GD MUN 2025

Committee: Lok Sabha

Agenda: Deliberation upon the basic structure
of the Constitution, AIR 1973 and SC 1461
Letter from the Executive Board

Greetings Members!

It gives us immense pleasure to welcome you to this simulation of the Lok

Sabha at GDMUN’25. We look forward to an enriching and rewarding
experience. Our agenda for the session is quite significant: “Deliberation
upon the basic structure of the Constitution AIR 1973 and SC 1461”. This
study guide is a stepping stone; we encourage our leaders to venture
beyond their boundaries, discovering new perspectives to bring forth in our
discussions. Your research, coupled with compelling arguments and a
robust presentation of facts, holds immense value. Here, it's essential to
note that the crux lies in the substance of your contributions—fluency,
diction, or oratory skills, while good to have, take a backseat to the content
you bring to the table. So, dive into your research, express your thoughts,
and you're sure to make a lot of sense. We're genuinely looking forward to
learning a great deal from each one of you and hope this committee brings
you an equally rewarding experience. If you have any queries or need
clarification, please feel free to reach out. We'll do our best to respond to
your questions. The upcoming committee sessions promise excitement and
interest, fueled by the all-encompassing nature of the issue at hand. As
members of the Executive Board, we're not just here to guide; we genuinely
hope to gain insights from being part of this vibrant committee. Don't
hesitate to contact us for any doubts you may have. Warm regards,

Aayaan Manhas
Speaker
[email protected]
RESEARCH TIPS

Lok Sabha Website

1) Go to http://loksabhaph.nic.in/
2) Under the Debates section, you will find 2 options - Text of Debate and
Uncorrected Debate. In the Text of Debate, speeches are uploaded 2-3
months after the Parliament session ends because those are filtered
documents. Under the uncorrected debate section, you will find the
speeches immediately. For your research, you can use any.
3) Now go to the Questions section and click on Question Search. In the
search Box, type the name of the topic, e.g. CAA and see what questions
were asked by MPs in Parliament, what was the reply of the Minister and if
we can get any substantive content.

List of Websites for Legal Research of a Topic

https://indiankanoon.org/
https://www.livelaw.in/
https://www.barandbench.com/
https://www.legallyindia.com/
https://www.vakilno1.com/
https://lawtimesjournal.in/
https://www.manupatrafast.com/articles/ArticleSearch.aspx

List of Websites for Substantive Research

https://www.researchgate.net/
https://www.academia.edu/
https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/
https://prsindia.org/
https://ficci.in/
https://www.ssrn.com/in
Valid Sources:
1. Government Reports (Each ministry publishes its own reports
including the External Affairs Ministry)
2. PTI, PIB
3. Government-run News channels i.e. RSTV, LSTV, DYD News
4. RTI
5. SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGEMENTS
6. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
7. ANY STATUTORY LAW OF INDIA
8. Questions and Answers of the Parliament
9. Government Reports
10. Parliamentary Standing Committee reports
Divide your debate and prepare according to these three
parts:

General debate – wherein you communicate your stance on the issue,

1.
keeping in mind not to reiterate the aforementioned points made by your
fellow delegates.
Thematic debate - wherein you draw attention to specific topics.
2.
Furthermore, this allows us to address each subtopic/theme/issue separately
as in Discussion Sessions.
3. Action on draft document i.e A BILL cover the end goal of this
committee.

Introduction to the committee-

The Lok sabha is the lower house of the parliament,The Lok sabha
assembles in lok sabha chambers,sansad bhawan New Delhi,Lok
sabha is composed of representatives chosen by direct elections on
the basis of adult suffrage (w.r.t representation of peoples act
1951).The maximum allowed strength of the house under the
constitution is 552(currently 543 active members).The distribution of
the total elective membership among the States ensures that, to the
greatest extent possible, the ratio of seats assigned to each State to
its population is the same for every State. The Lok Sabha lasts for five
years from the date of its first meeting, unless it is dissolved earlier.
When that time has passed, the House is dissolved.

However, this time frame could be prolonged while a proclamation of

emergency is in effect.
The Lok Sabha performs a number of functions,Major once are
mentioned below-

1. Legislative:

Law-making is the main function of the Parliament and in this field

the Lok Sabha plays an important role. All types of bills can originate
in the Lok Sabha and if a bill is moved in and passed by the Rajya

Sabha, it has to come to the Lok Sabha for its approval.

2. Financial:

Control over the purse makes one powerful. In financial matters, the
Lok Sabha has a distinct superiority

over the Rajya Sabha. The Money Bill can be introduced only in the
Lok Sabha. It is up to the Lok

Sabha to accept or reject the suggestions for change in the Money

Bill made by the Rajya Sabha.

3. Control over Executive:

The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lower

House of the Parliament. Thus, the

government is accountable to the Lok Sabha for its acts of omission

and commission. It is only the Lok Sabha which can force the Council
of Ministers to resign by passing a vote of non-confidence against it.
There are also other methods by which the Lok Sabha can exercise
control over the central executive. These methods are putting
questions, moving adjournment motions and call-attention motions,
budget discussions, cut-motions and debates etc. By employing any
of these methods the

Lok Sabha can expose the misdeeds and inefficiency of the

government and warn it against repeating such mistakes.

4. Constitutional:

The Lok Sabha shares with the Rajya Sabha the power to amend the
constitution.

5. Electoral:

(a) The Lok Sabha takes part in the election of the President and the
Vice-President.

(b) It elects the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker.

