Table of Contents

Legal Aspects of the Collection of Fisheries

Data

Table of Contents

by
W.R. Edeson
Senior Legal Officer
Legal Office, FAO
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Rome, December 1999
FAO Fisheries Circular No. 953 FIDI/C953
This electronic document has been scanned using optical character recognition (OCR) software and careful manual
recorrection. Even if the quality of digitalisation is high, the FAO declines all responsibility for any discrepancies that may
exist between the present document and its original printed version.

Table of Contents

PREPARATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME
2.1 Internal waters, archipelagic waters and the territorial sea
2.2 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
2.3 The High seas
2.4 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
2.5 Other International Instruments
2.6 Some General Conclusions
3. THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH FISHERIES DATA IS COLLECTED

4. THE PHRASE “NATIONALITY OF CATCHES”

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 Table of Contents

4.1 The European Community

5. NATIONAL LAWS

6. THE TEST USED BY CWP

ANNEX 1 - Extract from M. Tsamenyi and K. Mfodwo

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 PREPARATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

PREPARATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation as a working document to the eighteenth
session of the Coordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics (CWP) (Luxembourg, Grand Duchy, 6-9
July 1999). The present version takes account of some of the discussions at the CWP meeting and
includes the final version of the criteria adopted by the CWP for assigning catches to countries.
Edeson, W.R.
Legal aspects of the collection of fisheries data.
FAO Fisheries Circular. No. 953. Rome, FAO. 18p.
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews legal aspects of the collection of fisheries data, particularly in relation to the criteria
used to assign responsibilities in relation to the collection and reporting of fishery data and for
recording catch data by country. The matter is of concern as a lack of accepted criteria can lead to
non-reporting or double reporting of fishery data. This paper reviews the provisions of the principal
international fisheries instruments concerning the collection and exchange of fisheries data. It describes
the development of criteria by the Coordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics (CWP) in the late
1970s and some of their shortcomings. It concludes with presenting refined criteria which were adopted
by the CWP in 1999.

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 1. INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to outline the provisions of the principal international fisheries instruments
concerning the collection and exchange of fisheries data. These instruments are: the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 1982 (hereafter referred to as the 1982 UN Convention), the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (hereafter referred to as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement), the FAO Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on
the High Seas, (hereafter referred to as the FAO Compliance Agreement), and the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries, (hereafter referred to as the Code of Conduct). The paper will then consider
briefly other uses to which these data might be put for a purpose different to the main purpose for
collecting the data. It will then consider the phrase “nationality of catches”, as well as some situations in
national law where uncertainties may arise as to where responsibility should lie (usually as between the
coastal State and the flag State) for the provision of data.

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 2. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME

2. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME

2.1 Internal waters, archipelagic waters and the territorial sea
2.2 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
2.3 The High seas
2.4 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
2.5 Other International Instruments
2.6 Some General Conclusions

2.1 Internal waters, archipelagic waters and the

territorial sea
The 1982 UN Convention does not make any reference whatever to the collection of data in these areas,
indeed, it makes only passing references to fishing in respect of innocent passage and in respect of transit
passage. Thus any specific obligation to report such data will need to be found in regional or sub-regional
agreements. Further, in several countries, it is the policy not to permit foreign fishing in such waters. It is
an interesting legal question which need not concern us here whether there exists a basic legal obligation
at least to obtain data in order to base a minimum level of management responsibility with respect to the
fisheries in such waters.1
1 Indeed, it may be noted here that the provisions of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
concerning the precautionary approach (Article 6) and the compatibility of conservation and
management measures (Article 7) also apply to “areas under national jurisdiction”, while the
general principles set out in Article 5 apply with respect to the exercise of sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks within areas under national jurisdiction. In the latter, the
reference to sovereign rights combined with the objective of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement to effectively implement the relevant provisions of the 1982 UN Convention
dealing with such stocks would support a limited interpretation of the phrase to apply to the
exclusive economic zone only; however, the normal meaning of the phrase “areas under
national jurisdiction” is capable of embracing the territorial sea, archipelagic waters and
internal waters. Further, Article 3 refers to “areas under national jurisdiction, subject to the
different legal regimes that apply within areas under national jurisdiction and in areas
beyond national jurisdiction”, which implies an application to more than just the EEZ.,
while the phrase “different legal regimes” here also in its ordinary meaning would include
internal waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic waters. Cf the use of “regime” in Article
7 (3) of the 1982 UN Convention. The question becomes important in two quite distinct

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 2. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME

areas: in regions where there are archipelagic states, such as the Western Pacific, where
substantial areas of water would be included or excluded depending on the interpretation
adopted, and in the Mediterranean where there exist for the most part only territorial seas
and where a literal interpretation of Article 63(2) combined with a narrow interpretation of
the “areas under national jurisdiction” that covers only the EEZ might lead to a very limited
application of these provisions of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Notwithstanding
their ordinary meanings, both of these phrases are also quite ambiguous. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to explore this ambiguity further here.

