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Mathematics in Mind

Vitaly Kiryushchenko

Diagrams, Visual
Imagination,
and Continuity in
Peirce’s Philosophy
of Mathematics
Mathematics in Mind

Series Editor
Marcel Danesi, University of Toronto, Canada

Editorial Board
Louis H. Kauffman, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Dragana Martinovic, University of Windsor, Canada
Yair Neuman, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Rafael Núñez, University of California, San Diego, USA
Anna Sfard, University of Haifa, Israel
David Tall, University of Warwick, United Kingdom
Kumiko Tanaka-Ishii, University of Tokyo, Japan
Shlomo Vinner, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
The monographs and occasional textbooks published in this series tap directly into
the kinds of themes, research findings, and general professional activities of the
Fields Cognitive Science Network, which brings together mathematicians,
philosophers, and cognitive scientists to explore the question of the nature of
mathematics and how it is learned from various interdisciplinary angles. Themes
and concepts to be explored include connections between mathematical modeling
and artificial intelligence research, the historical context of any topic involving the
emergence of mathematical thinking, interrelationships between mathematical
discovery and cultural processes, and the connection between math cognition and
symbolism, annotation, and other semiotic processes. All works are peer-reviewed
to meet the highest standards of scientific literature.
Vitaly Kiryushchenko

Diagrams, Visual
Imagination, and Continuity
in Peirce’s Philosophy
of Mathematics
Vitaly Kiryushchenko
Department of Philosophy
York University
Toronto, ON, Canada

ISSN 2522-5405     ISSN 2522-5413 (electronic)

Mathematics in Mind
ISBN 978-3-031-23244-2    ISBN 978-3-031-23245-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23245-9

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
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I think there could be a mathematical
explanation of how bad your tie is
Russell Crowe as John Nash in Ron
Howard’s “A Beautiful Mind”

Just as we say that a body is in motion, and

not that motion is in a body, we ought to say
that we are in thought and not that thoughts
are in us
Charles S. Peirce

v
Preface

This book is about the relationship between necessary reasoning and visual experi-
ence in Charles S. Peirce’s mathematical philosophy. As we know from Kant, vision
(as a part of human sensibility) and responsiveness to reasons (as supported by our
overall conceptual capacities) are related with one another through the imagination.
Mathematics is an expression of this relation based on our most fundamental intu-
itions about space and time. Peirce went a long way to develop Kant’s take on the
nature of mathematics, and central to his interpretation of it was the idea of dia-
grammatic reasoning. According to Peirce, in practicing this kind of reasoning, one
treats diagrams not simply as external auxiliary tools, but rather as immediate visu-
alizations of the very process of the reasoning itself. As thinking, in this case, is
actually performed by means of manipulating images, seeing and understanding
become one.
Defining diagrammatic reasoning as a fusion of vision and thought helped Peirce
find some intriguing answers to questions concerning the nature of mathematical
knowledge, many of which could not even be as much as formulated by Kant. What
is the role of observation in mathematics? How can we explain the fact that mathe-
matical reasoning is deductive and, at the same time, capable of the discovery of
new truths? How is mathematical necessity reconciled with the essential incom-
pleteness and indeterminacy of our ordinary visual experience? What exactly is the
relationship between the particularity of a mathematical diagram and the generality
of the meaning it conveys—and what is the difference (if any) between mathematics
and natural languages in this respect? and so on. Peirce’s life-long, if unsystematic,
work on the issues that are associated with the questions above created an intricate
conceptual puzzle. The driving motivation of the research this book represents is to
show that tackling this puzzle requires something more than sifting through the
wealth of available historical and philosophical material. While the histories of sci-
ence and philosophy do provide separate bits of the puzzle, Peirce’s theoretical
interests, by his own admission, appear to be closely intertwined with certain facts
of his personal history. In light of this, without considering relevant biographical
data, in Peirce’s case, there is no way to understand how the pieces of the puzzle
actually fit together. Due to the plurality of data impelled by the task, this book is

vii
viii Preface

addressed both to those specializing in philosophy, mathematics, and intellectual

history, and to a wider audience that might be interested in what all those areas have
in common in Peirce’s case.
Last but not least, this book could not have been written without the support of
family, friends, and colleagues. I am especially grateful to Eric Bredo, Marcel
Danesi, Paul Forster, Nathan Houser, Henry Jackman, Steven Levine, Mark Migotti,
and James O’Shea. Of great importance for the book were my conversations with
Kathleen Hull and Thomas L. Short. As to the biographical part of the study, I am
indebted to Joseph Brent, the author of the most comprehensive biography of
Charles Peirce to date. Finally, I owe much more than I can tell to my constant com-
panions and interlocutors, Zina Uzdenskaya and Gleb Kiryushchenko.

Toronto, ON, Canada Vitaly Kiryushchenko

Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1
Two Approaches to Diagrams������������������������������������������������������������������     1
Peirce’s Vision������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     4
What This Book Is About������������������������������������������������������������������������     6
2 
Meritocratism, Errors, and The Community of Inquiry���������������������   11
Meritocratism and Science����������������������������������������������������������������������    11
Peirce’s Maxim����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    15
3 Logic and Mathematics ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   21
Self-Interpretation, Conventionality, and The Language of Thought������    21
Two Kinds of Minds��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    25
Fast, Pedestrian, or Both?������������������������������������������������������������������������    29
4 Peirce’s Transcendental Deduction and Beyond: Categories,
Community, and the Self ������������������������������������������������������������������������   31
The Kantian Legacy ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    31
Peirce’s Deduction ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    35
Some Consequences of Peirce’s Deduction: The Community
of Inquiry and the Self ����������������������������������������������������������������������������    39
Fixation of Belief ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    43
5 Sign Relation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49
Kinds of Relations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    49
Degenerate Relations ������������������������������������������������������������������������������    58
Categories and Math��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    60
6 One, Two, Three ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   63
Abstractions, Things, and Signs��������������������������������������������������������������    63
Modes of Being����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    68

ix
x Contents

7 
Iconicity, Novelty, and Necessity������������������������������������������������������������   75
Novelty����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    75
Necessity��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    77
Inference as Observation��������������������������������������������������������������������������    81
8 
The General and the Particular��������������������������������������������������������������   85
Mathematical Diagrams as Icons ������������������������������������������������������������    85
The General and the Particular Fused Together��������������������������������������    88
9 
Diagrams Between Images and Schemata ��������������������������������������������   93
The Role of Mathematical Cognition in Kant’s 1st Critique ������������������    93
Diagrams and Schemata��������������������������������������������������������������������������    98
10 Existential Graphs ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 105
Visualized Inferences and Inferential Visuality ��������������������������������������   105
The Graphs Explained������������������������������������������������������������������������������   107
The Graphs Contextualized����������������������������������������������������������������������   112
11 
Iconicity, Similarity, and Habitual Action �������������������������������������������� 117
Three Formulations of the Maxim ����������������������������������������������������������   117
What Is Likeness?������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   120
12 
Mapping Philosophy: Peirce’s Quincuncial Projection������������������������ 125
Language and Maps ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   125
Quincuncial Map��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   128
The Virtual ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   138
13 L’image-Mouvement, Mathematically Sublime,
and the Perception of Totality ���������������������������������������������������������������� 141
Synthetic Unity vs. Dynamic Totality������������������������������������������������������   141
The Mathematically Sublime������������������������������������������������������������������   144
The Architectonic Role of Mathematics��������������������������������������������������   149
14 
The Metaphysics of Continuity�������������������������������������������������������������� 153
Reality, Generality, and Continuity����������������������������������������������������������   153
The Analytic Approach to Continuity: Cantor and Dedekind������������������   156
Continuity and Infinitesimals������������������������������������������������������������������   159
15 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 163

References �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 167

Chapter 1
Introduction

Two Approaches to Diagrams

Mathematicians apply visual diagrams1 in their work all the time, whether they want
to make special use of Euclid’s fifth postulate, to prove Fermat’s principle, or to
extract an algorithm that defines the seemingly chaotic movement of pigeons pick-
ing bread crumbs from the ground. Using diagrams helps mathematicians identify
patterns that solve particular mathematical problems by making the force of neces-
sary reasoning visually given. An important question, though, is: What is it that a
mathematician actually manages to see when using visual diagrammatic representa-
tions? A mathematical diagram, a paradigmatic use of which is exemplified in
Euclid’s Elements, is an individual image that instantiates necessary relations. A
mathematical diagram, therefore, is a relational image of some universal mathemat-
ical truth. As such, it has a dual nature. On the one hand, as an observable entity, it
allows a mathematician to experiment upon it and to visually demonstrate the neces-
sity of a given conclusion. On the other hand, it represents an abstract mathematical
entity that cannot be reduced to a sum total of its particular representations. It fol-
lows, then, that a diagram partakes the characteristics of both an individual image
observed at this particular instant and an object of a general nature that makes a
thing what it is at any particular moment of its existence. In combining the charac-
teristics of individual images and abstractions, diagrams show the essential in a
thing at the expense of the features that are less prominent or less relevant to the
case. A diagram may thus be considered a visible form (είδος) that, as the Platonic
geometers once believed, represents an immediate union of knowing and seeing.
But again: Seeing what exactly?
There are two ways to define what using mathematical diagrams actually amounts
to, depending on what kind of questions we would like to ask. For example, our
interest might be in the practicalities of using diagrams. In this case, we normally do
well simply by establishing that, when using those diagrams with the aim to

1
Peirce’s idea of diagrammatic likeness (or parallelism in relations rather than in appearance taken
simpliciter) indeed goes beyond visual perception. However, the current research concentrates on
the latter exclusively, so throughout this book a “diagram” will always refer to vision.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 1

V. Kiryushchenko, Diagrams, Visual Imagination, and Continuity in Peirce’s
Philosophy of Mathematics, Mathematics in Mind,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23245-9_1
2 1 Introduction

visualize something that is, by its nature, general, we apply those diagrams as aux-
iliary tools. In doing so, we facilitate our reasoning by some external means and
then translate the results into a formal symbolic calculus in order to make infer-
ences. From this perspective, although the diagrams are constructed as elaborately
staged observations that make certain steps of a mathematical proof visually avail-
able, those diagrams do not constitute an entirely independent mathematical lan-
guage and are but partial models designed for the purposes of informal demonstration
only. Accordingly, on this view, mathematicians do not actually build proofs on
visual imagery directly, but rather use the latter to enhance the symbolic formaliza-
tions of the former, where the symbolic formalizations are considered as the math-
ematical language proper. This view does have significant practical merit as it
proves suggestive of a variety of particular modes of use associated with diagrams
in mathematics.
The above, however, is not the only possible approach. Instead of simply accept-
ing the fact that formal proofs are sometimes not enough, we might be interested in
figuring out why exactly that is so. In this case, instead of inquiring into certain
particular modes of using diagrams in mathematical proofs, we would rather be ask-
ing a question about the conditions of the possibility of diagrammatic experience.
Our interest would be metaphysical rather than purely practical, and the straightfor-
ward approach just outlined would not be of much help. After all, explaining, in
general terms, the advantages of using something by saying that it is good for the
purpose is like explaining the effects of opium, as the doctor in Moliere’s “Imaginary
Invalid” famously puts it, by virtus dormitiva, or its “capacity” to do what it does.
Moreover, in this case, simply saying that a diagram is an individual object that
represents some abstract entity (as we just established above) would not suffice
either. Such is every sign, written and spoken words included.
In order to achieve progress on the matter, we would need to make some further
assumptions. As diagrams are visual signs that help us observe necessary relations,
there has to be something about the very nature of our ordinary visual experience
that makes such observation possible. In other words, there has to be a direct link
between our most basic mathematical intuitions and the cognitive mechanisms that,
in appealing to spatial relations, enable our visual integration. When considering
diagrams, we should presuppose a necessary connection between the way deductive
inferences generally work and the basic schematisms behind the ordinary percep-
tions that make those inferences a matter of vision. This, in turn, means that we have
to assume further that some mathematical notions are at the core of our ordinary
perception. There is, in short, a mathematical a priori of human sensibility, the very
possibility of which naturally brings forth the further assumption that mathematical
diagrams, properly constructed, might represent an independent deductive lan-
guage—which is to say that they might themselves be not just auxiliary tools, but
immediate visualizations of the mathematical deductive process as such. From this
point of view, the necessary character of deductive arguments would not be simply
illustrated by diagrams; it would be internal to the diagrams that mathematicians
create. There would have to be something in the very way the diagrams are con-
structed that conditions their deductive force as it is directly given in visual
Two Approaches to Diagrams 3

perception. In fact, as will become clear later in the book, in inquiring about the role
of visual experience in mathematical cognition, we should assume that there is a
reciprocal relationship between our ordinary vision, on the one hand, and the math-
ematical demonstrations that supposedly constitute an independent mathematical
language, on the other hand. The problem though is that (as will be discussed in due
course) thanks to its reciprocity, this very relationship also needs to be shown rather
than simply described.
The two views summarized above constitute the framework within which most
of the research on the use of diagrams in mathematics relevant to the current study
is situated, with subjects ranging from the general and historical analysis (Brown
1999; Cheng et al. 2001; Giardino 2017; Mumma and Panza 2012; Otte 1997;
Pietarinen 2011, 2016) and the overall logical status of diagrams (Shin 1994, 2002;
Sloman 2002) to the role diagrams play in mathematical proofs (Barker-Plummer
1997; Dörfler 2005; Hanna 2007; Kulpa 2009; Moktefi and Shin 2013; Mumma
2010; Sherry 2009), the role of analogical reasoning in scientific concept-formation
(Abrahamsen and Bechtel 2015; Nersessian 1992), the use of diagrammatic tools in
teaching mathematics (Bakker and Hoffmann, 2005; Boaler 2016; Danesi 2016b;
Hegarty and Kozhevnikov 1999; Kucian et al. 2011; Legg 2017; Murata 2008;
Novak 1998; Prusak 2012), and the application of mathematics to the making of
geographic maps (Kiryushchenko 2015; Tversky 2000). Whatever the differences
between the two views are, there is an underlying assumption shared by the majority
of the researchers on both sides of the aisle. The assumption is that, because of the
aforementioned dual nature of diagrams (as connecting the particular and the gen-
eral, images and relations), studying them may be seen as a way of bridging the gap
between the purely platonic view of mathematics as a domain of abstract, unchang-
ing forms, on the one hand, and theories that aspire to uncover the experiential basis
of mathematical truths, on the other hand (Danesi 2016a, pp. 15–18).
This assumption is epitomized in the claim that the cognitive structure of math-
ematics presupposes a strong connection between mathematical abstractions and
metaphorical cognition, where “metaphorical” is understood as providing a link
between our conceptual capacities and our bodily experiences. In this view, our
ideas of quantity and number systems are linked to our perception through what is
known as “conceptual blending” (Lakoff 1999; Lakoff and Núñez 2000). To unpack
the metaphors that instantiate such blending is to reveal the cognitive schematism
deeply ingrained in mathematical cognition. Revealing this cognitive schematism,
in turn, would require showing that both figurative language and complex math are
“implanted in a form of cognition that involves associative connection between
experience and abstraction” (Danesi 2016b, p. 4). Mathematical diagrams are well-­
suited to be used in order to demonstrate the truth of this assumption. They differ
from discrete symbolizations in that they involve both observation and generaliza-
tion and are capable of effectively combining pictorial and algebraic characteristics.
This being the case, a study of diagrams (whether with an eye on particular modes
of their application or concentrating on their general metaphysical properties) con-
stitutes a productive way to approach the associative connection in question.
4 1 Introduction

It is often claimed that all representations, algebraic formulas and linguistic

expressions included, always already contain some sort of a diagram (at least in the
sense that any information can be diagrammatized, i.e., represented as some sort of
a visual schema). Therefore, it might seem that, in presenting diagrams as being in
opposition to linguistic expressions and algebraic formalizations, we are trying to
describe an opposition between a part and its whole. Yet once we understand clearly
what exactly is being opposed to what in this case, the problem disappears. The true
opposition here is between a visual representation of a piece of information, where
the whole of this information is grasped immediately as such, and a linear string of
arbitrary linguistic signs, where grasping the whole is the end result of reading the
signs consecutively.

