視
CASE BRIEF: BALIRAM WAMAN HIRAY v. JUSTICE
B. LENTIN, (1988) 4 SCC 419
CASE NAME Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin, (1988) 4 SCC 419
1988 SCC (Cri) 941, (1989) 176 ITR 1, (1989) 72 STC 384, 1988 AIR 2267,
CITATION
(1989) 44 TAXMAN 111
COURT Supreme Court of India
BENCH Hon’ble Justice A.P. Sen and Justice L.M. Sharma
PETITIONER Baliram Waman Hiray
RESPONDENT Justice B. Lentin
DECIDED ON Decided on 12th September, 1988
INTRODUCTION
The Lentin Commission was formed to look into corruption and shortcomings in Maharashtra’s
public health system. Its findings led to the decision in the case of Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v.
Justice B. Lentin and Others, which was made on September 12, 1988. The Commission’s findings
denounced a number of officials, including the previous Health Minister, Dr. Baliram Waman
Hiray, for their part in pervasive corruption that led to drug-related deaths. Several people,
including Dr. Hiray, received show-cause notices from the Commission for perjury under Section
193 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for allegedly providing false testimony during the
investigation.
Whether the Lentin Commission, established under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, could be
considered a “court” for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) was the main legal question before the Supreme Court. According to this clause, unless the
“court” where the false evidence was presented files a complaint, no court may consider a case of
perjury. Dr. Hiray contested the legality of the perjury notice, claiming that this provision did not
grant the Commission the status of a court. This raised significant concerns over the ability of
fact-finding authorities to begin criminal proceedings for perjury.
FACTS OF THE CASE
A one-man Commission of Inquiry led by Judge B. Lentin of the Bombay High Court was
appointed by the Maharashtra State Government on February 21, 1986, in accordance with Section
3 read in conjunction with Section 5(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, to investigate the
deaths of 14 patients at the government-run Jamsetjee Jee Bhoi Hospital in Bombay between
January 22, 1986, and February 7, 1986, following their administration of tainted glycerol.
According to its terms of reference, the Commission was expected, among other things, to
investigate and report on the circumstances and causes of the tragic deaths as well as to
determine, based on the growing body of evidence gathered by the Lentin Commission, wholly
responsible for the purchase and distribution of substandard drugs. A shady and dishonest
relationship surfaced between the drug companies producing and distributing subpar and tainted
pharmaceuticals, the PG NO 948 delinquent Food & Drugs Administration, hospital employees,
and the appellant, Bhai Sawant, two former Health Ministers, and some government officials.
The Commission’s findings criticized the State’s public health system and pointed out ongoing
political meddling, naming former Health Minister Bhai Sawant in particular. Sawant just escaped
receiving a notice to show cause for perjury under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, according to the article. Four people, including Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray, were given show-
cause notices by the court for providing misleading testimony in an attempt to disprove
allegations of systemic corruption.
The Legislature was presented with the conclusions of the Lentin Commission on March 30, 1988,
and the State Government accepted the recommendations. One important suggestion was to start
a different investigation into corruption allegations against former Health Ministers Bhai Sawant
and Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray, under the direction of a retired High Court judge. Along with other
officials thought to be accountable for many deaths, the investigation was also set to focus on Dr.
S.M. Dolas, the State’s Food & Drugs Controller, who had served in that capacity for fifteen years.
The government’s subsequent actions were unrelated to the current issue, even though the
investigation found both Health Ministers guilty of grave wrongdoing.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether, for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a
Commission of Inquiry established under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is a
“Court”?
ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES
Arguments from the appellant
Even if the appellant’s testimony were technically considered perjury, it would not be so in
law. This was not a case where it was appropriate to investigate the appellant for the alleged
offense under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code in the interest of justice. Mentioned in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which seemed
to have occurred during or in connection with the proceedings that were being held before
it.
For the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) and Section 340 of the Code, the Commission of
Inquiry was not a court. It was declared that although perjury in front of the Commission
was undoubtedly punishable, “the Government or a public-spirited person” should make
the decision to file a complaint or make a finding under s. 340, PG NO 950.
For the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the Code, the Commission of Inquiry, which the State
Government appointed under sub-s. (I) of s. 3 of the Act, read with s. 5, is simply a fact-
finding body appointed by the Government for the `information of its mind.’ The fact that
the procedure adopted is of a legal character and that it has the authority to administer an
oath does not confer upon it the status of the Court.
