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The Fourth Eye
Indigenous Americas
robert warrior, series editor
B R E N D A N H O K O W H I T U A N D V I J AY D E VA D A S , E D I T O R S
INDIGENOUS AMERICAS
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
We dedicate this collection to Merata Mita and Barry Barclay.
Koro, Kui, you stood up to blaze the trail. Through your work we can see that there
is nothing that cannot be achieved. You have departed beyond the veil, but you
remain as bright stars, illuminating the path for those who follow after you.
Accordingly, this book is presented as a means of honoring you both.
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Maps ix
2. Postcolonial Trauma 25
Child Abuse, Genocide, and Journalism in New Zealand
ALLEN MEEK
5. Consume or Be Consumed 76
Targeting Maori Consumers in Print Media SUZANNE DUNCAN
Acknowledgments 235
Contributors 237
Index 241
Map 1. Map of the North Island showing iwi boundaries. Designed by Allan Kynaston. Source:
Brendan Hokowhitu et al., Indigenous Identity and Resistance (Dunedin: Otago University Press,
2010), 91. Reproduced courtesy of Otago University Press.
Map 2. Map of the South Island showing iwi boundaries. Designed by Allan Kynaston. Source:
Brendan Hokowhitu et al., Indigenous Identity and Resistance (Dunedin: Otago University Press,
2010), 92. Reproduced courtesy of Otago University Press.
Map 3. Map of the North Island showing principal towns, cities, and regions. Source: Geoffrey Rice,
ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2d ed. (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1981), 390.
Reproduced with permission of Oxford University Press.
Map 4. Map of the South Island showing principal towns, cities, and regions. Source: Geoffrey Rice,
ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2d ed. (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1981), 391.
Reproduced with permission of Oxford University Press.
Map 5. Set of four maps of the North Island. The diminishing dark shading represents the loss of
Maori land between 1860, 1890, 1910, and 1939. Source: Claudia Orange, An Illustrated History of the
Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2001), 318–19. Reproduced courtesy of
Bridget Williams Books.
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction: Fourth Eye
The Indigenous Mediascape in Aotearoa New Zealand
B R E N D A N H O K O W H I T U A N D V I J AY D E V A D A S
Our language has been brought to the very brink of extinction, more than anything
else by the influence of monolingual broadcasting. . . . So broadcasting has an enor-
mous responsibility in the recovery of a language it has helped to push towards
extinction.
—Derek Fox, “Honouring the Treaty: Indigenous Television in Aotearoa”
xv
xvi BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
The term “Indigenous” itself and its derivatives (e.g., “indigeneity”) have been con-
tested within various academic disciplines including Indigenous Studies, Cultural
Studies, Postcolonial Studies, Race and Ethnic Studies, Area Studies, Anthropology,
and Sociology. For instance, Jace Weaver suggests that “Indigeneity is one of the most
contentiously debated concepts in postcolonial studies.”13 It has also been debated at
national and international levels and has come to determine policy in institutions
such as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:
Over a very short period, the few decades since the early 1970s, “indigenous peoples” has
been transformed from a prosaic description without much significance in international law
xviii BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
and politics into a concept with considerable power as a basis for group mobilization, inter-
national standard-setting, transnational networks, and programmatic activity of intergov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations.14
The landmark 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a
culmination of “25 years of contentious negotiations over the rights of native people to
protect their lands and resources, and to maintain their unique cultures and tradi-
tions,”15 symbolically at least, recognized both the cultural and political dimensions of
articulating the notion of “Indigenous.” Although not a legally binding text, eleven
countries abstained from voting while four countries—Australia, New Zealand, Can-
ada, and the United States—voted against the declaration when it was passed but later
recanted:16 Australia in 2009 and the remaining three in 2010.
Undoubtedly then, common understandings of indigeneity have come to be sub-
sumed by political dimensions, where “the concept of indigenous peoples involves
those descendants of original occupants who acknowledge their distinctiveness and
marginalisation, and use this politicised awareness to mobilise into action,”17 or, as
Gerald Alfred articulates, “It has been said that being born Indian is being born into
politics. I believe this to be true; because being born a Mohawk of Kahnawake, I do not
remember a time free from the impact of political conflict.”18 Here, the recognition of
Indigenous communities challenging and resisting the constitution and hegemony of
the nation-state is significantly marked, and moreover it acknowledges the possibility,
and right of Indigenous peoples to call for political and constitutional autonomy, and
redefine “a new social contract based on the constitutional principles of partnership,
power-sharing, and self-determining autonomy.”19
The complexities surrounding the term “Indigenous” do not preclude the need to
articulate how the term is mobilized in various contexts, yet it does reinforce the hesi-
tancy and, indeed, impossibility of a strict definition: “the concept of ‘indigenous’ is
not capable of a precise, inclusive definition which can be applied in the same manner
to all regions of the world.”20 Similarly, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights stated, “no single definition can capture the characteristics of indige-
nous populations.”21 The term is, in other words, heterogeneous and includes a myr-
iad of contextually based understandings, sometimes within nation-states themselves
whose Indigenous communities are as diverse in language, culture, and epistemology
as they are similar. Each of these communities has their own specific histories, tradi-
tions, and struggles, which are played out within particular geopolitical, social, cul-
tural, and economic contexts. The term is also often problematically conflated with
other terms such as “Native,” “Indian,” “Aboriginal,” “tangata whenua,” “First Nations,”
“Fourth World,” and “tribal peoples.” Indigeneity is also differently recognized within
the politics of nation-states, ranging from a discourse of partnership in New Zealand
to outright nonrecognition in China, for instance.
INTRODUCTION xix
Not all indigenous peoples have been conquered; not all nations are comprised of indige-
nous peoples; and not all indigenous peoples can be conceived as nations. . . . Some people
consider indigenous peoples as stewards holding the land for future generations. Others
look on indigenous peoples as landless tribes under colonial subjugation. For still others,
references to indigenous peoples implies a politicized minority demanding self-
determining autonomy. . . . For yet others still, indigenous refers to any group that belongs
to a territory.23
The importance of place, immediacy, and historical context to indigeneity itself thus
makes any universalizing attempt to define the concept antithetical to its very under-
pinnings. Any demarcation of Indigenous peoples, therefore, must work through the
domain of culture—the practices, rhythms, and ways of life that constitute a specific
community.
In this collection we use both the cultural and political dimensions to articulate the
notion of “Indigenous.” Also, due to the collection’s focus on the immediacy of media,
xx BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
In resistance to this colonial rule, indigenous political actors work across American spatial
and temporal boundaries, demanding rights and resources from the liberal democratic
settler-state while also challenging the imposition of colonial rule on their lives. This resis-
tance engenders a “third space of sovereignty” that resides neither simply inside nor outside
the American political system but rather exists on these very boundaries exposing both the
practices and the contingencies of American colonial rule.25
In the specific context of New Zealand, the popularity of the phrase “tangata whenua”
(people of the land) unmistakably became increasingly significant to identity politics of
the 1990s and beyond as it came to tacitly refer to globally forming notions of indigene-
ity and the politics therein. That is, tangata whenua morphed to not only mean the
interconnectedness of various whanau (extended family), hapu (clan), and iwi
(peoples) with land, it also came to refer to the increasing significance of indigeneity—
of place-based politics—to Maori rights in general. Tangata whenua became the
imagined united Indigenous polity that formed the Maori Other in partnership with
the state. It is important to note here that the advancement of “tangata whenua” as a
tool designed to nationalize Indigenous political agency was later subsumed within
the prominent discourse of biculturalism in New Zealand; an extremely problematic
notion not merely because it excludes all those people who are not Maori nor descen-
dants of European settlers, but more importantly, because “biculturalism” came to
tacitly refer to the incorporation of Maori culture within the dominant neocolonial
system; or what Coulthard refers to as the “politics of recognition.” Biculturalism, as a
politics of recognition, is an important thematic to be remembered throughout this
collection for it shapes the pervading discourse and, in turn, the “mediascape”26 with
INTRODUCTION xxi
which the majority of chapters engage. The institutionalization of Maori Television, for
instance, provides a prominent example of the problematics surrounding state recog-
nition and control of Indigenous media.
