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TRADE IN GOODS
This page intentionally left blank
 Trade in Goods
The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating
Trade in Goods

PETROS C. MAVROIDIS

Edwin B. Parker Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, NY,

Professor at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland
Research Fellow at CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research)

1
 3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
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Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
© P. Mavroidis, 2007
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
Crown copyright material is reproduced under Class Licence
Number C01P0000148 with the permission of OPSI
and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland
First published 2007
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Mavroidis, Petros C.
Trade in goods : the GATT and the other agreements regulating trade in goods /
Petros C. Mavroidis.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–923903–0 (alk. paper)
1. Foreign trade regulation. 2. General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (1947)
3. General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (Organization) I. Title.
K4600.M393 2007
343⬘.087—dc22 2007034285
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk

ISBN 978–0–19–923903–0

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
For Meritas
This page intentionally left blank
 Acknowledgements

Winston Churchill once said: ‘writing a book is an adventure. To begin with, it is

a toy and an amusement; then it becomes a mistress, and then it becomes a mas-
ter, and then a tyrant. The last phase is that just as you are about to be reconciled
to your servitude, you kill the monster, and fling him out to the public.’ A num-
ber of people should take credit for helping me to complete this book, although
they should not be held accountable for flinging it out to the public; this is my
sole responsibility.
This book is the natural extension (and substantial revision) of my Commentary
on the GATT (Oxford University Press, 2005). Rob Howse asked me to write on
that subject, and I thank him for showing confidence in me.
Bryce Bittner, Jorge Huerta-Goldman, Kevin Stemp, Anastasios Tomazos,
Arun Venkataraman, Edwin Vermulst, and Jasper-Martijn Wauters read parts
of the original manuscript, and corrected my misunderstandings on a host of
issues. Heinz Opelz shared with me his invaluable experience as Director of mar-
ket access issues of the GATT. At the WTO, Cato Adrian, Marc Bacchetta, Tessa
Bridgeman, Willie Chatsika, Edwini Kessie, Patrick Allison Low, Juan-Alberto
Marchetti, Julie Pain, Serge Stamnas, Gretchen Stanton, Luigi Stendardo, Joelle
Vuillemenot, and Erik Wijkstrom, never tired of responding to my (ever increas-
ing number of ) questions. Rhian-Mary Wood-Richards helped me identify doc-
uments important to my research, and bring the various chapters to their present
status. The same goes for Sarah Sladen who has helped me enormously to prepare
this book, and had to brush up her German on the way. My computer skills, or
lack of them, have betrayed me a number of times: Angay Vijayakumar, Ashley
Pineda, and Boris Niyazov, thank you so much for being such a help on this
score. My students on both sides of the Atlantic, through their comments, ques-
tions and overall class-participation, greatly contributed to the manner in which
I deal with the issues here. Teaching at CLS about the WTO for the past years
with my dear friends and colleagues Kyle Bagwell, George Bermann, and Jagdish
Bhagwati, has been a very enriching experience for me. At Neuchâtel, I benefited
from discussions with Yvan Fauchère, Pauline Lièvre, Panagiotis Delimatsis, and
Laurenz Sigismondi. Yvan, in particular, not only generously shared with me his
expertise on SPS issues, but helped me bring this book to its current shape.
I benefited from a series of talks with Marc Bacchetta, Chad Bown, Marc
Busch, Meredith Crowley, Bill Davey, Jeff Dunoff, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Bill
Ethier, Crawford Falconer, Joe Francois, Gary Horlick, Aaditya Mattoo, Niall
Meagher, Mattia Melloni, Damien J. Neven, Federico Ortino, Joost Hugo Bart
Pauwelyn, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Tom Prusa, Eric Reinhardt, Kamal Saggi,
viii Acknowledgements

Simon Schropp, T.N. Srinivasan, Mike Trebilcock, and Joseph H.H. Weiler who
generously shared their unique knowledge on GATT issues with me.
Bernard Hoekman, Doug Irwin, André Sapir, and Joel Trachtman read re-drafts
of my chapters and gave me very useful comments. They also largely influenced
the approach taken in this book: Doug persuaded me that we have a lot to learn
by placing the GATT in its appropriate historical context, and I have certainly
immensely enjoyed my time reading the preparatory work of the GATT. Joel’s
comments were, as always, to the point. He has always been particularly generous
with his time and I have benefited a lot from my interaction with him over the
years. As is the case with the other people I thank in this note, there is unfortu-
nately no reciprocity involved, so far at least. Bernard and André are uniquely
positioned to discuss the law and economics of the world trading system. They
have shared with me their vast knowledge of the institutions and the political
economy considerations of the key actors. They have also corrected my many
misconceptions on issues of their expertise.
Ivan Crowley read the whole manuscript, and deserves a very particular men-
tion. His comments have been outstanding as they have been detailed: he spot-
ted numerous errors and inconsistencies in previous drafts, and brought them
to my attention; through his comments, he opened up new avenues for me. He
responded beyond the call of duty.
David Palmeter has been a great friend and mentor over the years. My under-
standing of the GATT has been deeply influenced by his work and our cooper-
ation. His continuous interest in trade issues and his ever-innovating approach is
a source of inspiration for me.
Lance Liebman put a wonderful group together (Kyle Bagwell, Gene
Grossman, Henrik Horn, Bob Staiger, Alan Sykes) to work on the American Law
Institute (ALI) project on WTO law, and asked me to participate in it. I have
learned so much participating in this group, it is simply impossible for me to
thank my colleagues and friends there enough.
I have already expressed elsewhere that my interest in the study of the GATT
is largely due to Frieder Roessler. He hired me for the GATT legal service a few
years ago, and through our discussions inspired my interest in the field. I hope
that he will get some pleasure reading this book. Bernard Hoekman and Henrik
Horn picked up from where Frieder had left off. Bernard’s knowledge of the
world trading system is unique in so many respects. What is also unique is his
approach. He is a true social scientist. Henrik has been my steady co-author for
over 10 years. I owe him much more than I will ever be able to express, and hope
that, when reading this book, he will have the sense that his (ongoing) tutoring
was (is) not in vain.
While writing this book, I had the opportunity to revisit some of Bob Hudec’s
work and realize, yet again, that he had already assessed (in a much superior man-
ner) most of the issues I am dealing with. It is a pity he is not with us any more;
I would have loved to share this book with him.
 Acknowledgements ix

My wife, Suja Rishikesh-Mavroidis, has still not given up trying to educate

me on market access issues, her area of expertise. She also undertook most of our
family tasks, providing me with precious time to work on this book. I will never
be in a position to thank her enough for all she has done for our family and me
over the years. This book, as is the case of all my work, is for her and our daugh-
ters, Meera-Natalia, Riya-Valentina, and Tara-Eleni.
Petros C. Mavroidis
Commugny, Switzerland
April 27, 2007
This page intentionally left blank
 Summary Contents

Acknowledgements vii
List of Abbreviations xix
Table of Cases xxiii
Table of Legislation xxvii

1. From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994 1

2. Disciplines on Trade Instruments 39
3. Domestic Instruments 190
4. State Contingencies 320
5. Institutional Provisions 388
6. The GATT, Then and Now 447

Appendices 455
References 478
Index 499
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

1. From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994 1

1 The Genesis of the GATT 2
2 Why the GATT? 6
2.1 Why ask the question? 6
2.2 The negotiators say . . . 7
2.3 Economic theory suggests 12
2.4 And some unexplored avenues 18
2.5 To conclude (?) 20
3 The GATT in the GATT era: An Agreement, and an Institution
as Well 20
4 The GATT Rounds of Trade Liberalization 23
5 Expanding the GATT: The Emergence of the Codes 24
6 The GATT in the WTO era: Just an Agreement, Albeit a Pivotal One 25
7 The Modern GATT discipline in a Nutshell 30
7.1 The GATT in its WTO context 30
7.2 The legal relation of the GATT with the WTO Agreement 31
7.3 The substantive content of modern GATT 34

2. Disciplines on Trade Instruments 39

1 Introduction 42
2 The Treatment of QRs 42
2.1 The legal text 42
2.2 What is a QR? 43
2.2.1 The attribution of practices to governments 45
2.2.2 The measures covered 50
2.2.3 The standard of review: no effects test and no intent test 55
2.2.4 The relationship between Art XI and other GATT provisions 58
2.2.4.1 Art III of the GATT 58
2.2.4.2 Art VI of the GATT 62
2.2.4.3 Art XX of the GATT 63
2.2.4.4 Art XXI of the GATT 63
2.2.4.5 Infant industry protection (Art XVIIIc) 63
2.2.4.6 Arts XII and XVIII of the GATT 63
2.2.4.7 Art XIII of the GATT 63
2.3 Trade in textiles 67
2.4 Discriminatory legal QRs 67
2.5 The non-segmentation nature of Art XI of the GATT 68
xiv Contents

3 Tariff Protection in the GATT 68

3.1 The legal text 68
3.2 The basic discipline with respect to tariff protection 70
3.3 Why yes to duties and no to QRs? 71
3.4 The mechanics of binding the duties 72
3.4.1 The Harmonized System (HS) 72
3.4.2 What is the tariff promise? Ordinary customs duties,
other duties and charges 74
3.4.3 The typology of ordinary customs duties 78
3.4.4 Multilateral trade negotiations (rounds) 79
3.4.5 The treatment of export tariffs (taxes) under GATT 84
3.4.6 Certification of schedules 86
3.5 Interpreting tariff commitments 87
3.5.1 The legal relevance of HS 87
3.5.2 Scheduling of concessions must be WTO consistent 88
3.5.3 The (non) impact of legitimate expectations 93
3.6 Changes in tariff protection after their consolidation 93
3.6.1 Switching between different types of duties 94
3.6.2 Withdrawing concessions from members leaving the WTO 95
3.6.3 Renegotiating the tariff protection 97
3.6.3.1 INR holders 99
3.6.3.2 PSI countries 100
3.6.3.3 SI countries 102
3.6.3.4 MFN trade is the basis for defining PSIs and SIs 102
3.6.3.5 New products 103
3.6.3.6 The mechanics of the negotiation 103
3.6.4 Rectifications and modifications of schedules 112
3.7 Fees and charges for services rendered 114
3.8 Customs Valuation (CV) 118
3.9 The Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection (PSIA) 119
3.10 The MFN 120
3.10.1 The MFN discipline in a nutshell 123
3.10.2 The measures coming under the purview of the MFN 124
3.10.2.1 Any advantage . . . 124
3.10.2.2 . . .granted to products originating in
any country . . . 125
3.10.2.3 . . .irrespective whether it discriminates de jure
or de facto . . . 126
3.10.3 . . .must be extended to like products 126
3.10.4 The rules of origin 129
3.10.5 The MFN treatment must be extended immediately
and unconditionally 132
3.10.6 No rebalancing permitted 135
3.10.7 The standard of review: no effect and no intent test 136
3.11 Special and differential treatment for developing countries 137
3.11.1 The Enabling clause 137
 Contents xv

