After The Reich - Giles MacDonogh
After The Reich - Giles MacDonogh
Praise
Title Page
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Preface
Introduction
PART I - Chaos
Chapter 1 - The Fall of Vienna
Chapter 2 - Wild Times: A Picture of Liberated Central Europe in 1945
Liberation from the East
Liberation from the West
Disputed Areas
Werewolves
Illustrious Bones
Chapter 3 - Berlin
The Soviets in the Saddle
Subsistence
The Arrival of the Western Allies
The Honeymoon is Over
Autumn 1945
Spring 1946
Chapter 4 - Expulsions from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia
Beneš’s Return
Revenge
Prague
Landskron
Brno Death March
Iglau and Kladno
The American Zone
Freudenthal, Freiwaldau and Bilin
Brüx, Saaz, Komotau, Aussig and Tetschen
Theresienstadt
Pankrác
Torture
Expulsions
Chapter 5 - Home to the Reich! Recovered Territories in the Prussian
East
Country Life
Working for the Poles
Rural Silesia
Treks
Transit Camps
Home to the Reich
Conclusion
Notes
Further Reading
Index
Copyright Page
OceanofPDF.com
PRAISE FOR AFTER THE REICH
“In After the Reich, Giles MacDonogh, a British author of several books
about German history, chronicles the final weeks of the war and the
occupation that followed. His ambitious mission: to offer a comprehensive,
unsparing account of what happened to the German people when the tables
were turned. MacDonogh works to assemble a massive indictment of the
victors, and his array of detail and individual stories is both impressive and
exhausting.”
—Washington Post Book World
“In his meticulously researched book After the Reich, British-born Giles
MacDonogh, an expert in German history, offers a different view of this
‘noble’ war’s aftermath. With unsparing detail and ample documentation,
he chronicles the events after the victory in Europe in May 1945 to the
Berlin airlift four years later, and exposes the slippery slope of the moral
high ground many of us believed the Allies possessed during those years. . .
. One cannot read After the Reich without thinking of the phrase ‘winning
the war but losing the peace’ as the book draws a line from the occupation
directly to the division of Berlin and the Cold War that gripped much of the
world and informed foreign relations for the next 60 years. Scars across
Europe from the post-World War II era remain, and MacDonogh has picked
the scab at a time of modern war and occupation when, perhaps, the world
most needs to examine an old wound.”
—Boston Globe
“Mr. MacDonogh has given readers the history of an era all too often
ignored.”
—Contemporary Review
“Throughout time it has been the victor who has written history, but
here historian MacDonogh examines the darker side of the Allied
occupation of defeated Germany. . . . Of interest to students of modern
Europe, complementing W. G. Sebald’s On the Natural History of
Destruction (2003) and other studies of history from the point of view of
the vanquished.”
—Kirkus Reviews
OceanofPDF.com
For Joseph Maximilian Cornelius MacDonogh
born 8 December 2002
OceanofPDF.com
The author and publishers would like to thank the following for
permission to reproduce illustrations: Plates 1, 2, 8, 21, 22 and 29, Herder-
Institut Marburg, Bildarchiv; 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 15, Sudetendeutsches Archiv;
11, 12, 13 and 14, Oberhausmuseum, Passau; 19, Sebastian Cody; 23, 24
and 26, Private Collection; 25, Provost and Fellows of Eton College; 27,
Bob McCreery; 28, Dennis Sewell; 29, Volkswagen AG; 30, akg-
images/Tony Vaccaro. Plates 9 and 10 are from the author’s collection;
plates 16, 17 and 18 are taken from Josef Schöner, Wiener Tagebuch
1944/1945, edited by Eva-Marie Csáky, Franz Matscher and Gerald
Stourzh, and reproduced with permission. Every effort has been made to
clear permissions. If permission has not been granted please contact the
publisher who will include a credit in subsequent printings and editions.
OceanofPDF.com
Preface
This book is about the experience of the Germans in defeat. It is about
the occupation imposed on them following the criminal campaigns of Adolf
Hitler. To some extent it is a study in resignation, their acceptance of any
form of indignity in the knowledge of the great wrongs perpetrated by the
National Socialist state. Not all of these Germans were involved in these
crimes, by any means, but with few exceptions they recognised that their
suffering was an inevitable result of them. I make no excuses for the crimes
the Nazis committed, nor do I doubt for one moment the terrible desire for
revenge that they aroused.
I have tried as much as possible to use individual accounts to give the
flavour of the time. Many of these are by women. There is an obvious
reason for this: there were not many men left. Those who survived did so in
a variety of places, from internment camps to Soviet mines. The subject is
so vast that I have had to use a broad brush. Some elements are immensely
well covered, such as the American Zone and the beginnings of the Cold
War. It was the start of the American century and the end of isolation, after
all. Other parts of the story are hardly told: the French occupation, for
example. Because I wished to give the tenor of everyday life at the time, I
have divided the book into four parts: the first looks at the chaos that
followed the end of the war within the lands that were then Germany, and
the punitive stance of the Allies; the second looks at the day-to-day
existence of the Germans and Austrians; the third examines crime and
punishment; and the fourth introduces the chronology and records the major
political developments from Potsdam to the foundation of the two German
republics. The Austrian State Treaty lies outside the scope of this book, as it
did not occur until 1955.
My ‘Germans’ are the German-speaking peoples as they are massed in
central Europe. I have therefore included Austria, which called itself
‘German Austria’ until it was annexed in 1938, and subsequently became
part of the Greater German Reich. I mention the South Tyrol in Italy,
because Austrians saw that as part of their lands, as well as other satellites
in Yugoslavia, for instance. I have also examined the plight of the so-called
‘ethnic’ Germans who were expelled, mostly from Czechoslovakia, but also
from Hungary and Romania. Elsewhere ‘Germany’ is defined by its 1937
borders, and I have referred to towns and villages by the names Germans
would have known. Where possible I have included the Polish or Czech
names too.
Although it was my first intention to study the German-speaking
peoples as they suffered their chastisements on the ground, I soon realised
that it was impossible to make any sense of what was happening without
reference to what was taking place on Mount Olympus: the Allied
command HQs and the political forces behind them. I had to travel de haut
en bas and vice versa - to examine the effect of the occupation on the
Germans, but also to look upstairs at what the Olympians were doing, and
see what they had in store. On the other hand I have always tried to focus
on Germans, not on the Allies.
The book is the fruit of my long acquaintance with both Germany and
Austria. My interest began during a short stay in Cologne in my mid-teens
and a meeting with one of the two modern German novelists whose
writings have most coloured this book. I was a guest of the Böll family and
one afternoon the later Nobel Prize winner Heinrich Böll came to tea. He
introduced me to Underberg, the viciously powerful bitters, and I can still
feel the wave of fire travelling up from my stomach to my cheeks. We
argued about Irish Republicanism, which he favoured. It wasn’t until much
later that I began to respect his books, and admire the picture of the returned
soldier in those early stories and novels.
I met Ernst Jünger many years later, through my friend the eccentric
hotelier Andreas Kleber, who was then still in possession of his family
hotel, the Kleber Post in Saulgau in Württemberg (incidentally one of the
first venues for the writers’ group Gruppe 47). One night I had dinner with
Jünger there and the two of us spoke to ZDF television about the meaning
of Prussia. Jünger was a writer from the generation before Böll, but outlived
the younger man by decades. He was a mere ninety-seven when I met him
and had another six years to live. Again conversation turned to drink: the
bottle of Pommard he consumed with his wife every night (he had two-
thirds of it, he confessed), and his real love - Châteauneuf-du-Pape.
He became more serious when he complained that he could not wear his
Pour le Mérite medal, which he had won in the Great War, when he had
been left for dead on the field of battle. He was, I think, the last surviving
military holder of the medal. The Allies had swiftly banned the wearing of
decorations, and the Federal Republic has followed suit. War could not be
officially celebrated, and that went for acts of heroism too. I recalled the
First World War memorial in the little park in Berlin-Friedenau where I had
stayed with friends. The inscription had been chipped off: in Germany such
things were taboo, while in Britain war memorials were still placed at the
focal point of any town or hamlet. In Germany there were no more heroes.
The Germans had lost the right to them.
Friends of mine, even published historians, have often told me that the
Germans ‘deserved what they got’ in 1945: it was a just punishment for
their behaviour in occupied lands and for the treatment of the Jews at home.
This book is not intended to excuse the Germans, but it does not hesitate to
expose the victorious Allies in their treatment of the enemy at the peace, for
in most cases it was not the criminals who were raped, starved, tortured or
bludgeoned to death but women, children and old men. What I record and
sometimes call into question here is the way that many people were allowed
to exact that revenge by military commanders, even by government
ministers; and that when they did so they often killed the innocent, not the
guilty. The real murderers all too often died in their beds.
It is true that some of the old men and a lot of the women had voted for
Hitler, but it should be recalled once again that he never achieved more than
37.4 per cent of the vote in a free election, and in the last one he was down
to 33.1 per cent.1 That meant that, even at his most popular, 62.6 per cent of
the German electorate were unmoved by his programme. Of course, at that
point it did not propose the slaughter of the European Jews (he never made
any public statement on this subject other than dark allusions that have
become easier to read in retrospect); nor did it mention his desire to
confront Soviet Russia and enslave the Slavs; nor did it hint that he would
eventually bring the roof down on the German house and kill a large
number of its inmates. It is possible that he might have secured more votes
that way, but I think not. To make all Germans responsible for the relatively
docile Hitler of 1933 is to apply the Allied weapon of collective guilt.
Collective guilt makes them all responsible: women, old men and children,
even newborn babies - they were German and they could also be
slaughtered or starved to death. Indeed, the Soviet propagandist Ilya
Ehrenburg exhorted the Red Army not to save ‘the child in its mother’s
womb’.2
There were many Russians, Poles and Czechs who were not ashamed to
feel that way in the heady days of liberation. Some of them were as young
as fifteen at the time they joined ad hoc police squads and they may still be
alive today and healthy; but I think few of them would now own up to the
acts of terrible violence they committed.
If children are included in collective guilt, this could be accepted on the
basis that they were going to grow up to be Germans and therefore possibly
Nazis. Then, of course, we need to determine at what age a child becomes a
German, and can be blamed for the crimes of his country. It is clearly not
twenty-one (when many are already in the army), or eighteen (when they
were likely to have been called up, and were often among the bravest and
most ruthless fighters), or sixteen (when they had already been drafted into
anti-aircraft units or, like Günter Grass, about to be forced into the SS), or
indeed younger (Hitler Youth boys as young as twelve distinguished
themselves in the Battle of Berlin). Maybe in an indoctrinated society a cut-
off point for guilt needs to be imposed at seven, and, if so, a date needs to
be fixed when the child had attained that age. Was it 1933 or 1945 (twelve
years after the last free election)?
Of course the real reason why the Allies imposed the idea of collective
guilt was that it was a useful way of depriving the Germans of rights and
national sovereignty. Once their guilt was assumed, they could be punished.
They were to be at the mercy of the Allies until their conquerors had
decided what to do with them, and in the meantime they could not protest
about their treatment.
Then there is the issue of tit-for-tat. The Anglo-Americans wisely
fought shy of exacting reparations because they realised that they would
then have to pay to feed the Germans; and that if they left the Germans an
industrial base they might be able to feed themselves. The tit-for-tat school
of retribution and revenge goes back a long, long way. Historically minded
Germans might blame the French for the Thirty Years War (which caused
bloodshed on a similar scale to the Great War) or for the territorial
ambitions of Louis XIV. More might recall the Napoleonic invasion of
Germany and the occupation of Prussia. Bismarck was famously intractable
in 1871 when the French demanded mercy, saying there was not a tree in
his country that did not bear the scars of the French years. Then the
jackboot was on the other foot. On each occasion there were territorial
cessions and crippling reparations to pay. Someone needed to cry halt. But
the business surfaced again at Versailles in 1919, and there was the same
punitive peace. After the Second World War most wise men understood that
a peace treaty would have been a farce. It was left to what Churchill called
‘our consciences to civilisation’ to determine how the enemy was to be
treated.
Post-war Germany is a problem that has taxed me for years and it is
hard to know now who has helped me with this particular book. Some,
perhaps many of them, are already dead. Some names stand out in my
mind, others were often nameless people I met on my travels, and who
unburdened themselves over a late-night drink, or a second glass at
lunchtime.
In London my friends Karl-Heinz and Angela Bohrer have been
constant in their encouragement over the years. Karl-Heinz was kind
enough to give me an extensive interview on his childhood in post-war
Germany. Angela long ago gave me a copy of her mother Charlotte von der
Schulenburg’s privately printed memoirs. I also learned much from the
writings of her aunt, Tisa von der Schulenburg, and from my meetings with
her. My neighbour in Kentish Town Nick Jacobs, owner of the German-
specialist publisher Libris, was kind enough to lend books and copy
interesting articles. In Oxford I thank Sudhir Hazareesingh; Robert Gildea
for providing me with some suggestions for reading on the French
occupation of Germany; and Blair Worden for explaining the role of Hugh
Trevor-Roper.
Germany provides me with many memories and much assistance, from
my friend Ursula Heinzelmann in Berlin; Gertrud Loewe; Eva Raps in
Wiesbaden; and in the wine country growers told me of their experiences of
the immediate post-war years. The late Prince Franz von Sayn-Wittgenstein
in Munich sent me his privately printed memoirs; Daria Fürstin von Thurn
und Taxis the unpublished memoirs of her uncle Willy; and Christiane von
Maasburg gave me permission to quote from the Magisterarbeit she wrote
on Nikolaus von Maasburg. A kind lady in Hildesheim recounted harrowing
details of the trek she undertook from Pomerania as a child of six; the
retired border guard Captain Schmidt in Coburg told me no less moving
stories of his childhood in Silesia; an anonymous man in Malbork, Poland,
briefly informed me of how he evaded the Polish authorities after the war;
an ethnic German woman in Opolne offered to pray for me, if I gave her ten
marks; a former Danzig policeman I met in Titisee-Neustadt told me about
his time in an American camp in Passau, surrounded by members of the
French Division Charlemagne.
In Vienna, enormous thanks are due above all to my friends Christopher
Wentworth-Stanley and Sebastian Cody. Christopher found me literature on
post-war Austria and read a part of the manuscript, as did Ambassador
Erwin Matsch. Sebastian was kind enough to read and comment on a
number of chapters. Johannes Popper von Podhragy sent me articles from
his late father’s archive. Dr Wolfgang Mueller provided me with much help
and a useful book list. On Lake Bled, Janez Fajfar showed me the
wonderful mural in the hotel he has run for decades in the palace where Tito
and Stalin fell out in 1947. In Prague I was counselled by Dr Anna Bryson
and in Sofia by my old friend Professor Evgeni Dainov.
I am also grateful to all those who helped locate or donated pictures:
John Aycoth in Washington, Sebastian Cody and Christopher Wentworth-
Stanley in Vienna, Lady Antonia Fraser, Livia Gollancz and Dennis Sewell
in London, Manfred Pranghofer and Rudi Müller of the Oberhaus Museum
in Passau, Bob McCreery, Klaus Mohr of the Sudetendeutsches Archiv in
Munich, Bengt von zur Mühlen of Chronos Films in Berlin, Eva Reinhold-
Weisz of Böhlau Verlag in Vienna, Elisabeth Ruge of the Berlin Verlag in
Berlin, Thomas Urban of the Herder Institut in Marburg, Mrs C. Skinner at
Eton College, Manfred Grieger and Ulrike Gutzmann at Volkswagen in
Vienna.
My thanks are due to the staffs of the British Library and the German
Historical Institute. At John Murray I am grateful to my editor Roland
Philipps, to Caro Westmore and Rowan Yapp, to Douglas Matthews, for
making me yet another exemplary index; and to Peter James, whose
demanding questions sent me back to my books over and over again.
I would also like to thank my family for their patience, especially in the
last days when my body was over-charged with adrenalin and I was able to
think and talk of little else.
Giles MacDonogh
London, October 2006
OceanofPDF.com
Chronology
The war had been the bloodiest yet, particularly for civilians. Laying
aside some three million dead German soldiers, by 7 May 1945 at least 1.8
million German civilians had perished and 3.6 million homes had been
destroyed (20 per cent of the total), leaving 7.5 million homeless; and the
bloodshed was going to continue for a lot longer. As many as 16.5 million
Germans were to be driven from their homes. Of these some two and a
quarter million would die during the expulsions from the south and east.1a
It was called die Stunde null (Zero Hour), though it was nothing of the
kind. Germany was wrecked from top to bottom, but memories were still
acute, the country had a past, and a large body of people who had supported
the ancien régime needed to be assessed and rendered harmless. As it was,
like Weimar, many of them were carried over into the new post-Nazi
world.2 There were simply too many of them, and most had lost their faith
in Hitler when his armies were defeated at Stalingrad.
In May 1945 National Socialism was as good as dead. Apart from a few
desperate ideologists, as anxious to save their skins as defend their creed,
the vast majority of Germans had already come to the conclusion that it had
been founded on a terrible fallacy. Defeat was one thing, but, as the
dramatist Carl Zuckmayer pointed out a few years after the end of the
conflict, Germans - even those in the Hitler Youth and the Waffen-SS - were
already conscious of the country’s ‘moral bankruptcy’. The defeated
Germans surprised their conquerors by their docility. They offered next to
no resistance to them. They did what they were told. Of the promised
Werewolves - Nazi guerrillas trained to fight in occupied territory - there
was virtually no sign.
To some extent Germans believed the Allied propaganda: the Russians,
the Americans, the British and the French had come to ‘liberate’ them. The
Allies may have freed the Germans of their National Socialist shackles, but
they did a lot of other things to them first. The novelist and psychiatrist
Alfred Döblin records a conversation he had with a well-brought-up girl in
the Black Forest. ‘We received the Allies with so much joy’, she told
Döblin, ‘as liberators. And in the first week everything made us happy. The
Allies were so lucky with us. Then they started requisitioning rooms, hotels,
flats; we could take nothing with us. That took the wind out of our sails.’
Döblin told her that the war wasn’t over yet. She asked him when it would
be concluded. He said: ‘When the ruins are knocked down and the rubble
cleared away, and when new houses have been built where everyone can
have a home and they can come out of their shelters and sheds. When the
economy has taken off once more, when politics are stable again. Fräulein
E., you are young. You will live to see the peace. Later, when you look back
on the present time, you will be astonished that you were young enough to
believe that it was peace.’3
For some Germans defeat was what they were waiting for: it fulfilled
their most eager hopes. In his dark first novel, Kreuz ohne Liebe, written in
the years immediately following German defeat, Heinrich Böll explores the
feelings of an anti-Nazi who has been fighting in the army from day one.
Christoph Bachem’s brother has been shot. He is a Nazi who repents in the
end and saves Christoph’s life. Christoph’s best friend has spent the war in a
concentration camp, a victim of the same brother. Christoph enjoys a brief
sojourn with his wife, Cornelia, before losing her for good after deserting
and fleeing to the west. He indulges his feelings of utter nihilism. ‘No,’ he
said tiredly, ‘I want no more. It is horrible to have been a soldier in a war
for six years and always to have had to wish that it would be lost; to see the
collapse, and at the same time to know that whatever power succeeds it, and
kicks the daylights out of the corpse of this state, will quite probably be
equally diabolic; the devil possesses all the power in this world, and a
change of power is only a change of rank among devils, that I believe for
certain.’b Bachem has no faith in the Allies either. As he tells Cornelia,
Do you believe, then, that these people who are about to conquer us
with their rubber soles and tins of Spam, will ever understand what we have
suffered? Do you believe they will understand what it feels like to be
showered with their bombs and shells and at the same time to be sullied by
this diabolic state; what it means to be crushed between these two mill-
stones? They simply cannot have suffered as much as us, and since Christ’s
death there has been a hierarchy of suffering in which we will remain the
victors, without the world ever learning or understanding what it was we
felt.4
The Allies may have chosen to style themselves as ‘liberators’ but they
came in hate. In the cases of the Russians, French, Poles and Czechs, this
was understandable. To be occupied is to be violated, even when it is not
coupled with regular atrocities. The atrocities committed by the SS and the
Wehrmacht in Poland and Russia were horrendous, and they were not
lacking in France and Czechoslovakia either. It is hardly surprising that
there were acts of revenge. Any SS man found in the east was liable to be
subjected to the most fabulous torture and death. Such things we may
understand, but surely never condone.
As the Soviets chose to introduce their own brand of ideology along the
way, controlled ‘revolutions’ were carried out too, by the ‘Lublin’ Poles
(those patronised by Moscow rather than the West) and the Czechs. The
middle and upper classes were ruthlessly dispossessed. Their homes were
sequestered, while they themselves were imprisoned, tortured and in many
cases killed. In the Prussian east the old, Junker squirearchy was wiped out
without mercy.
The French worked the hatred out of their systems in a few acts of
grisly violence. Demonstrations of gross brutality were comparatively rare
in the British army. For a few years Germany became another colony,
dealing with the Germans a burden placed on the Christian white man. It
was like India all over again. The Americans, however, saw it differently:
although both the British and the Americans used films and photographs of
the camps to encourage their soldiers to be hard-hearted and to chastise
Germans, it seems to have had more effect on American GIs, who took their
brief that much more seriously - that is, until the politicians decided the
German people were to be wooed. There was a PR war to win now, against
the new enemy, the Soviet Union.
With the exception of the death camps in Poland, which had already
been closed and blown up by the Germans, all the most infamous
concentration camps together with work camps were put back to use by the
Allies: Auschwitz-Birkenau,5 Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald for the
Russians; Dachau for the Americans and Bergen-Belsen for the British, not
to mention the grisly Ebensee in the Salzkammergut, where the Americans
kept 44,000 SS men. This strikes us as disgusting now, but there were
obvious logistical reasons for using them, together with an understandable
temptation to ‘rub the Germans’ noses in their own mess’. Central Europe
was teeming with homeless DPs (displaced persons) who were in the
process of resettlement after ethnic cleansing. Millions of POWs were also
held in camps. In the east they were earmarked for work details and they
needed to be housed. Some were to be allotted a more sinister fate. They
too needed to be put in a secure place until their destiny was decided.
While the fate of the Jews shocked the British and the Americans and -
particularly in the case of the Americans - sharpened their attitudes towards
the conquered nation, the Soviet authorities made little of it. The
anonymous author of A Woman in Berlin, for example, was surprised: ‘no
Russian has so far reproached me for the German persecution of the Jews’.6
When the Allies invaded Germany in the first half of 1945, they came
bearing war aims and plans. They had gone to war because they had been
provoked by the Axis powers. Now the desire was to crush Germany and its
allies. ‘Their effort to emerge victorious included neither an aim to destroy
any segment of the German population nor a plan to save any part of
Germany’s victims,’ one historian has written. ‘The post-war punishment of
perpetrators was largely a consequence of afterthoughts. The liberation of
the survivors was almost entirely a by-product of victory. The Allies could
harmonise with their war effort all sorts of denunciations of the Germans,
but there was no disposition to deviate from military goals for the
deliverance of the Jews. In that sense the destruction of the Jews presented
itself as a problem with which the Allies could not effectively deal.’7
The Allies needed to win first, before they could even think about how
they would clear up the mess. The first war aim was to establish security,
which the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 had singularly failed to do. At first
there were only the British. When Churchill came to power in 1940
‘appeasement’ was already a dirty word. ‘Vansittartism’, which saw the
Germans as a tribe of incorrigible louts from the time of Tacitus to the
present day, had become the dominant thinking in governing circles. It was
developed by the diplomat Lord Vansittart, who spent part of the war giving
radio broadcasts which examined different Germans in turn, pointing out
how nasty they all were. Vansittartism inspired historians to search archives
for further evidence of the deep-seated evilness of the Germans. To some
extent it is still alive today.8
The first Vansittartite directive to emerge from Whitehall was ‘absolute
silence’. Officially, at least, Her Majesty’s Government would not talk to
Germans. With time ‘absolute silence’ gave way to ‘unconditional
surrender’. There was to be no negotiated peace this time. The opposite
school was that of the historian E. H. Carr, who thought that a civilised
Germany was merely a question of finding the right man. In Britain’s first
studies for a post-war Germany there was discussion of reparations:
Germany would thereby be deprived of the means to make war. From the
summer of 1943 the task of planning the occupation was handed over to
Clement Attlee, who would become one of the ‘Big Three’ at the Potsdam
Conference9 when the Conservatives lost the July 1945 election.
The Western Allies tended to agree with Robert Vansittart that the
Second War had been largely caused by the perpetrators of the First, and
that meant Prussia. It was a long time before they came to terms with the
idea of Nazism as a non-Prussian movement. The Atlantic Charter of 14
April 1941 had a little flavour of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points
twenty-three years before. An expression of the principles on which the
peace was to be based, it was drawn up by Churchill and amended by
Roosevelt. The American president added the passages condemning
aggressive war and calling for German disarmament.10 It was followed by
the Declaration of the United Nations signed by twenty-six governments on
1 January 1942, an agreement to uphold the Atlantic Charter.
The first meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt to discuss war aims
was held in Newfoundland in August 1941. Churchill was more pragmatic
than Roosevelt; the American leader was much more hostile to the
Germans. He had been partially educated in Germany and he had come
home with strongly held anti-German views. He had no desire to meet a
member of the German resistance who came to see him at the beginning of
the war.11 The two leaders decided that there would be no annexations after
the successful campaign, and no territorial changes would be effected that
did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
The high-minded principles expressed at that time formed the basis for the
Atlantic Charter - Pax Americana. Future wars would be prevented by
stopping Germany from disturbing the peace. Germany was to be
demilitarised, denazified and made to restore the land it had poached from
its neighbours.12
German and Austrian émigrés played an important role in shaping
American thinking after 1941. Many of them worked in the Research and
Analysis Branch (R & A) of Military Intelligence (OSS). Prominent were
the historians Hajo Holborn and Felix Gilbert, the politicologues Otto
Kirchheimer, John Herz and Franz Leopold Neumann and the philosopher
Herbert Marcuse. The most important of them was Franz Neumann, the
author of Behemoth: The Structure and Practise of National Socialism.
Neumann argued for a radical reconstruction of Germany to avoid repeats
of Hitler’s coming to power. One key plank to his doctrine was the
establishment of some sort of European Union. The traditional Germany
was to be removed by a social revolution.13 There was only a brief window
when the Western Allies tried to woo the Jews. This corresponded to the
time of the first Nuremberg trials. When East and West fell out for good, the
Allies - the West in particular - were prepared to sweep a good deal under
the carpet in order to groom their new German ally and relieve themselves
of the unpleasant business of censuring its people for their past conduct.
The Allies had nonetheless been influenced in their designs by a
sizeable body of literature penned by exiles. Books by Hermann
Rauschning and Konrad Heiden, and Sebastian Haffner’s Germany - Jekyll
& Hyde, instructed the Allies on how to deal with a post-Nazi Germany.
The bacillus (to borrow a word from the Nazis themselves) had to be wiped
out completely. Haffner wanted to see Germany broken up into small states,
a much more extreme solution than the eventual Federal Republic, which
created autonomous regions. For the British the Prussians were still the
enemy. Churchill, for one, wished to see the south Germans more mildly
treated than the ‘Prussians’ in the north: Nazy tyranny and Prussian
militarism ‘must be absolutely destroyed’.14
By 1943 the Allies knew they were going to win. Stalingrad and the
subsequent collapse of Hitler’s Russian offensive made that abundantly
clear. The Allies could now sit down and decide what they were going to do
with Germany. The military plan was enshrined in Operation Eclipse. In the
winter of 1943 the European Advisory Commission or EAC met to work
out how Germany would be administered. It met again on 18 February
1944, and by this time the cake had been properly portioned out: Soviet
Russia was to receive 40 per cent of Germany’s land mass, 36 per cent of its
population and 33 per cent of its productive capacity.c Britain and America
took the remainder. Likewise Berlin was to be divided in three.
Stalingrad engendered a new mood among the Allies. Both the
Americans and the British were smitten with Stalin and the great progress
he was making. The Americans now saw themselves carving up the world
with the Soviet Union and were worried that the Russians would not
approve of their close relations with the British and their ideologically
unacceptable empire. Churchill was worried - and continued to be worried
even after victory - that the Americans would not stay in Europe and would
leave him to face the Russians across the ideological divide.15 At the
Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the Allies decided that Germany
was to surrender ‘unconditionally’. What that meant Churchill explained to
the House of Commons on 22 February 1944. The Allies would not stain
their ‘victorious army by inhumanity’: ‘unconditional surrender means the
victors have a free hand . . . If we are bound, we are bound by our own
consciences to civilisation.’16 What else that meant was not really clear to
anyone, but it gave Churchill room for manoeuvre.
The American who was urging the greatest retribution against the
Germans was Roosevelt’s treasury secretary, Henry Morgenthau - although
the text of his plan was largely written by his assistant Harry Dexter White.d
Morgenthau was ‘touched by atrocities against the Jewish race’.17 His idea
was a ‘peace of punishment’ which involved splitting the country into four
states that would be almost entirely agrarian. Austria was to be cut in two.
The secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, thought this idea of
‘pastoralisation’ unnecessarily harsh, but ‘the President’s vindictiveness
kept the Treasury proposal alive’. At that time Roosevelt was still keen to
see the United States and Soviet Russia rule the world together.18
Germany was to be reformed by the ‘four Ds’: decentralisation,
demilitarisation, denazification and democracy. The US War Department’s
Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was responsible for post-war planning. The
army also liked the Morgenthau Plan as it promoted the sort of chaos that
suited their strategic aims: it was therefore at the heart of the crucial US
Joint Chiefs of Staff document JCS 1067. Both Roosevelt and Churchill had
their moments of flirtation with the draconian plan. In August 1944
Roosevelt for one had lost patience with the Germans. ‘The German people
should be taught their responsibility for the war and for a long time they
should have only soup for breakfast, soup for lunch and soup for dinner.’
His then secretary for mobilisation, James Byrnes, added: ‘It did not sound
like President Roosevelt. He was very angry.’19
In these moments Churchill played along. Roosevelt’s Morgenthau
mood reached its height at the Quebec Conference in August 1943, when he
expressed his approval for an eliminatory ‘Carthaginian Peace’. At the time
he pretended that he only wanted to shore up Britain; to ‘keep Britain from
going into complete bankruptcy at the end of the war’. The Ruhr was going
to give Britain the means to survive.20
At Teheran (28 November to 1 December 1943) Britain agreed to a
change in Poland’s eastern borders. Later Churchill would make a great
play of the fact that he had tried his best for Poland, but he gave himself
away in the House of Commons on 27 February 1945 when he offered
British citizenship to any Poles who did not wish to return to their country.
He knew that they were not to regain their liberty, or even all their territory.
Roosevelt was more cautious about accepting Stalin’s demands for a
ratification of the treaty signed with Hitler: there were elections coming up
and there were lots of Polish Americans who might object. He didn’t like
the idea of Stalin annexing the Baltic States either.21
Roosevelt began to backtrack about the Morgenthau Plan after the
meeting in Quebec. It was not Morgenthau but the cooler Byrnes who
accompanied him to the Yalta Conference from 5 to 11 February 1945. By
that time the idea of splitting Germany up into autonomous regions was no
longer so popular. The US was for a federal system. At the Teheran
Conference the call had been for five pieces; by the time the leaders met in
Moscow, they were down to two. Roosevelt’s vice-president and successor
Harry Truman was not at all keen on the Morgenthau Plan, which he
branded ‘an act of revenge’. ‘My aim is a unified Germany with a
centralised government in Berlin.’ Morgenthau himself was rather miffed.22
Stalin was also a supporter of the Morgenthau Plan, but the noises he
put out to the West altered several times: at Teheran he was in favour of a
divided Germany; at Yalta he wanted unity, but Allied zones of occupation;
at Potsdam he argued for a single economic unit. He feared that the German
beast would rise again and seek revenge if it were not well and truly slain.
He was also keen to satisfy Russian public opinion by granting a ‘day of
judgment’, when the Germans would feel the full weight of their
conquerors’ fury. The West was afraid that he meant ultimately to extend
communism to the Rhine, or even the Atlantic, but if he was to export it to
central and western Europe he would need support on the ground: the
punishment of the Germans could not go on for too long, as he needed to
have them on his side.23 Stalin also feared the West. He believed that Britain
and America were planning to make a separate peace with the Germans and
would use the German army to attack him. It was only when the Americans
fought the bloody campaign in the Ardennes, which ended in January 1945,
that he was satisfied that the West would not sign a separate peace.24
France had yet to join the top table and for the time being French goals
were subtly different. When the EAC met in February, France was still
occupied by the Germans. The French nonetheless drew up a list of war
aims: German surrender, withdrawal from occupied territory, the
destruction of the Wehrmacht, Allied occupation of Germany, punishment
of war criminals and large-scale reparations, particularly in German coal
and coke.25 There was not much new from Clemenceau at Versailles. This
changed a little at the liberation. Now France’s chief concern was its
recognition as a great power. It was quick to field an army to that effect. Its
wartime leader in exile, Charles de Gaulle, wanted to grab what he could
while the going was good.
The Soviets’ aims have been the subject of prolonged discussion, as
their apparent desire to inflict communism on the whole of mainland
Europe was the reason for the Cold War. What documentary evidence there
is has been examined since the end of that war by - among others - Vojtech
Mastny. We know, for example, that the plans were drawn up by a team
composed of Maisky, Litvinov and Voroshilov. Assistant foreign minister
Maisky was responsible for Germany and reparations, while Litvinov
handled peace treaties and Voroshilov was in charge of military planning.
According to Mastny, Stalin was flexible and pragmatic, ‘lest he ask for too
much, or too little’.26 Though there was no master-plan, there were
minimum war aims: Stalin wanted to retain Russia’s western borders as
established by the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. That meant hanging on to
Poland east of the Bug, as well as the Baltic States; he wanted no repetition
of the small power blocs that had dominated eastern central European
politics in the 1930s. The Soviet Union was to be the sole military great
power in mainland Europe - this included France and Italy - a policy that
caused friction with Tito, who aspired to that position.
Stalin also wanted to see the establishment of strong communist parties
in all the lands occupied by his armies and was keen for these parties to
play important roles and to be active. On the other hand they were not to
bring about revolutions and they were not to follow the Soviet model. He
told Maurice Thorez, the French communist leader, that he was to find
friends. So far as Germany was concerned, Stalin was open on all issues but
the Polish one: he wanted to compensate the Poles with German land. He
also sought to avoid recreating a German ‘pressure-cooker’ by hemming the
country in with antipathetic neighbours. However, he was anxious not to
breed a lasting desire for revenge. He wanted reparations. He told Maisky
to take as much out of Germany as he could without starving its people.27 It
was obviously also to be deprived of its military might, but Stalin was
indifferent to the form of regime: multi-party democracy or communist
party.
In his relations with the Western Allies, Stalin sought a co-operative
Realpolitik to allow for Germany’s reconstruction. Europe was to be carved
into two interest blocs controlled by the Soviet Union and Britain. Russia
would extend its sphere to include Sweden and Turkey, whereas Britain
would take in all of western Europe to the Rhine as well as Greece. At the
centre would lie a neutral zone made up of Germany, Austria, Italy,
Denmark and Norway. Stalin told German exiles in Moscow that he had
opposed the repackaging of Germany in small states. Even so, he wanted to
exploit central Europe for his arms programme. The Cold War was
definitely not desired by the Soviet leader, although his distrustful and
antagonistic nature may have contributed to worsening relations. The Soviet
consolidation of eastern Europe was in response to the Marshall Plan,
America’s programme of economic aid launched in 1947.28
The reduction of Germany to a number of states was another project
that failed to come to fruition after the First World War. Splitting Germany
up into manageable units had been advocated by Haffner, as already noted.
The French were keen to wrest away the western regions. On 12 August
1944 de Gaulle proposed an indefinite occupation of ‘Rhenania’, expressing
a policy that had been at the heart of French ambitions in central Europe
since the Thirty Years War. He reiterated his determination in January 1946:
‘we hold on to the Rhine’.29 There should be no return to a centralised
Reich. The Russians were less keen on breaking up Germany, and were
unimpressed by de Gaulle’s projects for ‘Rhenania’, despite the French
pandering to them by advocating the cession of German regions east of the
Oder to the Poles and the Russians.30 In October 1944 de Gaulle pushed for
a separate zone of occupation for France. He would achieve ‘Rhenania’ by
hook or by crook. He demanded the Rhineland north of Alsace, the Saar
and the west bank of the Rhine as far as Cologne, as well as the Palatinate,
Baden and all the Hesses. The British pledged him part of their zone.31
De Gaulle rejected Morgenthau’s proposal to ‘pastoralise’ Germany. He
felt it would create an economic crisis, and besides France needed the
produce of German industry. He also had to reckon with a French desire for
revenge. A poll taken early in 1945 showed that 76 per cent of the French
wanted Germany split up; 59 per cent wanted a proportion of all Germans
deported; 80 per cent supported General Leclerc’s proposal to shoot five
Germans for any attack on French army personnel; two-thirds were in
favour of annexing the Saar; 87 per cent thought the Soviets would be able
to punish the Germans properly; while only 9 per cent had any confidence
in the Americans.32 De Gaulle was still wrestling with proposals for massive
changes to the shape of Germany and, if needs be, shifting huge numbers of
Germans. Silesia was to be given to the Poles, while the Rhineland and
Westphalia would be administered by the Allies. Originally he thought that
the fifteen million Germans living in the latter could be moved out, but then
decided that the project would be ‘too grandiose’.33
There was a an element of bella figura too. As Georges Bidault, the
head of the resistance organisation, put it, the French had to play a major
role in the war after the liberation, otherwise ‘the Germans will not look on
them as conquerors’.34 Unfortunately the Americans, Roosevelt in
particular, were unwilling to equip the French army to play that major role.
At the end of 1944, de Gaulle tried his hand in Moscow. Stalin managed to
get de Gaulle to recognise his ‘Lublin’ Poles over the London government
in exile as the price for a Franco-Soviet treaty.
The Allied zones were ratified at Yalta in February 1945. France was
once again excluded. Russia was making strides towards winning the war.
Its troops were poised to cross the Oder while the Western Allies had yet to
cross the Rhine. Churchill argued for including the French among the
victorious powers. Stalin reluctantly agreed. He did not think the French
had pulled their weight and in 1940 they had let the Germans in. France
might have a zone, ‘but only as a kindness and not because she is entitled to
it’.35 Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins to Paris to sugar the pill:36 the French
were to have a small zone in the west, carved out of the British and
American portions. An Allied Control Council was to be set up to deal with
questions affecting all four zones. It would meet in Berlin.
In April 1945 the Western Allies had second thoughts. The Americans
had pushed far into Saxony, which had been allotted to the Soviets; and the
British had taken a sizeable chunk of Mecklenburg. Some people were
hoping that the Western Allies would push on, take Berlin and turn on
Soviet Russia. Chief among these was Hitler himself, and his propaganda
minister, Goebbels. As it was, the British and Americans did not turn on
their Russian ally - possibly because Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels were so
anxious for them to do so; but they did hang on to their booty for a while,
and Churchill for one was anxious to use it as a counter for Soviet
assurances about their territorial acquisitions. The new US president -
Roosevelt died that April - Harry Truman would not listen, however, and
the Russians moved into Mecklenburg and Saxony without providing
satisfactory assurances about Germany’s borders or the status of Berlin.
Stalin prevaricated for as long as he could so that he might strip Berlin bare
and install his toadies in all the worthwhile positions of power.
The French were still worrying about their own status as their troops
marched into Germany with the Anglo-Americans. A total of 165,000
troops under arms meant a lack of labour at home. Germans would have to
be sent to France to carry out the work in the same way as the French had
been obliged to toil in Germany. De Gaulle spoke of needing two million
Germans, although he never managed that. He was still keen to annex the
Rhineland. As Maurice Couve de Murville, a member of the French
provisional government, put it pathetically, ‘If we do not achieve this we
have lost the war.’37 France’s attitude led to friction, particularly with the
Americans. When French troops occupied Stuttgart - which was meant to
form part of the American Zone as the capital of Württemberg - the
Americans ordered them to leave. De Gaulle refused, saying he would stay
put until the zones were finalised. The French were causing problems in the
Levant too, and in an act of bravura against the Italians (who had taken
back Haute Savoie and Nice during the war) they occupied the French-
speaking Val d’Aosta. The American solution was to offer them some bits
of Baden and Württemberg while keeping the lion’s share for themselves.38
In Berlin on 5 June the Western Allies formally came into the zones and
sectors, but it was not until 26 July, while the Big Three were deliberating
at Potsdam, that the Soviets finally recognised the French Sector of Berlin.
The French were still clamouring for more of Baden and Württemberg.
They had been given a curious territory along Germany’s western borders
with two big lumps sticking out to the east. It was mocked as ‘the
brassière’. e
There were other nations which expected to be in the running for
something at the peace, principally the Poles and the Czechs. They placed
their hopes on the tit-for-tat cessions and annexations that had become a
feature of the twentieth century. The process had started with the population
transfers between the Bulgarians and the Turks in 1913. In that instance
50,000 people had voluntarily switched lands. In 1923 the exchange of
Greeks and Turks was more acrimonious, and the figures more disturbing:
400,000 Turks went east, and 1,300,000 Greeks took their place in what
was to become a mono-racial homeland. In the spring of 1943 Roosevelt
told Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, that the transfer of
Germans from East Prussia would be similar to the business with the Turks
and Greeks. In 1945 Stalin wanted revision of the Treaty of Riga of 1921,
which had created three Baltic states out of Russia’s old Baltic territories.
The expulsion of the Germans from the lands east of the Oder and Neisse
rivers came down to that, and the fact that Roosevelt had always been
prepared to give Stalin what he wanted: Russo-American cooperation was
to become ‘the cornerstone of the new world order’. Britain tagged along in
the hope of hanging on to its great-power status.39
Stalin was not going to relinquish Poland east of the Bug. With a blank
cheque from the Russians as far as their western borders were concerned,
the Poles were keen to recoup as much as they could by acquiring German
territory. The idea of advancing to the Oder - and beyond - went back to the
neo-Piast thinkers, Roman Dmowski and Jan-Ludwig Popławski.40 As
Germany walked into Poland again, the idea became more and more
attractive. Hitler was seen as Prussia, and Prussia needed to be docked.
Berlin was mentioned as a fitting ‘showplace for Prussia’s death’.41 In
London Władysław Pałucki began clamouring for the Oder-Neisse line as
early as 1942. It can have been no surprise when Stalin adopted this view
too, at Yalta.
Poland’s eastern borders, with the Soviet Union, presented a trickier
problem. At Yalta Churchill and Roosevelt were slightly at variance over
the Curzon Line, first proposed by the British foreign secretary Lord
Curzon in 1920. Roosevelt held out for Lvov, a city that was chiefly Polish.
Churchill was prepared to abandon Lvov to the Russians. As regards the
western borders, Stalin made his feelings abundantly clear. When the
Anglo-Americans expressed their doubts about the size of the German
population to be evicted, he stood up and in an impassioned voice declared:
‘I prefer the war should continue a little longer although it costs us blood
and to give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of the Germans
. . . I will maintain and I will ask all friends to support me in this [that] . . . I
am in favour of extending the Polish western frontier to the Neisse river.’ It
was at this point that Churchill uttered his line about stuffing the Polish
goose so full that it died of indigestion. The figure of six million Germans
was conjured up as the number who would be required to move. In private
Churchill told Byrnes that it was more like nine million. 42 Poles would
have to be resettled too, from Lvov and the lands east of the Bug, but the
population was mixed, with the Poles in the towns and owning the big
estates, which was hardly the case in East Prussia, Pomerania or Lower
Silesia.
Edvard Beneš, head of the Czechoslovak government in exile, had taken
a long time to recover from the humiliation of Munich. He had spent seven
years in exile. It was his plan from the beginning to reduce the size of the
minorities in the young republic: Hungarians and Germans in Bohemia and
Moravia. The Germans made up some 23 per cent of the Czechoslovak
population. Other lessons he had learned from the rape of his country were
the need to co-operate with the Poles (who had grabbed the region of
Teschen while the Czechs were prostrate and defenceless), and to secure the
patronage of the Soviet Union. The Poles could be accommodated in
Freistadt (Fryštát) and he would expel two-thirds of the Hungarians in
Slovakia. As for the Germans, his ‘5th Plan’ provided for the cession of
certain border regions with an overwhelmingly German population. That
would relieve him of a third of his Germans; a third more would be
expelled. He would keep the Jews, democrats and socialists.43
Later the plans were adapted. The three cantons he was prepared to cede
to Germany - Jägerndorf, Reichenberg and Karlsbad - grew smaller. The
border adjustment would still leave him with 800,000 Germans. He decided
that some of these would flee, some would be expelled and the rest
‘organised for transfer’. When the peace came he quite forgot about the idea
of losing territory and actually claimed land from Germany, but the Allies
did not respond.44 For much of the war Beneš had clung to the idea of a
reduction in the number of his German subjects. He had the backing of the
British. On 6 July 1942 the war cabinet ruled that the Munich Accords were
invalid and agreed in principle to the idea of a transfer of the German
populations of central and south-east Europe to the German fatherland in
cases where it seemed ‘necessary and desirable’. Ten months later
Roosevelt also came round to this view, although American military
planners thought it could be done more humanely by transferring six small
territories to Germany. Stalin too agreed to the transfer on 12 December
1943 after the Czech ministers Jan Masaryk and Hubert Ripka spoke to the
Soviet ambassador to the exile regimes, Bogomolov.45
Austria
Hitler’s armies went into Austria on 12 March 1938. Very soon the
Germans made the place intolerable for certain groups of people. The Jews
were an obvious target, and the Nazis introduced a regimen that was far
more extreme than that current in Germany - at least until November that
year, when Berlin turned up the heat with the ‘Reichskristallnacht’, when
mobs throughout Germany smashed Jewish properties. Adolf Eichmann
was placed in charge of antisemitic activities in Austria and went about his
business with all the diligence that Himmler expected of him. But it was not
just Jews: in two great trainloads the ‘Prominenten’ were also shipped out
to Dachau. These were the members of the governing elite who had banned
the NSDAP or Nazi Party and thrown its members into Austria’s own
concentration camp at Wöllersdorf in Lower Austria. They had executed a
few of these Nazis for their part in the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss four
years before. It was time for Nazi revenge. The fates of the Austrian elite
are in part recounted in Bruno Heilig’s book Men Crucified: ministers, civil
servants and magistrates, most of them of an age when they were no longer
capable of hard labour, were physically broken and beaten to death. Some
of them went on to Buchenwald, others to Mauthausen. Those who survived
returned as martyrs. No one begrudged them that title.
Despite the treatment of their leading politicians, many on the right and
left in Austria might have been prepared to back Hitler. Perhaps 10 per cent
of the country’s adult citizens joined the NSDAP, but a certain Teutonic
heavy-handedness failed to win them all the friends they might. Austrian
industry was appropriated by Göring’s Four Year Plan and increasing
numbers of Germans swanned about their newly acquired territory all the
while, treating Austrians with a disdain they have yet to forget. Worse,
Austrians tended to be despatched to the toughest theatres of war. For the
Allies, however, Austria was now part of Greater Germany and they were at
war. Exiles tried to guide their hands, and plead that the Austrian case was
different. Many Allied leaders found that hard to take, but for political
reasons they evolved the idea of Austria as a victim. Although no one had
seriously considered granting it a government in exile, the Allies had to
entertain the idea that Austria had an exile community that wished to meet
and discuss the country’s future, and there might be added benefits if their
discussions caused problems for the German administration.
There were five possible solutions for a post-war Austria. The first was
a simple reversion to the independent state it had been between 1918 and
1938. The second proposed leaving Austria in bed with Germany. A third
involved making some sort of Danube Confederation based loosely on the
most positive side of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and a fourth was that
favoured by the Morgenthau plan: a separation of Austria’s provinces with
perhaps the Vorarlberg going to Switzerland, the Tyrol and Salzburg to
Bavariaf (which would then be detached from Germany) and the eastern
parts attached to a federation of Danubian lands. A fifth possibility was
simply to roll up Austria and Bavaria together to make a Catholic south-
German state.46
The Allies probably felt that a little confusion would do some good - it
did not pay to let the Austrians feel they were completely off the hook.
They would have to labour to show their love before they could receive the
prize of renewed independence. This ambivalence was enshrined in the
Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943: ‘Austria, which was the first
victim of Nazi aggression, must be liberated from German domination.’47
The Anschluss, the annexation of 15 March 1938, was declared null and
void: ‘Austria is nonetheless reminded that it bears a responsibility from
which it may not escape, for having participated in the war on the side of
Hitler’s Germany and that, in the final reckoning, the role that it plays in its
own liberation will inevitably be taken into account.’48 The Austrians were
not so much to be exonerated from the roles they had played in the
‘Movement’ and war as encouraged to rebel against the Germans.
The pretender to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Otto von Habsburg,
blamed the Russians for the mealy-mouthed nature of the Declaration, but it
is likely that Edvard Beneš had a hand in it too.49 The Declaration also
rejected the idea of a Danubian Federation and put paid to the hopes of a
Habsburg restoration. This was Stalin’s work. Otto himself had left for
America in 1940, leaving his brother Robert in London to campaign for the
cause there. Otto’s name figured on a Nazi hit-list. He went first to New
York and then to Quebec. Naturally he was hoping that the Allies would
look favourably on a Habsburg restoration, but there was little chance of
that. He found certain figures remarkably unsympathetic in their attitude to
Austria. One of these was Churchill’s foreign secretary Eden, who had
apparently defined the country as ‘five Habsburgs and a hundred Jews’.
Otto wanted to change Roosevelt’s mind. It will be recalled that the
president was smitten with the Morgenthau Plan at Quebec. Otto claims that
he was able to bring both Churchill and Roosevelt round.50
On 25 October 1944 the Soviets asked for an acceleration of the
Austrian solution. They wanted to stipulate their future zone. At that point
the French were neither particularly interested in Austria nor included in the
handing out of the spoils. It was only later, when they located some of their
own industrial base in Austria, that they started to clamour for reparations
along with the Russians.51 As far as territory was concerned, the Soviets
plumped for Burgenland and the eastern half of Lower Austria. They also
wanted to keep the eastern half of Styria together with Graz, where the
main industries were located - many of them outhoused from Germany at a
safe distance from Anglo-American bombers. The British would have to be
satisfied with the western half and Carinthia; the Americans would have the
rest. The Viennese Sachertorte would be cut in three, but Russia would take
the inner-city 1st Bezirk or district, the 3rd Bezirk and the northern parts
that abutted the Danube. Even then they intended to control traffic on the
river. The other slices would go to the Anglo-Americans. 52
Meanwhile Austrian exile groups met to discuss the future. In Britain
there were as many as 30,000, of whom 90 per cent were Jews.53 The
Austrian Centre was based in Westbourne Terrace in Paddington and had its
own restaurant, library and reading room, as well as a newspaper,
Zeitspiegel. Before the full horror was known and even as late as April
1945, there was an active campaign among exiles to make the Jews return.
That month appeared the pamphlet Vom Ghetto zur Freiheit. Die Zukunft
der Juden im befreiten Österreich (From the Ghetto to Freedom: The Future
of the Jews in a Liberated Austria). It called for the punishment of those
who had committed crimes against the Jews and the restitution of their
property. 54
Austrian exile groups began to plan for a non-Nazi, independent Austria
even before the war started. In June 1939 a discussion group had called
itself ‘Das kommende Österreich’ (The Coming Austria). It was not just
among the British exiles that such discussions took place. One of the most
influential figures was Ernst Fischer, who led the Austrian Communist
Group in Moscow. In 1944 he published The Rebirth of my Country in
which he advocated the complete economic divorce of Austria and
Germany after the war and suggested alliances with Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia.55 With the establishment of the provisional government in the
autumn of 1945 he was made minister of education.56
F. C. West, president of the Austrian Centre, brought up the question
that loomed largest in the minds of most exiles with his lecture ‘Zurück
oder nicht zurück - das ist keine Frage’ (To return or not to return, that is
not the question). Most Jews had reservations, and these were positively
encouraged by Zionist groups. Willi Scholz (who was not a Jew) was at
pains to reassure Jews that not only would the new Austria welcome them,
they were needed there - ‘Österreichische Juden, geht nach Österreich
zurück!’ (Austrian Jews, go back to Austria!).57 In 1941 the Free Austrian
Movement (FAM - it became the FAWM, or Free Austrian World
Movement, in March 1944) was founded as the political voice of the
Centre. It was dominated by the communists, and very soon the monarchists
and even the social democrats withdrew their support. 58
Young Austria with its slogan ‘Jugend voran’ (youth forward) was a
dynamic movement for those under twenty-five. At its height it had a
thousand members, and a hundred of these fought in the British armed
forces.59 Jews, social democrats and communists signed up. The
communists had been declared illegal by Dollfuss in February 1934 and had
been driven into exile even before the Jews. Austria’s biggest party before
the Anschluss was the Christlichsozialen or Christian Socialists, but these
were as good as unrepresented in the exile colony. They were often
antisemites, and would have been put off by the heavy Jewish presence.
Monarchists, supporting the candidature of Otto von Habsburg, were not
without influence, but this bore fruit with the Gentiles, not with the Jews.60
Otto von Habsburg had tried to raise an Austrian battalion in America in
1942, and the recreation of a post-war independent Austria gave
monarchists leave to hope.61 Legitimists such as Baron Leopold Popper von
Podhragy were pushing for a National Committee and an Austrian fighting
force. The legitimists were often noblemen (nobles figured largely in the
early Austrian resistance groups) and were among the first to fall out with
the Nazis, who treated them with disdain, and vice versa. The British
Foreign Office was lukewarm about the creation of an Austrian force.
Eden’s response was merely to stress that German influence was to be
removed; besides he did not think that he had the proper cadre among the
30,000 Austrians in London.62 A year later the Foreign Office was able to
invoke bad experiences in America as a reason for not raising such a
battalion. A document dated 15 March 1943 shows how divided Austrians
in London were.63 64
The leaders of Austrian Social Democracy, Viktor Adler and Otto
Bauer, had also fled from Paris to New York. At first the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact had thrown a predictable spanner into the works, but the
position altered after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union and the Russo-
British Alliance, and it was once again respectable to be left-wing. The
Social Democrats had traditionally taken the line that Austria was not
capable of a wholly independent existence and had tarred their image by
supporting union with Germany. Initially Young Austria stood for the
liberation of ‘Germany’: ‘Ohne ein freies demokratisches Deutschland -
kein unabhängiges Österreich’ (Without a free, democratic Germany, no
independent Austria). They encouraged a worldwide levée-en-masse to
overthrow the Nazis with violence. The most important thing was to make
the British authorities recognise their right to fight - their right to possess,
like the Poles and the Czechs, their own fighting units.65 Communists were
powerful behind the scenes in almost all the British-based organisations.
Their plan was that Soviet Russia would form the basis of a system of
security that would prevent further warfare and protect the smaller states of
south-eastern Europe from German aggression.66 Towards the end of the
war there were sheaves of publications describing the political form of the
new Austria, though in order not to frighten the monarchists - who had been
liable to Nazi persecution from 1942 - the word ‘republic’ was avoided .67
They had no desire to fall out until Hitler was beaten.
The communist journalist Alfred Klahr was a leading theorist of a new
Austria divorced from Germany. Klahr advocated a rewriting of recent
Austrian history to emphasise unity and resistance to Hitler. It was
necessary to tread gently when it came to the Ständesstaat or Corporate
State, which replaced democratic government in Austria in 1934, to limit
the traitors to a mere handful of high-ranking collaborators. Germany could
not sell itself as a victim - it did not possess this card.68 One of the tactics
used was to describe Austria as a culturally separate entity to Germany,
which meant concentrating on writers who were anti-German, like
Grillparzer. Music was also big: Austria could claim to be more
international, that musicians from all over the world had lived in Vienna;
that the Beethoven of the Ninth Symphony and the setting of the Ode to Joy
was a Viennese incarnation. The nationalistic, antisemitic Wagner was
billed as a purely German phenomenon.
On 19 February 1942 Churchill promised to free Austria from the
‘Prussian yoke’. He had actually overstepped the mark, and his speech was
disowned by the Foreign Office, but it had an encouraging effect in exile
circles. Finally, the independence of Austria did become a war aim, as
recognised by the colonial secretary Lord Cranborne in the Lords in May
1942 and Eden in the Commons in September. This line of argument was
eagerly lapped up by the Austrian exiles, who were more anxious than ever
to put the blame on the ‘Piefkes’, ‘Preussen’ or ‘Nazipreussen’. The
Austrians who occupied positions of power, they argued, were denatured
opportunists: true Austrians had nothing to do with the regime.69 Any small
act of resistance or non-cooperation was held up in triumph. When they
returned to Austria after the war, they had to admit that they had been living
in cloud-cuckoo land.70
In their hearts and minds, Foreign Office officials remained
unconvinced by the exiles. In November 1942 Roger Makins spoke in his
master’s voice and cast doubt on the importance of a group principally
composed of Jews and royalists, while others pointed to the communist
influence and were sceptical as to whether Austrians would accept its
decisions. The presence of so many Jews on the committee could only
damage its credibility.71 On the other hand some progress was made through
their champions in Britain like Sir Geoffrey Mander, and there were voices
raised in Parliament for the creation of Austrian fighting units in the Allied
armies.72
Austrian exiles had the French example before their eyes after June
1944. The French were rapidly accorded the right to organise their country
behind the lines and escape from the threat of military occupation and
government. The exiles were deluding themselves in making this
comparison, but this did not prevent their dreaming.
The non-political Jews, who made up the bulk of the exiles, were less
likely to be convinced of Austria’s lamb-like innocence, because many of
them had witnessed the barbarity of the Austrian Gentile population in
1938. They were also unconvinced by attempts to ‘relativise’ the atrocities
perpetrated against the Jews by including them in a host of other brutalities
as a way of focusing on the general monstrosity of the Germans. They were
also doubtful of the Austrian Centre’s picture of the Jews as loyal Austrians.
Their ideal would have been a popular uprising against the Nazis. At the
very end they were successful and there was a small-scale mutiny when the
Russians loomed at the border. Hitler sent the Austrian-born Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, head of the SD, or Sicherheitsdienst, the Security Service of
the SS, to put it down, and three officers were publicly hanged in
Floridsdorf.73
Soviet Russia clung to the idea of an independent Austria within its
1938 borders, but the power in east central Europe was to be
Czechoslovakia. Austria was to be ‘neutralised’ and also to be refused any
form of confederation with its neighbours, as the Russians feared a revival
of a Catholic or Austro-Hungarian empire. Nor were there to be any
concealed unions, of the NATO or EU sort; in return Austria was not to be
brought into the communist camp. The zones were also mapped out: the
Soviets wanted the industry (particularly the arms industry) in the east. The
east also had the railway hubs for their planned satellites in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.74
The Allies connived at the ‘myth’ of Austria’s victimhood,75 but this
was largely dictated by their own convenience. For the Jews the ‘liberation’
was the moment of truth. The Marxists had failed to come to terms with the
genocide because such things had nothing to do with class struggle. When
they were faced with the facts, they were speechless. The Anschluss and the
war nonetheless strengthened the Austrian sense of independence. In the
1930s this had been at best half formed. Now all Austrians accepted the
idea of the independent state, and rejected the notion of Grossdeutschland.
It is an attitude which colours Austrian minds to this day, to the degree that
the flirtation with Germany that started with the pan-German antisemites
like Schönerer and Lueger and reached its height between the wars is all but
forgotten. It was being put away in the recesses of the Austrian collective
memory as the Red Army mustered at the gates of Vienna.
OceanofPDF.com
PART I
Chaos
OceanofPDF.com
1
The Fall of Vienna
14 April 1945 A shocking view from the Graben:
the marvellous high-pitched roof of the cathedral with
its eagle-motif has disappeared and the lefthand
incomplete tower has been burned out. The finials and
gables appear miserable and black against the heavens.
Only the tower is still standing, the symbol of my
beloved city.
Josef Schöner, Wiener Tagebuch 1944/1945, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar 1992, 160
OceanofPDF.com
2
Wild Times: A Picture of Liberated Central
Europe in 1945
On 8 May Germany had surrendered
unconditionally and was occupied by the victorious
powers. Everyone was freed from National Socialist
tyranny. Those whose lives were in danger from the
regime were finally spared. But for many others,
however, the misery and risk of death had not
disappeared. For countless people the suffering only
began with the end of the war.
Richard von Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten: Erinnerungen, Berlin 1997, 95
OceanofPDF.com
3
Berlin
When I rode through the area around the
Tiergarten yesterday, I thought to myself: one day they
will talk of May 1945 in the same way as they describe
the Sack of Rome. Naturally, it was different to 1527,
because Berlin was already half finished, but had it not
been for the lunacy of the defence it would not have
been so much of a battlefield. It was only when we now
see what the Russians are taking away that we can see
how fundamentally rich we were.
Margret Boveri, Tage des Überlebens, Frankfurt/Main 1996, 140-1
OceanofPDF.com
4
Expulsions from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Yugoslavia
On 4 May complete calm reigned. Even the three
days of public mourning for the death of Hitler decreed
by Secretary of State Frank passed everywhere without
incident. You could never have supposed or expected
that the Czechs, who had in the course of the war never
dared offer even the slightest open resistance to the
German armed forces, would descend into an
unprecedented orgy of horror against defenceless
people after the surrender, that spared neither helpless,
wounded soldiers, women or children.
‘H.K.’, 21 June 1947. Quoted in Wilhelm Turnwald, ed., Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen, Munich 1951, 18
The so-called Sudetenland and its German population had been one of
the causes of the war. Hitler had taken up the complaints of the
Sudetenländer: Bohemians and Moravians under the leadership of Konrad
Henlein. Their mistreatment had prompted the Munich Agreement of
September 1938, which ceded much of the border area to Germany, leaving
the rest of the country defenceless. In the spring of 1939, German tanks
rolled into Prague.
It is true that the Sudetenländer had their grievances. Former subjects of
the Austrian Crown, their towns and villages formed a deep ring around the
Czech lands. They also made up a large percentage of the populations of
Prague and Brno (Brünn), Iglau and Zwittau. In Slovakia there were Insel
und Streudeutsche (Island and Straw Germans); there were German
communities in the Carpathian Mountains and a colony amounting to just
under a third of the city of Pressburg or Bratislava. In Troppau they were
wholly intermingled with the Slavs and spoke their own patois called
Slonzakische, but in most areas they maintained a fierce division. They felt
they had been duped at Saint-Germain-en-Laye in October 1919 when the
Allies finally refused them a right to ‘self-determination’ as promised by
President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.1 Beneš, representing
Czechoslovakia, had proclaimed that his state would be the ‘new
Switzerland’ with minority rights ensured by a system of cantons. This
never happened.2 All German-speakers (including German-speaking Jews)
were affected by the new state which cut them off from their capital, Vienna
- from their businesses, government, friends and relations.3
The West had granted the Czechs’ leader the historic Czech territory of
Bohemia and Moravia, together with Slovakia. Over the centuries, however,
huge numbers of Germans had settled in the Czech lands and Hungarians in
the Slovak east. The Czechs became the political lords and masters of the
new state, though they amounted to just 51 per cent of the population.ay The
Germans formed nearly a quarter, but the Slavic Slovaks could not be
expected to side with them, so it would always be two against one. Conflict
was ‘pre-programmed’.4 There were even attempts to break up the German
lands by planting Czech colonies.5az
As grieving Germans were quick to point out, their numbers in Bohemia
and Moravia were greater than the entire Norwegian people and almost the
same as the Danes or the Finns. They had their political organisations:
Henlein’s SdP, or Sudetenland Party, represented 68 per cent of the
Germans, and was the biggest party in the Czechoslovak state. There was
also the Sudetenland Socialist Party, which co-operated with the Czechs. If
the Germans could never achieve any political clout, until recently, they still
had topped the bill socially and financially - though many Germans had
been hard hit by the Depression. The Czechs were employed in their
businesses, on their farms. The nobility and captains of industry were
German-speaking as were many lawyers and doctors. In 1945 there were
many instances of farmworkers appropriating German farms, the junior
doctors snatching the German practice, and the junior managers taking over
German businesses - to some extent repeating the process that had taken
place in 1938 when the Germans became top dogs again. There were cases
of pure opportunism: Czechs, who had up till then moved in German
circles, had German wives or German-speaking children, suddenly became
the apostles of Czech nationalism and hunted down former friends. When
the communists took over in 1948, those who had profited from the
Revolution launched in May 1945 lost most of what they had gained.
