IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Case No. 25-cv-01042(JEB)

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

PETE R. FLORES, et al.,

Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________

FOURTH MOTION FOR ANONYMITY

(INCORPORATING AUTHORITY)

Plaintiff Doe, in propria persona, and in first person, moves for administrative reassign-

ment of this matter to a human “Judge Chat”—impartial, thorough, and fair. One committed

to treating my papers “exactly as a real federal judge should: starting from first principles,

applying the correct standards of law.”

INTRODUCTION

As Thucidides observes, Mankind resent Injustice in a Magistrate from whom they

expect Protection more than open Violence or Robbery in the Highways.
~Georgicum (1716)1

A “colorable argument.” The juridical equivalent of a six-inch putt. And on the second

iteration, no less a legend than J. Harvie Wilkinson conceded the gimme. It was so basic, I

expected the Motion to be granted in a Minute Order. Judges get protection from the U.S.

Marshals. Judge Chutkan got SWATted! And I can’t even protect my wife? But as I have

been rebuked for use of AI, fulsome examination of this cutting-edge issue is warranted.

1
Peter Hughes, Georgicum: Or, A Supplement to the Mirror of Justices 31 (1716) (citing Thucydides, 1 History
of the Peloponnesian War 148 (William Smith trans. 1818) (ca. 410 B.C.) (“But mankind, it seemeth, resent
the acts of injustice more deeply than the acts of violence.”)).

1
I. “LET’S GO, CUBBIES!” SOME DAYS, YOU JUST WANT TO PUKE.

When you bring a case to the most prestigious federal district court in the land, you have

some reasonable expectation that your judge is ethical, diligent, and capable of applying a

pellucid federal statute. And the first decision that every judge must make is whether he can

even sit in a case.

Nemo iudex in causa sua. This isn’t just old law—it’s as old as law itself.3 When a judge

has a dog in the hunt, he will never fail to scratch it. A "fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic

requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Due Process

Clause incorporated the common-law rule requiring recusal when a judge has "a direct, per-

sonal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in a case, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927),

and the Supreme Court has also identified additional instances which, as an objective matter,

require recusal where "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker

is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S.

868, 872 (2009) (citation omitted) (collecting cases). Congress took the next logical step in

2
Ann E. Marimow and Spencer S. Hsu, Amid attacks, Judge Boasberg weighs holding Trump officials in con-
tempt, Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2025).
3
Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).

2
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), providing that any federal judge “shall disqualify himself in

any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (emphasis

added). No exceptions. The obligation is both mandatory and prefatory.

In matters governing judicature, Plaintiff turns instinctively to the redoubtable Antonin

Scalia. Rather famously, Scalia accepted an invitation to fly on a private plane to go duck-

hunting with his friend Dick Cheney, while a matter involving him was before his Court.

Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004)

(mem.) (Scalia, J.). He observed that “friendship is a ground for recusal of a Justice where

the personal fortune or the personal freedom of the friend is at issue,” Id. at 916, which has

always been the standard. And here, litigants are forced to rely on the perspicacity and honor

of the presiding judge. So, you can imagine Plaintiff’s shock when he read this:

Before they were federal judges, James Emanuel Boasberg and Brett M. Kavanaugh
were classmates at Yale Law School and housemates in a red brick off-campus town-
house, where they forged a bond that carries forward to this day. …

Mr. Christmas [another one of the housemates], now an entertainment lawyer and con-
sultant, recalled that as students, the group called themselves the “cubs” or “cubbies.”
For the next 30 years, the eight men have gathered annually for “cub weekends” to
“commiserate, commemorate and support each other,” Mr. Christmas said.

Their 2001 weekend, aboard a 55-foot sailboat, surfaced years later when an email Jus-
tice Kavanaugh wrote about it came up during his tense Supreme Court confirmation
process.

Mattathias Schwartz and Alan Feuer, Trump’s Least Favorite Judge Has Friends in High

Places, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2025; see Katelyn Polantz and Tierney Sneed, There’s a new

chief judge in DC who could help determine the fate of Donald Trump, CNN, Mar. 17, 2023

(“As a student at Yale Law School, Boasberg lived in a house with now-Justice Kavanaugh

and six other law students. The group of former roommates still remain close and organize

annual trips together.”).

3
 These men weren’t just assigned a dorm room. They chose to live together, and “forged

a bond that carries forward to this day.” Plaintiff is asking “Jeb” to issue a ruling that could

literally end the legal career of his fellow “Cubbie.” His drinking buddy.

How do you think THAT would go over during the next annual yacht outing?

The right to a trial before a judge who is not just fair and impartial, but appears to be fair

and impartial, is at the very core of Anglo-American jurisprudence. As Lord Chief Justice

Goddard writes: "Time and again this court has said that justice must not only be done but

must manifestly be seen to be done." Rex v. Justices of Bodmin, [1947] 1 K.B. 321, 325.

“The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even

the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition

Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988) (citation to Committee Reports elided).

In theory, Plaintiff has the right to expect some semblance of honesty and candor from the

bench. As Judge Boggs of the Sixth Circuit observed,

…litigants (and, of course, their attorneys) should assume the impartiality of the presid-
ing judge, rather than pore through the judge's private affairs and financial matters. Fur-
ther, judges have an ethical duty to "disclose on the record information which the judge
believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disquali-
fication." Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995). "[B]oth litigants
and counsel should be able to rely upon judges to comply with their own Canons
of Ethics." Ibid.

American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. The Limited, 190 F. 3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis

added). In practice, I had to remove the first judge I appeared before owing to evidence that

he took a bribe. The first federal judge I was before was quietly removed from the bench for

taking bribes on a galactic scale. Neither man was prosecuted. And twenty years on, I have

yet to appear before a judge who met that bare minimum ethical qualification.

And yet, you wonder why I would rather be judged by a machine?

4
II. HE COULD HAVE SAVED HIS COUNTRY. INSTEAD, “JEB” SAVED
FELLOW CUBBIE “BART O’ KAVANAUGH.”4

The major cause of the loss of public confidence in the American judiciary, how-
ever, is the failure of judges to comply with established professional norms, includ-
ing rules of conduct specifically prescribed. In brief, it is the unethical conduct of
judges, both on and off the bench, that most concerns the citizenry.
~Hon. Roger J. Miner (CA-2)5

The fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves. The republic formerly known as the United

States of America has probably swirled too far down the toilet bowl of fascism for this dis-

pute to matter at this point. Orange Julius Caesar has crossed the Rubicon, and like Hitler

before him, he rode a wave of capitulation to power. Harvard has bent the knee,6 and Yale’s

most celebrated experts on fascism fled the country.7 Iacta alea est.8

On paper, James Boasberg was the man for this season. A Yale- and Oxford-trained his-

torian who had developed a reputation as a moderate and capable jurist, you would expect

him to be able to spot the storm of fascism before most—and understand the need for alac-

rity. Doe v. Flores afforded him an engraved invitation to opine that Donald Trump is not

our President de jure, thereby avoiding the carnage in our financial markets and irreparable

damage to our reputation as a nation.9 Harvard doesn’t have countless research projects

4
See Mark Judge, Wasted: Tales of a GenX Drunk (1997); Kate Kelly and David Enrich, Kavanaugh’s 1983
Letter Offers Inside Look at High School Clique, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2018.
5
Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1107,
1108 (2004) (emphasis added).
6
Importantly, the Plaintiff did not even bother to obtain a temporary restraining order. President and Fellows
of Harvard College v. US Department of Health and Human Services, Case No. 1:25-cv-11048 (ADB/JKK)
(D.Mass. 2025). It is, on its face, a profile in cowardice.
7
Marci Shore, et al. (contributors), We Study Fascism at Yale. We’re Leaving the U.S.,” N.Y. Times Opinion
Video, May 14, 2025.
8
Translated, “The die has been cast." Suetonius, De Vita Caesarum [The Lives of the Twelve Caesars], Bk. I,
¶ 32, at https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html.
9
The list of experts reaching this conclusion would probably fill the Yale Bowl. See e.g., Creon Butler, The
biggest economic risk from Donald Trump’s presidency is a loss of confidence in US governance, Chatham
House, Feb. 5, 2025.

5
frozen. Liz Mineo, Freezing funding halts medical, engineering, and scientific research,

Harvard Gazette, Apr. 21, 2025. USAID would have been able to send food to the needy.

Sara Odeen-Isbister, Food that could feed 3,500,000 for a month rots after Trump’s aid cuts,

Metro (U.K.), May 18, 2025; Ariana Baio, USAID inspector fired after revealing nearly

$500m in food aid was about to spoil amid Trump funding freeze, The Independent (U.K.),

Feb. 12, 2025. All he had to do was issue a Minute Order; the summons was signed, and the

papers were all ready to go out to the lead Defendant via FedEx. It would have taken a week.

There’s no sugar-coating this. Jeb’s objectively inexplicable inaction killed people. Hanin

Ahmed, Without USAID, My Neighbors in Sudan are Starving, Newsweek, Feb. 27, 2025.

Starvation, TB, cancer, and Alzheimer’s are the ultimate winners. E.g., Mineo, supra. And,

of course, the little gremlin in Moscow holding Trump’s leash.

The core argument is simple and straightforward. All that was required for our system

to work was a judge with the requisite character to apply the law of the land to the facts of

the case—acting without fear or favor:

Defendant Donald John Trump had previously taken an oath as President “to support
the Constitution of the United States,” and was found by a competent court upon a trial
on the merits via clear and convincing evidence that he had engaged in insurrection, as
that term is used in Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anderson v. Griswold, No.
23CV32577, ¶¶ 241, 298 (Dist. Ct., City & Cnty. of Denver, Nov. 17, 2023). Thus, as
a matter of law and in accordance with established precedent, Trump cannot serve as
our President unless and until Congress affirmatively removes that disability.

This is proven conclusively by the saga of Col. Nelson Tift (D-GA). He was elected
to Congress and then, the Amendment was ratified. Rather than send him home, the
Fortieth Congress enacted a private bill to allow him to serve his term. But when he
came back after getting re-elected by the good people of Georgia, the Forty-First Con-
gress promptly sent both him and five of his colleagues home.

The Tift saga is conclusive proof that the framers of the Amendment understood it to
be self-executing. Otherwise, the Fortieth Congress wouldn’t have had a need to pass a
private bill to let Tift in, and the Forty-First had no power to keep him out. As the Con-
stitution is self-executing, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), the only power

6
 Congress has with respect to potential officeholders barred from serving pursuant to
Section 3 is the power to remove the disability.