Peirce’s Vision

One of the thinkers who pioneered the research of the role diagrams play in logical
and mathematical reasoning was the philosopher and mathematician Charles
Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). Peirce was one of the earliest authors on visual per-
ception whose account included not just immediately given particulars, or sense
data, but also kinds, relations, modal qualities, and other general objects. He is
famous for claiming that anything general is, by definition, relational; that a relation
is something that can always be represented visually by means of a diagram; and
that the capacity to recognize relational similarities is a necessary condition not
only for vision but for human perception in toto (CP12: 314; CP6: 190, 595; CP7:
499). As a logician and a mathematician, Peirce also believed that the capacity for
the recognition of relational sameness is fundamental for human rationality, and
that, if expressed graphically, a proper understanding of this capacity can provide
the basis for a deductive mathematical language. This language would amount to a
complete system of diagrammatic expression independent from formal symbolic
proofs. In using such language, one would be able to accomplish all necessary deri-
vations by applying a set of basic, intuitively grasped graphic conventions rather
than an essentially arbitrary system of natural language-based signs. Creating such
an independent language and applying it in mathematical proofs, Peirce believed,
could show that diagrams might be construed not just as external aids to mathemati-
cal reasoning, but rather as immediate visual embodiments of the very process of
such reasoning. This, in turn, could address the metaphysical concern about using
diagrams in mathematics as described above and help us clarify the reciprocal rela-
tionship between mathematical demonstrations and visual experience.
It is important for the current study that Peirce’s theoretical convictions were in
sync with some of his personal proclivities. Peirce was a deeply visual thinker. So

2
Peirce, C. S. (1931–1958). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vols. 1–8. C. Hartshorne,
P. Weiss, & A. Burks (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Peirce’s Vision 5

much so that he often complained about his personal inability to cope with the limi-
tations of written language and considered his predisposition to use graphical repre-
sentation and visual images as evidence of his “intellectual left-handedness”
(Hardwick 1977, pp. 95–96). As an educator, Peirce went as far as to claim that it
would be a good idea if some sort of diagrammatic logic were taught to children in
schools before the grammar of a natural language (CP4: 619). As Peirce’s numerous
autobiographical sketches also suggest, he was convinced that his aptitude for visual
representation had everything to do with his mathematical mindset and that both
were responsible for certain pronounced traits of his own personality. As will tran-
spire, being a mathematician, according to Peirce, is an intellectual advantage that
comes at a price.
Peirce’s aptitude for visual representations, of course, went beyond psychologi-
cal and educational effect. He firmly believed that the link between this aptitude and
his strong mathematical capacity was a necessary one and that this link pointed at
something larger than a set of personal intellectual idiosyncrasies. In fact, Peirce
was convinced that the link is valid for every mathematician and that there is no
mathematical reasoning proper that is not diagrammatic (CP1: 54; CP2: 216; CP5:
148). According to Peirce, although we certainly can express our thoughts without
using diagrams, the deductive force of our inferences is best expressed diagram-
matically. There is little doubt that this belief was one of the principal driving forces
behind Peirce’s work on his system of diagrammatic logic (his Existential Graphs,
henceforth EG), which he began to develop in the mid-1880s and continued to
improve incessantly until his death in 1914. The system is so designed as to com-
bine some minimal algebraic symbolizations with a set of basic graphical conven-
tions and to permit uninterrupted experimental manipulation with the resultant
graph. Peirce devised a full-blown graphical grammar aimed at regulating this
manipulation. The design of the grammar is such that the logical form of any graph
constructed using this grammar, as well as any derivation the graph may represent,
are immediately available to the eye.
Deriving and carefully observing, according to Peirce, should be construed as
one and the same process. Accordingly, every Peircean graph can do what no infer-
ence written in a formal symbolic language can: It can convey information and, at
the same time, provide an interpreter with a key to how to decode it. Seeing how a
given graph develops through a series of transformations into a meaningful struc-
ture, and understanding how this development works is one and the same act the
mathematician performs. Conceived in this way, the fusion of seeing and under-
standing, which Peirce’s graphs represent, provides us with something more than
unnecessary visual help to mathematical reasoning. The iconicity of the graphs can
tell us something important about the homological relationship between the gram-
mar of the visual language Peirce had in mind and the very machinery of thought,
or, as Peirce himself puts it, thinking in actu (NEM43: 239; CP4: 6).

3
Peirce, C. S. (1976). The New Elements of Mathematics. C. Eisele (Ed.). Vol. 4. The Hague, The
Netherlands: Mouton.
6 1 Introduction

In Peirce’s case, the idea of visual language proves to be crucial not only for the
proper understanding of the mode of reasoning specific to mathematics. It is also
important for the proper understanding of his pragmatism and his semiotics, the two
parts of Peirce’s philosophy which he struggled to reconcile throughout his life and
which are permeated with mathematical thought. Seen from this perspective, visual-
ized mathematical reasoning appears to be the very heartbeat that pumps blood
through the veins of Peirce’s entire philosophical system and serves as a background
for his philosophical realism (sf. Peirce 2010, pp. xvi–xviii; Fisch 1967). Moreover,
according to Peirce, not only his own philosophical thought, but philosophy in gen-
eral stands in dire need of mathematical concepts and can be properly understood as
a worthy intellectual enterprise only if considered a consequence of visualized
mathematical reasoning (cf. K.L. Ketner’s and H. Putnam’s introduction to Peirce’s
Cambridge Conference Lectures in Peirce 1992, pp. 1–104).

What This Book Is About

Now that the overall context of Peirce’s interest in visual thinking is established, it
is time to explain what this book is about. Peirce’s theoretical intuitions pertaining
to diagrammatic thinking represent an intricate knot of relations between written
language, ordinary visual experience, necessary mathematical reasoning, and imag-
inative experimentation with graphically expressed information. The current study
is preoccupied with this knot but pursues no ambition to solve it completely.
Notably, it does not in any way intend to approach the matter against the back-
ground of a comprehensive reconstruction of Peirce’s mathematical philosophy.
Neither will it go into great detail about Peirce’s EG, especially as there is ample
research on the matter, both classical and cutting edge (see Pietarinen 2011; Roberts
1973; Shin 2002; Zalamea 2003; Zeman 1964 among a plethora of other sources).
In considering the relationship between mathematical reasoning, diagrams, and
everyday visual experience, we will not pay attention to either the direct cognitive
causes of this relationship or the variety of ways in which mathematicians actually
use pictures and diagrams in their work (for these topics, see the accounts of how
the links between numerical and spatial representations are rooted in the same pat-
terns of brain activity in Gracia and Noël 2008; Hubbard et al. 2005, and the discus-
sions of particular ways in which conceptual material and images are combined in
mathematical reasoning in Loeb 2012; Lowrie and Kay 2001; Martinec and Salway
2005; Pinto and Tall 2002).
What this study offers instead is an approach that will allow tracing the roots of
Peirce’s conception of a diagram in certain patterns of interrelation between his
semiotics, his pragmaticist philosophy, his mathematical ideas, bits of his biogra-
phy, his personal intellectual predispositions, and his scientific practice as an applied
mathematician. Every one of those areas is thoroughly researched, yet they have
What This Book Is About 7