The events of September 1938 and the occupation of the rest of
Czechoslovakia had made the Czechs more than bitter towards the German
minority. The German-speaking area became part of the Reich, and the
people Germans - this change of nationality was to prove fatal in 1945. The
previously grieving regions were attributed to the nearest German land-
mass: a Reichsgau Sudetenland encompassed the core towns of Troppau,
Aussig, Eger and Reichenberg; the region around Hultschin was attached to
Oppeln in Upper Silesia; northern Bohemia to Lower Bavaria; southern
Bohemia to the new Austrian Reichsgau Upper Danube; southern Moravia
to the newly forged Reichsgau Lower Danube; and Teschen to the
recaptured Polish parts of Upper Silesia centred around Kattowitz.6 In the
remaining areas of the ‘Protectorate’ citizenship was awarded on racial
grounds: ethnic Germans were attached to the Reich. For many German-
speakers the change was tantamount to signing their death warrants.7
It was enough for a lawyer to have practised German law to receive a
death sentence.8 The Czechs had not welcomed Hitler as the Austrians had
and even some members of the German-speaking population had been more
than apprehensive: socialists, Jews and the large number of Germans from
the Reich who had sought refuge in Prague. When the tide turned in the war
the Czechs looked forward to the moment when they could deal with the
‘German problem’ once and for all.
When he felt that victory was certain, Beneš had left London for
Moscow. Before he went he told the British ambassador to the Czech
government in exile, Philip Nicols, that he would need to effect the transfer
of the German population and deprive them of their citizenship, otherwise
‘riots, fights, massacres of Germans would take place’. Molotov assured
him that the expulsions would be but a ‘trifle’. Beneš received the necessary
assurances from Stalin: ‘This time we shall destroy the Germans so that
they can never again attack the Slavs.’ He also assured the Czechs in
Moscow that he would not meddle in the domestic affairs of a Slav nation,
which, in retrospect, gives a rather clearer idea of how much his word could
be relied upon.9
Beneš’s Return
Beneš left Moscow on the last day of March 1945. On 1 April he was in
the Ukraine. His goal was Košice in Slovakia where he remained for thirty-
three days while the Russians and Americans carved up the country and the
Czechs rose up in their wake. Patton’s American troops moved up rapidly
behind Field Marshal Schörner’s 800,000-man army. On 4 May they
crossed the mountain passes from Germany to assume their preordained
positions along the line Carlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis. The American general
had been told that Prague was out of bounds. He stopped in Beraun. The
Czechs wanted to grab the credit for the liberation of the capital. On the
night of 8 May the Red Army formed a protective shield around the city
allowing the uprising to take its course.10
On 6 May the Red Army reached Brno. The day before Beneš heard
that Prague had risen against the Germans. He moved on to Bratislava. The
progress of the Russians was the signal for most of Vlasov’s divisions to
head south into Austria;ba the Cossacks were in two minds about being
captured by the Red Army, although some did go into Prague, and
effectively liberated it before the regular Russian forces.11 In Prague the
resistance formed the ČNR (Česka národni rada, or Czech National
Council). The first Red Army tanks entered the city on the 9th and military
operations ended two days later when Schörner retreated. Beneš did not
make his triumphal entry until the 16th. His excuse for coming so slowly
had been his own safety - there were German snipers about.12
Beneš showed his hand first in his Košice Statutesbb of 5 April 1945:
‘Woe, woe, woe, thrice woe to the Germans, we will liquidate you!’ he
intoned on the wireless. There followed his famous decrees. Number five,
for example, declared all Germans and Hungarians to be politically
unreliable and their possessions were therefore to fall to the Czech state.
The Košice Programme unleashed a ‘storm of retribution, revenge and
hatred . . . Wherever the troops of the Czech General Svoboda’s army -
which was fighting alongside the Russians - and the Revolutionary Guards
(Narodni vybor) emerged, they did not ask who was guilty and who was
innocent, they were looking for Germans.’13
On 12 May Beneš repeated his threats in Brno: ‘We have decided . . .
that we have to liquidate the German problem in our republic once and for
all.’14 On 19 June came the first of the ‘Retribution Decrees’: ‘Nazi
criminals, traitors and their supporters’ were to be tried before
‘Extraordinary People’s Courts’. These were primitive tribunals. It took all
of ten minutes to try a man and send him down for fifteen years. There were
475 ‘official’ capital sentences. Thirty death sentences were handed out for
those involved in the Lidice Massacre.15 A national court would examine
war crimes. On 21 June came the next decree: all persons of German or
Hungarian nationality, traitors or Quislings were to lose their land.
Germany would pay reparations. There was to be no compensation for loss
of citizenship or property. The last measure was the so-called ‘Little
Decree’ of 27 October which laid down the punishment for those who had
offended against national honour.16 On 6 August Beneš had spoken at
Prague University, a discourse that had particular resonance for Germans,
not least because it was considered Germany’s oldest seat of learning. He
had hardened his heart against all pleas for humanity: ‘We know that liberal
society is in theory and practice an anachronism.’17 Already 800,000
Germans had been chased out of the country.
To implement Beneš’s various decrees there were ‘judicial volunteers’
and a Central Committee of Investigation (Ústřední vyšetřujicí vybor).
There were a fair number of KZler, or former concentration-camp inmates,
among them, graduates of Dachau and Buchenwald. Many of their acolytes
were mere ‘half-grown’ boys.18 Those who suffered agreed that the sixteen
to twenty-five-year-olds were the worst.19 By September they had around
100,000 prisoners: 89,263 German-speakers, 10,006 Czechs and 328 others.
They had released 1,094 Czechs and 613 anti-fascist Germans. The most
pernicious decree was the ‘Little’ one, employed for ‘settling various
personal accounts’, although the process had started long before. Beneš
himself was not immune, and wrought his revenge on various Czechs. His
apologists admit a popular desire for retribution;20 it was the ‘duty of the
government to turn the turbulent mood’, however.
Instead, many politicians, including Beneš himself, exploited it. As
another historian puts it, the atrocities ‘were not driven from above, but
without the toleration of the authorities in Prague they would hardly have
been able to persist into the summer months’.21 In the end even the British
(who had encouraged the purge) protested to Beneš about ‘excesses’ and
there was a distinct turning down of the heat while the Big Three met in
Potsdam.22 Expelling the Germans was a vote catcher, but not a measure
likely to make friends - except possibly with the Poles. In retrospect it has
been hard to find mitigating circumstances to excuse Beneš, apart from the
fact that he was old and ill and thought he might defeat the communists by
unleashing the terror himself.23
Revenge
For seven years the Czechs and Slovaks had suffered humiliation at the
hands of the Germans. In the extreme Nazi view all Slavs were
Untermenschen and the German regime treated them as second-class
citizens. As in other Slavic lands there were plans to ‘Germanise’ parts of
the country, no doubt partly in response to the cold wind that had greeted
the Germans after 1919, which had - for example - seen the decline of the
German population in the city of Brno from 60 to 20 per cent. In Znaim the
number of Germans had also dwindled after 1918, but had increased
sharply after 1938. A Bohemian and Moravian Land Company had been
formed to find areas for settlement by Germans. The company ran a model
farm. During the Protectorate 16,000 agrarian holdings were confiscated,
totalling 550,000 hectares. Some 70,000 Czechs lost their homes. At the
beginning of April 1945 treks were organised to evacuate the German
colonists and take them back to the Sudetenland.24 The numbers of Germans
had been further expanded by evacuations and the advance of the Red
Army. There were around 600,000 of the former and 100,000 Slovakian
Germans together with 1.6 million Silesians taking refuge in the region.25
Some of the Slovakian Germans had already gone to Lower Austria.26
The resistance had been wiped out as early as the autumn of 1941, and
was unable to re-form until 1943 and 1944, when there was an uprising in
Slovakia. Nazi brutality was measured: apart from the massacre at Lidice -
provoked by the British-masterminded assassination of the deputy protector
Reinhard Heydrich - there were no startling atrocities.27 The country was
hardly touched by the aerial bombardment that struck terror into the rest of
Europe.28 The French bore far worse, and behaved better towards the
defeated Germans; but then again, the French were not considered to be
racially inferior.
The clue to the severity of the post-war response is the Revolution. This
was to be revenge for everything that had happened since the Battle of the
White Mountain in 1620 when Imperial troops wiped out the native
Bohemian nobility. Germans were still the masters, the Czechs the servants;
the nobility was all German- or Hungarian-speaking and gravitated towards
Vienna or Budapest. Prague’s old university was German once again, and
there were German Gymnasiums and Realschulen. The Czechs resented
these institutions as many of their own had been closed during the
‘Protectorate’. It is significant that these were turned into ‘wild’ or
unofficial concentration camps in May. Brno too had its Technische
Hochschule, German institutions, shops and pubs. With the backing of the
Red Army, and a clear idea that the Western Allies would turn a blind eye to
all that happened, the Czechs would seize their moment for some
spectacular ethnic cleansing.
Measures were introduced consciously aping those taken by the
Germans against the Jews: they could go out only at certain times of day;
they were obliged to wear white armbands, sometimes emblazoned with an
‘N’ for Němec or German;29 they were forbidden from using public
transport or walking on the pavement; they could not send letters or go to
the cinema, theatre or pub; they had restricted times for buying food; and
they could not own jewellery, gold, silver, precious stones, wireless sets or
cameras. They were issued with ration cards, but were not allowed meat,
eggs, milk, cheese or fruit. The Germans also had to be ready to work as
slaves on farms, in industry or in the mines.
There were two waves of atrocities: Russian liberators, who raped and
pillaged, and the Czech partisans who arrived in their wake. As elsewhere,
the Russians had been given carte-blanche. The Czechs were less prone to
sexual crimes, but were often accused of acting as talent spotters for their
Soviet friends. There are several reported instances, however, of the
Russians putting a stop to the worst excesses of the Czechs.30 The Czech
atrocities committed in the following weeks and months were led by the RG
(Revolučni Garda) and the special police or SNB (Sbor Národní
Bezpečnosti) who wore German military trousers and SA shirts, together
with the army, or with civilian mobs bent on plunder and sadistic violence.
The reports read like some of the most gruesome moments of the French
Revolutionary Terror.
For prosperous Germans a striking aspect was blatant theft. The Czech
partisans took anything that appealed to them and piled it up on a waiting
lorry which then disappeared into the Protectorate. Sometimes they simply
moved into the house, adopting the former owner’s possessions and putting
on the banished Germans’ clothes. The train from Prague to the north was
called the ‘Alaska Express’, alluding to the gold rush, and those who took it
were zlatokopci or ‘gold-diggers’.31 Once the wilder days were over, the
new Czech Republic moved to regulate the plunder so that the booty came
to the state. In 1947 the expellees assessed the value of the stolen effects at
19.44 milliard dollars.32
Prague
At the end of the war Prague contained around 42,000 Germans native
to the city, together with a further 200,000 or so ‘Reich’ Germans working
for the various staffs and ministries, as well as refugees.33 The streets of
Prague were quite used to hearing the German language spoken - many of
Prague’s Jews communicated in German. As soon as the battle for Prague
ended, Czech partisan units began to imprison German civilians and intern
them at various points around the city. The morning of 5 May 1945 was
quite calm. Germans still walked the streets in uniform. The mood changed
at 11.00 a.m. Suddenly there was a great cry and people began to wave
Czech flags. Arms were being handed out at Buben railway station. Some
units of the Vlasov Army appeared. A hospital train was shot up. The
insurgents captured the radio station and began broadcasting the slogan
‘Smrt Němcům! Smrt všem Němcům! Smrt všem Okkupanten!’ (Death to
the Germans! Death to all Germans! Death to all occupiers!). There was to
be no mercy for old men, women or children - even for German dogs:
Margarete Schell’s was stoned by Czech children and had to be shot. It was
the first day of the Revolution.34
It was the day Margarete Schell was taken into custody by a ‘nasty
butcher’ of her acquaintance. The RG were attended by people who knew
the Germans and could show them where they lived. Margarete was well
known - a voice on Prague Radio and an actress. She was incarcerated in a
cellar and then transferred to Hagibor Camp. It was March 1946 before she
was taken in a goods wagon to freedom in Germany. As a born Praguer, she
did not know how to answer the ‘Gretchen Question’:bc ‘Why do you admit
to being a German?’ She was a Prague German. Doubtless there were
Prague Germans who thought it wiser not to say; and some of these would
have escaped denunciation. Another ruse was to make out you were an
Austrian. The Austrian ambassador appeared in their temporary prison to
reclaim Austrian subjects, but his intercession did little for the 40,000
Austrians who were living in terror outside the capital.35
Many of the city’s most notable Germans were put to death during this
bloodletting. Professor Albrecht, the last rector of the German university,
was arrested at the Institute for Neurology and Psychiatry. He was beaten
up and hanged outside the lunatic asylum. The director of the Institute for
Dermatology suffered a similar fate. Hans Wagner, a Prague-born German
physician attached to the German army, last saw his former colleague, the
dean of the German Medical Faculty, Professor Maximilian Watzka, in
Pankrác Prison. The German-speaking nobles were also targeted: Alexander
Thurn und Taxis was thrown into a wild concentration camp with his
family. He and his two sons had to watch while his wife, her mother and the
governess were repeatedly raped. When the sport was over he was marched
off to a Russo-Polish run Auschwitz.36
A truce was declared at midday on the 8 May when the German army
began to leave the city. No adequate arrangements had been made between
the Czech National Council and the Wehrmacht for the transport of sick and
injured soldiers and some 50,000 soldiers were left behind. On the 9th the
Red Army finally appeared in Prague and Germans were told to bow when
they saw a Soviet car.37 The physics graduate ‘K.F.’, who had been
imprisoned on the 5th, was taken out and forced to clear the barricades
which had been built by the Czechs as they rose up against the garrison and
which were preventing the Russians from getthing their tanks down the
streets.38 Germans were beaten bloody with iron bars and lead pipes by a
civilian mob and made to remove their shoes and run over broken glass.
The biggest barricades were 2.5 to 3 metres high, and made up of paving
stones, iron bars and barbed wire. They had to dismantle the obstacles and
repave the streets.
Women too were forced to clear the barricades. Helene Bugner was first
beaten by the porter of her block of flats, then a Professor Zelenka drove
her and twenty other women off to clear the streets. ‘Here, I have brought
you some German sows!’ said the professor. Their hair was cut with
bayonets and they were stripped of shoes and stockings. Both men and
women died from the beatings. A large crowd of Czechs stood by and
cheered whenever a woman was struck or fell. At the end of their work they
had to tread on a large picture of Hitler and spit on it. Margarete Schell saw
people being forced to eat pieces of such pictures as she too was put to
work on the barricades.39 As they were driven off, one woman heard a
Czech tell another, ‘Don’t hit them on the head, they might die at once.
They must suffer longer and a lot more.’ When Helene Bugner returned that
evening she was unrecognisable to her children.
Marianne Klaus saw her husband alive for the last time on the 9th. She
received his body the next day - the sixty-six-year-old had been beaten to
death by the police. On the same day she saw two SS men suffer a similar
fate, kicked in the stomach until blood spurted out; a woman Wehrmacht
auxiliary stoned and hanged; and another SS man hung up by his feet from
a lamppost and set alight.40 Many witnesses attested to the stringing up and
burning of Germans as ‘living torches’, not just soldiers but also young
boys and girls. Most were SS men, but as the Czechs were not always too
scrupulous about looking at the uniforms, a number of Wehrmacht soldiers
perished in this way too. In part this savagery was a response to a rumour
that the Germans had been killing hostages. There was reportedly a repeat
performance on the day when Beneš finally arrived in Prague: Germans
were torched in rows on lampposts.41
The Ministry of Education, the Military Prison, the Riding School, the
Sports Stadium and the Labour Exchange were set aside for German
prisoners. The Scharnhorst School was the scene of a massacre on the night
of the 5th. Groups of ten Germans were led down to the courtyard and shot:
men, women and children - even babies. The others had to strip the corpses
and bury them. Alfred Gebauer saw female SS employees forced to roll
naked in a pool of water before they were beaten senseless with rifle butts.
There were as many as 10,000-15,000 Germans in the football stadium in
Strahov. Here the Czechs organised a game where 5,000 prisoners had to
run for their lives as guards fired on them with machine guns. Some were
shot in the latrines. The bodies were not cleared away and those who used
the latrines later had to defecate on their dead countrymen. As a rule all SS
men were killed, generally by a shot in the back of the head or the stomach.
Even after 16 May when order was meant to be restored, twelve to twenty
people died daily and were taken away from the stadium on a dung wagon.
Most had been tortured first. Many were buried in mass graves at Pankrác
Prison where a detachment of sixty prisoners was on hand to inter the
corpses. Another impromptu prison was in a hotel up in the hills. This had
been the Wehrmacht’s brothel. A number of Germans were locked up in the
cellar, and the whores and their pimps indulged in a new orgy of sadism and
perversity. German men and women had to strip naked for their treatment.
One of them was Professor Walter Dick, head of a department at the
Bulovka Hospital. He was driven insane by his torturers and hanged himself
on a chain.
One witness who was too ill to work was sent to the hospital camp at
Motol, where there was an SS ‘cellar’. This contained eighty to a hundred
men who were brought out every day for beatings. A local speciality was to
get the men to beat one another. In this case they had to slap one another
round the face. They were often stripped naked prior to the torture and then
literally booted down the steps to their cell once the guards had tired of
their fun. The SS cellar contained a number of Hitler Youth boys of
fourteen. Whenever it was deemed to be too full, guards fired at random
though the bars to create more space. Gebauer swore that Czech
collaborators were also badly treated, particularly women who had had
German lovers. Thousands of dead Germans were buried in the cemetery in
Wokowitz.42
Some German Bohemians eluded arrest by helping the Russians and
Czech authorities. Hans Wagner indicated a Dr Rein from Postelberg, a
prison doctor who was especially cruel. The Russians wanted the pick of
the women. In the cellar where Margarete Schell was imprisoned, a plump
doctor - possibly a Jew - came to take some of the women to safety before
the Russians made their tour. A woman wanted to bring her children:
‘Kinder hier lassen, Kindern tun sie nichts,’ he said (Leave the children
here, they won’t do anything to the children). When they returned the
Russians had taken four girls who returned exhausted in the morning.43 Acts
of kindness by Czechs were numerous. Some risked their lives to protect
friends and acquaintances. ‘Hansi’ Thurn und Taxis reached safety in
Austria through the intercession of a Czech general. He was assisted at the
beginning by a Russian forced labourer on his estate.44
One wounded German officer had been in the Oko cinema since the 6
May. After helping tear down the barricades that day he was taken back to
his temporary prison. There was no peace that night: the Russians and
Czechs came for the women. Men who tried to protect them were beaten
up, children who would not let go of their mothers’ skirts were dragged out
with them and forced to watch. Several women tried to commit suicide. The
officer remained in the cinema until Whitsun. That day the cries of tortured
Germans coming from the Riding School mingled with the voices of
churchgoers next door, ‘praying for mercy and neighbourly love’.45
After Whitsun the officer was taken to the Scharnhorst School. There
was an ominous sign over the door reading ‘Koncentrační Tabor’. ‘There
they tried to surpass in everything all that they had learned of concentration
camps.’ Cinemas were popular sites for ‘concentration camps’. The Slavia
in Řipská ulice was also used for around 500-700 prisoners.46 The physics
graduate ‘K.F.’ was taken there too and tortured. On the 10th he was taken
off to Wenceslaus Square and driven towards three naked bodies hanging by
their feet from a billboard. They had been covered with petrol and set
alight, their faces punched in and the teeth knocked out - their mouths were
just bloody holes. With others he was then obliged to drag the corpses back
to the school.
Once they had laid down the bodies, one of the Czechs told the
graduate: ‘To jsou přece vaší bratrí, ted’ je políbejte!’ (They are your
brothers, go on . . . kiss them!). Scarcely had he wiped the blood from his
mouth than he was taken to the ‘death cellar’ to be beaten to death. They
despatched the young Germans one by one. The graduate was the fourth in
line. After the second killing a door opened and a Czech man came in. The
graduate learned later that this was the nephew of the minister Stránský. He
asked them who they were, and led out the graduate and a seventeen-year-
old Hitler Youth, because they were the two that spoke Czech. In general,
knowledge of Czech helped, but no one was immune: former officials,
police officers and German-speaking Jews were subjected to imprisonment
- even if they had just emerged from Nazi concentration camps. The
minister’s son told them with a grin on his face that they were the only ones
who had ever emerged from the cellar alive.47
Anna Seidel was a sixty-seven-year-old engineer’s widow living in
Prague-Smichow. On the 9th she was rounded up with three other ladies,
two of them of her age. They were robbed and beaten black and blue; their
hair was shorn, their foreheads daubed with swastikas; they were then
paraded through the streets on a lorry, shouting ‘My jsme Hitler-kurvy!’
(We are Hitler-whores!). If they did not shout loudly enough they were
beaten again. After four weeks in Pankrác they were taken to
Theresienstadt, where they remained for a year. Helene Bugner was taken
away to Hagibor, which was seen as one of the better camps. From there
she went to Kolin where the younger women were raped by Russians, some
of them as many as forty-five times in a night. A Czech woman working for
the Red Cross had set herself up as the talent-spotter. The women returned
from these nightly sessions badly bitten by their paramours. Helene Bugner
was released from agricultural work after three and a half months following
complaints by the British: she had been a secretary in the legation for
twelve years.48
Hans Wagner went to the Russian commander to beg for more beds for
the sick and wounded. He took the precaution of going with a Czech
colleague, Dr Dobbek. The Russian general Gordow was not in the slightest
bit interested: ‘If you have no room for your wounded, throw them in the
Vltava, there is plenty of room for them there!’49 Wagner went for a walk on
the afternoon of the 14th. Hanging from the sign to the famous restaurant U
svatého Havla were the half-carbonised remains of a German soldier who
had been strung up by his heels. His right arm was missing from the
shoulder. Wagner concluded that he was an amputee. Everywhere he noted
the signs that the communists had taken over, under the shadow of the
liberating Red Army. After popping into the Elekra, the family coffee
house, he went towards the railway station. A blonde woman was being
attacked by a mob. She was shouting in perfect Czech, but in a moment she
was surrounded and stripped of her clothes. A dray wagon came by, and
each of her limbs was attached to one of the horses. The beasts were driven
off in opposite directions.
With the re-establishment of government, the wild concentration camps
in Prague’s cinemas and schools were wound up and the prisoners
despatched to proper camps. One woman who had been in the Slavia
cinema and claimed to have been spared from lynching by a semi-
miraculous thunderstorm was taken to the main station on a sort of death
march, which saw many German Bohemians beaten to death to the applause
of the local mob. They were pushed into coal trucks where they were
robbed one last time and then taken away. Others endured the death march
to Theresienstadt. It is estimated that only 10 per cent of those who set out
from Prague survived.50 Modřany was another infamous Czech camp,
mostly populated by Prague Germans; another was Bystřice, where
Margarete Schell went on 28 July. The prisoners were welcomed by a
demonstration of brutality. Anyone with professional titles was singled out
for extra beating. She was whipped. She began to despair: ‘We will never
get out of here, this is the last stop.’51
The fate of the Prague Germans slowly became known to the outside
world. The Austrians were busy trying to show the Allies that they had
never had any affection for Germany and the Nazis, and they had their own
problems. In Vienna the former diplomat Josef Schöner was visited by a
Prague Czech on 18 May who gave him a misleading report that all the
Germans had been interned or were working on rebuilding. The German-
speakers were finished; they had defended themselves fiercely during the
uprising, particularly the women, while the Russians had plundered the city
like Vienna. They had also looted freely in Bratislava, and there had been a
high incidence of rape, ‘so that the first elation at liberation had much
abated’.52
Many Germans spent a prolonged period in Pankrác Prison. Wagner
claimed that a special treat for visiting Russian bigwigs was to be taken
over the prison and witness a German being beaten to death. Another was to
toss a prisoner from a second-floor parapet and shoot at him while he
plummeted to the ground. Some boys from Reichenberg were accused of
being Werewolves. They had to fight one another until they were bloody
and then lick up the blood. When that resulted in vomiting, that too had to
be licked up. When they had cleaned up the mess they were stripped and
beaten with whips until the skin hung from their bodies. Then they were
tossed into a cellar. Those who did not die from their wounds were later
hanged.53
Caught up in the massacres were not just Prague Germans but refugees
from eastern Bohemia and Moravia. Wagner saw a miserable troop of old
men, women and children from Ohlau. He tried to give them milk but the
RG dashed the bottles out of his hands and threatened to shoot the children
who were prepared to lick it up from the pavement. International
condemnation had little effect. In the ‘revolutionary’ days, the International
Red Cross was too frightened of the Russians to act. In Prosecnice camp
there was an IRC inspection in April 1946. As soon as the visit was over,
the treatment of prisoners became worse.54
Landskron
The massacres were by no means confined to the capital. As soon as the
Russians had liberated a town or village, partisans arrived to administer
revolutionary justice. The primary targets were members of the Nazi or
Sudetenland Party (SdP), or members of those organisations Beneš decreed
had aided the Nazis in their tyranny. Partisans also listened to denunciations
from local Czechs before they struck. The rich were particularly vulnerable.
Also susceptible were doctors, grocers, butchers and publicans, and anyone
who might have denied credit, or schnapps. In many places all Germans
were considered guilty. In other places the action was coloured by some
German outrage. In Littau near Iglau, the German-speaking pocket south of
Prague, the Waffen-SS had torched the Czech village of Javorička in March
1945. The partisans responded by driving the Germans into a forester’s
house and the Schloss and murdering them.55
In Landskron the fighting stopped on the 9 May. The Russian liberators
were chiefly interested in the townswomen, whom they pursued into the
night. There were few Czechs to speak of, and they were mainly concerned
to protect their own property from plunder. This idyll changed when on the
17th some lorry-loads of armed Czech partisans arrived. All the male
German inhabitants were hunted into the main square. By the early
afternoon there were as many as a thousand. The Czechs amused
themselves by drilling them, forcing them to lie down and get up, all the
while walking among them, spitting and kicking them in the groin and
shins. Those who fell during this humiliation were taken to a water tank and
drowned. Any who bobbed up were shot. Meanwhile a ‘People’s Court’ had
been established with a jury composed of local Czechs. The Germans had to
crawl to the bench. Most of the men then had to run a 50-60 metre gauntlet.
Many fell and were beaten to pulp. The next day the survivors were
reassembled. One man was strung up from a lamppost. The court adjourned
only when a horrified woman set fire to her house which threw the crowd
into a panic. Twenty-four Germans had been killed. An even greater
number committed suicide.
Brno Death March
Brno was another German enclave. Before the Great War it was
considered to be a ‘suburb of Vienna’.56 Even with the post-war migration it
contained 60,000 Germans, and there were many more between Brno and
the border. The Russians reached the city on 25 April. There followed the
usual scenes of rape and violence. The next morning all Germans had to
report for work. Czech partisans established their HQ in Kaunitz College,
where the city’s leading Germans were beaten and tortured. Sometimes they
were forced to go on all fours and bark like dogs. When the Czechs had
finished with them they were delivered to the hospital, where they were
thrown into a cellar. A Red Cross nurse examined a German who had
indescribable wounds to his genitals. Before he died he was able to explain
his crime: he had sold vegetables to the Gestapo.57
At 9 p.m. on 30 May began the Brno Death March. It was the Feast of
Corpus Christi, normally a day for solemn processions, and the largely
Catholic Germans did not fail to draw comparisons. The 25,000 marchers
had fifteen minutes to pack a bag and to assemble in the Convent Garden,
where they spent the night. At dawn they were driven into the courtyard and
relieved of their valuables before marching to the camp at Raigern in the
pouring rain. The procession included inmates of the old people’s home, the
hospitals and the children’s clinic and one Englishwoman who had been
married to a local Nazi. Her case naturally excited the interest of the Daily
Mail correspondent Rhona Churchill, who filed a story on 30 May.58
Stragglers were beaten with truncheons and whips and those who failed
to get up were shot and their bodies stripped and plundered. Survivors were
strip-searched before being driven on to a camp at Pohrlitz, about halfway
to the Austrian border.59 The Red Cross nurse claimed that a thousand had
already died. Another said that the camp claimed a further 1,700 lives. One
mother recounts that two of her three children died on the march.60 The
marchers were lodged in a car factory. The younger women were raped by
the guards. Those still capable of walking were pushed on to the border the
next morning, leaving behind about 6,000, who were thrown into grain
silos. The Red Cross nurse stayed with them, and her reports do not make
pleasant reading. It may be that some of the atrocities committed have been
exaggerated in retrospect, but there is more than enough corroboration to
make it clear that the Czechs behaved with inhuman cruelty.
The Pohrlitz camp was evacuated on 18 June. Sixty to seventy people
had been dying daily, largely from typhus. Nutrition consisted of stale bread
and rotten root vegetables. The Russians came every night at 7.30 and
stayed until 2 a.m. They raped the women, even a seventy-year-old. When
the Red Cross nurse tried to protect a tender eleven-year-old, she herself
was taken away to ‘suffer the consequences’ and was raped by five soldiers.
Another witness said that the youngest raped was seven years old, the oldest
eighty. Some of the healthier ones escaped and made their own way to the
border. It was evidently desired that Brno should be free of Germans in time
for Beneš’s five-day visit in July. As it happened, the Czechs had failed to
round up all the Germans, while others who had broken down on the march
were returned to the city. When Beneš arrived they were forced out into the
sand dunes without food or water. Many died, others went mad.61
The first to leave Pohrlitz were the sick, who were driven away and
dumped in the marshes by the River Thaya on the Austrian border. No one
knew they were there and according to the Red Cross nurse they starved to
death. The corpses were photographed and shown in newsreels in Britain
and the United States. The Czechs responded by saying that they had been
killed by the Austrians. There was another massacre at Nikolsburg, where
the bodies of 614 men were thrown into a mass grave.62
Iglau and Kladno
The German-speaking pocket around Iglau ( Jihlava) in western
Moravia was also a sore subject for the Czechs. When the town fell on 5
May it was the signal for a mass suicide of Germans: as many as 1,200 took
their lives, and perhaps 2,000 were dead by Christmas. Between six and
seven thousand Germans were driven into the camps Helenental and
Altenberg. When Helenental was closed, the inhabitants were plundered
and herded south towards the Austrian border. Some 350 people are said to
have lost their lives on the way. They were detained in another camp in
Stannern where hundreds more perished.63
The Germans in Kladno were subjected to the full severity of the
Revolution from 5 May onwards. Erika Griessmann’s father was taken
away and never returned. She herself was beaten for refusing to tell the RG
where the family jewellery was buried. A few days later she saw Germans
being chased across a field like hares, gunned down by partisans with
submachine guns. Her family was thrown out of their house on the 9th and
made to run the gauntlet down their street while the crowd lashed out at
them. She spotted some of their neighbours weeping at their windows at the
sight.
They joined a group of refugees. Many of them were bloody, after
Czechs had hurled grenades into their midst. For the second time the
seventeen-year-old Erika heard that she and the better-looking Germans
would be raped by the Russians. They apparently had first refusal. The
Russians, however, treated her well. She fainted, and was pulled into a car
by the hair. She woke on a sofa bound hand and foot. Five high-ranking
Soviet officers asked her if she were hungry, and where she wanted to go.
She said she wanted her mother. They took her to the football stadium
where she found her mother and younger brother.
After threatening to shoot them all, Czechs took the Germans to
Masshaupt where they had to stand in a ditch while a crowd spat on them
and pelted them with stones. They were then returned to the football
stadium on a lorry. There were German soldiers lying all around with bullet
wounds in their stomachs and heads. Erika’s party were strip-searched and
taken to a barracks. Bodies were strewn everywhere, even small children
whose parents had cut their throats to save them from further tortures.
On the 10th they prepared to march. Before the gates of the barracks a
jeering crowd had assembled. A Czech read a speech: all Germans were
criminals. Hand grenades were once again tossed among the refugees,
producing another bloodbath. A Czech priest appeared to administer the last
rites. Many of the dying refused his blessing. Erika and her mother
managed to get into an ambulance and someone gave Erika a Red Cross
nurse’s hat. Russian sentries accompanied the German wounded as they left
Kladno. One of the Russians recognised that Erika was no nurse and
demanded she go with him. The injured in the ambulance took her side. He
then requested either Erika or their watches. The heavily wounded German
soldiers gave the Russian their watches and rings and Erika was bought
free. That way they reached comparative safety in the American-occupied
zone.64
The American Zone
It was the Americans rather than the Russians who liberated western
Czechoslovakia. Whatever the Bohemian Germans might have wanted to
believe, however, the Americans did not meddle in the activities of Czech
partisans. The most that can be said is that the expulsions from their zone
were generally more humane than those that took place east of the line.65
They finally left in December 1945.
One woman did however report that Americans helped her cross the
border; in another instance a woman was returned to Brno from Germany as
a Czech national, and as a German had to suffer the consequences. In Bory
Prison in Pilsen, the torture stopped when the Americans came to inspect,
and started again the next day. The writer Ernst Jünger had a letter from his
friend Sophie Dorothea Podewils on 10 October 1945. She had been in the
Pilsen prison. ‘What took place in the German and also in the Hungarian
part of Czechoslovakia is a tragedy that is only comparable to what the
Jews had to bear here.’66
In Mies near Marienbad, Czech partisans and American soldiers
searched German houses together. Later the partisans shot twenty-five
Germans in their camp. Elbogen (Habartov) was the seat of the Control
Commission, which granted permission to Czechs to cross to the other
Allied zones, but its decisions were not always respected by the partisans.67
Franz Weinhand was picked up by the militia in Gfell and taken to the
castle in Elbogen. He and his fellow Germans screamed so loudly during
their whippings that they began to annoy the American sentries a hundred
metres away. One of them fired his machine gun at their window. Two days
later members of the American Commission arrived at the castle and took
photographs of the Germans’ naked bodies. Weinhand and the others dared
not say a word for fear of reprisals. After four weeks the Americans took
the political prisoners to Landshut in Bavaria. In September they were sent
back to Czechoslovakia.68
In Schlackenwerth a German clockmaker called Müller was tortured to
death. He came from the resort of St Joachimsthal (Jáchymov), where a
Herr Steinfelsner, the owner of a sawmill, was hanged before the town hall
in the presence of the townsfolk. The body hung there until some
Americans came by in a jeep and forced the partisans to take it down.69 In
Bischofteinitz (Domažlice) the usual scenes occurred when the men were
rounded up. Thirty-five of them were called out and butchered. In Blatna a
girl who had dallied with the Americans even had her head shaved after
their departure. The Americans were also in Chodau (Chodov), where the
luggage of departing Germans were plundered almost as systematically as
they were across the border in Poland. 70
There were Czechs working and living in German areas, and Germans
in the towns which lay in the middle of largely Czech areas. České
Budějovice or Budweis in south-western Czechoslovakia was in the Czech
heartlands. Until the nineteenth century the Germans had dominated the
town. There was still an active minority in 1945, who were put to work in
the mines. Most of the atrocities took place around the labour exchange.
Large numbers of Czech women cheered as the Germans were beaten
bloody. The priest, Pater Joseph Seidl, was one of them - he had apparently
committed no other crime than being German. The beds in the military
hospital were taken over by the Czechs. One severely wounded soldier was
given a lethal jab. SS men aged between eighteen and twenty-one were
dragged into the courtyard and beaten to death. In Pilsen, another largely
Czech city, Franz Wagner, a former communist who had spent a term in
Dachau, was robbed and beaten up before being expelled from the
country.71
Freudenthal, Freiwaldau and Bilin
Reports indicate that Czechs particularly loathed German innkeepers
and physicians. Innkeepers perhaps looked down on Czech customers, and
physicians either refused to treat Czechs or were suspected of being
involved in Nazi genocide. Carl Gregor was a general practitioner in
Freudenthal (Bruntál) in the north-eastern sector of the Czech lands. He was
taken to the Freudenthal camp and accused of having murdered 150
foreigners. He laughed off the accusation, and was tortured by eighteen men
who beat his back so badly that the skin burst on his buttocks.
In Freudenthal all the inmates had to witness the executions, which took
place behind the barrack block. Gregor’s knowledge of Czech and Slovak
meant that he had to translate the orders given by the commandant. On one
occasion twenty men had to dig their own grave and then climb in. They
were shot in the back of the head. One man had to be shot three times, yet
he was still alive when the prisoners filled in the grave. The excuse for this
slaughter was an accident with a grenade that killed a Russian. The Czechs
then told the Russians that the death had been the result of a German-laid
time-bomb and demanded that a hundred hostages be shot in reprisal. The
Russians allowed them to kill just a score.72
In Freiwaldau (Jeseník) they marched the camp inmates to the border
and pushed them into Germany. The ordeal took seventy-two hours, while
the Germans were beaten with whips and pistol butts.73 Alfred Latzel was
the proprietor of a large sugar refinery and farm. On 20 June he was
dispossessed and warned that he would have problems were he to remain in
Czechoslovakia. He felt he had done no wrong and decided to brave it. He
was taken in for a short interview by the local police, at the end of which he
was delivered to the Camp II Jauernig - a former RAD or
Reichsarbeitsdienst camp. Latzel learned much later that he had been
incarcerated because he had allegedly denounced communists during the
Third Reich. He denied it. At Jauernig, the gaoler was a German
communist. German denouncers were also present at the torture sessions
egging on the others.
After four days Latzel was taken to another camp in an old work-service
barracks at Adelsdorf, a former POW compound. Here his father-in-law, the
estate owner Dr Erich Lundwall, was the representative for the prisoners.
The partisan guards wore old SS uniforms, although they sported red stars
in their caps together with the letters KTOF - Koncentrační Tábor Okres
Frývaldov (Concentration Camp Area Freiwaldau). The same legend hung
over the door of the camp, but later this was changed first to ‘internment
camp’, then ‘collection point for internees’. The restructuring of the
Freiwaldau camps by the authorities in Prague was not popular with the
partisan guards. In the period of the wild camps, the partisans not only
wielded power, but allegedly amassed quantities of valuables, food and
drink, some of which might have been intended for the prisoners. New
arrivals were worked over by the guards, beaten with whips and rifle butts.
Latzel describes two boys of fifteen or sixteen who tried to escape and were
brought back to the camp by their own communist fathers. They were
slowly tortured to death after swastikas were carved into their buttocks.
They were finally shot in front of two prisoners chosen from each hut. A
Nazi greengrocer was selected for special treatment. He eventually
vanished. It was assumed he had been killed. The guards also enjoyed
whipping a seventy-year-old man. After each stroke he had to say ‘Děkuji!’
(Thank you!).74
Once the camps were taken over by the regular gendarmerie, the
brutality was moderated, if never exactly stopped. The bourgeois Latzel was
given unusual work to do outside the camp. He ploughed the fields and
worked in the woods and factories; he plundered farms and factories and
dismantled machines. Nothing was ever entered in an inventory. The food
improved with time. To a diet of dried-potatoes-and-water soup
unbelievable delicacies were added: vegetables and pearl barley and, once a
week, meat. Every now and then there was jam, and cakes at Christmas.
Eventually there was even a visit from a priest, though he was not allowed
to deliver a homily, and some amateur dramatics were permitted, as well as
a cabaret. Some mild, anti-Nazi propaganda appeared, such as an obituary
for the Third Reich that was intended to be witty. The Nazi Karl Froning
thought it tasteless and silly. When they were shown films of the Nazis’
victims they thought they were falsified (a common enough reaction at the
time) - ‘most of us had seen enough of these atrocities ourselves and
suffered them on our own bodies’.
There was a third camp for men in the Freiwaldau area at Thomasdorf; a
fourth, Biberteich, housed around 300 women. Karl Schneider spent a
gruelling fourteen and a half months at Thomasdorf after he was accused of
shooting a Czech. He was tortured and had the usual beating from another
prisoner, Franz Schubert from Niklasdorf. Schubert did not hit him forcibly
enough and was clouted so hard as a result that he fell dead to the ground.
The same night the Czechs killed two others after hours of torture. One of
them was a boy of fifteen or sixteen. The commandant greeted the new
arrivals with the usual smashing of heads and limbs. When one was seen to
bleed profusely he remarked, ‘German blood is no blood, it is pig’s shit!’
The commandant’s name was Wiesner, which suggests he might have had
some of that non-blood himself.
The Pg and SA member Karl Froning was the former administrator of
Thomasdorf in the days when it had contained Russians. He seems to have
fared reasonably well by comparison to others, possibly because some of
the Czech passion was spent by the time he arrived in the camp in July. He
remembered the Czech lessons in the open air, calculated to humiliate
Germans who had always refused to learn that language. Effusions of
violence were not unknown, however, and the guards had a particular
animus towards a Freiwaldau physician called Dr Pawlowsky, who was
obliged not only to lie in his own excrement, but to consume it too. He
eventually collapsed before his torturers and died. In four weeks, Froning
estimated, some 10 per cent of the 200 inmates died from one cause or
another.75
In Bilin (Bilina), north-west of Prague, they had the good fortune to be
taken directly to the border without being subjected to a Czech camp. Anton
Watzke nonetheless saw appalling scenes along the way with the Czech
soldateska killing German women. They even shot the priest. In another
instance the witness Adolf Aust remembered seeing a man shot who had
paused to relieve himself.76
Brüx, Saaz, Komotau, Aussig and Tetschen
It was the Poles who liberated the town of Tetschen (Děčín) in the north
on 10 May. For five days they raped, looted, torched and killed. A grocer
was taken off to the water tower and thrown in. They shot at him and
missed. Finally one of the Poles fished him out, saying he had done well
and his life was saved. The Poles reportedly killed scores of POWs; the rest
were taken to the camp at Jaworczno where they were sent down the mines.
Other Sudeten Germans were deported to Glatz in Silesia, which had been
awarded to the Poles. Here they went through their agonies all over again
until they were re-expelled with the Silesian Germans - this time to the new
slimmed-down ‘Reich’.
According to Franz Limpächer, there was just one Czech in his village
of Kleinbocken: Stanislaus Mikesch had moved there from Kladno, married
a German girl and become a great enthusiast for Hitler. After the arrival of
the Poles he re-emerged wearing a good many red stars and announced that
he was now the local commissar. He immediately confiscated his
neighbour’s belongings. More Czechs arrived from Prague, Tábor and
Pardubice and took over the houses of the Germans.77
In the small town of Brüx (Most) near by, Dr Carl Grimm was attached
to the Czech police as a doctor for Germans. He said Brüx had 30,000
inhabitants, of whom two-thirds were Germans. Some of the worst raping
and pillaging was carried out by Russian DPs who had been brought in to
work at a local dam. Part of Grimm’s work was to certify the causes of
death, and he therefore took note of the number of suicides in the months of
May, June and July. At its high point, some sixteen Germans committed
suicide daily, often entire families. Few could shoot or gas themselves as
the Germans had been obliged to hand over their weapons and their gas had
been cut off. Most had hanged themselves from whatever convenient perch
they could find for that purpose. Grimm thought the total number of
suicides amounted to between 600 and 700 - about 3 per cent of the German
inhabitants.
Grimm’s work with the local police delayed his imprisonment. The
other Brüx men were taken off to a camp at Striemitz, half an hour away on
foot, while the women were taken to the Poros glassworks in Brüx itself,
from which a thousand were eventually marched to the German border at
Deutschneudorf. Some of the men were put to work in the mines and at the
hydrogenation works. Others were taken to Concentration Camp 28 at
Maltheuren.78 Germans who worked in heavy industry were often protected
by the Russians who requisitioned the factories. When the factories were
handed over to the Czechs, the Germans who worked there were put into
Camp 27. German mine directors were shot: Czechs had been forced to
work there during the war.
Householders were simply at the mercy of Czechs who appeared at the
doors and forced them out. Apart from a thirty-kilo suitcase (which would
be stolen from them anyhow), they were allowed to take nothing with them.
The Czechs were protected by soldiers who then took the Germans off to
‘evacuation camps’ like Negerdörfel in Brüx, which had formerly been an
anti-aircraft barracks. Some of them were quickly invalided out to
Germany.The worst treatment was naturally meted out to former Nazis,
together with the owners of important buildings or impressive houses. They
were either taken to Camps 27 and 28 or locked up in the barracks, the
police HQ, the local court or Striemitz. Once again the men had to box one
another, with the guards standing by to make sure they hit hard.
The terror in Brüx started late, on 1 August. The rest of the German
men were rounded up, beaten and marched off to Camp 28. Grimm gives a
full list of the camps in the borough of Brüx: 17/18 and 31/32 near
Maltheueren, Rössel camp and Camp 37 near Brüx itself, 22/25 at
Niedergeorgenthal and 33/34 at Rosenthal. These camps provided workers
for the hydrogenation works, which normally employed 35,000 workers.
There were also camps for the mines, which employed a further 25,000, but
Grimm didn’t know their names. He estimated that there were around thirty
camps in all in that part of Czechoslovakia. During the war, the mines and
the dams had been staffed by foreign workers - Dutch, French, Italians,
Croats, Bulgarians, Poles, Ukrainians and Russians. Now they were to be
replaced by Germans.
Grimm himself was in Tabor - or Campbd - 28, with a fluctuating
population ranging from 500 to 1,400 souls. The inmates were not just from
the local towns and villages of the Sudetenland; there were Germans from
the Reich too and Hungarian Germans. The camp was made up of wooden
huts, with around thirty men to a cell. The fury of the Russians and Czechs
had not abated. In the interests of maintaining health, fifteen men who were
suffering from tuberculosis were shot. Beatings were a matter of course and
the work was gruelling enough: eighteen hours a day at the hydrogenation
works with six hours’ sleep. Work was a two-hour march away, and a two-
hour slog home. The march was all part of the planned humiliation. It was
led by two ‘court jesters’, one wearing a top hat and the other a Prussian
Pickelhaube. The prisoners with white swastikas and ‘KT 28’ on their
backs had to sing German nationalist songs. One of the jesters came to a
sticky end when the ‘Kadle’ (commandant) Vlasak tried to shoot through
the top of his hat as a joke, and hit him in the head by mistake. When he
was laid out in his coffin he was found still to be alive and was shot two
more times through the heart.
‘Kadle’ Karel Vlasak liked to be called ‘Tgyr’ or ‘Tiger’. The prisoners
had their own name for him: ‘The Beast of 28’. He walked around the camp
with a revolver in one hand and a nagaika or cat-o’-nine-tails in the other.
He liked to strike the prisoners with his entire forearm. When they fell, as
many did, he would kick them in the stomach and the testicles. His
compatriots cheered at the sport. Eduard Kaltofen recounts a story of his
beating a crippled solder to death with his own crutch. On another occasion
four men had to prepare their own coffins before they received a shot in the
back of the head. Vlasak was later arrested - not because of his behaviour
towards the prisoners, but because he had taken property from them and not
handed it over to higher authorities.79
The occupation of the famous hop town of Saaz (Žatec) and nearby
Postelberg (Postoloprty) followed similar lines. On 9 May the liberating
Russian armies raped and shot a few of the overwhelmingly German
citizenry. Some Germans hanged or poisoned themselves, others vanished.
The Russians were replaced by Czech soldiers under General Svoboda on 2
June. In the meantime, the locals had been praying that the Anglo-
Americans would step in to create some sort of equitable division between
the Czechs and the Germans. That never happened. On the 3rd it was
decided to rid Saaz of its Germans. Before the war there had been some
16,000 people in the town. Five thousand men and boys were herded into
the market square. Anyone who struck the Czechs as unusual was savagely
beaten. The men were then marched off to Postelberg fifteen kilometres
away, where the population had already been evacuated. The journey took
two hours. If a man collapsed he was shot - boys in front of their fathers,
fathers in front of the boys. The Saazer males were installed in an old
barracks building. Another 150 men were left behind in Saaz Prison where
they were subjected to more sophisticated brutality. They were taken off to
Postelberg later that day, leaving only the anxious womenfolk behind.80
The following day there was a small-scale massacre in the Postelberg
Barracks. A detail was formed to bury the dead in gravel ditches that would
from now on serve as the camp latrine. The men were then robbed of any
valuables they had about them. Later a detail went through the prisoners to
locate doctors, pharmacists, priests, members of the important professions,
useful skilled workers, half-Jews, men married to Jews and any former
inmates of German camps. They were transferred to the camp in Saaz.
The hoi polloi spent the night in the stables. In the morning the doors
were opened with a cry of ‘Rychle, rychle!’ (Quick, quick!). Those who
tarried were gunned down. The dead and wounded were tossed into the
latrine. The remaining men were sifted politically. All members of the SS,
SA, Nazi organisations, the Wehrmacht and the National Socialist Party had
to come forward. The shootings continued throughout the day and night.
Five boys of around fifteen who had tried to escape were beaten bloody
with whips and executed before the eyes of the others.
The survivors, numbering perhaps 275, were crammed back into the
stables. It was four days before they received any bread and by then some
had gone out of their minds. When the doors were finally opened, one of
the men emerged stark naked and pranced around like a ballet dancer. A
German captain begged the chief torturer, Police Captain Marek, for the
right to die like a soldier. Marek made him kneel down to shoot him in the
back of the head. He fired and missed. The German officer turned and said,
‘Shoot better!’ Marek took two more attempts to finish him off.81
For the former soldier Ottokar Kremen from Komotau (Chomutov), the
Russians were sweetness and light compared to the Czechs. Returning from
the army on 7 May, he found the town occupied by Russian soldiers. They
assured him they would not be staying long and allowed him to take away
some clothes. When he discovered that his bicycle had been stolen while he
was inside, the Russian major commandeered a motorcycle from another
Russian and gave it to him, together with a laissez-passer in Russian.
Kremen then went to his sister-in-law’s house in the nearby village of
Gersdorf. He was not alone in finding the Russian soldiers more
understanding than the Czechs. Dr Siegel in Theresienstadt said the
Russians were often ‘notably more decent’. A Russian doctor treated the
wounds of those that came out on work details and helped others to flee.
Siegel used to tell girls who wanted to escape the misery of the nightly
rapes to make friends with a Russian and clear off with him.82
Nearly a month later, at the beginning of June, the Czechs came to
Gersdorf and arrested Kremen. He was interrogated and asked whether he
had been in the SS, the SA or the Party, all of which he denied. The Czechs
seized the motorbike and everything else they could find and took him to an
inn where he had to box other Germans. Then he was escorted to the former
Hotel Weimar in Komotau where he was locked up in a room with sixteen
others, including an eleven-year-old boy who was later shot with his father,
the owner of the local bell foundry. They were taken from the hotel-prison
to the camp that had been set up in the former Komotau State Farm. As they
left, a Czech held a bust of Adolf Hitler and they were told to salute it.
Kremen heard one Czech say to another that anyone who made the so-
called Hitler Greeting would be shot. Kremen told the others and no one
raised their hands. At the camp they had to strip. Any good clothing was
carted off and they were given rags that had belonged to those who had
already perished; very often they were covered in blood. Kremen was led to
a large room with seventy-eight other men. They were drilled all day -
including men of eighty. Anyone who did not march properly was beaten.
Kremen found his knowledge of Czech useful. He was able to take over
the drilling, and at his own request he taught the prisoners Czech, which
meant they could sit down for a while. The SS and SA members were later
picked out, beaten up and shot. The other men had to clean up the yard and
scatter sand on the blood. The survivors were then sent to the ‘infamous’
concentration camp in the former French POW camp at Maltheuren. But
Kremen and a few others were spared. They were put in the old glassworks:
him, a doctor called Lockwenz, an engineer, an Austrian who was known to
have shown goodwill towards Czechs, a Yugoslav, a staff captain from the
Czech army and a local postman. The Austrians and the Yugoslavs were
sent home. Meanwhile the glassworks filled up again with more Germans,
so that the inmates totalled 360 men and eight women. A lot of local
worthies were among them: directors of local industries, including the
sausage maker, who was later beaten to death, a priest and a gamekeeper,
who also perished. They were put to work on the railways, with Kremen as
interpreter. While he was at work, Kremen met a young Czech railwayman
who had been offered a three-room flat in Komotau. He had refused. He
didn’t want someone else’s flat. ‘Where will it all lead?’ he said. ‘I am not
going to take any of the flats here, they have all been stolen.’83
Back in the camp the beatings and torture continued. One Latvian could
hardly make himself understood, as he knew little German and less Czech.
He claimed that his membership of the SS was an accident. He was shot. A
German colonel who had served in the Czech army until 1924 was beaten to
death. A geometer who had a Polish-sounding name also died a hideous
death. There had been little love lost between the Czechs and the Poles
since 1938, when the Poles had seized the moment of the Czech diplomatic
defeat to march into the Tetschen area and appropriate it.
Kremen had been lucky he was not in Komotau when they celebrated
the Revolution there. All the men aged between thirteen and sixty-five were
made to assemble in the square. There were between five and six thousand
in all. The area was then cordoned off. The men had to remove their upper
garments to see if there were the usual SS markings. Anyone found to have
the tattoo was stripped naked and beaten to pulp. One young, blond boy put
up a fight. They prized open his legs and destroyed his genitals before
beating him to death.
The survivors were marched out through Görkau, Eisenberg and
Kunersdorf. On the way they passed a half-dead local official who had been
strapped to a telegraph pole. They spent three nights in Gebirgsneudorf
before moving on to Brüx and Maltheuern. Here they were given their first
food for four days. The Germans worked in the hydro-electric works. When
the anniversary of Lidice came round the camp commandant personally
slaughtered the Komotau optician and his two sons and another boy in front
of one another. Germans were forced to beat each other up. Their Calvary
came to an end when 250-300 of them were sent to Germany in August
1945.84
The Czechs indulged in a little orgy of shooting in the small town of
Duppau near Kaaden (Kadan). First they shot the soldier Franz Weis and
threw his body on to the town square; shortly afterwards it was the turn of
two SS men who had been invalided out of the army, Josef Wagner and
Franz Mahr. The headmaster of the secondary school, Andreas Draht, and
his assistant teachers, Damian Hotek, Franz Wensich and Rudolf Neudörfl,
were next in line. The Czechs then turned their attentions to the chief
postmaster, Karl Schuh. The men who carried out this little massacre were
Captain Baxa and Lieutenant Tichý. In the village of Totzau close by they
killed thirty-four Germans because they found arms, although permission to
keep them had apparently been granted by the American Army Command
in Karlsbad. In another place they shot the wife of the roofer Holzknecht
because she looked out of the window at the wrong moment. In Podersheim
they killed the farmer Stengl, and another eighty Germans were massacred
in the Jewish cemetery. None, according to the witness Eduard Grimm, was
associated with the Nazis. Josef Jugl was accused of being a Werewolf, and
hauled off to the camp at Kaaden. On the way the Czech guard took pity on
him. ‘Kaaden Prison bad,’ he said, ‘you still young.’ He told him to scarper,
and Jugl did.85
On 30 July there was an explosion in Aussig (Ustí nad Labem). The
Svoboda Guards had arrived that night in the town, forcing the Germans to
wear white armbands and walk in the gutter. About 300 young men from
Prague turned up. At about 3.30 a.m. the eyewitness heard a terrible bang,
and thought a cupboard might have fallen over. He climbed on the roof and
saw smoke billowing from somewhere behind the Marienberg: it was a
huge ammunition dump, filled with captured German weapons. Later the
Germans were accused of having sabotaged it. He went out on to the street.
Luckily he wore no armband, for the explosion was also the signal to attack
the Germans with whatever weapons came to hand. As the town
commander allegedly put it: ‘Now we will start the revolution against the
Germans.’ He saw men and women with prams thrown twenty metres off
the bridge into the Elbe and then shot at by the SNB guards with machine
guns. Any that managed to reach the bank were beaten with iron bars.
Eventually some Russian soldiers succeeded in clearing the streets and a
curfew was established. About 400-1,000 people had been killed.86
Anti-fascists did not necessarily have any advantages. As one Czech
told Herbert Schernstein, ‘Němec jest němec’ (A German is a German).
Schernstein had just returned to his home town after seven years in
concentration camps as a communist. He had endured Theresienstadt,
Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück. His friend Willi Krebs, who had been the
founder of the Prödlitz Communist Party, had been robbed of his shop.87
Near Aussig were the concentration camps Lerchenfeld and Schöbritz.
Heinrich Michel was actually working as a policeman for the newly
appointed police director Douda when he was arrested on 16 May. Douda
was a Muscovite who had been employed in the local gym. He had gone to
Russia in 1938 and therefore had the complete confidence of the new
regime. After insulting Michel, he had him thrown into a cell in the
courthouse prison with a painter, a gunsmith, a lawyer and others. On the
second day the cell began to fill up. One man brought a ‘bestial stench’ with
him. It soon became clear why: he was seeping excrement from his trouser
legs to his collar. When they undressed him they found no appreciable part
of his body that was not covered in blood. He had been caught trying to
escape and suffered the consequences.
After drinking three-quarters of a bottle of schnapps, the lieutenant
commanding decided he would show them how to treat an SS man. The
doors to the cells were thrown open, including that housing the SS. He
chose Willi Künstner, an honorary member of the SS and personnel
manager of the firm of Schicht, a major employer in Aussig. He was so
badly beaten that he had to be taken away to hospital where he died without
regaining consciousness. The courthouse gaol was the feeder for the local
concentration camps. Michel was taken to Lerchenfeld where he was made
a kapo. A former Luftwaffe camp that had been manned by Hungarians and
wrecked by the Russians during their advance, it was run by a Commandant
Vrša. All new arrivals had to sing the ‘Deutschlandslied’ and SA songs
while a picture of Hitler was paraded before them. Then they had to run a
forty-to-fifty metre gauntlet while they were lashed with bullwhips. SA men
received an extra twenty-five stripes on the bottom.
With time the population of Lerchenfeld camp grew to 3,500. Michel
himself was severely beaten by a Czech guard. When he asked him why he
had treated him that way the guard said it was because he had once reported
him for stealing a cake when he was twelve years old. When the Russians
took over Lerchenfeld in October, the inmates were moved to Schöbritz.
They had to build the camp themselves and that meant spending the first
night in the open air. In Böhmisch Leipa (now the ‘Czech’ Česka Lipa), a
camp was erected for around 1,200 Germans. In the savagery of the Czech
takeover the innkeepers of the area seem to have come out badly, while the
local Landrat or councillor had his face pushed in his own excrement until
he died from that and other beatings. Two hundred and fifty-one prisoners
perished within twelve months.
Theresienstadt
The most notorious camp in Czechoslovakia was Theresienstadt, the
Nazis’ show camp where inmates had been required to purchase living
space in a ‘model ghetto’. Many of Germany’s, Austria’s and
Czechoslovakia’s most famous or most talented Jews had been holed up
within the eighteenth-century walled town. They died in droves, either from
neglect or when they were shipped out to Auschwitz or Treblinka.
On 5 May 1945 Theresienstadt was taken over by the Red Cross. The
commandant, Karl Rahm, tried to escape and the last Jewish administrator
(the Jews had their own governing body) tendered his resignation.88 A
typhus epidemic kept the prisoners in the ghetto for the time being. The
Czechs saw a new use for the citadel: it would be filled with Germans.
Some were put to work tending the sick Jews. On 24 May there was a
delivery of 600 Prague Germans of both sexes, including Red Cross sisters
from the clinics. They were taken to the Little Fortress about a kilometre
away from the fortified town. It had a long, dark history. It was here that the
murderers of Archduke Francis Ferdinand - Princip and Čabrinović - died in
1918. They had been too young for execution and had succumbed to TB.89
In Nazi times the Little Fortress had been largely devoted to political
prisoners. The SS had their amenities there, including a swimming pool and
a cinema. In 1943 the Little Fortress was expanded with the construction of
a fourth courtyard. The 600 Germans were taken there.
The prisoners were separated into four groups: men, youths, children
and women. The entrance was through a low archway covered with grass.
Once inside the dark tunnel leading to the cells the RG lashed out at the
men with truncheons, beating them to the ground. Anyone who failed to get
up was fertiggemacht (finished off). In the courtyard they had to run the
gauntlet. Those who fell were dealt with in person by the Camp
Commandant Alois Pruša, who beat in their kidneys. He was occasionally
assisted in his work by his daughter Sonja, a girl of around twenty. Another
source attests to his having two daughters, both equally brutal. One boasted
that she had killed eighteen Germans with her own hands. Pruša’s own
viciousness might have been explained by the fact that he had been detained
in Theresienstadt by the Nazis. Another inmate, Eduard Fitsch, maintained
that the guards were all former concentration camp prisoners.
Those who had been ‘finished off’ breathed their last in their own
appointed cell. Between fifty-nine and seventy of the 600 died in those first
few hours. Two hundred more succumbed in the next few days. Pruša and
his assistant Tomeš did not give much hope to the survivors, who were told
that those who had entered the Little Fortress would never leave it. All their
papers, photographs and other - non-valuable - effects were put on a heap
and burned. The man who commanded the fourth courtyard was a Pole
called Alfred Kling. He claimed that he was an expert in killing and could
simply decide by the number of strokes how long a victim would survive
his beating. As he put it, ‘We have reduced you to such a state in two
months that the Gestapo would have needed five years to achieve.’90
Dr E. Siegel, a Czech-speaking general practitioner working for the Red
Cross, was subjected to the full initiating ceremony. Not only was he
beaten, but there were attempts to dislocate his arm and break his bones. A
truncheon was placed in his mouth to knock out his teeth, and he was told
to confess he was a member of the SA - which he continued to deny. When
they had finished with him he was thrown on a concrete floor in a pool of
his own blood. There he lay for three days until a Czech ‘colleague’ visited
him. This man picked him up by the hair and dashed him to the ground
again. He still failed to die.91
Siegel was made camp doctor. Not that he could do much for the
moment. As a result of his torture he could neither stand nor sit. With his
left hand he needed to hold up his head, otherwise it fell on to his breast - so
badly damaged were the muscles in his neck. His left eye functioned only
when he looked straight ahead, and he could hardly hear as a result of the
blows to his ears. His heart gave him trouble, but another doctor was able to
give him some injections. They were not short of medicaments - according
to Siegel, they lay in heaps around the former ghetto.