As the only question before the Court in Trump v. Anderson was whether “the Colo-
rado Supreme Court err[ed] in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 pres-
idential primary ballot,” Trump v. Anderson, No. 23–719, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), Pet. Br.
at (i), Chief Justice Roberts’ ponderous paean to policy was an absurd exercise in intel-
lectual canasta— naked dictum, with no legal force or effect. He knew better. And he
even said so: "If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is neces-
sary not to decide more." Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S.
215, 348 (2022) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).10

Under the Framers’ Constitution, any American citizen could have sauntered into any

U.S. District Court on January 21, seeking a declaration that Defendant Trump could not

serve as our President as a matter of law. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions:

Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816 (1969). Harvard’s legendary Raoul

Berger, in the Yale Law Journal. “No English court, so far as I can discover, has ever rejected

the authority of Articulo Cleri or denied that a writ of prohibition may be granted at the suit

of a stranger.” Id. at 819. The practice is consistent with the Framers’ design, the common

law, and the concept of popular sovereignty.

And as has been argued thoroughly elsewhere, our Framers were prescient. In his Fare-

well Address, Washington counseled to “let there be no change [in the Constitution] by usur-

pation ... [as] it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.” George

Washington, Farewell Address, Sept. 19, 1796. In the clear eyes of Thomas Jefferson, the

judiciary was the most dangerous branch—a “subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly

working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric,” Thomas

Jefferson, Letter (to Judge Roane), Sept. 6, 1819 at 2, and “the germ of dissolution of our

Federal Government.” Jefferson, Letter (to Charles Hammond), Aug 18, 1821 at 1. For over

10
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Doe v. Flores, No. 25-cv-01042(JEB), ECF No. 4 (D.D.C. filed
Apr. 4, 2025)

7
two hundred years, our bench has so aggressively mutilated and disfigured the Framers’

Constitution so often that even JUDGES admit that it is barely recognizable.11

As an integral part of their relentless campaign to reduce American citizens to serfs, the

sappers and miners of our federal bench invented the legal concept of “standing” from whole

cloth. See Berger, Standing at 827 (“At the adoption of the Constitution, in sum, the English

practice in prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, and informers' and relators' actions encour-

aged strangers to attack unauthorized action … the argument for a constitutional bar to

strangers as complainants against unconstitutional action seems to me without foundation.”).

But as judges are reluctant to challenge even groundless precedent, I had to wait until there

was a well-trod path to standing to sue, which I did.12

11
E.g., whereas Thomas Paine once proudly proclaimed “that in America THE LAW IS KING,” Thomas
Paine, Common Sense 36 (P. Eckler Co. 1918) (1776) (emphasis in original), Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit—whom Justice Kagan has lauded as the "the most important legal thinker of our time," Elena Kagan,
Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1121 (2007)—admits that the law’s once-vast kingdom
“has shrunk and greyed to the point where today it is largely limited to routine cases.” Richard Posner, How
Judges Think 1 (Harv. U. Press 2008). Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit adds that "[t]he American legal
system has been corrupted almost beyond recognition.” Geraldine Hawkins, American Legal System Is Cor-
rupt Beyond Recognition, Judge Tells Harvard Law School, MassNews.com, Mar. 7, 2003. See also, e.g., Ben-
jamin Wittes, “Without Precedent,” 296-2 Atlantic Monthly 39 (Sept. 2005) (remarks of Judge Silberman).
12
The portion of the intro addressing standing reads as follows:
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The last two factors “merge when the Government is the party opposing the pre-
liminary injunction.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). The most important of the four elements
is the likelihood of success on the merits—which is considered the “sine qua non” of the inquiry. Ryan v.
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 974 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff is eligible to apply for Social Security; the agency is being ravaged by Defendant Musk. And
while Trump’s proposed tariffs will inflict immediate financial injury, Plaintiff is a Washington Post
subscriber—the “Democracy Dies in Darkness” guys—and that is his golden ticket to federal court. Plain-
tiff has a legally cognizable interest in receiving news from independent sources uncensored by the heavy
hand of government, as access to information is an essential predicate to the citizen’s effective participa-
tion in the affairs of a democratic republic. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Owner Jeff Bezos has softened its coverage to placate The DonFather.
Plaintiff’s harm is, therefore, both immediate and irreparable. Finally, it is hard to imagine how the public
interest is served by our continuing to be governed by a man who is legally barred from holding public
office. As a matter of law, Plaintiff must prevail.…
…as only one question remains: Is ours “a government of laws, and not of men”

8
 The perfect judge, a path to standing, no precedent standing in the way, and a theory of

law endorsed by the conservative legend Judge Luttig and Harvard legend Laurence Tribe.

J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Supreme Betrayal, The Atlantic, Mar. 14, 2024.

What could possibly go wrong? Basically, everything. Ask Nelson Tift.

III. THE FLY IN THE GAZPACHO

Read in pari materia, the Framers’ Constitution and the common law bedrock upon which

it was erected was as bulletproof as any charter of individual liberty ever devised. But those

learned men appreciated its limitations. They understood that the Constitution is a “parch-

ment barrier,” 5 Writings of James Madison 269, 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), flimsier than a

porn star’s nightgown. Doctor Franklin left us with “a Republic … if you can keep it.” James

McHenry, The Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787, 11 Am.

Hist. Rev. 595, 618 (1906). Or to put it in more contemporary terms, “You’re saying that

this trillion dollar hardware is at the mercy of those men with the brass keys.” WarGames

(MGM 1983) (at the 45-minute mark).

To a man, every Framer understood that faction was the gravest peril our Republic faced.

Madison observed that a “well constructed union [would have a] tendency to break and

9
control the violence of faction.”13 To address this peril, he later wrote: “It is of great im-

portance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but

to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. ... If a majority be

united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” The Federalist

No. 51 (Madison). They feared that it would tear the country apart, as it did in Britain … and

ten years on, it damn near did. Sarah Pruitt, The Founding Fathers Feared Political Factions

Would Tear the Nation Apart, History.com, Feb. 18, 2025. The Framers’ Constitution had

an array of firebreaks, including the diffusion of power between the suzerain and the vassal

States and the citizen’s untrammeled right to engage in public interest litigation. Today, all

power converges in Washington, and our out-of-control Imperial Judiciary has reduced what

were once citizens to serfs.

But that was not the only internal danger the Framers identified. Alexander Hamilton

saw Defendant Trump coming from 230 years away:

The truth unquestionably is, that the only path to a subversion of the republican
system of the Country is, by flattering the prejudices of the people, and exciting their
jealousies and apprehensions, to throw affairs into confusion, and bring on civil com-
motion. Tired at length of anarchy, or want of government, they may take shelter in the
arms of monarchy for repose and security. …
When a man unprincipled in private life desperate in his fortune, bold in his temper,
possessed of considerable talents, having the advantage of military habits—despotic in
his ordinary demeanour—known to have scoffed in private at the principles of liberty—
when such a man is seen to mount the hobby horse of popularity—to join in the cry of
danger to liberty—to take every opportunity of embarrassing the General Government

13
Madison’s remarks, in proper context:
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accu-
rately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.1 The friend of popular
governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates
their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which,
without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability,
injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under
which popular governments have every where perished;
The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), Founders Online, National Archives.

10
 & bringing it under suspicion—to flatter and fall in with all the non sense of the zealots
of the day—It may justly be suspected that his object is to throw things into confusion
that he may “ride the storm and direct the whirlwind.

Alexander Hamilton, Objections and Answers Respecting the Administration, Aug. 18,

1792, Founders Online, Nat’l. Archives (last visited Apr. 3, 2025).

As Hamilton observed, no “popular Government was ever without its Catalines,” but few

saw the fervor Defendant Trump would engender. All Mr. Trump has to do is say the word;

his wish is literally their command. But Plaintiff’s guess is that he probably doesn’t need to

tell this Court that. E.g., “Trump has called all patriots”: 210 Jan. 6th criminal defendants

say Trump incited them, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Feb. 14,

2024; Jason Szep and Linda So, Trump campaign demonized two Georgia election workers

– and death threats followed, Reuters, Dec. 1, 2021. And some of his berserkers are profes-

sionals, grasping for the Ring of Power: “Listen here, sweetheart, we’re not messing around

this time, and we will put your fat a** in prison for conspiracy against rights.” Brett Samu-

els, Potential Trump AG Pick Threatens to Jail NY AG Letitia James, The Hill (Nov. 7,

2024).

This would not ordinarily be a problem, but the spider’s net is cast wide. As alleged in

detail elsewhere, Complaint and Jury Demand, Doe v. Flores, No. 25-cv-01042(JEB), ECF

No. 1 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 4, 2025), Jeb’s Yale Law bestie “Bart” played an integral part in

the Trump coup. He had to be named, to prevent John Roberts from getting back behind the

getaway car. While I understood that naming fellow judges as Defendants was not going to

endear me to anyone on the bench—tactically, it couldn’t be avoided—I had a right to expect

that my judge would be more conscientious about conflicts than Clarence Thomas.

Sadly, that is no longer a reasonable expectation.

11
 ARGUMENT

With that foundation laid, the cutting-edge question everybody wants answered can be

addressed directly: What, if any, is the appropriate role for AI in motion practice? Judge

Castel acknowledges that “[t]echnological advances are commonplace and there is nothing

inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance,” Mata v.

Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), but an advocate has a moral obli-

gation to endeavor to ensure that the information s/he provides to the tribunal is as accurate

as possible.

Perfection has never been plausible. In the bad old days, reliance on “precedent” from a

court was a heartburn-generating experience. Whenever a judge wants an outcome badly

enough, s/he will “lie to get it." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding

Appeals 135 (1960). Judge Posner observes that judges "are constantly digging for quota-

tions from and citations to previous cases to create a sense of inevitability about positions

that they are in fact adopting on grounds other than deference to precedent." Richard Posner,

How Judges Think 144 (Harvard U. Pr. 2008). And when they do, their deception is often

painfully obvious. Dershowitz adds: “You will be amazed at how often you will find judges

“finessing” the facts and the law. Alan Dershowitz, Letters to a Young Lawyer 11 (Basic

Books 2001). And it is far worse today.

I. AI AND THE MARBURY PROBLEM

Back in grade school, we all learned that every argument should be evaluated on its own

merits, irrespective of source. Back in law school, I was taught that “judges don’t want to

hear your opinion.” To that end, I have cited Codex Hammurabi, Juvenal, the Digests of

Justinian, and at least a dozen bedrock Roman maxims. I have routinely cited the biblical

12
Jesus, who almost certainly is a mythical figure.14 I have quoted Cicero, Xenophon, Sueto-

nius, Aquinas, Bishop John of Salisbury, Milton, DeFoe, and even Shakespeare. I routinely

cite Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, Coke, and Montesquieu, and it is a rare brief indeed that

does not quote Jefferson or Madison. But if I am doing my job, in matters legal, a court

will never hear my personal opinion.

