Evolving Partnerships:

U.S. Alliances and the

Pacific Islands

Grace Price

February 2025
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

About the Project 2049 Institute

The Project 2049 Institute is a nonprofit research organization focused on promoting American values and security
interests in the Indo-Pacific region. We specialize in open-source research using Chinese language sources to inform
policy debate and advance public education. Our core mission is to create and disseminate knowledge that makes the
region more peaceful and prosperous.

The Project 2049 Institute is located in Arlington, Virginia. We are a 501(c)3 tax-exempt organization. Independent
and non-partisan, our research is focused on bolstering human rights and national security.

Our research is supported by private foundations, U.S. government agencies, like-minded governments,
corporations, and individual donors. Learn more by visiting our website at https://project2049.net/about/.

Cover Image: USNS Mercy provides medical care to Fijian patients during Pacific Partnership. (Source: U.S. Navy/Mass
Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mark El-Rayes)

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the various staff members of the Project 2049 Institute whose review made this
report possible, included but not limited to Jennifer Hong Whetsell, Michael Mazza, Griffin Allen, and interns
Ella Russell and Sheng-Wen Cheng.

2
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................................................................4

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................................6

SETTING THE SCENE ................................................................................................................................................................8

THE UNITED STATES ......................................................................................................................................................................................8

JAPAN ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................8
AUSTRALIA .........................................................................................................................................................................................................9
NEW ZEALAND ..................................................................................................................................................................................................9
PARTNERS IN THE BLUE PACIFIC............................................................................................................................................................ 10

CHALLENGES HINDERING EFFECTIVE COOPERATION ...................................................................................... 11

MISMATCHED DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY.......................................................................................................................................... 11

THE REGION’S LIMITED INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY...................................................................................................................... 12
BALANCING REGIONAL AUTONOMY WITH EXTERNAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS ................................................................. 13

RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................................................................... 15

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................................................ 17

3
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Executive Summary
The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have been the dominant powers in the Pacific
Islands region, which includes 14 Pacific Island countries (PICs), several U.S. territories, and the U.S.
state of Hawaii, for several decades. However, they now find themselves competing for influence with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC, China), which has increased its influence in the region through
a combination of economic diplomacy and political maneuvering. With the PICs playing an outsized
role in the competition with China, the United States and its allies need to adjust their foreign assistance
strategies to create more meaningful, enduring, and sustainable partnerships. Evolving Partnerships: U.S.
Alliances and the Pacific Islands will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific,
and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.

All four countries—the region’s traditional partner states—play a unique and vital role. They engage in
a range of activities, including providing development aid, conducting capacity building programs, and
addressing transnational threats. In 2022, they, along with the United Kingdom, launched the Partners
in the Blue Pacific (PBP) initiative to bring together like-minded countries to establish a developmental
framework that aligned with the Blue Pacific Continent vision, the PICs’ long-term approach to
navigating regional challenges.

However, obstacles remain in the way that hinder the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
from effectively cooperating in the region. One such challenge is the mismatched definitions of security
between the PICs and its traditional partner states. The PICs use an expanded definition of security that
includes human security and identifies climate change as the single greatest threat to their livelihoods.
Traditional partner states, on the other hand, primarily view security in the Pacific through a geopolitical
lens. Another challenge is the region’s ability to absorb aid. Due to the wide range of development
challenges the PICs face and the rapid influx of aid, they end up accepting more aid offers than they can
reasonably manage. This can have the unintended consequence of straining local bureaucracies, which
can lead to gaps in accountability and transparency. Finally, the PICs continue to raise concerns about
larger powers bypassing regional institutions in pursuit of their strategic interests. The PICs highly value
their ability to present a unified voice on policies that impact the region and worry increased
competition will threaten that unity.

These three challenges are substantial but far from insurmountable. With a new administration in power
in the United States, the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies have an opportunity to seek new forms
of cooperation and collaboration in the provision of aid. Working together more effectively, they can

4
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

jumpstart development across the PICs while ensuring China does not infringe on important allied
interests in the region.

Recommendations:

1. Reform aid delivery models to reduce burdens on small bureaucracies

The aid and security environment in the Pacific is filled with many projects, large and small, that can
clog up administrative channels. The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand should take
measures aimed at streamlining their aid delivery models to relieve some of the pressure on Pacific Island
bureaucracies.

2. Maintain human development assistance as a significant portion of foreign assistance

The human security challenges in the Pacific are broad and require adequate attention and resources;
however, there has been a steady decline in aid commitments to human development initiatives, like
education and health. Traditional partner states need to ensure meeting human development goals
remains a priority in the Pacific.

3. Be more proactive in communicating at the national and grassroots levels

The United States and its allies should consult frequently with both PIC governments and citizenries to
provide updates on policies that affect the islands and to seek guidance and feedback as the allies develop
new policies. By prioritizing regular dialogue, they would show respect for the PICs’ sovereignty and
earn more credibility in the eyes of aid recipients.