In New Zealand, the mediascape, both historically and contemporarily, is molded
by an anxiousness surrounding the ongoing conflict for citizenship rights within the
politics of recognition (see chapter 6). Essential to this binary drama is the contermi-
nous development of the politics of Indigenous representation and media technology.
For instance, the development of the Internet and other globalized media forms has
occurred simultaneously with the escalating self-interpretation of Maori as “Indige-
nous” within the newly forming pan-Indigenous community. The pan-Indigenous
peoples’ movement is “ironically an outcome of profound and, in historical terms,
rapid change in the relationships between those who seek recognition as distinct
peoples and the nation-states in which their territories are situated.”27 Thus, although
focused on New Zealand’s local context, this collection also looks at how regional and
national Indigenous media is connecting with other Indigenous media circuits to
form a larger transnational Indigenous media network. Conceived under the category
of “Fourth World,” this relatively recent media complex is described by Ella Shohat and
Robert Stam as the most significant development in the global media landscape.28
Within the context of this book, we employ the term “Indigenous media” to first
articulate the relationship between two disciplines—Media Studies and Indigenous
Studies. This is a task taken up by Brendan Hokowhitu in chapter 6. The term also
seeks to capture the relationship between mainstream dominant media in New Zea-
land and representations and stereotypes of Maori as discussed in the first part of the
book. Further still, the term is used in the second and third parts of the collection to
demonstrate the use, appropriation, circulation, and distribution of media by and
through Maori,29 or what Harald Prins terms the “indigenization of visual media.”30
These two parts move from a discussion of Maori as being objects of dominant image-
making practices to an exploration of the emergence and struggles of Maori to take
ownership of image-making technologies, including a key media initiative, the devel-
opment of Maori Television.
Before proceeding to discuss the three major parts that frame this book, the following
provides the reader with a brief contemporary political history focusing on the pre-
eminence of the Treaty of Waitangi (hereafter referred to as “the Treaty”)31 to Indige-
nous claims to media rights in New Zealand. To this extent, the Treaty and a develop-
ing urban Indigenous “third culture” have played pivotal roles in determining both the
state-sponsored and Indigenous-controlled path that Indigenous media has taken.
In New Zealand, the official narrative of Indigenous urbanization is quite well
known. Prior to World War II, 90 percent of Maori were rural.32 According to the state’s
xxii BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
Figure I.1. Police and security personnel surround the car with New Zealand Prime Minister
John Key as he leaves Hiruharama (Te Tii) Marae on February 5, 2012, at Waitangi, New Zealand.
Photograph by Kenny Rodger, reproduced with permission of Getty Images.
Maori and Pakeha societies essentially lived and worked in separately located communities
until the Maori urban migration after the Second World War. . . . This urban migration was
stimulated by the situation for Maori in the Depression years of the 1930s. Maori were often
the first to lose work, and were paid lower unemployment benefits than Pakeha. . . . In 1956,
nearly two-thirds of Maori lived in rural areas; by 2006, 84.4 percent of Maori lived in urban
areas.33
According to Mason Durie, in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century at least, the
state “actively discouraged tribal organization,” which “underline[d] the significance
of a new cultural identity based less on tribe than on simply being Maori.”34 Ideologi-
cally driven state intercession included the banning of speaking te reo Maori (the
Maori language) in schools via the “Native Schools’ Code” introduced in the 1870s,
which, along with other government regulations over the next century, effectively
meant that by 1970 it was commonly thought that the Maori language would soon be
extinct without radical intervention. Similarly, the 1907 Tohunga Suppression Act
banned the practices of tohunga, who were experts of various kinds of Maori knowl-
edge. The state realized that tohunga were key adhesives to the social fabric of a Maori
INTRODUCTION xxiii
epistemology. Also, the 1960s Maori Trade Training Scheme actively relocated young
Maori away from their rurally based hapu and into manual labor training in the cities.
It is apparent then that from the state’s perspective, the urbanization of Maori was
not merely to satiate labor needs in the city; it was ideological. The state programs to
urbanize Maori were tactics that facilitated the biopolitical management of the
Indigenous population. “Pepper potting,” for instance, was a housing policy that
encouraged assimilation by distributing Maori families within previously all-Pakeha
neighborhoods.35
By the 1970s, it was increasingly evident that the “Maori Problem” (a phrase used
to articulate the state’s project of assimilating and “modernizing” the Indigenous pop-
ulace) had not been resolved via assimilation. Indeed, new subjectivities of radical
urban indigeneity posed the greatest threat to the nation-state. Urban Maori culture
was heavily influenced by the immediate engagement with neocolonial methods of
subjugation, and interaction with an increasingly politically informed academic met-
ropolitan culture, leading to what became popularized as a process of “conscientiza-
tion” and, later, “decolonization.” The Indigenous rights movement in New Zealand
was characterized by radical, cutting-edge, and often mediated Indigenous subjectivi-
ties that altered the political and mediated landscapes.
Importantly, radical Indigenous groups came into contact with civil rights and
decolonializing discourses springing from the United States and other places. In the
1970s, Ranginui Walker referred to the “new wave” of Maori radicals as “Neo-Maori
Activists” who formed groups such as the Maori Organisation on Human Rights
(MOOHR), Waitangi Action Committee (WAC), He Taua (literally, “a war-party”), Maori
People’s Liberation Movement of New Zealand, and Black Women: “The political ethos
of the groups was based on the liberation struggle against racism, sexism, capitalism,
and government oppression.”36 MOOHR, for instance, mediated Indigenous resis-
tance via the newsletter Te Hokioi, which took the name of the Maori-language news-
paper published in the 1860s by the Indigenous political movement Te Kingitanga (the
Maori King Movement, see chapter 7). The modern newsletter focused on the Treaty
as a vehicle for the promotion of Indigenous rights, culture, and language.37 The
actions of groups like Nga Tamatoa (an activist group who focused their protests on
historical violations of the Treaty by the state), MOOHR, and WAC are important to
note here not only because they reflect the unsettling neoformation that the postcolo-
nial theorist Homi Bhabha had in mind,38 but also because they located their resis-
tance through highly mediated protests in relation to the Treaty. What was witnessed
via the heavily visibilized radical urban Maori culture of the 1970s and early 1980s was
a paradigmatic shift in how the nation was conceived.
In the mid-1970s the colonial narrative of “He iwi ko tahi tatou: Now we are one
people”39 (code for a subordinated Indigenous population within a dominant settler-
colonial culture) was severely disrupted by the progressively mediated face of Indig-
enous resistance. The “1975 Land March,” for example, began on September 13,
Figure I.2. Protest poster “Ake! Ake! Ake!” (Forever and ever and ever!) [1980s], Hocken Collections
Uare Taoka o Hakena, University of Otago, Dunedin, ref. no. 8607737.
Figure I.3. Protesters in the Land March of 1975, walking over Auckland Harbour Bridge.
Reproduced with permission of the New Zealand Herald.
xxvi BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
1975, at Spirits Bay (in the “far north” of the country), marched the length of the North
Island to the parliament buildings in Wellington, and was led by a prominent Maori
woman activist, Whina Cooper. The image of the 1975 March crossing the iconic
Auckland Harbour Bridge (Figure I.3) provides an enduring image of Indigenous
resistance in New Zealand.