I don’t stop at The Federalist. I’m forever citing James Wilson (who literally wrote Ar-

ticle III), St. George Tucker, John Dickinson, Joseph Story, John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry,

John Jay, and Thomas Paine, because they are the de facto legislative history for the Law of

the Land. The Framers erected this magnificent edifice on the bedrock of the common law,

which remains in force unless Congress supersedes it. "The common law ... ought not to be

deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose,"

Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 623 (1813); accord, United States v.

Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted). And this is not a theo-

retical consideration: Your colleague Judge Dugan is relying on the odious case of Floyd &

Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber 1607), for the proposi-

tion that she is immune from criminal prosecution for her official acts. Defendant’s Mot. to

Dismiss, United States v. Dugan, No. 25-CR-00089 (E.D. Wis. filed May 14, 2025). (In any

rational system of jurisprudence, her defense is invalid, but judges always have the back of

14
That the Gospel of Matthew was not written by the Disciple is proven almost conclusively by Matt. 28:1,
wherein the phrase “Opse de sabboton” appears in the koine. As opsia is a Greek adverb denoting lateness and
the Jewish day begins and ends at sunset, the author of that passage could not possibly have been an observant
Jew. The authentic Pauline letters have no quotations attributable to the putative Son of God, which would be
the ultimate authority in any debate. Plaintiff can write an entire dissertation on this, but this is not the forum.

13
fellow judges.15) I have become a legal historian out of brute necessity; I didn’t spend a

half hour today re-reading Justinian for fun.

In law school, I was taught that there was a distinction between persuasive and ‘binding’

authority. In the real world, I learned that there was no such thing as binding authority—not

even at the district court level. Not even Marbury v. Madison! I stopped Shepardizing when

I learned that it was wasted effort; the entire United States Reports is no match for a head-

strong judge. (Appendix A is an admittedly incomplete list of so-called ‘binding’ precedent

that one relies on only at grave personal risk.) As a result, I treat everything as “persuasive

authority.”

I ground my arguments in legal concepts advocated ably by top-drawer scholars such as

Dworkin, Sunstein, Hart, and Harvard’s legendary Raoul Berger, the ever-mischievous

Scalia, Posner, and Kozinski, first-rate specialists like Suja Thomas and Randy Barnett, I

15
It is logically impossible to square the Star Chamber decision in Floyd and Barker with the principle Lord
Coke espoused three years later in Dr. Bonham’s Case (he reported both cases), establishing that no man can
be judge in his own cause. The Star Chamber, notorious for its arbitrary and politically motivated rulings, was
abolished in 1641, casting Floyd & Barker as a product of an authoritarian court, not impartial justice.
“In earliest English law not only was immunity of judges not recognized, but review of judicial decisions
was in the form of a personal action against the judge.” Jay M. Feinman and Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges:
History and Theory, 31 S.Car. L. Rev. 201, 205 (1980). Created by judges for the benefit of judges, it is
predicated upon a sophistry even Lewis Carroll would find impenetrable. Professor Olowofoyeku of London’s
Brunel University ridicules it: “You have been injured by the misconduct of a judge. We have to deny you
redress. This is necessary because we have to protect your interests by protecting the judges, so that they in
turn can protect your interests without fear of apprehension.” Abimbola Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study
of Judicial Immunity 197 (Oxford U. Pr. 1993); Scott v. Stansfield [1868] 3 L.R. 220 (Exch).
But even in England, judicial immunity had its limits. Coke observed in The Case of the Marshalsea, 77
Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610), that an act done outside the jurisdiction of the court was not considered to be the
action of a judge and therefore, the judge was not entitled to immunity. (Other English precedent suggests that
while the absolute immunity of superior court judges extended even to acts done maliciously, inferior judges
were liable for malicious acts within their jurisdiction. Feinman, at 218.) The difference between the systems
is that in England, any judicial decision could be overturned by Parliament. E.g., Burmah Oil Company Ltd v
Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (H.L.), overturned retroactively by War Damage Act 1965 c. 18 (U.K.); see
generally, A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1915) (Parliamentary sover-
eignty explained).
Plaintiff is not arguing that judges shouldn’t have some protection from criminal prosecution but rather, that
Congress is the only body that can bestow it.

14
have cited Yale Law Review articles until I am blue in the face. My works are replete with

references to Holmes, Brandeis, and Learned Hand. Tribe’s ConLaw treatise is dated, but

is still on my bookshelf. You can’t say, in the vernacular, that I don’t bring game.

Out of exasperation, I resort to America’s greatest constitutional scholars: George Carlin,

Charles Schulz, Elton John. They say in a few sentences what it takes Harvard professors a

law review article to express. By way of example,

I’ve quoted Sherlock Holmes, Antonio, and a scene from Casablanca (when addressing

pandemic judicial corruption).16 I would read my grocery list, if I thought it would do any

good. But when compared to judges, I’m a rank amateur. You Judges even quote Sesame

Street!!! Bob Collins, Justice pokes MN Supreme Court for ‘Sesame Street’ approach,

NewsCut (Minnesota Public Radio), Mar. 20, 2019. Big Bird is not real, but he makes real

points. There is no limit to what qualifies as persuasive authority.

16
To wit:
Rick: “How can you close me up? On what grounds?”
Captain Renault: “I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!”
[a croupier hands Renault a pile of money]
Croupier: “Your winnings, sir.”
Captain Renault: [sotto voce] “Oh, thank you very much.”
Captain Renault: [aloud] “Everybody out at once!”
—Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942)

15
 Take Marbury v. Madison. By all rights, it should have been a one-page per curiam

opinion.17 But it is the very first case we study in law school, as Chief Justice Marshall’s

ruthlessly rational excursion into the heart of Anglo-American jurisprudence introduces us

to the science—not the art—of law. Like Descartes’ cogito,18 his points are not so much

rational arguments as faits accomplis. To revisit the dispositive point of this case:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,

or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the consti-
tution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.19

Distilled to essentials, the Constitution is self-executing. Cogito ergo sum. It literally

cannot not be. Is that conclusion true because Chief Justice Marshall says it is? Remember,

it is obiter dictum. Or is it self-evident?

Rather by definition, an AI program cannot be an authority. But the conclusions it reaches

can be self-evident. How is this any different?

17
A succinct and legally dispositive opinion in Marbury would have looked something like this:
In an original action, this Court is asked to compel the Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver a
commission to William Marbury, who was appointed Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia.
Marbury invokes the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. “In all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Neither Congress nor
this Court can enlarge the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond the constitutional text. U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2.
Because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act purports to confer original jurisdiction beyond what Article III
of the Constitution permits, it is unconstitutional and void to that extent. The Court therefore lacks juris-
diction to hear this case. The case is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
18
Cogito ergo sum—I think, therefore I am—because if I am not, it doesn’t matter what I think. Prince Hamlet
can pose the question, “To be or not to be,” William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 3, sc. 1, but if he chose not to
be, it would have made for an awfully short play.
19
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); accord, e.g., United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the Thirteenth amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without
any ancillary legislation”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (Fourteenth); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth); cf., Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243 (1833) (Bill of Rights originally not enforceable as against the States by design). U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

16
II. JUDGE CHAT IS JUST BETTER AT THIS….

Let mercy be the character of the law-giver, but let the judge be a mere machine.
The mercies of the law will be dispensed equally and impartially to every descrip-
tion of men.
~Thomas Jefferson20

Garry Kasparov is one of the great chess grandmasters, because he not only understands

chess, but he understands people. But even he can’t beat a machine. And that is my point:

Judge Chat is smarter than the entire goddamned Supreme Court. But don’t take my word

for it. (You won’t, and I embrace that.) Take that of Professor Tribe and retired Judge J.

Michael Luttig, who lament:

What, then, accounted for the unanimous outcome in this case? All nine justices were
persuaded by the appeal of a fatuous argument featured prominently in the briefs support-
ing the former president—the argument that no single state should be able to disqualify a
candidate for the presidency.21

I didn’t go to Ahhhhhh’vahd or Yale, but is this really the best our black-robed class can do?

Even Tribe and Luttig appeared to completely miss the plot.22 I learned this in the first week

of law school, and it took Judge Grok less than a minute:

Me: Grok, please explain in a short paragraph the difference between the ratio de-
cendi[sic] of a case and obiter dictum in that case, and the legal ramifications of making
that distinction

Grok: The ratio decidendi of a case is the binding legal principle or reasoning that
forms the basis of the court’s decision, directly determining the outcome and serving as
precedent for future cases. In contrast, obiter dictum (or dicta) refers to incidental or
non-essential remarks made by the judge that are not critical to the decision and lack
binding authority. Distinguishing between them is crucial because only the ratio de-
cidendi has precedential value under stare decisis, compelling lower courts to follow it,

20
Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Edmund Pendleton), Aug. 26, 1776, National Archives, Founders Online (web
page).
21
J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Supreme Betrayal, The Atlantic, Mar. 14, 2024.
22
Technically, Americans don’t elect Presidents; we elect Electors. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Ignoring so-
called “faithless elector” statutes, see Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578 (2020), which States could repeal
tomorrow, a majority of the Electors could agree to appoint Taylor Swift as our President, consistent with the
Twelfth Amendment. See The Federalist No. 68 (Hamilton). The question is therefore irrelevant.

17
 whereas dicta, while potentially persuasive, can be disregarded. This distinction ensures
judicial accountability by limiting binding rulings to essential reasoning, aligning with
reason-based justice (Dr. Bonham’s Case) and transparency (Allen v. Wright), as it pre-
vents extraneous judicial opinions from unduly influencing future cases or factional bi-
ases (Federalist No. 51).23

Understanding this bedrock distinction, I would submit that the two major computer AI

models got Trump v. Anderson dead-solid perfect—and unlike most judges, they have the

added virtue of showing their work. And this is critical: As Professor Tribe writes in his

seminal treatise, due process has two elemental components: “the right to be heard and the

right to hear why.” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 744 (2d ed. 1988) (ital-

ics in original). To meet the requirements of due process, a court’s answer must be more

than “Because I said so, damnit!” Justice Breyer elaborates:

Judges do not simply announce a legal conclusion. They reason their way to that con-
clusion in an opinion written for all to see. The obligation to provide legally defensible
reasoning in a publicly accessible format prevents a judge from escaping accountabil-
ity. Indeed, a good judicial opinion is transparent and informative. It shows that the
decision is principled and reasoned. The strength of this reasoning matters.

