Wundt, Avenarius, and Scientific Psychology A Debate at the

Turn of the Twentieth Century

Visit the link below to download the full version of this book:

https://medidownload.com/product/wundt-avenarius-and-scientific-psychology-a-deb
ate-at-the-turn-of-the-twentieth-century/

Click Download Now

 Acknowledgements

This research is part of the project “Scientific Philosophy: Avenarius,

Petzoldt and the Berlin Group”, founded by SIR program (MIUR—
Italy), and conducted at the University of Naples “Federico II.” For the
archival documents consulted during the research, the author thanks
the following: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz.
Handschriftsabteilung (Richard Avenarius’ Nachlass); Universitätsarchiv
- Leipzig (Wilhelm Wundt’s letters); and Universitätsbibliothek der Karl-
Marx-Universität Leipzig, Abteilung für Handschriften und Inkunabeln.
This book is a revised and translated version of Chiara Russo Krauss, Con
Wundt, oltre Wundt. Richard Avenarius e il dibattito sulla psicologia sci-
entifica tra Otto e Novecento, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2016. The
author thanks Rubbettino for the permission to publish the translation,
and Palgrave Macmillan for making this book available to an interna-
tional audience.

vii
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Wundt and the Rise of Scientific Psychology 1
1.2 The Historiography of Wundtism 3
1.3 Mach and Avenarius in the History of Philosophy 5
1.4 The Aim of the Book 7
References 9

2 Richard Avenarius 13
2.1 Avenarius’ Relationship with Wundt 13
2.2 The Critique of Introjection 18
2.3 Object and Purpose of Psychology 24
2.4 Mach and Avenarius 28
2.5 Psychophysical Parallelism 33
References 38

3 Wilhelm Wundt and the Crisis in the Relationship

with Avenarius 41
3.1 The “Ideal-Realistic” Approach 41
3.2 Physical and Psychical Causality 45
3.3 Physiology and Psychology 48
3.4 Psychology and the Spiritual Sciences 50
3.5 The Break with Avenarius 52
References 57

ix
x    Contents

4 The Spread of the New Definition of Psychology 59

4.1 The Repudiation of Wundt: Oswald Külpe’s Grundriss 59
4.2 A Philosophical Deepening: Hugo Münsterberg 68
4.3 The Circle Widens: Ebbinghaus and Ward 81
4.4 A Synthesis: E. B. Titchener (with a Digression
on William James) 90
References 108

5 Wundt’s Reaction 113

5.1 The Appropriation of the Definition of Psychology
by Point of View 113
5.2 Two Interpretations of Psychophysical Parallelism 117
5.3 Against the Materialistic Definition of Psychology 121
5.4 The Final Charge Against Avenarius 125
5.5 Closing Remarks 141
References 146

Index 149
 About the Author

Chiara Russo Krauss, Ph.D. is a researcher in the history of philos-

ophy at the University of Naples “Federico II.” Her field of expertise
is the German philosophy of the late nineteenth century, with special
attention to the problems connected with the development of mod-
ern sciences, and psychology in particular. She published studies about
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Neo-Kantianism, Oswald Külpe, Wilhelm
Wundt, and, especially, Empiriocriticism and its main representatives:
Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. Russo Krauss translated from
German into Italian two Avenarius’ books and published several essays
on his thought, based not only on his works but also on his unpublished
documents.
Russo Krauss is the Principal Investigator of the project “Scientific
Philosophy: Avenarius, Petzoldt and the Berlin Group,” founded by the
SIR Program of the Italian Ministry of University and Research.

xi
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1  Wundt and the Rise of Scientific Psychology

