The Essential Thucydides

On Justice, Power, and

Human Nature
SECOND EDITION, EXPANDED AND REVISED

Selections from
The History of the Peloponnesian War
The Essential Thucydides
On Justice, Power, and
Human Nature
SECOND EDITION, EXPANDED AND REVISED

Selections from
The History of the Peloponnesian War

Edited and Translated by

PAUL WOODRUFF

Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Indianapolis/Cambridge
 In Memory of
T. F. R. G. Braun
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 Contents

The page numbers in curly braces {} correspond to the print edition of this
title.

Prefaces
Introduction
Further Reading
Works Cited
Maps

BOOK 1
Early History, Method, and the Cause of War
Thucydides’s Preface [1.1]
The Archaeology [1.2–20]
On Historical Method [1.20–22]
Origins of the War
Thucydides’s Explanation for the War [1.23]
Conflict of Corcyra with Corinth
Speech of the Corcyreans [1.32–36]
Speech of the Corinthians [1.37–43]
Debate at Sparta [1.66–88]
The Case for Making War on Athens (432 BCE) [1.66–67]
Speech of the Corinthians [1.68–72]
Speech of the Athenians [1.73–79]
Speech of Archidamus [1.80–85]
Speech of Sthenelaïdas [1.86–88]
The Fifty Years’ History [1.96–97]
Pericles’s War Speech [1.140–46]
 BOOK 2
The First Year of the War
The Attack on Plataea [2.2–6]
Preparations: Alliances and Preliminary Speeches [2.7–17]
Early Operations [2.18–23]
Pericles’s Funeral Oration [2.34–46]
The Plague: Human Nature in Crisis [2.47–54]
Military Operations of 430 [2.55–58]
Pericles’s Last Speech [2. 59–64]
Thucydides’s Judgment of Pericles [2.65]
Further Events of 430/429 [2.66–70]81
The Siege of Plataea [2.71–78]
Athenian Naval Victories at Naupactus [2.83–92, 103]

BOOK 3
Rebellion, Civil War, and Human Nature
The Revolt of Lesbos (Mytilene, 428 BCE) [3.2–19]
Ambassadors from Mytilene Speak at Olympia [3.8–15]
The Siege of Mytilene [3.16–19]
Breakout from Plataea (428/427 BCE) [3.20–24]
Defeat of Mytilene (427 BCE) [3.25–28]
The Mytilenean Debate (427 BCE) [3.35–52]
Speech of Cleon [3.37–41]
Speech of Diodotus [3.42–51]
The Fate of Plataea (427 BCE) [3.51–68]
Speech of the Plataeans [3.53–60]
Speech of the Thebans [3.61–68]
Human Nature Adapts to Civil War
Civil War on Corcyra (427 BCE) [3.70–81]
Moral Breakdown in Civil War: Human Nature in a Crisis [3.82–84]
The End of the Civil War (425 BCE) [4.47.3–48]
 BOOK 4
Both Sides Suffer Defeats
Defeat of Spartans at Pylos and Other Events of 425/424 BCE [Summary]
A Speech to Unite the Greeks on Sicily, Summer 424 BCE [4.59–65]
Brasidas’s Campaigns against Athens [Summary]
Brasidas’s Speech at Acanthus (424 BCE) [4.84–86]
Defeat of Athenians at Delium (424/423 BCE) [4.96]
Athenian Loss of Amphipolis (424/423 and 422 BCE) [Summary]
Athenian Massacre at Scione (423/422 BCE) [Summary]
Defeat of Athenians at Amphipolis (422 BCE) [Summary]

BOOK 5
Peace and War
The Peace of Nicias (421 BCE) [5.15–17]
The Second Preface [5.26]
The Failure of the Peace of Nicias [Summary]
Power Beats Justice at Melos (416 BCE) [5.84]
The Melian Dialogue [5.85–116]

BOOK 6
Launching the Sicilian Expedition
Sicilian Antiquities [Summary of 6.2–6]
Debate at Athens [6.8–26]
Speech of Nicias [6.9–15]
Speech of Alcibiades [6.16–19]
Second Speech of Nicias [6.20–26]
The Expedition Sails (415 BCE) [Summary of 6.27–105]
Debate at Syracuse [6.39]
Arrival of the Athenians [Summary]
Digression on the Tyranny in Athens [6.54]
The Athenians at Syracuse [83.4]
 Alcibiades’s Escape [6.89.3, 92.2]

BOOK 7
Athenian Catastrophe in Sicily
Sparta Joins the War [Summary]
Night Battle for Epipolae [7.42–46]
The Athenians Delay Their Departure [7.47–56]
Forces on Both Sides [Summary of 7.57–59]
Preparations for the Battle in the Great Harbor [Summary of 7.59–68]
Battle in the Great Harbor, September 9, 413 BCE [7.69–74]
The Athenians Retreat and Are Destroyed [7.75–87, 8.1]
Nicias’s Exhortation [7.77]
The Bitter End [7.78–87, 8.1]

BOOK 8
Aftermath of the Sicilian Expedition [8.1, Summary]
Oligarchy in Athens and the Empire [8.48.5–6, 8.64.5, 8.68.4]
Collapse of the Oligarchy [8.89.3]
The Five Thousand [8.97]
After Thucydides Breaks Off: The Last Phase of the War [Summary]

Dates
Glossary
Index

Titles of Related Interest Available from Hackett Publishing

 {ix} Preface to the First Edition

The aim of this book is to make the best known parts of Thucydides’s History
available to readers who are not scholars and do not want to get lost in the
intricacies of Greek history or geography. Here is the basic narrative of the
Peloponnesian War down to the Athenian disaster in Sicily. Here too are the
famous speeches and debates, along with the vivid set-piece descriptions of the
plague and the civil war, and the gripping stories of the fall of Plataea and the
loss of the Sicilian expedition. All this is not enough, of course. If you like
Thucydides you will want to read the entire book for its artful construction and
for the many fine passages I have had to omit. Thucydides keeps his authorial
voice quiet in the History, and the best way to detect his strategy is in the
structure of the work. In these selections, then, I have done my best to indicate
the shape of the surroundings for each passage.
I first knew Thucydides mainly as a source for Greek history, and a
particularly difficult one at that. He not only left frequent seductive traps for
the unwary scholar, but he littered his pages with obstacles in the form of long
speeches in the hardest Greek prose I had ever seen. It was only after I began
teaching him in philosophy classes (at the suggestion of my colleague Joe
Horn) that I began to see what a brilliant mind was at work in his History.
Then I recalled what I had learned from wonderful teachers—the dazzling
lectures of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix; and the warm tutorials of T. F. R. G.
Braun, to whom this book is respectfully dedicated. I would like to say that
they are not to blame for any errors I may have made, but I cannot deny that
they have influenced my work deeply. I should mention one other teacher:
“War is a violent teacher,” writes Thucydides, personifying an abstraction as he
so often does, meaning that men at war take on the violent qualities of war
itself. My own small experience in this area supports his conclusion. On the
positive side, however, I am also coming to see that military experience has
allowed me to appreciate the power of Thucydides’s descriptions as I never
could before.
My translation is an unashamed betrayal of Thucydides: where the Greek is
obscure, I have tried to be clear. In this I have concentrated on the abstract
concepts that pepper the text—justice, power, human nature, and fear. At the
same time I have tried to bring into English the toughness of the original,
which has been obscured by {x} the flabby but accurate translations now in use.
My work began out of a love affair with Hobbes’s translation for its simplicity
and directness, and much of Hobbes remains.
Dates are always BCE (Before the Common Era). Proper names, technical
terms, and Greek words are explained in the Glossary. References to
Thucydides’s text are in boldface when they guide the reader to passages
included in this volume. References to notes in commentaries are by last name
of author. Summaries and introductory sections are in italics; the translation is
in roman.

In correcting my translation I am indebted to Mark Gifford, Michael Gagarin,

David Dean-Jones, and various anonymous readers for the publisher. To these,
many thanks. I must also thank Peter Green for helpful conversations about
Thucydides, and confess one special debt: the title of this volume was proposed
by Mark Gifford.
I am also grateful to Shirley Hull, Heidi Hall, Julie Baxter, and Mary Nix for
assistance in typing the manuscript, and I must thank the Cambridge
University Press for their kind permission to use substantial passages that I first
translated for a work they commissioned, Early Greek Political Thought from
Homer to the Sophists (1995), which I edited with Michael Gagarin. The
passages include all or parts of the following sections: 1.1, 20–23, 70, 75–77;
2.35–46, 52–53, 60, 63, 65; 3.37–48, 81–84; 5.84–116; 6.18, 39, 89; 8.48, 64,
68, 89, 97.
 {xi} Preface to the Second Edition

What’s Special about This Expanded Volume

Here are all the great speeches and debates from the first seven books of
Thucydides’s great History of the Peloponnesian War, along with his most vivid
descriptions of battles—the breakout from Plataea, night battle on Epipolae,
Phormio’s naval victory, and the Battle of Delium. This edition brings out
Thucydides’s views on war, power, and human nature, along with his
explanation of the origins of the war. It also includes connecting material in
order that readers may understand these passages in context.
The result is a volume that contains the essential Thucydides, while being
short enough to be included in college level courses on great books. I have
translated this material to bring out the ideas as clearly as possible. I explain
important terms in footnotes and I cross-reference related passages. I have
often replaced pronouns with proper names in the interest of clarity.
Otherwise, this is as accurate as I can make it. I started with Hobbes, because
he is the translator who best understood Thucydides’s ideas, as they were akin
to his own. But of course I had to make my version more readable and bring it
up to date with recent scholarship.

Why a Second Edition

I completed the first edition of this abridged Thucydides in 1993. Since then,
scholars have been active in the field. P. J. Rhodes has published three valuable
commentaries, on Books 1, 3, and 4–5.24 (2014, 1994, and 1998). Only his
work on Book 2 (1988) was available for me for the first edition. Hornblower’s
masterful commentary is in three volumes (1991, 1996, and 2008). Marchant’s
commentary on Book 1 (1905) was updated and reissued in 1993 and has been
useful, as has the elegant commentary on the same book by Cameron (2003). A
number of other fine books and articles about Thucydides have come into print
since 1993.
Therefore I have reviewed with care the entire volume (Introduction and
Translation) and made many revisions in view of more recent scholarship, or
with a view to readability.
{xii} Newly Translated Passages
I have added translations of a number of passages, mainly to fill in
Thucydides’s way of accounting for war and violence:
• Corcyra Debate, 1.31–53, which sets the stage for the war and illustrates
Thucydides’s way of framing a debate.
• Opening of the war, 2.1–23. Important for understanding Pericles’s
strategy.
• Phormio’s naval battle, 2.83–92. The most wonderful account of a sea
battle.
• The Mytilene (Lesbos) rebellion, 3.1–16, along with 3.27, 28, and 35.
Crucial for an understanding of the Athenian Empire.
• The decision to execute all the men of Mytilene, 3.36. Sets up the debate
that follows.
• The civil war starts in Corcyra, 3.70–81. Introduces Thucydides’s most
famous discussion of values.
• The speech of Hermocrates, 4.59–65. Bears on the way Thucydides’s
characters understand human nature.
• The Battle of Delium, 4.96. A major land battle vividly described, the first
recorded case of killing by friendly fire.
• The decision for peace 5.15–17. It is typical of Thucydides to attribute the
peace to the self-interest of the leaders on both sides.
I have also expanded slightly my own summaries that fill in for passages I have
not included, to make for better continuity.

Note to the Reader on Conventions

All cross-references within Thucydides’s History are in the format 1.99, where
1 is the book number and 99 is the chapter number. Passages that are included
in this translation are bold-faced. Thus 1.2 is in this volume, but 1.99 is not.
Dates are all BCE (Before the Common Era) unless otherwise indicated.
Thucydides sometimes interrupts his narrative with what I think we would
print as footnotes. These passages I have put into footnotes, inside quotation
marks to indicate that they are his work and not mine.
{xiii} In the footnotes, the principal commentaries are cited by author’s last
name only: Rhodes, Dover, Hornblower, and Rusten. The relevant passage in
each case will be easy to find in the commentary on the chapter in Thucydides
to which the footnote belongs. Classical scholars use “ad loc.” (at the location)
for this.
 {xv} Introduction

The Author
Who is like Thucydides? He reminds us of modern historical scholars when he
sweeps myth away from old stories (1.20, 6.54), but few historians are so artful
in their selection and organization of material or so quiet about conflicting
sources. In some ways, Thucydides resembles a writer of historical fiction, and
the tragic poets who began that sort of work in Greece probably taught him a
great deal. Cornford called him “the artist who was no longer an actor,” who
“could discern the large outlines shaping all that misery and suffering into the
thing of beauty and awe which we call tragedy” (1907, 250). Indeed, the
influence of tragedy explains many elements in the History; but all in all the
book is less like tragedy than it is like history: the absence of verse, of choruses,
and, most important, of any sort of intervention by supernatural powers leaves
it far from tragedy, which was written, after all, to be performed at a religious
observance, and to linger in the mind as only poetry can do. True, tragedy is
driven by a sense of inevitable outcome, and Thucydides’s story unfolds with a
necessity to which he frequently calls our attention. But Thucydidean necessity
(anankē) is not fate, and it has nothing to do with the gods. The style of the
History, too, is remote from poetry. Thucydides is no tragedian.
Much of the History consists of paired speeches, and these recall the sophists
who taught men to argue both sides of a question. No doubt this too left a
mark on Thucydides (as it did on his poetic counterpart Euripides), so that he
is more like a sophist than he is like any other writer, at least in the most
famous parts of the History. This comparison applies only to form, however, for
while the sophists do not seem to care which side is right in their fictional
examples, Thucydides, in his real ones, is deeply engaged, and shows a moral
outrage at the catastrophe of Greece that is no less obvious for being
understated.
Is he a moral philosopher, then? He had a philosopher’s education and was
concerned, as philosophers are, to detect the real beneath the apparent. Jaeger,
Strauss, and Grene all treat him as a political philosopher. In his political views
he is like Plato in some ways and Aristotle in others. Like Plato he finds
demagoguery antithetical to {xvi} any serious thought of justice. Like both
Plato and Aristotle, he is distrustful of out-and-out democracy, and like
Aristotle he seems to favor a mixed constitution. He is far beyond any other
ancient thinker, however, in his understanding of the ways of power in the real
world. His work calls for comparison with that of Machiavelli and Hobbes, but
he rarely instructs as they do. Hobbes put it best: “Digressions for instruction’s
cause, and other such open conveyances of precepts (which is the philosopher’s
part), he never useth; as having so clearly set before men’s eyes the ways and
events of good and evil counsels, that the narration itself doth secretly instruct
the reader, and more effectually than can possibly be done by precept.”1
Thucydides is not a philosopher, however. His subject is the history of the
Peloponnesian War; and although he believes that this exemplifies general
truths about human nature he never develops an explicit theory, never directly
engages with philosophers in debate, and never pauses to explain his method in
any detail. To be a philosopher is, at least, to take part in the running debates
philosophers have with each other; and Thucydides does not do that. He seems
like a pioneer in social science, however, aiming to understand why people do
the things they do, while discerning patterns in human behavior that he
believes will repeat, more or less, in the future. But seems to impose the
patterns he sees onto the stories he tells, so he is not really a social scientist.
Well, who is like Thucydides? No one, of course. He is unique and
inimitable. He is a historian, and although his History of the Peloponnesian War
is our only source of information for much of the material it covers, it is also a
highly imaginative piece of work, energized by its author’s concern for personal
and political morality, and crafted to display his mastery of rhetorical style.
Of the life of Thucydides we know little beyond what he tells us. He was the
son of an Athenian named Olorus, whose wealth came from gold mines in
Thrace, in northern Greece; and he was evidently related to Cimon, a
successful Athenian general in the wars against Persia, since he was buried in
Cimon’s family tomb. We know that he was elected general in 424,2 and that
he lived long enough after 404, when the war ended, to reflect on that end in
his unfinished History. Scholars infer, therefore, that he was a fairly young
general, and put his birth between 460 and 455.
{xvii} As general he was in charge of offshore forces in northern Greece in
424, a year in which the Spartans were operating in that theater. The strategic
city of Amphipolis was their chief target, and they succeeded in taking it away
from the Athenians. Thucydides, who had been responsible for the defense of
the region, was punished by exile until the end of the war. Much of his twenty-
year exile he spent at his home in Thrace, but he also visited the Peloponnesus
(probably including Sparta) and may also have traveled to Syracuse. After the
war, he visited Athens and then returned to Thrace to try to finish writing the
History. He died before revising Book 8, with seven years of his story left to
tell. He was buried at Athens in the tomb of Cimon’s family. This far we are
on fairly firm ground, but everything else we are told about Thucydides comes
from biographies written centuries after his death. The story that he died by
violence, for example, must be treated as legend.
Of his education we can only surmise that he learned much from the sophists
who were beginning to be popular in Athens during his youth. Legend has it
that he studied with the sophist-politician Antiphon, whom we know he
greatly admired (8.68), and with the philosopher Anaxagoras, about whom he
says nothing. Probably, however, he learned most from Protagoras, but no
teacher could take the credit for Thucydides. His style of writing is uniquely his
own, and he must be counted as one of the most original prose stylists of Greek
or any language. As a thinker he has an extraordinary ability to produce the
intellectual equivalent of counterpoint in music. Many themes are sounded in
the History as its author explores both sides of complex issues. The most
insistent of these is the necessity that is thought to fall on those who try to
manage an empire: they feel that empires cannot remain stagnant, that they
must grow, and that as managers of empire they must pursue growth and keep
order with a businesslike disregard for the moral principles they would
otherwise hold dear. The tragic center of Thucydides’s tale is a pair of cities
that felt themselves compelled to wage an atrocious war, with dismal
consequences for them and their allies. It is a sad and a cautionary tale,
brilliantly told, with unforgettable moments of irony.

The Combatants
The war that gives Thucydides’s History its plot and narrative line was a classic
confrontation between the sea power of Athens and the land power of Sparta
(or Lacedaemon), complicated by political, cultural, and commercial rivalries.
Greece was far from unified at the time, {xviii} but consisted of a multitude of
city-states of various sizes and, in some areas, tribal groups settled in villages.
All spoke one dialect or another of Greek, and all shared a common heritage in
religion and poetry. They had a distinct sense that they were Greek and
everyone else was foreign (barbaros). Athens, Sparta, and others had joined
hands under Spartan leadership to drive the Persian armies from Greek soil
fifty years before the war of which Thucydides writes.
The principal differences between Sparta and Athens at the time of the war
were these: (1) The Spartans had an ancient constitution, of which they were
very proud, which combined elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy. Its stability was the envy of Greece. Athens, on the other hand, had
been through more than a century of political upheavals and emerged with a
spanking new democracy.3 (2) Sparta, isolated in the center of the
Peloponnesus, was a bastion of resistance to cultural change, while Athens
welcomed all sorts of innovation and became a home to what is called the new
learning. A minor language barrier further sharpened this difference: the two
cities spoke different dialects of Greek. They were divided also along ethnic
lines; as Ionians, the Athenians had very different customs and traditions from
Dorians, such as the Spartans, Corinthians, and Syracusans. (3) Sparta
controlled its own fertile district, known as Laconia, as well as the conquered
territory of Messenia. These made Sparta self-sufficient in terms of food.
Athens, on the other hand, had too little farmland to support its large
population and not much forestland; it depended on commerce to supply food
for its people and timber for its shipbuilding. (4) Sparta was relatively poor in
money and was not enriched by the voluntary alliance that it led. Athens
controlled rich silver mines and some of its citizens owned gold mines in
Thrace. It was a thriving commercial center and, to make it still richer, ruled an
empire from which it collected payments. It was these that financed the
Parthenon and the other grand buildings of the period. And it was the exacting
demand for these payments that caused some allies to defect (1.99).

Sparta
Spartan government was much admired by conservatives all over the Greek
world. Sparta ruled an agricultural domain worked by {xix} a conquered people
(the helots) who outnumbered the Spartans and were liable to rebel if Sparta
showed any weakness. To meet this challenge, the Spartans developed a superb
military machine and a system of government that was a model of stability.
Military leadership was in the hands of two hereditary kings. The Spartan
Assembly was open to all citizens, but they did not all have the right to make
speeches there. The Spartan Council of Elders (Gerousia) consisted of the two
kings and twenty-eight wellborn citizens who were elected for life. There were
five officials known as ephors (overseers) who were elected for one-year terms by
the Assembly and whose duties included the judiciary. Citizenship was limited
to freeborn males who owned landed estates of a certain size; at the time of the
war there were fewer than four thousand citizens of military age. Spartan
armies were the most feared in all Greece, owing to their discipline and
training, but Sparta depended heavily for manpower on its allies.
Since the sixth century, Sparta had been developing a system of alliances—
known as the Peloponnesian League—with the mainly Dorian cities of the
Peloponnesus. The Spartans did not collect payments from their allies, as the
Athenians did, but relied on them for direct military assistance and rewarded
them by bolstering their traditional oligarchical governments against attempts
by the people to seize power.4

Athens
The hallmark of democratic Athens was the freedom of its citizens, especially
the freedom to speak their minds in the Assembly, and the city vibrated with
opportunities that scandalized such conservatives as Plato.5 The Assembly in
Athens was a legislative body open to all adult male citizens, any of whom
could address the Assembly. Because any effective speaker could sway the
Assembly, some men rose to power without winning elected office. Such men
were called demagogues. There was also a Council (boulē), consisting of five
hundred citizens selected by lot, which ran the city’s day-to-day operations and
prepared business for the Assembly. The use of the lottery for the Council and
other offices presupposed the democratic principle that all citizens were
qualified to assist in government.
{xx} Generals, however, were elected, and could have considerable influence.
All officials faced formal scrutiny on leaving office, so that they could be
punished for corruption or malfeasance while in office. The popular courts
consisted of large panels of up to 501 judges—ordinary citizens who had shown
up to collect their day’s pay for court duty and were chosen by lot. Such a large
panel, it was thought, could not be bribed or otherwise influenced unfairly.
There was no judge or judiciary set above these panels, and their decisions were
final. Pay for court duty meant that poor citizens could afford to take part.
Power was held by citizens in Athens, and policy shifted quickly to suit their
wishes. By Greek standards (and by most standards in history) this was extreme
democracy, even though citizenship was limited to adult males whose parents
were citizens. Women, slaves, and a large population of resident aliens (called
metics) were excluded. Readers who are inclined to scoff at this should consider
that democracy in the United States was not more inclusive than this until well
into the nineteenth century.
In fact, citizenship was open to a much wider class in Athens than in Sparta.
Rich or poor, if you could prove Athenian descent, you were a citizen of
Athens. This too shocked the conservatives: day laborers, with no landed
estates at all, could pass judgment in the people’s courts on the richest men of
the city. At the start of the war there were more than forty thousand citizens in
Athens, of whom twenty-one thousand could afford to serve as the heavily
armed infantry known as hoplites. (Soldiers were required to buy their own
equipment.) Resident aliens could contribute about eight thousand more men
of the hoplite class.
After the Persian Wars, Athens ruled the sea as head of an alliance—the
Delian League—of Greek cities against what remained of Persian rule over
Greeks in Asia Minor and the islands. Some allies contributed ships and men
to the war effort, but most simply made payments to the League’s treasury in
Delos. Athenian sea power brought commercial ascendancy, and Athens
moved the treasury from Delos to the Acropolis in 454, while still protecting
the allies from Persians and pirates. The Persian threat receded, leading to a
treaty in 449. As the allies’ payments now exceeded the cost of protection, the
Athenians started spending the surplus on beautiful buildings, such as the
Parthenon (447). By then, what had been an alliance had clearly turned into an
empire of island and coastal cities.

{xxi} The Empire

Although Athens referred to these cities as its allies, Thucydides considered
them to be virtually enslaved by Athens, and this was the view of the
Peloponnesians. In fact, Athens shared interests with the democratic elements
in many of the cities touched by its influence, while the Spartans found most in
common with oligarchical regimes.6 Was the Athenian Empire truly
oppressive? On the positive side, Athens kept the Aegean Sea safe for its island
allies by stamping out piracy and keeping the Persians at bay; it also frequently
defended the democratic elements of its allies against oligarchic takeovers. On
the negative side, if any of the allies turned away from Athens or ceased
making payments, Athens put them down brutally, as it did Euboea (447–446)
and Samos (440–439).
Thucydides tells us that the empire was unpopular (2.8, 1.99), but gives us
hints that it was better liked by the democrats of the subject cities (3.47, cf.
8.48); he also supplies evidence that the empire was more popular with its
subjects than the Peloponnesians expected. Athens had been exploiting
dissension in the cities it dealt with for a long time, probably siding with
democrats against oligarchs, and in this way cultivated the loyalty of at least
one faction in many of the cities that came into the empire. The rebellion at
Mytilene has been the subject of scholarly debate; it’s likely that the common
people were more favorable to Athens than the wealthy who led the rebellion,
but they must have participated in building the city’s defenses as needed for the
rebellion (3.2).
When a Spartan general reached the member cities of northern Greece in
424, he was surprised to see how little enthusiasm there was for the freedom he
claimed to have brought them (4.85). In 413, in Sicily, the Spartan general
Gylippus offered safety to troops from the islands, which the Athenians saw as
allies. At the time, the Athenians and their allies were fleeing from Syracuse,
close to annihilation; some of the islanders chose to leave the Athenians to face
defeat alone (7.82), but those who stayed showed great loyalty to Athens. And
when a number of allies rebelled in the moment of Athens’s greatest weakness,
after the Sicilian disaster, a surprising number remained loyal to Athens. All of
these incidents took place after Athens had required higher payments to
support the war, so it is likely that the Athenians had been fairly popular with
their empire {xxii} at the onset of hostilities. Thucydides is not deliberately
trying to deceive us, however. The empire had never been popular with the rich
and wellborn of the subject cities, and these were the people who mattered
most to him.7

The New Learning

Cultural differences between the combatants are of great interest to Thucydides
(1.70, 1.84). The Spartans’ educational system helped them field the most
disciplined and effective army in all of Greece, but it also helped them to resist
the intellectual and artistic revolution of the fifth century. No ruins of great
buildings adorn the site of Sparta, no festive vases survive as great art in the
museums. Sophists and other representatives of innovation were excluded
during that period, and the great age of Spartan poetry—Tyrtaeus, Alcman,
Terpander—was long gone.
The new learning was not born in Athens, but it was welcomed there by
Pericles, who was the most effective leader of the democracy. It was mainly of
interest to those who could afford the luxury of adult education, and in itself
was neither liberal nor conservative, but appealed equally to democrats like
Pericles and oligarchs like Antiphon. Many ordinary Athenians were shocked
by it, however, and it was gleefully satirized in a play of Aristophanes, The
Clouds (423), which brings out its main elements: natural science and rhetoric,
both pursued with a critical spirit that was not hindered by reverence for
traditional beliefs or morality. A third element was anthropology, which began
in this period as the study of human progress. Leaving myths of the golden age
to one side, the early social scientists saw technology and social organization as
human-made improvements on primitive conditions.8
Traveling teachers known as sophists were the main carriers of this new
learning from city to city, but we should keep in mind that all men of learning
were called sophists at the time. It was {xxiii} Plato who limited the use of the
term to the more radical thinkers and gave it its pejorative tone. Thucydides’s
contact with the sophists gave him his interests in rhetoric, in human progress,
and in the natural explanation of events; but he survived this education without
losing his commitment to traditional morality.9

Background of the War

Athens had been a city-state of minor significance until the middle of the sixth
century, when growing commerce and a sharp change in government thrust it
into the mainstream. The change in government was the institution of one-
man rule—what the Greeks came to call a tyranny. The tyrant was Pisistratus,
who, with his sons Hippias and Hipparchus, ruled Athens successfully for a
large part of the century. Before Pisistratus, a statesman named Solon had
attempted to patch up a compromise between the various class interests in
Athens. The compromise failed (hence Pisistratus), but some of Solon’s devices
survived to be the foundation of democracy. In 510, Sparta put down the
tyranny in Athens, unintentionally setting the stage for political evolution
there. Some elements of democracy were in place by 500, but the whole was
not functioning until about 461, when Pericles’s spectacular career in politics
got its start.
The Greek cities along the coast of Asia Minor had been important centers of
Greek commercial and cultural life, but they were brought under the Persian
Empire by the sword of Cyrus the Great in 546. In 499, a number of these
cities rebelled against the Persians but were roundly defeated, and, in 494, the
Persians brought down Miletus, the gem of the Asiatic Greek cities. Because
Athens had aided the Ionian cities in their rebellion, the Persians evidently
realized they could not rule Asia Minor safely unless they controlled all of the
Greeks around the Aegean, and especially Athens. In 490, the Persian king
Darius launched a naval expedition against mainland Greece. This was
defeated by Athens in the famous Battle of Marathon.
Ten years later a new Persian king, Xerxes, tried to conquer Greece with a
much larger force. This time Athens could not face the enemy alone. With
foresight it had equipped a substantial fleet that carried its women and children
to safety and returned to join the allied Greek fleet that defeated the Persian
ships at Salamis. The Persian {xxiv} army remained through the following year,
only to be defeated by a Spartan-led Greek army at the Battle of Plataea (479).
The victorious army was the product of an alliance of Greek cities, including -
Athens and its tiny neighbor Plataea. At the time, no one would have thought
to question the right of the Spartans to lead such an effort. Both Sparta and
Athens deserved to be proud of the victory. Without Spartan forces and
leadership, the Greeks would not have won at Plataea; but absent the pluck and
ingenuity of the Athenians in the victory at Salamis, the Persians would have
been able to carry the war into the Peloponnesus by sea, divide the Greeks, and
defeat them.
Soon after the Battle of Plataea the Spartans turned to matters closer to their
home, and a number of Greek cities asked Athens to lead them against Persia.
The alliance was cemented in 477 as the Delian League, with its center on the
small sacred island of Delos, and the Greeks began a protracted mopping up of
the remnants of Persian power around the Aegean Sea. Popular or not, the
Athenian Empire grew by fits and starts, with some reverses, throughout the
middle of the fifth century. During this period it came into conflict with Sparta
and its allies on several occasions. The Thirty Years’ Peace of 446 between
Athens and Sparta was to last only fourteen years, and in 431 the
Peloponnesian War began, as Sparta went to war against the growth of the
Athenian Empire.

Brief History of the War

The first phase of the war began in 431 and lasted ten years. Although the
Athenians met with some serious reverses, they were victorious when it
mattered most, and thus were able to make the Peace of Nicias (421–414)
favorable to Athenian interests. Pericles’s original strategy in the war had been
to avoid fighting the Spartans on land, and so to leave them free to waste and
pillage Attica. Holed up in the city, with access to the sea protected by the long
walls that led to their seaport at the Piraeus, the Athenians withstood year after
year of Spartan raids in harvest season. During the second year of war, in 430, a
disastrous plague broke out in the city, exacerbated by the overcrowding of
refugees from the farmland outside the walls. A year later, weakened by the
plague, Pericles himself died, a victim of the consequences of his own policy.
Still, Athens held out. Pericles’s plan, which the Athenians followed at first all
too closely, guaranteed a protracted war, costly to both sides, with no clear
resolution. {xxv} As long as Athens conceded the land to Sparta, and Sparta the
sea to Athens, there was no hope of either side’s bringing the war to an end.
And, indeed, it was not until much later, in the second phase of the war, that
Sparta acquired a navy with Persian gold and was able to threaten Athens with
defeat at sea.
In 428, Mytilene rebelled against the Athenian Empire, along with most of
the island of Lesbos. As a large city with its own independent fleet, Mytilene
was too valuable to lose, so Athens sent a substantial force to bring the island
city back into the fold. In 427, after a long siege, democrats in Mytilene sued
for peace. Many Athenians wanted to make an example of Mytilene by killing
its adult male citizens and enslaving the rest—a common practice with
conquered peoples in Greece at the time. Better judgment prevailed, however,
and, at the eleventh hour, Athens decided not to carry out this bloodthirsty
sentence.
Meanwhile, the small town of Plataea was in trouble. This town had joined
bravely in the defense of Greece against the Persians, and so was supposed to
have earned the undying gratitude of all Greeks. But Plataea offended its
powerful neighbor Thebes (now a Spartan ally) by deciding to join forces with
Athens, in spite of its traditional ties to Thebes. A Theban army attacked
Plataea in 431; then in 429, an army of the Peloponnesian League besieged it
and destroyed the city in 427. The Athenian promise to defend it had meant
little (2.73, 3.57).
The greatest success of the Athenians in the first phase of the war was the
capture in 425 of a band of 120 Spartan citizen soldiers on a small island called
Sphacteria. So much did the Spartans value their citizens that they were willing
to sue for peace on virtually any terms to get their men back. A leader named
Cleon persuaded Athens not to make peace, however, and the war continued
until after Cleon’s death, when it finally became clear that Athens had little to
gain from further conflict. Peace was ratified in 421.
The Peace of Nicias (421–414) was an uneasy affair, as it did not resolve the
fundamental problems between Athens and Sparta. Fighting began again soon
after the peace was made, and a new generation of warlike leaders emerged.
The most famous of these in Athens was Alcibiades, an aristocrat who was
equally brilliant in politics and at war, and who is known to modern readers
through his striking speech in Plato’s Symposium. In 416, Athens began the
conquest of a neutral island, Melos. When the inhabitants refused to surrender,
they were starved into submission; then the men were killed and the {xxvi}
women and children enslaved. This foreshadows what might have been the fate
of Athens: twelve years later, when Athens was starving under siege by the
Peloponnesians, the Athenians had reason to fear that they would suffer the
same destruction as Melos.10
In 415, Alcibiades revived an old plan to expand Athenian influence by
conquests in Sicily. Blocked by the Persian Empire from fully exploiting the
commercial opportunities of the Black Sea, Athens could neither expand its
influence nor secure its food supply without secure allies in Sicily, but Syracuse,
an ally of Sparta, was picking off Athens’s allies in Sicily. So the Athenians
decided to send an expedition to Sicily with the goal of conquering Syracuse.
This was an ambitious goal, as Syracuse was large, powerful, and governed at
the time as a moderate democracy. Athens whipped up a glorious armada out
of the cream of the Athenian Empire for this expedition. Shortly after the force
set sail, Alcibiades was recalled to face charges of crimes against religion—
falsely brought, apparently, owing to the jealousy of his political rivals. Instead
of returning to face his enemies at home, Alcibiades fled to Sparta with a mind
full of plans by which the Spartans could (and later did) achieve victory.
In 413, Syracuse defeated the Athenian expedition with the help of the
Spartan general Gylippus, utterly destroying the Athenian and allied army and
ships. Athens would never recover from this loss. In 412, many of the allies of
Athens rebelled, and in 411, the desperate Athenians turned over their
government to an oligarchy known as the Four Hundred, hoping that it would
be more effective than the democracy had been. It was not; and the Athenian
fleet, which was stationed on Samos, remained stubbornly democratic. Within
the year, this force restored the democracy in Athens. Thucydides’s description
of the chaotic maneuvering of various parties in Athens and on Samos brings
his history to an unexpected close. He apparently did not live to carry out his
intention of writing the full history of the war down to its end in 404.
The story was picked up by Xenophon in his Hellenica and is summarized at
the end of this volume: in the end Athens was defeated by Sparta. For strategic
reasons, in order to balance the growing power of Thebes, Sparta held back
from doing to Athens what Athens had done to Melos. But that was a close
call.

{xxvii} On Reading Thucydides

The History seems to do more to hide than to reveal its author’s intentions, and
yet many readers are left with the feeling that they know just what Thucydides
thought, although they disagree about what this is. That’s because, as Connor
writes, “Reading Thucydides is not for the faint hearted, nor for those who fear
complex ideas or ironic outcomes.”11 It’s easy to get Thucydides wrong; often
the safest course is to say that we cannot be sure precisely what his views were.
Evidence for Thucydides’s political and moral judgments may be drawn from
three sources within the text: authorial statements, speeches, and narrative
structures.

Authorial Statements
Thucydides makes occasional remarks in his own persona. Few of these are
substantial, however. Some solid material may be culled from the
“Archaeology” of Book 1 (1.2–19) and some from descriptions of the plague. In
the passage on the civil war in Corcyra (3.81–85) we have his most impressive
statement, which includes praise for the traditional virtues of reverence (3.82.8)
and simplicity (3.83.1). Thucydides plainly mourns the loss of these virtues in
the violent partisanship of war.
 Reverence (here, eusebeia, elsewhere also, to hosion) calls for special comment,
because Thucydides here sums up all of the moral failure of Corcyra under this
one word. Reverence is the specific virtue violated by those who break oaths or
fail to recognize the claims of suppliants. Reverence overlaps considerably with
justice, but while justice seems to apply among equals, reverence is the virtue
shown by the strong when they treat the weak properly. Traditionally, that is
because the weak have only the gods to protect them, and so they can only
hope that powerful people will act well out of fear of the gods, or that people
are likely to act well out of fear of the gods. Suppliant status does nothing to
protect anyone in his history.12 Oaths are broken left and right (3.59, 3.82).
Treaties sworn before the gods are {xxviii} abrogated.13 The one character who
is marked by his fear of the gods is Nicias, who leads a major Athenian force to
a total loss.14
Thucydides’s view of history is godless, and in this he is unique among early
historians. He does not seem to believe that the gods intervene in human
history. He does not place credence in oracles.15 And he does not find that
belief in gods has any effect on human action. Athens does not need to wait for
the gods to punish it for its excesses; the peoples Athens has mistreated and
their allies will suffice to bring the city and its empire down. They will be
moved by fear or greed or ambition. And yet, Thucydides seems to mourn the
failure of reverence in civil war and treats that failure as summing up the whole
moral disaster of civil war (end of 3.82). For him, therefore, reverence appears
to have been a secular virtue—less about worshiping gods and more about
treating weaker people well, following oaths, and keeping treaties.16 In
Thucydides’s story, people fear each other more than they fear the gods. In
reality, many scholars believe that fear of the gods was a major factor in
explaining people’s choices in the war. For example, the Spartans apparently
thought that the gods had caused them to be defeated at Pylos because they
and their allies had violated the Thirty Years’ Peace, but that when the
Athenians violated the Peace of Nicias, they (the Spartans) could safely resume
operations against Athens. But Thucydides makes no mention of the gods in
this context; he merely says that the Spartans thought that their defeat was to
be expected, or was reasonable (eikotos—7.18).
Thucydides gives us two direct judgments about Athenian politics: a eulogy of
Pericles (with corollary condemnation of the next generation of leaders), and a
verdict on the government of the Five Thousand (2.65 and 8.97). In addition,
the narrative is peppered with {xxix} judgments about people’s motivations, of
which the most famous (and apparently least justified) is the comment that
Cleon was acting from fear when he tried to back out of commanding the final
expedition to Pylos (4.28). The most numerous authorial comments are asides
of the form “as was to be expected”—hōs eikós, which is often well translated “as
is natural.” In this group falls a line from the passage cited above: when Cleon
pulled back, the people reacted “as a mob usually does,” and pressed Nicias to
give Cleon the command.
There are also authorial judgments of character:17 to the eulogy of Pericles at
2.65 should be added the positive comments on Brasidas at 4.81, Pisistratus at
6.54, and Nicias at 7.86, as well as the negative ones on Cleon (4.21, 28, 5.16)
and Alcibiades (6.15). Some of these judgments are conventional; others (like
those for the tyrants) are radically revisionist. Each one calls for a study of its
own. Most scholars agree that Thucydides is too hard on Cleon and too easy
on Nicias, for example.18 Whether or not Thucydides genuinely admires
Pericles or Nicias, the language he uses seems to show what qualities he looks
for—integrity, as shown by Pericles, courage and moral ambition in the case of
Nicias.
What should we make of all these authorial statements? Little, I think, except
what falls out from an interpretation of the entire text that includes them.
Because these passages are normative, and because they are not attributed to
any of the characters of the piece, they are taken to be “authorial.” Really,
however, Thucydides authored the entire book; and if some of these passages
seem to ring in the authentic voice of Thucydides—the verdict on the Five
Thousand is a good example—that is because of our sense for what is
Thucydidean, a sense we have developed from our reading of the whole book.
In the passage on the Five Thousand, Thucydides makes a brief and
unprecedented break from his narrative mode to give a judgment that is
entirely consonant with what we have already been led to expect from
Thucydides—that he thinks the best government falls in between rule by the
many and rule by the few. This expectation on our part makes us ready to
believe that the passage expresses his own view. Such are the factors that
convince us, and they are not internal to the passage in question. It would be
risky, therefore, to select authorial sentences from the History as if they were
fragments uniquely recording the thought of their author. But I join most (but
{xxx} not all) scholars in finding a true, traditional moral commitment in his
description of moral decline during civil war (3.81–85).19
We must also keep in mind that Thucydides had the gift of seeing all sides of
complex issues, and we should be on our guard against irony everywhere in
reading the History. Thucydides wrote in a literary tradition in which irony was
the norm: every tragedy magnifies the glory of its hero before showing how his
mistakes and defects of character bring him down. This is not authorial praise
for the hero, but rather a device for placing the hero in a moral context in
which his fall is best explained: if a character knows more, or has more power,
than is fitting for a human being, an Athenian audience knew his doom was
near. In history, as in tragedy, Greek writers show the same mixture of pride,
awe, and terror at the extent of human innovation and achievement. In tragic
poetry, the mechanism for doom seems to be driven by gods; in Thucydides it
is an all-too-human necessity that brings down those who overreach. The
narrative structures are similar, however, so we should not be surprised if
something like tragic irony shows up in the History.
Readers of Thucydides are lovers of Athens, and so tend to take the Funeral
Oration as expressing Thucydides’s own love for his city; and then, loving
Pericles because they love Athens, they tend to swallow Thucydides’s eulogy of
Pericles straight. Both passages are balanced by irony, however. This becomes
clear, for example, to readers who set the Funeral Oration against the
description of the plague. After the Funeral Oration praises the civilization of
Athens, the account of the plague shows how easily the Athenians shed their
veneer when times were hard. As for Thucydides’s eulogy of Pericles, it is hard
to square with his critical attitudes toward democracy and empire, which
Thucydides knew to have been Pericles’s legacy to Athens.

The Speeches
Nearly one-fourth of the text of the History consists of speeches delivered
elegantly in the first person by historical figures. As the speeches are teeming
with insights, many scholars have held that they are our best source for
Thucydides’s own ideas; others scoff at this, saying that each speech represents
only the point of view of a {xxxi} particular character at a particular time.20 A
third possibility is to try to identify Thucydidean elements within the speeches
and separate them from what belongs to the speakers.
All three approaches are too simple. Understanding Thucydides is like
understanding a playwright whose subject is history: he speaks few lines in his
own person, but reveals much by the lines he thinks appropriate for others to
speak. Study of the speeches must begin with a review of Thucydides’s
enigmatic introduction (1.22):
The words particular people said in their speeches, either just before or
during the war, were hard to record exactly, whether they were speeches I
heard myself or those that were reported to me at second hand. I have
written down what I thought the situation demanded for each speaker,
keeping as near as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.
The word translated “what . . . the situation demanded” (ta deonta) can also
mean “what was appropriate,” and may be a technical term for what was the
right strategy in each case according to current rhetorical theory.21
The consensus of scholars is that Thucydides did not keep strictly to actual
texts that were delivered. The speeches are too good, too artfully contrived, and
too closely tied in with each other to be verbatim transcriptions of what was
said. Still, many of them might well be paraphrases of their originals. On this
point there is no general agreement: we do not know whether a given speech
contains arguments that were actually used, and we have no sure way of telling
paraphrase from historical fiction. Historians are left to speculate about what is
likely to have been the case for each speech. The Melian Dialogue, for
example, did not take place in public, so Thucydides was probably left to his
own invention. Pericles’s Funeral Oration, by contrast, seems to represent an
occasion that would have been known to Thucydides’s readers, and so he may
have felt obliged to give an accurate report. Still, we do not have any reason to
believe that Greek readers expected accuracy on such points.
{xxxii} In the end, although we cannot be sure where it crops up, we must
conclude that there is fiction in the speeches; but even when they are fictional
they are historical too, since they represent the imagination of a writer who
wants to bring the historical truth to light by this means and is trying to be
faithful to what the situation demanded—to ta deonta. But what sort of truth
was Thucydides trying to serve in doing this? What did he mean by ta deonta?
What a conventionally trained speaker of the period would have seen fit to say?
What Thucydides thinks the speaker really should have said, all training aside?
Or what would best reveal the speaker’s thoughts and motivations and desires?
All of these are possible. We simply do not know which is closest to being
right. Even if 1.22 were unambiguous, we would still have to ask if it truly
described Thucydides’s practice. He was probably interested in all of the above.
Certainly he was aware of the conventions of rhetoric, and he seems also to
have cared about the ideals to which rhetoric should be put. But I think a
frequent purpose of the speeches is to reveal the motives of the speakers. The
speeches are part of Thucydides’s larger project of bringing submerged realities
to the surface, a project announced early on when he brings out what he
believes is the real reason for the war:
I believe that the truest reason for the quarrel, though least evident in what
was said at the time, was the growth of Athenian power, which put fear
into the Lacedaemonians and so compelled them into war (1.23, see 1.73
with note).
Generally, Thucydides wants to bring the darker side of human nature to light
by revealing motives such as fear, which speakers would want to conceal in real
life.
Thucydides sees Cleon, for example, as a cowardly man who fears the people;
yet in his speech against the Mytileneans, he shows contempt for the people
and their democratic processes (3.37 ff.). No doubt a coward like Thucydides’s
Cleon would feel contempt for ordinary people, but why would he—a
politician—express that openly? Such cowardice commonly leads to flattery,
not to open expressions of contempt. Similarly, the angry reproaches leveled at
Sparta by the Corinthian spokesman (1.69) are more likely to represent what
the Corinthians felt than what they said openly at the time.
Some important speeches evidently conceal the true thoughts and feelings of
the speakers. Early in his defense of the lives of the Mytileneans, Diodotus says
that in Athens, “a man who has something rather good to say must tell lies in
order to be believed, just as a man who gives terrible advice must win over the
people by {xxxiii} deception” (3.43). And indeed he disguises his plea for
compassionate justice under a cloak of realpolitik, while his opponent, Cleon,
hides his argument for ruthless expediency under a mantle of justice. We meet
a similar pair of deceptions in the very first exchange of speeches, between
Corinth and Corcyra (1.32–44).
Cleon speaks deceptively again in regard to Pylos, when he says that if he
were general, he would go straight to the attack; when offered the command,
he tries to back out, but the Assembly calls his bluff (4.27–28). We don’t have
the actual speech in this case, but we do have a similar deception by Nicias. In
his second speech of the Sicilian debate, Nicias tries to stop the expedition
indirectly, by raising its price tag. He fails, as the Assembly calls his bluff.
Thucydides bluntly explains Nicias’s reasons for speaking as he does, contrary
to his own opinion (6.19, 20–23). He will try a similar tactic again, in writing
this time, with tragic results: knowing that the expedition had failed and should
be recalled, he gives the Athenians a choice between recalling the force and
doubling it (7.11–14). They choose the latter option, with the result that the
defeat devastates Athens.
A good rhetorical strategy would be to pretend to care about justice while
pursuing the opposite, as Glaucon points out in the Republic: “the height of
injustice is to seem just without being so” (361a). Thucydides is well equipped
to see through such pretenses to virtue (2.51), and he does so implicitly in
framing the speech of the Corcyreans (1.32–36) and later that of Cleon (3.37–
40). The Spartan Brasidas uses promises of freedom and justice to dismember
the Athenian Empire (e.g., 4.85–87), and although he may truly be virtuous,
he displays his virtue for strategic ends. The plain outrage at injustice that is
shown by the Spartan ephor in Book 1 is as extraordinary as is the brevity of his
speech (1.86).
Thucydides’s speakers rarely persuade their audiences, but they seem often to
have persuaded themselves. The Lacedaemonians, for example, are not moved
by the arguments of either side in the debate at Sparta (1.88), while, in the
same debate, the Athenians appear to be quite convinced by their own excuses
for assuming an imperial role. Generally, the Athenians are shown to believe
what they say again and again in their speeches: that their actions have been
necessary and that their strategy will triumph over the chances of war. On both
points they are self-deceived, as we shall see. Individual speakers too may be
self-deceived, as when they exaggerate their own virtues or success (Alcibiades
at 6.16 and Brasidas at 4.86).
In sum, we cannot trust the speeches. They do not directly tell us what
Thucydides believed, and they do not always reveal what {xxxiv} he thinks the
speakers believed. The speakers are revealed, not for what they say, but for
what they are, beneath their speaking. But what of Thucydides? What do we
learn about him? Many of the speeches do illustrate his view of human nature,
as adumbrated in the descriptions of the plague and the Corcyrean civil war.
But that is not all. His selection and arrangement of speeches is masterful. The
concatenation of the Melian Dialogue with the Sicilian Debate, for example, is
startling: the same Athenians who decried the hopes of the Melians plunge, a
few pages later, into a huge military gamble fueled by hope. Or consider the
curious interleaving of the stories of the sieges of Plataea and Mytilene, each
ending in a brutal debate. After hearing how badly the Plataeans failed in their
plea for justice, we can understand better why Diodotus had earlier defended
the Mytileneans without appealing to justice. In the end, the moral difference
between Athens and Sparta at this point is reduced to this: that Sparta’s
interests required it to sacrifice Plataea, while Athens’s interests permitted it to
spare the majority of Mytileneans.

Narrative Structures
Thucydides’s selection and arrangement of narrative material similarly serves
his purposes. The most salient example is his placement of the description of
the plague immediately after the Funeral Oration of Pericles. The glories of
Athens, as Pericles describes them, melt away under pressure of disease, and
much of what has passed for virtue turns out to be sham. Again, it is not simply
because he had eyewitnesses at hand that he tells us in vivid detail about the
last days of Plataea or the Sicilian expedition. The Plataeans were led into their
debacle by Athenian promises (2.73—only a few pages after the eulogy of
Pericles) and then abandoned, betrayed by the vagaries of Athenian democracy
(3.57). The Athenians should either have told Plataea they could not defend it
or have given up Pericles’s strategy. As it was, they evidently tried to have their
strategy while promising a course of action—the defense of Plataea—that could
only be achieved by abandoning that strategy. Athens later treated the
expedition to Sicily in the same way, supporting the plan but taking its
command away from the one man who could make it work. Both are sharp
examples of the cost of incompetence in high places and the failure of
democracy to provide clear, consistent leadership in time of war. The story is
told in a way that is deceptively simple, but artfully arranged to leave its point
in the reader’s mind.
{xxxv} If I am right so far about evidence for the views of Thucydides, there is
nothing in the History that can be excluded and nothing that has independent
authorial force. The work must be read with care as a whole. All of it is
animated by the enormous intelligence of its author.
Some scholars find this advice hard to follow: they cannot read Thucydides as
a whole because, in their eyes, the book breaks down into sections that were
written at different stages, and each of these must be taken on its own.22 I shall
not deal with the developmental hypothesis here, except to say that it must be a
last resort. On the whole, the History is very tightly written, and its complex
interlocking structures repay the most careful attention. It is a mosaic, of
course, but a mosaic that appears to derive from a master plan, at least until it
reaches the unfinished sections that make up Book 8.

Political Theory
The philosophical Thucydides lurks everywhere in the History. Can we, on the
basis of many sightings, produce a composite picture of his political theory?
Any attempt is speculative and controversial. Anyone who tries must blunder
through the complex trail left by a man who could see all sides of the issues he
treated. I will have space for only a general outline here.

Constitutions
Thucydides seems to hold that the main object of politics is stability and the
avoidance of civil strife (stasis), which brings out the worst in people.
Accordingly we would expect him to support the Lacedaemonian model of
government and reject the Athenian. This is borne out by the text, up to a
point. The story it tells is built around the failure of Athens, a failure that was
partly due to the vacillations of Athenian democracy and the instability of its
constitution when subjected to great stress. These themes are illustrated in the
Athenians’ failure to make peace after their victory on Sphacteria, in the
mishandling of the Sicilian expedition, in the chaos of the year 411, and, of
course, in the banishment of unsuccessful generals like Thucydides. Such
malfeasance led the general Nicias to be more afraid of his own people’s
government than of the enemy (7.48). Athenian democracy, as Thucydides
represents it, worked well only when controlled by a {xxxvi} Pericles, who could
have the stabilizing effect of a monarch (2.65); otherwise it tended to fall into
the hands of demagogues, such as Cleon (3.37, 4.21, 28, 5.16), and could be
seen as a tyranny of the many over the few. Democracy was felt to be
oppressive by many die-hard conservatives, who longed for traditional upper-
class privileges. Thucydides and most of our sources for the period belonged to
this group. In addition, Thucydides has a dim view of human nature when it is
ungoverned, and the same should go for democracy, since it seems to give
human nature the largest, most untrammeled scope. On the other hand,
Thucydides also shows the value of democracy to the Athenians. Connor
writes:
 He [Thucydides] makes clear that the Athenians made risky decisions and
sometimes serious blunders, but the democratic culture that enabled these
mistakes also helped produce a people of astonishing adaptability and
resilience.23
Was Thucydides, then, an admirer of the Spartan constitution? Certainly not,
for he represents that system, too, as seriously flawed (8.96). Sparta did not
accept the good advice of Archidamus in Book 1 any more than Athens stuck
by the strategy of Pericles; and Lacedaemonians too committed their share of
atrocities. Nor is democracy entirely bad. Its strength is revealed in the Sicilian
episode, for Syracuse was at the time a moderate democracy, and Thucydides
sees this as making it a more powerful opponent for Athens (7.55, cf. 8.96). Its
people evidently felt they had a stake in the city and were for that reason
willing to defend it. Thucydides also points out to us that democracy is more
stable than a newly minted oligarchy (8.89). In the end, he prefers a mixed
constitution of the kind promised by the proposal for the Five Thousand
(8.97); this, we must suppose, promised the stability and fairness that he looked
for in government. It was never implemented.
Whatever his views were on constitutions, Thucydides seems to have been
committed to the cause of freedom for the cities of Greece, holding that
freedom under any constitution was better than the tyranny of empire.24

{xxxvii} Justice
On the main points of ethics, Thucydides’s views do not depart from the
standard views of his class and period.25 Justice, reverence, and other virtues are
as they are thought to be, and are unchallenged goods, though fragile ones.
Justice is the principal moral concept in the History; the word and its cognates
ring through the book as if they mattered; and they would, too, if equals in
power came to court or arbitration under established law. Justice consists in the
following:
1. That traditional law be maintained.26
2. That disputes be settled without violence by a duly constituted authority.
3. That an agreement be kept, even when it is in the interests of one party to
abrogate it.27
4. That punishment be meted out as retribution, proportional to the offense,
 and only to the guilty.28
5. That overreaching and avarice (pleonexia) be avoided.
6. That the tyrannical use of force be avoided. (This follows directly from 1,
as such tyranny occurs when traditional law is abrogated.)
I have said that Thucydides is a traditionalist on justice, and so he is. His view
differs widely from the two main positions that had been advanced by sophists.
The extreme position, represented by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, is that
conventional justice is bad for us because it runs against human nature. Instead
of justice, which is the law of men, Callicles says we should follow the law of
nature (Gorgias 483b–d).
Thucydides is no Callicles: though he shows how justice is often subverted by
power, neither Thucydides nor any of his speakers ever suggests that justice is
merely an empty convention, or that nature offers us a better law. All he shows
is that nature, or necessity, or in {xxxviii} one case both together,29 may be too
powerful for justice. Thucydides clings to the traditional view of nature and
justice: justice is good, but nature is dangerous and should therefore be kept
under control.
The more moderate sophistic position is that of Protagoras, who holds that
justice is a kind of second nature to us, something every Greek learns from
society as he learns language. This is a pleasantly optimistic model: if justice is
like language, it is not easily forgotten; and though it is not as natural to us as
claws to a lion, justice remains essential to normal human life in
communities.30 Thucydides takes a harsher view: justice is essential for living
well in communities, but it is far from being as easy to maintain as a language.
He has a sharp eye for pretenses of all sorts, and is not taken in by the
posturing of his compatriots in the name of virtues such as justice. He sees not
only how fragile the Greek moral system is, but also how much of it is built
upon deception. Scene by scene, Thucydides relentlessly exposes the motives of
the Greeks to his scrutiny. Time and time again in the History, justice is
honored more in speech than in action, and more by the weak than by the
powerful. It is this realism that draws readers to the History: its frightening
accuracy about the fragility of goodness in human dealings when power is
involved.
Pericles’s Funeral Oration praises Athens as a lesson for Greece. The irony of
this in the larger context of Thucydides’s story is shocking. Athens was a lesson
for Greece, but not in an admirable way. Consider what lesson Athens almost
taught at Mytilene and did teach at Melos, or what its army demonstrated
outside Syracuse: don’t follow the example of Athens. Thucydides and others
conveyed this point with such force to posterity that democratic reformers in
the nineteenth century, such as Grote, had to refute his view of Athenian
democracy in order to restore its ideals to intellectual respectability.

{xxxix} Power
Thucydides has many words for power—dunamis, of course, but also kratos
(control) and archē (empire) are prominent, as are anankē (compulsion,
necessity, expedience) and bia (force, violence). In international affairs, power
is measured31 in the accumulation of wealth and the development of naval
superiority. Speeches at international gatherings have virtually no effect, and
arbitration between states is irrelevant when interests truly conflict. Alliances
are valuable to you just so long as you have the force to keep your allies at your
side; consanguinity (as between Melos and Sparta, or Plataea and Thebes)
carries no weight.
At the level of domestic politics, Thucydides’s concern is mainly with
Athenian democracy. Here, and here only, speeches make a difference—but
not much. Pericles was able to manipulate the people to some extent, but his
power rested more on his reputation for virtue than on his rhetoric, and even
this power failed him when the war began to bite on the Athenians, and they
began to look for someone to bite in turn. Alcibiades was a successful speaker,
on the whole, and his first great service to Athens, according to Thucydides,
was a speech that prevented civil war (8.86). Cleon, by contrast, maintained an
uneasy hold on the people. When peace was possible after Pylos, he was
powerful enough to talk a weary people into continuing the war (4.21); but in
scenes Thucydides describes in greater detail, Cleon was first defeated in a
rhetorical contest (over Mytilene) and then outmaneuvered by a skillful
politician (Nicias, when he called Cleon’s bluff over Pylos). In fact, such
success as Cleon had seems mainly due to luck. Even in democracy, power rests
more on understanding human nature than on knowing how to manipulate
words. To avoid exile at the hands of the people, a leader must be able to
predict the behavior of the democracy, vague and vacillating as it is (7.48).
Where Alcibiades and Thucydides failed to stay in the people’s good graces,
Nicias succeeded: his cautious and dilatory conduct of the Sicilian campaign
kept him from losing his command, though it led in the end to total defeat.
Such are the advantages of understanding how human nature serves democracy.

{xl} Human Nature

Two features of the new learning were its positive view of human nature
(phusis) and its critical attitude toward social conventions (nomos). Thucydides
rejects both of these and harks back to the traditional view of nature as
something wild and always in need of the trainer’s strong hand. In this he is
more like Plato than he is like other intellectuals of his period. War, civil strife,
or natural disaster can easily strip away the good work of civilization. “War is a
violent teacher,” says Thucydides: it teaches people not only to be vicious, but
also to mask their vices with fine-sounding names. Loss of life saddens
Thucydides, but he does not see it as a moral outrage in itself. After all, he was
no pacifist, but a seasoned soldier and a member of a social class whose
principal role in society involved bloodshed. He is appalled, however, by death
in a civil brawl and shows a sense of outrage at the loss of virtue that
accompanies it:
Civil war brought many hardships to the cities, such as happen and will
always happen as long as the nature of human beings is the same, although
they may be more or less violent or take different forms, as imposed by
particular changes in the circumstances. In peace and prosperity, cities and
private individuals alike have better intelligence because they are not
plunged into the necessity of doing anything against their will; but war is a
violent teacher: when it takes away the easy supply of what they need for
daily life, war gives to people’s passions the violent quality of their present
situation.
Civil war ran through the cities; those it struck later heard what the first
cities had done and far exceeded them in inventing artful means for attack
and bizarre forms of revenge. And they reversed the usual way of using
words to evaluate what they did. (3.82)
But war is not simply the cause of this. War and the loss of virtue are together
consequences of something else: “the cause of all this was the desire to rule out
of avarice and ambition, and the zeal for winning that proceeds from those
two,” he goes on to say. What causes the trouble, then, is the exercise of power
in the interest of merely personal or civic gain—what the Greeks called
pleonexia, avarice or overreaching. Now, is it inevitable that power will lead to
injustice? Evidently not. Pericles, for all his faults, ruled like the Pisistratids
before him without corruption, according to Thucydides. Bad {xli} as it may be
in wartime, human nature does not determine events. Choice, chance, and
economic factors are all important to Thucydides’s story. The observance of
traditional laws and the cultivation of traditional virtues—including a moderate
respect for the laws of one’s neighbors—these would be enough to keep the
wickedness in check, if only people could cling to them. There appears,
however, to be a necessity in human events that brings on war.

Necessity
Anankē is usually translated “necessity,” and this is right if taken as in the
sentence “it was a military necessity to bomb Hiroshima.” In Greek, as in
English, such language often masks a choice. I have usually rendered anankē
with forms of “compulsion” and “compel,” which suggest a human agency,
because the basis of one person’s anankē is usually the action—or expected
action—of another. In some cases it means little more than what is expedient,
as in the Corinthian speech at Athens (1.37).
Anankē arises in a wholly human context in Thucydides. It is not fate or the
will of the gods, nor can it be reduced to mechanical laws of history or
economics. It is not even the force behind human nature. Although he believes
human behavior falls into patterns—that is why he thinks history is useful
(1.22.4)—Thucydides does not appeal to the idea that psychological laws
objectively determine individual choices. On the contrary, anankē is generally
subjective in Thucydides: those who cite it in their speeches contend that it
limits their range of choices and makes further discussion pointless. Plainly,
their opponents do not agree. Thucydides makes only one appeal to anankē in
his own voice, and that is in his explanation of the war: the growth of Athenian
power “put fear into the Lacedaemonians and so compelled them into war”
(1.23). As the story unfolds, we see that this anankē does indeed work through
fear, and that it affects both sides: the Spartans feel they must curtail Athenian
power while they still can; the Athenians feel that they cannot let any power
slip from their grasp, lest the cities they have held down rise up and destroy
them.
Athenians, however, do not see the war as inevitable. In their defense, before
the Peloponnesians, Athenian representatives appeal to anankē and the
principle (which they claim is established) that the weak be held down by the
more powerful (1.76, cf. 5.105): even Sparta, they say, would have been
compelled by anankē to seize power forcibly, or else put itself at risk, if it had
remained at the head {xlii} of the anti-Persian league. In context we see that
such anankē results from ambition, fear, and advantage (self-interest), with fear
topping the list (1.76). But, Thucydides recognizes, human beings are free to
decide how to respond to those motives.32
Fear, ambition, and self-interest are strong motives, but they do not actually
make events in history inevitable, even in Thucydides. They merely make
events feel inevitable to the principal actors. We the audience can see that the
war was not inevitable from clues Thucydides leaves for us.33 Sparta did not
have to go to war; it could have followed the sage advice of Archidamus and
gone to arbitration instead, as the Spartans realized later with regret (7.18).
Athens did not have to grow in the way it did—not, at least, for the reasons the
Athenians gave. Had Sparta continued as head of the anti-Persian league, it
would surely not have been compelled to set up an empire on the Athenian
model. Neither Thucydides nor our other sources give us any reason to believe
the Athenian counterfactual. The Peloponnesian League never did follow the
Athenian model, even when it was victorious.34
This appears to be Thucydides’s story, and it leaves no room for the law of
nature which the Athenians claim to follow: that the strong are always
compelled to rule over the weak (1.76, 5.105). This “law,” which is peculiarly
Athenian in Thucydides, kicks in only when the strong have overreached and
therefore have reason to fear the weak. The Spartans make nothing of anankē
before attacking and subsequently destroying Plataea. All in all, hardly anyone
but the Athenians makes such pleas, and these are steadfastly rejected by their
weaker opponents, who are never persuaded that it was inevitable for Athens to
destroy them.
Anankē is not the only illusion of the Athenians. They are also beguiled by
gnōmē—planned strategy. This requires a chapter in itself: Athenian strategy
led to one disaster after another, while their {xliii} only great success, at
Sphacteria, was due almost entirely to chance. A full study would show that
Thucydides represents the Athenians as caught in elaborate self-deceptions,
with their concept of anankē at the center of the web. Anankē is usually a bad
excuse. You are likely to make it after your avarice has led you to commit
injustice, which has in turn led you to be afraid of the people you have treated
unjustly. That fear in turn produces the sense of anankē that drives the
Athenians. The Athenians are partly right to feel that their actions are
inevitable. Once begun, the cycle may be unstoppable; but the cycle did not
have to begin, and moral decay is not inevitable in Thucydides’s History; it has
precise and (except for the plague) avoidable causes. Alliances can be
maintained—witness the rise of the Peloponnesian League—and sound forms
of government can be proposed—witness the concept of the Five Thousand.
But when a special interest takes power over others (such as the common
people over the wealthy, or an imperial partner over allied cities), it starts the
terrible cycle.

Plato and Thucydides

The philosopher and the historian have in common a fascination with Athens’s
loss of virtue during the Peloponnesian War, but they differ sharply on causes
and cures. Both see the decline in terms of the rise of democracy, the growth of
empire, and the new learning’s critique of morality. Both emphasize the gap
between the moral ideals of the Greeks and their experience of life, which was
such that life could not possibly have taught them those ideals. Plato adds a
metaphysical explanation for the gap between life and ideals (by postulating
moral ideals that have a separate existence as Forms or Ideas) and supplies an
ambitious scheme for closing the gap through radical reform in education
(bringing the future philosopher kings up from the cave of ignorance to see the
Forms). In the Republic, Plato attributes the moral decay of individuals to poor
company and inadequate education. His solution is a society rebuilt around
moral education, with strong controls over the appetites of ordinary people to
prevent their succumbing to avarice and overreaching.
Thucydides gives no formal explanation, but what he implies is less optimistic
than Plato’s theory: education and tradition cannot be relied upon. They fail
when subjected to stress, and once the cycle of moral decay begins, from avarice
to a sense of anankē, there is no stopping it. Apparently the only hope is not to
take this road at all, {xliv} to maintain traditional governments and alliances, to
cling to old values and virtues, to avoid the first small step toward overreaching.
Antidemocratic and suspicious of change it may be, but this message comes
from the depths of painful experience. It is what we would expect to hear from
the tragic age of Greece.
1. From Hobbes’s Introduction (Molesworth, vol. 7, p. xxii; Schlatter 1975, 18).
2. All dates in this volume are BCE.
3.The concept of democracy in ancient Greece is best illustrated by the constitution of Athens, which
was designed to distribute power among the citizens as equally as possible, with no regard for wealth or
parentage.
4.Oligarchies were governments controlled by small numbers of men who were rich and usually
wellborn.
5. See Plato, Republic 8, 557b ff., 562d ff., 564d.
6.Aristotle tells us that Athens set up democracies everywhere, and Sparta oligarchies (Politics 4.11).
That would explain why the oligarchs at Melos did not let the Athenians make their case to the
common people (5.84–85).
7.As Athens tightened the screws on its collection of payments, the allied cities became more resentful.
On the issues, see the following passages with Hornblower’s notes (1991): 1.99.1, 2.8.5, 3.3.4, 3.27.3,
and 3.47.1.
8. For a review of early Greek anthropology see Guthrie (1971, 60–84). The main figures in this
development are Democritus and Protagoras. Thucydides’s “Archaeology” (1.2–20), which Guthrie
ignores in this context, not only is indebted to their sort of work, but also goes further in introducing
empirical method to the subject.
9. Hornblower 1987, 189 with n. 105.
10. Rawlings 1981, 247, citing Xenophon, Hellenica 2.29–10.
11. Connor 2017–2018.
12.On the treatment of suppliants: 3.58–59, 3.66–67, and 3.81. In 6.19, we learn that the Egestans, in
asking Athens to make war on Syracuse, “begged them as suppliants” and appealed to the Athenians to
stand by their oaths. They were successful, but not for that reason (6.24).
13. On the abrogation of treaties: 1.87–88 (with 7.18), 3.10, 3.56, 3.65, and 3.68. The treaty of Nicias
(5.18–23) is ineffective, as the war continues by proxy by both sides (5.26, cf, 5.35). Nicias will say that
this was a treaty “in name only” (6.10).
14.In 7.77, Nicias assesses his life as follows: “I have passed my life in great devotion to what is ordained
toward the gods, while toward men I have shown great justice and given no offense. . . . And now we
have a reason to hope for milder treatment from the gods, since we have come to deserve their pity more
than their anger.” Soon after this, they are all killed or captured.
15.On oracles and divination: Thucydides shows some skepticism at 2.8, 2.17, 2.54, 5.103, 7.50, and
7.79. But he finds one that holds water at 5.26 (the second preface).
16. On reverence in Greek thought, see Woodruff 2014.
17. See Smith 1903, on Thucydides’s treatment of character.
18. Bury 1951, 486 and 483. He calls Nicias, “this hero of conscientious indecision.”
19. Hornblower (1987, 189) writes: “It is astonishing . . . that his position could ever have been
mistaken, by any reader of the euethes passage [on the loss of the virtue of simplicity in the civil war], for
that of the immoralists of his generation.”
20.Werner Jaeger takes the generous view: the speeches are “above all else the medium through which
[Thucydides] expresses his political ideas” (1945, 391). Hornblower takes the more austere line: “the
sentiments contained in those speeches can never be used as evidence for his own opinions” (1987, 72).
21. See Hornblower 1987, 46.
22. See Hornblower 1987, chapter 6.
23. Connor 2017–2018.
24. Nichols 2015. See also Raaflaub 2012.
25. Ostwald, following a substantial tradition (1988, 61, n. 31).
26.Thucydides admired the Pisistratids for preserving Athenian traditions (6.54) and sympathized with
the Peloponnesian war aim of supporting traditional autonomy in the cities (e.g., 2.8).
27.A violation of principles 2 and 3 (in the refusal of the Spartans to go to arbitration as agreed) was a
principal cause of the war (1.85, 7.18).
28. The deterrent theory of punishment, which belonged to the new learning, is not offered by Diodotus
as having anything to do with justice. It is Cleon’s retributivism that is associated with justice (3.37 ff.).
29. Even at 5.105, where the Athenian spokesman comes closest to Callicles of anyone in the History, he
stops short of saying that it is good or proper that the strong rule as many people as they can. He
represents the rule of the strong neutrally, as a natural constraint. In representing it as a constraint, he
implies that he feels a pull in the other direction. As often in Thucydides, an appeal to anankē to explain
an injustice shows that the speaker is still loyal to justice as an ideal, but feels constrained from following
it.
30.Plato, Protagoras 320d ff. Although not a direct quotation from Protagoras, the passage represents a
view that was part of the new learning, and is probably Protagorean in general outline.
31.This is Thucydides’s assumption throughout Book 1, and yet Sparta, the greatest land power of
Greece, was insignificant in both wealth and ships until it made a deal with the Persians.
32.Ostwald thinks Thucydides holds that “ἀνάγκη will always ride roughshod over human judgments of
right and wrong” (1988, 61), but Finley has written “the element of compulsion in events was not, to his
mind, such that it could not be controlled or directed” (1942, 308).
33. Kagan argues that the war was not inevitable, using evidence from Thucydides. He believes, however,
as I do not, that Thucydides thought the war inevitable (1969, 366).
34.Athens and Sparta were ruled by different sorts of fears in any case: Athens feared for its supplies of
grain and timber, but Sparta feared an uprising of the conquered people who worked its farms.
 {xlv} Further Reading

Translations
The four best-known translations of Thucydides have been Thomas Hobbes
(1629), Richard Crawley (1876, revised ed., 1910), Benjamin Jowett (1881,
revised ed., 1900), and Rex Warner (1954). I have consulted all of these in
preparing my own.

