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Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low
Interest Rates
Preface and
Acknowledgements
Published on: Dec 20, 2021
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0)
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Preface and Acknowledgements
“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” (a statement
typically attributed to Keynes, but without hard proof that he actually said it...). This
book was indeed triggered by facts changing, namely by the steady decrease in real
interest rates which started in the mid 1980s. Over time, I came to the conclusion that
this was a fundamental change, one that was likely to last, and one which forced us to
rethink the role of fiscal and monetary policy.
The purpose of this book is to focus on the implications of low rates for fiscal policy, to
review the theory and the evidence, and draw practical implications for policy in
advanced economies today.1
My target readers are primarily policy makers and their staff, who have to navigate
complex waters over the coming years. They are the ones I want and need to convince.
The main challenge in discussing fiscal policy is the widely held and nearly religious
belief that public debt is very bad. You can see this book as an attempt to take a richer
and more balanced position. Not to love debt, but to understand when and how to use
it.
The book is more of an essay than a treatise. There are still many questions to which I
do not have a full answer, and some to which I am not even sure I have the right
answer. The discussion of the issues covers a wide range of complex and often
unsettled macroeconomic issues, from dynamic inefficiency, to the source of the equity
premium, to the nature of sudden stops, to the size of multipliers. I have tried to
identify the zones of uncertainty or disagreement. I have tried to explain things simply
in the text, being more precise in boxes: some will find the treatment too difficult, and
others, too superficial. So be it.
First, my co-authors on fiscal policy issues throughout the years, Roberto Perotti,
Francesco Giavazzi, Alvaro Leandro, Daniel Leigh, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Jean Pisani-
Ferry, Arvind Subramanian, Takeshi Tashiro, Jason Furman, Angel Ubide, Jeromin
Zettelmeyer. Special thanks are due to Larry Summers; our discussions over nearly
five decades have always been illuminating.
Second, to the many people who have offered suggestions and made comments on the
first draft of the book, Silvia Ardagna, Agnes Benassy-Quere, John Cochrane, Peter
Diamond, Olivier Garnier, Joe Gagnon, Vitor Gaspar, Jose de Gregorio, Patrick
2
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Preface and Acknowledgements
Honohan, Martin Hellwig, Gerhard Illing, Larry Kotlikoff, Bas Jacobs, Philippe Martin,
Atif Mian, Maury Obstfeld, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Adam Posen, Jim Poterba, Xavier Ragot,
Ricardo Reis, Klaus Regling, Chang Yong Rhee, Antonio Spilimbergo, Coen Teulings,
Angel Ubide, Etienne Wassmer, Christian von Weizsacker, Jakob von Weizsacker, Ivan
Werning, Charles Wyplosz. Special thanks to David Wilcox, who read the manuscript
line by line and made it much better.
Third, to the people who accepted to be part of a reading group, a group which
included many of my colleagues from the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, including, in addition to those already cited, Jacob Kirkegaard, Madi
Sarsenbayev, together with Kyoung Mook Lim, John Seliski and Michael Falkenheim
from the Congressional Budget Office, Daniel Leigh and Raphael Espinosa from the
International Monetary Fund.
Fifth, to Noelle, who has allowed me, once more, to obsess about the book and ignore
all other tasks.
As usual, all mistakes are mine. And all the loose ends naturally determine my future
research agenda...
Washington DC
November 2021
Footnotes
1. Translating these conclusions to emerging markets and developing economies is
important, but would have required an extensive treatment, which I decided not to
explore in this book. For a first pass on commonalities and differences between
advanced economies and emerging markets in this respect, see Blanchard, Felman,
and Subramanian 2021 [21]. ↩
3
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low
Interest Rates
Chapter 1| Introduction
Published on: Dec 20, 2021
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0)
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
This has led policy makers and academics to often reach drastically different
conclusions about what fiscal policy should do at this juncture. Some, focused on the
very high levels of debt, have argued for a need for urgent fiscal consolidation and a
steady decrease in debt. Some have argued that it is enough to stabilize the debt, and
accept these higher levels. Some, focused on the very low rates, have argued that this
2
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
is a great time for governments to borrow, especially if this is done to finance public
investment. Yet others have argued for more radical solutions, for example, the
cancellation of the debt held by central banks.1
What policy makers conclude and do will soon matter a lot. Many believe that, in the
wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the desire to decrease debt and the resulting fiscal
consolidation were too strong, leading to a slower recovery. Policy makers in Europe
now face a very concrete issue: In the face of the Covid crisis, current EU fiscal rules
have been suspended. The old rules are largely seen as in need of serious reforms and
European Union policy makers have to redesign them.
