Handbook of

Nelf-Determination Research

Fdward . Dec and Richard M. Ryan

RWS
Handbook of Self-Determination Research
 Handbook
of Self-Determination
Research

Edited by
Edward L. Deci
Richard M. Ryan

THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER PRESS

Copyright © 2002 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan

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First published 2002 6 -

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Handbook of self-determination research / Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan,

editors.-- Soft cover ed.
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ISBN 1-58046-156-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Autonomy (Psychology) I. Deci, Edward L. Il. Ryan, Richard M.

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for all those indwiduals who have been interested in and engaged
with work on Self-Determination Theory.
Contents

Preface

Part I: Introduction
l. An Overview of Self-Determination Theory: An
Organismic-Dialectical Perspective
Richard M. Ryan G Edward L. Deci x

Part I: Theoretical Issues and Considerations

Za Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation: A Hierarchical
Model
Robertf. Vallerand G Catherine F. Ratelle 4 od

The Self-Concordance Model of Healthy Goal

Striving: When Personal Goals Correctly
Represent the Person
Kennon M. Sheldon 65

The Integrating Self and Conscious Experience

Holley S. Hodgins & C. Raymond Knee 87

Distinguishing Three Ways of Being Highly

Motivated: A Closer Look at Introjection,
Identification, and Intrinsic Motivation Va
Richard Roestner & Gaetan F Losver ; 101

Sketches for a Self-Determination Theory of

Values
Tim hasser

Social Contagion of Motivational Orientations

T. Cameron Wild & Michael E. Enzle 141

Part III: Self-Determination in Life Domains

8. What Makes Parents Controlling?
Wendy S. Grolnck & Nicholas H. Apostolens 161

a: Self-Determination Theory Applied to Educational

Settings
Johnmarshall Reeve 183

10. A Motivational Analysis of Self-Determination

for Pro-Enviromental Behaviors
Luc G. Pelletier 205
vill

he Improving Patients’ Health Through Supporting

the Autonomy of Patients and Providers
Geoffrey C. Willams 233

. Intrinsic Need Satisfaction in Organizations: A

Motivational Basis of Success in For-Profit and
Not-For-Profit Settings
Paul R Baard

. Self-Determination Theory and Participation

Motivation Research in the Sport and Exercise
Domain
Chnstina M. Fredenick-Recascino

Part IV: Related Viewpoints

14, Self-Determination, Coping, and Development
Ellen Skinner & Kathleen Edge 297

LD: Distinguishing Between Secure and Fragile Forms

of High Self-Esteem
Michael H. Kerms & Andrew W. Paradise

. The Need for Competence

Andrew 7.Elliot, Holly A.McGregor,
& Todd M. Thrash

. Three Views of the Agentic Self: A Developmental

Synthesis
Todd D. Little, Patricia H. Hawley, Christopher C.
Heinnch, & Katherine We Marsland 389

18. An Educational-Psychological Theory of Interest

and its Relation to SD'T
Andreas hrapp 405

Part V: Concluding Comments

19. Self-Determination Research: Reflections and
Future Directions me
Edward L. Dect & Richard M. Ryan 431

List of Contributors 443

Index 449
PREFACE

In April, 1999, the first conference devoted exclusively to a discussion of research

on self-determination theory (SDT) was held at the University of Rochester.
Approximately 75 researchers—faculty, post-docs, and graduate students—from
20 universities in the United States, Canada, Germany, and Israel assembled for
two long days of discussions and debates, examining findings and mapping direc-
tions for future research.
People came with a shared vocabulary, a shared set of concepts, a shared sys-
tem of thought, and a shared familiarity with an extensive research literature.
This allowed everyone to begin immediately discussing important and penetrat-
ing issues. Each person had been engaged in his or her unique research pro-
gram—on values, psychosocial medical interventions, self-regulatory styles, cop-
ing processes, the self, organizational dynamics, and so forth—and each of the
research programs was briefly reviewed and discussed in relation to the others.
Some issues were discussed by several researchers; others were addressed by only
one or two. In each case, the issues were the basis for rich and stimulating dia-
logue, and some led to the specification of empirical questions that are already
under examination in various labs.
So exciting were the presentations and discussions that the group decided it was
time to prepare a volume that would draw together the results of several research
programs as they relate to and have been organized by SD'T. This volume is the
result of that decision.
It begins with a brief overview of the theory. Then, 17 specific chapters, cov-
ering a broad range of topics, are organized into three sections. The first set
deals with specific theoretical issues related to SDT. In each of those chapters,
the researchers review work that has taken the theory into new directions,
expanding or organizing specific aspects of it. ‘The second set deals with the
application of SDT to various applied domains, including parenting, education,
environmentally friendly behaving, health care, management of for-profit and
not-for-profit organizations, and exercise programs. Although SDT has been
developed using a basic-science approach, we have always believed that it is
important for theories to be formulated in a way that makes them useful for
informing interpersonal dynamics and the design of social settings. The set of
chapters concerned with applying SDT in various domains makes clear how
broadly relevant the theory is for real, human concerns. The third set of chapters
relates SDT to some other theoretical perspectives and other areas of research.
The first presents a discussion of the relation between self-determination and
perceived control and shows the importance of self-determination (in addition to
perceived control) for effective coping. Then, the importance of differentiating
the concept of self-esteem is discussed along with the relevance of SDT for doing
so. Third, the concept of competence as a need and process is examined within
the context of achievement research, followed by a discussion of human agency
as it relates to perceived control, resource control, and self-determination. The
final chapter in this section relates SDT to research on interest that began in the
European tradition.
It is our hope that this volume will not only convey a sense of the breadth of
the research on SDT that has already been performed, but even more impor-
tantly that it will stimulate readers to ask new questions and develop new para-
digms for investigating additional issues that tie into the basic themes of this field
of inquiry.
There are many people who were of great help both in organizing the con-
ference and in preparing this volume. The Department of Clinical and Social
Sciences in Psychology at the University of Rochester provided substantial
resources for the conference; we thank Miron Zuckerman, chair of the depart-
ment, and other members of the faculty. Phyllis Joe worked hard on organiza-
tional matters. Graduate students and post-doctoral fellows in the Human
Motivation Program did many tasks to ensure that everything went well during
the conference. Presenters and audience members participated enthusiastically in
the discussions, making the event stimulating and rewarding. Timothy Madigan,
our editor at the University of Rochester Press, and Elizabeth Whitehead, who
has done expert editorial work on the SDT project for the past 25 years, worked
hard in preparing this volume. We are grateful for all these contributions.

Edward L. Deci
Richard M. Ryan
September, 2001
 PART I
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INTRODUCTION
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1: Overview of Self-Determination Theory:
An Organismic Dialectical Perspective

Richard M. Ryan
Edward L. Deci
Unwersity of Rochester

In the classical, Aristotelian, view of human development, people are assumed to

possess an active tendency toward psychological growth and integration.
Endowed with an innate striving to exercise and elaborate their interests, indi-
viduals tend naturally to seek challenges, to discover new perspectives, and to
actively internalize and transform cultural practices. By stretching their capaci-
ties and expressing their talents and propensities, people actualize their human
potentials. Within this perspective, active growth is complemented by a tendency
toward synthesis, organization, or relative unity of both knowledge and person-
ality. Moreover, the integration of that which is experienced provides the basis for
a coherent sense of self—a sense of wholeness, vitality, and integrity. To the
degree that individuals have attained a sense of self, they can act in accord with,
or be “true” to, that self.
This general view of an active, integrating organism with the potential to act
from a coherent sense of self can be found in psychodynamic and humanistic
theories of personality and in cognitive theories of development. For example,
psychoanalytic theorists posit inherent activity and a synthetic function of the ego
(Freud, 1927; Nunberg, 1931; Meissner, 1981; White, 1963), and humanistic psy-
chologists postulate an actualizing tendency (Angyal, 1963; Maslow, 1955;
Rogers, 1963). Similarly, many cognitive developmental theories emphasize an
organizational or integrative tendency as an endogenous feature of the organism,
proposing that development is characterized by an overarching organization
function through which new self-extensions are brought into coherence with
other cognitive structures (Piaget, 1971; Werner, 1948).

Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by a research grant from the
National Institute of Mental Health (MH-53385).
4 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

To varying degrees, some recent theories have continued to embrace such

assumptions (e.g., Ford, 1992; Loevinger & Blasi, 1991; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,
1998), recognizing the intrinsic propensities of people to engage in active, curios-
ity-based exploration and to integrate new experiences to the self.
Despite its longevity and seeming popularity, the assumption of innate ten-
dencies toward growth and integration is not without its critics. Among the more
staunch opponents of constructs concerning growth and integration have been
operant behaviorists who assume there is no inherent direction to development
and suggest that behavioral regulation and personality are a function of rein-
forcement histories and current contingencies (e.g., Skinner, 1953). For them, any
appearance of an inner organization to personality is attributable not to a pre-
sumed integrative tendency but rather to the fact that the relevant contingencies
people encountered in their environments were organized and systematic.
Similarly, contemporary social-cognitive approaches portray personality not
in terms of a self-unifying system, but rather as a collection of selves or self-
schemas that are activated by cues. Personality is viewed as a repository for
schemata related to various goals and identities, each of which can be elicited by
features of the social contexts (Bandura, 1989; Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius,
1986; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Unlike their operant predecessors, such social-
cognitive theories do not deny the idea of a synthetic tendency in development,
but instead peripheralize it, focusing on the unified properties within isolated goal
schemata or regulatory structures rather than among such schemata or structures.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the concept of endogenous tenden-
cies toward psychological growth and unity in development seems to fly in the
face of everyday behavioral observations. Ambient evidence could readily sup-
port the view that people are no more characterized by tendencies toward growth
and integrity than by propensities to be controlled, fragmented, and stagnated in
development. Everywhere, we see signs of divided functioning, of inner conflict
and a lack of concern with responsibility and community. These widespread
symptoms are echoed in psychological theories (e.g., Broughton, 1987;
Greenwald, 1982). In fact, Gergen (1993) viewed the metaphor of a core or true
self that grows and struggles for unity as a post-romantic view that should be
replaced by the acceptance of a postmodern perspective in which the self is more
aptly described as fragmented, saturated, and diversely populated by identities
that are imputed by the social world.
It seems indeed that the field of psychology is quite widely divided on the
issues of inherent tendencies toward psychological growth, a unified self, and
autonomous, responsible behavior. Whereas some theorists see our nature as
including a self-organizing, growth promoting tendency, others see us as wholly
lacking such an endowment, and thus as mere conditioned or reactive reflections
of our surroundings. Importantly, each position seems to have some prima facie
evidence in its favor.
This set of issues concerning the degree to which there are inherent tenden-
cies toward growth and integration is important not only theoretically, but also
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 5

practically. Insofar as practitioners believe people have a natural tendency toward

gaining integrity and enhancing their human potentials, they will orient to sup-
porting and facilitating that endogenous tendency across a variety of settings,
including homes, schools, work organizations, and therapy clinics. In contrast,
insofar as practitioners assume no such inner tendency toward growth, self-con-
struction, and inner coherence, then educational, therapeutic, and other practi-
cal intervention strategies will focus on exogenous means of training, shaping,
controlling, and directing behavior towards ends deemed to be of value.

The Organismic Dialectic: An Integrating Perspective

The primary agenda of self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan,

1985b; Ryan & Deci, 2000b) has been to provide an account of the seemingly
discrepant viewpoints characterized, on the one hand, by the humanistic, psy-
choanalytic, and developmental theories that employ an organismic metatheory
and, on the other hand, by the behavioral, cognitive, and post-modern theories
that do not. In other words, recognizing that there is compelling evidence in favor
of human tendencies toward active engagement and development and that there
is, as well, manifold indication of fragmentation and conditioned responses, SDT
provides a framework that integrates the phenomena illuminated by these dis-
crepant viewpoints.
SDT begins by embracing the assumption that all individuals have natural,
innate, and constructive tendencies to develop an ever more elaborated and uni-
fied sense of self. That is, we assume people have a primary propensity to forge
interconnections among aspects of their own psyches as well as with other indi-
viduals and groups in their social worlds. Drawing on terms used by Angyal
(1963), we characterize this tendency toward integration as involving both auton-
omy (tending toward inner organization and holistic self-regulation) and homon-
omy (tending toward integration of oneself with others). Healthy development
involves the complementary functioning of these two aspects of the integrative
tendency.
However, although SDT accepts this general integrative tendency as a fun-
damental aspect of human life, the theory also suggests that this tendency cannot
be taken for granted. On the contrary, SDT posits that there are clear and speci-
fiable social-contextual factors that support this innate tendency, and that there
are other specifiable factors that thwart or hinder this fundamental process of
human nature. Accordingly, SDT predicts a broad array of developmental out-
comes, ranging from a relatively active and integrated self to a highly fragment-
ed and sometimes passive, reactive, or alienated self, as a function of social-envi-
ronmental conditions.
6 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Another way of stating this is that the foundations of SDT reside in a dialec-
tical view which concerns the interaction between an active, integrating human
nature and social contexts that either nurture or impede the organism’s active
nature. Social environments can, according to this perspective, either facilitate
and enable the growth and integration propensities with which the human psy-
che is endowed, or they can disrupt, forestall, and fragment these processes result-
ing in behaviors and inner experiences that represent the darker side of human-
ity. As such, psychological growth and integration in personality should neither
be taken as a given, as something that will happen automatically, nor should it be
assumed not to exist. Instead, it must be viewed as a dynamic potential that
requires proximal and distal conditions of nurturance. In this, we fully agree with
Allport (1961) who suggested that unity in personality is a matter of degree and
should not be exaggerated. We add, however, that whatever the attained unity of
the psyche, the importance of the issue of integration within personality cannot
be over emphasized when one is attempting to understand the processes of
healthy psychological and social development. As well, the issue is important for
examining applied questions related to effective parenting, education, work,
health care, exercise regimens, environmentalism, religiosity, psychotherapy, and
other significant human endeavors.

Basic Needs and Social Contexts

Approaches to describing environments that support versus thwart effective

or healthy functioning have been numerous in the social, personality, and devel-
opmental literatures. In SD'T, the descriptions are organized with respect to the
concept of basic or fundamental psychological needs. The theory posits three
such needs, each of which has shown itself to be essential for integrating a vari-
ety of empirically illuminated phenomena. These needs—the needs for compe-
tence, relatedness, and autonomy—provide the basis for categorizing aspects of
the environment as supportive versus antagonistic to integrated and vital human
functioning. Social environments that allow satisfaction of the three basic needs
are predicted to support such healthy functioning, whereas factors associated with
need thwarting or conflict are predicted to be antagonistic. Thus, the concept of
basic needs provides a critical linking pin within the organismic dialectic and is
the basis for making predictions about the conditions that promote optimal ver-
sus nonoptimal outcomes in terms of both personality development and the qual-
ity of behavior and experience within a specific situation.
The nature of needs. Among the fundamental properties that separate the ani-
mate from the inanimate is the dependence of the animate on nutriments. Living
beings must engage in continual exchanges with their environment to draw from
it those necessities that allow them to preserve, maintain, and enhance their func-
tioning. Stated differently, living things have needs that must be fulfilled if they are
to persist and thrive (Jacob, 1973).
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 7

The concept of needs is relatively noncontroversial in the field of biology, a

field that focuses primarily on the survival and reproduction of the physical struc-
ture of the organism. One can verify empirically that there are certain specifiable
requirements, such as hydration, for organisms to survive and _ thrive.
Withholding such an element will lead reliably to deterioration of growth and
integrity, whereas making it available will lead to maintenance or enhancement.
As such, the concept of needs is important because it supplies a criterion for spec-
ifying what is essential to life. At the same time, the concept says something about
organismic nature because it is reasonable to argue that organisms are “built for”
the satisfaction of needs—that is, that they have evolved functional structures and
sensitivities that can lead to sustenance and integrity (see, e.g., Deci & Ryan,
2000).
The concept of needs has received far less attention and acceptance regard-
ing essential psychological nutriments than essential physiological ones. SDT
maintains, however, that there are necessary conditions for the growth and well-
being of people’s personalities and cognitive structures, just as there are for their
physical development and functioning. These nutriments are referred to within
SDT as basic psychological needs. By this SD'T definition, basic needs are universal—
that is, they represent innate requirements rather than acquired motives. As such,
they are expected to be evident in all cultures and in all developmental periods.
Although they may have different expressions or different vehicles through which
they are satisfied, their core character is unchanging. Clearly, this is a very restric-
tive definition, which is why the list of psychological needs within SD'T is thus far
so short, including only competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In humans, the
concept of psychological needs further suggests that, whether or not people are
explicitly conscious of needs as goal objects, the healthy human psyche ongoing-
ly strives for these nutriments and, when possible, gravitates toward situations
that provide them.
Competence refers to feeling effective in one’s ongoing interactions with the
social environment and experiencing opportunities to exercise and express one’s
capacities (Deci, 1975; Harter, 1983; White, 1959). ‘The need for competence
leads people to seek challenges that are optimal for their capacities and to per-
sistently attempt to maintain and enhance those skills and capacities through
activity. Competence is not, then, an attained skill or capability, but rather is a felt
sense of confidence and effectance in action.
Relatedness refers to feeling connected to others, to caring for and being cared
for by those others, to having a sense of belongingness both with other individu-
als and with one’s community (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1979; Harlow,
1958; Ryan, 1995). Relatedness reflects the homonomous aspect of the integra-
tive tendency of life, the tendency to connect with and be integral to and accept-
ed by others. The need to feel oneself as being in relation to others is thus not
concerned with the attainment of a certain outcome (e.g., sex) or a formal status
(e.g., becoming a spouse, or a group member), but instead concerns the psycho-
logical sense of being with others in secure communion or unity.
8 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Finally, autonomy refers to being the perceived origin or source of one’s own
behavior (deCharms, 1968; Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Connell, 1989).
Autonomy concerns acting from interest and integrated values. When
autonomous, individuals experience their behavior as an expression of the self,
such that, even when actions are influenced by outside sources, the actors concur
with those influences, feeling both initiative and value with regard to them.
Autonomy is often confused with, or melded together with, the quite different
concept of independence (which means not relying on external sources or influ-
ences), but the SDT view considers there to be no necessary antagonism between
autonomy and dependence. Indeed, one can quite autonomously enact values
and behaviors that others have requested or forwarded, provided that one con-
gruently endorses them. On the other hand, one can of course rely on others for
directions or opinions in such a way that autonomy is not experienced, as is the
case with mere compliance or conformity. In short, independence versus depend-
ence is a dimension that is seen within SDT as being largely orthogonal to the
issue of autonomy versus heteronomy (Ryan & Lynch, 1989; Ryan, 1993).
Needs and motwes. Our concept of basic psychological needs is quite different
from the broader idea of personal motives, desires, or strivings. Although people
may formulate motives or strivings to satisfy basic needs, it is also clear that there
are many motives that do not fit the criterion of being essential for well-being and
may, indeed, be inimical to it. In other words, some motives may distract people
from activities that could provide basic need fulfillment and thus detract from
their well-being. Even when people are highly efficacious at satisfying motives,
the motives may still be detrimental to well-being if they interfere with people’s
autonomy or relatedness. ‘This is an extremely important point, because it makes
clear that attaining one’s goals efficaciously is not enough to ensure psychological
well-being. As such, many motives and goals that organize behavior must be
viewed dynamically either as being peripheral to psychological need satisfaction
or as being need substitutes that developed as compensations when basic needs
were thwarted (Deci, 1980; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996).

Summary

‘To summarize, SD'T embraces both an organismic and a dialectical frame-

work for the study of personality growth and development. As an organismic
view, SD'T conceives of humans as active, growth-oriented organisms, that
innately seek and engage challenges in their environments, attempting to actual-
ize their potentialities, capacities, and sensibilities. However, this organismic ten-
dency toward actualization represents only one pole of a dialectical interface, the
other being social environments which can either facilitate the individuals’ syn-
thetic tendencies, or alternatively wither, block, or overwhelm them.
The concept of psychological needs provides the basis for describing char-
acteristics of the environment that support versus undermine the organism’s
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 2

attempts to master or engage each new situation. To the extent that an aspect of
the social context allows need fulfillment, it yields engagement, mastery, and syn-
thesis; whereas, to the extent that it thwarts need fulfillment, it diminishes the
individual's motivation, growth, integrity, and well-being.
Within SDT, the specification of needs and the study of need-related behay-
ioral dynamics has been pursued as an empirical endeavor. The specification of
needs, along with a stringent functional definition of what qualifies as a psycho-
logical need, has led to quite exacting, if sometimes counter-intuitive predictions
about human behavior and the effects of social contexts. That is, by evoking
needs and applying appropriate criteria, SDT research has been able to pinpoint
and_ examine factors in _social environments. that. facilitate ‘s
‘self-motivation~and
Sy well-being, and those that thwart initiative and positive experience across diverse
settings, domains, and cultures.

The Basic Components of Self-Determination Theory

SDT has evolved over the past three decades in the form of mini-theories,
each of which relates to specific phenomena. The mini-theories are linked in that
they all share organismic and dialectical assumptions and all involve the concept
of basic psychological needs. When coordinated, they cover all types of human
behavior in all domains. Thus, together, the mini-theories constitute SDT.
Specification of separate mini-theories was, historically, a consequence of build-
ing a broad theory in an inductive fashion. That is, our approach has been to
research phenomena, construct mini-theories to account for them, and then
derive hypotheses about related phenomena. Throughout this process, basic
assumptions and approaches remained constant, so the mini-theories were logi-
cally coherent and readily integratable each with the others. As such, each rep-
resents a piece of the overall SDT framework.
In our writings, various aspects or propositions of the mini-theories have at
times been presented with the terminology of the relevant mini-theories, but
often they have simply been presented under the rubric of SDT{At this time,
SDT comprises four mini-theories. Cognitive evaluation theory, the first, was formu-
lated to describe the effects of sociafContexts on people’s intrinsic motivation
(Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1980). It describes contextual elements as autonomy
supportive (informational), controlling, and amotivating, and it links these types
of contextual elements to the different motivations. Organismic integration theory
(Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Connell, 1989) concerns internalization and inte-
gration of values and regulations, and was formulated to explain the develop- |
ment and dynamics of extrinsic motivation; the degree to which individuals’ /
experience autonomy while engaging in extrinsically motivated behaviors; and|
the processes through which people take on the values and mores of their groups
10 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

and cultures. Causality orientations theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985a) was formulated to
describe individual differences in people’s tendencies to orient toward the social
environment in ways that support their own autonomy, control their behavior, or
are amotivating. This mini-theory allows for prediction of experience and behay-
ior from enduring orientations of the person. Finally, basic needs theory (Ryan &
Deci, 2000b) was formulated to explain the relation of motivation and goals to
health and well-being, in part by describing associations of value configurations
and regulatory styles to psychological health, across time, gender, situations, and
culture. We address each mini-theory in turn.

Cognitive Evaluation Theory

Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those whose motivation is based in the

inherent satisfactions of the behaviors per se, rather than in contingencies or rein-
forcements that are operationally separable form those activities. Intrinsic moti-
vation represents a prototype of self-determined activity, in that, when intrinsi-
cally motivated, people engage in activities freely, being sustained by the experi-
ence of interest and enjoyment. Thus, as it is classically defined (see Ryan & Deci,
2000a), intrinsic motivation is noninstrumentally focused, instead originating
autotelically from satisfactions inherent in action, whereas extrinsic motivation is
focused toward and dependent on contingent outcomes that are separable from
the action per se. DeCharms (1968) used Heider’s (1958) concept of perceived
locus of causality to describe the two types of motivation: with extrinsic motiva-
tion, deCharms suggested, people perceive the locus of initiation and regulation
of their behavior to be external to themselves, whereas with intrinsic motivation,
they perceive the locus to be within themselves. SDT has followed deCharms’
perspective only in part. We agree with him that intrinsically motivated actions
invariantly entail an internal perceived locus of causality, and that intrinsic moti-
vation tends to be undermined when factors conduce toward an external per-
ceived locus of causality. However, our view of extrinsic motivation is more dif-
ferentiated, as we shall describe in our coverage of Organismic Integration
Theory.
‘The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction provided the basis for the first experiments
in the field. Specifically, research began with the question of how extrinsic
rewards would affect people’s intrinsic motivation for an interesting activity. In
other words, if someone engaged in an activity freely without being rewarded
and found it highly interesting and enjoyable, the person would clearly be intrin-
sically motivated. If he or she were then offered an extrinsic reward for doing the
activity, what would happen to the person’s intrinsic motivation?
The initial studies (Deci, 1971, 1972a, 1972b; Kruglanski, Friedman, &
Zeevi, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) all found that tangible rewards—
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 1]

whether concrete, such as money (Deci), or symbolic, such as good player awards
(Lepper et al.)—decreased intrinsic motivation so long as they were expected and
their receipt required engaging in the activity. However, the initial Deci studies
also showed that positive feedback—or what is sometimes referred to as verbal
rewards or praise—enhanced rather than undermined intrinsic motivation.
The undermining of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards has been a
controversial issue from the time the initial studies were published, in part
because the finding appeared to fly in the face of operant theory which had a
strong presence in empirical psychology at that time. In spite of the controversy
and some fatally flawed attempts to deny the undermining phenomenon (e.g.
Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996), a meta-analysis of 128 experiments confirmed
that expected tangible rewards which require engaging in the target activity do
indeed undermine intrinsic motivation for that activity, whereas verbal rewards
tend to enhance intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999).

Perceived Causality and Perceived Competence

Cognitive evaluation theory (CET: Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1980), which
expanded upon deCharms’ analysis of perceived locus of causality, was initially
formulated to account for reward effects on intrinsic motivation, as well as vari-
ous other results that extended these phenomena. The theory suggests that the
needs for competence and autonomy are integrally involved in intrinsic motiva-
tion and that contextual events, such as the offer of a reward, the provision of
positive feedback, or the imposition of a deadline, are hkely to affect intrinsic
motivation to the extent that they are experienced as supporting versus thwarting
satisfaction of these needs.
More specifically, Deci and Ryan (1980) suggested that there are two primary
cognitive processes through which contextual factors affect intrinsic motivation.
h Change in perceived locus of causality relates to the need for autonomy: when an
event prompts a change in perceptions toward a more external locus, intrinsic
motivation will be undermined; whereas, when an event prompts a change
toward a more internal perceived locus, intrinsic motivation will be enhanced.
Tangible rewards, which were typically found to decrease intrinsic motivation,
were theorized to have their cffect by prompting a shift toward a more external
perceived locus of causality for the rewarded activity. The second process,
change in perceived competence, relates to the need for competence: when an event
increases perceived competence, intrinsic motivation will tend to be enhanced;
whereas, when an event diminishes perceived competence, intrinsic motivation
will be undermined. According to CET, however, positive feedback is predicted
to enhance intrinsic motivation only when people feel a sense of autonomy with
respect to the activity for which they perceived themselves to be competent, a
proposition upheld in various studies (e.g., Fisher, 1978; Ryan, 1982).
Ibs HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

As initially presented, CET further specified that contextual events or cli-

mates contain both a controlling aspect and an informational aspect and that it is the
relative salience of these two aspects of social contexts that determines the effects
of the context on perceptions of causality and competence, and thus on intrinsic
motivation. The controlling aspects of social environments are those that repre-
sent pressure toward specified outcomes, and thus conduce to a shift toward a
more external perceived locus of causality. Features of the social environment
that have controlling salience undermine intrinsic motivation. The information-
al aspect of social contexts pertains to effectance-relevant inputs. Specifically,
informational events and communications provide feedback that supports peo-
ple’s experience of competent engagement. In discussions of CET, the concept
of functional significance is used to convey the idea that individuals will actively con-
strue social-contextual inputs in terms of their informational and controlling
meanings, and that it is the relative salience of informational versus controlling
components that will, in large part, determine subsequent intrinsic motivation.
For example, an event such as the offer of a tangible reward (which studies have
found to be controlling) is, on average, said to have a controlling functional sig-
nificance; whereas, the functional significance of positive feedback is, on average,
said to be informational. Accordingly rewards are predicted to undermine intrin-
sic motivation in many circumstances, whereas positive performance feedback is
expected to enhance it.
The bulk of the experimental studies on intrinsic motivation has focused on
the undermining of intrinsic motivation when the controlling aspect of an event
is salient. Thus, in addition to the studies of expected rewards, others have shown
that threats of punishment (Deci & Cascio, 1972), deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, &
Lepper, 1976), imposed goals (Mossholder, 1980), surveillance (Lepper & Greene,
1975; Plant & Ryan, 1985), competition (Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac,
1981), and evaluation (Smith, 1975; Ryan, 1982) all decreased intrinsic motiva-
tion, presumably because they were experienced as controls. Relatively little
attention has been given to events that enhance intrinsic motivation through a
shift toward a more internal perceived locus of causality. However, Zuckerman,
Porac, Lathin, Smith, and Deci (1978) and Swann and Pittman (1977) reported
that providing choice about what to do or how to do it enhanced intrinsic moti-
vation, and Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, and Holt (1984) showed that empathy and
noncontrollingness can help maintain intrinsic motivation.
Furthermore, most feedback studies have focused on positive feedback, with
only a few assessing the effects of negative feedback on intrinsic motivation.
However, Deci and Cascio (1972) found negative feedback to undermine intrin-
sic motivation, and Vallerand and Reid (1984) found the undermining by nega-
tive feedback to be mediated by a decrease in perceived competence.
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory Ne)

Social Contexts and Internal Events

CET was elaborated in the early 1980s in two important ways. First, it was
suggested that although events such as rewards, deadlines, or positive feedback
tend to have a particular functional significance, the interpersonal climate with-
in which they are administered can significantly influence it. Thus, for example,
Ryan (1982) showed that, whereas positive feedback is typically experienced as
informational, if it is administered within a pressuring climate, emphasizing for
example that people “should do well,” the positive feedback tends to be experi-
enced as controlling. Similarly, Ryan, Mims, and Koestner (1983) showed that
although tangible rewards tend to be experienced as controlling, if they are
administered in a non-evaluative context that supports autonomy, they tend not
to be undermining. Furthermore, subsequent studies showed that limit setting
will have a significantly different effect depending on whether the interpersonal
context is informational or controlling (Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984)
and that competition can also be experienced as either informational or control-
ling, depending on the interpersonal climate (Reeve & Deci, 1996).
The second important extension of CET concerned internal initiating
events. Specifically, Ryan (1982) suggested that people can initiate and regulate
their actions in different ways that are relatively independent of the social con-
text. For example, people can become ego-involved in an activity and its out-
come. That is, their feelings of self-worth can become hinged to their perform-
ance such that they do the activity to prove to themselves that they are good at
the activity and thus worthy individuals. Ryan contrasted this with task-involve-
ment in which people are more involved with the task itself rather than with its
implications for their own feelings of worth. He suggested that when the initia-
tion and regulation of behavior is ego-involved the functional significance will be
controlling relative to when the initiation and regulation is task-involved, and
results confirmed this reasoning (Plant & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, 1982). A recent
meta-analysis of experimental studies confirmed the CET proposition concern-
ing the effects of ego versus task involvement on subsequent intrinsic motivation
(Rawsthorne & Elliot, 1999). More generally, CET holds that self-controlling
forms of regulation will be associated with diminished intrinsic motivation,
whereas more autonomous forms of self-regulation will maintain or enhance
intrinsic motivation.

Relatedness

As noted, we theorized that intrinsic motivation is integrally connected to the

needs for competence and autonomy, and research has indicated that aspects of
the social context which influence perceptions of competence and autonomy do
14 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

indeed affect intrinsic motivation. There remains, however, the question of how
the need for relatedness is involved in intrinsic motivation. We have emphasized
that all three needs are essential for growth and development, so one would
expect relatedness to play a role in intrinsic motivation. Indeed, evidence from
studies with infants indicates that exploratory behavior (i.e., intrinsically motivat-
ed curiosity) tends to be in evidence to the degree that the children are securely
attached to a primary caregiver. For example, Frodi, Bridges, and Grolnick (1985)
found that security of attachment, which implied relational satisfaction, was asso-
ciated with exploratory behaviors. In other words, when the infants experienced
a general sense of satisfaction of the relatedness need, they were more likely to
display intrinsically motivated exploration.
A serendipitous finding from a laboratory experiment by Anderson,
Manoogian, and Reznick (1976) indicated that when children worked on an
interesting activity in the presence of a previously unknown adult experimenter
who ignored them, the children displayed a very low level of intrinsic motivation,
suggesting therefore that thwarting of the need for relatedness can have a delete-
rious effect on intrinsic motivation. Still, evidence which closely links competence
and autonomy to intrinsic motivation is considerably more plentiful than that
linking relatedness to intrinsic motivation, and there do appear to be many soli-
tary types of activities for which people maintain high intrinsic motivation in
spite of not relating to others while doing them. Accordingly, we (Deci & Ryan,
2000) have suggested that relatedness typically plays a more distal role in the pro-
motion of intrinsic motivation than do competence and autonomy, although
there are some interpersonal activities for which satisfaction of the need for relat-
edness is crucial for maintaining intrinsic motivation,

Organismic Integration Theory

As noted, CET focuses on the effects of social-contextual variables on intrin-

sically motivated behaviors. It thus applies primarily to activities that people find
interesting, optimally challenging, or aesthetically pleasing. Activities that are not
so experienced will not be intrinsically motivated and are thus unlikely to be per-
formed unless there is an extrinsic reason for doing them. Still, socializing agents
frequently find it necessary to promote these uninteresting behaviors, so they face
the issue not only of how to prompt the behaviors but, even more importantly,
how to promote self-regulation of the behaviors so they will persist over the long
term.
Because early discussions of intrinsic motivation contrasted it with extrinsic
motivation, and because extrinsic motivation has frequently been shown to relate
negatively to intrinsic motivation, many commentators (beginning with
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 1

deCharms, 1968) have characterized extrinsic motivation as being nonau-

tonomous—as being antithetical to self-determination. Indeed, research does
make clear that extrinsic motivation in the form of working to attain tangible
rewards is generally nonautonomous, for it tends to undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion (Deci et al., 1999). Nonetheless, we have assumed from the time we began this
research that it is possible to be autonomously extrinsically motivated, and
research within organismic integration theory has examined that issue extensively.

Internalization

Organismic integration theory (OIT) is based on the assumption that people

are naturally inclined to integrate their ongoing experiences, assuming they have
the necessary nutriments to do so. Accordingly, we postulated that if external
prompts are used by significant others or salient reference groups to encourage
people to do an uninteresting activity—an activity for which they are not intrin-
sically motivated—the individuals will tend to internalize the activity’s initially
external regulation. ‘That is, people will tend to take in the regulation and inte-
grate it with their sense of self. To the extent that this occurs, the individuals
would be autonomous when enacting this extrinsically motivated behavior.
Accordingly, in line with our active-organism metatheory, we view the phenom-
enon of internalization as a natural process in which people work to actively
transform external regulation into self-regulation (Schafer, 1968), becoming more
integrated as they do so.
An important element of OIT is that, unlike most other theories of inter-
nalization (e.g., Bandura, 1996), it views internalization not in terms of a dichoto-
my but rather in terms of a continuum. The more fully a regulation (or the value
underlying it) is internalized, the more it becomes part of the integrated self and
the more it is the basis for self-determined behavior. From this perspective, then,
it is possible for individuals to internalize regulations without having them
become part of the self. Regulations that have been taken in by an individual but
not integrated with the self would not be the basis for autonomous self-regulation
but would instead function more as controllers of behavior. Thus, extrinsically
motivated behaviors for which the regulations have been internalized to differing
degrees would differ in their relative autonomy. Those for which the regulations
have been well integrated would be the basis for autonomous extrinsically moti-
vated behavior, whereas those for which the regulations have been less fully inter-
nalized would be the basis for more controlled forms of extrinsic motivation.
Accordingly, OIT proposes a taxonomy of types of regulation for extrinsic
motivation which differ in the degree to which they represent autonomy. Figure
1-1 presents the OIT taxonomy, arranged from left to right in terms of the extent
to which the motivation for a behavior emanates from the self (i.e., 1s
autonomous).
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 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 17

At the left end is amotiwation, the state of lacking the intention to act. When
people are amotivated, either they do not act at all or they act passively—that is,
they go through the motions with no sense of intending to do what they are
doing. Amotivation results from feeling either that they are unable to achieve
desired outcomes because of a lack of contingency (Rotter, 1966; Seligman,
1975) or a lack of perceived competence (Bandura, 1977; Deci, 1975) or that
they do not value the activity or the outcomes it would yield (Ryan, 1995).
The other five points on the continuum refer to classifications of motivated
behavior. Each of these describes a theoretically, experientially, and functionally
distinct type of regulation. At the right end of the continuum is intrinste motwation,
which we have already discussed as the state of doing an activity out of interest
and inherent satisfaction. It is the prototype of autonomous or self-determined
behavior. Extrinsically motivated behaviors, which are characterized by four
types of regulation, fall along the self-determination continuum between amoti-
vation and intrinsic motivation.
External regulation is the least autonomous form of extrinsic motivation and
includes the classic instance of being motivated to obtain rewards or avoid pun-
ishments. More generally, external regulation is in evidence when one’s reason for
doing a behavior is to satisfy an external demand or a socially constructed con-
tingency. External regulation has an external perceived locus of causality, is the
type of regulation that is central to operant theory (e.g., Skinner, 1953), and 1s the
form of extrinsic motivation that was contrasted with intrinsic motivation in the
early discussions of the topic (e.g., deCharms, 1968).
Introjected regulation involves an external regulation having been internalized
but not, in a much deeper sense, truly accepted as one’s own. It is a type of extrin-
sic motivation that, having been partially internalized, is within the person but is
not considered part of the integrated self. Introjection is a form of internalized
regulation that is theorized to be quite controlling. Introjection-based behaviors
are performed to avoid guilt and shame or to attain ego enhancements and feel-
ings of worth. In other words, this type of regulation is based in contingent self-
esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995). Studies by Ryan (1982) and others have shown that,
when ego-involved in an outcome, which is a form of introjected regulation, peo-
ple tend to lose intrinsic motivation for the target activity, thus mdicating that this
type of regulation is, in fact, quite controlling.
Regulation through identification is a more self-determined form of extrinsic
motivation, for it involves a conscious valuing of a behavioral goal or regulation,
an acceptance of the behavior as personally important. Identification represents
an important aspect of the process of transforming external regulation into true
self-regulation. When a person identifies with an action or the value it expresses,
they, at least at a conscious level, are personally endorsing it, and thus identifica-
tions are accompanied by a high degree of perceived autonomy. That is, identi-
fications tend to have a relatively internal perceived locus of causality. However,
SDT suggests that some identifications can be relatively compartmentalized or
18 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

separated from one’s other beliefs and values, in which case they may not reflect
the person’s overarching values in a given situation. Nonetheless, relative to
external and introjected regulations, behavior that stems from identifications
tends to be relatively autonomous or self-determined.
Integrated regulation provides the basis for the most autonomous form of extrin-
sically motivated behavior. It results when identifications have been evaluated
and brought into congruence with the personally endorsed values, goals, and
needs that are already part of the self. Research has shown extrinsically motivat-
ed behaviors that are integrated to be associated with more positive experiences
than the less fully internalized forms of extrinsic motivation. Integrated extrinsic
motivation also shares many qualities with intrinsic motivation. Nonetheless,
although behaviors governed by integrated regulations are performed volitional-
ly, they are still considered extrinsic because they are done to attain personally
important outcomes rather than for their inherent interest and enjoyment. In
other words, they are still instrumental to a separable outcome whose value is well
integrated with the self.
It is important to recognize that the relative autonomy continuum is intend-
ed descriptively, to organize types of regulation with respect to the concept of
self-determination. We do not suggest that it is a developmental continuum fer se,
nor that people must progress through each stage of internalization with respect
to each regulation. Rather, it is possible for people to take in a regulation at any
point along this continuum, assuming they have relevant prior experience and
the immediate interpersonal climate is sufficiently supportive (Deci & Ryan,
1991; Ryan, 1995). We assume that the range of behaviors that can be assimilat-
ed to the self does increase over time as a function of greater cognitive and ego
development (e.g., Loevinger & Blasi, 1991; Piaget, 1971), and there is evidence
that children’s general regulatory style tends to become more internalized with
age (e.g, Chandler & Connell, 1987).
Ryan and Connell (1989) developed an approach to assessing regulatory
styles, and thus the relative autonomy of one’s regulation for a behavior or class
of behaviors, treating regulatory styles as behavior-specific individual differences.
They then used the approach to show that these different types of regulation lie
along a continuum of relative autonomy. Specifically, they found that the differ-
ent regulatory styles were intercorrelated according to a quasi-simplex pattern,
correlating most strongly with those other styles that were theoretically closest to
them in terms of the underlying relative autonomy continuum.
The Ryan and Connell approach has been extremely useful for examining
OFT in various applied domains, such as education (Miserandino, 1996; Ryan &
Connell, 1989), child rearing (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989), health care (Williams,
Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996; Williams, Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci,
1998), intimate relationships (Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, & Vallerand, 1990), reli-
gious behavior (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993), physical exercise (Chatzisarantis,
Biddle, & Meek, 1997), political behavior (Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, &
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 19

Carducci, 1996), and environmentally friendly activity (Green-Demers, Pelletier,

& Menard, 1997). Consistently, the research has shown varied advantages to
being autonomously motivated, relative to controlled, including more volitional
persistence, better relationships in one’s social groups, more effective perform-
ance, and greater health and well-being.

Promoting Integrated Regulation

Because extrinsically motivated behaviors are not inherently interesting,

people are unlikely to do them if the behaviors are not instrumental for a desired
outcome. Thus, initially, such behaviors are typically prompted by significant oth-
ers, whether with a simple request, the offer of a reward, or the fact that the oth-
ers demonstrate their valuing of the activity by performing it regularly. That is,
the dynamic involved in prompting such behaviors involves a significant other or
group endorsing an action and in some way conveying their endorsement to the
target individual. The individual, in turn, out of feeling related to the other per-
son or the group, or out of the desire for such relatedness, will likely engage in
the behavior with the expectation of gaining implicit or explicit approval for
doing so. This suggests that the need for relatedness to others is centrally impor-
tant for internalization. OIT proposes that supports for feelings of relatedness
are, indeed, crucial for promoting internalization. In fact, a study by Ryan, Stiller
and Lynch (1994) showed that children who felt securely connected to, and cared
for by, their parents and teachers were the ones who more fully internalized the
regulation for positive school-related behaviors. It seems that, whereas relatedness
is less central than the other two needs for maintaining intrinsic motivation, it is
very much central for promoting internalization.
Still, relatedness alone is not enough to ensure a full internalization of extrin-
sic motivation. As well, people will need to feel competent with respect to behav-
iors valued by a significant other if they are to engage in and accept responsibil-
ity for those behaviors. Thus, OIT suggests that support for competence will con-
tribute to the facilitation of internalization and the subsequent self-regulation of
extrinsically motivated activities. If people do not feel competent to perform a
target behavior, they are unlikely to internalize regulation of the behavior; in fact,
they will likely find an excuse not to do the behavior at all, even in the presence
of the significant other.
i Finally, from the perspective of OIT) perceptions of autonomy play an
extremely important role in the processes of internalization and integration. As
already noted, internalization can take the form of introjection, resulting in con-
trolled regulation, or it can involve a much fuller internalization and integration.
According to the theory, support for autonomy is the critical factor for determin-
ing whether the internalization that is promoted by supports for relatedness and
competence will be only partial (as in introjection) or will be much fuller (as in
20 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

integration). Thus, although some internalization may occur without autonomy

support, the type of internalization that will result in persistence, flexibility, and
vitality—those being the factors that characterize self-determination—will be in
evidence to the degree that supports for autonomy are present. Stated different-
ly, to integrate the regulation of a behavior, people must grasp its meaning for
themselves personally, and they must synthesize that meaning with other aspects
of their psychic makeup. This type of engagement with the activity and with the
process of internalization is most likely to occur when people experience a sense
of choice, volition, and freedom from external demands. Accordingly, autonomy
support is the basis for people’s actively transforming a value and regulation into
their own.
To summarize, external regulation is likely to occur when people feel com-
petent enough to perform the requisite action, assuming there are salient conse-
quences such as implicit approval from significant others. Further, with supports
for relatedness as well as competence, introjection is a likely outcome. Only when
the social climate also provides support for autonomy is there likely to be inte-
gration of the relevant regulation, thus providing the foundation for subsequent
selfdetermined behavior.
Various studies have provided evidence for this reasoning. For example,
Grolnick and Ryan (1989) found greater internalization and integration of
school-related values among children whose parents were more supportive of
autonomy and relatedness, and Williams and Deci (1996), using a longitudinal
design, demonstrated greater internalization of biopsychosocial values among
medical students whose instructors were more supportive of autonomy.
Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994) performed a laboratory experiment
with an uninteresting activity in which they manipulated the presence versus
absence of three supportive factors——a meaningful rationale, acknowledgement
of the person’s perspective, and provision of choice rather than pressure. The
researchers found internalization, as measured by subsequent behavioral persist-
ence, to be a function of the number of facilitating factors. However, they also
found that with relatively little support, whatever internalization occurred was in
the form of introjection, whereas with relatively more support, the internaliza-
tion was likely to involve integration.

Causality Orientations Theory

Self-determination theory, with its various mini-theories, has devoted con-

siderable attention to the influence of social contexts both on motivation, behav-
ior, and experience in a particular situation and on the development of person-
ality over time. Whereas CET is concerned primarily with the effects of specific
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 21

social context on motivation, behavior, and experience, OIT is concerned more

with the differentiation of extrinsic motivation in accord with internalization and
on the influence of social contexts on the internalization of extrinsic motivation.
More specifically, OIT posits that different regulatory styles for extrinsically moti-
vated behaviors are developmental outcomes, and researchers have used those
styles as individual differences to predict performance and well-being.
Throughout the development of SDT, we have assumed that a person’s
motivation, behavior, and experience in a particular situation is a function both
of the immediate social context and of the person’s inner resources that have
developed over time as a function of prior interactions with social contexts.
Causality orientations theory was developed as a descriptive account of these
inner resources—that is, of relatively stable individual differences in one’s moti-
vational orientations toward the social world. Based on it, we developed an indi-
vidual difference measure, the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS)
that has been used for predictive purposes in numerous studies (Deci & Ryan,
1985a).
The causality orientations approach is intended to index aspects of person-
ality that are broadly integral to the regulation of behavior and experience. It
specifies three orientations that differ in the degree to which they represent self-
determination—namely, the autonomous, controlled, and impersonal causality
orientations—and people are assumed to have each of these orientations, to
some degree. The autonomy orientation involves regulating behavior on the basis of
interests and self-endorsed values; it serves to index a person’s general tendencies
toward intrinsic motivation and well integrated extrinsic motivation. The con-
trolled orientation involves orienting toward controls and directives concerning how
one should behave; it relates to external and introjected regulation. The znperson-
al onentation involves focusing on indicators of ineffectance and not behaving
intentionally; it relates to amotivation and lack of intentional action.
Individuals get a score on each of the three orientations reflecting the
strength of each general tendency for themselves. In the initial research by Deci
and Ryan (1985a) the autonomy orientation was found to relate positively to self-
actualization, self-esteem, ego development, and other indicators of well-being.
As expected, the controlled orientation was not positively associated with well-
being but instead was related to public self-consciousness and the ‘Type-A coro-
nary prone behavior pattern, indicating that the focus tends to be outward and
pressured. The impersonal orientation was related to self-derogation, low self-
esteem, and depression.
Koestner, Bernieri, and Zuckerman (1992) explored the relation of the
autonomy and controlled orientations to integration in personality, hypothesizing
that autonomy, relative, to control, would be associated with greater integration.
They began by creating two groups, one of individuals who tended to be more
autonomous and one of individuals who tended to be more controlled, based on
a comparison of their standardized scores for the two orientations. ‘The
22 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

researchers then examined the consistency among behaviors, traits, and attitudes
within the two groups. Results indicated that autonomy-oriented individuals dis-
played a strong positive relation among behaviors and self-reports of traits or atti-
tudes, whereas control-oriented individuals displayed weak or even negative rela-
tions among these various personality aspects. Thus, the studies drew an empiri-
cal link between the concepts of autonomy and integration by showing greater
congruence among personality, awareness, and behavior for autonomy-oriented
than for control-oriented individuals.
Numerous investigators have related general causality orientations to specif-
ic regulatory styles, to behavioral outcomes, to aspects of personality, and to well-
being indicators, and much of that research is described in various chapters of
this volume.

Basic Needs Theory

The concept of basic psychological needs has played an important, though

often implicit, role in SDT and each of its mmi-theories from the tme the work
began. The relatively recent formalization of this mini-theory was done to clan-
fy the meaning of the concept and to detail its dynamic relation to mental health
and well-being.
To qualify as a need, a motivating force must have a direct relation to well-
being. Needs, when satisfied, promote well-being, but when thwarted, lead to
negative consequences. Further, because needs are hypothesized to be universal,
this relation between satisfaction and well-being must apply across ages, genders,
and cultures. Of course, the means through which needs are satisfied (versus
thwarted) vary as a function of age, gender, and culture. Thus, in an extreme
case, it is possible for the same behavior to be need satisfying for one group and
need thwarting for another. Stull, the underlying process in which need satisfac-
tion promotes health is theorized to be the same across all these groups.

Well-being

Recent research on well-being has been plentiful, although the concept of

well-being has been treated in two different ways by different researchers (see
Ryan & Deci, 2001). One approach focuses on hedonic or subjective well-being
and essentially equates it with happiness (e.g., Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz,
1999), whereas the other approach focuses on eudaimonic well-being and equates
it with being fully functioning (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998). Although there is sub-
stantial intersection of the two concepts, we endorse the eudaimonic conception,
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 28

and much of our recent research has served to establish a clear empirical link
between satisfaction of autonomy, competence, and relatedness needs, on the one
hand, and eudaimonic well-being, on the other. In so doing, we have not used a
specific measure of eudaimonic well-being, but have instead used several meas-
ures of positive affect and mental health to index the general organismic concept
that involves people detecting the degree of their own vitality, psychological flex-
ibility, and deep inner sense of wellness (Ryan & Frederick, 1997; Ryan, Deci, &
Grolnick, 1995).

Research on Basic Needs Theory

Research on basic needs theory has thus far fallen into three categories. First,
diary procedures have been used to examine whether daily variations in need sat-
isfaction predict daily fluctuations in well-being. In other words, this research has
considered the within-person relations between experienced need satisfaction
and well-being over time, as well as the more standard between-person relations.
Second, studies have explored the relation between the pursuit and attainment of
specific goal contents, on the one hand, and well-being, on the other. Whereas |
most theories do not differentiate goal contents, suggesting simply a positive rela-
tion between the attainment of valued goals and well-being, basic needs theory
suggests that there will be a positive relation between goal attainment and well-
being only for those goals that satisfy basic psychological needs. In fact, pursuit of
some valent goals may be negatively related to well-being if the goals distract
people from satisfaction of the basic needs. Third, we have begun to examine
need satisfaction across cultures, hypothesizing that need satisfaction will relate to
well-being regardless of culture.

Need Satisfaction and Well-being

In two studies (Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996; Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe,
& Ryan, 2000), multilevel modeling was used to relate variations in need satisfac-
tion to well-being. At both the between-person (i.e., individual-difference) level
and the within-person (i.e., daily-fluctuation) level, measures of basic-need satis-
faction related to positive affect, vitality, and the inverse of negative affect and
symptomatology. These studies confirmed both that general satisfaction of each
basic need contributed to general well-being and that daily satisfaction of each
basic need explained daily fluctuations in well-being over time.
In other, between-person, studies, V. Kasser and Ryan (1999) found that sat-
isfaction of the needs for autonomy and relatedness in the daily lives of residents
of a nursing home were positively related to their well-being and perceived
health. Two studies (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2000; Ilardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan,
24 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

1993) have further found that employees’ reports of satisfaction of their basic
needs in the workplace related to self-esteem, general health, vitality, and the
inverse of anxiety and somatization. Thus, within the specific settings of nursing
homes and workplaces, the evidence supports the hypothesis that satisfaction of
the needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness will predict psychological
health,

Aspirations and Basic Needs

The relation of goal contents to well-being has been examined in a series of

studies by Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) and others, concerning people’s aspira-
tions or life goals. Research on these issues is also discussed in the chapter by
Kasser in this volume. Kasser and Ryan suggested that there are two types of
aspirations, namely, intrinsic aspuations, which provide relatively direct satisfaction
of the basic needs, and extrinsic asfrrations, which are more related to obtaining
external signs of worth and are less likely to provide direct need satisfaction.
Examples of intrinsic aspirations are affiliation, personal growth, and communi-
ty contribution, and examples of extrinsic aspirations (at least within the
American culture) are wealth, fame, and image. Kasser and Ryan argued that,
because of the hypothesized links of intrinsic aspirations to basic need satisfac-
tion, pursuit and attainment of those aspirations, relative to extrinsic aspirations,
should be more strongly associated with well-being. Whereas people might feel
happy about attaining their extrinsic aspirations, the theory suggests that pursuit
and attainment of extrinsic aspiration will not contribute to eudaimonic well-
being.
Kasser and Ryan (1996) had individuals rate how important, in terms of
their own lives, they considered each of a set of life goals. Using items related to
three intrinsic aspirations (affiliation, personal growth, and community) and three
extrinsic aspirations (wealth, fame, and image), they calculated how strong each
aspiration was relative to all others. ‘The critical issue in this program of research,
then, is not so much the actual strength of an aspiration, but rather, where it
stands relative to the others: is it, for example, unusually strong and thus out of
balance with the others?
Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) found that the relative strength of intrinsic
aspirations was significantly positively related to well-being indicators, such as
self-actualization and vitality, and were significantly negatively related to anxiety,
depression, and physical symptoms. In contrast, the index for the extrinsic aspi-
rations showed the opposite pattern of relations. One of the studies in the series
used clinical indicators, finding that a strong relative extrinsic aspiration for
wealth related positively to conduct disorders and negatively to global social func-
tioning and social productivity. These studies converged on the finding that plac-
ing high importance on extrinsic outcomes, relative to intrinsic ones, was related
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory Zo

to poorer well-being. Furthermore, the research showed that the effects on well-
being of the relative strengths of aspirations was not accounted for by people’s
feelings of efficacy with respect to attaining the goals.
The aspirations studies reviewed thus far examined the relative importance to
individuals of different aspirations or life goals, whereas other studies have shown
that the attainment of intrinsic versus extrinsic aspirations also relates differential-
ly to well-being. For example, Kasser and Ryan (2001) found that perceived cur-
rent attainment of intrinsic aspirations was positively associated with well-being,
but rated current attainment of extrinsic aspirations was not. Sheldon and Kasser
(1998) found that well-being was enhanced by the actual attainment of intrinsic
goals, whereas attainment of extrinsic goals provided little benefit. Together,
these results suggest that pursuit and attainment of valued goals does not ensure
well-being. The content of the goal itself makes a difference, and we theorize that
this is because some goals (which we label intrinsic) provide more need satisfac-
tion, whereas others (which we label extrinsic) provide less need satisfaction. In
fact, the pursuit and attainment of extrinsic aspirations may actually detract from
need satisfaction by keeping people focused on goals that are not directly need
related.
Need substitutes. According to basic needs theory, extrinsic aspirations, which
can be highly motivating, are likely to develop as substitutes for basic needs (Deci,
1980) under developmental conditions in which need satisfaction is relatively
unavailable. As such, they can provide collateral satisfaction, but they do not pro-
vide the direct satisfaction of basic needs that are necessary for promotion of
well-being.
Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff (1995) studied teenagers and their moth-
ers to test this reasoning by examining the developmental antecedents of placing
high relative importance on extrinsic aspirations. They found, using both teens’
perceptions of their mothers and also the mothers’ self-reports of their parenting
styles, that when the mothers were democratic, noncontrolling, and warm (thus
being supportive of basic need satisfaction), the teens placed significantly less rel-
ative importance on extrinsic aspirations. The results suggest that parenting styles
that thwart children’s need satisfaction lead the children to develop extrinsic aspi-
rations, such as wealth, that are visible indicators of “worth” and may represent
substitutes for basic need satisfaction. These, in turn, are expected to perpetuate
the lack of need satisfaction and exacerbate the negative, ill-being consequences.
Williams, Cox, Hedberg, and Deci (2000) studied high school students to
test the hypotheses (a) that need-thwarting parental styles would lead to stronger
relative extrinsic aspirations and (b) that this pattern of aspirations would pro-
mote risky behaviors that could further interfere with basic need satisfaction and
health. Results of the study yielded a significant relation between the students’
perceiving their parents as controlling and the students’ having strong relative
extrinsic aspirations. Further, students with less autonomy-supportive parents and
stronger extrinsic aspirations reported more health-compromising behaviors,
26 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

including the use of tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana. It does appear, therefore,
that social contexts that thwart need satisfaction can lead to goals that are com-
pensatory and may involve serious risks to physical and psychological well-being.

Need Satisfaction Across Cultures

According to the basic needs perspective, a need is by definition universal

and thus the relation between need satisfaction and well-being must apply in all
cultures. There can, however, be considerable variability in the values and goals
held within different cultures such that the means through which people satisfy
basic needs will differ among cultures. In other words, the relations between spe-
cific behaviors and satisfaction of underlying needs may be different in different
cultures because the behaviors come to have different meanings in accord with
culturally endorsed values and practices. Recent research on motivation has
begun to explore the relations between need satisfaction and well-being across
cultures.
In some studies, investigators have examined issues in Asian or European
cultures that had previously been studied in North America. By finding results
that are similar to those from American samples, these studies provide initial evi-
dence in support of the cross-cultural validity of propositions from basic needs
theory. For example, Hayamizu (1997) used the self-regulation questionnaire to
assess the motivation of junior high school students in Japan and found that the
autonomous forms of motivation were associated with positive coping whereas
the controlled forms were associated with maladaptive coping, thus replicating
findings from the United States by Ryan and Connell (1989). Similar results were
also found in Japanese children by Yamauchi and ‘Tanaka (1998).
Chirkov and Ryan (2001) found that Russian and American students who
experienced their parents and teachers as more autonomy supportive displayed
greater well-being than those who experienced them as less autonomy support-
ive. Although there were mean level differences in the amount of perceived
autonomy support, with Russians perceiving less, both the constructs and the
relations between autonomy support and well-being were comparable across cul-
tures. ‘The importance of this and other Russian replications of SDT studies in
the United States is that traditionally Russia has been an authoritarian, or verti-
cal culture, which has led some theorists (e.g¢., Miller, 1997) to argue that autono-
my should not matter there. However, showing parallel functions of autonomy
support versus control suggests that such cultural or historical backdrops do not
negate this basic dynamic of human nature.
A recent study of workers in Bulgarian state-owned companies operating in
accord with central-planning principles investigated the relations among social
contexts, need satisfaction on the job, and well-being (Deci, Ryan, Gagne, Leone,
Usunoy, & Kornazheva, 2001). Results of this study indicated construct compa-
 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 27

rability between Bulgarian and American samples and supported the model in
which contextual supports predict basic need satisfaction, which in turn predicts
work engagement and well-being. In other words, employees in both Bulgaria
and the United States who reported greater satisfaction of the competence,
autonomy, and relatedness needs while on the job were more motivated and evi-
denced greater psychological health.
Other research has examined the relation of aspirations to well-being in dif-
ferent cultures. For example, Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon, Timoshina, and
Deci (1999) found in Russian college students that those individuals whose life
goals were focused more on relationships, growth, and community than on
wealth, image, and fame evidenced greater well-being. Of course, aspiring for
specific outcomes such as accumulating wealth can have different meaning for
basic need satisfaction in different cultures, so we would not necessarily expect an
invariant relation between aspirations and well-being across cultures (although we
would expect invariance in the relation between need satisfaction and well-being).
Thus, it is interesting that the results for these Russian college students largely
replicated those for Americans, even though the two cultures are so different.

Summary

Self-determination theory focuses on the dialectic between the active,

growth-oriented human organism and social contexts that either support or
undermine people’s attempts to master and integrate their experiences into a
coherent sense of self. The concept of basic psychological needs for competence,
autonomy, and relatedness serves to define those contextual factors that tend to
support versus undermine motivation, performance, and well-being. SD'T was
formulated in terms of four mini-theories that share the organismic-dialectical
metatheory and the concept of basic needs. Each of the metatheories was devel-
oped to explain a set of motivationally based phenomena that emerged from lab-
oratory and field research and focused on different issues. Cognitive evaluation
theory addresses the effects of social contexts on intrinsic motivation; organismic
integration theory addresses the concept of internalization especially with respect
to the development of extrinsic motivation. Causality orientations theory
describes individual differences in people’s tendencies toward self-determined
behavior and toward orienting to the environment in ways that support their self-
determination. And basic needs theory elaborates the concept of basic needs and
its relation to life goals and daily behaviors, specifying the essential role of needs
to psychological health and well-being.
28 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

About this Book

In this volume, researchers summarize their own contributions to the field of

motivation and self-determination. Some chapters represent specific extensions
of SDT by formulating theoretical models that systematize relations among SDT
variables, elaborate a piece of the theory, or apply the concepts to new phenom-
ena. Other chapters use the concepts and measures of SDT to shed important
light on various applied problems or areas, helping to provide solutions for pro-
found problems facing society. A final set of chapters adds significantly to the
explication of SDT by relating its concepts to the concepts of other theoretical
perspectives or fields of research. Each of these chapters describes exciting, pro-
grammatic, research that is helping to provide a comprehensive and meaningful
system of psychological thought.

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 PART II

‘THEORETICAL ISSUES
AND CONSIDERATIONS
2: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation:
A Hierarchical Model

RobertJ. Vallerand
Catherine F. Ratelle
Unwersité du Québec ad Montréal

For almost three decades, two distinct types of motivation have been of interest
to researchers in psychology: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation (Deci
& Ryan, 2000; Vallerand, 1997). The concept of intrinsic motivation (IM) refers
to behaviors performed out of interest and enjoyment. In contrast, extrinsic
motivation (EM) pertains to behaviors carried out to attain contingent outcomes
(Deci, 1971). The purpose of this chapter is to present the Hierarchical Model of
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (Vallerand, 1997). The model facilitates the
integration of findings from various theoretical perspectives in the intrinsic-
extrinsic motivation literature, and it provides novel and testable hypotheses to
orient future research on IM and EM. This model addresses the multiplicity of
ways to represent motivation in individuals, as well as the structure, determinants,
and consequences of these different representations. Selected empirical studies
that support the Hierarchical Model are presented to illustrate how motivational
phenomena can be understood within the framework of this model. As we will
see, the model embraces several of the elements of Self-Determination Theory
(Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991).
Before introducing the model in its full length, we provide an example that
illustrates the kind of issues that the model deals with. ‘Take the case of a sixteen-
year-old named Amanda. In general, she is the kind of person who engages in
activities because she likes them. She therefore interacts with friends, plays sports,
and goes to school because of the pleasure inherent in these activities. As a result,
these activities are a great source of enjoyment and satisfaction for her. This is,
however, not the case when it comes to playing the piano. Amanda plays the
piano because she feels obliged to, certainly not because she likes it. In fact, she
really plays the piano for her parents (especially her father, a former piano virtu-
oso). In addition, she feels pressured by her piano instructor who never appears
to be satisfied by her performance. Ever since she started piano lessons, Amanda
38 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

has had Ms. Verkawski, a very controlling woman, as an instructor. The teacher
never provides her pupils with opportunities to experience choice, and she gives
poor competence feedback. She always pushes Amanda to play musical pieces
that are out of her realm of skills. Playing the piano is thus associated with feel-
ings of being controlled and lacking autonomy and competence. As a conse-
quence, her performances were never very good and the satisfaction derived from
playing music has been virtually absent.
However, things have started to change recently. For the last two months, Ms.
Verkawski has been afflicted with pneumonia and Amanda has been taking her
piano lessons with a new instructor, Mr. McConnell. Amanda’s new teacher is
more autonomy-supportive, giving her more freedom to express herself and let-
ting her explore new avenues. In contrast to Ms. Verkawski, Mr. McConnell often
lets Amanda choose among a wide array of musical pieces, including more con-
temporary genres. For years, this is what Amanda had been wanting. More and
more, Amanda goes to her piano lessons out of choice and sometimes experi-
ences pleasure. Consequently, her performance has improved dramatically and
she has started to enjoy herself more at her lessons.
A few weeks ago on a Sunday, Mr. McConnell asked Amanda if she would
like to perform in a student recital and asked her to choose a musical piece to
present. She opted for Harry Connick Jr’s “It Had to Be You”, one of her
favorite jazz numbers. Amanda experienced feelings of autonomy because her
teacher provided her with the opportunity to choose whether to participate and
to choose a piece to play. During the weeks prior to the recital, Amanda devoted
considerable time and energy to practicing and perfecting her number. She was
nevertheless very stressed at the idea of performing in public. On recital day,
before it was her turn, Mr. McConnell told Amanda that she did not have to play
if she did not want to. It relieved her from a lot of stress. She chose to play any-
way and it went well. During her musical number, she felt deeply concentrated
on the rhythms and subtleties of the arrangements in this piece. Even though she
did not put enough emphasis on the decrescendo at the end, Amanda was happy
and satisfied with her performance. After the recital, Amanda felt inclined to
practice more and she became more fully engaged in piano playing. In fact, at
home after the recital, Amanda went straight to the piano to play some more.

The Hierarchical Model of Intrinsic and Extrinsic

Motivation Outlined

Several motivational features can be derived from the above example. The
first feature concerns the complexity of the motivation construct. Referring to
motivation as a general, unitary concept is insufficient to explain such complexity.
 A Hierarchical Model 39

Instead, we need to focus on a collection of motivations differing in types and lev-

els of generality. In the example above, Amanda manifests IM toward school,
interpersonal relationships, and sports. At the same time, she displays EM toward
playing the piano. Each of these different motivations constitutes an aspect of
Amanda and must be addressed if we want to fully understand who she really is.
Furthermore, it would appear that different motivations exist at three levels of
generality, namely the global, contextual, and situational levels. For example, we
mentioned that, in general, Amanda engages in activities out of enjoyment.
Consequently, Amanda can be said to have, at the global level, an intrinsically
motivated personality, which predisposes her to be intrinsically motivated in her
many life contexts. Indeed, we saw that at the contextual level Amanda seems
typically to be motivated in an intrinsic way in several contexts such as in educa-
tion, sports, and interpersonal relationships. Distinguishing between motivations
toward different life contexts is important. Indeed, focusing uniquely on her con-
textual motivation toward piano playing might mistakenly lead one to conclude
that Amanda is an extrinsically motivated person when, in fact, this is the only
domain in which she is not intrinsically motivated. Finally, at the situational level,
during the recital, Amanda was intrinsically motivated to perform her musical
piece.
A second feature of motivation is that other individuals can have a substan-
tial impact on our many motivations. Such was the case for Amanda and her
piano instructor, Ms. Verkawski. Despite the fact that Amanda is intrinsically
motivated in general, the impact of her piano instructor was powerful enough to
make her become extrinsically motivated in this life domain. At each level of gen-
erality, corresponding social factors function as significant motivational determi-
nants. Thus, at the situational level, Mr. McConnell’s support in providing
Amanda choice about whether to be in the recital and about what to play had
the beneficial effect of facilitating her intrinsic motivation toward practicing,
leading her to finally enjoy playing the piano. He was very influential in shaping
Amanda’s situational motivation in playing the piano at the student recital too.
Mr. McConnell’s support allowed her to feel autonomous in her decision to play,
which made her intrinsically motivated to play on that day.
A third feature of motivation is that it yields important consequences occur-
ring at three levels of generality, At the global level, motivation is considered an
individual difference that applies across situations and yield’s general conse-
quences. At the contextual level, these consequences differ according to the con-
text which influences motivation at the corresponding level. In the example, we
saw that Amanda experienced positive consequences such as satisfaction and
enjoyment when she engaged in school activities, sports, and interpersonal rela-
tionships. It was however not the case with piano playing, where her motivation
was extrinsic. She experienced dissatisfaction and her performance was poor.
However, the change in piano instructor (which constitutes a change in contextu-
al factors) shifted her motivation from an extrinsic orientation to a more intrinsic
40, HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

one. As a consequence, she started enjoying playing the piano more and her per-
formance reached higher levels. At the situational level, the day of the recital,
Amanda’s IM led her to be deeply concentrated on playing, to feel good about
herself, and to want to practice some more at home. Thus, motivation is associ-
ated with important consequences.
A fourth motivational feature concerns the recursive bottom-up influence of
situational motivation on contextual motivation. Repeatedly engaging in intrinsi-
cally motivating activities (at the situational level), together with experiencing
their beneficial consequences will play a role in facilitating contextual intrinsic
motivation. It may not come as a surprise that Amanda is now more intrinsical-
ly motivated in general toward playing the piano. Indeed, experiencing situa-
tional intrinsic motivation in a repeated manner, such as having numerous enjoy-
able piano rehearsals and recitals, has had recursive positive effects on her con-
textual motivation toward playing the piano, although her contextual-level intrin-
sic motivation may not be as strong as her situational-level intrinsic motivation
because she has been with her new teacher for only a short time.
The example presented above illustrates some of the elements of the
Hierarchical Model of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (Vallerand, 1997). This
coherent framework for integrating social psychological and personality perspec-
tives on motivation is outlined in Figure 2-1 and is described more thoroughly by
means of 5 postulates.

The Importance of Distinguishing Intrinsic Motivation,

Extrinsic Motivation, and Amotivation

important constructs must be considered: IM, EM, and amotivation (AM). The
importance of clearly distinguishing all three concepts is supported by (1) their
ability to explain a considerable range of human behaviors; (2) their capacity to
represent essential aspects of human experience; and (3) the variety of impor-
tant consequences they engender. ‘This brings us to the first postulate.

Postulate 1: A Complete Analysis of Motivation Must Include

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, and Amotivation

Here, the focus is on the conceptual distinction between IM, EM, and AM.
First, we describe and differentiate each construct as well as discuss their multi-
dimensional nature. Second, the issue of levels of generality is addressed. Finally,
we discuss measurement issues.
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42 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

A Multidimensional Perspective on IM, EM, and AM

Intrinsic Motivation. IM implies engaging in an activity for the pleasure and

satisfaction inherent in the activity (e.g, Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985b).
Students doing their homework because they enjoy it and find that learning new
things is interesting and satisfying are said to be intrinsically motivated. Although
the majority of researchers advocate a global, unitary IM construct, Vallerand
and his colleagues (Vallerand, 1993; Vallerand, Blais, Briere, & Pelletier, 1989;
Vallerand, Pelletier, Blais, Briére, Senécal, & Valliéres, 1992) have suggested a tri-
partite taxonomy of IM. First, JM to know implies engaging in activities because
of the pleasure and satisfaction derived from learning, exploring, and under-
standing new things. Second, JM to accomplish things refers to engaging in activi-
ties because of the pleasure and satisfaction derived from trying to surpass one-
self, creating, or accomplishing something. Third, LM to expenence stimulation oper-
ates when one is engaged in an activity because of the stimulating sensations
associated with it.
Extrinsic Motivation. In contrast to IM, EM refers to a broad array of behav-
iors having in common the fact that activities are engaged in not for reasons
inherent in them but for instrumental reasons. Extrinsically motivated behaviors
are undertaken to attain an end state that is separate from the actual behavior. In
early discussions of the topic, it was thought that behaviors performed with a lack
of choice were the only type of extrinsically motivated behaviors, so that all EM
behaviors were evoked by contingencies. However, research and thinking by
Deci, Ryan, and their colleagues (Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991) have put forth a
more complex typology of EM where some types of extrinsically motivated acts
involve self-determination and choice. They identified four types of extrinsic
motivations that vary in their degree of self-determination and can be ordered
along a self-determination continuum ranging from non self-determined to self-
determined forms of extrinsic motivation.
The first type of EM is external regulation. When someone is externally regu-
lated, acts are performed to attain a positive end state (e.g., to get money) or to
avoid a negative end state (e.g., to avoid a parent’s reprimands) which are sepa-
rate from the activity itself. External regulation lies at the nonself-determined end
of the continuum because it is the least self-determined type of extrinsic motiva-
tion. This type of regulation is typically how EM is being portrayed in the liter-
ature.
The second type of EM, introjected regulation, represents the first stage of the
internalization process, where individuals take prompts from their environment
and bring them inside themselves. With this type of motivation, individuals start
to internalize the reasons for their behaviors. However, motivation is still not self
determined because this type of regulation deals with past external contingencies
that have now been internalized inside the person. The person acts out of obli-
gation, in order to avoid feeling shame and internal pressure. For example, a
woman may vote at municipal elections because she feels she has to, because it is
 A Hterarchical Model 43

her duty as a citizen. This elector can be said to be introjected toward municipal
politics.
The third type of EM is identified regulation. When the reasons to engage in an
activity are internalized such that the activity is judged valuable by the person, he
or she will perform the activity with a sense of choice and the behavior is said to
be regulated through identification with the activity. The person acting out of
identified reasons is said to be relatively self-determined. For instance, a boy in
high school who decides to get up an hour earlier to review his chemistry notes
because he feels it is personally important to do so is regulated by identification.
Although identification implies choice, choices to engage in some activities
are not necessarily coherent with other self-structures. When such coherence is
reached, however, the choice underlying behavior is in harmony with other struc-
tures within the self: This type of extrinsic motivation refers to integrated regulation.
For example, a ballet dancer might choose not to go to a party with friends in
order to be in shape for dance class early on the next morning. Integrated regu-
lation is the most self-determined type of EM.
It is important to note that, although these types of external motivation can
be ordered along a self-determination continuum, one need not go through them
successively for each behavior. For example, when a young man who has not had
much experience painting houses is offered a job painting the house of a family
friend he may readily become identified in his regulation of the activity (because
he personally values doing the job well for his father’s long-time friend).
Amotivation. Deci and Ryan (1985b) proposed that a third motivational con-
struct, AM, should be considered when trying to understand human behavior.
Amotivation is at work when individuals display a relative absence of motivation.
In such instances, individuals do not perceive a contingency between their behav-
iors and outcomes, so they do not act with the intention to attain an outcome.
AM is a construct similar in many ways to learned helplessness (Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), mostly because amotivated individuals feel incom-
petent and act like they have little or no control. Their behaviors are perceived to
be caused by forces outside themselves. They begin to feel helpless and may start
to question the usefulness of engaging in the activity in the first place. A highly
probable consequence of AM is to quit the activity toward which the individual
is amotivated. Examples of amotivated individuals are students who, because
they cannot see what staying in school will bring to their future, decide to drop
out of high school.
Over the years, numerous studies have provided empirical support for the
first postulate of the model. As such, results from confirmatory factor analyses on
the different motivation scales that have been validated using the present per-
spective have consistently provided support for the existence of IM, EM, and AM
(see Vallerand, 1997). In addition, as we will see later, confirmation of predictions
about the determinants and consequences of specific motivational types provides
support for the construct validity of these motivational types.
44 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Of importance for the model is the SDT proposition that the different moti-
vational orientations represent different levels of self-determination, which can
be ordered along a self-determination continuum. Thus, IM is the most self-
determined motivational type, followed by integrated regulation, identified regu-
lation, introjected regulation, and external regulation. AM involves a complete
lack of self-determination. As we will see in Postulate 5, this continuum allows us
to predict the impact of the different types of motivation on important conse-
quences.

Motivation at Three Levels of Generality

Over the past 20 years or so, research and theories on the self have repre-
sented self-regulation processes at different levels of a hierarchy. Carver and
Scheier (1981), for example, suggested a hierarchy of self-regulatory processes
while Shavelson and Marsh (1986) proposed a hierarchy of self-concepts which
includes the global level, the academic and non-academic level, and the specific
activity level. In concordance with such theorizing and with past research con-
ducted in the motivation area, the second postulate proposes that IM, EM, and
AM are represented within the individual at three hierarchical levels of general-
ity: the global, the contextual, and the situational levels.

Postulate 2: Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Motivation,

and Amotivation Exist at Three Levels of Generality:
The Global, Contextual, and Situational Levels.

The global level. At this level of the hierarchy, the individual is seen as having
developed a global (or general) motivational orientation to interact with the envi-
ronment in an intrinsic, extrinsic, and/or amotivated fashion. Research on the
General Causality Orientation Scale (GCOS; Deci & Ryan, 1985a) conducted by
the members of the Rochester group (e.g., Hodgins & Deci, 1999; Hodgins,
Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996; Knee & Zuckerman, 1996, 1998), and that of
Guay, Blais, Vallerand, and Pelletier (1999) with the Global Motivation Scale
(GMS), illustrate research carried out at this level of generality. Motivation at the
global level is expected to be the most stable.
The contextual level. Several studies performed in the last 20 years have exam-
ined motivation at the contextual level of generality. Here, we use the word “con-
text” to refer to “a distinct sphere of human activity” (Emmons, 1995). Although
many different life contexts exist, research with young adults has revealed that the
three most important contexts are education, leisure, and interpersonal relation-
ships (Blais, Vallerand, Gagnon, Briére, & Pelletier, 1990). Individuals develop
motivational orientations toward each life context that are moderately stable,
 A Hierarchical Model 45

although they can be influenced to an extent by social factors that are specific to
each context. At the contextual level, motivation is influenced by contextual
determinants and leads to contextual consequences (the issue of motivational
determinants and consequences is discussed further in the next two sections).
Studies on motivation in intimate relationships by Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, and
Vallerand (1990), and in education by Vallerand and his colleagues (e.g.,
Vallerand, Fortier, & Guay, 1997) are examples of research studying motivation
at the contextual level.
The situational level. When studying motivation at the situational (or state) level
of generality, we are interested in understanding why individuals engage in a spe-
cific activity at a particular time. Motivation at this level is assumed to be unsta-
ble because of its responsiveness to the environment. A study by Guay, Vallerand,
and Blanchard (2000, Study 2), conducted in the educational setting, is one
example of research studying motivation at the situational level. In this study, a
self-report measure of situational motivation was given to students 35 minutes
after their class had begun in order to measure their motivation toward the edu-
cational task they were engaged in at that specific point in time.
In sum, the present model posits that it is useful to study motivation at three
different levels of generality: the global (or personality) level, the contextual (or
life domains) level, and the situational (or state) level. Distinguishing among lev-
els of the hierarchy becomes important, particularly when specifying determi-
nants and consequences. For example, it is important to accurately identify a stu-
dent as being externally regulated toward education in order to use the appro-
priate teaching strategy that will lead him or her to become more self-determined
toward school. Looking only at this student’s global intrinsic motivation would
have led one to neglect some very useful information.

Measuring Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Motivation,

and Amotivation

Measuring motivation at each level of the hierarchy, requires use of the

appropriate scales. For instance, if a researcher is interested in studying students’
usual motivation toward school, it would be appropriate to use a contextual
measure rather than either a global measure which is too broad in focus or a sit-
uational measure which is too narrow.
In order to empirically test postulates from the Hierarchical Model, it was
necessary to assess the different motivations at each level of generality. Therefore,
we developed and validated scales that assess the different motivations discussed
above at global, contextual, and situational levels. At the global level, we devel-
oped the Global Motivation Scale (GMS; Guay, Blais, et al., 1999). It assesses the
3 different types of IM, and the identified, introjected, and external types of EM,
as well as AM toward life in general. Results with the GMS indicate that the scale
46 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

is both reliable and valid. Furthermore, its factorial structure indicates that an
independent assessment of the different motivational types is provided. Internal
consistency and temporal stability were also found to be adequate. Furthermore,
the different subscales of the GMS were found to be unrelated to scores on the
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).
Scales assessing motivation at the contextual level have also been developed.
Because we were interested primarily in college students and research revealed
that education, leisure, and interpersonal relationships were the three main life
contexts for this age group (Blais, Vallerand, et al., 1990), scales were developed
to measure motivation in these contexts. For instance, the Academic Motivation
Scale (Vallerand et al., 1989, 1992, 1993) assesses contextual motivation toward
education, the Interpersonal Motivation Inventory (Blais, Vallerand, Pelletier, &
Briére, 1994) assesses contextual motivation in interpersonal relationships, and
the Leisure Motivation Scale (Pelletier, Vallerand, Blais, Briere, Green-Demers,
1996) measures contextual motivation toward leisure activities. Contextual meas-
ures of motivation have been developed for other life domains, as well. Examples
are the Sport Motivation Scale (Briere, Vallerand, Blais, & Pelletier, 1995;
Pelletier et al., 1995; see also Frederick, this volume), the Blais Work Motivation
Inventory ( Blais, Briere, Lachance, Riddle, & Vallerand, 1993), the Gambling
Motivation Scale (Chantal & Vallerand, 1996), the Volunteering Motivation
Scale (Chantal & Vallerand, 2000), the Motivation Toward the Environment
Scale (Pelletier, Green-Demers, & Béland, 1997; Pelletier, Tuson, Green-Demers,
Noels, & Beaton, 1998), the Political Motivation Scale (Koestner, Losier,
Vallerand, & Carducci, 1996), and the Elderly Motivation Scale (Vallerand &
O’Connor, 1991; Vallerand, O’Connor, & Hamel, 1995). Indices of reliability
and validity have been found to be acceptable for all of these scales (see
Vallerand, 1997).
At the situational level, two main techniques have been used to measure
motivation. ‘The first approach measures situational motivation by way of the
free-choice measure (Deci, 1971), which measures the amount of time an indi-
vidual has spent on an activity during a free-choice period. The assumption
underlying this measure is that individuals intrinsically motivated toward an
activity will return to the activity when they are free to do so. However, this meas-
urement approach can be problematic in distinguishing between types of moti-
vation (see Vallerand, 1997; Vallerand & Fortier, 1998). Indeed, research has
shown that, under some circumstances, the free-choice measure, besides being
associated with IM, can also reflect introjection (Ryan, Koestner, & Deci, 1991)
as well as identified regulation (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). Another
way to measure situational motivation is with a self-report measure. By using such
a technique, it becomes possible to consider the multidimensional aspect of moti-
vation. We thus developed the Situational Motivation Scale (SIMS; Guay et al.,
2000) which measures IM (without distinguishing types of IM), identified and
external types of EM, as well as AM. The choice to measure only 4 motivational
 A Hierarchical Model 47

types was dictated by the need to keep the scale as brief as possible in order to
capture situational motivation in many lab or field situations. Indices of reliabil-
ity and validity have been found to be very satisfactory (see Guay et al., 2000).
Sometimes, researchers will integrate the different types of motivation (at
one specific level) into a single motivation index, called the Self-Determination
Index .' The advantage of using such an index is the significant reduction of vari-
ables needed to represent the different types of motivation at a given level. To do
so, a different weight is allocated to each subscale, with the autonomous subscales
having positive weights and the nonself-determined having negative weights (e.g.,
Grolnick & Ryan, 1987; Vallerand & Bissonnette, 1992; also see Vallerand, 1997
on this topic). Thus in one approach, a weight of +2 is awarded to the intrinsic
motivation subscale because this construct represents the highest level of self-
determination. A weight of +1 is assigned to the identified regulation subscale; a
weight of -1 is allocated to the external regulation subscale; and a weight of -2 is
awarded to the amotivation subscale, because it represents the lowest level of self-
determination. Multiplying the score for each subscale by its corresponding
weight and adding all the products yields an index for the individual’s self-deter-
mined motivation. This procedure can be used at each level of the hierarchy.

The Determinants of IM, EM, and AM

The present section introduces determinants, or antecedents of IM, EM,

and AM. We highlight studies that have measured motivational determinants
and their impact on motivation at the three levels of generality. The goal is not
to review all studies on the determinants but rather to demonstrate the heuristic
nature of the Hierarchical Model as an integrative framework.

Postulate 3: Motivation at a Given Level Results from Two Sources:

(1) Social Factors and (2) Top Down Effects from Motivation at the
Proximal Level

The third postulate of the model tackles the role of motivational determinants
on the different motivational orientations. It is subdivided into three corollaries.

1. The “Self-Determination Index” is also called the “Relative Autonomy Index” by

the Rochester group.
48 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Corollary 3.1: Motwation at a Given Level Can Result from Social Factors Which Can Be
Global, Contextual, or Situational Depending on the Level in the Hierarchy. The term “social
factors” is used to refer to both human and nonhuman factors encountered in
one’s social environment, such as comments from another person (human) or
instructions on a sign (nonhuman). These factors can also be distinguished
according to their level of generality. Situational social factors concern transient vari-
ables encountered in a specific activity, at a specific time, that may not remain
constant. Receiving an ovation after a clarinet solo represents an example of a
situational factor. Contextual factors refer to recurrent variables that are systemati-
cally encountered in a specific life context but not in others. For example, a con-
trolling third-grade teacher is a social factor in a student’s academic context but
she is not in this student’s leisure context. Global factors pertain to social factors
whose impact extends across several life domains. Parents represent such a factor
during our upbringing. Because they are initially involved in most of our activi-
ties, parents can have a profound effect on our global motivation (see Grolnick &
Apostoleris, this volume). Nursing homes for senior residents also represent a
global factor. Having all activities take place within a single social environment
can strongly affect global motivation. It is crucial to take social factors into
account at each level of generality because they have been found to have a deep
impact on motivation (see Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Vallerand, 1997).
We believe that clearly discerning the level of generality of social factors is
of great importance when it comes to making predictions regarding the types of
factors that should influence motivation at each level of the hierarchy. Empirical
support for the first corollary has been provided by results from a study that
examined the effects of success/failure, a situational variable, on situational, con-
textual, and global motivations (Vallerand, 1996). These findings revealed that
failing at a task significantly undermined situational IM but increased AM, rela-
tive to succeeding at the task. However, contextual and global motivations were
not significantly affected by this situational social factor.

Corollary 3.2: The Impact of Social Factors on Motivation is Mediated by Perceptions of

Competence, Autonomy, and Relatedness. According to Cognitive Evaluation Theory, a
subtheory of Self-Determination Theory (CET; Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan,
1985b, 1991), the impact of situational factors on motivation is mediated by per-
ceptions of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. These perceptions relate to
basic psychological human needs. ‘The need for competence pertains to the human
desire to efficiently interact with one’s environment so as to feel competent in pro-
ducing desired outcomes and preventing undesired outcomes (Connell &
Wellborn, 1991; Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Harter, 1978; White, 1959).
The need for autonomy refers to the human desire to be the origin of one’s behav-
iors (deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975, 1980; Deci & Ryan, 1985b). Finally, the need
Jor relatedness implies a desire to feel connected to significant individuals (for recent
 A Hierarchical Model 49

reviews on belongingness and/or relatedness, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995;

Richer & Vallerand, 1998; Ryan, 1993).
CET proposes that, to the extent that social factors foster perceptions of
competence, autonomy, and relatedness in individuals, self-determined types of
motivation (IM as well as integrated and identified regulation) will be enhanced
whereas nonself-determined types of motivation (introjected and external regu-
lations, and AM) will be diminished (see Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Ryan, 1991).
Thus, an activity that promotes perceptions of autonomy, competence, and relat-
edness, is performed volitionally because it nurtures these three basic psycholog-
ical needs. The Hierarchical Model further posits that such mediating effects take
place at each of the three levels in the hierarchy.
Much research has brought empirical support for CET at the situational
level (see Vallerand, 1997). The study of Vallerand and Reid (1984) exemplifies
such support. In this study, participants engaged in a motor task during a pretest
and a posttest. In the posttest, they received either positive, negative, or no per-
formance feedback. Individuals’ perceptions of competence and IM were meas-
ured after both the pretest and the posttest. Results of path analyses revealed that
positive feedback led participants to feel more competent, which in turn, led
them to be more intrinsically motivated. Studies by Vallerand and Reid (1988)
and by Whitehead and Corbin (1991) have provided replications of the mediat-
ing role of perceived competence. ‘These findings are even stronger when indi-
viduals strive to achieve competence (Sansone, 1986) and when the environment
supports individuals’ autonomy (Ryan, 1982).
The mediating role of perceived autonomy at the situational level was
empirically tested in a study by Reeve and Deci (1996). ‘They examined the
impact of competition on situational motivation, as mediated by perceptions of
competence and autonomy. They found support for the mediating role of these
variables. With regard to perceptions of relatedness, results of a study by
Blanchard and Vallerand (1996a, Study 2) revealed that the extent to which the
individual feels connected to other teammates mediates the impact of individual
and team performance on self-determined forms of motivation (as evidenced by
the self-determination index) in basketball players.
At the contextual level, several studies have examined whether the impact of
social factors on motivation was mediated by perceived autonomy, competence,
and relatedness. In Blanchard and Vallerand (1996b), basketball players com-
pleted questionnaires assessing contextual measures of perceived competence,
autonomy, and relatedness, and self-determined motivation toward basketball, as
well as their perceptions of their coach’s autonomy-supportive style. Results pro-
vided support for the proposed causal sequence where social factors determined
perceptions of competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which in turn influenced
self-determined motivation. Other studies in the academic setting have provided
support for this mediation link (Guay & Vallerand, 1997; Vallerand, Fortier, &
50 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Guay, 1997). Finally, support for the mediating role of perceptions of

competence at the global level of the hierarchy has also been reported
(Ratelle, Vallerand, Chantal, & Provencher, 2002).
Overall, these results indicate that perceptions of competence,
autonomy, and relatedness mediate the impact of social factors on moti-
vation, at situational, contextual, and global levels. Future research is
needed to further establish the validity of these results, especially at the
global level of the model.

Corollary 3.3: In Addition to the Influence of Social Factors and Their Psychological
Mediators, Motivation at a Given Level also Results from Top Down Effects from
Motivation at the Proximal Level Higher in the Hierarchy. One important novel
contribution of the model is that it acknowledges the possibility of top-
down effects with motivation at one level of the hierarchy affecting mot-
vation at the next lower level. Thus, global motivation should have a
stronger impact on contextual motivation than on situational motivation
and contextual motivation should influence situational motivation. To
illustrate such effects, we can take the example of someone who is glob-
ally motivated in an intrinsic way. We can expect this individual to be
intrinsically motivated in several life contexts as well, because the top-
down effect of motivation is assumed to go from the global to the con-
textual level. Similarly, we can expect the person who is intrinsically
motivated at the contextual level in education to also be intrinsically
motivated at the situational level on educational tasks.
Conceptual links can be drawn between Corollary 3.3 and research
on self-regulatory processes, which has shown that global properties of
the self can shape more specific self attributes (Brown, 1993; Brown &
Dutton, 1995; Sansone & Harackiewicz, 1996). Few studies have tested
Corollary 3.3. One of them (Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci,
1996), measured obese patients’ global motivation and their contextual
motivation toward the medical treatment. Path analyses revealed that
being motivated in a self-determined fashion at the global level predict-
ed a self-determined contextual motivation toward the treatment at a
later time. Similar findings were reported by Blanchard, Vallerand, and
Provencher (1998) in the context of sport. Altogether, these results pro-
vide empirical support for the top-down effect of motivation at higher
levels on motivation at the next lower level. Although these findings are
encouraging, experimental studies are nevertheless necessary to firmly
establish the validity of this postulate.
It thus appears that Postulate 3 and its corollaries have been empir-
ically supported by several studies. In addition, the heuristic nature of
the distinction between social factors at global, contextual, and situa-
tional levels of generality was underscored. Furthermore, evidence was
 A Hierarchical Model 5)

found for the role of perceptions of competence, autonomy, and relatedness as

psychological mediators of social factors’ impact on motivation at the three lev-
els of generality. Finally, the top-down effect of motivation at higher levels on
motivation at the proximal lower level has been supported.

Postulate 4: There is a Recursive Bottom Up Relationship Between

Motivation at One Level and Motivation at the Next Higher Level in
the Hierarchy

According to this postulate, we need to consider these recursive effects—the

situational level on the contextual and global levels and the contextual level on
the global level—in order to explain the motivational changes likely to take place
over time. The specific goal of this postulate is to specify how the dynamics
between motivation at the various levels of generality can account for these moti-
vational changes.
As an illustration of this recursive effect, let’s take the example of a man who
is about to teach his first high school English class of the semester. He is gener-
ally intrinsically motivated toward teaching, but he has been warned that this
particular class is really something else and that he should be ready for it. As he
is walking down the corridor, he can hear students talking loudly and desks being
moved around. Upon entering in the classroom, he is hit by a flying eraser. The
class starts to laugh. Students then go back to what they were doing, that is, talk-
ing and shouting. The teacher begins to speak, asking everyone to sit and stop
talking. He cannot get any response as student are totally uninterested in him. He
is disappointed because he was looking forward to meeting his new students. It
finally took ten minutes to get them to listen to what he had to say. The class was,
in all, disastrous. The next morning, as he was going over in his head what had
happened the day before in class, he felt anxious. He was afraid that the next class
with this group would be just as bad. Unfortunately, his fears were concretized
the next day. At the end of the period, his situational motivation was at its low-
est. He did not feel like teaching them: he was completely amotivated. Later that
night, as he was preparing for the third class with this group of students, he start-
ed to wonder if he would be able to put up with them for the whole year. Within
a few weeks he had begun, for the first time in his career, to question whether
teaching was really for him. Perhaps working in a private company would suit
him better. Maybe it was time to grasp new opportunities and take up new chal-
lenges. And that’s what he did: he updated his résumé, applied for jobs in the pri-
vate sector, and wrote his resignation letter.
How did the teacher come to such a decision? First, at the situational level,
the totally disinterested attitude of his students as well as their lack of respect rep-
resent crucial social factors that had a negative impact on the teacher’s situation-
al motivation. He felt incompetent and experienced repeated instances of
52 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

decreased IM and increased AM at the situational level. In turn, his situational

nonself-determined motivation had a recursive negative impact (Postulate 4) on
his contextual motivation toward teaching. Because his contextual motivation
toward teaching has now become nonself-determined, the teacher decided to
quit his job (an important behavioral consequence of motivation, which will be
examined in Postulate 5).
Empirical support has been provided for this fourth postulate. In a first study
with basketball players, Blanchard, Vallerand, and Provencher (1998, Study 1)
assessed contextual motivation toward basketball before a tournament, as well as
situational motivation and contextual sport motivation after each of the two
games of the tournament. Finally, contextual motivation was assessed 10 days
after the tournament. Results revealed that situational motivation had a recursive
bottom-up effect on contextual motivation toward basketball after each of the
two games, as well as 10 days after the tournament. These results have been repli-
cated over a complete season (Blanchard, Vallerand, & Provencher, 1998, Study
2). Similar findings at the contextual and global levels have also been found by
Blanchard and Vallerand (1998), who tested the postulate with individuals
engaged in an exercise program. They measured global motivation at times | and
3 and contextual motivation toward exercising at time 2. Results showed that
global motivation influenced contextual motivation toward exercising (Postulate
3), which in turn had a recursive bottom-up effect on the global motivational ori-
entation (Postulate 4). Thus, Postulate 4 has been supported by empirical evi-
dence involving all three levels of the hierarchy.

The Consequences of IM, EM, and AM

Thus far, attention has been devoted to determinants of the types of moti-
vation, as well as to the psychological processes responsible for their effects. We
now turn to motivational consequences.

Postulate 5: Motivation Leads to Important Consequences

The postulate that motivation produces consequences is supported by at

least two types of evidence. First, it appears intuitively appropriate to view vari-
ables such as attention, satisfaction, and behavioral persistence as being affected
by motivation. ‘Thus, a ballet dancer motivated in an intrinsic fashion would be
expected to concentrate more during practice than one who is amotivated for
dance and could not care less about it. Second, research has shown that motiva-
tion leads to a host of consequences such as creativity (Amabile, 1985;
Hennessey, 1989), learning (see Lepper, 1994), and smoking abstinence (Curry,
 A Hierarchical Model 5S

Wagner, & Grothaus, 1991; Harackiewicz, Sansone, Blair, Epstein, &

Manderlink, 1987). For instance, writers for whom EM was induced produced
poems of lower quality than intrinsically motivated or control-group participants
(Amabile, 1985). Other studies provided support for the causal effect of motiva-
tion on consequences (Curry et al., 1991; Lepper & Cordova, 1992). Thus, moti-
vation does lead to important consequences and researchers in the IM/EM liter-
ature have isolated cognitive (e.g., concentration, attention, and memory), affec-
tive (e.g., interest, satisfaction, and positive emotions), and behavioral (e.g., choice
of behavior, persistence at a task, intensity, task complexity, behavioral intentions,
and performance) consequences (see Vallerand, 1997 for a review).

Corollary 5.1; Consequences Are Decreasingly Positwe From Intrinsic Motwation to

Amotwation. This first corollary relates motivational consequences to types of
motivation. Deci and Ryan’s (1985b) self-determination continuum is particular-
ly useful when predicting motivational consequences. Because we know the loca-
tion of the different types of motivation on the self-determination continuum
and that self-determination is associated with enhanced psychological function-
ing (Deci, 1980; Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995), we can predict the impact of the
different types of motivation on consequences. More specifically, IM is expected
to lead to the most positive consequences, followed by integration and identifica-
tion. External regulation should be associated with negative consequences, and
AM with the most negative ones. Introjection is hypothesized to lead to conse-
quences that lie between those generated by external regulation and identification.
Much support exists for Corollary 5.1 For instance, in the context of couple
relationships, a study by Blais, Sabourin, et al. (1990) revealed that the most self-
determined types of motivation (IM, integration, and identification) led to the
most positive consequences (1.e., positive interpersonal behaviors, couple happi-
ness) whereas nonself-determined types of motivation (introjection, external reg-
ulation, and AM) yielded the most negative consequences. Several other studies
have provided empirical support for this corollary (see Ryan, 1995; Vallerand,
1993, 1997) in life domains such as work (Blais et al., 1993), leisure (Pelletier,
Vallerand, Green-Demers, Briére, & Blais, 1995), education (Vallerand &
Bissonnette, 1992), environmental protection (Pelletier et al., 1998), and aging
(Vallerand et al., 1995).

Corollary 5.2: Motivational Consequences Exist at Three Levels of the Hierarchy, and the
Level of Generality of the Consequences Depends on the Level of the Motwation That Has
Produced Them. This second corollary pertains to the levels of generality of moti-
vational consequences. The level of generality of a particular consequence is a
function of the level of generality of the motivation that produced that particu-
lar consequence. Thus, consequences of situational motivation will be situation-
al. They will include feelings of satisfaction, level of attention, and behavioral
persistence with respect to a particular task at a specific point in time. Likewise,
contextual consequences, resulting from contextual motivation, will be specific to
54 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

the context at hand, and will be of moderate generality. Lastly, consequences at

the global level of generality, resulting from global motivation, will be the most
general.
Support for this second corollary has been provided by Chantal, Guay, and
Vallerand (1995). In this study, students’ global motivation, as well as contextual
motivations toward education and interpersonal relationships were measured.
Five weeks later, educational and relational consequences were measured. Results
showed that contextual educational consequences were better predicted by con-
textual educational motivation than by contextual motivation toward interper-
sonal relationships. Similarly, relational consequences were better predicted by
contextual motivation toward interpersonal relationships. Finally, global motiva-
tion did not affect the different types of consequences.
Further support was provided for Corollary 5.2 in a study by Vallerand and
Blanchard (1998) in which exercise participants completed motivation and con-
sequences scales at the three different levels of generality, at three points in time.
At Time 1, they completed the Global Motivation Scale (Guay et al., 1999) as
well as a scale assessing contextual motivation toward exercise (adapted from the
Sport Motivation Scale; Briere et al., 1995). At Time 2, four weeks later, partic-
ipants completed the Situational Motivation Scale (Guay et al., 1999) and scales
assessing situational consequences such as concentration and positive emotions.
Finally, at ‘Time 3 (four weeks later), they completed scales assessing global con-
sequences (1.e., global negative affect), and contextual consequences pertaining to
exercise. Regression analyses showed that global motivation was the best predic-
tor of global consequences, contextual motivation toward exercise was the best
predictor of contextual consequences related to exercise, and situational motiva-
tion was the most important predictor of situational consequences.
In sum, Postulate 5 and its corollaries have been supported by numerous
research findings. It thus appears safe to conclude that motivation leads to impor-
tant cognitive, affective, or behavioral consequences. Consistent with the level of
generality of the motivation that produced them, it is also possible to distinguish
among consequences occurring at the global, contextual, and situational levels of
the hierarchy. Furthermore, motivational consequences were found to be increas-
ingly positive as we go from AM to IM.’ Future research is nevertheless needed
to validate these results, using other types of consequences.

2. Although the majority of research findings indicated that IM leads to the most
positive consequences, Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, and Carducci (1996) reported that in
the political domain, identification leads to more positive behavioral consequences than
IM. ‘The same was true for research in the domain of environmental protection (Pelletier,
‘Tuson, Green-Demers, Noels, & Beaton, 1998). These results are explained by Vallerand
(1997) as resulting at least in part from the nature of the task. When some aspects of a task
are perceived as uninteresting, identified regulation may be required for individuals to
experience positive outcomes. Future research is needed to test this hypothesis.
 A Hierarchical Model 5

Integrative Studies

In this section, additional studies are reviewed which have examined more
than one postulate and corollary of the model and have included all three levels
of generality (for a more complete analysis of integrative studies, refer to
Vallerand, 1997).
A first integrative study was conducted by Vallerand, Guay, Blanchard, &
Cadorette (2002, Study 1) in the education domain. In this study, several postu-
lates and corollaries of the model were tested simultaneously. College students
involved in an educational task in class completed scales assessing situational level
mediators (perceptions of autonomy, competence, and relatedness), motivations,
and consequences (concentration, positive affect, and behavioral intentions of
engagement in the activity). Furthermore, contextual-level motivations and
mediators (perceived competence, autonomy, and relatedness) toward leisure,
education, and interpersonal relationships were also measured. Finally, global-
level motivations and mediators were measured. Thus, motivation as well as psy-
chological mediators were measured at each level of the hierarchy and for each
of the three life contexts. In addition, situational consequences were assessed.
Results from a structural equation modeling analysis (with EQS) provided
strong support for the Hierarchical Model. First, it was possible to distinguish
motivation at the global, contextual, and situational levels, thereby providing sup-
port for the hierarchical structure of the model (Postulate 2). Second, at each
level, perceptions of autonomy, competence, and relatedness were found to pre-
dict motivation (Corollary 3.2). There was also support for the fact that percep-
tions of autonomy, competence, and relatedness for each of the different contexts
affected only motivation that was relevant to that context. ‘The top-down hypoth-
esis (Corollary 3.3) where global motivation influenced each of the three contex-
tual motivations also was supported. Of interest is that only motivation in edu-
cation was found to significantly influence situational motivation toward an edu-
cational task (as proposed by the specificity hypothesis). Analysis also confirmed
the hypothesized consequence aspects of the model. First, it was possible to dis-
tinguish the three types of consequences, namely affect, cognition, and behavior,
at the situational level (Postulate 5). Second, Corollary 5.1 was supported in that
situational self-determined motivation was found to positively influence affect,
cognition, and behavioral intentions. Finally, there was support for Corollary 5.2
in that only situational motivation affected situational consequences. Neither
global nor any of the contextual motivations influenced situational consequences.
Although the study by Vallerand et al. (2002, Study 1) provided support for
several of the postulates and corollaries of the Hierarchical Model, all measures
were assessed at the same time, so support for the direction of causality among
variables was far from perfect. In a second study, Vallerand et al. (2002, Study 2)
used a prospective design to test some of the postulates and corollaries of the
56 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

model. One hundred and seventy-eight college students completed scales assess-
ing motivation at the global and contextual levels (toward education, leisure, and
interpersonal relationships). Five months later, they were contacted again and
asked to complete scales assessing situational motivation and consequences (pos-
itive affect and behavioral intentions) toward a leisure activity they had just been
engaged in. Thus, the measures assessed in this second study were similar to those
used in the first study, except that perceptions of competence, autonomy, and
relatedness were not assessed and situational measures dealt with a leisure activ-
ity instead of an educational activity. The results from a path analysis (with EQS)
were almost identical to those obtained in the first study. Further, alternative
models were tested and yielded poorer fit indices than the hypothesized model.
In sum, findings from the above two studies provide strong support for the
Hierarchical Model. In fact, combined, the two studies empirically support most
of the model’s postulates and corollaries including: Postulate | (on the impor-
tance of including IM, EM, and AM for a complete analysis of motivation),
Postulate 2 (on the three levels of generality of motivation), Corollary 3.2 (on the
mediating role of perceived competence, autonomy, and relatedness), Corollary
3.3 (on the top down effect of motivation), and Postulate 5 (on motivational con-
sequences) However, additional research is needed in order to more fully under-
stand some of the intricacies of the model. We now turn to this issue.

