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Case

RE: AKOTO AND 7 OTHERS

Supreme CouB • 28 Aug 1961 • Ghana

CORAM

KORSAH C.J., VAN LARE JSC, AKIWUMI J.S.C.

JUDGEMENT

KORSAH C.J.: The appellants were arrested and placed in detention on the 10th and 11th
November, 1959, under an order made by the Governor-General and signed on his behalf
by the Minister of Interior under section 2 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958.1(1)

The order reads:

“L.N. 310

THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT, 1958

THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION ORDER (No. 5) 1959

WHEREAS the Governor-General is satis^ed that this Order is necessary to prevent the
persons in the Schedule to this Order acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the
State:

NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Governor-General by

(2) This Order shall take ecect at 7 o’clock in the aeernoon of 10th day of November, 1959.

2. (1) The persons described in the Schedule to this Order shall be taken into custody and
detained under section 2 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958.

(2) Subject to the power under section 3 of that Act to suspend, vary or revoke this Order,
and subject to subsection (3) of section 5 of that Act, the period of which the persons
described in the Schedule to this Order are to be detained shall be for a period of ^ve
years.

SCHEDULE

Name FuBher PaBiculars

1. BAFFOUR OSEI AKOTO .. .. .. .. Senior Linguist to the Asantehene, of

House No. O.1. 141, Ashanti New Town,

Kumasi.

2. PETER ALEX DANSO ALIAS

KWAKU DANSO .. Lorry Driver, of House No. M.E. 70,

Kumasi.

3. OSEI ASSIBEY MENSAH .. .. .. .. Storekeeper, House No. M.E. 60, Ashanti

New Town, Kumasi.

4. NANA ANTWI BUSIAKO ALIAS

JOHN MENSAH .. “Nkofohene” of Kumasi of House

No. O.B. 473 Mbrom, Kumasi.

5. JOSEPH KOJO ANTWI-KUSI

ALIAS ANANE ANTWI-KUSI .. .. .. .. .. of Kumasi.

Asafo, Kumasi.

8. ANDREW KOJO EDUSEI .. .. .. .. Auctioneer and Leker Writer of House No.

O.1. 165, Ashanti New Town, Kumasi.

9. HALIDU KRAMO .. .. .. .. .. TranspoB Owner of House No. S. 51,

Suame, Kumasi.

Made at Accra this 10th day of November, 1959.

By the Governor-General’s Command.

A. E. INKUMSAH

Minister of the Interior

It is admiked that the order is regular on its face, that it was duly signed by the Minister of
Interior, and that the appellants are the persons named in it.

The main issues raised by counsel for the appellants are that:

(1) The learned judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in refusing the application without
making an order for a formal return.

(2) By viBue of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1816 the couB is required to enquire into the
truth of the facts contained in “The Grounds” upon which the Governor-General was
satis^ed that the order was necessary to prevent the appellants from acting in a manner
prejudicial to the security of the state.

(3) The Minister of Interior who signed the order for and on behalf of the Governor-
General was actuated by malice.

(4) The grounds upon which the appellants were detained do not fall within the ambit of
the expression “Acts prejudicial to the security of the state”.

(5) By viBue of section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap. 10 of the Laws of the Gold
Coast (1951 Rev.) now section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the
Governor-General is precluded from exercising the powers conferred on him under the
Preventive Detention Act, to make an order for the arrest and detention of the appellants
without trial except in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.

(6) The Preventive Detention Act, 1958, by viBue of which the appellants were detained, is
in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana with respect to aBicle 13 (1) of the Constitution, or is contrary to the solemn
declaration of fundamental principles made by the President on assumption of omce.

(7) The Preventive Detention Act not having been passed upon a declaration of
emergency is in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.

On the ^rst issue, it is observed that the application of the appellants for the writ of
habeas corpus is suppoBed by amdavit with exhibits disclosing all the material facts
essential to determining the regularity of the order, namely: (a) the order of detention, (b)
the wriken information furnished in accordance with the requirements of the Act, (c) the
wriken representations by the detainees to the Governor-General, and (d) the reply of the
Governor-General.