(c) Its members are elected to different committees of the

Parliament.

6. Judicial:

(a) The Lok Sabha has the power to punish a person on the ground of
breach of privilege

(b) It takes part in the impeachment proceedings against the

President of India

(c) It shares power with the Rajya Sabha to remove the Judges of the
Supreme Court and the Judges of High Courts.
Introduction

One of the most important and significant debates in Indian constitutional

law concerns the Basic Structure of the Constitution. A thirteen-judge
Supreme Court bench established the principle that although Parliament
has broad authority to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot
change or destroy its "Basic Structure" in the seminal decision of
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, which serves as
the foundation for this agenda. This theory protects the fundamental
principles entrenched in the Constitution by acting as a judicially
established check on parliamentary power. During Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's administration, when constitutional amendments were regularly
proposed to strengthen governmental power and curtail judicial review—
most notably through the Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth, and
Twenty-Ninth Constitutional Amendments, the ruling was handed down
amid intense political unrest.

The Constitution authorizes Parliament and state legislatures to enact

legislation within their jurisdictions subject to constitutional restrictions.
Any law contravening constitutional provisions can be examined and set
aside by the judiciary. Although Article 368 authorizes Parliament to
amend the Constitution, such power is not unfettered. In Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court limited it by
formulating the basic structure doctrine that Parliament is not competent
to modify or abolish the basic features of the Constitution. Although not
used
the in the passage, the phrase "basic structure" provides
safeguarding of the original constitutional vision. Since then, the Supreme
Court has decided whether Parliament may revise the Constitution and
serve as its last interpreter.
Pre- 1973

Parliament's power to reform the Constitution, specifically the chapter

dealing with citizens' fundamental rights, was tested as early as 1951.
Numerous laws were passed in the states after independence to reform the
ownership of land and tenancy patterns. This was consistent with the
election promise of the governing Congress party to enforce the socialistic
objectives of the Constitution[enshrined in Article 39 (b) and (c) of Directive
Principles of State Policy] which called for equitable distribution of means
of production among citizens and avoidance of concentration of wealth
amongst a few. Owners of property negatively impacted by these
legislations approached the courts. The courts invalidated the land reform
acts, stating that they had crossed the core right to property assured by the
Constitution. Agitated with the adverse judgments, Parliament incorporated
these laws in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution under the First and
Fourth amendments (1951 and 1952 respectively), and hence effectively
exempted them from judicial review.

Parliament enacted the Ninth Schedule into the Constitution in the very
first amendment of 1951 as a method of immunising some laws against
review by the courts. According to the provisions of Article 31,which
themselves were modified a number of times subsequently, laws included
in the Ninth Schedule -- relating to acquisition of private property and
compensation payable for such acquisition -- cannot be questioned in a
court of law on the basis that they infringed the fundamental rights of
citizens. This shield of protection encompasses over 250 state legislatures
passed laws with the purpose of controlling the extent of land holding and
eliminating different forms of tenancy. The Ninth Schedule was designed
with the key motive of stopping the judiciary - who defended the right of
citizens to property on a number of occasions - from deviating the agenda
of the Congress party headed government towards a social revolution.
Property owners once more challenged the constitutional amendments
which put land reforms legislation in the Ninth Schedule before the
Supreme Court, stating that they contravene Article 13 (2) of the
Constitution.

Article 13 (2) enshrines the protection of the citizen's fundamental

rights.[4] Parliament and the state legislatures are categorically forbidden
from enacting legislation that could strip away or restrict the fundamental
rights accorded to the citizen. They contended that any modification of the
Constitution was considered law as contemplated by Article 13 (2). In 1952
(Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India) and 1955 (Sajjan Singh v.
Rajasthan), the Supreme Court rejected both stands and maintained
Parliament's power of amending any section of the Constitution including
one that impacts upon the fundamental rights of citizens. Substantially
however, two dissenting judges in Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan case
questioned whether the basic rights of citizens could be a plaything of the
majority party in Parliament.

The Shankari Prasad Verdict

In 1965, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court discussed the extent of

Parliament's amending power in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan. The case questioned the constitutional validity of the
Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment Act, 1964, which added various
land reform legislation to the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, thus
insulating them from judicial scrutiny under Part III (Fundamental
Rights).,In a 4:1 majority judgment, Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, in the
majority verdict, held that Article 368 of the Constitution gave Parliament
the authority to amend any portion of the Constitution, including Part III
(Fundamental Rights). The majority upheld the ruling of Shankari Prasad
v. Union of India (1951), holding that constitutional amendments under
Article 368 were not "law" for the purposes of Article 13(2) that prevents the
State from enacting any law which takes away or abridges fundamental
rights.

Mostly, it disapproved the contention that there were implied constraints

on Parliament's ability to revise fundamental rights. It believed that the
Constitution framers had used separate language for constitutional
amendments under Article 368, differentiating them from regular
under Articles 245-248. In consequence, constitutional
legislation
amendments fell outside Article 13. But Justice Hidayatullah, in a
memorable dissent, exercised prudence, and while indicating that
Parliament's amending powers were broad, opined that it may not be able
to change the basic structure or integral features of the Constitution. His
apprehensions prefigured what was to later emerge as the basic structure
doctrine. While the majority in Sajjan Singh did not accept the notion of
implied limitations, this case sowed the seeds of subsequent constitutional
controversy. Justice Hidayatullah's dissent, as well as arguments advanced
by counsel such as M.K. Nambiar, reflected early concerns regarding
unlimited parliamentary amending power, concerns that would fully
emerge in Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) and reach their
culmination in the development of the Basic Structure Doctrine in
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973).

