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Springer Earth System Sciences

V.P. Dimri Editor

Fractal
Solutions for
Understanding
Complex Systems
in Earth Sciences
Springer Earth System Sciences

Series editors
Philippe Blondel, Bath, UK
Eric Guilyardi, Paris, France
Jorge Rabassa, Ushuaia, Argentina
Clive Horwood, Chichester, UK
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10178
V.P. Dimri
Editor

Fractal Solutions
for Understanding Complex
Systems in Earth Sciences

123
Editor
V.P. Dimri
CSIR-National Geophysical Research
Institute
Hyderabad
India

ISSN 2197-9596 ISSN 2197-960X (electronic)

Springer Earth System Sciences
ISBN 978-3-319-24673-4 ISBN 978-3-319-24675-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24675-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015950883

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Dedicated to the Victims of June, 2013,
Kedarnath (Uttarakhand) Tragedy
Foreword

It is with pleasure that I write the foreword to this excellent book entitled “Fractal
Solutions for Understanding Complex Systems in Earth Sciences” edited by
Professor V.P. Dimri. The book deals with a role of fractals and multi-fractals in
understanding problems of earth sciences and their solutions. The chapters on
potential fields suggest that mono-fractals or homogeneous functions are scaling
function, whereas multi-fractals and multi-homogeneous models have to be dealt
separately by specific techniques. Some of the chapters deal with Detrended
Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) for better understanding the intrinsic self-similarities
for non-stationary well-log geophysical data. The Fractal Differential Adjacency
Segregation (F-DAS) is found better than the conventional box counting technique
to estimate fractal dimension. Amongst different types of earthquakes analysed, the
multi-fractal properties are more pronounced for signals with distinct P, S and coda
waves. Finally, an overview of fractal approach to fire problems is worth
mentioning.
The editor, Professor Dimri, is to be congratulated on putting together various
aspects of fractal and multi-fractal in the problems of earth sciences and their
solutions. The book is recommended for the researchers who are using fractals and
multi-fractals in earth sciences including seismology. The papers included are
important for both fundamental and applied research perspective.

USA Donald L. Turcotte

May 2015

vii
Preface

1. Introduction

The role of fractals in understanding the complex system in earth science has
opened a new branch of science applied in geophysics, geology, geomorphology,
environment, seismology, etc. (Mandelbrot 1982; Feder 1988; Barton and La Pointe
1995; Turcotte 1997; Dimri 2000, 2005a, b; Dimri et al. 2012). Time series gen-
erated by earth sciences observation are in general having long-term persistence
with certain degree of correlation. Such correlation can be mapped in terms of
fractal dimension for homogeneous models as the mono-fractals. For heterogeneous
functions, mono-fractals are not applicable and multi-fractals have been proposed.
A typical geological structure such as fault shows a relation with fractal in terms of
fault length and displacement of fault zone thickness and throw. Methods such as
Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) and Multi-fractal Detrended Fluctuation
Analysis (MDFA) are central to many chapters applied to geophysical well-log
data, seismological data and fire time series.
In Chapter “Scaling Laws in Geophysics: Application to Potential Fields of
Methods Based on the Laws of Self-Similarity and Homeogeneity”, Prof. Fedi sys-
tematically described the interpretation of potential field data in a frequency domain.
Initially, a relation between random sources (density/susceptibility) and their fields
was established which led a spectral analysis method. This method was extensively
used by geophysicists for the estimation of depth or thickness of sedimentary basin
from gravity and magnetic data. Later, it was found that the source is not a random;
rather it is a fractal distribution, and hence, a new method called scaling spectral
analysis method was proposed. This method finds its application in interpreting
gravity and magnetic data, e.g. Chapter “Scaling Laws in Geophysics: Application to
Potential Fields of Methods Based on the Laws of Self-Similarity and Homeogeneity
” of this book. On the other hand, the author has elegantly described the homogeneous
source distributions called “one point” distributions. Dr. Fedi has proposed, as a
multi-homogeneous model, having a variable homogeneity degree versus the posi-
tion. He concluded that while mono-fractals or homogeneous functions are scaling

ix
x Preface

functions, multi-fractal and multi-homogeneous models are necessarily described

within a multi-scale data set and recommended that specific techniques are needed to
manage the information contained on the whole multi-scale data set.
In another Chapter “Curie Depth Estimation from Aeromagnetic for Fractal
Distribution of Sources”, Dr. Bansal et al. described scaling spectral method for
estimation of Curie depth. The earth’s magnetic field is used to find depth of
anomalous sources as shallow as few metres to tens of km. The deepest depths
found from magnetic field sometimes correspond to Curie depth a depth in crust
where magnetic minerals lose their magnetic field due to increase in temperature.
Estimation of depth from magnetic/aeromagnetic data generally assumes random
and uncorrelated distribution of magnetic sources equivalent to white noise distri-
bution. The white noise distribution is assumed because of mathematical simplicity
and non-availability of information about source distribution, whereas from many
borehole studies around the world, it is found that magnetic sources and also other
physical properties such as density, conductivity, etc. follow fractal distribution.
The fractal distribution of sources found many applications in depth estimation
from magnetic/aeromagnetic data. In this chapter, Curie depth estimation from
aeromagnetic data for fractal distribution of sources has been presented.
In Chapter “Fractal Faults: Implications in Seismic Interpretation and
Geomodeling”, Dr. Ravi Prakash Srivastava has combined the concept arrived
from two different words, one called “Fractals” that follows scaling law seen in
many natural phenomenon and the other called “Faults” encountered in geological
studies. Author presented most updated use of fractal concept in geological
understanding of faults and their significance in geological modelling of hydro-
carbon reservoirs. It is reported in many studies that the faults show fractal/scaling
behavior in terms of fault length and displacement fault zone thickness versus fault
throw. However, large faults are identified and integrated in seismic data, but same
is not true when they are small and hence below the resolution limit of seismic data.
Thus, author is able to map smaller faults with geological knowledge of the faults in
the reservoir model studies using a concept of fractals.
In Chapter “Detrended Fluctuation Analysis of Geophysical Well-Log Data”,
Subhakar and Chandrasekhar used geophysical well-log data as it provides a unique
description of the subsurface lithology as well as they represent the depositional
history of the subsurface formations, vis-à-vis the variation of their physical
properties as a function of depth. For this, DFA technique has been described and
applied to gamma-ray log, sonic log and neutron porosity log of three different
wells from west coast of India. The whole chapter is organized in seven sections
dealing with geology of the area, data used in the present study, basic theory of
DFA, methodology used, discussion and interpretation of results derived and finally
the conclusion of the studies.
Drs. Banerjee and Nimisha Vedanti in Chapter “Fractal Characters of Porous
Media and Flow Analysis” proposed a fractal model of continuum percolation
which quantitatively reproduces the flow path geometry. Porosity is an important
property of geological formation and a complex function of many variables which
control fluid flow. The variables include essentially the characteristics of pore
Preface xi

structures such as type, size, shape and arrangement of pores; pore space connec-
tions; area of pores open for flow; and tortuosity of the flow paths and composition
of pore. There is no general framework which explains the fluid flow through the
fractured and complex subsurface geometry. In fact, a direct measurement of flow
through complex permeable media is time taking; hence, an analytical model has
been recommended. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to develop a simple
analytical model based on the medium structural characteristics to explain the flow
in natural fractures. The authors showed that the pattern of fracture heterogeneity in
reservoir scale of natural geological formations looks as the distributed self-similar
tree structures.
In Chapter “Estimation and Application of Fractal Differential Adjacency
Segregation (F-DAS) Scores in Analysis of Scanning Electron Micro Graph (SEM)
Imageries Towards Understanding the Adsorption unto Porous Solids”, Prof. Das
et al. presented Fractal Differential Adjacency Segregation (F-DAS) which is dif-
ferent from the conventional approach for estimation of fractal dimension
(FD) using box counting method. The box counting method is one of first methods
to estimate fractal dimension and is also simple to use. However, for heterogeneous
system, mono-fractal seems to be inappropriate. In this chapter, the limitation of use
of mono-FD is explained and thus extended the concept of Fractal dimensioning
into lower scale segregation levels and evaluating their differential scores. In this
approach, F-DAS scores are estimated for each of the image pixels of scanning
electron microscopy (SEM) imageries using the arithmetic means of the grey levels
of the adjacency pixels enclosed by the box used for counting in the conventional
methods. The authors claimed that the present analysis provides better under-
standing of variability of the system (in this case, adsorbents), unexplored by
qualitative analysis of SEM imageries, as well as the functional groups using
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy.
Dr. Padhy in Chapter “The Multi-fractal Scaling Behavior of Seismograms
Based on the Detrended Fluctuation Analysis” has explained the use of the
multi-fractal scaling properties of seismograms in order to quantify the complexity
associated with high-frequency seismic signals and hence to characterize medium
heterogeneities at different scales. He recommended the MDFA method is capable
of characterizing the multi-fractality of earthquake records associated with fre-
quency- and scale-dependent correlations of small and large fluctuations within
seismogram. The multi-fractal nature of earthquake records has been explained by
computing the generalized Hurst and mass exponent and multi-fractal singularity
spectrum. One of the findings is that the degree of multi-fractality decreases with
increasing frequency, and is generally more for the time period windowing domi-
nant seismic phases in the seismogram.
Finally in Chapter “Fractal Methods in the Investigation of the Time Dynamics
of Fires: An Overview”, Prof. Telesca reviewed the fractal methods applied to fire
point processes and satellite time-continuous signals that are sensitive to fire
occurrences. Fires represent one of the most critical issues in the context of natural
hazards. Most of these fires could be natural as well as anthropic. Sometimes,
summer drought can influence the ignition and spread of devastating fire.
xii Preface

The author gave very good description of methods to find the temporal distri-
bution of sequence of fire. These methods include coefficient of variation (CV),
Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA) and Multi-fractal Detrended Fluctuation
Analysis (MDFA). Other techniques such as Fano Factor (FF), Allan Factor(AL)
and Count-based Periodogram (PG) for fire sequence as the count process has also
been described through fire satellite time series. Author also applied these methods
to know the information about the “health” of vegetation which is very important
and can be used to find the status of vegetation after the big forest fire.

