1MRK511453-UEN E en Cyber Security Guideline REB500 8
1MRK511453-UEN E en Cyber Security Guideline REB500 8
IEC18000572
IEC18000572
The software and hardware described in this document is furnished under a license and may be used or
disclosed only in accordance with the terms of such license.
This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit
(https://www.openssl.org/). This product includes cryptographic software written/developed by: Eric
Young ([email protected]) and Tim Hudson ([email protected]).
Trademarks
ABB is a registered trademark of ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Manufactured by/for a Hitachi Energy
company. All other brand or product names mentioned in this document may be trademarks or
registered trademarks of their respective holders.
Warranty
Please inquire about the terms of warranty from your nearest Hitachi Energy representative.
Disclaimer
This document contains information about one or more Hitachi Energy products and may include a
description of or a reference to one or more standards that may be generally relevant to the Hitachi
Energy products. The presence of any such description of a standard or reference to a standard is not a
representation that all the Hitachi Energy products referenced in this document support all the features
of the described or referenced standard. In order to determine the specific features supported by a
particular Hitachi Energy product, the reader should consult the product specifications for that Hitachi
Energy product. In no event shall Hitachi Energy be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental, or
consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, nor shall Hitachi
Energy be liable for incidental or consequential damages arising from the use of any software or
hardware described in this document.
Hitachi Energy may have one or more patents or pending patent applications protecting the intellectual
property in the Hitachi Energy products described in this document. The information in this document
is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy.
Hitachi Energy assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document.
All people responsible for applying the equipment addressed in this manual must satisfy themselves that
each intended application is suitable and acceptable, including compliance with any applicable safety or
other operational requirements. Any risks in applications where a system failure and/or product failure
would create a risk for harm to property or persons (including but not limited to personal injuries or
death) shall be the sole responsibility of the person or entity applying the equipment, and those so
responsible are hereby requested to ensure that all measures are taken to exclude or mitigate such
risks.
Products described or referenced in this document are designed to be connected and to communicate
information and data through network interfaces, which should be connected to a secure network. It
is the sole responsibility of the system/product owner to provide and continuously ensure a secure
connection between the product and the system network and/or any other networks that may be
connected.
The system/product owners must establish and maintain appropriate measures, including, but not limited
to, the installation of firewalls, application of authentication measures, encryption of data, installation
of antivirus programs, and so on, to protect these products, the network, its system, and interfaces
against security breaches, unauthorized access, interference, intrusion, leakage, and/or theft of data or
information.
Hitachi Energy performs functionality testing on released products and updates. However, system/
product owners are ultimately responsible for ensuring that any product updates or other major system
updates (to include but not limited to code changes, configuration file changes, third-party software
updates or patches, hardware change out, and so on) are compatible with the security measures
implemented. The system/product owners must verify that the system and associated products function
as expected in the environment in which they are deployed. Hitachi Energy and its affiliates are not
liable for damages and/or losses related to security breaches, any unauthorized access, interference,
intrusion, leakage, and/or theft of data or information.
This document and parts thereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from
Hitachi Energy, and the contents thereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any
unauthorized purpose.
Conformity
This product complies with the directive of the Council of the European Communities on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility (EMC Directive
2014/30/EU) and concerning electrical equipment for use within specified voltage limits (Low-voltage
directive 2014/35/EU). This conformity is the result of tests conducted by Hitachi Energy in accordance
with the product standards EN 60255-26 for the EMC directive, EN 60255-1 & EN 60255-27 for
the low voltage directive, and EN 50121-5 for Railway applications (Emission and immunity of fixed
power supply installations and apparatus). The product is designed in accordance with the international
standards of the IEC 60255 series.
1MRK511453-UEN Rev. E Table of contents
Table of contents
Section 1 Introduction........................................................................................................ 4
1.1 This manual................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Intended audience......................................................................................................................4
1.3 Revision history.......................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Product documentation.............................................................................................................. 4
1.5 Symbols and conventions.......................................................................................................... 5
1.5.1 Symbols....................................................................................................................................5
1.5.2 Document conventions.............................................................................................................6
Section 1 Introduction
1.1 This manual GUID-BD3A323B-5DCE-4CE6-8F93-36CDCFC7A276 v3
The cyber security deployment guideline describes the process for handling cyber security when
communicating with the IED. Certification, Authorization with role based access control, and product
engineering for cyber security related events are described and sorted by function.
This guideline is intended for the system engineering, commissioning, operation and maintenance
personnel handling cyber security during the engineering, installation and commissioning phases, and
during normal service. The personnel is expected to have general knowledge about topics related to
cyber security.
The electrical warning icon indicates the presence of a hazard which could result in electrical
shock.
The warning icon indicates the presence of a hazard which could result in personal injury.
The caution icon indicates important information or warning related to the concept discussed
in the text. It might indicate the presence of a hazard which could result in corruption of
software or damage to equipment or property.
The information icon alerts the reader of important facts and conditions.
The tip icon indicates advice on, for example, how to design your project or how to use a
certain function.
Although warning hazards are related to personal injury, it is necessary to understand that under certain
operational conditions, operation of damaged equipment may result in degraded process performance
leading to personal injury or death. Therefore, comply fully with all warning and caution notices.