3.11.2 Some historical features 138

3.11.3 The Enabling clause in the WTO legal order 143
3.11.4 The test for compliance with the Enabling clause 144
3.11.5 Is the candle worth the flame? (criticism of the
Enabling clause) 145
3.12 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) 148
3.12.1 PTAs in the WTO: FTAs and CUs 148
3.12.2 Globalization yes, preferences yes as well 148
3.12.3 What matters when discussing preferential trade? 150
3.12.4 PTAs in the GATT 152
3.12.4.1 No per se inconsistency 152
3.12.4.2 The Art XXIV of the GATT test in a nutshell 153
3.12.4.3 Designed at home, approved (?) in Geneva 153
3.12.4.4 The multilateral track 156
3.12.4.5 The bilateral track 168
3.12.4.6 Why not litigate more? 171
3.12.5 What is the permissible extent from MFN
deviation when a PTA is formed? 177
4 Export Subsidies 179
4.1 Rigidity required? 179
4.2 From discouraging to outlawing export subsidies 181
4.3 Counteracting prohibited subsidies 184

3. Domestic Instruments 190

1 National Treatment and its Rationale 193
2 The Coverage 195
2.1 Wide coverage 195
2.2 Subsidies 195
2.2.1 What is a (domestic) subsidy? 195
2.2.1.1 Financial contribution 196
2.2.1.2 Benefit to recipient 198
2.2.1.3 The specificity requirement 200
2.2.2 The classification of subsidies 200
2.2.3 Counteracting subsidies 201
2.2.4 Remedies 201
2.2.5 Farm subsidies 202
2.2.5.1 The regulation of farm trade in the GATT era 202
2.2.5.2 The WTO Agreement in a nutshell 206
2.2.5.3 AG over SCM 208
2.3 Government procurement 210
2.3.1 What is government procurement? 210
2.3.2 The basic discipline: non-discrimination 211
xvi Contents
2.3.3 The past and present of GPA membership 211
2.4 The coverage of Art III of the GATT—revisited 212
3 National Treatment, and Negative Integration 215
4 National Treatment: The Legal Discipline 216
4.1 Fiscal measures 216
4.1.1 DCS products 217
4.1.1.1 Defining DCS 217
4.1.1.2 SATAP 221
4.1.2 Like products 234
4.1.2.1 Defining like products 234
4.1.2.2 Taxation in excess 236
4.2 Non-fiscal measures 237
4.2.1 A measure . . . 237
4.2.2 . . . affecting sale, offering for sale, . . . 238
4.2.3 . . . of like products 238
4.2.4 Less favourable treatment 242
4.3 A critique of the case-law concerning NT 247
4.4 General exceptions 254
4.4.1 Coverage 254
4.4.2 An exception to which provisions? 254
4.4.3 Regulatory diversity 259
4.4.4 A two-tier test for compliance with Art XX of the GATT 260
4.4.5 Public morals (Art XX(a) of the GATT) 261
4.4.5.1 Coverage 261
4.4.5.2 The necessity requirement 262
4.4.6 Human, animal and plant life (Art XX(b) of the GATT) 262
4.4.6.1 Coverage 262
4.4.6.2 The necessity requirement 262
4.4.6.3 No science required 263
4.4.7 Domestic laws and regulations (Art XX(d) of the GATT) 264
4.4.7.1 Coverage 264
4.4.7.2 The necessity requirement 264
4.4.8 Exhaustible natural resources (Art XX(g) of the GATT) 266
4.4.8.1 Coverage 266
4.4.8.2 Jurisdictional limits 268
4.4.8.3 Measure must be relating to the objective pursued 269
4.4.8.4 Measures restricting domestic production or
consumption 270
4.4.9 The chapeau of Art XX of the GATT 271
4.4.9.1 The scope of the chapeau 271
4.4.9.2 Complying with the chapeau 271
4.4.9.2.1 Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 271
4.4.9.2.2 Disguised restriction of trade 274
4.4.10 A critique of the case-law 276
4.4.10.1 The discontents of an exhaustive list 276
4.4.10.2 Extra-territoriality 277
 Contents xvii

4.4.10.3 A two-tier test? 285

4.4.10.4 The standard of review 285
4.5 A specific exception: films 286
5 Dealing with NTBs 287
5.1 The TBT and SPS Agreements 287
5.2 The legal relationship between GATT, TBT, and SPS 288
5.3 TBT 288
5.3.1 Coverage 288
5.3.2 International standards 289
5.3.3 Unilateral technical regulations 295
5.3.4 Domestic standards 296
5.4 The WTO SPS Agreement 297
5.4.1 Coverage 297
5.4.2 The SPS Agreement in a nutshell 298
5.4.3 International standards 299
5.4.4 Unilateral measures based on scientific evidence 299
5.4.5 Measures adopted on the basis of precaution 309
6 State Trading Enterprises (STEs) 315
6.1 STEs: definitional issues 315
6.2 The legal obligation in a nutshell 316

4. State Contingencies 320

1 Introduction 321
2 National Security (Art XXI of the GATT) 322
2.1 The legal discipline 322
2.2 Practice in the GATT years 322
2.3 Practice in the WTO era 330
3 BoP 331
4 Exchange Restrictions 335
5 Antidumping (Art VI of the GATT) 338
5.1 An unfair (?) price discrimination 338
5.2 Finding dumping 343
5.3 Establishing injury 349
5.4 Sunset reviews 352
5.5 Price differentiation in antitrust statutes 358
5.6 What does the ‘anti’ in AD refer to? 361
5.6.1 Discriminatory pricing 361
5.6.2 Predation 362
5.6.3 Strategic dumping 363
5.6.4 AD as a safeguard mechanism 364
6 Countervailing Duties (CVD) 365
7 Safeguards 365
7.1 The regulatory framework 365
7.2 The typology of safeguards 366
7.3 Safeguards imposed by PTAs 367
xviii Contents
7.4 Conditions for lawful application of safeguards 368
7.4.1 Initiation of investigation 368
7.4.2 Unforeseen developments 370
7.4.3 Increased imports 371
7.4.4 Injury 371
7.4.5 Are safeguards truly non-discriminatory? 375
7.4.6 The issue of compensation 376
7.4.7 The duration of safeguards 378
7.5 Safeguards and voluntary export restraints (VERs) 380
7.6 Safeguards: a safe harbour too far? 381
8 The Notion of Market Access Revisited 385

5. Institutional Provisions 388

1 Introductory Remarks 389
2 Participation 390
2.1 Contracting Parties to the GATT, WTO members 390
2.2 Accession 391
2.3 Non-application 394
3 Decision Making 395
3.1 Consensus, the default rule 395
3.2 Special procedures 396
3.2.1 Interpretations 396
3.2.2 Amendment of the GATT 397
4 Dispute Settlement 398
4.1 The early GATT years 398
4.2 The late GATT years 400
4.3 The WTO DSU 402
4.4 The WTO: exclusive forum for adjudication of trade disputes 404
4.5 A closer look into procedures 406
4.5.1 Request for establishment of a panel 406
4.5.2 Burden of proof 407
4.5.3 Discovery powers 408
4.5.4 Standard of review 410
4.5.5 The process before the AB 411
4.5.6 The types of complaints before panels and the AB 411
4.5.6.1 Violation complaints 412
4.5.6.2 NVCs 412
4.5.6.3 Situation complaints 415
4.5.7 Recommendations and suggestions by panels and the AB 416
4.6 Enforcing WTO obligations 417
4.6.1 The process in a nutshell 417
4.6.2 The types of complaint matter for enforcement purposes 418
4.6.3 Compliance within a reasonable period of time 418
4.6.4 Compliance panels 419
4.6.5 Compensation 420
4.6.6 Suspension of concessions 421
 Contents xix

4.6.6.1 Procedural issues 421

4.6.6.2 Quantifying suspension of concessions 422
4.7 Monitoring compliance 424
4.8 The value of precedent in the WTO 425
4.9 Does WTO enforcement work? 426
5 Waivers 435
6 Transparency 436
6.1 Introductory remarks 436
6.2 Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 437
6.3 Art X of the GATT 440
6.3.1 The discipline in a nutshell 440
6.3.2 The coverage 441
6.3.3 The standard of review 442
6.3.4 Laws of general application 443
6.3.5 Uniform, reasonable, and impartial administration 443
6.3.5.1 Uniform administration 444
6.3.5.2 Reasonable administration 444
6.3.5.3 Impartial administration 445
6.3.6 The obligation to maintain independent tribunals 445
7 Relation to the Havana Charter 446

6. The GATT, Then and Now 447

1 The GATT 1947: A Solid Text (with some compromises) 447
2 The Evolution of the GATT: No Keeping up with the Joneses 448
3 Rule of Reason 451

Appendices 455
References 478
Index 499
 List of Abbreviations
AB Appellate Body
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific group
AD Antidumping
ADICMA Association of Industrial Producers of Leather, Leather Manufactures
and Related Products (Argentina)
AG Agreement on Agriculture
AGOA Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (US)
AMS Aggregate measurement of support
ANZCERTA Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
Art Article
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
BFA Bananas Framework Agreement
BIA Best information available
BISD Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (GATT publication)
BoP Balance of payments
BTN Brussels Convention on Nomenclature for the Classification of
Goods in Customs Tariffs
CAP Common Agricultural Policy (EC)
CCCN Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature
CDSOA Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act
CEA Council of Economic Advisors
CFI European Court of First Instance
CITES Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species
CLC Contingent liberalization commitments
CRTA Committee on regional trade arrangements
CTD Committee on trade and development
CTG Council for Trade in Goods
CTS Consolidated Tariff Schedules
CU Customs union
CUSFTA Canada/US free trade area
CV Customs Valuation
CVD Countervailing duty
DDG Deputy Director-General
DG Director-General
Doc Document
DOC Department of Commerce (US)
DCS Directly competitive or substitutable products
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding
EBA Everything but arms
EC European Community
 List of Abbreviations xxi

ECR European Court Reports

ECT European Community Treaty
ECJ European Court of Justice
EFTA European Free Trade Association
ESTO European Scientific Technology Observatory
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FOREX Foreign exchange contracts
FSC Foreign Sales Corporation
FTA Free trade area
FTAA Free trade area of the Americas
GAAP Generally accepted accountancy principles
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GC General Council
GDP Gross domestic product
GIR General Interpretative Rule (HS)
GMO Genetically modified organism
GN Geneva Nomenclature
GNP Gross national product
GPA Government Procurement Agreement
GSP Generalized system of preferences
G 90 Group of 90 less developed WTO Members
G 20 Group of 20 leading developing WTO Members
HHI Herfindhal-Hirschman Index
HS Harmonized System
ICITO Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization
ICJ International Court of Justice
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ILA Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
ILC International Law Commission
IMF International Monetary Fund
INR Initial negotiating right
IT Information technology
ITA Information Technology agreement
ITC International Trade Centre
ITCom International Trade Commission (US)
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITLOS International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
ITO International trade organization
LFN Least favoured nation
LFT Less favourable treatment
LLDCs Least developed countries
MAS Mutually agreed solution
MEA Multilateral environmental agreement
MERCOSUR Free trade area between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay (Mercado del sur)
xxii List of Abbreviations
MFA Multi-fibre Agreement
MFN Most-favoured-nation
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Investment (now, METI)
MRA Mutual Recognition Agreement
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement
NAMA Non-agricultural market access
NGO Non-governmental organization
NME Non-market economies
NT National treatment
NTB Non-tariff barrier
NV Normal value
NVC Non-violation complaint
OCD Ordinary customs duty
ODC Other duties and charges
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
PFC Production flexibility contract
PGE Permanent Group of Experts
POI Period of investigation
PPA Protocol of provisional application
PSE Producer Subsidy Equivalent
PSI Principal Supplying Interest
PSIA Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
R&D Research and development
RTAA Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
QR Quantitative restriction
RBP Restrictive business practice
ROO Agreement on Rules of Origin
RPT Reasonable period of time
SATAP So as to afford protection
SCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SCt Supreme Court (US)
SG Agreement on Safeguards
SG&A Administrative, selling, and general expenses (AD)
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance
SI Substantial interest
SPS Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phyto-sanitary Measures
STE State trading enterprise
TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TEC Treaty Establishing the European Community
TEDs Turtle excluding devices
TEE Taxes of equivalent effect
TMB Textiles Monitoring Body
 List of Abbreviations xxiii

TNC Trade Negotiating Committee

TPA Trade Promotion Authority
TPRM Trade Policy Review Mechanism
TRIMs Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures
TRIPs Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
TRQ Tariff quota
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VER Voluntary export restraint
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
WB World Bank
WCO World Customs Organization
WHO World Health Organization
WP Working party
WTO World Trade Organization
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 Table of Cases
Please note: this table makes use of short titles of GATT Panel, WTO Panel and AB Reports. Full
report titles and citations can be found in the Appendices (pp. 456–64).

