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Phenomenal Intentionality
 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Series Editor:
David J. Chalmers, Australian National University and
New York University

Self Expression Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal

Owen Flanagan Knowledge
Torin Alter, Sven Walter (editors)
Deconstructing the Mind
Stephen Stich Beyond Reduction
Steven Horst
The Conscious Mind
David J. Chalmers What Are We?
Eric T. Olson
Minds and Bodies
Colin McGinn Supersizing the Mind
Andy Clark
What’s Within?
Fiona Cowie Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion
William Fish
The Human Animal
Eric T. Olson Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
Robert D. Rupert
Dreaming Souls
Owen Flanagan The Character of Consciousness
David J. Chalmers
Consciousness and Cognition
Michael Thau Perceiving the World
Bence Nanay (editor)
Thinking Without Words
José Luis Bermúdez The Senses
Fiona Macpherson (editor)
Identifying the Mind
U.T. Place (author), George Graham, The Contents of Visual Experience
Elizabeth R. Valentine (editors) Susanna Siegel
Purple Haze Attention is Cognitive Unison
Joseph Levine Christopher Mole
Three Faces of Desire Consciousness and the Prospects of
Timothy Schroeder Physicalism
Derk Pereboom
A Place for Consciousness
Gregg Rosenberg Introspection and Consciousness
Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar
Ignorance and Imagination
(editors)
Daniel Stoljar
Decomposing the Will
Simulating Minds
Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, and
Alvin I. Goldman
Tillmann Vierkant (editors)
Gut Reactions
Phenomenal Intentionality
Jesse J. Prinz
Uriah Kriegel (editor)
 Phenomenal
Intentionality
EDIT ED BY U R I A H K R I EGEL

1
 3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Phenomenal intentionality / edited by Uriah Kriegel.
p. cm. — (Philosophy of mind)
Includes index.
ISBN 978–0–19–976429–7 (alk. paper)
1. Intentionality (Philosophy) 2. Phenomenology. I. Kriegel, Uriah.
B105.I56P53 2013
128c.2—dc23
2012026340

ISBN 978–0–19–976429–7

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
 CONTENTS

About the Contributors vii

1. The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 1

uriah kriegel

2. The Access Problem 27

m ichelle mon tagu e

3. Indexical Thought 49
d av i d p i t t

4. Phenomenal Presence 71
chr istopher fr ey

5. Consciousness and Synthesis 93

colin mcginn

6. Constructing a World for the Senses 99

k a t a l i n fa r k a s

7. Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality:

In Defense of a Kantian Account 116
fa r i d m a s r o u r

8. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional

Objects 137
fr eder ick k roon

v
vi Contents

9. Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought 156

tim cr ane

10. Intellectual Gestalts 174

elija h chudnoff

11. Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? 194

a d a m pa u t z

12. Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness 235

charles siewert

Index 261
 A BOU T T H E CON T R I BU TOR S

Elijah Chudnoff is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of

Miami. His main areas of research are epistemology and philosophy of mind.
He has written a number of papers defending a traditional Platonist view of
intuition as a form of intellectual perception. He is currently working on a book
about cognitive phenomenology.

Tim Crane is Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of

Cambridge, having previously taught at University College London. He works
mainly on the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, and has defended a non-
physicalist account of the mind and an intentionalist conception of mental phe-
nomena. His books include The Mechanical Mind (1995), and Elements of Mind
(2001). He has just completed a book on the representation of the non-existent
(The Objects of Thought) and a collection of his papers, Aspects of Psychologism, is
forthcoming from Harvard University Press.

Katalin Farkas was born and educated in Budapest, and has been teaching at
the Central European University since 2000. Her main area of research is the
philosophy of mind. In her book, The Subject’s Point of View (Oxford University
Press, 2008) she defends an uncompromising internalism about the mental,
and an equally uncompromising conception of the phenomenal availabil-
ity of mental features. Perhaps unsurprisingly, she has great admiration for
Descartes and hopes to make a modest contribution to restoring his reputation
after a century or so of bad press.

Christopher Frey is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University

of Chicago. His research is in the philosophy of perception and ancient Greek
philosophy, especially Aristotle’s metaphysics and natural philosophy.

Uriah Kriegel is a research director at the Jean Nicod Institute in Paris, work-
ing mainly in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. His books include Subjective

vii
viii About the Contributors

Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (Oxford University Press, 2009)

and The Sources of Intentionality (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Frederick Kroon teaches philosophy at the University of Auckland. He has

published on a range of topics, including the theory of reference, the nature
of rationality, semantic paradox, nonexistence, and the pretense approach to
the nature and semantics of fiction. His current research involves applying fic-
tionalist ideas to problems and puzzles in the philosophy of language. He is a
subject editor for twentieth-century philosophy for the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, and holds the PhD from Princeton University.

Colin McGinn teaches philosophy at the University of Miami, specializing in

philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. He has taught
at Rutgers University, Oxford University, and London University. He has pub-
lished some twenty books, ranging from consciousness to evil, Shakespeare to
sport, fi lm to logic, Wittgenstein to imagination. He has written extensively
for the general reading public and has published a novel. He is an avid tennis
player and surfer.

Farid Masrour is a College Fellow in the Philosophy Department at Harvard

University. He is interested in philosophy of perception and in related areas of
philosophy of mind, epistemology, history of philosophy, and cognitive sciences

Michelle Montague is lecturer in philosophy at the University of Bristol and

an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin. Her
main interests are in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and meta-
physics. She is an editor of Cognitive Phenomenology (Oxford University Press,
2011) and is currently working on a book on mental content, with particular
reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

Adam Pautz is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas

at Austin. He works on consciousness, the philosophy of perception, the sen-
sible qualities, and “the naturalization program.”

David Pitt is professor of philosophy at California State University, Los

Angeles. He has published articles in philosophy of mind, philosophy of lan-
guage, and metaphysics. He is currently working on a book manuscript on
thought and reference.

Charles Siewert is Robert Alan and Kathryn Dunlevie Hayes Professor of

Humanities and professor of philosophy at Rice University. He is the author
of The Significance of Consciousness (Princeton University Press, 1998) and has
written extensively on the interpretation and explanation of phenomenal con-
sciousness and its relation to introspective self-knowledge, perceptual experi-
ence, and conceptual thought.
 1

The Phenomenal Intentionality

Research Program
U r i a h K r i ege l

Introduction/Abstract
Since the late seventies, the main research program for understanding
intentionality has been based on the attempt to naturalize intentionality by
identifying a natural relation that holds between internal states of the brain and
external states of the world when and only when the former represent the latter.
Call this the Naturalist-Externalist Research Program, or NERP. Different versions
of NERP differ on how they construe the relevant natural relation. Typically, it
is construed as involving in its core a type of tracking relation, whereby internal
states occur sensitively to the presence of specific external conditions.1
Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire
approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness
has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role it is not
accorded in NERP. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the
fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby
notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complemen-
tary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research
program—what I call the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program,
or PIRP.
My principal goals in this chapter are the following. First, I will explicitly
articulate, and elaborate upon, what I take to be the fundamental claims at
the heart of this nascent research program. Secondly, I will review some of the
arguments in the recent philosophical literature that support key theses of
PIRP, in the process illustrating some apparent advantages of the framework
in comparison to NERP. Thirdly, I will point out some important theoretical
options within the generic PIRP framework, specifying issues about which pro-
ponents of the general framework might disagree.

1
2 phenomenal intentionality

1. An Overview of PIRP
Phenomenal intentionality is the intentionality a mental state exhibits purely
in virtue of its phenomenal character. As far as I know, the term makes its first
appearance in two papers circulating in the second half of the nineties, Brian
Loar’s (2003) “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content” and
Terry Horgan and John Tienson’s (2002) “The Phenomenology of Intentionality
and the Intentionality of Phenomenology.” Loar’s paper started circulating in the
late nineties, however, and in any case the idea of phenomenal intentionality is
present in Loar’s work much earlier. His 1987 paper “Subjective Intentionality”
may be regarded as the first explicit published discussion of phenomenal inten-
tionality in analytic Anglo-American philosophy. Arguably, however, the lively
debates on intentionality among Brentano and his students (see Brentano 1874,
Twardowski 1895, Husserl 1901, and Meinong 1904) in fact concerned phenome-
nal intentionality, which was probably the only intentionality they recognized.2

1.1. Toward a New Research Program

The term “research program” can be used to intimate two different things. In
one sense, the term is used to refer to a degraded kind of theory—a cluster of
ideas whose purpose is to become a comprehensive theory of some phenomenon
but which has not yet reached the maturity and cohesion required. In another
sense, the term is used to denote a perfectly clear general framework for the
study of some phenomenon, a framework within which several distinct theo-
ries could be pursued that share a fundamental commonality (a “paradigm”
perhaps). My claim here is that work on phenomenal intentionality is on the
cusp of qualifying as a research program in the second sense.
Compare NERP, where a number of distinct theories can be discerned—infor-
mational semantics, functional role semantics, teleosemantics—that nonetheless
share the general idea that some kind of naturalistically kosher relation between
brain events and world events must underlie intentionality. Put impressionisti-
cally, the basic idea shared by all theories within NERP is that intentionality is
injected into the world with the appearance in nature of a certain kind of tracking
relation. It is when the relevant tracking relation occurs between distinct states
(including brain states and environmental states) in the world that intentional-
ity makes its first appearance on the scene. Once intentionality has thus been
injected into the world, it can start being “passed around” so it is somewhat “freed
from” the relevant tracking relation. Linguistic expressions, paintings, and traffic
signs, for example, may represent even in the absence of tracking, because they
somehow derive their intentionality from things that do track. But the source of
all intentionality is the relevant kind of tracking relation. Something like this is
the paradigm that guides work on intentionality within NERP.
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 3

The basic, guiding idea of PIRP could be thought of on the same model
(Kriegel 2011). The cornerstone would be the idea that intentionality is injected
into the world with the appearance of a certain kind of phenomenal character.
It is when the relevant phenomenal character shows up that intentionality
makes its first appearance on the scene. Here too, once this phenomenal char-
acter appears, and brings in its train “original intentionality,” intentionality
can be “passed around” to things lacking this (or any) phenomenal character.
But the source of all intentionality is the relevant phenomenal character.
Within NERP, different comprehensive theories of intentionality may dif-
fer along two central dimensions. First, they may differ on what they identify
as the relevant tracking relation that brings intentionality into the world. Is
it a causal relation, an informational relation, a counterfactual-dependence
relation, a teleological relation? Much of the debate on intentionality during
the eighties concerned this question. Secondly, they may differ on how they
choose to account for derived intentionality, in language and other forms of
tracking-free intentionality.3 The leading account here is probably Grice’s (1957,
1969) intention-based theory (see also Schiffer 1982), which is most naturally
applied to language, but may also be extended to pictorial representation (Abell
2005, Blumson 2006) and perhaps other forms of derived intentionality. One
may say, then, that comprehensive theories of intentionality within NERP are
composed of two chapters, namely, (i) an account of the relevant tracking rela-
tion and (ii) an account of the derivation relation (in the relevant sense).4
More generally, the two chapters concern source intentionality (if you will)
and non-source intentionality. This general structure can be reproduced for
PIRP. This would be to think of a comprehensive theory of intentionality as
involving the following two chapters: (i) an account of the kind of phenomenal
character that constitutes source intentionality and (ii) an account of the deri-
vation relation that underlies non-source intentionality. Accordingly, different
theories of intentionality within PIRP would differ in the kind of phenomenal
character they identify as the source of all intentionality and/or in how they
choose to account for phenomenality-free intentionality (in language, pictures,
unconscious mentation, etc.).5
In the remainder of this section, I offer a first pass at understanding PIRP—
what it attempts to do (§1.2) and how it attempts to do it (§1.3). Later, I will
review some of the main ideas surrounding the notion of phenomenal inten-
tionality (§2), then outline the structure of a general theory of intentionality
within PIRP (§3).

1.2. Location Projects and the Theory of Intentionality

Jackson (1998) usefully describes the core of what he calls “serious metaphysics”
as the project of addressing the “location problem”: the problem of finding a
4 phenomenal intentionality

place for some phenomenon (typically familiar from the manifest image) in a
description of the world cast entirely in some privileged vocabulary. In fact, how-
ever, there appear to be two kinds of location problem one might distinguish.
I will call these naturalistic location and foundational location (respectively).6
Roughly and generically, naturalistic location of a puzzling phenomenon
(e.g., intentionality) is a matter of identifying it with some phenomenon also
describable in such a way that the phenomenon, as thus alternatively described,
counts as “non-mysterious” and “kosher” within a metaphysical perspective
that gives pride of place to natural science. In the case of naturalizing inten-
tionality, the project is to locate intentionality in a world fully described by the
natural sciences. To do so is to “naturalistically locate” intentionality.
Naturalistic location thus involves taking the vocabulary of the natural sci-
ences to be the privileged vocabulary in serious metaphysics. Foundational
location, on the other hand, involves taking some other vocabulary, considered
in some sense foundational, to be privileged. In the case of intentionality, for
example, foundational location is, roughly, a matter of (i) identifying the fun-
damental source(s) of intentionality in the world (the way it gets “injected” into
the world), and (ii) identifying the principal way(s) derivative kinds of inten-
tionality arise from it.
Within NERP, the two kinds of location project—foundational and
naturalizing—are effectively pursued in tandem. Proposed “sources” are
naturalistically respectable phenomena (causal, covariational, informational,
or teleological relations); and their spread to non-source intentionality is
construed as naturalistically respectable as well. Part of the philosophical
motivation for proposing such sources is the desire to foundationally locate
intentionality in a manner that also constitutes naturalistic location of these
phenomena.
Within PIRP, things proceed differently. Pride of place is given to the idea
that phenomenal consciousness is implicated in the source of intentionality—
it somehow founds, or grounds, all intentionality.7 Naturalization, if it is to
come at all, needs to be a naturalized version of PIRP (“NPIRP,” if you will).

1.3. Fundamental Tenets of PIRP

As noted earlier, work on phenomenal intentionality already qualifies as a
research program in the looser sense, since many interrelated theses recur
in discussions of the notion. I now propose, in rough and generic terms, an
explicit articulation of the common basic ideas that are implicit in this work on
phenomenal intentionality. The six theses below will be put somewhat vaguely,
in order to be suitably generic.8 It would be too much to expect that all philoso-
phers who qualify as pursuing PIRP subscribe to all six theses. But my sugges-
tion is more modest: that (a) most would subscribe to all six theses and (b) all
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 5

would subscribe to most theses.9 I first present the six theses, then offer some
initial clarification of each.

Phenomenal Grounding. There is a kind of intentionality—phenomenal inten-

tionality—that is grounded in phenomenal character.
Inseparatism. The phenomenal and the intentional do not form two separate
mental realms, but are instead inseparably intertwined.
Distinctiveness. Phenomenal intentionality is special and distinctive, in that
it has certain important properties that non-phenomenal forms of inten-
tionality do not.
Narrowness. Phenomenal intentionality is narrow, that is, it is not constitu-
tively dependent upon anything outside the experiencing subject.
Subjectivity. Phenomenal intentionality is inherently subjective: it is built
into the phenomenal character of a phenomenally intentional state that
it (re)presents what it does to someone.
Basicness. Phenomenal intentionality is a basic kind of intentionality and
functions as a source of all intentionality.