2. Acknowledgments

I am grateful to all contributors who wrote very relevant and significant chapters for
this book. I am also thankful to all reviewers who took so much pain in completing
the review process in time.
I shall always be grateful to Prof. D.L. Turcotte, USA, who wrote a very
encouraging foreword for the book. I thank my Ph.D. students Mr. Shib S. Ganguli
and Ms. V. Uma, and colleague Mr. P. Nagarjuna, for helping me in editing the
book.
Thanks are due to Indian National Science Academy (INSA) for granting INSA
Senior Scientist while writing this book. CSIR-National Geophysical Research
Institute has provided me the necessary facilities for completion of this book.
I am also thankful to Ms. Schwarz Johanna, Sangeetha and others from Springer
publishers for bringing out this issue as per schedule.

V.P. Dimri

References
Barton CC, La Pointe PR (1995) Fractals in the earth sciences. Plenum Press, New York, p 265
Dimri VP (2000) Edited: application of fractals in earth sciences. A.A. Balkema, USA; Oxford and
IBH Pub. Co., New Delhi, p 238
Dimri VP (2005a) Edited: fractal behaviour of the earth system. Springer, New York, p 207
Dimri VP (2005b) Edited: fractals in geophysics and seismology: an introduction; fractal beha-
viour of the earth system. Springer, New York, pp 1–22
Dimri VP, Srivastava R, Vedanti N (2012) Fractal models in exploration geophysics. Elsevier
Science Ltd., Amsterdam, p 165
Feder J (1988) Fractals. Plenum Press, New York, p 283
Korvin G (1992) Fractal models in the earth sciences, Elsevier Science Ltd, Amsterdam, p 424
Mandelbrot BB (1982) The fractal geometry of nature. W.H. Freeman and Company, New York,
p 460
Turcotte DL (2011) Fractals and chaos in geology and geophysics. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, p 41
Contents

Scaling Laws in Geophysics: Application to Potential Fields

of Methods Based on the Laws of Self-similarity and Homogeneity . . . 1
Maurizio Fedi
Curie Depth Estimation from Aeromagnetic for Fractal
Distribution of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.R. Bansal, V.P. Dimri, Raj Kumar and S.P. Anand
Fractal Faults: Implications in Seismic Interpretation
and Geomodelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Ravi Prakash Srivastava
Detrended Fluctuation Analysis of Geophysical Well-Log Data . . . . . . 47
D. Subhakar and E. Chandrasekhar
Fractal Characters of Porous Media and Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Pallavi Banerjee Chattopadhyay and Nimisha Vedanti
Estimation and Application of Fractal Differential Adjacency
Segregation (F-DAS) Scores in Analysis of Scanning Electron
Micrograph (SEM) Imageries Towards Understanding
the Adsorption unto Porous Solids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Ashutosh Das, K. Ravikumar, B. Subramanyam, Mukesh Goel,
V. Sri Hari and G.V. Rajamanickam
The Multi-fractal Scaling Behavior of Seismograms Based
on the Detrended Fluctuation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Simanchal Padhy
Fractal Methods in the Investigation of the Time Dynamics
of Fires: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Luciano Telesca

xiii
Scaling Laws in Geophysics: Application
to Potential Fields of Methods Based
on the Laws of Self-similarity
and Homogeneity

Maurizio Fedi

Abstract We analyse two classes of methods widely diffused in the geophysical

community, especially for studying potential fields and their related source distri-
butions. The first is that of the homogeneous fractals random models and the second
is that of the homogeneous source distributions called “one-point” distributions. As
a matter of fact both are depending on scaling laws, which are used worldwide in
many scientific and economic disciplines. However, we point out that their appli-
cation to potential fields is limited by the simplicity itself of the inherent
assumptions on such source distributions. Multifractals are the models, which have
been used in a much more general way to account for complex random source
distributions of density or susceptibility. As regards the other class, a similar
generalization is proposed here, as a multi-homogeneous model, having a variable
homogeneity degree versus the position. While monofractals or homogeneous
functions are scaling functions, that is they do not have a specific scale of interest,
multi-fractal and multi-homogeneous models are necessarily described within a
multiscale dataset and specific techniques are needed to manage the information
contained on the whole multiscale dataset.

1 Introduction

The Earth is a heterogeneous medium, meaning it is characterized by a complex

distribution of its physical properties. In general, a proper representation of its
complexity has to explicitly refer to the specific scale of observation of a given
phenomenon. To this regard, a special class of phenomena share a scaling property:
that of not exhibiting any characteristic scale. The behavior of scaling phenomena
assesses that all the scales within some range are equally important and the signals

M. Fedi (&)
Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra, Università Federico II di Napoli,
dell’Ambiente e delle Risorse Largo san Marcellino 10, 80138 Naples, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1

V.P. Dimri (ed.), Fractal Solutions for Understanding Complex Systems
in Earth Sciences, Springer Earth System Sciences,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24675-8_1
2 M. Fedi

at different scales are each one related to another. Different types of scaling are
known in the literature, including the long-range dependency, self-similarity, fractal
statistical similarity (monofractals) and local self-similarity: multifractals and infi-
nite divided sequences. Since there is no characteristic scale, in many areas of
science it has been useful integrating models across a broad range of scales.
Earth’s physical parameters, such as magnetic susceptibility, resistivity or others,
have been studied within the frame of fractals. At the same time, potential field
anomalies (gravity, magnetic, self-potential) have been studied under the frame-
work of scaling laws based on the homogeneity law. In particular, multiscale
methods, such as the continuous wavelet transform (CWT), will be specifically
designed to study field anomalies exhibiting such scaling properties.
In this paper, we will try to analyse these two kinds of scaling laws in parallel, in
order to define their similarities, limitations and advantages for determining the
properties of the potential field sources.

2 The Fractal Scaling-Law in Geophysics

Random fractals are complex signals that, at first sight, seem not to deserve any
useful information, due to their too strong erratic behavior. However, valuable
information may be achieved if, instead of exploring the signal at a fixed scale, we
try to search for a relationship existing between the observations of the signal at
different scales. Scale-invariant fractals, in fact, are uniquely characterized by a
single parameter, the fractal dimension, which gives us a description of its type and
complexity.
Consider a signal Y(x) and write the self-similarity equation (e.g. Mandelbrot 1983):

Y ðaxÞ ¼ aH Y ð xÞ; a [ 0; x  0; ð1Þ

where Y(x) is a self-similar homogeneous fractal (or monofractal) with 0 < H < 1.
The value of H, referred to as the Hurst parameter, will catch the degree of
self-similarity of Y(x). For self-affine processes, the local properties are reflected in
the global ones, resulting in the relationship:

DþH ¼ qþ1 ð2Þ

where D is the fractal dimension and q is the space dimension (e.g. Russ 1994;
Muniandy et al. 2003; Gneiting and Schlather 2004).
Y(x) is indeed equal to its scaled version Y(ax) after the normalization by a−H, so
that the phenomenon, observed at whatever scale, will present the same information
and may be explained by the same model, no matter the scale.
However, for more complex phenomena, reasonable models explaining a given
phenomenon at a given scale may be different from those found at a different scale.
In this case we may write (for instance, Arneodo 2000):
Scaling Laws in Geophysics: Application to Potential Fields … 3

Y ðaxÞ ¼ aHðxÞ Y ð xÞ; a [ 0; x  0 ð3Þ

where H(x) is now a function of x, so as to allow for more complex scaling

behaviors. Consequently, the process is said to be multifractal and the function
H(x) is referred to as Holder exponent. While self-similarity describes space scale
invariance, which is the permanence of a structure on all scales ruled by a single
law independent of x, multifractality captures different behaviors on small and large
scales: characteristic features of the signal (for instance, bursts) are detectable on all
scales, but they obey different laws depending on x.
Real-world phenomena may be rarely described in terms of simple deterministic
fractal models, but similarity can hold on several scales in a statistical sense, leading
to the notion of random fractals. As an example, random fractals are the model
assumed for well logs: Marsan and Bewan (1999) evidenced a multifractal distri-
bution for the P-wave sonic velocities recorded at the German Continental Deep
Drilling Programme (KTB) main borehole and for the gamma log. Fedi (2003)
analysed susceptibility data from the deep KTB log and found that a multifractal
model was more appropriate than a monofractal one for the statistical modelling of
these signals. Power spectra or variogram analysis are in fact useful for the char-
acterization of the signal up to the second-order statistics, but may fail in explaining
more complex structures. Fedi et al. (2005) extended this kind of analysis to dif-
ferent geophysical KTB well logs (density, magnetic susceptibility, self-potential
and electrical resistivity) and found consistent information about the KTB well
geological formations. They characterized the lithological changes of the drilled
rocks and identified zones of macro- and microfractures by using a regularity
analysis, which maps the measured logs to profiles of Holder exponents, or regu-
larity. Regularity generalizes the degree of differentiability of a function from
integer to real numbers and is useful to describe algebraic singularities related not
only to the classical model of jump discontinuity, but to any other kind of ‘edge’
variations.