4. Realize the potential of the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative

Almost three years after the implementation of the PBP initiative, it remains unclear how PBP plans to
implement its promises. All four partner countries play a significant role in the region independently
and each country brings unique strengths, advantages, and resources to the table that, when pooled,
could have an amplified impact in the region. They should elevate the PBP as the primary mechanism
through which they disperse aid to the region to ensure the initiative lives up to its stated
transformational nature.

5
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Introduction
The Pacific Islands region, which includes 14 Pacific Island countries (PICs), several U.S. territories, and
the U.S. state of Hawaii, has seen renewed interest from its large traditional partners—the United States,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—in recent years. All four countries have strategic and economic
stakes in the region. The exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of the PICs are among the world’s richest in
terms of marine resources. 1.4 million metric tons of tuna are caught in their waters annually, supplying
more than 30% of the global market for tuna.1 The PICs reside over large deep-sea mineral deposits,
which hold an estimated value of up to U.S.$20 trillion, that can fuel the global transition to green
energy.2 They also sit on major trade and communication routes and have served and continue to serve
as points from which to project military force.3 The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
have been the dominant, and uncontested, players in the region until recently.

Through a combination of economic diplomacy and political maneuvering, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC, China) has increased its influence in the region. In 2024, China was the region’s second
largest bilateral aid partner, right behind Australia.4 Over nearly two decades, China has committed
$10.6 billion to the region and funded major infrastructure projects ranging from communications to
roads to ports.5 In 2022, China and the Solomon Islands shocked the region by signing a security
agreement that allows Chinese forces to be stationed in the Solomon Islands, raising concerns about
China’s expanding military presence in the region.6

The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand now find themselves competing against the PRC
for sway. All four traditional partners have increased the number of high-level leaders’ meetings and
expanded the size and scope of aid. Australia, the region’s top donor, accounts for 38% of total overseas
development finance (ODF). Japan accounts for 8% and New Zealand and the United States account
for 7% each. In sum, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States contributed 60% of the
region’s ODF.7

However, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. While
China is a relatively new donor and its ODF only accounts for about 9% of the total, China’s approach
to assistance is very appealing to the PICs. When China initially entered the scene, it funded large, flashy
projects. In 2018, China shifted its strategy and began to fund smaller, more targeted projects involving
more grants, rather than loans, and community-level outreach that aligned with the interests of both
PIC leaders and PIC populations.8 In other words, China has become a more effective competitor. If
the challenges facing the PICs remain unresolved, China will continue to make inroads.

6
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

This report comes at a critical time. As of early February 2025, the United States has placed a 90-day
freeze on foreign assistance and the United States’ principal agency for foreign assistance, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), has been dismantled, casting doubt over all U.S.-
funded aid and development work. The Trump administration now has a unique opportunity to
revamp the United States’ approach to foreign aid; done right, it can ensure better outcomes both for
the United States and for aid recipients, including for PIC partners. With the PICs playing an outsized
role in the competition with China, the United States and its allies need to adjust their foreign assistance
strategies to create more meaningful, enduring, and sustainable partnerships. This report will map out
efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles
that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their
collective engagement with the PICs.

7
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Setting the Scene

There are overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral aid and security frameworks in the Pacific,
which makes for a complex security and development environment. The United States, Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand—each with a unique approach to foreign assistance and each with unique strengths
and weaknesses—all play pivotal roles in the region.

The United States

The United States has significant economic and military interests in Micronesia, which comprises
approximately 2,000 islands distributed among six countries in the northwest of the Pacific Island
region. In 1982, the United States signed the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the Republic
of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of Palau.
Under these agreements, the United States provides economic assistance to these states (Freely
Associated States or FAS) in exchange for exclusive military access.9 In March 2024, the United States
renewed the COFAs for the next 20 years, committing to provide $7.1 billion in economic assistance
over that timeframe.10

The United States’ engagement in the region dwindled following the end of the Cold War but picked
up again during the first Trump administration. President Donald Trump established a Pacific Islands
directorship in the National Security Council and was the first U.S. president to host leaders of the
Freely Associated States at the White House.11 Engagement further increased under the Biden
administration. The United States announced its first-ever Pacific Partnership Strategy, hosted two
summits for the region’s leading decision-making body, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and opened
new embassies in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. U.S. programing on illegal, unreported,
and unregulated (IUU) fishing; climate change; security cooperation; development financing; and
digital connectivity were also expanded.12

Japan
Japan’s development assistance is grounded in the Pacific Islands Leaders Meetings (PALM), the leader
level meetings that have occurred every three years between Japan and the PICs since 1997. These
meetings have led to Japan’s commitment to a wide range of socioeconomic assistance, including
education, health, fisheries, and climate resilience.13 Between 2008 and 2021, Japan’s climate-related
ODF made up 36% of its total support to the PICs, which was higher than any other partner state.14