• Abbreviations and acronyms in this manual are spelled out in the glossary. The glossary also contains
definitions of important terms.
• Push button navigation in the LHMI menu structure is presented by using the push button icons.
For example, to navigate the options, use and .
• HMI menu paths are presented in bold.
For example, select Main menu /Settings .
• Signal names are presented in bold.
The signal 21120_EXT_TEST_TRIP can be set and reset via the LHMI Test Trip menu.
• Parameter names and parameter values are presented in italics.
For example, the default value of the Operation setting is Not inverted.
• Section references are presented with the respective section numbers.
For example, see Section 1.5.2 for more details about document conventions.
Dangerous voltages can occur on the connectors, even though the auxiliary voltage has
been disconnected.
Whenever changes are made in the IEDs, measures should be taken to avoid inadvertent
tripping.
The IEDs contain components which are sensitive to electrostatic discharge. Unnecessary
touch of electronic components must therefore be avoided.
The electric power grid has evolved significantly over the past decade thanks to many technological
advancements and breakthroughs. As a result, the emerging “smart grid” is quickly becoming a
reality. At the heart of these intelligent advancements are specialized IT systems, various control and
automation solutions such as substation automation systems. To provide end users with comprehensive
real-time information, enable higher reliability and greater control; the automation systems have become
ever more interconnected. To combat the increased risks associated with these interconnections,
we offer a wide range of cyber security products and solutions for automation systems and critical
infrastructure.
The new generation of automation systems uses open standards such as IEC 60870-5-103, DNP 3.0
and IEC 61850 and commercial technologies, in particular Ethernet- and TCP/IP-based communication
protocols. They also enable connectivity to external networks, such as office intranet systems and
the Internet. These changes in technology, including the adoption of open IT standards, have brought
huge benefits from an operational perspective, but they have also introduced cyber security concerns
previously known only to office or enterprise IT systems.
To counter cyber security risks, open IT standards are equipped with cyber security mechanisms. These
mechanisms, developed in a large number of enterprise environments, are proven technologies. They
enable the design, development and continual improvement of cyber security solutions specifically for
control systems, including substation automation applications.
Hitachi Energy fully understands the importance of cyber security and its role in advancing the security
of substation automation systems. A customer investing in new Hitachi Energy technologies can rely on
system solutions where reliability and security have the highest priority.
At Hitachi Energy, we are addressing cyber security requirements on a system level as well as on
a product level to support cyber security standards such as NERC-CIP, IEEE 1686, Compliance to
IEC 62443-4-2 and BDEW Whitepaper. We support verified third-party security patches and antivirus
software to protect station computers from viruses and other types of attacks. Cyber security can also
be improved by preventing the unauthorized use of removable media (such as USB memory sticks)
in station computers. We have built additional security mechanisms into our products. Those offer
advanced account management, secure communication, and detailed security audit trails. This makes it
easier for our customers to address NERC CIP requirements and maintain compliance standards.
Maintenance Center
Security Zone 4
Encrypted
communication
Encrypted
communication
Firewall/ Router/
Station LAN
VPN
Other AB B
L
R
3
Me nu
§
Help
Protection
and Control
IEDs
Bay Units
12
I ESC
12
I 12 I ESC 3 Clea r
3 Clea r ESC 3 Clea r
Me nu Help
Me nu Help Me nu Help
L L L
R
R R
19000003-IEC19001101-4-en.vsdx
IEC19001101 V4 EN-US
REB500 is a multi application protection IED, with an integrated HMI, suitable for various requirements
of the power system applications.
Hitachi Energy follows a secure development life-cycle for the development of its products and ensures
that design best practices including defense-in-depth are utilized to develop a secure product and with
continuous improvement and updates the security is maintained. However, achieving a secure system
does not end with only a secure product, a defense-in-depth strategy needs to be adopted, which
means that there are multiple techniques which are applied in layers to thwart or delay an attacker. The
important thing about security is to understand that security is a chain consisting of many components.
Which components to implement in the system depends on both which security threats to address and
what is considered as the correct and balanced security of the system.
Physical security and upholding processes that support the organization’s security policies are perhaps
the most important part of system security. Also important is the authorization of users, logging, firewalls,
hardening of the unused ports and the use of secure protocols. Dependence between different security
measures needs to be considered to get the best out of implemented security features. For example, to
get the most out of audit logging you depend on good authorization and the opposite is also true.
Security is a process and not a state. It is about applying fit-to-purpose, cost-effective mechanisms and
at each point in time throughout the process. A layered defense helps to mitigate the threats.
Security policy is a set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system or organization
provides security services to protect sensitive and critical system resources.
Principles and decisions, rules or good practices that are applied when designing systems. Hitachi
Energy’s products and solutions use certain specific security principles and best practices as a basis
for providing system security. One important principle is the defense-in-depth which calls for the
employment of security mechanisms in layers. The defense-in-depth strategy is summed up by the term
Belt and Braces, that is, if one mechanism fails other mechanisms are remaining to provide adequate
protection.
Another fundamental principle is the least privilege which states that an entity is only given the privilege
needed to perform the tasks and devices do not run any unnecessary services.