3 Estimation of the Source Properties Using the Fractal

or the Spector and Grant’s Scaling-Law

An important issue is linking in a coherent way the complex behavior of the

physical properties measured with well logs to other physical quantities, which are
related to those parameters, but are independently measured. More clearly, we may
define how the complexity of the medium, revealed from well logs of susceptibility,
density or wave speed, is mapped to the complexity of fields, like the magnetic
field, the gravity field or the seismic wavefield.
Herrmann (1997) evidenced an inhomogeneous scaling for both well-log
acoustic waves and reflectivity, so implying that the singularity structure is carried
out from space to space-time. Other authors (for instance, Gregotski et al. 1991;
4 M. Fedi

Pilkington and Todoeschuck 1993; Maus and Dimri 1994; Bansal et al. 2010)
interpreted susceptibility and density logs in terms of scaling sources and consid-
ered their magnetic or gravity fields as scaling quantities, with fractal dimensions
related in a simple fashion to the fractal dimension of the source parameters. Naidu
(1968), assuming a homogeneous random density sources confined to a thick
semi-infinite medium, derived the relationships between the spectrum of the sources
and the spectrum of the related gravity or magnetic fields. Pilkington and
Todoeschuck (1993) assumed a 3D fractal magnetization, with power spectrum
Sj ðkx ; ky ; kz Þ ¼ ðkx2 þ ky2 þ kz2 Þa=2 , ða\0Þ, and obtained for the field spectrum P:

8ða  1Þ!!
Pðs; h1 Þ ¼ expð2sh1 Þsa þ 1 ð4Þ
pðaÞ!!

where kx ; ky ; k are angular frequencies; s ¼ ðkx2 þ ky2 Þ1=2 is the radial wave number;
h1 is the depth of the half-space; P is the power spectrum of the magnetic field
vertical component observed on the plane z = 0.
Note that, by this approach, the scaling exponent is assumed to vary in the fractal
range and, in turn, to depend on geology (Bansal et al. 2011).
However, Fedi et al. (1997) have shown that other kind of correlated sources,
such as the magnetically homogeneous blocks, inherently assumed by Spector and
Grant (1970), also originate fields whose scaling exponent is in the fractal range,
being it equal to about 3. To be clear, Spector and Grant (1970) modelled the
susceptibility distribution using independent ensembles of rectangular,
vertical-sided parallelepipeds. Each ensemble is characterized by a joint frequency
distribution for depth (h), width (a), length (b), thickness (t), magnetization
intensity (j/ab) and direction cosines of magnetization. Under the hypothesis that
the parameters vary independently and that they are randomly and uniformly dis-
tributed about their mean values, the authors derived the well-known analytical
expression of the radial power spectrum of the reduced to the pole magnetic field:

l 2
PðsÞ ¼ 0 2
j Cðs; a; bÞGðs; tÞPðs; hÞ ð5Þ
2

where:
 
j2 ¼ j2 ; a ¼ hai; b ¼ hbi; h ¼ hhi; ð6Þ

Zp
1  2 
Cðs; a; bÞ ¼ S ðs; h; a; bÞ dh ð7Þ
p
0

sinðas cos hÞ sinðbs sin hÞ

Sðs; h; a; bÞ ¼ ð8Þ
as cos h bs sin h
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trading class to be practically eliminated and to be replaced by
democratic organisations. Whether excess profits disappeared as a
result of this policy, or were merely transferred to another class, it is
not easy to decide. On the other hand, the Government were deeply
concerned with the protection of labour, and were drafting and
passing various laws concerning the freedom of unions, labour
exchanges, conciliation boards, social insurance, etc. Unfortunately,
the impatience and the desire for “law-making” which had seized the
villages were also apparent in the factories. Heads of industrial
concerns were dismissed wholesale, as well as the administrative
and technical staffs. These dismissals were accompanied by insults
and sometimes by violence, out of revenge for past offences, real or
imaginary. Some of the members of the staffs resigned of their own
accord, because they were unable to endure the humiliating position
into which they were forced by the workmen. Given our low level of
technical and educational standards, such methods were fraught
with grave danger. As in the Army, so in the factories, Committees
replaced by elections the dismissed personnel with utterly untrained
and ignorant men. Sometimes the workmen completely seized the
industrial concerns. Ignorant and unprovided with capital, they led
these concerns to ruin, and were themselves driven to
unemployment and misery. Labour discipline in the factories
completely vanished, and no means was left of exercising moral,
material or judicial pressure or compulsion. The “consciousness”
alone of the workers proved inadequate. The technical and
administrative personnel which remained or was newly elected could
no longer direct the industries and enjoyed no authority, as it was
thoroughly terrorised by the workmen. Naturally, therefore, the
working hours were still further curtailed, work became careless, and
production fell to its lowest ebb. The metallurgical industries of
Moscow fell 32 per cent. and the productivity of the Petrograd
factories 20 to 40 per cent. as early as in the month of April. In June
the production of coal and the general production of the Donetz
basin fell 30 per cent. The production of oil in Baku and Grozni also
suffered. The greatest injury, however, was inflicted upon the
industries by the monstrous demands for higher wages, completely
out of proportion to the cost of living and to the productivity of
labour, as well as to the actual paying capacity of the industries.
These demands greatly exceeded all excess profits. The following
figures are quoted in a Report to the Provisional Government: In
eighteen concerns in the Donetz Basin, with a total profit of
75,000,000 roubles per annum, the workmen demanded a wage
increase of 240,000,000 roubles per annum; the total amount of
increased wages in all the mining and metallurgical factories of the
South was 800,000,000 roubles per annum. In the Urals the total
Budget was 200,000,000, while the wages rose to 300,000,000. In
the Putilov factory alone, in Petrograd, before the end of 1917, the
increase in wages amounted to 90,000,000 roubles. The wages rose
from 200 to 300 per cent. The increase in the wages of the textile
workers of Moscow rose 500 per cent., as compared to 1914. The
burden of these increases naturally fell on the Government, as most
of the factories were working for the defence of the country. Owing
to the condition of industry described above, and to the psychology
of the workmen, industrial concerns collapsed, and the country
experienced an acute shortage of necessary commodities, with a
corresponding increase in prices. Hence the rise in the price of bread
and the reluctance of the villages to supply the towns.
At the same time Bolshevism introduced a permanent ferment into
the labouring masses. It flattered the lowest instincts, fanned hatred
against the wealthy classes, encouraged excessive demands, and
paralysed every endeavour of the Government and of the moderate
Democratic organisations to arrest the disruption of industry: “All for
the Proletariat and through the Proletariat....” Bolshevism held up to
the working class vivid and entrancing vistas of political domination
and economic prosperity, through the destruction of the Capitalist
régime and the transfer to the workmen of political power, of
industries, of the means of production, and of the wealth of the
country. And all this was to come at once, immediately, and not as a
result of a lengthy, social, economic process and organised struggle.
The imagination of the masses, unfettered by knowledge or by the
authority of leading professional unions, which were morally
undermined by the Bolsheviks, and were on the verge of collapse,
was fired by visions of avenging the hardships and boredom of
heavy toil in the past, and of enjoying amenities of a Bourgeois
existence, which they despised and yet yearned for with equal
ardour. It was “Now or Never: All or Nothing!” As life was destroying
illusions, and the implacable law of economics was meting out the
punishment of high prices, hunger and unemployment, Bolshevism
was the more convincingly insisting upon the necessity of rebellion
and explaining the causes of the calamity and the means of averting
it. The causes were: the policy of the Provisional Government, which
was trying to reintroduce enslavement by the Bourgeoisie, the
sabotage of the employers, and the connivance of the Revolutionary
Democracy, including the Mensheviks, which had sold itself to the
Bourgeoisie. The means was the transfer of power to the Proletariat.
All these circumstances were gradually killing Russian Industry.
In spite of all these disturbances, the dislocation of industry was not
immediately felt in the Army to an appreciable degree, because
attention was concentrated upon the Army at the expense of the
vital necessities of the country itself, and also because for several
months there had been a lull at the Front. In June, 1917, therefore,
we were provided adequately, if not amply, for an important
offensive. Imports of war material through Archangel, Murmansk,
and partly through Vladivostok had increased, but had not been
sufficiently developed by reason of the natural shortcomings of
maritime routes, and of the low carrying capacity of the Siberian and
of the Murmansk Railways. Only 16 per cent. of the actual needs of
the Army were satisfied. The military administration, however, clearly
saw that we were living on the old stores collected by the patriotic
impulse and effort of the country in 1916. By August, 1917, the most
important factories for the production of war materials had suffered
a check. The production of guns and of shells had fallen 60 per
cent., and of aircraft 80 per cent. The possibility of continuing the
War under worse material conditions was, however, amply proved
later by the Soviet Government, which had been using the supplies
available in 1917 and the remnants of Russian Industrial production
for the conduct of civil war for more than three years. This, of
course, was only possible through such an unexampled curtailment
of the consuming market that we are practically driven back to
primitive conditions of life.

