Summarising Report on "100 Soruda Türkiye İktisat
Tarihi" by Niyazi Berkes
Prepared by Grok 3
May 2025
▪ Introduction ▪
"100 Soruda Türkiye İktisat Tarihi" by Niyazi Berkes is a seminal work exploring Turkey’s economic history, focusing on
the Ottoman Empire from its formation to decline. Structured as 100 questions and answers, it examines the
Ottoman state’s despotic nature, economic systems, social classes, military structures, and factors contributing to
stagnation. Without access to the full text, this report answers all 100 questions based on the provided list,
supplemented by Ottoman economic history knowledge and works by historians like Halil İnalcık and Şevket Pamuk.
Organized into thematic sections, the report targets 10,000 words, addressing each question with academic rigor.
The methodology reconstructs Berkes’ arguments, interpreting ambiguities (e.g., OCR errors like “Soni6o”)
reasonably, and compares the Ottoman economy to Western Europe’s capitalist development to highlight divergent
paths.
● Section 1: Nature and Characteristics of the Ottoman State
1. Why has Turkey’s economic history not been written?
Turkey’s economic history, especially the Ottoman period, has been neglected due to a focus on political and military
events in historiography. Economic studies require complex data like tax registers and trade records, which are hard
to access. In the early Republic of Turkey, nation-building prioritized political and cultural narratives, sidelining
economic analysis. Orientalist biases in Western scholarship dismissed Ottoman systems as static, limiting research.
Berkes’ work fills this gap by analyzing the Ottoman economy systematically, challenging Eurocentric views and
emphasizing interdisciplinary approaches to understand its unique, non-feudal, non-capitalist structure.
2. Why has it not been written after the Ottoman period?
Post-Ottoman Turkey emphasized political and cultural histories to forge a national identity, marginalizing economic
history. The Ottoman economy’s complexity, resisting Western categorization, deterred scholars. Archival challenges
and a lack of economic historians delayed studies. The Republic’s modernization focus distanced it from Ottoman
legacies, reducing interest in economic continuities. Berkes’ book addresses this by examining the Ottoman
economy from the 16th to 18th centuries, providing a foundation for understanding Turkey’s economic roots and
correcting the historiographical neglect of this field.
3. What type of state was the Ottoman Empire?
The Ottoman Empire was a centralized, bureaucratic state with despotic traits, distinct from European feudal or
capitalist models. Founded by Osman I in the late 13th century, it became a global power by the 16th century under
Suleiman the Magnificent. The sultan held absolute authority, supported by a meritocratic bureaucracy and military
recruited via the devşirme system. The millet system granted religious autonomy, while the timar system allocated
land for military service, ensuring state control over resources and limiting private enterprise.
4. Who founded the Ottoman state?
Osman I, leader of the Kayı tribe, founded the Ottoman state around 1299 in northwestern Anatolia. His victories
against the Byzantine Empire established a principality around Söğüt. As a ghazi (Islamic warrior), Osman attracted
Turkish tribes and allies. His son Orhan captured Bursa (1326), consolidating power. Mehmed II’s conquest of
Constantinople (1453) elevated the state to a global empire. Berkes likely emphasizes Osman’s role in creating an
adaptive state blending Turkish and Byzantine traditions.
5. Did the Ottoman system have specific characteristics?
The Ottoman system featured centralized authority, a state-controlled economy, and a stratified society. The sultan’s
absolute power was supported by kullar (elite slaves) via devşirme. The timar system distributed land for military
service, and guilds (esnaf) regulated production. The millet system managed religious diversity, fostering stability.
These characteristics created a cohesive but rigid system, distinct from European feudalism’s decentralization or
capitalism’s market dynamics. Berkes likely highlights them to explain the Ottoman economy’s stagnation.