Commentaries on the Greek Text

I have used all the available commentaries at every turn. Especially useful is the
work in five volumes begun by Gomme and completed by Andrewes and
Dover. The best philological commentary on a part of the text is a recent work
on Book 2 by Rusten. There are also good school commentaries on Books 6
and 7 by Dover. The Molesworth edition of Hobbes’s translation (1843) has
useful notes. For more recent commentaries, see my preface to this second
edition.

Works about Thucydides

A general discussion of Thucydides scholarship is in Dover (1973). A beginner
to the study of Thucydides should read Hornblower (1987), W. R. Connor
(1977 and 1984), and, especially, de Romilly (1951). On the philosophical side
of Thucydides, Woodhead (1970) is helpful, and the careful studies of Ostwald
on autonomia and anankē are invaluable for a scholar (1982, 1988). Farrar gives
the most thorough recent treatment of Thucydides as a political philosopher
(1988). Euben (1990) treats Thucydides’s discussion of the civil war on
Corcyra. The most famous concept study on Thucydides is Adam Parry’s
dissertation (1957).

Works about Ancient Greece

The J.A.C.T.1 World of Athens (Cambridge, 1984) is a good place to begin. The
new Cambridge Ancient History, vol. V (1992), edited by {xlvi} D. M. Lewis et
al., gives a recent word on many topics of interest to readers of Thucydides.
Ostwald (1986) covers Athenian politics and law. On Athenian democracy,
Hansen (1999) is magisterial for the fourth century; Ober’s recent work on the
fifth century is essential reading, of which his 2010 is an apt example.

Works about the Peloponnesian War

Although controversial on some points, Kagan’s series of volumes (1969–1987)
is the most thorough. The study by de Ste. Croix (1972) is especially good on
the background of the war. Peter Green’s account of the Sicilian expedition is
both good scholarship and good reading (1970). Hawthorn shows the relevance
of Thucydides to politics today (2009). Two collections of essays about
Thucydides have come out in recent years and a third is in production: Rusten
(2009), Rengakos and Tsakmakis (2012), and Low (forthcoming).

1. Joint Association of Classical Teachers.

 {xlvii} Works Cited

Bury, J. S. A History of Greece. 3rd ed. Revised by Russell Meiggs. London: Macmillan, 1951.
Cameron, H. D. Thucydides Book I: A Students’ Grammatical Commentary. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2003.
Connor, W. R. The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1971.
__________. “Pericles on Democracy: Thucydides 2.37.1.” Classical World 111, no. 2 (2017–2018): 165–
75.
__________. “A Post-Modernist Thucydides?” Classical Journal 72 (1977): 289–98.
__________. Thucydides. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Cornford, Francis M. Thucydides Mythistoricus. London: Edward Arnold, 1907.
Dover, K. J. Thucydides. J.A.C.T. Greece and Rome: New Surveys in the Classics #7. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973.
__________. Thucydides Book VI. With Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1965.
__________. Thucydides Book VII. With Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1965.
Euben, Peter. The Tragedy of Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Farrar, Cynthia. The Origins of Democratic Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Finley, John H. Jr. Thucydides. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942.
Gagarin, Michael, and Paul Woodruff, eds. Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Gomme, A. W., A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. 5 vols. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1945–1981.
Green, Peter. Armada from Athens. London: Doubleday, 1970.
Grene, David. Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in Plato and Thucydides. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965. (Originally published as Man in His Pride: A Study in the Political Philosophy of
Plato and Thucydides. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.)
Guthrie, W. K. C. The Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
{xlviii} Hansen, M. G. The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology.
2nd ed. Trans. J. A. Cook. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.
Hawthorn, Geoffrey. Thucydides on Politics: Back to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009.
Hornblower, Simon. A Commentary on Thucydides. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991–2008.
__________. Thucydides. London: Duckworth, 1987.
Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. 2nd ed. Trans. Gilbert Highet. London: Oxford
University Press, 1945.
Kagan, Donald. The Fall of the Athenian Empire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
__________. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Low, Polly. Cambridge Companion to Thucydides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Marchant, E. C. Thucydides Book I. Originally published 1905. With new introduction and bibliography
by Thomas Wiedemann. London: Bristol Classical Press, 1982. Reissued 1993 and 2001.
Nichols, Mary P. Thucydides and the Pursuit of Freedom. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
Nussbaum, Martha C. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Ober, Josiah. “Thucydides on Athens’ Democratic Advantage in the Archidamian War.” In War,
Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens, edited by David Pritchard, 65–87. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
Ostwald, Martin. “Anankē in Thucydides.” American Classical Studies 18 (1988).
__________. “Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History.” American Classical Studies 2 (1982).
__________. From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century
Athens. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Parry, Adam Milman. “Logos and Ergon in Thucydides.” PhD diss., Harvard University, 1957.
Published in New York, 1981. Repr. Salem, NH, 1988.
Raaflaub, Kurt. “Thucydides on Democracy and Oligachy.” In Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, edited by
A. Rengakos and A. Tsakmakis, 189–222. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
Rawlings, H. D. The Structure of Thucydides’ History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
{xlix} Reeve, C. D. C. “Thucydides on Human Nature.” Political Theory 27 (1999): 435–46.
Rengakos, A., and A. Tsakmakis, eds. Brill’s Companion to Thucydides. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
Rhodes, P. J. Thucydides History II. Edited with translation and commentary. Warminster: Aris and Philips,
1988.
__________. Thucydides History III. Edited with translation and commentary. Warminster: Aris and
Philips, 1993.
__________. Thucydides History IV.1–V.24. Edited with translation and commentary. Warminster: Aris and
Philips, 1998.
__________. Thucydides History I. Edited with introduction, translation and notes. Oxford: Oxbow Books,
2014.
Romilly, J. de. Thucydide et l’imperialisme athénienne. 2nd ed. Paris, 1951. Translated as Thucydides and
Athenian Imperialism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.
Rusten, J. S., ed. Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Thucydides. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
__________. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Schlatter, Richard. Hobbes’ Thucydides. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1975.
Smith, Charles Forster. “Character-Drawing in Thucydides.” American Journal of Philology 24, no. 4
(1903): 369–87.
Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de. The Origins of the Peloponnesian War. London: Duckworth, 1972.
Strauss, Leo. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Wills, Garry. Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
Woodhead, A. Geoffrey. Thucydides on the Nature of Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1970.
Woodruff, P. “Justice and Morality in Thucydides.” In Cambridge Companion to Thucydides, edited by
Polly Low. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
__________. Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
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 {1} BOOK 1

Early History, Method, and the Cause of War

Thucydides begins with a brief preface followed by an investigation of the beginnings

of Greek civilization. This section, known as the “Archaeology,” is important mainly
as an illustration of historical method. There Thucydides brings out, among other
factors, the importance of economics in history and the value of sea power.

THUCYDIDES’S PREFACE
[1] Thucydides,1 an Athenian, wrote up the war of the Peloponnesians and the
Athenians as they fought against each other. He began to write as soon as the
war was afoot, with the expectation that it would turn out to be a great one and
that, more than all earlier wars, this one would deserve to be recorded. He
made this prediction because both sides entered the war at their peak in every
sort of military preparation, and also because he saw the rest of the Greek
world taking one side or the other, some right away, others planning to do so.
This was certainly the greatest mobilization there had ever been among the
Greeks. It also reached many foreigners—indeed, it affected almost everyone.
Because of the great passage of time it is impossible to discover clearly what
happened long ago or even just before these events; still, I have looked into the
evidence as far as can be done, and I am confident that nothing great happened
in or out of war before this.

{2} THE ARCHAEOLOGY

Now Thucydides reconstructs the prehistory of Greece to support his thesis that no
ancient display of power could compare with those of the Peloponnesian War. He
makes astute use of all the evidence available to him—the Homeric poems, traditions
of aristocratic families, king lists, archaeology, and even the current condition of other
early peoples. He uses these resources critically and is guided at every stage by his
conception of eikós—what could reasonably be expected in the circumstances.
[2] It is evident that what is now called “Hellas”2 was not permanently settled
in former times, but that there were many migrations, and people were ready to
leave their land whenever they met the force of superior numbers. There was
no trade, and they could not communicate with each other, either by land or
over the sea, without danger. Each group used its ground merely to produce a
bare living; they had no surplus of riches, and they planted nothing,3 because
they could not know when someone would invade and carry everything away,
especially since they had no walls. They counted themselves masters of just
enough to sustain them each day, wherever they were, and so made little
difficulty about moving on. Because of this they had no strength, either in the
size of their cities or in any other resources. The best land was always the most
subject to these changes of inhabitants: what is now called Thessaly, also
Boeotia, most of the Peloponnesus except for Arcadia, and whatever was most
fertile in the rest of Greece. For the excellence of the land increased the power
of certain men, and this led to civil wars, by which they were ruined; and all
this made them more vulnerable to the designs of outsiders. Accordingly,
Attica has been free from civil war for most of its history, owing to its having
thin soil; and that is why it has always been inhabited by the same people.4
Here is strong support for this account: because of the migrations, the rest of
Greece did not develop at the same rate as Athens, since the most able refugees
from wars and civil strife all over Greece retired to the safety of Athens. There
they became citizens, and they {3} added so much to the citizen population that
Attica could no longer support them, and colonies were sent out to Ionia.
[3] I am further convinced of the weakness of Hellas in ancient times by this
fact: before the Trojan War, Hellas evidently took no action in common. And I
do not believe that the name “Hellas” was yet applied to the whole country.
Before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, there was no such name at all,
but the various regions took the names of their own inhabitants, with
“Pelasgian” naming the largest. When Hellen and his sons came to power in
Phthiotis [a part of Thessaly], however, they were called in to the aid of other
cities, which one by one came to be called Hellenes because of their association
with them. That name cannot have prevailed over all of Greece until much
later, however. The principal evidence for this is from Homer, who does not
ever give them that name in general, though he was born long after the Trojan
War. He does not use the name for anyone but those who came from Phthiotis
with Achilles (who were the very first Hellenes); but he calls the others
“Danaans,” “Argives,” or “Achaeans” in his poems. He does not use the term
“foreigner” (barbaros) either, because, it seems to me, the Hellenes were not yet
marked off by one name in opposition to them. City by city, then, they came to
be called Hellenes if they understood each other’s language, and later they all
had this name; but before the Trojan War they did not enter into any action
with their forces joined, owing to their lack of strength and communication;
and they joined in that expedition only because they had learned to make more
use of the sea.
[4] Minos, by all reports, was the first to build a navy;5 he made himself
master of most of what is now the Hellenic Sea, ruled the islands called the
Cyclades, and sent colonies to most of them, expelling the Carians and setting
up his own sons there as governors. Also, as one would expect, he freed the seas
from piracy as much as he could, so that his revenue could reach him more
easily.
[5] In ancient times, you see, the Greeks had turned to piracy as soon as they
began to travel more in ships from one place to another, and so had the
foreigners who lived on the mainland shore or on the islands. Their most
powerful leaders aimed at their own profit, but also hoped to support the weak;
and so they fell upon cities that had no walls or were made up of settlements.
They raided these places and made most of their living from that. Such actions
were nothing to be ashamed of then, but carried with them a certain glory, as
we may {4} learn from some of the mainlanders for whom this is still an honor,
even today, if done nobly. The same point is proved by the ancient poets, who
show that anyone who sails by, anywhere, is asked the same question—“Are
you a pirate?”—and that those who are asked are not insulted, while those who
want to know are not reproachful.6
They also robbed each other on the mainland, and even now much of Greece
follows this old custom—the Ozolean Locrians, for example, and the Aetolians
and Acarnanians and mainlanders near them.7 The fashion of carrying iron
weapons survives among those mainlanders as well, from their old trade of
thieving. [6] All of Greece used to carry arms, you see, because the places they
lived were not fortified and travel was unsafe; so they became accustomed to
living every day with weapons, as foreigners do. The fact that some parts of
Greece still do so testifies that the practice was once universal.
The Athenians were the first Greeks to put their weapons away and change to
a more relaxed and luxurious style of life. It was due to this refinement that the
older men among the rich there only recently gave up the fashion of wearing
long linen robes and tying up the hair on their heads in knots fastened with
golden cicadas.8 From them, because of their kinship with Athens, the same
fashion spread to the older men of Ionia and lasted a long time. The moderate
sort of clothing that is now in style was first used by the Lacedaemonians, who
had made the lifestyle of the rich equal to that of ordinary people, especially in
regard to dress.9 They were also the first to strip themselves naked for exercise
and to oil themselves afterward. In the old days athletes used to wear loincloths
around their private parts when they competed, even at the Olympic Games,
and it has not been many years since this custom ended. Even now there are
foreigners, especially in Asia, whose athletes wear loincloths in boxing matches.
And in many other ways one could show that the lifestyle of the ancient Greeks
was similar to that of foreigners today.
[7] As for the cities, those that were settled more recently—since the advance
of navigation—had a surplus of money and so were built {5} with walls right on
the coasts, blocking off isthmuses, both for commercial reasons and to
strengthen themselves individually against their neighbors. The older cities,
however, were built farther from the sea, owing to the greater danger of piracy
on the islands as well as on the mainland. They robbed each other and any
non-seamen who lived by the coast, with the result that even today those
people are still settled inland.
[8] Most of the pirates were islanders—Carians or Phoenicians, as they had
settled most of the islands. The evidence for this is as follows: when the
Athenians purified Delos during this war,10 they dug up the graves of those
who had died on the island and found that more than half were Carian. They
knew this by the style of the weapons that were buried with them and by the
burial customs, which are still in use.11
Once Minos’s navy was afloat, navigation became easier, since he expelled the
evildoers from the islands and planted colonies of his own in many of them.
And as those who lived along the coasts became more addicted to acquiring
wealth, their settlements became more stable. Some, who had become richer
than before, threw up walls around their towns. In their desire for gain, the
weaker cities let themselves be subject to the stronger ones, while the more
powerful cities used their surplus wealth to bring weaker ones under their rule.
And that was the situation later, when they sent the expedition against Troy.
[9] In my view Agamemnon was able to get the fleet together because he had
more power than anyone else at that time, and not so much because he was the
leader of the suitors of Helen who were bound by oaths to Tyndareus.12
Those who received the clearest account of the Peloponnesians from their
predecessors say that Pelops used the great wealth he brought from Asia and
was the first to win power among the Peloponnesian people (who were very
poor at the time). Because of this he gave his own name to the land, though he
was an outsider. Afterward, his descendants became still more powerful. After
Eurystheus {6} was killed in Attica by the Heraclids,13 Atreus made himself
king of Mycenae and the other lands Eurystheus had ruled. Eurystheus had
entrusted the rule of Mycenae to him when he set off on campaign, because of
their family relationship. Atreus was his mother’s brother and happened to be
living at the time with Eurystheus, in exile from his father for the death of
Chrysippus.14 When Eurystheus did not come back, the Mycenaeans wanted
Atreus to be king, partly out of fear of the Heraclids and partly because they
thought Atreus was an able man and, at the same time, because he had served
the interests of the majority. That is how the descendants of Pelops became
greater than those of Perseus.
Now Agamemnon was the son of Atreus and inherited his power; besides this
he had a stronger navy than anyone else. That is why I think he assembled his
forces more on the basis of fear than good will. It is evident that most of the
ships were his and that he had others to lend to the Arcadians, as Homer
declares (and his evidence should be good enough for anyone).15 Besides, in the
“Giving of the Scepter” Homer says that Agamemnon was lord “of many
islands and all Argos.”16 Now, since he lived on the mainland, he could not
have controlled islands (except for the neighboring ones, of which there were
only a few) unless he had a navy. And we should infer the character of earlier
enterprises on the basis of that expedition.
[10] Of course Mycenae was small, and the cities of that time may not have
seemed to be worth very much; but such weak evidence should not count
against believing that the expedition was as great as the poets have said it was,
and as tradition holds. For if the Lacedaemonians’ city were wiped out, and if
only their temples and building foundations remained, I think people in much
later times would seriously doubt that their power had matched their fame; and
yet they own two-fifths of the Peloponnesus and are leaders of the rest, along
with many allies outside. Still, it would seem to have been rather weak, since it
was not settled as one city making use of costly temples or other buildings, but
was made up of villages in the old {7} Greek style.17 If the same thing were to
happen to Athens, however, one would infer from what was plain to see that its
power had been double what it is.
We have no good reason, then, to doubt those reports about the size of the
army in the Trojan War, or to measure a city more by its appearance than its
power. We should think of that army as indeed greater than those that went
before it, but weaker than those we have now. This depends on our trusting
Homer again on this point, where he would be expected as a poet to
exaggerate; but on his account that army was still much weaker than modern
ones: he makes the fleet consist of 1,200 ships and reports that the Boeotian
ships carried 120 men each, while those of Philoctetes carried 50. I think he
did this to show the maximum and minimum, but he makes no mention at all
in his catalogue of the size of the other ships.18 He does, however, show that all
the rowers in Philoctetes’s ships were also fighters, for he writes that all the
oarsmen were archers. As for passengers on the ships, it is not likely that there
were many, aside from the kings and other top people, especially since they had
to cross the sea with military equipment on board, and in ships without the
protection of upper decks, built in the old pirate fashion. So if we take the
mean between the largest and smallest ships, we find that not many went to
Troy, considered as a joint expedition from all of Greece.
[11] This is to be explained more by lack of wealth than by a shortage of men.
Because of their lack of rations, they brought a smaller army—just the size they
expected would be able to support itself while fighting. When they landed, they
got the upper hand in fighting. (That is obvious; otherwise they could not have
fortified their camp.) After that, apparently, they did not use all their power,
because they had to turn partly to farming in the Chersonese, and partly to
piracy. Because they were dispersed in this way, the Trojans were better able to
hold them off for those ten years and were an equal match for the Greeks who
were left near Troy at any one time. If they had gone out with plenty of rations,
however, and concentrated their forces on continuous warfare without farming
or piracy, they would easily have taken the city once they’d gotten the upper
hand in fighting, since they were a match for the Trojans with the {8} portion
of the army that was present at any time. If they had settled down in a siege
they would have taken Troy in less time with less trouble.19
All enterprises were weak before the Trojan War for want of money, and this
one was too, for all that it was the most famous expedition of ancient times.
The facts show clearly that it was weaker than its fame would have it, and
weaker than the verbal tradition that has come down to us from the poets.
[12] After the Trojan War the Greeks were still in motion, still resettling,
and so could not make progress in one place. The Greeks came back from Troy
after a long absence, and this brought about many changes: civil war broke out
in most cities, and the people who were driven out founded new cities. The
people now known as Boeotians were thrown out of Arnē by the Thessalians in
the sixtieth year after Troy was taken; they settled in what is now Boeotia, but
was then called Cadmeïs. (Only a portion of them were in that country before
then, some of whom fought against Troy.) And in the eightieth year the
Dorians seized the Peloponnesus along with the Heraclids.20
With much ado, then, and after a long time, peace came with security to
Greece; and now that they were no longer being uprooted they began to send
colonies abroad. The Athenians settled Ionia and most of the islands, while the
Peloponnesians planted colonies in most of southern Italy and Sicily, as well as
in some other parts of Greece. And all these were founded after the Trojan
War.
[13] Now that Greece was becoming more powerful, and the Greeks were
more interested in making money than before, tyrannies were set up in most of
the cities;21 with their incomes growing larger (the hereditary kings before
them had had only fixed revenues) {9} the Greeks built navies and became
more attached to the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first to
change the design of ships almost to their present form, and to have built the
first triremes in Greece at Corinth.22 The Corinthian shipbuilder Ameinocles
evidently built four ships at Samos, and he went to Samos about three hundred
years before the current war ended [i.e., in 704]. The earliest naval battle we
know of was fought between Corinth and Corcyra, and that was only 260 years
before our war’s end [664].23 Because it was settled on the Isthmus, Corinth
had always been a center of commerce. The old Greeks had traded by land
more than by sea, so the Peloponnesians had no contact with outsiders except
through Corinth. So the Corinthians had the power of wealth, as the old poets
show us when they named their land “the rich.”24 After the Greeks took more
to the sea, the Corinthians scoured the sea of pirates with the ships they had,
and their city had the power of a large income because they were a center for
trade by sea and land alike.
Later, the Ionians got together a great navy in the time of Cyrus (the first
Persian king) and his son Cambyses. The Ionians made war on Cyrus and for a
time had control of the sea near them. Polycrates also had a strong navy; he was
tyrant of Samos at the time of Cambyses, and used his navy to take over several
islands, including Rheneia [near Delos], which he captured and dedicated to
Apollo.25 The Phocaeans, too, when they were settling Massalia [probably
Marseilles] defeated the Carthaginians in a sea battle [about 600].
[14] These were the greatest naval powers, yet even they evidently used only a
few triremes, though this was many generations after the Trojan War. Instead,
they were made up of fifty-oared boats and long ships like those used at Troy.
It was only shortly before the Persian War and the death of Darius (who was
king of Persia after Cambyses) that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyreans had
triremes in any number. These were the only navies worth mentioning in all of
Greece before the Persian invasion. The people of Aegina had only a {10} few
ships, most of them of fifty oars, while the Athenians, and any others that had
navies were no stronger. So it was only recently that Themistocles—during the
war with Aegina, and when the Persian invasion was expected—persuaded the
Athenians to build the ships in which they fought sea battles.26 But even these
ships were not completely decked over.
[15] Such, then, were the navies of the Greeks, both the ancient and the more
recent ones. Those who used them nevertheless gained great power for
themselves in increasing their wealth and ruling other peoples, for they sailed
to the islands and conquered them (especially if they did not have enough
land). But there was no warfare on land that would lead to any power; such
wars as they had were all between neighbors, and the Greeks had not yet sent
an army abroad to conquer any nation far from home. They never agreed to be
subject to the greatest cities, you see, and they never put a common army
together on an equal basis, but they fought each other only as citizens of
individual states. The most they did was in the old war between Chalcis and
Eretria, when the rest of Greece was divided into alliances with one side or the
other.27
[16] While the rest were being held back from progress by other factors, the
Ionians were conquered by the Persians. The Persian kingdom was flourishing;
and after Cyrus had conquered Croesus,28 he marched against all the lands
between the Halys River and the sea, subduing all the Ionian cities on the
mainland. Later, Darius used his Phoenician navy to take control of the islands
as well.29
 [17] As for the tyrants who used to rule in the Greek cities, they looked only
to their own interests—protecting their lives and augmenting their personal
wealth, keeping their cities as safe as possible. They resided for the most part in
the cities and did no action worth remembering except against their neighbors
—not even the tyrants of Sicily, who had arrived at the greatest power. Thus
Greece was held back for a long time, because its cities could not do anything
remarkable together, and no city dared try anything by itself.
{11} [18] But after that, most of the last tyrants were put down by the
Lacedaemonians, both in Athens and in the rest of Greece where there were
tyrannies, except for those of Sicily.30 For although Lacedaemon was troubled
with civil strife for longer than any other city we know after its foundation by
the Dorians who live there now, it acquired good laws31 even so at a very early
time and has always been free from tyrants. For up to the end of this war it has
been over four hundred years that the Lacedaemonians have followed one and
the same constitution; and this has made them strong in themselves, and also
given them the ability to arrange matters in the other cities.
After the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle
was fought by the Persians against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon.
And in the tenth year again after that, Xerxes, king of Persia, came with his
great fleet into Greece to subjugate it. Since a great danger now threatened
Greece, the leadership of the Greeks that formed an alliance in that war was
given to the Lacedaemonians, because they were foremost in power. When the
Persians invaded Athens, the Athenians, who had planned in advance to leave
their city and were already packed, went aboard ships and became seamen.
Soon after they had jointly beaten back the foreigners, all the Greeks—both
those who had rebelled from the Persian king and those who had jointly made
war against him—divided themselves and one part followed the Athenians
while the other followed the Lacedaemonians. For these two cities appeared to
be the mightiest; one had power by land, and the other by sea. But the alliance
[of all Greece against the Persians] lasted only a while, for afterward the
Lacedaemonians and the Athenians began to disagree and made war on each
other, along with their various allies. And any other Greek cities that had a
quarrel went over to one side or the other. So Athens and Sparta spent the time
between the war against the Persians and this present war partly in peace and
partly in war (either one against the other or against allies in rebellion); and
they both arrived at this war well furnished with military provisions and were
also quite experienced in dealing with danger.
[19] The Lacedaemonians led their allies without requiring any payments
from them, but took care that they were governed by {12} oligarchy, which
served their interests alone. Over time, however, the Athenians took into their
hands the ships of all their allies except for Chios and Lesbos, and ordered each
of them to make certain monetary payments. And so it came about that the
military preparation of either side alone was greater in the beginning of this
war than it had been when the alliance [against Persia] was intact and
flourishing.
[20] Such, then, was the state of Greece in the past as I found it, though
particular pieces of evidence may be hard to believe.

ON HISTORICAL METHOD
People take in reports about the past from each other all alike, without testing
them—even reports about their own country. Most of the Athenians, for
example, think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was killed by Harmodius
and Aristogeiton, and don’t know that it was Hippias who was in power, since
he was the eldest son of Pisistratus, and Hipparchus and Thessalus were his
brothers. In fact, on the very day, and at the very moment of the deed,
Harmodius and Aristogeiton suspected that some of their accomplices had told
Hippias about the plot. So they avoided him as having been forewarned, but
they still wanted to do something daring before they were captured. When they
met Hipparchus by chance at the Leocorium, where he was organizing the
Panathenaic Procession, they killed him.32
Other Greeks have wrong opinions about many subjects that are current and
not forgotten in the passage of time, for example, that the Lacedaemonian
kings have two votes each, instead of one, and that they have a military unit
there called “Pitanate,” which never existed.33 That shows how much the
search for truth strains the patience of most people, who would rather believe
the first things that come to hand. [21] But if the evidence cited leads a reader
to think that things were mostly as I have described them, he would not go
wrong, as he would if he believed what the poets have sung about them, which
they have much embellished, or what the prose-writers have strung together,
which aims more to delight the ear than to {13} be true. Their accounts cannot
be tested, you see, and many are not credible, as they have achieved the status
of myth over time. But the reader should believe that I have investigated these
matters adequately, considering their antiquity, using the best evidence
available. People always think the greatest war is the one they are fighting at
the moment, and when that is over they are more impressed with wars of
antiquity; but, even so, this war will prove, to all who look at the facts, that it
was greater than the others.
[22] The words particular people said in their speeches, either just before or
during the war, were hard to record exactly, whether they were speeches I
heard myself or those that were reported to me at second hand. I have written
down what I thought the situation demanded for each speaker, keeping as near
as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.
And as for the real actions of the war, I did not think it right to set down
either what I heard from people I happened to meet or what I merely believed
to be true. Even for events at which I was present myself, I tracked down
detailed information from other sources as far as I could. It was hard work to
find out what happened, because those who were present at each event gave
different reports, depending on which side they favored and how well they
remembered.34
This history may not be the most delightful to hear, since there is no
mythology in it.35 But those who want to look into the truth of what was done
in the past—which, given the human condition, will recur in the future, either
in the same fashion or nearly so—those readers will find this History valuable
enough, as this was composed to be a possession for all time, and not to be
heard for a prize at the moment of a contest.

{14} Origins of the War

THUCYDIDES’S EXPLANATION FOR THE WAR

[23] The greatest action before this was the one against the Persians, and even
that was decided quickly by two battles at sea and two on land.36 But the
Peloponnesian War went on for a very long time and brought more suffering to
Greece than had ever been seen before: never had so many cities been captured
and depopulated (some by foreigners, others by Greeks themselves at war with
one another—some of which were resettled with new inhabitants); never had
so many people been driven from their countries or killed, either in the war
itself or as a result of civil strife.
Tales told about earlier times, but scantily confirmed in actuality, suddenly
ceased to be incredible: tales of earthquakes, which occurred over most of the
earth at this time, quite violent ones—eclipses of the sun, which were more
frequent than is recorded in earlier times—great droughts in some places
followed by famine—and, what caused enormous harm and loss of life, the
plague.
All these hardships came upon them during this war, which began when the
Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the Thirty Years’ Peace that had been
agreed between them after the conquest of Euboea. I will first write down an
account of the disputes that explain their breaking the Peace, so that no one
will ever wonder from what ground so great a war could arise among the
Greeks. I believe that the truest reason for the quarrel, though least evident in
what was said at the time, was the growth of Athenian power, which put fear
into the Lacedaemonians and so compelled them into war,37 while the
explanations both sides gave in public for breaking the Peace and starting the
war are as follows.

{15} CONFLICT OF CORCYRA WITH CORINTH

The island of Corcyra had been a colony of Corinth, but came into conflict with
Corinth over Epidamnus, a city which both sides claimed as its colony. Corcyra tried
to resolve the issue amicably, by going to arbitration, but Corinth would not go along
with this. In a great sea battle, Corcyra humiliated Corinth (1.24–30).
[31] For a whole year and more after the sea battle, the Corinthians, in a rage
over their war with Corcyra, built ships and armed the strongest naval
expedition they could, and they recruited rowers from the Peloponnesus and
the rest of Greece as well, on salary. When the people of Corcyra learned of
this armament they were frightened. They weren’t allied with any other Greeks
at the time, as they had not signed on with either the Athenian or the
Lacedaemonian alliances. So they decided to go to Athens in order to become
allies of the Athenians and see what benefits would come from them.
When the Corinthians learned of this, they sent their own embassy to
Athens, so that the Athenians would not augment the Corcyrean navy with
their own and put a stop to their battle plan. The Assembly was formed [in
Athens] and the two sides came to debate. Then the ambassadors from
Corcyra spoke along these lines:38

Speech of the Corcyreans

[32] Justice39 requires this: when people come to their neighbors for help, as
we do, and the neighbors do not owe them anything for {16} services or
military assistance in the past, then those who ask must show, first, that what
they ask for will be beneficial to the givers—or at least not costly—and, second,
that the receivers will be forever grateful. If they don’t establish any of these
points clearly, then they have no right to be angry if they are unsuccessful. In
sending us here with a request for an alliance, the people of Corcyra are
trusting us to provide you with firm assurances on these points.
Now, it turns out that our way of dealing with you has been unreasonable in
view of our need and unprofitable for our present situation. Previously, we’ve
never wanted to be anyone’s ally, but now we’re asking for just that, when it’s
precisely because of this40 that we are alone in our war with Corinth. And what
we used to think sound-minded—not letting a foreign alliance end up making
us follow our neighbors’ judgment—this has now come round to seem bad
judgment and weakness. In our latest sea battle we pushed back the
Corinthians alone, by ourselves. But now they are going to attack us with a
larger armament drawn from the Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, and we
see that we cannot survive if all we have is our own power, and our danger will
be extreme if we fall under them. So we are compelled to ask for help from you
and anyone else. And please forgive us for daring to reverse our old isolationism
—which was due not to cowardice, but to an error in judgment.
[33] The outcome for you if you agree to our request will be fine in many
ways—first, because you will be giving assistance to people who have been
wronged, rather than to people who have harmed others—and, second, so that
you will lay down a store of gratitude that will never be forgotten—and all the
more because you will do so by taking on people who are in tremendous
danger. Besides, we have the largest navy, after yours. Think of it this way:
What stroke of good luck could be more unusual—or more painful to your
enemies? Here is an addition to your power that you could have acquired at
great expense of money and favors—and it came to you unasked {17} for,
without risk or cost, and gave itself to you! Besides, it brings you a reputation
for virtue, gratitude from those you help, and, for your own part, greater
strength. All this has come in one stroke of luck to very few people in the
whole of time; and very few people come asking for an alliance prepared to
give, to those they call upon, more security and honor than they will take. Of
course it’s in war that we would be useful to you, but some of you may think
there won’t be a war. If so, they’re making a strategic error, and they don’t
realize that the Lacedaemonians are frightened by you into wishing for war,
while the Corinthians are powerful on their side—and they are your enemies;
they plan to seize us first and attack you afterward, so that we won’t stand
together against them in shared hostility. They won’t miss a chance to get
ahead in two ways: either to destroy us or to use us to strengthen themselves.
So our job is to anticipate this by our offering an alliance—and your accepting
it—so that we plan ahead against them, rather than reacting to them in our
plans.
[34] If they say that justice forbids their own colony from accepting you as
allies, let them learn that any colony that is well treated rewards its mother city,
but if treated unjustly, it goes foreign; colonists were not sent out to be slaves,
you see, but to be equals of those they left behind. That the mother city has
been unjust to us is clear: when they were invited to arbitration about
Epidamnus, they chose to press charges by war rather than by fair means.
What they are doing to us, who are their close relatives, proves that you should
not let them deceive you or help them out when they ask directly. The less
regret you take on by doing favors to your enemy, the safer you will be in the
end.
[35] You will not violate your treaty with the Lacedaemonians41 by accepting
us, since we are not allies of either side. The treaty says that any Greek city not
then in an alliance is permitted to go over to whichever side is pleases. It would
be horrible if the treaty allowed these people to fill their ships with men from
all over Greece—many of them from cities subject to you—while they block us
from the proposed alliance or from any source of help whatever. And then
they’ll cast you as unjust villains if you agree to our request!
In fact, we’ll have a far more serious charge against you if we do not persuade
you. You’d be rejecting us, who are not your enemies, when we are in danger,
and you’d fail to hinder them who are your {18} enemies when they are on the
attack, and, moreover, you’d be turning a blind eye while they draw power from
your empire and add it to their own. That’s unjust. You should either prevent
them from recruiting mercenaries from your territory, or send us whatever aid
you decide upon; but really it’s quite clear you should agree to help us. The
advantages for you are many, as we said at the start, and will now demonstrate:
the greatest is that your enemies are our enemies—a very clear guarantee,
because they are plenty strong enough to harm us if we drop out of the alliance.
Besides, the offer of a naval alliance should not be turned down as easily as one
with a power on land; you should —if you can—above all let no one else have a
navy or—if you can’t—make friends with whoever would be toughest to beat.
[36] Suppose you are well aware of these advantages, but are afraid that if you
trust to those advantages you will break the treaty: you should recognize that
acting from fear will frighten the enemy all the more because it increases your
strength; whereas being sure of yourselves will make you less frightening than
ever—because you will decide against the alliance and become weak while your
enemy gains strength; at the same time, you must see that the issue is more
about Athens than Corcyra, and that you will not be looking out for the best
interests of Athens if—when the war is so close that it is almost here now—you
look only at the immediate situation and hesitate to add to your side a country
that carries great possibilities, whether you make it a friend or an enemy.42 You
see, Corcyra is beautifully placed along the coastal routes to Sicily and Italy, so
that it could block a naval expedition from there to the Peloponnesus or one
that is sent from the Peloponnesus to Italy, and in other ways it is a most useful
location. In short, summing up the particular and general points, please
understand why you should not throw us away. There are only three naval
powers worth mentioning in Greece, yours, ours, and the Corinthians’. Two of
those will join into one if you let us go and the Corinthians conquer us. Then
you’d be fighting Corcyra and the Peloponnese together. But if you accept us,
you will enter the contest with more ships, because of ours.”
That is what the ambassadors from Corcyra said. After them, the Corinthians
spoke along these lines:

{19} Speech of the Corinthians

[37] Necessity43 compels us to this response in view of the case that Corcyra
has made—they not only asked for an alliance, they claimed that we had done
them injustice and that they’d been brought to war without a reason—so we
must first respond to their two points and then go on to explain why you
should find that our proposal offers you more safety, and why you have a good
reason to reject their entreaty. They say that a sound mind kept them out of
alliances, but they devised this practice for wrongdoing, not virtue. They
wanted no allies in injustice and no witnesses to embarrass them if they ever
asked for help. At the same time, their city is self-sufficient by location, so that
they are their own judges when they harm someone—more than they would be
under a treaty—because they rarely sail to their neighbors but often receive
others who are compelled to pass into their port. And this elegant neutrality of
theirs is merely a screen—not for sharing injustice with others—but so that
they can violate justice on their own, do violence wherever they prevail, and—
where no one sees them—steal more than their share and be shameless in their
acquisition.
But if they were as good as they say they are, their independence from their
neighbors would have made it all the easier for them to show virtue clearly by
giving and accepting justice.44
[38] They are not men of this kind, however, neither to others nor to us.
They are our colonists, but they’ve always pulled away, and now they are at war,
claiming they were not sent out [as colonists] to be treated badly. But we say
we did not set up this colony to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders and
to have from them the admiration we may reasonably expect. Certainly our
other colonies honor us, and we are much loved by the colonists. Now it’s clear,
since the majority of our colonists like us so much it’s not right for them alone
to dislike us and that our military operation is appropriate, since we have been
wronged in the extreme. The noble thing to do, if we were in the wrong, would
be for them to give in to our anger, and it would be a disgrace for us to use
violence against moderation on their part. But in the arrogance [hubris] and
freedom of wealth, they have done many wrongs to us. And now Epidamnus,
—it’s our city and they {20} never claimed it when it was troubled, but when
we came to help it, they seized it and are holding it by force.
[39] They say they were willing to come to arbitration for justice before now.
But it’s meaningless to call for arbitration when you already have a secure
advantage; you should do so only after you’ve put both your actions and your
words on an equal basis with us, before beginning such a contest. But they
waited till after they’d besieged the place. Then when they realized we’d not
overlook the matter, they offered the appearance of arbitration. And it’s not
enough that they did wrong there; here they are asking you not only for an
alliance but for an alliance in injustice—and even though they are at odds with
us. The right time to come to you would have been when they were safest,
before they had done injustice to us, before they were in danger—not at a time
when, although you might help them, you’ve never had a share of their power.
But you would get an equal share of blame from us, even though you’d have
kept apart from their wrongdoing. No. Only after they’d shared their power
with you for a long time should they expect you to share the consequences of
their actions.
[40] We’ve now proved that the accusations we brought are on target, and
that the Corcyreans are violent and greedy.45 Now you must understand that it
would be unjust for you to accept them as allies. Yes, the treaty does say that
unlisted cities may join whichever side they want. But this provision is not for
those who join up to cause harm to others, and not (as you’ll see if your minds
are sound) for those who need security because they gave up another alliance,
or for those who would bring their new allies war instead of peace.46 That’s
what will happen to you unless you agree with us. You’d not merely become
their fellows in combat, you see; you’d also trade a treaty with us for war,
because we would be compelled, if you go with them, to take defensive
measures against you along with them. Of course you have every right to stay
out of the way of both sides—or, if not, justice requires you to go with us
against them. After all, you have a treaty with Corinth, but you don’t even have
a cease-fire with Corcyra.47 And you ought not to establish a rule that permits
a {21} city to ally itself with one that has rebelled against another. When Samos
rebelled we did not cast our vote against you, at the time the Peloponnesians
were voting both ways on whether to come to its defense.48 Instead, we
opposed the measure in public, on the grounds that each city could punish its
own allies. Look: if you will help out these evildoers, some of your allies will be
all the more likely to come over to our side, and this rule you’ve made will apply
to you more than to us.
[41] Our claims on you have all the justice we need according to the laws of
the Greeks;49 and you should consider this, moreover: you owe us a favor,
which we think you should now pay back to us, since we are neither enemies
aiming to harm you, nor friends who share an enterprise. When you were short
of warships for the war with Aegina—before the Persian invasion—you
borrowed twenty ships from Corinth. And remember our good service over
Samos, when we kept the Peloponnesians from coming to help Samos. We
made possible the conquest of Aegina and the punishment of Samos, and this
at just the sort of time when it’s natural for people who are advancing on their
enemies to forget everything but victory. They think whoever helps them then
is a friend, even if he was an enemy before, and whoever stands back is hostile
even though he used to be a friend; because they rank immediate victory above
genuine relationships.
[42] Take these points to heart. If you’re young, learn from the old and decide
to defend us as we defended you. And don’t decide that what we say is right
but not advantageous in case it comes to war. Real advantage, you see, lies most
in doing the least wrong, and a future containing this war is quite uncertain,
although Corcyra is using it to frighten you into injustice. And it would be a
bad choice if—stirred up by this fear—you incurred the certain and immediate
hostility of Corinth, which you would not otherwise have. If your minds are
sound, however, you’d rather reduce the suspicion—which we already really
have—over your treatment of Megara.50 A recent {22} favor at the right time,
even if it is small, has the power to mitigate a greater wrong. [Again, if your
minds are sound] you won’t be tempted by their offer of a great naval alliance.
Not committing injustice to an equal makes you more reliably powerful than
seizing what looks like an advantage in the face of danger.
[43] We have now fallen into the very same circumstances as you when we
proclaimed at Sparta that one may punish one’s own allies;51 so now we insist
that you observe the same rule and not—after reaping the benefit of our
decision—cause us harm with yours. Give us an equal return; you must
recognize that this is precisely the time when anyone who helps is most clearly
a friend, and anyone who stands aside is an enemy. And these people of
Corcyra—don’t accept them as allies against our will, and don’t defend them in
their injustice. Do as we say, and you will be doing what is right, and, at the
same time, adopting the plan that best serves your own interests.

[44] Such was the speech of the Corinthians.

The Athenians heard them out and met twice in assembly. At the first
meeting they were no less favorable to the Corinthians, but at the second they
changed their minds—not to form a complete alliance with Corcyra and have
friends and enemies in common (because if Corcyra ordered them to sail
together against Corinth, they would violate their treaty with the
Peloponnesians)—but to form a defensive alliance, to come to each other’s
defense in case anyone attacked Corcyra or Athens or their allies. They saw
that the war with the Peloponnesians was coming, and they wanted to prevent
Corcyra, with so large a navy, from falling into the hands of Corinth. They
judged it better to let the two cities wear each other out, so that if Athens had
to make war, their enemies at Corinth and elsewhere would be weaker at sea.
[45] On such a strategy, Athens accepted the proposal from Corcyra, and
soon after the Corinthians had left, they sent ten ships to help defend
Corcyra.52 Their orders were to avoid naval battle with the Corinthians unless
they sailed against Corcyra or attempted {23} to land troops on Corcyrean soil.
This they were to prevent if they could. Athens gave these orders so as not to
dissolve the treaty.
Corinth then launched a second fleet to attack Corcyra; after success in the first day’s
fighting they were dismayed to see a substantial Athenian fleet join the Corcyreans.
They saw this as a violation of the Thirty Years’ Peace.
[53] So the Corinthians decided to send some men to the Athenian ships on
a fast boat, without a herald’s wand,53 to sound them out. They were sent to
say, in effect: “You do us an injustice, you Athenians, by starting a war and
dissolving the treaty. We are merely getting back at our own enemies, and
you’ve taken up arms and are standing in our way. If you plan to keep us from
sailing to Corcyra or anywhere else we wish, and you intend to dissolve the
treaty, then seize us first and treat us as enemies.” So spoke the Corinthians.
The Corcyreans in the fleet who could hear this immediately shouted: “Seize
them and kill them!” But the Athenians answered: “We are not starting a war,
Peloponnesians, or dissolving the treaty. We came in support of the people of
Corcyra, who are our allies. So if you wish to sail anywhere else, we won’t stop
you. But if you sail to Corcyra or any other part of their land, we will do our
utmost to stop you.”
The Corinthians then sailed home, after setting up a trophy for their victory. The
Corcyreans also set up a trophy, as both sides now had some claims to victory. The
Corinthians took back with them 250 citizens of Corcyra whom they had taken as
prisoners, along with 800 captured slaves, who would be sold.

DEBATE AT SPARTA
The Case for Making War on Athens (432 BCE)
The immediate allegations that Peloponnesians made against the Athenians were
three: (1) their siege of Potidaea, (2) their decision to help defend the island of
Corcyra against Corinth, and( 3) their decree restricting trade with Megara.
1. Potidaea was a town in northern Greece along the coast. It had been founded as
a colony of Corinth, but was a paying member of the Delian League, which had
become, in effect, an empire of Athens. Fearing that {24} Corinth might turn
Potidaea against them, the Athenians demanded that Potidaea sever ties with
Corinth. When Potidaea refused, Athens besieged the city—a huge military effort
(1.56–65, 2.58).54 For the end of the siege, see 2.70.
2. Corcyra, modern Corfu, was a colony of Corinth that was at war with its
mother city, with the help of Athens.
3. Megara was Athens’s immediate neighbor in the direction of Corinth; the
Athenian decree prohibiting trade between Megara and Athens or any of the
Athenian allies caused great hardship in the city, and this was much resented by the
Peloponnesians.
An additional charge was brought, less officially, by the people of the island of
Aegina. They complained that Athens had violated their autonomy, which had been
guaranteed in the Thirty Years’ Peace Treaty.
Invited by Corinth, representatives of the cities in the Peloponnesian League
gathered in Sparta to try to talk the Lacedaemonians into war with Athens on the
grounds that Athens had broken the Thirty Years’ Peace Treaty. This had been in
effect since 446, at least in theory. The treaty had forced Athens to give up some of its
conquests at the time. The treaty listed the allies on both sides and barred each side
from recruiting the other’s allies. Apparently it also specified that future disagreements
would be settled by arbitration.
Sparta opened its assembly to a series of complaints from its allies against Athens, of
which Corinth gave the last. Thucydides presents only the barest sketch of the early
speeches, but he gives us his version of the Corinthian speech in full, followed by a
reply from the Athenians. Afterward, the Spartans debated the issue among
themselves: a king named Archidamus urged caution, but an official known as an
ephor carried the day with a call for war.55
These four speeches constitute the famous Debate at Sparta.56 All four are carefully
composed in relation to one another, so that the structure of the debate rewards careful
study. A remarkable feature of the debate is that, while the enemies of Athens have
much to say against Athens, they also comment at length about its military and
cultural strength. We are led to see at the outset that the Athenians cannot lose this
war unless they make terrible mistakes or have extraordinarily bad luck. By
representing the speeches in this way, Thucydides is preparing us for the tragic
downfall of {25} Athens, which will in fact be due to a series of military errors
compounded by overreaching and bad luck.
[66] These were the charges that Athenians and Peloponnesians made against
each other before the war: the Corinthians complained that Athens had
besieged their colony Potidaea while Corinthians and Peloponnesians were
there; the Athenians that Corinth had induced their payment-making ally to
break away—and that after this they fought openly on the side of Potidaea
against Athens. But war had not yet broken out, and the truce held, because
the Corinthians who took the action were volunteers acting privately.
[67] Once Potidaea was under siege, however, the Corinthians would not
relax. They had men inside and were afraid the place would be lost. They
immediately summoned their allies to Lacedaemon, and, when they arrived,
clamored that Athens had broken the treaty and committed injustice against
the Peloponnese. Although the people of Aegina were too fearful of Athens to
send a formal embassy, they secretly gave their most urgent backing to the
Corinthians’ call for war, claiming that they did not have the autonomy
promised them by the treaty.57
For their part, the Lacedaemonians invited their other allies along with
anyone else who had a complaint of injustice against Athens. After convening
their regular assembly, they called for speeches. Each group presented its own
accusations. The Megarians brought several issues forward, especially that it
was against the treaty for Athens to close ports to them throughout the
Athenian Empire and ban them from the marketplace in Athens. Last came
the Corinthians, who had given the others the opportunity to goad the
Lacedaemonians into a fury. They spoke along these lines:

Speech of the Corinthians

[68] You have so much confidence in your own constitution and society,
Lacedaemonians, that you are too suspicious of us outsiders when we have a
complaint to make. This confidence gives you your {26} self-control,58 but it
also makes you rather ignorant in foreign affairs. Many times we have warned
you of the damage Athens was about to do to us, and each time you have
ignored our guidance entirely. You suspect that we’re speaking for our personal
interests alone, and that is why you did not call the League together before we
were hurt, but waited until it was actually happening to us.
And now we are in the best position to speak, since we have the worst
complaints—we’ve been abused59 by Athens and neglected by you. Now, if the
Athenians had done their injustices to Greece in secret, you would not know,
and we would have to inform you. But as it is, who needs a long speech? You
can see they have subjugated60 some of us, while plotting against others,
(especially our allies), and have long since mobilized for any war. Otherwise
they would not have taken Corcyra from us by force or besieged Potidaea,
when one of these is quite handy for attacks against our interests in Thrace,
and the other could have provided us Peloponnesians with a very substantial
navy.61
[69] And for all of this you are yourselves responsible, because you allowed
them first to fortify their city after the Persian Wars and later to build the long
walls.62 From that day to this you have been taking freedom away, and not
merely from the people they have subjugated, but from your allies as well. If
you have the power to put a stop to subjugation, yet look the other way while it
happens, then you have done it yourselves, more truly than if you had been the
subjugators, yet all the more if you claim honor and virtue as the liberators of
Greece!63
{27} Even now it has been hard to hold this meeting, and our agenda is
unclear. We should no longer be asking whether we have suffered injustice, but
how we may defend ourselves. The Athenians made up their minds and went
into action against us without delay, while we were indecisive. But we know the
path they follow, how the Athenians encroach upon their neighbors little by
little. As long as they think you are blind to this and do not notice it, they will
proceed with some caution; but once they realize that you are looking the other
way, in full knowledge, then they will lay into us fiercely. You Lacedaemonians
are the only Greeks who prefer procrastination to power as a defense, and you
are the only ones who like to crush your enemies not at the start but when
they’ve doubled their strength. You were supposed to be dependable, but your
reputation has eclipsed the truth. We know ourselves that the Persians came
from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnesus before you sent a significant
force against them; and now you are looking the other way from the Athenians,
who are not as far off as they were, but close by; and instead of attacking them
for your own defense you are waiting for them to attack, when the odds against
winning will be much worse for you. We also know that the Persian king was
defeated mainly by his own mistakes, and that our survival so far against the
Athenians has been due to their blunders more often than to any help from
you. Really, hoping for help from you has destroyed some people who were
unprepared because they relied on you.
Now please do not think we are speaking out of hostility; this is merely a
complaint. Complaints are for friends who make mistakes, accusations for
enemies who commit injustice. [70] Besides, we think we are in as good a
position as anyone to find fault with our neighbors, especially in view of the
great differences between the two sides, to which we think you are blind.
We don’t think you have thought through what sort of people these
Athenians are: your struggle will be with people totally different from
yourselves. They love innovation, and are quick to invent a plan and then to
carry it out in action, while you are good only for keeping things as they are,
and you never invent anything or even go as far as necessary in action.
Moreover, they are bold beyond their power, take thoughtless risks, and still
hope for the best in danger; whereas your actions always fall short of your
power, you distrust even what you know in your minds to be certain, and you
never think you will be delivered from danger. Above all, they never hesitate;
you are always delaying; they are never at home, and you are the worst {28}
homebodies, because they count on getting something by going abroad, while
you fear you will lose what you have if you go out.
When they overcome their enemies, they advance the furthest; and when
overcome by them, they fall back the least. And as for their bodies, they devote
them utterly to the service of the city as if they were not their own, while they
keep total possession of their minds when they do anything for its sake. Unless
they accomplish what they have once set their minds on, they count themselves
deprived of their own property. And if they do get what they went for, they
think lightly of it compared to what their next action will bring, but if they
happen to fail in any attempt, they turn to other hopes and make up the loss
that way. You see, they alone get what they hope for as soon as they think of it,
through the speed with which they execute their plans.
At this they toil, filling all the days of their lives with hard work and danger.
What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy, because they are continually
getting more. They do not consider a feast day as anything but time to do
something that needed to be done; and they think that an idle rest is as much
trouble as hard work. So that, in a word, it is true to say that they are born
never to allow themselves or anyone else a rest.
[71] That is the character of their city, Lacedaemonians, and yet you still
procrastinate! You don’t realize that you will enjoy the longest peace if you
make your intention clear never to put up with injustice, while using your own
military with justice. You think fairness lies in a defense that does no harm to
others and brings no damage on yourselves. This would hardly work even with
neighbors similar to you. As we have just now shown you, however, your
customs are quite old-fashioned compared to theirs. New ways necessarily
prevail over old, in politics as in technology; unchanging traditions may be best
for a city at peace, but a city faced with the many necessities of war must have
many innovations as well. That is why there have been more changes in Athens
than here, because of the Athenians’ wide experience.64
So now is the time to put an end to your torpor! Help Potidaea and the
others, as you promised, by immediately attacking Attica, so you will not betray
your friends and kindred to their worst enemies {29} and drive us in despair to
seek out some other alliance. There would be no injustice in that, either to the
gods who received our oaths or to the people who heard them. Treaties are
broken not by those who go elsewhere because they were abandoned, but by
those who fail to help the ones they swore to help. But if you decide to become
engaged, we will stay with you, since to change allies then would be a
sacrilege,65 and we would not find more compatible allies in any case. Think
carefully about all this, and try not to let the Peloponnesus sink under your
leadership below the level at which it was given you by your ancestors.
[72] So spoke the Corinthians. Athenian ambassadors happened to be at
Sparta already on other business, and when they heard the speeches against
them they decided they should present themselves to the Lacedaemonians, not
to defend themselves on the charges brought by the cities, but to persuade the
Lacedaemonians to consider the whole issue at greater length rather than make
a quick decision. Besides, they wished to point out how powerful their city was,
refreshing the memories of the old while instructing the young on what they
had missed. They believed their speech would turn the Lacedaemonians more
to peace than to war. So they went to them and asked for permission to speak
to the assembly. On being invited to do so, they came forward and spoke as
follows:
 Speech of the Athenians66
[73] Our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but to represent our
city on another matter. Still, when we heard the great outcry against us we
came forward, not to respond to the charges made by the cities (for you are no
law court set over our speeches and theirs), but so that you will not be too easily
persuaded by your allies into making a bad decision on important matters.
Besides, we want to review the whole case against us and show that we are not
being {30} unreasonable in holding on to our possessions, and also that we are a
city to be reckoned with.
There is no need to speak of the distant past, for which hearsay is a better
witness than what you listeners have seen. The Persian Wars, however, and
events you know from your own experience, must come into this speech,
although it is a nuisance for us to keep bringing them up. In our actions at that
time we took risks to achieve benefits that partly went to you in actual fact; so
at this point we should not be deprived of all our glory, for what it’s worth.
This story will be told, not by way of asking favors, but as evidence to show you
what sort of city will be your opponent if you make the wrong decision.
We say that at Marathon we faced the Persians first and alone.67 And when
they came a second time, when we were too weak to resist by land, we took to
our ships with all our people and joined in the battle at Salamis [in 480], which
kept them from sailing down to the Peloponnesus and destroying one city after
another with a fleet so large that you would have been unable to combine forces
against it. The best evidence for this comes from the Persian king himself: as
soon as he was beaten at sea he quickly took the greater part of his army and
went back home, seeing that his power was no longer what it had been.
[74] That is how it was, and it is clear that, when our cause depended on
Greek ships, we Athenians provided the three things that contributed most to
the victory: the largest number of ships, the most intelligent commander, and
the most unhesitating zeal. We supplied just under two-thirds of the four
hundred ships.68 Themistocles, the Athenian leader, gets the most credit for
positioning the battle in the narrow strait, which clearly saved our cause; and
you honored him for this more highly than any other outsider who came to
your city. We showed the most daring zeal when no one came to help us from
farther south and all of Greece to the north of us had been subjugated by the
Persians. Then we decided it was right for us to leave our city and sacrifice our
property. We did not want to abandon the common cause of our remaining
allies or split off and so become useless to them, so we took to our ships
without any anger at you for not coming to our defense any sooner.
We insist, therefore, that our action did you at least as much good as it did us.
You did come to help—when we had nothing left to {31} save—and you did so
more out of fear for yourselves than for us, since you left behind cities where
your homes were still occupied, which you hoped to enjoy in the future. We,
however, set out from a city that was no more, we risked our lives for homes
that survived only in a slender hope, and we did our share of fighting to save
you while saving ourselves as well.69 If we had surrendered to the Persians
earlier, as the others had done, out of fear for our land, or if we had not had the
courage to take to our ships—if we had thought ourselves defeated—then there
would have been no point in your fighting the Persians at sea: you did not have
enough ships, and the Persians would have taken everything they wanted
without a blow.
[75] Really, Lacedaemonians, in view of our zeal and intelligent strategy
during the Persian Wars, do we deserve to be treated with such extreme
hostility by the Greeks, even though we do have an empire? After all, we did
not take the empire by violence; it was the allies themselves who came and
begged us to take command when you were unwilling to stay with us and finish
off the war against the Persians.70 After that action we were compelled to
develop our empire to its present strength by fear first of all, but also by
ambition, and lastly for our own advantage.71 When we had come to be hated
by most people,72 when some had already rebelled and been put {32} down,
and when you had turned away from our former friendship to suspicion and
hostility, then we thought it would not be safe to risk letting anyone go free,
especially since the rebels went over to your side.73 No one should be blamed
for looking after his own interests to fend off such great dangers.
[76] You Lacedaemonians, for example, use your position of leadership in the
Peloponnesus to arrange affairs in the cities there to your own advantage. If you
had stayed on as leaders of the alliance against the Persians, you would have
been as much hated by all as we are now, and we are sure that your leadership
would have been no less painful to the allies than ours has been. You too would
have been compelled to rule with a strong hand or else put yourselves in
danger. We have not done anything in this that should cause surprise, and we
have not deviated from normal human behavior: we simply accepted an empire
that was offered us and then refused to surrender it. If we have been overcome
by three of the strongest motives—ambition, fear, and our own advantage—we
have not been the first to do this. It has always been established that the weaker
are held down by the stronger.74 Besides, we took this upon ourselves because
we thought we were worthy of it, and you thought so too, until now that you
are reckoning up your own advantage and appealing to justice—which no one
has ever preferred to force, if he had a chance to achieve something by that and
gain an advantage.
When people rule over others, following human nature,75 they deserve to be
praised if they use more justice than they have to, in view of their power. And
we think that if anyone else had our position, you would really see how
moderate we have been; yet our very fairness has brought contempt on us
instead of the praise that’s reasonable to expect.
[77] While we have sustained some losses from lawsuits arising from treaties
with our allies, and we have allowed them trial in our {33} own city by
impartial laws, we have been given a reputation for litigiousness.76 No one
notices that others, who have empires in other places, and are less moderate
toward their subject states than we, are never upbraided for it. Those who have
the power to use force, you see, have no need at all to go to law. And yet
because these men have been used to dealing with us on equal terms, if they
lose anything at all which they think they should not have lost, either by
sentence of our courts or by the power of our government, they are not
thankful for the large amount that they retain. Instead, they complain more
about their slight loss than they would if we had put law to one side and openly
seized their goods at the start. For in that event, not even they could deny that
the weaker must give way to the stronger. People are apparently more
passionate over injustice than violence, because then they feel that someone
who is their equal has taken an unfair advantage, while they accept violence
from someone stronger as a matter of necessity. Even when they suffered worse
things under the rule of the Persians, they accepted them; but now they find
our empire hard to bear. And that was to be expected: the present is always the
worst to those who are subject to the rule of others.
That is why, if you should defeat us and manage an empire yourselves, you
would soon find a change from the love they bear you now out of fear of us, at
least if you are planning the sort of behavior you showed when you were their
leaders for that short time against the Persians.77 The customs in your country
are not compatible with those of others; and to make matters worse, when any
one of you travels abroad, he neither follows your customs nor those of the rest
of Greece.
[78] Make your decision with the slow deliberate care due to important
matters, and don’t bring trouble on yourselves by giving in to other people’s
opinions and complaints. Before you go to war, you must realize how
unpredictable war is. The longer it lasts the more it is likely to turn on chance.
The odds of disaster are the same for {34} both sides, and no one can see where
the dangers lie. People tend to go into war the wrong way around, starting with
action and turning to discussion only after they have come to harm. We are not
making that mistake, and neither are you, so far as we can see. So while it is
still possible for both sides to use good judgment, we ask you not to dissolve
the treaty or break your oaths, but to submit our differences to arbitration
according to the agreement. If not, the gods who heard the oaths are our
witnesses, and once you have started the war we will do our best to resist
wherever you show the way.

[79] So spoke the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard the
complaints of their allies against Athens, as well as the Athenian speech, they
put everyone else out of their assembly and discussed the situation among
themselves. The opinions of the majority came down to this: that the
Athenians were guilty of injustice, and they should go to war right away. But
their king, Archidamus, who had a reputation for intelligence and prudence,
came forward and spoke in this vein:

Speech of Archidamus
[80] I have seen too many wars, Lacedaemonians, (and so have you, if you’re
my age) for any of us to desire the business out of that ignorant belief, to which
ordinary people succumb, that war is safe and good. If you think about it with a
clear mind, you will see that this war we are discussing would be no small one.
Our strength would be comparable if we were to fight Peloponnesians who are
our neighbors, where we could reach any place quickly. But these men live in a
distant land, and besides they are superbly trained at sea and have all sorts of
excellent resources—private and public wealth, ships, horses, infantry, the
largest population of any city in Greece, and many tax-paying allies as well.
How could we lightly undertake a war with men like these? Unprepared as we
are, where could we get the confidence to rush into war? From our ships? We
are weaker there, and it would take time to build and train a navy to match
theirs. From our money? There we are even weaker, since we have no public
treasury and cannot easily raise money from our citizens.
[81] Perhaps one of you takes heart from our heavy infantry, which is superior
to theirs in quality and numbers, because this would allow us to invade them
frequently and waste their lands. But they have plenty of land in their empire,
and will bring in whatever they need by sea. If, on the other hand, we try to get
their allies to {35} rebel, we will have to provide them with naval support, as
they are mostly islanders. So what kind of war will this be? Unless we take
control of the sea, or cut off the income that supports their navy, we will be in
worse shape than ever. And then we will have gone too far to make an
honorable peace, especially if everyone thinks we started the quarrel. We must
not indulge in the false hope that we will end the war quickly if we destroy
their crops. No, I am afraid that we shall leave this war as a legacy to our
children. We cannot expect the Athenians to give up their ambitions slavishly
to save their land, or, with their experience, to be easily shattered by war.
[82] Now I am not asking you to be so blind to the damage Athens is doing
to your allies that you let them get away with it and do nothing to catch them
as they scheme against us.78 But do not take up arms just yet. Send to them
instead, and make demands, without implying too clearly whether you plan to
make war or give way, and use the time to prepare our forces. We should
acquire allies, either Greek or foreign, who can add a naval force or money to
our power. (No one should be blamed for saving themselves by taking help
from foreigners as well as Greeks—not if Athens is plotting against them, as it
is against us.79) We should also stockpile our own resources. If Athens accepts
our demands, so much the better; if not, we’ll let two or three years go by and
then attack them, if we choose, from a stronger position. And perhaps once
they’ve seen our preparations and realize that we really do mean to back up our
demands, they’ll give in more easily, before their farmland is ruined and while
they can still decide to save the goods they have now, which are not yet
destroyed. Remember, their land is nothing but a hostage to us, and as such, it
is more useful to us the better cultivated it is. You ought to spare Athenian
farmland as long as possible and not make them so desperate that they are
harder to control. If we are hurried by the complaints of our allies into wasting
their land before we are prepared, then be careful we don’t bring down shame
and trouble on the Peloponnesus.
{36} Recognize that complaints can be resolved, whether they are from cities
or private individuals, and that we’d be engaging all of us in a war for the sake
of private interests,80 when the war’s progress cannot be foreseen, and there is
no decent way to end it easily.
[83] Now, although there are many of us, no one should think it is cowardice
that prevents us from quickly attacking that one city. They have just as many
allies as we do, and theirs give them money. After all, war depends more on
finance than on weapons, since money lets you put weapons to use; and this is
especially true when a land power takes on a sea power. We should collect
money first, therefore, before we are carried away by our allies’ speeches. We
are the ones who will bear most of the responsibility for the outcome, either
way, so we should take the time to look ahead.
[84] Yes, we are slow and make delays; that is their biggest complaint about
us. But don’t be ashamed of that. If we begin the war in haste, we’ll have many
delays before we end it, owing to our lack of preparation. Besides, our city has
always been famous, always free; and this slowness of ours is really nothing but
clearheaded self-control. It is this that gives us our unique ability to restrain our
arrogance81 in success, and to yield less than other people to misfortune. When
people try to excite us with praise into doing something dangerous, we do not
let the pleasure of it overcome our better judgment; and if someone tries to
spur us on with harsh criticism, we do not let ourselves be swayed by our anger.
Our discipline makes us good soldiers and gives us good judgment. We are
good soldiers because our self-control is the chief cause of a sense of shame,
and shame of courage;82 while we have good judgment because our education
leaves us too ignorant to look down on our laws,83 and our self-control is too
strict for disobeying them. We have none of that useless {37} intelligence that
condemns the enemy’s forces in a fine speech but fails to deliver as good an
attack in the field. Instead, we think the plans of our neighbors are as good as
our own, and we can’t work out whose chances at war are better in a speech. So
we always make our preparations in action, on the assumption that our enemies
know what they are doing. We should not build our hopes on the belief that
they will make mistakes, but on our own careful foresight. And we should not
think there is much difference between one man and another, except that the
winner will be the one whose education was the most severe.
[85] These practices were passed down to us by our ancestors and they have
always helped us. Do not let them go; and do not let yourselves be rushed into
a decision in a brief part of a day, when it concerns many lives and cities, a
great deal of money, and our honor. Instead, decide at leisure. We can do that,
more easily than most people, because of our strength. Send to the Athenians
about Potidaea, and send to them about the injustices of which our allies
complain. I urge this because they are ready to go to arbitration, and in such a
case it is not lawful to attack them first, as if they were in the wrong. But do
prepare for war in any case. This decision will be the strongest, and it will put
the most fear into our enemies.

Archidamus spoke along those lines. Then Sthenelaïdas, who was one of the
ephors that year, stood up last and spoke thus:

Speech of Sthenelaïdas84
[86] I don’t understand all these words the Athenians use. They praised
themselves a lot, but nowhere did they deny the injustice they’ve shown to our
allies and the Peloponnesus. Yes, they were good men against the Persians at
one time, but they are bad men to us now, and they deserve double punishment
for changing from good to bad. We’ve stayed the same, then and now: we will
not disregard any injustice to our allies, if we are clearheaded, and we will
punish Athens without delay, since there is no delay in our allies’ suffering.
{38} Others may have plenty of money and ships and horses, but we have
good allies and they should not be betrayed to the Athenians. This issue is not
to be settled in arbitration or speeches, since the damage is not being done in a
speech; no, this calls for swift punishment with all our strength. Don’t let
anyone persuade us that it’s proper to stop and discuss injustice while it’s being
done to us; what’s really proper is for those who are planning injustice to spend
a lot of time in discussions.
Vote for war, then, Lacedaemonians! Be worthy of Sparta and don’t let
Athens grow any stronger! Don’t betray your allies either, but with the gods’
help let us attack the aggressors!