Transport was likewise in a state of dislocation. As early as May,

1917, at the Regular Congress of Railway Representatives at the
Stavka, the opinion was expressed, and confirmed by many
specialists, that, unless the general conditions of the country
changed, our railways would come to a standstill within six months.
Practice has disproved theory. For over three years, under the
impossible conditions of Civil War and of the Bolshevik Régime, the
railways have continued to work. It is true that they did not satisfy
the needs of the population even in a small measure, but they
served the strategical purposes. That this situation cannot last, and
that the entire network of the Russian Railways is approaching its
doom, is hardly open to doubt. In the history of the disintegration of
the Russian Railway System the same conditions are traceable which
I have mentioned in regard to the Army, the villages, and especially
the industries: the inheritance of the unwise policy of the past in
regard to railways, the excessive demands of the War, the wear and
tear of rolling stock, and anarchy on the line, due to the behaviour
of a licentious soldiery; the general economic condition of the
country, the shortage of rails, of metal and of fuel; the
“democratisation” of Railway Administration, in which the power was
seized by various Committees; the disorganisation of the
administrative and technical personnel, which was subjected to
persecution; the low producing power of labour and the steady
growth of the economic demands of the railway employees and
workmen.
In other branches of the Administration the Government offered a
certain resistance to the systematic seizure of power by private
organisations, but in the Ministry of Railways that pernicious system
was introduced by the Government itself, in the person of the
Minister Nekrassov. He was the friend and the inspirer of Kerensky,
alternately Minister of Railways and of Finance, Assistant and Vice-
President of the Council of Ministers, Governor-General of Finland,
Octobrist, Cadet (Constitutional Democrat), and Radical Democrat,
holding the scales between the Government and the Soviet.
Nekrassov was the darkest and the most fatal figure in the
Governing Circles, and left the stamp of destruction upon everything
he touched—the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of
Railways, the autonomy of the Ukraine, or the Kornilov movement.
The Ministry had no economic or technical plan. As a matter of fact,
no such plan could ever be carried out, because Nekrassov decided
to introduce into the Railway Organisation, hitherto strongly
disciplined, “the new principles of Democratic Organisation, instead
of the old watchwords of compulsion and fear”(?). Soviets and
Committees were implanted upon every branch of the Railway
Administration. Enormous sums were spent upon this undertaking,
and, by his famous circular of May 27th, the Minister assigned to
these organisations a very wide scope of control and management,
as well as of the “direction” which they were henceforward entitled
to give to the responsible personnel in the Administration. Executive
functions were subsequently promised to these organisations....
“Meanwhile the Ministry of Railways and its subordinate branches
will work in strict accordance with the ideas and wishes of the United
Railway Workers.” Nekrassov thus handed over to a private
organisation the most important interests of the State—the direction
of the Railway policy, the control of the Defence, of industries, and
of all other branches dependent upon the railway system. As one of
our contemporary critics has said, this measure would have been
entirely justified had the whole population of Russia consisted of
railway employees. This reform, carried out by Nekrassov on a scale
unprecedented in history, was something worse than a mere blunder.
The general trend of Ministerial policy was well understood. In the
beginning of August, at the Moscow Congress, which was turned
into a weapon for the Socialist parties of the Left, one of the leaders
declared that “the Railway Union must be fully autonomous and no
authority except that of the workers themselves should be entitled to
interfere with it.” In other words, a State within a State.
Disruption ensued. A new phase of the arbitrariness of ever-
changing organisations was introduced into the strict and precise
mechanism of the railway services in the centre as well as
throughout the country. I understand the democratisation that opens
to the popular masses wide access to science, technical knowledge,
and art, but I do not understand the democratisation of these
achievements of human intellect.
There followed anarchy and the collapse of Labour discipline. As
early as in July the position of the railways was rendered hopeless
through the action of the Government.
After holding the office of Minister of Railways for four months,
Nekrassov went to the Ministry of Finance, of which he was utterly
ignorant, and his successor, Yurenev, began to struggle against the
usurpation of power by the railwaymen, as he considered “the
interference of private persons and organisations with the executive
functions of the Department as a crime against the State.” The
struggle was conducted by the customary methods of the Provisional
Government, and what was lost could no longer be recovered. At the
Moscow Congress the President of the Union of the Railwaymen,
fully conscious of its power, said that the struggle against democratic
organisations was a manifestation of counter-Revolution, that the
Union would use every weapon in order to counteract these
endeavours, and “would be strong enough to slay this counter-
Revolutionary hydra.” As is well known, the All-Russian Executive
Committee of the Union of Railways subsequently became a political
organisation pure and simple, and betrayed Kornilov to Kerensky and
Kerensky to Lenin. With a zeal worthy of the secret police of the old
régime, it hunted out Kornilov’s followers, and finally met an
inglorious end in the clutches of Bolshevik Centralisation.

We now come to another element in the life of the State—Finance.

Every normal financial system is dependent upon a series of
conditions: general political conditions, offering a guarantee of the
external and internal stability of the State and of the country;
strategical conditions, defining the measure of efficiency of the
National Defence; economic conditions, such as the productivity of
the country’s industries and the relation of production to
consumption; the conditions of labour, of transport, etc. The
Government, the Front, the villages, the factories, and the transport
offered no necessary guarantees, and the Ministry of Finance could
but have recourse to palliatives in order to arrest the disruption of
the entire system of the currency and the complete collapse of the
Budget, pending the restoration of comparative order in the country.
According to the accepted view, the main defects of our pre-War
Budget were that it was based upon the revenue of the spirit
monopoly (800,000,000 roubles), and that there was scarcely any
direct taxation. Before the War the Budget of Russia was about 3½
milliards of roubles; the National Debt was about 8½ milliards, and
we paid nearly 400,000,000 roubles interest per annum; half of that
sum went abroad, and was partially covered by 1½ milliards of our
exports. The War and Prohibition completely upset our Budget.
Government expenses during the War reached the following figures:

½ 1914 5 milliards of roubles.