Accession of Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Akzo v EC Commission [1991] ECR I-3359. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Argentina—Footwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94, 117–18, 367, 371
Argentina—Hides and Leather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49–50, 56–7, 440, 442–5
Argentina—Poultry Antidumping Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
Argentina—Preserved Peaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Australia—Automotive Leather II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182–3, 422
Australia—Salmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .299, 305, 306–7, 307

Belgian Family Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125, 133

Belgian Tax Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Border Tax Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213, 234, 240, 241, 253, 277, 280
Brazil—Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171, 185–6
Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp (1993) 509 US 209 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

Canada—Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182, 183–4, 185, 188–9, 409, 419–20

Canada—Autos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126, 133, 134, 182
Canada—Dairy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Canada—FIRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59, 339
Canada—Wheat Exports and Grain Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243, 265, 315, 316, 317–19
Canada/EC—Article XXVIII Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106–7
Chile—Alcoholic Beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .226–7, 228, 229, 231–3
Chile—Price Band System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74–5

Dominican Republic—Import and Sale of Cigarettes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 115, 335–8

EC—Agreements with Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

EC—Animal Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126–7
EC—Asbestos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33, 128, 239–43, 252, 253, 257, 262, 263,
275–6, 279, 284, 288, 307, 414, 453
EC—Association with African and Malagasy States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165–6
EC—Bananas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
EC—Bananas III . . . . . . . . 33, 34, 64, 65–6, 89–92, 113, 125, 136–7, 243, 423, 424, 435–6, 441
EC—Bed Linen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
EC—Chicken Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87–8
EC—Citrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
EC—Commercial Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211, 405
EC—Computer Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
EC—Hormones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299, 300, 301, 302, 305–6, 308–9, 312, 409, 410
EC—Imports of Beef . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
EC—Minimum Import Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
EC—Oilseeds I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412–13
xxvi Table of Cases

EC—Pipe Fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .342, 349, 351

EC—Poultry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57, 66, 125, 441, 443
EC—Sardines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33–4, 288, 292–4
EC—Selected Customs Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441–2, 444, 445–6
EC—Tariff Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129, 133–4, 137, 143, 144–5,
147, 279, 280, 284, 453
EC Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312–13
EFTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

India—Autos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51–2, 59
India—Patents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
India—Quantitative Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63, 155, 334
Indonesia—Autos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Japan—Agricultural Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Japan—Agricultural Products II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265, 299, 310, 311, 312, 409
Japan—Alcoholic Beverages I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234, 275
Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194–5, 217–18, 219, 221–2, 223,
224–5, 227, 230, 231, 236
Japan—Apples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301, 302–3, 310, 311
Japan—Film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 414, 415
Japan—Semiconductors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45–8, 51, 54, 55, 62, 238
Japan—SPF Dimension Lumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27, 28

Korea—Alcoholic Beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217, 218–20, 225–6, 227

Korea—Beef . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 244–7, 255, 264–5, 286, 315, 316–17
Korea—Dairy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

Lotus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Mexico—Antidumping Measures on Beef and Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

Mexico—Corn Syrup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419

Spain—Unroasted Coffee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113–14, 124, 127–8

Tax Legislation Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29

Tetrapak v EC Commission [1995] ECR II-762 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359–60
Turkey—Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31–2, 169–70, 173, 177–8

US—1916 Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424

US—AD Measures on OCTG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356, 357
US—Carbon Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
US—Certain EC Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
US—Corrosion–Resistant Steel Sunset Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355, 357, 358
US—Cotton Yarn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
US—Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197–8
US—Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
US—Customs User Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116–17, 118, 124
US—FSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 182, 186–8, 196–7, 237–8, 238, 243, 419
US—Fur Felt Hats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
 Table of Cases xxvii
US—Gambling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265–6
US—Gasoline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255–6, 260, 261, 269, 270, 271–2, 274–5
US—Hot Rolled Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
US—Lamb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371–3, 374, 375, 411
US—Lead and Bismuth II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
US—Line Pipe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158, 170–1, 173, 175, 338, 369, 373, 375
US—Malt Beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230, 234–5, 236
US—Nicaraguan Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322–30
US—Non–Rubber Footwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124, 125, 135–6
US—OCTG Sunset Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356, 425
US—Offset Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339339
US—Restrictions on Imports of Sugar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76, 90
US—Section 110(5) Copyright Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
US—Section 337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
US—Shrimp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 257, 259–60, 266–74, 277, 279, 280, 281, 284–5, 425
US—Softwood Lumber IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197, 199, 200, 425
US—Stainless Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
US—Steel Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .370, 371, 378, 432
US—Superfund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–6, 230, 236
US—Taxes on Automobiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230, 234, 235, 252
US—Textiles Rules of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
US—Tuna (Mexico) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257, 259
US—Underwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
US—Upland Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209, 210
US—Wheat Gluten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .367, 371
US—Wool Shirts and Blouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
US—Zeroing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
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 Table of Legislation
Agriculture Agreement (AG) . . . . 90, 91, 206, Art 9.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
207, 208, 210 Art 9.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .348
Annex 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207 Art 11.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Art 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90, 91 Art 11.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352, 356, 358
Art 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Art 11.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353, 358
Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 Art 17.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341, 342, 354
Art 6.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 Art 18.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Art 6.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty 1860 . . . . . . . . .120
Art 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 208 Convention on the International Trade of
Art 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206 Endangered Species (CITES). . . . . 285
Art 21.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90, 208, 209 Customs Valuation Code (Agreement
Antidumping Code (Agreement on on Implementation of Article VII
Implementation of Article VI of GATT and Protocol to the
of GATT) . . . . . . . . . 24, 37, 321, 339, Agreement) . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 119, 135
342, 344, 350, 352, Dispute Settlement Understanding
361, 368, 372, 374, (DSU) . . . . . . . . . . .22, 402, 407, 425,
375, 387, 448 428, 431, 432
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357, 358 Appendix 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .408
Art 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345, 347 Art 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199, 268
Art 2.2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Art 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .424
Art 2.2.1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .346 Art 3.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .424
Art 2.2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .346 Art 4.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .402
Art 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .344, 346 Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .405
Art 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 Art 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406, 419
Art 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 Art 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406
Art 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Art 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341, 342, 409, 410
Art 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349, 352 Art 12.12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .349 Art 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .408
Art 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343 Art 13.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .409
Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Art 13.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .408
Art 5.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343 Art 19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416, 422
Art 5.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347, 349, 356 Art 21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .403
Art 5.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .344 Art 21.3(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Art 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340, 347, 358 Art 21.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404, 419, 420, 425
Art 6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .340 Art 21.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424, 425
Art 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .423
Art 6.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 22.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417, 428
Art 6.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 22.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185, 422, 430
Art 6.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 22.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Art 6.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 22.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Art 6.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 22.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
Art 6.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349, 358 Art 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .405
Art 6.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .340 Art 23.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .404, 405
Art 6.13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Art 23.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92, 404, 405
Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 Art 23.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404, 405, 435
xxx Table of Legislation

Art 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .405 Art VIII.1(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116, 117

Art 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412 Art IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124–5, 135
Art 26.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 Art IX.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Art 26.1(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 Art X . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258, 436, 440–5, 449
Art 26.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416, 418 Art X.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441, 442, 445
EC Treaty Art X.3. . . . . . . . . . . 34, 440, 443, 444, 445
Art 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248, 250 Art X.3(a). . . . . . . . . . . . 441, 442, 443, 445
General Agreement on Tariffs and Art X.3(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445, 446
Trade (GATT) . . . . . . . .26–7, 30, 218, Art XI . . . . . . . . . 35, 37, 38, 42–6, 49–62,
372, 390, 447–8 64, 68, 85, 159, 203, 237,
Art I . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52, 56, 64, 74, 122–3, 254, 259, 286, 322,
125, 126, 127, 129, 136, 331, 381, 443
137, 143, 211, 256, 331, Art XI.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44, 47, 48, 51, 56,
398, 399, 448 57, 62, 202, 334
Art I.1 . . . . 124–8, 133, 134, 135, 136, 144 Art XI.2 . . . . . . . . . . 45, 138, 202, 203, 448
Art I.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Art XI.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202
Art I(b)(iv) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 28, 29, 143 Art XII . . . . . . . . . . . . .37, 60, 331, 335, 384
Art II . . . . . . . . . . 16, 23, 38, 51, 56, 68–70, Art XII.4a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
74, 81, 84, 92, 108, 1 Art XIII . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 64, 65, 67, 72, 91,
13, 114, 332, 394 211, 331, 436
Art II.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 Art XIII.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
Art II.1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, Art XIII.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
87, 88, 89, 115, 336 Art XIII.2(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Art II.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Art XIII.3(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Art II.2(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115, 116, 117 Art XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67, 276
Art II.7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90 Art XV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 321, 332, 335,
Art III . . . . . . . . . . . . 44, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 337, 338, 384
60, 61, 68, 127, 195, 213, Art XV.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
215, 221, 227–34, 239, Art XV.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
244, 248, 249, 251, 252, Art XV.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335, 337
253, 255, 256, 257, 258, Art XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 91, 181, 196, 321
262, 285, 287, 288, 307, Art XVI.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
308, 331, 359, 386, 448 Art XVI.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203
Art III.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . .216, 221, 222, 223, Art XVI.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29
228, 239, 240, 242, 251 Art XVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210, 315–19
Art III.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 125, 212, 213, Art XVII.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
216, 219, 221–6, 228–36, Art XVII.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
238, 239, 240, 243, Art XVII.1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .317, 318, 319
251, 252 Art XVII.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Art III.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 125, 214, 235, Art XVIII . . . . 37, 60, 63, 81, 321, 332, 334
237–44, 246, 247, 248, Art XVIII.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
255, 256, 286, 287 Art XVIII.12a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Art III.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Art XVIII(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331, 332, 334
Art III.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195, 211 Art XVIII(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Art IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52, 53, 286 Art XIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 166, 321, 365,
Art V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68, 331 366, 369, 371, 380,
Art VI . . . . . . . . . . . 35–6, 38, 44, 62, 180, 381, 382, 384, 385
321, 338, 339, 449 Art XX . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 38, 44, 54, 61, 63,
Art VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118, 119 67, 179, 228, 241, 247, 248,
Art VII.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 249, 251, 253–61, 263, 265,
Art VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114–15, 116, 118 266, 271, 274, 275, 276, 277,
Art VIII.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 281, 282, 285, 286, 302, 307
 Table of Legislation xxxi
Art XX(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . 257, 261, 262, 276 Art XXVIII bis . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 79, 84, 203
Art XX(b) . . . . . . . . . . . 259, 261, 262, 263, Art XXVIII.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104, 110
266, 267, 275 Art XXVIII.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98, 104
Art XX(d) . . . . . . . 247, 255, 263, 264, 265 Art XXVIII.3. . . . . . . . . . 99, 104, 107, 109
Art XX(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 261, 266–70, Art XXVIII.3b. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
273, 279, 285 Art XXVIII.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110, 111
Art XX(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 Art XXVIII.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Art XX(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 Art XXIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5–6, 446, 449
Art XXI . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 38, 44, 60, 61, 63, Art XXIX.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
67, 166, 282, 321–6, Art XXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112, 397
328, 329, 330 Art XXXI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Art XXI(b)(i)-(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Art XXXII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
Art XXI(b)(iii) . . . . . . . . . . . . 322, 324, 325 Art XXXIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
Art XXII . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 63, 77, 154, 172, Art XXXV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394, 395
321, 398, 401 Art XXXVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140, 141
Art XXII.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Art XXXVI.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Art XXIII. . . . . . . . . . 21, 77, 154, 172, 328, Art XXXVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140, 141–2
398, 401, 412 Art XXXVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140, 142
Art XXIII.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 London Draft
Art XXIII.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . 325, 326, 411 Annex 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Art XXIII.1(b) . . . . . . . . 237, 238, 326, 327, Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
411, 412, 414, 415 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
Art XXIII.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . .327, 411, 415 Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Art XXIII.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .326–30 Part IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138, 140, 142
Art XXIV. . . . 31, 32, 64, 81, 132, 148, 152, Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
153, 154, 156, 157, 158, Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 90
160, 161, 165–72, 174, General Agreement on Trade in Services
175, 177, 178, 368, 451 (GATS)
Art XXIV.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art XXIV.5 . . . . . . .132, 153, 161, 168, 177 Art I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art XXIV.5(a) . . . . . . . 32, 160–4, 170, 177 Art I.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238
Art XXIV.5(b) . . . . . . . . 159, 160, 162, 171 Art III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art XXIV.5(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Art V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Art XXIV.6 . . . . . . . . . . 106, 153, 162, 163 Art VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art XXIV.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153, 156 Art XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art XXIV.7(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Art XVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Art XXIV.7(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Geneva Final Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Art XXIV.8 . . . . . . . . . . 132, 153, 164, 166, Protocol of Provisional Application . . . . . . 4
167, 171, 177, 178 Government Procurement Agreement
Art XXIV.8(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170, 177 (GPA). . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 210, 211, 212
Art XXIV.8(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Art V.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Art XXV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 Art V.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Art XXV.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 Art XXIV.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Art XXV.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 Harmonized System Convention
Art XXV.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390, 395 Art 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Art XXV.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328 Art 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Art XXVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .390 Havana Charter for an International Trade
Art XXVI.5(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .390–1 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 6, 446
Art XXVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81, 94, 95–6 Art 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Art XXVIII . . . . . . . . . . 71, 81, 94, 97–104, Art 93.1(b)-(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
106, 108, 109, 110, 112, Import Licensing Procedures Agreement
163, 384, 428 (ILA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 33, 41, 65
xxxii Table of Legislation