8
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Japan’s engagement with the region took on more traditional security elements when it launched the
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) in 2016, which recognizes the PICs as playing an important
role in realizing Japan’s vision for a prosperous and stable Indo-Pacific.15 While defense cooperation has
been limited, Japan held its first Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue in 2021 and has conducted more
port calls, goodwill trainings (small-scale, basic training opportunities between armed forces), and
capacity building programs.16 While some PICs have raised concerns that Japan’s policies seek to exclude
China from the region, the PICs generally see Japan as a trusted partner and welcome its greater support
and cooperation in climate change, maritime security, and economic development initiatives.17

Australia
A member of the PIF, Australia is the region’s most generous development partner. In 2017, Australia
outlined a ‘step-up’ policy to reenergize its relationship with the PICs. Under this policy, Australia
launched the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) to provide grant and
loan financing to build high quality infrastructure.18 Australia also invested in renewable energy, climate
and disaster resilience, and the Pacific Fusion Centre, a regional organization that provides training to
Pacific security officials and monitors regional security challenges.19 Australia then set an important legal
precedent for small island nations threatened by rising sea levels when, in November 2023, it signed the
Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty, a legally binding treaty in which the parties recognize that “the
statehood and sovereignty of Tuvalu will continue,” even in the face of the worst climate impacts. Under
this agreement, Australia will support Tuvalu’s efforts to create climate-resilient infrastructure and
initially allow up to 280 Tuvaluans a year a choice to live, study, and work in Australia.20

Stated in its 2024 National Defence Strategy, Australia considers the Pacific Islands region to be “vital
to Australia’s security and prosperity.” Securing a role as the “partner of choice” in security cooperation
remains a core principle for Australia.21 At the end of 2024, Australia unveiled a series of initiatives: a
$118 million deal to help the Solomon Islands expand its police force, a treaty with Nauru in which
Nauru agrees to not enter any security agreements without consulting Canberra first, and funding for a
National Rugby League team in Papua New Guinea tied to a security agreement. 22

New Zealand
New Zealand, also a member of the PIF, has placed great emphasis on soft power and public diplomacy
in its engagement with the PICs. New Zealand launched its ‘Pacific Reset’ in March 2018 to pursue
relationships based on “partnership, friendship, and mutual benefit.” There was a 30% budgetary
increase to support diplomatic and development activities, and ten new diplomatic positions were

9
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

created in the Pacific (Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Honolulu). 23
60% of New Zealand’s development budget is geared to the Pacific, and half of its global climate change-
related development assistance is dedicated to the Pacific.24

On the security front, New Zealand focuses heavily on improving maritime security and addressing
transnational threats, such as transnational crime, cybercrime, and climate change. In 2024, New
Zealand committed nearly $30 million to support sustainable Pacific fisheries, including addressing IUU
fishing, by investing in capacity and capability support, regional capacity and coordination, training
programs, and data monitoring.25 However, New Zealand is also seeking to expand military ties with its
Pacific neighbors. In June 2023, New Zealand signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Fiji to
strengthen military training and maritime security, address disaster and humanitarian response
coordination, and combat climate change.26

Partners in the Blue Pacific

The United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom launched the Partners in
the Blue Pacific (PBP) in June 2022 as an informal organization to bring together like-minded countries
to establish a developmental framework that aligned with the PIF’s Blue Pacific Continent vision, the
region’s long-term approach to navigating regional challenges.27 PBP countries and France committed
$55 million to the Pacific Humanitarian Warehousing Program to enhance countries’ crisis responses
and prepare them better for disasters. PBP countries worked together with Pacific Island partners to
organize the Pacific Cyber Capacity Building and Coordination Conference (P4C) in October 2023 to
bring together relevant stakeholders, pool resources, and share best practices to address and counter
cyber threats. They also committed $22 million to support an ocean and fisheries research vessel for
Pacific countries, which will provide research for addressing climate change impacts on Pacific oceans
and fisheries.28

10
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Challenges Hindering Effective Cooperation

Despite renewed attention in the form of increased aid commitments and diplomatic gestures,
improvements in the PICs’ development outcomes remain a mixed bag. Adult literacy rates have
increased from 87.6% in 1990 to 94.2% in 2022, but the region is struggling to realize their gender
equality milestones in other aspects. Life expectancy has risen from 64 years in 1980 to 72 in 2022, but
six PICs have unstainable debt and are rated at a high rate of debt distress.29 It is little wonder that they
welcome Chinese assistance and have signaled their reluctance to sign onto agreements or align with
policies that seem to exclude China. China diversifies their aid pool, and China aligns its aid with the
interests of the PICs. China’s actions are seen as proactive, while in recent years the actions of the United
States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have been seen as reactive.