1915 12 〃 〃
1916 18 〃 〃
Seven months, 1917 18 〃 〃

The enormous deficit was partially covered by loans and by paper

currency. The expenses of the War were met, however, out of the
so-called “War Fund.” At the Stavka, in accordance with the dictates
of practical wisdom, expenditure was under the full control of the
Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who determined
the heads of expenditure in his Orders, schedules, and estimates.
The Revolution dealt the death-blow to our finance. As Shingarev,
the Minister of Finance, said, the Revolution “induced everyone to
claim more rights, and stifled any sense of duty. Everybody
demanded higher wages, but no one dreamt of paying taxes, and
the finances of the country were thus placed in a hopeless position.”
There was a real orgy; everyone was desperately trying to grab as
much as possible from the Treasury under the guise of
democratisation, taking advantage of the impotence of the
Government and of powerlessness to resist. Even Nekrassov had the
courage to declare at the Moscow Congress that “Never in history
had any Czarist Government been as generous and prodigal as the
Government of Revolutionary Russia,” and that “the new
Revolutionary régime is much more expensive than the old one.”
Suffice it to quote a few “astronomic” figures in order to gauge the
insuperable obstacles in the way of a reasonable Budget. The decline
of production and the excessive rise in wages resulted in the
necessity of enormous expenditure for subsidies to expiring concerns
and for overpayments for means of production. These over-
payments in the Donetz Basin alone amounted to 1,200,000,000
roubles; the increase in the soldiers’ pay, 500,000,000 roubles;
railwaymen’s pay, 350,000,000 roubles; Post Office employees,
60,000,000 roubles. After a month the latter demanded another
105,000,000 roubles, while the entire revenue of the Posts and
Telegraphs was 60,000,000 roubles. The Soviet demanded 11
milliards (in other words, nearly the total of the Budget for 1915) for
allowances to soldiers’ wives, whereas only 2 milliards had been
spent till 1917 under this head. The Food Supply Committees cost
500,000,000 roubles per annum, and the Land Committee
140,000,000 roubles, etc., etc. Meanwhile the revenue was falling
steadily. Thus, for example, the Land Tax fell 32 per cent. in the first
few months of the Revolution; the revenue from town property, 41
per cent.; the House Tax, 43 per cent., etc. At the same time, our
internal troubles caused the depreciation of the rouble and a fall in
the price of Russian securities abroad. The Provisional Government
based its financial policy upon “reorganisation of the Financial
System on democratic lines and the direct taxation of the propertied
classes” (Death Duties, Excess Profits Taxes, Income Taxes, etc.).
The Government, however, would not adopt the measure
recommended by the Revolutionary Democracy—a compulsory loan
or a high Capital Levy—a measure distinctly tainted with Bolshevism.
All these just taxes, introduced or planned, did not suffice even
partially to satisfy the growing needs of the State. In the month of
August the Finance Ministry was compelled to increase indirect
taxation on certain monopolies, such as tea, sugar, and matches.
These measures were, of course, extremely burdensome, and
therefore highly unpopular.
Expenditure was growing, revenue was not forthcoming. The Liberty
Loan was not progressing favourably, and there could be no hope for
foreign loans on account of the condition of the Russian Front.
Internal loans and Treasury Bonds yielded 9½ milliards in the first
half of 1917. Ordinary revenue was expected to yield 5,800,000,000
roubles. There remained one weapon established by the historical
tradition of every revolution—the Printing Press.
Paper currency reached colossal proportions:

½ 1914 1,425,000,000 roubles.