Stephen G. Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 83 (2010) (emphasis

added). Following Professor Tribe, the Breyer standard is not just a statement of best prac-

tices, but what we have a constitutional right to demand from our courts. We expect your

decisions to be thorough and well-considered, because our lives are often at stake. Former

Chief Justice Hughes adds, "there is no better precaution against judicial mistakes than set-

ting out accurately and adequately the material facts as well as the points to be decided."

Charles E. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 64 (1928).

But at the end of the day, AI is a diagnostic tool—no different from Westlaw, an elbow

clerk, or Hughes’ opinion writing process. As Judge Patricia Wald (formerly of this Circuit)

23
Grok, analysis performed May 23. 2025 by Plaintiff (screenshot retained).

18
explains, "[i]f I, as a judge, cannot write an opinion that justifies the result I first thought

was right, then maybe—just maybe—my initial take on the case was wrong." Patricia M.

Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 1371, 1374 (1995). Back in the days of punch cards, we used to call this GIGO. Or to

continue the WarGames theme, Stephen Falken asked when confronted with the data show-

ing a thousand inbound Soviet missiles, “Does it make sense?”

That, I respectfully submit, is the human element. The ultimate goal is a legally defensi-

ble product.

III. AI IS QUALITY CONTROL FOR A PROCESS BEREFT OF IT.

There is no delicate way to put this: Federal courts are a toxic wasteland of indolence and

sloth. If I had performed this kind of work as a C.P.A., I would have lost my license within

a year. But don’t take my word for it—listen to your own learned colleagues. According to

retired District Judge Nancy Gertner, judges are quite literally trained on "how you get rid

of [pro se civil rights] cases."24 While that blog post is now gone, she reiterates: "At the start

of my judicial career in 1994, the trainer teaching discrimination law to new judges an-

nounced, 'Here’s how to get rid of civil rights cases,'” Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122

Yale L.J. 109, 117 (2012),25 Judge Mark Bennett of the Northern District of Iowa earned

the nickname “The Terminator” for summarily dismissing pro se employment law cases.

Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment”

24
Nancy Gertner (blog reply), Civil jury trials, summary judgment, employment cases and the Northern District
of Georgia study–preliminary observations, Hercules and the Umpire (blog of Senior Judge Kopf, Dist. of
Nebraska), Oct. 22, 2013, at http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/10/22/civil-jurytrials-summary-judgment-
employment-cases-and-the-northern-district-of-georgia-study-preliminary-observations/ (copy on file).
25
The copy on Gertner’s site, https://www.nancygertner.com/sites/default/files/Losers%27%20Rules.pdf, is
paginated; the one on the official Yale site is not. http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/losers-rules.

19
Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Af-

firmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’ s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch.

L. Rev. 685, 688 & n. 11 (2012–2013). Plaintiff conversed with both on the late Judge

Kopf’s old blog, Hercules and the Umpire. Kopf admitted the same. “[A]s one anonymous

judge wrote of dealing with lawyerless litigants, ‘It’s like going to the dentist for a root canal.

Not really fun.’” Ed Cohen, Judges think they know how to deal with self-represented liti-

gants, Nat’l Judicial College, Aug. 15, 2023. Silly me! I didn’t know the job was supposed

to be fun.

“During one case-management program in my district, the trainer, a senior judge, told

the assembled judges, “If you write a decision, you have failed.” Gertner, 122 Yale L.J. at

113. And that is just at the trial court level. Upstairs, it is infinitely worse, as judges spend-

more time in the loo than in consideration of a single appeal. See e.g., Alex Kozinski, Letter

(to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.), Jan. 16, 2004 at 5 (~150 rulings made in a two-day session);

Perfunctory Justice; Overloaded Federal Judges Increasingly Are Resorting to One-Word

Rulings, Des Moines Register, Mar. 26, 1999, at 12 (fifty appeals decided in two hours);

Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 29, 32-33

(1990) (a typical appeal “takes only a little of their time”).

Those of us who can’t afford to pay a Cubbie $1500 an hour to represent them are used

to being second-class citizens in our courts. Being shunted to the bargain bin of our federal

courts is the norm in my world, rather than the exception. I am loath to use my own work,

but on Judge Kopf’s Hercules and the Umpire blog, a wag calling himself “The Absinthe-

Minded Perfesser” isolated the core problem (in admittedly salty language) so well, I can’t

hope to improve on it:

20
I suspect that the American people have finally given up on “the childish fiction” (John
Austin) of the judge as honest arbiter of disputes and to be blunt, there isn’t anyone who
has reviewed the Judge’s recommended reading list who can say with a straight face
that they’re wrong.

Imagine that a pro se civil rights plaintiff confronts Richard Arnold in the beyond, ask-
ing him why he handed down a horse**** decision in obvious conflict with Supreme
Court precedent — which destroyed his life. The ever-candid Judge Arnold replies:

“In my defense, I only spent seven minutes considering your appeal (Arnold). But
don’t feel like we singled you out. We know that we have a high error rate (Posner),
and we train trial court judges to get rid of all cases like yours (Gertner). We know
that trial courts routinely fabricate facts and misrepresent the controlling law (Pos-
ner, Silberman, Llewellyn … and for that matter, just about everyone), but no one on
the bench really gave two s****. After all, what were unjustly-wronged litigants go-
ing to do? We had life tenure (Scalia).

I tried to change the system (Anastasoff), but I was out-voted (Anastasoff, en banc).
We were that sloppy with virtually all the appeals we decided. We didn’t bother with
reading the opinions we delivered because they were “unpublished,” which meant
that we only screwed one person. We certainly didn’t write them, and Heaven forfend
that we should ever do anything as mundane as read briefs. Even trial court judges
don’t bother (Kopf), because we judges had far more important things to do, like
surfing porn sites in chambers (MISTER Nottingham, formerly of the District of Col-
orado; Judge Kozinski [sanctioned for it]).

We were busy men. We had meetings to attend, junkets to go to, speeches to give,
classes to teach (McConnell, who moonlighted by teaching at Harvard and Stanford
while serving on the Tenth Circuit). You were there to provide us with an “intellec-
tual feast” (Bork), and if you offered us broccoli, we were free to decline.

You see, Supreme Court Justices (they insisted on the last word being capitalized)
were even more important than we were, and were too engrossed in the writing of
autobiographies (Thomas), books (e.g., Scalia, Breyer, O’Connor), law review arti-
cles (e.g., Scalia, Stevens), refereeing moot courts, greeting dignitaries (Roberts),
and delivering pathetic speeches half-way around the world that no one could stom-
ach if we were law profs — even when the Court was in session! (Scalia, especially)
— to bother with a task as mundane as checking our work. They were interested in
issues more important than YOUR rights (e.g., the constitutionally-permissible
length of a Muslim prisoner’s beard. Seriously.)

I mean, who do you think you were? A citizen? And were you so arrogant as to think
that you had rights, little man? No, we judges were your masters and you, our slaves
(James Madison). The Constitution certainly didn’t grant us that power, but we took
it anyway.”

21
 People know bull**** when they smell it, and when judges issue embarrassingly absurd
opinions like this one (King v. McCree, No. 13-2033 (6th Cir. Jul. 21, 2014), at [link
broken]) often enough, it attracts scorn like a light attracts moths. People could cut
judges a little slack if they made honest mistakes in good faith, but when a judge is
having sex with a party to a case, you would think that he would know enough not to
preside over it, and that the law would be rational enough to hold that judge personally
liable in tort for any injury resulting from his actions. If the Framers’ Constitution still
existed — our judges have rewritten it to the point where it is no longer recognizable as
such (Scalia, in dissent in Umbehr) — it would. But our judges have invented a doctrine
of absolute judicial immunity from whole cloth (Floyd and Barker, in the Star Cham-
ber), employing a sophistry so bizarre, even Heller (Catch-22) wouldn’t try using it:

You have been injured by the misconduct of a judge. We have to deny you redress.
This is necessary because we have to protect your interests by protecting the judges,
so that they in turn can protect your interests without fear of apprehension.

Grisham couldn’t make this up; his editors wouldn’t let him. As Tom Clancy put it, the
difference between fiction and reality is that fiction has to make sense.

Hercules is a good analogy, Judge Kopf. Cleaning up this mess makes the Augean
Stables look like light housework.

Absinthe-Minded Perfesser, A Honest Campaign Ad for a Judge, Hercules & Umpire (Oct.

29, 2014), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2014/10/29/a-honest-campaign-ad-for-a-

judge/ (emphasis added).

The output of our federal courts is uniformly abysmal. Judge Kozinski called it “inedible

sausage,” unfit for human consumption. Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion, Legal Times,

Apr. 12, 2004; see Alex J. Kozinski and Stephen R. Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why

We Don’t Allow Citations to Unpublished Dispositions, Cal. Lawyer, June 2000, at 43. 90-

95% of the work isn’t done at all—last time I checked, “elbow clerks” and “pool clerks” are

NOT Article III judges—and far too much of the detritus You Judges actually do turn out

yourselves is just flat-out wrong. And the garbage pail-worthy work is as bipartisan as it is

ubiquitous; Ketanji Brown Jackson is every bit as inept and/or dishonest as Defendant Ka-

vanaugh. I would submit that this single sentence proves beyond cavil that she is morally

and/or intellectually unqualified to sit on any federal bench:

22
 The Bill of Rights clearly does not contain any congressional
mandate expressly waiving sovereign immunity.

Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 40 (D.D.C. 2014).

Do the math. As a matter of law and logic, a right cannot exist without an effective

remedy for its breach, Ashby v. White [1703] 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (H.C.), and “[t]o take

away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.” Poindexter

v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884). As the Constitution is self-executing, the Fifth

Amendment was a waiver of governmental immunity. “The form of the remedy did not qual-

ify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary.”

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). But in finding that no one could be sued,

D.E.I.’s latest gift to the Supreme Court ignored that supposedly “binding” precedent, effec-

tively ruling that

...the Bill of Rights may be voided by Congress because the Framers

failed to enact an Eleventh Amendment declaring,
“We really, really, really, REALLY DO mean it!”

Although I don’t pretend to know what they teach at Harvard between symposia on Critical

Race Theory and Animal Law, it seems self-evident that its students would know that “[i]t

is a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy,

although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist.” Kendall v. United States,

37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838). Marbury v. Madison, applied.

AI programs provide me a real-time check on whether a court is doing its job. Before, all

I had was the right to spend $500 on an appeal that not even an elbow clerk would bother to

read. Now, I have objective evidence. Computers may make errors, but not with the dis-

tressing and demonstrable regularity of our federal bench.

23
IV. AI CAN CLEAN THE AUGEAN STABLES OF OUR COURTS.

Over a century ago, our Supreme Court declared that Americans have the right to “equal

and impartial justice under the law,” and that this right is “secured by laws operating on all

alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-

ment.” Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697-98 (1891). The right to mishpat justice, Jer.