There is likle wonder therefore that upon service of the copies of the motion and other
relevant papers on the respondents the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, on
behalf of the Minister, ^led an amdavit which brieny stated the following additional facts:

“1. Since 1st July, 1959, makers relating to preventive detention, other than the statutory
power conferred on the Minister responsible for Defence by section 3 (2) of the
Preventive Detention Act, 1958, have been placed within the poBfolio of the Minister of
the Interior. 2. I am authorised to say that the Preventive Detention Order (No. 5) 1959 (L.N.
310) was made by the Governor-General in good faith under section 2 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1958, and the making therefore was duly signi^ed in good faith by the
Minister of the Interior. 3. The reason for the making of the said Order is as set out in the
recital thereto, namely that in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of the
Preventive Detention Act, 1958, the Governor-General is satis^ed that the said Order is
necessary to prevent the persons detained acting in a manner prejudicial to the security
of the State. The grounds of detention served upon the said detainees contain paBiculars
of the previous acts or conduct upon which the conclusion of the Governor-General is
based”.
In these circumstances we consider that all the facts relevant for determining whether the
writ should issue or not having already been disclosed in the amdavits ^led, a formal
return was unnecessary and that the learned judge was entitled to dispose of the
application upon the amdavits. It is not disputed that (a) the appellants belong to the class
of persons to whom the Preventive Detention Act applies, (b) that they are the persons
mentioned in the order and (c) the order was made by the competent authority.

It was fuBher contended on behalf of the appellants that where a judge does not order a
release under rule 14 of Order 59 of the Supreme [High] CouB (Civil Procedure) Rules,
1954, he is obliged to order a formal return to the writ. We do not accept this view as a
correct interpretation of rule 14 which reads:

“On the hearing of the application the Judge may, in his discretion, order that the person
restrained be released, and the order shall be a sumcient warrant to any gaoler, constable
or other person for the release of the person under restraint”.

We are clearly of opinion that rule 14 does not make it compulsory that in every case the
judge should order a formal return. In this view, we are foBi^ed by what Goddard, L.J. (as
he then was) said in R. v. Home Secretary, ex paBe Greene:2(2)

“To avoid any misunderstanding, I desire to add that, both in the present case and in R.v.
Home Secretary, ex p. Lees the applicants themselves exhibited to their amdavit copies of
the orders under which they were detained, and no question was raised as to the
accuracy of the copies. However, cases may arise where persons who are detained,
whether under defence regulations or otherwise, do not, and perhaps cannot, inform the
couB of the order or warrant under which they are detained. In such a case, if the couB
sees ^t to grant an order nisi or summons to show cause, it will be necessary for the
person who has the custody of the prisoner to make an amdavit exhibiting the order or
warrant under which he detains the prisoner. Although, as I have pointed out above, the
old procedure did not require a return to be veri^ed, at any rate in the ^rst instance,
modern practice does require an amdavit, and care should be taken in these cases under
the regulations to exhibit the actual order signed by the Secretary of State, which alone is
the authority for detaining the prisoner.”

On the second issue, the contention is that by viBue of section 3 of the Habeas Corpus
Act, 1816,3(3) the couB was bound to enquire into the truth of the facts alleged in the
grounds upon which the Governor-General was satis^ed that the order was necessary to
prevent the appellants acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state. There is
of course the preliminary question whether the Habeas Corpus Act, 1816,3(4) is a statute
of general application within the meaning of section 14 of the Supreme CouB ordinance,
1876.4(5) In our opinion it is a statute of general application, because the act was law in
force in England on the 24th July, 1874, and there are no local circumstances which can
possibly operate to exclude its application in this country. The question the Habeas
Corpus Act, 1816, raises is one of procedure. At common law the return to a writ of habeas
corpus could not be cotroveBed but the 1816 Act permiked the couB to enquire into the
truth of the facts set foBh in the return if ordered, except in cases where a detention
order is made for the security of the state and the administrative plenary discretion is
vested in the person making the order as decided in Liversidge v. Anderson.5(6) Following
the above decision, we hold that although the Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, is a statute of
general application it does not apply in this case because the Preventive Detention Act
under which the appellants are detained vests plenary discretion in the Governor-
General, (now the President), if satis^ed that such order is necessary. The couB could not
therefore enquire into the truth of the facts set foBh in the grounds on which each
appellant has been detained.