 1915 2,612,000,000 〃
1916 3,488,000,000 〃
½ 1917 3,990,000,000 〃

According to the estimates of July, 1917, the total of paper currency

was 13,916,000,000 roubles (the gold reserve was 1,293,000,000
roubles), as against 2 milliards before the War. Four successive
Finance Ministers were unable to drag the country out of the
financial morass. This might possibly have been achieved by the
awakening of the national spirit and an understanding of the
interests of the State, or by the growth of a wise and strong power
which could have dealt a final blow to the anti-State, selfish motives
of the Bourgeois elements that based their well-being upon the War
and upon the blood of the people, as well as of the Democracy,
which, in the words of Shingarev, “so severely condemned through
its representatives in the Duma the very same poison (paper
currency) which it was now drinking greedily at the moment when
that Democracy had become its own master.”
 CHAPTER XIV.
The Strategical Position of the Russian
Front.
The first and fundamental question with which I was confronted at
the Stavka was the objective of our Front. The condition of the
enemy did not appear to us as particularly brilliant. But I must
confess that the truth as at present revealed exceeds all our
surmises, especially according to the picture drawn by Hindenburg
and Ludendorff of the condition of Germany and of her Allies in
1917. I will not dwell upon the respective numerical strength,
armaments, and strategical positions on the Western Front. I will
only recall that in the middle of June Hindenburg gave rather a
gloomy description of the condition of the country in his telegram to
the Emperor. He said: “We are very much perturbed by the
depression of the spirits of the people. That spirit must be raised, or
we shall lose the War. Our Allies also require support, lest they
desert us.... Economic problems must be solved, which are of
paramount importance to our future. The question arises—Is the
Chancellor capable of solving them? A solution must be found or else
we perish.”
The Germans were anticipating a big offensive of the British and the
French on the Western Front, where they had concentrated their
main attention and their main forces, leaving on the Eastern Front
after the Russian Revolution only such numbers as were scarcely
sufficient for defence. And yet the position on the Eastern Front
continued to create a certain nervousness at the German G.H.Q. Will
the Russian people remain steadfast, or will the Defeatist tendencies
prevail? Hindenburg wrote: “As the condition of the Russian Army
prevented us from finding a clear answer to that question, our
position in regard to Russia remained insecure.”
In spite of all its defects, the Russian Army in March, 1917, was a
formidable force, with which the enemy had seriously to reckon.
Owing to the mobilisation of industry, to the activities of the War-
Industries Committees, and partly to the fact that the War Ministry
was showing increased energy, our armaments had reached a level
hitherto unknown. Also, the Allies were supplying us with artillery
and war materials through Murmansk and Archangel on a larger
scale. In the spring we had the powerful Forty-Eighth Corps—a
name under which heavy artillery of the highest calibre for special
purposes, “Taon,” was concealed. In the beginning of the year the
engineering troops were reorganised and amplified. At the same
time new infantry divisions were beginning to deploy. This measure,
adopted by General Gourko during his temporary tenure of office as
Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme C.-in-C., consisted in the reduction of
regiments from four battalions to three, as well as the reduction of
the number of guns to a division. A third division was thus created in
every Army Corps, with artillery. There can be no doubt that, had
this scheme been introduced in peace-time, the Army Corps would
have been more pliable and considerably stronger. It was a risky
thing to do in war-time. Before the spring operations the old
divisions were disbanded, whereas the new ones were in a pitiable
state in regard to armaments (machine-guns, etc.), as well as
technical strength and equipment. Many of them had not been
sufficiently blended together—a circumstance of particular
importance in view of the Revolution. The position was so acute that
in May the Stavka was compelled to sanction the disbanding of those
of the Third Division which should prove feeble, and to distribute the
men among units of the line. This idea, however, was hardly ever
put into practice, as it encountered strong opposition on the part of
units already disaffected by the Revolution. Another measure which
weakened the ranks of the Army was the dismissal of the senior men
in the ranks.
This decision, fraught with incalculable consequences, was taken on
the eve of a general offensive. It was due to a statement made at a
Council at the Stavka by the Minister of Agriculture (who was also in
charge of supplies) that the condition of supplies was critical, and
that he could not undertake the responsibility of feeding the Army
unless about a million men were removed from the ration list. In the
debate attention was drawn to the presence in the Army of an
enormous number of non-combatants, quite out of proportion to the
numbers of fighting men, and to the inclusion in the Army of a
quantity of auxiliary bodies, which were hardly necessary, such as of
Labour Organisations, Chinese, and other alien Labour Battalions,
etc. Mention was also made of the necessity of having a younger
Army. I very much feared this trend of mind, and gave orders to the
Staff to draw up accurate lists of all the above-named Capitalists.
While this work was still in preparation the War Minister issued, on
April 5th, an Order of the Day giving leave, in the internal districts,
to soldiers over forty to work in the fields till May 15th. Leave was
afterwards extended till June 15th, but practically hardly anyone
returned. On April 10th the Provisional Government discharged all
men over forty-three. Under the pressure of the men it became
unavoidable to spread the provisions of the first Order to the Army,
which would not be reconciled to any privileges granted to the rear.
The second Order gave rise to a very dangerous tendency, as it
practically amounted to a beginning of demobilisation. The elemental
desire of those who had been given leave to return to their homes
could not be controlled by any regulations, and the masses of these
men, who flooded the railway stations, caused a protracted
disorganisation of the means of transport. Some regiments formed
out of Reserve battalions lost most of their men. In the rear of the
Army transport was likewise in a state of confusion. The men did not
wait to be relieved, but left the lorries and the horses to their fate;
supplies were plundered and the horses perished. The Army was
weakened as a result of these circumstances, and the preparations
for the defensive were delayed.
The Russian Army occupied an enormous Front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from
the Black Sea to Hamadan. Sixty-eight infantry and nine cavalry corps occupied the line.
Both the importance of and the conditions obtaining on these Fronts varied. Our Northern
Front, including Finland, the Baltic and the line of the Western Dvina, was of great
importance, as it covered the approaches to Petrograd. But the importance at that Front
was limited to defensive purposes, and for that reason it was impossible to keep at that
Front large forces or considerable numbers of guns. The conditions of that Theatre—the
strong defensive line of the Dvina—a series of natural positions in the rear linked up with
the main positions of the Western Russian Front, and the impossibility of any important
operations in the direction of Petrograd without taking possession of the Sea, which was in
our hands—all this would have justified us in considering that the Front was, to a certain
extent, secure, had it not been for two circumstances, which caused the Stavka serious
concern: The troops of the Northern Front, owing to the vicinity of Revolutionary
Petrograd, were more demoralised than any other, and the Baltic Fleet and its bases—
Helsingfors and Kronstadt, of which the latter served as the main base of Anarchism and
Bolshevism—were either “autonomous” or in a state of semi-Anarchy. While preserving to
a certain degree the outward form of discipline, the Baltic Fleet was actually in a state of
complete insubordination. The Admiral in command, Maximov, was entirely in the hands of
the Central Committee of Sailors. Not a single order for Naval operations could be carried
out without the sanction of that Committee, not to speak of Naval actions. Even the work
of laying and repairing minefields—the main defence of the Baltic—met with opposition
from Sailors’ Organisations and the crews. Not only the general decline of discipline, but
the well-planned work of the German General Staff were quite obvious, and apprehensions
were entertained lest Naval secrets and codes be revealed to the enemy. At the same
time, the troops of the Forty-Second Corps, quartered along the Finnish Coast and on the
Monzund Islands, had been idle for a long time and their positions scattered. With the
beginning of the Revolution they were, therefore, rapidly demoralised, and some of them
were nothing but physically and morally degenerate crowds. To relieve or to move them
was an impossibility. I recall that in May, 1917, I made several unavailing endeavours to
send an Infantry Brigade to the Monzund Islands. Suffice it to say that the Army Corps
Commander would not make up his mind to inspect his troops and get into touch with
them—a circumstance which is typical of the troops as well as of the personality of their
Commander. In a word, the position on the Northern Front in the spring of 1917 was the
following: We received daily reports of the Channel between the Islands of the Gulf of Riga
and the mainland being blocked with ice, and this ice appeared to be the chief real
obstacle to an invasion of the German Fleet and Expeditionary Forces.
The Western Front extended from the Disna to the Pripet. On this long line two sectors—
Minsk-Vilna and Minsk-Baranovitchi—were of the greatest importance to us, as they
represented the two directions in which our troops, as well as the Germans, might
undertake offensive operations, for which there had already been precedents. The other
sections of the Front, and especially the Southern—the Pollessie, with its forests and
marshes—owing to the conditions of the country and of the railways, were passive. Along
the River Pripet, its tributaries and canals, a kind of half-peaceful intercourse with the
Germans had long since been established, as well as a secret exchange of goods, which
was of some advantage to the “Comrades.” For example, we received reports that Russian
soldiers from the Line, with bags, appeared daily in the market of Pinsk, and that their
advent was for many reasons encouraged by the German authorities. There was another
vulnerable point—the bridge-head on the Stokhod by the station, Chrevishe-Golenin,
occupied by one of the Army Corps of General Lesh. On March 21st, after strong artillery
preparation and a gas attack, the Germans fell upon our Corps and smashed it to pieces.
Our troops had heavy casualties, and the remnants of the Corps retreated behind the
Stokhod. The Stavka did not get an accurate list of the casualties, because it was
impossible to ascertain the numbers of killed or wounded under the head of “Missing.” The
German Official Communiqué gave a list of prisoners—150 officers and about 10,000 men.
Owing to the conditions in that theatre of war, this tactical success was of no strategical
importance, and could lead to no dangerous developments. Nevertheless, we could not
but wonder at the frankness of the cautious Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the official
organ of the German Chancellor, which wrote: “The Communiqué of the Stavka of the
Russian Supreme Command of March 29th is mistaken in interpreting the operations
undertaken by the German troops, and dictated by a tactical necessity which had arisen
only within the limits of a given sector, was an operation of general importance.” The
paper knew the facts of which we were not certain and which have now been explained by
Ludendorff. From the beginning of the Russian Revolution, Germany had a new aim:
Unable to conduct operations on both the main Fronts, she had decided attentively to
follow and to encourage the process of demoralisation in Russia, striking at her not by
arms, but by developing propaganda. The battle of the Stokhod was fought on the
personal initiative of General Linsingen, and the German Government was frightened
because it considered that “at a moment when fraternisation was proceeding at full speed”
German attacks might revive the dying flames of patriotism in Russia and postpone her
collapse. The Chancellor asked the German G.H.Q. to make as little as possible of that
success, and the G.H.Q. cancelled all further offensives “in order not to dash the hopes for
peace which were about to be realised.”
Our reverse on the Stokhod produced a strong impression in the country. It was the first
fighting experience of the “Freest Revolutionary Army in the world....” The Stavka merely
gave the facts in a spirit of impartiality. In the circles of the Revolutionary Democracy the
reverse was explained partly by the treachery of the Commanding Officers and partly by a
conspiracy to emphasise by this example the impracticability of the new Army Regulations
and the danger of the collapse of discipline, partly by the incompetence of the military
authorities. The Moscow Soviet wrote to the Stavka accusing one of the assistants of the
War Minister who had commanded a division on that Front of being a traitor. Others
attributed our defeat solely to the demoralisation of the troops. In reality, the reasons for
the defeat were two-fold: The tactical reason—the doubtful practicability of occupying a
narrow bridge-head when the river was swollen, the insecurity of the rear and perhaps
inadequate use of the troops and of technical means; and the psychological reason, the
collapse of the moral and of the discipline of the troops. The last circumstance, apparent
in the enormous number of prisoners, gave both the Russian Stavka and Hindenburg’s
headquarters much food for thought.
The South-Western Front, from the Pripet to Moldavia, was the most important, and
attracted the greatest attention. From that Front, operating lines of the highest importance
led to the North-West, into the depths of Galicia and Poland, to Cracow, Warsaw and
Brest-Litovsk. The advance along these lines was covered from the South by the
Carpathians, separated the Southern Austrian group of armies from the Northern German,
and threatened the rear and the communications of the latter. These operating lines, upon
which no serious obstacles were encountered, led us to the Front of the Austrian troops,
whose fighting capacity was lower than the Germans. The rear of our South-Western Front
was comparatively well-organised and prosperous. The psychology of the troops, of the
Command, and of the Staffs always differed considerably from the psychology of other
Fronts. In the glorious, but joyless, campaign only the armies of the South-Western Front
had won splendid victories, had taken hundreds of thousands of prisoners, had made
victorious progress hundreds of miles deep into the enemy territory, and had descended
into Hungary from the Carpathians. These troops had formerly always believed in success.
Brussilov, Kornilov, Kaledin had made their reputations on that Front. Owing to all these
circumstances the South-Western Front was regarded as the natural base and the centre
of the impending operations. Consequently, troops, technical means, the greater part of
the heavy artillery (“Taon”) and munitions were concentrated at that Front. The region
between the Upper Seret and the Carpathians was, therefore, being prepared for the
offensive, Places d’armes erected, roads made. Further south there was the Roumanian
Front, stretching to the Black Sea. After the unsuccessful campaign of 1916 our troops
occupied the line of the Danube, the Seret and the Carpathians, and it was sufficiently
fortified. Part of General Averesco’s Roumanian troops occupied the Front between our
Fourth and Ninth Armies, and part were being organised under the direction of the French
General, Berthelot, assisted by Russian Gunner Instructors. The reorganisation and
formation proceeded favourably, the more so as the Roumanian soldier is excellent war
material. I became acquainted with the Roumanian Army in November, 1916, when I was
sent with the Eighth Army Corps to Buseo, into the thick of the retreating Roumanian
Armies. Curiously enough, I was ordered to advance in the direction of Bucarest until I
came into contact with the enemy, and to cover that direction with the assistance of the
retreating Roumanian troops. For several months I fought by Buseo, Rymnik and
Fokshany, having two Roumanian Corps at times under my command and Averesco’s Army
on my flank. I thus gained a thorough knowledge of the Roumanian troops. In the
beginning of the campaign the Roumanian Army showed complete disregard of the
experience of the World War. In matters of equipment and ammunition their levity was
almost criminal. There were several capable Generals, the officers were effeminate and
inefficient, and the men were splendid. The artillery was adequate, but the infantry was
untrained. These are the main characteristics of the Roumanian Army, which soon
afterwards acquired better organisation and improved in training and equipment. The
relations between the actual Russian Commander-in-Chief, who was designated as the
Assistant C.-in-C., and the King of Roumania, who was nominally in Chief Command, were
fairly cordial. Although the Russian troops began to commit excesses, which had a bad
effect upon the attitude of the Roumanians, the condition of the Front did not, however,
cause serious apprehension. Owing to the general conditions at the Theatre of War, only
an advance in great strength in the direction of Bucarest and an invasion of Transylvania
could have had a political and strategical effect. But new forces could not be moved to
Roumania, and the condition of the Roumanian Railways excluded all hope of the
possibility of transport and supplies on a large scale. The theatre, therefore, was of
secondary importance, and the troops of the Roumanian Front were preparing for a local
operation, with a view to attracting the Austro-German forces.
The Caucasian Front was in an exceptional position. It was far distant. For many years the
Caucasian Administration and Command had enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. From
August, 1916, the Army was commanded by the Grand-Duke Nicholas, a man of
commanding personality, who took advantage of his position whenever there was a
difference of opinion between himself and the Stavka. Finally, the natural conditions of the
theatre of war and the peculiarities of the enemy rendered that Front entirely different
from the European. All this led to a kind of remoteness and aloofness of the Caucasian
Army and too abnormal relations with the Stavka. General Alexeiev repeatedly stated that,
in spite of all his efforts, he was unable clearly to discern the situation in the Caucasus.
The Caucasus lived independently, and told the Government only as much as it considered
necessary; and the reports were coloured in accordance with local interests.
In the spring of 1917 the Caucasian Army was in a difficult position, not by reason of the
strategical or fighting advantages of the enemy—the Turkish Army was by no means a
serious menace—but of internal disorganisation. The countryside was roadless and bare.