Like the 1975 Land March, the “occupation” of Bastion Point in Auckland three
years later has had a lasting impact on radical Indigenous consciousness. After a
prolonged period of political stasis and “being occupied,” Ngati Whatua ki Orakei
(iwi from the far north who now reside in the Auckland city region) and others led by
Joe Hawke40 repossessed their lands. As a result,
On 25 May 1978, after 506 days of occupation, 600 police officers, supported by the New
Zealand Army, arrested 222 protestors for willful trespass on Crown land. The use of army
and police, ordered by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, received dramatic media attention,
which reverberated through the country.41
The lasting image of Bastion Point is of Maori versus the state. Of note here is
the documentary film of Merata Mita, Bastion Point: Day 507.42 Mita and her film
crew were the only media sanctioned by Ngati Whatua ki Orakei to step onto
Figure I.4. Protesters and police at Bastion Point during its occupation in 1978. Photograph by
Robin Morrison, reproduced with permission of the Auckland War Memorial Museum and Robin
Morrison estate.
INTRODUCTION xxvii
Bastion Point during the occupation, marking a significant point in the “control of
the image” by Maori, and a key contribution to the corpus of what came to be con-
ceived as “Fourth Cinema” (see the discussion below). Mita describes her subse-
quent documentary film of the resistance as
the total opposite of how a television documentary is made. It has a partisan viewpoint, is
short on commentary, and emphasizes the overkill aspect of the combined police/military
operation. It is a style of documentary that I have never deviated from because it best ex-
presses a Maori approach to film.43
The resistance to the ongoing neglect by the state toward “things Maori” eventually led
(in the 1980s and 1990s) to the indoctrination of Treaty principles within state institu-
tions such as health, education, social welfare, research, and broadcasting. Mirroring
the broader Indigenous challenges, criticism of “mainstream media” galvanized
around the failure of the state to promote Maori language and culture through cen-
trally funded broadcasting. According to longtime Maori public broadcaster Derek
Fox, for instance:
The Treaty, signed in 1840 between the British Crown and the chiefs of Aotearoa guaran-
teed the Maori people tino rangatiratanga, or absolute authority over all their resources. . . .
Like the land, the public broadcasting system is a vital present day resource, and as such
Maori are legally entitled to an equal share of it.44
As a result of such challenges, by 1986 the Waitangi Tribunal (a state entity, established
following the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act to assess historical grievances lodged by
Maori against the state) recommended that
It is consistent with the principles of the Treaty that the language and matters of Maori inter-
est should have a secure place in broadcasting. . . . In the formulation of broadcasting policy
regard must be had to the finding that the Treaty of Waitangi obliges the Crown to recognise
and protect the Maori language.45
Where any property or part of the universe has value as a cultural asset . . . the Crown has an
obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi to recognise and guarantee Maori rangatiratanga
[chiefly sovereignty] over its allocation and use for that purpose. . . . The sale of frequency
management licenses under the [Radio Communications Act] without negotiating an agree-
ment with Maori would be in breach of the Treaty.46
xxviii BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
Under growing pressure from Maori then, Te Mangai Paho (the Maori Broadcasting
Funding Agency) was established under the 1993 Broadcasting Amendment Act with
the mandate of “promot[ing] Maori language and Maori culture by allocating available
funds, on such terms and conditions, as Te Mangai Paho thinks fit, for broadcasting
and the production of programmes to be broadcast.”47
In 1996, a joint Maori/Crown Working Group on Broadcasting Policy was assem-
bled to discuss the inculcation of Maori language and culture within mainstream
broadcasting. The panel found that Maori content should feature “generally but not
invariably in prime time” and “for reasonable periods at any one time” with the
intended effect of “raising the profile/status/mana [power and authority] of Maori lan-
guage and culture and enhancing their recognition as a part of everyday life . . . [and]
providing a Maori view of the world, in its full complexity.”48 Similarly, a 1997 Ministry
of Commerce policy report, resulting from consultation hui (gatherings) and submis-
sions, found that
the government has a responsibility to promote and protect te reo through television and
radio; there should be a well-resourced, separate, Maori-owned and controlled television
channel broadcast nationally, but there should be provision for regional involvement and
Maori radio; Maori programming on mainstream media and in primetime is vital to pro-
mote and revitalise te reo; and public funding to develop Maori broadcasting should be dis-
tributed by a specialised agency like Te Mangai Paho.49
As the millennium drew to a close, however, while Maori had made remarkable head-
way in influencing policy, there was hardly any discernible change in practice. As Ron-
ald Niezen points out, such a state of affairs only serves to increase Indigenous angst:
There is a gap between the “normal” glacial pace of international legal and institutional re-
form and the rapid growth of Indigenous peoples’ networks, the solidification of Indigenous
political consciousness, and the broad base of rising expectations that accompany new pow-
ers of collective self-representation. The sense of collective injury and injustice is only made
more poignant by limited political recognition and reform in the context of ongoing
oppression.50
Central to the politics of recognition as played out via the demand by Maori to be rep-
resented in the media as “equal Treaty partners,” was the emerging sense of Maori as
Indigenous peoples. While tangata whenua51 is not a new concept, as stated above, it
became increasingly significant to identity politics of the 1990s as the term came to
frame Maori agency within dominant discourses, including state policy. Yet, within the
nation-state, Maori only materialized as tangata whenua through a discourse of part-
nership with the Crown. The interstitial space occurring at the interface between the
neoformations of indigeneity and the grid of disciplinary coercions merely resusci-
tated New Zealand’s “bicultural drama.” That is, New Zealanders’ postcolonial identity
INTRODUCTION xxix
merely provided trappings for a bicultural imaginary.52 The “Maori Problem” morphed
into “Treaty Partner,” and, accordingly, both partners were produced in the bicultural
imaginary through the Treaty. Aroha Harris refers to this as a “treaty consciousness.”53
For the non-Indigenous “partner,” Jeffrey Sissons suggests, “post-settler belonging
absolutely requires the perpetuation of an indigeneity through which new relation-
ships to the land may be negotiated.”54 Sissons goes on to say, “Within this imagined
political community settlers belong by virtue of a relationship between the Crown,
which represents them, and Maori tribal leaders who represent tangata whenua.”55
Non-Indigenous New Zealanders on the whole, therefore, failed to come to grips with
the implications of the Treaty and an increasingly educated Indigenous populace will-
ing to strongly advocate for their sovereignty via the state’s obligations to advance
Maori language and culture. Thus, developments in Indigenous media remained, as
Paulo Freire puts it, symptomatic of “false generosity.”56
As outlined above, the radical intent of tangata whenua as a political device was
quickly subsumed by a discourse of biculturalism. That is, New Zealanders in general
only viewed Indigenous political agency in relation to a tokenistic conceptualization
that in reality came to be referred to as “state handouts” within right-wing literature.
Accordingly, Maori began to differentiate between media that reflected false generos-
ity and Maori-controlled media. Maori lawyers and politicos Moana Jackson and
Atareta Poananga, for instance, provided a “two-house model” framework that dif-
ferentiated between self-determination and assimilation intent in media culture:
The TV One programmes [i.e., state funded] Marae and Te Karere are contained within the
mainstream house. . . . Both programmes attempt to portray values, language and issues re-
lated to the Maori house. . . . Within the mainstream house they occupy a “room,” but the
“house” is not Maori. They are still a minority within the whole industry and have to conform
to the policies and practices of the mainstream house.57
Similar to these conclusions, in the present collection, Allen Meek’s chapter, “Postco-
lonial Trauma: Child Abuse, Genocide, and Journalism in New Zealand,” discusses a
series of cover stories in two prestigious New Zealand magazines, Metro and North
and South, concerning the deaths of young children in Maori families. Similar to
INTRODUCTION xxxi
Smith, Meek deduces that “in the context of these magazines the representations of
these children’s deaths were used to implicitly justify settler culture and colonial rule
in Aotearoa” (see chapter 2).