Some initial clarifications are in order. Regarding Phenomenal Grounding,

what the pertinent kind of grounding comes to, metaphysically, is a mat-
ter about which different PIRPers could go different ways. One clarification
is essential though: somewhat atypically, as I use the term “grounding,” the
grounding relation need not be anti-symmetric. On the contrary, it could well
be that the phenomenal property and the intentional property it grounds are
strictly identical. (More on that in 1.4.)
As for Inseparatism, a traditional picture divided the mind into two separate
realms: sensory states, which are essentially phenomenal but non-intentional,
and cognitive states, which are essentially intentional but non-phenomenal
(Horgan and Tienson 2002). This is what Inseparatism rejects, holding instead
(i) that paradigmatic sensory states in fact exhibit intentionality, which is
moreover grounded by their phenomenality, and (ii) that paradigmatic cog-
nitive states in fact boast a phenomenality, which moreover grounds their
intentionality.
Next consider Distinctiveness. This is the idea that there is something special
about phenomenal intentionality that sets it apart from other kinds of inten-
tionality. Phenomenal intentionality has certain significant peculiarities. Part
of the reason the notion of phenomenal intentionality becomes the focus of
dedicated research is precisely this distinctiveness.
Concerning Narrowness, now, an intentional property is narrow just in case
it supervenes on the subject’s non-relational properties, that is, is “locally
supervenient.” Thus to say that phenomenal-intentional properties are narrow
is to say that they are locally supervenient.
6 phenomenal intentionality

As for Subjectivity, I note that recent philosophical work on phenomenal

consciousness has increasingly emphasized the fact that phenomenal charac-
ter has to do not just what it is like but with what it is like for the subject. This
feature is inherited by phenomenal intentionality: a phenomenally intentional
state presents what it does to the subject. (More on this in 2.3.)
Finally, Basicness is essentially the thesis that all intentionality derives from
phenomenal intentionality. It appears to follow from this that in the absence of
phenomenal intentionality there would be no intentionality at all. Clearly, this
is a linchpin thesis for the foundational location project.

1.4. Some Theoretical Options within PIRP

There are a number of important issues about which proponents of the generic
PIRP framework could take different positions. Here I will briefly describe some
of these issues and some principal theoretical options concerning them.10
First is the relation between phenomenal properties and fundamental inten-
tional properties. One view is that the “relation” is outright identity: the inten-
tional property just is the phenomenal property. An alternative view is that
phenomenal properties are distinct from the relevant intentional properties,
that the intentional properties supervene with metaphysical necessity upon
the phenomenal properties, and/or that the intentional properties are realized
by the phenomenal properties. A third option is that there is an anti-symmetric
relation of metaphysical dependence that the intentional properties bear to the
phenomenal properties and that goes beyond mere supervenience—a sort of
“in virtue of” relation. There may be other options as well.
Second is the extent of phenomenal intentionality. One view is that
phenomenal intentionality is confined to perceptual experience, or to this plus
somatic and emotional experience. Another view is that it is much more perva-
sive, including for instance the phenomenology of agency, the phenomenology
of thought (so-called cognitive phenomenology), and so on.11 Embracing the
leaner view presumably would greatly complicate the task of making a case for
Basicness; the wider the extent of phenomenal intentionality, the more ten-
able Basicness is. However, there is nothing incoherent about pursuing PIRP
while rejecting an expansive account of phenomenology. One could perfectly
well hold that all phenomenology is sensory and nonetheless subscribe to all
six theses listed earlier. This is important, because some commentators discuss
the notion of phenomenal intentionality as though it is definitionally tied to
the possibility of cognitive phenomenology (e.g., Lycan 2008).
Third is the question of whether (some or all) phenomenally intentional
states exhibit any kind of non-foundational, merely derived intentionality
along with their underived source intentionality. One view is that some or all
do, one that none do.
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 7

Fourth is the question of whether phenomenal intentionality is in fact

naturalistically, or even physicalistically, locatable. One view is that it is,
even though the relevant kind of naturalization evidently would need to look
rather different from NERP. The opposite view is that phenomenal-intentional
properties are primitive and irreducible (or at least not reducible to physical
properties).12

2. Arguments for Central PIRP Theses

In this section, I survey various arguments from the recent philosophical lit-
erature pertaining to the existence of phenomenal intentionality, its scope and
extent in human mentality, its distinctive features, and its basic role as the
source of all intentionality.

2.1. The Existence of Phenomenal Intentionality

Why think that there is such a thing as phenomenally grounded intentional-
ity? One consideration unlikely to win converts but central in motivating sym-
pathizers is the idea that phenomenal intentionality is simply introspectively
manifest: attending to one’s stream of consciousness in the right way brings
out that some conscious episodes are intentional, and intentional because phe-
nomenal. Certainly introspection suggests that some mental states have both
intentionality and phenomenality. Whether introspection reveals that some-
times the former is grounded in the latter is a harder question. Admittedly, it
is implausible that introspection presents any grounding relation as a ground-
ing relation. But it is much more plausible that introspection presents what
is in fact a grounding relation under a simpler guise, but in such a way that a
sufficiently sophisticated theoretician could justifiably conceptualize what is
presented as grounding.13
An argument with a more neutral starting point is due to Charles Siewert
(1998). He notes that, purely in virtue of their phenomenal character (and
without need of interpretation), conscious experiences are often assessable
for accuracy. Suppose you undergo an experience with a squarish phenome-
nal character. If nothing around you is square, your experience is assessable
as inaccurate. If the right object or surface is square, your experience may be
assessable as accurate. Thus phenomenal character can bring in its train accu-
racy conditions. Since having accuracy conditions is an intentional property,
it appears that at least some phenomenal character can guarantee intentional
properties.
Finally, the existence of phenomenal intentionality may be supported with
thought experiments. For instance, we can conceive of a disembodied soul in
8 phenomenal intentionality

an otherwise empty world who is phenomenally indistinguishable from us

(Kriegel Ms). Intuitively, portions of the soul’s inner life are also intentionally
indistinguishable (in the sense of instantiating the same intentional prop-
erties) from corresponding portions of our own inner life—we and the soul
will have some intentional states in common. The fact that some phenomenal
duplication secures intentional duplication suggests (perhaps entails) that
some phenomenal properties are sufficient for intentional properties. Another
thought experiment is the more familiar brain-in-vat one (Horgan et al. 2004).
Intuitively, an envatted brain that is physically identical throughout its exis-
tence to your brain, with identical sensory inputs all the while, would have a
conscious mental life that intentionally matches yours exactly. And intuitively,
the basis for this intentional match would be that this envatted brain would
have a mental life some of which is phenomenally exactly like yours.

2.2. The Scope of Phenomenal Intentionality

Once one knows that there is phenomenal intentionality in the world, one
wants to know just how much of it there is. Much of the work carried out by
PIRPers concerns this question.
The question may be profitably divided into two sub-questions, concern-
ing (respectively) sensory and non-sensory phenomenal intentionality. The
challenge presented by each question has been quite different. In the sensory
domain, it is widely acknowledged that there is sensory phenomenology; the
challenge has been to show that there is a sensory intentionality it grounds. In
the non-sensory domain, it is widely acknowledged that there is non-sensory
intentionality; the challenge has been to show that there is a non-sensory phe-
nomenology that grounds it. In this section, I review some work on non-sensory
phenomenal intentionality.14 This work has tended to fall in turn into two
categories, concerned with phenomenal intentionality within and without the
sphere of perceptual experience.
Within the perceptual sphere, there are elements in perceptual experience
that are intentionally rich but are claimed to nonetheless involve phenomenal
intentionality. Perhaps the most systematic contribution to the study of per-
ceptual phenomenal intentionality is due to Susanna Siegel (2005, 2006a), who
argues that high-level properties are represented in perception. These include
causation, meaning, and kind properties. The idea is that we not only under-
stand, but can also perceive, that one billiard ball causes the motion of another;
that some words on a page mean that the basketball game has been canceled;
that something colorful and shapely is a parrot (see also Siewert 1998).
A particularly intriguing debate in this area concerns the point at which
perceptual experiences start presenting us with an objective world, a world
whose character is independent of the subject’s perceptual activity. Siegel
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 9

(2006b) herself argues that this occurs when part of the content of a perceptual
experience is that its object will not move if the subject changes her spatial
perspective on it. Farid Masrour (2008) argues that this occurs rather when
the experience acquires a certain phenomenal feature he calls “dynamic unity
structure.”15 Other views are also possible.
A related and quite central debate concerns the representation of perspectival
properties. Suppose you look at a tilted coin. Does your perceptual experience
present the coin as (having the non-perspectival property of being) circular or
as (having the perspectival property of being) elliptical? Kelly (2004) argues
that only the (non-perspectival) circularity is presented in experience, whereas
Noë (2004) claims that both the (non-perspectival) circularity and (perspec-
tival) ellipticality are presented.
For a variety of reasons, friends of phenomenal intentionality have often
been keen to argue for the existence of non-perceptual experience with a purely
intellectual or cognitive phenomenology that constitutes its intentionality.
Perhaps the strongest thesis in this vein is Pitt’s (2004) claim that thoughts
have a phenomenology which is both proprietary and individuative, that is, a
phenomenology that both is different from all other types of phenomenology
and varies whenever the content varies.16
The literature contains two main types of argument for claims of this sort
(though there are at least three more minor types of argument I will not survey
here). One is an argument from phenomenal contrast: two conscious episodes
are contrasted, where (i) there is clearly an overall difference in what it is like
to undergo these episodes and (ii) the best account of that difference is in terms
of a difference in a purely cognitive phenomenal character. A much discussed
argument of this form is due to Strawson (1994), though it is present in essence
already in Moore (1953). Strawson argues for the existence of “understanding
experience” by contrasting the overall phenomenologies of a French speaker
and a non–French speaker listening to the news in French. Strawson claims
that there is a difference in what it is like for them to listen to the news, and
that the difference is best accounted for in terms of an element of understand-
ing experience present only in the French speaker’s phenomenology.17
The second kind of argument appeals to an asymmetric access one has to
one’s conscious cognitive states and their contents (Goldman 1993, Pitt 2004).
Schematically, the argument proceeds as follows: one has a special, immediate
access to some of one’s cognitive states (and their contents); only to phenom-
enal states (and contents) can one have this kind of special access; therefore,
(some of) one’s cognitive states (and their contents) are phenomenal.
This is a very partial survey of research in this area. The telos of this research
appears to be to establish that sensory states’ phenomenology is inherently
intentional and that non-sensory states’ intentionality is phenomenally
grounded. If something like this is established, then the separatist picture
10 phenomenal intentionality

of the mind collapses, and a more unified picture emerges that conforms to
Inseparatism (see §1.3). One way to develop the inseparatist picture is to con-
strue the concept of mind as a prototype concept, such that a state or event
qualifies as mental to the extent that it is appropriately related to prototypical
mental states, but where all (and perhaps only) prototypical mental states are
phenomenally intentional states (Horgan and Kriegel 2008).

2.3. The Distinctiveness of Phenomenal Intentionality

Another focal point of much work on phenomenal intentionality is the thought
that there is something special about phenomenal intentionality—that phe-
nomenal intentionality exhibits significant distinctive features absent in other
types of intentionality. This is important, because if phenomenal intention-
ality is indeed distinctive, it may resist theoretical treatment perfectly suit-
able for other types of intentionality. For example, one might hold that while
teleosemantics is the true theory of non-phenomenal intentionality, some other
theory would be needed to accommodate the distinctive features of phenomenal
intentionality.
One recurrent distinctiveness claim is that only phenomenal intentionality
has determinate content in and of itself (Searle 1991, 1992, Loar 1995, Horgan
and Tienson 2002, Strawson 2008, Horgan and Graham forthcoming). We may
state this thesis as follows:

Determinate Content. Necessarily, for any intentional state M with con-

tent C, if C is non-derivatively determinate, then M is phenomenally
intentional.

On this view, non-phenomenally intentional states can have determinate con-

tent, but not in and of themselves. Instead, they must derive their determinate
content from phenomenally intentional states they are appropriately related
to. By “determinate content,” I simply mean content which is as fine-grained
as one’s intentional contents appear pre-theoretically to be. For example,
pre-theoretically it seems that one’s thoughts are fine-grained enough to be
about rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts, about Phosphorus rather
than Hesperus, about triangles rather than closed trilateral figures, and so
on. If a kind of intentional state is not this fine-grained, I say that its content
is indeterminate. And if it is this fine-grained, but not intrinsically so, I say
that its content is only derivatively determinate. Determinate Content claims
that only phenomenally intentional states have non-derivatively determinate
content.18
One key argument for this thesis, in very rough outline, is that noth-
ing other than phenomenal character can secure content determinacy.
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 11

In particular, tracking relations cannot account for this determinacy—not

even when teleologically augmented. Whenever an internal state bears track-
ing relations to rabbits or Phosphorus, it also bears them to undetached rab-
bit parts or Hesperus. And as Fodor (1984, 1990) argued long ago, whenever
tracking a property F is adaptive for an organism, it is also and equally adaptive
for it to track any property coextensive with F. Evolutionary benefit cannot
discriminate between coextensive properties (let alone necessarily coextensive
ones). Of course, for all I just said, there may be some other non-phenomenal
feature that can secure content determinacy, but proponents of Determinate
Content have attempted to consider all the initially plausible candidates and
argue against them (see especially Horgan and Graham forthcoming).
Another claim with the same general structure is that only phenomenal
intentionality is intrinsically subjective (McGinn 1988, Kriegel 2003b, Georgalis
2006). Put in McGinn’s (1988) terms, the basic idea is that conscious content
is Janus-faced, in that in addition to its outward-looking face of presenting
some object or state of affairs in the world, it also possesses an inward-looking
face involving an elusive presence to the subject. This can perhaps be interpreted
more rigorously as the thesis that while unconscious intentional states instan-
tiate in and of themselves only the two-place relation x represents y, conscious
ones instantiate the three-place relation x represents y to z. Let us say that an
intentional state M is non-derivatively subjective just in case it instantiates the
three-place representation relation intrinsically, that is, in and of itself.19 Then
we may put the thesis as follows:

Intrinsic Subjectivity. Necessarily, for any intentional state M, if M is

non-derivatively subjective, then M is phenomenally intentional.

The thesis allows unconscious intentional states to instantiate the three-place

representation relation, but not intrinsically. Rings on a tree trunk can repre-
sent the tree’s age to a botanist, and an unconscious state in the dorsal stream
of the visual system can represent a circle to a neuroscientist. But in these cases,
the representation-to is not inherent in the representation-of. Rather, the
representation of a worldly feature represents what it does to someone simply
because someone harbors a separate representation of it; it is only thanks to
this other (second-order) representation that the original (first-order) repre-
sentation represents to someone. Phenomenally intentional states, by contrast,
are non-derivatively subjective in that they represent what they do to someone
without requiring that “someone” to harbor a numerically distinct representa-
tion of them.
It is not easy to discern in the existing literature a clear argument for Intrinsic
Subjectivity. This is probably because the pull of the thesis is mostly phenom-
enological. It has sometimes been claimed, on broadly phenomenological
12 phenomenal intentionality

grounds, that all conscious states necessarily involve a kind of for-me-ness, or

subjective significance, whereby their subject is aware of them in an immedi-
ate and somewhat elusive manner (Levine 2001, Kriegel 2005, 2009, Horgan
et al. 2006). It is natural to think that when an intentional state is conscious,
its for-me-ness will manifest itself as the kind of non-derivative subjectivity
under discussion.
Here too it is clear that the intrinsic subjectivity of phenomenally intentional
states creates a prima facie problem for NERP, as the latter is geared to account
mostly for representation-of, not representation-to. Perhaps one exception is
Millikan’s (1989) consumer semantics, which may be naturally thought of as
capable of accounting for representation-to. In consumer semantics, the con-
tent of a representation R is determined not by the way the system that produces
R tracks conditions in the world, but by the way the downstream systems that
consume R track them. In a way, we may say that it is what R represents to the
consumer systems that determines R’s content. Thus consumer semantics offers
a NERP-y gloss on representation-to. However, it is unclear that this type of
representation-to is the one referred to by proponents of Intrinsic Subjectivity.
For starters, the latter is always and necessarily a personal-level phenomenon,
whereas the former can be a sub-personal phenomenon. Likewise, since the
latter is a phenomenal element and the former is a matter of accessibility or
consumability, it would appear that the latter is an occurrent property whereas
the former is a dispositional one. Fuller discussion of these issues cannot be
attempted in this review, but clearly there are some principled obstacles in the
way of a consumer-semantic account of representation-to.20
A third distinctiveness claim that shows up often in the relevant literature
is that phenomenal intentionality always involves narrow content, in the sense
of being shared by intrinsic duplicates, whereas non-phenomenal intentional-
ity often involves wide content (Loar 2003, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan
et al. 2004, Georgalis 2006, Kriegel 2007, 2011).21 If a kind of content internal-
ism were generally true of phenomenal intentionality, while content externalism
were commonly true of non-phenomenal intentionality, that would constitute
another distinction of phenomenal intentionality. Any distinctiveness the-
sis based on narrowness, however, would have to stress a quantificational differ-
ence only: phenomenal intentionality is always narrow, whereas non-phenomenal
intentionality is only sometimes narrow. For it is clear that non-phenomenal
intentionality can be and often is narrow as well. For some non-phenomenal repre-
sentations represent non-Twin-Earthable properties. For example, an unconscious
representation of a chair is arguably shared by intrinsic duplicates, since arguably
there are no Twin-Earth scenarios in which something looks superficially like a
chair but lacks some chairly underlying nature.
Arguments for internalism about phenomenal intentionality vary depend-
ing on the strength and nature of the internalism. But the basic argument for
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 13

the narrowness of phenomenal intentionality is fairly straightforward (Horgan

et al. 2004): phenomenal intentionality supervenes on phenomenal character;
phenomenal character is locally supervenient; therefore, phenomenal inten-
tionality is locally supervenient. The first premise is more or less definitional,
the second is supported by brain-in-vat thought experiments (involving phe-
nomenal duplicates that lack the relevant relations to the environment), and
the inference is buttressed by the transitivity of supervenience.
Content determinacy, intrinsic subjectivity, and narrowness are recurring
central claims among philosophers working on phenomenal intentionality.
There are other, more idiosyncratic claims that can and have been made, but
which will not be discussed here.

