Emotion Theory The Routledge Comprehensive Guide

Volume I History Contemporary Theories And Key

Elements 1st Edition Andrea Scarantino download

https://ebookbell.com/product/emotion-theory-the-routledge-
comprehensive-guide-volume-i-history-contemporary-theories-and-
key-elements-1st-edition-andrea-scarantino-57928334

Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com

Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.

Emotion Theory The Routledge Comprehensive Guide Volume I History

Contemporary Theories And Key Elements Andrea Scarantino

https://ebookbell.com/product/emotion-theory-the-routledge-
comprehensive-guide-volume-i-history-contemporary-theories-and-key-
elements-andrea-scarantino-60557902

Emotion Theory The Routledge Comprehensive Guide Volume Ii Theories Of

Specific Emotions And Major Theoretical Challenges First Edition
Andrea Scarantino

https://ebookbell.com/product/emotion-theory-the-routledge-
comprehensive-guide-volume-ii-theories-of-specific-emotions-and-major-
theoretical-challenges-first-edition-andrea-scarantino-60696004

Sketch For A Theory Of The Emotions Routledge Classics 2nd Edition

Jeanpaul Sartre

https://ebookbell.com/product/sketch-for-a-theory-of-the-emotions-
routledge-classics-2nd-edition-jeanpaul-sartre-2000826

Sketch For A Theory Of The Emotions Jeanpaul Sartre Philip Mairet

https://ebookbell.com/product/sketch-for-a-theory-of-the-emotions-
jeanpaul-sartre-philip-mairet-11885540
The Emotions In The Classics Of Sociology A Study In Social Theory
Massimo Cerulo

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-emotions-in-the-classics-of-
sociology-a-study-in-social-theory-massimo-cerulo-34411722

Feeling In Theory Emotion After The Death Of The Subject Rei Terada

https://ebookbell.com/product/feeling-in-theory-emotion-after-the-
death-of-the-subject-rei-terada-51390264

Reversal Theory The Dynamics Of Motivation Emotion And Personality 2

Updated Michael J Apter

https://ebookbell.com/product/reversal-theory-the-dynamics-of-
motivation-emotion-and-personality-2-updated-michael-j-apter-1778556

Emotions As Original Existences A Theory Of Emotion Motivation And The

Self 1st Ed Demian Whiting

https://ebookbell.com/product/emotions-as-original-existences-a-
theory-of-emotion-motivation-and-the-self-1st-ed-demian-
whiting-22502072

The Psychology Of Emotion From Everyday Life To Theory 5th Edition

Kenneth T Strongman

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-psychology-of-emotion-from-everyday-
life-to-theory-5th-edition-kenneth-t-strongman-5064130
 EMOTION THEORY: THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE

Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide is the first interdisciplinary reference
resource which authoritatively takes stock of the progress made both in the philosophy of
emotions and in affective science from Ancient Greece to today. A two-­volume landmark
publication, it provides an overview of emotion theory unrivaled in terms of its comprehen-
siveness, accessibility and systematicity.
Comprising 62 chapters by 101 leading emotion theorists in philosophy, classics, psychol-
ogy, biology, psychiatry, neuroscience and sociology, the collection is organized as follows:

Volume I:
Part I: History of Emotion Theory (10 chapters)
Part II: Contemporary Theories of Emotions (10 chapters)
Part III: The Elements of Emotion Theory (7 chapters)

Volume II:
Part IV: Nature and Functions of 35 Specific Emotions (22 chapters)
Part V: Major Challenges Facing Emotion Theory (13 chapters)
• Special Elicitors of Emotions
• Emotions and Their Relations to Other Elements of Mental Architecture
• Emotions in Children, Animals and Groups
• Normative Aspects of Emotions

Most of the major themes of contemporary emotion theory are covered in their historical,
philosophical, and scientific dimensions. This collection will be essential reading for students
and researchers in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, sociology, anthropology, political
science, and history for decades to come.

Andrea Scarantino is Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State University, where he has taught
since 2005. He has published more than 40 papers on emotions, information, computation,
and communication.
 THIS SET COMPRISES
TWO VOLUMES

Volume I: History, Contemporary Theories, and Key Elements

• Chapters 1–27
• Part I: History of Emotion Theory
• Part II: Contemporary Theories of Emotions
• Part III: The Elements of Emotion Theory

Volume II: Theories of Specific Emotions and Major Theoretical Challenges

• Chapters 28–62
• Part IV: Nature and Functions of 35 Specific Emotions
• Part V: Major Challenges Facing Emotion Theory
 EMOTION THEORY:
THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
Volume I: History, Contemporary Theories,
and Key Elements

Edited by Andrea Scarantino

 Designed cover image: Andrea Scarantino
First published 2025
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
and by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
© 2025 selection and editorial matter, Taylor & Francis; individual
chapters, the contributors
The right of Andrea Scarantino to be identified as the author of the
editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
ISBN: 978-1-138-67668-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-63950-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-55994-0 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781315559940
Typeset in Sabon
by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive)
 CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables viii

Notes on Contributors x
Acknowledgements xv

Introduction to Volume I: The Value of History, a Wealth of

Theoretical Options, and the Elements of Emotion Theory 1
Andrea Scarantino

PART I
History of Emotion Theory 15

1 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome 17

Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

2 Emotion Theory in Ancient and Classical India, 500 BCE–1200 CE 33

Maria Heim

3 Emotion Theory in Early and Medieval China, 500 BCE–1200 CE 51

Curie Virág

4 Emotion Theory in the Middle Ages 72

Simo Knuuttila

5 Emotion Theory in the Renaissance 95

Sabrina Ebbersmeyer

6 Emotion Theory in the 17th Century 110

Lisa Shapiro

v
 Contents

7 Emotion Theory in the 18th Century 129

Eric Entrican Wilson

8 Emotion Theory in the 19th Century at the Rise of Scientific

Psychology 148
Rainer Reisenzein

9 Emotion Theory in the 19th- and 20th-Century Phenomenological

Tradition 171
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

10 Emotion Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century 188

Anna Kennedy and Keith Oatley

PART II
Contemporary Theories of Emotions 213

11 An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotions in Philosophy 215

Michael S. Brady

12 An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotions in Psychology 232

Agnes Moors

13 An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotions in Neuroscience 260

Stephan Hamann

14 An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotions in Sociology 287

Kathryn J. Lively

15 Basic and Discrete Emotion Theories 310

Michelle N. Shiota

16 Appraisal Theories of Emotions 331

Phoebe C. Ellsworth

17 Constructionist Theories of Emotions in Psychology and Neuroscience 350

Lisa Feldman Barrett and Tsiona Lida

18 Social Constructionist Theories of Emotions 388

Batja Mesquita and Brian Parkinson

vi
 Contents

19 Cognitivist Theories of Emotions in Philosophy and Affective Science 408

Bennett W. Helm

20 Motivational Theories of Emotions in Philosophy and Affective Science 429

Andrea Scarantino

PART III
The Elements of Emotion Theory 467

21 Are Emotions Events, Processes, States, or Dispositions? 469

Hichem Naar

22 Is Emotion Physiology More Compatible with Discrete, Dimensional,

or Appraisal Accounts? 488
Bruce H. Friedman and Julian F. Thayer

23 Can Brain Data Be Used to Arbitrate Among Emotion Theories? 511

Philip A. Kragel, David Sander, and Kevin S. LaBar

24 What Do Nonverbal Expressions Tell Us About Emotion? 543

Disa A. Sauter and James A. Russell

25 Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions? 561

Jean Moritz Müller and Hong Yu Wong

26 Emotional Experience: What Is It and What Is It For? 577

Richard Dub

27 How Should We Understand Valence, Arousal, and Their Relation? 599

Giovanna Colombetti and Peter Kuppens

Index 621

vii
 FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures
6.1 Le Brun’s depiction of love 116
6.2 Le Brun’s depiction of hate 116
15.1 Paul Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory of Facial Expressions of Emotion 315
19.1 Belief–desire accounts of emotions 411
19.2 Reisenzein’s belief–desire account of emotions 412
19.3 Judgmentalist accounts of emotions 414
19.4 Appraisal accounts of emotions 416
19.5 Cognition–arousal accounts of emotions 418
19.6 Psychological constructionist accounts of emotions 419
19.7 Neo-Jamesian accounts of emotions 421
19.8 Perceptual accounts of emotions 423
20.1 Ekman’s theory of basic emotions 438
20.2 Plutchik’s theory of basic emotions 439
20.3 Frijda’s theory of emotions as modes of action readiness 443
20.4 Frijda and Parrott’s list of possible modes of action readiness (ur-emotions) 444
20.5 Roseman’s appraisal theory of emotions 447
20.6 Scherer’s appraisal theory of emotions 449
20.7 Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal theory of emotions 454
20.8 Scarantino’s motivational theory of emotions 457
20.9 Some dividing lines in the family of motivational theories of emotions 460
22.1 Discrete emotions situated in a circumplex model 497
23.1 Evaluating theories with univariate models of brain activity 514
23.2 Evaluating theories with multivariate models of brain activity 526
27.1 Overview of possible relations between valence and arousal 612

Tables
4.1 The four basic emotions for the Stoics 74
4.2 The medical taxonomy of emotions in the Pantegni 81
4.3 Isaac of Stella’s distinction between concupiscible and irascible emotions 81
4.4 Self-regarding vs other-regarding emotions in the 13th century 82

viii
 Figures and Tables

4.5 The contrary emotions of the irascible power 83

4.6 Aquinas’s distinction between concuscipible and irascible emotions 85
13.1 Comparison of the attributes of major neuroscience emotion theories 277
16.1 Major appraisal dimensions proposed by theorists in the 1980s 335
17.1 Comparing constructionist and typological perspectives on emotion 351
24.1 Components of emotion episodes 553

ix
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Lisa Feldman Barrett is University Distinguished Professor at Northeastern University, USA,

with appointments at the Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and Harvard Medical
School, where she co-­directs the Interdisciplinary Affective Science Laboratory (IASLab). She
is the author of How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain (2017, Mariner Books)
and Seven and a Half Lessons About the Brain (2020, Mariner Books). She is among the top
1% most-­cited scientists for her research in psychology and neuroscience.

Michael S. Brady is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, UK. He works on

the philosophy of emotion and its links with moral philosophy and epistemology. His books
include Emotional Insight (2013, Oxford University Press), Suffering and Virtue (2018,
Oxford University Press), and Emotion: The Basics (2018, Routledge).

Pia Campeggiani is Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Bologna,

Italy. Her publications include Le ragioni dell’ira. Potere e riconoscimento nell’antica Grecia
(2013, Carocci) and Theories of Emotion. Expressing, Feeling, Acting (2023, Bloomsbury).

Giovanna Colombetti is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Exeter, UK. She works in
the philosophy of emotion and 4E cognition. She is the author of The Feeling Body: Affective
Science Meets the Enactive Mind (MIT Press, 2014), and she is currently working on a second
monograph on the situated nature of emotion and our affective relations to objects and spaces.
She is Co-­Editor in Chief of the journal Emotion Review.

Richard Dub is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Clarkson University, USA. He

works in the philosophy of mind and psychology, specializing in the emotions and in
psychopathology.

Sabrina Ebbersmeyer is Professor for the History of Philosophy at the University of

Copenhagen, Denmark. Working primarily on Renaissance and Early Modern philosophy,
her research focuses on debates in moral psychology and philosophy of mind, on humanism
and gender in the historiography of philosophy. She has published on numerous Renaissance
and Early Modern philosophers, including Isotta Nogarola, Bernardino Telesio, Elisabeth of

x
 Notes on Contributors

Bohemia, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. She is author of Homo Agens (2010, de Gruyter)
and recently co-­edited the volume Women, Philosophy, and Science: Italy and Early Modern
Europe (2020, Springer).

Phoebe C. Ellsworth is the Frank Murphy Distinguished University Professor of Psychology

and Law (emerita) at the University of Michigan, USA. She has made groundbreaking contri-
butions in the theory of emotions and the field of psychology and law. She is the author of over
100 articles and books, including her 1985 classic with Craig Smith, “Patterns of Cognitive
Appraisal in Emotions”, and her book Emotion in the Human Face (co-­authored with Paul
Ekman and Wallace Friesen).

Bruce H. Friedman is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at Virginia Tech,

USA. His research specialization is psychophysiology, and he served as Associate Editor of the
journal Biological Psychology from 2009 to 2021.

Stephan Hamann is a Professor in the Department of Psychology at Emory University, Atlanta,

USA. He has published influential articles on emotional memories, emotion regulation, and
individual differences in emotion activation in Nature, Journal in Cognitive Neuroscience,
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, and Psychological Science. He is the editor-­in-­chief of the jour-
nal Neuropsychologia.

Maria Heim is George Lyman Crosby 1896 & Stanley Warfield Crosby Professor in Religion
at Amherst College, USA. Her recent books include Words for the Heart: A Treasury of
Emotions from Classical India (2022, Princeton University Press) and The Bloomsbury
Research Handbook of Emotions in Classical Indian Philosophy, co-­edited with Chakravarthi
Ram-­Prasad and Roy Tzohar (2021, Bloomsbury).

Bennett W. Helm is the Elijah Kresge Professor of Philosophy at Franklin & Marshall College,
USA. He is the author of Emotional Reason (2001, Cambridge University Press), Love,
Friendship, and the Self (2010, Oxford University Press), and Communities of Respect (2017,
Oxford University Press).

Anna Kennedy is Associate Lecturer at The Open University in Scotland. She researches the
history of emotion theories of the late-­19th and early 20th centuries. She has recently contrib-
uted a chapter on emotion theory to the textbook Exploring Psychological Worlds: Thinking,
Feeling, Doing (2023, The Open University Press)

Simo Knuuttila, who passed away in 2022, was Professor Emeritus of Theological Ethics and
the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Helsinki, Finland. His publications include
Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (1993, second ed. 2020, Routledge) and Emotions in
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (2004, Oxford University Press). He was also editor and
co-­editor of several books on the history of philosophy, such as Sourcebook for the History of
the Philosophy of Mind (2014, Springer).

David Konstan is Professor of Classics at New York University, USA. Among his publications
are The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature (2006,
University of Toronto Press), and In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome
(2018, Oxford University Press).

xi
 Notes on Contributors

Philip A. Kragel, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at Emory

University, USA. His work explores the neural and computational basis of cognitive and affec-
tive behavior in humans.

Peter Kuppens is Professor of Psychology at KU Leuven, Belgium, and studies the measure-
ment, structure, and dynamics of emotions in everyday life, and their relation with mental
health. He recently co-­edited the volumes Affect Dynamics and The Open Handbook of
Experience Sampling Methodology.

Kevin S. LaBar, Ph.D., is Professor and Associate Chair of the Department of Psychology &
Neuroscience at Duke University, USA. He is a senior editor and co-­author of the Principles
of Cognitive Neuroscience, Sinauer Press.

Tsiona Lida is a doctoral student in history at Harvard University, USA, and a research affili-
ate of the IASLab. She studies affect and emotion in the context of modern European intel-
lectual history and Jewish history.

Kathryn J. Lively is Professor of Sociology at Dartmouth College, USA. Her interests include
emotion, identity, self-­change, and Internal Family Systems. She is co-­author of Symbols,
Selves, and Social Reality: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology and
Sociology (2003, Oxford University Press). Her publications have appeared in the American
Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Psychology Quarterly, and Emotion Review.

Batja Mesquita is Professor and Director of the Center for Social and Cultural Psychology,
University of Leuven, Belgium. She is the author of Between Us: How Cultures Create
Emotions (2022, Norton), and co-­editor of Changing Emotions (2013, Psychology Press) and
Mind in Context (2011, Guilford Press).

Agnes Moors is Professor in the Faculty of Psychology, KU Leuven, Belgium. Her research
combines theoretical work, informed by philosophy, with empirical work. She is the author of
Demystifying Emotions: A Typology of Theories in Psychology and Philosophy (2022,
Cambridge University Press).

Jean Moritz Müller is Deputy Professor at the University of Tübingen, Germany. He has
published extensively on the philosophy of emotion and related-­areas of metaethics, e.g. the
monograph The World-­ Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality
(2019, Palgrave-­Macmillan).

Hichem Naar is Research Associate at the University of Duisburg-­Essen, Germany. He

works on the nature, value, and normative significance of various attitudes, in particular the
emotions. He has published the monograph The Rationality of Love (2022, Oxford
University Press).

Keith Oatley is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Applied Psychology at the University
of Toronto, Canada. He was the initiator and is now co-­author of the longest running text-
book of emotions: Understanding Emotions (with D. Keltner and J. M. Jenkins, fourth edi-
tion, 2019, Wiley). He has published psychological novels including The Case of Emily V.,
which won the Commonwealth Writers Prize for First Novel.

xii
 Notes on Contributors

Brian Parkinson is Professor of Social Psychology in the Department of Experimental

Psychology, University of Oxford, UK. He is the author of Heart to Heart: How Your
Emotions Affect Other People (2019, Cambridge University Press) and co-­ author (with
Agneta Fischer and Tony Manstead) of Emotion in Social Relations: Cultural, Group and
Interpersonal Processes (2005, Psychology Press). He is Co-­editor in Chief of the journal
Emotion Review.

Rainer Reisenzein is Professor of General Psychology at the University of Greifswald,

Germany. His research is focused on emotion and motivation, and it is marked by an interdis-
ciplinary orientation. He is the author of numerous articles on emotion-­related topics, includ-
ing emotional experience, facial expressions, emotion measurement, emotion theory, and the
history of emotion research, and has co-­authored a three-­volume German textbook on emo-
tions. He is on the editorial board of Cognition and Emotion and Experimental Psychology
and is an associate editor of Emotion Review.

James A. Russell is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience atBoston

College, USA, and former editor of the journal Emotion Review. He is co-­author with Albert
Mehrabian of An Approach to Environmental Psychology (1974, MIT Press) and co-­editor
with Jose Miguel Fernandez Dols of The Science of Facial Expression (2017, Oxford
University Press).

David Sander, Ph.D., is a Full Professor at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where he
holds the Chair for Psychology of Emotion (Department of Psychology) and is Director of the
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. With Oxford University Press, he has edited the Oxford
Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences as well as the Handbook of Value.

Disa A. Sauter is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Amsterdam, the

Netherlands, where she directs the Amsterdam Interdisciplinary Centre for Emotion. She
works on the communication of emotions via nonverbal expressions, with special interest in
vocalizations like laughter, cries and sighs, and in positive emotions.

Andrea Scarantino is Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State University, USA. He has

authored more than 40 papers on emotions, information, computation and communication.
His articles have appeared in venues such as Nature, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science, Emotion, and
Psychological Inquiry.

Lisa Shapiro is Professor of Philosophy and Dean of Arts at McGill University, Canada. Her
research has focused on emotions in relation to metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of
mind in the early modern period. She is the translator and editor of The Correspondence of
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes (2007, University of Chicago Press), co-­
editor of Emotions and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (2012,
Oxford University Press) and the Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
Philosophy (2023, Routledge), and editor of Pleasure: A History (2018, Oxford University Press).

Michelle N. Shiota is Professor of Psychology at Arizona State University, USA. Her research
has been published in American Psychologist, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
Emotion, and Cognition and Emotion. She is a co-­ editor of the Handbook of Positive

xiii
 Notes on Contributors

Emotions (2014, Guilford), an author of the textbook Emotion (2017, Oxford University
Press), and a co-­author of Emotion and Motivation (with Sarah Rose Cavanagh) (2023,
Oxford University Press). She is Co-­Editor in Chief of the journal Affective Science.

Julian F. Thayer is Distinguished Professor of Psychological Science in the Department of

Psychological Science at the University of California, Irvine, USA, and is also the Ohio Eminent
Scholar Professor in Health Psychology Emeritus at The Ohio State University. Among his
many honors, he received the Society for Psychophysiological Research’s 2018 award for
Distinguished Contributions to Psychophysiology.