The rest of the introduction offers a guided tour of the book and its major conclusions.2
Chapter 2 introduces five notions related to interest rates, which will be useful
throughout the book:
Section 1 defines the neutral interest rate r*. It can be defined in two equivalent ways.
The first is that it is the safe real interest rate such that saving is equal to investment,
assuming output is equal to potential output. The second is that it is the safe real
interest rate such that aggregate demand is equal to potential output. The two
definitions are indeed equivalent but suggest different ways of thinking about the
factors which determine the neutral rate, ways which will turn out to be useful later.
Section 2 introduces the distinction between safe rates and risky rates such as the rate
of return on stocks. It shows how an increase in perceived risk or in risk aversion leads
to both a higher risky rate and a lower safe rate. When looking at data in the next
chapter and thinking about the factors behind low safe rates, the distinction will turn
out to be empirically important. Are current low safe rates due to shifts in saving or
investment, or instead to higher risk or risk aversion?
Section 3 looks at the role of central banks. One can think of the effective mandate of
central banks as setting the actual safe real interest rate, r, as close as they can to the
neutral interest rate, r*, and in so doing, keep output close to potential output. The
important conclusion is that, while central banks are sometimes blamed for the current
low rates, the rates set by central banks reflect mostly low neutral rates, which
themselves reflect the factors behind the movements in r*, saving, investment, risk,
and risk aversion. In other words, central banks are not to blame for low rates: they
just reflect underlying fundamental factors.
3
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
Section 4 discusses the importance of the inequality (r-g)<0, where r is the real safe
interest rate and g is the real growth rate of the economy. When r is less than g, debt,
if not repaid, accumulates at rate r, while output grows at rate g. Thus, if no new debt
is issued, the ratio of debt to output will decrease over time, making for more
favorable debt dynamics. As r is forecast to be less than g with high probability for
some time, this will play a major role in our discussion of fiscal policy later.
Section 5 discusses the nature and implications of the effective lower bound (ELB).
Because people can hold cash, which has a nominal interest rate of zero, central banks
cannot decrease the nominal policy rate much below zero. This implies that they
cannot achieve real policy rates much lower than the negative of inflation; call that
rate the ELB rate, and denote it by rmin. This potentially reduces their ability to
decrease r in line with r* when r* is very low, leading to situations where r>r*. In
other words, it potentially reduces or even eliminates the room for monetary policy to
maintain output equal to potential output. This is the situation in which many central
banks find themselves today, and again has major implications for our discussion of
fiscal policy later.
Section 6 concludes. As the neutral rate r* has declined over time, it has crossed from
above two important thresholds. First, r*, and by implication, r has become smaller
than g, with important implications for debt dynamics and welfare effects of fiscal
policy. Second, in some cases, r* has become so low as to be lower than the ELB rate,
rmin, limiting the room for monetary policy to maintain output at potential, and by
implication, increasing the need to use fiscal policy.
Section 1 looks at the evolution of safe real rates over time. It shows that, even
ignoring the high real rates of the mid-1980s which were largely due to disinflationary
policies followed by central banks, safe real rates have steadily declined across
advanced economies, the United States, the euro zone, and Japan, over the last 30
years. Their decline is due neither to the Global Financial Crisis of the late 2000s, nor
to the current Covid crisis, but to more persistent factors.
Section 2 shows that this decrease has led to an increasing gap between growth rates
and safe rates, an increasingly negative value of (r-g). While potential growth has
slightly declined, the decrease in interest rates has been much sharper. While there
have been periods of negative (r-g) in the past, this one looks different, neither due to
wars, nor to bursts of inflation under low nominal rates, nor to financial repression.