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychology was still
regarded as the branch of philosophy studying the soul. However, the
situation changed rapidly as the development of experimental physiol-
ogy resulted more and more in the adoption of scientific methods for the
study of phenomena that seemed only classifiable as psychical.
Over the course of a century, Europe—and Germany in
particular—experienced breathtaking advances in the knowledge of liv-
ing organisms. Johannes Müller (1801–1858) trained a whole generation
of experimental physiologists. Mathias Schleiden (1804–1881), Theodor
Schwann (1810–1882), and Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) put to good
use the recent improvement of microscope optic and developed the first
cellular theories. Justus von Liebig (1803–1873) made a great contribu-
tion to the development of organic chemistry. But the list goes on.
This scientific renewal led to the unfolding of a grand research
program, aiming at questioning the assumptions of the so-called
Naturphilosophie, i.e., the speculative biology that was based on the
assumption of a teleological living force animating organic matter. In its
place, this new trend affirmed the possibility and necessity of a mechanis-
tic explanation of living beings.
As soon as the perceptual apparatus and the nervous system became
the objects of research, the advances in the field of physiology impacted
significantly on psychology too. The focus was increasingly on the

© The Author(s) 2019 1

C. Russo Krauss, Wundt, Avenarius, and Scientific Psychology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12637-7_1
2 C. RUSSO KRAUSS

organism’s reaction to stimuli. Ernst Weber (1795–1878) and Gustav

Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) formulated the law that mathemati-
cally described the relationship between the change in a physical stim-
ulus and the change in perception. Charles Bell (1774–1842), François
Magendie (1783–1855), Marshall Hall (1790–1857), and Hermann von
Helmholtz (1821–1894) outlined the phenomenon of reflex arc, accord-
ing to which peripherical signals travel toward the central nervous system
through sensory nerves, from where a response departs, that proceeds
centrifugally down the motor nerves.
As a result, from the field of pure physiology, a new science origi-
nated, named psychophysics by Fechner. He defined it as the “exact sci-
ence of the functional or dependency relations between body and mind.”
An “ancient task,” indeed. Nonetheless, what was new was how this dis-
cipline intended to tackle such a task: by building on “experience and
mathematical connections of empirical facts” (Fechner 1860, V).
Although all these studies on the physiology of sensations and nerv-
ous system had already started to change the understanding of human
mind, none had yet proposed a complete remake of the old psychology
on these new bases. It was Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) who first took
this further step. For this reason, “even though he cannot be credited
with a single significant scientific discovery, any genuine methodologi-
cal innovation or any influential theoretical generalization,” it is generally
recognized that he “played the crucial role in constituting the field” of
scientific psychology (Danziger 1990, 396).
Indeed, it was Wundt’s merit if psychology became aware of itself, of
what it had become. In his magnum opus Grundzüge der physiologischen
Psychologie (Principles of Physiological Psychology 1874), he brought
together in a coherent fashion the psychophysiological findings that had
been accumulating for over a century. Secondly, but even more impor-
tant, in this book he explicitly conceived psychology as an autonomous
science, defining its object, method, and aim, as well as its relations with
other disciplines, such as philosophy and physiology.
The book began with this declaration of intent:

The work which I here present to the public is an attempt to mark out a
new domain of science. I am well aware that the question may be raised,
whether the time is yet ripe for such an undertaking. The new disci-
pline rests upon anatomical and physiological foundations which, in cer-
tain respects, are themselves very far from solid; while the experimental
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

treatment of psychological problems must be pronounced, from every

point of view, to be still in its first beginnings. At the same time, [a gen-
eral survey of the present status of a developing science is the best mean
of discovering the blanks that our ignorance has left in its subject matter]
(Wundt 1874, III, trans. Wundt 1904, V, translation modified)

In spite of the somewhat rhetorical cautiousness of this statement,

the book turned out to be anything but too ahead of its time. On the
contrary, it met the widespread need for orientation in the vast but cha-
otic world of the physiological study of psychological phenomena. The
immense success of the work made Wundt the preeminent figure in the
world of psychology, even though his scientific value was probably not
comparable to that of other scientists from that era.1
The subsequent foundation of the Leipzig Institute for Experimental
Psychology (1879) further consolidated Wundt’s role as the “pope” of
the new discipline.2 Here again, the importance of his laboratory lies not
in the number of discoveries that were made in those rooms,3 rather in
its impact and meaning for the culture of the time. A continuous flow of
students from all over the world came to the Leipzig Institute, eager to
learn the rudiments of the new science from the man that was regarded
as its highest representative.4

1.2  The Historiography of Wundtism

In 1929 Edward Boring wrote what can be considered the first history
of psychology. His partition of scholars into several different schools and
trends, as well as his reconstruction of their ideas, became a historio-
graphical canon.
Boring saw in Wundt the origin of scientific psychology, “the first man
who without reservation [was] properly called a psychologist” (Boring
1929, 310). Of course, there were other leading scholars of psychology,

1 An account of Wundt’s—not quite impressive—scientific career up to the time of the

publication of the Grundzüge can be found in Diamond (2001).