The securing of settler domination over the landscape via the media is a constant
presence in New Zealand and is often played out through the discourse referred to by
the neocolonial media as “public sentiment.” For instance, the state’s decision-making
regarding the 2010 negotiations of Tuhoe (iwi of the central North Island) claims over
Te Urewera (Tuhoe ancestral lands, which after colonization became a state-governed
“National Park”), was influenced by “public sentiment” as reported by the neocolonial
media, which claimed there would be a “public outcry” if the National Party–led gov-
ernment ceded control of the National Park back to its Indigenous proprietors. Sub-
sequently, the original agreement to return governance of Te Urewera to Tuhoe was
revoked by the government, while Prime Minister John Key broke protocol “by
announcing the decision publicly, saying the matter had to be cleared up following a
series of media stories about the possibility of the transfer happening.”65 This event in
2010 merely follows a litany of misreporting by the neocolonial media in New
Zealand.
Hodgetts et al. argue that “throughout New Zealand history when Maori have
asserted rights to land and autonomy, Pakeha regulation news coverage has been
partial, providing little background to grievances and dismissing Maori concerns as
unreasonable and unnecessarily hostile.”66 This sentiment is highlighted by the Fore-
shore and Seabed Act debacle of 2004. After two decades of institutionalized bicultur-
alism, it was increasingly clear that previous Pakeha tolerance of Maori political asser-
tiveness was waning thin, leading to a prominent right-wing backlash that rearticulated
Maori claims to Indigenous rights as “Maori favoritism” and “reverse-racism.” For
example, in early 2004, Don Brash, the then leader of the opposition National Party,
delivered his now infamous speech on “Nationhood,” which castigated the “danger-
ous drift towards racial separatism in New Zealand.”67 Brash promised that a National
government would “remove divisive race-based features from legislation,” arguing
that “there can be no special privileges for any race.”68 Brash’s speech rejuvenated the
flailing National Party, which gained seventeen points in popularity immediately fol-
lowing his address; an unprecedented gain for a New Zealand political party. The
growing antagonism toward Maori “favoritism” also led to reactionary politics by the
then governing Labour Party; it ratified the Foreshore and Seabed Act, which disquali-
fied the right of Maori to govern traditional preserves. Hodgetts et al. found that during
the controversy the news media served to inflame, alarm, and misinform the public
with regard to the issues at hand. For example, on June 21, 2003, Television One News
headlines ran: “More Maori claims for large areas of the New Zealand coastline are
looming after a Court of Appeal decision.”69
More recently, on October 15, 2007, the New Zealand police under the auspices of
the 2002 Suppression of Terrorism Act raided houses nationwide and arrested
xxxii BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
The typical New Zealand journalist is a European woman in her 30s who works as a reporter
for a newspaper, holds a bachelor’s degree, has less than five years experience, is paid about
$40,000 a year, has no religious belief—and probably speaks French well enough to conduct
an interview with Jacques Chirac.71
The same report found that 83 percent of those surveyed were Pakeha, with “8.5%
identifying as Maori or Maori/Pakeha.”72
The skewing of “national” media that such institutionalized underrepresentation
invites is made poignant by the few content analysis studies conducted in this area.
Barclay and Liu’s quantitative analysis of the coverage by two urban newspapers of a
prominent seventy-nine-day Indigenous land occupation at Moutoa Gardens, Whan-
ganui, in 1995, found that
Maori did not achieve one-half of the “amount of voice” in coverage; rather, the various
Maori interests were accorded the status of a minority voice. Overall, the proportion of mate-
rial quoted from Maori occupiers was less than that from any of the other groups, and Maori
quotes were shorter. In terms of balance, occupiers’ accounts were matched with alternative
accounts more often, compared with frequency of matching for other groups.73
Maori epistemology deemphasized violence and negativity, and further that “When
values such as ‘cultural proximity’ and ‘relevance’ [we]re adapted by Maori journalists
working in a Maori media organisation whose audience are Maori, the news gathered
is different. The focus is on Maori, problems facing Maori and often achievements by
Maori.”75 It is apparent then that for Maori and Indigenous peoples in general, the
mainstream news media (and increasingly advertising) has come to play a pivotal role
in what Frantz Fanon referred to as “internalization.”76 Here it is important to note that
the New Zealand state is the primary funder of the most prevalent media outlets in
New Zealand, including Television One, Television Two, Radio New Zealand, and
Maori Television. Coulthard points out that Fanon’s ideas anticipated the work of Louis
Althusser, “who would later argue that the reproduction of capitalist relations of pro-
duction rests on the ‘recognition function’ of ideology, namely, the ability of a state’s
‘ideological apparatus’ to ‘interpellate’ individuals as subjects of class rule.”77 The
argument could then be made that in New Zealand the state-funded media outlets are
part of an ideological apparatus that promotes the internalization and naturalization
of derogatory representations of what it means to be Indigenous and disavows
Indigenous claims to sovereignty.
Beyond misreporting of Indigenous assertions to land, the phrase “Maori news is
bad news” (coined by Walker) has become synonymous with how Maori perceive
mainstream news reportage of themselves. For example, the news media frequently
refers to child abuse as a “Maori Problem,” a discourse supported by many politicians.
For instance, in 2010 the Social Development minister, Paula Bennett, addressed par-
liament and singled out Maori leaders as having a responsibility to rectify Maori child
abuse: “I need you as respected leaders to go back to hapu, iwi and your whanau . . .
and say it’s time to face up to this. It’s time to face up to the fact that Maori children and
Maori babies are being beaten, abused and killed and it’s time it stopped.”78 In response,
Green Party coleader and Maori member of Parliament (MP) Metiria Turei argued:
“Paula Bennett singles out Maori when abuse is rife through all communities. Where is
her call to Pakeha leaders, to religious organisations, to the state itself for the abuses
that took place in their hands?”79 Maori historian Danny Keenan found that newspaper
reportage of Maori domestic violence emphasized “predetermined ideas about Maori
people and behaviour, thereby sustaining simplistic racial dichotomies.”80 In a particu-
lar child abuse case referred to by Keenan, one headline included a reference to the film
Once Were Warriors, thereby “encouraging readers to make logical connections between
the child’s death and a work of fiction noted for its ‘intensely negative portrayal of
Maori.’ ”81 As outlined above, Allen Meek’s chapter in this volume examines issues of
child abuse, genocide, and journalism. As with Keenan’s analysis, Meek finds that “the
media exploited the ‘traumatic’ impact of these images and narratives and potentially
mobilized public opinion against Maori self-determination” (see chapter 2).
One area that has been largely under-studied, however, is the role advertising plays
in appropriation of Indigenous culture. The most globally recognizable example of
xxxiv BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
mediated appropriation of Maori culture (and perhaps any Indigenous culture) is that
of the haka entitled “Ka Mate,”82 which is used in pre-match entertainment by New
Zealand’s national rugby union team, the All Blacks. The appropriation and use of
Maori culture by the likes of global conglomerates such as Adidas is outlined clearly by
Pakeha copyright lawyer John Hackett, who argues in relation to “Ka Mate” that “they
[i.e., Maori] aren’t absolutely certain who created the haka [i.e., “Ka Mate”]; and, there
is no written contract to verify ownership, making it part of the public domain.”83 In
contrast, Maori lawyer and Treaty of Waitangi claimant Maui Solomon points out the
very use of a colonial legal tradition to evaluate and judge cultural and intellectual
property rights (IPR) is fraught with contradictions:
The intellectual property rights system is totally inadequate to recognize and protect Maori
cultural values and cultural rights. For example, the IPR system was developed to protect
private economic rights that came out of the Industrial Revolution, but when you talk about
Maoritanga [Maori culture], cultural heritage rights, these are collective by nature so they
don’t belong to one individual, they belong to the whanau, the hapu, or the iwi. . . . Increas-
ingly . . . you’ve got major corporates who are drawing upon Maori branding, Maori imag-
ery, and Maori icons to promote their products. Now if they’re going to do that they’ve got to
go to Maori and make sure that they have the proper authority that they are doing the right
thing, that they are using those images and icons in a culturally appropriate way. And if there
is going to be a commercial return then what share of those benefits will Maori get?84
In this collection, Jay Scherer’s chapter, “Promotional Culture and Indigenous Iden-
tity: Trading the Other,” examines the discursive codes of production, the dominant
cultural assumptions, and the claims of authenticity that are routinely summoned by
cultural intermediaries who produce commercial images of “Ka Mate” and other
Indigenous intellectual properties. The significance of Scherer’s chapter lies in how it
reveals the ongoing erosion of the territorial frontiers and cultural boundaries of the
global advertising industry in relation to Indigenous intellectual and cultural property.