Art 1.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .297

Art 1.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Art 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299, 302, 303
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Art 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298, 305, 308, 309
Art 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Art 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Art 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Art 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .309
Art 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Art 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .299
Art 3.5(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Art 5.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299, 300, 302, 307
Information Technology Agreement . . . 82–4 Art 5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .299
Lomé Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64, 169 Art 5.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304–9, 312, 314
Montreal Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 401 Art 5.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304, 312, 314, 409
Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) . . . . . . . 67, 203 Art 5.7 . . . . . . . . . . . 309, 310, 311, 312, 314
Pre-shipment Inspection Art 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–20, 135 Subsidies and Countervailing
Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120 Measures Agreement (SCM)
Art 4(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120 (Agreement on Interpretation
Rules of Origin Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 of Articles VI, XVI and
Art 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130, 131–2 XXII of GATT) . . . . . . . . . .24, 37, 42,
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 196, 201, 208, 210,
Art 2(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 321, 368, 372,
Art 2(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130, 131 374, 375, 387
Art 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Annex 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Safeguards Agreement Art 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196, 197
(SG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 91, 321, 350, Art 1.1(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
365, 368, 369, 373, Art 1.1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
374, 384, 387, 449 Art 2.1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Art 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366, 367, 369 Art 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181, 200
Art 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Art 3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182, 183
Art 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .380 Art 3.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 183, 419, 420
Art 3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Art 3.1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
Art 4.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 Art 3.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Art 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373, 374, 375 Art 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185, 186, 201
Art 4.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 Art 4.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Art 4.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Art 5.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 Art 4.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183, 185, 187
Art 5.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 Art 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200, 202
Art 5.2(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 Art 6.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202
Art 7.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378 Art 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Art 7.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 Art 7.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Art 7.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Art 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 Art 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198, 199
Art 8.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376, 377 Art 14(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Art 8.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377, 378 Art 31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Art 11.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 Technical Barriers to Trade
Art 12.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .377 Agreement (TBT) . . . . . . . 24, 33, 34,
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures 61, 252, 262, 287,
Agreement (SPS) . . . . . . . . .24, 34, 61, 288, 291, 295,
252, 262, 287, 288, 298, 299, 386
291, 297, 298, 301, Annex 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
308, 386 Annex 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296
Annex A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297, 298, 301 Art 1.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 288
 Table of Legislation xxxiii
Art 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 World Trade Organization Agreement
Art 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 295 (Marrakesh Agreement) . . . . 22, 31–4,
Art 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 291, 292, 294, 296 431, 449
Art 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295, 296 Annex 1A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33, 90, 288
Art 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296 Annex 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .437
Art 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296 Art II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Textiles and Clothing Agreement (ATC) . . . 67 Art IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390, 396, 435
Art 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Art IX.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396, 397
Trade in Civil Aircraft Agreement . . . . . . . .24 Art X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Trade Related Intellectual Property Art X.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .397–8
Agreement (TRIPS) . . . . . . . 150, 362, Art XI.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
398, 449 Art XII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
Trade-related Investment Measures Art XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282, 395
Agreement (TRIMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Art XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Understanding on Notification, Art XV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
Consultation, Dispute Art XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 213
Settlement and Surveillance . . . . 21, 22
Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21–2 US legislation
United Nations Charter Africa Growth and Opportunity Act . . . 131
Art 102. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86 Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933 . . . . .448
Vienna Convention on the Law of Continued Dumping and Subsidies
Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 88, 256, Offset Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
342, 343 Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Art 31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 31, 275 Solidarity Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .330–1
Art 31.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 Smoot-Hawley Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Art 70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 Webb Pomerene Act 1918. . . . . . . . . . . . .54
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 1
From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

1 The Genesis of the GATT 2

2 Why the GATT? 6
2.1 Why ask the question? 6
2.2 The negotiators say . . . 7
2.3 Economic theory suggests 12
2.4 And some unexplored avenues 18
2.5 To conclude (?) 20
3 The GATT in the GATT era: An Agreement, and an
Institution as Well 20
4 The GATT Rounds of Trade Liberalization 23
5 Expanding the GATT: The Emergence of the Codes 24
6 The GATT in the WTO era: Just an Agreement,
Albeit a Pivotal One 25
7 The Modern GATT discipline in a Nutshell 30
7.1 The GATT in its WTO context 30
7.2 The legal relation of the GATT with the WTO Agreement 31
7.3 The substantive content of modern GATT 34

Overview

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is part of the wider post-
Second World War effort to establish key multilateral institutions that would
contribute to more harmonious relations across nations. Its humble origin not-
withstanding, or maybe, because of its humble origin, the GATT managed to
foster un-paralleled cooperation among trading nations. In this chapter, follow-
ing a very brief account of the advent of the GATT, we ask the question why was
the GATT needed in the first place. A response to this question does not have a
mere historical value; it is highly informative about the objectives that the various
instruments committed to the GATT purport to achieve. To address this ques-
tion we first review the GATT preparatory work, and then, economic theory.
The preparatory work of the GATT is quite informative about what various
2 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

trading nations had in mind, but is not particularly helpful when it comes to
explaining the various instruments committed to the GATT edifice. Economic
theory has been struggling with this question, and has provided many insights
that help us better understand why the GATT was needed in the first place. We
still lack nevertheless, an internally coherent theory which will explain GATT
from A to Z. It is probably quite appropriate to think of the GATT as an instru-
ment that combats international beggar thy neighbour policies. The next question
is how should we define beggar thy neighbour coming under the purview of the
GATT, and what does the GATT do to address it. We will thus briefly discuss, in
this chapter, the GATT discipline which could be summarized as follows: since
any policy might affect trade, the GATT binds both trade and domestic instru-
ments, albeit at varying degrees. The GATT outlaws quotas. Tariffs, in turn, will
be negotiated, bound, applied on a non-discriminatory basis, and, eventually,
reduced in the context of trade liberalizing rounds. The GATT has concluded
eight such rounds so far. Its success in reducing tariff barriers around the world
has been hailed as monumental. By virtue of the non-discrimination obligation,
it requires that World Trade Organization (WTO) members do not afford pro-
tection to their domestic production through the use of domestic instruments. It
follows, that the only form of protection that WTO members can offer to their
domestic production is through tariffs. WTO members can, nevertheless, raise
the originally negotiated protection, in case one of the state contingencies specif-
ically provided for in the GATT contract occurs.

1 The Genesis of the GATT

Adlai Stevenson is reported to have said that trade is quite boring, and that its greatest
need was for fresh clichés.¹ Viewed from the perspective of a statesman, this is probably
a wise statement: trade talks until recently, with the emergence of the anti-globalization
movement, would not make the headlines the way other events do. This was probably
even more the case when the GATT was created amidst other towering achievements
in the post-Second World War era, such as the advent of the United Nations, the World
Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The GATT came into life
lame, since its institutional umbrella never saw the light of the day. Yet its initial low key
character has proved to be a key ingredient of its institutional success. For the GATT is
a success story, an important one. The reputed US statesman would probably react in a
different way, had he been asked about trade today.
The GATT is an off-shoot of a broader and more ambitious project, the
International Trade Organization (ITO).² The ITO was intended to serve as the

¹ See Aaronson (1999).

