Introduction

Traditionally, there was an assumption that one scientific discipline is independent from the
other. This affects the utility of disciplines on both sides of the border. But now there is a
paradigm shift towards the interdependence of disciplines. There is no such an independent
discipline, rather what is really true is one affects the other. Economic, Geography, History,
sociology, anthropology and even Physics can affect politics and they are too affected by it. The
effect of one social science in the other is something without doubt. But we have to aware also
the effect of hard sciences on political science.

Physics for instance- now wars are more destructive than before. The destructive natures of
contemporary wars can be associated with the physicists’ capacity to invent more destructive
machine guns. The role of technology become high in the current wars and it will be more in the
future wars. The role of scientists in the laboratory is as much important as the soldiers in the
battle field. The number of civilian died in the war was high in the Second World War than in the
First World War. This is because the capacity of explosive fissure to go beyond the target areas
had increased due to inventions from scientists.

When we come to our own area of interest geography and politics the relation among the two is
tremendous and its bi- directional. Remember the role of geography in the war- the war in Iraq (a
country with a plain topography) and Vietnam (thick forest, multiple gorges and swampy fields)
was different; one Russian president said Russia had two generals that can trust upon them-
General January and General February (high snow seasons, in these snowy seasons its
impossible to invade and win over Russians i.e. the president want to talk about); in Ethiopian’s
defeat against Italians the role of topography was enormous; some regions of the world are
significant and attract vast majority of foreign interventions because of their location and the
resource inside. We said the Middle East found at the cross road to three continents (it is due to
its geographic location). We said Middle East is a strategic geopolitical location due to, among
other factors, its richness in Oil. We said the al-Qaeda failed to establish itself in Somalia after
its expulsion from Afghanistan because there are no such chains of mountains conducive for
hiding in Somalia for terrorist operation as much as in Afghanistan.
We study in political science about ideas/ideology, behavior and institutions. State is one of these
institution which is political/power to use force legitimately, legal/had recognition, sovereign
equality and independent and geographic/territory and population. Some of the elements of the
state had a geographic manifestation. Even when we go higher, in supra state institutions, the
makers/states had an intention of being geographically vast and also try to prevent other nations
going vast. One scholars from the west commented that “no considerable state could permit the
unification of East Europe with Asia”. This commentary shows the westerns intention expanding
the west to the east and preventing the east from coming to the west.

Assignments

1. Inter State Boundary Conflicts in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia with its Neighbors
2. Intra State Boundary Conflicts In Africa: The Case of Territorial Disputes Among
Ethiopian Regions
3. Conflict Over Trans-Boundary Rivers: Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt Contestation Over Nile
4. The Global Commons: Deteriorations and Contestations Over Them
5.

Geography Matters

Geography may be considered as the study of strictly natural phenomena such as climate,
topography, soil, and resources (natural geography). In more ambitious formulations it may
study social organization as dependent on those natural phenomena and attempt to trace the
casual connections between the conditions which are naturally provided and social practices and
customs, as well as the method of securing a livelihood (social or economic geography).

We see difference in economic and political conditions between places in a country and among
countries. Our live is shaped by where we live our lives. There is different concentration of
peoples, resources and cities. Some areas have high prevalence of conflict than others. Usually
foreign intervention comes to the areas of high conflict, resource and terrorism. Geography
affects the kind of institutions that states will have. Institutions are place specific. Therefore,
difficult to ignore the spatial dimension of human life.
The element of geography that will affect politics is not only natural (first nature, exogenous)
such as climate, soil quality water bodies, mineral resources. But is also includes the second
nature (human additions). The human additions to the space can enhance the geopolitical
significance. Places achieve a geopolitical significance not because of nature alone, it can be by
human additions to the space. Look for instance, what happened in the Suez Cannel. Nature
never let the Mediterranean and Red Sea to share waters one another. But the humans had cut the
195 kilometers long earth distance to construct the shortest possible distance between Asia and
Europe. Its not nature alone/first nature gave this area a geopolitical significance rather it’s also
the humans/second nature.

Political science affected by concepts internal to itself, endogenous, and external from it,
exogenous. For instance, Marxists gave an economic interpretation for politics but later they add
the geographic interpretation to politics. They said/Leninism “the spatial/geographic expansion
of capitalist nations to Asia, Africa and Latin America through colonialism help them to
postpone the collapse as predicted by classical Marxists. Generally, politics is not an issue of
power and its rational distribution. We need to go beyond the classical understanding of politics.

The primitive man was at the mercy of nature. Nature ruled over his habits of work and play,
over what and how much he ate, and over where and how long he lived. The elements were, like
an absolute rule in that man had neither the means nor the temerity to challenge them. It was a
time when man was nature directed.

While primitive man was wholly surrounded by and lived in nature, modern man is wholly
surrounded by and lives in a social environment. The direct impact of the laws of nature is
replaced by that of social laws and forces-hence the tendency to view the historical and social
environment as the determining factor. Man becomes less "natural" and more human and social;
he becomes man directed. The man's contact with his natural environment is rapidly diminished.

However, man aware that nature limits his potentialities. A heating plant or air-conditioning
device cannot transform the climate of the Arctic or of equatorial Africa. Neither can drainage,
irrigation, or fertilizer make all lands productive. Despite new inventions, man's "conquest" of
the earth-his mastery of nature-does not become boundless. There always remains a limit,
imposed by nature, which man cannot escape. There is "earth dependence" of man and politics.
We may be proud of the degree to which we have succeeded in emancipating ourselves from the
dictates of natural forces, but we have to admit that modern man still remains nature limited. The
fact that environment influences human life, in one way or another, has been admitted since
ancient times and must still be admitted in our day. Man is nature limited if not directed.

A row of mountain peaks and a water divide if not break up the unity of states, nations and ethnic
groups. The geographical location and nature of our country influence our political perspective.
The activities of man are one of the many manifestations of nature. Man, and his thoughts and
politics, cannot be detached from nature; they are the necessary effects of natural cause.

The bridge linking geography and political science must be built from and by both sides;
everyone knows best the advantages and pitfalls of his own embankment and ford approach. To
be sure, this bridge must be rather floating than rigid, because boundaries between fields of study
are as change able and difficult to fix as riverbeds.

The impact of the natural environment on man.

The Genesis of Geopolitics as a Discipline

There are two schools of thought about the effect of nature on politics/man. The first assumes
nature determines/pre modern geopolitical thought/ and the other argue it limits/modern and post
modern geopolitical thought/. The nature can and does not only limit our capacity to do certain
things but also determines our will to do or not to do these things. A genuinely deterministic
school of geopolitics accepts the compelling character of the natural environment in both foreign
and internal politics. Everyone evaluates the same problem from his own geographical
perspective, and every nation thinks in terms of a world map centered on its own country. The
territory of a state would permit autarky. Geographical isolation protects a state not only from an
outright military attack but also from undesirable influences.

The natural environment of each particular republic has to be considered in order to adjust the
form of the commonwealth to the nature of places and the human laws to the natural laws. The
architect tries to adapt his construction to the material and site he has at his disposal. The
politicians must follow the architect's example; the political structure must fit the human
character as molded by the given environment. There is a correlation between the internal regime
of the state and the natural environment.

Aristotle discussed many questions we would classify as geopolitical. He considered the

environment from the point of view of (a) its impact on human character and (b) its implications
for the economic and military necessities of the ideal state. The inhabitants of an ideal state must
be worthy, and "there are three things which make men good and virtuous; these are nature,
habit, rational principle. Climate and national character are closely related; heterogeneity of the
territory of a state breeds heterogeneity among the people and prevents the achievement of unity
and peace within the country. The geographical environment molds men's characters by favoring
one or another occupation, and certain ways of earning a livelihood make people prefer one kind
of political regime. We lack uniformity due to environmental influences.

Rousseau "return to nature," away from the abstract and artificial conception of the personality of
the state, that is, to nature as embodied in the "geographic personality. States had legal
personality (recognition), political personality (monopoly use of force) and geographic
personality (territory). Law and power alone does not determine politics. The politics of the
country is affected by location/space/environment/geography. The integration of the knowledge
of geography with politics is quite essential.

the content of contemporary geopolitics stems from the Swedish political scientist, Rudolf J.
Kjellen (1864-1922). contributes to geopolitics are to be found in two volumes: The State as a
Form of Life (1917) and Foundations for a System of Politics (1920). The term, geopolitics, is
introduced in the Foundations to connote the matters involved in the situation of the state's
territory, its shape and form, and its natural and physical resources. He revised the contents of
political science and it should be too.

