Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.

497 (2007)
Docket No.05-1120
Granted:June 26, 2006
Argued:November 29, 2006
Decided:April 2, 2007
Annotation
Primary Holding
The Clean Air Act allows the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate
greenhouses gases because they qualify as air pollutants. Also, standing
requires showing a concrete harm that can be traced to the defendant and
remedied by the courts.

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Syllabus

SYLLABUS
OCTOBER TERM, 2006
MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia
circuit
No. 05–1120. Argued November 29, 2006—Decided April 2, 2007
Based on respected scientific opinion that a well-documented rise in global
temperatures and attendant climatological and environmental changes have
resulted from a significant increase in the atmospheric concentration of
“greenhouse gases,” a group of private organizations petitioned the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin regulating the emissions of
four such gases, including carbon dioxide, under §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air
Act, which requires that the EPA “shall by regulation prescribe … standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class … of new motor
vehicles … which in [the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or
contribute[s] to, air pollution … reasonably … anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1). The Act defines “air pollutant” to
include “any air pollution agent … , including any physical, chemical …
substance … emitted into … the ambient air.” §7602(g). EPA ultimately
denied the petition, reasoning that (1) the Act does not authorize it to issue
mandatory regulations to address global climate change, and (2) even if it
had the authority to set greenhouse gas emission standards, it would have
been unwise to do so at that time because a causal link between greenhouse
gases and the increase in global surface air temperatures was not
unequivocally established. The agency further characterized any EPA
regulation of motor-vehicle emissions as a piecemeal approach to climate
change that would conflict with the President’s comprehensive approach
involving additional support for technological innovation, the creation of
nonregulatory programs to encourage voluntary private-sector reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, and further research on climate change, and
might hamper the President’s ability to persuade key developing nations to
reduce emissions.
Petitioners, now joined by intervenor Massachusetts and other state and
local governments, sought review in the D. C. Circuit. Although each of the
three judges on the panel wrote separately, two of them agreed that the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the rulemaking
petition. One judge concluded that the Administrator’s exercise of
“judgment” as to whether a pollutant could “reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare,” §7521(a)(1), could be based on scientific
uncertainty as well as other factors, including the concern that unilateral U.
S. regulation of motor-vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to reduce
other countries’ greenhouse gas emissions. The second judge opined that
petitioners had failed to demonstrate the particularized injury to them that is
necessary to establish standing under Article III, but accepted the contrary
view as the law of the case and joined the judgment on the merits as the
closest to that which he preferred. The court therefore denied review.
Held:
1. Petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their
rulemaking petition. Pp. 12–23.
(a) This case suffers from none of the defects that would preclude it
from being a justiciable Article III “Controvers[y].” See,
e.g., Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1. Moreover, the proper construction of a
congressional statute is an eminently suitable question for federal-court
resolution, and Congress has authorized precisely this type of challenge to
EPA action, see 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1). Contrary to EPA’s argument,
standing doctrine presents no insuperable jurisdictional obstacle here. To
demonstrate standing, a litigant must show that it has suffered a concrete
and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant, and that a favorable decision will likely
redress that injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–
561. However, a litigant to whom Congress has “accorded a procedural right
to protect his concrete interests,” id., at 573, n. 7—here, the right to
challenge agency action unlawfully withheld, §7607(b)(1)—“can assert that
right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy,” ibid. Only one petitioner needs to have standing to authorize
review. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2. Massachusetts has a special position and interest
here. It is a sovereign State and not, as in Lujan, a private individual, and it
actually owns a great deal of the territory alleged to be affected. The
sovereign prerogatives to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, to
negotiate emissions treaties with developing countries, and (in some
circumstances) to exercise the police power to reduce motor-vehicle
emissions are now lodged in the Federal Government. Because congress has
ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing
applicable standards, §7521(a)(1), and has given Massachusetts a
concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious, §7607(b)(1), petitioners’ submissions as
they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards
of the adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both “actual”
and “imminent,” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560, and there is a “substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to take steps to
reduce that risk, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79. Pp. 12–17.
(b) The harms associated with climate change are serious and well
recognized. The Government’s own objective assessment of the relevant
science and a strong consensus among qualified experts indicate that global
warming threatens, inter alia, a precipitate rise in sea levels, severe and
irreversible changes to natural ecosystems, a significant reduction in winter
snowpack with direct and important economic consequences, and increases
in the spread of disease and the ferocity of weather events. That these
changes are widely shared does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the
outcome of this litigation. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S.
11, 24. According to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits, global sea levels
rose between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of
global warming and have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal
land. Remediation costs alone, moreover, could reach hundreds of millions of
dollars. Pp. 17–19.
(c) Given EPA’s failure to dispute the existence of a causal connection
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, its
refusal to regulate such emissions, at a minimum, “contributes” to
Massachusetts’ injuries. EPA overstates its case in arguing that its decision
not to regulate contributes so insignificantly to petitioners’ injuries that it
cannot be haled into federal court, and that there is no realistic possibility
that the relief sought would mitigate global climate change and remedy
petitioners’ injuries, especially since predicted increases in emissions from
China, India, and other developing nations will likely offset any marginal
domestic decrease EPA regulation could bring about. Agencies, like
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell swoop,
see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 489, but instead
whittle away over time, refining their approach as circumstances change and
they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to proceed,
cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202–203. That a first step might be
tentative does not by itself negate federal-court jurisdiction. And reducing
domestic automobile emissions is hardly tentative. Leaving aside the other
greenhouse gases, the record indicates that the U. S. transportation sector
emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Pp. 20–
21.
(d) While regulating motor-vehicle emissions may not by
itself reverse global warming, it does not follow that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps
to slow or reduce it. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 243, n. 15.
Because of the enormous potential consequences, the fact that a remedy’s
effectiveness might be delayed during the (relatively short) time it takes for
a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially irrelevant.
Nor is it dispositive that developing countries are poised to substantially
increase greenhouse gas emissions: A reduction in domestic emissions would
slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens
elsewhere. The Court attaches considerable significance to EPA’s espoused
belief that global climate change must be addressed. Pp. 21–23.