Security service is a fundamental concept in product or system security, The service meets the
security objectives identified by the threat-and-risk analysis. Security services are implemented by
means of security functions and mechanisms. A confidentiality security service, for example, might
be implemented using HTTPS with encryption as the security function. This, in turn, makes use of
encryption mechanisms.
1. Accountability procedures are used to keep track of who does what and when; it goes hand in
handwith non-repudiation providing evidence on who did what. Accountability functions track the
usage of security services and network resources. Accountability logs facilitate recovery and fault
discovery.
2. Authentication is used to confirm the identities of communicating entities (person, device, service
or application) and ensures that the entities are not masquerading or attempting unauthorized replay
of previous communication.
3. Authorization protects against unauthorized use of network resources. Access control ensures
that solely authorized personnel or devices have access to system components (products), stored
information, information flows, services and applications. The three-security services Accountability,
Authentication, and Authorization are sometimes bundled together and abbreviated AAA.
4. Availability means that authorized entities have access to system components, stored information,
information flows, services and applications regardless of incidents that affect the system.
5. Confidentiality goes hand in hand with Privacy and entails protecting data from unauthorized
disclosure. Data confidentiality ensures that data content cannot be understood by unauthorized
entities. Encryption, access control lists, and file permissions are methods frequently used to protect
data confidentiality.
6. Integrity ensures the correctness or accuracy of data. The data is protected against unauthorized
modification, deletion, creation, and replication. Integrity features might also indicate unauthorized
activities.
The different security layers, in the integration environment of REB500 and the product itself:
• Physical perimeter protection: measures to prevent attacks via physical access to the product.
• Electronic security perimeter protection: measures to prevent attacks entering via remote access
channels.
Physical security zones are used to limit access to a particular area because all the systems in that
area require the same level of trust of their human personnel, such as operators, and maintainers. For
physical zones, locks on doors or other physical means protect against unauthorized access. In general
words, the boundary is the wall or cabinet that restricts access. This physical zone should have physical
boundaries commensurate with the level of security desired and aligned with the asset owner's physical
security plans. It is expected that only authorized people are allowed into the asset owner site control
zone, and unauthorized people are restricted from entering in the zone.
The asset owner must ensure the physical security of all cybersecurity-critical assets. This means a
physical security perimeter must be in place around all cyber-security-critical assets and all physical
access points to those assets must be known, documented, identified, and controlled. The access to the
substation as well as to the rooms is in the scope of the asset owner. And even though all the panels
delivered from the system integrator are equipped with facilities to add locks, the handling of the locks
and keys is in the responsibility of the assert owner.
The electronic perimeter protection is implemented using different cybersecurity features in the
substation.
REB500 product support security features to support defense-in-depth strategy which are described in
different chapters of the security deployment guideline.
• REB500 product support both local account management and integration with a central account
managementserver. In case of central account management, the authentication is provided by the
central account management whereas authorization is managed locally.
• REB500 product supports user authentication based on usernames and passwords.
• REB500 product supports user roles and permissions, enabling least-privileges configuration for
users. Security relevant user operations are logged as security events.
• REB500 product supports configuring complex password policies.
• REB500 product supports encrypted communication using protocols like HTTPS, FTPS and IED
configuration protocol via TLS.
• REB500 product support an integrated firewall, which supports deny-by-default and derives its settings
from the device configuration.
• Sensitive data is stored using OS secure "vault".
• REB500 product implements denial of service functionality to limit CPU load, which does not allow the
primary functionality of REB500 to be compromised.
For maintaining the REB500 product defense-in-depth strategy, it is essential that relevant updates are
done to device.
Customer should periodically check for updates related to security and ensure the updates are installed
as soon as they are available.
To subscribe to the latest cybersecurity alerts and notifications for Hitachi Energy products here:
https://www.hitachienergy.com/products-and-solutions/cybersecurity/alerts-and-notifications/subscribe
Access to REB500 is secured by user authorization, protecting the access through HMI500 Operator
tool and encrypting communication channels used for configuration purposes.
HMI500
TCP/IP Remote
Central Unit
REB 50 0
I ESC
12
L
R
3
Me nu
Clea r
Help TCP/IP
HMI500
REB500 Processbus
Local
REB 50 0 REB50 0
Bay
Units I ESC
12
3 Clea r
Me nu
L
R
Help
I ESC
12
L
R
3
Me nu
Clea r
Help
TCP/IP
HMI500
Local
13000033-IEC18000314-3-en.vsdx
IEC18000314 V3 EN-US
Ports that are marked as Closed, by default, can be opened by activation of software features in the
product configuration (for example, IEC 61850 station communication).
The port on the switch which is connected to REB500 station bus (CU-connector X1001/1002) should be
rate limited to 600 packages per second.
Rate limitation to
600 packages
per second Rea dy Star t T rip
REB 500
Me nu Help
1 1
I ESC 2 Clea r I ESC 2 Clea r
3 3
Me nu Help Me nu Help
R R
L L
17000044-IEC18000628-4-en.vsdx
IEC18000628 V4 EN-US
If the package rate exceeds the limit of 2000 packages per second, this can have an impact
on the REB500 process bus and thereby lead to a deactivation of the Busbar Protection
function. It is recommended to verify this package rate in actual operation of the system-
communication.