Geopolitics: What is and what is not?

We political scientists have emphasized history perhaps too much in our education, but we have
failed to learn from the historians to relate man to his natural setting. Geopolitics should
investigate the relationship between politics and the geographical environment in the same way
as the relation between history and geography has long been studied. Geopoliticians do not
construct their thesis as embracing the totality of human affairs. Their point of view is that
geographical factors and politics combine and conspire together for the creation of certain
principles of sound politics.

Geopoliticians tend to stress, although not exclusively, the environmental determination of man's
character, that is, of his will. The area of knowledge in which geography and political science
meet, and necessarily overlap, a two-sided effort must be made. The relationships between man
and nature

Geopolitics is the study of political phenomena (1) in their spatial relationship and (2) in their
relationship with, dependence upon, and influence on, earth as well as on all those cultural
factors which constitute the subject matter of human geography (anthropogeography) broadly
defined.

When studying the geopolitics, we must pursue two themes: one, the investigation of the
objective impact of "natural" environment on politics-of the actual physical limitations and
opportunities with which the "natural" environment and spatial relationships confront any
government; and, two, the investigation of the subjective impact of geography on politics.

There is no genuine give and take between man and nature, as between two independent entities,
because, strictly speaking, man is more than nature directed; man and nature are one. Therefore,
geopolitics as a science of the relationship between the free political creations of man and man's
physical geographical environment cannot exist. Geopolitics cannot be limited to the study of the
political aspects or consequences of man earth relationship.

geopolitics formulates the scientific foundation of the art of political transactions in the struggle
for existence of political living forms on the living space of the earth.'

geopolitics examines the character of the state as a living organism. The conditions of birth,
growth, life functions, and death are studied empirically in order to determine the operative laws.
The states exhibit a tendency toward expansion; that there is a compelling urge to move from
narrower to wider spaces. This leads to a discussion of frontiers and an examination of the
varieties of boundaries that have prevailed in history.
Geopolitics may be summed up as an attempt to find a deterministic principle which controls the
development of states. The basic determining factor upon which it has come to rest is that of
geographic conditions, and it is materialistic in large degree.

Or in other terms geopolitics is a contemporary rationalization of power politics/ ultimate goal is

a world organization based on domination and not on cooperation between equal states. A
believer in democracy and a peaceful international order can find little comfort in this.

The subject matter of geopolitics includes also consideration of population problems, frictional
issues between states, the generative instincts of a people which lead to colonization in its
various forms, races, nationalism, and almost any other topic that bears upon the expansion of
states.

the study of the state, its borders and its relations with other states (Heffernan 1998: 61). Given
the prevailing nature of the international system (a world composed of nearly 200 states), this
would appear to be a fairly reasonable starting position. Nation-states are very important and
many conflicts have indeed occurred over the demarcation of territorial boundaries, the
ownership of territory and access to resources such as oil and water. The last hundred years of
human history would provide ample evidence such as the Israel–Palestine dispute and the long-
standing tension between India and Pakistan over the ownership of Kashmir.

Geopolitics provides a way of seeing the world in which a great deal of emphasis is placed on
exploring and explaining the role of geographical factors (such as territorial location and/or
access to resources) in shaping national and international politics. In the process, ideas about
places and populations are mobilised to construct ‘geopolitical visions’ (see Dijink 1996). While
these visions of place can vary in cultural and geographical sophistication, the labelling of
geographical space inevitably carries with it distinct implications for international relations
and/or representations of national identities.

The Swedish political geographer Rudolph Kjellen first used the term ‘geopolitics’ at the end of
the nineteenth century. Kjellen’s definition of geopolitics as ‘the science, which conceives of the
state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space.
Geopolitics and Political Geography

In other words, geopolitics is what the word itself suggests etymologically: geographical politics,
that is, politics and not geography-politics geographically interpreted or analyzed for its
geographical content. Being an intermediary (or subsidiary) science, it has no independent field
of study but one that is defined in terms of the fields of geography and political science and their
mutual interrelation.

The relation which subsists between man and his geographical environment has been the subject
of speculation at least since the time of the Greeks. The relation can be studied by geopolitics
and political geography.

Broadly speaking political geography is concerned with a historical and factual account of
changes in the circumstances of states, and it observes states in a condition of rest. Geopolitics,
on the other hand, observes and speculates upon the influence of geographical necessities upon
political events and changes in the political forms of states. Political geography studies "the
influence of man on natural environment," while geopolitics attempts to study the opposite,
namely, "the influence of the natural environment on man.

The only real difference between political geography and geopolitics is in emphasis in the focus
of attention. Political geography qua geography tends to focus its attention on the geographical
phenomena; it gives a political interpretation and studies the political aspects of geographic
phenomena. Geopolitics qua politics, on the contrary, tends to focus on the political phenomena
and attempts to give a geo graphical interpretation and study the geo graphical aspects of these
phenomena.

Geopolitics, as well as political geography, attempts to show that man, and in particular political
man, and environment, being separate and discrete, do, nevertheless, interrelate and continuously
interact.

the influence which environment exerted on political practices

According to an English geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, the planetary surface should be
regarded as divided into islands. He called the land mass including Asia, Africa, and Europe the
World Island. The other continents could be regarded also as islands and satellites of this great
land mass. Within the World Island was the Heartland: the region to which, under modern
conditions, sea power can be refused access, lies without the region of Arctic and Continental
drainage.

the state which degenerated into merely legalistic discussion and a juristic science. In seeking to
provide the state with more substance, he found the potentialities of geography.

Frontiers have varied in history. There are frontiers of an ethnic character, of an economic
character, of a strategic character. There are artificial frontier lines, such as walls and
embankments or mathematical survey lines. Finally, there are natural frontier lines, which are
said to be mountains, the seas, swamps, deserts, and sometimes rivers. None of these has
prevailed perpetually, and all have some deficiencies. Buffer states, in fact, have been created to
avoid some of the difficulties inherent in other types of boundaries.

There are various conceptions of space which vary from mere surface, which may include either
water or land, to extremely subtle forms of human relations to that surface either as an individual
matter or as politically organized groups.

advanced a basic strategy for German foreign policy and autarkie or self-sufficiency became an
ultimate ideal.

a concern for geographical factors in international politics.

Chapter Two

Organic Theory of the State and Territoriality

Introduction

The state is a philosophical (or, more specifically, a metaphysical). The "life" of the state is not
related directly to physical organisms. The state is, in this essence, a spirit, or idea, in which all
nationals are bound spiritually into an organic oneness: into unity in multiplicity. All references
to a state's birth, life, or death are references to spiritual phenomena which may or may not be
related to the empirical fact of appearance or disappearance of political units on the world scene.
The spiritual nexus unites that is physically separated. The spiritual association individual to the
state is good for unity. It is not the spiritual association alone that keeps the state alive. States
live on a territory/space. Conscious

The state should seek to preserve the conditions for healthy living and space for growth; the state
was concerned with the character and quality of its citizens both in the present and in the future.
The "geographic conscience" of the state, unification of geographic area would provide a great
source of man power and resources, and it has the great advantage of being unassailable. As a
result of this all states are geographical conscious- all states had expansionist tendencies. A great
state needs great space and the citizens of a great state should comprehend the importance and
significance of great areal development.

Organic Theory of the State

Does the state die in a way the way biological organisms die? do not die the way biological
organisms do- difficult to assign precise points of birth or death to societies as we do with
biological organisms.

The state is a fragment of humanity on a piece of soil. This conception is, of course, the organic
theory of the state and its peculiar quality rests in the relation to territory, or to space. Since the
state cannot exist without its territory or space, the latter is extremely important in political life.
With the organic theory the growth of a state is represented by its expansion. Decay and death
are represented by static boundaries or a decrease in space. A growing state will expand and a
dying state will contract in that organ. The frontier is a peripheral organ of the state, its towards
which the state do an expansion. The manner in which the expansion over the frontier takes place
may vary in different circumstances; it may be by emigration, by the establishment of trading
centers or cultural centers, or it may take place by war. The forms of expansion also may vary;
there may be spheres of interest, spheres of influence, or colonies.