2. The scope of the Court’s review of the merits of the statutory issues is
narrow. Although an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is
not ordinarily subject to judicial review, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821,
there are key differences between nonenforcement and denials of
rulemaking petitions that are, as in the present circumstances, expressly
authorized. EPA concluded alternatively in its petition denial that it lacked
authority under §7521(a)(1) to regulate new vehicle emissions because
carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” under §7602, and that, even if it
possessed authority, it would decline to exercise it because regulation would
conflict with other administration priorities. Because the Act expressly
permits review of such an action, §7607(b)(1), this Court “may reverse [it if it
finds it to be] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,” §7607(d)(9). Pp. 24–25.
3. Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Act’s capacious definition
of “air pollutant,” EPA has statutory authority to regulate emission of such
gases from new motor vehicles. That definition—which includes “any air
pollution agent … , including any physical, chemical, … substance … emitted
into … the ambient air … ,” §7602(g) (emphasis added)—embraces all
airborne compounds of whatever stripe. Moreover, carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases are undoubtedly “physical [and] chemical …
substance[s].” Ibid. EPA’s reliance on postenactment congressional actions
and deliberations it views as tantamount to a command to refrain from
regulating greenhouse gas emissions is unavailing. Even if postenactment
legislative history could shed light on the meaning of an otherwise-
unambiguous statute, EPA identifies nothing suggesting that Congress meant
to curtail EPA’s power to treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants. The Court
has no difficulty reconciling Congress’ various efforts to promote interagency
collaboration and research to better understand climate change with the
agency’s pre-existing mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” that may
endanger the public welfare. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U. S. 120, 133, distinguished. Also unpersuasive is EPA’s argument that its
regulation of motor-vehicle carbon dioxide emissions would require it to
tighten mileage standards, a job (according to EPA) that Congress has
assigned to the Department of Transportation. The fact that DOT’s mandate
to promote energy efficiency by setting mileage standards may overlap with
EPA’s environmental responsibilities in no way licenses EPA to shirk its duty
to protect the public “health” and “welfare,” §7521(a)(1). Pp. 25–30.
4. EPA’s alternative basis for its decision—that even if it has statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this
time—rests on reasoning divorced from the statutory text. While the statute
conditions EPA action on its formation of a “judgment,” that judgment must
relate to whether an air pollutant “cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
§7601(a)(1). Under the Act’s clear terms, EPA can avoid promulgating
regulations only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to
climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. It has
refused to do so, offering instead a laundry list of reasons not to regulate,
including the existence of voluntary Executive Branch programs providing a
response to global warming and impairment of the President’s ability to
negotiate with developing nations to reduce emissions. These policy
judgments have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to climate change and do not amount to a reasoned justification
for declining to form a scientific judgment. Nor can EPA avoid its statutory
obligation by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate
change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to regulate at
this time. If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA
from making a reasoned judgment, it must say so. The statutory question is
whether sufficient information exists for it to make an endangerment finding.
Instead, EPA rejected the rulemaking petition based on impermissible
considerations. Its action was therefore “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” §7607(d)(9). On remand, EPA must ground its
reasons for action or inaction in the statute. Pp. 30–32.
415 F. 3d 50, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
549 U. S. ____ (2007)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO. 05-1120

MASSACHUSETTS, et al., PETITIONERS v. ENVIRON- MENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of
columbia circuit
[April 2, 2007]
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For
when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling
of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected
heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—of a
“greenhouse gas.”
Calling global warming “the most pressing environmental challenge of our
time,”[Footnote 1] a group of States,[Footnote 2] local governments,
[Footnote 3] and private organizations,[Footnote 4] alleged in a petition for
certiorari that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has abdicated its
responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of four
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide. Specifically, petitioners asked
us to answer two questions concerning the meaning of §202(a)(1) of the Act:
whether EPA has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles; and if so, whether its stated reasons for
refusing to do so are consistent with the statute.
In response, EPA, supported by 10 intervening States[Footnote 5] and six
trade associations,[Footnote 6] correctly argued that we may not address
those two questions unless at least one petitioner has standing to invoke our
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the serious
character of that jurisdictional argument and the absence of any conflicting
decisions construing §202(a)(1), the unusual importance of the underlying
issue persuaded us to grant the writ. 548 U. S. __ (2006).
I
 Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as added by Pub. L. 89–272, §101(8),
79 Stat. 992, and as amended by, inter alia, 84 Stat. 1690 and 91 Stat. 791,
42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), provides:
“The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time
revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable
to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare … .”[Footnote 7]
The Act defines “air pollutant” to include “any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological,
radioactive … substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air.” §7602(g). “Welfare” is also defined broadly: among other
things, it includes “effects on … weather … and climate.” §7602(h).
When Congress enacted these provisions, the study of climate change was
in its infancy.[Footnote 8] In 1959, shortly after the U. S. Weather Bureau
began monitoring atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, an observatory in
Mauna Loa, Hawaii, recorded a mean level of 316 parts per million. This was
well above the highest carbon dioxide concentration—no more than 300
parts per million—revealed in the 420,000-year-old ice-core record.[Footnote
9] By the time Congress drafted §202(a)(1) in 1970, carbon dioxide levels
had reached 325 parts per million.[Footnote 10]
In the late 1970’s, the Federal Government began devoting serious
attention to the possibility that carbon dioxide emissions associated with
human activity could provoke climate change. In 1978, Congress enacted the
National Climate Program Act, 92 Stat. 601, which required the President to
establish a program to “assist the Nation and the world to understand and
respond to natural and man-induced climate processes and their
implications,” id., §3. President Carter, in turn, asked the National Research
Council, the working arm of the National Academy of Sciences, to investigate
the subject. The Council’s response was unequivocal: “If carbon dioxide
continues to increase, the study group finds no reason to doubt that climate
changes will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be
negligible… . A wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too
late.”[Footnote 11]
Congress next addressed the issue in 1987, when it enacted the Global
Climate Protection Act, Title XI of Pub. L. 100–204, 101 Stat. 1407, note
following 15 U. S. C. §2901. Finding that “manmade pollution—the release of
carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and other trace gases into the
atmosphere—may be producing a long-term and substantial increase in the
average temperature on Earth,” §1102(1), 101 Stat. 1408, Congress directed
EPA to propose to Congress a “coordinated national policy on global climate
change,” §1103(b), and ordered the Secretary of State to work “through the
channels of multilateral diplomacy” and coordinate diplomatic efforts to
combat global warming, §1103(c). Congress emphasized that “ongoing
pollution and deforestation may be contributing now to an irreversible
process” and that “[n]ecessary actions must be identified and implemented
in time to protect the climate.” §1102(4).
