Philosophical Exposition of Momentariness in Buddhism

A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Philosophy and

Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy

Submitted By
Sudeshna Datta
Roll No: MA(Sem-IV)Phil-23
Reg. No: VB - 3346 of 2020-21

Prepared under the Supervision Of

Dr. Sujay Mondal
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion
Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan,
West Bengal - 731 235

June 2025
 Dedication

To my beloved parents, Mr. Prasanta Kumar Datta and Ms. Pratima Rani
Datta, Your love, sacrifices, and unwavering support have been my greatest
strength. This work is dedicated to you.
 Acknowledgement
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Sujoy Mondal , for
their invaluable support, continuous guidance, and insightful feedback throughout the
course of this dissertation. Their mentorship played a crucial role in the successful
completion of this work.

I am sincerely thankful to the Head of the Department, Dr. Manjari Chakraborty, for
providing us with the opportunity to undertake this dissertation and for fostering an
environment that promotes academic growth and research excellence.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr.Murugesan A for his encouragement,

motivation, and thoughtful guidance. His consistent efforts to support my academic
development and shape my journey have been truly valuable and deeply appreciated.

Most importantly, I am deeply grateful to my family—especially my Father, Prasanta

Kumar Datta, and my mother, Pratima Rani Datta, and my elder sister, Deepanwita
Datta, for their endless love, sacrifices, and belief in me. Their emotional strength and
constant support have been the foundation of all my achievements.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends, Debika Chattaraj,for their continued support,
cooperation, and encouragement, which helped me stay motivated and positive during
every stage of this dissertation.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Visva Bharati university,Santiniketan for

providing the academic environment, resources, and support necessary for the successful
completion of this dissertation. The institution has played a vital role in shaping my
academic foundation and research skills.

Sudeshna Datta
 Table of Contents

Chapt
er Contents Page No

One Introduction 1-8

Two Momentariness 9-29
Three Interpretation and Application of 30-42
Momentariness across Different
Buddhist School
Four Personal Identity And 43-54
Momentariness
Five Conclusion 55-57
Bibliography 58-59
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Context of the Research

Buddhism as a spiritual and philosophical tradition, emphasizes the impermanent nature of

reality. Momentariness is a key aspect of this impermanence. In Buddhist philosophy, the

doctrine of momentariness asserts that all conditioned things are impermanent and exist only for

a single moment before disappearing. This concept is not only a metaphysical claim but also a

practical tool for understanding the nature of suffering (Duḥkha) and the path to liberation

(nirvāṇa). This philosophical exposition of momentariness offers a framework for examining the

ethical implications of impermanence , the momentary aspect of existence and the continuity of

experience.

The context of this research lies in the broader discourse of Buddhist epistemology and

metaphysics, where the concept of dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda) and the absence

of a permanent self (Anātman) are closely related to momentariness. Classical Buddhist writings

have addressed the concept in great detail, but current research is still examining how it relates to

contemporary philosophical questions like causality, consciousness and the nature of time.

The context of this research, therefore, encompasses the historical, philosophical, practical, and

contemporary dimensions of momentariness in Buddhism. By examining its development,

implications, and applications, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of

momentariness and its significance in Buddhist thought and practice. It also seeks to address the

challenges and critiques of momentariness, offering a balanced perspective that acknowledges

both its strengths and limitations. Ultimately, this research contributes to the ongoing dialogue

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on momentariness, enriching our understanding of this key Buddhist concept and its relevance to

broader philosophical and scientific discussions.

While momentariness is a well-known concept, its interpretations and implications vary widely

across different traditions in Buddhism. This study seeks to bridge these gaps by providing a

detailed and nuanced analysis of momentariness, drawing on primary Buddhist texts,

commentaries, and contemporary scholarly works.

1.2. Research Questions

● What is the philosophical basis of momentariness in Buddhism?

● How does the concept of momentariness relate to other core Buddhist teachings, such as

impermanence, non self and dependent origination?

● What are the practical implications of momentariness for Buddhist meditation and ethical

practice?

● . How do different Buddhist schools interpret and apply the concept of momentariness?

● What are the main criticisms or challenges to the theory of momentariness and how can

they be addressed / countered?

1.3. Research Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this is that the concept of momentariness provides a useful framework for

understanding the nature of reality and reaching emancipation, rather than just a metaphysical

2
assertion. When properly interpreted, momentariness is said to offer a deep understanding of the

fleeting essence of life and to form the basis of Buddhist ethics and practices for meditation.

1.4. Research objectives and Aims

● To explore the historical and philosophical development of momentariness in Buddhism.

● To analyze the relationship between Momentariness and other core Buddhist concepts.

● To examine the practical applications of Momentariness in meditation and ethical

conduct.

● To compare interpretations of momentariness across different Buddhist schools.

● To address criticism and challenges to the theory of momentariness.

The ultimate aim of this research is to deepen the understanding of momentariness and its

significance in Buddhist thought and practices.

1.5. Research Methodology

This research emphasizes a qualitative and interpretive approach. Focusing on textual analysis

and comparative philosophy. Primary sources include Buddhist scriptures, commentaries and

philosophical writings from Theravāda,Mahāyāna traditions. Scholarly publications on Buddhist

philosophy and Momentariness are examples of secondary sources. The study also incorporates a

3
critical analysis of key debates and interpretations ,aiming to provide a comprehensive

understanding of the topic.

1.6. Key terms and Meaning

● Momentariness: The doctrine that all phenomena arise and cease instantly, existing

only for a single moment in time. Nothing endures beyond this fleeting instant.

● Impermanence: The universal truth that all conditioned things are transient,

continuously changing, and ultimately subject to decay and disappearance.

● Phenomena : The basic elements or events of reality, encompassing both physical and

mental occurrences that appear and disappear moment by moment.

● Dependent origination: The principle that all phenomena arise dependent on causes and

conditions, meaning nothing exists independently or permanently.

● Personal Identity: The inquiry into what constitutes the sameness of a person over time

despite continuous change in body, mind, and experience.

● No Self : The doctrine that there is no permanent, unchanging self or soul in beings; the

self is a collection of monetary aggregates.

● Aggregate : The five groups—form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and

consciousness—that compose a being and are themselves momentary.

● Nirvāṇa : The ultimate goal of Buddhism representing liberation from suffering and the

cycle of rebirth.

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 ● Vipassanā : Insight meditation focused on realizing impermanence, suffering and non

self.

● Ālaya-vijñāna : Store consciousness, subliminal continuum in Yogācāra.

● Bīja: Seeds; latent impressions in Alaya Vijnana.

● Saṃvṛti-satya : Conventional truth ; apparent reality of enduring objects.

● Paramārtha- satya: Ultimate truth; the moment at nature of reality.

● Citta-saṃtāna : Mind- stream; the continuum of momentary mental events.

1.7. Limitations of Research

The study is limited to textual sources and may not fully capture the lived experience of

momentariness in contemporary Buddhist practice. The diversity of Buddhist traditions and

interpretations may make it challenging to present a unified view.The research relies heavily on

translated texts, which may introduce interpretive biases .The philosophical nature of the topic

may limit its accessibility to readers unfamiliar with Buddhist terminology.

1.8. Literature review

● Rita Gupta in her article “The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness and its

Presuppositions” which was published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy in 1 march

1980 (it appeared in volume 8), examines the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness,

5
 focusing on Dharmakīrti’s arguments in the Hetubindu. She explores its presuppositions,

particularly the idea that all phenomena exist only momentarily. A key issue discussed is

the time gap between a cause (e.g., sowing a seed) and its effect, challenging the strict

momentary nature of causation.

However, the article mainly focuses on Dharmakīrti’s view, neglecting other Buddhist

perspectives. It also lacks a deeper exploration of momentariness in relation to personal

identity and dependent origination. Further research could provide a broader and more

integrated understanding of the doctrine.

● Jeson Woo’s article “Incompatibility and the proof of the Buddhist doctrine of

Momentariness” , was published in August 2001 in the journal of Indian Philosophy,

volume 29,issue 4, spanning pages 423-434. Jeson Woo's article examines how

Buddhist logicians use the concept of incompatibility ('virodha') to prove that all

phenomena are momentary. It argues that if things were not momentary, contradictions

would arise in causality and perception. Woo analyzes key Buddhist arguments, showing

how they establish momentariness as essential for coherence in Buddhist metaphysics.

However, the paper does not extensively address counter arguments from non-Buddhists,

such as Udayana's critique of the inference from existence. It also lacks a deeper

exploration of how incompatibility relates to broader philosophical notions like time and

persistence.

● “The Effect of Momentariness on Karma and Rebirth in Theravada Buddhism” by

Colonel Adam L. Barborich is a legitimate academic publication. It was published in

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 2017 as part of the proceedings of the International Conference on Indian Cultural

Heritage: Past, Present and Future, organised by the Institute of Media Studies, in

Bhubaneshwar,India. Colonel Adam L. Barborich’s work explores how the doctrine of

momentariness influences karma and rebirth in Theravāda Buddhism. Early Buddhist

thought saw time as a continuous flow, but the Abhidharma introduced a momentary,

discrete model of existence. This shift required reinterpreting karma and rebirth, leading

Buddhaghosa to emphasize "death-threshold karma" in determining rebirth. To reconcile

momentariness with continuity, he proposed "duration-less duration," where past,

present, and future dhammas interact. Barborich argues this shift transformed Buddhist

metaphysics, moving from an experiential view of time to an abstract, event-based

model.

However, this paper does not extensively address Lack of comparative analysis with

Mahāyāna perspectives on momentariness and karma and limited engagement with

historical debates within Theravāda traditions regarding momentariness.