Íngrid Vendrell Ferran is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Marburg, Germany. Her
research interests are phenomenology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and epistemology. Her
publications include Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie (2008,
Akademie) and Die Vielfalt der Erkenntnis. Eine Analyse des kognitiven Werts der Literatur
(2018, Mentis). Her articles have appeared in venues such as Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, and Human Studies.

Curie Virág is Associate Professor in World Philosophy at the University of Warwick,

UK. Specializing in the philosophy and intellectual history of both early and middle-­period
China, she has published studies on such topics as emotions, pleasure, self-­cultivation, and
agency, particularly in their ethical and epistemological dimensions. She is the author of The
Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy (2017, Oxford University Press) and co-editor, with
Douglas Cairns, of In the Mind, In the Body and in the World: Emotions in Early China and
Ancient Greece (forthcoming, Oxford University Press).

Eric Entrican Wilson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State University, USA. His
research focuses on the history of early modern ethics and moral psychology, especially in the
work of figures such as Kant, Hume, and Smith. His writings have appeared in venues such as
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Kantian Review, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
and History of Philosophy Quarterly.

Hong Yu Wong is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy of Neuroscience Group
at the University of Tübingen, Germany. His research interests center on action, perception,
and the body.

xiv
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are lots of people who deserve credit for the completion of this multi-­year project. I will
start with the authors of the 62 chapters. They have written what is, in a great many cases, the
best introduction to the topic at hand available anywhere. This took significant efforts, in part
because the mandate for each chapter was to be clearly understandable outside of the authors’
discipline.
The authors also had to wait for the project to come to an end, often without hearing from
me for several months. But they kept faith that this gigantic collection would eventually be
published and not collapse under its own weight. I consider myself incredibly lucky to have
made this journey with the 101 authors who have contributed to this book. I am eternally in
their debt.
What saddens me very much is that two of the authors, Ed Diener and Simo Knuuttila,
passed away before seeing their chapters on, respectively, happiness and medieval theories of
emotions in print. Both chapters are a magnificent testament to their scholarship. This collec-
tion is meant to honor their memory.
I would also like to thank Andy Beck (senior editor for philosophy) and Marc Stratton
(editorial assistant) from Routledge for the biblical patience they demonstrated over the years,
checking on me regularly, but also allowing the collection to acquire its final shape through a
trial-­and-­error process. They were not only patient, but also very understanding with respect
to the final length of the book, which is a consequence of my unwillingness to compromise on
either completeness or comprehensibility. When it mattered, they were in my corner and
helped me secure a two-­volume extension of the original one-­volume agreement.
The production phase of the volumes has (so far!) proceeded smoothly and efficiently, and
I want to thank three people for it: Thivya Vasudevan (the project manager), Lindsey Esplin
(the production editor), and Matthew Van Atta (the copyeditor). I also want to mention the
many, many prominent emotion theorists who have helped me behind the scenes by offering
advice on the best people to invite for each chapter, and by providing anonymous feedback on
the authors’ first drafts. Thank you so very much.
The Philosophy Department at Georgia State University deserves credit for being a wel-
coming home for me since I started teaching there in 2005, and for having given me graduate
assistants over the years who have helped with various aspects of the project. My colleagues

xv
 Acknowledgements

and friends Eddy Nahmias and Jessica Berry need to be thanked for their valuable advice on
book title and cover art.
My father Franco, my mother Adriana, and my brother Davide have also been supportive
in more ways than I can describe, most importantly by showering me with love, trust and
understanding. I will miss (not!) the way my dad said goodbye to me on the phone literally for
years: “How is the encyclopedia project going? Remember that the best is the enemy of the
good!” I hope this is the lonely exception to the rule.
Finally, a big change has come into my life during the editorship of this book: the birth of
my daughter Tula Ilaria Scarantino, who is now three and a half years old. She has taught me
new forms of love, happiness, amusement, gratitude, awe, hope, and pride, along with variet-
ies of fear, stress, and empathic concern I have never experienced before.
May her life be filled with the emotions that make life worth living, which is to say with all
the emotions humans are capable of, provided she has them the Aristotelian way: at the right
time, to the right degree, towards the right people, for the right purpose, and in the right way.

xvi
 INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I
The Value of History, a Wealth of Theoretical
Options, and the Elements of Emotion Theory

Andrea Scarantino

Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide is the result of 6 years of work by 101
leading emotion theorists in philosophy, classics, psychology, biology, psychiatry, neurosci-
ence, and sociology. It includes around 750,000 words in total, distributed over two volumes
and 62 chapters. The two volumes aim to introduce you to:

• The history of emotion theory over the past 25 centuries, mostly in the Western tradition,
but with brief forays into the Indian and the Chinese traditions (Volume I, Part I)
• The main contemporary theories in the philosophy of emotions and in affective science
(Volume I, Part II)
• The elements out of which emotions are composed and their interpretations in different
theories of emotions (Volume I, Part III)
• What we know about the definitions, bodily underpinnings, and functions of 35 specific
emotions (Volume II, Part IV)
• Some of the most significant theoretical challenges currently facing emotion theory in a
variety of disciplines (Volume II, Part V)

I am very proud of this collection, and grateful beyond measure to the distinguished authors
who have contributed to it, dealt with my surely aggravating requests to break everything
down into digestible parts, and patiently waited for this mammoth project to come to an end.
I believe the two volumes you are now perusing offer an unrivaled introduction to emotion
theory in terms of systematicity, comprehensiveness, relevance, and accessibility.
The defining ambition of this project is to speak to two audiences at once: experts and
neophytes. To experts, the volumes aim to offer a cutting-edge synthesis of the available philo-
sophical and scientific literature on a variety of critical topics. All chapters provide systematic
overviews of decades and in some cases centuries of theoretical investigation, articulating
innovative taxonomies of the available theoretical options, with their attendant costs and
benefits. To neophytes, the volumes aim to offer a one-stop shop where one can learn the ropes
of the field without being hindered by discipline-specific jargon or misled by oversimplifica-
tions. When I started my journey in emotion theory, this is exactly what I needed and craved
for but could not find, which led me to spend several years trying to find my way in an intri-
cate and terribly confusing literature.

1 DOI: 10.4324/9781315559940-1
 Andrea Scarantino

You will be the judge as to whether we have succeeded in achieving both theoretical depth
and expository clarity. What I can tell you is that we have tried very hard – each chapter has
been written and rewritten with the overarching objective of presenting what we know about
emotions in a way that combines informativeness and understandability. I hope you will enjoy
the fruits of our collective labor.
I will now explain the rationale for each of the three parts of Volume I, give you an over-
view of the contents of the chapters contained within, and hint at some of the insights about
emotions that Volume I aspires to provide.

Part I: History of Emotion Theory

Why should we care about the history of emotion theory, you may wonder? After all, when
we study chemical elements like oxygen or astronomical objects like the stars, we do not need
to learn about what Lavoisier or Galileo thought about them. If we come upon their theories,
we immediately realize that they entertained all sorts of mistaken ideas of no use to modern
chemists and astronomers. Things are somewhat different when it comes to emotion concepts.
The historical chapters in Part I collectively make a powerful case that emotion concepts are
not like the concepts of oxygen or star, because they systematically mix descriptive and nor-
mative concerns.
Chemical and astronomical concepts are paradigmatic natural kind concepts, namely con-
cepts which aim to carve nature at its joints by individuating inductively rich categories about
which reliable scientific generalizations can be formulated. Oxygen and stars are supposed to
exist as they are independently of any human practices – what makes them natural kinds
depends not on how we think and talk about them, but on their objective properties, which
scientists try to discover as they search for laws of nature.
A great many emotion theorists have historically treated emotion concepts as natural kind
concepts. Aristotle already told us that one can approach the study of emotions as a natural
scientist, and define emotions in terms of their bodily manifestations (e.g. anger is the boiling
of blood and heat around the heart; De anima 403a 16-403b 1). This approach thrived espe-
cially in the 17th century at the rise of mechanistic philosophy, when the physiology, the
expressions, and (eventually) the neural underpinnings of emotions became central theoretical
concerns.
But Aristotle added that there is another way to conceptualize emotions typical of the
dialectic philosopher, who cares about how emotions result from appraisals of the stimulus
situation and dispose one to action (e.g. anger results from appraising stimuli as slights and
leads to an impulse for revenge). This second aspect of emotions was important for practical
reasons, which is why we find Aristotle’s theory of emotions (mostly) in the Rhetoric, a trea-
tise meant to help public speakers shape the emotions of their audience strategically, in order
to gain persuasive advantages in the context of political oratory and lawsuits. The Middle
Ages offer many other prominent examples of the importance of this practice-oriented
approach – several of the leading theorists of the time conceptualized emotions in terms of
how a sage should manage them to lead a morally virtuous life.
What the history of emotion theory reveals is an essential, but not much explored, duality
at the core of emotion concepts: they have been treated concurrently as natural kind con-
cepts, used in “projects of inquiry in which extension and intension are altered to preserve
inductive and explanatory power”, and as normative kind concepts, used to “prescribe and
condemn … behavior” (Griffiths 2004, 907; see also Hacking 1999). These are, of course,
very different projects, animated by distinct objectives which pull in disparate directions.

2
 Introduction to Volume I

When emotion concepts are used in projects of inquiry, the objective of the theorist is to
conceptualize emotions in ways that are helpful for describing nature, for making predictions,
and for explaining behavior. This often leads to focusing on intersubjectively available physi-
cal markers of emotions and trying to discover empirically robust generalizations. When
emotions are used in normative projects, the objective of the theorist is to conceptualize emo-
tions in commonsensical ways that promote human-centered practices like linguistic com-
munication, morality, aesthetics, religion, therapy, medicine, art, law, and politics.
The problem is that there is no reason to expect that conceptual frameworks optimized in
the service of naturalistic description, prediction, and explanation will also best serve whatever
human-centered practices motivate our possession of folk emotion concepts (and vice versa).
This creates a threat to emotion theory which has emerged with increasing vigor over the past
30 years, but was interestingly anticipated in the first half of the 20th century, namely that folk
emotion concepts, although suitable for normative projects, are just too variable in physical
terms to function well in projects of inquiry. Despite this skeptical threat, for most of its history
emotion theory has been propelled by the implicit assumption that a good theory of emotions
in projects of inquiry is a theory of the very things we call “emotions” in everyday life for
purposes of praising, blaming, cajoling, controlling, influencing, and educating one another. It
is worth noting that most contemporary emotion theorists still hold this view and embody
some of the traits of both natural scientists and dialectic philosophers of Aristotelian lore.
As you will notice in the following chapters, the interplay between normative and descrip-
tive projects has been a formidable force shaping emotion theories over centuries and civiliza-
tions. You will observe it at work in the way emotion theories in Ancient Greece were
influenced in part by moral concerns about virtue and the good life; in the ways Indian and
Chinese theories of emotions were driven by a practical interest in therapeutic intervention,
moral development, and aesthetic cultivation; in the way medieval theories of emotions were
affected by the preoccupation of reconciling ancient Greek moral doctrines with the teachings
of Christianity and the avoidance of sin; in the way Renaissance theories of emotion were
affected by an optimist outlook on the value of humanity and concerns with the artistic repre-
sentation of the human body and the preservation of its health through medicine and natural
magic; and in the way 17th- and 18th-century theories of emotion were influenced by epis-
temic concerns with knowledge, moral concerns with freedom of choice, and political con-
cerns with the social order and the wealth of nations.
When science and philosophy parted ways in the mid-19th century, a clearer divide emerged
between attempts to study emotions as natural kinds and attempts to study them as normative
kinds. But the two projects never fully separated. Affective scientists throughout the 20th
century were driven in part by the attempt to make their theories of emotions compatible with
commonsense uses of emotion concepts in human-centered practices. Conversely, lots of phi-
losophers aimed to make their theories of emotions empirically informed as they engaged in
normative projects in epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. And very few
theorists in either camp felt the need to distinguish between what emotion terms mean as
ordinarily understood, and what is a good thing to mean by emotion terms for theoretical
purposes.
Even James, who famously challenged common sense by arguing that we do not run
because we are afraid, but are afraid because we run, ended up relying on common sense when
it came to justifying his physiological theory of emotions. He stated that emotions are percep-
tions of bodily changes because a disembodied emotion is for us inconceivable – none of us
can allegedly think of it. Of course, many of James’s critics could easily think of a disembodied
emotion, and developed alternative theories on that basis, but the point is that an astronomer

3
 Andrea Scarantino

or a chemist would never rely on this style of argument, and defend a theory of oxygen or a
theory of stars in light of what ordinary language concept users can conceive oxygen or
stars to be.
What the exploration of 25 centuries of emotion theory provided by Part I ultimately
offers you is a unique opportunity for understanding what desiderata drive researchers to
formulate theories of emotions, and how such desiderata have changed across eras, civiliza-
tions, social systems, disciplines, and research traditions. You may or may not end this explo-
ration convinced that a conceptual framework devised in the service of projects of description,
prediction, and explanation won’t efficiently serve human-centered functions, and that a
conceptual framework tailored in the service of normative projects can’t possibly carve nature
at its joints.
In Chapter 1: Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome, Pia Campeggiani and David
Konstan introduce us to the two main normative options articulated in Ancient Greece and
Rome when it comes to how a sage should live: the Stoic’s ideal of apatheia, or freedom from
the emotions, and the Aristotelian ideal of metriopatheia, or having the appropriate emotions
in the appropriate circumstances. Campeggiani and Konstan discuss in some detail the theo-
ries of the emotions developed by Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, and the Stoics, highlighting
their groundbreaking contributions on emotion elicitation, phenomenology, and intentional-
ity. They examine two influential assumptions about the nature of emotions introduced in
Ancient Greece. One is that emotions stand in opposition to activity – as Aristotle put it,
emotions are pathê, or things we are affected by, rather than things we do. The other assump-
tion is that emotions stand in opposition to reason – Plato described them as wild horses to be
controlled by the charioteer of reason. As the subsequent chapters make clear, versions of
these two ideas, and in due course opposition to them, have shaped centuries of theoretical
investigation on the emotions.
In Chapter 2: Emotion Theory in Ancient and Classical India, 500 BCE–1200 CE, Maria
Heim discusses the conceptualization of emotions in the Indian tradition. Her primary focus
is on an early Pali Buddhist canonical body of scripture called the Abhidhamma (with its com-
mentaries) and the secular Sanskrit literature on aesthetics, both of which focused on the dis-
aggregation of emotional experience in order to, respectively, therapeutically transform it and
better understand the nature of art. Heim focuses on envy and jealousy as case studies to show
how Sanskrit relies on a cluster of five terms – amarsha, akshama, irshya, asuya, and matsara –
to draw subtle distinctions pertaining to the phenomenology of envy and jealousy. Heim also
discusses strategies of emotion regulation proposed by religious thinkers within the Indian
tradition, and in particular the practice of replacing one emotion with another (the cultivation
of opposites). Heim’s textual analysis shows how the study of emotions in classical India
requires linguistic sensitivity to categories which are translatable into English, but demand
extensive interpretive work because they do not perfectly coincide with the corresponding
English categories.
Curie Virág emphasizes in Chapter 3: Emotion Theory in Early and Medieval China, 500
BCE–1200 CE that traditional Chinese thinkers were driven to theorize about emotions by
their broader intellectual concerns in ethics, politics, psychology, and natural philosophy. She
discusses theories of emotions developed in the early Confucian and Daoist traditions (by
Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, and Zhuang Zhou), in the Han Empire (by Dong Zhongshu), and
in the Period of Disunion at the end of the Han Dynasty (by Wang Bi and Xi Kang). Virág pays
special attention to the historical development of the classical Chinese terms qing 情 (the term
arguably closest to the English word “emotion”), heart-mind (xin 心), inborn nature (xing
性), and desire (yu 欲), emphasizing that the meanings of these terms have constantly been

4
 Introduction to Volume I

renegotiated to reframe the inquiry into affective phenomena. Both Heim and Virág make a
convincing case that emotions are understood within the Indian and Chinese traditions very
differently from how they are understood within the Western tradition. This puts the methods
of Western emotion research in stark relief, and hints at possible alternatives to it.
Chapter 4: Emotion Theory in the Middle Ages by Simo Knuuttila covers the medieval
tradition in the West and its deep roots in Ancient Greek and Roman thought. Knuuttila docu-
ments how the Stoic doctrine of apatheia eventually came into conflict with the dictates of
Christianity, which teaches us to fear God, to love one’s neighbors, and to be angry at sin. The
normative focus transitioned from leading the life of the sage to leading a life conducive to
salvation, a process which culminated in Pope Gregory the Great’s canonization of the seven
deadly sins in the seventh century, many of which are emotions: anger, envy, sloth, gluttony,
lust, pride, and avarice. Knuuttila discusses among others the theories of emotions developed
by Augustine, Avicenna, Abelard, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, emphasizing the relative
disinterest of medieval thinkers in the phenomenology of the emotions compared to their
interest in their evaluative and motivational dimensions. Knuuttila also tracks the shifting
grounds of an essential taxonomic distinction in medieval emotion theory, namely the one
between concupiscible passions and irascible passions, the former connected to the appetitive
part of the soul and the latter connected to the spirited part of the soul (a distinction which
originates in Plato).
As Sabrina Ebbersmeyer argues in Chapter 5: Emotion Theory in the Renaissance, in the
Renaissance the tie of emotions with sin was partially severed – the emotions became valuable
expressions of our earth-bound humanity. The humanists of the Renaissance not only accepted
human nature as it is, but they also attempted to characterize human behavior without moral
evaluation. When Plato’s Symposium was rediscovered in the 15th century, interest in the
emotion of love and its varieties became dominant, with love playing a central role in a virtu-
ous life understood roughly along the lines of Aristotle’s metriopatheia. Ebbersmeyer’s chapter
discusses several humanist accounts of emotions, including those by Petrarca, Bruni,
Machiavelli, and Montaigne. Jointly, these contributions started undermining the view that
emotions are enemies of reason, highlighting the many ways in which they can be beneficial to
human flourishing. Work by Vives, Melanchton, Ficino, and Campanella also showed how a
magical approach to healing went along with an interest in the physiology of emotions and in
the role emotions could play in medical treatments’.
The 17th and 18th centuries continued to be a time of commingling of descriptive and
normative concerns. Lisa Shapiro argues in Chapter 6: Emotion Theory in the 17th Century
that the study of human anatomy and physiology that started in the Renaissance continued to
thrive in the 17th century, leading to a heightened interest in the bodily underpinnings of the
emotions. Shapiro focuses in particular on Burton’s, Reynoldes’s, and Descartes’s contribu-
tions on the physiology of emotions, charting the progressive emergence of a mechanistic
model of affective states. She also describes in some detail the influential theories of the emo-
tions developed by Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes, explaining how they each developed some
aspects of the medieval taxonomy of the emotions made popular by Thomas Aquinas, while
retaining the view that emotions are fundamentally tied to actions. Shapiro concludes by
exploring how new normative concerns shaped 17th-century theories of emotions, specifically
concerns with the impact of emotions in politics and with their impact on free will.
As Eric Wilson tells us in Chapter 7: Emotion Theory in the 18th Century, the Cartesian
mechanistic approach to emotions continued to be developed in the 18th century, but most
philosophers of the period focused on emotions in the context of morality, politics, religion,
and social interaction. Wilson discusses the theories of emotions articulated by Wolff,