That is to say, although the apex court in Sajjan Singh reaffirmed the wide
extent of Parliament's amending power, the dissenting opinion anticipated
the necessity of safeguarding the fundamental character and foundational
values of the Constitution from routine majoritarian processes.
The Sajjan Singh Case:

The subsequent important case that posed this question was Sajjan Singh
v. State of Rajasthan, where the constitutional validity of the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 was challenged in front of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. Under this amendment, some laws relating to property
rights were brought under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, hence
beyond the ambit of judicial review. The petitioners argued that this
amendment greatly reduced the extent of judicial review, a fundamental
aspect of the Constitution, and thus such an action could only be properly
undertaken through the process stipulated under Article 368, yet should be
struck down for transgressing the basic framework.

In line with the decision of Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, the

Supreme Court, 3:2, rejected the petitioner's arguments. The majority
opinion was that the "pith and substance" of the amendment was to
change the reach of the Fundamental Rights, and it did not in any way
infringe on the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226.
Reiterating its previous position, the Court reiterated the difference
between normal legislative power and constituent power, and further held
that Fundamental Rights were not beyond the ambit of Article 368. But
the minority judges had significant doubts. Justice M. Hidayatullah noted:

"I would need more cogent reasons than those provided in Shankari
Prasad to compel me to embrace the position that the Fundamental
Rights were not fundamental at all but were meant to be within the
jurisdiction of amendment as with the rest of the Constitution and
without the States' concurrence." Correspondingly, Justice J.R. Mudholkar
was hesitant to believe that the word "law" in Article 13 should be taken as
excluding amendments of the constitution within its meaning. He
propounded the important theory that every constitution has some
elementary characteristics which are not amendable — an early
conceptual expression which would come to be known much later as the
Basic Structure Doctrine.

The Golaknath Verdict

In 1967 an eleven-judge bench of the Supreme Court turned around. Giving

its 6:5 majority verdict in the Golaknath v. State of Punjab case, Chief
Justice Subba Rao advanced the interesting position that Article 368, which
had provisions regarding the amendment of the Constitution, was only
laying down the procedure of amendment. Article 368 did not grant
Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. The constituent power
(amending power) of Parliament emerged from other provisions in the
Constitution (Articles 245, 246, 248) that entrusted it with the law-making
power (plenary legislative power). The supreme court, therefore, decided
that Parliament's amending power and legislative powers were one and the
same. Any amendment of the Constitution, therefore, should be considered
to be law as defined in Article 13 (2).

The majority opinion invoked the idea of implied limits on Parliament's

ability to alter the Constitution. This perspective believed that the
Constitution provides a place of permanence to the citizen's fundamental
freedoms. By granting the Constitution to themselves, the people had kept
the fundamental rights for themselves. Article 13, in the opinion of the
majority, articulated this limitation on Parliament's powers. Parliament was
not able to amend, limit or undermine basic freedoms on account of this
very scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the freedoms conferred
by it. The judges declared that the basic rights were so inviolable and
transcendental in nature so that they could not be limited even if this step
were to get the unanimous ratification of both houses of Parliament. They
noted that a Constituent Assembly could be called by Parliament to
amend the basic rights if needed.

That is to say, the highest court maintained that certain aspects of the
Constitution were at its very heart and needed far greater than the
customary procedures to modify them. The term 'basic structure' was used
for the first time by M.K. Nambiar and other lawyers during the case of the
petitioners in Golaknath, but it was not until 1973 that the idea emerged in
the body of the verdict of the apex court.

Basic Structure (Concept):

The validity of the Twenty-fourth Amendment was challenged by the

Supreme Court of India, which gave a milestone judgment through eleven
separate judgments. The judges unanimously upheld the validity of the
Twenty-fourth Amendment and ruled that Parliament may amend any or
all of the provisions in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it was categorically
held that an amendment to the Constitution is not a law as contemplated
under Article 13(2) of the Constitution.

The Indian Parliament can enact laws for the country by exercising its
legislative power, whereas it can amend the Constitution by exercising its
constituent power. Constituent power is more superior to ordinary
legislative power, since the powers and functions of the Indian Parliament
and State Legislatures have constitutional limitations. The Indian
Constitution is not exhaustive of all the laws that govern the nation, but
only the Parliament can alter this structure under Article 368. Unlike
ordinary laws, amendments to the Constitution have to be enacted with a
special majority in both Houses of the Parliament. In the Kesavananda
Bharati case, seven out of the thirteen judges, including Chief Justice S.M.
Sikri, clearly declared that Parliament's constituent power has inherent
limitations. Parliament is not authorized under its amending power under
Article 368 to "damage", "emasculate", "destroy", "abrogate", "change", or
"alter" the 'basic structure' or the framework of the Constitution. This now-
famous ruling constituted the basis for what now enjoys universal
acceptance as the Basic Structure Doctrine, protecting some of the very
basic features of the Indian Constitution from the ambit of constitutional
amendment.

Basic Structure (Inclusions):

The Basic Structure, due to its open ended nature has obseverved several
changes and inclusions and till date is subject to judicial interpretation.

Strating from the Kesavanda Bharti Judgement each Justice laid down
differently what should include in the basic structure, There was no
unanimity of opinion within the majority.