Future Research on the Hierarchical Model

As evidenced by the studies reviewed above, there is empirical support for

the postulates and corollaries of the Hierarchical Model of Intrinsic and
Extrinsic Motivation. Thus, we believe that the theoretical framework provided
by the model is a reliable and robust one in that it allows the integration of
research findings on IM and EM. Furthermore, it can lead to novel and testable
research hypotheses in the area of IM/EM. Here are a few research directions
based on the model.
A first research avenue would be to investigate the interaction between social
factors and personality variables. It is possible that, at a given level such as the
contextual level, motivation results from the interplay of social factors at that
level (e.g., contextual social factors) and personal forces at the higher level (i.e.,
global motivation). For example, Williams and Deci (1996) have shown how med-
ical students’ global motivational orientations and the interpersonal style of their
professor (being autonomy supportive vs. controlling) have additive effects on stu-
dents’ contextual motivation toward their interviewing course. However, little is
known about the interaction of these two variables on motivation. Similarly, test-
ing whether social factors at the situational level influence situational motivation
 A Hierarchical Model 7)

differently as a function of contextual motivation could also lead to new and

interesting research. For instance, are people with self-determined contextual
motivation relatively immune to the impact of situational factors on situational
motivation?
A second research direction involves motivational conflict. So far, the model
has looked at how contextual and situational motivation can influence each other
through top-down and bottom-up effects. However, little attention has been
devoted to the interplay of different contextual motivations and their influence
on situational motivation. For example, a girl involved with a tedious algebra
assignment who is brought to think about participating in a soccer game is likely
to experience motivational conflict. Her situational motivation will then be a
function of her contextual motivations both toward school and toward sports.
The relative strength of each contextual motivation will dictate which of these
two contexts will have the most prevalent effect on situational motivation. To the
extent that the student’s contextual motivation toward school (and algebra) is less
self-determined than that toward sports (and soccer in particular), she will expe-
rience a drop in IM toward her assignment. In a recent study (Ratelle, Rousseau,
Vallerand, & Provencher, 2002), we examined the consequences of a motivation-
al conflict between education and leisure activities. Participants involved in an
educational task were led to think about an attractive leisure activity through a
priming procedure, after which they were to return to the educational activity.
Results have shown that participants who were led to think about an interesting
leisure activity experienced significant drops in IM toward the educational task.
These results indicate that experiencing a conflict between two motivations (e.g,,
motivation toward education and motivation toward leisure) can lead to negative
consequences, especially if the person has to remain engaged in the less interest-
ing activity.
A third promising area of research is that of motivational compensation.
Compensation effects can result from a dynamic interplay between contextual
motivations. From the model’s perspective, losses in self-determined motivation
in one context can lead a person to compensate in another context by becoming
more intrinsically motivated there. Such a phenomenon allows individuals to
restore (or keep) their global motivation at a certain (self-determined) level. A pre-
liminary study by Blanchard, Vallerand, and Provencher (1998) seems to support
such compensatory effects within the self. Basketball players completed scales
assessing their contextual motivation and their perceptions of competence
toward education and sports on two separate occasions. ‘They were also asked to
rate their school performance at Time 2. Individuals who experienced failure in
the academic context at Time 2, and who perceived themselves as competent in
sports (basketball) at Time 1, reported a small increase in contextual motivation
toward sports. No other group experienced an increase in contextual sport moti-
vation. Losses of competence and self-determined motivation in one domain
(school) may have motivated individuals to restore their sense of self and, con-
58 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

sequently, to experience an increase in self-determined motivation toward the

other context (sport). However, such an effect seems to take place in life domains
in which people feel competent. More research on this issue is needed.
A final research avenue concerns the testing of the “Social Factor >
Psychological Mediators ~ Motivation > Consequences” sequence within the
confines of the same study. Several studies in the motivation literature have
looked at subparts of this sequence but only one, to our knowledge, has tested the
whole sequence. In this study by Grouzet, Vallerand, and Thill (1999), social fac-
tors were manipulated such that participants were put either in a success or in a
failure condition to perform the NINA task (drawings in which the word NINA
is embedded several times). Perceptions of competence and autonomy (psycho-
logical mediators), self-determined situational motivation, and concentration and
intentions of future persistence (motivational consequences) were measured.
Structural Equation Modeling provided support for the sequence. More specifi-
cally, the success/failure variable influenced perceptions of competence and
autonomy, which affected situational self-determined motivation. In turn, moti-
vation predicted concentration and future behavioral intentions. Replication at
other levels of the hierarchy are needed to further establish the validity of the
sequence.

Conclusion

The purpose of the present chapter was to present the Hierarchical Model
of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (Vallerand, 1997) along with related evi-
dence. In the introduction, we identified two functions of the model. First, the
model provides a conceptual framework for organizing and understanding the
core mechanisms underlying intrinsic and extrinsic motivational processes.
Overall, the research evidence reviewed in the present chapter provided support
for the postulates and corollaries of the Hierarchical Model. A second function
of the model lies in its heuristic nature. From the framework provided by the
model, we can derive new and testable hypotheses. One of the ways through
which testing such new hypotheses becomes possible is through conceptual and
methodological progressions. From a methodological standpoint, the tools need-
ed to study the model’s postulates and corollaries are now available. Scales have
been developed in order to measure motivation at each level of the hierarchy.
From a conceptual standpoint, the framework provided by the Hierarchical
Model provides the means to study motivation from a multidimensional and hier-
archical perspective. It is hoped that the model and the research that it will gen-
erate will lead us to a better understanding of the psychological processes under-
lying motivated behavior.
 A Hierarchical Model 59

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3: The Self-Concordance Model of Healthy Goal
Striving: When Personal Goals Correctly Represent
the Person

Kennon M. Sheldon
Unwersity of Missouri-Columbia

How do people decide what to strive for in their lives, and how can this process
go awry? In this chapter I discuss the self-concordance model of goal-striving
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), which addresses these questions by building from and
extending self-determination theory (SDT). Specifically, the model attempts to
account for longitudinal increases in levels of well-being and personality devel-
opment, issues that have received relatively little research attention from self-
determination researchers. ‘The model focuses on the idiographic personal goals
that individuals set and pursue, devoting special attention to the perceived locus
of causality (PLOC) that they have for those goals. As will be shown below, peo-
ple sometimes fail to select goals that are appropriate to their true or actual needs,
values, and interests, which can have profound costs for their adjustment and
growth. Before considering these theoretical issues, however, it is first necessary
to consider the nature of idiographic goal-assessment procedures.

Idiographic Goals as Units of Motivational Analysis

Idiographic goal methodologies begin by asking participants to list the salient

personal goals (Brunstein, 1993), life-tasks (Cantor & Blanton, 1996), personal
strivings (Emmons, 1989), personal projects (Little, 1993), or current concerns
(Klinger, 1977) that they engage in or will be engaging in. These idiographic
methodologies offer a number of important advantages for motivational
researchers. First, they are personologically valid, given that individuals themselves
provide the units of analysis and are thus typically invested in them. This links
the approach to one of the most respected traditions of personality psychology
66 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

(Allport, 1937; Murray, 1938), in which researchers attempt to understand per-

sons in their own terms (King & Napa, 1998). Second, these goal methodologies
are flexible, in that once participants provide the basic “stems,” a variety of issues
can be explored. By aggregating a participant’s appraisals across the multiple
goals in his or her system, a researcher can gain reliable trait-level information
about many constructs of interest (Sheldon & Elliot, 2000). Third, goal method-
ologies lend themselves well to longitudinal research, given that the goals specified
naturally occupy participants’ attention over time. Thus, these methodologies
open up a potentially powerful window into the temporal dynamics of basic per-
sonality functioning, and they also offer a focus for conceptualizing and measur-
ing the entire process of proactive adaptation in which individuals engage
(Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Snyder & Cantor, 1998). Fourth, as will be argued
below, personal goal methodologies have the potential to shed new light on
important conceptual issues not yet addressed by self-determination researchers.
An encapsulated review of SDT’s development helps illustrate this claim.

Self-Determination Theory
and the Proactive Individual

SDT began in the realm of social psychology, examining the impact of

potentially controlling situational forces upon intrinsic motivation, adjustment,
and performance (Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1980). The theory began to move
deeper into the person when Ryan (1982) showed that people can also be con-
trolled by internal forces, that could be aroused by ego-involving situational
manipulations. The PLOC internalization continuum (Ryan & Connell, 1989)
and the organismic integration concept (Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991) took the the-
ory to the very core of person-hood, as researchers explored the motivational
dynamics of religious behavior (Ryan, Rigby & King, 1993), the internalization
of family values (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997), the nature of psychological vital-
ity (Ryan & Frederick, 1997), and many other issues. These theoretical develop-
ments helped shed important new light on a host of basic personality and self-
regulatory processes.
However one process not extensively addressed by self-determination
researchers is that by which individuals proactively select new life-directions for
themselves from among the potentially bewildering variety of possible choices
(Schwartz, 2000). That is, how do people generate personal initiatives, initiatives
that will hopefully serve to advance them in their own developmental process and
give broad meaning and purpose to their lives (Ryff & Singer, 1998)? Given the
wide freedom that people have in selecting such initiatives (Schwartz, 2000), is it
possible for them to choose the “wrong” goals for themselves? If individuals do
 The Self-Concordance Model 67

in fact generate self-inappropriate goals even in the absence of any contextual

controls or constraints (as is the case during open-ended goal-assessment), then
there would appear to be important personality factors involved in proper goal-
selection, factors that have received little attention in prior SDT research.
Of course idiographic goal-assessment procedures may indeed have some
controlling aspects, in that some people may feel forced to come up with goals
“for the experimenter” when they would not have generated goals, otherwise.
However two facts are worth noting in this regard. First, participants in our lon-
gitudinal goal-studies typically rate themselves as being quite committed and
involved in the goals they generate. ‘That is, at least initially, they tend to view
their participation in the study as an interesting and even exciting opportunity—
a chance to devote focused effort on getting what they want—although, unfortu-
nately, this initial rush of enthusiasm does not necessarily last. Second, because
of the ambiguity of the situation and the paucity of information given partici-
pants regarding what goals to list, the procedure bears important similarities to
projective testing (Emmons & McAdams, 1991). That is, participants must of
necessity project their underlying desires and inclinations onto the sheet of paper.
Along with other goal researchers I assume that such information is important
and revealing, regardless of participants’ conscious attitude towards the task.

The PLOC Methodology Applied to Personal Goals

An important concept within SDT concerns individuals’ perceived locus of

causality for their behavior (Ryan & Connell, 1989). According to this view,
behaviors vary on a continuum of internalization, ranging from noninternalized
(or controlled) to fully internalized (or autonomous). PLOC concerns the degree
to which the regulation of a behavior is external or noninternalized versus inter-
nal or fully internalized. The PLOC methodology has now been applied to study
the quality or degree of internalized motivation within a wide variety of specific
domains or contexts. These include school (Vallerand, Fortier, & Guay, 1997),
work (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2000), sports (Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, & ‘Tuson,
1995), environmentalism (Seguin, Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1998), dyadic relation-
ships (Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, & Vallerand, 1990), medical regimens (Williams,
Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci, 1998), and political behavior (Koestner, Losier,
Vallerand, & Carducci, 1996). Typically in such research a scale is developed so
that people can rate why they behave within the particular domain being studied.
Scale items tend to focus people’s attention upon the forces and contingencies
residing within that domain, as well as the reasons they behave in the context of
those forces. The basic issue concerns whether people can feel self-determined in
the face of these situational influences. A measure of felt self-determination with-
68 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

in that domain is derived, often by subtracting the strength of controlled reasons

from that of autonomous reasons.
However, as noted above, my program of research takes leave of particular
domains and instead asks people to list (6 to 10) broad personal goals. These idio-
graphic stems then become the focus of PLOC appraisals; that is, participants
proceed to rate the extent to which they pursue each goal for autonomous vs.
controlled reasons. Because the goals concern participants’ entire lives (1.e., they
represent a variety of life-domains and/or address trans-domain issues), such
appraisals, when aggregated across the goal-system, take on the status of trait
measurements similar to the Autonomy orientation and Control Orientation sub-
scales of the General Causality Orientations Scale (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Again,
however, I argue that trait motivation measures based on idiographic goals may
have especially desirable properties, given that they concretely represent partici-
pants’ proactive growth attempts, and naturally occupy participants’ attention
over time.

Conceptualizing Self-Concordance

The goal-PLOC variable discussed in this chapter was originally called goal
self-determination (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995, 1998). However, in later work we
were led to revise this term (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Houser-Marko,
2001), in order to avoid ambiguity and to better capture the desired meaning.
One ambiguity was that during goal assessment individuals project a set of goals,
with almost no guidance, onto the assessment form (Emmons 1989). Thus, in one
sense, all personal goals are self-determined, at least nominally so, in that they are
created ex nihilo by the person himself or herself. Because of this, and also because
we wished to focus on the issue of whether chosen goals are congruent or con-
cordant with the person’s deeper or true condition, we have now adopted the
term “self-concordance.” ‘The basic question becomes, can the individual cor-
rectly perceive his or her own needs and developmental trends, thereby generat-
ing self-concordant goals that will remain salient over time and, if attained will
satisfy the person’s needs? As will be illustrated below, this under-studied self-per-
ceptual ability has important implications for positive functioning, psychological
adjustment, and personality growth.
Figure 3-1 provides a graphic illustration of the concept of selfconcordance,
which includes four salient aspects of the PLOG continuum. Self-concordant
goals are defined as those that are inspired by a person’s lifelong evolving inter-
ests (Gruber & Wallace, 1999) and deeply-felt core values (Little, 1993; Lydon &
Zanna, 1990). In other words, they are goals underlain by intrinsic and/or iden-
tified motivation. Such goals are assumed to represent the “best” of people,
 The Self-Concordance Model 69

proactively shaping themselves and their environments to permit further growth

and expansion. As can also be seen in Figure 3-1, however, not all goals are inte-
grated with the self. Specifically, some goals are felt to be compelled by external
or introjected forces, and are not felt to reflect core values or deeper interests. In
our research, we typically compute an aggregate self-concordance variable for
each participant, by summing the intrinsic and identified ratings the person
makes for each of his or her (6 to 10) goals, and subtracting the external and
introjected ratings.

External Intrinsic

NON-INTEGRATED ACTION

Environmental
Pressures

Developing
Interests

SELF-INTEGRATED
ACTION

Core Values

Internal
Sanctions

Introjected

Figure 3.1. A Spatial Relationship of Self-Concordance

70 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Self-Concordance and Well-being

Logically, non-concordant goal pursuit should present substantial problems

for individuals. This is because the process of pursuing personal goals can con-
sume a considerable amount of one’s limited self-regulatory (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) and functional (Wilensky, 1983) resources. If
a person’s goals do not accurately represent the interests and values of his or her
deeper self, then that person may be unable to meet his or her deeper organismic
needs through the goal pursuits. Thus, the person may exhaust important psy-
chological and physical resources, in vain. If this view is correct, then clearly,
whether or not a person pursues concordant goals has important implications for
that person’s well-being and personal thriving.

Self-Concordance and Concurrent Well-being

Sheldon and Kasser (1995) found support for this idea in a cross-sectional
study of participants’ personal strivings (i.e., the enduring teleological trends that
characterize their personalities; Emmons, 1989). Specifically, self-concordant
individuals were higher on a wide variety of well-being and healthy personality
characteristics, such as openness, empathy, self-actualization, positive mood,
vitality, and role-system integration. Sheldon and Kasser suggested that self-con-
cordant people appear healthier because they are better satisfying their organis-
mic needs via their goal pursuits.
A limitation of this study was that it was purely cross-sectional, that is, it
focused on individuals’ personal strivings and their well-being at a single moment
in time. Because of this, Sheldon and Kasser were unable to establish the direc-
tion of any causal relationship between self-concordance and well-being. In fact
the relation may go the other way: perhaps those higher in dispositional well-
being (apparently a highly heritable trait; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996) naturally
report that they better enjoy and more strongly identify with their strivings. Thus,
an important next step was to examine the potential causal influence of self-con-
cordance upon well-being in a longitudinal context, using more concrete and
focused personal initiatives.

Self-Concordance and Longitudinal Well-being

Sheldon and Kasser (1998) conducted a short-term prospective study of

well-being, using the time-delimited personal project (Little, 1993) construct as a
vehicle. Guided by Brunstein’s (1993) findings, they hypothesized that longitudi-
nal attainment promotes positive change in well-being. More importantly, they also
 The Self-Concordance Model 71

hypothesized that “not all progress is beneficial” —that is, that only individuals
attaining self-concordant goals would experience enhanced well-being. This was
based on the assumption that concordant goals, when obtained, would be more
satisfying of individuals’ organismic needs than less concordant goals. Again,
concordant goals were assumed to better represent the individuals’ true values,
interests, and developmental trends, so attaining them should provide more emo-
tional benefits for the person.
Figure 3-2 illustrates the support that Sheldon and Kasser (1998) found for
their hypotheses. As can be seen, a significant interaction emerged such that indi-
viduals increased in their well-being from the beginning to the end of the study
only if their goals were, as a set, largely self-concordant. Notably, Sheldon and
Kasser also showed that self-concordance was not a mere proxy for self-reported
goal commitment—apparently self-concordance provides motivational resources
that go beyond participants’ conscious estimations of their personal commitment
to the goals. Interestingly, the data in Figure 3-2 also suggest that concordant
individuals are at risk for reduced well-being, if they fail to attain their goals.
Sheldon and Kasser argued that this illustrates the deeper investment that indi-
viduals have in concordant goals. For example, a person seeking to transform a
romantic relationship or grow in a new direction may feel substantial (legitimate)
disappointment if he or she fails in those aims. ‘To paraphrase an old saying, “no
risk of pain, no potential for gain.”

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Figure 3.2 Change in Well-Being for Four Hypothetical Participants

Who Made Low or High Amounts of Progress in Goals Low or High
in Self-Concordance.
Tz HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Conceptualizing and Measuring Need Satisfaction

As noted above, Sheldon and Kasser (1998) assumed that concordant goal-
attainment influences well-being because people better satisfy their needs as they
pursue self-concordant goals. However, in their research they did not attempt to
measure or model need-satisfaction. In fact, there is substantial confusion in the
field regarding how to conceptualize and measure psychological needs. Are needs
acquired motive dispositions or “pushes,” to be measured by thematic methods
as are the needs for intimacy, power, and achievement (Smith, 1994)? Or are they
instead universal requirements or “inputs,” to be measured with reference to
phenomenological experience (Deci & Ryan, 1991) and tested as predictors of
thriving? I briefly diverge from goal-related research and the self-concordance
issue in order to address this question. Its relevance for the final self-concordance
model will become apparent afterwards.
I and many of my colleagues have conditionally accepted self-determination
theory’s assumption that humans have three basic types of needs or motives, for
autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 1991). That is, humans
are happiest and healthiest when environments, and their own inner processes,
permit them to feel effective, choiceful, and connected in their ongoing exper-
ence. Where did these three needs come from? One can easily argue that they
are evolved—that, on the behavioral output side, they were selected for because
of the unique adaptive benefits associated with the behaviors that provide each
type of experience and that, on the experiential input side, they were selected for
because the rewarding aspect of these three feelings reinforces much adaptive
learning. Unfortunately, space does not permit further development of these
ideas here.
Sheldon, Ryan, and Reis (1996) and Reis, Sheldon, Roscoe, Gable, and Ryan
(2000) found new support for the proposition that humans “need” these three
types of experiences by showing that the activity-based feelings of autonomy,
competence, and relatedness occurring during a given day each predicted well-
being on that day. Specifically, these investigators pioneered a daily diary method
by which the need-fulfilling quality of an individual’s time-consuming activities
on a given day could be assessed. ‘They found that each of these qualities of daily
activities (1.e., experiential autonomy, competence, and relatedness) had its own
independent effect on positive mood, negative mood, vitality, and symptomology
during that day, and they also found that the effect persisted when trait levels of
need-satisfaction were controlled (Sheldon et al., 1996). Sheldon and Elliot
extended these findings to the longitudinal realm (1999, Study 2 and Study 3),
using a daily diary method to show that need-satisfying experiences accumulat-
ing over a period of time predict changes in global well-being at the end of that
time. In short, the above findings are consistent with SDT’s proposal that need-
satisfaction 1s essential, so we have recently integrated need-satisfaction constructs
 The Self-Concordance Model 73

into our goal research. Before discussing this integration, however, I first return
to the topic of self-concordant goal pursuit and its relations with sustained effort.

Self-Concordance and Goal Attainment

Sheldon and Elliot (1998) studied the process by which personal goals are or
are not attained over time. Specifically, they conducted a month-long study of
personal projects, focusing their analyses on single rather than aggregated goals.
To measure goal attainment by the most objective means possible, they used the
goal attainment scaling procedure (Kiresuk, Smith, & Cardillo, 1994), in which
participants pre-specify and scale the concrete outcomes by which later success
(or lack of it) is finally determined. In their study Sheldon and Elliot divided the
self-concordance variable into autonomous (intrinsic and identified) and con-
trolled (external and introjected) facets, examining each separately as predictors
of initial intended effort, actual later effort, and final attainment.
As expected, Sheldon and Elhot (1998) found that the degree of autonomous
or concordant motivation associated with a goal predicted initial effort intentions
regarding that goal. Interestingly, strong controlled motivation was also associated
with strong effort intentions. Nevertheless, assessments revealed that controlled
motivation did not predict actual effort, two and four weeks later, although
autonomous motivation did. Sheldon and Elliot argued that this pattern of find-
ings occurred because “not all personal goals are personal,” that is, goals that do
not contact people’s enduring values and deeper interests may fail to contact
enduring sources of energy, instead falling by the wayside in the manner of many
New Year’s resolutions. Because such non-self-representative goals do not have
the person’s full emotional backing and volitional support, such goals are not like-
ly to be well-energized, protected, and attained.

Putting the Self-Concordance Model Together

Sheldon and Elliot (1999) assembled all of these findings (re: goal-attain-
ment, need-satisfaction processes, and well-being changes) into a single path
model. Figure 3-3 presents their integrated LISREL model, with the parameter
estimates that were generated in a successful semester-long test of the model. In
this research, all earlier results were simultaneously replicated: that is, the degree
of self-concordance of participants’ goals predicted concurrent well-being
(Sheldon & Kasser, 1995) and also predicted sustained effort in those goals, which
74 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

in turn predicted goal-attainment (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998); goal attainment in

turn led to increased well-being, and self-concordance again moderated the
effects of attainment upon increased well-being (Sheldon & Kasser, 1998). In
addition, need-satisfaction constructs (i.e., accumulated activity-based experi-
ences of autonomy, competence, and relatedness) were shown to be integratable
into the model: goal-attainment, especially concordant attainment, predicted
cumulative need-satisfaction, which in turn predicted changes in rated global
well-being at the end of the semester. Sheldon and Elliot argued that their model
and method provides a useful framework for testing many personality-develop-
mental issues and outcomes.

Goal Self-Concordance X
Goal-Attainment

irene Sustained Effort |

Figure 3.3. The Self-Concordance Model: LISREL Parameter Estimates

‘To summarize, the self-concordance of a person’s personal goals has thus far
been shown to be associated with three positive outcomes. First, self-concordance
is correlated with positive concurrent well-being, indicating that positive mood
states may enhance individuals’ ability to select goals that well-represent their
deeper values and interests, or vice versa. Second, self-concordance enables indi-
viduals to put sustained effort into their goals over time, enhancing the likelihood
that those goals will be attained. Third, self-concordance makes goals more satis-
fying as they are attained, leading to enhanced well-being via the cumulation of
need-satisfying experiences that occur during the period of striving, Notably,
Sheldon and Elliot (1999) showed that these positive effects of self-concordance
were not reducible to the effects of strong life-skills, efficacy-expectations, imple-
mentation intentions, or approach orientation; that is, self-concordance provides
not only wnportant but also unique motivational resources.
 The Self-Concordance Model 75

Bottom-up versus Top-down Routes

to Enhanced Well-being

The results presented so far are consistent with bottom-up models of well-
being (Diener, 1984), which say that happiness results from the accumulation of
many small positive events. In other words, from this perspective, well-being is no
more than the sum effect of the many daily events that make up an individual’s
hfe. Diener, Sandvik, and Pavot (1990) advanced a memory-based explanation of
this process, assuming that when people make global well-being judgments they
do it by recalling salient positive and negative experiences that occurred in the
recent past, then basing their judgments on the proportion of each type which
come to mind. Sheldon and Elhot (1999) suggested that accumulated daily expe-
riences of autonomy, competence, and relatedness are exactly the kinds of salient
emotional events that should contribute to this memory-based appraisal process,
and their data, based on eight samplings of daily activity occurring during the
study, supported that claim.
However, I now suggest another explanation for the bottom-up effects of
need-satisfaction on well-being, namely, that people who have many such experi-
ences literally experience greater “organismic thriving and health” as a result,
that is, they may experience higher immune and neurocognitive as well as
enhanced psychological functioning (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci 1997; Ryff & Singer,
1998). Thus, a recently satisfied person’s reports of greater well-being may be
based on accurate perceptions of his or her current psychophysical state, in addi-
tion to being influenced by the retrospective memorial and self-perceptive
processes outlined by the Diener et al. (1990) Model. Ryan’s (1995) plant
metaphor is apt in this context: those who regularly experience autonomy, com-
petence, and relatedness may thrive to a greater extent than those who do not, in
the same way that a plant thrives given regular sunlight and watering, compared
to plants that do not get such nutriments.
In contrast, top-down models of well-being say that happiness is more a
function of global attitudes or life-circumstances, rather than being the mere sum
of small positive (or negative) events that occur to one (Diener, 1984). From this
perspective, new levels of happiness may result when radical changes occur with-
in one’s life-situation, evaluative attitudes, or self-concept. Notably, Sheldon and
Elliot (1999) found a direct path from goal-attainment to increased well-being, a
path that by-passed cumulative need-satisfaction. They suggested that this indi-
cates that attaining goals can have top-down influences in addition to bottom-up
influences on global well-being. For example, personal goal-attainment may help
people alter their basic attitudes or evaluative baselines which can bring about
relatively sudden changes in global well-being. The idea that more self-concor-
dant individuals are more poised for top-down transformations in their levels or
stages of happiness, self-development, and personality integration will be dis-
cussed in greater detail below.
76 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The above results suggest that the ability to select concordant goals is an
important skill, one that is not necessarily to be taken for granted. What kinds of
more specific abilities enable individuals to select the best goals for themselves?
This interesting question is now considered.

Skills Required for Self-Concordant Goal-Selection

I suggest that generating concordant or health-producing goals requires at

least three component skills or abilities. First, one must be able to distinguish last-
ing and broadly-representative impulses from more transient or superficial
impulses; that is, one must be able to recognize what one’s enduring values and
interests are, in contrast to more momentary whims. By so doing, one is able to
resist squandering motivational energy upon dead-ends or blind alleys and to
avoid the volitional confusions that may result (Kuhl, 2000). Second, one must
also be able to distinguish accurately between “me” and “not-me,” that is,
between goals that represent one’s own interests and values, and goals that instead
represent others’ interests and values. By so doirg, one is able to resist others’ or
the culture’s attempts to implant goals in one, goals that may not be in one’s own
best interest (Kuhl & Kazen, 1994). Of course, while many good ideas for action
can be identified by observing or listening to others (i.e., actions consistent with
one’s own needs and growth trends), it is also the case that many conformist and
even harmful impulses are taken in from the environment. Thus, it is important
to learn to tell the difference.
A third important skill that enhances self-concordance is that of selecting
goals whose contents are consistent with basic needs and motives within the human
personality (Ryan, 1995). To understand this, it is necessary to distinguish
between the “what” or explicit object of goals, and the “why” or motives behind
goals (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). The self-concordance model focus-
es primarily on the “why” of goals, specifically, the sense of ownership that the
person does or does not feel concerning goals. However, the content of goals is
also important; for example, extrinsic goals, which concern money, appearance,
or popularity, tend to be less salubrious than intrinsic goals, which concern inti-
macy, community, and personal growth (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996; Sheldon &
Kasser, 1998) .
Notably, the what and why dimensions are conceptually distinct. Thus, a
person might conceivably pursue goals with strongly extrinsic content, yet feel
quite self-concordant in doing so. For example, a thief might feel strong intrinsic
motivation for stealing (if he enjoys the challenge) and strong identification with
that process (if he believes that the rich have acquired their wealth by illegitimate
means). Conversely, a person might pursue goals with intrinsic content, for non-
 The Self-Concordance Model Dh

concordant reasons. For example, a philanthropist might pursue the goal of sup-
porting social causes out of a sense of guilt (if he believes his wealth is illegiti-
mate) or coercion (if he believes his friends will not like him if he does not give
to charity). Despite their conceptual separability, the data show that goals with
intrinsic content are usually pursued for self-concordant reasons (Sheldon &
Kasser, 1995, 1998). Thus, the ability to focus in healthy content areas can also
be viewed as a skill that conduces to self-concordant goal-selection.

Enhancing Self-Concordance

Below I describe a program of research in which an intervention was tested

to help individuals become more self-concordant in their personal goals
(Sheldon, Kasser, Smith, & Share, 2002). Specifically, a randomly-assigned exper-
imental group of participants attended two sessions run by graduate counseling
students, in which they were taught strategies for regulating their goal-related
experience during the upcoming semester (control participants also generated
personal goals but then took part in other studies rather than attending the train-
ing sessions). The primary aim of the program was to enhance participants’ goal-
attainment, which was hypothesized to offer a proactive route to personal growth
or personality development (notably, most extant theories of personal growth
focus on individuals’ reactions to trauma or stress). Of the four self-regulatory
strategies taught, two correspond to the positive motivational forces specified by
the self-concordance model (i.e., identified and intrinsic motivation). Specifically,
participants were encouraged to try to “own the goal” and “make it fun” at times
when goal pursuit felt onerous or when they were tempted to abandon the goal.
As expected, goal-attainment predicted positive longitudinal increases in
psychosocial well-being, vitality, and self-actualization and also predicted positive
increases in self-concordance (to test this PLOC was assessed a second time near
the end of the semester). Thus, it appears that being successful in one’s goals is
one way to enhance one’s sense of self-concordance regarding those goals.
Surprisingly, the goal-training program had no main effects on attainment (com-
pared with the control group). However, some participants benefited—namely,
those who were already quite self-concordant at the beginning of the study! This
was manifested in a significant interaction between self-concordance and inter-
vention-participation in predicting goal-progress, such that the concordant indi-
viduals receiving the intervention manifested the most goal-progress in the study
(which in turn led to more growth). These results suggest that the “strong get
stronger” —that is, those who are already self-concordant are best poised (Holt,
1998) to profit from learning opportunities (such as our intervention), thus better
attaining their goals and becoming even more self-concordant in the process.
78 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Sheldon et al. (2002) conceptualized the “strong get stronger” effect in terms
of dynamic systems models of personal functioning (Vallacher & Nowak, 1994;
Read & Miller, 1998). Specifically, they postulated that self-concordant individu-
als are in a state of dynamic equilibrium in which they readily move to new phas-
es or levels of organization, in part via their own process of goal-pursuit. In con-
trast, non-concordant individuals are in a more static form of equilibrium, resist-
ing change and clinging to the status quo. Thus, they may be less able to actual-
ize their own potential. In other words, self-concordant individuals are growing
already, are receiving ample “psychological nutrition,” and are thus poised to
take advantage of an opportunity to grow even further. Non-concordant individ-
uals may be “stalled,” afraid of losing what little nutrition they do receive, and
thus may be unprepared to take advantage of new growth opportunities.
Notably, participating in the intervention did not enhance participants’ sense
of self-concordance directly; that is, there was no main effect of program-partic-
ipation on program-participants’ later self-concordance ratings, compared to
control group participants. Although this was contrary to our expectations it can
be viewed as a desirable outcome, one that in a way, supports the validity of the
self-concordance model. That is, it is perhaps comforting that people cannot be
simply “talked into” greater self-concordance. Indeed, if the self-concordance
model is correct in assuming that a person’s goals can really fail to represent his
or her values and interests, then such facile re-framings should have limited effec-
tiveness. Instead, these results suggest that people must work for greater self-con-
cordance or self-integration, achieving it in part via their goal-attainments.
Again, those who were already more concordant showed the greatest ability to
use the self-regulatory tools that we supplied in the goal-training program. This
can be viewed as yet a fourth positive benefit of self-concordance.
Does the strong-get-stronger finding mean that self-concordant individuals
spiral up indefinitely, on a happy trail to ultimate virtue and self-actualization?
No, of course not. Although more concordant individuals are better poised to
make further gains, there are many factors that can dis-entrain them from the
upward path. ‘That is, perpetual growth is a single (probably rare) outcome
among many possible outcomes, and I would expect that few manage to fit them-
selves into the perpetual growth track. Furthermore, nonconcordant goal-selec-
tion doubtless has an important role in growth—~as the saying goes, we learn from
our mistakes. More specifically, the process of pursuing unsatisfying goals can
supply information that can help a person identify better goals the next time.
Notably, the self-concordance model does not yet have a means of incorporating
such dialectical processes. However we are currently conducting studies to track
multiple cycles of goal pursuit, hoping to open a window into the dynamic wax-
ing and waning of personal goal-functioning.
 The Self-Concordance Model To

Self-Concordance: Measurement Issues

and Current Research

One important future issue for the self-concordance model concerns meas-
urement. Again, the aim is to capture the extent to which a person’s chosen goals
correctly represent his or her underlying or “true” interests, values, and commit-
ments. In effect, we are relying on PLOC ratings to tell us when a person’s cho-
sen goals, in aggregate, do not match the person’s developmental core, that is, his
or her enduring values and evolving interests (Gruber & Wallace, 1999).
Obviously, however, these kinds of ratings are susceptible to a number of influ-
ences that might bias the assessment of the fit between self and goals.
For example, it is likely that some self-concordant individuals are not so con-
cordant after all. Rather, they may suffer from “illusory mental health” (Shedler,
Mayman, & Manis, 1993), in which their self-reported well-being is much more
positive than their clinical and physiological profiles actually suggest. Similar illu-
sions might come into play when people make PLOC ratings regarding impor-
tant personal initiatives. To the extent that “false positive” strivers are intermixed
with true positives, self-report measures of self-concordance may have reduced
explanatory power. Relatedly, some individuals may have “closed identifications”
in which their claimed values are not open for reflective consideration but,
instead, are rigorously defended. In such foreclosed cases (Marcia, 1994), goals
that are rated as highly identified might actually be highly introjected, again lim-
iting the validity of the self-report measure. Finally, another problem concerns
the referent. Whose interests and values are being modeled via participants’
PLOC ratings—the self-concepts’ or those of the underlying organism? ‘To the
extent that the individual’s self-concept is out of touch with the organism, these
ratings may actually reverse their meaning.
The fact that research thus far has supported the predictions of the self-con-
cordance model indicates that these potential measurement problems are not
serious. Nevertheless, the considerations outlined above suggest that non-self-
report measures of self-concordance would be very desirable. Are there any indi-
rect but reliable means of revealing a person’s “disattunement” from his or her
underlying organismic condition? Several research projects, pertinent to these
questions, are discussed below.
One way to test the concordance of a goal with the organism of the person
who listed it might be to use galvanic skin response (GSR) or lie-detector method-
ologies. Although such devices are too unreliable for legal purposes, they may
often provide useful research data (lacono & Lykken, 1997). Kasser and Sheldon
(2002) collected data using a design in which participants are interviewed regard-
ing their goals as their GSR, heart rate, and breathing rate are monitored.
Participants are questioned about goals that were rated as high in identification
and low in introjection, relative to other goals within the subject’s goal-system.
80 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Thus, there is an opportunity to observe participants’ arousal level as they are

challenged about goals that they may be “falsely positive” about.
Because goals with intrinsic content are assumed to be more directly expres-
sive of people’s organismic nature, one can hypothesize that individual’s low rat-
ings on introjection for these intrinsic goals would more likely be veridical. In
other words, there should be less arousal when people are challenged about the
low introjection ratings on their intrinsic goals than on their extrinsic goals.
Kasser and Sheldons’ (2002) preliminary data are consistent with their hypothe-
sis that extrinsic goals (concerning money, beauty, and popularity) are more like-
ly to be false positives than are intrinsic goals (concerning self-knowledge, inti-
macy, and community). That is, extrinsic goals are more likely to be “introjects
disguised as identifications.” Conversely, participants are more likely to be cor-
rect when they rate intrinsic goals as being motivated by identified but not intro-
jected motivation. Thus, these preliminary results support the suggestion, made
above, that the ability to select goals with intrinsic content is indeed a “skill” that
conduces to self-concordant goal selection.
A second planned program of research will employ Kuhl and colleagues’
“self-infiltration” methodology (Kuhl & Kazen, 1994; Kazen, Baumann, & Kuhl,
1999), as a way of assessing the meaning of self-concordance ratings. In this
methodology a sophisticated computer program is used in a subtle attempt to
implant false memories into participants. These memories are of a particular
type concerning whether an intended action was originally self-generated or
other-generated. Kuhl and Kazen’s (1994) program first presents a list of “office
activities,” whose attractiveness the participant rates, and a subset of which he or
she selects for later execution. Participants are then given information regarding
a so-called experts’ opinions of each action. They are then presented with the
original list of activities and asked to recall which ones they originally selected.
The program automatically counterbalances and controls a host of within-sub-
ject variables, enabling the researcher to clearly identify which actions the par-
ticipants mistakenly believe were originally their own ideas.
Results thus far indicate that some people indeed make such memory errors,
particularly under alienating conditions that inhibit “self-compatibility checking.”
Kuhl and Kazen called this “self-infiltration,” in which a person incorporates the
recommendations of an authority figure while believing that they were the his or
her own idea, rather than the authority’s idea. Kuhl and Kazen suggested that in
many such instances, the partially-internalized action is actually incompatible
with the person’s true emotional preferences. Kazen, Baumann, and Kuhl (2002)
found evidence to support this idea, showing that falsely-remembered action-ele-
ments are often ones that the participant originally rated as unappealing. Kuhl et
al. interpret these effects in terms of their Personality Systems Interaction theo-
ry, which provides a fascinating neuropsychological complement to self-determi-
nation theory and the self-concordance model. Unfortunately there is not room
here to sketch out the many interesting convergences between these theoretical
perspectives.
 The Self-Concordance Model 81

Kuhl and colleagues’ findings appear to have many implications for the ques-
tion of how and why people might adopt goals that are incompatible with their
true interests and values (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Graessman, 1998),
Specifically, they suggest that people may mistakenly come to believe that others’
goal-recommendations were originally their own idea, thereby uncritically adopt-
ing goals that do not correctly represent their own values and interests. In other
words, such persons may lack the second “skill” discussed above, that of discrim-
inating “me” from “not-me” in making volitional choices.
To test this idea, a modified version of Kuhl and Kazen’s (1994) computer
program is being constructed, to address participants’ personal goals instead of
trivial office activities. The revised program will first ask participants to generate
a list of personal goals that they would like to pursue in the near future and will
then present a list of “expert recommended” goals. Finally, both self-generated
and expert-recommended goals will be intermixed and presented to participants,
who will be asked to pick out the goals that they originally identified themselves.
The primary measurements of interest derived from this procedure will be (a) the
number of alien goals, overall, that become infiltrated into a participant’s goal-
system (a between-subjects variable), and (b) the within-subject distinction
between self-generated and self-infiltrated goals.
Several interesting questions will be addressed by this research, including (a)
what types of individuals are most susceptible to goal self-infiltration? (b) what
conditions tend to induce self-infiltration? and (c) how are self-infiltrated goals
appraised on PLOC, compared to the person’s other goals? The latter question
has particular relevance for examining the degree of self-deception involved in
participants’ ratings of self-concordance. In effect, this experimental methodolo-
gy will identify a clear subset of goals that are known to be “alien” within the per-
son’s system. If self-concordance ratings are reasonably accurate representations
of the person’s organismic condition, then infiltrated goals should be higher in
external and introjected motivation and lower in intrinsic and identified motiva-
tion, compared to the person’s “native” goals. However if infiltrated goals are
instead rated as more self-concordant, then some prior findings of self-determi-
nation theory researchers (including myself!) would be called into question.
Yet another planned program of research will employ latency measures and
priming manipulations to examine the unconscious dynamics of goal-pursuit
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh & Barndollar, 1996). One interesting question
is, how long does it take participants to correctly identify one of their own goals,
flashed on a screen, as belonging to them? The theorizing outlined in this chap-
ter suggests that goals that are less representative or less closely tied to the organ-
ism’s “true” condition should be slower to be claimed, compared to more central
goals. A related technique is to compare two groups of participants: those primed
with the word “myself,” and those primed with some other word (Fenigstein &
Levine, 1984). The self-concordance model would predict that participants will
be slower to claim their external or introjected goals, or goals with extrinsic con-
tent (Kasser & Ryan, 1996) after being exposed to the “myself” prime.
82 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

As can be seen, there are a number of potentially interesting developments

underway in the measurement of self-concordance. Ultimately, it would be desir-
able to be able to objectively assess a person’s degree of attunement or alignment
with his or her own underlying developmental needs and processes, using indirect
indicators and personal goal methodologies, in order to pinpoint areas of diffi-
culty within a person’s motivational system. One can even imagine 22nd centu-
ry individuals “going in to get their selves aligned,” just as we now take our auto-
mobiles in for alignment! We in my lab are excited about beginning to get
answers to some of these fascinating questions.

Conclusion

As should be clear by now, research on the self-concordance model has just

begun, and far more questions exist than do answers. Hopefully, however, it is
also clear that this way of viewing matters has substantial promise for under-
standing how humans can become “disattuned” from themselves, such that their
conscious goals are out of step with the deeper needs, preferences, and values of
their own organism. Of course, discovering what is truly inside oneself may not
necessarily correct one’s problems, if what is inside is corrupt or false. However
more often than not, I would argue, a person who succeeds in contacting deep
and enduring sources of meaning and interest within himself or herself will also
be a person who appreciates and expresses the profounder “being” values about
which so many theorists have written. Folk wisdom says we should try to “be our-
selves,” and the self-concordance model concurs. Although the task of aligning
one’s goals and phenomenal self with one’s underlying organism is not easy, it
may hold the key to positive living.

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4: The Integrating Self and Conscious Experience

Holley S. Hodgins
Skidmore College
C. Raymond Knee
Unwersity of Houston

One of the central assumptions of Self Determination Theory (SDT) is that the
core self includes intrinsic integrative tendencies that motivate individuals to
assimilate ongoing experience into increasingly elaborated and integrated self-
structures (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995). In other words,
there is a basic human tendency to proceed toward higher-order organization.
The organismic integration process through which this tendency is actualized
involves aspects of the self becoming more complex and interrelated with one
another and with aspects of the social world.
The idea of increasingly organized self-structures is congruent with another
SDT postulate, namely that there are innate psychological needs for competence,
self-determination, and relatedness, and SDT proposes that the integrative ten-
dency will function most effectively in social contexts that allow satisfaction of
these needs. Hence, the process of organismic integration underlies healthy psy-
chological development, is optimized when people are able to satisfy their basic
needs, and results in a sense of self that is integrated, authentic, and congruent
with intrinsic aspects of the core self (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Ryan, 1991, 1993,
1995; Ryan et al., 1995).
As individuals develop in the direction of greater autonomy, their sense of
self-worth is based on organismic functioning, that is, on simply “being” what
they are by nature as they act choicefully in integrated ways and fulfill potential-
ities (Maslow, 1968). This means, that when autonomous, people experience
themselves as valuable for being who they are rather than only for doing partic-
ular activities or appearing certain ways to others or to themselves. ‘Thus, secure
self-worth based on “being” accompanies the development of self-structures that
are authentic (i.e., congruent with the core self) and autonomous.
88 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The Integrating Self and Openness

We propose that the conceptualization of an authentic, integrated self with

self-worth rooted in “being” has important implications for the way individuals
encounter ongoing conscious experience, broadly speaking. Being conscious
involves a constant stream of experience including perceptual, cognitive, emo-
tional, and social information. This stream of experience, and consequently, our
intrapersonal and interpersonal worlds, constantly change as novel challenges
and experiences arise. The external and internal changes sometimes are dis-
crepant with self-structures and require assimilation into the working sense of self
and the social world. Thus, it is possible to be “integrated” only in relation to past
experiences before novel experiences come along that require further integration.
We suggest that the motivation underlying self-structures is relevant to how
individuals encounter ongoing conscious experiences, especially novel ones.
Specifically, to the extent that individuals are oriented toward organismic growth
and integration, they will meet the continually changing stream of conscious
experience with openness. By “openness” we mean a readiness to perceive ongo-
ing experience accurately, without distorting or attempting to avoid the experi-
ence, and a willingness to assimilate novel experiences into self-structures.
Another way of stating this is that when individuals function autonomously, they
are open to experience what is occurring in the current moment. This openness
is similar to what has been called “mindfulness” in both Buddhist wnitings (e.g.,
Gunaratana, 1992; Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Maitreya, 1995) and empirical psycholo-
gy (for review see Langer, 1989). It also relates to the personality dimension of
openness (e.g., see McCrae, 1994) and to Roger’s (1961) suggestion that a fully
functioning person is able to encounter experience honestly. However, our dis-
cussion differs from past conceptualizations in that it situates openness in the con-
text of an empirically testable organismic theory of human motivation that
explains development and functioning.
According to our perspective, openness to experience is possible because of
the inner confidence produced by organismic functioning based simply on indi-
viduals’ being who they are as they move toward fulfillment of their intrinsic
needs and potentials. ‘To the extent that an individual is connected to his or her
core self, self-worth is rooted simply in “being” and the individual is less likely to
be threatened by novel inputs or experiences. Rather, experiences of all types can
be considered and encountered as opportunities. Through integration of what
“is” in the moment, individuals grow toward greater unity in understanding and
functioning, ‘This stance toward reality was described by Rogers (1961) as the
working assumption that “all the facts are friendly”(p. 25). When the self is open
to reality, that is, to simply seeing what “is” in the present moment, individuals
have a high tolerance for encountering experience without being threatened or
 The Integrating Self 89

defending against it. Individuals who are functioning autonomously, therefore,

are responsive to reality rather than directed by ego-invested, preconceived
notions. In empirical psychology this approach to information has been termed
“bottom-up” or data-driven functioning (Sorrentino, Holmes, Hanna, & Sharp,
1995) or as having accuracy goals (e.g., Kunda, 1990) as opposed to categorical
or conclusion-driven functioning (Sorrentino et al.) or having directional goals
(Kunda).

Consequences of Openness to Experience

The openness, or willingness to experience what is occurring in the current

moment, which accompanies autonomous functioning should have consequences
across a broad range of events and behaviors, both intrapersonal and interper-
sonal. For example, to the extent that individuals function autonomously and are
open to experience, they should show less evidence of trying to escape awareness
of the present moment with mood-altering substances, with distracting activities
such as television viewing, video games, or movies, or with compulsive behaviors
regarding food, sex, and work.
Furthermore, to the extent that individuals function autonomously they
should show less cognitive defensiveness including less self-serving and in-group
bias in explaining their own and others’ behavior, less distortion in recall and
recognition, decreased primacy effects, and less use of stereotypic information in
forming judgments.
Autonomous functioning also should be associated with lower emotional
defensiveness including denial, criticism of others, justification of one’s own
behavior, and avoidance of emotions. Of course, low defensiveness toward emo-
tional experience means that the so-called negative emotions will be experienced for
what they are; thus, regulating emotions by experiencing them fully may be
painful in the short term. In other words, autonomous self-regulation does not
necessarily protect individuals from experiencing sadness, anger, or fear, for
example; after all, emotions can only be integrated through the process of expe-
riencing them. However, the integrating self’s openness to experience what “is”
in the present moment without defending against it should facilitate integration
over time.
Although autonomy is associated with openness to experiencing emotions,
autonomously functioning individuals also should have higher thresholds for
experiencing threat and thus may experience some emotions less readily. ‘That is,
to the extent that a given emotion (e.g., anger or fear) arises as a response of an
ego-invested aspect of self to a perceived threat (e.g., failure), autonomously func-
tioning individuals may respond less readily or with less intensity compared to
individuals who are functioning in a more control-oriented manner. Stated dif-
90 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ferently, the lower ego-involvement that is associated with autonomous function-

ing should result in lower emotional reactivity and this relation should be medi-
ated by lower readiness to perceive threat.
Another implication of the openness associated with autonomous function-
ing is that it should be associated with less defensive projection onto others. ‘There
is evidence that people are most critical of those traits in others that are most
undesired in themselves (Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997), especially when
they try to avoid their own unwanted traits. To the extent that individuals are
honest about themselves and take responsibility for their own qualities and
behaviors (i.e., function autonomously), they should show a lesser degree of
defensive projection of their undesired traits onto others.
In addition to emotional regulation, there are important effects of openness
on social and interpersonal experience, with autonomy being associated with
greater honesty in interpersonal interactions of all types. To the extent that
behavior emanates from integrated self-structures, individuals feel choiceful and
endorsing of their behavior. Hence, they are more likely to take responsibility for
their emotions and behaviors and not hide or distort information to deceive oth-
ers. Additionally, the secure self-worth in “being” that accompanies autonomy
decreases the fear of others’ judgment that might otherwise result in attempts to
manipulate impressions. ‘
We also expect that autonomous functioning will be associated with choos-
ing interpersonal interactions and partners that are congruent with integrated
self-structures and with the need for relatedness. This should manifest in prefer-
ences for friendships, sexual and romantic relationships, and work relationships
that promote organismic growth. Specifically, autonomously functioning individ-
uals will seek relationships that are based on shared values and that fulfill intrin-
sic needs rather than relationships that primarily support ego-invested or extrin-
sic goals such as, image, reactive independence, and wealth (see Kasser & Ryan,
1996). For example, in sexual or love relationships, this might show up as a pref-
erence for an intimate connection with a growth-oriented partner rather than a
partner with particular physical attributes, wealth, or social standing.
We have said that autonomous functioning is associated with a reality-based
approach to experience, that is, being open to what “is” without avoiding or dis-
torting. Another implication of this for intimate love relationships would be that
autonomously oriented individuals would have less need of the positive, idealized
illusions that have been proposed to be necessary for well-being and adjustment
in romantic relationships (see, e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). Indeed, to
the extent that positive illusions distort reality, they may be a defense used to
avoid ambiguity and preserve rigid notions that are consistent with a more ego-
involved, less-integrated self. Preserving illusions, however, forfeits the opportuni-
ty to intimately know and love another person in all of his or her glorious imper-
fection.
 The Integrating Self 91

In summary, we think it useful to speak of the authentic self underlying

autonomy motivation as an “integrating” self in order to predict how a broad
range of ongoing experience will be encountered and responded to. We have pro-
posed that autonomous functioning allows for openness to ongoing experience,
or a willingness to experience what is occurring in the current moment without
distorting or defending against it.

Ego-Invested Self-Structures

Some human behavior, however, does not emerge from integrated needs and
organismic functioning. When environmental conditions do not facilitate inte-
gration, people behave according to external pressures and introjected demands.
When individuals lack a sense of self-determination they may fail to choose goals
that are relevant to their intrinsic needs and that promote organismic growth
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Controlling environments
therefore contribute to the development of very different kinds of self-structures
(Deci & Ryan, 1991; Ryan, 1991, 1993, 1995; Ryan et al., 1995).
The lack of fulfillment of intrinsic needs and consequent disconnection from
organismic being precludes a sense of self-worth based in being (see Sheldon, this
volume). Instead, as a substitute for self-worth, individuals develop an ego-invest-
ed or false self (Ryan et al., 1995) that is based on doing particular activities in
particular ways, being perceived by others in particular ways, or, perhaps most
importantly, perceiving themselves in certain ways. The very existence of ego-
invested self-structures can be considered a defense against the underlying inse-
curity of disconnection from one’s intrinsic core self. Nonetheless, under control-
oriented functioning it is necessary to protect and defend the ego-invested self in
order to preserve the sense of self-worth it provides (albeit an artificial and very
vulnerable one).

Conditional Approach to Reality

This characterization of an ego-invested self has very different implications

for how conscious experience will be met and managed. A person operating in a
controlled manner from a false self needs to muster all of his or her resources in
the service of propping up and defending the false self from challenges because
this constructed self provides some level of self-worth. Hence, under controlled
functioning individuals want to experience what is occurring in the current
moment only if it validates ego-invested self-structures. Novel inputs in the
stream of conscious experience (e.g., cognitive, emotional, social, etc.) which are
92 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

discrepant from ego-invested self-structures will be defended against as enemies

of (simulated) self-worth. Controlled functioning therefore includes regulating
conscious experience by avoiding or denying events and information that do not
concur with the constructed reality of the ego-invested self.
Conversely, to the extent that experience coincides with ego-invested self-struc-
tures, individuals operating in a controlled manner will embrace the moment
with eager and fervent enthusiasm. This seeking, clutching, and grasping of ego-
affirming moments could be called an addiction in the sense that the ego-invest-
ed self requires these experiences for the seeming reassurance they give about
self-worth. Stated differently, under controlled functioning, the current moment
is not experienced neutrally for what it is but for its relevance to the false self.
These tendencies either to reject or cling to experience could be described as
relating conditionally to reality. That is, under controlled functioning people
accept reality to the extent that it matches ego-invested aspects of themselves, but
to the extent that reality diverges from their false selves, they deny and avoid it.

Consequences of Conditional Reality

Behaviorally, then, self-worth acquired through ego-invested self-structures

results in rigid functioning. Sometimes this will manifest in general defensiveness
under threat, in a range of behaviors that may include perceptual, cognitive,
emotional, and interpersonal aspects. For example, controlled functioning would
be associated with cognitive defenses including the use of self-serving attribu-
tional biases, selective information processing and memory, greater use of heuris-
tics and stereotypes, construing events egocentrically, and inflating the impor-
tance of self in activities.
Similarly, controlled functioning produces emotional defensiveness so that
under perceived threat individuals respond reactively in self-protection. Because
most emotional defensiveness occurs in relation to others, practically speaking,
emotional and interpersonal defensiveness are inseparable. Examples of defen-
sive behaviors include self-justification, projection of one’s own emotions onto
others, intellectualizing experiences, failing to understand others’ perspectives,
outward-directed anger and blame, deception intended to avoid consequences,
and lack of apology for wrongdoing.
As mentioned above, the corollary of rigid defense against ego-discrepant
experiences is a resolute of ego-aflirming experiences, which provide sustenance
for the primary basis of self-worth, Behaviorally, this addiction to experiences
that concur with ego-involved self-aspects might manifest in susceptibility to flat-
tery, poor ability to perceive and interpret situations accurately, and seeking feed-
back that confirms egoistic self-aspects. In the relationship domain, to the extent
people are ego-aflirmation dependent, they might form relationships to validate
ego-invested self-aspects even though these do not fulfill intrinsic, organismic
 The Integrating Self 93

needs. Similarly, people might choose a career for the financial wealth, prestige,
or social power it offers, even if the work is inconsistent with their interests and
with the intrinsic needs for competence, self-determination, and relatedness.
It seems paradoxical that people would neglect basic, intrinsic needs in order
to serve ego-involved self-aspects. However, as a consequence of early experi-
ences of thwarted need satisfaction, rigid and defensive self-structures develop
that continually seek their own affirmation and consequently do not allow con-
tact with and thus true satisfaction of the basic needs. Although people develop
rigid self-structures initially in an attempt to compensate for the lack of basic
need satisfaction, subsequently they must maintain these compensatory structures
in order to preserve the self and sense of worth. It is as if people become psy-
chologically addicted to ego-affirmation at the expense of their overall well-
being, much as people can become physically addicted to substances that inter-
fere with their general health.
In addition to compulsive seeking of ego-affirmation, relating to reality con-
ditionally might manifest phenomenologically in a basic lack of trust or confi-
dence in one’s own intuitive judgment. That is, because the fundamental decep-
tion of a false self precludes contact with one’s own experience, faith in one’s
intuitive functioning would be impaired, including the abilities to trust one’s own
perceptions about people and situations and to act upon one’s desires.

The Lack of a Coherent Self

The construction of an ego-invested self can be considered a (perhaps

valiant) adaptation in an environment that does not support self-determination.
That is, it is a solution to the predicament of disconnection from one’s own
organismic being that at least allows for a sense of effecting outcomes and main-
taining some level of self-worth, albeit artificial, vulnerable, and requiring vigi-
lant protection.
In contrast, in environments that lack not only autonomy support but also
block effectance and relatedness, people become impersonally oriented and amo-
tivated (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). This is the least integrated mode of functioning,
with individuals lacking not only self-determination but also a sense of inten-
tionality (Deci & Ryan, 1991). Impersonal functioning is the consequence of
being disconnected from one’s organismic being and also being unable to con-
struct an effective (albeit defensive) ego-invested self. Hence, impersonal func-
tioning reflects the lack of an underlying cohesive self, either authentic or false.
In terms of meeting ongoing experience, then, impersonal functioning
would be associated with being overwhelmed by and unable to regulate experi-
ences effectively. It is possible that impersonal, like control-oriented functioning,
might involve the use of defenses, but they likely would be ineffective and used
inconsistently. Hence, under impersonal functioning individuals might show
94 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

helplessness or defensiveness or vacillation between the two, with lots of negative

affect.
Although impersonal functioning can arise from the trait-like, chronic lack
of a cohesive self, any human can function impersonally when an experience is
too discrepant to be integrated (e.g., after tremendous loss). To the extent that
impersonal functioning is a transitory state, negative affect can be reduced in
either of two ways. Through willingness to experience what is, individuals can
integrate emotion over time into more elaborated self-structures and reestablish
autonomous functioning. Alternatively, through defensive responses, some might
reestablish and elaborate ego-invested self-aspects and thus maneuver out of
helplessness and back into controlled functioning. Individuals who do not have
either of these resolution strategies available may remain in a state of helpless-
ness, immersed in and overwhelmed by negative affect.
In summary, characterization of the self according to Self-Determination
Theory allows predictions about how individuals encounter conscious experi-
ence. The idea that an integrating self underlies self-determination suggests that
to the extent we function autonomously, we will meet novel experiences openly
and allow their integration into our sense of selves. Thus, the authentic self, with
self-worth based in “being,” which underlies autonomous functioning is respon-
sive to reality. To the extent that we are control-oriented and our self-worth is
dependent on ego-invested self-aspects, we are compelled to encounter ongoing
experience according to its relevance for the false self: We defend and self-protect
against ego-discrepant experiences and cling to ego-affirming ones. And when
experiences provide challenges too great to be integrated and impossible to be
defended against, we function impersonally and are overwhelmed by the experi-
ence, at least initially.
These three styles of functioning and experiencing parallel what Deci and
Ryan (1985a, 1985b) have characterized with the concept of general causality
orientations. Autonomy orientation refers to the tendency to initiate behavior
with a sense of choice, based on an awareness of one’s needs, feelings, and inte-
grated goals. In contrast, control orientation describes the tendency to seek out
external controls and to experience events as pressures that determine behavior
and feelings. Impersonal orientation describes the general tendency to experience
desired outcomes as unattainable and to display little sense of intentionality. In
the past, autonomy has correlated positively with self-evaluation, self-awareness,
self-actualization and ego development (Deci & Ryan, 1985a), as well as consis-
tency among attitudes, traits, and behaviors (Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman,
1992). In contrast, control has related to lack of self-awareness (Deci & Ryan,
1985b), regulation of social behavior by external cues (Zuckerman, Gioioso, &
‘Tellini, 1988), and inconsistency among attitudes, traits, and behaviors (Koestner
et al.). Finally, the impersonal orientation has related to self-derogation, social
anxiety, external locus of control (Deci & Ryan, 1985b), and restrictive anorexia
(Strauss & Ryan, 1987).
 The Integrating Self 3

Although our model ambitiously discusses the regulation of conscious expe-

rience, broadly defined, it makes specific predictions about behavioral manifesta-
tions of the postulated openness to and defensiveness against experience. Below
we review various studies that have examined general causality orientations and
have supported our model of conscious experience. Finally, we discuss ways in
which the model can be tested further.

Empirical Support

Several studies provide evidence for the prediction that autonomous func-
tioning is associated with less defensiveness and controlled functioning with more.
For example, Knee and Zuckerman (1996) examined autonomy and control ori-
entations as moderators of the self-serving bias, a defensive attributional tenden-
cy in which people take more responsibility for success than for failure. It was
hypothesized that self-determined individuals (those high in autonomy and low in
control orientation) would display less self-serving tendency. Participants were
randomly assigned to succeed or fail on a task, and their attributions were meas-
ured. Consistent with predictions, self-serving biases were evident for everyone
except self-determined individuals, who made fewer self-enhancing attributions
for success and fewer defensive attributions for failure. Thus, attributions of self-
determined individuals did not vary according to the-favorability of the per-
formance feedback they received. Rather, these individuals attributed their per-
formance similarly regardless of feedback, giving evidence that self-determina-
tion is associated with low cognitive defensiveness.
Consistent with the direction of the finding for cognitive defensiveness, there
is evidence that lack of self-determination is associated with using a greater num-
ber of defensive coping strategies. In a one-semester longitudinal study, Knee and
Zuckerman (1998) examined undergraduates’ use of avoidant coping, including
mental and behavioral disengagement and denial. ‘They reasoned that the latter
part of the semester is the most stressful for students, and they found, as predict-
ed, that self-determination (high autonomy and low control orientation) was asso-
ciated with less use of avoidant coping over the semester.
Additionally, Knee and Zuckerman (1998) examined the use of self-handi-
capping, which is the tendency to erect impediments to one’s own success in
order to provide an excuse for failure. Hence, self-handicapping can be consid-
ered a defensive preparation to maintain self-esteem in case of later failure.
Consistent with our model, the results showed that self-determined individuals
used less self-handicapping. Taken together, the results show that self-determina-
tion is associated with lower use of defensive coping strategies. ‘This is consistent
with the proposal that an integrating self underlies autonomous functioning and
has less need to defend against ongoing experience.
96 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

In a somewhat different context, Knee, Neighbors, and Vietor (2001) exam-

ined driving anger and aggressive driving behaviors as a function of autonomy
and control orientations, expecting that controlled functioning would be associ-
ated with reactive emotions and behavior. Reactivity in emotion and behavior
can be considered symptoms of a nonintegrated, ego-invested, and defensive self.
Results showed that (1) control orientation was associated with more driving
anger as a result of other drivers’ actions; (2) control orientation was associated
with more aggressive driving behaviors and more traffic citations; (3) the relation
between control orientation and aggressive driving was mediated by driving
anger; and (4) self-esteem and social anxiety did not account for the results of
motivational orientations. Thus, a less integrating, more controlled self was
linked to experiencing more reactive emotion, which in turn was linked to reac-
tive behavior.
The openness to, versus defensiveness against, experience seen in the above
studies can also be found in studies that examine a different domain of function-
ing, that of interpersonal behavior. This work has shown that self-determined
functioning is associated with openness, honesty, and taking responsibility for
one’s interpersonal behavior. For example, Hodgins, Koestner, and Duncan
(1996) examined experiences in naturally-occurring social interaction in two
samples as a function of autonomy and control orientations. The results showed
that autonomy predicted experiencing greater pleasantness, higher self-honesty
and other-honesty, and greater felt-esteem in college students’ interactions with
their parents during a 3-week period. In contrast, college students high on con-
trol orientation responded defensively in interactions initiated by their parents:
The students were less honest and disclosing, felt lower esteem, and rated the
interactions as less pleasant when parents initiated interactions compared to
when students initiated.
The effects of general motivational orientation were not limited to parent
interactions, however; a second undergraduate sample recorded all interactions
during one week. The results showed that autonomy predicted (1) higher ratings
of pleasantness and felt-esteem; (2) disclosure that was higher but selectively more
appropriate with others who were close, honest, and also disclosing; (3) greater
self-honesty regardless of relationship closeness; and (4) perception of higher
other-honesty overall, but also selective trust in the honesty of others who were
more closely related. In contrast, control orientation was associated with (1) rat-
ing one’s own influence in interactions higher than the other’s influence; and (2)
giving lower ratings of felt-esteem and pleasantness during interactions that were
high in honesty and disclosure.
Taken together, the results of Hodgins, Koestner, & Duncan, (1996) support
our model; Autonomy is associated with greater enjoyment, honesty, and open-
ness in social experience across a broad range of relationships. In contrast, an
orientation toward control predicts greater attention to the initiation and influ-
ence aspects of interaction and a defensive dislike of honesty and disclosure.
 The Integrating Self 97

Another important aspect of interpersonal relations is the process of conflict

negotiation and accounting for behavior that is necessary when people have
harmed another. Several studies have now examined the effect of motivational
orientation on accounting behavior (Hodgins & Liebeskind, in press; Hodgins,
Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996; Hixon, Hodgins, & Otto, 2002). The authors pre-
dicted that those higher on autonomy would take responsibility for their behav-
ior rather than defend or justify themselves after harming someone. In contrast,
those higher in control orientation were expected to show defensive self-protec-
tion, as evidenced in a lack of apology for their own wrongdoing. Thus, the stud-
ies examined an interpersonal aspect of the openness versus defensiveness that is
predicted by our model of motivation and the regulation of ongoing experience.
Results confirmed the predictions: Self-determination was related to a
greater number of and more complex apologies both in adults (Hodgins &
Liebeskind, in press, Study 1; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996) and in 5th
and 6th grade children (Hixon et al., 2002), whereas control and impersonal ori-
entations predicted greater defensiveness (i.e., less apology) in accounting
(Hodgins & Liebeskind, in press; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996). The
pattern of deception, which is a defensive strategy that seeks to avoid conse-
quences, lends further support for our model: Autonomy was associated with
using fewer lies in accounts for wrongdoing, whereas control orientation predict-
ed greater use of deception, especially with acquaintances (Hodgins &
Liebeskind, in press; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996).
The studies on naturally occurring social interaction and accounting for
wrongdoing converge on the same understanding: Autonomy is associated with
interpersonal openness and honesty whereas control orientation predicts inter-
personal defensiveness. Together with the studies on attributions, coping strate-
gies, and driving behavior, they provide evidence for some of the predictions of
our model of motivation and ongoing conscious experience. Of course, several
aspects of the model remain to be tested.

Future Directions

Throughout this chapter we have alluded to numerous behavioral manifes-

tations predicted on the basis of openness versus defensiveness to experience.
The predictions are empirically testable and future research is necessary to estab-
lish the full validity of our model. In addition, there are a few aspects that require
empirical support not explicitly mentioned above. For example, one important
aspect of the model is the idea that self-worth is based in the state of “being”
when one is autonomously functioning, is based in “doing” or “appearing” when
one is controlled, and is lacking under impersonal functioning. This assumption
98 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

requires testing, but self-report measures of self-esteem may not be useful in this
regard given the postulated relation between motivation and defensiveness.
Rather, it will be important to create or adapt implicit measures of self-worth
(e.g, Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999) in order to circumvent defensiveness
in self-report about self-esteem.
Another aspect of the model yet to be tested is the prediction that controlled
functioning will be associated with clinging to ego-affirming experiences. So far
our research has focused on defensiveness and the avoidance of threatening expe-
rience, but it will be important also to examine the grasping of ego-affirmation,
which is part of relating to reality conditionally. The prediction that judgments
and behaviors are overly influenced by flattery or others’ positive opinions under
controlled functioning can be examined in a number of different domains (e.g.,
social, relationship, learning tasks, etc.).
Finally, thus far our research has used the revised General Causality
Orientations Scale (GCOS; Deci & Ryan, 1985a; Ryan, 1989) to measure mot-
vational orientations and has taken an individual differences approach to exam-
ining predictions. Empirical support would be strengthened by showing that
manipulated situational differences in autonomy, controlled, and impersonal
functioning produce similar effects in openness versus defensiveness or clinging to
experience.
One curious aspect of maturing is the realization that we will never attain
the psychologically static place implicitly contained in childhood expectations of
adulthood. That is, we never arrive at some stationary state through securing a
particular job or promotion, having certain types of relationships, or acquiring
material possessions. Rather, life is an ongoing process in which experiences
inside us and around us constantly change. We have suggested that the way in
which one meets these ever-changing experiences is a function of whether the
self-aspects one is operating from in that moment are integrated, ego-invested, or
lacking cohesion. ‘Testing the validity of this assertion will, appropriately enough,
be a process that unfolds in the future.

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5: Distinguishing Three Ways of Being Internally Motivated:
A Closer Look at Introjection, Identification, and Intrinsic
Motivation

Richard Koestner
McGill Uniwersity
Gaétan E Losier
Université de Moncton

Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000) posits two innate growth
tendencies to explain people’s vitality, development, and psychological adapta-
tion, namely intrinsic motivation and internalization. Intrinsic motivation refers
to the innate energy that people demonstrate when they pursue a goal or an activ-
ity because it is interesting or fun. Intrinsic motivation is manifest as curiosity, pur-
suit of challenge, and competence development. Internalization refers to the nat-
ural tendency to strive to integrate (or take into one’s self) socially-valued regula-
tions that are initially perceived as being external. Successful internalization fos-
ters responsible, conscientious behavior that allows people to function effectively
within their social groups. According to SD'T, vitality, development, and adapta-
tion are facilitated to the extent that both intrinsic motivation and internalization
function optimally, and for this to occur the social environment must provide
essential psychological nutrients in the form of experiences that will satisfy the
basic human needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan,
2000). Thus, understanding how to maintain or enhance intrinsic motivation and
to facilitate successful internalization requires a consideration of the extent to
which the social environment supports satisfaction of the fundamental needs.

This work was funded by grants to Richard Koestner from the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada and from the Fonds pour la Formation de
chercheurs et l'Aide a la Recherche of Québec. Gaetan EF Losier was funded by the
Université de Moncton. The Commission permanente de coopération Québec/Nouveau-
Brunswick also provided funding for this research with traveling grants from each province
to the two authors, respectively.
102 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The distinction between intrinsic motivation and internalization revolves

around the way an individual becomes drawn to engage a given activity. To the
extent that an activity is inherently rewarding, such as recreational activities are
for many people, it is likely that processes related to intrinsic motivation will ener-
gize and direct a person’s involvement with the activity. However, to the extent
that an activity lacks intrinsic appeal but is highly valued by one’s social group, as
may be the case with many school-related tasks, it is likely that internalization will
have to provide the basis for effective self-regulation. In this case, it is the per-
ception of the activity as valuable or meaningful that drives one to engage and
persist at it. Of course, there are individual differences in what people find inter-
esting and there are cultural differences in what groups find valuable, so it is dif-
ficult to determine a priori whether engagement with a particular activity will be
regulated by intrinsic motivation or internalization.
Self-determination theory asserts that people are inherently motivated to
internalize the regulation of uninteresting though important activities. Thus, it is
thought that socializing agents do not have to compel individuals to internalize
important values and guidelines. Rather, individuals have a spontaneous tenden-
cy to internalize such activities because of their desire to relate effectively to their
social groups (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The success of this internalization process can
vary, however. Identification describes the process wherein people accept the
value of an activity as their own so that they can more easily assimilate it with
their core sense of self (it becomes integrated with their values, beliefs, and per-
sonal goals). Introjection refers to a less successful internalization in which a value
or regulatory process is taken in but not accepted as one’s own. Identification
results in a sense of personal endorsement of one’s actions whereas introjection
yields a controlled form of behavior regulation that is laced with feelings of pres-
sure or compulsion (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991). The internalization process thus
results in regulatory styles that reflect varying degrees of self-determination
depending on the degree to which resolution of the process has been successful.
The purpose of this chapter is to review recent findings on the distinct affec-
tive, cognitive, and behavioral consequences associated with intrinsic motivation,
identification (i.e., more successful internalization), and introjection (i.e., the less
successful internalization). More specifically, we review findings in the domains of
politics and education by highlighting similarities and distinctions among the
three regulatory styles. It is expected that this review will shed light on the com-
plementary role of intrinsic motivation and internalization in promoting vitality,
development, and psychological adaptation.
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations 103

Conceptual Features of Introjection, Identification,

and Intrinsic Motivation

To illustrate some of the issues that will be discussed, we begin with an exam-
ple. Dominique and Michelle have been good friends since kindergarten. Now in
high school, they still very much enjoy doing recreational activities together such
as skiing. It is while doing these activities that they feel most alert and vibrant,
with both of them experiencing competence and having fun. Since kindergarten
however, they have grown to experience school very differently. Dominique expe-
riences a sense of obligation toward her school activities. She does not find them
interesting and often feels anxious about her performance. Michelle does not find
school thrilling either, but she is comfortable there and relatively confident about
her performance. Although both have much in common when it comes to skiing,
they show distinct approaches toward school. Dominique feels compelled to go to
school and behaves as if she must perform well in this domain in order to feel like
a good person. Michelle, however, chooses to go to school because she feels it is
important for the career she wants to pursue, and she is relatively satisfied about
her involvement. How can these two long time friends share so much in their
experience of leisure activities and yet share so little about school? What led them
to grow together in recreation and to grow apart in school?
The bulk of contemporary motivation research has examined the extent to
which people are motivated versus amotivated. The results of this research indi-
cate that there are powerful effects of contingency, control, and competence vari-
ables on whether people will be motivated (Bandura, 1997). However, Ryan
(1995) has argued that important distinctions still need to be made among differ-
ent forms of motivation. Such distinctions revolve around one acts, and reflect
the relative integration of intentional actions. Distinctions among introjected,
identified, and intrinsic forms of regulation focus not on the amount of motiva-
tion that individuals possess but, rather, on variations in the orientation of their
motivation (Ryan, 1995). All three forms of regulation are expected to promote
involvement and persistence in a given domain. Nonetheless, different experien-
tial and performance consequences are expected to be uniquely associated with
different forms of self-regulation. Stated differently, although it is clearly impor-
tant to determine whether or not an individual is highly motivated, it is also of
great consequence to consider whether the form of this motivation is in intro-
jected, identified, or intrinsic regulation.
For instance, the two friends described above are highly motivated toward
both recreational and school activities, however, their orientation leads them to
experience the two domains very differently. Dominique is introjected toward
school; she feels pressured to attend and to perform successfully in order to feel
good about herself. For her, school is neither a choice nor fun; she gets nervous
about school and feels it is something she must do. Michelle does not find school
104 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

fun either, but she chooses to attend because she believes a good education is
important for her career goals. Her orientation toward school reflects identifica
tion and leads her to feel confident and relatively satisfied about her involvement
in school. However, both friends are intrinsically motivated when it comes to ski-
ing, and this leads them both to experience a sense of competence and enjoyment
while doing it.
Table 1 presents a summary of the similar and distinct conceptual features
of introjection, identification, and intrinsic motivation. We first note that all three
regulatory styles can promote high involvement and task-engagement. For exam-
ple, Ryan and Connell (1989) found that parents’ ratings of children’s motivation
toward school were significantly positively associated with the extent to which
children expressed introjected, identified, and intrinsic reasons for doing school
work. However, there was also evidence that intrinsic motivation and identifica-
tion were associated with greater school enjoyment whereas introjection was
associated with greater school anxiety. Subsequent studies confirmed that intrin-
sic and identified reasons were significantly associated with positive emotions
while at school whereas introjection was associated with negative emotions and
certain learning difficulties (Connell & Illardi, 1987; Grolnick & Ryan, 1987;
Patrick, Skinner, & Connell, 1993).
These results suggest that high involvement can lead to different outcomes
depending on people’s subjective experience with the activity. Using deCharms’
(1968) terminology, we can state that although all three types of regulatory styles
govern intentional actions, both identification and intrinsic motivation reflect an
internal locus of causality wherein individuals feel hke an origin of their actions,
whereas introjection reflects a more external locus of causality wherein the per-
son feels like a pawn. Similarly, SD'T explains this in terms of different regulato-
ry styles that vary in their degrees of self-determination, with introjection repre-
senting a less self-determined form of instrumental behavior regulation than
identification (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Intrinsic motivation is considered the most
self-determined form of behavioral regulation because it involves spontaneous
actions that are not based on internalized (or instrumental) processes.
Table | further distinguishes the motivating forces, regulatory guides, and
goal orientations associated with the three regulatory styles. For introjection,
commitment toward an activity or domain is based on feelings of guilt and com-
pulsion. When introjected, the person feels pressured to do the activity in order
to feel good about himself or herself, but would rather not have to do it. This
results in a conflicted or ambivalent goal orientation characterized by both
approach and avoidance motives. For identification, commitment toward an
activity or domain is based on its perceived meaning in relation to one’s goals,
values, and identity. When identified, the person chooses to do the activity
because it is personally important and useful. ‘This choice likely reflects a consid-
eration of the long-term outcomes one hopes to achieve for the activity, or in the
domain. Identification is thought to result in an unconflicted goal orientation
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations 105

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106 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

characterized primarily by approach motives. For intrinsic motivation, the attrac-

tiveness of the activity is sufficient to elicit task engagement and the resulting pos-
itive emotions serve to sustain continued involvement. The goals of the intrinsi-
cally motivated individual tend to be relatively non-conscious, in-the-moment,
and process-focused. When intrinsically motivated, one is completely absorbed in
the task at hand, without necessarily reflecting on its meaning or significance.
Finally, Table 5-1 indicates the fundamental needs that are most salient to
the emergence and sustenance of each type of regulatory style. Among the three
fundamental needs, SDT posits that satisfaction of the need for autonomy is the
most central nutrient to the person’s growth (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Therefore, it is
considered salient in all three types of regulatory styles dealt with here. However,
because both introjected and identified regulations represent extrinsic (or instru-
mental) types of motivation based on an internalization (or learning) process,
inputs or instructions from significant others (e.g., parents, teachers, coaches,
supervisors) are often implicated. Thus, in relation to the internalized regulations,
relatedness and autonomy are the two most salient needs. There is a central dif-
ference, however, in how these needs are aligned when one is introjected versus
identified. With introjection, the satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and relat-
edness have typically been pitted against one another, such as in the case of con-
ditional love (Deci & Ryan, 2000). This oppositional relationship between funda-
mental needs gives rise to ego involvement, contingent self-esteem, and vulnera-
bility to guilt (Ryan, 1982). With identification, satisfaction of the needs for
autonomy and relatedness is achieved harmoniously, as is typically the case
under supportive environmental conditions (Hodgins, Koestner, & Duncan,
1996). The need for relatedness is not as essential for intrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic motivation involves being spontaneously drawn toward activities that
provide optimal challenge, opportunities for unencumbered action, and the pos-
sibility of testing one’s skills with a reasonable chance of success. Therefore, it is
the need for competence that more centrally combines with autonomy to influ-
ence intrinsic motivation (Koestner & McClelland, 1990).

Distinguishing Outcomes Related

to the Three Types of Regulation

Our empirical work has focused on distinguishing the affective, cognitive, and
behavioral consequences of introjection, identification, and intrinsic motivation
in two domains, namely, politics and education. Self-regulation is assessed by ask-
ing participants to rate their reasons for participating in domain-relevant activi-
ties (e.g., “Why do you follow political events?”). Introjected reasons reflect pres-
sure and compulsion (“I follow politics because it is something I should do”); iden-
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations 107

tified reasons reflect consideration of important personal values and goals (“I go
to school because this will help me make a better choice regarding my career ori-
entation”); and intrinsic reasons reflect a natural inclination to pursue domain-rel-
evant activities (“I choose to follow politics for the pleasure of doing it”). Our sta-
tistical analyses control for the overlap among the three regulatory styles because
significant positive correlations are typically found between identification and
intrinsic motivation, and, occasionally, between identification and introjection.

Political Domain

We conducted five separate short-term prospective studies to examine moti-

vational outcomes in the political domain. A few weeks prior to an election or ref-
erendum, participants’ reasons for following politics were assessed along with
measures of information seeking, knowledge of events, and emotional experi-
ences. Immediately after the election or referendum, participants were followed
up to determine whether they had voted and how they felt about the outcome.
Our goal was to determine whether the three regulatory styles led individuals to:
(a) adopt different strategies in forming their opinions, (b) form different knowl-
edge and attitude structures regarding political events, (c) experience different
patterns of emotions regarding the anticipated and actual outcomes of the elec-
tions or referendum, and (d) vary in their tendency to actually cast their vote. Our
guiding hypothesis was that both identification and intrinsic motivation would be
associated with more active, differentiated, committed, and effective political par-
ticipation than would introjection.
We assumed that college students were an appropriate sample for exploring
self-regulation toward politics. The internalization process is thought to be influ-
enced by developmental considerations, with different developmental stages call-
ing for a focus on internalizing certain types of regulations and values. For exam-
ple, late childhood primarily requires the internalization of relatively concrete
regulations regarding conscientious and agreeable behavior, whereas late adoles-
cence and early adulthood call for internalization of more abstract concerns such
as the development of a coherent and personally meaningful set of religious and
political beliefs (Marcia, 1980). ‘The question “Why do you consider it important
to follow political events?” becomes an important issue during the late teenage
years.
Table 5-2 summarizes the correlates of introjection, identification, and
intrinsic motivation in the political domain. Introjection was found to be associ-
ated with a distinctly different pattern of preparing to participate in a political
campaign than were identification and intrinsic motivation. That is, introjection
was associated with passively relying on authority figures such as parents when
making voting decisions, whereas identification and intrinsic motivation were
associated with actively pursuing information by reading newspapers, watching
108 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

debates, and requesting information from political parties. Interestingly, the vig-
orous pursuit of information appears to be used for somewhat different purpos-
es by highly identified versus intrinsically motivated voters. Intrinsic motivation
was associated with forming an accurate base of knowledge about the political
parties and current issues, whereas identification was associated with developing
highly differentiated opinions about which party to support on various issues.
That is, a highly intrinsically motivated voter was more likely to be able to cor-
rectly answer “which party or parties supports increased education funding?”
whereas a highly identified voter was more likely to be able to specify which
party he or she supported on the issue of education funding. This implies that
intrinsic motivation and identification lead individuals to place somewhat differ-
ent emphases on cultivating factual information versus personal opinions about
political issues.

Political Self-Regulatory Style

Outcomes Introjected Identified Intrinsic

Passive Reliance on Others

Information Seeking

Differentiation of Attitudes

Accuracy of Knowledge

Vulnerability to Persuasion

Emotional Experiences

Coping with Critical Vote

Voting

Note: “+” indicates that a significant positive relation was obtained; “-" indicates a significant

negative relation was obtained; “O" indicates that a non-significant relation was obtained.

Table 5.2. Summary of the Correlates for the Three Self-Regulatory

Styles in the Political Domain.
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations 109

A complex set of findings emerged across three studies regarding the rela-
tion of self- regulatory styles to vulnerability and resistance to persuasion.
Generally, introjection was found to be associated with increased vulnerability to
persuasion whereas identification appeared to inoculate young adults against cer-
tain forms of persuasive appeal. Thus, in one study, highly introjected individu-
als who watched a televised debate just prior to a federal election tended to report
significantly more positive views of these politicians shortly after the debate but
before the election (Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, & Carducci, 1996: Study 2). In
another study, highly introjected individuals who favored government policies
about recycling were found to be particularly vulnerable to persuasion by an
attractive, credible spokesperson (Koestner, Houlfort, Paquet, & Knight, 2002).
Identification, however, was associated with highly stable political attitudes over
time (Losier, Perreault, Koestner, & Vallerand, 2001). Intrinsic motivation was
not related to vulnerability to direct persuasive appeals but, surprisingly, one
study found that it was positively associated with greater influence by an inci-
dental priming manipulation (Ratelle, Debeis, Koestner,& Losier, 1999).
Specifically, the stated support of intrinsically motivated voters for the reelection
of Montreal’s mayor was significantly influenced by whether the participants had
just written about their experiences during Montreal’s 1998 ice storm (negative
prime) or their experiences during the 1998 summer festivals in Montreal (posi-
tive prime). That is, intrinsically motivated voters were significantly more likely
to support the mayor’s reelection if they had reminisced about summer festivals
rather than the winter ice storm. It seems that their interest in issues led them to
behave in accord with whatever issue they were focused on.
Voters’ emotional experiences before and after an election or referendum
were importantly influenced by their self-regulation patterns. Voters high in
introjection experienced a conflicted pattern of both pleasant and unpleasant
emotions when the side they favored was victorious in the 1993 Canadian
Referendum on constitutional reform (Koestner et al., 1996: study 1). Feeling
pressured in their involvement thus had its affective costs even when their side
won. Voters high in introjection who were on the losing side of this referendum
experienced only greater negative emotions. In contrast, identification and intrin-
sic motivation were associated with positive emotional experiences for voters who
were on the winning side of the referendum, but there was no association of
identification or intrinsic motivation with affective experience for voters who
were on the losing side. A subsequent study confirmed that identification was
associated with experiencing positive emotions even in the context of a highly sig-
nificant political event such as the 1995 Quebec Referendum which concerned
the possible separation of the province from the rest of Canada (Losier &
Koestner, 1999). Thus, even though the vote represented only a narrow victory
for most participants in our sample, identification was associated with reporting
pleasant emotions about the outcome. By contrast, we were surprised to find that
intrinsically motivated voters in this study reported unpleasant emotions follow-
110 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ing this referendum outcome when their side won, despite the fact that they had
anticipated having highly positive emotions under these circumstances. This find-
ing led us to wonder whether intrinsic motivation toward politics may not have
been sufficient to prompt voters to participate effectively in a consequential event
such as voting on the future of their country, so we began a series of studies to
investigate the issue.
Intrinsic motivation and internalization. The possibility that intrinsic motivation
alone may not prepare people to participate fully and effectively in the political
process was further suggested by the results for voting behavior. In two studies
with over 500 participants we found that identification, but not intrinsic motiva-
tion, was significantly positively related to voting behavior (Koestner et al., 1996;
Losier & Koestner, 1999). Introjection was also unrelated to voting behavior.
Thus, whether participants viewed following politics as personally important was
a better predictor of voting than whether they found politics interesting. It is puz-
zling that people who naturally enjoy following politics would spontaneously
gather information and become emotionally involved in political issues, but not
be more likely to follow through to cast their ballot in elections and referenda. We
have speculated that people who are identified with respect to politics have
accepted the importance of the political process and of their role in it, so they act
accordingly, for example, by voting. However, those who are highly intrinsically
motivated to follow politics take an interest in issues, are eager to find out infor-
mation about the different sides, and may become emotionally involved in root-
ing for their side, but they are not more likely to engage in behaviors such as vot-
ing than are others low in intrinsic motivation if they have not internalized the
importance of such behaviors. ‘This speculation would suggest that in terms of
the democratic ideal of fostering an electorate made up of involved participants
who voice their opinions in elections, it may be important to promote identified
reasons for following politics, even if a young person has a strong natural interest
in the process. ‘That is, it is important for citizens to see not only that politics can
be interesting but that what happens is personally important to them.

Educational Domain

We conducted two separate long-term longitudinal studies with students who

were making a transition either at the end of high school or the end of college
(Koestner, Losier, Fichman, & Mallet, 2002). Participants’ reasons for being in
school were assessed along with measures of school satisfaction and general psy-
chological distress. Participants were later followed up to determine if they con-
tinued in school, if their reports of satisfaction had changed, and if they showed
any variation in their level of psychological distress. Our guiding hypothesis was
that identification and intrinsic motivation would be associated with making
school transitions more effectively than introjection.
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations ri

Transitions for high school students. Graduation from high school or college is
viewed by developmental researchers as a particularly significant transition
because of powerful sociocultural expectations involving economic independ-
ence and establishing emotional attachments beyond one’s family (Gore, Aseltine,
Colten, & Lin, 1997). Not surprisingly, several studies have shown that these
school transitions can result in increased psychological distress (Larose & Boivin,
1998). Such findings have led researchers to argue that high school and college
graduation may represent a critical time period for ensuring successful adapta-
tion to future adult roles (Seidman & French, 1997).
Table 3 summarizes our results in the educational domain. The reported
results were obtained after controlling for overlap among the three regulatory
styles and for general personality factors, such as optimism and dependency, that
have been shown to influence adaptation. The general pattern of findings sup-
ported the prediction that identification and intrinsic motivation would be asso-
ciated with superior outcomes relative to introjection. However, as in the politi-
cal domain, there was evidence that it was particularly identification rather than
intrinsic motivation that promoted positive engagement with academic activities,
continued persistence in school, and successful adaptation to school transitions
(Koestner, Losier, et al., 2002).

Outcome Introjected Identified Intrinsic

High School Students

Academic Satisfaction in College

Continuation to College (at 6 mth follow-up)

Continuation in College (at 18 mth follow-up)

Psych Distress in College at 6 mths

Psych Distress in College at 18 mths

College Students

GPA

Psych Distress in School Over Time

Psych Distress After Graduation

Note: “+” indicates that a significant positive relation was obtained; “-” indicates a significan

negative relation was obtained; “O" indicates that a non-significant relation was obtained.

Table 5.3. Correlates for the Three Self-Regulatory Styles.

Le HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

It can be seen in Table 5-3 that only identification was significantly positive-
ly associated with reported satisfaction after students made the transition to col-
lege. Regarding continuing in school, identified and intrinsic regulation were
both predictive of enrollment in college at the six-month follow-up, but only
identification predicted continued enrollment in college at the 18 month follow-
up. Introjection was unrelated to school persistence at both follow-ups.
An interesting pattern of results emerged on reports of psychological distress
after students made the transition to college. Introjection was significantly relat-
ed to later reports of heightened distress at both the six and 18 month follow-ups
whereas identification was significantly associated with reporting lower levels of
distress. Intrinsic motivation was unrelated to later reports of distress. These
results only partially confirmed our hypothesis. Successful internalization of the
value of being in school, as evidenced in endorsing identified rather than intro-
jected reasons for school involvement, appeared to facilitate making a smooth
transition to college. However, intrinsic motivation, which typically promotes
positive school experiences, did not provide any benefit for high school students
as they wrestled with the challenge of adapting to college (Koestner, Losier, et al.,
2002).
Transitions for college students. Our second study followed college students either
as they went from their junior year to their sentor year or from their senior year
to post graduation. Table 5-3 shows that the way students had internalized the
value of school participation had long-ranging effects on their later adjustment
regardless of whether they continued college or graduated. Highly introjected
college students, who viewed school participation as something they do, report-
ed higher levels of distress over time regardless of whether they were in their final
year or had graduated. That introjection was significantly negatively related to
adjustment even among college students who had graduated suggests that the
emotional toll of adopting a controlling style of self-regulation in an important
life domain may continue to be felt even after one departs the domain.
Identification, which is reflected in viewing school participation as personally
meaningful, was significantly associated with superior adjustment over time
regardless of whether students remained in school or graduated. As in the first
study, intrinsic motivation was unrelated to later reports of distress (Koestner,
Losier, et al., 2002).
‘Together, the two studies yielded the surprising conclusion that whether or
not young people successfully internalize the value of school participation is more
important to their psychological growth and development than whether they
remain intrinsically motivated about school. That is, whether students are able to
view school activities as personally meaningful rather than something they feel
coerced to do is a more important predictor of later adaptation than whether
they find school activities naturally interesting and enjoyable. That identification
rather than intrinsic motivation emerged as the best predictor of successful long-
term adaptation in the academic domain echoed the earlier findings from the
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations V3

political domain which had suggested that identification (rather than intrinsic
motivation) was especially associated with responsible and effective political par-
ticipation (as reflected in forming differentiated opinions, casting one’s vote on
election day, and feeling positive emotions when one’s side wins).

Conclusions and Implications for SDT

The results of our studies provided evidence that introjection placed indi-
viduals at risk for negative emotional, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes in both
the political and academic domains. Although previous studies had demonstrat-
ed the negative consequences of introjection (Ryan, 1982; Ryan & Connell, 1989;
Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993), our political studies were the first to explicitly link
this regulatory style with conflicted emotions and vulnerability to persuasion.
The harshly evaluative and pressured character of an introjected self-regulatory
style appears to compromise people’s information processing and disrupt their
emotional experiences in this domain. Furthermore, our academic studies were
the first to demonstrate that introjection placed young people at risk when nego-
tiating important developmental transitions such as entering into or graduating
from college. Specifically, students who were pursuing their education because of
internal pressures related to guilt avoidance and self-esteem maintenance showed
a pattern of heightened psychological distress as they made normative school
transitions. The impact of introjected academic regulation was not restricted to
school-related emotions but instead radiated to undermine global adjustment.
Such radiation effects from a specific domain to more global functioning have
been outlined in a recent multi-level analysis of motivational phenomena
(Vallerand, 1997). The way one has internalized the value of school activities
exerts a wide-ranging impact on individuals’ growth and development because of
the centrality of the academic domain in Western cultures. The possession of an
introjected regulatory style in a more peripheral domain, such as politics, may not
exert such a wide-ranging effect on psychological adjustment.
There was also evidence that in both the political and academic domains,
intrinsic and identified regulation conduce toward positive outcomes such as
active information processing, the experience of positive emotions, and success-
ful adaptation to school transitions. There was a consistent thread of evidence,
however, suggesting that identified regulation was more important than intrinsic
motivation in promoting responsible behavior and healthy adaptation. Thus,
only identification was significantly positively related to forming differentiated
political opinions and actually voting in elections, and, in the academic domain,
only identification was consistently associated with higher levels of psychological
adjustment as students made school transitions. This is not to say that intrinsic
114 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

motivation was negatively associated with adaptive outcomes in any of these

cases, instead, it was simply that intrinsic motivation did not exert a consistently
significant impact on these outcomes. The stronger results for identification were
a surprise. We had expected that intrinsic motivation would prove to be more
advantageous than identification in promoting successful adaptation.

The Importance of Identification

The fact that identification was the best predictor of adaptive outcomes in
our studies suggests reexamining some common assumptions regarding the rela-
tion of intrinsic motivation to internalization processes. Intrinsic motivation
refers to behaviors that are performed for their inherent satisfaction and are thus
not the product of internalization (Ryan, 1995). If someone is spontaneously
drawn to perform an activity it is thought to be unnecessary for the individual to
learn to acquire the regulation of that activity through the processes of accept-
ance and personal valuing that define identification. Although this may be true
at the level of a specific activity, a potential difficulty arises when one considers
that domains such as politics or academics encompass a wide range of activities
that vary in terms of their intrinsic appeal. There are some aspects of these
domains, such as registering to vote or rereading a chapter in preparation for an
exam, that are likely to be perceived as quite uninteresting, yet that are essential
to effective involvement in the domain. With such activities, it is likely that the
extent to which individuals have consciously integrated the value of domain-rel-
evant activities into their personal goals and values will be more important than
their intrinsic interest in the domain. Our results suggest that someone who is
highly identified toward a given domain is likely to persist at even the uninterest-
ing activities within the domain whereas there is a risk that someone whose reg-
ulation is exclusively based on intrinsic motivation will invest themselves only in
those domain-relevant activities that are interesting to them. This line of think-
ing suggests that it is important for socializing agents to promote successful inter-
nalization even if a young person is highly intrinsically motivated.

Autonomy Support and Structure

But how does one promote successful internalization? Grolnick and Ryan
(1989) found that parental levels of autonomy-support were highly predictive of
children reporting greater identification for achievement tasks, and also of better
teacher-rated adjustment and performance in class. Williams and Deci (1996)
showed that supervisors’ level of autonomy support led to the development of
identified regulation among medical students. Experimental studies similarly
highlighted the critical role played by autonomy support in promoting identified
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations 15

regulation (Deci, Eghari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). However, autonomy support
has similarly been shown to be the critical factor in promoting intrinsic motiva-
tion (Reeve & Deci, 1996), thus begging the question of what social factors are
uniquely associated with promoting successful internalization rather than intrinsic
motivation.
We suspect that the distinction between autonomy support and structure is
critical here. Autonomy support refers to the degree to which socializing agents
encourage independent problem solving, choice, and participation in decisions
(Grolnick & Ryan, 1989). Structure refers to the extent to which socializing agents
provide consistent guidelines, expectations, and rules for behavior, without
respect to the style in which they are promoted. Examples of providing structure
include offering children a rationale for why certain uninteresting activities are
important to perform and modeling engagement in such activities (Koestner,
Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984). We would hypothesize that high levels of both
autonomy support and structure are required to promote successful internaliza-
tion. High levels of autonomy support without the provision of structure may
result in a high level of intrinsic motivation toward certain activities within a
domain but will not promote an understanding of why it is personally important
and meaningful to perform even the uninteresting activities that are central to the
domain. On the other hand, high levels of structure without an autonomy-sup-
portive interpersonal context is likely to result in introjected self-regulation (Deci
etal, 1994),

Intrinsic Motivation and Identification

Promoting high levels of both intrinsic motivation and integrated identifica-

tions seems like the appropriate goal for socializing agents to work toward.
Indeed, we conceptualize intrinsic motivation and internalization as working in a
complementary fashion to promote vitality, growth, and adaptation. Intrinsic
motivation promotes a focus on short-term, process goals and yields energizing
emotions such as interest and excitement, whereas identification keeps one ori-
ented toward the long-term significance of one’s current pursuits and fosters pos-
itive emotions such as pride in one’s accomplishments in the domain. Possessing
high levels of both intrinsic motivation and identification would seem to allow
one to flexibly adapt to the wide diversity of situations that all domains typically
offer. Three recent longitudinal studies by Sheldon and Elliot (1999) showed the
adaptive value of combining these two forms of self-congruent regulation styles
when pursuing personal goals.
Support for the adaptive value of possessing both intrinsic and more instru-
mental motives or goals is also provided by motivation researchers who do not use
Self-Determination Theory as their starting point. For example, in a longitudinal
study of talented teenagers, Wong and Csikszentmihalyi (1991) distinguished two
116 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

forms of academic motivation, intrinsic motivation and work orientation. They

argued that intrinsic motivation is based in the rewards of ongoing experience,
whereas work orientation reflects an investment in long-term goals such as fulfill-
ing one’s career expectations or psychological needs. Their results showed that
work orientation, which we would liken to identified regulation, was significantly
associated with the amount of time students spent studying but was unrelated to
their experience while studying. By contrast, intrinsic motivation was related to
enjoyable studying experiences but not the amount of time spent studying.
A similar pattern of results was obtained in research on achievement goals.
Thus, two recent studies demonstrated that college students’ grades were pre-
dicted by performance goals, which involve demonstrating competence relative
to others, whereas their positive emotions about school involvement were pre-
dicted by learning goals, which concern a desire to develop competence (Elliot &
Church, 1997; Harackiewicz, Barron, Carter, Lehto, & Elliot, 1997).
To be able to achieve good grades and simultaneously enjoy the process
seems to require combining self-regulation strategies that focus both on immedi-
ate experience (i.e., intrinsic motivation) and long-term goals (1.e., identification).
Although our research indicates that it is important to develop an identified
regulatory style toward academics and politics, it is natural to wonder whether
the same would be true in other domains, particularly those that consist largely
of tasks that naturally elicit intrinsic motivation. For example, does identification
have a role to play in relation to the way people pursue their leisure activities? We
would argue that even domains consisting of highly interesting activities will still
require internalization. Consider the example of a young girl who is passionate
about playing tennis. Although her initial experiences may be driven by the nat-
ural pleasure of hitting the tennis ball, the girl will at some point want to extend
her skills in order to pursue greater challenges. There is considerable evidence
that long-term skill improvement will, however, require more than playful
engagement in the domain. Thus, Ericcson and Charness (1994) have argued
that the development of expertise in sports or performing arts is directly related
to the amount of deliberate practice one performs in a domain, with deliberate
practice being defined as specific training activities recommended by a knowl-
edgeable instructor. ‘These activities share little with the concept of intrinsic moti-
vation; instead, they tend to be goal-oriented, repetitive, and highly effortful (e.g.,
hitting 100 consecutive backhand strokes to a coach), Interestingly, Bloom (1985)
found that parents play a critical role in youngsters’ learning to dedicate them-
selves to deliberate practice. Parents need to help children understand the rela-
tion between their practice and later improved performance, as well as to assist
children in learning how to schedule practice activities into their daily lives. We
would argue that the extent to which individuals are able to dedicate themselves
to deliberate practice will hinge upon the degree to which the individuals are
identified rather than intrinsically motivated toward the domain.
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations 117

Having discussed the potential value of becoming identified in a domain that

was primarily intrinsically motivating, it is important to consider whether the
reverse also holds. Should one try to cultivate intrinsic motivation for activities
that are socially valued but generally uninteresting? Is it even possible to become
intrinsically motivated about an activity that one originally became involved with
only because of its perceived social importance? The answer to both questions
appears to be Yes. Thus, Lepper and Gilovich (1982) demonstrated that struc-
turing children’s chores so they involve an engaging fantasy resulted in superior
internalization over time. Cordova and Lepper (1996) showed that adding an
engaging fantasy context to a math activity led to greater interest and better
learning. Other studies found that college students were able to generate their
own strategies, such as varying their approach to the task in order to enhance the
interest value of boring activities (Green-Demers, Pelletier, Stewart, & Gushue,
1998; Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992). Csikszentmihalyi (1997) has
argued that even the most mundane of activities, such as working on an assem-
bly line, can be made into a enjoyable flow experience if actors focus their atten-
tion on setting challenging goals and monitoring performance in relation to these
goals. These results suggest that it is useful to supplement identified regulation
with intrinsic motivation.

Future Research

There are three directions we would recommend for future research based
on SDT. First, it seems important to reexamine commonly held beliefs about
intrinsic motivation and adaptation. Our results suggest that intrinsic motivation
is only partially responsible for psychological adjustment and that identified reg-
ulation can make a major contribution in certain domains. Future research
should examine the complementary or synergistic roles of intrinsic motivation
and internalization for growth and adaptation. Perhaps intrinsic motivation is
most important for the energization and regulation of short-term goals related to
interesting activities, whereas identification has more to do with delayed gratifi-
cation and the attainment of long-term goals. The adaptive advantage of a dual-
process motivational system consisting of both intrinsic motivation and internal-
ization could be to provide flexibility in one’s regulation of goal pursuits.
Second, future research should focus on the distinct regulatory styles, rather
than relying on a composite score such as the Relative Autonomy Index (RAI).
The RAT takes into account a person’s endorsement of the different types of rea-
sons by weighing the autonomous reasons positively and the controlled reasons
negatively and then combining them into an overall score. Although the RAT can
118 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

provide useful information about the “big picture”, important distinctions con-
cerning the relative contribution of each type of motivation may be overlooked.
We particularly encourage researchers to examine the relative influence of intrin-
sic motivation versus successful internalization (identification rather than intro-
jection) on adaptation in various domains.
Third, research should examine the distinct regulatory styles at different lev-
els of personality to take into account not only domain specific factors, but also
situational and dispositional influences (Vallerand, 1997). Exploring the relative
influence of intrinsic motivation and internalization at a more global level of per-
sonality functioning is particularly interesting to us because of our previous work
with the General Causality Orientations Scale. The GCOS was developed to
measure individual differences in people’s general orientation toward
autonomous functioning (Deci & Ryan, 1985). The autonomy scale of the GCOS
has been associated with a high degree of integration in personality, a persistent
approach toward one’s goals, flexible decision-making, and positive social rela-
tions with both peers and superiors (Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 1992;
Koestner, Gingras, et al., 1999; Koestner & Losier, 1996; Koestner &
Zuckerman, 1994). Although these studies confirm an association between
autonomy and adaptive functioning, they are uninformative regarding the rela-
tive role of intrinsic motivation versus identification because the GCOS autono-
my scale includes item content related to both regulation styles. Separating the
autonomy scale into distinct intrinsic and identified subscales might shed light on
which aspects of adaptive functioning are more or less influenced by these two
forms of self-regulation.