Even so, the PICs do not want to reduce their ties with their traditional partners. China’s methods of
gaining favor in the region have not escaped criticism from the PICs. For example, China’s security
agreement with the Solomon Islands was scrutinized for the way it transpired, accomplished through
secret bilateral negotiations rather than with transparency with the PIF.30 The PICs instead seek
relationships that prioritize their interests and see them as equal partners, not just as recipient states. The
challenges laid out over the next few pages are not new, but if the United States, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand fail to address them now, they could risk jeopardizing their standings in the region and
their long-term strategic interests.

Mismatched Definitions of Security

In 2018, the PIF’s Boe Declaration promulgated an expanded concept of security that includes human
security, environmental security, transnational crime, and cybersecurity. While it recognized the reality
of “an increasingly complex regional security environment…and a dynamic geopolitical environment
leading to an increasingly crowded and complex region,” it declared climate change as the “single greatest
threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific.”31 In order to address this
global issue that threatens their very existence, they look to others for assistance. The PICs prefer to take
a “friends to all and enemies to none” approach; they will pursue engagement that aligns with their
national interests and eschew aligning with one or more external powers against another. They have
often criticized regional policies or initiatives from traditional partners that they believe exclude China.
Many in the region believe external powers’ dominant security narratives lead them to neglect the PICs’
human development priorities.32

11
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

To be sure, traditional partners have often pursued policies that align with the values and development
goals of the PICs. Japan’s assistance has generally supported recipient nations’ development goals, and
Australia places combating climate at the top of its agenda in the Pacific.33 However, as geopolitical
tensions continue to rise, the PICs grow more concerned their own security interests will be pushed
aside.

Australia’s involvement in the trilateral security partnership with the United States and United
Kingdom, also known as AUKUS, will provide the Australian navy with nuclear-powered (but not
nuclear-armed) submarines for the first time, and New Zealand’s increased interest in joining the
trilateral partnership, has raised concerns in the Pacific about their commitments to a nuclear-free
Pacific. The United States’ recent changes to its climate policies and foreign assistance puts it at odds
with its Pacific partners. In his first day back in office, President Trump signed executive orders reversing
the Biden administration’s policies on climate change. He pulled the United States out of the Paris
Agreement, initiated plans to open up federal and public lands to oil drilling, and halted approvals of
new wind farms.34 Japan also has seen fit to tread lightly with its FOIP strategy, which brought Japan’s
security outline more in-line with that of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Japan sought
support for its FOIP strategy at PALM 8 in 2018, but to no avail. Since 2023, Japan has stopped using
the term with the PICs and has found they are more receptive to supporting individual parts of the
FOIP, such as supporting a rules-based order, than to embracing the entire concept.35

The Region’s Limited Institutional Capacity

The Pacific is the most aid-reliant region in the world; ODF equals about 14% of an average Pacific
economy’s GDP, which is the highest for any region.36 Due to the wide range of development challenges
the PICs face, they struggle with prioritization and end up accepting more aid offers than they can
reasonably manage. This can have the unintended consequence of straining local bureaucracies, which
have limited administrative capacity. For each additional project a country takes on, small bureaucracies
are laden with more administrative burdens. For example, as of 2018, Kiribati’s twelve-person Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development was expected to oversee more than three hundred aid projects
from over twenty donors, in addition to managing the ministry’s many other responsibilities.37

The straining of local bureaucracies can also lead to gaps in accountability and transparency. Officials’
limited time and resources are further divided as they have to accommodate many foreign visits and
missions as development partners wish to visit with them to discuss ongoing projects or sign new
agreements.38 As officials rush to accommodate foreign visits and external timelines, they may forgo
public consultation as they hurry to complete agreements. Additionally, in the past, donors would have

12
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

coordinated foreign assistance through a centralized foreign ministry with clear communication and
procedures. However, these processes have been obscured due to donor pressure and donors are now
entering into bilateral agreements with multiple ministries and agencies of recipient countries, which
creates a complex network of projects and reduces effective oversight.39

While Chinese aid has certainly created concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability, it
has also been attractive, in part, due to its flexibility. China affixes fewer compliance requirements and
has more relaxed governance, human rights, and environmental accountability standards, so Pacific
governments have more control over the aid. To make their aid models more competitive, the United
States and its allies in the region have taken some steps to make aid more flexible without sacrificing
accountability measures, such as providing direct budgetary support over project-based support. As
competition with China deepens, the United States and its allies must be careful to ensure that aid is
designed not just to counter Beijing but to foster meaningful change.