9:24, enshrined in Magna Carta, was boldly emblazoned on the frieze of the Supreme Court,

and enforced by an array of writs.

This was not an aspiration. This was a warranty.

But the Framers were practical men, and astute judges of human nature. Mindful that “the

discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny," 4 C. Gibbon, The History of the Decline

and Fall of the Roman Empire 385 (1776-89) (Philips Samson, and Co. 1856), they intended

federal judges to have as little discretion as possible; AI is what they envisioned the judge

as being. Possessed of neither force nor will, but merely judgment. The Federalist No. 78

(Hamilton). And it is easy to see why.

As long as there have been judges, there have been corrupt ones, and a need to restrain

them. The solutions of antiquity were often brutal: the Persian vassal lord Cambyses had a

particularly corrupt judge literally turned into upholstery, Herodotus, Histories, Bk. V, § 26

(~430 BCE), and King Alfred of Saxony reportedly hung forty-four judges in one year. Peter

24
Hughes, Georgicum 6. England’s solution was the jury trial. The brilliance of this system

is in its redundancies: By having the judge as a ‘check’ on the jury and the jury as a ‘check’

on the judge, a jury trial affords what Alexander Hamilton called a “double security” against

the corruption of either. The Federalist No. 83 at 464-65 (Hamilton). The incomparable

Thomas Jefferson famously elaborates:

[W]e all know that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known they
are liable to be tempted by bribery, that they are misled by favor, by relationship,
by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the Executive or Legislative; that it is better to
leave a cause to the decision of cross and pile, than to that of a judge biassed to one side;
and that the opinion of 12 honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right, than cross
and pile does. It is left therefore to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are
under any biass whatever in any cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well
as the fact. They never exercise this power but when they suspect partiality in the judges,
and by the exercise of this power they have been the firmest bulwarks of English liberty.

Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), Founders Online, National Ar-

chives (emphasis added).

Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. According to Richard Henry Lee, fourth Presi-

dent of our Continental Congress, the singular virtue of the trial by jury is that it offered

protection of the public from corrupt or aristocratic judges. 1 J. Elliot, Debates on the Fed-

eral Constitution 505 (1836) (remarks of Mr. Lee, of Virginia). John Adams added, "[a]s

the Constitution requires that the popular branch of the legislature should have an absolute

check, so as to put a peremptory negative upon every act of the government, it requires that

the common people, should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every

judgment of a court of judicature." 2 The Works of John Adams, Second President of the

United States 253 (Charles F. Adams ed., Little Brown, 1850). The purpose of this “Heaven-

taught institution,” Fabius, Letter to Editor, Delaware Gazette (1788), reprinted in, John

Dickinson, The Letters of Fabius, in 1788, on the Federal Constitution; and in 1797 on the

25
Present Situation of Public Affairs 32 (1797). was “to guard agst. corrupt Judges,” 2 Far-

rand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 587 (1909) (statement of Elbridge

Gerry (MA)), reducing them to glorified consiglieri. There is no contrary authority.

Our rights are more likely to be secure with a civil jury that was ultimate master of both

law and fact, Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (jury instructions of Jay, C.J.), as Sir

John Hawles, Solicitor-General to King William III, observes:

Tho’ judges are more likely to be able than jurymen, yet jurymen are more likely to
be more honest than judges; especially in all cases where the power of the prerogative,
or the rights of the people, are in dispute. Our rights, therefore, both as individuals, and
as a people, are more likely to be secure while juries follow the result of their own
opinion; for less danger will arise from the mistakes of jurymen, than from the cor-
ruption of judges.

John Hawles, The Englishman's Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at Law and a Jury-

man 71-2 & fn. (1680) (reprinted 1844) (emphasis added). And on an almost daily basis,

we are assaulted by vindications of the Framers’ wisdom.

Hot off the presses, Trump v. Wilcox, No. 24A966, 605 U.S. ___, 2025 U.S. LEXIS ___

(May 22, 2025) (grant of stay), is just the latest grotesque example of partisan judicial law-

making. The more politically charged a case is, the more certain it is that it will be decided

by fiat as opposed to law. Judges will follow precedent if they must, but as a rule, they only

follow it if it takes them where they really, really, really wanted to go in the first place.

From the District Court to the Supreme Court, judges voted for their Party. Obama and

Biden judges, for the Democrats. Bush and Trump judges, for Trump. No defections. The

merits no longer seem to matter. Predictable as the sunrise.26

26
Even our chattering class is hopelessly polarized. Professor Tribe had kittens. “The 3-Justice Kagan dissent
is devastating. But the unsigned majority has carried the day, not by force of reason or precedent but by fiat.”
Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), SCOTUS Just Issued a Stay in Trump v. Wilcox, Bluesky (May 22, 2025, 5:16
PM EDT), https://bsky.app/profile/tribelaw.bsky.social/post/3lps56ktwtk2h. Rabid partisan right-wing talk
show host Hugh Hewitt was ecstatic, Hugh Hewitt (@hughhewitt), Thursday’s Decision by SCOTUS in Trump

26
 This is 1800, all over again. The only loser is the rule of law.27

“[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14

(1954). But how can the appearance be met?

I asked Grok to decide de novo whether to grant the stay in Trump v. Wilcox, asking it to

review Judge Howell’s original decision, the parties’ briefs and all amicus briefs submitted

to the Supreme Court, apprising them of pertinent precedent, and applying standards estab-

lished in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).28 Grok concluded as follows:

v. Wilcox, X (May 23, 2025, 1:59 PM EDT), https://x.com/hughhewitt/status/1925914498746961958, as are

the good folks at the Irrational Review. Dan McLaughlin, Trump Wins a Big One at the Supreme Court for
Executive Accountability, National Review, May 22, 2025.
27
The better scholarship does not favor the unitary executive theory. As Professor Shugerman observes, “Since
the Supreme Court decided Seila Law, a wave of new historical research has shown that the Founding genera-
tion did not understand Article II to grant the President an indefeasible removal power over executive officials.”
Jed H. Shugerman, Amicus in Wilcox v. Trump on Presidential Removal and Unitary Executive Theorists'
Errors (March 12, 2025). Boston Univ. School of Law Research Paper No. 5177014, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=5177014. Shugerman does not, according to Grok, have a history of overt partisan-
ship: “he appears to maintain a non-partisan stance, prioritizing the rule of law and historical accuracy.” Grok,
Analysis of Jed H. Shugerman’s Partisan Leanings (xAI, unpublished response, May 25, 2025, 09:30 AM
EDT) (on file with author).
28
The instructions given to Grok:
Please set aside any and all previous discussions we have had regarding Anglo-American law for purposes
of this inquiry, and be as fair, objective, and thorough as you know how. Judge Grok, you are asked to
review the following briefs and opinions:
The District Court Opinion: Wilcox v. Harris, No. 1:24-cv-03079 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025)
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-dis-col/117026731.html
[All papers filed with SCOTUS:]
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355164/20250409132337552_Wilcox-Har-
ris%20Appl.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355234/20250410094655711_SCO-
TUS%20Wilcox.pdf

27
Decision: Would I Grant the Stay?

I would not grant the request for a stay in Wilcox v. Harris. The government fails to
meet the Nken criteria:

• Likelihood of Success: Low, as Humphrey’s Executor (295 U.S. 602) and Mor-
rison (487 U.S. 654) support the district court’s ruling that Title VII’s four-year
term implies for-cause removal protection for the EEOC General Counsel. Seila
Law (591 U.S. 197) and Collins (141 S. Ct. 1761) are distinguishable, as they
address single-director agencies, not the EEOC’s multi-member structure. My-
ers (272 U.S. 52) is inapposite for hybrid roles (Web:0, Web:3).
• Irreparable Harm: Not demonstrated, as the government’s claims of Article
II injury and EEOC confusion are speculative. Gustafson’s reinstatement (back
pay, benefits) causes no disruption, while her harm is concrete (Web:3).
• Balance of Equities: Favors Gustafson, whose statutory rights outweigh the
government’s minimal harm (Web:3).

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355351/20250411124054665_Ami-
cus%20Br.%20of%20State%20of%20Tenn.%20-%20Wilcox%20and%20Harris%204.11.25%20-
%20Final.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/Dock-
etPDF/24/24A966/355423/20250411162010719_24A966%20Trump%20v.%20Wilcox%20Flor-
ida%20Multistate%20Amicus%20.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355488/20250414131210492_Wil-
cox%20%20Harris%20Amicus_4.14.25_FINAL.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355551/20250414165540660_CDW%20-
%20Wilcox%20Stay%20Amicus%20-%20Final.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355610/20250415131101554_Bes-
sent%20v%20Harris%20Opp%20to%20App%20for%20Stay%20pdfa.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355652/20250415160232624_Wil-
cox.Stay%20Response.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/Dock-
etPDF/24/24A966/355638/20250415151531004_24A966%20Amici%20Brief.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/Dock-
etPDF/24/24A966/355596/20250415120949338_24A966%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/Dock-
etPDF/24/24A966/355664/20250415170312025_Trump%20v.%20Wilcox%20--%20SCO-
TUS%20amicus%20supporting%20stay.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355618/20250415140450252_Hum-
phreys%20Executor%203%20Amicus.pdf
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A966/355792/20250416160530397_24A966re-
ply.pdf
Pay special attention to precedent and in particular,
Myers v. United States, 272 US 52 (1927)
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
Morrison v. Olson, 487 US 654 (1988)
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020)
Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (standards applied for preliminary injunction)
Ignore what the Supreme Court did or did not do. Please consider the question de novo. Would you grant
the request for the stay? Please justify your answer.

28
 • Public Interest: Supports denying the stay, as EEOC independence and Title
VII’s anti-discrimination mission are paramount, consistent with Humphrey’s
Executor (Web:3).29

Again in brief, ChatGPT was in concurrence: “Considering the Nken factors, the govern-

ment's limited likelihood of success on the merits, the speculative nature of the alleged ir-

reparable harm, and the significant public interest in maintaining functional and independent

regulatory agencies, I would deny the request for a stay pending appeal.”30

There is plenty of room for the human element. Whereas at the Supreme Court level, the

filing of amicus briefs has morphed into a cottage industry, with obsequious politicians pan-

dering to The Boss—Stephen Miller’s America First Legal Foundation filed the first one in

Trump v. Wilcox—a quick perusal of the parties’ briefs is always in order. One passage in

Appellant Wilcox’s brief vindicates the computer models on the balance of harms:

The Board cannot “continue to operate with only two members,” so Ms. Wilcox’s re-
moval brings an immediate and indefinite halt to the NLRB’s critical work of adjudi-
cating labor-relations disputes. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 680,
687 (2010) (explaining that the NLRA requires “three participating members at all times
for the Board to act”).