CJI Sikri, Explained the Concept of Basic Structure and included;

- Constitutional Supremacy

- Republican and Democratic Form of Government

- Secular Character(Although not explicitly mentioned here)

- Seperation of powers between the legislature, Executive and

Judiciary

- Federal Character of the Constitution

Justice Shelat & Justice Grover added two more feature

- Inclusion of building a “Welfare State” contained in DPSP

- “Unity” & “Integrity”
Justice Hegde & Justice Mukherjee added:

- “Sovereignty”
- Democratic Character of Polity
- “Unity”
- Mandate to build a “Welfare State”

Justice Jagmohan Reddy, stated that basic features are to be found in the
Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions that translated as:

- Sovereign Democratic Republic

- Parliamentary Democracy
- Three Organs of the State

He also stated the constitution would not be itself without fundamental

freedom freedoms and directive principles.

Only Six judges on the bench agreed that the fundamental rights
belonged to the basic structure belonged to the fundamental rights of the
citizen belonged to the basic structure and Parliament could not ammed
it.

The Other side’s view, The Twenty-fourth Amendment's constitutional

validity was challenged by the Supreme Court of India, which gave a
milestone judgment in the form of eleven separate judgments. The judges
collectively upheld the validity of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and
held that Parliament can amend any or all of the provisions of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, it was strongly adhered to that a constitutional
amendment is different from a law as contemplated under Article 13(2) of
the Constitution. The Indian Parliament is able to enact laws for the
country through its legislative power, whereas it can amend the
Constitution through its constituent power. Constituent power is superior
to ordinary legislative power since the powers and functions of the Indian
Parliament and State Legislatures have constitutional limitations. The
Indian Constitution is not comprehensive in dealing with all the laws that
govern the nation, but only Parliament can modify this structure under
Article 368. Unlike regular laws, constitutional amendments have to be
enacted with a special majority in both Houses of Parliament. The
perspective given by Justice A.N. Ray (whose appointment as Chief
Justice over and above three senior judges, shortly after the delivery of the
Kesavananda Verdict, was generally believed to be politically motivated),
Justice M.H. Beg, Justice K.K. Mathew and Justice S.N. Dwivedi also
concurred that Golaknath had been erroneously decided. They asserted
the validity of all three challenged amendments. Justice Ray, believed that
all provisions of the Constitution were fundamental and no differentiation
could be drawn between the essential and non-essential provisions of the
Constitution. All of them believed that Parliament could introduce basic
changes in the Constitution under its power delegated in Article 368.

In short, the majority decision in Kesavananda Bharati acknowledged

Parliament's power to change any or all provisions of the Constitution as
long as such a move did not dismantle its foundational structure. Yet there
was no consensus of views regarding what constitutes that basic structure.
Although the Supreme Court almost came back to Sankari Prasad's
position (1952) by reaffirming Parliament's amending power as paramount,
in effect it reinforced judicial review power far more.

Basic Structure (1975):

In 1975, The Supreme Court once again got an opportunity to pronounce

on the basic structure of the Constitution. A challenge to Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi's election victory was upheld by the Allahabad High Court in
1975 on election malpractice grounds. On locus standi, pending appeal,
the vacation judge- Justice Krishna Iyer-granted a stay permitting Smt.
Indira Gandhi served as Prime Minister subject to the condition that she
would not receive a salary and participate or vote in Parliament until the
case was determined. In the meanwhile, Parliament approved the Thirty-
ninth amendment of the Constitution abolishing the power of the Supreme
Court to adjudicate petitions against elections of President, Vice President,
Prime Minister and Speaker of the Lok Sabha. A body established by
Parliament would have the authority to decide such election disputes.
Section 4 of the Amendment Bill in effect stopped any possibility of
challenging the election of an incumbent, holding one of the
aforementioned offices, before a court of law. It was a blatant pre-emptive
measure with the clear aim of assisting Smt. Indira Gandhi whose election
was the subject of the dispute in hand. Amendments were also provided to
the Representation of Peoples Acts of 1951 and 1974 and put in the Ninth
Schedule with the Election Laws Amendment Act, 1975 to save the Prime
Minister's face if the highest court had given an unfavorable judgment. The
mala fide intention on the part of the government was established by the
speed with which the Thirty-ninth amendment was enacted. It was tabled
on August 7, 1975 and adopted by the Lok Sabha on the same day. It was
passed by the Rajya Sabha (House of Elders or Upper House) on the
following day and assented to by the President two days later. The
amendment was approved by the state legislatures in special Saturday
sittings. It was gazetted on August 10. When the Supreme Court opened the
case for hearing the following day, the Attorney General requested the Court
to dismiss the case in the light of the new amendment.

Raj Narain's counsel, who was the political opponent contesting Mrs.
Gandhi's election, contended that the amendment was in violation of the
basic structure of the Constitution since it impacted on the manner of
holding free and fair elections as well as the judicial review power. Counsel
further contended that Parliament was not competent to invoke its
constituent power for validating an election that was held to be void by the
High Court.

Four out of five judges on the bench validated the Thirty-ninth

amendment, though only after eliminating that section that aimed at
reducing the judiciary's power to judge in the existing election controversy.
One of the judges, Justice Beg, validated the amendment as a whole. The
election of Mrs. Gandhi was held valid based on the election laws that were
amended. Judges reluctantly accepted the authority of Parliament to pass
legislations that come into effect retroactively.