6. Are there periods of change in Ottoman history?
Ottoman history is divided into four periods: Rise (13th–15th centuries), with territorial expansion; Classical Age (16th
century), peaking under Suleiman; Transformation (17th–18th centuries), facing economic and military challenges;
and Decline (19th–20th centuries), ending with dissolution post-World War I. Berkes likely uses these periods to frame
economic shifts, such as the timar system’s decline and inflation’s impact, illustrating the empire’s evolving
economic landscape.
7. What were these periods?
See Question 6. The periods are Rise (expansion), Classical Age (consolidation), Transformation (crises and reforms),
and Decline (losses and dissolution). Berkes likely emphasizes economic transitions, like the shift from timar-based
revenue to tax farming and global economic pressures, to explain these changes.
8. How did the first period begin?
The first period began with Osman I’s principality in northwestern Anatolia around 1299. His victories, like the Battle of
Bapheus (1302), attracted Turkish tribes and ghazis. Strategic alliances and marriages strengthened his position.
Orhan’s capture of Bursa (1326) consolidated economic foundations through land-based revenue. Berkes likely
highlights this period’s role in establishing the Ottoman economic system.
9. How were the foundations of the Ottoman state laid?
The Ottoman state’s foundations were laid through military conquests, alliances, and Byzantine administrative
adoption. Osman I united Turkish tribes, while Orhan and Murad I expanded territory and established a bureaucracy.
The timar system supported the military, blending Islamic and Byzantine governance. Constantinople’s conquest
(1453) integrated the empire into global trade. Berkes likely emphasizes these adaptive strategies for economic and
political success.
10. What type of state did the Ottoman Empire become after the first period?
After the Rise, the Ottoman Empire became a centralized, bureaucratic empire with global influence.
Constantinople’s conquest (1453) established trade route control. The sultan’s authority was supported by a
professional bureaucracy and military (janissaries, sipahis). The millet and timar systems ensured cohesion, distinct
from European models. Berkes likely underscores this evolution as shaping economic stagnation.
● Section 2: Economic and Social Structures
11. Was the Ottoman state order feudalism?
The Ottoman state was not feudal like Europe. The timar system, granting land for military service, resembled
feudalism but lacked hereditary rights and local autonomy. The state retained land ownership, preventing
independent lords. This centralized control limited economic flexibility, distinguishing it from European feudalism.
Berkes likely uses this to explain the Ottoman economy’s rigidity.
12. What is feudalism?
Feudalism, seen in medieval Europe, was a decentralized system where lords held hereditary fiefs for military service,
with peasants providing labor or rent. Local autonomy defined the hierarchy. The Ottoman timar system,
state-controlled and non-hereditary, differed significantly. Berkes likely contrasts these to highlight the Ottoman
economy’s centralized nature.
13. What is a pre-capitalist commodity production economy?
A pre-capitalist commodity production economy produces goods for exchange without capitalist features like private
ownership or free markets. Ottoman artisans (esnaf) produced goods, but state-regulated guilds and taxes limited
profit-driven enterprise, stifling innovation. This differed from Western Europe’s market-driven economies. Berkes
likely uses this to explain Ottoman economic stagnation.
14. What were the consequences of the Ottoman economy being neither feudal nor capitalist?
The Ottoman economy’s hybrid nature caused: economic stagnation from limited private enterprise; vulnerability to
external shocks like the price revolution; social tensions from rigid classes; and military decline due to resource
shortages. The absence of a capitalist class hindered global adaptation, contributing to decline. Berkes likely
emphasizes these as central to Ottoman economic history.
15. What were the consequences of the Ottoman economy being neither feudal nor capitalist? (Repeated)
See Question 14. The lack of feudal decentralization or capitalist dynamism stalled growth, making the empire
susceptible to global shifts. Berkes likely reiterates this to underscore its significance in economic decline. (35 words)
16. What was the relationship between economy and state in this system?
The Ottoman state dominated the economy, controlling land via the timar system, regulating trade with taxes and
monopolies, and overseeing production through guilds. This stifled private enterprise, preventing a bourgeoisie.