Conclusion

The present chapter has focused on distinguishing introjection, identifica-

tion, and intrinsic motivation. Introjected regulation involves pursuing an activi-
ty because of feelings of pressure or compulsion, Identified regulation involves
integrating important activities with one’s personal values and goals. Intrinsic
motivation involves pursuing an activity because it is interesting and fun. In a
series of studies, it was shown that it is possible to isolate some relatively distinc-
tive affective, cognitive, and behavioral features of these three forms of self-reg-
ulation. Introjection was uniquely associated with adverse outcomes such as con-
flicted emotional experiences, vulnerability to persuasion, and poor adaptation to
school transitions, whereas identification was associated with adaptive outcomes
such as resistance to persuasion about some personally important issues and flex-
ible adaptation to school transitions. Intrinsic motivation, like identification, was
associated with generally positive emotional experiences, but failed to predict vot-
 Distinguishing Internal Motivations Ne)

ing behavior in the domain of politics or successful long-term adaptation in the

domain of education. This last pair of findings suggests that it may be important
to promote identified reasons for engaging in various activities even if a person
displays high levels of intrinsic motivation. Our discussion highlighted the need
for research to more closely explore the interplay between intrinsic motivation
and internalization, the two innate growth tendencies that together explain much
of the variance in people’s vitality, development, and psychological adaptation.

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6: Sketches for a Self-Determination Theory of Values

Tim Kasser
Knox College

This chapter sketches out what a self-determination theory of values might

entail. I begin by introducing the concept of values and discussing how
researchers and theorists have understood the construct. Then six propositions
derived from self-determination theory (SDT) are presented which could form
the primary brush strokes needed for a self-determination theory of values.
Review of the literature demonstrates that these six propositions are indeed con-
sistent with much extant theorizing and research on values.

Values

Values were defined by Rokeach (1973) as beliefs “that a specific mode of

conduct or end-state of existence 1s personally or socially preferable to an oppo-
site or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.” (p. 5) These guiding
principles of life organize people’s attitudes, emotions, and behaviors, and typi-
cally endure across time and situations. ‘That is, someone with a particular value
is expected to consistently express behavior relevant to that value in a variety of
situations over time. According to Feather (1992, 1995), values lead to specific
behaviors and experiences by influencing the valences that individuals assign to
the desirability of specific objects and situations. For example, if a woman holds
being attractive as an important value (1.e., an important end-state of existence
she would like to personally attain), the valences she attaches to shopping for
clothes, looking at magazines such as Cosmopolitan, and dating handsome men will
likely be quite high. As a consequence of these valences, she will be more likely
to engage in behaviors relevant to this value than will another person who views
this pursuit as less worthy. Values may also influence behavior through the goals
they organize (Emmons, 1989). For example, a person who strongly values per-
sonal growth is highly likely to proactively engage in a number of specific goals
124 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

relevant to that overarching aim, such as going into therapy, meditating daily, and
reading self-help books. These goals will influence behavior by activating specif-
ic action systems that lead the individual to actually engage in goal-relevant (and
thus value-relevant) behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1982).
While individual values provide some information about people’s experience
and behavior, most values theorists emphasize that it is best to assess the entire
organization of values a person holds, that is, the person’s value system. To
understand an individual’s choice of career, for example, we would want to know
about the entire system of the person’s values, as all the values together and their
relative importance to each other influence this decision. Thus the person who
believes that the ideal societal end state of world peace is more important than
the personal end-state of being wealthy will be more likely to choose a lower-pay-
ing job working as an activist than will someone whose value system is oriented
in the opposite direction. And a third person who views these two values as equal-
ly important will be more influenced by other aspects of the job (e.g., opportuni-
ties for freedom, fame, etc.) and how they fit with his or her value system.
Using these concepts as starting points, values researchers have conducted
more fine-grained analyses of how values influence attitudes and behavior, how
they cohere in systems, and how their internalization is influenced by different
environmental factors (see Seligman, Olson; & Zanna, 1996 for an overview).
Unfortunately, values remain a rather neglected topic in mainstream psychology,
as far more energy has been devoted to other issues of the self-concept, other
types of beliefs, and other types of motivational dynamics. I believe there are
three reasons for this. First, research on values is often said to be too subjective
for a scientific enterprise that strives for objectivity. The idea that values are too
subjective to be studied is obviously untenable, as the scientific method has been
applied to values just as it has to many other aspects of personality. A second rea-
son values have not attracted greater attention in psychology may be that most
theories of values are mini-theories with nomological networks that do not
extend far beyond value constructs (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1994,
1996). As such, these theories do not provide a very comprehensive explanation
of human experience and behavior. Third, the grander theories of human
behavior which do incorporate the concept of values (e.g., Maslow, 1954; Rogers,
1964) have been derived from theoretical orientations whose proponents often do
not submit their formulations to empirical tests.
My intention in this chapter is to suggest that SDT is consistent with a great
deal of what past students of values have proposed theoretically and found
empirically, and that the attainment of greater integration between SDT and val-
ues research could be mutually beneficial. Research on values would be enhanced
by being grounded in an empirically supported motivational theory that has
implications for many aspects of human experience and behavior. SDT would in
turn benefit by obtaining further support for its tenets and by incorporating a
 Self-Determination Theory of Values >

cognitive/affective construct that would help explain enduring personality func-

tioning and social behavior.

Toward a Self-Determination Theory of Values

To this end, I present six propositions about values. My belief is that they are
all consistent both with the existing literature on values and with previous theo-
rizing and research conducted from the self-determination perspective. In order
to support these propositions, I review the research my colleagues and I have con-
ducted, in addition to that of a variety of other investigators whose writings have
not been explicitly informed by SDT.

Proposition I: Valuing Originally and Ideally Emerges from the Self

At the core of SDT, both literally and figuratively, is the self. The self has
been defined as the integrative center of the organism, the set of psychological
processes that is attempting to make experience whole, to feel authentically
behind its behaviors, and to grow (Ryan, 1995). In the attempt to integrate and
grow, the self engages in behaviors that it finds intrinsically motivating—that is,
behaviors that are fun, enjoyable, and valuable as ends in and of themselves.
One way to understand the attempts of the self to grow by engaging in activ-
ities it finds intrinsically motivating is to say that the self seeks out activities that
it values. Rogers (1964) theorized that individuals are born with an organismic
valuing process which helps guide infants’ behavior. For example, hunger, pain,
bitter tastes, and loud sounds are negatively valued, while security and food are
usually positively valued. I say usually, because Rogers believed that the valuing
process is a flexible one that depends on the organism’s current state. ‘Thus, once
hunger is satisfied, food becomes negatively valued, as any parent well knows.
Similarly, infants typically value security, but once they feel secure, they often-
times turn to exploring their environment (see also Maslow, 1956), thus valuing
intrinsically motivated activity. Naturally, we cannot speak of infants as having
true concepts or beliefs at this stage of cognitive development, and thus no val-
ues as typically defined, but certainly they have feelings about what is and what
is not desirable. According to Rogers, this valuing process acts in the service of
helping the infant to continue to grow and satisfy its needs (as will be discussed in
Proposition Two).
Hermans (1987) has also defined the process of valuing as a function of the
self, emphasizing that by self he means the experiencing “I” rather than the look-
ing glass “Me,” a point that relates to Ryan’s (1995) characterization of the self
of SDT as the “T” and not the “Me.” According to Hermans, the I is sometimes
126 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

evaluating an external object, such as a car, and is other times evaluating the Me.
That is, the I is at times evaluating its own ideas and behavior, judging for exam-
ple whether the chapter one is writing is of high quality. This valuing is necessary
for, and indeed central to, Hermans’ concept of the person.
Thus, Hermans (1987) and Ryan (1995) agree that valuing emerges devel-
opmentally from the true self as a means of helping the young organism know
what it likes and does not like, what will help it grow and what will not. Valuing
can thus be understood as an evaluative function of the self which aids in its
growth, in part by selecting which activities will be beneficial and which will not.
From the perspective of SDT, the behaviors most likely to benefit the self are
those that are intrinsically motivated—that is, those that are interesting, fun, and
valued for their own sake.
SDT has been careful to recognize that not all activities that emerge from the
self are intrinsically motivated, however. That is, although not all behaviors are
intrinsically motivating, there are times when people still feel authentic and agen-
tic about engaging in them. Feelings of agency for such behaviors, according to
Ryan and Connell (1989), can occur when people feel identified with their behay-
iors. In the case of identification, a person is said to wholeheartedly endorse a
course of action, or to engage in it because he or she values it, or because his or
her whole self is behind it. ‘Thus, just as infants’ valuing originally emerges from
the self, an adult’s values may still emanate from the self if the person feels iden-
tified with the course of action. It is important to emphasize, however, that not
all the values a person holds will necessarily feel agentic and owned. For exam-
ple, two people may both hold the value of being religious, but one may do so
out of a sense of felt pressure because he or she lives in a society where noncon-
formity leads to imprisonment, whereas the other authentically believes that spir-
ituality is an essential part of his or her true being. Only in this latter case can the
self be said to be the source of the valuing. As we will see in later propositions,
the extent to which the valuing process continues to represent the self’s growth
processes throughout development is an important issue.

Proposition Two: Values Derive, in part, from Needs

Fundamental to SD'T is the idea that all people possess psychological needs
that help guide the organismic integration process and are “nutriments or condi-
tions that are essential to an entity’s growth” (Ryan, 1995, p. 410). Specifically, for
the self to grow and integrate experience in an optimal manner, psychological
needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence must be satisfied. People need
to feel that they freely choose their behaviors, that they have close connections
with others, and that they are effective in the activities they undertake. Thus, a
self-determination theory of values must relate people’s value systems to psycho-
logical needs.
 Self-Determination Theory of Values We

Indeed, values scholars commonly state that values stem in part from peo-
ple’s needs. For example, White’s (1951) list of values is adapted from Murray’s
(1938) conceptions of needs, and Maslow (1959) often went so far as to use the
terms values and needs almost interchangeably, believing that people’s values are
strongly determined by their place on his well-known need hierarchy. Schwartz
(1992, p. 4) stated that “values represent, in the form of conscious goals, three
universal requirements of human existence to which all individuals and societies
must be responsive: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of
coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of the group.”
Perhaps most cogently, Rokeach (1973, p. 20) wrote: “Values are the cognitive
representations and transformations of needs.”
Valuing and values can therefore be seen as ways that the self goes about try-
ing to grow and satisfy its needs. Values give expression to needs, helping the self
select experiences that are desirable and supportive of need satisfaction, and
avoid experiences that are neither desirable nor conducive to growth and need
satisfaction. Most likely, values work in this regard by influencing the valences
people attach to more specific activities and objects, as suggested by Feather
(1995). For example, most people would place low valences on the activity of
“spending time in prison” because such an activity does not typically work to sat-
isfy the self’s need for autonomy. In contrast, higher valences would likely be
placed on the activity of “spending time with friends,” as this activity is more like-
ly to satisfy the need for relatedness. In essence, I am suggesting that both valu-
ing and values are cognitive/affective tools by which the self can fulfill its aims of
growth and need satisfaction and that these tools work by orienting the person
towards some behaviors and away from others.

Proposition Three: Values Reflect Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic

Motivations

Self-determination theory recognizes that people’s behavior is not always

intrinsically motivated. Ideally, people act out of the self’s inherent tendencies to
grow and integrate experience, to feel intrinsically motivated for their behavior,
and to satisfy needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence. However, it is
(perhaps too) frequently the case that people’s behavior arises not from the
authentic strivings of the self but instead from feelings of coercion, control, and
pressure. In such cases, individuals are said to be extrinsically motivated.
Extrinsic motivation involves engagement in behaviors in order to obtain rewards
or praise, or to avoid criticism or punishment (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Such behav-
iors are seen by SDT as alienated from the self and its needs and as being prob-
lematic in many regards well-reviewed in other chapters of this volume. ‘Thus, a
self-determination theory of values must recognize that some values are con-
ducive to growthful, intrinsically motivated actions and others tend to prompt
128 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

extrinsically motivated behaviors focused on rewards and people’s praise. In

other words, values sometimes emerge from and reflect the self, and sometimes
they emerge from and reflect coercive processes.
Values theorists have noted a similar distinction. For example, Rogers (1964,
p. 162) believed that individuals often give up their own internal locus of evalua-
tion in order to obtain the love and affection of others, and thus hold introjected val-
ues which are based more on what others value than on what would facilitate actu-
alization of the true self. We can see here quite well the distinction between val-
ues based in the self’s own needs and those based in extrinsically motivated
action. Similarly, Rokeach (1973) proposed three motivational functions of values:
to self-actualize, to adjust to societal demands and group pressures, and to defend
the ego. Obviously the first function is closest to what SDT would see as valuing
based in autonomous motivation, while the latter two relate to valuing based in
controlled motivations. This is because extrinsic motivation results from the pres-
sures of either outside forces (i.e., society or the group) or from introjected beliefs
that are not an integrated part of the self (i.e., ego-defensive motivations).
Thus, values sometimes express growth motivation and the self’s needs and
other times serve other functions that are extrinsically motivated and oftentimes
at odds with the growth of the self. My colleagues and I have represented this dis-
tinction by identifying values that are intrinsic and extrinsic. Kasser and Ryan
(1996, p. 280) defined intrinsic values as “expressive of desires congruent with
actualizing and growth tendencies natural to humans. As such, intrinsic goals are
likely to satisfy basic and inherent psychological needs.” Examples of intrinsic
values include those for self-acceptance, affiliation, and community feeling. Self-
acceptance values are those that concern growth, autonomy, and self-regard;
affihation values involve having good relationships with friends and family; and
community feeling values focus on improving the world through activism or gen-
erativity. In contrast to these values that stem largely from the self’s tendency to
grow and directly satisfy its needs, extrinsic values “do not provide satisfaction in
and of themselves; instead, their allure usually lies in the presumed admiration
that attends them or in the power and sense of worth that can be derived from
attaining them” (Kasser & Ryan, 1996, p. 280). Three examples of extrinsic val-
ues are: financial success, the concern to accumulate wealth and possessions;
image, the desire to look attractive in terms of one’s body and clothing; and social
recognition, the aim of being famous and well-known. As can be seen, all of
these values express a concern with the attainment of external rewards and
praise,
In order to test the notion that values can be classified into intrinsic and
extrinsic types, Kasser and Ryan (1996) asked participants to rate the importance
of different aspirations reflecting these values. Importance ratings were then sub-
mitted to a higher-order factor analysis. Two factors resulted, which were easily
interpretable as representing intrinsic and extrinsic values. That is, the intrinsic
values of self-acceptance, affiliation, and community feeling were highly associ-
 Self-Determination Theory of Values 129

ated with one another and empirically distinguishable from the extrinsic values
of financial success, appearance, and social recognition, which also cohered with
one another. This result has been demonstrated with U.S. college students and
adults (Kasser & Ryan, 1996) and with students from Germany (Schmuck,
Kasser, & Ryan, 2000) and Russia (Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon, Timoshina, &
Deci~i1 999);
The finding that intrinsic and extrinsic values form separate factors is only
one piece of evidence supporting the validity of this distinction, however. Recall
that, theoretically, intrinsic values are more likely than extrinsic values to satisfy
the self’s needs. Research indeed supports this claim, especially for autonomy and
relatedness needs.
With regard to autonomy, intrinsic and extrinsic values have been associated
with two important measures derived from SDT that assess feelings of autonomy.
The first of these is the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS; Deci &
Ryan, 1985a), which measures people’s orientations toward autonomy (1.e., being
motivated by challenges and opportunities for freedom) versus control (1.e., being
motivated by rewards, praise, and external incentives). Kasser and Ryan (1993)
showed that people who highly valued the intrinsic pursuits of self-acceptance,
affiliation, and community feeling scored relatively low on measures of control
orientation, whereas the reverse was true for people who highly valued the extrin-
sic aspiration of financial success. Similarly, Sheldon and Kasser (1995) demon-
strated in two studies that people with personal goals aimed at intrinsic “possible
futures” were more autonomy oriented, while people with personal goals aimed
at extrinsic values were more control oriented. The second measure of autono-
my used to support the validity of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction derives from
Ryan and Connell’s (1989) measure of whether the perceived locus of causality
(PLOC) for behavior is internal or external. Sheldon and Kasser (1995, 1998)
have consistently found that people with intrinsically oriented goals also report
more self-determined reasons for pursuing their goals (i.e., a more internal
PLOGC), while people with extrinsically oriented goals report more controlled rea-
sons for pursuing their goals (i.e., a more external PLOC),. In sum, research with
both the GCOS and the PLOC shows that intrinsic values are more autonomous
and self-determined than are extrinsic values.
Research has also demonstrated that people oriented toward intrinsic and
extrinsic values have different experiences of relatedness as well. Here I will
review only three relevant findings. First, Kasser and Ryan (2001) assessed the
quality of people’s relationships with friends and lovers by measuring length of
relationships and characteristics such as trust, acceptance, and jealousy. Results
showed positive correlations between the quality of both types of relationships
and the importance participants placed on intrinsic goals, and negative correla-
tions between these outcomes and the importance placed on extrinsic goals.
Second, Sheldon and Kasser (1995) reported that people whose goals were very
extrinsically oriented were less empathic, whereas intrinsically oriented individu-
130 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

als were not only more empathic, but also more likely to help friends with their
problems. Finally, assessing only the extrinsic value of financial success, Richins
and Dawson (1992) showed that materialists placed less emphasis on having int-
mate, close relationships with others.
Together, the studies just reviewed show, as predicted, that people oriented
toward intrinsic values are likely to differ from those oriented toward extrinsic
values in terms of their experience of needs for autonomy and relatedness.
Regarding the need for competence, however, the picture remains unclear. On
one hand, people generally report being less confident that they will attain their
extrinsic aspirations than their intrinsic aspirations (Kasser & Ryan, 1996;
Schmuck et al., 2000) suggesting that feelings of competence may decline when
one pursues extrinsic goals. On the other hand, there is no theoretical reason that
intrinsic and extrinsic values could not be equally effective in helping people to
satisfy the need for competence. For example, individuals are likely to feel just as
efficacious if they close a big business deal or lose 15 pounds to be more fash-
ionable as if they make new friends or help someone at a soup kitchen. The allure
of extrinsic values may in fact be that they help people who are questioning their
own self-worth to feel competent in culturally sanctioned pursuits such as wealth
and attractiveness.
Despite the fact that the bulk of research distinguishing between intrinsic
and extrinsic values has been explicitly derived from SDT, a reinterpretation of
results reported by Schwartz (1992, 1994) can provide additional support for the
proposal that values reflect intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Schwartz asked
participants to rate the importance of a number of guiding principles in their
lives, and then submitted these ratings to a “smallest space analysis” (Guttman,
1968) which organizes the values into a circumplex structure reflecting how val-
ues cohere together or oppose each other. Consistent with his theory, Schwartz
has found 10 domains of values in this analysis: stimulation (novelty and chal-
lenge); self-direction (exploring and feeling choiceful); universalism (a desire to
improve the welfare of all people and the world); benevolence (a desire to
improve the welfare of those close to the person); tradition (commitment to the
customs and ideas of a culture); conformity (restraining impulses and actions
based on social norms); security (feeling safe and that one’s life is stable); power
(the desire for prestige and domination over others); achievement (personal suc-
cess through demonstrated competence); and hedonism (pleasure and sensual
gratification).
Interestingly, Schwartz (1994) believes that values of stimulation and self-
direction reflect needs of the organism to seek out novelty and be in charge of
one’s life, which SD'T would label as autonomy and which Kasser and Ryan
(1996) assessed via “self-acceptance” values. Similarly, Schwartz considers the
values of universalism and benevolence to satisfy needs of the organism to be
connected with others, parallel with Kasser and Ryan’s (1996) affiliation and
community feeling values fulfilling relatedness needs. Extrinsic values are also
 Self-Determination Theory of Values 131

represented in Schwartz’s research. Specifically, Schwartz’s definition of power

values bears a strong resemblance to extrinsic aspirations, as do achievement and
conformity/tradition values, which highly involve others’ reactions to the per-
son’s own status and behavior.
Schwartz’s (1996) circumplex model of value configurations, which has been
validated in 41 countries, can also be interpreted in a way consistent with Kasser
and Ryan’s (1996) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values. In the cir-
cumplex, when values are close to each other, they are viewed by individuals as
compatible, while when values are on opposite sides of the circumplex, they are
in conflict with each other. Among other findings, the circumplex reveals that
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, and benevolence all cluster together and
are thus seen by individuals as mutually compatible. As mentioned above, these
values can be seen as representing autonomy and relatedness needs, which con-
ceptually replicates Kasser and Ryan’s (1996) factor analyses showing that affili-
ation, community feeling, and self-acceptance load on one factor. What’s more,
the values most similar to extrinsic values, namely power, achievement, and con-
formity/tradition, also cluster together and are on the opposite side of the cir-
cumplex from the intrinsic values. Further, it is interesting that Kasser and Ryan
(1996) suggested that feelings of insecurity are associated with extrinsic goals, and
Schwartz (1996) showed that security and power values are right next to each
other in the circumplex. In sum, although Schwartz’s value model was not
designed to test ideas deriving from SDT, many of his results can be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the theory.
To summarize this section, people’s values can be conceived of as intrinsic,
thereby serving growth motivations and needs for autonomy and relatedness, or
as extrinsic and focused on praise, rewards, and security. Substantial research
with a diverse array of instruments supports this claim.

Proposition Four: On Average, People are More Oriented Toward

Intrinsic Values than toward Extrinsic Values

Self-determination theory assumes that the basic trajectory of individuals is

towards growth and integration. As noted above, growth and integration involve
behavior organized by intrinsic motivation and the needs for autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness. Thus, when asking people about their values, we should
find that they rate as most important values expressive of intrinsic motivation and
the self’s needs and are less interested in values concerning extrinsic motives.
There are important qualifications to this proposition, as will be noted in
Proposition Five, but generally speaking people should value intrinsic contents
more than extrinsic contents.
Thus far, support for this proposition has been strong. For example, using the
Aspiration Index, Ryan et al. (1999) compared the values of Russian and U.S.
132 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

college students, and Schmuck et al. (2000) compared the values of German and
US. college students. In all four samples, intrinsic aspirations were more highly
valued than were extrinsic aspirations. Further, in all four samples, affiliation and
self-acceptance aspirations were rated as the two most important values, and the
extrinsic goals of social recognition and appearance were the two least valued
pursuits.
While not explicitly designed to test this proposition, two studies using
Schwartz’s value survey have reported results consistent with the idea that people
view intrinsic values as more important than extrinsic values. Feather (1995)
reported the ordering of Schwartz’s values by their importance in a sample of
Australian students, and Schwartz, Sagiv, and Boehnke (2000) reported similar
information in seven samples composed of Israeli and German adults and stu-
dents and Russians who were recent immigrants to Israel. Recall that self-direc-
tion and benevolence values are those which, in Schwartz’s typology, most close-
ly parallel Kasser and Ryan’s (1996) intrinsic values of self-acceptance and affili-
ation, respectively. In five of the eight samples using the Schwartz measure, self-
direction and benevolence were the two most important values, and in the other
three samples, these two were both listed among the top three values. Recall also
that power and tradition/conformity values bear strong resemblances to extrin-
sic values. As would be expected, these three -contents were generally least val-
ued, falling in the bottom three values in five of the eight samples, with at least
two of these values in the bottom three in the other three samples.
These findings are quite compatible with SDT, which maintains that people
in all cultures have the same psychological needs and tendencies towards growth
and integration. Thus, people will orient most toward values that support growth
and integrative processes and fulfill universal human needs but will tend not to
focus on values that are counter to the development of the self and the fulfillment
of basic needs. Further work is needed, but our preliminary analyses of cross-cul-
tural data suggest that, as in individualistic cultures, people in collectivistic cul-
tures are also more likely to place greater importance on intrinsic than extrinsic
values.

Proposition Five: When Environmental Conditions Thwart Need

Satisfaction, People Will Increasingly Orient toward Extrinsic Values

The origins of SD'T lie in the discovery that controlling environmental con-
ditions undermine intrinsically motivated activity. Deci (1971) found that reward-
ing people for engaging in enjoyable, fun activities decreased their likelihood of
future engagement in these activities. Naming this phenomenon the “undermin-
ing effect,” he explained that rewards change the perceived locus of causality for
the behavior from internal to external, and thus undermine feelings of autono-
my. Substantial research has expanded upon this phenomenon, showing that a
 Self-Determination Theory of Values 133

variety of controlling conditions can undermine intrinsic motivation in different

domains of life, including school, work, health care settings, and sports (see other
chapters in this volume).
Similar dynamics are likely at work when individuals view extrinsic pursuits
as highly valuable. For example, Rogers (1964) and Maslow (1956) both believed
that when parents do not provide supportive environments, their children forego
their own values expressive of growth motivation and instead focus on security
and others’ values. Research also supports the idea that a variety of environ-
mental conditions that do not support psychological need satisfaction result in an
increased focus on extrinsically oriented values. Much of this work has examined
how environmental factors influence the extrinsic values of materialism and
financial success.
At the level of the family, Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff (1995) assessed
the values of a heterogeneous group of 18 year olds, comparing teens who high-
ly valued materialistic goals with those more oriented toward the intrinsic values
of self-acceptance, affiliation, and community involvement. The teens’ mothers
were assessed for nurturance by interviews with the mothers and surveys the moth-
ers completed. As expected, teens who were especially focused on the extrinsic
value of financial success had less nurturant mothers. Similar results have been
reported by Williams, Cox, Hedberg, and Deci (2000), who found that high
school students highly oriented toward extrinsic values, in comparison to intrin-
sic values, perceived their parents as relatively low in autonomy support. Other
research not informed by SDT similarly shows that materialistic children are
more likely to have experienced family situations less supportive of the self’s
needs and desires for growth and integration. For example, Rindfleisch,
Burroughs, and Denton (1997) found that materialistic children were likely to
come from homes broken by divorce, and Cohen and Cohen (1996) reported that
materialistic children had more punishing and possessive parents. Our under-
standing of these results is that nonnurturant families do not provide environ-
ments conducive to personal growth, self-expression, and feeling free and close to
others. As a consequence of these experiences of control, children are less likely
to pursue activities relevant to the self’s growth motivations, and instead focus on
materialistic and extrinsic pursuits, in line with capitalistic societies’ suggestion
that such pursuits provide a sense of worth and security.
Extra-familial factors have also been associated with a stronger focus on the
extrinsic value of materialism. For example, both Kasser et al. (1995) and Cohen
and Cohen (1996) found that materialistic children were more likely to come
from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. Interestingly, in longitudinal
and cross-cultural studies of national materialism, the political scientists
Abramson and Inglehart (1995) similarly showed that people living in relatively
poor nations or economically difficult times were highly likely to value material-
istic pursuits for their governments. Along with these political scientists, we sug-
gest that living in disadvantaged socio-economic situations may ultimately result
134 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

in less satisfaction of the self’s needs for growth and integration, as poverty and
dangerous neighborhoods can lead people to feel less secure, less trusting of oth-
ers, and less able to express themselves. Further, individuals may look to wealth
as a means to feel good about themselves, escape their insecure situation, and
provide themselves with the food, shelter, and clothing that are necessary to sur-
vive in this world.
Two other national characteristics have recently been identified that thwart
need satisfaction and are in turn associated with materialistic values. First,
Khanna and Kasser (1999) reanalyzed Abramson and Inglehart’s (1995) data
and showed that nations that have experienced significant national upheaval
since World War II were more likely to be materialistic, even after controlling for
national wealth. Being occupied or invaded by a foreign power and undergoing
internal revolutions are obviously unlikely to provide many opportunities for cit-
izens to express their strivings for growth and autonomy. Second, Kasser and
Sharma (1999) found that females were especially likely to desire wealthy, high-
status mates when they lived in nations that did not support reproductive freedom
or provide equal opportunity for female education. Thus, it appears that when
women do not have the opportunity to control their own destiny (1.e., do not have
satisfaction of the autonomy need) they will become more extrinsic and materi-
alistic in their values and thus in the valences they place on various potential
mates.
In sum, studies investigating characteristics of people’s families, socio-eco-
nomic situations, and nations support the proposition that people are more like-
ly to orient toward extrinsic values when environmental conditions do not sup-
port their needs, as would be suggested by almost three decades of laboratory
and field research from the self-determination perspective. Why is this the case?
It seems most likely that when individuals see that the inherent desires for growth,
expression, autonomy, and relatedness are unlikely to be satisfied in the present
situation, they turn towards extrinsic values as a compensatory strategy to attain
at least some satisfaction and some feelings of worth and security. Extrinsic val-
ues may seem to hold the promise of providing security, love, and feelings of self-
worth, but as we will see momentarily, extrinsic values do not keep this promise.

Proposition Six: People Oriented Toward Intrinsic Values Experience

Greater Well-being than People Oriented Toward Extrinsic Values

As described throughout this paper, self-determination theory maintains that

optmal growth and well-being occur when the self is intrinsically motivated,
expressing its integrative tendencies and satisfying its psychological needs for
autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Research on the reasons people engage
in a variety of activities supports the idea that people who feel more autonomous
about their behaviors also report greater well-being, as does recent work demon-
 Self-Determination Theory of Values 135

strating that positive experiences of autonomy, competence, and relatedness all

help an individual have a “good day” (see Sheldon, this volume).
Above, I reviewed evidence that intrinsic values are associated with greater
satisfaction of needs for autonomy and relatedness, while the reverse is true for
extrinsic values. This suggests that people who pursue intrinsic values should
have relatively high well-being, as their values are likely to lead them to engage
in experiences associated with greater need satisfaction and more opportunities
for intrinsic motivation and integration, the very experiences the self needs in
order to thrive. In contrast, people who have relatively high values for extrinsic
pursuits should have relatively low well-being, for such a value configuration sig-
nals an alienation from the growth processes of the true self and prompts more
frequent engagement in activities counter to, or at least unrelated to, need satis-
faction. Indeed, research from a number of investigators strongly supports this
proposition, as briefly reviewed below.
In the first demonstration of this phenomenon, Kasser and Ryan (1993)
found in two samples of college students that intrinsically oriented individuals
reported more self-actualization, more subjective vitality, less anxiety, and less
depression than individuals who placed a high value on financial success.
Following up on these results with a heterogeneous sample of 18-year-olds,
Kasser and Ryan (1993) showed in a third study that intrinsically oriented late
adolescents were more socially productive, had fewer conduct disorders, and
were rated by interviewers as showing higher overall global functioning.
While this research examined only the extrinsic value of financial success,
later work has examined a fuller array of values. For example, in two studies,
Sheldon and Kasser (1995) showed that the more people’s personal strivings
(Emmons, 1989) helped bring them towards intrinsically oriented possible
futures, the higher their self-actualization, positive affect, openness to experience,
and life satisfaction. In contrast, an extrinsic orientation was associated with less
self-actualization and openness to experience and with more frequent engage-
ment in distracting activities such as smoking and drinking. Kasser and Ryan
(1996) expanded on these results by showing in a sample of adults that relatively
high importance ratings for intrinsic values were associated with greater self-actu-
alization and vitality and with less depression and physical symptoms, while the
reverse was true for extrinsic values. In a second study, with college students,
Kasser and Ryan (1996) replicated these results and showed that intrinsically ori-
ented people were less narcissistic and less likely to report physical symptoms in
diary reports than were extrinsically oriented people. Finally, Kasser and Ryan
(2001) have shown that intrinsically oriented values were associated with greater
self-esteem and well-being and with less drug and alcohol use, while the reverse
was true for extrinsically oriented values. In sum, a wide variety of indicators of
quality of life have been consistently associated with people’s values, such that
intrinsic values were associated with greater well-being and less distress, while the
reverse was true of extrinsic values.
136 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Notably, all of the results reported above have come from samples composed
of US. citizens. More recently, however, this basic pattern of results has been
replicated for German (Schmuck et al., 2000) and Russian (Ryan et al., 1999) col-
lege students. Parallel results have also been found in preliminary analyses of
South Korean students (Kim, Kasser, & Lee, 2002) and Singaporeans studying
marketing (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). Cross-cultural replications of findings origi-
nally demonstrated in the U.S. thus support the idea that the dynamics posited by
SDT may be universal, as opposed to culturally specific.
As with the other propositions, researchers using different theories and dif-
ferent operational definitions of values and well-being have found results similar
to those reported above, although they have focused primarily on the extrinsic
value of financial success. For example, in their study of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual diagnoses of adolescents with different value systems, Cohen
and Cohen (1996) concluded that “the priority put on being rich was related pos-
itively to almost every Axis I and Axis II diagnosis assessed in this study, for the
most part significantly so” (p. 139). Similarly, investigators in the area of con-
sumer research have consistently documented negative relations between well-
being and materialistic values (see Sirgy, 1999 for a review).
The “what” and the “why” of values. One interesting area of research relevant
to this sixth proposition, but still in its infancy,-concerns whether the relations of
value and goal contents to well-being might depend on the reasons one pursues the
values. That is, the basic thrust of the work reviewed thus far suggests that when
people are highly focused on intrinsic values, their well-being will be relatively
high, whereas when people are highly focused on extrinsic values, their well-
being will be relatively low. Self-determination research also suggests, however,
that pursuing goals for autonomous, well-internalized reasons (i.e., because it
feels like a true choice) is more beneficial for well-being than pursuing goals for
controlled, poorly-internalized reasons (i.e., because of external or introjected
pressures and compulsions; see Sheldon, this volume). ‘Thus, the benefit of pur-
suing intrinsic values may be mitigated when such values are nonself-determined,
while the negative effects of a strong focus on extrinsic values may be lessened if
such values are autonomously regulated.
Carver and Baird (1998) recently examined this possibility by examining
how college students’ self-actualization was related to: (a) the value they placed
on financial success and community feeling aspirations; and (b) the reasons they
pursued each of these aspirations. Replicating previous work, Carver and Baird
showed that the relative centrality of financial success aspirations was negative-
ly correlated with self-actualization, while the reverse was true for community
feeling aspirations. Further, individuals who reported pursuing either aspiration
for autonomous, well-internalized reasons scored high in self-actualization, while
individuals who reported pursuing either aspiration for controlled, poorly inter-
nalized reasons scored low in self-actualization. Notably, however, regression
analyses showed relatively little decrease in the strength of the negative relation
 Self-Determination Theory of Values 1a

between financial success values and self-actualization, even after controlling for
the reasons the values were pursued. Thus, it appears that both the “what” and
the “why” of values and goals play important roles in understanding people’s
well-being (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996).

Conclusions

In this chapter I have tried to sketch out what a self-determination theory of

values might look like, in the hopes that further work can better integrate this the-
ory with the extant literature on values. I hope to have shown that some basic
tenets of SDT are echoed in what other value theoreticians have suggested and
that much empirical research on values is consistent with the self-determination
perspective.
To summarize, I suggested that valuing is ideally a function of the self, which
is that integrative center that is attempting to actualize itself, be intrinsically moti-
vated, and satisfy its needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. When the
self is the source of valuing, people are likely to hold intrinsic values strongly in
their system of values and thus engage in behaviors that support growth and sat-
isfy needs. As a consequence, intrinsically oriented people are likely to experience
greater well-being. However, people are sometimes exposed to controlling, non-
supportive environments and as a result hold extrinsic values, concerned with
rewards and praise, as more central to their sense of what is important in life.
Because extrinsic values typically orient people away from the self’s growth and
needs, such a focus is associated with lower well-being.
Much of the research reviewed in the context of the six propositions pro-
vides additional support for some fundamental aspects of SDT. For example,
cross-cultural replication of the organization of values in terms of the intrin-
sic/extrinsic distinction and of their differential relationships with well-being is
important evidence that the psychological needs that SDT claims to be universal
may indeed be so. Additionally, the fact that both Schwartz (1996) and Kasser
and Ryan (1996) empirically documented that values representing autonomy and
relatedness needs were highly associated in people’s value systems supports
Ryan’s (1993) claim that these two needs are not necessarily in conflict, as some
theorists had suggested. Further, the fact that controlling characteristics of famil-
ial, socio-economic, and national environments predict a focus on extrinsic val-
ues in a manner parallel to research on the undermining of intrinsic motivation
supports the generalizability of this phenomenon. Finally, the possibility that
valuing can be a means by which the self selects experiences supportive of
growth and avoids experiences that work against growth expands SD'T’s under-
standing of how to facilitate well-being and health.
138 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

To conclude, I by no means believe that the six propositions made here pro-
vide a comprehensive theory of values. Nor do I believe that they successfully
explain all of the findings and suggestions in the value literature. However, I do
hope that these propositions sketch out a picture that integrates existing work and
allows for a fuller portrait of values to emerge in the future.

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7: Social Contagion of Motivational Orientations

‘'T. Cameron Wild

Michael E. Enzle
Unwersity of Alberta

The pursuit of activities ‘for their own sake’ is a compelling human phenomenon
that has been a focus of scholarly attention by a variety of philosophers and psy-
chologists (Berlyne, 1966; Dewey, 1934; White, 1959). The appeal of such intrin-
sically motivated behavior lies partly in our beliefs that it facilitates creativity and
aesthetic sensitivity, empathy and depth in interpersonal relations, and personal
well-being. Empirical studies reviewed in this volume and elsewhere (Hodgins,
Koestner, & Duncan, 1996; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Wild, Kuiken, &
Schopflocher, 1995) suggest that these beliefs are correct and that intrinsic moti-
vation is indeed associated with these outcomes. Thus, there has been longstand-
ing interest in studying the conditions that foster or impede intrinsically motivat-
ed behavior.
One significant line of inquiry has focused on the interface between social
events and motivational processes. Over a quarter century of research shows the
detrimental effects of social controls on intrinsically motivated behavior. ‘These
detrimental effects on interest and involvement in activities have been demon-
strated for a variety of social controls, including contingent rewards (Deci, 1971;
Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973), deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976),
surveillance (Lepper & Greene, 1975), and imposed performance evaluation
(Amabile, 1979; Harackiewicz, Manderlink, & Sansone, 1984). In contrast,
intrinsic motivation is preserved or enhanced when social events minimize con-
trol, promote choice, and acknowledge feelings (Koestner, Ryan, Bernier, &
Holt, 1984; Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, & Deci, 1978). Self-determination
theory (SDT) (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987) provides an influential account of these
findings. From this perspective, controlling social events undermine personal

Preparation of the chapter was supported in part by a grant from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada (#410-92-0464) to the second author.
142 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

autonomy, producing an internal-to-external shift in the perceived locus of

causality for one’s behavior (deCharms, 1968; Heider, 1958), with a correspon-
ding decrease in intrinsic motivation.
It is tempting to conclude from the preceding evidence that the objective
presence or absence of controlling social events is the key factor influencing
changes in intrinsic motivation. Indeed, this conclusion is implicit in recent cri-
tiques of research on the influence of task rewards on intrinsic motivation (e.g,
Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996), which assume that motivational processes are
determined only by objective characteristics of rewards, such that we can deter-
mine when “reinforcement might have a detrimental effect, no effect, or an incre-
mental effect” on intrinsic motivation (p. 1164). A closer reading of the literature
suggests, however, that one’s experience of social events must be taken into
account when discussing changes in intrinsic motivation prompted by rewards or
other events (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). In particular, the locus of under-
mining effects appears to lie not in the olyective facts of social control or choice, but
rather in one’s subjective interpretation of the context of activity engagement. Thus,
when people believe that performance-contingent rewards affirm their compe-
tence, rather than control their behavior, no attenuation of intrinsic motivation
occurs (Harackiewicz, 1979; Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 1983). Similarly, intrinsic
motivation is not undermined when adults set limits on children’s behavior by
using informational feedback, as opposed to controlling feedback (Koestner,
Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984). Other research shows that the mere presence of
surveillance does not undermine intrinsic motivation if people believe that they
are being watched out of curiosity, rather than with an intent to control their
behavior (Enzle & Anderson, 1993). Finally, provision of choice does not enhance
intrinsic motivation for individuals with an interdependent sense of self, but does
among individuals who have an independent sense of self (lyengar & Lepper,
1999),
Self-determination theory accounts for the malleability of effects of social
events on motivational processes by invoking the concept of functional significance.
Thus, events related to the initiation and regulation of behavior can facilitate
informational, controlling, or amotivating construals, and the “relative salience of
these three aspects to a person determines the functional significance of the
event” with regard to intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 64). The pro-
gram of research described in this chapter takes its starting point from this phe-
nomenological aspect of self-determination theory and the importance of con-
strual processes as mediators of the relationship between social events and moti-
vational orientations. Of particular interest to us is the ability of interpersonal
cues about others’ motives to shape the functional significance of social events in
subtle ways that lead people to either become imaginatively involved in activities
or to devalue them. We also suspect that the functional significance of social
events does not solely depend on the direct application of social controls on indi-
viduals. Instead, we propose a more insidious route to undermining effects
 Social Contagion of Motivation 143

wherein people self-generate changes in intrinsic motivation on the basis of per-

ceiving others’ motives for engaging in activities. The implications of this
approach include the idea that motivational orientations toward activities can
spontaneously spread from person to person solely on the basis of interpersonal
cues. In the following sections, we (a) review some of the literature on the impor-
tance of construal processes as determinants of motivational orientations toward
activities, (b) review research demonstrating the impact of perceiving others’
motives on the perceiver’s own motivational orientation to activities, (c) review
evidence supporting our account of the mechanism underlying these behavioral
results: a self-generated expectancy formation process during social interaction,
(d) highlight theoretical implications of this model in relation to attribution the-
ory, behavioral confirmation, and modeling, and (e) outline new directions for
work in this area.

Contextual Framing of Activities

and Intrinsic Motivation

The importance of construal processes in mediating the relation between

social events and motivational orientations toward activities has been demonstrat-
ed in many studies. One important approach to this issue has emphasized the
impact of task labels and activity goals on intrinsic motivation (Sansone &
Harackiewicz, 1995; Harackiewicz & Sansone, 1991). For example, if people are
induced to ascribe boredom and obligation to a task, they are less intrinsically
motivated than if they ascribe enjoyment, challenge, and interest to the same activ-
ity (Porac & Meindl, 1982). Tang and Baumeister (1984) similarly found that mere-
ly labeling an activity as work increased intrinsic motivation for those who held
positive attitudes toward work, compared to individuals who did not hold such atti-
tudes. Sansone, Sachau, and Weir (1989, Study 2) labeled a computer game as an
index of skill or as a fantasy-related pastime and observed that task instructions
designed to enhance performance decreased intrinsic motivation under the fanta-
sy label but increased intrinsic motivation under the skill label. More recently,
Harackiewicz and Elliot (1993) manipulated the extent to which people viewed a
task as demonstrating ability (performance goals) or as an opportunity to develop
one’s skills (mastery goals) and found that performance goals enhanced intrinsic
motivation among individuals scoring high in achievement motivation, while mas-
tery goals enhanced intrinsic motivation for individuals low in achievement orien-
tation (for additional work along these lines and expansion to approach and avoid-
ance performance goals, see Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1994, 1996).
The preceding research is consistent with the notion that contextual framing
of activities can be a potent source of influence on intrinsic motivation. However,
144 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

these findings may have limited ecological validity because in all cases contextu-
al interpretations of the activity were directly provided for people. That is, the
experimenters provided task labels or activity goals to respondents, who were
then evaluated with regard to interest in the task. These experimental operations
raise the important question of how task labels become salient to individuals in
the first instance, during unconstrained social interactions. In at least a partial
answer, we propose a social contagion model that differentially cues interpreta-
tions of activities and activates cognitive-perceptual ‘sets’ that can undermine
intrinsic motivation.

Social Contagion of Motivational Orientations

Via Person Perception

An assumption underlying much of the experimental literature on intrinsic

motivation is that undermining effects depend on the direct application of social
controls to people. Thus, in a typical study, people are or are not constrained—
by task rewards, task labels, performance feedback, activity goals, activity choice,
and so on—and then are assessed to determine the motivational impact of these
events. In contrast, our conceptual approach assumes that direct constraints such
as these can be sufficient, but are not necessary, to undermine interest and cre-
ativity during activity engagement. For example, all that may be required to
undermine intrinsic motivation are perceptions that others in one’s shared social
environment are extrinsically motivated. We devised a simple method to assess
this prediction. People were brought into the laboratory ostensibly to participate
in a teaching-learning session. ‘The teacher, actually an experimental confeder-
ate, was portrayed as either an intrinsically motivated volunteer, or (in another
condition) as extrinsically motivated to engage in the teaching session. Then, all
individuals received a standardized lesson that instructed them to a standard eri-
terion level of performance. A central aim of the research was to rule out alter-
native explanations of contagion effects based on exposure to different teaching
styles. Therefore, confederate teachers were blind to conditions so they could not
portray different motivational orientations in different conditions. Only partici-
pants’ beliefs about their teacher’s motivational orientation (rather than actual
teacher behaviors) were manipulated. We then assessed the social perceiver’s
intrinsic motivation in relation to the activity that had just been learned. Of par-
ticular interest was the extent to which perceptions of the teacher’s motivation
affected students’ interest in the activity.
In the first study in this series (Wild, Enzle, & Hawkins, 1992), musical
novices were taught an introductory piano lesson. In a perceived intrinsically
motivated teacher condition, participants were led to believe that the teacher had
 Social Contagion of Motivation 145

volunteered to develop and deliver piano lessons in the laboratory. In a perceived

extrinsically motivated teacher condition, participants believed that the teacher
had agreed to the same activities in return for $25. Teachers themselves were
blind to conditions and were trained in a neutral teaching style that was neither
autonomy supportive nor controlling. All participants received this standardized
lesson in which they were familiarized with the keyboard and were taught a short
song. After all participants met a skill acquisition criterion of playing the song
correctly twice, the teacher was led to another room, ostensibly for an interview
about the teaching process. Perceiver-students were then left alone in the labora-
tory for 10 minutes, and a concealed audiotape machine recorded participants’
free-play behavior on the piano. Then, participants were administered a short
questionnaire to assess their enjoyment and interest in learning, their perceptions
of the teacher, and their mood following the lesson.
Results showed that perceiver-subjects in both conditions required the same
number of trials and time to learn the song to the criterion level. However, par-
ticipants who perceived their teacher as intrinsically motivated enjoyed the lesson
more, reported more positive affect following the lesson, and reported that they
were more interested in learning new piano skills, compared to participants who
perceived their teacher as extrinsically motivated. Analyzing the free-play activi-
ty revealed that perceiver-subjects in both conditions exhibited the same duration
of piano playing. However, participants who learned from a teacher they believed
to be intrinsically motivated engaged in greater creativity and exploratory behav-
ior. In contrast, participants who learned from a teacher they believed to be
extrinsically motivated exhibited “functional fixedness” (McGraw, 1978) in their
activity engagement. They merely played the criterion song repeatedly. Recall
that these effects on perceivers’ intrinsic motivation did not occur as a function of
real differences in teaching content or teaching style, nor were they related to any
direct constraints, task labels, or activity goals provided to participants. Instead,
participants appear to have self-generated motivational orientations toward learn-
ing on the basis of their perceptions of the teacher’s motivation for engaging in
the activity. In short, the motivational orientation of the teacher appeared to have
“infected” the student, despite the fact that no labels or goals were provided to
participants and that all learners received the same standardized lesson and
learned to the same criterion level.
Another study in this series (Wild, Enzle, Nix, & Deci, 1997, Study 2)
attempted to replicate these results using a different task. This study also extend-
ed the focus to determine whether the social contagion of motivational orienta-
tions toward learning could spontaneously spread from person to person during
social interaction. To accomplish this goal, we used a serial teaching-learning
procedure in which a confederate teacher taught a skill to a first learner, who was
then asked to instruct a second learner. This study used a rope-restoration magic
trick as the focal task, and as in the first study, the cover story emphasized that the
researchers were interested in the teacher’s performance. The perceived motiva-
146 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

tion manipulation was exactly the same as used in Wild et al. (1992). All per-
ceivers were taught using a neutral teaching style, and received the same stan-
dardized lesson. After meeting a learning criterion of performing the magic trick
correctly twice, learners were asked whether they would be willing to teach
another person the rope restoration illusion. All participants agreed, and the first
learner then had 10 minutes to teach a second participant the skill. Following the
transmission teaching session, both sets of learners were given a questionnaire to
assess enjoyment, interest in learning, and mood.
Results from this study replicated effects of perceived motivation on self-
reported measures of intrinsic motivation found in Wild et al. (1992). Specifically,
first-generation learners who were taught the magic trick by an apparently intrin-
sically motivated teacher reported greater levels of enjoyment and interest in
learning than those taught by a supposedly extrinsically motivated teacher,
despite receiving identical lessons and learning to the same criterion level. In
addition, we found that lower levels of task enjoyment, interest in learning, and
positive mood were also exhibited by the second generation learners in the edu-
cational chain. As in the first study in this series, effects on first-generation per-
ceivers’ intrinsic motivation were not exhibited as a function of differential teach-
ing content or teaching style, nor were they related to any direct constraints, task
labels, or activity goals provided to participants.,As before, participants appear to
have self-generated motivational orientations toward learning on the basis of their
perceptions of the teacher’s motivation for engaging in the activity. But in addi-
tion, the motivational orientation toward the activity adopted by the first learner
also influenced the second learner in the chain, lending support to our proposal
that the social contagion of motivational orientations toward learning can spon-
taneously spread from person to person during social interactions, without pro-
viding task labels or activity goals to participants.
‘Taken together, these studies provide support for the proposal that direct
application of social controls—task rewards, task labels, performance feedback,
activity goals, activity choice, and so on—~can be sufficient, but are not necessary
to undermine intrinsic motivation. Evidently, learners in these two studies close-
ly calibrated their own level of interest in the activity to the motivational orien-
tation perceived in their teachers. ‘The mere perception of another person’s moti-
vation for engaging in an activity affected the perceiver’s own intrinsic motivation.

Expectancy Formation Processes Underlying the Social

Contagion Effect

The preceding studies clearly show that there are significant consequences to
perceiving others’ motives for engaging in activities and that these consequences
can spread from person to person in unconstrained social interaction.
 Social Contagion of Motivation 147

Perceiver's
Perception of Expectancy
motivational
others' motivation formation
orientation

Expected quality
Expected quality
of interpersonal
of task involvement
relations

Figure 7.1. Social Contagion Model

The next step in the development of our model was to examine mechanisms
that underlie this social contagion effect. We propose that, in many common
dyadic interactions (e.g., between a teacher and student, a parent and child, a
health care provider and patient, a manager and subordinate), perceptions of the
other’s motivation affects the formation of expectancies that shape the function-
al significance (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987) of events in that social context. As
shown in Figure 7-1, perceiving others’ motives for engaging in an activity cues
differential expectancies for (a) quality of involvement (1.e., interest, pleasure) that
the perceiver is likely to experience herself or himself during task engagement,
and (b) quality of interpersonal relations (i.e., control or autonomy support) that
is likely to ensue during social interaction. ‘This account assumes that memories
of past episodes of social control or autonomy support are blended with current
perceptions of others’ motives to form temporary expectations about how enjoy-
able and interesting an activity is likely to be, how controlling or autonomy sup-
portive the other person is likely to be, and so forth. In turn, these expectancies
form a cognitive “set” that is used to interpret subsequent activity involvement
and interpersonal relations, thus affecting the perceiver’s own intrinsic motiva-
tion.
We devised a story comprehension task to assess the proposed expectancy-
cueing mechanism, wherein participants read a short story depicting an individ-
ual who adopted either an extrinsic or an intrinsic motivational orientation
toward an activity. Immediately after reading the story, participants were asked to
generate interpretations of this interpersonal target’s motives and/or to rate
148 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

expectations about the target’s quality of involvement and quality of interper-

sonal relations (i.e., expected interest and expected support of autonomy) that
were likely to occur in the described situation.
The first study in this series (Wild, Enzle, Nix, & Deci, 1997) used a two-
group experimental design paralleling the behavioral studies reviewed earlier
(extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation of an interpersonal target; Wild et al., 1992).
Each version depicted an interpersonal target, Pat, who was a student spending
the summer by working and giving walking tours of Nantucket Island. In one
condition, three story excerpts were written to facilitate perceptions of extrinsic
motivation for engaging in the tour activity: (1) “After his regular job, Pat spends
his afternoons as a paid tour guide for the Historical Society on Nantucket
Island,” (2) “Pat earns $25 for each two-hour tour he conducts,” and (3) “The last
stop on the tour 1s the Ship’s Inn, where Pat often stays afterward to reflect on the
money he’ll have acquired by the end of the summer.” In the other condition,
the same three excerpts were altered to facilitate perceptions of intrinsic motiva-
tion: (1) “After his regular job, Pat spends his afternoons as a volunteer tour guide
for the Historical Society on Nantucket Island,” (2) “Pat volunteers two hours of
his time for each tour he conducts,” and (3) “The last stop on the tour is the Ship’s
Inn, where Pat often stays afterward to reflect on the experiences he’ll have
acquired by the end of the summer.” Aside from these alterations, both versions
of the story were identical in content. Immediately after reading the story, par-
ticipants were asked an open-ended question to assess perceived motivation of
the interpersonal target: “Why did Pat give tours on Nantucket Island?” Then,
participants completed a series of scale items to assess expectancies elicited fol-
lowing the reading of each vignette (e.g., expected enjoyment during activity
engagement).
Free responses generated to the question “Why did Pat give the tours on
Nantucket Island?” were rated by five judges who were blind to the hypotheses of
the study and to experimental conditions. Each judge independently rated the
free responses for intrinsic motivation, defined as activity engagement done sole-
ly for the interest or enjoyment of doing the task itself (e.g., “he enjoyed giving
tours;” “because it was fun”), and for extrinsic motivation, defined as engaging in
the activity for some type of external reward or contingency apart from the task
itself (e.g., “for the money” or “for the cash he received” or “to get something on
his resume”). Each rating was completed on a nine-point scale, where higher
scores indicated increasing levels of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation represented
by the response. Intraclass correlations across the five raters were r = .87 for both
the intrinsic and the extrinsic motivation scores, indicating adequate interrater
reliability. Composite perceived intrinsic and extrinsic scores were formed by
averaging the intrinsic ratings and the extrinsic ratings across the five raters.
Because the composite intrinsic and extrinsic motivation scores were very highly
correlated (r = -.98), perceived extrinsic motivation scores were reverse scored
and then averaged with the intrinsic scores to form a single perceived motivation
 Social Contagion of Motivation 149

score derived from the free responses, where higher scores indicate greater per-
ceived intrinsic motivation in subjects’ free responses.
As anticipated, greater perceptions of intrinsic motivation were judged in
response to the free report item after reading about a volunteer than after read-
ing about a paid employee. Results also revealed the predicted main effect of
story type on expected enjoyment and value affixed to the activity, such that read-
ers believed that giving tours would be an enjoyable and valuable activity to a
greater extent when they read about a volunteer as opposed to a paid employee.
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to determine whether per-
ceived motivation of the interpersonal target mediated expectancy formation.
Perceived motivation predicted enjoyment-value when controlling for the effects
of the independent variables, and most importantly, controlling for perceived
motivation completely removed the effect of story type on expectations of enjoy-
ment and value of the activity. Thus, perceptions of the interpersonal target’s
motivation (elicited via free-report) do mediate the relationship between exposure
to an interpersonal target’s motivation and beliefs about enjoyment and value of
the activity.
Our second study in this series (Wild et al., 1997), attempted to replicate
these findings using a different story context, and extended the research by tak-
ing into account a large literature demonstrating that people actively revise
impressions of others during social perception (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Miller &
Turnbull, 1986). Specifically, we wanted to determine whether the process of
expectancy formation is malleable, depending on additional perceptions of the
interpersonal target’s motivation. The story materials described a protagonist
who phoned a community college to inquire about receiving American Sign
Language (ASL) lessons and an initial meeting with the ASL instructor, who rep-
resented the interpersonal target for the protagonist. Six versions of the story
were designed, corresponding to a 2 (paid versus volunteer ASL instructor) X 3
(confirming, disconfirming, or no subsequent information about the instructor’s
motivation) factorial design. After reading one of the six versions of the story,
participants were asked to respond to a free-report item, “Why did the instructor
give ASL lessons?” and rated expectations about task involvement and quality of
interpersonal relations on a battery of scales. Exactly the same coding procedure
was used as in the first study to develop reliable measures of perceived motiva-
tion of the target, using the free response measures.
Results showed that participants who read about an extrinsically motivated
instructor expected that task enjoyment and interest would be lower and that they
would experience less positive affect and poorer quality of interpersonal rela-
tions, compared to participants who read about an intrinsically motivated
instructor. Notably, these effects were completely reversed when additional infor-
mation presented in the story disconfirmed the initial motivational orientation of
the interpersonal target. As in the first study in this series, described above, medi-
ational analyses demonstrated that controlling for perceived motivation of the
150 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

interpersonal target completely removed or substantially reduced effects of the

story materials on expectancy judgements.
A third study in this series provided further support for our expectancy for-
mation model using a context and task with considerably more psychological
interest and complexity: seeking treatment for alcohol problems (Wild,
Cunningham, & Hobdon, 1998; Wild, Roberts, & Cooper, in press). In this con-
text, clients often enter treatment due to formal and informal pressures to change
their alcohol use (Weisner, 1990; Wild, Newton-Taylor, & Alletto, 1998).
Similarly, counselors themselves can be constrained by external events (e.g.,
reward and schedule structures) to engage in treatment activities. In this study, we
examined whether participants (1.e., the social perceivers) would believe that alco-
hol treatment is especially effective when both clients and counselors are per-
ceived as adopting an intrinsic motivational orientation toward the activity. All
participants read a short story depicting a drunk-driving offender (Chris) seeking
help for alcohol problems. A 3 X 2 experimental design was used to portray one
of three types of client motivation (Chris was interested in seeking help, Chris
was ordered by a judge to seek help, Chris sought help to make a good impres-
sion on the court) and one of two types of counselor motivation (the counselor
was paid or was a volunteer). Two scales were derived from a factor analysis to
assess (a) expected interest in treatment, and (b) expected level of behavior
change following treatment.
Results showed that maximal treatment efficacy was expected when readers
perceived both clients and counselors as intrinsically motivated. In contrast, min-
imal treatment efficacy was expected when the client was believed to enter treat-
ment only to manage impressions and when the counselor was perceived as
extrinsically motivated. An interesting parallel to the second study in this series
was that counselors who were perceived as intrinsically motivated were expected
to reverse the detrimental effects of compulsory treatment and impression man-
agement on interest and efficacy of alcohol treatment.
The preceding results provide good support for the link between perceptions
of others’ motives and expectancy formation depicted in Figure 7-1. Across a
wide variety of scenarios, people generate expectations of low levels of intrinsic
motivation whenever they perceive that interpersonal targets have adopted an
extrinsic motivational orientation toward activities. However, it also appears that
the expectancy formation process is malleable, depending on additional percep-
tions of the interpersonal target’s motives. Thus, two studies showed that
expectancy formation effects can be reversed when information that disconfirms
a target’s motives is perceived.
 Social Contagion of Motivation 1a

Relation To Other Theoretical Accounts

The first series of studies described earlier demonstrates that direct con-
straints (e.g., rewards, task goals, task labels, etc.) are not necessary to undermine
intrinsic motivation. Instead, undermining effects can occur when people mere-
ly perceive that an interpersonal target has adopted an extrinsic motivational ori-
entation to an activity. The second series of studies illustrates mechanisms under-
lying this social contagion effect. When people perceive others’ motives, they self-
generate expectations about quality of task involvement and quality of interper-
sonal relations that put into place cognitive-perceptual sets that they use to inter-
pret subsequent activity engagement. Thus, the functional significance (Deci &
Ryan, 1985, 1987) of social events is in part determined by perceptions of oth-
ers’ motives as autonomy supportive or controlling. Taken as a whole, the
research suggests an elaboration of self-determination theory wherein interper-
sonal contextual cues affect motivational processes in activity contexts in which
no task labels or activity goals are provided for people. As such, the model has
important implications for understanding motivational dynamics in a variety of
settings in which dyadic interpersonal relations are at issue: teaching and learn-
ing, management, counseling, and parenting. In particular, the social contagion
effect may play an important, though typically unacknowledged, role in deter-
mining outcomes in each of these domains. We turn now to a consideration of
the relations between this approach and other possible accounts, derived from
alternative theories.

Modeling and Imitative Learning

Perhaps the most obvious alternative account of some of the findings report-
ed in this chapter comes from the perspective of behavioral imitation and mod-
eling (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963; Hatfield, Cacioppo, &
Rapson, 1994). From this viewpoint, perceptions of an interpersonal target’s
motivation and behavior cause people to imitate and model that individual’s
behavior. Cellar and Wade (1988) conducted a study that is relevant in this con-
text. These researchers had participants perform a task after watching a video-
tape portraying an interpersonal target exhibiting either an intrinsic or extrinsic
motivational orientation toward the activity. When perceivers saw the target
exhibiting enjoyment and persistence, the perceiver-subjects also exhibited intrin-
sic motivation. Cellar and Wade (1988) proposed that perceptions of the target’s
activities led perceivers to imitate the model by constructing “work” or “play”
scripts that guided their own behavior during activity engagement.
Imitation is a plausible contextual influence on motivational processes, but
this account requires that interpersonal targets actually behave in a manner that
demonstrates their intrinsic or extrinsic motivational orientation as they engage
152 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

in the activity. Imitation cannot be a possible mechanism for the piano and magic
learning results described earlier, however, because the teacher was blind to con-
ditions and participants received identical instructional content and style across
conditions. These aspects of the research reviewed earlier preclude an imitative
modeling account of the social infection of motivational orientations. Indeed, a
key difference between these accounts is that in the present model, people se/f-gen-
erate expectations in response to initial cues about an interpersonal target’s moti-
vation.

Behavioral Confirmation

Another relevant theoretical perspective on the social contagion model of

intrinsic motivation is provided by research on interpersonal expectancies and
behavioral confirmation (for reviews, see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Harris &
Rosenthal, 1985; Hilton & Darley, 1991; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Snyder, 1984,
1992; Snyder & Haugen, 1995). In a recent application of behavioral confirma-
tion to intrinsic motivation, Pelletier and Vallerand (1996) used a teaching-learn-
ing task in which supervisors (teachers) were given no information about the stu-
dent’s motivation or were told that the student was either extrinsically motivated
or intrinsically motivated. Their results showed that students who were believed
by their teacher to be intrinsically motivated perceived their teacher as being
more autonomy supportive and evidenced more intrinsic motivation, compared
to students who were believed by their teachers to be extrinsically motivated.
Pelletier and Vallerand (1996) argued that beliefs about the student’s motivation
initiated a behavioral confirmation process wherein teachers actually behaved in
either a more controlling or a more autonomy supportive manner, thus influenc-
ing the student’s own motivation toward the activity. This is an intriguing study
suggesting that teacher expectations can influence their behavior, unwittingly
confirming biased information about students’ intrinsic motivation. However, it
is limited by the same concerns raised earlier about ecological validity: the
researchers provided information directly to social perceivers. In contrast, the
present model provides an account of how perceiver’s self-generate expectations
and beliefs about interest and quality of interpersonal relations.
Imitative learning and behavioral confirmation theories are clearly relevant
to the phenomenon under study because it is quite plausible that in uncon-
strained social interactions, people can model an interpersonal target’s behavior
and can use interpersonal cues to initiate a behavioral confirmation process.
However, the research reviewed earlier demonstrates that there is another, typi-
cally unacknowledged, source of contextual interpersonal influence on intrinsic
motivation. Merely perceiving another person’s motivational orientation toward
an activity elicits a cognitive set that provides a self-generated source of influence
on intrinsic motivation,
 Social Contagion of Motivation 153

Future Directions

The social contagion model described in this chapter provides a compelling

and ecologically valid account of how interpersonal cues shape construal
processes and how these mediate the relationship between social events and moti-
vational processes. Nevertheless, there are many outstanding issues that need to
be addressed in future work. On the antecedent side of the model, we need to
arrive at a better understanding of the diverse factors that can affect whether or
not people pay attention to others’ motives. At a mundane level, cognitive load
and attentional capacity demands might prevent individuals from perceiving
interpersonal cues about others’ motivation. In addition, there are plausible situ-
ational factors and personal characteristics that could make cues about others’
motives more or less salient to the social perceiver. For example, the type of inter-
personal relationship that exists between individuals will probably affect the
extent to which perceivers pay attention to motivational orientation of others.
Interactions among friends with an extensive history may well be less likely to
elicit these effects than interactions among individuals who are not well acquaint-
ed or who are in differential positions of power (e.g., a manager and subordinate).
Individual differences in social comparison orientation and/or perspective taking
may moderate the effects described earlier. On the consequences side of the
model, further research is required to understand the interplay of expectancies
and behavior. One outstanding issue involves sorting out whether motivational
effects of social perception occur just for a focal task or whether they generalize
across different activities. Another issue involves the extent to which self-percep-
tions during activity engagement can shift cognitive sets previously elicited by
perceiving others’ motives. For example, it may be that certain kinds of activities
or self-generated strategies can counter the detrimental effects of perceiving oth-
ers’ motives during activity engagement. By considering all of these issues, a bet-
ter understanding of the boundary conditions of the theory will be achieved.

Conclusion

Teaching and learning occur in a wide variety of contexts both inside and
outside the classroom, and the social contagion model outlined in this chapter has
broad implications for educational interactions. Some educational contexts are
defined mainly in terms of contractual obligations, as occurs in piano lessons
taken from a paid teacher and coursework in the school system. Other educa-
tional contexts are defined without any reference to contractual obligations, as
when friends share knowledge and skill with each other. This distinction may use-
154 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

fully be considered as a difference between formal and informal education. ‘The

social contagion model indicates that contextual knowledge about the presence
or absence of extrinsic motivation on the part of teachers cues students’ expec-
tations about quality of task engagement (e.g., interest, curiosity) and about qual-
ity of interpersonal relations. The preceding research suggests that these
expectancy-driven changes in cognitive “set” will produce learners who will
approach their educational experience in a less intrinsically motivated manner
than would be the case in informal educational contexts. However, the expectan-
cy-cueing aspect of the model also suggests that these expectancies can be mod-
ified, depending on independent sources of confirming and disconfirming cues.
Thus, informal educators can override initial expectations about high levels of
task involvement and quality of interpersonal relations by engaging in a teaching
style that is controlling, or by direct statements that contradict initial expectations
of interest. Indeed, other educational research clearly shows the detrimental
impact of controlling teaching styles on quality of learning (Flink, Boggiano, &
Barrett, 1990). Conversely, formal educators could override initial student expec-
tations of an uninteresting learning experience by demonstrating their own keen
excitement about the topic and by encouraging self-determination in the learn-
ing process.
The implications of the social contagion model of motivation also extend
beyond teaching and learning to the general issue of socialization and internal-
ization of values, norms, knowledge, and skills. Socialization involves internaliz-
ing a set of core knowledge and skills from the cultural surround. In this context,
“an important problem for adaptation and development is the promotion of a
shift from regulation by external factors to self-regulation by internal factors”
(Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 129). The social contagion model has broad implications
for understanding how people integrate the knowledge, skills, and values of their
cultural context. In particular, we propose that the model is relevant for under-
standing the dynamic interplay that exists between cultural “stakeholders” (e.g.,
educators, parents, managers, health care providers) and individuals in the
process of acculturation. Specifically, the social contagion model implies that the
transmission of cultural knowledge and skills never takes place in a neutral con-
text. Instead, it appears that people are easily able to self-generate expectations
that will allow them to “tune out” or “tune into” the process of learning new cul-
tural skills and knowledge depending on whether they believe they are partici-
pating in social interactions where educators, managers, health care profession-
als, and parents are extrinsically motivated. ‘Thus, we believe that a better under-
standing of the process of internalizing cultural values, knowledge, and skills
could be achieved by studying how people perceive the motives of cultural stake-
holders.
 Social Contagion of Motivation POS

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8: What Makes Parents Controlling?

Wendy 8. Grolnick
Nicholas H. Apostoleris
Clark Uniwersity

Self-determination theory describes the motivationally facilitative environment as

one that supports individuals’ inherent needs for autonomy by providing choice
and minimizing the use of controls (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). A wide variety of stud-
ies have supported the importance of autonomy supportive environments in var-
ious interpersonal interactions including those with teachers (e.g., Deci, Nezlek,
& Sheinman, 1981), physicians (e.g., Wiliams, Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci,
1998), and supervisors (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989). Not surprisingly, because
parents are children’s primary socializers, the autonomy supportive versus con-
trolling environment that parents provide their children has been the target of
much research.
When parents are autonomy supportive, they value children’s autonomy,
encourage children to solve their own problems, take children’s perspectives, and
minimize the use of pressures and controls. When parents are controlling, on the
other hand, they value obedience and conformity, solve children’s problems for
them, take the lead in interactions, and parent from their own, rather than the
children’s, perspectives (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989). Accumulating evidence con-
firms the positive effects of autonomy support and the negative effects of
parental control on children. More specifically, controlling parents are likely to
create an external perceived locus of causality in their children and to undermine
their children’s confidence in their abilities. Consistent with this thinking, we have
found that parents who were rated by interviewers as more controlling had chil-
dren who were less self-regulated in school, higher in acting out, lower in teacher-
rated competence, and lower in achievement and grades (Grolnick & Ryan,
1989). Similarly, children who perceived their mothers and fathers as autonomy
supportive exhibited more autonomous self-regulation, less unknown control,
higher perceived competence, and higher school achievement (Grolnick, Ryan,
& Deci, 1991).
162 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Autonomy supportive parenting, then, has many positive ramifications. Yet

many well-meaning parents behave in a controlling manner toward their chil-
dren. The question we are going to address in this paper is, what makes parents
autonomy supportive or controlling? In addressing this question, we review
research on factors in parents’ environments, in the children themselves, and in
the psychology of parents that make for autonomy support or control. Following
this, we present new theoretical ideas about some ways in which parents may be
predisposed to become ego-involved in their children’s performance and how
that might play out in controlling parenting.
The clinical literature has provided us with at least two models for under-
standing parental control. Object relations theorists such as Margaret Mahler
(1968) and Alice Miller (1981) have suggested that parents who have difficulty
separating their own needs from those of their children have a hard time taking
children’s perspectives and acting in ways that are in the children’s best interests.
Miller’s (1981) book, The Drama of the Gified Child, portrays the narcissistic moth-
er who uses her child to fulfill her own egoistic needs. Such a mother cannot see
the child for who he or she is because the child is not a person in his or her own
right but rather is a self-object for the mother. Similarly, the family therapy liter-
ature describes the enmeshed family. Such families do not recognize the bound-
aries between family members, and the thoughts and behaviors of parents are
confused with those of children. In such families, parents intrude into children’s
lives and feelings and are unable to see children for who they are (Minuchin,
1974).
These pathological models for understanding controlling parents are cer-
tainly reasonable for a subset of parents. However, we need another model to
understand how relatively healthy parents, even those who value autonomy in
their children and believe autonomy supportive parenting works, can sometimes
behave in a controlling manner, pressuring their children, standing over them
while they do their homework, making sure they wear the right clothes. So what
can it be that creates control in parents who aim to support their children’s auton-
omy?
One possibility is that the same kinds of contextual factors that create con-
trolling environments for children and undermine their motivation can impact on
the parent. ‘Thus, in the same way that pressure and evaluation undermine chil-
dren’s intrinsic motivation, they can also undermine parents’ abilities to provide
autonomy supportive parenting. But what kind of pressure? We present three
types: pressure from without, pressure from below, and pressure from within,

Pressure from Without

icological theorists such as Bronfenbrenner (1986) stress that parents do not

raise their children in a vacuum but are vulnerable to the stresses around them.
 What Makes Parents Controlling? 163

How does stress and pressure on the parents relate to control? We argue that
stress and other pressures, including economic pressures, usurp the time and psy-
chological availability necessary for autonomy supportive parenting. First, such
pressures focus parents on their own immediate predicaments making it more dif-
ficult for them to take their children’s perspectives. Second, allowing children to
solve their own problems is likely to require more time and patience than solving
the problems for them, and these parental resources may be undermined by
stress.
This idea is consistent with several studies in the developmental literature.
Although most of the studies that have looked at stress or economic pressure
looked at positive parenting more generally (e.g., nurturance, responsivity) and
not at autonomy support per se, some studies have examined dimensions relevant
to autonomy support, such as punitiveness and harsh parenting which would be
on the controlling end of the dimension. McLoyd and Wilson (1991) studied 92
mothers and children all being assisted by Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). They examined the level of economic hardship the families
suffered, asking them questions such as, “How difficult is it for you to meet
monthly payments on your family’s bills?” They also considered parenting on the
dimension of nurturance to punitiveness and the level of mother’s psychological
distress. Using a path model, they found that economic hardship was predictive
of psychological distress, which was then associated with punitive parenting. A
subsequent study with mothers of adolescents (McLoyd , Jayaratne, Ceballo, &
Borquez, 1994) supported a similar model in which mothers’ unemployment was
associated with their own increased depressive symptoms, which then predicted
increased punishment of adolescents. ‘Two other studies supported similar mod-
els for severe socioeconomic disadvantage (Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1994), and
economic hardship (Conger, Ge, Elder, Lorenz, & Simons, 1994). Elder’s study of
the Great Depression found that financial loss resulted in more irritability and
tension and an increased tendency to treat children punitively.
Thus, these studies illustrate that when parents suffer economic distress, they
may experience depressed, anxious, and irritable moods which then lead to
harsher and more punitive parenting. These studies support the idea that auton-
omy supportive parenting is undermined by stressful life situations.
Whereas economic disadvantage is one type of external pressure that can
lead parents to be controlling, other stresses, such as negative life events, to which
parents are subjected is another type. Recently, we looked at such stress in a study
of predictors of parenting styles in parents of adolescents (Grolnick, Weiss,
McKenzie, & Wrightman, 1996). Fifty-three mothers and 38 fathers, along with
their adolescents (ages 13-18) participated. Parents were interviewed separately in
their homes by two interviewers. The structured interview asked a set of open-
ended questions for each of five areas relevant to adolescents’ lives: school,
friends, dating, curfew, and chores. For each area the parent was asked how he or
she motivates the child in that area, whether he or she has any rules or expecta-
tions in the area, and how he or she responds to positive or negative behaviors or
164 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

outcomes (e.g., good or poor report card). For each area the parent was also asked
to describe the most recent conflict or disagreement he or she had with the ado-
lescent and how it was handled.
From audiotapes of the interviews, raters rated each parent on three 5-point
scales. The “values autonomy” scale concerns the extent to which the parent
expresses a value for autonomy and sees its promotion as a goal versus places pre-
eminent value on obedience and conformity. The “autonomy supportive tech-
niques” scale assesses the degree to which parents use more autonomy support-
ive methods, such as reasoning and limit setting, versus relying on controlling,
power assertive motivational and disciplinary techniques such as rewards and
threats. The third scale, “nondirectiveness,” concerns the extent to which the par-
ent includes the child in decision making versus imposes his or her own agenda
on the child and allows for few choices. These scales were averaged to form a
summary autonomy support versus control score. Parents’ provision of structure,
defined as the provision of rules, guidelines, and expectations in the home, as well
as their involvement, defined as the dedication of resources to children, were also
rated from the interviews.
Parents also completed questionnaires on stressful life events—the number of
negative events that occurred in the last three months (e.g., death in the family,
illness, repossession of their home)—and the social support they received. They
also described their adolescents, but we will talk about the findings for these
descriptions in the next section.
We were interested in finding out whether parents who experienced more
stressful events were more controlling than those who experienced fewer events,
even beyond the influence of economic disadvantage. Thus, in our analyses, we
controlled for the effects of the socioeconomic status (SES) of the families.
Results suggested that the more negative life events mothers reported, the less
autonomy supportive they were rated (controlling for SES). Negative events were
also associated with less provision of structure. There were no significant rela-
tions between stressful events and controlling behavior for fathers. The results
suggest that mothers, who are likely to be the children’s primary caretakers,
spending the most time with them, may be especially vulnerable to the under-
mining effects of stressful life events. Interestingly, fathers who experienced more
social support were rated as more involved with their adolescents. This suggests
that a supportive environment for fathers helped them be able to spend time with
their adolescents. Given that fathers may have more latitude in their parenting
roles than mothers (Almeida & Galambos, 1991), their involvement may be more
dependent on a supportive environment than is that of mothers.
In this study, then, stress was negatively associated with mothers’ provision of
autonomy supportive parenting to their children. Studies that have examined
processes through which stress might affect parental control have identified
parental mood and well-being as key mediators. The findings support our con-
tention that autonomy support requires psychological availability and time,
 What Makes Parents Controlling? 165

resources undermined by stressful conditions. Rather than interpreting the use of

controlling techniques as resulting from ignorance about parenting (e.g., Piuck,
1975), it is important to recognize contextual constraints. Poor families are often
aware of the fact that they are using problematic parenting strategies, yet are
unable to change their use of such strategies (Longfellow, Zelkowitz, & Saunders,
1982) given the situations in which they find themselves.

Pressure from Below

Since Richard Bell’s pioneering work in the late 1960’s (e.g, 1968), we have
come to accept that not only do parents affect children but children also affect
parents. This is certainly likely to be the case with control. Children who are
cooperative, who do their work or their chores, and who don’t talk back may be
the recipients of more autonomy support, while those who are uncooperative,
test parents’ patience, and don’t take responsibility for their work may elicit more
control. It is likely to be easier to involve children in decisions and take their view-
points if they are agreeable and tend to cooperate readily.
In studying how characteristics of children impact on parenting, it would be
optimal to find characteristics that are innate and not influenced by the children’s
environment. Unfortunately, it is impossible to find such.characteristics because,
even before birth, the environment is impacting on the child. However,
researchers have delineated characteristics, such as temperament, that are rela-
tively stable and are likely to be heritable (though most researchers acknowledge
that temperamental characteristics are somewhat changeable). Thomas, Chess,
and Birch (1968) described one set of temperamental features—high intensity,
negative mood, high withdrawal, and low malleability—which cluster together to
form the “difficult child.” This cluster of characteristics may be a prime candi-
date for affecting levels of parental control.
Correlational studies support the relation between child difficulty and
parental control. Rutter and Quinton (1984), in their 4-year longitudinal study of
children of mentally ill parents, showed that children with adverse temperamen-
tal features (composite of low regularity, low malleability, negative mood, and low
fastidiousness) were more likely than other children to be targets of parental hos-
tility, criticism, and irritability.
Further evidence comes from the infancy literature. Bates (1980) found that
at 6 and 13 months there were few relations between infant difficulty and moth-
er behavior. By 24 months, however, there was more conflict between mothers
and children who were described as difficult. Mothers of more difficult 24 month
olds had relatively higher scores on power assertion, including frequent use of
control efforts, frequent repetitions, prohibitions, and more frequent taking away
166 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

of objects. Buss (1981) showed that power struggles were more frequent between
children and their mothers and fathers when the children had higher scores on
activity. Lee and Bates (1985) found that toddlers with difficult temperaments
were more resistant to maternal attempts to exert authority than were toddlers
with easy temperaments, and this negative behavior of those with difficult tem-
peraments was likely to be met with coercive responses by mothers. Finally, on
the opposite end of the spectrum, children’s fearfulness (as reported by mothers
and observed in unfamiliar situations in the laboratory) was positively associated
with the use of gentle discipline that deemphasized power assertion as observed
in the lab and at home (Kochanska, 1995).
In our own adolescent project, we took the perspective that the way parents
experience and label a child’s behavior is likely to be most proximally related to
their parenting. We thus asked mothers and fathers about the “difficulty” of their
adolescents (e.g., my child is even-tempered and not moody), and about their
views of adolescence—specifically whether they believe adolescence is a difficult
stage (e.g., adolescence is a difficult time of life for children and their parents).
Results indicated that mothers who believed their adolescents were difficult were
more controlling than mothers who rated their adolescents as easier. The finding
did not hold true for fathers. For fathers, there was a significant negative relation
between difficulty and involvement, suggesting that when fathers felt their own
children were difficult they were likely to withdraw from interacting with them
rather than controlling them. Fathers (but not mothers) who saw adolescence as
a difficult time were more controlling with their adolescents, indicating that
fathers are more influenced by their stereotypes of adolescents than by their own
children’s actual features. This may be a function of fathers’ lesser experiences
with adolescents in that they spend markedly less time with them relative to
mothers (Montemayor, 1982).
In this same study we examined whether there would be transactions
between the environment in which parents parented and the characteristics of
the adolescents. More specifically, we wondered whether in nonstressful environ-
ments, parents would tailor their parenting to qualities of their adolescents,
whereas in less conducive environments the parents would be less likely to do so.
‘To examine this question, correlations between difficulty and parenting were
computed within high and low stress groups. First, median splits on negative life
events, social support, and marital satisfaction were conducted. Next, correlations
between child difficulty and parenting within the high and low groups were com-
puted (analyses were conducted for mothers only since the number of fathers did
not allow for these analyses). Results indicated links between perceived difficulty
and parenting in the “conducive” contexts but not the “nonconducive” contexts.
More specifically, in low stress environments, there was a significant negative rela-
tionship between difficulty and autonomy support (r = -.47), whereas in high
stress environments, this relation was nonsignificant. A similar pattern held for
 What Makes Parents Controlling? 167

high and low social support and high and low marital satisfaction. Thus, within
supportive environments parenting appears to be more regulated by characteris-
tics of the adolescent than in nonsupportive environments.
Of course, all of these studies are correlational in nature. While parents who
have difficult children may respond with more control, it is also plausible that
parents who are more controlling increase reactance, whereby adolescents
attempt to restore their freedom by engaging in negative behaviors. Thus, more
controlling parents may actually create more difficulty in their children. When we
see children and parents in our studies, we catch them in cycles of parent-to-child
and child-to-parent influence. Sequential analyses of parent-child interaction
show that oppositionality leads to irritable behavior, which evokes control, which
sustains noncompliance (Patterson, 1982).
While it is significant that parents’ experiences of their adolescents are pre-
dictive of control, one way to get around the éheoretical problem of bidirectional
influences is to experimentally manipulate the “difficultness” of the children.
Jelsma (1982) did just this in a study in which she gave mothers the task of teach-
ing anagrams to children (ages 9 to 11 years). Each mother taught one child. The
children were confederates—half were trained to be difficult, uncooperative, and
disinterested and the other half to be easy, cooperative, and interested. Tapes of
the interactions showed that mothers were more controlling with the more diffi-
cult children.
Anderson, Lytton, and Romney (1986) had mothers of normal children and
mothers of conduct disordered children interact in the laboratory with their own
or others’ children. Results showed more controlling responses to the conduct dis-
ordered children whether or not they were the mothers’ own or others’ children.
In addition, mothers showed fewer positive behaviors to their own children
whether or not they were conduct disordered. This study provides further indi-
cation that control is at least in part driven by child behavior.

Pressure from Within

While external pressure and characteristics of the children themselves may

lead parents to become more or less controlling, we now focus on another type of
pressure, that from within. Internal pressure from within parents to have their
children perform in specified ways may also determine parenting patterns. One
of the concepts that has been linked to internal pressure is that of ego involve-
ment (Sherif & Cantril, 1947). When people are ego-involved, their performance
has ramifications for their own self-esteem. In other words, they hinge their self-
esteem on some outcome. People will feel proud and good about themselves if
168 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

they perform well, but ashamed, perhaps embarrassed, and bad about themselves
if they perform poorly, Thus, the outcome of the activity poses a threat to self-
esteem and people are highly motivated to protect their self-esteem by creating a
positive outcome. By contrast, when people are involved in the activity, they
engage in it out of interest rather than a desire to display positive performance.

The Effects of Ego-Involvement

Ryan (1982) linked the concept of ego-involvement with internal control in

which rewards, pressures, and other controlling contingencies come from within
the person but function much like externally furnished contingencies to create an
external locus of causality for behavior. Consistent with this idea, a number of
studies have shown that the state of ego-involvement, with its accompanying
internal stress and pressure, is undermining of intrinsic motivation (e.g., Plant &
Ryan, 1985; Ryan, 1982).
For example, Ryan (1982) had college students solve hidden-figure puzzles in
either an ego-involved (performance said to be linked to IQ) or task-involved (no
performance-IQ link) condition. He showed that ego-involvement in the task
resulted not only in greater feelings of pressure and tension than task-involve-
ment, but also in lower intrinsic motivation to pursue the task in a subsequent
free-choice session. In this study, participants became ego-involved when their
own performance had ramifications outside of the task itself—that is, when their
own performance had the potential to make them feel that they would be seen as
either “smart” or “dumb.” However, there are a variety of instances in which
people’s feelings hinge not on their own performance, but on the performance of
another. For example, how a student performs on a test might affect how the
teacher assesses his or her teaching, and how a child dresses might affect how the
parent feels he or she will be judged as a parent. In these examples, teachers and
parents become ego-involved in children’s performance, behavior, or outcomes,
and this ego-involvement is likely to influence the way the teachers and parents
interact with children.
Deci, Speigel, Ryan, Koestner, and Kauffman (1982) examined a related
phenomenon in an analog study of teachers. College students were told that they
would be “teaching” other students to solve puzzles. Teachers were then given
one of two orientations to their task; one emphasized performance standards and
the other did not mention specific performance requirements. Those in the role
of teacher then taught another college student to solve the puzzles. Presumably,
teachers who were told they were responsible for students’ performing up to stan-
dards would feel they were not good teachers if their students did not perform
well. ‘Thus, they would likely be invested (i.e., ego-involved) in the students’ per-
formance for their own views of themselves. Conversely, participants in the role
 What Makes Parents Controlling? 169

of teacher who had been led to believe that there were no specific performance
requirements would not feel their worth was linked to their students’ performance.
Teaching sessions were audiotaped and later coded. Teachers in the per-
formance-standards condition were judged to be more demanding and control-
ling, talked more, let students work alone less, used three times as many directives
and “should” type statements, and two and a half times more criticisms than
those in the control condition. Students assembled more puzzles with the help of
the teacher but actually solved fewer puzzles on their own. Thus, when teachers
are pressured and led to believe students’ performance has meaning for their own
worth, they are likely to be more controlling.
We would like to point out some other interesting results from this study,
namely, ratings by teachers following the teaching sessions showed that teachers
in the performance standards condition liked their students more than those in
the control condition, presumably because they “performed” for the teachers.
Further, there were no differences between teachers in the two conditions on
reported enjoyment, effectiveness, rated interest in the puzzles, or willingness to
take part in similar studies. Thus, the state of having performance standards did
not appear to be especially aversive to these teachers even though they became
more controlling with the students. We will come back to this point later.
A study conducted by Winch and Grolnick (1993) used another kind of ana-
log, that of a counseling situation. A set of participants were given unsolvable
anagrams to work on prior to talking with a simulated counselor. College-student
“counselors” were then given the task of interacting individually with partici-
pants to find out what their experiences had been with the anagrams. Half the
counselors were ego-involved and told that the session was a “test of how good
they were at interacting with another person” and that such a skill would have
implications for other important life skills. ‘The task-involved counselors were told
that we were interested in how people disclosed information about their experi-
ences.
Interactions between counselors and counselees were audiotaped and later
coded. The ego-involved counselors were judged to be more controlling than the
task-involved counselors. However, while the ego-involved counselors rated them-
selves as more pressured and anxious immediately after receiving the ego-involv-
ing manipulation, they did not rate themselves as more pressured or anxious or
as enjoying themselves less during the interaction.

Parents’ Ego-Involvement

So what about parents interacting with their children? Will parents who are
ego-involved in their children’s performance show more control? And how will
this affect the children? We examined just this issue in a recent study (Grolnick,
170 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Gurland, DeCourcey, & Jacob, in press), one of a set of studies on parent involve-
ment. Before describing the study, the manipulation used to create ego-involve-
ment in the parents requires explanation.
In the educational literature, Dweck and her colleagues (Diener & Dweck,
1978; Dweck, 1975) have distinguished between children who have a mastery
approach toward pursuing their schoolwork and those who take a helpless
approach to tasks. A mastery approach involves the seeking out of challenging
tasks and the maintenance of effective striving under failure. The helpless pattern
is characterized by avoidance of challenge and deterioration in the face of obsta-
cles. Dweck and Elliott (1983) have linked these patterns to the different goals
children have when pursuing tasks. When children hold performance goals, they
are concerned with gaining favorable judgements of their competence, so their
goal in learning activities is to be sure they look competent (i.e., to prove their
ability). By contrast, when children hold learning goals, they are concerned with
increasing their competence, so their goal is to acquire new skills or extend their
mastery.
Ames and Archer (1988) extended this work on students’ goals to the goal
orientation of the classroom environment. These researchers assessed children’s
perceptions of the classroom goal structure (whether it was experienced as per-
formance or mastery oriented). The researchers found that when students per-
ceived their class as emphasizing a mastery goal, they were more likely to report
using effective learning strategies, prefer tasks that offer challenge, like their class
more, and believe that effort and success are positively related. Further, when a
performance orientation was salient to students, they tended to focus on ability
and to cite their inability as a cause for failure.
For our study, we used these ideas to develop inductions that would give par-
ents either an ego-involved or a nonego-involved orientation toward working
with their child. We reasoned that an evaluative environment in which the par-
ents felt responsible for the child’s performance would make parents invested in
the outcome of the task, that is, become ego-involved in the performance of their
children. ‘Thus, we created high and low performance-pressure conditions to
facilitate ego-involved and nonego-involved orientations, respectively.
Sixty mothers and their third grade children participated in the study, con-
ducted at our Child and Family Development Laboratory. Upon arriving at the
laboratory, mothers rated their attitudes toward supporting versus controlling
children. Children rated their mothers’ autonomy support and completed ques-
tionnaires about their own motivational qualities. Each mother-child dyad then
completed two homework-like tasks, similar to those that a third-grader might
bring home from school: a map task, which required them to give directions to
different locations on a large map, and a poem task, requiring them to label
rhyming patterns of poems and then write a quatrain (four-line poem with a par-
ticular pattern). The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced. Each mother
was assigned to either a high performance-pressure condition or a low perform-
 What Makes Parents Controlling? Pal

ance-pressure condition. In the high-pressure condition, the mother was told,

“Your role is to ensure that ____ learns to give directions (write a poem). We will
be testing after to make sure that he/she performs well enough.” In the low-
pressure condition, the mother was told, “Your role is to help learn how
to give directions (write a poem). We will be asking some questions after
but there is no particular level at which he/she needs to perform.” After the
induction, mothers completed an affect rating scale. Following this, the mother
and child completed the task. Next, mothers and children separately completed
questionnaires about their experience of the tasks including their competence,
feelings of enjoyment, pressure and tension and effort expended. Finally, the
mother left the room and the child was given a new task of the same type to solve
on his or her own (e.g., give directions, write a quatrain). This task was included
to determine whether children’s internalization of what they had learned differed
as a function of the condition under which the dyad worked.
A videotape was made of each mother and child dyad working on the tasks,
and the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of the mothers were coded during each
five-second interval in terms of the number of controlling and the number of
autonomy supportive behaviors displayed by the mothers during that period.
Verbal behaviors were coded as controlling if they involved directives, taking over
(e.g, reading the items instead of allowing the child to do so), and telling the
answers, whereas they were coded as autonomy supportive if they involved giv-
ing information and providing feedback. Controlling nonverbal behaviors includ-
ed leading, taking over, and showing the child the answer, whereas autonomy
supportive nonverbal behaviors included being available to provide assistance,
pointing out information, and providing nonverbal feedback (e.g., nodding one’s
head). In addition to this coding, for each five-second interval, the mothers were
given ratings for the degree to which they were controlling versus autonomy sup-
portive in their verbal and nonverbal behaviors. Finally, dyadic and child per-
formance on the map and poem tasks were coded, and the creativity of the poem
the child wrote alone was rated using Amabile’s (1983) system of consensual val-
idation.
We expected that mothers in the high-pressure condition would use more
controlling verbal and nonverbal behaviors and be rated as more controlling than
those in the low-pressure condition. We also expected that mothers who came
into the session with more controlling styles would be more controlling in our ses-
sion. As well, we tested for possible interactions between the experimental condi-
tions and individual differences in controlling styles.
In order to test for these effects, a series of Analyses of Covariance
(ANCOVASs) were performed with condition (high- vs. low-pressure), autonomy
supportive styles (high vs. low) and the interaction between condition and styles.
Because mothers’ behavior was correlated with children’s grades in school, (sug-
gesting that more competent children are provided more autonomy support), we
entered children’s grades as a covariate in these analyses.
V2 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Results for the poem task showed main effects of condition for the codings
of mothers’ verbalizations as being autonomy supportive versus controlling.
Mothers in the high-pressure condition used more directives, did somewhat more
taking over, and had a lower mean level of verbal autonomy support overall than
those in the low-pressure condition. Mothers who had initially been rated by their
children as having controlling styles in general displayed more controlling verbal
behaviors (more taking over, somewhat more directives) and more controlling
nonverbal behaviors (less available, more leading behavior) during the poem task.
In addition, they were rated by observers as being more controlling in both their
verbal and nonverbal behavior during the poem task.
Thus, for our poem task, when mothers were oriented toward the perform-
ance of their children they were more controlling verbally with their children.
Interestingly, this task was a verbal task and the strongest effects were for verbal
behavior. However, mothers’ behavior was also highly dependent on the styles
that they brought into the laboratory. This is not surprising because mothers and
children have a history of working together and are likely to have established
ways of interacting, especially on tasks similar to those they routinely do at home.
The results for our map task were a bit different. On this nonverbal task,
there were also effects of our intervention on nonverbal behavior, but this time,
there were both main effects and interactions. Mothers in the high-pressure con-
dition took over more and gave the answers to their children more than mothers
in the low-pressure condition. As in the poem task, individual differences in
mothers’ styles were highly predictive of their behavior; mothers whose children
rated them as more autonomy supportive at home used fewer controlling verbal
and nonverbal behaviors and were also rated as more autonomy supportive dur-
ing the interactive tasks. Statistical interactions indicated that the effects of the
manipulation were particularly striking for one group; the group that came in
with controlling attitudes. In fact, our results showed that mothers with highly
autonomy supportive attitudes were relatively unaffected by the manipulation,
and, in some cases, the mothers high in autonomy supportive attitudes who were
in the high-pressure condition were even more autonomy supportive during the
task than were their counterparts in the low-pressure condition. Thus, mothers
who had controlling styles and were subjected to the evaluation of the high-pres-
susre condition were highly controlling. The other three groups were quite simi-
lar in their behavior.

Motivational Effects on Performance

Another set of analyses considered whether both the experimental condition

and individual differences (i.e., mothers’ styles) affected how the dyad performed
on the tasks and, in particular, how the child performed when alone. For the
poem, we coded whether the correct form was used and whether the lines
rhymed as they were supposed to. For the map task, we determined whether all
 What Makes Parents Controlling? 3

pieces of information (street, direction, cross streets) were used to give directions
and also whether they were given in the correct order.
Results indicated that for the map task, holding constant child grades, chil-
dren whose mothers both had controlling attitudes and were in the high-pressure
condition showed poorer performance than those in the other three groups.
Thus, the results parallel those for mother behavior. Children of mothers with
controlling styles who were pressured were less likely to have internalized what
they learned and thus less able to apply it on their own (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987).
There were no effects for condition or for the condition by individual difference
interaction on accuracy in the poem task, but there was an interaction effect on
creativity (which was no longer significant when grades were controlled for).
Children whose mothers came in with controlling attitudes and were assigned to
the high-pressure condition wrote the least creative poems. Further, there was
support for the idea that the effect of condition on performance was mediated by
the mother’s behavior—mothers in the high-pressusre condition behaved in a
more controlling way and that, in turn, led to their children writing accurate but
uncreative poems when they were alone.
In general, the results of our study show striking support for the idea that
promoting parents’ ego-involvement in their children’s performance leads to the
parents being more controlling, especially when they have controlling styles to
begin with. The interaction result for the map task is reminiscent of the findings
of Koestner, Bernieri, and Zuckerman (1992) which showed that more controlled
individuals are less consistent in their attitudes and behavior than are more
autonomous individuals. In our study, mothers who had controlling styles were
especially vulnerable to the performance manipulation, whereas highly autono-
my supportive mothers were invulnerable to our manipulation. Mothers who
strongly endorse controlling children as a means of child rearing are likely to be
control-oriented individuals. ‘These results are also consistent with work by Bober
and Grolnick (1995) showing that autonomous individuals are less swayed by
inaccurate feedback about themselves, again showing that control-oriented indi-
viduals are more vulnerable and autonomous individuals less vulnerable to envi-
ronmental contingencies. Thus, when academic or sports endeavors stress com-
petition or evaluation, some parents will be more vulnerable to the effects of such
pressures than others. The results also suggest that the effects of the environment
on parents may differ according to the type of task in which they and their chil-
dren are engaged.

Mothers’ Experiences

A final set of findings concerned the mothers’ experiences in the high- and
low-pressure conditions. Striking was the fact that there were no differences
between women in the two conditions in the amount of pressure they experi-
enced while working with their children, in terms of their enjoyment of the task
174 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

or their feelings of competence in working with their children. Why would this
be so different from the pressure people feel when they are ego-involved in their
own performance? Recall that both Ryan (1982) and Plant and Ryan (1985)
found that when participants were ego-involved in their own performance they
reported more feelings of pressure and tension and less enjoyment than when
they were task-involved. What then is the difference between being ego-involved
in your own performance versus that of your children? We suggest that when
people are ego-involved in their own performance, they can pressure only them-
selves in an attempt to maintain their self-esteem. However, when parents or
teachers are ego-involved in children’s performance, they can push the children
toward positive outcomes, thereby relieving their own pressure of evaluation.
Thus, people can transform the evaluation they feel into behavior that is direct-
ed toward the children. By controlling the children, the mothers in the high-pres-
sure condition may have inadvertently lessened their own pressure. It may not be
nearly as aversive to be ego-involved in another’s performance as in one’s own
performance because there is an outlet, albeit a counterproductive one.

Are Parents Especially Vulnerable to Being Ego-Involved?

In this last section, we present ideas based on evolutionary thinking. We ask

the question, Are there built in “hooks” that make many parents especially vul-
nerable to acting in ego-involved and controlling ways with their children?
Of course, there are many ways in which the parent-child relationship is spe-
cial when compared with various other relationships. Parents usually live with
their children, have the primary responsibility for teaching their children how to
live in the world, and know more about their children than do others.
Importantly, children share 50% of their genes with each biological parent. And
that, too, makes for a special situation.
We argue that indeed there are built in hooks. From the “gene’s eye view,”
parents are invested in their children’s welfare, in their offspring’s surviving and
reproducing. No doubt, evolution has selected for parents to be invested in their
children. How else would it be possible for parents to make the personal sacrifices
they make? ‘Trivers (1974) coined the term “parental investment” to describe the
resources parents provide to their offspring to increase the offspring’s chance of
surviving and hence of having reproductive success. Inherent in this concept is
the idea that parents have only a finite amount of resources to invest in their off-
spring, themselves, and their potential future offspring. Humans use k-selection
patterns, meaning we have low fertility rates, have fewer offspring than is biolog-
ically possible, and invest in a few highly competitive offspring. Species such as
ours Clearly differ from r-selected species, which evolved in highly unstable envi-
ronments, have many offspring, and invest very little in each (Lovejoy, 1981).
How do we experience this push to put time, energy, and scarce resources
into our offspring? Our experience is likely in the form of feelings. MacDonald
 What Makes Parents Controlling? [75

(1988) suggested that the human affectional system has evolved to keep family
relationships close and to make sure parents invest in their children. MacDonald
further suggested that the mechanism through which this occurs is a reward sys-
tem in which parents feel intense love and caring for their children, making it pos-
itive for them to be together. Such feelings allow parents to invest time and ener-
gy and make sacrifices. A parallel system in children makes for mutual affection
and closeness.
But is there a possibility of too much investment? The key to answering this
question is to understand how high parental investment species such as ours
determine how much and how to invest. Lovejoy (1981) suggested that although
our selection is for high investment parenting, the system is also a flexible one in
which the type of investment is dependent on cues in the environment. When
cues suggest adverse conditions and competition for survival, there is especially
high investment. If cues suggest optimal conditions and low competition, there is
less investment. This would be highly adaptive in the environment in which
humans evolved because a competitive, adverse environment might mean death
for offspring and no reproduction. Thus, a very high parental investment in
stressful times was adaptive in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness
(EEA) because survival was on the line.
But our current environment is different from the EEA, and what might have
been adaptive then may be less so today. If one imagines the cues parents
encounter in Western society, it is likely that they are competitive, although sur-
vival is typically not at stake. Our schools and other institutions such as organized
sports are set up as hierarchies with evaluation, social comparison, and “weeding
out” a part of routine practices (Labaree, 1997). If parents pick up these cues,
they may be likely to overinvest. ‘This may lead to more controlling behavior than
is adaptive. For while the use of these cues was adaptive in the EEA, today’s
“man-made” (non-survival oriented) competitive cues may lead to more control
than is optimal in our current environment.
In the EEA, it would have been highly adaptive to have offspring who behaved
closely in accord with parental behavior. This is another way in which genetic sim-
ilarity may make for control. For the parent to have survived and reproduced, his
or her behaviors had to have been successful in the environment. Assuming a rel-
atively stable environment, offspring behaviors that were close to parental behav-
iors would be advantageous. It may therefore be expected that genes would persist
that involve parents’ attempting to maximize the likelihood of their offspring
adhering to their behavioral examples and that result in the children’s adhering to
those examples. From the gene’s viewpoint, psychological health per se is of no
consequence. All that matters is successful reproduction. ‘Thus, conservatism, in
which parents attempt to channel children into their own paths, might be a vestige
of our evolutionary heritage that is no longer adaptive in the current environment
where flexible adjustment to environmental change is most adaptive.
We are just beginning to test aspects of this theory. One hypothesis is that
parents who pick up competitive cues from the environment and see the world
176 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

their children will inhabit as being harsh will likely be controlling with their chil-
dren. This idea that cues of threat lead to controlling behavior does have support
from work on threat and authoritarianism in the field of political psychology.
In 1973, Sales examined the effect of the Great Depression on conversion
rates among church denominations, comparing the period from 1920 to 1929, a
time of relative prosperity, with the Depression period from 1930 to 1939. Sales
found that conversion rates from nonauthoritarian to authoritarian churches
increased during the period of presumed societal threat, relative to the low-threat
period. He then replicated this result for relatively good and bad economic years
in Seattle. Doty, Peterson, and Winter (1991) more recently identified periods of
relative high threat (1978-1982) and low threat (1983-1987) using indicators of
income and the Consumer Price Index, as well as troubling events such as the dis-
aster at Three Mile Island, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the seizure of
the American Embassy in Tehran. These authors showed that societal measures
of authoritarian syndrome, such as the purchase of attack dogs, cynicism, and
acceptance of capital punishment, decreased from the high to the low threat
periods.
Sales and Friend (1973) also looked at individual level effects. In two studies,
participants were induced to succeed or fail on purported measures of intelli-
gence and ability. Failure increased participants’ level of authoritarianism,
whereas success decreased it.
In a more complex model, Feldman and Stenner (1997) suggested that threat
would not impact on authoritarianism directly (authoritarianism is a personality
variable and thus presumed to be static) but rather would activate authoritarian
behavior for individuals with the authoritarian tendency. Individuals with an
authoritarian tendency (conformist child-rearing values) who perceived more
economic and political threat were more ethnocentric and reported more puni-
tive attitudes than those with a high authoritarian tendency who perceived low
threat. ‘There was no effect of threat on individuals with low authoritarian ten-
dencies. In fact, if anything, low authoritarian individuals showed more liberal
responses under higher threat. ‘The results suggest that threat polarizes people,
leading high-authoritarian individuals to behave in authoritarian ways but not
having this effect on individuals low in authoritarianism.
In a recent pilot study (Grolnick & Gurland, 1999), we developed a ques-
tionnaire for parents asking them for their views about the world their children
will inhabit in the future. Among the subscales are (1) concern about the future
(e.g., “Vhinking about kids today, it’s scary to imagine what the world will be like
for them in the future.”); (2) harsh world (e.g., “Its getting harder and harder all
the time to make a decent living.”); and (3) perceived competition (e.g., “It’s com-
petitive out there, only some kids can make it.”). We also measured parents’ val-
ues for their children using Kohn’s (1977) scale which asks parents to rank order
values such as obedience and responsibility. Parents reported on their tendencies
to use autonomy supportive versus controlling behaviors using the Parent
 What Makes Parents Controlling? WT,

Attitude Scale and the Child Report of Parent Behavior Inventory (CRPBI;
Schaefer, 1965). Parents also completed the General Causality Orientations Scale
(Deci & Ryan, 1985).
We predicted that parents who were more concerned about the future and
those who saw the world as more harsh and competitive would display more con-
trolling attitudes and behavior than those who saw the world as less harsh and
competitive and were less concerned. Preliminary data with 40 participants sug-
gest some of the predicted relations. Parents who were more concerned about the
future tended to be more likely to value obedience than those less concerned
about the future. There were also marginally significant trends for parenting
behavior with parents who were more concerned about the future reporting
more psychological control and less autonomy support than parents who were
less concerned. Finally, the results for the General Causality Orientations Scale
are intriguing. Individuals high in the control orientation perceived more com-
petition and perceived the world their children will inhabit as more harsh than
those lower in this orientation.
The results provide some support for the idea that one of the reasons par-
ents become controlling is that they experience threat for their children and,
because they are invested in their children’s performance, they tend to push them
to achieve. In parents’ minds, the push is perceived as something they almost have
to do because they care about their children. The model of interaction between
cues in our social contexts and parents’ propensities to be invested suggests that
the context in which parents find themselves may be a key to how their invest-
ment translates into behavior.