[87] With these words, since he was an ephor,85 he put the vote to the
assembly of the Lacedaemonians. They decide matters there by shouting rather
than counting votes, and he said he could not tell which shout was louder. In
fact, he wanted them to show their opinion openly, so as to whip up
enthusiasm for making war. So he said, “Any of you Lacedaemonians who
thinks the treaty is broken and the Athenians are in the wrong, go over there,”
pointing out a place to them, and, “Anyone who does not think so, get on the
other side.” They stood up and divided, and by far the greater number thought
the treaty had been broken. Then they called the allies back in and told them
that they had decided the Athenians were guilty of injustice, but that they
wanted to call a formal meeting of all the Peloponnesian League and put it to
the vote, so that if they made war it would be on the basis of a common
decision.
This done, the allies went home, while the Athenians stayed on to finish the
business that had brought them. This decision of the Assembly (that the treaty
had been broken) was made in the fourteenth year of the Thirty Years’ Peace,
which began after the rebellion in Euboea.86
[88] The main reason the Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been
broken and that the war should begin was not that the allies’ speeches had
persuaded them. They made this decision because they {39} were afraid
Athenian power would continue to grow, seeing that most of Greece was
already subject to them.87

THE FIFTY YEARS’ HISTORY

Thucydides now flashes back to the fifty years that followed the Persian War and led
to the current crisis. In a rapid summary (known as the “Pentecontaetia,” or “Fifty
Years’ Tale”), he tells of the rise of Athens and the increasing friction between it and
the Peloponnesians (1.89–117). The following two chapters are essential reading on
the founding of the empire:
[96] So the Athenians took the leadership in this way, with the willing support
of the allies, owing to their hatred for Pausanias.88 Once established as leaders,
they assigned some cities to provide money as necessary, and others to supply
ships to use against the foreign enemy. A reason they gave [for requiring
money or ships] was to take revenge for their losses by wasting the [Persian]
king’s land. At this point the Athenians first set up the office of Treasurers of
Greece (hellenotamiai) to collect the income from abroad, as they called the
monetary contributions.89 The first assessment was 460 talents.90 The treasury
was at the sacred site on Delos, and so were their meetings.91
[97] At first they led a league of autonomous92 allies who took counsel
together in general meetings. Between the Persian War and {40} the present
one they achieved the following results93 through war and manipulation. They
were responding to the Persians, to their own rebellious allies when they
rebelled, and to the Peloponnesians whenever they were attacked by them. I
have written up these results and made this digression because all previous
writers have left this period out, covering either Greek history before the
Persian Wars or simply the Persian Wars. True, Hellanicus94 touched on these
events in his Attic History, but his account was brief and inaccurate on
chronology. Besides, these events hold the key to understanding how the
Athenian Empire came to be.
In the following highly condensed section, Thucydides tells how Athens became an
imperial power. It is a record of expanding ambitions and unrelenting warfare
abroad. Meanwhile, at home, unmentioned here by Thucydides, the democracy at
Athens was evolving into its classical form and the culture was flowering. Aeschylus
was writing his great plays, Sophocles was starting his career as a playwright, and
Socrates was gaining a reputation as an intellectual. (For notes on chronology, see
Dates, p. 229)
Thucydides sums up the fifty-year history and turns back to his main subject:
[118] All these things that the Greeks did to each other and to foreigners
happened in the roughly fifty-year period between Xerxes’s retreat and the start
of this war. In those years the Athenians brought their empire under strong
control and grew greatly in power, while the Lacedaemonians watched but did
not oppose them, except for a little now and then. The Lacedaemonians were
at peace most of this time, partly because they were always slow to respond to
hostilities even before this, unless compelled to do so, and partly because they
were kept back by wars at home. So they stayed at peace until the rise of
Athenian power was unmistakable and had begun to affect their allies. Then
they thought they could bear it no longer, concluding that Athenian strength
must be passionately resisted and destroyed. And so they decided to start this
war. The Lacedaemonians had already determined for themselves that the
treaty had been dissolved by Athenian injustice, but they sent to Delphi to ask
the god whether they would do well if they went to war. The god answered (we
are told) that victory would be theirs if they fought with all their power, {41}
and that he himself would take their side, whether they called on him or not.95

PERICLES’S WAR SPEECH

After their League had decided on war, the Lacedaemonians sent a delegation to
Athens “to lay charges against them, so that, if the Athenians ignored them, they
would have the best reason for going to war” (1.126). They demanded that the
Athenians raise their siege of Potidaea, set Aegina free, and rescind the decree blocking
commerce with Megara. Only on these conditions, they said, would peace be possible.
The Athenians refused, giving their reasons for continuing as they were. Then came
the final delegation from Sparta with this message: “The Lacedaemonians would like
there to be peace—and there will be peace, but only if you let the Greeks have their
autonomy” (1.139).96
Then the Athenians called an assembly to consider their options, and decided
to make up their minds and answer once and for all. Many people came
forward to speak on each side; some thought they should go to war, others that
they should rescind the Megarian Decree so that it would not stand in the way
of peace. Then Pericles—who was at that time the foremost Athenian and the
most able in speech or action97—advised them along these lines:

[140] My opinion has always been the same, Athenians: don’t give in to the
Peloponnesians. Of course I know the passion that leads people into war does
not last when they’re actually engaged in it; people change their minds with the
circumstances. But I see I must still give nearly the same advice now as I gave
before; and I insist, if you agree to the policy we agreed was just, that you
support it even if things go badly for us—otherwise you’ve no right to boast of
your intelligence if all goes well, since events can turn out as stupidly as {42}
people’s intentions, and that is why we usually blame chance when things don’t
turn out as expected.
It is obvious that the Lacedaemonians have been plotting against us, now
more than ever. We agreed in the Thirty Years’ Peace to refer our differences
to mutual arbitration,98 while each party kept what it had in the meanwhile.99
But they have not yet asked for arbitration, and they have not accepted our
offers either; they prefer war to speeches as a means of clearing away the
charges, and they’re already giving orders when they come, instead of
complaining as they did before. They are commanding us to leave Potidaea,
restore autonomy to Aegina, and rescind our decree against Megara; now these
latest arrivals are warning us to let the Greeks have their autonomy. No one
should think that the war will be over a trifle if we do not rescind the Megarian
decree (which is what they emphasize the most—that if we rescind the decree
there won’t be a war). There mustn’t be any suspicion remaining among you
that the war was over a small matter: this “little matter” holds all the firmness
of your resolve, and the proof of our judgment. If you give way on these points
you will immediately be ordered to give up something greater, since they will
expect you to be afraid and give way over that as well. A stiff refusal from you,
however, will teach them clearly to treat you more as equals.
[141] Make up your minds right now either to give in before we get hurt, or,
if we do go to war—as I think best—not to yield to any demand whatever,
great or small, and to hold on to our possessions without fear. The effect is the
same—subjugation—whether the claim is large or small, so long as it comes as
a command from equals to their neighbors, before arbitration.
Now as for the war and the resources on both sides, once you hear a detailed
account you must see that we’ll be just as strong as they will. First, the
Peloponnesians work their own land and have no wealth either in private or
public hands.100 Second, they have no experience of extended or overseas
warfare, since their attacks on each other are kept brief by their poverty. Such
people are unable to man ships or send out armies of foot soldiers with any
frequency, {43} for they’d be far from their own property while still depending
on their own food supplies. Besides, they would be blockaded by sea. Wars
must be supported by wealth that is available, not by forced contributions.101
And those who work their own land are more willing to risk their lives in war
than their money, since they have some confidence of surviving but are not sure
their money won’t be spent, especially if their war should be prolonged (as is
likely) beyond what they expected. The Peloponnesians and their allies are able
to hold out against all the other Greeks in a single battle, but they are unable to
make war against those whose preparations are different from their own. Their
League does not have a common council to take quick decisive action as
needed; instead, they all have equal votes, and because they are not akin,102
each group pursues its own interest, which means that nothing gets decided.
Some, you see, want more than anything to exact revenge, while others want to
keep damage to their own property at a minimum. They take a long time
before a meeting, and then devote only a fraction of it to any common business,
while spending the greater part on their individual concerns. Meanwhile, no
one thinks that his neglect of common interests will do any harm—that
someone else should look after their share of the common interest. The result is
that no one notices how everyone’s individual judgments are ruining the
common good for them all.
[142] The main point, however, is that they will be hindered by lack of
money, since they will have to delay action while they wait to raise funds. But
in war, the critical moment will not wait. And we should not have a moment’s
fear of their fort building or their navy.103 As for a fort in Attica, it would be
hard enough in peacetime {44} to build a citadel that would be our match, let
alone in war, when we are fortified against it. If they build only an observation
post, on the other hand, they may damage some of our land by raiding it, and
they may take in runaway slaves; but this would not be enough to keep us from
sailing to their land and building forts there or retaliating with our navy, which
is our great strength.
Our naval experience has actually done us more good on land than their
infantry experience has done for their navy. And they won’t easily learn to be
experts at sea. You yourselves have not yet mastered it completely, though
you’ve been studying it since right after the Persians came; how then could men
who are farmers rather than sailors do anything worthwhile? Besides, they’ll
have no chance to practice, because we will blockade them constantly with a
large fleet. They might take courage from superior numbers, set their ignorance
aside, and venture out against a light blockade; but if they are shut in by a large
navy then they will not stir that way at all, their lack of practice will make them
even less skillful than before, and they will be even more cautious because of
that. Naval warfare requires professional knowledge as much as anything else
does: it is not possible to learn by practicing it occasionally on the side; on the
contrary, if you’re studying naval warfare you can’t do anything else on the side.
[143] What if they would carry off the money at Olympia or Delphi and try
to hire away our foreign sailors at a larger salary? That would be dangerous to
us only if we could not match them by manning a fleet with our own citizens
and resident aliens. As it is, however, we can do this. Besides—and this is really
decisive—we have more boat captains and junior officers among our citizens
than all the rest of Greece, and they are better qualified too. Furthermore, to
say nothing of the risks involved, no sailor would agree to be outlawed by his
own country, accept a weaker chance of winning, and join forces with the other
side for only a few days of bonus payments.104
That is more or less how I think things stand for the Peloponnesians. As for
us, our position is free of all the faults I found in theirs, and we have great
advantages in other areas as well. If they invade our territory on foot, we shall
go to theirs by sea. And the advantage will be ours even if we waste only part of
the Peloponnesus while they waste all of Attica. They cannot replace their land
without {45} a battle, while we have plenty of land in the islands and on the
mainland. That’s how great a thing it is to have control of the sea!105
Consider this: would we be any safer from attack if we were islanders? Now
we should really think like islanders and give up our land and our farmhouses,
but keep watch over the sea and our city. We must not get so angry over losing
our farms that we engage the Peloponnesians in battle when they outnumber
us. If we won, we would have to fight against just as many men again; and if we
were defeated we would lose our allies, which are the source of our strength, as
they’ll not keep quiet unless we’re strong enough to fight them. We mustn’t cry
over our land and farms, but save our mourning for the lives of men: farmland
won’t give us men, but men can win farmland. If I thought I could persuade
you, I’d tell you to go out and destroy the farms yourselves, and prove to the
Peloponnesians that you will never surrender in order to save your land.
[144] Many other things give me hope that we shall win though, unless you
intend to enlarge your empire while still engaged in the war, or choose to take
on new risks.106 I am more afraid of our own mistakes, you see, than I am of
our opponents’ schemes. But all this should come clear in another speech, at
the time of action.
For the present, let us send the ambassadors back with this answer: (1) We
will give the Megarians the use of our market and ports if the Lacedaemonians
will cancel their policy of expelling us and our allies as aliens (since nothing in
the treaty blocks either our current policy or theirs). Also, (2) we will give the
Greek cities their autonomy (if they were autonomous when we signed the
treaty), as soon as the Lacedaemonians grant autonomy to their own cities to
enjoy as they see fit, and not merely to serve Lacedaemonian interests. And (3)
we would like to go to arbitration in accordance with the treaty. We will not
begin a war, but we will fight off those who do.
This is an answer that follows justice and suits the dignity of our city as well.
Nevertheless, you must realize that although we are being forced into this war,
if we embrace it willingly we will have less pressure from the enemy.
Remember too that the greatest danger gives rise to the greatest honor for a
city or a private man. Our ancestors, after all, stood up to the Persians; they
started with less than we have now, and even gave up what they had. It was
more good planning than good luck, and more daring than power, that enabled
them {46} to repel the Persian king and raise our city to its present heights. We
must measure up to our ancestors: fight off our enemies in every possible way
and try to deliver the city undiminished to those who come after.
[145] Such was Pericles’s speech. The Athenians thought his advice was best,
and voted to do as he had told them. They answered the Lacedaemonians as he
had proposed, in every particular and on the main point too: “They would do
nothing on command, but were ready to resolve the accusations on a fair and
equal basis by arbitration as specified in the treaty.” Then the Lacedaemonians
went home, and after that there came no more ambassadors.
[146] These, then, were the complaints and the issues on which the two sides
differed before the war—complaints which arose with the events at Epidamnus
and Corcyra.107 The two sides were still in communication, however, and went
to each other without heralds, though not without suspicion, for what was
happening amounted to a breach of the treaty and a reason for war.

1. Thucydides usually refers to himself in the third person. He provides a second preface at 5.26.
2. Hellas is the Greek name for Greece.
3.“Planted nothing”: planted no vineyards or olive orchards, which take years to produce a crop and are
easily destroyed by invaders.
4.Athenians believed they had always lived in Attica, and that their immigrants were refugees, rather
than invaders. Thucydides accepts this story as fact, but modern scholars see it as myth. See
Hornblower’s commentary.
5. By contrast, Herodotus consigns Minos to prehistory (3.122).
6. For example at Odyssey 3.71.
7. These peoples lived along the north shore of the Gulf of Corinth, west of Delphi and Phocis.
8.As cicadas seem to be born from the ground, they represented the Athenian belief that they had
themselves sprung from the ground on which they lived.
9.The moderate sort of clothing was a short tunic. Spartan citizens tried to regard themselves as equals
and to overlook the differences in wealth that actually occurred among them.
10. The Peloponnesian War. For the purification of Delos, see 3.104.
11.Although impressed by Thucydides’s use of this evidence, most modern archaeologists think he
mistook early Greek vases for Carian ones. See the summary of literature in Hornblower.
12.Helen’s suitors were said to have sworn to her father Tyndareus that they would avenge any wrong
done to the lucky suitor who married Helen.
13.The Heraclids, who were said to be descendants of Heracles, had sought refuge in Athens from
Eurystheus, who was a member of the Perseids, as his father was a descendant of Perseus.
14.Atreus was one of the sons of Pelops; he had helped to kill his half-brother Chrysippus—another son
of Pelops—at the request of his mother.
15. Homer, Iliad 2.612.
16. Homer, Iliad 2.108.
17.Sparta was not enclosed by a wall until Roman times. The Athenians, by contrast, believed that
Theseus had gathered their villages into one city at a very early date (2.15–16).
18. Homer lists the participants in the Greek army at Troy in his Catalogue of Ships, Iliad 2.484 ff.
19.Thucydides writes from experience: siege warfare was very expensive for the Athenians, since it
required keeping troops in the field for periods much longer than the brief campaigns to which they
were accustomed. This no doubt explains the reluctance of Sparta to lay regular siege to Athens.
20.The Dorian invasion is probably historical, though not as early as Thucydides puts it. According to
legend, the Heraclids, who claimed descent from Heracles, were driven out of the Peloponnesus by the
sons of Pelops and found asylum among the Dorians. Later they reclaimed their thrones with the aid of
the Dorians, who took over the Peloponnesus and reduced the local population to a status like that of
sharecroppers.
21. A tyranny at the time was a nontraditional monarchy. Later, during the democracy, Athenians came
to view tyrants as cruel and lawless. On the Athenian tyranny, see 1.20 and 6.54.
22.
Triremes were warships with three banks of oars (see Glossary). The fifty-oared ships Thucydides
mentions elsewhere were an older type of warship that remained in use.
23. See Herodotus 3.49–53. The ancient quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra (modern Corfu) was one
of the three chief causes of the Peloponnesian War. Scholars believe that Thucydides’s date is too early
by about seventy years.
24. Homer, Iliad 2.570.
25. On Polycrates, see Herodotus 3.122.
26. Such as the Battle of Salamis in 480, which saved Greece from the Persian navy.
27.The War of the Lelantine Plain (late 700s) was between the cities of Chalcis and Eretria, both on the
long island of Euboea north of Attica, and their respective allies.
28.Croesus was the king of Lydia whose wealth was legendary; Lydia was in Asia Minor (modern
Turkey).
29.
The tale of Cyrus’s defeat of Croesus in 544 and subsequent conquest of Ionia is told in Book 1 of
Herodotus, Histories.
30. In 510, the Lacedaemonians deposed Hippias in Athens.
31. “Has had good laws”: the expression is used for cities that are neither democracies nor tyrannies, and
is often a code word for moderate oligarchy. See the use of this expression in connection with the
establishment of oligarchy on Thasos (8.64). On the constitution of Sparta, see Herodotus 1.65 and
Introduction, xviii–xix.
32. A longer version of this story is to be found in 6.54–59.
33. “Other Greeks have wrong opinions”: this may simply refer to popular beliefs of the time; but it may
also be implied criticism of Herodotus, who said the Spartan kings had two votes each at 7.57, and who
referred to the Pitanate unit at 9.53.
34.See also 5.26, 5.68, and 7.44 on Thucydides’s methods and the difficulties he encountered in
applying them. Note the contrast between word and action in the first two paragraphs of 1.22; that
contrast will be made often in the speeches that Thucydides reports.
35. “No mythology”: Thucydides writes history without reference to any interventions by the gods. In
this he is following the new learning taught by sophists and others, who offered naturalistic explanations
in place of supernatural ones. Thucydides explains human events in terms of human nature and the
human condition.
36.The sea battles of Salamis (480) and Mycale (479) or possibly Artemisium (480), and the land battles
of Thermopylae (480) and Plataea (479).
37. “Compelled them into war”: scholars differ on how to take this. Comparison with parallel passages
suggests that Thucydides does not mean that war was simply inevitable, but that people on both sides
felt compelled to it by their mutual fear. Compulsion (anankē) is a subjective necessity. On the
interpretation of anankē see Introduction, xli–xliii.
38.“Along these lines”: toiade. Thucydides almost always introduces speeches with language of this kind,
indicating that he is presenting the main ideas behind the speeches, but not the actual words. On
interpreting the speeches, see the Introduction, xxx–xxxiv.
39. Each of the two speeches begins with the word that sets the ostensible theme for that speech:
“justice” for the Corcyreans, and “necessity” for the Corinthians. Note that the Corinthians, who plead
necessity and usefulness, have the better case for justice. For Athens to defend Corcyra against Corinth
will run against the spirit (though not the letter) of the Thirty Years’ Peace, and observing agreements is
an essential part of the ancient concept of justice.
On the other hand, the Corcyreans, who appeal to justice, have little basis beyond the usefulness of
their proposal for Athens. Necessity, anankē, in Thucydides usually means a subjective condition—what
people feel to be necessary for their own convenience or advantage. We might render it here as “the
expedient.” This passage gives us the first of many cleverly paired speeches provided by Thucydides to
show differing points of view, and to show also the way in which speakers mask their intentions
rhetorically in order to win over an audience. Compare the similar reversal in the debate over Mytilene:
there, Cleon appeals to justice as he argues for punishing the innocent, while Diodotus appeals to
advantage in their defense (3.37 ff.). This is all too neat, and fits too closely to Thucydides’s views on
human behavior, for it to be a transcription of the speeches as given. Rhodes thinks the Corcyreans
“have the better of the argument” (on 44.1). I think the two sides are equally weak: Thucydides lets us
see that the Corcyreans are plainly unethical in their appeal to justice, while the Corinthian appeal to
advantage is plainly false. Athens will, as usual in its history, go with what is advantageous rather than
what is just.
40. “Because of this”: because of their former policy of nonalliance.
41.The Thirty Years’ Peace Treaty between Athens and Sparta and their allies, 446/445, was to last only
fourteen years. It provided that either side must go to arbitration before resuming hostilities.
42. From the beginning of 1.36, this is all one sentence in Greek, with just one main verb, here
translated “recognize.” I have changed the construction from the impersonal “he” to the “you” that is
more congenial to English style. Note the Thucydidean paradoxes: your fear would frighten your enemy,
while your confidence would give him confidence. Cameron (53) calls this “a lollapalooza of a sentence.”
43. On this opening, see note 39.
44.If they really cared about justice, why did the Corinthians refuse to go to arbitration (1.28, 1.34; cf.
1.78)? Rhodes asks this ad loc., but the Corinthians make a reasonable argument: it’s late to come to
arbitration after hostilities begin, and one side has an advantage.
45. Greedy: a form of pleonexia, grasping more than your share. On the concept, see Glossary.
46.To make the English clear, I have had to rearrange this sentence from “it is rather for those who are
not” to “it is not for those who.”
47. An odd point, since Athens and Corcyra had no need for a cease-fire, never having been at war.
48. The people of the island of Samos defected from the empire in 440–439; the Athenians put them
down with great violence (1.115–17). From this passage only we learn that Corinth voted not to
intervene. Note that the Thirty Years’ Peace accepted that Samos was part of the Athenian League, so
that an intervention by Peloponnesians would have been a clear violation of the treaty. Corcyra, by
contrast, had no part in the treaty (Rhodes).
49.“The laws of the Greeks”: conventions (nomoi) that established expectations of behavior among
Greek states. See 2.37 (with note 50.).
50.This may refer either to the Megarian Decree of 432, which closed the markets and ports of Athens
and its empire to Megarian trade—a ruinous action. Alternatively, this may refer much earlier to
Megara’s separation from its Corinthian alliance with the help of the Athenians, who built long walls
from Megara to its port (1.103).
51.“One may punish one’s own allies”: Corinth voted against intervening when Athens put down the
rebellion of the Athenian ally Samos (1.40 and 1.115–17).
52.“They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon, Diotimus, son of Strombichus, and
Proteas, son of Epicles.”
53. As they were not officially at war, no herald was necessary.
54.Socrates served as a hoplite in the grueling campaign at Potidaea. For a description of his behavior
there, see Plato, Symposium 219e–220e.
55. On the Spartan constitution, see Introduction, xviii–xix.
56. Scholars disagree about the historical status of such speeches in Thucydides. See 1.22 and
Introduction, xxx–xxxiv.
57.Aegina, an island close to Athens, had rebelled in 457 and was brought under firm Athenian control.
We do not know precisely what sort of autonomy had been promised to the people of Aegina, or how
they felt it had been infringed. This passage probably refers to the Thirty Years’ Peace Treaty; see 2.27
with Hornblower’s notes on both passages. On the concept of autonomy, see Glossary.
58.Self-control: sōphrosunē, a virtue associated with oligarchy and also with Lacedaemon. The Greek
word cannot be contained by one English one; it is also translated in these pages as “prudence,”
“moderation,” and “clear-headedness.”
59. Abused: the verbal form of hubris, which can include insult and rape.
60. Subjugated: the Greek literally means, “enslaved.” See Glossary under “subjugation.”
61. Corcyra (modern Corfu) had a navy of 120 triremes, the second largest in Greece. In fact, Corinth
was the aggressor in its quarrel with Corcyra, and Athens had merely responded to calls for help against
Corinth (see 1.24 ff., and p. 15). Potidaea was of strategic importance for Athens’s interests in the part
of northern Greece known as Thrace, which was a source of gold as well as timber for ships. A former
Corinthian colony, it had been a tributary member of the Athenian alliance until its rebellion against
Athens in 432.
62. The long walls, guarding the road from Athens to its port, Piraeus, were built in 458.
63. See 2.8 and 8.46, for the Spartan claim to be the liberators of Greece.
64.Lacedaemonians took pride in the idea, largely mythical, that their institutions had not changed since
the time of Lycurgus (early eighth century). The changes in Athens are probably democratic reforms, the
growth of commerce, and the creation of a navy. For Thucydides’s mixed views on the effectiveness of
democracy at war, see Introduction, xxxvi.
65. Sacrilege: not hosia, therefore unholy or irreverent. On the concept of to hosion see note on 3.82.
66. The Athenian speech does not respond to specific charges of the Corinthians such as the matter of
Potidaea. Instead it responds to what Thucydides earlier called “the truest reason for the quarrel” (1.23):
the growth of the Athenian Empire, which was also a general theme of the Corinthian speech (1.69).
Thus, in shaping the debate he represents, Thucydides relegates “the explanations both sides gave in
public” to the sidelines. He is less interested in the words spoken at Sparta than in the real underlying
issue; he represents this as he sees it, as a debate about the empire.
67. Plataean troops were also engaged in the Battle of Marathon in 490.
68. An exaggeration: there were 200 Athenian ships in an allied fleet of a little under 400.
69.In 480, when the second Persian invasion under Xerxes reached Athens, the Athenians sent their
wives and children to safety on the islands and put every available man on board their fighting ships.
70. This is misleading: the Lacedaemonians did not simply leave matters to Athens. Initially, the Greek
alliance against the Persian Empire was led by them. But their general, Pausanias, alienated enough of
the allies that they turned to Athens for leadership, which Athens was eager to provide for economic
reasons—initially to safeguard and expand trade, and later to secure an income from the empire. See
1.95 and 1.96.
71. “We were compelled”: the verb is cognate with anankē, necessity. On the concept, see Introduction,
xli, ff. The three motive forces are deos, timē, and ōphelia. Fear is Thucydides’s favorite explanation for
violence and injustice, and he sees it operating even when it is well below the surface. The word
translated “ambition” literally means “honor.”
72.“Hated by most people”: see 2.8, 1.99, and 3.47. This is probably an exaggeration, as much of the
empire appears to have been loyal to Athens even in adversity. The issue is debated by scholars. Is
Thucydides to be trusted on this point? Or is he taking a narrowly oligarchical perspective? Did ordinary
Athenians see their empire this way? Was Athens seen as a supporter of democracy in the subject cities?
Did the empire in fact become harsher around 432 and ease up afterward under pressure of war? In 1.99,
Thucydides explains the decline of Athenian popularity in these terms: the allies began by making
payments so as to avoid contributing troops or ships in the war against Persia. Then, when they failed to
meet their financial obligations, Athenian forces would come against them. Since they had cut back on
their own military forces, they would have no adequate means of defense against Athens, and so they
continued in the empire, some of them resentfully (see Introduction, xxi).
73.Athens had been badly scared by the rebellion of the nearby island of Euboea in 446; that was why it
had agreed to the Thirty Years’ Peace.
74. See the Melian Dialogue, 5.105; and Democritus, frag. 267: “By nature it is fitting for the stronger to
rule.”
75.On Thucydides’s views of human nature, which may not be the same as those expressed by the
Athenians, see Introduction, xl–xli.
76.The interpretation of this passage is in question. According to the alternative reading, preferred by
Hornblower, the Athenians were losing cases tried abroad and therefore shifted trials to Athens so that
they could get a fairer hearing for themselves. This can be defended from the Greek, but would not fit a
context in which the Athenians are pleading their fairness to their allies.
77. “The sort of behavior you showed”: through tyrannical behavior, the Spartan general Pausanias had
alienated a number of the Greek cities he had liberated from the Persians in northern Greece (1.94–95);
but another Spartan general, Brasidas, was to be successful in winning friends for Sparta in that region
(4.76 ff.). Events showed, however, that Sparta could be a harsh master (see 3.93).
78. “To be so blind”: this is one of the accusations of Corinth, see 1.69.
79.“No one should be blamed”: see 1.75, where the Athenians introduce this line of thought: that a city
cannot be blamed for actions taken in its own defense. Seeking help from foreigners (which in this case
probably meant using Persian money or ships against Athens) was a terrible thing to do so soon after the
long, hard war to keep Persians out of Greek affairs. An early Spartan attempt to deal with Persia was
derailed by the Athenians (2.67). Toward the end of the war, however, almost twenty years after this
debate, Sparta did use Persian help to defeat Athens. As elsewhere in the debate, Thucydides may be
foreshadowing the outcome of the war.
80.“Private interests”: we cannot be sure what this means. Perhaps it refers to the commercial shipping
that Corinth and Megara are concerned about.
81. Arrogance: hubris.
82. “Our self-control . . . courage”: literally, “A sense of shame takes the biggest part in self control, and
courage takes the biggest part in shame.” When x takes part in y, it is y that explains x. For the
interpretation of this difficult passage, see Nussbaum (1986, 508, n. 24), and my note on 3.83. Self-
control (sōphrosunē), the chief virtue associated with Sparta, is essentially linked to a sense of shame
(aidōs), which is closely akin to shame (aischunē). Shame leads to courage because men who have a sense
of shame will not want to be seen doing anything cowardly.
83. Sophists were forbidden to bring the new learning to the Lacedaemonians. They were proud of their
resistance to the new learning taught by sophists, which sometimes appealed to nature over against
human law. See Plato, Hippias Major 283–84, and on the nature/law issue, see Introduction, xxxvii.
84. A truly Laconic speech. Spartans were famous for brevity in speaking and our word “laconic” is
derived from the name of their homeland. Sthenelaïdas plays no other part in the History.
85. Sparta had five elected officials known as ephors (overseers).
86. The debate took place in 432; the treaty had been negotiated in 446, after Athens had put down a
rebellion on Euboea, the island just north of Attica (1.114–15). Much later, the Lacedaemonians came
to regret their decision to start the war (7.18).
87. Speeches in Thucydides rarely affect action, although they frequently bring to light the motives for
action. As we have observed before, fear, not reason, is the principal cause of war and other human evils,
according to Thucydides (see Introduction, xxxii, and 1.23).
88. The Spartan general Pausanias had been acting like a tyrant. See 1.94–95 and above, note 77.
89.“Income from abroad”: the Greek word is phoron, which means, “that which is brought in.” It is
commonly translated as “tribute,” but this is misleading, as, in fact, the contributions were made to
support a common cause. A small amount (one-sixtieth, “first fruits”) was reserved for Athena, and was
recorded in lists inscribed on stone (called “tribute lists” by scholars).
90.A talent was a measure of weight; a talent of silver was worth 6,000 drachmas, which were worth 6
obols each, a good day’s wage for a skilled soldier or sailor.
91.The island of Delos was sacred to all Greeks. The treasury of the League was later moved to the
Acropolis, probably in 454. Around that time, the League had emerged as an empire of Athens.
Meetings of the allies appear to have been rare.
92.“Autonomous allies”: i.e., politically independent—but under Athenian hegemony. See Ostwald
1982.
93.“The following results”: i.e., the events to be related in chapters 98–116 of Book 1 (omitted from this
edition).
94.Hellanicus of Lesbos wrote a history of Attica while Thucydides was at work; its publication probably
led to the insertion of this criticism (Hornblower).
95. See 1.87. Later, after their defeat at Pylos (425) and the Peace of Nicias (421), some Lacedaemonians
felt they were to blame for not going to arbitration at this point, as the treaty required (7.18). On
Thucydides’s attitude toward oracles, see Introduction, xxviii n. 15.
96.Autonomy: autonomia; independence, really “having your own laws.” In general, members of the
Athenian Empire retained local laws. On the term, see Glossary.
97.“Most able in speech or action”: the sophist Protagoras promised to make his students “most able in
speech or action” (Plato, Protagoras 318e). Pericles was deeply involved in the new learning and had
spent much time with Protagoras.
98. Arbitration: dikas, cognate with the word translated “justice.”
99.“In the meanwhile”: almost all editors supply such a phrase, although it is not in the text. The point is
that in agreeing to the Thirty Years’ Peace, the Peloponnesians cannot have agreed to let Athens keep its
gains permanently, and they did not ratify the Athenian Empire.
100.Since the Lacedaemonians were not dependent on imported grain, as Athens was, they had not
developed the sort of commercial system that, along with its mines, had made Athens rich.
101. The Athenians had to resort to forcing money from their allies as early as 428/427, to support the
siege of Mytilene (3.19). There must be some irony in Thucydides’s comment about Pericles at 2.65: “he
also foresaw what the city could do.” Pericles’s critical remarks about forced contributions seem more
true of Athens than of Sparta.
102.“Because they are not akin”: the Peloponnesian League included Dorians and Aeolians, and there
were substantial cultural differences within these groups as well. See 6.17 for a similar prediction—not
borne out in the event—about the mixed population of Sicily.
103.The Corinthians had observed that Athens would be vulnerable to having a Peloponnesian fort set
up in its territory (1.122.1), an idea the Spartans did not take up until it was proposed to them by the
Athenian Alcibiades many years later. In fact, Sparta’s navy and fort building did eventually defeat
Athens; here Thucydides may be ironically foreshadowing events that are far in the future. For the
superiority of the Athenian navy, read the description of Phormio’s victories at sea over a larger
Peloponnesian fleet (2.83 ff.).
104.Although all Athenian sailors were paid, it did not follow that they included large numbers of mere
mercenaries, as the Corinthians had assumed. Pericles is right to imply here that allied sailors felt some
loyalty to Athens.
105. On the importance of sea power, see above 1.7, 1.13 ff., and 1.83.
106. Here Thucydides foreshadows the ill-fated expedition to take over Syracuse on Sicily (Books 6 and
7).
107. See 1.38.
 {47} BOOK 2

The First Year of the War

In the early pages of Book 2, Thucydides describes the opening moves of the war,
bringing out the strengths of the two sides and their contrasting strategies.
[1] At this point the war had already begun between the Athenians and the
Peloponnesians along with their respective allies. During this war they made no
contact with each other except through heralds, and once started, they waged
war continuously.1 This account presents events in the order in which they
occurred, by summers and winters.2

THE ATTACK ON PLATAEA

Plataea had originally been in the sphere of Thebes, but during the Persian Wars, the
Plataeans had fought bravely against the Persian invaders, while the Thebans had
given in. After the Greek victory, the allies would be expected to defend Plataea’s
independence (see 3.54 and 58), and Plataea remained aligned with Athens—a sore
point with the Thebans, who considered Plataea to be theirs. The first formal action
of the war is a surprise attack on Plataea by Thebes. A siege by Thebes and Sparta
follows a year later; see 2.71–78 and 3.20–24 with 3.52. For the debate that follows
the capture of Plataea, see 3.53–68.
{48} [2] Fourteen years had elapsed of the thirty-year treaty that was made
after the seizure of Euboea.3 In the fifteenth year,4 in early spring, a few more
than three hundred men from Thebes5 entered Plataea—a Boeotian city allied
to Athens6—under arms just after bedtime. They had been invited by Plataeans
who opened the gates for them: Naucleides and his group. To gain power for
themselves personally, they wanted to destroy their enemies among the citizens
and bring their city over to the side of Thebes. They had made this
arrangement through Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, the most powerful
man in Thebes. The Thebans saw the war coming and wanted first to take over
Plataea—which had always been at odds with them—while peace lasted and
war had not yet broken out openly. That is why they entered so easily without
being detected, because no guards had been posted. They grounded arms in the
agora, and, instead of following their hosts’ instructions—to go to work
immediately, invading the homes of their enemies—they decided to employ
gentle propaganda to bring the city into a friendly relationship with them.
They had their herald announce that anyone who wished to join the alliance of
their fatherland with all the Boeotians should place their arms next to the
Thebans’—thinking that in this way the city would readily come over to their
side.
[3] As soon as the Plataeans saw that there were Thebans inside and the city
had been taken at a stroke, they took fright, thinking that many more had
come in (because they could not see in the dark). So they came to an agreement
and accepted what they were told quietly, all the more so because the Thebans
did nothing violent or revolutionary to anyone. As they did this, the Plataeans
realized that there were not many Thebans, and they thought if they attacked
they would easily prevail. Because they did not want to break off their alliance
with Athens, the majority of Plataeans decided to make the attempt. They
came together by tunneling through the walls between their houses, so that
they would not be seen passing through the streets; they set wagons in the
streets without draft animals, to {49} serve as walls, and they did everything else
they thought helpful in the present emergency. When their preparations were
as complete as possible, they kept watch during the night, and exactly at dawn
they attacked from their houses, so as not to come upon the Thebans when
daylight gave them more confidence and they were on equal footing, but at
night when the Thebans would be more frightened and under the disadvantage
of their ignorance of the city. So the Plataeans attacked right away and soon
were fighting hand to hand.
[4] As soon as the Thebans realized they had been deceived, they formed a
perimeter and beat off attacks from all sides. At first they pushed the Plataeans
back two or three times, but then, with a tumultuous noise, the women and
slaves were upon them with high-pitched cries and screams, using stones and
roof-tiles as missiles—this while it rained heavily all night. They were
frightened. They turned and fled through the city, most of them not knowing,
in the mud and darkness, how to find paths to a safe exit (because all this
happened at month’s end).7 But their pursuers knew how to prevent their
escape, with the result that many were killed. One of the Plataeans closed the
gates through which they had entered, which were the only ones open, and
used the butt of a spear in place of the “acorn” to lock the bar, so there would
be no exit even here.
As they were chased down in the city, some of the Thebans climbed the walls
and threw themselves over, and most of those died. Others found some gates
that were not defended and, undetected, cut the bar with an ax given them by a
woman;8 only a few of those escaped, for discovery came quickly. Still others
scattered and perished here and there in the city. But the largest and best-
disciplined group hit upon a large house near the wall, with doors that
happened to be open; they thought the house doors were gates to the outside.
When the Plataeans saw that this group was trapped, they debated whether to
burn them up then and there, by setting the house alight, or to deal with them
some other way. But in the end the surviving Thebans, who had been
wandering around the city, agreed to surrender themselves and their weapons
to the Plataeans, to be dealt with in whatever way they wished.
[5] That’s what happened to those inside Plataea. The rest of the Theban
army had been ordered to stand by in force through the night in case those who
went in had a rough time; while on the road they got word of what had
happened and so they set out to help {50} out. But Plataea is seventy stades9
from Thebes, and the night’s rain slowed their march. The Asopus River rose
and was not easy to cross. Marching in the rain after barely making it across the
river, they came late. Already some of their men [in Plataea] were dead, and
those who lived had been captured.
When the Thebans saw what had happened, they planned to deal with the
Plataeans who were outside the city. (There were people and property on their
farms, since the trouble had come unexpectedly in peacetime.) The plan was to
exchange anyone they captured for the Thebans who were inside, if any of their
lives had been spared.
That was the Theban strategy. As the Plataeans thought through their own
plans, they came to suspect that such a thing would happen. In fear of this,
they sent a herald to the Thebans about their compatriots outside. They said
the Theban action was in violation of reverence, since the Thebans had tried to
seize the city while their treaty was in effect.10 They told the Thebans to do no
injustice to their possessions outside. If they did, the Plataeans would kill their
surviving prisoners, but if they withdrew from Plataean land they would turn
the men over to them. (That is the Theban story, and they said the Plataeans
swore an oath to this effect. But the Plataeans do not agree that they had
promised to turn over the men, but only [to do so] if they came to an
agreement after the start of negotiations. And they deny that they swore an
oath.)
So the Thebans withdrew from Plataean territory after doing no injustice. As
for the Plataeans, as soon as they had evacuated their belongings from the
countryside, they killed the men right away. There had been 180 prisoners,
including Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had acted.
[6] After that, they sent a messenger to Athens, turned over the dead to
Thebes under a truce, and made such arrangements in the city as they thought
best in the circumstances.
News of the events at Plataea reached Athens right away, and the Athenians
immediately rounded up the Boeotians11 who were in Attica. They also sent a
herald to the Plataeans with instructions to tell them to do nothing violent
about the Thebans they had captured until they had held council about them.
They had not yet got the {51} news that the men were dead, for the first
messenger left for Athens just as the Thebans came in, and the second after
they had been defeated and captured, having no knowledge of what came next.
So the Athenians sent their herald in ignorance, and he arrived to find that the
men had been killed.
After that, the Athenians went to Plataea in force, bringing grain and leaving
a garrison. They also evacuated the men who could not fight along with the
women and children.

PREPARATIONS: ALLIANCES AND PRELIMINARY SPEECHES

[7] After the action in Plataea and the glaring violation of the treaty, the
Athenians prepared for war, as did the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Both
sides set out to send diplomats to the king of Persia and to other foreign
powers, wherever they hoped for support. They also formed alliances with cities
outside their control: the Lacedaemonians ordered the Italians and Sicilians
who had taken their side to build ships in proportion to the size of each city (in
addition to those already there) with the goal of a five-hundred-ship navy,
asking also for specified monetary contributions and instructing them to
remain at peace and to allow the Athenians [to visit with] one ship until these
things were done. The Athenians marshaled their existing allies and sent
diplomats to places near the Peloponnesus—Corcyra, Kephalonia, Akarnania,
and Zakynthos—seeing that if they could cement these friendships they could
make war on the Peloponnesus from all sides.
[8] Neither side made small plans, but both put their whole strength into the
war. This was only to be expected, for in the beginning of an enterprise,
everyone is most eager. Besides, there were many young men in the
Peloponnesus at that time, and many in Athens, who for want of experience,
undertook the war quite willingly. And the rest of Greece watched in suspense
as its two principal cities came into conflict. Many prophecies were told, and
many sung by the priests of the oracles, both in the cities about to make war
and in others. There was also an earthquake in Delos a little before this, where
the earth had never been shaken before in the memory of the Greeks. This was
said to be a sign of what was going to happen afterward, and people believed
that. And if anything else of this sort happened by chance, people started
looking for an explanation.
Men’s sympathies for the most part went with the Lacedaemonians, especially
because they gave out that they would recover the Greeks’ liberty. Everyone,
private citizens and cities alike, endeavored in word and deed to assist them as
much as they could; and {52} everyone thought that the affair would be held
back if they were not part of it. That is how angry most people were against the
Athenians, some out of the desire to be set free from their empire, and others
for fear of falling under it.12
[9] Setting off in this spirit, then, and with the preparations described, the
two cities went to war supported by the following allies:
The allies of Sparta were: all the Peloponnesians beyond the isthmus except
for the Argives and the Achaeans, who were friends of both sides;13 outside the
Peloponnesus, Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambracians,
Leucadians, and Anaktorians; naval support from the Corinthians, Megarians,
Sicyonians, Pelleneans, Elians, Ambracians, and Leucadians; cavalry from the
Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other cities provided infantry. That
was the Lacedaemonians’ alliance.
The Athenian allies were the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, Messenians at
Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, Zakynthians, along with
other cities that made regular payments—cities in Caria along the coast, (as
well as their Dorian neighbors), Ionia, the Hellespont region, Thrace, all the
islands east of a line between the Peloponnesus and Crete, and all of the
Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and
Corcyreans provided naval support; the others infantry or money.
Those were the alliances on both sides, and so they prepared for war.
[10] After the events at Plataea, the Lacedaemonians immediately sent orders
to the cities in the Peloponnesus and their allies outside it to prepare an army
equipped as one would expect for an expedition away from home, for an attack
on Athens. When all were ready, two-thirds of the forces from each city
gathered at the isthmus at the appointed time. And when the army was
formed, Archidamus,14 who was king of the Lacedaemonians and commander
of the expedition, {53} summoned the generals from all the cities and other
noteworthy men of high rank. He advised them in this way:15
[11] “Peloponnesians and allies: Our fathers are not the only ones to have
fought frequent campaigns in the Peloponnesus and out of it; we ourselves, we
older ones, have been sufficiently acquainted with war, yet we have never gone
out with a larger force than this one. And although we are now going against
the most powerful city, we are the largest and best army. Justice therefore
requires us to prove ourselves no worse than our fathers and no less than our
own reputation. All Greece hangs on this venture, keeping us in mind and—
out of hatred of Athens—wishing us success in achieving our goal. You may
think we attack in such force that we can feel safe, that our enemy will not
march out to give battle. But you must not take that as a reason to proceed at
all carelessly: leaders and soldiers from every city must be prepared, each of
them expecting to run into some particular danger. Events in war, you know,
cannot be foreseen; many things happen suddenly and attacks are passionate.
Many times the smaller force punishes the larger one, if it is more cautious and
if the larger one, through contempt, has dropped its guard. In enemy territory,
our minds must be set on a confident campaign, while our actions must be
based on cautious planning.16 That way we should be boldest in attacking our
enemy and safest when under attack.
The city we march against is quite able to defend itself, superbly prepared in
every way, so that we must have every expectation that they will give battle,
perhaps even now before we arrive, but surely when they see us wasting their
possessions and destroying them. Anyone who sees with his own eyes that he is
suffering some unaccustomed evil is struck with a fit of anger at the moment
and takes action with very little thought and a great deal of passion. The
Athenians are even more likely than others to do this; after all, they think they
deserve to rule over others, invading their neighbors’ land and wasting it, rather
than seeing their own land wasted. Remember how much power there is in the
city we are fighting, and how much fame or infamy we will carry way from one
outcome or the other, {54} both for our ancestors and ourselves. Follow where
your commander leads, maintain order, keep a good watch above all else, and
respond sharply to orders. The finest and safest thing is this: for our large army
to be seen in good order.”
[12] This said, Archidamus dismissed the gathering. First he sent
Melesippus17 to Athens in case the Athenians would make any concessions
when they saw that the Peloponnesian army was now on the road. But the
Athenians would not even let him into the city, let alone their assembly. That
was because Pericles’s strategy was to accept no herald or diplomat while the
Lacedaemonians were on campaign—until the Athenians were victorious. So
they sent him back without a hearing, ordering him to cross the boundary that
very day—and to tell the Spartans that if they wanted to send a diplomat in
future to do so after they had returned to their own land.
They sent guards to accompany him and prevent him from meeting with
anyone.18 When he reached the border and was about to leave he said: “This
day begins great evil for the Greeks.”19 So he came to the army camp, and
Archidamus learned there would be no concessions from Athens. Then
Archidamus broke camp and advanced into Athenian land in force. As for the
Boeotians, they sent cavalry as their contribution to the Peloponnesian army,
but the rest of their troops went to Plataea and wasted the land.
[13] While the Peloponnesian army was still assembling on the isthmus or
was on the road before entering Attica, Pericles20 turned over his farmland to
the public in order to avoid suspicion. Archidamus was his guest friend,21 and
Pericles suspected that when he invaded Attica he would spare Pericles’s farms
and not waste them—either (as often happens) as a personal favor or under
orders from the Lacedaemonians to bring Pericles into disrepute (just as they
had {55} urged the Athenians to expel those under a curse, because of him22).
So Pericles announced in the assembly that Archidamus was his guest friend,
but that no harm would come to the city if his farmland and house were not
wasted by the enemy like those of other people.23 So he made these public
property.
Then he advised them for the present as he had before: to prepare for war and
bring things in from the fields, but not to go out to fight. Instead, they should
come in and guard the city while fitting out their navy, in which their strength
lay. He also said they should keep a tight hand on their allies—the source of
their power being the money contributed by the allies—because (he said)
victory in war is due on the whole to strategy and superiority in money. He
urged them to be confident: the city had an income of 600 talents a year in
payments from the allies, most years, apart from their other income. In the
Acropolis at the time they had 6,000 talents of silver minted.24 Besides, there
was unminted gold and silver in private and public dedications, as well as in the
sacred paraphernalia used for processions and contests, and the spoils of the
Persian Wars, and so on—amounting to at least 500 talents. In addition, quite
a lot of money could be raised from other sacred objects, which they could use,
and, if all else failed, there was the gold on the goddess herself; the image
appeared to have 40 talents of gold by weight, which could all be taken. If they
used this to save the city, they could restore it to equal value later.25
In this way he reassured them about money. As for hoplites, they had 13,000
apart from those who guarded the city and manned its {56} walls,26 who
numbered 16,000.27 They also counted 1,200 horsemen, including mounted
archers, 1,600 regular archers, and 300 triremes ready to sail. These were the
resources the Athenians had—no less in each category—when the
Peloponnesians were poised to invade and the war was about to begin. Pericles
said this, along with other points he was used to making, to demonstrate that
they would prevail in the war.
[14] The Athenians heard him out and approved. They fetched out of the
countryside their children and women, along with whatever property they had
in their homes, even stripping woodwork from their own homes. Cattle and
draft animals were sent over to Euboea and nearby islands.28 They grieved over
this evacuation because most of them had always lived in the countryside and
were used to it.
In 2.15 and 2.16, Thucydides explains the Athenian love for living in their
countryside by telling the story of the mythical consolidation of Athens under Theseus.
[17] When they reached Athens, a few of them had their own houses or
found refuge with friends or family. But most of them settled in vacant places
in the city, including temples and hero-shrines other than the Acropolis and
the Eleusinion29 and places that were closed off. The area called the Pelargic,
below the Acropolis, had been sacrosanct from development. A line ending an
oracle from Delphi made this explicit: “Better leave the Pelargic untouched.”
Even so, under the current necessity, the area was fully occupied. In my
opinion, the oracle’s meaning came out opposite of what people {57} expected:
it was not that occupying the area in violation of custom brought disaster to the
city. Instead, the war made it necessary to live there, and the oracle foresaw
that without saying so. All the oracle foresaw was that the occupation would
not be for anything good.30
They furnished the turrets on the walls, and many lived there or in whatever
other places they could, as the city did not have room for them all. Later, they
spread out on the long walls and settled there, as well as in much of the
Piraeus.
At the same time, they prepared for war, mustering their allies and fitting out
a hundred ships to send around the Peloponnesus. Such were their
preparations.

EARLY OPERATIONS
[18] As the Peloponnesian army advanced they came first to Oenoe, a town of
Attica where they intended to begin their invasion. Setting up camp, they
prepared to assault the wall with siege engines and other means. Oenoe is a
walled city on the border between Attica and Boeotia, which the Athenians
used as a guard post whenever war broke out. There the army spent time,
especially preparing for the assault. Archidamus was castigated for this, because
he was thought to have been too soft when mustering troops and too easy on
the Athenians, since he had shown no enthusiasm for the war. He was blamed
because after he mustered the army he had delayed at the Isthmus and made
the whole march in a leisurely manner; but most of all, he was blamed for
holding back at Oenoe. During this time, the Athenians retired into the city;
but it was thought that if the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica promptly,
they would have caught everything outside the walls—if it had not been for his
procrastination. And so the army was furious with Archidamus while he kept
them in camp. But it is claimed that Archidamus expected the Athenians to
make some concessions while their land was still intact—that they would
shrink from seeing it wasted—and that is why he held back.31
{58} [19] After that, they attacked Oenoe, and although they tried
everything, they were unable to take it. When the Athenians sent no heralds
[to make concessions], they invaded Attica, leaving Oenoe about eighty days
after the events in Plataea,32 in the summer when the grain was at its height. In
command was Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.
First, they set up camp and wasted land around Eleusis and the plain of Thria,
and fought off some Athenian cavalry at a place called Rheitoi. Then, keeping
Mount Argaleos on their right, they proceeded [north] through Kekropia till
they reached Acharnai—the biggest of those places the Athenians call
“demes.”33 They set up a fortified camp there and stayed a long time wasting
the land.34
[20] This is the strategy that, it is claimed, Archidamus had in mind while
lingering in Acharnai in full battle array, and not coming down into the plain
of Athens: he hoped that the Athenians would come out and not allow their
land to be wasted. That was likely, as the Athenian army was at its peak, full of
young soldiers and prepared for war as never before. So when they did not
oppose him at Eleusis or the plain of Thria, he thought it good to try to tempt
them out while he camped at Acharnai. Besides, he found the terrain there
favorable for a fortified camp, and besides that, the Acharnians were such a
large part of the city (3,000 hoplites35) that he thought they—not willing to
allow their property to be destroyed—would lead the whole army out into
battle. Or, if the Athenians did not come out during this invasion, then next
time he would be safer while he wasted the Attic plain, and he could even go
right up to the walls, because once the Acharnians had lost their property, they
would not be so enthusiastic about risking their lives on behalf of the others—
with the result that the Athenians would not be able to agree on a plan. With
that in mind, Archidamus stayed around Acharnai.
[21] As for the Athenians, they did not stir while the Peloponnesian army
was around Eleusis or the plain of Thria, hoping it would come no farther.
They remembered how Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias and king of the
Lacedaemonians, had invaded Attica fourteen years before the present war as
far as Eleusis and Thria and then turned back, advancing no farther. For this
he had been banished {59} from Sparta, on suspicion that he had been bribed
to turn back.36 But when they saw the army at Acharnai, sixty stades away from
the city, they no longer felt they should hold back. Quite naturally, they found
it horrible to watch their land wasted in plain sight—something the younger
ones had never seen, and the older ones not since the Persian Wars. So they—
especially the youth—were determined to go out and not allow this. They
formed factions and quarreled fiercely, some insisting on going out, some
opposed. The soothsayers sang out all sorts of prophecies, which people
interpreted to suit their own passionate beliefs.37 The Acharnians were the
strongest proponents of going out, seeing that they were a substantial part of
the city, and it was their land being wasted. The city was seething in tumult,
and people were furious with Pericles. Forgetting his former advice, they called
him a coward for not leading them out as a general should, and they blamed
him for all their troubles.
[22] As for Pericles, he saw that they were in a passion over their present loss
and not entirely in their right minds, but he trusted in his knowledge that they
should not go out. So he did not call an assembly or a military council,38 to
keep them from going wrong by meeting at a time when anger outweighed
strategy. He guarded the city and kept the peace as best he could. He
continually sent out cavalry, however, to protect the fields near the city from
harm by enemy advance parties. There was a cavalry battle between an
Athenian unit, supported by Thessalians,39 against Boeotian horsemen. At
first, the Athenians and Thessalians were winning, but they were defeated by
the arrival of Boeotian infantry. A few Athenians and Thessalians were killed,
but their bodies were recovered the same day without a truce. Next day, the
Boeotians set up a trophy.
[23] When it was clear that the Athenians were not coming out to fight
them, the Peloponnesians left Acharnai and ravaged some other demes
between Mounts Parnes and Pentelicon. While they {60} remained in Attica,
the Athenians sent the hundred ships40 they had fitted out around the
Peloponnesus carrying 1,000 hoplites and 400 archers.41 So they set off with
this force on their voyage. Meanwhile, the Lacedaemonians had spent as much
time in Attica as their supplies allowed, so they returned by way of Boeotia—
not by the route of their invasion.
Details of minor military operations follow in 2.24–2.33.

PERICLES’S FUNERAL ORATION

During the first winter of the war Athens held a public funeral for the soldiers and
sailors who had lost their lives in various minor actions of the war. Pericles delivered
a speech that Thucydides reconstructed as follows. It is the most famous speech that has
come down to us from antiquity.42 Pericles praises Athens in terms that do great
credit to the city and to himself (perhaps more than either deserved).
[34] [When winter came], the Athenians followed the custom of their
forefathers and held a funeral at public expense for the first who died in this
war. This was the custom:
Two days before, they erect a tent and lay out the bones of those who have
passed away, and everyone brings whatever offerings he chooses to his own
relatives. On the day for taking them out, wagons bring cypress chests, one for
each tribe, containing the bones, each to his own tribe.43 They also carry an
empty litter, prepared for the missing—those whose bodies could not be found
for retrieval. Anyone who wishes, whether citizen or friend from abroad, may
join the procession, and women of the families are present, weeping at the
funeral. Then they put them into the public tomb, which is in the loveliest
suburb of the city, where they have always buried the war {61} dead—except
for the ones from Marathon.44 These they buried on the spot, judging their
virtue to have been outstanding.
When they have buried them in earth, a speaker—chosen from the city for his
wisdom and high reputation—delivers an appropriate eulogy for them. After
that they depart. Such were their burials, and throughout the war, whenever
circumstances permitted, they followed this custom.
On this first occasion, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was chosen to speak. And
when the time came, he went from the tomb up to a high speaking platform,
constructed so that he could be heard by as many of the crowd as possible. And
he spoke in this way:45
[35] Most of those who have spoken before me on this occasion have praised
the man who added this oration to our customs because it gives honor to those
who have died in the wars; yet I would have thought it sufficient that those
who have shown their mettle in action should also receive their honor in an
action, as now you see they have, in this burial performed for them at public
expense, so that the virtue of many does not depend on whether one person is
believed to have spoken well or poorly.
It is a hard matter to speak in due measure when there is no firm consensus
about the truth. A hearer who is favorable and knows what was done will
perhaps think that a eulogy falls short of what he wants to hear and knows to
be true; while an ignorant one will find some of the praise to be exaggerated,
especially if he hears of anything beyond his own talent—because that would
make him envious. Hearing another man praised is bearable only so long as the
hearer thinks he could himself have done what he hears. But if a speaker goes
beyond that, the hearer soon becomes envious and ceases to believe. Since our
ancestors have thought it good, however, I too should follow the custom and
endeavor to answer to the desires and opinions of every one of you, as far as I
can.
[36] I will begin with our ancestors, since it is both just and fitting that they
be given the honor of remembrance at such a time. Because they have always
lived in this land,46 they have so far always handed it down in liberty through
their valor to successive generations up to now. They deserve praise; but our
fathers deserve even more, for with {62} great toil they acquired our present
empire in addition to what they had received, and they delivered it in turn to
the present generation. We ourselves who are here now in the prime of life
have expanded most parts of the empire; and we have furnished the city with
everything it needs to be self-sufficient both in peace and in war. The acts of
war by which all this was attained, the valiant deeds of arms that we and our
fathers performed against foreign or Greek invaders—these I will pass over, to
avoid making a long speech on a subject with which you are well acquainted.
But the customs that brought us to this point, the form of government and the
way of life that have made our city great—these I shall disclose before I turn to
praise the dead. I think these subjects are quite suitable for the occasion, and
the whole gathering of citizens and guests will profit by hearing them
discussed.
[37] We have a form of government that does not try to imitate the laws of
our neighboring states.47 We are more an example to others, than they to us. In
name, it is called a democracy, because it is managed not for a few people, but
for the majority.48 Still, although we have equality at law for everyone here in
private disputes, we do not let our system of rotating public offices undermine
our judgment of a candidate’s virtue; and no one is held back by poverty or
because his reputation is not well-known, as long as he can do good service to
the city.49 We are free and generous not only in our public activities as citizens,
but also in our daily lives: there is no suspicion in our {63} dealings with one
another, and we are not offended by our neighbor for following his own
pleasure. We do not cast on anyone the censorious looks that—though they are
no punishment—are nevertheless painful. We live together without taking
offense on private matters; and as for public affairs, we respect the law greatly
and fear to violate it, since we are obedient to those in office at any time, and
also to the laws—especially to those laws that were made to help people who
have suffered an injustice, and to the unwritten laws50 that bring shame on
their transgressors by the agreement of all.
[38] Moreover, we have provided many ways to give our minds recreation
from labor: we have instituted regular contests and sacrifices throughout the
year, while the attractive furnishings of our private homes give us daily delight
and expel sadness. The greatness of our city has caused all things from all parts
of the earth to be imported here, so that we enjoy the products of other nations
with no less familiarity than we do our own.
[39] Then, too, we differ from our enemies in preparing for war:51 we leave
our city open to all; and we have never expelled strangers in order to prevent
them from learning or seeing things that, if they were not hidden, might give
an advantage to the enemy. We do not rely on secret preparation and deceit so
much as on our own courage in action. And as for education, our enemies train
to be men from early youth by rigorous exercise, while we live a more relaxed
life and still take on dangers as great as they do.
The evidence for this is that the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country
by themselves, but with the aid of all their allies; when we invade our
neighbors, however, we usually overcome them by ourselves without difficulty,
even though we are fighting on hostile ground against people who are
defending their own homes. Besides, no enemy has yet faced our whole force at
once, because at the same time we are busy with our navy and sending men by
land to many different places. But when our enemies run into part of our forces
and get the better of them, they boast that they have beaten our whole force;
and when they are defeated, they claim they were beaten by all {64} of us. We
are willing to go into danger with easy minds and natural courage rather than
through rigorous training and laws, and that gives us an advantage: we’ll never
weaken ourselves in advance by preparing for future troubles, but we’ll turn out
to be no less daring in action than those who are always training hard. In this,
as in other things, our city is worthy of admiration.
[40] We are lovers of nobility with restraint, and lovers of wisdom without
any softening of character.52 We use wealth as an opportunity for action, rather
than for boastful speeches. And as for poverty, we think there is no shame in
confessing it; what is shameful is doing nothing to escape it. Moreover, the
very men who take care of public affairs look after their own at the same time;
and even those who are devoted to their own businesses know enough about
the city’s affairs. For we alone think that a man who does not take part in
public affairs is good for nothing, while others only say he is “minding his own
business.”53 We are the ones who develop policy, or at least decide what is to
be done;54 for we believe that what spoils action is not speeches, but going into
action without first being instructed through speeches. In this too we excel over
others: ours is the bravery of people who think through what they will take in
hand, and discuss it thoroughly; with other men, ignorance makes them brave
and thinking makes them cowards. But the people who most deserve to be
judged tough-minded are those who know exactly what terrors or pleasures lie
ahead, and are not turned away from danger by that {65} knowledge. Again we
are opposite to most men in matters of virtue:55 we win our friends by doing
them favors, rather than by accepting favors from them. A person who does a
good turn is a more faithful friend: his goodwill toward the recipient preserves
his feeling that he should do more, but the friendship of a person who has to
return a good deed is dull and flat, because he knows he will be merely paying a
debt—rather than doing a favor—when he shows his virtue in return. So that
we alone do good to others not after calculating the profit, but fearlessly and in
the confidence of our freedom.
[41] In sum, I say that our city as a whole is an education for Greece, and that
each of us presents himself as a self-sufficient individual, disposed to the widest
possible diversity of actions, with every grace and great versatility. This is not
merely a boast in words for the occasion, but the truth in fact, as the power of
this city, which we have obtained by having this character, makes evident.
For Athens is the only power now that is greater than its fame when it comes
to the test. Only in the case of Athens can enemies never be upset over the
quality of those who defeat them when they invade; only in our empire can
subject states never complain that their rulers are unworthy. We are proving
our power with strong evidence, and we are not without witnesses: we shall be
the admiration of people now and in the future. We do not need Homer, or
anyone else, to praise our power with words that bring delight for a moment,56
when the truth will refute his assumptions about what was done.57 For we have
compelled all seas and all lands to be open to us by our daring; and we have set
up eternal monuments on all sides, of our setbacks as well as of our
accomplishments.58
Such is the city for which these men fought valiantly and died, in the firm
belief that it should never be destroyed, and for which every man of you who is
left should be willing to endure distress.
[42] That is why I have spoken at such length concerning the city in general,
to show you that the stakes are not the same, between us and the enemy—for
their city is not like ours in any way—and, at the same time, to bring evidence
to back up the eulogy of these men {66} for whom I speak. The greatest part of
their praise has already been delivered, for it was their virtues, and the virtues of
men like them, that made what I praised in the city so beautiful. Not many
Greeks have done deeds that are obviously equal to their own reputations, but
these men have. The present end these men have met is, I think, either the first
indication, or the final confirmation, of a life of virtue. And even those who
were inferior in other ways deserve to have their faults overshadowed by their
courageous deaths in war for the sake of their country. Their good actions have
wiped out the memory of any wrong they have done, and they have produced
more public good than private harm. None of them became a coward because
he set a higher value on enjoying the wealth that he had; none of them put off
the terrible day of his death in hopes that he might overcome his poverty and
attain riches. Their longing to punish their enemies was stronger than this; and
because they believed this to be the most honorable sort of danger, they chose
to punish their enemies at this risk, and to let everything else go. The
uncertainty of success they entrusted to hope; but for that which was before
their eyes they decided to rely on themselves in action. They believed that this
choice entailed resistance and suffering, rather than surrender and safety; they
ran away from the word of shame,59 and stood up in action at risk of their lives.
And so, in the one brief moment allotted them, at the peak of their fame and
not in fear, they departed.60
[43] Such were these men, worthy of their country. And you who remain may
pray for a safer fortune, but you must resolve to be no less daring in your
intentions against the enemy. Do not weigh the good they have done on the
basis of one speech. Any long-winded orator could tell you how much good lies
in resisting our enemies; but you already know this. Look instead at the power
our city shows in action every day, and so become lovers of Athens. When the
power of the city seems great to you, consider then that this was purchased by
valiant men who knew their duty and kept their honor in battle, by men who
were resolved to contribute the most noble gift to their city: even if they should
fail in their attempt, at least they would leave their fine character [aretē] to the
city. For in giving their lives for the common good, each man won praise for
himself that will never grow {67} old; and the monument that awaits them is
the most splendid—not where they are buried, but where their glory is laid up
to be remembered forever, whenever the time comes for speech or action. For
to famous men, all the earth is a monument, and their virtues are attested not
only by inscriptions on stone at home; but an unwritten record of the mind
lives on for each of them, even in foreign lands, better than any gravestone.
Try to be like these men, therefore: realize that happiness lies in liberty, and
liberty in valor, and do not hold back from the dangers of war. Miserable men,
who have no hope of prosperity, do not have a just reason to be generous with
their lives; no, it is rather those who face the danger of a complete reversal of
fortune for whom defeat would make the biggest difference: they are the ones
who should risk their lives. Any man of intelligence will hold that death, when
it comes unperceived to a man at full strength and with hope for his country, is
not so bitter as miserable defeat for a man grown soft.
[44] That is why I offer you, who are here as parents of these men,
consolation rather than a lament. You know your lives teem with all sorts of
calamities, and that it is good fortune for anyone to draw a glorious end for his
lot, as these men have done. While your lot was grief, theirs was a life that was
happy as long as it lasted. I know it is a hard matter to dissuade you from
sorrow, when you will often be reminded by the good fortune of others of the
joys you once had; for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted, but for
the loss of a good we have been used to having. Yet those of you who are of an
age to have children may bear this loss in the hope of having more. On a
personal level new children will help some of you forget those who are no
more; while the city will gain doubly by this, in population and in security. It is
not possible for people to give fair and just advice to the state, if they are not
exposing their own children to the same danger when they advance a risky
policy. As for you who are past having children, you are to think of the greater
part of your life as pure profit, while the part that remains is short and its
burden lightened by the glory of these men. For the love of honor is the one
thing that never grows old, and useless old age takes delight not in gathering
wealth (as some say), but in being honored.61
[45] As for you who are the children or the brothers of these men, I see that
you will have considerable competition. Everyone is used to praising the dead,
so that even extreme virtue will scarcely win you a reputation equal to theirs,
but it will fall a little short. That is because {68} people envy the living as
competing with them, but they honor those who are not in their way, and their
good will toward the dead is free of rivalry.
And now, since I must say something about feminine virtue, I shall express it
in this brief admonition to you who are now widows: your glory is great if you
do not fall beneath the natural condition of your sex, and if you have as little
fame among men as is possible, whether for virtue or by way of reproach.
[46] Thus I have delivered, according to custom, what was appropriate in a
speech, while those men who are buried here have already been honored by
their own actions. It remains to maintain their children at the expense of the
city until they grow up. This benefit is the city’s victory garland for them and
for those they leave behind after such contests as these, because the city that
gives the greatest rewards for virtue has the finest citizens.
So now, when each of you has mourned for your own dead, you may go.