Friendrich Ratzel (1844-1904) in his “Political Geography” set up a general theory of the
effectiveness of geographic factors in the life and development of states." He emphasised the
organismic conception of the state, the physically determinstic view of human behaviour and the
struggle-for-space motive of political activities and thereby supplied some of the ideological
tenets of expansionism (Lebensraum) and economic self-sufficiency (Autarkic).

In the organic theory of the state- the state has both a body and a soul and is subject to the laws
of life. States not as legal bodies but as powers this power manifest in the size of territory they
occupy. It holds that the state or country is best understood as being like a living being. Like any
living organism, it therefore needs space to grow and it will be in competition with other living
beings for space. The state needs ‘living space’ (a certain amount of resources and land) for the
nation to thrive. Charles Darwin’s idea of a struggle for the ‘survival of the fittest’ is therefore
transferred to the realm of states. Drawing from organic notion of the state, geopolitics claims to
identify certain laws that govern state behavior.

State expansion has occurred throughout history, and some of those ways have been by force and
violence to existing political societies. By implication the geopolitician assumes that expansion
may continue to occur in the same ways as in the past, and by implication approves of war as a
means to the end of increasing a state's power and prestige and space. The idea that other states
can have geopolitical intentions of domination.

Territory and territoriality

The only material element of a state's unity is its territory. Consequently there is a strong
temptation to base the political organization primarily on the territory. Only rarely, if ever, do
two countries agree, throughout a longer historical period, that the boundary they share is just,
satisfies their mutual interests, and represents the ideal limit for their national aspirations and/ or
missions. Conflict was waged not only with bullets and mortars, but through the medium of map
imagery.
In this way territoriality is deeply embedded in social relations and territories, rather than being
natural entities, result from social practices and processes and are produced under particular
conditions and serve specific ends (Delaney 2005). Sack (1986) argues that territoriality involves
a classification by area whereby geographic space is apportioned.

Territory

However, territories are more than mere spatial containers; they link space and society conveying
clear meanings relating to authority, power and rights (Sassen 2006; Delaney 2009). David
Delaney has defined a territory as ‘a bounded social space that inscribes a certain social meaning
onto defined segments of the material world’ (2005: 14). These geographic spaces convey
messages of political power and control which are communicated through various means, most
notably through the creation and maintenance of boundaries that divide those ‘inside’ from those
‘outside’; separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. Space is controlled and territory facilitates classification,
communication, enforcement and exclusion through boundary-making. This may have important
implications, through constraining, restricting or limiting mobility, for example.

Territories are more than simply land; instead territory can be viewed as what Elden calls a
‘political technology’, related to the measurement of land and the control of terrain. Territory can
be seen as something calculable, mappable and controllable. territories are in effect politicized
space; mapped and claimed, ordered and bordered, measured and demarcated.

If territories reflect a particular way of thinking about space, then this points to the importance of
maps in solidifying and legitimizing these spatial units. Rather than neutral depictions of
supposed geographical realities, a more critical analysis suggests that maps have always been
useful weapons in larger political projects associated with territorial claims, and counter-claims
(Harley 1988; Black 1998; Crampton 2014). Mapping of territory itself functions so as to
enhance power sending out messages signifying control over portions of geographic space.

Territory refers to the delimited, bordered spatial units under the control and jurisdiction of
an administrative and/or political authority, for instance a nation state, regional or
city government (Agnew 2011; Paasi 2010).

Territoriality
We live in a world where we are regularly confronted with signs reminding us of where we
can or cannot go, and how to behave when we are there. These are everyday reminders of
how control of space facilitates various forms of social control (Plate 21). The global political
map provides us with the most obvious formalized manifestation of this territorialized mode
of thinking. However, this macro-scale territorialization is accompanied by a myriad of much
more micro-scale, often less formal, variants. We may be barred, admonished, instructed or
warned through signs telling us ‘keep out’, ‘authorized personnel only’, ‘no trespassing’,
‘keep off the grass’ and so on.

In everyday usage, territory is usually taken to refer to a portion of geographic space which is
claimed or occupied by a person, a group or an institution. In this way it can be seen as an
area of bounded space. Following from this, the ways in which individuals or groups lay
claim to such territory can be referred to as ‘territoriality’. Territories and territorial
strategies are bound up with attempts by individuals or groups to wield power, or to resist
power imposed on them.

Territoriality- staking claims to defined portions of the earth's surface. There are real maps
and logo maps. It is through logo maps that map minded individuals use as a vital means by
which political communities territorial entities represent themselves and dramatize their
claims to land. Unlike those objects (e.g., flags, anthems, monuments) that invoke the political
community metonymically, maps purport to offer up the actual political community in its
bounded entirety to one's gaze.

For Robert Sack (1989) territoriality is ‘the attempt by an individual or group to affect,
influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting
control over a geographic area’ (Sack 1986: 19). He draws attention to the means through
which territorial strategies may be used to achieve particular ends. In essence the control of
geographic space can be used to assert or to maintain power, or, importantly, to resist the
power of a dominant group.

Territoriality, as a component of power, is not only a means of creating and maintaining

order, but is a device to create and maintain much of the geographic context through which
we experience the world and give it meaning (Sack 1986: 219). Territoriality and the production
of territories can be seen as devices that tend to reify power so that it appears to reside in the
territory itself rather than in those who control it.

Once created, territories can become the spatial containers in which people are socialized
through various social practices and discourses so that territoriality can be seen as ‘a primary
geographic expression of social power’ (Sack 1986: 5). The social, cultural and political are
brought together so that people identify with territories in such a way that they can be seen ‘to
satisfy both the material requirements of life and the emotional requirements of belonging’
(Penrose 2002: 282). Notwithstanding the evolution of a more globally interconnected world,
territory continues to retain both an allure in terms of identity as well as a strategic value
(Agnew 2010b; Murphy 2013). This is reflected in a variety of ways such as preferential claims
to jobs on the basis of nationality (Ince et al. 2015).

It is sometimes assumed that humans have a natural tendency to behave in a territorial

manner: to claim space and to prevent others from encroaching on ‘our’ territory.
Considerable debate has occurred over the extent to which territorialization and territorial
behaviour should be seen as a ‘natural’ or ‘social’ phenomenon, a debate echoing wider long-
standing arguments over the relative influence of nature and nurture, a division that many see
as somewhat blurred (see Whatmore 2014).

The creation and imagining of territories and the utilization of territorial strategies can be
observed at a variety of spatial scales. The most obvious (and regularly contested) expressions
of territoriality are manifested at the level of the state, currently the world’s dominant form of
political organization. Political maps of the world display this territorial configuration of
bordered spaces in a way that leads us to view it as ‘natural’ and this impression of solidity
engenders a very state-centred view of the world in which territory is viewed as a mere canvas
on which political processes play out (Kadercan 2015). However, the state system is a political
and geographic construct that displays considerable dynamism. In recent decades the
number of states has risen dramatically, consequent on state collapse (many associated with
the fall of communism) and secessionist nationalism. Clearly, secessionist ideologies (Basque,
Kurdish or Scottish nationalism for example) are premised on the construction of a territory,
politically detached from the state(s) to which it currently belongs. Elsewhere, groups such
as ‘Islamic State’ (in Iraq and Syria) and Boko Haram (in Nigeria) are utilizing the control of
space in the pursuit of ideological objectives. Ultimately territorial sovereignty is relative,
contingent and never complete.

Apart from these state and sub-state examples, territorial configurations exist at a variety of
spatial scales. Although these may be less obvious and may often seem more vaguely defined
with less clear-cut boundaries, these ‘informal’ divisions run through a wide range of social,
cultural and political issues concerning race, class, gender and sexuality so that what can be
termed spatial enclaves of varying degrees of permanence are regularly created and sustained
(Sidaway 2007).

Class and territorial segregations- viewed as separate spaces inhabited by many people who
are marginalized not just in social and economic terms, but also spatially- spatial
marginalization. Societies are seen to be marked by clear inequalities: between rich and poor;
between property owners and those who are not; between those who own and control resources;
and between those who are paid workers or are unable to obtain a job. These social divisions
(together with race, ethnicity, gender and others) not only reflect inequality, they are also deeply
spatialized- enclave societies. perpetuating the idea that some households do not belong in
particular places.