5
 Andrea Scarantino

Hutcheson, Hume, Kant, Rousseau, Mandeville, and Smith. He focuses on a variety of taxo-
nomic distinctions popular in the 18th century, such as the distinction between selfish and
public affections (Hutcheson), direct and indirect passions (Hume), and natural and cultural
passions (Kant). Smith’s and Hume’s competing theories of sympathy are also covered in some
detail. Finally, Wilson considers emerging 18th-century theories of emotion regulation, show-
ing how the Platonic assumption that reason is the charioteer of the passions was called into
question by the view that reason is the slave of the passions (Hume) and by the view that the
passions are regulated by psychological mechanisms other than reason (Smith).
It is in the 19th century that descriptive questions about the roles played by emotions in the
architecture of the mind start being explicitly distinguished from normative questions about the
roles they ought to play in human life, although a great many accounts continued to be jointly
influenced by both concerns. In Chapter 8: Emotion Theory in the 19th Century at the Rise of
Scientific Psychology, Rainer Reisenzein discusses the groundbreaking theories offered by
Darwin, James, Wundt, Meinong, and Freud, explaining how they laid the foundations for,
respectively, evolutionary theories of emotions, bodily feeling theories of emotions, mental feel-
ing theories of emotions, cognitive theories of emotions, and psychoanalytic theories of emo-
tions. Reisenzein pays special attention to Darwin’s theory of emotional expressions, to James’s
analysis of the elicitation of emotional experiences and of the origins of emotion mechanisms, to
the tridimensional theory of emotional experience proposed by Wundt, to the cognitive basis of
emotions analyzed in Meinong’s theory of emotions, and to the role of unconscious affects in
Freudian psychoanalysis. Reisenzein concludes by reconstructing the legacy of these five pioneers
of emotion science. Collectively, they contributed to the emancipation of psychology from phi-
losophy and continued to influence emotion theory as the new science of psychology changed its
focus first from consciousness to behavior, and then from behavior to mental representations.
In Chapter 9: Emotion Theory in the 19th- and 20th-Century Phenomenological Tradition,
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran introduces us to the phenomenological tradition of research on the
emotions, with special focus on the theories developed between 1874 and 1950. She distin-
guishes between an initial phase of the tradition, starting with Brentano’s descriptive psychol-
ogy and Husserl’s analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness; a realist phase
associated with Scheler and Pfänder, who focused on the essence of emotions; a third phase
associated with Heidegger’s focus on the existential significance of emotions; and a fourth
phase marked by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of emotions as embodied engagements.
As Vendrell Ferran notes, phenomenologists viewed the intentionality of emotions as intrinsi-
cally affective and irreducible to the intentionality of any other mental states like perceptions
or beliefs. Her chapter shows how approaches to affective intentionality can provide novel
insights into current debates on the object-directness of emotions, on their cognitive bases,
and on the relation between emotions and values.
The historical portion of the volume ends with Anna Kennedy and Keith Oatley’s Chapter
10: Emotion Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century, which highlights eight theoretical
approaches which thrived during the time period: introspectivist approaches, behaviorist
approaches, evolutionary approaches, neurophysiological approaches, therapeutic approaches,
aesthetic approaches, skeptical approaches, and everyday approaches to emotions. Kennedy
and Oatley discuss seminal contributions to emotion theory by Titchener, Dunlap, Watson,
Skinner, Shand, McDougall, Tolman, Hull, Cannon, Selye, Papez, MacLean, Beebe-Center,
and Duffy. Their analysis reveals that the first half of the 20th century was an exceptionally
rich portion of the history of emotion theory, marked by prescient, but often forgotten, con-
tributions to the field. Their overview concludes in the mid-1950s, which is roughly the divid-
ing line between Parts I and II of this volume.

6
 Introduction to Volume I

Part II: Contemporary Emotion Theories

Two laments come to the lips of contemporary emotion theorists on a regular basis, mine
included. The first is that their favored theory is misunderstood by its opponents. The second
is that it is hard to understand other people’s theories – both with respect to what they say and
why they say it. This state of affairs is detrimental to progress, because it prevents theorists
from getting clear on what exactly they disagree about.
The aim of Part II of this volume is to offer a remedy, in the hopes of integrating theoretical
viewpoints where possible and understanding where the real dividing lines in contemporary
emotion theory lie. For the purposes of this exercise, emotion theories have been organized
into different research programs. A research program is an overarching theoretical approach
within which specific theories can be articulated (Lakatos 1970). It consists of two main ele-
ments: a set of non-negotiable “hard-core” assumptions, plus a range of “auxiliary hypothe-
ses” designed to protect the hard-core assumptions from refutation.
For example, in Newtonian physics, the law of gravitation and the three laws of motion
belonged to the hard core – you could not call yourself a Newtonian and give up on them.
Many other auxiliary hypotheses, however, were modifiable and did get modified over time
when empirical data threatened hard-core laws (e.g. hypotheses about the number of planets
in the solar system, the way light propagates, and the nature of atmospheric refraction).
The first four chapters of Part II try to distinguish the main research programs on emotions
in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and sociology. The reason for focusing on these four
domains is that other disciplines tend to rely on the accounts formulated in philosophy, psy-
chology, neuroscience, and/or sociology as they embark in their own investigations, without
articulating proprietary theories of what emotions are. The point of reconstructing research
programs is to figure out what the main theoretical options are in the contemporary debate,
distinguishing within each family of theories between non-negotiable commitments and revis-
able assumptions that can be changed to deal with emerging challenges.
In Chapter 11: An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotion in Philosophy, Michael
Brady introduces us to the main research programs in the philosophy of emotions. He begins
by asking what the aims of a philosophical analysis of emotions may be, distinguishing
between naturalized approaches which take their lead from empirical investigations and a
priori approaches which seek to systematize ordinary platitudes about emotions. Brady then
considers judgmentalism, arguably the most popular research program in philosophy through-
out the 1990s, covering Solomon’s, Nussbaum’s, and Marks’s strands of judgmentalism. His
second target is perceptualism, the most influential contemporary heir to judgmentalism,
which assimilates emotions with types of perceptions, considering formulations by Greenspan,
Roberts, Tappolet, Prinz, and de Sousa, and then criticisms by Brady and Helm. Brady con-
cludes by reviewing recent motivational theories in philosophy by Deonna and Teroni and by
Scarantino, canvassing their possible costs and benefits.
In Chapter 12: An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotion in Psychology, Agnes
Moors reconstructs four phases in the development of a psychological theory of emotions: the
articulation of a working definition that relies on superficial properties of emotions, the transi-
tion to a scientific explanation, the empirical testing of the explanation, and eventually the
development of a scientific definition. She distinguishes five primary research programs in
psychology, each coming in different flavors: the evolutionary program, the network-based
program, the evaluation-based program, the psychological constructionist program, and the
social constructionist program. Moors then discusses basic tenets, supporting evidence, and
main challenges for several influential psychological theories of emotions, including Ekman’s

7
 Andrea Scarantino

basic emotion theory, Lange’s network theory, Scherer’s appraisal theory, Moors’s goal-
directed theory, Barrett’s and Russell’s versions of the psychological constructionist program,
and Mesquita’s and Parkinson’s versions of the social constructionist program.
Chapter 13: An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotion in Neuroscience by
Stephan Hamann tackles research programs on emotions in neuroscience. Hamann traces the
early history of affective neuroscience, focusing on trailblazing insights by Cannon, Bard,
MacLean, and Papez and on the emergence of the limbic system idea. He then distinguishes
between two subfields of affective neuroscience, one devoted to testing psychological theories
of emotions, and the other devoted to articulating and testing emotion theories developed by
neuroscientists themselves. Five prominent neuroscientific theories of emotion are discussed in
the chapter: LeDoux’s survival circuits theory, Panksepp’s affective neuroscience theory,
Damasio’s theory of emotions as somatic markers, Barrett’s constructivist theory, and
Adolphs’s functionalist emotion framework. Hamann concludes with a table comparing and
contrasting neuroscientific theories in terms of several dimensions, including the main theo-
retical constructs they use, their assumptions about neural localization, and the type of empiri-
cal evidence they rely on.
In Chapter 14: An Overview of Contemporary Theories of Emotion in Sociology, Kathryn
Lively introduces us to research programs on emotions in sociology. She points out that,
although some of the founders of sociology like Marx, Weber, and Durkheim prominently
discussed emotions in their work, the emergence of emotions as distinctive objects of socio-
logical investigation is a more recent affair. She traces it back to the late 1970s, when
Hochschild offered a field-defining analysis of the emotional labor involved in managing one’s
own emotions in professional contexts (e.g. flight attendants are expected to convey positive
emotions to customers). Lively distinguishes between cultural approaches to emotion manage-
ment formulated in the wake of Hochschild’s analysis, Kemper’s and Bales’s micro structural
approaches to power and status dynamics in social interactions and groups, House’s social
structure and personality approach, Pearlin’s stress process model, Heise’s affect control the-
ory, and Collins’s interaction ritual theory.
Chapters 15, 16, 17, and 18 mark a transition from the high-altitude perspective of the first four
overview chapters to a granular analysis of the four currently most influential research programs in
affective science: basic emotion theory, appraisal theory, psychological constructionism, and social
constructionism. I invited some of the leading proponents of these four approaches to explain how
each research program understands emotions, what evidence supports the research program, and
what are the main dividing lines and outstanding challenges within each research program.
In Chapter 15: Basic and Discrete Emotion Theories, Michelle Shiota introduces us to the
contemporary literature on basic and discrete emotion theories, tracing their inspiration back
to Darwin’s work on emotional expressions. Shiota distinguishes a caricatured version of
basic emotion theory she thinks is often incorrectly identified with the research program, from
a more nuanced (and partially shifting) version articulated by Ekman over the decades. Shiota
examines the existing empirical evidence on autonomic physiology, facial expressions, neural
data, and coherence among components, noting where it supports Ekman’s theory, where it is
inconsistent with it, and where more studies are needed. She then discusses a group of “dis-
crete emotion” theories that have emerged in recent years to deal with the critiques traditional
basic emotion theory has received. Discrete theories preserve Ekman’s assumption that emo-
tions are evolutionary adaptations, but allow for a greater degree of variability in their physi-
cal manifestations. Shiota concludes by providing examples of the empirical evidence on
context-dependent expressive and physiological changes that speaks in favor of discrete emo-
tion theories.

8
 Introduction to Volume I

In Chapter 16: Appraisal Theories of Emotions, Phoebe Ellsworth introduces the research
program of appraisal theory, whose core assumption is that emotions are caused or consti-
tuted by evaluations of the meaning of the situation and its implications for well-being.
Ellsworth discusses early pioneers of the research program like Arnold and Lazarus, and the
impact of the now infamous epinephrine experiment run by Schachter and Singer in 1962,
which appeared to give cognition a starring role in turning undifferentiated states of arousal
into emotions. Several varieties of appraisal theory are examined in the chapter, including
versions by Scherer, Ellsworth, Roseman, Frijda, Smith, Clore, and Collins. Ellsworth’s discus-
sion focuses in particular on seven of the most common dimensions of stimulus evaluation:
novelty, intrinsic valence, certainty or predictability, goal conduciveness, agency, control, and
compatibility with personal or social standards. Ellsworth concludes by distinguishing cate-
gorical vs. dimensional and causal vs. non-causal varieties of appraisal theory.
In Chapter 17: Constructionist Theories of Emotions in Psychology and Neuroscience, Lisa
Feldman Barrett and Tsiona Lida discuss constructionist theories of emotions in psychology
and neuroscience. One of the take-home messages of their chapter is that the label psychologi-
cal constructionism – amply used throughout these volumes and in the literature – may be too
narrow to capture the totality of the research program developed by Russell, Barrett, and
others in opposition to classical theories of emotions. Barrett and Lida distinguish between
two general approaches to the study of emotions: typology and constructionism. Typology
holds that there are biologically and psychologically distinct emotion types whose physical
signatures are to be studied empirically – this is the approach characteristic of basic emotion
theories and (some) appraisal theories. Constructionism holds that emotions emerge dynami-
cally from more basic ingredients, are extremely variable at the physical level, and are unified
as members of the same category only by an act of “meaning making”. Barrett and Lida then
turn to a consideration of the empirical evidence for constructionism, which ranges from the
predictive coding literature in neuroscience to the role of cultural inheritance in emotion
knowledge. Barrett and Lida conclude by dispelling what they consider pervasive misunder-
standings about the constructionist research program.
In Chapter 18: Social Constructionist Theories of Emotions, Batja Mesquita and Brian
Parkinson introduce us to the research program of social constructionism. They begin by
articulating the core assumptions of the program, which include the dependence of emotions
on social cognition, the cultural specificity of emotions, their lack of passivity, and their social
functionality. Mesquita and Parkinson examine several social constructionist theories, includ-
ing Armon-Jones’s proposal that emotions depend on interpretations shaped by socially con-
structed concepts, and Averill’s proposal that emotions are transitory social roles. They then
canvass various sources of evidence for the core assumptions of social constructionism, focus-
ing especially on cultural differences in appraisal, on linguistic variability, on audience effects,
on social functionality, on emotion categorization, on dynamic construction, and on the
nature of emotional development in children. They conclude by discussing some of the ways
sociocultural and evolutionary explanations of emotions could be integrated.
Chapters 19 and 20 focus on research traditions in emotion theory, which are larger-scale
units of theoretical investigation than research programs. Whereas members of a research
program must agree on the hard-core assumptions that define the program, members of a
research tradition can belong to different research programs. What makes them members of
the same tradition is that they endorse a central orienting assumption which directs and con-
strains the way emotions are conceptualized and studied. The two assumptions we focus on
are that emotions are cognitions of some kind (cognitivist tradition) and that emotions are
motivations of some kind (motivational tradition). Crucially, both assumptions span across

9
 Andrea Scarantino

the divide between the philosophy of emotions and affective science, and so the two research
traditions being considered here are interdisciplinary. Naturally, the diversity of viewpoints
within each research tradition is much greater than the diversity of viewpoints within each
research program. There are many ways to understand what cognition and motivation are,
many ways to understand how they contribute – individually and in combination – to the
instantiation of emotions, and many ways to understand what else is essential to emotions
besides cognition or motivation. It is nevertheless fruitful to understand how research pro-
grams commonly considered to be competitors may share important commonalities at higher
level of analysis, possibly as a preliminary step towards synthesizing them into a hybrid suc-
cessor program.
In Chapter 19: Cognitivist Theories of Emotions in Philosophy and Affective Science,
Bennett Helm discusses the cognitivist tradition in philosophy and affective science, defined by
the assumption that understanding emotions requires making a central appeal to cognitions as
their causes or constituents. Helm distinguishes two concepts of cognition: cognition as an
information processing state (the notion prevalent in psychology), and cognition as a state
with a mind-to-world direction of fit (the notion prevalent in philosophy). He then proceeds
to consider how different cognitivist proposals fare with respect to a key set of theoretical
desiderata, including their ability to account for object-directedness, rationality, differentia-
tion, distinctness, phenomenology, causal roles, and importance. Helm’s discussion covers a
number of diverse research programs across disciplines, including belief-desire accounts (e.g.
Marks, Reisenzein), judgmentalist accounts (e.g. Solomon), appraisal accounts (e.g. Lazarus),
psychological constructionist accounts (e.g. Barrett), Neo-Jamesian accounts (e.g. Prinz), and
perceptualist accounts (e.g. Tappolet). Helm concludes by unveiling some of the important
insights shared by the diverse members of the cognitivist tradition.
In Chapter 20: Motivational Theories of Emotions in Philosophy and Affective Science,
Andrea Scarantino discusses the motivational tradition, which is defined by the assumption
that emotions are, or at least essentially comprise, motivations to act. Scarantino begins by
reconstructing the emergence of the concept of motivation in early 20th-century psychology,
suggesting that it was introduced to explain goal-driven behaviors that cannot be understood
through chains of reflexes. Scarantino then summarizes pioneering motivational proposals
developed in the 1960s by Leeper, Tolman, Simon, and Bindra, before turning his focus to
seven contemporary accounts which understand the connection between emotion and motiva-
tion in different ways. In particular, he discusses the motivational sides of basic emotion theory
and appraisal theory, comparing and contrasting Ekman with Plutchik in the basic emotions
camp and Scherer with Roseman in the appraisal camp. Scarantino then discusses Frijda’s
seminal contributions on the nature of modes of action readiness and control precedence,
including Frijda and Parrott’s recent theory of ur-emotions. The chapter ends with a compari-
son between two motivation-focused proposals in the philosophy of emotions, Deonna and
Teroni’s attitudinal theory and Scarantino’s motivational theory.

Part III: The Elements of Emotion Theory

Parts I and II jointly make an incontestable, if sobering, case that the community of emotion
researchers has yet to coalesce around a shared understanding of what emotions are. At the
same time, Parts I and II show that there has long been strong consensus on the main elements
out of which emotions are composed. The notion of element at work here is very broad – if
we think of emotions as recipes, the elements are all the ingredients or components which can
feature in recipes. Some elements have been acknowledged as central since Ancient Greece,

10
 Introduction to Volume I

most significantly experiences/feelings/qualia (often valenced, often bodily, often activating),

action tendencies/desires/impulses, and appraisals/evaluations/cognitions. Other elements
have become prominent more recently, including expressions/displays/manifestations in the
17th century with Descartes and Le Brun, peripheral nervous system changes in the 17th
century with Descartes and Burton, and central nervous system changes in the 19th century
with James and Hughlings Jackson.
The objective of Part III is to shift the focus of theoretical analysis from the emotions to the
elements themselves. The elements investigated are ontology, physiology, brain circuity, expres-
sions, actions, conscious experience, valence, and arousal (appraisal is another element of emo-
tions, but since it is the primary focus of appraisal theory, it is discussed at length by Ellsworth
in Chapter 16, Part II). The first objective in breaking down emotions into their core ingredi-
ents is to take stock of what we have learned about the main ways to understand each ingredi-
ent, about the subtypes of each ingredient, about their mechanisms of operations and about
their biological and social functions. The second objective is to determine whether learning
more about each individual emotion ingredient can help us choose between competing theories
of emotions, or at least provide constraints that any viable theory of emotions must satisfy.
Chapter 21: Are Emotions Events, Processes, States, or Dispositions? by Hichem Naar asks
a crucial but often neglected question any emotion theorist needs to ask, namely: What is the
ontological status of emotions? In other words, what kinds of things are emotions at the most
abstract level? Naar argues that there are two main ontological options, each with costs and
benefits: emotions can be things that occur (i.e. occurrents) or they can be things that persist
(i.e. continuants). Each option comes in two varieties. If we think of emotions as occurrents,
we have to decide whether they are events that occur at a time or processes that unfold over
time. If we think of emotions as continuants, we have to decide whether they are states or
dispositions. After having clarified these four primary options, Naar considers some of the
implicit ontological assumptions of basic emotion theory, appraisal theory, and psychological
constructionism. He argues that affect programs have been understood by basic emotion theo-
rists as occurrents, continuants, or a combination of the two; that appraisals have been under-
stood by appraisal theorists as occurrent processes; and that emotional experiences have been
understood by psychological constructionists as events, exploring some of the implications of
these ontological claims.
In Chapter 22: Is Emotion Physiology More Compatible with Discrete, Dimensional, or
Appraisal Accounts?, Bruce Friedman and Julian Thayer take stock of a debate on emotional
physiology that James started 130 years ago when he suggested it was possible for each emo-
tion to have a unique bodily reverberation. Friedman and Thayer begin by clarifying the
structure of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and of the cardiovascular, respiratory, and
electrodermal measures typically used by psychophysiologists to take stock of emotions. They
then take us back to the James-Lange vs. Cannon-Bard dispute on visceral emotional changes
as a springboard for examining the degree to which physiological data support, respectively,
basic emotion theory, dimensional approaches to emotions in terms of valence and arousal,
and appraisal theories. Their conclusion is that every theory can find some support in the
physiological data, but no theory is compatible with all the data. The final section of their
chapter illustrates how a dynamic systems theory approach may offer an integration of the
insights of competing emotion theories and lead to novel empirical hypotheses which cannot
be formulated within any of the traditional emotion theories.
In Chapter 23: Can Brain Data Be Used to Arbitrate Among Emotion Theories?, Philip
Kragel, David Sander, and Kevin LaBar examine whether neuroscientific data can used to
arbitrate between alternative emotion theories. They first explain what types of neural data