Scherer notes “the value of Indigenous culture to the broader All Blacks brand: a brand
that has become so popular it now exists as a vehicle for the promotion of numerous
corporations” (see chapter 3).
Also looking at the broad area of advertising, Suzanne Duncan’s chapter, “Consume
or Be Consumed: Targeting Maori Consumers in Print Media,” provides a unique
insight into “ethnic marketing” from a Maori perspective. Duncan finds that the pre-
dominant postcolonial mode of ethnically targeted advertising toward Maori involves
“social marketing,” that is, advertising “aimed at changing behaviors and adopting new
value systems that will aid in the social development of the target market.” Given the
state investment in social marketing toward Maori reported in her chapter, Duncan
suggests such advertising reflects a neoliberal agenda, “geared towards the biopolitical
management of the Indigenous body to increase productivity, via a more healthy and
efficient workforce, while also ensuring that the capitalist system and the postcolonial
INTRODUCTION xxxv
nation circumvent both moral and financial responsibility for the ‘deviances’ of the
community” (see chapter 5).
The Broadcasting Standard Authority (BSA) is the state entity set up via the 1989
Broadcasting Act to assess complaints and to encourage “the development by broad-
casters of codes of broadcasting practice,”85 including advertising practices. In 2006,
the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, as part of their annual race relations
report, investigated the BSA’s practices and found that it fielded numerous complaints
regarding print, advertising, and broadcasting in relation to racism, but none were
upheld. For instance,
Radio Pacific host John Banks described Maori Television as “useless” and “one of the most
disgusting apartheid TV stations in the history of the world.” . . . Maori Television com-
plained that the comments breached the prohibition against denigration contained in
guideline 7(a) of the Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice. The BSA acknowledged that the
host’s comments were ill-informed and calculated to offend. It noted, however, that the
protection of the denigration guideline extends only to a “section of the community.” In
the present case, the host’s comments were directed primarily at the policy decision to
create and fund Maori Television, and incidentally at Maori Television as a corporate en-
tity. In the view of the BSA, Maori Television was not a “section of the community,” and
thus the guideline did not apply.86
In the same year, the BSA rejected claims of racism made against a talkback radio host,
Michael Laws, concerning
remarks made in his capacity as a radio talkback host on Radio Live, describing the late King
of Tonga as a “fat brown slug.” The BSA ruling stated that the King was an individual not a
“section of the community.” Nor did the ruling regard the comments as a breach of good
taste and decency when viewed in the context of the robust nature of talkback.87
Given the prominence of John Banks (who is an ex–National Party minister, ex-mayor
of Auckland City, and currently the leader and only MP of the neoliberal Act Party) and
Michael Laws (who is also an ex–National Party MP and ex-mayor of Whanganui), it is
clear from the examples above that racism is alive and kicking in New Zealand. More
importantly, the first three chapters in this part demonstrate the important role that
the neocolonial media complex has played in perpetuating and subjugating Indige-
nous sovereignty via institutionalized and nondiscursive methods.
While such interrogations are highly pertinent, they leave little room for, first,
Indigenous political agency; second, for non-Indigenous people to approach an ethics
of representing the Indigenous Other; and, third, the multiple positionalities of “post-
colonial citizens” who view themselves beyond the colonizer/colonized, Maori/
Pakeha binary. Many contemporary media analysts, for instance, increasingly describe
settler nation-states as undergoing some variety of postcolonial moment, rupture, or
xxxvi BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
These works “backtrack” through the nation’s history not in triumphalist terms, but in ways
that address the legacies of grief and violence wrought by settler colonialism, a significant
transformation in the country’s sense of its own legacies, and a recognition that it matters
whose stories are told and by whom.92
In New Zealand, Maori directors have tended to the “backtracking” described above,
in feature films such as Ngati (1987)93 and Mauri (1999, first produced 1988),94 directed
by Barclay and Mita respectively. Yet, films by Pakeha directors, such as Broken Barrier
(1952, John O’Shea and Roger Mirams),95 To Love a Maori (1991, first produced 1972,
Rudall and Ramai Hayward),96 and Utu (1983, Geoff Murphy),97 all served to challenge
postcolonial racialized constructions through themes like early-colonial warfare and
interracial marriage. However, if there was such an event resembling a “postcolonial
moment” in New Zealand film, it would be Maori director Lee Tamahori’s Once Were
Warriors (1994), which at the time became the most successful motion picture in New
Zealand cinematic history. It was a film that, if nothing else, provided a vehicle for dis-
cussing a subversive postcolonial Maori underclass.
One of the central criticisms of Once Were Warriors by Maori was that while it real-
istically depicted urban Maori impoverishment, the undercurrent of the film, as its
name suggests,
intimates that the inherent violence of tane [Maori men] was, in pre-colonial times, appro-
priate behavior for a noble warrior culture but has, in “modern” times, become a natural
symptom of Maori urban dysfunction. The film’s illustration of the implicitness of Maori
male violence is never more indoctrinated than when Jake’s explosive violence is repetitively
heralded by the eerie wailing of a purerehua (bull-roarer); the wailing implying the stirring of
the inherent savage within.98
Yet, nowhere in the film does the history of colonial oppression enter to offer a more
accurate account of Maori penury, such as land confiscation, Treaty breaches, disease,
and warfare.
In contrast to their predecessors, contemporary Pakeha directors have in the
main lost their “postcolonial voice,” that is, their desire to cross-examine emerging
INTRODUCTION xxxvii
postcolonial identities. Niki Caro’s Whale Rider (2002), for example, typifies how
Pakeha directors have, since Utu, shied away from interrogating settler–Indigenous
relations by largely hiding postcolonial Pakeha presence:
Like a colonial painter Caro has removed the backdrop of the colonial reality and, in so
doing, purged Pakeha and other Westerners of any responsibility for the oppression of Indig-
enous peoples. In the simulacrum of Whangara [where Whale Rider was filmed], a Western
audience can recognize ubiquitous human themes in an exotic locale, while the colonial
process that produced the subjugation of Maori is rendered invisible.99
Said is aware when he hints continually at a polarity or division at the very centre of Oriental-
ism. It is, on the one hand, a topic of learning, discovery, practice; on the other, it is the site
of dreams, images, fantasies, myths, obsessions and requirements. It is a static system of
“synchronic essentialism,” a knowledge of “signifiers of stability” such as the lexicographic
and the encyclopaedic.103
xxxviii BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
The term “Fourth Eye” seeks to capture the politics of media representations of Indig-
enous peoples; the use of the media as a modality of Indigenous empowerment, sover-
eignty, resistance, and articulation of struggles; and the creative potentiality of an indi-
genized mediascape. The Fourth Eye thus captures the Indigenous politics of
representation, with an emphasis on biopolitical production. This section explores the
multiple, overlapping inflections on what might be considered “Indigenous media,”
whether that be as “anti-colonialist cultural criticism of representation,”108 as
INTRODUCTION xxxix
a reading practice for thinking about the space between resistance and compliance wherein
Indigenous filmmakers and actors revisit, contribute to, borrow from, critique, and reconfig-
ure ethnographic film conventions, at the same time operating within and stretching the
boundaries created by these conventions.112
It is very important to make the distinction between the way we are seen and the way we see
ourselves. And the reason for this becomes very clear if you look at the films that have been
made starting from 1911 in the United States, in Europe and in Aotearoa. If you look at those
films made by tauiwi [white people] or by foreign eyes on us, you will see very important dif-
ferences to the way they look at us and the way we see ourselves.114
With the creation of terms such as “Fourth Media” and “Fourth Cinema,” there is a
tendency to think of Indigenous-controlled media as a recent development. Impor-
tantly, Lachy Paterson’s chapter in the present collection, “Te Hokioi and the Legitimi-
zation of the Maori Nation,” pays attention to early colonial Indigenous media through
analysis of Te Hokioi (a hokioi was a native bird resembling a snipe, now extinct), a
Maori-language newspaper published by the Indigenous political movement Te Kingi-
tanga in the 1860s. This was a prominent decade of Maori/Pakeha armed conflict—
the time period depicted in the feature film Utu. As Paterson argues, “Te Hokioi was
the first, and perhaps most radical, example of Indigenous media activism in New
Zealand,” enabling Te Kingitanga “to broadcast its own developing ideology and to
counter the New Zealand government’s own propaganda directed at Maori” (see
xl BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
chapter 7). Paterson’s insightful historical analysis provides much food for thought
about how Indigenous media might be conceptualized today, as the 150-year gulf
since Te Hokioi’s publication speaks to the paradigmatic shift away from an Indige-
nous existentialism evident in this early Indigenous media activism.