4
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
Section 3 looks at the potential factors behind the decline in safe rates. Different
factors have different effects on saving/investment, and on riskless/risky rates.
Saving/investment factors affect all rates roughly in the same way. Risk/liquidity
factors lead to lower safe rates and higher risky rates. The evidence is that both sets of
factors have been at play. Within each set, the list of suspects is long, but their specific
role is hard to pin down. The last two sections look more closely at two of the potential
factors, where I have found the discussion to be misleading in the first case and
confused in the second case.
Section 4 looks at the relation between growth rates and interest rates. There is a wide
belief that the two are tightly linked. Indeed, some of the research has been based on a
relation known as the “Euler equation,” a relation between individual consumption
growth and the interest rate derived from utility maximization, which implies a close
link between the two. I argue that this relation however has no implication for the
relation between aggregate consumption growth (or output growth) and the interest
rate. Indeed, the empirical relation between the two is typically weak, and often
nonexistent. Lower potential growth is not the main cause of lower rates.
Section 6 concludes. The overall evidence suggests that the long decline in safe
interest rates is due to deep underlying factors, which do not appear likely to reverse
any time soon. Investors in bond markets share this conclusion. The conclusion must
however be qualified in two ways. The first is that we do not have a precise enough
sense of the factors behind the decline to be sure, and that fiscal policy must therefore
be designed under the assumption of a small but positive probability of a reversal. The
second is that the future path of interest rates is not exogenous and depends very
much on fiscal policy itself. For example, the 2021 Biden stimulus may well increase
aggregate demand, and by implication, lead to higher r* and r for some time. As I shall
discuss in later chapters, fiscal policy should indeed be designed so as to achieve a
value of r* that allows central banks to no longer be tightly constrained by the ELB. If
5
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
such a fiscal policy were to be implemented, it would imply a floor on future values of
r*, and by implication on future values of r itself.
With the ground having been prepared, the remaining three chapters turn to the
implications of low interest rates for fiscal policy. There are two separate questions to
be answered, which are sometimes mixed up:
How much “fiscal space” does a country have? Or more precisely, how much room
does the country have to increase its debt until this raises issues of debt
sustainability?
How should this fiscal space be used? The fact that there is space does not mean
that it should be used. Fiscal policy is about whether, when, and how to use that
space.
Section 1 starts with the arithmetic of debt dynamics under certainty, focusing on the
role of (r-g). It shows the respective roles of (r-g), debt, and primary balances. It shows
some of the dramatic implications of (r-g)<0 : Governments can run primary deficits
and keep their debt ratios stable. Formally, there is no issue of debt sustainability:
Whatever primary deficits governments run, debt may increase but it will not explode.
Put another way, governments appear to have infinite fiscal space...
Section 2 shows however that this conclusion is too strong, for two reasons. First,
fiscal policy, in the form of higher debt or deficits, increases aggregate demand, and
thus increases the neutral rate r*. To the extent that the monetary authority adjusts
the actual rate r in response to r*, this increases (r-g) and thus reduces fiscal space.
Second, uncertainty is of the essence. Debt sustainability is fundamentally a
probabilistic concept: A tentative operational definition might go as follows: Debt is
sustainable if the probability of a debt explosion is small (one still must define
“explosion,” and “small,” but this can be done). With this in mind, the section discusses
the various sources of uncertainty and their potential effects on debt sustainability. It
shows the respective roles of the debt ratio, the maturity of the debt, the distribution
of current and future primary balances, and the distribution of current and future (r-g).
It shows how “stochastic debt sustainability analysis” (SDSA) can be used by
governments, investors and rating agencies. It shows how realistic reductions in debt
from current levels have little effect on the probability that debt is sustainable; in
contrast, it shows the importance of contingent plans in case (r-g) increases and
reverses sign.