2.4. The Basicness of Phenomenal Intentionality

Perhaps the most important kind of claim made on behalf of phenomenal inten-
tionality is that it is in some way basic among forms of intentionality (e.g., as in
§1.2). In this section, I review first the main theses alleging basicness, then the
kinds of argument that have been offered in their favor.
The strongest possible basicness thesis is that, in reality, there is no inten-
tionality but phenomenal intentionality—all intentionality is phenomenal
(Strawson 2008, Georgalis 2006).22 On this view, it is simply false that there is any
non-phenomenal intentionality. There may well be a variety of information-bearing
states, but for one reason or another those do not qualify as intentional states. The
only states that qualify as intentional are phenomenal ones.
A more lenient view allows for some non-phenomenal intentionality but
claims that any such must derive from phenomenal intentionality (McGinn 1988,
Kriegel 2003b, 2007, 2011). The distinction between derived and underived inten-
tionality was brought into modern discussions of intentionality by Grice (1957),
who suggested that the intentionality of language derived from the intentional-
ity of thought: the linguistic symbol c^a^t represents cats only in virtue of bear-
ing a certain relation to cat thoughts, whereas cat thoughts have cat-representing
content in and of themselves. More generally, it has often been suggested that
all non-mental intentionality derives from mental intentionality (see Cummins
1979, Searle 1983, Dretske 1988). But proponents of phenomenal intentionality,
while embracing the distinction between derived and underived intentionality,
have sometimes sought to draw it more restrictively, claiming that the intention-
ality of non-phenomenal mental states derives from that of phenomenal ones.
Thus non-phenomenal mental states and non-mental items may be intentional,
but they must derive their intentionality from phenomenally intentional states.
A slightly weaker thesis that might easily be confused with this holds
that phenomenal intentionality is the only underived intentionality, and
all non-phenomenal intentionality is derived, but does not claim that
14 phenomenal intentionality

non-phenomenal intentional states (and items) derive their intentional-

ity from phenomenal-intentional states (Bourget 2010). Instead, it allows
non-phenomenal states to derive their intentionality from each other, in con-
trast to phenomenal-intentional states, each of which has its intentionality
independently of other intentional states.
A significantly weaker claim allows non-phenomenal states to boast
underived intentionality but requires that such states be potentially
phenomenal-intentional (Searle 1991, 1992). In other words, only states that
could potentially have phenomenal intentionality have underived intentional-
ity. Presumably, these states have their intentionality precisely because they
could potentially become phenomenal-intentional. Thus, a tacit and uncon-
scious belief that 13.46>8.27 is endowed with underived intentionality, but
only because it could be conscious. Indeed, its intentional content is partly
determined by the phenomenal character it would have if it were conscious.
A thesis weaker yet would require non-phenomenal states to bear some rela-
tion to phenomenal states in order to qualify as non-derivatively intentional,
but not necessarily the relation of “potentially becoming” (or “potentially
being”). Instead, it would allow various inferential and/or causal relations to
experiential states to suffice for derived intentionality (Horgan and Tienson
2002, Horgan and Graham forthcoming, Loar 2003). As Davies (1995) notes,
some sub-personal states, such as Marr’s (1982) 2.5D sketches, are naturally
construed as non-derivatively intentional but are not even potentially con-
scious by any intuitive construal of “potentially.” However, even such states are
cognitively integrated into a system of inferentially interrelated intentional
states some of which are phenomenally conscious. It may therefore be sug-
gested that being thus integrated is a necessary condition on a mental state’s
being non-derivatively intentional. On this view, a mental state qualifies as
intentional only if it is related to phenomenally conscious states by the relation
of being integrated into a single inferential web.23
In sum, there are four main grades of basicness claims discernible in the
existing literature:

(B1) All intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. (Strawson, Georgalis)

(B2) All intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality. (McGinn,
Kriegel)
(B3) All intentionality derives from potentially phenomenal intentionality.
(Searle)
(B4) All intentionality derives from intentionality appropriately related to
phenomenal intentionality. (Horgan et al., Loar)

Although the theses are different, the arguments adduced in their favor are
often neutral between them and can be wielded in defense of several or any.
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 15

I end this section with a review of the main arguments to be found in the lit-
erature. In the present context, I am not endorsing any of them; my purpose is
merely expository.
Most of these arguments follow a similar schema (Kriegel 2003b). First,
an asymmetry is established between phenomenal and non-phenomenal
intentionality, along the lines of one of the distinctiveness claims surveyed
in §2.3. Then, it is argued that the distinctive feature of phenomenal inten-
tionality is mandatory in the basic kind of intentionality (the underived
kind, the occurrently underived kind, or the not-merely-relationally
underived kind). It is then concluded that only phenomenal intentional-
ity is basic. Thus a schema for an argument for the primacy of phenomenal
intentionality emerges: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality has feature F; 2)
Only intentionality with feature F is basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal
intentionality is basic.
An argument from Determinate Content fitting this schema would proceed as
follows: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality has non-derivatively determinate
content; 2) Only intentionality with non-derivatively determinate content is
basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentionality is basic. This is probably
the most common type of argument for the basicness of phenomenal inten-
tionality one finds in the relevant literature (see Loar 1987, 1995, Searle 1992,
Horgan and Tienson 2002, Strawson 2008, Georgalis 2006, and Horgan and
Graham forthcoming). The central claim of Loar’s argument, for instance, is
that non-phenomenal states, left to their own devices, so to speak, would be
referentially inscrutable—there would be nothing to make them about rab-
bits, say, rather than undetached rabbit parts (see especially Loar 1995). Only
phenomenally intentional states are referentially “scrutable” (if you will) in
and of themselves: there is something about their phenomenal character that
makes them about rabbits rather than undetached rabbit parts. Yet we must
suppose that intentional content is always determinate, hence “scrutable.” So
non-phenomenally intentional states must derive their determinate content
(or derive the determinacy of their content) from phenomenally intentional
states.24 Searle (1992) also appeals to content (in)determinacy in his argumen-
tation, though of a different type. For Searle, the threat is that intentional con-
tent turn out to be indeterminate between different ways one and the same
worldly target could be presented (e.g., Hesperus and Phosphorus). But the dis-
tinctive feature of phenomenal intentionality he appeals to is essentially the
same “inherent determinacy” invoked by Loar.25
Another type of argument fitting the same schema starts from the premise
of Intrinsic Subjectivity (McGinn 1988, Kriegel 2003b, Georgalis 2006, Frey
this volume). As McGinn puts it, phenomenal intentionality is Janus-faced:
it has an outward-looking face, which has to do with what it presents, but
also an inward-looking face, to do with who it presents it to.26 The thought,
16 phenomenal intentionality

presumably, is that such Janus-faced content, and the intrinsic subjectivity it

bestows, are required for basic intentionality. If so, the fact that only phenom-
enal intentionality features it entails that only phenomenal intentionality is
basic. Fitting this into the above schema, we obtain the following: 1) Only
phenomenal intentionality is intrinsically subjective; 2) Only intrinsically
subjective intentionality is basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentional-
ity is basic.
Interestingly, it is harder to identify in the literature a similar argument
from Narrowness. Perhaps this is because the starting point of such an argu-
ment would have to be the premise that mental states with basic intentional-
ity must have narrow content, and in the present philosophical climate, this
would seem grossly question-begging. This is an interesting predicament, given
that it is precisely the internalist promise of phenomenal intentionality that
attracts its proponents in the first place. One argument that can be interpreted
as revolving around narrow content appeals to the phenomenon of intentional
inexistence: the fact that every intentional state can occur in the absence of that
which it is about. On one version of the argument (Kriegel 2007), it is claimed
that only adverbially intentional states exhibit intentional inexistence in and of
themselves, and then that only phenomenally intentional states are adverbial.
An adverbial intentional state, being entirely non-relational, would clearly have
narrow content, so this can be seen as an argument for a basicness thesis from
a narrowness one.
Bourget (2010) offers an importantly different kind of argument. He
claims that holism about intentionality, according to which intentional
contents are assigned in the first instance to networks of interrelated
states rather than individual states, is true of non-phenomenally inten-
tional states but not of phenomenally intentional ones. In consequence,
non-phenomenal states partially derive their intentional properties from
other non-phenomenal states. By contrast, since holism is false of phe-
nomenally intentional states, the latter’s intentionality is underived: each
phenomenally intentional state has its content irrespective of any relations
to other states. Here the designated distinctive feature of phenomenal
intentionality appears to be a sort of intentional atomism, and the resulting
argument takes the following form: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality is
atomistic; 2) Only atomistic intentionality is basic; therefore, 3) Only phe-
nomenal intentionality is basic.
As stressed earlier, I am not concerned here with the persuasiveness of any
of these arguments, nor for that matter with the plausibility of their conclu-
sions.27 The purpose of this section has been to review the kind of work that has
already been done on the notion of phenomenal intentionality. This work has
focused on four main questions: concerning the existence, scope, distinctive-
ness, and basicness of phenomenal intentionality.
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 17

3. The Structure of a General Theory

of Intentionality
In this section I consider how a general theory of intentionality would look
within PIRP. As we saw in §1, within NERP the general theory of intentional-
ity can be seen as involving two chapters: the theory of source intentionality
and the theory of non-source intentionality. The same general structure can
be replicated within PIRP. Since within PIRP phenomenal intentionality is the
source intentionality, within PIRP a general theory of intentionality would
comprise two chapters, the theory of phenomenal intentionality and the the-
ory of non-phenomenal intentionality.

3.1. The Theory of Phenomenal Intentionality

Recall that according to PIRP, intentionality is injected into the world with the
appearance of the right kind of phenomenal character. The fundamental task of
the theory of phenomenal intentionality is to identify the kind of phenomenal
character whose appearance injects intentionality into the world. One way to
think of the challenge is as seeking the phenomenological signature of direct-
edness (Kriegel 2011 Ch.3). In the nature of things, it would have to be a very
subtle phenomenal feature, one that may well be introspectively unimposing
but quite pervasive in our stream of consciousness.28
One suggestion might be culled from Strawson (2008). As noted in §2.3,
like others Strawson maintains that, distinctively, phenomenal intentionality
has determinate content in and of itself. But unlike others, he makes a pro-
posal about what it is that endows phenomenal intentionality with this content
determinacy: it is the phenomenology of taking. The notion of “taking” is pres-
ent already in Chisholm (1957), for whom the act through which the mind takes
something to be thus-and-so is the fundamental intentional act, with other
intentional states being elaborations or modifications of a core act of taking. For
Strawson, taking is a component or aspect of cognitive phenomenology. There
is a subtle phenomenological feature, cognitive rather than sensory in nature,
whereby a conscious experience takes something to be thus-and-so.29 This phe-
nomenal taking, as we might call it, determines the exact intentional content of
a phenomenally intentional state. Every phenomenally intentional state has a
phenomenal character that involves phenomenal taking as a component, and it
is in virtue of this phenomenal taking that the state is intentional.
A different suggestion is due to Masrour (2008), who claims that it is only
when a conscious experience exhibits a structural phenomenal feature he calls
“objectual unity structure” (OUS) that it becomes intentional. Two phenom-
enal items are objectually unified in a perceptual experience, according to
Masrour, just in case the experience presents them as belonging to the same
18 phenomenal intentionality

object. Consider R. C. James’s famous Gestalt-switch-provoking picture of

the Dalmatian (reproduced, e.g., in Marr 1982). Once the switch occurs and
the Dalmatian is “seen,” certain black spots in one’s visual experience become
objectually unified while other spots are not so unified. The sensory aspect of
the experience is the same before and after the switch, but after the switch the
experience also exhibits a richer objectual-unity structure than before; it is
only then that its phenomenal character intentionally represents a dog.30
I have considered two possible subtle phenomenal features that may serve
as the “intentional spark”—the kind of phenomenal feature whose appearance
injects intentionality into the world. Interestingly, it is often thought that all
phenomenal character is intentional. If that is the case, and phenomenal tak-
ing or OUS is indeed the intentional spark, then it follows that phenomenal
taking or OUS is a component in every phenomenal character, that is, that all
phenomenal character involves taking or OUS.
But the view that all phenomenal character is intentional may also suggest
a third and competing account of the subtle phenomenal feature that brings
intentionality into the world. This is the suggestion that the relevant feature
is phenomenality itself. By “phenomenality itself” I simply mean the most gen-
eral phenomenal genus, that of which all others are species (or perhaps the
phenomenal determinable of which every other phenomenal property is a
determinate). On this view, the intentional spark is generic phenomenality.
Philosophers attracted to the idea that all phenomenality is intentional
are often motivated by the claim that phenomenal character is diaphanous or
transparent: when one introspects one’s current conscious experience, one is
only aware of what the experience represents (Harman 1990). So a fourth sug-
gestion could be that transparency is the intentionality-injecting phenomenal
feature.31 This suggestion would be coextensive with the last one if indeed all
phenomenality is intentional. But it may be that not all phenomenality is inten-
tional. Thus, it is sometimes held that while the transparency of experience is
plausible for perceptual phenomenology (and certainly cognitive phenomenol-
ogy), it is quite less plausible for somatic and emotional phenomenology.32 If this
is the case, then the transparency suggestion and the generic-phenomenality
suggestion would not coextend after all.
Of course, another option always available is to hold that the phenomeno-
logical signature of directedness is a sui generis phenomenal feature, inexpli-
cable in terms of any other, simpler phenomenology. The view would be that
the feature is exhibited by some mental states, such that when (and only when)
it is exhibited, the relevant states are endowed with source intentionality.33 We
may call this feature sui generis phenomenal directedness.34
I have considered five options for identifying the phenomenal features
that inject intentionality into the world: phenomenal taking, unity structure,
generic phenomenality, transparency, and sui generis phenomenal directedness.
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 19

There are certainly other options worth exploring.35 The theory of phenomenal
intentionality would attend to all those options—and to the reasons for prefer-
ring one over others.
Also within the province of the theory of phenomenal intentionality would be
work on the scope and distinctiveness of phenomenal intentionality, reviewed in
§2.3 and §2.4. In addition, the theory of phenomenal intentionality would ulti-
mately consider contingent properties of phenomenal intentionality that are not
necessarily distinctive or special but do matter to its intentional function. For
example, I suspect that in phenomenal intentionality the referential connection
to the world works roughly as suggested in the descriptive theory of linguistic
reference, rather than as suggested by direct-reference theories. If this is right,
this would be of central importance to the theory of phenomenal intentionality,
even if it does not constitute a distinctive feature of phenomenal intentionality.