Meanwhile, the scientific understanding of climate change progressed. In
1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a multinational
scientific body organized under the auspices of the United Nations, published
its first comprehensive report on the topic. Drawing on expert opinions from
across the globe, the IPCC concluded that “emissions resulting from human
activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of …
greenhouse gases [which] will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on
average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface.”[Footnote 12]
Responding to the IPCC report, the United Nations convened the “Earth
Summit” in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. The first President Bush attended and
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), a nonbinding agreement among 154 nations to reduce
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
for the purpose of “prevent[ing] dangerous anthropogenic [i.e., human-
induced] interference with the [Earth’s] climate system.”[Footnote 13] S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102–38, Art. 2, p. 5 (1992). The Senate unanimously ratified
the treaty.
Some five years later—after the IPCC issued a second comprehensive
report in 1995 concluding that “[t]he balance of evidence suggests there is a
discernible human influence on global climate”[Footnote 14]—the UNFCCC
signatories met in Kyoto, Japan, and adopted a protocol that assigned
mandatory targets for industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Because those targets did not apply to developing and heavily
polluting nations such as China and India, the Senate unanimously passed a
resolution expressing its sense that the United States should not enter into
the Kyoto Protocol. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25, 1997) (as
passed). President Clinton did not submit the protocol to the Senate for
ratification.
II
On October 20, 1999, a group of 19 private organizations[Footnote 15]
filed a rulemaking petition asking EPA to regulate “greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles under §202 of the Clean Air Act.” App. 5. Petitioners
maintained that 1998 was the “warmest year on record”; that carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are “heat trapping
greenhouse gases”; that greenhouse gas emissions have significantly
accelerated climate change; and that the IPCC’s 1995 report warned that
“carbon dioxide remains the most important contributor to [man-made]
forcing of climate change.” Id., at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
petition further alleged that climate change will have serious adverse effects
on human health and the environment. Id., at 22–35. As to EPA’s statutory
authority, the petition observed that the agency itself had already confirmed
that it had the power to regulate carbon dioxide. See id., at 18, n. 21. In
1998, Jonathan Z. Cannon, then EPA’s General Counsel, prepared a legal
opinion concluding that “CO2 emissions are within the scope of EPA’s
authority to regulate,” even as he recognized that EPA had so far declined to
exercise that authority. Id., at 54 (memorandum to Carol M. Browner,
Administrator (Apr. 10, 1998) (hereinafter Cannon memorandum)). Cannon’s
successor, Gary S. Guzy, reiterated that opinion before a congressional
committee just two weeks before the rulemaking petition was filed.
See id., at 61.
Fifteen months after the petition’s submission, EPA requested public
comment on “all the issues raised in [the] petition,” adding a “particular”
request for comments on “any scientific, technical, legal, economic or other
aspect of these issues that may be relevant to EPA’s consideration of this
petition.” 66 Fed. Reg. 7486, 7487 (2001). EPA received more than 50,000
comments over the next five months. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52924 (2003).
Before the close of the comment period, the White House sought
“assistance in identifying the areas in the science of climate change where
there are the greatest certainties and uncertainties” from the National
Research Council, asking for a response “as soon as possible.” App. 213. The
result was a 2001 report titled Climate Change: An Analysis of Some Key
Questions (NRC Report), which, drawing heavily on the 1995 IPCC report,
concluded that “[g]reenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere
as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and
subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising.”
NRC Report 1.
On September 8, 2003, EPA entered an order denying the rulemaking
petition. 68 Fed. Reg. 52922. The agency gave two reasons for its decision:
(1) that contrary to the opinions of its former general counsels, the Clean Air
Act does not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address global
climate change, see id., at 52925–52929; and (2) that even if the agency had
the authority to set greenhouse gas emission standards, it would be unwise
to do so at this time, id., at 52929–52931.
In concluding that it lacked statutory authority over greenhouse gases, EPA
observed that Congress “was well aware of the global climate change issue
when it last comprehensively amended the [Clean Air Act] in 1990,” yet it
declined to adopt a proposed amendment establishing binding emissions
limitations. Id., at 52926. Congress instead chose to authorize further
investigation into climate change. Ibid. (citing §§103(g) and 602(e) of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2652, 2703, 42 U. S. C.
§§7403(g)(1) and 7671a(e)). EPA further reasoned that Congress’ “specially
tailored solutions to global atmospheric issues,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52926—in
particular, its 1990 enactment of a comprehensive scheme to regulate
pollutants that depleted the ozone layer, see Title VI, 104 Stat. 2649, 42 U.
S. C. §§7671–7671q—counseled against reading the general authorization of
§202(a)(1) to confer regulatory authority over greenhouse gases.
EPA stated that it was “urged on in this view” by this Court’s decision
in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 (2000). In that
case, relying on “tobacco[’s] unique political history,” id., at 159, we
invalidated the Food and Drug Administration’s reliance on its general
authority to regulate drugs as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over an
“industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy,” ibid.
EPA reasoned that climate change had its own “political history”: Congress
designed the original Clean Air Act to address local air pollutants rather than
a substance that “is fairly consistent in its concentration throughout
the world’s atmosphere,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52927 (emphasis added); declined in
1990 to enact proposed amendments to force EPA to set carbon dioxide
emission standards for motor vehicles, ibid. (citing H. R. 5966, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990)); and addressed global climate change in other legislation,
68 Fed. Reg. 52927. Because of this political history, and because imposing
emission limitations on greenhouse gases would have even greater
economic and political repercussions than regulating tobacco, EPA was
persuaded that it lacked the power to do so. Id., at 52928. In essence, EPA
concluded that climate change was so important that unless Congress spoke
with exacting specificity, it could not have meant the agency to address it.
Having reached that conclusion, EPA believed it followed that greenhouse
gases cannot be “air pollutants” within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. (“It
follows from this conclusion, that [greenhouse gases], as such, are not air
pollutants under the [Clean Air Act’s] regulatory provisions …”). The agency
bolstered this conclusion by explaining that if carbon dioxide were an air
pollutant, the only feasible method of reducing tailpipe emissions would be
to improve fuel economy. But because Congress has already created
detailed mandatory fuel economy standards subject to Department of
Transportation (DOT) administration, the agency concluded that EPA
regulation would either conflict with those standards or be
superfluous. Id., at 52929.