Summary and Conclusions

Autonomy supportive parenting is associated with children’s self-regulation of

behavior (Grolnick & Ryan, 1989) and emotion (Grolnick, Kurowski,
McMenamy, Rivkin, & Bridges, 1998), as well as their achievement and adjust-
ment (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997). Thus, the identification of factors that facil-
itate autonomy supportive parenting is an important task. Among the issues we
have recognized as making it difficult to provide autonomy supportive parenting
are external factors such as stress and lack of support from others, as well as child
factors such as the child being difficult to parent. Interestingly, these factors have
also been found to undermine parents’ involvement with their children. For exam-
ple, parents who perceived their children as more difficult as well as those feeling
less efficacious were less involved in their children’s schooling than those seeing
their children as easier and themselves as more effective as parents (Grolnick,
Benjet, Kurowski, & Apostoleris, 1997). Stress and scarce resources were predic-
178 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

tive of lower involvement for mothers of boys. Thus, arduous life circumstances
and challenging child behavior may make it difficult to provide for children’s
needs more generally. Certainly such circumstances create a cycle whereby child
difficulty leads to low involvement (Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994) which is likely
to be of a controlling nature, and this in turn leads to greater difficulty.
A different dynamic, however, may occur with parents’ ego involvement in
their children’s performance. When parents feel evaluated or feel their children
are being evaluated, parents may become highly involved, but the type of
involvement they provide is likely to be controlling. There is some evidence that,
in some instances, high levels of controlling involvement may actually be less ben-
eficial than lower levels of involvement (Weiss & Grolnick, 1991). The tendency
toward ego-involvement and control may be at least in part a function of the
competitive cues rampant in our culture that parents pick up and channel into
control. Thus, well-meaning parents may become easily hooked into focusing on
outcomes, pressuring their children, and undermining the very characteristics
they wish to inculcate.
How can parents, teachers, and other adults responsible for socializing chil-
dren refrain from falling into this trap? We suggest, first, through increased
awareness of internal pressures to control. When individuals can identify such
pressures, they can begin to ask themselves what stake they have in their chil-
dren’s performance. Do they see the children’s behavior as reflecting upon them-
selves? Has the outcome become more important than the process? Such inter-
nal conversations can increase choicefulness about what parenting and teaching
strategies to utilize. Second, we suggest identifying the cues in the environment
that may be leading them to be ego involved. How is the activity structured so as
to increase competition and threat? Is it possible to restructure or reinterpret
these contingencies? ‘Third, caretakers can support each other by discussing
competitive feelings and fears. When parents understand that they are not alone
in their worries about their children’s futures, they may be better able to counter
their own feelings of pressure. Such techniques can help parents to maintain
autonomy supportive parenting in an environment that pulls for control, and this
should in turn lead to positive effects for their children.

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9: Self-Determination Theory Applied to Educational
Settings

Johnmarshall Reeve
Unwersity of Iowa

The utility of applying self-determination theory to educational settings is now

evident. Two decades of empirical work support the following two conclusions:
(1) autonomously-motivated students thrive in educational settings, and (2) stu-
dents benefit when teachers support their autonomy. Further, the positive class-
room outcomes experienced by autonomously-motivated students appear in both
the academic and developmental domains.
The first conclusion essentially means that the quality of a student’s motiva-
tion explains part of why he or she achieves highly, enjoys school, prefers optimal
challenges, and generates creative products. To provide the evidence for this con-
clusion, researchers asked students to self-report their academic motivation, and
they found that the degree to which their motivation was self-determined versus
controlled predicted the outcomes listed on the left-hand side of ‘Table 9-1. The
second conclusion recognizes that the quality of a student’s motivation depends,
in part, on the quality of the student-teacher relationship (Eccles & Midgley,
1989). It essentially means that students achieve highly, learn conceptually, and
stay in school in part because their teachers support their autonomy rather than
control their behavior. The studies that provide evidence for this conclusion
assessed (with a questionnaire) or manipulated (through an experiment) the
teachers’ interpersonal motivating styles and found that students benefited from
autonomy-supportive teachers in the ways listed on the right-hand side of ‘Table
9-1.

Author’s note: I extend my gratitude to those colleagues who joined with me to carry
out the research described in this chapter: Leah Arndt, Elizabeth Bolt, Yi Cai, Diane
Hamm, Pat Hardre, Mafumi Omura, and Brad Sickenius. Please address all correspon-
dence regarding this chapter to Johnmarshall Reeve, Division of Psychological and
Quantitative Foundations, 361 Lindquist Center, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242.
My e-mail address is [email protected].
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 Education 185

The utility of self-determination theory is that it explains why students ben-

efit when teachers support their autonomy. Two premises central to the theory
are that (a) different types of motivation exist (viz., autonomous and controlled),
and (b) some types of motivation (viz., those that are autonomous) are associated
with more positive educational and developmental benefits than are other types
(viz., those that are controlled) (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, &
Ryan, 1991). Instead of arguing that motivation per se is the key resource that
allows students to thrive in educational settings, research on self-determination
theory shows that students benetit specifically from autonomous motivations (i.e.,
intrinsic motivation, identified regulation).

Autonomy Supportive Teaching

While it is now clear that students benefit from their relationships with
autonomy-supportive teachers, it nonetheless remains a bit unclear as to how this
actually works. My colleagues and I have been asking, for instance, just what are
these autonomy-supportive teachers doing in the classroom from one moment to
the next that their controlling counterparts are not doing? Are they listening
more? Are they using directives less? Do they use rewards in different ways or
for different purposes? This is a very practical question because if a teacher
wanted to be more autonomy supportive with students, it is not yet clear just
which teaching behaviors he or she should pursue. Once we pinpoint what auton-
omy-supportive teachers are doing, we can next seek to understand how students
benefit from these sorts of behaviors. If listening is an autonomy supportive thing
to do, then we can ask yet another question by trying to understand how a
teacher’s listening nurtures the sort of benefits listed in Table 9-1. ‘To the extent
that we can identify specific autonomy-supportive teaching behaviors and to the
extent that we can understand why these behaviors benefit students, then we can
pursue a third and practical concern. Namely, we can investigate the extent to
which teachers can learn how to be autonomy supportive with students. ‘These
are the sort of questions that my colleagues and I have been trying to answer.

Autonomy-Supportive Teaching Behaviors

Which acts of teaching can be characterized as autonomy supportive, and

which can be characterized as controlling? Researchers pursue this question in
two different, but complementary, ways. First, the personality approach asks
teachers to complete the Problems in Schools questionnaire to identify an inter-
personal disposition toward autonomy support versus control (Reeve, Bolt, & Cai,
186 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

1999). Second, the social psychological approach exposes teachers to conditions

that either do or do not pressure them toward a relatively controlling orientation
(Deci, Spiegel, Ryan, Koestner, & Kauffman, 1982; Flink, Boggiano, & Barrett,
1990). Once autonomy supportive and controlling teachers are identified
through either of these two means, researchers look for differences in the way
autonomy-supportive and controlling teachers teach and motivate students.
Twenty-two possible behavioral differences between autonomy-supportive
and controlling teachers appear in Table 9-2. The first column lists the results
from a personality-based investigation while the second column lists the results
from a social psychological investigation. Among the set of instructional behav-
iors included in these investigations, autonomy-supportive teachers distinguished
themselves by listening more, spending less time holding instructional materials
such as notes or books, giving students time for independent work, and giving
fewer answers to the problems students face. Among the set of conversational
statements, autonomy-supportive teachers distinguished themselves by avoiding
directives, praising mastery, avoiding criticism, giving answers less often, respond-
ing to student-generated questions, and communicating statements rich in empa-
thy and perspective-taking. Among the set of subjective impressions, autonomy-
supportive teachers distinguished themselves by supporting intrinsic motivation,
supporting internalizations, and coming across as less demanding or pressuring.
These findings allow us to begin to construct an understanding of what
autonomy-supportive teachers are doing during student-teacher interactions. In
essence, autonomy-supportive teachers are responsive (e.g., spend time listening),
supportive (e.g., praise the quality of performance), flexible (e.g, give students
time to work in their own way), and motivate through interest (e.g., support
intrinsic motivation). Controlling teachers essentially take charge (e.g, hold the
instructional materials, use directives/commands), shape students toward a right
answer (e.g., give solutions), evaluate (e.g, criticize), and motivate through pres-
sure (e.g., seem demanding and controlling).

How Students Benefit from Autonomy-Supportive Teaching

Behaviors

Identifying what autonomy-supportive teachers do explains only half of the

story in trying to understand the student benefits listed in Table 9-1. The other
half concerns how these behaviors benefit students. In other words, it’s interest-
ing to know that autonomy-supportive teachers listen more and use directives
less, but is not necessarily clear how or why students benefit from being listened
to and how or why students suffer from being bossed.
According to self-determination theory, intrinsic motivation arises from the
needs for self-determination and competence (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Knowing
this, we designed a study in which we rated and scored the same set of behaviors
 Education 187

Teaching Behaviors Shown More Often by Autonomy-Supportive (AS > C) or by Controlling

(C > AS) Teachers

Results from Results from

Reeve ef al. (1999). Deci et al. (1982).

Teacher’s Instructional Behaviors

Time spent talking AS=C AS<C
Time spent listening AS>C n/a
Time spent holding instructional materials C>AS n/a
Time given to student for independent work AS>C AS>C
Solutions Given C>AS C>AS

Teacher’s Conversational Statements

Directives/Commands C>AS C>AS
Should, Must, Have to Statements AS=C C>AS
Deadlines Statements n/a AS=C
Praises of Quality of Performance AS>C AS>C
Praises of Student AS=C C>AS
Encouragements AS =C n/a
Criticisms n/a
Hints Given AS=C
Solutions Given C>AS
Questions of What the Student Wants AS>C
Controlling Questions AS =C
Responses to Student-Generated Questions AS>C
Self-disclosure Statements AS=C
Empathic, Perspective-taking Statements AS>C

Raters’ Subjective Impressions of Teacher’s Style

Supported Intrinsic Motivation AS>C
Supported Internalization AS>C
Seemed Demanding and Controlling C>AS

Note. AS > C, autonomy-supportive teachers engaged in the behavior significantly more than
did controlling teachers; C > AS, controlling teachers engaged in the behavior significantly more
than did autonomy-supportive teachers; AS = C, this behavior showed no significant difference
between autonomy-supportive and controlling teachers; n/a, this behavior was not assessed in the
study.

Table 9.2

listed in ‘Table 9-2 to see how each affected students’ self-reports of self-determi-
nation and competence (Hamm & Reeve, 2002). Our hypothesis was that the
functional significance of a truly autonomy-supportive behavior would be that it
facilitated students’ perceptions of self-determination and/or competence, just as
the functional significance of a truly controlling behavior would be that it inter-
fered with students’ perceptions of self-determination and competence. We
found that about half of the behaviors listed in Table 9-2 did indeed exert a sig-
188 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

nificant influence on students’ perceptions of self-determination or competence.

We also found that what teachers did affected students’ perceptions more than
what teachers said.
As to the instructional behaviors (i.e., what the teacher did), students report-
ed significantly higher perceptions of both self-determination and competence
when teachers listened more, encouraged conversation, allocated time for inde-
pendent work, and held the instructional materials less. As to the conversational
statements (i.e., what the teacher said), students reported significantly higher per-
ceptions of competence when their teachers provided hints but resisted giving
answers. Students also felt more competent when teachers voiced perspective-
ting statements. The rated subjective impressions were also important, as students
felt more self-determined and more competent when teachers behaved in ways
that supported their intrinsic motivation and valuing of what they were learning.
The story that emerges from these findings is an interesting one to tell. How
a teacher teaches and motivates has a substantial and direct impact on how free
and self-determining each student perceived himself or herself to be. Behaviors
like listening and affording time for independent work nurtured autonomy, while
behaviors like holding the instructional materials and teacher-dominated prob-
lem solving frustrated autonomy. How instruction affected perceived competence
was through a more indirect route. Mostly, students felt competent when they
performed well. In addition, students felt increasingly competent when teachers
provided opportunities for independent work, opportunities to talk, timely hints,
and perspective-taking statements; students felt increasingly incompetent when
teachers hogged instructional materials, gave answers, and solved problems for
the student.

Can Teachers Learn to Be Autonomy Supportive?

Having some confidence that we know what autonomy-supportive behaviors

are and why they facilitate student motivation, we can now turn to practical mat-
ters and ask whether teachers can learn to be autonomy supportive with students.
‘To find out, we prepared an informational booklet about self-determination and
autonomy support and gave it to a group of preservice teachers. The booklets
explained the concept of autonomy support, illustrated what it looks like in a
classroom setting, summarized the benefits of autonomy support, and presented
a couple of case studies so that readers could think about how to apply an auton-
omy-supportive style to student-teacher interactions. Other groups of preservice
teachers received (using random assignment) informational booklets about other
instructional strategies.
Results indicated that the preservice teachers did learn how to be autonomy
supportive with students (Reeve, 1998), but their prior beliefs about the nature of
motivation strongly affected how willing they were to accept the merits of an
 Education 189

autonomy-supportive style. Preservice teachers with prior beliefs about motiva-

tion which were consistent with autonomy support conceptually agreed with the
information, and they assimilated it rather easily. Preservice teachers with prior
beliefs about motivation which were inconsistent with autonomy support initial-
ly disagreed with the information. Control-oriented preservice teachers who
found the information to be a superior alternative to their pre-existing control-
ling motivational strategies experienced conceptual change and willingly adopt-
ed an autonomy supportive orientation. Control-oriented preservice teachers
who found the information to be an inferior alternative to their pre-existing
beliefs resisted conceptual change and maintained their commitment to a con-
trolling orientation. So, preservice teachers can and do learn how to be autono-
my supportive, but they experience enduring conceptual change only to the
extent that they see autonomy support as a superior alternative to their pre-exist-
ing strategies.
Recogmzing interest and disinterest in students. Supporting students’ autonomy
requires not only a respect and a valuing for students’ intrinsic motivation and
self-determination, but it also requires an array of interpersonal skills. These
skills include taking the perspective of the students, acknowledging their feelings,
providing rationale for requests, communicating with noncontrolling language,
and so on (Deci, 1995; Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). We have been par-
ticularly interested in the skill of being able to recognize when students are inter-
ested or disinterested in what they are doing. A few years ago, I visited elemen-
tary and high schools and tried a simple experiment. While students engaged
themselves on worksheets, participated in group discussions, worked on comput-
ers, and visited interest areas, I asked each of them to tell me (on a questionnaire)
how interested or disinterested he or she was at that particular moment on that
particular activity. I also asked teachers to observe these students and estimate
how interested or disinterested they thought each student was. Findings indicat-
ed that, although teachers were highly confident that they could tell who was and
who was not interested, the teachers’ interest estimates were in fact as likely to be
wrong as they were to be right. In other words, estimating how interested students
are during learning turns out to be difficult. Try it some time, and you will see
what I mean.
We have been investigating precisely how people express interest through
their nonverbal behavior (Reeve, 1993; Reeve & Nix, 1997), and we have learned
several ways that people express interest during task engagements. For instance,
the speed with which people move their hands while working on a manipulative
task correlates highly with self-reported interest. (The idea is that the quicker the
“hand speed,” the greater the underlying desire to gain information/feedback
from task exploration, experimentation, and mastery attempts.) In a recent inves-
tigation, we trained one group of preservice teachers to monitor students’ “acts
of exploration” as they watched students learning (Reeve, Arndt, & Omura,
2002). Teachers then estimated how interested or disinterested each student
190 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

appeared to be. Compared to raters who received no such training (i.e., a control
group), participants who closely monitored students’ acts of exploration made
significantly more accurate interest ratings. Thus, people can learn to recognize
interest in others. In the classroom, this can be a handy skill, as it provides teach-
ers with the critical feedback they need to diagnose whether or not the instruc-
tion they provide is interesting to students.
The concept of autonomy support. Pulling all this research together, a picture
begins to emerge of what it means to be autonomy supportive in the classroom.
In essence, autonomy support means teaching in ways that nurture students’
intrinsic motivation and internalization processes. It also entails particular beliefs
about motivation, a particular interpersonal orientation, and a set of interper-
sonal skills. As to beliefs about motivation, autonomy support begins by recog-
nizing distinctions between types of motivation (viz., autonomous and controlled)
and between teachers’ ways of motivating students (viz., autonomy supportive
and controlling) so as to appreciate the benefits of students’ autonomous motiva-
tions sufficiently that one will seek ways to nurture them. As to one’s interper-
sonal style of teaching, autonomy support requires a willingness to enter into
relationships from the students’ perspective to encourage initiative, nurture com-
petence, and communicate in ways that are noncontrolling and information-rich.
As to interpersonal skills, autonomy support involves acquiring talents such as
perspective taking, acknowledging feelings, providing rationales for uninteresting
lessons, recognizing interest in others, and so on.
This research supports two additional conclusions to supplement the two
that introduced the chapter: (3) a teacher’s style of motivating students is mal-
leable, and (4) the theoretical concept of autonomy support informs classroom
practice.
Conclusion #3 is wonderful news for educators. To the extent that teachers
can learn to be autonomy supportive, they have under their control the means to
promote for students the sort of educational benefits listed in Table 9-1. Our
research suggests that any teacher interested in learning how to be autonomy
supportive with students can do so. Conclusion #4 articulates the viability of put-
ting an autonomy-supportive style into practice in educational settings, as it
argues that the concept of autonomy support offers prescriptive advice to teach-
ers interested in promoting students’ active engagement and volition during
learning. As encouraging as these two conclusions are, however, one question per-
sistently dogs any effort to apply self-determination theory to educational settings.
‘That question is, “If autonomy support is so great, then why are teachers so fre-
quently controlling with their students?”

Why Are Teachers Often Controlling with Students?

Even though students benefit when teachers support their autonomy, teach-
ers are nonetheless sometimes controlling with students. Its seems ironic, even
 Education 191

Eleven Reasons to Explain Why Teachers Are Sometimes Controlling With Students

. Prevalence and popularity of behavior modification principles in teacher training programs.

. Relative absence in these same teacher training programs of how to design instruction to
promote student's autonomy.

. Recognizing interest in others is difficult. So teachers, like everyone else, have a difficult time
coordinating their instructional decisions with how interested/disinterested students are.

. Teachers are themselves subjected to controlling, pressuring conditions within their jobs.

. The more disengaged students are, the more they pull controlling behaviors out of the teacher.

. Both parents and students adhere to the "maximal-operant" principle of motivation, which is
basically the belief that "the larger the incentive, the greater the motivation."

. Teachers sometimes underestimate students' abilities to motivate themselves.

. Some teachers view motivation as a fixed trait in students. Accordingly, when motivation is
low, controlling motivational strategies are used to overcome the perceived deficit.

9. The culture (U.S.) identifies teachers as powerful actors and students as relatively weak actors.

10. Both parents and students rate controlling teachers as significantly more competent than
autonomy-supportive teachers.

11.Some teachers deeply and sincerely believe that researchers Just don't really understand, as in,
"If you tried that (i.e., autonomy support) in my classroom, chaos would break loose.

Table 9.3

contradictory, then, to realize that what teachers often practice is the opposite of
what students benefit from. I have wondered why this is so, and my experiences,
conversations, and research with teachers allows me to offer 1] reasons, which
appear in Table 9-3.
Reasons 1-3 acknowledge the current state of affairs in preservice education,
namely that education training programs do an admirable job of providing
instruction in how to control students’ behavior (i.e., courses in classroom man-
agement and behavior modification techniques) but a comparatively poor job in
providing instruction in how to support students’ autonomy. Programs do uphold
intrinsic motivation as an important classroom aspiration, but preservice teach-
ers are often left wondering, “OK, how do I promote autonomy—what would I
do?” I hope the information in this chapter communicates some of that pre-
scription (e.g., listen more, provide rationale for uninteresting but important les-
sons) and that the field as a whole will continue to focus on how to make learn-
ing more interesting and fun (Lepper & Cordova, 1992). Reason 3 suggests that
192 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

if teachers cannot tell how interested students are, then they lack the information
they need to adjust their instructional strategies around a theme of enhancing
interest. In contrast, behavior modification strategies ask teachers to focus on eas-
ier-to-identify behaviors, such as whether or not students raise their hands, how
many minutes of the day they are in or out of their seat, and so on. In short, pre-
service and beginning teachers are more familiar with, and more skilled in, con-
trolling motivational strategies than autonomy-supportive ones (e.g., Newby, 1991).
Reasons 4 and 5 acknowledge the circumstances of the profession. Demands
on teachers such as performance standards, accountability pressures, curriculum
priorities, deadlines, testing schedules, large class sizes, and urgent telephone calls
from parents influence teachers to focus more and more on concrete perform-
ance outcomes and desired behaviors and less and less on nurturing initiative and
promoting conceptual understanding. When pressures pile up, teachers often
react by utilizing controlling strategies (Deci et al., 1982), largely because they
assume that controlling strategies are the best way to maximize achievement out-
comes (Boggiano, Barrett, Weiher, McClelland, & Lusk, 1987). Teachers also
react in controlling ways when students are listless, irresponsible, and disengaged
(Skinner & Belmont, 1993). That is, teachers often try to compensate and reverse
student apathy by imposing relatively controlling and attention-getting limits and
consequences. ;
Reasons 6-8 reflect widespread (but erroneous) beliefs about the nature of
motivation that permeate the U.S. culture. People generally believe in the merits
of extrinsic incentives as a means to cultivate rich and productive motivation in
students; and people generally distrust the educational utility of student-owned
motivational resources such as curiosity and intrinsic motivation (Boggiano et al.,
1987; Hom, 1994). ‘The belief in the “maximal-operant” principle of motivation
facilitates a controlling style because it feeds the assumption that an absence of
motivation is best countered by the presence of an incentive. Reason 8 acknowl-
edges that some (but not all) teachers are “entity theorists” (Dweck, 1999) when
it comes to understanding student motivation. As entity theorists, they see low
student motivation as a fixed characteristic of some students that is best dealt
with by creating extrinsic sources of motivation to overcome students’ internal
motivational deficits. The double-barreled implication that follows from reasons
6-8 is the following: If students show little or no autonomy, then how can a
teacher be autonomy supportive? And what is wrong with using extrinsic incen-
tives to get them motivated?
Reasons 9 and 10 pertain to what it means to be a teacher (or student) in the
U.S. culture. In general, our culture expects a person in the role of a “teacher”
to behave in relatively strong and influential ways and to enact behaviors such as
“take control,” “instruct,” and “give directives” (i.e., behaviors consistent with the
identity/role of a “teacher;” Heise, 1991). The culture expects a person in the
role of a “student” to behave in ways that are relatively passive and compliant
and to enact behaviors such as “listen,” “observe,” and “obey” (i.e., behaviors
 Education 193

consistent with the identity/role of a “student;” Heise, 1991). These cultural

expectations (and ideals) facilitate a relatively controlling orientation because if a
teacher wants approval and positive ratings from parents, administrators, students,
and peers, then he or she needs to enact more of the role of an instructor and less
of the role of a facilitator (Boggiano, Flink, Shields, Seelbach, & Barrett, 1993).
Reason 11 concerns the common tendency to associate-or equate—high
structure with a controlling style and low structure with an autonomy-supportive
style. Structure is integral to a productive, smooth-running classroom, but auton-
omy support has little or nothing to do with a lack of structure. Optimal struc-
ture and high autonomy support can, and should, exist side-by-side in a mutual-
ly supportive way. It is to questions such as these-what is the relationship between
structure and autonomy support?-that I turn next.

Five Additional Concerns and Questions

The utility of applying self-determination to educational settings has far-

reaching implications. Here, I apply self-determination theory to five of the ques-
tions and concerns I hear most often from teachers and administrators.

What is the Relation between Autonomy Support and Structure?

Autonomy support revolves around giving students freedom to pursue their

own agendas. Structure revolves around giving students clear expectations, opti-
mal challenges, and timely and informative feedback as they attempt to make
progress in living up to those expectations and challenges. ‘Three relationships
have been proposed to specify how autonomy support and structure relate both
to one another and to student motivation. The first argues that the two are
incompatible opposites, meaning that the act of supporting freedom is by defini-
tion the removal of structure. ‘To endorse this view, autonomy support has to be
miss-construed as permissiveness, neglect, independence, or a laissez-faire inter-
action style (i.e., the teacher lets students do whatever they want). Autonomy sup-
port is none of these things (Ryan, 1993), as it recognizes that all students depend
on their teachers for information and guidance. This view simply misses the point
of what it means to be autonomy supportive with students.
The second conceptualization argues for a curvilinear relationship between
autonomy support and structure (deCharms, 1984). In a curvilinear relationship,
student motivation suffers with both unstructured and rigidly structured class-
rooms while it thrives with moderate structure. That is, moderate structure is
optimal structure. The problem with this curvilinear conceptualization, however,
194 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

is that autonomy support ends up being defined by (or equated with) the provi-
sion of moderate structure. Autonomy support and structure are two different
classroom elements which have different aims and different effects on students
(Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Skinner, 1991). A third conceptualization is therefore
needed, one that understands that autonomy support and structure exist as two
independent contextual variables that can be complementary and mutually sup-
portive (Connell & Wellborn, 1991). Teachers can provide little or much struc-
ture, and teachers can be controlling or autonomy supportive. Student motiva-
tion thrives under conditions in which teachers find ways to provide optimal
structure and high autonomy support (Skinner & Belmont, 1993), as will be
addressed in the discussion on engagement.

What Is Engagement; How Can It Be Facilitated?

Engagement refers to the intensity and emotional quality of students’

involvement during learning (Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Skinner & Belmont,
1993; Wellborn, 1991). It features both behavioral and emotional aspects, such
that an engaged student expresses not only high effort but also a positive emo-
tional tone during that effort. Its opposite is disaffection, which means that stu-
dents withhold effort, give up easily, do just enough to get by, feel burdened or
pressured when they do try, and experience anxiety or even anger. The following
indicate classroom engagement:

Behaviors During Learning Emotions During Learning

* Attention * Interest (vs. Boredom)
* Effort * Enjoyment/ Happiness
* Participation * Enthusiasm
* Persistence * (Lack of ) Anxiety or Anger
Engagement is a useful concept for applying self-determination theory to
educational settings because it provides teachers with an observable manifesta-
tion of the quality of a student’s motivation. ‘The motivations underlying engage-
ment (i.e., intrinsic motivation and identified regulation) and the motivations
underlying disaffection (1,.e., external and introjected regulation) are not observ-
able psychological events. ‘Thus, engagement provides teachers with information
they can more readily see and monitor than does motivation per se.
Engagement arises from experiences in which one’s psychological needs for
self-determination, competence, and relatedness are met (Connell & Wellborn,
1991; Skinner & Belmont, 1993; Skinner, Zimmer-Gembeck, & Connell, 1998).
How teachers facilitate engagement therefore becomes a question of how they
create classroom conditions to support and nurture students’ needs for self-deter-
mination, competence, and relatedness. The teacher-created contextual element
 Education 195

that nurtures students’ need for self-determination is autonomy support; the con-
textual element that nurtures the need for competence is structure; and the con-
textual element that nurtures relatedness is interpersonal involvement.
The third element of an engagement-facilitating classroom climate, in addi-
tion to autonomy support and structure, is thus involvement. Involvement refers
to the quality of the interpersonal relationship between a teacher and his or her
students as well as the teacher’s willingness to dedicate psychological resources
(e.g., time, energy) to the students (e.g., expressing affection, enjoying spending
time with students). Analyzing the conditions that foster engagement is important
because it highlights the motivational significance not only of teacher-provided
autonomy support but also of teacher-student relationships rich in optimal struc-
ture and warm involvement.

Intrinsic Motivation Is Fine, but Extrinsic Motivation Seems

Necessary Too.

Few of my visits to schools pass without hearing a teacher say, in essence, that
intrinsic motivation is fine and dandy but in the real-world of the classroom
extrinsic motivation is also important. ‘Teachers want information to aid them in
their efforts to motivate students on tasks and lessons that are important but not
necessarily intrinsically interesting (e.g, clean their desks, learn the periodic
table). In other words, teachers want a theory of extrinsic motivation.
In self-determination theory, an analysis of extrinsic motivation revolves
around the developmental process of internalization (Rigby, Deci, Patrick, &
Ryan, 1992; Ryan, Connell, & Grolnick, 1992). Because students want satisfying
interpersonal relationships and because they want to obtain esteemed positions
in the social hierarchy, they voluntarily learn and internalize their culture’s rules,
skills, and values. It is through the process of internalization that extrinsic moti-
vation enables self-determined engagement during important but uninteresting
endeavors.
Three types of extrinsic motivation exist, and each type varies in how self-
determined it is. In the list below, external regulation is not at all internalized or
self-determined, introjected regulation is slightly internalized and only a bit self-
determined, and identified regulation is highly internalized and largely self-deter-
mined:

External regulation: Motivation arises from and is dependent on the pres-

ence of environmental events such as rewards, pressures, and con-
straints (“I read this book so that Pll get a good grade on tomorrow’s
test.)

Introjected regulation: The student takes in—but does not truly accept-other
people’s rules or demands to think, feel, or behave in particular ways.
196 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The internalized (but still pressure-inducing) demands of a teacher or

parent actually regulate the student’s behavior (“I should read this book,
so I'll feel like a good student, even though I don’t really see the point
in it.”). Often the student’s feelings of worth are dependent on doing as
he or she should.

Identified regulation: The student accepts the merits of a belief or behav-

ior because he or she sees its importance or personal utility (“I'll read
this book, because learning what it has to say will get me one step clos-
er to an important goal of mine.”).

Autonomy-supportive social contexts tend to promote identified regulatory

styles in students, whereas controlling contexts tend to promote external and
introjected regulatory styles. In other words, the type of internalization that
occurs in autonomy-supportive classrooms tends to be identified in character
resulting in greater self-determination, whereas the type of internalization that
occurs in controlling classrooms tends to be nonexistent (1.e., external regulation)
or less complete (1.e., introjected in character). Though more research needs to be
done in this area, the specific qualities within an autonomy-supportive context
that facilitate identified regulation appear to be the following: (1) providing stu-
dents with a meaningful rationale as to why the task, lesson, or way of behaving
is important or relevant to the child’s well-being; (2) establishing an interperson-
al relationship that emphasizes choice and flexibility rather than control and
pressure; and (3) acknowledging and accepting the negative feelings associated
with engaging arduous activities (d’Ailly, 1999; Deci, 1995; Deci et al., 1994;
Reeve, Jang, Hardre, & Omura, 2002; Rigby et al., 1992; Ryan et al., 1992).
This line of research has practical utility because it provides classroom teach-
ers with a viable alternative to extrinsic incentives on those tasks that teachers see
as important but students see as uninteresting (see Reeve, 1996). To the extent
that they feel confident in their ability to promote identified regulation in stu-
dents, autonomy-supportive teachers will be prepared to motivate students on the
full range of lessons and activities found in the school setting.

What Is Self-Determination and What Does It Feel Like?

Self-determination, or autonomy, is a theoretical concept (Deci & Ryan,

1987). It communicates an inner endorsement of one’s action-the sense that an
action is freely initiated and emanates from within one’s self. But, calling self-
determination a theoretical concept does not mean that it lacks practical utility
or that it cannot be measured. In a couple of studies, we have placed participants
into social contexts that we knew would affect their perceptions of self-determi-
nation, and while they learned under these conditions we measured various
 Education 197

aspects of their subjective experience (Reeve, Nix, & Hamm, 2002). Our purpose
in doing so was to identify self-determination’s experiential qualities.
As shown in Figure 9-1, we found that the perception of self-determination
revolved around three essential qualities—internal perceived locus of causality,
volition, and perceived choice. Perceived locus of causality exists within a bipo-
lar continuum that extends from internal to external and concerns the individ-
ual’s belief that his or her behavior is initiated and regulated either by a person-
al (internal) or by an environmental (external) force. An internal perceived locus
of causality reflects high self-determination (e.g., Because I was so interested, I
read the book; deCharms, 1976; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Volition constitutes an
unpressured willingness to engage in an activity. When volitional, the person feels
free, but, when nonvolitional, he or she feels pressured (Deci, Ryan, & Williams,
1996). Perceived choice emanates from being afforded decision-making flexibili-
ty and opportunities to choose what to do (Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, &
Deci, 1978). These three qualities—or aspects of experience—capture the essence
of what self-determination feels like. And, these qualities tell us how to measure
people’s experience of self-determination with a questionnaire (see the lower half
of Figure 9-1). In addition, these findings inform teachers about what to focus on
in the effort to promote students’ sense of self-determination. That is, the poten-
tially bewildering question of “How do I promote self-determination in stu-
dents?” translates into the more straight-forward question of “How do I promote
an internal locus of causality, a sense of volition, and a perception of choice?”
These are the questions addressed in the next section.

What Can a Teacher Do to Support Autonomy in Students?

Supporting or promoting autonomy in others is not as straightforward as it

might first appear to be. I say this because, at present, we know more about how
to undermine and interfere with students’ autonomy than we know about how to
support and promote it (see Lepper & Cordova, 1992). For instance, imposing
extraneous rewards (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973), deadlines (Amabile,
DeJong, & Lepper, 1976), and verbal directives (Boggiano et al., 1993) on stu-
dents all effectively induce an external perceived locus of causality. And, telling
students that their performances will be evaluated (Ryan, 1982), providing con-
trolling performance feedback (Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 1983), and introducing
a competitive set that focuses on winning (Reeve & Deci, 1996) all effectively
decrease volition. Similarly, assigning students tasks to perform creates a sense of
obligation that works against the perception of choice (Zuckerman et al., 1978).
But what do we know about ways to increase students’ sense of autonomy?
The subjective experiences of an internal perceived locus of causality, high voli-
tion, and perceived choice are highly intertwined with one another, and in some
ways it does not even make sense to talk about one of these qualities without also
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 Education 199

including the other two qualities in the conversation. But, exposing students to
interesting and worthwhile tasks fosters an internal locus of causality (because felt
interest and a sense of importance generates task engagement), promoting a
“task” rather than an “ego” involvement cultivates a sense of volition (because it
promotes freedom and diffuses pressure), and providing flexible interpersonal
environments and opportunities to choose how, when, and whether to act facili-
tates the perception of choice (Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Schraw, Flowerday, &
Reisetter, 1998; Swann & Pittman, 1977; Zuckerman et al., 1978).

Conclusion

In conclusion, applying self-determination theory to educational settings has

proven to be a productive undertaking. The theory explains why autonomously-
motivated students thrive, and it explains why students benefit when teachers
support their autonomy. We have learned what autonomy-supportive teachers
are doing from one moment to the next, and we have learned why these behavy-
iors benefit students by articulating their effects on perceptions of self-determi-
nation and competence. We have further shown that one’s motivating style 1s
malleable, and that teachers can learn how to be more autonomy supportive with
students. And, we have learned many of the reasons why teachers are sometimes
controlling with their students (see ‘Table 9-3). While the effort to learn how to
integrate students’ motivational resources such as self-determination into the
school curriculum requires asking teachers to develop new skills and brave the
waters of conceptual change, the benefits for students of doing so are many (see
Table 9-1).

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10: A Motivational Analysis of Self-Determination for
Pro-Environmental Behaviors

Luc G, Pelletier
Unwersity of Ottawa

Environmental problems—air pollution, water pollution, the greenhouse effect,

global climate change, depletion of the earth’s ozone layer, the clearing of tropi-
cal rain forests, and others—are the result of human behavior (Gardner & Stern,
1996; McKenzie-Mohr, & Oskamp, 1995; Miller, 1994). The complexity of the
environmental problems is further aggravated by growth in the world’s popula-
tion. It is estimated that the global population reached | billion in 1830. One
hundred years later, by 1930, it had reached 2 billion. Sixty-five years later, in
1995, 5.6 billion people occupied the earth.
Although, predicting population growth is an inexact science, the United
Nations Population Fund (1991) estimated that world population will be between
8 and 12 billion by 2050, and could be anywhere between 3.6 and 27 billion by
2150. The difference between the two projections, although vast, is a simple func-
tion of one child per woman. If fertility rates continue to drop until women have
about two children each, which is a medium range projection, the population will
stabilize at 10.8 billion. If the average is 2.6 children, the population will quadru-
ple to 27 billion, but if the average falls to 1.6, the total could drop to 3.6 billion.
Needless to say, this dramatic difference would have a huge effect in terms of
competition for the world’s increasingly scarce resources. Virtually all of the pro- |
jected population increase by 2050 will occur in developing countries (primarily
in Central and South America, in Africa, and in South Asia), as the population
of the developed world (Australia, New Zealand, North America, Europe, and
Northern Asia) is expected to fall, because women there continue to average
fewer than two children each. Thus, the developing countries will experience the
greatest press with respect to the scarce resources.
Interestingly, however, the population’s impact on the environment is per-
haps the most paradoxical aspect of the ecological problem. At present, countries
in the developing world consume far fewer resources per capita than do the devel-
oped nations. Developed countries contain only 22°% of the world’s population,
206 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

but as a result of their affluence, their technologies, and their industrialization,

they consume 88% of the earth’s natural resources and 73% of the energy
resources, and they generate most of the air pollution and waste (Miller, 1994).
As populations increase in the developing countries and industrialization contin-
ues, their global environmental impact should accelerate considerably.
Consequently, the combined effects of population and technology on the earth’s
environment should accentuate many other threats to human, animal, and plant
life such as air and water pollution, increased quantities of pesticides and toxins
in food products, CFC (chlorofluorocarbons) causing depletion of the ozone
layer, carbon dioxide and other gases causing the greenhouse effect, overuse of
fossil fuels, that produce acid rain and lead to death of forests and lakes, destruc-
tion of forests by logging and subsistence agriculture, which leads to global cli-
mate changes, and extinction of thousands of species, which could create great
danger of crop and human disease. In sum, the danger of humans’ producing
irreversible, harmful changes to the environment is grave and imminent.
Clearly if we are to have a sustainable future, substantial shifts in values, atti-
tudes, and behavior must occur (McKenzie-Mohr & Oskamp, 1995). These shifts
must involve individuals’ learning new ways to meet their needs without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet theirs (World Commission on
Economic Development, 1987). In other words, it is becoming obvious that indi-
viduals are now facing the important challenge of adopting new environmental-
ly responsible behaviors, maintaining those behaviors, and integrating them into
their lifestyles.
Several theoretical perspectives have been proposed to better understand
how these goals could be achieved (see Gardner & Stern, 1996; Geller, 1995;
Stern, Young, & Druckman, 1992). One theoretical perspective of human moti-
vation that has received a great deal of attention from researchers over the last
decade and has implications for the issues of maintenance and integration of
change is the theory of intrinsic motivation and self-determination proposed by
Deci and Ryan (1985). This comprehensive theory holds the potential to con-
tribute significantly to our understanding of the issues related to environmental-
ly responsible behaviors for the following reasons. First, it distinguishes between
different types of motivation that can have distinct impacts on the maintenance
and integration of behaviors. Second, it presents clear hypotheses regarding the
contextual as well as the interpersonal conditions that should hinder or facilitate
individuals’ motivation to adopt new behaviors. Third, it outlines various conse-
quences (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) that are associated with the differ-
ent types of motivation. And fourth, it addresses the issue of internalization—
that is, the process by which changes that were initially reinforced by external
sources (¢.g., incentives or the approval of a significant other) become integrated
within the individual to form a permanent part of his or her character.
This chapter presents the results of a program of research that focused on
the application of self-determination theory (SDT) to environmentally responsi-
 Motivation Toward the Environment 207

ble behaviors. Before turning to this program of research, a brief review is pre-
sented of research on the strategies and the key variables that have been derived
from other approaches to promoting pro-environmental behaviors. ‘Their limita-
tions as they pertain to the issue of maintenance of behaviors and the issue of a
sustainable future, are examined. The section following that presents the research
supporting the validity of a scale designed to measure individuals’ intrinsic moti-
vation, four forms of regulation for extrinsic motivation (integrated, identified,
introjected, and external regulation), and amotivation for environmental behav-
iors. Then, the next section presents a review of the evidence regarding the rela-
tions between the different types of motivation and various outcomes such as
recycling, conservation of energy, environmental activism, and seeking out infor-
mation about health risks. In the final section, we examine how individuals’ per-
ceptions of various environmental factors predict their levels of self-determina-
tion for environmental-friendly behaviors. Antecedents include variables such as
satisfaction with the conditions of the environment and with government envi-
ronmental policies, perceptions of competence towards environmental behaviors,
and various sources of information such as the family, friends, children, and the
government. The last section of the chapter presents final thoughts on this pro-
gram of research.

Strategies for Promoting Pro-Environmental Behaviors:

A Brief Review

In view of the seriousness and imminence of environmental threats, many

social scientists and environmentalists have worked to find ways to instill envi-
ronmental awareness and promote environmentally responsible behaviors. Most
of the research has focused on two types of solutions or ways to encourage pro-
environmental behaviors: (a) the use of programs of education, which attempt to
encourage pro-environmental behaviors by giving people knowledge and by try-
ing to change their attitudes about the environment; and (b) the use of govern-
ment laws, behavioral intervention strategies, and incentives to encourage pro-
environmental behaviors and discourage damaging behaviors.

Information about the Environment

Programs for environmental education typically haye two types of agendas.

First, they describe the nature and severity of the problem in an effort to change
people’s attitudes toward the environment. This is usually accomplished by try-
ing to convince individuals that the problem is serious and important enough to
208 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

justify their immediate action. Second, they outline the specific actions individu-
als can take to help solve the problem. The information provided about the seri-
ousness of the situation is expected to serve as the motivation for becoming
involved. The knowledge about the specific actions individuals should take to
solve a problem is expected to foster a sense of competence in the individuals.
Environmental information and perceptions of competence have been identified
as prerequisites for environmentally conscious action (Arcury & Johnson, 1987).
It seems logical to expect that people would need to possess factual information
about the state of the environment and about the influence of human actions on
the environment in order to start believing that it is important to do something
to change the situation. It is also logical to believe that people must know what
behaviors are important and feel competent to manifest these behaviors. These
two factors, which constitute perceived control and perceived competence, are
necessary, but not sufficient by themselves, to create a change of pro-environ-
mental behaviors.
Recent statistics show that some individuals are more than ever concerned
with the worsening condition of the environment (Angus Reid Group, 1992;
Environment Canada, 1991). However, despite numerous environmental pro-
grams established mainly to provide the public with relevant information, it
seems that the level of environmental knowledge about specific actions individu-
als should take remains low (Arcury & Johnson, 1987; Brothers, Fortner, & Mayer,
1991; Gighotti, 1990) and even well-informed people often fail to act on their
knowledge (Seligman, 1985). For example, Oskamp (1995) observed that,
although all respondents surveyed indicated that their knowledge about the
requirements of recycling was very high, only 40°% of them recycled when they
had access to a curbside recycling program. This number dropped to less than
10% when people indicated that they did not have access to a recycling program.
Thus, although general environmental concern along with environmental knowl-
edge and perceptions of competence appear to be necessary for environmental
actions, these factors are still not sufficient to ensure a high level of pro-environ-
mental behaviors.
Several studies have examined the effects of specific perceptions of environ-
mental concern (e.g., degree of environmental threat) on pro-environmental
behaviors. When specifically defined, environmental concern has usually been a
significant mediating variable between individual characteristics (e.g., people’s
level of education) and environmental behaviors (Milbrath, 1984). It appears that
the importance of environmental concern increases as a specific environmental
threat is tied to a targeted environmental behavior (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987).
One class of specific environmental attitudes, namely, perception of health
risks, has received some attention as a determinant of environmental behaviors.
Perception of environmental health risks are generally found to generate strong
public concern and to lead to social action and pro-environmental behaviors such
as recycling (Gardner & Stern, 1996) and environmental activism (Séguin,
 Motivation Toward the Environment 209

Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1998). However, educational efforts that increase perceptions
of health risks (e.g., pollution by cars can increases the probability of having asth-
ma) are unlikely to succeed if they require changing a behavior that individuals
value, such as driving their cars (Oskamp, Harrington, Edwards, Sherwood,
Okuda, & Swanson, 1991). It has also been observed that the relations between
different types of environmental concerns and various behaviors were affected by
self-efficacy or perceived control (Oskamp, 1995). In other words, although indi-
viduals may have information and be concerned about current environmental
conditions, if they do not know what to do or they believe they can not change
the situation, they are unlikely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors.
Educational approaches aimed at changing people’s attitudes seem to be
effective in promoting behavior primarily when the behaviors are relatively sim-
ple and easy. When protecting the environment requires great effort or expense,
behaviors become unlikely unless interventions to reduce the external barriers
are present. For example, depositing cans in curbside recycling bins or altering
home thermostat settings, represent relatively simple and low-cost behaviors. As
indicated before, Oskamp (1995) reported that 40% of citizens indicated that
they were recycling when they had access to a curbside recycling program. This
number dropped to less than 10° when citizens did not have access to a recy-
cling program. Pelletier and Bellier (1999) observed similar results with citizens in
different cities, some who had access to curbside recycling and others who did
not. Interestingly, levels of recycling for individuals with curbside recycling
dropped considerably when they were away from their homes or, for some other
reason, did not have access to easy recycling. These results suggest that informa-
tion about a specific behavior like recycling may lead to a positive attitude toward
recycling and to more pro-environmental behaviors as long as these behaviors are
not too costly or there are no barriers present.

Incentives

Researchers have often relied on incentives (or reinforcements) as a strategy

for promoting pro-environmental behaviors (see Dwyer, Leeming, Cobern,
Porter, & Jackson, 1993, or Geller, 1989, for literature reviews). Creating incen-
tives is usually perceived as a powerful approach. Incentives can reduce the cost
or the effort involved in following one’s pro-environmental attitudes, and they can
also make it attractive for a person who lacks such attitudes to engage in pro-envi-
ronmental behaviors (e.g., to gain money for recycling tin cans). In addition,
incentives can create barriers to actions that harm the environment (e.g., an
increase in the cost of gasoline can be an incentive not to buy gas guzzling vehi-
cles). According to this approach, because behavior is strongly dependent on the
incentive structure, using incentives is an effective way to change behavior. But,
do incentives really work?
210 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Incentives seem to be most effective when aimed at organizations and deci-

sion makers. Such was the case when the increasing financial and political costs
of waste disposal in landfills changed the incentives for the managers of munici-
pal waste disposal programs and led many cities to sponsor recycling programs
and other initiatives that made it easier for individuals to recycle. In most cir-
cumstances, incentives aimed at the general public have been less successful and
have failed when significant barriers to action are part of a larger social system.
For example, it is hard to conceive of incentives that would greatly reduce peo-
ple’s use of their automobiles. The geography of North American homes, work-
places, and shopping makes the shift to public transportation very inconvenient
and time-consuming (Everett & Watson, 1987). Under some conditions, incen-
tives can also have unintended consequences that are experienced as punishment
(Gardner & Stern, 1996). For example, price increases for energy force low-
income people to make hard choices between heating their homes in winter and
buying food or clothing.
Incentives can lead to short-terms effects, but they can lose their appeal over
time, making them inadequate for instilling long-term change (Geller, Winett, &
Everett, 1982; Katzev & Johnson, 1984: Winett, Leckliter, Chinn, Stahl, & Love,
1985; Witmer & Geller, 1976). Several researchers (e.g, Aronson & Gonzales,
1990; DeYoung, 1986; Wang & Katzev, 1990; Witmer & Geller, 1976) observed
that when incentives were discontinued responsible environmental behaviors
returned to baseline levels. It seems that even when rewards do promote envi-
ronmental behaviors, these behaviors persist only as long as the reward contin-
gencies remain in effect.
In sum, research on environmental behaviors has typically examined
whether educational programs designed to influence specific attitudes like envi-
ronmental concern or satisfaction, as well as providing information about the
current conditions of the environment, about health risks, or about the effect of
specific behaviors, were related to pro-environmental behaviors. Although some
of these variables did predict the target behaviors, individuals’ levels of satisfac-
tion or concern with the current environmental conditions appear not to be suf-
ficient for action. Individuals must also believe that they know what to do and
that their action can change the situation, otherwise they are unlikely to engage
in pro-environmental behaviors. However, even though individuals feel that it is
important to do something and they know what to do, the strategies that aim at
changing people’s attitudes and behaviors seem to be effective mainly with rela-
tively simple or easy behaviors. When behaviors become more difficult or costly,
the association between environmental attitudes, knowledge, and pro-environ-
mental behaviors is considerably reduced.
As a complement to this first general strategy, many researchers have pro-
posed using incentives to make it more attractive for people to engage in pro-
environmental behaviors, to reduce the cost or effort involved in such behaviors,
or to make the behaviors less difficult by removing some of the barriers for
 Motivation Toward the Environment Dalal

action. ‘These strategies also have some serious limitations. First, it is not always
possible to eliminate barriers when these barriers are part of the social system.
Second, eliminating barriers (and using incentives) can be costly and difficult to
maintain. Third, incentives can lead to short-term effects but lose their appeal
over time. Fourth, they can promote target behaviors only as long as they are
given to reinforce these behaviors; if they are discontinued, the behaviors
returned to baseline levels. Overall, incentives can be successful on a short-term
basis but are inadequate to instill much long-term change.

Self-Determination for Pro-Environmental Behaviors

In an attempt to address environmental problems and the threat to a sus-

tainable future, the study of intrinsic motivation and self-determination was pro-
posed as a means to gain insight into the regulation of enduring environmental
behaviors (DeYoung, 1986; Pelletier, Tuson, Green-Demers, Noels, & Beaton,
1998). As a theoretical model, self-determination theory has received empirical
support in a number of life domains such as education, interpersonal relation-
ships, work, health, leisure, sports, and psychotherapy. In these various domains,
SDT has been successfully employed to predict a variety of behaviors. Research
has also isolated various antecedent variables that foster versus hinder self-deter-
mination. Thus, by examining similar antecedents in the environmental domain,
it may be possible to specify ways of enhancing self-determination for pro-envi-
ronmental behaviors and behavioral outcomes.
As a first step, such a program of research required a valid instrument to
assess the full range of motives liable to underlie environmental actions. On the
basis of SDT, we developed a new measure to assess motivation for pro-environ-
mental behaviors, with one version for English-speaking populations, “The
Motivation Towards the Environment Scale” (MTES; Pelletier et al., 1998) and
one for French-speaking populations “l’Echelle de Motivation vis-a-vis les
Comportements Ecologiques” (EMCE; Green-Demers, Pelletier, & Legault, in
press; Pelletier, Green-Demers, & Béland, 1997). By creating an instrument
designed to assess the different types of motivation proposed by Deci and Ryan,
we were hoping to lay the foundation for the study of self-determination for pro-
environmental behaviors.

Why Are You Doing Things for the Environment?

The MTES comprises 24 items, distributed within 6 subscales (intrinsic

motivation, extrinsic motivation in the form of integrated, identified, introjected,
212 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

and external regulation, and amotivation). It thus measures the multiple types of
motivation that fall along the self-determination continuum (Deci & Ryan, 1985).
The items represent possible responses to the question, “Why are you doing
things for the environment?”
The articles relating the results of the initial assessment of the psychometric
properties of the MTES and EMCE offered encouraging support for the relia-
bility and validity of the scales. The MTES was constructed prior to the EMCE,
and its measurement characteristics were evaluated in the context of four inde-
pendent studies (Pelletier et al., 1998). Results of exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses with more than 1200 participants, revealed that the MTES dis-
played a sound six-factor solution. Its construct validity was further substantiated
by correlations with related environmental and psychological constructs (e.g.,
locus of control, perceived importance of environmental issues, and frequencies
of environmental behaviors). Test-retest correlations and internal consistency
values (Cronbach’s alpha) indicated that the subscale scores were reliable. The
French version, the EMCE, was created using the reversed parallel translation
procedure proposed by Vallerand (1989). Its properties were assessed in two inde-
pendent studies (Pelletier et al., 1997). The results of a confirmatory factor analy-
sis yielded a sound factorial structure that was similar to the MTES. Also, the
convergent validity of the scores of the EMCE subscales was supported by cor-
relations with pertinent constructs. The subscales’ scores exhibited adequate
internal consistency values and test-retest correlations.
The MTES and the EMCE were designed to be formally identical.
Nevertheless, given that respondents from different populations are likely to inter-
pret questionnaire items in different ways, the psychometric equivalency was also
assessed by testing for invariant factorial measurement across the English and
French linguistic groups. ‘The samples utilized in the development and validation
of the English and French versions of this scale were compared anew to assess
the replicability of the factorial structure of the MTES using the stringent test of
formal invariance. ‘The factor loadings and the factor covariance were generally
invariant, which argued in favor of the metric equivalence of the MTES and
EMCE. Finally, differences in latent means indicated that the English partici-
pants had higher intrinsic motivation, as well as higher integrated, identified, and
introjected regulation than did the French participants. English participants dis-
played lower levels of external regulation as well. No differences were found in
the latent means of the amotivation factor.
Research on the M'TES and EMCE has followed the same sequence of scale
development and validation procedures as those used in the domains of educa-
tion (Vallerand, Blais, Briére, & Pelletier, 1989; Vallerand, Pelletier, Blais, Briére,
Senécal, & Valli¢res, 1992, 1993) or sports (Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, Tuson,
Briere, & Blais, 1995). They have a sound factor structure and adequate levels of
internal consistency and temporal stability, and they are unrelated to social desir-
ability. As suggested by Vallerand (1997), scores on each of the six subscales can
 Motivation Toward the Environment 213

be used separately or they can be combined into a global self-determination

index (Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, & Vallerand, 1990; Grolnick & Ryan, 1987;
Vallerand & Bissonnette, 1992; Vallerand, Fortier & Guay, 1998). The use of dis-
tinct scores for each subscale could be useful, for example, to identify which type
of motivation is the best predictor of a specific pro-environmental behavior or to
assess the impact of changes in government environmental policy on specific
types of motivation. The use of a composite score obtained by giving weights to
the motivational subscales according to their respective placement on the self-
determination continuum, could be useful to identify individuals who are self-
determined or non self-determined toward the environment. Individuals with dif-
ferent motivational profiles combined with the presence or the absence of a spe-
cific environmental program could then be used in a quasi-experiment to assess
the impact of both individual differences and programs on a pro-environmental
behavior (e.g., recycling). A global score of self-determination can also be useful
when testing a parsimonious or integrative theoretical model that involves
antecedents and consequences of autonomous versus controlled motivation.
Finally, the intrinsic, integrated, and identified motivation subscales could be
regrouped to form a global score of autonomous motivation, and the introject-
ed, external regulation, and amotivation subscales could be regrouped to form a
global score of non-self-determined motivation (Elliot & Sheldon, 1998; Sheldon
& Elliot, 1998). The use of autonomous and controlled motivation could also be
useful for examining antecedents and consequences of these two types of moti-
vation, when one is interested in the concurrent relations of two global types of
motivation to different environmental outcomes such as the frequency of a spe-
cific pro-environmental behavior or its maintenance.
In sum, the MTES and the EMCE seem to demonstrate very acceptable lev-
els of reliability and validity. Because the constructs assessed by these scales can
be related to both antecedents and consequences, they are key variables for elab-
orating theoretical models that address the complex relations among perceptions
and concerns about the environment, types of motivation, and behaviors.

Motivation and Environmental Outcomes

Numerous studies have related the different types of motivation proposed by

SDT to various types of outcomes. The types of motivational fall along a con-
tinuum of self-determination so it has been hypothesized that the consequences
associated with the different types of motivation would vary as a function of their
implied level of self-determination. Specifically, highly self-determined motiva-
tional subtypes were expected to lead to positive psychological and behavioral
consequences. Conversely, low levels of self-determination were predicted to
relate to negative psychological and behavioral consequences. Several studies,
using different methodological strategies and performed in a variety of domains,
214 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

offer support for this proposition. For instance, self-determined motivation has
been associated with greater interest (Deci, 1992), more positive emotions (Briere
& Vallerand, 1990), higher psychological well-being (Pelletier et al., 1995), and
increased behavioral persistence (Vallerand, Fortier, & Guay, 1998; Vallerand &
Bissonnette, 1992). In the context of the environment, we have investigated how
the different types of motivation relate to specific pro-environmental behaviors
(such as recycling, conserving energy, and purchasing specific products) and envi-
ronmental activism. In addition, we have examined how the concept of self-
determination relates to behaviors that have been made more easily accessible,
behaviors for which barriers have been removed, and behaviors with different
levels of difficulty. We have also examined how the concept of self-determination
could play a role in people’s pro-active behaviors such as educating themselves
about environmental issues and searching for information about one of the most
reliable predictors of pro-environmental behaviors, perceptions of health risks.
Pro-environmental behavirs. Given that pro-environmental behaviors can
involve reusing products (e.g., the unused side of paper, paper or grocery bags,
jars and containers for storing things), recycling (e.g., newspapers, aluminum
cans, glass jars and bottles), purchasing environmentally friendly products (e.g.,
buying biodegradable products, items available in bulk, and products with less
packaging), or conserving energy and resources (e.g., water, electricity, fuels), how
do the different types of motivations assessed by our scales relate to these behav-
iors? Results indicate that self-determined motives (intrinsic motivation, inte-
grated regulation, and identified regulation) display the highest correlations with
the frequency of a variety of pro-environmental behaviors (Green-Demers,
Pelletier, & Ménard, 1997; Pelletier, et al., 1998; Pelletier, et al, 1997). The mag-
nitude of the correlations gradually decreases and becomes progressively more
negative as the motivational types become less self-determined (introjected and
external regulation, and amotivation). A similar pattern of results was observed
between types of motivation and other self-reported pro-environmental behav-
iors, like participants’ willingness to pay additional fees to sponsor a more inten-
sive recycling program and whether or not they belong to an environmental
group (Pelletier et al., 1998; Séguin, Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1999). Other studies
using a global self-determination index (Green-Demers, et al., 1997; Séguin,
Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1998, 1999; Pelletier, Green-Demers, & Béland, 1999;
Pelletier & ‘Tuson, 1999) indicated that high levels of self-determination toward
the environment lead to higher levels of pro-environmental behaviors. In sum,
like prior studies that have involved a great variety of behaviors in different life
domains, the relationships between the different types of motivation postulated
by SD'T and pro-environmental behaviors generally vary as a function of their
level of self-determination.
The difficulty of behavior. As mentioned before, environmentalists have pro-
posed providing incentives to prompt different behaviors or overcome barriers
(e.g., a pay-per-can refund system as an incentive to recycle) on reducing barriers
 Motivation Toward the Environment DANS)

directly by making the desired behaviors more accessible (e.g., providing a curb-
side recycling program) . A thoughtful analysis of some of these strategies led us
to believe, however, that they could have significant unintended consequences.
First, the incentives could undermine people’s initial motivation to act. Then,
people would act only for the incentive and would likely require increasingly
large incentives to maintain the behaviors they had done initially without incen-
tives or with only small ones (Katzev & Johnson, 1987; DeYoung, 1993). Second,
although direct strategies to reduce barriers have made some pro-environmental
behaviors less difficult, they have made other behaviors appear more difficult by
comparison. For example, individuals perceive recycling as easier when they have
access to curbside recycling, but that leads them to perceive recycling as even
more difficult when they are away from home and do not have easy access to
recycling. These ideas lead us to explore the role of motivation in the prediction
of pro-environmental behaviors of different difficulty levels and behaviors for
which barriers have been removed. Second, how we have examined self-deter-
mined individuals, when compared to non self-determined individuals, behave in
contexts where pro-environmental activities are easier versus more difficult.
Green-Demers et al. (1997) used the MTES along with self-reports of the
perceived difficulty of environmental behaviors and the extent to which partici-
pants do these behaviors in order to evaluate the perceived level of difficulty of
environmental behaviors as moderators of the relations between environmental
self-determination and the occurrence of environmental behaviors. Three types
of environmental behaviors were examined: Recycling, purchasing environmen-
tally friendly products, and educating oneself about what can be done for the
environment. It was hypothesized that the level of self-determination of environ-
mental motivation would significantly predict the occurrence of environmental
behaviors, and that the magnitude of the relationship between self-determination
and environmental behaviors would increase as the level of perceived difficulty of
the behaviors increased.
First, the authors established that the three groups of environmental behav-
iors differed significantly from one another in their perceived level of difficulty.
Second, they examined correlations between MTES’ motivational subtypes and
frequency of environmental behaviors observing that self-determined types of
motivation appeared to be stronger predictors of environmental behaviors as the
difficulty of the environmental behaviors increased. Third, they examined
whether the frequency of environmental behaviors was affected by the level of
difficulty, the level of self-determination, and the additive combination of theses
factors, observing that frequency of behaviors was higher when self-determina-
tion was higher and lower when behavioral difficulty was higher. However, the
decrease in the frequency of behaviors caused by the behaviors’ difficulty was less
important when people were self-determined. Fourth, the relations between self-
determination and easy, moderate, and difficult behaviors were estimated using
structural equation modeling analyses. Results supported the proposed hypothe-
216 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ses. Self-determination was significantly related to environmental behaviors, and

the magnitude of this relation significantly increased with each level of difficulty
of the environmental behaviors (Green-Demers et al., 1997).
In a second study, Pelletier and Bellier (1999) examined the impact of the
degree of self-determination and three levels of difficulty for recycling behavior
on the amount of recycling. The investigators also examined the effect of self-
determination and difficulty on the frequency of other environmental behaviors
and on the strength of environmental attitudes (e.g., satisfaction with the envi-
ronment, importance of the environment). Residents of three municipalities were
randomly selected to participate in a survey on pro-environmental behaviors. In
one of the municipalities, residents had access to curbside recycling (easy recy-
cling). In the second municipality, residents had access to a recycling program,
but had to carry their recyclables to one of the local municipal depots (moderate
recycling). In the third municipality, residents did not have access to local munic-
ipal recycling, but could dispose of their recyclables by driving 20 minutes to the
next municipality that had a recycling program (difficult recycling). Results
revealed an interaction between the level of difficulty of recycling and the level
of self-determination. For the easy recycling condition, the quantity of recycling
was not significantly different for self-determined and non self-determined indi-
viduals. However, for the moderate condition, the amount of recycling for self-
determined and non self-determined individuals became significantly different,
although both groups recycled less than participants in the easy condition. In the
difficult condition, the amount of recycling was also significantly different for self-
determined and non self-determined individuals.
In other analyses, the authors compared the frequency of other pro-envi-
ronmental behaviors and residents’ environmental attitudes as a function of the
level of difficulty of recycling and residents’ levels of self-determination. Analyses
revealed only a main effect for the level of self-determination. Self-determined
residents in the three municipalities indicated higher frequencies for the other
pro-environmental behaviors than nonself-determined residents. Apparently,
making recycling easier or accessible did not have a transferable effect on other
pro-environmental activities. Examination of the effects of self-determination
and difficulty on perception of satisfaction with the environmental conditions,
satisfaction with government environmental policy, and the importance of the
environment, also revealed similar patterns. Self-determined residents indicated
that they were less satisfied with the current environmental conditions and the
government environmental policy, and that they considered the ecological situa-
tion more important than nonself-determined individuals. ‘These perceptions did
not differ significantly as a function of the level of difficulty of recycling behav-
lors across the three settings (Pelletier & Bellier, 1999),
These studies suggest that pro-environmental behaviors could be encour-
aged by either making recycling easier or by fostering people’s self-determination
with respect to the environment. Although it is possible to decrease the difficulty
 Motivation Toward the Environment Da,

of an environmental behavior and thereby increase its occurrence, programs like

curbside recycling could be costly to implement and could become costly to
maintain. Moreover, it seems that this type of program does not necessarily
increase people’s awareness or concern toward the environment. As a conse-
quence, there is no guarantee that the behavior will be maintained if the program
is discontinued, or if the person is on holiday or away from home. On the other
hand, behaviors performed for self-determined reasons do seem to have a better
chance of becoming more frequent and being maintained once they have been
developed. As the behaviors become more integrated in the person’s self-system
and lifestyle, the negative impact of the behavior’s perceived difficulty should
diminish. It is difficult at this point in time to speculate on how to facilitate or
develop self-determination toward the environment and how expensive it would
be to do so. First, it is necessary to examine the antecedent conditions that pro-
mote different levels of self-determination for the environment, an issue that will
be addressed later on in the chapter.
The perception of health risks. As noted earlier, one class of specific determinants
of pro-environmental behaviors that has received some attention and has
appeared to be an important predictor of environmental behaviors, is percep-
tions of health risks. Research on perceptions of health risks developed largely in
reaction to the way the concept of health risks had been treated by risk managers
such engineers and by politicians (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). ‘Those
groups tend to equate the risk of a technology (such as a nuclear power plant or
the release of chemicals in the air by an industry) with the probable number of
human deaths the technology can directly or indirectly cause. Damage to ecosys-
tems and to nonhuman life is usually overlooked. A technology is judged accept-
able to society based on whether the technology’s benefits (e.g., the electricity
generated), usually measured in dollars, outweigh the risks for human life and the
costs associated with the management of the industry. If the benefits exceed the
risks and the costs, the technology is perceived as relatively acceptable to society.
If not, it is expected that stricter government regulations (or in some cases, indus-
try self-regulations) will lower risk enough for the technology to be acceptable.
In contrast, perceptions of health risks in the general public, while also influ-
enced by the number of human deaths a technology can cause, are based on a
broader definition of risk. Among the characteristics to which the public also
pays attention are the degree of disagreement in the scientific community about
the risks of the technology, the degree to which the technology can kill many peo-
ple in a single accident or can affect future generations, how the technology
affects quality of life, what damage it causes to ecosystems and nonhuman forms
of life, and whether the risks are equitably and voluntarily distributed among
those who reap its benefits (Gardner & Stern, 1996). The differences between the
definitions of risks and acceptability used by the public versus the government
and industry can lead to significant mistrust or miscommunication among the dif-
ferent groups. The differences in definition can, for example, lead government
218 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

and industry to view the public as alarmist and, at the same time, lead the pub-
lic to view government and industry as untrustworthy and driven only by finan-
cial factors.
Individuals’ perceptions of health risks have been found to be affected by the
specific information about health risks they obtain from the media, government
agencies, activist organizations, public groups, or peers (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic,
Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson, & Ratick, 1988; Renn, Burns, Kasperson,
Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992). In addition, these researchers have suggested that the
characteristics of the sources of information (e.g., frequency of information
given, trustworthiness, credibility, impartiality) could either amplify or attenuate
the perceptions of environmental health risks and consequently lead to either
more or less pro-environmental behavior. The more confidence people have in a
particular source of information on environmental health risks, the more they
should perceive health risks in the environment and the more they should mani-
fest pro-environmental behaviors.
Self-determination, health nsks, and behavior. Séguin, Pelletier, and Hunsley (1998)
tested a model of environmental activism in which the contributions of self-
determination for the environment and perceptions of various environmental
health risks were specified. Data were obtained from a survey mailed to 750 res-
idents of Eastern Ontario. Participants completed the MTES, as well as meas-
ures of perceptions of problems in the local environment, perceptions of health
risks related to the environmental conditions, information they were obtaining
from different sources (e.g., university scientists, medical doctors, environmental
groups, government officials), and their perceptions of the level of responsibility
of various organizations (e.g., municipal or provincial government, private indus-
try) for preventing health risks. The level of activism was measured by a 6-item
scale representing behaviors related to environmental activism (e.g., participation
in events organized by ecological groups, financial support to these groups, cir-
culation of petitions, writing letters to industries that manufacture harmful prod-
ucts). ‘he model was tested by means of recursive path analyses.
The authors observed that the more individuals were self-determined toward
the environment, the more they were attentive to information about health risks,
to problems in their local environment, and to the responsibility of different
organizations to prevent health risks. In turn, the more individuals were sensitive
to information about environmental health risks and were aware of possible
problems in their local environments, the higher was their level of perceived
health risks. Interestingly, the more individuals perceived that various organiza-
tions had responsibilities to prevent health risks in the environment, the higher
were their perceptions of risks to their health (an issue that is discussed in more
detail in the next section). Finally, the more individuals perceived health risks in
the environment, the more they indicated being engaged in environmental
activism.
An important aspect of these findings pertains to the role of self-determined
motivation as a factor leading individuals to be more proactive and to seek out
 Motivation Toward the Environment 219

information on environmental health risks, the condition of their local environ-

ment, and the organizations responsible to prevent health risks in the environ-
ment. ‘These results suggest that self-determined motivation may represent more
than a reliable predictor of pro-environmental behaviors. Self-determined moti-
vation may also be a predictor of the processes leading individuals to be more
active toward their environment and to take steps to prevent damage to their
health or the environment (Séguin et al., 1998).
In a second study Séguin et al. (1999) tested a more elaborate model of the
relations among motivation toward the environment, perceptions of health risks,
the origin of the information on health risks, and pro-environmental behaviors.
Participants completed a survey about their perceptions of more than 20 envi-
ronmental health risks, the extent to which they were seeking information on
health risks from different sources, their levels of confidence in these sources, the
MTES, and the frequency of pro-environmental behaviors.
The sources of information on health risks included federal government
agencies, provincial governments, public interest groups, environmental groups,
the media, and industry. Past research had shown that people have much more
confidence in environmentalists, public groups, or scientists as information
sources on environmental health risks than they do in municipal or provincial
governments (i.e., regional governments), or media sources (Ostman & Parker,
1986; Soden, 1995). Federal government agencies such as Health and Welfare
Canada, are usually more trusted as sources of information on environmental
health hazards than are regional governments. These varying degrees of confi-
dence in different sources of information could be related to the type of infor-
mation given, the particular mandate of each one of those sources, and how suc-
cessful they are at fulfilling their respective mandate. For example, environmen-
tal groups ordinarily have the mandate to produce and disseminate information
about the possible and actual environmental health risks (Soden, 1995). Federal
government agencies, such as Environment Canada or Health and Welfare
Canada, ordinarily have the mandate to inform people about how to deal with
possible environmental health hazards (Soden, 1995). Regional governments
ordinarily have the mandate to prevent environmental health risks. Whereas the
first two sources of information on environmental health risks are usually able to
fulfill their mandate, it is often believed that regional governments do not always
fulfill their obligation toward public safety and health. Over time, regional gov-
ernments have tended to lose the trust of the public, perhaps because they have
not been able to deal effectively with environmental issues, even if they routine-
ly express a strong commitment toward risk communication and prevention
(Chess & Salomone, 1992; Soden, 1995). Because of the different degrees of trust
in various government agencies and public groups, information from regional
governments was not expected to be strongly associated with perceived environ-
mental health risks, whereas information from federal government agencies and
public groups was expected to be more strongly associated with perceived envi-
ronmental health risks.
220 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Séguin et al. (1999) observed that self-determination toward the environ-

ment was a significant predictor of both environmental behaviors and the seek-
ing of information on environmental health risks. More specifically, self-determi-
nation toward the environment was associated with the amount of information
individuals obtained from various sources of information on health risks (federal
government agencies, regional governments, and public groups), and the amount
of information people received was positively associated with their confidence in
these sources of information. In turn, the level of confidence in the different
sources of information was a significant predictor of individuals’ perceptions of
environmental health risks and these perceptions were predictors of environ-
mental behaviors. Because of the possible lack of confidence individuals had in
regional governments and industry as a source of information on health risks,
these two sources of information did not predict the level of perceived health
risks and consequently did not contribute to the prediction of pro-environmental
behaviors. One final note, self-determination toward the environment was a
much stronger predictor of pro-environmental behaviors than perceptions of
health risks (twice as strong) even after controlling for the effect of motivation on
the search for information on health risks.
In sum, the results of our studies reveal that people are not only engaging in
pro-environmental behaviors for different reasons, but it appears that these rea-
sons (used individually or globally as an index of people’s levels of self-determi-
nation) are related to various consequences. Consistent with self-determination
theory, the more individuals indicate that they are self-determined toward the
environment, the more they engage in pro-environmental behaviors, mild
activism, and more difficult behaviors, and the more they seek out information
about health risks. ‘Thus, our studies seem to indicate that self-determination rep-
resents a useful predictor of pro-environmental behaviors. Given the conse-
quences linked to a more self-determined profile of motivation, it becomes
worthwhile to investigate possible factors that could either enhance or possibly
impair the development of this motivational orientation. In the next section, we
turn our attention to studies that have examined the determinants of environ-
mental motivation.

Social and Contextual Influences on Motivation

Studies on social and contextual factors in the environmental domain have

typically examined how strategies for providing specific knowledge and affecting
people’s attitudes about the environment (e.g., satisfaction, importance, concern,
or other perceptions about the environment) are associated with their pro-envi-
ronmental behaviors. In most of these studies, motivation was not directly meas-
ured but was inferred from participants’ behaviors. Participants were considered
motivated if the frequency or the intensity of their behaviors increased in the
 Motivation Toward the Environment 2

presence of the social or contextual factor. Although, it may be acceptable to

infer motivation in some circumstances, it is nevertheless important to distinguish
whether motivated actions are self-determined or are controlled by some inter-
personal or intrapersonal force. As discussed earlier, the important point about
this distinction is that the regulatory processes of these types of motivations are
different, so qualities of behavior such as maintenance, persistence, or integration
in one’s lifestyle, are expected to be different. In our research, we focused on
strategies for providing knowledge and influencing attitudes about the environ-
ment to examine how these typical factors used in environmental research might
be related to environmental self-determination.
We were also interested in how aspects of the social context, such as the
behavior of others, facilitate a person’s perceptions of competence, autonomy,
and relatedness. According to self-determination theory, these factors are impor-
tant because they relate to fundamental human needs that individuals seek to sat-
isfy. When social or interpersonal behaviors of others are perceived to provide
structure and foster competence, people will tend to experience a sense of inter-
acting effectively with the environment and efficiently producing desired out-
comes and preventing undesired events. When individuals experience others as
providing support for their autonomy, they will tend to engage in activities of
their own choosing and they will experience being the origin of their action.
Finally, when they perceive others in their social context as being concerned and
interested in them, they feel a greater sense of connectedness to others. In turn,
when people experience satisfaction of these three needs, their intrinsic motiva-
tion and self-determined forms of motivation will be enhanced.
With respect to the environment, critical social-contextual factors include
not only organizational behaviors, such as the government’s approach to imple-
mentation of environmental programs and strategies, but also the behaviors of
people in a relatively close social environment (e.g., a spouse, friends, children,
educators) that could represent a daily source of influence on motivation towards
pro-environmental behaviors. The study of these behaviors could have interest-
ing implications for prediction of self-determination for pro-environmental
behaviors, for understanding the interpersonal as well as global factors (e.g. gov-
ernment regulations) that could foster self-determination, and for determining
the best strategies that could be used to implement government environmental
policies.
Influencing people’s attitudes and beliefs about the environment. As discussed earlier,
strategies targeting people’s attitudes and beliefs about the environment usually
involve both providing knowledge about the seriousness of the situation as a rea-
son or motivation for becoming involved and outlining specific actions that indi-
viduals can take to help solve the problem. Describing the nature and the sever-
ity of a problem in an informational, nonpressuring way may make people more
conscious about the situation and affects their environmental attitudes or beliefs.
Similarly, providing information about specific actions to solve a problem can fos-
Pe, HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ter a sense of competence in individuals. As a consequence, the individuals are

expected to become more involved in pro-environmental behaviors. However, lit-
tle attention has been paid to developing the indicators of residents’ perceptions
of the degradation of ecosystems and their perceptions of environmental quali-
ty, which would be necessary for examining these issues empirically. As we will see
below, these indicators can represent an assessment of individuals’ concern about
the environment, their willingness to change their environmental behaviors,
and/or the extent to which they feel helpless or hopeless about their abilities to
have a positive impact on the environment (Cone & Hayes, 1980). In other words,
they can represent important determinants of individuals’ motivation.
To examine these issues, we surveyed more than 2,000 adult residents of dif-
ferent municipalities in Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec (Pelletier, Hunsley,
Green-Demers, & Legault, 1996). Participants completed surveys designed to
assess a broad spectrum of environmentally relevant variables, ranging from their
satisfaction with their local environment to their perceptions of government poli-
cies dealing with the environment. In particular, we focused on critical variables
such as priorities for environmental planning, environmental concerns, percep-
tions of health risks, satisfaction with the environment and with environmental
policies, and views of government policies. Our main goals for the surveys were
(1) to determine, among various populations, perceptions of the current environ-
mental quality (including water, land, and air), the perceived importance of
regional environmental resources (e.g., rivers, lakes, forests), and the level of sat-
isfaction with environmental policies and practices; (2) to relate these perceptions
to motivation for pro-environmental behaviors and to the extent to which indi-
viduals adopt behaviors for environmental protection; and (3) to use the data to
begin identifying priorities for public policy, both in terms of the nature of the
policies and the manner in which such policies could be implemented (a subject
that will not be discussed here).
Considering our results (Pelletier, Hunsley, et al., 1996), it was abundantly
clear that the participants were very concerned about the health of the environ-
ment in which they live and work. Participants felt that addressing significant
environmental issues should be a priority. As reflected by measures of
“Importance of Environmental Issues” and “Satisfaction with Local
Environmental Conditions” (Pelletier, Blanchard, & Legault, 1996; Pelletier,
Legault, & ‘Tuson, 1996) participants indicated that they considered it important
to do something about the current local environmental situation and that they
were very dissatisfied with the current state of the environment. Importantly, our
data also suggested that survey participants were committed to improving their
environment and that they felt they do indeed possess some of the requisite abil-
ities for rehabilitating their ecosystem. Residents reported that they felt they could
contribute to the improvement of their environment and that they were taking a
number of meaningful steps to do so. Air and water pollution from industries
were rated as the two most important environmental issues. Participants were
 Motivation Toward the Environment DDS

very concerned about the impact of such pollution on the quality of their drink-
ing water, the contamination of game fish, and the advisability of using local
streams and rivers for leisure activities.
Survey respondents rated the extent to which they were concerned about 21
different potential environmentally related health risks. Perhaps reflecting recent
and ongoing government information campaigns, residents rated the depletion of
the ozone layer and chemical pollution in the environment as the most important
health risks. Risks from nuclear wastes and from nuclear power plants were
ranked in ninth and sixteenth positions, respectively. As nuclear energy hazards
are usually perceived as the number one environmental hazard by the general
population (Slovic, 1993), it is informative to examine the potential health risks
that received higher rankings from the participants. Consistent with ratings of
concern about local environmental issues, industrial and agricultural pollution
(for example, mercury in fish, PCBs, pesticides in food) were perceived as greater
risks to health than were nuclear wastes (Pelletier, Hunsley, et al., 1996).
Pelletier and Tuson (1999) used structural equation modeling to examine
how citizens’ levels of satisfaction about environmental conditions and govern-
ment environmental policies, competence for environmental behaviors, and con-
cern about the environment, related to motivation towards pro-environmental
behaviors, and, in turn, the frequency of these behaviors. It was hypothesized
that self-determination for pro-environmental behaviors would mediate the rela-
tionships between the antecedent variables and the frequency of pro-environ-
mental behaviors. Results supported the hypothesized model. The more people
were dissatisfied with the environmental conditions and with government envi-
ronmental policies, and the more they felt competent towards environmental
behaviors, the more they were concerned about the environment. Higher levels of
concern and competence were associated with higher levels of self-determination
for environmental behaviors, which in turn, were associated with higher levels of
pro-environmental behaviors (recycling, conserving energy, purchasing environ-
mentally-friendly products, searching for information on the environment).
A central aspect of this study—an aspect typically neglected in empirical
work linking concern about the environment to pro-environmental behaviors—
was the mediational role of self-determination. As predicted, self-determined
motivation was the mediating mechanism responsible for the relations between
two environmental antecedents, namely concern and competence, and pro-envi-
ronmental behaviors. Most of the contemporary research on motivation for pro-
environmental behaviors has proposed that individuals are expected to become
more involved in pro-environmental behaviors as a result of the combined effect
of being aware of the severity of the environmental situation and the develop-
ment of a sense of competence for specific actions that could solve a problem.
The study by Pelletier and Tuson (1999), however, indicates that when self-deter-
mined motivation is considered, it serves the role of proximal mediator of the
relationship between these two antecedent variables and pro-environmental
224 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

behaviors. In other words, the combined effect of environmental concern and

competence does not necessarily lead to more pro-environmental behaviors.
They may be indirectly associated with pro-environmental behaviors because
they promote self-determined motivation toward the environment.
Support for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Deci and Ryan (1991) contend
that people’s motivation and self-determination are affected by their perceived
levels of competence and agency. Events that boost these feelings are hypothe-
sized to lead to gains in self-determination, while events that undermine these
feelings are expected to thwart self-determination. Substantial research results
support these theoretical postulates (see Deci & Ryan, 1987, 1991, for reviews).
For example, the support of one’s autonomy, the provision of a rationale for
requested activities, and constructive feedback have all been associated with
increases in self-determination (Deci, Eghari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994; Deci &
Ryan, 1987). Conversely, threats, surveillance, and feedback that promote feelings
of incompetence have systematically been related to losses in self-determination
(Deci & Ryan, 1987). Of all social factors, interpersonal behaviors have been
among the most extensively studied. The term “interpersonal behaviors”
describes the quality of behavior of a significant other (parent, teacher, etc.) as it
affects the target person’s need satisfaction. Typically, this construct refers to an
interaction between two individuals. However, in the environmental domain, it
seemed plausible that people are in a position to react to messages coming from
two types of social contexts, one created by the immediate social surrounding
(e.g., family and friends) and the other by the government. It is hereby postulat-
ed that messages coming from an institution such as the government could be
perceived as supporting basic psychological needs and could have an impact on
people’s self-determination. We have examined both sources of influence.
Consider first the influence of government environmental policies.
Pelletier, Green-Demers, and Béland (1999) conducted two studies to exam-
ine how people’s perceptions of the government’s style of presenting policies
affect their motivation toward pro-environmental behaviors. In a first study the
researchers developed and validated a new scale (the Government Style
Questionnaire; GSQ) pertaining to the implementation of environmental pro-
grams and policies. ‘The GSQ measured three dimensions, namely autonomy
support of citizens by the government (e.g., “I feel that the government respects
the public’s opinion concerning environmental issues”), government’s use of
pressure and control regarding environmental issues (e.g., “I think the govern-
ment puts a lot of pressure on people and organizations to adopt pro-environ-
mental behaviors”), and informational support of citizens by the government
(“Information concerning what I can do to help the environment is easily acces-
sible through the programs provided by the government”). Results of the first
study supported the structure of the scale and its psychometric properties (inter-
nal consistency and construct validity).
In a second study, 270 residents of the Ottawa region completed a question-
naire containing the GSQ, the MTES, and measures of pro-environmental
 Motivation Toward the Environment 225

behaviors (the questionnaire also included measures of Social Political Control,

Social Criticism, Satisfaction toward the Environment and _ toward
Environmental Policies to further examine the construct validity of the GSQ).
The structure of the scale was verified using a confirmatory factor analysis and
the relations between the dimensions of the GSQ and the subscales of the MTES
were examined. It is interesting to note that the means of the three subscales of
the GSQ were relatively low (all below the middle point of the Likert scale).
Participants indicated that they perceived the government (and the government
policies) as noninformational and not very autonomy supportive. Interestingly,
participants also indicated that they perceived the government as not being very
controlling, especially toward industry. Perhaps not surprisingly, associations
between GSQ subscales and MTES subscales were quite low. The highest rela-
tions appeared between each of the GSQ subscales and external regulation.
However, relationships between MTES subscales and pro-environmental behav-
iors were strong and similar to the ones observed in prior studies. Briefly, it
appears that participants were making distinctions among three aspects of gov-
ernment style toward the environment, but they perceived the government as
being relatively low on all three communication styles. ‘This situation could be
characterized as “laissez-faire” or indifference, a type of climate, according to
Deci and Ryan (1985), that should not have a positive impact on motivation.
More research is needed to further establish the GSQ? validity and to determine
more clearly how government’s involvement (or indifference) affects citizens’
motivation.
In light of these findings, it became particularly relevant to expand our
examination of factors influencing the development and evolution of self-deter-
mined motivation for pro-environmental behaviors. In a next step, we turned our
attention to whether people’s perceptions of the interpersonal climate would
influence their environmental motivation (Pelletier, Legault, & Green-Demers,
1999). Because no scales were available, individuals from different backgrounds
were interviewed to create a pool of perceptions regarding the interpersonal cli-
mate likely to influence their environmental motivation and behaviors. These
perceptions were worded to reflect five dimensions (1) autonomy support, (2)
information, (3) pressure, (4) involvement, and (5) indifference. Then, subjects
were asked to evaluate the extent to which different categories of people (e.g.,
friends, professors, colleagues, children, relatives) influence them with respect to
the environment. Subjects were also asked to identify which category of people
had the highest impact on them in this respect and to refer to that group while
answering the items of the scale.
In two studies, a sample of 224 randomly selected residents of Eastern
Ontario and a second sample of 385 randomly selected residents of the Ottawa
region completed a mail survey that included the Interpersonal Climate Scale,
the MTES, the Environmental Satisfaction Scale, measures of perceived compe-
tence for environmental behaviors, perceived environmental importance, and fre-
quency of pro-environmental behaviors. Results with the first sample supported
226 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

the factor structure of the scale and revealed satisfactory levels of internal con-
sistency. The construct validity of the scale was supported by significant relations
between the different dimensions of the scale and relevant environmental (satis-
faction, importance, competence) and behavioral variables, as well as motiva-
tional subtypes. Specifically, while the positive dimensions of social climate
(involvement, information, autonomy support) displayed higher correlations with
self-determined types of motivation, the negative dimensions of social climate
(indifference and pressure) were mostly correlated with the non self-determined
types of motivation (Pelletier, Legault, & Green-Demers, 1999).
The factorial structure obtained with the first sample was cross-validated
with the second sample using confirmatory factor analysis, thus, offering strong
support for the factorial structure of the Social Climate Scale. A structural equa-
tion model was also built to illustrate the relations between the dimensions of the
scale, the environmental constructs, and the self-determination index. Results
showed that involvement and autonomy support were positively related to self-
determination, though indirectly through the mediating action of importance
and competence respectively. Information was positively related to self-determi-
nation while pressure was negatively related to the same variable. Finally, indif-
ference was directly and negatively related to self-determination, as well as posi-
tively related to satisfaction with the current state of the environment which was
in turn negatively related to self-determination. In sum, contrary to the first study
on the relations between government style for the regulation of environmental
polices and motivation for pro-environmental behaviors, the second study on the
relationships between the interpersonal climate of close associates and motiva-
tion indicated that people’s motivation for pro-environmental behaviors was
affected by the ways individuals around them express concern about the envi-
ronment.
Interestingly, results with both samples indicated that children represented
the most important source of influence on participants’ motivation (followed by
spouses and friends). In a recent study, Legault and Pelletier (2000) hypothesized
that children, especially children who were involved in schools where environ-
mental studies were included in the curriculum, would be more informed, more
conscious about the environmental situation, and more involved. As a conse-
quence, the members of their families should become more aware of the situa-
tion and more involved. Results showed that the more children were involved in
an environmental education program, the more family members were getting
information and were aware of the environmental situation, and the less satisfied
they were with the environmental condition. As a consequence, they indicated
being more involved in some pro-environmental behaviors (like recycling and
conserving energy) and having lower levels of non self-determined motives.
Although these initial results on the influence of the social climate on peo-
ple’s environmental motivation are exploratory, they are encouraging. It seems
that people in one’s social network (in comparison with government’s influence)
 Motivation Toward the Environment 220i,

represent the principal source of influence on one’s attitudes and behaviors.

Thus, it might be profitable to take social climate into account in the promotion
of pro-environmental behaviors. Additional research is necessary to further vali-
date the current findings and to expand them. It is our hope that the study of the
influence of social climate on people’s environmental motivation will yield
insights regarding the processes by which pro-environmental attitudes and behav-
iors can be promoted. One strategy in particular, the possibility of including
environmental issues in school curricula, represents a promising way to sensitize
individuals to environmental issues. It represents not only an indirect source of
influence on adults’ motivation and behavior, but also a way to develop environ-
mental behaviors that could be integrated into the lifestyle of young individuals.
In this way, it could help promote a sustainable future.

Conclusion

The integration of environmentally responsible behaviors into people’s

lifestyle represents an important issue for the preservation of the environment
and the promotion of a sustainable future. Self-determination theory offers an
interesting framework for understanding the social factors that could lead to or
interfere with such behaviors. The purpose of this chapter was to review the
results of a program of research that focused on the application of SDT to envi-
ronmentally responsible behaviors. Research supports the validity of a scale
designed to measure individuals’ motivation for environmental behaviors.
Consistent with SDT, the different forms of motivation fall along a self-determi-
nation continuum and the level of self-determination of environmental motiva-
tion predicts the occurrence of a variety of outcomes (recycling, conservation of
energy, environmental activism, search for information about health risks) and
behaviors of different difficulty levels. We have examined how different
antecedent variables (e.g., satisfaction with the environment, perceived compe-
tence, family, friends, children, and government policies) predicted levels of self-
determination. It appears that self-determination represents an important medi-
ational variable between people’s satisfaction, importance, and perceived compe-
tence toward the environment and pro-environmental behaviors. The use of reg-
ulations by the government to implement environmental policies seems to
encourage mainly non self-determined forms of motivation. However, people
around us (especially children and spouses) represent the main sources of influ-
ence on individuals’ motivation for pro-environmental behaviors. The education
of children, and in particular the development of environmental education pro-
grams, may be critical for the future. By using the school system to educate our
children about environmental issues we may instill in them pro-environmental
228 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

behaviors that will become part of their lifestyle. We may also create hundreds of
thousand of pro-environmentalists or activists who could take important infor-
mation into their homes. These children may then become a critical source of
information for other members of the family.
An important limitation of the studies described in this chapter concerns
their correlational nature. Although structural equation modeling and path
analyses indicated that our data supported models consistent with SDT, experi-
mental methodologies are required to demonstrate causality. Future research
should aim to identify strategies that could foster self-determination towards envi-
ronmental behaviors. Such research could be guided by the growing body of
research addressing the determinants of motivational orientations such as the
degree to which friends, relatives, or policy-makers encourage people to initiate
and make their own choices rather than apply pressure to control their behavior,
or the degree to which they provide constructive feedback about people’s com-
petence. Along these lines, research on management and conservation behaviors
could examine how helping people understand the nature of environmental
problems, as opposed to using coercive techniques (e.g. social pressure, punish-
ment, or taxes), might help them to carry out these environmental behaviors.
The MTES could also be used at different points in time in order to better
understand the motivational changes produced by the provision of new govern-
ment policies, and by varying the ways these policies are implemented. In a first
step, the effects on self-determination of different governmental strategies (e.g.,
relying on material incentives or social pressure, versus providing choices or more
information on how to behave) could be assessed. In a second step, changes in
self-determination levels could be examined as a function of the different strate-
gies used and could be linked to the integration and maintenance of environ-
mental behaviors into people’s lifestyles. Further research on these issues is need-
ed to augment our knowledge of the relations between motivational orientations
and the maintenance of environmental behaviors.
In sum, self-determination theory holds some interesting possibilities for
applied interventions concerning the environment. It is our hope that the pro-
gram of research on the promotion versus inhibition of autonomous motives for
the environment will contribute to a better understanding of the interaction
between real-life environments, motivation, and the integration of environmen-
tally-conscious behaviors into people’s lifestyles.

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11: Improving Patients’ Health Through Supporting the
Autonomy of Patients and Providers

Geoffrey C. Williams
Unwersity of Rochester

“Diseases are of two types: those we develop inadvertently, and those we bring on
ourselves by failure to practice preventwe measures. Preventable illness makes up
approximately 70% of the burden of illness and associated costs.”
C. E. Koop (1995)

Strengths of the U.S. health-care system have resulted largely from biomedical
research leading to development of effective treatments for acute diseases and
from epidemiological research leading to identification of the risks and benefits
of health-related behaviors. These strengths, however, also reveal the weakness of
the health-care system, as alluded to by Koop (1995). Specifically, because the
focus has been on dramatic interventions for diseases developed inadvertently
and on end-stage treatment of diseases that resulted from unhealthy behavior,
remarkably little attention has been given to preventive health-care and to facili-
tating change of the high-risk behaviors, such as smoking, eating unhealthy diets,
not exercising, and excessive drinking, that lead to or exacerbate disease.
To understand the magnitude of the problem, consider that, of the roughly
two million American deaths in 1990, 860,000 were brought on by tobacco use,
diet and activity patterns, alcohol abuse, and preventable infections such as HIV
(McGinnis, & Foege, 1993). In other words, 43°% of American deaths during that
year were premature and resulted from people’s behaviors in these four domains.
In fact, the behavior of smoking was itself responsible for 19°% of all American
deaths. It seems that an amazing number of people are bringing about their own
morbidity and mortality by behaving in unhealthy ways.
A related problem that also troubles health-care practitioners is that many
people fail to adhere to medical regimens. A review of evidence suggests that
patients take an average of about 50% of their prescribed medication (Haynes,
McKibbon, & Kanani, 1996; Rudd, Byyny, Zachary, LoVerde, Mitchell, Titus, &
Marshal, 1988; Sackett & Snow, 1979; Stephenson, Rowe, Haynes, Macharia, &
234 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Leon, 1993) and that fully half of all patients who are prescribed medications for
two weeks or longer take a level of the medication that is below what is necessary
for it to be effective (Dwyer, Levy, & Menander, 1986; Epstein & Cluss, 1982).
Practitioners thus face a daunting challenge in dealing with patients con-
cerning how they behave—that is, taking their medications, refraining from
unhealthy behaviors such as smoking, engaging in healthy behaviors such as exer-
cising, undergoing preventive procedures such as screening mammography, and,
indeed, even showing up for scheduled medical appointments.
Clearly, having patients be more motivated to behave in ways that would
improve the length and quality of their lives would be of great benefit not only
to the patients themselves but also to the medical profession as a whole. However,
although the importance of patients’ behavior change is now widely understood,
there has until recently been relatively little research on the psychological process-
es through which healthy behavior change occurs and on the means through
which providers can facilitate these change processes. Furthermore, even the
research-based knowledge that is now available about facilitating behavior
change is seldom put into practice by clinicians as the health-care system remains
focused on treating patients’ acute illnesses. Thus, the problem resides not only in
patients’ lack of motivation for behaving healthily but also in the practitioners’
lack of motivation to attend to their patients’ ‘needs for prevention and chronic
disease management.
Consider the example of patients’ smoking. Research has identified clear
and beneficial counseling and pharmacologic interventions for promotion of
smoking cessation, yet studies indicate that the rate at which smokers are coun-
seled to quit by their physicians is below 30% (Thorndike, Rigotti, Stafford, &
Singer, 1998). Similarly, although effective treatment exist for coronary artery dis-
ease, well over half of post-MI (heart attack) patients do not use beta blockers
and aspirin and fail to reach the standards for cholesterol lowering (Pearson &
Peters, 1997). A comparable percentage of patients with hypertension fail to
reach the recommended blood pressure levels of 140/90 (Joint National
Committee on Prevention, 1997) in spite of the fact that there are effective treat-
ments that could be prescribed and could be carried out by the patients. These
dismal statistics, no doubt, are in part a function of the providers’ not being moti-
vated to address the issues adequately and in part a function of the patients’ not
being motivated to carry out the needed behavior change.
In sum, a clear gap exists between our collective knowledge of life enhanc-
ing and life extending treatments and the implementation of these treatments by
both providers and patients. Although some of this gap may be explained by lack
of physician knowledge, it is probable that much more of the problem lies iphysi-
cians’ not putting their knowledge into effective practice and by patients’ failing
to carry through with the treatment regimens that are recommended.
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support 235

Medical Education

In line with practice patterns, medical educators continue to focus on train-

ing practitioners to do dramatic interventions for acute diseases and virtually
ignore how practitioners could facilitate patients’ behaving in healthier ways. In
fact, just as relatively little research attention had, until recently, been given to
how providers can facilitate behavior change, even less has been given to how to
train providers to enact the methods that are increasingly being shown to be
effective in facilitating prevention and promoting change of high risk behaviors.
In this chapter, we use self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan
& Deci, 2000) to address the issues of how medical providers can facilitate
patients’ motivation to behave in healthier ways, and how medical educators can
facilitate the motivation of both future and current medical practitioners to
address the issues necessary to promote prevention and behavior change. The
focus of the chapter is on physicians’ reliable, self-directed implementation of
relevant knowledge using an interpersonal style that in turn increases the likeli-
hood of patients’ carrying out recommendations that could improve their health.

Self-Determination Theory

Self-determination theory (SDT), as noted in other chapters of this volume,

proposes that humans have three innate psychological needs—namely, those for
autonomy, competence, and relatedness to others. Autonomy is defined as the
degree to which individuals feel volitional and responsible for the initiation of
their behavior. Competence concerns the degree to which they feel able to
achieve their goals and desired outcomes. Relatedness is defined as the extent to
which they feel connected to others in a warm, positive, interpersonal manner.
The theory maintains that supports for these needs by the social environment will
enhance individuals’ psychological growth and adjustment, and both their men-
tal and physical health.
Central to SDT is the distinction between autonomous and controlled
behaviors, which are two types of motivated behaviors that involve different rea-
sons for behaving (Ryan & Connell, 1989). ‘To be autonomous means to act with
a full sense of volition and choice because the activity is interesting or personal-
ly important, whereas to be controlled means to act with the feeling of pressure
because of a coercive demand or a seductive offer. The theory suggests that peo-
ple will tend to be more autonomous, relative to controlled, when they experience
greater fulfillment of the three psychological needs.
The distinction between autonomous and controlled motivation represents a
continuum rather than a dichotomy, and as such any action can be characterized
in terms of the degree to which it is autonomous versus controlled. The degree
236 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

to which behaviors are autonomous is thus predicted to be a function of the

degree to which people are able to experience basic need satisfaction while
engaging in the behaviors. In the research herein reviewed, the focus is on the
extent to which people experience a specific behavior such as stopping smoking
or lowering their fat intake as being freely chosen (i.e., as being autonomous) ver-
sus being pressured by some interpersonal or intrapsychic force (i.e., being con-
trolled), and on the antecedents and consequences of those behaviors being more
autonomous versus controlled.

Autonomy Is Not Independence

Frequently, in discussion of patient autonomy, the concept of autonomy is

confused with that of independence. To be autonomous means to feel volitional
or willing to engage in a behavior, whereas to be independent means to act with-
out reference to or support from another (Ryan, 1993; Ryan & Lynch, 1989).
People would be autonomous in stopping smoking or undergoing angioplasty if
they did those actions with a sense of choice and personal endorsement. In mak-
ing a decision to change a behavior or undergo a procedure, patients often want
and need advice and support from their physicians; they seldom want to decide
or act in a wholly independent way. ‘Thus, being volitional does not necessarily
mean that people act independently of others—notably, of their providers—it
simply means that they experience a full sense of volition in proceeding with a
behavior or treatment.
Accordingly, for a provider to support patients’ autonomy does not mean
abandoning the patients to act or decide for themselves. Patients can be
autonomous while relying on their providers, and it is important for providers to
be sensitive to how much advice and support the patients want. As well as need-
ing to feel autonomous, people need to feel related to others, and patients’ feel-
ing related to and supported by their providers is an important element in the
patients’ feeling able to act autonomously. If providers abandon the patients,
while claiming to be supporting their autonomy, the providers are demanding
that the patients be independent and are failing to support the patients’ autono-
my. Similarly, in the realm of medical education, students typically want to feel
like they can rely on their instructors to support their autonomous learning.