6
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
Section 3 looks at the case for fiscal rules to ensure debt sustainability. SDSAs can only
be done in situ, for each year, for each country. The assumptions they require, for
example about the future evolution of (r-g), leave room for disagreement. Can one
design second best, more mechanistic, rules as guard rails, and still leave enough
room for fiscal policy to perform its macroeconomic role? This is the question for
example currently under discussion in the European Union. I express skepticism that a
mechanistic rule can work well, but, if a rule is nevertheless going to be adopted, I
suggest the direction it should explore. I argue that the analysis in Section 2 suggests
a rule that adjusts the primary balance in response to debt service—rather than debt—
over time.
Section 4 discusses the relation between public investment and debt sustainability. For
political reasons, fiscal austerity has often led to a decrease in public investment
rather than in other forms of spending. The transparency case for separating the
current account and the capital account (known as “capital budgeting” ) is a strong
one. The case for full debt financing of public investment, which is sometimes made, is
however weaker: To the extent that public investment generates direct financial
returns to the government, it can indeed be at least partially financed by debt without
affecting debt sustainability. One may also argue that, by increasing growth, it
increases future fiscal revenues. But much of public investment, even if it increases
social welfare, does not generate financial returns for the state, and has uncertain
effects on growth. Thus, it can affect debt sustainability, and this must be taken into
account in the way it is financed. The section shows how this can be integrated in an
analysis of debt sustainability.
Section 5 looks at the risk of sudden stops, and the potential role of central banks in
this context. Sovereign debt markets (and many other markets as well) are subject to
sudden stops in which investors either drop out or ask for large spreads even in the
absence of large changes in fundamentals. This has been more of an issue in emerging
economies’ markets, but, as the Euro crisis has shown, is also relevant for advanced
economies. Even if fundamentals suggest little debt sustainability risk and justify low
rates, another equilibrium may arise, where investors worry and ask for a spread over
safe rates, increasing debt service and increasing the probability that debt is
unsustainable, and thus justifying their worries in the first place. Given their nature,
these equilibria are often referred to as “sunspot equilibria.” I argue that the issue is
relevant, but that it takes extremely low levels of debt to eliminate the scope for
multiple equilibria, levels far below current debt levels. Realistic reductions of debt
over the next decades will not eliminate this risk.
7
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
I then look at whether central banks can reduce or even eliminate this risk. I
distinguish between two sources for the increase in spreads, sunspots or
deteriorations in fundamentals. I argue that central banks, by being large stable
investors, can prevent multiple equilibria and eliminate spreads when they are due to
sunspots, but that the conclusion is less obvious when spreads are due, at least in part,
to deteriorated fundamentals. The reason in short, is that central banks are parts of
the consolidated government, and their interventions change the composition, but not
the size either of the overall consolidated government liabilities, or of the overall risk. I
discuss why this may be different in the case of the European Central Bank, for
example in its ability to decrease Italian spreads during the Covid crisis.
Section 6 takes up two issues which have come up about the relation of central banks
to debt sustainability. Some observers have argued that, through quantitative easing
(QE) and the large scale purchases of government bonds, central banks are monetizing
the deficits and bailing out governments. I argue that this is not the case. Others have
argued that, to alleviate the debt burden, central banks should simply write off the
government bonds they hold on their balance sheet. I argue that it is not needed, and if
it were to be done, it would do nothing to improve the budget constraint of the
government.
Section 7 concludes. Negative (r-g) makes the dynamics of debt much more benign.
This does not, however, make the issue of debt sustainability disappear, both because
of endogeneity, i.e. the effect of fiscal policy back on the neutral interest rate, and
because of uncertainty, in particular with respect to r.
The best way to assess debt sustainability is through the use of a stochastic debt
sustainability analysis, or SDSA, an approach which allows one to take into account the
specificities of each country and each year. Given the complexity of the assessment, I
am skeptical that one can rely on quantitative rules. If, however, such rules are used,
they should be based on requiring the primary surplus to adjust to debt service rather
to debt itself. It cannot avoid including exceptions however, such as the need to allow
for larger primary deficits when the central bank is constrained by the ELB.