Balancing Regional Autonomy with External Strategic Interests

To the PICs, outside powers vying for influence in the region is nothing new. After World War II,
Australia, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United States formed the South Pacific
Commission (SPC) to set the regional agenda and promote the advancement of the Pacific Islands. In
response, Pacific Islanders created the South Pacific Forum (SPF) in 1971, now known as the PIF, to
exercise regional agency as they were frustrated by the lack of inclusion in the SPC. The PICs use their
regional organizations, such as the PIF, to manage their relations with larger powers and to advance their
interests on the world stage. Engaging with larger powers, the PICs have successfully negotiated several
critical achievements for the region, including establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the South
Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga) and achieving a limit on global warming to below 1.5 degrees in the 2015
Paris Agreement.40

However, the PICs are still being left out of conversations between larger powers concerning the region.
The PBP has been criticized for largely ignoring the Pacific Islands’ regional institutions and for
consulting PIC governments only a few days before it was announced. The PICs also criticize PBP as a
way for larger countries to marginalize China, which goes against the PICs “friends of all” stance. Some
have also claimed PBP nations made the same mistakes China made in placing geopolitical interests over
regional autonomy when China tried to launch the China-Pacific Island Countries Disaster
Management Cooperation Mechanism and the China-Pacific Islands Center for Disaster Risk
Reduction Cooperation in 2023, but only included countries that had diplomatic relations with
China.41 While open criticism of their aid partners is rare, Pacific Island leaders have occasionally spoken

13
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

out about their partners’ aid practices. Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka of Fiji stated he will reject “help
from nations who donate aid and expect compliance,” such as in choosing between the United States
and China.42

Pacific Island countries are geographically, linguistically, culturally, and economically diverse, but are
united by their shared development challenges. However, the region itself has at times struggled to
maintain regional unity. The cohesion of the Pacific Islands Forum took a hit when Kiribati withdrew
from the body in 2022.43 Kiribati’s opposition leader, Tessie Lambourne, raised concerns that China
had pressured the Kiribati president, Taneti Maamu, to withdraw.44 The withdrawal did not last long,
however, and Kiribati rejoined PIF six months later. Nevertheless, for a time, it did threaten the region’s
ability to speak with one voice, which has been crucial for dealing effectively with external powers.

14
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Recommendations
These three challenges are substantial, but far from insurmountable. As the United States updates its
approach to foreign assistance, it and its Indo-Pacific allies have an opportunity seek new forms of
cooperation and collaboration in the provision of aid. Working together more effectively, they can
jumpstart development across the PICs while ensuring China does not infringe on important allied
interests in the region.

1. Reform aid delivery models to reduce burdens on small bureaucracies

The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand already provide the bulk of aid to the region, but
they seem likely to increase dispersals to dilute the impact of Chinese assistance. However, with new aid
comes the risk of straining local bureaucracies. The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
should take measures aimed at streamlining their aid delivery models to relieve some of the pressure on
Pacific Island bureaucracies.

They should start by examining the number and size of their current programs. While there are many
donors in the region, their individual contributions can be fairly minor, such as funding for small one-
off projects. These projects may be beneficial, but they can also clog administrative channels. To
minimize the administrative burden on recipient countries, the traditional partner states should work
to fold smaller projects into larger ones. They should also cut programs that are not achieving their stated
goals and reallocate that money to underfunded sectors or to scalable programs that are achieving their
stated outcomes.

The partners should jointly coordinate their aid delivery or aid management and avoid duplicative
efforts. They should also consider joint reporting missions to reduce the time local officials are taken
away from their other duties.

2. Maintain human development assistance as a significant portion of foreign assistance

For many of the traditional partner states, development assistance has traditionally been a significant
part of their engagement with the PICs. However, in recent years, there has been less emphasis placed
on human development initiatives like health, education, and climate resilience. Between 2020 and
2022, there was a decline in aid committed to the health sector, from $845 million to $465 million. Aid
commitments to education peaked in 2011 and began to steadily decline with only a slight increase in
2022.45 Through the 2010s, there was a steady increase in ODF dedicated to infrastructure development

15
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

versus human development.46 The International Monetary Fund estimates climate resilient
infrastructure in the PICs requires $1 billion annually, but PIF countries only receive $220 million each
year.47

Traditional partner states need to ensure meeting human development goals remains a priority in the
Pacific. China’s strategic and military ambitions for the region have taken center stage over the last
decade, and while it is crucial to address the threat China poses, the human security challenges in the
Pacific are broad and require adequate attention and resources. Human development assistance should
also not be underestimated as an important way to boost soft power. If the trend in decreased aid in
sectors like education and health continues, then regional growth and development can stagnate and
lead to further problems down the road.

3. Be more proactive in communicating at the national and grassroots levels

The United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand should make greater efforts to consult the PICs
when implementing policies that impact the region. A common criticism of initiatives like the Partners
in the Blue Pacific is that larger powers are not adequately seeking the opinions of the countries they say
they are trying to help. The allies should consult frequently with PIC governments to provide updates
on policies that affect the islands and to seek guidance and feedback as the allies develop new policies.