11
 Andrea Scarantino

are available, distinguishing between electrocorticography (ECoG), electroencephalography

(EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), functional near-infrared spectroscopy
(fNIRS) and lesion studies. Their primary focus in the chapter is on fMRI evidence, in an
attempt to demonstrate how univariate and multivariate neuroimaging approaches have con-
tributed to the study of valence and arousal (dimensional theories), to the study of cognitive
appraisals (appraisal theories), and to the study of discrete emotions (basic emotion theories).
Their conclusion is that neural data alone cannot settle which theory of emotion is to be pre-
ferred, in part because not enough efforts have been made to increase the granularity of neural
predictions and to overcome confirmation bias.
In Chapter 24: What Do Nonverbal Expressions Tell Us About Emotion?, Disa Sauter and
Jim Russell introduce us to the literature on the nonverbal expression of emotions. They first
explain how expressive bodily movements are conceptualized by competing research pro-
grams. For basic emotion theorists, expressions are effects of the activation of affect programs;
for appraisal theorists, emotional expressions are effects of appraisals; for psychological con-
structionists, emotional expressions are effects of domain-general processes not specific to
emotions. After having canvassed the evidence in support of each of these three approaches to
emotional expressions, Sauter and Russell conclude that the evidence is inconclusive and that
a winner cannot be declared just yet. They sketch the outlines of a possible integrative path
that may help move the field forward, focusing on the need to understand emotional expres-
sions as lying on a continuum between biological preparedness and cultural learning. Their
view is ultimately that emotional expressions do not constitute a unified subject matter for
emotion theory, because they differ in terms of their origins, current functions, and mecha-
nisms of operation.
In Chapter 25: Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions?, Jean Moritz Müller and Hong
Yu Wong ask where we should draw the line between behaviors that happen to the emoter
(e.g. crying) and behaviors that the emoter intentionally performs (e.g. apologizing). They
propose that a behavior counts as an action just in case it is voluntary, goal-oriented, con-
sciously performed, and done for reasons. This model of action is enshrined in philosophy by
the so-called Humean theory of action, according to which actions are brought about by
desire and belief pairs which rationalize them. Müller and Yu Wong argue that not all behav-
iors prompted by emotions are actions in this technical sense. For example, basic bodily
expressions like frowning out of anger, and reflex-like emotional reactions like recoiling out
of fear of a suddenly looming object are neither voluntary nor done for reasons. The chapter
focuses on a class of behaviors whose agency is highly contentious, namely what they call
complex expressive behaviors such as jumping up and down out of joy or affectionately ruf-
fling another’s hair out of love. Hursthouse, who described these behaviors as arational
actions, famously argued that the Humean theory of action cannot explain them, because
they are neither instrumental nor caused by a belief-and-desire pair. Müller and Yu Wong
consider several competing interpretations of complex expressive behaviors which try to
show either that they fit the Humean model with some modifications (e.g. Smith), or that they
do not fit the Humean model but are nevertheless instrumental (e.g. Scarantino and Nielsen),
or that they do not fit the Humean model and have a non-instrumental point (e.g.
Bennett, Helm).
Richard Dub in Chapter 26: Emotional Experience: What Is It and What Is It For? focuses
on the nature and functions of emotional experience. Dub begins by introducing working defi-
nitions of state consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and emo-
tional phenomenology. He then focuses on three broad theories of emotional experience,
discussing their respective advantages and disadvantages. Somatic theories ground emotional

12
 Introduction to Volume I

experience in bodily changes, and they exist in Jamesian and non-Jamesian varieties. Cognitive/
perceptual theories take emotional experience to be modeled either after the phenomenology
of cognitive states like thinking or judging, or after the phenomenology of perceptual states
like seeing or hearing. Central theories propose that emotional phenomenology is irreducible
to any other kind of sensory, cognitive, or perceptual phenomenology. Dub then turns to the
question of what the functions of emotional consciousness might be, discussing its possible
adaptive roles in facilitating flexible action, globally broadcasting content, storing memories,
transferring information, facilitating the understanding of values, and solving control dilem-
mas. Dub concludes by examining whether we should foreclose the possibility of unconscious
emotions on conceptual grounds, and, if not, what evidence there might be for unconscious
emotions.
In Chapter 27: How Should We Understand Valence, Arousal, and their Relation?,
Giovanna Colombetti and Peter Kuppens discuss the central constructs of valence and arousal,
each of which can refer to multiple notions not always clearly distinguished from one another.
They discuss three main concepts of valence: experienced valence (how pleasant or unpleasant
an emotion feels), behavior valence (the direction of an organism’s emotional behavior toward
or away from something) and appraisal valence (the positive or negative character of emotion-
eliciting appraisals). They then consider the notion of arousal, distinguishing between two
main concepts of arousal: experienced arousal (feeling activated) and physiological arousal
(sympathetic arousal or brain arousal). Colombetti and Kuppens argue that it is a mistake to
conflate these different notions of valence and arousal, that emotions often have mixed valence
in several senses of valence, and that the notions of experienced and physiological arousal
tend to be too narrowly defined in the literature. Finally, they examine what the relations
between valence and arousal might be under various ways of understanding each term, con-
sidering the evidence for their independence, for a linear relation between them, for a sym-
metrical V-shaped relation, and for an inverted V-shape relation, concluding that the jury on
these options is still out, and more evidence is needed.

References
Griffiths, P. E. (2004). Emotions as Natural and Normative Kinds. Philosophy of Science, 71(5), 901–911.
Hacking, I. (1999). Making Up People. In M. Biagioli (Ed.), The Science Studies Reader (pp. 161–171).
New York: Routledge
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In I. Lakatos
& A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (pp. 91–195). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.

13
 PART I

History of Emotion Theory

 1
EMOTION THEORY IN ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME
Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

Introduction
Ancient Greek and Roman writers discussed emotions in various contexts, but only recently
have scholars entered into a dialogue with emotion studies in other fields and begun to pro-
vide a historical account of emotion theories in the classical world (Kaster 2005; Konstan
2006c, 2016; Cairns 2016, 2022, 2023; Cairns and Nelis 2017; Cairns 2019a; Cairns et al.
2022). The aim of this chapter is to review the most prominent philosophical theories of emo-
tions from Plato to the Stoics and explore their relationship to modern analyses.
The study of ancient emotions raises a number of methodological issues that need to be
briefly outlined. Since the principal evidence about theories of emotions takes the form of texts
in ancient languages, we begin with some remarks on the ancient Greek and Roman emotional
vocabulary. The nearest Greek equivalent for “emotion” is pathos (pl. pathê), from the verb
paskhô, “to be affected”; the Romans used a variety of terms, including affectus, passio, and
perturbatio. All these words suggest that emotions are reactions that people undergo. This
idea of emotions as passive occurrences informed the way ancient theories conceptualized
them both as bodily manifestations and in thought, putting the emphasis on the bodily altera-
tions and disturbances that emotions entail as well as on how they underpin beliefs and judg-
ments. This framework, as we shall see, led to a variety of ancient insights into the embodied
and cognitive nature of emotions that foreshadowed, and in some ways grounded, the current
debate on the nature of emotions.
The term “emotion” emerged as a coherent and inclusive category in the English language
only during the 19th century, having replaced kindred earlier terms such as “passion”, “senti-
ment”, “appetite”, and “affection” (Dixon 2003). That the definition of emotion is still very
much contested renders cross-cultural comparisons all the more complex. What is more, the
comparative study of social phenomena differs from that in the natural sciences in that the
object under investigation – that is, the domain of the theory – itself may vary from one society
to another. Thus, what we translate as “emotion” may not cover the same territory as the
native term in languages other than English, and in some cases the idiomatic division of the
psychic terrain is such that no concept maps onto the modern idea of emotion. This is the less
surprising in that, as noted before, the modern concept itself has undergone change, even in
recent history. In order to avoid projecting modern notions onto ancient emotion theories, it

17 DOI: 10.4324/9781315559940-3
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

is thus necessary to situate them in their historical context, which involves referring not only
to the philosophical sources, but also to the literary sources that supplied material and inspira-
tion for later, more rigorous conceptualizations. With these prefatory remarks, we turn now
to a brief look at the implicit conception of emotions found in archaic Greek literature, in
particular Homeric epic, before proceeding to the earliest systematic discussion of emotions,
or rather, of the several functions of the psukhê (soul), by Plato.
Long before the development of systematic philosophical thinking, which would be domi-
nated by Plato and Aristotle in the classical period, emotions were portrayed and implicitly
analyzed by poets. Homeric epic is particularly important in this respect; because it was the
revered foundation of the Greek cultural tradition, it represents our principal source of popu-
lar conceptualizations of emotions and affective experiences. Furthermore, it provided later
philosophical theorizing with models of mind and examples of emotional attitudes that were
discussed, amended, or rejected. For these reasons, a full understanding of ancient Greek theo-
ries of emotions must take into account what has been defined as the “Homeric encyclopedia”
(Havelock 1963).
Greek folk psychology, as illustrated in the Iliad, the Odyssey, and other early Greek litera-
ture, makes mention of a great many emotions as well as gestures and other expressions that
signify emotions, but they are not all grouped under a single category. In Homer, the word
phrên, or, in the plural, phrenes, designates the mind generally and as such may be the seat of
emotions as well as thoughts. The term êtor, specific to epic and lyric poetry, means something
like “heart” and often signifies life (to die is to have one’s êtor destroyed; Iliad 5.250, 21.114,
etc.); most often êtor is associated with pain and desire (Iliad 3.31, 9.9, 21.389; Odyssey
4.467; Hesiod Theogony 163; Theognis 1178), but it may also be the locus of reason or deci-
sion, though often characterized emotionally (Pindar, Olympic Ode 2.79; Theognis 122).
Particularly strong feelings, such as anger, which is perhaps the dominant emotion in the Iliad,
are associated with the thumos, which has something of the broad sense conveyed by the
English “temper”, ranging from “rage” to the neutral “temperament”, but also embracing
appetite, will, grief, joy, and courage or high spiritedness, the latter closely related to indigna-
tion and ire. In Homer, thumos is a psychic force or faculty that includes a wide spectrum of
sentiments and is also the source of motivations and desires (Claus 1981; Bremmer 1983; see
also Pelliccia 1995; on thumos in Homer, see Cairns 2019c). It is imagined as a gaseous sub-
stance flowing in the breast (Iliad 16. 540) or a beast to be tamed (Iliad 9.496, 18.113), sug-
gesting a physical substratum. In his doctrine of the tripartite soul, Plato introduces thumos as
a fundamental component of the psukhê, developing one strand of the Homeric notion and
emphasizing its connection to anger and indignation. Plato explicitly recognizes his debt to
Homer: in Republic IV, when presenting that part of the soul “which rages without reason”,
he quotes a line from the Odyssey. The Homeric legacy is crucial to an understanding of Plato’s
view of emotions, to which we now turn (for a comparison between thumos in Homer and
later philosophers, including Plato, see Sharples 1983; on Homeric influences on Plato’s theory
of the soul, see Cairns 2014; on the post-Homeric conception of thumos, see Cairns 2019b; for
a concise overview of scholarship on ancient emotions, see Campeggiani and Konstan 2017).

Plato
There is no passage in which Plato isolates the category of emotion as we understand the term,
nor does he offer a full account of emotion in general. Yet, a number of features in Plato’s
psychology, especially in respect to his doctrine of the tripartite soul, reflect an awareness of
the complexity of emotional phenomena.

18
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

Based on the subjective experience of conflict between rational preferences and irrational
or objectionable desires (Plato’s example is the impulse to view deteriorating corpses), Plato
identifies three distinct sources of motivation within the human psukhê; each “part” is defined
in terms of the set of goals toward which it is oriented and of its specific desires (Ferrari 2007).
To each of these parts corresponds a class of citizens and the distinct contribution it makes to
the common good: the isomorphism between the constitution of the individual’s soul and that
of the city underpins Plato’s political and ethical thinking, as well as his psychological theory,
on which we focus in this paragraph. Reason (logistikon), literally the calculating part, has an
inherent desire for true knowledge and seeks to rule the soul in its light (Republic 441e): in a
well-ordered soul (and city), reason performs the crucial task of figuring out what is good on
theoretical grounds and exercises governance accordingly. The appetitive part (epithumêt-
ikon) is the seat of bodily drives such as thirst, hunger, and sexual desire, and of all those
appetites (including the indulgence in grief that is elicited by poetic representation; Republic
605d, 606b) that arise outside the control of reason. Finally, the desire of the thumos (or
thumoeides, the “spirited” part) is directed toward honor (in Greek, timê) and to it pertain
anger, shame, an offended sense of justice, and the will to self-assertion and desire for others’
approbation, broadly involving an individual’s sense of status and social image (crucial values
in classical Greece, as of course in any society). Justice and happiness consist in the harmoni-
ous relationship of the three elements, which depends on the subject’s capacity to impose
rational goals and desires upon the undisciplined sources of motivation coming from the epi-
thumêtikon. Resistance to the latter is made possible by the alliance of reason with the thu-
mos: because it is the seat of competitiveness and self-esteem, if well-directed by the logistikon,
the spirited part works as a powerful motivating force toward the achievement of those goals
that reason defines as worth pursuing. In the dialogue Phaedrus, Plato introduces the image of
a charioteer and two horses, one obedient and one rebellious, as a figure for the human soul:
the docile horse evidently represents the thumos and the unruly one the appetites, whereas the
charioteer stands for the rational part of the psukhê. Rational desires, that is the desires for
what reason judges to be good, should manage those of the spirited part, making it compliant
and supportive in the task of taming the lower drives associated with the appetitive part. The
metaphor symbolizes the need for an inclusive kind of education, intellectual, affective, and
desiderative. It is not that each “part” of the psukhê represents the instantiation of a singular
function: in fact, all are capable of sophisticated intellectual, affective, and desiderative pro-
cesses and, as such, they metaphorically represent the different ways a person as a whole
interacts with his or her manifold and often contrasting motivations (Cairns 2014). Each
psychic part has its own desires and deals with them by evaluation and sentiment. Thus, both
the spirited and the appetitive parts are susceptible to arguments and make use of judgment
and reasoning (even if, when left to themselves, they do so not in order to know the truth, but
rather to calculate the best ways to pursue their objects of desire). For example, among the
various desires of the appetitive part of the soul, there is even one for philosophizing: it of
course differs from the philosopher’s motive in that it is not reason’s desire for knowledge but
is a superficial pleasure that has nothing to do with the pursuit of the truth (Cooper 1999).
The character of a person results from one’s overall attitude toward all these motivations, and
since this attitude is molded by social and political influences, Plato was urgently concerned to
reform traditional education and institutions.
According to Plato’s theory of the soul, what we think of as emotions are dispersed over
all its parts; even reason has emotions in the form of a passionate desire (erôs) for knowledge,
that is, knowledge of objectively existing immaterial forms. There is no single term in Plato
that represents “emotion” as such, although he touches upon a wide variety of what we think

19
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

of as emotions individually; for example, pity in the Republic (to eleinon), shame in the
Gorgias (aiskhunê), and erotic love (erôs) in various dialogues, above all the Symposium.
When, in the context of his critique of poetry in the Republic, Socrates condemns the public
venting of grief, he says that a good person will, thanks to reason, resist the pain caused by
the loss of a child or other misfortune (603e–604a), although pathos, that is, the “felt” dimen-
sion of the experience, inclines him to such grief (604a10–11). Poets appeal to the weaker
part of the soul (605a2–4) and can even induce decent people to experience such a sentiment,
since they are likely to sympathize (sumpaskhontes; 605d4) with or feel pity for (603b3) the
suffering of the characters on the stage. Poets may likewise arouse laughter, sexual desire,
temper, or anger, and all things involving desires, pleasures, and pains (606d1–2), all of which
are taken (in this context) to be irrational responses (Campeggiani 2020). The bottom line is
that Plato uses the word pathos in connection with a wide variety of reactions (Konstan
2006b), and for this reason, as we note below, Aristotle may be deemed the first to have theo-
rized the emotions as a class. As noted before, the root verb means basically to experience
something, and so bears a passive sense: a pathos is what happens to you, as opposed to what
you do (e.g., Sophist 248d4–5; Gorgias 476c2–3). By a slight extension, pathos may indicate
a quality or attribute of something as opposed to its essence (e.g., Euthyphro 11a8; Sophist
245a1l; Republic 376a11), but also mental phenomena such as wisdom or remembering, or
even stupidity or wonder (e.g., Phaedo 73e2; Theaetetus 155d3, 166b3; Republic 432d5l).
Plato labels pleasure and pain as pathê (Philebus 32b6–7, etc.), and also thirst and hunger
(Phaedo 94b7–10). In the Timaeus (69c8–d4), the pathê include, besides pleasure and pain,
confidence and fear, temper (thumos) and hope (cf. Aspasius 46.7–12 Heylbut, transl. Konstan
2006a: 46).
This very inclusivity suggests that Plato is listing the whole range of affections and activities
of the soul. Although it does not amount to a systematic treatment of emotions, Plato’s psy-
chology lays the groundwork for a more general conception of affectivity, shedding light on
the fundamental issues later thinkers will have to deal with. The tripartite theory of the soul
provides us with insights into the relationship between emotions, beliefs, knowledge, and
desires. The vivid descriptions of the phenomenology of mental conflict take account of vari-
ous cognitive and physiological aspects of emotions: the pleasure and pain they involve, their
conative dimension, and the complex interactions between emotions and the objects to which
they are directed. Finally, Plato’s concern for a philosophical reform of traditional culture and
his awareness of the way social institutions influence character and behavior highlight the
importance of affective education for individual happiness and social justice. On all these
issues, Aristotle, the first Greek philosopher to develop anything like a theory of emotions,
will have something to say.

Aristotle
Aristotle’s explicit exploration of emotions as such takes place chiefly in the Rhetoric and in
the De anima (On the Soul). Whereas in the Rhetoric the focus is on the emotions as inten-
tional (object-directed) responses involving some form of appraisal, in the De anima Aristotle
attends also to their physical dimension and, in accord with his hylomorphic approach to
soul-body relations, he affirms that the evaluative component of emotions is neither indepen-
dent of bodily states nor separable from them (De anima 403a 16–403b 1). A full understand-
ing of Aristotle’s theory and its relevance to contemporary concerns must take account not
only of both these texts, but also of the full range of Aristotle’s understanding of emotions as
evidenced in his ethical, aesthetic, political, and biological works.