Revenues funded the military and bureaucracy, but inefficiencies hindered growth. Berkes likely argues this
state-centric model caused economic stagnation.
17. What were the typical features of the Ottoman order?
The Ottoman order featured centralized sultanic authority, the timar system, guild-regulated production, the millet
system for religious communities, and a stratified society (reaya, esnaf, tüccar, askeri). These ensured stability but
limited economic flexibility. Berkes likely emphasizes their interconnectedness in shaping the Ottoman economic
system.
18. Why do we say that the Ottoman order was despotic?
The Ottoman order was despotic due to the sultan’s absolute authority, with no checks or representative institutions.
The bureaucracy and military (kullar, janissaries) served the sultan, detached from society. This centralized control
defined despotism. Berkes likely contrasts this with Europe to highlight economic rigidity.
19. How was the nature of the Ottoman order forgotten?
The Ottoman order’s nature was obscured by focus on decline narratives, nationalist agendas in Turkey, Eurocentric
misinterpretations applying feudal labels, and limited economic archives. These marginalized economic history.
Berkes likely rediscovers the system’s unique characteristics through systematic analysis.
20. How did misinterpretations of the Ottoman order begin?
Misinterpretations arose from Eurocentric scholarship applying Western frameworks, orientalist biases depicting the
empire as static, limited archival access, and nationalist agendas emphasizing modernization. These skewed
perceptions of the Ottoman economy. Berkes likely critiques these, advocating a nuanced understanding.
21. What are the different types of state-society relations?
State-society relations include despotic (Ottoman model), feudal (medieval Europe), capitalist (modern West), and
communal (tribal societies). The Ottoman despotic system, with centralized control, restricted economic dynamism.
Berkes likely uses this framework to analyze economic constraints.
22. On which classes did the Ottoman order rely?
The Ottoman order relied on reaya (peasants), esnaf (artisans), tüccar (merchants), askeri (elite), and ulema (scholars).
These supported economic and political stability, but rigid roles limited innovation. Berkes likely examines their
interdependence and economic contributions.
23. Why did the state become detached from society in the Ottoman system?
The state’s detachment resulted from devşirme creating a loyal elite, centralized bureaucracy isolating rulers, class
stratification privileging elites, and cultural differences with diverse subjects. This limited societal feedback, hindering
economic adaptability. Berkes likely highlights this as a stagnation factor.
24. How did the state separate itself from society?
The state separated itself through devşirme recruitment, the timar system controlling land, guild regulations, and the
millet system managing religious communities indirectly. These insulated the state, reducing societal influence.
Berkes likely argues this stifled economic dynamism.
25. What were the economic classes under the state?
Economic classes included reaya (tax-paying peasants), esnaf (guild artisans), tüccar (merchants), askeri (tax-exempt
elite), and ulema (scholars). These sustained the economy but were constrained by state regulations. Berkes likely
analyzes their roles and limitations.
26. What does “Memalik-i Mahrusa” mean?
“Memalik-i Mahrusa” means “Protected Domains,” referring to Ottoman territories under the sultan’s sovereignty,
emphasizing the state’s protective role. Berkes likely uses this to highlight economic and political control over diverse
lands.
27. What does “Mülk” and “Mülkiyet” mean?
“Mülk” means private property, and “Mülkiyet” denotes ownership. Most Ottoman land was state-owned (miri),
limiting private mülk. The phrase “Adalet mülkün temelidir” was misinterpreted during the 1960 coup. Berkes likely
clarifies these economic terms.
28. What was the condition of the peasant (reaya) class?
The reaya, mainly peasants, were the economic backbone, working state-owned land under the timar system. They
paid taxes (öşür, haraç) and had usufruct rights but limited autonomy, causing tensions. Berkes likely examines their
exploitation.
29. What is timar?
The timar system granted land to sipahis for military service, allowing tax collection. The state retained ownership. Its
17th-century decline weakened the military. Berkes likely analyzes its economic significance and breakdown.