2 The definition of Wundt as the “psychological pope of the old world” is in a letter that

William James wrote to Hugo Münsterberg in 1896 (Perry 1935, 145).

3 On the research conducted in Wundt’s laboratory see Robinson (2001).

4 Wundt tutored 186 students during his stay in Leipzig, but this number does not take

into account all the scholars that visited the laboratory for purely scientific reasons (Tinker
1932).
4 C. RUSSO KRAUSS

such as Franz Brentano (1838–1917), Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), and

George Elias Müller (1850–1934), who had different conceptions of
this science. However, their positions were minority ones, therefore, at
that time, “orthodox experimental psychology [was] the psychology of
Wundt” (Boring 1929, 377).
Still, at the end of the nineteenth century, this orthodoxy was increas-
ingly questioned. The emerging trend was addressed by Boring under
the heading “The ‘New’ Psychology.” He used this label to indicate the
Wundtian psychologists that progressively embraced anti-Wundtian posi-
tions, among whom he included Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909),
Oswald Külpe (1862–1915), and Edward B. Titchener (1867–1927). In
the same chapter, Boring also discussed the “new epistemology of Mach
and Avenarius,” since they “affected, on the systematic side, the new psy-
chology” (Boring 1929, 389).
Around 1979 the centennial of the foundation of the Leipzig Institute
for Experimental Psychology breathed new life into the dormant field of
Wundt studies. The anniversary was an opportunity to bring up to date
the historiographical canon that had aged over five decades.5 The result
was a rediscovery of the true Wundt, opposed to the common but dis-
torted depiction inherited from Boring, whose misinterpretations—as
the new research found out—were affected by Boring’s master Edward
B. Titchener. As an English man, the latter viewed Wundt through the
distorting lens of British empiricism, thus placing the German psycholo-
gist in the same line of descent with Locke, Mill, and Hume. Moreover,
despite having the merit of introducing Wundt in the United States by
translating his works, Titchener amended the texts, blue-penciling the
parts that did not fit with the narrative of Wundt as the founding father
of experimental psychology.6

5 The main fruits of this new wave of studies are the collective books by Bringmann and

Tweney (1980), and Rieber (1980). This latter also have a new and expanded edition
(Rieber and Robinson 2001).
6 On this subject see Blumenthal (1980). Specifically, Blumenthal claims that Boring

wrongly attributed to Wundt the following ideas: (1) psychology coincides with physiolog-
ical psychology; (2) psychology belongs to natural sciences; (3) “scientific” equals “exper-
imental;” (4) introspection is the primary method of psychology; (5) consciousness can
be reduced to a sum of elemental sensory contents; (6) mind and body are dualistically
opposed; (7) there is no such thing as free agency in mental processes (Blumenthal 1980,
438–42). Similarly, Kurt Danziger stresses that Boring only focused on Wundt’s research
on perception, while his main interest was actually the voluntary action (Danziger 2001).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

The renewal of Wundt studies that began in 1979 was also the occa-
sion for revisiting the history of the so-called “new psychology.” Kurt
Danziger’s well-known paper The positivist repudiation of Wundt pre-
sented a more accurate account of the disavowal of Wundtian ideas by
younger psychologists like Külpe, Titchener, and Ebbinghaus. Namely,
Danziger focused on the role played by the “positivist” Ernst Mach and
Richard Avenarius, whose conceptions influenced Wundt’s pupils, driv-
ing them to reject the master’s ideas. According to Danziger, despite his
citing of Mach and Avenarius, Boring lacked philosophical insight into
the more theoretical aspects of the discussion (Danziger 1979, 206).
Danziger’s paper indisputably corrected many inaccuracies of Boring’s
account, clarifying the different positions of the protagonists of the
debate. For this reason, it has become the reference point for anyone
interested in this phase of experimental psychology’s early history. Still,
on closer inspection, even Danziger’s work is not without shortcomings.
His reconstruction of the “repudiation of Wundt”—as subsequently all
those who draw on it—is affected by a common mistake in the history of
philosophy: the failure to recognize Richard Avenarius’ role in German
culture at the turn of the century.