Engagement should also extend past political leaders’ meetings to include greater outreach with local
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, and traditional leaders. Embassies should be
provided the resources they need to increase interactions with local communities. Effective two-way
communication is necessary to explain the priorities of traditional partner states and to ensure that
projects align with the realities on the ground. By prioritizing regular dialogue with both PIC
governments and PIC citizenries, the United States and its allies would show respect for the PICs’
sovereignty and earn more credibility in the eyes of aid recipients.

4. Realize the potential of the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative

In the first year, PBP nations made progress on some of its flagship programs, such as hosting the
inaugural Pacific Cyber Capacity Building and Coordination Conference in 2023, contributing to the
Pacific Humanitarian Warehousing Program, and hosting two ministerial meetings.48 However,
progress seems to have slowed. During an address to the United Nations in September 2023, President
of the Marshall Islands David Kabua welcomed the early efforts of PBP but also called for efforts to go
beyond making headlines.49 Almost three years after the implementation of the initiative, it remains

16
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

unclear how PBP plans to implement its promises. Pacific Island countries have fallen victim to
unfulfilled promises in the past, so the skepticism around the initiative is not completely groundless.

All four partner countries play a significant role in the region independently and each country brings
unique strengths, advantages, and resources to the table that, when pooled, could have an amplified
impact in the region. Therein lies the potential for the PBP to be truly transformational. But the PICs
are not yet convinced the initiative will live up to that potential. Going forward, the United States, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand should elevate the PBP as the primary mechanism through which they
disperse aid to the region, all the while regularly communicating with PIC communities about the PBP’s
work. Should the allies fail to do so, they risk undermining both achievements to date and efforts to
create genuine relationships.

Sudden reductions in aid can have immediate real-world effects for the PICs, given their heavy reliance
on foreign assistance. The PBP can mitigate those risks, as resource pooling and joint coordination have
the added benefits of sharing the burdens in tackling formidable problems.

Conclusion
Changing administrations can offer a positive opportunity for countries to re-evaluate existing policies
against their priorities, but it can also cause uncertainties and disruptions. The PICs recognize that all
traditional partner states have increased their engagements with them in the last decade. However, they
will be watching closely to see if the engagement continues, sustains, and increases, as China also steps
in to meet their needs. While the impacts of the United States’ global foreign assistance freeze are still
unfolding, China is already swooping in to fill the void left by the United States. The United States,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand must not take their attention off the Pacific Islands during this
critical time. Today, the region’s traditional partners and the PICs experience challenges that hinder
more effective security and aid cooperation. However, all four partner states must continue to play an
important role, bilaterally and collectively, and achieve great successes in addressing the region’s needs.

17
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

ENDNOTES

1
“Sustaining Pacific Island Fisheries,” Conservation International, accessed December 11, 2024,
https://www.conservation.org/projects/sustaining-pacific-island-fisheries.

2
Nick Bainton and Emika Skryzpek, “Pacific nations are extraordinarily rich in critical minerals. But mining them may take
a terrible toll,” The Conversation, August 3, 2022, https://theconversation.com/pacific-nations-are-extraordinarily-rich-in-
critical-minerals-but-mining-them-may-take-a-terrible-toll-187172; Georgina Lancaster, “Conflicting interests and
geopolitical competition in Pacific deep sea mining,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 26, 2024,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/conflicting-interests-and-geopolitical-competition-in-pacific-deep-sea-mining/.

3
Mihai Sora, Jessica Collins, and Meg Keen, “The Great Game in the Pacific Islands,” The Lowy Institute, August 2024,
https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/great-game-in-the-pacific-islands/.

4
Alexandre Dayant, Riley Duke, Nasirra Ahsan, Roland Rajah, and Hervé Lemahieu, “Pacific Aid Map: 2024 Key
Findings Report,” The Lowy Institute, November 19, 2024, 7, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/analysis/2024/key-
findings/.

5
“Pacific Aid Map,” The Lowy Institute, accessed February 13, 2025
https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/map/?donors=china.

6
Joseph Hammond, “China’s Security Agreement with the Solomon Islands,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 6, no. 8
(November-December 2023): 105-106 , https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/14/2003340194/-1/-
1/1/VIEW%20HAMMOND%20-%20JIPA.PDF.

7
The Lowy Institute, “Pacific Aid Map.”

8
Alexandre Dayant, Riley Duke, Gilliane de Gorostiza, and Roland Rajah, “Pacific Aid Map: 2023 Key Findings Report,”
The Lowy Institute, 2023, October 21, 2023, 5, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/Lowy-Institute-
Pacific-Aid-Map-Key-Findings-Report-2023.pdf; Dayant, Duke, Ahsan, Rajah, and Lemahieu, “Pacific Aid Map: 2024
Key Findings Report,” 9.