3.2. The Theory of Non-Phenomenal Intentionality

A comprehensive theory of intentionality would require not only an account of
the phenomenal character that serves as the source of intentionality but also
an account of how that phenomenal character outsources intentionality. That
is, a full understanding of source intentionality does not constitute an under-
standing of intentionality as such. The other chapter of the (PIRP-ly) theory
of intentionality concerns the nature of non-phenomenal intentionality and
how it is grounded in phenomenal intentionality. Surprisingly, perhaps, several
options for such an account can already be found in the existing literature (see
Kriegel 2011 Ch.4 for review and discussion).36
One account, due to Searle (1992), may be called potentialism. Recall that
according to Searle, non-phenomenally intentional states are intentional
in virtue of being potentially phenomenal. Thus, an unconscious belief that
p has p as its content in virtue of the fact that if it were conscious it would
have the phenomenal-intentional content that p. At the same time, linguistic
expressions, pictures, and so on, are surely not even potentially conscious. So
their intentionality must be grounded in mental intentionality in some other
way, perhaps through the Gricean mechanism of intention-based semantics
(see Grice 1957). We may thus propose that Searle’s overall account of how
non-phenomenal intentionality is grounded in phenomenal intentionality pro-
ceeds in two phases: the first extends intentionality from the narrow base of
phenomenally intentional states to the realm of non-phenomenal mentality
via counterfactuals about merely potential phenomenal character; the second
extends it from the mental realm to the realm of non-mental intentionality via
the right kind of speaker intentions.37
A second account may be called inferentialism (Loar 2003, Horgan and
Graham forthcoming). On this view, non-phenomenally intentional states
20 phenomenal intentionality

inherit their intentionality through inferential connections they bear to phe-

nomenally intentional states within the overall cognitive architecture of the
mind. Thus, an unconscious belief that p is assigned just this content because it
interacts with a conscious belief that p→q to bring about a conscious belief that
q. Again, because non-mental items are not inferentially connected to mental
ones, this would require supplementation in the form of an account of how
non-mental intentionality is grounded in mental intentionality.
A third account may be called interpretivism (Kriegel 2011 Ch.4). This view
proposes a unified account of non-mental and mental non-phenomenal inten-
tionality according to which all such intentionality is bestowed by phenom-
enally conscious interpretation. For example, an unconscious belief that p has
p as its content in virtue of the fact that the best (conscious) interpretation of
the system whose state it is would assign to the system a belief that p; and ditto
for any linguistic expression or picture with the content that p.
Of course, there is also a fourth option, which is to deny the existence
of non-phenomenal intentionality altogether; we may call it eliminativism
(Georgalis 2006, Strawson 2008).38 On this view, there is no problem of ground-
ing non-phenomenal intentionality in phenomenal intentionality, because the
former does not exist. Thus a full account of phenomenal intentionality, per-
haps along the lines of one of the options mentioned in §3.1, would constitute
a comprehensive theory of intentionality.
As before, I am not concerned here with how plausible these accounts are;
their portraits given here are too summary to allow serious discussion of their
merits anyway. My discussion here serves only to point out some available
options for accounting for non-phenomenal intentionality. In different combi-
nations with the accounts of phenomenal intentionality covered in §3.1, they
would constitute different comprehensive theories of intentionality. For exam-
ple, one comprehensive theory might combine the phenomenal-taking view of
phenomenal intentionality with potentialism about non-phenomenal inten-
tionality; another the sui generis phenomenal directedness view with inferen-
tialism about non-phenomenal intentionality; yet another the transparency
view of phenomenal intentionality with interpretivism about non-phenomenal
intentionality; and so on. Some combinations may be somehow more natural
than others, but all would appear coherent and thus antecedently viable as
comprehensive theories of intentionality in the PIRP genre.

Conclusion
Work on intentionality within analytic philosophy of mind has been domi-
nated for the past four decades by the idea that intentionality comes into the
world when a certain type of tracking relation appears. In the last decade or so,
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 21

however, another approach has been gaining momentum, suggesting that it is

rather the appearance of a certain type of phenomenal character that injects
intentionality into the world. From and around this newer approach a clus-
ter of observations, contentions, and debates has emerged that has enlivened
philosophical discussions of the mind, prompting philosophers to take a fresh
look at the phenomenon of intentionality. The claim I have been making in this
chapter is that the work pertaining to the cluster is ready to be consolidated
into a well-defined, clearly organized, self-conscious research program.39

Notes
1. First accounts in this vein, such as Dennis Stampe’s (1977) and Fred Dretske’s (1981),
were focused on broadly causal or informational relations. Under the influence of Ruth
Millikan (1984, 1989, 1993) and David Papineau (1984, 1993), many philosophers have
incorporated a teleological aspect into their account of the relevant relation (see Dretske
1988, McGinn 1989, Neander 1995).
2. I cannot make the case for this claim here, but my suspicion that it is only phenomenal
intentionality which is concerned in those debates arises from the fact that unconscious
mental states were not widely recognized before Freud’s work on repression and the
postulation in cognitive science of myriad sub-personal unconscious states. Brentano
(1874) himself argued explicitly for the co-extension of the mental, the conscious, and
the intentional. So it is only natural to interpret him, and hence his students, as con-
cerned with phenomenal intentionality. There is interesting historical research to be
done here.
3. I am assuming here that linguistic intentionality is derived. Some proponents of NERP
disagree (e.g., Millikan 1984), arguing [that the tracking property in virtue of which
mental states represent non-derivatively is exhibited by linguistic expressions as well.]
4. There is a limit-case version of NERP, too. According to Dennett (1990), all intentionality
is derived (none is underived), so in general the intentionality of derivatively intentional
states must derive from each other’s, without being ultimately grounded in underived
intentionality.
5. In principle, the second chapter could be exactly the same in a NERP-ly theory and a
PIRP-ly theory. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that the derivation relation
cannot be thought of in the same way by both. However, the nature of the sources of deri-
vation is likely to constrain theorizing about the nature of the derivation, so the radical
difference between the sources might very well lead to very different accounts of derived
intentionality.
6. I am indebted to Terry Horgan for this distinction.
7. One limit-case epistemic possibility is that there is not really any spread at all, because
the only intentionality there is is the intentionality of phenomenal consciousness itself
(more on this in 2.4).
8. I will offer some remarks in the present section about different ways of potentially cash-
ing out the theses as vaguely and generically stated, but more will be said on such matters
in §2.
9. I am indebted to Terry Horgan for this formulation.
10. Some of these matters will be further pursued later in the chapter.
11. This issue can get complicated by matters terminological. Some, like Georgalis (2006),
reserve “phenomenal” for the sensory kind of what-it’s-like-ness (more or less stipula-
tively), while yet recognizing the what-it’s-like-ness of thought. This looks to be probably
just a verbal disagreement with those who claim there is a phenomenology of thought.
22 phenomenal intentionality

12. This is the metaphysical picture of phenomenal consciousness embraced by Chalmers (1996),
as I understand him. Chalmers holds that phenomenal properties supervene on physicalis-
tically naturalizable ones with nomological necessity, and that the pertinent supervenience
laws are ontologically brute. He also regards his metaphysical picture as a form of natural-
ism about phenomenal consciousness, but not as a physicalistic version of naturalism. For
clearer examples of naturalistic PIRP, see McGinn 1988 and Kriegel 2011 Ch.2.
13. Horgan and Tienson’s (2002) descriptions of certain conscious episodes can be seen as
attempting to tap into an idea of this sort.
14. The present use of “sensory” and “non-sensory” pertains, in effect by stipulation, to rela-
tively raw aspects of one’s sense-induced experience. It is a non-trivial matter to get a
more formal specification of these terms going.
15. What that feature is is elucidated in terms of paradigmatic examples, which Masrour
describes in detail but which I will not reproduce here.
16. Weaker theses might suggest that there is an individuative but non-proprietary cognitive
phenomenology (say, because every belief is accompanied by imagery, and the imagery
varies with the belief’s content); or that there is a proprietary but non-individuative phe-
nomenology (say, because although beliefs in general are phenomenally different from
hopes, suppositions, and other propositional attitudes, it is not the case that a belief that
p is phenomenally different from a belief that q for any p and q).
17. For other arguments of this form, see Peacocke 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Kriegel
2003a, and Pitt 2004.
18. Different authors have focused on different types of threat to content determinacy.
Searle (1992) focuses on the threat to the intensionality of content; Loar (1995),
Georgalis (2006), and Horgan and Graham (forthcoming) on the Quinean threat of ref-
erential inscrutability; Strawson (2008) on the threat once referred to as the “horizontal
disjunction problem,” the thought that tracking theories of content cannot discriminate
between different links in a causal chain leading up to an intentional state.
19. Here as elsewhere, there are difficult questions surrounding the explication of intrin-
sicality. The relevant notion for our present purposes is that of a state instantiating a
certain property not in virtue of standing in a relation to some other state, but in and of
itself.
20. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Kriegel forthcoming.
21. An exception is McGinn (1988), who argues that conscious intentionality is wide, and
its being both wide and in some way present to the subject is part of what makes it so
mysterious.
22. As mentioned in a previous note, Georgalis would not state the thesis this way but would
probably subscribe to it as interpreted by us. Perhaps it is also worth noting that Strawson
does not use the term “phenomenal intentionality” but instead the term “experiential
intentionality.” Th is is potentially better in avoiding confusion with the more sensory
reading of the term “phenomenal.”
23. An even weaker thesis would require non-experiential intentional states to bear the
requisite relations not necessarily to phenomenal-intentional states but also possibly to
merely potentially phenomenal-intentional states. I am not familiar with any defense, nor
defender, of this latter claim.
24. The argument thus proceeds as follows: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality has inher-
ently scrutable content; 2) Only intentionality with inherently scrutable content is basic;
therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentionality is basic. Essentially the same argument
for the special status of phenomenal intentionality is presented by Horgan and Graham
(forthcoming), who develop the argument quite a bit further.
25. Th is kind of fined-grained content is what Searle (1992) refers to as “aspectual shape.”
His argument could thus be construed as follows: 1) Only phenomenal intentionality is
non-derivatively aspectually shaped; 2) Only non-derivatively aspectually shaped inten-
tionality is basic; therefore, 3) Only phenomenal intentionality is basic.
26. Similarly, Georgalis (2006) insists that only conscious intentionality involves essentially
not only the two-place relation x represents y but also the three-place relation x represents
 The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 23

y to z. However, Georgalis argues that there is an important difference between phenom-

enal and conscious intentionality and does not make the same claim about phenomenal
intentionality.
27. One objection, due to Shani (2008), is that although proponents of phenomenal inten-
tionality (most notably Loar and Georgalis) are right that a full theory of intentionality
must incorporate a certain fi rst-person notion, there are ways to do so without appeal-
ing to phenomenal intentionality. In particular, Shani argues that the central aspect of
fi rst-person intentionality would be a notion of idiosyncratic perspective, but such a
perspective can be accounted for in naturalistic, indeed broadly teleological, terms that
appeal solely to unconscious and non-phenomenal phenomena.
28. These two may not be unrelated: the most pervasive features of phenomenology are often
hardest to spot, because hardest to isolate (there may be no vivid contrasts between pres-
ence and absence).
29. Note that if taking is a cognitive phenomenal feature, and is necessary for phenomenal
intentionality, then all phenomenal intentionality is cognitive, at least in the sense that
phenomenal character must have at least one cognitive element in order to be inten-
tional. Th is may raise the objection that certain animals and neonates may be robbed
of intentionality. There are probably reasonable responses to this objection, but a full
discussion would take us too far afield. (Moreover, some of the moves here would parallel
relatively familiar moves from discussions in the theory of animal consciousness and the
problem it presents for higher-order thought theories.)
30. The pre-switch visual experience is already intentional: it represents an externally situ-
ated pattern of black and white splotches. Still, it may be that there must be some unity
structure present in order for the visual phenomenology to become intentional. It may
be, too, that virtually all visual phenomenology already has some unity structure and is
already intentional.
31. Th is requires that we think of transparency as a positive phenomenal feature, exhibited
by some (or all) experiences, rather than as the absence of certain phenomenal features,
as it sometimes is.
32. Th is is not to say that the transparency thesis has not been defended for such experi-
ences as well (Shoemaker 1994, Tye 2000). But it is roundly accepted that such defenses
tend to be more theoretical and rely less on the immediate intuitive conviction that the
thesis enjoys in the perceptual domain.
33. It would be a substantive question at this point whether all phenomenal states have
this phenomenal feature. (It is, of course, coherent to hold either that only some do or
that all do.) Which way one goes on this question will then have implications for any
possible coextension between the present suggestion and the generic-phenomenality
suggestion.
34. Methodologically, it is probably preferable to seek a more explanatory account of the
kind of phenomenal character we are seeking and settle for an account of it in terms of
sui generis phenomenal directedness only as a last resort.
35. See Kriegel 2011 Ch.3 for discussion of two more suggestions, one of which is developed
from Frey’s (this volume) discussion.
36. Gricean intention-based semantics, although the leading approach within NERP, can-
not be straightforwardly applied within PIRP because the relevant intentions Grice iden-
tifies are presumably unconscious. It is very possible, however, to divide the theory of
derived intentionality within PIRP into two parts, the fi rst concerned with the deriva-
tion of non-mental intentionality from non-phenomenal mental intentionality via the
Gricean mechanism and the second concerned with the derivation of non-phenomenal
mental intentionality from phenomenal intentionality via some other mechanism. (For
more discussion, see Kriegel 2011.)
37. Note that these intentions, at least those proposed by Grice, are typically unconscious.
So the derivation of linguistic intentionality from conscious intentionality would have to
proceed in two steps: it would not be possible for the former to derive directly from the
latter.
24 phenomenal intentionality

38. It is also possible to interpret Georgalis (2006) and Pitt (Ms) as holding this position.
Georgalis maintains that there is no unconscious intentionality, and although he allows
that some conscious intentionality is non-phenomenal, this is mainly because, as
remarked earlier, his notion of phenomenality is narrower and applies only to sensory
quality. Pitt, by contrast, allows that there is unconscious intentionality but proposes that
such intentionality is constituted by an unconscious phenomenality. Thus although there is
such a thing as unconscious intentionality, there is no non-phenomenal intentionality.
39. For comments on a previous draft, I would like to thank Ben Blumson, Curtis Brown,
Tamar Szabó Gendler, Kristin Hurlburt, Adam Pautz, Galen Strawson, and especially
Brie Gertler and Susanna Siegel.

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 2

The Access Problem

M ic h e l l e Mon tagu e

1. Introduction
We perceive and think about many things: we enter into many mental states
which involve intentional relations with particular objects. But how do we
do it? How do we achieve access to the things with which we stand in mental
intentional relations? When we think about or perceive some particular thing,
what makes it the case that we have that very thing in mind? What mechanism
determines what a thought or perception is of? I call this the “access problem.”
For the purposes of this chapter I will restrict my attention to perceptions and
thoughts of or about material objects other than oneself, and I will focus some-
times on thought, sometimes on perception.
I will use the terms “internal” and “external” to mark off two common and
opposed approaches to the access problem. There is, unsurprisingly, a con-
nection between my use of these terms and the currently popular contrast
between “internalist” and “externalist” conceptions of the mental, but the
words “internalist” and “externalist” have been used in too many different
ways in philosophy of mind to be stable. It will often be possible to substi-
tute “externalist” for “external” in what follows, but this will not work nearly
so well in the case of “internalist” and “internal.” As will become clear, the
questions raised by the access problem—the problem of giving a philosophical
characterization of the mechanism that determines which particular object a
subject is perceiving or thinking of on a particular occasion—cut across many
of the standard debates concerning internalism and externalism about men-
tal content.
The fundamental idea behind the internal approach to the access problem
is that thinking of an object essentially involves conceiving of it in some man-
ner, or characterizing it in some fashion, and that reference to the particular
manner involved is essential for determining which object is being thought

27
28 phenomenal intentionality

of. It is important to distinguish between these two claims, which we may

rephrase as

[1] A subject, S, cannot think of an object without thinking of it in some way

and

[2] It is not possible to settle the question of which object (if any) S is thinking
about without reference to the particular way of thinking of an object that is
involved in the thought.

[1] is a fairly weak claim, acceptable to most theories of intentionality, including

many external(ist) approaches. It does not require that reference to one’s way of
thinking of an object play an essential role in an adequate account of what deter-
mines which object one is thinking of, that is, an adequate account of how one
has access to that object. [2] does require this. [2] requires that a particular way of
thinking must be in place in order to count a thought or perception as being about
a particular object. It imposes what one might call a “particular-way-of-thinking”
condition on access, a “particular-way” condition, for short. This is an internal con-
dition on thinking of or perceiving a particular object in the current sense, because
it requires something over and above the physical object and a specification of the
external relations that the subject stands in with respect to that object.