20
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

The Rhetoric begins in a puzzling fashion. In the very first paragraph, Aristotle affirms that
pity and anger and similar pathê of the soul are not strictly relevant to the science of rhetoric,
which should deal exclusively with rational argumentation; appealing to the pathê is like
using a bent ruler to measure something (1354a20–32). Yet, in the very next paragraph, he
indicates that emotion is important to oratory because people judge a case differently when
they are distressed or cheerful, or feel hatred or affection. Accordingly, in the second book of
the treatise, he launches upon the first detailed and rigorous discussion of what we readily
identify as emotions, beginning with a brief and rather enigmatic definition: “Let the pathê be
all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and
upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things
and their opposites” (1378a20–23). Two points are worth noting in this connection. First,
emotions seem to be defined by their effect upon our judgment, an account that is natural in
the context of a treatise on rhetoric but which may seem too narrow as a description of emo-
tions as such. Second, it is worth noting that Aristotle here, and also at the beginning of the
first book of the Rhetoric, is careful to provide examples of the kinds of pathê he has in mind:
it is likely that Aristotle is here indicating a special sense of pathos, narrower than the general
use of the term that we found, for example, in Plato, precisely in order to identify emotion as
a distinct class of affects. He is not only the first seriously to theorize emotions, but he is also
the first to recognize just the kinds of items that we call emotions as a separate category
(Fortenbaugh 2002; Konstan 2006c; contra Cooper 1999).
Because Aristotle’s primary interest in the Rhetoric is in arousing or assuaging emotions by
means of speech, he naturally focuses on the stimuli to emotion – the kinds of events or behav-
ior which, when vividly described, will produce the desired effect. This emphasis is in part
responsible for the alleged intellectual nature of Aristotle’s conception of emotions. Richard
Lazarus, one of the founders of modern appraisal theory, has stated that “those who favor a
cognitive-mediational approach must also recognize that Aristotle’s Rhetoric more than two
thousand years ago applied this kind of approach to a number of emotions in terms that seem
remarkably modern” (Lazarus 2001: 40). Aristotle’s definition of anger gives a good idea of
his approach: “Let anger, then, be a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on
account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one’s own”
(Rhetoric 1378a31–33). The description of the emotion emphasizes three components famil-
iar to modern emotion theorists: anger involves an appraisal of its eliciting conditions (it is a
response to a perceived slight or belittlement), bodily changes and feelings (it is accompanied
by pain), and a conative state (it brings on a desire for revenge). We will consider in greater
detail each component in turn.
As to the appraisal dimension of anger, it is crucial to emphasize that a slight is a social
phenomenon: one has to be able to recognize and evaluate an insult and also to determine
whether the person who has put you down was fit – that is, in a social position – to do so.
Aristotle’s definition places very narrow limits on the causes of anger, and hence its very
nature. For example, the sudden fury that results from stubbing one’s toe on a chair would not
count as anger on Aristotle’s terms; a chair cannot insult a person, although one can of course
feel irritated (one might imagine the chair as a willful agent, but Aristotle does not consider
this reaction). What is more, it is dubious whether animals can experience anger on such a
description, since they do not normally respond to insults as opposed to maltreatment; nor
could we be angry at animals, on Aristotle’s view, because animals cannot slight us or belittle
us. Anger, as Aristotle conceives of it, requires a high degree of social sophistication (for
example, a clear sense of hierarchy) along with the ability to judge or appraise verbal acts and
their significance. The higher-order process of appraisal involved in anger is nevertheless

21
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

entangled with physical processes: not only would the evaluative recognition of an insult not
amount to an emotional reaction were it not accompanied by the relevant bodily state (e.g., in
the case of anger, the boiling of the blood and heat around the heart), but Aristotle says that
bodily feelings themselves can guide our value orientation. Sometimes, when the body is
already agitated (for example, when we are hungry or thirsty), we are moved to anger even by
insignificant stimuli; analogously, if one is not in the right physical state, one may feel no
excitement in spite of strong provocations (De anima 403a19–24; cf. also Rhetoric
1379a16–18). It also must be noted that the word “perceived” that Aristotle attaches to
“slight” and “revenge” renders the Greek participle phainomenos, from the verb phainesthai
(the root also of phantasia), meaning “to appear” or “be apprehended”: some have taken
Aristotle to mean that a slight must not escape one’s notice and that revenge must be percep-
tible, but he most likely meant that a slight could either be real or merely perceived as such by
the victim. Aristotle qualifies as phainomena the objects of many different emotions (e.g., fear,
pity, indignation, or envy: Rhetoric 1382a21–22, 1385b13, 1387a9, 1387b23). We will come
back to the role that imagination (phantasia) and beliefs (doxai) play in the formation of emo-
tions when discussing the De anima.
As we have noted, Aristotle mentions the hedonic properties of emotions not only in his
description of individual emotions but also in the general definition of pathê. In the Rhetoric,
he associates emotions with pain (lupê) and pleasure (hedonê); some emotions, such as anger,
are associated with both pleasure and pain (as will be shown), although he appears sometimes
to ignore this affective element (e.g., he affirms that hatred is not accompanied by pain). The
hedonic properties of emotions consist in bodily alterations. Pleasure and pain are described
in terms of sense perception (aisthetikē: Eudemian Ethics 1120b14): in the Rhetoric, pain is
often associated with physiological disturbances (1382a 21, 1383b 14, 1386b 23–24) and the
word hedonê covers a variety of pleasures, ranging from mental states to bodily sensations
(Cooper 1999: 416; on the role of perceived affects in Aristotle, see Campeggiani 2023).
The body is thus not absent from Aristotle’s understanding of emotions, as he makes abun-
dantly clear in his treatise on the soul, which is worth citing in extenso:

It seems too that all the affections of the soul come with body: anger, mildness, fear, pity,
confidence, and also joy and loving, and hating. For the body experiences something
along with these. This is shown by the fact that sometimes, when faced with strong and
manifest stimuli there is no indication of excitement or fear, but on other occasions
people are moved by weak and dim stimuli, that is when the body is aroused and is in
the condition it is when angry. Here is an even clearer case: in the absence of anything
fearful people find themselves experiencing what someone who is afraid does. If this is
so, it is clear that the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts. Thus, their defini-
tions will be of this sort: “being angry is a kind movement of such and such a body or
part or faculty, caused by this or that and for the sake of this or that. …” The natural
scientist and the dialectic philosopher would define each of these differently, for instance,
what anger is. For the dialectic philosopher would define it as a desire to return pain, or
something of the sort, whereas the natural scientist would define it as a boiling of blood
and heat around the heart.
(De anima 403a16–403b1)

Formal and physical components of emotions tend to be defined separately: the dialectic phi-
losopher focuses on the evaluative processes and the dispositional states that emotions imply,
keeping them conceptually separated from their bodily dimension, with which the natural

22
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

scientist is concerned. Yet, Aristotle affirms that a proper definition of emotion requires an
integrated analysis of both its formal and physical dimension: just as the soul and the body can
be distinguished in definition, but are entangled and indivisible in living organisms as hylomor-
phic compounds (De anima 412a–413a), in the same way pathê are “enmattered accounts”,
that is they display formal and physical elements but cannot be identified with either
The role played by phantasia in the formation of emotions also depends on their enmat-
tered nature. In the De anima, Aristotle describes the cognitive power of phantasia as depen-
dent on sense perception. It is required by or involved in cognitive activities as numerous and
as diverse as having desires, moving through space and performing actions, having memories,
forming expectations, thinking abstractly, imagining, dreaming, having perceptual impres-
sions, and experiencing emotional reactions (Nussbaum 1978; Frede 1992; Schofield 1992;
Caston 2021; Campeggiani 2024a). Aristotle is explicit that emotions may arise either from
beliefs (doxai) or from phantasia (De anima 427b22–25), and we have seen that, in the
Rhetoric, he qualifies as phainomenos, “perceived”, the object or the cause of a number of
emotions. Affective phenomena can thus be elicited by non-epistemic appearances: it is enough
to have a certain impression, deceptive as it may be, or to create an appearance by imagina-
tion, in order to feel an emotion (contra Fortenbaugh 2002: 100). It is also worth noting that
Aristotle’s discussion of the role that phantasia plays in affective processes and its connection
with sense perception further underscores the need for an inclusive understanding of emotions
as unitary psychophysical experiences, as stated at the beginning of De anima.
Finally, Aristotle takes account too of what today are called the action tendencies associ-
ated with emotion. Thus, he defines anger as “a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived
revenge”; if an insult is, as it were, the input that arouses anger, anger’s output is a desire to
retaliate for the insult. Aristotle goes so far as to say that if revenge is absolutely impossible
even to imagine, then one cannot really experience anger, since we cannot desire things that
we know cannot be realized. The role of phantasia is again of paramount importance: if the
perceived slight causes us to feel pain, our prospective revenge, which we anticipate in imagi-
nation, is a source of pleasure (Rhetoric 1378b8–10).
We have seen that, in his definition of emotions, Aristotle specifies that they are accompa-
nied by pain and pleasure (although these sensations are not always indicated explicitly in the
definition, e.g., of hatred and gratitude). It is tempting to treat this as an anticipation of the
idea that emotions are positive or negative, and to suppose that when Aristotle speaks of emo-
tions “and their opposites”, he is classifying them according to their experienced valence.
Anger, then, might be considered a negative pathos, since it is said to be painful. In fact, as we
have just seen, Aristotle adds that there is also a pleasurable aspect to anger in the savoring of
anticipated revenge: thus it is accompanied by both pain and pleasure. What is more, Aristotle
describes pity and indignation as opposites, and yet both are painful feelings. He defines pity
as “a kind of pain in the case of an apparent destructive or painful harm in one not deserving
to encounter it, which one might expect oneself, or one of one’s own, to suffer, and this when
it seems near” (Rhetoric 1385b13–16). Indignation, on the other hand, which Aristotle speci-
fies as the opposite of pity, consists in “feeling pain at someone who appears to be succeeding
undeservedly” (1387a8–9). The contrast between pity and indignation resides in the cause of
the distress that is associated with each: the former responds to undeserved misfortune, the
latter to unmerited good fortune (as Aristotle observes in Topics 1.15, there are several ways
to construe the opposite of complex propositions).
In this connection, we may observe that both these contrasting emotions, pity and indigna-
tion, involve a moral judgment: pity is not simply a gut response to another’s suffering, irre-
spective of the cause, nor is indignation reducible to mere resentment about another person’s

23
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

prosperity. Aristotle does recognize such an emotion, which he identifies as envy and defines
as “a kind of pain, in respect to one’s equals, for their apparent success in things called good,
not so as to have the thing oneself but [solely] on their account”, that is, because they have
something that we do not have, irrespective whether we have a need for it. But although oth-
ers, Aristotle reports, have regarded pity and envy as opposites – the one consisting in pain at
another’s misfortune, the other in pain at another’s good fortune – Aristotle himself flatly
denies this, precisely because envy lacks an appraisal of desert.
Aristotle does not, in the Rhetoric, include in his inventory of emotions pain caused by the
mere perception of someone who is suffering harm, irrespective of desert, which would
appear to be the proper opposite of envy. Pity, in fact, presupposes a certain distance. As he
observes, “people pity their acquaintances, provided that they are not exceedingly close in
kinship; for concerning these they are disposed as they are concerning themselves. … For
what is terrible is different from what is pitiable, and is expulsive of pity” (1386a18–23).
Aristotle cites the remark of a certain Amasis, who did not weep when his son was led out to
die but did so in the case of a friend: “the latter was pitiable, the former terrible”, Aristotle
comments (Herodotus 3.14 reports the story slightly differently). To understand Aristotle’s
point, we may recall that, in his definition of pity, Aristotle states that we feel pity at unde-
served afflictions of the kind that “one might expect oneself, or one of one’s own, to suffer”.
The sufferings of dear ones, whether close family or friends, are felt as though they were our
own, and, as Aristotle says, “people stop pitying when something terrible is happening to
them”. The reason is presumably that we feel pity when we are vulnerable to adversity rather
than when we are actually experiencing it. People who have always been well off tend to feel
immune to misfortune and so are not given to feeling pity, according to Aristotle. What is
more, Aristotle states that those who have lost everything are also incapable of pity, just
because they do not believe that they can suffer anything worse. Pity, then, requires some
similarity with the sufferer, so that we recognize our own vulnerability to such harm. The
emotion of pity (eleos) also plays a prominent role in the Poetics, where, together with fear
(phobos), it is the source of the “proper pleasure” of tragedy. Pity is elicited by the recogni-
tion that the pitied’s misfortune is undeserved and, in this respect, is distinct from what
Aristotle calls to philanthrôpon, a sympathetic or philanthropic feeling devoid of moral
content that is elicited by human sorrow as such (Poetics 1453a 1–7), and so more like a
unreflective or instinctive response (as Aristotle observes, we do not pity someone who is
justly condemned to punishment). On the other hand, “fear pertains to a person who is simi-
lar to ourselves” (Poetics 1453a5–6), since we perceive that we are vulnerable to a compa-
rable misfortune. This common vulnerability (which in the Rhetoric was one of the grounds
for pity) constitutes an emotional bond, at least among members of the same group who can
identify with one another’s condition.
Aristotle has several terms for sympathy, or rather, for sharing another person’s pleasure or
pain. In English, “condolence” (like sympathy) refers to sharing in someone else’s pain, but
there is not a corresponding term that denotes sharing in someone else’s pleasure. Aristotle
states that we feel what we may call positive and negative sympathy for those who are “our
own”, that is, very dear to us, but this joint pain or pleasure is not, strictly speaking, an emo-
tion (Konstan 2001). Aristotle perhaps draws another distinction between a full emotion and
an instinctive affect in his account of love or philia (Konstan 1997). The love between friends
and dear ones is predicated, according to Aristotle, on attractive qualities in the other, which
include congeniality, usefulness, and a good character, the last being the most significant. But
many creatures experience affection for their young, and clearly for none of these three
motives. As William Fortenbaugh observes:

24
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

Humans have the capacity to think and therefore can believe that an insult has occurred
and that some danger threatens. Animals lack this cognitive capacity and therefore can-
not experience emotions as analyzed by Aristotle. Of course, animals can be said to
experience pathê, for this word has multiple meanings and can be used inclusively to
cover both the emotional responses of human beings and the reactions of animals.
(2002: 94)

Fortenbaugh here understands “cognition” in the narrow sense of an abstract intellectual

process. But Aristotle’s multidimensional and anti-essentialist approach to emotions as psy-
chophysical experiences involving perception and bodily alterations, but also appraisals and
goal-oriented behaviors, accounts for the divergences and the continuities of forms of affective
experience as diverse as those of human and nonhuman animals.
We conclude by noting the importance of emotions for the virtuous life in Aristotle’s ethical
treatises: emotions, he says,

may be felt both too much or too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at
the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the
right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is
characteristic of virtue.
(Nicomachean Ethics 1106b20–23)

Later commentators sometimes referred to this equilibrium as metropatheia or “moderate

emotion”, but the term does not appear in Aristotle’s own works. Virtues are for Aristotle
correct dispositions toward emotions: morally virtuous people correctly appraise the object of
their emotions and orient their behavior accordingly (Campeggiani 2024b). Courage, for
example, is a correct disposition toward fear, and mildness (praotês) toward anger; virtuous
people rightly appraise and evaluate and their emotional responses and behavior are as they
ought to be: they are neither rash nor cowardly, neither irascible nor apathetic (Nicomachean
Ethics 1125b25–1126b10). How are we to achieve correct dispositions and become virtuous?
Aristotle’s multidimensional approach to emotions once again indicates the way: emotions are
bound up with cognitive and evaluative processes, but they also involve feelings of pleasure
and pain. Although these components are sometimes isolated for purposes of philosophical
analysis, they are indissociable in the emotional experience: this is why emotions cannot be
controlled by reason alone and require a long period of ethical training and practice
(Nicomachean Ethics 1179b–1180a). Education, achieved through laws, customs, and family
discipline, molds a person’s moral character and dispositions in part by the dispensation of
pleasure and pain in the form of rewards and punishments. The education of the emotions
thus represents, for Aristotle, an essential part of human life and the high road to moral virtue.
Yet, Hellenistic philosophers, to whom we now turn, were inclined to see emotions as a threat
to psychological stability and the virtuous life.

Epicureanism and Stoicism

Both Epicureanism and Stoicism originated in Athens at the end of the fourth century BC and
represented two major strands in Hellenistic philosophy for centuries thereafter.
Epicurus, an Athenian raised in Samos, set up a school in Athens toward the end of the
fourth century. Although no surviving treatise of his is devoted specifically to emotions, we
know that he applied the term pathê to the sensations of pleasure (hêdonê) and pain (algêdôn),

25
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

which he regarded as basic criteria for the evaluation of experience as to be pursued or avoided
(Diogenes Laertius 10.34; other such criteria were the information provided by the senses,
which he deemed always to be true – if we see something as red, there is no way to falsify the
sensation – and certain types of especially clear concepts acquired through the senses, such as
“warm”, “sweet”, “human being”). For Epicurus, the pathê reside in the non-rational part of
the soul (he seems to have adopted a bipartite model of the soul, with rational and irrational
parts) and are instinctive; as such, they are distinct from reactions that require the participa-
tion of the rational soul, such as joy and fear (khara and phobos: Diogenes Laertius 10.66; cf.
Lucretius De rerum natura [On the Nature of Things] 3.136–76; Konstan 2008: 3–25; these
emotions might also be referred to as pathê in a more latitudinarian usage). The latter, although
they involve sensations of pleasure or pain, are subject to reasoning and argument: they may
be mistaken, dependent on empty, that is irrational, beliefs (as in the case of the fear of death:
Letter to Menoeceus 124), and are thus liable to philosophical therapy, i.e. reasoning as a
challenge to empty beliefs and the disturbing desires they underlie (Letter to Menoeceus 132;
on Epicurean philosophy as therapy see Nussbaum 1994: ch. 4).
The major treatise on the emotions to survive from the Epicurean school is On Anger by
the first-century BC Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, whose library, buried by the eruption
of Vesuvius in 79 AD, has been partially recovered (the scrolls are scorched and require expert
restoration and interpretation). Philodemus identified two types of anger, one of which he
called orgê, the same term employed by Aristotle, and which he, like Aristotle, regarded as a
legitimate response to unwarranted offenses (this kind of anger is moderate in intensity and of
short duration). The other type of anger Philodemus labeled thumos, or “empty orgê”; that is
anger based on false opinion and hence the kind of uncontrolled rage to which the sage was
not vulnerable (Indelli 2004). It is debated whether this distinction goes back to Epicurus
himself or is a later development.
The goal in life for Epicurus was what he called ataraxia, or the absence of perturbation,
that is irrational fears and desires, but not fear or desire per se. This is quite different from the
Stoic apatheia, often taken to mean the elimination of all emotion, but more precisely, as we
shall see, referring to affects, such as fear but also pity and anger, etc., that are based on false
judgments. Ataraxia was a state of mind that, when combined with the absence of corporeal
pain, constituted the highest state of pleasure. The chief cause of mental disturbance was taken
to be fear, or more precisely, irrational or empty fear, that is fear based on a misapprehension
of the potential threat. The Epicureans held that the most fundamental fear was that of death
and of punishment in the afterlife; they thus argued that the soul disintegrates entirely upon
the dissolution of the body, and that, consequently, “death is nothing to us” (Epicurus Letter
to Menoeceus 124; Lucretius 3.830), since when we are dead we no longer exist, and when we
are alive death is absent. The unacknowledged fear of death and extinction was in turn the
cause of irrational desires, such as limitless ambition and greed, which were imagined as
somehow holding death at bay. So powerful were the effects of anxiety that, Lucretius affirmed,
some people actually commit suicide to escape it, “forgetting that the source of their sorrows
is this very fear” (Lucretius 3.82). This suggestion of unconscious anxiety anticipates modern
notions of repression and displacement and renders Epicureanism the most psychological (in
the modern sense) of the ancient theories of emotion. To sum up, Epicurus regarded pleasure
as naturally attractive, as evidenced by the behavior of animals and infants (sometimes referred
to as “the cradle argument”). The highest pleasure consisted in the well-being and proper
functioning of the mind and body: it was the positive experience of the absence of pain and
perturbation. If people failed to pursue such natural pleasure, it was because empty emotions –
that is, emotions and, above all, fear excited by imaginary dangers (death and posthumous

26
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

suffering) – blinded them to the natural and easily obtainable sources of pleasure and instilled
insatiable desires, whether for wealth or power, that seemed to promise an impossible security.
Epicurus, like Aristotle and the Stoics (as we shall see), thus recognized an irreducible element
of appraisal in his conception of the emotions (as distinct from the instinctive character of
pleasure and pain, which he also referred to more narrowly as pathê).
The Stoic school was formed in Athens around 300 BC by Zeno of Citium: his immediate
successors were Cleanthes and Chrysippus (a prolific writer sometimes called the “second
founder” of Stoicism); later important figures are Posidonius and, in Roman imperial times,
Seneca, Epictetus, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. In respect to the emotions, the Stoics are
best known for their condemnation of the pathê and their endorsement of a state of apatheia,
that is, the absence of emotion. But their view is in fact more nuanced, and in their radically
cognitive interpretation of the emotions, involving voluntary assent to impressions, along with
a new conception of pre-rational impulses, they developed Aristotle’s conception of the emo-
tions (and indeed that of Epicurus) in new and creative ways.
The writings of the founders of Stoicism survive only in fragments, although they were
abundant, and there are inevitably difficulties in reconstructing their views. Our most detailed
information comes from the works of Seneca, who lived in the first century AD in Rome and
was tutor to the emperor Nero, before Nero turned against him and ordered him to commit
suicide. Seneca wrote a treatise on anger (De ira), and another, shorter and incomplete, on
clemency or mercy (De clementia); his essay on benefactions (De beneficiis) has much to tell
us about gratitude (treated as an emotion by Aristotle in Rhetoric 2.7, though the emotion in
most translations is misidentified as kindness: see Konstan 2006c,: 156–68), and scattered
throughout his other writings (above all the collection of Moral Epistles addressed to Lucilius)
are insights into the nature of emotions of many sorts, including fear, shame, grief, and love.
Seneca also wrote several tragedies, in which he illustrated the passions in action. In this sec-
tion, we outline the Stoic account of emotions with reference mainly to Seneca’s writings,
highlighting where possible continuities and the differences between the Roman version of
Stoicism and its Greek predecessors.
Seneca affirms in his essay on anger that the Stoic definition of this emotion is roughly the
same as that of Aristotle: as he puts it, “Aristotle’s definition is not far different from ours; for
he says that anger is the desire that pain be paid back”. Chrysippus had described anger as
“the desire to take vengeance against one who is believed to have committed a wrong contrary
to one’s deserts” (SVF 3.395). “It is objected to both definitions”, Seneca continues, “that wild
animals grow angry but they are not stirred up by an offense or for the sake of punishment or
pain to another; for even if they accomplish this, it is not what they intend”. To this, Seneca
replies:

We must affirm that wild animals, and all creatures apart from human beings, are with-
out anger; for since anger is contrary to reason, it does not arise except where reason has
a place. Animals have violence, rabidity, ferocity, aggression, but do not have anger any
more than they have licentiousness. … Dumb animals lack human emotions, but they do
have certain impulses that are similar to emotions.