9
“The Compacts of Free Association,” Congressional Research Service, April 25, 2024,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194.

10
“Interior Department Applauds Renewed Economic Assistance for Compacts of Free Association” U.S. Department of
the Interior, March 11, 2024, https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-department-applauds-renewed-economic-
assistance-compacts-free-association.

11
Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, “Trump’s relations with the Blue Pacific,” The Lowy Institute, December 20, 2024,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-s-relations-blue-pacific.

12
The White House, “FACT SHEET: Following Through on the U.S.-Pacific Islands Partnership 53rd Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting in Nuku’Alofa, Tonga August 26-30, 2024,” The American Presidency Project, August 27,
2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/08/27/fact-sheet-following-through-on-the-
u-s-pacific-islands-partnership-53rd-pacific-islands-forum-pif-leaders-meeting-in-nukualofa-tonga-august-26-30-2024/;
and “The Pacific Islands: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, November 7, 2024,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11208.

18
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

13
Hideyuki Shiozawa, “US-Japan Development Cooperation for Stability and Prosperity,” East-West Center, June 29,
2022, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/us-japan-development-cooperation-stability-and-prosperity-in-the-
pacific-islands-region.

14
Dayant, Duke, de Gorostiza, and Rajah, “Pacific Aid Map: 2023 Key Findings Report,” 9.

15
“Japan and the Pacific Islands countries with Professor Koga Kei, Shiozawa Hideyuki and Euan Graham,” International
Institute for Strategic Studies, July 31, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/podcasts/japan-memo/2024/08/japan-and-the-pacific-
islands-countries/.

16
Minda Pollmann, “PALM10: Japan’s Chance to Engage with Pacific Island Countries,” RAND, December 19, 2023,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/palm10-japans-chance-to-engage-with-pacific-island.html; “Japan
deploys self-defense fleet to Indo-Pacific with eye on China,” Kyodo News, June 18, 2022,
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/06/d4162f53763f-japan-deploys-msdf-fleet-to-indo-pacific-with-eye-on-
china.html; and Aizawa Riho, “Japanese Ministry of Defense’s “Defense Diplomacy”,” National Institute for Defense
Studies, July 22, 2024, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary342e.pdf.

17
Associated Press, “Pacific island leaders agree to enhance Japan’s role in region amid growing China influence,” VOA,
July 18, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/pacific-island-leaders-agree-to-enhance-japan-s-role-in-region-amid-growing-
china-influence/7703084.html.

18
Dayant, Duke, de Gorostiza, and Rajah, “Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map: 2023 Key Findings Report,” 7.

19
“Stepping up Australia’s Engagement with Our Pacific Family,” Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
September 2019, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/stepping-up-australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-
family.pdf.

20
“Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union,” Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed February 12, 2025,
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty.pdf; Pat Conroy, “The Falepili Union: A
Pacific response to the greatest global challenges,” The Lowy Institute, August 28, 2024,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/falepili-union-pacific-response-greatest-global-challenges.

21
“National Defence Strategy,” Australian Government Defence, April 17, 2024,
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-
program.

Victoria Kim, “Three Deals in 12 Days: How Australia Is Countering China in the Pacific,” The New York Times,
22

December 20, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/20/world/australia/australia-china-pacific-deals.html.

23
Anna Powles, “Identity, national security and influence: The ‘Pacific Reset’ and shaping New Zealand’s relations with
the Pacific islands,” Development Bulletin, February 2021, https://pacificsecurity.net/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/DB82_Part6.pdf.

Rouben Azizian, “New Zealand and Pacific Security: Re-engagement in the Face of Strategic Competition,” in Strategic
24

Competition and Security Cooperation in the Blue Pacific, ed. Deon Canyon (Honolulu, HI: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies, 2022), 54, https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Blue-Pacific-Security-03-
Azizian-NZPacificSecurity-1.pdf; and Winston Peters, “The Pacific family of nations - the changing security outlook,”

19
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

New Zealand Government, May 13, 2024, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pacific-family-nations-changing-security-

outlook.

25
Wintson Peters and Shane Jones, “NZ support for sustainable Pacific fisheries,” New Zealand Government, July 23,
2024, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-support-sustainable-pacific-fisheries.

26
Christopher Cottrell, “New Zealand and Fiji strike defence deal amid rising Pacific tensions,” The Guardian, June 14,
2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/14/new-zealand-and-fiji-strike-defence-deal-amid-rising-pacific-
tensions; Tim Fish, “How New Zealand is trying to expand military relations with its Pacific Islands neighbors,” Breaking
Defense, July 24, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/how-new-zealand-is-trying-to-expand-military-relations-
with-its-pacific-island-neighbors/; and Andrew Little, “New Zealand and Fiji strengthen defence relationship,” New
Zealand Government, June 14, 2023, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-and-fiji-strengthen-defence-
relationship.