In this maker we are guided by the legal principles enunciated in the decisions in
Liversidge v. Anderson5(7); R. v. Home Secretary, ex paBe Greene6(8); R. v. Home
Secretary, ex paBe Budd.7(9)

In these cases the question raised was whether it was open to any couB to enquire into
the reasonableness of the belief of the Secretary of State in the makers in which
regulation 18B (1) required him to have reasonable cause to believe before a detention
order could be made. It will be noted that under the Preventive Detention Act the
Governor-General, if satis^ed that it is necessary, may make the order for the detention
of the person or persons named. On this point, Lord Greene, M.R. in ex paBe Budd, supra,
said:

“It is clear that, if the couBs have no power to inquire into the reasonableness of the belief
of the Secretary of State in the makers in which he is required to believe, they can have no
power to inquire into the grounds of his satisfaction in regard to makers of which he is
required to be satis^ed”.8(10)

We may also refer to the opinion of the majority of the House of Lords on this issue in
Liversidge v. Anderson.

Viscount Maugham said:

“The result is that there is no preliminary question of fact which can be submiked to the
couBs, and that, in ecect, there is no appeal from the decision of the Secretary of State in
these makers, provided only that he acts in good faith”.9(11)

Lord Macmillan said,:

“. . . I am unable to accept a reading of the regulation which would prescribe that the
secretary of State may not act in accordance with what commends itself to him as a
reasonable cause of belief without incurring the risk that a couB of law may disagree with
him . . . “10(12)

Lord Wright said:

“On the view which I have formed that there is under reg. 18B no triable issue as to
reasonableness for the couB, these authorities cease to be of any value. As the
administrative plenary discretion is vested in the Home Secretary, it is for him to decide
whether he has reasonable grounds, and to act accordingly. No outsider’s decision is
invoked nor is the issue within the competence of any couB.”11(13)

Lord Romer said:

“. . . . if at the trial the Home Secretary gives rebuking evidence to the ecect that, in his
opinion, there were reasonable grounds for his belief, his statement, being merely a
statement as to his opinion, must necessarily be accepted unless it can be shown that he
was not acting in good faith, and the onus of showing this would lie upon the plaintic.”
12(14) Upon the principles so clearly enunciated by the majority of the House of Lords in
Liversidge’s case, Lord Greene said in ex paBe Budd:

“It is scarcely necessary to say that language used in earlier decisions which may suggest
that the couBs may inquire into the reasonableness of the belief of the Secretary of State
cannot now be regarded as correct.”13(15)

Upon the production of the order the only question which has to be considered is its
legality; if the order is lawful the detention is lawful.
Thirdly, even if good faith is impugned, it is clear from the decided cases, that the burden
of proof is on the person who alleges it, and not on the constituted authority, in this case
the Minister of Interior, to disprove it. In this maker the main ground alleged for impugning
malice is that on the next day aeer their detention the Minister informed the appellants
that the grounds of their detention would be sent to them, and that they would be
permiked to see their lawyers to make representations, and fuBher that the government
wished to do them as much justice as possible. It is fuBher alleged that the Minister
addressed the appellants thus: “Some of you may not be guilty of the crimes charged, and
if you make representations your cases would be considered,” and fuBher that in answer
to a remark by one of the appellants that he had seen the “warrant of arrest” with many
names on it, some of them struck out, the Minister replied: “You sit down in Kumasi and
Alex Osei holds a pistol in each hand shooting at women in the streets of Kumasi. When
we were ^ghting the British for freedom we were arrested.” Upon this, it is urged that
because there is no return ^led or no denial by the Minister concerned there is therefore
evidence from which malice must be inferred.