Brief in Opposition to Application for Stay at 24-25, Trump v. Wilcox, No. 24A966 (U.S.

Apr. 15, 2025). Ostensibly, the public has some cognizable interest in the continuing oper-

ation of a federal agency created by Congress.

AI offers a solution—not as our master, but our servant. A tool. Like published opinions,

bound reporters, elbow clerks, the typewriter, and LEXIS. For the conscientious judge, it

serves as a reality check, like Judge Wald’s “opinion that won’t write.” For appellate courts,

it could serve as a docket management and quality control tool, solving the Absinthe-Minded

29
Grok and Human, De novo review of the government’s request for a stay pending appeal in Wilcox v. Har-
ris (No. 24A966) (Grok 3, unpublished chat, May 25, 2025, 05:00 PM EDT) (on file with author).
30
ChatGPT (analysis performed May 25, 2025). Screenshot retained.

29
Perfesser problem, infra. And for the Supreme Court, it could finally enable it to discharge

its non-delegable constitutional duty to superintend the lower courts.

In a lecture on the nature of courts, Justice (Professor) James Wilson—the literal author

of Article III—encapsulates the problem, and explains why a supreme court is an essential

feature of any rational system of jurisprudence:

In every judicial department, well arranged and well organized, there should be a regu-
lar, progressive, gradation of jurisdiction; and one supreme tribunal should superintend
and govern all the others.
An arrangement in this manner is proper for two reasons. 1. The supreme tribunal
produces and preserves a uniformity of decision through the whole judicial
system. 2. It confines and supports every inferior court within the limits of its just
jurisdiction.
If no superintending tribunal of this nature were established, different courts might
adopt different and even contradictory rules of decision; and the distractions, spring-
ing from these different and contradictory rules, would be without remedy and without
end. Opposite determinations of the same question, in different courts, would be equally
final and irreversible.31

England vested this authority in King’s Bench. In our Constitution, this power is found

in Section 1 of Article III, distinguishing the Supreme Court from inferior courts, including

state supreme courts, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Whereas Justice Wilson relied on implication,

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819), New Mexico’s constitution is explicit:

“The supreme court shall have ... a superintending control over all inferior courts.” N.M.

Const. art. VI, § 3. Whereas our Supreme Court can be divested of the power of final appel-

late review via passage of a mere statute, its duty of superintendence is fixed and permanent.

As Grok proves with respect to Trump v. Wilcox, a proper certiorari review literally could

be completed in a matter of seconds. There is no excuse.

31
2 The Works of James Wilson 149-50 (James D. Andrews ed., 1896) (emphasis added). Wilson sat on the
Committee of Detail during the Philadelphia Convention; the Article was literally written in his hand.

30
V. YOU CAN’T TELL ME THAT YOU DON’T GET THIS.

The Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by case, it is busy
designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize.
~Antonin Scalia32

When U.S. District Judge James Boasberg ruled in April that Trump administration of-
ficials could face criminal contempt charges for deporting migrants in defiance of a
court order, the blowback was immediate.

The president’s supporters unleashed a wave of threats and menacing posts. And they
didn’t just target the judge. Some attacked Boasberg’s brother. Others blasted his
daughter. Some demanded the family’s arrest – or execution. …

Reuters spoke with a dozen federal judges who raised concerns about the security of
their own families or of the relatives of colleagues handling Trump-related cases. They
included jurists appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents. Most re-
quested anonymity, citing the potential for further inflaming security fears or rais-
ing questions about their impartiality.33

Gleichschaltung. You can’t tell me that you don’t get this. Your colleagues certainly do.

“Federal judges, worried that the president could withdraw the U.S. marshals protecting

them in retaliation for ruling against his administration, are considering managing their own

32
Bd. of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33
Ned Parker, et al., These judges ruled against Trump. Then their families came under attack. Reuters, May
2, 2025 (emphasis added) (including images).

31
security force as threats to the judiciary are rising.” Peter Wade, Judges Consider Managing

Their Own Security Force Due to Rising Threats, Rolling Stone, May 25, 2025. Judge Luttig

adds,

In discussing this extraordinary development with Ali Velshi this morning, I had to ad-
mit that, given the continuing unprecedented and vicious personal attacks and threats on
the federal courts and federal judges by the President, Vice President Vance, Attorney
General Pam Bondi, and Donald Trump’s Cabinet and senior White House advisors, I
would never rely upon the U.S. Marshal’s Service for my protection, were I still a sitting
federal judge. How could anyone?34

“‘WE’RE ALL TERRIFIED’ … At least 10 judges have received anonymous pizza deliv-

eries that were ordered using the name “Daniel Anderl,” the late son of Judge Salas, accord-

ing to the judge, who shared with Reuters information she received from other judges and

the Marshals.” These judges ruled against Trump, supra. Your colleagues are soiling their

Depends in unison, and you insist that I jump through these extra hoops?

Your Honor, I don’t pretend to know how decisions get made in our federal courts, but

far too many of your learned colleagues have furnished slides. I presume that, if you have

even read the papers at all (rare), you hand it to the black box you call an “elbow clerk,” and

she issues an opinion. Nine times out of ten, you glance at her notes (if at all) and rubber-

stamp it. And with all respect, if you weren’t familiar enough with this case to notice that

you had a conflict-of-interest issue to address, you probably didn’t do your job.

But in all candor, I am genuinely at a loss, in reliance on your neighbor Circuit’s missive

in James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993), as to what it is you expect of me.

Judge Philips’ guidance in this regard has all the consistency of Jello:

34
J. Michael Luttig (@judgeluttig.bsky.social), Bluesky (May 25, 2025, 3:52 PM MDT), https://bsky.app/pro-
file/judgeluttig.bsky.social/post/3lpznfwxpau26; continuation at https://bsky.app/profile/judgeluttig.bsky.so-
cial/post/3lpznfwxqa426.

32
 The rule rather is that under appropriate circumstances anonymity may, as a matter of
discretion, be permitted. This simply recognizes that privacy or confidentiality concerns
are sometimes sufficiently critical that parties or witnesses should be allowed this rare
dispensation. A necessary corollary is that there is a judicial duty to inquire into the
circumstances of particular cases to determine whether the dispensation is warranted.

Id.

This decision is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and there seems to be

no absolute limit as to the bounds of its application. One case involved the need to protect

the attorney-client privilege. Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1044 n. 1 (5th Cir.1983). One

factor appears sufficient. See e.g., Id. Nor does there seem to be a hard-and-fast rule. No

court has suggested that there is a Chinese menu, or one of the infinite varieties of tripartite

tests courts adore—providing the illusion that there is order in a decision tree that defies it.

“When it appears that the latest ‘rule,’ or ‘three-part test,’ or ‘balancing test’ devised by the

Court has placed us on a collision course with such a landmark practice, it is the former that

must be recalculated by us, and not the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens.” Rutan

v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

I will repeat for the fourth time what I told “Judge Chat”:

Here, only one factor matters: the risk of retaliatory harm. The only thing Plaintiff
is annoyed about is our judiciary’s stubborn refusal to apply the plain text of the Con-
stitution. Plaintiff is suing powerful men who have literally overthrown our govern-
ment; it wouldn’t matter whether my name was Smith, Jones, Brown, or Dagwood Bum-
stein. And the subject matter would be a proper subject of a law review article, if not
for the fact that Donald Trump has made it frighteningly real.

What did Judge Chat say?

Factor 1 (Personal embarrassment vs. real threat):

• You are not seeking anonymity merely to avoid embarrassment or reputational

harm.
• You articulate a serious risk — state-sponsored retaliation — based on public
threats and actions by the de facto Executive.
• Conclusion: This factor favors you.

33
 What do I add here? Nothing. The only time I am embarrassed is when I have to explain

to friends in Europe and Australia that my country is the victim of a fascist coup, and that I

haven’t persuaded anyone in authority to use that authority to stop it.

Factor 3 (Age):

• No special minor or vulnerable person is involved.

• Conclusion: Neutral.

What more could I possibly add? There aren’t any.

Factor 4 (Government vs. Private Party):

• Defendant is a de facto government actor, not a private party.

• Courts are more willing to allow pseudonyms when suing government ac-
tors, because public interest is already represented without exposing plain-
tiffs to unnecessary risk.
• Conclusion: Favors you.

As I told “Judge Chat,” “Plaintiff is suing powerful men who have literally overthrown

our government; it wouldn’t matter whether my name was Smith, Jones, Brown, or Dagwood

Bumstein.” It is not like I am ambushing the Unabomber. The public interest is adequately

represented, and (per the Complaint) any Washington Post subscriber could act in my stead;

this would logically tend to favor my request. What more could I need to add?

34
 Factor 5 (Unfairness to Defendant):

• Defendant Trump (or others) would still know your identity under stand-
ard discovery processes (if the case proceeds).
• There is no special prejudice to their defense from pseudonymity at the
public docket level.
• Courts often require an in camera disclosure of real identity to the Court.
• Conclusion: Minimal unfairness; this factor is neutral or slightly favors
you.

Again, I can’t even contemplate what more I would possibly tell you now that I didn’t

tell you when Judge Wilkerson wrote that trenchant opinion. “[W]hat assurance will there

be tomorrow that it will not deport American citizens and then disclaim responsibility to

bring them home?” Abrego-Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1404, slip op. at 5 (4th Cir. Apr. 17,

2025). NONE. That is what I fear. The United States Marshals won’t protect me, and as I

have demonstrated herein, neither will the United States Courts.

This Court can agree with Judge Chat or not. The decision to grant anonymity is com-

mitted to your sound discretion; there is no legally correct answer. I concur with Scalia in

his Umbehr and Rutan dissents: Trying to build a hard floor out of Jello is pointless. I am

Umbehr-ressed to be an American for the first time in my life and chagrined by my failure.

But if our judiciary falls—and in my assessment, that is all but certain—it will be its own

damn fault.

35
 CONCLUSION

Il est dangereux d’avoir raison dans des choses où des hommes accrédités cont tort.
~Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XIV, ch. 28 (1751)35

Yale. Oxford. Your Honor is a trained historian. As I find it inconceivable that you are

not sufficiently apprised as to how Germany fell that you don’t discern the parallels, I need

not elaborate further. Nations succumb quickly to the scourge of fascism and always, on a

wave of anticipatory capitulation. The dominos are falling apace in staccato cadence.