1.3  Mach and Avenarius in the History of Philosophy

Avenarius is still regularly mentioned in the studies concerning German
philosophy of late nineteenth century. His name—as in the case of
Boring’s and Danziger’s works—mostly appears alongside that of Ernst
Mach. The two thinkers are regarded as representatives of the same
school of thought, indicated by various tags: critical positivism, realistic
empiricism, phenomenalism, neutral monism, philosophy of immanence,
and—last but not least—Empiriocriticism, the only term that designates
exclusively and unambiguously their philosophies.
The adjective “empiriocritical” was coined by Avenarius to charac-
terize some key concepts of his philosophical system.7 Later on, he and
his pupils adopted the noun “Empiriocriticism” to indicate that system
of thought as a whole (Carstanjen 1898, 54). Even though Mach and
Avenarius mutually acknowledged the similarities between their ideas,
they never had a close relationship, but only exchanged some letters

7 For instance: “empiriocritical axiom,” “empiriocritical standpoint,” “empiriocritical

finding,” “empiriocritical substitution” (cf. R. Avenarius 1888, 1890, [1891] 1905).

6 C. RUSSO KRAUSS

over the years. It was Joseph Petzoldt, one of Avenarius’ foremost disci-
ple, that vigorously promoted the association between the two thinkers
throughout his career, since he believed that they were the harbingers
of a new era in the history of philosophy. Petzoldt was very active in
Berlin at the beginning of the twentieth century, having founded the
Society for Empirical Philosophy, that was the base of the so-called Berlin
Group, formed by Hans Reichenbach and other logical empiricists.8
With his works, Petzoldt succeeded in creating and consolidating the
link between Mach and Avenarius. Yet, he was not quite as successful in
keeping alive the attention on Avenarius’ ideas. Because of Mach’s great
fame, and because of Avenarius obscure style of writing, the latter was
progressively overlooked, being cited next to Mach as a mere compan-
ion.9 The book that cemented this situation once and for all was Lenin’s
famous Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, where the latter term was
used as a label to indicate the duo Mach/Avenarius, even though the
Austrian physicist had the lion’s share.10
Given the above, we might say that the association with Mach was
both a blessing and a curse for the memory of Avenarius, since it ensured
that his name continued to circulate in the history of philosophy, while at
the same time it turned Avenarius into a sort of pale duplicate of Mach.
As stated earlier, Danziger’s partial account is an example of this progres-
sive oblivion, since it overlaps Avenarius and Mach, letting the first fade
into the second, to the point that the positivist and anti-Wundtian posi-
tion is often simply called “Machian.” The same is true for most of the
works that deal with the debate between Wundt and the representatives

8 On Petzoldt and the Berlin Group see Hentschel (1990), Haller and Stadler (1993),

Danneberg et al. (1994), Milkov and Peckhaus (2013).

9 For example, it is revealing how hastily Boring deals with Avenarius: “Titchener seized

especially upon Mach and was ever after greatly influenced by him. Külpe, more given to
philosophical intricacies, favored the difficult Avenarius. There is no real difference here,
for the two men later agreed that they were both saying the same thing though in very dif-
ferent words;” “Richard Avenarius […] was as difficult, uninspiring, and involved a thinker
as Mach was simple, dramatic, and clear. He worked without knowledge of Mach, though
at the same time, but both men later agreed that their theories were essentially the same”
(Boring 1929, 389, 391).
10 To get a sense of the disproportion between the two: throughout Lenin’s book,