Assuming that the Minister made the statement akributed to him, it cannot be held to be
evidence of malice; on the contrary it could suppoB the view that the Minister acted
promptly by informing the appellants of their rights and advised them that under the Act
they were entitled to make representations to the Governor-General, which advice the
appellants acted upon. The fact that their representations to the Governor-General did
not result in their release is not evidence of malice nor is the allegation that the Minister
had accused them of complicity in street shooting in Kumasi. We agree with the opinion
expressed by the learned judge of the couB below that these allegations do not
constitute evidence of bad faith or malice.

The couBs must presume that high omcers of state have acted in good faith in the
discharge of their duties. It will be wrong in principle to enquire into the bona ^des of
Ministers of State on a mere allegation of bad faith by a petitioner. The couB can only look
into allegations of bad faith if there is positive evidence, which is singularly absent in this
case—Nakkuda Ali v. M.F. De S. Jayaratne.14(16)

It is fouBhly contended that the grounds for the detention served on the appellants did
not disclose that they were suspected of preparing to commit acts prejudicial to the
security of the state, within the ordinary meaning of the expression “security of state” and
that the intention of the Preventive Detention Act was to prevent persons acting in a
manner prejudicial to the defence of this country, i.e. from foreign power.

It is clear from section 2 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, that power to make a
detention order is not limited to the defence of Ghana against a foreign power; on the
contrary the section speci^cally empowers the Governor-General to make such an order
in respect of:

“(a) the defence of Ghana,

(b) the relations of Ghana with other countries, or (c) the security of the State.”

We cannot therefore accept the narrow interpretation which counsel for the appellants
seeks to place on the purpose of the Act. We agree with appellants’ counsel that as a
guide to what acts may be adjudged to fall within the expression “the security of the
state” one may look at those ocences under PaB IV, Chapter 1, of the Criminal Code,
1960,15(17) or under Title 23 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 9,16(18) now repealed, under the
heading “Ocences against the safety of the State.” It will be observed that this includes a
large number of ocences which have nothing to do with the defence of Ghana or with
foreign countries, but in respect of which the Governor-General may if satis^ed that the
order is necessary, make an order under the Preventive Detention Act, 1958. The object of
the Act is to restrain a person from commiking a crime which it is suspected he may
commit in the future. Its aim is to prevent the commission of acts which may endanger
public order and the security of the State.

The grounds for the detention of each of the appellants akached to the amdavit in
suppoB of the application for habeas corpus are:

1. “BAFFOUR OSEI AKOTO

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have encouraged
the commission of acts of violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and have
associated with persons who have adopted a policy of violence as a means of achieving
political aims in those Regions.

2. PETER ALEX DANSO alias KWAKU DANSO

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have consistently
and in paBicular in October 1959, advocated and encouraged the commission of acts of
violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and generally have adopted, and have
associated with other persons who have adopted a policy of violence as a means of
achieving political aims in those Regions.

3. OSEI ASSIBEY MENSAH

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have advocated and
encouraged violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and generally have adopted
and have associated with other persons who have adopted, a policy of violence as a
means of achieving political aims in those Regions.

4. NANA ANTWI BUSIAKO alias JOHN MENSAH

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have consistently
and in paBicular in October, 1959, advocated and encouraged the commission of acts of
violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and generally have adopted, and have
associated with other persons who have adopted, a policy of violence as a means of
achieving political aims in those Regions.

5. JOSEPH KOJO ANTWI-KUSI alias ANANE ANTWI-KUSI

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have consistently
and in paBicular in September, 1959, advocated and encouraged the commission of acts
of violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and generally have adopted, and have
associated with others who have adopted, a policy of violence as a means of achieving
political aims in those Regions.

6. BENJAMIN KWAKU OWUSU

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have encouraged
the commission of acts of violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and have
associated with persons who have adopted a policy of violence as a means of achieving
political aims in those Regions.

7. ANDREW KOJO EDUSEI

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have consistently
and in paBicular in April, 1959, advocated and encouraged the commission of acts of
violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and generally have adopted and have
associated with other persons who have adopted a policy of violence as a means of
achieving political aims in those Regions.