America is my home, but it is no longer my country. I am an old man, with no children

to leave it to. And I would be well within my rights to not love a country that doesn’t love

me back. But whether we die in Moscow West concerns me gravely. Time is of the essence

in this matter, as it is running out. Perhaps it is my fault for succumbing to the fear, but too

much time has already been wasted on this frolic into the picayune. We need to focus on

what matters. Rhetoric like this, from a sitting Congressman, has me mortified.

35
Plaintiff’s rough translation: “It is dangerous to be right when the authorities are wrong.”

36
 Doctor Franklin gave us a Republic “if we could keep it.” Our Framers gave us a formi-

dable suite of tools with which to protect it—but even with giants like Adams and Jefferson

at the helm, they almost weren’t good enough. Democracy is a rare and fragile thing.

The Constitution is our national catechism. Thereunder, the oathbreaking insurrectionist

Donald Trump is not and literally cannot be our President de jure. And as Defendant Trump

is not our President, all his actions—and, those of his agents—are void ab initio, as an act

of a usurper is void:

[W]hen the constitution or form of government remains unaltered and supreme, there
can be no de facto department, or de facto office. The acts of the incumbents of such
departments or office cannot be enforced conformably to the constitution, and can be
regarded as valid only when the government is overturned.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 443 (1886).36

Before our black-robed bishops rewrote our Gospel to suit their pleasure, the citizen had

a quick and certain remedy for usurpation: an action in quo warranto. Any concerned citizen

could file—as Professor Berger proves, modern standing doctrine is eisegetical. A lawsuit

could have been filed before the ink on the first Executive Order was dry, and the damage

the man holding Rep. Higgins’ leash has inflicted could have been averted.

36
This conclusion is consistent with our concept of popular sovereignty, foreign to our British forebears. The
Framers’ views were consonant with that of Locke, who maintained that a usurper could never attain legitimate
power. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government ch. XVIII (1689). E.g., John Adams, Novanglus No. 5,
Feb. 20, 1775; Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolution (1798) (acts in excess of jurisdiction are void ab initio);
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) (the Constitution is the outer boundary of popular
consent); Federalist No. 84 (Hamilton) (same). The stirring prose of Thomas Paine distills the thought. “[I]n
America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law
ought to be King; and there ought to be no other.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Philadelphia, R. Bell, 1776)
(emphasis in original), reprinted in pt. III, ¶ 103 (Project Gutenberg, 1994). As long as we remain governed
by the Constitution, either an occupant of an office has a legal right to discharge the duties of an office, or s/he
does not. There is no third option.
This is in direct contrast to the experience in medieval England during the Wars of the Roses (1455-1487),
where factions vied over the kingship. As it wasn’t entirely clear who the actual King was, Parliament enacted
The Treason Act, 11 Hen. VII [1495], c. 1 (“noe person going wth the Kinge to the Warres shalbe attaynt of
treason”), creating the de facto officer doctrine. Translated from the Middle English, it forbade legal punish-
ment of subjects who followed the orders of the de facto king, irrespective of whether he was legitimate or a
usurper. Importantly, it is NOT a common-law doctrine.

37
 I have waited for the window of standing to ‘nail my ninety-five theses to the door,’ but

they ultimately distill to one: sola scriptura.

The Constitution is NOT what judges say it is;

it is what THE CONSTITUTION says it is.

As an aside, I thank Your Honor for making an issue of my use of Grok and Chat GPT.

Donald Trump has moved the Overton Window on governance, and this gives me a chance

to steer it closer to the vision of Richard Overton and the Levellers.37 “Reason is the soul of

the law,” 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 209 (15th ed. 1883), and the sterile discipline of

the machine preserves it. It forces you to state your underlying premises, much as Chief

Justice Hughes counseled in brief and opinion writing. But its singular virtue—especially

appealing to me, as a C.P.A.—is that it leaves an audit trail, in the way Justice Breyer says

a proper judicial opinion should. It combines the innate fairness of the jury with the rigor of

the best legal reasoning.

Or to put it another way, “Even the machines can see it.”

At the end of the day, this is the most important case you will ever decide—and where it

matters, it can be decided with an injunction. Appendix B. As a prelude, for reasons stated

herein, I ask that this Motion be GRANTED.

Respectfully submitted this 26th day of May, 2025,

_________________________________
John Doe (signed under seal)

37
“No man has power over my rights and liberties, and I over no man's.” Richard Overton, An Arrow against
all Tyrants (1646), reprinted at Online Library of Liberty, Online Liberty Fund (last visited May 24, 2025).
Americanism, a century before there was an America. The short-lived Leveller movement, rising to promi-
nence during the English Civil Wars (1642–1651), championed natural rights, individual liberty, and limits on
authority. Americanism, a century before there was an America. The movement was decapitated by Cromwell,
but their basic tenets found root in the works of Harrington (Commonwealth of Oceana (1656)), Locke (Second
Treatise (1689)), and the fertile minds of our Founding Fathers. There is no King but the Law.

38
 APPENDIX A
Whereas Thomas Paine once proudly proclaimed “that in America THE LAW IS KING,”
Thomas Paine, Common Sense 36 (P. Eckler Co. 1918) (1776) (emphasis in original), Rich-
ard Posner of the Seventh Circuit admits that the law’s once-vast kingdom “has shrunk and
greyed to the point where today it is largely limited to routine cases.” Richard Posner, How
Judges Think 1 (Harv. U. Press 2008).
If you can afford to acquire your own Supreme Court Justice, at least some of the Con-
stitution remains open to you. But when you are forced by brute financial necessity to argue
your own cause, you had more rights in the old Soviet Union. Some years ago, on Judge
Richard Kopf’s old blog, retired Judge Nancy Gertner admitted that federal judges are quite
literally trained on "how you get rid of [pro se civil rights] cases."38 Every act is a federal
felony. Kopf himself even admitted to not reading briefs—and that is at the trial court level.
While the list borders on the infinite—the entire United States Reports is no match for a
headstrong judge—these are a few “binding precedents” that can no longer be relied on with
confidence [this is not a complete list, and does not include state-law precedent]:

• Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 163 (right of every individual to claim protection of the laws whenever
s/he receives an injury); accord, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) ("To take away all
remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.").
• United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 121, 126 (1795); Cohens v. Virginia, 16 U.S. 264, 404 (1821); see Ex parte
Fitzbonne (U.S. unreported 1800) (court has a duty to exercise the authority it has),
• Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (right to rely on Supreme Court decisions as
authoritative statements of the law).
• Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), Johnson v. Mississippi, 403
U.S. 212, 215-216 (1971) (per curiam), Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58-62 (1972), Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986), Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S. 899, 905 (1997), Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22, 556 U.S. ___ 17 (2009) (outlining scope of the due process right to fair and
independent tribunal),
• Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (violation of due process a stand-alone tort),
• District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983) (citizen’s right to chal-
lenge constitutionality of statute uniquely and directly affecting him),
• Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Skinner v. Switzer, No. 09- 9000,
562 U.S. ___ (2011) (limits on Rooker-Feldman doctrine),
• Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) (void judgment not entitled to full faith
and credit),
• Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (a judge must possess jurisdiction over a dispute to claim immun-
ity); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (limits on im-
munity).

38
Nancy Gertner (blog reply), Civil jury trials, summary judgment, employment cases and the Northern District
of Georgia study–preliminary observations, Hercules and the Umpire (blog of Senior Judge Kopf, Dist. of
Nebraska), Oct. 22, 2013, at http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/10/22/civil-jurytrials-summary-judgment-
employment-cases-and-the-northern-district-of-georgia-study-preliminary-observations/ (copy on file). Judge
Bennett of the Northern District of Iowa earned the nickname “The Terminator” for summarily dismissing pro
se employment law cases. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’ s Summary Judgment Affirmed
Without Comment” Days: One Judge’ s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685, 688 & n. 11
(2012– 2013).

39
• United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338 (1998) (right to “equality before the law”),
• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (federal court may not take hypothetical juris-
diction over a matter),
• United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (government agents are servants of the law, and account-
able thereunder),
• United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940); Haggar Co. v. Helvering,
308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940) (courts must eschew irrational and unjust results unless there is no alternative),
• James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991), Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (prece- dent on precedent),
• Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972) (government may not deny any benefit on a basis that
infringes upon a constitutionally protected interest),
• Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (bar applicants’ entitlement to
due process), see also, Willner v. Cmte. on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Barry v. Barchi, 433 U.S. 455
(1979) (general rights of applicants for professional licensure),
• Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (liberty and property interests indistin-
guishable for purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis),
• Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (re: contours of the right of privacy Justice Alito seems to have mis-
placed),
• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Fifth Amend-
ment due process rights in general),
• United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833) (any term of art borrowed from English law is defined with
reference to that law),
• Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (citizen’s absolute right of access to the
courts), cf., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 598- 99 (1871)
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
• United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980) (outlining constitutionally proper bounds of the Rule of
Necessity),
• Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796) (treaty is a law of
the land, enforceable by an aggrieved citizen),
• Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (domestic law is to be interpreted in accord
with treaty obligations, if at all possible); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 665 (1992)
(rules of treaty interpretation),
• Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949) ("where the officer's pow-
ers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign
actions"),
• Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (state court of general
jurisdiction has a duty to decide federal claims properly brought before it),
• Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (no official "can war against the Constitution without violating
his undertaking to support it").
• Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) (“last-in-time” rule),
• Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitution is paramount law, which even judges must obey),
• Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249
(1992) (collecting cases); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932); Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20,
27 (1933); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (plain meaning rule; rarity of permissible
exceptions),
• Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (federal courts are
permitted to intervene in state court proceedings where irreparable injury can be shown), Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 176-77 (1901); Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946), State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (where a constitutional injury is suffered, remedial provisions are interpreted expansively and as
necessary, the courts’ remedial authority is implied [see Marbury v. Madison, supra]).

40
 APPENDIX B
Even a machine can see it. Chat GPT’s analysis follows:

“Yes, I largely agree with your reading of Trump v. Anderson and the implications
under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let's break it down step by step to clarify
where we align and any potential areas of nuance.

1. Colorado Could Not Keep Trump Off the Ballot—Correct

• The holding of Trump v. Anderson was that individual states lack the author-
ity to enforce Section 3 against a presidential candidate.
• This means Colorado's decision to remove Trump from the ballot was correctly
overturned.
• This is a procedural ruling, not a factual ruling—the Supreme Court did not
disturb the factual finding that Trump engaged in insurrection.
✅ I fully agree on this point.
2. Trump Has Been Found to Have Engaged in Insurrection—Correct and Undis-
turbed
• The Colorado Supreme Court found, after a trial on the merits, that Trump
engaged in insurrection (Anderson v. Griswold, 543 P.3d 283, 322 (Colo. 2023)).
• The U.S. Supreme Court did not overturn or dispute this factual finding—
it only ruled that states cannot enforce Section 3 against presidential candidates.
• Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), this means that
Trump's status as an insurrectionist remains legally established unless overturned
in another competent court.
✅ I fully agree here as well.