² See, for example, Dam (1970), Gardner (1980), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), Hudec (1975),
Jackson (1969), Matsushita et al (2006), Trebilcock and Howse (2005), Van den Bossche (2005),
 The Genesis of the GATT 3

institutional foundation to administer the Havana Charter for an International

Trade Organization, which was drafted following a series of negotiations of the
so-called Preparatory Committee for the ITO, held between 1946 and 1948 in
London, New York, Geneva and finally in the Cuban capital bearing its name.³
The Havana Charter was supposed to regulate trade (eg trade in goods and com-
modity agreements), and the use of public policy as related to domestic employ-
ment, economic development and restrictive business practices.⁴
The ITO was negotiated subsequent to the Bretton Woods negotiations, which
led to the creation of the WB, and the IMF. Although the literature discuss-
ing the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions sometimes suggests that the
ITO was supposed to constitute the third pillar of Bretton Woods, there is lack
of evidence in its negotiating history to support this view.⁵ Nevertheless, it is
certainly true that all three institutions shared one overarching goal: a genuine
effort to help promote international economic cooperation during the post-Sec-
ond World War period. The design and aim of these three institutions distin-
guished them from the major institutional arrangement of that time, the United
Nations, which was intended to be the overarching international organization to
help avoid another world war, without however addressing the underlying rea-
sons for conflict. Their different function notwithstanding, the three institutions
complemented the United Nations: promoting trade among nations,⁶ providing
technical assistance to address development-related issues, and financing devel-
opment policies were meant to be the international community’s response to the
ongoing quest of how best to address the causes for conflict.⁷

Wilcox (1949), and Zeiler (1999). The enactment of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(RTAA) in 1934 greatly facilitated this process. Irwin (2005, pp 204ff ) very convincingly makes
the point that the RTAA ‘fundamentally changed US trade politics by shifting tariff authority
from Congress, which proved very responsive to domestic import-competing industries, to the
executive branch, which was more apt to consider the national interest and use tariff negotiations
in the service of foreign policy objectives.’ The RTAA, however, was met with a lot of skepticism
in some quarters. The prevailing view at the time, as Aaronson (1999) reports, was that trade pro-
tectionism protects US jobs. RTAA was thus portrayed as a mere temporary measure, and not as
permanent feature in the US legal arsenal.
³ Meade (1942) had persuasively argued in favour of an international trade organization. Meade
participated in the GATT/ITO negotiations as a member of the UK delegation.
⁴ The ITO was definitely a far-reaching agreement. For example, Art 7 discussed what now-
adays has been termed social dumping. Charnovitz (1995) rightly points out that social dumping
in the ITO framework could provide the legal cause for an action on nullification and impairment
(whereby, the affected trading partner will be requesting some form of compensation). In today’s
GATT, the only clause which might suggest that impermissibly low cost-products can be legitim-
ately excluded from a given market, is Art XX(e) of the GATT which allows WTO members to
block imports of products produced through prison labour.
⁵ See the discussion in Jackson (1969), and Palmeter and Mavroidis (2004).
⁶ Dam (2004) reports that as late as 1916, the majority of US congressmen considered tariffs to
be a domestic issue. A notable exception among them was Cordell Hull, a genuine free-trader, who
believed that trade ‘dovetailed with peace’, see Hull (1948, pp 81ff ).
⁷ Henry Cabot Lodge used to say that the UN system was designed to avoid hell, but it was no
guarantee for heaven.
4 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

The GATT, a less ambitious (than the ITO) project was being negotiated in
Lake Success, New York—a village in northwest Long Island which had also
been the temporary headquarters of the United Nations from 1946 to 1951.
Between January and February 1947, state representatives negotiated the GATT,
a legal instrument aimed at relaxing government-mandated trade protection.
A relatively speaking homogeneous group (with few outliers) prepared the first
draft of the GATT.⁸ The GATT was not designed in any shape or form to be an
institution; rather, it was simply a trade agreement which was eventually to come
under the aegis of the ITO, once that would-be institution would be ratified and
enter into force. Whereas no reservations were allowed in the final text, reserva-
tions were quite appropriate during the drafting stage.⁹
The negotiations on the GATT text were complemented by negotiations on
tariff reductions: between April and October 1947, the state representatives,
negotiating under the institutional umbrella of the Preparatory Committee for
the ITO, conducted a round of tariff negotiations at the European office of the
United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. In effect, this was the very first round
of multilateral trade negotiations.¹⁰ The outcome of these negotiations coupled
with the document negotiated at Lake Success together constituted the Geneva
Final Act, which included the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA). Under
the terms of the PPA, the governments that participated in the negotiations
undertook to fully apply Part I of the GATT (dealing with tariff concessions and
the most-favoured-nation, or most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause) and Part III
of the GATT (containing provisions dealing with administrative issues). These
governments further undertook to apply Part II of the GATT (the heart of the
GATT, covering national treatment, antidumping, subsidies, safeguards, bal-
ance of payments, prohibition of quantitative restrictions, general exceptions to
the obligations assumed and dispute settlement) ‘to the fullest extent not incon-
sistent with existing legislation’.¹¹ The GATT entered into force on 1 January
1948 by virtue of the PPA. Its original 23 members were: Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Republic of China, Cuba, Czechoslovak

⁸ The participants were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), United Kingdom, United
States (see Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on Trade
and Employment, Draft GATT, E/PC/T/C.6/85 of 15 February 1947). The USSR ultimately did
not participate in the GATT/ITO endeavour. Penrose (1953, pp 12ff, and 90ff ) highlights the role
that some eminent economists, such as John Meynard Keynes, James Meade, and Lionel Robbins,
played in drafting the GATT. The final text was drafted by John Leddy, a US public official who
had also been trained in economics. Indeed, one important difference between the negotiation of
the GATT and, say, the Uruguay round agreements, is the identity of the delegates: the compos-
ition of national delegations has been increasingly politicized over the years.
⁹ See § 2 of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on
Trade and Employment, Draft GATT, E/PC/T/C.6/85 of 15 February 1947.
¹⁰ See 55 UNTS 187 (1947). 45,000 tariff concessions were negotiated, that is roughly $10
billion worth of trade, see Drache (2003).
¹¹ See UNITS 308, 1 (a) and (b) (1947).
 The Genesis of the GATT 5

Republic, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,

Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
The application of Part II only to the extent consistent with existing domestic
legislation is often referred to as ‘grandfather rights’.¹² Those member states which
had existing legislation inconsistent with provisions of the GATT at the time it
entered into force were allowed to continue applying these GATT inconsistent
measures. The inconsistency of domestic legislation of some member states with
provisions of the GATT did not create many problems since the grandfathering
provision was meant to be temporary as set out in Art XXIX: 2 of the GATT:
Part II of this Agreement shall be suspended on the day on which the Havana Charter
comes into force.
The entry into force of the GATT was provisional.¹³ As explained in Jackson
(1969), the GATT could have entered into force on a definitive basis, once a given
number of countries representing a high percentage of international trade would
have agreed to do so. It was decided, nevertheless, not to proceed in this way in
order to avoid creating discrepancies between those who had accepted the GATT
on a provisional basis, and those who would be accepting it definitively so. The
GATT also entered into force independently of the ITO: as explained in more
detail below, the adoption of the Havana Charter, which would signal the advent
of the ITO, was expected to occur within a fairly short period following the entry
into force of the GATT, and the plan was that the GATT would come under the
aegis of the ITO. In the meantime, GATT Art XXIX explicitly governed the
legal relationship between the GATT and the ITO in the following terms:
Article XXIX
The Relation of this Agreement to the Havana Charter
1. The contracting parties undertake to observe to the fullest extent of their executive
authority the general principles of Chapters I to VI inclusive and of Chapter IX of
the Havana Charter pending their acceptance of it in accordance with their constitu-
tional procedures.
2. Part II of this Agreement shall be suspended on the day on which the Havana Charter
enters into force.
3. If by September 30, 1949, the Havana Charter has not entered into force, the contract-
ing parties shall meet before December 31, 1949, to agree whether this Agreement
shall be amended, supplemented or maintained.

¹² A good example is the US countervailing duty law which did not require a determination
of material injury as required by Art VI, Part II of the GATT, until the United States agreed to
include such a requirement for signatories to the so-called 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code or
for other countries that entered into comparable bilateral agreements with the US.
¹³ Eric Wyndham-White was the first Executive Secretary of the GATT heading a small secre-
tariat. Eventually, in subsequent years, his post was renamed as Director-General of the GATT.
6 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994
4. If at any time the Havana Charter should cease to be in force, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES shall meet as soon as practicable thereafter to agree whether this Agreement
shall be supplemented, amended or maintained. Pending such agreement, Part II of
this Agreement shall again enter into force; Provided that the provisions of Part II
other than Article XXIII shall be replaced, mutatis mutandis, in the form in which
they then appeared in the Havana Charter; and Provided further that no contracting
party shall be bound by any provisions which did not bind it at the time when the
Havana Charter ceased to be in force.
5. If any contracting party has not accepted the Havana Charter by the date upon which
it enters into force, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall confer to agree whether,
and if so in what way, this Agreement in so far as it affects relations between such
contracting party and other contracting parties, shall be supplemented or amended.
Pending such agreement the provisions of Part II of this Agreement shall, notwith-
standing the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, continue to apply as between
such contracting party and other contracting parties.
6. Contracting parties which are Members of the International Trade Organization
shall not invoke the provisions of this Agreement so as to prevent the operation of
any provision of the Havana Charter. The application of the principle underlying this
paragraph to any contracting party which is not a Member of the International Trade
Organization shall be the subject of an agreement pursuant to paragraph 5 of this
Article.
Since the Havana Charter, as we will see in more detail infra, never came to fru-
ition, the GATT was applied for 47 years oxymoronically pending the advent
of the ITO. Before we continue with the history of the GATT however, it is
probably appropriate to ask at this point the question why was the advent of the
GATT necessary? We already alluded above that the ITO was thought of as part
and parcel of a wider construction that would foster international cooperation in
the post-Second World War era. Let us add some detail to this discussion now.

2 Why the GATT?

2.1 Why ask the question?

The WTO judge must ask this question: by virtue of Art 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the WTO judge must, when inter-
preting the GATT, take into account the object and purpose of the treaty.¹⁴ Absent

¹⁴ Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), Art 3.2 obliges the WTO judge to refer to cus-
tomary rules of interpretation, when interpreting the WTO. The Appellate Body (AB), in its very
first report (US—Gasoline) held that reference to customary rules of interpretation obliged the
WTO judge to have recourse to the VCLT-system: the judge must, according to Art 31 of the
VCLT, interpret an agreement in good faith. To this effect, the judge, will interpret the agreement
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their context, taking into account the
object and purpose of the treaty, and any subsequent practice or agreement relating to the same
subject-matter, as well as any other relevant rule of public international law. If need be, and only in
 Why the GATT? 7

some knowledge as to what is being sought through the advent of the GATT, it
will be difficult for the judge to establish a coherent understanding of the instru-
ments committed: the various instruments committed to the GATT serve a par-
ticular purpose, the purpose sought by the founding fathers of the GATT, and not
any purpose. Understanding the rationale for the GATT is, thus, the necessary
first step towards evaluating (and interpreting) its various instruments.
There is an intellectual reason as well, justifying the asking of the question:
we can learn what the objectives and purposes of the founding fathers were. A
response to this question will elucidate us as to the original design of the GATT.
Absent an understanding of the rationale behind the advent of the GATT, it will
be difficult, if not irresponsible altogether, to suggest what needs to be changed in
the current edifice.
Trade liberalization can serve different purposes; it is not as if one can hit one
bird only with this stone. In Lewis Carroll’s oft quoted passage from Alice in
Wonderland, Alice asks ‘where do we go from here?’, only to get the response ‘it
depends where you want to go’. Delving into the question ‘why a GATT?’ is the
question a wondering Alice would ask the founding fathers of the GATT.
The natural place to entertain this question is the historical account of the
GATT. As we will try to show in what follows, a coherent response to this ques-
tion is hardly provided by the negotiating history of the GATT: we know few
things about the motives of countries other than the United States and the
United Kingdom, and we also know that these two countries, the main negotiat-
ing partners of the GATT, did not have a common understanding of the ration-
ale for the GATT; probably for this reason, the common intention of the parties
as reflected in the GATT preamble, is at a level of generality that makes it simply
uninformative, when it comes to using such knowledge in order to interpret the
various instruments committed. Economic theory has attempted to provide a
response to this question. Following a quick survey of the literature offered infra,
our conclusion is that we are still lacking a framework that explains in a coherent
manner the rationale for the GATT. Theory, nevertheless, is still evolving. And,
anyway, the existing level of research has a lot to offer, in terms of analytical tools,
to the trade practitioner (be it a negotiator or a judge) aiming at understanding
the GATT, and eventually, making it a better institution.