Once he was able to walk again, Siegel was ordered to kill a number of
allegedly elderly prisoners in Cell 50 by lethal injections as it would be a
pity to prolong their agonies. He tried to get out of the order, even going so
far as to hide the poison. In the account he wrote later, he says he was saved
by a visit to the camp by a Czech doctor who proposed the creation of a
typhus ward. Siegel was put in charge. It was set up in the old SS cinema on
6 June. Later he had the chance to look into Cell 50 on his rounds. He
discovered its occupants to be aged between sixteen and eighteen, and
apparently members of the SS. Many of them had freshly amputated legs
and dislocated joints. Their bandages had come off and their stumps were
septic. They were so thickly crammed into the cell that their bodies
touched. They begged for their dressings to be changed, but Siegel was
forbidden to touch them or mention that he had seen them, lest he be locked
up with them himself. He said that these miserable boys were Pruša’s pride
and joy, that he would literally jump around like a clown at the sight of
them - although he was careful to show them only to his special friends and
not to the authorities from Prague.
The hundred or so children under twelve had a special building to
themselves. At first this was used for propaganda purposes as there was a
courtyard for them to play in and a place to hang out their washing.
Journalists were brought to the camp to see the children and note how well
they were treated. It was a case of history repeating itself: there was a
famous film produced by the Nazis in Theresienstadt, made to show the
outside world how humane it was. At the onset of winter, however, the
children were not so happy, because their quarters offered them little or no
protection from the cold.
Pruša maintained that everyone in the camp was a member of the SS or
the Gestapo. When the Russians expressed doubts about a number of boys
aged from twelve to fourteen, he replied that they were detained as the
children of SS or Gestapo men and that one of them had managed
singlehandedly to kill eleven Czechs. A similar story was retailed by the
Czech Ministry of the Interior: Theresienstadt contained only SS, despite
the fact that half its inmates were women of ages ranging from suckling
children to one old lady of ninety-two. There were also a number of blind
people who had been brought to the Little Fortress from Aussig after the
massacre. Much of the savagery stopped when Pruša was replaced by a
Major Kálal, who had no time for Germans but had, at least, a proper
soldier’s dislike of torture.92
Pankrác
One September evening in Pankrác (Pankratz), Hans Wagner had a little
performance to distract him from his sufferings: public executions. A gibbet
was set up outside the prison. Children stood on the cars to get a better view
of the hangings and there was a crowd he estimated at some 50,000. After
each execution they cheered.
The first in line was Professor Josef Pfitzner. He was followed by an SS
Gruppenführer Schmidt from Berlin. Next came the lawyer Franz
Schicketanz, who had prepared the case for the Sudeten Germans presented
to the British mediator Lord Runciman in 1938. Then it was the turn of Dr
Blaschtowitschka of the German Special Court. His father, the president of
the Prague Senate, died of hunger a few days later. Among the other victims
that day were Dr Franz Wabra, who headed a unit for internal medicine at
the hospital in Beraun, and an insurance official called Straněk. The Czechs
were killing some of their own collaborators: General Blaha, the founder of
the Society for Czech-German Friendship, together with its president,
Richtrmoc and its chief executive, Major Mohapl. The first two were
condemned to death. Mohapl was sent down for twenty years.
The most prominent denizen of Pankrác was Karl-Hermann Frank.
Wagner saw him exercising in the yard every afternoon. The former
Reichsprotektor had been handed over by the Americans and was publicly
hanged on 22 May 1946. At the beginning of 1947, another group of
German Czechs were strung up: Ernst Kundt, Hans Krebs and Hans Wesen.
The leading doctor, Karl Feitenhansl, was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The cases against Rudolf Jung and Dr Rosche were dropped - both had
already died from hunger in prison.
There were German Jews in Pankrác too. Dr Karl Loewenstein, once a
prominent Berlin businessman and former marine officer, had been in
charge of the Theresienstadt ghetto police. The Czechs accused him of
collaboration, assisting in the deportation of two Jewish policemen to
Auschwitz. Loewenstein remained fifteen months in the prison. He was cast
as a ‘typical Prussian officer’ who fulfilled his duties with an unbending
zeal. He remained in Pankrác despite letters of protest from the Jewish
leader Leo Baeck in London and others. He shared a cell with other
Germans, chiefly SS men. There was so little food that the prisoners ate
grass and eggshells. In March 1946 the Czechs finally decided that the
accusations were groundless: Loewenstein was simply a disciplinarian who
had done more to alleviate the sufferings of the Jews than to aggravate
them. He was released from Pankrác but not freed. He went to the camp at
Leitmeritz (Litoměřice), where once again he was surrounded by the race
that had locked him up in the first place and slaughtered his friends and
relations. He was not released from his Czech captivity until January
1947.93
Torture
Torture appears to have been the rule. In Prague, Johann Schöninger,
who had been based in London before the war, was hit with iron bars and
had nails driven into his feet. His assistant, Schubert, was beaten to death.
In Domeschau Johann Rösner had lighted matches pushed under his
fingernails. In Komotau, the torture seems to have been similar to the rack.
A Waffen-SS man’s penis and testicles had been so worked over that the
former had swollen to 8-9 cm thick and the latter were septic. The whole
area round to his anus was filled with pus and stank. In Theresienstadt one
woman observed a female SS member being forced to sit astride an SA
dagger: ‘I can still hear her screams.’ The chief torturers in the Little
Fortress were two guards named Truka and Valchař. Guards used a variety
of instruments for beating and lashing their victims: steel rods sheathed
with leather, Spanish pipes, rubber truncheons, iron bars and wooden
planks. In Klattau (Klatovy) one man had wooden wool soaked in benzene
put between his toes and set alight so that it burned his sexual organs.
Siegel thought they must have had orders from above, because the methods
used in all Czech camps were broadly similar.94
The first time the activities of the Czech torturers ever came to court
was in Germany itself, with the trial of Jan Kouril, one of the most brutal
guards at Kaunitz College. Kouril had later been assistant commandant of
Kleidova camp. He made the mistake of trying to sell gold fillings to a
German dentist in Munich. The dentist recognised him as one of his
torturers, and Kouril was tried and sentenced to fifteen years in prison by a
court in Karlsruhe. During the trial the grave-digger from the College gave
evidence that 1,800 bodies had been removed, including the corpses of 250
soldiers. While Kouril could find not one witness in his defence, 200 came
forward for the prosecution.95
In June 1945 a law was introduced to stop beatings in the camps. It was
not always heeded, but it alleviated some of the sufferings. The Czechs also
punished commandants and warders who overstepped the mark. By all
accounts this had less to do with the prisoners than with the pocketing of
their effects. Dr Siegel tells us, for example, that the ‘monsters’ Pruša and
his two daughters, as well as Kling and Tomeš and others from
Theresienstadt, were tried in the court in Leitmeritz.96
Expulsions
The end of the nightmare was the beginning of another: the march to
Germany or Austria. The deportations were sanctioned by Article 13 of the
Potsdam Accords, although it was stipulated that the expulsion of the
civilian populations should take place in the most humane manner possible.
Hans Freund went to Dresden in the blistering heat of June 1945. No water
was provided and many of the older Germans died.97
It went relatively smoothly for Margarete Schell, who found herself on
the same train as her mother and stepfather. She arrived in Hesse ‘a beggar,
homeless, outlawed - but free!’ They had been allowed to take just thirty
kilos of possessions with them (later this was increased first to fifty then to
seventy kilos) and were assigned to a numbered goods wagon. In each car
there was a little stove to warm them, but not enough room to lie down.
Right up to the last moment there was a worry that the Americans were not
going to let them in. They were Czechs, not ‘Reich’ Germans after all.98
The expulsions did not cover all Germans. Some were left to rot in
Czech prisons. Alfred Latzel’s father-in-law, for example, was sentenced to
eighteen years by a People’s Court in Troppau, to be served in Mürau bei
Hohenstadt, a medieval castle once the most dreaded prison in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. During the war it had been used to house Czechs and
Polish prisoners suffering from TB. The death rate had been alarmingly
high. Other Germans were retained after 1946 to work in the mines or
forests. The People’s Courts were painfully reminiscent of their namesakes
in Nazi Germany: justice was summary, death sentences ten a penny, life
imprisonment was an option, otherwise the culprit received five or ten years
in the mines. Max Griehsel had worked at the main office of the DAF, the
Nazi forced-labour organisation. He received a five-year sentence. The trial
was over in ten minutes.99
The Sudeten communists, who had never supported Henlein and who
had suffered under the Nazis, fared no better. Like the new Poland,
Czechoslovakia would not suffer minorities (except Slovaks). About 10,000
of them were expelled. It was a rare example of a deportation that followed
the rules laid down at Potsdam. It was orderly and relatively humane.100
Less so were the first organised shipments of non-communist Germans in
the summer of 1946: pictures show some of the 586,000 Bohemian
Germans packed in box cars like sardines.101
The behaviour of the Czechs and Hungarians created more frustrations
for Lucius Clay. He was worried about the definition of ‘German’ in
February 1947, especially as a number of pure Czechs were seeking refuge
in the West to escape from the communist shadow that had been cast over
their country. The expulsions were suspended for a time. When the Soviet-
inspired communist coup took place in 1948, many Czechs followed the
path of the Germans across the border. They became refugees in their turn.
As Clay was quick to point out, they were ‘not loved in Germany’ as a
result of the expulsions.102 From Hungary came ‘Swabians’, a development
which perplexed him.be
The process was revived on 1 September 1947 at a rate of twenty trains
arriving from Czechoslovakia every month.103 At the end of the official
expulsions the Americans asserted that they had received 1,445,049 Czech
Germans to settle in their zone, of whom 53,187 were anti-fascists; the
Russians had accommodated 786,485, including 42,987 anti-fascists. The
rest came in dribs and drabs, as many were still held to work in the mines.
In 1950 the Czechs admitted to having 165,117 German-speakers, but the
figure was probably somewhere between 210,000 and 250,000. The
expulsions had caused an economic crisis in Czechoslovakia. Despite the
pickings for the Czechs, whole villages remained empty and the fields
around lay fallow for want of labour.104 It is thought that 240,000 Germans,
German Bohemians and Moravians died at the hands of the Czechs.105
The Hungarians began to expel their Swabians on 1 November 1946.
The Germans were spread throughout the country and at first no one
thought of them as suspicious. Many were dragged off to Russia to work in
Siberia, along with Hungarian men - the Russians could not so easily tell
the difference. Then the minister president Béla Miklos decided that the
Germans would be sacrificed in the interests of better treatment for
Hungary. He would distance himself from his former German ally. A wide-
ranging land reform was instituted and Germans were interned, as the
Russians themselves had suggested in the spring of 1945.106
In May 1945 the authorities in Hungary identified between 200,000 and
250,000 Germans they wanted to expel. They were to be allowed up to 100
kilos of luggage. The Americans had allotted them an area near
Württemberg. The process continued until August 1946 when the
Hungarians began to lose interest and some Germans came out of hiding.bf
Not all had been banished by any means.107 The terrible winter led Clay to
suspend the process until the spring. Already 168,000 had settled in the
American Zone. The usual reports came in of their miserable state.
According to the American journalist James K. Pollack, they too had been
robbed down to their wedding rings and arrived wearing all the clothes they
possessed.108 The number of refugees in the American Zone was becoming
a problem. Clay wanted to send some back across the Oder-Neisse, but that
was impossible. For six months of 1946 he had suspended the reception of
ethnic Germans into the American Zone because he did not feel the
expulsions complied with Potsdam’s call for a ‘humane and orderly’
resettlement. This was a double-edged sword, as it prolonged the misery of
the poor souls trapped in the east.109
Romania was also ready to evict its 600-year-old German community
(there had been 745,421 German Romanian nationals in 1930). Border
changes at the so-called Adjudication of Vienna had shifted some of them
on to Hungary, but there were still over half a million Germans, mostly in
the Banat and the Siebenbürgen. In one town, Braşov or Kronstadt on the
western side of the Carpathians, they formed a slender majority. Hitler had
already launched his plans to move them to the Reich, a scheme that had its
echoes in the policies of the Federal Republic after the war. The Romanians
were less harsh to their Germans than other central European countries
were, although they were briefly interned; they were well treated on the
whole.110
There were also major expulsions from Yugoslavia, where there were
more than half a million Germans in the census of 1921. Many of these
were in Krain, which contained the German-speaking pocket of Gottschee.
The 35,000 Gottscheer had already fallen victim to Hitler’s alliance with
Mussolini, as the western half of Slovenia had been annexed by Italy in
1941. In the winter of 1941 to 1942 they had been resettled in Lower Styria
and in Carinthia in an instance of ‘ethnic rationalisation’. Those Germans
who remained behind in 1945 were pushed into camps such as Gakavo,
Kruševlje and Jarek (the latter took in most of the Batschka Germans),
while Rudolfsgnad and Molidorf were reserved principally for Germans
from the Yugoslav Banat. In Rudolfsgnad nearly two-thirds of the 30,000 or
so inmates died of typhus. About 6,000 more died in Jarek.111 Czechs
continue to deny that any wrong was committed against the German
Bohemians after the war, but they have a word - odsun, ‘spiriting away’ -
which is used to describe the ridding of their land of Germans at the time.
There was no exchange but expulsion ‘without ifs or buts’.112 It is described
not as an act of revenge, but as an ‘historic necessity’. There were a few
voices raised against the process at the time; notably two Catholic papers
Obzory and Lidové Listy and the journalist Helena Kozeluhová, who was
eventually required to emigrate.113 Then came the communists, and with a
brief hiatus for the Prague Spring there was an official silence about the
matter. Some exiles from communism did mention it, however. One of
these was the former minister Jaroslav Stránský, the uncle of one of the
Prague torturers, who had fled to London. Blame was laid at the feet of the
communists.114
OceanofPDF.com
5
Home to the Reich! Recovered Territories in the
Prussian East
The recommendation that the expulsion of the
German-speaking people from Poland, Bohemia,
Hungary and Rumania - about twelve million in all -
and their resettlement in the overcrowded ruins of
Western Germany should proceed in an ‘orderly and
humane’ fashion was somewhat reminiscent of the
request of the Holy Inquisition that its victims should be
put to death ‘as gently as possible and without
bloodshed’.
Golo Mann, The History of Germany since 1789, Harmondsworth 1987, 812
OceanofPDF.com
PART II
Allied Zones
Prologue
Germany was formally divided into zones on 5 June 1945. They were of
course clumsily drawn and certain industries became largely unworkable as
a result. Spinning was in British Westphalia, but weaving was in Russian
Saxony; cameras were made in the American Zone, but the optical glass
came from the Soviet, and the shutters from the French; the Americans had
68 per cent of the car industry; while the Russians had all the kaolin needed
to supply the various porcelain manufactures that were the pride of the old
German Residenzen.1 They were very different parts of Germany. As far as
the Western Allies were concerned, the joke ran round that the Americans
had been given the scenery, the French the vines, and the British the ruins.2
The Allies squatted in their zones offering greater or lesser degrees of
co-operation with their neighbours. The Anglo-Americans worked
reasonably well together and, as comrades in arms, they went on to create
Bizonia at the end of 1946 by uniting their zones. This became Trizonia
when the French finally agreed to the merger. The French saw their piece of
the German cake differently - almost as a conquered fiefdom. Naturally the
Russians would brook no interference with their slice and their purposes
were more similar to the French. What concord existed came at the
meetings of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, which met for the first
time on 30 July 1945 and issued its initial proclamation exactly a month
later. The ACC convened three times a month, bringing together the four
‘elements’, as they were called, on the 10th, 20th and 30th at the old
Kammergericht in the American Sector. During the Third Reich this was the
seat of the notorious Volksgericht or People’s Court, which had tried
offences against the state and had handed down huge numbers of death
sentences.
After Potsdam the Kommandatura was set up in the Luisenstrasse in
Berlin. It was the one Russian word that was palatable to all the Allies. That
the Soviets took precedence was clear to all and sundry: the Western Allied
flags had second place under a giant red star and hammer and sickle. The
Russian commandant was General Gorbatov, while Zhukov’s chief of staff,
General Sokolovsky, sat in on the meetings. The British representative was
General Lyne. The spadework at the ACC was done by the deputy military
governors or DMGs, leaving the governors proper to deal with their
governments. Each meeting was chaired by a different power, which also
provided the ‘light refreshments’ that followed. They generally were light,
except when the Russians were the hosts. The first British DMGs were
General Sir Ronald Weeks (who retired through ill-health in August 1945)
and General Sir Brian Robertson. The French sent General Koeltz, followed
by General Noiret. The governor, Pierre Koenig, came to Berlin ‘as seldom
as possible’.3 Clay was the Americans’ emissary. The DMGs also regulated
the work of the 175 different committees. A DMG typically spent the mid-
week in Berlin and the weekends in the zone. It was different for the
Soviets of course: Berlin was in their zone.
OceanofPDF.com
6
Life in the Russian Zone
Die Preise hoch
Die Läden fest geschlossen.
Die Not marchiert mit ruhig festen Schritt.
Es hungern nur die kleinen Volksgenossen,
Die grossen hungern nur im Geiste mit.
Komm, Wilhelm Pieck, sei unser Gast
Und geb, was Du uns versprochen hast.
Nicht nur Rüben, Kraut und Kohl
Sondern was Du isst, und Herr Grotewohl.
OceanofPDF.com
7
Life in the American Zone
They send us chicken feed and expect us to say
thank you.
Johannes Semler. Quoted in Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard, ein Politikerleben, Munich and Landsberg am Lech 1996, 51
OceanofPDF.com
8
Life in the British Zone
No German is persona grata with Mil. Gov.
A British officer. Quoted in Charles Williams, Adenauer, London 2000, 296
OceanofPDF.com
9
Life in the French Zone
When they at last reappeared, their faces looked as
white as the slips of paper they carried in their hands,
and they were speechless. They had spent that half an
hour arguing with three stubborn, disinterested little
bureaucrats already half asleep with wine. The men had
carefully examined, or pretended to, every paper in
their possession and then insisted on their filling out a
sheaf of forms. Only after these had been carefully read,
checked and rechecked were four Americans given
permission to inhabit two rooms in Stuttgart for the
night.
James Stern, The Hidden Damage, London 1990, 104-5
OceanofPDF.com
10
Austria’s Zones and Sectors
The 8 May! The day, the hour when every bell in
Vienna proclaimed peace and the end of the Second
World War. I was lying on an upturned fridge, unwashed
and unshaven, covered in filth in my ‘partisan uniform’
in a coal cellar in the Plösslgasse in the 4th Bezirk. The
door to the cellar was guarded by a Red Army soldier
speaking only a smattering of pigGerman, who played
ad nauseam the first bars of the Volga Boat Song - he
clearly couldn’t manage the rest.
Carl Szokoll, Die Rettung Wiens, Vienna 2001, 380
Vienna
On 9 May 1945 Cardinal Innitzer said Mass for Karl Renner’s new
Soviet-backed administration. All the working bells in the city were set to
chime and celebrate the end of the war in Europe. Vienna was still a sad,
wrecked city. More than 80,000 homes had been wholly or partially
destroyed and 35,000 people had nowhere to live. For the most part there
was no gas, electricity or telephone. Large tracts of the 1st Bezirk had been
turned to rubble in the last months of the war and in the wild looting that
followed liberation. The commercial Kärntnerstrasse was among the worst
hit. The French commander, Lieutenant-General Emile-Marie Béthouart,
described it as a heap of ruins. At one end the gutted opera house, at the
other the roofless cathedral, the Steffl.1
Unlike Berlin, Vienna was still recognisable under the dust and rubble.
The American novelist John Dos Passos came at the end of 1945 and
admitted that the city still ‘wears the airs and graces of a metropolis . . .
Vienna is an old musical comedy queen dying in a poorhouse, who can still
shape her cracked lips into a confident smile of a woman whom men have
loved, when the doctor makes his rounds of the ward.’2
The Russians were still the real power in the city, and Austrians were
required to fetch and carry. When Graf Alfred Sturgkh turned up three-
quarters of an hour late for a meeting at the Chamber of Commerce it was
because the count had had to unload a delivery of potatoes from a lorry.3
Anything might happen: in Hietzing people were being thrown out of their
houses for the benefit of the Russian garrison. The Margaréthas had to move
up to the attic to make room for a general. For the time being they had a
courteous colonel lodging with them who brought them flowers and wine
and went to the ballet.4 The former Nazis were proscribed. Most Pgs tried to
conceal their pasts, some tried to hide themselves, others committed suicide
- such as Josef Schöner’s friend the dermatologist Professor Scherber and his
wife, who came from Komotau in German Bohemia. Now that German-
speakers were being slaughtered with impunity, there was no point in going
home.5
The cautious Eugen Margarétha thought it wrong to be too black and
white about the Nazis. ‘However just the measure might be, it is possibly
going to come down hard on some individual cases who are decent fellows
in themselves . . . men who are hard-working in their domain and
indispensable people will be excluded from the economy.’ There was a little
mutual backscratching to be done. Margarétha’s greengrocer in the
Naschmarkt wanted him to sign an affidavit to say that he had been a good
man - despite membership of the Party. Margarétha received a lettuce for his
pains.6 He had little sympathy for most of the Austrian Nazis. Now they
were saying that they had been forced to join the Party, and that they had
been compelled to ‘torture hundreds of thousands of people to death, to gas
them or kill them in some other way! I am not a vengeful sort, but I have no
patience when I see and hear these now innocent lambs.’7
There was another side to the coin. As the Germans were also well
aware, the concentration camps had housed not just political prisoners and
innocent Jews or gypsies; they had also been used for hardened criminals.
Now all former KZlers were allowed to jump the queue for ration cards, flats
and other benefits. Eighteen thousand homes in Vienna were made available
to them, as well as to the bombed-out and the homeless. Margarétha’s office
had had a visit from a couple of former inmates ‘who have now mastered the
situation and are demanding jobs, accommodation, clothing etc’. They were
‘common criminals. Now you can’t tell the difference between this sort and
the poor devils.’8
Subsistence levels had dwindled to next to nothing. There were
1,500,000 people in the city and around forty lorries available to bring in
supplies. Rationing was reintroduced on 6 May, and on 1 June the daily
intake was fixed by the Russian authorities. The citizens were to have 250-
300 grams of bread a day, with 50 grams of fat and 20 grams of sugar. When
the refugees came flooding in across the Czech border the situation
worsened. Starving German Bohemians and Moravians were not averse to
robbing houses in the north-eastern Weinviertel in the hope of finding food.
The Viennese looked to the Western Allies for succour.9
They were making slow progress. On 11 May the Americans were
reported in Amstetten, the Russians had gone into Graz. Later the Americans
took Klagenfurt in Carinthia. The British were having to contend with
unforeseen changes to their Austrian policy, because in their absence Tito’s
partisans had moved into Carinthia and made it known that they intended to
keep for Yugoslavia part of the territory earmarked for the British Zone. In
Vienna on 16 May the mood was very low, because of the delay in seeing
Western troops in the city.10 After a month of looting and rape the Western
Allies were needed to raise the tone of the occupation. The Viennese
appreciated there might be disadvantages too: the Westerners would seek to
control the administration down to the smallest detail, whereas the Russians
had an ‘Asiatic liberality’ coupled with a sloppiness that allowed the
inhabitants of their zone to get on with what they wanted.11 This was
evidently the version edited for Austria. The Soviets did not behave like this
in Germany. The Austrians were not the enemy, after all. The Russians were
very little interested in the Austrian Pgs, for example. The Western Allies
might just have dug a little deeper. Some people maintain that the Soviets
were more interested in wiping out the opposition, because they impeded the
smooth exercise of power in the zone.12
As it was, a small advance party from the Western Allies did arrive on 3
June, just 186 of them in 140 cars. Field Marshal Alexander declined to go,
and sent Major-General Winterton instead. General Flory represented the
Americans and General Cherrière the French. They were spotted in the
Lainzer Strasse and covered with flowers. The Viennese received them with
jubilation. The Westerners took no notice of this effusion: the no-frat rule
was still in force. The story was now ebbing out: the Allies were going to
treat the Austrians ‘differently’, but not necessarily better. The Russians had
allotted eleven Hietzing villas for the use of the Western Allies. The purpose
of their visit was to work out the partition of the country, but although the
Russians plied them with caviar, they proved truculent when it came to
showing them airfields.ci The Westerners were required to take their leave on
the 10th, but did not depart until the 13th. The Russians were keen to reach
an agreement - they were fed up with paying for the provision of the
Austrian capital.13
New problems were emerging for Austria: huge numbers of people were
converging on the impoverished country. Around 100,000 Germans from
Prague, Brno and southern Moravia were streaming across the frontier with
their Czech tormenters in hot pursuit. The subject was on everyone’s lips
that June. Austria had no border guards to turn them back; the Russians did
nothing, and they had no food to feed them with. In Krems in Lower Austria
the refugees were deeply resented.14
Renner was in favour of letting them in, even if only 20 per cent of them
had any claim to Austrian citizenship.cj Renner was from Moravia himself,
from just outside Nikolsburg,ck where many of the local Germans had been
massacred.15 The rest of them, said Schöner, were Reich Germans, or
German-speaking Czechs. The communist minister of the interior, Honner,
was keen to throw them out, and - when they woke up to the fact that they
had another 300,000 mouths to feed - the Russians were too. The question
was where could they send them? The Czechs maintained they were leaving
their country of their own free will - like those who were quitting Poland.16
As regards the German-speaking Czechs, the attitude was less sauve qui
peut than on a pu nous sauver! (and to hell with the rest of them). The future
president of the National Bank, Margarétha, had a full report on the
expulsions from a Dr Dyszkant who had visited Brno and Prague. Germans,
‘but Austrians as well, are being chased away and on the road from Brno to
Vienna you see endless columns of refugees in a most miserable state who
pluck the fruit from the cherry trees as their only form of nourishment. In
Prague you hear not one word of German spoken any more.’17
In exchange for the ‘ethnic Austrians’ Austrians wanted to see the backs
of any German nationals left in their country. In 1945 there were 346,000 or
them. Ten years later that number had dwindled to 18,600. They were
‘treated with no consideration, dispossessed, properly seen to and
expelled’.18 The new foreign minister, Dr Karl Gruber, was one of their most
outspoken critics. They had once again asserted their superiority over the
‘sloppy’ Austrians. Gruber wanted revenge: ‘only with difficulty and full of
fury did the Austrians put up with the long years of Prussian condescension
and meddle-o-mania’. Gruber added that he thought that many of the
Germans had come to Austria to escape from the consequences of their
actions at home. There was possibly some truth in the assertion, but it
sounded like a dangerously familiar game of putting the Allies off the
scent.19
Far from showing sympathy for their ethnic German brothers and sisters
in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, the Austrians now began to
flex their muscles a bit to demand territory for their martyred state. These
demands did not come from the federal government, but they had the
backing of Gruber, especially in his capacity as governor of the Tyrol. If the
Poles could have some more land, why not the Austrians? The newly
recreated Burgenland still hankered after the city of Ödenburg (Sopron in
Hungarian), which had been awarded to Hungary at Saint-Germain and had
failed to come back with the rest of Burgenland because of a ‘falsified
plebiscite’;20 from Josef Rehrl, the governor of Salzburg, came a call to
detach Berchtesgaden and the surrounding region from Bavaria - despite its
ominous past - as well as the Rupertiwinkel, which had been estranged from
the archbishopric of Salzburg in 1809.
When they were not planning a merger with Switzerland (there was
some talk of this in the Tyrol too), the Vorarlberger eyed the Kleine
Walsertal, where the pastures made some of the best Bergkäse; the Tyroleans
wanted their brothers and sisters to the south; Upper and Lower Austria
looked enviously towards southern Moravia and Bohemia, despite the
streams of wretched German-speaking refugees and the certain knowledge
that the Czechs were purging the region of Teutons; finally there were even
discussions in Styria and Carinthia about revising the borders, and not just to
fend off the Yugoslavs, who were keen to wrest away areas of Austria where
there were populations of Slovenians. The Carinthians even mentioned the
Kanaltal and Gottschee,cl where there were clusters of Germans who had
come adrift from the fatherland and who felt insecure in the post-war
world.21 Renner gave a nod to the Foreign Office to pour a little cold water
on these territorial claims; Gruber, however, even spoke of ‘reparations’.22 It
is possibly in response that the story is told of the Germans offering to send
back the bones of Adolf Hitler.
Margarétha, who failed to note Hitler’s death in his journal, referred to
this overweening self-interest on the part of the Viennese in his entry for 14
August:
The Viennese are not interested in the atom bomb, nor the participation
of the Russians in the war [in Asia] . . . nor Japanese surrender; all they are
interested in are the questions: when will the unbearable demarcation lines
within Austria be wound up? When will we be rid of the Russians? When
will the new tram lines be finally ready? When are we going to get meat,
when are we finally going to have something to smoke? When will we have
coal and wood for heating, when gas? When will there be glass for the
window panes? The Viennese are not in the slightest bit interested in
elections . . .23
In London Austria’s territorial ambitions were given short shrift. The
European Advisory Commission limited itself to the job of dividing Austria
up into four zones of occupation. Access to Vienna from the Western zones,
however, was held up until June. In the meantime exiled political groups
continued to put pressure on the Allies, who in turn paid them scant
attention. After Otto von Habsburg returned to Europe in 1944, London was
the centre of legitimist agitation. He had not been a sparkling success. His
agitation in America had upset the governments in exile and the State
Department had had to issue a statement in April 1943 that it had no desire
to reinstate the Habsburgs.24 A leading monarchist was the Jewish nobleman
Baron Leopold Popper von Podhragy. In June Podhragy wrote a pamphlet
attacking Renner under the title An Experiment in Socialism using his
pseudonym ‘Florian George’.25
Renner had laid himself open: he was Austria’s ‘vicar of Bray’, a
communist toady who had begun life as a pan-German, a disciple of the
same antisemite Schönerer who had exercised a seminal influence on the
young Adolf Hitler. In 1918, when Austria had been divested of its subject
states, he wanted it hitched to the German Reich. In this he felt much as the
rest of his people felt at the time. He had also been implicated in the socialist
uprisings of 1919, 1927 and 1934. Podhragy was pro-Dollfuss, the Austrian
chancellor gunned down by the Nazis who himself brutally put down the
socialist revolt. Dollfuss had also scrapped democracy in Austria,
establishing the Corporate State. In Dollfuss’s Austria the press was
censored and arrest arbitrary.26 Podhragy might have had reason to suspect
that both Dollfuss and his successor Schuschnigg had monarchist leanings.
In 1938 Renner had publicly supported the Anschluss with Germany, where
other ‘German Austrians’ had been more reticent about the Nazis.
Renner had been quite open in giving his reasons for supporting the
Anschluss and had urged Austrians to do the same. In an article published in
London in May 1938 he had accused Dollfuss of ‘monarchism and
mediaeval clericalism’. ‘German-Austria’, a word of his own coinage, was
and remained in his view a component part of the German Republic.27 After
April 1945 he did not go back on this and he was as keen as ever to remove
the trappings of the Corporate State. He had also become a Russian puppet.
American intelligence reported that it was almost impossible to get
anywhere near him, as he was always flanked by Russian minders.28
Seven years of German rule had wrought many changes. Whereas in
1938 most Austrians would have supported some sort of bond with Germany
- not necessarily with the Nazis - in 1945 no one would have openly
admitted a pan-German bias. German behaviour in Austria immediately
following the Anschluss - the deporting of large numbers of ministers and
government officials to Dachau; the brutal revenge against anyone who had
been instrumental in repressing the Nazis during the time they were illegal;
the confiscation of over half of the Austrian industrial base;29cm the
deportation of the Jews (although many Austrians were not just indifferent
here, they actively joined in); the privations of war; the deaths of near ones
and dear ones; and finally the capital crime, defeat - had all served to sever
any bonds of affection that might have united the peoples on either side of
the Inn. If there were pro-German Austrians after 1945, they kept mum or
sought some other way out.
The Soviet authorities were playing their usual game and delaying the
entry of the Western Allies. As the American commander General Mark
Clark put it in the hard-hitting Cold War idiom of 1950: ‘They were busy
looting Austria at the time, and didn’t want to be bothered.’30 On 4 July 1945
the Allies came together again to decide the form of the Control Council.
The Western missions were headed by the DMGs: General Winterton for
Britain, General Gruenther for the US, and General P. R. P. Cherrière for
France. The Russian commander was allegedly ill,cn and the Soviet Union
was represented by Colonel General A. S. Zheltov, a political commissar
who was high up in the NKVD and who was famed for his entirely negative
attitude.31 Tolbukhin was actually in the doghouse and was replaced by
Koniev on the 7 July. Stalin was cross because he had allowed the Red Army
to give a negative image of the Soviet Union.32 Fischer was angling for a
German-style SED: a united front of communists and socialists. He had been
inspired by the communal elections in France, which had returned the
communists as the largest party in the country. Schärf feared that if the
Western Allies did not arrive soon there would be a communist putsch.33
The zones were not finalised until 9 July. The Soviet Union clung to its
bastions in the east: Burgenland - abolished by the Nazis and recreated for
the Russians - Lower Austria and Upper Austria north of the Danube. The
United States faced them across the Danube in Upper Austria, as well as
taking on the Salzkammergut. Britain was anchored in the south, with
Carinthia, Styria and the eastern Tyrol. France was left with the rest of the
Tyrol and the Vorarlberg. As in Germany, this meant some adjustment of the
lines. The Russians, for example, had occupied the eastern half of Styria.
Margarétha would have expressed the views of most Viennese in voicing his
unhappiness at the settlement. The Russian slice of the cake ‘meant that the
land around Vienna will be further leeched by the Russians, and that we will
receive no potatoes, no fruit, no milk, no eggs . . .’34
Under the Allied agreement, the city was divided into four sectors like
Berlin. The difference was that the 1st Bezirk, which occupied the medieval
city bordered by the famous Ringstrasse, was managed by all four powers, a
different victor taking on the role every month. Command was represented
by four generals who reigned supreme in their sectors, and who administered
the 1st Bezirk communally. They were the military commissars, whose
presidency was also subject to monthly change. The 1st Bezirk was patrolled
by the famous ‘four in a jeep’: a military policeman from each of the
occupying powers.
Beyond the 1st Bezirk, the Allies all had their sectors, each of which
included a slice of the inner city within the Gürtel as well as some more
suburban areas. The Russians had the old Jewish quarter in the second, and
Floridsdorf bordering the Danube, helping them to maintain their control of
the waterway, Wieden and Favoriten; the Americans received Neubau,
Alsergrund, the Josefstadt, Hernals, Währing and Döbling with its vineyards;
the French had Mariahilf with its famous shopping street, Penzing, Fünfhaus
and Ottakring. Their offices were in the old Military Academy. General
Béthouart was billeted in the villa of Frau Petznek in Hütteldorf. She was the
only child of Crown Prince Rudolf who, after her marriage to a Prince
Windischgraetz, had wedded a socialist politician. The Russians had been in
the villa before him. They had removed much of the furniture and ripped the
crowns off the books in the library. The British controlled Landstrasse, with
its important communications to their airport at Schwechat, Margarethen,
Simmering and Hietzing.
The Allies were the custodians of Austrian sovereignty. According to the
London Agreement, drawn up by the European Advisory Commission in
January 1944, they would continue to exercise executive power until
independence was restored by a state treaty. The Austrian government had to
submit proposals to the four powers, whose decisions had to be unanimous.
The Soviet Union fought off the notion of granting Austria its sovereignty
for ten years, although it was first suggested by US Secretary of State Byrnes
in February 1946, and the project had full British backing. The Russians’
pretext for their veto was that the country had been insufficiently purged of
its Nazis, although they were notoriously lazy about pursuing culprits.35
Renner had never been trusted by the Western powers. His chief rival
was the Dachauer Leopold Figl, who was the first to advocate a return to the
1929 Federal Constitution. Figl, patronisingly described by Mark Clark as ‘a
courageous and competent little fellow’,36 was the first great political figure
of the Austrian Second Republic. A vigneron from Lower Austria, he had
headed the Bauernbund or Peasants’ Union before 1938. He had received a
rough but effective political education in Dachau, spending a total of sixty-
two months in Nazi captivity along with a number of other important
political figures in post-war Austria. His hard peasant head proved an asset
when it came to dealing with Koniev, and he was often seen reeling out of
the Hotel Imperial (requisitioned by the Russian commandant), his belly full
of vodka, after some tough trading. Another Septembriste was Dr Karl
Gruber, who was only de facto foreign minister, because Austria officially
had no right to conduct its own foreign affairs.
Figl was freed on 6 April 1945. On the 17th he went to the Imperial to
make his peace with the conquerors.37 He emerged as the Landeshauptmann,
or governor, of Lower Austria. The Russians had no fondness for Figl, and
his conservative ÖVP,38 but they were hedging their bets, waiting to see if
Austria would fall into the communist bloc, and in the meantime they were
backing a multi-party system. Just to make sure the Austrians did not have it
too easy, however, they also gave credence to Yugoslav demands for
reparations and border changes.
Once the Americans had their feet under the desk in Vienna they too
took stock of the political situation. Renner had moved out of his old home
and into a former SS radio station in the Himmelstrasse in Grinzing. The
Americans knew about his pan-German past and his support for the
Anschluss. His persistent attacks on Dollfuss had angered Figl, who insisted
that the murdered chancellor had been a democrat at heart.39 The situation
was not an obvious one: socialists like Renner had managed to stay out of
concentration camps during the Nazi years, while the leaders of the
Corporate State - which might have been sympathetic to Hitler had it played
its cards right - had spent long, sometimes fatal, spells in Dachau and
Mauthausen. It was not until 6 September that the OSS recommended that
the American government recognise Renner’s regime.
The British were also playing hard to get. On 26 September they told the
Americans they were unwilling to recognise Renner because he was too
much under the thumb of the communists.40 The British thought the
communists wanted to extend their influence over the whole of Austria. The
dashing British political adviser Jack Nicholls (who was known to smuggle
women at risk from the Russians out in the boot of his car) had also
expressed his doubts about Renner’s self-important ways. With time the
British fell in behind Clark, whose view it was that Renner had to be given
time to clean out his stables and make the government more representative.
41
The British remained obdurate about their entry into Vienna, the
Russians having stolen a march on them once more. They had left the issue
to Churchill to sort out at Potsdam, which he had failed to do. Their refusal
to advance to their sector was ‘almost destructive’.42 It resulted in Stalin
agreeing to feed the Viennese population for the time being, but it was
hardly a humanitarian solution, unless the Russians could be relied upon to
do it properly. As it was, poor Austria was feeding a large number of
strangers. There were around a million refugees within its pre-1938 borders
and around 350,000 troops. The bulk of these were Russian, but there were
also 50,000 Americans, 65,000 British and 40,000 French. That figure had
been reduced to some 65,000 soldiers all told by the end of 1946.
The meeting of the victors at Potsdam in the summer of 1945 failed to
rule on the Austrian question. One thing was agreed, however - that in the
light of Austria’s ‘victim’ status, there were to be no reparations paid. The
French defied this by shipping home some valuable portions of Austrian
industry they found in their zone, but the Russians had a better way of
dealing with it. The day the conference opened, the Daily Telegraph reported
the hypocrisy behind Soviet behaviour. The Russians had already carried
away every machine, all cars and buses and cattle from the city: ‘Austria is
free but looted of all that can sustain or rebuild life.’ For six weeks there had
been no food delivered to the city, and half the newborn children had died.
The corpses of the city’s defenders still lay under the ruins of the buildings
they had fought over.43co
The Allies had appointed their own high commissioners to govern their
zones. Under these men there were a number of committees dealing with
particular problems such as denazification, the restitution of sequestered
property, DPs, POWs, military issues and disarmament. Once the Austrian
government was recognised after the 1945 elections, the Allied high
commissioners were invested with the rank of ministers in their respective
governments. In fact, despite the reports in the British press, there was some
small degree of co-operation between the Western and Eastern Allies at the
beginning, and some of the ‘German assets’ were run well, while others
were handed back to their original owners. The Allies jointly administered
the country’s oil industry at first, and Marshal Tolbukhin was in favour of
the removal only of Austrian heavy industry.44
Even the staunchly communist parts of the city in Heiligenstadt had had
enough of their Soviet liberators by the summer. For their own part, the Red
Army had found it unbelievable that the Austrian communists had managed
to live in such Gemütlichkeit in their fortress-like blocks of flats. There were
homely lace curtains and soft sofas more readily associated with the
bourgeoisie. Once the scales had fallen from their eyes the usual scenes of
rape and rapine had followed.45 On 22 July 1945, thirty American cars were
spotted in Mauer.46 Three days later a British quartermaster came to see
Eugen Margarétha. He asked the economist politely if he had any room to
spare. The Margaréthas volunteered two rooms on the parterre. It turned out
that the English were expected the next day. That proved to be yet another
optimistic rumour. They had still not pitched up on 5 August. Finally on the
12th a captain in the Coldstream Guards arrived, ‘a nice, well-turned-out
person’, who took pity on them and gave them sandwiches and beer. At the
end of the month electricity was restored and the Margaréthas’ fridge started
to work again, prompting much jubilation in the house.47
The world was at peace from the 15th. On the 19th the bedraggled
former capital of the great Habsburg Empire received a new monument. A
soaring column was set up on the Schwarzenberg Platz in the centre of the
city, surmounted by a figure of a Red Army soldier in a gilded helmet. The
coy Margarétha, who could not bring himself to talk about what the Russians
had been doing since their arrival that spring, said it had already been
dubbed ‘The Monument to the Unknown Looter’. Most of his compatriots
knew it as the ‘Unknown Father’ or, more coarsely, the ‘Unknown Rapist’.
The Russians erected their monument just six days before the other Allied
commanders moved into their digs.48
Koniev had asked the Allies to come to Vienna on 23 August to admire
the ‘Unknown Father’, but he was going to return Clark’s hospitality firstcp
and asked him to visit him in his HQ in Baden, the old summer capital. In
1945 it became Soviet army HQ and Russian officers and men moved into
holiday residences rendered infamous by the stories of Arthur Schnitzler.
The Russians had taken over most of the little spa and fenced off their
quarters with barbed wire. Clark was asked to review the troops, then was
taken back to headquarters and a bottle of vodka. It was the early afternoon.
The Russians were ‘obviously prepared for an afternoon of drinking. My
party was plied with vodka and there was more liquor on the table when we
went to Koniev’s for dinner about 5 o’clock.’ Clark came to the conclusion
the Russians wanted to get them ‘plastered’.
Not unnaturally, Clark was put out that Koniev was matching his shots of
vodka with nips of white wine. He complained, telling his Russian opposite
number that he wanted to drink the same juice as he was having: ‘you see,
I’ve got just one stomach to give for my country’. At ten they finished
dinner and went to Baden Opera House to see a performance of Russian
dancing. Clark had problems staying awake. The dancing was followed by a
propaganda film. Then Zheltov insisted they have another meal before they
went to bed. Clark went to his cot at four or five. Zheltov said he’d be back
at eight so that they could go for a swim. Clark had his black batman wake
him at 7.30 a.m. When he set eyes on his commander, he asked, ‘Boss, did
you drink some of that kerosene too?’49
Clark had no personal objection to Koniev, and they got on quite well at
first. The froideur of the Cold War only set in the following year, but in his
autobiography Clark gives the impression it was there from the start. The
American general cites an example of their mutual understanding when he
told the Russian his opinion of Fischer: ‘I don’t like him because he is a
communist.’ Koniev was completely unabashed. He apparently replied,
‘That’s fine. I don’t like him because he’s an Austrian communist.’50
The American intelligence officer Martin Herz, who interviewed Fischer
in August, understood him better. Fischer was a pragmatic communist.
Unlike Ulbricht in Berlin, he admitted that the Russians had raped women
during the occupation and that the emergency police they appointed
contained ‘many of the lowest, criminal elements of the population’. They
had been partly responsible for the looting. He was not in favour of the
proscription of half a million Austrian Nazis. The number was just too large
and doubtless included a great many hangers-on and nominal Party
members: ‘To outlaw them and make pariahs out of them would not only be
unwise, but also unjust.’ Fischer admitted candidly that National Socialism
was ‘a terror machine that worked with deadly precision and exacted
nominal acceptance from people who conformed only in order to be able to
live’. The Nazi rank and file should be allowed to redeem themselves.51
Clark had a little present for the Viennese before he went back to his
hunting lodge in Hinterstoder. In a mine in the Salzkammergut the
Americans had discovered the crown and regalia of the Emperor
Charlemagne. Now they wanted to restore it to its rightful place.
Unfortunately that meant the Hofburg, the imperial palace in the centre of
Vienna, which was occupied by the Russians. Renner was very much
opposed to the Americans letting it go anywhere near the Russians, so they
kept it in the vaults of the bank building that served as their HQ.52 The
Americans had armed it as if it were the Pentagon itself.53
It was Koniev who put an end to the British intransigence. He announced
on 27 August that he would withdraw his command over the Western sectors
of Vienna as of 1 September and that these areas would then be ‘without
masters’. The ploy worked, and the Americans, British and French took up
their positions on the first of the month.54 They could now look closely at
Vienna, which had been the Russians’ exclusive preserve since early April.
Herz noted that 200,000 Viennese were eating at the soup kitchens set up by
the Russians.cq It was hard not to give the Austrian communists some credit.
They were not tainted by their Austrian past, only by their period in Moscow
and the uncertainty of their instructions. The socialists were compromised by
their support for amalgamation with Germany; the conservatives because
they had been part and parcel of the anti-democratic Corporate State. The
communists had their ‘Immediate Programme’ which called for a purge of
the Nazis, three-party commissions to weed out fascists in the
administration, administrative reform, nationalisation of industry and a
democratic foreign policy. It was not meant to be a revolutionary
programme.55
The first meeting of the high commissioners took place under Koniev’s
roof at the Imperial on 11 September. Clark thought it a shambles. It was
Béthouart’s first chance to meet the charismatic American general, who he
decided resembled a Sioux Indian. The agenda was based on the four-power
arrangement decided in London before the end of the war. The Russians
knew exactly what they wanted: mastery of the Danube, the big oilfields at
Zistersdorf in the eastern Weinviertel, and the Austrian ‘bread-basket’ in
Burgenland.They already had most of the infrastructure - control of the
railway lines, the roads, the airfields and the telephone lines. All
international calls passed through Vienna, giving the Russians the chance to
monitor and control them. Similarly, the RAVAG, or Austrian radio network,
was based in the Soviet Zone. The Soviet forces thus still oversaw important
parts of the Austrian economic infrastructure, not just in the east of the
country, but nationwide.56
From 20 October 1945, the Western Allies thought it prudent to shift the
meetings around the corner to the Chamber of Industry on the
Schwarzenbergplatz (for the time being, Josef-Stalin-Platz). That meant
throwing out the Margaréthas. They found new premises and were helped to
move by black American drivers and Nazi forced labourers who were so
weak from hunger that they could hardly carry the boxes of files. The Allied
sessions took place once a month. They were stiff. For a while the British
high commissioner refused to attend because the Soviets would not allow the
West to bring in food supplies for the half-starved population. There was a
tea afterwards and attempts were made to break the ice. Koniev talked to
Béthouart about Balzac, which he had read in Russian.57
Possibly his interest in French literature led him to invite Generals
Béthouart and Cherrière, together with the civil administrator Alain de
Monticault, to a lunch in his Baden villa. Once again the vodka flowed.
Once again Koniev had an ulterior motive - he wanted to propose an alliance
with the French that would serve both their interests on the Council.58 The
communists were still a power to be reckoned with in French politics, and,
of all the Western Allies, the Russians had the most empathy with the
French.
All the main receptions to commemorate important Soviet feast days
were held in the Hofburg Palace. The feasts were as lavish as those held in
the Russian embassy in Berlin. There was copious vodka and caviar and the
Russians looked far more splendid in their Red Army dress suits than the
Western Allies in their khaki.59 A certain style and an ability to entertain on
an imperial scale may explain the gracious treatment accorded to the former
Austrian ruling house. Franz Joseph’s nephew Hubert Salvator was told that
the Russians would respect his property and person, and he was excused
from the duty of billeting officers. Béthouart relates that the Russians even
helped him put out his relics on Holy Days of Obligation.
The British HQ was in Schönbrunn Palace, where the commander
General Sir Richard McCreery occupied the room that had served Napoleon
before him, a fact that caused the French general de Lattre de Tassigny
considerable annoyance. McCreery, who had served with the British army in
Italy, endured strained relations with Koniev from the outset. Soon after he
moved into a villa near the palace in Hietzing the Soviets kidnapped his
gardener. He was never seen again.60
Each of the four powers was granted an hotel where they could put up
their guests. The Russians took the Grand, opposite the Hotel Imperial,
where the Russian commandant had his lodgings. It had also been Hitler’s
favourite on his visits to Vienna. The portrait of the Emperor Franz Joseph
had been replaced by one of Stalin. The Americans appropriated the smaller
but grander Bristol. The French occupied the Hotel Kummer in the
Mariahilferstrasse, and only later moved into the rather more impressive
Hotel de France on the Ring. The British were in Sacher’s behind the Opera.
The Western Allies all sponsored a newspaper which now joined the largely
propagandist Russian press consisting of Neues Österreich, the
Arbeiterzeitung, the Österreichische Zeitung and the Kleine Volksblatt. Now
the Americans launched the Wiener Kurier, the British Die Weltpresse and
the French Die Welt am Montag.
Clark gradually took on the role of baiter of the Russian bear that was
performed by Clay in Germany. He believed the Americans were ‘selling
Austria down the Danube’.61 When the Russians staked a claim to all
shipping on the river, Clark noted that the vital river barges were in the
American Zone in Linz. Linz was on the border with the Soviet Zone, so
Clark had them taken upstream to Passau, in the American Zone in
Germany. It transpired there were Yugoslav barges among them, and the
Yugoslavs began to complain. It was only when Clark had a direct order
from the secretary of state, however, that he agreed to hand over the
Yugoslav vessels.62
The political scene was beginning to move, and it looked hopeful for
Austria. On 11 September, the Allied Council gave permission for the re-
establishment of the three main political parties: popular, socialist and
communist. On 24 September Renner obligingly reshuffled his cabinet to
include Figl, leading the Western Allies to recognise his government on 20
October. Renner took the hint and resigned following the elections, which
took place on 25 November, eventually becoming federal president a few
days before Christmas when the deputies unanimously voted him upstairs.
On 3 December his place was taken by Figl.
The results of the first free elections since 1930 were announced on 2
December. There had been a 95 per cent turnout. Margarétha, who was one
of the founders of the People’s Party, the ÖVP, called them ‘brilliant’ and
with good reason: communist hopes were dashed and his party headed the
list with just over 1,600,000 votes, representing nearly half the electorate.
The SPÖ, the Socialist Party, won 1,434,898 votes. The communists, the
KPÖ, limped home a long way behind with 174,255 or 5.5 per cent. Even in
‘Red Vienna’ they had come third with just six seats in the regional
assembly. The SPÖ did best, with fifty-eight; the ÖVP won thirty-six. The
communists achieved just four seats in the Federal Parliament. Women, it
seemed, had been their undoing.
Women were now 64 per cent of the electorate, and they had suffered
unduly at the hands of the Red Army. The ÖVP campaigned with posters
that also showed the Russians in their worst light: ‘Ur-Wiener und Wiener
ohne Uhr, wählt ÖVP!’cr Another ruse was to put up posters telling the
Austrians, ‘For all who love the Red Army, vote KPÖ!’63 Missing from the
electorate were around a quarter of a million Austrian dead, 600,000 POWs,
half a million Nazis and sundry other political undesirables. The ex-Nazis
would not have helped the left much. Their half-million votes would
probably have gone to the People’s Party. Margarétha thought the message
would cause relief at home and abroad.64 He was right. The Americans
reported that Austria was now finally aware of the meaning of democracy.
The Figl government was recognised on 7 December 1946.65
The Viennese were cold and hungry. The larger coffee houses had been
taken over by the Americans. Margarétha and his wife had a modest
Christmas: festive Paprikafisch came out of a tin. The British captain was
kind enough to make Eugen a present of a dozen Havana cigars, and in turn
he gave the Guards officer a little bottle of cognac.66 Figl, however, began
his rule on fighting form. To thunderous applause he demanded the opening
of the demarcation lines between the zones, the restoration of Austrian unity,
the return of South Tyrol and the end of the Yugoslav threat to Carinthia.
Austria had never been a second German state.67
The communists were bitterly disappointed by the results of the
elections, although they were granted the concession of a ministerial
portfolio which went to Karl Altmann. As their Soviet-controlled newspaper,
the Österreichische Zeitung, put it, ‘We have lost a battle, but we are just at
the start of the battle for Austria, and that will be won.’68 Their failure to
endear themselves to the Austrian people may have been behind Koniev’s
departure: he was replaced by Vladimir Kurasov in the middle of 1946. Just
as in the aftermath of the Berlin elections of 1946, the Russians began to
show their teeth, creating petty difficulties for the Western Allies wherever
they could. As far as the Austrians were concerned, they had learned
nothing: the ÖVP were closet fascists misleading the public under a halo of
martyrdom (Dachau and Mauthausen), and the SPÖ were tainted by their
complicity in the Anschluss. Austria quite clearly could not be trusted to rule
itself.69
Feeding the Austrians
When Dos Passos visited Vienna at the end of 1945 he was able to have
a quick look round courtesy of American army public relations. He attended
Mass in the Hofburg Chapel and noted the American, British and French
‘gold braid’ listening to Schubert. The famous cafés, uncleaned and
unheated, served cups of ‘mouldy-tasting dark gruel called coffee’. The
waiters ‘kept up a pathetic mummery of service’ providing the usual glass of
water, but not the cream, although they still had the jugs. The writer plucked
up the courage to ask a waiter what was in the coffee. ‘That’s our secret,’ he
was told. He also wanted to know what the Viennese ate. ‘Bread and dried
peas’ was the answer.70
The winter had set in, provisions were at an all-time low, and there was
no fuel to heat houses and flats. The Allies gave permission for the felling of
large numbers of trees. Feeding Vienna remained a Western grievance. The
Soviets had made off with the arable land and the roads into the capital.
Their zone had produced 65 per cent of Vienna’s food before the war. Clark
said the Americans intended to give the Austrians 1,550 calories (he said the
average American had 3,000), but he admitted that the British had problems
matching that figure.71 As it was, the diet varied considerably across Austria.
In Vienna in May citizens received a piffling 833 calories, which they
presumably supplemented with fresh fruit and vegetables. In the American
Zone it was not much more, and the French complained they had no means
of feeding the Vorarlberger or the Tyroleans.
Desperation led the Austrian government to moderate the outward flow
of Germans and grant citizenship to one, the Nobel Prize-winning chemist
Friedrich Bergius, who had been trying to extract sugar from tree bark.
Bergius was also promising to make meat from wood, a project that has now
been dismissed as the purest alchemy. Bergius’s citizenship becomes all the
more scandalous given that he was fully in collaboration with IG Farben
during the war, and working for a Nazi victory. He fled to Buenos Aires and
died there in 1949.72
In order to receive foreign aid, Austria had to prove itself a proper enemy
of Hitler. At first it was the Russians who made trouble, charging that the
Austrians had not actively sought freedom from Hitler. After the war, it was
Yugoslavia that vetoed Austria receiving aid from UNRRA (the UN Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration). The aid was only forthcoming from
March 1946. The previous December the British Foreign Office had been
preparing a new four-power agreement for the administration of Austria that
would result in granting the Austrians a degree of self-government, but
holding them in check through vetoes. The Allies - particularly the British
and the French - wanted to scale down their operations in Austria, for the
simple reason that they were expensive.
The agreement was long in the making. At first the British did not tell
the other three of the draft; then the Americans opposed it. When it was
finally signed on 28 June 1946 it was supposed to last for six months, but in
reality it survived until the State Treaty was promulgated on 27 July 1955.73
The Austrian federal and state governments achieved a greater degree of
liberty and were able to use quasi-total power to run their houses. Military
government by the Allies was scrapped and replaced by ‘control missions’.
That the Russians saw the opening of a new era is clear, perhaps, from the
recall of Koniev and his replacement by Kurasov. Clark’s bugbear Zheltov,
however, remained behind.
As much as possible, the Western Allies sought to administer Austria
with the help of apparent anti-Nazis. Ulrich Ilg, who had been a minister in
the inter-war First Republic, was a typical appointee, much as the
gerontocracy had returned to power in Berlin. The French set him up in the
Vorarlberg. The British also worked to redraft Austrian law. An important
British contribution to the re-establishment of a non-Nazi Austria was
BALU - the British Austrian Legal Unit. The body had been formed in 1943
by pulling a number of Austrian lawyers out of the British army and putting
them to work in the War Office. In 1945 they were packed off to Vienna
where they formed part of the legal department of the Control Commission
under the British-born (but of German Jewish origin) lawyer Claud Schuster.
Schuster was assisted by George Bryant, né Breuer. BALU itself was run by
the Viennese Lieutenant-Colonel Wolf Lasky, who had worked in the town
hall until 1938. He was now claiming royalties for legal textbooks sold
during the Nazi interregnum. The Austrians took fright and appointed him to
the bench, so that he now enjoyed the curious position of being a judge in
both Austria and Britain. He never practised in Austria and had no desire to
settle there once his work was done. He later worked as a legal adviser to the
British in Germany.74 The British legal division generally advised acceptance
of the laws voted by the Austrian parliament. 75
In March 1947 a poll taken among the Austrians indicated the popularity
of the Allies - the Soviets, it seems, were not mentioned. The British were
well liked, but the French were no more than ‘perfumed Russians’. Mark
Clark was singled out for veneration for his tough stand against the Soviets,
Figl going so far as to call him ‘a legendary national hero’. Dos Passos
reported that he would wander around the streets of Vienna accompanied
only by an interpreter at a time when the city at night was ‘as in mediaeval
days’ - you went abroad at your own risk.76 The violence was normally down
to the Russians or gangs of DPs. The Austrians voiced their opinions of the
various DPs whose camps were scattered over their land: the Jews were
liked least, followed by the Poles, Yugoslavs and Russians. Quite a few of
these had become lawless bandits, seeking revenge for the indignities of the
lives they had led as KZler or forced labourers. The best loved now were
ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Balkans.77
With little food or fuel, Austria had around 600,000 extra mouths to feed.
There were about 170,000 ‘Danube Swabians’, 151,000 Sudetenländer and
15,000 Hungarian Germans, as well as 15,000 Germans from the
Siebenbürgen and the Banat and 170,000 Jews. It was only after 1949 that
the figures began to drop. The Americans put the DPs into the care of
Austrians, but the British thought they were better off under their own
authority. The Allies used the RAD camps that the Nazis had built for their
forced and volunteer labour force.78
A constant stream of German Bohemians and Moravians gushed into
Austria. The Russians had a camp for them in Melk on the Danube, but it
was grossly overstretched and they ended up becoming a burden to all the
Allied zones. The response was to demand the expulsion of ‘Reich’
Germans. Gruber was particularly vociferous here. By a highly specious
argument ‘German’ was made to mean ‘Nazi’. The expulsion of the
Germans from the Austrian body would purge it of its former evil. On 1
November 1945 the Americans stopped their ration cards in Salzburg.
Austria made a point of celebrating its anti-German past - books were
published, for example, that showed how gallantly Austria had resisted
Prussia in the Seven Years War.
In March 1947 there were hunger marches in Vienna and Lower Austria.
The demonstrators shouted, ‘Down with Figl’s hunger regime! We want new
elections! We are hungry!’ There was a sit-in at the chancellor’s office
orchestrated by the communists. The Viennese police were too terrified of
the Soviets to help. The latter even refused to allow the Allied ‘four-in-a-
jeep’ patrols to interfere. The demonstrations were coupled with the failure
of Gruber and the Austrians to make any headway towards independence in
Moscow.79
German Assets
The restitution of stolen property was part of the work of the Control
Council. The various Allies pursued property claims pertaining to their own
people. The French, for example, were anxious to trace the library of the
former prime minister Léon Blum, which had gone missing in Austria. It
was last seen in Carinthia, but was never found. As regards stolen Jewish
property, restitution was effected only in certain cases and in others the
awards were only partial.80
Restitution was complicated by several factors. One was that the Soviet
authorities were patently uninterested in the fate of the Jews, and were
determined to mop up as much property and money as they could. On 27
June 1946 the Russians seized all ‘German’ assets in their zone in
contravention of the Potsdam Accord. It followed on from similar measures
taken in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland. When the West protested,
the Russians contradicted the spirit of the Moscow Declaration and said that
the Austrians had ‘fought with Germany’.
‘German’ assets accounted for around a fifth of Austrian industry: more
than 62 per cent of Germany’s capital abroad. The total sums for other
countries - Finland, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia -
totalled 188 million dollars, while for Austria the figure was a staggering 1.5
milliard.81 Some of these assets had no connections with the Germans
whatsoever. Others were businesses legitimately built up and developed by
Germans. The Russians interpreted these matters very freely. Of 120
industries taken over in their zone, only 47 were actually ‘German’; and of
the seventy-six agricultural properties they took over, only one had
previously been in German hands. They expressed their intention of taking
over the 27,000-hectare Esterházy estate based in Burgenland, for example,
which could hardly be described as German and which would have fed
(according to the Americans) between 80,000 and 100,000 people. They had
72 per cent of Austria’s oilwells and half the country’s refinery capacity.82
Soviet Russia’s determination to grab all German property included
businesses that had been filched by Germans from Austrian Jews, who had
been either driven into exile or murdered in the camps. The Russians also
swiped a lot of things the Germans had stolen from the Austrian government
and foreign nationals. The demands for compensation by certain very rich
Jewish families such as the Rothschilds were used by the Russians as a
justification for their actions, as they claimed that the Americans would
beggar the Austrians were such claims to go through. They were much fairer
in their approach in that they shared their spoils with the people of their
zone. They sequestered the oilwells, although the equity had been mostly
held by Britons and Americans before the war. Their argument was that the
foreign interests had been legitimately sold to the Germans in 1938 and that
the Anglo-Americans had no right to claim them back.83
They took what ships they found on the Danube. Some of the companies
seized were simply stripped of anything of value that could be sent home to
Russia. Others were run at a profit. USIA (Upravleinje Sovetskogo
Imuščestva v Avstrii - Administration of Soviet Property in Eastern Austria)
was the company the Russians created to administer their spoils. In 1949
USIA was running 250 factories with 50,000 workers and controlled a third
of industrial production within the Soviet Zone. These factories made all
Austrian locomotives and turbines, half of the nation’s glass, fuel and
pharmaceuticals and around 40 per cent of its iron. They also had 157,000
hectares of land. The Russians continued to exploit Austria though USIA for
a decade and their profits over that period are estimated at over a milliard
dollars. The Western Allies protested, but, as no one wanted war, their
protests remained hot air.
Russia was anxious to snatch ‘German’ assets in the west too, but that
came to nothing. Not all the industry was in the east. VOEST was originally
the Hermann-Göring-Werke in Linz. After Potsdam’s ruling on former
German property the huge steelworks, one of the most modern in Europe,
fell to the Austrian state. In the light of Soviet behaviour in the east, the
Western Allies demonstratively waived their right to reparations - in the
French case, somewhat reluctantly.84
The confiscation of the Zistersdorf oilfields gave rise to an act of
resistance by Renner, who refused to sign the agreement.85 The Russians
threatened to report him to Koniev, but he must have known he had the
backing of the Western Allies, Clark in particular, who - like Clay north of
the Inn - could see the propaganda value in exposing Soviet knavery in this
and other instances. Clark also claims to have foiled a Soviet attempt to take
over the building of the Ministry of the Interior.