2.2 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The basic provisions concerning the EEZ are set out in Part V of the 1982 UN Convention. In this zone,
the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing inter alia the living marine resources. In Article 61 (2), the coastal State is required, taking
into account the best scientific evidence available to it to ensure through proper conservation and
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the EEZ is not endangered by
over-exploitation. This duty would at least imply a responsibility on the part of the coastal State to collect
such data if none were available.
The most important provision concerning data is set out in Article 61 (5), which deals with the
conservation of the living resources.
It states:
“Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant
to the conservation offish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis
through competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional, or global,
where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, including States whose
nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone”
The words “available scientific information” were probably employed in part to avoid imposing too
onerous a burden on countries in the collection of data, especially developing States, or in the need to
undertake scientific assessments of the living marine resources. This phrase was most probably linked to
the requirement in Article 61 (2) that the coastal State shall take “into account the best scientific
information available to it”.
Article 61 (5) reflects the increasing importance that was attached to exchange of information through
international organizations. The reference to “including states whose nationals are allowed to fish in the
exclusive economic zone” does not of itself emphasise a primary role of the flag state in providing data,
indeed, it seems merely to underline the intention at that time for available information to be exchanged.
The other provisions in Part V which have a bearing on the issue are to be found in Article 62 which
deals with the utilisation of the living resources. These are:
Article 62.4 (d) which allows the coastal State to impose on “nationals of other States
fishing in the exclusive economic zone”, amongst a number of other conditions, laws and
regulations relating to “specifying the information required of fishing vessels, including
catch and vessel statistics and vessel position reports”

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Another article of relevance is Article 62 4 (i), which relates to “terms and conditions
relating to joint ventures or other co-operative arrangements”.
These two provisions would allow a coastal State, as a condition of allowing foreign fishing in its EEZ,
to impose conditions regarding the provision of catch data (format, content, frequency, to whom the
reports should be made, etc), and indeed, this is the normal situation.
Overall, Part V does not mandate any specific or primary responsibility to collect data with respect to
fishing in the EEZ. Thus, it would be open to the coastal State to do this, either in respect of its own
vessels fishing in the EEZ or in respect of foreign vessels being authorised to fish in the EEZ as a
condition of fishing. It would also be open to the flag State of a foreign fishing vessel to collect data,
either as a condition of a licence imposed by the coastal State under a bilateral access agreement, or
under a joint venture agreement, or it could be provided voluntarily.
What is made clear however is that there exists an obligation to exchange available information through
competent international organizations, and that would imply the capacity on the part of such bodies to set
data reporting standards for States to follow.
For the sake of completeness, it should be added that a coastal State does have the power to control
marine scientific research in its EEZ or on its continental shelf. The coastal state should in normal
circumstances grant its consent to undertake marine science research projects, though it has a discretion
to withhold that consent if it is of direct significance for the exploitation of the natural resources of the
zone. (Article 246, 1982 UN Convention).

2.3 The High seas

As with the EEZ, the 1982 UN Convention did not mandate any specific responsibility with regard to the
collection of scientific data. The principal provision is Article 119 (2) which provides: “available
scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other scientific data relevant to the
conservation offish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent
international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, where appropriate and with
participation by all States concerned”
This obligation mirrors that which was found in respect of Article 61 concerning the EEZ, namely that
there is an obligation to exchange information, etc. For practical purposes, this would only be
information provided by the flag State.
The obligation to establish conservation measures for the high seas set out in Article 119 (1) presupposes
that the State undertaking the fishing of these high seas stocks has access to the necessary data, or is able
to provide it in order to arrive at meaningful conservation measures.
The simple regime laid down in the 1982 UN Convention for the high seas is now modified substantially
by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Indeed, insofar as straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks are concerned, we will see that it has also had some impact on the EEZ.

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2.4 UN Fish Stocks Agreement