The notion of “Fourth Cinema” is also synonymous with the work of Maori film-
maker Barry Barclay. Barclay’s film Te Rua (1991)115 is the subject of April Strickland’s
chapter, “Barry Barclay’s Te Rua: The Unmanned Camera and Maori Political Activ-
ism,” which looks at themes of Indigenous community and political activism. Of note
here is Strickland’s exploration of marae (land and buildings of genealogical signifi-
cance), which in this context refers to the site of ritual encounter between tangata
whenua and manuhiri (visitors) as a metaphor for Indigenous filmmaking. To explain,
Strickland quotes Barclay at length (see chapter 8):
When creating a communications marae, I think we must be conscious of that duty to offer
suitable hospitality. You must not insult your guests, or let them feel they are being left on the
outer. If we do not respect that most basic of marae rules, the communications marae we
have striven so hard to set up will be rejected, not only by the majority culture, but by our
own people—and indeed, by them first.116
In 1996, Te Mangai Paho funded the pilot project “Aotearoa Television,” which eventu-
ally led to the advent of Maori Television in 2004. Aotearoa Television screened in
Auckland for three months between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. Accessible
on a UHF frequency, it was praised for offering a range of programming with high pro-
duction values aimed particularly at youth, the largest demographic sector of the con-
temporary Maori population. In contrast to mainstream media programming of the
time, the station presented positive images of Maori, and contained cultural protocols
such as closing the day’s viewing with a karakia (prayer). However, Aotearoa Television
collapsed under loss of government funding amid accusations of poor financial man-
agement; a “scandal” that gained much mainstream media coverage and notoriety
in the public imagination, and in all probability stalled the actualization of Maori
Television for at least half a decade.
Nevertheless, the launch of Maori Television in March 2004 marked the most sig-
nificant event of Indigenous media in New Zealand’s history. In a media release, the
INTRODUCTION xli
chief executive of Maori Television, Ani Waaka, announced its arrival in relation to the
“Maori Renaissance” of the 1970s,117 suggesting a struggle lasting “30 years after the
first bid to beam te reo and tikanga Maori (Maori customary lore) into New Zealand’s
living rooms.” Maori Television’s mandate demonstrates a clear developmental and
nationalistic intent:
The principal function of Maori Television is to promote te reo Maori me nga tikanga Maori
[Maori language and customary lore] through the provision of a high quality, cost-effective
Maori television service in both Maori and English, that informs, educates and entertains
a broad viewing audience, and, in doing so, enriches New Zealand’s society, culture and
heritage.118
As a state entity Maori Television, almost by definition, is akin with other state-funded
broadcasters in the promotion of nationalism, yet with key differences. First, as
Smith points out, “The ‘New Zealander’ envisaged by MTS [Maori Television Service] is
thus a citizen of a nation state that is cognisant of Maori values, language and culture,
a cognisance produced in part by the televisual mediations of MTS.”119 Indeed, one of
the mandates of Maori Television was to promote Maori culture and language as part
of a broader government response to the Treaty of Waitangi, including the 1987 Maori
Language Act that recognized te reo Maori as an official language of New Zealand.
Accordingly, the evolution of an Indigenous mediascape in New Zealand has reso-
nated through Maori Television the sentiments of the broader Maori cultural renais-
sance, and even broader transnational Indigenous claims to sovereignty, bound
together by the key Indigenous postcolonial identity markers—land, language, cul-
ture, and community-building. Thus Chris Prentice, in her chapter “The Maori Televi-
sion Service and Questions of Culture,” argues that “(self-)representation or articula-
tions of identity politics are inseparable from the wider political economy, and its
onto-epistemological predicates, within which they take place.” She goes on to sug-
gest that Maori Television “is really only an epiphenomenon of a larger set of chal-
lenges for postcolonial Maori culture” (see chapter 10).
One definition of Indigenous media as “developmental” suggests that its philo-
sophical approach is fundamentally different to that of commercial media. Stuart, for
instance, argues that the functions of Maori media are primarily to revitalize Indige-
nous epistemology, while concomitantly unifying and educating its people: “Maori
media seeks to educate people to ensure the survival of both the language and culture.
The Maori media also actively seeks to promote positive images of Maori and to pro-
vide a Maori view of events and news, all roles assumed by a developmental media.”120
Stuart goes on to say that “The Maori media is building, or rebuilding, a culture, and by
doing so . . . is creating a nation, but a nation separated from a state, and internal
within a state.”121 Likewise, Hodgetts et al. suggest Maori media can provide “direct
links within Maori communities, for nurturing a sense of community, for education,
xlii BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
and for fostering a shared agenda necessary for continued advocacy for social
justice.”122
In many regards then, the mandate of Maori Television, at least, reflects an “Indig-
enous public sphere,” defined as “the highly mediated public ‘space’ for evolving
notions of indigeneity . . . [yet] a peculiar example of a public sphere, since it pre-
ceded any ‘nation’ . . . it is the ‘civil society’ of a nation without formal borders, state
institutions, or citizens.”123 However, it is clear from the discussion above that the
developmental aspect of Maori Television also had in its sights non-Indigenous New
Zealanders. As a starting point of her analysis of “Maori Television, Anzac Day, and
Constructing ‘Nationhood’ ” in the present collection, Sue Abel argues that Indigenous
media offers Indigenous peoples the opportunity to reconfigure the national imagi-
nary. Via viewer responses to the coverage of Anzac Day (a commemorative day for the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) on Maori Television, Abel concludes that,
presently, the national imaginary is far from being mature enough to truly interrogate
its colonial history (see chapter 11).
In her comparative essay regarding the coding and recoding of the nation as it
takes place on Television One versus Maori Television, Smith argues that Television
One as a “territorial writing machine,” “code[s] the imagined space of the nation-state
according to a settler cultural compass,”124 which serves to perpetuate the national
imaginary in the shadow of a settler history. In contrast, Smith suggests that “with the
broadcast of Maori programming and content on a distinctively Maori channel, the
national imaginary might be forced to invoke itself in terms of a double-time.”125 Here
Smith is proposing that Maori Television’s “will to cultural transformation” is not so
much through representation but because of “its spectral presence in the national
programming schedule, a presence which inserts micro-level pauses in mainstream
quotidian flows, and hence national orthodoxies, and which provide us with glimpses
of our bicultural futures.”126
Following on from her previous work, in the present collection Jo Smith and
Joost de Bruin’s chapter challenges the noncommercial/commercial dichotomy
that is supposedly inherent to developmental Indigenous media. “Indigeneity and
Cultural Belonging in Survivor-Styled Reality Television from New Zealand”
thought-provokingly examines “the different ways in which two recent New Zealand
television programs draw upon global reality television formats to articulate dis-
courses of indigeneity and cultural belonging” (see chapter 12). Importantly, the chap-
ter compares the discourses stemming from a mainstream program and a Maori Tele-
vision program to “illuminate the specificities of local discourses of indigeneity.”