January 1945. The inhabitants of East Prussia have finally been allowed
to flee, but the Red Army has cut them off from the Reich at Elbing. In
desperation hundreds of thousands make their way across the frozen inland
sea or Haff. Russian warships open fire on the ice
The ‘treks’ began that winter. These Silesians are making their way west
in any transport they can find. Note the elegant carriage among the carts and
traps
Over sixteen million Germans left their homes, few of their own free
will. These Sudetenländer are being shipped out in cattle trucks. The manner
of their going was a relief, however, after what many had suffered in the
camps
Conditions on the trains were at best primitive. Everything had to be
done in the carriages. If they were lucky the Czechs or Poles allowed them
to take off the waste
Miserable Sudeten expellees wait to board the train to Germany
Pious Sudeten Catholics hear an open-air Mass on their way to their new
lives
Silesians assemble in the streets of their town prior to their expulsion.
This was only the beginning of their Calvary: they would often spend weeks
in a transit camp where they would face the most abominable treatment.
Many died
The Oder at Frankfurt. This was to be the new Polish-German border
after the Western Allies gave in to Stalin’s demands at Potsdam
For the Jews life in the new Poland and the new Czechoslovakia had few
temptations: the ruins of the White Stork synagogue in Wrocław (Breslau) in
1991
Sudetenländer rounded up in Bergreichenstein (Kasperské Hory) push
their goods to the assembly camp. They are wearing white armbands to mark
them out as Germans
Germans were allowed to take only the basic minimum with them. Here
in Bergreichenstein in eastern Bohemia Czech officials inspect suitcases and
clothing for anything of value
Note that the guard is wearing a recycled German helmet while his
colleague is trampling on the German’s possessions
A rare of the Little Fortress in Theresienstald with German prisonners.
During the war the Kleine Festung had provided accommodation for the SS
and was used for occasional executions of Crechs and Jews. Now the boot
was on the other foot
Josef Schöner’s pictures of the ruins of Vienna. The State Opera House
with the Jockey Club behind. The Jockey Club had taken a direct hit in the
last weeks of the war. Hundreds of bodies lay in the cellars
OceanofPDF.com
11
Life in All Four Zones
Germany today is divided into four zones and
within each there are
two worlds: an army of occupation and a conquered
people.
The former are not just there to supervise and control,
they must
also exert an influence; they are meant to stop up the
spirit of aggression
and nationalism and eliminate it before leading the way
to
democratic self government; civilisation should heal the
smashed and
shaken land.
The first question that comes to mind is what do these
two worlds
know of one another? How do they perceive one
another? What is
the real relationship?
Naturally no one expects an army of occupation to
become an
object of love and adoration, and on the other side, a
conquered
people, whose leaders without question launched the
war, cannot
expect to be treated at once with sympathy and trust.
But the task of reorientation, even successful
administration,
requires an atmosphere of trust and respect on both
sides.
Carl Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht für das Kriegsministerium der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Göttingen 2004, 71
Children
As a Viennese Jew returning to central Europe in British uniform,
George Clare steeled himself against feeling pity for the conquered. At the
railway town of Hamm in Westphalia, his mettle was put to the test by a
swarm of infants who appeared under the train windows: ‘Eh Tommy . . .
Please Tommy vat you got? Chockie, sandvich, sveets?’ Clare observed the
‘manna from Britain’ that was tossed out to the urchins: hard-boiled eggs,
sweets, sandwiches, chocolate bars, oranges, apples, even tins of pilchards.
The children fought with one another to get at the loot while the soldiers
enjoyed the spectacle, like ‘throwing nuts to monkeys at the zoo’. Clare
went back into the compartment and fetched his haversack rations. He
jumped down from the train. The four children closest to the door ran away.
‘Hier bleiben!’ shouted Clare - Stay here! They turned back, curious to hear
a Tommy speak German. He shared out his rations among the four of them.
He wondered whether any German had done this in the Warsaw Ghetto and
yet he felt that what he was doing was right: ‘I could not hate all Germans,
as the Nazis had condemned and hated all Jews. No, I neither hated
Germans nor - with the exception of the children - did I pity them.’1
Many German children had become feral. They had lost one or both
parents, or had simply been estranged from them. In the big towns they
lived in holes in the ground like the rest, begging or scavenging for food. At
least one British high court judge began his life in this way, until he was
rescued by a British soldier who took him back to Britain with him and sent
him to school. James Stern remembered the vision of these curious
guttersnipes, clothed in rags - ‘or rather, from head to foot they were
perfectly camouflaged in filth, so that until they moved you could not tell
they were there’. At the approach of an adult, especially a foreign soldier,
they scattered like so many rabbits, disappearing into holes. When they re-
emerged they sniffed and stared around them. ‘And then you’d see that they
carried stones or sticks or bars of iron, and their teeth were black and
broken, or that they had no teeth, that one had a single arm, another a
crutch, and that the only clean spots on their bodies were the whites of their
eyes.’ When he looked into their eyes, however, they were no longer rabbits
to Stern - they were famished, diseased leopard-cubs ‘whose one enemy
was man’.2
Some of these children had homes, but they nonetheless went out and
hunted in packs, stealing what they could from the conquerors. When
Stern’s major was alerted to some theft from their well-stocked larder, he
decided that some children were to blame. The supposed criminals were
hunted down to a dung heap where they had their camp and threatened at
pistol point. The youngest of the boys was around five. The only evidence
they found was a bottle containing some pink petrol: American petrol was
dyed pink. That was enough to convict them. The major ordered a search of
their parents’ lodgings. The flats were searched and at least one of the boys
received a clip round the ear from his father, but no contraband was found,
and the case against the boys was dismissed.3
Nor was it only working-class children who took to crime in this way.
Zuckmayer met a certain Frau Doris von M., a former actress married to an
elderly Prussian nobleman who kept a boarding house for American visitors
to Berlin. ‘My son steals!’ she told the dramatist. ‘And we don’t know what
we should do about it.’ Her son and his private-school-educated friends
stole to trade, sometimes for pleasure, sometimes for sport: ‘The only true
Commandment is the eleventh - thou shalt not get caught.’ Jürgen was the
boy’s name. One day he returned with a pound of sugar that he had bought
with cigarettes pinched from a teacher’s pocket. He also had some
chocolate, taken from an American nurse. He proudly delivered these
preciosa to his parents, believing that he had done something useful and that
he was contributing to the family budget. He had two pilfered cigarettes for
his father and was disappointed when he received no thanks. Jürgen had no
religion: ‘The Lord looks after the “Amis”, because they can afford him.
The Ivans don’t need any, because they worship vodka. The Germans are
too poor for either.’
Jürgen’s parents were strict about his thieving, but it was not always so.
Others welcomed a wheelbarrow filled with stolen coal or a pound of
bacon.4 For many more indigent Germans they could hardly have done
without a little help from their children, particularly teenage boys. Heinrich
Böll’s short story ‘Lohengrins Tod’ (Lohengrin’s Death) of 1950 is about a
boy who is shot at by Luxembourgeois soldiers while stealing coal from a
train, falls and suffers appalling injuries. In the hospital they ask if his
parents should be informed, only to find out that his mother is dead, and the
head of the household is his elder brother. Stealing coal was hardly seen to
be a sin: after all, Dr Fringscu had actually absolved the coal-stealers from
his pulpit.5
Children were a considerable problem for the Allied authorities. There
were over fifteen million of them in Germany. Of those born after 1930,
some 1,250,000 had lost a parent in the war, and 250,000 had lost both. Up
to a third had no more contact with their fathers as they were in POW
camps, while a further million and a half were refugees from the east, with
a little under half that number living in makeshift camps. In the case of a
boy arrested for petty larceny in Munich in 1946, it transpired that his
mother had been killed in an air-raid in Essen in 1943, that his father was
missing in Russia, that he had been billeted with an aunt in Dortmund but
had been evacuated to East Prussia. He had moved to Danzig to be trained
to operate an anti-aircraft battery where he had been captured by the Red
Army. The Russians had released him. He had gone to Berlin, but had been
unable to locate the relative he was looking for. He had finally gone to
Bavaria in search of food. Many female children resorted to prostitution to
survive. Boys, too, performed a service for Allied soldiers. In Frankfurt
their most prominent client was the infamous American major ‘Tante Anna’
(Aunt Anna).6
American schoolmasters thought the appropriate policy was to organise
the children in sporting clubs and teach them democracy at the same time. It
was believed that baseball and football might instil a sense of fair play in
small Germans. The sporting life was lost on many of them, but jazz and
dancing tended to succeed where baseball failed: the jitterbug and boogie-
woogie were popular with German youth, as were Louis Armstrong and
Duke Ellington. Attempts to extend musical re-education to Samuel Barber
and Aaron Copeland proved less successful. The Germans had a musical
tradition of their own. A camp was established at Compiègne near Paris to
train German teachers.7 The Americans made the mistake of trying to herd
German children together in these imitation summer camps. Hitler’s
Volksgemeinschaft had emphasised the community in preference to the
individual, and right-thinking German youth wanted nothing of the
American idea. They loathed all notions of being ‘herded together once
again’.
One visionary was Yella Lepman, a Jewish writer born in Stuttgart who
returned to Germany in 1945 in an American uniform. From 1946 she built
up an international children’s library in Munich which she ran until 1957. In
December 1945 she went before incredulous American generals to demand
cases of books for German children. She stood her ground and eventually
received their blessing to import some. In her memoir she describes the
sight of young children as she first encountered them playing in the bomb
craters before the ruined station. Many were without shoes, and ran around
in their socks or barefoot. It was hard to tell the difference between little
boys and girls; ‘here and there they made an attempt to beg; a ten-year-old
with one leg, the other certainly lost during a night of bombing, hops like a
lame bird around the American canteen, clapping his hands imploringly.
Occasionally a white or black soldier takes pity and throws the child
something: a half chewed piece of chocolate out of his pack, a stale
sandwich, a few cigarettes to barter: that produces a wild commotion,
sometimes a fight, a punch-up.’8
CARE packets were the salvation of suffering Germans like Charlotte
von der Schulenburg. After the currency reform of 1948 which scrapped the
inflationary Reichsmark she exchanged the coffee in the parcels for
Deutsche Marks. She also received second-hand clothes from English and
American families who had heard of her plight. There was always a party
when the parcels came and the maid Klara was proud to take the children
into the village dolled up in their not quite new finery. The collars were
dazzlingly white, their hairbands freshly ironed.
Another charity organisation for the families of the Plotters was founded
by a Swiss doctor, Albert von Erlach. The money was spent on taking the
children of the conspirators and giving them a holiday with a Swiss family.
Two of Charlotte’s children were dressed up in their best tracksuits and
clogs and taken to a Red Cross train in Hanover where they were consigned
to the care of English nurses. The train took off with little Schulenburgs,
Schwerins and Kleists. They came back three months later. One of the
Schulenburg daughters had put on seven and a half kilos. She was smartly
dressed in grey flannel and wonderful shoes. The other had plump cheeks
and a splendid little coat. They called out to their mother, ‘We have brought
you silk stockings and Nescafé!’ The following year two of her other
children went and gorged themselves on oranges and chocolate and other
delicacies that Germans could only dream of. It broke her heart to lose her
children for such a long time, but she had to admit the benefits.9
Arts
German literature was set for a flowering after 1945, once the pressure
of Nazism had been lifted, and Goebbels’s nose pulled out of the pot.
Thomas Mann had adopted a typically high and mighty attitude to any
literary stir-rings that took place between 1933 and 1945: ‘A stench of
blood and shame attaches to them; they should all be pulped.’ Had such
pulping come about, it would have been as effective a form of censorship as
the Nazis ever used.10 Mann’s comments were occasioned by an invitation
to return to Germany penned by the author Walter von Molo in the summer
of 1945.
Please come soon . . . look at the grief-furrowed faces, look at the
unutterable sadness in the eyes of the many who did not take part in the
glorification of the shadowy side of our natures, who could not leave their
homes, because we are talking here of many millions of people for whom
there was no other place on earth other than their own land which was
gradually transforming itself into a huge concentration camp, in which there
would be only different grades of prisoners and warders.
Mann’s rigid stance did not make him popular in Germany, and Hans
Habe, who had returned to Germany in American uniform and set about
castigating his former countrymen, was dismissed as a ‘Morgenthau-boy’.11
Ernst Jünger’s tract Der Friede (The Peace) was one of the most
important pieces of samizdat literature written during the war, and it
continued its illicit circulation after the peace. It was written in 1941 and
revised in 1943, when Jünger was protected by the Army Command, chiefly
in Paris. The following year Jünger suffered a personal tragedy when his
son Ernst was killed near Carrara in Italy. It was Fritz-Dietlof von der
Schulenburg who brought a copy of the text back to Germany and
circulated it among the opposition. More copies were made in March 1945,
and these were distributed in south Germany. The Allies, however, refused
to grant a licence to print the book. In 1948 it was published in Paris,
Amsterdam and New York and in 1949 in Zurich and Vienna.12 On 30
August 1945, Jünger had a visit at Kirchhorst: ‘In the afternoon Axel von
dem Bussche-Streithorst came, a young and severely handicapped major.
He brought with him a copy of my treatise on the peace. I have the
impression that this is the best known of my writings . . . although no press
has printed it, no bookseller has sold it, and no newspaper has published a
review. The whole fame of the book rests on a few copies that I gave
away.’13
Written in Jünger’s mystical style, Der Friede is a work of great
foresight which makes a plea for an honest, workable peace. It is at once
clear why the Allies disliked it: it calls their actions - and their peace - into
question even before they had formulated the terms. For Jünger the blood of
dead soldiers was the seed that would bring forth corn after the peace; and
that corn was for all to share, conqueror and conquered. It must be a peace
in which all sides win. Hatred was poor-quality corn. ‘The good corn that
has here been so finely ground should never be squandered; it must provide
us with bread for a long time.’14 Jünger spared neither side. He talked of the
exterminations carried out by the Germans, ‘where men were killed like
vermin’ or ‘hunted down like wolves’. ‘Dark rumours spoke of horrible
agapes where thugs and torturers . . . waded in the blood of their victims.’
For the foreseeable future these ‘death pits’ would remain in the minds of
man - ‘they are the real monuments to this war like those at Douaumont and
Langemarck’.cv ‘No one can rid himself of guilt.’15 Jünger cast himself as
the ‘decent’ soldier, the respecter of his enemy, for ‘no one can be a hero to
his enemy who does not credit him.’16 Finally, Jünger warned against a
merely technical, non-creative peace. Such a settlement would mean that
‘tyranny would grow and fear with it, the darkness would spread yet further
and in a short while new fronts would open, occasioning new conflicts’.17
Jünger had his fans, although they were not often to be found among the
forces of occupation. He was also under attack from the exiles. He was the
most important German writer to have stayed put, but he wrote no praise of
the Nazis, and when the Nazis offered him a seat in their emasculated
Reichstag he told them he would rather write a good poem than represent
60,000 dolts. His book On the Marble Cliffs was seen as a brave attack on
the dictatorship, and gave solace to many opponents of the regime. Klaus
Mann nonetheless lashed out at him in Auf der Suche nach einem Weg,
calling him a ‘card sharp who tries to mislead people into believing
barbarity was a new way of thinking’.18
Like everyone else in public life, artists and writers had to fill in the
133-question Fragebogen or questionnaire to determine their degree of
collaboration with the regime. Ernst von Salomon sent up the high-minded
and clumsy Allied approach in his highly successful book Der Fragebogen
(The Answers) of 1951. Salomon was naturally an object of suspicion to the
Allies because he had played a role in the assassination of the Jewish
foreign minister Walther Rathenau in 1922. Salomon had been nineteen at
the time, a proudly Prussian, right-wing thug who had been at a cadet
school when the Great War ended and regretted having been denied the
chance to join the scrap and serve his king and Kaiser like countless other
Prussian noblemen before him. He was in and out of prison throughout the
1920s, but his first book, Die Geachteten (The Outlaws) of 1930, brought
him into the literary limelight. He became a successful author and
screenwriter and one of the darlings of the publisher Ernst Rohwohlt.
Salomon was a Prussian royalist, not a Nazi, but the tone of his books
appealed to the country’s rulers after 1933. He nonetheless dismissed out of
hand their attempts to woo him. When American interrogaters asked him
why he had not pursued what would have been a highly successful career in
the Party, he replied candidly that he had earned three times as much as a
screenwriter as he would have done as a Gauleiter.19 Die Fragebogen was a
huge success, selling a quarter of a million copies in the fledgling
Bundesrepublik. Having been so severely chastised and humiliated by the
Allies, many Germans revelled in its pugnacious treatment of what
Salomon saw as American hypocrisy. Liberals, both in Germany and
abroad, were not so sure. The Oxford academic Goronwy Rees, who
provided an introduction to the English edition, warned readers against the
smoothness of the author’s tongue, but concurred with Salomon’s outraged
contention that ‘to be convicted of National Socialism was necessarily to be
convicted of guilt’.20
What annoyed others more was the absence of apology for the deeds of
the Nazis, or indeed for some of the spicier moments of the author’s youth
(even though he had paid his debt), and his desire to turn the SA leader and
Nazi ambassador to Slovakia, Hanns Ludin, into a decent man and a martyr
to his principles. Despite his diplomatic rank Ludin was hanged, or rather
strangled, by the Czechs in January 1948. It took him twenty minutes to
die.21
But, if some of the arts were to see a flowering, others were dogged by
denazification. This particularly affected music and the persons of
Germany’s two greatest non-émigré composers, Richard Strauss and Hans
Pfitzner. Both had been members of the Nazi Reich Kulturkammer and
were eligible for internment under JCS 1067. The seventy-six-year-old
Pfitzner was put in the camp at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, smack opposite
the gates to Strauss’s villa, in 1945 and was banned from writing. The ban
was lifted the following year, but he had to go before the Spruchkammer or
denazification tribunal in 1947. He died in the same year as Strauss: 1949.
Strauss managed to avoid internment. He had never been a Nazi, and on
1 May 1945 described the Third Reich as ‘12 years of the rule of bestiality,
ignorance and illiteracy, which brought about the destruction of 2,000 years
of German civilisation’. Then Thomas Mann’s son Klaus turned up and
tricked him into saying the sort of things that would make Americans
believe he was an unrepentant Nazi. But not all Americans shunned him,
and famously the oboist and GI John de Lancie commissioned one of his
great late works, the Oboe Concerto of 1945. Denazification dangled over
Strauss’s head too, but he managed to make it to Switzerland. In 1947 he
gave a tour in Britain, although his music was still banned in Germany. He
was finally cleared in June 1948. He had meanwhile become an Austrian
citizen.22
The visual arts were also hampered by the perceived need to avoid
everything that had been practised under the Nazis: representation was out.
Those members of the older generation who struggled on did it with far less
conviction, as was plain to see in the poor late works of Dix and Grosz. One
exception, perhaps, were the ‘unpainted’ works of the right-wing artist
Nolde, who had gone into ‘inner exile’ after his paintings had been declared
degenerate by the Nazis. The Nazi artists, the sculptor Breker for example,
had no appreciable audience now. The coming men were of the Beuys and
Baselitz type, the latter literally standing tradition on its head.
The Press
The new papers after the war in Berlin were propaganda sheets put out
by the Russian army such as the Nachrichten für die deutsche Bevölkerung.
The first proper paper was the Tägliche Rundschau, which appeared on 15
May 1945, edited by SBZ. It was eagerly scoured in hope that it would give
a clue to what the Russians would do next. The next to appear was the
Berliner Zeitung a week later. Initially this was also the work of the Soviets,
but they handed it over to the town hall, and it was edited by Rudolf
Hernnstadt, a Jewish journalist who had enjoyed a good reputation before
the war. The first paper for Berlin was the communist Deutsche
Volkszeitung, edited by a Muscovite. This was followed by the socialist Das
Volk.
Experience and language made German and Austrian Remigranten
invaluable when it came to controlling and editing the new press. Bernhard
Menne became the first editor of the Welt am Sonntag, while Erich Brost
was his opposite number on the Kölnischen Kurier. The Viennese E. H.
Pollitzer - or Pollitt - was editor of the Lübecker Post. At first he worked
under the historian A. G. Dickens before he was allowed to run his own
show. Other returned Germans became prominent journalists. Leo Felix,
who had gone under the name Felix Field during the war, worked for a
number of papers. Peter de (or von) Mendelssohn was the British equivalent
of a Muscovite: he had emigrated to Britain and served in the British army
and helped the British establish the credentials of German journalists after
the war.23 He was editor of Ullstein’s ambitious Neue Zeit. In the end this
came to nothing, and the first paper free from Allied propaganda was the
Tagesspiegel.
For a while the Americans founded their ‘newspaper metropolis’ on the
little town of Bad Nauheim. This was the base for two new papers, the
Frankfurter Presse and the Frankfurter Rundschau. The first issue of the
Allgemeine Zeitung - which was to become the famous Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) - came out on 7 August 1945, after the break-up
of the Potsdam Conference. The editor had instructions from the Americans
not to print any stories about Allied discord. Later Peter de Mendelssohn
ran that too, before returning to London. The Frankfurter Presse got off to a
good start, with the letter from Walter von Molo to Thomas Mann and a
piece by Alfred Kerr. The Liberal Democrats had their voice in Der
Morgen. By September, newspapers were popping up like mushrooms.
There were 150 of them founded between 1945 and 1948.24
The Americans had a considerable success with the Neue Zeitung and
the glossy Heute in Munich. Erich Kästner edited the Neue Zeitung, which
was controlled by Major Hans Wallenberg, a former Ullstein editor who had
emigrated in 1937. Wallenberg was a convinced anti-communist who left
the Neue Zeitung to work for Springer in Hamburg. The paper was a breath
of fresh air in its time, as its aficionados admired the quality of the writing
and ignored its propaganda content. In 1947 it was selling 800,000 copies,
and Wallenberg believed he could easily dispose of one and a half million.
Zuckmayer thought that the Americans could be really proud of what they
had achieved through the Neue Zeitung.25 Another prominent ‘remigrant’
was Hans (Janos) Habe, the son of the Viennese press baron Imre Bekessy.26
Habe ran parts of the press for the Americans and had to deal with the odd
dissenting voice the Americans wanted to ban. One of these was Der Ruf,
which branded the occupation ‘anachronistic, colonialistic and inhumane’.
Habe turned to Thomas Mann for support: ‘These young people hate their
fathers; but they hate the enemies of their fathers even more.’27
The Americans were also successful in creating radio stations with a
distinct propaganda role. One of these was Radio Liberty, launched on 12
August 1946. Another was RIAS (Radio in American Sector), which came
into its own during the Berlin blockade, broadcasting from vans. Clay
believed that RIAS did essential propaganda work, and that the Americans
should grant it funds to continue.28
In the summer of 1947, Tisa von der Schulenburg found work as a
journalist in Hamburg. She paid a call on Martin Beheim-Schwarzbach,
who worked in the office of Die Welt in the city. He had been a chess
partner in London of Tisa’s first husband, Fritz Hess. The editor, Julius
Hollos, was also present at the meeting. She told them she wanted to work
as an illustrator on the Süddeutsche Zeitung. ‘Why not come to us?’ they
said. She was engaged at RM300 a month, as a writer and illustrator.29 She
focused her attention on the Ruhr, where she sketched the miners in the
same way as she had drawn the pits in County Durham in the 1930s.
Everyone was suspicious of her. The British thought she was a communist
agitator, the miners a British spy. When she tried to cover the 1948 London
Olympics for Die Welt the British refused to grant her papers. In despair she
took the veil.30
Where the former owners had been Jewish, newspapers were relatively
free from Allied interference. This was the case of Ullstein in Berlin,
owners of the Berliner Zeitung, the Berliner Morgenpost and the Berliner
Abendpost. Some of the Ullsteins had fled to America and others to
London, where they had created an Ullstein Ltd. The head of the family,
Hermann Ullstein, had died in the autumn of 1944. The only Ullstein
remaining in Germany was Heinz, who remained alive because of his
Aryan wife. Like most Jews married to Christians, he performed hard
labour for the Todt Organisation, but fled at the right moment and survived
the massacre of many of the others. He surfaced just in time to save the
machinery of the press, which the Russians had dismantled but not yet
shipped.
Axel Springer was a creation of the British Zone. The successful
German weekly Der Spiegel began life as Diese Woche, the child of the
twenty-one-year-old Major Chaloner of the Hanover Information Council.
When its editorial got out of hand, it was offered to the Germans and
Springer. Springer was given his first licence by Major William Barnetson,
later chairman of Reuters. Despite the opposition of some British
administrators, Springer rapidly advanced to become Germany’s first post-
war press baron.31
Attitudes to 20 July
The Allies introduced a term for the victims of National Socialism,
which should have secured privileges. In practice this did not happen much
at first. They were called ‘Opfer des Faschismus’ (victims of fascism) or
OdF. In theory at least Greta, the widow of the poet Adam Kuckhoff who
had been executed as a member of the communist-inspired ‘Red Orchestra’,
and Marion Gräfin Yorck, whose husband perished on a gibbet after 20
July, should have received higher rations. The OdFs had their own relief
organisation. It was not alone - there was a rival body in the VVN, or
Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes.
While he was attached to an American unit researching the nature of
Nazism, the poet W. H. Auden heard the story of the Scholls for the first
time and their touching but ultimately hopeless attempt to resist Hitler:
‘Those who condemn the Germans for their lack of opposition . . . should
have spent six months here during the war.’32 Hans and Sophie Scholl,
Alexander Schmorrell, Christoph Probst, Willi Graf and Professor Kurt
Huber had brazenly printed leaflets attacking Hitler and the war and
scattered them throughout the lecture halls of the university in Munich. A
branch of this ‘Weisse Rose’ Movement had been formed in Hamburg too.
They had all been beheaded for their pains - and eight more in Hamburg.33
Auden and his friends went to see the family of ‘Schurik’ Schmorrell to
learn the story at first hand. It proved a harrowing and emotional moment as
the father, mother and sister of the young medical student rehearsed the
story of his arrest and execution. The sister, Natascha, had been tortured and
lost an eye in the process. This did not protect them from the American
army of occupation. James Stern later learned that the Schmorrells, father,
mother and sister of a hero of the resistance, had been kicked out of their
home to provide accommodation for servicemen and their families.34
However much Stern wished to deny the idea of ‘good Germans’, the
subject exerted a sort of fascination for him. Spurred on by what Auden had
discovered about the White Rose conspirators, he paid a visit to Prince
Fugger von Glött in his vast palace near Memmingen. The prince had been
designated governor of Bavaria in the event of Hitler’s death on 20 July
1944, as he was connected with the two Jesuit priests who had taken part in
the discussions of the opposition. He had been arrested after the failure of
the Plot and had been one of the few survivors. As he told his harrowing
tale the scales began to drop from Stern’s eyes.
The BBC’s Hugh Carleton Greene made an early sympathetic
programme about the Plot broadcast on its first anniversary on 20 July
1945. Greene had been a journalist in Germany before the war and an
intelligence officer during the conflict. After the war he directed the
German-language service of the BBC and as control officer for the media
exerted an important influence in the intellectual reconstruction of
Germany. Ursula von Kardorff, who had been closely connected to many of
the plotters, described the programme as ‘very fair, no one could have done
it better’. From it she learned the sad news of Nikolaus von Halem’s
death.35
German attitudes were more complicated. Until May 1945 these men
had been traitors; now ordinary Germans had to get used to the idea that
they were actually heroes. For those who had been peripheral to the
plotters’ circle this was not a problem. Ursula von Kardorff was particularly
interested to know the fate of Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg. The BBC
or the Allied station in Calais had put it about that he was still alive. His
wife Charlotte had also held out hope. Immediately after the war she had
gone to the British CO in Plön to ask whether there was any truth in the
broadcasts. She was received by a Jewish liaison officer who promised to
look into things. Later he appeared at Testorf where she was living. ‘That
was just propaganda’ with no foundation in fact, he told her. Her husband
had been hanged in August 1944.36 Also in Lübeck was Fritz-Dietlof’s
sister Tisa. On the day of Greene’s broadcast she suffered a complete
nervous collapse: ‘The memory of the past year. All the tears that I had
failed to shed at Fritzi’s death came out unexpectedly in an unstaunchable
deluge, I was defenceless. All my brothers were dead. My home was lost.’37
One exile who had a fully open mind about the German opposition to
Hitler was Carl Zuckmayer. Zuckmayer had been a Heidelberg
contemporary of Carlo Mierendorff, one of the chief plotters who had been
killed in an Allied bombing raid on Leipzig in December 1943. He had also
been a friend of Helmuth James von Moltke, great-nephew of the Great
Moltke, Prussian chief of staff in Bismarck’s wars, and nephew of the
Lesser Moltke, who as chief of staff bungled the German advance in 1914.
Helmuth James’s manor at Kreisau (a gift to the older Moltke from his
grateful king) had been used for meetings and debates by members of the
opposition, who were later known as the Kreisauer Kreis, or Kreisau Circle.
Zuckmayer had believed that the Kreisauer were the perfect breeding
stock for the new Germany, but he sadly realised all too quickly how
comprehensive had been the purge after 20 July. Not only Mierendorff and
Moltke were dead, but also his friends the trades-unionist Wilhelm
Leuschner and the socialist Theodor Haubach. Some, however, had
survived; and Zuckmayer felt they should be hailed, and receive a promise
of support.38 Many of their names had not even appeared in the newspapers
- ‘the footsloggers, the unknown warriors of the resistance’. Zuckmayer
cites one example of a widow whose husband had been arrested in June
1941. More than a year later a neighbour drew her attention to a notice in an
advertisement column. It informed her and the rest of the world that the
man had been executed for high treason. The widow had lived as a post-
office cleaner, but when Zuckmayer met her she had no work and no
savings. The only thing she had to live on was a modest sum from the OdF.
She was bitter, because the Nazis did more for their people; indeed the
judges who had sentenced her husband to death received pensions, and so
did their widows. She lived in great solitude, her only pleasure had been her
wireless set, but the Nazis had taken that away. She was resigned to her
fate: nothing could give her back her husband.39
One who survived the general purge was the poet and writer Günther
Weisenborn. He had been involved with Harro Schulze-Boysen and the Red
Orchestra. The Gestapo lacked evidence against him and his life was
spared. He was condemned to life imprisonment. His young wife had
endeavoured to maintain contact with him in prison in Luckau. She
discovered that he was part of a work detail that was sent out of the prison,
so she travelled on the trains that transported the prisoners in order to catch
a glimpse of him. She had written and performed music to accompany some
of his lyrics, and to attract his attention she whistled one of these tunes. One
day she heard the same tune whistled inside the prisoners’ carriage, and
knew that he was aware that she was near him. When the Russians came
they released the prisoners from their ordeal, but immediately they were
assigned roles within the zone. Meanwhile the Battle for Berlin reigned, and
she could not find a way to him. The Russians finally dismissed him from
his job and he rode on a bicycle to Berlin. Their former home had been
destroyed by bombs, and he had not a clue where she might be. Later he
was riding though an unfamiliar suburb when he saw another bicycle
coming towards him: it was her - ‘They had found one another in the
chaos.’40
Jews in Germany and Austria
One way or another, Germany and Austria had lost the Jews, who had
been such a noticeable part of their populations. There had been around
450,000 in Germany in 1933. Of these some two-thirds emigrated. The
other third perished in the camps and ghettos. In Austria the original figure
was around 180,000, with almost all of them living in Vienna. Again two-
thirds got away, but the other 65,000 died. Of those whose lives were saved
by timely emigration, only a tiny percentage returned. Most of them would
have been reluctant to find themselves face to face with the murderers of
their friends and relations. But there were Jews in Germany and Austria
after 1945 - soldiers and DPs.
Not all Germans had been pleased by the official antisemitism of the
Nazi years, by any means. Ursula von Kardorff, who saw a convoy of
vehicles emblazoned with Stars of David (they belonged to the Jewish
Infantry Brigade) leading off a posse of bedraggled POWs, called it ‘divine
justice’ and recalled the moment three years before when she had seen Jews
wearing the same stars cowering in the backstreets of Berlin while German
soldiers swaggered around in smart uniforms bedecked with decorations.41
By the summer of 1945, the Jews had their own fighting units in
Germany. Up to 35,000 Jewish Palestinians signed up for the Brigade - a
proper fighting force. For much of the war the British had allowed German
and Austrian Jews only to serve unarmed in the Pioneer Corps and many
felt profoundly insulted. When former German and Austrian Jews arrived in
Germany in 1945 they learned what had become of their relatives and co-
religionaries who had stayed behind. They had feared the worst, but few
could have imagined that the horror would be as bad as it was. They were
still in uniform and very few could do much to help in the circumstances.
One exception was Captain Horwell, who became assistant commander of
Bergen-Belsen after the liberation, and was able to aid the 10,000 who
survived.42
Many German or Austrian Jews had distinguished themselves in the
fighting and they were to go on to play important roles under the
occupation. One who played a significant political part in the British army
was Michael Alexander Thomas. At D-Day Thomas was a liaison officer
between the British and the Poles. He was much feared by his staff, who he
insisted should shower and brush their teeth daily. Such rigour earned him
the sobriquet ‘the Prussian Baron’.43 In Germany he was appointed political
officer and made firm contacts with leading socialist politicians such as
Karl Severing and Rudolf Petersen in Hamburg. He prevented General
Templer from banning Germans from wearing military uniforms, as he
pointed out they had no other clothes. Templer found this advice
unwelcome. Thomas left the army as a result of the insensitivity of his
immediate superior, Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson, who referred to him as a
‘Jew-boy’.
Thomas was not the only Jew holding high rank as a political officer. In
Schleswig-Holstein Major Lyndon was head of the Political Department.
Jews also performed important roles in Information Departments - that is,
propaganda and denazification. Two majors, Calmon and Kendal (born
Knobloch), served first in Austria before being assigned the task of finding
war criminals. Major Linford was second secretary to Allied Control
Commission in Austria, acting as liaison with the other Allies. His
counterpart in Berlin was a Captain Lederer. Kaye Sely was chief of
information control, first in Hamburg and then in Berlin. Many of these
Jews were academics in disguise. The distinguished historian of Germany F.
L. Carsten was the son of a Berlin doctor who had Anglicised his first name
(Franz) to Francis. He spent his war at the Political Warfare Executive
(PWE) and performed an important role during the occupation as the author
of a handbook explaining Germany to British forces.44
Many Jews spoke German - although they often refused to use it among
themselves, having decided that the language was somehow polluted. Even
the Poles used Jewish soldiers as interpreters with the Germans in the so-
called ‘Recovered Territories’.45 When George Clare went to work in
denazification in Berlin in 1946, he found that all his colleagues were
German or Austrian Jews or half-Jews with the exception of the Russian.
Sely was from Munich. The American, Ralph Brown, was a Berliner.46 The
role of the Jews in the British army occasionally caused concern. Kaye Sely
showed George Clare a letter from ‘Public Safety’ accusing the Jews of
excessive zeal in denazification, citing the fact that most of the leading
lights were former German and Austrian Jews who might be acting from
motives of revenge.47 There were many more Jews in the American army
than in the British. The Americans were much more willing to grant
commissions to refugees. The British had qualms about using them.
Most of the Jews employed during the occupation worked as
interpreters, and a special school was formed to train them in Brussels. An
Austrian, Major Reitlinger, who had been in SOE during the war, was the
eyes and ears of General McCreery in Vienna. A Viennese, Sergeant R.
Rawdon, was interpreter for the Military Police unit who were the first
British soldiers to enter Berlin. Not only Jews, however, were used to make
up for the linguistic inadequacies of the British forces. Until they realised
who they were dealing with, the British and Americans actually employed
members of the Nazi Concordia Bureau and British Free Corps the motley
gang commanded by John Amery, son of the colonial secretary Leo. Once
the penny dropped, the traitors were shipped back to Britain and tried.48
The Fate of Jewish DPs
The Jewish survivors who drifted towards Germany in the hope of
reaching the West or Palestine were put back behind barbed wire in DP
camps. Many children were born in captivity. For the Jewish survivors there
was a quandary: once they had achieved a sense of humanity once again
and could begin to think about the basics of food and clothing, they needed
to decide what their future would be, and where. Could they go back to
their old homes in Poland or Hungary? These countries had been more or
less cleared of Jews. There were no more friends and relations to welcome
them, and wherever they went they would be reminded of the scale of their
tragedy. And there was the nasty thought of the gentile neighbour, who
might look them up and down, surveying them with a mocking smile that
said ‘What? Still alive?’49
These Jews, who were known as the she’erit Hapletah or ‘rescued
remainder’, kept flooding into Germany. Partly this was a result of renewed
antisemitic violence in the new Poland, where between 1,500 and 2,000
Jews were killed in pogroms in Kielce and elsewhere in 1945. Occupied
Germany was considered the safest place to be. Some 270,000 Jews went to
Germany after the end of the war and sought refuge in DP camps. The
period before they were to find new homes in Palestine and elsewhere has
been called the ‘grim aftermath of the Holocaust’.50
The British were suspicious about the influx of Jews into Germany.
They thought, possibly correctly, that they were intending to use Germany
as a springboard to Palestine. The head of displaced-persons operations for
UNRRA in Germany, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan, thought a
secret organisation was behind the arrival of so many ‘well-dressed, well-
fed, rosy-cheeked’ Jews who appeared to have ‘plenty of money’. The
British began to bar entrance to the DP camps to new arrivals and prevent
Jews from going south via Austria. They also introduced a compulsory
labour law for the inhabitants of the camps.51
At their height there were 184 Jewish camps scattered around Germany:
there were eleven in the French Zone, twenty-two in the British and 151 in
the American. One of the most famous camps was at Landsberg in Bavaria,
where the Landsberger Caytung was based. The Landsberger Caytung, the
most successful Jewish paper of the time, offered practical advice to Jews
and reported on the Nuremberg trials.52 Caytung (newspaper) was an
example of the Germanified Yiddish spoken in the camps. The Katzet was
the concentration camp, from the German ‘KZ’.
One unfortunate aspect of life in the DP camps was that Jews were often
driven in with their former tormentors - Hungarian, Ukrainian, Latvians and
Poles who had worked voluntarily in the camps and were now as good as
stateless. They formed a rough and often criminal core at the centre of the
camp. It was not uncommon for the Allies to assign ex-Nazis to the camps
as guards; to add insult to injury, they were armed. The presence of these
sentries and the barbed-wire fences around the barracks gave the Jews’ new
quarters an aspect of the concentration camps they had only recently quit.53
The preponderance of Jewish DP camps in the American Zone was no
accident: Jews wanted to reach America and found British policy on
Palestine unsympathetic. Britain was the principal enemy of the Jews before
1949.54 From January to April 1946 admissions to American camps ran at
around 3,000 a day, with some 2,000 entering camps in the American Zone
in Austria. By April there were 3,000 Jews in Berlin, 1,600 in the French
Zone, 15,600 in the British and 54,000 in the American. There were six
times as many Jews in American-occupied Austria as in the British Zone.
By the end of the year there were 204,000 Jews in the parts of Germany and
Austria controlled by the Western Allies, 90 per cent of them in the
American Zones. It was not always the case, however, that the Americans
were more considerate towards the Jews than the British. General Patton
expressed the view that they were ‘baser than animals’.55
The Americans were spending $500,000,000 a year on the camps. There
was some question as to whom the Jews belonged. They were hardly likely
to want to be Germans, and most of the eastern states disowned them too.
They were effectively stateless. As numbers continued to swell, the
Americans let in a trickle to the US by slightly loosening their quota in
December 1945. The British Dominions, which had been excessively stingy
in extending hospitality in 1938, continued to sport the oak. Jews who tried
to run the blockade into Palestine were famously intercepted and interned in
DP camps on Cyprus. When the Jewish state was established in May 1948
they flooded across the water.56
The DP camps in Germany resembled Yiddish-speaking villages. The
language acquired immense importance before Hebrew developed under the
auspices of the new state of Israel. German was clearly out, unless there
was no alternative. After 1949 the state of Israel would ban both German
and German music. The pre-war drive to assimilation also ground to a halt.
Adolf Hitler had taught the Jews in no uncertain terms that they were not
wanted.57 The camps were as close to the Shtetlach as anyone was likely to
see after the Third Reich. Indeed, they have been described as the shtetl’s
last evocation.58 The Jews remained there until they could find a means of
getting to Palestine or the United States. The American quota remained
very strict until 1950.
Carl Zuckmayer believed that the Jewish DP camps were keeping
antisemitism alive. As the Jews were outsiders or foreigners, the word
Ausländer (foreigner) had become synonymous with Jew in some parts of
the country. A little girl near his house in the Salzkammergut told him,
‘Mummy went shopping because she wanted to bake something for you.
She needed flour, so she had to go to the foreigners.’ Often this meant going
to a DP camp where those still lucky enough to own cars often found
supplies of benzene.
The Jewish camps were comparatively well provided for, and the
surplus was sold off - for a price. Zuckmayer heard the Germans grumble
that the Jews were growing rich from their hunger. In a dark corner of the
main station in Munich he saw a Jew wearing a kaftan, with a long beard
and curls - ‘a figure never seen in this part of Germany, but perhaps
[visible] in Vienna’s Leopoldstadt, in Bratislava, Łódź or Warsaw’.cw He
had a table, chair and cash register, and scruffy individuals were showing
him things they had in their pockets. A woman told him it was a big
jewellery market. The last of the family heirlooms were being transformed
into meat, fat or coffee. Some of the gems were obviously stolen.59
There were still 29,000 Jews in American camps in Austria at the time,
who were given better rations than the other DPs, and unlike the others they
were exempted from work. That this caused resentment is something of an
understatement, especially as the Jews were prominent in the black market.
An Allied report produced a statistic that 71 per cent of Austrians felt no
guilt about the Second World War. On the other side the Jews complained
too. ‘Until you get your things back, you are treated like a beggar. Once you
have them back, nobody remembers that you were ever a beggar.’60
Resentment of the Jews and their higher rations led to a small riot in
Bad Ischl in the Salzkammergut in the summer of 1947. The issue was the
milk quota. Angry protesters surrounded the hotel that served as the Jewish
DP camp and pelted it with stones: ‘Down with the dirty Jews! Hang the
Jews!’ they shouted. The American authorities acted firmly and one rioter
was sentenced to fifteen years. The sentence was later reduced by General
Keyes.61
There were also 15,000 Jews in Germany who had survived the
genocide. One of these was Victor Klemperer, who went back to his
damaged but inhabitable house in Dresden dreaming of good wines, food,
drives in his car, visits to the seaside and the cinema. Mostly he cherished
the fact of raw life, of ‘simple survival’.62 He was one of the 3 per cent of
German Jews who owed his survival to an Aryan spouse. Jews tended to be
given the pick of the jobs in the Russian Zone. A former ‘submarine’, the
machinist Walter Besser, was put in charge of a hospital in 1945. Jewish
leaders emerged from captivity in the concentration camps to found
newspapers. Josef Rosensaft had been in Bergen-Belsen, where he married
the camp doctor Hadassah Bimko after the war. He founded the first
Yiddish newspaper in the British Zone at Belsen, Undzer Sztyme (Our
Voice). Another was Zalman Grinberg, a doctor from Kovno. He founded
the Yiddish newspaper Undzer Weg (Our Way), first published in October
1945. In the British Zone Hans Frey started the Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt
für die Nord-Rhein Provinz in Westfalen. Between 1945 and 1948 there
were over 200 publications - books and newspapers - published in Yiddish
in Germany.63
The camps were mostly old barracks buildings, together with some
pukka structures that had been cleared of their German occupants. Quite a
few of them were near or actually located in old concentration camps like
Bergen-Belsen and Landsberg. Two training camps for Jews were housed in
property that had previously belonged to Julius Streicher and Hermann
Göring. Jewish DPs in the American Sector of Berlin were actually lodged
in the Villa Minou, where the infamous Wannsee Conference had been held
in the first weeks of 1942, and where reports had been delivered on the
progress of the Final Solution.64
In the main, the camps were not as daunting as they might have seemed
from the outside. They had their own schools and courses in Jewish history,
Hebrew, Zionism and Palestinian geography - once more attesting to the
abandonment of assimilation and the embracing of Zionism in most cases.
Political parties were formed, theatres put on Yiddish classics, and concerts
were given. Groups of singers such as the Happy Boys sang Yiddish songs.
American rabbis were assigned to the camps to look after the spiritual well-
being of the inmates.65
One of the most notorious DP camps was Bergen-Belsen. Once the
British had managed to bring down the death rate it was possible to
introduce some degree of comfort into the camp, especially when the
inmates were moved out of the old buildings and into the well-appointed SS
barracks. That took a while. At first witnesses were horrified to see how
dehumanised the former prisoners had become. Many of the Jews were
women, and General Dempsey, commanding the British Second Army,
recalled seeing one ‘standing stark naked washing herself with some issue
soap in water from a tank in which the remains of a child floated’.66
In theory, at least, the French, Dutch, Russians and Poles in Belsen had
homes to go to. The Jews did not want to go back, they wanted to go
forward. Once the enormity of their suffering was known, they received
special treatment. The British rabbi, Rev. Leslie Hardman, arrived at Belsen
soon after its liberation. On Friday 20 April he conducted the first Jewish
service there, observing Kiddush in the open air. With foreboding he
remained behind to eat some gefilte fisch with the prisoners. The next
morning he woke with excruciating pains and was forced to take to his bed
for forty-eight hours.67 Hardman witnessed some old-fashioned
antisemitism among the British officer corps. One officer exclaimed,
‘Bloody Jews! Serves them right!’ In general, however, it was more the
dehumanising effect of the war that he observed in the British - they had
seen too much horror to be able to respond any more.68
Part of the process of recovering was for women to begin to take an
interest in their physical appearance again. One of the doctors working at
Belsen was repeatedly asked by the women whether their beauty would
return.69 For some it would take a long time: the humiliation that had been
part of the policy of their Nazi torturers had gone too deep. One Red Cross
man recalled asking a woman what her name was and where she came
from. ‘Me . . .’ she replied, ‘no name - only number - no country, just a
Jewess, do you understand? I am only a dog.’70 Baths were treated with
suspicion. Some of the women had been in the extermination camps, and
had learned to fear trips to the shower block. The situation was considerably
improved when some old women’s clothes were found to replace the prison
gear and someone discovered a cache of lipstick. In the words of one of the
senior medical officers, ‘It was the action of genius, of sheer unadulterated
brilliance.’ The women were overjoyed. The same officer reported seeing a
woman dead on a slab still clutching her lipstick.71
By June the atmosphere was wholly changed at Belsen. When the
cameramen rolled up it reminded a Red Cross woman of ‘a Butlin holiday
camp’.72 The inmates wanted to know about Zionism and Palestine.
Ironically Hitler had made them better Jews: assimilation was a dead letter.
Even hardened atheists were keen to learn about a religion that had not been
practised for a generation.73 To inject a little morale, concerts were given
and the likes of Yehudi Menuhin and Benjamin Britten visited. The women
of Belsen rediscovered men. Dancing became popular, although the women
were still little more than skeletons. The camps were not just culturally
fertile. They were productive in human life. After the genetic experiments
of the concentration camps, many Jews feared they were barren. This
proved not to be the case. In 1946 UNRRA reported between eight and ten
thousand pregnancies in the camps, giving the Jewish camps the highest
birth rate in the world.74
Incidences of antisemitism were comparatively rare, although a Jewish
shopkeeper was threatened in Staubing and locals accused the Jews who
inhabited the old concentration camp in Deggendorf of carrying out armed
robberies. In Munich the Möhlstrasse had its complement of Jewish shops
and there was even a kosher restaurant.75 The camps had flourishing black
markets that led to one police raid on a camp near Stuttgart. In the course of
the police action a Jew was killed during a dispute about boot-leg eggs.
After that the police were banned from entering the camps.76
There were occasional incidences of fury directed at the Germans, but
they were rare. The greatest act of lawlessness committed by the Jews in
post-war Germany was the attempt to kill a large number of POWs in
Nuremberg. Abba Kovner, who had led an armed revolt in the Vilna Ghetto,
founded the Nakom (‘Revenge’) Group and conceived the idea of poisoning
the drinking water in the city. One member of the group found a job in the
waterworks, but David Ben-Gurion refused to allow him to go ahead with
the scheme. They turned instead to the camp, where 12,000 POWs were
kept, many of them ex-SS or Nazis, and succeeded in poisoning the bread.
The prisoners suffered terrible pains, but none died. The perpetrators fled to
Palestine and resisted all attempts to make them face justice in Germany.77
The afterlife of the German Jews was a long time fading. Behind barbed
wire they continued their shadowy existence for over a decade. The last
Jewish DP camps closed in 1957.
OceanofPDF.com
PART III
Crime and Punishment
OceanofPDF.com
12
Guilt
We experienced the false indignation of other
lemurs who came to the place of lies to dig up the dead
and expose the decomposed bodies; to measure them,
count them and photograph them, as it was their aim.
They played the role of prosecutor only to gain for
themselves the right to base revenge and then to satisfy
themselves with similar orgies . . . The hand that wants
to help man in all this, and to lead him forth in his
blindness, must be free from sin and acts of violence.
Ernst Jünger, Der Friede, Vienna 1949, 21
There was a joke doing the rounds (a variant of it is still told in Vienna):
a man comes into a police station and tells the officer that he wishes to
register as a Nazi. The policeman replies that he should have done that a
year and a half ago. The man tells the policeman, ‘Eighteen months ago I
wasn’t a Nazi!’
Dos Passos cites an interview with an American lieutenant whose
business it was to interrogate Nazis. ‘My people are Jewish . . . so don’t
think I’m not bitter against the Krauts. I’m for shooting the war criminals
where we can prove they are guilty and getting it over with. But for God’s
sake, tell me what we are trying to do?’ The lieutenant continued, ‘Hatred is
like a fire. You’ve got to put it out. I’ve been interrogating German officers
for the War Crimes Commission and when I find them half-starved to death
right in our own PW cages and being treated like you wouldn’t treat a dog, I
ask myself some questions . . . Brutality is more contagious than typhus and
a hell of a lot more difficult to stamp out . . .’ He mentioned Patton and his
habit of putting his foot in it, but he clearly approved. ‘All those directives
about don’t coddle the German have thrown open the gates for every
criminal tendency we’ve got in us.’55 The American hatred for the Germans
continued to astound many people. Dos Passos met an eastern European in
Berlin who spoke to him in French. The man asked him, ‘why do you
Americans feel this desire for vengeance? I can understand it in the
Russians, who suffered fearful injuries, but your cities were not laid waste,
your wives and children were not starved and murdered.’ Dos Passos did
not have an answer.56
For Zuckmayer there was a fundamental error behind the denazification
policy: it failed to create a belief in a state of law because it failed to
differentiate between the innocent and the guilty. The ideal liberation
should have come about through a revolution within Germany. It was not
going to be possible to clean up Germany by pushing a large number of its
citizens before the courts. There were too many cases, and the witnesses
were in many instances unreliable, as they knew they would come under the
microscope themselves and the most important thing was to deny
everything. The accused were protected - there was evidence of nepotism
and intimidation. Denunciations were frequently made out of sheer bloody-
mindedness and there were too few judges and lawyers around who were
free from guilt.
The courts themselves had a hopeless task. In one Bavarian district
Zuckmayer was told there were 11,850 former Nazis who were due to be
examined by the Spruchkammer. The president of the chamber estimated
that it was going to take between eleven and twelve years to acquit the
work. In Stuttgart there were around 80,000 cases. Zuckmayer saw a danger
of renazification as the suspects were forced to mark time before their cases
came up for review. He was for a wide-ranging amnesty for the small fry,
who were implicated in no particular crime other than opportunism or
ideological commitment.
Zuckmayer gives an example of a minor case - a midwife who had her
husband sent to Dachau for two years because he had had an affair with a
young girl in the factory where he worked. He later threw a bust of her
beloved Adolf out of the window, enabling her to denounce him. When her
case came up the husband made a plea in mitigation. She had helped non-
Aryans and delivered their children without question and had even waived
payment in certain cases. She was a good midwife and performed a service
to society. If she had committed a crime it was out of passion. She had also
been sufficiently punished: she had lost the man she loved because of the
Hitler bust. The judge accepted the plea, and let her off with a fine, and
allowed her to continue working as a midwife.57
Franz von Papen, a former chancellor who had become a Nazi minister
and ambassador, had never been a member of the Party. He had been
acquitted at Nuremberg. A new trial was arranged for January 1947. He was
to face a panel of seven judges: two Social Democrat lawyers and five
members of democratic parties. The seven included two Jews. Bavaria’s
minister for denazification called on the court to sentence Papen to ten
years’ hard labour on the basis of his having profited from Nazism. Papen
was given eight. His property was confiscated and he was deprived of his
civic rights.58 Schacht, who was tried at Nuremberg alongside Papen, had an
ingenious way of wriggling out of responsibility for the crimes of the Third
Reich. A paper was produced that had been written at the time of the
takeover of the Austrian National Bank by the Reichsbank, of which he was
then president. It was a hymn of praise to the God-given Führer written by
none other than Schacht. The banker was asked to comment: how did he
find it? ‘I find it excellent!’ said Schacht. He told the tribunal what clever
‘deception’ (Tarnung) it was.59
The wives of the leading Nazis were put through a predictably
humiliating trial. After leaving Straubing Prison, Emmy Göring was living
in a hut near her husband’s castle at Veldenstein in Franconia. She was
suffering from sciatica and had a high fever. She was nonetheless
incarcerated in a rat-infested prison for two weeks along with the wives of
Hess, Funk and Baldur von Schirach. The brides of Speer, Dönitz, Neurath
and Raeder, on the other hand, were spared this indignity, although Speer’s
wife Margarete was closer to Hitler than any of them, with the exception of
Henriette von Schirach who was the daughter of his hard-drinking court
photographer Heinrich Hoffmann. As it was, Frau Göring was able to
muster a good deal of testimony from Jews that she had helped them over
the years, even if she clearly disappointed the president of the tribunal by
failing to denounce her dead husband. She was classified ‘Group 2’ and
allowed to return to her hovel.60
Another high-profile case was the English-born daughter-in-law of
Richard Wagner, Winifred. There was no doubt that ‘Winnie’ was besotted
with her ‘Wolf’ - as she and her four children called Hitler - but after 1940
the Führer had avoided her. One of her grandchildren has even gone so far
as to say that she had wanted to marry Hitler, and that with her at his side
there would have been no war.61 Hitler kept away from Bayreuth, although
he continued to see three of the four Wagner children (the eldest girl,
Friedelind, emigrated to Switzerland and the United States, where she
fanned the flames against her mother) and exempted the first son, Wieland,
from military service as the heir to Bayreuth.
The Wagners all had questions to answer. Verena’s husband Bodo
Lafferenz had been in charge of the Kraft durch Freude Nazi leisure
organisation, and as such had held high rank in the SS. He was shipped off
to an internment camp in Freiburg. Wolfgang had not been a Party member
and could take refuge behind that fact, even if he had been entertained by
Hitler and had been as close to him as the others. Party member Wieland
had made himself scarce at the Americans’ approach, hiding in the French
Zone until the coast was clear. He had been administering the town’s
‘concentration camp’ - an outside station of the more notorious Flossenbürg
housing a few score inmates who were involved in technical research for
the SS. He never mentioned his closeness to the regime in his remaining
years, and set himself up as a hero of a debunking, cultural revolution in
Bayreuth. His designs were meant to clear his grandfather’s operas of all
their nationalist trappings, and as such they represent a major instance of
the cultural and artistic purge of the arts that followed the Second World
War. The Spruchkammer branded Wieland a ‘fellow traveller’. His mother
took the rap.
The Americans entered Bayreuth after reducing a third of the town to
rubble - including much of Wagner’s home, Wahnfried, though not the
house of the master’s son, Siegfried, which had been called the Führerbau
because it was made over to Hitler for his use during his visits to the
festival. The Americans moved into the opera house on the Green Hill and
created havoc playing jazz on Wagner’s and Liszt’s pianos. Winifred
insisted that most of the damage was done by ‘coloured’ American GIs,
who looted the theatre and shot up the sets with their revolvers. They also
amused themselves by dressing up in the operatic costumes. Another story
has it that German refugees stole the costumes, and for miles around you
could see people fleeing Bayreuth dressed as characters from Wagner
operas. The American authorities promptly banned the playing of Wagner’s
music.62
Winifred took on the role of the unrepentant Nazi, although she had
performed numerous acts of intercession with the Party to save the lives of
Jews and others who had fallen foul of the regime. Almost the first
‘Americans’ she received were Thomas Mann’s son Klaus, and Curt Riess,
reporting for the army newspaper, the Stars and Stripes. The two Germans
in American uniform were getting used to hearing that no one had been
aware of the atrocities carried out by the regime, and that everyone had
been against Hitler and was proud to possess a ‘“non-Aryan” granny’.
Winifred therefore came as a surprise. First of all she insisted on speaking
English to the freshly baked Americans - and was rather more proficient
than they were. She made no bones about her friendship with Hitler. She
praised his charm, his sense of humour and his good looks. This came from
the heart, although she later admitted that she could not resist the temptation
to rile the Germans in their borrowed clothes. Mann retired bruised.
The interview brought Winifred Wagner new fame. More reporters
pitched up at her house in the Fichtelgebirge. Some wanted to know if she
had slept with Hitler. She said no. She told them that Hitler had been misled
by Bormann. She clearly possessed a ‘stuff and nonsense’ charm, and had
seen enough of the Third Reich and its puffed-up officials to know how to
deal with a few army interrogators. With time she won the conquerors
round. One reason was her command of English, which made her an
important source of information for the occupying forces.63
Meanwhile Thomas Mann had weighed in from his exile in America,
publishing his reasons for not returning to Germany. He attacked those who
had continued to pursue an artistic life under Hitler. One who felt that he
was being indicted was Emil Preetorius, who had designed some of the
most famous sets for Bayreuth, and whose anti-Nazi views and friendship
with Jews had not only been well known but had put him in danger. Mann
gave no credence to the idea of ‘inner emigration’ as expounded by
Preetorius and others. Preetorius’s message to Mann was ‘My dear friend,
you have no idea of the sorcery of terror.’ It was an argument forcefully put
forward by Furtwängler when he asked Mann why he felt that Germans
should have been deprived of the solace of Beethoven during the years of
the Third Reich.64
Furtwängler’s humiliation began on 11 December 1946 in the
Spruchkammer in the Schlüterstrasse in Berlin. This was run by the British
major Kaye Sely as head of the Information Services Control Intelligence
Section. His attitude to denazification was generally more indulgent than
that of most gentiles, but it was not going to help Furtwängler much. The
first session of the Spruchkammer lasted for five hours before it was
adjourned so that more witnesses could be called. Heinz Tietjen, who had
abandoned his lover Winifred Wagner to her fate, once again played a
questionable role. Now he attempted to cover up for his intrigues at the
Lindenoper. He had had enough of the vain Furtwängler and sought to
promote the equally vain but considerably more ambitious Karajan. He
became Goebbels’s stooge in his campaign to discredit the older conductor.
65
Furtwängler meanwhile expressed his astonishment at his treatment
considering that he was the only member of the musical establishment to
have actively opposed Hitler.cx
In words reminiscent of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Furtwängler said, ‘You
have to work with the regime in order to work against it . . . Emigration
would have been a more comfortable solution in any case.’ The Western
Allies had plenty of dirt to throw at the conductor. Much of it centred on the
critic Edwin von der Nüll, who had made unflattering comparisons between
Furtwängler and Karajan, and whom the former had contrived to have sent
to the front, where he perished. Nüll had been a pawn of Goebbels.
Furtwängler’s defence had been limp, and the conclusion of the day was to
direct the case to the Allied Kommandatura. Those who had hoped to be
able to hear the conductor perform the Eroica the next day were to be
disappointed.66
Behind the scenes there was the constant clamour of the émigrés who
were determined to see the conductor as a cultural figurehead for the Nazis.
Chief among them was Erika Mann. His old rival Toscanini also played a
prominent role. Furtwängler had sealed his fate with many Jewish
Americans when in 1936 he had been offered the position of principal
conductor of the New York Philharmonic but chose to direct the orchestra
of the Berlin State Opera instead. Once again he had been a victim of Nazi
intrigue. News had been leaked to the press in order to compromise him
with the New Yorkers.67
The Americans led the way with denazification, trying 169,282 cases.
The Russians and the French weighed in at around 10 per cent of that figure
at 18,328 and 17,353 respectively.68 The British seemed to show very little
interest in the matter within their zone, handling a little over 1 per cent of
the American cases, at 2,296. Clay had full belief in the process and thought
the Allies were doing well. On 5 July 1945 he reported that denazification
in the early ‘liberated’ cities of Aachen and Cologne was virtually
complete. In Bavaria and Württemberg, however, it was going very slowly.
In March 1948, the Russians made a point of releasing 35,000 minor Nazis
from their camps.69
Clay had bagged 75,000 Nazis to date. Certain organisations were
particularly thick with them. He estimated that the police administration
was 100 per cent Nazi; the ‘Kripos’ or criminal police 60 per cent; the
others 40 per cent.cy In the banking world of Frankfurt half those employed
were Nazis; that meant 326 people. On the other hand the docility of the
post-war Germans struck Clay as it did everyone else: the ‘German masses
seem totally apolitical, apathetic and primarily concerned with [the]
everyday problems of food, clothing and shelter’. They did not quite behave
as he expected them to: ‘no general feeling of war guilt or repugnance for
Nazi doctrine and regime has manifested itself. Germans blame Nazis for
losing war, protest ignorance of regime’s crimes and shrug off their own
support as incidental and unavoidable.’70
Clay continued bagging Nazis. In autumn 1945 he had 80,000 in the bag
plus the same number of Waffen-SS and ‘Schupos’ - members of the
Security Police who were interned with the POWs. On top of these he had
around 75,000 Germans sacked because of their Nazi past, and 9,500 from
financial institutions.71 On 8 December the number of imprisoned Nazis in
the American Zone had risen to 90,000, and was to reach 100,000 by the
end of the year. Another 25,000 members of paramilitary organisations
were lodged with the POWs.72 It is not clear whether or not most of the SS
men had been released. Certainly, most of the Nazis had been released by
the summer of 1948. Clay admitted to holding 5,000 prisoners at that time,
with some 25,000 more awaiting trial outside the camps. They were all
hard-core cases. In September 1947 he turned his mind to the German
scientists who had been taken to the US in Operation Paperclip, to work on
the atom bomb and the rocket programme. In his opinion they should not
have been exempt from trial.73
On 13 May 1946 Control Council Order Four was passed. All literature
of a Nazi or militarist nature was to be confiscated. Clay was not impressed.
He had, by his own admission, been banning and confiscating such books
since the arrival of the Americans in Germany. He was particularly keen to
replace school textbooks from the era of the Third Reich. It was an
understandable measure, but taken to extremes it could only lead to absurd
situations and scenes reminiscent of the Nazi book burnings when over-
zealous local councils decided to expurgate their library collections.cz It also
furthered the confusion - which reigned at the heart of the Control Council -
that Nazism and ‘Prussianism’ were intimately related.74
Clay played the game while he was at the helm. In 1948 the Cold War
was coming and JCS 1067 was replaced by the less stringent JCS 1779,
which advocated economic unity and self-government. Clay was replaced
by his deputy, John McCloy. Times had changed and the former banker was
more interested in building a bridge to the Germans. His wife Ellen came in
useful in all this: she was German, and a distant cousin of Adenauer’s
second wife.75 McCloy himself went to Canossa: he paid a call on Frings
and promised the prelate that he would review the sentences passed on
German war criminals. The Americans began to release them in droves in
1949 in the interests of good relations with Adenauer’s government. 76
Seen as an exercise in punishing criminals, denazification was a farce.