Basic Structure - Redifinement (Minerva Mills & Waman Rao

Cases):

Even less than two years after Parliament restored Parliament's amending
powers to virtual absolute levels by the Forty-second Amendment, their
constitutional validity was questioned in the Supreme Court in the case of
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980). The petition was moved by the
proprietors of Minerva Mills, ailing industrial enterprise which had been
nationalised by the government in 1974. The renowned constitutional jurist,
Mr. N.A. Palkhivala, acted as counsel for the petitioners. Instead of posing
the challenge in terms of the violation of the fundamental right to property,
Palkhivala cleverly challenged the very extent of Parliament's power to
amend the Constitution. He maintained that Section 55 of the 42nd
Amendment gave Parliament unrestricted amending powers, and the
effort to immunise constitutional amendments from the scrutiny of the
judiciary was in contravention of the Basic Structure Doctrine established in
Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and reaffirmed in the Indira Gandhi Election
case (1975). He also argued that the revised Article 31C
was unconstitutional since it went against the Preamble, truncated
fundamental rights, and attempted to eradicate judicial review. Rendering
the majority judgment (4:1), Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud sustained both
contentions. The Court held that limited amending power in itself is a
fundamental feature of the Constitution and that Article 368 clauses (4)
and (5) giving Parliament untrammelled power were unconstitutional.
Justice Bhagwati, although dissenting, agreed that no authority could be the
sole judge of its own powers. The Court repealed the amendment of Article
31C, declaring that it breached the harmony among fundamental rights and
directive principles, a fundamental element of the Constitution. In
subsequent judgments, the Court reaffirmed that all the constitutional
amendments passed after Kesavananda Bharati are amenable to judicial
scrutiny, even such laws put into the Ninth Schedule, if determined to cause
injury to the basic structure.

Basic Structure (Limitations):

It is settled law that the validity of ordinary legislation is challenged on two

grounds: competence of the legislation and whether or not it offend
Articles 13(1) and 13(2) of the Constitution. This was reaffirmed again by
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud in Kesavananda Bharati. Another query arises may
ordinary legislation also be invalidated on the ground that it offends the
basic structure doctrine? Three of five judges opined in the Election Case
that ordinary laws cannot be challenged on this basis. Justice Beg
dissented, and Justice Khanna refused to pronounce. Chief Justice Beg
contended in State of Karnataka v. Union of India that imperatives flowing
out of the basic structure of the Constitution could rationally challenge the
validity of ordinary laws. Justice N.L. Untwalia, along with Justices Singhal
and Jaswant Singh, dismissed this, noting that an
argument to this effect had been specifically rejected in Indira Nehru
Gandhi v. Raj Narain. Support for this came when a five-judge bench in
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India held unanimously that the basic structure
doctrine is inapplicable to normal legislation. In Madras Bar Association v.
Union of India (NTT Case), constitutional validity of NTT Act was challenged
along with the Forty-Second Amendment on the ground that it infringed
judicial review powers. Justice J.S. Khehar held that Parliament could
transfer High Court powers to tribunals, but not in a way which erodes the
basic structure of the Constitution. Some of the major provisions of the Act
were invalidated, and the Act became unconstitutional. Justice R.F. Nariman
also agreed with the above judgment, based on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union
of India, which reaffirmed judicial review as a cornerstone of
constitutionalism.

Justice Nariman drew a distinction between Union of India v. R. Gandhi,

where substitution of one specialist tribunal with another would not
impact substantial legal issues before High Courts. In State of West Bengal
v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, the Supreme Court
confirmed that judicial review by constitutional courts is part of the basic
structure. Finally, in the NJAC judgment, Justice Khehar asserted that
ordinary laws may be tested against the basic structure when multiple
constitutional provisions collectively form its foundation.
Conclusion:

The basic structure doctrine is given a lot of weight in Indian constitutional

doctrine. Although it is now generally acknowledged that the Constitution
contains a fundamental structure, its exact boundaries are still unknown.
The Supreme Court of India may never provide a definitive list of
constitutional principles due to their dynamic character. But the Court
judgments have always encompassed a series of integral elements
including sovereignty, democracy, secularism, rule of law, independence of
judiciary, and basic rights. The concept of basic structure has shaped
common law interpretation over time beyond constitutional amendments.
The Court assured that judicial review forms part of the Constitution's
inviolable fundamental structure in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
(1997), holding provisions limiting the Supreme Court's and High Courts'
jurisdiction under Articles 226, 227, and 32 to be unconstitutional. In the
same vein, the Court employed the basic structure theory in S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India (1994) to hold that, despite the lack of a constitutional
amendment, state actions which offended fundamental principles could
justify the imposition of the President's Rule under Article 356. The theory
was originally advanced in the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala (1973), and it has since attracted admiration and criticism. Its
critics argue that in a democratic government, the public is ultimately in
control and must be able to alter even basic clauses if they happen to hinder
society's progress. Its defenders, on the other hand, view it as a necessary
protection against the misuses of fleeting political majorities, which were so
evident during the rule of Indira Gandhi. An essential query is evoked by the
constitutional arrangement in India, according to which one and the same
Parliament exercises both legislative and constituent powers. Routine
legislation can be rightfully spared from the test of basic structure in
regimes having different institutions for these functions. Yet, this double role
of Parliament in India poses the question why it should only be under
fundamental structural limitations when amending the
Constitution and not when legislating ordinary laws. In I.R. Coelho v. State
of Tamil Nadu (2007), the Court went on to obfuscate the distinction
between constituent and legislative activity by making it clear that ordinary
legislation added to the Ninth Schedule post-1973 are subject to the
fundamental structure test. The theory is vital to upholding India's
constitutional ideals, although its scope continues to be debated and
extended. It is respectfully proposed that the Supreme Court revisit and
clarify its application, content, and scope.