● Mark Siderits in his book “Buddhism as Philosophy:An Introduction” which was first

published on June 15,2007 by Hackett Publishing Company and revised second edition

was released on October 6,2021, presents Buddhist thought as a coherent philosophical

system. He analyzes key doctrines like anātman (no-self), dependent origination, and

momentariness. Using analytic philosophy, Siderits explains complex Buddhist ideas

with logical clarity. The book explores Madhyamaka and Yogācāra perspectives,

especially the concept of emptiness. He shows how Buddhist metaphysics challenges

notions of self and inherent existence.The ethical implications of suffering and liberation

7
 are also examined philosophically.Some critique the work for underrepresenting

Buddhism's meditative and spiritual aspects.Still, the book successfully bridges Eastern

philosophy with Western analytical traditions.

● Alexander von Rospatt in his book “Doctrine of Momentariness: A survey of its origins

and early phase of this doctrine up to Vasubandhu which was published in 1995 by

Franz Steiner Verlag in Stuttgart, remains a key resource for understanding

momentariness in Buddhist thought. Book traces the evolution of momentariness in

Buddhism, from early teachings on impermanence to Vasubandhu’s refined formulation.

He examines early scriptures, Abhidharma debates, and Vasubandhu’s synthesis of prior

interpretations. The book provides a thorough historical analysis but focuses mainly on

Vasubandhu, with limited discussion on later schools. Additionally, it does not

extensively address comparative perspectives with non-Buddhist philosophical

traditions. Despite these gaps, it remains a key resource for understanding

momentariness in Buddhist thought.

● Vaibhāṣika Darshan by Anantalal Bhattacharya is an important Bengali book that

explains the main ideas of the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhist philosophy. It was

published in 1955 by Sanskrit Book Depot, Kolkata. He offers a detailed exposition of

the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhist philosophy, with special emphasis on the doctrine of

momentariness (kṣaṇikatva). He not only presents the Vaibhāṣika claim that all

phenomena arise and perish within a single moment, but also supports this claim through

logical reasoning and scriptural citations. Drawing from classical texts such as the

Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra, Bhattacharya explains how momentariness is essential for

understanding the impermanent nature of reality. He refutes the idea of any lasting

8
substance by analyzing the nature of causality and dependent origination. The text argues

that without momentariness, the chain of cause and effect would break down. His clear

treatment of these arguments reflects a deep engagement with Buddhist metaphysics.

The book also examines criticisms from other schools such as the Sautrāntika and

provides responses based on Vaibhāṣika logic. This makes the text highly relevant for a

philosophical study of momentariness. Bhattacharya’s contribution is valuable not only

as a Bengali-language resource but also as a critical philosophical text that strengthens

the foundation of momentariness in early Buddhist thought.

CHAPTER TWO

MOMENTARINESS

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2.1. A Brief introduction to the concept of Momentariness

Momentariness or kṣaṇikatva is a fundamental and profound doctrine in Buddhist philosophy

that offers a significant perspective in understanding the nature of existence and life. According

to this view, all created matter and mental phenomena are inherently impermanent; they arise in

one moment and perish in the next. This perspective has been especially emphasized within the

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools of Buddhism, where it serves as a direct refutation of the

notion of permanence in both external objects and the self.1

In this chapter, we shall first examine how the doctrine of momentariness is established on the

basis of arthakriyākāritva—the capacity of an entity to perform a function. In Buddhist thought,

it is asserted that only that which can produce an immediate effect can be considered real, and

such efficacy is only possible if the entity is momentary. 2 If an entity were to endure for a long

duration, it would be eternal and thus incapable of undergoing transformation or producing any

effect.

Following this, we will explore the foundational principle of "Sarvaṁ Kṣaṇikam"—that is,

"everything is momentary." Buddhist analysis holds that anything that is produced must

necessarily be destructible, for whatever comes into existence is inevitably subject to cessation.

Thus, by applying this insight universally to all impermanent phenomena, the doctrine of all-

pervading momentariness is constructed.

From these two foundations, we arrive at the conclusion that momentariness is not merely a

theoretical construct, but a logically grounded and experientially validated doctrine. In this

chapter, we will critically examine the various arguments and proofs in support of
1Williams Paul, Mahayana Buddhism:The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 63–102.
2Dhammajoti,K.L.Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong,
2007), 259–260.

10
momentariness, including the theory of true causality, the philosophy of impermanence, and the

analysis of the continuity of experience.

2.1.1. Proofs for Momentariness

● Arthakriyākāritva (Efficacy in producing Effects): First and perhaps most central proof

is rooted in the concept of arthakriyākāritva, or the capacity to produce an effect.

Vaibhāṣikas argue that what is real (sat) must have the ability to perform a function; that

is, its existence must be verifiable through its causal efficacy. 3This is not merely a

metaphysical assertion but an epistemic criterion: that which cannot produce any effect is

not real. However, for something to be functionally effective, it must be dynamic, and

this dynamism is only possible if the entity is impermanent. A permanent object, by its

very definition, cannot engage in activity or transformation. It is static, and thus inert.

Therefore, the power to act (arthakriyāśakti) necessitates impermanence.This idea leads

directly to the conclusion that all real dharmas are kṣaṇika—momentary since only

momentary entities possess causal efficacy.

● Causal Argument (Hetu-Phala Nyāya)The second line of reasoning is the causal

argument, which hinges on the process of origination (utpāda) and cessation (nirodha).

Anything that is produced must, by nature, be subject to destruction. What is born must

die. A thing that has a beginning in time cannot be eternal. The Vaibhāṣikas assert that

the moment an object arises, its destruction is inevitable—not after a prolonged duration

but immediately, in the very next moment. 4 Therefore, every conditioned entity is caught

in an inescapable cycle of arising and perishing. The idea of continued existence over

3 Siderits, Mark.Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. (Ashgate, 2007).

4 Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna.( Motilal Banarsidass, 1998).

11
 time is an illusion created by mental projection or habitual tendencies (vāsanā), but in

reality, existence unfolds as a chain of momentary events.

● Continuity of Consciousness: The Vaibhāṣikas offer a subtle psychological proof

through the analysis of consciousness. Consciousness (vijñāna) appears continuous only

due to the rapid succession of momentary mental events. Each thought, perception, or

feeling is momentary; yet, the rapid flow gives the illusion of continuity. Just as the rapid

rotation of a firebrand creates the illusion of a circle of fire, the stream of momentary

cognitions gives rise to the notion of a continuous self or mind. In reality, however, there

is no enduring substance or unchanging self; only discrete, momentary mental events.

This insight not only supports the doctrine of momentariness but also aligns with the

Buddhist doctrine of anātman—the non-existence of a permanent self.5

From the above analysis, it becomes evident that the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is not a

mere metaphysical assumption, but a logically and experientially grounded philosophical

position. The notion of arthakriyākāritva demonstrates that real entities must be momentary to

possess causal efficacy. The causal argument reveals that production and destruction are

inseparable, thus necessitating impermanence. Furthermore, both experiential evidence and the

momentary nature of consciousness reaffirm that all conditioned phenomena arise and perish in

an instant. This comprehensive framework establishes momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) as a

foundational principle in Buddhist metaphysics.

2.2. The concept of a ‘moment’ in Buddhist Philosophy

5Harvey, Peter.The Selfless Mind: Personality,Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. RoutledgeCurzon,
2004.

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In Buddhist thought, a moment (khaṇa or kṣaṇa) is the smallest unit of time in which a

phenomenon can arise, persist, and cease. It is not a fixed duration but a conceptual measure of

the instantaneous nature of existence. Different Buddhist schools have debated the exact duration

of a moment, but the emphasis is always on its transient and impermanent nature. Abhidharma

texts describe the duration of a moment as the time it takes for a single thought or mental event

to arise and cease. At the conventional level (saṃvṛti-satya), moments are aggregated into

continuous experiences, such as thoughts, feelings, and objects. At the ultimate level

(paramārtha-satya), only the momentary arising and ceasing of phenomena exist, with no

underlying substance or continuity. But it is generally accepted that everything arises and ceases

within a moment.

The philosopher Vasubandhu, in his seminal work Abhidharmakośa, strongly emphasized the

doctrine of momentariness. He argued that all dharmas (phenomena) exist only in the present

and perish immediately after arising. According to Vasubandhu, the continuity that we perceive

is merely an illusion formed by habitual mental impressions (vāsanās). True existence, he held,

can only be attributed to the present moment, which immediately vanishes into non-existence. 6

Similarly, Dignāga, a key figure in Buddhist epistemology, built on the idea of momentariness

through his theory of perception (pratyakṣa). He maintained that perception is always

momentary and that knowledge corresponds only to what is directly and immediately present.

For Dignāga, the flux of momentary impressions forms the very basis of cognition, and what we

regard as stable knowledge is in fact a construction based on rapidly disappearing perceptual

data.7

6 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya trans. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. and rev. Leo M. Pruden (Berkeley,
CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1988), vol. 1, 259–260.
7 Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya, as cited in Tillemans, Tom J. F. Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti
and His Tibetan Successors (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2016), 29–31.

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 ‘Moment’ is central to the doctrine of momentariness , asserts that all conditioned things

whether mental, physical or abstract are always changing and exist only for a single moment

before disappearing. This idea challenges the common perception of continuity and stability,

proposing instead that what appears as enduring is, in reality ,a series of discrete momentary

events.

Buddhist philosophy views momentariness as a fundamental understanding of the nature of

reality rather than a theoretical concept. It emphasizes how transient and changeable everything

is, which is consistent with the Buddha’s teaching that holding into permanence causes suffering.

As stated in the theory of dependent origination, one can cultivate detachment and get a deeper

knowledge of the interdependent and conditioned character of what happened by acknowledging

in the transient.