The Act’s s. six clearly states that, with the exception of prosecution for providing false
testimony to the Commission, no statement made by an individual before a Commission of
Inquiry `may subject him to, or be used against him’ in any civil or criminal actions.
Arguments from the respondent
The majority opinion in Lalji Haridas’ case is binding on the Court and remains good law,
therefore there was no need to change the Act simply because sub-section (3) of section 195
of the Code was adopted.
The learned Advocate-General argues that it is obvious that a Commission of Inquiry is a
court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) as established in the Lalji Haridas case based on a
combined reading of sub-ss. (4) and (5) of s. 5. Put another way, the argument is that
although Section 4 gives a Commission of Inquiry the authority of a Civil Court in
accordance with the well-known format of acts establishing special tribunals, the
legislature has taken it a step further and resolved any question by passing Subsections (4)
and (5) of Section 5.
Different kinds of legislative practices exist. Subsection (4) of section 37 of the Indian
Income Tax Act, 1922, was incorporated into the Act in 1956 and states that any proceeding
before an Income Tax Officer will be considered a judicial proceeding. This is similar to the
provision in section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
A word’s definition might be either comprehensive or limited with regard to its common
meaning. Occasionally, a term’s definition may include the phrase “means and includes,”
which unavoidably casts uncertainty on its meaning. The learned Advocate-General
claimed that the inclusive portion of the term of “Court” in Section 195(3) of the Code was
only a legal declaration and ex abundanti cautela. It is argued that the inclusive portion of
the definition of “Court” in s. 195(3) of the Code is satisfied by the first half of sub-s. (4) of s.
5 of the Act.
JUDGMENT
The Court held that there was no question that Parliament had enacted sub-section (3) of Section
195 of the Code in order to carry out the Law Commission’s recommendations and address the
unclear legal situation resulting from differing High Court interpretations of the definition of
“Court” in Section 195(1)(b). In light of this, the inclusion of the inclusive clause in the definition
of “Court” in Sub-section (3) of Section 195 has changed the law to some extent. The law ought to
be clear and unambiguous.
If there were any aspects of the law that might be considered normative, it would be the
fundamental precepts requiring consistency in judicial decision-making. For the restricted
purpose of proceeding under either section 482 of the old Code or section 345 of the current Code,
a Commission of Inquiry was considered a Civil Court using fictional terms. The legal fiction in
sub-section (5) of section s. of the Act, which pertained to the proceedings before the Commission,
was primarily restricted to offenses that were punished by sections 193 and 228 of the Indian
Penal Code. It was not intended to apply to other offenses. Nonetheless, if permitted by law, the
State Government may still prosecute the appellant for committing the claimed offenses under
sections 193 and 228 I.P.C. in spite of the ruling.
ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION
The Lentin Commission was established under the Commissions of Inquiry Act. The question in
Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin and Others concerned whether the Commission
qualified as a “Court” for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC). In situations involving perjury, the section mandates that a court itself must begin
proceedings. As a result, parties other than courts—such as commissions of inquiry—are
prohibited from initiating proceedings unless they meet the requirements of this section.
Notwithstanding its quasi-judicial duties and its authority to call witnesses, gather evidence, and
administer oaths, the Supreme Court ruled that the Lentin Commission was ineligible to operate
as a “court.” The ruling relied on a limited meaning of the word “court,” stressing that only entities
endowed with the judicial ability to make legally binding decisions might use such power.
Commissions of inquiry are essentially fact-finding organizations without the power to make
decisions; hence, they are not included in this definition.
One could criticize the Court’s approach for taking an unduly strict reading of the word “court.”
The Court disregarded the reality that commissions of inquiry frequently have strong coercive
powers analogous to judicial procedures, such as the administration of oaths and forcing
testimony, by limiting the concept to bodies with final, binding decision-making authority. These
qualities, along with the commission’s duty to expose corruption, may put it in a special position
to deal with perjury in its own trials.
In summary, although the Court strictly interpreted procedural safeguards, it could have taken a
more liberal stance and permitted commissions with quasi-judicial duties to examine misleading
evidence in the course of their inquiries.