never been considered together in one study. Meanwhile, even though challenging
(especially stylistically), this approach might prove quite helpful. Discovering the
patterns just described can give us an idea of what the mathematical eye actually
sees with the help of diagrams and, at the same time, can provide us with a general
conceptual imprint of the mathematical mind that possesses the power of such sight.
Based on all these considerations, our strategy will be to develop five themes that
intertwine—which is the reason why these themes are not discussed in the book one
by one in consecutive chapters, but rather create a labyrinth of ideas in which the
reader will have to find their own path.
First, from the Peircean semiotic perspective, to learn what mathematical dia-
grams are is, to a large extent, to define what those diagrams are qua signs, which
characteristics they share with other kinds of signs, and which characteristics are
unique to them. As will transpire, there are three important facts about diagrams that
define their similarity to other kinds of signs: their being capable of generating new
meanings, their pragmaticist connection to habitual action, and their ability to fuse
the general with the particular. At the same time, what distinguishes diagrams as
signs is that they make it possible for us to observe a given argument in its develop-
ment rather than to read it in a linear fashion. This distinctive feature of diagram-
matic signs will help us better understand Peirce’s more general ideas of relation,
interpretation, and likeness. It will also provide a useful context for discussing the
Kantian roots of Peirce’s theory of signs. Diagrams considered as signs will be the
primary focus in Chapters 5–8 and 10–11 of the book.
Second, Peirce’s views on the role of diagrams in mathematical reasoning owe a
great deal to Kant. Kant’s critical philosophy was an object of steady interest for
Peirce the mathematician, and Kant’s influence on Peirce was mediated and greatly
diversified by lessons in logic and mathematics from his father Benjamin (MS 310,
823; Colapietro 2006, pp. 173–174, 196). This mediation enriched Peirce’s percep-
tion of Kant’s critical approach—to such an extent that in his application for a
Carnegie grant in 1902 Peirce avouched that “Kant’s criticism was, so to say, my
mother’s milk in philosophy” (MS L4 75, pp. 26–27). It is this beverage, according
to some, that made Peirce immune to the deficiencies of the classical empiricist
approach in philosophy and mathematics (Friedman 1995; Short 2007, pp. 66–67,
81–83). Peirce also praised Kant for the fact that he based metaphysics on logic and
for the decisive emphasis Kant laid on the idea of architectonic, or a systematic
vision of reason based on the unity of its most fundamental theoretical, practical,
and aesthetic ends (Nordmann 2006; Parker 1998, pp. 2–59). Importantly, Kant’s
transcendental schematism of the imagination and his idea of the mathematically
sublime provide a link between Peirce’s approach to the mathematical notion of
continuity and his idea of dynamic totality. This link adds an interesting twist to

4
Charles S. Peirce Papers. The Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
(henceforth, MS or L followed by the manuscript or letter number and, wherever needed, page
number).
8 1 Introduction

Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics, as in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Totalität

is one of the three mathematical categories of quantity responsible for the represen-
tation of the mathematical idea of number. The Kantian themes relevant to Peirce’s
conception of diagrammatic thinking are discussed in Chapters 4, 9, and 13, with
Chapter 9 presenting the material central for understanding the current project as
a whole.
Third, according to Peirce, diagrammatic representation has everything to do
with the thinking process forming an uninterrupted continuum. From this perspec-
tive, to learn what diagrams are is to understand how mathematicians of Peirce’s
day viewed the idea of continuity. Peirce was dissatisfied with what Cantor and
Dedekind had to say about the continuity of the real number line and struggled to
formulate his own solution to the problem. The novelty of Peirce’s approach is that
he moves away from the algebraic understanding of continuity through the idea a
sequence of real numbers and links it to the ideas of generality and triadic sign rela-
tion. This helps Peirce create a still wider semiotic context for his mathematical
studies. The idea of continuity will be the matter of our attention in Chapter 14.
Fourth, Peirce’s mathematical views on the nature of diagrammatic representa-
tion were deeply impacted by his work as a geodesist at the US Coast and Geodetic
Survey. While working at the Survey and at the Harvard Observatory, Peirce made
some original contributions as a mathematician in the fields of geodesy, spectros-
copy, and astronomy. The Survey published some of Peirce’s ideas on the economy
of research and the statistical approach to observational errors (CP3: 140–160; 7:
139–157). But Peirce’s measurements of gravity and his pendulum research apart,
the most philosophically interesting and important outcome of Peirce’s work at the
Survey was his quincuncial map projection―a version of the conformal stereo-
graphic projection created with the application of the theory of functions of a com-
plex variable. The principal feature of Peirce’s map is that it allows continuous
tessellation ad infinitum, in which all attributes of each new copy of the map exactly
match those of all its immediate neighbors. Thanks to this feature, the two-­
dimensional map reproduces an essential characteristic of the surface of the three-­
dimensional spherical object the map represents: its continuity. As will be
demonstrated in Chapter 12, this allows interpreting Peirce’s map as a virtual object
and a mathematical diagram of the Earth’s surface. The aim of this chapter is to
demonstrate that some of Peirce’s late semiotic ideas about diagrams find support in
his early practice as an applied mathematician, thus providing an interesting exam-
ple of the intersection of scientific practice and philosophical speculation.
Finally, as we point out in Chapters 2 and 3, in Peirce’s case, some biographical
data and a brief account of certain traits of Peirce’s character are necessary for the
proper understanding of how various parts of his theory of iconicity are related to
each other. Taken together, these details can shed more light on why exactly visual
experience was crucial for Peirce the mathematician and how the idea of it is related
to statistical reasoning, Peirce’s social habits, his conception of continuity, and the
important distinction Peirce made between mathematics and logic. Our contention
is that certain conceptual aspects of Peirce’s theory about diagrams should be
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amounting to one million and a quarter, half the actual circulation.
Have we too much money? [No no! exclaimed many voices.] If all
banks were put down, and all bank paper were annihilated, we
should have just one half the money that we now have. I am quite
sure that one of the immediate causes of our present difficulties, is a
defect in quantity as well as the quality of the circulating medium.
And it would be impossible, if we were reduced to such a regimen as
is proposed by the hard money theorists, to avoid stop laws, relief
laws, repudiation, bankruptcies, and perhaps civil commotion.

I have traced the principal causes of the present embarrassed

condition of the country, I hope with candor and fairness, and
without giving offence to any of my fellow citizens, who may have
differed in political opinion from me. It would have been far more
agreeable to my feelings to have dwelt, as I did in 1832, during the
third year of the first term of president Jackson’s administration,
upon bright and cheering prospects of general prosperity. I thought
it useful to contrast that period with the present one, and to inquire
into the causes which have brought upon us such a sad and dismal
reverse. A much more important object remains to me to attempt,
and that is to point out remedies for existing evils and disorders.

And the first I would suggest, requires the coöperation of the

government and the people; it is economy and frugality, strict and
persevering economy, both in public and private affairs. Government
should incur or continue no expense that can be justly and
honorably avoided, and individuals should do the same. The
prosperity of the country has been impaired by causes operating
throughout several years, and it will not be restored in a day or a
year, perhaps not in a period less than it has taken to destroy it. But
we must not only be economical, we must be industrious,
indefatigably industrious. An immense amount of capital has been
wasted and squandered in visionary or unprofitable enterprises,
public and private. It can only be reproduced by labor and saving.
 The second remedy which I would suggest, and that without
which all others must prove abortive or ineffectual, is a sound
currency, of uniform value throughout the union, and redeemable in
specie upon the demand of the holder. I know of but one mode in
which that object can be accomplished, and that has stood the test
of time and practical experience. If any other can be devised than a
bank of the United States, which should be safe and certain, and
free from the influence of government, and especially under the
control of the executive department, I should for one gladly see it
embraced. I am not exclusively wedded to a bank of the United
States, nor do I desire to see one established against the will and
without the consent of the people. But all my observation and
reflection have served to strengthen and confirm my conviction, that
such an institution, emanating from the authority of the general
government, properly restricted and guarded, with such
improvements as experience has pointed out, can alone supply a
reliable currency.

Accordingly, at the extra session, a bill passed both houses of

congress, which, in my opinion, contained an excellent charter, with
one or two slight defects, which it was intended to cure by a
supplemental bill, if the veto had not been exercised. That charter
contained two new, and I think admirable features; one was to
separate the operation of issuing a circulation from that of banking,
confiding these faculties to different boards; and the other was to
limit the dividends of the bank, bringing the excess beyond the
prescribed amount, into the public treasury. In the preparation of the
charter, every sacrifice was made that could be made to
accommodate it, especially in regard to the president. But instead of
meeting as in a mutual spirit of conciliation, he fired, as was aptly
said by a Virginia editor, upon the flag of truce sent from the capitol.