Recent Developments;

EWS Reservation:

The Parliament approved the 103rd Constitutional Amendment Act on

January 12, 2019, which added Articles 15(6) and 16(6), making a 10%
reservation in education and public employment for Economically Weaker
Sections (EWS) possible. This was the first time that economic
considerations became the exclusive grounds for reservation in India. The
amendment came under sharp criticism for allegedly violating the Basic
Structure Doctrine, especially the provisions of equality (Article 14) and social
justice as construed in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992), which had
emphatically ruled out economic status as the sole basis for reservation and
fixed reservations at 50%.

In Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022), a 3:2 majority held the

amendment, controversially holding that economic reservation did not
contravene the basic structure. Dissenting judges held that denial of EWS
benefits to SCs, STs, and OBCs discriminated against the historically
disadvantaged and violated principles of equality. The verdict reignites
debate regarding Parliament's authority under Article 368 as well as
economic-based affirmative action limits, spurring concerns about the
possibility that economic reservation can preempt social justice
requirements — an integral part of India's constitutional design.

Gyanvapi:

Throughout 2024, escalating communal tensions tied to anti-mosque

campaigns endangered India's secular nature (Articles 25-28, 14, 15). A basic
structure component maintained in S.R. Bommai v. UOI (1994). Conflicts
such as the Gyanvapi Masjid dispute (2022-2024), in which mosque
legitimacy was questioned through petitions referencing prior temples,
fueled violent rhetoric and societal polarization. Such campaigns
contravene the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, which
maintains the religious status quo as of August 15, 1947. The Supreme Court
in Ayodhya (2019), in giving the disputed land to Hindus, reiterated the 1991
Act's constitutional validity as necessary for the purpose of maintaining
public order and religious harmony. State inaction or collusion in fomenting
religious bigotry has the potential to violate the secular framework,
threatening the abuse of Article 356 cautioned in S.R. Bommai. This can
render empty India's constitutional promise of pluralism, infringing citizens'
Articles 14, 21, and 25 rights and eroding the independence of the judiciary
and rule of law.
CAA:

The statutory foundation of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019

(henceforth "CAA") is found in the Citizenship Act, 1955, which enacts the
parameters of acquisition of Indian citizenship. According to this parent Act,
Indian citizenship may be obtained through the following five means:

a. By birth within the territory of India,

b. By descent,

c. By registration,

d. By naturalisation, and

e. By incorporation of territory into India.

Before the CAA came into force, illegal migrants from those neighboring
countries were categorically excluded from obtaining Indian citizenship
under the Citizenship Act, 1955. The CAA, 2019, however, made certain
concessions by fast-tracking the citizenship of members of the following
religious groups namely, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and
Christians who have suffered religious persecution in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Bangladesh.

The main provisions of the CAA are listed below:

Exemption from Passport Act, 1920 and Foreigners Act, 1946: According
to current laws, any illegal immigrant is subject to imprisonment or
deportation. The CAA exempts members of the above-mentioned
communities from the penal sections of these acts.
Shortened Naturalisation Period: The residence period required for
naturalisation for these religious communities has been shortened from
eleven years to five years.

Geographical Exemptions: Certain tribal regions and areas under

protection of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, namely Assam,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura, have been exempted by the Act.

Legislative History and Notification: The bill was first brought to Lok
Sabha in 2016 and got passed on January 8, 2019. Until March 29, 2024, the
rules of the CAA have been notified officially, preceding general elections in
India. The Union Government has justified this legislative measure as a
moral and constitutional obligation, arising from the assurances made
during the Partition of India to protect religious minorities in Pakistan.
Parliamentary debates reflect a clear legislative intent to provide
expeditious refuge and citizenship to minority communities, whose lives,
dignity, and freedoms are allegedly under constant threat in the specified
neighboring countries.