Encryption algorithms are used to encode the user credentials file. The encryption algorithms and hash
functions are:
• AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), a block cipher based on a symmetric key algorithm to encrypt
and decrypt information. The effective key length used is 128 bits.
• SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm), a cryptographic hash function with a 160 bit hash value
Communication protocols and TCP port numbers such as IEC 61850 is well-known by port scanners and
receive more connection attempts than other port numbers. IEC 61850 has no built-in security features.
Unauthenticated and plain-text network communications protocols are a security risk. Each open
TCP/UDP port provides a possible access path for an attacker that can be used to send exploits and
receive data. It is the responsibility of the end user to mitigate these risks, for example by following such,
but not limited to, recommendations:
• Design a segregated network and recognize the network perimeter, zones and conduits. Do not mix
Office/Corporate LAN with Industrial Control System LAN.
• All unneeded applications and services (TCP/UDP ports) should be removed/stopped.
• Use firewalls to limit access to machines and ports.
• Monitor the network to detect unexpected traffic.
• Encrypt communication by using IPSec/VPN tunnels between machines if there is no built-in security
mechanism.
• Use the latest Hitachi Energy product versions to get new security enhancements.
The User Account Management outlines the functionality to administrate the persons that access the
REB500. Its key features are:
• The user account represents a person that should access the REB500. The person is identified by a
user name and a password.
• Account permissions are actions that a user could perform and requires authorization.
• User roles are groups of account permissions that could be assigned to users.
The relationship between user, role and permission is shown in the figure below.
User n n Account
User Role
Account Permission
IEC18000313 V2 EN-US
A user role can contain several permissions and a user account can be assigned to several user
roles. The user credentials are stored in a file on the flash file system. The permissions available are
predefined and cannot be changed. The users, roles and assignments can be changed according to the
needs.
When operating with central account management, the roles are fixed by the standard.
Mapping of permissions remains possible.
The user roles that group several account permissions could be changed according to the needs. Table
2 lists the predefined user roles at delivery:
The account permissions available are predefined. Table 3 shows all available permissions and their
mapping to default roles.
The system boundary for the REB500 security is the access to the actual device and the
used communication channels. Concepts such as role based permissions are available only
during active access to the device and do not cover the behavior of HMI500 or an externally
stored setfile, that is, access to menus and changes are possible while they do not require an
active interaction with the device.
Feature Permissions
Viewer
Operator
Installer
Engineer
Administrator
SECAUD
SECADM
RBACMNT
View read Eventlist@REB500 ● ● ● ●
readMeasurements@REB500 ● ● ● ● ● ●
readDisturbanceRecords@REB500 ● ● ● ●
Configuration readConfiguration@REB500 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
writeConfiguration@REB500 ● ● ● ● ●
deleteDatabase@REB500 ● ●
Restart IED restartSystem@REB500 ● ● ●
Reset Indication resetTripRelay@REB500 ● ●
Test IED forceInOutputs@REB500 ● ●
testSequencer@REB500 ● ●
startDebugMode@REB500 ● ●
Time Modification Time@REB500 ● ● ● ●
Firmware firmwareUpgrade@REB500 ●
Modification
Security Audit audit@REB500 ● ● ●
Factory Reset SecurityOptions@REB500 ● ● ●
User Access manageUsers@REB500 ● ● ●
Management
SecurityOptions@REB500 ● ● ●
Security Log SecurityLogServer@REB500 ● ● ●
Others writeDisturbanceRecords@REB500 ● ●
clearEventlist@REB500 ● ● ●
readTraceability@REB500 ● ● ●
closeAllSessions@REB500 ● ●
• changeOwnPassword@REB500
• authenticateSession@REB500
• getDeviceInfo@REB500
• stopDebugMode@REB500
Administrators can define new roles. The following permission dependencies exist:
• If a write permission is assigned to a user role, the corresponding read permission needs to be
assigned:
• writeConfiguration requires readConfiguration
• writeDisturbanceRecords requires readDisturbanceRecords
• clearEventlist requires readEventList
• readEventlist@REB500
• readMeasurements@REB500
• readConfiguration@REB500
• clearEventlist@REB500
• readTraceability@REB500
Performing a password reset in the maintenance menu or switching from local to Centralized
user account management or vice versa will reset the Permissions to user roles mappings to
the default mapping.
The user account representing a person is identified by a user name and a password. User name and
password are free of choice within defined rules. See Section 7.4 for detailed information about the
explicit and implicit rules for passwords. The maximum number of different user accounts is 20.
In delivery status, one user account is predefined. The default user will be a member of all default roles.
Sophisticated protection schemes are implemented to inhibit reading of the user credentials information.
Lost passwords cannot be recovered. If a user loses the password, then a new password can be reset
by an administrator. If an administrator loses the password, see Section 7.7.
All security-relevant configuration parameters are defined for the whole REB500; there is no possibility
to configure BUs individually.
The menus Tools /User account management and Tools /Security options are disabled by default. It
can be enabled by an administrator under Tools /Settings .
The menus User account management and Security options are only available in Online
mode. To enable the security menu, the button Apply must be clicked after selecting Enable
security menu.