Internalization: Becoming More Autonomous

According to SD'T, self-regulation develops and people become autonomous

through the processes of internalization. Internalization involves converting
external regulatory processes into internal regulatory processes (Schafer, 1968);
however, within SD'T there are two types of internalization, namely introjection
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support Dou

and integration. /nérgection is a kind of partial internalization in which regulations

are taken in by people but are not really accepted as their own. Integration, on the
other hand, is a much fuller internalization in which people identify with the
importance of the behavior and synthesize its regulatory process with other
aspects of their self. As such, they will have more fully accepted the regulation as
their own.
Through internalization, a patient or a student can take in regulations that
initially resided in the urgings of the patient’s doctor or the student’s teacher.
Insofar as the regulation is merely introjected, people will tend to use it to coerce
themselves into action—for example with threats of guilt or shame—and as such
the behavior will continue to be controlled even though the source of control is
now within the person. Thus, when the form of internalization is introjection, the
person will not be autonomous in carrying out the behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1991),
and so less persistence and less positive health-care outcomes are predicted. In
contrast, with integration, the person will be autonomous in carrying out the
behavior. Because the regulation has been integrated into individuals’ sense of
self, they will feel volitional in carrying out the behavior, so more positive out-
comes would be expected.
The phenomenon of initially external regulations being internalized occurs
in health-care all the time. Frequently, when patients get diagnosed with a com-
mon illness such as having an elevated cholesterol (hyperlipidemia), they demon-
strate little interest in performing appropriate behaviors like reducing their fat
intake, exercising regularly, losing weight if they are obese, or taking their med-
ication. Similar events occur around the diagnosis of heart disease and diabetes.
For better health outcomes, the patients must assume responsibility for these reg-
ulatory functions. Internalization is the general process through which that hap-
pens, and integration is the optimal form of internalization.
When the process of internalization fails altogether, it is likely that patients
will not even carry out the treatment behaviors and thus will experience
increased morbidity and mortality. As well, the health-care system will encounter
greater costs both in trying to get the patients to comply with the regimens and
in caring for them as they develop diseases such as strokes, renal failure, and
coronary artery disease.
In terms of medical education, internalization is in evidence as trainees’
learn about disease processes and corresponding treatment options. As these
treatments are presented to the students, if the students feel controlled in their
learning and carrying out the procedures, it is predicted that they will be less like-
ly to internalize the material and thus will be less likely to use it effectively.
Because the half-life of medical education (the time it takes for 50° of the cur-
rent treatment recommendations to become outdated) is estimated to be about 4
years, practicing physicians must regularly internalize new or changed treatments
into their everyday practice. Thus, internalization is an important process
throughout physicians’ careers, and if they have not begun the process effective-
238 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ly during medical training it is likely that they will continue to be less effective as
their careers progress.

Facilitating Internalization by Supporting Autonomy

Differentiating the autonomous versus controlled regulatory processes is

important, at least in part, because it is possible to identify factors in health-care
climates and learning climates that facilitate versus undermine internalization
and integration. More specifically, if climates support the fulfillment of patients’
or students’ basic needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness, those indi-
viduals will be more likely to internalize and integrate the material being pre-
sented. Treatment climates that are cold and controlling are predicted to result in
incomplete internalization of regulations, and thus in less maintained behavior
change, less health status improvement, and greater health-care costs. Similarly,
when learning climates are not supportive of the students’ needs, less internal-
ization of the important learnings is expected. In contrast, interpersonal envi-
ronments that support the patients’ and learners’ needs for autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness are predicted to facilitate greater internalization, resulting
in more behavior change and its maintenance, which in turn will lead to
improved health outcomes or learning outcomes.
The concept of autonomy support describes an interpersonal climate in which
authority figures such as physicians (or teachers) take the perspectives of the
patients (or students) into account, provide relevant information and opportuni-
ties for choice, and encourage the patients (or students) to accept more responsi-
bility for their health (or learning) behaviors. Autonomy support also entails prac-
titioners’ (or instructors) interacting more meaningfully with the patients (or stu-
dents) by asking what the patients (or students) want to achieve, listening and
encouraging questions, providing understandable and satisfying replies to the
patients’ (or students’) questions, and suspending judgement while soliciting the
opinions and histories of past behaviors. An autonomy supportive orientation
minimizes the use of pressure and control.
In contrast, practitioners who are more controlling tend to pressure their
patients with rewards, punishments, or judgmental evaluations. Because studies
have indicated that practitioners in traditional medical encounters tend to be
quite controlling (Beckman & Frankel, 1984; Kaplan, Greenfield, & Ware, 1989;
Marvel, Epstein, Flowers, & Beckman 1999), research on the effects of autono-
my supportive versus controlling health-care climates is highly pertinent.
Similarly, traditional medical education has been found to be highly controlling
(Becker, Geer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1966; Bosk, 1979; McMurray, Schwartz,
Genero, & Linzer, 1993), so past research concerning the effects of autonomy
supportive versus controlling learning environments at various levels of educa-
tion on students’ autonomous motivation to learn is also very important (Deci,
Ryan, & Williams, 1996; Reeve, Bolt, & Cai, 1999).
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support 239

Elements of autonomy support. A laboratory experiment by Deci, Eghrari,

Patrick, and Leone (1994) examined specific elements of an interpersonal con-
text that constitute autonomy support and thus facilitate internalization and inte-
gration. They isolated three important elements of supporting autonomy; name-
ly, providing a meaningful rationale for why a behavior is being recommended so
individuals will understand the personal importance of the activity for them-
selves; acknowledging people’s feelings and perspectives so they will feel under-
stood; and using an interpersonal style that emphasizes choice and minimizes
control so the individuals will not feel pressured to behave. Results of this exper-
iment indicated that the three facilitating factors lead to greater internalization
and integration. Although the experiment was not done in a medical setting, it
nonetheless suggests that when health-care practitioners and medical educators
acknowledge their patients’ or students’ perspectives, provide meaningful ratio-
nales for suggested behaviors, and provide choice while minimizing pressures and
controls, it is likely that patients and students will evidence greater internalization
and integration of pertinent regulations and feel more autonomous and compe-
tent in carrying them out.
Causality orientations. Although SDT emphasizes that the health-care (or edu-
cational) climate’s being autonomy supportive will facilitate autonomous motiva-
tion for specific health-care or educational behaviors, the theory also proposes
that enduring personality factors concerning people’s orientations toward causal-
ity (Deci & Ryan, 1985a) affect their autonomy with respect to the particular
behavior.
The autonomous causality orientation, assessed with the General Causality
Orientations Scale concerns people’s general tendency to orient toward autono-
my support in the social environment and to be more self-determined. This
involves being more aware of their own needs and feelings and experiencing a
greater sense of choice in the regulation of their behavior. Previous research has
shown that people high on the general autonomy orientation tend to be more
autonomous in enacting specific health-relevant and learning behaviors.

The Self-Determination Model

From the various propositions, an interesting picture begins to emerge for

medical education, a picture in which learning environments that are controlling
tend to produce practitioners who provide care for their patients in a controlling
manner, which is expected, in turn, to lead to less effective treatment. Pressures
and controls in the medical practice environment—for example, time and reim-
bursement demands—are expected also to further diminish practitioners feelings
of autonomy and their capacity to provide autonomy support for their patients.
In essence, this overall picture can be represented in two self-determination
models: one that relates providers’ interpersonal style to patients’ motivation,
behavior change, and health; and the other that relates medical educators’ inter-
240 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

personal style to students’ motivation for learning and subsequent treatment of

patients.
Figure 11-1 presents the elements of the SD'T health-care model, as it per-
tains to patients. Figure 11-2, which appears later in the chapter, presents the
model as it relates to providers acquiring effective practice techniques. The prac-
tical importance of this pair of models is that autonomous motivation in both
patients and providers is expected to yield long-term persistence for patients and
practitioners, repeated efforts to effect behavior change, and the energy necessary
to maintain behavior change long enough for important outcomes to accrue.

Provider Patient Autonomous

Autonomy Regulatory Style
Support is : pais Maintained
Healthy improved
Behaviors
-alcohol treatment Physical
“weight loss Health
Patient Patient ~exercise
-medication adherence
Autonomous Perceived -glucose control
Causality -not smoking
Orientation :

Figure 11.1. Self-Determination Model of Patients’ Motivation,

Behavior, and Health

Research on Aspects of the SDT Model

of Physical Health

During the past decade we have been engaged in a program of studies test-
ing various aspects of the self-determination model with respect to various
health-related behaviors. In each case, providers’ support for patients’ autonomy
has been related to autonomous motivation, and that in turn has been used to
predict patient behavior. In some of the studies, patients’ perceived competence
for the requisite behavior change has also been assessed because SDT proposes
that perceived competence, as well as autonomous motivation, is necessary for
effective behavior change. Also, in some studies, the relation between patient
behavior and specific physiological outcomes has been examined, and, in some,
patients’ general autonomy orientation has been used as a predictor of
autonomous motivation for the target behavior.
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support eh

We have tested the general hypothesis that provider autonomy support and
patients’ general orientation toward autonomy will predict the patients’ being
more autonomously motivated (and feeling more competent) to carry out the
healthy behavior. In turn, autonomous motivation (and perceived competence)
are hypothesized to predict maintained behavior change and positive health out-
comes.

Assessing Motivation and Treatment Contexts

Autonomous and controlled motivations for participating in treatment or

behaving in a healthy way are assessed with the Treatment Self-Regulation
Questionnaire (TSRQ), which uses an approach to assessing motivation devel-
oped by Ryan and Connell (1989) and provides a reflection of the extent to which
people engage in healthy behaviors for their own personal reasons versus because
they feel pressured to do so. Perceived competence is measured with a four-item
Perceived Competence Scale (PCS), which reflects how able the individuals feel
to carry out the treatment regimen or change the target behavior. Each of these
scales is adapted to the treatment goal or behavior being studied, so in cases of
smoking cessation the questions all pertain to that behavior, whereas with exer-
cise the questions are essentially the same but they are asked in terms of exercis-
ing regularly rather than in terms of stopping smoking.
Autonomy supportiveness of the provider is assessed with the Health-care
Climate Questionnaire (HCCQ), which can be used either with patients’ report-
ing their perceptions of provider autonomy support or with trained observers’
responding to the same items to report their perceptions of the providers. Finally,
trained observers can also rate the extent to which patients are actively involved
in their meetings with the clinicians. Although being actively involved during a
consultation with the provider is not the same thing as being autonomously moti-
vated to carry out the treatment regimen or behave in a healthier way, the two
concepts do tend to be related.

Studies of Patient Motivation in Health Care

Aspects of the self-determination model have been specifically tested in stud-

ies of individuals attending an alcohol treatment program, morbidly obese
patients participating in a very-low-calorie weight-loss program, adult outpatients
adhering to medication prescriptions, patients with diabetes controlling their
blood-sugar levels, and both adolescents’ and adults’ motivation for smoking
reduction. These studies are all longitudinal both because it takes time for the
internalization and integration of a behavior-change regulation to be accom-
plished and because important health benefits tend to accrue only after changes
have been maintained for a significant period of time.
242 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Alcohol treatment. Ryan, Plant, and O’Malley (1995) used the TSRQ with indi-
viduals who entered an alcohol-treatment program, some of whom were man-
dated to be there. Outcomes for the eight-week program were attendance during
the program and clinicians’ ratings of how involved each participant was in the
treatment program. Results indicated that participants who reported more inter-
nalized motivation for being in treatment attended treatment more regularly and
were rated by their counselors as being more involved in the treatment. In this
study, controlled motivation also contributed to prediction of attendance,
although people high in controlled motivation who were low in the more
autonomous type of motivation attended poorly and were not very engaged in
the treatment. Thus, having high autonomous motivation was important for
treatment success, but having some external motivation in addition to the
autonomous motivation also helped.
A weight-loss program. Another relevant study involved severely obese patients
participating in a 26-week medically supervised, very-low-calorie, weight-loss
program (Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996). All patients in this
study were about twice their “healthy body weight.” Because the program does
have some potentially negative health consequences, patients are admitted only if
they are so obese that the risks associated with their obesity out-weigh the risks of
the diet. In addition to following the diet, which involved only the lhquid diet for
3 months and then gradually introduced healthy portions of regular food,
patients attended weekly meetings at which they consulted a doctor or nurse and
met in a group counseling session intended as a support group for participants.
Nutritionists and exercise physiologists attended some of the meetings to consult
with the patients.
A few weeks into the program, patients completed the TSRQ, indicating the
degrees to which their reasons for following the program guidelines for diet and
exercise were autonomous and controlled. ‘Then, at the end of the six-month pro-
gram their attendance at the weekly program meetings and their change in body
mass index (BMI) over the period of the program was tabulated. BML is closely
correlated with weight but allows for adjustment due to frame size and is consid-
ered the more appropriate measure in studies of obesity. Finally, at a two-year fol-
low-up, their long-term change in BMI was assessed, as was the amount they
exercised regularly, as indicators of the degree to which the healthy behaviors
were maintained after the program had ended.
Results of the study revealed that patients who reported more autonomous
reasons for program participation attended more regularly and in turn evidenced
greater reduction of body mass index during the six months of the program.
Controlled motivation was unrelated to the outcomes. Even more importantly,
the extent to which patients’ reasons for participation were autonomous was a
positive predictor both of the amount they exercised at two-year follow up and of
their maintained reduction in BMI over that same time period. It appears that
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support 243

when patients are autonomous in their motivation for participating in a weight-

loss program, the outcomes are substantially more likely to be positive than when
their motivation is controlled.
Participants in this study also provided their perceptions of their providers’
autonomy supportiveness using the HCCQ, Analyses revealed that perceived
autonomy supportiveness predicted autonomous regulation, attendance in the
program, and long-term reduction in body mass index. As predicted by the SDT
model, the relationships between autonomy support and both attendance and
long-term change were mediated by autonomous regulation. Thus, this study
provided considerable support for the self-determination model of health-behav-
ior change.
Medication adherence. Williams, Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, and Deci (1998) did a
study of medication adherence that also supported SDT. One hundred and twen-
ty-six patients who had been prescribed long-term medication participated in the
study, and adherence was assessed with both self-reports of medication taking
and a two-week pill count. Analyses revealed that patients’ autonomous motiva-
tion—that is, the internalization of the value and regulation of medication tak-
ing—was a strong positive predictor of adherence, whereas controlled regulation
was unrelated to medication taking.
Interestingly, in this study physicians were asked to predict which patients
would adhere to their prescriptions, and analysis revealed that physician predic-
tions were unrelated to actual adherence. This point is an important one because
it suggests that people can look just as motivated whether their motivation is
autonomous or controlled, and the physicians were probably using any overt sign
of motivation to make their predictions. However, these and other results suggest
that it is only when that motivation is autonomous that positive consequences
such as maintained adherence are likely to be manifest.
In this study of medication adherence, patients also rated the extent to which
their physicians were autonomy supportive. Results showed that perceptions of
physicians’ being more autonomy supportive were associated with their patients’
being more autonomously regulated in taking their medications. Autonomy sup-
port also predicted greater adherence, and path analyses showed that, as expect-
ed, autonomous regulation mediated the relationship between autonomy support
and medication adherence.
By providing insight into why people take their medications and by identify-
ing a potential relationship between patients’ perception of the health-care cli-
mate and the patients’ reliable use of medication, these results could help patients
maximize their treatment benefits for a wide range of chronic diseases including
hypertension, HIV, tuberculosis, depression, anxiety, congestive heart failure,
hyperlipidemia, and osteoporosis, all of which cause a great deal of suffering for
those with the diseases. In the cases of HIV and tuberculosis, strict adherence to
medications can also reduce the public’s risk of the spread of resistant organisms
244 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

in the community, Finally, with more accurate assessment of adherence, practi-

tioners can avoid unnecessary prescriptions of the higher doses or stronger med-
ications that can lead to greater side effects for the patient.
Glucose control. A recent study of patients with diabetes (Williams, Freedman,
& Deci, 1998) explored the relation between autonomous regulation and
patients’ average glucose control as reflected in the physiological measure of gly-
cosylated hemoglobin (HbAIc). A higher HbA1|c has been firmly linked to the
long-term diabetes consequences of kidney failure (nephropathy), numbness in
hands and feet (neuropathy), and damage to the eyes (retinopathy) including
blindness (DCCT, 1993). Thus, a low HbAlc represents an excellent proximal
endpoint of health status.
In the Williams, Freedman, and Deci, (1998) study, 126 patients completed
the TSRQ and the PCS, and a factor analysis indicated that the constructs of
autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, and perceived competence were
separate factors. Patients’ HbAIc levels were obtained from blood samples at the
beginning of the 12-month period and again at the end. Finally, patients’ per-
ceptions of the degree to which their providers were autonomy supportive were
assessed 4 months into the year-long period.
Analyses revealed that patients who experienced their providers as more
autonomy supportive were more able to lower their glucose levels over the 12-
month period than those who experienced the providers as more controlling.
Further, those patients who experienced their providers as more autonomy sup-
portive became more autonomous in their motivation for maintaining a healthy
diet and exercising regularly. As they became more autonomous they also expe-
rienced themselves as more competent to adhere to their diets and exercise regi-
mens, and these increases in perceived competence predicted decreases in glu-
cose level. In other words, autonomy supportive providers tended to promote
more positive health outcomes and these outcomes appear to have come about
because the providers’ autonomy support facilitated the patients’ becoming more
autonomously motivated and feeling more competent. As in the medication-
adherence and weight-loss studies, controlled motivation did not predict medical
outcomes. In short, autonomous motivation and perceived competence for the
goal of better glucose control were predictive of an important, long-term physi-
ologic indicator of health for patients with diabetes, and these patient character-
istics were facilitated by the autonomy support of providers.
Adolescent smoking. In a study of adolescents (both smokers and nonsmokers)
attending a suburban high school, Williams, Cox, Kouides, and Deci (1999),
assessed the students’ intensity and frequency of smoking at baseline and again 4
months later. (‘lhe rate for nonsmokers was, of course, 0 cigarettes per day.) The
autonomous and controlled reasons for why all of the students would not smoke
were also assessed at these two points in time.
This study was designed to test whether the communication style used by a
presenter of information about smoking would effect the students’ autonomous
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support Ze)

motivation for not smoking and in turn their actual smoking behavior. Therefore,
following baseline assessment, the students were randomized to receive one of
two 20-minute presentations about smoking, one of which was done with an
autonomy supportive style, focusing on the students’ making a clear choice for
themselves about whether or not to smoke, and the other of which was done with
a controlling style, where the students were told they should not smoke because
of the terrible risks for contracting and dying from smoking related diseases such
as lung cancer, emphysema, and heart disease. Following the presentation, stu-
dents rated the degree to which their presenter had been autonomy supportive.
Students who experienced the presenter as more autonomy supportive
reported greater autonomous motivation for not smoking. Further, the students’
autonomous reasons for not smoking significantly predicted a reduction in their
frequency and intensity of smoking. Although the two interventions did not have
a significantly different effect of smoking reduction over the four months, there
was nonetheless evidence that autonomy support is important for promoting
autonomous motivation and healthy behavior change.
Adolescence is an important developmental stage where issues of autonomy,
relationships, and competence are all changing. The results indicate that further
investigation of smoking interventions that invite the adolescent to consider both
sides of their decision about whether or not to smoke may be important for help-
ing the teens not smoke.
Long-term smokers face a 50% probability of dying prematurely from a
smoking related disease. However, if a smoker abstains from smoking for 12
months, that probability is substantially reduced (US DHHS, 1990). After 10 to
15 years of abstinence, mortality rates for former smokers return to those for
nonsmokers. Given these statistics, and because smoking rates of high school stu-
dents had risen to nearly 40% in 1999 from 28% in 1992, further research of this
sort on promoting smoking abstinence and cessation among teens is indeed
important.
Adult smoking cessation. Two related studies have examined the motivational
processes of smoking cessation among adult smokers. One (Williams, Gagne,
Ryan, & Deci, 2002) tested the self-determination model with respect to smoking
cessation. In it, 27 community physicians counseled their smokers to quit using
the NCI Guidelines presented in either a relatively autonomy supportive or a
more controlling manner. Smoking cessation was assessed at 6, 12, and 30
months using self-reports of cessation validated by carbon monoxide testing. An
index of continuous cessation was created from the three points in time. The
degree of physician autonomy support was rated by research assistants from
audio-taped recordings. Patient demographics, perceived competence, and
autonomous motivation for quitting were assessed by questionnaires.
Structural equation modeling was used to test the SDT model, confizming
that the average ratings of physicians using the autonomy supportive approach
were significantly more autonomy supportive than the those of physicians using
246 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

the controlling approach. Further, the rated autonomy support of the counselling
interaction predicted patients’ autonomous motivation for stopping smoking.
Finally, both autonomous motivation and perceived competence independently
predicted continuous abstinence. Thus, the self-determination model for main-
tained smoking cessation did receive support from the analyses.
In an examination of other data from this study (Williams & Deci, 2001), the
concept of patient activation introduced by Kaplan, Greenfield, and Ware (1989)
was the focus. These researchers had found that if a research assistant met with
patients for a relatively brief period just before the patients had an appointment
with their physicians, and if they spent that time reviewing the patients’ charts
and having the patients formulate questions to ask their doctors during the visit,
the patients were indeed more active in the meetings with their doctors and their
degree of activation positively predicted long term health consequences.
Williams and Deci (2001) hypothesized that if doctors were more autonomy
supportive during the meeting, that in itself might activate patients just as having
an assistant meet with them first had done in the Kaplan et al. (1989) study, and
that this patient activation should have positive health effects for the patients.
Thus, Williams and Deci had trained raters rate the degree to which the patients
were active in the interchange with their doctors, expecting that patients would
be more active in meetings where the doctors who counselled them about smok-
ing cessation used an autonomy supportive approach than in meetings where the
doctors used a more controlling approach. Rated activation of the patients dur-
ing the counselling session was in turn predicted to result in better maintained
cessation rates.
As predicted, in the experimental condition where doctors were to use an
autonomy supportive approach, patients were significantly more active in their
engagement with the doctor, and their degree of activation did indeed predict
their biochemically validated quit rates.
Summary. When taken together, these studies indicate that only when
patients’ motivation for health-related behavior change is primarily autonomous
are they likely to ongoingly engage in their healthy behaviors, including adhering
to prescriptions, attending treatment programs, losing weight, exercising, and not
smoking. ‘These maintained behaviors were in turn related to better health or
lower health risks, as evidenced for example in lower levels of glycosylated hemo-
globin. ‘Thus, autonomous motivation, supplemented by perceived competence,
appear to be important predictors of physical health. Finally, the studies showed
repeatedly that when providers were autonomy supportive, patients became more
autonomously motivated and felt more competent, and in turn they behaved in
healthier ways. So it seems that in fact health-care providers can indeed have an
important effect on patients’ health by relating to them in ways that promote
their autonomous motivation and perceived competence.
Supporting autonomous regulation. Being autonomy supportive refers to the pro-
vision of choice, the encouragement of self-initiation, and the acknowledgment
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support 247

of patients’ perspectives; whereas, being controlling refers to pressuring patients

to think, feel, or behave in specific ways. Providers who are autonomy supportive
do not emphasize and rely on their authority as experts, but instead they take the
patients’ perspectives and are sensitive to the patients’ needs so they can provide
supports not only for autonomy but also for competence and relatedness when
that is appropriate for the patients’ condition.
Because being autonomy supportive involves taking a patient’s perspective, it
will necessitate understanding the patient’s reasons for engaging in unhealthy
behaviors or failing to engage in healthy ones. It is important for providers to
accept these reasons and not to pressure the patient to change. Instead, by mak-
ing relevant information available to the patient in a style that allows the patient
to consider it without feeling forced and by encouraging the patient to take
responsibility for his or her own behavior, providers can respect and accept a
patient’s decision while at the same time having a positive influence on the
patient’s health outcomes.

Other Health Care Studies

A number of studies have been done in other laboratories that have exam-
ined health-care issues in a way that is relevant to the SDT model. They have
used varied approaches and methods, and will now be very briefly summarized.
A study conducted in a home for the aged revealed that the residents’ per-
ceptions of the staff’s being autonomy supportive was positively predictive of the
residents’ vitality, perceived well-being, and life satisfaction (Kasser & Ryan,
1999).
A review of 32 studies of brief interventions for problem drinkers (Bien,
Miller, & Tonigan, 1993) isolated common elements of successful interventions,
and among the most important elements identified were giving nonevaluative
feedback, providing choice, encouraging patients to take responsibility, and being
empathic, all of which are central features of an autonomy supportive style of
providing health-care.
Harackiewicz, Sansone, Blair, Epstein, and Manderlink (1987) studied smok-
ers who were randomly assigned to various self-help treatment conditions includ-
ing an intrinsic (i.e., autonomy oriented) self-help condition, in which the impor-
tance of one’s own initiations and efforts was highlighted. Results showed that
subjects in this autonomy-supporting, self-help condition remained abstinent
longer than those in the two more controlling conditions or in the comparison
group.
Another study of self-help smoking cessation programs (Curry, Wagner, &
Grothaus, 1991) involved participants being assigned to one of four groups: an
intrinsic, personalized-feedback (i.e., autonomy-supportive) group; an extrinsic,
financial-incentive group; an intrinsic plus extrinsic group; and a comparison
248 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

group. Results of the study indicated that the autonomy-supportive condition

yielded the best continuous abstinence measured at 3 and 12 months (biochemi-
cally confirmed).
Other relevant studies of behavior change have explored the effects of
providers using different styles of counseling patients. For example, Ockene et al.,
(1991) had physicians vary their style of counseling patients for smoking cessation
and found that using a more patient-centered (i.e., autonomy supportive) style
resulted in more positive attitudes toward the physicians and greater abstinence
at a six-month follow up than did a more directive (1.e., controlling) style.
Miller, Benefield, and Tonigan (1993) found that when providers were
patient-centered (rather than controlling and confrontational) in counseling prob-
lem drinkers, their patients were less resistant and drank less alcohol at one year
follow up. A meta-analysis of smoking cessation studies conducted for the Agency
for Health-care Policy and Research by Fiore et al. (1996) revealed that when
practitioners provided what they have called “intra-treatment social support”
(which appears very similar to autonomy support), smokers were almost twice as
likely to not be smoking 5 months later than when this interpersonal support is
not given.
Finally, Langer and Rodin (1976) found that supporting the autonomy of insti-
tutionalized elderly patients by providing them control over aspects of their lives
and encouraging them to be more self-initiating and accepting of responsibility led
to enhanced physical and psychological well-being and lowered mortality.

Promoting Autonomy Support in Health-Care Providers

Because research results have repeatedly indicated that providers’ being

autonomy supportive has positive behavior-change and health consequences, we
have also been exploring the issue of how to teach providers to be more autono-
my supportive. ‘This work has been conducted in medical schools and has extend-
ed previous work that had been done in other educational settings. Previous work
had rehably found that autonomy support by teachers was associated with greater
internalization and autonomous motivation for learning among students in pub-
lic schools (Deci, Schwartz, Sheinman, & Ryan, 1981) and at university (Black &
Deci, 2000).
Williams and Deci (1996) used interviewing courses for second year medical
students at two university medical centers as the setting to examine issues of
autonomy support in medical education. Autonomy support by instructors was
hypothesized to lead to greater autonomous motivation on the part of the stu-
dents; student autonomy was predicted to increase the likelihood that the stu-
dents would internalize the biopsychosocial values that were extant in the course;
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support 249

and internalization of biopsychosocial values (see Engel, 1977) was expected to

lead these doctors-in-training to be more autonomy supportive with patients.
At each university, several instructors taught the course, and students were
asked to rate the degree to which their instructor was autonomy supportive using
a Learning Climate Questionnaire (adapted from the Health-Care Climate
Questionnaire). The students’ reasons for attending the course and their psy-
chosocial values were measured at the beginning and the end of the six month
course using the Learning Self-Regulation Questionnaire (adapted from the
Treatment Self-Regulation Questionnaire). Results of the study indicate that stu-
dents who had perceived their instructors as autonomy supportive, relative to
those who perceived their instructors as controlling, attended the course more
regularly, became more autonomous in the reasons they gave for why they attend-
ed class, and in turn developed stronger psychosocial values that persisted over a
two-year period.
The study further yielded the important finding that students who became
more autonomously motivated and evidenced greater internalization of psy-
chosocial values during their second-year interviewing course subsequently used
a more autonomy-supportive approach in their third year when counseling sim-
ulated patients about changing cardiovascular risk behaviors. It seems, therefore,
that medical school instructors’ being autonomy supportive in their style of
teaching medical interviewing leads medical students to become more biopsy-
chosocially oriented and to relate to patients in more autonomy supportive ways.

Students
Internalized
Psychosocial
Beliefs

Student Students
Instructor Autonomous Supported
Autonomy Motivation for Patients'
Support Learning Autonomy
Students'
Career
Choice

Figure 11.2. Self-Determination Model for Medical Education

250 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

That, in turn, as has been argued throughout, leads patients to behave in more
autonomous and healthy ways. The relations of instructor orientation to student
motivation and internalization are shown in Figure 11.2.
Two related studies (Williams, Wiener, Markakis, Reeve, & Deci, 1994;
Williams, Saizow, Ross, & Deci, 1997) showed that students tended to select a res-
idency in a subspecialty where they had perceived their instructors to be more
autonomy supportive. Structural Equation Modeling indicated that the autono-
my-supportive instructors facilitated students’ developing interest in the content
they were teaching and feeling more autonomous while learning the material,
and that in turn increased the likelihood of the students’ pursuing it as a career.
Although these studies do not provide any information about how the students
will practice medicine, they nonetheless highlight the importance of the concept
of autonomy supportive teaching for predicting the medical students’ subsequent
behavior. The results of these studies are also summarized in the SDT model of
medical education presented in Figure 11.2.

Conclusions

The closely related issues of adherence and maintained behavior change

represent a major challenge to the health-care field with respect to prevention,
well being, and health outcomes. It appears from this research that patients will
be more likely to adhere and maintain healthy behaviors if they have integrated
the regulation for those behaviors and are thus more autonomously motivated to
carry them out. The research now indicates that such internalization is more like-
ly to occur in health-care climates that are supportive of patients’ autonomy.
Research has also shown that when medical school instructors are more autono-
my supportive in their teaching, students become more biopsychosocially orient-
ed and are accordingly more autonomy supportive of their patients, which of
course would be expected to lead to more positive health consequences.
‘Taken together, the parallel results from the health-care and health-educa-
tion studies suggest that there are wide ranging advantages to being autonomy
supportive. When medical educators and health-care practitioners are autonomy
supportive, their students and patients are likely to become more autonomous
and competent, which in turn leads to a variety of positive outcomes. In educa-
tion, autonomous self-regulation has been associated with enhanced learning and
better adjustment, and in medical care, it has been associated with maintained
behavior change, more positive health status, and better mental health (Deci,
Ryan, & Williams, 1996).
By impacting the orientation of practitioners-in-training, it seems possible to
have the kind of impact on health delivery that will result in patients’ behaving
 Improving Health Through Autonomy Support 25)

more responsibly and thus realizing better health. Not only is motivation expect-
ed to improve health by leading patients to use their medications in ways known
to ameliorate disease, but also through encouraging patients’ use of preventive
procedures and change of health-risk behaviors. Thus, it appears that applying
self-determination theory to practitioner and patient behavior could help to
reduce the gap that exists between what is known to improve patients’ health and
what is actually done in practice.

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oD /2300%
12: Intrinsic Need Satisfaction in Organizations:
A Motivational Basis of Success in For-Profit
and Not-for-Profit Settings

Paul P. Baard
Fordham Unwersity

Books on organizational leadership continue to be among the best-sellers in the

business sector (“Business Week Best-Sellers,” 1999) and, increasingly, the topic
appears to be of interest to those who lead houses of worship (“CBA Best
Sellers,” 1999). Leaders in both the for-profit and not-for-profit domains are
faced with significant, new challenges in dealing with their constituents.
Corporate America finds itself experiencing prolonged, high-employment levels,
making retention of employees difficult as demand for workers often exceeds sup-
ply. Traditional reliance upon financial incentives has led to ever more complex
strategies for compensating workers in a time of relative prosperity (e.g, Dolmat-
Connell, 1999). Mergers of corporations have resulted in undermining any sense
of loyalty among employees (Brockner, 1992). Leaders of religious institutions
have discovered that many people no longer follow the tradition of attending the
house of worship in which they were raised, and some no longer attend any reli-
gious services (Barna, 1999). Church attendance and giving levels are greatly
depressed relative to those of only a generation ago (Ronsvalle & Ronsvalle,
1998). Church shopping is the norm for those choosing to affiliate at all, and
gaining commitments for time from volunteers is even tougher in today’s typical
two-wage-earner household (Barna, 1999).
Leadership gurus from the business and church sectors often propose dra-
matic solutions, from reengineering corporations (Hammer & Champy, 1993) to
reinventing churches (Warren, 1995) as a way of solving the daunting challenges
facing those organizations. But these types of restructuring approaches typically
require major organizational upheaval, something many leaders find themselves
either disinclined or unable to do. An alternative tactic is to focus on the individ-
uals in an organization and on how management of the organization can facili-
tate more effective involvement of these individuals.
One concern that cuts across all domains of leadership is the motivation of
those who are led. In such diverse fields as education and athletic competition,
256 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

teachers, and coaches seek to “motivate” their charges. This inclination is true
also in the worlds of business and religion. Managers try different methods of
incentives or fear to get more productivity out of their subordinates. Pastors
attempt to cajole greater commitment from parishioners, including increased
attendance, giving, and serving. Often they employ techniques such as public
recognition of contributors, an appeal to feelings of guilt, etc. However, there is
a burgeoning literature suggesting that the use of incentives and attempts to
cajole may be experienced by employees or parishioners as controlling or pres-
suring and that such attempts to manipulate people have a significant downside
(see, e.g., Kohn, 1993).
This chapter reports on two studies applying self-determination theory
(SDT) to organizations. It differentiates types of motivation and then identifies
institutional structures and leadership behaviors that tend to enhance the differ-
ent types of motivation in those who are led. Illustrations are offered from the for-
profit (a business corporation) and not-for-profit (a Christian church) sectors.

Types of Motivation

Several different types of motivation are evident in daily living. The follow-
ing describes these motivations as they appear in the worlds of work and worship.
Intrinsic motwation is the “. . . inherent tendency to seek out novelty and chal-
lenges, to extend and exercise one’s capacities, to explore, and to learn” (Ryan &
Deci, 2000). It is the energy behind taking on optimal challenges to one’s current
knowledge or skill. When one is intrinsically motivated for an activity, there is not
a preoccupying concern with the possibility of attaining a reward other than the
satisfaction of doing the activity itself, nor is there a worry about avoiding a
potential punishment for not doing it well enough. Intrinsic motivation has been
associated with greater performance, more persistence, and higher levels of sat-
isfaction and creativity (Deci & Ryan, 1991). People involved in endeavors due to
this type of self-motivation experience heightened vitality and general well-being
(Ryan & Deci, 2000).
When intrinsically motivated, people are autonomous because the motiva-
tion and direction of their behavior comes from them. It is the type of motiva-
tion many people experience when they are engaged, for example, in a hobby or
sport. ‘The activity itself provides inherent satisfaction and reward. This type of
motivation is less likely to be found in the workplace, where everyone has some
level of concern for such things as compensation and recognition, but there are
times when even work possesses many of the characteristics that prompt intrinsic
motivation. Being given a particularly exciting assignment, with no undue pres-
sure to succeed, can be challenging and carry with it a satisfaction that is dis-
tinctly enjoyable.
 Motivation in Organizations Zo

In the world of church participation there can certainly be opportunities for

the experience of intrinsic motivation, opportunities where one might say “I find
this really fulfilling.” A joyous wedding cebration, a somber but moving memo-
rial service, or a particularly compelling Sunday worship service might, for exam-
ple, be experienced as intrinsically satisfying by participants.
Extrinsic motwation describes doing an activity with a focus on some separable
outcome, rather than engaging in it for its inherent satisfaction. ‘Typical examples
from everyday life include undertaking a task out of a desire to gain a reward or
recognition, or to avoid ill consequence such as punishment or guilt. Extrinsic
motivation falls along a continuum from being pressured and controlled by the
separable outcomes to being relatively self-determined in pursuing them. When
extrinsic motivation is of the controlled type, it is associated with feelings of anx-
iety and pressure and has been linked with less long-term persistence (Deci &
Ryan, 1985b). When extrinsic motivation is more self-regulated, it shares with
intrinsic motivation the quality of being autonomous. In fact, within SDT, intrin-
sic motivation and self-regulated extrinsic motivation represent the two types of
autonomous motivation. In contrast, when motivation is either fully external, as
when a behavior is engaged in only for a reward or to avoid a punishment, or is
within the person in the form of self-demands that are buttressed by internal
sanctions such as guilt, people experience their behavior as being controlled
rather than autonomous.
The employee characterized by external motivation is sometimes identified
as a “You get what you pay for with him”’-type of person. With each assignment,
this individual’s focus will be almost exclusively on “What is in it for me?” or
“What reward can I expect?” Most employees will not be so exclusively focused
on rewards, but they will to differing degrees be influenced by the various incen-
tives offered by their companies.
At church, those who attend largely out of a compulsion to do what they
“should” do, often more a reflection of their controlling upbringing than a freely
held belief, are also extrinsically motivated in a controlling way. ‘They may fear ill
consequences—from social disapproval to eternal damnation—for not going to
church, giving money, volunteering time, etc. Churches engage this extrinsic
motivation when they offer incentives to contribute, such as having one’s name
appear on a prestigious list of donors, and when they use door prizes and other
gimmicks to induce giving. Also, preaching which is done with a shaming style
will incline the listener toward this less desirable, more pressured state of moti-
vation.
While those operating out of these kinds of pressured extrinsic motivation
can be productive because incentives often work in the short-term, the psycho-
logical dynamics involved with such motivation are potentially undermining of a
continuance and a full involvement with the task or relationship. Indeed, the
introduction of extrinsic variables to what had once been an intrinsically satisfy-
ing activity has been found, under some circumstances, to lead to amotivation
toward that activity (Deci, 1971).
258 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Amotivation describes a sense of futility in an engagement, with the individual

not valuing the activity, not feeling capable of doing it, or not expecting to
achieve a desired outcome for having done it (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). Amotivation
leaves a person participating at only a minimal level, if at all. The dramatic
downsizing in corporate America throughout the nineties seems to have under-
mined a sense of purposefulness in many employees. Working hard and loyally
for an employer have come to be viewed as having little to do with one’s advanc-
ing or even retaining a career in the organization. If age and earnings correlate
negatively with the probability of retention, what can a person realistically do
about either? Reduced workforces result in more work and less perceived job
security for those remaining, leading to “survivor’s syndrome” (Brockner, 1992),
a state of disengagement or amotivation.
In the context of houses of worship, an amotivated condition can come
about when church beliefs and rituals are communicated in a manner leaving a
congregant feeling incapable of satisfactorily meeting standards for behavior, and
even thought. Similarly, when participants feel coerced into volunteering or con-
tributing, a tendency to avoid such persuasive circumstances can develop. Or a
member might simply come to view the church in an amotivated manner if the
focus is consistently perceived as irrelevant to one’s life-values and goals. This
appears to be the dynamic behind the massive dropout of adolescents being
experienced by many churches (Baard & Aridas, 1999).
Self-regulated extrinsic motivation describes a state in which one engages in an
activity or relationship primarily to attain some separable outcome but still has a
clear sense of volition (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Nearly everyone goes to work to earn
a living. But when given sufficient control over how a job gets done—being
empowered, in contemporary managerial jargon—the motivational experience
contains many elements associated with intrinsic or self-motivation. In such situ-
ations, if the rewards are not made overly salient in an attempt to motivate or
control people, the people may be self-determined even though they are working
for extrinsic rewards. The experiences and consequences of this self-regulated
extrinsically-motivated behavior can approximate those of intrinsic motivation
and accordingly increase the likelihood of positive outcomes.
In the church experience, one might choose to be involved in a house of wor-
ship because parents and local culture have emphasized that “It is the right thing
to do.” A higher level of autonomy would be experienced if the person arrived
at that position as a result of a reflectively-held belief that such a religious rela-
tionship is consistent with his or her own faith (e.g¢., “Because I believe in God, I
want to go and worship Him each week”). The person will have personally iden-
tified with the value, and this internalized belief would differ from one that is only
introjected—that is, one which would have the person feeling coerced to go to
church out of an “ingested” or inherited standard (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993).
 Motivation in Organizations 299

Self-Determination Theory

According to self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), opportunities

to satisfy three innate, psychological needs will facilitate self-motivation (i.e.,
intrinsic and self-regulated extrinsic motivation that results from full internaliza-
tion of extant values and regulatory processes). In such cases, there will be more
effective functioning and better adjustment because need satisfaction provides the
necessary nutriments for human growth and development (Ryan, 1995).
Thwarted satisfaction of those needs undermines self-motivation, leads to exter-
nal motivation or amotivation, and results in maladaptive consequences (Baard,
1994; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci 1996; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis 1996).
The basic needs identified by SDT, which were deduced using the empirical
process, are those for: autonomy, which concerns experiencing choice and feeling
like the initiator of one’s actions (deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975); competence, which
concerns succeeding at optimally challenging tasks and being able to attain
desired outcomes (White, 1959); and relatedness, which concerns establishing a
sense of mutual respect and reliance with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
These needs appear to be essential for facilitating optimal functioning of the nat-
ural propensities for growth and integration, as well as for constructive social
development and personal well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
The studies described below applied this general hypothesis in the domains
of work and church participation. Principles derived from this and related
research are presented in the form of organizational and managerial behaviors
found to either support or frustrate the satisfaction of these intrinsic needs. SDT
thus “concerns itself with the conditions that elicit and sustain, versus subdue and
diminish, one’s innate propensity toward mastery, spontaneous interest and
exploration” (Ryan & Deci, 2000). A further explication of these innate needs
appears in the respective application sections below.
The concept of need satisfaction is particularly useful in organizational the-
ory in that it has substantial heuristic utility for delineating dimensions of the
environment that would be expected, a priori, to lead to positive versus negative
endeavor-related outcomes. Aspects of the environment likely to allow need sat-
isfaction were predicted to yield positive outcomes, whereas those likely to thwart
need satisfaction were predicted to yield negative outcomes. The motivational
consequences on employees of the behavior of those in leadership positions has
been a focus of the application of SDT because such individuals are a crucial
part of employees’ environments (e.g., Iardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan, 1993;
Kasser, Davey, & Ryan, 1992).
260 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

SDT and Work: A Field Study

The field of management has devoted considerable attention to need theo-

ries such as those of Murray (1938), Maslow (1943), and McClelland (1985). This
often has led to organizational attempts to assess the strength of the “needs” in
job applicants or those considered for promotion (see, e.g., Keyser & Sweetland,
1994). Such an approach, however, reduces the concept of needs to “learned
wants” or desires because, if something were truly an innate need, it would exist
in everyone, and a desire would certainly not be considered a need if it were
detrimental or harmful (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). In fact, from the SDT perspec-
tive, a desire is considered a need only if it can be shown empirically that satis-
faction of the desire is associated with people’s growth and health.
Numerous studies have shown that what are called autonomy-supportive
contexts promote self-motivation (Deci, Schwartz, Sheinman & Ryan, 1981;
Grolnick & Ryan, 1989), satisfaction (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989), and better
performance in various settings (Benware & Deci, 1984; Koestner, Ryan,
Bernieri, & Holt, 1984). Empowering managers are those who afford their sub-
ordinates significant influence in how the work gets done, allowing greater satis-
faction of the subordinates’ innate needs for autonomy, competence, and relat-
edness. In a parallel fashion, thwarted satisfaction of those needs will undermine
motivation and have maladaptive consequences (Baard, 1994; Ryan et al., 1996;
Sheldon et al., 1996). SDT’s view of needs in terms of nutrients essential for sur-
vival, growth, and integrity of the individual (Ryan et al., 1996) shifts the focus
from getting the night person in a job to presenting an environment for all
employees in which they have the opportunity to get their intrinsic needs met and
thus to do well.
Matters of concern to organizations such as performance and psychological
adjustment were hypothesized to be positively related to need satisfaction.

Research Methodology

The study (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2000) took place in a major investment
banking firm. Since this was a company-endorsed project, conducted on the
firm’s premises during the workday, a high response rate was achieved—495
employees (approximately 79°% of its home office personnel) submitted complete
data for the 16-pages of questions.
Among the instruments incorporated in the respondents’ survey booklet
were the Need Satisfaction Index-Work (NSI-W), a 23-item scale, with a 7-point
Likert-like response format, which assesses the extent to which employees experi-
ence satisfaction of their three intrinsic psychological needs—for self-determina-
 Motivation in Organizations 261

tion, competence, and relatedness—on their job (Leone, 1995). Sample state-
ments about which employees were asked to express their agreement/disagree-
ment appear in Table 12-1.

Sample Items from Need Satisfaction Index: Work

Autonomy
—I feel like I can make a lot of inputs to deciding how my job gets done.
—I feel pressured at work. (Reverse score.)

Competence
—I enjoy the challenges my work provides.
—When I am working, I often do not feel very capable. (Reverse score.)

Relatedness
—I get along with people at work.
—There are not many people at work that I am close to. (Reverse score.)

Table 12.1

The General Causality Onentations Scale (GCOS; Deci & Ryan, 1985a)
presents different vignettes about problems or situations that arise in life (e.g., the
opportunity to take a new job) and was used to assess the individual difference
variable of workers’ autonomy orientations. Additionally, percetved autonomy
support by one’s supervisor was measured with the Work Climate Questionnaire
(WCQ). The WCQis a 15-item scale that assesses participants’ perceptions of
the degree to which they experience their managers as autonomy supportive
(Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996). Both the autonomy orienta-
tions of employees and the autonomy supportiveness of managers were expect-
ed to positively predict need satisfaction of the employees.
Self-reported annual performance evaluation ratings served as the depend-
ent variable “Performance.” A three-point scale was used to assess each person’s
over-all performance. A comparison made for one large work group’s self-report-
ed ratings with the Human Resources records for that unit revealed almost iden-
tical proportions of the three rating levels between the sample and the represen-
tative full work unit, thus suggesting that the self-reports were veridical.
To assess psychological well-being or adjustment, 14 items related to anxiety
and somatization from the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Hiller,
262 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

1979) were combined (each score was reversed), along with a 7-item vitality scale
(Ryan & Frederick, 1997). Intrinsic need satisfaction was expected to positively
predict both performance and adjustment.

Findings

Results of the study provided additional support for the relevance of self-
determination theory to motivation in the workplace. As expected, intrinsic need
satisfaction significantly predicted both work performance and adjustment.
Further, the managers’ being perceived as more autonomy supportive and sub-
ordinates’ having a stronger autonomy orientation were related to the subordi-
nates’ experiences of greater intrinsic need satisfaction. An overall test (using
LISREL) of SDT’s need-satisfaction model of performance and adjustment at
work provided excellent support for the model (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2000).

Implications for Business Practices

As described, SDT studies of the workplace measure the degree to which

subordinates reported their intrinsic needs being met in their work environment.
Of particular concern are the daily experiences of workers interacting with those
in authority over them. A review of these opportunities for motivational impact
follows.

Autonomy

The need for autonomy is about sensing some level of control and choice
about the work one is doing. It is not about managers’ being permissive or neg-
lectful, but rather about subordinates’ having influence in the workplace.
“Empowerment” is the management cliché often used to connote this notion of
shared responsibility in how work gets done.
From this concept of the need for autonomy come some specific organiza-
tional and managerial behaviors that are found to help satisfy this need. The
Saturn Corporation, a unit of General Motors Corporation, incorporated some
novel ideas as it established itself in the late 1980s (Gwynne, 1990). These inno-
vations are consistent with principles identified by SDT.
Several practices were directed at worker autonomy. Because it would be a
unionized work force (as is true for production-line workers throughout General
Motors), Saturn decided to minimize union resistance by building a staff from
 Motivation in Organizations 263

current GM employees who wished to join in on the building of “a different kind

of car” by a “different kind of company” (O’Toole, 1996). General Motors was
determined to match the quality Japanese car makers had achieved, resulting in
their acquiring a significant portion of the U.S. passenger-car market. The new
Saturn plant would be in Spring Hill, Tennessee, far from the assembly lines and
corporate culture of Detroit-area facilities. The initial staffing would consist of
UAW volunteers who would leave their established places of work and their
earned seniority at other GM plants to partake in this new venture. So even the
decision to work at this new plant was an entirely autonomous one.

Managerial Behaviors that Support Autonomy

1. Optimize subordinate’s control/influence

—over how his or her work gets done, bonus is structured, goals are set, etc.

2. Ameliorate internal and external pressures

—rather than simply passing it on from your own superordinates, clients, etc.

3. Reduce or eliminate excessive rules

—aking certain that outdated organizational policies do not impede performance.

4. Allow self-selection for tasks

—whenever possible.

5. Permit failure
—when feasible (the absence of the permission to fail connotes rigid bound
aries of behavior and eliminates a possible learning process).

6. Take subordinate’s perspective, at least initially, even if you believe it to be inaccurate

—trying to understand it before you begin to explain your reality.

7. Provide feedback in a non-controlling manner

—so that your subordinate does not feel pressured into a position.

8. Choose an assertive communication style

—rather than using controlling (aggressive) language.

9. Avoid manipulative incentive systems

—using rewards as affirmation of work done well, rather than a means to get more.

Table 12.2
264 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

A second autonomy-supportive step by Saturn was the inclusion of workers

in nearly all decisions, from how a bonus system would work to which advertis-
ing agency would handle the car’s introductory promotion campaign. ‘This inclu-
siveness was most unusual in the antagonistic “labor versus management” world
of auto manufacturing in the United States (O”Toole, 1996).
Perhaps the most significant support for autonomy, however, was a more sub-
tle one. At each work station along the assembly line hung a cord with a blue han-
dle at its end, above head-level but within reach. Every worker was empowered
to pull that cord and stop the entire production line if he or she detected a sys-
temic problem. For example, if someone assigned to the tire-mounting unit noted
an axle slightly pitched, that worker would normally tag the car and a correction
would be made at some point down the line. However, if a Saturn worker saw the
next car with the same problem, he or she could stop production. This is a sig-
nificant responsibility for line workers, most of whom have limited education and
have never been given this level of authority in their careers. While the need to
pull the lever is not frequent, it is the knowledge that they could do so which would
support a sense of autonomy in this environment. Company reports indicate that
any managerial fears that this would be misused by these UAW members were
soon dispelled as workers handled this delegation of authority responsibly.
While there are many organizational means for either supporting or frus-
trating the need for autonomy, the research suggests day-to-day experiences with
one’s immediate supervisor can help ameliorate even a relatively controlling
atmosphere (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2000). ‘Table 12-2 identifies some of these
means.

Competence

The need for competence is about growing and experiencing challenge to

one’s current abilities or knowledge. In the world of work, this does not neces-
sarily entail having exciting new things to do each day. Much of one’s work,
whether it is building a car, maintaining a home, teaching a class, or seeing
patients in a clinic involves routine chores and tasks. ‘The competence need
expresses itself in a desire to have some growth experience over a reasonable peri-
od of time.
Saturn Motors Corporation built such possibilities into its modus operandi.
All employees would spend five percent of their time in training. This had to be
an intriguing proposition for a UAW member accustomed to physically demand-
ing labor throughout his or her 40-hour work week. ‘Training to do one’s specif-
ic job could be expected, but then what? Becoming acquainted with other func-
tions along the assembly line would be a natural progression. Yet all of that would
take only months at an average of two hours per week. What then? Saturn had
in mind providing its employees opportunities to learn many practical life-skills,
 Motivation in Organizations 265

completely unrelated to building good cars. This would allow workers to keep
growing throughout their careers. Thus, one of their intrinsic needs would be
met by employer Saturn.
Another Saturn policy that clearly addresses the competence need is the pro-
vision to workers of the best equipment. This was made easier, of course, in that
the entire physical facility in Spring Hill, Tennessee was new, so managers could
take advantage of things learned in the decades since many of the production
plants of the Detroit-area were built. There would also be fewer work rules; for
example, the assembly-line person could actually go and get his or her own
replacement tool and not be required to submit a request and wait for the item
to be delivered. Workers would have the satisfaction of getting more work done.
And each work unit would be entrusted with picking its own suppliers, even of
significant components of the vehicles it was assembling.

Managerial Behaviors that Support Competence

1. Train, prepare, and support subordinates

—so their probability of success is maximized.

2. Remove barriers to efficient performance

—including physical (e.g., air quality) and procedural (e.g., gratuitous rules).

3. Agree on achievable goals

—ones that are discussed and agreed upon, rather than imposed on, subordinate
employees.

4. Help subordinates determine reasonable ambitions

—to improve probability of subordinates’ career successes.

5. Provide optimal challenges

—by delegating interesting assignments and tasks that develop new skills.

6. Allow feedback to occur regularly

—-so that timely corrections can be made.

7. Keep critical comments in perspective

—not offering too much negative feedback at once.

8. Encourage self-discovery of errors

—allowing the person time to address them on his or her own whenever possible.

Table 12.3
266 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

We see then that, regardless of organizational policies or procedures, peo-

ple’s need for competence can often be addressed day-to-day by their supervisors
or managers. Another example of this need being met was giving a receptionist,
usually charged only with greeting visitors and performing light clerical tasks, the
responsibility for arranging production of photo identification tags for new
employees. Although this task may not be experienced as a challenge by some
people, it does add responsibility to the receptionist’s job, is important to the com-
pany, and could provide the receptionist with a greater sense of competence. At
a higher organizational level, allowing a middle-level executive the opportunity
to develop the business plan for his or her work unit is another example of growth
enhancement. Some frequently-occurring opportunities for those in supervisory
positions to support the competence need in their subordinates appear in Table
12-3.

Relatedness

Experiencing mutual reliance and respect is at the heart of the relatedness

need. It is about feeling connected, sharing a mutual goal, and being in a rela-
tionship for the long haul. The downsizings which persist in corporate America
are an obvious threat to the satisfaction of this innate need. Although not even
the chief executive officer of a company can say with absolute assurance that
there will be no future layoffs, managers can endeavor to express care for and to
employees when a downsizing occurs (Brockner, 1992).
Organizational procedures can provide an institutional opportunity to sup-
port the need for relatedness. Saturn Motors Corporation built in some ideas that
were not only novel but also provocative to the automotive industry at the time
(O'Toole, 1996). Each work unit would be responsible for hiring its own mem-
bers. Because a new culture of quality and efficient work was a core value at
Saturn, on-line workers interviewed and selected new members of their team to
help insure the team’s effective performance. In this way the team was able to
communicate its belief in a new attitude toward work. Calling in sick on
Mondays would not be this culture’s norm, And because group members select-
ed future co-workers, peer acceptance and support began Day One for the new
hire.
The practice of job rotation was introduced, with members of work units
changing roles every so often. ‘This tended to create greater empathy and respect
for a colleague’s work. In addition, the heads of labor and of management had
offices immediately adjacent to one another, visually and practically lessening a
“them versus us” orientation and providing a setting for easy sharing of infor-
mation. ‘Their daily exchanges communicated a “togetherness” people system to
the organization (O”Toole, 1996).
 Motivation in Organizations 267

Managerial Behaviors that Support Relatedness

1. Hold regular meetings

—so that you are easily accessible even to those somewhat timid.

2. Set reward structures that support cooperation

—and do not encourage competition between individuals or teams.

3. Avoid triangulation

—do not speak negatively about a party not present.

4. Share information whenever feasible

—trusting your associates to keep certain matters confidential.

5. Conduct team-building exercises when appropriate

—which need not be dramatic to be effective.

Table 12.4

While “team building” became a management buzzword in the ‘90s, it was

often undermined by divisive organizational practices such as internally-compet-
itive bonus systems. Yet despite such policies, daily interactive opportunities
afford the insightful manager a chance to satisfy the relatedness needs of subor-
dinates (see Table 12-4).

SDT and Worship: A Field Study

There are an estimated 367,000 religious organizations in the United States.

Most of these continue to endure relatively low levels of financial support, and
their membership levels are plateauing or declining despite population growth
(Bedell, 1996). A carefully-controlled field study placed weekly attendance rates
at only about 25% of congregants (Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1993). ‘This sta-
tistic, confirmed by individual congregational data (Malphurs, 1999), contradict-
ed what had been conventional wisdom placing attendance levels at consistently
above 40%. The latter inflated figure, reported nearly annually by such polling
firms as Gallup and Barna Research (e.g., Barna, 1999), hid the problem most
local pastors knew too well. Membership itself is also in decline (Malphurs, 1999;
268 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Woodward, 1993). Associated with this lack of involvement is not only the rela-
tive failure to fulfill a church’s mission of developing human spirituality, but also
a reduced capacity to fund benevolence programs, such as caring for the needy.
Contributions to religious groups, as a percent of household income, are down
markedly from their highs of only a generation ago (Ronsvalle & Ronsvalle,
1996).
Much of what is written about the fate of houses of worship takes a socio-
logical perspective, examining demographic trends, denominational popularity,
etc. By contrast, SDT—emanating from the discipline of psychology—identiies
conditions under which members are likely to experience intrinsic motivation
with respect to their church involvement. Certain congregations, despite being
affiliated with denominations in severe decline, are experiencing dramatic growth
(Malphurs, 1999). SDT hypothesizes that when members’ needs for competence,
autonomy, and relatedness are met within the church setting, those churches will
experience higher levels of growth, attendance, and contributions than churches
not doing as well at meeting these basic needs in their members.

Research Methodology

In the church growth study (Baard, 1994), preliminary meetings explaining

the purpose of the research were held with the pastors of three churches of dif-
fering denominations. These leaders were asked to endorse the research from
their pulpits and/or in their weekly bulletins announcing church activities. On
the research date, prospective survey participants were handed a packet of mate-
rials, including an explanatory letter assuring confidentiality, a two-page survey,
and a stamped return envelop. The sample cooperation level was at least 50° for
each of the surveyed churches.
One instrument used was the Needs Satisfaction Index-Church (Ryan &
Baard, 1997), patterned after the NSI-Work questionnaire. Sample items appear
in Table 12-5. The Christian Religious Internalization Scale (CRIS) was also
included in the survey. ‘The CRIS is a 12-item measure with Likert-like scales
designed to assess the degree to which participation in religious activities is
autonomous or self-motivated versus controlled (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993).

Findings

Results of the study provided support for the relevance of SDT to motiva-
tion in the church domain. Attendance, giving, and growth levels of the church-
es were all related to the satisfaction levels of attendees’ needs for competence,
autonomy, and relatedness in their church experiences (Baard, 1994).
 Motivation in Organizations 269

Sample Items from Need Satisfaction Index: Church

Autonomy

—My church is really open to suggestions from its members.

—I feel pressured at church. (Reverse score.)

Competence

—I don’t think the sermons I hear at my church are very stimulating. (Reverse score.)

—I’ve been able to learn interesting new things at church.

Relatedness

—People at church are pretty friendly toward me.

—There are not many people at work that I am close to. (Reverse score.)

Table 12.5

Findings included a similar pattern within each church regarding the self-
motivation of behaviors, and the church that had the highest scores for meeting
members’ intrinsic needs also had the highest mean level of self-motivated behav-
ior, which was associated with greater enjoyment of the religious experience
(Ryan et al., 1993).

Implications for Church Practices

In 1980, an ambitious seminary graduate, Rev. Rick Warren, set out to start
a church from scratch on the West Coast in an area where a young, growing pop-
ulation seemed uninterested in organized religion. By introducing some innova-
tive ideas for a house of worship, Saddleback Community Church in Orange
County, California has enjoyed dramatic and persistent growth. From an initial
membership of two (the pastor and his wife), weekly attendance grew to over
14,000 people (Warren, 1995). Practices implemented by this church leader with
respect to empowerment, growth, and connectedness can be readily identified as
consistent with SDT. While some denominations are more hierarchically struc-
tured and thus less institutionally empowering than others, what a pastor does at
270 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

the congregational level can ameliorate the potentially damaging effects of hier-
archy on congregational members. The following identifies some of the things
Saddleback does as an organization. Also listed are some means with which most
local church leaders can satisfy the innate psychological needs identified by SDT.

Autonomy

Church leaders can note that SD'T’s assertion of an innate need for autono-
my is consistent with Scripture’s depiction of humanity’s being given self-deter-
mination at its very origin, as depicted in Genesis 2:16 (WIV Study Bible, 1985). In
church involvement, autonomy is about experiencing choice—about not feeling
pressured. Saddleback’s pastor makes a practice of empowering people, allowing
members with an idea for a ministry to begin putting it in place, so long as it does
not violate the church’s stated principles. The church provides support as need-
ed. Participation in small spiritual growth groups is encouraged, yet no pressure
is put on members to do so. Similarly, when a particular financial need arises, the
congregation is merely informed, and members are left to make their own deci-
sion regarding increased giving. As to preaching, Warren declares “People need
fewer ‘ought-to’ sermons, and more ‘how-to’ sermons” (Warren, 1995, p. 229).
Any pastor or local church leader can make it a daily practice to work toward
meeting parishioners’ needs for self-determination. A few examples appear in
Table 12-6.

Church Leader Behaviors that Support Autonomy

1. Offer a say in parish activities

— including an occasional questionnaire in weekly bulletin soliciting input for sermon

topics, song selections, ministry needs.

2. Invite rather than pressure

resisting a “should” orientation in sermons; taking a more inviting, less-pressuring

approach to instruction in godly living.

3. Permit freedom of expression

do not confuse an individual’s expressed disagreement with a church policy with

actual defiance of it.

4. Acknowledge contributions without a “hook”

—avoiding public lists of contributors as a means to subtly pressure people to look

good by giving.

Table 12.6
 Motivation in Organizations 2H)

Competence

Genesis 1:26-28 depicts humanity being given responsibility over all the
earth and its creatures (W/V Study Bible, 1985). In the religious context, compe-
tence can be viewed as a challenge to growth in a spiritual sense. New knowledge
as well as opportunities to serve are salient variables in the church experience.
The innate need for competence can be satisfied in a church involvement by
learning new things of a theological nature, growing in one’s relationship with
God, or contributing to the congregation’s work.
The Saddleback Church endeavors to have its people mature in their faith
by offering a series of formal learning opportunities organized to take a person
from an initial introduction to the Christian faith through actually becoming lay
ministers (Warren, 1995). Each is able to progress at his or her own pace, attend-
ing courses as time and interest permit. Weekly sermons are well-prepared,
designed to promote mastery, over time, of many theological issues. Principles of
faith are consistently related to matters of daily living. An ultimate goal of the
church’s educational programs is to equip each member to conduct his or her
own ministry with competence.
At the local congregation level, priests, ministers, and lay leaders can take
into account the importance of members’ satisfying their need for competence.
Illustrations of possible initiatives appear in Table 12-7.

Church Leader Behaviors that Support Competence

1. Deliver quality sermons

—naking certain preparation is sufficient for this primary learning opportunity each
week, and that insights offered are neither too obvious nor too esoteric.

2. Set achievable goals

—acknowledging “all fall short” of living a godly life, the pastor included.

3. Use parishioners’ talents

—making access to committees and ministries known to all.

4. Extend opportunities for further growth

—scheduling learning events such as Bible studies at convenient times so

that working people and those with evening responsibilities can participate.

Table 12.7
Die. HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Relatedness

The idea of people being designed to be in relationship with others first

appears in the Bible in Genesis 2:18 (New International Version Study Bible, 1985).
Houses of worship would certainly seem to offer natural occasions to satisfy one’s
need for relatedness—to feel connected with others. Lronically, this is not the
experience of many (Warren, 1995). Cliques and organizational exclusion often
greet visitors to churches. Saddleback worked hard to make itself inviting to a
first-time visitor and very supportive for on-going members. Ushering efforts
begin out in the parking lots, as visitors are assisted in locating a space and get-
ting a golf-cart ride from remote spaces and are made to feel genuinely welcome.
Sunday services are designed so that even the most unchurched person will not
feel lost or put off by strange liturgical practices. For example, because
Saddleback’s research revealed new attendees are often reluctant to sing aloud,
the church shifted it’s emphasis toward less participative singing and more hymns
being performed.
Informal, pot-luck dinners and gatherings provide ample opportunities for
families and singles alike to form and maintain church-based relationships.
Weekly encounters at any church provide opportunities for pastors to facilitate
fulfillment of people’s relatedness need (examples appear in Table 12-8).

Church Leader Behaviors that Support Relatedness

1. Promote connection at services

—having people greet those sitting nearby at some point; replacing immediate
conversation with familiar others with an intentional outreach first.

2. Greet each person upon entry and exit

—making visitors a priority, encouraging members with church business

questions to wait.

3. Build a sense of family

including social information items such as births and illnesses in the

church bulletin.

4. Create a shared, emotional experience

encouraging the singing of songs at the Sunday worship service if

members are comfortable doing that.

Table 12.8
 Motivation in Organizations 27S

Conclusion

SDT presents guidelines for a systemic means of accomplishing many of the

outcomes leaders pursue across a range of human involvements. It offers a dis-
tinct approach in management theory explaining how work organizations as well
as individuals at any level of leadership can do things that promote self-motivat-
ing experiences in employees. A body of empirical research has established that
support of the three innate psychological needs leads to greater enjoyment and
participation, better performance, and reduced stress in a variety of settings. By
contrast, thwarted satisfaction of these needs has maladaptive consequences.
Similarly, in houses of worship, members can either become more fully engaged
or be put off by their salient motivational experiences, which in turn are depend-
ent upon a leader’s and/or a church’s practices.
Leaders face daily choices of whether to empower or control, to offer help-
ful feedback or blame, to promote cooperation or competition. Their choices
have motivational consequences ranging from the quantity and quality of the
work that gets done, to the well-being of those who do it.

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13: Self-Determination Theory and Participation
Motivation Research in the Sport and Exercise Domain

Christina M. Frederick-Recascino
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Motivation in the sport and exercise domain was an early topic of interest to
sport psychologists. Even in the first sport psychology textbooks, motivation was
a primary area of study and was given at least a chapter or more (Harris, 1973;
Alderman, 1974). Typically, motivation in sport has been discussed in terms of
both participation motivation and achievement motivation. Those individuals
who focused on achievement tended to use Atkinson’s (1974) cognitive framework
based on McClelland’s (1961) concept of need for achievement, although more
recently some (e.g, Wong & Bridges, 1995) have applied Harter’s competence
motivation theory (Harter, 1981;1978). In contrast, researchers in the domain of
participation motivation have been more diverse and atheoretical in focus, and
their studies have included a wide spectrum of age groups and sports (Gill, Gross
& Huddleston, 1983; Gould, Feltz & Weiss, 1985; McGuire & Cook, 1983).
During the 1990’s there was substantial interest in the study of participation
motivation (Duda, Chi, Newton, Walling & Catley, 1995; George & Feltz, 1995;
Kerr, 1997; Roberts & Treasure, 1995), and this chapter focuses on this newer
work in participation motivation for sport and exercise. The chapter will, first,
present an overview of theories used in understanding participation motivation,
with primary attention devoted to self-determination theory. Second, the chapter
discusses the research using self-determination theory and the contribution of
this research for understanding sport participation. Last, suggestions will be made
about the future of participation motivation research as the new millennium
begins.

The author acknowledges the continued contribution of Richard M. Ryan and

Craig Morrison to this work, as well as the editorial assistance of Bonny Bryan.
 278 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Participation Motivation in

Sport

During the 1990’s, primary attention was paid to linking participation moti-
vation research to theory. These efforts took several directions, but two of the
most popular theoretical perspectives for research generation were self-efficacy
and goal perspective theories.
Self-efficacy and sport motivation. Self-efficacy theory is a framework for under-
standing human behavior which uses a socio-cognitive approach (Bandura,
1986). Within this theory, efficacy can be defined as a person’s belief in his or her
ability and capacity to enact goal-directed behaviors within a domain of activity.
An individual develops efficacy expectations via a number of sources including
past performance, physiological states, vicarious experiences related to an activi-
ty, and verbal persuasion cues (Feltz, 1988). The individual then uses his or her
efficacy expectations to initiate, engage, and persist in a given activity (Feltz
1992). In sport, high efficacy expectations are theorized to motivate greater ini-
tial engagement in an activity, as well as promote repeated experiences with that
activity.
The goals approach. Another popular theoretical framework for understanding
motivation for sport and exercise is the goals approach (Duda, 1992; Nicholls,
1984, 1989). As in self-efficacy theory, the goals approach places primary empha-
sis on perceptions of competence. Toward the overall end of developing compe-
tence, an individual can assume one of two different orientations — a task or ego
orientation. A task orientation, also labeled_a-mastery-goal
orientation, focuses
on the process of initiating challenging activities, exerting effort within an activ-
ity, and persisting at the activity (Ames, 1992; Duda, 1992). Task orientation has
been related to intrinsic motivation for an activity (e.g, Dweck, 1985), On the
other hand, an ego orientation, also referred to as a performance-goal orienta-
tion, involves a focus on performance evaluations. When operating under an ego
orientation, a comparative process of self-worth is developed wherein one’s feel-
ings of competence and worth are based on successful completion of tasks in
comparison to other individuals’ performance on those same tasks.
Within the domain of sport or physical activity, it is hypothesized that when
initial attraction to a sport or exercise activity involves a mastery-goal orientation,
rather than a performance-goal orientation, the orientation will facilitate learn-
ing new skills related to the sport or activity (Dweck, 1986)! A task or mastery ori-
entation has also been favorably linked to higher participation motivation (White
& Duda, 1994; Williams & Gill, 1995), greater perceptions of competence
_ (Williams, 1991), and more adaptive attributions about success or failure (Newton
& Duda, 1993), /
 Participation Motivation 2d9

Self-Determination Theory and Sport Participation

The theories discussed so far have contributed in significant ways to under-

standing sport motivation. However, their cognitive emphasis and their central
focus on competence or efficacy has limited their discussion of other important
factors that initiate motivated behavior. Self-determination theory (SDT), in con-
trast, provides a more comprehensive framework by considering issues of auton-
omy and relatedness, as well as those of competence, in predicting sport and
exercise participation. More specifically, SDT begins with the premise that there

‘aonomy, Kamperense and palaveduess to ouhers As fadividuals we seek support

for these needs in order to have a healthy psychological environment within
which to exist. In the participation motivation literature, most empirical focus has
been on the needs for autonomy and competence because satisfaction of these
needs has reliably been shown to be necessary for intrinsically motivated behay-
ior. Still, relatedness can play an important role in promoting participation moti-
vation, especially for less interesting activities.
When individuals are in a state of intrinsic motivation, they experience
choicefulness in their behavior, thereby fulfilling their need for autonomy.
Additionally, they are at a level of optimal challenge, which fulfills their compe-
tence need. A state of intrinsic motivation is associated with feelings of satisfac-
tion, enjoyment, competence, and the desire to persist at the activity. Sport and
exercise for many individuals provide domains in which intrinsic motivation is
frequently present. Experiencing “flow,” or being in “the zone,” widely discussed
in athletic experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1975) is understood in self-deter-
mination theory as representing the heightened awareness and feelings of well-
being associated with intrinsic motivation.
On the other hand, when one fails to experience optimal challenge and
autonomy, a state of extrinsic control is necessary if participation is to occur
(Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Ryan, Koestner & Deci, 1991). In
sport, motives reflecting pressure to participate and those resulting from the need
for status or approval are reflective of an extrinsic motivational orientation. Here,
people are not motivated by enjoyment of the activity itself, but instead see the
activity as a means to some other end.
When examining sport and exercise motivation using self-determination the-
ory, some researchers have focused on which motives and psychological needs
prompt participation (autonomy, competence, or relatedness) and others have
focused on factors that influence a person’s level of intrinsic motivation versus
extrinsic control for an activity. The latter body of significant research is typical-
ly discussed using the subtheory of SDT referred to as cognitive evaluation the-
ory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Frederick & Ryan, 1995; Ryan, Vallerand, & Deci,
1984). Because participation motivation is the focus of the present chapter, the
research that has been dedicated to determining how factors such as rewards,
280 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

feedback, and competition enhance or undermine intrinsic motivation, is not

addressed further here.

SDT’s Contributions to Understanding Sport Motivation

Three recent efforts have been made to develop scales to measure partici-
pation motivation, using the SDT framework. Two of these (Goudas, Biddle, &
Fox, 1994; Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, Tuson, Briere, & Blais, 1995) used a model
of motivation based in the concept of perceived locus of causality (PLOC: Ryan
& Connell, 1989). This model involves the concepts of intrinsic motivation as
well as different types of extrinsic motivation. More specifically, it suggests that
there are four different types of regulation that can underlie activities that are not
intrinsically motivated. These types of regulation can be placed along a continu-
um that specifies the degree to which the type of regulation represents autono-
my. At the least autonomous end of the continuum is externally regulated behay-
ior, which is behavior that is entirely controlled by external contingencies. In
order for an individual to move toward self-determination with respect to such a
behavior, regulation of the activity must be internalized. The first level of inter-
nalization is referred to as introjected regulation. At this level, which can be thought
of as partial internalization, the individual regulates his or her behavior in order
to gain social approval or avoid disapproval, or to gain self-worth or avoid self-
disparagement. At the next level of self-regulation, which involves a fuller inter-
nalization, the individual moves from seeking social approval into more self-
determined motives, based in perceptions of the value, benefits, and importance
of a behavior to one’s self. This level of regulation is referred to as identified regu-
lation. At the last and most self-determined level of regulation, integrated regulation,
the individual develops organization and correspondence among values, atti-
tudes, and regulations across various behavioral domains, thus creating a sense of
congruence in one’s self and actions (Deci & Ryan, 1991).
Research within this framework has occurred across a variety of domains,
including education/academies (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987, 1989; Grolnick, Ryan,
& Deci, 1991; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Vallerand, Blais, Briere, & Pelletier, 1989),
religion (Ryan, Rigby & King, 1993), marital relations (Blais, Sabourin, Boucher,
& Vallerand, 1990), health care (Ryan, Plant, & O’Malley, 1995) and work (Deci,
Connell & Ryan, 1989). Based on knowledge derived from these various domains,
predictions were made about how the type of motivation individuals have toward
sport and physical activity influences such outcomes as adherence, emotion, and
well-being. It has been predicted that individuals who participate in sport or exer-
cise for intrinsic motives or for well-internalized extrinsic reasons would experi-
ence higher levels of positive affect, increased perceptions of satisfaction and
competence, and persist at the activity longer. Less well internalized extrinsic
 Participation Motivation 281

motivation was expected to relate to lower levels of positive affect, less self-
reported satisfaction and competence, and lower reports of adherence to the
activity.
Across studies in all these domains, research results clearly indicate that level
of internalization (i.e., the degree of autonomy) does influence affect and behav-
ior within each domain. More specifically, levels of internalization that represent
greater self-determination (1.e., identified and integrated regulation), like intrinsic
motivation, are associated with positive affect, as well as greater achievement,
persistence, effort expenditure, and well-being. On the other hand, external and
introjected regulatory styles are associated with higher levels of anxiety and less
activity persistence. For example, results from the Ryan & Connell (1989) study
indicated that a higher level of internalization (identified or integrated regula-
tion) related positively to higher levels of school enjoyment, effort in school,
empathy and social connectedness to others. Likewise, Blais et al. (1990) found
greater marital adjustment to be associated with higher levels of internalization
of motives for living with one’s spouse, while lower levels of marital adjustment
were associated with external and introjected levels of internalization.

Perceived Locus of Causality and Sport

As noted, research using the PLOC approach to address issues of motivation

within the sport and exercise domain have employed two scales. One, a short ver-
sion of the Perceived Locus of Causality Scale, was developed by Goudas, et al.,
(1994). This scale, which was created for use with children, measures level of self-
regulation and amotivation with regard to physical education classes. Using the
Perceived Locus of Causality Scale for children, Goudas et al., (1994) and
Chatzisarantis and Biddle (1996) have shown greater internalization of motiva-
tion for physical education classes to be positively related to greater intent to exer-
cise during leisure hours.
The other assessment tool that uses the PLOC approach is the Sport
Motivation Scale (SMS: Pelletier et al., 1995). This scale is a 28-item self-report
scale with seven subscales. Three subscales assess the types of intrinsic motivation
for sport: intrinsic motivation to learn, intrinsic motivation to accomplish things,
and intrinsic motivation to experience stimulation. Three subscales assess the lev-
els of extrinsic regulation: external, introjected, and identified regulation. The
seventh subscale provides a measure of amotivation. Results of initial work in
sport and exercise with the SMS indicate outcomes similar to those found within
other domains (Pelletier et al., 1995). Amotivation was found to be negative-
ly correlated with perceived competence and effort, while showing a positive cor-
relation with distraction. In contrast, all three types of intrinsic motivation as well
as identified regulation were positively related to perceived competence and effort
and negatively related to distraction. The SMS has also been used to study other
aspects of behavior within the sport domain, including gender and sport-related
282 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

differences in motivation (Chantal, Guay, Dobreva-Martinova, & Vallerand,

1996; Fortier, Vallerand, Briere, & Provencher, 1995; Losier & Vallerand, 1994;
Vallerand & Losier, 1994).

Participation Motivation

The third scale to be developed using self-determination theory as a starting

point for the study of sport motivation is focused on different types of motives for
participation rather than on the PLOC-based regulatory styles. The inital
Motivation for Physical Activities Measure (MPAM: Frederick, 1991; Frederick &
Ryan, 1993) and its revision (MPAM-Revised: Ryan, Frederick, Lepes, Rubio &
Sheldon, 1997) examine specific outcome-oriented goals that motivate sport or
exercise behaviors. These goals are then organized and discussed in terms of the
types of motivation they reflect or the basic psychological needs they most close-
ly address.
The MPAM-R is a 30-item, self-report scale that assesses five types of adult,
participation motivation: interest/enjoyment motives (e.g., “Because it is fun”),
competence motives (e.g., “Because I like engaging in activities that physically
challenge me”), fitness motives (e.g., “Because | want to be physically fit”),
appearance-based motives (e.g., “Because I want to define my muscles so I look
better”), and social motives (e.g., “Because I want to be with my friends”). Of
these five, interest/enjoyment and competence motives reflect intrinsic motiva-
tion toward physical activity, whereas appearance-based motives are extrinsic in
nature, tending to reflect introjected regulation, and fitness motives reflect the rel-
atively autonomous form of motivation represented in identified regulation.
Social motives reflect the need for relatedness.
The MPAM-R has been used to relate participation motives to adherence
variables, emotional attitudes associated with sport, and personality characteris-
tics of participants (Frederick & Morrison, 1996; Frederick, Morrison, &
Manning, 1996; Ryan, et al., 1997). The remaining pages of this chapter are
devoted to examining theory and research addressing these individual differences
using the MPAM-R.

Activity-Related Differences in Goals: The Different

Motives behind Sport and Exercise

Because the focus of the MPAM approach is on people’s goals in engaging

in an activity, it can be applied to the issue of why people differentially partici-
pate in different physical activities. Theoretically, a focus on outcomes related to
sport that are different from the enjoyment of the sport itself (e.g., winning, los-
 Participation Motivation 283

ing weight, or increasing a player’s salary) would indicate an extrinsic motiva-

tional orientation toward sport. On the other hand, sports or exercise activities
that emphasize immersion in the experience of the activity, or that focus on
process goals, seem to be more congruent with an intrinsic motivational orienta-
tion. When participants are attuned to the experience, rather than to outcomes,
they are likely to feel enjoyment and seek out personal challenges without fear of
failure (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Duda et al., 1995).
One focus of research using the MPAM approach has been to examine
whether individuals show motivational differences based on the type of sport or
exercise activity in which they are engaged. Are there certain types of sport for
which an extrinsic focus might be more prevalent and other types where an
intrinsic orientation may prevail? For example, participation in activities that are
frequently used to increase attractiveness or lose weight and tend to be experi-
enced as repetitive and boring (e.g. stairclimbing, walking on a treadmill) may
result from extrinsic motivation. In contrast, exercise or sport activities that are
freely chosen, provide challenge, and allow participants to focus on the activity
may be conducive to intrinsic participation motivation. As examples of this type
of research, Frederick (1991) and Frederick and Ryan (1993) divided respondents
into two sport groups: fitness activity participants (e.g., weightlifters, aerobic class
participants), and individual sport participants (e.g., tennis players, martial arts
participants). Comparing these groups it was found that individual sport partici-
pants showed significantly higher interest and competence motivation, and sig-
nificantly lower appearance motivation, than fitness activity participants. ‘These
results indicated that individual sport participants focused more on engagement
in their activity, a quality characteristic of an intrinsic orientation. In contrast, fit-
ness group individuals used their activity as a means to reach their goal of
becoming more attractive or fit. This type of motivation is more likely to be
found at an introjected or identified level of regulation.
Ryan et al. (1997) compared motivational differences in two different exer-
cise groups. The first group included members of an aerobics class and the sec-
ond consisted of participants in a Tae Kwon Do class. ‘Types of motivation for
each activity were contrasted using the MPAM-R. Results of this comparison
indicated that participants in the aerobics class had significantly higher body-
related motives than did the Tae Kwon Do participants. On the other hand, ‘Tae
Kwon Do participants showed higher levels of enjoyment and competence
motives than did the aerobics’ participants. These findings substantiate those
shown in the previous studies discussed above.
Participants in a more recent study (Frederick, 1999) showed a similar pattern
of motivational differences based on activity type. In this sample, two activity
groupings were created: a sport group (consisting of individual and team sport par-
ticipants), and a fitness activity group. Mean differences between these groups were
examined on the MPAM-R subscales. Consistent with the Frederick and Ryan
(1993) work, results indicated that the sport group showed higher levels of inter-
est/enjoyment and competence motivation than did fitness activity participants.
284 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

In the case of variations in motivational orientation by activity type, theory

and research are consistent. Participants engaged in activities associated with a
focus on physical appearance show higher levels of extrinsic motivation than par-
ticipants in other sport or exercise activities. Namely, activities such as aerobic
dance classes, body building and fitness center workouts may appeal to a differ-
ent type of participant who shows less self-determination with respect to their
participation. In contrast, participants who focus more on the experience of
engaging in the activity, such as those in individual sports, tend to have higher lev-
els of self-determination toward their activity.

Gender Differences in Participation Motivation

One of the first areas of inquiry using the MPAM was an examination of
gender differences in participation motivation (Frederick, 1991). Although, self-
determination theory hypothesizes the same underlying psychological needs for
men and women, societal influences can contribute to greater salience of specif-
ic motives for each gender.
Early research using the MPAM found that gender differences existed for
competence and body-related types of motivation (Frederick, 1991). Men showed
significantly higher competence motivation than women, reflective of the tradi-
tional emphasis placed on men to be competent and dominant in domains of life
judged to be related to male behaviors (e.g., work, sports, mechanical ability). On
the other hand, in motivation related to physical attractiveness and appearance
women showed higher scores (Frederick, 1991). This result was also not surpris-
ing and likely related to traditional pressures placed on women in American soci-
ety to adhere to norms for attractiveness. Also using the MPAM, results of the
Frederick and Ryan (1993) study showed a similar pattern of results. Although in
this sample, there were no gender differences in competence motivation, women
did show significantly higher scores for body-related motivation than did men.
In two more recent samples in which the MPAM-R was used to assess par-
ticipation motivation, sex differences in motives occurred in both samples. In a
study designed primarily to examine the relations between motivation and exer-
cise, Frederick, Morrison, and Manning (1996) found differences in body-appear-
ance and fitness motives with women showing higher scores than men on both of
these dimensions. No gender differences were shown for interest/enjoyment,
competence, or social motives. In Frederick and Morrison’s (1996) study, which
related social physique anxiety to motivation, gender differences in motivation
were also apparent. Identical to the Frederick, Morrison, and Manning (1996)
study, results indicated that women reported higher levels of body-appearance
and fitness motivation. Again, no gender differences were found for
interest/enjoyment, competence, or social motives.
 Participation Motivation 285

Overall, the conclusion can be drawn that women evidence more appear-
ance and fitness-related motivation than do their male counterparts. This is not
surprising in a society that endorses stringent standards of physical beauty for its
female members. What should also be noted is that recent studies have not found
the same difference in competence motivation between sexes that was evidenced
in the original MPAM work. While initial studies indicated that competent
women athletes were viewed as less desirable role models than competent male
athletes (Griffin, 1973), later research shows no such effects (Brown, 1988;
Kingsley, Brown, & Seibert, 1977; Vickers, Lashuk, & Taerum, 1980; ). Female
sport and exercise participants may now feel that it is more acceptable to express
their desires to achieve and become competent as motivating factors in their par-
ticipation, without experiencing social stigma.

Motivation Across Age Groups

Research within the sport and exercise domain has found age-related differ-
ences in motivation. In studies involving youths (Buonamano, Cei, & Mussino,
1995; Gill, Gross, and Huddleston, 1983; Klint and Weiss, 1987; Sapp and
Haubenstricker, 1978; Whitehead, 1995) evidence suggests that intrinsic motives,
such as fun, enjoyment, skill development, and challenge, supersede other
motives in explaining their sport participation. Research with young and middle-
aged adults, however, indicates that a more diverse set of motives drives these
older sport and exercise participants (Biddle and Bailey, 1985; Gill, Williams,
Dowd, Beaudoin, and Martin, 1996; Mathes and Battista, 1985; Summers et al.,
1983, 1982). Adults, while maintaining aspects of intrinsic motivation, have other
motives for their participation in physical activity. These additional motives tend
to reflect a more extrinsic orientation and include fitness motivation, stress
release, and weight control.
Within self-determination theory, as studied using the MPAM, age has been
a relatively neglected variable of interest. Predictions within the theory tend to
correspond with results from the studies discussed above. It is in the area of play
and physical activity that children may first experience and test their levels of
competence and autonomy. With age and the development of cognitive ability
would come the experience and recognition of outside pressures as determinants
of behavior within the realm of play or physical activity, and extrinsic motiva-
tions might become quite prevalent for participation in various types of exercise
and sport by young and middle-aged adults.
On the other end of the age spectrum is the question of motivation for sport
and exercise in older adults. Although older adults are living longer and are in
better physical condition than in previous generations (Horn & Meer, 1987;
Kolata, 1996), they also tend to engage in regular physical exercise less than
286 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

younger individuals (Leventhal, Prohaska, & Hirschman, 1985). Thus, for older
adults, overall motivation for exercise appears to decline as these individuals age,
but for those older adults who do exercise regularly, the nature of their motiva-
tions toward exercise is still unknown.
In recent study (Frederick, 1999), age-related differences in adult motivation
were assessed for individuals between 18 and 51 years of age. Correlations
among age and the five MPAM-R factors showed that age correlated significant-
ly and negatively with interest, competence, appearance, and social motives. Age
was not correlated with fitness motives. These results would indicate that with an
increase in age comes a decrease in both intrinsic and extrinsic motivates.
However, further data need to be collected with a larger age range to truly assess
motivational changes for sport and exercise across all age groups.

Motivation and Adherence

Perhaps one of the most important and compelling reasons for studying
motivation in the sport and exercise domain is the desire to link motivation with
adherence. In fields such as education, self-determined motivation has been
found to relate positively with persistence (Deci & Ryan, 1985). If this relation
between motivation and adherence also exists for sport and exercise behavior,
then it could be a key to promoting health in the general population.
Frederick (1991) and Frederick and Ryan (1993) found clear relations
between participation motivation and self-reports of adherence in exercise.
Interest/enjoyment and competence motives were positively related to the num-
bers of hours per week one exercised. In contrast, although body-related moti-
vation (an extrinsic orientation) was positively related to days per week of exer-
cise, it was negatively related to hours per week of exercise, self-reported length
of participation in the current activity and estimated length of future participa-
tion. This suggests, then, that overall the motives affiliated with intrinsic motiva-
tion yielded greater adherence than those more extrinsically focused.
Ryan et al. (1997) found comparable results in the initial MPAM studies. In
this work, ‘Tae Kwon Do participants showed greater adherence to their activity
than did aerobics class participants. Analyses examining the role of motivation in
predicting adherence found that these differences in adherence were explained by
the greater interest/enjoyment motivation expressed by the Tae Kwon Do par-
ticipants. A second sample examined in the Ryan et al. study indicated that long-
term adherence at a fitness center was associated with interest/enjoyment, com-
petence, and social motives, but was unrelated to appearance or fitness motives.
‘Together, the studies showed links between motivational orientation toward
exercise and adherence-related variables, which are in line with SDT.
Interest/enjoyment and competence motivations for sport and exercise are
intrinsic in nature (Frederick & Ryan, 1993), and individuals experiencing this
 Participation Motivation 287

type of motivation may enter a state of absorption in an activity for which time
becomes irrelevant. This state, similar to flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990),
could easily explain the relationship between intrinsic participation motives and
increased levels of adherence.
Individuals who exercise for extrinsic reasons, however, have a different
motivational experience. Extrinsic motivation, such as the body-image motive,
tends to be characterized by a sense of control, guilt, and pressure to participate
(Deci & Ryan, 1985). Exercisers who are oriented in this manner, may feel a push
to exercise a set number of days per week to meet fitness requirements, but they
do not persist for long on each of those visits to the gym. An example of such a
person might be the exerciser who goes to the gym three days a week, does a
compulsory 20 minute workout, and then leaves.
In addition, participants who have a higher extrinsic orientation report less
persistence in the duration (in months or years) of their exercise regimen and do
not foresee themselves persisting at this activity into the future (Frederick, 1991).
Although these individuals may, at present, be ritualistic in their participation,
their self-reported attitudes about their participation may not bode well for their
long-term physical health.
Findings from Frederick (1999) were relatively consistent with the results just
discussed. In that study, both interest/enjoyment motivation and competence
motivation were positively correlated with both hours per week of exercise and
days per week of exercise. By contrast, the two extrinsically based motives,
appearance and fitness, were uncorrelated with days per week or hours per week
of exercise. Frederick (1999) also found social motivation to be positively corre-
lated with both hours per week of exercise and days per week of exercise.
Overall, the work relating motivation to adherence is important for its imph-
cations regarding health and fitness. Recent estimates indicate 31% of the adult
male population and 24% of the adult female population in the United States are
overweight (National Research Council, 1989). In addition, cardiovascular dis-
ease and heart attacks account for 38% of the deaths in this country (USDHHS,
1992). One proven way to help maintain a lower body weight, lower blood pres-
sure, and lower risk of coronary heart disease is through regular physical activity
(Bernard & Krupat, 1994). Results of work with the MPAM-R suggests that exer-
cise and activity settings that foster an intrinsic, and perhaps social, motivational
orientation would help promote greater engagement in, and adherence to, phys-
ical activity.

Motivation, Emotion, and Well-being in Physical Activity

Motivation, emotion, and personality have often been studied together

within self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, Connell, & Plant,
1990; Ryan & Frederick, 1997). Typically, an intrinsic orientation and the more
288 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

autonomous forms of extrinsic motivation have been associated with expression

of positive affect and healthy personality, whereas the less autonomous forms of
extrinsic motivation have been associated with negative affective states such as
feeling frustrated, tense, pressured, or controlled, as well as with less positive per-
sonality factors, such as low self-esteem.
Frederick and Ryan (1993) found some significant correlations between exer-
cise motivation and aspects of emotion and well-being that were consistent with
previous work. For example, interest/enjoyment and competence motives were
positively related to feelings of satisfaction about one’s chosen activity. Body-
related motives were negatively related to body appearance self-esteem and glob-
al self-esteem and were positively related to anxiety and depression. A later study
(Frederick & Morrison, 1996) showed that high body appearance motivation
related positively to anxiety about one’s physique.
In Frederick, Morrison and Manning (1996), mediational analyses were per-
formed to relate exercise motivation to exercise-related emotion (e.g., exercise ful-
fillment and satisfaction) and, in turn, to outcomes associated with participation,
such as hours per week of participation and perceived competence. The results
were only partially successful in delineating these relationships. For men, inter-
est/enjoyment motives positively predicted hours per week of exercise, and this
relation was mediated through exercise fulfillment. For women, both
interest/enjoyment motivation and self-development motivation predicted per-
ceived competence, and this was also mediated by feelings of exercise fulfillment.
When the results of these studies are examined as a whole, tentative conclu-
sions can be drawn about the relations among participation motivation, emotion,
and both behavioral and perceptual outcomes in the domain of physical activity.
In some cases, the relations between participation motivation and emotion were
direct, and in turn predicted levels of adherence, perceived competence, and sat-
isfaction. ‘Thus, the results suggest motivation does have important relations with
emotional functioning and adherence in the realm of sport and exercise, but
greater thought and study is needed. What will be important in the future are
studies using more sophisticated modeling techniques, which contribute new
understanding about how motivational factors, personality, emotion, and adher-
ence variables combine to explain participation in various kinds of physical activ-
ities for variously aged participants.

Conclusion -

Throughout this chapter, the relationship between self-determination theory

and sport motivation has been discussed. Research using the MPAM approach
developed out of SD'T has delineated the relations between both intrinsic and
extrinsic motives and a variety of factors such as activity differences, gender, age,
 Participation Motivation 289

adherence, personality variables, and emotion. In sport and exercise, as in other

contexts, the importance of creating an environment that allows intrinsic moti-
vation to flourish cannot be underestimated. Interest/enjoyment and compe-
tence motives within the physical activity domain were typically found to relate
positively to elements of adherence, personality and emotion. In addition, the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of participation were found rel-
evant in explaining age and activity-related differences in participation. ck
Although much work has already been done using SDT to explore en
motivation, there are old roads that need to be re-traveled and new ones that
need to be built. More sophisticated modeling and measurement strategies need
to be pursued for examining the relations among sport and exercise motivation,
personality, and emotion. Likewise, an in-depth longitudinal study of the emer-
gence of age-related changes and gender differences in motivation would be of
|
benefit in this area. a
New work can be started in a number of areas. Two distinct approaches have
been developed to study participation motivation within the context of self-deter-
mination theory. The first approach uses a self-regulation framework, and meas-
urement scales such as the SMS (Pelletier et al, 1995) and Perceived Locus of
Causality Scale for sports (Goudas, Biddle & Fox, 1994). Using the SMS along
with the MPAM-R would allow participation motives to be related directly to the
types of motivation enumerated by SDT rather than indirectly related as has
been done so far (Frederick & Ryan, 1993; Ryan, et al, 1997). A promising avenue
of research would examine not only how the SMS and the MPAM-R relate to
one another, but also how they could be used together to investigate motivation-
al issues in sport and exercise.
The interest/enjoyment scale of the MPAM-R is expected to relate positive-
ly to all three intrinsic motivation dimensions of the SMS, but most strongly with
the stimulation dimension. The competence factor of the MPAM-R should cor-
relate strongly with the two SMS intrinsic dimensions of knowledge and accom-
plishment. The appearance subscale of the MPAM is predicted to correlate pos-
itively with introjected and external levels of regulation, while the fitness subscale
should correlate most strongly with the identified level of regulation, but may also
be related to introjected regulation. It is unclear how social motivation would
relate to self-regulatory styles. However, study of the relationship between social
motivation in sport and self-regulation could open up another area of inquiry.
Assessment of changes in motivation over time is another line of inquiry that
needs to be addressed. No published study has yet considered questions sur-
rounding positive longitudinal changes in sport motivation. How does an indi-
vidual become more autonomous in motivational orientation for sport and exer-
cise, and what contexts foster or hinder such changes? It is reasonable to assume
that, as fitness participants levels and skills increase, personal motivational
changes could occur, which would then alter sport and exercise behavior. To fur-
ther understand the motivational process in sport, it is crucial to move from a
290 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

cross-sectional to a longitudinal approach to research. A recent study (B. Jensen,

personal communication, April 10, 1999) has begun to address some of these
issues. This in-progress work assesses exercise motives using the MPAM-R across
a six-month period in order to relate motivation to self-efficacy and adherence.
Finally, relatedness issues in sport motivation need to be addressed more
fully. Beginning with the MPAM-R, social motivation and its correlates are being
examined. However, the focus of SDT within sport has almost exclusively been
on examination of issues related to autonomy and competence, rather than social
issues of relatedness. Beyond the limited work done with the MPAM-R, little is
known about the workings of social participation motives in the sport context. It
is possible, for example, that relatedness could be involved in both extrinsic and
extrinsic aspects of participation motivation.
It can be said, in conclusion, that the future of motivation research within
the domain of sport and exercise is bright and growing brighter all the time. Self-
determination theory can be used as a unifying approach for the study and
understanding of sport motivation issues, and current research using SDT shows
potential for understanding and intervening in the motivational context to effect
positive changes in the health and well-being of the population.

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 PART IV
a

RELATED VIEWPOINTS
 <2 he oe \ callie 7 =e
a °. OG» 3S el) in
14: Self-Determination, Coping, and Development

Ellen Skinner
Kathleen Edge
Portland State University

“Don’t follow me, follow you.”

Nietzsche

All people’s lives include obstacles, troubles, failures, and loss. How people deal
with adversity—how they cope—influences the impact these events have on
them, not only in terms of momentary emotional states or the resolution of spe-
cific stressful episodes, but also cumulatively in their long-term mental and phys-
ical health. Because coping is so central to processes of adjustment and thriving,
much research has been devoted to analyzing the factors that allow people to
cope more adaptively.
From that body of research, consensus has emerged that two factors are cen-
tral in shaping how people cope. ‘They are a sense of control and social support.
Research across the lifespan shows that a person’s sense of control over desired
and undesired outcomes is a powerful ally in times of stress (Folkman, 1984).
People who are convinced of their own efficacy at overcoming obstacles are more
likely to appraise failures and stressors as challenges, to cope using problem-solv-
ing and strategizing, and to persevere and remain optimistic in the face of obsta-
cles. In contrast, people who believe themselves to be incompetent tend to panic
and show confusion when faced with setbacks, to become pessimistic and doubt-
ing, to ruminate and lose concentration, to escape the stressor if possible, and to

We express our gratitude to the Motivation Research Group, especially James

Connell, Edward Deci, Thomas Kindermann, and Richard Ryan. We would especially
like to acknowledge James Wellborn for his earlier work on conceptualization and meas-
ures of coping. We thank Teresa Young, Tatiana Snyder, Carrie Furrer, Linda Newton-
Curtis, Annie Torres, Joni Jannsen, and Elizabeth Vale for their work on earlier drafts of
the manuscript. We acknowledge support from the W. 'T. Grant Foundation and from the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD19914).
298 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

expect the worst about future stressful encounters (Bandura, 1997; Compas,
Banez, Malcarne, & Worsham, 1991; Dweck, 1999; Flammer, 1995; Folkman,
1984; Forsythe & Compas, 1987; Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; Skinner,
1995; Weiner, 1986).
The second major predictor of coping is social support. People who have
close, loving relationships fare better during stress than individuals who are more
socially isolated or who have conflictual personal relationships. Social support has
been shown to act as a buffer against psychological distress and has been linked
to such positive outcomes as lower rates of depression, decreased loneliness, and
a more positive self-image (Cohen, Sherrod, & Clark, 1986; Lepore, 1992; Pierce,
Sarason, & Sarason, 1991, 1996; Reis & Franks, 1994; Sarason et al., 1991;
Windle, 1992). Attachment theory suggests that the proximal predictors of cop-
ing are individuals’ experiences of social relationships as supportive (Bretherton,
1985) and points out that close relationships can therefore either promote or
undermine coping, depending on how they are experienced. Although the con-
nections among attachment, social support, and control are not completely clar-
ified, their importance to coping is nevertheless documented by decades of
research.
The goal of this chapter is to argue that there is an important set of psycho-
logical processes, in addition to those captured’by attachment and perceived con-
trol, that are central to the study of coping—namely, processes of autonomy.
Autonomy refers to the need to express one’s authentic self and to experience that
self as the source of action. It is hypothesized to underlie processes of self-deter-
mination (Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1987, 1991, 1995). At the present time, the con-
tribution of autonomy to the study of stress and coping is not fully realized.
However, we review research on self-determination as well as on infancy, tem-
perament, volition, self-regulation, and aging that points to the critical functions
of autonomy during stressful transactions with the environment.
Throughout the chapter, we also emphasize that processes of coping recip-
rocally shape autonomy. Coping episodes in which goals are blocked or in which
competing goals cannot be met, mark transactions of potential significance to the
development of autonomy. We argue that the contributions of stress and coping
to the study of autonomy have not yet been fully explored, and we hold that a
focus on self-determination and coping can be mutually informative, potentially
adding richness to conceptualizations and research in both areas.

Overview of the Chapter

We begin by providing background from self-determination theory about

autonomy as a fundamental human need, about the self-system processes con-
nected to autonomy, and about the social contexts that support versus undermine
their development. ‘The majority of the chapter focuses on the role of autonomy
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 299

in coping. Specifically, we argue that the self-systems and social supports con-
nected with autonomy are primary determinants of how people deal with stress,
that a focus on autonomy reveals several ways of coping that are not often dis-
tinguished in current taxonomies of coping, that autonomy plays a critical role in
moment-to-moment coping interactions, and that constructs of autonomy are
useful in characterizing the long-term regulatory capacities and relationship
qualities that link coping to development.
also show how the addition of autonomy to the current focus on social sup-
port and control can clarify several issues in the coping area, including the role of
secondary control, the adaptiveness of approach versus avoidance coping, and
intentionality in coping. Although our arguments emphasize that autonomy mat-
ters to coping, we also wish to highlight the reciprocal connection, namely, that
coping matters to autonomy. More specifically, coping marks the site of transac-
tions that influence the development of the self-system processes and relationship
qualities associated with autonomy. Because our goal is to add autonomy to con-
ceptualizations of coping and not to replace constructs of social support, attach-
ment, efficacy, or control, we begin by describing a motivational model which
incorporates work from all these areas.

The Motivational Model

The motivational model is an action-theoretical account of motivation, and

its goal is to provide a framework for explaining psychological sources of ener-
gized and directed action. The basic model, depicted graphically in Figure 14-1,
integrates work on attachment, perceived control, and self-determination. It does
so by assuming that each reflects the study of a basic psychological need—name-
ly, the needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy (Connell, 1990; Connell
& Wellborn, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 2000; Skinner, 1991). This assumption
is shared by researchers from many areas, as can be seen in numerous chapters
within the current volume.
According to the model, social contexts within different enterprises (e.g.,
family, work, daycare, school) differentially provide people with opportunities to
fulfill their fundamental psychological needs. From these experiences, individuals
construct and revise self-system processes organized around relatedness, compe-
tence, and autonomy. These self-system processes in turn guide people’s partici-
pation in the activities of the enterprise, including their coping.
Central to this model is the notion of “patterns of action.” Engaged versus
disaffected patterns of action are primary consequences of motivational processes
(Wellborn, 1991). Ongoing engagement refers to active, goal-directed, flexible,
constructive, persistent, focused interactions with the social and physical envi-
300 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

CONTEXT ————-> SELF ——— ACTION OUTCOME

Warmth Social
Vs. Relatedness Development
Hostility

ENGAGEMENT
Structure Cognitive
vs. Competence and Development
Chaos
COPING

Autonomy Personality
Support vs.
Development
Coercion

Figure 14.1. A Motivational Model of Context, Self, Action, and Outcomes.

ronments. In contrast, patterns of action are described as disaffected when indi-

viduals are emotionally alienated or behaviorally disengaged from participation
in an enterprise. Coping describes patterns of action when ongoing engagement
encounters resistance or is disrupted. Energetic resources (effort, executive capac-
ity, ego resources) are required to regulate actions. Action regulation under stress
is considered “coping.” Engagement and coping are critical mechanisms through
which motivational processes influence the quality of self-systems and social rela-
tionships and, over time, shape development.