The opponents of the CAA point out its interaction with the National
Register of Citizens (NRC), arguing that it is being used as a method to
confer citizenship only on non-Muslim illegal immigrants who do not
qualify under the NRC model. Another key criticism is in regard to the
discriminatory criterion of religious persecution. Critics contend that the
exclusion of Shia and Ahmadiyya Muslims, atheists (categorized as
victims of religious persecution by the United Nations), and religious
minorities persecuted in other countries in the region, like the Uyghur
Muslims of China, is an expression of religious majoritarianism and
contravenes the secular nature constitutionally enshrined in the Preamble
and Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.
Electoral Bonds:
The Electoral Bond Scheme, launched by the Union Government of India in
the Budget of 2017-18, is a major change in the electoral financing system of
the nation. Legislatively brought about by Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
and Finance Act, 2017 amendments, the scheme contemplates a monetary
instrument in the shape of bearer bonds, which are to be purchased by
Indian residents or bodies incorporated in India, and redeemed by such
eligible political parties from accounts opened under identified accounts.
Electoral bonds, or promissory notes not signed in the name of the donor,
were introduced as a transparent, cashless substitute for traditional opaque
political donations. According to the scheme, only registered political parties
under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and receiving a
minimum of 1% votes in the last general or assembly elections can encash
these bonds. The bonds can be purchased for amounts between ₹1,000 and
₹1 crore, have a 15-day validity, and are being issued only through notified
branches of the State Bank of India at four specified 10-day windows every
year. Although the objective was to eliminate black money, increase
transparency, and bring system into political funding, several constitutional
and legal issues are surrounding the scheme's launch and operation. Firstly,
the passage of enabling provisions through a Money Bill under Article 110 of
the Constitution evaded the scrutiny of the Rajya Sabha, even though the
scheme does not technically fulfill the constitutional requirements of a
Money Bill, which relate to taxation and appropriation from the Consolidated
Fund of India. This calculated legislative tactic, insulated against judicial
review according to Mohd. Sayed Siddiqui v. State of U.P. and Article
110(3), has attracted considerable criticism. Additionally, statutory
amendments to Section 29C of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
Section 182(3A) of the Companies Act, 2013, and Section 13A(b) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 collectively exempt political parties from disclosing
bond-based donations and removed limits on corporate contributions,
undermining transparency.
This has raised concerns of corporate bidding and undisclosed influence on
public policy. Judicial dicta, such as State of U.P. v. Raj Narain and
Secretary, Ministry of I&B v. Cricket Association of Bengal, have identified
the right to information as an inherent part of Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. The secrecy over electoral bonds therefore immediately
violates the citizen's constitutional right to know, hindering electoral
accountability. Also, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Ajay Hasia v.
Khalid Mujib, the Supreme Court has enunciated the primacy of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in State action, principles purportedly
transgressed by the secrecy and selective disclosure provisions embedded in
the scheme. The imprecise penalties for violation of confidentiality in the
Finance Act, 2017 and the lack of definition of 'competent courts' to obtain
donation information under Clause 7(4) aggravate these constitutional
flaws. The Supreme Court's changing jurisprudence concerning institutional
integrity and electoral fairness reiterates the need for reforms guaranteeing
public scrutiny and normative financing equities, absent which the election
process is susceptible to capture by rich, anonymous donors and corporates,
diluting the republican democratic model visualized by the Constitution.

Secularism and Indian Constitution:

During the discussions in the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the

Indian Constitution, secularism was a hot topic. Prof. KT Shah suggested
that "Secular, Federal, and Socialist" be included in Article 1, but Dr.
Ambedkar disagreed, claiming that the word "secular" could compromise
democracy. He thought India's secularism was inherent and would only get
stronger. Some contend that rather than rejecting secularism, the Assembly
accepted it as a given and an essential component of fundamental rights. In
1976, the 42nd Amendment Act inserted the term "secular" to the
Preamble.
India's secular orientation is reflected in a number of its Constitutional
clauses. While Article 15 forbids discrimination based on religion, Article 14
guarantees equality before the law. Regardless of faith, equal job
opportunities are guaranteed by Article 16. Freedom of conscience and
religion is guaranteed by Article 25. In addition, the Constitution guarantees
that the state will not discriminate against people based on their religion.
The freedom to govern religion matters is guaranteed by Article 26, while
mandatory taxes for religious benefits are forbidden by Article 27. Religious
instruction is prohibited in state-funded educational institutions by Article
28. Minority populations are guaranteed cultural preservation under Article
29, and they are permitted to create and oversee educational institutions
without facing funding discrimination from the state under Article 30.

Parliament uses legislation, like personal laws, to define collective rights. It

is difficult to acknowledge different religious practices and make
institutional accommodations, which could exclude smaller religious
systems. The Constitution permits financial support to religious
educational institutions but forbids the establishment of a state religion
and equitable treatment of all religions. For the sake of cultural
advancement and harmonious coexistence, the state may sometimes
interfere with religious practices.

Article 44 requires the state to enact a unified civil code, whereas Article
25 preserves the freedom of religion. The directive's guiding principles also
recommend against killing cows. The 7th Schedule permits the federal
and state governments to enact laws by placing trusts, charities, and
religious institutions on the Concurrent List. In conflicts, central laws take
precedence. Constitutional modifications served to further acknowledge
the connection between religion and state, with the addition of the word
"secular" to the Preamble in 1975.
Defilement of Places of Worship or Objects of Great Respect

According to Section 295 of the IPC (298 of BNS) ( “any person who
destroys, damages or defiles any worship place, or any object declared as
holy object by any class of persons with the intention of insulting the
religious sentiments of any other class or with the knowledge that any of the
class is likely to consider such destruction or defamation as an insult to their
religion, shall be guilty and punishable with imprisonment of mentioned
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” In simple
words, if any act is done by a person which results in defamation and
destruction of any worship place or object (which is declared as sacred by
any religion) with a sole intention of insulting their religion, then that person
shall be held liable under the Section 295 and shall be punishable with
imprisonment, or with fine, or both. Section 295 enforces people to respect
the religious beliefs of persons of any religion. According to Section 297 of
the IPC, “If a person (with an intention of destroying the religious feelings of
any person, or hurt the religious feelings of any person, or with the
knowledge that the feelings of any person are probably to be hurt or
destroyed, or with the knowledge that the religion of any person is probably
to be insulted) commits any trespass in any worship place or place of
sculpture, or any place set aside from the performance of funeral rites or as a
repository for the remains of the dead, or offers any shame to any human
body, or causes disturbance to any persons assembled for the performance
of funeral ceremonies, then that person shall be held liable under the IPC
and he shall be punished with imprisonment of term, mentioned in
description which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.” In
simple words, Section 297 deals with punishment to people (with the
intention to hurt the religious feelings of another) who commit a trespass in
any worship place, or in sepulture, or burial, or place set apart for burial rites.
Uttarakhand Civil Code:

On February 4, 2024, the Uttarakhand Cabinet approved the final draft of

the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), and on February 6, 2024, Chief Minister
Pushkar Singh Dhami introduced the UCC bill in the State Assembly. A
committee formed in 2022, led by retired Supreme Court judge Ranjana
Prakash Desai, drafted the UCC. The committee included retired judge
Pramod Kohli, social activist Manu Gaur, former Uttarakhand Chief
Secretary Shatrughan Singh, and Doon University Vice Chancellor Surekha
Dangwal, who compiled a 740-page draft report (Hindustan Times, 2024).