Avenarius is mentioned 279 times and Mach 692 times. In 72 of these occurrences, the
two are cited together. This means that Mach is cited over three times more than Avenarius
(around 620 to 200, excluding the joint citations). Cf. Lenin (1927).
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

of the second generation of psychologists, where Avenarius is generally

cited by sheer convention.11

1.4  The Aim of the Book

Putting Avenarius back at the center of the debate between Wundt and
the second generation of experimental psychologists is not just a way
to counter the imbalance in favor of Mach. The truth is that without a
proper comprehension of Avenarius’ thought is not possible to under-
stand the “positivist repudiation” of Wundt.
In particular, this study aims at proving that Avenarius was neither
a pure philosopher, stranger to the Wundtian milieu, and whose work
influenced the experimental psychologists from outside; nor just one of
the many Wundtian psychologists that progressively adopted anti-Wund-
tian positions. Instead, Avenarius held a unique position, because he was

11 Avenarius is cited, next to Mach, by Kusch (1995, 1999). However, he only refers the

little that Danziger’s paper said about him. Avenarius is mentioned only once, still along-
side Mach, in Woodward and Ash (1982). There is no trace of Avenarius’ name in Mischel
(1970), nor in Kardas (2013). Since the list of studies neglecting Avenarius could extend
much further, let us concentrate on the few exceptions to this state of affairs. David K.
Robinson (1987) reconstructs the relationship between Avenarius and Wundt from archival
sources. Yet, being a historian, he does not focus on the philosophical discussion between
the two. Katherine Arens (1989) has the merit of talking about Avenarius by making direct
reference to his words. Nonetheless, she only focuses on Avenarius’ psychophysical theory,
presented in the Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (Critique of Pure Experience), leaving aside
his more philosophical works, such as Der menschliche Weltbegriff (The Human Concept
of the World) and the Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie (Remarks
on the Concept of Object of Psychology). Not entirely convincing is also Arens’ choice to
place Avenarius between Fechner and Wundt, not only because he was actually a follower
of Wundt, at least at first, but also because his mature view on psychology can be consid-
ered more advanced than the Wundtian one. For this reason, as we hope to demonstrate
with this book, it is difficult to agree with Arens’ statement that “the work of Wilhelm
Wundt represented the major trend in academic psychology which aided to obscure the
systemic analysis proposed by Avenarius” (Arens 1989, 120). Annette Mülberger (2012)
deals with the conflict between Avenarius’ and Wundt’s concepts of psychology, but only
indirectly, since she analyzes the work of Avenarius’ pupil Rudolf Willy (1899), who had
no significant impact on the debate of the time. Lastly, the great reconstruction of Wundt’s
intellectual career by Saulo de Freitas Araujo (2015) crosses Avenarius’ path when it comes
to the analysis of Wundt’s articles Über naiven und kritischen Realismus (On Naïve and
Critical Realism), directed against the immanentism of Wilhelm Schuppe and Robert von
Schubert-Soldern, and the Empiriocriticism of Avenarius and Mach. However, given the
purpose of Araujo’s book, Avenarius is only watched through Wundt’s eyes.
8 C. RUSSO KRAUSS

closely tied to Wundt (unlike Mach, who had practically no relationship

with him),12 and because—contrary to all other protagonists of Wundt’s
circle—he was a philosopher interested in experimental psychology, rather
than the reverse. For these reasons, Avenarius had a vantage point in the
promotion of scientific psychology within the faculties of philosophy. By
the same token, he was more exposed to Wundt’s accusation against the
representatives of the “new psychology:” the accusation of supporting
a materialistic—and therefore philosophical and metaphysical—stand,
rather than a rigorously scientific one.
This book will show: (1) that at the beginning Wundt and Avenarius
shared the same idea of psychology, thus finding an ally in each other;
(2) that, over the course of time, they parted ways, as Wundt took more
conservative positions, whereas Avenarius developed a philosophical
foundation for a radically physiological psychology; (3) that, at the turn
of the century, the two thinkers represented two alternative paradigms
for psychology: the declining Wundtian one and the rising Avenariusian
one.
To meet these goals, Chapters 2 and 3 will present the conceptions,
respectively, of Avenarius and Wundt. Chapter 4 will introduce some
leading figures of the second generation of experimental psychologists,
showing how their departure from Wundtian positions was influenced by
Avenarius’ thought. Finally, Chapter 5 will examine Wundt’s attempt to
respond to the new trend. To this end, we will pay particular attention
to the chronology of the works that form Wundt’s corpus, and to the
changes occurred in their different editions. By doing so, we will see that
many notions that are now generally regarded as typical of Wundt’s sys-
tem of thought (such as “immediate experience” or “creative synthesis”)
were not part of the Wundtian orthodoxy against which the representa-
tives of the “new psychology” were fighting. Rather, these notions were
the result of Wundt’s late efforts to adjust his ideas to respond to the
new trend.
Alongside a historically careful reconstruction of the debate between
Wundt and his pupils, we also aim at providing a deeper analysis of the