A number of insignificant Pgs were treated with the utmost cruelty while
the big fish went free. Most of the minor cases were not ideologically
committed anyway. Some of the worst killers, those who sent thousands to
their deaths, who carried out the executions in the east as members of police
units, or who operated the trains which took Jews to the death camps in the
General Gouvernement, were not punished at all; they retired from the
police or the railways without anyone having called them to account, and
died in their beds.
Nazis in the Austrian Woodwork
In Berlin, the Viennese George Clare was keeping an eye on Herbert
von Karajan. He was well aware of the conductor’s Nazi past. The
impresario Walter Legge came to see them in the Schlüterstrasse to enquire
about his status, as he wanted to know if he was permitted to give concerts
in Britain. He had been denazified in Vienna, but as Sely told him, ‘we
always discount Austrian denazification’. Sely later sent Clare off to
investigate, giving him the address of the British theatre and music officer
Peter Joseph Schnabel - otherwise known as ‘MacSchnabel’ from his
dandified ways and the fact that he had once performed the role of teaching
the Cameron Highlanders to ski.
Clare found a room in the Park Hotel in Hietzing, a stone’s throw from
British Army HQ in Schönbrunn, where his murdered parents had spent
their honeymoon. He met Schnabel at Demel’s coffee house by the
Hofburg. The Austrian Jew was doing a tour of the tables, kissing the hands
of the local ladies. It soon dawned on Clare that Allied culture boffins were
even more firmly wedded to the local terrain in Vienna than were those in
Berlin: there was Schnabel and ‘George’ the Frenchman, whose Danubian
accent gave him away. Also ‘one of us’ was the US captain Ernst
Häussermann, who was deputising for another - Ernst Lothar. Finally the
Russian representative dashed into the meeting late, and bearing a parcel.
She had a ‘sweet’ excuse in her hand: it was a Sachertorte. Her name was
Lily Wichmann, another Viennese.
Denazification was not a big issue for any of them. For a start Austria
had had its own government from the beginning - a privilege granted to the
‘first victim’. The armies of occupation were there to enjoy themselves, and
that meant music. It would have been a shame, according to Clare, to lock
up decent musicians. He looked up a former corporal in the Pioneer Corps
who had risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The colonel invited him to
the British Officers’ Club in the Palais Kinsky. Clare was shocked to see
how much the Austrians had buried the past. Pure German Hochdeutsch
was now out of fashion: everyone did their best to speak in a sing-song
Austrian dialect, and men donned Styrian hats and suits, and women
dirndls, to assert the cultural differences that occurred once you crossed the
little River Inn.77
Yet there was still the problem of what to do with the Nazis who so
openly contradicted Austria’s pose. The Figl government drew up a
National Socialist Law which was passed by the federal parliament on 24
July 1946 in the belief that it was in keeping with Allied demands for
denazification. It was not: the Russians in particular found it too lenient and
the Americans wanted automatic prosecution at the level of
Untersturmführer - that is, a second lieutenant in the SS. The Allies made
around 200 changes. The American minister, Erhardt, went so far as to
suggest the creation of ‘concentration camps’ for Nazis.78 These already
existed in the British Zone.da It was finally adopted on 7 February 1947.
Under this law Nazis were divided into two groups according to the power
they yielded during the Third Reich. For war criminals there was a special
jurisdiction. The categories were similar to those employed in the American
Zone in Germany: ‘incriminated’, ‘slightly incriminated’, ‘not
incriminated’. Of the more than half a million Austrian Nazis, a little under
10 per cent fell into the first class. It was assumed that the 470,000 in the
second class would be amnestied and returned to the suffrage for the next
elections.79
Special ‘People’s Courts’db - nomen est omen - were established to try
Nazis. There was no appeal. The first case came up on 14 August 1945
when four SA men were accused of the massacre of 102 Jews in Engerau.
There were seven death sentences passed by the end of the year. It was a
modest tally. Where possible the blame was laid at the feet of the Germans.
On 30 August William Donovan, head of the OSS, received a report that
63,000 of Vienna’s 67,000 Nazis had been tagged. A large number of them
were claiming they had been forced to join the Party and wanted their
names dropped from the register. Some 5,800 of the city’s ‘dangerous
Nazis’ had been gaoled, but another 10,000 were still at large.80
When the tally was concluded there was a total of 536,000 names on the
register; and 100,000 of these had been so keen they had joined before
1938, when it was still an illegal organisation. Denazification went off at
half cock in Austria. From the beginning it was left in the hands of the
Austrian government to pursue Nazis, albeit under the gaze of the Allied
Bureau. The Americans prided themselves in being the ‘most drastic’,
although the evidence does not necessarily point to that. In October they
came under strong criticism when it was reported that the former Gauleiter
Scheel had been seen walking about the streets of Salzburg. They were also
keen to weed out the ‘Austro-fascist’ Dollfussites from the ÖVP. The
British they castigated as the ‘mildest’. Again this is misleading.81
On 26 February the trial of Chancellor Schuschnigg’s foreign minister
Guido Schmidt opened in Vienna. This was the moment to review the
behaviour of the Corporate State and to discover who was responsible for
the Anschluss. Schmidt had come home from Nuremberg, where he had
appeared as a prosecution witness in the case against Schuschnigg’s
successor Arthur Seyss-Inquart.82dc The trial lasted 107 days but failed to
prove that Schmidt had acted behind the back of his chancellor. There had
been much finger-waving on the part of the Dachauer because Schmidt had
been spared incarceration in a camp. Although he had been ousted from
politics by the Nazis, he was nonetheless made a director of the Hermann-
Göring-Werke. He was acquitted.
The efficacy of the courts altered from zone to zone. The OSS reported
on a trial in Vienna of four criminals and Jew-murderers: three were
convicted and sentenced to hang.83 As in Germany capital sentences were
often commuted. The courts awarded ten death sentences and thirty-four
terms of life imprisonment. The tribunals delivered another 13,600 guilty
verdicts. The punishments for major culprits were chiefly pecuniary: up to
40 per cent of their property and a 10 per cent fiscal surcharge over a
certain number of years. In all Austria 42,000 people were treated in this
way. Lighter measures were imposed against a further 481,000. The
punishments were fairly trifling, but 72,000 to 100,000 government
employees lost their jobs. This, it seems, was in no way consistent, and
40,000 Nazi civil servants continued in their functions in the Tyrol and the
Vorarlberg.84 Nazis were debarred from a certain number of professions as
well: journalists, university chairs, physicians; they could neither vote nor
stand as candidates in elections.
Some of the Allied commanders considered that harsh. The Frenchman
Béthouart, for example, felt that the law was cruel to small-time Pgs and
that it eliminated valuable experts from the workplace while ‘closing the
door to national reconciliation’.85 He does not allude to Austria’s Jews, who
had been robbed and murdered, and who were wary of a state that had not
actively sought their return. Few but the main activists even thought of
coming back.86 After the delusions current during the war years, it was now
clear that the majority of the Austrian people were party to their
expropriation. Nonetheless, Béthouart pushed for and succeeded in
attaining a moderation of the statute that amnestied the youngest Nazis.
Béthouart was not alone in forgetting the Jews. Of the 120,000 or so
who had managed to escape from Austria after the Anschluss, only 8,500
had returned by March 1947. With time the number was to go down, not up.
There were other Jews in Austria - around 42,000 DPs, living mostly in the
American Zone. The Americans made sure they received larger rations than
the others: around 2,000 calories as opposed to the standard 1,550. It was
said that Austrian antisemitism was the reason why so many Jews were
reluctant to come back. The charge was bitterly resented by the mayor of
Vienna, Theodor Körner, who said he had issued an invitation to Jewish
artists to return. In a dazzling non sequitur he said, ‘The Austrians are
cosmopolitan and therefore not antisemites.’ The notion of Austrian
antisemitism amounted to ‘deliberate lies or thoughtless babble’.87
The British approach to the Nazi problem in Austria was markedly
different to the approach in the British Zone in Germany, where
denazification was at best limp-wristed. The enforcement squad was the
Field Security Service or FSS, which had instructions to identify and arrest
all those on the pre-prepared Allied lists, and which depended on the
Intelligence Corps at home. One former member described the force as a
‘secret service in uniform’.88 Nazi lawyers were suspended - twenty-six in
Carinthia and seventy-six in Styria.89 The FSS also had to deal with
brigands, gangs of non-German SS men and Cetniks who terrorised isolated
farmhouses close to the Yugoslav border. It had a more strategic role on the
Carinthian border, controlling a twenty-kilometre-broad strip otherwise
accessible only to residents. This was used not only for the defence of the
region against Tito but also to keep the Yugoslavs out of Venezia-Giulia.
Those involved in the hunt for war criminals worked from lists drawn up by
the Atrocities Committee Austria.90
In the British Zone the courts examined the case histories of 31,517
Nazis. Of those only 2,623 were acquitted. The British maintained three
internment camps for Nazis at Wolfsberg, Weissenheim and Wetzelsdorf.
The first named became a synonym - along with Glasenbach in the
American Zone - for the rough treatment of political prisoners. The higher
courts dealt with around another hundred cases. These meted out fifty-three
death sentences, forty-two of which were carried out.91 The main atrocities
committed in Styria concerned the death marches to Mauthausen at the end
of the war. These gave rise to a number of high-profile cases in 1946. The
Eisenerz Trial dealt with the SS guards who killed off 162 Hungarian Jews
in the village of that name because they were in no condition to make it to
Mauthausen. Ten of the eighteen defendants were sentenced to death, and
were shot on 21 June.92
Shooting gave way to hanging when the gallows was set up in the
Provincial Court on 24 September 1946 and eight men were despatched by
the British master, Albert Pierrepoint. The British had brought in a Herr
Zaglauer and his two assistants to learn the ropes. Pierrepoint expressed his
confidence in these hangmen, who were deemed ‘now fully competent
officially to conduct executions themselves in the approved British
manner’.93 The People’s Courts then took over from the British. In Austria
as a whole they meted out forty-three capital sentences. Vienna naturally
took the lead with twenty-eight, but Graz came second with twelve; Linz, in
the American Zone, passed only three; French Innsbruck, none.94
The Soucek Case examined by the People’s Court dealt with an
important group of neo-Nazis. The court also handled the trial of the
Leoben Gestapo chief Johann Stelzl and those responsible for the
euthanasia programme in the lunatic asylum in Klagenfurt. Four men were
condemned to death. Sometimes the tariffs handed out seem light: the main
culprit in the Stremer Jewish Murder Case, in which the defendants were
proved to have killed fifty Jews, received twenty years.95 The following
year, on 27 February 1948, the Russian general Kurasov proposed a bigger
amnesty. The consequence two months later was the law of 21 April which
struck 487,000 names from 524,000 on the original lists. This added half a
million electors to the roll, most of them on the right.
Once the former Nazis had been included again within the pale of the
constitution, a new party came on the scene in the guise of the Union of
Independents. Anti-Nazi politicians sought to ban the Independents in the
Western zones. The Soviets, however, refused to follow suit, and the
Independents promptly took 12 per cent of the vote in the elections of 9
October 1949. The ÖVP once again topped the poll.
Punishment by Starvation
Once it had been decided that all Germans were guilty, the next job was
to punish them. Despite the propaganda rations meted out by the Russians
in Berlin, the Potsdam Conference decided that the Germans were not to be
over-fed. Requests by the Red Cross to bring in provisions were waved
aside, and in the winter of 1945 donations were returned with the
recommendation that they be used in other war-torn parts of Europe -
although the Irish and Swiss contributions had been specifically raised with
Germany in mind. The first donations to be permitted reached the American
Zone in March 1946, to some degree thanks to the intervention of British
intellectuals such as Bertrand Russell and Victor Gollancz.
Gollancz had published a polemic with the title The Ethics of
Starvation96 in the middle of 1946. As a Jew whose family had settled in
Britain from Germany, Gollancz had no reason to love the Germans. What
he objected to was the inhumane and unethical treatment of German
civilians:
I am a Jew: and sometimes I am asked why, as a Jew, I bother
about people in whose name infamies have been committed against my
race, the memory of which, I fear - though I would wish it otherwise -
may never die. I am sometimes asked this, I regret to say, by fellow-
Jews who have forgotten, if they ever knew, the teaching of the
Prophets . . . It is indeed a fact that I feel called upon to help suffering
Germans precisely because I am a Jew: but not at all for the reason
imagined . . . It is a question . . . of plain, straight common sense,
undeflected by that very sentimentality that deflects the judgement and
corrupts the spirit of so many. To me three propositions seem self-
evident. The first is that nothing can save the world but a general act of
repentance in place of the present self-righteous insistence on the
wickedness of others, for we have all sinned, and continue to sin most
horribly. The second is that good treatment and not bad treatment
makes them good. And the third is - to drop into the hideous collective
language which is now much the mode - that unless you treat a man
well when he has treated you ill you just get nowhere, or rather it will
give further impetus to evil and head straight for human annihilation.97
Despite the great wrong perpetrated against his people, Gollancz could
not sanction another crime: ‘The plain fact is . . . we are starving the
Germans. And we are starving them, not deliberately in the sense that we
definitely want them to die, but wilfully in the sense that we prefer their
death to our own inconvenience.’98 Over and over again in his letters to his
wife, he is struck by the fact that these suffering infants might have been his
own children.
From newspaper reports Gollancz prepared a chilling indictment: seven-
tenths of people in the now British city of Hamburg had no bread for two
weeks of every month. He quoted the UNRRA figure for daily subsistence -
2,650 calories. The minimum needed to sustain life was 2,000. In March
1946 the average for the British Zone had fluctuated between 1,050 and
1,591. This consisted of four and a half slices of dry bread, three middle-
sized potatoes, three tablespoons of oatmeal, half a cup of skimmed milk, a
scrap of meat and a tiny dollop of fat. At those levels you could survive in
bed, but could not work. Then at the end of February the rations had been
cut to 1,014 for those not doing heavy work, that is women. Infant mortality
was now at ten times the rate of 1944. In Dortmund in February 1946 forty-
six out of 257 children born that month perished.99
Politicians and soldiers - like Sir Bernard Montgomery - insisted that no
food be sent from Britain. Starvation was punishment. Montgomery said
that three-quarters of all Germans were still Nazis - although he did not
reveal the source of his information. The Germans had only themselves to
blame, and they should be last in the queue. The economist and chancellor
of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton argued that the cost of the occupation was
tantamount to paying reparations to the Germans.100 Britain itself was
recovering from the wartime dearth, however. The food minister John
Strachey had proudly announced that meat consumption was at 98 per cent
of pre-war levels, and that the British were eating 50 per cent more fish.101
As Gollancz presciently wrote, Germany had been stripped of its bread
basket cum milk-churn in the east, the pastures of Pomerania and East
Prussia.102 Meanwhile the British authorities in Germany were proposing to
cut the rations back to 1,000 calories. The French were already at 950,
while the Americans were not much more generous at 1,270. Gollancz
pointed out that the inmates at Belsen had 800, which was not that much
less.103 In Baden-Baden, Alfred Döblin was suspicious: if they really had so
little food they would be dead. He thought most of them were managing to
supplement their diet from the black market.104 That didn’t necessarily help
the old and infirm, however.
Gollancz followed The Ethics of Starvation with a further tract in
January 1947. In Darkest Germany was the result of a six-week tour of the
British Zone which the publisher made in October and November 1946, just
before the frost. It consists of eighteen letters and articles he had written to
belabour the government. He regretted he had been unable to make it to
Berlin. On the other hand he suggested that his performance was slightly
superior to that of Hynd, who in the past year by his own admission had
spent no more than twenty-eight days in Germany.105
Gollancz had gone to Germany with the ‘attitude of a sceptic’. He
nonetheless armed himself with a photographer, and to allay any scoffing at
the veracity of his reports, he backed up everything he said with a picture.
Most of the photographs include the figure of a benign elderly man in a
dark coat and hat: standing behind naked boys suffering from malnutrition;
holding up a particularly awful apology for a child’s shoe; or comforting a
crippled communist in his festering hovel. The point was to show that he
had seen these things with his own eyes and taken nothing on trust.106
Hunger oedema was not confined to the new Russian colony of East
Prussia. Gollancz thought it affected up to 100,000 people. He saw some
telling cases in the hospital, with the usual waterlogged legs. His
photographer took a picture of a dying man. The death-rattle had already
started. Another had a scrotum that stretched a third of the way down to the
ground. On second thoughts Gollancz had this picture omitted from the
finished text.107 Tuberculosis was at four to five times its 1939 level. There
was no penicillin available for the hospitals, because the Germans did not
have the money to pay for it.108 The Third Man said it all.
Gollancz was also interested in clothes. In Darkest Germany he
reproduces a shocking collection of footwear (‘shoes’ is hardly the word).
One child told him that he would not be able to come to school the next day
because his father needed to use the shoes. When it rained there were
appalling levels of absenteeism. In three schools he visited he inspected the
feet of all the children. In one, the shoes of thirty-four out of fifty-eight
children were kaput, in the next fifteen out of thirty-seven, and in the last
thirty-four out of fifty-three. The problem was that even if there were
Reichsmarks available these could not be used for clothing: you needed
coupons or Bezugmarke. If you had the precious Bezugmarke the chances
were that there were no shoes to buy. In Düsseldorf there were no nappies.
Gelsenkirchen had 260,000 inhabitants. In June the following were
available for Bezugmarke: fifty-six cardigans, forty-nine frocks, twenty-one
pairs of knickers, four nappies, three babies’ knickers, three rubber sheets,
seven kilos of knitting wool and twenty-one small towels. There were 182
births that month.109 There were other significant shortages: in Hamburg
there were virtually no contraceptives, despite the dreadful levels of infant
mortality.
The bombing of Hamburg had left the city with a hopeless lack of
accommodation, forcing 77,000 people to inhabit bunkers and cellars. Of
these Gollancz estimated that a quarter lived in conditions which resembled
some of the more heart-wrenching pictures of Honoré Daumier. He went to
Belsen to concentrate his mind, and wrote to his wife: ‘I don’t for a single
second forget the other side of the picture.’110 The bombing of the western
Prussian town of Jülich had been the worst in Germany: 93 per cent of it
had been flattened. Given the desolation around him, Gollancz was amazed
to hear that 7,000 of the original 11,000 inhabitants were still living there.
Their presence was indicated by the stove pipes peeping out of the ground
and the tunnels that disappeared into the bases of the ruins. Still, ‘in spite of
everything’, the town’s mayor, an SPD man, continued to speak of
‘liberation’.111
Leaving aside the humanitarian issue, the failure to feed the Germans,
especially during the cruel winter of 1946-7, may have given rise to a deal
of negative propaganda. Carl Zuckmayer reported conversations overheard
in bread queues in the American Zone: ‘Yes, Hitler was bad, our war was
wrong, but now they are doing the same wrong to us, they are all the same,
there is no difference, they want to enslave Germany in exactly the same
way as Hitler wanted to enslave the Poles, now we are the Jews, the
“inferior race”, they are letting us starve intentionally, can’t you see that is
their plan, they take away all our sources of income and let us die slowly,
the gas chambers worked quicker . . .’112
Gollancz had noticed this even before the frost set in. ‘Youth is being
poisoned and re-nazified: we have all but lost the peace . . .’ he wrote to the
editor of the liberal News Chronicle.113 The problem had even broader
implications: ‘I should have liked to write about the general decline of
public morality under the impact of growing despair and of the financial
crisis in which the black and the grey sectors constantly encroach upon the
legitimate one . . .’ Gollancz thought German youth had no morality
whatsoever, and the situation was not helped by the lackadaisical approach
of the British authorities. There was just one monthly youth magazine
published by the British, as opposed to nine in the US Zone; and most of
those were fortnightly.114
Clay was profoundly concerned about the lack of subsistence. He noted
that the people were receiving just 1,000 calories in the British Zone in
February 1946, which would ‘hardly maintain life’. Ernst Jünger, who
seemed to receive regular gifts of food from his admirers, reported in March
that the rations had sunk to half what they were. ‘This is a death sentence
for many who up to now have only been able to keep their heads above
water with the greatest effort, above all children, old people and
refugees.’115 The US Zone had been up to 1,550, but by 18 March the figure
had dropped to 1,313. Germans were better fed in the Soviet Zone. Even
when spring returned, the American provision had only risen to 1,275.
Without access to black-market supplies no one could live and work. Once
again Clay reserved some of his bitterest comments for the French, who
applied to him for wheat in January 1946. Without wheat the calorie count
in their zone would drop from 1,380 to 1,145. Clay thought they had none
because they had taken it all to France. Absence of wheat and the need to
make bread had also obliged the French to close the breweries. In February
that year Clay gave orders to reopen them in the American Zone.116 On 26
May 1946 he spoke of a ‘nutritional disaster’. Ever the propagandist, he
thought it ‘may seriously retard the recovery of Western Europe and
probably disturb its political development’. German children under six were
suffering from a high incidence of rickets, and children between six and
eighteen were often stunted.117
Many Germans were prepared to see the Allies as liberating angels at
first, but they were soon disappointed when they saw the all-too-human
soldiers arrive filled with propaganda and hatred for the civilian population.
The high-flown rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter now appeared to be every
bit as pharisaic as the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson had been.118 The
danger of hunger and famine was slow to abate. Gollancz had had faith in
the idea of Anglo-American co-operation, but even with the creation of
Bizonia the rations were pitifully low. As the cold weather began to set in,
on 14 October 1946 the daily intake was only 1,550 calories.119
Stories abounded like those retailed in Paris during the Commune: dogs
and cats were not safe from hungry Germans. Rats and frogs were eaten,
together with snails - which made a filling soup. Horse was a relatively
common dish, as the beasts often expired by the roadside and were then
carved up by the locals with sharp knives. The Germans discovered the
nutritious character of certain plants. Nettles were an obvious resource.
Flour was made from shoots, rosehips and reed mace (cat’s tail). Acorns,
dandelion and lupine roots were ground to make coffee. In Austria to this
day they will tell you that their fondness for elderflowers and elderberries
dates from that time.120 Wild mushrooms were a great boon in season: they
stopped the stomach from rumbling but later tortured the consumer with
their indigestibility. Even by the winter of 1948 the situation had not been
remedied - the Germans had still to reckon with scanty rations. That winter
the Americans brought in supplies of maize. As we have seen, the Germans
were not impressed: Hühnerfutter (chicken feed) one man called it; no jolly
green giants for them.
The countryside should have had other uses. Germany was struck by a
plague of wild boars after the war, which were in their way as frightening as
the marauding gangs of eastern European DPs. The boars gobbled up
potatoes and other crops. Farmers armed themselves with bows and arrows
because they had been obliged to yield up their guns. Most of them had no
way of killing the creatures, which then fell victim to Allied troops, who
hunted them for sport, not out of hunger.121
The situation was made all the more acute by the failures of supply. The
potatoes sent from Bavaria in the winter of 1946-7 arrived frozen. Those
who had nothing to trade and no power to go out and scavenge fared the
worst: of the 700 inmates of the lunatic asylum at Grafenberg bei
Düsseldorf, 160 died. At the lowest point of that winter, the daily intake in
British Nordrhein-Westfalen was 865 calories. Rumours spread: in
Oldenburg the locals thought the Allies were hoarding food in preparation
for a new war; or it was said that they were hoping that all the Germans
would die, and save them the expense of feeding them. Special ‘hamster’
trains were organised to see if anything could be found out in the country -
either by trading with the farmers or simply by scrumping. When rickets
appeared in the British Zone, the authorities responded by issuing vigantol
and vitimin D2. In Berlin, TB now accounted for one death in ten.122
Some relief was to be had from the Hoover Diet introduced in the
summer of 1947: a 350-calorie meal for children. Former president Herbert
Hoover had toured Germany and pronounced that its food situation was the
worst in Europe and that its diet was providing the lowest number of
calories for a century. He proposed sending over America’s surplus potato
production. Suddenly the school meal became the equivalent of a banquet.
Germans learned to like peanuts and soya. At the beginning of 1948 there
was a twenty-four-hour general strike in Bizonia in protest against the lack
of food. 123
On 17 June 1948 Carl Zuckmayer, now joined by his wife Alice,
witnessed a full-scale demonstration from their Munich hotel room. The
protesters were several thousand students in their twenties. From
loudspeakers they chanted, ‘We want no tyranny from hunger!’ and ‘We
have not been colonised!’ The demonstrators wore death’s heads or white
clothes painted with skeletons, and dragged coffins and gravestones along
behind them. One had a bread-basket containing just a piece of crust; others
carried symbols of misery, hunger and death. Other university cities
witnessed similar protests that day: three years after the end of the war the
people were still starving, and their intellectual hunger was also as yet
unassuaged.
The Zuckmayers found it horribly reminiscent of other demonstrations
they had witnessed in the city that had seen the birth of Nazism. In 1933
they had found themselves enmeshed in a pack of brutal Nazi students.
They had been lucky to extricate themselves with their lives; and yet these
students in 1948 were well brought up and highly intelligent. One of the
organisers was a close relative of a member of the Scholl circle - the Weisse
Rose. The Zuckmayers watched as armed MPs advanced at them from the
Nazi Haus der Kunst, which was now an American officers’ mess. Carl
realised that the only way to make the Germans into decent people again
was to treat them with kindness.124
Fringsen
It wasn’t just the lack of food that killed, it was the extreme cold. In the
winter of 1945-6 the coal ran out. Joseph Frings, archbishop of Cologne,
addressed the ‘people of the Rhineland’ in his New Year’s Eve homily: ‘We
live in times when we have to help ourselves to little things that are
necessary to keep ourselves alive and to maintain our health, if we may not
obtain them through our work or by requesting them . . . But I believe that
in many cases it has gone much further than this, and when this happens
there is only one solution: to immediately return any property you have no
right to own, otherwise God will not forgive you.’125 The people were only
too ready to interpret the sermon: if you are going lose your lives by
freezing to death, then help yourself to what you need! No one paid much
heed to the second part of the paragraph, or indeed to the gist of the sermon.
The story of the primate’s condoning of theft spread like wildfire - the
Church approved the stealing of coal. In February 1947 a train was stormed
in Nuremberg, forcing the police to fire warning shots. On the 26th of that
month it was reported that there had been 305 deaths from hypothermia in
the Western zones, 1,155 cases had been admitted to hospital and 49,300
people treated for the effects of the cold.126 By March 17,000 people had
been arrested for stealing coal since the New Year.127 Frings had come into
his own once the war ended. He was the one post-war churchman to
originate a verb in German: fringsen - helping yourself (principally to
Allied coal) when the troops weren’t looking. It was similar to zapp-zarapp
- helping yourself the Russian way. Frings was more a man of the people
than the other high churchmen who had won their laurels objecting to
Hitler’s policies. He had suffered knocks with the best of them. In June
1943 a bomb had blown up the air-raid shelter he was in, killing two nuns
and injuring five others. Frings rolled up his sleeves and helped to rescue
the wounded. His own family house was destroyed, killing one of his
sisters; a brother was killed during an air attack on Magdeburg; another died
in a Russian camp.128
He had been appointed in May 1942 after his predecessor, Schulte, died
in the course of another air-raid. The Nazis had already expressed their
view of Frings when they attacked him in his parish, and Peter
Winckelnkemper, the ‘brown’ mayor of Cologne, had thrown an ashtray at
the priest, scarring his face. Perhaps because he had seen the suffering
caused by both sides in the conflict, he was able to speak up for the victims.
He stood up first to the Nazis, then to the Allies by rejecting ‘collective
guilt’. From his pulpit he called for justice and Christian love from the
conquerors; he demanded the liberation of POWs, spoke out against famine
and against the expulsions from the east and called for just proceedings in
denazification. He also pleaded for the lives of those who had been
condemned to death by the Allied courts.129
At Christmas 1945 he made this clear to his flock. The war was over,
but the current situation was one of general suffering: ‘I see it as my duty to
relieve your pain as best I might . . . by speaking and writing. I have always
made it plain that the whole nation is not guilty, and that many thousand
children, old people and mothers are wholly innocent and it is they who
now bear the brunt of the suffering in this general misery.’130
Frat
As already noted, there was to be no talking to the conquered Germans.
‘Fraternising’ was prohibited before the Western Allies arrived in Germany.
The ban was first imposed after the First World War, but then the
occupation of Germany had been limited to certain western districts. After
the Second World War in some places it remained in force until October
1945, although it was perfectly ineffective.131
Soldiers were told not to be moved by the hunger of a ‘yellow-haired
German child . . . there lurked the Nazi’. In the American army paper Stars
and Stripes servicemen were rehearsed in useful slogans: ‘Soldiers wise
don’t fraternise.’ A picture showed a comely German girl: ‘Don’t play
Samson to her Delilah - She’d like to cut your hair off - at the neck.’ Or
quite simply: ‘In heart, body and spirit every German is a Hitler!’132 The
British were almost as heartless. The order banning frat was introduced to
British forces in March 1945. In his proclamation to the Germans Bernard
Montgomery asked them to tell their children ‘why it is the British soldier
does not smile’. Very soon, however, Montgomery saw that the ban was
unworkable with the children and exempted those under eight. On 12 June
soldiers could address any child. The British scrapped the ban altogether in
September, but until the following month Germans had to get out of the
way of British soldiers on the pavement.133
In some quarters, the ban on frat was the source of acute frustration
among Germans. Ursula von Kardorff heard about the prohibition on 11
June. Soldiers began to shout at the women: ‘We would like to talk to you,
but we are not allowed. Eisenhower said so.’ Arthur Radley, a British
officer serving in Austria, thought the whole thing ludicrous, but the ban
had one unexpected advantage. His regiment had an RSM whom everyone
disliked, but they could find no way of getting rid of him. Then, as they
were marching into Styria, a girl asked him the time, and he replied. He was
put before a court martial and broken to private. He was then transferred to
another regiment. ‘A lot of people could breathe again.’134
On 29 June Clay reported that the ban was ‘extremely unpopular’. It
was chiefly a ‘boy-girl problem’. ‘The only fraternisation that really
interests the soldiers is going with the pretty German girl, who is very much
in evidence.’ He thought the whole thing made for bad propaganda: it
should be the American soldier, not the German girl, who wins hearts and
minds.135 It was also wholly ineffectual: within a month of the Western
Allies’ arrival a German lover became the rule. What the soldiers did when
they were alone was fratting. For George Clare, coining a mixed metaphor
rather a long time after the event, British soldiers were ‘cementing Anglo-
German relations at the grass-roots’. His mess, a large, requisitioned Berlin
flat, was ‘liberty hall’: you never went into any bedroom without knocking
first. There was a chance there would be a ‘Veronika’ in there. Others went
home to the family. One of Clare’s friends shared a bedroom with a woman
and her mother. The latter just turned over and went to sleep.136
Neither Allied soldiers nor German women were ready to co-operate
with the ban. Part of the problem was a shortage of the opposite sex. Most
German men aged between sixteen and sixty were absent; those who
remained were often invalids or cripples. Women aged between twenty and
forty outnumbered their men by 160 to 100. Margret Boveri reported four
women mobbing a twenty-year-old German youth in Neukölln in Berlin,
and recalled the problems that had been caused for her generation by the
loss of two million young men in the Great War. The conquerors, by
contrast to the old men around, looked healthy and proud, which acted as an
aphrodisiac of sorts. For the women themselves, their virtue had been
compromised by two things - the experience of rape, often aggravated by
violence, disease or pregnancy, and starvation. Clare’s frat, ‘Anita’, was
lucky to have been raped just once: she had tried to wriggle out of it by
pointing to her groin and saying ‘I sick!’ The Russian was wise to that. ‘I
rubber!’ he replied.137 Very soon Clare learned that most if not all of his
comrades in arms had adopted ‘Fräuleins’ and that certain nights when the
men did not return to their billets were called ‘Fräulein nights’.138
The way to the Berlin women’s hearts appears to have been through
their stomachs. From the Winston Club, British Other Ranks filled their
haversacks with spam and cheese rolls, buns and cakes. A haversack filled
with NAAFI food had the purchasing power of two cigarettes. You could
feed a Fräulein and her family for four Gold Flakes or Players. British
soldiers were rationed to 200 cigarettes a week, which made them the lords
of the land with full seigniorial rights.139 Morality was loose and
prostitution rife. Both the Allies and the German authorities turned a blind
eye to it. In Nuremberg one of James Stern’s colleagues interviewed a
prostitute. She said most of her customers were sad German soldiers
looking for companionship, but there were American soldiers too, ‘both
white and coloured’. The AMG had not sought to interfere, but the
prostitutes had to register and see a doctor once a week.140
It was generally not a formal business arrangement in that way. German
women were prepared to have sex with Americans for reasons that stretched
from companionship to the need for protection, cigarettes, food or
stockings. There was a wood in Nuremberg that Stern called ‘Conception
Copse’. Between 6 p.m. and the curfew it was littered with GIs and German
girls. As frat was still officially banned, they had to beware of MPs. There
were, however, plenty of DPs acting as auxiliaries to the American forces
who had no fear of the police - Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Italians,
Letts or Poles - and they too availed themselves of the German girls.141
OceanofPDF.com
13
Black Market
Old Reichsmark coins, which weren’t valid any
more because of their silver content - we weren’t
supposed to have them any more - and Party badges -
all badges from Hitler’s time, Hitler Youth badges -
with those we went to the [American] barracks and in
the barracks we got cigarettes. And the cigarettes we
exchanged for food at the farmers.
Quoted in Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans, New Haven and London 2003, 90
OceanofPDF.com
14
Light Fingers
Naturally I nicked things sometimes, coal and that
sort of thing. Wood too. Just recently I even stole a loaf
of bread from a baker’s shop. It was really quick and
simple. I just snatched the bread and walked out. I went
out calmly, only when I got to the corner did I start to
run. You just don’t have the nerves any more.
Heinrich Böll, ‘Geschäft ist Geschäft’, in Wanderer kommst du nach Spal - Erzählungen, Munich 1997, 171
Theft was not confined to petty larceny among the soldateska, DPs or
starving Germans. Whole governments were involved in robbing Germany
of anything that took their fancy. It could have been just about anything,
such as Göring’s yacht, the Karin II, which ended up in the hands of the
British royal family. One Soviet priority was the seizure of any important
works of art found in the capital. This was a fully planned operation, and no
particular novelty. The greatest art thief of all time was probably Napoleon
Bonaparte, and French provincial museums are still filled with paintings
acquired on his campaigns. The Nazis too plundered art wherever they
went, but they proved themselves amateurs beside the Red Army. The art
works stolen by Soviet troops were originally planned to be exhibited in a
huge museum of war trophies - the equivalent of Hitler’s museum in Linz.
As the tide of opinion changed, however, the Russians chose to conceal the
art works in special closed galleries throughout the Soviet Union. Many of
them remain hidden to this day.df
In true Soviet style many of these works of art were destroyed in the
fighting and more were to be eradicated by negligence during the first days
of the occupation. The pillage was by no means limited to Berlin, and
within their zone and in the former German areas that were ceded to Russia
and Poland the Soviets were able to make off with some two and a half
million objets d’art including 800,000 paintings. Some of these had been
stolen by the Nazis.
Art boffins travelled with the Red Army as they conquered Germany,
grabbing anything of value. This was not always so easy, as the squaddies
were often more likely to destroy works of art than to preserve them.
Fyodor Chotinsky, for example, chanced upon his first haul when he
entered one of the houses of a Graf Pourtalès on 10 March 1945. His
excitement was mitigated, however, when over the next few days troops
shattered the larger part of the porcelain, knocked over statuary, and poked
out the eyes of portraits in the style of Rembrandt and Greuze. Even when
troops were posted to watch over a collection, the boffins returned to find
that the guards had slept in the tapestries and used the porcelain to cook in.1
The nemesis of this Russian pursuit of trophies was the MFAA
(Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives) department of the US army. They too
took art works into ‘custody’, including some 200 canvases found in Berlin.
The Americans originally planned to ship a large percentage of Germany’s
art treasures home with them. This was a policy warmly supported by Clay,
who wanted to ‘hold them in trust for the German people’. There was a
little more to it than that, however. Clay’s concern for the art works
encompassed an element of ‘trophying’: the ‘American public is entitled to
see these art objects’. He opposed the return of works from the Kaiser
Friedrich Museumdg in Berlin before a place could be found to exhibit them.
Eventually President Truman stepped in and promised to send them back.2
This was in part due to Captain Walter Farmer, the author of the
‘Wiesbaden Manifesto’, who encouraged ministers, senators and museum
curators to protest against official policy. Those works of art that had
already been removed to America were brought back to Germany after their
return had been officially sanctioned by Clay in March 1948. The Prussian
Collections were given to Hessen, as the state of Prussia would shortly be
abolished by the notorious Control Council Law No. 46 of February 1947.
The former Prussian Collection from the Kaiser Friedrich Museum had
found a temporary home in Wiesbaden. They included the famous bust of
Queen Nefertiti. Much of Berlin’s treasure was housed in the castellated
flak towers that were National Socialism’s most striking gift to the capital.
In one of them, the Zoo Tower, Soviet art historians in uniform discovered
Heinrich Schliemann’s gold: the treasures of Troy protected day and night
by the director of the Museum for Antiquities, Dr Wilhelm Unverzagt.
Unverzagt had managed to prevent the soldiers from finding the gold until 1
May, when a superior officer appeared. Then he revealed the contents of the
cases. The officer posted sentries. A few days later General Bersarin made a
visit to the tower and assured Unverzagt that the treasures would be taken to
a safe place. At the end of the month Schliemann’s gold was carried off on
an army lorry. Its ultimate destination was Leningrad.
Unverzagt had one last job to perform: he had to supervise the inventory
as the boxes were filled with other treasures as they were removed from the
tower. The first convoy set out on 13 May. By the 19th the work was all but
finished. On the 21st he learned that the lorries were heading for the Soviet
army HQ at Karlshorst. Speed was vital: the Western Allies were due in
Berlin at any moment and the Soviet authorities did not want the British or
the Americans calling them to order. The Zoo Tower was going to be in the
British Sector after all. The art historians had to convince the generals of
the importance of what they were doing. Many of these senior officers were
demontageniki - keener on using their lorries and railway trucks to ship out
whole factories together with any heavy machines to rebuild the Soviet
economy.3 And there was still a problem: the flak tower was under Smersh -
Military Intelligence - control, and the culture boffins had no right to
remove the objects from it. They had to win over Marshal Zhukov. This was
done by sending Andrei Belokopitov, in civilian life the director of the
Artists’ Theatre in Moscow, to see the marshal. Zhukov thought the visit
was to do with the theatre and received Belokopitov cordially. When he
learned that it was to do with the treasure in the flak tower, he became
angry. Belokopitov told the marshal, however, ‘If this collection falls into
the hands of the Americans, you will regret this mistake.’
Zhukov summoned his adjutant, Antipenko. They would override
Smersh: the culture boffins had twenty-four hours to empty the Zoo Tower.
Belokopitov broke into the conversation: twenty-four hours were too few,
because the objects were very large. Zhukov awarded the boffins forty-eight
and dismissed them. They enlisted a detachment of some 300 experienced
pioneers who set about dismantling the Pergamon Altar. They also loaded
7,000 Greek vases, 1,800 statues, 9,000 antique gems, 6,500 terracotta
figures and thousands of objects of lesser value. The bigger job was
finished by the beginning of June. When the Americans arrived they were
told that the altar had been removed undamaged, but that some Egyptian
reliefs and Roman statuary had been smashed, and that a Chinese bronze
gong had rolled away down the stone steps.4 The largest piece of booty
transported to Russia were the friezes from the Pergamon Altarpiece, which
had been a present to Kaiser William II from the Ottoman emperor to thank
Germany for its help in excavating the site. The Pergamon Museum had
been built up around it.
The greatest tragedy of the sack of Berlin was the fire that took place in
the Control Tower in the Park at Friedrichshain. The huge concrete tower
was abandoned by its defenders on 2 May. Over the next three days it was
picked over by various foreign workers who were chiefly looking for food.
The tower was, however, the temporary repository of the classical
antiquities from the Berlin museums together with the paintings from the
picture gallery. There were 8,500 objects from the classical collections, as
well as 1,500 in glass. Of the 411 canvases, 160 were Italian masters, a
quarter of the total collection, and including works by Fra Angelico and
Luca Signorelli. Italian sculpture was represented by Donatello’s Madonna
and Child. There were large works by Rubens, as well as pictures by
Chardin, Zurbarán, Murillo and Reynolds. Of the German works one of the
most famous was Menzel’s Tafelrunde.
In the night of the 5-6 May the Control Tower burst into flames,
destroying at least some of the art works housed on the first floor. It was
thought that the fire had been started by Germans looking for food.
Someone had the wilder theory that Werewolves had set the tower alight.
Still it was impossible to convince the Russians to guard the tower, and
some time between the 7th and the 15th another fire broke out that
destroyed all that remained. The second fire may have been started by
thieves trying to find valuable works of art, as some artefacts and at least
one picture later materialised on the market. As there was no light in the
tower it was supposed they had lit newspapers in order to see better. When
art historians visited the site a few days later they found that the forced
labourers had already scoured the remains, taking with them fragments of
antique glass and pots. On contact with the air the marble disintegrated in
the hands of the despairing experts.5
At the beginning of July the Russians took another look at the Control
Tower in Friedrichshain. It was decided to sift through the ruins to see if
there was anything worth retrieving. They filled fifteen chests with broken
antiquities. One of the archaeologists was excited about a strangely shaped
vase he found buried in the ashes. When he had dusted it down he found
that he was holding a Russian bazooka shell that had failed to explode. The
Russian experts knew that it was important to remove anything salvageable
from the Control Tower before the autumn as the damp air would destroy
the remaining artefacts. The military governor of Berlin, Colonel General
Gorbatov, wrote to Zhukov to this effect, but work did not begin until
December. By March 1946 around 10,000 objects had been dug out. Even
the Americans from the MFAA were able to retrieve a few objects. There
seems to have been little or no security at the tower.6 More antiquities were
taken from the cellars of the New Mint where they had lain around in pools
of water, in many cases badly damaged. From the Museum Island the
Russians selected fifty-four canvases from the cellars. Among others there
was Goya’s May Pole, and Ghirlandaio’s Christ on the Cross. All the looted
treasure was taken to Schloss Tresckow in Friedrichsfelde or the former
abattoir for shipment back to Russia.
The fate of Hitler continued to trouble the Russians for many months:
was he actually dead? The British too had launched an investigation, with
the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper piecing his last days together. The
Russians had the advantage of possessing the Chancellery, the bunker and -
although they were confused at first - his bones. Trevor-Roper did not have
those, although the picture he drew was substantially correct.7
Meanwhile the Soviet authorities were falling out over the bones. Stalin
had been informed by Zhukov that Hitler had committed suicide on 30
April. His body and that of his new wife Eva Braun had been dug up in the
garden, in the spot designated by Admiral Voss. As the Smersh soldiers
were not certain that they had the right bodies, they reburied them, only
finally exhuming them on 5 May, when together with the bodies of the
Goebbels children, the chief of staff General Krebs and a couple of dogs,
they were sent to their HQ at Berlin-Buch as important trophies. The
autopsies were performed the next day. Contradictory evidence made the
officers concerned reluctant to send in a final report on the cause of Hitler’s
death. The Soviet authorities preferred the version that had him taking
poison - a cowardly way out. Shooting oneself was a braver, more soldierly
death.
When the Soviets’ Operation Myth was launched in 1946 to establish
the real sequence of events leading to Hitler’s death, some of Hitler’s
personal staff were brought back to Berlin and the bunker, in order to point
out the precise details of the suicide and subsequent burning in the garden.
The bones, for the time being, were stored in Magdeburg.8 Of particular
importance were the objects in Hitler’s personal collection. For them an
aircraft was laid on as Stalin wanted his bones examined by his foremost
experts. The Führer’s skull was eventually put into a paper bag and
deposited in the State Archives. The paintings in his private collection were
taken to the abattoir.9 The area around the Chancellery remained out of
bounds to Berliners. When Ruth Friedrich poked her nose into the cour
d’honneur of the Chancellery in May she saw a Soviet squaddie
comfortably ensconced in an armchair with a machine gun across his
knees.10
At Schloss Sophienhof near Berlin, Russian soldiers destroyed the
complete archive of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Part of the medieval-weapon
collection housed in the Berlin Arsenal was destroyed on orders issued by
the Soviet military authorities. At Karinhall, the house Göring had built for
himself on the site of the the Kaiser’s hunting lodge on the Schorfheide, the
Russians indulged in an orgy of destruction, demolishing statues by Pigalle,
Houdon and Boizo by using them for target practice. The hidden pictures by
Emil Nolde (the Nazis had forbidden Nolde to paint) in Teupitz Hospital
were burned.11
Not everything was rubbished. In Silesia delighted Russian officials
seized immense numbers of wireless sets. In the villas of prosperous
Silesians well-stocked libraries were found, and 40,000 art books were
collected and despatched back to the Pushkin Museum. In Gleiwitz there
was excitement when a horde of Stradivari and Amati violins was seized,
until it turned out that they were fakes. Silesia, however, was not as rich in
artefacts as its soil was fertile. A Kolbe figure was located and
appropriated. As they searched for booty on one estate Soviet art experts
found a group of soldiers about to hang a monkey. The creature was
accused of having lifted its paw in salute when they had shouted ‘Heil
Hitler!’ as a joke. The irony of the monkey’s response had been lost on
them. The art historians rescued the beast and made it their companion.12
Soviet officers - particularly Lieutenant Yevgeny Ludshuveit - were
credited with saving the Schlosser of Sanssouci (the town palace was
destroyed by British bombs in April). Frederick the Great’s art collection,
however, went east, and a Russian officer is thought to have slashed Philip
de László’s portrait of William II with a sabre.13 Most of the Russian energy
went into removing the best parts of the collections they found. In the old
Cistercian monastery at Lehnin they found some stored works of art and
organised their shipment. Frederick the Great’s first palace, Schloss
Rheinsberg, was stripped of its last contents, right down to the painted over-
doors. Viktor Lazarev, however, a professor of art history at Moscow
University, was one who respected the architectural ensemble where
possible. In Potsdam he advocated leaving paintings, sculpture, chandeliers
and tapestries in situ, when they were conceived as part of the
Gesamtkunstwerk. As many as 60,000 POWs were used in the evacuation
of these works of art, loading them on to 90,000 railway trucks.14
Berlin was not the only place rich in art treasure. The Russians had the
run of Saxony and much of Thuringia, not to mention Pomerania and the
prosperous port of Danzig. The electors and kings of Saxony had been great
collectors, and the Dresden Gallery was one of the world’s foremost art
museums. Part of the collection had been stored in a quarry at Grosscotta
near Pirna. Among the paintings there was the Sistine Madonna by Raphael.
The art historian Natalia Sokolova was the first to see the pictures when a
German unlocked the door to the store room.
A simple goods wagon stood in the tunnel. The German handed me the
candle. [Leonid] Rabinovitch turned on an electric lamp. In this twilight
were glimpsed the gold frames of the pictures, that were tightly packed
together. We turned our lights towards them and I felt I had gone deathly
pale. Before me I could see the broad span of the eagle that bore off
Rembrandt’s Ganymede in its claws. Rabinovitch carefully moved the
painting to the right, and another appeared.
‘Do you see?’ he whispered. ‘Wonderful,’ said the German . . . what lay
before me was the Sleeping Venus of Giorgione . . . After that came the Self-
Portrait with Saskia by Rembrandt and a small, silvery landscape by
Watteau, a view of Dresden by Canaletto, Titian’s Portrait of a Woman in
White . . .
The conditions in the quarry were terrible: it was cold and damp: ‘The
Germans had lost any moral claim to [the pictures]. Now they belonged to
the Red Army.’ There was a fear that they might have to fight the
Americans for them if they did not get them to their collection point at
Schloss Pillnitz as quickly as possible. Marshal Koniev came to inspect the
haul. He was also impressed and telegraphed Stalin to tell him that the
treasure had been found.15
There was more booty in Schloss Weesenstein. Here the Russians found
the Koenig Collection that had been bought by Prince John George of
Saxony, and forty-five Rembrandt etchings that had belonged to the
industrialist and banker Rudolf Gutmann of Vienna and had since been
earmarked for the Führer’s Museum in Linz. Only one of the etchings had
been detached from the collection: The Jewish Bride was thought to portray
too sensitive a subject.16
More paintings from the Dresden Gallery were found at Pockau-
Lengefeld by the Czech border in the fortress at Königstein and some
modern masters in a house in Barnitz. In Meissen orders were given to
restart production of the famous porcelain. This was not possible, however,
as the demontagniki had made off with the equipment. The contents of the
Porcelain Museum as well as some valuable paintings were stored in the old
castle at the top of the hill. Also in Saxony, Leipzig’s most valuable
collections had been placed in the strongrooms of banks. Nearly a hundred
were found in a vault on the Friedrich-Tröndlin-Ring in October. Thirty
more were found in a bank in the Otto-Schill-Strasse. The Russians took
only 10 per cent of their find home, but that still amounted to over a
hundred paintings. Another fifty-two came from the Coburgs’ Jagdschloss
Reinhardsbrunn and the palace in Dessau. Added to the pictures were whole
libraries from Friedenstein, Gotha and Leipzig. These were taken to the
Academy of Sciences in Moscow, together with the university libraries
from Leipzig and Halle.17
At the beginning of May a search had been made for the vanished
treasures of Danzig after the Russian shelling of the old city. The hunt
began in the Arsenal, where the Trophy Brigade had to brave the stench of
decomposing corpses to locate their quarry. After two days they found the
hiding place and unearthed treasures from the town hall and the museum.
The best bits went to Russia. A few odds and ends were given to the new
Polish director of the museum. In the ruins of the famous Artushof, they
looked in vain for the fifteenth-century wooden relief of St George. It had
been destroyed in the fire following the shelling. In the wreckage of a bank,
however, they unearthed the coin collection from Marienburg, the fortress
of the Teutonic Knights.18
The Soviet forces perpetrated all sorts of theft. The most common was
the pillaging which accompanied their arrival and which has never been
accurately assessed. When it is considered that virtually every sewing
machine, every gramophone and every wireless set went east, it can only be
described as looting on a staggering scale. The trophy battalions followed
on the heels of the soldiers who pinched anything that took their fancy. By 2
August 1945 these had seized 1,280,000 tons of material and 3,600,000 tons
of equipment. This way they hoped to make good the losses they had
incurred in the war. Officially they claimed the Germans had destroyed
$168 milliard’s worth of equipment, but that figure must also have included
items they destroyed themselves in their retreat.19
It was not always the Russians who arrived first. The art historian Paul
Ortwin Rave guided the MFAA to Ransbach where the Berlin State Theatre
and the Opera House had stored their costumes. They found the remains of
an orgy that had been enjoyed by Russian and Polish workers and prisoners
together. Once their German guards had run off they had broken into the
cases and dressed themselves up in costumes from Aïda and Lohengrin.
They had also found a hidden fund of champagne and cognac. In their
drunken state they had broken into cases containing Dürers and Holbeins,
but at the sight of the saints they had fled in holy terror. The Americans
took the prize to Frankfurt in their zone. It was they who located the
treasure in Altaussee, as well as parts of Göring’s collection, including the
sixteen cases which the Reichsmarshall had grabbed from among the
pictures stored in the Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino and which
the Germans had taken into safe keeping before the British destroyed the
building.20
Franz Sayn-Wittgenstein recalled examples of the Americans’ cupidity
in their zone. He was staying in his wife’s family mansion, Budingen, when
the US governor of Hessen, Newman, sent word to requisition silver and
furniture for his palace. They fobbed him off with tableware, which was
later returned. In June 1946 Clay rebutted a charge of looting made against
some of his soldiers who were accused of stealing six paintings. 21 Easier to
verify was the theft of the Quedlinburg Bibles by American soldiers in
Thuringia.22 The American commander in Budingen was a Captain
Robinson, who swiped five pictures from the Städel Gallery in Frankfurt.
‘Robinson revealed himself as nothing more than a common thief.’ They
were traced as far as Holland, whence they were in all probability shipped
to the United States. They were put up for sale many years later, and the
Städel was able to buy them back.23 Most American cases were restricted to
petty larceny out of a desire for souvenirs, though occasionally a shop was
looted for objects like cameras. GIs had a passion for Nazi artefacts only
equalled by the Soviet soldateska - as they advanced through Germany they
trashed each SS barracks in the pursuit of flags and swastikas. There was
also a celebrated case when two officers of the Women’s Army Corps were
tried for stealing $1,500,000 worth of jewellery from Princess Mary of
Hesse, a fantastic sum then.24
Captain Frank M. Dunbaugh took the 50,000 tin and lead soldiers that
were the pride of the Hirtenmuseum in Hersbruck in Franconia. They
represented the armies that went to war in 1914. In an effort to relocate the
soldiers the town contacted President Eisenhower, who promised his
support. Some 500 of the figures were tracked down in Texas. When
Dunbaugh was asked his excuse for ‘liberating’ them he replied that it was
to ‘deglamorize the Hitler war machine in every way possible’. Theft was
therefore justified by JCS 1067. In 1958 another 20,000 of the soldiers were
located and eventually shipped back to Hersbruck. An attempt to force the
Americans to compensate the museum for the rest fell on deaf ears.25
The Americans were not all thieves. In Wiesbaden they organised a
Central Collecting Point for Jewish paintings and books stolen by the Nazis.
It was run by Theodor ‘Ted’ Heinrich, later professor of art history at the
University of Toronto. Surviving Jews could apply to retrieve their
belongings there. The Americans also located a favourite grey that had
belonged to Queen Wilhelmina of Holland and which had been seized by
the Germans during the occupation of her country. In the confusion at the
end of the war, the horse had been given to a circus. The Americans
returned the animal to its mistress who had it saddled in order to form part
of a parade. When the music struck up, the horse got up on its hind legs and
began to dance, a trick it had learned in the circus. Her majesty was not
amused and the horse was put out to grass.26 Queen Wilhelmina might have
been more grateful that the horse had not been eaten by hungry Germans or
DPs. In Munich Carl Zuckmayer reported that Poles had stolen the world’s
sole porcine tightrope walker, once the pride of Althof’s travelling circus -
they had then slaughtered it and had it for dinner. When the owner tried to
prevent the Poles from killing his beloved pig he nearly lost his own life as
well. Althof had had the hog insured abroad and apparently received no
compensation for his loss.27
There were acts of common theft perpetrated by the British too. At the
Krupp residence, Villa Hügel in Essen, an inquiry carried out in 1952
revealed that property valued at two million marks had been purloined
during the occupation. Much of it was later found in Holland, where it was
waiting to cross the Channel. The greatest scandal surrounding the British
Zone was the use of Schloss Bückeburg, home of the Schaumburg-Lippe
family, by the RAF. The process was begun by Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Coningham, whom the art historian Ellis Waterhouse compared to Göring
in his acquisitiveness. Coningham removed and distributed enormous
quantities of valuable silver, furnishings and objets d’art from the Schloss,
and much of it later remained unaccounted for. The affair led to the
resignation of the military governor, Marshal of the RAF Sir Sholto
Douglas.28
The British lagged behind the Russians and the Americans in purloining
art works, but they had their own brand of organised theft in T-Force, which
sought to glean any industrial wizardry hatched under the Nazis and bring it
home to Britain. The Russians and the Americans were equally guilty on
this score, but, as George Clare puts it, they ‘preferred the inventors to the
inventions’, while the British were too hard up to feed their boffins. In
Cuxhaven, however, they learned what they could about the workings of the
V2, and they made off with all the German naval equipment they could
find. One of the things that Clare saw at the Askanier Works when he was
interpreting there was a prototype tape recorder.29 In January 1947 the
British launched Operation Matchbox designed to lure German scientists to
their zone, but they were even less efficient than the French; and the
Americans had the pick of them.30 As one American put it, ‘The British and
the Russians have got hold of a few German scientists . . . but there can be
no doubt that we have captured the best.’31
The Allies stole men and women who for one reason or another were
useful for their projects. Under the pretext of accusing them of seeking to
develop an atomic bomb, bacterial warfare, space travel and guided
missiles, the British and Americans arrested a number of nuclear physicists
and had them brought to England in what was meant to be a species of joint
enterprise. 32 These included Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Otto Hahn,
Werner Heisenberg and Max von Laue. With the exception of Heisenberg,
the men were found in Hechingen in Württemberg, where they had been
working on their uranium piles, drawn from the mines of Joachimsthal in
the Sudetenland. Heisenberg was discovered in his family skiing chalet in
Upper Bavaria. Others, such as Richard Kuhn and Wolfgang Gertner, were
apprehended in Heidelberg. Some of the smaller fry were taken by the
British in Hamburg.
Once the team had been assembled they were brought first to France,
initially to Rheims and Versailles, before being lodged in a villa in the Paris
suburb of Le Vésinet. They were eventually delivered to Farm Hall near
Cambridge, where they were perceived to have nothing in common bar the
title Herr Doktor ‘by which they punctiliously addressed one another’.33
Once the Anglo-Americans had learned everything they could about the
Nazi atom-bomb programme they were released in Hamburg and Göttingen,
but told not to stray into the Soviet Zone. That was also for their own safety.
The Russians were keen to abduct or simply tempt away scientists and
technicians who might have been useful to them. The Nobel Prize-winning
physicist Gustav Hertz was taken to Russia to help them develop nuclear
weapons. On 21 October 1945 a large number of skilled workers,
technicians and scientists were freighted out by train. The Western powers
made a weak protest, which the Russians simply ignored.34
OceanofPDF.com
15
Where are our Men?
The only thing I know for certain is that the
prisoners-of-war are dying of hunger and that the field
in which they have to sleep is hellish damp.
Ernst von Salomon, The Answers, London 1954, 423
OceanofPDF.com
16
The Trials
We had gambled, all of us, and lost: lost Germany,
our country’s good repute, and a considerable measure
of our own personal integrity. Here was a chance to
demonstrate a little dignity, a little manliness or
courage, and to make plain that after all we were
charged with, we at least were not also cowards.
Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, London 1976, 14
The Allies’ decision to indict the Nazi leaders had a precedent. Article
227 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles called for a trial of major German ‘war
criminals’, with the Kaiser at the top of the list - who, Lloyd George
proclaimed, should be hanged. It demanded the extradition of up to a
thousand Germans but proved a soggy squib: neither Holland - where
William II had been granted asylum - nor a largely unoccupied Germany
would agree to hand over the defendants. To show willing, the Germans
themselves put on a trial in Leipzig. Thirteen men were convicted, but as
they were perceived as heroes in Germany they all managed to escape.1
At their various meetings, the Second World War Allies agreed on the
need to liquidate the top Nazis. The question was how? Should they suffer
summary execution, a drumhead court martial, or should the victors risk a
trial?2 When the fate of the ‘war criminals’ was discussed in Moscow in
October 1943, the American secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was in favour
of a drumhead court martial. The Soviet delegation could not have
approved more strongly. As their Nuremberg judge, General Iona
Nikitchenko, put it: the accused were ‘war criminals . . . who have already
been convicted’. It was the British and Anthony Eden who reminded the
conference of ‘legal forms’. Legal form was clearly important, but they all
knew whom they wanted to eliminate. The British prosecutor, attorney-
general Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, put it in a nutshell: ‘Our work . . . is to see
the top-notch Nazis tried, condemned, and many of them executed.’ Hull’s
master, Roosevelt, was in favour of shooting them, and appointed a judge to
look into the possibility. His advisers, however, told the president that it
would be illegal. America switched course and called for a trial, and Soviet
Russia joined in. By this time the British had changed their minds and
favoured summary execution!3
If there were to be trials, there had to be a law to try them by - the old
maxim runs nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime without laws,
sometimes rendered as nullum crimen sine lege). The Allies had to invent a
body of law that would criminalise Nazi offences and backdate it to cover
the period in question. It would be a code based on merging two
conventions: the Hague Convention on Land Warfare of 1907 and the
Geneva Convention of 1928, to which Germany (and not Soviet Russia)
had been a party. It had been argued that the Hague Convention had merely
framed laws and usages that had existed for centuries, but it had been
assembled at a time when, for example, aerial warfare was unknown and
when guerrilla armies were not taken into consideration. Some things
emerged with crystal clarity: Article 23 of the Geneva Convention stated
that it was an illegal act to kill or wound a soldier who had laid down his
arms. It was also illegal to deny quarter. German soldiers had the Ten
Commandments printed in their pay-books. It was correctly assumed that
those who slaughtered POWs knew they had done wrong, and there were
instances when their comrades in arms shunned them as pariahs as a result.
The result of the fusion was ‘Nuremberg Law’. Nuremberg Law was the
basis of the Royal Warrant of 18 June 1945 used in the military courts in the
British Zone. The British defined the ‘war crime’ as a violation of the laws
and usages of war. Stalin threw everything he could at the invading German
armies; and he did not play by the book. German soldiers were rightly
terrified of falling into enemy hands alive. Savage reprisals were directed
towards the civilian populations of the Soviet Union when German troops
were slaughtered behind the lines. It was a policy that had been losing
German armies friends since the time of the Franco-Prussian War, but it was
an accepted ‘usage’ allowed by Article 453 of the British Manual of
Military Law. As the Labour MP and KC Reginald Paget put it, ‘It was
really unreasonable to expect the Germans to fight these all-in wrestlers in
accordance with the Queensberry rules.’4 The Americans were even more
ruthless: ‘one shot merited the destruction of a village. You will see the
result in some heaps of rubble in Bavaria and Franconia. As they advanced,
if a shot was fired from a village, they either stopped, or evacuated, and
whistled up the air force. The isolated heaps of rubble in this relatively
undamaged countryside are very striking. The result was that the Americans
had very few casualties.’5
The Germans were to be judged for their behaviour in foreign territory.
This was inserted at the behest of the Russians and the French. It involved
the treatment of civilians: murder, abuse, deportation, slave labour; the
murder of prisoners of war, killing hostages, plunder of public or private
property, ‘the wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity’.6 ‘Genocide’ was a new word for a
relatively new crime. The destruction of the European Jews figured as only
a small part of the case against the Germans in the early trials. The killing
of German and Austrian Jews on the territory of the Greater German Reich
was not automatically covered as it was theoretically the legal right of a
sovereign state to dispose of its citizens as it pleased. On the other hand
there was agreement that Julius Streicher should be done to death, so legal
nicety had to be bent a little as he was not really guilty of any other crime
that had been brought to the Allies’ attention.7 The persecution of German
and Austrian Jews at home was therefore vaguely included under the aegis
of ‘aggression and the preparation for unjust war’.
For the Russians the massacre of Jews was hardly of interest, although
half a million of their Jewish citizens were slaughtered by the Nazis. The
reason for this was the rampant antisemitism they themselves experienced
after the war in reaction against the upsurge in Zionism. On the other hand
the prosecution found the Final Solution increasingly useful when it came
to breaking down the defendants. Films of the concentration camps had a
sobering effect even on such seasoned performers as Göring and Hess. By
the time the trials were under way no German was an antisemite any more.
As one later commentator glibly put it, ‘there was hardly a defendant who
could not produce evidence that he had helped some half-Jewish physics
professor, or that he had used his influence to permit a Jewish symphony
conductor to conduct a little longer, or that he had intervened on behalf of
some couple in a mixed marriage in connection with an apartment’. 8
There was very little call for retribution from Jewish groups at first.
Henry Morgenthau remained a voice in the wilderness, and Truman for one
wanted to keep him there. He later resigned in a huff. Zalman Grinberg,
president of the liberated Jews in the American Zone, accused the Allies of
a lack of concern, and wondered whether this would have been the case if
another race had been the victim of a similar purge. Morgenthau continued
to thunder, as did the presidential adviser Bernard Baruch and the columnist
Walter Winchell, but they were not greatly heeded. On the other hand the
enormity of the crimes committed by Germans did provoke Americans to
calls for the severest punishments in the spring of 1945. Joseph Pulitzer of
the St Louis Post-Despatch thought 150,000 Nazis should be shot.