Congress anxious to fulfil the expectations of the people, another

bank bill was prepared, in conformity with the plan of a bank
sketched by the acting president in his veto message, after a
previous consultation between him and some distinguished members
of congress, and two leading members of his cabinet. The bill was
shaped in precise conformity to his views, as communicated by
those members of the cabinet, and as communicated to others and
was submitted to his inspection after it was so prepared; and he
gave his assurances that he would approve such a bill. I was no
party to the transaction, but I do not entertain a doubt of what
I state. The bill passed both houses of congress without any
alteration or amendment whatever, and the veto was nevertheless
again employed.

It is painful for me to advert to a grave occurrence, marked by

such dishonor and bad faith. Although the president, through his
recognized organ, derides and denounces the whigs, and disowns
being one; although he administers the executive branch of the
government in contempt of their feelings and in violation of their
principles; and although all whom he chooses to have denominated
as ultra whigs, that is to say the great body of the whig party, have
come under his ban, and those of them in office are threatened with
his expulsion, I wish not to say of him one word that is not due to
truth and to the country. I will, however, say that, in my opinion, the
whigs cannot justly be held responsible for his administration of the
executive department, for the measures he may recommend, or his
failure to recommend others, nor especially for the manner in which
he distributes the public patronage. They will do their duty, I hope,
towards the country, and render all good and proper support to
government; but they ought not to be held accountable for his
conduct. They elected him, it is true, but for another office, and he
came into the present one by a lamentable visitation of providence.
There had been no such instance occurring under the government.
If the whigs were bound to scrutinize his opinions, in reference to an
office which no one ever anticipated he would fill, he was bound in
honor and good faith to decline the Harrisburgh nomination, if he
could not conscientiously coöperate with the principles that brought
him into office. Had the president who was elected lived, had that
honest and good man, on whose face, in that picture, we now gaze,
been spared, I feel perfectly confident that all the measures which
the principles of the whigs authorized the country to expect,
including a bank of the United States, would have been carried.

But it may be said that a sound currency, such as I have

described, is unattainable during the administration of Mr. Tyler. It
will be, if it can only be obtained through the instrumentality of a
bank of the United States, unless he changes his opinion, as he has
done in regard to the land bill.

Unfortunately, our chief magistrate possesses more powers, in

some respects, than a king or queen of England. The crown is never
separated from the nation, but is obliged to conform to its will. If the
ministry holds opinions adverse to the nation, and is thrown into the
minority in the house of commons, the crown is constrained to
dismiss the ministry, and appoint one whose opinions coincide with
the nation. This queen Victoria has recently been obliged to do: and
not merely to change her ministry, but to dismiss the official
attendants upon her person. But here, if the president holds an
opinion adverse to that of congress and the nation upon important
public measures, there is no remedy but upon the periodical return
of the rights of the ballot box.

Another remedy, powerfully demanded by the necessities of the

times, and requisite to maintaining the currency in a sound state, is
a tariff which will lessen importations from abroad, and tend to
increase supplies at home from domestic industry. I have so often
expressed my views on this subject, and so recently in the senate of
the United States, that I do not think there is any occasion for my
enlarging upon it at this time. I do not think that an exorbitant or
very high tariff is necessary; but one that shall insure an adequate
revenue and reasonable protection; and it so happens that the
interests of the treasury and the wants of the people now perfectly
coincide. Union is our highest and greatest interest. No one can look
beyond its dissolution without horror and dismay. Harmony is
essential to the preservation of the union. It was a leading, although
not the only motive in proposing the compromise act, to preserve
that harmony. The power of protecting the interests of our own
country, can never be abandoned or surrendered to foreign nations,
without a culpable dereliction of duty. Of this truth, all parts of the
nation are every day becoming more and more sensible. In the
mean time this indispensable power should be exercised with a
discretion and moderation, and in a form least calculated to revive
prejudices, or to check the progress of reforms now going on in
public opinion.

In connection with a system of remedial measures, I shall only

allude to, without stopping to dwell on, the distribution bill, that just
and equitable settlement of a great national question, which sprung
up during the revolutionary war, which has seriously agitated the
country, and which it is deeply to be regretted had not been settled
ten years ago, as then proposed. Independent of all other
considerations, the fluctuation in the receipts from sales of the public
lands is so great and constant that it is a resource on which the
general government ought not to rely for revenue. It is far better
that the advice of a democratic land committee of the senate, at the
head of which was the experienced and distinguished Mr. King, of
Alabama, given some years ago, should be followed, that the federal
treasury be replenished with duties on imports, without bringing into
it any part of the land fund.

I have thus suggested measures of relief adapted to the present

state of the country, and I have noticed some of the differences
which unfortunately exist between the two leading parties into which
our people are unhappily divided. In considering the question
whether the counsels of the one or the other of these parties are
wisest, and best calculated to advance the interest, the honor, and
the prosperity of the nation, which every citizen ought to do, we
should discard all passion and prejudice, and exercise, as far as
possible, a perfect impartiality. And we should not confine our
attention merely to the particular measures which those parties
respectively espouse or oppose, but extend it to their general course
and conduct, and to the spirit and purposes by which they are
animated. We should anxiously inquire, whither shall we be led by
following in the lead of one or the other of those parties; shall we be
carried to the achievement of the glorious destiny, which patriots
here, and the liberal portion of mankind every where, have fondly
hoped awaits us? or shall we ingloriously terminate our career, by
adding another melancholy example of the instability of human
affairs, and the folly with which self-government is administered?

I do not arrogate to myself more impartiality, or greater freedom

from party bias, than belongs to other men; but, unless I deceive
myself, I think I have reached a time of life, and am now in a
position of retirement, from which I can look back with calmness,
and speak, I hope, with candor and justice. I do not intend to
attempt a general contrast between the two parties, as to their
course, doctrines, and spirit. That would be too extensive and
laborious an undertaking for this occasion; but I propose to specify a
few recent instances, in which I think our political opponents have
exhibited a spirit and bearing disorganizing and dangerous to the
permanency and stability of our institutions, and I invoke the serious
and sober attention to them, of all who are here assembled.

The first I would notice, is the manner in which territories have

been lately admitted as states, into the union. The early and regular
practice of the government, was for congress to pass previously a
law authorizing a convention, regulating the appointment of
members to it; specifying the qualification of voters, and so forth. In
that way most of the states were received. Of late without any
previous sanction or authority from congress, several territories have
proceeded of themselves to call conventions, form constitutions, and
demand admission into the union; and they were admitted. I do not
deny that their population and condition entitled them to admission;
but I insist that it should have been done in the regular and
established mode. In the case of Michigan, aliens were allowed to
vote, as aliens have been allowed to become preëmptioners in the
public lands. And a majority in congress sanctioned the proceeding.
When foreigners are naturalized and incorporated as citizens in our
community, they are entitled to all the privileges, within the limits of
the constitution, which belong to a native born citizen; and, if
necessary, they should be protected, at home and abroad—the
thunder of our artillery should roar as loud and as effectually in their
defence as if their birth were upon American soil. But I cannot but
think it wrong and hazardous, to allow aliens, who have just landed
upon our shores, who have not yet renounced their allegiance to
foreign potentates, nor sworn fidelity to our constitution, with all the
influences of monarchy and anarchy about them, to participate in
our elections, and affect our legislation.

Second, the New Jersey election case, in which the great seal of
the state, and the decision of the local authorities were put aside by
the house of representatives, and a majority thus secured to the
democratic party.

Third, nullification, which is nothing more nor less than an

assumption by one state to abrogate within its limits a law passed by
the twenty-six states in congress assembled.

Fourth, a late revolutionary attempt in Maryland to subvert the

existing government, and set up a new one without any authority of
law.