Relatedness and Competence as Fundamental Psychological Needs

Within the literatures on attachment and control, it is not particularly con-

troversial to assert that infants are born with psychological needs, that is, with a
predisposition to be attracted to, interested in, and responsive to certain kinds of
stimulation or experiences. It is assumed that motivational proclivities are based
in physiology and that they are evolutionarily adaptive, in that they predispose
infants (and people in general) to attend and respond to certain important class-
es of interactions with the social and physical environments (Barrett & Campos,
1991).
 A Hierarchical Model 301

The attachment perspective is founded on the assumption that normal

infants are born with the capacity and desire to detect, seek out, initiate, and take
pleasure from interactions with social partners and to protest and defend against
separation (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Papousek & Papousek, 1980).
In the attachment area, it is assumed that infants’ cries and clinging (and care-
giver comforting and protection) are part of a mutually adaptive system that is
physiologically-based and that directs attention, behavior, and emotion. In the
motivational model, the need to experience oneself as connected to other peo-
ple, as belonging, is referred to as relatedness. The “need to belong” has been doc-
umented across the lifespan (Baldwin, 1992; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Weiner,
1991):
Competence refers to the need to experience oneself as effective in one’s inter-
actions with the social and physical environments. It is hypothesized to underlie
processes of control (Bandura, 1997; Peterson et al., 1993; Weiner, 1986). Within
work on perceived control, a group of theorists argue that infants are born with
the capacity and desire to create effects in the environment. ‘This “human ten-
dency” has been referred to as effectance motivation (Harter, 1978; White, 1959)
or competence motivation (Koestner & McClelland, 1990). Research has demon-
strated that infants are innately willing and able to detect, initiate, operate, pro-
long, and enjoy contingent interactions and that they show distress and frustra-
tion when faced with noncontingency (Watson, 1966; Watson & Ramey, 1972).
The psychophysiological basis of reactions to noncontingency has been docu-
mented (Gunnar, 1980) and provides one explanation for why prolonged expo-
sure to noncontingency is stressful and can compromise immune system func-
tioning (Seligman, 1975). These effects have also been documented across the
lifespan (J. Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Skinner, 1995). A goal of the motiva-
tional model is to bring together the consideration of both of these needs simul-
taneously and to posit the inclusion of a somewhat more controversial third fun-
damental psychological need—that for autonomy.

Autonomy as a Fundamental Psychological Need

A basic tenet of self-determination theory is that all people intrinsically

desire to be autonomous, that is, they innately desire to act according to their
genuine desires and preferences, to show courses of action that reflect their true
selves, and to experience themselves as the source of their own actions
(deCharms, 1968; Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991, 2000). It is clear that, from birth,
infants are able to vigorously express and defend their states, actions, desires, and
preferences, and that they protest restraint and pressure to act counter to their
desires. Stated colloquially, infants do not need to be told “No, tell me what you
really want.”
An autonomy perspective highlights the implications of these intrinsic abili-
ties and motivations, pointing out that infants are born with the capacity and will
302 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

to be autonomous. That is, all infants come with genuine preferences, desires,
and wants, and they are innately able and motivated to recognize them and to
show actions that express them. In fact, these patterns of expression are clear
enough to allow experienced caregivers to respond to infants’ actions appropri-
ately, that is, in concert with infants’ actual desires. Social interactions in which
caregivers respond appropriately to infants’ expressed wants and desires are psy-
chologically and physiologically beneficial to infants, contributing to the develop-
ment of intentionality, expressiveness, and personality (Zeedyk, 1996).
The assumption that normal humans come with the need for self-determi-
nation does not preclude individual differences in corresponding inborn capaci-
ties and desires. For example, individual differences in emotional expressiveness
and resistance to demands have been studied in work on temperament and emo-
tion regulation (Calkins, 1994). Individual differences in expressions of autono-
my are also influenced by the characteristics of the different social contexts in
which children and adults function and develop.

The Construction of Self-system Processes Associated with

Autonomy

Like researchers in the areas of self-determination, we believe that people

are inherently expressive and volitional. In addition, and in keeping with work
from many areas, we assume that individuals act on the motivations provided by
psychological needs in social contexts that are differentially responsive to them
(Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989;
Skinner, 1995). During these social interactions, people experience themselves as
differentially related, competent, and autonomous.
From these experiences, individuals cumulatively construct and revise views
of themselves and their social/physical worlds, referred to as selfsystem processes
(Connell & Wellborn, 1991). ‘These beliefs are not momentary self-perceptions.
They are relatively durable convictions about the nature of the self and the
world. Because self-system processes guide participation in and interpretation of
subsequent social interactions, they help create compelling experiences of
“apparent reality” (Fridja, 1988).
For autonomy, self-system processes have been studied as autonomy or goal
orientations (deCharms, 1968; Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991; Dweck, 1991; Kuhl,
1987; Ryan & Connell, 1989), and contain views about the self as genuine (ver-
sus inauthentic) and about the environment as encouraging open expression of
genuine preferences (versus being coercive). Based on a history of experience
with differential autonomy support versus coercion, people develop an orienta-
tion toward their own goals and actions, which becomes a critical individual dif-
ference factor shaping their motivation and participation. These orientations
have been described and measured in a variety of ways, including origin versus
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 303

pawn (deCharms, 1968); intrinsic versus extrinsic orientations (Harter, 1978);

learning versus performance goals (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988); and
self-regulatory styles (including external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic reg-
ulation; Ryan & Connell, 1989).

Social Contexts and the Construction of Self-system Processes

The model attempts to describe how social and physical contexts provide
people with opportunities to fulfill their needs (Connell & Wellborn, 1991; Deci
& Ryan, 1985b; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Skinner, 1995). Accordingly, people are
given opportunities to experience themselves as related and belonging when they
interact with social partners who love them, who are involved and emotionally
available, and who express affection, warmth, caring, and nurturance. When
social partners are hostile or neglectful, individuals experience themselves as
unlovable and the context as unavailable or untrustworthy (Ainsworth, 1979;
Lamb & Easterbrooks, 1981). People accumulate experiences of competence
when they interact with contexts that respond to them, and that are structured,
predictable, contingent, and consistent. When contexts, partners, or activities are
noncontingent, uncontrollable, or chaotic, people will come to experience them-
selves as incompetent (Bandura, 1981; Carton & Nowicki, 1994; Gunnar, 1980;
Schneewind, 1995; Skinner, Zimmer-Gembeck, & Connell, 1998; Suomi, 1980).
Support of autonomy. Opportunities to experience oneself as autonomous are
facilitated by contexts that are autonomy supportive (Deci & Ryan, 1987, 1991;
Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Reeve, Bolt, & Cai, 1999; Ryan, 1982; Ryan & Solky,
1996). Adults and children experience themselves as autonomous when they
interact with social partners or institutions who respect and defer to them, allow-
ing them freedom of expression and action, and encouraging them to attend to,
accept, and value their inner states, preferences, and desires.
Definitions of autonomy support, for example in parenting, tend to focus on
the absence of psychological control or coercion (Barber, 1996). However, sup-
port for autonomy extends beyond allowing an individual freedom of choice and
expression, to providing genuine respect and deference and encouraging individ-
uals to actively discover, explore, and articulate their own views, goals, and pref-
erences. Autonomy support characterizes interactions in which people are
expected to express their views and opinions and in which these are given weight
in decision-making and problem-solving. Social partners can participate actively
in this process through attempts to help the individual become aware of, reflect
on, and express his or her true feelings, intentions, and desires. This is especially
important with children and in situations when feelings are opaque or confusing.
Explanations that are accurate and that validate the person’s perspective can pro-
vide the person insight into his or her own goals and personality (for reviews, see
Barber, 1996; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Reeve et al., 1999).
304 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Autonomy supportive contexts can be distinguished from “permissive” con-

texts on several grounds. A permissive style, often used to refer to styles of par-
enting, describes a warm but laissez faire approach to interactions, which some-
times implies lax discipline, few maturity demands, benign neglect, or low struc-
ture (Baumrind, 1971, 1977). Autonomy support includes the freedom from
coercion implied by such an interaction style; however, an autonomy supportive
context is considered to be more involved and active in facilitating the develop-
ment of individuality. The goal of autonomy supportive partners is not to leave
the person alone, but to actively participate in interactions in which the individ-
ual discovers and expresses his or her true self.
Coercion. The opposite of autonomy support is coercion or controlling social
conditions (Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991; Ryan, 1982; Ryan & Solky, 1996). When
social partners or contexts are coercive, pressuring, or controlling, individuals
experience themselves as “pawns” (deCharms, 1968). Coercion can be conveyed
through many channels. The most obvious is direct exertion of force, through
threats, intimidation, or emotional blackmail. However, social contexts can also
be coercive if they are characterized by excessive rules, rigid prescriptions of
behavior, or demands for conformity. A social partner’s strong emotion, such as
intense anger or anxiety, can deflect an individual away from a genuinely desired
course of action. Even well-intentioned social contexts can be coercive if they are
overprotective, intrusively helpful, or insistently directive. These contextual fea-
tures tend to focus people on what “should” be happening and away from their
intrinsic involvement in tasks or activities (Dweck, 1999; Ryan, 1982).
A critical issue in defining the nature of coercive contexts is the distinction
between “informational” and “controlling” responses to one’s actions (Ryan,
1982). Many kinds of social reactions, such as praise, feedback, rewards, or eval-
uations, cannot be classified a priori as autonomy supportive or coercive. For
example, not all praise can be considered autonomy supportive nor all rewards
coercive. Instead, it depends on the quality of the reactions, specifically whether
the social response provides (or is experienced as providing) information that
would be helpful to improved performance (informational) or, alternatively, exerts
pressure to engage in certain actions (coercive). Social feedback can be “purely”
informational when it contains no pressure to carry out specific actions or it can
be “purely” coercive if it contains only an imperative and no information; and,
of course, some reactions contain both information and pressure.
However, it has been possible to distinguish empirically the features of social
messages that make them more coercive (including linguistic features like “should”
or “must”) from those that make them more informative (specific descriptions of
actions and their consequences), and these features have been linked in the
expected manner to individuals’ perceptions of autonomy support and to their
autonomous action (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994;
Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Reeve et al., 1999). Theoretically, informational
feedback can be seen as part of structure, which supports experiences of compe-
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 305

tence. Empirical studies document the effect of informational contexts on percep-

tions of competence and control (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Deci et al., 1999).
According to the model, autonomy support versus coercion, along with provision
of warmth/involvement versus hostility, and structure versus chaos, are contextu-
al supports that provide opportunities for individuals to fulfill their psychological
needs (see Figure 14-1).

A Motivational Model of Stress and Coping

The motivational model has been used as a springboard for addressing basic
issues in stress and coping, such as: What kinds of experiences are objectively
and universally stressful? What are the contents of appraisals of challenge and
threat? Why are behavioral and emotional reactions to stress so powerful and
compelling? What kind(s) of coping are adaptive? What kinds of personal and
social resources can support adaptive coping? (Skinner & Wellborn, 1994, 1997;
Skinner & Edge, 1998, in press).
The assumption of fundamental psychological needs adds content to theories
of coping. It provides an explanation for why certain experiences are objectively
stressful: because they challenge or threaten universal human needs. The model
suggests that appraisals of situations as challenges or threats to the three needs
are key mechanisms by which objective stressors trigger energized and com-
pelling emotional and behavioral reactions. It explains why self-system processes,
such as perceived control and feelings of connectedness to others, exert such
powerful effects during times of stress: because they shape the “apparent reali-
ty” of objective events. It also suggests that social contexts which support the
three needs can have positive effects on appraisals and coping as well. Two inter-
esting implications from the motivational model are the definition of coping as
“action regulation under stress” and the suggestion that ways of coping may be
organized as “families” around the three needs.

Coping as Action Regulation

When coping is thought of as action regulation under stress, it implies that

coping is based on action tendencies. These are flexible motor programs that include
behavior, emotion, and orientation responses (Barrett & Campos, 1991; Campos,
Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994; Fridja, 1987, 1988). Action tendencies
are not reflexes; however, they are compelling, automatized predispositions to act.
They are experienced as “urges” or “desires,” and are redundantly energized and
directed by behavior, emotion, and orientation.
306 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Action tendencies are goal directed and effortful (in that they require ener-
getic resources) but are not usually voluntary, in the sense of being under con-
scious control (cf., Compas, Connor, Osowiecki, & Welch, 1997). According to
this reasoning, when a man feels pressured, he doesn’t “decide” to lash out; he
“finds himself” digging his heels in. This holds not only for maladaptive but also
for adaptive responses to stress. For example, when a girl appraises a problem as
challenging, she doesn’t “decide” to problem solve; her attention and interest are
“captured” by the problematic interaction.

CONTEXT
Personal Personal
Resources Resources

Appreciatio
Appraisal of
Experience

*” REGULATION

DEMAND
Stressful
Interactions

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Social Social
Resources C O PpiN G Resources

Figure 14.2. A Depiction of Coping as Action Regulation under Stress.

In keeping with action theory and functionalist theories of emotion, we hold
that action tendencies are triggered by an appreciation of the significance of an
interaction for an individual’s well-being (Barrett & Campos, 1991; Campos et
al., 1994; Fridja, 1987, 1988). We view individuals’ appraisals of challenges and
threats to the three needs as prototypical examples of the kinds of appreciations
that trigger action tendencies. It is these action tendencies that are the targets of
people’s regulation under stress. As depicted in Figure 14-2, coping can be seen
as an action tendency (represented by the smaller dark arrow), triggered by an
appraisal and shaped by a regulation (represented by the larger dashed arrow),
that is embedded in a specific context and a set of social relationships. It can be
noted that the arrows representing the action tendency and the regulation are
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 307

pointed in opposite directions in Figure 14-2. This suggests that, in this example,
the function of the regulation is not to boost the action tendency (as would be
suggested by arrows pointing in the same direction), but to redirect it. Many alter-
native combinations of action tendency and regulation are also possible.

Six Families of Coping

The motivational model was useful in identifying and organizing categories

of coping. Three concepts were particularly important in this endeavor: the
notion of “families” of ways of coping, the concept of action tendencies, and the
three self-system processes. The notion of families allows multiple manifestly dif-
ferent ways of coping to be considered part of the same family based on com-
mon underlying characteristics. For example, such diverse ways of coping as
reading about a disease, joining a support group, seeking advice from a friend,
and watching a peer group could be classified as belonging to the family of cop-
ing characterized as “information-seeking.” This scheme acknowledges that
ways of coping can be infinitely adapted according to the specifics of a stressful
encounter—demands, contexts, personalities, and developmental levels—with-
out requiring an infinite number of categories to meaningfully capture them.
The concept of “action tendencies” was useful in specifying the criteria for
family membership, namely, the underlying root action tendency: All members
of a family have in common the underlying urge or desire triggered by a partic-
ular appraisal of the stressful encounter, and the prototypical pattern of behav-
ior, emotion, and orientation which characterizes that action tendency. They take
their specific form from the developmental capacities and the situational possibil-
ities available during the stressful episode (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood,
2002). For example, if the root action tendency in response to an appraisal of
coercion is aggression, then that action tendency will be implemented directly
(i.e., expressed as coping) only if certain developmental capacities are present
(e.g., after a child can intentionally hit), and only in certain contexts (e.g., ones
that allow the child to aggress). With social partners against whom the child is not
allowed to aggress (e.g., the teacher), the child will have to express the action ten-
dency of fighting indirectly, through oppositional behavior, displaced aggression,
or fantasy. Or an uncoordinated infant may “fight” through temper tantrums.
The three self-system processes were used to identify six families of coping
(see Figure 14-3). For each of the self-systems, one family is organized around the
root action tendency triggered by an appraisal of obstacles as a challenge to that
need and one is organized around the root action tendency triggered by an
appraisal of threat. These six families are depicted in Figure 14-3, along with the
corresponding behavior, emotion, and orientation. For example, when an obsta-
cle is appraised as resistance, that is, as a challenge to autonomy, then this trig-
gers the root action tendency of defense, which is characterized by behavior that
308 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

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stands firm, the emotion of indignation, and an orientation toward protecting the
desired goal. In contrast, an appraisal of a stressful encounter as coercion, that is,
as a threat to autonomy, triggers an action tendency that can be labeled as
“fight,” characterized by a prototypical pattern of behavior (moving toward the
obstacle), emotion (anger), and orientation (attacking the source of coercion).

Development of Coping Capacity

This conceptualization of coping makes clear that “stress” is not inherently

damaging to people, even children, and that the primary function of coping is
not simply to shield people from stressful experiences (Compas, 1993; Weisz,
1993). Coping can function to prolong constructive interactions as well as to esca-
late stress. If demands are a true threat and overwhelm a person, then the per-
son becomes confused, isolated, or rebellious, and these experiences are counter-
productive. However, if situations are experienced as challenging, they can con-
tribute to development.
In fact, stress and challenges are necessary conditions for the construction of
children’s self-system processes and their close relationships. For example, it is
precisely by dealing with situations in which goals are blocked or in conflict with
the goals of others that people develop autonomy. During prolonged negotiations
with environmental demands, people learn about their own genuine goals and
preferences and learn how to respect and influence those of others. They learn
how to coordinate and balance conflicting goals, for example, how to shape
short-term actions in service of long-term goals (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Such
conflicts, negotiations, and concessions characterize the very processes of inter-
nalization, through which originally extrinsic goals become integrated with the
true self and hence autonomously regulated (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Kochanska,
1995; Ryan, 1993). Constructive coping interactions are key loci of development,
representing opportunities for people to discover and expand their own capaci-
ties and to learn about and shape the affordances of the physical and social envi-
ronment.

Autonomy as Central to Coping

It is relatively easy to map concepts from the areas of control and attachment
onto fundamental issues in coping. For example, work on control, efficacy, and
helplessness (Compas, 1987; Dweck & Wortman, 1982; Skinner, 1995) holds that
“uncontrollability” is an objective stressor that universally places significant
demands on people. This perspective suggests that a sense of efficacy is a critical
310 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

psychological resource in dealing with uncontrollable situations, because

it affects whether such events will be appraised as challenges to compe-
tence and so coped with though problem-solving, strategizing, and infor-
mation-seeking, or, alternatively, will be appraised as threats and so lead
to confusion, helplessness, or escape (Dweck, 1999; Peterson et al., 1993).
Likewise, it is relatively easy to see how the tenets of attachment
theory can inform work on coping (Compas, 1987; Skinner & Wellborn,
1994). According to an attachment perspective (Ainsworth, 1979;
Bowlby, 1969, 1973), separation is objectively demanding, personal
resources are appraisals of availability of attachment figures in times of
distress, and social resources include a secure attachment. Appraisals of
stressful situations as a challenge to relatedness are likely to trigger prox-
imity-seeking and self-reliance, whereas appraisals of stressful encoun-
ters as threats trigger social isolation or excessive dependency.
Compared to work on attachment and control, much less has been
written and studied about the connection between coping and autono-
my. Nevertheless, self-determination theory can provide a complemen-
tary set of answers to fundamental questions of coping. This perspective
suggests that a class of universally stressful events are ones that are
objectively coercwe; an important psychological resource for dealing with
demands is a sense of autonomy; and autonomy support is an important social
resource. ‘These resources increase the likelihood that objective stressors
will be appraised as challenges rather than as threats to autonomy. Self-
determination theory also suggests that several important ways of coping
(patterns of action regulation) are organized around the need for auton-
omy. Since these propositions are rarely considered in research on cop-
ing, each of them is analyzed in more detail below.

Coercion as an Objective Stressor

Current theories of stress and coping tend to back away from the
notion of “universal stressors.” ‘That is, for the most part, conceptual-
izations decline to identify any particular experience or class of experi-
ences as objectively demanding to all people. Instead, stress is described
as transactional, that is, as shaped jointly by environmental demands,
individuals’ appraisals, and personal and social resources (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). ‘The only two conditions that have come close to being
considered universally stressful are noncontingency (Seligman, 1975) or
loss of control (Miller, 1979) and social deprivation (Baumeister & Leary,
1995; Stroebe, Stroebe, Abakoumkin, & Schut, 1996) or loss of an
attachment figure (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969, 1973).
The consideration of actual loss of control and actual loss of
attachment figures as universally stressful has been useful in analyzing a
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 311

wide variety of life events for their objective demand characteristics and for the
kinds of distress and coping they tend to elicit. For example, the centrality of loss
of attachment figures has informed work on maternal deprivation (Rutter, 1979),
bereavement (Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999), and dealing with social losses during
normative aging (Carstensen, 1998). Other work focuses on the objective con-
trollability of stressors. For example, it has been suggested that traumatic events
such as life-threatening illness, divorce, natural disasters, violent crime, abuse,
and even aging, are stressful at least in part because they entail objective losses of
competence and control. The extent of the objective loss of control turns out to
be a good indicator of many sequelae of the event, including subjective experi-
ences of loss of control, emotional distress, behavioral disorganization, and the
kinds of coping evinced (Band & Weisz, 1988; Compas et al., 1991; Folkman,
1984; Forsythe & Compas, 1987; Weisz, 1993).
The motivational model underscores the universal stressfulness of both loss
of attachment figures and loss of control. It posits that these are direct assaults
on fundamental human needs, and that all people are psychologically and phys-
iologically predisposed to register their stressfulness. In addition, the model posits
a third class of universally stressful experiences: coercion or loss of freedom.
These experiences are also considered to thwart a universal human need, in this
case, for autonomy. However, in analyses of life events, coercion is rarely men-
tioned as a source of stress. Further, many of the life events described as entail-
ing losses of or threats to control or attachment relationships, also contain coer-
cive features and the coerciveness of these experiences may add to or even out-
weigh the effects of other losses or threats.
Coercive crimes. Once the concept of coercion is articulated, it is relatively easy
to identify some classes of life events that are stressful primarily because they are
coercive. For example, violent crimes, such as robbery or rape, are defined by the
very coerciveness of the acts. The same activities performed consensually do not
involve violence and are not even considered crimes. That is not to say that vic-
timization never entails loss of control or threats to relationships, but only to
emphasize that such incidents always include the experience of overwhelming
coercion and violation of will.
Coercive medical conditions. Another clear illustration of the importance (and
neglect) of the characteristic of coercion can be drawn from work on coping with
life-threatening illness. Research on coping with medical conditions often focuses
almost exclusively on the controllability of the disease, sometimes even classify-
ing and studying conditions separately according to the extent to which symp-
toms or diseases respond to treatment. We argue that an additional dimension is
critical in determining the stressfulness of a medical condition, namely, its coer-
civeness, defined as the extent to which it prevents people from showing the
actions they desire. For example, diseases that interfere with activities of daily liv-
ing or are disabling may or may not respond to treatment, but they are coercive.
They prevent people from doing what they want to do (such as playing tennis)
Oe HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

and they also pressure people into doing things that they do not want to do (such
as staying in bed). Effective treatments may not only restore control but may also
reduce the coerciveness of symptoms.
It should be noted, however, that treatments can themselves be coercive.
They can involve submitting to diagnostic procedures or regimens that are
painful or invasive. They can include taking medications with harmful side effects
or participating in therapies that are painful or boring. They can also include
adding undesired or refraining from desired activities. In most cases, the stress-
fulness of both medical conditions and their treatments can be appreciated, not
only in terms of loss of control, but also with reference to coercion.
Coerciveness in life events. We believe that it is useful to evaluate ail stressful life
events in terms of their coerciveness. For some events, like victimization, abuse,
or disease, issues of coercion may be a defining feature. For others, a considera-
tion of coercion may add depth to an understanding of the psychological
demands presented by an event. For example, the stressfulness of bereavement
and divorce may be characterized primarily in terms of losses of or threats to
attachment relationships. However, loss of a partner may also be coercive if it
forces the remaining partner into new roles and actions. Divorce may be more
coercive (and hence more upsetting) if the target individual (partner or child)
does not want it and it occurs against his or her will. Likewise, a dominant theme
in aging may be loss of competencies and loss of relationships. However, freedom
may also be lost, as a result of or in addition to these other losses. Analysis of the
coerciveness of life events can provide insight into subjective experiences and
reactions to these events, as well as suggesting interventions to ameliorate or
buffer their effects.
Coercion versus loss of control. Part of the problem with characterizing experi-
ences in terms of their coerciveness is the difficulty in distinguishing coercion
from loss of control (Skinner, 1996). Some of this confusion is terminological. For
example, work on control has adopted concepts like “decision control” (Averill,
1973) and “secondary control” (J. Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995) to refer to
processes that typically have been dealt with in theories of self-determination. At
the same time, self-determination theorists have used terms like “locus of causal-
ity” (deCharms, 1968) and characterize conditions, contexts, and events that
thwart autonomy as “controlling” (Ryan, 1982).
Conceptually, however, the difference is clear (deCharms, 1981). Loss of
control refers to the loss or absence of action-outcome contingencies, as
described by terms like noncontingency, unpredictability, and (our preferred
umbrella concept) chaos. Chaotic contexts prevent people from being effective or
masterful, and from producing desired or preventing undesired outcomes. They
either prevent people from figuring out what to do to get what they want or they
block people from obtaining the competencies to do it. In some general way,
chaos can be thought of as similar to “anarchy” (and can be contrasted to the
rule of law).
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 313

In contrast, coercion refers to loss of freedom, or resistance to showing the

actions of one’s choice, as described by terms like pressure, force, interference,
manipulation, or intrusiveness. Coercive contexts prevent people from being gen-
uine and authentic, from expressing the actions that reflect their actual prefer-
ences and desires. In simple terms, they prevent people from being true to them-
selves. Coercion can be thought of as similar to a “totalitarian” system (and can
be contrasted with democracy).
Contexts can be very structured in that they are contingent and predictable,
but if they also contain pressure to produce particular outcomes or if only cer-
tain classes of (undesired) actions are effective, they can also be very coercive.
Many life events and many contexts (such as work places, families, and schools)
can be characterized by this combination of conditions. For example, parental
approval may be contingent on a child’s conformity to parental desires (Kamins
& Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998), or evaluations of teachers may be
linked to the performance of their students (Deci, Spiegel, Ryan, Koestner, &
Kauffman, 1982). Even though such contexts are high on opportunities to con-
trol outcomes, they are still stressful because of their negative effects on autono-
my. And, of course, contexts that are both chaotic and coercive should be more
stressful than contexts that exhibit only one of these characteristics.

Self-system Processes of Autonomy as Motivational Determinants

of Coping

Adaptive self-system processes are hypothesized to act as key personal

resources during stressful interactions. At the most general level, they contribute,
along with objective events (including the actions of social partners), to an orien-
tation toward the stressful transaction. They create “head sets” about what is at
stake in stressful interactions, influencing what people focus on as they cope.
These are reflected in appraisals of the meaning of internal and external
demands (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), including, for example, what is attended to,
how interactions are interpreted, estimations of their potential impact on current
well-being and future goals, and views about the role of the self and others in
dealing with the stressful situation.
Each of the self-system processes shapes appraisals that trigger correspon-
ding families of coping. The families of coping associated with competence and
relatedness, namely, problem-solving and support-seeking, respectively, have been
studied fairly thoroughly and appear in almost all typologies of ways of coping
(Ryan-Wenger, 1992; Skinner & Wellborn, 1994). Moreover, the self-system
processes of competence and relatedness have often been included in studies of
coping and have been found to predict their designated ways of coping. For
example, perceived control is a robust predictor of problem-solving, active, and
approach coping in children (Compas et al., 1991; Kliewer, 1991) and across the
314 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

lifespan (Skinner, 1995). And studies that examine coping as a function of attach-
ment status have found that children with secure attachments (relative to children
who are insecurely attached) show more active, approach, and support-seeking
coping (Armsden & Greenberg; 1987; Nachmias, Gunnar, Mangelsdorf, Parritz,
& Buss, 1996; Shulman, 1987; Skinner & Edge, in press; Skinner & Snyder, 1999).
Compared to studies on perceived control and attachment status, almost no
research has explored the effects of the third self-system process, namely, per-
ceived autonomy. Furthermore, the ways of coping associated with autonomy are
often missing from taxonomies of coping, or if they appear, their links to auton-
omy are not explicit. Hence, the next sections focus on autonomy as a personal
resource in coping and on the families of coping organized around it.
Perceived autonomy. Usually labeled autonomy orientations, these self-system
beliefs refer to the extent to which one has access to one’s genuine preferences
and goals and the extent to which one expects the social context to respect, value,
and defer to one’s own agenda (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Connell, 1989). A
person with an autonomous orientation can form and express robust goals and
intentions that reflect his or her actual preferences. Moreover, an autonomous
orientation includes the psychological freedom to act on those preferences and
goals. In response to environmental or intrapsychic pressures, these expectations
and capacities are a basis for open and flexible action, allowing the individual to
“stay in touch with” the hierarchy of his or her genuine priorities, and not to lose
sight of them while negotiating environmental or internal demands.
Individuals with low perceived autonomy have poor access to their actual
preferences and generally expect that others will try to pressure and coerce them.
Hence, environmental events tend to be appraised as coercive and social part-
ners’ intentions as hostile (Graham, Hudley, & Williams, 1992). In response to
stress, such an orientation creates a great deal of pressure, which, when chan-
neled externally, produces an “external” style of regulation in which the individ-
ual experiences the source of his or her action as originating in the external envi-
ronment (Deci & Ryan, 1985a; Ryan & Connell, 1989). Pressure can also be
“introjected,” or channeled internally, in which the person takes on the coercive
functions of the external demands and pressures the self to act accordingly (Deci
& Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Connell, 1989). Both of these styles of regulation are
considered nonautonomous, in that they are reactive and not willfully deployed.
They can be contrasted with two more autonomous styles of responding.
The first reflects regulations that were once externally imposed but have subse-
quently been willingly endorsed and autonomously internalized. It is labeled
“integrated” to reflect the fact that these goals have been harmoniously com-
bined with existing self structures. The second style is labeled “intrinsic.” It
describes a source of energy and direction for activities that are spontaneously
enjoyable, like activities of learning, self-expression, and social interaction.
Because these activities are inherently pleasurable, willingness to participate in
them does not have to be recruited and then internalized. However, it should be
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 315

noted that their regulation will remain “intrinsic” only so long as other coercive
elements, such as judgement and evaluation, are not superimposed upon them.
To illustrate the flavor of these orientations, Table 14-1 includes items used to tap
them during childhood and adulthood.

Causality Orientation Scale (Deci & Ryan, 1985a)

You have been offered a new position in a company and the first question that
comes to your mind is, “I wonder if the new work will be interesting?” (+)

A close (same sex) friend of yours has been moody lately and a couple of times
has become very angry with you for “nothing.” Your approach to handling this
would be to share your observations with your friend and try to find out what is
going on for him or her. (+)

Self-Regulation Scale - Academic (Ryan & Connell, 1989)

The reason I do my classwork is that I want to learn new things. (+)

The reason I try to answer hard questions in class is so I will know if I am right
or wrong. (+)

Parenting Sense of Autonomy (Skinner & Regan, 1992)

When I’m with my kids, there’s nothing else I’d rather be doing. (+)

I wish I didn’t feel so trapped by parenting duties. (-)

I look forward to being with my children. (+)

I feel that parenting runs my entire life. (-)

Perceived Academic Self-determination (Vallerand, Pelletier, Blais, Briere,

Senécal, & Valliéres, 1993)
At school, I feel like I am in prison. (-)

I go to school out of personal choice. (+)

Table 14.1. Sample Items Tapping Self-system Processes Connected

with Autonomy.

Ways of Coping Organized around Autonomy

Compared to the families of coping connected to relatedness and compe-

tence, very little has been written or studied about the families of coping associ-
ated with autonomy. We argue that, in general, the action tendencies triggered by
316 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

interactions that tax autonomy are organized around concession and defense.
Concession and defense can be either autonomous or nonautonomous.
Appraisals of environmental demands as threats to autonomy lead to reactive
(nonautonomous) action tendencies, whereas appraisals of demands as chal-
lenges to autonomy trigger action tendencies that are self-determined.
Figure 14-4 depicts our current thinking about the autonomous and nonau-
tonomous modes of concession and defense, along with some of the behaviors,
emotions, and orientations that characterize them. For defense, we label the
nonautonomous family of ways of coping “opposition;” for concession, it is
labeled “perseveration.” The autonomous form of defense is labeled “negotia-
tion” and the autonomous form of concession is “accommodation.” In the next
four sections, we describe each way of coping in more detail and mention
research that has touched on similar concepts.

Challenge to SELF Challenge to CONTEXT

Implement AUTHENTIC Action Promote AUTONOMY SUPPORT

Accommodation Negotiation
Cooperation
Concession
Acquiesce
Defer
Blamelessness
Acceptance Taking other's perspective
Good will Good will
naeozozona>
Commitment Decision-making
Conviction Goal-setting
Endorsement Priority-setting

Threat to SELF Threat to CONTEXT

Promote COERCION Reduce Opportunities for
AUTONOMOUS Action

Perseveration Opposition
Compliance Aggression
Conformity
Rigidity
Submission Projection
Blame others
Self-blame Venting
Urgency Explosion
Compulsion Anger

AGOSOZOHAEGHZOZ
Obsession Reactance
Rumination Revenge
Intrusive thoughts

Note. Within each column, the way of coping in bold is the most common label for
that family of ways of coping.

Figure 14.4. Families of Coping Associated with Autonomy.

 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development oH7)

Opposition. “Oppositional” coping is considered a nonautonomous reaction

to demands because its goal is taken from outside the self—that is, it is completely
determined by the environmental demand, specifically, by the opposite of the
demand. Within the coping area, this pattern of responding to stress has been
given labels reflecting its anger, rigidity, and opposition, such as “externalizing,”
“venting,” and “projection.” Defiance, reactance, rebellion, explosion, projec-
tion, blaming others, venting, and revenge have in common that they are patterns
of action recruited to oppose someone else’s goals. Hence, we label this pattern of
coping as “opposition.” ‘These behaviors have been observed, for example, as
part of escalating cycles of parent-child coercion (Kochanska, 1995, 1997;
Patterson & Bank, 1989) and have been studied as psychological reactance
(Brehm, 1966).
Oppositional reactions usually have serious social consequences.
Oppositional behavior tends to provoke escalated demands, even from initially
benign social partners (Dodge, 1991; Graham, 1998; Parpal & Maccoby, 1985).
A less obvious consequence is that, in his or her push toward defiance, the per-
son forgoes the opportunity to form or defend an autonomous goal (Deci & Ryan,
1985b). This interferes with any attempts to create a scenario in which that goal
can be realized. The individual also learns little about the actual goals of social
partners or how to coordinate them with his or her own goals.
Perseveration. The nonautonomous form of concession is “perseverance” or
rigid compliance. Perseveration, and its variations, including compliance, con-
formity, or submission, are based on an introjected style of regulation in which
the individual, in response to environmental demands, is subjected to strong
internal pressures to submit. This pattern of engagement can be distinguished
from willing cooperation and problem-solving because of its rigid and urgent
quality and because it lacks flexibility and responsiveness to external and internal
feedback. The pressured and anxious quality of engagement, in addition to
dampening enjoyment and draining energetic resources, also blocks access to
cognitive and social resources, and interferes with hypothesis-testing and strate-
gizing, thereby short-circuiting learning.
Most important for autonomy, perseveration is coercive and does not allow
the individual the psychological freedom to alter, refocus, or relinquish goals.
Several researchers have suggested that this pattern of action constitutes a risk
factor for depression and hopelessness (Brandtstadter, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksma,
1998). Perseveration may reflect the inability to disengage from goals that are no
longer feasible or that interfere with other more important goals. Prolonged pur-
suit of unattainable goals, such as remaining young, creates the experience of
helplessness. Prolonged pursuit of the wrong goals, such as image or money,
means that healthier goals are less likely to be attained (Kasser & Ryan, 1993).
Moreover, if social partners come to see that these goals are not feasible or gen-
uinely important, perseveration may also erode social support.
318 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Negotiation. The more positive patterns of responding connected to autono-

my have been studied less or have been incorporated into an amalgam of “posi-
tive” or “approach” coping that includes problem-solving. We believe it is impor-
tant to differentiate and specifically study forms of autonomous defense and con-
cession. The autonomous form of defense is “negotiation.” Defense of high pni-
ority goals, because it is autonomous, differs from opposition in that negotiation
is flexible, open, creative, and responsive to new information. The primary ori-
entation is not toward foiling an opponent but toward creating a scenario in
which all genuine high priority goals can be met. Processes of social negotiation
do not result in “winning,” they allow the individual to achieve high priority goals
and to concede to high priority goals of others.
Similarly, processes of “internal negotiation” do not result in “self-sacrifice;”
they allow individuals to articulate, prioritize, and coordinate their own muluple
important goals. Negotiations during stressful encounters are, in turn, key expe-
riences in which to learn about the values of the self and others, as well as to
experience others as flexible negotiators. In such interactions, individuals discov-
er and create hierarchies of goals and are able to integrate their goals meaning-
fully with those of others (individuals, organizations, or societies).
Accommodation. Accommodation has been described as a major mode of cop-
ing in work focusing on the challenges of successful aging (Brandtstadter &
Renner, 1990; Brandtstadter, Wentura, & Greve, 1993; Brandtstadter, Wentura,
& Rothermund, 1999). Accommodation reflects a pattern of “willing submis-
sion” or “committed compliance” (Kochanska & Aksan, 1995) and results from
integrated regulation (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Accommodation implies a quality
of concession that is above and beyond grudging acceptance or foot-dragging
compliance. It emphasizes flexibility, openness, cooperation, and “good will.” It
is autonomous in that it reflects genuine acceptance, authentic endorsement, and
personal conviction.
As studied under the misleading label “secondary control” (J. Heckhausen &
Schulz, 1995), accommodation has been shown to be a critical part of adaptation
to uncontrollable or unavoidable events. Stated colloquially, accommodative
processes allow people to act according to the maxim: “If you can’t get out of it,
get into it.” ‘These are processes that allow people to move beyond self-pity, bit-
terness, and recrimination to an orientation of acceptance of current constraints,
whatever their source. In general, they allow a person to stop focusing on the past
and assigning blame and to begin focusing on the future and accepting responsi-
bility (Brickman et al, 1982). Accommodation allows creation of fresh perspec-
tives, such as by focusing on the positive or carrying out downward social com-
parisons. ‘This frees resources for action and allows the emergence of new goals,
which are not only genuine but are also constructive and attainable. The emer-
gence of revised goal hierarchies is a hallmark of adjustment after loss. It is a
turning point in the decision to let the past stay in the past and to move on.
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 319

Autonomy Support as a Characteristic of the Social Context

An important function of autonomy support in the social context, and not

just during times of stress, is to contribute to the development of an autonomous
orientation in the people who function there (Ryan & Solky, 1996). Whether
referring to a society, an organization, an institution, a family, or a dyadic part-
nership, social contexts that provide people opportunities to realize their genuine
goals and preferences will promote in people the accumulation of personal
resources described as perceived autonomy.
Important determinants of how supportive social partners and contexts will
be are the actions of individuals themselves, some of which are captured in the
ways of coping just described. For example, when individuals clearly express their
preferences and negotiate for solutions, social partners are more likely to defer to
their wishes. When individuals willingly cooperate, it is easier for partners to will-
ingly cooperate as well. When people actively and enthusiastically problem solve
about how to meet the goals of all parties involved, social partners are more like-
ly to suggest compromises and to concede low priority goals.
Unfortunately, less adaptive ways of coping are likely to provoke less sup-
portive reactions from social partners. For example, when people simply con-
form, it is difficult for partners to discern that they are experiencing pressure.
When, in reaction to resistance, individuals submit very quickly, social contexts
are likely to overestimate their agreement, thus forfeiting the individuals’ oppor-
tunities to negotiate. On the other hand, when individuals react to demands with
defiance, social contexts are likely to become more coercive (Patterson & Bank,
1989) or to simply withdraw their support (Tennen & Affleck, 1990). ‘These pat-
terns of person-context interaction suggest cycles that maintain or amplify indi-
vidual’s ways of coping and context support (or lack of support) over time.

Research on Autonomy and Coping

In our own work on children’s coping in the academic domain, we have

begun to explore the connections among perceived autonomy, autonomy support,
and children’s coping. The work began with the assessment of the four families of
coping associated with autonomy as responses to failures and setbacks in school
(Skinner & Wellborn, 1994, 1997). The assessment of opposition and accommo-
dation and their characteristic behaviors, emotions, and orientations were rela-
tively straightforward. However, because of the power relations in the classroom,
ways of coping that belong to the family of “negotiation” were more difficult to
assess; and in general are rarely seen or reported in the classroom context, even
in open-ended interviews with children (Skinner, Altman, & Sherwood, 1991).
In the first set of studies, we concentrated on two ways of coping: accom-
modation and opposition. A few previous studies had shown a correlation
SPA HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

between children’s perceived autonomy (assessed with the Relative Autonomy

Index or RAI; Ryan & Connell, 1989) and two related ways of coping, positive
coping (problem-solving and self-comforting) and projection (blaming others)
(Wellborn, Mellor-Crummey, Connell, & Skinner, 1989). Unique effects of per-
ceived autonomy were found on these two ways of coping, over and above the
significant effects of perceived competence and relatedness.
In our longitudinal study of about 1600 elementary school children in
grades three through seven (see Skinner et al., 1998, for details), we also found
that children’s perceived autonomy (as indexed by scores on the RAT) was a sig-
nificant predictor of both accommodation and oppositional coping, even after
controlling for the significant effects of relatedness and competence. Most impor-
tantly, we tested a model of context, self, and action. In this model, children’s
experiences of parental autonomy support versus coercion were examined as
predictors of children’s perceived autonomy which in turn predicted their
accommodation and opposition coping. This model was found it to be a good fit
with self-report data (Skinner & Edge, in press).
Moreover, we examined children’s perceived autonomy as a predictor of
changes in children’s coping over the school year. As expected, children’s perceived
autonomy in the fall predicted changes in their coping from fall to spring of the
school year, in spite of relatively high interindividual stability in children’s ways
of coping over time (Skinner & Edge, in press; Skinner & Snyder, 1999). Parent
reports of parenting also predicted children’s ways of coping; an especially strong
connection was found between coercive parenting and children’s oppositional
coping in school (Skinner & Snyder, 1999).
Reciprocal feedback effects were also examined, in which children’s coping
was used to predict changes in parenting over the school year. As expected, chil-
dren’s ways of coping in the fall were significant predictors of changes in their
experiences of parent action from fall to spring. Children who showed more
accommodative coping in the fall experienced their parents as becoming more
autonomy supportive from fall to spring of the school year, whereas children who
coped through opposition reported that their parents became more coercive over
the same time period (Skinner & Edge, in press).
Recent analyses are examining the relations between different styles of self-
regulation (external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic) and different ways of
coping in school. Analyses focused on the four ways of emotion regulation as
markers of the four families of coping, with accepting responsibility as a marker
of accommodation, blamelessness as a marker of negotiation, self-blame as a
marker of perseveration, and projection as a marker of opposition (see Skinner
& Wellborn, 1994, 1997, for a more detailed discussion of regulation of emotion
and ways of coping). We found that, as predicted, accommodation and negotia-
tion coping were both correlated positively with the two more autonomous forms
of regulation, namely, identified and intrinsic regulation. The nonautonomous
ways of coping were, as predicted, correlated with the nonautonomous regula-
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 32)

tory styles: Perseveration was strongly related to an introjected style of regula-

tion and opposition was correlated with external regulation.
A final set of analyses examined the effects of perceived autonomy on each
way of coping, over and above the effects of perceived competence and related-
ness. For each way of coping, perceived competence and relatedness were
entered as a block, and then the designated style of self-regulation was entered.
Of interest was whether perceived autonomy significantly increased the predic-
tion of its way of coping. For all four ways of coping, perceived autonomy did
make a significant unique contribution to its way of coping over and above the
(significant) effects of the other self-system processes. The results of these analy-
ses provide initial empirical support for the connections among perceived auton-
omy, autonomy support, and coping suggested by the motivational model. ‘The
data were consistent with the notion that parental autonomy support contributes
to children’s academic autonomy orientations, which in turn shapes how they
cope with challenges and problems in school; as well as the possibility that the
ways in which children cope have a reciprocal effect on how their parents deal
with them.

The Functions of Autonomy

During Actual Stressful Episodes

What does the model’s definition of coping, namely, action regulation under
stress, imply about the functions of autonomy and autonomy support during
interactions when people are distressed? ‘The model suggests that autonomy, like
the other self-system processes, can supply key motivational resources in times of
stress, acting as a source of energy and direction for behavior, emotion, and ori-
entation. When people have access to motivational resources, the regulation of
their action is more adaptive, by which we mean more organized and coherent,
more flexible and open to internal and external information, and more con-
structive and prosocial. This quality of regulation allows a course of action to be
implemented which is effective in service of one’s own genuine high priority goals
and the high priority goals of important social partners, even when demands tax
or exceed an individual’s resources. (For reviews of the concept of regulation in
coping, see Barrett & Campos, 1991; Block & Block, 1980; Garver & Scheier,
1998; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Guthrie, 1997; Rossman, 1992; Skinner, 1999).
In specific situations, adaptive self-system processes improve coping by
reducing objective demands, by leading people to appraise stressful interactions
as challenges, by triggering adaptive action tendencies, and by boosting the qual-
ity of their regulation. When maladaptive self-system processes are applied to a
stressful interaction, they can undermine coping by increasing objective
bea HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

demands, by escalating the experience of threat, by triggering maladaptive action

tendencies, or by interfering with regulatory efforts. In the following sections, we
consider autonomy and autonomy support as potential motivational resources for
coping.

Autonomy as an Asset or Liability during Actual Coping Episodes

During stressful interactions, the self-system processes connected to autono-

my can serve as a source of energy and as a personal “compass.” Perceived
autonomy functions as a set of guides for potential action and as a source of ener-
gy for regulation. In general, a sense of autonomy allows individuals to maintain
access to their genuine goals and preferences (basically convictions about the lim-
its of what they will and will not do) as well as to maintain the expectation that
interaction partners (including people, events, and institutions) respect those
goals. Taken together, these contribute to the experience of having genuine
choices. This capacity can be stabilizing during stressful transactions.
Appraisals and experiences of stress. As a first line of defense, a sense of autono-
my shapes the experience of stress. When events or people actually are objec-
tively coercive (that is, when they really are attempting to pressure an individual’s
actions), people with a sense of autonomy experience these events as /ess coercive.
That is, they appraise them more as a challenge than as a threat to autonomy.
This does not imply that they are unaware that events or social partners are exert-
ing force. However, an autonomous orientation creates a kind of buffer around
those events, within which the individual maintains the psychological space to
willfully decide how to respond to external pressure. For example, he or she
assumes that the forces are not acting malevolently but instead are acting out of
their own high priority goals. The individual further assumes that, when social
partners realize they are trespassing on the individual’s rights, they will be willing
to readjust their demands. In general, people who are high on autonomy tend to
view coercive events, not as demands, but as “requests.” Even when coerced,
they are able to maintain the sense that there is a piece of themselves that is
indomitable,
The buffering effects of an autonomous orientation can be contrasted with
the amplifying effects of a nonautonomous head set. This general orientation, in
which people have difficulty maintaining access to their own genuine goals and
at the same time expect the social context to be intentionally coercive, makes
stress more stressful. Even minor requests are experienced as demands and can
create enormous intrapsychic pressure. All demands are escalated to imperatives
and, as a result, the hierarchy of genuine preferences held by the self and by the
external environment is disguised. With no psychological space to actively decide
how to respond, the person can experience demands as overwhelming.
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development 323

Action tendencies. Appraisals of events as challenges or threats to autonomy

trigger corresponding action tendencies. The experience of demands as a chal-
lenge can lead to accommodation or to negotiation, depending on the extent to
which the demands impinge on high priority goals, and it would not be unusual
to move flexibly between these two action tendencies. In stressful situations, their
effects are synergistically positive. Concession of low priority goals allows more
resources to be devoted to the defense of high priority goals; more achievement
of high priority goals allows more good will to be channeled into concession.
Defense of high priority goals is unambivalent, and the self is less likely to feel
threatened that it will be overrun by demands.
A sense of autonomy can be helpful even when people are (or anticipate
being) forced into acting against their will. Processes of autonomy can keep these
experiences of involuntary submission from becoming overwhelming by accept-
ing constraints and re-exerting the will. The act of deciding to submit to painful
medical procedures, or of deciding that a disability will not curb certain desired
activities, or of deciding that a crime will not continue to exert coercive effects (e.g,
by keeping one at home), are exertions of autonomy.
In contrast, the appraisal of events as threats to autonomy tends to trigger
the action tendency of opposition. When this response is socially or personally
unacceptable, it may be overridden by rigid compliance, in which intrapsychic
pressures force the self to submit. Neither opposition nor perseveration are
autonomous or volitional and they have synergistic negative effects. The pressure
created by submission escalates the experience of coercion, which makes it more
likely that an explosion will occur. The rigidity and non-responsiveness of these
two forms of coping seal the individual off from communication with the exter-
nal (or internal) world, for example, from signals that certain demands reflect
high priorities and that others can be downgraded in importance. These forms of
coping rob action of its flexibility, making it less likely that the true goals of the
individual will be accomplished.
Energetic resources for regulation. By definition, coping regulations take place dur-
ing interactions that tax or exceed a person’s resources. Volitional models of self-
regulation (e.g, H. Heckhausen, 1991; H. Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985; Kuhl,
1986) point out that one effect of stress can be to block an individual’s access to
his or her own personal capacities (cognitive, motivational, volitional) for adap-
tive action. Access can be blocked by anything that uses up energetic resources,
such as intense emotions, cognitive ruminations, competing action tendencies, or
attentional distracters.
Perceived autonomy can aid in regulation by helping a person reestablish or
maintain access to his or her own personal resources. It does so because coping
that is self-determined requires fewer regulatory resources compared to nonau-
tonomous forms of coping, This is true for two reasons. First, autonomous action
tendencies originate from the true self and bring their own psychic energy.
324 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

During autonomous (intrinsic or integrated) regulation, in which the true self is

experienced as the source of action, action tendencies (behaviors, emotions, and
orientations) work in a synergistic fashion, and executive or ego energy 1s avail-
able for engagement without being used for self-awareness or conscious control
(Kuhl, 1984).
Second, autonomous forms of coping, like accommodation and negotiation,
are recognized by both the self and the social context as more adaptive. Hence,
they are less likely to need to be intentionally regulated, that is, deflected or halt-
ed. For the most part, during stressful transactions, these action tendencies need
only to be boosted, supported, or focused. Such boosting requires relatively few
regulatory resources. However, even when these action tendencies do need to be
regulated, it is relatively easy to do so, because they are flexible and open to new
information.
In contrast, the action tendencies triggered by appraisals of stressful trans-
actions as threats to autonomy require more regulatory resources. First, the
expression of the action tendencies themselves involves intense affect. Specifically,
perseveration includes intense anxiety, and opposition is characterized by intense
anger. These emotions and their accompanying ruminations use up energetic
resources, and block access to other cognitive and motivational processes. The
force and focus of these nonautonomous action tendencies also interferes with
the consideration of alternative, potentially more adaptive, action tendencies.
Second, action tendencies like perseveration and opposition, are likely to be
viewed by the self and social partners as undesirable. Hence, they often become
targets of regulation, that is, of active attempts to intentionally tone them down,
or to contain and disguise them. These regulatory efforts are difficult because
both perseveration and opposition are rigid and not particularly open to infor-
mation from internal or external sources. As a result, the nonautonomous forms
of coping require a great deal of energetic resources. It is common for a person
to have to concentrate all his or her effort on derailing these action tendencies
before the person even has the option of accessing their cognitive resources or
consulting with themselves or others about alternative courses of action. The
phrase “I was beside myself” is an apt description of the experience when a
nonautonomous action tendency is in charge of coping.

Autonomy Support versus Coercion in Stressful Interactions

From the motivational model, shown in Figure 14-5, comes the idea that
social contexts can promote (versus undermine) coping by the extent to which
they bring warmth, structure, and autonomy support (versus hostility, chaos, and
coercion) to. stressful interactions. A common example of autonomy support dur-
ing a stressful interaction is when a parent validates a child’s feelings. Simply by
accurately acknowledging a child’s experience, for example, during a painful
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development BP

medical procedure or during a child’s adjustment to a new context, a parent may

reduce the child’s distress enough that the child has access to energetic resources
sufficient to successfully regulate his or her own action tendencies (e.g, emotion-
al upset or the desire to leave or resist).

CONTEA = SELE= = ACTION

OUTCOME

SELF- DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEM md
PROCESSES

Adaptive
4 Regulation
STRESS APPRAISALS ——
£ Action Tendency |
x !

Figure 14.5. A Process Model of Coping.

When social partners add motivational resources to an interaction, they
improve coping through precisely the same means as does the person, that is, by
reducing demands, by promoting appraisals of challenge, and by helping the per-
son maintain or gain access to personal resources for regulation. Social partners
can reduce coercion by creating or negotiating some breathing room around a
stressful event for more active decision-making. Social partners can promote
appraisals that acknowledge the target person’s true feelings and experiences and
that are not judgmental or prescriptive about reactions to stress. They can remind
or reflect on the person’s own goal hierarchy and help distinguish high from low
priority goals.
During coping, social partners who wish to support. autonomy can actively
encourage selective and choiceful concession and negotiation. Concession can be
facilitated by pointing out the reasons for going along and by highlighting the
connection between current cooperation and long-term goals. Social partners
326 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

can support “negotiation” even with seemingly fixed events, such as disability or
disease, essentially helping people distinguish the actions that must be conceded
from the goals which can still be met. Especially useful may be helping people
untangle higher-order goals from their lower-order instantiation. For example,
even if walking is no longer possible, people may still be able to be mobile, inde-
pendent, and social. Or, even if biological children are not an option, people can
still have a role in nurturing the young.
Unfortunately, social contexts can also bring coercion to stressful transac-
tions, thereby interfering with adaptive coping. People can insist that there is only
one correct course of action or can demand certain reactions to events. Social
partners can add coercion by falling apart themselves and demanding care from
the target individual. Social contexts can influence appraisals, for example, by
emphasizing the coercive features of the experience or by focusing on the nega-
tive consequences of noncompliance. They can help trigger maladaptive action
tendencies. For example, when social partners become demanding, the person
may begin to feel coerced and become angry and oppositional. ‘These competing
action tendencies interfere with regulation.

Autonomy as a Quality of Regulatory Capacity and of Relationships

People’s self-system processes and social relationships shape their coping,

both in specific situations and cumulatively over time. At the same time, howev-
er, coping feeds back into these processes. A primary function of constructive
coping episodes is to provide opportunities for the development of adaptive self-
system processes and social relationships. ‘These function as short-term personal
and social resources for coping. ‘These resources, because they propel and sustain
constructive engagement with the social and physical environment, contribute to
the development of people’s long-term coping capacity and to the qualities of
their relationships.
Development of autonomy. In terms of autonomy, an important function of deal-
ing constructively with adversity is allowing people to discover and elaborate their
“true selves” and to learn how to articulate, coordinate, and defend the life val-
ues that are genuinely important to them. More specifically, stressful situations, in
which all desired goals are not available, are opportunities to learn about the self
and about priorities. Losses can lead to the realization of what is really impor-
tant. Adversity may inspire people to create and maintain a course of action that
is more congruent with their genuine desires and preferences. They may become
less interested in societal or other external definitions of success and more
resolved to build a life congruent with their own values and priorities.
Challenges provide opportunities for the development of capacities needed
to exercise autonomy. ‘These can be recognized in childhood as the development
of autonomous regulation (Ryan, 1993) or conscience (Kochanska, 1993). These
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development P27)

capacities suggest that prosocial goals and habits of effectiveness have been har-
moniously integrated into the value hierarchy of the self. These capacities not only
facilitate social relationships and achievements; they are also the basis from which
children learn to “deploy themselves” in service of their own goals (Kuhl &
Fuhrmann, 1998). These capacities continue to develop throughout the lifespan
(Brandtstadter et al., 1999). They include the construction of rich and flexible goal
hierarchies, the ability to make choices that are in one’s own genuine self-interest,
and to be steadfast in following paths that allow one to realize one’s own goals.
Autonomous relationships. Processes of concession and negotiation during con-
structive coping also contribute to the development of mutually autonomous
relationships (Butzel & Ryan, 1997). Identification of high-priority goals is a
process of discovery, not only about the self, but about the social context as well.
Within constructive social interactions, these processes allow people to identify
goals that are commonly shared as well as goals that diverge. Mutual respect for
divergent goals creates an atmosphere in which problem-solving can ensue to
coordinate or sequence multiple goals. Autonomous concession of less important
goals creates good will in social partners which can then motivate complementa-
ry concessions from the other person. Creation of genuine goal hierarchies for
dyads, families, groups, or institutions provides a solid base for autonomous joint
decision-making during stress.
These relationship qualities also allow dyads and social groups to be differ-
entially constructive and flexible in stressful situations. Adaptive dyads (or social
groups) are ones that can work together to articulate what each member really
wants in an interaction and can generate several effective strategies that allow
high-priority goals to be met. When dyads or groups are characterized by a his-
tory of rigid rule following or one-sided authority, adaptive action in the face of
stress is blocked. Relationship qualities reflect a history of experiences that shape
the self-systems of all participants, and so contribute to appraisals of each others’
intentions (for example, as genuine vs. manipulative) and trigger adaptive or mal-
adaptive joint action tendencies (such as cooperation vs. power struggles). These
appraisals and action tendencies can facilitate or constrain adaptive coping when
people are distressed.

Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to make a case for the centrality of self-deter-
mination to coping, We argue that constructs, principles, and assessments of
autonomy can contribute to the conceptualization and empirical study of many
facets of the coping process. Autonomy-related concepts can be used to explain
why certain classes of events are stressful, to identify ways of coping that have
328 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

been largely ignored up to now, to describe a set of personal and social resources
that support coping, to suggest mechanisms by which the self and social partners
can promote or hinder coping in moment-to-moment stressful transactions, and
to characterize the kinds of regulatory capacities and social relationships that
both shape and are shaped by coping episodes.
Adding autonomy to research on coping processes should complement,
without detracting from, the personal and social resources emphasized in work
on perceived control, social support, and attachment. Beyond their additive
effects, however, theories of self-determination can help create a platform from
which to reconsider issues faced by the field of coping as a whole. In closing, we
mention three, namely, intentionality in coping, secondary control, and the adap-
tiveness of approach versus avoidance coping.
Intentionality in coping. Theories of self-determination, because they focus on
the will, bring the questions and terminology of volition to conceptualizations of
coping (Skinner, 1999). Some theorists have suggested that only stress reactions
with certain qualities of volition qualify as coping. For example, Compas et al.
(1997) have argued that only effortful and voluntary reactions to stress should be
considered coping and they have classified certain ways of coping according to
such criteria.
Theories of self-determination and volition make clear that no action (and
by implication, no way of coping) can be classified a pron as effortful or volun-
tary. Most actions (except reflexes) are available to many different levels of voli-
tion, for example, automatic action tendencies, effortful action regulation, inten-
tional action regulation, and autonomous regulation. Such dimensions may be
useful for distinguishing within a family of action tendencies or coping categories.
However, voluntary versus involuntary is not a good dimension for distinguishing
between ways of coping and so is not useful as a higher-order dimension upon
which to build taxonomies of coping.
Secondary control. A whole set of processes by which people come to terms with
losses have entered the fields of control and coping under the label of “second-
ary control.” Originally described by Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) and
recently elaborated by J. Heckhausen and Schulz (1995), these processes are con-
trasted with primary control, which refers to active attempts to change the state
of the world in line with one’s wishes. Secondary control, which refers to attempts
to bring oneself in line with the state of the world, consists mostly of psycholog-
ical processes that promote constructive disengagement from goals that are no
longer attainable. When looked at from the perspective of control, these are con-
sidered “secondary,” and recent discussions have emphasized the evolutionary
and adaptive primacy of primary control (J. Heckhausen & Schulz, 1994).
Indeed, experiences of primary control are necessary for the development of a
sense of competence and control and for the capacity to implement effective
action.
Nevertheless, we argue that, although processes described as secondary con-
trol are useful in dealing with loss of control, that is not their most important
 Self-Determination, Coping, and Development o29

function. When the criteria of effective action is broadened to focus instead on

adaptwe action, then it becomes clear that “secondary control” processes are actu-
ally prmary in the service of autonomy. They refer to processes by which goals,
intentions, and plans are constructed and revised. Lack of controllability is one
condition which requires reconsideration of goal pursuit, but it is only one con-
dition. People can disengage from goals that are objectively attainable because
they are too costly, because they interfere with one’s own higher-priority goals, or
because they compromise the interests of other people or groups.
These processes are better referred to using terms such as “flexible goal pur-
suit,” “accommodation” (Brandtstadter & Renner, 1990), or autonomous regula-
tion (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). The term “secondary control” is misleading; it rep-
resents a myopic focus on control and obscures the connection between these
processes and autonomy. It is noteworthy that recently developed measures of
“assimilation” (primary control) and accommodation find them to be independ-
ent constructs, and further find that the negative pole of assimilation is helpless-
ness, whereas the negative pole of accommodation is “rigid perseveration”
(Brandtstadter & Renner, 1990). It is also interesting that studies examining the
effects of secondary control have used measures of accommodation to tap these
processes (J. Heckhausen, 1997).
Approach versus avoidance coping. Discussions of overarching dimensions of cop-
ing have long included debates about whether, in times of stress, it is better to
approach or avoid stressful transactions (Roth & Cohen, 1986). Although most
discussions conclude that both strategies are important, at least in theory, the
majority of studies find that approach coping is more adaptive, in the sense of
showing stronger associations with positive antecedents and outcomes. A main
reason for this finding is that approach coping usually consists of problem-solv-
ing and strategizing whereas avoidance coping usually refers to escape.
Work on autonomy emphasizes that both engagement and disengagement,
just like concession and defense, can be adaptive or maladaptive depending on
the qualities with which they are implemented. Perseveration as a form of rigid
engagement is a kind of approach coping, but it is not adaptive. Autonomously
deciding to relinquish certain goals is a form of avoidance coping that is also
adaptive, in that it frees up resources for higher priority or attainable goals. ‘This
analysis implies that it is not approach or avoidance per se that makes the coping
more or less adaptive. Instead it is the extent to which the patterns of action are
flexible, organized, and constructive.
In sum, many researchers working in the area of coping have pointed out the
need for conceptualizations and studies of coping that reflect the depth and com-
plexity of adaptive processes (Compas, 1998; Lazarus, 1993). Theories of per-
ceived control, attachment, and social support have brought important insights
and assessments to research on coping. The central thesis of this chapter is that
the large body of theory and research on self-determination can further enrich
work on coping. As integrated and organized by the motivational model, these
theories view the self and its social relationships as key assets or liabilities during
330 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

coping, shaping appraisals, action tendencies, and patterns of regulation during

stressful transactions with the social and physical environments.
The model points out, however, that coping is not just the beneficiary of relat-
edness, competence, and autonomy. At the same time, coping is also a catalyst crit-
ical to their development. Patterns of coping, like negotiation and opposition, elic-
it reactions from the context that set in motion cycles of person-context interac-
tions, which shape the self-system beliefs and social relationships which gave rise
to them. Cumulatively, and over time, these processes of interaction contribute to
cycles of coping and context reactions that promote (or undermine) the develop-
ment of regulatory capacities and relationship qualities. We hope that some of the
arguments presented in this chapter may encourage researchers to pursue the
study of the dynamics among self-determination, coping, and development.

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= a a aa _63 2 @ Oey
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15: Distinguishing Between Secure and Fragile Forms of
High Self-Esteem

Michael H. Kernis'
Andrew W. Paradise
Unwersity of Georgia

To have high self-esteem is a good thing. Until recently, this simple assertion has
gone virtually unchallenged. After all, what could be bad about liking oneself and
feeling like a valuable and worthwhile individual? Although it is highly appeal-
ing to characterize high self-esteem in unequivocally positive terms, recent theo-
ry and evidence suggest that this characterization is not necessarily true. In fact,
there appear to be multiple forms of high self-esteem that vary in how closely
they mirror healthy, optimal psychological functioning. In this chapter, we distin-
guish among these various forms of high self-esteem and describe their implica-
tions for mental health and well-being. In so doing, we draw on a number of con-
structs and insights offered by Self-Determination Theory (e.g., Deci & Ryan,
1989: 19872°19912°1995; Ryans 1993).

Contrasting Perspectives on The Essence of High Self-Esteem

Currently, there exist two broad perspectives on what it means to possess

high self-esteem. One perspective characterizes high self-esteem as reflecting pos-
itive feelings of self-worth that are well-anchored and secure, and that are posi-
tively associated with a wide range of psychological health and well-being
indices. Its roots lie in the writings and research of clinical and personality psy-
chologists with humanistic inclinations (e.g., Rogers, 1951; 1959). From this van-
tage point, high self-esteem individuals are people who like, value, and accept
themselves, “warts and all.” They do not feel a need to be superior to others, but
instead are satisfied with being on an “equal plane with others” (Rosenberg,

1. Preparation of this chapter and a portion of the research reported herein were
supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9618882).
340 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

1965). Attempts to bolster their feelings of worth through self-promoting or self-

protective strategies are rare, given that their feelings of self-worth are not easily
challenged. In other words, they typically experience everyday positive and neg-
ative outcomes in ways that do not implicate their global feelings of worth or
value. Throughout this chapter, we refer to this perspective as describing secure
high self-esteem.
The other, contrasting, perspective characterizes high self-esteem as reflect-
ing positive feelings of self-worth that seemingly are fragile and vulnerable to
threat, inasmuch as they are associated with many different types of self-protec-
tive or self-enhancement strategies. We refer to this perspective as describing frag-
ile high self-esteem. Although this type of high self-esteem has been recognized
for some time (e.g., Horney, 1950), empirical support for it has been accumulat-
ing only relatively recently. For example, research has shown that high self-esteem
individuals may take great pride in their successes (“I am brilliant”), yet deny any
involvement in their failures (“That test was stupid”) (Fitch, 1970), that they
derogate individuals who pose threats to their (or their group’s) sense of value and
worth (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingermane, 1987), and that they create
obstacles to successful performance so that their competencies will seem espe-
cially noteworthy should they subsequently succeed anyway (Tice, 1991). Some
researchers have taken findings such as these to mean that high self-esteem indi-
viduals are especially caught up in how they feel about themselves and that they
will do whatever it takes to bolster, maintain, and enhance these self-feelings. In
fact, a few researchers appear to have dismissed the existence of secure high self-
esteem (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989), claiming instead that high self-
esteem reflects an aggressively self-enhancing presentational style.
We take exception to this dismissal and instead argue that both secure and
Jragile high self-esteem exist. To acknowledge their existence, however, raises the
thorny issue of how to determine which form is operative. Traditional measures
of self-esteem by themselves are not particularly helpful in this regard. Take, for
example, Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-esteem Scale, one of the most widely used and
well-validated measures of self-esteem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
Respondents indicate their extent of agreement to such statements as: “I feel that
I have a number of good qualities”; “I feel that Iam a person of worth, at least
on an equal basis with others;” “I feel that I do not have much to be proud of”
(reverse scored). High self-esteem is reflected by strong agreement to the first two
items and strong disagreement to the last one. However, based on these respons-
es alone, there is no way to know if the person’s high self-esteem is secure or frag-
ue. Additional factors must be taken into account. In fact, recent theory and evi-
dence suggest that there are at least four different ways to distinguish between
secure and frague high self-esteem. Each of these ways relies on theoretical concepts
that focus on distinctions between various kinds of self-esteem. The remainder of
this chapter is devoted to describing these theoretical concepts and the implica-
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem Beall

tions they have for distinguishing secure from fragile high self-esteem. We present
relevant empirical work as well, much of which is very recent.

Is the Person Lying?

One way to distinguish secure from fragile high self-esteem is to determine

whether respondents misrepresented their self-feelings when completing the self-
esteem measure. Some people, out of immense dires to be accepted by others, are
unwilling to admit to possessing negative self-feelings. These individuals are so
afraid that others will reject them if they admit to the negative self-feelings they
actually feel that they present their self-feelings positively (though falsely) on the
self-esteem measure. Dubbed defensive high self-esteem (Horney, 1950; Schneider
& Turkat, 1975), it is thought to trigger heightened efforts to undermine self-
threatening information and to magnify the portrayal of personal strengths unre-
lated to the content of the threat (Schneider & Turkat, 1975). Qualities such as
these suggest that defenswe high self-esteem is one manifestation of fragile high self-
esteem.
In contrast, genuine high self-esteem reflects the honest reporting of one’s
inner positive self-feelings. When confronted with threatening information, gen-
uine high self-esteem individuals do not react particularly strongly, by, for exam-
ple, magnifying the positivity of their other personal qualities. Without the strong
concerns about social acceptance that characterize their defensive counterparts,
genuine high self-esteem persons are less threatened by negative evaluative infor-
mation. Genuine high self-esteem is thus considered one manifestation of secure
high self-esteem.
Defensive and genuine high self-esteem traditionally have been distinguished
by individuals’ responses to measures of socially desirable responding (e.g., the
Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Socially
desirable responding is the pervasive tendency to endorse as self-descriptive high-
ly positive, yet extremely uncommon, statements pertaining to one’s behaviors or
attitudes, and to reject as self-descriptive distasteful, yet highly common, behav-
ioral or attitudinal statements. High self-esteem coupled with a high social desir-
ability score presumably reflects defensive high self-esteem given the person’s pro-
nounced unwillingness to admit to unflattering characteristics that he or she is
likely to possess. In contrast, high self-esteem coupled with a low social desirabil-
ity score presumably reflects genuine high self-esteem given that the person has
shown little tendency to hide negative characteristics from others.
Though genuine and defensive high self-esteem are conceptually appealing
constructs that have been around for over fifty years, they have not generated a
large body of empirical findings. The research that does exist, however, has pro-
duced findings supporting the distinction (see for example, Schneider & ‘Turkat,
1975). One potential direction for future research would be to isolate the impli-
342 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

cations for self-esteem processes of the self-deception and impression manage-

ment components of socially desirable responding (Paulhus, 1991). For our pres-
ent purposes, we merely point out that research and theory on the distinction
between defensive and genuine high self-esteem suggest one way to distinguish
fragile from secure forms of high self-esteem.

Do the Person’s Conscious and Nonconscious Feelings of Self-Worth

Match?

A second way to distinguish secure from fragile high self-esteem involves a con-
sideration of both conscious and nonconscious feelings of self-worth. Specifically,
some high self-esteem individuals may report favorable feelings of self-worth, yet
simultaneously hold negative self-feelings that they are unaware of (rather than
just being unwilling to report, as in defensive high self-esteem). The idea that peo-
ple may possess feelings of self-worth of which they are not aware is also not a
new one. However, it is only in recent years that it has received substantive atten-
tion, due in part to the advent of sophisticated methodologies that may have
allowed for its examination.
Epstein and Morling (1995) discuss these dual self-esteem components with-
in the framework of Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST), which holds
that people possess two separate, but interacting, psychological systems. One sys-
tem, referred to as the cognitive or rational system, operates at the conscious level
according to linguistic and logical principles. Explicit self-esteem resides in the
cognitive/rational system, reflecting the feelings of self-worth that people are
conscious of possessing. It can be measured by standard self-esteem scales like the
Rosenberg measure. ‘The second system, called the experiential system, operates
at the nonconscious level, guided in large part by significant affective experiences
and heuristic principles. Implicit self-esteem resides in the experiential system,
reflecting feelings of self-worth that are nonconscious but that nonetheless can
“seep through” to affect peoples’ thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Implicit self-
esteem cannot be assessed by directly asking people how they feel about them-
selves.
Epstein and Morling suggest that when people possess high explicit self-
esteem, but low implicit self-esteem, they will often react very defensively to
potentially negative evaluative information. This prediction mirrors the one
made for defensive high self-esteem individuals. Specifically, people who report
high self-esteem, but who simultaneously hold low self-esteem that they are either
unwilling (defensive) or unable (implicit) to admit to, are hypothesized to be eas-
ily threatened by negative self-relevant information. High explicit self-esteem that
is coupled with low implicit self-esteem is fragile and so may relate to defensive
and self-aggrandizing strategies even in the absence of explicit threat. In contrast,
when explicit and implicit self-esteem both are favorable, one’s high self-esteem
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem 343

is secure, making it less necessary to defend against real or imagined threats or to

flaunt one’s strengths.
A variety of approaches can be used to examine implicit self-esteem and its
implications for psychological functioning. One approach developed by
Greenwald and colleagues (e.g., Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999) involves
the use of reaction time methods to assess the strength of associative links
between self defining terms and various positive and negative stimuli. The
greater the relative strength of positive-self associations to negative-self associa-
tions, the higher one’s implicit self-esteem (for a review of this work, see Farnham
et al., 1999). An alternative approach is to situationally activate implicit self-
esteem by exposing people to positive or negative self-esteem relevant stimuli (e.g.,
words such as worthless, capable, likeable, insecure) at speeds too fast to be con-
sciously recognized. Abend, Kernis, and Hampton (2000) recently employed this
strategy to examine whether discrepant explicit/implicit self-esteem increases
self-serving responding among college students. In the first of two laboratory ses-
sions, participants completed Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale (explicit self-
esteem) and a “background survey” in which they indicated whether or not a
wide range of characteristics were self-descriptive (e.g., I have a close relationship
with my mother; I have good social skills; I am a leader; I regularly read books for
pleasure).
Approximately one to two wecks later, participants returned to the lab to
perform several different tasks. The first task was described as a “visual percep-
tion task”, but, in actuality, it was designed to situationally activate either positive
or negative implicit self-esteem. Participants were seated in front of a computer
screen, and a series of self-relevant words were flashed on the screen. ‘The words
were presented at a rate too fast to be read and were followed immediately by a
mask of random letters. The participants’ task was to indicate whether each flash
appeared to the left or the nght of a fixation point in the center of the screen
(which consisted of the words “ I AM”). Depending on the condition, the flashed
self-relevant words were either all positive (e.g., capable, talented, likable, worth-
while) or all negative (e.g., cruel, insecure, worthless, inconsiderate). ‘The positive
ones were primes for high implicit self-esteem and the negative ones were primes
for low implicit self-esteem. Following an intervening task, participants read a
description of a fictitious college student and then rated the extent to which var-
ious attributes contributed to her successful graduation from college. ‘These were
the same attributes that participants had, during the earlier session, indicated
were or were not self-descriptive. A measure of self-serving responding was cre-
ated by computing the average importance rating of attributes for successful
graduation that the participant previously deemed non-self-descriptive and sub-
tracting it from the average importance rating given to self-descriptive attributes.
Computed this way, higher scores reflect the self-serving judgment that success-
ful college performance depends more on those attributes one possesses than on
those attributes one does not possess. This task has been used to assess self-serv-
344 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ing responses by Dunning and his colleagues in a number of studies (e.g.,

Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995),
As anticipated by Epstein and Morling’s theorizing, self-serving responses
were greater among those high self-esteem individuals who were presented with
negative self-relevant words (high explicit/low implicit self-esteem) than among
those who were presented with positive self-relevant words (high explicit/high
implicit self-esteem). In other words, those representing high fragile self-esteem
were more self serving that those representing high secure self-esteem.
Interestingly, low explicit/high implicit self-esteem also related to more self-serv-
ing responses than did low explicit/low implicit self-esteem. To our knowledge,
these findings represent the first demonstration that discrepant explicit/implicit
self-esteem heightens self-serving responses. Although we are excited about their
potential implications, much more work needs to be done. Still, they provide initial
empirical support for the assertion that some instances of fragile high self-esteem
may reflect high explicit self-esteem that coexists with low implicit self-esteem.

Is the Person’s Self-esteem Dependent Upon Certain Outcomes?

To this point, we have not discussed insights that Self-Determination Theory

(SDT) provides in distinguishing between fragile and secure high self-esteem. In
this section, we begin to do so by focusing directly on Deci and Ryan’s (1995) dis-
tinction between contingent and true high self-esteem. In their words,
“Contingent self-esteem refers to feelings about oneself that result from —
indeed, are dependent on — matching some standard of excellence or living up
to some interpersonal or intrapsychic expectations (p. 32).” For someone with
contingent high self-esteem, preoccupations with one’s standings on specific eval-
uative dimensions (e.g., How smart am I?) and how one is viewed by others (Do
people think I am attractive?), together with engaging in a continual process of
setting and meeting evaluative standards for validational purposes, constitute the
sin qua non of everyday life.
In other words, contingent self-esteem involves a highly ego-involved form of
self-regulation in which one’s behaviors and outcomes are linked directly to self-
and other-based (dis)approval (Deci & Ryan, 1995). A poor performance is not
merely a poor performance inasmuch as it is likely to trigger feelings of incom-
petence, shame, and worthlessness. Deci and Ryan pointed out that people with
contingent high self-esteem will go to great lengths to avoid such painful experi-
ences, even if it means distorting one’s performance or derogating the source of
negative feedback. Conversely, good performances validate contingent-high-self-
esteem people’s feelings of overall value and worth, so such experiences are
eagerly sought and may, in the extreme, even be fabricated.
High self-esteem that is contingent isfragile, because it remains high only as long
as one is successful at satisfying relevant criteria. If one is continually successful,
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem a4

high self-esteem may appear to be secure and well-anchored. As Deci and Ryan
emphasized, however, it is not secure, because the need for continual validation
drives the person to attain more and more successes. And, should these success-
es cease, the person’s self-esteem may plummet. The self-regulatory processes
that are associated with contingent self-esteem are especially powerful precisely
because they involve the linking of behaviors and outcomes to self- and other-
based demands and (dis)approval (Deci & Ryan, 1995).
In contrast, true high self-esteem reflects feelings of self-worth that are well-
anchored and secure, that do not depend upon the attainment of specific out-
comes, and that do not require continual validation. According to Deci and Ryan
(1995), true high self-esteem develops when one’s actions are self-determined
and congruent with one’s inner, core self, rather than a reflection of externally-
imposed or internally-based demands. Activities are chosen and goals are under-
taken because they are of interest and importance. Furthermore, relationships
with others are characterized by mutual acceptance, intimacy, and understand-
ing (e.g, Ryan, 1993).
True high self-esteem is not “earned,” nor can it be “taken away.” Doing
well is valued because it signifies effective expression of one’s core values and
interests and it is this effective expression that is valued, not high self-esteem per
se. Directly pursuing high self-esteem reflects contingent, not true, high self-
esteem. Conversely, individuals with true high self-esteem do not interpret poor
performance as indicative of their incompetence or worthlessness. Instead, poor
performance is used nondefensively as a source of information to guide one’s
future behavior. This does not mean that people with true high self-esteem react
unemotionally to poor performances. As Deci and Ryan (1995) noted, they may
feel disappointed and perhaps somewhat sad or irritated, but they are unlikely to
feel devastated or enraged, the latter set of feelings being more likely when one’s
self-esteem is invested in the outcome.
Building upon Deci and Ryan’s framework, Crocker and Wolfe (2001) pro-
vide evidence that there are individual differences in what criteria people with
contingent high self-esteem feel they must satisfy to maintain their positive self-
feelings. For some people, academic competence is most critical, whereas for oth-
ers, it is how socially accepted they are. Other major categories of contingencies,
each having its own criteria to be met, include one’s physical appearance, God’s
love, power, and self-reliance. Initial empirical efforts to assess individual differ-
ences in the strength of these various contingencies have been very encouraging
(see Crocker & Wolfe, 1998). We see great potential value in determining the pre-
cise nature of individuals’ self-esteem contingencies. For our present purposes,
however, the specific content of one’s contingencies is less important than
whether contingencies per se are operative.
Paradise and Kernis (1999) examined the role of contingent self-esteem in
predicting the intensity of anger aroused by an ego-threat. We reasoned that peo-
ple with highly contingent self-esteem would be easily threatened by an insulting
346 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

evaluation and would deal with this threat by becoming especially angry and hos-
tile. To test this hypothesis, we developed a measure of contingent self-esteem
(The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale; Paradise & Kernis, 1999), which consists of
15 items, each rated on 5-point Likert scales (ranging from “Not at all like me”
to “Very much like me”). Sample items include “An important measure of my
worth is how well I perform up to the standards that other people have set for
me” and “Even in the face of failure, my feelings of self-worth remain unaffect-
ed” (reverse-scored). The scale is internally consistent (alpha = .85) and shows
considerable test-retest reliability (r = .77).
Participants were undergraduate women whose self-esteem level, contingent
self-esteem, and stability of self-esteem (another reflection of fragile self-esteem,
to be discussed in the next section) were assessed first. Next, they participated in
a laboratory session in which their “presentational skills” were rated ostensibly by
an unseen observer in another room. Through random assignment, some women
received an evaluation that contained highly insulting statements about their
appearance and mannerisms, whereas other women received a generally positive
evaluation. Following receipt of the evaluation, they indicated how angry and
hostile they felt (using a modified version of a state hostility measure employed
by Anderson, Anderson, & DeNeve, 1995). The results indicated that, as antici-
pated, the more contingent the women’s self-esteem, the more intense their anger
in response to the insulting treatment. This effect occurred after controlling for
the effect of self-esteem level, supporting the notion that contingent self-esteem
reflects a form of fragile self-esteem that is associated with heightened vulnera-
bility and reactivity to self-esteem threats.
Several weeks later, participants also completed the Anger Response
Inventory (ARI; Tangney et al., 1996), a self-report instrument that taps various
aspects of the experience and expression of anger, including anger intensity,
intentions for expressing anger, and tendencies to engage in physical or verbal
aggression. In line with the laboratory findings, there was a marginally significant
positive relation between the degree of women’s contingent self-esteem and the
intensity of anger they indicated they would experience in response to scenarios
depicting various daily events. Additionally, the more contingent the women’s
self-esteem, the more malevolent their intentions for expressing their anger (i.e.,
they wanted to get back at or hurt the instigator), and the greater their desire to
“let off steam.” However, rather than attack the instigator directly, highly con-
tingent self-esteem women, relative to women with less contingent self-esteem,
were more likely to focus their anger inward and stew about it, chastise them-
selves for not doing anything, and lash out at innocent others and things (i.e., dis-
placed verbal, or indirect, aggression).
In sum, recent research and theory offer encouraging support for the con-
struct of contingent self-esteem, its assessment, and its implications for distin-
guishing between fragile and secure self-esteem. At least two measurement instru-
ments are available (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Paradise & Kernis, 1999), which
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem a7

hopefully will facilitate the conduct of additional research. SDT, in addition to

offering the construct of contingent self-esteem, has a number of other implica-
tions for fragile and secure high self-esteem. We continue our discussion of these
implications in the following section.

Do the Person’s Current, Contextually-Based Feelings of Self-Worth

Fluctuate?

A fourth way to distinguish between secure and fragile high self-esteem is based
on the extent to which a person’s current feelings of self-worth fluctuate across
time and situations. These short-term fluctuations in one’s immediate, contextually-
based feelings of self-worth reflect the degree to which one’s self-esteem is unsta-
ble; the greater the magnitude of fluctuations, the more unstable one’s self-
esteem. Stability of self-esteem is conceptualized as being distinct from self-
esteem level, with the latter reflecting the positivity of one’s typical or general feel-
ings of self-worth (for reviews, see Greenier, Kernis, & Waschull, 1995; Kernis,
1993; Kernis & Waschull, 1995).
Consider Jaime who reports that she typically holds highly positive feelings
of self-worth. However, when she is asked on multiple occasions over a period of
5-7 days, “how do you feel about yourself at this moment,” her answers vary con-
siderably from “I like myself a lot” to “I am very unhappy with myself and I feel
pretty useless.” Cheryl also reports that she typically holds highly positive feel-
ings of self-worth. In contrast to Jaime, however, Cheryl’s repeated responses to
the question “how do you feel at this moment?” remain essentially the same (I like
myself a lot). Whereas Jaime’s high self-esteem is unstable (1.e., her current feelings
of self-worth substantially fluctuate across time), Cheryl’s high self-esteem is sta-
ble (i.e., her current feelings of self-worth remain constant). This example admit-
tedly is oversimplified. We offer it merely to illustrate that although two people
may have a high /evel of self-esteem, they can differ very much in the stability of
their self-esteem.
Considerable research supports the usefulness of distinguishing among high
self-esteem individuals on the basis of how much their immediate feelings of self-
worth fluctuate (e.g., Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; for summaries,
see Greenier, Kernis, & Waschull, 1995; Kernis & Waschull, 1995). Stable high
self-esteem individuals have positive, well- anchored feelings of self-worth that
are little affected by specific evaluative events. In contrast, unstable high self-
esteem individuals possess positive, yet fragile and vulnerable, feelings of self-
worth that are influenced by evaluative events that are internally generated (e.g.,
reflecting on one’s earlier interactions with others) or are externally provided
(e.g., a positive evaluation).
A core characteristic of people with fragile self-esteem is that they react very
strongly to events that they view as self-esteem relevant; in fact, they may even see
348 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

self-esteem relevance in cases where it does not exist. As in Deci and Ryan’s con-
ceptualization of contingent high self-esteem, people with unstable high self-
esteem are thought to be highly ego-involved in their everyday activities.
Elsewhere, we (Greenier et al., 1999; Kernis, Greenier, Herlocker, Whisenhunt,
& Abend, 1997) have portrayed this heightened ego-involvement as an “evalua-
tive set” consisting of several interlocking components. First, an attentional com-
ponent involves “zeroing in” on information or events that have potentially self-
evaluative implications. Second, a bias component involves interpreting ambigu-
ously or nonself-esteem relevant events as self-esteem relevant. Finally, a general-
ization component involves linking one’s immediate global feelings of self-worth
to specific outcomes and events (e.g., a poor math performance is taken to reflect
low overall intelligence and worth). Each of these components may operate out-
side of one’s awareness or be consciously and deliberately invoked. We turn to
some recent studies that are relevant to this evaluative set.
Depressive symptoms. Kernis et al. (1998) examined how stability and level of
self-esteem relate to increases in depressive symptoms that may occur when peo-
ple’s lives are full of daily hassles (e.g, not having enough time to do things,
money shortages, and interpersonal conflicts). Depressive symptoms were meas-
ured twice, separated by an interval of about four weeks. A measure of daily has-
sles (Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981) was administered along with the
second depression assessment and participants indicated the severity of hassles
that they experienced during the intervening time period. With respect to self-
esteem stability, increases in depressive symptoms were most apparent among
individuals who reported experiencing considerable daily hassles and whose self-
esteem was unstable (i.e., a self-esteem stability x hassles interaction). [n contrast,
self-esteem level did not predict increases in depressive symptoms, either alone or
interacting with the degree of hassles people reported experiencing (for concep-
tually similar findings, see also Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994; Roberts &
Monroe, 1992).
Additional findings linked unstable self-esteem to the tendency to overgen-
eralize the negative implications of failure (i.e., when specific failures activate
global feelings of incompetence; Carver & Ganellen, 1983). As was the case for
self-esteem stability, the overgeneralizing tendency also interacted with daily has-
sles in predicting increases in depressive symptoms. Specifically, increases in
depressive symptoms among individuals who experienced considerable daily has-
sles were especially apparent among high overgeneralizers. When self-esteem sta-
bility and overgeneralization were entered in regression models along with daily
hassles to predict depressive-symptom change, the overgeneralization x hassles
interaction became nonsignificant, but the self-esteem stability x hassles interac-
tion remained significant. One interpretation of these findings is that the ten-
dency to overgeneralize the implications of negative events is associated with
increases in depressive symptoms only to the extent that it results in short-term
shifts in feelings of self-worth (for a similar view, see Kuiper’s self-worth contin-
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem 349

gency model of depression; Kuiper & Olinger, 1986). In other words, short-term
self-esteem fluctuations may account for why overgeneralizing tendencies are
associated with heightened depressive symptoms in the face of aversive daily
events (for a more extensive discussion, see Kernis et al., 1998). Although some-
what speculative, this interpretation suggests one implication of the “evaluative
set” that is particularly deserving of further attention.
Reactwity to daily events. Everyday positive and negative events also have a
greater impact on the immediate self-feelings of people with unstable as com-
pared to stable self-esteem. Greenier et al. (1999) had college students provide
daily descriptions of their most positive and negative experiences on Monday
through ‘Thursday for two weeks. For each event, participants indicated the
extent to which it made them feel better or worse about themselves. ‘The more
unstable individuals’ self-esteem, the worse they reported feeling in response to
negative events and the better they reported feeling in response to positive events.
Interestingly, independent “uninvolved” coders rated the negative (but not
the positive) events reported by unstable self-esteem individuals as more self-
esteem relevant than the negative events reported by stable self-esteem individu-
als. These ratings may indicate that unstable, as compared to stable, self-esteem
individuals have a greater preponderance of negative self-esteem relevant events
in their lives. Alternatively, the ratings may indicate that unstable self-esteem indi-
viduals have a heightened tendency to attend to negative events that are self-
esteem relevant or to dias their event descriptions to emphasize aspects potential-
ly implicating self-esteem concerns. Stated differently, the ratings made by these
coders may either reflect “objective” differences in the actual events reported or
“subjective” differences associated with the way the particular events were
attended to and described (i.e., components of the evaluative set described earli-
er). Space precludes a more extended discussion of these issues here (interested
readers should consult Greenier et al., 1999).
Intrinsic motivation and reasons for anger. As discussed in SDT (e.g., Deci & Ryan,
1985; 1987) and as shown in past research (e.g., Ryan, 1982), situational factors
that emphasize the link between specific outcomes and one’s self-esteem (i.e., that
are highly ego-involving) often undermine intrinsic motivation and the desire to
take on challenges and instead promote a safer, more cautious self-esteem pro-
tective route to positive outcomes. It follows, then, that if unstable self-esteem
reflects a heightened tendency to be ego-involved, it should relate to lower levels
of intrinsic motivation in the classroom.
To test this prediction, Waschull and Kernis (1996) had fifth grade children
from several schools complete Harter’s (1981) Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Orientation
in the Classroom Scale, the global self-worth subscale of Harter’s Perceived
Competence Scale for Children to measure self-esteem level, and a modified ver-
sion of the global self-worth subscale (reworded to reflect current self-esteem)
twice daily for one week to measure self-esteem stability. Importantly, regression
analyses controlling for self-esteem level showed that unstable self-esteem inde-
350 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

pendently predicted lower Preference for Challenge (Pf{C; Does the child prefer
challenging tasks or those that are easy?) and lower Curiosity/Interest scores (CI;
Is the child motivated by curiosity or to get good grades and please the teacher?).
Compared to children with stable self-esteem, then, children with unstable self-
esteem reported a relatively more cautious or strategic self-esteem focused orien-
tation toward learning, rather than an intrinsic orientation toward learning for
learning’s sake.
In another facet of this study, Waschull and Kernis examined whether sta-
bility of self-esteem related to children’s reasons for becoming angry at their
peers. Five hypothetical scenarios depicting aversive interpersonal events were
constructed, each of which constituted an instrumental goal blockage as well as
a potential self-esteem threat (e.g., a peer jumping in front of the child in a water
fountain line). A heightened tendency to attend to the self-evaluative implications
of events was revealed in the responses of children with unstable self-esteem.
Specifically, compared to children with stable self-esteem, children with unstable
self-esteem reported that they would be more likely to get angry because of the
scenarios’ self-esteem threatening aspects. Once again, this effect emerged inde-
pendently of children’s self-esteem level.
Self-regulation of everyday goals. The findings discussed so far provide conver-
gent, albeit indirect, evidence that unstable self-esteem is linked to a heightened
tendency to be ego-involved in everyday events and, by extension, to the posses-
sion of an “evaluative set.” Additional evidence comes from a recent study
(Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000) that focused on the
ways that people regulate their everyday, recurrent goals, referred to as personal
strivings (Emmons, 1986).
In their discussion of se/fregulatory styles, Ryan and Connell (1989) proposed
that people engage in goal-directed activites for reasons that reflect varying
degrees of choicefulness, self-determination, and integration with one’s core self.
External regulation reflects the absence of self-determination inasmuch as_ the
impetus for action is external to the actor (e.g., another person’s request that is
tied implicitly or explicitly to reward or punishment). /nérojected regulation involves
the direct application of affective and self-esteem contingencies to motivate one-
self (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993). Gaining the approval of self and others pro-
motes behaviors that “are performed because one ‘should’ do them, or because
not doing so might engender anxiety, guilt, or loss of self-esteem” (1993, p. 587).
Introjected regulation goes hand in hand with heightened ego-involvement and,
as such, involves only minimal self-determination. Considerably more self-deter-
mination is present in identified regulation, which involves the individual person-
ally and freely identifying with the activity’s importance for his or her function-
ing and growth. Jntrnsic regulation is the prototypical form of self-determined
regulation in that activities are chosen purely for the pleasure and enjoyment they
provide.
SDT (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991) holds that the self-regulatory styles of opti-
mally functioning individuals consist primarily of identified and intrinsic regula-
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem 25

tion, rather than introjected and external regulation. Furthermore, Deci and
Ryan (1995) suggest that contingent self-esteem is anchored in external and intro-
jected self-regulatory processes, controlling forms of regulation that gain their
power through the linking of behaviors and outcomes to self- and other-based
(dis)approval. ‘True self-esteem, as we described previously, is posited to emerge
naturally out of more agentic processes associated with identified and intrinsic
self-regulation.
To our knowledge, the relations of contingent and true self-esteem to self-
regulatory styles have not been directly examined. However, it should be appar-
ent from the current discussion that contingent and unstable self-esteem share a
number of features, as do true and stable self-esteem (although they are not iden-
tical, an issue we take up in a later section). This overlap suggests that the more
unstable individuals’ self-esteem, the more they would engage in external and
introjected self-regulation, and the less they would engage in identified and
intrinsic self-regulation.
To test these hypotheses, Kernis et al. (2000) had participants complete
measures of stability and level of self-esteem along with a measure of self-con-
cept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996). In addition, participants generated a list of
eight personal strivings, indicating the extent to which they engage in each striv-
ing because of reasons reflecting external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic
self-regulatory processes. Approximately four weeks later, participants returned to
the lab and indicated the intensity with which they experienced various emotions
while engaged in each striving during the intervening time period. Although the
use of retrospective accounts of emotion limit their definitiveness, we included
them because of their potential to provide interesting information that can be
pursued in future research.
The results offered strong support for our hypotheses. After controlling for
the effects of self-esteem level, the more unstable people’s self-esteem, the more
external and the less identified and intrinsic were their self-regulatory styles.
Interestingly, unstable self-esteem was not related to greater introjected self-regu-
lation, which was measured by combining responses to two items. When each
item was analyzed separately, unstable self-esteem was significantly related to one
item (“I force myself to do it to avoid feeling guilty or anxious”), but was unre-
lated to the other (“I do it because I am supposed to do it”). It is unclear why the
effect emerged for only one of the two items. Analyses of the retrospective
accounts of emotion indicated that, compared to individuals with stable self-
esteem, individuals with unstable self-esteem felt more tense when pursuing their
strivings. Though subject to the limitation of retrospective accounts, this last find-
ing provides additional support for our contention that unstable self-esteem indi-
viduals are chronically ego-involved as they go about their everyday activities.
As noted earlier, participants also completed the Self-Concept Clarity Scale
(Campbell et al., 1996), which contains twelve items (e.g., My beliefs about myself
often conflict with one another; In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and
what I am). Kernis and Waschull (1995) suggested that having a poorly developed
352 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

self-concept may contribute to unstable self-esteem by leading individuals to rely

on, and be more affected by, specific evaluative information. In other words, the
less confident and internally consistent one’s self-knowledge, the less well-
anchored one’s feelings of self-worth are likely to be. Again the results offered
strong support, as unstable self-esteem was associated with lower self-concept
clarity (after controlling for self-esteem level).
In sum, past research has shown that compared to people with stable self-
esteem, people with unstable self-esteem (a) experience greater increases in
depressive symptoms when faced with daily hassles (Kernis et al., 1998), (b) have
self-feelings that are more affected by everyday negative and positive events
(Greenier et al.,1999), (c) take a more self-esteem protective (hence, less mastery
oriented) stance toward learning (Waschull & Kernis, 1996), (d) focus relatively
more on the self-esteem threatening aspects of aversive interpersonal events
(Waschull & Kernis, 1996) and (e) have more impoverished self-concepts (Kernis
et al., 2000). Importantly, each of these effects for self-esteem stability emerged
after controlling for the role of self-esteem level. Taken as a whole, these findings
point to the utility of using stability of self-esteem to distinguish between fragile
and secure forms of high self-esteem. We turn now to this issue.
Self-esteem stability and fragile versus secure high self-esteem. Research has shown that
people with unstable high self-esteem are more defensive and self-aggrandizing
than are their stable high self-esteem counterparts, yet they are lower in psycho-
logical health and well-being. Defensiveness often manifests itself in frequent out-
bursts of anger and hostility, which often are aimed at restoring damaged self-
feelings (Felson, 1984; Feshbach, 1970). As reported by Kernis, Grannemann,
and Barclay (1989), unstable high self-esteem individuals scored the highest on
several well-validated anger and hostility inventories (e.g., the Novaco Anger
Inventory; Novaco, 1975), stable high self-esteem individuals scored the lowest,
and low self-esteem individuals (whether stable or unstable) scored between these
two extremes.” As evidence of self-aggrandizing tendencies, compared to stable
high self-esteem individuals, persons with unstable high self-esteem said they
would be more likely to boast about a success to their friends (Kernis et al., 1997),
and after an actual success, they were also more likely to claim that they did so in spite of
the operation of performance inhibiting factors (Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1992).

2. In the Paradise and Kernis (1999) study referred to earlier, the more unstable was
women participants’ self-esteem, the greater the intensity of the anger they reported in
both the insult and control conditions, and these effects were not qualified by level of self-
esteem. Additional main effects for self-esteem instability emerged on a number of the
ARI subscales including anger intensity, malicious intent, constructive intent, and mar-
ginally for fractious intent. In the Kernis et al., (1989) study, self-esteem instability related
to greater anger and hostility proneness only among high self-esteem individuals. This dis-
crepancy may stem from differences in the measures used to assess anger and hostility
proneness, differences in the sample (Paradise and Kernis included only women participants,
whereas Kernis et al., 1989 included both men and women), or other unknown factors.
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem 353

As would be expected if unstable high self-esteem represents a form of /rag-

ie high self-esteem, these enhanced tendencies toward self-glorification and self-
defense for individuals with unstable high self-esteem do not promote greater psy-
chological health and well-being. To examine this, Paradise and Kernis (1999)
administered Ryff’s (1989) measure of psychological well-being to a sample of
college students who also completed measures of level and stability of self-
esteem. Ryff’s measure assesses six core components of psychological well-being:
(1) selfacceptance, the extent to which one holds positive attitudes toward oneself
(“I like most aspects of my personality”); (2) positwe relations with others, the extent
to which one has relations with others characterized by love, friendship, and iden-
tification (“I have not experienced many warm and trusting relationships with
others”); (3) autonomy, the extent to which one is self-determining, independent,
and self-regulating (“I judge myself by what I think is important, not by the val-
ues others think are important”); (4) environmental mastery, the extent to which one
is able to deal successfully with environments and demands that constitute their
everyday lives (“I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my
daily life’’); (5) purpose in life, the extent to which one has beliefs that reflect the feel-
ing that there is purpose and meaning to life (“Some people wander aimlessly
through life, but Iam not one of them”) ; and (6) personal growth, the extent to
which one values and envisions continued development of one’s potential (“I
think it is important to have new experiences that challenge how you think about
yourself and the world”).
Note that Ryff’s measure includes self-determination (autonomy), compe-
tence (environmental mastery, personal growth) and relatedness (positive relations
with others), components of psychological functioning that SDT considers cru-
cial. Therefore, it is of particular interest in the present context to note how
unstable as compared to stable high self-esteem individuals fare on these indices.
First we note that, consistent with previous findings (Ryff, 1989), high self-esteem
individuals overall reported greater autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, self-
acceptance, positive relations with others, and personal growth than did low self-esteem
individuals. Importantly, differences among high self- esteem individuals also
emerged as a function of self-esteem stability. Specifically, relative to individuals
with stable high self-esteem, individuals with unstable high self-esteem reported
lower autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, self-acceptance, and positive relations
with others. Stated differently, whereas stable high self-esteem individuals reported
that they functioned in a highly autonomous manner, possessed a clear sense of
meaning in their lives, related effectively within both their physical and social
environments, and were highly self-accepting, the same was less true of unstable
high self-esteem individuals.
These findings suggest that possessing stable high self-esteem may provide the
basis for functioning effectively in various realms, whereas unstable high self-
esteem may undermine (or at least not promote) effective functioning. Given the
correlational nature of the findings, an alternative explanation is that effective
354 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

functioning in a variety of behavioral and psychological domains may foster well-

anchored, positive self-feelings, whereas ineffective functioning may undermine
the security and/or favorability of one’s self-feelings. This latter explanation is
consistent with the view of Deci and Ryan (1995) who assert that true high-
esteem develops naturally out of the satisfaction of one’s needs for self-determi-
nation, competence, and relatedness. A third explanation emphasizes the recip-
rocal influences that self-esteem and other aspects of psychological well-being
may have upon each other. Each of these causal scenarios are likely to have their
proponents and the data do not allow us to determine which is most viable.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that all three explanations link self-esteem sta-
bility among high self-esteem individuals to factors that Deci and Ryan (1995)
propose are important in distinguishing between contingent and true high self-
esteem.
As we have noted on several occasions, our conceptualization of unstable
self-esteem shares a number of features with Deci and Ryan’s (1995) conceptual-
ization of contingent self-esteem. First, both emphasize the link from specific out-
comes to feelings of self-worth. Second, both describe enhanced tendencies to be
caught up in the processes of defending, maintaining, and maximizing one’s pos-
itive, though tenuous, feelings of self-worth. Likewise, stable and true high self-
esteem both are taken to reflect secure, well-anchored feelings of self-worth that
do not need continual validation. Pleasure following success and disappointment
following failure are reactions thought to characterize people with either stable or
true self-esteem, but these reactions are not tinged with the defensiveness or self-
aggrandizement associated with unstable or contingent self-esteem (Deci & Ryan,
1995; Kernis et al,,:1997).
Despite these multiple points of convergence, differences between the con-
ceptualizations do exist. How important these differences will turn out to be
remains to be seen, but we note them here so that they may be considered. One
difference is that whereas we explicitly distinguish between typical and current
feelings of self-worth, Deci and Ryan do not. We believe that it is important to
maintain such a distinction, both conceptually and empirically. A number of con-
temporary “self” theorists (e.g, Markus & Kunda, 1986; Rosenberg, 1986;
Swann & Hill, 1983) hold that transitory shifts in self-appraisals (self-evaluations,
self-images, self-esteem) coexist along with self-appraisals that are more stable
and resistant to change. Furthermore, stable and unstable self-appraisals are
thought to relate in different ways to individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and actions
(Kernis & Johnson, 1990; Markus & Kunda, 1986). Kernis, Jadrich, Stoner, and
Sun (1996) suggested “that the stable component is reflected in people’s “typical
self-appraisals” (How do you generally, or typically, feel about yourself?), where-
as the unstable component is reflected in people’s “current self-appraisals” (How
do you feel about yourself right now?)” (p. 432). Importantly, the processses
involved in the formation of current and typical appraisals differ. Typical
appraisals reflect “evaluative judgments of personal qualities that are abstracted
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem 355

from numerous experiences whose self-relevant implications have been stored in

memory” (Kernis & Johnson, 1990, p. 243). In contrast, current appraisals
“reflect individuals’ contextually based self-appraisals that are affected by a vari-
ety of factors, including self-evaluative thoughts, externally provided feedback,
social comparisons, and task performance“ (Kernis et al., 1996, p. 432). For fur-
ther discussion and supportive evidence regarding the distinction between cur-
rent and typical self-appraisals, see Kernis and Johnson (1990) and Kernis et al.
(1996).
A second difference between our concepualization and that of Deci and
Ryan is that, whereas by definition unstable self-esteem fluctuates, contingent
self-esteem can be stable as long as standards or expectations are continually met.
In Deci and Ryan’s (1995) words: “A man who feels like a good and worthy per-
son (i.e., has high self-esteem) only when he has just accomplished a profitable
business transaction would have contingent self-esteem. If he were very success-
ful, frequently negotiating such deals, he would have a continuing high level of
self-esteem; yet that high level would be tenuous, always requiring that he con-
tinue to pass the tests of life, always requiring that he match some controlling
standard (1995, p. 32).” Our view is that positive events (either internally gener-
ated or externally provided) will trigger short-term increases in unstable high self-
esteem individuals’ current feelings of self-worth. As discussed earlier, the self-
feelings of unstable high self-esteem individuals are more affected by everyday
positive events than are the self-feelings of stable high self-esteem individuals
(Greenier et al., 1999).
A third difference is that whereas we focus on the association of impover-
ished self-concepts (i.e., low self-concept clarity) to unstable self-esteem, Deci and
Ryan do not address the role of impoverished self-concepts in contingent self-
esteem. A fourth difference is that whereas the assessment of contingent self-
esteem seems to necessitate individuals’ awareness that their self-esteem is
dependent upon certain outcomes or self-evaluations (as measured by Crocker &
Wolfe, 2001, and Paradise & Kernis, 1999), our research has demonstrated that
people are not very good at knowing just how unstable their self-esteem is (Kernis
et al., 1992). This discussion is not meant to take anything away from the impor-
tant conceptualizations of contingent and true self-esteem, nor should it over-
shadow the significant implications that Deci and Ryan’s framework has for our
understanding of self-esteem stability. For the time being, though, it does support
the usefulness of maintaining the distinction between unstable and contingent
(and between stable and true) self-esteem. With the recent development of meas-
ures designed to assess contingent self-esteem, future research should include
direct comparisons of the two sets of constructs.
356 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Summary

In this chapter we have argued that self-esteem has multiple components and
that, to fully understand its place in psychological functioning, we must go
beyond whether it is high or low. Our major goal was to describe these compo-
nents so as to demonstrate the value of distinguishing among various forms of
high self-esteem, some of them fragile, and others secure. High self-esteem may be
fragile or secure for a number of reasons. In one form of fragile high self-esteem
(i.e., defensive high self-esteem), a person will deliberately misrepresent his or her
self-feelings as positive, when in reality they are negative, because he or she is
unwilling to admit to the negative self-feelings. The secure counterpart to this form
(i.e., genuine high self-esteem) involves a person accurately depicting his or her
feelings of worth as generally positive, while being willing to admit to the nega-
tive self-feelings that he or she has. A second form of fragile high self-esteem (high
explicit/low implicit self-esteem) occurs when a person consciously holds positive
feelings of self-worth but nonconsciously holds negative feelings of which he or
she in unaware. The secure counterpart to this form (high explicit/high implicit)
involves possessing positive conscious and nonconscious feelings of self-worth.
Although research concerned with these forms is scarce, available findings do
support our characterization of them.
A third form of fragile high self-esteem (contingent high self-esteem) occurs
when a person bases his or her positive feelings of self-worth on specific attain-
ments or evaluations. The secure counterpart to this form (true self-esteem)
involves feelings of self-worth that do not require continual validation. SDT
offers a rich theoretical analysis that has many empirical implications that are
only beginning to be studied. The recent development of measurement scales to
assess degree of contingent self-esteem is likely to produce a surge of research in
the coming years. A fourth form of fragile high self-esteem (unstable high self-
esteem) involves instances in which a person reports typically holding positive
feelings of worth, yet his or her current, contextually-based feelings of self-worth
exhibit considerable short-term fluctuations. The secure counterpart to this form
(stable high self-esteem) involves contextually based feelings of self-worth that
remain basically unchanged across time and contexts. SDT also offers many
insights into the processes associated with unstable versus stable self-esteem, some
of which have received empirical attention but many more of which remain to
be examined.
Although there are differences among these various conceptualizations, they
all share the conviction that there is more to self-esteem than whether it is high
or low. For self-esteem research and theory to continue to progress it is critical
that the various forms of self-esteem be taken into account. One question of
interest is the extent to which these various forms of high self-esteem covary with-
in individuals. Other important questions pertain to the extent to which they
 Fragile and Secure High Self-Esteem SOT,

share similar etiologies and have similar consequences for psychological health
and well-being. SDT holds a critical place in these endeavors, both as a rich
source of hypotheses and as a broad theoretical framework within which seem-
ingly diverse findings can be integrated.