2.3. Momentariness as an extension of Impermanence

The concept of impermanence is a fundamental aspect of Buddhist philosophy. It asserts that all

phenomena, whether physical, mental, or emotional, are transient and subject to change. This

teaching is enclosed in the Three Universal Characteristics (Tilakkhana), which include

impermanence (Anitya), suffering (Dukkha), and non-self (Anattā). Impermanence underscores

that nothing in the world remains constant; everything is in a perpetual state of flux. The

Buddha’s doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda )further elaborates on this,

illustrating that all phenomena arise due to specific causes and conditions, and it also ceases to

exist when that cause and condition is removed. Whatever is subject to origination is also subject

to destruction . Two analogies are often used – the flow of river water and the flame of a fire.

Just as the flow of river water is constantly changing and the flame of fire is perpetually

14
flickering, everything in the world is similarly transient and ever changing. The Greek

philosopher Heraclitus said ‘ one cannot step into the same river twice.’8

Later the followers of the Buddha transformed this doctrine of impermanence into the theory of

Momentariness. According to the theory since everything is conditioned or dependent on causes,

it is not merely impermanent, in fact nothing can exist only for a single moment before

disappearing. That means they exist for a single moment , then cease to exist , giving rise to a

new, distinct moment. This doesn’t imply a break in the flow of experience , but rather a

continuous succession of momentary events.

The key distinction is that impermanence focuses on the general principle of change while

momentariness focuses on the specific nature of this change as a continuous series of discrete ,

momentary entities. For example- Impermanence would say the flame is constantly

changing ,flickering and evolving . Momentariness would add that the flame itself is not a

continuous entity but rather a series of momentary flames, each distinct from the next ,yet

connected through the flow of heat and light.

8Heraclitus, as quoted in Plato, Cratylus 402a, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. C.D.C. Reeve
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 440.

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16
2.4. Philosophical analysis of Momentariness

2.4.1. Momentariness as a theory of temporal ontology

The doctrine of momentariness (Kṣaṇikavāda) serves as a distinct theory of temporal ontology,

proposing that reality consists of a sequence of discrete, momentary existences rather than a

continuous, enduring flow of time. Unlike classical ontologies that posit stable substances

persisting through time, Buddhist momentariness asserts that all phenomena—mental and

physical—exist for a single moment before ceasing, with new moments arising/emerging in a

causal sequence. This radical perspective redefines/reinterprets time not as an independent,

flowing medium but as an emergent property of successive momentary events.

In this framework, the past no longer exists, the future has not yet come into being, and only the

present moment is real—but even the present is fleeting, dissolving as soon as it arises. This is

consistent with the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), according to

which continuity is ensured without an underlying permanent essence by each momentary entity

conditioning the subsequent one. Unlike Western theories of time, such as Aristotelian continuity

or Newtonian absolute time, Momentariness views time as nothing more than a conceptual

designation for the succession of fleeting dharmas (phenomena), in contrast to Western theories

of time, such as Aristotelian continuity of time or Newtonian absolute time ,which assume a

constant temporal substance.

Philosophically, this momentarist temporal ontology has significant epistemological and ethical

implications. Since nothing persists beyond a moment, knowledge must be direct and immediate,

grasping reality as it arises/emerges. Likewise, moral responsibility is understood in terms of

moment-to-moment karmic causation, where actions shape future moments without a permanent

17
self linking them. Ultimately, this theory of time supports the Buddhist path to liberation by

dissolving attachments to fixed identities and external realities, revealing the impermanent,

selfless nature of existence.

2.4.2. The rejection of Permanence and the implications for the nature of existence

The doctrine of momentariness (Kṣaṇikavāda) fundamentally rejects the notion of permanence

(Nityatva) which redefines the very understanding of existence. According to classical Buddhist

philosophy, to exist is to change; existence is not a static property but a dynamic process. The

rejection of permanence emerges from the observation that all phenomena are contingent

conditioned, and thus necessarily impermanent. This view directly challenges metaphysical

systems that posit an unchanging substratum or essence underlying phenomena.9

The argument against permanence can be summarized as follows: if a thing were truly

permanent, it would neither be affected by causes nor engage in causal relations. However, we

observe that all entities interact, affect, and are affected by other entities, implying that they are

dependent and mutable. The rejection of permanence implies that existence is characterized by

flux and transformation, not by stability or stasis. Each moment gives rise to a new state, and the

previous state ceases to exist — there is no enduring entity that persists through change.10

There are significant philosophical implications to this dynamic conception of existence. First, it

challenges the concept of substantial self (ātman) or immutable being. Second, it reorients

ethical and existential reflection: attachment, aversion, and delusion arise from mistaking the

9Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Chapter 1, Verses 1–2, in The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way:
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3–4.
10 Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura (Boston: Wisdom Publications,
2013), Chapter 1, Verses 1–2.

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impermanent for the permanent, leading to suffering. Thus, recognizing the momentary nature of

existence is a necessary step toward liberation (nirvāṇa).

Moreover, the theory of momentariness supports a relational ontology, where entities are defined

by their relationships and conditions rather than their inherent nature(svabhāva). Existence is

thus an ongoing process of arising (utpāda) and cessation (nirodha), structured by dependent

origination (pratītyasamutpāda). By dissolving the rigid boundary between 11 Being and non-

being, this perspective emphasizes the middle path between eternalism (śāśvata) and nihilism

(Uccheda).

2.4.3. The problem of continuity in momentariness framework

In a Momentariness framework, the problem of continuity arises from the challenge of

explaining how a series of momentary entities can produce the appearance of persistence and

coherence in the world. The concept of Kṣaṇikavāda (momentariness) holds that our perception

of things, ideas even our personal identities is continuous over time, even though everything

exists only for a single moment before disappearing. This apparent contradiction raises a

fundamental philosophical question:

If nothing endures beyond a single moment, how do we experience a sense of stability, causal
progression, and temporal unity?

Buddhist scholars address this problem through the concept of causal continuity

(pratītyasamutpāda), which posits that each momentary phenomenon arises in dependence on the

previous one, maintaining a causal linkage without requiring an enduring substance. Just as a

11 Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. and ed.
Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

19
flame appears continuous despite being a succession of momentary combustions, reality is

understood as a flow of discrete, causally connected moments. Additionally, the theory of

conceptual construction (kalpanā) suggests that continuity is a cognitive illusion created by the

mind, which aggregates momentary events into stable entities.

Another explanation comes from the seed and fruit analogy (bīja-phala-nyāya), where each

momentary state leaves behind potential (bīja or "seed") for the emergence of the next, ensuring

a causal flow without requiring permanence. This idea is central to the Yogācāra school, which

argues that continuity is maintained in the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna), where

karmic imprints persist as potentialities rather than fixed entities.

Thus, in the momentariness framework, continuity is not the persistence of an identical entity but

rather the uninterrupted causal succession of ever-changing phenomena. Our perception of

stability is a mental construct, masking the reality of moment-to-moment transformation.

2.4.4. Epistemological Implications of Momentariness

2.4.4.1. How momentariness shapes Buddhist epistemology

In Buddhist epistemology, Momentariness is a fundamental concept that shapes how perception,

knowledge, and reality are understood. All phenomena are impermanent and exist only for a

moment before disappearing. How Buddhists define knowledge (Pramāṇa), particularly

perception in the light of the transient nature of reality. Since objects do not endure over time,

valid cognition must apprehend them instantaneously, without relying on memory or conceptual

construction. This leads to the Buddhist insistence on direct, momentary perception as the most

20
reliable form of knowledge. Furthermore, momentariness challenges the notion of enduring

substances, emphasizing a flux of causal conditions rather than stable entities.12

According to the theory of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), this epistemological

position emphasizes that knowledge is contingent, contextual, conditioned and transient rather

than absolute. Thus, momentariness not only redefines the nature of knowledge but also serves as

the foundation for the Buddhist rejection of eternal essences or self-sustaining entities in both

epistemology and metaphysics.

2.4.4.2. The role of mindfulness in perceiving momentary phenomena

In order to perceive momentary phenomena, mindfulness is essential since it promotes a greater

awareness of the transient nature of reality. In Buddhist practice, mindfulness is the disciplined

attention to the present moment, allowing practitioners to observe the continuous arising and

passing away of sensations, thoughts, and external phenomena. Mindfulness trains the mind to

experience this flux directly, without attachment or conceptual distortion, because

momentariness(Kṣaṇikavāda) argues that everything exists just for a moment. One may develop

a deeper understanding of reality as a dynamic process rather than a collection of fixed entities,

by practicing Vipassanā(insight meditation), which cultivates the capacity to observe the

impermanence of experiences. This awareness helps in reducing attachment and suffering,

aligning perception with the Buddhist epistemological view that all knowledge must be grounded

in the direct apprehension of ever-changing phenomena. Thus, mindfulness serves as both a

practical and epistemological tool for realizing the truth of momentariness.

12 Dignāga, Compendium of Logic (Pramāṇa-samuccaya), trans. Masaaki Hattori (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1968), esp. Chapter 1 on perception.

21
2.4.5. Ethical Implications of momentariness

2.4.5.1. Momentariness and the cultivation of Non Attachment

Non-attachment, in the context of momentariness, refers to the ethical practice of disengaging

from clinging to transient experiences, possessions, or even identities. When one deeply

understands all phenomena are impermanent and ever-changing, attachment to them naturally

fades. This doesn't mean indifference or detachment in a negative sense, but rather a profound

recognition that everything is fleeting. As a result, non-attachment cultivates a freedom to

engage with the world without being ensnared by desires, fears, or aversions. By not clinging to

what is temporary, one can experience life more fully and compassionately, without the suffering

that arises from attachment. Non-attachment, therefore, is not about renouncing the world, but

about participating in it with awareness of its transient nature, thus fostering a peaceful mind that

is not bound by desires or ego. This quality is central to the Buddhist path, where non-attachment

serves as a gateway to liberation from suffering and the cycle of rebirth.