These attempts to purify urban space have led to the displacement of some urban residents while
others are rendered homeless. Gentrification is where parts of the urban area experience
regeneration or renewal, resulting in more affluent residents moving in and displacing the
original predominantly workingclass inhabitants.

Urban gating, urban gatekeepers.

The apparent rise in the numbers and varied forms of gated communities within urban areas in
various parts of the world in recent years could be interpreted as a very obvious manifestation of
attempts to control and limit access to portions of geographic space. The creation of residential
fortresses where security guards patrol the perimeter of walled residential zones in an attempt to
exclude undesirables to exclude those seen as not belonging there, so maintaining the
‘undefiled’ and ‘exclusive’ nature of the neighbourhood. The level of ‘fortification’ of these
developments is quite varied ranging from perimeter walls, gates and barriers, through the
limiting of non-residential access by intercoms and associated ‘screening’ devices, to more
perceptual barriers or codes deterring access (Plate 21.3). Individual streets, where homes are
owned by super-rich global elites, may be subject to private security and monitoring, as in parts
of London. The general population is prevented, or at least discouraged, from traversing
such spaces (Gentleman 2014). The idea of gating can be seen as a consequence of two inter-
connected factors: security and prestige.

The social and the spatial are inextricably linked as ‘gated minds’ are translated into gated
places (Landman 2010).

Ethnicity, ‘race’ and space

In the same way that class is mapped onto space, so too is ethnicity. Ideas of race are firmly
embedded in everyday discourses but racial and ethnic categories are social constructions rather
than innate biological realities.

Racial map: a division of space based on the racial

Ethnic map

Regional map

nationalist conflicts may give rise to attempts to create ethnically pure spaces through the
forcible removal of ethnic ‘others: de-territorialized

many cities exhibit high degrees of ethnic segregation. In considering these spatial
concentrations of ethnic groups in urban areas, it might be argued that individuals choose to
locate in such areas for a variety of reasons. In brief there are a combination of ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ factors; for some there are attractions such as ‘being amongst one’s own’, while others
may feel driven to seek sanctuary from a racist, hostile society. Clustering offers feelings of
defence, mutual support and a sense of belonging and community.

This spatial arrangement was designed to ensure greater degrees of control over the majority
black population and is a classic example of the utilization of a territorial strategy to attain
political objectives.

Personal Space
We can recognize two important social tendencies that bolster territoriality: the wish by people to
have space of their own and the wish by others to exclude people from certain spaces. At its most
elementary level, the assertion of territoriality is reflected in claims to private property. Thus,
people desire to mark their own home, to adorn it in their chosen style (influenced of course by
social trends, technologies and fashions) and, in various ways, to mark it out as theirs.
Homeowners are generally keen to stamp their personality on their home through the ways in
which they choose to decorate it, alterations to layout, choice of colour schemes, furnishings and
so on. This personalizing of space is further manifested through such things as the display of
paintings, posters or photographs and the collection and arrangement of ornaments. The
geographer Jean Gottman suggested that people ‘always partitioned the space around them
carefully to set themselves apart from their neighbours’ (1973: 1). This manifestation is
commonly interpreted as being symptomatic of our inherently territorial nature.

Symbolic connections are often made between the domestic home and the nation whereby
images of the former are seen to give material meaning to the latter. The home is seen in some
ways to be at the heart of the nation. In times of war, for example, people have been encouraged
to fight for the ‘homeland’ and the defence of ‘hearth and home’.

Private property is regarded by many as an outcome of human territorial behaviour and it

represents a claim to space that is reinforced by the legal system of many countries.

While the home is commonly depicted as a refuge from the outside world it may also be a site
for domestic violence and fear (Squire and Gill 2011).

Even within buildings territorial behaviour can be recognized. As we have seen, the idea of the
kitchen as a ‘woman’s place’ is one example of this. The domestic home in many different
cultural contexts is often spatially divided, not just in terms of gender but also in terms of age,
with certain spaces being designated for women or for children (Spain 1992). The banning of
children from some rooms and the proprietorial attitude towards one’s own room in a house are
other examples of this. In the home, space is even being claimed at the level of ‘my chair’, ‘my
place at the table’ and so on. There are also distinctions amongst those allowed in, with
differential access for close family and friends on the one hand and more casual acquaintances
on the other. Even then, friends may be welcomed into the living room but are less likely to be
invited into the more ‘private’ spaces such as bedrooms (Morley 2000).

While for some it conjures up feelings of comfort and security, for others it may be a place of
discomfort, alienation and tension (Blunt and Dowling 2006). For some the home may come to
feel like a prison – quite literally so for those sentenced to home imprisonment or the many
others subject to degrees of curfew, control and house arrest. Home is therefore a social
construction in which social identities are (re)produced but which conveys different meanings to
different people.

Taking the idea of territory down to its most elementary level, the desire for personal space can
be seen as a form of territorial behaviour. Humans like to have a pocket of space around them
that is ‘theirs’ and they resent others ‘invading’ their space (unless invited!). This can be
interpreted as a territorial claim to a portion of geographic space. While this might be taken as
reflecting a natural tendency, it is worth noting that the amount of space needed appears to vary
from one society to another, a fact noted long ago by Hall (1959). For many young people, their
own room, apartment, etc., may seem like a ‘natural’ ambition, but for many of the world’s
inhabitants such a desire is completely unobtainable. Nurture, culture, power and politics all need
to be considered where the complexities and diversities of human territorialities are concerned.

Spatial segregation within this class- Within the class different sets of students inhibit different
parts of the class. Students occupy different sections of a class- gender, class and ethnicity.

Territorial thinking, the production of territories and the employment of territorial strategies are
bound up with maintaining power or with resisting the imposition of power by a dominant group.
Social phenomena such as class, racial or gendered identities invariably embody a territorial
component.

The claiming of space is a political act whether it occurs in the ‘public’ or ‘private’ arena (and
the categorization and demarcation of these areas is a key expression of territoriality) and
territories provide a material expression of the fusion of meaning, power and social space
(Delaney 2009).
State Contraction and Expansion: Irredentism and Secessionism

We said state is not just philosophical rather it is empirical as well that manifest itself on the
territory. It is the territory that made states empirical/physical. Therefore, we have to be
geographically conscious and need to know what affect the territorial integrity of the state (what
affect the geography of state). Territorial integrity of a sovereign state can be affected by
nationalist movements such as irredentism and secessionism (there are two ethno nationalism
forces- irredentism and secessionism- that affect the territory). They are not just ethnic
movements, rather movements for territory. Both movements are results of human territoriality
and other factors.

Organic Theory of state- States can expand and contract in size. Nationalist sentiment frequently
play a role in such changes.

Geographically fragmented states- geographically disadvantages states- conducive for secession

movements- cost of administration could be high- distance from the sea, erratic and low rainfall

Geographically dispersed ethnic groups- Kurds, Basque/Eskara, Somalis, Arabs- Oromos,

Amharas- irredentist claims

secessionist and irredentist causes supported by sovereign states can have on the international
system. Why would a sovereign state which shares no affinity with minority groups elsewhere,
make a decision to support their secessionist cause?

Why states reject both claims?- in order to thwart any territorial loss

As sovereign states are unlikely to grant a right to secession to minority populations within their
own borders, these movements can lead to violence, bloodshed, and loss of life if these groups
decide to continue their fight for independence using any means necessary.

An irredentist conflict ensues when an ethnic group, from a position inside any given sovereign
state, attempts to unite with its kin, who are living as a minority in a neighboring country or
countries, by making claims on the adjacent territories where these same people are
concentrated. It is an attempt to incorporate the land and people of their ethnic brethren.
Irredentism refers to political efforts to unite ethnically or religiously related segments of a
particular population that have been incorporated into several different states.

In order for irredentism to take place, ethnic groups must be dispersed geographically in two
or more countries adjacent to each other (as the Basque and Kurdish cases in this study
demonstrate). Irredentist movements are only possible if groups identify with their kin who
are geographically dispersed over two or more.