Congressman Dewey Short of Missouri advocated mass executions of SS
and OKW men.9
The hypocrisy of Nuremberg Law alarmed many people. One was the
Indian jurist Rahabinode Pal, a judge in the Tokyo trials, who dissented
from the judgments, seeing the sentences meted out as retrogressive, ‘a
sham employment of legal process for the satisfaction of a thirst for
revenge’. Field Marshal Lord Montgomery also disapproved of the tenor of
the trials that ‘have made the waging of unsuccessful war a crime, for
which the generals of the defeated side would be tried and then hanged’. He
understood that if the Germans had won the war, he might have been put on
trial himself.du Shortly after a British Military Court in Hamburg sitting in
the aptly named Curio-Haus had condemned Field Marshal Erich von
Manstein to eighteen years in prison, the Korean War broke out, and the
German press was happy to report that the American army was accused of
precisely the same atrocities as the field marshal.10
Many contemporary observers agreed with Pal and believed the scores
of trials that took place after the end of the war were simply a case of
victors’ justice. These dissenters included soldiers, jurists and judges. The
Soviets, who provided a general as their prosecutor in the main trials in
Nuremberg (he had been involved in fake trials in the 1930s and later
became the director of Sachsenhausen concentration camp in its first years
under Soviet management) and a more junior officer as a judge, constantly
reminded the Western Allies that the purpose of the tribunals was to punish
the defeated enemy. Yet the Soviet attitude was in some senses the most
lenient, because they of all the nations that had defeated Nazi Germany
were the most likely to have committed atrocities on a similar scale.
Reginald Paget KC was one of the most stentorian voices raised against
the trials. He agreed to lead Field Marshal von Manstein’s defence team
gratis, describing the Royal Warrant as ‘simply an exercise of the power of
the victor over the vanquished’. As far as he was concerned, none of the
convictions would have been secure in an English court, and they would all
have been quashed by the Court of Appeal. For Paget the conqueror had no
right to impose a form of trial which he ‘would consider inadequate for his
own citizens’.11
And yet something needed to be done. The Germans had performed
terrible acts. To claim that what they had done was in no way illegal
because they were obeying higher commands or putting through the secret
policies of the state was simply not good enough: not all Germans had sat
around waiting for homicidal orders; many had acted on their own
initiatives. Trials would also have the further advantage of recording the
acts of the Nazi regime, providing a huge quantity of sworn evidence about
the workings of the state. They would also have the effect of laying the
blame. The American prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson made it clear:
they were not trying the German people, just the men in the dock. Although
many condemned the trials at the time, a precedent was set for war crimes
and crimes against humanity and there is little protest against global
jurisdictions today. Clay realised that the courts were establishing
something. Writing to Jackson’s successor Colonel Telford Taylor on 17
October 1947, he said, ‘At Nuremberg we are establishing procedure for
[the] future and not aiming at any specific individuals. History will make no
distinction between a von Rundstedt and a von Leeb.’12
Under Nuremberg Law, the implication was that any officer who
received what was later liable to be interpreted as a criminal command
must refuse to carry it out, although - as Paget pointed out - both the British
and American Manuals allowed superior orders to be used as a defence for
‘criminal’ actions.13 In reality that meant an officer had to resign his
commission. In Nazi Germany the response would have been a court
martial and a firing squad. Colonel General Beck did resign his command in
1938, and encouraged other generals to follow his example (none did), but
that was not in wartime. He was one of the movers and shakers behind the
various military and civil plots to remove or kill Hitler between 1938 and
20 July 1944, when finally he did indeed pay with his life.
Suggesting that generals had absolute authority within their areas of
command was also to misunderstand the nature of Hitler’s regime. Like
Stalin, the Führer was a great believer in impera et divida. He alone had
enjoyed unrestricted power; the underlings had to jostle for position beneath
him. On the battlefield this became a struggle for control between the SS
and the Wehrmacht. The SS reported to Himmler, who answered to Hitler.
The Waffen-SS had the advantage of better equipment, while the traditional
army tended to lead the campaign under experienced generals, the majority
of whom hailed from the traditional, Prussian officer corps. The SD was
responsible for the dirty work behind the lines. It, too, answered to
Himmler, but its actions within the Wehrmacht domains were agreed by the
general commanding, which - as so often in Hitler’s state - involved making
the traditional general complicit in the actions of the SD either by co-
operating with it or by agreeing to take over its functions by rounding up
commissars, partisans or Jews. It was not Hitler’s or Himmler’s intention
that anyone should emerge from the conflict with clean hands. Even
diplomats were obliged to sign memos that said they agreed with the policy
of deporting the Jews.
Paget pointed out that ‘usages’ were not considered binding in the
British Manuel of Military Law and ‘could be disregarded by belligerents’.
There were other fishy aspects to the Royal Warrant that had been taken
from Nuremberg Law: the accused was not allowed to know the charges nor
what evidence was adduced against him; he could not challenge the
authority or jurisdiction of the court; he could not insist on being tried by
his peers - and was generally subjected to the judgments of those holding
inferior rank and therefore diminished responsibility. The Royal Warrant
disregarded the long-established rules of evidence and admitted hearsay.
The statements of hearsay witnesses were not only given credence, the
witnesses were not summoned and could not be cross-examined. There was
no right of appeal.14
Paget also made it clear that the defendants remained prisoners of war,
because Britain had not brought hostilities to an end. As POWs they could
demand particular treatment. POWs had rights in international law: the
captor had to treat them as well as he did his own troops and subject them
to the same law as he would apply towards his own men.15
Interrogations
Before the German war criminals could be put on trial they needed to be
apprehended and interrogated. The British, for example, possessed a
remarkable collection of Nazi-hunters. They included men who later
achieved fame in other spheres, such as Robert Maxwell16 and the historian
Hugh Trevor-Roper. The interrogations and the accumulated details of Nazi
crimes had another role - they could be used against the German population.
Trevor-Roper was compiling his report for British intelligence at the time. It
was published as The Last Days of Hitler and was considered to be
excellent propaganda for the Allied cause. Trevor-Roper hardly needed to
be encouraged to belittle the Nazi leadership and show the Germans how
foolish they had been to follow them.dv
Maxwell was a Czech Jew and many of those employed to find the
Nazis were Jews from Germany and Austria. They had the ability to
interrogate Germans in their own language, and in many instances they felt
a real sense of motivation in their work. These included Peter A. Alexander,
a former bank clerk from Vienna. Major Frederick Warner (formerly
Manfred Werner from Hamburg) and Lieutenant-Colonel Bryant (Breuer)
formed part of an eighty-man team that arrested, among many others, the
chief of Bremen’s Gestapo Dr Schweder. They left him in the hands of a
group of RAF officers, who he thought would treat him relatively kindly.
They did not, and staged a mock trial in the best Gestapo tradition, so that
Schweder thought his last hour had come. When Warner returned Schweder
was overjoyed to see him.17
Peter Jackson (formerly Jacobus) was responsible for arresting the
Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Höss, having tracked him down to a
farmhouse kitchen where he was hiding. His superior officers were aware
that Jackson’s mother had been killed in Auschwitz, but they still believed
he was the only man for the job of interrogating the prisoner. The revulsion
Jackson felt towards Höss could be overcome only by drinking large
quantities of whisky. He was allegedly drunk for a week. 18
Former Pioneer Anton Freud was the man who captured Dr Tesch, who
had produced the gas for the ‘showers’ at Auschwitz. Freud’s team also
apprehended Himmler’s deputy, Oswald Pohl, who was delivered to
Nuremberg and condemned to death. Fred Pelican (born Friedrich Pelikan
in Poland) was the man who caught Hans Esser, the Nazi leader in Neuss in
Silesia. Flight Sergeant Wieselmann was involved in the search for the
killers of the fifty British airmen who were shot after the Great Escape. A
Sergeant Portman worked on the dossier concerning the deaths of 7,000
Jews who had died while being transferred from one concentration camp to
another.
One Nazi who particularly interested the British was William Joyce, the
American-born, half-Irish fascist who was known to all and sundry as Lord
Haw Haw. He had fled from Hamburg and was living in an inn near the
Danish border with his wife. On 28 May 1945 two British officers were
searching for kindling in the local wood. Joyce, who was doing much the
same, couldn’t resist giving them a hand, and shouted to them in French,
telling them where they might find some pieces of wood. He then repeated
himself in English: ‘There are a few more pieces here.’ His voice was
instantly recognised. ‘You wouldn’t happen to be William Joyce, would
you?’ Joyce put his hand in his pocket. The officer thought he was going to
draw a gun and shot him in the leg. Joyce groaned that his name was Fritz
Hansen (his forged German papers said his name was Wilhelm Hansen), but
he was still carrying his military passport, which had him down as William
Joyce. He was taken back to Britain, where with doubtful legality he was
tried for treason and hanged in Wandsworth Prison.19
Despite the huge dragnet and the large forces at the Allies’ disposal,
very few of the top Nazis were executed. Many of the most important ones
like Hitler and Goebbels killed themselves before capture. Others managed
to commit suicide in captivity. A surprisingly large number of leading Nazis
were able to take poison behind bars, posing the question whether the Allies
turned a blind eye to such things. In his memoirs, Franz von Papen claims
that he was offered means to take his own life on two occasions, both times
by American guards.20
Himmler, the most important war criminal after Adolf Hitler, never
reached the courts. He had been spurned by Dönitz and issued instructions
to the leading SS men around him to disappear while he lay low in
Flensburg with his mistress and their children. The leading lights of the SS
were provided with false papers and cyanide capsules. Himmler himself
assumed the identity of Sergeant Heinrich Hitzinger of the Field Service
Police, a man whom he had had executed for defeatism. He shaved off his
moustache and, putting a patch over one eye, set out to join the Werewolves
in Bavaria. Unfortunately for Himmler the Allies had outlawed the Field
Service Police, and on 21 May the British picked him up halfway between
Hamburg and Bremen.
The British failed to recognise him. Eventually Himmler revealed his
identity himself. He still thought he had something to offer the Western
Allies, and asked for a meeting with Montgomery or Churchill. At Second
Army HQ at Barfeld he was strip-searched. A Captain Selvester found two
brass tubes on him. It is not altogether clear why they did not search his
mouth. Selvester alerted Montgomery’s intelligence chief Colonel Michael
Murphy. Murphy decreed that the formal interrogation should not begin
before he arrived. Selvester ordered some thick cheese sandwiches for the
prisoner and watched him as he ate. An intelligence officer could not resist
taunting Himmler with some photographs of corpses taken at Buchenwald.
Himmler shrugged him off: ‘Am I responsible for the excesses committed
by my subordinates?’21 It was an extraordinary response: of course he was.
Himmler was brought a change of clothes, but he refused to don a
British army uniform, preferring to wrap himself in a blanket. He was still
insisting he wanted to see Montgomery or Churchill. Colonel Murphy
arrived at eight and had Himmler bundled into his car. Murphy handled him
roughly and called him a ‘bastard’. He was driven to a villa outside
Lüneburg and ordered to strip again by a Sergeant-Major Austin. Himmler
responded by saying, ‘He does not know who I am.’ Austin replied, ‘Oh yes
I do: you’re Himmler. Ausziehen!’ Himmler was then examined by Dr C. J.
L. Wells, who noticed the phial in his mouth. Himmler was too quick for
them, however, and was able to flick the phial out with his tongue and crack
it. There were attempts to save him, but the effect of the poison was
immediate. Himmler died just after 11.00 p.m. on 23 May. He was buried in
an unmarked grave on the Heath two days later.22
Göring took a long time to realise that the Allies were not going to treat
him, or anyone else for that matter, according to the rules that had governed
VIP prisoners in previous wars. On 7 May 1945 US forces commanded by
Brigadier Robert Stack were searching for him around Mauterndorf dw in
Austria, where he possessed one of many mansions. The Görings were still
half convinced that they were going to be shot after Hermann had tried to
wrest authority from the Führer in the bunker. There was a large SS guard
with them. The Americans and Göring were converging on Fischhorn
Castle near Zell-am-See, which had been requisitioned for the latter’s use.dx
Here Göring was hoping to negotiate with Eisenhower. When the
Americans arrived, Göring was still bogged down in traffic in a car laden
with his monogrammed pigskin suitcases.
He had been out of touch with reality of late. He had badly overplayed
his hand with Hitler, and persisted in believing that Eisenhower would deal
with him directly. The Americans were generally courteous for the time
being, and Göring posed for photographers in Kitzbühl the next day. Some
said he had been seen talking to American officers on the balcony of the
Grand Hotel with a champagne glass in his hand.23 He was encouraged to
blab about other Nazi leaders at informal gatherings. This was part of the
process of softening up the prisoner. He was still cross with Hitler for
ordering his arrest and described him as narrow-minded and ignorant.
Ribbentrop - never his favourite - was a scoundrel, and Hess an eccentric. It
was not until the 10th that he came face to face with General Spaatz, the
commander of the US air force. Then the Americans took him into the
kitchen and stripped him of his medals and insignia, leaving him only his
epaulettes. He was housed in a prison compound for high-ranking Nazis,
with a tall black soldier posted outside his door.
He discovered Robert Kempner among the American officers. Kempner
had been in Police Department 1a, the political police that had sired the
Gestapo. He had been sacked by Rudolf Diels in January 1933, and as a
Jew he then thought it prudent to leave. Göring must have realised that
Kempner would be a powerful adversary. The Americans asked him about
the concentration camps. The man who had nominally hosted the Wannsee
Conference denied all knowledge. He pointed out that Hitler had been
deranged at the end of his life. He later denied that he had ever signed a
death warrant or sent anyone to a concentration camp.dy Shown pictures of
Dachau he blamed Himmler.24
The robber-in-chief now had the disagreeable experience of being
robbed himself. US army engineers discovered his picture collection in
Berchtesgaden: works by Rembrandt, Rubens, Van Dyck, Boucher and
Botticelli were all hauled out. One Rembrandt bought in Paris in 1940
turned out to be a fake. French Moroccan soldiers had already pilfered some
of his jewellery; a GI stole his field marshal’s baton, which was intercepted
at customs and eventually found its way into the collection at West Point;
his 1935 wedding sword was stolen by a platoon sergeant who placed it in a
bank vault in Indiana. Later his wife Emmy was defrauded of an emerald
ring by a sergeant who came to tell her that Göring was about to be
released.25
Prison Walls
On 20 May 1945 Göring was flown to Mondorf-les-Bains in
Luxembourg to join fifty-two other Nazi big fish in ‘Ashcan’, Allied
Supreme Headquarters Centre for Axis Nationals. The gloves were off:
Göring was treated with scant respect when the aircraft landed. He was
struck by the monotonous movements of the GIs’ jaws churning up their
chewing gum.26 The prisoners were strip-searched for poison and weapons,
and anything of value to them was taken away. The first to arrive had been
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who had succeeded Kurt von Schuschnigg as
chancellor at the Anschluss, and had later been Reich commissioner of
Holland. He had been responsible for throwing all the leading Austrian non-
Nazis - including a sizeable number of government ministers - into Dachau
and beginning the persecution of the Jews.dz In Holland he bore
responsibility for the deportation of most of the Jews. Hans Frank was next,
much the worse for wear after slashing his wrists. He had been the governor
general of Poland who proclaimed his mission to be ridding ‘Poland of lice
and Jews’.27 Göring was reunited with Frank, Bohle, Brandt, Daluege,
Darré, Frick, Funk, Jodl, Keitel, Ley, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg and Streicher.
The Americans dubbed him ‘fat stuff’. Three days later there was a fresh
delivery: Admiral Dönitz arrived together with Speer. Speer did not stay
long. He was flown to Eisenhower’s HQ at Versailles and then to the
British-run interrogation centre named ‘Dustbin’ in the medieval castle of
Burg Kransberg in the Taunus. Here he received a visit from Hugh Trevor-
Roper, who was then researching his Last Days of Hitler. They seem to
have got on: in the summer of 1947 Trevor-Roper sent a copy of the book to
Speer for his comments.28
Franz von Papen was delivered to Mondorf in May 1945, but he was not
considered important enough for the Grand Hotel, where the leading Nazis
were lodged, and went to a smaller establishment next door instead. He had
been pushed further and further out of the nest, as ambassador to Austria
before the Anschluss and then as ambassador to Turkey. He was still
claiming to be surprised that he had been arrested at all. He had been
housed in some comfort in a château near Spa in Belgium where he had the
Hungarian regent Admiral Horthy for a cellmate.ea Horthy also
accompanied him to Mondorf.29 Papen and Horthy’s regime was Spartan,
and the elderly regent’s health began to suffer. Papen claims in his
autobiography that he tore the notorious American gaoler Colonel Andrus
off a strip for maltreating a head of state. Papen’s prison was beginning to
establish itself as the place for the B-stream Nazis. Soon they were joined
by Schwerin von Krosigk and the Freiherr von Steengracht from the
German Foreign Office. There were now six to a room. Papen tried to pin
Andrus down on the subject of the Hague Convention governing prisoners
of war. Andrus shook him off, but permission was swiftly granted to write
letters. On 15 June Joachim von Ribbentrop was brought in. He had been
tracked down in a bed and breakfast in Hamburg, having spent six weeks on
the run, during which he had composed a letter to the British government.
He was arrested after a tip-off on the 14th. A British lieutenant found him in
bed, dressed in pink and white pyjamas.
The old rivalries and hatreds persisted. There was a ridiculous
adherence to correct forms of address. Even after the sentences were
pronounced, Speer would ask the former deputy Party leader, ‘What did you
get, Herr Hess?’30 Göring could not abide Ribbentrop, Speer or Dönitz.
With Dönitz the feeling was clearly mutual. Once when Göring was
complaining that his lot was the worst, because he had more to lose, Dönitz
acidly remarked, ‘Yes, and all of it stolen!’ Göring was interrogated by
Major Hiram Gans and Lieutenant Herbert Dubois. Dubois asked him if he
were ashamed of the milliard-mark fine imposed on the Jews in 1938.
Göring expressed his muted regrets: ‘You have to take the times into
account.’ He soon got the hang of how to deal with the interrogations.
When a Russian team arrived to prepare their case he had them roaring with
laughter.31
The Trials
The Allies were now finalising the procedure for the war-crimes trials
that were to be held in Nuremberg. On 8 August the ‘London Statute’ was
drawn up and signed by Justice Jackson from the United States, the future
Lord Chancellor Sir David Maxwell Fyfe from Britain, Professor Gros from
France and General Nikitchenko from the Soviet Union. (Nikitchenko
started out as prosecutor and later served as a hanging judge.) It was hardly
difficult to tear holes in the text: there were four different powers with four
different ideas of law. One of the nations prosecuting was as totalitarian as
Nazi Germany had been. There was little hope for the defendants: the
prosecution had all the advantages, the defence all the disadvantages; and
there was to be no questioning of the competence of the tribunal. Article 6
contained the meat - the court had the right to condemn persons, either as
individuals or as members of organisations, for crimes against peace and
conspiracy to wage war, war crimes and crimes against humanity. These
had not, of course, been crimes when they were committed, nor were any of
the prosecuting powers immune from accusations of this sort - particularly
Soviet Russia. When the defendants brought this up the response of the
court’s president Lord Justice Lawrence was to say, ‘We are not interested
in what the Allies may have done.’32 Article 9 ruled that carrying out orders
was not an excuse; evidence of atrocity by a member of an organisation
would be taken as evidence of the criminal nature of the organisation. The
defendants at Nuremberg were mostly intelligent men, and there was a fair
smattering of jurists among them. Naturally they protested, but it was
cogently impressed upon them that they might just as easily have been put
up against a wall.
Although the Allies had plenty of time to prepare their cases, a lot of
their accusations proved groundless, or they were obliged to let a major
criminal go free for want of evidence. Papen was still falsely accused of
being a member of the Party even when the Americans were in possession
of the full Nazi Party membership archive. The case against him was that he
had conspired to wage aggressive war, which was a difficult one to prove
given that he was nowhere near the inner circle of the regime, and came
within inches of losing his life during the 1934 Röhm Putsch, the so-called
Night of the Long Knives. His real crime was folly - believing that Hitler
could be contained. He was by no means alone in this.
Papen and his friend Horthy had not yet understood the new post-war
world. Horthy composed a letter to Churchill pleading for the maintenance
of a ‘big’ Hungary with access to the sea as a bulwark against Bolshevism.
There was no reply. In August the inhabitants of the annexe were
transferred to a wing of the Grand Hotel. Horthy was sent away. Papen now
found himself together with the major Nazis, and reflected on how different
they looked in their shabby beltless uniforms and worn-out laceless shoes to
the last time he had seen them all strutting about at a rally in Nuremberg in
1937. Nuremberg was also where they were now heading. The party was
taken to Luxembourg aerodrome.
Göring was housed in a proper prison cell in the courthouse now, as
opposed to a maid’s room in Mondorf. He was watched at all hours of the
day. Humiliations were arranged for him, such as a formal discharge from
the German armed forces (arranged by the Americans), which had the effect
of bringing on a minor heart attack. The Allies turned up the heat during the
interrogations, but Göring was given a defence lawyer in Otto Stahmer
from a short list of jurists who had managed to keep their noses relatively
clean during the Third Reich. It should be added that few of them were
entirely clean: the list contained 206 names, of whom 136 had been Pgs and
10 were former members of the SS. One, Rudolf Dix, had been president of
the Nazi bar association; another, Ernst Aschenbach, had been an expert in
deportation attached to the Paris embassy.33 Stahmer was a patent lawyer.
Papen chose a Breslau lawyer called Kubuschok, with Papen’s own son
acting as his junior. Speer made a wise choice in Hans Flächsner, a
diminutive Berliner who gave him useful advice, telling him not to over-
dramatise his role in the Third Reich and pointing out that the Allies had
already decided he was only a minor criminal and that he was not to put on
the airs of a major one. Speer was probably right in believing he owed a
deal of his salvation to Flächsner. Being contrite, or undergoing religious
conversion, availed the prisoners little. Both Frank and Seyss-Inquart
showed contrition. Both were hanged.34
To Papen’s horror he chanced upon Horthy again on one of his weekly
trips to the showers. Papen was beginning to learn something of the charges
against him: he had instituted the terrible People’s Courts, which had been
set up after the acquittal of the Bulgarian communist Dimitrov. It was not a
charge that was likely to stick. The Americans were understandably baffled
that Papen had continued to serve the Nazis after the Röhm Putsch, when
his speechwriters were murdered for writing an anti-Nazi speech for him.35
Another who claimed that he had no idea why he was there was Dönitz.
Hitler’s successor stressed that it was not for generals to take decisions to
go to war, and had he refused to carry out his orders ‘he would have
received the heaviest punishment’. He was also charged with using
concentration-camp inmates as workers in his dockyards.36 The charge was
pretty pharisaic, given that the Allies had millions of POWs working as
slaves for them at the time of the trial.
John Dos Passos arrived in Nuremberg on 19 November 1945 to cover
the trials. The arrangements in the courthouse were compact. For the
spectators and journalists the facilities were good, and they had their own
post office and a smart snack bar.37 The chief defendants were housed in the
basement and brought up in a lift. Then it was just a few steps down the
corridor to the courtroom.38 There was a consolation for Göring, at last: at
Nuremberg he regained his supremacy. He was number one on the list,
meaning that he was the first into the dock with a seat on the front bench at
the extreme right facing the judges. The hated Bormann - tried in absentia -
was down at number nineteen and Speer at twenty-two. Dönitz had been
positioned at a measly fourteen.
His neighbour in the dock was Rudolf Hess, who was flown from
England to Nuremberg on 8 October. After his mysterious flight in May
1941, Hess had been incarcerated in Britain. He was now brought home for
the gathering of the clans. The frugality of prison life in Nuremberg came as
a shock to him after the relative comfort of his confinement in Britain. He
was pretending to have lost his memory and stared stonily at everyone who
tried to remind him of details of his distinguished past. He later announced
that he had been acting all along: ‘Good wasn’t I? I really surprised
everyone, don’t you think?’ he asked his fellow inmates. Despite being
officially compos mentis Hess still paid no attention to the court. He would
not wear the headphones, but read books and chatted throughout the
proceedings.39
As Hess could not be indicted for most of the juicier atrocities
committed by the regime (which had taken place while he was in British
captivity), he was given the Streicher treatment and tried for conspiracy
against peace and humanity - a charge concocted for Nazi leaders who were
earmarked for long detention or execution, and who had been essentially
condemned before they entered the dock. His crimes were not great by
comparison to some: he was tangentially involved in the drafting of the
antisemitic Nuremberg Laws and with the invasion of Poland. Göring
laughed off many of the Allied accusations. He swiftly dealt with an
attempt to foist responsibility for the Reichstag Fire on him, and the
interrogator, Kempner, did not raise the matter again. Göring might well
have begun to waver when he learned that the Americans had arrested his
wife Emmy in October and put his daughter Edda in an orphanage
(although she was later allowed to join her mother in Straubing Prison).
Emmy was not a political figure. She and Edda were eventually released
when the Americans realised that this sort of Sippenhaft - a method
favoured by the Nazis - would not make it easier to justify their cases
before the courts.
Göring stood his ground, however. He had a positive attitude towards
life and for the time being was not tempted to follow the examples of some
others: Ley managed to strangle himself with the hem of a wet towel
attached to a lavatory cistern, and the mass-murderer Dr Leonardo Conti
also killed himself, leaving a note saying he had lied under oath to cover up
his knowledge of medical experiments.40 Field Marshal Werner von
Blomberg died of a heart attack in March 1946.eb In 1948, General Johannes
Blaskowitz committed suicide by jumping from the third storey of the
prison block.ec
In all this gloom Göring might have taken heart at the news that his IQ
was placed third among the remaining Nazi prisoners, exceeded only by
Schacht and Seyss-Inquart.41ed The time of surveys ceased, however, when
on 19 October 1945 Göring and the others were served their indictments by
none other than Major Airey Neave, a British intelligence officer who had
successfully escaped from Colditz and who would later become a member
of Mrs Thatcher’s shadow cabinet.ee German civilians took a muted interest
in the show trials. Göring may have impressed the court, but little of this
seeped out to the German population. Such reports as there were of the
trials were heavily censored. The radio broadcasts delivered by a Gaston
Oulman every night were confined to the more sensational aspects of the
prosecution’s case.42 In Berlin, Ruth Friedrich thought the indictments had
little relevance to ‘good Germans’ but she approved, as it gave heart to the
Allies. ‘Not so much for us, but for the farmer in Oklahoma, who wants to
make sense of his son’s missing leg.’43
Papen had finally learned that he was charged with conspiracy to wage
war. Dos Passos, who arrived on the day before the trials were to start,
heard an address from Colonel Andrus, in which he regretted to inform the
press that the former SD chief Kaltenbrunner was ill and would miss the
first day. He seemed disappointed that he had not managed to keep all of
them fighting fit for the première. Frick was paralysed in his left wrist after
a suicide attempt, but Göring was in better health than he’d been in twenty
years, having lost weight and been weaned off drug addiction.44 The trial of
the major war criminals began at 10 a.m. on 20 November. The president of
the court Lord Justice Lawrence was assisted by Francis Biddle from the
US, and his deputy John J. Parker. From France came Professor Henri
Donnedieu de Vabres, who scribbled away silently throughout the trial
without ever uttering a word. The Germans had a particular contempt for
General Nikitchenko, the one judge who disdained the use of the gown, and
wore his military uniform throughout: ‘We knew what his verdict would be,
with or without a trial.’45
Dos Passos sized up the prisoners in the dock: Göring looked like a
‘leaky balloon’, ‘a fat man who has lost a good deal of weight’. Ribbentrop
was a ‘defaulting bank cashier’, Schacht, ‘an angry walrus’. The former
head of the Luftwaffe was still ‘the master of ceremonies . . . Nero must
have had a face like that’; while Hess paid ‘no attention to anything’.46
The charges were read out and Jackson made a speech in which he
offered the estimate that 5.7 million Jews had lost their lives as a result of
Nazi orders. Most of the defendants claimed they knew nothing of this.
Schacht advanced the ingenious argument that he had been helping the Jews
to emigrate by framing legislation that would rob them; Streicher claimed to
be a Zionist, which, in a way, he was.47 During the recess Göring was asked
who had issued those orders. Göring replied, ‘Himmler, I suppose.’48 The
camps came back to haunt them: films were shown of their victims. The
psychiatrists Kelly and Gilbert took notes as the defendants watched scenes
of civilians being burned in a barn. Hess was captivated, others tried to look
away; Frank choked back tears; Funk actually shed some at the sight of the
crematorium ovens. When Hess muttered disbelief, Göring told him to shut
up.49
Göring indulged in a few jokes. There was a strong Jewish presence at
Nuremberg in the form of jurists attached to the army, translators and
interpreters. At one stage he spotted a group of Jews in the public gallery
and whispered: ‘Look at them, nobody can say we have exterminated them
all!’50 He was outraged by the testimony of Lahousen, the Austrian Abwehr
chief, who spoke on 30 November, giving details of the plans to kill Hitler.
Göring blurted out, ‘That’s one we have forgotten to knock off after 20 July
1944.’51 The leading Nazis could not shake off the accusations levelled
against them for the very reason that they had been slack about destroying
the evidence - too many papers had lain around at the end of the Thousand-
Year Reich. The other problem was the officials and SS men who were
prepared to give evidence against them. Turning ‘king’s evidence’ for the
prosecution was a way of saving your life for the time being. Some of the
worst criminals even stayed out of prison while they made themselves
available to the courts.52
The apparently honest statements of the state secretaries Bühler and
Steengracht were particularly damning, as well as those of the SS men
Ohlendorf, Wisliceny, Höttl, Höss and Pohl. One man who outraged all the
main defendants was Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, possibly the most
brutal of the police generals, and one who was perfectly aware of the crimes
he was committing.53 He may have just been buying a sort of freedom (he
died in a prison hospital in Munich in 1972). Before 1949 he appeared as a
prosecution witness no fewer than twenty times, earning Göring’s loud
condemnation as a ‘Schweinehund!’
That opening day was also notable for the surprise announcement from
Hess that he wished to take responsibility for his actions, and that he had
never lost his memory, he had been pretending all along. Hess was a puzzle
even to his own colleagues. Papen confessed that he didn’t know if he were
sane or not. He thought he had been compos mentis at the time of the flight
to Britain. During the trial he read novels by the Bavarian writer Ganghofer.
Göring, with support from his old enemy Ribbentrop and from Rosenberg,
persisted in his claim that the court had no authority and that the British and
Americans were equally guilty of infringing international law. He was
occasionally seen plotting with Hess. Like the other prisoners, he gave
Streicher a wide berth. He was contemptuous of Hans Frank, who had been
smitten with religion since his incarceration and was much given to tears -
he had been behind the brutal treatment of the Poles. Göring claimed to be
shocked by what he now learned of the camps, and declared that the story
was incredible. But we also know that he tried to save people from the
camps, so it was pretty clear he knew that something nasty went on there.54
Göring could not claim so easily that he had had no knowledge of the
killings that took place on the Night of the Long Knives in 1934. It had
been chiefly his party. He dismissed Röhm, however, as a ‘dirty
homosexual swine’ and justified himself by saying it was them or him. As
Speer and others sought to atone for their roles in the mass murders, or
claimed a dubious role in opposition, or - like Paulus - chose to implicate
Hitler and his gang in monstrous crimes, Göring started to talk about
honour. He didn’t care whether he lived or died, but he was not going to
grovel before the court. He urged the generals to be equally resolute. He
said they were all going to be treated as martyrs before too long, and their
bodies set up in mausolea like Napoleon’s.
When the defendants were shown a Soviet film of German atrocities,
Göring yawned and scoffed. With a little justification he pointed out that the
Russians did not necessarily occupy the moral high ground. As it turns out,
he was right to be scornful: the Soviet film showed images of Katyn, and
the mortal remains of a large element of the Polish officer corps, murdered
not by the Germans but by the NKVD. (The massacre was part of the Soviet
indictment.) He was, nonetheless, appalled by the images he had seen.55
The defendants all took the trial very differently. Jodl was calm and
soldierly, and awaited his fate. Seyss-Inquart thought he would be acquitted,
and told Viennese stories. The one thing that disturbed him was the
knowledge that Hitler had appointed him in his will to replace Ribbentrop.
Frank admitted his guilt and spent his time in meditation. He, Papen, Seyss-
Inquart and Kaltenbrunner were regular in their attendance at Mass.
Ribbentrop continued to write long letters in self-justification; Rosenberg
made pencil-sketches of the witnesses; Streicher let out cries and screams
during the night. To the end he maintained that the trial was the triumph of
world Jewry.56 Of the service chiefs Keitel remained his pompous self,
pleading not guilty to the indictment, but Dönitz and Raeder - who had been
turned over by the Soviet authorities in a rare gesture of cooperation -
conducted themselves with dignity, as did Neurath.57
The prosecution opened its case against Hess on 7 February 1946.
Göring took the stand at last on 13 March, and remained in the dock until
the 22nd. He had waited five months for his moment. He put on a fine
performance and refused either to grovel before the court or to deny his role
in the ‘movement’. He gaily quoted Winston Churchill’s line, ‘In the
struggle for life and death there is, in the end, no legality.’58 He took
responsibility for everything he could, thereby removing much of the case
against Papen, for example, when he claimed that the Anschluss had been
his show.59 Asked about some aspect of mobilisation, Göring answered that
the Americans had so far kept quiet about their own strategic plans. The
Americans now began to doubt the wisdom of this sort of public trial.
Göring was in danger of becoming a hero again. Even the American press
reported. ‘Göring wins first round.’60
There was a reluctance among the Allies to produce witnesses for the
defence, and it took them a while to locate Göring’s chief of staff, Koller,
even though he was in British captivity.61 The British proved more
successful at badgering Göring than the Americans had been. Under Sir
David Maxwell Fyfe’s cross-examination he began to sweat. The British
case hinged on the shooting of the fifty airmen after the so-called Great
Escape - a terrible crime and a contravention of the Geneva Convention, but
one that looks peripheral now compared to others perpetrated by the Nazis.
They had been shot on Emmy’s birthday. Göring may well have known
nothing about it, but that hardly absolved the Luftwaffe chief of the ultimate
responsibility for the crime.62
One of the Nazis who dramatically turned his coat at Nuremberg was
Frank, the governor of the Polish General Gouvernement. Many of the most
repulsive acts of grisly murder and cruelty had occurred on his beat, even if
it was not necessarily true that the murderers were in any way responsible
to him. When asked if he had participated, however, he replied with a clear
‘Yes’. It had been the testimony of Höss, he said, that had made him want to
take the responsibility on to himself: ‘My conscience does not allow me to
throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself have never
installed a concentration camp for Jews, or promoted the existence of such
camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally laid that dreadful responsibility on his
people, then it is mine too, for we have fought Jewry for years; and we have
indulged the most terrible utterances - my own diary bears witness against
me . . . A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not
have been erased.’63
The atrocities in the concentration camps nettled even the most
obstinate Nazis. After the camp commandant Rudolf Höss had given his
testimony Göring turned to Raeder and Jodl and said, ‘If only there weren’t
this damned Auschwitz! Himmler got us into that mess. If it weren’t for
Auschwitz we could put up a proper defence. The way it is our chances are
blocked. Whenever our names are mentioned, everybody thinks of nothing
but Auschwitz or Treblinka. It’s like a reflex.’64
Some of Göring’s greatest crimes were not even mentioned in the
indictment. Nowhere did the Allies make mention of the bombing of
Warsaw, Rotterdam, London or Coventry. The Soviets, who had not
possessed the capacity to bomb Germany with the same ferocity as the
Anglo-Americans, had wanted to bring the matter up, but it was vetoed by
the West. For good reason, thought Speer: ‘The ruins around the courthouse
demonstrate all too plainly how cruelly and effectively the Western Allies
on their part extended the war to non-combatants.’65
Göring addressed the court for the last time on 31 August 1946. He
reiterated the precept of nulla poena sine lege and declared that the German
people were ignorant of crime and ‘free from blame’. He would expiate
their guilt with his martyrdom.66 Less dramatically perhaps, he reminded the
court of his efforts to negotiate a peace in 1939 - behind Hitler’s back. More
and more was leaking out from the courts. It was not just the Germans who
were shocked. In Bendorf in the Rhineland, Elena Skrjabina thought the
whole process hypocritical, and the bench’s impartiality compromised by
the judges from her own land. On 1 September she wrote:
Recently the Nuremberg trials have been creating great interest.
Now they are over. The accused have been most severely punished and
rightly so. However, who were the judges? When I think that the most
savage measures of punishment were being demanded by the
representatives of the Soviet Union, I cannot help but feel oppressed
by the injustice of it all. Indeed, the Soviet Authorities have destroyed
and are right now destroying millions of their own people for nothing
whatsoever. No other country in the world has so many jails and
camps.67
The French academic Robert d’Harcourt had no reason to love the
Germans, having had two sons pass through Buchenwald. He was even
harder hitting in his accusation of hypocrisy: the Germans ‘are not angry
with the fliers who destroyed their towns today, it is the judges. By their
attempts to forcibly convert them the Allies have lost most of the moral
high ground that they had obtained through victory. To take on the role of
Solomon presupposes a moral qualification. It is this moral authority that
the vanquished no longer recognise in the victors.’68
The summing up began on 30 September. The judges rehearsed the
entire history of the Third Reich, giving the impression that the trial was
entirely political. It was Lord Justice Lawrence who read out the sentences:
his speech lasted a day and a half. The defendants slept ill that night.
Lawrence began with Göring, who was found guilty on all four counts and
sentenced to death on 1 October. Apart from Hess - who was given life -
similar sentences were meted out to those seated on the front bench until the
judge reached Schacht. Göring flinched when Schacht was acquitted, then
slammed down the earphones in disgust. Hess was not wearing his
earphones and later told Speer that he had assumed he had been awarded
the death penalty, but he had not bothered to listen.69 In the back row there
were custodial sentences for Dönitz and Raeder, then came Papen, who was
also acquitted. In Berlin 25,000 workers downed tools in protest when they
heard the news about Papen.70 The Russians still insisted he was an
important Nazi.
Göring’s counsel entered a plea in mitigation, again mentioning his
efforts to maintain peace in 1939 - moves that must have been known to the
British government at least. The British had no desire to modify the
sentence, and the government issued an instruction to Sir Sholto Douglas in
Berlin that such a thing would not be politically expedient. As it was, the
Soviet judge, Nikitchenko, had called for the three acquitted men, Schacht,
Papen and Goebbel’s deputy propaganda chief Hans Fritzsche, to be
convicted, and wanted the death sentence for Hess.71 Schacht had been
liberated because his role in the expropriation of the Jews was a pre-war
internal matter, but Streicher had been sacked as Gauleiter of Franconia in
1940 and banned from public speaking two years before. Fritzsche believed
he had been tried because Goebbels was not around to take the rap.
After the sentences those on ‘death row’ were creamed off - Göring,
Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, Streicher, Sauckel, Frick, Rosenberg, Seyss-
Inquart, Frank and Kaltenbrunner. The cellar of the courthouse emptied,
leaving the condemned men to themselves. The seven men who were
eventually to be transferred to Spandau Prison in the British Sector of
Berlin were provided with new cells upstairs: Hess, the economics minister
and Reichsbank chief Walter Funk, the Grand Admirals Dönitz and Raeder,
the Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach, the former foreign minister
and ‘protector’ of Bohemia and Moravia Constantin von Neurath and Speer.
They had been given sentences ranging from ten years to life.
Göring cheated the executioners by taking cyanide from a phial he had
managed to conceal from his guards. One of the reasons he gave for his
choice of end in the note he left in his cell was the Allied decision to film
the deaths of their prisoners. The gallows equipment arrived at Nuremberg
on the night of 13 October. The next day hammering could be heard from
the gymnasium, and the slave-driver Fritz Sauckel had begun to scream. In
the absence of Göring, the other Nazis went to their deaths at the appointed
hour on the 16th. Ribbentrop was now the leader. The hangman botched the
execution and the rope throttled the former foreign minister for twenty
minutes before he expired. The others died as planned.ef Speer could hear
them being collected from their cells: ‘scraps of phrases, scraping of boots,
and reverberating footsteps slowly fading away’. When Streicher’s name
was called, someone cried, ‘Bravo, Streicher!’ Speer thought it was Hess.
As they went to their deaths, the others shouted words of defiance. Keitel’s
last utterance was ‘Alles für Deutschland. Deutschland über alles’ (All for
Germany, Germany above all else). Ribbentrop, Jodl and Seyss-Inquart said
something similar. Streicher chanted, ‘Heil Hitler! This is the Purim
Festivaleg of 1946!’72 The bodies were photographed. On 16 October they
were taken to a house at 25 Heimannstrasse in Munich-Solln which the
Americans had been using as a mortuary. They were inspected by Allied
teams before they were cremated. The ashes were scattered into the
Conwentzbach seventy-five metres downhill from the house - a muddy,
Bavarian ditch. The cremated were entered in the books under false names:
Hermann Göring was Georg Munger, and the scourge of the Jews, Julius
Streicher, received the name of Abraham Goldberg.73
The next morning the seven men they left behind to serve out their
sentences were called to clean out the cells. Speer observed the remains of
the last meal in their mess tins. Papers and blankets were strewn about.
Only in Jodl’s cell was everything in apple-pie order, the blankets neatly
folded. On Seyss’s wall he noted that the former Austrian chancellor had
put a cross on the calendar for the 16th, the day of his death. In the
afternoon Speer, Schirach and Hess were handed brooms and mops and sent
into the gym where the men had been hanged. The scaffold had already
been taken down, but - spotting a mark on the floor he took to be a
bloodstain - Hess stood to attention and raised his arm in a Nazi salute.74
OceanofPDF.com
17
The Little Fish
A Prosecutor cannot also be a judge . . . Justice is
by its nature light, which also renders the shadows
starker. The less passion is reflected in its source, the
clearer the crime emerges in its hideousness.
Ernst Jünger, Der Friede, Vienna 1949, 50, 51
OceanofPDF.com
PART IV
The Road to Freedom
OceanofPDF.com
18
Peacemaking in Potsdam
18 July 1945 Now it will be decided whether we
can carry on living in Europe or if we must try to live
our lives as a refugee God knows where. A year has
elapsed since the [assassination] attempt of 20 July. A
year filled with blood and misery which might perhaps
have been avoided. But our people had to drink the cup
down to the dregs, and in the end, it was all for the
good.
Ursula von Kardoff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen, 1942-1945, Munich 1994, 337
The wartime conferences had calmly discussed the Germans’ fate, but
at the Potsdam Conference the Allies finally realised that ‘Uncle Joe’ had
stolen a march on them. He would call the shots. The Allies met from 17
July to 2 August 1945 at the palace of Crown Prince ‘Little Willi’, the
Cecilienhof in Potsdam. The Western Allies were able to see their
handiwork for the first time. In a fifteen-minute raid on 14 April they had
flattened the centre of Frederick the Great’s Residenz.1 The town centre had
lost ‘everything that was historic, a memorial or artistically important’,
according to Hanna Grisebach.2 There were consolations: ‘The voices that
we have had to listen to for over twelve years have been silenced.’3
Hanna Grisebach was a Jewish convert to Protestantism married to a
Heidelberg colleague of Karl Jaspers. For many of the same reasons as the
philosopher, her husband was forced into retirement in 1937. The couple
moved to the so-called ‘von-Viertel’, the aristocratic quarter, of Potsdam.
Frau Grisebach was taken into the circle of the largely royalist nobles like
the Wedels, Schulenburgs, Buddenbrocks and an old Princess Trubetzkoy
who lived in Potsdam, many of whom subscribed to the ‘confessing
Church’ and were wholly opposed to Hitler’s regime. Like Gertrud Jaspers,
Hanna Grisebach spent the last few days of the Third Reich in hiding.4
On 24 April Hanna noted ‘the first Russian in our house’. Their Polish
maid Marja was able to interpret and shoo the Russian away, saving the life
of her young son. Her teenage daughter she now dressed as a boy, cutting
off her long plaits to save her from being raped. By now the Germans had
retreated, leaving a sorry spectacle of destruction: ‘battered vehicles,
shattered cars, discarded pieces of uniform and weapons of every kind lie
scattered around . . .’5
The Russians showed more respect for Potsdam’s cultural monuments
than the Anglo-Americans. During the battle for Potsdam the business of
safeguarding the palaces in the park of Sanssouci was given to Yevgeny
Ludshuveit, an art historian. He sent a radio message to German High
Command to ask them to cease shelling the park: ‘I was very worried about
the treasures, and wanted them to be preserved.’6 The Glienecke Bridge,
which connected Potsdam with Greater Berlin to the north, was another
victim of the bombardment. You might still cross to the Wannsee side, but
only by means of a ‘hair-raising climb’ over the pylons that had previously
held up the suspension bridge. In their destructive rage the SS had set fire to
all the fine boats belonging to the Imperial Yacht Club moored on the
Havel.7
The care taken over the remaining monuments was not extended to the
private property of Potsdam’s townsfolk. There was the usual hunt for
watches and bicycles. The Grisebachs lost eight watches, as well as all their
bicycles. Hanna’s son managed to buy another of the latter with a gold
watch, but that was also later stolen. Surviving meant helping yourself to
what you could. Hanna Grisebach brought back part of a horse and
marinated it in vinegar and spices. The dish brought forth whoops of joy.
She also received her share of a cow that had trodden on a mine. Possibly
the greatest discovery of all was the contents of the cellar of a villa which
the owner had thrown into the waters of the Hasengraben, in order to
prevent the Russians from drinking it. Hanna’s daughter, together with a
friend, had located the booty and they were prepared to wade out to their
hips to bring up the precious bottles: ‘top wines from famous sites’. The
Grisebachs drank them with relish, while the one who had donated them lay
in bed with a cold. The wine put the food to shame. Anything they didn’t
want, such as a bottle of Malaga, could be traded with the Russians for
bread and bacon.8
On 5 May Hanna heard a rumour that the Americans were coming to
Potsdam. Stories of this sort were rife at the time - there was no connection
with the Potsdam Conference in July. The first Russian wave was moving
on. A baggage train set off, creating a ‘picturesque scene’ reminiscent of
Tolstoy’s The Cossacks or similar episodes from War and Peace. Boys
spent their time shooting ducks and riding horses around, while abandoned
boats bobbed on the water. The Americans didn’t come, however, and from
mid-May there was very little food. Supplies of meat and fat dried up and
the Grisebachs lived on potato flakes and whatever fruit and vegetables they
could scrump from abandoned gardens. Added to this they caught fish in
the Havel or the lake, sometimes picking up a few after the Russians had
tossed a grenade into the water - their usual form of angling.
In their hunger they were pleased to hear that professors were equated
with manual workers in the handing out of ration cards: they were eligible
for the card I. When a field full of potatoes was located twenty kilometres
away in Buckow, Hanna and others set off on replacement bicycles they had
unearthed. They had to dodge Russian fire to get at the tubers, as the
soldiers wanted to distil them. Still, despite several setbacks, Hanna was
able to get away with thirty-five kilos.9
First Contacts between East and West
One pretext for the Allied conference was to enforce the zones decreed
at Yalta. The Allies had all ended up in the wrong places: the French had
been in Stuttgart; the Americans were in Thuringia and had advanced to
Halle in Saxony; the British had occupied the western half of Mecklenburg,
while other American units had crossed the Harz Mountains to reach
Magdeburg on the Elbe. This so-called Magdeburg Pocket was due to the
Soviets. The Allied zones remained fluid until just before Potsdam, and
there was a good deal of idle speculation about who would fall to whom.
Even at the beginning of September it was still not clear to Berliners who
was where. It was said that the Russians were to evacuate Eisenach and
Jena and that the British had control of the airport in Erfurt (all three were
in the Russian Zone). The British were to receive Thuringia, they heard, and
the Russians would be compensated in East Asia. The Western Allies were
forced to retreat to positions previously agreed by the politicians at Yalta
behind the Elbe and the Harz. The generals grumbled. In their enthusiasm
to take back their rightful territory, the Russians also attempted to grab
Coburg in Franconia, probably because they thought the town was in
Thuringia. This led to a stand-off with the Americans.
On 11 July 1945, Margret Boveri reported a fresh wave of arrests
connected with the conference. The neighbouring communes were being
cleared of Germans to make room for the delegates. Babelsberg was already
purged, now it was the turn of Wannsee. Intellectuals were the main targets,
Pgs or non-Pgs. Pace Hanna Grisebach, there were disadvantages to their
academic status.
The conference proved a chance to survey the behaviour in the Allied
camps. There was bad blood on both sides. The Soviets still believed that
they had done the lion’s share of the fighting and borne the brunt of the
losses. The East did not trust the West, and vice versa. The Russians
believed that the Western Allies were merely taking a breather before they
attacked the Soviet Union and that they had kept their options open
throughout the war by conducting secret negotiations with the Germans.
That channels were open is undoubtedly true, and the Soviet authorities had
been informed of the fact by the British intelligence officer Kim Philby and
others. The Russians said they were not allowed to interview all the
prisoners held by the West. But they were allowed to talk to a number of
them and ‘the records of the interrogations confirmed that there had been
some backstage negotiations between the Nazis and the US and British
Intelligence about the possibility of a separate peace.’10 The Russians had
also held talks with the Germans.11
There were advocates for war against the Soviet Union in both the
British and American camps, but how far up they went was concealed
during the Cold War. The Hitler Book, prepared for Stalin from
interrogations with high-ranking German POWs in 1948, abounds with
accusations of Western Allied perfidy.12 Some British generals, notably
Montgomery, were anxious to push on against the Russians. This had been
supported by Churchill, but the plans would have been leaked to the
Russians by Donald Maclean of the British Foreign Office, adding to the
feeling of distrust that existed among the Big Three. In 1945 the Russians
believed the British were holding back a substantial German army for use in
the next campaign and for that reason had omitted to disarm German forces
in their zone. At Potsdam Zhukov made a formal protest, claiming the
British were keeping the 200,000-man Army Group North in readiness and
that a million men in Schleswig-Holsteinej had not been given POW status.13
The Americans were rounding up scientists and taking them back to the
United States to use in - among other things - their atom-bomb
programme.14 That the Russians were hardly averse to this themselves does
not figure in Zhukov’s memoirs. The Russians believed that the Anglo-
Americans had intentionally failed to bomb targets that would be of use to
them later. One example of this was the headquarters of IG Farben in
Frankfurt, which was virtually intact - so much so, in fact, that the
Americans took it over as their own HQ.15
Truman had no desire to continue the war against the Soviet Union and
agreed to fall back to the lines agreed by the Big Three at Yalta. Churchill
now expressed ‘profound misgivings’ in a cable to the president.16 These
pieces of territory might have been used for bargaining, for example, on the
Oder and Neisse rivers. There was a little warm-up for Potsdam in Berlin
on 5 June when Montgomery and William Strang from Britain, Eisenhower,
Clay and Robert Murphy from the United States, and the French
commander de Lattre de Tassigny were invited to settle the government of
the city at Zhukov’s HQ in Karlshorst. The Anglo-American generals were
then invested with the Order of Victory, while de Lattre de Tassigny had to
make do with the Order of Suvorov First Class.17 Clay gave Zhukov the
Legion of Merit.18
The inferior decoration handed out to de Lattre was emblematic of the
status of the fourth ally: France was not invited to Potsdam.ek It was ‘a bitter
blow to French pride’.19 Truman had given the French assurances that their
wishes would be noted and their arguments put forward, but they had not
endeared themselves to the Americans through their behaviour: they had
occupied Stuttgart and the Italian Val d’Aosta and they had indulged in
colonial rivalry with the British in the Levant. The French had forgotten
nothing, and learned nothing. In 1919 they had taken 50 per cent of
Germany’s reparations; now they demanded machines, coal and labour, as
well as the restitution of all that the Germans had taken from them. The
French were desperately angling for the Ruhr with its natural resources and
heavy industry, but the incoming foreign secretary Bevin and the British in
general did not want to give an inch, fearing that the Russians would also
claim their pound of flesh.20
At the Berlin meeting Germany formally ceased to exist as an
independent nation. The Allies signed the Declaration of Defeat and
Assumption of Sovereignty. The four powers also agreed the form of the
Allied Control Council that was to rule Germany, but the Russians made it
clear that the Western Allies would not be allowed to take up their sectors in
the capital until they had complied with Yalta: they had to fall back behind
the River Elbe and the Harz Mountains. Western politicians wanted this
decision to be taken by the Control Council, but Eisenhower (who was
impressed by Zhukov) was in favour of giving in to the Russians, and
Truman’s emissary Harry Hopkins had discussed this quid pro quo in
Moscow.21 Zhukov believed that the Western Allies were prepared to accept
this loss of territory because they were still anxious for the Russians to play
a military role in the war in the Far East.22 Ursula von Kardorff already had
a fair idea of the future Russian Zone on 11 June - Weimar, Leipzig,
Dresden - and doubted Stalin’s credentials as a ‘benefactor of mankind’.
The zones were ratified on 26 July. 23
Zhukov also had a meeting with Hopkins the next day, 12 June.
Hopkins had flown in from two weeks in Moscow, where he had had six
meetings with Stalin to discuss the UN Charter among other things and the
chance of fitting in a few non-communists in the government of the Lublin
Poles. Otherwise his task had been to reassure the Russian leader that the
United States had no foreign political ambitions in Europe, thereby leaving
him a free hand in Poland and Austria. Hopkins had not consulted
Churchill, whom Truman was holding at arm’s length, while he refused to
speed up the scheduled talks. Members of Truman’s entourage, however,
took a completely different view, arguing for a showdown with Russia.
These included Harriman, Forrestal and Leahy.24
Stalin and Molotov backed four or five of Hopkins’s Poles, who later
had to flee for their lives. On the way out Hopkins’s aircraft had flown over
Berlin. Seeing the ruins he remarked, ‘It’s another Carthage.’25 He was
sympathetic towards the Russians, and regretted the former president’s
sudden death. He had no close relationship with Truman: ‘It is a pity
President Roosevelt didn’t live to see these days. It was easier with him.’26
Hopkins told Zhukov that the Americans would not be ready for 15 June
and that they would need to postpone the leaders’ conference for another
month, until 15 July. Zhukov proposed Potsdam because there was no
suitable building in Berlin in a good enough state of repair. The only place
in Potsdam was the crown prince’s palace, but there was the advantage of
Babelsberg, a largely undamaged area of villas that had been inhabited by
film-folk and politicians in Weimar times.27
The themes on the agenda were the political and economic future of
Germany, denazification, demilitarisation and decentralisation, Germany’s
eastern border, the status of Königsberg and East Prussia. Austria was also
on the agenda, as well as all the other former belligerent powers. Zhukov
took Hopkins and his assistant Charles ‘Chip’ Bohlen on a tour of the
ruined city and afterwards there was a buffet lunch that was ‘light on food,
heavy on vodka’.28
Hopkins had been present at Yalta, and knew his old master’s mind. He
had been sent to deal with de Gaulle, which he clearly found an onerous
duty. When Roosevelt’s interpreter at the conference, Chip Bohlen, had
said, ‘We can all admit that de Gaulle is one of the biggest sons of bitches
who ever straddled a pot,’29 the late president had laughed. Roosevelt was
insistent that de Gaulle should not receive a place at the top table. Churchill
had to present the French case and obtain an occupation zone in Germany.
Stalin only agreed as long as it took nothing away from his portion. What is
striking is how little fight the Western Allies put up against the Russian
leader even at Yalta. Hopkins had advised Roosevelt to accept Stalin’s huge
reparations demands,30 and when America and Britain gave way on
Poland’s western borders, it is not clear they knew exactly what was
involved.
Churchill had tried to settle the Polish issue before the Red Army
arrived, but Russia’s might had won the day. He had had a change of heart.
On 15 December 1944 he had been quite open about the complete
expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories, but he was worried about
numbers. It appeared that he thought six million was the upper limit, and
now he learned that the figure would be eight or nine, which was
completely impossible to effect.31 Churchill clung to his Wismar pocket as a
bargaining counter, and on 9 June 1945 he cabled Truman to advise him to
do the same and hold on to American positions in Thuringia and Saxony.
He might have hoped for a better rapport with Truman, as his relations with
Roosevelt had been strained at the end of the late president’s life. He told
Truman not to consider withdrawing until the Austrian question had been
properly settled. On 14 June Truman cabled Stalin, however, and agreed to
move his troops back to the Elbe. Churchill had no alternative now but to
comply with his ally’s decision. He now informed Stalin that the British
would be gone by the 15th. Stalin then played for more time. He requested
that the Allies wait until 1 July before taking up their lines in Berlin. There
were mines to be cleared, and other chores to be effected first.32
They should have known what they were in for by now - Stalin had
already shown his hand in eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia was a case in
point. The government in exile had taken leave of King George VI on 15
February and left England on 12 March. On 19 March Beneš and Masaryk
were in Moscow. On 6 April they arrived in Prague to be welcomed with
bread and salt. On 9 April an interim government was set up under Zdenek
Fierlinger with representatives of the four parties and four non-party
members. The highest goal was co-operation with Moscow.
The Poles had been obliged to accept the Curzon Line in the east, but on
21 July 1944 Stalin was able to placate the Lublin government by dangling
compensation in front of their eyes, in the form of German territory in the
west. Churchill and Roosevelt had raised no objection to the Oder-Neisse
Line at Yalta, although there had been misgivings about giving the Poles
such a large amount of German territory and it was left that land would be
found for them in the west and north. The Poles were well aware of what
they wanted from the Potsdam conference. The Lublin regime had formally
stated that they wanted the Oder-Neisse on 5 February 1945. As Władisław
Gomułka put it, ‘we must expel all the Germans because countries are built
on national lines and not on multinational ones’.33
The issue was scheduled for review at Potsdam. The reason why the
Russians had stood by and watched the Warsaw Uprising from the other
side of the Vistula was that they wanted those elements out of the way that
were not in favour of a communist or pro-Moscow Poland. The Western
Allies continued to support the regime in exile in London. The sixteen
London government emissaries who went to Moscow to enquire about
possible collaboration were arrested. Meanwhile the Lublin men trotted
along behind the Red Army. In March 1945 they created five new Polish
woiwode: Masuria, Pomerania, Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia and Danzig.
They were already referring to the areas as the ‘Recovered Territories’. The
move resulted in protests from Washington: there had to be peace talks
first!34
In their policy of demontage and cultural pillage, the Russians showed
no desire to co-operate with the West. Some of the Soviet generals, such as
Bulganin, thought like Montgomery - they had won a battle, not the war.
Fascism had to be defeated, particularly in America. ‘America is now the
arch-enemy!’ said Bulganin on the eve of the storming of Berlin. ‘We have
destroyed the foundations of fascism, now we must destroy the foundations
of capitalism - America.’ In cultural terms this was expressed by the
Russian officer Vladimir Yurasov prior to the Western Allies’ arrival in
Berlin: ‘Take everything out of the Western Sector of Berlin. Do you
understand? All of it! What you can’t take, destroy. Only leave nothing for
the [Western] Allies: no machine, not even a single bed; not even a chamber
pot!’35 Berlin and its industrial satellites were being stripped bare: the
hardware of companies such as Osram and Siemens, of the telephone
exchanges, of the S-Bahn and so on, right down to their typewriters, was
being loaded up and shipped back to Russia.
The Russian leader was also wary of American and British attempts to
promote capitalism. The American minister responsible for Germany was
John McCloy, who was a banker in normal life. He had some sympathy for
the defeated Germans in that his wife had been born in Germany. In
opposition to the Morgenthau view (which was essentially behind
demontage) McCloy encouraged the rebuilding of Germany. Morgenthau
had not abandoned his famous plan. In 1945 he published Germany is our
Problem. Truman had been opposed to the plan even as a senator, so he was
happy to listen to McCloy. Another opponent of Morgenthau was the
secretary of war Henry Stimson, who thought the secretary for the Treasury
‘biased in his semitic grievances’. The day before his departure for
Potsdam, Truman accepted Morgenthau’s resignation, commenting, ‘That
was the end of the conversation and the end of the Morgenthau Plan.’ On
the other hand the plan was still present in the minds of many of the
soldiers, and their desire to lay waste to Germany had been sharpened by
what they had seen in the concentration camps.36
In their recorded statements the Russians showed themselves more
sympathetic to the conquered Germans. Anastas Mikoyan, then vice-
president of the Council of People’s Commissars, expressed the view in an
interview with Pravda, which found its way into The Times: ‘We have
crushed Hitler’s armies in fierce combat and taken Berlin, but our moral
sense and our traditions do not allow us to ignore the suffering and
privations of the German civilian population.’ It was a far cry from the
realities of life under Soviet dominion. Germans also clung to the
comforting line of Stalin’s - ‘Hitlers come and go, but the German people
remain.’37
It was also becoming clear how little the Anglo-Americans could trust
Stalin. The Russians had occupied the Danish island of Bornholm, which,
they said, lay to the east of the line of their own sphere of influence. The
truce in Hungary was signed without any participation of the Western
Allies, and at the time of Potsdam the west had yet to be allowed into
Vienna. Just how much Stalin was lying at Potsdam is clear from an
exchange between Clay and Zhukov on 7 July, just ten days before the
meeting of the Big Three. Zhukov informed the American general that
Silesia had already been turned over to the Poles; ‘the Germans had moved
out of the area in such huge numbers that there is little agriculture
remaining for this area’. The Russians did not even have access to the coal,
said Zhukov. They had to pay for it like everyone else. The British and the
Americans were having to supply the Germans with 20,000 tons of food
every month. The loss of Silesia was therefore highly significant. The
United States had already protested about the handing over of Silesia to the
Poles.38
At the Cecilienhof - the palace of the Prussian crown prince and the
venue for the Potsdam Conference - the Russians planted a great red star of
geraniums, pink roses and hortensias in the flower bed at the entrance.39
Inside the house there were frantic preparations for the arrival of the Big
Three.40 The different quarters were to be colour-coded: blue for the
Americans, white for the Russians and pink for the British. The conference
table had been specially made in the Lux Factory in Moscow.41 The
Russians and the Americans were already observing one another from
either side of the Glienecke Bridge, as they were to do until the end of the
Cold War.
In Potsdam itself Hanna Grisebach and her family were made aware of
the coming of the Big Three by increased security around the Neue Garten
and the Cecilienhof. They were lucky enough to be on the far side of the
Heiligensee. All the streets leading directly to the palace had to be
evacuated. GPU carried out a wave of arrests and a sentry was posted in
their garden. There were one or two advantages: the Russians quickly laid
out a new street and a bridge was thrown across the Havel to Babelsberg
where the leaders were staying. A pontoon bridge was also put up to allow
access to Sacrow and the airport at Gatow. Russian soldiers rode bareback
and naked into the waters of the lakes, reminding Hanna of centaurs, but
she was less pleased to find herself under house arrest from 16 July, living
in a state of impotent rage while she observed the Red Army guard
knocking twenty-five kilos of unripe apricots off their tree in the garden.