Seneca goes on to observe that animals can utter sounds, but they do not have language. Their
perceptions, moreover, are muddy and confused: “thus, their attacks and outbreaks are vio-
lent, but they do not have fears and worries, sadness and anger, but rather things that are simi-
lar to these” (De ira 1.3.4–8); so too, in the Consolation to Marcia (5.1), Seneca states that
animals do not experience sadness and fear any more than stones do.

27
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

When it comes to authentic human emotions, Seneca explains: “there is no doubt but that
what arouses anger is the impression that is presented of an injury” (De ira 2.1.3). Both
Chrysippus’s and Seneca’s descriptions bear on the judgment that an injustice or insult (iniu-
ria) has occurred. Likewise, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle’s definition of anger implied, as we have
seen, an evaluative perception of a slight. Aristotle had also insisted on the enmattered nature
of emotions and the Stoics too provided a physical account of emotions: for example, Zeno
described them as “a fluttering of the soul” (SVF 1.206), and Chrysippus noted that emotions
were accompanied by swellings or contractions of the soul that we feel in the heart (LS 65 K 1).
Nonetheless, even if they recognized the physiological substratum of emotions, the Stoics
concentrated principally on their cognitive aspect and conceived of emotions as necessarily
involving reason and thus inaccessible to animals or human children up to the age of 14. In
his more precise definition in the second book of On Anger, Seneca states that anger is aroused
by the presentation or appearance of an offense, but he immediately adds that the emotion
follows automatically not upon the presentation itself, but only when the mind gives its assent
(“anger ventures nothing on its own, save when the mind approves [animo adprobante]”; De
ira 2.1.4). Thus, for anger to arise, one must receive the impression (species = Greek phanta-
sia) of having endured an offense and must desire passionately (concupiscere) to avenge it, and
must further join two judgments together, namely that one ought not to have been harmed or
offended and that one ought to seek revenge, and all this is not a function of that impulse
(impetus) that is stimulated independently of our will (sine voluntate nostra). In a similar vein,
Chrysippus had defined emotions as consisting of two judgments: that something is beneficial
or harmful, and that it is appropriate to react. The immediate impulse, Seneca explains, is a
simple thing, whereas a true emotion is compounded and contains several elements: one has
recognized something (that is, received an impression), considered it improper or injurious
(indignari), condemned it, and is in the act of avenging it, and all this cannot occur unless the
mind has given its assent to what has struck it. And this animals cannot do, and hence they do
not in fact get angry in the proper sense.
If human emotions differ from those of animals, according to the Stoics, in respect to their
evaluative nature, human beings too have precognitive affective responses to impressions,
defined as impulses (impetus). Consistent with earlier Stoic views (cf. Posidonius’ idea of
“emotional movements” and the notion of “pre-emotions” or propatheiai mentioned by Philo
and by Clement of Alexandria: Sorabji 2000; Graver 2007), Seneca labels such responses “the
initial preliminaries to emotions” (principia proludentia adfectibus: 2.2.5), and he provides a
detailed list of such reactions to a wide variety of stimuli. These include shivering with cold,
squeamishness at certain kinds of touch, hair standing on end in response to bad news, blush-
ing, dizziness caused by heights, and the sentiments (which resemble emotions but do not
count as such) that we experience when seeing plays, reading books, hearing music or seeing
horrible paintings, or watching people being severely punished even if they deserve it (other-
wise, a judgment of desert would yield the pathos or emotion of pity). What all these reactions
have in common is precisely that they are involuntary and do not depend on judgment or
assent. When you are watching a tragedy, you may shudder instinctively at the action on stage
but you know perfectly well that there is no real danger, and hence what you are experiencing
is not fear, and your response is not in principle different from trembling because of a chill. In
this same context, Seneca states that “the ears of a soldier prick up at the sound of a trumpet,
even when peace reigns and he is wearing the toga” (De ira 2.2.6). This is not the confidence
that Aristotle regarded as the opposite of fear, based on a sound judgment of one’s superiority
in battle, but mere excitement; indeed, Seneca says that war horses react similarly to the clash
of arms.

28
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

The Stoics’ insistence that full-scale emotions are not only elicited by an impression (in
Greek, phantasia; in Latin, species) but require the rational and voluntary assent to this
impression is crucial to their belief that the sage is free of such responses. They recognized that
even a wise person will shiver when cold, and held that growing pale or trembling at the
prospect of a storm at sea was likewise instinctive and not subject to reason; hence, the sage
too would be subject to them, but not to emotions as strictly defined. Seneca’s description of
emotions as concitationes animi voluntate (“willed stirrings of the mind”) and their definition
in terms of their propositional content reveal both their voluntary nature and the ethical
responsibility they imply: rational human beings are accountable for their emotions, insofar
as they are accountable for what they believe and hence for assenting to an impression. This
also explains the place attributed to emotions in the Stoic ethical system: their elimination is
prescribed because they are grounded on incorrect value judgments (for example, that insults
or even death constitute an evil, whereas the only true evil is vice), and no one should believe
what is false. Apatheia (that is, impassivity, freedom from passion) thus becomes the norm to
which the Stoics are committed. The sage’s affective experience will be rational and good:
apatheia does not exclude affective responses arising from true judgments of the value of
things (again, only virtue counted as an unqualified good for the Stoics, and vice as an evil);
such responses were labeled eupatheiai, literally “good pathê” (see further in this section).
The Stoics classified all emotions under four general headings: pleasure, pain, appetite or
desire, and fear. The first two were responses to present stimuli, perceived either as good or as
evil; the latter two to anticipated positive or negative presentations – for example, the expecta-
tion of pain. Under each of these classes, they listed a large number of emotions, minutely
distinguished from one another. For example, anger was defined as a wish for revenge inspired
by the impression of an injury (one must judge voluntarily that it is an injury), and so falls
under the rubric of desire. Under pain, the Stoics grouped such pathê as envy, jealousy, pity,
grief, and an assortment of other feelings for which it is difficult to find suitable English
equivalents. Pity, to take one of these subtypes, is defined as “pain for someone who has suf-
fered undeservedly” (Diogenes Laertius 7.111; cf. Stobaeus Eclogae 2.92.7; Andronicus Peri
pathôn 2, p. 12 Kreuttner). In these classifications, elaborate as they are, the general term, e.g.,
lupê (pain or distress), is not repeated among the species of emotion. Similarly, fear as a gen-
eral class may be taken to mean “avoidance”, thus including a wide spectrum of emotions
ranging from trepidation (agōnia) to shame (aiskhunē) and reluctance (oknos), since each of
them represents a painful response to something perceived as evil (e.g., somebody else’s goods
in the case of envy, or somebody’s unjust suffering in the case of pity). Pleasure includes satis-
faction and, perhaps surprisingly, spite. It is probably best to understand the general catego-
ries as elements that are associated with the several emotions they cover; thus, pain and
pleasure are not complete emotions in themselves (although the Stoics use the term pathos for
these), but components of the relevant emotions.
The Stoics also held that the good emotions of the sage fall under only three headings: joy
corresponding to pleasure, caution to fear (one takes care to avoid undesirable states’ affairs
but without regarding them as vicious and hence frightening), and wishing to desire or appe-
tite. These emotions (as they appear to be) also embrace subclasses; wishing includes goodwill
(eunoia) and cherishing (agapêsis), among others; caution includes respect (aidôs) and rever-
ence (hagneia); whereas joy (khara) embraces gladness and cheerfulness (see Gill 2016). The
genera to which eupatheiai belong all have virtue as their object: we feel joy at being virtuous,
we wish to be virtuous, and we take caution against misdeeds or vice. There is no category of
eupatheiai corresponding to pain, since the wise are secure in their virtue and regard nothing
else as bad or harmful. This is where the Stoics connect their emotion theory with their theory

29
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

of value: virtue is the only thing that is genuinely good, and it is under our control. Likewise,
only vice is bad. All the rest (such as health, wealth, beauty, and their contraries) should be
regarded as morally indifferent, although the Stoics allowed that such things might be pre-
ferred to illness or poverty; but preference does not confer value on its object – value inheres
in virtue and virtue alone. It is usually rational to pursue health and avoid disease, but actually
obtaining health is irrelevant for our happiness. In ordinary emotions, undue importance is
attached to these “indifferents”, by regarding them as being good or bad for us: precisely
because ordinary emotions are grounded on such incorrect evaluations, freedom from them is
a moral ideal. If emotions are false judgments concerning what is good and what is bad, they
are cured by reasoning rather than by suppression: the judgment that something is good or
bad, and hence deserving of anger, for example, or pity, can be cognitively addressed by show-
ing that the objects of our emotion are in fact indifferent and not a matter of virtue or vice.
The Stoics also recommended techniques to counter the incipient judgment that might gener-
ate an emotion; for example, observing ourselves in a mirror and seeing how hideous we
appear with our features distorted by rage serves as negative reinforcement and will incline us
to think twice about how we judge offenses (De ira 2.36.1). It is worth remarking that apatheia
is not inconsistent with the sage’s good emotions: the Stoics endeavored not to eliminate
affectivity from human life but rather to set the mind free from false beliefs and shape it
according to virtue. For the Stoics, good emotions, which are based on genuine knowledge,
were a fundamental part of the virtuous life.

Conclusion
Our survey of ancient Greek theories of emotions has been necessarily brief, but we hope we
have shown that they anticipate modern views in a variety of ways. Each of the philosophical
conceptions we have reviewed is distinct, but all take account of the phenomenology of emo-
tions, their intentionality as reactions to objects or events, and their epistemological and moral
dimensions. All the classical schools conceived of emotions as psychophysical experiences,
though the fullest account of emotions as embodied phenomena goes back to Aristotle, whose
conception of the pathê as logoi enhuloi, “enamatterred accounts”, in the De anima did not
preclude the analysis of their intentional and evaluative dimension in the Rhetoric. The Greek
and Roman thinkers in general did not attempt comparative analyses of emotions in different
cultures, although Latin writers were conscious of differences in vocabulary; but the overall
cognitive orientation of ancient theories, along with their practical emphasis on the education
of the emotions and their relation to social institutions, opened up a space for something like
today’s social constructivist approaches to emotion by acknowledging changes in the nature
of emotions over time and dependency of appraisals on contemporary values. This is espe-
cially clear in connection with Aristotle’s exploration of the role played by doxai and phanta-
siai (beliefs and impressions) in emotions, and the crucial function of moral evaluation. It is
fair to say that, in theorizing about emotions, it is appropriate to treat the classical Greek and
Roman thinkers not as primitive precursors to modern approaches, but as full colleagues in a
common project of investigation.

References
Bremmer, J. (1983) The Early Greek Concept of the Soul, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cairns, D.L. (2014) “Ψυχή, Θυμός, and Metaphor in Homer and Plato,” Études Platoniciennes 11.
Online: https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesplatoniciennes.566

30
 Emotion Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome

———. (2016) “Mind, Body, and Metaphor in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion,” in D. Boquet and
P. Nagy (eds.) Histoire intellectuelle des émotions, de l’Antiquité à nos jours, L’Atelier du Centre de
Recherches Historiques 16. Online: https://doi.org/10.4000/acrh.7416
Cairns, D.L., and Nelis, D. (2017) Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and
Directions, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verglag.
Cairns, D.L. (2019a) “Introduction: Emotion History and the Classics,” in Id. (ed.) A Cultural History
of Emotions in Antiquity, London: Bloomsbury.
———. (2019b) “Thymos,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, digital ed., New York, Oxford
University Press.
———. (2019c) “Thymos in Homer: Philological, Oral-­poetic, and Cognitive Approaches,” Quaestiones
Oralitatis 4: 13–30.
Cairns, D.L. (2022), “Emotions through time?” in D.L. Cairns, M. Hinterberger, A. Pizzone, and
M. Zaccarini (eds). Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium, Mohr Siebeck:
Tübingen, 3–33
———. (2023) “Emotions,” in Oxford Classical Dictionary, New York: Oxford University Press.
Online: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.7034
Cairns, D.L., M. Hinterberger, A. Pizzone, and M. Zaccarini eds. (2022) Emotions through Time: From
Antiquity to Byzantium, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Campeggiani, P. (2020) “The feel of the real: perceptual encounters in Plato’s critique of poetry,’ in
L. Candiotto and O. Renaut (eds.) Emotions in Plato, Leiden-­Boston: Brill, 39–60.
———. (2023) “Aristotle on Feelings of Bodily Changes,” in A. Alsmith and M. Longo (eds.) The
Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness, London: Routledge, 72–82.
———. (2024a) “The Realms of Fantasy: Aristotle on the Phenomenology of Mental Imagery,” in
X. Buxton and E. Clifford (eds.) Forms of Thought: The Imagination of the Mind in Classical Athens,
London: Routledge, 85–100.
———. (2024b) “Affective Construals: What Aristotle’s Moral Psychology Tells Us about Emotion,” in
D. L. Cairns and C. Virág (eds.) In the Mind, in the Body, in the World: Emotions in Early China and
Ancient Greece, New York: Oxford University Press, 155–169.
Campeggiani, P., and Konstan, D. (2017) “Emotions,” in Oxford Bibliographies Online in Classics,
New York: Oxford University Press. Online: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/
document/obo-­9780195389661/obo-­9780195389661-­0239.xml
Caston, V. (2021), “Aristotle and the Cartesian Theater,” in J. Fink and P. Gregoric (eds.) Encounters
with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge, 169–220.
Claus, D.B. (1981) Toward the Soul: An Enquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή before Plato, New Haven,
London: Yale University Press.
Cooper, J.M. (1999) Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dixon, T. (2003) From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferrari, G.R.F. (2007) “The Three-­Part Soul,” in G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to
Plato’s Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fortenbaugh W.W. (2002) Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric,
Poetics, Politics and Ethics, 2nd edition, London: Duckworth.
Frede, D. (1992) “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” in M.C. Nussbaum and A. Rorty
Oksenberg (eds.) Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gill, C. (2016) “Positive Emotions in Stoicism: Are They Enough?” in R.R. Caston and R.A. Kaster
(eds.) Hope, Joy and Affection in the Classical World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Graver, M.R. (2007) Stoicism and Emotion, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.
Havelock, E.A. (1963) Preface to Plato, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Indelli, G. (2004) “The Vocabulary of Anger in Philodemus’ De Ira and Vergil’s Aeneid,” in D. Armstrong,
J. Fish, P.A. Johnston, and M.B. Skinner (eds.) Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans, Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Kaster, R.A. (2005) Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Konstan, D. (1997) Friendship in the Classical World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. (2001) Pity Transformed, London: Bloomsbury.
———. (2006a) (transl.) Aspasius. On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1–4, 7–8, London: Bloomsbury.

31
 Pia Campeggiani and David Konstan

———. (2006b) “The Concept of Emotion from Plato to Cicero,” Méthexis 19: 139–151.
———. (2006c) The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature,
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
———. (2008) “A Life Worthy of the Gods”: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus, Las Vegas:
Parmenides Publishing.
———. (2016) “Their Emotions and Ours: A Single History?” in D. Boquet and P. Nagy (eds.) Histoire
intellectuelle des émotions, de l’Antiquité à nos jours, L’Atelier du Centre de Recherches Historiques
16. Online: https://journals.openedition.org/acrh/6756
Lazarus, R.S. (2001) “Relational Meaning and Discrete Emotions,” in K.R. Scherer, A. Schorr, and
T. Johnstone (eds.) Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Nussbaum, M.C. (1978) “The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanation of Action,” in Aristotle’s De
motu animalium, M. C. Nussbaum (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 221–269.
———. (1994) The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Pelliccia, H. (1995) Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Schofield, M. (1992) “Aristotle on Imagination,” in M.C. Nussbaum and A. Rorty Oksenberg (eds.)
Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sharples, R.W. (1983) “‘But Why Has My Spirit Spoken with Me Thus?’: Homeric Decision-­Making,”
Greece & Rome 30/1: 1–7.
Sorabji, R. (2000) Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

32
 2
EMOTION THEORY IN ANCIENT
AND CLASSICAL INDIA,
500 BCE–1200 CE
Maria Heim

Introduction
Turning to Indian civilization on the category “emotion” offers current emotion research fresh
reflection on human experience. The Indian thought explored in this chapter describes, classi-
fies, and theorizes this domain of human experience in markedly subtle and sophisticated
ways, exploring the nuances of emotional experience with fine-grained analyses, rich phenom-
enological description, and large-scale theoretical models. Specifically, the two main theoreti-
cal models discussed in this chapter, the Buddhist Abhidhamma system and Sanskrit aesthetic
theory, provide close phenomenological study of emotional experience aimed at describing its
wide variability; both resist reductionist and essentialist accounts of emotions. Since the Indian
systems operate, from the ground up, with different assumptions and paradigms from those of
the Western traditions, they can cast the contours of Western emotions research in sharp relief,
call into question their supposed universalism, and suggest substantial alternatives to them.