Chapter 5 looks at the welfare costs and benefits of debt and deficits and draws
implications for fiscal policy. The chapter is organized around four sections. The first
two sections discuss what may feel like an abstract and slightly esoteric topic, namely
the effects of debt on welfare under certainty and then under uncertainty, but, it turns
out, is a topic that is central to the discussion of fiscal policy.
8
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
Section 1 looks at the welfare costs of debt under certainty. Public debt is widely
thought of as bad, as “mortgaging the future.” The notion that higher public debt
might actually be good, increase welfare (on its own, i.e. ignoring what it is used to
finance) feels counterintuitive. The section reviews what we know about the answer
under the assumption of certainty. The answer is that debt might indeed be good, and
that the condition, under certainty, is precisely (r-g)<0. The section puts together the
two celebrated steps of the answer. The “Golden Rule” result, due to Phelps 1961, that,
if (r-g)<0, less capital accumulation increases welfare; and the demonstration by
Diamond 1965 in an overlapping generation model, that, if (r-g)<0, issuing debt does,
by decreasing capital accumulation, increase the welfare of both current and future
generations. These are clearly important and intriguing results. They are, however,
just a starting point.
A major issue is again uncertainty, the issue taken in Section 2. Under the assumption
of certainty, there is only one interest rate, so the comparison between r and g is
straightforward. But, in reality, there are many rates, reflecting their different risk
characteristics. The safe rate is indeed less than the growth rate today. But the
average marginal product of capital, as best as we can measure it, is substantially
higher than the growth rate. Which rate matters? This is very much research in
progress but, thanks to a number of recent papers, we have a better understanding of
the issue. For example, in the Diamond model, which focuses on finite lives as the
potential source of high saving and excess capital accumulation, the relevant rate is
typically a combination of the two, although with a major role for the safe rate. Going
to the data suggests that the relevant rate and the growth rate are very close, making
it difficult to decide empirically which side of the golden rule we actually are. In other
models where, for example, the lack of insurance leads people to have high
precautionary saving, potentially leading to excess capital accumulation, the answer is
again that the safe rate plays a major role; in that case however, while debt is likely to
help, the provision of social insurance, by getting at the source of the low r, may
dominate debt as a way of eliminating capital overaccumulation. Overall, a prudent
conclusion, given what we know, is that, in the current context, public debt may not be
good, but is unlikely to be very bad—that is, to have large welfare costs; the more
negative (r-g), the lower the welfare costs.
There are two lines of arguments in favor of the use of fiscal policy and debt. The first
is the “pure public finance” argument, which assumes that output remains at potential
9
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
and focuses on the use of debt either to smooth distortionary taxes or to allocate the
cost of exceptional spending across generations. This may be the case if the
government must finance a war, or embarks on a major public investment, for example
a Green Deal to fight global warming. The use of debt allows the government both to
smooth taxes and thus reduce tax distortions, and to shift some of the cost to future
generations if so desired.
In the current context however, where the room for monetary policy to sustain output
is limited by the effective lower bound, fiscal policy can play another role, that of
helping maintain output at potential. This macro stabilization role is called the
“functional finance” argument for the use of fiscal policy and debt. The section reviews
the role of debt, spending, and taxes (and, by implication, deficits) in affecting
aggregate demand: Higher debt affects wealth and thus consumption demand. Higher
government spending affects aggregate demand directly, lower taxes do so by affecting
consumption and investment. Multipliers, that is the effect of spending and taxes on
output, have been the subject of strong controversies and a lot of recent empirical
research. The section discusses what we have learned. The basic conclusion is that
multipliers have the expected sign, and fiscal policy can indeed be used to affect
aggregate demand.
Section 4 puts the conclusions about welfare costs and benefits of debt and deficits
together, and draws implications for fiscal policy. In short, one can think of two
extreme approaches to fiscal policy. The first is the pure public finance approach. The
other is the functional finance approach. The implication of the arguments developed
in the previous sections is straightforward. The weaker private demand and thus the
lower the neutral rate, the lower the costs of debt, the smaller the room for monetary
policy, and the more the focus of fiscal policy should be on functional finance and
macro stabilization. This is particularly the case if the effective lower bound is strictly
binding: in this case, the macro stabilization role of fiscal policy, and the reliance of
deficits even if this increases debt, is essential. The stronger private demand and thus
the higher the neutral rate, the higher the costs of debt, the larger the room for
monetary policy, and the more the focus of fiscal policy can be on pure public finance
goals, and fiscal consolidation if debt is thought to be too high. The section presents
the basic argument and discusses a number of related issues, such as the role of the
inflation target, or alternatives to deficits to increase aggregate demand.