Any attempt to go out was greeted by cries of ‘Dvai-Dvai! Zuhrick nah
Haus!’ (Quick, quick! Back in the house!). When an aircraft flew low over
their street she hoped it was the British and American leaders going home.42
Stalin arrived by train on 16 July. He wanted no special arrangements,
no regimental bands. He told Zhukov to meet him, and to bring along
anyone he thought necessary. Zhukov sat beside him in the car and they
drove to a luxurious villa. Stalin wanted to know who had lived there. He
was told it had belonged to General Ludendorff.43 The British and
Americans arrived the same day. Truman and Churchill were in frequent
contact in the run-up to the conference. Churchill had wanted King George
VI to attend, and also to review the British forces in Berlin, but that idea
was dropped in June.44 The British had had a general election on 5 July, but
because British servicemen were scattered throughout the world, the results
would not be in for three weeks. Churchill informed Truman that, whatever
the results of the election, the conference should not be hurried. 45
Truman came via Amsterdam. He was very much an innocent abroad
and relied on his secretary of state, James Byrnes. He had no strong feelings
of his own. He had inherited from Roosevelt the idea that America and the
Soviet Union could happily coexist. Kennan, for one, thought this an
illusion.46 Truman and Byrnes flew in separate aircraft, Byrnes himself
piloting the plane between Cassel and Magdeburg. Truman looked at both
cities from the window. He could see not one single undamaged building.
He landed on the ‘British’ airfield at Gatow, which was conveniently close
to Potsdam. They drove to their quarters in Neubabelsberg. British and
American soldiers lined the route until they reached the Soviet Zone.
The Americans had already decided they wanted to undermine
communism in Germany. To that end they desired to see the creation of
some centralised agencies that might squeeze out Soviet influence. It was
one of the first rumbles that presaged the Cold War. Neither Truman nor
Byrnes thought Germany was a danger any more: it had been destroyed,
and the atom bomb was there should it ever seek to menace world security
again. Byrnes was also firmly in agreement with the British in wanting to
keep the Ruhr free from the Russians. Besides, the cession of the Ruhr
would upset the struggling German economy and make the occupation even
more expensive for the Anglo-Americans.
Truman was lodged in a three-storey villa at 2 Kaiserstrasse on the
Gribnitzsee, which had been the home of ‘the head of the movie colony’
who had been sent ‘back’ to Russia - ‘for what purpose I do not know’,
Truman wrote to his mother and sister. It was evidence of a certain naivety
as far as Russia was concerned, and did not augur well. The house had been
newly painted, and received the ironic title of the ‘Little White House’,
‘although it was painted yellow’.47 Churchill had a house of the same size,
two blocks away at 23 Ringstrasse. Truman went to bed early to prepare
himself for what was likely to be a tough day on the 17th. He met Churchill
in person for the first time the next morning, but felt he was no stranger.48
Churchill was accompanied by his daughter Mary, Sir Anthony Eden,
the head of the Foreign Office Sir Alexander Cadogan and his naval
adjutant, Commodore C. R. Thompson. Truman told Churchill he wanted to
suggest an agenda, and asked him if he had brought one himself. ‘No,’ he
said. ‘I don’t need one.’49 In fact both the British and the Americans had
decided to toughen their stance over the Oder-Neisse, to the degree that
they were prepared to go back on what they had indicated they would
accept at Yalta. Stalin had made it clear at Yalta that he meant the Western,
not the Eastern Neisse.el Now the diplomats arriving in Potsdam were to
play innocent and carried instructions not to permit an extension of Poland
to the Western Neisse. The Americans also wanted to prevent the
subtraction of most of Pomerania. Poland was to receive the southern half
of East Prussia, Danzig, Upper Silesia and part of Pomerania, but that part
would be far east of Stettin.50
The Americans were ready to dig their heels in, though the British were
more concessionary, as they had been at Yalta. The sticking point was the
Eastern Neisse. The British wanted the border drawn there, which would
leave a substantial part of Lower Silesia in German hands, together with
three million Germans. The negotiations would hinge on reparations: the
Russians would not receive a brass farthing from the Western zones of
Germany if they insisted on advancing the Polish border to the Western
Neisse. What the Western Allies had not reckoned with was the obduracy of
Stalin. He was not prepared to budge on this issue, and their opposition
simply caved in.51
Truman allowed himself a little excursion to the capital. He saw the
remains of the Reich Chancellery, ‘where Hitler had conducted his rule of
terror’. He looked at the mess and was thankful that his own country had
been spared such ‘unimaginable destruction’. ‘That’s what happens . . .
when one overreaches oneself,’ he added sententiously.52 The news of the
statesman’s Berlin walkabout reached the ears of Ruth Friedrich: ‘They are
having a very discreet meeting in Potsdam, no noise penetrates the
kilometre-thick cordon. As a result it is exciting to learn that the foreign
heads of government have visited the inner city and the Tiergarten district
and seen over the ruined buildings of Hitler’s Reich Chancellery and the
air-raid cellar.’53 She would not have been so impressed had she known how
profoundly Truman had understood the plight of the German people. On the
second day of the conference the American leader characterised the Soviets
as the sort of people who stole rare old grandfather clocks and damaged
them in the process.54
Stalin visited Truman in the Little White House shortly after his arrival
in Potsdam. He came with Molotov and Pavlov the interpreter and insisted
on being called ‘generalissimo’ and not ‘marshal’, in tribute to his great
victories in the field.55 Truman wanted him to stay for lunch. Stalin tried to
fight him off, but he stayed in the end. Truman congratulated himself, and
felt that he could do some good for the world as a result of this small
domestic triumph.
The conference began at 5.10 p.m. on the 17th. Stalin proposed that
Truman should preside, and Churchill seconded him. Truman’s first move
was to propose a quarterly conference of foreign ministers as a means of
avoiding the pitfalls that had followed the First World War. This had been
foreseen at Yalta in February. The Allied Control Council was to start work
at once. Truman made his demands: he wanted complete disarmament for
Germany, and Allied control of all industry that might be used to produce
arms. ‘The German people should be made to feel that they had suffered a
total military defeat and that they could not escape responsibility for what
they had brought upon themselves.’ The Nazi Party was to be destroyed, its
officials removed from office. The country was to be reconstructed on
democratic lines prior to its eventual peaceful participation in international
life. Nazi laws were to be rescinded and there were to be trials for war
crimes. On the other hand the seeds were to be sown for reconstruction:
Germany was to be seen as one economic unit.56
Now it was Stalin’s turn. As far as Germany was concerned he wanted
his share of the German merchant fleet and navy, and reparations and
trusteeships due to him under the UN Charter. He made demands relating to
other countries before finishing with Poland’s western borders and the
liquidation of the London-based government in exile. Churchill was not
happy about giving Stalin the German fleet. He told the dictator that
‘weapons of war are terrible things and that the captured vessels should be
sunk’. The wily Georgian had an answer to that: ‘Let us divide it . . . If Mr
Churchill wishes he can sink his share.’57 That concluded the first day.
There was music playing all over Potsdam that July, or so it seemed.
Hanna Grisebach was a violinist and played Mozart with a local doctor and
a Frau von Kameke. The Russians came to the house of the latter and loudly
applauded. This led to one of her strangest engagements: to play before the
NKVD. She was very pleased to oblige, as it meant a hot meal. Her elderly
husband, however, remained at home in profound anxiety. It was only when
he heard the valedictory word ‘Dosvidania’ on the doorstep that he calmed
down.58 On 18 July Ursula von Kardorff noted that the Big Three were
sitting in Potsdam ‘like the Norns’ in Wagner’s Götterdämmerung who spin
the golden rope of world knowledge that binds past, present and future. In
the opera the rope snaps.59
The second day continued the discussions about the Conference of
Foreign Ministers before the Big Three came to the subject of defining
Germany. Churchill was vague. He said Germany was what it had been
before the war. Stalin countered by asking whether Austria and the
Sudetenland were part of Germany. For him Germany was ‘what she has
become after the war. Austria is not part of Germany.’ Truman proposed the
1937 frontiers, before Germany began to expand. Stalin would accept that,
‘minus what she lost in 1945’. Truman was evidently perplexed: ‘Germany
lost all in 1945.’60
Stalin was impatient to broach the Polish issue. He had obviously made
promises to the Lublin Poles. The Western Allies were content to leave this
issue for the proposed peace conference. Truman did not think they had
adequately defined Germany. Stalin’s answer was evasive. Germany had no
government, no definable borders, no frontier guards and no troops. The
country was divided up into four zones of occupation. Truman insisted on
the 1937 borders and Churchill agreed.61
Stalin returned to the ownership of the German fleet on the 19th. He
made it crystal clear that he saw war material as plain, old-fashioned booty.
Indeed, his view throughout - and indeed that of the Red Army - was the
traditional one - the victor has the right to live off the conquered, take his
chattels, eat his food and help himself to his women; and it is for the
conqueror to decide whether he should preserve the life of the vanquished.
Stalin had his grievances. On this day it was Franco and the Blue Division
which had fought in the USSR; on another it was the Italians who had done
the same. When there was mention of the Yugoslavs, who were
embarrassing the West by demanding large-scale repatriations of their
citizens from Austria, Stalin said he would not discuss the matter, as the
Yugoslavs were not present. Eden reminded him that they had discussed the
matter at Yalta, and the Yugoslavs had not been there either.62
Truman assured the Soviet leader that he would carry out the Yalta
Agreement to the letter. He was getting bored, and perhaps just a little
worried about what he had let himself in for.em He threatened to leave.
Stalin laughed and rejoined that he would like to go home too. Truman gave
a state banquet in the Little White House. The young American pianist
Eugene List, a sergeant in the US army, played Chopin’s Opus 42.
Appropriately for a man who had belatedly set himself up as the patron of
the Poles, Stalin was a Chopin fan. He was impressed and drank a toast to
the pianist. Stalin liked the wine and asked where it came from. It was
Californian. Truman also played the ‘Missouri Waltz’ for his guests. Only
Churchill failed to see the charm of it all: ‘he did not care much for that
kind of music.’63
The following day Truman inspected American troops in Berlin. The
session that afternoon raised the question of Vienna. Churchill complained
that his soldiers had not been allowed to take possession of their sector.
Stalin said the zones were now settled, and he could bring his army in now.
The Polish issue had been handed over to the foreign ministers to solve.
They reported back on the next day, the 21st. The Lublin Polish leader
Bolesław Bierut had told Byrnes that the Poles would still be at a
disadvantage despite the huge amounts of German territory they were to
swallow. Poland would still be smaller than it was before the war, because it
had lost 180,000 square kilometres to the Russians. On the other hand he
conceded darkly that it would be a more homogeneous state.en Yalta had
decided that it was for the peace conference to give Poland its shape, but
that the Allies would consider the Poles favourably. Truman continued to
insist on the 1937 German borders, but he was beginning to realise that
Stalin had presented him with a fait accompli. ‘It now appeared . . . as if
another occupying government was being assigned a zone in Germany. This
was being done without consultation . . .’64
Stalin reiterated the position as seen at Yalta - the eastern borders would
follow the Curzon Line. That meant he would hang on to what he had
gained from his deal with Ribbentrop in 1939. ‘It had been decided at Yalta
that Poland should receive cession of territory in the north and west.’
Truman agreed, ‘but insisted that it was not correct to assign a zone of
occupation to the Poles’. Stalin then uttered two monstrous lies: ‘What had
happened . . . was that the German population in these areas had followed
the German Army to the west, and the Poles had remained.’ The Germans
were not only still there, but, with the exception of some parts of Upper
Silesia, there were no native Poles.eo Stalin went on to say that ‘he was
unable to see what harm had been done by the establishment of a Polish
administration where only Poles remained’.65 He then added, ‘The western
frontier question was open, and the Soviet Union was not bound [by Yalta].’
‘You are not?’ Truman asked. ‘No,’ said Stalin. According to Truman
Churchill had a good deal to say but gathered that it was not the time to say
it. Truman reiterated that it was a matter for the peace conference. 66 In the
meantime the brutal torture and expulsion of the civilian populations of the
region continued unabated. Even if the peace conference had been held in
Paris in the summer of 1946, by then there would have been only a small
minority of them left.
Stalin mentioned East Prussia, adding that ‘it would be very difficult to
restore a German administration’ there. In his view, ‘an army fights in war
and cares only for its efforts to win the war. To enable an army to win and
advance, it must have a quiet rear. It fights well if the rear is quiet and better
if the rear is friendly . . .’ This was the prologue to the revelation that the
East Prussian Germans had all packed their bags and left as well - an act of
great consideration towards the advancing Russians, as they had realised
that the Red Army would want to know they had a quiet rear. ‘Even if the
Germans had not fled . . . it would have been very difficult to set up a
German administration in this area because the majority of the population
was Polish . . .’ Truman and Churchill were fobbed off with more lies.
Stalin ‘insisted there was no other way out’.67
The matter was then placed in hock for the peace conference. Churchill
continued to worry about British interests. He didn’t want to have to foot
the bill for feeding the Germans. The regions the Russians had de facto
ceded to Poland represented a quarter of Germany’s arable land. Truman
expressed either terrible weakness or the hopelessness of the Western Allies
when he said he ‘did not think there was great disagreement on Polish
frontiers’. This was probably yet another attempt to delay the decision, but
until a time when Stalin’s contention that there were no Germans had
become reality. When he repeated that ‘there was no German population’
because they had ‘all fled westward’ and so ‘there the [area] falls to
Poland’, Truman countered that ‘nine million Germans seemed like a lot to
me’. Churchill enquired, ‘who is to feed them?’ He was reluctant to take on
this role without having the means at his disposal. It was a repeat of his
concerns over provisions for the British Sector in Vienna.68 The needle had
stuck in Stalin’s gramophone: the population had disappeared before the
Red Army arrived - ‘he emphasized that no single German remained in the
territory to be given to Poland’.69ep
It was at that moment that the president’s aide Admiral Leahy
whispered his famous interjection: ‘Of course not . . . The Bolshies have
killed all of them.’ In his memoirs Truman took a tough stance: ‘Of course I
knew that Stalin was misinterpreting the facts. The Soviets had taken the
Polish territory east of the Curzon Line, and they were trying to compensate
Poland at the expense of the other three occupying powers. I would not
stand for it, nor would Churchill. I was of the opinion that the Russians had
killed the German population or had chased them into our zones.’70
Churchill later claimed that had he returned to Potsdam he would have
prevented the Soviets from making off with so much of Silesia, but his
contention was never put to the test.71 It was a pity he did nothing at the
time, beyond repeating that it was a matter for the peace conference. No
monitors were despatched east, no enquiries were made among the
incoming treks or among the miserable trainloads of refugees that
discharged their cargoes in the Western zones. They did not want to know.
Churchill was concerned for the beleaguered British economy. Silesia’s
coalmines had been awarded to Poland, so that coal was not available for
Germans. The West would have to foot the bill again. He was concerned
that Germany needed to be built up again to avoid becoming a burden on
the West. Reparations therefore had to take second place.72 Stalin came up
with his most ingenious argument to date at this point: ‘the less industry
there was in Germany, the greater would be the market for American and
British goods’. Churchill reiterated, ‘We do not wish to be confronted by a
mass of starving people.’ Stalin replied, ‘There will be none,’ and added,
‘Are we through?’73 That night Stalin gave his banquet. For occasions of
this sort there was no shortage of provisions. On the contrary, it was quite a
thing, with vodka and caviar at the beginning and melon and champagne at
the end. There were at least twenty-five toasts. Truman took care to eat little
and drink less. Stalin was not to be outdone by Eugene List, and had two
great pianists and violinists perform. Truman was interested in what Stalin
was drinking in his tiny glass. He presumed it was vodka, but the Russian
leader was employing the same ruse as his marshal Koniev. Stalin finally
told him with a smile that it was French wine - since a recent heart attack he
could not drink as much.74
The next day, 22 July, was a Sunday. Truman studied the Yalta
Declaration to see what it said about Poland’s western borders. The Big
Three had accepted the Curzon Line then, but had left the western border
open. They had not expected problems on this issue. Truman concluded that
there was no case for the Poles receiving a zone. He did not really object,
but he didn’t like the manner in which it had been done. Stalin thought that
the Western Allies should listen to the Poles on this subject. Meanwhile the
Soviet leader was romping home. He pointed out that the leaders at Yalta
(Churchill was still at the conference at this point) had not meant the
Eastern Neisse, but the Western Neisse. There were indeed two rivers of
that name in Silesia, as we have seen - one which ran into the Oder below
Breslau and one that joined it below Guben. This meant that the line
demarcating Poland’s western borders would run to the left of the town of
Stettin, and more than a hundred kilometres to the left of Breslau, and
would encompass all that part of German Lower Silesia that ran between
the two rivers. To make it clear to the Western leaders, Stalin rose and
showed them the area on a map.75
This cunning confusion over the two Neisse rivers added greatly to the
Polish cull. Not only were the Poles to be richly rewarded with their half of
East Prussia, Danzig, all of Hinter Pomerania and a large chunk of
Brandenburg east of the Oder and the so-called ‘border area’, they were
now to receive such stock German towns as Brieg, Bunzlau, Frankenstein,
Glatz, Glogau, Goldberg, Grünberg, Hirschberg, Landeshut, Liegnitz,
Ohlau, Sagan, Waldenburg and Warmbrunn, containing altogether some 2.8
million Germans.76 In all they would be awarded 21 per cent of Germany’s
pre-1937 territory, while the Russians made off with 3,500 square miles of
East Prussia. All in all Germany would lose a quarter of its extent, and a
large part of the arable land that had fed it in the past. In return the Poles
were meant to shut up about Poland east of the Bug, and accept their place
in Stalin’s world.
Truman and Churchill were giving way at every point. Stalin talked of
Königsberg as a conquest next. This was booty - not in keeping with
Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s high-minded utterances in Newfoundland in
1941 - but Byrnes thought Churchill understood Stalin’s desire to grab a
colony or two. The status of the city had been discussed at Teheran. The
Soviet Union ‘should have an ice-free port at the expense of Germany’.
Stalin added that the Russians had suffered so much at the hands of
Germany that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory as
some small satisfaction to tens of millions of Soviet citizens. Besides,
Roosevelt and Churchill had already agreed. Churchill made a weak attempt
to backtrack. He said it would be difficult to admit that East Prussia did not
exist and that Königsberg would not come under the authority of the Allied
Control Council. Once more, the region’s ultimate status would be left for
the peace conference that was never to be.77
The conference then heard a report from Field Marshal Alexander about
the British Sector of Vienna. The area contained 500,000 people, but the
British had no means of feeding them, their zone being hundreds of miles to
the south and west of the city. Stalin promised to look into the matter with
Renner. On the 24 July he generously agreed to feed the British charges for
the time being.
The conference returned to the thorny matter of the Polish border on the
25th. Churchill and Eden had met the Polish delegates, headed by Bierut,
the previous day. Bierut was a Soviet pawn who simply lied to and
stonewalled the British leader, but all the same he provided a rather more
generous estimate of the number of Germans remaining beyond the Oder.
He believed there were a million and half of them. At the next session
Churchill said that the question of the transfer of populations from
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland should be discussed: ‘This area was
part of the Russian Zone and the Poles are driving the Germans out. He felt
this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question
of food supply, reparation and other matters which had not yet been
decided’. In his reply, Stalin came close to being frank. The Poles, he said,
‘were taking their revenge upon the Germans . . . for the injuries the
Germans had caused them in the course of the centuries’. Churchill
expressed a material consideration once more - that revenge took the form
of throwing the Germans into the American and British Zones to be fed.78
Truman reminded Stalin that the Poles were his responsibility too, and
that he was also at the mercy of the Senate; and that they might easily
refuse to ratify any proposed treaty. Stalin brought up another bargaining
counter, one that was not in his hands: the Ruhr. This was in the British
Zone, and the British were having a hard time keeping the French out.
Churchill announced that he was leaving for Britain. ‘What a pity!’ said
Stalin. ‘I hope to be back,’ replied the British premier. Stalin suggested that,
judging from his rival’s face, ‘he did not think Mr Attlee was looking
forward to taking over Churchill’s authority’, apparently adding, ‘He does
not look like a greedy man.’ The British left Alexander Cadogan to mind
the fort.79
There was no meeting on 26 July, as the British were absent. Truman
flew to Frankfurt-am-Main to visit Eisenhower. On the way to Schloss
Berckheim, General Bolling’s palatial headquarters in Weinheim, he drove
through unscathed villages, and saw healthy-looking Germans. Eisenhower
was based in the big IG Farben building in Frankfurt, which reminded
Truman of the Pentagon. The British delegation had still not returned on 27
July and Truman relaxed with Eugene List’s piano-playing. He wrote to his
mother and sister of this ‘Godforsaken country’. ‘To think that millions of
Russians, Poles, English and Americans were slaughtered all for the folly of
one crazy egotist by the name of Hitler. I hope it won’t happen again.’80 The
day before he had met a Lieutenant Hitler, who came from the solidly
German town of St Louis.
Churchill had very much expected to be back, but Attlee won by a
landslide and became prime minister on the 26th. On the 27th he
unexpectedly named the former docker Ernest Bevin as foreign secretary.
Bevin himself thought he was destined for the Treasury, and that Hugh
Dalton would get the Foreign Office. Attlee had even told Dalton as much
when he saw him that morning. The Foreign Office, however, was not
happy with Dalton, possibly fearing that the Old Etonian economist would
be ‘too soft’ on the Russians. The permanent under-secretary, Cadogan,
thought Bevin ‘the heavyweight of the cabinet’. A further deciding factor
was the king’s antipathy towards Dalton. He too preferred Bevin.81
Bevin had no problem thinking himself into the role of chief diplomat.
As he told his private secretary Nicholas Henderson, he knew all about
‘foreigners’. He had had plenty of experience of ships’ captains. ‘Oh yes, I
can handle them,’ he said. As it was, he was devoted to the old guard at the
Foreign Office and the Foreign Office liked him too, because he did not
prevent them from shaping government policy. Bevin was strongly anti-
Soviet and had become fed up with Churchill’s softness towards them. He
thought the Conservatives had thrown too many ‘baubles at the Soviets’.
On 28 July, badly overweight and heavily dependent on drink and
cigarettes, Bevin went to Brize Norton to take his first flight.82
Truman was introduced to Ernest Bevin. Both he and Byrnes were
rather shocked by his aggressiveness towards the Soviets. When he got to
his digs, Bevin told General Sir Hastings Ismay that he was ‘not going to
have Britain barged about’.83 His passion for the British Empire would not
have been popular with the Americans or the Russians. Britain, however,
had far less might than the other two. Economically it was on its back: six
years of war had cost a quarter of the country’s pre-war wealth; its income
was reduced by half; exports were just a third of what they had been, and its
merchant fleet was down by 30 per cent. It had also lost 40 per cent of its
markets - chiefly to the Americans. Together with these problems, the
colonies were crawling with nationalists who were looked on with
sympathy by the other two powers round the Russian table in Potsdam.84
Despite the limited affections of the Americans, Britain had only one way
to turn. The Americans were avowed enemies of colonialism and the
sterling bloc, which they saw as a threat to the open world economy.85
Naturally Stalin knew Attlee well. The later arrival of the British meant
that the conference did not kick off until 10.15 p.m. on the 28th. Bevin was
seeing the Russian leader for the first time. He decided he was like a
‘renaissance despot’ - it was always yes or no, ‘though you could only
count on him if it was no’. Bevin immediately protested about the Oder-
Neisse Line.86 For the time being, however, the conference continued to
discuss booty. Stalin agreed that he would not seek reparations from Austria
(he was insisting on payments from Italy). He would find another way of
making off with the booty he desired - by sequestering ‘German’ assets.
Truman was growing impatient with the reparations issue. He realised all
too well that when these countries were bankrupted by reparations they
would need bailing out by the United States. It was after midnight when the
meeting broke up.87
The 29th was the second Sunday of the conference. Truman attended a
church service in Babelsberg. Stalin had caught a cold and had stayed in
bed, thereby postponing the end. Truman thought he was faking the illness,
and that he was merely disappointed that Churchill had been replaced by
Attlee. Molotov took his place at the table. Zhukov remarked that Attlee
was rather more reserved than Churchill, but that he continued Churchill’s
line of argument.88 Truman’s original suppositions about Stalin had been
revised - he had never met such stubborn characters before and hoped he
would never do so again.89
The American secretary of state James Byrnes read out a statement
offering a definition of Poland’s western borders that would prevail until the
matter could be decided by the peace conference. The area was to be
administered by the Poles ‘until Poland’s final western border was fixed’ by
the peace conference.90 Byrnes drew a line starting at Swinemünde, west of
Stettin, and proceeding down the Oder to the Neisse before following the
Eastern Neisse to the Czech frontier. The Poles would also administer
Danzig and the lower half of East Prussia. It would not be considered a part
of the Soviet Zone.91
Molotov immediately objected: he wanted the border fixed at the
Görlitzer or Western Neisse. Truman thought he ‘requested a very large
concession on our part’. That was a considerable understatement. Truman
was already annoyed by the Russian-Polish fait accompli. The Russians had
warned their clients in Poland and Czechoslovakia to put a temporary stop
to their expulsions, at least until such time as the Allies could find places
for them within the shrunken Germany. The miserable German population
in Silesia were hoping vainly for justice from Potsdam. The Polish
authorities had now declared them to be ‘outside the law, without
possessions or honour’.92 The final decision was pure whitewash.eq Molotov
returned to the Ruhr. It was the bit of western Germany the Russians
wanted and had failed to occupy. Now he demanded two milliard dollars or
its equivalent - five to six million tons of machinery. Russian reparations
had already been fixed at Yalta. They were to receive a quarter of the
equipment in the Ruhr. There were other little points of that nature to clear
up. The naval issue was settled by a three-part division.93
Stalin continued indisposed. Truman wrote to his mother and sister. He
was not convinced that Stalin was ill. Perhaps the generalissimo genuinely
missed Churchill, for it was certain that Attlee would make just as many
concessions, if not more. Stalin did not please the American leader: ‘You
never saw a more pig-headed people as the Russians. I hope I never have to
hold another conference with them.’94
The end drew near. The eleventh and penultimate meeting took place on
the 31st. The Ruhr was British, and Bevin fixed the Russian share at 10 to
15 per cent. That meant 15 per cent in commodities or 10 in reparations.
Bevin also held out for the Eastern Neisse, but Byrnes was ready to concede
and grant the Russians the plum they longed for. Truman added forlornly
that it was only a temporary measure. Bevin was still insisting on the 1937
borders and hoping for a deal of some sort before he would concede. The
Americans pulled the carpet out from under his feet. He wanted to know if
the British could also give away parts of their zone to other countries.er
Truman added in what was no doubt a resigned tone: ‘we all agreed on the
Polish question’. Stalin said, ‘Stettin is in Polish territory.’ Bevin added,
‘Yes, we should inform the French.’ And they decided to tell the French.
The French had wanted it thus all along.95
The Anglo-Americans had lain prostrate while the Russians had walked
all over them. Truman thought the Polish compromise was ‘the best we
were able to get’.96 It begs a number of questions: had Stalin placed the
border at Berlin and the Spree, would the Allies have consented? Berlin had
a Slavic history too, as indeed did Magdeburg. Why not fix Poland’s border
at the Elbe? For the Germans on the right bank of the Oder, however,
Potsdam gave an ambiguous verdict, leaving the Oder-Neisse issue open
until 1974 and later. The final decision was to be left until a peace treaty
was agreed. This never happened. The Oder-Neisse Line therefore became a
temporary frontier until a permanent one was fixed at a later conference. In
the meantime the Poles resumed their expulsions from the areas allotted to
them by the Soviets. The cities of Breslau and Stettin felt this decision
acutely. The Anglo-Americans had not intended to leave them in Poland,
either permanently or temporarily. They had planned to divide Breslau,
leaving the bulk of the city in German hands, and the right-bank suburbs
were to go to Poland. At Yalta Churchill had said, ‘It would be a great pity
to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion.’97
Zhukov claimed that the Oder-Neisse Line had been settled at Yalta, and
that Churchill was backtracking.98 Without Churchill’s at best limp
resistance, Truman agreed to the Oder-Neisse Line including the Eastern
Neisse and Breslau.99
At the next meeting Stalin was after booty again. He wanted a line
drawn from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and the opportunity to appropriate
any German property to the east of that marker. They discussed war
criminals: the Russians wanted the Krupps indicted. Krupps had made
possibly the greatest demands on the Nazi government for Russian slave
labour and raw materials. The Russians complained that Rudolf Hess was
living comfortably in England. Bevin replied that the British would send the
Allies a bill for his upkeep.100 Attlee thought the Russians had Goebbels.
Stalin was evasive. He wanted to have a list of war criminals who might be
in the Soviet Union, but the Americans opposed this. Stalin asked for just
three names, at which Attlee suggested Hitler: ‘Stalin replied that we do not
have Hitler at our disposition but that he had no objection to naming
him.’101
Stalin reverted to the western Polish border at the last meeting, which
began at 10.40 p.m. on 1 August. Molotov had amended the line on the
map. Stalin said that he wanted it fixed immediately west of Swinemünde,
but that the precise location would be decided by the Poles and Russians.
Bevin objected. ‘No,’ he said, ‘the British could not cut themselves out of
this . . . The line must be recognised by the United Nations.’ The delegates
continued to bicker about Swinemünde and how many other German
villages to the west of the coastal town would fall to Poland. The session
broke up at 3 a.m.102
The Potsdam Conference laid down the guidelines for the transfer of
populations. An estimated 3.5 million Germans were to be brought out of
the new Poland and settled in the British and Soviet Zones in an orderly and
humane manner as enshrined in Article 13. A schedule was drawn up which
foresaw the entire number crossing the frontier before August 1946.103
The Big Three agreed to create a number of ‘central agencies’ that
would be law in all four zones. The French smelled a rat: central agencies
smacked of the ‘Reich’. ‘There is thus a German state,’ complained de
Gaulle; that was ‘inadmissible’.104 It was not only the French who were
unhappy. Potsdam ended in recrimination. The path to the Cold War was
open. From now on decisions would be taken at the regular meetings of the
Allied foreign ministers. The Russians had the dropping of the US atom
bombs on Japan to concentrate their minds. On 22 August Truman put an
end to Lease-Lend while de Gaulle was on a visit to America. Franco-
American relations were marked by mutual incomprehension. France,
which had signed a treaty with Soviet Russia in December, was playing the
communist card. It was easily done with the Communist Party the largest in
the French Assembly.105
The Western Allies were shocked that they had made so many
concessions to the Soviets. They had managed the conference badly. Soviet
power was at its height, while the British were at the nadir of their fortunes.
The death of Roosevelt in April had meant that the only delegation to have
maintained the same dramatis personae at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam had
been the Soviets, and they had known how to invoke past agreements.106
Although Truman had accepted Morgenthau’s resignation, it was only at
Potsdam that the politician’s thinking really became a dead letter.107 One of
the most influential critics of Potsdam was the diplomat George Kennan,
who was stationed in Moscow and knew the Soviet leaders well. He viewed
the whole conference with ‘unmitigated scepticism and despair’. ‘I cannot
recall any political document the reading of which filled me with a greater
sense of depression than the communiqué to which President Truman set
his name at the conclusion of these confused and unreal discussions.’
Quadripartite control was, thought Kennan, ‘Unreal and unworkable’.108
He believed that the agreement was wrong, point by point. War crimes
needed to be settled by immediate execution, and there was no common
ground to be found with the Soviets. ‘In all fairness’ the granting of
Königsberg to the Soviet Union had been agreed by Churchill and
Roosevelt, ‘but the casualness and frivolity with which these decisions were
made . . . the apparent indifference on the American side’ appalled Kennan.
He also showed how Truman and Byrnes had been hoodwinked. The
Russians required an ice-free port, and felt they deserved one after the
sacrifices made by the Soviet people. Kennan pointed out that they already
had three - Ventspils, Libau (Liepaja) and Baltisky - and Königsberg was
forty-nine kilometres from the sea. The result was a disaster ‘without
parallel’ in modern times.
Not only were the East Prussian population subjected to the most
ghastly fate imaginable (and in many cases it was unimaginable), but - as
Kennan pointed out - it resulted in the most terrible squandering of the
resources of a rich agricultural province. Gone were 1.4 million head of
cattle, 1.85 million pigs, four million tons of wheat, fifteen million tons of
rye and 40 million tons of potatoes in a yearly average.109
Some Germans, however, were relieved to hear the outcome of the
Potsdam Conference. For Ruth Friedrich it was as if a ‘stone had fallen
from our hearts: so there is not to be a fresh war but they were going to
rebuild and rule together’. The order was enshrined in Control Council
Proclamation No. 1 of 5 June, which informed the German people that the
four powers would jointly govern Germany.110
For the Potsdamer life returned to what they now called normality.
Hanna Grisebach was free to scrump again, stealing potatoes from the
crown prince’s garden. She was caught red handed by a Russian:
‘Zappzarapp kartoscha!’ Her daughter pacified the soldier with a little
school-book Russian. He dismissed them: ‘Na Haus!’111 The shadows
lengthened and the cold set in. By February it was fifteen degrees below,
and there was no glass in their windows. They slept in their coats and
animal skins. The shortage of potatoes had been joined by a dearth of coal
and wood. It was Karl Jaspers who finally helped them out by recalling
August Grisebach to his chair in the newly reopened university. His wife
and children had to remain behind in Potsdam until repeated visits to
OMGUS, the American HQ in Berlin-Dahlem, yielded the necessary
papers.
OceanofPDF.com
19
The Great Freeze
Whenever I think of the winter of 1946 to 1947 in
Germany, I always recall the glitter on the walls and in
the interiors of houses, that I must have seen a hundred
times in German homes and which resembled the
sparkly sheen on the unpolished side of a granite block.
It was the glitter of a wafer-thin layer of white frost, an
icy blast of damp; the frozen moisture in the
atmosphere created by men, sweat, coughing and
breathing; men whose clothing was sometimes soaked
though with snow, and who dried out slowly when they
got home.
Carl Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht für das Kriegsministerium der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Göttingen 2004, 82
After Potsdam the stage was set for the Cold War, but it did not come
for a while. One reason for this was that Stalin did not want a war, hot or
cold; and it was the Western Allies, first Britain, and then America, who
pushed him into it. He had no desire to reach the North Sea, the Rhine or
the Atlantic. The Soviet Union was exhausted by war. If Stalin had
considered resuming the march west, he knew that his country needed a
good twenty years to recover first. When goaded to invade western Europe
by one of his generals, he answered, ‘But who would feed all its people?’1
Similarly, he tried to restrain Tito’s wilder ambitions - although this did not
come out at the time - when he appeared to back his territorial claims.
Stalin’s system was about security, and his almost paranoiac sense that the
Soviet Union was in danger. Poland was the lynchpin: he wanted a good,
deep buffer. In Germany he saw something more akin to an ally. He sought
to avoid division, although he allowed certain policies - such as agrarian
reform - which could only have been intolerable to the West. The Cold War
was the result of what Vojtech Mastny has called the ‘Western perception of
a Soviet threat’.2 Stalin kept his options open.
There was friction at Potsdam, but the Allies went home in the belief
that they were policing the globe together. They had instituted a regular
conference of foreign ministers (CFM) to keep the world in check. The
merry-go-round had taken the foreign ministers to London in September
1945. It was their first meeting since Postsdam. There was a predictable
scrimmage over who was to receive what in the way of German resources.
The French were still clamouring loudly for the Rhine and the Ruhr and
‘justice’, by which they meant coal, machinery, locomotives, consumer
goods and men. They were pre-empted by the Soviets, who had awarded
themselves 50 per cent of reparations, with 20 per cent each to Britain and
America. France and the other claimants had to make do with 10. Bevin
was still firm on the Ruhr. He was generally sympathetic to the French, but
in this instance he realised that any internationalisation of the area would be
tantamount to opening the door to the Russians.3
French behaviour upset Molotov and led to a chilling of relations
between the two countries. On 7 October 1945 Pravda ran an article saying
that the French had less right to discuss eastern Europe than the Yugoslavs,
Czechs or Poles. Moscow complained that the French were not prepared to
deport Russian POWs, by which it almost certainly meant those Russian
citizens who were hiding under French skirts because France had not been
party to Yalta. The Russians responded by saying they would not return
French POWs, which meant Alsatians who had been recruited into the
German army after 1940.4 They would have to spend another winter in the
Gulag.
The winter of 1945-6 was not abnormally cold, but the terrible lack of
coal and food was felt acutely by the very large numbers of Germans
without proper roofs over their heads. The ground was rock hard and the
lakes froze. The Kommandatura authorised a Holzaktion in the Grunewald
woods, allowing Berliners to cut down the venerable trees of the former
royal hunting reserve. That winter 167 people committed suicide from
despair, and the British authorities in Berlin decided to evacuate children
aged between four and fourteen to their zone. This involved 50,000 children
and 10,000 accompanying adults. Despite this precaution, 60,000 Berliners
are believed to have died before March 1946. The following winter killed
off an estimated 12,000 more when temperatures hovered around thirty
degrees below.5
As noted in the previous chapter, the meetings between the Big Three
had foreseen a peace conference, similar to that which met in Versailles in
1919, putting the final coat of varnish on the post-war settlement. There
were endless discussions about this, and about just who was to be allowed a
seat at the table. Byrnes was still courting Stalin. He sat next to him at
dinner in Moscow at the CFM in December 1945 and raised a toast: ‘Whom
we hath [sic] joined together, let no peace put asunder.’ By his own
admission it went down like a lead brick. The brief American-Soviet
rapprochement struck fear into Bevin, but on 9 February 1946 Stalin
appeared to open the batting in the Cold War with his speech hailing the
victory of the Soviet people. The war, he said, had been the result of
monopoly capitalism. 6 It was very probably true, however, that the Soviet
leader had not meant to frighten the Western Allies. Both he and Molotov
were still keen on East-West co-operation. So, to some extent, was Byrnes;
but his attempts to maintain the peace between East and West were
undermined by Truman, who pronounced himself ‘tired of babying the
Soviets’. He would go so far, and no further.7
Churchill made his speech in Fulton, Missouri on 5 March in which he
was supposed to have coined the phrase ‘Iron Curtain’. The words had, in
fact, been first used by Joseph Goebbels.8 Churchill’s views were loudly
cheered by the Foreign Office, though they were very cautiously received in
America at first, which was moving only slowly in that direction.9 The idea
persisted in some quarters that Soviet Russia and America could carve up
the world. The notion had found favour with Roosevelt. It often had to do
with a profound Anglophobia on the part of senior American army
officers.10 Now voices of dissent began to ring out.
The Soviets had no desire to see Germany break up - they had their eyes
on the Ruhr with its industries, and on their 10 per cent share of German
production. After the Berlin election of May 1946 that went by the board.
The Russians were proceeding with their idea of setting up ‘democratic’
government in their zone. The political resolve of the Western Allies in
Berlin had first been put to the test in March that year when the Soviets
called for the merging of the SPD and the KPD. In April the socialists and
communists of the SBZ held a conference in the Admiralspalast Theatre
where the call for the new ‘Socialist Unity Party’ or SED was unanimous.
Elections by secret ballot were held in the West but were banned in the
Russian Sector. The Soviet ban was challenged in both Prenzlauerberg and
Friedrichshain, but Russian troops broke up the polling station and carried
off the ballot boxes. In the Western sectors the vote was a disaster for the
Russian plans to introduce a one-party state: 29,610 Social Democrats voted
against, with just 2,937 agreeing to the merger. It had been ‘the first free
and secret election on German soil since 1932’.11 Russia’s policy had blown
up in its face, especially when free elections were allowed.
The New Ideologists
The East-West co-operation that had won the war was going out of
intellectual fashion. A different set of men were wielding influence in the
Western corridors of power. George F. Kennan had served in the Moscow
embassy during the war. For him the Soviet Union posed a threat to the
American way of life.12 He believed the Americans were deceiving
themselves if they thought they could change events in the areas already
under Soviet hegemony; on the other hand he could see no reason for
making things easier for them. Germany was not going to work - a shared
Germany was a ‘chimera’. In the summer of 1945 Kennan wrote his famous
‘long telegram’: ‘We have no choice but to lead our section of Germany -
the section of which we and the British have accepted responsibility - to a
form of independence so prosperous, so secure, that the East cannot
threaten it.’ Better a dismembered Germany than totalitarianism at the
North Sea.13 Kennan’s memorandum was echoed by three similar telegrams
from the British diplomat Frank Roberts, although he expressed himself
with more caution.
In retrospect Kennan probably went too far. It is highly unlikely that
Stalin wanted to cross the Elbe. It did not make a lot of sense to strive for a
communist Europe while the Americans and the British retained large
forces on the mainland. If that had been what he desired, it was better to
wait: the fruit might fall from the tree without any need to struggle. Besides,
America had the atomic bomb, and was to possess a monopoly in nuclear
weapons until 1949.14 The Soviets were still keen to reform their zone. The
Soviet diplomat A. A. Sobelev told Murphy that the pan-German central
government laid down by Potsdam would need years of preparation, as the
spirit of Prussia had to be excised from the administration first.15 The
changes of attitude were in the West, where the Americans feared an attack
on the open economy and the British an attack on their interests in the
Middle East and the Mediterranean.16 Kennan was not deceived by the
Czechs. By 1945 the country was already under the sway of Moscow.
‘Personal acquaintance with the Czech ambassador in Moscow, Zdenek
Fierlinger, had given me the impression that we had to do in his person not
with the representative of a free and independent Czechoslovakia but with
one who was to all intents and purposes a Soviet agent.’17
Views like Kennan’s were becoming common currency in America.
General George Patton was a case in point: with time he preferred Nazis to
communists. A more analytical indictment of the policy that led to the
Anglo-American rout at Potsdam appeared in Ralph Keeling’s Gruesome
Harvest of 1947. Keeling called it ‘one of the most brutal and terrifying
peace programmes ever inflicted on a defeated nation’. Germany was not a
pawn in the battle between East and West, thought Keeling, ‘she is the
major prize’. Germany needed to be attracted over to the American side and
kept there.18 This was to become American policy before the year was out.
Keeling echoed many of Victor Gollancz’s views on the treatment of the
Germans, but he was rare at the time in being prepared to bring up Allied
wartime atrocities, such as the bombing of civilian targets and the
firestorms where men, women and children were fried at temperatures of
1,000 degrees. The Oder-Neisse Line contradicted the Atlantic Charter, and
- Keeling pointed out - even the draconian Morgenthau had limited his
territorial demands for the Poles to the southern half of East Prussia and the
mixed Germano-Polish area of Upper Silesia.19
In Britain, Roberts’s views prevailed in the Foreign Office, which was
calling for an all-out offensive against Russia’s mission of ‘dynamic and
proselytising communism’. What Roberts feared was ‘communism on the
Rhine’. The British attitude was so aggressively anti-Soviet in Bevin’s
Foreign Office that some observers have suggested that the British were the
prime movers in the Cold War.20 There were still delusions of grandeur in
Whitehall and Bevin was certainly all in favour of the hard line. He thought
it might be necessary to abandon the idea of a united Germany but insisted
that responsibility for the breakdown in relations between the wartime
Allies should rest fairly and squarely with the Soviets. Though the Russians
appeared peaceful in Europe, they were already moving troops into Iran, the
move that was to prompt Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech.21 The Americans
were the last to abandon their faith in a united Germany, but Byrnes was
defeated in Paris, the location both of the farcical peace conference and of
the Quai d’Orsay, which was most famously opposed to German unity.
Byrnes could not believe a peace conference had any value now that so
many countries had been absorbed into the Soviet bloc.22
Bevin was also worried about money, especially as Britain did not have
much. Reputations die hard, but Britain’s subaltern position was recognised
by the permanent under-secretary, Cadogan, who referred to the leaders of
the Allied coalition as ‘the great two and a half’. In 1945 the economist
Maynard Keynes was talking of a ‘financial Dunkirk’, and as the fuel crisis
set in during the cruel winter of 1946-7 Britain’s economic handicap was
patently obvious.23 In 1945-6 alone, Germany cost the British taxpayer £74
million, while the British people had to put up with a continuation of
wartime rationing.
Although Truman had recognised the Oder-Neisse Line on 9 August
1945, the Americans were ready to backtrack almost immediately. For the
time being, however, the Control Council defined Germany as the land
between the Line and the ‘present western borders’. The French had made it
clear as well that, although not party to Potsdam, they approved the
cessions in the east. It was Byrnes who reopened the can of worms by
raising the question of border revision and threatening Poland with a peace
conference. 24
That other Russo-sceptic, Clay, drew his inspiration from Byrnes. On 19
August he wrote to the secretary of state, ‘You are carrying so much of the
hope of the world on your shoulders against almost insurmountable odds
that you should be free of all other worries. If you cannot win the fight for
peace, no one can.’25 The Berlin elections were coming up. Clay thought the
Americans should support the democratic parties in the west - the CDU and
the SPD represented the ‘substantial majority of the population’. ‘I am not
unduly apprehensive of the election results in Berlin,’ he wrote, as he did
not trust them anyway. Berlin depended on Russia, which fed its people,
and was subject therefore to Soviet economic pressure.26 Indeed, there was
a feeling that the Germans in the SBZ could not be trusted and that they
would turn to communism under the blandishments of the occupiers. Even
when there was plenty of evidence to the contrary - as in the Austrian
elections - the Anglo-Americans still persisted in their view. The feeling
that Germans in the east had been seduced by the Soviets strengthened their
resolve to create a separate state in the west of the country. As early as May
1946 Bevin explained to the cabinet why he felt a divided Germany was
desirable. The Russians presented a danger as great as, if not greater than, a
revived Germany. The idea was to create a Germany ‘that would be more
amenable to our influence’, whereas a united Germany would be more
under Soviet hegemony.27
Byrnes was also the architect of Bizonia - the idea of merging the
Western zones rapidly replaced Bevin’s notion of a ‘loose federation’. In
April 1946 the four powers met to discuss the situation in Germany, and
Russia was accused of reneging on the agreements made at Potsdam. The
result was an economic amalgamation of the British and American zones.
The conference affirmed the fact that the enemy had changed since the
onset of the Cold War: the Germans had become allies in the new order.
The British cabinet agreed in principle to Bizonia on 25 July 1946.
Germany should become self-sufficient again by 1949.28
Byrnes made his statement of intent in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946.
He had been attending the impotent Paris Peace Conference and had left for
Berlin before flying on to the Württemberg capital. He met the German
minister presidents and addressed an audience in the Opera House. The
German politicians told him a new Hitler was an impossibility: were such a
man to emerge, he would have to be a communist. Byrnes said it had been a
mistake for America to lose interest in Europe after the First World War.
‘The American people want to help the German people to win their way
back to an honourable peace among the free and peace-loving nations of the
world . . . What we want is lasting peace. We will oppose harsh and
vengeful measures which obstruct our attempts at peace. We will oppose
soft measures which invite the breaking of the peace . . . We do not want
Germany to become the satellite of any power or powers or to live under a
dictatorship, foreign or domestic.’ There were sideways swipes at the Poles
for seizing land before they had been granted leave. Poland’s borders, he
warned, were not final; there had been no agreement. The French were also
put in their place: America could not deny their right to the Saar, but it
would not support any encroachment on the Ruhr or the Rhineland. The
criticism of the French in Stuttgart, of all places, must have been especially
piquant.29
Byrnes’s hard stand was heartily approved by Clay. The British were
also enthusiastic. Churchill cabled his congratulations. After some initial
reticence, Bevin appeared pleased and made similar noises before the
House of Commons in October.30 Attlee was all for withdrawing from
Germany, but Bevin, the Foreign Office and the chiefs of staff ganged up on
him, claiming that it would be tantamount to another Munich. They wanted
confrontation, not retreat. Above all Byrnes’s speech went down well with
the Germans. The Wiesbaden Kurier called it ‘a ray of light at last’. Then
again, in Wiesbaden, it was wise to praise anything the Americans did.31
When Byrnes went, Clay continued the hard line. Washington interfered
very little with American military commanders in Germany.32 Not so
enthralled by Byrnes’s words were the Poles, who staged a protest outside
the American embassy in Warsaw.33
John Dos Passos had the chance to interview Clay in Berlin at the end
of 1945. Clay exerted his charm on the journalists, telling them ‘with a
smile that we weren’t necessarily trying to produce an efficient Germany,
we were trying to produce a democratic Germany’. He did not know if he
would succeed in this. Nor could he say whether the Germany they
produced would be separate or unified: ‘That decision couldn’t seem to get
past the [Control] Council.’ Clay was referring to the French, who
obstructed anything that exuded a whiff of unity.34
The French were up to their usual tricks and not playing ball with the
Anglo-Americans. From the very beginning they sought to disable the
Control Council and resist the implementation of the Potsdam Agreements
as far as creating ‘central agencies’ was concerned. There was to be no
recreation of the ‘Reich’. Pierre Koenig wielded his veto like a bacon slicer.
On 20 October 1945 he put paid to the idea of a unified trades union
structure. The Americans were incensed. First Eisenhower threatened to
scrap the Control Council, then the matter came within Clay’s domain, and
Clay was permanently furious with the French for their obstructions. The
latter still had their hearts set on the dismemberment of Germany and
looked approvingly to what had happened on the other side of the Oder-
Neisse Line. As Bidault put it: if you can do it with Breslau, why not
Mainz?35
The South Tyrol
One issue that was festering in the autumn of 1946 was what to do with
the German-speaking South Tyrol. Hitler had been surprisingly pragmatic
about ethnic Germans. Where ‘Heim ins Reich’ (home in the Reich)
provided a pretext for annexation in most cases, for the German-speaking
majority in the South Tyrol and Gottschee it meant ‘come home to the
Reich’: Mussolini was to be allowed to continue Italianising this former
Austrian territory north of the River Adige or Etsch.es
In 1919 the region had been 95 per cent German, but self-determination
was nonetheless denied to its people. The Allies had promised the Italians
the Brenner to lure them over to their side in 1915. Some vague noises had
been made about autonomy, but once the Italian fascists came to power they
were keen to consolidate the region by evicting the natives and replacing
them with poor peasants from the south. Mussolini encouraged new
industries in Bolzano (Bozen) and Merano (Meran), and brought in
Sicilians to man them. The fanatical Ettore Tolomei from Trentino pursued
a policy of promoting Italian institutions and banning the German language
and place names. Many changed their family names to something more
Italianate in order to retain their farms. The experience of persecution had
been a bitter one for the South Tyroleans; and they had been only partly
mollified in 1943 when the Germans had taken over from the Italians and
Mussolini’s drive had abated. The Soviet Union might well have consented
to hand over the territory had it not been for Marshal Badoglio’s coup
against Mussolini that year. Now Italy was on the winning side again, and
would not be penalised in a post-war peace settlement. Similar sentiments
were expressed by Churchill’s foreign secretary Anthony Eden: there was
more to be gained by sparing Italy further humiliation.36
From May 1945, the South Tyroleans naturally hoped that they would
be allowed the chance to join their cousins in the north, and become part of
an independent Austria. This was the aim of the SVP (South Tyrolean
People’s Party), founded on 8 May. Karl Gruber had been active in
reclaiming the South Tyrol from the very moment the Allies arrived in
Austria. He felt that Austria had proved its victim status, and could now
reap the reward. In September 1945 there had been a demonstration on the
streets of Innsbruck, and Figl expressed the view that ‘The return of the
South Tyrol to Austria is every Austrian’s dream.’37
The Italian foreign minister Alcide De Gasperi was from Trent and was
more prepared to see Trieste fall to the Yugoslavs, however, than the South
Tyrol return to Austria. He tried to frighten the Anglo-Americans by
conjuring up a vision of a communist Austrian state on the Brenner. This
was calculated to have an effect on Truman. In general the Allies were split,
with the American Austrian expert James Riddleberger siding with Austria,
and the Italian authority Samuel Reber resisting. In Britain Lord Hood and
Arnold Toynbee were in favour of Austria, while A. D. M Ross and the
historian of the Habsburg Monarchy, A. J. P. Taylor, were against.38
Renner sent notes to the Allies on 6 and 16 September 1945 canvassing
their views on a return of the region to Austria.39 In January 1946 the
Austrian government issued a note to the Allied Council with a request that
it be forwarded to the member governments. The note requested the return
of the province of Bolzano-Bozen - its agricultural production was vital to
the Austrian economy. The request had support from some unusual circles.
In the House of Lords Robert Vansittart spoke in favour of the cession of
the South Tyrol to Austria, and the foreign secretary Bevin lent it a
sympathetic ear.40 The South Tyrol, however, was not what it had been in
1919. As a result of Mussolini’s transfer of poor Italians from the south and
Hitler’s encouragement of the ‘Heim ins Reich’ programme to bring
German-speakers to Germany, the Italian minority amounted to nearly 40
per cent of the population, and their presence was particularly strong in the
bigger towns.
Gruber had assumed office as foreign minister with a desire to pursue a
‘dynamic foreign policy’ that was mostly thrust at the idea of getting the
South Tyrol back.41 A petition was signed by 158,628 South Tyroleans and
handed to Figl in Innsbruck. On 1 May 1946 the Allies refused a South
Tyrolean request for a plebiscite. The question was deferred to a putative
Paris peace conference.
On 5 May 20,000 South Tyroleans gathered in the bailey of Schloss
Sigmundskron wearing placards that read, ‘Wir bitten die Siegermächte:
schenkt uns unsere Heimat!’ (We ask the victorious powers, give us our
home!). Gruber now suggested that the South Tyrol be administered by the
United Nations. When Austrian demands were rejected by the Italians, a
general strike was organised in Innsbruck, Salzburg and Vienna. Gruber
was invited to ‘air his views’ in Paris in August. By the end of the month
his demands had been modified: South Tyroleans were to enjoy political
liberty; the province of Bolzano was to have economic autonomy; there was
to be a special customs policy between Austria and the South Tyrol.42 The
Italians agreed to a different statute for the region within the province of
Trentino-Alto Adige. Trentino had also been a part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, but its population was almost entirely Italian-speaking. As it was,
the Allies made the decision to evacuate Italy at the Paris CFM on 24 June
1946. On the question of the South Tyrol, the foreign ministers were content
to ask Italy for certain guarantees for the German-speaking population.
They had eventually resolved to maintain frontiers, where possible, as they
had been before the war. The French were more in favour: they had to put
away a dream of extending their Austrian zone to the Adige. The decision
to maintain the status quo was bitterly disappointing to the Austrians.
Renner scrapped a banquet that was to be offered in 1946 to commemorate
the victory over Germany.43
The injustice of the South Tyrolean position finally led to a meeting
between the Austrian foreign minister and his Italian counterpart De
Gasperi in Paris on 5 September 1946. They met to consider a South
Tyrolean ‘Magna Charta’.44 The accord guaranteed the rights of the
German-speakers. Once again they were to be entitled to German schools,
and Germans might occupy a number of local-government positions. Place
names could be written in German again. Exchanges between the north and
the south of the Tyrol were encouraged with an automatic right for qualified
students to study at Innsbruck University. In 1948, however, hopes of
autonomy were dashed when the southern region was bound into the new
area of Trentino, where Italians had a two-thirds majority.
The Paris Conference proved a humiliating experience for De Gasperi,
but good news was on the horizon in the form of Trieste. The British had
managed to keep the Yugoslavs out, and the following year the port, with its
80 per cent Italian population, reverted to Italy. ‘Co-belligerency’ with the
Allies had once again saved the Italians from the worst punishment. Italy
lost its African colonies, and had to cede Fiume and Istria to Yugoslavia and
the Dodecanese to Greece. A few Alpine villages were transferred to
France.45
The Russians Come into the Cold
Russian attempts to show the Germans they were soft and cuddly did
not help when it came to Berlin’s first free elections for fourteen years. The
poll, which was held in October 1946, gave very different results to the
local elections which the Russians had been able to run by themselves. The
SED received a paltry 19.8 per cent, trailing behind the right-wing CDU,
with 22.2 per cent, and with less than half the votes of the SDP, based in the
Western sectors. For the SPD it was the best score they had achieved since
1925; Berliners perceived the SED as the ‘Russian party’.46 Some saw the
behaviour of the Red Army as being partly to blame. A majority of female
voters in Austria had certainly refused to support political parties that
appeared to emanate from the same place as their rapists. The bourgeois
parties in the SBZ had also been able to exploit the women’s plight. The
Russian journalist K. Gofman took the matter up with the Bulgarian
ideologist Georgy Dimitrov in Moscow, condemning ‘this evil which
carries such a huge cost for our local prestige in Germany’.47
The news that the hated wartime coalition might be on the verge of
collapse was rapturously greeted in the courthouse prison in Nuremberg.
When Churchill began to criticise the Soviet Union, even Hess forgot that
he had lost his memory and told the other major Nazis that he had always
known it would be thus, that the trial would end, and that they would be
restored to their high-sounding titles and dignities. Göring too slapped his
thighs in glee and exclaimed, ‘History will not be deceived! The Führer and
I always prophesied it! The coalition will break up sooner or later.’48
The first calls from the Soviet Zone to create pan-German committees
in keeping with the Potsdam Agreement came as early as 1945. They were
issued by the LPD or Liberal Democrats. They suggested the creation of a
‘general plenipotentiary’ to act as a liaison man between the different
centres of power, or the formation of a ‘party control commission’. In 1946
the Liberal Democrats called for a German Zone Council, and the following
year a committee made up of all German parties. That same year the CDU
in the Soviet Zone demanded ‘national representation’.49
The Russians were also changing their minds about their wartime
partners. A New York Times reporter who interviewed a Soviet general in
Dresden, heard him say that the destruction was ‘your work and now it is
our work to clear it up’.50 A new froideur had set in with the Allies since the
attempt by the Soviets to manipulate the elections. This was the beginning
of the squeeze on West Berlin that was to culminate in the airlift and the
failed attempt by the Russians to overrun the Western sectors. Berlin was to
be ‘a Danzig without a corridor’. What was more, the Western Allies were
pathetically understaffed, particularly in Berlin, where the US had no more
than two battalions of troops to face the Red Army.51 The day after the poll
the NKVD began rounding up over 400 scientists and technicians in the
Russian Sector and shipping them back to the USSR. Three days later the
British protested against a violation of human rights. In a rare moment of
candour Colonel Frank Howley admitted that the Americans too had taken
away German scientists. They were ‘hardly in a strong position’ if they
chose to protest.52
The Great Freeze
The winter of 1946-7 was possibly the coldest in living memory. In
Cologne there were sixty four days in the 121 from December to March
when the temperature was below zero at 8.00 a.m. Near Frankfurt further to
the south, deep snow lay on the ground until March.53 The puny ‘cannon
oven’ was the only source of warmth for most. It was capable of warming
one side of the room, but its effect rarely extended to the other. The cannon
oven gave off an intense heat, but only for a short period, as the rations of
fuel were soon burned up. In the American Zone households were limited to
six briquettes, and sometimes there were none at all.
The cannon oven was a way of locating life in the ruins. A makeshift
chimney indicated a room under the rubble. The stench was appalling,
reminding Zuckmayer of a working coalmine. The inhabitants of these
smoky dens were happy for all that - at least they had some sort of roof over
their heads. They were lucky, too, if they were not obliged to share a room
with another family. Only in the relatively rubble-free western districts of
Berlin where the Allies had requisitioned many of the houses could one find
fresh air and the scent of pine trees, but even that was spiked with benzene.
Fuel was short here, however, and living in an elegant villa meant little if it
could not be heated. The privileged inhabitants of Zehlendorf or Dahlem
froze with the rest.54
Everything was burned that winter. Germans might have regretted that
they had been so quick to put their Nazi literature into the stove. A rumour
went round that there were to be public burnings of Nazi books, but the
truth was only that the Berlin public libraries threw out the now
ideologically suspect material in September 1945, and the others naturally
followed suit. Using Nazi paraphernalia as fuel had begun even before the
Führer’s death. The anonymous Woman in Berlin was cooking on National
Socialist literature on 27 April 1945. Later she burned the Movement’s
sacred text to keep warm. ‘I suspect . . . Adolf ’s Mein Kampf will one day
become a collector’s item.’55 Christabel Bielenberg, taking refuge in the
Black Forest, wondered where the big portrait of the Führer had gone that
had previously adorned the walls of the Burgomaster’s office: ‘In the
stove,’ she was told.56
By 20 November 1946 the icy wind was causing alarm among
Berliners, who were turning up their threadbare collars against the cold. On
6 December Ruth Andreas Friedrich and her friends were wondering if they
could hold out. Ten days later it was minus twenty. The pipes were frozen.
The women returned to fetching water from the pumps. On 21 December
the ice had to be broken in the buckets to make morning coffee. In the
American Sector the electricity was turned off for eight to ten hours a day,
and the situation was worse in the British. As the lavatories were frozen
over, the Berliners packed up their excrement and dumped it in the nearest
ruin. Prices rocketed at Christmas. The Andreas Friedrichs were able to
steal a tree in Teltow, but a goose at RM1,400 was more than a pair of shoes
and much more than they had to spend. A pound of chocolate was RM500,
a bar of soap RM40. The maximum monthly earnings were in the region of
RM1,000.57
One of the sufferers that winter was the publisher Peter Suhrkamp, who
was seriously ill as a result of his confinement in Ravensbrück. His wife
was trying her best to treat an inflammation of his lungs by giving him
access to fresh air, yet that meant freezing air. Suhrkamp literally risked life
and limb every time he ventured to the lavatory. The cold had been so
intense that it not only froze the water pipes, but also caused the pipe from
the lavatory to explode, leaving the bathroom floor covered in frozen
excrement. A hot-water pipe had been fed through the bathroom to afford
some feeble warmth. This turned the sewage into a semi-liquid mass the
colour of coffee ice-cream. The only way to rid the bathroom of this
stinking mass was to scrub it with boiling water, but with the lack of
combustible material and the terrible cold, it was not possible to get water
that hot. It was weeks before a plumber could effect the necessary repairs;
meanwhile the bathroom remained a serious health hazard.58
In the courthouse in Nuremberg the Seven survivors from the first IMT
trial felt the cold like everyone else. Speer, who had been ruminating on
how Air Marshal Harris had expressed himself when he spoke about the
Germans - had he used words like ‘extinction’ or ‘annihilation’? - suddenly
began to shiver. On 22 December he sat in his cell wrapped in a blanket,
watching his breath. He was wearing his spare underwear around his feet.
On Christmas Eve the men buried the hatchet, or at least declared a truce:
Funk gave Dönitz a sausage and Schirach handed Speer a piece of bacon as
neither had received any provisions from home. Neurath also shared his
Christmas biscuits with Speer, while the American chaplain gave them all
cigars, cigarettes and chocolate.59
That Christmas the grim news leaked out that a second frozen train had
arrived from Poland. Of the refugees, thirty-five had died, stripped of their
clothes at the border, 182 were seriously affected by frostbite, and twenty-
five more required amputations. Among the victims were thirty children.
The Berliners’ stomachs rumbled and they grumbled: under Hitler there had
been potatoes. The political risk of letting them go hungry was becoming
apparent.60 This might have prompted the reforms in the SBZ. Ration Card
VI was scrapped and demontage halted. Seventy-four Berlin industries were
returned to the people. On 7 January 1947 the barometer had plunged once
again in Nuremberg, this time to minus eighteen Fahrenheit. Speer learned
that in Berlin people were burning their last sticks of furniture. The
prisoners’ shower had frozen.61 The thermometer sank again on 31 January.
The power in Berlin was cut for eight to ten hours a day again. The
Berliners went out with their rucksacks to scour the Grunewald for
kindling.62
The winter bit everywhere in Europe. Britain had to cut back on its
commitment to the fight against communism, so Greece became an
American sphere of influence. The Soviets made more mischief at the
London Conference of Foreign Ministers of 16 January 1947. Stalin’s
advice appears so contradictory it is small wonder that the Western Allies
could not get the measure of him. He told his delegation that if reparations
obstructed German renewal they should drop their demands,63 yet the
Soviets backed the Yugoslav leader Joze Vilfan, who was demanding $150
million, 2,470 square miles of Carinthia (including the provincial capital
Klagenfurt and part of the city of Villach), and 130 square kilometres of
Styria (although to the Russians the Yugoslavs said they would be happy
with sixty-three square kilometres on the Drau, and an important power
station). These areas possessed large Slovenian populations. The Soviets
added that they wanted a special statute to protect the Croats in Burgenland.