• User account management: If enabled all functionality is accessed based on roles. Otherwise,
everyone has access to all functionalities. A choice can be made between local and central account
management.
• Password reset to factory default: If enabled all user account management can be reset to factory
defaults on the local HMI.
• LHMI menu clear: If enabled the menu Clear is available on the local HMI.
If password reset to factory default is disabled, then there is no way to access the device in
case the administrator password is lost.
If LHMI menu clear is disabled, then no modification are possible in the maintenance menu.
The user account management Tools/Security account management /Manage users is accessible
only to users with permission manageUsers@REB500 and SecurityOptions@REB500.
By default, the Administrator role has these permissions. The following operations are available:
To enable the local user account management, enable user account management in the Tools /Security
Options menu with the selection of Local.
23000007-IEC19001119-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001119 V1 EN-US
Enabling the user account management in local mode from the state of having no user
account management enabled, does not require a setfile download.
If user account management was previously used in central mode, a setfile download is
required to reflect the change in settings.
In the first tab of the user account management, details of user accounts are available. By selecting a
user in the list, the assigned roles for the user can be seen. Also, the user could be added, user details
could be changed or the user could be deleted.
IEC18000629 V2 EN-US
Table 4: Items in User accounts tab in User account management dialog box
Item Description
Users List of available User names.
Assigned roles List of roles assigned to a selected user under “Users”
Add user Opens a dialog for adding users (Figure 13)
Delete user Selected user is deleted including all the user credentials like assigned roles,
password.
Change password Opens a dialog for changing the selected user’s password (Figure 21)
Change assignment Opens a dialog for changing the assigned roles for the selected user. (Figure 20)
13000027-IEC18000630-1-en.vsdx
IEC18000630 V2 EN-US
Item Description
User Name 1 to 32 characters (letters, numbers, underscore and blank)
Password As defined in password policy. Case-sensitive.
Confirm password Re-enter same value as for password.
Roles List of defined roles for the system.
Assigned roles List of roles assigned to that user.
>> Selected role is assigned to user
<< Selected assigned role is removed from user.
In the second tab of the user account management, user roles and their details are defined. The
tab shows in a list the names of the existing user roles. By selecting a role in the list, the assigned
permissions of the role could be seen. Also, the role could be added, role permissions could be
modified, or the role could be deleted.
13000028-IEC18000631-1-en.vsdx
IEC18000631 V2 EN-US
Table 6: Items in User roles tab in User account management dialog box
Item Description
Roles List of available roles
Assigned permissions List of permissions assigned for the selected role
Add role Opens a dialog for adding a role.
Delete role Deletes the selected role including the assigned permissions for that role.
Be careful, there is no security query when deleting a user role and a once
deleted role cannot be restored
Change permissions Opens a dialog for changing the assigned permissions for the selected role.
13000029-IEC18000632-1-en.vsdx
IEC18000632 V2 EN-US
Item Description
Role Name 1 to 32 characters (letters, numbers, underscore and blank)
Session timeout Defines the period of inactivity after which a user of this role is logged out.
(applicable when item “Disable” is unchecked). 1 to 1440 minutes, default 15
minutes.
Disable If checked, the session timeout is disabled, that is, the user’s session
belonging to this role will never expire. Otherwise, sessions of users
belonging to this role will expire based on the value in the Session timeout
field.
Permissions List of defined permissions.
Assigned permissions List of permissions assigned to this role.
>> Assigns selected permission to role.
<< Removes selected assigned permission is from role.
The password policies define rules that a password must fulfill to get accepted. They can be managed
via Tools/Security account management /Manage policies.
Password policies are only available in local user account management. When using central
user account management, password policies are handled by the managing server.
Managing a list of password history which prevents using previous passwords when
changing passwords, is only available in a central user account management system.
13000030-IEC18000633-1-en.vsdx
IEC18000633 V2 EN-US
To enable the password policies the check box Enforce password policies must be checked. Changes
in the password policies with regards to the password length or password characters are considered for
new passwords only. That means existing passwords are not checked against these policies and the
passwords are still valid and usable. If the Password lifetime is enabled, then change in password
lifetime has immediate effect on the existing passwords also. To be sure that all passwords are
compliant the passwords must be changed after defining a password policy.
Item Description
Enforce password If enabled password policies are enforced when creating passwords.
policies Otherwise, users can choose any password without any rules.
Minimum password 6 to 32, default 6.
length
Password lifetime The number of days after which the password expires. 1 to 1826 days,
default 365.
Password must contain If any of the options below is checked, the password must contain at least
one character of the character set defined by that option.
Lower case characters a to z
Upper case characters A to Z.
Numeric characters 0 to 9
Special characters Any other character than the ones from the other options.
User credentials can be exported for reuse via Tools/Security account management /Export user
credentials. The information is exported in a binary format and cannot be viewed. The exported user
credentials can be imported on another device by using Tools/Security account management /Import
user credentials. In this way, user credentials created in one device can be reused in the other.
Users can change their own password: Tools /Change password. In the dialog box, the password must
be typed two times to eliminate, unintentional typing errors. When clicking OK, the password is checked
against the password policies.
If the administrator loses the password, it can be reset to factory default manually using the local HMI.