27
Cherry Hitkari, “PacNet #13 – Revamping Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative,” Pacific Forum, March 1, 2024,
https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-13-revamping-partners-in-the-blue-pacific-initiative/.

28
“Readout of The Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) Ministerial,” U.S. Department of State, September 22, 2023,
https://2021-2025.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/readout-of-pbp-ministerial.

29
“2024 Regional Human Development Report: A Complex Landscape of Progress and Challenges – Pacific Island
Countries,” United Nations Development Programme, April 5, 2024, https://www.undp.org/pacific/press-releases/2024-
regional-human-development-report-complex-landscape-progress-and-challenges; and Gordon Peake and Meghan
Sullivan, “In the Pacific, Aid Should Be About More than Competition with China,” United States Institute of Peace,
October 17, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/pacific-aid-should-be-about-more-competition-china.

30
Derek Grossman, “China’s Pacific Push is Backfiring,” RAND, July 26, 2022,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/07/chinas-pacific-push-is-backfiring.html.

31
“Boe Declaration on Regional Security,” Pacific Islands Forum, September 5, 2018,
https://forumsec.org/publications/boe-declaration-regional-security.

32
Meg Keen and Mihai Sora, “Looking through a Pacific Islands lens: Access, accountability, and alignment in global
engagements,” The Lowy Institute, December 12, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/looking-through-
pacific-islands-lens-access-accountability-alignment-global.

33
Darshana M. Baruah, “The Contradiction at the Heart of U.S. Policy Toward the Pacific Islands,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, September 15, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Europe-
GeoEcon-Pacific_Islands.pdf.

34
Lisa Friedman, Brad Plumer, Rebecca F. Elliott, and Eric Lipton, “Trump Signs Orders to Promote Fossil Fuels and End
Climate Policies,” The New York Times, January 20, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/20/climate/trump-
emergency-oil-gas.html.

35
International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Japan and the Pacific Island Countries.”

36
Dayant, Duke, de Gorostiza, and Rajah, “Pacific Aid Map: 2023 Key Findings Report,” 3.

20
Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Jonathan Pryke and Alexandre Dayant, “How to Improve Aid to Pacific Island Nations,” Council of Foreign Relations,
37

October 16, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/how-improve-aid-pacific-island-nations.

38
Keen and Sora, “Looking through a Pacific Islands lens.”

39
Keen and Sora, “Looking through a Pacific Islands lens.”

40
William Waqavakatoga and Joanne Wallis, “International Relations of the Pacific Islands,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia
of International Studies, November 22, 2023, 4-16,
https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190846626-e-796.

41
Greg Fry, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, and Terence Wesley-Smith, “‘Partners in the Blue Pacific’ initiative rides roughshod
over established regional processes,” DevPolicy Blog, July 5, 2022, https://devpolicy.org/pbp-initiative-rides-roughshod-
over-regional-processes-20220705/; and William Waqavakatoga and Joanne Wallis, “Security In Context: Regionalism in
The Pacific Islands,” Security in Context, May 28, 2024, https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/regionalism-in-the-
pacific-islands.

42
Dominic Giannini, “The donor you know: Fiji PM rejects money with strings,” Canberra Times, October 17, 2023,
https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/8388784/the-donor-you-know-fiji-pm-rejects-money-with-strings/.

43
“Kiribati withdraws from Pacific Islands Forum in blow to regional body,” The Guardian, July 10, 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/10/kiribati-withdraws-from-pacific-islands-forum-pif-micronesia.

44
“China influence Kiribati exit from Pacific Islands Forum, MP claims,” The Guardian, July 11, 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/12/china-influenced-kiribati-exit-from-pacific-islands-forum-mp-claims.

45
The Lowy Institute, “Pacific Aid Map.”

46
Dayant, Duke, Ahsan, Rajah, and Lemahieu, “Pacific Aid Map: 2024 Key Findings Report,” 12-13.

47
Manal Fouad, Todd Schneider, Natalija Novta, Gemma Preston, and Sureni Weerathunga, “Unlocking Access to
Climate Finance for Pacific Island Countries,” International Monetary Fund, September 30, 2021, https://blog-
pfm.imf.org/en/pfmblog/2021/09/unlocking-access-to-climate-finance-for-pacific-islands-countries.

48
“Pacific Humanitarian Warehousing Program factsheet,” Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February
13, 2024, https://www.dfat.gov.au/development/pacific-humanitarian-warehousing-program-factsheet.

49
“UNGA78: Dialogue with, not just about, the Pacific – RMI President Kabua to 78th UN General Assembly,” Pacific
Islands Forum, September 21, 2023. https://forumsec.org/publications/unga78-dialogue-not-just-about-pacific-rmi-
president-kabua-78th-un-general-assembly.

21