Irredentist claims are usually, but not always, made by ethnic or religious groups who happen to
be the dominant majority inside a sovereign state and wish to incorporate the land and
territory of their kin living as minorities inside a neighboring country or countries. For
irredentist movements, the level of violence, bloodshed, and loss of lives may be magnified
because often the claimant is not a minority population but rather a dominant majority, which is
in charge of a sovereign state with a well-organized and decent-sized military, ready and willing
to fight a full scale war on behalf of its kin living inside a neighboring country.

Secessionist conflicts, on the other hand, emerge when minority groups declare their
independence, separating themselves and the territory on which they reside from the
sovereign authority of a state ruled by a different ethnic majority. Secessionism refers to a
decision by an ethnic minority to secede or rather to break free from the sovereign
authority of the country where the group resides, in order to be able to self-govern that territory
where it is concentrated. Secessionist conflicts often ensue when claims to secede are rejected by
the dominant majority (which is governing the state) in order to thwart any territorial loss.

Irredentist causes are more likely to lead to international conflict than secessionist ones. The
reason for this is that unlike secessionist movements, which are commonly fought by
underprivileged minorities lacking adequate military resources, irredentist causes are usually
advanced by sovereign states that have access to large-scale armies. Unlike secessionist
movements, which are mainly initiated from the bottom-up at the grassroots level, irredentist
campaigns, for the most part, are recognized as top-down phenomena, launched and driven by
governments.

Whereas secessionism is about the creation of a sovereign state, irredentism is about the
expansion of an existing one. Or as Donald Horowitz writes, “irredentism involves subtracting
from one state and adding to another state, new or already existing; secession involves
subtracting alone.”

The fundamental difference between irredentism and secessionism is that in most cases the push
to incorporate the land of its ethnic kin who reside across the border in a neighboring country is
made by a sovereign state with a well-organized and capable military. As in the case of
secession, when the request to incorporate the territory and/or its people is denied, the claimant
may not easily give up. The motivations to incorporate the land may be so strong they might be
based on various factors: to protect ethnic kin from what is perceived as the hostile policies
of the host-state; or to reclaim a geographic area that was once lost in a past dispute. This
reluctance to give up contributes to an environment of insecurity for the anti irredentist state
where the minority is located. The situation can intensify as the claimant pursues its objective by
any means possible—including assisting its kin with military, logistical, and financial support to
launch cross-border attacks against the host-state so that it will give into its demands. An effort
on the part of the anti-irredentist to defend its border against the claimant raises the stakes and
brings about hostility and violence, which ultimately paves the way to interstate war.

Similar to secessionist claims, irredentism challenges the territorial integrity of a sovereign state.

Eg. Kashmiri conflict- Pakistan’s irredentist claims on Kashmir

In an attempt to preserve the status quo and to defend its own borders—hanging on to the land
and people that others claim as their own—the anti-irredentist state becomes the aggressor by
escalating the ethnic conflict to war. The likelihood for war is higher between two states that
share an ethnic group over a contiguous geographic territory, where in one country the group
happens to be a dominant majority, and in the other, a disenfranchised minority.

minority- and majority-led irredentism- while an irredentist claim made by a majority ethnic
group in a dominant position inside a country can lead to expansion of territory, those initiated
by minority groups gear toward state creation, the same as it is with secessionist movements.

Basque minority-led irredentism- inside a sovereign state (Spain). The Basque people have
been living in the territories of present-day northern Spain and southwestern France since ancient
times- consists of seven provinces, which includes three provinces (Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and
Soule) in France and four (Viscaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra) inside Spain- which pushed
for independence of its four provinces in northern Spain. In July 1961, these radical Basques
took refuge inside France after the French government offered ETA a sanctuary within its
borders as a form of support. The group used its French base of operations to regroup and
reinvigorate its fight for secessionism. This agreement implied that the French government
would provide a safe zone for ETA refugees as long as they neither practiced violence within its
borders nor encouraged it among the French Basque population. ETA’s goal at the time was to
liberate the seven provinces, including the three located inside France, to fulfill the group’s
irredentist vision of an independent Basque Country free of Spanish and French dominance.

The Kurdish secessionist movement- irredentist aims to establish a Greater Kurdistan from the
territories of all four neighboring countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria). what might start out
as secessionism could potentially evolve into a minority-led irredentist movement or vice
versa.

In contrast to majority-led irredentism, usually launched by sovereign states with large-scale

armies, those initiated by minorities lack adequate military resources to fight a full-scale
interstate war; (1b) minority-led

a state-driven irredentism to one initiated by a minority group, it is clear that the Basque
movement was launched at the grassroots level and not backed by the support of a large-scale
army.

Unlike Pakistan’s irredentist claims on Kashmir, France has never made claims on the
Basque land and people. expansion of its territory by incorporating the people and land of its
Muslim brethren. Pakistan has never faced any risk of losing its land to India for having
supported the Kashmiri people. In contrast, France stood to lose a part of its own territory by a
continued support of the Spanish Basques, which had incited a similar movement among those
located inside its own border.

Similar to the Basque case, the Kurdish one inside Turkey can be considered both
secessionist and, at various times, an irredentist conflict, initiated by a minority group that
drew the support of a sovereign state (Syria). The Kurdish people have inhabited the territories
under the sovereign authority of present-day Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria since the time of the
Persian and Ottoman Empires. Today, there are approximately 12 million Kurds inside Turkey, 5
million inside Iran, 4 to 5 million inside Iraq, and 1 to 2 million in Syria. PKK not only sought
independence from Turks but also wanted to unite all the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria
into a single Kurdish state. one can make the argument that the Kurdish movement inside Turkey
was not just secessionist but also an irredentist one.

Irredentism and Secessionism

In some cases an emotion can lead to irredentism, the desire to incorporate within the state all
areas that had once been part of the state and/or areas of adjacent states that have become home
to their ethnic kin. If such effort succeed, one state expands at the expense of the another. On the
other hand, secession occurs when the people and territory withdraw from a state to become
independent. In that situation, the original state may contract due to establishment of new state
rather than expansion of the neighbor. This in turn may be a useful means through which group
cultural norms and heritage may be preserved. Clustering also produces spaces of resistance
whereby external threats, whether to cultural norms or of physical attack, may be reduced.

Chapter Three

Natural Resources and Conflict

Conventional wisdom suggests that having access to greater quantities of inputs should lead
to higher levels of output. This expectation has been challenged for natural resource
endowments. Recent empirical work suggests that resource rich countries tend to grow slower
than their resource poor counterparts (Sachs & Warner, 1997, 2001), and are more prone to
suffer from civil strife (Collier & Bannon, 2003) and rent seeking (Leite & Weidmann, 1999;
Auty,2001a;Torvik,2002). For these reasons natural resource abundance has been coined a
curse for development rather than a blessing.

There exist competing explanations for the mechanism linking resources to conflict and
impeded growth. One prominent hypothesis that is gaining momentum highlights the adverse
implications of resource richness on institutional quality (Ishametal.,2003). In particular,
empirical work suggests an inverse relation between so-called “point resources” and
institutions or governance proxies (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Isham et al., 2003, Bulte et al.,
2005). Not surprisingly, therefore, it appears that economies that are abundantly endowed with
diffuse resources (resources spread thinly across space), typically grow faster than countries
with resources that are geographically clustered (or “pointy”). Similarly, Ross (2004b) shows
that pointy resources trigger and prolong conflicts whereas diffuse resources do not.
Pointiness therefore appears to matter, and arguably deserves a more prominent place in
economic theory than it currently occupies.

Resource abundance induces a re-allocation of effort from production toward rent seeking or
conflict. Resource abundance and pointiness could promote an unequal distribution of
income between groups in society, regardless of whether resources are contested through rent
seeking or conflict. The effect of increased resource pointiness is that the contest more closely
resembles a winner-takes-all event. Very pointy resources, therefore, appear to contribute to
inequality as they end up being controlled by one tribe.

Empirical work suggests that resource abundance and pointiness are significant determinants
of economic performance and (civil) war.

increasing pointiness provides an incentive to allocate effort toward contesting. Indeed, we find
that the economy as a whole can be made worse off following the discovery of a new resource
stock if that resource is sufficiently “pointy” – the potential “conflict trap” equilibrium.