2.2 The negotiators say . . .

One, probably natural, way to start this discussion is to look into the (official)
records explaining the intent of the founding fathers of the GATT. There are
two revelation mechanisms: national and multilateral. Under the former, one
could extend research to a wide range of possible sources, ranging from official

accordance with the limited conditions of Art 32 of the VCLT, the judge will further refer to the
preparatory work of the agreement.
8 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

constitutional records to unofficial representations. Historians will, for good rea-

sons, normally privilege the former, a choice followed here as well.¹⁵ The prepara-
tory work of the work of the GATT exhausts the multilateral sources.
Researching into national sources is, of course, informative about national per-
ceptions but not necessarily about common intentions: any time, for example, we
observe variance between a nationally defined objective and the end result of the
international negotiation, we can legitimately cast doubt on the validity of the
national intention to act as explanatory variable for the common understanding.
We should probably start this discussion by pointing out that we do not know
much about national positions of the original participants, other than the United
Kingdom and the United States. Hart (2002) offers a very comprehensive account
of Canada’s priorities. His main conclusions are that Canada essentially played
second fiddle to the UK and US negotiators who monopolized the negotiations,
and was quite happy with the introduction of MFN which, in its view (and cor-
rectly so), was a means to curtail the dominance of the then two super-powers.¹⁶
Capling (2001) discusses the Australian participation. Once again we are left
with the impression that the Australian participation did not heavily influence
the negotiated outcome. In Capling’s account, Australia was largely pre-occupied
with sectoral negotiations, and even threatened to walk out of the negotiating
room when the United States initially refused to reduce its duties on wool and
wool products.
The overwhelming majority of historical accounts focuses on the US and UK
negotiating positions.
Irwin (1996a, and 2005) delves into the US constitutional process. He aptly
describes the context in which US trade policy was being shaped in order to
describe the goals sought by the US administration. The United States was com-
ing out from the Great Depression. Legislative initiatives, such as the Hawley-
Smoot Act, although they have been over-dramatized, help us understand the
prevailing attitude towards crisis-management in that period of time. In Irwin’s
account, the United States was looking to reduce tariffs around the world. US
Congress nevertheless, the US administration felt, was looking for product by
product tariff reductions, and this was a constraint imposed on US negotiators.
The US negotiators were also unequivocally for the dismantling of preferences
(largely practiced by the UK government at that time); crucially, the US admin-
istration was looking for a reduction of the role of the state, taking the view that
trade would be safer in private hands.¹⁷ It should be noted that, at that time, the
US policy-makers could count on visionaries, such as Cordell Hull, who genu-
inely believed that they were responding to a call of history and were contributing

¹⁵ This approach is also followed because it is not my aim to conduct extensive research on this
score, but, to a large extent, to rely on existing research, which is quite rich anyway.
¹⁶ See Hart (2002, pp 133ff ).
¹⁷ Miller (2000) takes exactly the same view. See also Gardner (1980), Jackson (1969), Dam
(1970), and Zeiler (1999) on this score.
 Why the GATT? 9

to world peace by establishing a world trade institution. Moving the competence

on trade issues from Congress to the Executive, as noted supra, reinforced the
voice of people like Cordell Hull.
The same author (Irwin) also explains the UK attitude which was quite dif-
ferent, in that it was quite pragmatic: the United Kingdom, the only other state
with considerable bargaining power at the time, sought tariff reductions, but also
the maintenance of a system of preferences that would allow it to trade with its
Commonwealth partners on a discriminatory basis. The UK government, largely
influenced by the thinking of John Maynard Keynes, who was acting as policy
adviser, believed that the UK government would have less to offer to US tariff reduc-
tions, if it had unilaterally removed its imperial preferences. In a way, reducing its
imperial preferences was a quid pro quo for US tariff reductions. In Miller’s (2000)
account, a large part of the negotiations concerned the exchange between UK
imperial preferences against US tariff reductions.¹⁸ Keynes must also be behind
the UK negotiating position, that the role of state in the post-war era should not
be put into question. The two delegations thus had a different approach on the
issue of state trading, cartels, and quotas: Miller (2000) explains that the UK
delegation, in favour of a strong role for government in the post-Second World
War era, insisted on allowing for quotas for balance of payments (BoP) reasons.
In Miller’s (2000) account, the pragmatic, government-friendly attitude of the
UK delegation prevailed in four key issues: preferences (which were not elimi-
nated), quotas (which were allowed for BoP reasons), state trading (which could
legitimately persist, provided that it operated on non-discriminatory terms), and
cartels (that were not disallowed).¹⁹
There was a substantial overlap as well. The British were not opposed to the
idea of creating a trade institution, which they viewed as means to curtail US
dominance. Both governments seem to believe that trade expansion (through
the signing of the GATT) was an appropriate means to fight unemployment
that crippled the US economy in the pre-New Deal era and was looming all over
Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War.²⁰ It should come as no sur-
prise that a specific provision in an earlier GATT draft was dedicated to this
issue.²¹ However, whereas the US delegates viewed opening of trade as an antidote,

¹⁸ Recall that, because of Hawley-Smoot, the US was practicing abnormally high tariff s imme-
diately after the Second World War and had thus a lot to offer in terms of tariff reductions.
¹⁹ The provisions on cartels (restrictive business practices, RBPs) were included in Chapter V of
the ITO Charter. The non-advent of the latter meant that the only legal relevance of this provision
was through the rather innocuous Art XXIX of the GATT reflected supra.
²⁰ Gardner (1980) underscores this point. Modern research casts doubt on the usefulness of trade
instruments to solve unemployment problems, see, inter alia, Krugman (1995), and Dewatripont
et al (1999) for analyses concerning the effects of trade on unemployment on the two sides of the
Atlantic. This is not to deny, of course, that trade and employment policies do interact, and that
the formulation of coherent policies can be beneficial. Jansen and Lee (2007) offer a survey of the
most recent empirical literature on this score which questions some of the orthodoxies of the past.
²¹ GATT, Art XVI of the New York Draft entitled Maintenance of domestic employment recog-
nized the right of every government to aim to achieve full employment, and imposed an obligation
10 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

the UK government had a more cautious approach on this issue: arguably influ-
enced by Keynes’ thinking, the UK delegates did not deny that trade could
indeed be beneficial on this score; they seem to privilege nevertheless, short-term
macroeconomic solutions to address unemployment. In the dominant UK view,
a drop in tariffs would not in and of itself help achieve the GATT objective to
end unemployment; wealthy domestic markets (with little if any unemployment)
would in turn drive trade expansion.²²
One can not nevertheless, maintain the view that fighting unemployment
was the only concern: many factors (other than trade) are better suited to fight
unemployment, and this much was known at that time as well. Trade expansion
could probably be of some help in this endeavour,²³ but trade alone, as suggested
above, could not be the answer to the problems the US society was facing. It
follows that a look into national constitutional processes is not very informative
about a common rationale for the GATT: the two most important players shared
(to some extent) the view that trade expansion would play an important role in
achieving full employment and increase welfare, although they disagree as to how
trade expansion should be achieved; they further buy into the idea that, at that
juncture, promotion of multilateral cooperation should be pursued, and that an
international trade organization is part of a wider cooperative game. The cost of
MFN was probably higher for the United States: before the GATT/ITO negotia-
tions, the US government did not practice widespread MFN in its trade relations;
in what seems to be a fairly rational decision, the US government practised condi-
tional MFN, the condition being the bargaining power of the other signatory.²⁴
In negotiating the GATT/ITO, not only did the US accept, counter-intuitively
to some extent, substantive MFN, it also accepted procedural MFN (multilateral-
ism), since it accepted to essentially negotiate, rather than act unilaterally. At
the same time, as we saw above, elimination of imperial preferences was a major
request by the US government, whereas keeping them as negotiating ploy was
very much the UK response.
What governments were after, it seems, is to curtail the potential for unilat-
eral action. They seem to realize that unilateral actions by other countries can
have negative (external) effects on their own welfare: a high US tariff could lead

on states striving for full employment to avoid creating balance of payment problems on their
trading partners. According to the companion provision (Art XVII), governments which aimed
at promoting the establishment or reconstruction of particular industries would be free to do so,
provided that they negotiated a settlement with the affected states, see UN Economic and Social
Council Doc E/PC/T/C.6/85 of 15 February 1947.
²² Th is is very much a Keynesian view. Keynes cared a lot about short-run effects and tended to
pay less attention to long run: a drop in tariff s could, for example, in the short run lead to domestic
unemployment, and such effects pre-occupied him. It is him after all who famously used to say ‘in
the long run we are all dead’.
²³ This could be the case, were the United States to open up its import market in sectors where
no domestic production existed, while requesting, in return, the opening up of foreign markets in
goods where US production existed (assuming no capacity constraints).
²⁴ See Hawkins (1951, pp 81ff ), and Miller (2000, pp 10ff ) on this score.
 Why the GATT? 11

to increased unemployment in the United Kingdom. We have little evidence,²⁵

nevertheless, as to precisely which external effects (besides fighting unemploy-
ment) they had in mind.
The second revelation (of the intentions) mechanism is the GATT itself, and
more precisely, negotiating documents and the GATT preamble. The GATT
preamble is informative with respect to the common aspirations of the contract-
ing parties, but not that helpful when it comes to using the common aspirations
as guidance in order to interpret the various GATT (committed) instruments.
Raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, making full use of the
resources of the world, are mentioned as the objectives sought through the
GATT. The objectives sought are thus expressed at a very high level of generality:
they cannot serve as compass that will guide us on the direction to choose when
interpreting the various instruments committed to the GATT; the objectives,
as expressed in the GATT preamble, are hard to implement through the use of
the instruments committed. They are general aspirations that can be achieved
through various government (and private) actions, trade liberalization being at
best, a contributing factor.²⁶
Nevertheless, the preamble is not the only place to look at. Looking into various
negotiating documents is quite informative as well. There are of course, hundreds
of negotiating documents relating to the GATT that were circulated between
1946 and 1948 during the London Conference, the New York Conference, the
Geneva Conference, and the Havana Conference. It is probably appropriate to
concentrate on the documents explaining the heart of the GATT, the tariff bar-
gain. Rationally, negotiators focused on barriers which constituted the main
market access impediment at the time and were probably hiding the relevance
of NTBs, assuming they were already important at that time. Recall that the
institutional provisions in the current GATT text were added only in an effort to
ensure that GATT’s life until the entry into force of the ITO would be smooth.
Had the ITO entered into force simultaneously with the GATT, there would
have been, presumably, no institutional provisions in the latter. The tariff bargain
is the heart of the GATT, and it is best explained in Annexure 10 of the London
Draft:²⁷ negotiations should take place under strict reciprocity (in the sense,
that countries should not be expecting one way preferences), and following the

²⁵ Absent, of course, the rather generic references to unemployment and macro-economic

stability.
²⁶ Irwin (2005) rightly underscores that, prior to the late forties, at least in the United States,
there was no statement or generally held view that the government was responsible for maintaining
full employment, and to avoid recessions. The Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), established
by the US Employment Act of 1946, was a watershed: the government was explicitly assuming
responsibility for macro-economic management. The preamble is broad, and thus unhelpful when
it comes to using it as a compass that will help us orientate the various GATT instruments, but it
does reflect a new view of the government’s role, and thus, very much the mindset of the founding
fathers.
²⁷ See E/PC/T/33.
12 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

principal supplier rule. The stated rationale for the latter is that, countries granting
a concession to principal suppliers would be in a position to extract the maximum
concession as counterpart to their offer. Reciprocity and principal supplier rule
are key ingredients of the terms of trade explanation of the GATT, as we will see
in what follows. Although no explicit reference to this theory is made in the vari-
ous negotiating documents, one should not outright exclude its relevance during
negotiations. At the very least, there is coincidence between what happened dur-
ing the negotiations and the manner in which economic theory tried to explain
the rationale for the GATT in subsequent years.²⁸
In a nutshell, a survey of the revelation mechanisms suggests that signing a
trade agreement (the GATT) was perceived as a means to constrain the behav-
iour of trading partners, and not of domestic lobbies, with the (predominantly
US) idea that the GATT would be a contribution towards establishing world
peace.