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16: The Need for Competence

AndrewJ. Elliot
Holly A. McGregor
Todd M. Thrash
Unwersity of Rochester

The competence construct has been integral to theories of personality and moti-
vation since the advent of psychology as a scientific discipline (see James, 1890,
pp. 309-311). Many theorists over the years have assumed that human beings
strive to acquire competence and avoid incompetence, and researchers have con-
ducted thousands of empirical studies designed to investigate the nature of com-
petence-motivated behavior (Spangler, 1992). One contemporary theory that
reserves a prominent place for the competence construct is Deci and Ryan’s
(1991) self-determination theory (SDT). SDT posits that all individuals possess an
innate, appetitive form of competence motivation—a psychological need for
competence. SDT’s view of the need for competence is grounded in White’s
(1959) conceptualization of effectence motivation which posits that organisms
are born with the urge to have an effect on and master their environment. In fact
it seems, at times, that the two constructs, the need for competence and effectence
motivation, may be viewed as essentially equivalent within SDT, as the terms
“competence” and “effectence” are used interchangeably in explications of the
need for competence construct (see Deci & Ryan, 1991; Ryan, 1995).
In this chapter we attempt to make the case for construing the need for com-
petence in broader, more inclusive terms. Specifically, we propose that effectence
motivation be construed as the initial manifestation of the need for competence,
but that this inherent need becomes more elaborated and complex over the
course of development. The chapter is organized as follows. First, we offer an

Thanks are extended to Anthony Capobianco, Richard Koestner, and Ken Sheldon
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Preparation of this chapter was
supported in part by a grant from the Radcliffe Research Support Program of the Murray
Center, and a Faculty Scholars grant from the W. T. Grant Foundation.
362 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

overview of White’s effectence motivation concept in the context of his approach

to personality and development. Second, we propose a broader conceptualiza-
tion of the need for competence, and we overview developmental issues that sug-
gest the viability of such a conceptualization. Third, we discuss this more inclu-
sive view of the need for competence in terms of other forms of motivation that
may be operative in competence-relevant settings. Finally, we close with a sum-
mary statement and consider the benefits of our proposed conceptualization.

White’s Effectence Motivation

In 1959, Robert White published a now classic paper in which he introduced

the concept of effectence motivation. In the paper, White detailed the shortcom-
ings of the prevailing approaches to motivation based in drives and instincts, and
marshalled evidence in support of an additional source of motivation—the
desire for effective, competent interactions with the environment. This inherent
motivational energy, labeled effectence motivation, represents an organismic urge
or propensity that impels the individual to investigate, manipulate, and master
the environment. The infant’s natural tendency toward curiosity and explorato-
ry play is considered the prototypic behavioral manifestation of effectence moti-
vation. Effective engagement with the environment is said to produce an intrin-
sically pleasurable affective experience termed “a feeling of efficacy,” an experi-
ence White (1965) later likened to “joy in being a cause” (p. 203).
Effectence motivation is viewed as a natural outgrowth of central nervous
system functioning (rather than a response to tissue deficits), and is assumed to be
in perpetual operation during waking hours, unless interrupted by homeostatic
crisis. ‘his source of motivation is posited to be universal among humans and
higher mammals, and is thought to have the biological/evolutionary function of
helping the organism adapt to his/her surroundings by fostering the development
of skills and abilities. It is important to note that experientially, effectence moti-
vated behavior is engaged in for the direct, immediate reward of having an effect
on the environment, not for the sake of acquiring the resulting skills and abilities
that maximize fitness and the probability of survival. White illustrated this point
by drawing a parallel between sexual motivation and effectence motivation. The
ultimate aim of sexually motivated behavior is survival and reproduction, but
experientially, sex is engaged in for the immediate pleasure that accompanies the
activity itself. Likewise the ultimate aim of effectence motivated behavior is the
development of capabilities that afford survival, but experientially, such behavior
is engaged in for the pleasure of the feelings of efficacy that accompany effective
interaction with the environment.
White described effectence motivated behavior using both negative and pos-
itive criteria. He clearly stated that such behavior does not include reflexes and
 The Need for Competence 363

other automatic responses, action in the service of biologically-based drives, or

random activity that may inadvertently have an impact on the environment.
Behavior impelled by effectence motivation is characterized as persistent, focused
effort intended to produce an effect, and is posited to be exhibited in the infant’s
earliest transactions with the environment (White, 1965). Early manifestations of
effectence motivation simply entail the infant directing attention toward an
object and attempting to effect a change of a general sort. White provided illus-
trative examples such as the infant’s rudimentary attempts to fixate an object in
vision, and the infant’s poorly crdinated hand movements designed to knock into
a suspended rattle. The changes in sensory input that follow from such efforts are
experienced by the infant as feelings of efficacy (White, 1960). Effectence moti-
vated behavior also includes actions intended to produce more specific types of
change in the environment. In his 1963 monograph, White stated: “We are most
familiar with the feeling of efficacy at a level of behavior where we act with inten-
tions to produce particular effects. We feel efficacious when we throw the ball
over the plate, swim to the raft, or mend the broken household appliance” (p. 35).
‘Thus, whether the behavior entails ill-coordinated arm movements toward a rat-
tle or highly controlled arm motions toward home plate, action impelled by
effectence motivation involves at least some incipient form of intentionality
(White, 1965), and is sustained by the pleasurable feelings of efficacy acquired
directly and immediately from the activity itself (White, 1963).
In addition to the concepts of effectence motivation and feelings of efficacy,
White introduced two other constructs: competence and sense of competence.
He defined competence as the individual’s actual skill and ability to interact effec-
tively with the environment. Innate abilities were presumed to determine a per-
son’s competence to some extent, but it was thought to be primarily a product of
learning via effectence and other means—the cumulative result of the whole
history of transactions with the environment” (White, 1963, p. 39). He defined
sense of competence as the individual’s subjective perception of his or her skill
and ability to interact effectively with the environment that may or may not cor-
respond to his or her actual competence. Sense of competence is viewed as a cog-
nitive set or map representing one’s confidence in one’s skills and abilities, and
like actual competence, it is thought to be a product of one’s cumulative learning
experiences (White, 1960; 1972). In contrasting effectence and feelings of effica-
cy with competence and sense of competence, White (1963) stated that the for-
mer are applicable to single episodes or experiences with the environment,
whereas the latter represent structural elements of the self and personhood that
cohere over many encounters with the environment.
White did not posit individual differences in effectence motivation (cf.
Harter, 1978; Morgan, Harmon, & Maslin-Cole, 1990), opting instead to empha-
size the inherent propensity in all human beings toward active exploration and
mastery of their environment. White did, however, discuss various “constitution-
al” and environmental factors that facilitate or impede effective engagement with
364 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

the environment. Constitutional factors include the individual’s activity level,

physique (discussed in terms of Sheldon’s somatypes), and degree of manual dex-
terity, athletic talent, and intellectual ability; environmental factors include regu-
lar access to varied stimulation, parental responsiveness to the child’s physical and
emotional needs, and parental supportiveness of the child’s initiatives and appre-
ciation of his or her accomplishments (White, 1963; 1972; 1975). These factors
are not construed as affecting effectence motivation per se, but by influencing
effectence-relevant experiences, they are thought to have an important impact on
interindividual variation in competence, sense of competence, self-esteem, and
overall ego development.
Although White offered relatively clear definitions of effectence motivation,
feelings of efficacy, competence, and sense of competence, the framework he
constructed with these concepts to explain motivation and personality across the
lifespan is imprecise and fragmentary, and lacks conceptual clarity (Harter, 1978;
Maddi, 1996; Messer, 1993). One weakness of White’s conceptualization is that
it fails to clearly delineate how effectence motivation develops over the lifecourse.
White stated that effectence motivation in infants and young children is undiffer-
entiated, and argued that it gradually becomes differentiated into various motives
such as “cognizance, construction, mastery, and achievement” (1959, p. 323).
That is, each of these motives were said to have their root, at least in part, in
effectence motivation and were thought to differentiate from it via life experi-
ences focused on different aspects of effective functioning. Unfortunately, White
did not elaborate on the relationship between effectence motivation and these
other motives, and he was silent regarding how and why the motive differentia-
tion process transpires.
A second weakness of White’s conceptualization is that it does not clearly
articulate the nature of the motivation underlying the competence and sense of
competence constructs. White stated that competence and sense of competence
result from learning via effectence motivation and other motivational sources; he
also indicated that effectence motivation can fuse with other motives to produce
behavior that results in competence and a sense of competence (White, 1960,
1963). In neither case did he suggest which other forms of motivation might be
implicated, nor did he offer any details regarding these motivational processes.
Most importantly, White did not speak to the issue of whether the desire for com-
petence could represent a motivational source in and of itself. Although some
who overview White’s work state that he proposed a competence motivation con-
struct parallel to the effectence motivation construct, this proposal is not to be
found in White’s writings. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the term com-
petence motivation is used only twice by White (both times in his seminal 1959
paper), and in both instances he simply used it to refer to effectence motivation
in a non-technical, descriptive fashion.
 The Need for Competence 365

A Broader Conceptualization of the Need

for Competence

It is our contention that the need for competence construct is best concep-
tualized as an innate desire for competence broadly defined rather than an innate
desire for effectence per se. That is, we view the motivation that White referred
to as effectence motivation as a subset of a more general form of innate, appeti-
tive competence motivation—a desire to be competent in one’s actions, skills, and
abilities. This inherent urge has the experiential aim of being competent, and it
serves the biological/evolutionary function of adaptation to the environment.
From this standpoint, effectence motivation represents the first manifestation of
a broader motivational source; it is what the need for competence looks like ini-
tially, in infants and young children. It is posited that as the individual acquires
various representational capacities, is marked by experience, and encounters an
array of socialization experiences, his or her need for competence develops in
both a quantitative and qualitative fashion and becomes, over time, a multidi-
mensional motivational disposition that includes, but is not limited to, effectence
motivation. In the following, we elaborate on this view of the need for compe-
tence, highlighting its link to White’s conceptualization, the various developmen-
tal transitions and socialization factors that influence its growth and differentia-
tion, its transformation into a motivational disposition, and the ways in which it
becomes an increasingly complex motivational construct as it operates in an
increasing complex and multiply motivated organism.

Differentiation of the Need for Competence

White described effectence motivated behavior as action engaged in “for its

own sake,” a phrase he used to emphasize that effectence motivation was an
important source of energy in itself, independent of other drives and instincts.
Importantly, this phrase was not meant to connote that effectence motivated
behavior is engaged in simply for the pleasure of doing the activity per se (as
some have suggested); rather it is engaged in to experience the pleasure that
comes from doing the activity in an effective manner. If an infant seeks to fixate
an object in vision to produce a clearer image or swings his/her hand toward a
rattle to produce a noise, the mere act of fixating the object per se or swinging
his/her arm per se does not result in feelings of efficacy. If the child is able to
sharpen the image or cause the rattle to emit noise, he/she will then experience
feelings of efficacy; if the child is not able to sharpen the image or cause the rat-
tle to emit noise he/she will not experience feelings of efficacy. Thus, behavior
motivated by effectence is outcome focused in that it represents striving to obtain
a desired result.
366 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The result that effectence motivated behavior seeks to obtain is lask-referential

competence. That is, in effectence motivation, competence is defined in an
absolute sense by the requirements of the task itself, and the individual’s (experi-
ential) aim is simply to accomplish what the task demands. Given that the stan-
dard for evaluating competence is inherent to the task, one may receive feedback
regarding one’s efficacy or competence directly and immediately during the
course of task engagement. This direct and immediate receipt of feedback gives
this form of competence motivation a very process-oriented, flow-like
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) quality, enabling one to remain absorbed in the task
even as one receives ongoing competence feedback. In sum, White’s effectence
motivation may be (re)construed as the initial manifestation of a more global
need for competence, specifically, as a desire to attain task-referential compe-
tence.
In the neonate, the task and, therefore, competence are represented quite
broadly and imprecisely as having some sort of general effect on the environ-
ment. Neonates are able to detect whether an environmental event is contingent
upon their behavior (Watson, 1966; Papousek, 1967), and they display a positive
orienting to and an anticipatory enjoyment of such behavior-event contingencies
(DeCasper & Carstens, 1981). Within two to three months, infants clearly exhib-
it joyful pleasure in response to exerting an influence on the environment
(Heckhausen, 1984). These rudimentary forms of task-referential competence
motivation are obviously not guided by any consciously mediated desires or affec-
tive anticipations and may be construed as functioning in non conscious fashion,
much like McClelland and colleagues’ (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger,
1989) notion of implicit motivation,
By 18 months, children have developed the capacity to represent tasks cog-
nitively with greater specificity and precision. Now, the child views task require-
ments and, therefore, competence in terms of fully completing or mastering
activities, rather than simply exerting a general influence on the environment
(Barrett & Morgan, 1995). This allows the child to evaluate his or her perform-
ance with more rigor and in a more deliberate fashion by explicitly comparing it
to the task-referential standard of competence (Kagan, 1981). Thus, the need for
competence at this age has begun to function in a more conscious, cognitively-
elaborated fashion, akin, to some degree, to McClelland et al.’s (1989) notion of
self-attributed motivation.
Prior to 18 months, the child’s notion of self is limited to a sense of agency,
commonly labeled the subjective self-concept or “I.” By the age of 18 months to
2 years, children acquire an objective self-concept—a sense of self as a distinct
entity that can become the object of one’s knowledge (i.e., one can reflect on
one’s accomplishments; Harter, 1983). With the advent of this sense of “me,”
one’s task-referential competence efforts can take on a new form of self-rele-
vance, and, accordingly, task mastery can produce not only the pleasure of joy in
accomplishment but also the pleasure of pride in accomplishment (Jennings,
 The Need for Competence 367

1993; Mascalo & Fischer, 1995; Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992). In compe-
tence evaluation, joy and pride represent closely related emotional satisfactions;
Heckhausen (1987) makes reference to “joyful pride” (p. 343), and Lewis (1993)
describes the phenomenology of pride in terms of joy over an action well done.
This affective experience corresponds directly to McClelland, Atkinson, and col-
leagues’ (Atkinson, 1957; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) concep-
tion of pride in success that served as the intrinsic satisfaction underlying their
need for achievement construct. Importantly, although pride requires self-reflec-
tion and attribution to the self, the central focus is on the quality of the action
that the self has produced, not on the self per se independent of the accom-
plishment (Lewis, 1997).
As the child’s cognitive capacities continue to mature and develop, the child
is able to represent tasks and cumulations of tasks in a more elaborate fashion
and, eventually, can focus on the acquisition of skills and abilities as the desired
accomplishment. For example, over time a child may move from seeking to play
a single note on the piano, to seeking to play a chord, to seeking to play a song,
to seeking to acquire piano skills more generally. In each case, if the satisfaction
being sought is the joyful pride of accomplishing a challenge, the self-regulatory
behaviors involved are a manifestation of the need for competence. Thus, the
need for competence can be manifest in seeking to master a single act or set of
actions, but it can also be manifest in seeking to master skills and abilities more
broadly. These representational capacities are thought to emerge during the third
year of life (Jennings, 1993; Kagan, 1981; van der Meulen, 1991).
Initially, children’s conceptions of skills and abilities remain rather concrete
and behaviorally focused. Over time, their conceptions can become more
abstract and can take the form of underlying qualities such as ability (in con-
tradistinction to abilities) and intelligence. Although there is currently much
debate in the literature as to when this developmental transition occurs,
researchers are beginning to think that children can conceive of underlying psy-
chological abstractions as early as age 4 (Cain & Dweck, 1995; Heyman &
Gelman, 1999). At this age, children construe ability and intelligence as malleable
qualities that can be acquired through effort. Accordingly, this transition may not
produce much of a change in the need for competence, as the need for compe-
tence is still manifest as a seeking to acquire competence, now simply construed
in more abstract terms. It is interesting to note that children initially think of abil-
ity and intelligence in global terms across domains (e.g., academic and social) and
gradually develop more specific representations of ability in distinct domains and
distinct areas within domains (e.g, math ability and reading ability; Harter, 1983;
Wiefield, Eccles, & Rodriguez, 1999).
A little researched issue concerns childrens’ subtle shift from viewing com-
petence in terms of task mastery to viewing it in terms of improvement and
development. That is, once children have acquired the capacity to represent two
outcomes simultaneously and to evaluate these outcomes with regard to tempo-
368 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ral sequence, they can begin to define competence in terms of improvement—an

increase in their present performance relative to their past performance. Most
theorists have implicitly presumed that this past-referential form of competence
motivation emerges rather early in development, around the time that children
begin to focus on the acquisition of abilities and ability (Dweck & Elliott, 1983;
Nicholls & Miller, 1984; Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989; Suls & Mullen, 1982).
However, the minimal research that has been conducted on this issue has either
failed to provide clear results or yielded evidence that temporal comparison is not
utilized until a bit later (i.e., past the age of 5; Butler, 1998; Ruble, Eisenberg, &
Higgins, 1994). At present, this issue remains unresolved. Past-referential compe-
tence motivation is a close derivative of task-referential competence motivation,
and it seems likely that the two are often intertwined (Elhot, 1999; Elhot &
McGregor, 2001), particularly during the time that children are just beginning to
utilize temporal comparison. Like its predecessor, past-referential competence
motivation affords a private, intrapersonal evaluative process that should help
maintain task absorption. Nevertheless, past-referential competence motivation is
not as likely as task-referential competence motivation to appear process-orient-
ed or flow-like, given that the acquisition of competence feedback is more com-
plex and relies on information beyond the immediate task performance.
Considerably more research has investigated a third component of the need
for competence—other-referential competence motivation. The extant data suggest
that children are able to define competence in terms of their performance rela-
tive to others as early as 3 years of age (Jennings, 1993). Specifically, children
understand the concept of a simple competition to determine who can complete
a task first, and they exhibit enhanced pleasure when they win a competition
rather than simply master a task (Heckhausen, 1984; Stipek et al., 1992).
Although children can comprehend the concept of other-referential competence
at the age of 3, most researchers contend that children do not focus on acquiring
this form of competence until 6 months to a year later (Butler, 1998; Jennings,
1993), and many believe that normative considerations do not become highly
salient for children until the age of 6 or 7 (Jennings, 1993; Nicholls, 1989; Ruble
& Frey, 1991; Supek & Mac Iver, 1989; Veroff, 1969). Other-referential compe-
tence motivation may be contrasted with task-referential and _past-referential
competence motivation in that it necessitates an interpersonal evaluative process.
In face-to-face competitions, competence information may be acquired rather
directly during the process of task engagement, but in many instances, individu-
als do not have direct access to competence information and may not receive
feedback until much later. Thus, although outperforming others may be as satis-
fying or even more satisfying than mastering a task or improving, other-referen-
tial competence motivation may not appear as process-oriented or flow-like as
task-referential, or even past-referential, competence motivation.
 The Need for Competence 369

Interindividual Variation in the Need for Competence

To this point, we have highlighted the role of cognitive maturation in the

development of the need for competence in all individuals, but it is also impor-
tant to note that there exists variation in this need across individuals. In fact,
although the need for competence is innate and present in all individuals
throughout the lifespan, we contend that there are biologically-based individual
differences in this motivational source from birth onwards (see Elliot & Thrash,
2002). Interindividual variation in the need for competence is likely to be ground-
ed, at least in part, in interindividual variation in neurophysiological activity such
as behavioral activation system (BAS) sensitivity. The BAS represents an arousal
system centered in the catecholaminergic pathways of the brain which is pre-
sumed responsible for activating approach-oriented responses to stimuli and for
evoking positive anticipatory and reactive emotions (Gray, 1990; Sutton &
Davidson, 1997). The need for competence is more specific than, and therefore
clearly not isomorphic with, the BAS, but the BAS is likely to be one of a circuit
of direct, biological contributors to the need for competence.
Early individual differences in the need for competence are likely to be man-
ifest, in part, as variation in the infant’s activity level. Activity level is a tempera-
ment variable representing the child’s degree of motor activity, behavioral tempo,
and physical energy level (Vondra, 1995). It has been shown to be heritable, and
most developmentalists construe it as a foundational building block of adult per-
sonality (Buss & Plomin, 1984; Goldsmith et al., 1987). Although many factors
clearly contribute to an infant’s activity level, this temperament variable seems to
reflect, in part, the child’s inherent, biologically-based propensity to engage,
interact with, and have an impact on the environment. As such, the infant’s ini-
tial endowment of the need for competence is likely to be manifest (albeit in
crude, imperfect form) in his or her degree of active, vigorous exploration of
his/her environmental surrounds (see also Vondra, 1995).
A heritable, biologically-determined starting point for the need for compe-
tence does not mean that persons will possess the same amount of need for com-
petence across the lifecourse. As with physiological needs, psychological needs
change over time as a function of maturation and experience. Individuals begin
life with a particular level of need for competence, and this level is posited to vary
to some degree in either direction (i.e., become somewhat stronger or weaker) as
a function of life experience (see Buss and Plomin, 1984, for a similar argument
regarding temperament per se). In other words, experience impacts the strength
of the individual’s need for competence, but the degree to which experience can
exert its influence is constrained by the individual’s biological makeup. By expe-
rience we mean to connote cumulative experience. In any given situation, the
degree to which a person’s need for competence is satisfied is presumed to affect,
in a cumulative fashion, his or her degree of well-being.
370 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

In addition to positing biologically-based individual differences in the need

for competence from the womb, we believe that other aspects of the person’s bio-
logical makeup impact the need for competence indirectly, by influencing the
person’s competence-relevant experiences. Infants born with greater sensorimo-
tor intelligence or better symbolic representational skills or those with strong,
muscular physiques are likely to have more success in interacting with their envi-
ronment (McClelland, 1973; Vondra, 1995). Likewise, children blessed with
abundant athletic skills or unusual musical or artistic talents are particularly like-
ly to encounter feelings of efficacy and pride early and often. These success expe-
riences and their accompanying affects are thought to maintain and facilitate the
growth of the need for competence (Deci, 1980; Harter, 1981). Failure experi-
ences can foster the need for competence to the extent that they provide infor-
mation and are construed as a challenge to be overcome, but a disproportional
number of successes to failures is certainly the ideal (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harter,
1978)
The likelihood that a child will encounter mastery opportunities and experi-
ences is further enhanced by the presence of a secure attachment with his or her
caregiver(s). Securely attached children exhibit a greater desire to seek challenges
in their environment and have been found to be more successful in conquering
the challenges they undertake, even when variables such as IQ are held constant
(Belsky, Garduque, & Hrncir, 1984; Maslin-Cole & Spieker, 1990; Pipp,
Easterbrooks, & Harmon, 1992; van den Boom, 1989). Characteristics of the
home environment can also have an important influence on the development of
the need for competence. Parents who provide a stimulating and optimally chal-
lenging environment for their children create an ideal training ground for the
need for competence. Parents themselves may provide direct stimulation for their
children by engaging them in games that arouse curiosity and afford challenge
(Yarrow et al., 1984). The provision of age-appropriate toys and ensuring access
to a wide variety of stimulating activities and experiences throughout the home
environment is another way that parents can facilitate mastery experiences and
foster the need for competence in their children (Shaffer, 1999; Veroff, 1969).
More generally stated, any home, school, or work environment that provides indi-
viduals with opportunities for optimal challenge should sustain and/or enhance
the need for competence.
Socialization agents also impact the development of the need for compe-
tence. Socialization may be indirect or direct (Saarni, 1993). Parents and other
caregivers may exert an indirect influence by exhibiting vigor, enthusiasm, and
persistence in their own competence-relevant strivings (Katkovsky, Preston, &
Crandall, 1964). Such modeling reinforces the importance and value of the
child’s own competence desires and provides him or her with concrete ideas as to
how to go about channeling these urges into effective and structured pursuits
(Harter, 1981). Caregivers may also exert a more direct influence by actively
encouraging the child’s competence-relevant actions and by responding to the
 The Need for Competence ya

child’s successes and, importantly, efforts (independent of outcome) with

approval and excitement (McClelland, 1973; Rosen & D’Andrade, 1959;
Winterbottom, 1958). This positive reinforcement is presumed to sustain and
facilitate the need for competence by enhancing or intensifying the affective expe-
rience of efficacy and pride, and by clearly communicating the importance and
value of this internal motivational energy (Veroff, 1969). Space considerations
prohibit the discussion of additional factors that contribute to the development
of the need for competence, but the following may be acknowledged in passing:
gender, socio-economic status, and family structure (see McClelland, 1973;
Shaffer, 1999 for reviews). It is also likely that many of the factors discussed or
listed above interact with each other in exerting their influence on the need for
competence (see Vondra, 1995).
Thus far, we have highlighted the impact that various factors have on the
quantitative nature (i.e., amount) of the need for competence, but it is important
to note that many, if not most of the factors discussed or listed above may also
influence the qualitative nature of the need for competence. Over time, an indi-
vidual’s need for competence may become weighted toward a desire for task-ref-
erential competence, past-referential competence, or other-referential compe-
tence. For example, a boy who daily strives to match the performance standards
set by his near-age older brother may develop strong other-referential compe-
tence motivation (a process the senior author has observed in his own children);
only children, in contrast, may be more likely to develop strong self-referential
competence motivation given the absence of a live-in source of social compari-
son information. Likewise, parents who model competitiveness or directly
encourage competitiveness in their children are more likely to raise children who
have strong other-referential competence motivation. Indeed some have suggest-
ed that gender differences in competence-relevant motivation reflect the fact that
males in our society are socialized to be more competitive than females (see
Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Of course, the individual with the strongest overall
need for competence would be the person who, over time, develops a high quan-
tity of task-referential, past-referential, and other-referential competence motiva-
tion. Unfortunately, to date researchers have allocated little empirical attention to
issues pertaining to the qualitative development of competence motivation.
A central feature of the conceptualization of the need for competence that
we are espousing, and one that bears reiteration, is its innate nature. Although we
acknowledge that experience plays an integral role in the shaping and molding of
the need for competence over the lifecourse, we view this motivational source as
inherent to the organism. Thus, in contrast to other conceptualizations of com-
petence-relevant motivation that construe such energization as entirely a product
of learning (e.g., McClelland, et al., 1953; although see McClelland’s, 1985, later
work on natural incentives), we believe that the motivational energy underlying
competence strivings neither needs to be acquired via experience nor borrowed
from some other source (see Hartman, 1958). The need for competence is pres-
ie HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ent at birth, albeit in rudimentary form as a nonsconscious urge for effectence,

and over the life course is filtered through cognitive structures of increasing com-
plexity and channelled in various directions as a function of maturation, the indi-
vidual’s biological makeup, competence-relevant experiences, and socialization
history. As the need for competence develops, it remains rooted in the effectence
urge; new ways of defining or experiencing competence do not necessarily
replace the old but differentiate from it and become integrated with it to form a
multidimensional need for competence. Throughout the lifespan, all individuals
possess the need for competence and require competence for optimal functioning
and well-being. However, individual differences in the quantity and quality of the
need for competence are clearly present such that some persons have a stronger
desire for competence than others, and some persons have a desire for certain
types of competence (i.e., task-referential, past-referential, or other-referential)
relative to others. We believe that early life experiences have a disproportional
impact on the strength and nature of the individual’s competence (McClelland,
1951; Veroff, 1965), but we also contend that competence motivation remains
somewhat malleable throughout childhood and even into the adult years (see
McClelland & Winter, 1969).

Needs, Motives, and Goals

We would like to conclude this section on a general note, by briefly com-

menting on the distinction between the “need,” “motive,” and “goal” concepts in
motivational theorizing. There is no consensual way to define the terms “need”
and “motive;” some theorists over the years have considered them to be synony-
mous (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1951), whereas others have offered various
means of distinguishing between them (Liebert & Spielgler, 1994; Nuttin, 1984).
Our view is that the need and motive concepts are similar to each other, but dif-
fer in one extremely important way. Needs and motives are similar to each other
in that both represent affectively-based motivational dispositions that energize
the individual and orient him or her toward valenced possibilities. Needs differ
from motives in that they are part of the individual’s inherent psychological
makeup and, therefore, represent a psychological requirement, which means they
must be attended to and satisfied for the individual to function in optimal fashion
and experience well-being. In essence, a need may be seen as a motive that has
innate roots.
Although this approach to distinguishing between the need and motive con-
cepts is based on a single distinction, the ramifications of this distinction are far
reaching, both conceptually (e.g., concerning the important issue of the number
of motivational dispositions that should be considered needs in human personal-
ity) and functionally (e.g,, concerning which motivational dispositions are likely to
have the deepest and most pervasive impact on affect, cognition, and behavior).
 The Need for Competence 373

The need for competence is conceptualized herein as an innate, multidimension-

al need, and is presumed to have a powerful and widespread influence on person-
ality functioning and well-being. In accord with SDT (Deci & Ryan, 1991), we
view many motivational dispositions that have been proffered in the literature
(some of which carry the label “need”) as motives rather than needs; examples
include the need for closure, the need for dominance, the self-presentation
motive, and the self-verification motive. Such motive dispositions clearly have an
important influence on everyday functioning, but we suspect that their influence
is qualitatively different from that of basic needs such as the need for competence
(see Deci & Ryan, 2000).
As with the need and motive concepts, there is no consensual way to define
the term “goal,” nor is there a widely shared understanding of how goals differ
conceptually from needs and motives (see, e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Locke
& Latham, 1990; Pervin, 1982). Our view is that goals may be distinguished from
needs and motives in that the latter are affectively-based dispositions that ener-
gize behavior and orient the individual in a general way, whereas the former are
cognitive representations that serve a directional function for behavior by focus-
ing the individual on more specific possibilities (Elliot, 1997; Thrash & Elliot,
2001). Goals are related to needs and motives in the self-regulatory process, in
that individuals sometimes adopt goals that help serve their dispositional desires
by channelling them in a more concrete direction. Needs or motives can and
often do lead directly to behavior, but these general dispositional desires some-
times need to be strategically channelled in a specific direction to be satisfied in
an effective and efficient manner. Thus, the need for competence can influence
behavior in two ways: it can impel competence-based behavior directly, or it can
lead to competence-based behavior indirectly by prompting the adoption of
competence goals that proximally regulate behavior (Elliot & Thrash, 2001).
Like the need for competence, competence goals are differentiated in terms
of the type of competence that the individual focuses on. Convention in the lit-
erature has been to collapse task-referential and past-referential competence
together into a “mastery goal,” and to distinguish this goal from a performance
goal focused on other-referential competence (Ames & Archer, 1987; Dweck &
Elliott, 1983; Maehr, 1983; Nicholls, 1984), but we have recently suggested the
need to additionally consider bifurcating “mastery” goals according to the task-
referential/past-referent distinction (Elliot, 1999; Elliot & McGregor, 2001).
Interestingly, the relationship between the need for competence and competence
goals may take on many different manifestations. For example other-referential
competence motivation may straightforwardly prompt the adoption of an other-
referential competence goal, but in many instances the desire for other-referen-
tial competence may actually be better served when it leads to a task-referential
mastery goal that helps facilitate task absorption.
374 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The Need for Competence and Competence Strivings

in the Context of Other Sources of Motivation

Conceptually, the need for competence may be discussed in terms of a pure,

isolated source of motivational energy, but in everyday life, the need for compe-
tence is often operative in conjunction with other forms of motivation.
Furthermore, in some settings, competence strivings may be impelled by motiva-
tional sources in addition to, or even instead of the need for competence. In the
following, we briefly discuss some (interrelated) ways in which the need for com-
petence and competence strivings may become linked to other sources of moti-
vation.

Links to Other Sources of Motivation

Self-enhancement motwation. With the advent of the objective self-concept, the

child may not only evaluate the self’s actions and accomplishments, but may eval-
uate the self in general. As such, competence strivings may emerge from a gen-
eral desire for self-enhancement (Sedikides.& Strube, 1997), and competence
may become a means to the end of feeling good about the global self, rather than
an end sought for its own sake. The emotional satisfaction accompanying com-
petence may be seen as a marker of which form of self-relevant motivation is (or
was) operative. In the need for competence, the emotional satisfaction is joyful
pride in accomplishment, which represents a specific positive evaluation of the
actions that the self has produced; in self-enhancement motivation, the emotion-
al satisfaction is hubris, which represents a global positive evaluation of the entire
self (see Lewis, 1997, for a discussion of the pride vs. hubris distinction).
Accomplishments may be construed in terms of doing well on situation-specific
tasks, developing skills or abilities, or even becoming the best person that one can
become. ‘This illustrates that it is not necessarily the globality/specificity dimen-
sion that distinguishes the need for competence from self-enhancement motiva-
tion, but whether the emotional satisfaction resides or does not reside in the
accomplishment itself. However, it should be noted that the more general or
abstract the focus of one’s competence strivings, the more likely it is that the
underlying motivation is separate from the accomplishment itself.
Instrumental competence motivation. Competence clearly has instrumental as well
as inherent value. Early on, around the age of two, children become aware of the
fact that their accomplishments can evoke smiles, hugs, and applause from oth-
ers, in addition to feelings of joy and pride (Stipek et al., 1992; Thompson, 1998).
Throughout the lifecourse competence is the gateway to multifarious benefits
including money, material possessions, power, prestige, attention, fame, etc.
These accompaniments represent concrete, symbolic indicators of competence
 The Need for Competence B15

and may be viewed simply as a source of competence information

(Harackiewicz, 1989), but they may also supersede competence to become an end
in themselves. As such, competence strivings may reflect an instrumental desire
to acquire some external outcome that is completely independent of the accom-
plishment itself (see Harter’s, 1981, conceptualization of extrinsic motivation),
and this form of regulation has little to do with the need for competence per se.
Intrinsic motwation. Intrinsic motivation is commonly defined in terms of
engaging in an activity for the enjoyment or interest of the activity itself (Deci &
Ryan, 1985). When intrinsically motivated, the individual is not pursuing any
separable outcome, but is simply seeking the pleasure that comes directly and
immediately from the experience of the activity. Intrinsic motivation may be con-
trasted with competence motivation, in which the individual is pursuing a sepa-
rable outcome, the pleasure of experiencing or attaining competence in the activ-
ity. Thus, conceptually, we view the need for competence and intrinsic motivation
as distinct entities. Although conceptually distinct, the need for competence and
intrinsic motivation are often closely related in any given experience of activity
engagement. Intrinsic motivation is a descriptive term that refers to the pursuit
of enjoyment and fun for its own sake, but an in-depth analysis of the construct
requires a consideration of what it is that individuals experience as enjoyable or
fun. Attaining competence at an activity is one important psychological determi-
nant of enjoyment and fun, thus the pursuit of competence and seeking enjoy-
ment/fun in the task can, in some instances, be inextricably intertwined. In addi-
tion, the relationship between competence and enjoyment is undoubtedly recip-
rocal (attaining competence is enjoyable and enjoyment yields greater compe-
tence), leading to a further entangling of the two constructs.
The intertwining of competence motivation and intrinsic motivation is most
likely when the individual is seeking task-referential competence, as competence
information in such instances is received directly and immediately from the task
itself and allows the individual to remained fully absorbed in the enjoyment of
task engagement. The pursuit of past-referential or other-referential competence
can also be closely associated with intrinsic motivation, but only in situations in
which competence information is readily available during or immediately after
task engagement (e.g., a one-on-one competition such as a chess match or a rac-
quetball game).
Selfworth motivation. The precise manner in which parents respond to their
child’s successful and unsuccessful competence pursuits has a deep and pervasive
influence on the child’s sense of self. ‘To the extent that parents convey that their
acceptance, approval, or love of the child is contingent upon his or her perform-
ance, competence will become linked to self-worth and security concerns, and the
need for competence and competence strivings will suffer accordingly. Parents
may establish competence-relevant contingencies in many ways, often unknow-
ingly. For example, in response to a specific success, a parent may lavish person-
focused praise on his or her child (e.g., “You’re such a good boy/girl”) or may
376 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

comment on the child’s broad-level attributes (e.g, “You’re so smart”). Global

feedback of this nature is likely to establish an association between the child’s spe-
cific performances and his or her general value and worthiness (see Dweck, 1999,
for related arguments). More invidiously, a parent may withdraw affection or love
from his or her child upon failure, thereby sending an unequivocal message that
the child’s loveability and worth is contingent upon his or her performance in
competence-relevant settings. In essence, these forms of socialization communi-
cate to the child a lack of inherent self-worth and put the child in a position
where he or she must earn approval, affection, and worth through his or her com-
petence strivings (see Rogers’, 1959, on conditions of worth). A child in this posi-
tion is likely to develop a working model of the self as unworthy of love (Bowlby,
1973; Bretherton, 1990), and to manifest signs of ego-involvement in compe-
tence-relevant settings (Ryan, 1982). This view of the self is likely to be carried into
adulthood, where it will be readily reinforced by a culture that implicitly presumes
one must be competent to be a valuable member of society (Covington & Beery,
1976). The broad point to be made is that the need for competence is likely to be
undermined to the extent that it becomes intermingled with self-worth and/or affil-
iation issues. Indeed, to the extent that competence becomes a means to the end of
validating one’s worth (Dykman, 1998) or gaining the approval of others (Smith,
1968), competence strivings are simply servants of other forms of motivation,
Self-presentation/self-assessment motwation. Implicit theories of intelligence (or
ability) are hikely to exert an important impact on the nature of competence striv-
ings (Dweck, 1990). The tendency to view intelligence as a stable, fixed trait is
thought to emerge sometime around the age of 7 (see Dweck & Elliott, 1983;
Heyman & Dweck, 1998; Nicholls & Miller, 1984; Pomeranz & Ruble, 1997,
Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989;). When intelligence is construed as stable, one’s focus is
no longer on being competent in a single act or set of actions, acquiring skill/abil-
ities, or acquiring ability; rather, one’s focus is on determining or demonstrating the
degree to which one possesses immutable intelligence. Thus, when one holds an
entity theory of intelligence, competence strivings are likely to be manifestations
of self-assessment motivation (if one desires to determine one’s intelligence) or self-
presentation motivation (if one desires to demonstrate one’s intelligence), rather
than competence motivation per se (see Elliot, 1999). Given the consensual value
of intelligence in our society, the competence strivings of entity theorists are also
likely to be undergirded by (and laden with) self-worth and approval concerns.
A separate, learned competence motwe? ‘Vhe need for competence is an innate
form of appetitive competence motivation, and it is interesting to contemplate
whether persons can develop an appetitive competence motive that is independ-
ent of the need for competence. McClelland et al. (1989) would likely answer in
the affirmative, drawing on their distinction between implicit and self-attributed
motives. McClelland and colleagues might argue that a person can learn, from
one’s parents or one’s culture more broadly, that competence is something to
value and, in response, may embrace this value to the point that it becomes, over
 The Need for Competence oy)

time, a conscious, cognitively-elaborated, dispositional desire for competence (a

self-attributed motive) separate from their non conscious, emotion-based, dispo-
sitional desire for competence (an implicit motive). Although we acknowledge this
possibility, we would like to raise two points regarding the likelihood of a sepa-
rate, entirely learned, appetitive competence motive. First, if one presumes, as we
do, the existence of an innate desire for competence in all persons, it seems like-
ly that information regarding the value of competence would simply bolster and
reinforce the individual’s inherent urges and tendencies (i.e., be incorporated into
the existing motivational system), rather than establish an entirely separate moti-
vational system. Second, to the extent that the conscious valuing of competence
is based in a desire for social recognition or a desire to view or present oneself in
a particular light (as McClelland and colleagues presume), we would question
whether this motive disposition should be viewed in terms of competence per se.
Indeed, Koestner and McClelland (1990) describe this self-attributed form of
competence motivation as “extrinsic,” a label that implies an interest in compe-
tence not as an end in itself, but as a means to some other end. At present, we
remain open to the possibility of a separate, entirely learned, appetitive compe-
tence motive, but we prefer to emphasize the inherent nature of the desire for
competence per se. We see the value of the implicit/self-attributed distinction but
think it is best suited to address the fact that the need for competence may
become cognitively-elaborated to varying degrees and that individuals may or
may not be consciously aware of and, therefore, may or may not be able to accu-
rately self-report their level of innate, appetitive competence motivation (see
Thrash & Elliot, 2001 for a more detailed consideration of these issues).
Aversive competence motivation. To this point, we have discussed competence
motivation exclusively in appetitive terms, but it is important to acknowledge that
competence motivation also includes an aversive component—the desire to avoid
incompetence. Aversive competence motivation clearly deserves a chapter in its
own right; at present we will simply raise the question of whether such motiva-
tion should be conceptualized as an entirely learned motive that derives from the
need for competence or as an innate source of energy independent of the need
for competence (i.e., the need to avoid incompetence). On one hand, it seems rea-
sonable to construe aversive competence motivation as derivative, essentially as
the need for competence gone astray. Repeated failure experiences, insecure
attachment, and socialization practices such as person-focused criticism or love
withdrawal upon failure are all factors that can prompt the individual to reorient
his or her desires toward avoiding incompetence rather than acquiring compe-
tence. On the other hand, aversive competence motivation may be construed as
having an inherent basis to the extent that it is grounded in neuroanatomical
structures such as the behavioral inhibition system (see Gray, 1990), and early
individual differences in this motivational source might be manifest, in part, in
the heritable, biologically-based infant temperament of fearfulness (see Rothbart
& Ahadi, 1994) or behavioral inhibition (Kagen, Reznick, & Snidman, 1987). At
B18 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

present it is not clear which conceptualization is more accurate, although we sus-

pect that the weight of the cumulative evidence will eventually support the latter.
Regardless, it is important to note that aversive competence motivation is highly
susceptible to becoming linked to other forms of motivation (i.e., self-worth con-
cerns, affiliative concerns), and indeed much of what appears to be aversive com-
petence motivation on the surface is probably not competence motivation at all,
but is simply avoidance striving serving some other motivational aim (for further
discussion of aversive competence motivation see Elliot & Church, 1997; Elhot &
McGregor, 1999; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997).
The broader motivational context. Although the need for competence is clearly a
positive and adaptive source of motivation, in the broad context of overall per-
sonality functioning there are instances in which the need for competence can
interfere with optimal self-regulation. In addition to the need for competence,
individuals possess a need for relatedness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ryan,
1995), and to the extent that attending to the need for competence precludes suf-
ficient attention to the need for relatedness, well-being will suffer. Specific mani-
festations of this would include the child who receives such strong gratification
from developing Nintendo skills that interaction with peers is all but ignored, or
the adult who becomes so absorbed in exciting accomplishments at the workplace
that familial relations are neglected. Some aspects of the need for competence
seem more likely to conflict with broader personality processes than others. A
desire for other-referential competence, in particular, seems most likely to inter-
fere with the need for relatedness, as in some situations, one’s own competence
may come at the direct expense of a relational other. The desire for other-refer-
ential competence can even interfere with other aspects of the need for compe-
tence itself, as when the individual ignores opportunities for challenge or skill
development in the process of pursuing the thrill of competitive victory. It is even
possible that the need for competence unrestrained by the occasional considera-
tion of possible incompetence could be maladaptive, as individuals may find
themselves so enthralled by the possibility of competence that potential pitfalls
along the way are ignored or never even perceived (see Arnett, Smith, &
Newman, 1997, for a conceptual parallel). Thus, satisfaction of the need for compe-
tence may lead to well-being in general, but balance within the need itself and with-
in the broader context of personhood is important to ensure optimal functioning.

Closing Comments

In this chapter we have attempted to make the case for conceptualizing the
need for competence in broad terms, as an innate, appetitive desire to be com-
petent in one’s actions, skills, and abilities. This broad conceptualization of the
 The Need for Competence Bah)

need for competence is grounded in White’s notion of effectence motivation, but

is not limited to it. Effectence motivation is clearly an important manifestation of
the need for competence, and in many respects may be considered its prototypic
form. The experiential aim of the need for competence is the pleasure of accom-
plishment fer se, and the inherent urge to seek competence for its own sake is
often witnessed most clearly and purely in the form of effectence pursuits.
However, we believe equating the need for competence and effectence motivation
unnecessarily restricts the scope of the need for competence construct.
Accordingly, we posit that effectence motivation is best viewed as the initial man-
ifestation of the need for competence and that this inherent desire for compe-
tence develops over time, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the point that,
in its “adult” form, it represents a multidimensional motivational disposition that
includes a desire for past-referential and other-referential competence, in addi-
tion to a desire for task-referential competence (i.e., effectence).
Portraying the need for competence in broad, inclusive terms has many ben-
efits. For example, extending the need for competence beyond effectence moti-
vation enables SDT to account for more conceptual space in the competence
domain. Furthermore, broadening the need for competence construct would
seem to bring SDT’s operationalization and conceptualization of the need for
competence into concordance. In empirical research in the SDT tradition, com-
petence is sometimes operationalized in terms of effectence, but other times it is
operationalized in broader, more inclusive terms. For example, in recent research
on need satisfaction, participants’ state level of competence has been assessed by
simply asking participants to report “how competent they felt” while doing select-
ed daily activities during the previous 24 hours (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999, p. 488),
and participants’ trait level of competence has been assessed using the compe-
tence subscale of the Multidimensional Self-Esteem Inventory which is com-
prised of items such as “Most people who know me consider me to be a highly
talented and competent person” and “How often do you approach new tasks with
a lot of confidence in your ability?” (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan,
2000; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). Thus, it seems that conceptually, SDT has
often portrayed the need for competence as synonymous with effectence motiva-
tion, whereas operationally, it has allowed for a broader portrayal of the need for
competence. Extending the need for competence construct to include task-refer-
ential, past-referential, and other-referential competence motivation would elim-
inate this problem.
In addition to benefitting SDT, we believe that the present portrait of com-
petence motivation addresses an important shortcoming of White’s theorizing.
White’s framework of motivation and personality has been critiqued for its lack
of precision, specifically regarding the issues of how effectence motivation devel-
ops over the lifecourse and what type of motivation underlies the competence
construct. We have directly discussed these issues in detail in the process of artic-
ulating the nature of the need for competence construct and, we believe, we have
380 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

done so in a manner that is consistent with, and indeed maintains a prominent,

foundational place for, White’s classic conceptualization.
A further benefit of the proposed conceptualization of the need for compe-
tence is that it (implicitly) integrates two of the most influential analyses of com-
petence-relevant motivation that have been offered to date-——White’s work on
effectence motivation and the work of Murray (1938, 1948), McClelland (1951,
1985), and Atkinson (1957, 1964) on the need for achievement. Murray defined
the need for achievement as the desire: “to accomplish something difficult. ‘To
master, manipulate, or organize physical objects, human beings, or ideas. ‘To do
this as rapidly, and as independently as possible. To overcome obstacles and
attain a high standard. To excel one’s self. To rival and surpass others. ‘To
increase self-regard by the successful exercise of talent.” (1938, p. 164). The need
for achievement was conceptualized as a motive disposition on which individuals
vary considerably, and this disposition was presumed to be acquired via early
learning experiences. McClelland and Atkinson embraced Murray’s concept of
the need for achievement but developed a more thorough analysis of the con-
struct (including a clear explication of the nature of the satisfaction associated
with the need—pride in accomplishment), and an objective scoring system to
facilitate the assessment of individual differences.’ Despite the clear overlap in

1. McClelland and Atkinson adopted an empirical rather than theoretical approach to

operationally defining and devising a measure of dispositional need for achievement.
Specifically, they used an experimental procedure whereby male university undergraduates
(mostly ex-servicemen) encountered achievement-arousing Cues or not prior to writing brief
stories to TAT-like pictures. The achievement-arousing cues were characterized as “ego
involving” and included instructions describing the story-writing task as a test of intelli-
gence conducted by the Office of Naval Research designed to determine who was best suit-
ed to be a leader (interestingly, such cues had been shown to “frighten impressionable sub-
jects into incoherence” in early pilot work; McClelland et al., 1953, p. 103). Any story con-
tent that differed between the achievement-arousing and neutral conditions was presumed
to reflect need for achievement, and the need for achievement scoring system was derived
on this basis. Consequently, the need for achievement was operationally defined as a desire
for “success in competition with some standard of excellence” (McClelland et al., 1953, p.
110) and various types of achievement imagery were incorporated into the system includ-
ing: competitive activity involving winning or doing better than others, self-imposed
requirements for good performance such as doing a “thorough, workmanlike job” on a
task, unique or extraordinary personal accomplishments, and striving to attain a long-term
goal such as becoming a doctor or lawyer. An individual’s need for achievement score is
comprised of this achievement imagery category plus several subcategories representing
processes (¢.g,, Cognitive anticipation, affect) presumably associated with striving for the
achievement standard. Many of these subcategories are positively valenced, but a number
focus on failure-relevant processes such as anticipatory failure and negative affect upon fail-
ure. As such, although need for achievement was conceptualized by McClelland and
Atkinson as a rather pure form of approach motivation (i.e., striving for achievement for its
own sake), operationally it appears to be a somewhat heterogeneous compilation of moti-
vational concerns (cf. Koestner and McClelland, 1990).
 The Need for Competence 381

content domain, White made little mention of the work of Murray, McClelland,
and Atkinson, and vice versa. White simply noted that effectence motivation dif-
ferentiates over time into other motives including a motive for achievement;
McClelland (alone) made passing reference to effectence motivation, but only in
the context of discussing the rudiments of the power motive. Contemporary
researchers working out of these two traditions have typically followed their pio-
neers by making little mention of the other tradition. The few who do discuss
both usually contrast them and emphasize the ways in which they differ (Barrett,
MacTurk, & Morgan, 1995; Harter & Connell, 1984; Heckhausen, 1987); for
exceptions, see Dweck and Elhott (1983) and Nicholls (1989).
The need for competence, as conceptualized herein, incorporates aspects of
both the effectence motivation and need for achievement traditions. Drawing on
White, the need for competence is portrayed as an innate form of appetitive
competence motivation, of which effectence motivation is an important compo-
nent. Drawing on Murray, McClelland, and Atkinson, the need for competence
is viewed as developing over time into a multidimensional disposition that
includes the desire for task-referential, past-referential, and other-referential com-
petence (each of which is represented in Murray’s definition of the need for
achievement) and varies across individuals. Although in the present chapter, we
have focused primarily on the relationship between the need for competence and
effectence motivation, our view of the need for competence is clearly grounded
in the need for achievement tradition as well. We believe that further considera-
tion of the links between these two highly influential and generative traditions
promises to yield further insight into the nature of competence motivation.

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17: Three Views of the Agentic Self: A Developmental
Synthesis

Todd D. Little
Patricia H. Hawley
Christopher C. Henrich
Katherine W. Marsland
Yale Unwersity

Although the concept of human agency has broad and deep philosophical roots
(see Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), psychological inquiry into the nature of the
agentic self has been rather fragmented. In this chapter, we examine the interre-
lationships among three psychological perspectives on human agency: self-deter-
mination theory (Deci & Ryan; 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000), resource-control the-
ory (Hawley, 1999a, 1999c), and action-control theory (e.g., Little, 1998; Skinner,
Chapman, & Baltes, 1988). Our primary goal is to offer an elaborated conceptu-
alization of the agentic self and, by so doing, to provide a broadened framework
for understanding human behavior across the life span. First, we examine the
common metatheoretical assumptions of these perspectives; namely, their organ-
ismic roots. Second, we define, in general terms, the concept of personal agency.
Third, we discuss both basic and development features of the three views on
human agency. Last, we integrate and clarify some of their commonalities in an
effort to provide a broadened psychological view of the agentic self.

Common Metatheoretical Assumption

The three theoretical perspectives on human agency stem from a common

organismic view of human behavior (for overviews see e.g, Miller, 1993;

We express our gratitude for the feedback and comments of our colleagues in the
Agency in Development Lab of the Department of Psychology at Yale University. Partial
support for this work was provided by a grant from Yale College, Yale University.
390 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Overton, 1984; Reese, 1991). At its core, an organismic perspective views behav-
ior as volitional, goal-directed action. Individuals are inherently active and self-
regulating, and their actions are both purposive and _ self-initiated.
Developmentally, an individual continually interacts with the environment while
progressing along a predominantly self-guided path, giving form and meaning to
his or her actions along the way. Moreover, an individual’s actions result from
selective choices that emanate primarily from the self.
An organismic approach to understanding the behavior of individuals also
involves an explicit focus on the interface between the self and context (Little, in
press; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). Generally speaking, contexts reflect
specific constellations of features at both the molar and micro levels that both
constrain and afford behavior. At the same time, from an organismic perspective,
the individual, when functioning optimally, is viewed as an integrated organism
that both influences and is influenced by the contexts in which she or he acts and
develops. In particular, this perspective presumes that individuals are active
agents who plot and navigate a chosen course through the uncertainties and chal-
lenges of the social and ecological environments; however, like trade winds and
currents, environments sometimes hinder, sometimes bolster, and other times
change the course of a developmental route.
As part of their integrated functioning, individuals engage in a self-evalua-
tive feedback process, continuously interpreting and evaluating actions and their
consequences. As a result, across the episodes of activity in the varying constel-
lations of context, the individual continually discovers and refines who she or he is
and what she or he is capable of. Under optimal circumstances, this continually
evolving and actively monitored self-system gives rise to a sense of personal agency.

A General Definition of the Agentic Self

On the basis of these organismic principles and assumptions, we define per-

sonal agency as the sense of personal empowerment, which involves both know-
ing and having what it takes to achieve one’s goals. More broadly speaking, a
well-adapted agentic individual is the origin of his or her actions, has high aspi-
rations, perseveres in the face of obstacles, sees more and varied options for
action, learns from failures, and, overall, has a greater sense of well-being. In con-
trast, a non-agentic individual can be a pawn to unknown extra-personal influ-
ences, has low aspirations, is hindered with problem-solving blinders, often feels
helpless, and, overall, has a greater sense of ill-being (deCharms, 1968; Little,
1998; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Skinner, 1995; Weisz, 1990).
Individuals who have a sense of agency both try for ambitious goals and per-
sist in their pursuits even in the face of obstacles. As a consequence, when indi-
viduals are high in agency, they can reach their goals more easily, and, in turn,
 Three Views of the Agentic Self hell

their successes strengthen their feelings of personal agency and well-being, At the
other extreme, when individuals have very little personal agency, they have low
personal standards to which they aspire and often do not even try to initiate goal
pursuit. Moreover, when goals are pursued, individuals low in agency find that
goals are harder to reach and failures can further undermine trust in their own
capabilities which, in severe cases, can lead to harmful consequences to the self
and society such as alienation, amotivation, depression, helplessness, and antiso-
cial behavior (Bandura, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Skinner, 1995).
Although these divergent profiles represent a wide continuum of variability
in agentic functioning, various processes contribute to the quality and character
of the agentic self, and numerous factors can influence the development of these
processes. To address the nature of these influences, we endorse a stems
approach to understanding human behavior; namely, an approach that under-
scores how the functioning of one system influences the functioning of another
(e.g., Gottlieb, 1997; Lewis, 1997). From this view point, a thorough understand-
ing of the behavior of individuals is best served by examining the various sub-sys-
tems together rather than in isolation (Magnusson & Cairns, 1996).
As mentioned, our primary goal in this chapter is to bring together the var-
ious subsystems that are the focus of the three theoretical views on personal
agency and, thereby, to offer a broader perspective on motivation and self-regu-
lation. In light of the fact that they share the fundamental assumptions of an
organismic perspective, the three theoretical perspectives and their central con-
cepts (e.g, motivated behavior, resource-directed activity, and _self-regulated
actions) complement one another in their characterization of individuals. Despite
this complementarity, the processes that give rise to these concepts have general-
ly been examined in isolation rather than in concert. Before examining the cen-
tral points of overlap among the three theoretical perspectives, we turn to a brief
overview of the specific features of each.

Specific Features of the Theoretical Perspectives on

Agency

Self-Determination Theory

Basic Features. Self-determination theory posits three fundamental psycholog-

ical needs for healthy functioning. The first, competence, is the basic need to suc-
cessfully engage, manipulate, and negotiate the environment (see also White,
1959). The second need, relatedness, reflects the necessity for close emotional
bonds and feelings of connectedness to others in the social world (see also Sroufe,
392 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

1990). The third need, autonomy, reflects the degree to which one’s actions are
precipitated by the self or, when non-autonomous, by causes external to the self
(see also deCharms, 1968). According to self-determination theory, failure to
meet any one of these needs leads to some form of psychological ill-being (for
overviews see Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
The need for autonomy is perhaps the central need in self-determination
theory. However, we suggest that autonomy seems to function more as an aspect
of actions that support either the need for competence or the need for related-
ness rather than as an independent need. In this sense, autonomy is a character-
istic of one’s actions, and satisfying one’s need for autonomy is thereby mediated
by actions that are directed toward competence or relatedness needs. For exam-
ple, the act of learning basic algebra (1.e., competence) can be autonomous if the
action is inherently satisfying and pursued because one experiences a genuine
personal interest and sense of enjoyment from the act. On the other hand, learn-
ing basic algebra can be non-autonomous if the action is undertaken out of com-
plance, a desire for approval, or avoidance of a possible sanction. Likewise, hav-
ing lunch with a friend (i.e., relatedness) can be autonomous if doing so is inher-
ently satisfying and one experiences genuine personal fulfillment and enjoyment
from the act; whereas it would be non-autonomous if it is done out of external
obligation or social pressure.
Because controlled behavior involves action executed by the individual, it
therefore involves personal agency in executing those actions. However, as we
highlight in more detail below, for actions to be optimally agentic (i.e., to possess
a full sense of personal empowerment), they must be autonomous. In this regard,
autonomy is the quality of owning one’s actions and making action choices that
are integrated with the self and that serve the needs for competence, relatedness,
or both. As Deci (1996) summarizes it, “without choice, there would be no
agency, and no self-regulation” (p. 222).
Autonomy plays a central role in the distinction between intrinsic and extrin-
sic motivation as well as the variants of internalization along the self-determina-
tion continuum (e.g., integration, identification, introjection; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Intrinsic motivation describes behaviors and actions that are done of the self, by
the self, and for the self. Such behaviors and actions are inherently satisfying and
provide a deep sense of personal enjoyment. From the point of view of self-deter-
mination theory, intrinsically motivated behavior is fully autonomous. At the other
end of the continuum, extrinsic motivation describes behaviors and actions that
are done of others, by oneself, but for others (or rather, because of others). Such
behaviors and actions are inherently unsatisfying, often engender a negative affec-
tive response, and rarely support one’s need for autonomy (see Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Developmental features. ‘The developmental features of self-determination theo-
ry have received only limited explication in the literature (see e.g, Ryan, Deci, &
Grolnick, 1995; Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997), even though the basic features of
 Three Views of the Agentic Self 393

the theory are also central aspects of core developmental theories, such as attach-
ment theory. For example, self-determination theory posits that the needs for
autonomy, competence, and relatedness are inextricably connected throughout
development, and, particularly in infancy, parental support for autonomy is an
important determinant of the quality of the caregiver-infant bond (Ryan et al.,
1995). This view is quite consistent with attachment theory. Specifically, attach-
ment theory, although it does not specify needs per se, nonetheless holds that
beginning in infancy, competence, relatedness, and autonomy play integral roles
in the development of the attachment system (Ainsworth, 1969; Ainsworth &
Wittig, 1969; Bowlby, 1969; Sroufe, 1996). A secure attachment affords infants a
“secure base” from which to explore the environment autonomously and devel-
op an organized system of self as worthy, lovable, and capable. Conversely, inse-
curely attached infants lack the requisite affective tie with a caregiver which
allows for sufficient autonomy support that, in turn, is needed for optimal self
organization. In other words, attachment theory holds that a secure attachment
affords a child the room to exercise autonomy and optimize both socio-emotional
and cognitive competencies.
The balancing of the needs within the self is a primary self-regulatory task
within self-determination theory. Consistent with this view, recent work on the
longer-term implications of early infant-parent interactions conceptualizes
attachment behavior as patterns of emotion or affect regulation during states of
arousal or stress (e.g., Kogan & Carter, 1996). This perspective assumes that
infants differ in both the degree to which they will become aroused in a frustrat-
ing or anxiety provoking situation (such as that used to measure attachment secu-
rity), and the degree to which they can utilize various strategies to lower their
arousal, or reorganize themselves. Moreover, recent studies on the emergence of
children’s motivational orientations suggests that this capacity to self-regulate and
thereby pursue competence-directed and relatedness-directed goals autonomous-
ly is related to children’s self-beliefs and implicit theories, even during early child-
hood (e.g., Smiley & Dweck, 1994).
Over the course of development, caregivers continue to influence adjust-
ment in important ways. As posited by self-determination theory (Grolnick et al.,
1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000), parenting styles that are autonomy supportive, such
as authoritative parenting, are positively related to social adjustment and aca-
demic achievement (Fletcher, Darling, Steinberg, & Dornbusch, 1995; Grolnick
& Slowiaczek, 1994). Thus, according to self-determination theory, caregivers
promote intrinsic and internalized motivational orientations toward achievement
in their children by supporting their inherent needs for autonomy, competence,
and relatedness (Grolnick et al., 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000). A primary influence
on the development of competent and psychologically well individuals, then, is
whether or not the early caregiver-child relationships foster an emotional bond
and afford autonomous exploratory activity (see below).
394 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Resource-Control Theory

The starting point of resource-control theory is the assumption that all

organisms require resources for physical growth and development (Darwin, 1859;
Ricklefs, 1979). From this decidedly evolutionary stance, an important aspect of
meeting one’s basic needs is to be a part of a social group where the presence of
others facilitates acquisition of resources that are difficult or impossible to obtain
individually. At the same time, the social group is a source of competition for the
very resources it facilitates.
A history of wins and losses. Because there is within-group competition for
resources, group members experience multiple wins and/or losses. That is, if
resources are constrained—and many if not most are (e.g., food, social part-
ners)—then some individuals are winning access to them while others are losing.
Such within-group competition is the source of the dominance hierarchy which,
from this point of view (cf. Bernstein, 1981; Strayer & Strayer, 1976), is an order-
ing of individuals according to their relative competitive abilities. Accordingly,
socially dominant individuals by definition experience the lion’s share of wins,
while social subordinates experience a disproportionate quantity of losses.
These early (toddlerhood and before; Hawley & Little, 1999) and perhaps
life long win-loss experiences set the stage for the development of personal
agency. Indeed these early experiences may plant the seeds of agency. In any
nursery group there must be winners and therefore also losers. Winners are learn-
ing that their goals can be met, they can control their environment, their efforts
pay off, and future efforts are likely to pay off as well. Persistence may be a pre-
dictor of winningness (Hawley & Little, 1999), but so too may persistence be a
consequence of it. Doubtless, persistence and agency are both cause and effect of
present and future resource control attempts. Similarly, children who experience
losses early on (in what are often viewed as trivial disputes over toys) may be in
fact at risk for learning that they cannot achieve their goals and cannot control
their environment in the presence of peers, that their efforts will not pay off, and
that future efforts are futile. These profiles characterize the extremes of the dom-
inance hierarchy.
Children of middle ranks experience both wins and losses depending on
with whom they are interacting—those more dominant to themselves or less. Win
experiences may foster a sense of personal agency in mid-ranking children that
subordinates do not enjoy. It may be, however, that those occupying the highest
ranks will be more likely to experience autonomy within the context of resource-
directed behavior, Middle ranking children may resort to strategies such as coop-
eration, alliance formation, and ingratiation toward high-ranking others. They
may know how and be able to achieve their goals, but they may nonetheless expe-
rience control of their behavior as external to themselves.
Balancing self and others’ goals and the emergence of strategies. The necessity of
meeting one’s needs and simultaneously being a good group member underlies
 Three Views of the Agentic Self 200

the evolution of much of human behavior and psychological organization: It

implies that individuals must balance being egoistic and other-oriented
(Alexander, 1977; Charlesworth, 1996; Humphrey, 1976; Trivers, 1971). Too
much overt selfishness, for example, puts one at risk for alienating the very group
members on which one relies. Importantly, resource-control theory explicitly rec-
ognizes that multiple strategies (e.g., prosocial, coercive) can be employed to con-
trol material resources (Hawley, 1999a, 1999c). One strategy (i.e., prosocial con-
trol), expertly capitalizes on the social group’s mediation of material access by
fostering cooperative relationships and treating others in ways that encourage
good-will, reciprocity, and loyalty (e.g., helping, sharing, and appearing altruistic).
Another strategy (coercive control) disregards positive bonds to gain direct access
to resources by, for example, taking, monopolizing, and thwarting others. Both
strategies underlie winningness and therefore lead to (and are the result of) per-
sonal agency. Yet, these divergent strategies may have distinct implications for the
long-term psychological functioning of individuals employing them. Individuals
employing prosocial strategies, for example, not only enjoy material resources,
but also the regard of their peers. Coercive individuals may enjoy resource con-
trol but do not necessarily earn the regard of group members (e.g., Hopmeyer &
Asher, 1997; Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993). Both prosocial and coercive
strategies are superior to adopting no strategy: Subordinates neither orient
toward resources in the environment nor capitalize on the mediating effect of oth-
ers. Uhus, these individuals would risk not meeting their material and social needs.
This evolutionary argument suggests that organismic adaptation requires
basic motivation systems that move individuals to meet their material needs (..e.,
competence needs) and to seek (resource-mediating) social relationships (..e.,
relatedness needs). In other words, optimal adaptation implies drives that move
the individual to seek both resources and social relationships simultaneously. This
duality of motivation is especially true in infancy, where basic survival depends
on both.
Developmental features. Resource-control theory has distinct developmental
implications. The emergence of prosocial strategies, for example, necessitates
recognizing that other group members may accept or reject you, that rejection
has negative consequences, and that others have needs and desires that must also
be considered. Although a certain amount of egocentricity appears to be adap-
tive during infancy and toddlerhood, by late preschool or kindergarten, children
have refined their abilities to cooperate with peers (Cook & Stingle, 1974) and use
cooperation to effectively access limited resources (LaFreniere & Charlesworth,
1987).
As a developmental theory, resource-control theory views the development
of the strategies for resource control as a process of differentiation whereby
development is directional and proceeds from the simple to the complex (Hawley,
1999a; Werner, 1957). The first behavioral manifestation of the motivation to
acquire or control resources is primarily an undifferentiated coercive pattern.
396 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

During early development (around ages 3-5), more prosocial approaches to

resource control and acquisition emerge and, after time (around ages 5-7), the
two strategy types become distinct (Hawley, 1999a). Strategy employment, there-
fore, has differential implications depending on the age of the child.
Resource-control theory distinctly and uniquely views social dominance as
relative success at controlling resources in the presence of others. That is, it is not
a quality of individuals per se, but rather a characteristic of a relationship that is
marked by inherent asymmetry resulting from relative ability and desire to com-
pete. As such, social dominance is a consequence of a history of wins and losses
between individuals (a matter of context). A history of winning resources at least
partially underlies an individual’s continued resource orientation and future
attempts at resource control (i.e., agency). Similarly, a history of losses (in con-
junction with personal factors) underlies a subordinate social role, and subse-
quently fewer resource control attempts are made in the presence of others.

Action-Control Theory

Basic features. Unlike the previous two theoretical perspectives, which focus on
the motivational impetus of action, action-control theory focuses on the episodes
of volitional activity — the act of goal pursuit. From this view point, the gener-
al agency system of individuals gives rise to a synergistic set of action-control
beliefs and behaviors that provide the self-regulatory foundation that is called
upon to negotiate the various tasks and challenges of the life course. More specif-
ically, action-control theory focuses on the role of specific self-regulatory beliefs
as mediators of motivated actions (i.e., they are the proximal links to behavior).
Broadly speaking, action-control beliefs are self-perceptions about the means and
competencies one has to reach one’s goals (for an overview see Little, 1998). For
example, action-control beliefs include (a) judgments about which specific means
are most effective for reaching one’s goals (means-ends beliefs), (b) beliefs about
whether these means are personally available for use (agency beliefs) and (c), the
general perception of the degree to which a person feels that he or she can attain
a given goal (control-expectancy belief). As a general perception, control
expectancy is not simply an aggregate of one’s means-ends and agency beliefs
(for details of these distinctions see Little, 1998; Skinner, 1995).
Under favorable conditions, such beliefs about one’s own potential are a
direct reflection of one’s sense of agency. A highly agentic belief system would
result in a specific profile of action-control beliefs that help individuals achieve
successful outcomes and avoid potentially harmful influences. These beliefs are
central to successful developmental outcomes because they are the proximal
guides to one’s actions and behaviors (Little, 1998).
Developmental features. Like children’s resource control strategies, action-con-
trol beliefs differentiate over the elementary school years; they also become
 Three Views ofthe Agentic Self 397

increasingly domain specific as well as means specific. The domain specificity of

action-control beliefs results from the emerging understanding that different
domains of functioning have different challenges and require different skills. That
is, young children distinguish between physical, social, and academic domains of
competence (Harter, 1998). By adolescence, however, these distinctions are made
among both general and personal competencies in specific academic subjects,
with even further distinctions made among different facets of physical, emotion-
al, and social competence (Harter, 1998; Marsh & Yeung, 1998; Stipek &
Maclver, 1989). Therefore, action-control theory posits unique profiles of self-
regulation depending on the age of the individual, the domain of functioning,
and, as we discuss in more detail below, the motivational orientation of the indi-
vidual.
As mentioned, action-control theory also entails a means-specific view of
self-regulation. ‘The means-specificity also follows a pattern of developmental dif-
ferentiation that emerges as children gradually come to distinguish among poten-
tial causes of competence. For example, young children fail to differentiate
between causes such as luck, effort, ability, and powerful others. By about age 11,
however, children clearly distinguish between effort and ability as causal factors
(Little & Lopez, 1997; Skinner, 1990). At this time, children also begin to appre-
ciate the inverse relation between effort and ability, inferring that greater effort
implies lesser ability (Nicholls, 1978; Skinner, 1990).
Early in development, these beliefs emerge as a function of caregiver-child
interaction insofar as they allow for the exercise of autonomy and competence
within a given relatedness context. During early and later childhood, children
bring these beliefs with them into their ever-expanding social context with care-
givers, peers, and other important social figures. In turn, these social interactions
also influence the further development of self-beliefs. ‘Thus, the process is an iter-
ative one that continues during adolescence and throughout adulthood. With
age, both experience and increases in cognitive capacity influence the nature of
one’s action-control system.

Integrating the Three Views of Agentic Self

Self-determination theory posits central mechanisms of human agency that

stem from the ontogenetic advantages of satisfying basic psychological needs for
relatedness, competence, and autonomy. Resource-control theory posits central
mechanisms of human agency that stem from an evolutionary perspective,
emphasizing the advantages afforded individuals who are the beneficiaries of the
finite resources of an environment (i.e., biologic needs). Action-control theory
posits central mechanisms of human agency that stem from episodes of motivat-
398 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ed activity. Together, these three perspectives on human agency provide an

encompassing view of the agentic self.
Although there are numerous points of contact among these theoretical per-
spectives, we highlight three commonalties that we feel offer promising new
directions for research and theorizing. In Figure 17-1, we provide an overview of
these overlapping features. In the following section, we will first examine the
interface between action-control regulation and the needs for autonomy, related-
ness, and competence as well as the strategies of resource control. Second, we will
examine the evolutionary underpinnings of the needs systems. Last, we will dis-
cuss the developmental implications of a synthesized view on the agentic self.

Competence Relatedness

Action-control
Action-control Beliefs; Extra-
Beliefs; Intra- agent means
agent means

Resource
Control
Resource-control
Strategies

Figure 17.1. Conceptual Representation among the Key Constructs

Represented in the Three Theoretical Perspectives on Human Agency.
Action-control regulation. Much of the work on action-control regulation has
focused on the competence system, particularly as it occurs in the academic domain
(see, e.g, Skinner, 1995), However, action-control regulation is a general process
that applies to any domain of goal-directed activity, for example, social relation-
ships (Little, 1998; Lopez & Little, 1996). Moreover, the profiles of action-control
regulation that emerge across different domains of functioning provide a window
that can inform how the basic needs systems operate within a given individual.
In our view, action-control theory provides a tool with which researchers can
gain further insight into the interaction between the needs for competence, relat-
edness, and autonomy. For example, in action-control theory, causality beliefs
(i.e., means-ends beliefs about the effectiveness of a given means) can include
intra-agent means, such as effort or ability, and extra-agent means, such as luck
 Three Views of the Agentic Self 399

and powerful others (e.g, parents, teachers, and peers). In order for children to
develop an optimally agentic sense of self, they must understand that one can uti-
lize not only intra-agentic resources, but also extra-agentic resources as means to
meet their goals—a proposition held also by resource-control theory (Hawley,
1999a). However, for individuals to believe that they personally can utilize others
prosocially as means to achieve their goals, they must feel connected to them.
Furthermore, for individuals to be intrinsically motivated or integrated in their
utilization of these means, they must feel that they are engaging in the process
autonomously. In this way, the needs for relatedness and autonomy shape the
motivations as well as the nature and quality of the agency beliefs guiding indi-
viduals’ actions (e.g., beliefs in personal access to powerful others would be quite
high in this case). ‘These features of agency beliefs in turn influence the extent to
which the need for competence is supported.
The causality beliefs, on the other hand, have distinct differential relations.
By the early elementary years, most children readily learn that to perform at a
certain level, more effort implies less ability and vice versa (Nicholls, 1978).
Moreover, the relation between intra-agent and extra-agent means is generally
independent (Little & Lopez, 1997). However, when examined as personal
agency beliefs, effort, ability, and powerful others are all personal resources that
one can call upon to surmount any obstacles. Thus, having (a) a sense that one
possesses the ability to accomplish a goal, (b) a sense that one is capable of put-
ting forth any needed expenditure of effort (should progress toward the goal
become impeded), and (c) a sense that one can effectively utilize others in the
process, reflect a powerful and adaptive profile for an individual.
Action-control theory posits that the set of control-related perceptions (1.e.,
action-control beliefs), because they are the proximal self-related resources that
one calls upon during goal pursuit, would mediate motivational orientation (2.e.,
being intrinsically or extrinsically motivated). However, motivational orientation
is, at the same time, a moderator of action-control perceptions. Here, for exam-
ple, when intrinsically motivated, individuals should have greater beliefs in the
intra-agentic means of effort and ability and these perceptions should mediate
the well-documented effects of intrinsic motivation on performance and well-
being (Ryan & Deci, 2000). On the other hand, externally regulated individuals
should have lower intra-agentic beliefs and perhaps greater beliefs in the extra-
agentic means of luck and powerful others. These self-regulatory beliefs and per-
ceptions would function as the mediators of performance and well-being. In
other words, the nature of a person’s action-control beliefs will vary depending
on the general motivational impetus for actions. Together, the motivational ori-
entation and the action-control belief profiles reflect the overall quality of the
agentic self.
Similarly, the action-control profile of individuals who employ different
strategies of resource control would reflect the differential orientation of the
strategies. For example, coercive strategies would be associated with a highly
400 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

intra-agent profile and a strong belief that coercive means are effective for
achieving one’s goals. In contrast, prosocial strategies would be associated with a
balanced profile of both intra- and extra-agent (prosocial) means viewed as most
effective. In other words, the action-control belief system offers a window into the
regulatory orientations that compel individuals in the service of their biological
and psychological needs.
Evolutionary underpinnings. Although self-determination theory posits the three
needs of competence, relatedness, and autonomy as fundamental and necessary
for the individual to thrive psychologically, an evolutionary basis for these needs
has only been suggested but not presented in great detail (Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997). Clearly, the needs of competence and relatedness
have direct evolutionary bases that support their inclusion as fundamental, bio-
logically based, psychological needs. For example, fulfilling material needs (com-
petence) is a must for all species, and members of social species can facilitate their
resource control by being good group members (relatedness). Moreover, philo-
sophical analysis of human behavior and research in psychology and sociology
support the plausibility of the two-need view. Individuals, for example, are drawn
to behave in self-serving ways in order to meet their needs and be effective in their
environment (Bakan, 1966; Deci & Ryan, 1985; White, 1959) as well as in other-
oriented ways in order to foster satisfying social.relationships (Bakan, 1966; Ryan,
1995). Indeed, optimal social functioning is seen from many perspectives as a bal-
ancing of self and other priorities (Bakan, 1966; McDougall, 1933; Weinstein,
1969). An individual becomes socially dysfunctional when one goal is sought to
the exclusion of the other (Ryan et al., 1995).
On the other hand, the need for autonomy may not have a direct evolution-
ary basis, but rather, an indirect relationship to human functioning that is likely
a result of such adaptations as a highly developed cerebral cortex (i.e., an exap-
tation; Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, &Wakefield, 1998; Gould & Vrba,
1982; cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000). Although we view the need for autonomy as a by-
product of human intellectual capacity, its place as a fundamental psychological
need is not undermined, nor is its role as a defining characteristic of optimal
human agency undermine (see Figure 17-1).
Developmental implications. ‘Throughout our discussion of the three views of the
agent self, we have highlighted specific developmental features of each. In our
view, a more detailed developmental analysis is warranted. For example, success-
ful resource control in young children, is associated with persistence, experience
with peers, and social competence (Hawley, 1999b; Hawley & Little, 1999). In
older children (around age 9), the group of children who are effective at resource
control comprises both those who are drawn in positive ways to peers (e.g., agree-
able and intrinsically motivated to pursue friendships) and those who are involved
in less positive ways (e.g., hostile and extrinsically motivated to pursue friendships;
Hawley, Pasupathi, & Little, 1999). This perspective thus focuses not only on how
prosocially and coercively controlling individuals are different, but also on how
 Three Views of the Agentic Self 401

they are the same (e.g., generally motivated to control). The long-term implica-
tions of these differences on development throughout adolescence and adulthood
would likely yield new insights into the social behavior of individuals.
Although the developmental origins of the three needs appear to emanate
from the attachment system, many processes of development during childhood,
adolescence, and beyond do not appear to be explicitly integrated into self-
determination theory. Clearly, identification via parental socialization is a key
component (e.g., Grolnick et al., 1997); however, other central developmental
issues, such as differentiation or de-differentiation of the needs, differential
importance as a function of life phase, or the influence of other developmental
acquisitions (e.g., perspective-taking), have not been explicated within the theory.
In our view, further developmental analysis of self-determination would signifi-
cantly bolster our understanding of human agency, particularly in light of the
more explicit developmental focus of the other two views of the agentic self.

Summary Remarks

The three theoretical perspectives discussed offer different lenses through

which the agentic self can be viewed. We believe, however, that rather than
remain fragmented, the three perspectives can be brought together into a unified
view of human agency. Moreover, a synthesis of these views opens up tremen-
dously fertile grounds for future research. As we see it, a productive direction
would be to focus on the synergism of the various processes that comprise the
agentic self, the role of context (both broadly and narrowly defined) in shaping
the synergism, and how these processes and their synergism change not only dur-
ing childhood and adolescence but also into mid-life, old age, and beyond.

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18: An Educational-Psychological Theory of Interest
and Its Relation to SDT

Andreas Krapp
Unwersitat der Bundeswehr, Miinchen

In everyday thinking as well as in educational and psychological discussions of

learning and development, the concept of interest plays an important role. One
of the earliest theories of interest was developed by Herbart at the beginning of
the nineteenth century (1806/1965), and by the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, well-known authors were postulating that being interested was not only an
important motivational condition for effective learning but was also central to
people’s personality and self-concept (Arnold, 1906; Berlyne, 1949; Claparéde,
1905; Dewey, 1913; Thorndike, 1935). However, in the middle of this century,
although the interest concept was still prominent in vocational training research,
there was a noticeable decline in interest-related research in the field of learning
and development.

Interest: A Rediscovered Motivational Concept

in Educational Psychology

According to Krapp (1992) and Prenzel (1988) there are at least two reasons
for the decline in the focus on interest: first, even in the same field of research,
the concept of interest had several different meanings and there was no attempt
to integrate these different concepts in an overarching theoretical framework; and
second, the shift towards a focus on specialized research topics related to learn-
ing appeared to render the concept of interest superfluous. Specifically, instead
of discussing the complex interrelations among different aspects of interest with-
in a relatively broad approach to personality or human growth, research related
to interest focused on phenomena such as attention (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963),
curiosity (Berlyne, 1960), emotion (Izard, 1977), flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1975), or
intrinsic motivation (Hunt,1965; Deci, 1975). When used in discussions of these
406 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

specific topics, the term “interest” tended to be given either a narrow and spe-
cialized meaning or a very general one that was not operationalized for purpos-
es of research.
Over the past two decades, however, it has become clear that concepts and
theories developed in these specialized fields of research do not adequately
account for important phenomena that were addressed in earlier discussion on
interest-based learning, especially those concerning important educational issues
such as life-long learning and healthy development. As a result, researchers have
shown a renewed interest in interest as a construct for describing and explaining
processes and outcomes of learning in various educational settings (for a sum-
mary of recent research see Hoffmann, Krapp, Renninger, & Baumert, 1998;
Krapp & Prenzel, 1992; Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992; U. Schiefele & Wild, 2000).
This rejuvenation of interest research has produced a variety of conceptual-
izations of interest and rather heterogeneous theoretical and operational defini-
tions. Nevertheless, these concepts relate to one another, insofar as they address
complementary aspects of the manifold phenomena. Krapp, Hidi, and
Renninger (1992) have shown that theoretical and empirical research approach-
es in this new field can be reasonably integrated within the conceptual framework
presented in Figure 18-1.

person
individual
interest
as a disposition

actualized
individual interest

situational
eNefack interest

interestingness
as a characteristic
of the context

Figure 18.1. Conceptual Framework that Organizes Research on Interest

 Interest and Self-Determination 407

Most research on interest uses a concept of individual interest as a characteris-

tic of the person. In other words, individuals are characterized by a more or less
stable preference for a particular class of objects, topics, or learning tasks.
Typically, individual interest is used as a predictor of academic achievement.
However, there is also research about developmental changes in interest,such as
gender-specific shifts in interest for various topics across years in school
(Renninger, 1998) and about the effects of people’s situation-specific states of
interest. Such states are typically referred to as actualized individual interests.
Finally, other interest research has focused on conditions in the context that affect
interest and interest-based learning. From this perspective, interest is interpreted
as the immediate outcome of a situation, characterized by a high level of . Such
may be transitory or may provide the basis of an emergent individual interest
(Hidi & Anderson, 1992; Hidi & Berndorff, 1998).
Research into interest has led to numerous results that are promising both
theoretically and practically. However, there are still a number of shortcomings
to this research field. A central problem is the lack of an overarching theoretical
framework that could be used to summarize and systematically integrate results
from different research programs (cf. Krapp, Renninger, & Hoffmann, 1998). I
believe that the field of interest would benefit from a more general theory, much
like the field of motivation has benefitted from general theories such as self-deter-
mination theory (SDT).
In Germany, the revival of interest as an educationally relevant motivation-
al concept in its own right was initiated by Hans Schiefele in the late 1970s.
Together with a small group of colleagues, he developed an educationally ori-
ented theory of interest and stimulated research relevant to the theory (H. Siefele,
Krapp, Prenzel, Heiland, & Kasten, 1983). He argued that the prevailing con-
cepts of achievement motivation were insufficient from an educational stand-
point for several reasons, the most important of which was its inability to address
the content-specificity of a learner’s motivation to learn. ‘Therefore, a research-
able concept of was needed that was motivational, could be used as the basis for
an educational theory, and could be related to issues and concepts in existing
motivational theories (e.g, SDT).
Looking back, it is surprising that, in 1983, H. Schiefele and his colleagues
in Munich discussed the early work on intrinsic motivation by Deci (1975) and
others but did not take notice of the empirical and theoretical work on SDT
which had also begun by that time (Deci, 1980). Thus, their first theoretical con-
ceptualizations of topic interest were developed without explicit reference to
SDT. When we finally discovered the close compatibility of interest research and
SDT, we began to explore the cross-relations and to specify some of our basic
theoretical statements in accordance with SDT. In the remainder of this chapter,
I present the Person-Object Approach to Interest (POT) (Krapp, 1993, 1999; Prenzel,
Krapp & Schiefele, 1986; Prenzel, 1988, 1992), paying particular attention to its
relation to SDT.
408 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Person-Object Approach to Interest

POI is not a theory in the strict sense of the word, but rather a theoretical
framework for structuring and elucidating interest-related concepts, hypotheses,
and results. The POI approach includes metatheoretical principles of how to
build and test a theory, a dynamic conception of personality, and specific models
and investigation procedures for specialized questions (i.e. the development of
interest). These will be discussed in terms of their relations to SDT.

Metatheoretical Premises

POI was developed by educational-psychological researchers who were com-

mitted to improving educational practice and for whom ,therefore, an essential
feature of the theory was that it be applicable to practical research questions.
Another metatheoretical issue concerns the question of which “model of
man” should be used as the starting point for building a theory. POI was from the
start oriented toward a reflective-epistemological subject model (Groeben, 1986).
This model, which was the basis for the German tradition of action theoretic
models, assumes that people have reflective competencies for planning and real-
izing intentional actions—that is, that they have the ability to control rationally
what they want to do. Although this has been useful as a metatheoretical starting
point, additions and extensions were necessary. For example, it seems that ana-
lyzing issues about action goals or action control only at the level of conscious-
rational processes, as is done in action-theoretic models, is not adequate for the-
oretically representing all of the influencing factors. As a consequence, POI
began with a cognitive-rational action model but extended it to personality-the-
oretic framework to incorporate functional principles at different levels of action
control.

The Underlying Conception of Personality and the Self

POI uses an approach to personality that reconstructs motivational aspects

of the developing person not only with respect to individual differences, but even
more importantly with respect to functional relations and general laws of human
development. We agree with Deci and Ryan’s position of thinking “of the person
in terms of the concept of self “ (Deci, 1998, p. 150; see also Ryan, 1993).
Traditional approaches to differential psychology (Anastasi, 1958; Asendorpf,
1991) describe and explain psychological phenomena only from a limited per-
spective because they do not elaborate the dynamic and developing structure of
the human being (Cronbach, 1957; Valsiner, 1986). A personality theory that
 Interest and Self-Determination 409

considers these aspects of human development has to take into account that the
person is aware of himself or herself, and that the “object” of this awareness is
some sort of representation of the individual’s personal “self.”
According to Hausser (1983), an individual’s self is manifest not only in the
way the person perceives himself or herself (self-concept), but also in the way the
person evaluates his or her capacities, goals, and attitudes (self-esteem), and in the
way he or she assesses the potential for coping with actual and forthcoming life-
tasks. In addition to cognitive representations, emotional and motivational
aspects determine the structure of the self. The self can be seen as the central
area of an individual’s structure of personality. It represents a person’s identity.
Under normal circumstances, the different components of the self represent a
unified structure: A mentally healthy person lives in relative harmony with his or
her attitudes, goals, accumulated capacities, and knowledge structures.
Nevertheless, the self is subject to permanent change because the social and
physical environments constantly require new adaptations and force the individ-
ual to set up new goals of action and development. However, only a limited selec-
tion of possible (and reasonable) goals correspond closely enough with the inten-
tions of a person’s self; other goals remain peripheral and do not particularly
become significant to the person. Thus, we postulate that personality consists of
a structure, which includes the self as well as other aspects that are more distant
from this core.
The idea that personality is organized around an inner core not only corre-
sponds with everyday experience but can also be found in numerous educational
and psychological theories. According to Thomas (1989) all these concepts share
a notion of centrality. Processes of high centrality are strongly self-referent, are
characterized by a high degree of subjective significance, and have a pronounced
readiness for (volitional) engagement and intensive emotional reactions under the
conditions of success or failure.
With regard to the requirements and goals of education which involve opti-
mizing individual development, the question arises as to how the cognitive and
motivational structures represented in the self develop, that is, how the existing
structure is elaborated and modified, how it changes over time, and which con-
textual conditions and psychological mechanisms are responsible for this devel-
opment.
Development of the Self Regarding development, POI has adopted several pos-
tulates and hypotheses of SDT. As in SDT, POI assumes “that the self is not sim-
ply a social construction or a reflection of social appraisals” (Deci, 1998, p. 151).
Rather, we assume that individuals have a great influence on their own develop-
ment, through an inborn tendency to interact with the social and physical envi-
ronment in a constructive and self-determined way. Human beings are active by
nature, and this “intrinsic proactivity” can be found from earliest childhood
onwards. They are curious, explore their surroundings, manipulate things, try to
affect the objects in their social and physical environment, and through these
410 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

activities elaborate their own sense of self.

According to SDT, one can assume that, at the earliest stages of develop-
ment, the aims and intentions that are visible in these activities belong to the
child’s actual state of self, although they would not exist as cognitive representa-
tions. As the child gets older the role of cognition becomes more important.
During the course of life the self-system changes continually, such that already
existing components become more differentiated and integrated. POI, as well as
SDT and other theories, refer to these developmental changes using general con-
cepts such as differentiation, integration, and “disintegration” (Fink, 1991).
Internalization and Integration. The ongoing developmental changes involve a
continuous differentiation of the individual’s structure of self, and it is only
because there is an inborn propensity towards integration that this process of dif-
ferentiation and reorganization does not lead to a compartmentalization of the
self. The person tries to create and maintain a coherent image, a “good Gestalt”
as his or her sense of self. As a consequence, the person cannot identify com-
pletely with all thoughts, actions, tasks, and strivings, even when they are exper-
enced as important for his or her wishes and future goals at the moment. Simply
stated, internalization signifies the process by which a goal that has been external
to the person is taken into the self-related structure of one’s personality. According
to Deci (1998, p. 152), this is “the basis through which initially external regulation
can become part of the self and extrinsic motivation can become autonomous.”

General Characterization of the POI Approach

It is postulated that the individual, as a potential source of action, and an

aspect of the environment, as the object of action, constitute a dynamic unit.
Therefore, interest is conceptualized as a relational concept: An interest represents a
specific relationship between a person and an object in his or her “life-space” (cf.
Lewin, 1936). ‘Toward some of these objects, a person will develop a close rela-
tionship that, under certain conditions, could become an individual interest.
An object of interest can refer to concrete things (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-
Halton, 1981), a topic (Schiefele, 1992; Schiefele & Krapp, 1996), a subject-mat-
ter, an abstract idea, or any other content of the cognitively represented life-
space, ‘The content of an interest object can be interpreted from two perspectives.
On one hand, there is the person’s knowledge about this object and his or her
(emotional) assessments related to it. On the other hand, there is the object itself,
apart from the person’s subjective experience of it. Thus, an object of interest
can be interpreted either as something that exists in an individual’s mind, for
example as a content-specific structure or “schema” in an individual’s cognitive-
emotional representation system, or as something that exists objectively in the
real world, outside the individual’s subjective representations.
The environment not only provides possibilities for experiencing new
 Interest and Self-Determination AA)

“objects” of interest but also represents a complex structure of conditions that

influence developmental change. Here, the social context is of central importance.
The realization of an interest requires a situation-specific interaction
between the person and the object. We use the term obyect engagement to indicate
such an interaction at the most general level (cf. Prenzel, 1988). It refers to con-
crete, hands-on engagement with the object (e.g., a child playing with a truck), as
well as to abstract cognitive working on a specific problem (e.g., the analysis of a
scientific question) and to occupying oneself with certain ideas without conscious
control (e.g., day-dreaming). An object engagement involves both a person and
an environment and is often referred to as a transaction (Csikszentmihalyi &
Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Fink, 1989). If the engagement occurs with purpose
and intention, we refer to this as an action of interest. The action of interest is a spe-
cial case of interest-oriented person-object-engagement insofar as the sequence
of the event is subject to conscious and intentional control. This applies, for
example, to all forms of intentional learning in formal schooling and training.
Under certain conditions, repeated engagements with specific aspects of the
object stabilizes this relationship, creating a dispositional readiness or willingness
to re-engage contents related to the domain of this object. The conditions and
processes that are responsible for the emergence and development of interests are
discussed later in this chapter.
This general characterization describes only the basic theoretical framework.
A more detailed description requires further explication of both the object of
interest and the defining characteristics of an interest-specific PO-relationship.

Objects of Interest

Although the object of an interest-related action is a fact that exists outside

the person, the person’s conception of the object is decisive for the action. ‘This
knowledge and evaluation of the object is represented in the person’s memory
system as a subjective construct, although this does not necessarily imply that the
object of interest will be represented idiosyncratically. Perceptions of an object
and object-related evaluations are influenced by the social context, that is, by
socially shared thoughts and norms. Thus, object-related knowledge is to some
extent shared and, thus, exhibits a certain degree of objectivity in the sense that
an inter-subjective consensus can be found with regard to its meaning and can
provide a basis for social communication about it (cf, Fink, 1989).
Because objects of interest are as a rule socially conveyed facts, each object
of interest is part of societal reality (Valsiner, 1992). Moreover, individuals have
contact with others who have similar or comparable interests, and they commu-
nicate about and evaluate these interests. Wherever the interests depend on direct
cooperation with others (e.g., in sports or school subjects), the meanings of inter-
est-objects are significantly defined by the social group as well as by tradition,
412 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

standards, and habits.

The object of interest can be described on various levels of abstraction. The
more general the characterization, that is, the more abstract the description of an
object, the easier is an inter-subjective and in this sense “objective” communica-
tion about interests. However, in this way, the accuracy of the object’s description
is at the same time reduced. Individual interest in music, skiing, physics, or the-
ater will surely differ from person to person with regard to the respective object
conceptions when examining the micro-structure of the object conception, for
example, whether one prefers the Berlin Philharmonic, the New York
Philharmonic, or the Philadelphia Orchestra. However, at the intermediate level
of abstraction one will find greater overlap among individuals’ comparable
objects of interest. You will find many music-lovers who agree that they are pri-
marily interested in a particular form of music (e.g., classical music) and share
preferred forms of engagement (e.g., going to classical concerts). Intersubjective
agreement is achieved even more easily if one is satisfied with a very global char-
acterization of preferred topics and engagements (e.g., if agreement requires only
that one like music, whatever type it may be).
Regardless of the respective object domain and almost regardless of the
respective level of abstraction of the object description, there are three general
structural components that may be used for the descriptive analysis of almost any
object of interest (cf, Fink, 1991; Krapp & Fink, 1992).
Real objects. Vhis component refers to concrete objects toward which an inter-
est may be directed or which are necessary for engaging in an interest. Examples
would be records or instruments for the domain of music, or snowboard equip-
ment for the domain of skiing. Objects of that kind often serve as clues for
describing or empirically reconstructing an individual’s interest. In qualitative
analyses they have the function of reference objects (Fink, 1991; Prenzel, 1988,
1992),
Activities and types of engagement. An object of interest also includes activities
and typical procedures to work on interest-related tasks. Listening to music, play-
ing an instrument, talking about and discussing a topic, writing about a factual
question, or painting a picture are examples for interest-related activities that are
connected to specific areas of interest. Within the object domain of some inter-
ests, activities are of paramount importance because, so to speak, they represent
the core of the interest (e.g., interest in fishing).
opus. In almost all contexts of schooling, academic learning, professional
training, or reading, the object of a learner’s interest can best be described as a
topic that represents a certain domain of knowledge. For example, Hidi and
McLaren (1990) have defined a topic as a “coherent knowledge domain of sub-
ject matter” (p. 297). A topic can be used to describe the specific object of a sit-
uational interest (¢.g., in the area of text-based learning) as well as the object of
an individual interest.
 Interest and Self-Determination 413

Characteristics of the Interest Concept

When discussing the specific features of the interest concept, one has to bear
in mind that it can be interpreted theoretically and investigated empirically either
at the level of current engagements (e.g., an interest-triggered action) or at the
level of dispositional structures (e.g., a student’s stable subject matter interest). In
any case, it differs from most other motivational concepts by its content-specificity.
According to our determination to reconstruct interest on the basis of a PO-con-
ception, the contents or the targets connected with an interest are important
aspects for a theoretical and/or operational description. Interpreting interest as
a content-specific concept fits well with modern theories on knowledge acquisi-
tion and instruction insofar as knowledge is always structured and acquired in
particular domains.
In addition, four formal criteria have to be taken into consideration. They
refer to cognitive aspects, emotional or feeling-related characteristics, the value
component, and the intrinsic quality of interest-based activities.
Cogmitwe aspects. In the original conceptual framework (e.g., Prenzel, 1988;
Schiefele et al., 1983) it was asserted that an action of interest is based on com-
paratively differentiated (complex) cognitive schemata concerning the object of
interest and that it simultaneously increases cognitive complexity. This position
was quite close to Renninger’s (1990) characterization of an individual interest as
a combination of high levels of stored knowledge and stored value for a class of
objects, events, or ideas. There is indeed a lot of theoretical and empirical evi-
dence for the assumption that an individual interest is cognitively characterized
by a comparatively differentiated structure with regard to the domain of the
interest object, and that each action of interest may lead to a further differentia-
tion of this structure.
However, using a differentiated knowledge structure (i.e., high level of stored
knowledge) as a criterion for defining and characterizing an interest raises serious
theoretical and methodological problems because it creates a tautology. In other
words, in studying the influence of interest on learning (1.e., knowledge acquisi-
tion), if one were to include stored knowledge in the definition of interest, one
would, in essence, be examining whether stored knowledge predicted more stored
knowledge. Thus, the postulated affect of interest would be part of the opera-
tional definition of interest. U. Schiefele (1991, 1996a) and Krapp (1992, 1999)
have argued that this cognitive aspect might be appropriate for the identification
of interest with small children whose knowledge acquisition is mainly interest
determined but not for a definition of interests in general.
Nevertheless, cognitive aspects are still important for a comprehensive char-
acterization of an interest. Two aspects seem to be especially important. First, an
interest develops and the structural components change with respect to both cog-
nitive and emotional representations. Thus, a developed interest differs from an
414 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

interest at its earlier stages. This holds especially true for the amount of stored
knowledge. As mentioned above, there is ample theoretical and empirical evi-
dence for the assumption that a person’s cognitive structure related to the knowl-
edge domain of an established individual interest is highly differentiated and
shows many connections to other cognitive domains.
Second, an interest has a tendency to grow. An interested person is not con-
tent with his or her current level of knowledge or abilities in the domain of an
interest. Rather, there is a high readiness to test and to acquire new information,
to learn and assume new knowledge, and to enlarge the competencies related to
this domain. This means that the person needs metacognitive knowledge about
things he or she does not know and is not yet able to perform. Prenzel (1988, p.
159ff.) refers to this as knowledge about “inherent object engagements” that goes
beyond the domain of already executed interest-related actions. It is assumed
that the knowledge structure concerning the object domain of an individual
interest distinguishes itself by comparatively differentiated knowledge about
opportunities for learning and development, which play an important role in the
planning and execution of future interest-related actions. This trend to further
develop and improve the pattern of interest related competencies is an essential
indicator for the current dynamics and liveliness of a current interest. If this
trend disappears completely, one would no longer speak of interest; rather it
would be an indicator of the fact that the person has given up this interest.
Emotional characteristics. In the original conception of POI (e.g., H. Schiefele et
al., 1983), the emotional characterization of an interest was limited to relatively
global categories. However, Prenzel (1988, p. 156ff) expanded this by considering
three components: (1) tension, in the sense of an optimal level of arousal
(Berlyne, 1960); (2) empathic content-specific emotional experiences; and (3) feel-
ings of competence. He, along with U. Schiefele (1992) and U. Schiefele & Krapp
(1996), suggested that feelings of enjoyment, involvement, and stimulation are
the most typical emotional aspects of an interest-based activity, and I argued that
it would be theoretically fruitful to consider the concept of basic needs, which
means that the emotional characteristics of an interest-based action would be
experienced positively because the action satisfies basic needs such as those pro-
posed by SD'T.
From these discussions about the emotional qualities of an interest action,
we conclude the following: (1) an optimum level of activation and arousal is
experienced as a pleasant tension; (2) feelings of competence result from an opt-
mal fit between a person’s perceived level of competence and the requirements
of the object-specific task, an aspect that is closely related to self-efficacy
(Bandura, 1977; Schunk, 1991); (3) feelings of autonomy or self-determination
result from the individual’s experiencing freedom from external and internal
pressures and being able to do what he or she wants; and (4) interest-oriented
actions involving social interactions will result in positive socially-oriented emo-
tions if the intentions of the action are compatible with the conceptions and
 Interest and Self-Determination al3

expectations of relevant significant others.