However, we also note that the link between resources and conflict intensity is not unambiguous;
there are circumstances where more pointy resources may be less heavily contested. This is
consistent with findings by Ross, 2004a, who notes that “resources do not necessarily make
conflicts longer or more severe – at times they appeared to shorten conflicts and promote
cooperation among opposing sides.”

ambiguous and depends on the degree of resource pointiness.

Renewable Resource and Conflict: Theory

A neo-malthusian line of reasoning posit that increasing scarcity of and decreasing access to
renewable resources raise frustration, which in turn creates grievances against the state, weakens
it and civil society, and leads to opportunities for insurrection (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1994, 1999;
Bachler et al., 1996). Homer-Dixon (1999 asserts that resource scarcity is more likely to provoke
internal conflict than interstate war. Kahl (2008: 50f) adds that elites may abuse their power over
access to resources in situations of scarcity. By manipulating state policies in their favor, elites
can limit access to resources, thus contributing to conflict.

Cornucopians or ‘resource optimists’ do not share the neo-malthusian view. Although they
acknowledge that resource scarcity may put human well-being at risk, cornucopians claim that
humans are able to adapt to resource scarcity through market mechanisms, technological
innovations, social institutions for resource allocation, or any combination thereof (e.g.
Lomborg, 2001). Resource optimists instead suggest various causal mechanisms in which
scarcity is just one of several factors in the overall relationship between natural resources and
conflict. Even in instances of acute resource scarcity then, conflict does not appear to be the
automatic outcome. And if conflict occurs, resource scarcity is unlikely to be the main cause,
which is supported by recent research showing that economic and political factors are more
important drivers of conflict than resource scarcity (e.g. Gartzke, 2012; Koubi et al., 2012;
Buhaug, 2010).

Renewable Resource and Conflict: Empirical

However, social, economic, and political conditions, which may also affect conflict besides
resource scarcity, vary considerably between different types of resources as well as areas of the
world.

interstate conflict on water. Empirical analyses in this context suggest that states tend to
cooperate rather than fight over shared water resources (Dinar et al., 2007; Brochmann, 2012)
and that institutionalized agreements can reduce dispute risk (Zawahri & Mitchell, 2011; Tir &
Stinnett, 2012). joint democracy and/ or international water management institutions facilitate
cooperative solutions to water problems even in situations of scarcity. Furthermore, side-
payments, issue linkages, or economic and political ties between countries also prevent interstate
conflict over water. While scholars do not fully rule out conflict over scarce water resources,
they find that if conflict materializes then it occurs in the form of disputes and political tensions,
but not in the form of armed hostilities or even ‘water wars’ (e.g. Gledisch & Hegre, 2000;
Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel, Mitchell & Sowers, 2006; Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Dinar,
2009).
Intrastate conflict- Hauge & Ellingsen (1998) find that land degradation, freshwater scarcity, and
deforestation all have positive and significant effects on the incidence of armed conflict (see also
Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Gizelis & Wooden, 2010).

Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) report that increased vegetation rather than scarcity is positively
associated with the incidence of organized raids. Theisen (2008: 810) to conclude that ‘scarcity
of natural resources has limited explanatory power in terms of civil violence’. on the link
between renewable resources and conflict does not provide robust evidence for the claim that
resource scarcity leads to intra- or interstate conflict.

Non Renewable Resource and Conflict: Theory

access to non-renewable resources should in general lead to more economic output. Stylized
facts show, however, that resource-rich countries have performed quite differently in this respect.
For instance, Norway and Botswana do well economically, while Nigeria and Algeria have
performed poorly despite their immense natural wealth.

In particular, it is argued that resource-rich countries have dysfunctional political and economic
institutions (Ross, 2001; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Morrison,
2007; Aslaksen, 2010; Tsui, 2011)4 and are prone to more rent seeking (Auty, 2001a,b; Torvik,
2002, 2009; Wick & Bulte, 2006; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 2006).5 Resource-wealth countries
also appear to experience more civil strife (Collier&Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005). Problems
associated with abundance of non-renewable natural resources have thus been called the
‘resource curse’ and the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl, 1997).

resource wealth could contribute to conflict by creating funding opportunities for rebels (Collier
& Hoeffler, 2004, 2005; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009). Similarly, natural resource wealth
can either turn the state into a more attractive target for rebels because political power is
associated with rents from resource extraction (Fearon & Laitin, 2003;
Besley&Persson,2011;Mitchell&Thies,2012),or it can make separatism financially attractive for
resource-rich regions (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 2006; Sorens, 2011).

Abundance of non-renewable resources has also the potential to make a country more dependent
on global commodity markets, which are likely to be volatile. This makes resource-dependent
states vulnerable to trade shocks, which in turn may increase the risk of conflict (Humphreys,
2005; Ross, 2006; Dal Bo ´ & Dal Bo ´, 2011).

Resource abundance and dependence may also aggravate grievances leading to conflict if a
particular resource is controlled by only one group (Wick & Bulte, 2006), or if citizens perceive
the distribution of resource rents to be unfair (Østby, Nordas & Rød, 2009; Murshed & Gates,
2005; Humphreys, 2005). Similarly, resource extraction might induce conflict if the local
population becomes frustrated with negative externalities associated with the extraction process,
such as pollution, land expropriation, or in-migration (Ross, 2004a; Humphreys, 2005).

In contrast, some scholars propose the ‘rentier state’ as a counter-argument, which suggests that
governments use revenues from abundant resources to buy off peace through repression (Ross,
2001), patronage (Le Billon, 2003), or large-scale distributive policies (Le Billon, 2001; Basedau
& Lay, 2009). Fjelde (2009), for example, argues that oil-rich governments can use political
corruption to obtain support from key segments of the society, effectively outspending other
entrepreneurs of violence. Consequently, rentier states tend to be politically more stable and less
prone to conflict.

Non Renewable Resource and Conflict: Empirical Evidences

The existing literature offers different and in part competing arguments on whether and how
abundance of non-renewable natural resources may lead to conflict. A multitude of empirical
studies has tried to identify whether and how natural resources may increase the risk of civil war
onset, its duration, or intensity.

Collier & Hoeffler (2004) report that rebellion is more likely to occur in countries with abundant
natural resource deposits, and interpret this as evidence for the argument that resource abundance
constitutes a financial opportunity for rebels.

Research also examines the effects of natural and geographic characteristics of resources in the
form of lootable versus non-lootable resources (Le Billon, 2001; Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore,
2005; Lujala, 2009,2010),physically diffuse and pointresources, and resources that are proximate
to or distant from national capitals (Le Billon, 2005). These specific measurements of resource
type appear useful since lootable, distant, and spatially diffuse resources are more difficult for
governments to control (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Buhaug & Rød, 2006; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala,
2009). Hence, rebels may face fewer barriers in capturing and controlling such resources.
Moreover, given that resources are not distributed uniformly across a country’s territory and that
a conflict may affect only some parts of a state’s territory.

the specific location of oil within a country matters for the type of conflict (secessionist vs.
governmental conflict) as well as its duration and intensity. Lujala (2009, 2010) also reports that
the location of oil production inside a conflict zone is associated with longer and more intense
conflicts. Sorens (2011) finds evidence that a measure of local mineral resource production,
which includes oil, is positively related to secessionist and territorial conflict.

Rentier state- resource wealth can be used to engage in large-scale redistribution and to establish
an effective security apparatus. Thies (2010) observes that almost all primary commodities,
including oil, tend to strengthen state capacity.

Onset, duration, severity & recurrence of conflict

‘natural resource curse: resources are associated with (i) slower economic growth, (ii) violent
civil conflict, and (iii) undemocratic regime types.

The rational choice paradigm considers civil war a special form of noncooperative behavior, and
the greed motive simply reflects opportunities for rebels (or rebel leaders) to enrich themselves.
Grievance, in contrast, is rooted in a behavioral paradigm, and emphasizes relative deprivation,
social exclusion and inequality (e.g., due to ethnic or religious divides, see Regan, 2003). In the
context of resource-rich societies, grievance might be exacerbated by insufficiently compensated
land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities, and labour
migration (e.g., Rosser, 2006). Resource rents also provide a potential source of funding for the
start-up costs associated with initiating a rebel organization. The Collier and Hoeffler paradigm
views rebels as rational predators or, using terms with a less negative connotation, as
entrepreneurs following up on a profitable opportunity.