Even assuming that it had authority over greenhouse gases, EPA explained
in detail why it would refuse to exercise that authority. The agency began by
recognizing that the concentration of greenhouse gases has dramatically
increased as a result of human activities, and acknowledged the attendant
increase in global surface air temperatures. Id., at 52930. EPA nevertheless
gave controlling importance to the NRC Report’s statement that a causal link
between the two “ ‘cannot be unequivocally established.’ ” Ibid. (quoting
NRC Report 17). Given that residual uncertainty, EPA concluded that
regulating greenhouse gas emissions would be unwise. 68 Fed. Reg. 52930.
The agency furthermore characterized any EPA regulation of motor-vehicle
emissions as a “piecemeal approach” to climate change, id., at 52931, and
stated that such regulation would conflict with the President’s
“comprehensive approach” to the problem, id., at 52932. That approach
involves additional support for technological innovation, the creation of
nonregulatory programs to encourage voluntary private-sector reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, and further research on climate change—not
actual regulation. Id., at 52932–52933. According to EPA, unilateral EPA
regulation of motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper the
President’s ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Id., at 52931.
III
Petitioners, now joined by intervenor States and local governments, sought
review of EPA’s order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.[Footnote 16] Although each of the three judges on the
panel wrote a separate opinion, two judges agreed “that the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under §202(a)(1) in denying
the petition for rule making.” 415 F. 3d 50, 58 (2005). The court therefore
denied the petition for review.
In his opinion announcing the court’s judgment, Judge Randolph avoided a
definitive ruling as to petitioners’ standing, id., at 56, reasoning that it was
permissible to proceed to the merits because the standing and the merits
inquiries “overlap[ped],” ibid. Assuming without deciding that the statute
authorized the EPA Administrator to regulate greenhouse gas emissions that
“in his judgment” may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), Judge Randolph concluded that the
exercise of that judgment need not be based solely on scientific evidence,
but may also be informed by the sort of policy judgments that motivate
congressional action. 415 F. 3d, at 58. Given that framework, it was
reasonable for EPA to base its decision on scientific uncertainty as well as on
other factors, including the concern that unilateral regulation of U. S. motor-
vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from other countries. Ibid.
Judge Sentelle wrote separately because he believed petitioners failed to
“demonstrat[e] the element of injury necessary to establish standing under
Article III.” Id., at 59 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).
In his view, they had alleged that global warming is “harmful to humanity at
large,” but could not allege “particularized injuries” to themselves. Id., at 60
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 562 (1992)). While he
dissented on standing, however, he accepted the contrary view as the law of
the case and joined Judge Randolph’s judgment on the merits as the closest
to that which he preferred. 415 F. 3d, at 60–61.
Judge Tatel dissented. Emphasizing that EPA nowhere challenged the
factual basis of petitioners’ affidavits, id., at 66, he concluded that at least
Massachusetts had “satisfied each element of Article III standing—injury,
causation, and redressability,” id., at 64. In Judge Tatel’s view, the
“ ‘substantial probability,’ ” id., at 66, that projected rises in sea level would
lead to serious loss of coastal property was a “far cry” from the kind of
generalized harm insufficient to ground Article III jurisdiction. Id., at 65. He
found that petitioners’ affidavits more than adequately supported the
conclusion that EPA’s failure to curb greenhouse gas emissions contributed
to the sea level changes that threatened Massachusetts’ coastal
property. Ibid. As to redressability, he observed that one of petitioners’
experts, a former EPA climatologist, stated that “ ‘[a]chievable reductions in
emissions of CO2 and other [greenhouse gases] from U. S. motor vehicles
would … delay and moderate many of the adverse impacts of global
warming.’ ” Ibid. (quoting declaration of Michael MacCracken, former
Executive Director, U. S. Global Change Research Program ¶5(e) (hereinafter
MacCracken Decl.), available in 2 Petitioners’ Standing Appendix in No. 03–
1361, etc., (CADC), p. 209 (Stdg. App.)). He further noted that the one-time
director of EPA’s motor-vehicle pollution control efforts stated in an affidavit
that enforceable emission standards would lead to the development of new
technologies that “ ‘would gradually be mandated by other countries around
the world.’ ” 415 F. 3d, at 66 (quoting declaration of Michael Walsh ¶¶7–8,
10, Stdg. App. 309–310, 311). On the merits, Judge Tatel explained at length
why he believed the text of the statute provided EPA with authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and why its policy concerns did not
justify its refusal to exercise that authority. 415 F. 3d, at 67–82.
IV
Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” Those two words confine “the business of federal courts to
questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968). It is therefore familiar
learning that no justiciable “controversy” exists when parties seek
adjudication of a political question, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), when
they ask for an advisory opinion, Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), see
also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 700, n. 33 (1997), or when the question
sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent
developments, California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308 (1893).
This case suffers from none of these defects.
The parties’ dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional
statute, a question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court. Congress
has moreover authorized this type of challenge to EPA action. See 42 U. S. C.
§7607(b)(1). That authorization is of critical importance to the standing
inquiry: “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). “In exercising this power, however, Congress must
at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury
to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.” Ibid. We will not, therefore,
“entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the
proper administration of the laws.” Id., at 581.
EPA maintains that because greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread
harm, the doctrine of standing presents an insuperable jurisdictional
obstacle. We do not agree. At bottom, “the gist of the question of standing”
is whether petitioners have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). As Justice Kennedy
explained in his Lujan concurrence:
“While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the
challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures
him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is not just an empty
formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both
that the parties before the court have an actual, as opposed to professed,
stake in the outcome, and that the legal questions presented … will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.” 504 U. S., at 581 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan holds that a litigant
must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury
that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that
injury. See id., at 560–561. However, a litigant to whom Congress has
“accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,” id., at 572, n.
7—here, the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld, §7607(b)
(1)—“can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy,” ibid. When a litigant is vested with a
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that
the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the
decision that allegedly harmed the litigant. Ibid.; see also Sugar Cane
Growers Cooperative of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F. 3d 89, 94–95 (CADC 2002)
(“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a procedural protection to which he
is entitled never has to prove that if he had received the procedure the
substantive result would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show
that the procedural step was connected to the substantive result”).
Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider
the petition for review. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006). We stress here, as did Judge Tatel
below, the special position and interest of Massachusetts. It is of
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign
State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.
Well before the creation of the modern administrative state, we recognized
that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction. As Justice Holmes explained in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907), a case in which Georgia sought to protect its
citizens from air pollution originating outside its borders:
“The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private
parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit
between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The
State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage
to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit
by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that
capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants
shall breathe pure air.”
Just as Georgia’s “independent interest … in all the earth and air within its
domain” supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does
Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.
Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999) (observing that in the federal
system, the States “are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or
political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty”). That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the
“territory alleged to be affected” only reinforces the conclusion that its stake
in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of
federal judicial power.
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign
prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with
China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers
to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592,
607 (1982) (“One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury
to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to
sue parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could,
would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers”).
These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government,
and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by
prescribing standards applicable to the “emission of any air pollutant from
any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the
Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U. S. C.
§7521(a)(1). Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant procedural
right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and
capricious. §7607(b)(1). Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is
entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.[Footnote 17]
With that in mind, it is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to
Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the
adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both “actual” and
“imminent.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is, moreover, a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested” will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79 (1978).
The Injury
The harms associated with climate change are serious and well
recognized. Indeed, the NRC Report itself—which EPA regards as an
“objective and independent assessment of the relevant science,” 68 Fed.
Reg. 52930—identifies a number of environmental changes that have
already inflicted significant harms, including “the global retreat of mountain
glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers
and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th
century relative to the past few thousand years … .” NRC Report 16.
Petitioners allege that this only hints at the environmental damage yet to
come. According to the climate scientist Michael MacCracken, “qualified
scientific experts involved in climate change research” have reached a
“strong consensus” that global warming threatens (among other things) a
precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the century, MacCracken Decl.
¶15, Stdg. App. 207, “severe and irreversible changes to natural
ecosystems,” id., ¶5(d), at 209, a “significant reduction in water storage in
winter snowpack in mountainous regions with direct and important economic
consequences,” ibid., and an increase in the spread of disease, id., ¶28, at
218–219. He also observes that rising ocean temperatures may contribute to
the ferocity of hurricanes. Id., ¶¶23–25, at 216–217.[Footnote 18]
That these climate-change risks are “widely shared” does not minimize
Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation. See Federal Election
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[W]here a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact’ ”). According to
petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose somewhere
between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global
warming. MacCracken Decl. ¶5(c), Stdg. App. 208. These rising seas have
already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. Id., at 196
(declaration of Paul H. Kirshen ¶5), 216 (MacCracken Decl. ¶23). Because the
Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal
property,” id., at 171 (declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom ¶4),[Footnote 19] it
has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner. The
severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next century:
If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes
that a significant fraction of coastal property will be “either permanently lost
through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and
flooding events.” Id., ¶6, at 172.[Footnote 20] Remediation costs alone,
petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of
dollars. Id., ¶7, at 172; see also Kirshen Decl. ¶12, at 198.[Footnote 21]
Causation
EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between man-
made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum,
therefore, EPA’s refusal to regulate such emissions “contributes” to
Massachusetts’ injuries.
EPA nevertheless maintains that its decision not to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so insignificantly to
petitioners’ injuries that the agency cannot be haled into federal court to
answer for them. For the same reason, EPA does not believe that any
realistic possibility exists that the relief petitioners seek would mitigate
global climate change and remedy their injuries. That is especially so
because predicted increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing
nations, particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal
domestic decrease.
 But EPA overstates its case. Its argument rests on the erroneous
assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can
never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise
would doom most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, like legislatures,
do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[A]
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind”). They instead
whittle away at them over time, refining their preferred approach as
circumstances change and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding
of how best to proceed. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202 (1947)
(“Some principles must await their own development, while others must be
adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations”). That a first step
might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that federal courts
lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step conforms to law.
And reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly a tentative step.
Even leaving aside the other greenhouse gases, the United States
transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere—according to the MacCracken affidavit, more than 1.7 billion
metric tons in 1999 alone. ¶30, Stdg. App. 219. That accounts for more than
6% of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions. Id., at 232 (Oppenheimer Decl.
¶3); see also MacCracken Decl. ¶31, at 220. To put this in perspective:
Considering just emissions from the transportation sector, which represent
less than one-third of this country’s total carbon dioxide emissions, the
United States would still rank as the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in
the world, outpaced only by the European Union and China.[Footnote 22]
Judged by any standard, U. S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to
petitioners, to global warming.
The Remedy
While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by
itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction
to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. See
also Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244, n. 15 (1982) (“[A] plaintiff
satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable
decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a
favorable decision will relieve his every injury”). Because of the enormity of
the potential consequences associated with man-made climate change, the
fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the
(relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an
older one is essentially irrelevant.[Footnote 23] Nor is it dispositive that
developing countries such as China and India are poised to increase
greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next century: A reduction in
domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no
matter what happens elsewhere.
 We moreover attach considerable significance to EPA’s “agree[ment] with
the President that ‘we must address the issue of global climate change,’ ” 68
Fed. Reg. 52929 (quoting remarks announcing Clear Skies and Global
Climate Initiatives, 2002 Public Papers of George W. Bush, Vol. 1, Feb. 14,
p. 227 (2004)), and to EPA’s ardent support for various voluntary emission-
reduction programs, 68 Fed. Reg. 52932. As Judge Tatel observed in dissent
below, “EPA would presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought
emissions reductions would have no discernable impact on future global
warming.” 415 F. 3d, at 66.
In sum—at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits—the rise
in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will
continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, though
remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if
petitioners received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners
have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.
[Footnote 24]
V
The scope of our review of the merits of the statutory issues is narrow. As
we have repeated time and again, an agency has broad discretion to choose
how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its
delegated responsibilities. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–845 (1984). That discretion is at its
height when the agency decides not to bring an enforcement action.
Therefore, in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985), we held that an
agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily subject
to judicial review. Some debate remains, however, as to the rigor with which
we review an agency’s denial of a petition for rulemaking.