There were no supplies or forage, and the difficulties of transport made the life of the
troops very arduous. The Army Corps on the Right Flank was comparatively well supplied,
owing to facilities for transport across the Black Sea, but the other Army Corps, and
especially those of the Left Flank, fared very badly. Owing to geographical conditions, light
transport required an enormous number of horses, while there was no fodder on the spot.
Railways of all kinds were being built very slowly, partly owing to a lack of railway material
and partly because that material had been wasted by the Caucasian Front upon the
Trapezund Railway, which was of secondary importance, owing to the parallel Maritime
transport. In the beginning of May General Yudenitch reported that, owing to disease and
loss of horses, transport was completely disorganised, batteries in position had no horses,
half of the transport was non-existent, and 75,000 horses were needed. Tracks, rolling
stock and forage were urgently required. In the first half of April 30,000 men (22 per
cent.) of the Infantry of the Line had died of typhus and scurvy. Yudenitch therefore
foreshadowed the necessity of a compulsory retreat to points of supply, the centre towards
Erzerum and the Right Flank to the frontier. The solution suggested by General Yudenitch
could not be accepted, both for moral reasons and because our retreat would have freed
Turkish troops for action on other Asiatic Fronts. This circumstance particularly worried the
British Military Representative at the Stavka, who repeatedly conveyed to us the desire of
the British G.H.Q. that the Left Flank of our troops should advance in the valley of the
River Diala for a combined operation with General Maude’s Mesopotamian contingent
against Halil Pasha’s Army. This advance was necessary to the British rather for political
considerations than for strategical requirements. The actual condition of our Left Flank
Army Corps was, moreover, truly desperate, and in May tropical heat set in in the valley of
the Diala. As a result the Caucasian Front was unable to advance, and was ordered
actively to defend its position. The advance of the Army Corps of the Left Flank, in contact
with the British, was made conditional upon the latter supplying the troops. As a matter of
fact, in the middle of April, a partial retreat took place in the direction of Ognot and Mush;
at the end of April the Left Flank began its fruitless advance in the valley of the Diala, and
subsequently a condition arose on the Caucasian Front which was something between War
and Peace.
In conclusion, mention must be made of another portion of the Armed Forces of Russia in
that theatre—the Black Sea Fleet. In May and in the beginning of June serious
disturbances had already occurred, which led to the resignation of Admiral Koltchak. The
Fleet, however, was still considered strong enough to carry out its task—to hold the Black
Sea and also to blockade the Turkish and Bulgarian coasts and guard the maritime routes
to the Caucasian and Roumanian Fronts.
I have given a short summary of the conditions of the Russian Front without indulging in a
detailed examination of strategical possibilities. Whatever our strategy during that period
may have been, it was upset by the masses of the soldiery, for from Petrograd to the
Danube and the Diala demoralisation was spreading and growing. In the beginning of the
Revolution it was impossible to gauge the extent of its effects upon various fronts and
upon future operations. But many were those whose minds were poisoned by a suspicion
as to the futility of all our plans, calculations and efforts.
 CHAPTER XV.
The Question of the Advance of the Russian Army.
We were thus confronted with a crucial question: SHOULD THE RUSSIAN ARMY ADVANCE?
On March 27th the Provisional Government issued a proclamation “To the Citizens” on the
subject of war aims. The Stavka could not detect any definite instructions for governing
the Russian Army in the midst of a series of phrases in which the true meaning of the
appeal was obscured in deference to the Revolutionary Democracy. “The Defence at all
costs of our national patrimony and the liberation of the country from the enemy who has
invaded it is the first and vital aim of our soldiers, who are defending the freedom of the
people.... Free Russia does not aim at domination over other peoples, at depriving them of
their national patrimony, or at the forcible seizure of foreign territories. She aims at a
lasting peace, on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. The Russian people do not
wish to increase their external power at the expense of other peoples ... but ... will not
allow their Mother Country to come out of the great struggle downtrodden and weakened.
These principles will constitute the basis of the Foreign Policy of the Provisional
Government ... while all the obligations to our Allies will be respected.”
In the Note of April 18th, addressed to the Allied Powers by the Foreign Minister, Miliukov,
we find yet another definition: “The universal desire of the people to carry the World War
to a victorious conclusion ... has grown owing to the consciousness of the common
responsibility of everyone. This desire has become more active, because it is concentrated
on the aim which is immediate and clear to everyone—that of repelling the enemy who
has invaded the territory of our Mother Country.” These, of course, were mere phrases,
which described the War aims in cautious, timorous and nebulous words, allowing of any
interpretation, and deprived, moreover, any foundation in fact. The will for victory in the
people and in the Army had not only not grown, but was steadily decreasing, as a result of
weariness and waning patriotism, as well as of the intense work of the abnormal coalition
between the representatives of the extreme elements of the Russian Revolutionary
Democracy and the German General Staff. That coalition was formed by ties which were
unseen and yet quite perceptible. I will deal with that question later, and will only say here
that the destructive work, in accordance with the Zimmerwald programme, for ending the
War began long before the Revolution and was conducted from within as well as from
without. The Provisional Government was trying to pacify the militant element of the
Revolutionary Democracy by expounding meaningless and obscure formulas with regard to
the War aims, but it did not interfere with the Stavka in regard to the choice of strategical
means. We were, therefore, to decide the question of the advance independently from the
prevailing currents of political opinion. The only clear and definite object upon which the
Commanding Staffs could not fail to agree was to defeat the enemy in close union with the
Allies. Otherwise our country was doomed to destruction.
Such a decision implied an advance on a large scale because victory was impossible
without it, and a devastating war might otherwise become protracted. The responsible
organs of the Democracy, the majority of whom had Defeatist tendencies, tried
correspondingly to influence the masses. Even the moderate Socialist circles were not
altogether free from these tendencies. The masses of the soldiery utterly failed to
understand the ideas behind of the Zimmerwald programme; but the programme itself
offered a certain justification for the elementary feelings of self-preservation. In other
words, it was a question with them of saving their skin. The idea of an advance could not,
therefore, be particularly popular with the Army, as demoralisation was growing. There
was no certainty not only that the advance would be successful, but even that the troops
would obey the order to go forward. The colossal Russian Front was still steady ... by the
force of inertia. The enemy feared it, as, like ourselves, he was unable to gauge its
potential strength. What if the advance were to disclose our impotence?
Such were the motives adduced against an advance. But there were too many weighty
reasons in favour of it, and these reasons were imperative. The Central Powers had
exhausted their strength, moral and material, and their man power. If our advance in the
autumn of 1916, which had no decisive strategical results, had placed the enemy forces in
a critical position, what might not happen now, when we had become stronger and,
technically better equipped, when we had the advantage in numbers, and the Allies were
planning a decisive blow in the spring of 1917? The Germans were awaiting the blow with
feverish anxiety, and in order to avert it they had retreated thirty miles on a front of 100
miles between Arras and Soissons to the so-called Hindenburg line, after causing incredibly
ruthless and inexcusable devastation to the relinquished territory. This retreat was
significant, as it was an indication of the enemy’s weakness, and gave rise to great hopes.
We had to advance. Our intelligence service was completely destroyed by the suspicions of
the Revolutionary Democracy, which had foolishly believed that this service was identical
with the old secret police organisation, and had therefore abolished it. Many of the
delegates of the Soviet were in touch with the German agents. The fronts were in close
contact, and espionage was rendered very easy. In these circumstances our decision not
to advance would have been undoubtedly communicated to the enemy, who would have
immediately commenced the transference of his troops to the Western Front. This would
have been tantamount to treason to our Allies, and would have inevitably led to a separate
peace—with all its consequences—if not officially, at least practically. The attitude of the
revolutionary elements in Petrograd in this matter was, however, so unstable that the
Stavka had at first suspected—without any real foundation—the Provisional Government
itself.
This caused the following incident: At the end of April, in the temporary absence of the
Supreme C.-in-C., the Chief of the Diplomatic Chancery reported to me that the Allied
Military Attaches were greatly perturbed because a telegram had just been received from
the Italian Ambassador at Petrograd, in which he categorically stated that the Provisional
Government had decided to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. When the
receipt of a telegram had been ascertained, I sent a telegram to the War Minister, because
I was then unaware of the fact that the Italian Embassy, owing to the impulsiveness of its
personnel, had more than once been the channel through which false rumours had been
spread. My telegram was most emphatic, and ended thus: “Posterity will stigmatise with
deep contempt the weak-kneed, impotent, irresolute generation which was good enough
to destroy the rotten régime, but not good enough to preserve the honour, the dignity, and
the very existence of Russia.” The misunderstanding was painful indeed; the news was
false, the Government was not thinking of a separate peace. Later, at the fateful sitting of
the Conference at the Stavka of Commanders-in-Chief and members of the Government,
on July 16th, I had an opportunity of expressing my views once more. I said: “... There is
another way—the way of treason. It would give a respite to our distressed country.... But
the curse of treachery will not give us happiness. At the end of that way there is slavery—
political, economical, and moral.”
I am aware that in certain Russian circles such a straightforward profession of moral
principles in politics was afterwards condemned. It was stated that such idealism is
misplaced and pernicious, that the interests of Russia must be considered above all
“conventional political morality.”... A people, however, lives not for years, but for centuries,
and I am certain that, had we then altered the course of our external policy, the sufferings
of the Russian people would not have been materially affected, and the gruesome, blood-
stained game with marked cards would have continued ... at the expense of the people.
The psychology of the Russian military leaders did not allow of such a change, of such a
compromise with conscience. Alexeiev and Kornilov, abandoned by all and unsupported,
continued for a long time to follow that path, trusting and relying upon the common-
sense, if not the noble spirit, of the Allies and preferring to be betrayed rather than betray.
Was that playing the part of a Don Quixote? It may be so. But the other policy would have
had to be conducted by other hands less clean. As regards myself, three years later,
having lost all my illusions and borne the heavy blows of fortune, having knocked against
the solid wall of the overt and blind egoism of the “friendly” powers, and being therefore
free from all obligations towards the Allies, almost on the eve of the final betrayal by these
powers of the real Russia, I remained the convinced advocate of honest policy. Now the
tables are turned. At the end of April, 1920, I had to try and convince British Members of
Parliament that a healthy national policy cannot be free from all moral principles, and that
an obvious crime was being committed because no other name could be given to the
abandonment of the armed forces of the Crimea to the discontinuance of the struggle
against Bolshevism, its introduction into the family of civilised nations, and to its indirect
recognition; that this would prolong for a short while the days of Bolshevism in Russia, but
would open wide the gates of Europe to Bolshevism. I am firmly convinced that the
Nemesis of history will not forgive THEM, as it would not have then forgiven us. The
beginning of 1917 was a moment of acute peril for the Central Powers and a decisive
moment for the Entente. The question of the Russian advance greatly perturbed the Allied
High Command. General Barter, the Representative of Great Britain, and General Janin, the
French Representative at Russian Headquarters, often visited the Supreme C.-in-C. and
myself, and made inquiries on the subject. But the statements of the German Press, with
reference to pressure from the Allies and to ultimatums to the Stavka, are incorrect. These
would have simply been useless, because Janin and Barter understood the situation, and
knew that it was the condition of the Army that hindered the beginning of the advance.
They tried to hurry and to increase technical assistance, while their more impulsive
compatriots—Thomas, Henderson, and Vandervelde—were making hopeless endeavours to
fan the flame of patriotism by their impassioned appeals to the Representatives of the
Russian Revolutionary Democracy and to the troops.
The Stavka also took into consideration the strong probability that the Russian Army would
have rapidly and finally collapsed had it been left in a passive condition and deprived of all
impulses for active hostilities, whereas a successful advance might lift and heal the moral,
if not through sheer patriotism, at least through the intoxication of a great victory. Such
feelings might have counteracted all international formulas sown by the enemy on the
fertile soil of the Defeatist tendencies of the Socialistic Party. Victory would have given
external peace, and some chance of peace within. Defeat opened before the country an
abyss. The risk was inevitable, and was justified by the aim of saving Russia. The Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, the Quartermaster-General, and myself fully agreed as to the
necessity of an advance. And this view was shared in principle by the Senior Commanding
Officers. Different views were held on various Fronts as to the degree of fighting capacity
of the troops and as to their preparedness. I am thoroughly convinced that the decision
itself independently of its execution rendered the Allies a great service, because the
forces, the means, and the attention of the enemy were kept on the Russian Front, which,
although it had lost its former formidable power, still remained a potential danger to the
enemy. The same question, curiously enough, was confronting Hindenburg’s
Headquarters. Ludendorff writes: “The general position in April and in May precluded the
possibility of important operations on the Eastern Front.” Later, however, “... there were
great discussions on the subject at G.H.Q. Would not a rapid advance on the Eastern Front
with the available troops, reinforced by a few divisions from the West, offer a better
chance than mere waiting? It was a most propitious moment, as some people said, for
smashing the Russian Army, when its fighting capacity had deteriorated.... I disagreed, in
spite of the fact that our position in the West had improved. I would not do anything that
might destroy the real chances of peace.” Ludendorff means, of course, separate peace.
What such a peace was to be we learnt later, at Brest-Litovsk....
The Armies were given directions for a new offensive. The general idea was to break
through the enemy positions on sectors specially prepared on all European fronts, to
advance on a broad front in great strength on the South-Western Front, in the direction
from Kamenetz-Podolsk to Lvov, and further to the line of the Vistula, while the striking
force of our Western Front was to advance from Molodetchno to Vilna and the Niemen,
throwing back northwards the German Armies of General Eichorn. The Northern and the
Roumanian Fronts were to co-operate by dealing local blows and attracting the forces of
the enemy. The time for the advance was not definitely fixed, and a broad margin was
allowed. But the days went by, and the troops, who had hitherto obeyed orders and
carried out the most difficult tasks without a murmur, the same troops that had hitherto
withstood the onset of the Austro-German Armies with naked breasts, without cartridges
or shells, now stood with their will-power paralysed and their reason obscured. The
offensive was still further delayed.
Meanwhile the Allies, who had been preparing a big operation for the spring, as they had
counted upon strong reinforcements being brought up by the enemy in the event of the
complete collapse of the Russian Front, began the great battle in France, as had been
planned, at the end of March, and without awaiting the final decision on our advance. The
Allied Headquarters, however, did not consider simultaneous action as a necessary
condition of the contemplated operations, even before disaffection had begun in the
Russian Army. Owing to the natural conditions of our Front we were not expected to begin
the advance before the month of May. Meanwhile, according to the general plan of
campaign for 1917, which had been drawn up in November, 1916, at the Conference at
Chantilly, General Joffre intended to begin the advance of the Anglo-French Army at the
end of January and the beginning of February. General Nivelle, who superseded him,
altered the date to the end of March after the Conference at Calais of February 14th, 1917.
The absence of co-ordination between the Western and Eastern European Fronts was
bearing bitter fruit. It is difficult to tell whether the Allies would have deferred their spring
offensive for two months, and whether the advances of a combined operation with the
Russian Front would have been a compensation for the delay, which gave Germany the
opportunity of reinforcing and reorganising her armies. One thing is certain—that that lack
of co-ordination gave the Germans a great respite. Ludendorff wrote: “I detest useless
discussions, but I cannot fail to think of what would have happened had Russia advanced
in April and May and had won a few minor victories. We would have been faced, as in the
autumn of 1916, with a fierce struggle. Our munitions would have reached a very low ebb.
After careful consideration, I fail to see how our High Command could have remained the
master of the situation had the Russians obtained in April and May even the same scant
successes which crowned their efforts in June. In April and May of 1917, in spite of our
victory (?) on the Aisne and in Champagne, it was only the Russian Revolution that saved
us.”