8. HALIDU KRAMO

Acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, in that you have encouraged
the commission of acts of violence in the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions and have
associated with persons who have adopted a policy of violence as a means of achieving
political aims in those Regions.”

It cannot be denied that in these circumstances, the Governor-General may order the
detention of these persons if satis^ed that the order is necessary to prevent the persons
concerned from acting in a manner indicated which cannot fail but be prejudicial to the
security of the state. Where the very basis of law is sought to be undermined and
akempts are made to create a state of acairs which will result in disruption, and make it
impossible for normal government to function, the Governor-General would be justi^ed in
evoking the special powers under the Preventive Detention Act to prevent those whom he
is satis^ed are concerned in it, acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state.

Fiehly, in our view, section 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code,17(19) to which we have been
referred which reads:

“(1) All ocences under the Criminal Code shall be enquired into, tried and other wise dealt
with according to the provisions of this Code.

(2) All other ocences shall be enquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to
the provisions of this Code, subject, however, to the provisions of any Ordinance
regulating the manner or place of enquiry into, trial or other dealing with such ocences”
merely makes provisions for trial of ocences commiked, but cannot operate to restrain
the exercise of powers of detention for prevention of acts calculated to be prejudicial to
the safety of the State. The mischief aimed at by the Preventive Detention Act is in respect
of acts that may be commiked in the future, whereas the Criminal Code concerns itself
with acts which have in fact been commiked.

By notice ^led during the pendency of this appeal, counsel for the appellants invoked the
powers of the Supreme CouB under section (2) of ABicle 42 of the Constitution to
declare the Preventive Detention Act invalid on the ground that it was made in excess of
the power conferred on Parliament.

Counsel submiked:

“1. That the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, was made in excess of the power conferred on
Parliament by or under the Constitution with respect to ABicle 13 (1) of the Constitution,
that until that ABicle is repealed by the people, (a) freedom and justice shall be honoured
and maintained, (b) no person should sucer discrimination on grounds of political belief,
and (c) no person should be deprived of freedom of speech, or of the right to move and
assemble, or of the right of access to the couBs of law. 2. That the Preventive Detention
Act, 1958, is contrary to the Declaration of Fundamental Principles solemnly subscribed to
by KWAME NKRUMAH on accepting the call of the people to the high omce of PRESIDENT
OF GHANA and to which HE adhered upon that declaration, namely that “The powers of
Government spring from the will of the people and should be exercised in accordance
therewith”, in paBicular, with reference to the honouring and maintaining of freedom and
justice, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of political belief, non-deprivation of the
freedom of speech, or of the right to move and assemble without hindrance or of the
right of access to the couBs of law.

3. That the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, which was not passed upon a declaration of
emergency or as a restriction necessary for preserving public order, morality or health,
but which neveBheless placed a penal enactment in the hands of the President to
discriminate against Ghanaians, namely to arrest and detain any Ghanaian and to imprison
him for at least ^ve years and thus deprive him of his freedom of speech, or of the right to
move and assemble without hindrance, or of the right of access to the couBs of law,
constitutes a direct violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and is wholly
invalid and void.”

ABicle 42 (2) reads:

“The Supreme CouB shall have original jurisdiction in all makers where a question arises
whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament by or
under the Constitution and if any such question arises in the High CouB or an inferior
couB, the hearing shall be adjourned and the question referred to the Supreme CouB for
decision.”
As the legal issues arising from those questions could not properly be raised and/or
determined at the High CouB we deemed it appropriate to grant the leave sought, and
the issues have been accordingly argued in the course of this appeal.

All the grounds relied upon appear to be based upon ABicle 13 of the Constitution. It is
contended that the Preventive Detention Act is invalid because it is repugnant to the
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1960, as ABicle 13(1) requires the President upon
assumption of omce to declare his adherence to ceBain fundamental principles which are:

“That the powers of Government spring from the will of the people and should be
exercised in accordance therewith. That freedom and justice should be honoured and
maintained. That the union of Africa should be striven for by every lawful means and when
akained, should be faithfully preserved. That the Independence of Ghana should not be
surrendered or diminished on any grounds other than the fuBherance of African unity.
That no person should sucer discrimination on grounds of sex, race, tribe, religion or
political belief. That Chieeaincy in Ghana should be guaranteed and preserved. That every
citizen of Ghana should receive his fair share of the produce yielded by the development
of the country. That subject to such restrictions as may be necessary for preserving public
order, morality or health, no person should be deprived of freedom of religion, of speech,
of the right to move and assemble without hindrance or of the right of access to couBs of
law.”