2.4.5.2. The relationship between momentariness and the path to liberation

The relationship between momentariness and the path to liberation is rooted in the realization

that all phenomena, including the self, are impermanent and ever-changing. In Buddhist

philosophy, understanding momentariness is essential for transcending the cycle of suffering

(dukkha) and rebirth (saṃsāra).13 By recognizing that all things arise and pass away in each

fleeting moment, a practitioner develops insight into the nature of reality, which directly

influences their ethical behaviour and mental cultivation. This awareness of impermanence leads

to the cultivation of wisdom, which is a key aspect of the path to liberation. As one becomes less

13 Adam L. Barborich, “The Effects of Momentariness on Karma and Rebirth in Theravāda Buddhism,”
(Bhubaneswar: Institute of Media Studies, 2017), 1–5.

22
attached to transient phenomena, they cease to grasp at things that are inherently unsatisfactory

and fleeting. This nonattachment reduces the fuel for craving, aversion, and ignorance—the three

poisons that bind beings to the cycle of suffering. Ultimately, understanding momentariness

guides the practitioner toward nirvāṇa, the cessation of suffering, as they break free from the

illusion of permanence and experience the liberation that comes with realizing the impermanent,

interconnected nature of all things.

2.4.6. Practical applications of momentariness

In meditation practice, momentariness refers to the understanding and direct experience of the

transient nature of each moment. It involves the awareness that thoughts, feelings, and sensations

arise and pass away rapidly, emphasizing the impermanence of all phenomena. By focusing on

the fleeting nature of each moment, practitioners cultivate mindfulness and detachment, realizing

that nothing, whether internal or external, lasts. This insight into momentariness helps to reduce

attachment, alleviate suffering, and promote a deeper sense of peace, as meditators learn to fully

engage with the present without clinging to it. Through this practice, one can develop a profound

understanding of the nature of existence, which is ever-changing and momentary.14

2.5. Nyaya Critique of Momentariness

2.5.1. Doctrine of Persistence and Causal Efficacy

The Nyāya school, rooted in realist metaphysics, holds that objects have enduring existence and

are capable of maintaining identity through time.Nyāya asserts that a cause must persist at least

for a certain duration to produce an effect. The assumption is separated by the concept of

momentariness, which claims that the cause disappears as soon as it emerges. According to

14 Nyanaponika Thera, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (Rider, 1962), 45–52.

23
Nyāya philosophers, causal effectiveness/efficacy(Arthakriyākaritva) cannot be explained if the

cause disappears before its consequence is produced. Furthermore, causal transmission is

metaphysically problematic if cause and effect never co-exist. In order for there to be causality,

Nyāya suggests that the cause must come before the effect and overlap with it at least for a

minimal duration. This overlap is denied by the transient existence of dharmas, which

undermines the intelligibility of causality itself.

Buddhist Response: Buddhists reinterprets causation as a series of transient conditions rather

than as a process involving persistence. According to the theory of dependent origination, each

momentary dharma(phenomena) gives rise to the next in a smooth causal chain.Continuity is

understood in terms of conditional relations rather than identity.

The Sautrāntikas explain that what appears as endurance or persistence is merely a succession of

similar moments. A flame seems continuous, yet is a series of momentary flickers. Similarly, a

cause only needs to condition to the next moment, a cause need not endure.15

2.5.2. Perception, Cognition, and Continuity

Nyāya epistemology emphasizes the role of pramanas(valid knowledge), such as

perception(pratyaksa), inference(anumana),and verbal testimony(Sabda). Each of them

necessitates object and consciousness continuity. The cognitive experience of

recognition(pratyabhijna), remembering(smriti), and inference are all in opposition to

momentariness, according to Nyāya thinkers such as Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara. For instance,

a person seen earlier presupposes that the self (Ātman) remains numerically identical through

15Siderits Mark, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,2007),125-128.

24
time. There cannot be ontological continuity to support cognition if the object and subject are

both continuously perish and reborn.

Furthermore, according to Nyaya ,the mind must be a subtle yet enduring entity that can

coordinate sensory inputs and produce coherent awareness. According to the Nyāya , the basic

possibility of coherent experience is destroyed when Buddhists deny a persiting mind.

Buddhist Response: Buddhists argue that cognition occurs as a series of causally related

moments, even though they acknowledge that the mind and mental activities are transient. Each

moment of consciousness arises dependent on the previous one. This sequence maintains the idea

of momentariness while creating/generating the appearance of continuity.

Buddhists argue that perception is a process rather than a fixed event. Dependent on a sensory

object and the preceding/previous mental moment, a cognition emerges. Valid knowledge is

made possible by the causal relationships between the object and the subject, even though they

may not exist instantaneously in the strictest sense.

It is explained that memory is an effect of a previous cognitive impression/imprint(vāsanās). It

merely requires a continuity of causal conditions, not the survival of an identical self or mind.

2.5.3. Moral Agency and Personal Identity

The self(Ātman),an eternal conscious subject that endures through experiences, births and lives,is

a truth that Nyaya philosophy strongly maintains. The idea of momentariness seems to

undermine karmic responsibility, moral agency, personal identity by rejecting a continuous self.

25
The Nyāya a argument is simple yet forceful: if the agent who performed an action no longer

exists at the time the result manifests, then karmic justice becomes incoherent. Who receives the

fruits of karma if there is no enduring self?

According to Nyāya , an action needs an agent(karta),and its effects are only understood if the

agent persists to experience them. It is believed that the Buddhist solution of a continuum of

dharmas is seen as an inadequate substitute for the real self.

Buddhist Response: The Buddhist response draws from the concept of the five

aggregates(pañcaskandha) and non self. While Buddhism rejects the concept of a permanent

self, it does recognize a continuum of causally linked mental and physical experiences. The

individual who experiences the karmic fruit is neither completely different from nor similar to

the one who acted, just as a flame transferred from one candle to another is not the same but also

not completely different16. This perspective is referred to as the “middle way” between

annihilationism and eternalism.17

Moral agency, according to Dharmakīrti, is based on causal continuity rather than an unchanging

self. The law of karma, which is natural law of cause and effect rather than retribution directed at

a permanent self, upholds the concept of justice and responsibility.

2.5.4. Infinite Regress and Contradiction

A objection is also raised by Nyaya logicians: if every moment is momentary, then an entity’s

arising(utpāda), existing(Sthiti) and cessation(bhaṅga) are also considered momentary events.

16 Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 141–145.

17 Harvey, Peter, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 18–20.

26
This leads to an infinite regress of momentary events explaining other momentary events. By

applying its own ideas against its own foundations, the doctrine destroys itself.

Buddhist Response: The three aspects of each moment- arising(utpāda), existing(Sthiti) and

ceasing(bhaṅga)- are acknowledged by Buddhists, but they maintain that these are not three

distinct temporal phases but rather three aspects of a single momentary event.

Dharmakīrti argues that analyzing the arising and ceasing of a moment is a conceptual

abstraction because that moment itself is invisible in time. Since there is only one real moment

and others are consequences of conceptual designation, the claimed regress does not occur.

2.6. Vedanta Critique of Momentariness

2.6.1. Ultimate Reality vs. Phenomenal Change

Momentariness is criticized by the Vedanta school from the perspective of non-dual

metaphysics, especially in Advaita Vedānta. According to Advaitins, time,change and plurality

are all manifestations of the phenomenal realm(Vyāvahārika), which is ultimately

illusory(Mithyā), and Brahman is the one unchanging reality(Satya). Momentariness is therefore

rejected as a misconception due to avidyā (ignorance). Vedantins like Sankara argue that all

change, including the appearance of arising and perishing, is only a superimposition (Adhyāsa)

on the changeless substratum of Bramhan. To claim that everything is momentary is to make the

rope for a snake- a classic example used by Vedanta to illustrate epistemic error. 18

Buddhist Response: Buddhists do not posit a transcendental, unchanging substratum beneath

phenomena but they accept that the empirical world is characterized by impermanence. They

18 Śaṅkara, Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, trans. Swami Gambhirananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1996), 2.1.14–20.

27
argue that change is real and observable rather than illusory, and that it can be explained without

the help of a metaphysical framework like Brahman.

According to Buddhism, superimposition(Adhyāropa) and reification are similar to claiming that

there is an eternal, unchanging nature behind changing appearances. Change is the very

foundation of reality, not a veil to be pierced. The momentary nature of phenomena is revealed

directly through meditative insight and analysis, not merely through discursive reasoning.

By arguing that the idea of Brahman is a construction imposed on the dynamic flux of

experience, Buddhist thinkers therefore reject the Vedantic critique.

2.6.2. Unity and Continuity of Consciousness

The notion of a unitary, self-revealing consciousness (cit or Chaitanya) that underlies all mental

and perceptual processes is fundamental to Vedānta. This consciousness does not depend on

discrete dharmas or mental events, nor is it momentary. According to Vedānta, the continuity of

conscious experience cannot be explained by the Buddhist idea of momentary, discrete streams

of awareness. Spiritual realization, memory, and reflection all require a constant witness that

remains the same through different states of consciousness. On the other hand, momentariness

suggests a series of disconnected flashes that are unable to make meaningful lived experience. 19

Buddhist Response: Buddhism acknowledges the self luminous nature of consciousness , but it

rejects the idea of its eternal nature or fundamental unity. Consciousness is a stream(Santāna) a

series of momentary awareness(citta) that arises and ceases in dependence upon conditions.