THE PLAGUE: HUMAN NATURE IN CRISIS

During the second year of the war, in 430, when refugees from the countryside were
crowded into Athens for safety from Lacedaemonian raiding parties, a terrible plague
struck Athens. Thucydides plunges into a vivid account of the plague, right after
reporting Pericles’s Funeral Oration. The juxtaposition of these two passages is a
striking instance of Thucydides’s style: the funeral oration gives us a bright picture of
a wonderfully civilized city; the story of the plague shows how easily civilization slips
away when times are hard.62
{69} [47] Such was the funeral they held that winter, and with the end of that
season the first year of the war came to a close.
In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with
two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica under the command of
Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon. After they had settled in, they started
wasting the country around them.63
They had not been in Attica for many days when the plague first began
among the Athenians. Although it was said to have broken out in many other
places, particularly in Lemnos, no one could remember a disease that was so
great or so destructive of human life breaking out anywhere before. Doctors,
not knowing what to do, were unable to cope with it at first, and no other
human knowledge was any use either. The doctors themselves died fastest, as
they came to the sick most often. Prayers in temples, questions to oracles—all
practices of that kind turned out to be useless also, and in the end people gave
them up, defeated by the evil of the disease.
[48] They say it first began in the part of Ethiopia that is above Egypt, and
from there moved down to Egypt and Libya and into most of the Persian
Empire. It hit Athens suddenly; first infecting people in Piraeus [the port of
Athens], with the result that they said the Peloponnesians must have poisoned
the water tanks (they had no other sources of water there at the time).
Afterward, the plague moved inland to the city, where people died of it a good
deal faster. Now anyone, doctor or layman, may say as much as he knows about
where this probably came from, or what causes he thinks are powerful enough
to bring about so great a change. For my part, I will only say what it was like: I
will show what to look for, so that if the plague breaks out again, people may
know in advance and not be ignorant. I will do this because I had the plague
myself, and I myself saw others who suffered from it.
[49] This year of all years was the most free of other diseases, as everyone
agrees. If anyone was sick before, his disease turned into this one. If not, they
were taken suddenly, without any apparent cause, and while they were in
perfect health. First they had a high fever in the head, along with redness and
inflammation of the eyes; inside, the throat and tongue were bleeding from the
start, and the breath was weird and unsavory. After this came sneezing and
hoarseness, and soon after came a pain in the chest, along with violent {70}
coughing. And once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomiting, and
brought up, with great torment, all the kinds of bile that the doctors have
named.64 Most of the sick then had dry heaves, which brought on violent
spasms, which were over quickly for some people, but not till long after for
others. Outwardly, their bodies were not very hot to the touch, and they were
not pale but reddish, livid, and flowered with little pimples and ulcers;
inwardly, they were burning so much with fever that they could not bear to
have the lightest clothes or linen garments on them—nothing but mere
nakedness, and they would have loved to throw themselves into cold water.
Many of them who were not looked after did throw themselves into water
tanks, driven mad by a thirst that was insatiable, although it was all the same
whether they drank much or little. Sleeplessness and total inability to rest
persisted through everything.
As long as the disease was at its height, the body did not waste away, but
resisted the torment beyond all expectation, so that they either died after six or
eight days from the burning inside them, or else, if they escaped that, then the
disease dropped down into the belly, bringing severe ulceration and
uncontrollable diarrhea; and many died later from the weakness this caused,
since the disease passed through the whole body, starting with the head and
moving down. And if anyone survived the worst of it, then the disease seized
his extremities instead and left its mark there: it attacked the private parts,
fingers, and toes. Many people escaped with the loss of these, while some lost
their eyes as well. Some were struck by total amnesia as soon as they recovered,
and did not know themselves or their friends. [50] This was a kind of disease
that defied explanation, and the cruelty with which it attacked everyone was
too severe for human nature.65 What showed more clearly than anything else
that it was different from the diseases that are bred among us was this: all the
birds and beasts that feed on human flesh either avoided the many bodies that
lay unburied, or tasted them and perished. Evidence for this was the obvious
absence of such birds: they were not to be seen anywhere, and certainly not
doing that. But this effect was more clearly observed in the case of dogs,
because they are more familiar with human beings.
{71} [51] Now this disease was generally as I have described it, if I may set
aside the many variations that occurred as particular people had different
experiences. During that time no one was troubled by any of the usual
sicknesses, but whatever sickness came ended in this. People died, some
unattended, and some who had every sort of care. There was no medical
treatment that could be prescribed as beneficial, for what helped one patient
did harm to another. Physical strength turned out to be of no avail, for the
plague carried the strong away with the weak, no matter what regimen they
had followed.
But the greatest misery of all was the dejection of mind in those who found
themselves beginning to be sick, for as soon as they made up their minds it was
hopeless, they gave up and made much less resistance to the disease. Another
misery was their dying like sheep, as they became infected by caring for one
another; and this brought about the greatest mortality. For if people held back
from visiting each other through fear, then they died in neglect, and many
houses were emptied because there was no one to provide care. If they did visit
each other, they died, and these were mainly the ones who made some pretense
to virtue. For these people would have been ashamed to spare themselves, and
so they went into their friends’ houses, especially in the end, when even family
members, worn out by the lamentations of the dying, were overwhelmed by the
greatness of the calamity. But those who had recovered showed more pity, both
on those who were dying and on those who were sick, because they knew the
disease firsthand and were now out of danger, for this disease never attacked
anyone a second time with fatal effect. And these people were thought to be
blessedly happy, and through an excess of present joy they conceived a kind of
light hope never to die of any other disease afterward.
[52] The present affliction was aggravated by the crowding of country folk
into the city, which was especially unpleasant for those who came in. They had
no houses, and because they were living in shelters that were stifling in the
summer, their mortality was out of control. Dead and dying lay tumbling on
top of one another in the streets, and men lay at every water fountain half-dead
with thirst. The temples also, where they pitched their tents, were all full of the
bodies of those who died in them, for people grew careless of holy and profane
things alike, since they were oppressed by the violence of the calamity, and did
not know what to do. And the laws they had followed before concerning
funerals were all disrupted now, everyone burying their dead wherever they
could. Many were forced, by a shortage of necessary materials after so many
deaths, to take {72} disgraceful measures for the funerals of their relatives:
when one person had made a funeral pyre, another would get before him,
throw on his dead, and give it fire; others would come to a pyre that was
already burning, throw on the bodies they carried, and go their way again.
[53] The great lawlessness that grew everywhere in the city began with this
disease, for, as the rich suddenly died and men previously worth nothing took
over their estates, people saw before their eyes such quick reversals that they
dared to do freely things they would have hidden before—things they never
would have admitted they did for pleasure. And so, because they thought their
lives and their property were equally ephemeral, they justified seeking quick
satisfaction in easy pleasures. As for doing what had been considered noble, no
one was eager to take any further pains for this, because they thought it
uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But the
pleasure of the moment, and whatever contributed to that, were set up as
standards of nobility and usefulness. No one was held back in awe, either by
fear of the gods or by the laws of men: not by the gods, because men concluded
it was all the same whether they worshiped or not, seeing that they all perished
alike; and not by the laws, because no one expected to live till he was tried and
punished for his crimes. But they thought that a far greater sentence hung over
their heads now, and that before this fell they had a reason to get some pleasure
in life.
[54] Such was the misery that weighed on the Athenians. It was very
oppressive, with men dying inside the city and the land outside being wasted.
At such a terrible time it was natural for them to recall this verse, which the
older people said had been sung long ago:
A Dorian war will come,
and with it a plague.
People had disagreed about the wording of the verse: some said it was not
plague (loimos) but famine (limos) that was foretold by the ancients; but on this
occasion, naturally, the victory went to those who said “plague,” for people
made their memory suit their current experience. Surely, I think if there is
another Dorian war after this one, and if a famine comes with it, it will be
natural for them to recite the verse in that version. Those who knew of it also
recalled an oracle that was given to the Lacedaemonians when they asked the
god [Apollo] whether they should start this war or not. The oracle had said:
they would win if they fought with all their might, and that he himself would {73}
take their part.66 Then they thought that their present misery was a fulfillment
of the prophecy; the plague did begin immediately when the Peloponnesians
invaded, and it had no appreciable effect in the Peloponnesus, but preyed
mostly on Athens and after that in densely populated areas. So much for the
plague.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 430

[55] After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain, they fell upon the territory
called Paralia as far as Mount Laurion [the western coast of Attica], where
Athens had silver mines. First they wasted the part of it that looks toward the
Peloponnesus, and then they turned to the part that faces Andros and Euboea.
Pericles was general then, and he kept to his strategy in the previous invasion—
that the Athenians not go out against them.67
[56] But he started to equip one hundred ships to sail against the
Peloponnesus while they were still on the plain and had not yet gone into
Paralia; and as soon as they were ready, he put to sea. In these ships he had
4,000 hoplites, as well as 300 horsemen in older ships that were then for the
first time made into horse transports. Chios and Lesbos joined him with fifty
ships.
When the Athenian expedition sailed, they left the Peloponnesians still in
Paralia. They first came to Epidaurus in the Peloponnesus and wasted much of
the land there; they also attacked the city with some hope of taking it, but were
disappointed. Putting out from Epidaurus they wasted the lands of Troezen,
Halieis, and Hermione (all places along the coast of the Argolid in the
Peloponnesus). From there they sailed to Prasiae, a small maritime town of
Laconia. There they wasted the land, took the town, and sacked it. After doing
this they went home and found that the Peloponnesians were no longer in
Attica, but had also gone home.
[57] All this time, while the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the Athenians
campaigning by sea, the plague went on killing the Athenians, both in the
army and in the city. A result of this, we are told, is that the Peloponnesians
left the country sooner out of fear of the plague, when they learned it was in the
city from deserters and by seeing the funerals. Still, this invasion was the
longest they {74} ever made in Attica—almost forty days—and they wasted all
of the land.68
[58] The same summer, Hagnon and Cleopompus, who were generals along
with Pericles, took the army he had used and immediately campaigned against
the Chalcideans near Thrace and against Potidaea, which was still besieged.69
On their arrival they brought battering rams against Potidaea, and tried in
every way to take it. But they had no success either in taking the city or in
doing anything else worthy of so large a force, for the plague struck them there
too and pressed them hard, nearly destroying the army. The Athenian soldiers
who had been there before, and who had been in good health before that,
caught the disease from Hagnon’s army.70 (As for Phormio and his 1,600, they
were not now in the Chalcidice.)
So Hagnon came home with his ships to Athens, after losing 1,050 men out
of 4,000 to the plague in less than forty days.
The soldiers who were there before stayed on in that place and continued the
siege of Potidaea.
 PERICLES’S LAST SPEECH
After the second Spartan invasion of Attica, the spirits of the citizens began to flag,
and they turned in anger against Pericles, who was responsible for the decision to let
the Lacedaemonians lay waste to Attica.
[59] After their second invasion by the Peloponnesians, now that their land
had been wasted a second time, and the plague was lying over them along with
the war, the Athenians changed their minds71 and blamed Pericles for
persuading them to make war—as if the troubles that had come their way were
due to him—and were in a hurry to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians.
They sent ambassadors to them, without effect. They were all together at their
wit’s end, and so they attacked Pericles.
When he saw that they were angry over their present circumstances, and were
doing exactly what he had expected, he called an assembly—he was still general
at the time—intending to put heart into them, to turn aside their anger, and so
to make their minds {75} calmer and more confident. He stood before them
and spoke in this way:
[60] I expected you to get angry with me, and I can see why it has happened.
I have called this assembly to remind you of certain points and to rebuke you
for your misplaced anger at me and for your giving in too easily to misfortune.
I believe that if the city is sound as a whole, it does more good to its private
citizens than if it benefits them as individuals while faltering as a collective
unit. It does not matter whether a man prospers as an individual: if his country
is destroyed, he is lost along with it; but if he meets with misfortune, he is far
safer in a fortunate city than he would be otherwise. Since, therefore, a city is
able to sustain its private citizens in whatever befalls them, while no one
individual is strong enough to carry his city through disaster, are we not all
obliged to defend it and not, as you are doing now, sacrifice our common
safety? In your dismay at our misfortunes at home you are condemning
yourselves along with me—me for advising you to go to war and yourselves for
agreeing to it. And it is I at whom you are angry, a man who is second to none
(in my opinion) for recognizing and explaining what must be done—I, a
patriot, beyond corruption. A man who knows something but cannot make it
clear might as well have had nothing in mind at all; while a man who can do
both will not give such loyal advice if he has no love for his city; and a man who
has both ability and love for his city, but can be overcome by money, will sell
everything for it alone. It follows that if you were persuaded to go to war
because you thought I had all those qualities, even in a moderately higher
degree than other people, there is no reason for me to bear a charge of injustice
now.
[61] Of course, for people who have the choice and are doing well in other
ways, it is very foolish to go to war. But if (as is the case with us) they are
compelled either to submit directly to the rule of their neighbors, or else to take
on great dangers in order to survive, a man who runs away from danger is more
to be blamed than one who stands up to it.
For my part, I am the man I was. I have not shifted ground. It is you who are
changing: you were persuaded to fight when you were still unharmed, but now
that times are bad, you are changing your minds; and to your weak judgment
my position does not seem sound. That is because you already feel the pain that
afflicts you as individuals, while the benefit to us all has not yet become
obvious; and now that this great reversal has come upon you in so short a time
you are too low in your minds to stand by your decisions, for it makes your {76}
thoughts slavish when something unexpected happens suddenly and defies your
best-laid plans. That is what has happened to you on top of everything else,
mainly because of the plague.
Still, you live in a great city and have been brought up with a way of life that
matches its greatness; so you should be willing to stand up to the greatest
disasters rather than eclipse your reputation. People think it equally right, you
see, to blame someone who is so weak that he loses the glorious reputation that
was really his, as it is to despise someone who has the audacity to reach for a
reputation he should not have.
So set aside the grief you feel for your individual losses, and take up instead
the cause of our common safety.
[62] As for your fear that we will have a great deal of trouble in this war, and
still be no closer to success, I have already said something that should be
enough for you: I proved many times that you were wrong to be suspicious of
the outcome. I will tell you this, however, about your greatness in empire—
something you never seem to think about, which I have not mentioned in my
speeches. It is a rather boastful claim, and I would not bring it up now if I had
not seen that you are more discouraged than you have reason to be. You think
your empire extends only to your allies, but I am telling you that you are
entirely the masters of one of the two usable parts of the world—the land and
the sea. Of the sea, you rule as much as you use now, and more if you want.
When you sail with your fleet as it is now equipped, there is no one who can
stop you—not the king of Persia or any nation in existence. This power cannot
be measured against the use of your land and homes, though you think it a
great loss to be deprived of them. It makes no sense to take these so seriously;
you should think of your land as a little kitchen garden, and your house as a
rich man’s trinket, of little value compared to this power. Keep in mind too
that if we hold fast to our liberty and preserve it we will easily recover our land
and houses; but people who submit to foreign domination will start to lose
what they already had. Don’t show yourselves to be doubly inferior72 to your
ancestors, who took the empire—they did not inherit it from others—and, in
addition, kept it safe and passed it on to you. No, what you should do is
remember that it is more shameful to lose what you have than to fail in an
attempt to get more. You should take on the enemy at close quarters, {77} and
go not only with pride, but also with contempt.73 Even a coward can swell with
pride, if he is lucky and ignorant; but you cannot have contempt for the enemy
unless your confidence is based on a strategy to overcome them—which is your
situation exactly. Even if you have only an even chance of winning, if you are
conscious of your superiority it is safer for you to be daring, for in that case you
do not depend on hope74 (which is a bulwark only to those who have no
resources at all), but on a strategy based on reality, which affords a more
accurate prediction of the result.
[63] You have reason besides to support the dignity our city derives from our
empire, in which you all take pride; you should not decline the trouble, unless
you cease to pursue the honor, of empire. And do not think that the only thing
we are fighting for is our freedom from being subjugated: you are in danger of
losing the empire, and if you do, the anger of the people you have ruled will
raise other dangers. You are in no position to walk away from your empire,
though some people might propose to do so from fear of the current situation,
and act the part of virtue because they do not want to be involved in public
affairs. You see, your empire is really like a tyranny—though it may have been
thought unjust to seize, it is now unsafe to surrender.75 People who would
persuade the city to do such a thing would quickly destroy it, and if they set up
their own government they would destroy that too. For those who stay out of
public affairs survive only with the help of other people who take action; and
they are no use to a city that rules an empire, though in a subject state they may
serve safely enough.
[64] Don’t be seduced by this sort of men. After all, it was you who decided
in favor of this war along with me; so don’t be angry with me. What the enemy
did when they invaded was just what was to be expected when we refused to
submit to them; and this plague has struck contrary to all expectations—it is
the only thing, of all that has happened, that has defied our hopes. I know that
I have become hated largely because of this; but that is an injustice, unless you
will also give me credit whenever you do better than you’d planned to do.
{78} What heaven sends we must bear with a sense of necessity, what the
enemy does to us we must bear with courage—for that is the custom in our
city; that is how it used to be, and that custom should not end with you.
Keep this in mind: our city is famous everywhere for its greatness in not
yielding to adversity and in accepting so many casualties and so much trouble
in war; besides, it has possessed great power till now, which will be
remembered forever by those who come after us, even if we do give way a little
now (for everything naturally goes into decline): Greeks that we are, we have
ruled most of the Greeks, and held out in great wars against them, all together
or one city at a time, and our city has the most wealth of every sort, and is the
greatest. And yet a man of inaction would complain about this! No matter,
anyone who is active will want to be like us, and those who do not succeed will
envy us. To be hated and to cause pain is, at present, the reality for anyone who
takes on the rule of others, and anyone who makes himself hated for matters of
great consequence has made the right decision; for hatred does not last long,
but the momentary brilliance of great actions lives on as a glory that will be
remembered forever after.
As for you, keep your minds on the fine future you know will be yours, and
on the shame you must avoid at this moment. Be full of zeal on both counts.
Send no more heralds to the Lacedaemonians, and do not let them know how
heavy your troubles are at present. The most powerful cities and individuals are
the ones that are the least sensitive in their minds to calamity and the firmest in
their actions to resist it.

THUCYDIDES’S JUDGMENT OF PERICLES

Thucydides tells us that this speech did restore public confidence in the war, but not in
Pericles. Other sources tell us Pericles was removed from public office and prosecuted,
probably for deceiving the people. He was found guilty and made to pay a fine; on an
earlier occasion he had been prosecuted for embezzlement and acquitted.76 In the
following year, however, Pericles was reelected to high office, and lived on until taken
by the plague in 429. Here Thucydides gives us the following assessment of the man,
his manner of politics, and his strategy for the war:
{79} [65] With such speeches, Pericles tried to appease the passionate anger of
the Athenians and to keep their intelligence from being subverted by their
present afflictions.77 They were persuaded on the public matter, and no longer
sent embassies to the Lacedaemonians, but applied themselves more to the war.
As individuals, however, they were upset by what had happened to them—the
people were upset because they had been deprived of the little they had, and
the powerful because they had lost their fine possessions in the country, along
with their houses and costly furnishings. Most of all, however, it was because
they had war instead of peace. As a group, they did not give up their anger
against him until they had punished him with a fine.78 Not long after, however,
as is common with a mob, they made him general again and turned all public
affairs over to him, for their pain over their private domestic losses was dulled
now, and they thought he was the best man to serve the needs of the city as a
whole.
As long as he was at the head of the city in time of peace, he governed it with
moderation and guarded it securely, and it was greatest under him. After the
war was afoot, it was obvious that he also foresaw what the city could do in
this. He lived two years and six months after the war began. And after his
death his foresight about the war was even better recognized, for he told them
that if they would be quiet and take care of their navy, and not seek to expand
the empire during this war or endanger the city itself, they should then have
the upper hand. But they did the opposite on all points, and in other things
that seemed not to concern the war they managed the state for their private
ambition and private gain, to the detriment of themselves and their allies.
Whatever succeeded brought honor and profit mostly to private individuals,
while whatever went wrong damaged the city in the war.
The reason for Pericles’s success was this: he was powerful because of his
prestige and his intelligence, and also because he was known to be highly
incorruptible. He therefore controlled the people without inhibition, and was
not so much led by them, as he led them. He would not humor the people in
his speeches so as to get power by improper means, but because of their esteem
for him he could {80} risk their anger by opposing them. Therefore, whenever
he saw them insolently bold out of season, he would put them into fear with his
speeches; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would raise up
their spirits and give them courage. Athens was in name a democracy,79 but in
fact was a government by its first man. But because those who came after were
more equal among themselves, with everyone aiming to be the chief, they gave
up taking care of the commonwealth in order to please the people.80
Since Athens was a great imperial city, these mistakes led to many others,
such as the voyage against Sicily, which was due not so much to mistaking the
power of those they attacked, as it was to bad decisions on the part of the
senders, which were no use to the people they sent.81 They weakened the
strength of the army through private quarrels about popular leadership, and
they troubled the state at home with discord for the first time. After their
debacle in Sicily, when they lost most of their navy along with the rest of the
expedition, and the city was divided by civil strife, they still held out eight
years82 against their original enemies, who were now allied with the Sicilians,
against most of their own rebellious allies besides, and also eventually against
Cyrus, the son of the king of Persia, who took part with, and sent money to,
the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet. And they never gave in until they
had brought about their own downfall through private quarrels.
So Pericles had more than enough reasons to predict that the city might easily
outlast the Peloponnesians in this war.
With these words Thucydides takes Pericles offstage, although he lived and led
Athens for another year before succumbing to effects of the plague.

{81} FURTHER EVENTS OF 430/429

After recounting a series of minor operations in 2.66–68, Thucydides mentions two
major events. By sending an Athenian fleet to Naupactus (2.69), the Athenians cut
off access for the Peloponnesians to the Gulf of Corinth that runs along the north side
of the Peloponnesus. There the admiral Phormio, although outnumbered, won a
number of significant battles (2.83 ff.) The Athenian siege of Potidaea, one of the
causes of the war, finally came to an end after great loss of life (2.70).
[69] In the following winter, the Athenians sent twenty ships around the
Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio. Taking Naupactus as his base,
he guarded the passage there so that no one could sail in or out of Corinth or
the Gulf of Crisa.83 They sent another six ships to Caria and Lycia under the
command of Melesander, both to collect money and to keep Peloponnesian
pirates from darting out from there to molest merchant shipping from Phaselis,
Phoenicia, and that part of the mainland. But when he landed in Lycia with
the force of Athenians and their allies he had on board, Melesander was
overcome in battle and killed, with the loss of part of his army.
[70] That same winter [in 430/429] the Potidaeans could no longer withstand
the siege,84 for they saw that the Peloponnesians’ invasions of Attica would not
make the Athenians lift the siege. Their food supply had failed, and they did
what they had to do in order to eat, some of them even tasting each other’s
flesh. And so they began negotiations for an agreement with the commanders
of the Athenian army surrounding them.85 The Athenian commanders
accepted the agreement because they saw how miserable their army was in that
cold place and knew that Athens had already spent two thousand talents on the
siege.86
These were the conditions of the treaty: the Potidaeans would leave with their
wives and children and the force that had come to help them; each man would
take one cloak, and each woman two, and they would take a certain sum of
money for traveling expenses.
{82} And so they departed under a truce, some to the Chalcidice, others
where they were able to go. But the people in Athens called the commanders in
question for making this agreement without asking them (for they thought
they could have taken the city on any terms).87 Afterward, they settled Potidaea
with a colony of their own citizens.
That was what happened that winter [430/429], and so ended the second year
of this war, as written up by Thucydides.

THE SIEGE OF PLATAEA

In the next fighting season, the Lacedaemonians moved against Plataea instead of
Attica, perhaps for fear of the plague and probably because Thebes had insisted that
Plataea be punished for the events recorded in 2.2–6. The Plataeans trusted the
Athenians to help them and did not surrender, but, as we will see, Athens did little.
And although the Plataeans put on a brilliant defense, they lost their city. The present
passage (2.71–78) shows how the siege was begun and how it was conducted; the end
is vividly recorded in 3.20–24 and 3.52.
[71] The next summer [in 429], the Peloponnesians and their allies did not
invade Attica, but sent their army against Plataea under the command of
Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had pitched camp, and was
about to waste the land, when the Plataeans sent ambassadors to him with
these words:
“Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, your attack on the land of Plataea is
neither just nor worthy of yourselves and your ancestors. Remember when
Pausanias of Lacedaemon liberated Greece from the Persians with the help of
those Greeks who were willing to risk joining him: after the terrible battle that
was fought on our land,88 Pausanias made a sacrifice to Zeus Liberator in the
agora of Plataea, and calling together all of the allies, he granted this right to
the Plataeans: that their land and their city should be theirs to hold with
autonomy; that no one should make war against them unjustly or try to make
them a subject people; and that if anyone did, the allies then present would do
their best to defend Plataea. These rights your ancestors granted us for our
valor and zeal in that emergency. Now, {83} however, you are doing the
opposite: you’ve come with the Thebans, our worst enemies, to make us subject
to them. We call the gods to witness, therefore—your ancestral gods and the
gods of this land, by whom those oaths were made—and we tell you this: do no
injustice to the land of Plataea, and do not violate your oaths. Let us live under
our own laws as Pausanias declared we should.”
[72] As the Plataeans were speaking, Archidamus interrupted them and said:
“There is justice in what you say, Plataeans, if your actions will match your
words. Use the right Pausanias granted you: keep your own laws and help us
liberate the others who took the same risks [at the Battle of Plataea], who were
party to the same oaths, and who are now subject to the Athenians. It is for the
liberation of these people and others that all this military preparation has been
made, and this war started. You should really join us and keep the oaths
yourselves; if not, then do as we asked earlier and keep quiet, mind your own
business, and don’t join either side. Accept both sides as your friends and do
not make war on either one. That would satisfy us.”
So said Archidamus.
After hearing him, the Plataean ambassadors went back into the city and
communicated what he had said to the people. Then the people told him that
they could not do as Archidamus asked unless the Athenians agreed, since their
wives and children were in Athens and they were afraid for the entire city as
well: once the Spartans had gone, the Athenians might come and disregard
their neutrality, or the Thebans might take advantage of their promise to admit
both sides as friends and try to take the city back for themselves.
Then Archidamus said this to encourage them:
“Give your city and houses over to us Lacedaemonians, show us the
boundaries of your land, tell us how many olive trees you have and anything
else you can count. Then move wherever you want, for as long as the war lasts.
When it is over, we will give you back what we have received. Until then we
will keep it in trust, working the land and paying you whatever rent will be
enough for you.”
[73] On hearing this they went back into the city and, after meeting with the
people, said that they would first communicate Archidamus’s request to the
Athenians; if the Athenians agreed, they would do as he asked. Till then they
requested a truce in which their land would not be wasted. Archidamus made a
truce for as many days as the journey was expected to take and did not cut
down the trees or vines. The Plataean ambassadors arrived in Athens, discussed
the {84} matter with the Athenians, and returned with this message to those
who were in Plataea:
“In the past, say the Athenians, since we became their allies, they have never
abandoned us to those who would do us injustice; and now they will not
neglect us either. They will send us as much help as they can, and they are
pressing us, by the oaths of our ancestors, not to make any changes in our
alliance.”
[74] When the ambassadors made this report, the Plataeans decided not to
betray the Athenians, but to see their land wasted if necessary and to put up
with whatever misery should befall them. They decided not to go out again,
but to give their answer from the walls: that they could not do as the
Lacedaemonians asked.
When they had given this answer, King Archidamus first called on the gods
and heroes of the land as his witnesses:
“All you gods and heroes who protect Plataea, be my witnesses that, because
they first broke the oath we swore together, there has been no injustice at all in
our entering their land, where our ancestors defeated the Persians after praying
to you, and where you made the ground favorable for the Greeks in the contest.
And there will be no injustice in what we are about to do now,89 because,
although we have made many reasonable offers, we have had no luck with
them. Consent, then, to our punishing those who started the injustice, and
agree to their paying the price to those who exact it in accordance with law.”
[75] After making this plea to the gods, he prepared his army for war. First
they built a palisade around the city from trees they had felled, so that no one
could get out; and then they heaped up earth in a ramp against the city wall,
hoping to take the city quickly, since they had so large an army at work. They
cut wood on Mt. Cithaeron and built structures on either side of it, laying the
wood crisscross to serve as walls, so that the ramp would not spread out too far.
As filler for it, they brought stones and earth and anything else they could
throw in to finish the ramp. They worked on this for seventy days and nights
continuously,90 dividing into shifts so that some could carry while others had
time for sleep or food. They were compelled to keep at their task by the
Lacedaemonian officers who were in charge of supervising the work of the
allied contingents. When the Plataeans {85} saw the ramp rising, they built a
framework of wood and put it on top of their own wall where the ramp was
being piled up, and they laid bricks inside it, which they had taken from nearby
houses they had demolished. The timber served to bind the bricks together, so
that the structure would not be weakened as it grew taller. They covered this
with hides and leather so that the workers would be safe, and to protect the
timbers against fire-bearing arrows. So the height of the wall rose greatly on
one side, and the ramp went up as fast on the other.
Another device the Plataeans used was this: they broke a hole in their own
wall where the ramp touched it91 and pulled earth from it into the city. [76]
But the Peloponnesians found this out, and packed mud into mats of reeds and
threw these bricks into the gap. Because these bricks had been reinforced by
reeds, they did not spread out and could not be carried away, as the earth was.
Foiled on that plan, the Plataeans gave it up; but then they dug a tunnel from
the city under the ramp, working out the precise location, and again hauled off
the filling of the ramp. For a long time they were not detected by those outside,
so that although the Lacedaemonians kept adding material, the ramp was less
finished, because it was being taken away from underneath and always settling
into the place that was hollowed out. Still, the Plataeans were afraid they could
not hold out even by this method, since there were only a few of them against
many, so they invented this device as well: they gave up working on the high
wall opposite the ramp, and, beginning on this side and that, from where the
city wall was lower, they built another wall in the form of a crescent bending in
toward the city. If the great wall were taken, they could hold this one and make
the enemy build yet another ramp—and this ramp, being further in, would be
twice as much work, and the enemy would be more exposed to shots from both
sides.
At the same time as they were building the ramp, the Peloponnesians brought
their battering rams against the city. They used one of these against the high
wall opposite the ramp and shook down a large part of it, frightening the
Plataeans. They used others against other parts of the wall. The Plataeans
deflected some of these rams by snagging them with loops of rope; others they
broke with huge logs that they hung by both ends on long iron chains from two
poles that jutted out over the wall like a pair of antennae. They would pull {86}
the log up crosswise to the poles and then, when the battering ram was about
to strike, they would take their hands off the chains and let the log drop and
break off the beak of the ram by the force of its fall.
[77] After this, the Peloponnesians realized that they could not take the city
under these difficult conditions, with their battering rams useless and their
ramp faced by a wall. They prepared, therefore, to put a wall around the city.
But first they decided to try the effect of fire, to see if they could burn the city
down when a wind came up, since Plataea was a rather small city, and they
were trying every sort of scheme to take it without the expense of a long siege.
So they brought bundles of sticks and threw them from the ramp into the space
between it and the wall, which, since they had many hands, they quickly filled.
Then they heaped up other bundles around the rest of the city, wherever they
could reach from the height of the ramp; and they lighted bundles with pitch
and brimstone and threw them in, raising such a flame as had never been seen
(not at least in a man-made fire; in mountain forests, of course, trees have
caught fire owing to friction caused by the wind and have flamed up of their
own accord). This fire was a very large one, however, and the Plataeans, who
had survived everything else, came close to being destroyed by it. Large parts of
the city were inaccessible, and if there had been a wind to whip it up (as the
enemy hoped) they would not have come through. But, as it happened, we are
told that a heavy rain fell along with thunder, quenched the flames, and
brought this danger to an end.
[78] When the Peloponnesians failed in this as well, they dismissed the
majority of their army, retaining only a part. Then they built a wall around the
city, assigning a section of the perimeter to each of their allies. There was a
ditch inside the wall and another outside it, from which they made the bricks.
When it was all finished, around the rising of Arcturus [in mid-September],
they left guards for half the wall (the other half being guarded by Boeotians),
and went home, dismissing the army to the cities from which they came.
Before this, the Plataeans had already sent their wives and children, along
with everyone else who was no use in war, to Athens. There were 400 of them
who remained under siege, with 80 Athenians and 110 women to make bread.
These were all who were there when they were laid under siege; no one else
was inside the wall, free or slave.
Such was the beginning of the siege of Plataea.
{87} Chapters 79–82 record unsuccessful campaigns of the Athenians near Potidaea,
and of the Peloponnesians against Stratus, the key to Acarnania, north along the west
coast from Naupactus.

ATHENIAN NAVAL VICTORIES AT NAUPACTUS

[83] In the meantime, the fleet of Corinth and other allies was supposed to set
out from the Gulf of Crisa92 and join Cnemus to prevent the coastal
Acarnanians from coming to the support of their people farther inland [around
Stratus]. But they never arrived. At exactly the date of the battle at Stratus,
they were compelled to fight against Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships
that guarded Naupactus. Phormio, you see, waited for them to leave the gulf so
he could attack them where there was plenty of room. The Corinthians and
allies were not in order for a naval battle, having prepared more for supporting
their army in Acarnania. Besides, they did not expect that twenty Athenian
ships would dare start a battle against their forty-seven. Nevertheless, they saw
the Athenians sailing along the shore opposite them as they themselves kept
close to the land.93 And when they started crossing from Patras in Achaia to
the mainland across from them, toward Acarnania, they caught sight of the
Athenians issuing from Chalcis and the Evenus River to engage with them.
Then they tried setting out at night, but were discovered, so at that point they
were compelled to fight in the middle of the passage.94 The Peloponnesians
formed a circle with their ships, making it as large as they could without
allowing space for enemy ships to sail between them.95 They had bows out and
sterns in, putting the small boats of the fleet inside, along with five of their best
ships, which were to dart out on short notice to give support wherever the
enemy might attack.
{88} [84] The Athenians lined up single file and circled around them, driving
them together by always shaving past them and making them think they would
strike at any moment. Phormio had ordered the Athenians not to attack before
he himself gave the signal. He expected that the Peloponnesians would not stay
in formation (unlike an army on land) but that their ships would bump into
each other, while the smaller boats caused confusion, once the wind came up
from the gulf, as it usually did at daybreak. That is what he was waiting for as
he sailed around—the moment when they would instantly be in turmoil.
Besides, as his ships were the better sailors, he thought he could choose when
to attack—and this would be the best time for that.
Then the wind came up, and all at once, now that their circle had contracted,
leaving little space between them, the Peloponnesians were thrown into
confusion by the wind, the smaller boats were in their way, ship was running
into ship, they were pushing off with poles, they were screaming warnings and
curses at each other, they couldn’t hear messages or commands, and they didn’t
know how to lift their oars out of the waves, so the ships did not respond to the
steersmen.96 Just then, at exactly the right time, Phormio gave the signal and
the Athenians charged. They holed one of the command vessels and damaged
others wherever they went, and none of the Peloponnesians stayed to defend
themselves, but all fled in confusion to Patras and Dyme in Achaea. After the
Athenians had chased them and taken twelve ships and killed most of the men
who were in them, they fell off and went to Molycreum. They set up a trophy
and consecrated a ship to Poseidon at Rhium, then returned to Naupactus. The
Peloponnesians, with their surviving ships, sailed straightway to Cyllene (the
naval depot for Elis). There, after the battle at Stratus, came Cnemus and the
ships from Leucas, with which they were supposed to have joined forces.
[85] After this, the Lacedaemonians sent advisers to Cnemus at the fleet—
Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron—with orders to prepare better for the
next naval battle, and not to let a few ships deprive them of the use of the sea.
They considered their defeat very much against reason, especially since this was
their first attempt fighting at sea, and they thought that the defect lay not so
much in {89} seamanship as in courage, never comparing the long practice of
the Athenians with their own brief training. When they arrived, with Cnemus,
they called for more ships from the cities and fitted out the ones they already
had for naval warfare.
Meanwhile, Phormio sent to Athens with news of the enemy’s preparation
and of his own victory. He urged Athens to send as many ships as they could
quickly, because every day they expected a new battle. They sent him twenty
ships, but they also instructed the commander to go first to Crete, because
Nicias (a Cretan who represented Gortyn in Athens) persuaded them to sail
against Cydonia, claiming that this was now their enemy, so as to gratify the
people of Polichna, who were neighbors of the Cydonians.97 The commander98
took the ships to Crete, joining the people of Polichna in wasting the land of
the Cydonians, and spent a great deal of time there owing to adverse winds and
weather unfit for sailing.
[86] In the meantime, while the Athenians were wind-bound in Crete, the
Peloponnesians in Cyllene had put themselves in battle-order and sailed along
the shore to Panormus in Achaea, where their land forces came to aid them.
Likewise, Phormio sailed around to Molycrian Rhium99 (this Rhium is friendly
to Athens, while the other Rhium on the Peloponnesus lies on the opposite
shore, at most seven stades away by sea, this gap forming the mouth of the
Gulf of Crisa). They anchored outside Rhium with twenty ships—the same he
had used in the former battle. So when the Peloponnesians saw the Athenians,
they came to anchor at the Achaean Rhium with seventy-seven ships, not far
from Panormus, where they left their land forces. For six or seven days both
sides stayed opposite each other while they drilled and prepared for battle. The
Peloponnesians, fearing what had happened to them before, planned not to
leave Rhium for open water, while the Athenians planned not to sail into the
narrows, where they thought a confined battle would go against them.
At last Cnemus and Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders,
called the soldiers together, desiring to fight quickly before reinforcements
came from Athens. They saw that most of them were {90} fearful and lacked
enthusiasm because of their former defeat, and so they encouraged them with
words to this effect:
[87] “That battle in the past, men of the Peloponnesus, gives us no just
grounds to fear for the one in the future—if any of you have such a fear. You
know we were not prepared for it, as we had sailed not for a sea battle but [to
carry troops] for an expedition on land. Many things happened to go against us
by bad luck, and I suppose, since it was our first time, our lack of experience in
naval warfare tripped us up as well. So the loss can in no way be ascribed to
cowardice on our part, and in all justice we must not say that we were defeated
in full battle or allow our minds to be dulled by that unfortunate outcome—
rather, we should say that although bad luck can trip people up, resolution of
the mind will always make them courageous, and that when courage is present
they have no plausible excuse for cowardice in any circumstance. As for you,
you are not so far short of experience as you are long on daring. Yes, their
knowledge, which you fear, gives them courage and reminds them to do what
they learned in a tough situation, but without a good spirit no skill holds out
against danger. Fear, you see, drives out memory, and skill is no use without
strength of spirit. To their superiority in skill, oppose yours in daring, and to
the fear you have from that defeat, oppose the fact that you weren’t prepared at
the time. You have many more ships now and will be fighting off your own
shore with your hoplites nearby. For the most part, victory goes to the larger
and better-prepared force. So we cannot see any reason whatever to expect
failure. And as for the mistakes we made before, they teach us to do better,
now that we have these advantages. With confidence, then, carry out your
assigned tasks, both steersmen and sailors, and stay in the position in which
you were stationed. We will prepare for this test better than the previous
commanders, and we will not give anyone an excuse for cowardice. Should
anyone insist on that, he will pay an appropriate penalty. But good soldiers will
be honored with the rewards they have earned by virtue.”
[88] Thus did the leaders of the Peloponnesians encourage them. For his
part, Phormio was afraid his men were shaky, because he saw them muttering
among themselves over the number of enemy ships. So he decided to call them
together to encourage and instruct them for the impending battle. Of course he
had always told them before, and prepared their minds to believe, that no
number of attacking ships was too great for them to withstand. And the
soldiers had for a long time drilled this opinion into themselves: they were
Athenians, and no mob of Peloponnesian ships should ever make them give
way.
{91} But this time, seeing that they were dispirited at the sight before them,
he wanted to restore their confidence. And so he called the Athenians to a
meeting and spoke to this effect:
[89] “I have observed your fear at the number of the enemy. That, soldiers, is
why I have called you together, because I don’t think we should be shaky over
circumstances that are not terrible. Look. First of all, because they were
defeated earlier, they themselves don’t even think they are equal to us; that is
why they have fitted out so many more ships than we have. Second, the belief
that carries them on with such great confidence—that courage belongs to them
—this confidence comes from just one thing: the success their experience has
generally brought them on land, and they think they can do the same at sea.
But, in justice, we now have that advantage, just as they do on land. Their
spirit is no stronger than ours, but each side shows more boldness where it has
more experience. The Lacedaemonians are in charge because of their
reputation,100 but they are bringing most of their allies into danger against
their will, since they would not otherwise venture into a naval battle again after
such a severe defeat. Don’t be afraid of their daring. You are much more
frightening to them, and rightly so, on account of your earlier victory, and
because they think you would not stand up to them unless you intended to do
them harm worthy of that earlier victory.
When people enter a contest with greater numbers, as they are doing, they
rely more on power than strategy. People who are much weaker, however, will
not dare enter the fray unless they have some great and sure design (unless they
are compelled to fight). With this in mind, they will be more frightened by our
unexpected response than they would be if we were armed in proportion to
them. Many armies have fallen to smaller enemies through inexperience, and
some through lack of daring. We are free from both of those.
As for the battle, I will not willingly engage in the gulf or sail into it; a narrow
space is not favorable to a few boats that are nimble and have experience, when
they confront a large fleet that is ignorant [of naval tactics].101 You can’t charge
in to ram the enemy unless you can see them from a distance, and you can’t
withdraw [in a narrow space] {92} if you have to under pressure. And there will
be none of that sailing through and quick turning which is the right tactic for
more nimble ships,102 but we’d be compelled to give up naval for infantry
tactics,103 in which the larger number would win.
I will take the best care I can on this point. As for you, stay in good order by
the ships and respond sharply to orders, especially since their anchorage is
nearby. In action, take most care to keep silent and stay in position—this is of
great value in battle, and especially when at sea. And be worthy of what you did
to them before, as you fight them off. This is a great contest for you, which will
either destroy the Peloponnesian hope for a navy or strike fear into Athens of
danger from the sea. I remind you how you defeated most of them. When men
have been defeated, they are not willing to face the same dangers with minds as
determined as before.”
[90] In such words, Phormio, too, gave encouragement to his soldiers.
When the Peloponnesians saw that the Athenians would not enter the gulf or
the narrows, they decided to try to draw them in against their will. So they
weighed anchor and set off at dawn, arranging their ships in rows of four,
heading into the gulf along their own shore, with the right wing in the lead,
just as they had anchored. There they placed twenty of their swiftest boats, so
that if Phormio thought they were sailing to attack Naupactus he would sail
along the shore to defend it, so that the Athenians ships would not sail out of
the trap, but be surrounded by Peloponnesian ships.
As they expected, Phormio got worried about Naupactus because it was now
unguarded. So as soon as he saw them weigh anchor—against his will and in
haste—he went aboard and sailed along the shore, with the Messenian infantry
moving along in support. The Peloponnesians saw them sailing in single file, in
the gulf already and close to the shore—which is what they most wanted.
Then, upon one signal, the Peloponnesians suddenly backed water and turned
to attack the Athenians, each ship as fast as it could,104 in hope of {93}
destroying the whole fleet. But the eleven Athenian ships in the lead escaped
the right wing of the Peloponnesians as it turned and got into open water. The
Peloponnesians intercepted the others, drove them to the shore in flight, and
swamped them.105 They killed all the Athenians that had not swum to safety
and took some empty ships in tow. One they captured fully manned. But the
Messenians came to the rescue; plunging into the sea fully armed, boarding
some ships as they were being towed, they fought from the decks and recovered
them.
[91] On that side, the Peloponnesians were winning, defeating the Athenian
ships. But on the right wing, their twenty ships were chasing the eleven
Athenians that had escaped into open water. All but one of these got safely
away to Naupactus. By the temple of Apollo they turned and took a defensive
posture in case their enemy should follow them to the land. As the
Peloponnesians came after, they were singing the Paean as if they had already
won the victory. One ship from Leucas was far ahead of the rest, chasing the
Athenian ship that had fallen behind. By chance, there was a trading vessel
anchored out to sea, which the Athenian ship sailed round in a circle, catching
the Leucadian pursuer by surprise, rammed it amidships and swamped it. The
Peloponnesians panicked at this unexpected and unlikely event. They were in
disorder anyway, rushing in pursuit as winners. Some of them dropped oars to
hold the boats (an unfortunate thing to do with the enemy so near) waiting for
reinforcements. Others, through ignorance of the coast, ran aground on shoals.
[92] The Athenians saw this and took heart again; on a single command they
shouted and set upon their enemies, who did not resist for long, owing to their
recent mistakes and their disarray. The Peloponnesians turned and fled to
Panormus, from which they had set out. The Athenians gave chase and
captured six of the ships that were nearest and recovered their own, which had
been swamped at the start by the shore and taken in tow. Some of the men
they killed, others they took alive. On the Leucadian ship that had been
swamped near the trading vessel, a Lacedaemonian named Timocrates was
sailing; when the ship was lost, he cut his own throat and his body drifted up to
the harbor at Naupactus.
{94} The Athenians went back and erected a trophy at the place where they
had set out for their victory. They picked up the dead and the wrecks that were
on their shore and, under a truce, gave to their enemies what was theirs. The
Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors over the ships that had fled to
shore and been disabled there, and the ship they had captured they dedicated
next to the trophy, at Rhium in Achaea. After that, because they were afraid of
reinforcements coming from Athens, they sailed by night into the Gulf of
Crisa, and all but the Leucadians went on to Corinth. The Athenian force,
with the twenty ships106 that should have reached Phormio before the battle,
arrived at Naupactus soon after the Peloponnesians had gone away. And the
summer ended.
After this, Cnemus and Brasidas attempted an attack on the port of Athens, which
was unguarded. From the west side of the isthmus at Corinth their sailors carried
their oars and other gear across so they could use forty ships in the harbor at Megara.
They caught the Athenians by surprise at Salamis, but sailed back to Megara when
the Athenians arrived in force (2.93–94).
Thucydides then gives a detailed account of an assault by Thracians against
Macedon (2.95–101). Meanwhile, Phormio led an Athenian campaign in support of
their allies in Acarnania.
[103] Phormio and the Athenians left Acarnania and returned to Naupactus.
In early spring they sailed back to Athens bringing with them the ships they
had captured and the freemen among the prisoners from the naval battles.
These were set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended that winter,
and the third year of the war written up by Thucydides.

1.The war had begun when Pericles talked the Athenians into denying the Spartan demand (1.140–46).
At the time he wrote this sentence, Thucydides was not considering the Peace of Nicias, which was
made in 421, or the fighting that followed and grew back into full-fledged war.
2. Note that footnotes in quotation marks are translations from the text. Thucydides often includes
details that interrupt the flow of his story; he would have used footnotes (or at least parentheses) if he
had had the option. I have placed in footnotes names of people and details about places that do not
figure in the wider story, hoping to make the translation more readable.
3. Euboea, the long island running beside the northern coast of Attica, had rebelled from Athens in 446
and Sparta had invaded Attica. Athens recovered the island and made peace with Sparta soon after.
4.“This was at the time when Chrysis had been priestess in Argos for forty-eight years, and Ainesios
was ephor in Sparta, and Pythadoros had two months left as archon in Athens, six months after the
battle at Potidaea.”
5.“They were led by Boeotian archons Pythangelos, son of Phyleidos, and Diemporos, son of
Onetoridos.” An archon holds a high position in government.
6. See map, p. lii.
7. “At month’s end”: i.e., in the dark of the moon.
8. This might have been a Theban enslaved in Plataea (Hornblower).
9. A stade is a distance of about 600 feet, so this was a march of almost 8 miles.
10.The treaty is presumably the Thirty Years’ Peace, sworn to in 445. The keeping of oaths falls under
the concept of reverence or holiness (to hosion). On the concept, see Introduction, xxvii.
11. Boeotians are people from the land Thebes controlled.
12.Archidamus will claim that all of Greece is on their side (2.11), but, as Rhodes and others have
pointed out, Thucydides’s story does not support this; Athens had many allies, some loyal to Athens
even in defeat (see 7.82, and Introduction, xxi.).
13.“Pellene, however, alone of the Achaeans fought alongside [the Lacedaemonians] at first; later all of
them did.”
14.Compare this with his notable speech at Sparta, 1.80–85; on both occasions he shows admirable
caution. Compare both his speeches also with Pericles’s speeches.
15. “In this way”: toiade. Could also be translated “such things”; this way of introducing the speech
indicates that this is not an exact transcription of the speech. See Introduction, xxx, ff.
16.Here we have an instance of the gnōmē/ergon contrast, juxtaposed with the more prominent contrast
between active campaigning and planning. On this see Parry 1957.
17. “Melesippus, son of Diakritos, a full Spartan citizen.”
18. Presumably to prevent him from contacting Spartan sympathizers in Attica.
19. An example of the famous laconic (or Spartan) style: sharp and brief.
20. “Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of the ten elected generals.” On the Athenian constitution, see
Introduction, xix–xx.
21. “Guest friendship”: (xenia) was a special relationship in ancient Greece. It meant not only that the
friends could expect hospitality from each other, but also that they would support and protect each
other.
22. “Those under a curse”: Pericles was descended from a family that had been implicated in sacrilege
long before, and the Lacedaemonians had tried to have him banished from Athens on those grounds
(1.126–27).
23. Pericles would not even allow the appearance of collusion with the enemy at the expense of Athens.
24. “At their richest, they had had 9,700 talents, from which they had spent the balance on building the
Propylaea [the gateway to the Acropolis] and other buildings, as well on the siege of Potidaea.” Rhodes
proposes to emend this text to a lower figure, 5,700 talents. In the end, the siege of Potidaea would cost
2,000 talents. A silver talent was worth 6,000 drachmas, and a drachma was generally a day’s pay for
skilled work or for military service.
25.The image of the goddess Athena in the Parthenon had been made of gold and ivory by Pheidias.
Any precious metal taken from sacred objects would be treated as a loan and returned as soon as
possible.
26. “The wall was 35 stades between Phaleron and the city’s circular wall, and of that circular wall, 43
stades were defended (the undefended part ran between the walls to Phaleron and the long walls). The
long walls to Piraeus were 40 stades, and of these the outer wall was under guard. The wall around
Piraeus with Munychia was 60 stades, of which half was defended.” Athens was some distance from its
two ports, Phaleron and Piraeus; to preserve their lifeline, the Athenians protected access to their ports
by walls. Munychia is one of the harbors at Piraeus. A stade is about 200 yards; the 148 stades of
defended wall would have extended over 18 miles. The Athenians would have had about 865 armed men
defending each mile of wall.
27.“That is how many were engaged in defense at the start, when the enemy invaded. They were drawn
from the oldest and youngest, as well as from those resident aliens who were hoplites.” Hoplites were
heavy infantry. This home defense force could be called up in need, but were not always in arms.
28. Euboea is the long island north of Attica.
29. Eleusinion: a temple precinct northwest of the Acropolis.
30. On Thucydides’s attitude toward oracles, see Introduction, xxviii, n. 15.
31.Once he had wasted all Athenian farmland, Archidamus would have no further bargaining chips, and
would no longer have a way to tempt the Athenians to come out from behind their walls—where he
could be confident of a victory that might end the war. His troops, he had reason to believe, were
invincible in an infantry battle. But the Athenians (as Pericles had advised them) would remain safe
behind their walls.
32. “I.e., the entry of the Thebans.” See 2.2–2.6.
33. The Athenian people were divided into demes, of which this was the largest.
34. Destroying the crops of this grain-producing area would have been time-consuming.
35. The number is too large; see Hornblower, ad loc.
36. On the consequences of this exile, see 5.16.
37. Literally: “Which they heard as each had his passion.”
38.Pericles did not put his policy up for debate at this time. On the power of a general to forestall
debate, see the commentaries.
39.“This Thessalian support was based on an old alliance with Athens; the troops who came included
Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Krannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pherains. The contingent from Larisa
was under command of Polymedes and Aristonus, each representing his party in the city; Menon
commanded the Pharsalians, and each of the other cities had its own commander.”
40. See 2.17.
41. “In command were Carcinus, son of Xenotimus, and Socrates, son of Antigones.”
42. On the influence of this speech on modern rhetoric, see Wills 1992.
43.These were the ten tribes organized by Cleisthenes in 508 as part of his liberal reforms that led to
democracy. The bones were what remained after the dead had been burned; the relatively low
temperature of an ancient funeral pyre left bone and ash.
44.The Athenians who died at Marathon were given the honor of burial in a mound at the site of the
battle. The mound may still be seen rising from the field where they fought.
45. On this way of introducing speeches, see Introduction, xxx, f.
46. Athenians believed they had sprung from the very soil of Attica (see 1.2).
47.The contrast is with Sparta, which was said to have borrowed its form of government from cities in
Crete. Observe also the wider contrast between 2.37–40 and Archidamus’s discussion of Spartan
customs at 1.84.
48. Athens seems to have led Greece in the development of democracy at this time, encouraging it in the
Delian League. All male citizens participated in Athenian democracy, whether rich or poor, and were
equal at law, although members of the poorest class did not hold public offices. Women, slaves, and
resident aliens had no role in politics, but the Athenian system blunted the power of wealth effectively
enough that the rich often plotted to restore oligarchy, i.e., government by the few who were wealthy.
On Athenian democracy, see the summary discussion in Gagarin and Woodruff 1995, 21–59, and the
masterly book by Hansen 1999.
49. “We do not let our system of rotating public offices undermine our judgment of a candidate’s virtue”:
the exact meaning of this sentence is in doubt. Pericles is evidently defending Athens against the charge
that the best men are not given the most power in democracies. He is probably referring to the use of the
lottery and the related system of the rotation of offices, which ensured the participation of a wide variety
of citizens in democracy. Individual merit was a factor in the advance screening of candidates for
selection by such means, and also in the election of generals. On the issues, see Hornblower, Rusten, and
Rhodes on this passage.
50.
Unwritten law is associated by other authors with matters of religious importance. See Antigone 454,
Xenophon’s Memorabilia 4.4.19, and Pseudo-Lysias 6.10. See Hornblower for further references.
51.Here the implicit contrast with Sparta is especially striking. Pericles attributes to Athens everything
contrary to what was well-known about Sparta.
52.“We are lovers of nobility with restraint, and lovers of wisdom without any softening of character”
(philokaloumen te gar met’ euteleias kai philosophoumen aneu malakias): the most famous sentence in
Thucydides. Like many of Thucydides’s memorable sentences, it admits of a variety of interpretations. I
have translated kalon here as “nobility,” meaning nobility of character, but the reader should be warned
that it can mean beauty as well. “With restraint” (met’ euteleia) could also mean, “without excessive
expenditure,” but this seems inappropriate. If Pericles means that Athens is not extravagant, his claim is
preposterous in view of his magnificent building program. “Lovers of wisdom” translates philosophoumen,
which is cognate to our “philosophize” but has a much wider meaning. For the charge that such studies
make people soft, see especially Aristophanes, Clouds and Plato, Gorgias 485–86, with Republic 410e.
53.
“Minding his own business” (being apragmōn) is the opposite of “being a busybody” (polupragmosunē),
which the Greeks considered unseemly.
54.Although not all Athenians were involved in developing policy, all were involved in the making of
decisions in the Assembly. This elegant point hangs on a single particle, ge. For this interpretation, see
Rusten’s and Hornblower’s notes on the passage. Pericles holds that it is up to the leaders of Athens to
develop policy and then to instruct the people to carry it out.
55. Virtue: aretē. This traditionally involved doing good to one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies; that
is why Pericles uses the concept here to introduce the topic of friendship among cities.
56. See 1.21.
57. This recalls Thucydides’s criticisms of earlier historians (1.20).
58.“Of our setbacks”: this phrase could also mean: “Of the evil we have done to our enemies, and of the
good we have done to our friends.”
59.I.e., the one thing they have feared is the reputation for cowardice. Note the frequent use of the
contrast between word and action in Thucydides.
60.
“At the peak of their fame and not in fear”: here I follow Rusten and Rhodes; Gomme’s reading
would have it that their deaths end their fear but not their fame (1945–1981).
61. “As some say”: Simonides, for example (Plutarch, Moralia 786B).
62. Although we have no hard figures for this, we believe that over a quarter of the Athenian population
was killed by the plague. This reduction in manpower further restricted the military options available to
Athens. In 3.87–88, Thucydides reports how the plague struck Athens again in the winter of 427 and
lasted over a year. He gives the casualty figure as 4,400 hoplites, 300 horsemen, and innumerable
ordinary people. With very little change, this account of the plague was put into Latin epic verse by the
philosopher Lucretius (De Rerum Natura, Book 6). What was the plague? On Thucydides’s description
it does not exactly match any disease that is known to us now. Either the disease is extinct or we must
read Thucydides’s account of it with considerable charity. See Rusten, Hornblower, and Rhodes on this
passage. Recent research on the basis of DNA suggests that the plague was either typhoid or typhus, but
the matter is still under discussion by scholars.
63.During the war, the Spartans regularly invaded Attica at harvest time and destroyed the crops. In
430, however, their occupation of Attica was apparently the longest of this phase of the war, about forty
days (2.57).
64. See Republic 405d on the interest of doctors in naming things, where Plato shows a similar contempt
for medical science.
65. “Too severe for human nature”: the disease was more severe than a normal human disease. Some
Athenians must have seen the plague as sent by the gods, perhaps as retribution for Athenian imperial
policy.
66. See 1.118.
67. See 1.143 and 2.22.
68.So also 3.26; Thucydides must have written this before the later phase of the war, when, from 413–
401, the Lacedaemonians occupied Decelea continuously.
69. Siege of Potidaea: see pp. 23–24.
70. The original expedition had numbered 3,000 hoplites (2.31).
71. See 8.1 and the Old Oligarch 2.17.
72. “Doubly inferior”: in neither winning an empire nor passing it on to your sons.
73. Not only with phronēma, but also with kataphronēma. A word play of the kind taught by sophists.
74. On hope, see the Melian Dialogue, 5.103, and Diodotus on Mytilene, 3.45.
75.For the thought that the empire was founded on injustice, and was therefore like a tyranny, see 1.122,
with 124, 2.8, 3.37, and 6.85. This was, of course, the basic Lacedaemonian charge against Athens. For
the idea that an empire cannot serve justice and be safe, see 5.107. For Alcibiades’s view that an empire
must grow in order to survive, see 6.18.
76. For the trial and acquittal, see Plutarch’s “Life of Pericles,” 32.
77.See 3.82, with note, on the danger that war can displace intelligence in favor of passions as violent as
war itself.
78. Pericles’s fine was said by one source to have been eighty talents, a substantial sum; other sources give
a more likely figure of fifteen to twenty (see Glossary on “talents”). Compare Plutarch’s “Life of
Pericles,” 35; and Diodorus (12.45.4). Plato’s tale that the charge was theft is open to doubt, or else
refers to an earlier occasion (Gorgias 515e).
79. See 2.37.
80.“They gave up taking care of the commonwealth”: Thucydides is highly critical of the next generation
of Athenian leaders, such as Cleon. See Connor 1971.
81.“Bad decisions on the part of the senders” refers primarily to the recall of Alcibiades from the
expedition; this not only weakened the expedition, but also gave Sparta the advantage of Alcibiades’s
advice (6.53; cf. 6.89). Also, as Thucydides well knew, Athens had badly underestimated the power of its
enemies in Sicily. (For the meaning of this sentence, see Hornblower.)
82. The manuscripts read “three years.” But as the war continued for eight, most editors emend the text
at this point.
83.The sea route to Corinth ran through narrows where a bridge now stands. East of the narrows is the
Gulf of Corinth, also known as the Gulf of Crisa; Naupactus lies on the north side of the western
approach to the narrows.
84. The siege had begun in 432. See pp. 23–24 and 2.58.
85.
“The Athenian commanders were Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristoclides, and
Phanomachus, son of Callimachus.”
86. See Plato, Symposium 220a–c for an account of the conditions under which the besieging army lived.
87.Had they captured the city in battle and not come to terms, the Athenians could have sold its people
profitably as slaves.
88.“The terrible battle”: the Battle of Plataea, in 479, was the last major engagement on land in the war
to keep the Persian Empire from taking over Greece. Plataea, unlike Thebes, had joined in the defense
of Greece and had been promised special status.
89.The Spartans later came to believe that this action put them in the wrong, since the Thebans had
invaded Plataea in peacetime (2.2–6, cf. 3.56).
90.As campaigns rarely lasted over forty days (see 2.57), this figure is probably an error in the
manuscript. Seven or seventeen days is more likely.
91. The bottom of the ramp touched the wall, though its upper portion left a gap (2.77).
92.Gulf of Crisa (or Krissa): an ancient name for what was known later as the Gulf of Corinth. Crisa
was a town southeast of Delphi.
93. The Corinthian fleet had to cross the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth, which runs east-west. They
are now sailing along the south side of the gulf looking for an opportunity to cross to the north, where
the Athenians are patrolling.
94.
“Each city had appointed its own commanders; the Corinthians were under Machon, Isocrates, and
Agatharchidas.”
95. Sailing between ships (the diekplous) could be an effective tactic. The enemy ships would be in a line;
sailing through the line would scatter the enemy in such a way that their ships could be rammed.
Ramming was the best way to put an enemy ship out of action.
96. High waves would trap oars that were not well handled, so the sailors couldn’t row and the boats
would not have enough motion to be steered. Then the ships would be out of control—a nightmare for a
closely packed fleet. The Athenian oarsmen were more skilled at rowing under such conditions.
97. Gortyn, Cydonia, and Polichna are towns in Crete.
98.Thucydides does not give the commander’s name or explain this extraordinary diversion of forces—
surely an example of mismanagement of the war by the Assembly of Athens.
99.
To the east of the two towns named Rhium, the gulf narrows considerably and then widens into the
Gulf of Corinth.
100. Some editors take “because of their reputation” with “bringing . . . against their will.” But Rusten
rightly points out that the Lacedaemonian reputation is not at stake; the defeated navy was Corinthian.
Their reputation simply puts the Lacedaemonians in charge.
101.Athenian tactics required space to maneuver, so that they could pull back and ram the enemy. If the
ships were crowded into a narrow space, the large numbers of Peloponnesian soldiers on board would
give them the advantage.
102.The Athenians liked to sail in between enemy vessels at speed and then turn quickly so that they
could ram the vulnerable side or stern of the enemy, while keeping their own boats safe from the enemy’s
bow, which carried the sharp bronze ram.
103.In close quarters, enemy foot soldiers on deck could hurl weapons at the Athenian ships, close with
them, board, and kill the sailors using their infantry skills. Athenian ships tried to avoid such contact.
104. This movement gives them tactical advantage, as they are now set to ram the Athenian ships from
the side, and the Athenians are not in a defensive posture, with prows toward the enemy.
105. Swamped: the verb used is often translated as “sank,” but in fact such ships did not sink, but floated
too low in the water to be rowed. See Rhodes’s note to 3.78.
106. See 2.85.5–6.
 {95} BOOK 3

Rebellion, Civil War, and Human Nature [428–425

BCE]

[1] The next summer, just as the grain was at its peak, the Peloponnesians and
their allies entered Attica with their army, under the command of
Archidamus.1 There they settled in and wasted the land. Athenian cavalry, as
was their custom,2 attacked at weak points and also prevented the many light-
armed Lacedaemonians from going out ahead of their hoplites and doing harm
near the city. When they had stayed as long as their rations lasted, the
Peloponnesians went back and dispersed to their cities.

THE REVOLT OF LESBOS (MYTILENE, 428 BCE)

Mytilene is the principal town on the island of Lesbos, an island that lies close off the
coast of Asia Minor, to the west. Although they had enjoyed special privileges in the
Athenian Empire, the Mytileneans rebelled against Athens in the summer of 428.
Most of the rest of the island of Lesbos joined the rebellion.
[2] Right after the Peloponnesian invasion, Lesbos broke off from the
Athenians, all but Methymna.3 They had wanted to do this even {96} before
the war, but the Lacedaemonians had not accepted them as allies, and even
now they were compelled to break away earlier than planned. They had been
waiting till they finished heaping up moles4 for the harbor and building walls
and ships, and also for the arrival of what they needed from Pontus—archers
and grain and whatever they’d sent for.5 But the Athenians got word from
enemies of Mytilene at Tenedos and Methymna, along with private citizens of
Mytilene who had special relations with the Athenians6—that Mytilene was
forcing Lesbos into unity and hastily making all sorts of preparation for
breaking from Athens with help from Lacedaemonians and Boeotians7 (who
were kin to them), and that all Lesbos would be lost if this were not nipped in
the bud.
[3] The Athenians thought it would be quite dangerous if Lesbos—with its
navy and its power still whole—should join the enemy alliance, especially now
that Athens was suffering badly from the plague and was engaged in the war at
its height. At first, they were so reluctant to believe that the charges were true
that they refused to believe them. But after they sent ambassadors to Mytilene
and could not persuade them to dissolve the union and undo their preparations,
the Athenians feared the worst and wanted to take preventive action. So they
suddenly sent the forty ships they had made ready for sailing around the
Peloponnesus.8 They had heard there would be a festival for Apollo Maloeis
outside town, celebrated by all the people of Mytilene, and they hoped to
deliver a surprise attack {97} by making haste. If the attempt succeeded . . .9 If
not, they would tell the Mytileneans to give up their ships and demolish their
walls; if they refused, they would go to war. So these ships set off. Now there
were ten ships from Mytilene in Athens to support the Athenians by the terms
of the alliance; these the Athenians seized and put their crews under guard.
But the Mytileneans had warning of this voyage through a man from Athens,
who crossed to Euboea by sea, then by land to Geraestus,10 where he found a
merchant ship ready to sail, and arrived on the third day after leaving Athens.
So they did not go to the festival of Maloeis; moreover, they fenced off gaps in
their walls and harbors, where they were unfinished, and posted guards. [4]
Soon after, the Athenians sailed in and saw this. Their commanders delivered
their assigned proclamation, but the Mytileneans paid no attention to that, and
so they went to war.
The Mytileneans were unprepared, compelled suddenly into war, but they put
out a naval force to fight just in front of the harbor. Afterward, when they had
been driven back in, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley. They
wanted the Athenian ships to be sent away, if possible, on reasonable
conditions. The Athenian commanders accepted the proposal, as they feared
they were too weak to make war on all of Lesbos.
After a ceasefire was granted, the Mytileneans sent to Athens—among others
—one of the informers (who now had regrets), to try to persuade them to
withdraw their fleet, on the grounds that they had no intention to revolt.11 At
the same time—suspecting that the mission to Athens would fail—they sent
ambassadors to Lacedaemon in a trireme that escaped detection by the
Athenian fleet, which was riding at anchor at Malea, north of the city. They
arrived at Lacedaemon after a miserable voyage on the open sea and negotiated
for aid to be sent.
[5] When the ambassadors came back from Athens without success, the
Mytileneans and the rest of Lesbos (except Methymna) went to war.
Methymna helped the Athenians, as did Imbros, {98} Lemnos, and a few other
allies.12 Then the Mytileneans made a sally against the Athenian camp with
the whole strength of their city. They did not have the worst of the ensuing
battle; still, they did not set up camp in the field. They did not trust their own
strength, and so retired into the town. There they lay quiet, not wanting to risk
battle until help came from the Peloponnesus (if it ever would) or they had
made further preparation. Meanwhile, Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermiondas, a
Theban, had arrived. They had been sent out before the revolt but were unable
to come in before the Athenian fleet arrived; after the battle, they sailed in
secretly in a trireme and encouraged the Mytileneans to send with them
another trireme taking ambassadors [to Lacedaemon], which they did.
[6] The Athenians, much emboldened by the Mytileneans’ inactivity, called
in their allies, who came in more quickly because they saw no strength from the
Lesbians. They brought their ships around to anchor to the south of the city
and fortified two camps, one on either side, and they set ships at anchor at the
entrances to both harbors and bottled up the Mytileneans so they could not use
the sea. But the rest of the land was under control of the Mytileneans and the
other Lesbians who had come to their aid, while the Athenians held a little
land near their camps, with Malea as their principal naval station and market.
And thus went the war over Mytilene.

Ambassadors from Mytilene Speak at Olympia

While the Mytileneans were enduring the siege by the Athenians, their ambassadors
made a plea for help to the Peloponnesians who were meeting at Olympia right after
the Games (3.9–14). They complained that their alliance with Athens, though
beneficial in the beginning to both sides, had degenerated to the point at which it was
held together only by the fear each side had of the other (3.12). The Mytileneans
expected the Athenians to take away their remaining rights at any moment, and so
they decided to strike first. Unfortunately, circumstances forced them to go into
rebellion earlier than they had planned, before they were prepared. Now, therefore,
they really needed help from the League. The Peloponnesians welcomed them into the
League, but without control of the sea they were unable to offer significant help.
{99} [8] Now the ambassadors from Mytilene, who had gone out in the first
ship, went on to Olympia because the Lacedaemonians told them to attend the
Games there, so that their other allies could hear them and deliberate. It was
the Olympiad in which Dorieus of Rhodes won his second victory.13 After the
formal events, they arranged a council, and the ambassadors spoke to them to
this effect:

[9] What has been established as custom among the Greeks is well known to
us, Lacedaemonians and allies. Those who break off in war, leaving a former
alliance, are gladly accepted in so far as they bring an advantage [to their new
allies]. But they are considered traitors to their earlier friends, and so people
think the worse of them. And such a judgment is quite in accordance with
justice if the two sides—those who break off and those they’ve broken off from
—are like-minded, with equal good will,14 balanced in preparation and
strength, and with no reasonable cause for a revolt. But between us and the
Athenians that is not so. No one should judge us harshly because, after being
honored by them in time of peace, we have broken away from them in time of
danger.15
[10] Justice and virtue must be the first topics of our speech, especially
because we are seeking an alliance with you. Friendship cannot last among
private people, nor can a treaty endure among cities, for any purpose, without a
shared belief in the virtue16 of all parties and a similarity of habits. A difference
of minds leads to conflict in action.
Between us and the Athenians, the alliance arose first when you gave up the
Persian War and they stayed on to do the work that remained.17 We joined the
alliance, however, not for enslaving the Greeks to the Athenians, but for
freedom from the Persians for the Greeks. And as long as they led us as equals,
we followed with enthusiasm. But when we saw that they set aside their enmity
against {100} Persia and started subjugating18 their allies, then we were afraid.
The allies were unable to unite themselves for resistance, because there were so
many voters,19 and all of them were subjected to subjugation except for us and
the Chians.20 We campaigned alongside them, while we followed our own laws
and were a free state in name. Now we no longer trust the Athenians as leaders,
in view of the examples they have shown. You see it is not reasonable to expect
that, after subduing our fellow allies, they would not do the same by the rest of
us, whenever they have the power to do so
[11] If we had all remained under our own laws, we would be more confident
that they would make no radical changes. But now they have most places
subject to them, while associating with us on an equal basis. It’s highly likely
they will find it intolerable for us to have equal status any longer if we’re the
only ones—especially since they are increasing their power while we are left
more and more isolated. A balance of fear is the only bond of trust for an
alliance; because then if one side wants to violate the alliance, it will lack
superiority and so be deterred from action.
The only reason they left us under our own laws was that they thought they
could advance their empire more by coloring it with specious argument and
policy than by attacking in force. Moreover, they used us as evidence to support
their claim that—since we had an equal vote with them—we would not have
campaigned with them willingly unless the other side had committed an
injustice.21 In this way they brought the stronger against the weaker; and they
left them for last with the intention of making them weaker by removing the
{101} rest. If they had begun with us, however, when all the members were in
full strength and had a cause to stand for, they would not have subdued them
so easily.
Besides, our navy kept them in fear that we might join you or someone else; a
combined force would have been dangerous to them. Partly also we escaped by
fawning on their common people and whoever was their leader at the time. But
we did not expect to hold out for long, if this war had not started, in view of
the examples we saw in their treatment of others.
[12] What friendship could there be, then, or what assurance of liberty, when
we were putting up with each other against our long-range plans? They fawned
on us when they were at war, out of fear for us, while we did the same by them
in time of peace. In most cases good will is the basis for trust, but in this case it
was fear that was our security: fear more than love kept us in the alliance.
Whichever side first felt safe enough to take bold action, they would be the first
to break the alliance. So if anyone thinks we acted unjustly by rebelling in
anticipation of the trouble they intended for us, without waiting to be certain
that something of the sort would happen, his judgment is incorrect. Look:
suppose we had power on an equal basis for plotting and planning against
them, as they do against us. Then, being on an equal basis, our security would
not have to be up to them. But in reality it is up to them to attack at any time,
so it has to be up to us to defend ourselves in advance.22
[13] Such were the reasons and the causes of our revolt, Lacedaemonians and
allies. They are clear enough to assure our hearers that we acted reasonably, and
strong enough to frighten us into taking certain steps for our security. We
wanted to do this long ago, when we sent to you during the peace about our
revolt, but were prevented when you did not accept our ambassadors.23 When
the Boeotians invited us now, however, we accepted straightway. We
considered that we were staging a double revolt—from the Greeks24 (so that
we could set them free, instead of helping the Athenians inflict evil on them)—
and from the Athenians (so we could escape destruction at {102} their hands by
taking action ahead of them). But our revolt came too soon, and we were not
prepared. So it is all the more appropriate that you admit us among your allies
and send help as soon as you can, so you can prove that you are defenders of
those in need and, at the same time, dangerous to your enemies.
There has never been a better time than now. The Athenians have lost
terribly by plague and by expense of money. Some of their ships are on your
coast and some on ours, so it’s unlikely they have ships in reserve. If you invade
them a second time this summer by sea and land, either they won’t have a naval
force to hold you off, or they will pull back from both fronts. And don’t anyone
suppose that you’d be putting your homes at risk for the sake of a foreign
country. Although Lesbos seems far away, the benefit will be next door. That’s
because the war is not in Attica, as one might think, but wherever Attica gets
its support. This support is the revenue they have from their allies, and it will
be greater if they subdue us. Then no one else will revolt, and all our resources
will go to them. Besides, we would suffer more terribly, more even than those
who were enslaved earlier.
If you come to our aid wholeheartedly, however, you will add to your allies a
city with a great navy, of which you are much in need. You will also weaken the
Athenians by encouraging their allies to revolt—since they’ll all be more bold
in coming over, once you shake off the charge of never helping those who do
revolt. And if you prove yourselves as liberators, your strength in the war will
be much more solid.
[14] In reverence, therefore, to the hopes of the Greeks that depend on you,
and to Zeus of Olympus, in whose sacred precinct we are, in effect,
suppliants,25 take us as allies and defend the people of Mytilene. And don’t cast
us off. If you do, the danger to our lives will be our own, but if you help us
succeed, you will provide a public benefit to all. And, yes, it will be a public
disaster if we fail because you don’t agree to help. Be the men the Greeks
esteem you to be—be the men our fear calls you to be.