External (and indeed externalist) theories of access seek to explain the phe-
nomenon of having an object in mind solely in terms of external relations (causal
or historical) that hold between a thinker’s relevant mental state and the world.
According to the external approach, which object is being thought of can be deter-
mined without any appeal to the specific way in which one may be thinking of it (see
for example, Donnellan 1966, 1974; Fitch 1990; and Dretske 1995). Fitch, for exam-
ple, claims that “intrinsic features of a given thought have little or no bearing on the
issue of how a thought refers to a particular object” (1990: 676). Dretske concurs:

What determines the reference of a de re mode of representation (the

object it is a representation of) is not how it is represented, but a cer-
tain external causal or contextual relation I will designate C. There is
nothing in the content of the representation, nothing the represen-
tation says, which makes it about this object rather than that object
or no object at all. De re modes of representation have their reference
determined contextually, by the relation I am here calling C.1

A standard externalist causal theory seeks to solve the access problem

by asserting that my thought is about John simply because he stands in the
 The Access Problem 29

relevant position among the causes leading to whatever internal state it is in

me that is a (the) candidate for being my John-thought. Gareth Evans calls
this the “Photograph Model,” according to which “a mental state can represent
a particular object simply in virtue of that object’s playing a suitable role in
its causal ancestry” (1982: 81).2 Such a theory may accept [1]—that thinking
of an object requires thinking of it in some way or other. What is crucial is its
rejection of [2], its claim that there is no internal “particular-way” condition on
access—that one does not need to consider which particular way of thinking of
an object is in play in order to determine either which object is being thought
of, or whether any object is being thought of at all.
In this chapter I argue that there is an ineliminable internal “particular-
way” condition on access in addition to whatever external conditions there may
be.3 The question is then, what is the nature of this “particular-way” condi-
tion? I will begin with a consideration of “Russell’s Principle” as articulated by
Gareth Evans. It is uncontroversial that Evans places an external condition on
thoughts about particular objects:

there is a kind of thought we sometimes have, typically expressed in

the form ‘This F is G’, and we may aim to have a thought of this kind
when, in virtue of the absence of any appropriate object, there is no
such thought to be had. (1982: 46)

And it is no less clear that his version of Russell’s Principle places an internal
condition on such thoughts, in holding that one cannot be said to be thinking
about a particular object unless one knows which object one is thinking about,
in the sense that one can distinguish it from all other objects. This is clearly an
internal condition on access, as defined earlier, because it requires that some-
thing more than causal relations between the subject and the object be in place,
that is, that the subject knows which object he is thinking of.
I am going to argue that Russell’s Principle does not in fact succeed as an
internal constraint on access. I will not, however, reject it for the usual reasons,
which have to do with misrepresentation of the locations of objects, the pos-
sibility of subjective qualitative duplication, and so on.4 I will focus first on the
particular case of seeing something, and argue that Russell’s Principle does
not provide a sufficiently robust internal condition on access in cases of seeing.
Then I will raise the more general question of whether it can ever provide a suf-
ficiently robust internal condition on genuinely having an object in mind.
I will call the internal view I defend the “matching view.” It states that for
a perceptual experience to be about an object, there must be a certain degree
of match between the properties an object has and the properties the expe-
rience represents the object as having. One distinctive feature of the match-
ing view, as opposed to Russell’s Principle, is the emphasis it places on the
30 phenomenal intentionality

phenomenological or qualitative features of experience. It states that certain

phenomenological features of an experience need to be in place in order for it
to qualify as thinking of or perceiving a particular object.
I construe phenomenological features of experience as “narrow.” So I reject
“phenomenal externalism” as defended by Dretske 1996 and Lycan 2001.
According to a narrow construal of the phenomenological features of experi-
ence, “phenomenal duplicates” can have phenomenologically identical experi-
ence despite having radically different environments. My claim, then, is that
one has to consider phenomenology narrowly construed, when determining
the object of a thought or perception.5
You may wonder how this can be right. For if reference to phenomenology is
necessary when establishing which particular object a thought is about, then
we can never establish this in the case of non-conscious thoughts, or indeed any
dispositional states like beliefs and desires, since they have no phenomenology.
This seems an unacceptable consequence of my proposal: surely non-conscious
mental states or occurrences like thoughts and beliefs can have determinate
intentional objects? In fact, though, this is not an objection to the present pro-
posal. On the contrary: it is a virtue of the present proposal that it reveals this
as a problem, and sets us the task of explaining how non-conscious mental
states can have determinate objects. The idea that non-conscious mental occur-
rences or dispositional mental states can be determinately about particular
objects is standardly taken for granted, but it stands in need of defence.
Among those who have clearly recognized this problem, and offered solu-
tions, are Searle 1992: ch. 7; Strawson 1994: §7.8, 2008: §6; and Kriegel 2011. It
doesn’t arise for someone like Dennett, because of his anti-realism about men-
tal states. It is, however, a topic for another time. In this chapter I will restrict
attention to conscious mental episodes.

2. Russell’s Principle
According to Russell “it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a judgment or
entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or sup-
posing about” (1912: 32). In Evans’s words, “in order to be thinking about an
object or to make a judgment about an object, one must know which object is in
question—one must know which object it is that one is thinking about” (1982:
65). This plainly imposes an internal condition on our access to objects in the
sense defined earlier.
To know which object one is thinking of, one need not know exactly what sort
of object it is: it is plausible that I can think about the electron microscope in my
school’s science lab without knowing that it is an electron microscope.6 What is
required to satisfy the principle, as both Russell and Evans acknowledge, is rather
 The Access Problem 31

“discriminating knowledge” or a “discriminating conception” of the relevant object:

a capacity to uniquely identify the object, to distinguish it from all other things.
Evans proposes that there are three ways in which one may be able to do this, three
distinct kinds of modes of identification of objects in virtue of which one may pos-
sess the capacity to uniquely identify an object. One may [1] have knowledge of
(uniquely) distinguishing facts about it; one may [2] be in a position to identify the
object demonstratively; or one may [3] have a recognitional capacity, a capacity to
recognize the object so as to be able to pick it out from all other objects.7
Evans explicitly links the concept of a mode of identification to a subject’s aware-
ness. It is because a mode of identification essentially involves S’s being in a certain
state of awareness that S is in a position to think about a particular object. And
given that Evans distinguishes between one’s awareness and the modes of iden-
tification that it involves on the one hand, and the relevant external object and
its properties on the other hand, it seems plain, again, that he is thinking of the
character of the state of awareness in an essentially internalist way, at least in part.
If Evans is right, then, we have to study modes of identification, internal features of
thought, in any full investigation of the mechanisms of object-access, the mecha-
nisms that determine which object a thought is of. One cannot remain wholly out-
side of a thought to explain how it manages to be about a particular object.
In what follows I will focus on Evans’s account of demonstrative identifica-
tion and the way in which it is supposed to guarantee the unique identification
of an object. Although I reject Evans’s account, I will use it to articulate my own
view, while at the same time showing the implausibility of the external solu-
tion to the access problem.

3. Perceptual Identification
To begin to see how the “matching view” answers the access problem, I will
first consider an apparent disanaology between the phenomenon of seeing and
other sensory cases, in particular, auditory and olfactory cases. In the cases of
audition and olfaction, but not initially in the case of seeing, when there is too
much mismatch between the properties represented by an experience of an
object x and the properties object x has, we are reluctant to say that “perceptual
contact” is made, where by “perceptual contact with x” I mean seeing, hearing,
tasting, touching, or smelling x. Since our theories tend to take visual cases as
central and generalize from there, the importance of mismatch for whether
perceptual contact is made is overlooked. Once the relevance of mismatch has
been illustrated, I will go on to argue that our intuitions about seeing can be
brought into line with these other sensory cases.
Suppose for simplicity that colors are objective properties of objects, and
consider Maria, who is looking at a red object in a normally attentive way and
32 phenomenal intentionality

is in no other sort of contact with it, sensory or otherwise, so that the only
information link she has to the object is visual. Suppose that the mechanisms
of visual experience operate normally except for the fact that she has, for what-
ever reason, and quite exceptionally, an experience of something green, on
looking at the object. Question 1: Does she see the object’s color? Presumably
not—not at all. Question 2: Can she think about the object’s color specifically on
the basis of the particular character of her visual experience? Presumably not—
not at all. The failure of match rules this out.8
Suppose now that the object is round and that she sees it, for whatever reason,
and quite exceptionally, as square. Question 3: Does she see the object’s shape?
Presumably not—not at all. Question 4: Can she think about the object’s shape
specifically on the basis of her visual experience, in the sense just explained?
Presumably not—not at all. Again this is explained by failure of match.
Now combine the cases of color and shape. Question 5: Does she see the
object? Most people will say Yes, even though they may agree that she can see
neither the object’s color nor its shape, and cannot even think about its visually
perceptible properties specifically on the basis of the character of her visual
experience. Question 6: Can she think about the object on the basis of her
visual experience? Again most philosophers will presumably answer Yes. For if
she can see it, she can surely think about it.9
Now consider sounds on the same basis, that is, supposing that objects’
sounds are objective properties of objects. Suppose Maria, listening on her head-
phones, has, quite exceptionally, an experience as of Jimi Hendrix’s “Are You
Experienced?” when the sound waves from a performance of the “Moonlight”
sonata impact on her ears (she is in no other sort of contact, sensory or other-
wise). Question 7 (parallel to Question 1 in the visual case): Does she hear the
music’s sound? Again the answer is No. Question 8 (parallel to Question 2):
Can she think about the music’s sound specifically on the basis of the character
of her auditory experience, in the sense of “specifically on the basis of” just
explained? Again the natural answer is No.
Now consider Question 9 (parallel to Question 5 in the visual case): Does
she hear the piece of music? The natural answer appears to be No—she just
isn’t hearing the music, although her auditory experience is being caused by
sound waves stemming from the playing of the “Moonlight” sonata—whereas
the natural answer to Question 5 in the visual case (Does she see the object?)
seemed to be Yes. So the visual and auditory cases appear to diverge. But with
Question 10 (parallel to Question 6): Can she think about the music on the
basis of her auditory experience?, the two cases may appear to fall back into
step. For many, I think, will want to answer Yes to this question.
Many take the visual case as central and reach for a theory based on that
case. Thus those who answer Yes to the visual Question 5 may decide to
answer Yes to its auditory parallel Question 9, on the grounds of general
 The Access Problem 33

theoretical smoothness, and in spite of the seeming naturalness of answer-

ing No (they may also produce other considerations). But Thomas Reid was
right to point out in his Inquiry that philosophers are far too ready to restrict
their attention to the visual case, and that the other senses deserve separate
attention.
Now consider smells on the same basis, that is, supposing that objects’
smells are objective properties of objects. Suppose Maria has, quite excep-
tionally, an experience as of smelling freshly cut apples when the molecules
from a freshly baked loaf of bread reach her nose (she is in no other sort
of contact with it with it, sensory or otherwise). Question 11 (parallel to
Question 1 in the visual case): Does she smell the bread’s smell? Again the
answer is No. Question 12 (parallel to Question 2): Can she think about the
bread’s smell specifically on the basis of the character of her olfactory experi-
ence, in the sense of “specifically on the basis of” just explained? Again the
natural answer is No.
Now consider Question 13 (parallel to Question 5 in the visual case):
Does she smell the bread? or Is it the bread that Maria smells? The natu-
ral answer appears to be No—she just isn’t smelling the bread, although
her olfactory experience is being caused by molecules stemming from the
bread—whereas the natural answer to Question 5 in the visual case (Does
she see the object?) seemed to be Yes. So the visual and olfactory cases
also appear to diverge. But with Question 14 (parallel to Question 6): Can
she think about the bread on the basis of her olfactory experience?, again
the cases may appear to fall back into step. For most, I think, will want to
answer Yes to this question.
What the auditory and olfactory cases suggest is that if one’s experience
of something x is wildly inaccurate, then that inaccuracy can have the con-
sequence that it is incorrect to say that one is in perceptual contact with that
something. Why do our intuitions seem to diverge with respect to the seeing
case? One source of the disanalogy may be that in the visual case, although
Maria does not see the red round object’s shape and color, she does see where
it is located. And since it may seem that location properties play a role in indi-
viduating physical objects, we have the intuition that Maria can see the object
in virtue of correctly identifying its location.
With this background, let’s reconsider the phenomenon of seeing with the
following two cases.

[1] One is in causal, and sensory, and indeed visual, contact with a rock, but
one’s visual-experience-based conception of it is inaccurate because of fog
conditions—it appears bigger and of a different color than it really is. One
can nevertheless locate and track the rock in spite of one’s inaccurate con-
ception of it.
34 phenomenal intentionality

Does one see the rock? Most would say yes.

[2] One is in causal, sensory, and indeed visual contact with a garden shed, but
when one looks at it one has—due to a disorder in one’s visual system, or
a distortion of the atmosphere in which the light-waves that would have
reached one from the shed do reach one, but profoundly rearranged—an
experience as of a pink elephant. In this case, too, one can locate and track
the shed, in spite one’s inaccurate conception of it.10

Does one see the shed? (I am assuming that there is no other sort of link, causal
or historical, between one and the shed.) My intuition is that one does not,
because one’s apprehension or representation of it is simply too inaccurate.
Visual contact with an object, in the present sense, is not enough—I suggest—to
guarantee that one sees it, that one is in perceptual contact with it—even if
standing in this relation makes it possible for one to locate and track it. To see
an object, one’s experience (representation) of the object must not be wildly
inaccurate. It is arguable, further, that if one cannot see the object, one cannot
really think about it either (assuming one has no other access to it).
But what do I mean by “visual contact”? For present purposes I’ll begin by
defining it as follows. Visual contact is causal and sensory contact of a sort that
[a] involves the impact of light on a sensory organ and [b] gives rise to experi-
ences of color and shape of a kind that can be sufficiently indicated by saying
that they are of the same sort qualitatively speaking as experiences of the kind we
call “visual.”11 If a peculiarity of one’s brain has the consequence that the only
sensory experiences one has when light waves impact on one’s eyes are olfac-
tory, then one is not having visual experience. If aliens or robots can master
our shape and color words on the basis of discriminating differences between
sounds that they experience as a result of the impact of light waves on their
sensory organs, then they do not have visual experience, nor do they see. Nor
do bats see, given how we ordinarily conceive of their experience, however well
they can negotiate their environment. Seeing, then, is not only an essentially
conscious experience,12 it also essentially involves a certain specific kind of
qualitative character, and my question is this: what is the relationship between
the qualitative character of a particular act of seeing and what is seen?13
What I am suggesting with case [2] is that being in visual contact with an
object does not entail that one sees it, that is, that one is in perceptual contact
with it. That is, one can be in visual contact with an object, the object can be
causing one to have a certain set of visual experiences, but that kind of contact
is not yet enough for seeing.
Is one subject to an illusion, in case [2]? The word “illusion” is defined in
different ways. According to one definition, an illusion is a perception of an
object, so that perceptual contact is made, but the content of one’s perception
 The Access Problem 35

is a markedly inaccurate depiction of the object perceived, in some respect or

respects—an object is perceived (seen, heard, felt, etc.), but some of the object’s
properties appear other than they really are. In denying that one sees the shed
at all, in case [2], I am denying that the case can be characterized as a case of
illusion. Perceptual contact has not been made, one is not actually seeing the
shed because there is simply too much inaccuracy with respect to the shed’s
properties.
So far I have only made a prima facie case for the matching view. Hopefully
the case is strong enough so that anyone who thinks hard about these ques-
tions should at some point feel the pull of the intuitions behind them.