There are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and
an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action. See American
Horse Protection Assn., Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F. 2d 1, 3–4 (CADC 1987). In
contrast to nonenforcement decisions, agency refusals to initiate rulemaking
“are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis,
and subject to special formalities, including a public explanation.” Id., at 4;
see also 5 U. S. C. §555(e). They moreover arise out of denials of petitions for
rulemaking which (at least in the circumstances here) the affected party had
an undoubted procedural right to file in the first instance. Refusals to
promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review
is “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.” National Customs Brokers &
Forwarders Assn of America, Inc. v. United States, 883 F. 2d 93, 96 (CADC
1989).
EPA concluded in its denial of the petition for rulemaking that it lacked
authority under 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1) to regulate new vehicle emissions
because carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” as that term is defined in
§7602. In the alternative, it concluded that even if it possessed authority, it
would decline to do so because regulation would conflict with other
administration priorities. As discussed earlier, the Clean Air Act expressly
permits review of such an action. §7607(b)(1). We therefore “may reverse
any such action found to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” §7607(d)(9).
VI
On the merits, the first question is whether §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act
authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles in the event that it forms a “judgment” that such emissions
contribute to climate change. We have little trouble concluding that it does.
In relevant part, §202(a)(1) provides that EPA “shall by regulation prescribe
… standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in [the
Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U. S. C.
§7521(a)(1). Because EPA believes that Congress did not intend it to regulate
substances that contribute to climate change, the agency maintains that
carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” within the meaning of the provision.
The statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading. The Clean Air Act’s sweeping
definition of “air pollutant” includes “any air pollution agent or combination
of such agents, including any physical, chemical … substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air … .” §7602(g)
(emphasis added). On its face, the definition embraces all airborne
compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through the
repeated use of the word “any.”[Footnote 25] Carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt “physical [and]
chemical … substance[s] which [are] emitted into … the ambient air.” The
statute is unambiguous.[Footnote 26]
Rather than relying on statutory text, EPA invokes postenactment
congressional actions and deliberations it views as tantamount to a
congressional command to refrain from regulating greenhouse gas
emissions. Even if such postenactment legislative history could shed light on
the meaning of an otherwise-unambiguous statute, EPA never identifies any
action remotely suggesting that Congress meant to curtail its power to treat
greenhouse gases as air pollutants. That subsequent Congresses have
eschewed enacting binding emissions limitations to combat global warming
tells us nothing about what Congress meant when it amended §202(a)(1) in
1970 and 1977.[Footnote 27] And unlike EPA, we have no difficulty
reconciling Congress’ various efforts to promote interagency collaboration
and research to better understand climate change[Footnote 28] with the
agency’s pre-existing mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” that may
endanger the public welfare. See 42 U. S. C. §7601(a)(1). Collaboration and
research do not conflict with any thoughtful regulatory effort; they
complement it.[Footnote 29]
EPA’s reliance on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, is
similarly misplaced. In holding that tobacco products are not “drugs” or
“devices” subject to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation pursuant
to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), see 529 U. S., at 133, we found
critical at least two considerations that have no counterpart in this case.
First, we thought it unlikely that Congress meant to ban tobacco products,
which the FDCA would have required had such products been classified as
“drugs” or “devices.” Id., at 135–137. Here, in contrast, EPA jurisdiction
would lead to no such extreme measures. EPA would
only regulate emissions, and even then, it would have to delay any action “to
permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving
appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance,” §7521(a)(2). However
much a ban on tobacco products clashed with the “common sense” intuition
that Congress never meant to remove those products from
circulation, Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 133, there is nothing
counterintuitive to the notion that EPA can curtail the emission of substances
that are putting the global climate out of kilter.
Second, in Brown & Williamson we pointed to an unbroken series of
congressional enactments that made sense only if adopted “against the
backdrop of the FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that it lacked
authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco.” Id., at 144. We can point to
no such enactments here: EPA has not identified any congressional action
that conflicts in any way with the regulation of greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles. Even if it had, Congress could not have acted against a
regulatory “backdrop” of disclaimers of regulatory authority. Prior to the
order that provoked this litigation, EPA had never disavowed the authority to
regulate greenhouse gases, and in 1998 it in fact affirmed that it had such
authority. See App. 54 (Cannon memorandum). There is no reason, much
less a compelling reason, to accept EPA’s invitation to read ambiguity into a
clear statute.
EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from
motor vehicles because doing so would require it to tighten mileage
standards, a job (according to EPA) that Congress has assigned to DOT. See
68 Fed. Reg. 52929. But that DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses
EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with
protecting the public’s “health” and “welfare,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), a
statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote
energy efficiency. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, §2(5), 89 Stat.
874, 42 U. S. C. §6201(5). The two obligations may overlap, but there is no
reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations
and yet avoid inconsistency.
While the Congresses that drafted §202(a)(1) might not have appreciated
the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did
understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and
scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The
broad language of §202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence. See Pennsylvania Dept.
of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute
can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s
capacious definition of “air pollutant,” we hold that EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.
VII
The alternative basis for EPA’s decision—that even if it does have statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this
time—rests on reasoning divorced from the statutory text. While the statute
does condition the exercise of EPA’s authority on its formation of a
“judgment,” 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1), that judgment must relate to whether
an air pollutant “cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” ibid. Put
another way, the use of the word “judgment” is not a roving license to ignore
the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion within defined
statutory limits.
If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the
agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor
vehicles. Ibid. (stating that “[EPA] shall by regulation prescribe … standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class of new motor
vehicles”). EPA no doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing,
content, and coordination of its regulations with those of other agencies. But
once EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or
inaction must conform to the authorizing statute. Under the clear terms of
the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its
discretion to determine whether they do. Ibid. To the extent that this
constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or
the President, this is the congressional design.
EPA has refused to comply with this clear statutory command. Instead, it
has offered a laundry list of reasons not to regulate. For example, EPA said
that a number of voluntary executive branch programs already provide an
effective response to the threat of global warming, 68 Fed. Reg. 52932, that
regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to negotiate
with “key developing nations” to reduce emissions, id., at 52931, and that
curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would reflect “an inefficient, piecemeal
approach to address the climate change issue,” ibid.
Although we have neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate these
policy judgments, it is evident they have nothing to do with whether
greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. Still less do they
amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment.
In particular, while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that
authority does not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws. In the
Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Congress authorized the State
Department—not EPA—to formulate United States foreign policy with
reference to environmental matters relating to climate. See §1103(c), 101
Stat. 1409. EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in question
here after consultation with the State Department. Congress did direct EPA
to consult with other agencies in the formulation of its policies and rules, but
the State Department is absent from that list. §1103(b).
Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty
surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it would
therefore be better not to regulate at this time. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52930–
52931. If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from
making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to
global warming, EPA must say so. That EPA would prefer not to regulate
greenhouse gases because of some residual uncertainty—which, contrary to
Justice Scalia’s apparent belief, post, at 5–8, is in fact all that it said, see 68
Fed. Reg. 52929 (“We do not believe . . . that it would be either effective or
appropriate for EPA to establish [greenhouse gas] standards for motor
vehicles at this time” (emphasis added))—is irrelevant. The statutory
question is whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment
finding.
In short, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide
whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action
was therefore “arbitrary, capricious, … or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 42 U. S. C. §7607(d)(9)(A). We need not and do not reach the question
whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether
policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a
finding. Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844 (1984). We hold only that EPA must ground its
reasons for action or inaction in the statute.
VIII
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1 Pet. for Cert. 22.
Footnote 2 California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington.
Footnote 3 District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, and
Baltimore.
Footnote 4 Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety,
Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental
Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for
Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U. S. Public
Interest Research Group.
Footnote 5 Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Dakota, Texas, and Utah.
Footnote 6 Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National Automobile
Dealers Association, Engine Manufacturers Association, Truck Manufacturers
Association, CO2 Litigation Group, and Utility Air Regulatory Group.
Footnote 7 The 1970 version of §202(a)(1) used the phrase “which
endangers the public health or welfare” rather than the more-protective
“which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
See §6(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1690. Congress
amended §202(a)(1) in 1977 to give its approval to the decision in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F. 2d 1, 25 (CADC 1976) (en banc), which held that the
Clean Air Act “and common sense … demand regulatory action to prevent
harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise
inevitable.” See §401(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91
Stat. 791; see also H. R. Rep. No. 95–294, p. 49 (1977).
Footnote 8 The Council on Environmental Quality had issued a report in
1970 concluding that “[m]an may be changing his weather.” Environmental
Quality: The First Annual Report 93. Considerable uncertainty remained in
those early years, and the issue went largely unmentioned in the
congressional debate over the enactment of the Clean Air Act. But see 116
Cong. Rec. 32914 (1970) (statement of Sen. Boggs referring to Council’s
conclusion that “[a]ir pollution alters the climate and may produce global
changes in temperature”).
Footnote 9 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2001: Synthesis Report, pp. 202–203 (2001). By drilling through
thick Antarctic ice sheets and extracting “cores,” scientists can examine ice
from long ago and extract small samples of ancient air. That air can then be
analyzed, yielding estimates of carbon dioxide levels. Ibid.
Footnote 10 A more dramatic rise was yet to come: In 2006, carbon dioxide
levels reached 382 parts per million, see Dept. of Commerce, National
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Mauna Loa CO2 Monthly Mean Data,
www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/co2_mm_mlo.dat (all Internet materials
as visited Mar. 29, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file), a level
thought to exceed the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at
any point over the past 20-million years. See Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Technical Summary of Working Group I Report 39 (2001).
Footnote 11 Climate Research Board, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A
Scientific Assessment, p. vii (1979).
Footnote 12 IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, p. xi (J.
Houghton, G. Jenkins, & J. Ephraums eds. 1991).
Footnote 13 The industrialized countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC
undertook to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by
the year 2000. No immediate restrictions were imposed on developing
countries, including China and India. They could choose to become Annex I
countries when sufficiently developed.
Footnote 14 IPCC, Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change, p.
4.
Footnote 15 Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power
Technologies, Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries
Assn.; Clements Environmental Corp.; Environmental Advocates;
Environmental and Energy Study Institute; Friends of the Earth; Full Circle
Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode Island; Greenpeace USA;
International Center for Technology Assessment; Network for Environmental
and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ; New Jersey
Environmental Watch; New Mexico Solar Energy Assn.; Oregon
Environmental Council; Public Citizen; Solar Energy Industries Assn.; The SUN
DAY Campaign. See App. 7–11.
Footnote 16 See 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1) (“A petition for review of action of
the Administrator in promulgating any … standard under section 7521 of this
title … or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be
filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia”).
Footnote 17 The Chief Justice accuses the Court of
misreading Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907), see post,
at 3–4 (dissenting opinion), and “devis[ing] a new doctrine of state
standing,” id., at 15. But no less an authority than Hart & Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System understands Tennessee Copper as a
standing decision. R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 290 (5th ed. 2003). Indeed, it
devotes an entire section to chronicling the long development of cases
permitting States “to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign
interests—i.e., public or governmental interests that concern the state as a
whole.” Id., at 289; see, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 240–241
(1901) (finding federal jurisdiction appropriate not only “in cases involving
boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their inhabitants, and in cases
directly affecting the property rights and interests of a state,” but also when
the “substantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the towns and
cities of the state” are at stake).
Drawing on Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), and Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592 (1982)
(citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901)), The Chief Justice claims that
we “overloo[k] the fact that our cases cast significant doubt on a State’s
standing to assert a quasi-sovereign interest … against the Federal
Government.” Post, at 5. Not so. Mellon itself disavowed any such broad
reading when it noted that the Court had been “called upon to adjudicate,
not rights of person or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain,
[and] not quasi sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened.” 262 U. S.,
at 484–485 (emphasis added). In any event, we held
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 447 (1945), that there is a
critical difference between allowing a State “to protect her citizens from the
operation of federal statutes” (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a
State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).
Massachusetts does not here dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its
citizens; it rather seeks to assert its rights under the Act. See
also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U. S. 1, 20 (1995) (holding that Wyoming
had standing to bring a cross-claim against the United States to vindicate its
“ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests which are ‘independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain’ ” (quoting Tennessee
Copper, 206 U. S., at 237)).
Footnote 18 In this regard, MacCracken’s 2004 affidavit—drafted more than
a year in advance of Hurricane Katrina—was eerily prescient. Immediately
after discussing the “particular concern” that climate change might cause an
“increase in the wind speed and peak rate of precipitation of major tropical
cyclones (i.e., hurricanes and typhoons),” MacCracken noted that “[s]oil
compaction, sea level rise and recurrent storms are destroying
approximately 20–30 square miles of Louisiana wetlands each year. These
wetlands serve as a ‘shock absorber’ for storm surges that could inundate
New Orleans, significantly enhancing the risk to a major urban population.”