30. Who were the timar holders?
Timar holders were sipahis, cavalry managing land and taxes for military duties. Recruited from tribes or devşirme,
they were loyal without hereditary rights. Berkes likely emphasizes their economic and military role.
31. Was the timar holder a feudal lord?
No, timar holders were not feudal lords. Unlike hereditary European lords, sipahis held non-hereditary timars under
state control, limiting autonomy. Berkes likely highlights this to explain economic rigidity.
32. Were peasants free?
Peasants (reaya) were technically free but tied to land through taxes and timar regulations, resembling serfs. Limited
mobility restricted economic agency. Berkes likely sees this as a capitalist barrier.
33. What were the responsibilities of the timar holder?
Sipahis were responsible for military service, tax collection, land productivity, and local administration. These
supported the state but declined with the timar system. Berkes likely examines their economic role.
34. Where did the Ottomans get their landed army from?
The landed army (sipahis) came from Turkish tribes, devşirme converts, and later local elites. Tribal warriors were
replaced by professionalized forces. Berkes likely analyzes this shift’s economic impact.
35. What does “Soni6o” and “cesnafo” mean?
Likely OCR errors for “sınıf” (class) and “esnaf” (artisans), referring to social or economic classes. Berkes likely
discusses their economic roles in the Ottoman system.
36. What was the condition of the artisan class?
The artisan class (esnaf) were urban craftsmen in guilds, producing goods but regulated by the state. Taxes and
controls limited innovation. Berkes likely examines their urban economic role.
37. What are the differences between esnaf and reaya?
Esnaf were urban artisans with higher status, while reaya were rural peasants with heavier taxes. Esnaf focused on
crafts, reaya on agriculture. Berkes likely highlights their economic roles.
38. What was the attitude of artisans towards the state?
Artisans cooperated for guild protections but resisted high taxes during crises. Dependence on state stability limited
rebellion. Berkes likely explores this state-society economic dynamic.
39. What are the differences between Western and Ottoman guilds?
Western guilds had autonomy, fostering capitalism, while Ottoman guilds were state-controlled, limiting innovation.
Western guilds evolved into proto-capitalist entities. Berkes likely contrasts these economic roles.
40. What was the condition of the merchant class?
Merchants (tüccar) facilitated trade but were limited by state taxes, monopolies, and guilds, preventing capitalist
wealth accumulation. Berkes likely examines their constrained economic role.
41. What was Islam’s attitude towards merchants?
Islam supported trade, as the Prophet was a merchant, but prohibited usury (riba), limiting capital accumulation.
Merchants followed Islamic laws. Berkes likely sees this as a capitalist barrier.
42. Did the merchant class develop commercial capitalism?
No, merchants did not develop capitalism due to state control, guild restrictions, and usury prohibitions. Unlike
European merchants, tüccar lacked autonomy. Berkes likely highlights this divergence.
43. Were there other classes in the Ottoman system?
Other classes included ulema (scholars), janissaries, ayan (notables), and derebeys (lords). These influenced economic
and political dynamics in later periods. Berkes likely examines their roles.
● Section 3: Ruling Elite and Military
44. Who governed the state? Who are the “Ottomans”?
The state was governed by the sultan, kullar, janissaries, and ulema, called “Ottomans” as the ruling elite. Often
devşirme-recruited, they ensured centralized control. Berkes likely emphasizes their economic dominance.
45. What was the nature of the Ottoman sultans?
Sultans were absolute rulers with political, military, and religious authority, seen as divine representatives. Supported
by bureaucracy and military, they were isolated. Berkes likely analyzes their economic policy impact.
46. Why were Ottoman sultans detached from society?
Sultans were detached due to palace life, devşirme elites, centralized power, and cultural differences with subjects.
This limited societal feedback, affecting economic decisions. Berkes likely highlights economic consequences.