[15] So spoke the Mytileneans. Then the Lacedaemonians and their allies
accepted the arguments they had heard and brought the people of Lesbos into
their alliance. As for the invasion of Attica, they {103} ordered the allies who
were there to proceed as quickly as possible to the Isthmus of Corinth with the
usual two-thirds of their forces.26 They arrived first and built shipways to
transport ships from Corinth across to the sea that faces Athens, so they could
attack both by sea and by land. They did this wholeheartedly, but the other
allies assembled slowly, as they were busy bringing in the harvest and were
weary of warfare.

THE SIEGE OF MYTILENE

Eventually, the people of Mytilene began to run out of food and realized that the
Peloponnesians would not be able to save them. Then the democrats of Mytilene
threatened to come to terms with the Athenians on their own. The oligarchic leaders
of Mytilene were thus forced to surrender to the Athenian general, whose name was
Paches. The only condition was that nothing be done to harm the Mytileneans until
their representatives could be sent to Athens to plead their case before the Athenian
people.
[16] When the Athenians realized the Peloponnesians were doing this on the
assumption of Athenian weakness, they decided to prove it was a mistake, as
they were able to ward off the Peloponnesian fleet easily without bringing in
the ships from Lesbos. So they manned a hundred ships, embarking citizens
along with foreign residents, leaving out only the caste of horsemen and the
very rich.27 They then sailed along the isthmus in a show of strength, making
forays into the Peloponnesus wherever they wished.
The Lacedaemonians saw this as quite unexpected and concluded that what
the Lesbians had said was not true and decided that the situation was
impossible, since the allies had still not arrived, and {104} they had had news
that the thirty Athenian ships sent earlier around the Peloponnesus had wasted
land not far from their city. 28 So they went back home. 29 When they saw that
the Peloponnesians had left, the Athenians also went home with their hundred
ships.30
[18] About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were in the isthmus, the
Mytileneans marched with mercenaries by land against Methymna, hoping it
would be betrayed to them. They assaulted the city but did not succeed as
expected, so they went on to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus.31 After they had
arranged things in those places more securely and strengthened their walls, they
returned speedily home. When the coast was clear, the people of Methymna
made war against Antissa but were beaten by the people of Antissa and their
allies, so they speedily returned to Methymna, with the loss of many of their
soldiers.
When the Athenians learned of this and understood that the Mytileneans
were masters of the land, and that their own soldiers there were not enough to
hold their enemy back, they sent Paches32 in command of a thousand Athenian
hoplites, in early autumn. These soldiers rowed their own boats to Mytilene.
On arrival, they circled the city with a single wall and built guard towers on the
strong points. Then Mytilene was besieged powerfully on both sides, land and
sea. And winter came on.33
[19] The Athenians needed money for the siege. For the first time they raised
200 talents by levying a tax on themselves.34 They also {105} sent Lysicles and
four other commanders with twelve ships to raise money from their allies.
Here Thucydides interrupts the story of Mytilene to report on a brilliant action at
Plataea, where a large number of Plataeans escaped from the Peloponnesian siege
(3.20–24).

BREAKOUT FROM PLATAEA35 (428/427 BCE)

[20] That same winter the Plataeans were oppressed by a shortage of food, as
they were still under siege by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians. They had no
hope of relief from Athens, and could see no other way to survive. So at first
they decided—they and the Athenians besieged with them—that they would
all go out and climb over the walls of the enemy if they could do so by force.
The idea for this attempt came from Thaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer,
and Eupompides son of Daïmachus, one of their generals. Afterward, half of
them got cold feet because they expected the danger to be great, but two
hundred and twenty persisted in wanting to escape according to plan.
They made ladders equal to the height of the enemy wall, which they
measured by the layers of brick on the side toward the town where it was not
plastered over. Many men counted the layers at the same time, and though
some would get the count wrong, the majority got it right, largely because they
counted many times and were not too far away to see the wall clearly enough
for what they wanted. And so they worked out the height of the ladders by
estimating the thickness of a brick.
[21] The wall of the Peloponnesians had been built on this design: it
consisted of a double circle, one toward Plataea, and the other facing out in
case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were about sixteen feet apart,
and in the space between them they built shelters assigned to the guards. These
were connected in such a way that the whole looked like one thick wall with
battlements on either side. At every tenth battlement there were large towers,
each as thick as the wall, stretching from the inner to the outer face, so you
could not go around the tower; you had to go through the middle of it. At
{106} night, in a rainstorm, they left the battlements [which were on top of the
wall] and watched from beneath the towers, which were not far apart and had
been roofed over. Such, then, was the design of the wall from which the
Peloponnesians kept their watch on Plataea.
[22] When the Plataeans were ready, they waited for a stormy night with no
moon. Then they went out of the city, led by the same men who had planned
the breakout. First they crossed the ditch that went around the city, and then
came up close to the enemy’s wall. Because it was dark, the enemy could not
see them coming, and the noise they made as they went could not be heard for
the blustering of the wind. Besides, they maintained a good distance from each
other, so that the clashing of their arms would not give them away. They were
lightly armed, wearing shoes only on their left feet, so they could step safely in
the mud.36
In this way they came to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower
and tower, knowing that there was no watch kept there at the time. First came
those carrying ladders, who placed them against the wall; then twelve lightly
armed men, taking only dagger and breastplate, went up, led by Ammeas the
son of Coroebus, who was the first to climb, followed by the others. Six men
then went to each tower. After them came others, lightly armed with small
spears, and behind them were men carrying shields for them so that the
spearmen could climb more easily—shields they would give to the spearmen
when they closed with the enemy.
When most of them had climbed up, the watchmen in the towers realized
they were there: one of the Plataeans dislodged a tile when he took hold of the
battlements, and this made a clatter. Immediately the watchmen gave the alarm
and the army ran to the wall. In such a dark and stormy night, they did not
know what the danger was, and the Plataeans who were left in the city, came
out and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to that
where their men had gone over, in order to attract attention away from the
others. So, in a tumult, the enemy stayed where they were, as no one dared to
go to the aid of anyone else, and they could not work out what was going on.
The Peloponnesians had assigned three hundred men to a support role
wherever needed; they went outside the wall to where the shouting was. Signal
fires meaning “enemy” were kindled {107} toward Thebes. The Plataeans
responded with many signal fires on top of their walls, which they had prepared
for this purpose—that the enemies’ signals would be meaningless, and the
Thebans would draw the wrong conclusions and not come to help the
watchmen—not until their own men were over the wall and had reached a
place of safety.
[23] Meanwhile, the Plataeans who had scaled the wall first and killed the
watchmen there were now masters of both towers. They guarded the passages
by standing in the entries so that the defenders could not come through. They
also set ladders from the wall to the towers and brought more men up. Some
were shooting missiles at the defenders to keep them away, from both above
and below, while the greater number set many ladders against the wall at once,
knocked the battlements over, and crossed between the towers. As each one
made it to the other side, he stood on the edge of the ditch shooting arrows
and javelins at any defenders who came outside to keep them from crossing.
When all the others were over, the men in the towers, last of all and with
great difficulty, came down to the ditch. Just then, the three hundred arrived,
carrying torches. These allowed the Plataeans who were on the far edge of the
ditch to see them all the better out of the darkness, and they shot their arrows
and javelins at the enemies’ bare limbs, while the lights of the enemy made the
Plataeans harder to see.37 The results was that the last of the Plataeans got
across the ditch unseen, although they had to force their way with difficulty.
The water in it was frozen over, though not hard enough to bear their weight;
it was the sort of slush that forms when the wind is from east or north. The
snow that fell during the night, blown in by such a wind, increased the depth of
water, so they could scarcely keep their heads out as they waded across. But it
was the magnitude of the storm that enabled them to escape.
[24] From the ditch the Plataeans formed up and took the road toward
Thebes, leaving on their right the hero-shrine for Androcrates,38 because they
supposed they would be least suspected of heading toward their enemies. At
the same time, they saw the {108} Peloponnesians with their lights chasing
down the road that goes by Mount Cithaeron and the Oak-heads [toward
Athens].
The Plataeans went about three-quarters of a mile39 toward Thebes, then
doubled back and took the road to Erythrae and Hysiae. They reached the
mountains and so escaped to Athens—212 men out of a greater number. Some
had turned back to the city before crossing, and one archer had been captured
at the outer ditch.
The Peloponnesians who were out in the fields gave up the pursuit. But the
Plataeans who stayed in the city had no idea what had happened, and those
who turned back told them that not a man survived. So at first light they sent a
herald to arrange a truce for picking up the dead; but when they learned the
truth, they gave that up. And that is how these men from Plataea climbed over
the fortifications of their enemies, and were saved.40
Now Thucydides returns to Mytilene as follows:

DEFEAT OF MYTILENE (427 BCE)

[25] At the end of the fourth winter (427 BCE), Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian,
was sent by trireme to Mytilene. He sailed to Pyrrha41 and went from there by
land to Mytilene, which he entered along the channel of a torrent, and so
crossed under the wall of the Athenians undiscovered. He told the magistrates
that Attica should again be invaded, that the forty ships assigned to their
defense were coming, and that he had been sent in advance to let them know
this, as well as to look after the rest of their affairs. The Mytileneans took heart
and were less inclined to yield to the Athenians. And so this winter ended, and
with it the fourth year of the war written up by Thucydides.
 [26] Next summer, after the Peloponnesians had sent forty ships to Mytilene
under command of Alcidas, they invaded Attica with their allies in order to
give the Athenians trouble on both fronts, to make them less able to support
their forces on Lesbos against the fleet on its way to Mytilene. For this
invasion, Cleomenes was in command instead of Pausanias, the son of
Pleistoanax, who {109} although he was king was yet rather young, Cleomenes
being his father’s brother.42
This time they cut down what had begun to sprout again after earlier wastage,
and also whatever else they had overlooked on previous invasions. This
invasion was the most destructive of all, aside from the second. For while the
Peloponnesians were constantly waiting to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos,
which by this time should have arrived there, they went out and destroyed
much of the countryside. But when nothing came out as they had hoped, and
they ran out of food, they withdrew, and went home to their various cities.
[27] Meanwhile, the Mytileneans were compelled to give in to the Athenians,
as the Peloponnesian fleet had not arrived, but was taking its time. Besides,
their food was running out. The cause was this: Salaethus lost hope that the
ships would come and armed the common people [the dēmos], who had been
unarmed till then, so they could go out and attack the Athenians. But as soon
as they had gotten arms, they no longer obeyed those in command; they held
public meetings at which they insisted that those in power43 either bring their
rations into the open and divide them among them all, or else, they said, they
would make their own peace by giving the city up to the Athenians.
[28] Realizing that they did not have power to prevent this, and that they
would be in danger if they isolated themselves from the peacemaking process,
the men in charge of things joined in coming to an agreement with Paches and
the army. The terms were these: the Athenians were permitted to make
whatever decision they wished about the Mytileneans, who would accept the
Athenian army in their city while sending ambassadors to Athens to plead their
own case; Paches would not imprison or enslave or kill any Mytilenean until
the ambassadors returned.
That was the agreement. But those Mytileneans who had dealt most actively
with the Lacedaemonians were terrified. So when the army came in, they did
not trust the agreement and took sanctuary at the altars. Paches got them out
by promising to do them no harm, {110} and put them on Tenedos44 till the
Athenians made their decision. After this he sent some triremes to Antissa to
take the town, and he arranged the army’s affairs as he thought best.
The Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas had been proceeding slowly toward Mytilene.
Hearing that Athens now controlled the city, they conducted a few small operations in
Ionia and set off home. Paches sailed from Mytilene to protect Ionia from Alcidas and
deal with issues elsewhere. (Summary of 3.29–34)

The Mytilenean Debate (427 BCE)

The Athenians were enraged by the rebellion of what they considered a privileged
ally. They therefore had decreed that all the Mytilenean men of military age be put to
death and the rest enslaved. The day after this decree, many Athenians had second
thoughts and an assembly was convened to reconsider the issue. Thucydides
reconstructs the famous debate as follows. A remarkable feature of the debate is that it
bears out what Diodotus says in his speech: “a man who has something rather good
to say must tell lies in order to be believed” (3.43). His own speech illustrates the
point: in order to make his case for justice persuasive, Diodotus must deny that he is
speaking on behalf of justice, while Cleon had needed to say that he was pleading for
justice as he advocated killing and enslaving innocent people. For another example of
such twisted rhetoric, see the Corcyrean debate (1.32–43).
[35] When Paches came back to Mytilene,45 he settled matters in Pyrrha and
Eresus.46 He found Salaethus the Lacedaemonian hidden in Mytilene,
apprehended him, and sent him to Athens, together with those men he had put
in custody at Tenedos, and whomever else he thought responsible for the
revolt. He also sent back the greater part of his army, and with the rest he
stayed and settled affairs in Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought
convenient.
[36] When these men and Salaethus arrived at Athens, the Athenians killed
Salaethus straightway, though he made them many {111} offers, including one
to get the army of the Peloponnesians to raise the siege of Plataea, which was
still going on. They considered what judgment to make about the others and,
in their anger, decided to kill them—not only the ones in Athens, but also all
the men of military age in Mytilene, the women and children to be sold as
slaves. They blamed them especially for this revolt because they had not been
subject to Athenian rule, as other cities were,47 and they were upset that the
Peloponnesian fleet had boldly faced the danger of sailing to Ionia to support
them48—which meant that they had not revolted on the spur of the moment.
 They therefore sent a trireme to inform Paches of their decision, with orders
to dispose of the Mytileneans in haste. The next day, however, they
straightaway felt a kind of repentance, reasoning that this decision was cruel
and that the judgment was momentous—to destroy a whole city rather than
those who were guilty.
When this became apparent to the ambassadors of the Mytileneans who were
there, along with the Athenians who favored them, they urged the
officeholders49 to put this to judgment again. They were easily persuaded,
because it was clear to them that the majority of the citizens wanted to be given
an opportunity to deliberate on this again. The assembly met straightaway and
various opinions were expressed. Among the speakers was Cleon,50 who had
won the earlier debate to have them killed. Of all the citizens, he was the one
most given to the use of force and, at the time, he was by far the most
persuasive to the common people. He came forward again and spoke to this
effect:

{112} Speech of Cleon51

[37] For my part, I have often seen that a democracy is not capable of ruling an
empire, and I see it most clearly now, in your change of heart concerning the
Mytileneans. Because you are not afraid of conspiracies among yourselves in
your daily life, you imagine you can be the same with your allies, and so it does
not occur to you that when you let them persuade you to make a mistake, or
you relent out of pity, your softness puts you in danger and does not win you
the affection of your allies; and you do not see that your empire is a tyranny,52
and that you have unwilling subjects who are continually plotting against you.
They obey you not because of any good turns you might do them to your own
detriment, and not because of any good will they might have, but only because
you exceed them in strength. But it will be the worst mischief of all if none of
our decisions stand firm, and if we never realize that a city with inferior laws is
better if they are never relaxed than a city with good laws that have no force,
that people are more use if they are sensible without education than if they are
clever without self-control, and that the more common sort of people generally
govern a city better than those who are more intelligent. For those intellectuals
love to appear wiser than the laws and to win a victory in every public debate—
as if there were no more important ways for them to show their wisdom! And
that sort of thing usually leads to disaster for their city. But the other sort of
people, who mistrust their own wits, are content to admit they know less than
the laws and that they cannot criticize a speech as powerfully as a fine orator
can; and so, as impartial judges rather than contestants, they govern a city for
the most part very well. We should do the same, therefore, and not be carried
away by cleverness and contests of wit, or give to you, the people, advice that
runs against our own judgment.
{113} [38] As for me, I have the same opinion I had before, and I am amazed
at these men who have brought this matter of the Mytileneans into question
again, thus causing a delay that works more to the advantage of those who have
committed injustice. After a delay, you see, the victim comes at the wrongdoer
with his anger dulled; but the punishment he gives right after an injury is the
biggest and most appropriate. I am also amazed that there is anyone to oppose
me, anyone who will try to prove that the injustice the Mytileneans have
committed is good for us and that what goes wrong for us is really damaging to
our allies. Clearly, he must have great trust in his eloquence if he is trying to
make you believe that you did not decree what you decreed. Either that, or he
has been bribed to try to lead you astray with a fine-sounding and elaborate
speech.
Now the city gives prizes to others in contests of eloquence like this one, but
Athens itself must carry the risks. You are to blame for staging these rhetorical
contests so badly. The habits you’ve formed: why you merely look on at
discussions, and real action is only a story to you! You consider proposals for
the future on the basis of fine speeches, as if what they proposed were actually
possible; and as for action in the past, you think that what has been done in
front of your own eyes is less certain than what you have heard in the speeches
of clever fault-finders. You are excellent men—at least for being deceived by
novelties of rhetoric and for never wanting to follow advice that is tried and
proved. You bow down like slaves to anything unusual, but look with suspicion
on anything ordinary. Each of you wishes chiefly to be an effective speaker,
but, if not, then you enter into competition with those who are. You don’t want
to be thought slow in following their meaning, so you applaud a sharp point
before it is even made; and you are as eager to anticipate what will be said, as
you are slow to foresee its consequences. You seek to hear about almost
anything outside the experience of our daily lives, and yet you do not
adequately understand what is right before your eyes. To speak plainly, you are
so overcome with the delight of the ear that you are more like an audience for
the sophists than an assembly deliberating for the good of the city.
 [39] To put you out of these habits, I tell you that the Mytileneans have done
us a far greater injustice than any other single city. For my part, I can forgive
those cities that rebelled because they could not bear being ruled by us, or
because they were compelled to do so by the enemy. But these people were
islanders, their city was walled, and they had no fear of our enemies except by
sea, where they were adequately protected by their fleet of triremes. Besides,
they were {114} governed by their own laws, and were held by us in the highest
honor. That they should have done this! What is it but a conspiracy or a
betrayal? It is not a rebellion, for a rebellion can only come from people who
have been violently oppressed, whereas these people have joined our bitterest
enemies to destroy us! This is far worse than if they had made war on us to
increase their own power.
They’d learned nothing from the example of their neighbors’ calamities—
everyone who has rebelled against us so far has been put down—and their
prosperity did not make them at all cautious before rushing into danger. They
were bold in the face of the future and they had hopes above their power to
achieve, though below what they desired. And so they started this war, resolved
to put strength before justice, for as soon as they thought they could win, they
attacked us, who had done them no injustice. It is usual for cities to turn
insolent when they have suddenly come to great and unexpected prosperity. In
general, good fortune is more secure in human hands when it comes in
reasonable measure, than when it arrives unexpectedly; and, generally, it is
easier to keep misfortune away than to preserve great happiness. Long ago we
should have given the Mytileneans no more privileges than our other allies, and
then they would not have come to this degree of insolence, for generally it is
human nature to look with contempt on those who serve your interests, and to
admire those who never give in to you.
They should be punished right now, therefore, as they deserve for their
injustice. And do not put all the blame on the oligarchs and absolve the
common people there, for they all alike took up arms against you. The
democrats could have come over to our side and would long since have
recovered their city, but they thought it safer to join in the oligarchs’ rebellion.
Now consider your allies. If you inflict the same punishment on those who
rebel under compulsion by the enemy, as on those who rebel of their own
accord, don’t you think anyone would seize the slightest pretext to rebel, when
if they succeed they will win their liberty, but if they fail they will suffer
nothing that can’t be mended? And then we would have to risk our lives and
our money against one city after another. If we succeed we recover only a
ruined city, and so lose its future revenue, on which our strength is based. But
if we fail, we add these as new enemies to those we had before, and the time we
need to spend fighting our old enemies we must use up fighting our own allies.
[40] We must not, therefore, give our allies any hope that pardon may be
secured by bribery or by persuading us that “it is only human {115} to err.” For
these people conspired against us in full knowledge and did us an injury of their
own will, while only involuntary wrongs may be pardoned. Therefore I contend
then and now that you ought not to alter your former decision, and you ought
not to make the mistake of giving in to the three things that are most
damaging to an empire: pity, delight in speeches, and a sense of the
appropriate.53 It may be right to show pity to those who are likeminded, but
not to those who will never have pity on us and who must necessarily be our
enemies for ever after. As for the rhetoricians who delight you with their
speeches—let them play for their prizes on matters of less weight, and not on a
subject that will make the city pay a heavy price for a light pleasure, while the
speakers themselves will be well rewarded for speaking well. And as for the
appropriate, we should show that only toward people who will be our friends in
the future, and not toward those who will still be as they are now if we let them
live: our enemies.
In sum I say only this: if you follow my advice, you will do justice to the
Mytileneans and promote your own interests at the same time. But if you see
the matter differently, you will not win their favor; instead, you will be
condemning yourselves: if they were right to rebel, you ought not to have been
their rulers. But then suppose your empire is not justified: if you resolve to hold
it anyway, then you must give these people an unreasonable punishment for the
benefit of the empire, or else stop having an empire so that you can give charity
without taking any risks.
If you keep in mind what it would have been reasonable for them to do to you
if they had prevailed, then you—the intended victims—cannot turn out to be
less responsive to perceived wrong than those who hatched the plot, and you
must think they deserve the same punishment they’d have given you—especially
since they were the first to commit an injustice. Those who wrong someone
without any excuse are the ones who press him the hardest, even to the death,
when they see how dangerous an enemy he will be if he survives; for (they will
think) if one side is wronged without cause, and escapes, he will be more harsh
than if the two sides had hated each other equally in the beginning.
{116} Therefore, do not be traitors to yourselves. Recall as vividly as you can
what they did to you, and how it was more important than anything else for
you to defeat them then. Pay them back now, and do not be softened at the
sight of their present condition, or forget how terrible a danger hung over us at
that time. Give these people the punishment they deserve, and set up a clear
example for our other allies, to show that the penalty for rebellion is death.
Once they know this, you will less often have occasion to neglect your enemies
and fight against your own allies.

[41] So spoke Cleon. After him, Diodotus,54 the son of Eucrates, who in the
earlier assembly had strongly opposed putting the Mytileneans to death, came
forward this time also, and spoke as follows:

Speech of Diodotus
[42] I find no fault with those who have brought the Mytilenean business
forward for another debate, and I have no praise for those who object to our
having frequent discussions on matters of great importance. In my opinion,
nothing is more contrary to good judgment than these two—haste and anger.
Of these, the one is usually thoughtless, while the other is ill-informed and
narrow-minded.
And anyone who contends that discussion is not instructive for action is
either stupid or defending some private interest of his own. He is stupid if he
thinks there is anything other than words that we can use to consider what lies
in the future hidden from sight. And he has a private interest if he wants to
persuade you to do something awful, but knows that a good speech will not
carry a bad cause, and so tries to browbeat his opponents and audience with
some good slander instead: the most difficult opponents are those who also
accuse one of putting on a rhetorical show for a bribe. If the accusation were
merely of ignorance, a speaker could lose his case and still go home with a
reputation more for stupidity than injustice. But once corruption is imputed to
him, then he will be under suspicion even if he wins, and if he loses he will be
thought both stupid and unjust. Such accusations do not do the city any good,
since it loses good advisers from fear of them. The city would do best if this
kind of citizen55 had the least ability as speakers, for they would then persuade
the city {117} to fewer errors. A good citizen should not go about terrifying
those who speak against him, but should try to look better in a fair debate. A
sensible city should neither add to, nor reduce, the honor in which it holds its
best advisers, nor should it punish or even dishonor those whose advice it does
not take. This would make it less attractive for a successful speaker to seek
greater popularity by speaking against his better judgment, or for an
unsuccessful one to strive in this way to gratify the people and gain a majority.
[43] But we do the opposite of that here; and besides, if anyone is suspected
of corruption, but gives the best advice anyway, we are so resentful of the profit
we think he is making (though this is uncertain), that we give up benefits the
city would certainly have received. It has become the rule also to treat good
advice honestly given as being no less under suspicion than bad, so that a man
who has something rather good to say must tell lies in order to be believed, just
as a man who gives terrible advice must win over the people by deception.
Because of these suspicions, ours is the only city that no one can possibly
benefit openly, without deception, since if anyone does good openly to the city,
his reward will be the suspicion that he had something secretly to gain from
this.
But on the most important matters, such as these, we orators must decide to
show more foresight than is found in you shortsighted citizens, especially since
we stand accountable for the advice we give, but you listeners are not
accountable to anyone, because if you were subject to the same penalties as the
advisers you follow, you would make more sensible decisions. As it is, whenever
you fail, you give in to your momentary anger and punish the man who
persuaded you for his one error of judgment, instead of yourselves for the many
mistakes in which you had a part.
[44] As for me, I did not come forward to speak about Mytilene with any
purpose to contradict or to accuse. Our dispute, if we are sensible, will concern
not their injustice to us, but our judgment as to what is best for us. Even if I
proved them guilty of terrible injustice, I still would not advise the death
penalty for this, unless that was to our advantage. Even if they deserved to be
pardoned, I would not have you pardon them if it did not turn out to be good
for the city. In my opinion, what we are discussing concerns the future more
than the present. And as for this point that Cleon insists on—that the death
penalty will be to our advantage in the future, by keeping the others from
rebelling—I maintain exactly the opposite view, and I too am looking at our
future well-being. I urge you not to reject the usefulness of my advice in favor
of the apparent attractions of his. {118} You may be so angry with the
Mytileneans now that you consider his argument to be more just. But we are
not at law with them, and so we have no need to speak of justice. We are in
council instead, and must decide how the Mytileneans can be put to the best
use for us.
[45] The death penalty has been ordained for many offenses in various cities,
and these are minor offenses compared to this one; yet people still risk their
lives when they are buoyed up by hope, and no one has ever gone into a
dangerous conspiracy convinced that he would not succeed. What city would
ever attempt a rebellion on the supposition that its resources, whether from
home or from its alliance with other states, are too weak for this? They all have
it by nature to do wrong, both men and cities, and there is no law that will
prevent it. People have gone through all possible penalties, adding to them in
the hope that fewer crimes will then be done to them by evildoers. It stands to
reason that there were milder punishments in the old days, even for the most
heinous crimes; but as the laws continued to be violated, in time most cities
arrived at the death penalty. And still the laws are violated.
Either some greater terror than death must be found, therefore, or else
punishment will not deter crime. Poverty compels the poor to be daring, while
power leads to greed through pride and arrogance.56 Each human condition is
dominated by some great and incurable passion that impels people to danger.
Hope and passionate desire,57 however, dominate every situation: with desire as
the leader and hope as the companion, desire thinking out a plan, and hope
promising a wealth of good fortune, these two cause the greatest mischief, and
because they are invisible they are more dangerous than the evils we see.
Besides these, fortune [tuchē] plays no less a part in leading men on, since she
can present herself unexpectedly and excite you to take a risk, even with
inadequate resources. This happens especially to cities, because of the serious
issues at stake—their own freedom and their empire over others—and because
an individual who is acting with everyone else has an unreasonably high
estimate of his own ability. In a word, it is an impossible thing—you would
have to be simpleminded to believe that people can be deterred, by force of law
or by anything else that is frightening, from doing what human nature is
earnestly bent on doing.
[46] We should not, therefore, make a bad decision, relying on capital
punishment to protect us, or set such hopeless conditions that {119} our rebels
have no opportunity to repent and atone for their crime as quickly as possible.
Consider this: if a city in rebellion knew it could not hold out, as things are it
would come to terms while it could still pay our expenses and make its
remaining contributions; but if we take Cleon’s way, wouldn’t any city prepare
better for a rebellion than they do now, and hold out in a siege to the very last,
since it would mean the same whether they gave in late or early? And what is
this if not harmful to us—to have the expense of a siege because they will not
come to terms, and then, when we have taken a city, to find it ruined and to
lose its revenue for the future?58 You see, our strength against our enemies
depends on that revenue.
We should not, then, be strict judges in punishing offenders, and so harm
ourselves; instead, we should look for a way to impose moderate penalties to
ensure that we will in the future be able to make use of cities that can make us
substantial payments. We should not plan to keep them in check by the rigor
of laws, but by watching their actions closely. We are doing the opposite now,
if we think we should punish cruelly a city that used to be free, was held in our
empire by force, rebelled from us for a good reason—to restore its autonomy—
and now has been defeated. What we ought to do in the case of a city of free
men is not to impose extreme penalties after they rebel, but to be extremely
watchful before they rebel, and to take care that the idea of rebellion never
crosses their minds. And once we have overcome them, we should lay the fault
upon as few of them as we can.
[47] Consider also how great a mistake you will be making on this score if
you follow Cleon’s advice: as things are, the democrats in all the cities are your
friends, and either they do not join the oligarchs in rebellion or, if they are
forced to, they right away become hostile to the rebels, so that when you go to
war with them, you have their common people on your side; but if you destroy
the democrats of Mytilene, who had no part in the rebellion, and who delivered
the city into your hands of their own will as soon as they were armed, then you
will, first, commit an injustice by killing those who have done you good service,
and, second, accomplish exactly what oligarchs everywhere want the most:
when they have made a city rebel, they will have the democrats on their side
right away, because you will have shown them in advance that those who are
not guilty of injustice suffer the same penalty as those who are. And even if
they {120} were guilty, however, we should pretend that they were not, so that
the only party still allied with us will not become our enemy. And in order to
keep our empire intact, I think it much more advantageous for us to put up
with an injustice willingly, than for us justly to destroy people we ought not to
destroy. And as for Cleon’s idea that justice and our own advantage come to
the same in the case of punishment—these two cannot be found to coincide in
the present case.
[48] Now I want you to accept my proposal because you see that it is the best
course, and not because you are swayed more by pity or a sense of the
appropriate.59 I would not have you influenced by those factors any more than
Cleon would. But take my advice and judge the leaders of the rebellion at your
leisure, while you let the rest enjoy their city. That will be good for the future,
and it will strike fear into your enemies today. Those who plan well against
their enemies, you see, are more formidable than those who attack with active
force and foolishness combined.

[49] So spoke Diodotus. After these two quite opposite opinions were
delivered, the Athenians were at odds with each other, and the show of hands
was almost equal on both sides. But the opinion of Diodotus prevailed.
On this they immediately sent out another ship in haste, so they would not
find the city already destroyed by coming in after the first ship (which had left
a day and a night earlier). The Mytilenean ambassadors provided wine and
barley cakes for the second ship and promised them great rewards if they
overtook the first. And so they rowed in such haste that they ate their barley
cakes steeped in wine and oil while they rowed, and took turns rowing while
others slept.60 They were lucky in that there was no wind against them. And
since the first ship was not sailing in any haste on its perverse mission, while
the second one hurried on in the manner described, the first ship did arrive
first, but only by the time it took Paches to read the decree. He was about to
execute the sentence when the second ship came in and prevented the
destruction of the city. That was how close Mytilene came to destruction.
[50] As for the other men Paches had sent away as being most to blame for
the rebellion, the Athenians did kill them as Cleon had advised, just over a
thousand of them. They also razed the walls of {121} Mytilene and confiscated
their ships. Afterward, they stopped collecting payments directly from Lesbos.
Instead, they divided the land (all but that of Methymna61) into 3,000
allotments, of which they consecrated 300 to the gods, the rest going to
Athenians who were chosen by lot and sent out as allotment holders. The
people of Lesbos were required to pay them two silver minas62 annually for
each lot, and worked the land themselves. The Athenians also took over the
communities that Mytilene had controlled on the mainland and made them
subject to Athens. So ended the business on Lesbos.

THE FATE OF PLATAEA (427 BCE)

[51] The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians made war
against the island of Minoa63 (which lies near Megara), under the command of
Nicias. The Megarians had built a tower there for use as a garrison, and Nicias
wanted it as an Athenian lookout post that would be nearer to Megara than
Budorum or Salamis, so he could use it to prevent the Peloponnesians from
sailing their triremes out of Megara unobserved (as had happened before with
raiding expeditions), as well as from sending anything into Megara by sea. First
he captured two towers on the side of the island facing Nisaea [the port of
Megara], thus securing a passage for his ships between the mainland and the
island; then he walled off the section that faced the mainland, (for it might
have received aid by a bridge over the shallows where the island was near the
mainland). He finished this in a few days and, after establishing a garrison in a
fort there, went home with his army.
Earlier, (3.20–24), Thucydides had interrupted his account of Mytilene to record
the breakout from Plataea, which was undergoing a siege through the same winter of
428/427.64 Now he returns to the siege. The Plataeans who remained after the
breakout lasted until summer, when they had to capitulate.
{122} [52] About the same time that summer the Plataeans ran out of food
and were no longer able to withstand the siege; so they surrendered to the
Peloponnesians. This is what happened:
The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but the people inside could not
defend themselves. When the Lacedaemonian commander saw how weak they
were, he did not want to take the place by force. He had orders for this from
Lacedaemon, so that if they made a treaty with Athens that would restore all
land taken in war, then they would not have to give up Plataea if it had come
over of its own accord. So the Lacedaemonian commander sent a herald to the
Plataeans to ask if they would give up the city of their own accord and accept
them as judges to punish those who had done any injustice, and to punish no
one without judicial procedure. The herald told them this, and they—for they
were then at their weakest—gave up the city. Then the Peloponnesians fed the
Plataeans for as many days as it took the judges (of whom there were five) to
come from Lacedaemon. When they arrived, no formal charge was announced.
Instead, they called the Plataeans forward and asked them this one question:
“Had they done any good service for the Lacedaemonians or their allies in the
present war?” The Plataeans, however, begged to speak at greater length, and
appointed as their speakers Astymachus and Lacon, who had represented
Lacedaemon in Plataea. They came forward and spoke as follows:
The debate is remarkable for bringing out different concepts of what the Greeks
understood to be lawful in the interaction of city-states. It also illustrates uses of the
concepts of justice and reverence. The Plataeans appealed to the gods, to reverence, to
the law of the Greeks, and to the Spartan virtue of moderation. As is typical in
Thucydides, the appeal was ineffective. Thucydides apparently aims to show that such
ethical values carry no weight in real life. The decision will be made on the basis of
the interests of the Lacedaemonians in keeping the Thebans on their side in the war
(3.68).

Speech of the Plataeans

[53] We gave up our city to you, Lacedaemonians, because we trusted you and
did not expect to undergo this sort of trial, but some more lawful proceeding
instead; and we agreed to submit to your judges (as we are doing), rather than
others, because we thought we would be treated quite fairly that way. But now
we are afraid we have been wrong on both points: we have reason to suspect
that we are {123} facing the most terrible penalties in this trial, and that you are
not impartial. We gather this from the fact that there has been no formal
charge that we could answer (as it was we asked permission to give this speech),
and also from the fact that your question was short and worded so that a true
answer would convict us while a false one would be refuted. Since, however, we
have nowhere else to turn in our present straits, we are compelled to do what
seems safest—to make a speech before we take our chances. A word unspoken
that might have saved us could be a reproach to people in our situation later on.
Besides, it will be hard for us to persuade you. If we had not known each
other, we might have helped ourselves by producing testimony of which you
were unaware. As things stand, however, you already know everything we have
to tell you. Our fear is not that you have already found our virtue to be less than
yours and will make that your accusation, but that you have already judged our
case in order to please another city. [54] Nevertheless, we will make the case we
have that justice is on our side in the quarrel with Thebes; we will remind you
of our good services to you and the rest of Greece, and in this way we will try to
persuade you.
As for that short question, whether we have done anything to help the
Lacedaemonians and their allies in this war, we answer as follows: if you ask us
as enemies, we say we have done you no injustice by not helping you; but if you
consider us friends, then you are the ones who have done the greater wrong, by
making war on us. When there was peace, however, and during the Persian
War, we behaved ourselves well: we were not the first to break the peace this
time, and in that earlier war we were the only Boeotians65 who joined you to
fight for the freedom of Greece. Though we are not sailors we fought in the sea
battle of Artemisium, and in the battle on our own land we were with you and
Pausanias.66 We took part beyond our means against every other threat to the
Greeks at that time. We also helped you Lacedaemonians in particular after the
earthquake when the revolt of the Helots seizing Ithome struck terror into
Sparta.67 At {124} that time we sent you a third of our forces, which you have
no reason to forget.
[55] That is the sort of people we decided to be, during those important
events of the past. Since then we have been enemies, but that is your fault. We
asked for an alliance when Thebes attacked us, but you rejected us and told us
to turn to the Athenians, since they were nearby and you lived far away.68
Nevertheless, you have had no more trouble than you should from us in this
war, and you would have had none in the future. We did not rebel against the
Athenians when you asked us to do so, but that is not an injustice. For they
were the ones who helped us against Thebes when you held back, and it would
have been ugly to betray them,69 especially since they treated us well. It was at
our urging that we became allies and were given a share in their citizenship;70
so we had reason to follow all their commands with alacrity. When you or the
Athenians are leaders of the allies, then it is the leaders, rather than the
followers, who are to blame for ugly behavior when evil is done.
[56] The Thebans have done us many injustices; you know yourselves about
the latest of these, which is the cause of our present troubles. They seized our
city when a treaty was in effect, and at a sacred time of the month too; we were
right to punish them then, in accordance with the law that holds everywhere:
reverence allows one to repel an aggressor.71 So there is no reason why we
should be made to suffer on their account. If you measure justice by your
immediate benefit and their hostility, you will make it obvious that you are not
true judges of what is right, but merely serving your own interests. And yet,
although the Thebans seem useful to you now, we and the other Greeks were
far more useful to you then, when you were in greater danger. As things are
now, you terrify other people when you attack them, but in former times it was
the Persians who threatened us all with servitude, and the Thebans were on
their side. Justice demands that you compare the zeal we showed then with any
offense we may have committed now. You will find that one far outweighs
{125} the other, especially since it came at the right time, when hardly any of
the Greeks dared oppose Xerxes’s power with their valor. At that time, the
greater praise went to those who did not selfishly find safety in the face of the
attack but to those who dared do what was best voluntarily and at great risk.
We were in the former group and given the highest honors; now we are afraid
that the same sort of choice will lead to our destruction, since we sided with the
Athenians as justice required, rather than with you, as would have been to our
advantage. You should always exercise the same judgment in similar cases and
realize that your advantage lies in what is good for your allies, when they can be
certain of your gratitude for their virtue and when your immediate interests are,
in a sense, served.
[57] Keep in mind also that you are now thought to be an example of heroism
to most of the Greeks. Your judgment in this trial will not go unnoticed,
because you are widely praised and we are without blame. If your decision
about us is unreasonable, watch out: people may not accept an improper
sentence against good men, even if it is given by better ones; and they may
resent it if you decide to dedicate spoils taken from us in the common temples,
since we have done good service to Greece. It will be thought horrible that
Plataea should be destroyed by Lacedaemonians, and that you—whose fathers
honored our valor by inscribing the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi72
—should now blot us out entirely from all of Greece to gratify the Thebans.
Look how far our troubles have gone: we were ruined when we were conquered
by the Persians, and now we have been defeated by the Thebans through you,
who used to be our greatest friends; and we have been put through two great
ordeals—first to die of hunger if we did not give up the city to you, and now to
be on trial for our lives.
 Although our zeal in defense of Greece exceeded our power, we Plataeans are
now abandoned by everyone, alone and unprotected. None of our former allies
is helping us. You Lacedaemonians were our only hope, but now we fear you
are not reliable.
[58] We beseech you, then, for the sake of the gods who sanctified our
alliance and for the sake of our excellent service to Greece, be moved by us and
change your minds about whatever the Thebans have persuaded you to do. Ask
them instead to return you this courtesy: be content not to kill those you ought
to spare. Then you will earn sincere gratitude rather than thanks for a shameful
act, and you {126} will not be giving others pleasure at the cost of evil to
yourselves.73 You can take our lives quickly enough, but it will be hard work for
you to live down the infamy of this deed. We are not your enemies but well-
wishers who were compelled to make war; and therefore you cannot have a
good reason for punishing us. The reverent judgment, then, would be for you
to put our lives in safety, if you remember that you received us by our voluntary
submission with our arms held out as suppliants (for the law of the Greeks
forbids killing people who do that74).
Keep in mind also that we have been your benefactors through everything.
Look at the tombs of your fathers who were buried here after they were killed
by the Persians; we have honored them yearly at public expense with clothing
and other customary offerings that our land produces in season. We have
offered them the first fruits of every crop as companions from a friendly
country and as allies to our comrades in arms. Now you will do the opposite if
you give us the wrong sentence. Consider this: Pausanias buried them here
because he thought it was friendly ground and that they would be among
people who were friends; but if you kill us and turn Plataea into part of Thebes,
won’t you be leaving your fathers and kindred deprived of the honors they now
have, in a hostile territory and among the very men who killed them? Won’t
you be subjugating the very soil on which the Greeks were liberated? Leaving
the temples deserted, where they prayed before defeating the Persians? And
abolishing the ancestral sacrifices set up by their founders?
[59] It will not add to your glory, Lacedaemonians, to do these things—not
to violate what is generally lawful in Greece, not to sin against your ancestors,
not to destroy us because of someone else’s hatred, when we are your
benefactors and have done you no injustice ourselves. Only this will add to your
glory: spare our lives, relent, and in your moderation take pity on us.75 Fix your
minds not only on the horror of what we would suffer, but also on the sort of
people we are, who would suffer this fate. And remember the uncertainty of
life, how disaster can strike anyone, even undeservedly.
It is right and absolutely necessary for us to beseech you and call upon the
gods we all worship in Greece: listen to us. We have {127} brought up the
oaths your fathers made, and we beg you not to forget them; we have become
suppliants at your fathers’ tombs, and we call upon the dead not to fall under
the rule of Thebans or let their best friends be betrayed into the hands of their
worst enemies. We remind them of that day on which we won the most
brilliant victory at their side—we who are now, on this day, in the most
horrible danger.
To bring this speech to an end—which is necessary, but very painful for men
in our situation, since it brings the danger to our lives even closer—we say in
conclusion that it was not to the Thebans that we gave up our city (we would
have preferred the most awful death by starvation to that). But we trusted you,
and came over to you. And it is only justice, if you are not convinced by us
now, for you to put us back where fortune had us, and let us choose our own
fate. We lay on you this solemn charge: do not let us Plataeans, who were so
zealous on behalf of Greece, be turned over to our worst enemies, the Thebans;
do not violate our trust in you as suppliants by letting us out of your hands. Be
our saviors, you who liberated the rest of Greece! Do not destroy us!

[60] So spoke the Plataeans. The Thebans were afraid the Lacedaemonians
would give in to that speech, and so they came forward and said they also
wished to speak, since the Plataeans had been allowed to give a longer speech
than the short question required, contrary to the plan. When they were told to
speak, they said:

Speech of the Thebans

[61] We would not have asked permission to make a speech if these men had
given a brief answer to the question, instead of turning against us with an
accusation and at the same time defending themselves at length on points that
are irrelevant, on which they were not charged, and praising themselves for
deeds with which no one has found fault. But as it is we must reply to these
accusations and refute their defense, so that neither our “wickedness” nor their
“glory” may do them any good. And you should hear the truth about both of
these before you decide.
Our quarrel with them arose from this: we founded Plataea76 after the rest of
Boeotia, together with some other places which we had, after we had driven
out the mixed peoples who were there; but {128} the Plataeans would not allow
us to be their leaders, as had been arranged at the start. Instead, they violated
the traditions of their ancestors and took themselves outside the rest of
Boeotia. And when we used force against them they went over to the
Athenians and together they did us a great deal of harm, for which we made
them suffer in return.77
[62] When the foreign king invaded Greece, they say they were the only
Boeotians who did not join the Persians, and this is the point they use to
glorify themselves and insult us. Now we admit they did not go over to the
Persians, because the Athenians did not; by the same token, however, when the
Athenians attacked the rest of Greece, they were the only Boeotians to go over
to Athens. But you should consider what forms of government the two cities
had when we did these things. Our city at the time happened to be governed
neither by an oligarchy that is equally fair for all78 nor by a democracy. Instead,
we had what is most contrary to moderate lawful government, and nearest to
tyranny: affairs were in the control of a small clique with absolute power. These
few men hoped to increase their personal power even further if the Persian
army was victorious, and so they held the majority back by force and brought
the Persians in. The city as a whole was not master of itself at the time it did
these things, and it does not deserve to be censured for mistakes it made when
it was not governed under law.79 But at least when the Persians were gone and
the city had regained its laws, look what happened: once the Athenians moved
against the rest of Greece and tried to make themselves masters of our land,
and had actually taken many places already with the help of internal divisions
[stasis], didn’t we {129} fight at Coronea and liberate Boeotia with our victory?
80 And aren’t we now zealously helping to liberate the rest of Greece, and

furnishing as many horses and as much other equipment as the other allies put
together? That is our defense against the charge that we went over to the
Persians.
[63] Now we will try to prove that you Plataeans have done more injustice to
the Greeks than we have, and that you deserve severe punishment more than
we do. You say you became allies and citizens of Athens to get back at us; in
that case you should merely have called them in against us, instead of joining in
their attack on other cities. That was open to you: if you had really been
following the Athenians against your will, you could have fallen back on the
alliance you already had with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians, which
you keep bringing up. That would have been sufficient to protect you from us
and, what is most important, to give you the security to do as you pleased. But
no, you followed the Athenians of your own accord, you were not forced into
it; you even chose to do so. And you say it would have been a shameful thing
for you to betray your benefactors! It is far more shameful, and unjust as well,
for you to have betrayed all the Greeks with whom you had sworn a treaty,
than to betray the Athenians alone, especially since they are enslaving Greece,
while the others are liberating it. Besides, what you are giving them in
gratitude is out of proportion and quite shameful. You brought in the
Athenians because of injustices that were done to you, as you say yourselves,
and now you are cooperating with them in doing injustice to others. Yet it
would be better to leave a debt of kindness unpaid than to return a good deed
with an action that is unjust.
[64] In fact, you have made it clear that it was not for the sake of Greece that
you alone did not join the Persians then, but because the Athenians did not.
You wanted to do whatever they did, the opposite of the other Greeks; and
now you claim the benefit of this, when it was only because of them that you
did well. But that’s unreasonable. You chose the Athenians; let them help you
in this trial. And don’t bring up that oath that was made in the past,81 as if that
should save you. You relinquished that oath, you see, when you violated it by
{130} helping the Athenians subjugate Aegina and others who were protected
by the same oath, instead of preventing that. You were quite willing to help
them then; you were governed then under the same laws as you are now, and
no one had control of you by force, as happened to us.82 Also, you rejected our
last invitation, which we gave you before the siege, to be at peace with us and
remain neutral. So whom could the Greeks all hate with more justice than you,
when you are aiming at their destruction behind a screen of heroism? And as
for those actions in which, as you say, you were of service for a time, you have
made it clear that they were not your sort of thing at all. You have proved to us
what it is that your nature truly inclines you to do: you have walked with the
Athenians down the path of injustice. That is what we had to say about our
going over unwillingly to the Persians, and your going over willingly to the
Athenians.
 [65] As for this last injustice you charge us with—our “unlawful entry into
your city when a treaty was in effect and at a sacred time of the month”83—we
do not think we are in the wrong as much as you are even on this point. If we
had assaulted your city in combat or wasted your land as enemies, then we
would have done you an injustice. But when men of your own city called us in
of their own accord—top-ranking men in wealth and nobility,84 who wanted to
put a stop to your foreign alliance and bring you back to the ancestral customs
that all Boeotians share—what is the injustice in that? “It is the leaders who
break the law, not the followers.”85 In fact, however, they did not break the
law, in our judgment, and neither did we. They are citizens as much as you are
and had more at stake, and they opened their own gates and took us into their
own city in a friendly spirit, not a warlike one. Their intention was to keep the
bad people here from getting worse, and to give the better people what they
deserve. The men who called us in are the arbiters of sensible policy; they were
not trying to deprive the city of your persons, but to bring you back home to
your kindred—not trying to make you anyone’s enemy, but to arrange a settled
peace for you with everyone.
[66] The proof that what we did was not an act of war is that we did no one
an injustice, but proclaimed that anyone who wished to be governed by the
ancestral customs of Boeotia should come to {131} us. And you were peaceful
at first; you were coming in readily and agreeing to our terms. But afterward,
when you realized how few of us there were, then you did not treat us as we
had treated you (though perhaps we were a trifle rude in entering without the
consent of the majority). Still, while we did nothing to cause a revolution in
action, and used only speeches to urge you to leave, you attacked us contrary to
our agreement. The ones you killed in the fighting do not upset us as much, for
there was a kind of law governing their deaths. But the ones who held out their
arms as suppliants, whom you captured alive and later promised not to kill—
wasn’t it a horrible thing for you to wipe them out lawlessly? You committed
three injustices one after the other: first you broke the agreement, then you
killed the men, and in doing so broke your promise to spare them if we did no
harm to your property in the fields. Yet you say that we are the lawbreakers and
you do not deserve to be punished! No. And if these judges know what is right,
you will be punished for all of your crimes.
[67] Now we have gone through this at length, Lacedaemonians, for your
sake and ours alike: for yours, to let you see that your sentence will be just; for
ours, to show that our vengeance is even more reverent; and also to ensure that
you are not moved by the recital of their virtues in the past (if they really had
any). When victims of injustice have a record of virtue, that should count in
their favor; but a good record should double the punishment for wrongdoers,
because their crimes are so inappropriate for them.
And don’t let them profit by weeping and appealing for pity when they bring
up your fathers’ tombs and their own lack of friends. On the other side, you
see, we claim that our young men met a much more horrible fate when they
were wiped out by these Plataeans—young men whose fathers either died at
Coronea to bring Boeotia over to your side or were left in old age, bereft of
family, to beg you for revenge, and they are suppliants with much more justice
on their side.86 People deserve to be pitied if they ought not have suffered as
they have; if, on the other hand, justice requires that they suffer (as with these
men), then their suffering ought to be a source of delight. As for their lack of
friends, they have themselves to thank: they rejected their better allies of their
own accord. They acted lawlessly before we had done them any harm, and
condemned our men more out of spite than justice. And the penalty they are
paying falls short of that, for they will be sentenced under law—not holding
out {132} their arms in battle as they claim they are, but after consenting to put
themselves on trial.
Therefore, Lacedaemonians, uphold the law of the Greeks,87 which these
men have violated, and make them pay for their lawless actions against us—a
just return for the zeal we have shown in your service. Do not let their words88
make you reject us, but give the Greeks an example of a contest you decide not
by words, but by deeds. If what they did is good, a brief report will suffice; if
they are in the wrong, however, fancy speeches are merely smoke screens. But if
those in authority do what you are doing now—summing up the issue in one
question for everybody, and making judgments on that basis—then there will
be much less searching for fine words to cover unjust actions.

[68] So spoke the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges still thought their
question was the right one to ask—whether they had received any good service
from the Plataeans in the war. This, they said, was because they had expected
the Plataeans all along to keep the peace, in accordance with the old treaty of
Pausanias after the Persian War; and later they had offered them neutrality on
the same terms before the siege, and been refused. They held that they were
released from the treaty, since their intentions were just, and they had been
treated badly by the Plataeans.
So they brought each one forward and asked him the same question again:
whether he had done any good service in the war for the Lacedaemonians and
their allies.89 And when they said they had not, they took them off and killed
them without a single exception. They killed at least 200 Plataeans there and
25 Athenians;90 and they made slaves of the women. Then the Thebans gave
the use of the city for a year to Megarians who had been driven out of their city
by civil war, along with the surviving Plataeans who had supported Thebes.
{133} Afterward, they razed it to the ground and used its foundations to build a
hostel91 near the precinct of Hera two hundred feet around, with rooms in a
circle upstairs and down, making use also of the Plataeans’ roofs and doors.
From the other materials in the Plataean wall, brass and iron, they made beds
that they dedicated to Hera, for whom they also built a stone temple a hundred
feet on a side. The land became public property, which was rented on a ten-
year lease and cultivated by Thebans. Virtually everything the Lacedaemonians
did against Plataea, they did for the sake of Thebes, which they thought would
be useful to them in the war that was then afoot. So ended the business in
Plataea in the ninety-third year of their alliance with Athens.92

HUMAN NATURE ADAPTS TO CIVIL WAR

Civil War on Corcyra (427 BCE)
After describing the end of Plataea, Thucydides turns to other events of that summer,
of which the most important was the civil war on Corcyra, an island off the western
coast of Greece. Athens had been supporting Corcyra in the island’s quarrel with
Corinth, and this had been one of the provocations of the war, since Corcyra had been
a Corinthian colony, albeit a highly independent one (1.32–42). The people of
Corcyra had been bitterly divided for some years, with the party of the dēmos
favoring Athens and the party of the oligarchs favoring Corinth. This sort of tension
was called by the same word that was used for violent civil war: stasis. Indeed, this
tension would soon escalate to the level of violence. Thucydides discusses this case of
civil war at considerable length, although it was common in Greece. He may have
seen the wider wars among Greek cities as instances of civil war writ large.93
In 427, the tension in Corcyra erupted in open civil war between democrats and
oligarchs, and both sides called in allies from abroad. A Peloponnesian fleet arrived
first and gave the democrats a fright; but the arrival of a large Athenian fleet under
Eurymedon sent the Spartans packing and gave the democrats the confidence to begin
a massacre of those who supported oligarchy, four hundred of whom had taken
sanctuary as suppliants in the temple of Hera. Others had been persuaded to help man
the thirty ships they had expected to use in the defense of Corcyra against the
Peloponnesians.
{134} [70] The civil war in Corcyra began when the prisoners taken at the
battles over Epidamnus came home on their release by the Corinthians.94 The
word was that they had been ransomed by their agents95 for eighty talents,96
but the fact was that they had been persuaded to bring Corcyra over to the
Corinthian side. These men set out to do this, meeting with citizens one by
one, aiming to pull the city away from the Athenians. A ship arrived from
Athens and another from Corinth, both bringing ambassadors. The people of
Corcyra held a meeting for speeches [from both sides] and voted to be allies of
the Athenians on the terms agreed upon earlier,97 while being friends with the
Peloponnesians as before.
A certain Peithias was an agent of the Athenians by his own will and also a
leading spokesman for the dēmos.98 He was taken to court by these men,99 who
accused him of making Corcyra subject to Athens. On being acquitted, he
indicted five of the richest of these men, claiming that they had cut vine stakes
from ground belonging to the sanctuary of Jupiter and Alcinous, assessing a fee
of one stater for each stake.100 When they lost the case, they took sanctuary in
the temples because of the size of the fee, hoping to pay in installments. But
Peithias, who happened to be a member of the council, persuaded it to follow
the law. Those men were hard pressed by the law, and they learned that
Peithias was going to persuade the people (while still on the council) to adopt
the same friends and enemies as Athens. So they conspired [with others of
their party], armed themselves with daggers, suddenly broke into the council
house, and killed Peithias along with sixty other council members and private
{135} citizens. A few of those who were on Peithias’s side escaped to the
Athenian trireme that still lay in the harbor.
[71] After this action, [the leaders of the oligarchs] called the Corcyreans to
an assembly, and told them that it would be for the best, and that they would
be least likely to fall into subjection to Athens, if in future they would not
admit anyone from either side unless they came in peace and in a single ship,
and that they should understood [the arrival of] more than one ship [from a
foreign power] to be an act of war. After saying this, they compelled the
assembly to ratify their proposal.
Then they straightway sent ambassadors to Athens to inform them of what
they had done and show them that it was advantageous. They were also
supposed to persuade the refugees101 there to do nothing that was not
supportive or would lead to a change of course. [72] But when the ambassadors
arrived, the Athenians seized them as radicals102 along with their sympathizers,
and kept them on [the island of] Aegina.
Meanwhile, those who were managing things in Corcyra attacked the dēmos
and overcame them in battle, after a trireme came from Corinth bringing
ambassadors from the Lacedaemonians.
As night fell, the dēmos fled to the acropolis and the higher parts of the city,
where they came together and made themselves secure, while also controlling
the Hyllaic Harbor. The oligarchs seized the agora, where most of them lived,
and the harbor near it on the mainland side.
[73] The next day they exchanged a few shots from slings, and both sides sent
to the countryside to recruit slaves to take their part, on the promise of liberty.
The majority of slaves went over to the dēmos,103 while the other side recruited
800 mercenaries from the mainland. [74] The day after that, they fought again,
and the dēmos was victorious, as they were superior both in the strength of their
positions and in the number of their men. The women assisted them boldly,
throwing tiles from the rooftops and enduring a tumult beyond their natural
strength. About twilight, the oligarchs retreated. They were afraid that the
dēmos could attack and take the dockyard with only {136} a shout and destroy
them. So to block their passage, they set fire to the houses that circled the
agora along with the shared housing. They spared neither their own nor others’
houses, but burned up a great deal of merchandise. The whole city was in
danger of destruction, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way.
After the battle, both sides spent the night peacefully on guard. Since the dēmos
had been victorious, the Corinthian ship slipped away and most of the
mercenaries got over to the mainland by stealth.
[75] Next day, Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian general, came
in support with twelve ships and 500 Messenian hoplites from Naupactus. He
negotiated an agreement and persuaded them to agree to condemn ten men
who were the most responsible (they soon fled), while the rest would live
together under a treaty among themselves and with Athens, to adopt the same
friends and enemies as Athens.
When he had done this, he would have sailed away, but the leaders of the
dēmos persuaded him to leave five of his ships with them, to keep their
adversaries from stirring up trouble, and to take an equal number of theirs,
which they would fill with Corcyraeans and send with him. To this he agreed,
but the leaders of the dēmos enlisted only their enemies for the ships. But these
people were afraid they’d be sent to Athens, and so they took sanctuary at the
temple of Castor and Pollux. Nicostratus tried to bring them out, and
encouraged them to leave. But when he failed to persuade them, the dēmos took
up weapons, alleging that the oligarchs must have bad intentions, or else they
would have had enough trust to board the ships. The dēmos took away the
oligarchs’ weapons from their homes, and would have killed some that they ran
into, if it had not been for Nicostratus. When others saw this, they took
sanctuary in the temple of Hera. In all there were over 400 in sanctuary. The
dēmos were afraid they [the oligarchic suppliants] would do something
revolutionary and persuaded them to come out of sanctuary; they then took
them across to the island that faces the sanctuary of Hera and sent across
whatever they needed.
[76] While the civil war was at this stage, on the fourth or fifth day after
those men had been taken across to the island, the Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-
three ships arrived from Cyllene, where they had been at anchor since their
voyage from Ionia.104 Alcidas was in {137} command as before, with Brasidas
as his adviser. They first put in at Sybota, a harbor on the mainland, and then
sailed at break of day against Corcyra.
[77] The Corcyraeans were in a state of tumult, frightened by events in the
city as well as by this naval attack. They prepared sixty ships and sent each one
out against the enemy as soon as it was manned—although the Athenians
advised them to let them sail out first and afterward follow with the whole
Corcyraean fleet together. As the ships came out piecemeal, two of them
immediately deserted to the enemy, while the soldiers on board others started
fighting with each other, and there was total disorganization.
The Peloponnesians saw their confusion and assigned twenty ships to fight
the Corcyraeans; the rest they drew up against the twelve Athenian ships,
which included the Salaminia and the Paralus.105
 [78] In their part of the battle, the Corcyraeans suffered from cowardice and
disorder, attacking in small numbers. The Athenians, for their part, did not
attack the mass of the enemy or even the center of the formation against them,
for fear of being outnumbered and surrounded. Instead, they assaulted a wing
and swamped one ship.106 Then the Peloponnesian fleet took a circular
position, and the Athenians sailed around it trying to put them into disorder.
Those fighting the Corcyraeans saw this and were afraid of a repetition of the
Battle of Naupactus, so they came to help. Joining up, they rowed against the
Athenians all together. The Athenians withdrew, rowing backward, as slowly
as possible in order to give the Corcyraeans time to escape while the enemy was
all lined up against them.107 So went this battle, and it ended about sunset.
[79] The Corcyraeans were afraid the enemy would follow up their victory by
attacking the city or by picking up the men they had taken over to the island,
or by doing something else radical. So they brought back the men from the
island to the sanctuary of Hera and guarded the city.
{138} Although the Peloponnesians had won the naval battle, they did not
dare invade the city, but they took thirteen of the Corcyraean ships and
returned to the mainland where they had started. The next day they made no
further attack on the city, although it was in confusion and fear, and although
Brasidas (it is said) urged Alcidas to do so, but without equal authority.108
Instead, they landed soldiers at the headland of Leucimme,109 and wasted their
fields.
[80] In the meantime, the dēmos of Corcyra were terrified of an attack by
those ships, so they conferred with the suppliants [in sanctuary] and others over
how the city could be saved. They persuaded some of them to go aboard [as
deck-soldiers]. In spite of everything, they manned thirty ships to face the
attack. But the Peloponnesians only wasted the land till midday and then sailed
away.
That night news reached them by signal fire of sixty Athenian ships coming
their way from Leucas, with Eurymedon, son of Thucles, as general. These the
Athenians had sent on learning of the civil war and of Alcidas’s fleet heading
for Corcyra.
[81] So the Peloponnesians sailed home right away by night in haste, keeping
close to shore, and having their ships carried over at the Isthmus of Leucas, so
they would not be sighted sailing around the island.
 When the people of Corcyra heard that the Athenian ships were approaching,
and that the Peloponnesians were leaving, they brought in the Messenian
soldiers110 who had been outside into the city, and ordered the ships they had
manned to come around into the Hyllaic Port.111 During the voyage around,
they killed any of their enemies they could lay hands on; and as for the ones
they had persuaded to man the ships, they got rid of them all as they
disembarked. And they came to the temple of Hera and persuaded fifty of the
suppliants who had taken sanctuary there to submit themselves to a trial; then
they condemned them all to death. When the suppliants saw what was being
done, most of them—all those who were not induced to stand trial by law—
killed one another right there in the temple; some hanged themselves on trees,
and everyone made away with himself {139} by what means he could. For the
seven days that the Athenian admiral Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty
ships, the Corcyreans went on killing as many of their own people as they took
to be their enemies. They accused them of subverting the democracy, but some
of the victims were killed on account of private hatred, and some by their
debtors for the money they had lent them. Every form of death was seen at this
time; and (as tends to happen in such cases) there was nothing people would
not do, and more: fathers killed their sons; men were dragged out of the
temples and then killed hard by; and some who were walled up in the temple of
Dionysus died inside it.

Moral Breakdown in Civil War: Human Nature in a Crisis

[82] So cruel was the course of this civil war [stasis], and it seemed all the more
so because it was the first of these. Afterward, virtually all Greece was in
upheaval, and quarrels arose everywhere between the democratic leaders, who
sought to bring in the Athenians, and the oligarchs, who wanted to bring in
the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace they could have had no pretext and
would not have been so eager to call them in, but because it was war, and allies
were to be had for either party to hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves
at the same time, invitations to intervene came readily from those who wanted
a new government. Civil war brought many hardships to the cities, such as
happen and will always happen as long as the nature of human beings is the
same, although they may be more or less violent or take different forms, as
imposed by particular changes in the circumstances. In peace and prosperity,
cities and private individuals alike have better intelligence because they are not
plunged into the necessity of doing anything against their will; but war is a
violent teacher: when it takes away the easy supply of what they need for daily
life, war gives to people’s passions the violent quality of their present
situation.112
Civil war ran through the cities; those it struck later heard what the first cities
had done and far exceeded them in inventing artful means for attack and
bizarre forms of revenge. And they reversed the {140} usual way of using words
to evaluate what they did.113 Ill-considered boldness was counted as loyal
manliness; prudent hesitation was held to be cowardice in disguise, and
moderation merely the cloak of an unmanly nature. A mind that could grasp
the good of the whole was considered wholly lazy.114 Sudden fury was accepted
as part of manly valor, while plotting for one’s own security was thought a
reasonable excuse for delaying action.115 A man who expressed anger was
always to be trusted, while one who opposed him was under suspicion. A man
who made a plot was intelligent if it happened to succeed, while one who could
smell out a plot was deemed even more clever. Anyone who took precautions,
however, so as not to need to do either one (they would say), had been
frightened by the other side into subverting his own political party. In brief, a
man was praised if he could commit some evil action before anyone else did, or
if he could urge on another person who had never meant to do such a thing.
Family ties were not so close as those of the political parties, because party
members would readily dare to do anything on the slightest pretext. These
parties, you see, were not formed under existing laws for the good, but for
making gains in violation of established law. And the oaths they swore to each
other had their authority not so much by divine law, as by their being partners
in breaking the law. And when the party in power received fine proposals from
their enemies, they were on guard to see that they were not acted on, rather
than taking them in a noble spirit.
To take revenge was of higher value than never to have received injury. And
as for oaths of reconciliation116 (when there were any!), {141} these were
offered for the moment when both sides were at an impasse, and were in force
only while neither side had help from abroad; but on the first opportunity,
when one person saw the other unguarded and dared to act, he found his
revenge sweeter because he had broken trust than if he had acted openly: he
had taken the safer course, and he gave himself the prize for intelligence if he
had triumphed by fraud. Evildoers are called skillful sooner than simpletons are
called good, and people are ashamed to be called simpletons but take pride in
being thought skillful.
The cause of all this was the desire to rule out of avarice and ambition,117 and
the zeal for winning that proceeds from those two. Those who led their parties
in the cities promoted their policies under decent-sounding names: “equality
for the mass of citizens” on one side, and “moderate aristocracy” on the
other.118 And although they pretended to serve the public in their speeches,
they actually treated it as the prize for their competition; and striving by
whatever means to win, both sides ventured on most horrible outrages and
exacted even greater revenge, without any regard for justice or the public good.
Each party was limited only by its own appetite at the time, and stood ready to
satisfy its ambition of the moment, either by voting for an unjust verdict or
seizing control by force.
As a result, neither side thought much of reverence,119 but they praised those
who could pass a horrible measure under the cover of a fine speech. The
citizens who remained in the middle were destroyed by both parties, partly
because they would not side with them, and partly for envy that they might
escape in this way.
[83] Thus was every kind of wickedness afoot throughout all Greece by the
occasion of civil wars. Simplicity, which is the chief cause of a noble
character,120 was laughed down and disappeared. People were sharply divided
into opposing camps, and, without trust, {142} their minds were in strong
opposition. No speech121 was so powerful, no oath so terrible, as to overcome
this mutual hostility. But when any group was on top, they calculated there was
no hope of a firm peace, and so they were more concerned to avoid harm than
they were able to trust. For the most part, those of weaker intelligence122 had
the greatest success, since a sense of their own inferiority and the subtlety of
their opponents put them into great fear that they would be overcome in debate
or by schemes due to their enemies’ intelligence. They therefore went daringly
to work against their enemies in action, while their more intelligent opponents,
scornful and confident that they could foresee any attack, thought they had no
need to take by force what might be gotten by intelligence. They were therefore
unprotected and so more easily killed.
Section 84 was not known to certain ancient authors who commented on the wider
passage, and so many scholars believe it to be a work of imitation.123 I include it
because it may well be genuine, and it is thoroughly Thucydidean in thought and
style, while being of considerable interest in its own right.124
[84] Most of these atrocities, then, were committed first in Corcyra, including
all the acts of revenge people take, when they have the opportunity, against
rulers who have shown more arrogance (hubris) than good sense (sōphrosunē),125
and all the actions people choose unjustly in order to escape long-standing
poverty, especially if they had been thrown into it. Most of these acted from a
passionate desire for their neighbors’ possessions, but there were also those who
attacked the wealthy not to get more than their share,126 but primarily out of
zeal for equality, and they were the most carried away by their undisciplined
passion to commit savage and pitiless attacks. Life in the city had been thrown
into such confusion at this time that human nature, having become accustomed
to violate justice and laws, now came to dominate law altogether, and showed
itself with delight to be the slave of passion, the victor over justice, {143} and
the enemy of anyone superior.127 Without the destructive force of envy, you
see, people would not value revenge over reverence, or profits over justice.
When they want revenge on others, people are determined first to destroy
without a trace the laws that commonly govern such matters, though it is only
because of these that anyone in trouble can hope to be saved, even though
anyone might be in danger someday and stand in need of such laws.128
Here Thucydides resumes his account of the civil war:
[85] Such was the anger that the Corcyreans expressed in their city—the first
against fellow citizens.
Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with their ships. Later, refugees
from Corcyra—about 500 of them had escaped—seized forts on the mainland
and took control of the Corcyrean territory opposite the island, which they
used as a base for plundering Corcyra, causing considerable damage and a
severe famine that broke out in the city. Meanwhile, they sent ambassadors to
Lacedaemon and Corinth about going home.129 After a time, when nothing
came of that, they got boats and hired mercenary soldiers, then crossed over to
the island, about 600 in all. There they burned their boats so that their only
hope would be to take control of the land. They went up to Mount Istone130
and built a fort there; then they preyed on those in the city and took control of
the land.
 Thucydides now turns to various events that took place through the winter of
426/425. Syracuse had been building its own empire over other Greek cities in Sicily,
threatening or taking over places that had been allies of Athens. The Athenians were
concerned about this because their allies in Sicily were important trading partners.
They sent ships to Sicily to help their allies, but accomplished little (3.86–88, 90, 99,
103, 115). Thucydides frequently interrupts the Sicilian narrative with other events.
In 426, the {144} Lacedaemonians founded a colony in Trachis, northwest of Athens,
which they called Heracleia. This was soon depopulated owing to the enmity of local
people and bad leadership from Sparta, but it would come back to prominence after
this war ended (3.92–93). The Athenians campaigned in Aetolia, on the north side of
the Gulf of Corinth, where they suffered a disastrous defeat (3.94–98). Farther west
along the north side of the gulf, the Peloponnesians campaigned in Ambracia and
Acarnania, where they and their allies were badly defeated in a series of remarkable
battles (3.100–102, 105–14). In the sixth winter of the war (426/425) the
Athenians purified the island of Delos (3.104), and there was an eruption in Sicily of
Mount Aetna (3.116). Thucydides returns to the civil war in Book 4:

THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR (425 BCE)

In 425, the Athenian general Eurymedon returned to Corcyra and attacked the fort
on Mount Istone. The oligarchs there surrendered on condition that they be tried by
the people of Athens. The Athenians, for their part, required that the oligarchs accept
temporary imprisonment on an island, from which they must not try to escape.
The Corcyrean democrats were afraid Athens would pardon the oligarchs, so they
enticed some of them to try escaping. The escape was discovered, and the Athenians,
considering the treaty broken, turned their captives over to the Corcyreans. This is
what happened next:
[4.47.3] When the Corcyreans took over the prisoners they shut them up in a
large building and later brought them out twenty at a time, bound them
together, and made them go down a path lined with hoplites drawn up on both
sides. They were beaten and stabbed by the troops in the lines, whenever any of
them was spotted as someone’s personal enemy. And to speed up the laggards,
men with whips followed them down.
[4.48] They took about sixty men from the building, drove them down the
path, and killed them, while those inside the building thought they were only
being moved to another place. When someone told them, and they saw the
truth, they cried out to the Athenians and asked them to kill them if they
wanted, but said that they were no longer willing to leave the building, and
that, as long as they had the power, they would not allow anyone to come in.
The Corcyreans, however, had no intention of forcing their way in at the
door; they climbed up on the roof of the building, tore off the roofing, and
began throwing roof tiles and shooting arrows inside. {145} The inmates
defended themselves as well as they could, but most of them killed themselves
either by stabbing their throats with arrows that had been shot at them, or by
strangling themselves with cords from beds that happened to be there or ropes
they made from their own clothes.
This went on most of the night (for it happened at night), and so they
perished either at their own hands by strangulation or else struck down from
above. At daybreak the Corcyreans threw them crisscross on wagons and carted
them out of the city. The women they had captured at the fort were made
slaves.
This is how the Corcyreans who had occupied the mountain fort were
destroyed by the democrats; and at this point the civil war that had grown so
large came to an end, at least as far as this war was concerned, since there was
hardly anything left of one of the two sides.