This contention, however, is based on a misconception of the intent, purpose and ecect of
ABicle 13(1) the provisions of which are, in our view, similar to the Coronation Oath taken
by the Queen of England during the Coronation Service. In the one case the President is
required to make a solemn declaration, in the other the Queen is required to take a
solemn oath. Neither the oath nor the declaration can be said to have a statutory ecect of
an enactment of Parliament. The suggestion that the declarations made by the President
on assumption of omce constitute a “Bill of Rights” in the sense in which the expression is
understood under the Constitution of the United States of America is therefore untenable.

We may now consider the ecect of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1960, with
regard to the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, enacted by the parliament of Ghana under
the Ghana Constitution Order in Council, 1957.18(20) We observe, that by the Constitution
(Consequential Provisions) Act 196019(21) enacted by the same Constituent Assembly
which enacted the Republican Constitution, the Preventive Detention Act, 1958 was
amended thus: In section 2, in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 3, and in subsection
(2) of section 4, for “Governor-General” in each place where it occurs substitute
“President”. Also that by ABicle 40 of the Republican Constitution, 1960, the laws of
Ghana comprise, inter alia, enactments in force immediately before the coming into
operation of the Constitution, a foBiori, the Preventive Detention Act, 1958 being law in
force in Ghana at the time the Constitution was enacted and having been amended by
the same body which enacted the said Constitution, it cannot be denied that it must have
been the intention of the people of Ghana by their representatives gathered in a
Constituent Assembly to retain the Preventive Detention Act, 1958 in full force and ecect.
The contention that the legislative power of Parliament is limited by ABicle 13 (1) of the
constitution, is therefore in direct connict with express provisions of ABicle 20. We hold
that the Preventive Detention Act does not constitute a violation of the Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana, consequently it is neither invalid nor void.

We are of opinion that the ecect of ABicle 20 of the Constitution which provides for “The
Sovereign Parliament”, is that subject to the following quali^cations, Parliament can make
any law it considers necessary. The limitations are that (a) Parliament cannot alter any of
the entrenched aBicles in the Constitution unless there has been a referendum in which
the will of the people is expressed; (b) Parliament can however of its own volition,
increase, but not diminish the entrenched aBicles; (c) the aBicles which are not
entrenched can only be altered by an Act which speci^cally amends the Constitution.

It will be observed that ABicle 13 (1) is in the form of a personal declaration by the
President and is in no way paB of the general law of Ghana. In the other paBs of the
Constitution where a duty is imposed the word “shall” is used, but throughout the
declaration the word used is “should”. In our view the declaration merely represents the
goal which every President must pledge himself to akempt to achieve. It does not
represent a legal requirement which can be enforced by the couBs.

On examination of the said declarations with a view to ^nding out how any could be
enforced we are satis^ed that the provisions of ABicle 13 (1) do not create legal
obligations enforceable by a couB of law. The declarations however impose on every
President a moral obligation, and provide a political yardstick by which the conduct of the
Head of State can be measured by the electorate. The people’s remedy for any depaBure
from the principles of the declaration, is through the use of the ballot box, and not
through the couBs.
We do not accept the view that Parliament is competent to pass a Preventive Detention
Act in war time only and not in time of peace. The authority of Parliament to pass laws is
derived from the same source, the Constitution, and if by it, Parliament can pass laws to
detain persons in war time there is no reason why the same Parliament cannot exercise
the same powers to enact laws to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial
to the security of the State in peace time. It is not only in Ghana that Detention Acts have
been passed in peace time.

Finally, the contention that the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, is contrary to the
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana is untenable and for the reasons indicated the
appeal is dismissed.

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