Fifth, the refusal of a minority in the legislature of Tennessee, to

coöperate with the majority, (their constitution requiring the
presence of two thirds of the members,) to execute a positive
injunction of the United States to appoint two United States
senators. In principle, that refusal was equivalent to announcing the
willingness of that minority to dissolve the union. For if thirteen or
fourteen of the twenty-six states were to refuse altogether to elect
senators, a dissolution of the union would be the consequence. That
majority, for weeks together, and time after time, deliberately
refused to enter upon the election. And if the union is not in fact
dissolved, it is not because the principle involved would not yield to
a dissolution, but because twelve or thirteen other states have not
like themselves refused to perform a high constitutional duty. And
why did they refuse? Simply because they apprehended the election
to the senate of political opponents. The seats of the two Tennessee
senators in the United States senate, are now vacant, and Tennessee
has no voice in that branch of congress, in the general legislation.
One of the highest compliments which I ever received, was to have
been appointed, at a popular meeting in Tennessee, one of her
senators, in conjunction with a distinguished senator from South
Carolina, with all the authority that such an appointment could
bestow. I repeat here an expression of my acknowledgments for the
honor, which I most ambitiously resigned, when I gave up my
dictatorship, and my seat as a Kentucky senator. [A general laugh.]

Sixth. Then there is repudiation, that foul stain upon the

American character, cast chiefly by the democrats of Mississippi, and
which it will require years to efface from our bright escutcheon.

Seventh, the support given to executive usurpations, and the

expunging the records of the senate of the United States.

Eighth, the recent refusal of state legislatures to pass laws to

carry into effect the act of distribution, an act of congress passed
according to all the forms of the constitution, after ample discussion
and deliberate consideration, and after the lapse of ten years from
the period it was first proposed. It is the duty of all to submit to the
laws regularly passed. They may attempt to get them repealed; they
have a right to test their validity before the judiciary; but whilst the
laws remain in force unrepealed, and without any decision against
their constitutional validity, submission to them is not merely a
constitutional and legal, but a moral duty. In this case it is true that
those who refuse to abide by them only bite their own noses. But it
is the principle of the refusal to which I call your attention. If a
minority may refuse compliance with one law, what is to prevent
minorities from disregarding all law? Is this any thing but a
modification of nullification? What right have the servants of the
people, (the legislative bodies,) to withhold from their masters their
assigned quotas of a great public fund?

Ninth. The last, though not least, instance of the manifestation of

a spirit of disorganization which I shall notice, is the recent
convulsion in Rhode Island. That little, but gallant and patriotic state
had a charter derived from a British king, in operation between one
and two hundred years. There had been engrafted upon it laws and
usages, from time to time, and altogether a practical constitution
sprung up, which carried the state as one of the glorious thirteen,
through the revolution, and brought her safely into the union. Under
it, her Greens and Perrys and other distinguished men were born
and rose to eminence. The legislature had called a convention to
remedy whatever defects it had, and to adapt it to the progressive
improvement of the age. In that work of reform the Dorr party might
have coöperated; but not choosing so to coöperate, and in wanton
defiance of all established authority, they undertook subsequently to
call another convention. The result was two constitutions, not
essentially differing on the principal point of controversy, the right of
suffrage.

Upon submitting to the people that which was formed by the

regular convention, a small majority voted against it, produced by a
union in casting votes, between the Dorr party and some of the
friends of the old charter, who were opposed to any change. The
other constitution being also submitted to the people, an apparent
majority voted for it, made up of every description of votes, legal
and illegal, by proxy and otherwise, taken in the most irregular and
unauthorized manner.

The Dorr party proceeded to put their constitution in operation

by electing him as the governor of the state, members to the mock
legislature, and other officers. But they did not stop here; they
proceeded to collect, to drill, and to marshal a military force, and
pointed their cannon against the arsenal of the state.
 The president was called upon to interpose the power of the
union to preserve the peace of the state, in conformity with an
express provision of the federal constitution. And I have as much
pleasure in expressing my opinion that he faithfully performed his
duty, in responding to that call, as it gave me pain to be obliged to
animadvert on other parts of his conduct.

The leading presses of the democratic party at Washington,

Albany, New York, Richmond, and elsewhere, came out in support of
the Dorr party, encouraging them in their work of rebellion and
treason. And when matters had got to a crisis, and the two parties
were preparing for a civil war, and every hour it was expected to
blaze out, a great Tammany meeting was held in the city of New
York, headed by the leading men of the party, the Cambrelengs, the
Vanderpools, the Allens, &c., with a perfect knowledge that the
military power of the union was to be employed, if necessary, to
suppress the insurrection, and, notwithstanding, they passed
resolutions tending to awe the president, and to countenance and
cheer the treason.

Fortunately, numbers of the Dorr party abandoned their chief; he

fled, and Rhode Island, unaided by any actual force of the federal
authority, proved herself able alone to maintain law, order, and
government, within her borders.

I do not attribute to my fellow citizens here assembled, from

whom I differ in opinion, any disposition to countenance the
revolutionary proceedings in Rhode Island. I do not believe that they
approve it, I do not believe that their party generally could approve
it, nor some of the other examples of a spirit of disorganization
which I have enumerated; but the misfortune is, in time of high
party excitement, that the leaders commit themselves, and finally
commit the body of their party, who perceive that unless they stand
by and sustain their leaders, a division, and perhaps destruction of
the party, would be the consequence. Of all the springs of human
action, party ties are perhaps the most powerful. Interest has been
supposed to be more so; but party ties are more influential, unless
they are regarded as a modification of imaginary interest. Under
their sway, we have seen, not only individuals, but whole
communities abandon their long cherished interests and principles,
and turn round and oppose them with violence.

Did not the rebellion in Rhode Island find for its support a
precedent established by the majority in congress, in the irregular
admission of territories, as states, into the union, to which I have
heretofore alluded? Is there not reason to fear that the example
which congress had previously presented, encouraged the Rhode
Island rebellion?

It has been attempted to defend that rebellion, upon the

doctrines of the American Declaration of Independence; but no
countenance to it can be fairly derived from them. That declaration
asserts, it is true, that whenever a government becomes destructive
of the ends of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, for the
security of which it was instituted, it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it, and institute new government; and so
undoubtedly it is. But this is a right only to be exercised in grave and
extreme cases. ‘Prudence indeed will dictate,’ says that venerated
instrument, ‘that governments long established should not be
changed for light and transient causes.’ ‘But when a long train of
abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object,
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their
right, their duty, to throw off such government.’

Will it be pretended that the actual government of Rhode Island

is destructive of life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness? That it has
perpetrated a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing the
same invariable object, to reduce the people under absolute
despotism? Or that any other cause of complaint existed, but such
as might be peacefully remedied, without violence and without
blood? Such as, in point of fact, the legitimate government had
regularly summoned a convention to redress, but for the results of
whose deliberations the restless spirit of disorder and rebellion had
not patience to wait? Why, fellow-citizens, little Rhody (God bless
and preserve her,) is one of the most prosperous, enterprising, and
enlightened states in this whole union. No where are life, liberty, and
property, more perfectly secure.

How is this right of the people to abolish an existing government,

and to set up a new one, to be practically exercised? Our
revolutionary ancestors did not tell us by words, but they proclaimed
it by gallant and noble deeds. Who are the people that are to tear
up the whole fabric of human society, whenever and as often as
caprice or passion may prompt them? When all the arrangements
and ordinances of existing and organized society are prostrated and
subverted, as must be supposed in such a lawless and irregular
movement as that in Rhode Island, the established privileges and
distinctions between the sexes, between the colors, between the
ages, between natives and foreigners, between the sane and the
insane, and between the innocent and the guilty convict, all the
offspring of positive institutions, are cast down and abolished, and
society is thrown into one heterogenous and unregulated mass. And
is it contended that the major part of this Babel congregation is
invested with the right to build up, at its pleasure, a new
government? That as often, and whenever society can be drummed
up and thrown into such a shapeless mass, the major part of it may
establish another, and another new government, in endless
succession? Why, this would overturn all social organization, make
revolutions—the extreme and last resort of an oppressed people—
the commonest occurrences of human life, and the standing order of
the day. How such a principle would operate, in a certain section of
this union, with a peculiar population, you will readily conceive. No
community could endure such an intolerable state of things any
where, and all would, sooner or later, take refuge from such
ceaseless agitation, in the calm repose of absolute despotism.