Conclusion
This collection is unique in its intent to synthesize the discrete disciplines of Indige-
nous and Media Studies by bringing together a number of Indigenous and
INTRODUCTION xliii
Notes
1. Our choice to use “New Zealand” throughout the collection, bar the title, is partly based on
recognition of the international audience. There are also ideological concerns that motivate
our decision. All the currently employed nomenclatures are problematic. For instance, although
“Aotearoa” (a Maori name meaning “Land of the Long White Cloud”) is now commonly used as
a translation for “New Zealand” within the imagined bicultural nation, in actuality the name
originally referred to the North Island, whereas the South Island is still commonly referred to as
“Te Waipounamu” (“The Land of Greenstone”). Many writers choose to refer to New Zealand as
“Aotearoa/New Zealand” in recognition of the supposed bicultural nation. The problematics
surrounding the conjunction include its inference that New Zealand adheres to biculturalism
where, in the main, it clearly does not and, second, because it implies that there was, or is,
such a thing as a homogenous group of people who could constitute a “Maori nation.” Such
a concept “forgets” that Maori are not one people, rather they are a confederacy of diverse
peoples. However, we employ “Aotearoa New Zealand” in the title of the book, first, to acknowl-
edge the multiple Indigenous peoples of the land now referred to as New Zealand and, second,
because for many there is a subversive element to its inclusion within the nomenclature of the
nation-state.
2. “Maori” is a generic word that prior to colonization meant “normal” but has come to ubiqui-
tously and problematically represent New Zealand’s Indigenous peoples.
3. Lee Tamahori (dir.), Once Were Warriors (Culver City, Calif.: Columbia Tristar Home Video, 1994).
4. Niki Caro (dir.), Whale Rider (South Yarra, Victoria, Australia: Buena Vista Home Video, 2002).
5. “Haka” is the generic name for all types of dance or ceremonial performance that involve move-
ment. According to Timoti Sam Karetu, while haka have been “erroneously defined by genera-
tions of uninformed as ‘war dances,’ the true ‘war dances’ are the whakatu waewae, the tutu
ngarahu and the peruperu.” Timoti Sam Karetu, Haka! The Dance of a Noble People (Auckland:
Reed Books, 1993), 37.
xliv BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
6. In academic English texts that include Maori words and in relation to italicization, there is no
normative standard, with some authors choosing to italicize all Maori words, some choosing to
italicize none, and some choosing to italicize all Maori words excepting proper nouns. In the
present collection, and in consultation with the publisher, the editors have chosen the last of
these options. In this decision we have been mindful that nonitalicization of Maori words
would signal the further assimilation of an already subjugated language into the dominant
English text, yet we are also cognizant of the grammatical error of italicizing proper nouns,
such as Maori place names, which do not have English equivalents.
7. Valerie Alia, The New Media Nation (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Pamela Wilson and
Michelle Stewart, eds., Global Indigenous Media: Cultures, Poetics and Politics (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2008); Jeffrey D. Himpele, Circuits of Culture: Media, Politics, and Indig-
enous Identity in the Andes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Laurel Evelyn
Dyson, Max A. N. Hendriks, and Stephen Grant, eds., Information Technology and Indigenous
People (Hershey, Pa.: Information Science Publishing, 2007); Kyra Landzelius, Native on the Net
(London: Routledge, 2006); Faye Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, eds., Media
Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); John Hart-
ley and Alan McKee, The Indigenous Public Sphere: The Reporting and Reception of Aboriginal
Issues on the Australian Media (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
8. Lisa Brooten, “Media as Our Mirror: Indigenous Media of Burma (Myanmar),” in Global Indig-
enous Media: Culture, Poetics and Politics, ed. Pamela Wilson and Michelle Stewart (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008), 111–27; Michael Christie, “Digital Tools and the Manage-
ment of Australian Aboriginal Desert Knowledge,” in Global Indigenous Media: Cultures, Poetics
and Politics, ed. Pamela Wilson and Michelle Stewart (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
2008), 270–86; Terence Turner, “Representation, Politics, and Cultural Imagination in Indige-
nous Video: General Points and Kayapo Examples,” in Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Ter-
rain, ed. Faye Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002), 75–89; Doris Baltruschat, “Co-producing First Nation’s Narratives: The Journals of
Knud Rasmussen,” in Indigenous Screen Cultures in Canada, ed. Sigurjón Baldur Hafsteinsson
and Marian Bredin (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010), 127–42.
9. Faye Ginsburg, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larkin, “Introduction,” in Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod,
and Larkin, Media Worlds, 3.
10. Faye Ginsburg, “The Parallax Effect: The Impact of Aboriginal Media on Ethnographic Film,”
Visual Anthropology 11, no. 2 (1995): 67.
11. John Hartley, “Television, Nation, and Indigenous Media,” Television & New Media 5, no. 1
(2004): 12–13.
12. Kevin Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2007), xix. Bruyneel refers to political space as “the lived and envisioned territorial, institu-
tional, and cultural location through which a people situates its past, present and future as a
political identity. . . . [Political identity is] that which binds a group together both through its
relationship to discernable power inequities—whether stronger or weaker groups—and
through its collective vision of how to generate, sustain, or expand the group’s capacity to deter-
mine its future” (ibid.).
13. Jace Weaver, “Indigenousness and Indigeneity,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, ed.
Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray (London: Blackwell, 2000), 221.
14. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Applicability of the International Legal Concept of ‘Indigenous
Peoples’ in Asia,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel
Bell Daniel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 336.
INTRODUCTION xlv
15. See the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at www.un.org/esa
/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
16. The 2007 announcement can be seen at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
37102&Cr=indigenous&Cr1=#.UVG9SVtNZjE.
17. Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, The Politics of Indigeneity: Challenging the State in Canada and
Aotearoa New Zealand (Dunedin, N.Z.: Otago University Press, 2005), 30.
18. Cited in Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples
(London: Zed Books, 1999), 110.
19. Maaka and Fleras, The Politics of Indigeneity, 31.
20. Erica-Irene Daes, Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the
Concept of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Human Rights, June 10, UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (New York, 1996), 5, http://
www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/2b6e0fb1e9d7db0fc1256b3a003eb999.
21. African Union, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Advisory Opinion of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Banjul, Gambia: African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 2007), 3, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/ACHPR-AdvisoryOpinion
-IndigPeoples.pdf.
22. Maaka and Fleras, The Politics of Indigeneity, 29.
23. Ibid., 30.
24. Glen Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition’ in
Canada,” Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2007): 437.
25. Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty, xvii.
26. The term “mediascape,” coined by Arjun Appadurai, offers one way to describe and situate the
role of electronic and print media in “global cultural flows,” which are fluid and irregular as they
cross global and local boundaries. For Appadurai, mediascape indexes the electronic capabili-
ties of production and dissemination, as well as “the images of the world created by these
media.” Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” The-
ory, Culture & Society 7 (1990): 298–99.
27. Ronald Niezen, The Rediscovered Self: Indigenous Identity and Cultural Justice (Montreal:
McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2009), 22.
28. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1994).
29. Article 16 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples notes that
“Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to
have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination. States shall take
effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity.