Ancient and Classical Indian Thought

This chapter is not a survey of ideas about emotions in Indian thought; it would be no more
possible to do so than to condense in a single chapter 2,500 years of European reflection on
emotions. Instead, it centers on what may be tentatively called “ancient” and “classical” texts
from India. The periodization of Indian civilization is nowhere settled, and mapping European
historical periods and their associations onto it may be misleading. In this chapter, “ancient”
and “classical” are merely terms of convenience to begin to demarcate the huge swaths of
intellectual history under consideration. The recorded intellectual history of ancient India was
dominated by texts in the elite Indo-European language of Sanskrit, starting from approxi-
mately 1200 BCE and continuing to the present day. More specifically, as the rich philosophi-
cal contexts of ancient Greece and China were getting underway, India too was abuzz with
philosophical debate and experimentation; this was the period of the Buddha and his many
interlocutors (beginning around the fifth century BCE). The texts we have from this “ancient”
period formed the basis of two and a half millennia of relatively unbroken philosophical
reflection in what became the main indigenous religions of India, now referred to as Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Jainism. We can also speak, again as a matter of convenience, of a later period,

33 DOI: 10.4324/9781315559940-4
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Kasvikon
oppisanoja
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Kasvikon oppisanoja

Author: Elias Lönnrot

Release date: March 29, 2017 [eBook #54457]

Language: Finnish

Credits: Produced by Jari Koivisto

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KASVIKON

OPPISANOJA ***
Produced by Jari Koivisto

KASVIKON OPPISANOJA
Kirj.

Elias Lönnrot

SUOMI, tidskrift i fosterländska ämnen, 1858.

Adertonde årgången
 Helsingfors, Finska Litteratur-Sällskapets tryckeri, 1859.

Imprimatur: L. Heimbürger.

Kuusi eri osaa on kasveissa merkittävä ja ne ovat: juuri, varsi,

lehdet, silmikot, kukka, hedelmä. Itsekullaki näillä osilla on monta
ominaisuutta, jotka tekevat ne eri kasveissa erilaisiksi. Semmoisten
ominaisuutten selittämiseksi tarvitaan asianomaisia oppisanoja.

Pintansa vuoksi on itsekuki osa:

kierä (glaber, glatt), jolla ei ole karvoja. sileä (laevis, slät), kun ei
ole kuoppia, uurtoja, naarmuja, nyyliä eikä muita epätasaisuuksia.
karkea (asper, skarp) pienillä kyhmyillä, nyhillä ja nystyröillä.
karhea (scaber, sträf) melkein näkymättömillä kankeilla karvoilla.
lienteä (pubescens, småluden) lyhyellä, hienolla, tiheällä karvalla.
sametti-nukkainen (velutinus, sammetshårig) lienteällä, ulottavalla,
tav. erivärisellä karvalla. silkkimäinen (sericeus, silkesluden),
pitkästä, hienosta, pintamyötäisestä, kiiltävästä karvasta. höyteä
(villosus, luden), pitkästä, laheasta, tiheästä karvasta. karvainen
(pilosus, hårig), pehmeästä, ei ylen lyhyestä eikä tiheästä karvasta.
hatuinen (hirsutus, sträfluden), karkea-, pitkä- ja tihukarvainen.
takkuinen (hispidus, sträfhårig), karkea-, paksu- ja harvakarvainen.
kalsea (hirtus, kort sträfhårig), lyhytkarvaisempi edellistä. villainen
(lanatus l. lanuginosus, ullhårig); villaksi (lana l. lanugo) sanotaan
tiheätä, kiemuraista, vähän sekasortoista karvaa. nutturainen
(floccosus, flockullig); nutturoilla (flocci, flockull) ymmärretään
tukkupäistä villaa. vanukkeinen (tomentosus, filthårig); vanuke
(tomentum, filtludd) s.o. vanuksissa oleva villa. seittinen l.
lukinverkkoinen (araneosus l. arachnoideus, spindelvässhårig);
seitiksi (aranea, spindelvässhår) sanotaan pitkiä, hienoisia,
hämähäkin verkon tapaan yhteen kutoutuneita villakarvoja.
ripsikarvainen l. ripsinen (ciliatus, hårbräddad); ripset (cilia,
kanthår) ovat yhtäpitkät karvat jonkun osan (esm. lehden)
reunassa. parrakas (barbatus, skäggig), kun karvat ovat vihkona
tav. jonkun osan päässä; semmoista vihkoa sanotaan parraksi
(barba, skägg). sukainen l. sukasinen (setosus, borstbärande);
su'iksi l. sukasiksi (setae, borster) sanotaan kankeita, liereitä
karvoja. nojosukainen (strigosus, plattborstig); nojosukaset
(strigae, plattborster) ovat kankeita, lyhempiä, litteämäisiä,
alaspainuneita karvoja. koukkusukainen (setis hamosis, s. hamatis,
s. aduncis, s. apice uncinatis, krokborstig); koukkusuat (hami l.
unci, krokborster) ovat koukeropäisiä sukakarvoja. väkäsukainen
(glochidatus, hullingbärande); väkäsu'illa (glochides, hullingborster)
on päässä vastahakaisia karvoja. poltinsukainen l. polttava (urens,
brännande) polttavilla sukakarvoilla l. poltinsu'illa (stimuli,
brännborster) varustettu. Poltinsu'illa on sisässä polttavaa nestettä.
pistinsukainen (aciculosus); pistinsuat (aciculi, nålborster) tarttuvat
koskiessa ihoon ja heltiävät juuriltansa. piikkisukainen, piikillinen
(aculeatus); piikeiksi (aculi, taggar) sanotaan pistimiä, jotka eivät
lähde juuriltansa irti. pehmytpiikkinen l. hakarainen (muricatus,
vektaggig) hakaroilla l. pehmeillä piikeillä (murices). kärheä l.
takistava (adhaerens, snärjande) hienoilla koukeroilla tahi
väkäpäisillä piikeillä (ruohoissa). Itsekuki piikki on myös joko
yhtenäinen (simplex, enkel) tahi jaettu (fissus, delad), haarapäinen
(furcatus, gaffellik), kaksi-, kolmihaarainen (bi-, trifurcatus), suora
(rectus, rak), kovera (incurvus, inböjd), latvaan päin väärä, keikkeä
(recurvus, tillbakaböjd), alaspäin väärä. Koveraa ja keikkeätä
sanotaan myös yhteisellä sanalla koukeroiseksi (aduncus, klolik).
nyhäinen, (verrucosus, vårtfull) on se pinta jolla on pieniä syyliä,
nystyröitä eli nyhiä (verrucae). tahmea (viscosus, viscidus, klibbig)
ja jäläinen (glutinosus, limaktig), kun pinnasta tihkuu iskuista,
liimaista, tartuttavaista nestettä. pisakarvainen (pilis glandulosis,
glandelhårig) nesteisellä nypyllä eli pisamalla karvan päässä.
haarakarvainen (pilis furcatis, med gaffelformigt klufna hår).
sulkakarvainen (p. plumosis, m. fjäderlika hår). tähtikarvainen (p.
stellatis, m. stjernlikt delade hår). nivelkarvainen (p. septatis, m.
ledade hår). kilseinen (p. lepidosis l. squamosis, m. fjällika hår).
kehnäinen (farinosus, mjölig), kun pinnalla on vaksimaista ulos
pihkunutta ainetta. härmäinen (pruinosus, daggblå), kun sama aine
on vaalean sinertävää. paikullinen (maculatus, fläckig), pilkullinen,
tähneellinen, kirpulainen. kaarnainen (suberosus, korkbarkig),
pullokuorinen. juomuinen (striatus, strimmig), juovikas,
juotikkoinen, viiruinen. pyköinen (rimosus, sprickfull), halkeimikas,
siirtoileva, risoileva, pakoileva, rakoinen.

1) Juuri (radix, rot).

juurenniska l. niska (collum radicis, rothals), juuren ja varren raja

eli välipaikka. lisäjuuri (radix adventitia, birot), maassa olevasta
varresta tahi oksasta lähtevä uusi juuri. ilmajuuri (r. aërea, luftrot),
yläällä maasta olevasta kasviosasta maahan lähtevä lisäjuuri.
yksiperäinen (r. simplex, enkel), joka alkuansa niskasta lähtien on
yhtenä juurena, jos sitte alempana jakauisiki. moniperäinen (r.
multiplex, sammansatt), joka heti alusta on jakaunut useammaksi
osaksi. haaraton (r. integra, odelad), yksiperäinen juuri, jolla ei ole
varsinaisia haaroja, vaan ainoastaan hapsia (fibrillae, rottrådar).
kokonainen (r. integerrima, helt och hållet odelad), yksiperäinen
haaraton sekä hapsiton juuri. haarova (r. ramosa, grenig), kun
yksiperäinen emäjuuri jakauu useammaksi haaraksi ja monasti
haaratki uusiksi haaroiksi eli haarukoiksi. Niin hyvin haarat (rami,
grenar) kuin haarukat (ramuli, smågrenar) voivat olla hapsilla tahi
säikeillä (fibrae, rottågor) varustetut. emäjuuri (r. palaris, pålrot),
haaraton pystöjuuri ja haarovanki juuren pystöinen pääosa.
yksivartinen (r. unicaulis, enstjelkig), emäjuuri, josta nousee
ainoastansa yksi varsi. monivartinen (r. multicaulis, mångstjelkig),
josta lähtee useampaa vartta. rihmamainen (r. filiformis, trådlik),
rihman tahi hienomman nauhan paksuinen haaraton juuri. suikea
(r. fusiformis, tapplik), keskeltä paksumpi, pitkämäinen, haaraton.
suippeneva l. suippo (r. conica kägellik), kun niskasta alkain
vähitellen hoikkenee päähän asti. naurismoinen (r. napiformis,
roflik), niskasta pullakka, alempata hoikalla hännällä eli navalla.
hapsinen (r. fibrillosa l. capillacea, trådig), moniperäinen juuri
hapsimaisilla eri säikeillä. tupastava (r. caespitosa, tufvig), kun
moniperäisen juuren niskasilmikoista vuosittain kasvaa uusia varsia
ja juuria, jotka entisten kuihtuneitten kanssa kutouvat tuppaaksi eli
mättääksi. kimputtu (r. fasciculata, hopknippad), kun muutamat
säikeet heti varren rajalla ovat myhkyröityneet yhteen tukkuun.
vuosinainen (r. annua l. fugax, enårig), joka yhtenä vuotena
kasvattaa varren, kukat ja siemenet, sitte kuihtuu. kaksivuotinen (r.
biennis l. vivax, tvåårig), joka edellisenä vuotena tavallisesti ei tee
kun varren, toisella kukkii ja siementyy, sen jälkeen katoaa e.m.
nauris. monivuotinen (r. perennis, mångårig) monta vuotta kestävä
joko vanhalla eli uudisvarrella, e.m. puut, koiruoho. mahero (r.
perennans, öfvervintrande), joka kukkimisen ja siementymisen
jälkeen vielä jonkun vuoden pitkittää kasvuansa. rönsyävä (r.
stolonifera, skottalstrande), kun juuren niskasta kasvaa lehtivesoja
eli rönsyjä (stolones, grenskott) varren ympäri. suomukaulainen (r.
stipata, fjällkransad), kun juuren niskan ympäritse on suomumaisia
hilseitä. karvaniskainen (r. comosa, topphårig), kun niskasta lähtee
karvoja tahi sukasia varren alapään ympärille. pystöinen l.
pytöpystö (r. perpendicularis l. verticalis, lodrät), suoraan alas
maahan lähtevä haaraton juuri. alaskohtainen (r. descendens,
nedstigande), pystöhaarainen juuri. uloskohtainen (r. horizontalis,
vågrät), kun juurihaarat leviävät ulospäin maata pitkin. kallas (r.
obliqua, sned), joka on kallellaan. ulottava (r. procurrens,
utlöpande), pitkä uloskohtainen juuri. tihkeä (r. compacta, fast),
jonka sisus yltä ylensä on yhtä ainetta. möyheä (r. carnosa, kottig),
pehmeä, tursea, lihamainen; e.m. nauris. mehevä (r. succosa,
saftig), tuore, nesteinen, mantoinen. maitias (r. lactescens,
mjölksaftig), kun leikkaaman jäljestä tihkuu valkoista tahi muun
väristä nestettä. puutava (r. lignosa, trädartad), sitkeää,
puuntapaista ainetta. mahkurainen (r. tuberosa, knölig), kun juuren
haarat tahi säikeet paikoittain ovat tursuneet pyöreiksi tahi
muikulaisiksi kyhmyiksi. helminauhainen (r. moniliformis,
perlbandslik), kun on joka haarassa useampaa pientä mahkuraa eli
nyylää toinen toisensa perästä. rippunyyläinen (r. filipendula,
trådhängande), kun juuren nyylät eli myhkyrät ovat harvemmassa,
ikään kuin ripuksissa. Muistutus. Muutamilla harvalukuisilla kasveilla
on juurensa ei maassa, vaan vedessä, ja monta kasvia löytyy, jotka
ovat toisiin kasveihin juurtuna. Näitä sanotaan loiskasveiksi eli
loisioiksi (plantae parasiticae, parasiter). Ne ovat kahta laatua,
toiset varsinaisia, toiset epäperäisiä loisioita. Edelliset itävät ja
juurtuvat niillä kasveilla, joista sitte elävätki, jälkimäiset nousevat
ensin maasta ylös ja tarttuvat vasta myöhemmin pienillä
syylämäisillä juurilla kiinni muihin kasveihin, jonka jälkeen niiden
entinen juuri ja varsi kuoleuvat; elantonsa ne sitte saavat niiltä
toisilta kasveilta.

2) Vartalo (cormus, stam).

Juuresta nousevaa kasviosaa sanotaan yhteisellä nimellä

vartaloksi, joka tavallisesti on maan päällä, mutta muutamissa
kasveissa kokonansa tahi osiksi maan sisälläki kokoon
kasvettuneena, käpristyneenä. Maan-alaista vartaloa ennen arveltiin
ja vieläki monasti sanotaan juureksi, vaikka se ylöspäin
kasvamallansa, hilseisillä lehtien jäännöksillä ja silmikoillansa selvästi
osottaa itsensä samaa laatua olevan, kun muuki tavallinen varsi.

Maanalaisia varsi-osia ovat sipuli, mukula ja juurakko.

a. Sipulista.

sipuli (bulbus, lök), lyhyt, käpertynyt varren-osa päälitysten

röyköttyneillä hilseisillä kuoruslehdeillä.
sipulin sydän l. emys (discus bulbi, lecus, lökstock), joka
ylöspäin lähettää kukkaperän ja toisesta päästään työntää
juurihapsia maahan.
hilseinen sipuli (b. tunicatus, hinnskalig), kun lehdet ovat
muodostuneet leveiksi monikertaisiksi kalvokääreiksi.
verkkosuoninen (b. reticulatus, nätskalig), kun sipulihilseillä
on verkontapaisia ristisuonia.
töyhtöinen (b. fimbriatus, fransig), kun vasta mainitut suonet
yhdistyvät hepsupääksi.
liistoinen (b. foliosus, bladig), lehtisellä eli liistoisella,
ei kalvomaisella eikä limitetyllä kuorella.
suomuinen (b. squamosus, fjällig), soukemmilla ja usein limikkäillä
kuoruslehdeillä.
moniperäinen (b. compositus, sammansatt), jossa on monta kynttä
(bulbilli, smålökar) yhdessä.
monikoloinen (b. nidulans, mångklyftig), kun kynsien ja sydänsipulin
välissä on pieniä kaaloja eli kolosia.
pahkasipuli (bulbotuber, b. solidus, lökknöl, tät lök),
tihkeäaineinen sipuli, jossa sydän on voittopuolella.
kalvosipuli (b. foliosus, bladig), jossa kuoruslehdet voittavat.
sipulinen juuri (radix bulbosa, lökartad rot) y.k. sipuli.

b. Mukulasta.

mukula (tuber, stjelkknök) kyhmistynyt, täyteinen, turpea tahi

möyheämpi maanalainen varren-osa silmikoilla, joista sikiää
uusia kasveja. Kun mukulaa ennen luettiin juureksi, niin siitä
on juurelle seuraavia tunnussanoja saatu.
mukulainen juuri (radix tuberosa, knölig) y.k. mukula.
kämmekkäinen (r. palmata, handlik), sormentapaisesti haarova.
kaksoismukulainen (r. didyma, tvåknölig), kun maanpäälisen varren
päässä on kaksi mukulaa vieretysten.
nysteröinen (r. granulata, grynig), kun monta pientä mukulaa on
varren tyvessä yhteen nyhertynyt.
 c. Juurakosta.

juurakko (rhizoma, rotstock), erästen kasvien tavallisesti

maanalainen varren-osa, joka ylipäästään vuosittain kasvaa ja
työntää uuden varren maan päälle entisen kuihtuneen sijasta.
Seki ennen juuren nimellä tuttu on saanut seuraavia
erotussanoja.
suikertava juuri (radix repens, krypande rot), maan pintaa myöten
venyvä eli luikertava.
nivelikäs (r. articulata, ledad), kun vuosilisäin välit ovat
hoikempia.
solmikas (r. nodosa, knutig), kun vuosilisät yhtyvät vahvemmilla
välipaikoilla.
typäkkä (r. praemorsa l. succisa, afstympad), kun juurakko on
lyhyt ja ikään kuin katkaistu päästä.

Erilaatuisia maasta yleneviä vartaloita ovat runko, vali, korsi ja

varsi.

runko t. puuvarsi (truncus, kronstam), tyvestä latvaan hoikkeneva

puinen vartalo erinäisellä sydän-, puu- ja kuorikerralla, haarova
ja oksiva (puilla ja pensailla).
vali t. palmuvarsi (cauloma l. caudex, palmstam), tasapaksu,
puinen, tav. haaraton vartalo erottamattomalla sydän-, puu- ja
kuorikerralla. Valivartaloisia ovat palmut ja eräät muut puut.
korsi t. heinävarsi (culmus, strå), heinäkasvien vartalo, pillikäs,
solmunivelinen, tuppilehtinen, yksinäinen, harv. haarova.
Vahvempaa sanotaan oljeksi.
ruoko (calamus, säfstrå), erilaatuinen, nivelitön, hohka-aineinen,
ei pillikäs korsi.
varsi (caulis, stjelk), semmoinen vartalo, joka ei kuulu yhteen
eikä toiseen edelliseen laatuun (ruohoilla, kukkasilla j.n.e.)