The UN Fish Stocks Agreement is not yet in force, but it reflects a much more elaborate and
sophisticated approach to the collection of data. Whereas the 1982 UN Convention only addressed the
question of collection and exchange of data in passing, it had come to be recognized that it should be
addressed much more vigorously. Further, it imposes quite specific obligations on States that are in
contrast to those found in the 1982 UN Convention, some of which, we have seen, are at best implied.
The Agreement is also quite complex in its operation. Although it is not yet in force, that may be less
important in respect of data collection than it at first appears, as there is nothing to prevent States from
collecting and sharing the information required under the Agreement even before it comes into force.
Indeed, something like that is already happening with the FAO Compliance Agreement as some States
are already providing the information they are required to provide before it has come into force, and there
is no reason why States should not be able to do the same with respect to the obligations under the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement.
It is also important to note that the UN Fish Stocks Agreement only applies to highly migratory fish
stocks and straddling fish stocks beyond areas under national jurisdiction, though some of its provisions
also apply in areas under national jurisdiction2. In particular, the coastal State is to apply mutatis
mutandis the general principles set out in Article 5, while Articles 6 (Precautionary Approach) and 7
(Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures) shall also apply to such areas.
2 See footnote 1 above.
The introduction to Article 5 itself is interesting, for it states: “In order to conserve and manage
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas
shall, in giving effect to their duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention:” This picks up the
various duties in the 1982 UN Convention to cooperate, which would include those referred to above
with respect to exchange of data, limited though it is to the particular stocks to which the Agreement
applies.
One of the general principles stated in Article 5 is of direct concern to us here. Paragraph (j) provides:
“collect and share, in a timely manner, complete and accurate data concerning fishing activities on,
inter alia, vessel position, catch of target and non-target species and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I,
as well as information from national and international research programmes”
Article 6, which sets out the precautionary approach which is to be applied by “States”, also makes
reference to the need to collect data, for paragraph (d) provides: “develop data collection and research
programmes to assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species and their
environment....”
It will be noted that these two provisions are cast in general terms. Where the fishing is taking place on
the high seas, this will in almost all situations place the primary burden on the flag State.
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement also makes specific provision for the responsibility of the flag State.
Article 14 sets out the following:
“States shall ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag provide such information as may be
necessary in order to fulfil their obligations under this Agreement. To this end States shall

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in accordance with Annex I...”

Here follows a number of detailed conditions regarding the collection and exchange of scientific,
technical and statistical data.
This is backed up by Article 18 which sets out Duties of the Flag State, which include among the
measures to be taken by the flag State in paragraph 3 e) “requirements for recording and timely
reporting of vessel position, catch of target and non-target species, fishing effort and other relevant
fisheries data in accordance with subregional, regional, and global standards for the collection of such
data.”
The new regime set out in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is complemented by Articles 9 (Subregional
and regional fisheries organizations and arrangements) and 10 (Functions of subregional and regional
fisheries management organizations and arrangements). The most important provision for our purposes is
found in paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) of Article 10. These state:
(d) “obtain and evaluate scientific advice, review the status of the stocks and assess the
impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species”
“(e) agree on standards for collection, reporting, verification and exchange of data on
fisheries for the stocks”
(f) “compile and disseminate accurate and complete statistical data as described in Annex I,
to ensure the best scientific evidence is available, while maintaining confidentiality where
appropriate”
All of these provisions are complemented by Annex I of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The chapeau to
Article 1 of this Annex powerfully illustrates the progress made since the 1982 UN Convention in regard
to increased recognition of the essential need for the collection of reliable data: “The timely collection,
compilation and analysis of data are fundamental to the effective conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.” Only the limitation as to the stocks covered by
the Agreement and the Annex (i.e. the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks) obscures
the progress made since 1982. The Annex sets out very elaborate provisions concerning data. It is
important to note that the obligations are placed on both the flag State and more generally on States.
Thus while the flag State has a specific obligation which is set out in Articles 14 and 18 above, it is
clearly not put in such a way in this Annex as to exclude responsibility on the part of the coastal State
from collecting data also.
However, in one very important respect, the Annex places particularly strong obligations on the flag
State, for in Article 5, there is an obligation to ensure that vessels flying its flag send to its national
fisheries administration, and where agreed, to the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management
organization or arrangement, log book data on catch and effort, including data on fishing operations on
the high seas. Likewise, in Article 7, concerning data exchange, it is stated: “Data collected by flag
States must be shared with other flag States and relevant coastal States through appropriate subregional
or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements”. Such organizations are also to
compile such data and make them freely available in a timely manner and in an agreed format to all
interested States.

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2.5 Other International Instruments

It is useful to look briefly at other international instruments that might have a bearing on the question of
data collection.3
3 For a useful table summarizing the provisions of several regional agreements, see further
M. Tsamenyi and K. Mfodwo, Integrated Fisheries Monitoring - the Legal Framework, pp
12-14. Paper presented at International Conference on Integrated Fisheries Monitoring,
Sydney 1-5 February, 1999 The table is attached as an annex to this paper. They conclude:
“The language of obligation set out in many of these treaties is weak by contrast with for
example, the Straddling/Highly Migratory Stocks Agreement, and also in relation to the
importance of the tasks.” p12.
The Code of Conduct has extensive provisions touching on fisheries data collection and exchange,
though space limitations do not allow a fuller analysis here. The principal articles dealing with fisheries
data are to be found in articles 7.3.4. 7.4, 8.1.3, and 12. The Code is neutral on the question of attributing
primary responsibility for collecting data, placing the obligations on States, though the role of
subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements is fully recognised (Article
7.4) As well there are references to States ensuring that “timely, complete and reliable statistics on catch
and fishing effort are collected and maintained in accordance with applicable international standards, and
in sufficient detail to allow sound statistical analysis” The Code also urges subregional and regional
fisheries management organizations or arrangements to compile data and make them available, in a
manner consistent with any applicable confidentiality requirements in a timely manner and in an agreed
format to all members of these organizations and other interested parties in accordance with agreed
procedures (Article 7.4.7).
The Compliance Agreement imposes obligations on flag States to exchange information with respect to
vessels. Article VI requires parties to make readily available to FAO certain information with respect to
each fishing vessel entered on its record of fishing vessels. This information is to be circulated
periodically to all parties, and on request, to any individual Party, and, subject to any restrictions imposed
by the party concerned, to any global, regional or subregional fisheries organization. This information
does not address catch data, but the information that will be circulated will play an important part in
helping to detect unauthorised fishing on the high seas.