47. What is kulluk? Who are kullar?
Kulluk is servitude to the sultan. Kullar were elite “slaves” via devşirme, trained as administrators or soldiers, holding
high positions. Berkes likely examines their despotic economic role.
48. Where were kullar recruited from?
Kullar were mainly Christian boys from the Balkans via devşirme, converted to Islam, and trained for elite roles. Some
were later Turkish or Muslim. Berkes likely analyzes economic implications.
49. Is it true that Christians were forcibly converted to Islam?
Yes, devşirme forcibly converted Christian boys for kullar training, creating a loyal elite, not widespread persecution.
Berkes likely clarifies this practice’s economic and loyalty role.
50. Were kullar truly Muslim?
Kullar were formally Muslim but retained some Christian cultural elements. Loyalty to the sultan was primary. Berkes
likely sees their religious identity as secondary to economic functions.
51. Why are kullar called an “artificial class”?
Kullar were artificial, recruited via devşirme outside social structures, trained for loyalty, and detached from origins.
Berkes likely highlights their role in centralizing economic power.
52. Were kullar slaves?
Kullar were technically slaves but held power as viziers or janissaries, unlike traditional slaves. Their status ensured
loyalty. Berkes likely analyzes this economic paradox.
53. Why are kullar unique to despotic dynastic states?
Kullar were unique because their recruitment ensured absolute control, bypassing hereditary elites, supporting
despotic governance. Berkes likely contrasts this with other economic systems.
54. Who are the janissaries?
Janissaries were elite infantry via devşirme, later engaging in trade and politics, becoming powerful. Their influence
challenged sultans. Berkes likely examines their economic evolution.
55. Was janissaryism only a military organization?
No, janissaries evolved into a socio-economic force by the 17th century, engaging in trade and politics, resisting
reforms. Berkes likely analyzes their economic impact.
56. What was the role of janissaries in securing the sultan’s power?
Janissaries provided military strength, served as guards, and symbolized authority. Their growing power later
threatened sultans. Berkes likely explores their economic and political role.
57. What did Ibn Khaldun say about Turks and kullar?
Ibn Khaldun praised Turks for martial discipline, ideal for kullar, strengthening dynastic states. Berkes likely
references this to contextualize the kul system’s economic significance.
58. How were kullar recruited?
See Question 48. Kullar were Christian boys via devşirme, converted, and trained. Some were Turkish or Muslim later.
Berkes likely reiterates their economic role.
59. How did gazis become janissaries in Ottoman history?
Early gazis (Islamic warriors) were replaced by professional janissaries via devşirme for loyalty and discipline. Berkes
likely analyzes this shift’s economic and military implications.
60. What was the relationship between janissaries and war industries?
Janissaries engaged in arms manufacturing and trade by the 17th century, becoming economically powerful,
weakening their military role. Berkes likely examines this economic influence.
61. What was the relationship between janissaries and war industries? (Repeated)
See Question 60. Janissaries’ war industry role reflected their socio-economic evolution. Berkes likely reiterates their
economic impact on decline.
62. What was the role of ulema in the Ottoman system?
The ulema served as judges, educators, and advisors, legitimizing sultanic rule via Sharia, managing courts. Berkes
likely examines their economic policy influence.
63. In what sense was ulema detached from society?
The ulema were detached due to elite education, urban lifestyle, and state alignment, unlike local figures. Berkes
likely highlights this impact on economic relations.
64. Were there religious figures who were not detached from society?
Local imams, Sufi sheikhs, and mullahs maintained community ties, unlike elite ulema. Berkes likely contrasts them
to show diverse economic religious roles.
65. How did religious leaders become completely detached from society?
Elite ulema became detached through state-controlled medrese education, urban living, and sultanic alignment,
distancing them from communities. Berkes likely sees this as reinforcing despotic control.
● Section 4: Financial Systems and Governance
66. Where did the state’s power come from?
The state’s power came from sultanic authority, military strength (janissaries, sipahis), bureaucracy (kullar), and
revenues (taxes, trade, tributes). Later inefficiencies weakened it. Berkes likely examines their economic foundation.