If resources are important for financing an insurgence, then arguably the ‘lootability’ of
resources is important.
lumping all types of conflict together may obscure the analysis (Le Billon, 2001). The empirical
evidence is mixed (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Ross, 2004a, 2006). Ross (2003) finds
little support for a link in general, but does argue in favour of a relation between conflict and
‘lootable’ resources such as alluvial diamonds and drugs (see also Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005;
Olsson, 2006).

resource-rich economies tend to suffer from weak and unaccountable leadership, which is unable
or unwilling to diversify the economy and deliver key public goods. Alternatively, resource
riches may invite oppressive regimes, resulting in genuine grievances among a share of the
population.

effectiveness of the state’ in delivering public goods (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

resource scarcity, rather than abundance, as a driver of violent conflict. Scarcity is linked to
conflict via two mechanisms: it may trigger marginalization of powerless groups by an elite
scrambling for resources, and it could have a debilitating effect on processes of social and
economic innovation (resulting in an ‘ingenuity gap’).

conflicts are triggered by greed (fighting over future resource rents),

According to both the economics and political science literature, natural resources tend to
magnify the risk of civil war. This resource-war link is often viewed as one of the dimensions of
the paradoxical resource curse perspective—the view that more of a good thing may be bad for
development.

Resource wealth, via an income effect, lowers the probability of conflict, and especially of the
onset of a major conflict. Economic success and peace are signalled by economic diversification
and low dependence on natural resources (even if such resources are physically abundant). Our
findings are consistent with the view that resource scarcity—rather than abundance—may drive
conflict.
Chapter Four

Hydro Politics

Water/transboundary rivers are a gifts of nature but ,water is regularly treated as a security issue-
source of dispute. Water- source of confrontation and cooperation

The term hydropolitics is the result of substantial attention to the potential for conflict and
violence to erupt over international waters and relates to the ability of geopolitical institutions to
manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable manner, i.e., without tensions or
conflict between political entities.

Hydropolitical vulnerability is defined by the risk of political dispute over shared water systems.

As human populations and economies grow, the amount of fresh water in the world remains
roughly the same as it has been throughout history. The total quantity of water in the world is
immense, but most is either saltwater (97.5%) or locked in ice caps (1.75%). The amount
economically available for human use is only 0.007% of the total, or about 13,500 km3, which is
about 2300 m3 per person—a 37% drop since 1970 (1). This increasing scarcity is made more
complex because almost half the globe’s land surface lies within international watersheds—the
land that contributes to the world’s 263 transboundary waterways.

The pressures on water resources development leads to intense political pressures. Furthermore,
water ignores political boundaries. Water demands are increasing, groundwater levels are
dropping, surface water supplies are increasingly contaminated, and delivery and treatment
infrastructure is aging (5). Collectively, these issues provide compelling arguments for
considering the security implications of water resources management (6–8).

In conjunction with this crisis, though, come the political stresses that result as the people who
have built their lives and livelihoods on a reliable source of freshwater are seeing the shortage of
this vital resource impinge on all aspects of the tenuous relations that have developed over the
years— between nations, between economic sectors, and between individuals and their
environment.
It is quite clear that people affect their environment, but to what extent is the opposite true? Just
how deep is the causal relationship between environmental stresses and the structure of human
politics?

the greatest threat for water conflicts is that water scarcity can and will lead directly to warfare
between nations

shared water does lead to tensions, threats, and even to some localized violence but not to war.

Water as a tool, target, or victim of warfare—not the cause.

Although wars over water have not occurred, there is ample evidence showing that water issues
have led to intense political instability and that acute violence has occasionally been the result.
Conflicts over shared water resources occur at multiple scales, from sets of individual irrigators,
to urban versus rural uses, to nations that straddle international water ways. Trans boundary
waters share certain characteristics that make their management especially complicated, notably
that these basins require a more complete appreciation of the political, cultural, and social
aspects of water and that the tendency is for regional politics to regularly exacerbate the already
difficult task of understanding and managing complex natural systems. Within this framework,
water resources leads to intense political pressures, while threatening the processes of sustainable
development and environmental protection.

the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses defines a

watercourse as “a system of surface and underground waters constituting by virtue of their
physical relationship a unitary whole and flowing into a common terminus.” An international
water course is a watercourse with parts situated in different States (nations).

Surface and groundwater that cross international boundaries present increased challenges to
regional stability because hydrologic needs can often be overwhelmed by political
considerations. Although the potential for paralyzing disputes is especially high in these basins,
history shows that water can catalyze dialogue and cooperation, even between especially
contentious riparians. There are 263 rivers around the world that cross the boundaries of two or
more nations and an untold number of international ground water aquifers.
Within each international basin, demands from environmental, domestic, and economic users
increase annually, while the amount of freshwater in the world remains roughly the same as it
has been throughout history. Given the scope of the problems and the resources available to
address them, avoiding water conflict is vital. Conflict is expensive, disruptive, and interferes
with efforts to relieve human suffering, reduce environmental degradation, and achieve
economic growth. Developing the capacity to monitor, predict, and preempt transboundary water
conflicts, particularly in developing countries, is key to promoting human and environmental
security in international river basins, regardless of the scale at which they occur.

Even more striking than the total number of basins is a breakdown of each nation’s land surface
that falls within these watersheds. A total of 145 nations include territory within international
basins. Twenty-one nations lie in their entirety within international basins, and a total of 33
countries have greater than 95% of their territory within these basins.

A final way to visualize the dilemmas posed by international water resources is to look at the
number of countries that share each international basin. Nineteen basins are shared by five or
more riparian countries: one basin—the Danube—has 17 riparian nations; five basins—the
Congo, Niger, Nile, Rhine, and Zambezi—are shared by between 9 and 11 countries; and the
remaining 13 basins— the Amazon, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Lake Chad, Tarim, Aral Sea,
Jordan, KuraAraks, Mekong, Tigris-Euphrates, Volga, La Plata, Neman, and Vistula (Wista)—
have between 5 and 8 riparian countries (42).

Disparities between riparian nations— whether in economic development, infrastructural

capacity, or political orientation— add further complications to water resources development,
institutions, and management. As a consequence, development, treaties, and institutions are
regularly seen as, at best, inefficient, often ineffective, and, occasionally, as a new source of
tensions themselves.

There is room for optimism, though, notably in the global community’s record of resolving
water-related disputes along international waterways. For example, the record of acute conflict
over international water resources is overwhelmed by the record of cooperation.

So if there is little violence between nations over their shared waters, what is the problem? Is
water actually a security concern at all? In fact, there are a number of issues where water causes
or exacerbates tensions, and it is worth understanding these processes to know both how
complications arise and how they are eventually resolved. Non cooperation costs result primarily
in inefficient water management, leading to decreasing water quantity, quality, and
environmental health.

The timing of water flow is also important; thus, the operation of dams is also contested. For
example, upstream users might release water from reservoirs in the winter for hydropower
production, whereas downstream users might need it for irrigation in the summer. In addition,
water quantity and water flow patterns are crucial to maintaining fresh water ecosystems that
depend on seasonal flooding. Freshwater ecosystems perform a variety of ecological and
economical functions and often play an important role in sustaining livelihoods, especially in
developing countries. As awareness of environmental issues and the economic value of
ecosystems increases, claims for the environment’s water requirements are growing. For
example, in the Okavango basin, Botswana’s claims for water to sustain the Okavango Delta and
its lucrative ecotourism industry have contributed to a dispute with upstream Namibia, which
wants to use the water passing through the Caprivi Strip on its way to the delta for irrigation (54,
55).

Generally, parties base their initial positions in terms of rights—the sense that a riparian is
entitled to a certain allocation based on hydrography or chronology of use. Upstream riparians
often invoke some variation of the Harmon Doctrine, claiming that water rights originate where
the water falls. India claimed absolute sovereignty in the early phases of negotiations over the
Indus Waters Treaty, as did France in the Lac Lanoux case, and Palestine over the West Bank
aquifer. Downstream riparians often claim absolute river integrity, claiming rights to an
undisturbed system or, if on an exotic stream, historic rights on the basis of their history of use.
Spain insisted on absolute sovereignty regarding the Lac Lanoux project (58), whereas Egypt
claimed historic rights against first Sudan, and later Ethiopia, on the Nile (59).