The purpose of the next and final chapter is, by focusing on three recent fiscal policy
episodes, in the European Union, in the United States and in Japan, to give more flesh
10
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
to these propositions.
Chapter 6 looks, in light of the previous discussion, at three episodes of fiscal policy
in action.
The chapter looks at three recent episodes where, for better or for worse, fiscal policy
played or is playing a major role. The purpose is not to review them in full, which
would take another book, but to show and discuss fiscal policy choices in the light of
the analysis so far.
To caricature just a bit, the three episodes can be thought of “too little?”, “just right?”,
“too much?”
Too little? The first section looks at the period of “fiscal austerity” that took place in
the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. After the large initial increase in debt due to
the crisis, the focus quickly turned to debt reduction. This was particularly true in the
European Union, which embarked on a strong fiscal consolidation. Today, there is fairly
wide agreement that, at least in Europe, the fiscal consolidation was too strong, too
much based on the traditional view of debt, both by markets and by policy makers, and
came at a substantial output cost.
Just right? The second section looks at the Japanese economy over the last three
decades. Japan experienced the ELB constraint starting in the mid-1990s, earlier than
either the United States or Europe, and has remained close to it ever since. Japanese
macroeconomic policy is often characterized as a failure, with the central bank unable
to achieve its inflation target, a low growth rate, and debt ratios steadily rising to
reach more than 170% for net debt and 250% for gross debt. I think it should be seen
instead as a qualified success, with the use of aggressive fiscal and monetary policies
to compensate for very weak private demand: Output has remained close to potential.
Growth is low, but because of demographics, not productivity growth, and not debt.
Inflation is low, lower than the target, but this is not a major failure. Looking forward
however, there are reasons to worry: The debt ratios are very high. So far, investors do
not mind, and 10-year nominal rates are close to zero. But can the build-up of debt
continue? What happens if interest rates increase? Are there alternatives?
Too much? The third section looks at the effects of the American Rescue Plan, the
stimulus program put in place by the Biden administration in early 2021. In 2020, the
focus of fiscal policy had been protection, of both households and firms. In early 2021,
the goal partially shifted from protection to sustaining the recovery. The program was
11
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
extremely large relative to the apparent output gap. The strategy (intentional or not)
was in effect twofold. For the Treasury, to strongly increase aggregate demand, and
thus increase the neutral rate so as to relax the ELB constraint. And for the Fed, to
delay adjustment of the policy rate to the neutral rate, allow for some overheating and
generate slightly higher inflation in the process. To a number of observers, the
program appeared too large, leading to worries about overheating and excessive
inflation. The section takes stock of where things are at the time of writing.
Footnotes
1. Some quotes. Schäuble: “Borrowing in times of crisis to stabilise the economy
makes sense, as long as the question of repayment is not forgotten. The need to pay
back the debt later is often overlooked.” https://www.ft.com/content/ 640d084b-7b13-
4555-ba00-734f6daed078 ; Krugman: “The bottom line is that government debt just
isn’t a major problem these days.” https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/03/opinion/biden-republicans-debt.html?smid=url-share ; Manifesto by 150
French economists: “Let’s agree to a contract between European states and the
ECB: The ECB commits to forgive the public debts that it holds, and the states agree
to invest the same amounts in ecological and social reconstruction.” Le Monde,
February 5, 2021. ↩
Citations
1. Interest rates are for 2021, based on the average of monthly observations, from
January to September, inclusive. ↩
12
Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates • Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates Chapter 1| Introduction
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lift me, but I fell against the wall.