4. Perceptual Contact: How Wrong Can One Be?

How wrong can one be before perceptual contact fails? The question cannot
receive a sharp answer, but it seems that Evans must disagree with my intuition
about the shed case—irrespective of the degree of inaccuracy. For he takes it
that one can satisfy Russell’s Principle with respect to a particular object, given
one’s present sensory contact with it, simply in virtue of being able to locate
and track that object on the basis of that contact:

our conditions for demonstrative identification do not require that

the subject’s information link be functioning well—so long as it pro-
vides an effective route to the object. He can misperceive its colour, or
its shape, or get altogether quite a wrong view of the thing, while still
having a perfectly clear Idea of which thing is in question.14

Clearly Evans takes it that one can think about the object, in this case.
Presumably, then, he must also think that one can see the object, given that
one is able to think about it solely and specifically on the basis of one’s present
visual contact with it.
Evans’s focus on locating and tracking derives in part from his attempt to
give a detailed explanation of what having discriminating knowledge of a phys-
ical object via perception amounts to. He argues that discriminating knowl-
edge of a physical object requires that one have what he calls a “fundamental
idea” of that object. To have a fundamental idea of an object is, centrally, to
grasp its “fundamental ground of difference,” where its fundamental ground
of difference is what differentiates it from all other objects of its own kind and
all other objects. The fundamental ground of difference for physical objects,
according to Evans, is their location in space.15 So to have a fundamental idea
of a physical object is, by definition, to have discriminating knowledge of that
object. The tracking element in Evans’s account records his commitment to
36 phenomenal intentionality

the idea that demonstrative identification is often dependent on a continuing

information-link with an object.
Some have rejected Evans’s theory on the grounds that one can demon-
stratively identify an object even if one gets the location wrong. Campbell,
for example, says that Evans’s view “has no plausibility at all. It implies that
you cannot even think demonstratively about an object you can see perfectly
well, because you are subject to some illusion about its location” (2002: 112).
But although such illusion cases may show that knowledge of location is not a
necessary condition for demonstrative identification, they do not threaten the
position I ultimately defend in this chapter—the matching view, according to
which one must represent a sufficient number of the object’s properties cor-
rectly in order for it to be true that one sees it.
Suppose that one’s visual experience is of nothing but flashing stars and
circles, when one is in visual contact with a dog. Those who hold that the abil-
ity to track and locate an object on the basis of visual contact is a sufficient
condition of seeing the object will presumably allow that one can be said to see
the dog, so long as one can locate and track it via the movement of the flash-
ing stars and circles.16 It seems to me, however, that one does not see the dog.
If one rejects the view that the tracking/locating ability is necessary on the
basis of considerations advanced by Campbell, then one presumably endorses
the matching view. For if one sees the object “perfectly well” despite misrepre-
senting its location, one must presumably be representing some of its visible
properties correctly.
So far, Evans seems to be committed to accepting that one sees the shed
and the dog, in the situations described. In the Appendix to chapter 6 of The
Varieties of Reference, however, he writes

if one sees the object as a woman . . . and if what one sees is not a woman
(or, at least, a person), then the mistake deprives the attempted thought of
content. (There would be a question about how seriously mistaken one
has to be for this to be the consequence. But it seems that we do not
attach the same importance to misperceiving a man as a woman, as we
should attach to misperceiving, say, a stone as a woman. In the former
case, a thought involving a demonstrative identification expressible by
“that woman” is merely incorrect; in the latter case there is some incli-
nation to say that the attempted thought lacks a content.) (1982: 196–7,
my emphasis)

This case is similar to the case of the shed and dog cases, and suggests that
Evans might after all be disinclined to say that one was able to think about the
shed and the dog in those situations. But given that it is plausible to say that
one must be able to think about something if one can see it (if one is capable
 The Access Problem 37

of thinking at all), and given that the shed and dog cases are cases in which
one has no other causal or historical or sensory link with the object, so that
there is no question of one’s being able to think about it unless one can see it, it
appears to follow that if one cannot think about it then one cannot see it either.
Evans does not explicitly say that one cannot see the object (the stone), in the
quoted passage, only that any attempted thought about it would lack a content.
To this extent he leaves open the possibility that one might be said to see it
although one was unable to have a contentful thought about it. But this seems
most implausible, for the reason just given.
The notion of “seeing as” makes us think specifically of the deployment of
concepts in perceptual experience, and it may be that the only point that Evans
is intending to make, in describing this particular failure to meet a necessary
internal condition on access, is a point about concept deployment—a point
about the potentially radical interference effects that can arise from inappro-
priate concept deployment. It is, however, arguable that the point has a wider
scope, and that failures of this general kind can arise even in the absence of
inappropriate concept deployment.
Consider two takes on the stone/woman case (I am assuming that the stone
doesn’t look at all like a woman). According to the first

[a] one possesses the concept woman, and is mistakenly representing proper-
ties associated with being a woman, when in visual/causal contact with a
stone, in such a way as to be having experience that one takes to be experi-
ence of seeing (and thinking about) a woman.

It is the incorrect deployment of the concept woman, or, more broadly, of

concepts associated with woman, that prevents one from being able to have a
genuine thought about, and so, presumably, and a fortiori, genuinely see, the
stone. According to the second

[b] whether or not one possesses the actual natural-kind concept woman, one’s
experience mistakenly represents the stone as having “womanly” proper-
ties (shape and color properties, say) in a way that one might characterize
by saying that if the visual content of one’s experience were transferred to
a sheet of paper, the resulting picture would be judged to be a picture of a
woman.

The first interpretation of Evans is no doubt the most likely, but the second is
also worth recording, even while it confl icts with his “official” view. My intu-
ition is that one does not see the stone in either case, because the ground-floor
reason that one does not see the stone is not that one’s experience involves
specifically conceptual error, but simply that it involves too much error. Evans
38 phenomenal intentionality

might perhaps agree, given that he says that “there is some degree of incorrect-
ness in a subject’s conception of an object that makes it pointless to ascribe
thoughts about it to him” (p. 134). This, however, requires taking the word
“conception” in a wide sense, and has to be set against his claim that one “can
misperceive [an object’s] colour, or its shape, or get altogether quite a wrong
view of the thing, while still having a perfectly clear Idea of which thing is in
question” (p. 179). So I will now return to his “official” theory, and to the sug-
gestion that the case of the shed (or dog) puts it in doubt.
Differently put, the proposal is as follows:

[i] one is in visual contact (as defined earlier) with the object o;

a fortiori

[ii] one is in sensory contact with o;

a fortiori

[iii] one is in causal contact with o;

and by hypothesis one is no other sort of contact with o.

Although it is true that

[iv] one can track and locate o,

given [i], and therefore that

[v] one has discriminating knowledge of o,

so that

[vi] one satisfies Russell’s Principle with respect to o,

and also true that

[vii] one has a fundamental idea of o in Evans’s sense,

even so, it still is not the case—according to the proposal—that

[viii] one can see o,

or (therefore) that
 The Access Problem 39

[ix] one can think about o.

There is, then, in this case, and most generally, no way in which

[x] one can have o in mind

and the impossibility of [x] rules out the possibility that

[xi] one stands in an intentional relation to o;

so one is not in an intentional relation with o.17

The dialectic so far may be summed up as follows. If one accepts my intuition
about the dog and elephant cases, one may say either

[a] the subject cannot see the dog (or shed), nor can she think about it

or

[b] the subject cannot see the dog (or shed), but she can think about it.

If the intuition is denied, one may say either

[c] the subject can see the dog (or shed) and think about it

or

[d] the subject can see the dog (or shed) but she cannot think about it (!)

In considering option [b] it is worth comparing the case of (super) blindsight

where, by hypothesis, [i]—[v] at least are true.18 One is in causal contact with the
object and one can on that basis track and locate it even though one cannot see it
(one can imagine giving correct answers when one prompts oneself about where
one thinks the object is, then after it is moved, one prompts oneself again). Some
would say that although one cannot see it one can think about it. Others would
say that one cannot really be said to think about it either. I am more inclined to
say that one can think about object o in the (super) blindsight case than the shed
or dog case, because I think that the (super) blindsight case differs from the shed
or dog case in that there is a respect in which the experience as of a pink elephant,
for example, is positively preventing one from thinking of the shed.
Some may feel the force of the intuition that one does not see the shed, but
think that larger theoretical considerations oblige one to concede that this is not
the best thing to say. Many philosophers accept across-the-board externalism
40 phenomenal intentionality

and want to show that they are hard, no-nonsense cognitive scientists whose
theoretical claims about perception should apply to robots as easily as human
beings. And even those who are half-minded to agree with the present proposal
are likely to object that the case of the shed is extreme and does not provide a way
of dealing with cases that fall somewhere between it and the case of the rock.

5. The Limits of Error: How Wrong

Can One Be, continued
The key difference between [1] and [2] is plainly the difference in how badly one
gets things wrong. How many of an object’s properties does one have to get right in
order to see it? It is, again, very hard to give a precise general answer to this ques-
tion, but perhaps one can borrow an idea from the so-called cluster version of the
description theory of names, which states that if most or a “weighted most” of a
set of definite (uniquely identifying) descriptions associated with a proper name “a”
are satisfied by a unique object x, then x is the referent of “a.” As is well known, this
provision allows the cluster theory to avoid certain objections made to the original
“Russell-Frege” version of the theory (see Searle 1958/1983); for as long as a speaker
possesses a certain sufficient number of descriptions, or a certain number of the
right descriptions, she can successfully refer to the object that satisfies the descrip-
tions in virtue of possessing the properties attributed by the descriptions.19
One plausible way of understanding the notion of a “weighted most” is that
there is a hierarchy of such properties, some mattering more than others, and
the general idea is that one might treat “see” or “think about” as relevantly
similar to “refer.” Thus one cannot be thinking about the shed if one takes the
thing that one takes oneself to be thinking about to be an abstract object like
a number, for example. That is too far off beam. But nor is it enough that one
takes the thing that one takes oneself to be thinking about to be a concrete
object, a physical object—if my intuition about the shed case is right. So what
is enough? How many of an object’s properties must I get right? No less impor-
tantly, how many must I not get wrong—and which ones, exactly? Well, that is
for discussion. And even if one can give a plausible “weighted cluster” theory of
the conditions on seeing o or thinking about o, one cannot expect it to be more
precise than the cluster version of the description theory of names.20
The question remains: how many of an object’s properties does one have to get
right in order to see it? And this raises a new question: what is it to “get an object’s
properties right,” in the perceptual cases in question? Plainly, my getting it right
is not just a matter of my seeing what any ordinarily sighted person would see in
my position. If I see a round coin from a certain position as a thin ellipse, and in
so doing see what any ordinarily sighted person would see from that position, I do
not get the coin’s properties right, in the relevant sense, if I judge it to be thinly
 The Access Problem 41

elliptical. So too if I see a house from a distance as a tiny blob, and judge it to be
tiny-blob-shaped-and-sized. Rightness is defined by reference to the object’s actual
properties, and the matter of perceptual judgment is key.21 If I am seeing an object
from a distance—a house that looks like a blob—there is a clear sense in which
I am not misperceiving the house’s properties if I know what is going on. Houses
look like blobs from a sufficient distance, and in this case it is part of the content
of the visual experience that one is seeing an object from far away. Representing
the house as far-off and thus blob-like will not involve an error in the content. This
suggests that when considering cases of seeing at a distance, “distance factoring”
should be considered to be part of the content of the experience, when evaluating
the accuracy of what is seen. More generally, some conception of the form “Th is is
what xs look like when seen from where I am relative to them” should be consid-
ered to be part of the content of visual perceptual experiences.22
Many might still think my claim quite implausible. The most likely response,
perhaps, will be that one does see the shed, although it looks to one like a pink
elephant; or that one sees the shed as a pink elephant. And it is true that if one
sees an object, it must look a certain particular way. The question, though, is
whether an object can look any particular way to one and still be said to be seen.
I have suggested that the answer is no: that if the properties one represents
and the properties an object has are too radically mismatched, one does not
see the object. The present response simply denies this, insisting that one does
see the shed despite its looking like a pink elephant. It is arguable that the “see-
ing/seeing as” locution has limited application: one can be said to see an object
as something so long as the object is seen in the first place. The present claim,
however, is that one cannot be said to see the object in the first place, in shed
cases, let alone be said to be seeing it as something. One’s elephantine visual
experience actually blocks one from seeing the shed.
Suppose (as is wholly feasible) that I’ve been hypnotized in such a way that I
see my cat as a wicker basket. I’m astonished to see the wicker basket suddenly
move. I do not think I can see the cat in this case. I’m blocked from seeing the cat
by my experience of the wicker basket. One can imagine saying in this case, “I
know my cat is just there but I can’t see it!” What if my causal, visual contact with
the shed begins to change, and I begin to have experiences that are less elephan-
tine, and are in particular less unlike shed experiences. Then it may seem natural
for me to say “When I first saw it I thought it was an elephant.” This may be the
natural thing to say but this is because we naturally generalize backwards, and
call it seeing, even if the best thing to say is that we didn’t really see it at all.

6. Object-Positing
In this section I consider a series of objections that focus on the thoughts the
subject in the shed case may be said to have, based on causal and visual contact
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A dissolution of the slavish bands
Wherein the Turk hath yoked your lands and you?
What will you give me if I render you80
The life of Calymath, surprise his men
And in an outhouse of the city shut
His soldiers, till I have consumed 'em all with fire?
What will you give him that procureth this?

Gov. Do but bring this to pass which thou pretend'st, [148]

Deal truly with us as thou intimatest,
And I will send amongst the citizens;
And by my letters privately procure
Great sums of money for thy recompense:
Nay more, do this, and live thou governor still.90

Bar. Nay, do thou this, Ferneze, and be free;

Governor, I enlarge thee; live with me,
Go walk about the city, see thy friends:
Tush, send not letters to 'em, go thyself,
And let me see what money thou canst make;
Here is my hand that I'll set Malta free:
And thus we cast it: To a solemn feast
I will invite young Selim Calymath,
Where be thou present only to perform
One stratagem that I'll impart to thee,100
Wherein no danger shall betide thy life,
And I will warrant Malta free for ever.
 Gov. Here is my hand, believe me, Barabas,
I will be there, and do as thou desirest;
When is the time?

Bar. Governor, presently.

For Calymath, when he hath viewed the town,
Will take his leave and sail towards Ottoman.

Gov. Then will I, Barabas, about this coin,

And bring it with me to thee in the evening.110

Bar. Do so, but fail not; now farewell, Ferneze: [Exit Governor.
And thus far roundly goes the business:
Thus loving neither, will I live with both,
Making a profit of my policy;
And he from whom my most advantage comes
Shall be my friend.
This is the life we Jews are used to lead;
And reason too, for Christians do the like.
Well, now about effecting this device:
First to surprise great Selim's soldiers,120
And then to make provision for the feast,
That at one instant all things may be done:
My policy detests prevention:
To what event my secret purpose drives,
I know; and they shall witness with their lives.
[Exit.

SCENE III.
Enter Calymath and Bassoes.

Caly. Thus have we viewed the city, seen the sack,

And caused the ruins to be new repaired,
Which with our bombards' [149] shot and basilisk[s][150]
We rent in sunder at our entry:
And now I see the situation,
And how secure this conquered island stands
Environed with the Mediterranean sea,
Strong countermined with other petty isles;
And, [151] toward Calabria, backed by Sicily,
(Where Syracusian Dionysius reigned,)10
Two lofty turrets that command the town;
I wonder how it could be conquered thus?

Enter a Messenger.

Mess. From Barabas, Malta's governor. I bring

A message unto mighty Calymath;
Hearing his sovereign was bound for sea,
To sail to Turkey, to great Ottoman,
He humbly would entreat your majesty
To come and see his homely citadel,
And banquet with him ere thou leav'st the isle.

Caly. To banquet with him in his citadel?20

I fear me, messenger, to feast my train
Within a town of war so lately pillaged,
Will be too costly and too troublesome:
Yet would I gladly visit Barabas,
For well has Barabas deserved of us.

Mess. Selim, for that, thus saith the Governor,

That he hath in [his] store a pearl so big,
So precious, and withal so orient,
As, be it valued but indifferently,
The price thereof will serve to entertain30
Selim and all his soldiers for a month;
Therefore he humbly would entreat your highness
Not to depart till he has feasted you.

Caly. I cannot feast my men in Malta walls,

Except he place his tables in the streets.

Mess. Know, Selim, that there is a monastery

Which standeth as an outhouse to the town:
There will he banquet them, but thee at home,
With all thy bassoes and brave followers.

Caly. Well, tell the Governor we grant his suit,40

We'll in this summer evening feast with him.

Mess. I shall, my lord. [Exit.

Caly. And now, bold bassoes, let us to our tents,

And meditate how we may grace us best
To solemise our Governor's great feast.
[Exeunt.

SCENE IV.

Enter [152] Governor, Knights, and Del Bosco.