I know of no mode by which an existing government can be

overthrown and put aside, and a new one erected in its place, but by
the consent or authority of that government, express or implied, or
by forcible resistance, that is, revolution.

Fellow-citizens, I have enumerated these examples of a

dangerous spirit of disorganization, and disregard of law, with no
purpose of giving offence, or exciting bitter and unkind feelings, here
or elsewhere, but to illustrate the principles, character, and tendency
of the two great parties into which this country is divided. In all of
these examples, the democratic party, as it calls itself, (a
denomination to which I respectfully think it has not the least just
pretension,) or large portions of that party, extending to whole
states, united with apparent cordiality. To all of them the whig party
was constantly and firmly opposed. And now let me ask you, in all
candor and sincerity, to say truly and impartially to which of these
two parties can the interests, the happiness, and the destinies of this
great people be most safely confided? I appeal especially, and with
perfect confidence, to the candor of the real, the ancient, and long-
tried democracy—that old republican party with whom I stood, side
by side, during some of the darkest days of the republic, in seasons
of both war and peace.

Fellow-citizens of all parties! The present situation of our country

is one of unexampled distress and difficulty; but there is no occasion
for any despondency. A kind and bountiful Providence has never
deserted us; punished us he perhaps has, for our neglect of his
blessings and our misdeeds. We have a varied and fertile soil, a
genial climate and free institutions. Our whole land is covered, in
profusion, with the means of subsistence and the comforts of life.
Our gallant ship, it is unfortunately true, lies helpless, tossed on a
tempestuous sea, amidst the conflicting billows of contending
parties, without a rudder and without a faithful pilot. But that ship is
our country, embodying all our past glory, all our future hopes. Its
crew is our whole people, by whatever political denomination they
are known. If she goes down, we all go down together. Let us
remember the dying words of the gallant and lamented Lawrence.
Don’t give up the ship. The glorious banner of our country, with its
unstained stars and stripes, still proudly floats at its mast-head. With
stout hearts and strong arms we can surmount all our difficulties.
Let us all, all, rally round that banner, and firmly resolve to
perpetuate our liberties and regain our lost prosperity.

Whigs! Arouse from the ignoble supineness which encompasses

you; awake from the lethargy in which you lie bound; cast from you
that unworthy apathy which seems to make you indifferent to the
fate of your country. Arouse! awake! shake off the dew drops that
glitter on your garments, and once more march to battle and to
victory. You have been disappointed, deceived, betrayed; shamefully
deceived and betrayed. But will you therefore also prove false and
faithless to your country, or obey the impulses of a just and patriotic
indignation? As for captain Tyler, he is a mere snap, a flash in the
pan; pick your whig flints and try your rifles again.

[The conclusion of the speech was followed with general and tremendous
cheering; and the largest, and one of the most respectable multitudes ever
assembled in Kentucky, dispersed without a solitary instance of disorder or
indecorum occurring.]
 ON SLAVERY AND
ABOLITION.
AT RICHMOND, INDIANA, OCTOBER 1, 1842.
[IN the autumn of 1842, Mr. Clay being on a visit to the state of Indiana, the
occasion of his meeting a large concourse of people, was seized upon, for the
purpose of presenting him with a petition, signed by many of his political
opponents, praying him to emancipate his slaves, in Kentucky. Instead of treating
the matter with indignation, as was perhaps expected by some, Mr. Clay replied
with good humor to Mr. Mendenhall, who had been selected to present him with
the address, in the following words.]

I HOPE that Mr. Mendenhall may be treated with the greatest

forbearance and respect. I assure my fellow-citizens here collected,
that the presentation of the petition has not occasioned the slightest
pain, nor excited one solitary disagreeable emotion. If it were to be
presented to me, I prefer that it should be done in the face of this
vast assemblage. I think I can give it such an answer as becomes
me and the subject of which it treats. At all events, I entreat and
beseech my fellow-citizens, for their sake, for my country’s sake, for
my sake, to offer no disrespect, no indignity, no violence, in word or
deed, to Mr. Mendenhall.

I will now, sir, make to you and to this petition such a response
as becomes me. Allow me to say that I think you have not
conformed to the independent character of an American citizen in
presenting a petition to me. I am, like yourself, but a private citizen.
A petition, as the term implies, generally proceeds from an inferior in
power or station to a superior; but between us there is entire
equality. And what are the circumstances under which you have
chosen to offer it? I am a total stranger, passing through your state,
on my way to its capital, in consequence of an invitation with which
I have been honored to visit it, to exchange friendly salutations with
such of my fellow citizens of Indiana as think proper to meet me,
and to accept of their hospitality. Anxious as I am to see them, and
to view parts of this state which I had never seen, I came here with
hesitation and reluctance, because I apprehended that the motives
of my journey might be misconceived and perverted. But when the
fulfilment of an old promise to visit Indianapolis was insisted upon,
I yielded to the solicitations of friends, and have presented myself
among you.

Such is the occasion which has been deliberately selected for

tendering this petition to me. I am advanced in years, and neither
myself nor the place of my residence is altogether unknown to the
world. You might at any time within these last twenty-five or thirty
years, have presented your petition to me at Ashland. If you had
gone there for that purpose, you should have been received and
treated with perfect respect and liberal hospitality.

Now, Mr. Mendenhall, let us reverse conditions, and suppose that

you had been invited to Kentucky to partake of its hospitality; and
that, previous to your arrival, I had employed such means as
I understand have been used to get up this petition, to obtain the
signatures of citizens of that state to a petition to present to you to
relinquish your farm or other property, what would you have thought
of such a proceeding? Would you have deemed it courteous and
according to the rites of hospitality?

I know well, that you and those who think with you, controvert
the legitimacy of slavery, and deny the right of property in slaves.
But the law of my state and other states has otherwise ordained.
The law may be wrong in your opinion, and ought to be repealed;
but then you and your associates are not the law-makers for us, and
unless you can show some authority to nullify our laws, we must
continue to respect them. Until the law is repealed, we must be
excused for asserting the rights—ay, the property in slaves—which it
sanctions, authorizes, and vindicates.

And who are the petitioners whose organ you assume to be?
I have no doubt that many of them are worthy, amiable, and
humane persons, who, by erroneous representations, have been
induced inconsiderately to affix their signatures to this petition, and
that they will deeply regret it. Others, and not a few, I am told, are
free blacks, men, women, and children, who have been artfully
deceived and imposed upon. A very large portion, I have been
credibly informed, are the political opponents of the party to which
I belong—democrats, as they most undeservedly call themselves,
who have eagerly seized this opportunity to wound, as they imagine,
my feelings, and to aid the cause to which they are attached. In
other quarters of the union, democrats claim to be the exclusive
champions of southern interests, the only safe defenders of the
rights in slave property, and unjustly accuse us Whigs with abolition
designs wholly incompatible with its security. What ought those
distant democrats to think of the course of their friends here, who
have united in this petition?

And what is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana, to

liberate the slaves under my care, in Kentucky? It is a general
declaration in the act announcing to the world the independence of
the thirteen American colonies, that all men are created equal. Now,
as an abstract principle, there is no doubt of the truth of that
declaration; and it is desirable, in the original construction of society,
and in organized societies, to keep it in view as a great fundamental
principle. But, then, I apprehend that in no society that ever did
exist, or ever shall be formed, was or can the equality asserted
among the members of the human race, be practically enforced and
carried out. There are portions of it, large portions, women, minors,
insane, culprits, transient sojourners, that will always probably
remain subject to the government of another portion of the
community.