States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should encourage privately
owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity.” See www.un.org/esa/socdev
/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
30. Harald Prins, “Visual Anthropology,” in A Companion to the Anthropology of American Indians,
ed. Thomas Biolsi (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004), 506–25.
31. “The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand’s founding document. It takes its name from the place
in the Bay of Islands where it was first signed, on 6 February 1840. This day is now a public holi-
day in New Zealand. The Treaty is an agreement, in Maori and English, that was made between
the British Crown and about 540 Maori rangatira (chiefs). . . . The Treaty is a broad statement of
principles on which the British and Maori made a political compact to found a nation state and
xlvi BRENDAN HOKOWHITU AND VIJAY DE VADAS
build a government in New Zealand. The Treaty has three articles. In the English version, these
are that Maori ceded the sovereignty of New Zealand to Britain; Maori gave the Crown an exclu-
sive right to buy lands they wished to sell, and, in return, they were guaranteed full rights of
ownership of their lands, forests, fisheries and other possessions; and that Maori would have
the rights and privileges of British subjects. The Treaty in Maori was deemed to convey the
meaning of the English version, but there are important differences. Most significantly, in the
Maori version the word ‘sovereignty’ was translated as ‘kawanatanga’ (governance). Some
Maori believed they gave up the government over their lands but retained the right to manage
their own affairs. The English version guaranteed ‘undisturbed possession’ of all their ‘proper-
ties’, but the Maori version guaranteed ‘tino rangatiratanga’ (full authority) over ‘taonga’ (trea-
sures, not necessarily those that are tangible). Maori understanding was at odds with the
understanding of those negotiating the Treaty for the Crown, and as Maori society valued the
spoken word, explanations at the time were probably as important as the document.” http://
www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty/the-treaty-in-brief.
32. Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle without End (Auckland: Penguin Books,
1990), 197.
33. Te Puni Kokiri, Historical Influences: Maori and the Economy (Wellington: Government Printer,
2007), 7.
34. Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Auckland:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 55.
35. The word “Pakeha” stems from precolonial words such as “pakepakeha” and “pakehakeha”
(and the like) common to certain parts of the Pacific, referring to “Imaginary beings resembling
men, with fair skins.” Herbert W. Williams, A Dictionary of the Maori Language, 7th ed. (Welling-
ton: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer, 1975 [first published in 1844]), 252. The word has
evolved to commonly refer to “New Zealander of European descent.” See John Moorfield, Te
Aka: Maori-English, English-Maori Dictionary and Index (Auckland: Pearson, 2005), 108.
36. Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 220.
37. Ibid., 209–10.
38. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994).
39. Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, one of Queen Victoria’s representatives, Captain
William Hobson, the British consul, uttered these words of unification that have since come to
symbolize, for many Maori at least, the Crown’s betrayal of the Treaty’s original intent.
40. Joe Hawke is a Ngati Whatua ki Orakei leader who was plucked out of obscurity by Dame Whina
Cooper to assist her in leading the 1975 Land March across the Auckland Harbour Bridge.
Hawke became the Ngati Whatu voice for the occupation of Bastion Point, and features promi-
nently in Mita’s film Bastion Point: Day 507 (see note 42 below).
41. Robert Consedine and Joanna Consedine, Healing Our History: The Challenge of the Treaty of
Waitangi (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2001), 104–5.
42. Merata Mita, Gerd Pohlmann, and Leon Narby (dirs.), Bastion Point: Day 507 (Wellington: Awa-
tea Films, 1980).
43. New Zealand Film Archive, Land Wars Film Programme (Wellington: New Zealand Film Archive,
2008), 1.
44. Cited in Jo Smith and Sue Abel, “Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Indigenous Television in Aotearoa/
New Zealand,” New Zealand Journal of Media Studies 11, no. 1 (2008): 2.
45. Cited in Donald Browne, “A Voice for Tangata Whenua: A History of the Development of Maori
Electronic Media,” in Electronic Media and Indigenous People: A Voice of Our Own?, ed. Donald
Browne (Ames: University of Iowa Press, 1996), 150.
INTRODUCTION xlvii
to England. Rudall’s specially-made sound camera helped win the couple freelance work, and
Ramai learnt how to operate camera and sound equipment. Some say she was the only profes-
sional camerawoman working in England at that time, as would be the case back home in New
Zealand . . . Ramai and Rudall are acknowledged as true pioneers of New Zealand film and
made many documentaries, educational and travel films in New Zealand, Britain, Australia,
and China. Ramai and her husband filmed in China in 1957, working on the first English-
language films made there since the beginning of Communist rule in 1949. Dressed in a piupiu,
she presented Chairman Mao with a Maori feather cloak. Ramai also wrote, directed and helped
shoot Children in China, the first of a series of children’s educational films she initiated, and
commanded. The series was made for the National Film Library each year over 15 years, and
included the popular Eel History Was a Mystery (which included shots of her elderly Aunt smok-
ing eels) and The Arts and Crafts of Maori Children. Argues author Deborah Shepard: ‘Ramai also
ensured that Hayward Films represented Maori issues in a positive light at a time when the
National Film Unit was patronising in its treatment and few other film-makers were interested
in the subject.’ . . . Hayward has also popped up occasionally on-screen, both in documentaries
and the occasional acting role, including a 1989 documentary, Riwia Brown’s screen directing
debut Roimata, and playing Billy T’s domineering mother on the 1990 sitcom incarnation of The
Billy T James Show. She also became a committed advocate of issues relating to Maori welfare,
joining the Maori Woman’s Welfare League and the Maori Artists and Writers organisation.”
http://www.nzonscreen.com/person/ramai-hayward/biography. See also Rudall Hayward and
Ramai Hayward (dirs.), To Love a Maori (Auckland: Hayward Historical Film Trust, 1991).
97. Geoff Murphy (dir.), Utu (Auckland: Utu Productions, 1983).
98. Brendan Hokowhitu, “Tackling Maori Masculinity: A Colonial Genealogy of Savagery and
Sport,” The Contemporary Pacific 16, no. 2 (2004): 263–64.
99. Brendan Hokowhitu, “The Death of Koro Paka: ‘Traditional Maori Patriarchy,’ ” The Contempo-
rary Pacific 20, no. 1 (2008): 128.
100. Vincent Ward (dir.), River Queen (Moore Park, New South Wales: Twentieth Century Fox Home
Entertainment, 2005).
101. Vincent Ward (dir.), Rain of the Children (Auckland: Vincent Ward Films/Forward Films, 2008).
102. Homi Bhabha, “The Other Question,” Screen 24, no. 6 (1983): 24.
103. Ibid.
104. Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture, and the Postmodern World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1996), 68.
105. Robert Young, White Mythologies, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 45.
106. Cited in Ginsburg, “Parallax Effect,” 66.
107. Cited in Michelle Raheja, “Reading Nanook’s Smile: Visual Sovereignty, Indigenous Revisions of
Ethnography, and Atanarjuat (The Fast Runner),” American Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2007): 1179.
108. Marcia Langton, “Well, I Heard It on the Radio and I Saw It on the Television”: An Essay for the
Australian Film Commission on the Politics and Aesthetics of Filmmaking by and about Aborigi-
nal People and Things (North Sydney: Australian Film Commission, 1993), 7.
109. Stuart, “The Construction of a National Maori Identity by Maori Media.”
110. Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, eds., Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the
Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 1991).
111. Raheja, “Reading Nanook’s Smile.”
112. Ibid., 1161.
113. Cited in Leonie Pihama, “Re-presenting Maori: Broadcasting and Knowledge Selection,” in Cul-
tural and Intellectual Property Rights: Economics, Politics and Colonization, ed. Leonie Pihama
Exploring the Variety of Random
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AWARD THEATRE.
DANTE.
TOPKAPI.
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LINDA. See
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LINDA/LINDA'S.
For titles beginning with Linda or
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