Gov. In this, my countrymen, be ruled by me,

Have special care that no man sally forth
Till you shall hear a culverin discharged
By him that bears the linstock, [153] kindled thus;
Then issue out and come to rescue me,
For happily I shall be in distress,
Or you released of this servitude.

Knight. Rather than thus to live as Turkish thralls

What will we not adventure?

Gov. On then, begone.

Knight. Farewell, grave Governor!11

[Exeunt.
 SCENE V.

Enter, [154] above, Barabas, with a hammer, very busy;

and Carpenters.

Bar. How stand the cords? How hang these hinges? fast?
Are all the cranes and pulleys sure?

First Carp. [155] All fast.

Bar. Leave nothing loose, all levelled to my mind.

Why now I see that you have art indeed.
There, carpenters, divide that gold amongst you:
Go swill in bowls of sack and muscadine!
Down to the cellar, taste of all my wines.

Carp. We shall, my lord, and thank you. [Exeunt.

Bar. And, if you like them, drink your fill and die:10
For so I live, perish may all the world.
Now Selim Calymath return me word
That thou wilt come, and I am satisfied.
Now, sirrah, what, will he come?

Enter Messenger.

Mess. He will; and has commanded all his men

To come ashore, and march through Malta streets,
That thou mayest feast them in thy citadel.

Bar. Then now are all things as my wish would have 'em,
There wanteth nothing but the Governor's pelf,
And see, he brings it.20

Enter Governor.
Now, Governor, the sum.

Gov. With free consent, a hundred thousand pounds.

Bar. Pounds say'st thou, Governor? well, since it is no more,

I'll satisfy myself with that; nay, keep it still,
For if I keep not promise, trust not me.
And, Governor, now take my policy:
First, for his army, they are sent before,
Entered the monastery, and underneath
In several places are field-pieces pitched,
Bombards, whole barrels full of gunpowder,30
That on the sudden shall dissever it,
And batter all the stones about their ears,
Whence none can possibly escape alive:
Now as for Calymath and his consorts,
Here have I made a dainty gallery,
The floor whereof, this cable being cut,
Doth fall asunder; so that it doth sink
Into a deep pit past recovery.
Here, hold that knife, and when thou seest he comes,
And with his bassoes shall be blithely set,40
A warning-piece shall be shot off from the tower,
To give thee knowledge when to cut the cord
And fire the house; say, will not this be brave?

Gov. O excellent! here, hold thee, Barabas,

I trust thy word, take what I promised thee.

Bar. No, Governor, I'll satisfy thee first,

Thou shalt not live in doubt of anything.
Stand close, for here they come [Governor retires]. Why, is not
this
A kingly kind of trade to purchase towns
By treachery and sell 'em by deceit?50
Now tell me, worldlings, underneath the sun [156]
If greater falsehood ever has been done?

Enter Calymath and Bassoes.

Caly. Come, my companion bassoes; see, I pray,

How busy Barabas is there above
To entertain us in his gallery;
Let us salute him. Save thee, Barabas!

Bar. Welcome, great Calymath!

Gov. How the slave jeers at him. [Aside.

Bar. Will 't please thee, mighty Selim Calymath,

To ascend our homely stairs?60

Caly. I, Barabas;
Come, bassoes, attend. [157]

Gov. Stay, Calymath!

For I will show thee greater courtesy
Than Barabas would have afforded thee.

Knight [within]. Sound a charge there!

[A charge; the cable cut. Barabas falls into a caldron.

Enter Martin Del Bosco and Knights. [158]

Caly. How now, what means this!

Bar. Help, help me, Christians, help.

Gov. See, Calymath, this was devised for thee.

Caly. Treason! treason! bassoes, fly!70

Gov. No, Selim, do not fly;

See his end first, and fly then if thou canst.

Bar. O help me, Selim, help me, Christians!

Governor, why stand you all so pitiless?

Gov. Should I in pity of thy plaints or thee,

Accursèd Barabas, base Jew, relent?
No, thus I'll see thy treachery repaid,
But wish thou hadst behaved thee otherwise.

Bar. You will not help me, then?

Gov. No, villain, no.80

Bar. And, villains, know you cannot help me now—

Then, Barabas, breathe forth thy latest hate, [159]
And in the fury of thy torments strive
To end thy life with resolution;
Know, Governor, 'twas I that slew thy son;
I framed the challenge that did make them meet:
Know, Calymath, I aimed thy overthrow,
And had I but escaped this stratagem,
I would have brought confusion on you all,
Damned Christians! dogs! and Turkish infidels!90
But now begins the extremity of heat
To pinch me with intolerable pangs:
Die life, fly soul, tongue curse thy fill, and die! [Dies.

Caly. Tell me, you Christians, what doth this portend?

Gov. This train he laid to have entrapped thy life;

Now, Selim, note the unhallowed deeds of Jews:
Thus he determined to have handled thee,
But I have rather chose to save thy life.

Caly. Was this the banquet he prepared for us?

Let's hence, lest further mischief be pretended. [160]100

Gov. Nay, Selim, stay, for since we have thee here,

We will not let thee part so suddenly;
Besides, if we should let thee go, all's one,
For with thy galleys could'st thou not get hence,
Without fresh men to rig and furnish them.

Caly. Tush, Governor, take thou no care for that,

My men are all aboard.
And do attend my coming there by this.

Gov. Why, heard'st thou not the trumpet sound a charge?

Caly. Yes, what of that?110

Gov. Why then the house was fired,

Blown up, and all thy soldiers massacred.

Caly. O monstrous treason!

Gov. A Jew's courtesy:

For he that did by treason work our fall,
By treason hath delivered thee to us:
Know, therefore, till thy father hath made good
The ruins done to Malta and to us,
Thou canst not part: for Malta shall be freed,
Or Selim ne'er return to Ottoman.120

Caly. Nay, rather, Christians, let me go to Turkey,

In person there to mediate [161] your peace;
To keep me here will not advantage you.

Gov. Content thee, Calymath, here thou must stay,

And live in Malta prisoner; for come all [162] the world
To rescue thee, so will we guard us now,
As sooner shall they drink the ocean dry
Than conquer Malta, or endanger us.
So march away, and let due praise be given
Neither to fate nor fortune, but to Heaven.
[Exeunt.

EDWARD THE SECOND.

Edward II. was entered in the Stationers' Books 6th July 1593. In
the Dyce Library at South Kensington there is a 4to. with a MS. title-
page (in a hand of the late seventeenth century) dated 1593.
Without doubt the date 1593 is a copyist's mistake for 1598. In the
first leaf, which is in MS., there are a few textual differences, due to
the copyist's carelessness; but the printed matter throughout (A. 3—
K. 2) exhibits the text of ed. 1598.
In 1876 an edition of Edward II. in 8vo., dated 1594, was discovered
in the library at Cassel. The title is:—The troublesome raigne and
lamentable death of Edward the second, King of England: with the
tragicall fall of proud Mortimer. As it was sundrie times publiquely
acted in the honourable citie of London, by the right honourable the
Earl of Pembroke his servants. Written by Chri. Marlow Gent.
Imprinted at London for William Jones, dwelling neare Holborne
conduit at the Signe of the Gunne, 1594.
The title of the 4to. of 1598 runs as follows:—The troublesome
raigne and lamentable death of Edward the second, King of England:
with the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer: And also the life and death
of Peirs Gaueston, the great Earle of Cornewall, and mighty favorite
of king Edward the second, as it was publiquely acted by the right
honorable the Earle of Pembrooke his seruauntes. Written by Chri.
Marlow Gent. Imprinted at London by Richard Bradocke, for William
Jones, dwelling neere Holbourne conduit, at the signe of the Gunne,
1598.
Another edition (in 4to.) appeared in 1612, with the following title:—
The troublesome raigne and lamentable death of Edward the
second, King of England: with the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer.
And also the life and death of Peirs Gaueston, the great Earle of
Cornewall, and mighty fauorite of King Edward the second, as it was
publiquely acted by the right honorable the Earle of Pembrooke his
seruants. Written by Christopher Marlow Gent. Printed at London for
Roger Barnes, and are to be sould at his shop in Chauncerie Lane
ouer against the Rolles, 1612.
The last of the old editions is dated 1622:—The troublesome raigne
and lamentable death of Edward the second, King of England: with
the tragicall fall of proud Mortimer. And also the life and death of
Peirs Gauestone, the great Earle of Cornewall, and mighty Fauorite
of King Edward the second. As it was publikely Acted by the late
Queenes Maiesties Seruants at the Red Bull in S. Johns streete.
Written by Christopher Marlow Gent. London, Printed for Henry Bell,
and are to be sold at his Shop at the Lame-hospitall Gate, neere
Smithfield, 1622.
The text of the 1598 4to., which is fairly free from corruptions,
differs but slightly from the texts of the two later 4tos. I have not
had an opportunity of inspecting the 8vo. of 1594; but I suspect that
it agrees very closely with the later copies.

PERSONS REPRESENTED.
Edward II.
Prince Edward, his son, afterwards Edward
III.
Gaveston.
Old Spencer.
 Young Spencer.
Earl Mortimer.
Young Mortimer.
Berkeley.
Lancaster.
Leicester.
Edmund, Earl of Kent.
Arundel.
Warwick.
Pembroke.
Archbishop of Canterbury.
Bishop of Winchester.
Bishop of Coventry.
Beaumont.
Trussel.
Sir John Hainault.
Levune.
Baldock.
Matrevis.
Gurney.
Rice ap Howel.
Lightborn.
Abbot.
Lords, Messengers, Monks, James, &c.,
&c.

Queen Isabella.
Niece to Edward II.
Ladies.
EDWARD THE SECOND.
 ACT THE FIRST.
SCENE I.

Enter [163] Gaveston, reading a letter from the King.

Gav. My father is deceased! Come, Gaveston,

And share the kingdom with thy dearest friend.
Ah! words that make me surfeit with delight!
What greater bliss can hap to Gaveston
Than live and be the favourite of a king!
Sweet prince, I come; these, these thy amorous lines
Might have enforced me to have swum from France,
And, like Leander, gasped upon the sand,
So thou would'st smile, and take me in thine arms.
The sight of London to my exiled eyes10
Is as Elysium to a new-come soul;
Not that I love the city, or the men,
But that it harbours him I hold so dear—
The king, upon whose bosom let me die, [164]
And with the world be still at enmity.
What need the arctic people love starlight,
To whom the sun shines both by day and night?
Farewell base stooping to the lordly peers!
My knee shall bow to none but to the king.
As for the multitude, that are but sparks,20
Raked up in embers of their poverty;—
Tanti; [165] I'll fawn [166] first on the wind
That glanceth at my lips, and flieth away.
But how now, what are these?

Enter three poor Men.

 Men. Such as desire your worship's service.

Gav. What canst thou do?

1 Man. I can ride.

Gav. But I have no horse. What art thou?

2 Man. A traveller.

Gav. Let me see—thou would'st do well

To wait at my trencher and tell me lies at dinner-time;30
And as I like your discoursing, I'll have you.
And what art thou?

3 Man. A soldier, that hath served against the Scot.

Gav. Why, there are hospitals for such as you;

I have no war, and therefore, sir, begone.

3 Man. Farewell, and perish by a soldier's hand,

That would'st reward them with an hospital.

Gav. I, I, these words of his move me as much

As if a goose would play the porcupine,
And dart her plumes, [167] thinking to pierce my breast.40
But yet it is no pain to speak men fair;
I'll flatter these, and make them live in hope. [Aside.
You know that I came lately out of France,
And yet I have not viewed my lord the king;
If I speed well, I'll entertain you all.

Omnes. We thank your worship.

Gav. I have some business. Leave me to myself.

Omnes. We will wait here about the court. [Exeunt.

 Gav. Do; these are not men for me;
I must have wanton poets, pleasant wits,50
Musicians, that with touching of a string
May draw the pliant king which way I please.
Music and poetry is his delight;
Therefore I'll have Italian masks by night,
Sweet speeches, comedies, and pleasing shows;
And in the day, when he shall walk abroad,
Like silvian [168] nymphs my pages shall be clad;
My men, like satyrs grazing on the lawns,
Shall with their goat-feet dance the antic hay. [169]
Sometime a lovely boy in Dian's shape,60
With hair that gilds the water as it glides,
Crownets of pearl about his naked arms,
And in his sportful hands an olive-tree,
To hide those parts which men delight to see,
Shall bathe him in a spring; and there hard by,
One like Actæon peeping through the grove,
Shall by the angry goddess be transformed,
And running in the likeness of an hart
By yelping hounds pulled down, and [170] seem to die;—
Such things as these best please his majesty.70
Here comes my lord [171] the king, and [here] the nobles
From the parliament. I'll stand aside.

Enter the King, Lancaster,Old Mortimer, Young Mortimer, Edmund,

Earl of Kent, Guy, Earl of Warwick, &c.

Edw. Lancaster!

Lan. My lord.

Gav. That Earl of Lancaster do I abhor. [Aside.

Edw. Will you not grant me this? In spite of them

I'll have my will; and these two Mortimers,
That cross me thus, shall know I am displeased.

E. Mor. If you love us, my lord, hate Gaveston.

Gav. That villain Mortimer, I'll be his death! [Aside.

Y. Mor. Mine uncle here, this earl, and I myself,81

Were sworn [172] to your father at his death,
That he should ne'er return into the realm:
And know, my lord, ere I will break my oath,
This sword of mine, that should offend your foes,
Shall sleep within the scabbard at thy need,
And underneath thy banners march who will,
For Mortimer will hang his armour up.

Gav. Mort dieu! [Aside.

Edw. Well, Mortimer, I'll make thee rue these words.

Beseems it thee to contradict thy king?91
Frown'st thou thereat, aspiring Lancaster? [173]
The sword shall plane the furrows of thy brows,
And hew these knees that now are grown so stiff.
I will have Gaveston; and you shall know
What danger 'tis to stand against your king.

Gav. Well done, Ned! [Aside.

Lan. My lord, why do you thus incense your peers,

That naturally would love and honour you
But for that base and obscure Gaveston?100
Four earldoms have I, besides Lancaster—
Derby, Salisbury, Lincoln, Leicester,
These will I sell, to give my soldiers pay,
Ere Gaveston shall stay within the realm;
Therefore, if he be come, expel him straight.
 Edw. Barons and earls, your pride hath made me mute;
But now I'll speak, and to the proof, I hope.
I do remember, in my father's days,
Lord Percy of the north, being highly moved,
Braved Moubery [174] in presence of the king;110
For which, had not his highness loved him well,
He should have lost his head; but with his look
The undaunted spirit of Percy was appeased,
And Moubery and he were reconciled.
Yet dare you brave the king unto his face;
Brother, revenge it, and let these their heads
Preach upon poles, for trespass of their tongues.

War. O, our heads!

Edw. I, yours; and therefore I would wish you grant—

War. Bridle thy anger, gentle Mortimer.120

Y. Mor. I cannot, nor I will not; I must speak.

Cousin, our hands I hope shall fence our heads,
And strike off his that makes you threaten us.
Come, uncle, let us leave the brainsick king,
And henceforth parley with our naked swords.

E. Mor. Wiltshire hath men enough to save our heads.

War. All Warwickshire will love [175] him for my sake.

Lan. And northward Gaveston [176] hath many friends.

Adieu, my lord; and either change your mind,
Or look to see the throne, where you should sit,130
To float in blood; and at thy wanton head,
The glozing head of thy base minion thrown. [Exeunt Nobles.

Edw. I cannot brook these haughty menaces;

Am I a king, and must be overruled?
Brother, display my ensigns in the field;
I'll bandy [177] with the barons and the earls,
And either die or live with Gaveston.

Gav. I can no longer keep me from my lord. [Comes forward.

Edw. What, Gaveston! welcome.—Kiss not my hand—

Embrace me, Gaveston, as I do thee.140
Why should'st thou kneel? know'st thou not who I am?
Thy friend, thyself, another Gaveston!
Not Hylas was more mourned of [178] Hercules,
Than thou hast been of me since thy exile.

Gav. And since I went from hence, no soul in hell

Hath felt more torment than poor Gaveston.

Edw. I know it.—Brother, welcome home my friend.