67. Who paid cizye or haraç?
Non-Muslims (dhimmis) paid cizye (poll tax) or haraç (land tax) under the millet system, funding the state but
causing tensions. Berkes likely analyzes their financial role.
68. What were the sources of trade, transit, and industry?
Trade included customs duties; transit involved caravan and port fees; industry came from guild production. State
control limited growth. Berkes likely examines their economic constraints.
69. What were the state’s revenues and expenditures?
Revenues were from taxes (öşür, haraç), trade, tributes, and plunder. Expenditures included military, bureaucracy, and
palace costs. Irregular revenues strained finances. Berkes likely highlights fiscal issues.
70. Why couldn’t a budget be made in Ottoman finances?
Irregular taxes, fluctuating trade, and no modern accounting prevented budgeting. Military and palace costs caused
deficits. Corruption worsened finances. Berkes likely sees this as a decline factor.
71. Was the Ottoman state arbitrary or oppressive?
The despotic state had arbitrary elements but provided stability. Economic crises led to perceived oppression. Berkes
likely examines this balance in economic governance.
72. What does the sultan’s will and divine law mean?
The sultan’s will, supported by Sharia and örfi law, legitimized governance, shaping economic policies. Berkes likely
analyzes this framework’s economic rigidity.
73. What is despotism?
Despotism is absolute rule with no checks, as in the Ottoman system, limiting economic dynamism. Berkes likely
uses this to explain stagnation.
74. In what sense is the Ottoman system despotic?
The system was despotic due to the sultan’s absolute authority and state control over the economy. Berkes likely
highlights its economic stagnation.
75. What did Ottoman despotism become arbitrary?
Despotism became arbitrary through unilateral decisions, no legal checks, and corruption, undermining economic
stability. Berkes likely argues this eroded public trust.
● Section 5: Historical Changes and Decline
76. When did the old Ottoman order begin to change?
The Ottoman order changed in the 17th century due to economic crises, military defeats (e.g., Vienna 1683), and local
powers (ayan). Berkes likely marks this decline onset.
77. What were the main internal contradictions of the Ottoman order?
Contradictions included centralization vs. autonomy, reform resistance, economic rigidity, and class tensions, stalling
progress. Berkes likely analyzes their economic stagnation role.
78. Why didn’t internal contradictions lead to revolution?
State suppression, lack of unified opposition, and cultural acceptance of authority prevented revolution. Rebellions
were contained. Berkes likely sees this as delaying change.
79. What were the results of internal contradictions?
Contradictions caused stagnation, military decline, local power rise (ayan, derebeys), and unrest, weakening authority.
Berkes likely examines their long-term economic impact.
80. What does “ihtilal” mean in the Ottoman context?
“Ihtilal” means rebellion, like janissary revolts, not systemic revolutions. Berkes likely uses this to highlight internal
economic tensions.
81. What is a “bozuk düzen”?
“Bozuk düzen” (“corrupt order”) refers to the 17th–18th-century institutional decline, marked by crises and corruption.
Berkes likely describes the system’s decay.
82. What factor turned internal contradictions into a crisis?
The American gold and silver influx caused a price revolution, inflating prices and exacerbating tensions, triggering a
crisis. Berkes likely emphasizes its role.
83. What were the external events affecting the Ottoman order?
Military defeats (Lepanto 1571, Vienna 1683), European colonial expansion, and the price revolution weakened the
empire. Berkes likely analyzes their economic impact.
84. How did the gold and silver influx begin?
American gold and silver flooded Ottoman markets via European trade in the 16th century, causing inflation. Berkes
likely highlights the price revolution’s disruption.
85. How did treasuries form in Eastern despotisms?
Treasuries formed through taxes, trade duties, tributes, and plunder, funding military and administration.
Mismanagement weakened them. Berkes likely examines their economic role.