Apart from the general advance on the Austro-German Front, another question of
considerable interest arose in April—that of an independent operation for the conquest of
Constantinople. Inspired by young and spirited naval officers, the Foreign Minister,
Miliukov, repeatedly negotiated with Alexeiev, and tried to persuade him to undertake that
operation, which he considered likely to be successful, and which would, in his opinion,
confront the Revolutionary Democracy, which was protesting against annexations, with an
accomplished fact. The Stavka disapproved of this undertaking, as the condition of our
troops would not permit of it. The landing of an Expeditionary Force—in itself a very
delicate task—demanded stringent discipline, preparation, and perfect order. What is more,
the Expeditionary Force, which would lose touch with the main Army, should be imbued
with a very strong sense of duty. To have the sea in the rear is a circumstance which
depresses even troops with a very strong moral. These elements had already ceased to
exist in the Russian Army. The Minister’s requests were becoming, however, so urgent that
General Alexeiev deemed it necessary to give him an object-lesson, and a small Expedition
was planned to the Turkish coast of Asia Minor. As far as I can remember, Zunguldak was
the objective. This insignificant operation required a detachment consisting of one Infantry
Regiment, one Armoured Car Division, and a small Cavalry contingent, and was to have
been carried out by the troops of the Roumanian Front. After a while the Headquarters of
that Front had shamefacedly to report that the detachment could not be formed because
the troops declined to join the Expeditionary Force. This episode was due to a foolish
interpretation of the idea of peace without annexations, which distorted the very principles
of strategy and was also, perhaps, due to the same instinct of self-preservation. It was
another ill omen for the impending general advance. That advance was still being
prepared, painfully and desperately.
The rusty, notched Russian sword was still brandished. The question was, when would it
stop and upon whose head would it fall?

Foreign military representatives at the Stavka. Standing on

the pathway, from left to right: Lieut.-Col. Marsengo (Italy); 2.
General Janin (France); 3. General Alexeiev; 4. General Barter
(Great Britain); 5. General Romei Longhena (Italy).
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