12 The only evidence of a correspondence between the two is a telegram Mach sent to

Wundt for his 70th birthday (Mach to Wundt, August 16, 1902, Wundt Archive, NA
Wundt/III/1601-1700/1601/135/355-356). On the other hand, we have almost fifty
letters left from the correspondence between Wundt and Avenarius (see Wundt Archive and
Avenarius Archive).
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

philosophical content of this debate, thus avoiding the stereotyped rep-

resentations of its protagonists’ positions.
In summary, the reader will find in these pages: (1) an exposition of
Wundt’s ideas and of the way they evolved in response to the chang-
ing cultural environment; (2) a unique introduction to the philoso-
phy of Richard Avenarius, that fills the surprising lack of studies on his
thought and gives him back his own philosophical identity; (3) a more
accurate account of a turning point in the history of psychology, which
updates the canonical but partial reconstruction of the “repudiation of
Wundt” provided by Kurt Danziger in his milestone essay from 1979;
(4) an overview of some of the main protagonists and topics of the phil-
osophical debate on scientific psychology of the late 19th and early 20th
century.

References
Avenarius Archive, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—Preußischer Kulturbesitz,
Handschriftenabteilung.
Wundt Archive, Psychologischen Instituts der Universität Leipzig—
Universitätsarchiv Leipzig. http://home.uni-leipzig.de/wundtbriefe/viewer.
htm.
Araujo, Saulo de Freitas. 2015. Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of
Psychology: A Reappraisal. Heidelberg: Springer.
Arens, Katherine. 1989. Structures of Knowing: Psychologies of the Nineteenth
Century. Dordrecht: Springer.
Avenarius, Richard. 1888. Kritik der reinen Erfahrung. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Leipzig:
Fues.
———. 1890. Kritik der reinen Erfahrung. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Leipzig: Fues.
———. [1891] 1905. Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzig: Reisland.
Blumenthal, Arthur L. 1980. “Wilhelm Wundt: Problems of interpretation.” In
Wundt Studies: A Centennial Collection, edited by Wolfgang G. Bringmann
and Ryan D. Tweney, 435–45. Toronto: Hogrefe.
Boring, Edwin G. 1929. A History of Experimental Psychology. New York:
Century.
Bringmann, Wolfgang G., and Ryan D. Tweney, eds. 1980. Wundt Studies: A
Centennial Collection. Toronto: Hogrefe.
Carstanjen, Friedrich. 1898. “Der Empiriokritizismus: Zugleich eine Erwiderung
auf W. Wundts Aufsätze ‘Über naiven und kritischen Realismus’.”
Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 22: 45–95, 190–214,
267–93.
10 C. RUSSO KRAUSS