Vartalo eli varsi sanotaan olevan:

ruohomainen (cormus l. caulis herbaceus), kun on pehmeä

laatuansa ja vuosittain lakastuva. puinen (c. lignosus, trädartad),
kiinteä, monivuotinen, vasta ylempätä haarova varsi puilla (arbores,
träd). pensainen (c. fruticosus, buskartad), kiinteä, monivuotinen,
juuresta alkain haarova varsi pensailla (frutices, buskar).
pensastava (c. suffruticosus, nästan buskartad), kun haarat
ainoastaan tyvestä ovat kiinteä-aineisia ja monivuotisia, mutta
ylempätä ruohomaisia, vuosittain lakastuvia, pensastoilla
(suffrutices, småbuskar). täyteinen (c. solidus, tät), ylensä yhtä
lomatonta ainetta. pillikäs (c. fistulosus, pipig) pitkin pituuttaan
tyhjä sisältä. pullakka (c. inflatus, uppblåst), pillikäs ja pöhökäs.
runsasytyinen l. ytevä (c. medullosus, märgfull), tavallista
vahvemmalla ytimellä. hohkamainen l. sienettävä (c. spongiosus,
svampaktig), täynnä sienemäistä solukkoa. mehinen (c.
succulentus, vattenaktig), runsaalla vehriällä tahi vedenkarvaisella
nesteellä. maitias, edell. hentoinen (c. laxus, svag) ja hoikka (c.
debilis, spenslig), niin nerkko ja kaihera, että tuskin pysyy pystössä.
veltto l. hervoton (c. flaccidus, slak), joka ei kestä pystössä. tönkeä
(c. rigidus, styf), joka taivuttaissa katkeaa. notkea (c. flexilis,
böjlig), norea, katkeamatta taipuva. sitkeä (c. tenax, seg),
notkistuva ja työläästi taittuva. hauras (c. fragilis, spröd), jäykkä ja
helposti katkeava. solmikas l. solmunivelinen (c. nodosus l. nodoso-
articulatus, knutig), jolla on useampaa solmuilla (nodi, knutar)
erotettua jaksoa eli solmuväliä (internodium), e.m. oljella. nivelikäs
l. hoikkanivelinen (c. articulatus l. constricto- articulatus, ledad),
kun varren erijaksoin välit ovat pehmeämpiä, tav. sujuvia ja
hoikempia. yhtenäinen (c. continuus l. contiguus,
sammanhängande), jolla ei ole eri jaksoja, solmuja tahi niveliä.
solmuton l. nivelitön (c. enodis l. exarticulatus, oledad), y.k. ed.
liereä l. pyöreä (c. teres, trind), yhtä pyöreä ilman särmittä,
kulmitta ja eri sivuitta. sivupuoli (c. semiteres, halftrind), puoli
litteä, toinen pyöreä. litteämäinen (c. compressus, hoptryckt),
littenevillä sivuilla, särmitön. litteä (c. complanatus, platt), ohuempi
edellistä. kaksiteräinen (c. anceps, tvåäggad), litteä kahdella
terävällä vastapäisellä syrjällä. kulmikas (c. angulatus, kantig),
harjumaisesti kohonneilla sivuilla. nulokulmainen (c. obtusangulus,
trubbkantig), tylppämäisillä harjuilla. särmikäs (c. acutangulus,
hvasskantig), terävillä kulmilla. ohutsärmäinen (c. acutissangulus,
skarpkantig), vieläki terävämpikulmainen. kolmi-, kuusi-,
monikantainen (c. tri-, hexa-, polygonus, 3-, 6-, flerkantig) 3:lla,
6:lla, monella kehkerällä kulmain välisellä sivulla. kolmi- —
kymmentahkoinen (c. tri- — decemqueter, 3—10-sidig), niin
monella tasaisella sivulla. kolmi-, kuusi-, moniteräinen (c. tri-, sex-,
multangularis, 3-, 6-, flereggad), niin monella kouruisella sivulla ja
ohuella terämäisellä särmällä eli syrjällä. nauhamainen (c.
fasciatus, bandformig), useammasta varresta yhteen kasvettunut.
lehtinen (c. foliatus, bladig). lehvakka l. lehtevä (c. foliosus), jolla
on paljo lehtejä. lehdetön (c. aphyllus, bladlös). tupillinen l.
tuppikäärinen (c. vaginatus, slidad), kun varren ympäri on
tuppimaisia, usein lehdestyviä kääreitä. suomuinen (c. squamosus,
fjällig), suomumaisilla lehti-käperöillä ympäri vartta. suomukkainen
(c. squamulosus, småfjällig), y.k. ed. hyvin pienoisilla suomuilla.
paanuttu (c. imbricatus, täckt), päälitysten limitetyillä suomuilla
tahi lehdeillä niin peitetty, ettei itseä vartta näykkään. sulitettu (c.
alatus, vingad), kun kaksi vastakkaista syrjää ovat lehtimäisesti
levenneitä. apulehtinen (c. stipulatus, försedd med stipler).
apulehdetön (c. exstipulatus, stipellös). paljas (c. nudus, bar), jolla
ei ole minkäänlaista lehdetystä. uurtoinen (c. sulcatus, fårad),
pitkinäisillä syvemmillä juovilla eli uurteilla. juomuinen, pyköinen,
karvainen, höyteä, piikillinen, kierä, kehnäinen, paikullinen, sileä,
karkea, nyhäinen, kaarnainen y.m. ovat jo edellä mainitut. pysty (c.
erectus, upprätt), suoraan ylös maasta nouseva. kallas (c. obliquus,
sned), k. ed. suora (rectus, rak), mutkiton. piukka (c. strictus,
upprätt och styf l. rak och styf), pysty ja jäykkä tahi suora ja
jäykkä. mutkiva (c. flexuosus, krokig), sinne tänne väärä. polviva
(c. geniculatus, knäböjd), solmunivelinen varsi eri suuntaisilla
solmuväleillä. koheneva (c. adscendens, uppstigande), tyvipuoli
vartta maassa tahi kallellaan, latvapuoli pysty. kaareva (c.
incurvatus, uppböjd), kaaressa ylöspäin. lenko (c. declinatus,
nedböjd), tyveltä pystössä, latvempata alaskaareva. nuokkuva (c.
nutans, lutande), pysty varsi pää kallellaan. nuokahtava (c.
cernuus), vähemmin kallellaan päästä. rippuva (c. pendulus,
hängande), toisiin kasveihin, kalliovieriin tahi muihin aineisiin
juurtunut ja varrellaan alas roikottava. rento (c. procumbens,
nedliggande), maassa makaava ilman juuria tekemättä. lama (c.
prostratus l. humifusus), haaroinensaki maassa. laiehtiva (c.
fluitans, flytande), veden kalvolla makaava. suikertava (c. repens,
krypande), juuria maahan lähettävä rento varsi. longertava (c.
sarmentosus, refvig), kun varsi pitemmillä väleillä lähettää juuria
maahan ja välijaksot eivät makaa aivan maassa kiinni. loikertava (c.
reptans), y.k. ed. kiiveksivä l. juurrehtiva (c. radicans, rotslående),
kun varsi pienoisilla ilmajuurilla tarttuu muihin aineisiin ja niitä
myöten kohotteleikse, e.m. verhamo. väänneliäs (c. scandens,
klängande), samalla tavalla muiden kasvien tahi ainetten varassa
nouseva ja niihin kärheillään (cirrhi) tahi hakaroillaan takistuva.
köynneliäs (c. volubilis, slingrande), kun varsi kasvaissaan kiertyy
jonkun muun kasvin tahi aineen ympäri joko vastoin päivää (c.
volubilis dextrorsum, från venster åt höger) e.m. humala, tahi
myöten päivää (c. vol. sinistrorsum, från höger åt venster) e.m.
salkopapu.

ihkayhtenäinen (c. simplicissimus, helt och hållet enkel), jolla

ei ole varsi- eikä kukkahaarukoita.
yhtenäinen (c. simplex, enkel), varsi haaraton, kukat haarovia.
haarova (c. ramosus, grenig), haarallinen, haarakas.
monihaarainen (c. ramosissimus, mycket grenig), kun on paljo ja
uudelleen haarottavia haaroja.
yltävä l. läpituntuva (c. excurrens l. integer, fortlöpande),
jonka pitkin pituuttaan aina latvaan asti voipi selvästi erottaa
haaroista, e.m. havupuissa.
haihtuva l. sortuva (c. deliquescens, söndergrenad), kun emävarsi
sortuu eli jakauu haaroiksi, joista sitä ei taida erottaa,
e.m. lehtipuissa.
latvavarainen (c. prolifer, toppalstrande), kun uusia haaroja ja
lehtejä ei lähde varren sivuilta, vaan ainoastansa latvasta.
kaksitteleva (c. dichotomus, klynnedeld), kun varsi jakauu kahdeksi
haaraksi ja haarat eteenpäin yhä kahdeksi.
kolmitteleva (c. trichotomus, upprepadt tregrenig), kun samalla
tavalla kerroten jakauu kolmeksi haaraksi.
ristihaarainen (c. brachiatus, armgrenig), haarat paritellen
vastakkaisia ja likimäiset haaraparit ristissä toinen toisensa
kanssa.
pitkittävä l. rajaton (c. indeterminatus, obegränsad), kun varsi
sivulta kukkiessaan latvasta pitkittää kasvuansa.
rajattu l. rajauva (c. determinatus, begränsad), latvasta kukkiva
ja siihen kasvunsa päättävä varsi.
 Erittäin merkittäviä varressa ovat ydin (medulla, märg), puuaine
(lignum, ved), kuori (cortex, bark). Puuaineessa on kaksi erikertaa,
sisämäinen kovempi sydänpuu (duramen, kärnved) ja ulkomainen
pehmeämpi ja tavallisesti valkeampi manto eli pintapuu (alburnum,
splint l. hvitved).

Kuoressa samoin on useampaa erikertaa, ensin puuta vasten nila l.

niini (liber, bast), sitte välikuori (periderma, barkhud) ja
päälimmäisnä närvi l. ketto (epidermis, öfverhud).

Varteen eli vartaloon kuuluvia ovat myös haarat (rami, grenar) ja

oksat eli haarukat (ramuli, qvistar l. smågrenar), lehdet (folia, blad),
perälehdet (bracteae, skärmblad l. blomskärmar), apulehdet
(stipulae, stipler), silmät eli silmikot (gemmae, knoppar), (kukka flos,
blomma), siittimet (partes fructificationis, fröredningsdelar) ja
hedelmä (fructus, frukt).

Haaroista.

Vastakkaisia (rami oppositi, motsatta), ovat haarat, kun ovat

vastapäätä, toinen toisella, toinen toisella puolella vartta.
vuorottaisia (r. alterni, skiftevisa), kun lähtevät varren ympäriltä
toinen toistansa ylempätä.
ristikkäisiä (r. brachiati, armgreniga), ristittäin vastakkaisia.
kahtaallisia l. kahdappäisiä (r. distichi, tvåsidiga), juurillansa
ympäri vartta, mutta päillänsä ei kun kahta suuntaa.
härkiläisiä (r. verticillati, kranssittande), kun kolme tahi
useampaa haaraa lähtee yhtä korkealta kuki suunnallensa.
erinäisiä (r. sparsi, strödda l. aflägsnade), kun haarat lähtevät
 sieltä täältä kierteisesti ympäri vartta.
harvinaisia (r. remoti, åtskiljda), kauvempana toisistaan.
lähinäisiä (r. conferti l. approximati, tättsittande), tiheässä
ja liketysten.
sisäpäisiä (r. coarctati, hopträngda), kun latvoillaan kääntyvät
vartta vasten.
tasalatvaisia (r. fastigiati, jemntoppade), kun eri paikoista
lähteneitten haarain latvat ovat yhtä korkealla, jolloin myös
itseä vartta sanotaan tasalatvaiseksi.
vitsamaisia (r. virgati, vidjelika), kun ovat hoikkia, pitkiä ja
melkein haarattomia.
pystönäisiä (r. erecti, upprätta), kun nousevat ylös melkein vartta
seuraten.
ulostyvisiä (r. parallelo-patentes, frånstående), alusta ulospäisiä,
sitte pystönäisiä.
varsimyötäisiä (r. adpressi, tilltryckta), tyvestä alkain vartta
myöten kasvavia.
siirottavia (r. patentes, utstående), ylöspäisiä soukalla
varsihangalla eli kulmalla.
ulospäisiä (r. divergentes l. horizontales, utböjda), kun seisoa
sojottavat suoraan varresta ulos. Toisia latinalaisia nimityksiä
semmoisille haaroille ovat divaricati ja patentissimi.
leveneviä l. ulottavia (r. diffusi, utspridda), y.k. ed. tahi
vähän ylöspäisiä.
alaskaarevia (r. deflexi, nedböjda), kaaressa alaspäin.
alaspäisiä (r. reflexi l. refracti, tillbakaböjda), kun enemmin
eli vähemmin kääntyvät alaspäin vartta vasten.
taaspäisiä (r. retroflexi, återböjda), mutkitellen alaspäin
kääntyneitä.
rippuvia (r. penduli, hängande), kun ovat velttoja ja suoraan
 alaspäin.
haarahanka (ala, grenvinkel l. grenveck) on haaran ja varren
välikulma.
haarahankainen (alaris), haarahangassa oleva.

Erilaatuisia haaroja ovat:

lonkero (sarmentum, örtrefva), aluslehden hangasta lähtevä,

maata
myöten kulkeva, lehdetön, usein koukeroinen hyötöhaara, joka
päästänsä kasvattaa lehtejä ja uusia juuria.
rönsy (stolo l. flagellum, grenskott), aluslehden hangasta lähtevä,
maasta kohoamaton lehdekäs haara, joka alapuoleltansa
paikoittain
työntää juuria maahan ja päästänsä lehtejä, välistä kukkiaki.
kasvanto (turio, årsskott), itsekunki haaran tahi varren vuotuinen
lisä.
ora (spina, torn), kesken kasvettunut jäykkä oksan käperö kovalla,
pistävällä päällä. Jos on vaan yksi kärki oralla, sanotaan sitä
yhtenäiseksi l. yksikärkiseksi (sp. simplex, enkel), muuten
haarapäiseksi (sp. divisa, delad). Orilla varustettua vartta
sanotaan oraiseksi (c. spinosus, tornbärande), ja varulliseksi
(armatus, beväpnad) mainitaan yhteisesti kasviosaa, jolla on
oria,
piikkejä tahi poltinsukia, varuttomaksi (inermis, obeväpnad)
sitä, jolla niitä ei ole. Orat samoin kuin muutki oksat lähtevät
varren puuaineesta, piikit (aculei, taggar) ainoastaan kuoresta.
kärhi (cirrhus, klänge), rihmamainen ja usein kierteinen oksan
pidennys, jolla kasvi tarttuu muihin aineisiin. Vartta, jolla on
semmoisia, sanotaan kärhiseksi (cirrhosus, klängegrenig).
Toisinaan kärhet lähtevät lehden ruodista tahi keskisuonesta,
 välistä kukkaperästäki. Kärhet ovat tavallisesti yhtenäisiä,
välistä haaroviaki (c. ramosi, greniga).

Lehdeistä.

sirkkalehdet (cotyledones, hjertblad), ensimmäiset itulehdet.

aluslehdet (folia radicalia, rotblad), jotka lähtevät varren
alimmaisesta päästä juuren niskassa.
varsilehdet (f. caulina, stjelkblad), varresta lähtevät.
haaralehdet, oksalehdet (f. ramea, grenblad), haaroista tahi
oksista.
kukkalehdet (f. floralia, blomblad), jotka ovat lähellä kukkia.
Vähän erilaatuisia ovat perälehdet.
lehtihanka (axillum, bladveck), lehden ja varren välikulma.
lehtihankainen (axillaris), lehtihangassa oleva.
lehtiruoti l. ruoti (petiolus, bladskaft), se osa, joka yhdistää
emälehden ja varren.
emälehti (lamina l. limbus, bladskifva), lehden lapa eli levy.
lehden päälystä (pagina superior, öfra sida), se puoli, joka
varsimyötäisissä lehdeissä on vartta vasten.
lehden alusta (pagina inferior, undra sida), joka on vastapäin
päälystää, nurja puoli.
lehden kanta (basis folii, bladbas), emälehden varren tahi ruodin
puolinen laita.
lehden pää (apex folii, bladspets), kantaa vastapäinen laita.
lehden laita (margo, bladkant), ympärys, reuna, ääri eli syrjä.
 Tavallisia ruodin erotuksia ovat liereä, sivupuoli, kolmikulmainen,
litteä, litteähkä, pullakka j.n.e.

kupuva (petiolus ventricosus, bukig), keskeltä tursea eli pöyheä.

tuppimainen (p. vaginans, slidformig), kun ruoti on varren puolelta
laajennut ja tupenmoisesti varren ympäri kääriytynyt. sulitettu (p.
alatus, vingad), kahdella lehtimäisellä syrjällä. kärhikäs (p.
cirrhiferus, klängebärande), kärheksi jatkuva. lehdentö (phyllodium,
bladlikt bladskaft), lehtimäisesti laajennut ruoti puuttuvalla
emälehdellä. ruodikas (fol. petiolatum, skaftadt blad), jolla on ruoti.
Tuppimaisilla lehdeillä (folia vaginantia, slidomfattande blad) on
tuppi (vagina, slida), joko halkinainen (v. fissa l. divisa, öppen l.
klufven), taikka kokonainen (v. integra l. indivisa, hel). Jos tuppi
muuttuu lehdeksi, sanotaan sitä lehdestäväksi (v. foliifera,
bladbärande), muuten lehdestymättömäksi (v. aphylla, bladlös).
ruoditon (fol. sessile, oskaftad), kun emälehti on suorastaan
varressa kiinni. johteinen (f. decurrens, nedlöpande), kun lehti
kannastaan jatkuu ja juoksee vartta myöten alas seuraavaan
lehteen asti. puolijohteinen (f. semidecurrens, halftnedlöpande),
kun juoksee vaan puoliväliin. sepokantainen (f. amplexicaule l.
amplectens, stjelkomfattande), kun lehden kanta kiertää varren
ympäri. puolisepoinen (f. semiamplexicaule, halftomfattande), kun
kiertää vaan puolen vartta. läpikantainen (f. perfoliatum,
genomborrad), kun varsi käypi lehden kannan läpi. yhtynyt (f.
connatum, sammanvext); yhtyneiksi sanotaan kahta vastakkaista
lehteä, joiden kannat ovat niin yhteen kasvaneet, että näyttää kun
olisi vaan yksi varren keskeä lävistämä lehti. silposuoninen (f.
simplicinerve l. nervosum, enkelt nervig), jonka suonet ei haarau.
haarasuoninen (f. ramosinerve l. venosum, grenigt nervig), kun
suonet tekevät haaroja. verkkosuoninen (f. reticulato-venosum,
nätådrig), kun suonihaarat juoksevat ristin rastin toisiinsa yhtyen.
tasasuoninen (f. rectinerve, rätnervig), kun silposuonisen lehden
suonet juoksevat suoraan ja tasasuuntaisesti pitkin lehteä.
kaarisuoninen (f. converginerve, bågnervig), kun juoksevat
kaarevasti. tukkusuoninen (f. diverginerve, divergerande nervig),
kun useampia silposuonia on tyvestä yhdessä tukussa, josta ne
sitte vähitellen erouvat, juosten kuki tasasuuntaisesti lehden
laitaan. sulkasuoninen (f. penni- l. pinninerve, fjädernervig), kun
keskisuonesta lähtee kummallenki puolelle sulantapaisesti
haarauneita eli sulkamaisia suonia (nervi pennati l. pinnati,
fjäderlika nerver). kourasuoninen (f. palminerve, handnervig), kun
lehtikannasta lähtee suonia ympärinsä lehden laitaan. Itsiä suonia
sanotaan tässä tilassa kouramaisiksi (nervi palmati, handlika), lehti
tavallisesti on pyöreähkä. kilpisuoninen (f. pelti- l. stellinerve, sköld-
l. stjernnervig), kun lähtee poikkimaisesti ruotia vasten säteemäisiä
suonia yltä ympärinsä. Ruoti näissä ei ole lehden laidassa, vaan
keskellä emälehden alla puolen, kuin varsi männässä. Tämmöistä
lehteä sanotaan myös kilpimäiseksi (f. peltatum, sköldlik).
kantasuoninen (f. pedatinerve, fotnervig), kun lehtikannasta lähtee
kaksi hyvin haarottavaa suonta ja niistä uusia suonihaarukoita
lehden päähän. Toisinaan on niiden välissä kolmas pienempi
emähaara. yksivarainen (f. simplex, enkel), on lehti, jos ruodilla on
vaan yksi lehti. monipuolinen l. liittoinen (f. compositum,
sammansatt), kun ruodilla on monta pientä erinäistä lehteä eli
lehdykkää (foliolum, småblad), jotka ovat taikka ruodittomasti
taikka eri ruodeillansa eli ruodukoilla (petioluli l. petioli partiales,
småbladskaft) emäruodissa (petiolus communis l. rachis folii,
allmänt bladskaft) kiinni. ehytlaitainen (f. integerrimum,
helbräddad), kun lehden laidassa ei ole mitään lovia, pykäliä tahi
muita koloja. kokonainen (f. integrum l. indivisum), kun on vaan
pienempiä koloja laidassa. lohkottu (f. divisum, delad), syvemmillä
Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.

More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge

connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and

personal growth every day!

ebookbell.com