"Take a sip of this, we must restore circulation. It is the cold as
much as anything; another sip, Miss Vaughan." He used my true
name on purpose; it helped to restore me. He was most humane
and kind; he did not even remind me of Dutch courage.
CLARA VAUGHAN
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
Low fever followed the long prostration to which the fear of outer
darkness had reduced my jaded nerves. This fever probably
redeemed my sight, by generalizing the local inflammation, to which
object the doctor's efforts had been directed. Tossing on my weary
bed, without a glimpse of anything, how I longed for the soft
caresses and cool lips of Isola! But since that one visit, she had been
sternly excluded. The Professor had no chance of delivering his
therapeutic lecture. In fact he did not come. "Once for all," said Dr.
Franks, when he heard of that proposal, "choose, Miss Valence,
between my services, and the maundering of some pansophist. If
you prefer the former, I will do my utmost, and can almost promise
you success; but I must and will be obeyed. None shall enter your
room, except Mrs. Shelfer and myself. As to your lovely friend, of
whom Mrs. Shelfer is so full, if she truly loves you, she will keep
away. She has done you already more harm than I can undo in a
week. I am deeply interested in this case, and feel for you sincerely;
but unless you promise me to see--I mean to receive--no one
without my permission, I will come no more."
It sounded very hard, but I felt that he was right.
"No crying, my dear child, no crying! Dear me, I have heard so
much of your courage. Too much inflammation already. Whatever
you do, you must not cry. That is one reason why I will not have
your friend here. When two young ladies get together in trouble, I
know by my own daughters what they do. You may laugh as much
as you like, in a quiet way; and I am sure Mrs. Shelfer can make any
one laugh, under almost any circumstances. Can't you now?"
"To be sure, my good friend, I have seen such a many rogues.
That is, when I know Charley's a-coming home."
"Now good bye, Miss Valence. But I would recommend you not
to play with your paints so. There is an effluvium from them."
"Oh, what can I do, what am I to do to pass the endless night?
I was only trying to build a house in the dark."
"Sleep as much as you can. I am giving you gentle opiates.
When you can sleep no longer, let Mrs. Shelfer talk or read to you,
and have a little music. I will lend you my musical box, which plays
twenty-four tunes: have it in the next room, not to be too loud. And
then play on the musical glasses, not too long at a time: you will
soon find out how to do that in the dark."
He most kindly sent us both the boxes that very day; and many
a weary hour they lightened of its load. Poor Isola came every day
to inquire, and several times she had her brother with her. She made
an entire conquest of Mrs. Shelfer, who even gave her a choice
canary bird. I was never tired of hearing the little woman's
description of her beauty, and her visit to the kitchen formed the
chief event of the day. Mrs. Shelfer (who had Irish blood in her
veins) used to declare that the ground was not good enough for
them to walk on.
"Such a pair, Miss! To see her so light, and soft, and loving,
tripping along, and such eyes and such fur; and him walking so
straight, and brave, and noble. I am sure you'd go a mile, Miss, to
see him walk."
"You forget, Mrs. Shelfer, I may never enjoy that pleasure."
"No, no. Quite true, my good friend. But then we may, all the
same."
Exactly so. There lay all the difference to me, but none to any
other. This set me moralising in my shallow way, a thing by no
means natural to me, who was so concentrated and subjective. But
loss of sight had done me good, had turned the mind's eye inward
into the darkness of myself. I think the blind, as a general rule, are
less narrow-minded than those endowed with sight. Less inclined, I
mean, to judge their neighbours harshly, less arrogant in exacting
that every pulse keep time with their own. If eyes are but the chinks
through which we focus on our brain censoriousness and bigotry, if
rays of light are shafts and lances of ill will; then better is it to have
no crystalline lens. Far better to be blind, than print the world-
distorted puppets of myself. I, that smallest speck of dust, blown
upon the shore of time, blown off when my puff shall come; a speck
ignored by moon and stars; too small (however my ambition leap)
for earth to itch, whate'er I suck; and yet a speck that is a mountain
in the telescope of God; shall I never learn that His is my only
magnitude; shall I wriggle to be all in all to my own corpuscle?
CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER V.
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