2.6 Some General Conclusions

It will be apparent from the above that there is no systematic obligation to obtain or to exchange data set
out in the 1982 UN Convention. Certainly there is no single approach mandated to the collection of data
under that Convention. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement comes closest in the clear obligation it imposes
on the flag State to provide the relevant data. This obligation is not intended to exclude the responsibility
of others. However, legally speaking, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is limited to straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks4, and in any event, like the Compliance Agreement, is not yet in force.
4 Though it should be noted that Article 18 is worded generally, while Article 14 is clearly
limited to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, while Annex I is also
dearly limited to those stocks.

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 2. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME

However, this aspect is less important than it might appear, as the action necessary i.e. to exchange data,
is not of itself an activity which depends on the existence of an agreement. It is something that can be
done by either the coastal State or the flag State under existing powers.5 Indeed, the only constraint that
could arise is if there were a provision under national law restricting the release of information.
5An example of this can be found in the present situation regarding the FAO Compliance
Agreement in respect of its obligation to provide data on certain vessels operating on the
high seas. This can already be provided by the flag State, and already Canada and US are
providing that information.
There is of course another way of approaching the matter, namely that there exists a general duty to
cooperate with respect to shared resources which brings with it at least a minimal duty to share basic
information regarding such stocks. Without diminishing the importance of such an approach, it is
suggested that it is too vague in setting relevant standards for data collection.
What is more important from a legal point of view is that the national law of the flag State or of the
coastal State in question mandates the provision of data in a form that enables it to provide this
information to an international forum and in a meaningful form.
More importantly, there are clear obligations to share available information, and it is appropriate that this
should be collected in an internationally agreed manner. All the references in the 1982 UN Convention
refer to co-operation through competent global, regional sub-regional organizations. The UN Fish Stocks
Agreement goes further in that it imposes an obligation to provide the information in accordance with
“sub-regional, regional and global standards for the collection of such data” (Article 19 Duties of the flag
State), while Annex I itself provides the basis for formulating standard requirements for the collection
and sharing of data.
Thus the approach of the Co-ordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics (CWP) becomes of critical
importance in setting those internationally agreed standards.

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 3. THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH FISHERIES DATA IS COLLECTED

3. THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH

FISHERIES DATA IS COLLECTED
Both the 1982 UN Convention and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement make it clear that the purpose of
collecting fisheries data is to underpin decisions with respect to conservation and management of the
resources, in the case of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, with respect to straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks. That said, it is unlikely that these statistics, having been collected, will be
used only for that purpose. Thus, the data might be used, for example, directly or indirectly, to assist in
identifying the origin of a catch for the purposes of trade rules concerning the origin of a particular item
in trade (subject to any applicable confidentiality restrictions). However, it is important to keep in mind
the basic purpose of the data collected, and that same information might only partly serve another
purpose in another context. For example, in the area of fish processing, sales, and trade in the product,
the data will have to be adapted to meet that purpose.
Fisheries data will also play an important role in determining the financial contributions to certain
management organizations, as for example is the case with the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Thus,
Article XIII of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, which deals
with finances, states, that a scheme for contributions shall be adopted by the Commission, which shall
involve an equal basic fee and a variable fee, which shall be based “inter alia on the total catch and
landing of species covered by the Agreement in the area,” and the per capita income of each Member.
However, it will be apparent that simply answering this question by reference to the flag of the vessel
making the catch will not be sufficient information.
Fisheries data will also of course be useful in negotiations concerning access to exclusive economic
zones where one of the issues is catch history. Indeed, Article 62(3) of the 1982 UN Convention requires
the coastal state to take into account a number of factors, including the need to “minimise economic
dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the [EEZ]”.6
6 Note also, for example, other provisions where catch data will become important: Articles
66 (Anadromous stocks), 67 (Catadromous species), 69 (rights of landlocked States) and 70
(rights of geographically disadvantaged States).
Another area where the data might also play a role is in determining the parties to a negotiation on the
management of a particular straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stock. Here, the information
would need to be looked at more closely in order to determine if, in fact, the stock in question was
actually found in the EEZ of a particular coastal State, it would not be enough merely to work from data
made by the flag State (unless of course, it was provided in enough detail to permit such a more detailed
analysis). Related to this question is the “catch history” of a particular country in a particular area, which
will often be a major issue in negotiations.
Another instance where the catch data can be used is to cross check the accuracy of the statistics

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provided in respect of landings.

There are no doubt numerous other instances where such data can (or does) serve another purpose.