That declaration, whatever may be the extent of its import, was

made by the delegations of the thirteen states. In most of them
slavery existed, and had long existed, and was established by law. It
was introduced and forced upon the colonies by the paramount law
of England. Do you believe that, in making that declaration, the
states that concurred in it intended that it should be tortured into a
virtual emancipation of all the slaves within their respective limits?
Would Virginia and the other southern states have ever united in a
declaration which was to be interpreted into an abolition of slavery
among them? Did any one of the thirteen states entertain such a
design or expectation? To impute such a secret and unavowed
purpose would be to charge a political fraud upon the noblest band
of patriots that ever assembled in council; a fraud upon the
confederacy of the revolution; a fraud upon the union of those
states, whose constitution not only recognized the lawfulness of
slavery, but permitted the importation of slaves from Africa, until the
year 1808. And I am bold to say, that, if the doctrines of ultra
political abolitionists had been seriously promulgated at the epoch of
our revolution, our glorious independence would never have been
achieved—never, never.

I know the predominant sentiment in the free states is adverse to

slavery; but, happy in their own exemption from whatever evils may
attend it, the great mass of our fellow-citizens there do not seek to
violate the constitution, or to disturb the harmony of these states.
I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of
slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we
have derived it from the parental government, and from our
ancestors. I wish every slave in the United States was in the country
of his ancestors. But here they are, and the question is how they can
be best dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about
to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly
opposed than I should be, to incorporate the institution of slavery
among its elements. But there is an incalculable difference between
the original formation of society and a long existing organized
society, with its ancient laws, institutions, and establishments. Now,
great as I acknowledge, in my opinion, the evils of slavery are, they
are nothing, absolutely nothing, in comparison with the far greater
evils which would inevitably flow from a sudden, general, and
indiscriminate emancipation. In some of the states the number of
slaves approximates towards an equality with that of the whites; in
one or two they surpass them. What would be the condition of the
two races in those states, upon the supposition of an immediate
emancipation? Does any man suppose that they would become
blended into one homogeneous mass? Does any man recommend
amalgamation—that revolting admixture, alike offensive to God and
man; for those whom He, by their physical properties, has made
unlike and put asunder, we may, without presumptuousness,
suppose were never intended to be joined together in one of the
holiest rites. And let me tell you, sir, if you do not already know it,
that such are the feelings—prejudice, if you please, (and what man,
claiming to be a statesman, will overlook or disregard the deep-
seated and unconquerable prejudices of the people,)—in the slave
states, that no human law would enforce a union between the two
races.

What then would certainly happen? A struggle for political

ascendancy; the blacks seeking to acquire, and the whites to
maintain possession of the government. Upon the supposition of a
general immediate emancipation in those states where the blacks
outnumber the whites, they would have nothing to do but to insist
upon another part of the same declaration of independence, as Dorr
and his deluded democratic followers recently did in Rhode Island;
according to which, an undefined majority have the right, at their
pleasure, to subvert an existing government, and institute a new one
in its place, and then the whites would be brought in complete
subjection to the blacks! A contest would inevitably ensue between
the two races—civil war, carnage, pillage, conflagration, devastation,
and the ultimate extermination or expulsion of the blacks. Nothing is
more certain. And are not these evils far greater than the mild and
continually improving state of slavery which exists in this country?
I say continually improving; for if this gratifying progress in the
amelioration of the condition of the slaves has been checked in some
of the states, the responsibility must attach to the unfortunate
agitation of the subject of abolition. In consequence of it, increased
rigor in the police, and further restraints have been imposed; and
I do believe that gradual emancipation, (the only method of
liberation that has ever been thought safe or wise by any body in
any of the slave states,) has been postponed half a century.

Without any knowledge of the relation in which I stand to my

slaves, or their individual condition, you, Mr. Mendenhall, and your
associates, who have been active in getting up this petition, call
upon me forthwith to liberate the whole of them. Now let me tell
you, that some half a dozen of them, from age, decrepitude, or
infirmity, are wholly unable to gain a livelihood for themselves, and
are a heavy charge upon me. Do you think that I should conform to
the dictates of humanity by ridding myself of that charge, and
sending them forth into the world, with the boon of liberty, to end a
wretched existence in starvation? Another class is composed of
helpless infants, with or without improvident mothers. Do you
believe, as a christian, that I should perform my duty towards them
by abandoning them to their fate? Then there is another class who
would not accept their freedom if I would give it to them. I have for
many years owned a slave that I wished would leave me, but he will
not. What shall I do with that class?

What my treatment of my slaves is you may learn from Charles,

who accompanies me on this journey, and who has travelled with me
over the greater part of the United States, and in both the Canadas,
and has had a thousand opportunities, if he had chosen to embrace
them, to leave me. Excuse me, Mr. Mendenhall, for saying that my
slaves are as well fed and clad, look as sleek and hearty, and are
quite as civil and respectful in their demeanor, and as little disposed
to wound the feelings of any one, as you are.
 Let me recommend you, sir, to imitate the benevolent example of
the society of Friends, in the midst of which you reside. Meek,
gentle, imbued with the genuine spirit of our benign religion, while
in principle they are firmly opposed to slavery, they do not seek to
accomplish its extinction by foul epithets, coarse and vulgar abuse,
and gross calumny. Their ways do not lead through blood,
revolution, and disunion. Their broad and comprehensive
philanthropy embraces, as they believe, the good and the happiness
of the white as well as the black race; giving to one their
commiseration, to the other their kindest sympathy. Their
instruments are not those of detraction and of war, but of peace,
persuasion, and earnest appeals to the charities of the human heart.
Unambitious, they have no political objects or purposes to subserve.
My intercourse with them throughout life has been considerable,
interesting, and agreeable; and I venture to say, nothing could have
induced them as a society, whatever a few individuals might have
been tempted to do, to seize the occasion of my casual passage
through this state to offer me a personal indignity.

I respect the motives of rational abolitionists, who are actuated

by a sentiment of devotion to human liberty, although I deplore and
deprecate the consequences of the agitation of the question. I have
even many friends among them. But they are not monomaniacs,
who, surrendering themselves to a single idea, look altogether to the
black side of human life. They do not believe that the sum total of all
our efforts and all our solicitude should be abolition. They believe
that there are duties to perform towards the white man as well as
the black. They want good government, good administration, and
the general prosperity of their country.

I shall, Mr. Mendenhall, take your petition into respectful and

deliberate consideration; but before I come to a final decision, I
should like to know what you and your associates are willing to do
for the slaves in my possession, if I should think proper to liberate
them. I own about fifty, who are probably worth fifteen thousand
dollars. To turn them loose upon society without any means of
subsistence or support would be an act of cruelty. Are you willing to
raise and secure the payment of fifteen thousand dollars for their
benefit, if I should be induced to free them? The security of the
payment of that sum would materially lessen the obstacle in the way
of their emancipation.

And now, Mr. Mendenhall, I must take respectful leave of you.

We separate, as we have met, with no unkind feelings, no excited
anger or dissatisfaction on my part, whatever may have been your
motives, and these I refer to our common Judge above, to whom we
are both responsible. Go home, and mind your own business, and
leave other people to take care of theirs. Limit your benevolent
exertions to your own neighborhood. Within that circle you will find
ample scope for the exercise all your charities. Dry up the tears of
the afflicted widows around you, console and comfort the helpless
orphan, clothe the naked, and feed and help the poor, black and
white, who need succor; and you will be a better and wiser man
than you have this day shown yourself.
 ON THE ADMISSION OF
CALIFORNIA,
AND OTHER MATTERS CONNECTED WITH

SLAVERY IN THE STATES AND

TERRITORIES.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

JANUARY 29, 1850.
[THE thirty-first congress commenced its session in the midst of great
excitement, principally in relation to the question of slavery, and more particularly
in connection with California, which newly-acquired territory was then seeking
admission into the Union as a state. Mr. Clay had been induced to return again to
the senate, and his genius and self-sacrifice did more, perhaps, to control the
elements of discord, and reconcile contending factions, than the labors of any
other single individual. Many projects were submitted, which were nearly
unexceptionable; but it remained for Mr. Clay to embody in a series of resolutions
such conciliatory propositions as ultimately met the approval of all who were
desirous of ‘promoting the greatest good of the greatest number.’ We have not
been able to procure a perfect copy of his speech on the occasion of submitting
these resolutions, but the following abstract will afford a tolerably correct idea of
what was said.]

MR. PRESIDENT: I hold in my hand a series of resolutions, which

I desire to present to the consideration of the senate. Taken
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