Now let the treacherous Mortimers conspire,
And that high-minded Earl of Lancaster:
I have my wish, in that I joy thy sight;150
And sooner shall the sea o'erwhelm my land,
Than bear the ship that shall transport thee hence.
I here create thee Lord High Chamberlain,
Chief Secretary to the state and me,
Earl of Cornwall, King and Lord of Man.

Gav. My lord, these titles far exceed my worth.

Kent. Brother, the least of these may well suffice

For one of greater birth than Gaveston.

Edw. Cease, brother: for I cannot brook these words.

Thy worth, sweet friend, is far above my gifts,160
Therefore, to equal it, receive my heart;
If for these dignities thou be envied,
I'll give thee more; for, but to honour thee,
Is Edward pleased with kingly regiment. [179]
Fear'st thou thy person? thou shalt have a guard.
Wantest thou gold? go to my treasury.
Wouldst thou be loved and feared? receive my seal;
Save or condemn, and in our name command
Whatso thy mind affects, or fancy likes.

Gav. It shall suffice me to enjoy your love,170

Which whiles I have, I think myself as great
As Cæsar riding in the Roman street,
With captive kings at his triumphant car.

Enter the Bishop of Coventry.

Edw. Whither goes my lord of Coventry so fast?

Bish. To celebrate your father's exequies.

But is that wicked Gaveston returned?

Edw. I, priest, and lives to be revenged on thee,

That wert the only cause of his exile.

Gav. 'Tis true; and but for reverence of these robes,

Thou should'st not plod one foot beyond this place.180

Bish. I did no more than I was bound to do;

And, Gaveston, unless thou be reclaimed,
As then I did incense the parliament,
So will I now, and thou shalt back to France.

Gav. Saving your reverence, you must pardon me.

Edw. Throw off his golden mitre, rend his stole,

And in the channel [180] christen him anew.

Kent. Ah, brother, lay not violent hands on him,

For he'll complain unto the see of Rome.

Gav. Let him complain unto the see of hell,190

I'll be revenged on him for my exile.

Edw. No, spare his life, but seize upon his goods:
Be thou lord bishop and receive his rents,
And make him serve thee as thy chaplain:
I give him thee—here, use him as thou wilt.

Gav. He shall to prison, and there die in bolts.

Edw. I, to the Tower, the Fleet, or where thou wilt.

Bish. For this offence, be thou accurst of God!

Edw. Who's there? Convey this priest to the Tower.

Bish. True, true. [181]200

Edw. But in the meantime, Gaveston, away,

And take possession of his house and goods.
Come, follow me, and thou shalt have my guard
To see it done, and bring thee safe again.

Gav. What should a priest do with so fair a house?

A prison may best [182] beseem his holiness.
[Exeunt.

SCENE II.

Enter [183] both the Mortimers, Warwick, and Lancaster.

War. 'Tis true, the bishop is in the Tower,

And goods and body given to Gaveston.
 Lan. What! will they tyrannise upon the church?
Ah, wicked king! accursed Gaveston!
This ground, which is corrupted with their steps,
Shall be their timeless [184] sepulchre or mine.

Y. Mor. Well, let that peevish Frenchman guard him sure;

Unless his breast be sword-proof he shall die.

E. Mor. How now, why droops the Earl of Lancaster?

Y. Mor. Wherefore is Guy of Warwick discontent?10

Lan. That villain Gaveston is made an earl.

E. Mor. An earl!

War. I, and besides Lord Chamberlain of the realm,

And Secretary too, and Lord of Man.

E. Mor. We may not, nor we will not suffer this.

Y. Mor. Why post we not from hence to levy men?

Lan. "My Lord of Cornwall," now at every word!

And happy is the man whom he vouchsafes,
For vailing of his bonnet, one good look.
Thus, arm in arm, the king and he doth march:20
Nay more, the guard upon his lordship waits;
And all the court begins to flatter him.

War. Thus leaning on the shoulder of the king,

He nods and scorns, and smiles at those that pass.

E. Mor. Doth no man take exceptions at the slave?

Lan. All stomach [185] him, but none dare speak a word.
 Y. Mor. Ah, that bewrays their baseness, Lancaster.
Were all the earls and barons of my mind,
We'd[186] hale him from the bosom of the king,
And at the court-gate hang the peasant up;30
Who, swoln with venom of ambitious pride,
Will be the ruin of the realm and us.

Enter the Archbishop of Canterbury and a Messenger.

War. Here comes my Lord of Canterbury's grace.

Lan. His countenance bewrays he is displeased.

Archbish. First were his sacred garments rent and torn,

Then laid they violent hands upon him; next
Himself imprisoned, and his goods asseized:
This certify the pope;—away, take horse. [Exit Messenger.

Lan. My lord, will you take arms against the king?

Archbish. What need I? God himself is up in arms,40

When violence is offered to the church.

Y. Mor. Then will you join with us, that be his peers,
To banish or behead that Gaveston?

Archbish. What else, my lords? for it concerns me near;—

The bishoprick of Coventry is his.

Enter Queen Isabella.

Y. Mor. Madam, whither walks your majesty so fast?

Queen. Unto the forest, [187] gentle Mortimer,

To live in grief and baleful discontent;
For now, my lord, the king regards me not,
But doats upon the love of Gaveston.50
He claps his cheek, and hangs about his neck,
Smiles in his face, and whispers in his ears;
And when I come he frowns, as who should say,
"Go whither thou wilt, seeing I have Gaveston."

E. Mor. Is it not strange, that he is thus bewitched?

Y. Mor. Madam, return unto the court again:

That sly inveigling Frenchman we'll exile,
Or lose our lives; and yet ere that day come
The king shall lose his crown; for we have power,
And courage too, to be revenged at full.60

Archbish. But yet lift not your swords against the king.

Lan. No; but we will lift Gaveston from hence.

War. And war must be the means, or he'll stay still.

Queen. Then let him stay; for rather than my lord

Shall be oppressed with civil mutinies,
I will endure a melancholy life,
And let him frolic with his minion.

Archbish. My lords, to ease all this, but hear me speak:—

We and the rest, that are his counsellors,
Will meet, and with a general consent70
Confirm his banishment with our hands and seals.

Lan. What we confirm the king will frustrate.

Y. Mor. Then may we lawfully revolt from him.

War. But say, my lord, where shall this meeting be?

Archbish. At the New Temple.

Y. Mor. Content.
 [Archbish.] And, in the meantime, I'll entreat you all
To cross to Lambeth, and there stay with me.

Lan. Come then, let's away.

Y. Mor. Madam, farewell!80

Queen. Farewell, sweet Mortimer; and, for my sake,

Forbear to levy arms against the king.

Y. Mor. I, if words will serve; if not, I must.

[Exeunt.

SCENE III.

Enter [188]Gaveston and the Earl of Kent.

Gav. Edmund, the mighty prince of Lancaster,

That hath more earldoms than an ass can bear,
And both the Mortimers, two goodly men,
With Guy of Warwick, that redoubted knight,
Are gone toward Lambeth—there let them remain.
[Exeunt.

SCENE IV.

Enter [189]Nobles and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Lan. Here is the form of Gaveston's exile:

May it please your lordship to subscribe your name.

Archbish. Give me the paper. [He subscribes, as the others do

after him.

Lan. Quick, quick, my lord; I long to write my name.

 War. But I long more to see him banished hence.

Y. Mor. The name of Mortimer shall fright the king,

Unless he be declined from that base peasant.

Enter the King, Gaveston, and Kent.

Edw. What, are you moved that Gaveston sits here?

It is our pleasure, and we will have it so.

Lan. Your grace doth well to place him by your side,10

For nowhere else the new earl is so safe.

E. Mor. What man of noble birth can brook this sight?

Quam male conveniunt! [190]
See what a scornful look the peasant casts!

Pem. Can kingly lions fawn on creeping ants?

War. Ignoble vassal, that like Phaeton

Aspir'st unto the guidance of the sun.

Y. Mor. Their downfall is at hand, their forces down:

We will not thus be faced and over-peered.

Edw. Lay hands on [191] that traitor Mortimer!20

E. Mor. Lay hands on that traitor Gaveston!

Kent. Is this the duty that you owe your king?

War. We know our duties—let him know his peers.

Edw. Whither will you bear him? Stay, or ye shall die.

E. Mor. We are no traitors; therefore threaten not.

Gav. No, threaten not, my lord, but pay them home!

Were I a king——

Y. Mor. Thou villain, wherefore talk'st thou of a king,

That hardly art a gentleman by birth?

Edw. Were he a peasant, being my minion,30

I'll make the proudest of you stoop to him.

Lan. My lord, you may not thus disparage us.

Away, I say, with hateful Gaveston.

E. Mor. And with the Earl of Kent that favours him.

[Attendants remove Kent and Gaveston.

Edw. Nay, then, lay violent hands upon your king,

Here, Mortimer, sit thou in Edward's throne:
Warwick and Lancaster, wear you my crown:
Was ever king thus over-ruled as I?

Lan. Learn then to rule us better, and the realm.

Y. Mor. What we have done, our heart-blood shall maintain.40

War. Think you that we can brook this upstart pride?

Edw. Anger and wrathful fury stops my speech.

Archbish. Why are you moved? be patient, my lord,

And see what we your counsellors have done.

Y. Mor. My lords, now let us all be resolute,

And either have our wills or lose our lives.

Edw. Meet you for this? proud overbearing peers!

Ere my sweet Gaveston shall part from me,
This isle shall fleet [192] upon the ocean,
And wander to the unfrequented Inde.50
 Archbish. You know that I am legate to the pope;
On your allegiance to the see of Rome,
Subscribe, as we have done, to his exile.

Y. Mor. Curse him, if he refuse; and then may we

Depose him and elect another king.

Edw. I, there it goes—but yet I will not yield:

Curse me, depose me, do the worst you can.

Lan. Then linger not, my lord, but do it straight.

Archbish. Remember how the bishop was abused!

Either banish him that was the cause thereof,60
Or I will presently discharge these lords [193]
Of duty and allegiance due to thee.

Edw. It boots me not to threat—I must speak fair: [Aside.

The legate of the pope will be obeyed.
My lord, you shall be Chancellor of the realm;
Thou, Lancaster, High Admiral of the fleet;
Young Mortimer and his uncle shall be earls;
And you, Lord Warwick, President of the North;
And thou of Wales. If this content you not,
Make several kingdoms of this monarchy,70
And share it equally amongst you all,
So I may have some nook or corner left,
To frolic with my dearest Gaveston.

Archbish. Nothing shall alter us—we are resolved.

Lan. Come, come, subscribe.

Y. Mor. Why should you love him whom the world hates so?

Edw. Because he loves me more than all the world.

Ah, none but rude and savage-minded men
Would seek the ruin of my Gaveston;
You that be [194] noble born should pity him.80

War. You that are princely born should shake him off:
For shame subscribe, and let the lown [195] depart.

E. Mor. Urge him, my lord.

Archbish. Are you content to banish him the realm?

Edw. I see I must, and therefore am content:

Instead of ink I'll write it with my tears. [Subscribes.

Y. Mor. The king is love-sick for his minion.

Edw. 'Tis done—and now, accursed hand, fall off!

Lan. Give it me—I'll have it published in the streets.

Y. Mor. I'll see him presently despatched away.90

Archbish. Now is my heart at ease.

War. And so is mine.

Pem. This will be good news to the common sort.

E. Mor. Be it or no, he shall not linger here. [Exeunt Nobles.

Edw. How fast they run to banish him I love!

They would not stir, were it to do me good.
Why should a king be subject to a priest?
Proud Rome! that hatchest such imperial grooms,
For [196] these thy superstitious taper-lights,
Wherewith thy antichristian churches blaze,
I'll fire thy crazèd buildings, and enforce100
The papal towers to kiss the lowly ground! [197]
With slaughtered priests make [198] Tiber's channel swell,
And banks raised higher with their sepulchres!
As for the peers, that back the clergy thus,
If I be king, not one of them shall live.

Enter Gaveston.

Gav. My lord, I hear it whispered everywhere,

That I am banished, and must fly the land.

Edw. 'Tis true, sweet Gaveston—O! were it false!

The legate of the Pope will have it so,
And thou must hence, or I shall be deposed.110
But I will reign to be revenged of them;
And therefore, sweet friend, take it patiently.
Live where thou wilt, I'll send thee gold enough;
And long thou shalt not stay, or if thou dost,
I'll come to thee; my love shall ne'er decline.

Gav. Is all my hope turned to this hell of grief?

Edw. Rend not my heart with thy too-piercing words:

Thou from this land, I from myself am banished.

Gav. To go from hence grieves not poor Gaveston;

But to forsake you, in whose gracious looks120
The blessedness of Gaveston remains:
For nowhere else seeks he felicity.

Edw. And only this torments my wretched soul,

That, whether I will or no, thou must depart.
Be governor of Ireland in my stead,
And there abide till fortune call thee home.
Here take my picture, and let me wear thine; [They exchange
pictures.
O, might I keep thee here as I do this,
Happy were I! but now most miserable!

Gav. 'Tis something to be pitied of a king.130

Edw. Thou shalt not hence—I'll hide thee, Gaveston.

Gav. I shall be found, and then 'twill grieve me more.

Edw. Kind words, and mutual talk makes our grief greater:
Therefore, with dumb embracement, let us part—
Stay, Gaveston, I cannot leave thee thus.

Gav. For every look, my lord [199] drops down a tear:

Seeing I must go, do not renew my sorrow.

Edw. The time is little that thou hast to stay,

And therefore, give me leave to look my fill:
But come, sweet friend, I'll bear thee on thy way.140

Gav. The peers will frown.

Edw. I pass [200] not for their anger—Come, let's go;

O that we might as well return as go.

Enter Kent [201] and Queen Isabel.

Queen. Whither goes my lord?

Edw. Fawn not on me, French strumpet! get thee gone.

Queen. On whom but on my husband should I fawn?

Gav. On Mortimer! with whom, ungentle queen—

I say no more—judge you the rest, my lord.

Queen. In saying this, thou wrong'st me, Gaveston;

Is't not enough that thou corrupt'st my lord,150
And art a bawd to his affections,
But thou must call mine honour thus in question?

Gav. I mean not so; your grace must pardon me.

Edw. Thou art too familiar with that Mortimer,

And by thy means is Gaveston exiled;
But I would wish thee reconcile the lords,
Or thou shalt ne'er be reconciled to me.

Queen. Your highness knows it lies not in my power.

Edw. Away then! touch me not—Come, Gaveston.

Queen. Villain! 'tis thou that robb'st me of my lord.160

Gav. Madam, 'tis you that rob me of my lord.

Edw. Speak not unto her; let her droop and pine.

Queen. Wherein, my lord, have I deserved these words?

Witness the tears that Isabella sheds,
Witness this heart, that sighing for thee, breaks,
How dear my lord is to poor Isabel.

Edw. And witness heaven how dear thou art to me:

There weep: for till my Gaveston be repealed,
Assure thyself thou com'st not in my sight.
[Exeunt Edward and Gaveston.

Queen. O miserable and distressèd queen!170

Would, when I left sweet France and was embarked,
That charming Circe [202] walking on the waves,
Had changed my shape, or at [203] the marriage-day
The cup of Hymen had been full of poison,
Or with those arms that twined about my neck
I had been stifled, and not lived to see
The king my lord thus to abandon me!
Like frantic Juno will I fill the earth
With ghastly murmur of my sighs and cries;
For never doated Jove on Ganymede180
So much as he on cursed Gaveston:
But that will more exasperate his wrath:
I must entreat him, I must speak him fair,
And be a means to call home Gaveston:
And yet he'll ever doat on Gaveston:
And so am I for ever miserable.

Enter the Nobles.

Lan. Look where the sister of the king of France

Sits wringing of her hands, and beats her breast!

War. The king, I fear, hath ill-entreated her.

Pem. Hard is the heart that injuries [204] such a saint.190

Y. Mor. I know 'tis 'long of Gavestone she weeps.

E. Mor. Why, he is gone.

Y. Mor. Madam, how fares your grace?

Queen. Ah, Mortimer! now breaks the king's hate forth,

And he confesseth that he loves me not.

Y. Mor. Cry quittance, madam, then; and love not him.

Queen. No, rather will I die a thousand deaths:

And yet I love in vain—he'll ne'er love me.

Lan. Fear ye not, madam; now his minion's gone,

His wanton humour will be quickly left.
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