1.“Son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.” Archidamus was one of Sparta’s two kings, who
were mainly war leaders, from 467 to 427. The first phase of the war is named after him, the
Archidamian War, even though he had opposed it. See 1.79–85 and 2.18–20.
2.Note that the Athenians did provide their land with some protection during Pericles’s period, contrary
to what we would expect from his strategy (1.143, 2.63). For his use of cavalry to defend fields close to
the city, see 2.22 (Hornblower, ad loc.).
3. On the causes of the separation, which Athenians saw as a revolt, see 3.12. Scholars debate over
whether the revolt was supported by the dēmos from the start; in most parts of the Delian League, the
dēmos supported Athens because Athens usually supported the dēmos against the oligarchs. So it seems
likely that in Mytilene the dēmos was more sympathetic than were the oligarchic rulers to Athenian rule
(see Introduction, xxi.). But the common people evidently threw themselves into the work of building
defenses against the Athenians.
Methymna was a town on Lesbos.
4. Moles: embankments projecting into the sea to protect shipping in a harbor.
5.Pontus is an area in the north of Asia Minor, near the Black Sea. The supplies came by sea, and
therefore would have been blocked by the Athenians once the war began.
6.They were proxenoi, guest friends of the Athenians, who looked after Athenian visitors to Lesbos.
Pontus is the region of eastern Anatolia south of the Black Sea. Tenedos is a smaller island north of
Lesbos.
7.The Boeotians, whose capital was Thebes, had long been hostile to Athens. Lesbos had apparently
been settled by Greeks from that area in very early times.
8.“Under the command of Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two others.” Cleippides was the father of the
orator Cleophon.
9. Thucydides leaves the sentence incomplete. We are to supply something like, “so far so good.”
Ancient Greeks did not feel obliged to observe a truce at times that were sacred to merely local gods
such as this one.
10. Geraestus: a port city on the southeast corner of Euboea.
11. As often, Thucydides uses a revealing term for “revolt”: neoterizein, to do something new and
therefore radical.
12.Imbros and Lemnos, islands to the north of Lesbos, were longtime members of the Delian League,
the alliance with Athens. Methymna was the second most important town on Lesbos, north and west of
Mytilene.
13. Dorieus won the pankration (hand-to-hand fighting) at Olympia in 432, 428, and 424.
14.Many modern editors follow an emended text that reads: “with matching intentions” in place of
“with equal good will.”
15.Note the conflicting explanations the Mytileneans give for breaking away: here they appeal to
prudence (we’re quitting now it’s dangerous); in the next section they appeal to justice (we’re quitting
now they are enslaving Greeks).
16. Virtue: good quality of character.
17.On the same day in 479, the allied Greeks under Spartan leadership defeated the Persians on land at
Plataea and on sea at Mycale. For the formation of the Delian League in 478, see Introduction, xx.
18.Subjugation: douleia, which can be translated as “slavery,” but here means subordinate status in the
Delian League as it began to look more like an empire controlled by Athens. For taking people into
chattel slavery, as the Athenians would do with the people of Melos, the Greeks had a different word:
andrapodismos.
19.Members of the Delian League met in council (1.97); the complaint is that there were too many of
them to come to an agreement to resist enlarging Athenian power.
20. Lesbos and Chios, both fairly large and prosperous, had special arrangements with the Delian
League, contributing their own forces. Smaller members contributed only money for their mutual
protection from the Persians.
21. Lesbos and Chios had assisted Athens in the bloody subjugation of Samos (1.116–117). The passage
apparently shows that the synod of the Delian League was still meeting at the time, 440. Each member
state had one vote. Note that Chios was still autonomous at the time of the revolt of Mytilene, a fact
overlooked here. See Hornblower’s note.
22.A loose translation of a difficult passage. I have translated ep’ ekeinois and eph’ hemin as “up to them”
and “up to us.” Hobbes uses “at their discretion,” and Jowett “at their mercy.” The idea is the same.
23. See 3.2.
24.“From the Greeks”: i.e., from the Delian League, which had (in their view) turned Greeks against
Greeks, though it had been founded as a Greek alliance against the Persian Empire.
25.The ambassadors have not really come as suppliants, but they play the role here for rhetorical effect,
in view of their location at Olympia. Zeus, who is worshiped at Olympia, has a special role in the
protection of those who claim status as suppliants. Such claims have no effect on those in power,
according to Thucydides’s story. See especially 3.81.
26.
Two-thirds: see above, 2.10. The rule in the alliance was apparently that, when summoned, each city
would deploy two-thirds of its forces in the allied cause.
27. “Leaving out only the class of horsemen and the very rich”: I have supplied the “only.” They made
sailors of groups that were usually exempt from sea duty—hoplites and foreign residents (metics). The
richer folk remained exempt. This was not the usual way of manning the ships. Only the lowest class and
allied oarsmen were normally mustered into the ships, but in this case the Athenians filled the ships any
way they could, to make an impression on the Peloponnesians. Athenians were divided into classes for
military service by the size of the crop expected from their land, in bushels (medimnoi). The poor (thetes)
were sailors; the next class up could afford armor and so were used as hoplites; the third class up could
afford to be horsemen or knights, and the very rich (five-hundred-bushel men) were eligible for the
highest offices.
28.We learn from 3.7 (not translated here) that the Athenian fleet of thirty ships had been split by now;
twelve remained in the west of Greece, and eighteen were returning. These eighteen most likely were the
force in question. They may have had the shock value of the full fleet of thirty.
29.“Later, the Lacedaemonians prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, levying forty ships from their allies
and putting Alcidas, who was to go with them, in command.”
30. I have omitted 3.17, because most editors agree it is either an interpolation or a transplant from an
earlier book.
31. Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus: small towns on Lesbos that evidently had supported Mytilene.
32. Paches is identified as “the son of Epicurus.” Little is known about Paches, except that a late source
tells us he killed himself during the routine scrutiny after holding office (Plutarch, Life of Nicias 6.1; Life
of Aristides 26.5).
33. The fourth winter of the war.
34.Probably this means that this was the first time they had raised so much by a one-time tax on
property.
35.The siege had begun two years earlier in the summer of 429. Most of the Plataeans had taken refuge
in Athens before the siege wall was complete, but 400 Plataean soldiers remained, along with 80
Athenian allies and 110 women to cook for them (2.71–78).
36.“So they could step safely in the mud”: an odd reason. If bare feet are safer, why not carry both shoes
in hand while crossing the ditch and put them on for climbing the ladders? Scholars believe there may
have been a religious reason of the sort Thucydides omits from his story, owing to his reluctance to
admit religion to his theory of human motivation (Rhodes).
37.I have experienced the same in Vietnam in 1969 along the Cambodian border, when our flares,
dropped by helicopters, illuminated us and blinded us to enemy movements, as they crossed at night into
Vietnam at the end of their journey down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
38.
The shrine of Androcrates: Herodotus mentions this at 9.25 in his account of the Battle of Plataea.
Modern scholars are not sure where this was.
39. Three-quarters of a mile: six or seven stades, or about 1,200 yards. Stades had different lengths in
different cities.
40. Thucydides’s tale of the breakout is so vivid it could only have come from an eyewitness.
41. Pyrrha: a small city supporting Mytilene. See 3.18.
42. The young Pausanias was grandson of the Pausanias who was in command at the Battle of Plataea—
the decisive event in the Persian War. The young man was king because his father, Pleistoanax, was in
exile (see 2.21 and 5.16).
43.Those in power: the ruling oligarchs: dunatoi. Plainly, the government of Mytilene had been a closely
held oligarchy.
44. Tenedos: a small island loyal to Athens.
45. Paches had been away protecting the coast of Ionia from Peloponnesian ships.
46.Pyrrha and Eresos: small cities on the west coast of Lesbos that had rebelled along with Mytilene.
Eresus was next to Antissa, which Paches had dealt with in 3.28.
47.Mytilene had enjoyed the status of an autonomous ally of Athens, contributing ships rather than
funding to the allied effort.
48. Evidently this was the first time in many years that the Peloponnesians had sailed to Ionia. The
Athenians were shocked; such voyages would change the face of the war for the city that had considered
the Aegean its own private lake.
49.The relevant officeholders would have been the council members in the currently active contingent of
the council, or prytany, who had the power to call an assembly. The contingents from the various tribes
took turns running day-to-day affairs in Athens.
50.“Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus”: the most effective of the new politicians who rose to prominence in
Athens after Pericles’s death without serving as elected generals. (Cleon later would take on the role of
general, with mixed success.) Note that this passage makes it clear that Thucydides is not reporting on
the entire debate; his history is selective.
51. It was Cleon who had persuaded the Assembly to pass the original motion for killing the
Mytileneans. At this time, Cleon was the most powerful leader in Athens, typical of those who were
called demagogues by the Greeks. He exerted tremendous influence on Athens through his speaking
ability. Because he did not run for election as general, he could formulate policies and push them
through the Assembly without being held accountable, as were all Athenian officials at the end of their
terms. Cleon and his like were bitterly resented by upper-class writers such as Thucydides, who takes
him to be typical of the new generation of politicians that in his view corrupted Athens after the death of
Pericles. In his rhetoric he is like today’s populists.
52. See Pericles’s last speech, 2.63.
53. The appropriate: epieikeia, what is fitting for a particular case, implying a flexible approach to
enforcing the law, which is nevertheless in line with justice. This is often translated “equity” in
Aristotle’s ethics, where it calls for treating special cases not according to law, but according to what we
think the lawmakers would judge in those cases. Sometimes also translated “fairness.”
54. Of Diodotus we know only what we learn from Thucydides’s representation of him in this debate.
55. “This kind of citizen”: people like Cleon.
56. Greed: pleonexia, taking more than one’s share; arrogance: hubris.
57. “Passionate desire”: eros. On hope, see 5.103.
58.See 3.39.3 where Cleon makes the general point that after any rebellion Athens will, at great
expense, regain a city that has been ruined. Diodotus’s response shows that this result is not necessary.
59. The appropriate: epieikeia, what is fitting for a particular case, implying a flexible approach to
enforcing the law, which is nevertheless in line with justice.
60. The normal practice on fast warships was for sailors to eat and sleep on land.
61. Methymna had not joined the rebellion.
62.As two minas was roughly a hoplite’s annual pay, this may have been intended to support a hoplite
garrison. See Hornblower.
63.
No such island is known to us; a process of silting must have made Minoa part of the mainland.
Apparently it was close to the port used by Megara.
64. See 2.2–2.6 for the beginning of hostilities at Plataea.
65.
The Plataeans exaggerate; Thespiae, also in Boeotia, resisted the Persians at great cost to themselves
(Herodotus 7.132, 8.50).
66.The Greeks fought two indecisive naval battles with the Persians at Artemisium (not far from
Thermopylae) in 480. At Plataea, however, they won an overwhelming victory on land in 479 under the
Lacedaemonian general Pausanias.
67.The Helots were a subject people to the Lacedaemonians, who kept them in a form of serfdom. They
were frequently in rebellion, and on more than one occasion seized and fortified the mountain of
Ithome, most recently in 464.
68. Probably in 519. See Herodotus 6.108.1–3.
69. Ugly: not kalon. An equally good translation would be “ignoble.”
70.The Plataeans were never full citizens; their survivors apparently enjoyed honorary citizenship after
these events, and this may have given them some rights. See Hornblower.
71. Reverence (to hosion) is a principal theme of the Plataeans. Here it is tantamount to justice, elsewhere
it has more religious overtones (as in the honor they have done to the Spartan dead, see 3.58). On the
concept, see 3.82 with note.
72. The tripod with this inscription can be seen in the Hippodrome in Istanbul.
73. “Evil to yourselves”: here, probably, an evil reputation.
74.For the claims of suppliants, see also 3.14 and Introduction, xxvii; for the related idea of unwritten
laws of the Greeks, see 3.67 and 2.37 with notes.
75. Moderation or self-control, sōphrosunē, was a virtue to which the Lacedaemonians laid special claim
(1.84).
76.If this is supposed to mean that Plataea was founded by Thebans, it is probably false, in view of
Plataea’s long independent tradition.
77. Herodotus 5.77.
78. “That is equally fair for all”: isonomos. Elsewhere, isonomia is usually associated with democracy; this
passage shows, however, that democrats could not make a unique claim to fairness for all, though
isonomia here might refer to fairness for all aristocrats.
79. “A small clique with absolute power”: dunasteia. Aristotle says that a dunasteia is the fourth stage of
oligarchy, a hereditary clique that approximates monarchy and is the moral equivalent of tyranny (Politics
1292b7, 1293a31). Aristotle explicitly contrasts dunasteia with the rule of law. In this passage,
Thucydides anticipates the development by Plato in the Laws and Aristotle in the Politics of the ideal of
the rule of law. As for the value of the Theban excuse, we should not be impressed by their claim that
the city was not master of itself; in fact, after the defeat of the Persians, Thebes withstood a siege by the
Greek allies for twenty days rather than hand over their pro-Persian leaders for punishment (Herodotus
9.87).
80. The first battle of Coronea: in 447/446 Boeotian exiles and their allies fought to liberate Thebes
from Athenian control during an earlier phase of the Peloponnesian War, before the Thirty Years’ Peace
took effect in 446/445. They defeated a substantial Athenian army and forced them to give up their
attempt to expand into Boeotia (1.113). Not to be confused with the Battle of Coronea in 394 in which
Thebes was defeated.
81. See 3.59.
82. See 3.62.
83. See 2.2–6 and 3.56.
84. The “top-ranking men in wealth and nobility” are potential oligarchs. The passage that follows
represents oligarchic thinking of the period.
85. Paraphrasing the Plataeans’ remarks at 3.55.4.
86.“More justice on their side”: i.e., more justice than the Plataeans who claimed suppliant status in 3.58
and 3.59.
87. For the idea of a “law of the Greeks,” see also 3.58; for unwritten law, see 2.37 with note.
88. Words: logoi, which can mean words, speeches, arguments, or (as probably here) stories. In this
context, each side is giving a speech and making arguments, and so using logoi in those senses. The point
of difference is that since the Plataean case depends on history it depends on mere stories; whereas the
Theban case depends on the current fact of the matter: that Plataea is allied with Athens. On the word-
deed contrast here, see Parry (1957, 190 ff.).
89. See 3.52.
90.There had been 480 when the siege began, but about 220 had broken out and escaped in the
meanwhile (3.24).
91.The hostel would serve visitors to the Shrine of Hera, for the maintenance of the rites mentioned
above.
92. The alliance had begun in 519 (Herodotus 6.108).
93.For the idea that the wars among Greek cities could be considered as civil wars, see Hermocrates’s
speech (4.61) and Plato, Republic 5.469b–471b.
94. Prisoners taken in battles over Epidamnus: see 1.24 ff.
95. Agents: proxenoi.
96.The value of a talent of silver was 6,000 drachmas; a drachma was a day’s pay. The MSS make the
ransom 800 talents, but this is an enormous sum, and most scholars believe Thucydides meant to write
“80.”
97.The terms agreed upon earlier: see 1.44 for the defensive alliance of 433. In 431, Corcyra went
beyond the treaty and supported an Athenian offensive action, sending fifty ships along with a hundred
Athenian ships on a raiding mission (2.25), and this no doubt enraged the Peloponnesians.
98. The dēmos: the popular pro-Athens and anti-oligarchy faction in Corcyra.
99. “These men”: returning prisoners, with others of the faction of wealthy men who evidently favored
oligarchy.
100.Alcinous was the king of the Phaeacians (Odyssey 6–8), a fictitious people with whom the
Corcyreans identified. A stater was probably worth three drachmas.
101. Leaders of the faction of the dēmos who had fled to Athens when the oligarchs raided the council.
102.Radicals: the Greek reads “innovators,” which was understood to mean those who try to overturn a
form of government.
103.
Why did the slaves side with the dēmos? Probably because they rightly predicted who would win (see
Hornblower).
104.The forty ships the Peloponnesians had meant to send to Mytilene had sailed around to Cyllene,
where they were joined by thirteen Peloponnesian ships. Cyllene was a port in Elis, on the northwest
shore of the Peloponnesus.
105. The Salaminia and the Paralus: ships used by the Athenians for special purposes.
106.“Swamped one ship”: the verb used is often translated as “sank,” but in fact such wooden ships did
not sink, but floated too low in the water to be rowed (Rhodes).
107.The Athenian victory at Naupactus in 429 is described in detail in 2.83. The Athenians backed
away, rather than turning tail, because their main weapons were the bronze beaks on the bows of their
ships. This maneuver, like the ones at Naupactus, shows the skill of the Athenian oarsmen.
108. As subordinate to Alcidas, Brasidas could not insist on his plan.
109. Leucimme: a headland on the southeastern end of Corcyra.
110.The Messenians here were former helots (serfs) of the Spartans who had been resettled by Athens
near Corcyra after the failure of their revolt against Sparta in 464. They had been brought to Corcyra by
the Athenians to support the democrats there.
111. The Hyllaic Port was a harbor controlled by the democrats.
112. “War gives to people’s passions the violent quality of their present situation”: the passage contrasts
the good intelligence (gnomai, judgments, minds) of people in peacetime with the violent passions
(orgai) of people at war. Thucydides is saying that humans at war by nature become violently passionate,
not that they are that way at all times. Pericles tried to prevent this; see the opening sentence of 2.65.
113.“They reversed the usual way of using words”: they applied terms of moral judgment in novel ways
without changing their meanings, so as to commend what used to be thought evil and condemn what
used to be thought good. Compare Plato, Republic 560d. See Nussbaum (1986, 404).
114. For this interpretation of a difficult sentence, I am grateful to Mark Gifford.
115. “Plotting for one’s own security was thought a reasonable excuse for delaying action”: “delaying
action” may mean “shirking one’s duty.” This sentence is so sparing of words in the original that it allows
a number of interpretations, of which these are a sample: i. Long deliberation to avoid mistakes was
considered a well-thought excuse for avoiding action (Gomme). ii. To plot against an enemy behind his back was
perfectly legitimate self-defense (Warner). iii. Deliberation for one’s safety was held to be a good excuse for
abandoning one’s party. iv. A man’s plan for security gave others a reasonable pretext for defensive action, i.e.,
for a preemptive attack.
116. “Oaths of reconciliation”: oaths sworn between opposing parties, in contrast to the oaths party
members swore to each other, which are treated in the preceding paragraph.
117.Avarice and ambition: pleonexia and philotimia. On such motivators, see the Athenians’ speech at
1.75.
118. The Greek is plēthous isonomia politikē and aristokratia sophron.
119. Reverence: eusebeia. This evidently includes all of the values in which the Greek gods were supposed
to take an interest, including justice and the keeping of oaths. Its meaning is very close to that of to
hosion, which is translated “reverence” in 3.56. On the concepts behind both words, see Introduction,
xxvii–xxviii.
120.“Simplicity, which is the chief cause of a noble character”: literally, “simplicity (to euēthēs), of which a
generous spirit most takes part.” This probably means that simplicity (or openness) is what best explains
generosity. Reeve understands this to mean that simplicity is the largest element in a noble character
(1999, 441). See my note on 1.84.3 and Nussbaum (1986, 405 and 508, n. 24).
121. Speech: logos. Reeve 1999 translates this as “rational argument.”
122. Intelligence: gnōmē. It can also mean “strategy.” For the contrast of gnōmē with action, see 2.40.
123. On authenticity of 3.84, see Hornblower 1991.
124. On the larger passage, see Reeve 1999.
125. More arrogance than good sense: more hubris than sōphrosunē.
126. “Not to get more than their share”: not for pleonexia, which often means “avarice” in Thucydides.
127.Note that this claim about human nature is embedded in the situation at a point in time—not that
human nature is set to violate justice, but that arrogance leads its victims naturally to unjust revenge, and
forced poverty leads its victims naturally to taking more than their just share (pleonexia). The word
translated as “passion” (orge) can also mean “anger.”
128. “Such laws”: these are not the laws of any particular city-state, but are evidently based on the
common good of justice mentioned by the people of Melos in 5.90. On unwritten law, see 2.37 with
note. On the meaning here, see Reeve 1999: those who do injustice now may well depend on justice at a
later time.
129. I.e., asking for help in regaining power in Corcyra.
130. Mount Pantocrator, the highest peak on the island.
 {147} BOOK 4

Both Sides Suffer Defeats

DEFEAT OF SPARTANS AT PYLOS AND OTHER EVENTS OF 425/424

BCE
The next summer (425), an Athenian expedition under the general Demosthenes set
up a fort on a headland at Pylos, on the west coast of the Peloponnesus, a place also
known as Navarino in modern times. This was close enough to alarm the
Lacedaemonians by providing a base for their hereditary enemies, the Messenians,
allies of Athens. The natural bay at Pylos forms a magnificent harbor, as it is
protected from the open sea by an island called Sphacteria.
When the Lacedaemonians got wind of this, they brought home their troops from
Attica earlier than planned, where they were conducting their annual summer raid.
They besieged the Athenian fort on the headland, stationed troops on the island, and
occupied the harbor with a naval force. The Athenians responded by sending a fleet
that destroyed the Lacedaemonian ships and blockaded the island (4.1–14).
Fearing for their troops on the island, the Lacedaemonians proposed to end the war
with a peace treaty. In Athens, the populist leader Cleon opposed the peace, thinking
that Athens could do better. And so the war dragged on, while the Lacedaemonian
troops remained on the island supported by the heroic efforts of swimmers and boaters
bringing food through the blockade (4.15–23).
The Athenian forces at Pylos were also suffering from lack of food; to make matters
worse, they had no good source for drinking water. In Athens, Cleon pointed to Nicias
and said that if the generals were real men, they’d land forces on the island, capture
the enemies, and force a more advantageous peace. He said that’s what he’d do if he
were a general—in only twenty days. Nicias called his bluff, and Athens made Cleon
a general, sending him to take the island (4.26–28).
With Cleon and Demosthenes in command, the Athenians landed on the island,
fought a brief campaign, and succeeded in under twenty days to {148} bring the
Lacedaemonians as prisoners to Athens. Of the 420 hoplites who had been on the
island, 292 survived as prisoners, including about 120 full Spartiates.1 The blockade
had lasted for seventy-two days (4.29–41).
In the same year, Athenians campaigned against Corinth (4.42–45) and helped
bring about the end of the civil war in Corcyra (4.46–48, above pp. 144–45).
Meanwhile, in Sicily, fighting continued between cities aligned with Athens and
those aligned with Syracuse. In addition to various other operations that year, the
Athenians intervened in Sicily, in support of their allies and in the hope of
preventing Syracuse from totally dominating the Greek cities on the island (4.58–
65).

A SPEECH TO UNITE THE GREEKS ON SICILY, SUMMER 424 BCE

Representatives of the Sicilian Greek cities gathered at Gela to resolve their
differences and form an alliance that would essentially deprive Athens of allies on the
island. Hermocrates, a leader in Syracuse, gave the most effective speech, which recalls
the debate at Sparta, especially the speech of Archidamus (1.80–85), although he also
echoes the views of the Athenians on human nature (1.73–78). Note that he considers
the fighting among Sicilian cities to be a kind of stasis, or civil war.
[59] Sicilians, as one who comes from a city that is neither the smallest nor the
most afflicted by war, I shall make clear the strategy I judge to be best for the
common good of all Sicily. Why should anyone make a long speech about the
calamity of war, laying out everything to those who already know? No one, you
see, is compelled to war by ignorance, or deterred from it by fear, if he thinks it
will turn to his advantage. But it turns out that some think the gain greater
than the danger, while others prefer to take on danger rather than accept
immediate losses. But to prevent either group going to war when the time is
not right, exhortations for peace are beneficial, and they will be of the greatest
worth to us if we follow them right now. We fell into war in the first place
because each city wanted to secure its individual interests, and for the same
reason we are now trying to return to mutual amity through reasoned
discussion. And if it comes out that each does not go away with a fair deal, we
will be at war again.
{149} [60] Nevertheless you must realize, if your minds are sound, that this
assembly ought not to be only for the interests of the individual cities, but
about whether we can preserve Sicily as a whole—which, I conclude, Athens is
plotting to seize. And you ought to think that the Athenians are more
compelling persuaders for peace than any words of mine. Of all the Greeks,
they have the greatest power, they lie here with a few ships to watch for us to
make mistakes, and, under the lawful title of “alliance,” they put a fine
appearance on their natural hostility, to their own advantage. Look, if we enter
into war, [with each other] and call in these men (they are apt enough to bring
their army without being called in), and if we harm ourselves at our own
expense [through fighting each other], and if we cut down any obstacles to
their building an empire here—then, when they see us worn out, we should
expect them to come with a larger expedition and try to make all these places
here subject to them.
[61] Now, if our minds are sound, we must not call in allies to damage what
we already have, but to acquire more than we have already. And we must think
that nothing is so destructive of cities as civil war [stasis], and that Athens is
plotting against all of us whose home is Sicily, and yet we are in civil war, city
against city.2 Realizing this, we must reconcile individual with individual and
city with city, and we must try to save the whole of Sicily by common effort.
And let no one suppose that, while the Dorians are enemies of Athens,
Chalcidians are safe because they are kin to Ionians.3 The Athenians are not
coming at us from hatred of one group, in virtue of our divided ethnicity;
they’re coming because they covet the good things in Sicily that we enjoy in
common. They’ve proved this themselves in their response to the appeal from
Chalcidians: although they never received any support from their alliance with
these people, they have enthusiastically offered more than their alliance
required by justice.
{150} Indeed we should forgive the Athenians for being so avaricious and
cunning in these matters.4 I don’t blame those who want to rule an empire; I
blame those who are too willing to be subjects of an empire. It’s always human
nature, after all, to rule over those who give in and to guard against anyone who
attacks. We are at fault if we know this and do not take the right precautions,
and if we fail to conclude that our first priority is for all of us to set things in
good order against our common danger. We would soon be relieved of that
danger if we come to an agreement with each other, because the Athenians are
attacking us from the places here that have called them in, not from their own
country. If we agree [on peace], then war won’t be ended by war, but our
quarrels will be ended by peace without trouble. And then those who have been
called in and came unjustly under a good pretense will have good reason to go
away without success.
 [62] As far as Athens is concerned, we’ll find that this is a good outcome, if
we deliberate well. When everyone agrees that peace is the best of things, why
should we not make it among ourselves? Or does anyone believe that peace is
not better than war for preserving the good things that some of us have and
putting an end to the opposite? Or that peace does not keep honors and glory
in greater safety? Or whatever else one might say in a long speech, as about
war? Consider these points, and do not make light of my advice; instead,
everyone should provide for his own safety on this basis.
Now if anyone supposes that he can achieve a reliable result [in war], whether
with justice or by violence, let him take care that he does not fail miserably,
contrary to his hopes. He should realize that many people before now have
sought revenge for injustice, while others have hoped to use power to take more
than is right—and then the first group instead of taking revenge gets destroyed,
and the second, in place of winning more, loses what it had. Vengeance, you
see, does not succeed according to justice, merely because of an injustice, nor
does hope make the use of force reliable. The unpredictability of the future is
overwhelming, and although it is the most common cause of failure, it appears
nevertheless to be the most useful—because when everyone has the same fears
we take more thought before moving against each other.
{151} [63] Now we should be struck doubly with terror, both by nonspecific
fear of the uncertainty of events and by the frightful Athenians who are already
here. We should take these as sufficient to prevent our achieving what we had
planned [in our wars with each other]; so let us send out of our land the
enemies that hover over us, and let us make a peace among ourselves forever,
or, if not, make a truce for as long as we can and put off our private quarrels to
some other time.
In sum, let us realize this: that if we follow my advice every one of us shall
have our cities free, and then, being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to
respond according to their merit to those who do us good or harm. But if we
reject this and follow the advice of others, we won’t be considering how to be
revenged on anyone, but, however far we succeed in that, we will be compelled
to become friends to our greatest enemies, and enemies to those we ought not.
[64] For my part, as I said in the beginning, I am speaking for the greatest
city, which is more likely to be an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing
these things, I hold it best to come to an agreement, and not do such hurt to
our enemies as to hurt ourselves more—and not to suppose, in a foolish desire
for victory, that my personal control of my plans gives me equal control of their
outcome, which I cannot command. I will give way to reason, and I think
justice requires you to do this as well—and of your own accord, not forced to it
by the enemy. For there is no shame for relatives to give in to relatives, one
Dorian to another, or one Chalcidian to another of the same family, or, in sum,
any one of us to another, as we are neighbors who live together in one land,
encompassed by the sea, and called by one name, “Sicilians.”5 We will, I
suppose, make war when it arises and then make peace again by ourselves
through shared discussions.
When foreigners invade us, if our minds are sound we shall unite in our
defense, because we are all endangered by any harm done to particular cities.
As for allies, let us never call in any of them after this, nor call in arbitrators. So
doing we shall attain two benefits for Sicily: to be rid of the Athenians and of
domestic war, and from now on we will inhabit a land that is free and safer
from the plots of others.

[65] When Hermocrates had spoken in this way, the Sicilians followed his
advice and agreed among themselves that the war should cease, every one
retaining what they then enjoyed (except that {152} Morgantina would go to
the people of Camarina for paying an agreed sum of money to Syracuse6). The
allies of the Athenians summoned the Athenian officers and told them that
they were coming to terms and that they too would be covered by the treaties.
When they approved, they made the agreement, and after that the Athenian
ships sailed away from Sicily.
When their generals came home, the Athenians in the city banished two of
them, namely Pythodorus and Sophocles, laying a fine on the third,
Eurymedon, on the grounds that they could have prevailed in Sicily but had
been bribed to give up and go home.7 So great was their good fortune at the
time that the Athenians thought nothing could cross them, and that they could
achieve easy and more difficult enterprises equally with great or slender means.
The cause of this was the success of most of their designs, which was beyond
reasonable expectation, and this bolstered their hope.8

BRASIDAS’S CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ATHENS

The Lacedaemonian general Brasidas had a striking series of successes, which
Thucydides describes in the remainder of Book 4 and the opening of Book 5. He was a
brilliant military leader, successful even when commanding a force of subject people
(helots) armed as hoplites. He was also an unusually persuasive speaker. His strategy
did not fit the usual policy of the Lacedaemonians, as he set out to do what Athens
had done—to set up a small empire in northern Greece by talking the cities there into
joining Sparta.
In the summer of 424, the Athenians campaigned against Megara, a port city very
close to Athens and of great strategic importance. Brasidas effectively thwarted the
Athenians from winning the city, though Thucydides soft-pedals his success as well as
the Athenian failure (4.66–74).
Brasidas then proceeded with his army to Thrace, in northern Greece, detaching
cities from the Athenian Empire wherever he could. The Thracian Chalcidice and the
area around it were critical to Athenian interests, as there were mines for precious
metals there, and the three fingers of the {153} Chalcidice jutted out into vital
Athenian trade routes along the coast. The most important Athenian base there was
the Athenian colony of Amphipolis, located just inland, on the eastern bank of the
major river of the area, the Strymon. Also important was Acanthus, which had a
strategic position where the eastern finger of the Chalcidice joined the mainland,
comparable to that of Potidaea on the western finger.
Thucydides tells us that Brasidas’s virtue and good conduct at first made a positive
impression on the cities in Thrace, winning many friends for Sparta (4.78–83, 84–
86, 87–88).
BRASIDAS’S SPEECH AT ACANTHUS (424 BCE)
[84] The same summer, a little before the grape harvest, Brasidas marched with
his Chalcidean allies to Acanthus, a colony founded by people from Andros. A
sharp disagreement [stasis] arose there about whether to receive him, between
those who had joined the Chalcideans in inviting him there, and the common
people.9 They let Brasidas address them, however, because the majority feared
for their crops, which were still out in the fields; and so he persuaded them to
let him in on his own and to listen to him before they decided what to do. So
Brasidas stood up before the people—he was a powerful speaker, for a
Lacedaemonian10—and spoke as follows:

[85] My army and I were sent here, Acanthians, to make good the reason we
Lacedaemonians gave for this war when we began it: to fight Athens for the
freedom of Greece. If we were slow in coming, it was because we
underestimated the war back home, which we hoped would destroy Athens
quickly without putting you at risk. So do not find fault with us for that. We
have come now, as soon as we could, and we will try to bring down the
Athenians with your help. But now I am astonished: Why are your gates shut
against us? Why are you not glad to see us?
We Lacedaemonians thought we were coming to our allies—that we were
with you in spirit before we actually got here, that you wanted us to be here.
That is why, with all possible zeal, we took the enormous risk of marching
many days through foreign territory. But if you people have a different plan—if
you are standing against your {154} own freedom and the freedom of the other
Greeks—that would be terrible. And it’s not only your opposition that
concerns me, but the negative effect you will have on all the other cities I visit:
they will all be less willing to join me if you, the first people I visit, with your
reputation for strength and intelligence, refuse me. I will have no convincing
explanation to offer, and they’ll believe either that the freedom I bring is really
injustice, or that my army is too weak and ineffective to protect you against the
Athenians if they attack. And yet when I took this same army to relieve
Nisaea,11 the Athenians did not dare risk battle, though they outnumbered us;
and it is unlikely they would send as large an army as that against you.12
[86] As for me, I have come not to harm the Greeks but to free them; and I
have bound the Lacedaemonians by the solemn oath that the allies I bring in
will be autonomous. My purpose, moreover, is not to make you our allies by
force or fraud; but, on the contrary, for us to be your allies against subjugation
by Athens. Therefore I claim that you have no reason to be suspicious of me or
doubt that I am able to defend you, after the guarantees I have given. Instead,
you should join us with confidence.
Now if any of you are holding back for fear of certain people,13 because you
think we will turn the government over to them, take heart: you have my
strongest guarantee that I did not come to take sides in civil war. I would not
be bringing freedom in the strict sense, I think, if I set aside tradition and put
the majority under the subjugation of the few or vice versa.14 That would be
worse than belonging to a foreign empire, and we Lacedaemonians would have
no thanks for our trouble. Instead of honor and glory, we would be given the
blame; and we would be openly guilty of just those offenses for which we are
fighting Athens to the death—and it would be more hateful in us than in
someone who had made no pretense to virtue. It is more shameful for men
with a good reputation to overreach by means of {155} an honest-looking fraud
than to do so by an open use of force. Force moves with the justification of
strength,15 which has been given by good fortune, while fraud works through
the scheming of an unjust mind. [87] That is how carefully we look after what
matters most to us. The strongest assurance you could find, besides our oaths,
lies in the facts: look at the facts behind our words and you will be compelled to
see that it is to our advantage for us to do as I say.
Perhaps you will reply to my offer that it is beyond your power to join me,
and you will protest that you wish us well and so should not be harmed by your
refusal, that this freedom does not seem to you to be free of risk, and that
though it is right to bring freedom to those who are able to accept it, justice
forbids you to compel people to be free if they are unwilling. If you say that, I
will call the gods and heroes of this place to witness that I came here to do
good, but did not convince you; then I will try to force you over to our side by
wasting your farmland.
Even so, I will not believe I am doing an injustice, since I have two utterly
compelling reasons for this:16 first, so that the Lacedaemonians will not be
harmed by the taxes you will pay to Athens if, for all your goodwill, you do not
join us; second, so that the other Greeks will not be prevented by you from
escaping their subjugation. Otherwise, we Lacedaemonians would have no
good reason whatsoever for giving people freedom against their will, if it were
not for the sake of some common good. Empire is not our goal; it is what we
are working to stop in other people. And we would do an injustice to the
greater number if we allowed you to stand against the autonomy we are trying
to bring to all.
Think carefully about this. Strive to be the first in freedom for the Greeks and
so win everlasting glory, save your personal possessions from destruction, and
earn the name of highest valor for your entire city.
The people of Acanthus voted by secret ballot to rebel against Athens, persuaded by
Brasidas’s arguments and by their fears for their crops.

{156} DEFEAT OF ATHENIANS AT DELIUM (424/423 BCE)

In 4.76–77, we learned of an Athenian plan to win allies in Boeotia by encouraging
the party of the common people to take control of various cities. In support of them,
Athens undertook to post a garrison at the sanctuary of Apollo at Delium, north of
Athens. In 4.89–101, we learn what happened next. The Athenians fortified Delium
and left a garrison. But as their army was withdrawing, a substantial army of
Boeotians attacked them. This was one of the few large-scale land battles of the
period, with about seven thousand hoplites on each side supported by cavalry and
light armed troops.17
The Athenian army was caught off guard while beginning its withdrawal. While
their general Hippocrates was exhorting his troops, before he was finished, the
Boeotian army rushed downhill to attack them.
[96] The Athenians went forward to meet them, both sides clashing together
at a run. The extreme ends of neither army ever came hand to hand, as they
found themselves blocked by rushing water on both sides. But the rest fought
strongly, standing close together and shoving with their shields. The left wing
of the Boeotians was defeated right up to the middle of the line by the
Athenians, who were pushing back Thespian soldiers primarily among others.
When the units assigned next to them gave way, the Thespians were encircled
by the Athenians in a small space, and those of them who died were cut down
fighting there hand to hand. Some of the Athenians were confused by the
encirclement, failed to recognize other Athenians, and so killed each other. In
this way the Boeotians were overcome on this side and fled to join the fighting
on the other side.
But on the right wing, where the Thebans stood, they had the better of the
Athenians, and little by little, at first, they forced the Athenians to give ground.
Then, because his left wing was in distress, the Theban general Pagondas sent
two companies of cavalry from where they were hidden around the hill. When
they suddenly came into sight, the victorious wing of the Athenian army
thought another army was attacking them and went into a panic. Then the
whole army of the Athenians ran away headlong, doubly terrified, on one side
by the cavalry and on the other by the Thebans who were winning ground and
breaking their ranks. Some fled toward Delium and the sea, some toward
Oropus, and others toward Mount Parnes. Still others went whatever way
seemed to give them hope of safety. The Boeotians came after to kill them,
especially the cavalry and {157} the Locrian troops who had arrived just when
the battle had turned. But night fell, and so the majority of those who were
fleeing were more easily saved. The next day those who had escaped to Oropus
or Delium went from there by sea to Athens, having left a garrison at Delium,
which they still retained in spite of their defeat.
The Athenians had lost nearly 1,000 hoplites, the Boeotians about 500. Seventeen
days later, the Boeotians recaptured Delium.

ATHENIAN LOSS OF AMPHIPOLIS (424/423 AND 422 BCE)

At this time, our author Thucydides was a general with duties to protect Athenian
interests in Thrace and elsewhere in northern Greece. He had command of a small
fleet stationed at the island of Thasos. While he was at Thasos, the Spartans under
Brasidas threatened the strategic Athenian colony of Amphipolis. Amphipolis had
been founded by Pericles in 437/436 in a part of Thrace that was crucial to Athenian
gold mining interests and also controlled access to timber reserves that were important
to the Athenian navy. The new city had been settled with a mix of Athenian colonists
and local people from northern Greece.
When the Spartan army arrived outside Amphipolis, the citizens of Amphipolis who
were loyal to Athens sent to Thucydides for help. Thucydides arrived just too late to
save the city—or, rather, Brasidas offered such generous terms to the people of
Amphipolis that they switched sides before Thucydides arrived. Brasidas was eager to
come to terms quickly because he knew that Thucydides had great influence in the
region, since he owned the rights to work gold mines close by in Thrace. For this loss,
Thucydides was punished by exile from Athens. That was fortunate for posterity;
because it gave him the time to travel, and interview leaders and soldiers on both
sides, so that he could write this history of the war. The story of the loss of Amphipolis
is told in 4.104–8. Brasidas went on to take over the town of Torone and then spent
the winter consolidating his gains. In the spring of 423, Athens and Sparta made a
one year’s truce (4.117–19).

ATHENIAN MASSACRE AT SCIONE (423/422 BCE)

Before he had word of the truce, Brasidas induced the people of Scione18 to come over
to the Spartans, using the same arguments that had worked at Acanthus and
Amphipolis. The people of Scione were so impressed that {158} they crowned him
with gold as the liberator of Greece (4.120–21). As this happened two days after the
truce was made, the Athenians considered that Scione was not protected. Cleon
persuaded the Athenians to take the city and kill its people. A town called Mende, also
on the Chalcidice, came over to Brasidas as well. While Brasidas was engaged farther
inland (4.124–28), the Athenians responded in force, taking Mende and allowing its
people to go on as before, once they had punished Brasidas’s supporters (4.129–30).
Immediately after, they put Scione under siege for the winter (4.131).
The next summer (in 422) Cleon talked the Athenians into sending an expedition
that recovered Torone. They enslaved the women and children of Torone and sent the
men as prisoners to Athens; these were later exchanged for Athenian POWs (5.2–3).
Scione survived the siege until after the Peace of Nicias, which allowed the Spartans
to withdraw their troops safely from Scione—abandoning the city and breaking the
promise Brasidas had made. As decided before (4.122), the Athenians would later kill
all the men of Scione (5.3).

DEFEAT OF ATHENIANS AT AMPHIPOLIS (422 BCE)

The loss of Amphipolis had been heavy for Athens, as it held a strategic location and
was also a major source of revenue as well as the timber necessary to maintain the
Athenian navy (4.108). Cleon, who had been largely responsible for the success at
Pylos, tried to regain Amphipolis in 422, but the attempt ended in defeat for Athens
and death for Cleon with great loss of life on the Athenian side.

1. Spartiates were the full citizen hoplites. They were a valuable bargaining chip because of their great
value to the state, as the citizen population of Sparta was much smaller than that of Athens, and was on
the edge of serious decline.
2.For the idea that Greeks fighting Greeks was really a kind of stasis, or civil war, see Plato, Republic
5.469b–471b.
3. Chalcidians: people whose Ionian ancestors came to Sicily from Chalcis (modern Chalcida) on the
island of Euboea, north of Attica. Ionians and Dorians spoke different dialects of Greek and practiced
slightly different customs. Dorians generally (but not always) sided with Sparta and Corinth, while
Ionians generally (but not always) sided with Athens. Generally, northeast Sicily was settled by Ionians,
and southeast Sicily by Dorians.
4. “We should forgive”: compare the Athenian excuses at 1.76 and 5.105. “For being so avaricious”: for
pleonektein. Compare the Athenian excuse for their pleonexia (taking more than their share) at 1.76.
5.Syracuse and many other Greek cities in Sicily were Dorian in culture, but Leontini and Catana were
Ionian, as colonies of Chalcis in Euboea.
6. Morgantina was an inland town. Thucydides does not explain this exception to the peace agreement.
7.Punishing generals in this way helped bring about the disaster in Sicily in 413, when Nicias, afraid of
such penalties, stayed too long outside Syracuse (7.48).
8. This bolstered their hope: the danger of excessive hope is a major theme in Thucydides; see the
Spartan warning at 4.17, and also the Athenian warnings at 3.45 and 5.103. In this paragraph
Thucydides is preparing the reader for catastrophes that lie ahead for the Athenians such as the defeats
at Delium and Amphipolis, which were due at least in part to imperial overreaching.
9. Such details undercut Thucydides’s claim at 2.8 and elsewhere that most Greeks supported the
Lacedaemonians. In most places, it was the oligarchs who supported them, while the common people
sided with Athens.
10. Thucydides means to contrast Brasidas’s eloquence with the abrupt, laconic style of Sthenelaïdas
(1.86).
11. Nisaea: the port for Megara.
12. Here Brasidas is misleading the Acanthians. In fact the army he had commanded at Nisaea had been
larger than the one he now has, but even with that he had been reluctant to take on the Athenians. The
Athenians had seized Nisaea earlier that year. Brasidas’s army then came and occupied a position
between Nisaea and Megara, to protect Megara. Seeing themselves outnumbered, the Athenians did not
attack Megara. But they kept Nisaea. See 4.70–74 and 4.108.
13.“Certain people”: oligarchs. The leading democrats no doubt feared reprisals from the oligarchs
whom Sparta supported.
14. Again, Brasidas is misleading his audience. He had helped establish a narrow oligarchy in Megara
earlier that year (4.73–74).
15.
“The justification of strength”: this is the closest anyone comes in this history to saying that might
makes right; at Melos, the Athenians will say, instead, that might makes right irrelevant (5.89).
16.“Two utterly compelling reasons”: kata duo anankās to eulogon. Contrast this with Athenian appeals to
anankē, which do not involve reasons, and do not issue, as these do, in justifications (e.g., 1.76.) Anankē
in Thucydides is not fate, but a felt necessity; in the speech of the Corinthians it is tantamount to what is
expedient (1.37). See Introduction, xli.
17.It was at this battle that Socrates showed his famous courage in retreat (Plato, Apology 28e, Laches
181b, Symposium 221a ff).
18.Scione is located on the western finger of the Chalcidice, which the Athenians had controlled from
their recaptured base at Potidaea.
 {159} BOOK 5

Peace and War

THE PEACE OF NICIAS (421 BCE)

The Athenian victory at Pylos had now been balanced by the two major defeats
described in Book 4, at Delium and now at Amphipolis. Although victorious at
Amphipolis, the Spartan general Brasidas was wounded and died soon after the
battle, and neither Athens nor Sparta had the will or the leadership to continue the
war. Athenians were afraid that their allies might rebel, and Lacedaemonians were
concerned about the possibility that Argos would turn against them. They were also
troubled by raids from Athenian allies based close to the Peloponnesus—Pylos to the
west and Cythera to the south. Thucydides also imputes self-interested motives to the
leaders on both sides, which led them to make peace.
In 421, peace was sworn after negotiations led by the Athenian general Nicias, after
whom the treaty was named. The Peace of Nicias was slightly more favorable to
Athens than to Sparta, and was never accepted by all of Sparta’s allies, with the
result that warfare did not entirely cease between the two sets of allies.
[15] In view of these considerations, both sides decided to make a treaty. The
Lacedaemonian decision was especially strong because they were eager to
recover the men that had been taken from the island, as the Spartiates among
them were of high rank and were kin [to Lacedaemonian leaders].1 They had
begun to ask for peace right after the men’s capture, but the Athenians, by
reason of their success, would not lay down the war on equal terms at this time.
After the Athenian defeat at Delium, however, the Lacedaemonians realized
that they would now be more receptive, and so right away they made the
yearlong truce, during which they were to meet and consult about the longer
term.
{160} [16] But after the Athenians were defeated at Amphipolis, and both
Cleon and Brasidas had been killed—these being the ones most strongly
opposed to peace, Brasidas because he had good success and honor from the
war, Cleon because he thought that if peace came his evil actions would come
to light and his slanderous statements would be less credible2—then those in
the two states who most aspired to influence became much more enthusiastic
[for peace]. These were Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the
Lacedaemonians and Nicias the son of Niceratus,3 who was at the time the
most successful general [in Athens].4
Nicias wanted peace while he had never been defeated and was well esteemed,
so that he could carry his good fortune forward, give himself and the city an
immediate rest from their present labors, and for the future leave a name as one
who had never caused the city to fail. He thought that he could do this by
avoiding danger (as anyone does who puts himself as little as possible into the
hands of chance), and that peace would provide relief from danger.
Pleistoanax had been slandered by his enemies over his return from exile; they
had been suggesting to the Lacedaemonians that every time something went
wrong for them it was because they had broken the law in bringing him
back.5 . . .
[17] Pleistoanax was troubled by these slanders, and considered that in time
of peace there would be no occasion for failure, and also that if the
Lacedaemonians recovered the men [who’d been captured at Pylos], his
enemies could no longer blame him for their loss, whereas during a war the
people in charge had to be subject to slanders over everything that went
wrong.6 He was therefore enthusiastic to make peace.
{161} Thucydides gives the text of the treaty in detail (5.18–23). It was to last fifty
years. Places sacred to both sides were to be open to both. Sparta agreed to return
Amphipolis to Athens, while Acanthus and certain other cities were declared to be
neutral. The captured Spartiates were to be repatriated, as were Athenians taken by
Sparta. The parties to the treaty—seventeen leading men from each city—were to
renew their oaths every year. A defensive alliance between the two cities was sworn
soon after. Athens was to do what it liked with Scione and other cities in the area.
Later that summer the Athenians captured Scione and killed all males there above the
age of childhood, as Cleon had persuaded them to do earlier, enslaving the women
and children (5.32, 4.122).
Thucydides concludes this section as follows:
[24.2] The Athenians gave back the men from the island, and the summer of
the eleventh year began. This concludes the account of the first war, which
lasted continuously for those ten years.

THE SECOND PREFACE

Much later, after the defeat of Athens in 404 BCE, Thucydides resumed writing his
History, in view of the failure of the Peace of Nicias to end the war. He tells us that
for over six years the two sides held back from invading each other’s land. But
hostilities continued through proxies.
The following passage is known as his second preface:
[26] This history also has been written by Thucydides of Athens in order as
each event came to pass, by summers and winters, up to the time when the
Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the Athenian Empire and took
the long walls and the Piraeus. At that point the war had lasted twenty-seven
years in all.
As for the period of the treaty in the middle, anyone who thinks that this was
not war is making a mistake. He should look at how the period was cut up by
the actual events; then he’ll find that it makes no sense to judge this a peace,
when the two sides did not make the exchanges they had agreed on. Besides,
there were violations on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars,
among other actions; and the allies in Thrace continued at war, while the
Boeotians observed a mere ten-day truce.7 So, counting the first ten-year war,
the doubtful cessation of hostilities that followed it, and the war {162} that
grew out of that, you will find exactly that many years, if you add up the times,
with only a few days left over. And for those who think there is some certainty
in oracles, here is one case in which an oracle happened to be reliable.8 I have
remembered all along, from the beginning of the war right up to its end, that
many people predicted it would last three times nine years.
I lived through all this at a good age to observe the war,9 and I applied my
mind to gaining accurate knowledge of each event. It turned out that I was
living in exile for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis,10 and because
I spent time with both sides (more time, in fact with the Peloponnesians,
owing to my exile) I was able to observe things more closely and without
distraction. So I will now discuss the quarrel that followed the ten years’ war,
the dissolution of the treaty, and what came afterward as they waged war.
 THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE OF NICIAS
Neither Athens nor Sparta was able to live up to their agreements. Each side
continued to entertain suspicions of the other (5.35). In Athens, opponents of the
treaty rallied around Alcibiades, a young, good-looking aristocrat whose talent for
politics was not balanced by moral principle (5.43–44). On the other side, three key
allies of Sparta—Megara, Corinth, and Boeotia—refused to accept the treaty. At the
same time, a ten years’ peace between Argos and Sparta came to an end. Argos lies
north of Sparta in the Peloponnese, and had a history of friendship with Athens along
with a tradition of democratic government (5.44). As a result, there was a flurry of
diplomatic activity among powers in the Peloponnese and Athens. Under democratic
leadership, Argos made a hundred-year alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea
(“the quadruple alliance”) that threatened to bottle up the Spartans in the
Peloponnese, 420 (5.47).11
{163} In 419, Argos went to war against the Spartan ally Epidaurus with help
from Athens (5.53). In 418, also with help from Athens, Argos went to support
Mantinea (in the center of the Peloponnese) in their attempt to take over the Spartan
ally Tegea, a nearby city south of Mantinea (5.62). There, a large army of Argives
and their allies were soundly defeated by the Lacedaemonians in what is known as
“The First Battle of Mantinea,” one of the largest battles of the period, vividly
described by Thucydides (5.66–74). In this battle, the Athenian general Laches, who
was to be featured in a dialogue by Plato, lost his life. Afterward, Argos made peace
with Sparta and came under the control of oligarchs until the democrats drove them
out in 417.

POWER BEATS JUSTICE AT MELOS (416 BCE)

[84] The following summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and
rounded up the Argives who were suspected of siding with the
Lacedaemonians—300 men—and put them for safety on islands in the
Athenian Empire.12 And the Athenians made war against the island of Melos,
with thirty ships of their own, six from Chios, and two from Lesbos. The
Athenian contingent was 1,200 hoplites, 300 archers, and 20 mounted archers,
while the allies, including islanders, contributed about 1,500 hoplites. The
Melians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians,13 and so did not want to be
subject to Athens as the other islands were. At the beginning, they had stayed
at peace with both sides. Later on, however, when the Athenians drove them to
it by wasting their land, they were openly at war.
Now the Athenian generals, Cleomedes and Tisias, set up camp in Melian
territory with these forces. Before doing any harm14 to the Melian land, they
first sent ambassadors to negotiate. The Melians refused to bring these
ambassadors before the common people, but ordered them to deliver their
message to a few officials and leading citizens. The Athenians spoke as follows:

THE MELIAN DIALOGUE

[85] Athenians: Since we may not speak before the common people, for fear
that they would be led astray if they heard our persuasive {164} and
unanswerable arguments all at once in a continuous speech—we know that is
what you had in mind in bringing us to the few leading citizens—you who are
sitting here should make your situation still more secure: answer every
particular point, not in a single speech, but interrupting us immediately
whenever we say anything that seems wrong to you.15 And first, tell us whether
you like this proposal.
[86] To this the Melian Council replied: We would not find fault with the
appropriateness of a leisurely debate, but these acts of war—happening right
now, not in the future—do not seem to be consistent with that. We see that
you have come to be judges of this proceeding, so we expect the result to be
this: if we make the better case for justice and do not surrender because of that,
we will have war; but if you win the argument, we will have servitude.
[87] Athenians: Well, then, if you came to this meeting to reason on the basis
of conjectures about the future, or for any other purpose than to work out how
to save your city on the basis of what you see here today—we should stop now.
But if that is your purpose, let’s speak to it.
[88] Melians: People in our situation can be expected to turn their words and
thoughts to many things, and should be pardoned for that. Since, however, this
meeting is to consider only the point of our survival, let’s have our discussion
on the terms you have proposed, if that is your decision.
[89] Athenians: For our part, we will not make a long speech no one would
believe, full of fine moral arguments—that our empire is justified because we
defeated the Persians, or that we are coming against you for an injustice you
have done to us. And we don’t want you to think you can persuade us by saying
that you did not fight on the side of the Lacedaemonians in the war, though
you were their colony, or that you have done us no injustice. Instead, let’s work
out what we can do on the basis of what both sides truly accept: we both know
that decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both
sides are under equal compulsion;16 but when one {165} side is stronger, it gets
as much as it can, and the weak must accept that.17
[90] Melians: Well, then, since you put your interest in place of justice, our
view must be that it is in your interest not to subvert a practice that is good for
all:18 that a plea of justice and appropriateness19 should do some good for a
man who has fallen into danger, if he can win over his judges, even if he is not
perfectly persuasive. And this rule concerns you no less than us: if you ever
stumble, you might receive a terrible punishment and be an example to
others.20
[91] Athenians: We are not downhearted at the prospect of our empire’s
coming to an end, though it may happen. Those who rule over others (such as
the Lacedaemonians, who are not our present concern) are not as cruel to those
they conquer as are a subject people who attack their rulers and overcome
them.21 But let us be the ones to worry about that danger. We will merely
declare that we are here for the benefit of our empire, and we will speak for the
survival of your {166} city: we would like to rule over you without trouble, and
preserve you for our mutual advantage.
[92] Melians: But how could servitude be as much to our advantage, as empire
is to yours?
[93] Athenians: Because if you submit, you will save yourselves from a very cruel
fate; and we will reap a profit from you if we don’t destroy you.
[94] Melians: So you would not accept a peaceful solution? We could be friends
rather than enemies, and fight with neither side.
[95] Athenians: No. Your enmity does not hurt us as much as your friendship
would. That would be a sign of our weakness to those who are ruled by us; but
your hatred would prove our power.
[96] Melians: Why? Are your subjects so unreasonable as to put us, who never
had anything to do with you, in the same category as themselves, when most of
them were your colonies, or else rebels whom you defeated?
[97] Athenians: Why not? They think we have as good a justification for
controlling you as we do for them; they say the independent cities survive
because they are powerful, and that we do not attack them because we are
afraid. So when you have been trampled down by us, you will add not only to
our empire, but to our security, by not staying independent. And this is
especially true because you are islanders who are weaker than the others, and
we are masters of the sea.
[98] Melians: But don’t you think there is safety in our proposal of neutrality?
Here again, since you have driven us away from a plea for justice, and are
telling us to surrender to whatever is in your interest, we must show you what
would be good for us, and try to persuade you that your interests coincide with
ours. Won’t this turn the people who are now neutral into your enemies?22
Once they’ve seen this, they will expect you to attack them eventually also. And
what would this accomplish, but to make the enemies you already have still
greater, and to make others your enemies against their will, when they would
not have been so?
[99] Athenians: We do not think the free mainlanders will be terrible enemies
to us; it will be long before they so much as keep guard against us. But islanders
worry us—those outside the empire like you, {167} and those under the empire
who resent the force that keeps them that way—these may indeed act recklessly
and bring themselves and us into foreseeable danger.
[100] Melians: Yes, but if you would face such extreme danger to retain your
empire, and if your subjects would do the same to get free of you, then
wouldn’t it be great weakness and cowardice on our part, since we are still free,
not to go to every extreme before becoming your subjects?
[101] Athenians: No, not if you think sensibly. Your contest with us is not an
equal match of courage against courage, so losing to us will not be shameful for
you. This is a conference about your survival and about not resisting those who
are far stronger than you.
[102] Melians: But we know that in war the odds sometimes are more even
than the difference in numbers between the two sides, and that if we yield, all
our hope is lost immediately; but if we hold out, we can still hope to stand tall.
[103] Athenians: Hope! It is a comfort in danger, and though it may be harmful
to people who have many other advantages, it will not destroy them. But
people who put everything they have at risk will learn what hope is when it fails
them, for hope is prodigal by nature; and once they have learned this, it is too
late to take precautions for the future. Do not let this happen to you, since you
are weak and have only this one throw of the dice. And do not be like the
ordinary people who could use human means to save themselves but turn
instead to blind hopes when they are forced to give up their sensible ones—to
divination, oracles, and other such things that destroy men by giving them
hope.23
[104] Melians: You can be sure we think it hard to contend against your power
and good fortune, unless we might do so on equal terms. Nevertheless, we trust
that our good fortune will be no less than yours. The gods are on our side
because we stand in reverence against men who are unjust. And as for power,
what we lack will be supplied {168} by the alliance we will make with the
Lacedaemonians, who must defend us as a matter of honor, if only because we
are related to them. So our confidence is not as totally unreasonable as you
might think.
[105] Athenians: Well, the favor of the gods should be as much on our side as
yours. Neither what we think just nor how we act is contrary to what men
believe about the gods, or would want for themselves. Nature always compels
gods (we believe) and men (we are certain) to rule over anyone they can
control. We did not make this custom,24 and we were not the first to follow it;
but we will take it as we found it and leave it to posterity forever, because we
know that you would do the same if you had our power, and so would anyone
else. So as far as the favor of the gods is concerned, we have no reason to fear
that we will do worse than you.
As for your opinion about the Lacedaemonians, your trust that they will help
you in order to preserve their own honor—we admire your blessed innocence,
but we don’t envy you your foolishness. Granted, the Lacedaemonians do show
a high degree of virtue toward each other according to their local customs; but
one could say many things about their treatment of other people. We’ll make
this as brief and as clear as possible: of all the people we know, they are the
ones who make it most obvious that they hold whatever pleases them to be
honorable, and whatever profits them to be just. So your plan will not support
your hope for survival, and it now seems reckless.
[106] Melians: But on that point we most firmly trust the Lacedaemonians to
pursue their own advantage—not to betray their colonists, the Melians, for in
doing so they would benefit their enemies by losing the confidence of their
friends among the Greeks.
[107] Athenians: Don’t you realize that advantage lies with safety, and that the
pursuit of justice and honor brings danger? Which the Lacedaemonians are
usually least willing to face?
[108] Melians: But we believe they will take a dangerous mission in hand for
our sake. They will think it safer to do so for us than for anyone else, since we
are close enough to the Peloponnesus for action, {169} and we will be more
faithful to them than others because our kinship gives us common views.
[109] Athenians: But it is not the good will of those who call for help that
provides security to those who might fight for them. Instead, it is only superior
power in action that could make them safe. The Lacedaemonians are more
aware of this than anyone else; at least they have no confidence in their own
forces, and therefore take many allies along with them when they attack a
neighbor. So while we are masters of the sea, you cannot reasonably expect
them to cross over to an island.
[110] Melians: Yes, but they may have others to send. The sea of Crete is wide;
it is harder for its masters to seize ships there, than it is for people who want to
escape to slip through. And if the Lacedaemonians failed in this, they would
turn their arms against your own land or the lands of your allies that have still
not been invaded by Brasidas.25 And then you will have hard work defending
your own land and that of your allies, rather than attacking a country that does
not concern you.26
[111] Athenians: You might well find that such a thing27 happens, while being
fully aware that Athens has never given up a single siege through fear of anyone
else.28 We are struck by the fact that though you said you would confer about
your survival, in all this discussion you have never mentioned a single thing that
people could rely on and expect to survive. Your strongest points are mere
hopes for the future, and your actual resources are too small for your survival in
view of the forces arrayed against you. Your planning will be utterly irrational,
unless (after letting us withdraw from the meeting) you decide on a more
sensible policy. Do not be distracted by a sense of honor;29 this destroys people
all too often, when dishonor and death {170} stand before their eyes. Many
have been so overcome by the power of this seductive word, “honor,” that even
when they foresee the dangers to which it carries them, they are drawn by a
mere word into an action that is an irreparable disaster; and so, intentionally,
they fall into a dishonor that is more shameful than mere misfortune, since it is
due to their own foolishness.
You must guard against this if you are to deliberate wisely, and you must not
think it unseemly for you to submit to a city of such great power, which offers
such moderate conditions—to be our allies, and to hold your own land under
tribute to us. You are being given a choice between war and survival: do not
make the wrong decision out of a passion for victory. Remember what is
usually the best course: do not give way to equals, but have the right attitude
toward your superiors and use moderation toward your inferiors. So think
about this when we withdraw from the meeting, and keep this often in your
mind: you are considering what to do for your fatherland—your only one—and
this one discussion will determine whether it meets success or failure.
[112] So the Athenians withdrew from the conference, and the Melians, left to
themselves, decided on much the same position as they had taken in the
debate. Then the Melians answered as follows:
Melians: Athenians, our resolution is no different from what it was before: we
will not, in a short time, give up the liberty in which our city has remained for
the seven hundred years since its foundation. We will trust in the fortune of the
gods, which has preserved it up to now, and in the help of men—the
Lacedaemonians—and we will do our best to maintain our liberty. We offer
this, however: we will be your friends; we will be enemies to neither side; and
you will depart from our land, after making whatever treaty we both think fit.
[113] That was the answer of the Melians. As they broke off the conference,
the Athenians said:
Athenians: It seems to us, on the basis of this discussion, that you are the only
men who think you know the future more clearly than what is before your eyes,
and who, through wishful thinking, see doubtful events as if they had already
come to pass. You have staked everything on your trust in Lacedaemonians,
good fortune, and hopes, and you will be ruined in everything.
{171} [114] Then the Athenian ambassadors went back to their camp. When
the generals saw that the Melians would not submit, they turned immediately
to war and surrounded the Melian city with a wall, after dividing up the work
with their allies. After that, the Athenians left a contingent of Athenian and
allied troops there to guard the city by land and sea, and went home with the
greater part of their army. The rest stayed behind to besiege the place.
[115] (About the same time, the Argives invaded the country around
Phlius,30 where they were ambushed by Phlians and exiles from Argos, losing
about eighty men. Meanwhile, the Athenians at Pylos brought in a great deal
of plunder from the Lacedaemonians. The Lacedaemonians did not go to war
over this, because that would have broken the treaty. Instead they proclaimed
that any of their people could plunder the Athenians in return. The
Corinthians were at war with the Athenians, but this was over certain disputes
of their own, and the rest of the Peloponnesus kept quiet.)
The Melians, in a night attack, captured part of the Athenian wall opposite
the marketplace, killed the men there, and brought in grain and as many
necessary supplies as they could. Then they went back and kept quiet. After
that the Athenians maintained a better watch.
And so the summer ended.
[116] (The following winter, the Lacedaemonians were about to march into
the land of Argos, but they returned when they found that the sacrifices for the
border crossing were not favorable. The Argives suspected some of their own
people of being involved in the Lacedaemonian plan; they captured some of
them, and the rest escaped.)
About the same time, the Melians took another part of the Athenian wall,
because there were not many men to guard it. After that another army came
from Athens under the command of Philocrates. Now that the city was
besieged in force, there was some treachery, and the Melians on their own
initiative surrendered to the Athenians, to be dealt with as the Athenians
decided: they killed all the men of military age whom they had captured, and
they made slaves of the women and children.31 Later, they settled the place
themselves, sending five hundred colonists.