Buddhist scholars such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti argue that there is no need to propose an

eternal witnessing consciousness. Each moment of cognition is self aware and causally linked to

19 Śaṅkara, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, trans. Swami Madhavananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2003), verses 129–140.

28
the next. The illusion of a unified self or witness arises due to the continuity of similar moments,

not from a real, enduring substance. Moreover the Vedantic witness is problematic from an

epistemological standpoint because it has been proposed but never experienced directly. On the

other hand, momentary consciousness is experienced in each moment of awareness, making it

more phenomenologically grounded.

2.6.3. The Self as Substratum of Experience

The Vedānta upholds the notion that Self (Ātman) is eternal, self luminous, and unalterable. The

atman is the essential foundation for all experience, not an illusion. Unlike the Buddhist view

which considers the self as merely a designation for a stream of momentary events, Vedanta

posits the self as the very condition for experience itself.

Questions of spiritual practice, ethical responsibility, and liberation lose their metaphysical

foundations in the absence of this enduring self. Thus, the fundamental argument for soteriology

from the Vedantic standpoint is undermined by the Buddhist accounts' rejection of the atman. 20

Buddhist Response: The Ātman is rejected by Buddhists to dissolve the illusion of a

metaphysical ego, not to deny moral agency. The doctrine of no-self is a central insight meant to

free beings from suffering and attachment.

The individual is composed of five aggregates(Pañcaskandha): form, feeling, perception, mental

formations, and consciousness. Beyond this, a permanent self does not need to be posited.

Continuity is explained by causal connection, not identity.

Liberation or nirvana is not union with a cosmic self, but freedom from the illusion of self and

the cessation of craving, aversion and ignorance. From a Buddhist perspective, the Vedāntic idea

20 Śaṅkara, Upadeśa Sāhasrī, trans. Swami Jagadananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1949), 1.3.4–1.3.11.

29
of liberation goes the risk of cosmically reifying the ego, which is counter to the whole purpose

of spiritual practice.

2.6.4. Dependence on Time and Epistemic fault

The notion of momentariness assumes that time exists since describing anything as momentary

entails discussing its duration. Vedanta holds that time itself is part of maya- an illusory

construct that emerges only in the empirical domain. In the Pāramārthika (ultimate), time does

not exist, time is unreal.

Accordingly, Vedānta criticizes momentariness as having epistemological flaws since it views

time as real and change as fundamental. It ignores the fact that the true nature of reality is not

change but rather changelessness.

Buddhist Response: Buddhists consider time not as an external dimension, but as an imputed

concept based on the succession of momentary events. There is no need to posit a substratum

beyond time- momentariness is the nature of things, not a product of illusion.

In fact, Buddhists claim that the Vedāntic claim of timelessness is itself an abstraction, when

analyzed, fails to account for lived experience. Temporal succession is directly known, while

Brahman is never encountered in ordinary or meditative experience without presupposing some

structure of change.

30
 CHAPTER THREE

Interpretations and Application of Momentariness across different Buddhist

Schools

3.1. Theravāda Interpretation and Application of Momentariness

3.1.1. Philosophical Interpretation

In the Theravāda tradition, particularly as elaborated in the Abhidhamma literature, the notion of

momentariness is not developed as an independent metaphysical theory but is implicitly present

in the detailed analysis of mental and material phenomena. According to the Abhidhamma,

reality consists of ultimate constituents (paramattha dhammas) which arise, exist briefly, and

then cease. Each dhamma undergoes three sub-moments: arising (uppāda), presence (ṭhiti), and

cessation (bhaṅga). These sub-moments are extremely brief, and the entire cycle of arising and

passing away occurs rapidly and continuously.

Though Theravāda does not assert the full metaphysical claim that only the present moment

exists (as the Sautrāntika does), it nonetheless affirms the radical transience of phenomena. The

famous Pali phrase “Sarvaṁ anityaṃ” (“all is impermanent”) is taken not just as a doctrinal

statement but as an experiential truth to be realized through meditative observation.

Classical texts such as the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa emphasize the momentariness of

phenomena as a key insight for spiritual progress. In his discussion of insight meditation

(Vipassanā), Buddhaghosa describes how the practitioner observes the rising and falling of

physical and mental events, cultivating the perception that all phenomena are in constant flux. 21

21 Buddhaghosa,The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (Kandy: Buddhist

Publication Society, 1991), 123–130; Bhikkhu Bodhi, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma (Kandy: Buddhist

31
3.1.2. Application in Meditation Practice

The most prominent application of momentariness in Theravāda lies in the field of meditation. In

vipassanā practice, meditators are trained to observe their internal and external experience in real

time. As mindfulness deepens, the practitioner begins to perceive phenomena not as continuous

entities but as a series of discrete events that arise and vanish with startling rapidity.

For example, bodily sensations, thoughts, and emotions are observed as impermanent processes,

not enduring states. This direct experience of momentariness leads to the development of

yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana—“knowledge and vision of things as they really are.” It is a key

component of the path to enlightenment.

Modern vipassanā traditions, such as the Burmese Theravāda lineages of Mahāsi Sayadaw and

S.N. Goenka, have emphasized this experiential realization of momentariness as the basis for

insight. Practitioners often report perceiving the body and mind as mere waves of arising and

vanishing sensations, further confirming the doctrinal teachings in lived experience.

3.1.3. Ethical and Soteriological Implications

Understanding momentariness in Theravāda is not merely an intellectual exercise but carries

deep ethical and soteriological significance. When one sees that all conditioned things are

fleeting and unstable, attachment to them naturally weakens. This weakening of taṇhā (craving)

is essential to the process of liberation.

Moreover, the realization of momentariness leads to a deeper understanding of the three marks

of existence: impermanence (anitya), suffering (dukkha), and non-self (anattā). Since nothing

endures, there can be no permanent self or soul. The five aggregates (pañcakkhandha) that make
Publication Society, 1999), 45–60.

32
up the human being are seen as momentary and insubstantial, thereby undermining the illusion

of personal identity.

In this way, the recognition of momentariness becomes a direct catalyst for attaining nibbāna,

the cessation of suffering. It helps the practitioner to see through the deceptive continuity of

experience and realize the unreliability of samsaric existence.

3.2. Sarvāstivāda Interpretation and Application of Momentariness

3.2.1. Philosophical Interpretation

The Sarvāstivāda school, one of the prominent early Buddhist schools, developed a distinct

doctrinal position on the nature of time and existence that significantly modified the

understanding of momentariness. Unlike the strict presentism of the Sautrāntikas, the

Sarvāstivādins affirmed the tri-temporal existence of all dharmas—past, present, and future—

hence the name “Sarvāstivāda” (literally “the theory that all exists”).22

According to their theory, while all dharmas exist in all three times, only present dharmas

possess causal efficacy (karitra). The past and future dharmas exist in a latent, non-functional

mode, which makes it possible to account for memory, continuity, and karmic fruition. 23 This

view was detailed extensively in canonical texts such as the Mahāvibhāṣā, compiled by

Sarvāstivāda scholars in Kashmir.

The Sarvāstivāda position attempts to address a core challenge posed by momentariness: if all

things vanish immediately upon arising, how can cause and effect be explained? How can

memory function, or karma operate across lifetimes? By positing the real, albeit inactive,

22 Williams Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge,
2000),54.
23 Gethin Rupert,The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 214.

33
existence of non-present dharmas, the Sarvāstivādins sought to preserve the law of dependent

origination (pratītyasamutpāda) without succumbing to ontological nihilism.

3.2.2. Application in Abhidharma Analysis

Sarvāstivāda's Abhidharma system represents one of the most rigorous and comprehensive

frameworks for analyzing phenomena in early Buddhist scholasticism. Their layered

understanding of dharmas across time enabled intricate debates regarding the nature of

perception, cognition, and karmic process.24

Momentariness is acknowledged insofar as present dharmas are momentary in their function—

they arise, perform their function, and cease. However, their existence is not limited to a single

moment in the absolute sense. This nuanced view avoids the metaphysical problems associated

with strict momentariness while preserving the key insight of impermanence.

This view also allowed Sarvāstivādins to develop complex models of cognition and karmic

fruition that could explain how present mental states are influenced by past causes and how

present actions condition future effects. In this system, causal series are composed of

overlapping, momentary dharmas, unified by function and continuity.

3.2.3. Soteriological Implications

Although Sarvāstivāda accepts the tri-temporal existence of dharmas, the transitory nature of

their causal function remains essential for the path to liberation. The practitioner must still

realize the impermanent and insubstantial nature of conditioned phenomena, even if those

phenomena have a broader ontological existence.

24 Dhammajoti K.L.Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong,
2009), 33.

34
In practice, Sarvāstivāda meditation manuals emphasize the contemplation of dharmas as

momentarily functional and devoid of ātman (self). By cultivating insight into the fleeting nature

of functional existence, the practitioner generates disenchantment (nibbidā) and dispassion

(virāga), leading to cessation.

The Sarvāstivādins approach can be seen as striking a balance between philosophical realism and

soteriological pragmatism. Their model provides a theoretical foundation for continuity and

moral responsibility, while retaining the core Buddhist aim of liberation from attachment to

transient phenomena.

3.3. Sautrāntika Interpretation and Application of Momentariness

3.3.1. Philosophical Interpretation

The Sautrāntika school, emerging as a critique of Sarvāstivāda realism, espoused a rigorous

interpretation of momentariness, affirming that only the present moment exists and that all

phenomena (dharmas) perish the instant they arise. They reject the Sarvāstivādins' claim that

past and future dharmas have any kind of real existence. This view aligns closely with the

earliest teachings of the Buddha on anicca and anattā, which emphasize transience and non-

substantiality.25

For the Sautrāntikas, reality is composed of a stream of discrete momentary events. They assert

that each phenomenon arises due to conditions, performs its function, and ceases immediately—

leaving behind no enduring substance. This strict momentariness is foundational for their

metaphysics, psychology, and theory of karmic continuity.