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 4. THE PHRASE “NATIONALITY OF CATCHES”

4. THE PHRASE “NATIONALITY OF

CATCHES”
4.1 The European Community

It is proposed now to address in particular the problem that has arisen in regard to the “nationality of
catches”, and to consider some possible areas where some problems might arise in allocating
responsibility. It is, in particular, hoped to clarify what is meant by the phrase the “nationality of catches”
in view of the fact that it is sometimes used as a basis for allocating responsibility for providing
information.
If the phrase is used as a means of identifying the responsibility of the party to compile the data, there
should be no problem with its use. For example, if it is said that catch has the nationality of the flag State
where it is the flag state making the reporting, or that it has the nationality of the coastal State where it
has been caught by a vessel of the flag State, there can be no problem. The problem arises once the
phrase is used as a basis for making decisions about who should report; in fact, it is not very helpful to
talk about the nationality of a catch for the purpose of data collection, except as a short hand expression
to indicate where the responsibility lies.
For example, fish caught within an EEZ of a particular State might be said to have the nationality of that
State, but the term could be quite misleading if it is intended to suggest that catches have a nationality
simply because the fish have been caught in the EEZ of a particular State, or at another extreme that they
have a nationality simply because they were caught by a vessel flying the flag of a particular State.
In this regard (i.e. on the “nationality” of a catch) the 1982 UN Convention is silent. All it does is give
sovereign rights over the marine living resources to the coastal State, but until the fish are caught, they
can hardly be said to have a nationality or indeed, to be owned. Once caught e.g. within an EEZ, the fish
may well be regarded as belonging to (i.e. having the nationality of) the coastal State for certain purposes
under national law. They may well continue, (depending how the national law has chosen to characterise
the matter, if at all) to be fish having the nationality of the coastal State even though caught by another
flag State. But, if for statistical purposes, it is thought better to have the information provided by the flag
State, even though caught within the EEZ, then that could be acceptable. However, it is most probably
better not to talk about “nationality” in this context except possibly as shorthand for the obligation of the
flag State or the coastal State to provide that information.
In other words, the nationality of a catch is at bottom not an important issue for conservation and
management purposes, though it could become so in other contexts, as was discussed in the preceding
heading 3. As mentioned, the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention regarding the collection of data are
for the most part silent on who should provide the information, emphasising instead the need to provide

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it. It is only in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement that an obligation is placed squarely on the flag State, but
even there it is not placed on the flag State exclusively.
It is interesting to note that the CWP itself uses the term “nationality of catch” and “nationality of catch
data” interchangeably in its Report of the 17th Session, 1997, (paragraphs 19-24). It is suggested that the
term “nationality of catch data” is preferred inasmuch as it lessens the impression that the nationality of
the catch is important for fisheries conservation and management; such a phrase also emphasises more
the origin of the catch data, which is more important.

4.1 The European Community

Before turning to consider the situation under national laws, it is proposed to consider the situation
arising under European Community law, which raises another dimension to the use of the term
“nationality of catch”, and which shows how origin of catch issues can arise under European Community
law. It has to be stressed however, that the issues raised here are peculiar to the European Community.
What follows is a brief summary of one case that was considered by the European Court of Justice, but it
should not be thought that this case is dispositive of the entire matter, as similar issues of interpretation
can arise under other Community laws.
The facts of the case are as follows: some British trawlers cast empty nets into the Baltic Sea some 40 to
80 miles off the Polish coast. These nets were then taken over by Polish trawlers, which trawled with
them though without taking them on board, nor did the British vessels enter Polish Territorial Waters.
When the trawl was completed, the British trawlers lifted the nets, the ends of which had been passed to
them by the Polish vessels, the contents of the nets were taken on board the British trawlers, which then
took the fish to UK. In UK, they were treated as being of Community origin and thus entitled to duty free
admission. However, this view was contested by the EC. Following an exchange of letters, the matter
ended up in the European Court of Justice, and after a lengthy analysis of the Regulation in question, the
court declared:
“that by not levying customs duties on the importation into its territory offish caught
during joint fishing operations in which vessels flying the British flag took part together
with vessels flying the flag of a non-member country, the latter having performed the
essential part of the operation of catching the fish and the former having merely raised
the nets out of the water, the United Kingdom has failed to fulfil its obligations under
article 4 (2) (f) of Regulation (EEC) no 802/68 of the council on the common definition of
the origin of goods and under Regulation (EEC) no 950/68 of the Council on the common
customs tariff, as amended by Regulation no 3000/79”7
7
Judgment of the court, 28 March, 1985. European Court Reports 1985, p 1169
This case is a very useful illustration of the problems which can arise once we enter the realm of the
domestic laws of particular countries, for although it was Community law being applied. It was in effect
the equivalent of national law for our purposes. Further, it shows how a matter such as origin of catch
can become enmeshed with a question of nationality of catch, when in truth the legal core of the issue
was not either of these, but the interpretation of an EC regulation, and in particular of the words “taken
from the sea” and “originating in the country in which the last substantial process or operation that is
economically justified was performed”. Applying these words to the facts, the conclusion of the court
was that the most significant “operation in fishing was carried out by Polish vessels”.