2.3 Economic theory suggests

Our walk through the revelation mechanisms discussed above was not counter-
productive: if anything, it seems that trade liberalization was viewed as a response
to unilateral behaviour. We are still in the dark nevertheless, as to which unilat-
eral behaviour trade agreements are meant to address. So, a detour to economic
theory is warranted in order to form an opinion on this score. Economists will,
usually, ask the following questions:
(1) are there gains from trade liberalization?
(2) if yes, why are countries not pursuing trade liberalization anyway, that is, in
the absence of a written commitment (agreement) to do so?
Assuming a positive response to (1) above, it is the response to (2) that will take us
close to the response to the question: what is the rationale for trade agreements?
One will be hard-pressed to find, among economists, people arguing that there
are no gains from trade liberalization. Indeed, as explained in numerous writings
from Smith’s classic The Wealth of Nations onwards, all nations have a compara-
tive advantage in producing particular goods, and gains from trade result from
specialization.²⁹ The modern understanding of international trade policy is, to a

²⁸ See infra in section 2.3 of this chapter.

²⁹ For a very simple, yet very clear explanation, of gains from trade, see Krugman and Wells
(2005). Rose (2004) in a provocative paper, argued that there is not much evidence that the GATT/
WTO had contributed to trade liberalization: in his view, nations would have behaved more or less
in the same way even in the absence of an institutional framework such as the GATT/WTO. Irwin
(2005) first criticized Rose’s approach, rightly pointing that the author himself accepts the impact
of the WTO when fi xed effects have been taken into account (as they should). Subramanian and
Wei (2007) have shown that the WTO has had a strong positive impact on trade, amounting to
120% additional world trade (or $8 trillion in 2000 alone). They also show that trade promotion
is uneven and that it depends on what do countries do with their membership, who they negotiate
 Why the GATT? 13

large extent, still based on the notion of comparative advantage, as further devel-
oped by Ricardo. The obvious next question is why then does not trade liberal-
ization³⁰ take place unilaterally? Why, in other words, do we need the GATT in
order to do what we would have been anyway doing (even without the GATT)?
Two theories have been advanced to answer this question: the commitment,
and the terms of trade theory. The commitment theory has been developed in
various research papers. The focus of this approach is the relationship between
government and its private sector: a government will choose its trade policy and
will commit it in an international agreement signed to this effect; the private
sector will act accordingly. The gain for the government is that investment deci-
sions are forestalled; it will lose, however, contributions by the various lobbies.³¹
There are many good arguments in support of this view: for a government facing
unpopular (for segments of the society) choices, the argument ‘I have tied my
hands to the mast’³² is an easy way out that minimizes the political costs associ-
ated with such unpopular choices.³³ In this understanding, national governments
will use GATT as an excuse for unpopular choices.³⁴
A number of authors have taken issues with important features of the com-
mitment theory: Srinivasan (2005), for example, asks why is there need for an
international commitment, if the source of the distortion is domestic? One could
respond that the commitment theory does not pretend that it offers the first best
response to a domestic distortion: it offers one plausible response. Is nevertheless
the response plausible? The validity of this theory largely depends on the cred-
ibility of the commitment. How much of a safe-box is the GATT? Is it true that
once a commitment has been made, there is no way back? No, is the short answer.
First, the GATT contains a number of loopholes (safeguards, antidumping (AD),
etc) which allow for cheap exit from the GATT obligations; second, violations of

with and what products are covered in their negotiations. Goldstein et al (2007) report similar
results.
³⁰ Grandmont and McFadden (1972) have shown that, loosely speaking, global competitive
free market equilibrium is Pareto optimal to the extent that raising the welfare of one single player
will negatively affect the welfare of someone else. Th is theorem relies on several assumptions, some
of which are quite strong and unrealistic. For example, the presence of production externalities
(eg sub-standard production of steel which leads to environmental pollution) casts doubt on the
validity of the theorem.
³¹ See Bagwell and Staiger (2002, pp 32–4).
³² See Irwin (1996a), Maggi (1999) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) who discuss the
time inconsistency issue.
³³ Economic theory distinguishes between Pareto and Kaldor Hicks efficiency. Trade liberal-
ization is Kaldor Hicks efficient, that is, while overall the society wins from market opening, some
of its segments (domestic producers facing foreign competition) might (and often do) lose. Overall,
however, that is, when the losses are measured against the gains of other segments of the society
(users of cheaper inputs, consumers), the society will, in the usual case, benefit.
³⁴ This is the well known time inconsistency issue: to deter pressure from lobbies, a government
might be willing to ‘tie’ its policies against the GATT mast. As we will see, however, in what fol-
lows, the GATT mast is not an absolute safe box, and if at all (at least some) governments retain
discretion to deal with this issue at their discretion. Th is issue is linked to the remedies issue, which
we discuss in Chapter 5. On this score, more generally, see Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
14 From GATT 1947 to GATT 1994

the GATT contract can also serve as temporary safeguard, since GATT remedies
are, as a matter of practice, prospective only; third, many domestic legal orders
have adopted a hostile attitude towards WTO law anyway. In light of all of the
above, it is at best doubtful that we can speak of a credible commitment, when
we try to explain the GATT through the lens of the commitment theory. If the
commitment is not credible, why commit in the first place?
Critically, as things stand, commitment theory also suffers from the lack of research
explaining the various GATT instruments in light of commitment theory. This does
not mean, however, that it is a totally unhelpful theory. Commitment theory might
be crucial in explaining specific behaviour: for example, a government might be will-
ing to take a dispute and lose before the GATT, only to turn then to its domestic con-
stituency and explain that its hands are indeed tied, or, that, at the very least, it would
be now quite costly to disregard the GATT ruling. This is what Hudec called ‘use
GATT as an excuse’. One might have difficulty in proving that this is indeed what
happened in particular cases, although one might legitimately speculate along these
lines. In other words, the fact that commitment theory does not explain the GATT
from A to Z, does not mean that its relevance as a tool to help us understand specific
transactions should be dismissed altogether. Commitment theory may be of more
relevance to explain recent accessions to the WTO: the contract covers more policy
space nowadays, that is, a larger number of instruments are being committed.
Regan (2006) has recently revisited this literature, and has forcefully argued that
the very purpose of the GATT (and the WTO) is to counter-attack protectionism.
In this view, absent the GATT, trading nations will have an incentive to continue
protecting domestic producers. His view is not the classic commitment story: in his
story, there is a divide between government and country preferences. Trade agree-
ments aim to bridge this gap and make governments act in accordance with the
country interest. Hence, in his story the game is not between government and the
private sector. There is however, an important overlap: both in the commitment
and the protectionism stories, the role for trade agreement is essentially to address
a domestic problem and not an international externality. The problem with this
explanation for the GATT is that it remains unclear why governments would nego-
tiate such an agreement in the first place, unless their true aim was to maximize
social welfare (in which case, the country-government divide does not exist).
The terms of trade theory³⁵ differs from the two mentioned above, in that it
traces the rationale for trade agreements (and hence, the GATT) not in domestic
distortions but in international externalities.³⁶ This theory has recently found its

³⁵ Bagwell (2006) traces this theory to the work of early and mid-nineteenth century econo-
mists such as Mill and Torrens. Harry Johnson (1953–4) is credited with an elegant formalization
of the theory.
³⁶ As we saw, there is some historical support for this view. Drache (2003) further reports a
meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941 in Newfoundland, where the two leaders com-
monly held the view that international beggar thy neighbour policies must be addressed in the
post-Second World War era within the framework of a (trade) institution.
 Why the GATT? 15

advocate in the scholarship of Bagwell and Staiger (2002). Bagwell and Staiger
(2002) use terms of trade theory to interpret the various GATT institutions.
Their starting point is that it is simply not the case that unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion is the first best instrument for all: countries that can influence the terms of
trade, have a strong incentive to set tariffs and influence the terms under which
particular goods are being traded on the world stage to their advantage: optimal
tariff theory, from which they borrow in this respect, suggests that governments
behaving in accordance with their self-interest should not necessarily unilaterally
abolish tariffs.³⁷ Hence, tariffs can and do occur for good reasons. Unilateral
setting of tariffs however, can lead to terms of trade externalities: a country
setting tariffs will choose its tariff rates by calculating the welfare implications
to its domestic producers and consumers. It will also be imposing an externality
on foreign producers of the product or commodity affected by the tariffs, which
in all likelihood will not be internalized.³⁸ Consequently, unilateral tariff-setting
can spiral into a Prisoner’s Dilemma type³⁹ of situation, where countries behave
in a non-cooperative manner and impose externalities on each other. In other
words, in this vein, absent a trade agreement, different countries will not behave
cooperatively.⁴⁰ A trade agreement is the means to internalize these externalities
and accordingly, a means to escape from the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Through inter-
national negotiations, trading partners will aim at reducing tariffs to the polit-
ically optimum-level (that is, at the level where, tariff imposition does not result
in external effects for foreign producers). In this vein, reciprocity is the driving
force. The terms of trade theory rests on only two key assumptions: ceteris pari-
bus, a government preference is such that it suffers a welfare loss when its terms of
trade deteriorate; second, assuming a country is large, an increase in an import