This is only possible if the password reset to factory default has been enabled in Security Options.
After password reset only, the default user with the default password will be available. All
other users are deleted. An alarm is triggered and logged.
4. Confirm OK with .
5. In the main maintenance menu, select Exit to leave this menu as well.
6. The central unit will start up with factory default.
A password reset to factory default will recreate the device's SSH keys used for the FW
update via SFTP (SSH File Transfer Protocol used by the FW update tool).
If all used SSH keys must be recreated the password reset must be executed on each
individual REB500 device, that is, on the Central Unit and all Bay Units.
The start and end of the key recreation can be observed in the extended event list:
• SCA Minor Error Event number 1 - the recreation of the SSH keys has been started.
• SCA Minor Error Event number 2 - the recreation of the SSH keys has ended, staring from
this time the new keys are in use.
Central user account management allows easy management of access control across all devices
by maintaining all user credentials on central servers, according to IEC 62351-8 pull model. When
configured and enabled, all access requests are validated by this central architecture. In case of failure,
a local replica will be used for authentication when the central server is a LDAP server or an emergency
user when the central server is Active Directory. The following figure shows a simplified representation of
this setup.
Central Server
RE B 5 0 0
Ready St art Tr p
i
Menu Hel p
R
L
RE B 50 0 RE B 5 00
Ready St art Tr p
i Ready St art Tr p
i
1 1
I ESC 2 Cl ear I ESC 2 Cl ear
3 3
R R
L L
Unlike in the local user account management, CAM does only support the roles specified by IEC 62351
plus the Hitachi-specific role of Administrator. It is therefore not possible to add custom or remove roles.
It is, however, possible to modify the roles-to-permission mapping in the Tools /Security account
management /Manage settings /User roles /Change permissions . For detailed information on user
permissions, see Section 5.2.
User name and password should contain only ASCII (American Standard Code for Information
Interchange) characters.
This is ensured when using the local user account management (See Section 7), since the HMI500
software only allows the use of certain characters for user and password. If users account management
is managed centrally, this is beyond the control of the REB500, respective der HMI500-Software.
The use of characters which do not correspond to the ASCII character set can lead
to undesired effects when processing the user name for example, Syslog (User Activity
Logging).
• At least one LDAP server (for example, Hitachi SDM600) is connected to the station-bus
• A user has been created to allow LDAP replication (name same as technical key of device)
• A device certificate (PKCS12-file) for the REB500 has been issued.
CAM is enabled by means of Tools /Security Options dialog (see Section 6).
23000002-IEC19001114-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001114 V1 EN-US
Due to the fact that configuration parameters are necessary, a setfile download is required in
case of switching from/to central account management.
Custom role-permission mappings and UAM credentials are always reset when switching
from UAM to CAM and vice-versa.
The additional CAM parameters are set in Tools /Security Account Management /CAM settings.
14000062-IEC18000635-3-en.vsdx
IEC18000635 V3 EN-US
Item Description
LDAP server 1/2 protocol Protocol to use to access server. Start TLS or LDAPS
LDAP server 1/2 address The IP-address of the server
LDAP server 1/2 port The TCP port
StartTLS-protocol ➔ port number 389
LDAPS-protocol ➔ port number 636
Base DN Base DN (Distinguished name) for querying the LDAP server
Replication interval Interval for synchronizing the local CAM replica with the LDAP server, set in
seconds
Replication group LDAP replication group on the server
The CAM settings of Table 9 can be imported via Tools /Security Account Management /CAM
settings /Import Settings.
When using Hitachi SDM600 as a CAM server, the corresponding configuration XML file can
be created there.
The device certificate (PKCS12 files) can be downloaded via Tools /Security account
management /CAM settings /Download Device Certificate . The path and password for the file have
to be specified.
When using Hitachi SDM600 as a CAM server, the corresponding certificate can be created
there.
For support of other LDAP servers, please refer to the user documentation of that product.
Due to the fact that configuration parameters are necessary to be changed when using CAM,
a setfile download is required to finish enabling CAM.
The application note 1KHL020828Aen Distributed busbar protection REB500 CAM Activation
and Usage_Tips and Troubleshooting provides additional information and guidelines to the
cyber security deployment guideline to configure the activation and usage of the central user
account management on REB500 as well as for the troubleshooting in this context.
To disable CAM, local or no user account management has to be chosen in the Tools /
Security Options menu. A setfile download is required to complete this operation.
Symptoms:
• LHMI Alarm CAM enabling failed and CAM server not available
• System events CAM Minor_Error 001 and 002
• Security event 3810 CAM server communication failed
Probable causes:
Solution:
If the initial activation of CAM failed, the CU reverts to local UAM. Access to the device is
possible using the local default credentials.
Symptoms:
Probable cause:
Solution:
Authentication will continue to work based on the latest local LDAP replica. After
reconnection with the server(s), authentication will again run via the LDAP server and the
local replica will be updated.
Symptoms:
Probable cause:
Solution:
Authentication will continue to work based on the latest local LDAP replica. After
reconnection with the server(s), authentication will again run via the LDAP server and the
local replica will be updated.
Symptoms:
Probable cause:
Solution:
• Verify with system administrator that LDAP settings and certificates are still valid.