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 4. THE PHRASE “NATIONALITY OF CATCHES”

Similar issues can arise under national laws, e.g. because of the way the import laws of the country are
drafted, or because of federal structures which introduce such complications.

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 5. NATIONAL LAWS

5. NATIONAL LAWS
It is proposed now to give a brief overview of different situations which might arise under national law
and which might cause confusion as to who should report data. (It needs to be said at the outset here that
there is no problem about who should report data concerning fishing on the high seas as that will for all
practical purposes be the flag State only).
First, what might be called a straight forward licensing regime, where the coastal State issues licenses to
its own vessels in its own EEZ. In such a situation, there could be little doubt that responsibility should
fall on to the coastal State to collect and to exchange relevant data.
Second, where the coastal State issues licenses or permits for foreign vessels to fish in its EEZ (or for
that matter, its territorial sea and internal waters). There are two situations which need to be considered
here. First, where the coastal State has granted the license directly to a foreign vessel, second, where it
has granted the authority to fish under a bilateral access agreement.
In the first case, the provision of data would presumably be a condition of the license, in the second, it
would presumably be a provision of the access agreement in which the flag State has agreed to ensure
that its vessels collect such information.
In both of these situations, the present approach would appear to be that the flag State will be responsible
for the provision of such data even though the fishing itself is being conducted entirely within the EEZ of
the coastal state authorizing the fishing. However the point should be made that there is nothing that
mandates that solution, for in the EEZ, as we have seen, there is no particular obligation imposed by the
1982 UN Convention to achieve that result.
Thus the selection of the flag State is based on the assumption that it is best placed to provide that data.
From the point of view of nationality of the catch, however, in both of these situations, if the fish were to
have any “nationality”, it would be that of the coastal State.
Under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the situation is different inasmuch as the flag State has particular
reporting responsibilities imposed on it wherever it has been fishing for the stocks to which the
Agreement applies. However, the coastal State also has responsibilities in respect of its vessels, though
worded somewhat less stringency.
Similar to the access agreement situation is where the fish is obtained under a joint venture or a charter
arrangement. In the case of the joint venture, the range of possibilities is in theory very wide. They could
involve at one extreme a very small coastal State interest in the venture, e.g. as low as 10% of the total
venture, where the coastal State partner has provided nothing more than the access to the local resource,
though with the fishing being done by the foreign partner. Depending on the local law of the coastal State
in question, it may be difficult to distinguish between such a vessel and a foreign flag vessel. Some
countries also have a category of “locally based foreign fishing vessels”, where the foreign vessel obtains
certain benefits because of its commitment to the coastal State, e.g. because it lands all or most of its

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 5. NATIONAL LAWS

catch in a port in the coastal State.

Similar situations can arise under charter arrangements, where a chartered vessel is, though flagged in
another country, fishing as a local fishing vessel in terms of the authorization it has received. This is
possible under the laws of quite a few countries, though the particular solutions adopted will vary
considerably.
In fact, the range of possibilities is quite wide here when you allow for the fact that there are different
arrangements that can be made according to the type of legal system we are dealing with (e.g. common
law, civil law, socialist legal systems, economies in transition, etc). However, this theoretical range of
possibilities should not be overstated, as most arrangements tend to fall into a number of fairly easily
predictable types. The point which has to be made however, is that if you start to become too closely
involved in the details and possible permutations of national law, then the range of possibilities makes it
unlikely that a solution will be found which is clear cut for all purposes.
Thus by focussing on e.g. the flag State, even when the vessel is fishing in the internal waters, territorial
waters or EEZ, it provides a clear cut solution to the provision of data that avoids getting into the niceties
of different national laws, and how a vessel is authorized to fish in the EEZ. It also provides a workable
solution where the fishing takes place across national zones, not only with the straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks covered by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, but also in respect of shared
stocks between two EEZ’s.8
8
See Article 63 (1) on the 1982 UN Convention.
The problem which needs to be addressed, therefore, is how we can reduce the problem of nonreporting
or double reporting.
At the seventeenth session of CWP, a paper was presented which identified the following problem areas.
FAO has recently reviewed some specific situations in which difficulties in assigning a
nationality existed and led to misreporting and double counting. This is the case of New
Zealand, Namibia, Peru, and probably Argentina, for which statistics of catches taken
under joint-venture or concession agreements between these countries and a number of
countries, including Japan, Rep. of Korea, Taiwan, etc., were over-reported.
In the case of New Zealand, the problem had first been emphasized a few years ago by
anomalies in the food balance sheets constructed by FAO to estimate fish consumption.
As of 1 April 1978, when the New Zealand 200 mile EEZ was declared, a number of
joint-venture agreements were approved and these arrangements continue until 1 April
1983, when a “deepwater trawl policy” was introduced, allocating quotas to New
Zealand-owned companies. These companies were permitted to catch their quotas using
foreign chartered vessels and/or their own trawlers. Squid jigging and purse seining
charter agreements continued as previously. In accordance with generally recommended
practice, also accepted by FAO, these quantities caught by foreign fishing boats under
charter arrangements have been recorded by the local authorities as New Zealand
production. Some of the catches taken by these foreign vessels are landed in countries
other than New Zealand, and these quantities are treated in the New Zealand statistics as
exports. Unfortunately, these same catches are, in many cases, also reported as national
catches (instead of national imports) in order to avoid import duties, by the flag States of