1. See 4.29–41.
2.Thucydides plainly detested the populist Cleon. For a more positive assessment of his character, see
Bury 1951, 456.
3.Nicias: on Nicias’s character, see Introduction, xxviii with note 14, xxix, below, 7.86, and Bury 1951,
483.
4.It seems characteristic of Thucydides to attribute self-interested motives to the leaders who advocated
peace at this juncture; but note that he does not attribute such motives to other major advocates of peace,
Archidamus (1.80–85) and Hermocrates (4.59–64).
5. Here I omit a brief passage on the exile of Pleistoanax in 446, see also 1.114, 2.21, and 3.26.
Pleistoanax was recalled in 427 or 426 on the basis of oracles from Delphi, which may have resulted
from bribery on his part: that would have been the sacrilege that (according to his detractors) caused
trouble for Sparta. Both cities took such transgressions very seriously.
6. “Had to be subject to slanders”: an interesting use of anankē.
7.“Ten-day truce”: probably a truce that either side could end on ten days’ notice. Renewals every ten
days would have been impractical.
8.Thucydides usually looks down on those who trust oracles, soothsayers and the like (2.54, 5.103, 7.50,
and 7.79).
9.To be a general in 424, Thucydides should have been over thirty. If he was a very young general, he
would have been born about 455, and would have been in his early twenties when the war began and in
his early fifties when he wrote this sentence.
10. See 4.104–8, where he does not mention his exile.
11. Thucydides gives us the actual texts of the treaties he discusses in Book 5.
12. A year later, Athens would send these men back to Argos to be executed.
13. Herodotus 8.48.
14. “Before doing any harm”: literally, before doing injustice.
15.
The dialogue format used here is unique in Thucydides and has been much discussed by scholars. See
Hornblower, vol. 3, 218 ff.
16. “Under equal compulsion”: justice is worth discussing only when both sides must feel the force of law
equally; but when one side is more powerful, it does not apply. When one side is weaker, the ancient
Greeks tend to appeal to reverence, to hosion, which, for example, is supposed to protect suppliants (see
Introduction, xxvii). Hornblower gives an alternative translation: “Justice enters [human discussion] only
when there is a corresponding power to enforce it”; that is, when the power enforcing it is equal to the
justice of the cause.
The Athenians are not saying that might makes right; merely that might supersedes right between
unequals. The passage has often been misunderstood, as has Machiavelli’s view that good outcomes
excuse wrongdoing. Machiavelli does not say that might makes right, but that success excuses wrong
(Discorsi 1.9). Excusing wrongdoing deflects blame from the wrongdoer, but does not make the wrong
right. For Brasidas’s view see 4.86, where he contrasts force with fraud or deception as being more just
than fraud.
17. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (writing about four hundred years after these events) argued that this
Athenian demand was not appropriate for Greeks to make of other Greeks; it is what one would expect
the Persian kings to make of the Greeks (On Thucydides’s Character, 39).
18.“A practice that is good for all”: the Greek reads simply “the common good thing”; I have supplied
“practice.”
19. Appropriateness: epieikeia, what is fitting for a particular case, implying a flexible approach to
enforcing the law, which is nevertheless in line with justice.
20.At the time of writing this, Thucydides knew that Athens would stumble and come near to total
destruction by Sparta. What saved the city in 404 was not a plea for justice, but the Spartans’ need to
maintain Athens as a counter to the rising power of Thebes.
21.Fear of subject peoples: as the Lacedaemonians feared a helot uprising, the Athenians feared a revolt
from within their empire; so we learned from the debate over Mytilene (3.37–51). Tragic literature
showed tyrants living in fear of being overthrown. See Pericles’s speech (2.63) and Creon’s defense in
Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus (583–89).
22.“Won’t this turn the people who are now neutral into your enemies?” Hornblower points out that
Athenian activity in Sicily would turn neutral cities into enemies.
23. Thucydides is out of step with Athenians in his attitude toward oracles, as the city cared deeply about
following the will of the gods, and their officers would not have said such things on Melos (Hornblower,
citing Dionysius, On Thucydides, 40). But the application of this warning to the Sicilian Expedition is
striking. In Sicily the Athenian armada was destroyed because their general, Nicias, had too much faith
in divination. Again and again during the war, the Athenians were beguiled by hope into taking great
risks. For the Athenian tendency to hope see 1.70, 1.74, 2.42, 2.62, and 7.77. For the way hope leads to
crime, see 3.45.
24. “This custom”: nomos, which is often translated as “law,” although that does not fit the context here.
Law or no law, strong people tend to rule weak ones. Note that the Lacedaemonians do not follow this,
as they are averse to holding an empire and prefer to be surrounded by independent states. See the treaty
the Lacedaemonians impose at 5.79. Cf. the Athenian argument at Sparta, which makes a similar
overstatement: you Spartans would do the same (1.76). They did not.
25.Brasidas was the Spartan general who persuaded Acanthus and other cities to rebel from Athens in
424 and in 422 defeated an Athenian army at Amphipolis, where he was fatally wounded.
26.“Hard work”: ponos, which also means trouble or pain; here it seems to shift meaning from one
phrase to the next. I have supplied “defending” and “attacking.”
27. “Such a thing”: a Spartan invasion of Attica.
28. This was quite true at the time, and is borne out by the histories of Mytilene and Potidaea, both of
which were taken after long sieges while Lacedaemonian forces were harassing Attica. The point
foreshadows the siege of Syracuse, however, which the Athenians will be forced to abandon.
29.“A sense of honor”: Greek aisxune, which may also be translated as “shame.” See Hornblower on the
way Thucydides plays with various meanings of the word in this passage.
30. Phlius: a city north of Argos.
31.Compare the Athenian treatments of Scione (5.32) and Torone (5.2–3), the Thracians’ massacre of
the people of Mycalessus (7.29), and the Spartans’ actions at Hysiae (5.83). Why does Thucydides pause
to give the Athenian rationale in this case, through the Melian dialogue, while passing over the other
massacres briefly? Probably he does so to set up Athens for its tragic failure at Syracuse. See
Hornblower, vol. 3, p. 225.
 {173} BOOK 6

Launching the Sicilian Expedition

That same winter (416/415), immediately after the destruction of Melos, Athens
decided to attempt the conquest of the Greeks in Sicily, an enormous undertaking and
a very dangerous one, as the Athenians were not well-informed about the relative
strengths of their allies and their enemies in Sicily. Athens had long wanted to
establish bases on Sicily,1 and evidently hoped to establish sources of grain and timber
in the western Mediterranean. Athenians in favor of returning to war thought that
control over substantial parts of Sicily would increase Athenian power to the point at
which the Peloponnesians would not be able to resist them. They wished, however, to
make it appear that their expedition was merely a response to a call for aid from their
allies.
Leontini, a Greek city in Sicily, had been an ally of Athens. In 422, its democracy
was overthrown by an army from Syracuse and its people sent into exile, while its
aristocrats took up residence in Syracuse. At the time, Athens had been unable to forge
an alliance that would enable it to rescue the people of Leontini; but anti-Syracusan
sentiment was strong in Athens, and many Athenians were itching for a chance to cut
Syracuse down to size.
Conveniently, in 416, the Sicilian city of Egesta sought help from Athens. The
Egestans had engaged in a war with their neighbor to the south, Selinus,2 which was
being helped by Syracuse. A delegation from Egesta came to Athens asking for help;
meanwhile, Athenian ambassadors who had been to Egesta to evaluate the situation
there returned with glowing reports.

{174} SICILIAN ANTIQUITIES

Thucydides begins his account of the Sicilian expedition by reviewing the histories of
the peoples living in Sicily at the time. The earliest people on the island were known
as Sicels, who were said to have migrated from Italy before the first millennium
BCE. They were later pushed mainly into the interior as Greeks settled along the
eastern and southern coasts.
 Egesta (sometimes known as Segesta) was a city of non-Greek origin, in northwest
Sicily, which had adopted Greek culture. Syracuse, the largest and most powerful of
the Greek cities in Sicily, was Dorian in origin, as were many of the Sicilian Greeks.
There were two cities north of Syracuse along the west coast of Sicily that were
exceptions—Catana and Leontini—Ionian cities founded as colonies from Chalcis in
Euboea, the long island that runs north of Attica.3 After taking over Leontini,
Syracuse was riding high, and the Athenians’ potential friends in Sicily needed help
more than ever. Athens therefore welcomed the offer of the Egestans to pay for the cost
of a venture into Sicily.
In fact, the situation was worse than the Athenians could have known. Egesta was
lying about its resources, and would not be able to support an Athenian expedition.
Leontini had been defeated. The Sicels were naturally hostile to the Greek colonies on
their island, but could not be relied upon to support the growth of the Athenian
Empire. Syracuse was now a city of mixed cultural heritage with a tradition of
democracy; no doubt some of its citizens would support Athens, but this support would
turn out to be much weaker than expected.
A brief report of actions in Argos and Macedon brings Thucydides’s account of the
sixteenth year of the war to a close (6.7).

DEBATE AT ATHENS
[8] Next summer, in early spring [415], the Athenian ambassadors returned
from Sicily along with the ambassadors from Egesta, who brought sixty talents
of uncoined silver as one month’s pay for the sixty ships they wanted Athens to
send.4 The Athenians called an {175} assembly and heard the same story from
both sets of ambassadors, their own and those from Egesta. It was attractive
but not true, especially the claim about the money—that they had a great store
of it ready in their temples and in their public treasury.5 On hearing this, the
Athenians voted to send sixty ships to Sicily under the command of Alcibiades,
Nicias, and Lamachus, with independent authority.6 Their mission was to
assist the people of Egesta against those of Selinus, to resettle Leontini if the
war went well enough for them, and to carry out other actions in Sicily in
whatever way they judged best for the Athenians.7
Four days later, the people assembled again to consider how to equip the fleet
as quickly as possible, and to vote for whatever else the generals would need on
the voyage. But Nicias had been put in command without his consent, for he
thought the city had made the wrong decision to take on the conquest of all of
Sicily—an enormous task—on a slight and specious pretext. So he came
forward with the intention of changing their minds, and gave this advice to the
Athenians:

Speech of Nicias
[9] Although this assembly was called to deliberate on the preparation we
should make for the voyage of our fleet against Sicily, still it seems to me that
we should once again consider whether it would be better not to send it at all,
and not to draw on ourselves a war that is no business of ours, after so short a
deliberation on so weighty an affair, and taking the advice of men from a
different tribe.8 For my part, I would gain honor from this expedition; and as
for the danger {176} to my life, I am less afraid than others, though I think one
can be just as good a citizen by having a regard for one’s own life and property:
a person like that will want the city to prosper especially for his own sake. But
as I have never before spoken anything that is against my conscience9 in order
to gain higher honor for myself, I shall not do so now: I shall say only what I
find to be the best. My speech would be too weak to prevail over your character
if I advised you to save what you have and not risk what is in your hands for a
gain that is uncertain and lies in the future. Still, I will let you know that your
haste is unseasonable, and you will not easily achieve your goals.
[10] You see, I say that you will leave many enemies here, and in sailing there
you evidently want to draw new enemies toward you. Perhaps you think that
the peace treaty you made with the Lacedaemonians is firm;10 in fact it will be
a treaty in name only, even if you keep still (that is the result of what some of
you11—and some of the enemy—have done). But if a considerable force of
yours ever fails, the attack our enemies make on us will be swift indeed. They
only agreed to this treaty in the first place because circumstances compelled
them to do so,12 and they lost more face than we did; since then, many points
in the treaty have come under dispute. Besides, there are some who utterly
refuse to accept it, and they are by no means the weakest.13 Some [the
Corinthians] are at war with us already; others [the Thebans] are maintaining a
[renewable] ten-day truce with us because the Lacedaemonians are keeping
still. But it is more than likely that if we divide our forces—as we’re now in a
hurry to do—they will be glad to join the Sicilians in an attack on us, since they
preferred them as allies to many others in former times.
It behooves a man,14 therefore, to consider these things, not to run into new
dangers when the future of our city is up in the air,15 {177} and not to seek a
new empire before we have quite secured the one we have already. The
Chalcidians of Thrace,16 after so many years of revolt, are still not tamed, and
others on the mainland are of doubtful obedience.
We are rushing to the aid of Egesta, we say, because it is our ally and has
been treated unfairly; but those who have done us an injustice by rebelling—
well, we shall punish them some time in the future! [11] Yet if we subdue the
Chalcidians, we could keep them down, while if we take control of Sicily, we
would find it hard to rule so many people at such a distance. Now it would be
foolishness for someone to attack people he can’t hold down, when, if he fails,
he will be in a very different condition from that in which he started.
As for the Sicilians, it seems to me, at least as things now stand, that they will
be even less dangerous to us if they do fall under the rule of Syracuse. And yet
that is what the people of Egesta are trying to use to frighten us. As things are,
some individual cities may come [against us] because they favor the
Lacedaemonians; but there is no reason why one empire should attack the
other. If Syracuse had an empire, then the same people would probably wipe it
out, and on the same principle as would apply to their pulling down our empire
with the help of the Peloponnesians.17
The Greeks in Sicily will fear us most if we never come, and next to that if we
show our power and then quickly withdraw. We all know, you see, that people
are most impressed by a threat that is farthest away and least liable to have its
reputation put to the test. But if we fail in any way, they will immediately
despise us and join with our enemies here to attack us. That is just what has
happened to you Athenians in regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies:
because you have done better against them than you expected (considering how
frightened you were of them), you despise them now, and so you are turning
against Sicily. You ought not to be puffed up by the misfortunes of your
enemies; you should be confident only if your strategy is better than theirs. And
don’t think that the Lacedaemonians have set their minds on anything other
than how they can repair their reputation after their recent disgrace. They are
determined to {178} overthrow us if they can—and all the more because they
have been working so hard and so long to cultivate a reputation for excellence
[aretē]. So if we are sensible we shall see that the real issue is not about the
people of Egesta, who are not even Greek, but about how we may rush to our
own defense against the insidious plots of a city that works through oligarchy
[i.e., Sparta].
[12] We should also remember that we have only recently been given a rest
from plague and war to allow our numbers and our money to increase; and it is
only fair [dikaion] for us to spend this here, rather than on these refugees18 who
are begging for assistance; it is to their advantage to tell a specious lie and
contribute only words, while their friends bear all the danger—they’ll not thank
their friends as they deserve if they win, and they’ll destroy their friends for
company if they lose.
Now there may be someone here who is delighted at being put in command
and will advise you to sail—entirely for ends of his own, especially if he is
rather young for such a command. He may wish to be admired for his horse-
breeding and so, owing to his heavy expenses, he may aim at a profit from this
command.19 If there is such a man, do not let him purchase his personal
splendor at this great risk to the city. Remember, men like that defraud the
people and waste their own money as well. Besides, this is an important matter;
it is not the sort of thing a young man should decide, let alone take hastily in
hand.
[13] When I see the supporters this man has mustered sitting here, I am
afraid. You older men, I urge you if you are sitting next to one of those people:
do not be ashamed if they think you a coward for voting against war, and do
not be sick (as they are) with yearning for what is far away. Keep in mind that
the least success comes by way of desire, and the most by planning ahead. Raise
your hands against this for the sake of your city, because it is running into
greater danger now than ever before. Vote to observe the old boundaries
between the Sicilians and us. There is nothing wrong with those boundaries—
the Ionian Gulf if you sail along the coast, the Sicilian Sea if you sail directly
across. Tell the Sicilians to manage their own affairs and settle their differences
on their own. And to Egesta, send this particular answer: since they began the
war against Selinus without {179} the Athenians, they should end it in the
same way, entirely by themselves. And tell them we will not make alliances
after this as we used to do, with men whom we defend when they are in
trouble, but who cannot give us any help when we are in need.
[14] And you, President of the Assembly, if you think it your job to take care
of the city, and if you wish to be a good citizen, put this once more to the
question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. If you are afraid to set aside
custom by putting this to a second vote,20 keep in mind that no one will blame
you for doing this before all these witnesses. People will think that you are a
physician to a city that has made a bad decision; and that good leadership is
shown by one who does his best to benefit his city, or at least does no harm of
his own will.21

[15] Nicias spoke along those lines, but most of the Athenians who took the
floor advised against setting aside the earlier vote and urged them to make the
expedition, while a few took the other side. Alcibiades made the most spirited
case for the expedition partly out of his desire to cross Nicias (with whom he
had been at odds on other points of state) and because Nicias had made a
slanderous reference to him. Mainly, however, it was because he wanted to
have a command and hoped to be the man who would take both Sicily and
Carthage for Athens, and he wanted to increase his own personal wealth and
glory through success. Because he was highly esteemed by the citizens, he had
desires that were too vast for his actual estate to support, for horse-breeding
and other expenses as well. Later on this was one of the main causes of the
destruction of Athens.22 The people were alarmed by his highly
unconventional personal life and by the ambitious plans he made for every little
thing he did. So they thought he dreamed of being a tyrant, and they became
his enemies. Even though his public management of the war was excellent,
they {180} were all so displeased with his private life that they put other people
in charge. And this led to the defeat of the city not long afterward.
At this time, however, Alcibiades came forward and gave this advice to the
Athenians:

Speech of Alcibiades
[16] Really, Athenians, I have a better claim than anyone else to have this
command. (I am compelled to begin with this issue since Nicias has attacked
me.) I consider myself quite worthy of this position, because what has made me
notorious has also won glory for my ancestors and myself, and, besides, has
helped my country. The other Greeks thought our city more powerful than it
really was because of my elegant appearance at the Olympic Games, when
before that they had hoped we’d been beaten down by the war. I entered seven
chariots there (more than any one man had entered before); I won first, second,
and fourth place; and in everything I displayed the magnificence of a winner.23
Such actions customarily earn honor, but they earn a reputation for power as
well.
As for my expenses in the city for dramatic festivals24 and my other splendid
largesse, it is only natural that my fellow citizens feel envy; but outsiders see
this as strength. And this so-called foolishness is really quite useful, when a
man helps both himself and his city at private expense. There’s no injustice in
being above equality if you think well of yourself; since a person who is doing
badly does not make anyone else a partner in his fortune either. If a man will
not even greet us when we are down on our luck, then, when things go well for
us, he should be equally content if we look down on him—or else, if he insists
on equality, he should give the same in return. I know that all of those people
who are as brilliantly successful as I am will cause pangs of envy as long as they
live (especially to their peers, but also to everyone they meet); after their deaths,
however, they will leave a legacy of people who claim a kinship with them that
never existed, and a country that boasts of them not as strangers or sinners, but
as their very own citizens who have done fine things.
{181} That is what I aim at, that is what has made me notorious in my private
life. Now consider whether I handle public affairs any the worse. Without great
risk or expense to you I brought together the greatest powers of the
Peloponnesus and made the Lacedaemonians stake everything they had on one
day’s battle at Mantinea and though they won the battle they have not yet
recovered their confidence.25 [17] This is the result of that youth and
foolishness of mine, which is supposed to be unnatural: I dealt with
Peloponnesian power by giving good arguments, my enthusiasm won their
confidence, and I persuaded them. Don’t be afraid of these qualities now, but
make use of our services while I am still in my prime and Nicias is thought to
be lucky.
Do not abrogate your decision about this voyage on the grounds that the
power you will encounter there is great. The cities in Sicily are packed with a
mixed rabble of various peoples, you see, and easily shift to admit newcomers as
citizens. As a result, no one thinks of this as his own fatherland, so they are not
sufficiently armed to defend their own lives, and they have not set up adequate
facilities in the countryside. Each person looks instead only to what he can get
from the commonwealth either by a persuasive speech or by civil war, and
keeps his property in readiness to move to another land if he should fail. It is
not reasonable to expect that a crowd like this would either give ear to a single
policy or adopt a common plan of action. If we say anything to please them,
they will almost certainly come over one by one, especially if they are divided by
civil war, as we hear they are.26 And indeed, they do not have as many hoplites
as they boast of; and in general the Greek population is not as large in each city
as they say it is. Greece has greatly falsified our numbers, and has scarcely
deployed enough hoplites for the current war.
So the situation there is as I have said, from the reports I have heard; and it
will be even easier, since we will have a great many foreigners who will take our
side through hatred of Syracuse,27 and {182} there will be nothing to hinder us
at home if you make the right decisions. Our ancestors won the empire at a
time when they had all the enemies we now say we would leave behind if we
sail—and the Persians besides—and their only strength lay in their naval
superiority. Besides, the Peloponnesians have never had less hope against us
than now. Even if they were at full strength and invaded our land—which they
could do even if we don’t sail to Sicily—they can do us no harm by sea, since
we are leaving a fleet behind us that is large enough to oppose them.
[18] What reasonable case could we make for holding back? What excuse
could we make to our allies in Sicily for denying them assistance? We ought to
defend them, if only because we have sworn to do so, without objecting that
they have not aided us in return. We did not take them into our alliance so that
they would come to our assistance, but so that they would trouble our enemies
there and so prevent them from coming against us here.
This is how we got our empire—as did everyone else who rules—by eagerly
coming to the support of anyone who calls on us, whether Greek or foreign. If
we all sat still, or waited to decide which race of people we should help, then
we would be adding little to our own empire, and therefore putting it at greater
risk.28 In dealing with a stronger power, one should not only defend oneself
when it attacks; one should take advance action to preempt an attack. We
cannot control the size of empire we want as we would a budget: in our
situation we are compelled to plan new conquests as well as not to let our old
subjects go free, because if we do not rule others we run the risk of being ruled
by them ourselves.29 You should not weigh peace in the same balance as others
do unless you plan to change your way of life to match theirs.
Let us conclude, then, that sailing to Sicily will increase our power at home,
and let us make the voyage, so that we may cast down the pride of the
Peloponnesians and show them the contempt we have for the current peace by
sailing against Sicily. And along with this we will either become masters of all
of Greece by the addition of those cities, as we expect, or we will at least ruin
Syracuse, to the benefit of ourselves and our allies. As for our safety, our ships
will protect us whether we are successful and stay, or whether we leave; since
we will be masters of the sea against all the Sicilians put together.
{183} Don’t give in to Nicias’s arguments for his do-nothing policy. Don’t let
him distract you from this expedition by starting a quarrel between the young
men and their elders. Follow the usual procedure instead, as our ancestors did
when they brought us to our present height30 by consulting young and old
together. Try to advance the cause of our city by the same means now. And
don’t think that either youth or age has any power without the other:
remember that the greatest strength comes from a mixture of the simplest
people with the middle sort and those who make the most exact judgments, all
together.31 Keep this in mind, also: that a city is like anything else: if it rests, it
will wear itself out by itself. All human skills decay, but the waging of war
continually adds to a city’s experience and puts it in the habit of resisting the
enemy in action, rather than making speeches. On the whole, I find that if a
city which is used to being active grows idle, it will quickly be destroyed by this
change; and the safest way for a people to live is to conduct civic affairs
according to their current character and customs for better or for worse, with
the least possible change.32

[19] So spoke Alcibiades. Then the ambassadors from Egesta and the refugees
from Leontini came forward, reminded them of their oaths, and begged them
as suppliants to come to their help. When the Athenians had heard all this,
they were far more earnestly bent on the expedition than they had been before.
When Nicias saw that his earlier arguments would no longer sway them, he
thought he might change their minds by insisting that the expedition be
equipped on a very large scale. So he came forward again and spoke:

Second Speech of Nicias

[20] Because I see you are entirely bent on this expedition, Athenians, I wish it
the success we desire. I will, however, deliver my judgment on the matter as it
stands now. From the reports I have heard, we are setting out against great
cities that are not subject to one another and do not have the need for change
that would make them welcome a shift from harsh servitude to easier masters,
or give them any reason {184} to prefer our empire to freedom.33 Besides, there
are a great many Greek cities for one island: in addition to Naxos and Catana
(which I hope will join us because of their kinship with Leontini34) there are
seven others armed in all respects mostly as we are.
The two we are mainly sailing against, Selinus and Syracuse, are the most
powerful of these; they have many hoplites and archers and javelin throwers, as
well as many triremes and a mob of people to fill them.35 They have a lot of
money, some in private hands, some in the temples in Selinus; and the
Syracusans have taxes coming in from some of the foreigners besides. Their
main superiority to us is that they abound in horses and that they use their own
grain rather than importing it.36
[21] Against a power like that we need more than a naval force that’s poorly
armed; a large force of foot soldiers must sail with them if we mean to do
anything worthy of our plan and not be kept off the land by their many
horsemen, especially if the cities there join together out of fear of us, so that
only Egesta proves to be our friend and furnishes us with cavalry to resist them.
And it would be a disgrace to be forced to withdraw, or to send afterward for
help because our initial decision had been ill considered. So we should leave
here with sufficient forces, realizing that we are going to sail far from home,
and mount a different sort of campaign from when we went among our allies
here against someone, here where we had easy access to the supplies we needed
from our friends. But we are taking ourselves away to a land of strangers, from
which a messenger could hardly reach us in four months in winter.
[22] Therefore my opinion is that we should take with us a great many
hoplites of our own, our allies, and our subjects, as well as anyone we can get
from the Peloponnesus by persuading them or offering them a fee. We should
also take many archers and slingers to use against their cavalry, and we must be
far superior in ships so that we can easily bring in what we need. We will also
need grain in {185} merchant vessels—both wheat and roasted barley, and
bakers must be pressed into service and hired, a share from each mill, so that if
the army is weather-bound it will have what it needs. (Because our army will be
so large, not every city will be able to take it in.) We should provide everything
else too, as much as possible, and not depend on others. Above all, we must
take as much money as we can. As for the money they say is available in
Egesta, keep in mind that what’s most available is merely talk.
[23] Even if we go ourselves from Athens with a force that is not simply a
match for theirs (except for their fighting troops, the hoplites) but superior in
every way, we will hardly be able to overcome them and see to our own
security. Remember that when people go to found a city among enemies of
another race, they must take control of the land immediately, on the first day
they land, or else they are sure to find everything hostile if they fail.37 That is
what I am afraid of, and I know that this business requires a great deal of good
planning and even more good luck—a difficult matter, since we are only
human. As for me, I want to set out with as little as possible left to luck, and to
make our departure with a force that can be expected to provide security. This,
I think, will be the most reliable course for the whole city, and the safest for
those of us who go on the expedition. If anyone is of a contrary opinion, I offer
to resign my command to him.

[24] Nicias said all this in the belief that the Athenians would either be
deterred by the magnitude of the undertaking or, if he had to sail, would at
least provide him a large enough force for safety at the outset. But the difficulty
of equipping the expedition did not wipe out the Athenians’ desire to make it;
instead, it inflamed them all the more, and the result was the opposite of what
he expected: they approved of his advice and thought that they would now be
quite safe. Now everyone alike fell in love with the enterprise: the older men
hoped to subdue the place they were sailing to, or at least that such a large force
would have no serious trouble; the young men were longing to see and study a
far-off country and were confident they would be brought back safely; while
the great mass of people, including the military, expected not only to gain their
wages by it for the time being, but to win such power that their salaries would
go on forever. The result of this vehement desire of the majority was that {186}
anyone who did not favor the expedition kept quiet out of fear that if he held
up his hand in opposition he would be thought to harbor ill will against the
city.
[25] In the end a certain Athenian38 stood up and called on Nicias to make
no further excuses or delays, but to declare right then before them all what
forces the Athenians should vote to give him. To this he answered unwillingly
that he would consider it at more length with his fellow commanders, but that
his immediate judgment was this: they would need no fewer than one hundred
triremes from Athens (of which a number to be determined would be troop-
transports) and others to be sent for from the allies; with these should sail at
least five thousand hoplites from Athens and the allies, more if possible. The
rest of the force should be in proportion: archers from here and from Crete,
slingers and anything else that was found necessary should be readied and taken
along.
[26] Immediately on hearing this the Athenians voted for this decree: that the
generals are to have independent authority to act as they see best, both in
regard to the size of the expedition and in regard to the entire voyage. After
this they began their preparation by making lists of those who would serve and
sending instructions to the allies. The city had just recovered from the plague
and the continuous warfare: a number of young men had come of age and
money had accumulated during the armistice, with the result that everything
was more easily supplied. And so they were involved in preparations.

THE EXPEDITION SAILS (415 BCE)

Soon after, a gang of upper-class young men defaced the herms in Athens in a single
night (6.27–29).39 This caused great consternation, as it was felt that such a
violation of sacred statues could bring the wrath of the gods upon the city. The
ensuing investigation succeeded only in fanning people’s fears of conspiracy and
sacrilege. In this atmosphere of panic and rumor, accusations were made against
Alcibiades. It was said that he had celebrated mock religious rituals in his house, and
he was therefore suspected {187} in the case of the herms as well. Alcibiades denied all
charges and offered to stand trial then and there, but his enemies decided to wait until
he had left Athens before renewing their attack.40
The expedition sailed in midsummer (6.30–32). All Athens turned out to see them
off. After appropriate prayers and a stately exit from the harbor, the ships raced each
other as far as the island of Aegina. There were a hundred Athenian triremes, of
which forty were used for transport, thirty-four allied triremes, and two fifty-oared
ships from Rhodes. Supplies were carried by thirty merchant ships and about a
hundred smaller vessels. There were 5,100 hoplites, of which 1,500 were Athenians
of the hoplite class and 700 Athenians of the lowest property level who served as
marines. The rest came from allied cities, as did more than 1,000 lightly armed troops
(archers and slingers). The main deficiency was in cavalry, as only thirty horses were
taken across to Sicily (6.43–44).

DEBATE AT SYRACUSE
When rumors of the Athenian preparation reached Sicily, the Syracusans called an
assembly (6.33–41). The conservative leader Hermocrates warned the Syracusans to
prepare for the attack from Athens by mobilizing their allies and setting out to fight
the Athenians before they crossed into Sicily. Hardly anyone believed him, however.
The democratic leader Athenagoras made light of the threat from Athens in a speech
that is a model of rhetoric gone wrong. First, he argued that the idea that Athens
would send an expedition was simply not reasonable (not eikós) in view (a) of the
threat to Athens from the Lacedaemonians in their back yard, and (b) of the great
strength of Syracuse. (He was right, of course: it was unreasonable for the Athenians
to launch their expedition. But they did so, nonetheless; people often do unreasonable
things.) Second, (he says) the whole story appears to be a fabrication put forward to
frighten the democrats into turning to the oligarchs for safety. Athenagoras closed by
promising to guard against a takeover by the oligarchs, and then gave these
persuasive remarks in defense of democracy:41
{188} [39] Some will say that democracy is neither intelligent nor fair [ison]
and that the wealthy are best able to rule. But I answer first that the dēmos is
the name for the whole people,42 while oligarchy names only a part. Second,
though the rich are indeed the best guardians of the city’s money, the
intelligent are the best councilors, and the many are the best judges of what
they hear. Now in a democracy all three groups enjoy an equal share,43 both the
groups and their members. But while an oligarchy allows the many their share
of dangers; it takes more than its share of the profits—not only that, it runs off
with everything.
An unnamed general then took the floor, criticizing the previous speakers for their
partisanship. He proposed the policy that eventually won the war for Syracuse, which
was much in line with what we know of Thucydides’s political views: the city should
act together and forget its political divisions. First it should find out what was really
going on, while making preparations for defense, with cavalry, infantry and
“everything that is a glory in war” (6.41).

ARRIVAL OF THE ATHENIANS

 On arrival, the Athenians and their allies found that the treasure promised by
Egesta amounted to only thirty talents. Uncertain how to proceed, they first delayed
while Alcibiades tried unsuccessfully to persuade Messina to join them. After that the
Athenians made a show of force at Syracuse and proceeded to Catana, where they
settled an internal quarrel in Athens’s favor and drove out the faction that supported
Syracuse. They planned to set up camp for the winter at Catana. There they met a
fast ship from Athens that had been sent to bring Alcibiades home to defend himself
against a number of charges. He was suspected of having made secret arrangements
with Sparta and also of various crimes against religion (6.42–56).

{189} DIGRESSION ON THE TYRANNY IN ATHENS

In fact, Alcibiades was in trouble (Thucydides maintains) because his loyalty to
Athenian democracy was in doubt, and so the people did not carefully evaluate the
rumors that were circulated against him. They had heard about the tyranny of
Pisistratus and his sons, and were therefore in constant fear of a recurrence of
tyranny. Thucydides thinks this fear of tyranny is irrational. He proceeds to explode
one of the central myths of democratic Athens—that of the slaying of the tyrants by
Harmodius and Aristogeiton (see also 1.20). Thucydides corrects the popular myth on
three points: first, the man who was assassinated was not the reigning tyrant, but the
tyrant’s younger brother; second, the motive was not politics but sexual harassment by
a man in power; third, the assassination did not bring the tyranny to an end.
[54] In fact, Aristogeiton and Harmodius took this enormous risk as an
incidental result of a love affair.44 I shall tell the story at some length, to make
the point that the Athenians are no more reliable than anyone else in reporting
their own history or describing their own tyrants. When the reigning tyrant
Pisistratus died as an old man [in 527], it was the elder brother Hippias who
took power, and not, as ordinary people believe, Hipparchus. Now Harmodius
was at that time glowing with youthful beauty, and the lover who had him was
Aristogeiton, a citizen belonging to the middle class.45 Harmodius was
solicited by Hipparchus (the son of Pisistratus) but did not give in to him;
instead, he told Aristogeiton all about it. Aristogeiton was struck with the
anguish of jealousy, as happens to lovers, and also with the fear that
Hipparchus might use his power to take the boy by force, so he immediately
formed a plan to bring down the tyranny using means available to a man of his
rank.46 Meanwhile, Hipparchus made another attempt on Harmodius that was
no more successful than the first. At this, although he was unwilling to use
{190} violence, the rejected suitor arranged to disgrace the boy in a subtle way
that could not be traced to this event.47
In general, their government had not been hard on the people, and had
consistently avoided arousing their anger. Tyrants though they were, the
Pisistratids had cultivated virtue and wisdom to a high degree. Taxing only 5
percent of Athenian income, they had adorned the city beautifully, fought their
wars to the finish, and supported public religion. Meanwhile the city continued
to enjoy all its former laws and customs, except that they always saw to it that
one of their supporters held public office.
Harmodius and Aristogeiton had planned to kill Hipparchus and Hippias at a
religious procession. Fearing discovery, however, they acted in haste and were able to
kill only Hipparchus, leaving the elder brother to continue his rule. Badly frightened
by the episode, Hippias became increasingly repressive during the remaining three
years of his reign. He was deposed by an army of Lacedaemonians in 510. Thucydides
passes over without comment the splendid irony that it is Sparta that delivered
Athens from tyranny and so prepared the way for democracy in Greece (6.55–59).

THE ATHENIANS AT SYRACUSE

Up to now the Athenians had been avoiding a confrontation with Syracuse because
they lacked sufficient cavalry to face the Syracusans on open ground. Now (in October
415) they lured the enemy cavalry north toward Catana, then sailed to Syracuse,
landed, and dug in. Then the Athenians won a brilliant victory over the Syracusans
on the Helorus Road (6.65–71).48 In this battle, the Syracusans showed their
inexperience and took considerable losses. After the Battle of the Helorus Road, the
Athenians sailed back to Catana for the winter, and the Syracusans began to improve
their defenses.
Camarina was a city founded on the south coast of Sicily, toward the east, which
had weak alliances with both Athens and Syracuse. The people of Camarina listened
to a debate between Hermocrates, representing Syracuse, and Euphemus, representing
Athens. Each speaker tried to win Camarina over to his side (6.72–88). Hermocrates
gave an argument similar to that in his speech at Gela (4.59–64), for the unity of
Sicilian Greeks {191} against the threat of an expanding Athenian Empire.
Euphemus made an argument that recalls Athenian claims at Sparta (1.75) and
Melos (5.89):
[83.4] As we told you, it is out of fear that we hold onto our empire in Greece;
and we came to Sicily for the same reason, to make arrangements with our
friends for our own safety—not to enslave anyone, but rather to see that no one
is enslaved.
The Camarinans were not convinced by either speaker; in equal fear of both sides,
they declared neutrality. They would remain neutral until coming in on the side of
Syracuse in 413, once the Syracusans had recaptured the point of land south of the
Great Harbor (7.33).49
In the spring of 414, the Athenians nearly brought the war to a successful
conclusion. They seized the heights behind Syracuse (known as Epipolae), built a
circular fort there, and began to run lines of fortification around the city, down both
sides toward the sea. Once the walls were completed, it would only be a matter of time
before Syracuse surrendered. The Syracusans countered by trying to build fortified
walls across the advance of the Athenian fortifications (see map, p. liv), but the
Athenians foiled two such attempts and cut off the Syracusan water supply. The
Syracusans attempted to storm the circular fort while most of the Athenians were
away. Nicias happened to be in camp at the time, nursing an illness. He saved the
fort by setting fire to the equipment, which drove off the enemy. Lamachus had been
killed the same day in an earlier engagement, and Nicias—who was chronically ill
and had opposed the business from the start—became sole commander of the
expedition for the time being.

ALCIBIADES’S ESCAPE
The attempt to arrest Alcibiades failed when he escaped and took refuge in Sparta.
The advice he subsequently gave to the Spartans was excellent. First, he advised them
to take immediate steps to save Syracuse by sending fresh troops and a crafty general
to lead them. Second, he advised them to fortify a hilltop in Attica (Decelea) and
maintain a force there year in and year out; this would be far more damaging to
Athens than the annual {192} invasions Sparta had been sending at harvest time
(6.91). The Spartans took Alcibiades’s advice.50
In order to win the confidence of the Lacedaemonians, Alcibiades explained in his
speech why he was willing to help them now after years of service to the Athenian
democracy:
[89.3–6] If anyone thought worse of me for siding with the people, he should
realize that he is not right to be suspicious. We51 have always been in
disagreement with tyrants, you see. Whatever is opposed to an autocrat is
identified with the people (dēmos) and because of this we have continued as
leaders of the majority party. Besides, in a city governed by democracy, we were
generally compelled to conform to prevailing conditions; we have tried,
nevertheless, to be more moderate in politics than the headstrong temper that
now prevails. There have been others in the past—there still are some—who
have incited the mob to worse things. These are the ones who have driven me
out. But as for us, we were leaders of the city as a whole, and we thought it
right to join in preserving the city in the same form in which it turned out to be
greatest and most free—the form in which we had received it. We did this even
though anyone with any sense knows well enough what democracy is—I as well
as anyone (that’s why I could lambaste it if I wanted, although there is nothing
new to say about a form of government that everyone agrees is foolish).
Besides, we thought it was not safe to change our government when you were
bearing down on us as enemies.
[. . .]
[92.2–4] Now in my judgment no one should think worse of me because I,
who was once thought a lover of my own city, am now of my own power going
against it with its greatest enemies; and I do not think you should distrust my
word as coming from the zeal of a fugitive. For though I am fleeing from the
malice of those who drove me out, I shall not flee from helping you, if you take
my advice. Those who have merely harmed their enemies, as you have, are not
so much enemies as are those who have compelled their friends to become
enemies. I do love my city, but as a place where I could safely engage in public
life, not as the site of injustice to me. I do not think the {193} city I am going
against is my fatherland; it is much more a matter of my recovering a city that
is not mine. A true lover of his city is not the man who refuses to invade the
city he has lost through injustice, but the man who desires so much to be in it
that he will attempt to recover it by any means he can.52

1. For earlier attempts by Athens in Sicily see, for example, 4.1 and 4.24.
2. Selinus: modern Selinunte, on the south coast in far west Sicily.
3. On ethnic divisions among Greek Sicilians, see the speech of Hermocrates (4.59–64).
4.An Athenian talent (about 57 pounds of silver by weight) was worth 6,000 drachmae. One drachma (6
obols) per day was the going rate for skilled troops serving a long way from home (3.17 and 6.31). There
would have been two hundred men to a ship, so one talent would meet the payroll of one ship for a
month. Note that Athenian sailors were skilled professionals, not slaves. For a display of their skill, see
the account of Phormio’s battle at 2.83–92.
5.In fact, only 30 talents would be available, as the Athenians discovered on their arrival in Sicily (6.46).
Thucydides says the ambassadors had been fooled by a false display of wealth. We have good evidence,
however, that the Athenians had at least 251 talents altogether from Sicilian sources (Hornblower). The
temple at Egesta was begun on an elegant plan but never completed. The shell is still standing.
6.The three generals could act without consulting the Assembly. As the three generals shared power
equally, it was necessary for at least two of them to agree on any decision. Thucydides gives their formal
patronymics here. For Nicias’s character, see the Introduction, xxix.
7.The “other actions” consisted of the conquest of Syracuse, which, for diplomatic reasons, could not be
part of the official mission.
8.“From a different tribe”: Egesta (or Segesta) was a Hellenized city of northwestern Sicily. Its
population, however, was not Greek by origin, but claimed to be descended from the Trojans. In 6.11,
Nicias will refer to them, with more contempt, as “not even Greek,” barbaroi.
9. “Conscience”: following Hobbes. The Greek is gnōmē, which has a range of meanings including
“judgment,” “plan,” and “strategy.” For an occasion on which Nicias does not speak his conscience, see
7.48.
10. Peace of Nicias, 421–414 (pp. 159–61).
11. “Some of you”: Alcibiades in particular had tried to disrupt the peace.
12. See pp. 159–60.
13. Corinth, Thebes, Megara, and Elis were not full parties to the Peace of Nicias.
14. The man in question is Alcibiades. Throughout the speech of Nicias, personal references to
Alcibiades become progressively less indirect.
15. “Up in the air”: an English equivalent to the Greek metaphor, “out to sea.”
16. The Chalcidians of Thrace: an alliance of cities, formed in 423, which had pulled out of the
Athenian Empire under the influence of Macedon (432) and later of the Spartan general Brasidas (424),
with their center in Olynthus, at the neck of Pallene, the southern prong of Chalcidice.
17.The reasoning is odd, but consistent with Thucydides’s view that people naturally want to tear down
any empire.
18. The common people of Leontini were refugees after their defeat in 422 by Syracuse.
19.Here Nicias plainly refers to Alcibiades, whose extravagance on horses had made him famous.
Alcibiades was about thirty-six years old at the time.
20.“If you are afraid to set aside custom”: luein tous nomous. It was not against the law to put an issue
twice to a vote, but it was unusual to do so.
21. Note the allusion here to the medical oath to do no harm (Hippocrates, Epidemics 1.9).
22.On Alcibiades’s character, see 5.43. After a period of exile in which he collaborated with Sparta
(415–412), Alcibiades would redeem himself by leading the Athenian war effort in the eastern Aegean
with a great measure of success between 411 and 406. He was later held responsible, however, for a
mistake made by one of his subordinates that had resulted in significant losses. He was exiled again two
years before Athens’s final defeat in 404.
23. At the Olympic Games of 416. Only the very rich could afford to equip and train even one chariot.
24.“Dramatic festivals”: choregiai. Rich people were required to fund costly projects for the city, such as
shipbuilding and the training of a chorus for the theater.
25. Alcibiades helped form the quadruple alliance of Athens with the Peloponnesian states of Argos,
Elis, and Mantinea. These allies posed a threat to the Spartans, but they were soundly defeated by the
Spartans at Mantinea in 418, restoring the reputation and confidence of Sparta (5.66–74). Alcibiades
claims a success here for a venture that failed badly.
26.Cf. the speech of Hermocrates, a Syracusan who called upon the Sicilian Greeks to unite against the
Athenian threat in 424 (4.59–64, esp. 61).
27.“A great many foreigners”: barbaroi. These were Sicels, early non-Greek settlers on Sicily most of
whom resented the Greek colonies, some of whom were allied with Athens and sending monetary
support.
28.This is a reply to Nicias, who had opposed helping the Egestans because they were not Greek (6.9,
6.11).
29. Cf. 2.62 and 63.
30. Cf. Pericles’s remarks at 1.144.
31. “A mixture”: here Alcibiades is alluding to ancient medical practice, as was Nicias at the end of his
first speech.
32. Athens had grown its empire largely by winning over factions in the cities it wished to take over. This
strategy would fail in Sicily.
33. Nicias here speaks of Syracuse, which was both free of foreign influence and a democracy. Elsewhere
in expanding its empire Athens had depended on exploiting local discontent (3.62, see Dover).
34.Naxos was a city on the east coast of Sicily toward the north, not to be confused with the island in
the Aegean for which it was named. It was probably founded by Ionians from Chalcis in Euboea, who
went on from there to found Leontini and Catana; Syracuse was founded by Dorians from Corinth.
35. Greek navies of the period were manned mainly by the lower social orders, who were paid for their
service.
36. A weakness of Athens was apparently its dependence on imported grain.
37.Nicias here compares the expedition to a colony set down in a hostile territory, an experience well
understood by his audience.
38. Plutarch identifies the speaker as Demostratus (Life of Nicias 12); cf. Aristophanes, Lysistrata 387 ff.
39.The herms were statues of religious importance scattered through Athens, in front of temples and
houses, each showing a man’s face and a phallus. Thucydides tells us that the faces were mutilated, and
we learn from Aristophanes that some phalluses were also broken off (Lysistrata 1094).
40. Alcibiades would have had strong support from the members of the expedition had he been charged
before they all sailed away. Later, a man named Andocides confessed involvement in the affair of the
herms and was exiled after naming other participants, who were executed. He wrote a detailed account
of the matter in his De Mysteriis.
41. Since Athenagoras’s strategic advice is all bad, there is a bite to Thucydides’s decision to join it to this
defense of democracy, a form of government Thucydides tends to distrust.
42. In fact, dēmos has a number of meanings: although it can refer to the entire citizen body, it more
often designates the poor or common people, and may mean simply a political group that claims to
represent the interest of the poor. Athenagoras is using what is called a persuasive definition. His
contemporary opponents would not have been moved; to many of them democracy meant mob rule, not
rule in the interest of the whole people. Nevertheless, Thucydides will attribute Syracuse’s success to its
moderate, inclusive democracy (7.55). For Alcibiades’s criticism of democracy, see the end of 6.89.
43. “Enjoy an equal share”: isomoirein. May be translated “have fair shares.”
44.“An incidental result of a love affair”: Hobbes has “an accident of love.” Thucydides’s point is that the
motives of the killers are not entirely political. Herodotus tells a different story in which love plays no
part (5.55–65). In Plato’s version, the tyrannicide was due to love, and it ended the tyranny (Symposium
182c). On the different accounts, see Hornblower’s discussion (2008, 433–38).
45.
Mostly it was Athenian men of the upper classes at this time who tried to have affairs with younger
men or boys.
46.“Using means available to a man of his rank”: assassination. Not being an aristocrat or a man of
wealth, Aristogeiton could not have organized a political coup.
47. We learn in 6.56 what Hipparchus did to disgrace Harmodius: he invited the boy’s young sister to
participate in a religious procession and then threw her out on the grounds that her family were not
citizens of good standing.
48. The Helorus Road runs south from Syracuse.
49. As Dover points out, news of this success “achieved what persuasive arguments could not.” After
taking the southern point of land, Syracuse was in a position to build the boom across the harbor
entrance that would be the key to destroying the Athenian expedition.
50.Either the idea of a permanent fort in Attica was an old one, or else Thucydides foreshadowed this
development in the debate at Sparta (1.122, 142).
51.Alcibiades’s noble family, including Pericles, were known to have been opposed to tyrants
(Herodotus 6.121, 123).
52. A frequent theme in this History is the readiness of exiles to ally themselves with the enemies of their
home cities, in return for which the enemies support the political causes of the exiles. “My country right
or wrong” is a sentiment that would have meant little to Thucydides or his contemporaries. All the more
strange in its context, then, is the attitude of Socrates in Plato’s Crito, who says he has an obligation to
obey the city that has—wrongly in his view—condemned him. Contrast the case of Themistocles, who
went over to the Persians when he was exiled by the Athenians. Thucydides finds nothing to censure
him in this, and indeed praises him for the high quality of the advice he gave to the Persians in their
continuing war against the Greeks (1.138). We know that Thucydides had been in exile from Athens
after the loss of Amphipolis in 424 (which was not his fault) and that he had also spent some of his exile
in the Peloponnesus. It is tempting to believe that the speech he gives here to Alcibiades reflects some of
his own sentiments toward the city that had rejected him on such slender grounds.
 {195} BOOK 7

Athenian Catastrophe in Sicily1

SPARTA JOINS THE WAR

Syracuse was now on the edge of surrender, but in the nick of time the
Lacedaemonian general Gylippus stole into Syracuse by sea with a small force. He
quickly put new heart into the Syracusans, seized the heights of Epipolae,2 and ran a
line of fortification—the cross-wall—that blocked the advance of the Athenian
circular siege-wall (7.1–7). The Athenians now feared they would not be able to
complete their siege-wall and had lost their best chance to take Syracuse. Nicias then
went into a defensive posture. He saw how grave the situation was and realized that
the army would have to be withdrawn or substantially reinforced. Fearing that the
Athenians would not believe a messenger, he sent the bad news to Athens in the form
of a letter (7.11–15) in which he said that the Athenian army was now under siege
itself. He went on to point out that his force was losing its effectiveness: the wooden
ships and their rigging were wearing out, slaves were running away, and foreign
troops were deserting. Nicias insisted that the army either be called back to Athens or
reinforced by a number of troops and ships equal to the original expedition. At the end
of the letter he asked to be relieved of the command.
The Athenians decided not to relieve Nicias. They would, however, send
reinforcements under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, who would be joint commanders
with Nicias. Eurymedon came right away with a few ships, while Demosthenes
stayed back to muster the new expeditionary force.
{196} That winter (414/413), the Lacedaemonians decided to go to war against
Athens (7.18). Perhaps they had been at fault in 431, when they started the original
ten-year war. This time, however, there was no doubt in their minds: Athens had
broken the Peace of Nicias3 and would have to bear the consequences. In the spring of
413, the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica and fortified Decelea as Alcibiades had
advised them to do. This was a serious threat to Athens, for it kept the farmland of
Attica under constant threat of attack and virtually put Athens under siege. Still, the
Athenians were determined to wage war both at home and in Sicily, and they
imposed new taxes on their empire in order to support the war.
Meanwhile, Gylippus brought new troops to Syracuse from various allies in Sicily.
He captured Plemmyrium (the point of land across the Great Harbor from the city),
and subsequently strengthened the Syracusan navy. Then a series of battles in the
Great Harbor gave naval superiority to the Syracusans for the first time. (Summary
of 7.1–41)

NIGHT BATTLE FOR EPIPOLAE

[42] But just as the Syracusans were preparing to follow up on their victory
with attacks by land and sea, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with
reinforcements from Athens: about seventy-three ships (including foreign ones)
and five thousand Athenian and allied hoplites, along with a good number of
javelin throwers, both Greek and foreign, slingers, archers, and enough
supplies. The Syracusans and their allies were quite dismayed at first, with no
end in sight and no respite from danger, seeing that in spite of the fortification
at Decelea there had come an army almost as large as the first, and the power
of Athens seemed great on all sides. Meanwhile, a sort of confidence returned
to the first Athenian army in the wake of its misfortunes.
When Demosthenes saw how things stood, he decided he should not waste
time and fall into Nicias’s situation. The fear Nicias had inspired in Syracuse
on his first arrival had turned to contempt when, instead of attacking Syracuse
at once, he had spent the winter at Catana.4 At the {197} same time, he had
allowed Gylippus to reach Syracuse with his army of Peloponnesians—which
the Syracusans would not even have sent for if he had attacked directly, since
they thought they were strong enough alone, and would not have learned of
their weakness until surrounded by a siege-wall, with the result that even if
they had sent for aid it would not have been as helpful.
So Demosthenes thought all this over and realized that like Nicias he would
be most frightening to the enemy right now on the first day. He therefore
decided to put the present shock value of his army to use as quickly as he could.
He observed that the cross-wall by which the Syracusans had kept the
Athenians from encircling the city with their siege wall was only a single one,
and that if anyone took control of the way up to Epipolae and then seized the
camps there he would easily capture the cross-wall (since no one would even
wait for the attack). He therefore hurried to put this to the test, as he thought
it his quickest way to end the war: either he would succeed and take Syracuse,
or he would lead the army away and prevent any further attrition to the
Athenians who were there with him or to Athens as a whole.
First, then, the Athenians went out and wasted the land of the Syracusans
around the Anapus River, and they were the stronger, as at first, by land and by
sea, since the Syracusans dared not go out against them either way, except for
horsemen and javelin-throwers from the Olympeion. [43] After that,
Demosthenes decided to try to take the cross-wall with battering rams. But the
rams he brought up were burnt by the enemies who were defending the wall,
and his other attacking forces were repulsed at many points; so he decided to
waste no more time, and persuaded Nicias and the other generals to make the
attempt he had planned against Epipolae. It was considered impossible to
approach and make the ascent secretly by day, so he ordered them to take five
days’ rations, all the stonemasons and builders, a supply of arrows, and
whatever else they would need to build a fort if they took the hill. Then he and
Eurymedon and Menander marched against Epipolae with the whole army
after the first watch, leaving Nicias in the camp.5
When they reached Epipolae at the hill of Euryelus, just where the earlier
army had made their first ascent,6 they were unseen by {198} the Syracusans
who kept watch. They then advanced and seized the Syracusan outpost that
was there, killing some of the guard. Most of them, however, escaped and ran
straight to the camps, of which there were three on Epipolae, all fortified: one
for the Syracusans, one for the other Sicilians, and one for their allies. They
reported the attack there and also informed the six hundred Syracusans who
had originally guarded this part of Epipolae. They came immediately to the
defense, but Demosthenes and the Athenians took them on and put them to
flight, though they fought with spirit. The main body of Athenians continued
to advance in order to finish what they had come for in one rush, without
losing their momentum. Meanwhile, another party had taken the Syracusan
cross-wall right away—the troops guarding it had not even stayed to fight—
and were pulling down its battlements.
The Syracusans and their allies, along with Gylippus and his forces, came to
the defense from the fortified camps. Because they had not expected so daring
an attack, and at night too, they were in a state of panic when they joined battle
with the Athenians and at first they were forced to pull back. But the
Athenians were rushing forward in greater disorder, thinking they had won and
wanting to get through all of the enemy forces that were not yet engaged in the
battle as quickly as possible, to prevent their regrouping during a lull in the
attack—and while the Athenians were advancing in disorder, the Boeotians
were the first to offer them any resistance: the Boeotians charged, routed the
Athenians, and put them to flight.7
[44] And then the Athenians were thrown into great perplexity and
confusion, which it was not easy to sort out by asking both sides how the
particular events fit together.8 Battles are easier to understand in daylight, but
even then soldiers who are present scarcely know more than their own
particular experiences. So in a night battle—and this the only one in the war to
involve large armies—how could anyone know anything for certain? Though
the moon was bright, they saw each other as you’d expect in the moonlight:
bodies were visible, but there was no way to know whether they were friends or
enemies. And there were a great many hoplites on both sides, maneuvering in a
very tight space. Some of the Athenians were beaten already; others,
undefeated, were still moving ahead in the {199} original direction of attack.
Also, a great part of the rest of the army either had just got to the top of the
hill or were on their way up, and did not know which way to go. Once the rout
had begun, all the forward troops were in confusion, and the shouting made it
hard to tell what was happening. The Syracusans and their allies were cheering
each other on as victors with great clamor, as that was their only means of
communication at night, and at the same time they were holding off anyone
who attacked.
Meanwhile, the Athenians were trying to find each other and were taking
everyone who was going the other way as an enemy, including friends who
were already running back for safety. They were constantly asking for the
password, since they had no other means of recognition. As they were all
asking at the same time, this produced a great racket, and gave away the word
to the enemy. The enemy password, however, they could not learn as easily,
since the enemy, who were keeping together in their victory, had fewer
problems of recognition. The result was that when the Athenians met enemies
whom they outnumbered, they let them go because they knew the password;
but they—if the situation were reversed—could not answer and were killed. By
far the worst damage, however, was caused by the singing of the Paean (“battle
hymn”)9 coming from both sides right near them—it drove them to their wits’
end. The Argives and Corcyreans, along with all the other Dorians who sided
with Athens, put fear into the Athenians whenever they sang the Paean, and
the enemy had the same effect. The final result of all this was that men from
various parts of the army kept running into each other, once they were in total
confusion—friends against friends and citizens against fellow citizens. They
not only terrified each other but even came to hand-to-hand fighting and could
scarcely be parted without difficulty. And as they were being chased along the
cliffs—since the way down from Epipolae is narrow—many of them threw
themselves off the rocks and died. And when the survivors got back down to
level ground, many of them, especially members of the first army, knew the
country well enough to find safety in the camp. Some of the second army,
however, lost their way and wandered into the fields; these were rounded up
and killed by Syracusan horsemen at daybreak.
[45] Next day the Syracusans put up two trophies, one in Epipolae, where the
Athenians had come in, the other at the place where {200} the Boeotians had
made the first stand. Meanwhile, the Athenians retrieved their dead during a
ceasefire. Many Athenian and allied troops were killed, and more weapons
were lost than were taken from the dead, since those who were forced to leap
from the cliffs left their armor behind, and though some of them perished,
others survived.
[46] After this the Syracusans recovered their former confidence from their
unexpected success and sent fifteen ships under Sicanus to Akragas,10 which
was in a state of civil war, to bring the city over to their side if possible, while
Gylippus went around the rest of Sicily by land again to raise another army in
the hope of taking the Athenian lines by force, considering how the Battle of
Epipolae had turned out.

THE ATHENIANS DELAY THEIR DEPARTURE

[47] Meanwhile, the Athenian generals met to discuss the disaster that had
struck them, as well as the general weakness of the whole army at the time.
They saw that their plans had failed and that the soldiers were angry at staying
on. They were troubled by sickness from two causes: this was the season of the
year in which people are most susceptible to disease, and the site of their camp
was swampy and unpleasant.11 Besides, everything seemed hopeless to them.
Demosthenes said he thought they should stay no longer; they should follow
the plan he made when he took the chance on Epipolae. Since this attack had
failed, he voted to leave and waste no more time while they were still able to
cross the sea and the expedition could at least win a battle with the ships that
were newly arrived. He also said that it would be more effective for the city to
wage war against those who were setting up fortifications on its own soil than
against the Syracusans, who could no longer easily be defeated, and that they
had no reason to spend any more money on the siege.
[48] That was Demosthenes’s conclusion. As for Nicias, however, although
he personally felt that their position was poor, he did not want this weakness to
be made public in discussion. He did not want to announce their departure to
the enemy by putting it openly to the vote of many soldiers, for then they
would be much less likely to surprise the Syracusans when they did decide to
go. As for the situation of the enemy, with which he was much better
acquainted than the others, he still held out hope that Syracuse would be in
poorer {201} shape than the Athenians if only they would continue the siege:
the Athenians would wear them out by lack of money, especially since with
their present fleet they had greater control of the sea. Besides, he said, there
was an element in Syracuse that wanted to turn the city over to Athens and
kept sending him messages not to let them raise the siege. Knowing all this, he
said in his public speech at that time that he would not take the army away
(though in fact he was wavering and making time for further consideration).12
For he said he was well aware that the Athenians would not accept their
departure unless they had voted for it themselves. And the people who would
pass judgment on them had not seen matters at firsthand, as they had, but
would base their votes on the reports of others and would believe any slander
they heard from a fine speaker. As for the soldiers now present, he said, many,
indeed most, of those who were now wailing about their misery would wail on
the other side when they got home and complain that the generals had sold out
and left for a bribe.13 So, for his part, he knew too much about the nature of
the Athenians to want to be killed unjustly by them on a dishonorable charge.
If he had to die, he’d prefer to do so at the hands of the enemy—a risk he’d be
taking on his personal initiative. Besides, in spite of everything, the Syracusans
were in a condition even worse than their own: the cost of keeping mercenaries,
along with paying for outlying ports and maintaining a large fleet for a full year
now, had made them poor and would soon cripple them. They had already
spent two thousand talents and were heavily in debt as well. If the Syracusans
lost even a small part of their force through not supplying it, their troops would
drift away, since they were allies and not compelled to fight, as ours were, by
their situation. Therefore, he said, the Athenians should hang on and continue
the siege, rather than go away in defeat over money, in which they were far
superior.
[49] Nicias said all this forcefully because he saw exactly how things were in
Syracuse and knew they had run out of money. Besides, he knew how many
Syracusans wanted the Athenians to win and were sending him messages not to
raise the siege. At the same time, he placed special confidence in the navy, just
as he had before, in spite of their defeat.
{202} Demosthenes, however, would not hear of continuing the siege at all. If
they could not take the army away without a vote’s being taken in Athens—if
they had to wear down the Sicilians—then, he said, they should move up to
Thapsus or Catana and stay there, where their land forces could subsist by
overrunning a large territory, plundering their enemies’ land and so weakening
them. Meanwhile, he said, they should use their ships for combat in the sea,
rather than in the narrow harbor that favored the enemy. In the open water
they could use their skill in pulling away and charging without rushing up and
pulling back within narrow, circumscribed limits.14
All in all, he said, there was no way he would want to stay any longer where
they were: they should get out of there as quickly as possible, without delay.
Eurymedon gave the same advice, but as Nicias was still opposed, delay and
hesitation began to grow, along with the suspicion that Nicias’s confidence
came from knowing more than the others. In this way the Athenians
procrastinated and stayed in that place.
[50] Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus’s plan
for Agrigentum had failed when the faction that was friendly to Syracuse there
got driven out while he was still at Gela. But Gylippus came with another large
army raised in Sicily and with the Peloponnesian hoplites that had been sent by
transport ships in the spring and had arrived at Selinus from Libya. (A storm
had driven them to Libya, and the Cyreneans there had given them two
triremes with pilots. In sailing along the coast they had sided with the people
of Euesperides, who were besieged by the Libyans. After defeating the
Libyans, they had sailed along to Neapolis, a Carthaginian trading post, where
there is the shortest route to Sicily—two days and a night of sailing. From
there they had crossed to land in Sicily at Selinus.15)
As soon as these reinforcements arrived, the Syracusans immediately prepared
to attack the Athenians both on sea and on land. The Athenian generals saw
that a fresh army had reinforced the enemy, while their own situation, far from
improving, was getting worse every day on every point, especially owing to the
sickness that weighed on the men. Now the generals were sorry they {203} had
not moved out earlier, and since even Nicias had withdrawn his earlier
opposition, provided there was no public vote on the matter, the generals gave
word as secretly as they could and told everyone to be prepared to sail from the
camp on a certain signal. And they were going to do it, but just when they were
ready to sail, the moon had an eclipse, since there was a full moon that night.
Then most of the Athenians took the eclipse to heart and called on the generals
to stop, while Nicias—who put too much faith in divination and such practices
—said he would not even consider moving now until they had waited the
twenty-seven days prescribed by the soothsayers. That is why the Athenians
put off their intended departure.16
[51] The Syracusans found out about this on their own and it encouraged
them more than ever not to let up on the Athenians, now that the latter had
acknowledged that they were no longer stronger on land or sea—otherwise
they would never have planned to sail away. Besides, they did not want them
settling down anywhere else in Sicily, where they would be harder to fight, but
wished to compel them to give battle at sea as soon as possible in a place where
Syracuse would have the advantage. So they manned their ships and trained as
many days as they thought sufficient. When the time was right they assaulted
the Athenian walls on the first day, and when a small number of hoplites and
cavalry sallied out by a gate, they cut off some of the hoplites, routed them, and
chased them back. Because the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy
horses and a small number of hoplites.
[52] On that day, the Syracusan army withdrew, but on the next they sailed
out with seventy-six ships while their infantry advanced to the walls. The
Athenians went out against them with eighty-six ships and engaged them in
battle. Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and drew his
ships closer to the shore, in hopes of surrounding the enemy; but the
Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian center and then cut him
off in the inmost hollow of the harbor, where they killed him and destroyed the
ships he had with him.17 After that they chased down all the Athenian ships
and drove them ashore.
{204} [53] When Gylippus saw his enemies’ navy vanquished and forced to
land outside the stockade of their own camp, he ran down to help with part of
his army along the causeway,18 intending to kill those who landed and make
the shore there friendly to the Syracusans, so they could tow the ships away
more easily. But the Etruscans19—they were the ones who were guarding this
area for the Athenians—saw them coming on in disorder, so they rushed out to
attack and routed the Syracusans who were in front, hurling them into the
marsh called Lysimeleia. Later, when the Syracusans and their allies arrived in
greater strength, the Athenians came to the rescue in alarm for their ships and
engaged them in battle. After beating them, the Athenians chased the
Syracusans away and killed a few hoplites, while saving most of their ships and
bringing them around to the camp. But the Syracusans and their allies took
eighteen Athenian ships and killed all the men in them. Intending to set fire to
the rest of them, the Syracusans loaded an old hulk of a boat with brush wood
and pine torches—the wind was running right toward the Athenians—set it
afire and aimed it at them. Then the Athenians, in alarm for their ships,
devised ways of putting out the flames and escaped the danger by quenching
the fire and preventing the approach of the hulk.
[54] After that, the Syracusans put up a trophy for the naval battle and also
for cutting off the hoplites outside the wall on the previous day [7.51], when
they had taken the horses as well. The Athenians put up a trophy of their own
for the Etruscan victory that drove foot soldiers into the marsh, and for their
own success with the rest of their army.
[55] Now that the Syracusans had won a brilliant victory—and had won it at
sea, where they had formerly been afraid of the ships that had come with
Demosthenes—the Athenians were totally downhearted. Their surprise was
great, but their regret at having made the expedition was even greater.
Syracuse and its allies were the only cities the Athenians had come against
that were like them in character—that were governed as they were by
democracy20 and had ships and cavalry, along with substantial resources. The
Athenians had not been able to bring any {205} advantage to bear on them:
they could not bring them to surrender either by offering them a change in
constitution21 or by bringing superior force down on them; and now that they
had failed in most of their plans, they were at their wits’ end—especially since
they had been vanquished even at sea, which they had never expected, and
which made them more dejected than ever.
[56] And now the Syracusans started sailing around the harbor without fear
and planned to shut off its entrance, so that the Athenians could no longer sail
out secretly at will. Indeed, the Syracusans were no longer concerned merely to
save themselves, but were designing ways to block the escape of the Athenians,
since they correctly believed that their strength was now much greater than the
Athenians’, and that if they could overcome the Athenians and their allies both
at sea and on land, they would win great glory among the Greeks. Of the other
Greeks, they hoped, some would be set free immediately, while others would
be liberated from fear, since it would be impossible for Athens, with its
remaining strength, to sustain any longer the war that would be brought down
upon it. And they would be given the credit for this, so that everyone else—
even generations to come—would admire them greatly. And indeed the contest
was an important one, for more than the reasons given above: besides defeating
the Athenians, they would defeat all of Athens’s many allies as well, and they
would do this not alone but as leaders of the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians
who had come to their aid, while they had been the first to expose their own
city to danger and had opened the way for most of their naval success.