25 Gethin Rupert,The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 214.

35
To explain continuity and memory, the Sautrāntikas develop the theory of latent impressions or

seeds (bīja). Actions leave behind karmic imprints in the mental continuum, which later manifest

as results without requiring the existence of a permanent self or enduring substance.

3.3.2. Causal and Psychological Application

The Sautrāntika explanation of causality hinges on their seed theory. Since no entity endures

over time, causal continuity must be explained through the transformation of conditioned

potentials. When an action occurs, it deposits a seed within the mental stream (citta-santāna),

which later ripens as experience or result. This allows them to maintain ethical responsibility and

karma without compromising their radical momentariness.26

This approach is evident in their analysis of mental processes. Mental events are seen as

momentary and causally linked through conditional relations. Cognitive continuity is, therefore,

a series of discrete, conditionally connected moments, each arising and ceasing rapidly but

coherently.

3.3.3. Meditative and Soteriological Application

In practice, the Sautrāntika view supports a sharp and focused insight meditation aimed at

deconstructing the illusion of continuity. Meditators are trained to observe how the mind and

body are not unified wholes but sequences of momentary occurrences. This perception leads to

disenchantment with the world and with the notion of self.

The doctrine thus has direct soteriological significance: by realizing that all conditioned

phenomena arise and cease instantaneously, practitioners develop detachment, which leads to the

26 Cox Collett, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence (Tokyo: International Institute for
Buddhist Studies, 1995), 110–112.

36
cessation of suffering. The rejection of a continuous self and substance is seen as a key to

achieving liberation (nirvāṇa).

3.4.Mahāyāna Schools

3.4.1. Yogācāra Perspective

3.4.1.1. Ontological Foundation: Only Consciousness Exists

At the core of Yogācāra philosophy lies the doctrine of vijñaptimātra, often translated as

“consciousness-only” or “representation-only.” This view asserts that there is no external,

independently existing material world; rather, what we perceive as external objects are merely

mental representations or manifestations of consciousness. In this framework, consciousness is

not something that perceives a separate world—it is the world. All phenomena, including forms,

sensations, and objects, are regarded as projections or transformations of consciousness itself.

This ontological stance arises from a deep analysis of perception and cognition. Yogācāra

philosophers argue that we never have direct access to external objects; we only experience

representations (vijñapti) of them within consciousness. Since these representations are all we

ever encounter, postulating the existence of independent external objects is unnecessary and

philosophically unjustified.

By affirming that only consciousness exists, Yogācāra lays the groundwork for the doctrine of

momentariness: all events, including mental ones, arise and cease within consciousness alone,

without reliance on any enduring external substratum. This eliminates the notion of a permanent

self or world and supports the broader Buddhist aim of overcoming attachment to inherently

existing entities.

37
3.4.1.2. Momentariness and the flow of Consciousness

Yogācāra is able to account for identity, memory and karmic continuity while rejecting the idea

of permanent self because of the stream-like nature of consciousness. Even if every moment is

impermanent, the succession of moments creates the illusion of continuity and permanence or

stability.27 Thus, what we take to be a stable “mind” or “self” is merely a conceptual imputation

on an ever-changing flow of mental events. This view not only supports the Buddhist principle

of non-self (anātman) but also provides a dynamic model for understanding how karmic causes

produce effects within a momentary framework.

3.4.1.3. The role of ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness)

The concept of ālaya-vijñāna, or storehouse consciousness, plays a pivotal role in Yogācāra

philosophy by reconciling momentariness with continuity in experience, karma, and personal

identity. While all forms of consciousness are momentary, ālaya-vijñāna serves as an underlying

substratum of constantly changing but causally connected mental impressions. It stores the latent

karmic seeds (bīja) generated by past actions, which mature into future experiences in the form

of mental and sensory phenomena.28

The ālaya-vijñāna functions as a mechanism for causal continuity without reifying a self. It links

past actions to present experiences, thereby accounting for moral responsibility and rebirth

within a momentary framework. In meditative practice, realization of the constructed and impure

nature of the ālaya is essential for spiritual progress. Eventually, upon liberation, the ālaya-

27 Powers John, Introduction to the Yogācāra School of Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 65–
66.
28 Williams Paul and Anthony Tribe, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge, 2021), 111–112.

38
vijñāna is said to cease, giving way to pure wisdom consciousness (amalavijñāna in some

interpretations).

Thus, ālaya-vijñāna is central to Yogācāra thought: it upholds momentariness while enabling

psychological and karmic continuity, all without violating the core Buddhist doctrines of

impermanence, non-self, and dependent origination.

3.4.1.4. Self-Awareness of the Moment in Yogācāra (Svasaṃvitti)

A central aspect of Yogācāra’s application of momentariness is its doctrine of self-awareness,

known as Svasaṃvitti or svasaṃvedana. Since Yogācāra holds that each mental event is

momentary, it must be self-revealing in the very instant it arises. There is no enduring self or

second mental act that can reflect back on a previous one; thus, cognition must include

awareness of itself at the moment it occurs.

According to this view, every cognitive event (such as seeing, thinking, or feeling) not only

grasps an object but also contains a reflexive awareness of its own occurrence. This is not a

separate act of knowing but an intrinsic feature of consciousness itself. For example, when one

experiences a feeling of joy, that joy is simultaneously known — not through a later reflection,

but in the very moment it arises.

This self-luminosity (prakāśa) of consciousness ensures that knowledge is immediate and self-

authenticating, without the need for an external verifier. It also supports the theory of

momentariness: if a moment of consciousness cannot recur, it must reveal itself entirely within

its brief existence, otherwise it would be unknowable.

In Yogācāra epistemology, this self-awareness serves as the foundation of reliable knowledge,

and in its purified form, becomes the basis for non-dual wisdom (jñāna) that realizes the true

39
nature of mind. Thus, the doctrine of svasaṃvitti shows how momentariness does not lead to

epistemological disintegration, but instead supports a coherent model of knowing within a non-

dual idealist framework.

3.4.2. Madhyamaka school

3.4.2.1. Interpretation of momentariness in Madhyamaka school

The Madhyamaka school interprets momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) not as an ultimately real feature

of phenomena, but as a conventional truth that helps reveal the deeper insight into emptiness

(śūnyatā). According to Madhyamaka philosophy, all things lack inherent existence (svabhāva);

they do not possess any fixed, independent essence 29. Momentariness, therefore, is not seen as

the arising and ceasing of independently existing entities in each moment, as some earlier

Buddhist schools claim (such as the Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika), but rather as a concept that

highlights the absence of permanence or substantiality in phenomena. Nāgārjuna, the founder of

the school, uses the idea of momentariness to demonstrate the illusory nature of continuity and

identity—emphasizing that phenomena arise only in dependence on causes, conditions, and

conceptual designations. In this way, the Madhyamaka interpretation of momentariness

contributes to the central philosophical aim of the school: to deconstruct all views of

essentialism and guide practitioners toward a direct understanding of emptiness and the middle

path between existence and non-existence.

29Jay L., Garfield,The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 91–92.

40
3.4.2.2 Application of Momentariness in Madhyamaka school

In the Madhyamaka school, the application of momentariness serves as a powerful means to

reveal the deeper truth of emptiness and dependent origination. While the Madhyamika do not

assert momentariness as an ultimate reality, they utilize the concept to refute the notion of

permanence in both self and phenomena. By emphasizing that all things arise and seize moment

by moment, they demonstrate that nothing possesses a stable, lasting identity. This application is

particularly effective in deconstructing the belief in a permanent self (ātman) and in substantially

existing objects, which are viewed as the roots of attachment and suffering. 30 Moreover,

momentariness supports Madhyamaka's presentation of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent

origination), showing that phenomena exist only through interdependent causes and conditions,

never in isolation or permanence. Meditatively, the insight into momentariness trains the mind to

recognize the transient and constructed nature of thoughts, feelings, and experiences, thus

weakening clinging and leading to wisdom. In sum, the Madhyamaka school applies

momentariness as a pedagogical and contemplative tool that aids in realizing emptiness, freeing

the practitioner from delusion and paving the way to liberation.

3.5. Comparative Analysis : Similarities and Differences

3.5.1. Similarities across schools

● Impermanence as a Foundational Doctrine: All schools affirm the impermanence of

conditioned phenomena, even if the mechanisms of this impermanence differ.

30 David, Burton,Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy (London: Curzon Press, 1999),
35.

41
● Soteriological Purpose: The contemplation of momentariness serves to diminish

attachment and ignorance, facilitating the path to liberation.

● Meditative Practice: Momentariness is a central aspect of Buddhist meditation, helping

practitioners directly experience the transitory nature of reality and the non-self.

3.5.2. Key Differences

● Ontological Views

Sarvāstivāda’s tri-temporal existence contrasts sharply with Sautrāntika’s strict

presentism. On the other hand Madhyamaka denies inherent existence altogether, making

momentariness just another conceptual tool.

● Explanation of Continuity

Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda offer complex models of continuity, while Sautrāntika and

Yogācāra focus on the flow of momentary events or consciousness.

● Role of Consciousness

Yogācāra emphasizes the role of foundational consciousness (ālayavijñāna), while other

schools like Theravāda and Sautrāntika focus on discrete momentary events.