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 5. NATIONAL LAWS

the foreign fishing vessels operating in the New Zealand waters under joint-venture
agreement. This, of course, has the effect of greatly inflating the reported catch figures in
the Southwest Pacific (Area 81). This problem was solved, in agreement with the New
Zealand fishery authorities, who provided FAO with data on catches by vessels from other
countries fishing in New Zealand waters under charter or licence agreements, broken
down by country, species, and quantity landed in New Zealand and outside New Zealand.
A similar situation pertained in Namibia, where the fisheries management authorities
allocate catch quotas to Namibian companies, which often enter into joint-ventures with
foreign companies which provided the vessels. There was some double reporting of
catches (which are all landed in Namibia) which was subsequently resolved by asking
Namibia to separate catches by flag of vessel.
In the case of Peru, the quantities over-reported referred exclusively to the Giant Squid
(Dosidicus gigas). In April 1994 a Reorganization Plan for the rational and sustained
exploitation of Giant Squid was approved. This plan seeks to maximise economic benefits
resulting from the harvesting of this resource, by using its high availability to cover the
sector’s requirements of research reorganization, planning and development. As a result
of these measures, the Ministry of Fisheries has so far received money from fishing
concessions, awarded through public tenders, issued to foreign flag vessels using special
tackle for the harvesting of this species. These large quantities (60,998 Mt. in 1991,
93,852 in 1992, 132,586 in 1993 and 167,132 in 1994) misreported by the Peruvian fishery
authorities under the Peruvian catch, were removed because they were already included
under the catch of foreign flag vessels, in particular Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese
vessels.
With regard to the Argentinian catch data, it will be necessary to investigate if the
quantity (or part) produced by Asian jigger boats (about 100,000 m.t.) under a charter
regime, is also recorded in the statistics of the chartered flags of Japan, Taiwan and Rep.
of Korea, fishing respectively with 44, 13 and 11 jigger vessels.
It will be apparent that it is in the area of joint ventures and charters that the greatest uncertainty as to
responsibility for reporting will arise. It will be noted that in each of the situations referred to, the end
result was to attribute the responsibility to the flag State to provide the catch data. Given the already
heavy reliance on the flag State, it would seem advisable to strengthen that commitment to all but the
most exceptional cases. In other areas, there are no reports of uncertainty as to where the responsibility
does or should lie.

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 6. THE TEST USED BY CWP

6. THE TEST USED BY CWP

In 1954 the United Nations Statistical Commission decided that fish catches should be assigned to the
country of the flag flown by the fishing vessel. This concept was adopted by all member agencies of the
Coordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics (CWP) at its Ninth Session (1977) and defined more
precisely at the CWP’s Tenth Session (1980) as follows:
The flag of the vessel performing the essential part of the operation catching the fish,
should be considered the paramount indication of the nationality assigned to the catch
data and this indication overridden only when one of the following arrangements between
a foreign flag vessel and the host country exists:
a) the vessel is chartered by the host country to augment its fishing fleet; or
b) the vessel fishes for the country by joint venture contract or similar
agreements (as opposed to the ad hoc practice of a vessel selling catches to a
foreign vessel or landing catches at a foreign port) and the operation of such
vessel is an integral part of the economy of the host country.
When governments negotiate joint ventures or other contracts in which vessels of one
country land their catches at ports of another country or unload their catches to vessels of
another country and the one of the above-mentioned criteria is applicable, the assignment
of nationality to such catches and landings data should be specified in the agreement.
This formulation had, it appears, worked quite well, except in the area of charters and joint ventures. The
Eighteenth Session of CWP (Luxembourg, 6-9 July 1999) refined the criteria further by seeking to
strengthen the role of the flag State even more and endeavouring to eliminate some of the uncertainties
surrounding joint ventures and charters. The revised formulation which was adopted by the CWP reads:
The flag State of the vessel performing the essential part of the fishing operation shall be
responsible for the provision of catch and landing data.
Where a foreign flag vessel is fishing in the waters under the national jurisdiction of
another State, the flag State of the vessel shall have at all times the responsibility to
provide relevant catch and landing data. The only exceptions to this shall be:
(a) where the vessel undertakes fishing under a charter agreement or
arrangement to augment the local fishing fleet, and the vessel has become for
all practical purposes a local fishing vessel of the host country;
(b) where the vessel undertakes fishing pursuant to a joint venture or similar
arrangement in waters under the national jurisdiction of another State and
the vessel is operating for all practical purposes as a local vessel, or its
operation has become, or is intended to become, an integral part of the
economy of the host country.