FORCES ON BOTH SIDES

Here Thucydides interrupts the story to give a list of the allies on both sides. In this he
follows the tradition set by Homer in Book 2 of the Iliad, but goes beyond it by
providing political explanations for the presence of each ally. On the Athenian side
were:
1. Willing allies from Athenian colonies;
2. Unwilling allies who came from subject states within the empire;
3. A few independent allies, such as Chios, that were obliged by treaties to
support Athens; and
{206} 4. More willing forces who came from states that were not in the empire,
either for mercenary reasons or out of hatred of Sparta.
Of the entire force allied with the Athenians, most were Ionian, although the fourth
category included a number of Dorians, such as those from Argos, an enemy of Sparta.
There were also a number of non-Greeks, such as the Egestans (who had invited the
Athenians in the first place), the Etruscans, and a few Sicels.
Syracuse, a Dorian city, was aided by:
1. Neighboring states such as Selinus;
 2. Some Sicels; and
3. Allies from the Peloponnesian League (Spartans, Boeotians, and
Corinthians). As the Syracusans were already quite numerous, the most
valuable contribution of Sparta was the excellent leadership provided by their
general, Gylippus. (Summary of 7.57–59)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE IN THE GREAT HARBOR

The Syracusans proceeded to block the mouth of the harbor—nearly a mile wide—
with a string of transports and triremes at anchor. When they saw this, the Athenians
realized that their position was untenable. Before the eclipse, they had told their allies
in Sicily to suspend shipments of supplies by land; now they would be cut off
completely if they lost communication by sea. So they decided to pull in their ground
forces to defend the smallest possible compound, and then to man every available ship
in an attempt to break out of the harbor. If they failed, they would leave Syracuse by
land.
Before the battle, Nicias encouraged his forces with a speech in which he reminded
them of their advantages, warned them of the danger to Athens if they failed, and
gave them tactical advice—to grapple with Syracusan ships whenever possible and
sweep their decks clear of defenders.
On the other side, the Syracusan generals and Gylippus prepared their ships to ward
off Athenian grappling irons, and encouraged their forces with a speech. They pointed
out that the Athenians had overloaded their ships with land soldiers who would not
be effective at sea, reminded their troops of earlier victories, and exhorted them to be
as hard on the Athenians as the Athenians would have been on them, implying that
Athens would have treated Syracuse as it had treated Melos (5.116)—killing the
men and enslaving the women and children. (Summary of 7.59–68.2)
The Syracusan generals concluded:
{207} [68.3] No one should go soft and think that we would gain if they broke
out safely. That’s what they will do just the same if they defeat us; but we will
have a fine victory if we carry out our plans successfully—as is to be expected—
punishing the Athenians while restoring liberty to all of Sicily with greater
stability and productivity than before. This is the rarest kind of jeopardy: if we
lose we’ll come to little harm, but if we win the benefits will be enormous.
 BATTLE IN THE GREAT HARBOR, SEPTEMBER 9, 413 BCE
[69] The Syracusan generals and Gylippus gave this encouragement to their
soldiers; then they manned their ships as soon as they saw the Athenians doing
the same. Nicias was terrified by the present state of affairs, realizing how great
the danger was and how near, now that they were on the point of departing,
and thought—as happens in a great crisis—that when all has been done there is
still something missing, and that when everything has been said it is still not
enough. In this state he once again called on each ship captain, one by one,
addressing him by his father’s name, his own, and that of his tribe, and
entreated each one if he had a brilliant reputation not to betray it now, and not
to tarnish the ancestral virtues that had distinguished their forefathers. He
reminded them also of their country with its great liberty and the untrammeled
freedom it gives everyone to live as he pleases;22 and he said whatever else
people say at such a time when they are at the point of action and don’t mind
sounding old-fashioned, using words that fit nearly any occasion, bringing in
wives and children and ancestral gods, crying out in the hope that such
speeches will be helpful in the terror of the moment.
When he had exhorted them as long as he thought he could (which was less
than he thought he should), Nicias withdrew and led his land forces along the
shore, placing them as widely as he could so as to give the maximum benefit of
their encouragement to those on board the ships. Meanwhile, Demosthenes,
Menander, and Euthydemus—these men had embarked as commanders of the
fleet—put out from their camp and sailed straight to the barrier at the mouth
of the harbor, to the passage that had been left open, with the intention of
forcing their way out.
[70] The Syracusans and their allies had already set out with about as many
ships as before, some of them guarding the outlet and the rest forming a circle
around the harbor so they could attack the {208} Athenians from all sides at
once. At the same time, their land forces came along to support them wherever
their ships might put ashore. The Syracusan navy was under the command of
Sicanus and Agatharchus, each of whom had charge of a wing, while the
Corinthians under Pythen held the center. When the Athenians first reached
the barrier, their initial charge overwhelmed the ships assigned to guard it, and
they tried to break open the bars. But after that, when the Syracusans and their
allies hit them from all sides, the battle spread from the barrier throughout the
harbor and was more fiercely fought than any naval battle in history. The
sailors were full of enthusiasm to row wherever they were ordered; the
steersmen were full of ingenuity and there was great mutual rivalry among
them. The soldiers on board did their utmost when one ship came alongside
another to see that their fighting from the decks was not outdone by the sailors
in other tasks. Each and every one of them, in fact, pushed himself eagerly to
be the best at his assignment.
But with so many ships engaged in a small area (this was the largest sea battle
in the narrowest quarters, for there were almost two hundred ships altogether)
they could not ram each other very often, since there was no room to back up
and charge; but they had frequent collisions, as one ship would run against
another by chance while it was fleeing or attacking a third vessel. While a boat
was approaching, the soldiers on the decks pelted it with javelins and arrows
and stones in abundance; but once they were alongside they fell to hand-to-
hand fighting as the marines tried to board each other’s vessels. In many places,
owing to the lack of room, it happened that one ship would be charging
another while being charged itself, and that two ships, or sometimes more,
would be forced against one, and the captains wound up having to defend on
one side while preparing to attack on the other, not just one ship at a time but
many from all directions. Meanwhile the great din of so many ships in combat
was terrifying and drowned out orders coming from the officers. Officers were
shouting out instructions and encouragement on both sides, of course, going
beyond their normal duties in the excitement of battle: the Athenians were
crying out to their men to force the passage and now if ever to show their spirit
and secure a safe return to their country; the Syracusans and their allies were
shouting about how fine it would be to prevent the Athenian escape and to
bring honor to each country by their victory. The generals on both sides were
shouting as well: if they saw anyone backing to stern unnecessarily they called
on the ship-captain by name. The Athenians would ask if he was retreating
because he thought he’d be more at home here, where the {209} land was so
terribly hostile, than on the open sea, which they had won at such cost. The
Syracusans would ask why he was running away, since he knew perfectly well
that the Athenians were desperate to escape any way they could.
[71] While the naval battle hung in the balance, the land forces on both sides
were in an agony of suspense and conflict of mind, the local troops eager to win
more glory than before, the invaders afraid that their situation might get even
worse. Since everything depended on their ships, the Athenians were in the
most extraordinary fear of what might happen, and since the battle was uneven
in different parts of the harbor, the watchers on shore could only get uneven
impressions of it. They were watching at close range and not all seeing the
same thing at the same time. Those who saw their side winning took heart and
fell to calling upon the gods not to take away their chance of escape;
meanwhile, those who caught sight of defeat were wailing, even shrieking
outright, and they were more overwhelmed in their minds by the sight of the
battle than the actual combatants were. Others could see a part of the fighting
that hung in the balance, and the protracted indecision of the struggle was
agony for them as their bodies reflected their fears. These watchers had the
hardest time of all, as they were always on the brink between escape and
destruction. So it was that in one and the same army, while the sea battle was
in doubt, you could hear all this at once: wailing, cheering, “we’re winning,”
“we’re losing,” along with all the other confused shouting that has to come
from a great army in serious trouble.
Much the same happened to the men on the ships, until at last, after a long-
drawn-out battle, the Syracusans and their allies clearly got the upper hand,
forced the Athenians to retreat, and chased them back to land with a lot of
shouting and cheering. Then the troops from the ships landed helter-skelter—
if they hadn’t been taken at sea—and rushed to the camp. And now the soldiers
on land were no longer of two minds: they all wailed and groaned from the
same impulse, all unable to bear what had happened. Some of them ran to help
the ships, others rushed to guard what was left of the wall; most of them,
however, were only looking for a way to save their own skins. The panic at this
point was greater than it had ever been. Their disaster was comparable to the
one they had inflicted on the Lacedaemonians at Pylos: when the
Lacedaemonians lost their ships there they also lost the men they had put on
the island; and now the Athenians had no hope of escaping over land unless by
a miracle.
[72] After this cruel battle, which consumed many ships and men on both
sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies picked up {210} their dead and
the wreckage of their ships, sailed back to the city, and put up a trophy. The
Athenians, however, were so cast down by the enormity of the present disaster
that they never thought to ask permission to pick up their dead or their
wreckage; all they wanted was to get away that very night. Demosthenes went
to Nicias and proposed that they man the remaining ships and, if possible,
break out at dawn, since, as he said, they still had more serviceable ships than
the enemy. The Athenians had sixty ships remaining, while the enemy had
fewer than fifty. Nicias accepted this proposal, but when they asked the sailors
to man the ships they refused to go aboard. They were in such a panic from
their defeat that they thought they could never win a victory ever again.
[73] And so they all resolved to break out by land. Hermocrates of Syracuse
suspected they had such a plan, however, and thought it would be terrible if an
army of that size withdrew by land, found a base somewhere in Sicily, and
planned a new campaign against them. So he went and told the authorities
what he was thinking, and urged them not to let the Athenians slip away by
night, but to send out all the Syracusan and allied forces to occupy the roads,
seize the narrow passes, and keep watch. The authorities agreed with him and
felt as strongly as he did that this should be done, but they were afraid that they
could not easily get the soldiers to obey, since they were now happily resting
after the great battle and enjoying a festival besides (by coincidence this was the
day for worshiping Heracles). Most of the men had been celebrating their
victory by drinking heavily at the festival, and now the very last thing they
would agree to do would be to take up their arms again and sally out to fight.
Hermocrates saw that the authorities were convinced his proposal was
impossible, and, because he could not persuade them, he came up with this
stratagem on his own: he was afraid the Athenians might easily get a head start
during the night and cross over the most difficult terrain, so as soon as it grew
dark he sent some of his friends on horses to the Athenian camp. They rode up
within earshot and called to a few Athenians, pretending to be friendly to their
cause (Nicias did have some informants inside the city); then they instructed
them to tell Nicias not to take the army out at night, since the Syracusans were
guarding the roads, but to prepare for an easy departure the next day. The
horsemen said this and rode off, while those who heard them took the message
to the Athenian generals.
[74] It never occurred to the generals that this message was a fraud, so they
decided to stay the night. Then, since they had not set off immediately after
their defeat, they decided to wait another day to give the soldiers time to pack
as well as they could, taking what {211} they needed the most and leaving all
the rest behind. Their aim was to take only what was necessary for physical
survival.
Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus took their land forces out ahead of
them and blocked the roads in the area the Athenians were likely to cross; they
also guarded the river and stream crossings and posted troops to receive and
hold the Athenian army where they thought best. They also sailed up and
dragged the Athenian ships off the beach. They burned some of these (as the
Athenians would have done) and easily tied up the others wherever they lay
and towed them into the city, since there was no one to stop them.

THE ATHENIANS RETREAT AND ARE DESTROYED

[75] Later, two days after the sea-battle, Nicias and Demosthenes decided they
were ready enough, and the army began its withdrawal. It was a lamentable
departure, and not just because of the single fact that by losing all their ships
they had dashed all their great hopes and put themselves and their city in
danger: as they left the camp each one of them was struck by the sight or the
thought of some great grief. The dead were lying about unburied, and when
anyone saw the body of a friend on the ground he was seized with fear and
horror, while the living who were left behind sick or wounded were a more
horrible sight than the dead and were far worse off than those who had passed
away. Their continual pleading and wailing brought home the utter
helplessness of the army; they begged to be taken along, and if any of them saw
a friend or relative he’d call on him by name, and they would hang on the necks
of their departing tent-mates, or follow them as far as they could, till strength
or life failed them and they were left behind with no shortage of prayers and
lamentations.
As a result the entire army was full of tears, and in this state of helplessness it
was not easy for them to start their retreat, though they were leaving a hostile
place and had already suffered more than tears could express; still, they were
afraid of the suffering their unknown future might bring them. They hung
down their heads and many thought themselves worthless. They seemed like a
whole city of refugees trying to escape from a siege, and not a small city either,
as there were no fewer than 40,000 people in the entire crowd that was on the
march. Each of them carried whatever provisions he could; even hoplites and
horsemen did this, although it went against custom for them to carry their own
rations while under arms; some did so because they’d lost their servants, others
because they did not trust them, since they had been deserting for a long time
and now most of them had just run away. Even so, they did not carry enough,
since {212} the army was running out of food. And the other indignities they
bore were too great for them to take lightly at this point, even though sharing
troubles equally with many other people usually lightens the load. The worst
part was that they had come down from such a height of splendor and glory to
this miserable end—the greatest reversal that had ever happened to a Greek
army: these men who had come to enslave other people now had to leave in
fear of being enslaved themselves; in place of the prayers and battle hymns with
which they had sailed out they now left with the omens against them; besides,
this force that had traveled by sea was now reduced to foot soldiers, depending
on hoplites more than on sailors. Still, in view of the great danger hanging over
them, they felt they had to bear all this. [76] When Nicias saw that the army
had lost its spirit and was so greatly changed, he passed through the ranks and
gave them whatever encouragement and comfort he could in the circumstances,
his voice rising higher and higher as he went along because he was so serious
and so eager that his exhortation should benefit as many men as possible.

Nicias’s Exhortation
[77] Even now, allies and Athenians, we should keep hope alive. People have
been saved ere now from greater dangers than these. You should not think too
badly of yourselves, either for your past losses or present suffering, which is
undeserved. I may have less strength than any of you—you see how sick I am—
but I have as good a reputation as anyone for success in both private and public
life, and I am now in the same danger as the lowest ranking men here. Still, I
have passed my life in great devotion to what is ordained toward the gods,
while toward men I have shown great justice and given no offense. In view of
this my hope for the future is still confident, and these losses cause me no
anxiety so far as our merit is concerned; indeed, we may well have some relief
from them. Our enemies have now had their share of good luck, and if we have
offended any of the gods in this campaign we have already had enough
punishment. Others have invaded their neighbors before we did, and what they
suffered for doing what human beings do23 has been bearable. And now we
have a reason to hope for milder treatment from the gods, since we have come
to deserve their pity more than their anger. And just look at yourselves: with so
many fine hoplites, marching in good order, you shouldn’t {213} give way to
panic. Wherever you settle down you will immediately be a city, and no other
force in Sicily will be able to withstand your attack or force you out once you’re
established.
As for the journey, you must take care that it be safe and orderly. And each of
you keep this thought above all: that whatever place you are forced to fight in
will be your fatherland, with your walls. We will hurry along our way equally by
night and day, since our supplies are short. If we can reach a friendly town of
Sicels, then you should consider yourselves secure. A message has been sent to
them telling them to meet us and bring food.
To conclude, soldiers, you must see that your only choice is to be brave; there
is no place of safety near enough for cowards to reach. But if you now escape
our enemies, you will all see what you desire, and those of you who are
Athenians will restore the fallen power of Athens to its former greatness. It is
the men, you see, and not the walls or empty ships, that are the city.

The Bitter End

[78] As Nicias made this exhortation he went along the troops, collecting any
stragglers he saw out of position and putting them in their places.
Demosthenes did no less for his troops and said much the same things. Then
they marched out in hollow rectangle formation, Nicias commanding the front
and Demosthenes the rear, hoplites on the outside and baggage carriers and
general rabble inside. When they came to the crossing of the Anapus River,24
they found a unit of Syracusans and their allies drawn up on the bank. These
they put to flight, took control of the ford, and marched forward, harassed by
the pressure of the Syracusan cavalry and the javelins of their light-armed
troops. On that day they advanced about four miles and a half and spent the
night by a certain hill. The next day they left at dawn and went about two miles
farther, reaching a flat place where they set up camp, planning to get food from
the houses (for the place was inhabited) and to take water from there along
with them, since it was scarce for many miles ahead of them on their intended
route. But the Syracusans got ahead of them and walled off the passage in front
of them where there is a steep hill with precipitous ravines on either side, called
the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians went on, while great numbers of
Syracusan cavalry and javelin throwers {214} pressed them from both sides by
charging them or throwing javelins. The Athenians fought for a long time and
then returned to their camp. They had less food than before, now that the
Syracusan cavalry would no longer let them leave their position.
[79] Early in the morning they set off on their way up to the hill that had
been fortified by the enemy. In front of them, below the wall, they found the
enemy foot soldiers lined up many shields deep, as the place was narrow. The
Athenians charged and attacked the wall under heavy fire from the soldiers on
the steep hill above them, who could easily reach their targets since they were
throwing their javelins from above. When the Athenians could not force
through, they backed down and rested. Just then a small thunderstorm blew up
and drenched them, as often happens when autumn is near. At this the
Athenians lost heart still more and thought that all these events were meant to
destroy them.25 While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a
detachment to dig in behind them where they had entered the gorge; but the
Athenians sent some of their own men in response and stopped them. After
that the Athenians took their whole army down to more level ground and
camped.
The next day they went on26 while the Syracusans pelted them with javelins
from all sides in a circle and wounded many of them. And when the Athenians
went after them, they withdrew, but when the Athenians backed off they
attacked. They were especially fierce in attacking the Athenians at the rear, in
hopes that routing a small number of them would throw the whole army into a
panic. The Athenians held out against this for a long time, and after advancing
a little over half a mile they rested on the plain while the Syracusans retired to
their own camp.
[80] That night Nicias and Demosthenes made a decision. The army was in
terrible shape: they had run out of all their supplies and many of them had been
wounded in all those encounters with the enemy. So they decided to light as
many fires as they could and take the army out of there, not the way they had
originally planned, but toward the sea—the opposite direction from the route
guarded by the Syracusans. (All along, they had been marching not toward
Catana but toward the other part of Sicily, around Camarina and Gela {215}
and the Greek or foreign cities in that area.27) And so, when they had lighted a
good many fires, they moved off in the night. And then—well, in any army,
especially a large one, fear and terror are likely to strike, and more so at night,
in enemy territory, and when the enemy is not far off—then they fell into a
total panic. Nicias’s unit, which led the way, stayed together and made good
progress, while Demosthenes’s troops, much more than half the army, got
separated and went on without much order. Still, they reached the sea at dawn
and set off on the Helorus Road toward the Cacyparis River, which they
planned to cross so they could head for the interior. There they hoped to meet
the Sicels whom they had sent for. When they got to the river they found
another unit of the Syracusan guard digging in and putting stakes across the
ford. They forced their way across and went on to the next river, the Erineus,
on the advice of their guides.
[81] Meanwhile, when the Syracusans and their allies realized at daybreak
that the Athenians had gone, many of them accused Gylippus of letting them
go intentionally, and went after them in hot pursuit. Their route was easy to
follow, and they caught up around lunchtime. First they found Demosthenes’s
troops, who were in the rear and had moved more slowly and in greater
disorder because of that panic during the night. Immediately, the Syracusans
attacked and surrounded them with cavalry—which was easy since they were
divided—and herded them into one place. Nicias’s troops, however, were
almost six miles farther on; he was moving faster because he thought that their
safety lay in not willingly staying to fight at this point, and that they should
retreat as quickly as possible and fight only where compelled to do so. But
Demosthenes was having a much worse time of it, under constant pressure
from the enemy because he was in the rear where they attacked first. When he
saw that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he stopped his advance and went into
battle formation. During this lengthy process, however, he got surrounded by
enemy cavalry, and then he and his Athenians were in serious trouble. They
were huddled up in a place with a wall around it, roads on this side and that,
and a good many olive trees; and they were being hit by javelins from all sides.
The Syracusans had a good reason for attacking them in this way rather than at
close quarters: it would only have helped the Athenians for them to expose
themselves to {216} danger at the hands of such desperate men. Besides, now
that victory was assured, everyone felt a certain reluctance to throw away his
life, and they hoped that their tactics would enable them to subdue the
Athenians and take them alive.
[82] After hitting them all day from all sides, Gylippus saw that the
Athenians were worn out with wounds and other troubles, so he and the
Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation: any of the islanders with the
Athenians could freely come over to their side if they wished (and troops from
a few cities did cross over).28 Afterward, they made an agreement with all the
rest of Demosthenes’s troops: if they laid down their arms, no one would be
killed by violence or imprisonment or starvation. So they surrendered, 6,000 of
them in all;29 and they threw all the money they had into the hollow of some
shields, filling up four shields. They were then taken immediately to the city.
Meanwhile, Nicias and his army reached the Erineus River that day, crossed,
and set up camp on high ground. [83] The next day, the Syracusans caught up
with him and told him that Demosthenes’s troops had surrendered. They
ordered him to do the same. Nicias did not trust them, so he sent a horseman
under truce to find out. When the horseman brought back word of the
surrender, Nicias sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans to say that he
was ready to agree on behalf of the Athenians to repay Syracuse for the cost of
the war if they would let his army go away. He also promised to give them
Athenian hostages till the money was paid—one man for each talent. But the
Syracusans and Gylippus did not accept the terms. They attacked and
surrounded the Athenians, hitting them with missiles from all sides, as they
had the others, till evening. Then, although they were pinched by their lack of
food and supplies, they kept watch that night intending to leave as soon as it
was quiet. But when they took up their weapons the Syracusans heard them
and raised the battle hymn. The Athenians realized they had been found out
and returned to camp, all but about 300 of them who forced their way through
the Syracusan guards and went as far as they could that night.
{217} [84] When day came, Nicias led his army forward, while the Syracusans
and their allies laid into them as before, hitting them from all sides with
javelins and other missiles. The Athenians hurried on to the Assinarus River,30
partly because they were under pressure on all sides from attack by the cavalry
and a mob of other troops (which they hoped would ease off once they had
crossed the river), and partly because they were exhausted and desperate for
water. As soon as they were there, they rushed in without any order, each man
wanting to be the first to cross, while the enemy laid into them and made the
crossing even harder. They were forced to go into the river in heaps, and so
they fell upon one another and got trampled under foot. Some died
immediately on each other’s spears, others got tangled in the baggage and were
washed away. On the other side of the river were Syracusans who stood on the
steep bank and threw javelins down at the Athenians while most of them were
drinking greedily or getting in each other’s way in the river hollow. The
Peloponnesians also came down and killed them in the river. This immediately
fouled the water, but they went on drinking it nonetheless; and although it was
fouled by mud and blood, many of them even fought over it.31
[85] In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river, and the army was
utterly defeated, partly at the river, and partly by horsemen who chased down
those who ran away, Nicias personally surrendered to Gylippus because he
trusted him more than he did the Syracusans. He told Gylippus and the
Lacedaemonians to do whatever they liked with him, but to stop slaughtering
the other soldiers. After that, Gylippus ordered his troops to take live captives.
The remaining soldiers were brought to the city alive (except for the many who
were hidden away)32 while the 300 who had broken through the guard during
the night were chased down and captured also. The number of Athenian
captives collected as public property was not large, but a great many were
secretly stolen away and all Sicily was filled with them. (That was because there
had been no agreement in their case, as there had for those captured with
Demosthenes.) A large part of the army was dead, for the slaughter at the river
had been dreadful, {218} exceeding that of any other action in this war, while a
good many had been killed earlier during those frequent attacks along the way.
Still, many escaped. Some got away then and there, while others were made
slaves and ran away later. All these fugitives made their way toward Catana.
[86] The Syracusans and their allies formed up and returned to the city with
their booty and as many prisoners as they could take. The remaining Athenian
and allied captives were sent down into the stone quarries, which they
considered the easiest place to guard safely; but Nicias and Demosthenes were
executed, though Gylippus was opposed to this, since he thought it would be a
fine prize for him if he could deliver the enemy generals to the
Lacedaemonians on top of everything else. One of the two happened to be
their worst enemy—Demosthenes, for what he did on the island and at Pylos;
while the other had been extremely helpful to them over the same affair. Nicias
had worked hard on behalf of the Lacedaemonians on the island; it was he who
had persuaded the Athenians to make the treaty that released them.33 For this
the Lacedaemonians were friendly toward him, and that was the main reason
he had trusted Gylippus enough to surrender to him. Some of the Syracusans,
however, had conspired with him earlier (so it is said) and were afraid that he
would speak out under torture and so get them into trouble just when all was
going well. Others, mainly Corinthians, were afraid that with his great wealth
he would bribe certain people, make his escape, and be the cause of some fresh
mischief to them. So they persuaded the allies to kill him. This or something
like it was the cause of his death, though of all the Greeks in my time he was
the one who least deserved such a misfortune, because he had governed his
entire way of life by the pursuit of virtue (aretē).
[87] The Syracusans treated the men in the quarries badly at first. They were
crowded together in a small sunken area without a roof where they were
tormented by the sun’s heat and stifling air, followed by cold nights, as autumn
was coming on—a change that gave them new diseases. They had to do
everything in the same narrow space,34 and, in addition, the carcasses of the
dead, who had died of {219} their wounds or the change in temperature or
some such cause, were heaped up together and the stench was unbearable. All
the while they were afflicted with hunger and thirst, for during an eight-month
period the Syracusans fed each prisoner a cup of water and two cups of grain
each day.35 In short, they were not spared a single one of the miseries you’d
expect when men are thrown into a place like that.
For seventy days they lived like this all together. After that, they kept the
Athenians, along with the Sicels and Italians who had joined them, but sold all
the rest. It is hard to say how many men were captured altogether, but there
were at least 7,000.
This was the greatest action of the war—in my opinion, the greatest in all
Greek history—the most glorious victory for the winners, and the worst
calamity for the losers. They were utterly vanquished on all points, and none of
their losses was small. It was “total destruction” as the saying is,36 for the army
and navy alike. There was nothing that was not lost, and few out of many
returned home.37 That is what happened on Sicily.
[8.1] When the news was told in Athens, even though the messengers were
actual soldiers who had fled from the scene itself, and gave a clear report,
people refused for a long time to believe that the loss had been so utterly
complete. When they did realize the truth, they were furious with the orators
who had joined in promoting the expedition (as if they had not voted for it
themselves!).38 They were also angry with the prophets and soothsayers and all
those who had claimed to give them assurances from the gods that they would
take Sicily. Everything from every side was a grief to them, and on top of {220}
this overwhelming loss, they were stricken with fear and panic, the worst ever.
It was bad enough that every private family, and the city as a whole, was
burdened with the loss of so many hoplites and cavalry and men of military age
for whom replacements were nowhere to be seen. But when they did not see
enough ships in the boathouses, or money in the treasury, or officers to staff
the ships, then they lost hope of surviving this crisis altogether. They thought
their enemies from Sicily would immediately sail a navy into the Piraeus,39
especially after such a great victory, while their enemies in Greece would
double all their preparations and lay into them fiercely by land and by sea with
the support of their former allies, who would now rebel.
Nevertheless, they decided they ought not to give in while they still had
resources. They voted to build a fleet using wood and money from wherever
they could find it, and also to make sure of their allies’ loyalty, especially those
on Euboea.40 Then they decided to slash public expenses and to select a
committee of senior men to advise them on the crisis as the situation
demanded. Now that they were face to face with real danger, the people were
ready—as often in democracy—to turn over all their affairs to good
management.41 Then they carried out the decisions they had made. And so the
summer ended.

1.Book 7 was originally continuous with Book 6; the break was not his doing. It includes much of
Thucydides’s most vivid and affecting prose. A number of passages reduced me to tears as I translated
them (PBW). Here the horrors of war, which the Athenians had so successfully visited on others in the
past, have now come home to them.
2. Epipolae is the high ground beyond and north of the walled city.
3.During the previous winter (415/414) the Athenians had supported Argos against Sparta and, in the
process, attacked Epidaurus, Prasiae, and various other cities of the Peloponnesus. This was regarded by
the Lacedaemonians as a clear violation of the Peace of Nicias (unlike the raids from Pylos), and
Thucydides agreed (6.105).
4. After their initial victory on the Helorus Road in October 415, Nicias and Lamachus had decided to
sail back to Catana for the winter as previously planned. Since this was a joint decision it does not seem
entirely fair to blame Nicias for it.
5.The plan was to go around the end of the cross-wall and seize and fortify the heights that commanded
the wall and the Syracusan camps.
6.After the first winter the Athenians had taken Epipolae by this route (6.97); their enemy Gylippus
used the same approach when he took the hill and began the successful cross-wall (7.2).
7. Boeotia had sent a force of three hundred hoplites to support Syracuse.
8. Here Thucydides describes one of his resources, interviews with veterans. See 1.22, 5.26, and 5.68.
9. Battle hymns were sung by all Greeks before and after battle, but only Dorians used them during
active combat.
10.Akragas: later known as Agrigento and now in Sicilian as Girgenti, a wealthy Greek city on the south
coast of Sicily.
11. The season was summer, and the disease was possibly malaria.
12. Remember that this is the man who said he would always speak his conscience (6.9).
13.The generals in command of an earlier expedition to Sicily had been convicted on such a charge in
424 (4.65).
14.The Athenian sailors were skilled at maneuvers at sea, which enabled them to ram enemy ships
broadside and so disable them. For a vivid account of a sea battle, see 2.83–84.
15.Euesperides is modern Benghazi; Neapolis is modern Nabeul. The distance from Nabeul in Africa to
Selinus in Sicily is about 140 miles.
16. For Thucydides’s attitude toward divination, oracles, etc., see Introduction, xxviii.
17. This extraordinary sentence telegraphs its disturbing ending by putting the name of its main figure,
Eurymedon, as the first word, but in the accusative case, and then letting the reader wonder about his
fate until the last phrase. So swift and telling is the turning point of this battle. Eurymedon was cut off
in the northern part of the harbor, close to Ortygia (the old island city inside Syracuse).
18. The causeway separated the harbor from the swamp to its west.
19. The Etruscans, a people of northern Italy, were long-standing enemies of Syracuse and had
volunteered to help the Athenians.
20.Syracuse was at the time a moderate democracy; a more extreme government would take over after
the Syracusan victory over Athens. See Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 1304a27.
21. Nicias had predicted this problem (6.20).
22. For a similar thought, see the Funeral Oration, 2.37.
23. Cf. 1.76 and 5.105, where the Athenians defend their expansionist policy as normal for human
beings, and 4.61 where Hermocrates excuses it on those grounds: “It’s always human nature, after all, to
rule over those who give in.”
24. The Anapus River flows into the Great Harbor just south of the main Athenian camp.
25.Thucydides is often scornful of superstitions. See 2.8, 2.17, 2.54, 5.103, 7.50, and 7.79; but he finds
one that holds water at 5.26 (the second preface). See Introduction, xxviii.
26. They must have taken a new direction now, in an attempt to get around the gorge.
27.They would have been expected to head for Catana (north of Syracuse, along the east coast), since
that was the nearest friendly city. Camarina and Gela (on the south coast) were not friendly to Athens,
but at this point the generals wanted simply to get out of range of the Syracusan army.
28.The islanders with the Athenians were allied troops. Their only partial response to this invitation
shows that some of the allied troops, at least, were loyal to Athens even in defeat.
29.
6,000: the casualties had been heavy. The tearful army that had left Syracuse seven days earlier had
numbered 40,000, and Demosthenes had started out with more than half of the total (7.75).
30. Now known as the Fiumara di Noto, well south of Syracuse.
31. This sentence is famous as the most horrifying in Thucydides’s history: the Athenians were so
desperately thirsty that they fought each other over water tainted with mud and blood, while enemy
javelins rained down on them. See Hornblower’s note.
32. Syracusan soldiers hid some captives so that they could ransom them for personal profit.
33.The island is Sphacteria, off Pylos, where Demosthenes had cut off the 120 Lacedaemonian soldiers
whose loss helped bring Sparta to agree to the Peace of Nicias. Nicias had brought about the release of
the Spartan soldiers besieged at Sphacteria and arranged the peace of 421 that bears his name.
34. Although Thucydides is not explicit, we must imagine here that he is referring to the mound of
excrement produced by the prisoners, which stank of course, along with the rotting flesh of the dead.
35. A cup: a kotyle held about 0.27 liters. When the Lacedaemonian soldiers were cut off on Sphacteria,
under the treaty described in 4.16, the Athenians allowed each of them two cups of wine, eight cups of
grain, and a piece of meat, plus an additional half ration for each slave, each day. The Syracusans are
allowing the Athenian prisoners only half of what the Athenians allowed the Spartan slaves on Pylos.
The grain was probably wheat.
36. “Total destruction”: panōlethria, a word Herodotus uses for the sack of Troy (2.120.5).
37. According to Isocrates, 40,000 soldiers were lost along with 240 triremes, an enormous loss even for
an alliance of Greek city-states. Athens alone lost 3,000 hoplites, 9,000 of the lower class of citizens, and
at least a 160 triremes. Since Athens had begun the war in 431 with only 13,000 hoplites of prime
military age (2.13), and had since then lost many of these to war and plague, the loss of 3,000 hoplites
would have been devastating.
38.See 3.43 for a similar complaint. The whole city had been committed to the expedition (6.31). Aside
from Alcibiades and Demostratus (see note on 6.25) we do not know who the orators were who had
spoken for the war.
39. The Piraeus: the harbor of Athens.
40. Euboea: the long island running north of Attica, an important source of farm products for Athens.
41.The selection of such a committee smacks of oligarchy. It is a sensible move, to Thucydides’s way of
thinking, but a move the dēmos would take only in a crisis, and shows that Athens was swinging toward
the conservative revolution that would give it an oligarchy in 411. Syracuse, meanwhile, moved in the
opposite direction. A group of radical democrats, including Athenagoras, came to power in the wake of
the victory over Athens in 412. Their triumph was brief. In 409, Carthaginians swept into a Sicily
weakened by war; they destroyed Selinus, Himera, and (a few years later) Akragas. To meet the
continuing threat of attacks from Carthage, Dionysius seized power in Syracuse, overthrew the
democracy, and became tyrant in 405.
 {221} BOOK 8

Aftermath of the Sicilian Expedition1

The collapse of the Sicilian expedition was a major turning point for Athens.
The tragedy of its imperial ambitions was complete, hubris leading to
overreaching, and overreaching leading to disaster. The future of the war
appeared to be no better than survival against tall odds. “The following winter,”
continues Thucydides, “all the Greeks immediately rose up against Athens in
view of their overthrow in Sicily” (8.2.1). This is an overstatement by
Thucydides. Such an uprising was what the Athenians most feared, and it was
what Thucydides thought they deserved. What actually happened was less
dramatic. A number of allied or subject cities turned against Athens, but many
apparently remained loyal.2 The most damaging defection at this stage was that
of the island of Chios in 412, which defected after it turned toward oligarchy,
with encouragement by the Spartans. Meanwhile, another important island,
Samos, went the opposite way: with radical democrats firmly in control, it
became the main base for Athenian operations in the Aegean Sea.
The greatest change in the war at this time came from the intervention of
Persia, which began to finance Spartan naval operations. Greek navies cost a
great deal of money to keep afloat, and Sparta, which was rich only in trained
manpower and agricultural land, {222} would not otherwise have been able to
compete in this area. The Persians wanted to regain control of the Greek cities
and islands along the western coast of Asia Minor,3 and to do this they were
willing to weaken the Athenians without giving the Spartans very much power.
They therefore initiated a delicate game of diplomacy in which Athens and
Sparta competed for financial support from Persia. Athens never got anything
but a few messages to raise their hopes and throw their internal politics into
confusion; the Spartan navy got less than they wanted but enough to make
them a serious threat to the Athenians. They teamed up with their allies,
including Syracuse, which sent a fleet under Hermocrates. The Spartan-allied
fleet defeated an ill-prepared Athenian naval force near Euboea. After this,
with the defection of Euboea, Athens lost a major source of food. Soon after, a
Spartan fleet was defeated at Sestos, on the Hellespont, by an Athenian naval
force that had been stationed at Samos.
Thucydides’s eighth book breaks off in midnarrative, probably owing to the
unexpected death of the author. The text we have covers a short-lived
oligarchic revolution in Athens, a series of naval battles in the Aegean Sea, and
a tale of many betrayals by Alcibiades. Alcibiades had already betrayed Athens
by helping the Spartans; now he will betray the Spartans, become an adviser to
the Persians, and then go back to support Athens.
Below is a sketch of the main political events, with a few quotations from
Thucydides in italics.

OLIGARCHY IN ATHENS AND THE EMPIRE

Athenian conservatives believed that if they could set up a stable oligarchy in
Athens they would earn the confidence of the Persians, and so obtain from
them the money they needed for their survival as a naval power. The idea was
born out of a suggestion from Alcibiades to officers of the Athenian fleet that
was then stationed on Samos and was sent from there to Athens, where it took
hold among a group that had long been yearning for an excuse to abolish
democracy. The failure in Sicily had not been entirely the fault of the
democratic form of government, but many conservatives would have agreed
with Thucydides’s view of the matter: it was the democracy that had pulled
Alcibiades out of the command when he was most needed, and it was the
democracy that had been unwilling to accept failure from its {223} generals and
so had driven them to sink more and more resources in a losing proposition.
For all these reasons, then, the cause of oligarchy gained momentum, and, in
June 411, a new government was established in Athens, known as the Four
Hundred, promising to extend power to a wider group of five thousand (a
promise they probably never intended to make good). One of the most
important of the oligarchic changes was the elimination of all forms of state
pay for public service (except for military service). Such payments had enabled
the poor to take part in government, and indeed may have enticed them to do
so. The Four Hundred managed to intimidate the people of Athens, so that in
the beginning the oligarchy met little resistance. Thucydides was struck by
their success:
It was no marvel that this business succeeded, since it was managed by many
intelligent men;4 but it was a great undertaking, since the Athenian people took it
hard to lose their freedom about a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants.
During this time they had not been subject to anyone, and for half of that time they
had grown accustomed to being the rulers of others. [8.68.4]
Before the oligarchic coup, some Athenians had argued that oligarchy in
Athens would be well received by the Persians. Alcibiades had sent word that
the Persians would come in on the side of Athens if the democracy was put
down. Privately, some of those conspiring to set up an oligarchy were arguing
that the empire would be more secure if an oligarchy in Athens were to be
matched by oligarchies in the subject states. The counterargument, given by a
general named Phrynichus, is of some interest:5
{224} As for the allied cities to whom the conspirators promise oligarchies, since even
the Athenians would be rid of democracy, Phrynichus said he knew full well that this
would neither make those who had already rebelled more likely to return, nor would
it strengthen the loyalty of those who remained, because they would not want to be
subject to an empire, whether democracy or oligarchy, if they could have their liberty
with either form of government. And even those who are called “good and noble
men”6 would, he thought, give them no less trouble than the democracy had done,
since those men had devised evil projects into which they had led the people, and then
they had themselves made the largest profit from them. Besides, under an oligarchy,
allies would be put to death violently without trial, whereas democracy offers a refuge
to ordinary people and is a moderating influence on the oligarchs. [8.48.5–6]
Phrynichus was exactly right: those allies that did accept oligarchy turned
soon after to freedom from the Athenian empire. An oligarchy installed in
Thasos, for example, rebelled within two months:
At Thasos the outcome was contrary to what was expected by the Athenians who
had installed the oligarchy; and so, in my opinion, it was in many of the other parts
of their empire. For as soon as the cities adopted “sensible” policies and felt free from
fear in their actions, they moved straightway to freedom from the superficial “good
government” given them by the Athenians, for which they had no respect.7 [8.64.5]

COLLAPSE OF THE OLIGARCHY

The oligarchy in Athens did not fare well. The troops on Samos never accepted
it. That year Alcibiades reappeared on the Athenian side of the war. Although
the city made no move to reinstate him, the army on Samos welcomed him and
elected him general. Then, when they wanted to sail to Athens and put down
the oligarchy, Alcibiades talked them out of it, thus averting a civil war that
would have been damaging to Athens. Thucydides writes of this as Alcibiades’s
first good service to Athens.
Meanwhile, the oligarchs were not getting along with each other:
Most of the Four Hundred fell into the private ambition that is fatal to an
oligarchy grown out of a democracy. For at once each of them claimed not merely to be
equal to the others, but to be the top man by far. In a {225} democracy, on the other
hand, if a man is defeated in an election he bears it better, because he does not think
he has been beaten by his equals.8 [8.89.3]
And the war continued. With Spartan encouragement, the island of Euboea
rebelled in September, and this threw the Athenians into an even greater panic
than the loss of the Sicilian expedition had done, as Euboea was the
breadbasket of Athens. In battle at Euboea, the Athenians were ill prepared,
and lost so many ships that they would not have been able to defend Athens
itself, had the Spartans been quick on the attack.

THE FIVE THOUSAND

In the panic that followed the loss of Euboea, the Four Hundred oligarchs
were ousted and the form of government they had promised was finally
introduced—rule by the Five Thousand, who had not yet been named:
The Athenians . . . immediately called an assembly on the Pnyx, where they had
been accustomed to assemble in former times.9 There they deposed the Four Hundred,
and voted to entrust affairs of state to the Five Thousand—or the number that could
afford a hoplite’s equipment10—and to give no one a salary for holding any public
office, on pain of a curse. There were also frequent assemblies after this, in which they
elected lawmakers and voted in other measures toward a constitution. And now for
the first time, at least in my life, the Athenians seemed to have ordered their
constitution well: it consisted now of a moderate blending, in the interests of the few
and the many. And this was the first thing, after so many misfortunes had occurred,
that made the city raise its head again. [8.97]
We do not know as much as we would like about the Five Thousand, or
about why Thucydides thought so well of this form of government. The career
of the Five Thousand was short, and may have been only a ploy of the oligarchs
to win over the hoplite class to their {226} side. In any case, Thucydides’s
History breaks off shortly after this passage, and we are left to make out the
story of the rest of the war from other sources.

AFTER THUCYDIDES BREAKS OFF: THE LAST PHASE OF THE WAR

The story was picked up by Xenophon in his Hellenica. After the restoration of
democracy in Athens, the city made a valiant effort to restore enough of the
empire to stay afloat. The Athenians still had good hopes of defense until the
destruction of their fleet at Aegospotami (“Goat River”) in 405. When the
news of this reached Athens “a wail ran up from Piraeus through the long walls
to the city” as the Athenians were struck with the fear that they would be
treated as they had treated the Melians and other conquered peoples.11 After
this, Athens was besieged by Sparta and forced to surrender unconditionally in
404.
Sparta did not treat Athens as Athens had feared. The Spartans did not
destroy Athens, but merely tore down the long walls between Athens and
Piraeus that had secured Athenian access to the sea and took away all but
twelve triremes of the Athenian navy. This disabled Athens from waging war
for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the Spartans installed an
oligarchic regime favorable to themselves, the group known later as the Thirty
Tyrants. These are the authorities Socrates would not serve, as he tells us in the
Apology of Plato.12
What happened next? Democracy was restored in Athens in 403, and the
long walls were rebuilt in 393. Some facsimile of the empire rose from the
ashes, and Athenian culture bloomed as bright as ever. With the foundation of
Plato’s Academy in about 385, Athens began to become truly the school of
Greece. Its population never recovered, however, from the plague and the war.
In 431 we believe there were {227} more than 40,000 adult male citizens in
Athens; in 317 there were only 21,000.
Sparta went into an even steeper decline. The Spartans’ old ally Thebes
turned against them, and their subject peoples in the Peloponnesus rose up
against them again and again. Sparta meanwhile lost population at an
astounding rate. By the end of the fourth century, Sparta was no longer a factor
in Greek affairs.
1.This section is a sketch for those who want only to know what happened next in broad terms. Readers
interested in the political history of Athens and the fall of the empire should read Book 8 entire along
with Kagan 1987. Short passages of translation from Book 8 are printed in italics.
2.Why did they remain loyal? Athens was too weak at this point to frighten them into loyalty by a show
of force. Probably the best explanation is the one Thucydides consistently ignores: that without
Athenian support, many cities in the empire would not have been free from the Persians, and would not
have been able to maintain democratic governments in the face of internal opposition from oligarchs.
For other evidence of allied loyalty to Athens, consider the troops who stayed with Demosthenes when
they could have surrendered safely (7.82).
3.Athens and the Delian League had liberated these places from the Persian Empire long before the
Peloponnesian War.
4. The group that planned the coup included Antiphon, who was also (probably) the man of that name
who was well known as a sophist. Thucydides expresses great respect for Antiphon’s intelligence. After
the restoration of democracy, Antiphon was put on trial for his life. Part of the speech he made in his
own defense (much admired by Thucydides) has survived in a papyrus. Antiphon’s defense speech is a
striking attempt to use the argument from likelihood (eikós) against the plain evidence of the case against
him: it is not likely, he claims, that an orator would want to bring down democracy, since that is the
political context in which he does best. For a translation of the speech, see Gagarin and Woodruff 1995,
219.
5.Phrynichus’s speech represents what Hornblower calls “an elite Athenian take” on the view the allies
had of the empire. He was among the politicians most strongly opposed to the democracy.
6. A favorite expression used by aristocrats to refer to members of their class.
7. “Sensible policies”: sōphrosunē; “good government”: eunomia. Both expressions are associated with
oligarchy.
8. This is a troublesome paradox. The idea seems to be that in democracy a good man who is defeated
can be consoled by the belief that the people who beat him were his inferiors, as would be true in class
terms when an aristocrat is defeated by a common man or by the votes of common men.
9.The Pnyx is a hill near the Acropolis and, as the regular meeting place of the Assembly, had symbolic
importance for the democracy.
10.Hoplites were the heavily armed infantry that formed the backbone of every fighting force in Greece
during this period. Since they were expected to pay for their own weapons and armor, they had to be
men of at least moderate means.
11.Xenophon, Hellenica 2.2.3. For some of the Athenian atrocities against conquered peoples, see 5.116
(massacre of the Melian men and enslavement of the women and children), 2.27 (exile of the people of
Aegina), 4.57 (execution of the prisoners from Aegina), 5.3 (execution of the men at Scione). Compare
the atrocities committed by the Spartans at Plataea (3.68) and the Corcyreans against their own people
(4.47–48). Plato does not believe that Greeks should treat fellow Greeks this way (Republic 5.469b–
471b).
12.Socrates was evenhanded: although critical of democracy, he would not support the Thirty Tyrants in
the commission of crimes (Apology 32b–d).
 {229} Dates

(All dates are BCE)

c. 594 Solon’s reforms in Athens
c. 560 The Athenians give Pisistratus a bodyguard, and this marks the beginning
of his first period of rule as a tyrant
546–545 King Cyrus seizes Asia Minor, including the Asiatic Greeks, for the
Persian Empire
527–510 The sons of Pisistratus rule in Athens
508/507 Democratic institutions begin to evolve in Athens under Cleisthenes
499–494 The Asiatic Greeks rebel against the Persian Empire
494 The Persians take Miletus; they kill the men of Miletus, and burn the
temple of Apollo at Didyma
490 The Persian king Darius sends an army against Greece, which is defeated
by the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon
482 The Athenians, under Themistocles, build the great fleet that will defeat
the Persian navy at Salamis
480 The Persian king Xerxes brings a larger army against Greece; Persian
victory at Thermopylae on land and a draw on sea at Artemisium;
allied Greek victory at Salamis
479 Battle of Plataea: the Greek allies defeat the Persian army; naval victory on
the same day at the Battle of Mycale in Asia Minor
478 Fortification of Athens
478 Foundation of the Delian League
461 Athenian democracy is fully evolved with the reforms of Ephialtes
c. 461–429 The age of Pericles in Athens
458 The Athenians build the long walls to protect the road to their seaport at
the Piraeus
{230} 454 The treasury of the Delian League is transferred to Athens
447–433 Athens builds the Parthenon (the chief temple to the goddess Athena on
the Athenian acropolis)
447/446 Athens puts down a rebellion in Euboea
446/445 Athens and Sparta conclude the Thirty Years’ Peace
432 The “Megarian Decree” is passed in Athens
431–421 Peloponnesian War, first phase (Archidamian War)
430 The plague breaks out in Athens
429 Battle of Naupactus, Athenian victory under Phormio
429 Death of Pericles
427 Surrender of Mytilene to Athens
427 Surrender of Plataea to Sparta and Thebes
427 Civil war (stasis) in Corcyra
425 Capture of 120 Spartan soldiers on Sphacteria
424 Amphipolis revolts against Athens; Thucydides goes into exile
424 Battle of Delium, Athenian defeat
422 Battle of Amphipolis, deaths of Brasidas and Cleon
421–414 Peace of Nicias
416 Slaughter of the Melians
415 Athenian invasion of Sicily
414–404 Peloponnesian War, second phase (Decelean or Ionian War)
413 Destruction of Athenian army and navy outside Syracuse
412 Revolt of Athenian allies
411 Rule by the Four Hundred
411 Thucydides’s History breaks off
405 Destruction of the Athenian navy at the Battle of Aegospotami (“Goat
River”)
404 Surrender of Athens to the Spartans
 {231} Glossary

This glossary explains the most important Greek words and proper names that occur
in the text. References at the end of each entry lead readers to relevant passages in
Thucydides.
adikia, “injustice,” is consistently rendered that way in this translation, although
“wrong” is sometimes more accurate to the context (1.77, 3.38 ff., 44, 47,
5.89).
advantage, see sumpheron.
Aegean Sea, the body of water to the east of Greece, between Greece and what
is now Turkey. It is dotted with islands, and was rimmed all around with
Greek cities in ancient times.
Alcibiades, an Athenian general and politician who rose to prominence at an
early age in about 420. A former disciple of Socrates, he was a man of
enormous charm and great wealth. He talked the Athenians into the expedition
to Sicily (6.17 ff.); after he was removed from command and indicted for
impiety he fled to Sparta and gave them tips on conducting the war against
Athens (6.91–92). He returned to the Athenian side in 411 but was exiled in
406 and died two years later under mysterious circumstances. He is best known
to modern readers through a stunning speech he gives at the end of Plato’s
Symposium. Though this is fiction, it reveals a great deal about the historical
figure behind it.
Amphipolis, a city in Thrace in northern Greece that was of strategic
importance because it guarded access by river to major sources of timber (for
shipbuilding) and precious metals. Originally settled by Thracians, it was made
a colony of Athens in 437, but was lost to the Spartans in 424. The historian
Thucydides held a command in the area at the time of its loss; he was held
accountable and exiled (4.108). Site of a major Athenian defeat in 422, a battle
in which both Cleon and Brasidas died. After this time it maintained its
independence until Philip of Macedon (Alexander’s father) took it in 357.
anankē, “necessity” or “compulsion.” Anankē in Thucydides is usually the
subjective necessity felt under the influence of fear (see Introduction, xli–xlii).
In this translation it is usually translated by “compulsion” or “compel.” The
word’s most famous occurrence in this text is at 1.23; see also 1.75 and 5.105.
andrapodismos, selling free people into slavery. See also douleia.
{232} appropriateness, see epieikeia.
archē, in Thucydides means “empire” and is translated that way throughout. It
can also mean, “rule,” “reign,” and in other contexts “cause,” “origin,”
“beginning,” or “first principle.” On the Athenian Empire, see especially, 1.76,
2.8, 2.36, 3.37 ff., 46, 5.89, 5.97, 6.18, 8.48.
Archidamus, (1.80 ff.) Spartan king during the first phase of the war (the
Archidamian War), 431–421.
aretē, good character, often translated by “virtue.” In Thucydides it often refers
particularly to courage.
Asiatic Greece, the Greek cities located along the coast of Asia Minor (modern
Turkey). Most of these were inhabited by Greeks known as Ionians.
Athenagoras, Syracusan radical democrat (6.39).
Attica, the Athenian homeland (see map, p. lii).
autonomia, independence, having one’s own laws. See Ostwald 1982. In
Thucydides’s time autonomy was a relatively new concept, used for what the
allies thought they lost when the Delian League became an empire. Some allies
evidently complained that Athens violated their autonomy by extending the
jurisdiction of its courts into allied states for some types of cases (1.77). For
some of Athens’s enemies autonomy probably meant “retaining a traditional
form of government”—i.e., oligarchy. Athens supported democratic changes in
many cities belonging to the empire. Such changes would have violated
autonomy in the traditional sense, while leaving the people loyal to Athens.
This would explain why, when Athens was at its weakest later in the war, it was
not entirely abandoned by the allies it was supposed to have subjugated. See
Introduction, xxi.
Boeotia, the country bordering on Athens to the west, with its main city at
Thebes. Boeotia had shrugged off Athenian attempts at conquest before the
war, and during the war was an ally of Sparta.
Brasidas, Spartan general successful both in speaking and in battle. He
persuaded several cities to defect from Athens and won major victories (4.84–
86), including the one at Amphipolis at which he died (4.104–8, summary at p.
157–59).
Chios, an island in the eastern Aegean that remained loyal to Athens until 413,
after which it resisted Athens until the end of the war. Chios was one of the
very few members of the Delian League that retained its own fleet.
civil war, see stasis.
Cleon, Athenian politician and demagogue who rose to power after the death of
Pericles. He was responsible for the brilliant Athenian success {233} at
Sphacteria (425). In this History, he figures mainly as the speaker who
advocates the death penalty for all male citizens of Mytilene (3.36 ff.). Died at
Amphipolis in 422 (4.104–8, summary at p. 158).
colonies, city-states founded by older Greek cities. They were usually
independent politically, but maintained friendly relations with their parent
cities. Greek colonies in Sicily and southern Italy date from the eighth century.
compulsion, see anankē.
Corcyra, an island off the west coast of Greece, modern Corfu. Corcyra was a
colony of, but in conflict with, Corinth. See 1.32–43 and 3.81 ff.
Corinth, a Dorian city on the isthmus between Attica and the Peloponnesus.
Corinth was an important commercial center and a major ally of Sparta.
Cyrus, king of Persia and founder of the Persian Empire. He conquered Asia
Minor, along with the Greek cities located there, in 546/545.
Darius, king of Persia who put down the Ionian revolt in 494 and proceeded to
send by sea an expedition against Greece that was defeated at Marathon in 490.
Delian League, the alliance of Greek city-states led by Athens, formed in 478 in
the extended conflict with Persia that followed Greek victories at Salamis and
Plataea.
Delium, a shrine on the edge of Boeotia, scene of a terrible defeat for Athens in
424.
Delos, a tiny island near the center of the Aegean. Sacred to Apollo, and a
center of Greek religious life, Delos also became the center of the League
established by Athens to continue fighting against the Persian Empire. In 454,
the League’s treasury was moved to Athens.
demagogue, literally, “leader of the people.” Demagogues in Athens exercised
influence apart from holding public office by speaking effectively in the
Assembly.
dēmos, literally “people,” often means a political group that claims to represent
the common people as opposed to the wealthy, although some advocates of
democracy defend it as rule by and for the whole people of a city (6.39). See
also 2.65, 5.85, 7.48.
Demosthenes, Athenian general who occupied Pylos in 425 and commanded the
reinforcements for the Sicilian expedition in 413.
dikaion, rendered “justice” in this translation, although “right” (as opposed to
“wrong”) is sometimes more accurate in context. See 3.39 ff., 44, 47, 82, 5.89
ff., 5.98, 5.105, 5.107, and Introduction, xxxvii–xxxviii.
{234} Diodotus, the Athenian speaker who defended the lives of the
Mytileneans (3.42 ff.). Nothing more is known of him.
Dorians, a group of Greeks with a distinct cultural tradition marked by the
Doric dialect. Spartans, Corinthians, and, indeed, most of the Peloponnesian
League were Dorians, as were the Syracusans.
douleia, subjugation, slavery, but not necessarily chattel slavery. Opponents of
the empire commonly used the word and its cognates for the status of the
member states of the Athenian Empire. To reduce people to chattel slavery (as
Athens did to the women and children of Melos), the word is andrapodismos.
drachma, see talent.
eikós, “reasonable expectation.” Greek orators frequently built arguments
around what was eikós, or what could reasonably be expected. I have followed
Hobbes in translating the word as “reason.” Some modern translators prefer
“probability,” but this is misleading. Typical uses are at 2.63, 3.40.4, 6.17–18.
empire, see archē.
ephor, one of five high elected officials in Lacedaemon.
epieikeia, the appropriate or what is fitting for a particular case, implying a
flexible approach to enforcing the law, which is nevertheless in line with justice
(3.40, 48, 5.86, 90).
Epipolae, the strategic height overlooking Syracuse, site of the night battle that
turned the tide against the Athenians in 413 (7.42 ff.).
Euboea, the long island off the north coast of Attica. Athenian military and
economic strategy depended on retaining control over Euboea, which tended to
prefer independence.
Eurymedon, Athenian commander at Corcyra (3.81) and Sicily (7.42–52).
factionalism, see stasis.
Five Thousand, the more democratic oligarchy that the Four Hundred
promised to the Athenians, and which briefly succeeded them (8.97).
Four Hundred, the oligarchy, named after the size of its executive body, that
seized power in Athens and held it for a few months in 411 (8.64 ff.).
Hermocrates, Sicilian leader who gave a strong speech for uniting Sicily against
the threat of Athenian hegemony (4.59 ff.)
Hipparchus, the younger son of the tyrant Pisistratus, killed by Harmodius and
Aristogeiton (6.54 ff.).
{235} hoplites, or heavily armed infantry, formed the backbone of Greek armies
in this period. As they were expected to pay for their own armor (hopla), they
usually had to have some money of their own, but were sometimes armed at
public expense (as is likely in the case of Socrates). Hoplites, in most cases,
were moderately well-off citizens.
injustice, see adikia.
Ionians, a group of Greeks characterized by a distinct dialect and cultural
tradition, and living mainly on or near the coast of Asia Minor, where they
came in contact with stimulating non-Greek cultures. Athens was commonly
accepted as the original homeland of the Ionians.
isonomia, a system of law or justice that is fair or equal. See the notes on 3.62
and 3.82.
justice, see dikaion.
Lacedaemon, the name usually used for Sparta.
Lamachus, Athenian general who was given shared command of the Sicilian
expedition with Nicias and Alcibiades in 415 and was killed in 414.
Lesbos, the largest of the islands off the west coast of Asia Minor. Its main city
was Mytilene.
Marathon, a plain on the coast north of Athens and the site of the battle in
which the Athenians and their Plataean allies defeated the Persian army that
first invaded Greece in 490.
Megara, a city located between Athens and Corinth; a member of the
Peloponnesian League. The Megarian Decree of the Athenians barred Megara
from commerce with Athens and its empire, and was one of the causes of the
war.
Melos, a Dorian but nonaligned island in the Aegean. In 416/415 the island
was seized by Athens and its people destroyed (5.85–116).
Messenians, the inhabitants of Messenia, the district of the Peloponnesus west
of Sparta. Conquered by Sparta in the eighth and seventh centuries, most of
the Messenians were forced to work what had been their own land for Spartan
landlords. Something between serfs and sharecroppers, they were known as
helots. A series of uprisings led to the settlement of a group of Messenians at
Naupactus after 455, a safe distance from Sparta, in the middle of the fifth
century. Messenians fought alongside Athens against Sparta whenever they
could, and in 369, finally achieved independence.
metics, resident aliens in Athens.
{236} Miletus, an Ionian city of Asiatic Greece, the main center of Ionian
Greek culture before its destruction by the Persians in 494.
Mytilene, capital of the island of Lesbos, and one of the few members of the
Delian League to retain its own fleet. It rebelled against the Athenian empire
in 428, was defeated in 427, and narrowly missed total destruction (3.36–49).
In 412, amid the general revolt of the allies, it rebelled again.
Naupactus, site of a settlement of Messenian enemies of Sparta on the north
shore of the Gulf of Corinth. See Messenians. Also the site of a major Athenian
naval victory under Phormio in 429.
necessity, see anankē.
new learning, the enlightenment of the fifth century in Greece, which grew
around the sophists and the teaching of rationalist science and rhetoric. Pericles
was associated with the movement, and under his leadership Athens gave the
warmest welcome in Greece to the new teachers. Sparta, characteristically, gave
the coldest.
Nicias, an Athenian politician and general. His name is given to the peace
treaty of 421 between Athens and Sparta. Opposed to the expedition against
Sicily (6.9 ff.), he was nevertheless made one of its three commanders in 415.
He is best known to philosophers through his part in Plato’s dialogue on
courage, the Laches.
oligarchy, literally, “rule by the few.” Oligarchs, rich men or aristocrats, held
power in most of the cities that were allied with the Spartans. See 1.19, 3.39,
47, 82, 5.85, 6.39, 7.48.
Peloponnesus, the near-island in which Sparta is located. A system of military
alliances gave Sparta effective control of most of the Peloponnesus during the
period of this war.
people, see dēmos.
Pericles (490–429), leader of Athens during the period of its greatest expansion
and most explosive cultural development. Strategy in the war (2.12, 13, 22),
delivers funeral oration (2.34 ff.), praised by Thucydides (2.65).
Phrynichus, a conservative Athenian general (8.48).
Piraeus, the main port of Athens.
Pisistratus, first tyrant of Athens, from about 560 to his death in 527. During
his rule and that of his sons, Athens emerged as a military and commercial
power in Greece and began its rise to cultural ascendancy (1.20, 6.54).
{237} Plataea, small city in Boeotia that distinguished itself by joining Athens
and Sparta during the Persian Wars. Site of the decisive battle in which Greek
allied troops led by Sparta defeated the Persian army (479). Plataea sided with
Athens in the wars with Sparta, and was destroyed in 427 (2.71–78, 3.20–24,
3.52–68).
pleonexia, avarice or greed that leads to overreaching; wanting more than your
share.
Pnyx, the hill next to the Acropolis at which the Athenian Assembly met.
Potidaea, a colony of Corinth with a strategic position near Macedonia. A
member of the Delian League, it rebelled in 432 in protest against a rise in
taxes, and was taken after a long siege in the winter of 430. The siege of
Potidaea was one of the immediate causes of the war. Socrates served there as a
soldier, and his hardiness during that cold winter is reported by Alcibiades in
Plato’s Symposium 219e ff.
Pylos, see Sphacteria.
reason, i.e., what is reasonable, see eikós.
Salamis, an island in the Saronic Gulf offshore from Attica. Site of the naval
battle in which the Greek navy defeated the navy of the invading Persians in
480.
Samos, an island off the coast of Asia Minor not far from Miletus. A strong
member of the Delian League, Samos tried to quit in 440, but was brutally
brought to heel by Pericles. In the second phase of the war, after 412, Samos
became a major Athenian naval base.
slavery, see douleia and andrapodismos.
Solon, Athenian statesman and poet, born about 638. In about 594, at a time of
great social unrest, he attempted to preserve a balance in government by
instituting moderate popular reforms. These were thought to have paved the
way for the development of Athenian democracy a century later.
sōphrosunē, the virtue of being sound-minded, clearheaded, prudent, self-
controlled, and moderate; the basis the Spartans claimed for all their virtues
(1.84). This virtue was especially claimed also by supporters of oligarchy.
Sphacteria, a tiny island offshore of Pylos, on the west coast of the
Peloponnesus. In 425, Athenians and Messenians fortified Pylos, and when the
Spartans countered with a garrison on Sphacteria, the allies besieged and
eventually captured 120 Spartan soldiers on the island. This was the most
dramatic success Athens had in the war.
{238} stasis, the Greek word for civil disturbances ranging from political
conflict to all-out civil war. It is translated as “civil war” here, as Thucydides
uses the word mainly for violent stasis. The word can be used, however, simply
for factionalism. See 1.18, 2.65, and, most important, 3.82–83 and 6.17.
subjugation, see douleia.
sumpheron, “advantage” or “what is advantageous”; “expedience” (1.76, 2.39,
3.38, 44, 47, 5.90–91, 5.98, 5.106, 5.107).
Syracuse, a colony of Corinth and the most prosperous of the Greek cities on
the island of Sicily. It was the main target of Athens’s ill-fated expedition of
415–413.
talent, a large sum of money amounting to sixty minas, each of which was
worth a hundred drachmas. A drachma would pay for one day’s labor by a
skilled man; a citizen’s pay for a day of jury duty was half a drachma (three
obols).
Thermopylae, a battle in 480 in which a small Spartan force was wiped out in a
glorious defense of the pass of Thermopylae against the invading Persian army.
The stand of the Spartans against overwhelming numbers gave luster to the
reputation of the Spartans for discipline and courage.
Thirty Years’ Peace, the treaty that kept a kind of peace between the Athenians
and the Lacedaemonians and their respective allies from 446/445 to 432/431,
when the Spartans voted to go to war.
trireme, a large Greek warship of the period (1.13–14). A trireme carried a crew
of two hundred rowers, marines, and officers. They fought by ramming each
other at speed or by placing themselves close enough to other vessels that the
marines on board could fire off javelins, arrows, or slings.
Tyrant, tyrannos, a sole ruler, usually without the legitimacy of a traditional
monarch (1.17–18, 2.63, 3.37, 6.54). Rulers called “tyrants” were established in
many Greek cities during the seventh and sixth centuries. The word tyrannos
did not have a pejorative connotation until late in the fifth century.
 {239} Index

Acanthus, 153–55, 161

Aegina, 21, 24, 41, 130
Alcibiades: 163, 175; at Samos, 224; character, 162, 178–79, 222; speaks on
Sicily, 180–83; suspected of impiety, 186–87, 189; recalled from Sicily, 191–
92; speaks at Sparta, 192–93
alliances: 19, 22, 99–101, 129, 149, 161–62, 179; lists of allies, 52, 205–6
ambition, as cause of war, xviii, xl, xlii, 31, 141, 224
Amphipolis, 157–58, 161
anankē. See necessity
Antiphon, 223n4
appropriateness (epieikeia), 115, 120, 165
arbitration, 20, 24, 38, 41n95, 42, 45
Archidamus: besieges Plataea, 82–86; invades Attica, 57–60, 95; speaks at
Sparta, 34–37; speaks to officers, 52–54
Argos, 162–63, 171
Aristogeiton, 12, 189–90
Athenian Empire: as tyranny (unjust), 77, 112, 115, 119, 165; democracy in,
119; natural, 150; origins, xx, xxiv, 12, 40, 62, 182; power of, 76; popularity,
xxi–xxii, 51–52, 153n9, 177. See also Delian League
Athenians: constitution, xviii–xx, 62, 64, 80, 222–23; customs, 63–65;
evacuation, 56–57; strength at outset, 55–56; speech at Sparta, 29–34;
tyranny, 189–90, 226
autonomy, 41–42, 45, 119, 154, 232. See also freedom
avarice (pleonexia), as cause of war, xxxvii, xl, xliii, 141

Brasidas: 33n77, 160; at Amphipolis, 157, 159; campaign in Thrace, 152–55;

speech at Acanthus, 153–55

Callicles, xxxvii
Catana, 174, 188, 196
Chios, 12, 73, 100, 163, 205, 221
civil war: xxxv, xl, 181, 200; in Acanthus, 153–54; in Athens, 2, 80; in Corcyra,
133–45; in Sparta, 11; moral breakdown in, 139–43; Sicilians against
Sicilians, 149
Cleon: as speaker, xxxix; character, xxix, xxxii–xxxiii, 111, 160; speaks on
Mytilene, 112–116, 117; victory at Sphacteria, 147–48; defeat at Amphipolis,
158
Cnemus (Lacedaemonian general), 87–90, 94
Corcyra: 24, 26, 46; civil war, 133–45; speech in Athens, 15–18
{240} Corinth: history, 9; speech at Athens, 19–22; speech at Sparta, 25–29

death penalty, 118

Decelea, 191, 196
Delian League, xx, xxiv, 12, 39–40, 100nn18–20, 101n24. See also Athenian
Empire
Delium, battle of, 156–57, 159
demagogues, xv, xix, xxxvi, 112n51, 233
democracy: in Athens, xix–xx, 62, 64, 80, 220, 226; in Corcyra, 134–36, 139; in
Delian League, 119; strengths, xxxvi, 188, 204; weaknesses, xxxiv, xxxv,
xxxviii, 112, 192, 220, 222; vs. oligarchy, 224
dēmos, 134–36, 188
Demosthenes (general): at Sphacteria, 147; in Sicily, 195–97, 200, 202, 207,
210, 215; death, 218
Diodotus: on rhetoric, xxxii; in Mytilene debate, xxxiv, 116–120
divination, 167, 203, 219. See also oracles
Dorians, xix, 8, 52, 72, 149–51

eclipse, 203
education: in Athens, 112; in Sparta, 36
Egesta, 173, 175, 177, 178, 183, 188
eikós, xxix, 2, 223n4, 234
empire. See Athenian Empire
Epidamnus, 17, 46, 134
Epipolae, 191, 195, 197–200
equality (isonomia): 180; in democracy, 188; in oligarchy, 128
Eurymedon, 133, 138–39, 143–44, 195, 202, 203

fear: as motive, 6, 18, 38–39, 142, 155; as binding alliances, 100–101; and
empire, 191
Five Thousand: xxix, 223; Thucydides’s admiration for, xxxvi, 225
Four Hundred, 223–25
freedom: from Athenian empire, 26, 153–55, 184; from Persian empire, 99,
123; as source of confidence, 65

gods, xxviii, xxx

Gylippus, 195, 197, 200, 202, 204, 206–7, 211, 214, 215–17

Harmodius, 12, 189–90

Hermocrates: speaks at Gela, 148–51; at Camarina, 190–91; deceives
Athenians, 210
Hippias and Hipparchus, 12, 189–90
Homer, 3, 6–7, 65
hope, as misleading motivation, 35, 66, 71, 77, 118, 150, 152, 167
human nature: and crime, 118; and democracy, xxxix; and empire, 150, 168,
212; in war, xl, 139, 142–43

Ionians, 10, 149–51, 174, 206

{241} justice/injustice: and empire, 77, 164–70; and oaths, 83–84; and
punishment, 119, 141; and vengeance, 150; appeals to, 15, 21, 28, 38, 53, 99,
113–115, 123–24, 129–31, 151; in civil war, 141–43; overview, xxxvii, 233; vs.
advantage, 116–18, 120, 125

Lacedaemonians: constitution, xviii–xix; customs, 168, 178; early history, 6–7;

decision for war, 38–39; in victory, 226; population, 148n1
Lamachus, 175, 191
law: law of the Greeks, 21, 132; rule of law, 128; unwritten law, 63, 124, 131,
 143; vs. force, 33
Leontini, 173–74, 183
Lesbos. See Mytilene

Marathon, 30, 61
Megara, 21, 24, 41–42, 45, 154nn12,14
Melos, 163–71
Messenians, 92, 136, 138, 235
Methymna, 95–96, 104
Minos, 3, 5
Mytilene: debate, 110–120; defeat, 108–110; revolt, 95–98; speech at Olympia,
98–102

nature. See human nature

Naupactus, 81, 87, 137
naval power: development, 5, 9–10; importance 44–45; tactics 91–92
necessity, xli–xliii, 15n39, 19, 33
Nicias: and divination, 203; at Megara, 121; contacts in Syracuse, 210; defends
camp, 191; leadership in retreat, 215–16; lies to delay departure, 200–2;
exhorts troops, 206, 207, 210, 212–13; fear of democracy, xxxix, 201; speaks
on Sicily, 175–79, 183–87; surrender, 217–18; Thucydides’s judgment, 160,
218
oaths, xxvii–xxviii, 83–84, 140, 155. See also treaties
oligarchy: equality in, 128; in Athens, 220n41, 221n2, 222–23; against the
empire, 119, 224, 236; in Peloponnesian League, 12; weaknesses of, 188,
224–25; vs. democracy, 224. See also civil war
oracles, xxviii, 40, 51, 56–57, 72, 162, 167

Paches, 103–4, 109–111, 120

Pausanias, 33n77, 39
Pausanias the younger, 108–9
Peace of Nicias, xxv, 159–62, 196
Peithias, 134–35
Pericles: Funeral Oration, 60–68; last speech, 74–78; prosecution and fine, 79;
strategy, 54–55, 59; Thucydides’s judgment, 78–80; war speech, 41–46
Persian Empire, xxiii, 10
Persian Wars, 30, 31, 99
Phormio: Naupactus campaign, 81, 87–94; speech, 91–92
piety. See reverence
{242} pity, xxviii n14, 71, 112, 115, 120, 126, 131, 213
piracy, in early times, 3–5, 7
Pisistratus, xxiii, 189
plague: 68–72; symptoms, 69–70
Plataea: attack on, 47–49; battle of, xxiv, 82; breakout from, 105–8; siege of,
82–86, 111; speech to Archidamus, 82–83; speech in debate, 122–27;
surrender, 122, 127
Plato, and Thucydides, xliii–xliv
Polycrates, 9
Potidaea, 24, 41–42, 74, 81–82
Protagoras, xxxviii
punishment, xvii, xx, xxxvii, 21, 37, 63, 79, 84, 113–16, 118–20
Pylos, 147

reverence: xxvii–xviii, 50, 102, 124, 126, 131; in civil war, 141, 143

Salamis, xxiv, 30
Samos, 9, 21, 100, 221, 224
Scione, 157–58, 161
self-control, 26, 36
Sicily: history, 174; unity of, 148–51, 181
Solon, xxiii
sophists, xvii, xxii–xxiii
Sparta. See Lacedaemonians
speeches: authenticity xxx–xxxii, 13; effectiveness, xxxiii, xxxix, 113, 132
Sphacteria, xxv, 147
stasis. See civil war
Sthenilaïdas, 37–38
suppliants, xxviii, 102, 126–27, 131, 138, 183
Syracuse: xxvi; building empire, 143, 173, 177; debate at, 187–88

Thebes: value to Sparta, 133; attack on Plataea, 47–49, 124; speech against
Plataea, 127–32
Themistocles, 30
Thirty Years’ Peace, 20, 24, 38, 50–51
Thucydides: as general, 157; authorial statements, xxvii–xxx; exile, xvii, 157,
162, 193n52; life, xvi–xvii; mentions himself, 1, 162; overstatements, 51–52,
221; political theory, xxix, xxxv–xxxvi
Torone, 157–58
treaties, xxviii, 29, 97, 132. See also alliances
triremes, 9
Trojan War, 6–8
truce. See treaties
tyrants: 8–11; in Athens, 12, 189–90, 226
tyranny, 77, 112

virtue: and honor, 90; and Nicias, 218; and treaties, 99, 123; in Athens, 65–66;
of women, 68; strategically signaled, xxxiii, 71, 77, 131, 154

war: xl, 75; and finance, 7, 36, 43, 55; and human nature (a violent teacher),
139; uncertainty of, 33–34, 53