42
Buddhist School View on Momentariness Key Texts Key Philosopher(s)
Momentariness means all
phenomena (dharmas) arise and Abhidhamm
Theravāda cease instantly; emphasis on the a Pitaka Buddhaghosa
impermanence of physical and
mental phenomena.
Momentariness highlights
emptiness (śūnyatā) and Mūlamadhy
Madhyamaka dependent origination; all amakakārik Nāgārjuna
phenomena are empty of ā
inherent existence and
momentary.
Focuses on the momentary
nature of mental phenomena; Vijñaptimāt
Yogācāra consciousness is a stream of ratāsiddhi Vasubandhu, Asanga
momentary events, stressing
subjective experience and
transformation.
Arguments dharmas exist three
times (past, present, future), Mahāvibhās Various Sarvästivāda
Sarvāstivāda challenging pure ā scholars
momentariness; it holds a more
continuous existence concept.
Supports momentariness Vasubandhu (early
Sauträntika strictly; only present moment Abhidharma phase)
dharmas exist, with past and kośa

43
 future being merely conceptual. commentary

CHAPTER FOUR

PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MOMENTARINESS

4.1. A Brief introduction to personal identity

The question of personal identity—what it means to be the same person over time—has long

intrigued philosophers across cultures. In most philosophical traditions, personal identity is

associated with the notion of a persistent self, an enduring “I” that underlies experience and

action. However, Buddhism offers a radically different view that challenges this deeply held

assumption. Central to Buddhist philosophy is the doctrine of anātman (non-self) and

Kṣaṇikavāda (momentariness), both of which suggest that the idea of a continuous, unchanging

personal identity is an illusion. According to this view, what we call a “person” is merely a

temporary aggregation of physical and mental elements, lacking any permanent essence. 31

This chapter explores how Buddhist thought addresses the concept of personal identity through

the lenses of impermanence, non-self, and momentariness. It begins by examining the

conventional understanding of personal identity, followed by a critical analysis of Buddhist

teachings such as the five skandhas, dependent origination, and momentary existence.

31 Harvey Peter,The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvāṇa in Early Buddhism (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 28–33.

44
Ultimately, it highlights how the denial of a fixed self in Buddhism offers not only a

metaphysical critique of identity but also a transformative path toward liberation from suffering.

4.2. The Concept of Personal Identity in Indian Philosophy

In Indian philosophical traditions, the question of personal identity is deeply tied to metaphysical

inquiries about the self (ātman), consciousness, and liberation. In most orthodox schools of

Hindu philosophy such as Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, and Nyāya, the self is regarded as a real, eternal,

and unchanging substance. These schools assert that the self persists through time, remains

unaffected by bodily or mental changes, and survives even after death. The ātman is considered

the true essence of an individual—distinct from the physical body and mind—and is often

equated with pure consciousness or even the universal spirit.

In these traditions, continuity of personal identity is ensured by the presence of the soul or self,

which undergoes various experiences but remains the same across lifetimes. This enduring self is

believed to accumulate karma and progress toward liberation (mokṣa) through spiritual practice.

However, Buddhist philosophy departs radically from this assumption. The Buddha questioned

the very foundation of a permanent self and introduced a framework where what is

conventionally known as a “person” is actually an ever-changing stream of physical and mental

phenomena. In doing so, he fundamentally redefined the concept of identity—not as something

fixed or lasting, but as something fluid, dependent, and impermanent. This radical departure is

grounded in the doctrines of anātman (non-self) and momentariness, which we will now

examine in greater detail.32

4.3. Doctrine of Anātman (Non-Self)

32 Dasgupta, Surendranath, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922),
247–258.

45
One of the most distinctive and foundational teachings of Buddhism is the doctrine of anātman,

or non-self. This doctrine challenges the deeply ingrained belief in a permanent, unchanging self

that underlies personal identity. Unlike the ātman of Hindu systems, which is seen as the core

essence of a person, Buddhism maintains that there is no such enduring entity. Instead, what we

take to be the “self” is merely a mental and linguistic construction that arises from ignorance

(avidyā) and clinging (upādāna).

The core of this teaching is elaborated in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta, where the Buddha

systematically analyzes the five aggregates (pañcaskandha)—form, feeling, perception, mental

formations, and consciousness—and demonstrates that none of these can be regarded as self.

Each aggregate is subject to change (anitya), leads to suffering (dukkha), and lacks inherent

essence (anātman). Therefore, clinging to any of them as “I” or “mine” results in delusion and

suffering. For example, the body grows, decays, and dies; consciousness arises and ceases with

each moment of perception; thoughts and feelings fluctuate constantly. None of these aspects of

experience exhibit the stability or autonomy required to qualify as a true self.

The Buddha also employed analogies to challenge the concept of self. One of the most well-

known is the chariot analogy, in which he asks: is the chariot the same as its wheels, its axles, its

frame—or is it something separate from them? Just as a chariot is merely a conventional

designation for a collection of parts, so too a person is nothing more than the temporary union of

aggregates. There is no underlying self that exists independently of these components. Buddhism

thus presents the self as a useful fiction, a conventional term (saṃvṛti-satya) necessary for

communication and moral responsibility, but ultimately unreal from the standpoint of absolute

truth (paramārtha-satya). The mistaken belief in a permanent self perpetuates suffering and

46
keeps beings trapped in saṃsāra, the endless cycle of birth and death. The realization of non-self

is, therefore, a liberating insight that dissolves attachment and leads toward nirvāṇa.33

4.4. The Five Skandhas and the Illusion of Self

The doctrine of anātman is intimately linked to the analysis of human existence through the

framework of the five skandhas or aggregates. These skandhas describe the constituents of what

we commonly refer to as a “person” and form the basis of the Buddhist denial of a permanent

self. The skandhas are: form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), mental formations

(saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna). Together, they constitute the totality of individual

experience, yet none of them—individually or collectively—can be identified as a fixed self.

● Form (rūpa) refers to the physical body and the material aspect of existence. This

includes the sense organs and their interaction with the external world. The body is

subject to aging, illness, and death—it changes constantly and cannot persist as a fixed

self.

● Feeling (vedanā) encompasses the sensations experienced through contact with the

world. These may be pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, and they arise and pass away

continuously. There is no control over these feelings, and they are influenced by external

and internal factors.

● Perception (saṃjñā) is the faculty of recognition and identification—how we label and

interpret sensory information. Like feelings, perceptions change rapidly depending on

33Bodhi,Bhikkhu,The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (Boston:
Wisdom Publications, 2000), 45–50.

47
 circumstances, memory, and conditioning. No perception remains constant or

independent.

● Mental formations (saṃskāra) include volitions, emotions, habits, and predispositions.

This skandha represents the dynamic and karmically active side of the mind. These

formations are shaped by past actions and in turn shape future behaviour. Their

impermanence and dependence on causes and conditions disqualify them from being a

true self.

● Consciousness (vijñāna) is the awareness of sensory and mental objects. It is not a

unified field but is divided into six types, each associated with a sense (eye-

consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc.). Consciousness arises and ceases depending on

sense contact—it is a stream, not a substance.34

Each of these aggregates is impermanent (anitya), subject to suffering (dukkha), and non-self

(anātman). When people cling to any of them as “me” or “mine,” they become entrapped in

illusion. The Buddha’s insight, therefore, was not that there is no experience, but that experience

lacks an owner or controller. The skandhas operate according to dependent origination and

cause-and-effect, not under the command of a self.

In this light, what we call a “person” is simply the temporary and conditional assemblage of

these aggregates. The sense of unity and continuity we feel is not due to an underlying soul but

arises from memory, language, and causal connections between moments of experience. In

Buddhist thought, this is likened to a flame passing from one candle to another—there is

continuity, but no essence that endures.

34 Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,2007), 36-40.

48
The illusion of self arises because of ignorance (avidyā)—a failure to see things as they truly are.

By deeply understanding the nature of the five skandhas, a practitioner begins to see through this

illusion, leading to non-attachment and the possibility of liberation (nirvāṇa). Therefore, the five

skandhas are not only tools for philosophical analysis but also integral to Buddhist soteriology.

49
50
4.5. Momentariness (Kṣaṇikavāda) and Its Implication for Personal Identity

Closely linked to the doctrine of non-self in Buddhism is the theory of momentariness, or

kṣaṇikavāda. This concept, developed most fully in the Abhidharma traditions and by later

schools such as the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, asserts that all conditioned phenomena

(saṃskṛta dharmas) exist only for a single moment and are destroyed the very next. In other

words, reality is not composed of enduring substances but of a continuous stream of momentary

events. This radical understanding of impermanence has profound implications for how

Buddhism interprets the nature of personal identity.

According to kṣaṇikavāda, every mental and physical event arises, remains for a brief instant,

and immediately ceases, giving rise to the next moment in a causal sequence. There is no stable

substrate that persists through this process. Thus, even what appears to be continuous—such as a

person’s thoughts, emotions, or personality—is in fact a rapid succession of momentary

phenomena. Just as a film appears continuous due to the rapid succession of frames, the illusion

of personal continuity arises due to the rapid succession of these fleeting moments.35

This view dismantles any metaphysical grounding for a permanent self. If nothing persists from

one moment to the next, then no entity—no “I”—can be said to endure through time. The

apparent unity of personal identity is therefore a conventional projection based on memory,

causal continuity, and the interaction of the five aggregates(pañcaskandha).36 It has no

ontological basis in a real, enduring self.

Buddhist scholars such as Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna elaborated on this perspective.

Vasubandhu, in particular, emphasized the doctrine of mind-stream (citta-santāna), suggesting

35 Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 140.
36 Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 67–69.

51
that what we call a person is a flow of momentary mental events linked by causal relationships.

Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, deconstructed the very notion of identity by demonstrating that all

phenomena are empty (śūnya) of inherent existence—including the self. 37 For him, clinging to

any form of identity is an error born of conceptual fabrication.