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6. THE TEST USED BY CWP

In any situation where there is uncertainty as to the application of these criteria, any
agreement, charter, joint venture or other similar arrangement shall contain a provision
setting out clearly the responsibility for reporting catch and landing data, which shall be
reported to the flag State, and, where relevant, to any coastal State in whose waters
fishing operations are to take place or competent subregional, regional or global fisheries
organization or arrangement

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 ANNEX 1 - Extract from M. Tsamenyi and K. Mfodwo

ANNEX 1 - Extract from M. Tsamenyi and

K. Mfodwo
Extract from M. Tsamenyi and K. Mfodwo, Integrated Fisheries Monitoring - the Legal Framework, pp
12-14. Paper presented at International Conference on Integrated Fisheries Monitoring, Sydney 1-5
February, 1999
AGREEMENTS MONITORING PROVISIONS
ICCAT Under Article IX, the Contracting Parties agree:
· To furnish, on the request of the Commission, any available statistical, biological
& other scientific information the Commission may need for the purposes of the
Convention;
· To allow the Commission to obtain such information on a voluntary basis direct
from companies & individual fishermen when their official agencies are unable to
obtain & furnish the information to the Commission.
In Annex II to the Final Act, the Parties:
· recognised the need to collect adequate statistics on catch & fishing effort & the
necessary biological data, & make available for publication the statistical & related
economic data with a view to enabling the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas;
· urged all countries to take steps without delay to create, where they do not already
exist, offices within their fisheries administrations suitably staffed & having
appropriate financial & legislative support to undertake the collection & the
processing of the data to be used by the Commission.

IOTC Institutions
· IOTC Commission undertakes continuous review of the conditions & trends of the
stocks.
· Commission gathers, analyses & disseminates scientific information, catch &
effort statistics & other data relevant to the conservation & management of the
stocks.
· Commission encourages, recommends & co-ordinates research & development
activities in respect of the stocks & fisheries covered by the Agreement.
· Commission decides scope & form of fisheries statistics & the intervals at which
they shall be provided (Article XI).
· Commission endeavours to obtain fishing statistics from fishing States or entities
which are not Members of the Commission.

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ANNEX 1 - Extract from M. Tsamenyi and K. Mfodwo

Member States

· Required to co-operate, through the Commission, in the establishment of an

appropriate system to keep under review the implementation of conservation &
management measures taking into account appropriate & effective tools &
techniques to monitor the fishing activities & to gather the scientific information
required for the purposes of the Agreement (Art. X(3)).
· Members of the Commission agree to co-operate in exchanging information
regarding on fishing by non-Parties to the Convention (Art. X(4)).
· Members of the Commission shall, on the request of the Commission, provide
such available & accessible statistical & other data & information as the
Commission may require (Article XI).

CCSBT Institutions

The Commission is required to collect & accumulate the following information

under Article 8:
· Scientific information, statistical data & other information relating to southern
bluefin tuna & ecologically related species;
· Information relating to laws, regulations & administrative measures on southern
bluefin tuna fisheries;
· Any other information relating to southern bluefin tuna.

The Commission is also required to develop, at the earliest possible time &
consistent with international law, systems to monitor all fishing activities related to
southern bluefin tuna in order to enhance scientific knowledge necessary for its
conservation.

Member States

The Parties undertake under Article 5 to:

· Expeditiously provide to the Commission information, fishing catch & effort
statistics & other data relevant to conservation of southern bluefin tuna &, as
appropriate, ecologically related species;
· Cooperate in collection & direct exchange, when appropriate, of fisheries data,
biological samples & other information relevant for scientific research on southern
bluefin tuna & ecologically related species;
· Cooperate in the exchange of information regarding any fishing for southern
bluefin tuna by nationals, residents & vessels of any State or entity not party to the
Convention.

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ANNEX 1 - Extract from M. Tsamenyi and K. Mfodwo

CCAMLR Institutions

The functions of the Commission under Article IX(1) include to:

· Compile data on the status of & changes in population of Antarctic marine living
resources & on factors affecting the distribution, abundance & productivity of
harvested species & dependent or related species or populations;
· Ensure the acquisition of catch & effort statistics on harvested populations;
· Analyse, disseminate & publish the information referred to immediately above &
the reports of the Scientific Committee.

Member States
Under Article XX the Members of the Commission agree:
· to provide annually to the Commission & to the Scientific Committee such
statistical, biological & other data & information as the Commission & Committee
may require in the exercise of their functions;
· to provide information about their harvesting activities, including fishing areas &
vessels, so as to enable reliable catch & effort statistics to be compiled;
· that in any of their harvesting activities, advantage shall be taken of opportunities
to collect data needed to assess the impact of harvesting.
Article XXIV requires the establishment of a system of observation & inspection on
the defined principles - both have been established and are fully operational.

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