People v. Salvatiera, G.R. No.
104663, 24 July 1997
Facts:
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellant: David Salvatierra
On August 17, 1990, at 4:30 PM, Charlie Fernandez, a "palamig" vendor, was stabbed in the left
breast by David Salvatierra while walking on M. de la Fuente Street with two other men. The
assailants fled, but Charlie managed to walk home, inform his father, Marciano, and then
collapsed. He was rushed to the hospital, underwent surgery, but died the next day. Milagros
Martinez, a fish vendor, witnessed the attack but did not immediately report the incident to the
police authorities because she was afraid. Charlie’s father reported the crime to the police that
afternoon, and a relative of the victim informed the police that accused David Salvatierra was
one of the suspects in the crime. On November 15, 1990 (after 3 months), Salvatierra was
arrested for creating a commotion along Miguelin Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He was taken in
custody by policemen who later found out that he was a suspect in the killing of Charlie
Fernandez. Charlie’s father, persuaded Milagros to testify as witness against the accused. In a
police line-up, she identified and pinpointed the accused as the person who stabbed Charlie and
gave a sworn statement. On November 19, 1990, Salvatierra was formally charged with murder.
Issue:
1. Whether the case should be dismissed for violating the accused-appellant's constitutional
rights since no warrant was obtained during the three-month period between the crime and his
arrest
2. Whether the police line up without the assistance of counsel is valid
Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED; accused CONVICTED
1. NO. As such, because no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening
period between the commission of the crime and his apprehension, his arrest would have
ordinarily been rendered unconstitutional and illegal inasmuch as even warrantless arrests
made within shorter periods like ten (10) days are illegal. The element of immediacy between the
time of the commission of the offense and the time of the arrest had not been complied with. It
should be stressed that Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court no longer allowed
situations under the old rule which allowed a warrantless arrest provided that the offense “has in
fact been committed.”
While these arguments may be valid, appellant’s claim that the case against him should be
dismissed for violation of his constitutional rights, must fail. Appellant is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this before entering
his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had
been cured by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his
plea and participated during the trial. Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a sufficient cause
for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial was
free from error.
2. YES. In People v. Lamsing, the Court that: “although it is not assigned as error, accused-
appellant complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was identified by three
persons, including Elizabeth De los Santos, without the assistance of counsel.” It was settled in
Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(l) of the
Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial
investigations. The reason for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory. The accused’s right to counsel attaches only from the
time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him. This overturns the holding
of the Court in People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 406 (1994) that any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up at the start of the custodial investigation is
inadmissible in evidence.
On alibi:
The trial court correctly disregarded appellant’s alibi. It is elementary that for alibi to
prosper, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime is indispensable. Even if the testimony of appellant’s wife that the distance
between the crime scene and their house was about twenty minutes’ walk away, still, it was not
impossible for appellant to be in the crime scene and return home for merienda not only by
walking but by means of transportation like pedicabs and jeepneys which abounded in the area.