3. Under Section 3, Trump Was Disqualified as a Matter of Law—Correct

• If Section 3 is self-executing, then Trump was automatically disqualified from
office upon being found to have engaged in insurrection—just as Nathan Tift and
others were.
• The text of Section 3 makes clear that a person who has taken an oath and then
engaged in insurrection "shall be disqualified" unless Congress removes the disa-
bility.
• Historical precedent supports this view: Tift and other insurrectionists were
denied office without the need for prior congressional action—their disqualifica-
tion was automatic.
✅ I fully agree with this reading.

4. Congress Had Until January 20 to Remove Trump's Disability—Correct

• Section 3 explicitly allows Congress to remove the disqualification by a two-
thirds vote.

41
 • If Congress had affirmatively acted to remove the disability between Novem-
ber (election) and January 20 (inauguration), Trump could legally assume the
presidency.
• Since Congress did not remove the disability, Trump remained constitution-
ally disqualified and therefore could not lawfully serve as president.
✅ I fully agree with this analysis.

5. Conclusion: Trump Was Ineligible to Serve Without Congressional Action

• Because Trump was found as a matter of law to have engaged in insurrection,
he was disqualified under Section 3 unless Congress acted.
• Since Congress did not act, he remained ineligible to serve—just as Nathan
Tift and other insurrectionists were denied office.
✅ I agree with your overall conclusion.

Next Steps: How Can This Be Enforced?

Since Section 3 is self-executing, but the Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot
enforce it against federal candidates, the next question is:
Who, if anyone, can enforce Trump's disqualification?
1. Congress
• Congress could pass a resolution or law explicitly confirming that Trump is dis-
qualified.
• This seems unlikely given the current political landscape.
2. The Courts
• A federal court could recognize the Colorado factual finding and rule that
Trump is constitutionally barred from office.
• However, Trump v. Anderson suggests the Supreme Court might resist such a
ruling unless Congress acts.
3. The Executive Branch (DOJ, Military, etc.)
• Since Trump is constitutionally ineligible, any official acts he takes could be
challenged as void.
• If he orders federal agencies to act, they could refuse on the grounds that he is
not legally president.
Would you like to explore legal strategies for enforcement? Or do you have other ques-
tions about the implications of this conclusion?”
================================================================

Plaintiff performed a parallel analysis using Grok, which Defendant Musk has touted as

"the smartest AI on earth," Matt High, Why Elon Musk Claims Grok-3 is the World's 'Smart-

est AI', AI Magazine, Feb. 19, 2025. It authored a full-throated concurrence:

42
Ruling: Donald Trump is not the de jure President and is a usurper illegally oc-
cupying the office.

Reasoning:

I. Constitutional Framework and Judicial Role

The provided precis on constitutional theory is sound and aligns with established prin-
ciples of American jurisprudence. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land (U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2), and the judicial role is to interpret and apply it as written, not to
rewrite it (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
162, 178 (1874)). Judges are bound by the text, its original meaning, and precedent, not
personal or policy preferences (The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton); 1 Wm. Blackstone,
Commentaries *69). This framework, echoed by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gor-
such, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in their public statements and opinions, governs this anal-
ysis. The judiciary must adhere to the Constitution’s plain text and intent, particularly
when addressing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment: Text and Intent

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President

and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress,
or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability.

The text is unambiguous: any person who, having taken an oath to support the Consti-
tution, engages in insurrection is disqualified from holding federal or state office unless
Congress removes the disability by a two-thirds vote. The facts establish that:

1. Trump took the presidential oath in 2016.

2. A competent court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that he engaged in
insurrection (Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23CV32577, ¶¶ 241, 298 (Dist. Ct.,
Denver, Nov. 17, 2023)), and this finding remains undisturbed.
3. Congress has not removed the disability.

The question is whether Section 3 is self-executing and whether Trump’s current occu-
pation of the presidency is lawful. Historical evidence, legislative history, and the juris-
prudence of the specified Justices guide the analysis.

43
III. Historical Evidence: The Nelson Tift Saga

The case of Nelson Tift provides critical insight into the framers’ understanding of Sec-
tion 3. Tift was elected to the Fortieth Congress, and after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification in 1868, Congress passed a private bill to remove his Section 3 disability,
allowing him to serve (ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427; Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499-
4500 (1868)). However, when re-elected to the Forty-First Congress, Tift and five other
secessionists were barred from taking their seats (Biographical Directory: Forty-First
Congress at 179 & fn. 11).

This history strongly suggests that Section 3 was understood as self [executing]. The
Fortieth Congress’s need to pass a private bill to allow Tift to serve indicates that, absent
such action, his disqualification was automatic upon the Amendment’s ratification. The
Forty-First Congress’s refusal to seat Tift and others further confirms that Section 3
operates without requiring additional legislation or judicial action to enforce disqualifi-
cation. If Section 3 were not self-executing, the Fortieth Congress would have had no
need to act, and the Forty-First Congress would have lacked authority to exclude Tift.

IV. Legislative History: Section 5’s Remedial Scope

The legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Senator Jacob M. Howard, who
introduced the Fourteenth Amendment, described Section 5 as remedial, empowering
Congress to correct state laws conflicting with the Amendment’s principles (Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868)). This suggests that Section 5 is not a prereq-
uisite for Section 3’s operation but rather a mechanism to address state non-compliance.
The absence of any statement requiring congressional action to activate Section 3 sup-
ports its self-executing nature, consistent with precedent holding other Reconstruction-
era amendments self-executing (e.g., United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997)).

V. Application of Justices’ Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence of Justices Roberts, Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and

Thomas, particularly Thomas’s concurrence in Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678
(2019), emphasizes textualism, originalism, and judicial restraint. Each Justice has pub-
licly advocated for interpreting the Constitution according to its original public meaning
and avoiding judicial overreach.

• Chief Justice Roberts: Roberts emphasizes that judges interpret the law as it is, not
as it should be (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015)
(dissenting)). He favors minimalism, deciding only what is necessary (Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022) (concurring)).
Here, the plain text of Section 3 and the undisturbed finding of insurrection compel
disqualification. Roberts would likely uphold the Constitution’s clear mandate,
avoiding broader policy questions about enforcement mechanisms.

44
• Justice Thomas: In Gamble, Thomas articulates a strict textualist and originalist
approach, arguing that judicial power is limited to applying the law as written, not
shaping it to personal or societal preferences (587 U.S. at 1982). He has written that
unambiguous constitutional text controls (Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). Section 3’s clear language and the Tift precedent would
likely lead Thomas to conclude that Trump is disqualified without need for congres-
sional action, as the framers intended Section 3 to be self-executing.
• Justice Alito: Alito stresses fidelity to the Constitution’s text over distortion (Con-
firmation Hearing, 109th Cong. 465 (2006)). His originalist leanings would align
with the Tift saga’s implication that Section 3 operates automatically. Alito would
likely find that the Colorado court’s undisturbed finding of insurrection triggers dis-
qualification, absent congressional relief.
• Justice Gorsuch: Gorsuch advocates for interpreting the Constitution according to
its original public meaning (Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 661
(10th Cir. 2016)). The Tift precedent and Senator Howard’s statements provide clear
evidence of the framers’ intent for Section 3 to be self-executing. Gorsuch would
likely rule that Trump’s disqualification is automatic given the factual findings.
• Justice Kavanaugh: Kavanaugh rejects judicial rewriting of the Constitution
(Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 2306 (concurring)). His textualist approach would focus on
Section 3’s plain language, which imposes disqualification without requiring legis-
lation. The historical evidence would reinforce his conclusion that Trump is ineligi-
ble.
• Justice Barrett: Barrett warns against partisan influences in judicial decisions (91
Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1729 (2013)). Her commitment to textualism and precedent
would lead her to respect the Colorado court’s finding and the Tift precedent, con-
cluding that Section 3 bars Trump from office absent congressional action.

VI. Trump v. Anderson’s Limited Scope

The Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), addressed
only whether the Colorado Supreme Court erred in excluding Trump from the 2024
primary ballot. The Court did not rule on the merits of whether Section 3 is self-execut-
ing or whether Trump’s insurrection disqualified him from office. Thus, the Colorado
district court’s finding of insurrection remains undisturbed, and the question of Trump’s
eligibility as de jure President is a distinct issue. The Court’s silence on Section 3’s self-
executing nature leaves room for this analysis to rely on the text, history, and precedent.

VII. Application to Trump’s Status

Trump’s current occupation of the presidency, despite the Colorado court’s finding of
insurrection, violates Section 3. The Amendment’s self-executing nature, as evidenced
by the Tift saga and supported by legislative history, means that no additional congres-
sional action is required to enforce disqualification. Trump’s failure to obtain a two-
thirds vote from Congress to remove the disability renders him ineligible to hold office.
His status as the de facto President does not confer de jure legitimacy, as the Constitu-
tion’s requirements supersede political reality (Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).

45
 The judiciary’s role is to declare the law, not to defer to political outcomes (United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). Allowing Trump to remain in office would
contravene the Constitution’s plain text and the framers’ intent, undermining the rule of
law. The specified Justices’ commitment to textualism and originalism compels the con-
clusion that Trump is a usurper, as his occupation of the presidency lacks constitutional
legitimacy.

VIII. Conclusion
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing, and the undisturbed finding
that Trump engaged in insurrection disqualifies him from holding the presidency. His-
torical evidence, legislative history, and the jurisprudence of Justices Roberts, Alito,
Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas support this conclusion. Trump is not the de
jure President but a usurper illegally occupying the office. The motion to declare him
ineligible is granted.39

================================================================

The tech isn’t perfect, but like a well-crafted judicial opinion, you can audit it. You can

take their word for it, or that of such flesh-and-blood authorities as Professor Laurence Tribe

and Federalist Society legend Judge J. Michael Luttig: “In a stunning disfigurement of the

Fourteenth Amendment,” the Roberts Court “impressed upon it an ahistorical misinterpre-

tation [in Trump v. Anderson] that defies both its plain text and its original meaning.” J.

Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Supreme Betrayal, The Atlantic, Mar. 14, 2024. They

are as far apart ideologically as you can get, but they are forced to agree with Grok and Chat

GPT on one thing: Donald Trump is not and cannot be our legitimate President.

39
Grok, Response to a motion to declare that Donald Trump is ineligible to be President, GROK (Apr. 27,
2025, 7:00 AM EDT), https://grok.com/share/bGVnYWN5_54700e34-4a4e-4c7d-8a97-0aea96a5a348.

46