The bill includes provisions banning polygamy and child marriage,

granting equal property rights to sons and daughters, and ensuring equal
rights for adoptive and biological children. It requires live-in couples to
register their partnership within a month and mandates parental approval.
The UCC sets the marriage age at 18 for women and 21 for men, imposes a
one-year waiting period before divorce, and recognizes marriage
ceremonies according to religious traditions. This legislation fulfills a BJP
election promise from 2022. Critics argue that implementing a UCC faces
challenges due to India's religious and cultural diversity, political sensitivity,
and legal complexity. Minority religious groups fear it might infringe on
their freedoms, and political parties are wary of alienating voters. Legal
experts must craft a fair code that respects individual rights. The success of
such reform depends on social awareness and acceptance, along with
political will and consensus. The debate involves balancing equality and
individual liberty with cultural and religious traditions. K.M. Munshi (1948)
argued for a UCC to unify personal laws for national consolidation. Since
the adoption of the Indian Constitution, there has been a tension between
maintaining diversity and promoting federalization and decentralization of
power. Bhikhu Parekh (2008) emphasized that identity is shaped by
societal interactions and self-understanding. Peter D'Souza (2015)
highlighted the conflict between individual and group rights.
State intervention in personal laws, as seen with the ban on triple Talaq, is
seen as necessary for promoting social justice. B.R. Ambedkar supported
state intervention in religious matters to advance social reforms. The Indian
situation with the UCC is complex, with concerns about minority
assimilation into the dominant culture. However, a rational and inclusive
approach to framing a national UCC, informed by the Uttarakhand
experience, could promote secularism, unity, and non-discrimination from
a constitutional and human rights perspective.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, better known as the UMEED Act (Unified
Management Empowerment Efficiency and Development), brings
sweeping reforms to India's governance and management of Waqf
property. Waqf, under Islamic law, refers to property devoted
permanently in God's name for religious or charitable purposes. The
returns typically finance social causes, educational institutes, and mosques.
These properties cannot be inherited, sold, or transferred and are
unalienable. State Waqf Boards and Waqf Tribunals were framed under
the Waqf Act, 1995, that was amended in 2013 to provide for the same status
as civil courts in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908. India has more than 8.7
lakh Waqf properties located on 9.4 lakh acres, worth more than ₹1.2 lakh
crore, which are legally safeguarded public property and one of the nation's
biggest landholdings. The UMEED Act, which was sanctioned in April 2025
after long legislative deliberations and reviewed by a Joint legislative
Committee, seeks to modernize the Waqf administration framework,
enhance transparency, and correct previous misuses. One of the most
important among these is the cancellation of the "Waqf by user" concept
under which properties held for religious use had been accepted as Waqf.
The properties that were already registered with this concept or that were
part of legal litigation are exempted. It also removes Section 40
of the old act, under which Waqf Boards were granted the right to declare
any property as Waqf. This jurisdiction was severely attacked for its arbitrary
encroachments and extension. The Act also reinstates the requirements
qualifying donors as having practiced Muslims for not less than five years
and specifies that Muslim trusts under other legislation shall be exempted
from Waqf law.

To link property dedications with protections of personal law, it also

mandates that the inheritance rights of women, orphans, and widows be
settled prior to any property being dedicated as Waqf. The Act prohibits
Waqf claims over Sixth and the fifth schedule of the
Constitution-protected regions, safeguarding tribal and indigenous rights
to land, and introduces the Limitation Act, 1963 in Waqf matters to cap
long-drawn litigation. Compulsory non-Muslim representation on Waqf
Boards at the state as well as federal level is an important but controversial
aspect of the UMEED Act. This contravenes the Muslim community's
constitutional rights under Articles 25, 26, 29, and 14, which secure
cultural identity, religious liberty, and independence in managing religious
affairs. This move is viewed to contravene the decision in Sardar Syedna
Taher Saifuddin v. State of Bombay (1962), whereby the Supreme Court
recognized religious communities' freedom to manage their own
organization independent of external interference. Instead of senior
government servants for autonomous Waqf Tribunals as the chief
determinant of Waqf issues with a final appellate option at the High Court,
the Act alters adjudicating procedures. Waqf Tribunals formally remain the
trio-member formations stipulated in the JPC framework, yet de facto are
virtually emasculated, creating misgivings about loss of minority
self-government and independence in the judiciary. To enhance financial
accountability and transparency, other reforms involve reducing the
contribution required by the Waqf Board to 5% from 7%, obligating online
registration of Waqf properties, and obliging audits for institutions
with annual incomes exceeding ₹1 lakh.
RECENT: The Act has faced challenge in the Supreme Court of India by more
than 65 petitions submitted by political figures, religious institutions, civil
rights organizations, and opposition parties. The petitioners oppose the Act
as it dilutes constitutional assurances of religious and minority rights and
diminishes the community's governance of its religious assets. Against this,
six state governments have justified the legislation as a legitimate regulatory
reform required for transparency and public accountability.
 This guide is not meant to be exhaustive or
authoritative. You are encouraged to go beyond the
contents of this guide and even question the content
mentioned here.