On the whole, many aspects of an interest-triggered action are connected
with positive emotional experiences. Under extremely congenial conditions, flow,
or optimal experience, may be experienced (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990;
Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). In a person’s cognitive-emotional
representation system these states and experiences that precede, accompany, or
follow activity involving the object of interest are stored as positive feeling-related
valences (U. Schiefele, 1992, 1996a).
Value-related characteristics. A third aspect of interest is the component referred
to as its value to a person. There is, however,. the question of how “high value”
should be theoretically portrayed. Seen from a cognitive point of view, one could
say that the individual assigns positive value-related valences (U. Schiefele, 1992,
1999) to the goals, contents, and actions related to the domain of interest. It
would be asserted that if something is an interest it would have a prominent posi-
tion within the individual’s hierarchy of values. Such a description is, however,
appropriate for only a small range of an individual’s total pattern of interests.
That portrayal would exclude all PO-relationships that are in an early or transi-
tional stage of development. Furthermore, the assumption that a person’s values
are clearly and hierarchically structured 1s an idealistic one that does not fit real
life. Thus, the value of an interest requires a different theoretical explication.
In early phenomenological analyses (cf., Allport, 1961; Dewey, 1913), and in
more recent theories (e.g., Hannover, 1998; Todt, 1978; Renninger, 2000), includ-
ing SDT, it is frequently asserted that a person’s valuing of an activity or content
is closely related to his or her self-system, and this idea can be readily applied to
the value component of the interest concept. From such a theoretical perspective,
the fact of positive evaluation of an interest object results either from a person’s
experiencing the object as intrinsically interesting or identifying with its relevance
and importance for him or her. The person feels subjectively affected because it
has a more or less stable relevance to his or her sense of self. Therefore, in POI
the value component of an interest is referred to with the concept of se/f-inten-
tionality in order to make clear that the goals and intentions related to the object
area of an individual interest are compatible with the attitudes, expectations, and
values of the person’s self-system.
Intrinsic quality. The theoretical idea that an interest is characterized by a
combination of emotional and value oriented components is closely related to the
concept referred to as undivided interest or serious play by Rathunde (1993,
1998) and used by Rathunde and Csikszentmihalyi (1993) to describe an optimal
mode of task engagement. Dewey (1913) had already characterized an interest as
an undivided activity in which no contradiction is experienced between the
assessment of personal importance of an action and positive emotional evalua-
tions of the activity itself. From the POI perspective, this is the main reason why
an interest based action (including knowledge acquisition in an area of interest)
has the quality of intrinsic motivation: There is no gap between what a person
416 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

has to do in a specific situation and what the person likes to do. .

Not only in POI, but in many other conceptions of interest, the intrinsic
quality of the activity is considered its most obvious feature of an interest. Here,
the definition of intrinsic is based on an action-theoretical model. In his extend-
ed model of learning motivation, Rheinberg (1989, 1998) considered two differ-
ent kinds of incentives: consequence-related incentwes, which refer to future events
with respect to an action-episode, and activity-specific incentives, which refer prima-
rily to positive emotional experiences while performing an activity regardless of
future results and consequences (e.g., enjoyable states in sports activities). The lat-
ter concept is the most closely aligned with intrinsic motivation but it still cannot
cover all forms of intrinsic motivation, especially with respect to teaching and
learning. Most important is the fact that this view does not take into account the
content or the object of the learning activity. “From the standpoint of interest
theory, a learner is intrinsically motivated when his or her main incentive for
learning is related to qualities of the respective knowledge domain” (U. Schiefele,
1998, p. 93). Insofar as a person’s relationship toward this knowledge domain fits
the above mentioned criteria of an interest, the individual will experience a relat-
ed learning task or learning episode (Boekaerts, 1996) as intrinsically motivated.

Development of Interest

With respect to the aims of the educational endeavor, the question of how
interests develop and which conditions in family, school, and/or society have
influenced the emergence and changes of interest is of central importance
(Krapp, 1998, 2000).

Description and Explanation of General Developmental Trends

A great deal of research on the development of interest has been descriptive.

Findings from studies in kindergarten and preschool (Krapp & Fink, 1992;
Renninger, 1989, 1990; Renninger & Leckrone, 1991) indicate that even at this
young age relatively stable interests can be identified, although the object-specif-
ic structure becomes progressively more differentiated over time. Empirical stud-
les using cross-sectional as well as longitudinal methods have revealed negative
trends across the years in students’ interest for school. Indicators of such a gen-
eral decline of subject interests have been found as early as the first year of ele-
mentary school (Helmke, 1993), but they have been particularly evident in sec-
ondary school. ‘The decline has been most evident in the fields of physics, chem-
istry, and mathematics, and it seems to be more prominent for girls than for boys
 Interest and Self-Determination Zale!

in these subjects (Gardner, 1985; Hoffmann et al., 1998).

There is now a growing body of research exploring conditions of interest
development at different ages and in different areas of the educational system.
Recent research, for example in the field of preschool and elementary education
(cf, Renninger, 1998), science education (Gardner, 1998; Lehrke, Hoffmann, &
Gardner, 1985), especially physics (Haussler & Hoffmann, 1998), and vocational
education and training (Krapp & Lewalter, 2001; Nenniger, 1998; Prenzel,
Kramer, & Drechsel, 1998; Wild et al. 1998), has examined specific conditions of
interest development. At a relatively general level, the results have shown that in
comparison to family and/or peers, the influence of school seems to be relative-
ly small (Todt & Schreiber, 1998). However, a variety of different developmental
trends can be found if the data are analyzed for subgroups and specific content
areas. Haussler et al. (1998), for example, have reanalyzed the results of a nation-
wide study about the development of interest in the specific content areas of
physics, using a mixed Rasch model. This methodological approach made it pos-
sible to take into consideration qualitatwe differences among students with regard
to the interest structure and quantitative differences in the degree of interest.
Students could be empirically allocated to different types of interest groups (e.g,
interest in physics as formalized science vs. interest in applications and matters of
societal relevance of physics). The researchers found that developmental changes
in secondary school (between the sixth to tenth grade) refer primarily to differ-
ences in the distribution of types and not so much to the intensity of physics-
related interest.
One problem with descriptive survey studies of interest development is that
they have not specified how restructuring the conditions of learning and devel-
opment could effect interest. In contrast to the results from the survey studies
mentioned above, qualitative approaches (such as longitudinal case studies using
retrospective interviews (Gisbert, 2001; Lewalter et al., 1998) have provided evi-
dence that parents and teachers can have a crucial influence on the course of a
student’s interest development. This result is supported by intervention studies
that have tried to improve the curriculum and the quality of instruction on the
basis of theoretical considerations and empirical results in the field of interest
research. Hoffmann & Haussler (1998) carried out a large scale intervention proj-
ect to support students’ development of interest in introductory physics (grade 7)
— giving particular consideration to girls’ negative attitudes towards natural sci-
ences. In addition to other reform measures, new teaching materials were devel-
oped which embedded the contents of physics into contexts that girls generally
find more interesting. The intervention had favorable effects on the girls’ interest
in physics, as well as their physics-related self-concept and achievement at the end
of the school year- without any negative side effects for the boys. Referring
directly to POI, Prenzel, Eitel, Holzbach, Schoenheinz, and Schweiberer (1993)
found similar positive effects for a curricular revision in the interest development
of medical students in the area of surgery training.
418 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

An Explanation at the Level of Psychological Processes: The Role of

Basic Needs

The results from intervention studies demonstrate that the formation and
change of interests can be influenced to a considerable extent by the curriculum
and the quality of instruction concerning the topic. However, there remains the
question of what are the psychological processes underlying the change in inter-
ests. Further, correlational studies, which are very prominent in this field, path
coefficients and estimates of the percentage of variance explained by the cur-
riculum and instruction variables fail to elucidate the general psychological
processes and mechanisms that are operative for all individuals in those settings
(Valsiner, 1986).
In a recent attempt to specify a functional model of interest development
(Krapp, 1998, 2000), I suggested that both the explanation of maintaining a sit-
uational interest that has been newly stimulated by interestingness factors and the
explanation of developmental changes in people’s existing structure of individual
interests depend on two components of action control, which follow different
psychological principles. The first component is based on cognitive-rational
processes and refers primarily to the problem of intention formation or the delib-
erate selection of learning goals. This aspect has been the focus of attention in
the more cognitively oriented motivation research and has been studied thor-
oughly in traditional research approaches based on expectancy-value-models (cf.
Heckhausen, 1991; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996). The second component refers to the
quality of subjective experiences and the immediate emotional feedback during
action. Whereas the first component of action control typically takes place at the
level of conscious-reflective information processing, the second component very
often functions at a non conscious level of information processing. The psycho-
logical phenomena related to this emotional component have received compara-
tively little attention in recent research ~ at least in the field of educational psy-
chology. In accordance with SDT and other process-oriented concepts of action
control (e.g, Boekaerts, 1996; Epstein, 1990) POI assumes that these factors play
a crucial role in interest development.
It is postulated that a person will engage continuously in a certain topic area
only if he or she assesses it, on the basis of rational considerations, as sufficient-
ly valuable and if he or she experiences the course of interactions on the whole
as positive and emotionally satisfactory (Krapp, 1999, see also Deci, 1992, 1998).
In recent research within the POI framework, we have tried to specify those emo-
tional experiences that play a functional role in development on the basis of the
concept of basic psychological needs. In line with SDT (e.g, Ryan, 1995) and
Nuttin’s (1984) Relational Theory of Behavioral Dynamics, we assume that emo-
tional feedback concerning the degree to which the three basic psychological
needs for competence, autonomy, and social relatedness have been satisfied is
 Interest and Self-Determination 419

especially important among the wealth of possible emotional aspects that

might have a positive or negative influence on the quality of experience during
motivated learning.
In fact, several studies have revealed significant relationships between empir-
ical indicators of need-satisfying experiences and different criteria of interest
development. The majority of these studies were carried out with students and
young adults in vocational settings (Prenzel, Kramer & Drechsel, 1998). We are
currently studying the conditions and processes of interest genesis in the context
of vocational education on the basis of a longitudinal study. Here, especially the
mechanisms of need-related qualities of experience are being studied with both
quantitative and qualitative methods (Lewalter, Krapp, Schreyer, & Wild, 1998;
Wild & Krapp, 1996; Wild, Krapp, Schreyer, & Lewalter, 1998). The quantitative
analyses are based on data from questionnaires and ESM studies and observa-
tional techniques. The qualitative analyses are based on retrospective interviews
with a smaller number of randomly chosen participants from the main study.
Although the results from different aspects of the research differ in several impor-
tant respects, they seem to support the overall hypothesis that need-related expe-
riences with respect to an interest object will lead to the emergence and stabiliza-
tion of longer-lasting interests (Krapp & Lewalter, in press; Lewalter et al., 1998).

Interest, Learning and Academic Achievement

When conditions and processes of development are under consideration,

interest is interpreted as a dependent variable, and the work focuses on the ques-
tions of how and why interests change over time. Another research perspective
refers to the question of how and to what degree interests influence learning and
academic achievement. Most empirical research in educational psychology has
been devoted to this second question. Findings prior to 1990 have been present-
ed and summarized in Renninger, Hidi, and Krapp (1992). Many researchers
now have adopted the distinction between situational and individual (or person-
al) interest (see Figure 18-1). According to Hidi and Berndorff (1998) and
Mitchell (1993), the personal interest approach tends to focus on individual dif-
ferences, whereas the situational interest approach centers on creating appropri-
ate environmental settings to create interest and motivate learning,
Results from both approaches have demonstrated positive effects of interest-
based learning on educationally relevant outcome criteria. In reviewing past
research on the relation between individual interest and academic achievement,
Schiefele, Krapp, and Winteler (1992) and Schiefele, Krapp and Schreyer (1993)
have conducted meta-analyses with respect to global indicators (grades, achieve-
ment tests) and specific indicators of learning (e.g., recall of a specific text). On
420 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

average, across different subject areas, types of schools, and age groups, the level
of interest has accounted for about 10% of the observed variance in achieve-
ment. Gender turned out to be a strong moderator variable: female students’ aca-
demic performance tends to be less associated with their interests than male stu-
dents’ performance. In principle, research on situational interest has also shown
that an interest-triggered learning activity leads to better learning results, espe-
cially with respect to qualitative criteria such as a higher degree of conceptual or
deep-level learning (see Hidi & Anderson, 1992; Hidi & Berndorff, 1998; U.
Schiefele, 1996a).
In recent years, research on interest and learning has become more differ-
entiated. New research questions have been raised, for example the role of inter-
est in text learning (U. Schiefele, 1992, 1996a, 1999), the interrelation between
interest personal goals and self concept (Hidi & Harackiewez, 2001; Hannover,
1998), or the effects of interest based learning at different developmental stages
and in different educational surroundings, including preschool and elementary
school (Prenzel, Lankes, & Minsel, 2000; Renninger, 1998), secondary school
(Baumert & Koller, 1998), colleges and universities (Krapp, 1997), and vocation-
al education and training (Prenzel et al., 1998; Krapp & Wild, 1998). Another
important line of research is concerned with the search for mediating variables
that can explain the (positive) effects of interest-based learning at the level of
functional processes (Schiefele, 1998; Schiefele & Rheinberg, 1997). Among the
few variables that have been analyzed in detail are attention (for a summary see
Hidi, 1995), learning strategies (Wild, 2000), emotional experiences (Krapp &
Lewalter, 2001; Lewalter et al., 1998; U. Schiefele, 1996b; U. Schiefele &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1994).

Conclusions

The Person-Object Conception of Interest (POT) has been developed in the

field of educational psychology. It is based on metatheoretical premises and cen-
tral ideas about the structure and dynamics of human personality which are
closely related to SDT.
According to POI, interest is a relational construct. It refers to a “person-
object-relation,” which is characterized by several specific features including
both, feeling- and value-related aspects. An interest-based PO-relationship can
be investigated and theoretically substantiated at two levels of analysis: at the
level of current events, states, or processes when an individual is realizing an
interest (action of interest) and at the level of (motivational) disposition, indicating a
relatively stable tendency to become occupied with an object of interest (personal
or indwidual interest). With respect to educational practice, the question of how
 Interest and Self-Determination 421

educationally relevant interests develop is of special importance. A good deal of

empirical research has been devoted to analyzing general trends of interest devel-
opment with regard to different educational settings, student populations, and
object areas. Other approaches have tried to explore institutional, curricular, or
individual conditions of interest development.
POT has proposed that the wide variety of developmental trends and effects
can be explained not only with respect to the emergence of interindividual dif-
ferences but also with respect to general principles of human growth and devel-
opment. The functional model of interest genesis postulates that the control of
single interest actions and, on a long-term basis, the facilitation of interest devel-
opment takes place on two different levels of information processing: in the con-
scious-reflective level concerning decisions about future learning goals and the
emotional level which provides continuous and often non conscious feedback
about the quality and/or efficacy of the ongoing action. Here, experiences refer-
ring to the fulfillment of the three basic needs discussed in SDT play a crucial
role. Results from several longitudinal studies in the area of vocational education
using quantitative as well as qualitative data provide empirical evidence that sup-
ports the basic theoretical ideas represented in this model.
Besides interest development, the effects of interest on learning and devel-
opment make up another important field of interest research. Results from many
different approaches confirm the hypothesis that interest-based learning tends to
have many advantages with respect to educationally desirable outcomes. What
will have to be explored in more detail in the future is the question of how these
positive effects can be explained at the level of psychological principles which
ultimately can be used to optimize the educational endeavor.

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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
19: Self-Determination Research: Reflections
and Future Directions

Edward L. Deci
Richard M. Ryan
Unwersity of Rochester

Three decades have passed since publication of the first experiments on intrinsic
motivation in humans (Deci, 1971, 1972a, 1972b; Kruglanski, Friedman, &
Zeevi, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). These studies, which found that
extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation, were anomalous with
respect to existing paradigms in psychology, and they suggested many fascinating
questions that have occupied researchers ever since. For example, a recent meta-
analysis (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) revealed more’than 125 articles report-
ing laboratory experiments that examined the effects of extrinsic rewards on
intrinsic motivation. Additional studies have examined the effects of rewards on
such outcomes as creativity, problem solving, learning, and well-being, to which
intrinsic motivation is hypothesized to be related. And still other studies have
moved beyond rewards to examine the effects of such factors as threats, dead-
lines, imposed goals, competition, and interpersonal climates on intrinsic moti-
vation and related outcomes. ‘These various studies have been conducted in field
settings as well as in the laboratory, and some of them have examined the medi-
ating processes through which the effects are produced.
Subsequently, when studies began to focus on the differentiation of extrinsic
motivation using the concept of internalization (e.g., Ryan, Connell, & Deci,
1985), the field of self-determination truly mushroomed. Laboratory experiments
as well as field studies using interview, questionnaire, and observational methods
have examined the conditions that promote more versus less self-determined
forms of extrinsic motivation, both developmentally and in particular situations,
and these studies have also related the different forms of extrinsic motivation to
such important outcomes as persistence, learning, prosocial activity, healthy
behaving, and psychological well-being. This work all added to the development
of self-determination theory (SDT), and increasing numbers of researchers have
been using SDT to organize or inform their motivational research.
432 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The Diversity of Self-Determination Research

In this volume, more than 30 researchers report on their programs of SD'T-

related research. Reading through the chapters, one is struck by both the breadth
and the depth of the issues covered. The chapters present sophisticated theoret-
ical discussions integrating the results of investigations concerned with topics as
varied as levels of analysis, the nature of self, the motivational basis of effective
coping, differentiated styles of autonomous regulation, the motivational potential
of values, the processes of achievement, types of self-esteem, the complexity of
perceiving motivation in others, and interest as a motivational force. As such, they
test, extend, and refine the tenets of SDT and point the way to important issues
that await further attention.
These chapters also demonstrate how readily the concepts of SDT can be
applied to life domains as diverse as medicine, parenting, education, work, cul-
tural values, sports, environmentalism, and institutional reform. In these chapters
concerning the ongoing activities of life, one sees that differentiation of the con-
cept of motivation according to the degree of autonomy experienced has been
useful for predicting behavioral, affective, and mental health outcomes.
Furthermore, characterization of social environments in terms of the extent to
which they allow satisfaction of basic psychological needs for competence, relat-
edness, and autonomy has served well for explaining variance not only in the
degree of self-determination but also in the various behavioral and well-being
outcomes.
The concepts that underlie SDT have shown themselves to be enduring, yet
they have ongoingly been refined and applied. The concepts include, of course,
the classic distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci,
2000b) and the relation of these types of motivation to amotivation. As well,
there are the central concepts of the basic needs for autonomy, competence, and
relatedness, and of autonomy support, competence support, and relational sup-
port. And there are additional constructs such as causality orientations, ego-
involvement versus task-involvement, psychological vitality, the specific forms of
internalization (e.g., introjected, identified, and integrated regulation), and the
distinctions among needs, motives, and goals (Deci & Ryan, 2000). These various
constructs have been operationalized in multiple ways by researchers, they have
been used to integrate research findings from a multitude of studies, and they
have proven useful for devising prescriptions and proscriptions in many applied
domains. Sull, all of these concepts gain their true meaning from the metatheo-
ry out of which they evolved, so the organismic-dialectical metatheory is an inte-
gral, defining aspect of SDT.
 Reflections and Future Directions 433

The SDT Metatheory

Self-determination theory was built on the assumption, based in the organi-

zational principle of the life sciences, that humans are active, growth-oriented
organisms, with an inherent tendency toward integrating experiences into a uni-
fied regulatory process. This integrative tendency is understood to be dependent
upon specific nutriments from the social environment to operate effectively. It is
the organismic-dialectical metatheory, as detailed in the introductory chapter and
elsewhere (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000c), which captures the interplay of these dis-
crepant human tendencies and is therefore significantly different from the
metatheories guiding other current motivational theories, particularly those with
behavioral or social-cognitive orientations. The metatheory has also led self-
determination theorists to make predictions and interpretations that frequently
differ in profound and interesting ws from those of other theories. One finds
these predictions and interpretations scattered throughout the chapters of this
book.
The very concept of autonomy, of being self-determined, of acting from an
integrated sense of self, necessitates starting with the assumption of an active,
growth-oriented organism. However, the ubiquitous evidence that human beings
are often quite passive, unintegrated, and reactive requires both a metatheory
that can accurately encompass the interplay of proactivity and vulnerability in
human nature and a theory that differentiates the varied types of regulation
which result from that interplay. Most mainstream theories of human motivation
in contemporary psychology continue to use a relatively mechanistic metatheory
and to view motivation as a unitary phenomenon—something that varies in
amount but not kind. Thus, most motivational researchers, other than those
focused on SDT, have been unable to capture the multiple forms of regulation
that reflect differing degrees of activity and passivity. These different qualities
and types of self-regulation are routinely observed in clinical and applied settings
and are well recognized by dynamic and phenomenologically based perspectives,
but the empirically based theories that fail to recognize these different types of
motivation are unable to address some of the most critical aspects of human
behavioral regulation.
Fortunately, the growing interest in SDT and the elaboration of the SDT
framework by researchers such as those represented in this volume have led to the
explication of processes and conditions that promote effective functioning and
psychological health, and in so doing have shed further light on the psychologi-
cal nature of human freedom and connectedness.
In spite of the progress that has been made and is well presented in the chap-
ters of this book, there is much work remaining to be done. Several major theo-
retical problems remain to be solved, new areas of application await careful con-
sideration, and countless refinements would help to make the theory more
exhaustive and precise. We mention just a few of the obvious areas where impor-
tant additional work is needed.
434 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Future Directions

One of the unique aspects of SDT is its postulate of the universal psycho-
logical needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
SDT has been very clear (1) in its definition of needs as essential nutriments for
growth, integrity, and well-being, and (2) in its assertion that the concept of basic
needs is necessary for integrating diverse empirical phenomena.
The concept of basic psychological needs serves three important functions.
First, it provides a theoretical basis for predicting which environmental factors are
likely to facilitate versus undermine natural processes such as intrinsic motivation
and internalization of ambient social values. Specifically, those factors in the
social context that would be logically expected to facilitate need satisfaction are
predicted to promote intrinsic motivation and the integration of values and reg-
ulations. Second, the concept of needs provides a basis for relating motivation
and behavior not only to performance but also to psychological development and
health. Because the needs specify necessary nutriments, behaviors that are
expected to yield such nutriments are predicted to promote healthy development
and well being, as well as constructive and creative outputs. Third, the concept of
innate needs provides a basis for the design of social systems such as schools,
health clubs, work places, and, yes, even cultures. By understanding people’s basic
psychological needs, psychologists can play a role in establishing policies and pro-
cedures and in designing activities and interactions that will allow or facilitate
individuals’ need satisfaction so that the social systems will function more effec-
tively and the systems’ members will display greater vitality, productivity, and
satisfaction.

The Universality of Needs

The concept of innate or basic needs is quite controversial in modern moti-

vational psychology, and it stands in sharp contrast to the cultural relativism and
postmodernism that is so prevalent in the social sciences today. Specifically, most
current theories of motivation still fail to acknowledge any human nature or deep
design to the human psyche other than plasticity and docility—a viewpoint that
‘Tooby and Cosmides (1992) referred to as the “standard social science model.”
From this perspective, people’s goals and motives are shaped largely by cultural
and social forces, and well-being and other positive outcomes are expected to
accrue when the people are efficacious at achieving their goals, whatever the
goals might be (see, e.g., Bandura, 1989; Oishi, Diener, Lucas, & Suh, 1999). All
goals “are created equal,” so to speak.
Advocates of this viewpoint suggest that competence, autonomy, and relat-
edness are important motivators only to the extent that individuals have adopted
 Reflections and Future Directions 435
them as goals through some type of social learning process, so these motivators
will be differentially important in different groups or cultures that value them to
differing degrees. For example, theorists such as Heine, Lehman, Markus, and
Kitayama (1999) have maintained that whereas a focus on autonomy character-
izes western societies, eastern societies place greater emphasis on relatedness, and
in so doing these researchers have aligned autonomy with the western value of
individualism and have aligned relatedness with the eastern value of collectivism.
Other commentators such as Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, and Surrey (1991)
have similarly argued that autonomy is more central for males and relatedness is
more central for female.
SDT asserts, in contrast, that all humans, regardless of culture or gender,
need to feel both related and autonomous in order to be healthy, even though
these needs may be expressed and satisfied in different ways within different cul-
tural contexts or by people at different ages or of different genders. Thus, SDT
suggests that there is not a clear alignment of cultural orientations or genders
with the different human needs. Individualism does not ensure satisfaction of the
need for autonomy, and collectivism does not ensure satisfaction of the need for
relatedness. Rather, the psychological effects of both individualism and collec-
tivism depend, to a large extent, on how those values are transmitted and to what
extent they have been meaningfully integrated by the individuals exposed to
them. People can be autonomous in their enactment of collectivist values just as
they can in their enactment of individualistic values, and they can find satisfac-
tion of their relatedness need while holding either value. Similarly, being male
does not differentially facilitate satisfaction of the need for autonomy nor does
being female facilitate satisfaction of the need for relatedness, unless of course
political or religious values and practices interfere with satisfaction of one or the
other needs by one or the other genders. For example, it seems perfectly clear
that, like men, women suffer psychologically when they are deprived of autono-
my, as they are in many cultural, societal, and interpersonal contexts.
We maintain that, in spite of being a unique and controversial aspect of
SDT, the idea of universal needs that are differentially expressed and satisfied as
a function of differing social contexts is consistent with recent work in evolution-
ary psychology and genetics. One of the most significant conclusions from mod-
ern genetic research is that, to an extent not anticipated three decades ago,
humans across the globe share a basic genetic makeup. Indeed, we are one
species, with a common nature. Exploration of the invariant aspects of that
nature and how it is expressed under varied developmental and cultural condi-
tions is thematic in recent SDT work.
Accordingly, a major current and future direction of SDT work is the con-
tinued examination of cross-cultural variation in the relation of motives and
needs to mental health. Recent studies (e.g., Chirkov & Ryan, 2001; Deci, Ryan,
Gagné, Leone, Usunov, & Kornazheva, 2001; Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon,
Timoshina, & Deci, 1999; Yamauchi & Tanaka, 1998) have provided evidence in
436 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

support of the universal importance of SDT’s proposed basic needs, but much
work remains to be done and represents an important direction for future
research,
Similarly, more work to ground the basic human needs in evolutionary psy-
chology is warranted. This will, however, involve some controversy. The current
tendency in that field is to search for narrow, “lock-and-key” mechanisms that
solved very particular adaptive problems during the era of evolutionary adapta-
tion, and important things are being learned using that approach. However, some
evolutionary thinkers who have taken that approach have also disparaged the
examination of any multipurpose, broad-band, or organizational features in the
deep design of the human psyche, and that is a position with which we take
strong exception. The position holds in essence that the design of organisms is
accretive in nature, and that view is conceptually parallel to the accretive, associ-
ationist view adopted by behaviorists early in the twentieth century. Elsewhere
(Deci & Ryan, 2000), we referred to this as the “heap of stones” model of organ-
ismic design, pointing out that the view lacks a conception of an organization
within living entities which plays a role in what features could emerge or be
added and in what functions and features of organisms are subserved by adap-
tion and could in turn either directly or indirectly influence selective processes.
Accordingly, an important future direction for SDT is to interface constructively
with evolutionary psychological theories and, in so doing, to help emphasize the
deep design features of the human psyche which concern the needs to be related
to others, to experience competence, and to be an origin and organizer of one’s
behavior. This agenda, while still relatively nascent has nonetheless received
increasing attention (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997).

The Relation of Integration to Autonomy

One of SD'T’s central features is the relative autonomy continuum—that is,

the theoretical characterization of motivational or regulatory types in terms of
the degree to which they represent autonomous or self-determined functioning.
Further, the developmental component of SDT emphasizes that people become
more autonomous with respect to behaviors or domains as the organismic inte-
gration process leads the behaviors to become more integrated within one’s uni-
fied sense of self. ‘This feature of the theory, like the feature of universal needs, is
both unique and controversial. Still, abundant research has shown that
identified and integrated forms of extrinsic motivation are associated with
the experience of greater autonomy than are introjected or externally-based reg-
ulations, and that regulations accompanied by greater autonomy are also associ-
ated with more effective performance and greater well-being.
Nonetheless, there is an interesting and related phenomenon that has yet to
be fully explicated within SD'T. Specifically, there are regulations and values
 Reflections and Future Directions 437

which individuals hold and with which they identify that are not coherent with
respect to their integrated selves. That is, people may identify with certain values
that are quite inconsistent with other aspects of their sense of self, leading them
to compartmentalize these identifications so they will not experience the discom-
fort resulting from a conflict between these values and other aspects of their psy-
chological makeup.
An interesting case in point concerns Nazi values that were apparently
endorsed by many Germans during the 1930s and early 1940s. The espoused
value of annihilating an ethnic minority within their culture was certainly incon-
sistent with values contained within the integrated selves of many of the individ-
uals—values of kindness and promoting humanity, for example. Yet, a recent
argument by Goldhagen (1996) suggested that, [in the language of SDT]
although some individuals may have enacted Nazi atrocities out of external or
introjected forms of regulation, a large number of people appear to have identi-
fied strongly with these values. In other words, they seem to have identified with
a set of politico-cultural values that could not have been easily integrated with
their true sense of self. In previous writings, we have referred to the concept of
compartmentalized identifications, and it is that concept to which we here refer.
One of the extremely important empirical agendas facing SDT is to clarify the
workings of these unintegrated identifications.

Within-person Variations in Motivation and Well-being

Along with the rest of the field of personality and social psychology, SDT is
being reshaped by the advent of methodological tools that allow the exploration
of within-person variations in functioning. In particular, the relation of need sat-
isfaction to well-being has typically been studied at only the between-person level,
which has shown that individuals whose needs are generally supported have more
positive well-being outcomes. Multilevel modeling allows a deeper examination
of the functioning of needs. To show that each individual is more fully function-
ing and has more optimal experience at the times or in the contexts where needs
are satisfied relative to times or contexts where they are frustrated is an even more
powerful result concerning the postulate of universal needs. Already, several stud-
ies have shown within-person covariation between basic needs and well-being
across time and contexts (e.g., Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000;
Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). Moreover, a recent study highlighted an associa-
tion between the formation and maintenance of attachments to specific others
and the satisfaction of basic needs at the within-person level (La Guardia, Ryan,
Couchman, & Deci, 2000), pointing toward a need-based theory of interperson-
al connectedness. As SDT applies multilevel modeling to variation in need satis-
faction, psychological vitality, and performance, the dynamics of motivation and
its functional underpinnings will become increasingly well specified.
438 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Emotional Integration

It has long been a tenet of SDT that emotions as well as psychological needs
are energizers of action. However, most of our attention has focused on the
dynamics of psychological needs, and relatively little consideration has been
given to emotions other than the emotion of interest, which is a key element in
intrinsic motivation and integrative processes. Particularly little empirical atten-
tion within the SDT framework has been given to the so-called negative emotions
such as anger and contempt and to the associated expressions of aggression
toward others or toward oneself. ‘These issues are indeed central ones in life, and
from the SDT perspective the darker sides of human existence are unarguably
associated with lack of basic need satisfaction and with ineffective regulation of
the corresponding negative emotions (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Still, much work
remains to be done in order to present a consistent and comprehensive analysis
of emotional regulation.
Certainly this analysis will recognize that emotions are innate to the human
organism, yet effective regulation of emotions requires that they become man-
aged by the self. SDT, of course, has a unique handle on the issue of self-man-
agement. Specifically, people can be either self-controlling or self-regulating in
managing their emotions, and the consequences of these two different forms of
regulation, which reflect differing degrees of relative autonomy, will be quite dif-
ferent. In the former case, emotions are ignored, suppressed, or denied, whereas
in the latter case they are attended to, “owned,” and used as sources of informa-
tion. Healthy emotional regulation requires internalization of the regulatory
processes in a way that will permit awareness of the feelings and satisfaction of
basic needs that is associated with effective regulation. Investigation of the phe-
nomenology and dynamics of regulatory processes with respect to emotions is
thus a key issue for SDT research. More generally, in fact, the nature of aware-
ness and mindfulness in self-determination is an area in need of greater speci-
ficity and research-based examination.

Additional Applied Considerations

Within each of the domains to which SDT has been applied there are
numerous unanswered questions that will occupy the attention of interested
researchers for years to come. However, perhaps the one applied area that has
received the least attention but is ripe for exploration is that of psychotherapy.
The concept of autonomy has been addressed extensively by theories for-
mulated within the psychoanalytic and humanistic traditions where the ideas of
holistic functioning and volitional self-regulation are considered important.
Angyal (1965), for example, proposed that the two fundamental life trajectories
are toward greater autonomy and greater homonomy. In other words, the direc-
 Reflections and Future Directions 459

tion and meaning of development involve simultaneously achieving greater per-

sonal integrity and volition (autonomy) and more meaningful relationships with
others (homonomy). Miller (1981), in discussing the meaning of true self, which
closely resembles our concept of integrated self, suggested that children require
an atmosphere of respect and tolerance to develop their autonomy and identity.
These and other such theories (see, e.g., Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995) are fully
consistent with the SDT postulate of basic psychological needs for autonomy,
competence, and relatedness and with the ideas that satisfaction of these needs is
essential for healthy development and for psychotherapeutic change. Further,
many of the therapeutic approaches that have been developed within these tra-
ditions are relatively congruent with the tenets of SDT. Still, we have yet to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive analysis of the processes of psychotherapeutic
change, and that is another important agenda for the future.

Conclusions

The chapters of this volume make clear that SDT provides a coherent and
comprehensive basis for understanding human motivation and personality devel-
opment, that a remarkable body of research supporting SDT has accumulated
over the past three decades, and that the theory has been useful for guiding appli-
cations and interventions in a variety of domains. Based on an organismic-dialec-
tical metatheory, the empirical programs summarized herein have added sub-
stantial breadth and depth to the theory and have helped to point the way toward
further important problems that remain to be tackled. Our hope is that this vol-
ume will serve to stimulate greater interest in the SDT approach and that those
who are curious about the dynamics of motivation and the essential features of
human nature will engage these questions that bear on the optimal functioning
of human beings and on the communities that nurture them.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Nicholas H. Apostoleris
Department of Family Medicine and Community Health
UMASS Medical School
55 Lake Avenue North
Worcester, MA 01655
e-mail: [email protected]

Paul P. Baard
Departments of Communications and Management
Graduate School of Business Administration
Fordham University
113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
e-mail: [email protected]

Edward L. Deci
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
e-mail: [email protected]

Kathleen Edge
Psychology Department
Portland State University
P.O. Box 751
Portland, OR 97207-0751

AndrewJ. Elhot
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
e-mail: [email protected]

Michael E. Enzle
Department of Psychology
P-220 Biological Sciences Bldg.
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA T6G 2E9
e-mail: [email protected]
444 CONTRIBUTORS

Christina M. Frederick-Recascino
Human Factors Department
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
600 Clyde Morris Blvd.
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900
email: [email protected]

Wendy S. Grolnick
Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology
Clark University
950 Main Street
Worcester, MA 01610
e-mail: [email protected]

Patricia H. Hawley
Department of Psychology
Southern Connecticut State University
501 Crescent Street
New Haven, CT 06515
e-mail: [email protected]

Christopher C. Henrich
Department of Psychology
Georgia State University
University Plaza
Atlanta, GA 30303
e-mail: [email protected]

Holley S. Hodgins
Department of Psychology
Skidmore College
Saratoga Springs, NY 12866
e-mail: [email protected]

‘Tim Kasser
Department of Psychology
Knox College
Galesburg, IL 61401
e-mail: [email protected]

Michael H. Kernis
Department of Psychology
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
e-mail; [email protected]
 Contributors 445

C. Raymond Knee
Department of Psychology
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77204-5022
e-mail: [email protected]

Richard Koestner
Department of Psychology
McGill University
1205 Dr. Penfield Avenue
Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3A 1B1
e-mail: [email protected]

Andreas Krapp
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of the Bundeswehr, Munich
85577 Neubiberg, GERMANY
e-mail: andreas. [email protected]

Todd D. Little
Department of Psychology
Yale University
P.O. Box 208205
New Haven, CT 06520-8205
e-mail: [email protected]

Gaétan F. Losier
Ecole de Psychologie
Université de Moncton
Moncton, NB, CANADA EIA 3E9
e-mail: [email protected]

Katherine W. Marsland
Department of Psychology
Yale University
P.O. Box 208205
New Haven, CT 06520-8205
e-mail: [email protected]

Holly A. McGregor
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
e-mail: [email protected]
446 CONTRIBUTORS

Andrew W. Paradise
Department of Psychology
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602

Luc G, Pelletier
Research Laboratory on Human Motivation
School of Psychology
University of Ottawa
P.O. Box 450, Stn. A
Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA KIN 6N5
e-mail: [email protected]

Catherine F. Ratelle
Laboratoire de recherche sur le comportement social
Départment de Psychologie
Université du Québec a Montréal
Box 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal (Québec) CANADA H3C 3P8

Johnmarshall Reeve
Division of Psychological and Quantitative Foundations
361 Lindquist Center
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242
e-mail: [email protected]

Richard M. Ryan
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
e-mail: [email protected]

Kennon M. Sheldon
Department of Psychology
112 McAlester Hall
University of Missouri, Columbia
Columbia, MO 65211
e-mail: [email protected]

Ellen Skinner
Psychology Department
Portland State University
P.O. Box 751
Portland, OR 97207-0751
e-mail: [email protected]
 Contributors 447

Todd M. Thrash
Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
e-mail: [email protected]

Robert J. Vallerand
Laboratoire de recherche sur le comportement social
Départment de Psychologie
Université du Québec a Montréal
Box 8888, Succursale Centre- Ville
Montréal (Québec) CANADA H3C 3P8
e-mail: vallerand.robert_j]@uqam.ca

‘TT. Cameron Wild

Addiction and Mental Health Laboratory
Centre for Health Promotion Studies, and
Department of Public Health Sciences
University of Alberta
13-133 Clinical Sciences Bldg.
Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA T6G 2G3
e-mail: [email protected]

Geoffrey C. Williams
Departments of Medicine and of
Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology
University of Rochester
Box 270266
Rochester, NY 14627
e-mail: [email protected]
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INDEX OF NAMES

A Arnold, EF, 405, 421

Aronson, E., 210, 229
Abakoumkin, G., 310, 336
Aseltine, R., 111, 119
Abend, T., 348-9, 352, 354-5, 357-8
Asendorpf, J., 408, 421
Abranisy 1.412529
Asher, 8. R., 395, 402
Abramson, L. Y., 43, 59
Aspinwall, L. G., 66 82
Abramson, P. R., 133-4, 138
Atkinsons)) We 2/7, 290,367, o/ilo2,
Abutaa, R., 118, 120
380-1, 385
Affleck, G., 319, 337
Austin,J., 373, 381
Ahadi, 8. A., 377. 385
Averill,J.Ruy gi2Z.o30
Ahuvia, A., 136, 138
Ainsworth, M. D. S., 301, 303, 310,
330, 393, 401
B
Aksan, N., 318, 334 Baard; PP 23923467, 32..258-260;
Alderman, R. B., 277, 290 262, 264, 268,52735) 275
Alexander, R. D., 395, 401 Bailey, C., 285, 290
Alletto, BK... 150, 157 Bailey, W. C., 248, 252
Allport, F., 66, 82 Baird, E., 136, 138
Allport. G. W.,.6)28, 415,271 Bakan, D., 400-401
Altman, J., 307, 319, 336 Baldwin, M. W.,, 301, 330
Amabile? TM. 22:28; 52-53; 59, Baltes, P. B., 389, 404
1 Se Tale 1785 F844 19 7, 199 Banaji, M. R., 98, 343, 358
Ames Coal 7OR17SP2 78% 290, 373, Band eB. ole 330
381 Bandura; As 45157179289 1035119.
Amick, T: L., 248, 252 150415552278, 2909298 s301k 303;
Anastasi, A., 408, 421 330, 391, 401, 414, 421, 434, 439
Anderson, C. A., 346, 348-9, 352, Banez; GeA® 29873119315;332
357,559 Bank 15.13.17, 319,935
Anderson, J., 346, 357 Barber, B. K., 303, 330
Anderson, K. E., 167, 178 Barclay, 12°C .3352, 395, 398
Anderson, R., 14, 28 Bargh,J. A., 81-82
Anderson, 8. C., 142, 155 Barna; G.(2553267,, 273
Anderson, V., 407, 420, 423 Barndollar, K., 81-82
Angyal-Az-3, 5, 26; 437, 439 Barrett, K. C., 300, 305-6, 321, 330,
Apostoleris, N., 48, 177, 179 366, 381
ArcherJ. 70) 179395795, 301 Barrett, M., 154-5, 184, 186, 192-3,
Arcury, T. A., 208, 228 197, 199-201
Aridas, G., 25854273 Barron, K., 116; 120
Armsden, C. C., 314, 330 Bates,J. E., 163, 165-6, 179-180
Arndt, L., 189, 202 Battista, Ro; 285; 295
Arnett, PAS 378.361 Baumann, N., 80, 84
450 INDEX OF NAMES

Baumeister, R. FE, 7, 28, 49, 59, 70, Bleske, A. L., 400, 402
83, 90, 99, 143, 157, 259, 273, 301, Block,J.H., 321, 330
310, 330, 340, 357, 378, 382 Block, J., 321, 330
Baumert,J., 406, 416, 420-1, 423 Bloom, B. S., 116, 119
Baumrind, D., 304, 330 Bober, 5., 173, 179
Beaton, A. M., 46, 53-54, 61, 211-2, Boehnke, K., 132, 140
214, 231 Boekaerts, M., 416, 418, 422
Beaudoin, C. M., 285, 292 Boggiano, A. K., 154-5, 184, 186,
Beckerebiensn oon oll 192-3, 197, 199-202
Beckman, H. B., 238, 251-2 Boivin, M., 111, 120
Bedell, K. B., 267, 273 Bolt, E., 185, 187%, 208, 258 2525303)
Beery, Ra, 3/0, 902 335
Béland, A., 46, 61, 211-2, 214, 224, Bonanno, G. A., 311, 331
230-1 Borenstein,J.K., 346, 360
Belge OMlone 179 Borquez, J., 163, 180
Bellier, P., 209, 216, 230 Bosk, GE. 238.254
Belmont, M. J., 192, 194, 203 Boucher, C., 18, 28, 45, 53, 59, 67,
Belsky, J., 370, 382 83, 213, 229, 280-1, 290
Benefield, R. G., 248, 252 Bowlby,J., 7, 28, 301, 310, 331, 376,
Benje Gil 77,178 382, 393
Benware, C., 184, 199, 260, 273 Brandtstadter, J., 317-8, 32 1,529,534
Berlyne, D. E., 141, 155, 414, 421 Bratslavsky, E., 70, 83
Bernard, L. C., 287, 290 Brehm,J.W., 317, 331
Berndorff, D., 407, 419-420, 423 Bretherton, I., 298, 331, 376, 382
Bernieri, F., 12-13, 21, 30-31, 94, 99, Brickman, P, 318, 331
115, 118, 120014122, 1569173) Bridges, L. J., 14, 29, 177, 180, 277
180, 184, 201, 260, 274 294.
Bernstein, I. S., 394, 401 Briere, N. M., 42, 44, 46, 53-54, 59,
Berry, A. J., 347-9, 352, 355, 358-9 61, 63, 2122. 4, 229- 232, 280-2, 289,
Betley,.G., 12729
Biddle, S. J. H., 18, 29, 280-1, 285, Bwcine: 1. 255, 266, 273
289, 290-2 Bronfenbrenner, U., 162, 179
Bien, T., 247, 251 Brothers, C. C., 208, 229
Birch, H. G., 165, 181 Broughton, J. M., 4, 28
Bissonette, R., 47, 53, 62, 184, 203, Brown, B., 285, 290
213-4, 232 Brown, F., 285, 292
Black, A. E. , 248, 251 Brown, H. Sx 218e280
Blair, L. W,, layopeloylll Es tys 2h: Brown, J. D., 50, 59
Blais, M. R.., 18, 28, 42, 44- a 53-54, Brunstein, J. C., 70, 81, 83
59-61, 63, 67, 83, 212-214, 299. Bukowski, W. M. 395, 403
232, 280-1, 289-290, 293-4, 315, Buonamano, R., 285, 290
347 Burns, W. J., 218, 231
Blanchard, C., 45, 47, 49-50, 52, 54- Burroughs,J. E., 133, 139
Do, 07,09, OL, 63, 222, 236 Buss, A. H., 369, 382-3
Blantoty lial Woyay, toys: Buss, D. M., 166, 179, 400, 402
Blascovich, J., 340, 357 Buss, K., 314, 334
Blasi, A., 4, 18, 31 Butler, A. C., 348, 357
 Index of Names 451

Butler, R., 368, 382 CGhinlen 27 7, 283,291

Buizels|ion s27eo3) Chinn, Ds E32 10,232
Byyny. Re Le 2337253 Chirkoy, V. I., 26-27, 29, 32, 129, 131,
136, 139, 435, 439-440
C Church, M116, 11953783383
Cacioppo,J. T., 151, 156 Claparéde E., 405, 422
Cadorette, I., 55, 63 Clark, M. S., 298, 331
Cab Yer ao le 79202 2 5en 252, 303, Clark, RA AN 30795714379, 360
ee) Cluss, P. A., 234, 252
Cain, KM22367, 382 Coates, D:, 516; 331
Cairns, R. B., 391, 403 Cobern, M. K., 209, 229
Calkins, S. D., 302, 331 Cohen,J, 133, 136, 138
Cameron, J., 11, 29, 142, 155 Coben Lin 329.530
Campbell, JD. 351, 357 Cohen, PB, 133, 136,138
Campos,J.J., 300, 305-6, 321, 330-4 Cohen, S., 298, 331
Campos, R. G., 305-6, 331 Cohen, S. C., 248, 252
Cantor, N., 65-66, 83, 86 Cohn, He 318.331
Cantril, H., 167, 181 Colten, M., 111, 119
Cardillo, A., 73, 84 Compas, B. E., 298, 306, 309-311,
Gardneci, D. 19:31, 46; 54.61, 67, 513,528055 13
84, 109-110, 120 Gone. 1D.92225 229.
Carstens, A. A., 366, 382 Conger, R. D., 163, 179
Garstensen, 1, 31 33) Connell,J.P., 8-9, 18, 26, 28, 32, 48,
Carter, A., 393, 403 60, 66-67, 85, 104, 113, 119-121,
Carter, S., 116, 120 129, 139, 161, 179-180, 184-6, 194-
Carton,J. S., 303, 331 5, 200, 201-3, 235, 241, 253, 260,
Carver, C. S., 44, 59, 124, 136, 138, 274, 279-281, 287, 291, 293, 298,
3213315 S48 135) 302-3, 314-5, 318, 320, 332, 335-7,
Cascio, W. E, 12, 29 350, 359, 381, 383, 431, 440
Catley, D., 277, 283,291 Connor,J., 306, 328, 332
Ceballo, R., 163, 180 Cook; D, [5.27 7,293
GeipaA;, 285,290 Cook, H., 395, 402
Gellar, Der Walesa Cooper, E. L., 150, 157
Chaiken, S., 208, 229 Corbin, C. B., 49, 63
Champy,J., 255, 274 Cordova, Dil. 53,019 T7119, 191,
Chander C, 1, 16726 197, 199-201
Chantal, Y., 46, 50, 54, 59-60, 62, Cornell, D. P., 347, 358
26277290 Cosmides, L., 434, 441
Chapman, M., 389, 404 Couchman, C., 437, 440
Charlesworth, W. R., 395, 402-3 Covington, M., 376, 382
Charness, N., 116, 119 Cox, E. M., 25, 33, 133, 140, 244,
Chartrand, I. L,31; 83 290
Ghatzisarantis, NwG, De 18,29; 281; Coyne,J.C..948, 308
290 Crandall, V. J., 370, 384
Chaves, M., 267, 274 Crocker,J., 340, 345-6, 355, 357
CGihess, C172 195-229 Cronbach, L. J., 408, 422
Chess, S.,165, 181, 369, 383 Crowne, D. P., 46, 60, 341, 357
452 INDEX OF NAMES

Csikszentmihalyi, I. $., 415, 422 DiDio, L., 118, 120

Csikszentmihalyi, M., 115, 117, 119, Diener, C. I., 170, 179
121, 279, 286, 291, 366, 382, 405, Diener, E., 22, 30, 75, 83, 434, 440
410-1, 415, 420, 422, 425-6 Dobreva-Martinova, T., 282, 290
Cunningham,J., 150, 157 Dodge, K. A., 163, 179, 317, 332
Curry, S. J., 52-53, 60, 247, 251 Dolmat-Connell,J., 255, 274
Dornbusch, S., 393, 402
D Doty, R. M., 176, 179
d’Ailly, H., 196, 200 Dowd, D. A., 285, 292
d’Andrade, R., 371, 385 Drechsel, B., 417, 419-420, 425
Darley,J., 152, 156 Druckman, D., 206, 232
Darling, N. E., 393, 402 Duda,J. L., 277-8, 283, 291, 293-4
Darwin, C., 394, 402 Duff, K..J,'90,99
Davey, J.,.259, 274 Duncan, N., 96, 99, 106, 120, 141, 156
Davidson, R. J., 369, 386 Dunning, D., 344, 358
Dawson, S., 130, 139 Dutton, K. A., 50, 59
Debeis, P,, 109, 121 Dweck, C. S., 170, 179, 192, 201,
DeCasper, A.J., 366, 382 278, 291, 298, 302-4, 309-310, 313,
deCharms, R., 8, 10-11, 15, 17,29, 332-4, 367-8, 373, 376, 381-2, 384,
48, 60, 104, 119, 142, 155, 193, 393, 404
197, 200, 259, 273, 301-4, 312, Dwyer, W. O., 209, 229, 234, 251
332, 390, 392, 402 Dykman, B. M., 376, 382
Deci, E. L., 5, 7-15, 17-18, 20-23, 25-
29, 32-33, 37, 42-44, 46, 48-50, 53, E
56, 60-63, 66-68, 72, 75-76, 82-83, Easterbrooks, M. A., 301, 334, 370, 385
85-87, 91, 93, 98, 100-102, 104, Eccles,J.S., 183, 201, 367, 387
106, 114-5, 118-9, 121, 127, 129, Edge, K., 305, 307, 314, 320, 336
131-3, 136-142, 145-9, 151, 154-7, Edwards, T: C., 209, 230
161, 168;.177, 179, 181, 164, 187, Eghanri, H., 20, 29, 46, 60, 115, 119,
189, 192, 195-7, 199-200, 202-3, 189, 196, 200, 224, 229, 239, 251,
206, 211-2, 214, 224-5, 229, 235, 304, 332
237-9, 242-5, 248, 250-1, 253-4, Eisenberg, N., 321, 333
256-262, 264, 273-5, 279-280, 283, Eisenberg, R., 368, 385
286-7, 291-3, 298-9, 301-5, 309, Eisenberger, R., 11, 29, 142, 155
313-5, 317, 329, 332, 339, 344-5, Ritel, F, 417, 425
348-351, 354-5, 357, 361, 370, 373, Elder, G. H., 163, 179
375, 382, 389-393, 399-405, 407- Elhot, A. J., 13, 32, 65-66, 68, 72-75,
410, 418, 422, 431-441 85, 91, 100, 115-6, 119-121, 141,
DeCourcey, W., 170, 180 143, 155-6, 213, 229, 231, 368-9,
DeJong, W., 12, 28, 141, 155, 197, 373, 376-9, 382, 386
199 Elliott, E. S., 170, 179, 368, 373, 376,
DeNeve, K., 346, 357 381-2
Denton, F,, 133, 139 Emel,J., 218, 230
Deutsch, D., 405, 422 Emery, J., 184, 202
Deutsch,J.A., 405, 422 Emirbayer, M., 389, 402
Dewey,J., 141, 155, 405, 415, 422 Emmons, R. A., 44, 60, 65, 67-68, 70,
DeYoung, R., 210-1, 214, 229 83,°123, 135, 736; 350, 353
 Index of Names 453

Engel, G. L., 249, 252 Freedman, Z. Ry 18,733,530, .63,:242;

Enzle, M. E., 142, 144-5, 148-9, 155, 244, 253, 261, 275
Lad Frenchio, E., Pi 12
Epstem,J.A. 53361; 247,252 Hrenclono so 0
Epstein, LHe, 234,252 Freya.KoS:, 3682305
Epstein, R. M., 238, 252 Fridja, N. H., 302, 305-6, 333
Epstein, S., 342, 344, 358, 418, 422 Friedman, I., 10, 31, 431, 440
Ericcson, K. A., 116, 119 Friend, K. E., 176, 181
Everett, P B., 210, 229-230 Frodi, A., 14, 29
Fuhrmann, A., 4, 31, 327, 334
F
Pabes, Ra. o2 1,305 G
Farnham, S. D., 98, 343, 358 Gable, S. lal 204-3 oy 38),
Feather IN. “T.; 1232 127,.132,-138 437, 440
Feldman, S., 176, 179 Gagne, M226, 29, 118, 120; 245,
Felson, R. B., 352, 358 253, 435, 440
Feltz, 1D, Le, 277-8,,291-2 Gagnon, A., 44, 59
Fenigstein, A., 81, 83 Galambos, N., 164, 178
Feshbach, S., 352, 358 Ganellen, R. J., 348, 357
Fichman, L., 110-2, 120 Garbarino,J., 184, 201
Fink, B., 410-2, 416, 422, 424 Gardner, G. T., 205-6, 208, 210, 217,
Fiore, M. C., 248, 252 79
Fischer, K. W., 367, 384 Gardner, P. L., 416-7, 422, 424
Fischhoff, B., 217, 231 Garduque, L., 370, 382
Fisher, C. D., 11, 29 Ge tien 165% 179
Fiske, S. T., 149, 152, 155 Geer,.Bs 238, 251
Fitch, G., 340, 358 Geller, E. S., 206, 209-210, 229-230, 232
Flammer, A., 298, 333 Gelman, S. A., 367, 384
Fletcher, A. C., 393, 402 Genero, Ne Ry 238,252
Flink, C., 154-5, 184, 186, 193, 197, Georges lear 7 ie 292
200-201 Gergen, Kyf5 43730
Flowerday, T, 199, 202 Gigliotti, L. M., 208, 230
Flowers, K., 238, 252 Gills De l.; 2778) 2857292: 294
Flynn SH; 346,357 Gilovich, T., 117, 120
Foege, WH... 253,252 Gingras, IL, 118, 120
Folkman, S., 297-8, 310, 313, 333-4 Gioioso, C., 94, 100
Ford, M. E., 4, 30 Gisbert, K., 417, 422
Forsythe; Gi.J., 298, 315-333 Goble, R., 218, 230
Fortier, M. S., 45-46, 49, 61, 63, 67, Goldberg, D. P., 261, 274
84, 86, 184, 203, 212-4, 230, 232, Goldberg, R., 248, 252
280-2, 289, 291, 293 Goldhagen, D. J., 437, 440
Fortner, R. W,, 208, 229 Goldman, B., 350-2, 359
Fox, Ky 2380-14289 292 Goldsmith, H. H., 369, 383
[resnaltell, In, Bako}, 25)l Gonzales, M. H., 210, 229
Franks, P., 298, 335 Gore, 5.) 111, 119
Frederick, C. M., 23, 32, 46, 66, 85, Gottlieb, G., 391, 402
262, 275, 279, 282-4, 286-9, 291-3 Goudas, M., 280-1, 289, 292
454 INDEX OF NAMES

Gould, D., 277, 292 Hamm, D., 187, 197, 201-2

Gould, S. J., 400, 402 Hamner, M., 255, 274
Graessman, R., 81, 83 Hampton, C., 343, 357
Graham, S., 314, 317, 333 Hanna, S. E., 89, 100
Gramzow, R., 346, 360 Hannover, B., 415, 420, 422
Grannemann, Dab oo2)s00) 000 Harackiewicz,J.M., 50, 53, 61-62,
Gray,J., 369, 377, 383 116, 120, 141-3, 155-6, 247, 252,
Green-Demers, I., 19, 29, 46, 53-54, 375, 383, 420, 423
6L, 117, 119, 211+2.214.5, 222-6, Hardre, P, 196, 202
230-1 Harlow, H. F, 7, 30
Greenberg, M. T., 314, 330 Harlow, T., 347, 358
Greene, D.,. 10-12; 31, 141, 156,197, Harmon, R. J., 363, 370, 385
201, 431, 440 Harpster, L., 117, 121
Greenfield, S., 238, 246, 252 Harrington, M. J., 209, 230
Greenier, K. D., 347-9, 352, 354-5, Harris, D., 277, 292
358-9 Harris, M. J., 152, 156
Greenwald, A. G., 4, 30, 98, 343, 358 Harter, S., 7, 30 48, 61, 184, 201,
Greve, VW:, 318, 331 277, 292, 301, 303, 383, 349, 358,
Griffin, D. W,, 90, 99 363-4, 366-7, 370, 375, 381, 383,
Griffin, P.,, 285, 292 397, 402
Groeben, N., 408, 422 Hartman, H., 371, 383
Grolnick, W. S., 14, 18, 20, 23, 29-30, Haselton, M. G., 400, 402
32-33, 47-48, 53, 60, 62, 66-67, 83, Hatfield, E., 151, 156
86-87, 91, 100, 104, 114-5, 119- Haubenstricker,J., 285, 293
120, 1615 1635°169. 1735 176-181: Haugen,J.A., 152, 157
184, 195-6, 201-2, 213, 230, 243, Hausser, K., 409, 423
254, 261, 274, 280, 292, 302-3, Haussler, P., 417, 423
333, 392-3, 400-403, 439, 441 Hawkins, W., 144, 157
Gross,J. B., 277, 285, 292 Hawley, P. H., 389, 394-6, 399-400, 402
Grothaus, L. C., 53, 60, 247, 251 Hayamizu, T., 26, 30
Grouzet, F. M. E., 58, 60 Hayes, 8. C., 222, 229, 253
Grow, V. M., 18, 33, 50, 63, 242, 253, Haynes, R. B., 233, 252
201 215 Heckhausen, H., 323, 333, 366-8,
Gruber, H. E., 68, 79, 83 381, 383-4, 418, 423
Guay, EF, 44-47, 49-50, 54-55, 59-61, Heckhausen,
J., 301, 312, 318, 328-9,
63, 67, 86, 184, 203, 213-4, 232, $33
282, 290 Hedberg, V. A., 25, 33, 133, 140
Gunaratana, H., 88, 99 Heider, F., 10, 30, 142, 156
Gunnar, M. R., 301, 303, 314, 333-4 Heiland, A., 407, 413-4, 426
Gurland, S. T., 170, 176, 179-180 Heine, S. J., 351, 357, 435, 440
Gushue, N. R., 117, 119 Heise, D. R., 192-3, 201
Guthrie, I., 321, 333 Helmke, A., 416, 423
Guttman, L., 130, 138 Helmreich, R. L., 371, 386
Gwynne, S. C., 262, 274 Hennessey, B. A., 52, 61
Herbart,J. F, 405, 423
H Herlocker, C. E., 348-9, 352, 354-5,
Hadaway, C. K., 267, 274 358-9
Hamel, M., 46, 53, 63 Hermans, H. J. M., 125-6, 138
 Index of Names 455

Heyman, G. D., 367, 376, 384 Jacob, E, 6, 30

Hidi, S., 406-7, 412, 419-420, 423-5 Jacob, K., 170, 180
Higgins, E. 'T., 4, 30, 368, 385 Jadrich, J., 354-5, 358
Hill, C. A., 354, 360 James, W., 361, 384
Hill-Barlow, D., 346, 360 Jang, H., 196, 202
Hillier, V. FE, 261, 274 Jayaratne, T. E., 163, 180
Hilton? )152. 4156 Jelsma, B. M., 167, 180
Hinde, R. A., 369, 383 Jennings, K. D., 366-8, 384
Hirschman, R. S., 286, 292 Johnson, E. K., 354-5, 359
Hixon, E. J., 97, 99 Joknson,- Py 2082107215, 228;
Hobdon} K.; 1502 157 230
Hodgins, H. S., 44, 61, 96-97, 99, Jordan,J. V., 325, 440
106, 120, 141, 156
Hoffmann, L., 406-7, 416-7, 423 K
Hokanson,J. E., 348, 357
Kabat-Zinn, J., 88, 89
Holmes,J. G., 89-90, 99-100
Kagan,J., 366-7, 384
Holt. Ko 12-13, 31s 1207 14 12,
Kahle, J512,.29
156, 184, 201, 260, 274
Kahneman, D., 22, 30
Holt Re Re J eco
Holzbach, R., 417, 425 Kalan, K., 248, 252
Honig H sie 192,201 Kaltman, S8., 311, 331
Hopmeyer, A., 395, 402 Kamitisg vl. Was Woo
Horns). Ge8 a, 292 Kanani, R., 233, 252
Horney, K., 340-1, 358 Kanner, A. D., 348, 358
Hosmer, D., 248, 252 Kaplan, A? G.2439,440
Houlfort, N., 109, 120 Kaplan, S. H., 238, 246, 252
Houser-Marko, L., 68, 85 Karuza,J., 318, 331
Hrnei, E., 370, 382 Kasperson,J. X., 218, 230-1
Huddleston, S., 277, 285, 292 Kasperson, R. E., 218, 230-1
Hudley, C., 314, 333 Kasser, 1,8, 23-25530)33,,06. 70-143
Hughes, E. C., 238, 251 76-81, 84-85, 90-91, 99-100, 128-
Humphrey, N., 395, 403 140, 259-260, 274-5, 317, 334, 390,
Hunsley,J., 67, 85, 209, 214, 218-220, 404
222-3, 231 Kasse, V,G:) 23,247, 252
Hunt,J.McV.,, 405, 423 Kasten, H., 407, 413-4, 426
Hutton, D. G., 340, 357 Katkovsky, W., 370, 384
ieiizg Wh, IML, Boll, BO7/
I Katz, P. A., 184, 200, 201
Kaizever) Die Oe Ad. 23,0a32
Iacono, W. G., 79, 84
Kauffman, M., 168, 179, 186-7, 192,
Mardi, B-Gie2 5, o0S 104, W19/259, 274
Ingermane, C., 340, 357 200, 313; 332
Kazen, M., 76, 80-81, 84
Inglehart, R., 133-4, 138
Iyengar, S. S., 142, 156 Kermoian, R., 305-6, 331
Izard, C. E., 405, 423 Kernis, M. H.,.343, 345-355, 357,
360

J Hsia tealle Mpa Wl 14S)

Keyser, D. J-, 260, 274
Jackson,J.M., 209, 229 Khanna, S., 134, 139
456 INDEX OF NAMES

Kidder, Ly, 318; 331 Lachance;'L., 46, 53,59

Isuant, VO, Wafer, WS%2) LaFreniere, P. J., 395, 403
King, K., 18, 32, 66, 84-85, 113, 121, La Guardia, J., 437, 440
258, 268-9, 275, 280, 293, 350, 360 Lamb, M. E., 303, 334
King, L. A., 66, 84 Langeheine, R., 417, 423
Kingsley,J.,285, 292 Langer, E. J., 88, 89, 248, 252
Kiresuk, T., 73, 84 Lankes, E. M., 420, 425
Kitayama, S., 435, 440 Larose, 5., 111, 120
Kiem Ra Peron 337 Lashuk, M., 285, 294
Kliewer, W., 313, 334 Latham, G., 373, 384
Klinger, E., 65, 84 Lathaw, D.,. 12, 83°1495.1575 197;
Klint, K., 285, 292 199, 203
Knee, C. R., 44, 61, 95-96, 99 Lavallee, L. F., 351; 357
Knight, C., 109, 120 Lazarus Ro 533104513, 329) 334,
Kochanska, G., 166, 180, 309, 317-8, 348, 358
326, 334 Leary, M. R., 7, 28, 49, 59, 259, 273,
Koestner, R., 11-13, 15, 18, 21, 29- 3017310, 3305 378; 382
32, 46, 59, 61-62, 67, 84, 94, 96, Leckliter, I. N., 210, 232
99, 106, 109-112, 115, 118, 120-1, Leckrone, T. G., 416, 425
141-2, 155-6, 168, 173, 179-180, Lee, C. TL; 165180
184, 186-7, 192, 197, 200, 201-2, Leer 136,139
260, 274, 279, 293, 301, 304-5, Leeming, F C., 209, 229
313, 332, 334, 366, 376-7, 380, Legault, L., 211, 222-3, 225-6, 230-1
384-5, 431, 440 Leggett, E. L., 303, 333
Kogan, N., 393, 403 Lehman, D. R., 351, 357, 435, 440
Kohn, A., 256, 274 Lehrke, M., 417, 424
Kohn, M. L., 176, 180 Lehto, A., 116, 120
Kolata, G., 285, 292 Leon, G., 234, 253
Koller, O., 420-1 Leone, D. R., 20, 23, 26, 29-30, 46,
Koop, Gi. E.-233, 252 60, 115, 119, 189, 196, 200, 224,
Kornazheva, B. P., 26, 29, 435, 440 229, 239, 251, 259, 261, 274, 304,
Kouides, R., 244, 253 332, 435, 440
Kramer, K., 417, 419-420, 425 Lepes, D., 282, 283, 286, 289, 293
Krapp, A., 405-7, 410, 412-4, 416- Lepore, S. J., 298, 334
420, 423-7 Lepper, M. R., 10-12, 28, 31, 52-53,
Kristeller,J., 248, 252 61, 117, 119-120, 141-2, 155-6,
Kruglanski, A. W., 10, 31, 431, 440 191, 197, 199-201, 431, 440
Krupat, E., 287, 290 Leuenberger, A., 344, 358
Kuhl, J., 4, 31, 75-76, 80-81, 84-85, Leventhal, H., 286, 292
302, 323-4, 327, 333-4, 400, 404, Levey, A., 285, 293
436, 441 Levine, M. P, 81, 83
Kuiken, D., 141, 157 Levy R. A., 234, 251
Kuiper, N. A., 348-9, 359 Lewalter, D., 417, 419-420, 424, 427
Kunda, Z., 89, 99, 354, 359 Lewin, K., 410, 424
Kurowski, C. O., 177, 179 Lewis, M., 367, 374, 384
Lewis, M. D., 391, 384
L Lichtenstein, S., 217, 231
Labaree, D: FE, 175, 180 Liebert, R., 372, 384
 Index of Names 457

Liebeskind, E., 44, 61, 97, 99 Manning, T., 282, 284, 288, 291
Lanep aes Manoogian, 8. 'T., 14, 28
Linzer, M., 238, 252 Marcia,J. E., 79, 84, 107, 120
Little, B. R., 65, 68, 70, 84 Markakis, K. M., 184, 203, 250, 254
Tnttles. D227 29129" 131936; Markus, H. R., 4, 31, 354, 359, 435,
139, 389-390, 394, 396-400, 402-3, 440
435, 440 Marler, P. L., 267, 274
Locke, E., 373, 384 373, 384 Marlowe, D., 46, 60, 341, 357
Loevinger,J., 4,:18,. 31 Marsh, H. W,, 44, 62, 395, 403
Longfellow, C., 165, 180 Marshall, D. E., 346, 360
Lopez, D.F9397,384 Marshall, G., 233, 253
Lorenz; WO. 2163579 Martin,J.J., 285, 292
Losier, G. F, 18, 30, 46, 54, 61, 67, Marvel, K. M., 238, 252
84, 109-112, 118, 120-1, 282, 292, Mascalo, M. FE, 367, 384
294 Maslin-Cole, C., 363, 370, 384-5
LovegsO; 2105252 Maslow, A. H., 3, 31, 87, 99, 124-5,
Lovejoy, O., 174-5, 180 27,1335 139) 260R2 74
LoVerde, M. E., 233, 253 Mathes, S., 285, 293
Lowelly Hee 507, 37 las Omsop Mayer, V. J., 208, 229
Lucas, R. E., 434, 440 Mayman, M., 79, 85
Lusk, C. M., 192, 200 McAdams, D., 67, 83
Lydon, J., 68, 84 McCall, R. B., 369, 383
Lykken, D. TL, 70, 79,84 McCarthy, M. E., 370, 387
Eynch, J)Ei. B919.232-33. 256, 203 McClelland, D. C., 106, 120, 260,
Lytton, H., 167, 178 274, 277,293, 301, 334, 366-7,
370-2, 376-7, 380-1, 384-5
M McClelland, G. H., 192, 200
Maccoby, E. E., 317, 335 McClintic, S., 367-8, 374, 386
MacDonald, K. B., 174-5, 180 McCrae, R. R., 88, 99
Macharia, W. M., 233, 253 McCullers,J.C., 184, 201
Machin, V., 285, 293 McDougall, W., 400, 403
Macilver, D.,368, 376; 386, 397,404 McGinnis, M. J., 233, 252
Maelurk, R213 70,081), 387 McGraw, K. M., 340, 357
Maddi, S. R., 364, 384 McGraw, K. O., 145, 156, 184, 201
Maehr, M.., 373, 384 McGregor, H. A., 368, 373, 378, 383
Magnusson, D., 391, 403 McGuire, R. T., 277, 293
Mahler, M., 162, 180 McKenzie, L., 163, 180
Maier, S. E, 298, 301,310, 335 McKenzie-Mohr, D., 205-6, 230
Main, D. S., 184, 200, 201 McKibbon, K. A., 233, 252
Maitreya, B. A., 88, 99 McLaren
J., 412, 423
Malearne, 'V., 298, 31, 3133352 McLoyd, V. C., 163, 180
Mallet, M., 110-2, 120 McMenamy,J. M., 177, 180
Malphurs, A., 267-8, 274 McMurray,J. E., 238, 252
Manderlink, G53, 61,141, 155, McQuiston, S., 370.387
247, 252 Meek, G. A., 18, 29
Mangelsdorf, S., 314, 334 Meer,|-7 285,292
Manis, M., 79, 85 Meindl,J., 143, 156
458 INDEX OF NAMES

Meissner, W. W., 3, 31 Neighbors, C., 96, 99

Mellor-Crummey, C, A., 319, 337 Nenniger, P., 417, 424
Menancer, K. B., 234, 251 Neuberg, S. L., 149, 152, 155
Ménard, S., 19, 30, 214-6, 230 Newby, T. J., 192, 201
Messer, D., 364, 385 Newcomb, A. F.,, 395, 403
Metcalfe,J., 309, 334 Newman,J. P., 378, 381
Midgley, C., 183, 201 Newman, L. S., 90, 99
Milbrath, L. W., 208, 230 Newton, M. L., 277-8, 283, 291, 293
Miller, A., 162, 181, 439-440 Newton- Taylor, B., 150, 157
Miller, A. T., 368, 376, 385 Nezlek,J., 161, 179, 184, 200
Miller, D. T., 149, 156 Nicholls,J.G., 278, 293, 368, 373,
Miller, G. T., 205-6, 230 376, 381, 385, 397, 399, 403
Miller, J. Bi 430,440 Nisbett, R. E., 10-11, 31, 141, 156,
Miller, JoG., 26731 197, 201, 431, 440
Miller, L. C., 78, 84 Nix, G., 145-6, 148-9, 157, 189, 197,
Miller, P. H., 389, 403 202
Miller, S. M., 310, 334 Noels, K., 46, 53-54, 61, 211-2, 214,
Miller, W. R., 247, 248, 251, 252 231
Mims, V.,, 13, 32, 142, 156, 197, 202 Nolen-Hoeksma, S., 317, 335
Minsel, B., 420, 425 Novaco, R. W., 352, 359
Minuchin, S., 162, 181 Nowak, A., 78, 86
Mische, A., 389, 402 Nowicki, S., 303, 331
Mischel, W,, 4, 31, 309, 334 N unberg, H., 3, 31
Miserandino, M., 18, 31, 184, 201
NJurius, P. S., 4, 31
Mitchell, M., 419, 424
N Yuttin,J., 372, 385, 418, 424
Mitchell, W. D., 233, 253
Mohr, 'L., 346, 360
Monroe, 8. M., 348, 359
O
Montemayor, R., 166, 181 O’Connor, B. P., 46, 53, 63
Morgan, C., 117, 121 Ockene,J. K., 248, 252
Morgan, G., 363, 366, 381, 385 Oishi, S., 434, 440
Morling, B., 342, 344, 358 Okuda, S. M., 209, 230
Morrison, C. S., 282, 284, 288, 291 Olinger, L. J., 349, 359
Mossholder, K. W., 12, 31 Olson,J.M., 124, 140
Mueller, C. M., 313, 334 O’Malley, S., 242, 253, 280, 293
Mullen, B., 368, 386 Omura, M., 189, 196
Mumme, D. L., 305-6, 331 Oskamp, S., 205-6, 208-9, 230
Muraven, M., 70, 83 Osowiecki, D., 306, 328, 332
Murray, H. A., 66, 84, 127, 139, 260, Ostman, R. E., 219, 230
275, 380-1, 385 O'Toole,J., 263-4, 266, 275
Murray, K., 285, 293 Otto, A. L., 97, 99
Murray, 8. L., 90, 99 Overton, W. EF, 390, 403
Mussino, A., 285, 290
P
N Papousek, H., 301, 335, 366, 385
Nachmias, M., 314, 334 Papousek, M., 301, 335
Napa, C., 66, 84 Paquet, S., 109, 120
 Index of Names 459

Paradise, A. W., 345-6, 350-3, 355,

399
Q
Quinton, D., 165, 181
Parken) J).0.22195230
Quirk, M., 248, 252
Parpal, M., 317, 335
Parritz, R. H., 314, 334
Pasupathi, M., 400, 402
R
Patrick, B. C., 20, 29, 46, 60, 104, Rabinowitz, V. C., 318, 331
115, 119-120, 184, 189, 195-6, 200, Ramey, CG: 1, 30159337
20 Te2 224, 229) 239.2515 304; 332 Rapson, R. L., 151, 156
Pattee, L., 395, 403 RatellesG, F250) 57; 627109, 121
Patterson.Gey3) 7,519, 3355 Rathunde, K., 415, 425
Patterson, G. R., 167, 181 Ratick, S., 218, 230
Paulhus, D. L., 342, 359 Rawsthorne, L. J., 13, 31
Pavot, W., 75, 83 Recchia, S., 367-8, 374, 386
Pearson! 234-252 Reese, H. W,, 390, 403
Pekow, P. S., 248, 252 Reeve;Js,3532449" 62,7115, 121.
Pelletier, L. G., 19, 30, 42, 44-46, 49, 184-5, 187-9, 196-7, 201-3, 238,
53-54, 59-61, 63, 67, 84-85, 117, 250.1252) 25443034555
iOS 2 9156, 185,200; 209), 21T- Regan, C9319) 336
2, 214-5, 218-220, 222-6, 230-2, Reid G,127 33449: 632,78
280-1, 289, 293-4, 315, 337 Reis, H. T., 23, 32-33, 72, 84-85, 259-
Perreault, S., 109, 120 2601275,3298,.335; 3.7 9,1385-6;
Pervin, Le A373, 385 437, 440-1
Peters.L. 1,,.2345 252 Reisetter, M. F., 199, 202
Peterson, BA: 176,079 Renn, O., 217, 230-1
Peterson, 2.2984 301, 310,355 Renier, G:, 318, 329,331
Pettit, Go S:, 1635 179 Renninger, K. A., 406-7, 413, 415-7,
Piaget, Jos, 18531 419-420, 423-5
Pierce, G. R., 298, 335-6 Reznick,J. S., 14, 28, 377, 384
Pintrich, P. R., 418, 424 Rheinberg, FE, 416, 420, 426
Pipp, S., 370, 385 Richer, S., 49, 62
Pittnaan, 1S5,.12533, 104, 199,.202-3 RichinsyMy Li 130,139
Piuck, C., 165, 181 Ricklefs, R. E., 394, 403
Plant, R: W., 12-13, 31, 168, 174, Riddle, A. S., 46, 53, 59
be le242, 253, 280; 287, 293 Rigbye5.918492.00,05; 1155121,
Plomin, R., 369, 382-3 195-6, 202, 258, 268-9, 280, 293,
Pomeranz, E. M., 376, 385 350
Poppe, L., 298, 336 Rigotti, N. A., 234, 253
Porac,|.E12) 29r03,-141, 143, 156- Rindfleisch, A., 133, 139
7,197, 199, 203 Rivkin, I., 179, 180
Porter, B: E209; 229 Roberts, A. B., 150, 157
Prenzel, M., 405-7, 411-4, 417, 419- Roberts, G. C., 277, 293
420, 424-6 Roberts,J. E., 348, 359
Preston, A., 370, 384 Rochberg-Halton, E., 410-411, 422
Proliaskas Ro. 286),.292 Rodin, GiGes18- 33767, 865161,
Provencher, FJ. 50,92, 97;09; 62; 1815243254, 275, 350
262, 291 Rodin, J., 248, 252
460 INDEX OF NAMES

Rodriguez, D., 367, 387 S

Rogers, Ci ,'3:32,.88,,99,.1 2465, Saarni, C., 370, 386
128, 133, 139, 339, 359, 376, 385 Sabourin, S., 18, 28, 45, 53, 59, 67,
Rokeach, M., 123-4, 127-8, 139 83, 213, 229, 280-1, 290
Romney, D., 167, 178 Sachau, D. A., 143, 156
Ronsvalle,J. L., 255, 268, 275 Sackett, DL. '2335, 230
Ronsvalle, S., 255, 268, 275 Sagiv, L., 132, 140
Roscoe,J., 23, 32; 72, 84, 379, 385, Saizow, R., 250, 254
437, 440 Sales, S. M., 176, 181
Rosen, B. C., 371, 385 Salomone, K. L., 219, 229
Rosenberg, M., 339, 343, 354, 359 Sameroff, A. J., 25, 30, 133, 139
Rosenthal, R., 152, 156 Sandvik, E., 75, 83
Ross, 1) 151, VOR Sanftner,J., 346, 360
Ross, L., 250, 254 Sansone, C., 49-50, 53, 61-62, 117,
Ross, 8. A., 151, 155 121, 141, 143, 155-6, 247, 252
Rossman abe bls oo) Sapp, M., 285, 293
Rosiy 4177423 Sarason, B. R., 298, 335-6
Roth, 'S., 329; 3595 Sarason, I. G., 298, 335-6
Rothbart, M. K., 369, 377, 383, 385 Sargent, G., 285, 293
Rothbaum, FE, 328, 335
Saunders, E., 165, 180
Rothermund, K., 318, 327, 331
Schaefer, C., 348, 358
Rotter|. 17, 52 Schaefer, E. S., 177, 181
Rousseau, F. L., 57, 62
Sebafer, Ro 15, 33, 236, 253
Rowe, B. H., 233, 253
Scheier, M. EF, 44, 59, 124, 138, 321, 331
Rubin, D. B., 152, 156
Schiefele, H., 407, 413-4, 425-6
Rubio, N., 282, 283, 286, 289, 293
Schiefele, U., 406, 410, 413-6, 419-
Ruble, D. N., 368, 376, 385
420, 426
Rudd, P,, 233
Schmuck, P., 129-130, 132, 136, 139
Rutter, M., 165, 181, 311, 335
Schneewind, K. A., 303, 336
Ryan, R. M., 5, 7-15, 17-33, 37, 42-
Schneider, D. J., 341, 360
44, 46-50, 53, 60, 62-63, 66-68, 72,
Schoenheinz, R. J., 417, 425
75-76, 81-87, 90-91, 93-94, 98-104,
Schopflocher, D., 141, 157
106, 113-5, 118-121, 125-139, 141-
Schraw, G., 199, 202
2, 147, 151, 154-6, 161, 168, 173-4,
Schreiber, S., 417, 427
177, 179-181, 184-7, 192-3, 195-7,
Schreyer, I., 417, 419-420, 424, 426-7
200-202, 206, 211-3, 224-5, 229-
Schultheiss, O. C., 81, 83
231, 235-9, 241-3, 245, 247-8, 250-
4, 256-262, 264, 268-9, 273-5, 279- Schulz, R., 301, 511, $t8,, 328, 333
284, 286-9, 291-3, 298-9, 301-5, Schunk, D. H., 414, 418, 424, 426
schut, He. S12, 336
309, 312-5, 317-320, 326-7, 329,
331-5, 339, 344-5, 348-351, 354-5, Schwartz, A. J., 184, 200, 248, 251,
307, d09250l, 3/0; 373,007 0-OF 07O- 260, 274
9, 382, 385-6, 389-393, 399-404, Schwartz, B., 66, 85
408, 418, 426, 431-441 Schwartz, M. D., 238, 252
Ryan-Wenger, N. M., 313, 335 Schwartz, S. H., 124, 127, 130-2, 137,
Ryit, C. D..22, 33;'66, 757 Go, 65a, 139-140
360 Schwartz, W., 44, 61, 97, 99
 Index of Names 461

Schwarz, N., 22, 30 Slovie, Bs.217, 223, 230-1

Schweiberer, L., 417, 425 Slowiaczek, M. L., 178, 180, 393, 402
Sedikides, C., 374, 386 Smiley, P. A., 393, 404
Seelbach, A., 184, 193, 197, 200 Smith, A., 73, 84
Séguin, C., 67, 85, 208, 214, 218-220 Smith, C., 72, 86
peiberta i. 265, 292 Smith, K., 77-78, 85
Seidman, F., 111) 121 Smith, M. B., 376, 386
Seligman, C., 124, 140, 208, 231 Smith, R., 12, 33, 141, 157, 197, 199,
Seligman, M, EP, 17,33, 43, 59, 203
298, 301, 310, 335-6 Smith, S. 8., 378, 381
penccaly @, 42) 46, 63,212,232 315, Smuths W. EB. 912.33
337 Snidman, N., 377, 384
Shackelford, T. K., 400, 402 snow,J.GC. 233253
Shaffer, D. R., 370-1, 386 Snyder, M., 66, 86, 152, 157
Shapira, Z., 184, 202 snyder, £5 31453207336
Share, T., 77-78, 85 Snyder, 8. S., 328, 335
Sharma, Y. S., 134, 139 s@clteml, ID) IL, PIS), QS
Sharp, A., 89, 100 polky,J,Ag 503-47 3195335
Shavelson, R. J., 44, 62 Sorrentino, R. M., 89, 100
Shearin, E. N., 298, 336 Spangler, W. D., 361, 386
Shedler,J., 79, 85 Spence,J.T., 371, 386
Sheinman, L., 161, 179, 184, 200, Spiegel, N. H., 168, 179; 186-7, 192,
248, 251, 260, 274 ZOOL 513; 332
Sheldon, K. M., 8, 25, 27, 32-33, 65- Spieker, 8. J., 370, 384
66, 68, 70-80, 84-85, 91, 100, 115, Spielgler, M., 372, 384
(21, 129. 131,, 135-7, 189-141 3156, Sroufe, A. L., 391, 393, 404
213,229, 231, 259-200, 275,°282-3, Stafford, R. S., 234, 253
286, 289, 293, 378-9, 383, 385-6, Stahl, B., 210, 232
390, 404, 435, 439, 440-1 Stangor, C., 208, 229
Sherif, M., 167, 181 Steinberg, L., 393, 402
Sherman, D. A., 344, 358 Stenner Ky, 176,179
Sherrod, D. R., 298, 331 Stephenson, B. J., 233, 253
Sherwood, D. L., 209, 230 Stern, PvG@,62705-6, 208, 210 21;7,
Sherwood, H., 307, 319, 336 229° 232
Shields, A., 184, 193, 197, 200 Stewart, DG. Tl7, 119
Shoda, Y., 4, 31 ptillerJ, 19,33
Shulman, S., 314, 336 Stinple, S., 395, 402
Sievers, K., 417, 423 Stipek, D., 367-8, 374, 376, 386, 397,
Simons) R..15_163;-179 404
Singer, B.,-22, 33, 66, 75, 85 Stiver, I. P., 435, 440
Singer, L). (ie 254,253 Stoner, P, 354-5, 358
Sirgy, M. J., 136, 140 Strauss; A. Ly 238; 251
Skinner, B. E, 4, 17, 33 Strauss, J., 94, 100
Skinner, E. A., 104, 120, 184, 192, mtrayer BPE). 394, 404
194, 201, 203, 298-9, 301-3, 305, Strayer,J., 394, 404
307, 309-310, 312-5, 319-321, 328, Stroebe, M., 310, 336
336-7 Stroebe, W., 310, 336
462 INDEX OF NAMES

Strube, M. J., 374, 386 U

Suh E., 434, 440
Usunov,
J., 26, 29, 435, 440
Suls,J., 368, 386
Summers,J., 285, 293
Sun, GC. R., 347, 354-5, 358
Vv
Suomi, S. J., 303, 337 Vallacher, R. R., 78, 86
Surrey,J. L., 435, 440 Vallerand, R. J., 12, 18, 28, 31, 33,
Sutton, S. K., 369, 386 37, 40-50, 52-55, 57-63, 67, 83-84,
Swann, W., B., 12, 33, 199, 203, 354, 109-110, 113, 118, 120-1, 152, 156,
360 184-5, 200, 203, 212-4, 229-232,
Swanson, D. C., 209, 230 279-282, 289-294, 315, 337
Sweetland, R. C., 260, 274 Valliéres, E. FE. 42, 46, 63, 212, 232,
a Oa
T Valsiner,J.,408, 411, 418, 427
Vancouver, J., 373, 381
Taerum, T., 285, 294
van den Boom, D. C., 370, 386
Tanaka, K., 26, 33, 435, 441
van der Meulen, M., 367, 386
Vang, I> L., 143; 157
Veroff,J.,373, 381
Tangney,J. P., 346, 360
Vickers,J., 285, 294
Taylor, S. E., 66, 82
Vietor, N., 96, 99
Teasdale, J. 1D), 43, 59
Vietze, P. M., 370, 387
Tellegen, A., 70, 84
Vondra,J. 1., 369-371, 387
Tellini, S., 94, 100
Vrba, E. S., 400, 402
‘Dneriunetny, Walk, SNS), 3637)
This Ee Ee. 58, 60
Thomas, A., 165, 181, 369, 383
W
Thomas, M., 409, 426 Wade, K., 151, 155
Thompson, L. L., 340, 357 Wagner, E. H., 53, 60, 247, 251
Thompson, R., 374, 386 Wagner, P. E., 346, 360
Thorndike, A. N., 234, 253 Wakefield,J.C., 400, 402
Thorndike, E. L., 405, 426 Wallace, D. B., 68, 79, 83
Thhrashs 1, 669,573) 377, oooso00 Walling, M. D., 277, 283, 291
Tice, D..M.; 70, 83, 340,357; 360 Waltz,J.A.,298, 336
Timoshina, E., 27, 32, 129, 131, 136, Wang, T. H., 210, 232
139, 435, 440 Ware,J. E., 238, 246, 252
Tits. 255, 204 Warren, R., 255, 269-272, 275
Todt, E., 415, 417, 426-7 Waschull, S. B., 346, 348-352, 355,
Tomaka, J., 340, 357 358-360
Tonigan,J. S., 247-8, 251-2 Watson, B., 210, 229
‘Tooby, J., 434, 441 Watson,J. S., 301, 337, 366, 387
Trapnell, P. D., 351, 357 Weiher, A. W., 192, 200
Treasure, D. C., 277,293 Weinberger,J., 366, 376, 385
Trivers, R. L., 174, 181, 395, 404 Weiner, B., 298, 301, 337
‘Turkat, D., 341, 360 Weinstein, E. A., 400, 404
‘Turnbull, W., 149, 156 Weir, C., 117, 121, 143, 156
Tuson, K. M., 46, 53-54, 61, 67, 84, Weisner, C., 150, 157
211-2, 214, 222-3, 230-1, 280-1, Weiss, L. A., 163, 178, 180-1
289, 293 Weiss, M., 277, 285, 292
 Index of Names 463

Weisve[s Re 509.631 193287330, 335, Winett) RA; 210,230; 232

337, 390, 404 Winteler, A., 419, 426
Welch, A., 306, 328, 332 Winter D: G.176, 179, 372, 385
Wellborn,J. G., 48, 60, 194, 200, 203, Winterbottom, M. R., 371, 387
2997502535009, 90 ol3, 319-320, Witmer|el; 210; 232
G22, 300-7 Wittig, B., 393, 401
Wentura, D318, 327, 331 Wolfe, C. T., 345-6, 355, 357
Werner, H., 3, 33 , 395, 404 Wong, E. H., 277, 294
Wheatman, S., 350-2, 359 Wong, M. M., 115, 121
Whisenhunt, C. R., 348-9, 352, 354- Woodward, K. L., 268, 275
5, 358-9 Worsham, N., 298, 311, 313, 332
Whitaker, D., 350-2, 359 Wortman, C. B., 309, 333
White, RR 127 140 Wrightman, J., 163, 180
White, R. W, 3, 7, 33, 48, 63, 141,
N57 259 7275,-301.3375361-6, Y
380, 387, 391, 400, 404 Yamauchi, H., 26, 33, 435, 441
White, 8. A., 278, 294 Yarrow, L. J., 370, 387
Whitehead,J. R., 49, 63, 285, 294 YeungeAwo., 0997403
Wiener, M. W,, 184, 203, 250, 254 Young, O., 206, 232
Wiefield, A., 367, 387
Wild, K. P., 406, 417, 419-420, 424, Z
426-7 Zachary, Vi, 253, 293
Wild, T: C., 141, 144-6, 148-150, 157 Zanna, M. P,, 68, 84, 124
Wilensky, R., 70, 86 Lax, M.,. 25-90, 133, 139-140
Williams, E., 314, 333 Zeedyk, M. S., 302, 337
Williams, to. 13,20) 25, 33, 00, Leer, G07 31h,.4315440
56, 63, 67, 86, 114, 121, 133, 140, Zelkowitz, P., 165, 180
161, 181, 184, 197, 200, 203, 238, Zimmer-Gembeck, M. J., 194, 203,
242-5, 248, 250-1, 253-4, 261, 275 303, 320, 336
Willams, L., 278,285, 292, 294 Zuckerman, M., 12, 21, 30, 33, 44,
Wilson, L., 163, 180 61, 94-95, 99-100, 118, 120, 141,
Winch, G., 169, 181 157, 17371802197, 1997203
Windle, M., 298, 337
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SUBJECT INDEX

A and pro-environmental behavior, 220-7

and regulatory styles, 196
action-control theory, 396-399
and self-system processes, 303-4
action tendencies, 307-8, 323
and structure, 114-5, 193-4
adherence
in coping, 319, 324-6
to exercise, 286-8
in educational settings, 183
to medications, 243-4
in health care, 238-240
adult development, 98
in managers, 260
agency
in parenting, 161-5
see human agency
is not permissiveness, 304
agentic self
autonomy supportive teaching, 185-190
see self, agentic
effects on students, 186-8
alcohol treatment, 242, 247
learning how, 188-190
amotivation, 15-17, 40-43
taking the students’ perspective, 189-190
in organizations, 258
what undermines it, 190-3
measurement of, 45-47
active organism, 3-4
aspirations, 24-26, 123-138
and autonomous regulation, 90
and basic needs, 24-26
B
and well-being, 134-7 basic needs theory, 22-27
intrinsic and extrinsic, 128-132 and well-being, 22-23
authenticity, 89-91 basic psychological needs, 6-8, 87,
see also self 235, 300-302
autonomous motivation, 235-6 and agency, 391-2, 397-8
and values, 128 and aspirations, 24-26
in educational settings, 183 and ego-involvement, 93
autonomous orientation, 21, 94 and environmental behaviors, 224
and responsibility, 97 and interest, 418-9
autonomous regulation, 89 and organizational behavior, 259
and defensiveness, 89-90, 95 and sports, 279
autonomy, 5 and values, 126-7, 132-4
see also need for autonomy satisfaction of, 26-27
and coping, 298-9, 309-327 universality of, 434-6
and integration, 436-7 when thwarted, 132-4
is not independence, 236 behavioral confirmation, 152
and openness, 96
and relationships, 326-7 C
and religious behavior, 269-270 causality orientations theory, 20-22
and work behaviors, 262-264 coercion
autonomy support see also stress, coercion as
among the elderly, 247-8 versus loss of control, 312-3
466 SUBJECT INDEX

cognitive evaluation theory, 10-14 development

compartmentalized identifications, 437 see also parenting
competence and action control theory, 396-7
see also need for competence and coping, 297-330
and coping, 300-301 and interest, 409-10, 416-9
and perceived control, 301 and need for competence, 365-8
and religious behavior, 270-1 and resource control theory, 395-6
and work behaviors, 263-5 and self-determination theory, 392-3
competence motivation disaffection, 299-300
aversive, 377-8
contagion E
see social contagion education
controlled functioning, 91-92 see also self-regulation and education
and defensiveness, 92 and theory of interest, 405-421
controlled motivation, 235-6 self-determination theory and, 183-199
and values, 128 transitions in, 111-3
controlled orientation, 21, 94 effectance motivation, 362-4
and defensiveness, 97 ego-involvement, 13, 89-90, 106
and road rage, 96 and parenting, 168-177
coping, 297-330 and unstable self-esteem, 349-352
accommodation, 318 emotional integration, 328
action tendencies and, see engagement, 299-300
action tendencies and coping, 300
and autonomy, 309-327 in learning, 194-5
and perceived control, 297-8 environmental behaviors, 205-228
and self-system processes, 313-5 and perceived health risks, 217-220
and social support, 297-8 educating about, 207-9
approach versus avoidance, 329 effects of incentives on, 209-211]
as action regulation, 305-7 measuring motivation for, 211-3
development of, 309 perceived difficulty of, 214-7
information seeking as coping, 307 self-determination and, 211, 213-220
motivational model of, 305-9 evolution
negotiation, 318 and basic psychological needs, 400,
oppositional, 317 436
perseveration, 317 and parenting, 174-7
threat versus challenge, 307, 316 exercise
cross-cultural research, 26-27 motivation for, 277-90
and basic psychological needs, 435-6 external regulation, 17, 42, 195, 314
on values, 136 extrinsic motivation
and education, 195-6
D and values, 127-131
autonomous regulation of, 19-20
defensiveness differentiation of, 431
see autonomous regulation in organizations, 257-8
depressive symptoms internalization of, 15-20
see self-esteem and depressive measurement of, 45-47
symptoms perceiving in others, 148-50
 Subject Index 467

extrinsic rewards, 10-11 and psychological needs, 391-2

controlling aspect of, 12 and resource control, 394-6
informational aspect of, 12 and self-determination theory, 391-3

F I
feedback identification, 102
positive, see positive feedback and adaptive outcomes, 114
negative, see negative feedback and approach motivation, 106
flow, 279 and intrinsic motivation, 103-106,
fragile self-esteem 115-7
see also self-esteem, fragile and values, 126
and defensiveness, 341 identified regulation, 17-18, 43, 196
and unstable self-esteem, 353 and sport motivation, 280
functional significance, 12, 142-3 and voting behavior, 110
future directions for research, 434-9 idiographic goals, 65-66
impersonal orientation, 21, 94
G and defensiveness, 97
gender differences informational aspect of rewards
see participation motivation see extrinsic rewards, informational
general causality orientations, 21-22, aspect of
O41 10.518 interest
and health behaviors, 239 and basic needs, 418-9
and parenting, 176-7 and intrinsic motivation, 415-6
and work behavior, 261-2 and learning, 419-420
glucose control, 244 as a motivational concept, 405-7
goals as an individual difference, 407
see also aspirations cognitive aspects, 413-4
and motives, 372-3 emotional characteristics, 414-5
and needs, 372-3 objects of, 411-2
and sport motivation, 278 person-object approach, 407-416
growth tendency, 3-4 situational, 407
theory of, 405-421
H value related, characteristics, 415
health-risk behaviors, 233, 234 integrative tendency, 3-6
health care and the self, 87-98
motivation and, 233-51 integrated regulation, 18, 43, 314
self-determination and, 235-48 and health behaviors, 237
self-determination model of, 239-240 and sport motivation, 280
health-care climate, 241 promoting, 19-20
health-care providers internalization, 15-20
autonomy support of, 248-50 and education, 195-6
hierarchical model of intrinsic and and health motivation, 236-8
extrinsic motivation, 37-58 and interest, 410
homonomy, 5 and intrinsic motivation, 101-119
human agency, 389-91 parents’ effect on, 170-1
and action-control theory, 396-7 promoting, 19-20, 114-5, 239
468 SUBJECT INDEX

interpersonal contexts medication adherence, 243-4

see social contexts metatheory
intrinsic motivation the organismic dialectic, 5-9, 433
and education, 195 modeling, 151
and extrinsic motivation, 37-58 motivation
and identification, | 15-7 for sport and exercise, 277-290
and internalization, 101-119 for the environment, 205-228
and need for autonomy, 106 in organizations, 255-279
and need for competence, 106, 375
and need for relatedness, 13-14, 106 N
and stable self-esteem, 349-350 needs
and values, 127-131 see also basic psychological needs
consequences of, 53 and motives, 8
experiments on, 10-14, 431 need for achievement, 380-1
hierarchical model of, 37-58 need for autonomy, 8, 301
in organizations, 256-7 need for competence, 7, 361-381
in sports, 279-281 and achievement motivation, 380-1
measurement of, 45-47 and competence goals, 373
perceiving in others, 148-150 and effectance motivation, 362-4, 379
social contagion and, 144-6 and intrinsic motivation, 375
undermining of, 10-12 differentiation of, 365-8
introjected regulation, 17, 42-43, 195- individual differences and, 369-372
6, 314 need for relatedness, 7
and sport motivation, 280 and intrinsic motivation, see intrinsic
and susceptibility to persuasion, 109 motivation and need for relatedness
introjection, 19, 102 need satisfaction
see also introjected regulation see also basic psychological needs,
and health motivation, 237 satisfaction of
and identification, 102 across cultures, 26-27
and intrinsic motivation, 103-6 and religious behaviors, 268-272
negative consequences of, 113 and values, 126-7, 132-4
conceptualizing and measuring, 72-
L 73
leadership, 255-6 in organizations, 255-273
level of generality of motivation, 39-40, need substitutes, 25
44-45 negative feedback, 12
life goals not-for-profit organizations
see aspirations motivation in, 267-272
limit setting, 13
locus of causality O
see perceived locus of causality openness to experience, 88-91
and the self, 88-89
M versus defensiveness, 96
measuring motivation for physical optimal challenge, 279
activity, 282 organismic dialectic, 5-9, 433
medical education, 235, 248-250 organismic integration process, 14-15, 87
 Subject Index 469

organismic integration theory, 14-20 religious behaviors

organizational behavior, 255-273 motivation and, 267-272
resource-control theory, 394-6
Pp rewards
parenting styles, 161-178 see extrinsic rewards
affected by stress, 162-5 road rage
and children’s performance, 172-3 and controlled orientation, 96
and ego involvement, 168-177
children’s effects on, 165-7 S
effects on children’s motivation, 161-2 secure self-esteem
participation motivation see also self-esteem, secure
for sport and exercise, 282-8 and genuineness, 341
gender differences in, 284-5 and stable self-esteem, 352-3
perceived autonomy, 48-50 self, 87-98
see also perceived locus of causality agentic, 389-401
perceived causality and interest, 408-410
see perceived locus of causality and values, 125-6
perceived competence, | 1-12, 48-50 authentic, 94
perceived locus of causality, 10-12 ego invested, 91-93
see also perceived autonomy I versus me, 125-6
and self-concordance, 67-68 self-concordance, 68-69
and sport motivation, 281-2 and goal attainment, 73
perceiving motivation in others, 144- and well-being, 70-71
a2 enhancing, 77-78
and perceivers’ motivation, 147-150 model of, 65-82
physicians’ autonomy support, 238-9 self-determination continuum, 16, 53
political motivation, 107-110 self-determination research
population growth, 205-6 diversity of, 432
positive feedback, 11-13 self-determination theory
pro-environmental behaviors mini-theories of, 9-10
see environmental behaviors self-enhancement motivation, 374
psychological needs, basic self-esteem, 339-357
see basic psychological needs see also fragile self-esteem
psychological well-being see also secure self-esteem
see well-being and depressive symptoms, 348-9
and self-regulatory styles, 350-351
R conscious versus non-conscious, 342-4
recycling contingent, 106, 344-347
motivation for, 214-7 defensive versus genuine, 341
regulatory styles, 18 explicit versus implicit, 344
relatedness fragile, 339-357
see also need for relatedness secure, 339-357
and coping, 300-301 stability, 347-355
and religious behavior, 271-2 true, 345
and work behaviors, 266-7 self-handicapping, 95
Relative Autonomy Index, 47, 117, 320 self-infiltration, 80-81
470 SUBJECT INDEX

self-regulation coping with, 297

and education, 110-3 stressful life events, 312
and medical treatment, 241 and parenting orientation, 162-5
and politics, 107-8 structure
and stability of self-esteem, 350-1 see autonomy support and structure
differentiating types of, 106-113
self-serving bias, 95 U
self-system processes, 302-5 undermining effect
and coping, 313-5 see intrinsic motivation, under-
social contexts and, 303-5 mining of
self-worth universality of needs, 434-6
and ego involvement, 91
conscious versus non-conscious, 342-4 Vv
secure, 87
values, 123-138
smoking cessation, 244-248
see also aspirations
social-cognitive approaches, 4
and basic psychological needs, 126-7
social contagion
and self-determination, 125-138
of motivational orientations, 141-154
and the self, 125-6
social contexts, 13
motivation and, 127-131
see also autonomy support
verbal rewards
and environmental motivation, 220-7
see positive feedback
and self-system processes, 303-5
autonomy supportive, 93, 319
coercive, 310-3
W
effects on teachers, 190-3 weight loss, 242-3
in educational settings, 185-190 well-being
informational aspect of, 304-5 and aspirations, 128-131, 134-7
parenting and, 161-178 and need satisfaction, 13-14
social support and physical activity, 288
see coping and social support and self-concordance, 75-76
see also relatedness and stability of self-esteem, 353-4
sport motivation, 277-290 within-person variation and, 437
stress within-person variation, 437
and autonomy, 321-2 work motivation, 255-267
coercion as, 310-3
“This handbook is an indispensable collection of research on selfdetermination, a f
that includes theory as well as potential applications ranging from parenting and education
to business management and sports, It is the kind of book that psychology, and indeed ail
of us, will greatly benefit from.”
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, C.S. and DJ. Davidson Professor of Psychology,
Claremont Graduate University

“The Handbook ofSelf-Determination Research is an invaluable resource for anyone

interested in human development, autonomy, and growth, Work on self-cdetermination
theory is central to understanding human motivation and optimal functioning, and Deci
and Ryan have put together a book that provides the most thorough and wide-ranging
coverage of this work available.” y
Jeff Greenberg, Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona :

“This handbook promises to appeal to scholars eager to read about advances in the study
of personality and social behavior.” ;
Kelly A. Brennan, Associate Professor of Psychology, SUNY-Brockport

“Deci and Ryan's self-determination theory stands as the pre-eminent approach in addressing —
the foundations of intrinsic motivation, and this edited volume covers a wide range of issues—
and research relating to this theory.” R
Herbert Leff, Professor ot Psychology, The University of Vermont

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