In almost all of the disputes that have been resolved, however, particularly on arid or exotic
streams, the paradigms used for negotiations have not been rights based at all—neither on
relative hydrography nor specifically on chronology of use, but rather needs based. Needs are
defined by irrigable land, population, or the requirements of a specific project.
In agreements between Egypt and Sudan signed in 1929 and in 1959, for example, allocations
were arrived at on the basis of local needs, primarily those of agriculture. Egypt argued for a
greater share of the Nile because of its larger population and extensive irrigation works. In 1959,
Sudan and Egypt then divided future water from development equally between the two. Current
allocations of 55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM)/year for Egypt and 18.5 BCM/year for Sudan
reflect these relative needs (59).

emphasized the needs rather than the inherent rights of each of the riparians- irrigated by gravity
flow.

One might speculate as to why negotiations move from rights-based to needs based criteria for
allocation. Rothman (64), among others, points out that negotiations ideally move along three
stages: the adversarial stage, where each side defines its positions, or rights; the reflexive stage,
where the needs of each side bringing them to their positions is addressed; and finally, to the
integrative stage, where negotiators brain storm together to address each side’s underlying
interests. The negotiations here seem to follow this pattern from rights to needs and,
occasionally, to interests. Although each negotiator may initially see him- or herself as Egyptian
or Israeli or Indian and the rights of one’s own country are paramount, over time one must
empathize to some degree and to notice that even one’s enemy (be he or she Sudanese,
Palestinian, or Pakistani) requires the same amount of water for the same use with the same
methods as oneself.

The second reason for the shift from rights to needs may simply be that rights are not
quantifiable and needs are. If two nations insist on their respective rights of upstream versus
down, for example, there is no spectrum along which to bargain; no common frame of reference.
One can much more readily determine a needs- based criterion—irrigable land or population, for
example—and quantify each nation’s needs.

From Rights and Needs to Interests: Baskets of Benefits

One productive approach to the development of trans boundary waters has been to move past
rights and needs entirely and to examine the benefits in the basin from a regional approach. This
has regularly required the riparians to go beyond looking at water as a commodity to be divided
—a zero-sum, rights based approach—and to develop an approach that equitably allocates not
the water but the benefits derived there from—a positive sum, integrative approach.

In many water-related treaties, water issues are dealt with alone, separate from any other political
or resource issues between countries—water qua water. By separating the two realms of “high”
(political) and “low” (resource economical) politics or by ignoring other resources that might be
included in an agreement, some have argued, the process is either likely to fail.

As water quality degrades—or quantity diminishes—over time, its effect on the stability of a
region can be unsettling.

Two thirds of the world’s water use is for agriculture, so when access to irrigation water is
threatened, one result can be movement of huge populations of out-of-work, disgruntled men
from the countryside to the cities— an invariable recipe for political instability.

There is the human security issue of water-related disease. It is estimated that between 5 and 10
million people die each year from water-related diseases or inadequate sanitation. More than half
the people in the world lack adequate sanitation. Eighty percent of disease in the developing
world is related to water. This is a crisis of epidemic proportions, and the threats to human
security are self evident (2).

WATER AND INSTITUTIONS

The international community has long grappled with effective institutional arrangements for
managing shared water resources. From the international to the local, grappling with the
institutional implications of shared waters has taken many forms, from international declarations
to guiding principles to treaties and local management.

Acknowledging the benefits of cooperative water management, the international community has
long advocated institutional development in the world’s international waterways and has focused
considerable attention in the twentieth century on developing and refining principles of shared
management. In 1911, the Institute of International Law published the Madrid Declaration on the
International Regulation regarding the Use of International Watercourses for Purposes other than
Navigation. The Madrid Declaration outlined certain basic principles of shared water
management, recommending that coriparian states establish permanent joint commissions and
discouraging unilateral basin alterations and harmful modifications of international rivers.
Expanding on these guidelines, the International Law Association developed the Helsinki Rules
of 1966 on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers. Since then, international freshwater law
has matured through the work of these two organizations as well as the United Nations and other
governmental and nongovernmental bodies (66, 67).

Human and ecological needs

International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE), The World Water Council, a
self described “think tank” for world water resource issues

despite the efforts over the past decade to expand global institutional capacity over freshwater
resources, no supranational agency exists to manage trans boundary resources globally.

Legal Principles

According to Cano (99), international water law was not substantially formulated until after
World War I. Since that time, organs of international law have tried to provide a framework for
increasingly intensive water use, focusing on general guidelines that could be applied to the
world’s watersheds. These general principles of customary law, codified and progressively
developed by advisory bodies and private organizations, are not intended to be legally binding in
and of themselves, but they can provide evidence of customary law and may help crystallize that
law. Customary laws are rules of international law and considered as sources.” It is tempting to
look to these principles for clear and binding rules, but it is more accurate to think in terms of
guidelines for the process of conflict resolution: “(T)he principles (of customary law) themselves
derive from the process and the outcomes of the process rather than prescribe either the process
or its outcome” (J. Dellapenna, personal communication, 1997).

The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses

(UN Convention), adopted in 1997 by the UN General Assembly. It focuses on international
trans boundary water resources (65). The UN Convention codifies many of the principles deemed
essential by the international community for the management of shared water resources, such as
equitable and reasonable utilization of waters with specific attention to vital human needs,
protection of the aquatic environment, and the promotion of cooperative management
mechanisms. The document also incorporates provisions concerning data and information
exchange and mechanisms for conflict resolution. Once ratified, the UN Convention will provide
a legally binding framework, at least upon its signatories, for managing international
watercourses. Even without ratification, its guidelines are being increasingly invoked in
international forums.

The UN’s approval of the Convention, however, does not entirely resolve many legal questions
concerning the management of internationally shared waters. First, the Convention would
technically only be binding on those nations that have ratified or consented to be bound by the
agreement. To date, five years after its adoption by the UN General Assembly, only 14 countries
are party to the UN Convention. there is no practical enforcement mechanism to back up the
Convention’s guidance. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, hears cases only
with the consent of the parties involved and only on very specific legal points. Moreover, in its
55-year history, the Court has decided only one case, apart from those related to boundary
definitional disputes, pertinent to international waters—that of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project on the Danube between Hungary and Slovakia in 1997.

The historical record of water conflict and cooperation suggests that international watercourses
can cause tensions between coriparian states, but acute violence is the exception rather than the
rule. A much more likely scenario is that a gradual decline in water quantity or quality, or both,
affects the internal stability of a nation or region, which may in turn impact the international
arena. Early coordination among riparian states, however, can serve to ameliorate these sources
of friction.

despite the potential for dispute in international basins, the record of acute conflict over
international water resources is historically overwhelmed by the record of cooperation. During
those 50 years, there were only 37 acute disputes (those involving violence); of those, 30 were
between Israel and one or another of its neighbors, and the violence ended in 1970. Non-Mideast
cases accounted for only five acute events, and during thesameperiod,157treatieswerenegotiated
and signed. In fact, the only water war between nations on record occurred over 4500 years ago
between the city-states of Lagash and Umma in the Tigris-Euphrates basin (40, 103).
The total number of water-related events between nations of any magnitude are likewise
weighted toward cooperation—507 conflict-related events, versus 1228 cooperative events—
implying that violence over water is neither strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor
economically viable.

One of the most profound is the shift of development funds from global and regional
development banks such as the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank to private
multinationals, such as Bechtel, Vivendi, and Ondeo (formally Lyonnaise des Eux) (for example,
109, 110). Development banks have, over the years, been susceptible to public pressures and
ethics and, as such, have developed procedures for evaluating social and environmental impacts
of projects and incorporating them in decision making. On international waters, each
development bank has guidelines that generally prohibit development unless all riparians agree
to the project, which in and of itself has promoted successful negotiations in the past. Private
enterprises have no such restrictions, and nations eager to develop controversial projects have
been increasingly turning to private capital to circumvent public ethics.

Currently, there is inherent political power in being an upstream riparian, controlling the
headwaters.

Chapter Five

Boundary Demarcation and Delimitation