• Replace invalid device and/or server certificate.
Authentication will continue to work based on the latest local LDAP replica. After replacing
the certificates, the authentication will again run via the LDAP server and the local replica will
be updated.
CAM AD is enabled by means of Tools /Security Options dialog (see Section 6).
23000003-IEC19001115-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001115 V1 EN-US
Due to the fact that configuration parameters are necessary, a setfile download is required in
case of switching from/to central account management.
In case the setfile download is to a system with empty database, then a manual reboot is
required after the download.
Custom role-permission mappings and UAM credentials are always reset when switching
from UAM to CAM and vice-versa.
The additional CAM parameters are set in Tools /Security Account Management /Manage settings.
23000004-IEC19001116-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001116 V1 EN-US
Item Description
AD server 1/2 protocol Protocol to use to access AD: Start TLS or LDAPS
AD server 1/2 address The IP-address of the AD server
AD server 1/2 port The TCP port
StartTLS-protocol ➔ port number 389
LDAPS-protocol ➔ port number 636
AD server DNS-name 1/2 DNS-name to validate the AD server certificate
Base DN Base DN (Distinguished name) for querying the AD server
User Principal Suffix Part of the AD user principal name used to authenticate a user
The device certificate (PKCS12 files) can be downloaded via Tools /Security account
management /CAM AD settings /Download Device Certificate. The path and password for the file
have to be specified.
Every user that shall authenticate to the device must be assigned one or more IEC 62351 roles. Since in
AD users are organized in groups, the group names must be mapped to IEC 62351 roles. This is done in
the Tools /Security Account Management /AD groups to role map tab.
23000008-IEC19001120-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001120 V1 EN-US
• Under tab AD groups to role mapping import the text file by using the button Import AD Groups
• Map IEC roles to the imported group names. The relationship between roles and groups should be
1:1.
23000005-IEC19001117-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001117 V1 EN-US
Due to the fact that configuration parameters are necessary to be changed when using CAM,
a setfile download is required to finish enabling CAM.
The application note 1KHL020828Aen Distributed busbar protection REB500 CAM Activation
and Usage_Tips and Troubleshooting provides additional information and guidelines to the
cyber security deployment guideline to configure the activation and usage of the central user
account management on REB500 as well as for the troubleshooting in this context.
To disable CAM, local or no user account management has to be chosen in the Tools /
Security Options menu. A setfile download is required to complete this operation.
A user with an administrator role will create a (local) emergency user account (see Section 8.4.2.2).
Business processes and auditing must ensure that the details of the account usage are documented,
and that a limited set of people (only users with Administration roles) know the password. The
credentials are deployed to some secure location, for example, secured with a PIN or key. When
authentication to AD fails due to unavailability of the AD server and the device must be accessed, any
user can retrieve the emergency credentials in an “out of band” manner and access the device. This is
referred to as “breaking the glass”.
Emergency account will be active for 15 minutes after the first failed authentication due unavailability of
the AD server. During this period if the AD server comes online again, then user will be allowed to log in
using both emergency account and his regular CAM AD account. In this latter case emergency account
will be deactivated again.
Important: After the emergency credentials have been used (“glass broken”) and the emergency
situation is resolved, a user with an Administration role shall create a new emergency account and
deploy its credentials “behind the glass”.
Configuration of the emergency user account is done in tab Tools/Security Account Management/
Emergency user by the following entries:
• Press Create
23000006-IEC19001118-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001118 V1 EN-US
23000009-IEC19001121-1-en.vsdx
IEC19001121 V1 EN-US
To Change the password of an existing emergency user, delete the user and create it anew.
If the emergency account is not configured, it is not possible to authenticate when the AD
server is not reachable.
Symptoms:
• LHMI Alarm CAM enabling failed and CAM server not available
• System events CAM Minor_Error 001 and 002
• Security event 3810 CAM server communication failed
Probable causes:
Solution:
If the initial activation of CAM failed, the CU reverts to local UAM. Access to the device is
possible using the local default credentials.
Symptoms:
Probable cause:
Solution:
Authentication will be possible through the emergency account. After reconnection with the
server(s), authentication will again run via the AD server and the emergency account will be
deactivated.
If the emergency account was not configured, it is not possible to authenticate when the AD
server is not reachable.
Symptoms:
Probable cause:
Solution:
During CAM Active Directory activation, the local UAM is still active. Access to the device is
possible using the local default credentials.
Authentication will be possible through the emergency account. After replacing the
certificates, authentication will again run via the AD server and the emergency account will
be deactivated.
If the emergency account was not configured, it is not possible to authenticate when the AD
server is not reachable due to certificate validation issues!
A bay unit is run standalone when the firmware of a spare BU is updated or when the local event list
needs to be read. However, when the device is configured to use CAM AD, it will try to connect to the
central unit, which will fail. The procedure to access such a device depends on whether an emergency
user was configured or not.
This is only possible if the security option “Enable password reset to factory default” is
activated! For details about this security option see Section 6.2, topic Password reset to
factory default.