Importantly, the theory of momentariness does not imply nihilism or that persons do not exist at

all. Rather, it affirms that persons exist only conventionally—as dynamic processes rather than

static entities. This dynamic view of identity aligns with the ethical and meditative goals of

Buddhism: since the self is not fixed, it can be transformed. Moment-to-moment awareness,

meditation, and ethical practice become tools for reshaping the stream of experience in a way

that leads toward wisdom and liberation.

4.6. Dependent Origination and the Construction of Identity

The doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is one of the most important and

central teachings in Buddhism. It provides a detailed explanation of how phenomena arise,

persist, and cease, based on interdependent causes and conditions. This doctrine is closely related

to the Buddhist understanding of personal identity and momentariness. It shows that what we

consider to be a "self" is not a singular, independent entity but a conventionally existent

construct that arises in dependence on multiple conditions.

According to the doctrine of dependent origination, everything that exists—be it physical or

mental—is interdependently co-arisen. The famous formulation of the twelve links of dependent

origination (dvādasāṅga pratītyasamutpāda) outlines how ignorance (avidyā) gives rise to

craving (tṛṣṇā), which leads to clinging (upādāna), and in turn to the formation of karma,

37 Garfield, Jay L.,The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), introduction.

52
rebirth, and suffering (dukkha).38 The entire chain illustrates the causal and momentary nature of

existence—a cycle that can only be broken through the cessation of ignorance and craving. 39

One of the key implications of this teaching for personal identity is that there is no fixed or

independent self. The identity we experience is not an autonomous or permanent entity but is

instead an aggregation of momentary factors arising in response to causes and conditions. As the

Buddha explained, the self is like a product of a complex web of interrelations, much like the

flame of a fire that is dependent upon fuel, heat, and oxygen. There is no flame that exists

independently of these conditions; similarly, there is no enduring self that exists apart from the

five aggregates or the forces of dependent origination.40

This view is clearly articulated in the Discourse on Dependent Origination, where the Buddha

demonstrates how ignorance leads to the formation of the aggregates and thus to the illusion of a

permanent self. The process of becoming (bhava) is seen as a chain of events that leads to the

arising of suffering and the continuous cycle of rebirth. The self, therefore, is a conceptual

construct arising in the context of dependent origination but lacking any substantial, independent

existence.

Moreover, dependent origination sheds light on the impermanence of identity. Since all

phenomena—including identity—arise dependent on conditions, they are constantly changing.

The person we think we are is always in flux, conditioned by past experiences, mental habits,

and external circumstances. This fluidity of identity aligns with the Buddhist insight into

38 Bodhi, Bhikkhu,The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (Boston:
Wisdom Publications, 2000), 535–540.
39Harvey, Peter, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 61–65.
40 Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 66–67.

53
momentariness: each moment, we are reborn as a new aggregation of skandhas, subject to the

same cycle of dependent origination.

Thus, dependent origination provides a comprehensive view of identity as a process rather than a

static entity. It is an interdependent, conditional arising of mental and physical elements, ever-

changing, and devoid of any inherent, permanent self. The recognition of this truth is crucial to

the Buddhist path and offers a transformative way of seeing personal identity.

4.7. Buddhist Practices and the Transformation of Identity

Buddhism not only presents a theoretical critique of personal identity through doctrines such as

anātman, momentariness, and dependent origination, but also offers a rich set of practical

methods designed to transform how individuals experience and relate to their sense of self. These

practices are not merely philosophical or meditative exercises; they are existential tools aimed at

realizing the illusory nature of self and achieving liberation from suffering.41

The eightfold path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga) is the central framework for Buddhist practice,

encompassing ethical conduct, mental discipline, and wisdom. Through right view, right

mindfulness, and right concentration, practitioners gradually come to see the impermanent,

unsatisfactory, and non-self nature of all phenomena, including what is conventionally perceived

as “I” or “me.”42

● Mindfulness and meditation (bhāvanā) are especially crucial for transforming the sense

of personal identity. In practices such as vipassanā (insight meditation), individuals

closely observe the arising and passing of sensations, thoughts, and emotions. This direct

41 Gethin, Rupert,The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 81–90.
42 Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans., The Noble Eightfold Path: Way to the End of Suffering (Kandy: Buddhist Publication
Society, 1994), 28–55.

54
 observation of experience reveals that all mental and physical events are transient and

conditioned, thereby weakening the habitual clinging to them as part of a self.

● The practice of selflessness is also supported by ethical conduct (śīla), which involves

reducing attachment, anger, and pride—all of which are rooted in ego and a false sense

of identity. By cultivating compassion, humility, and generosity, one slowly dissolves

the illusion of a rigid, self-centred identity and begins to see oneself as part of a greater

interdependent whole.43

● The doctrine of the two truths—conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth

(paramārtha-satya)—also plays an important role in practice. On the conventional level,

we speak of persons, responsibilities, and identities. However, through meditative

insight, one realizes the ultimate truth: that there is no enduring self behind these

conventions. The ability to hold both truths simultaneously allows practitioners to

function ethically in society while remaining unattached to the illusion of a permanent

identity.

● Advanced meditative states, such as the realization of śūnyatā (emptiness), especially in

Mahāyāna traditions, further dissolve the grasping itself. When one sees that not only the

self but all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, the boundaries between self and

others begin to dissolve. This realization leads to a profound transformation of identity—

moving from a narrow, ego-based self to a compassionate, open awareness that

transcends individuality.44

43 Keown, Damien, Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 57–65.
44 Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (London: Routledge, 2009), 85–92.

55
 ● In the Yogācāra school, the concept of ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) provides

a framework for understanding how karmic imprints shape the flow of identity over time.

Through meditation and purification, these karmic seeds can be altered, allowing for a

transformation of the mind-stream and a new mode of being to emerge—free from

delusion and clinging.

In essence, Buddhist practice does not seek to destroy the self in a nihilistic sense but aims to

reveal its emptiness and fluidity, thus enabling a radical transformation in how one lives,

perceives, and relates to others. Identity, then, becomes a skillful means rather than a prison—a

set of patterns that can be reshaped through wisdom and compassion.

The transformation of identity through Buddhist practice is not only theoretical but deeply

practical and experiential. It is a liberation from the suffering caused by the illusion of a fixed

self and an opening into a freer, wiser, and more compassionate mode of existence.

56
 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of momentariness stands as one of the most profound contributions of Buddhist

philosophy, offering a dynamic and transformative perspective on the nature of existence.

Rooted in the broader framework of impermanence, non-self (anātman), and dependent

origination (pratītyasamutpāda), it presents reality as a continuous stream of causally linked yet

momentary phenomena—each arising and ceasing within an instant. This view radically departs

from traditional metaphysical systems that posit permanence, essence, or enduring identity.

Throughout this dissertation, I have explored the conceptual basis, philosophical implications,

and practical applications of momentariness, analyzing its interpretations across various

Buddhist schools—Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. While

each school approaches momentariness from a distinct ontological and epistemological

standpoint, they converge on the insight that clinging to permanence is the root of suffering and

that understanding impermanence is essential to liberation.

Despite its philosophical elegance, momentariness has been critically examined by other Indian

traditions such as Nyāya and Vedānta, which challenge its ability to explain causality, memory,

moral responsibility, and the continuity of personal identity. In response, Buddhist thinkers

refined their theories using concepts such as causal succession, karmic seeds (bīja), and the

57
storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). These responses not only preserved the coherence of

the doctrine but also expanded its philosophical depth.

One of the most profound philosophical consequences of momentariness lies in its implications

for personal identity. Instead of conceiving the self as a fixed and enduring entity, Buddhism

redefines it as a causally connected series of momentary phenomena, without any permanent

substratum. This challenges traditional notions of identity but offers a new framework—

functional, interdependent, and ethically responsible—through which personal agency and moral

continuity can still be understood.

From a personal philosophical perspective, the doctrine of momentariness offers both logical

clarity and existential relevance. In a world obsessed with permanence—of achievements,

relationships, and identity—this Buddhist insight serves as a powerful reminder of

impermanence. It calls into question our attachments, our sense of control, and even our

understanding of the self. Yet, rather than inducing nihilism, this insight brings a sense of

urgency and ethical responsibility, encouraging us to live with awareness, compassion, and

mindfulness.

From my own point of view, the doctrine of momentariness is more than an abstract

metaphysical claim—it is a deeply relevant and transformative insight for everyday life. In a

world constantly marked by change, instability, and uncertainty, this doctrine teaches us to let go

of rigid attachments — to people, possessions, identities, and even beliefs. It encourages a

deeper awareness of the present moment and fosters mindfulness, compassion, and detachment.

Personally, I find that momentariness allows for a more flexible, adaptive, and ethical approach

to life. It helps me to appreciate experiences as they are—fleeting yet meaningful—and to

navigate suffering with clarity and resilience.

58
In particular, the Buddhist rejection of a permanent self challenges us to rethink personal identity

not as a fixed entity but as a process—conditioned, interconnected, and momentary. This has

profound ethical implications: it removes the illusion of ego-based permanence and replaces it

with a sense of shared vulnerability and responsibility. We act not as isolated selves, but as

participants in a vast web of causality and interbeing.

Thus, the doctrine of momentariness, while seemingly paradoxical, offers a powerful lens

through which to understand suffering, selfhood, and spiritual growth. It is not a nihilistic denial

of existence, but an invitation to live more consciously—grounded in the present, aware of

impermanence, and committed to ethical and compassionate action.

In conclusion, this study reaffirms the significance of momentariness as both a philosophical

principle and a practical guide. It has the power to deconstruct illusions, dissolve ego-clinging,

and open the path to freedom from suffering (nirvāṇa). In a world driven by impermanence,

momentariness is not merely a truth to be understood, but a wisdom to be lived.

59
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