³⁷ In doing that, they take issue with Krugman (1991), who summarizes GATT-think in three
sentences: (a) exports are good; (b) imports are bad; (c) other things equal, an equal increase in
imports and exports is good. The last step is obviously assumed by reciprocity-driven international
negotiations. On the other hand, in Krugman’s explanation, a government needs to be mercantilist
to behave in the manner he describes. Th is is not necessarily so: a politically motivated government,
and probably a government that wants to affect terms of trade to its own advantage, could behave in
a similar manner. It thus follows that Krugman (1991) does not believe that there is enough empir-
ical evidence to support optimal tariff-theory.
³⁸ Absent extraordinary circumstances, the country setting the tariff level will have little
incentive to internalize this externality. In Bagwell and Staiger’s terminology, such will not be a
politically optimum tariff, that is, a tariff which takes adequately into consideration the interests of
domestic producers and consumers, but imposes no external effect on foreign producers. One can
of course take the issue with the terminology here: since the (negative) effect on foreign producers
travels through the price mechanism, one should not speak of an externality. This is, however, pure
semantics.
³⁹ Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) provide an explanation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and how one
gets out of it by changing the pay-offs, pp 9–10 and 110–12. See also, Axelrod (1984).
⁴⁰ A prima facie similar view is taken in Krugman (1991). However, whereas Krugman argues
that free trade is the best unilateral policy, Bagwell and Staiger pay attention to optimal tariff
theory, and view reciprocal negotiations as the necessary mechanism to liberalize trade. Krugman
accepts the optimal tariff-argument as a matter of theory, but dismisses its practical importance
(less so, in his later writings).
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
Muts. Chapka. Khalaloutch.
Gordel. Kouchak. Sitit.
Naald. Igla. Chicha.
Dobbelsteen. Napérstok. Oulioul.
Geef de hand. Daï raukou. Kot Koussoutou.
Neem dit geschenk. Primi prézént. Kamaïti.
Zeer verpligt. Blagodarstvouiou. Déléamoui.
Wast de Hemden. Vouimoui Kadmouikh.
roubachki.
Zeep. Mouilo. Kadkhom.
Sabelmarter. Sobol. Komkom.
Vos. Lissitsa. Tchachiann.
Otter. Vouidra. Mouichémouicn.
Haas. Ouchkann. Zaits. Mouis tchitch.
Hermelijn. Gornostall. Deitchitch.
Gans. Gouss. Ksoaiss.
Eendvogel. Outka. Archimouss.
Hen. Kouritsa. Kokorok.
Ooijevaar. Lébéd. Maskhou.
Beeren. Medvéd. Kaza.
Wolf. Volk. Kotaioum.
Koei. Korova. Koouja.
Visch. Riba. Etchiou.
Vleesch. Mésso. Tatal.
Boter. Masso. Kotkhom.
Melk. Moloka. Nokann.
Geef gaauw te eeten. Daï iést-po- Kotkotakossassk.
skoréié.
Geef gaauw te drinken. Daï-pitt poskoréie. Tikossosk.
Man. Mouje. Alkou.
Vrouw. Baba, jéna. Kanija.
Dogter. Défka. Outchitchion.
Klein kind. Malinnko robénok. Paatchitch.
Kerk. Tsérkov. Takakijout.
Priester. Pop. Jakatchitch.
Vrouw van de priester. Popadica. Alnatsch.
Bediende van de kerk. Diatchok. Diiatschok.
Kroon in de kerk. Padilo. Kapoutchitch.
Een. Jédinn. Dizk.
Twee. Dva. Kaza.
Drie. Tri. Tsoko.
Vier. Tchétiré. Tsak.
Vyf. Pétt. Koumnak.
Zes. Schést. Kilkok.
Zeven. Sémm. Idakok.
Agt. Vossemm. Tsoktouk.
Negen. Dévétt. Tsaktak.
Tien. Déssétt. Koumoukhtoukh.
Elf. Yédinn nodssét. Dizzkkina.
Twaalf. Dvanassét. Kachichina.
Dertien. Trinadssét. Tchokchina.
Veertien. Tchétiré nadsset. Tchakchina.
Vyftien. Pett nadssét. Koumnakchina.
Zestien. Schest nadsset. Kilkoukchina.
Zeventien. Semnadsset. Paktoukchina.
Agttien. Vossémnadssét. Tchoktouk.
Negentien. Dévétt nadssét. Tchaktak.
Twintig. Dvatssét. Koumkhtouk.
Vyftig. Péttdéssét. Koumkhtoukha.
Hondert. Sto. Koumkhtoukoumkhtoukha.

Einde der Woordenboeken.

 Opmerkingen van de bewerker.

De kanttekeningen in het originele werk zijn als titels

van secties (data) en paragrafen (beschreven
onderwerpen), dan wel als kanttekeningen in deze e-
tekst opgenomen, afhankelijk van het format waarin de
tekst gelezen wordt.
Interpunctie, spelling, afbrekingen, opmaak, gebruik van
accenten, transcripties e.d. zijn overgenomen uit de
brontekst, en niet gestandaardiseerd of gecorrigeerd
(inclusief de woordenlijsten), behalve zoals vermeld
onder Wijzigingen. Persoons- en plaatsnamen worden
niet altijd hetzelfde gespeld (bijv. Coock, Cooke en Cook)
zonder dat dit tot duidelijk andere uitspraak en dus tot
verwarring leidt. De volgende namen (die wel
verschillende uitspraken hebben) hebben mogelijk
betrekking op dezelfde persoon of plaats: Boulguin en
Boulgum, Oumiavin en Bumiavin, Figuil en Tiguil,
Kartchina en Katchina, Maklofski en Marklofski, Peledoni
en Pelodoni, Podporojenei en Podporejenei, Schmaleff
en Smaleff, Tongousen en Toungousen, Ustiug en
Usting, Vorokoff en Vorokhoff, Yndoma en Yudoma.
Diverse conversaties: in het originele werk wordt het
begin en het einde van de gehele conversatie met
aanhalingstekens aangegeven, wisselingen van spreker
worden niet met aanhalingstekens aangegeven.
De e-reader omslag is voor deze e-tekst gemaakt, en is
in het public domain geplaatst.
Pag. I-177, uit hun om hem te bezoeken: hier lijkt een
woord weggevallen (“uit hun midden” o.i.d.).
Pag. II-66, niet minder dan achtenswaardig: dit lijkt
strijdig met het vervolg van de alinea.
Page II-259, voetnoot [204]: van het noord-oosten naar
het zuid-westen: de Lena stroomt (min of meer) van het
zuid-westen naar het noord-oosten.
Pag. II-270, kopees: mogelijk zetfout voor kopecks.
In de woordenlijsten zijn mogelijk verschillende accenten
weggevallen; deze zijn niet aangevuld of gecorrigeerd.
Enkele woorden zijn meerdere malen in de lijsten
opgenomen, soms met verschillende spellingen. De
woordenlijsten zijn uit het originele werk overgenomen,
en bevatten zeker enige fouten in de Russische
woorden.
Wijzigingen.
Voetnoten zijn onder de betreffende paragraaf gezet; de
voetnoten in de eerste woordenlijst zijn verzameld
onderaan de eerste woordenlijst.
Herhaalde kanttekeningen (datum en plaats) zijn
verwijderd; deze werden in het brondocument herhaald
als een alinea of datum/plaats op de volgende pagina
doorliep. Soms werden ze enigszins korter of iets anders
geformuleerd; in dergelijke gevallen is steeds de meest
uitgebreide of de duidelijkste versie gekozen. In de bron
staan sommige kanttekeningen midden in een alinea,
deze zijn naar het begin van de alinea verplaatst,
waardoor sommige alinea's beginnen met twee
kanttekeningen. Sommige kanttekeningen zijn
samengevoegd (bijvoorbeeld “De baden van Natchikin”
en “De heete bronnen van Natchikin” tot “De baden en
heete bronnen van Natchikin”) als ze op hetzelfde
onderwerp betrekking hebben en er geen duidelijke
reden is voor de overgang van de ene naar de andere
kanttekening.
Enkele overduidelijk ontbrekende of overbodige
leestekens en spaties zijn stilzwijgend toegevoegd of
verwijderd.
Overduidelijke zetfouten (bijvoorbeeld verwisselingen
van letters; weggevallen letters; verkeerd om gezette
letters) zijn stilzwijgend gecorrigeerd.
In de woordenlijsten zijn horizontale lijntjes toegevoegd
om het lezen te vereenvoudigen.
Verschillende plaatsen: kibitsk gewijzigd in kibitk
Pag. I-vii: onvertsaagde gewijzigd in onversaagde
Pag. I-4, voetnoot [3]: Petropavlosskaia-gaven gewijzigd
in Petropavlosskaia-haven
Pag. I-6: woei,) gewijzigd in woei,
Pag. I-8: vermaardhed gewijzigd in vermaardheid
Pag. I-26: boosten gewijzigd in beesten
Pag. I-47: konde om gewijzigd in konden hem
Pag. I-55: Bolchaiä-reka gewijzigd in Bolchaïa-reka;
nïeuwe gewijzigd in nieuwe
Pag. I-61: Bolchaia-reka gewijzigd in Bolchaïa-reka
Pag. I-63: vethaalt gewijzigd in verhaalt
Pag. I-65: bouw-ordre gewijzigd in bouw-order
Pag. I-71: slatkaïa-treva gewijzigd in slatkaïa-trava
Pag. I-76: aftechrikken gewijzigd in afteschrikken
Pag. I-84: eïgentlijke gewijzigd in eigentlijke
Pag. I-97: vischvangt gewijzigd in vischvangst
Pag. I-124: Bolchaiä-reka gewijzigd in Bolchaïa-reka
Pag. I-129: nimmer en dag gewijzigd in nimmer een dag
Pag. I-130-132: kanttekeningen geven als datum
Januarij 1787, gecorrigeerd naar 1788.
Pag. I-133: inwoonners gewijzigd in inwoonders;
Beniouski gewijzigd in Beniovski
Pag. I-135: en op en gewijzigd in en op een
Pag. I-141: nog en andere gewijzigd in nog een andere
Pag. I-145: Varcknei gewijzigd in Vercknei
Pag. I-147: ieder werk gewijzigd in ieder werkt
Pag. I-158: Koriakken gewijzigd in Koriaken
Pag. I-167: Klutchekaïa gewijzigd in Klutchefskaïa
Pag. I-183: Yelofski gewijzigd in Yelofki
Pag. I-186: Ozernaï gewijzigd in Ozernoï
Pag. I-195: eenen of anderen heilig gewijzigd in eenen
of anderen heiligen
Pag. I-196: kinren gewijzigd in kinderen
Pag. I-207: Kaminei gewijzigd in Kaminoi
Pag. I-208: èén gewijzigd in één
Pag. I-236: Monteney gewijzigd in Monterey
Pag. II-16: Chestokovæ gewijzigd in Chestokova
Pag. II-28: wachtede zij niet gewijzigd in wachteden zij
niet
Pag. II-40: Youchtka gewijzigd in Youltitka
Pag. II-66: Lamonten gewijzigd in Lamouten; Yakonten
gewijzigd in Yakouten
Pag. II-79: Kriak gewijzigd in Koriak
Pag. II-84: monkamorr gewijzigd in moukhamorr
Pag. II-129: Simeon gewijzigd in Siméon zoals elders
Pag. II-136: Aldaun gewijzigd in Aldann
Pag. II-142: I, Deel, gewijzigd in Deel I,
Pag. II-143: Babouscka gewijzigd in Babouschka
Pag. II-149: Tounsen gewijzigd in Toungousen
Pag. II-166: ging de Heer Majoor en ik gewijzigd in
gingen de Heer Majoor en ik
Pag. II-181: wegens den del van gewijzigd in wegens
den handel van
Pag. II-197: Lamonters gewijzigd in Lamouters
Pag. II-200: ordres gewijzigd in orders; Okhata
gewijzigd in Okhota
Pag. II-204: bewisten gewijzigd in betwisten
Pag. II-206: Moundoukaun gewijzigd in Moundoukann
Pag. II-209: het beste gewijzigd in het beest
Pag. II-210: Yndome gewijzigd in Yndoma
Pag. II-223: ans gewijzigd in lans
Pag. II-227: Néderézoff gewijzigd in Nédarézoff
Pag. II-231: Nêdarézoff gewijzigd in Nédarézoff
Pag. II-235: snaphaanschoot gewijzigd in snaphaanschot
Pag. II-236: LISTUENISCHNOYé-DéREVO gewijzigd in
LISTUENISCHNOYÉ-DÉREVO
Pag. II-239: Den 26. gewijzigd in Den 24.
Pag. II-251: pleeg gewijzigd in pleegde
Pag. II-253: siberien gewijzigd in Siberien
Pag. II-257, voetnoot [203]: Kaaloff gewijzigd in Kasloff
Pag. II-279: Mantchouxsche gewijzigd in Mantchousche
Pag. II-318, 319: paginanummers gecorrigeerd (218
gewijzigd in 318 en 219 gewijzigd in 319).
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