Danneberg, Lutz, Andreas Kamlah, and Lothar Schäfer, eds. 1994. Hans
Reichenbach und die Berliner Gruppe. Braunschweig: Vieweg.
Danziger, Kurt. 1979. “The Positivist Repudiation of Wundt.” Journal of the
History of the Behavioral Sciences 15 (3): 205–30.
———. 1990. “Wilhelm Wundt and the Emergence of Experimental
Psychology.” In Companion to the History of Modern Science, edited by Robert
C. Olby, Geoffrey N. Cantor, John R. R. Christie, and M. J. S. Hodge, 396–
408. London: Routledge.
———. 2001. “The Unknown Wundt: Drive, Apperception, and Volition.” In
Wilhelm Wundt in History, 95–120. Boston: Springer.
Diamond, Solomon. 2001. “Wundt before Leipzig.” In Wilhelm Wundt in
History, 1–68. Boston: Springer.
Fechner, Gustav Theodor. 1860. Elemente der Psychophysik. Leipzig: Breitkopf
und Härtel.
Haller, Rudolf, and Friedrich Stadler. 1993. Wien, Berlin, Prag: Der Aufstieg der
wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Hentschel, Klaus, 1990. Die Korrespondenz Petzoldt—Reichenbach: Zur
Entwicklung der “wissenschaftlichen Philosophie” in Berlin. Berlin: SIGMA.
Kardas, Edward P. 2013. History of Psychology: The Making of a Science. Boston:
Cengage Learning.
Kusch, Martin. 1995. Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical
Knowledge. London: Routledge.
———. 1999. Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1927. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Edited by
Alexender Trachtenberg. Vol. XIII. Collected Works of V. I. Lenin. London:
Martin Lawrence.
Milkov, Nikolay, and Volker Peckhaus, eds. 2013. The Berlin Group and the
Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Dordrecht: Springer.
Mischel, Theodore. 1970. “Wundt and the Conceptual Foundations of
Psychology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1): 1–26.
Mülberger, Annette. 2012. “Wundt Contested: The First Crisis Declaration in
Psychology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences 43 (2): 434–44.
Perry, Ralph B., ed. 1935. The Thought and Character of William James. Vol II.
Philosophy and Psychology. London: Oxford University Press.
Rieber, Robert, ed. 1980. Wilhelm Wundt and the Making of a Scientific
Psychology. New York: Plenum Press.
Rieber, Robert, and David Robinson, eds. 2001. Wilhelm Wundt in History:
The Making of a Scientific Psychology. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Publishers.
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

Robinson, David K. 1987. “Wilhelm Wundt and the Establishment of

Experimental Psychology, 1875–1914: The Context of a New Field of
Scientific Research”. PhD dissertation‚ University of California, Berkeley.
———. 2001. “Reaction-Time Experiments in Wundt’s Institute and Beyond.”
In Wilhelm Wundt in History, 161–204. Boston: Springer.
Tinker, Miles A. 1932. “Wundt’s Doctorate Students and Their Theses 1875–
1920.” The American Journal of Psychology 44 (4): 630–37.
Willy, Rudolf. 1899. Die Krisis in der Psychologie. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland.
Woodward, William Ray, and Mitchell G. Ash, eds. 1982. The Problematic
Science: Psychology in Nineteenth-Century Thought. New York: Praeger.
Wundt, Wilhelm. 1874. Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. 1st ed.
Leipzig: Engelmann.
———. 1904. Principles of Physiological Psychology. Translated by Edward B.
Titchener. New York: Macmillan.
 CHAPTER 2

Richard Avenarius

2.1   Avenarius’ Relationship with Wundt

Richard Avenarius was born in Paris in 1843, son of the publisher
Eduard and brother of the poet Ferdinand, who founded the important
journal Der Kunstwart (1887). The name Richard was chosen to honor
his maternal uncle and godfather, the composer Richard Wagner.1
Being raised in such a stimulating environment, Avenarius grew with-
out focusing on a single interest. He spent his early life traveling through
Italy, and studying philology, psychology, and philosophy in Leipzig,
Zurich, Berlin, and Munich (where he lived with his uncle, Wagner). In
the years spent at these German universities, Avenarius encountered sev-
eral figures that were crucial for the shaping of his philosophy, such as the
philologist Friedrich Zarncke, the Herbartian Heymann Steinthal, the
logician and philosopher Moritz Drobisch, the physiologist Carl Ludwig,
the already mentioned Fechner, and the zoologist Karl Semper, who also
became his brother in law. In 1866, Avenarius settled down in Leipzig,
where he soon revealed an inclination for organizing cultural initiatives.
He took part to the then rising student movement for university reform,

1 Extended biographical information on Richard Avenarius can be found in the family

history written by another of his brother (Avenarius 1912, 123–150).

© The Author(s) 2019 13

C. Russo Krauss, Wundt, Avenarius, and Scientific Psychology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12637-7_2