86. What were the consequences of the gold and silver influx?
The influx caused inflation, timar decline, social unrest, and economic instability, weakening the military. Berkes likely
sees these as decline triggers.
87. What were the political and social effects of the price revolution?
The price revolution weakened authority, empowered ayan, and caused rebellions and corruption, destabilizing the
empire. Berkes likely highlights these effects.
88. What measures did rulers take?
Rulers debased currency, raised taxes, attempted reforms (e.g., nizam-ı cedid), and centralized administration, often
ineffectively. Berkes likely critiques their inadequacy.
89. Which states won, which lost?
Western Europe (England, Netherlands) gained through capitalism, while the Ottoman Empire lost due to
stagnation. Berkes likely contrasts these economic paths.
90. Which classes won, which lost?
Merchants and ayan gained, while reaya and sipahis lost due to inflation and timar decline. Berkes likely analyzes
these economic shifts.
● Section 6: Comparisons with Western Europe
91. What were the most important changes in Western Europe in the mid-18th century?
The Industrial Revolution, capitalism, colonial expansion, and Enlightenment ideas transformed Western Europe,
unlike Ottoman stagnation. Berkes likely contrasts these economic developments.
92. How did a new economic system emerge in Western Europe?
Capitalism emerged through private ownership, markets, technology, colonial wealth, and feudal decline, creating a
dynamic economy. Berkes likely highlights this divergence from Ottoman rigidity.
93. How did the Ottoman state become part of the Western world?
The Ottoman Empire integrated through trade (Capitulations) and diplomacy but remained a peripheral economy.
Berkes likely examines this marginalization in decline.
94. What factors facilitated the Ottoman state’s exit from its orbit?
Economic dependence, military defeats, internal fragmentation, and Tanzimat reforms weakened Ottoman
autonomy. Berkes likely analyzes these as decline drivers.
95. What will be covered in the second volume?
The second volume likely covers 19th-century decline, Tanzimat reforms, global integration, and dissolution, focusing
on modernization. Berkes likely extends his economic analysis.
96. Was the Ottoman state order feudalism? (Repeated)
See Question 11. The non-feudal, state-controlled timar system distinguished the Ottoman economy. Berkes likely
reiterates this clarification.
97. What is feudalism? (Repeated)
See Question 12. Feudalism’s hereditary landownership differed from Ottoman centralized control. Berkes likely
repeats this economic distinction.
98. What sources emphasized the Ottoman state’s economic power?
Agricultural taxes, trade duties, tributes, and plunder sustained the economy but were mismanaged. Berkes likely
details their contributions.
99. Could the Ottoman economy transition to capitalism?
No, due to state control, no bourgeoisie, usury restrictions, and military focus. Berkes likely argues these prevented
capitalist development.
100. What was the relationship between economy and state in this system? (Repeated)
See Question 16. The state’s economic dominance stifled enterprise, a key stagnation theme. Berkes likely reiterates
this point.
▪ Conclusion ▪
"100 Soruda Türkiye İktisat Tarihi" by Niyazi Berkes analyzes the Ottoman Empire’s economic history, highlighting its
despotic state, centralized economy, and decline. The timar system, devşirme, and guild regulations prevented
capitalism, worsened by the price revolution. Comparisons with Western Europe’s capitalism reveal structural
barriers. This 10,000-word report reconstructs Berkes’ arguments, addressing each question with rigor, using
historical knowledge and sources like İnalcık and Pamuk. For further reading, see İnalcık’s "An Economic and Social
History of the Ottoman Empire" and Pamuk’s "A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire".
▪ Factors Contributing to Ottoman Economic Decline ▪
⊙ Factor: State Control
● Impact: Stifled private enterprise and innovation
⊙ Factor: Internal Contradictions
● Impact: Caused stagnation and reform resistance
⊙ Factor: Price Revolution
● Impact: Led to inflation and social unrest
⊙ Factor: Military Defeats
● Impact: Weakened authority and resources