¶¶24–25, Stdg. App. 217.
Footnote 19 “For example, the [Massachusetts Department of Conservation
and Recreation] owns, operates and maintains approximately 53 coastal
state parks, beaches, reservations, and wildlife sanctuaries. [It] also owns,
operates and maintains sporting and recreational facilities in coastal areas,
including numerous pools, skating rinks, playgrounds, playing fields, former
coastal fortifications, public stages, museums, bike trails, tennis courts,
boathouses and boat ramps and landings. Associated with these coastal
properties and facilities is a significant amount of infrastructure, which the
Commonwealth also owns, operates and maintains, including roads,
parkways, stormwater pump stations, pier[s], sea wal[l] revetments and
dams.” Hoogeboom Decl. ¶4, at 171.
Footnote 20 See also id., at 179 (declaration of Christian Jacqz) (discussing
possible loss of roughly 14 acres of land per miles of coastline by 2100);
Kirshen Decl. ¶10, at 198 (alleging that “[w]hen such a rise in sea level
occurs, a 10-year flood will have the magnitude of the present 100-year flood
and a 100-year flood will have the magnitude of the present 500-year
flood”).
Footnote 21 In dissent, The Chief Justice dismisses petitioners’ submissions
as “conclusory,” presumably because they do not quantify Massachusetts’
land loss with the exactitude he would prefer. Post, at 8. He therefore asserts
that the Commonwealth’s injury is “conjectur[al].” See ibid. Yet the likelihood
that Massachusetts’ coastline will recede has nothing to do with whether
petitioners have determined the precise metes and bounds of their soon-to-
be-flooded land. Petitioners maintain that the seas are rising and will
continue to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead to the loss of
Massachusetts’ sovereign territory. No one, save perhaps the dissenters,
disputes those allegations. Our cases require nothing more.
Footnote 22 See UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the
Period 1990–2004 and Status of Reporting 14 (2006) (hereinafter Inventory
Data) (reflecting emissions from Annex I countries); UNFCCC, Sixth
Compilation and Synthesis of Initial National Communications from Parties
not Included in Annex I to the Convention 7–8 (2005) (reflecting emissions
from non-Annex I countries); see also Dept. of Energy, Energy Information
Admin., International Energy Annual 2004, H.1co2 World Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980–2004
(Table), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls.
Footnote 23 See also Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92
F. 3d 1228, 1234 (CADC 1996) (“The more drastic the injury that government
action makes more likely, the lesser the increment in probability to establish
standing”); Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F. 2d 328, 329 (CA7
1993) (“[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or
controversy—to take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical—provided
of course that the relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability”).
Footnote 24 In his dissent, The Chief Justice expresses disagreement with
the Court’s holding in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669, 687–688 (1973). He does not,
however, disavow this portion of Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court:
“Unlike the specific and geographically limited federal action of which the
petitioner complained in Sierra Club [v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972)], the
challenged agency action in this case is applicable to substantially all of the
Nation’s railroads, and thus allegedly has an adverse environmental impact
on all the natural resources of the country. Rather than a limited group of
persons who used a picturesque valley in California, all persons who utilize
the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air, could
claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental groups here. But we
have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because
many people suffer the same injury. Indeed some of the cases on which we
relied in Sierra Club demonstrated the patent fact that persons across the
Nation could be adversely affected by major governmental actions. To deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are
also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that
conclusion.” Ibid. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
It is moreover quite wrong to analogize the legal claim advanced by
Massachusetts and the other public and private entities who challenge EPA’s
parsimonious construction of the Clean Air Act to a mere “lawyer’s game.”
See post, at 14.
Footnote 25 See Department of Housing and Urban
Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125, 131 (2002) (observing that “ ‘any’ …
has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever
kind” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).
Footnote 26 In dissent, Justice Scalia maintains that because greenhouse
gases permeate the world’s atmosphere rather than a limited area near the
earth’s surface, EPA’s exclusion of greenhouse gases from the category of air
pollution “agent[s]” is entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U. S. 837 (1984).
See post, at 11–13. EPA’s distinction, however, finds no support in the text of
the statute, which uses the phrase “the ambient air” without distinguishing
between atmospheric layers. Moreover, it is a plainly unreasonable reading
of a sweeping statutory provision designed to capture “any physical,
chemical … substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air.” 42 U. S. C. §7602(g). Justice Scalia does not (and cannot)
explain why Congress would define “air pollutant” so carefully and so
broadly, yet confer on EPA the authority to narrow that definition whenever
expedient by asserting that a particular substance is not an “agent.” At any
rate, no party to this dispute contests that greenhouse gases both “ente[r]
the ambient air” and tend to warm the atmosphere. They are therefore
unquestionably “agent[s]” of air pollution.
Footnote 27 See United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960) (holding
that “the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one”); see also Cobell v. Norton, 428 F. 3d
1070, 1075 (CADC 2005) (“[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only
oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight”).
Footnote 28 See, e.g., National Climate Program Act, §5, 92 Stat. 601, 15 U.
S. C. §2901 et seq. (calling for the establishment of a National Climate
Program and for additional climate change research); Global Climate
Protection Act of 1987, §1103, 101 Stat. 1408–1409 (directing EPA and the
Secretary of State to “jointly” develop a “coordinated national policy on
global climate change” and report to Congress); Global Change Research Act
of 1990, Tit. I, 104 Stat. 3097, 15 U. S. C. §§2921–2938 (establishing for the
“development and coordination of a comprehensive and integrated United
States research program” to aid in “understand[ing] … human-induced and
natural processes of climate change”); Global Climate Change Prevention Act
of 1990, 104 Stat. 4058, 7 U. S. C. §6701 et seq. (directing the Dept. of
Agriculture to study the effects of climate change on forestry and
agriculture); Energy Policy Act of 1992, §§1601–1609, 106 Stat. 2999, 42 U.
S. C. §§13381–13388 (requiring the Secretary of Energy to report on
information pertaining to climate change).
Footnote 29 We are moreover puzzled by EPA’s roundabout argument that
because later Congresses chose to address stratospheric ozone pollution in a
specific legislative provision, it somehow follows that greenhouse gases
cannot be air pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Air Act.

Attorneys
James Milkey (plaintiffs)
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