REB500 logs all user activities mentioned in Table 12 and can forward these events via Syslog or IEC
61850. The logged events can also be retrieved and viewed in HMI500 Operator.
The persistency of these events is guaranteed to be greater than 48 hours by storing them in the
flash-memory. Integrity of the logs is guaranteed by CRC. If the integrity check fails then the event list
will be empty.
Users with permission audit@REB500 can view the security events in the HMI500 Operator ( View/
security event list ).
13000031-IEC18000636-2-en.vsdx
IEC18000636 V2 EN-US
The user can update the view by pressing Refresh, forcing HMI500 to retrieve the events from REB500.
If the user presses Update cyclically, HMI500 will retrieve the events from REB500 every 4 seconds
and update the view accordingly.
The user can set the information about Security log servers to which the user activity logs must be
forwarded (Tools/Security log servers ).
The user can configure up to 6 external log servers. Each server can be configured with IP Address,
IP port number and protocol format. The format can be either SysLog (RFC 3164 or RFC 5424) or
Common Event Format (CEF) from ArcSight.
13000032-IEC18000637-1-en.vsdx
IEC18000637 V2 EN-US
Item Description
Id Identification number (read-only)
Type Type of external log server :
• None
• Syslog UDP
• Syslog TCP
• ArcSight TCP
• Syslog UDP RFC5424
• Syslog TCP RFC5424
The user activity events contain the attributes listed in Table 12.
Field Description
Sequence number The sequence of event per source (BU or CU), between 1 and
232-1.
Date Date of the event
Time UTC time of the event
Time invalid If the time value of the field Time is valid, the value of the field
Time invalid is empty.
If the time value of the field Time is invalid, the value of the field
Time invalid is TIV.
User name Name of the user that causes the event or “Anonymous” if user is
not known.
Event Id Identifier of the event type (see Section 9.4)
Severity Severity of the event depending on the importance of the event.
Critical events are marked as Alarm, others as Event.
Source Name of the source where user activity event occurs: The
configured Logical Device Reference, see Operation Manual
Section Device structure.
This is not necessarily the device where a button is pressed,
but the device where the activity is executed. For example,
when choosing Clear/Reset all latched relays, lists and LED”
on a BU, this is executed on the CPC of the connected CU
and the source will therefore be its Logical Device Reference for
example, LDR00 (CPC).
Event text See Section 9.4.
The following table contains the event types that can be logged, including their 61850 mapping on the
logical node GSAL.
When establishing a connection from HMI500 to the REB500 system, there will be an initial
event 1310 for user Anonymous.
In some cases the HMI500 disconnect and reconnect to the REB500 System which result in
additional event 1210 and 1110.
In some cases the HMI500 is checking for local UAM availability which results in a 1120 -
Log-In failed - Unknown user.
User activity events can be sent to Syslog servers. For the events in Table 14 additional information is
sent apart from the information displayed to user in HMI500 Operator.
Starting up a REB500 system with a connected HMI500 causes a Log-in failed Unknown user entry in
the Security event list (see Figure 22). Since the user credentials are not cashed in the HMI500, this
can be seen as a normal behavior. To avoid this "log-in failed" information, the HMI500 shall be not
connected during start-up phase of the system.
17000046-IEC19000214-2-en.vsdx
IEC19000214 V2 EN-US
This section provides instructions on decommissioning the IED, by resetting it to factory setting, removal
of sensitive information added during lifetime of the IED.
24000006-IEC23000006-1-en.vsdx
GUID-F4AF1086-1E94-4267-BFC0-9C676E272A72 V1 EN-US
Select Delete Database before exit the menu (see red mark in Figure 23).
Do not use the procedure described in REB500 Operation Manual, Section “Installation
Mode” to delete the database as this only describes the procedure for an entire system
and not for an individual IED (CU or BU).
Cyber security issues have been the subject of standardization initiatives by ISA, IEEE, or IEC for some
time and Hitachi Energy plays an active role in all these organizations, helping to define and implement
cyber security standards for power and industrial control systems.
Some of the cyber security standards which are most important for substation automation are still under
active development such as IEC 62351 and IEC 62443 (former ISA S99). Hitachi Energy is participating
in the development by delegating subject matter experts to the committee working on the respective
standard. Since these standards are still under development Hitachi Energy strongly recommends to use
existing common security measures as available on the market, for example, VPN for secure Ethernet
Communication.
An overview of applicable security standards and their status is shown in Table 15.
Hitachi Energy has identified cyber security as a key requirement and has developed a large number
of product features to support international cyber security standards such as NERC-CIP, IEEE 1686, as
well as local activities like the German BDEW white paper.
The two standards IEC 62351 and IEC 62443 are still under revision. Due to interoperability reasons
Hitachi Energy recommend not to implement these standards yet. Nevertheless, Hitachi Energy
considers these standards already today as a guideline to implement product features or system
architectures.
This chapter contains a compliance statement of the REB500 security functionality against the standard
IEC 62443-4-2 Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 4-2: Technical security
requirements for IACS components.
REB500 devices (central unit and bay units) are considered as embedded devices, so "Embedded
device requirements" have been selected.
Any cybersecurity vulnerability or incident related to a Hitachi Energy product can be securely reported
to Hitachi Energy using https://www.hitachienergy.com/products-and-solutions/cybersecurity/reporting.