Lord Pakenham dismissed the Yugoslav request, adding that it was not
worth the paper it was written on.64 The game came to an end the following
year when Stalin and Tito fell out at the Villa Bled.
Business took Ruth Friedrich to Hamburg that winter. She noted a rise
in the popularity of the Nazis. People had been scrawling ‘88’ on walls.
Someone explained that H was the eighth letter of the alphabet, and 88
stood for ‘HH’ or ‘Heil Hitler’. The British were to blame. They were not
sufficiently tough on the Nazis.65 They had lodged many of the bombed-out
citizens in Nissen huts, where they froze. The police were turning a blind
eye to thefts of coal. They believed that protecting coal supplies was down
to the conquerors. Ruth Friedrich was keen to compare prices with Berlin.
A half-packet of soap powder cost five marks, a quarter pound of tea a
hundred.66 On her return she missed her connection to the military train in
Hanover, and had to spend twenty-four hours there before she could catch
the next. At first she found a sort of buffet in a bunker where the people
smelled of fish and onions. She had to pay a ten-mark deposit for a beaker
to drink some coffee. Later she ran across the black market where American
soap was changing hands for fifty marks a bar. The hand of the woman who
offered it to her was so dirty that she wanted to tell her to use it herself. She
made her way to an official doss-house where she was put into the women’s
dormitory. There she met a woman who had been raped eight times trying
to cross the ‘green border’. She was bleeding badly and stank.67
Another smell permeated Berlin that winter: the carbide lamp that
reeked like garlic. Filth, and washing, was a huge problem. Like Hitler’s
victims who languished in concentration camps, it became imperative to
retain human dignity that winter. Zuckmayer spoke of the necessity of
keeping fingernails clean and brushing teeth. Germans went to
extraordinary lengths to polish their shoes, even though there was no
bootblack. Despite the outside temperatures, some Germans - particularly
refugees from the east - were virtually naked and concealed their shame
behind ragged blankets. On their feet they wore bits of planking tied on
with lengths of cloth.68
Vienna was no warmer. General Béthouart recalled the miserable
figures stumbling past his Hütteldorf villa returning from the Vienna woods
with faggots. The Viennese spoke of the ‘blue hour’ when gas was issued to
the pipes to allow the citizens to cook their dinners on a low flame.69 Food
was scarce and money no longer had any value. As in Germany, American
cigarettes had the greatest worth. Josefine and Leopold Hawelka had
managed to reopen their café in the Dorotheergasse. Leopold went off each
day to the Vienna woods to find kindling to keep the stove alight and boil
the kettle for the coffee. Once Josefine forgot she had hidden some cartons
of cigarettes in the stove, and lit it. A great deal of money went up in
flames.70
Bizonia
Clay was in favour of inter-zonal co-operation from the first. Once more
it was the French who stood in the way. He had put his hope in the
provision for central agencies that had been decreed at Potsdam, but the
French didn’t like the idea of resurrecting the ‘Reich’. ‘If these agencies
cannot be obtained and/or the boundaries of occupied Germany are to be
changed, the present concept of Potsdam becomes meaningless,’ he wrote
in the spring of 1946. There was no exchange of commodities between the
zones. Clay thought it essential to have a common financial policy and
freedom to travel from one to the other. He was so angry with the French by
16 June that he sued for permission to retire.71
In Paris on 11 July 1946, Byrnes offered to merge the American Zone
with anyone who was interested. The British took up the offer at the end of
the month and all the problems were ironed out by 9 August. The joined
zones would have a common standard of living, pooled resources and a
common export policy, and would fix imports necessary to supplement
indigenous resources.72 Heralded by General George Marshall’s Harvard
speech that laid the keel of the famous ‘plan’ to relieve impoverished, war-
torn Europe, Bizonia kicked off with an Economic Council in Frankfurt in
June 1947. For the first time in fourteen years the national tricolour was
raised. When the Americans noticed, they objected, and it had to be hauled
down. In the course of the Council the Transitional Law was passed that
legalised federal authority over the provincial Länder. It was a move
towards the creation of a sovereign, federal state.
A Thaw in the Weather
In March 1947 milder weather set in, bringing fresh dangers. The
hospitals had filled up with cases of broken bones: people who had slipped
on the ice; and there was now a great stink to replace the great freeze.73 It
was time for the Moscow Conference, which came hard on the heels of the
announcement of the Truman Doctrine, which was designed to lure Europe
away from communism by stick and carrot. Marshall, who had replaced
Byrnes as secretary of state, would develop the policy into the Marshall
Plan in his prize-giving speech at Harvard in June. General Mark Clark
considered Moscow the most important planning meeting between the
Allies since Potsdam. The idea of a peace treaty for Austria was brought up,
and returned to the files. There were attempts to conclude peace with
Germany as well, which had faltered at Paris and New York in December,
and which made no progress in Moscow either.74 Already the London
Conference discussions just prior to Moscow had been bogged down by
Yugoslav demands. Moscow was a trying time for Clark, who had already
made up his mind to go home. During the night he was woken by calls from
females asking if he needed anything, so that he had to wrap his telephone
in a towel and put it in a drawer. The rooms at the hotel were bugged, and
for privacy the American delegates spoke to each other as they walked
around the Kremlin walls.75
Stalin was comparatively unmoved by the Truman Doctrine and still
hoped to effect German unity. The French predictably blackballed it. In
April that year French policy changed a little, as the French communists left
the government which they had haunted since the liberation. It was the
Marshall Plan that seemed to threaten Soviet security, in that it extended
offers of assistance to countries within Stalinist eastern Europe. Molotov
was instructed to break off talks with the West in Paris on 30 June when it
became clear that the Anglo-American plans were directly aimed at the
Soviet Union. The Soviet satellites were ordered to ignore the siren offers
of aid.76 The Soviet response was Cominform. It was intended to keep the
Eastern bloc on the straight and narrow.
Bevin was more fearsome than Marshall in his belligerence towards the
Soviet Union. There is a story about the London CFM in November 1947,
when Bevin confronted the Russian foreign minister. ‘What do you want?’
he demanded to know. Molotov replied, ‘I want a unified Germany.’
Molotov came to the conclusion that it had been easier to work with the
patrician Eden than with this man of the people. After the London meeting
Soviet policy changed - the Russians were seeking confrontation. The Cold
War had begun.77
The Carthaginian peace was aired for the last time in October 1947
when the British and Americans announced an unpopular scheme to
dismantle all industries that had originally been constructed for the war
effort. Adenauer protested, pointing out that industrial production was a
third of pre-war levels. Lord Pakenham also had his doubts about the
fairness of a policy which was reminiscent of the savage demontage in the
Soviet east that had stripped industry down and bled the zone white.
Nacht und Nebel
By 1947 Austria was liberated, but still not free. At the ‘peace
conference’ in Paris the previous autumn that settled matters with the
‘satellite’ states which had been allied to Hitler’s Reich, Austria was not
considered. Austria was a ‘victim’ when it suited the Allies but most of the
time it did not, and the Russians had never really believed in Austrian
innocence.78 For the Austrians the situation was highly frustrating,
especially as 71 per cent of them thought they bore no guilt for the war, and
only 4 per cent were prepared to concede that Nazism had something to do
with them; although at least 8 per cent had been members of the Party and a
million or so had served in the Wehrmacht - and half of those in the savage
war in the east where no one wore kid gloves.
Austria had also been properly turned over to war work. The Danube
had been pressed into service, forty-two airfields and landing strips had
been created and 50,000 Austrians had been involved in building war-
planes. The Russians in particular were keen to show how many concealed
weapons they had found in their zone - evidence that the Austrians were not
trustworthy.79 The Austrians countered that there had been 35,000 Austrian
victims of National Socialism, and 65,000 Jews had lost their lives (the
Jews were generally mentioned when it was deemed convenient). They
talked of their resistance and published their Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch in which
Austria’s anti-Nazi stance was fully documented. Moscow poured cold
water on it, and dubbed it a ‘Viennese Masquerade’ - an allusion to the
farce at the heart of Strauss and Hofmannsthal’s Der Rosenkavalier.80
The Cold War was now revving up and the Soviets were anxious to
hang on to what they had. Attempts to control the police were finally
checked by the Western Allies, but the West was not able to put a stop to
Nazi-style Nacht und Nebel disappearances which claimed around 400
people over three years. An American report on Soviet kidnappings was
submitted on 18 July 1947. The problem became acute that winter when the
Russians were turning up the heat in Berlin. On 12 April 1948 Martin Herz
wrote, ‘Hardly a week passes in Austria without some person disappearing
without trace . . . last seen being invited by uniformed Soviet personnel to
enter a waiting vehicle’.81
The wave began with some Balkan subjects the Russians wanted to talk
to. In May 1947 a woman was removed rolled up in a rug. In December Dr
Paul Katscher, who worked in the Ministry of Transport, was kidnapped as
he passed the statue of Goethe near the Hofburg. The next day he had been
due to speak in Geneva about the number of Austrian railway carriages that
had disappeared in the east. The Russian commander, Kurasov, refused to
allow Figl to comment on Katscher’s disappearance - he was suspected of
being a British agent. Katscher is believed to have perished in a Soviet
prison. Similar charges were levelled against Dr Rafael Spann and Gertaude
Flögl, who were also kidnapped. Another woman, Ernestine Sunisch, was
arrested on the busy Kärtnerring in broad daylight.
By the time the Russians kidnapped Anton Marek, a chief inspector of
police and former Dachau inmate, on 11 June 1948, the Berlin blockade
was in full swing. Marek had annoyed the Soviets by purging the police of
its communist stooges. He was grabbed outside the Ministry of the Interior.
In Russia he was sentenced to the standard twenty-five years, but was
released after seven, at the conclusion of the State Treaty. The gendarmerie
official Johann Kiridus suffered a similar fate. Another civil servant
kidnapped in this way and also released in 1955 was Frau Ottillinger, head
of economic planning. She was taken from the car of her minister, Peter
Krauland. She was not in the Soviet Zone. In 1948 alone it is thought that
around 300 Austrians were the victims of Nacht und Nebel kidnappings.82
A Solution in the East
The GDR was still not a foregone conclusion. There was limited room
for manoeuvre at the beginning, and Stalin hung on for longer than the West
before creating his puppet regime. The French sat in their corner and
clamoured for the Ruhr. The Anglo-Americans had made the first moves
when it came to dividing Germany.83 That the Russians were still making
concessions is clear from Stalin’s meetings with the German Muscovites. At
the end of January 1947 a delegation from the Soviet Zone had visited
Moscow to report to Stalin and Molotov. It contained Pieck, Grotewohl,
Ulbricht, Max Fechner and the interpreter Fred Oelssner. Stalin toyed with
the idea of allowing the SPD back into the Soviet Zone. He was not
impressed by Grotewohl’s opposition to this, which he saw as a sign of
weakness.84
Stalin wanted to know what the SED thought of a referendum on the
future structure of Germany. Was it to become a united state, or a federal
state? Grotewohl estimated a 60 per cent majority for a united state. Stalin
did not think that was enough. He wanted to know if there were not more
people to win over in the west who were prepared to accept a state that
looked east. This idea was at the heart of the pan-German people’s congress
at the beginning of 1948 and led to the creation of the NDPD (the National
Democratic Party of Germany) in the Soviet Zone. Stalin was still keen to
see a structure for all Germany. The KPD was renamed the SED in the
Western Zones, but the West refused to accept the change.
The falling out between the Allies was now plain to see. In Berlin the
Western Allies felt particularly vulnerable, and they were surrounded by
Soviet troops.85 The Soviet plan to erect national German legal jurisdictions
foundered at the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference. The abject failure
of the conference fanned rumours of war. On 6 and 7 December 1947 the
People’s Congress for Unity and Just Peace met in East Berlin. Of the 2,215
delegates, 664 came from the Western zones. Their mandates were dodgy,
in that they had been selected by parties rather than by a popular vote. The
idea was to elect a delegation to go to London to put pressure on the foreign
ministers’ meeting there and call for national unity. A delegation was
elected, but it did not receive permission to enter the United Kingdom.86
Before it broke up, the Congress had issued a manifesto calling for a
central German administration, the nationalisation of industry in the
Western zones and the formation of a united German government once a
formal peace treaty had been signed. A standing committee was also chosen
to prepare for a second congress in March 1948. Such moves were not
rejected out of hand by the Liberal and Christian Democrat parties in the
Western zones. The CDU already possessed a ‘working community’ with
its Eastern sister and was equally keen to see the establishment of national
representation. Even the SPD leadership was prepared to co-operate in
principle. On the other hand they would not work with the SED as long as
the SPD was banned in the Soviet Zone. It was therefore Grotewohl who
stood in the way of progress in this matter, together with the Allied Control
Council. The French once more smelled the unity-rat and were particularly
adamantine in their refusal to allow cross-zonal political activities. Another
negative voice was that of Jakob Kaiser, which prompted the Soviet
authorities to banish him from their zone. The SED were left as the sole
voice behind the 1948 Congress, which effectively destroyed its credibility.
As it was the Congress met on 17-18 March 1948 in East Berlin. There
were 2,000 delegates, 500 of them from the West. The SED presence was
naturally that much stronger, and the percentage of CDU delegates declined
from a quarter to a fifth. The Congress created a German People’s Council
composed of 300 East German members and a hundred from the West. This
was divided into committees, and discussions began on the form of a
constitution for a united German Democratic Republic. There was a repeat
too of Stalin’s call for a plebiscite. There was an immediate negative
response from both the Americans and the French, who refused to recognise
the gathering in Berlin. The British tolerated the Congress but nonetheless
described the suggestion as ‘useless, unnecessary and uncalled for’. With
the Western powers turning their backs on the call for unity, the take-up was
almost completely limited to the Soviet Zone.
The West had already made its decision. A six-power conference
meeting in London in February and March 1948 backed the Marshall Plan:
American finance would help rebuild Western Europe. Germany had to play
its role in this, and could not be plundered for ever. It became clear at the
time that the West already had plans to create a separate German state in its
zones.87 The Russians were naturally angry that discussions were being held
about Germany to which they were not party and called the entire Control
Council into question. They saw the Marshall Plan as the embodiment of
American imperialism. In February 1948 the bourgeois parties were
eliminated from the Czech government, giving a clear signal that the Soviet
Union was consolidating its power within its bloc. All over the east the
Russians began to show their hand - in Romania, Poland, Hungary and
Bulgaria. When a separate German state was mooted at the Second London
Conference that took place between April and June 1948 and a new
currency agreed on 18 June, Germany’s split had been effectively achieved.
OceanofPDF.com
20
The Berlin Airlift and the Beginnings of Economic
Recovery
24 June 1948 With a rattling din yesterday night an
iron curtain fell between Helmstadt and Marienborn.
Ruth Andreas Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, Frankfurt/Main 1985, 236
Three years after the end of the war, Germany was limbering up for
economic recovery. Nineteen-forty-eight was to be the year of German
rehabilitation, but there were political problems to face first. Heinrich Böll’s
early short stories describe the beginnings of business after the war. In
‘Geschäft ist Geschäft’ (Business is Business), a man spots an
acquaintance, a former soldier like himself. After the war they had both
been depressed: ‘We had our old army caps pulled down over our brows,
and when I had a little cash I’d go to him, and we’d have a chat; sometimes
about hunger, sometimes war; and sometimes he gave me a fag, when I was
broke; and I occasionally brought him bread coupons as I was clearing
rubble for a baker at the time.’ Now there he was in a brand-new, white-
painted wooden shop with a corrugated-iron roof at a busy intersection. He
was licensed to sell cigarettes and gobstoppers. He looked well fed. The
man watched as he sent a little girl packing who didn’t have enough
pfennigs for a gobstopper.
The narrator had not done so well. He thought back to the various digs
he had occupied since the end of the war, above all the cellar, which was
not too bad when heated with stolen briquettes. Then the newspapers
learned about it and took photographs and wrote an article on the tragedy of
the returned soldier living in squalor. He had to move. He did occasional
jobs, humping and carrying, or cleaning bricks. At other times he stole:
coal, wood, a loaf of bread. During the war they stole constantly -
somebody stole and the others reaped the reward. Now the same was true
again. He alone was left waiting at the tram-stop, while the others were
already on board heading for their destinations.
He stood watching the man in the booth. The other gave him no sign of
recognition. He watched another man picking up fag-ends. In his POW
camp he had seen colonels doing just that, ‘but this one wasn’t a colonel’.
He was one of the unlucky ones like the narrator. For some people coming
back from the war was like getting off the tram at their stop. The house was
still there, if a bit dusty, there was jam in the cupboard and potatoes in the
cellar. Life went back to normal; the old firm took them back. ‘There was
still medical insurance; you went through the paces of denazification - just
like a man going to the barber to have an annoying beard shaved off’. On
holidays and holy days they could chat about their medals and about acts of
gallantry and come to the conclusion ‘that we were really splendid fellows,
in the end just doing what was required of us’.
In another story, ‘Mein Onkel Fred’ (My Uncle Fred), Böll’s
eponymous hero comes back from the war, possessing nothing but a tin can
containing a few cigarette butts. He demands bread, sleep and tobacco; then
he lies down on the sofa and, complaining it is too small for him, remains
there, scarcely stirring, for months.
The fourteen-year-old narrator is the family breadwinner. His father has
been killed in the war, and his mother has a small pension. The boy’s job
was to take unwanted possessions to the black market, swapping a Dresden
cup for some semolina, three volumes of Gustav Freytag for two ounces of
coffee or a pillow for some bread. Freytag’s brand of German nationalism
must have seemed highly dispensable just after the war. At other times he
stole coal. His mother wept at the thought of this, but did nothing to stop
him.
Meanwhile Uncle Fred snoozed on the sofa. One day his sister - the
boy’s mother - suggested gently that he might enquire whether there was a
position going in his old firm, where he had kept the books. The boy was
sent to find out. He discovered a pile of rubble about twenty feet high.
Uncle Fred was clearly elated when the news was brought to him. He asked
the boy to break open a crate containing his few effects. In it was his
savings book, containing 1,200 marks and a few other objects of trifling
worth and his diploma from the Chamber of Commerce. The boy was told
to collect the cash and sell the rest. He managed to dispose of all but the
diploma, as Uncle Fred’s name had been inscribed with India ink. This
provided enough food for weeks, a considerable relief as the schools had
opened their doors again and the narrator was compelled to finish his
studies.
Uncle Fred rose Lazarus-like from the sofa, shaved and called for clean
underwear. He borrowed the boy’s bicycle and set off for the city. He
returned smelling strongly of wine and armed with a dozen buckets. He had
decided to revive the flower trade in the town. He set up beside the tram
stop and with a shout of ‘Flowers, fresh flowers - no coupons required!’ he
began his new life. Within three weeks he had three dozen buckets and two
branches, and a month later he was paying taxes. It was impossible for the
boy to keep up with his uncle’s progress: there were ever more buckets and
branches, and soon he had colonised the entire town. The boy retired from
his branch of the family business and concentrated on school. A few years
later his uncle was a man of substance in a red car, and the boy was
designated his heir - only he had to go to business school first.
In the spring of 1947 Alfred Döblin paid the first of two visits to the
German capital. It was here he had achieved fame for Berlin-
Alexanderplatz, the most famous novel of the Weimar Republic, and also
the best-known fictionalised account of Berlin life. By his own account,
Döblin entered though the back door. Like Renée Bédarida he landed in
Frohnau in the French Sector. It was a soft introduction, but he had few
illusions: ‘Reality exceeds fantasy.’ He went into the centre, arriving at the
same Stettin Station that had received him and his family when they came
from the Pomeranian port in 1888. He was immediately struck by the vision
of an elegant restaurant with chandeliers and brightly painted shutters.
Outside the signs were in Cyrillic. It was for Russians.1
He went west, arriving in an incongruously elegant flat in the
Kurfürstendamm, in the British Sector. There was a publisher there
(possibly Suhrkamp). ‘I asked what do the people get up to here? I was told
that many sold their possessions, if they still had any, and lived off the
proceeds. One piece after another disappeared in this way. Many dealt on
the black market, very many.’2
The terrible weather was over - it was a sunny day, and they went out to
the Café Wien. There was no coffee to be had, and the ‘cup’ turned out to
be no more than coloured mineral water. Döblin looked for the cinema that
had given the première of the film of his novel Berlin-Alexanderplatz. It
was no more. The fashionable literary café of the Weimar days, the
Romanischen, was open - to the skies. The sheer enormity of the
destruction at last dawned on Döblin. Here was the city he had so ably
chronicled in his novels, and almost all of it was gone: the Wintergarten
with its variety shows, the Viktoria Café. There were no buildings either
side of the Brandenburg Gate. He watched with astonishment as a Russian
soldier walked past the Kranzler Eck with his lover on his arm. A paper
seller gave him what for: ‘As things are going in Europe and the world,
anything is possible, and who knows if, after ten or twenty years, a Russian
soldier and his wife will be walking along the wrecked boulevards of some
western city.’3
Döblin continued his voyage of discovery. On the Schlossbrücke (called
the ‘Dolls’ Bridge’ because of the statues of Prussian worthies) he had
recollections of the various Kaisers. There was little more than the river. On
Alexanderplatz he looked at the great department store Tietz: ‘It looks like a
man who has had his neck broken by a blow, and whose skull has been
pushed down into his ribcage.’ Döblin was bitter. He had converted to
Catholicism, but he could not quite bring himself to bestow mercy on his
former tormentors: “What am I actually doing here . . . They allowed
themselves to be defiled . . . I feel like a man who has been betrayed.’4 In
the Königstrasse he noticed women pushing prams past the wreck of
another Jewish department store, Wertheim - they were filled with wood.
His goal was the Frankfurter Allee, where he had lived and practised: a
popular quarter that provided him with models for his books. ‘The sight was
shocking. A terrible martial violence must have descended to knock these
houses flat . . . Every now and then a façade reported for duty. There the
house must have stood . . . It is no longer what I knew and where I lived.’5
Döblin returned to give a lecture the following year. Berlin made him
uneasy: ‘This was the principal theatre of the horror. This is where the
crime took wings. The nation allowed itself to be deafened by singing youth
and applauding bystanders.’ He was hard on Berlin, a city that was no more
enthusiastic about Hitler than many others. ‘The judgment of history speaks
in a terrible voice.’ But Döblin’s message is one of hope: ‘A man finds it
easier than a city to change. A man may transform himself where a city
crumbles away.’6
Currency Reform
The currency had been chaotic since the end of the war. The Soviets had
simply printed money when they needed it, and this had caused rampant
inflation.7 Nobody trusted cash. Farmers and shopkeepers were placed in a
difficult position. The former avoided the market. The latter ruled over
empty shops in the basements of ruined buildings. Germany’s post-war
planners therefore conceived of a system that would inject confidence into
the currency and wind up the black market and the cigarette economy. They
wanted to create a marketplace where shopkeepers and manufacturers were
kept permanently short of working capital to create a powerful incentive for
rapid turnover and all cash received would promptly be spent on new
goods. The scheme was an instant success. The Germans were often
literally ‘drunk’ with the opportunities it gave them, and the black market
disappeared overnight.8
The first proposals for monetary reform were made in the autumn of
1946. The Reichsmark was pegged at ten to a dollar. Barter markets were
created in order to undermine the illegal black markets where most
Germans did their shopping. In January 1947 Clay believed the new money
to replace the Reichsmark should be centrally printed in Berlin, but there
were doubts about the Russians. As it was, the cigarette economy had its
own ways of regulating itself. The price of a twenty-cent packet of
cigarettes was RM120, which remained the same for six months even in
Berlin. French cigarettes were a third of that sum. A month’s shopping
amounted to only RM50. A dollar was worth 600 marks, so six marks
bought you a cigarette. In the Rhineland Elena Skrjabina was able to buy a
lorry with a suitcase filled with cigarettes.9 With rumours that the old
money was shortly to go, there was frenzied buying to get rid of potentially
worthless currency. In May 1948 the price of a pound of strawberries had
gone down to RM25 and cherries were now at 12. The pubs were filled with
Berliners drinking away their reserves. Elena Skrjabina’s Bendorf shop was
doing a roaring trade.10
The problem was that the new money did not come, and the prices
began to rise again. On 16 June a pound of coffee cost 2,400 marks. Two
days later the word was out that the new currency was to be called the
‘Deutsche Mark’. On 25 June 1948 currency reform was introduced in the
Western zones. The old money would be exchanged at a rate of one-tenth of
the new, though for a while the two currencies ran side by side. The SBZ
had been excluded from monetary reform because the Russians could not
have been trusted to print the right amounts.11 By June 1948 Ludwig Erhard
had made arrangements to print 500 tons of banknotes in the US and have
them airlifted to Frankfurt. Virtually all rationing and price controls were
abolished. Clay told him that his advisers had said that the move was a
terrible mistake. Erhard replied: ‘Herr General, pay no attention to them.
My own advisers tell me the same thing.’12
The Soviet answer was immediate. That same day the Russian
commander Sokolovsky required the SBZ to introduce ‘immediate and
necessary measures to protect the interests of the German population and
the economy of the Soviet Zone’.13 The Russians acted that night: passenger
trains were halted, and at the beginning of July they cut the city off
completely from the West.et
In the meantime shops in the Western zones filled with goods; black
markets disappeared; people ceased to ‘hamster’; and production increased.
The atmosphere changed too. Every man, woman and child received DM60
in two instalments, and they all set out on shopping sprees. Ruth Friedrich’s
friend Frank reported from Munich that the shops were crammed with food
and that no one spoke of calories any more, because they all had enough to
eat.14 Clay wrote to his guru Byrnes to complain about the British and the
French, who had dragged their feet over the currency reform. Clay could
report the immediate benefits: ‘Overnight hoarded goods appeared on the
shelves as the stores had to sell to meet pay-rolls . . . even fruits and
vegetables from the farm once more went on sale in the market place.’ In
one month productivity had risen by 10 per cent.
In Hehlen the Schulenburgs were now the proud possessers of DM280,
but Charlotte still didn’t know where the next tranche of money would
come from. There was a knock at the door and her faithful cook and maid
Klara came in wearing a white apron. Charlotte handed her DM40, and
Klara said, ‘I want to tell her ladyship something, I don’t want any more
money.’ When Charlotte replied that she had none to give her for the time
being, the maid said, ‘I am doing this for his lordship’s sake.’ She meant:
you don’t have to thank me.15
Crisis in Berlin
Döblin’s second visit marked the moment of change in Berlin. From
June 1947 the city had a new mayor in Ernst Reuter, a former communist
and intimate of Lenin’s who had gone over to the socialists in the 1920s and
had emigrated to Turkey on the arrival of the Nazis. He had returned to
Germany in November 1946 and taken a British train from Hanover to
Berlin at the end of the month. On 5 December he was elected to the
council. It was a bad moment to start, just before the killer winter. The
council worked just half the day, as the offices could not be heated.16 The
Russians vetoed his election as mayor, because, they said, Turkey was a
fascist country. Louise Schroeder had to take his place meanwhile. Stalin
was looking to find a way of preventing the Western Allies from creating
their own Germany. It was the policy that Bob Murphy called ‘irritate and
tire’ - wear down the West.17 Come what may, the Russians would force the
Western Allies out. Molotov made it sound like ‘them or us’: ‘If we are to
lose in Germany we would have lost the war.’18 Everything short of military
force was to be used. The Russians were constantly probing and pushing,
spreading rumours that the Western Allies were about to pack their bags.
They invaded the railway offices in the US Zone, but the Americans
resisted and they backed off. They made applications to the Americans for
any of their citizens hiding in their sector.19
Currency reform was the pretext, but it wasn’t really about that. The
Soviets saw the chance of making the Western Allies abandon Berlin,
thereby losing their attraction to the Germans, or forcing them to drop the
London programme for a separate state, or obliging them to return to the
grand alliance as embodied in the CFM mechanism.20 There was fear in
some quarters that the Russians would succeed.21 Clay for one was looking
for a showdown:
I doubt very much if this action would imperil the quadripartite
machinery. If it should, we still force the Russians to slam the door and
even if they did slam the door, we should still continue in Berlin.
However, we cannot continue successfully unless we establish a
governmental machinery for western Germany. The resentment of the
Germans against colonial administration is increasing daily and those
democratic Germans who hate communism and would prefer to
establish the types and kind of government which we desire will soon
lose their positions of leadership with their own people.
He told the under-secretary of the army, William Draper, that ‘two and a
half years without government is much too long’. On 5 November 1947 he
said that a provisional government would be established no later than 31
January 1948.22
The others were not so sure. General Robertson was for appeasement.
The French even considered allowing the Russians the stake in the Ruhr
they coveted so much.23 Clay was right that the Russians were not actually
looking for a fight. They wanted to humiliate the West by offering to
provision all the Berliners. That way they would win their love. The
Berliners certainly did march on their stomachs, and their stomachs were
empty. The Russians were going to keep the air corridors open and avoid
military confrontations. They made no preparations for a military
emergency. Nor was the Western bluff that convincing: the bombers the
Americans sent to Britain were not configured for atom bombs.24
From 23 February 1948 the London Conference was debating just this
question. The Russians had jumped off the CFM carousel at the end of the
previous year. They were not invited to London. In their absence and in the
imposing setting of India House the foreign ministers of Britain, Belgium,
France, Holland, Luxembourg and the United States were giving form to
the state of West Germany. On 17 March the Brussels Pact was signed as
the first step towards NATO. The terms were leaked to the Soviets by
Donald Maclean on the same day the Prague coup took place. Most of the
Western ministers were convinced that the time had come to split Germany
in two, but the French held aloof for the time being. They thought the
Russians would prevent it. They only reluctantly agreed to the idea of West
Germany because of Prague and because Sokolovsky walked out of the
Control Council on the 20th. Couve de Murville, the French foreign
minister, began to panic and decided there would be a fresh war within
three years.25
Howley had been made American commandant at the Kommandatura
on 1 December 1947. He was looking forward to a scrap too. He called his
British counterpart, General Herbert, ‘shockingly defeatist’. When the
Russians cut off the city in June, Herbert predicted that that would drive the
Westerners out by October.26 He might have been conscious of just how
weak the West was. In a reply to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge dated 5 March
1948, Clay detailed the strength of the American forces in Berlin - there
were fewer than 2,000 soldiers. ‘It is obviously our desire to retain as small
as garrison as possible.’ The Americans also had some German police
auxiliaries, as the Russian-backed Markgraf Police (run by Paul Markgraf )
were not meant to function in the American Zone.27
On 18 March there was cause for a little celebration in Berlin. It was the
centenary of the March Revolution of 1848 which had brought a brief
triumph to the cause of the German middle classes, before they joined the
more reactionary nobility and rallied behind Bismarck and the Empire. A
crowd of 30,000 gathered at the ruined Reichstag. There were speeches
from Franz Neumann of the SPD, Jakob Kaiser of the CDU and the mayor-
elect, Ernst Reuter. Reuter alluded to the events in Prague. ‘Who will be
next?’ he asked. Berlin would be next. ‘If the world knows this we will not
be abandoned by the world.’28
The situation was worsening with each month. There were no barriers
between the sectors, and those fleeing the Russians could try to disappear in
the west of the city in the hope of finding a way out to the West. On 25
March the journalist Dieter Friede disappeared in a Nacht und Nebel
kidnapping. The Soviet authorities later justified their actions by claiming
that he was a spy. The ‘Mini Blockade’ was next. It began on 31 March and
lasted until 2 April. The SBZ’s policy was improvised.29 This time it was
provoked by an Anglo-American refusal to allow the Russians to board
their military trains.30 One of these crossed the Soviet Zone daily. There
were also several freight trains every week, thirty-two daily ‘paths’ - or
crossings - to supply the garrison and the Germans and a daily passenger
aircraft. It was a warning shot, a trial run. Three days later, on 2 April, the
Allied Kommandatura was dissolved. More disappearances followed. Some
200,000 people were reported to have been forcibly taken to the USSR
since the end of the war. The Berliners felt particularly vulnerable once
again. The Russian-backed SED launched a propaganda campaign in the
Western sectors.31
The Soviets had shown their hand in the communist takeover in Prague
in February and Jan Masaryk’s suspicious death the following month. They
were now openly demonstrating what was in store for their bloc. Truman
understood that Berlin needed to be held for propaganda purposes; it was
also necessary to stop the flow of communism west. ‘If we failed to
maintain our position there, communism would gain great strength among
the Germans.’32 Like Clay he gave the Germans no credit for being able to
make up their own minds.
Prague brought the French down to earth. It was timely that Robert
Schuman was president of the council, and possessed the sort of wise head
France needed at the time. In March Koenig met Clay and Robertson in
Berlin for talks on the German constitution and the French merging with
Bizonia to form Trizonia. Koenig became predictably uppity at the idea of a
‘Reichstag’. On 6 April Couve de Murville flew to Germany to see Clay.
He was concerned that Berlin might fall to the Russians. They also
discussed currency reform. When the Russians did move to cut Berlin off
from the west, the French foreign minister Bidault stressed that for the sake
of Allied prestige there could be no backing down. Schuman, who had
begun his political career in Germany, insisted that Berlin was a symbol that
could not be abandoned. It was not thought politic that any French soldiers
should die for Berlin, however, and the French air force was kept out of the
operation, the excuse being that it was too weak - which was probably
true.33
Airlift
Russian ‘milk snatchers’ formed the pretext for the airlift. The Russians
were supposed to provide food for the entire population of Berlin, although
the Western Allies donated the flour. To this end the Russians had 7,000
cows in suburban farms. In the early summer of 1948 they cut off the milk.
Berliners were obliged to go to the east in lorries to collect it. The American
medical officer reported to Howley: ‘Unless we get fresh milk, six thousand
babies in our sector will be dead by Monday.’ Three years before, the
Anglo-Americans had had fewer scruples about infant mortality. Howley
saw Russian uncooperativeness as an attempt to intimidate the Americans
and ordered in 200 tons of condensed milk and another 150 tons of
powdered milk. Howley proudly reported that not one baby died in his
sector.34
Clay thought he might keep his meagre garrison alive, but not the
Germans. The Soviet attempt to prevent the Western Allies from reaching
their sectors of the city provoked a discussion between Clay and Robertson
on the legitimate response. The British decided they would not shoot if the
Americans did not. ‘I believe this [the Russian move] is bluff,’ wrote Clay,
‘but do not wish to bluff back as British may be doing unless we mean it
[sic].’35 The American secretary of the army, General Kenneth Royall,
thought the president should send Stalin a note. He was not certain how
serious the situation had become. Clay replied, ‘I do not believe this means
war but any failure to meet this squarely will cause great trouble.’ He added
that he would rather go to Siberia than abandon Berlin. The Soviets were
now challenging the Western Allies’ right to be in Berlin in the first place.
Clay cited the EAC agreement made during the war, by which the German
capital would be administered by the three powers. Added to this there was
the oral agreement with Zhukov of 5 June 1945 and ‘three years of
application’. The right to provision the city and its Western garrisons was
governed by mostly tacit or oral agreements.36
Clay was not prepared to put up with hair-splitting: ‘Legalistic argument
no longer has meaning . . . our reply will not be misunderstood by 42
million Germans and perhaps 200 million West Europeans. We must say,
we think, as our letter does, “this far you may go and no further.” There is
no middle ground which is not appeasement.’37 Clay continued to see the
idea of the Russians inspecting trains as the thin end of the wedge: the
‘integrity of our trains is a part of our sovereignty’. It was a ‘symbol of our
position in Germany and in Europe’. When the Anglo-Americans put the
Russian ‘bluff’ to the test the Soviet authorities would not let them cross the
SBZ without prior inspection. The managers of the trains all refused bar one
American, who panicked and let the Russians on board. The decision was
made to switch to aircraft.38
That was also not without difficulties at first. On 5 April a Soviet Yak
fighter dived under a scheduled British BEA Vickers Viking aircraft as it
came into land at Gatow. As it rose it took off the starboard wing of the
Viking. Both planes crashed, killing the fifteen British and American
passengers and crew together with the pilot of the Yak. Robertson called for
fighter protection for the transports and immediately went to see
Sokolovsky in protest. The Russian commander was adamant that the pilot
had had no orders from him to buzz the British plane. He would not direct
the Soviet air force to molest flights in the corridor. Robertson was satisfied
with his answer and called off the escort. Later the Russians showed a
similar docility when there were complaints about the positioning of a
barrage balloon. No one wanted to take responsibility for war.39
Clay was not going to budge. There was little or no freight for the time
being, as it required permission from the Russians, ‘which I will not
request’. The British had their own aircraft, but the French had ‘no air
transport worthy of the name’ even if, for the time being, they were happy
to keep their small force in Berlin. Clay was still stubbornly determined:
‘We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige
in Germany and Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol
of American intent.’40
The balloon went up again when the Russians walked out of the
Kommandatura on 17 June, Howley was relieved. They claimed that there
was an urgent need to repair the roads near Magdeburg and the bridges over
the Elbe, which therefore had to be closed. On 22 June the price of coffee
had risen to RM3,000, bread was at 200 and a single Chesterfield was 65.41
On the 24th the motorway was blocked between Berlin and Helmstedt.42
Only military convoys were allowed to pass. They also cut off supplies of
gas and electricity to the Western sectors of the city. Ruth Friedrich noted in
her diary that an ‘iron curtain’ had abruptly fallen between Helmstadt and
Marienborn.43 ‘We poor little Berlin mice!’ They had spent all their money,
and the Russians were doing their best to prevent the new currency from
crossing their zone. ‘In the end the entirety of Berlin had harmed their
stomachs in the prospect of currency reform.’44 The new currency was
issued in the Western zones on 25 June at 7.00 a.m. That same day the
Russians stopped the supply of brown coal to the city. From 7 July coal
would also have to be brought in by air. ‘I do not expect armed conflict,’
wrote Clay; the ‘principal danger is from Russian-planned communist
groups out looking for trouble’. For such a propagandist, he was
surprisingly worried about the behaviour of the Berliners: ‘Perhaps the
greatest danger comes from the amazing resistance of the Berlin population.
This is driving the Soviet administration and the SED to further extreme
measures.’45
‘June 24 1948’, wrote Howley grandiloquently, ‘is one of the most
infamous dates in the history of civilisation. The Russians tried to murder
an entire city to gain a political advantage.’46 There were 2,250,000
Germans in the Western sectors, and just 6,500 soldiers to protect them. The
Russians had 18,000 men in their sector and another 300,000 stationed in
their zone.47 In order to stress the weakness of the Western powers the
Russians began military manoeuvres. Bevin, who (as opposed to Attlee)
was running the show in London, chipped in by inviting the Americans to
station B-29 bombers in Britain. It was hoped that this gesture would
concentrate the Russians’ minds, even if there was no provision for their
carrying nuclear weapons. Britain was rapidly becoming a client nation of
the United States.48
The Berlin airlift began on 26 June. The idea came from the British. Air
Commodore Reginald Waite proposed a scheme to supply the civilians as
well as the garrisons. He and Robertson took the scheme to Clay, who up
until then had preferred the idea of a convoy.49 General John Cannon was
responsible for the name ‘Operation Vittles’. Ruth Friedrich noted the
change: ‘The skies are buzzing as they did during the Blitz. For the time
being the American military authorities have increased air traffic to Berlin
to a maximum.’50 The density was to increase. At first the excuse was the
need to provision the American and other Allied garrisons, then Clay made
it clear that the Soviets would not be allowed to starve the Berliners in the
Western sectors. For eleven months American C-47s (‘Gooney Birds’,
which the Berliners called ‘Rosinenbomber’ or raisin bombers) and C-54s,
as well as British cargo planes, under the command of the American Major-
General Tunner and the Briton Air Marshal Williams flew in 4,000 tons of
food daily. British Sunderland flying boats landed on the Havel, bringing
much needed salt from Hamburg. At the height of Operation Vittles, 13,000
tons of food was delivered in twenty-four hours.
British planes left Frassberg for Gatow, while the Americans flew from
Wiesbaden to Tempelhof. The Americans operated two-thirds of the flights,
the British the rest. West Berlin was the prize won for the new, Allied-
backed West German state.51 Clay wanted to know if American service
families should be flown to safety. Truman advised against it, saying that it
would have a bad ‘psychological effect’. Clay agreed to make ‘emergency
arrangements for essential supplies’.52 The political nature of the blockade
was swiftly understood by Truman. It was fully in keeping with his
doctrine: this far but no further. He told Clay to make the blockade-busting
formal. The humanitarian aspect was important, but so was access to the
former capital. On 26 June Truman directed that the airlift be put on a full-
scale organised basis. Every available aircraft was to be used.53 The same
day the Russians introduced Order 111 which created their own currency.
This took the form of coupons attached to existing banknotes. The coupons
were stuck on with glue made from the ubiquitous potato. On the fourth
exchange it fell off. The Berliners were quick to dub them Tapetenmark or
wallpaper money. The new notes were ready on 26 July.
The SBZ authorities were credited with saying they were going to ‘Dry
out the Western Sector as we would tie a tourniquet around a wart.’54 On 26
June it was reported that the Americans could provision the city for another
thirty days. News was transmitted by the RIAS (Radio in American Sector)
van. Ruth Friedrich remarked on the ‘frustration of being at the centre of
the world stage and yet only [having] the chance to be informed of this
between twelve midnight and two o’clock in the morning’. Meanwhile an
aircraft flew over her head every eight minutes. 55
On 28 June American soldiers arrested Sokolovsky - allegedly by
mistake - for speeding in their sector. He identified himself, but they still
held him for an hour. Sokolovsky told Robertson that the blockade was
about the currency, and he could draw his own conclusions. The Russian
was unconvinced by the game his countrymen were playing in Berlin.
Rumours flew this way and that. Clay was later told that the Russians
intended to put up barrage balloons to impede landing.56 When the first
proper banknotes were issued in the east, the SBZ further exacerbated the
plight of the westerners by making them go deep into their sector to convert
their old coupons. The dollar was now worth DM28, and a flight to the
West cost $28. No one had DM784. Anyone who might be able to scrape
together such a princely sum had left. Even Ruth Friedrich, who had
endured the worst of it, now thought it was time to go.
Clay’s airlift was as much a propaganda success as the Soviet blockade
was an own goal. In West Berlin and Western Germany the wholly negative
picture of Soviet aims never disappeared. The crisis also accelerated the
polarisation of the two sides. Otto Grotewohl addressed the SED Central
Committee on 30 June to affirm his clear commitment to an ‘Eastern
orientation’, even if this did not change the Party’s policy on unity.57
Currency anarchy continued. The Eastern ‘coupon mark’ was now worth
ten Reichsmarks. It could also be used in the Western sectors, but not for
everything. A money market grew up around the Zoo Station. Certain
currencies were used for different goods: matches were paid for with
Western money; onions half and half; raisins Western; sugar Eastern. You
bought a newspaper with Eastern money, but the printing had to be paid for
with Western currency.58
The Western authorities prevented the new currency from reaching
Berlin, but the SBZ did not call off the blockade. ‘Technical problems’ had
required the closing of land routes and waterways to Berlin. As Lucius Clay
put it, ‘the technical difficulties would last until the Western Powers buried
their plans for a West German government’.59 On 2 July the Russians cut off
the water to the Western sectors, claiming the need to repair the locks.
Howley pointed out that water was needed to make bread, although once
again he was unclear about how much.60
A great disappointment to the Berliners was the craven behaviour of
Wilhelm Furtwängler, who cancelled his appearance with the Berlin
Philharmonic Orchestra on 7 July 1948. The conductor was due to direct the
orchestra in Potsdam with American soloists. He evidently thought it would
be too risky, even though the Americans had agreed to lay on the transport.
The Berliners had to be satisfied with Leopold Ludwig.61 As a result of the
airlift, the Russian-occupied Radio Station could no longer be used.
Eventually the Soviet authorities gave up their island in the British Sector
and built themselves a new station in Adlershorst in their own fief. The next
day the blockade claimed its first life when an American Dakota crashed.
The second crash occurred two weeks later on the 25th when a C-47
ploughed into a house in Friedenau killing the crew.62
On 14 July the Russians dropped all pretence about ‘technical
difficulties’. 63 A week later a plane was landing every three minutes, but
the situation was dire, and in November and December the operation was
often hampered by fog, even if the weather miraculously improved when
the food situation was at its worst. Radar allowed some planes to land. The
lack of landing space had meant that the French airstrip at Tegel was being
rapidly made ready for aircraft. As many as 17,000 men were working on
the runway, on the promise of a hot meal every day. Berliners received at
best a couple of hours’ electricity at day, and often had to wait until the
middle of the night to cook. The short-lived burst of electric light brought
the same sort of euphoria as a glass of wine. The lucky ones lived in an
Allied-occupied building. They had power and light.64
On 23 July Clay reported to Truman in the White House. It was not
going to be a repeat of Potsdam. Truman was not to be bamboozled. He
returned to the idea of supplying the city by armed convoys. Clay was not
so keen, but he did not think the Russians were prepared to go to war.65 In
America voices were raised calling for a break with the Russians. ‘These
people did not understand that our choice was only between negotiations
and war,’ Truman said. ‘There was no third way.’66 The real reason for the
blockade must have become obvious to all and sundry on 27 July when the
Conference of Foreign Ministers in London decided that they had agreed on
the creation of a West German state. All that was needed now was a ‘basic
law’ to serve as a constitution. The basic law (Grundgesetz) would be
ratified by the provincial assemblies or Landtage. There would be no vote
in the east, as the ministers had decided the people were not free to express
their opinions and might vote against. Clay concluded once again that the
Germans needed the responsibility of self-government. Germany was to
have its own administration before the peace treaty. This little bombshell
made the Western Allies reconsider evacuating some Berliners who might
otherwise have been abducted.67
The West had finally had enough of the Soviet-controlled Markgraf
Police and on 26 July organised their own force under Johannes Stumm,
Markgraf’s former deputy. Three-quarters of the Markgraf Police promptly
deserted to the Stumm. When on 29 July the Magistrat or town council tried
to meet at the Red Rathaus they were met by SED members chanting, ‘We
want just one currency!’ Members of the council were intimidated and
beaten up, and Western policemen were carried off by SED thugs. One who
was manhandled was Jeanette Wolff, a Jewess who had survived two
concentration camps. She was called a ‘Judensau’ ( Jewish pig) in the
Rathaus carpark. ‘I have only one life to lose, and this life belongs to
freedom,’ she exclaimed. The communist stooges stormed the council
chamber. The future author of Berlin’s constitution, Otto Suhr, refused to
begin the session until they left. Louise Schröder, standing in for Reuter,
told the communists to be reasonable, and to go home and listen to the
session on the radio. The SED men withdrew. ‘The storming of the Bastille’
was over.68
Berlin was sealed off by road, rail and water. Contingency plans were
made to withdraw the Allied armies to the Rhine. On 2 August Stalin said
he would lift the blockade if both Eastern and Western marks were allowed
to circulate freely throughout Berlin. It was also the ‘insistent wish’ of the
Soviet government that the Allies ‘postpone the next stages planned in the
integration of the Western Zones’. The Russians admitted that the West was
in Berlin ‘on sufferance’, but would not concede that it was ‘there by
right’.69 The next day Clay said he was prepared to compromise on the
currency issue. Molotov wanted more: on 10 August he demanded control
of exports from the Western sectors. Clay told Washington to reject this
request.70 In the meantime the Markgraf police were being increasingly
tough on people seeking Western currency. On the 12th they arrested 320
on the Potsdamer Platz. On the 24th Stalin changed his mind, and once
again requested the withdrawal of the currency, but the West said no: it had
been a success. That same day there was a mid-air collision between two C-
47s. Both crews perished.71
The four military governors met on 1 September. Sokolovsky was
concerned that the air transports might be used to flood Berlin with new
Deutsche Marks. Three days later the Russian commander came clean: the
restrictions were the result of the London Conference and were aimed at the
splitting of eastern and west Germany’.72 Berliners were getting by with
dried potatoes and other vegetables and tinned meat. The suicide rate rose
again. There were now around seven a day. Sokolovsky also announced that
the Soviet Union would start air-force manoeuvres over Berlin on the 6th.
This was, he said, normal practice for this time of the year. Clay noted in
his report to Washington, ‘This is amusing since in the four summers we
have been in Berlin we have never heard of these manoeuvres previously.’
Robertson expressed the hope that the Soviet manoeuvres would not
interfere with the air corridor. Sokolovsky replied, ‘Certainly.’ Clay was not
certain whether that meant ‘Certainly yes’ or ‘Certainly no’.73
On 6 September there was an attempted coup d’état at the Stadthaus.
Clay naturally had a report of the new outrage:
Meanwhile their [that is, the Soviets’] tactics in Berlin are getting
rough. Yesterday a communist mob prevented City Assembly from
meeting. It manhandled three American reporters at the scene. Today a
well-organised mob was on hand again. The deputy mayor foolishly
took forty-odd plain clothes men from western sectors to keep order.
Uniformed police of the Soviet sector under direct orders of Soviet
officer started to arrest them. They rushed into offices of three western
liaison representatives where some are still at siege. However, Soviet
sector police broke into our office and led about twenty of the poor
devils off to death or worse.
Pride is a cheap commodity, thank God, or I could never hold my
head up. We are being pushed around here like we were a fourth class
nation. My impulse was to send our military police in to restore order
as Americans were being pushed around by Germans.
Clay thought there would be more ‘inspired rioting in western sectors’.
Robertson was optimistic. Clay was not.74
The meeting was the last one held in the Red Rathaus. As the Western
delegates were unable to make it through the Soviet Sector they met in the
Taberna Academica on the Steinplatz in the British Sector instead. The
Russians responded by kidnapping some of Stumm’s men, and the
intimidation did not stop there: even Howley suffered from anonymous
nocturnal telephone calls.
In Washington General Draper expressed concern. Clay thought there
would be more of these Goebbels-style ‘spontaneous demonstrations’. ‘I
think mob-violence is prelude to Soviet-picked city government taking over
the city; then spreading mob-violence into western sectors.’ When Clay
protested to Sokolovsky’s deputy Kotikov on 8 September the Russian said
the ‘mob’ were workers proceeding legitimately to the town hall. The
Western police had attempted to stop them. He accused the American MPs
of being drunk and disorderly.75 In fact Sokolovsky was innocent of the
outrage, which had been organised by Tulpanov and Ulbricht off their own
bats.76
The Westerners responded with a massive demonstration of support for
democracy before the Reichstag on 9 September. ‘On Thursday hundreds of
thousands of Berliners demonstrated on the Platz der Republik for
democratic freedom and against the shocking events at the Stadthaus . . .
women deserted their cookers, hairdressers left their clients in the lurch
under their wave machines and the newspaper-sellers closed up shop. All of
them ran thinking I must demonstrate; we belong to the West. We must
prove it.’77
The response had been impressive: 300,000 Germans staged an anti-
communist rally. The Berliners were rallied by their mayor, Reuter. Before
the ruined Reichstag he told them, ‘Look at this city and admit that you
cannot abandon it!’ The city under siege became the symbol of moral
renaissance and contributed greatly to German rehabilitation.78 The red flag
was torn down. Fifteen-year-old Wolfgang Scheunemann was killed and
222 people injured when the Russians fired into the crowd. The volleys
ceased, however, when the British deputy provost calmly walked over to the
Russians and pushed them away with his swagger-stick.79 The Russians
took it out on five men they had arrested at the scene. On 9 September these
unfortunates were sentenced to twenty-five years’ hard labour.80
Clay was slow to see the significance of the Reichstag demonstration.
He noted that a communist counter-demonstration was planned for the
Soviet sector. He seemed doubtful of the wisdom of the British in issuing a
permit for the rally. ‘The huge attendance was I am sure a great surprise
even to the Germans and led the German political leaders to inflammatory
speeches.’ Clay thought they were ‘playing with dynamite’. He saw a risk
of the whole business blowing up in their faces - such demonstrations
‘could turn into mass-meetings against the occupying powers and could
develop into the type of mob government which Hitler played so well to get
into power’. He concluded that it had set ‘a dangerous, habit-forming
precedent’.81
Accidents continued to occur. The British crashed an Avro York on 20
September killing five, and a month later a C-54 went down in Frankfurt.
But the situation had now become static. The Allies needed to bring in a
minimum of 4,500 tons a day, though 5,500 were ideal. As it was there
were days when the tonnage reached 8,000. It was now a question of who
would back down first. ‘The airlift has been a magnificent success and can
keep us in Berlin through the winter. As long as we pursue diplomatic
means to gain a settlement the airlift adds to our prestige.’ Clay still had
acute reservations about the French and apparently had problems with the
Labour government in Britain: ‘Our difficulties with the French continue.
Neither is being in partnership with the British a bed of roses.’82
While the blockade was in force neither Bevin nor Marshall would
communicate with the Soviets. The Soviet foreign minister had stayed away
from the meeting of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in September. The
Western powers decided that the case would be referred to the United
Nations.83 Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinsky in New York
denied the existence of a blockade or any threat to peace. Meanwhile the
Soviets were also trying their hand at propaganda by broadcasting their own
peace plans from Moscow. They offered an all-German government, a
formal peace treaty, a united Germany west of the Oder-Neisse Line, four-
power control of the Ruhr, higher industrial output and, most important of
all, higher rations.84 The Americans, however, had a new trick up their
sleeves. They were going to win over the children: Harry King, the
president of the confectioners Huylers, had obtained ten tons of sweets and
some parachutes, and on 26 October Clay saw the chance for some
excellent propaganda. The ‘morale value would be real if candy could be
flown out’.85 This was the cue for Operation Little Vittles when airman
Lieutenant Gail Halvorsen’s ‘Candy Bombers’ dropped packets of sweets
for the children by parachute into Berlin. Some even fell in the Eastern
Sector.
The new airfield at Tegel opened on 5 November when the top brass
flew in. The French commander General Jean Ganeval thanked his workers
for their ‘almost Egyptian labour’.86 The city was suffering from TB, with
84,000 recorded cases. By November the Magistrat was divided in two with
the Soviet Sector meeting in the Red Rathaus and the Western sectors
meeting in the town hall in Schönefeld. The situation was formalised on 1
December. Clay predicted that the Berlin elections that were due to take
place on 5 December ‘will almost certainly result in a split city’. It was a
chance to take back the promise of abiding by the Soviet-inspired Eastern
mark. This would ‘necessitate immediate issue of western currency’. Clay’s
prediction came true that time.87 As Germany polarised, so did Berlin. In
the East they elected a mayor to be the counterpart of Reuter in the West. It
was Friedrich Ebert, ‘a fat, repulsive man’ according to Howley,88 who was
to remain in the post for twenty years.
The process of making two Berlins was accelerated by the
establishment of a ‘Free University’ in the buildings of the old Kaiser
Wilhelms Gesellschaft in Dahlem, with General Clay’s blessing. The
pretext was provided when the Soviet-backed authorities at the Humboldt
University in the Linden had expelled three students, Otto Hess, Joachim
Schwarz and Otto Stolz, although all three were wholly above board, and
Hess had the added advantage of Jewish blood. Clay wanted the new
university to open its doors by the autumn.89 The Allies distributed coal that
December. Each household received 18 kilos, and those with children were
allocated four times that amount. In the woods 120,000 cubic metres of
trees were felled to provide fuel. Even this largesse was hardly able to stave
off the cold of Yuletide in Berlin, and as many as 2,000 Berliners died of
cold and hunger that winter. It was second only to the winter of 1946-7.
General Ganeval brought the French glory in the long run. The antennas
of the Soviet-controlled Radio Berlin posed a danger on landing and take-
off at Tegel. Ganeval decided to seize the initiative. He requested that the
directors of the radio remove the masts as being a danger to planes. When
they did nothing, Ganeval coolly blew them up at 10.45 on the morning of
16 December. The Russian General Kotikov was furious, and demanded to
know how he could have done such a thing. The Frenchman replied, ‘With
the help of dynamite and French sappers.’90 The Russians exacted their
revenge by making off with the outlying village of Stolpe, which up to then
had lain in the French Sector.91
At Christmas the SED leadership was summoned to Moscow. On his
return Pieck announced that the East was not ready to embrace popular
democracy. There were no immediate plans to create an East German state.
Stalin made it clear that it was not just the Western orientation that needed
to be fought in Germany, he wanted the Americans out.92 In West Berlin
they had a treat in the form of a visit by Bob Hope and the aptly named
Irving Berlin. The stars performed at the Titania Palast in Steglitz. At the
end of the year electricity was pumped out between 11 p.m. and 0.30 a.m.
to allow the Berliners to welcome the New Year.93
It was in January 1949 that the diarist Speer alluded to the airlift for the
first time. He noted that the Alliance had broken down and that had led to
the blockading of the roads to Berlin: ‘day and night transport planes roar
over our building’. They were on their way to the British airfield at Gatow
near by. As they toiled in the garden, the Spandau Seven wondered what the
events meant for them. They came to the conclusion that they would be
handed back to the countries that captured them. Speer was comforted by
the idea he would be returned to the British.94 It meant no such thing: the
only real effect it had on the men was that their wives were unable to pay
them visits because they could not reach Berlin.95
The battle for Berlin had descended into mud-slinging. The Russians
condemned the Anglo-Americans for the barbaric bombing of Dresden.
Clay again saw the possibility of propaganda: he seemed to recall that the
bombing had been carried out ‘at the specific request of Red Army’. He
wanted to know if there were any written communications along those lines
that might be leaked.96 On 30 March, Moscow decided that Sokolovsky had
failed and had him replaced by Vassily Chuikov. The Western Allies had no
more problems dealing with the emergency:97 the Russians might as well let
the trains run unmolested.
George Kennan visited Berlin on 12 March that year. He went to stay at
Harnack House in Dahlem, once part of the Kaiser Wilhelms Gesellschaft;
the Americans had taken it over as a social club that mirrored Marlborough
House in the British Sector. The city was not a pretty sight. Not only was it
still ruinous, but it was dead - ‘a ghost of its former self’. Harnack House
was one of the few places that was still alive. It was ‘like a garish honkey-
tonkey that has stayed open too late in a sleepy provincial town. It was
Saturday night . . . A German band was faithfully whacking out American
dance tunes which they knew by heart. The faces of the musicians were
drawn and worn . . .’ Kennan observed a major studying the bill of fare:
‘Look what’s on de menu. Tuna fish. Tuna fish, for God’s sake. We been
feedin’ it to our dog. He don’t even like it any more. He jes’ looks at me
and says: jeez, tuna fish again.’98
He went to see the mayor. Reuter told him, ‘this is the hardest time of
the year. Fresh food is at its lowest. The grippe season was upon them. But
morale could be maintained as long as we Americans evidenced
determination to remain.’ Kennan learned that, contrary to all appearances,
the housing situation in Berlin was far from being the worst in Germany.
Berlin had lost 40 per cent of its accommodation, but it had also seen a 25
per cent drop in its population. When the airlift reached a consistent 8,000
tons a day the Russians would have to concede. That night there was a
colonial-style dinner party. The conversation addressed ‘the price of
antiques, the inadequacies of servants, and the availability of cosmetics at
the PX’.99
During the eleven months of the airlift, Berlin had returned to wartime
conditions. There was an evening curfew, and lack of gas and electricity
obliged its inhabitants to live by candlelight and eat the dehydrated food
provided by the Western Allies. The city was deserted in the evenings and
there was no street lighting. There was no work. The Russians decided to
drop their demands for the scrapping of the new Deutsche Mark, but they
still insisted that the West cease its attempts to create a West German state.
The Russian blockade failed. The Soviet operation had been both a waste of
time and a loss of face. One recent historian has called it ‘a harvest of
blunders’.100 On the night of 11-12 May 1949 road traffic was resumed.
‘Hurrah, we’re still alive!’ shouted the grateful Berliners, who were driven
into the arms of the West in gratitude. One of the main streets of Berlin-
Zehlendorf was renamed in Clay’s honour. The Anglo-Americans could
now congratulate themselves that they were winning the propaganda battle
for Berlin. The citizens of the former capital were turning against
communism. Even the slowest Germans now began to understand that they
were best off with the Western Allies. Not all West Berliners, however,
supported the American and British action, and 120,000 of them registered
for food rations in the East. Howley dismissed them as ‘spineless
backsliders’.
The Americans celebrated in Hollywood too, where three films had
been made by December 1948. The most popular of these was The Big Lift
with Montgomery Clift. In the Berlin streets the urchins played a new
game: Airlift.
Austria
The airlift had its echoes in Austria.101 Methods were used that were
once again reminiscent of the Berlin blockade. In April 1946, the Soviet
acting commander, L. V. Kurasov, demanded the removal of the radio-
control tower at Tulln. The main road to the airport was often closed. The
Russians caused difficulties for the British in Semmering and at the airport
in Schwechat that they shared with the French. They tried to board the
Mozart Express which linked the American Zone with the US sector in
Vienna, and which was run for the exclusive use of American personnel.
This led to an incident in the winter of 1946 when two Russian officers
boarded the train and pulled a gun on Specialist Sergeant Shirley Dixon;
Dixon replied by drawing his own gun, shooting one of the men dead and
injuring the other. The Russians were naturally furious, and demanded that
the Americans hand Dixon over for trial. The Americans refused. They tried
Dixon themselves and acquitted him. The Russians demanded a fresh trial,
but by that time Dixon was out of harm’s way. The Russians then began to
cut up the air traffic arriving and leaving Tulln, going so far as to fire on the
aircraft. General Mark Clark responded by arming the planes coming into
Tulln and informing the outgoing Soviet commander Koniev that he had
done so. Clark says there were no more incidents.102
Contingency plans were drawn up to withdraw the Western Allied
forces to a line along the River Enns,103 and the Western Allies considered
transferring their administrations to Salzburg. As the Cold War dawned,
Béthouart was conscious of his inferior strength when it came to resisting
the Russians. From the autumn of 1945 he possessed no more than a weak
division of mountain troops.104 The situation was similar for the other
Western powers: for Soviet divisions you read Western battalions.
Washington and London were sceptical of the need to reinforce the armies
in Austria. London refused to countenance the idea of a Russian attack and
Washington believed the likelihood to be remote.105 That changed once the
Soviet Union began to topple the post-war regimes in Budapest and Prague
and flex its muscles in Berlin. Béthouart was summoned to a meeting at the
Hôtel Matignon in Paris, attended by General Revers, chief of the general
staff, and Koenig, Béthouart’s opposite number in Berlin. The government
wanted to know how the French Zone could protect itself. As a result mines
were provided to blow up the roads in the event of a Russian advance; there
were parachute exercises in the mountains and stocks of weapons and food
were built up for use by Austrian resisters.
The Americans were also ready to fight any Soviet aggression, but the
British, who were defending the port of Trieste, were much more reluctant.
On 5 August 1948 General de Lattre de Tassigy organised a conference of
the Western powers in Strasbourg, where the possibility of rearming the
Germans was voiced for the first time.106 It was the first step towards
bringing West Germany into NATO.
There was much bandying about of accusations. Like Zhukov north of
the Inn, Koniev indicted the British for keeping the Germans under arms.
The political commissar, Colonel-General A. S. Zheltov, half in jest,
focused on factories capable of making buttons for military uniforms. The
Soviet Union could not be satisfied until Austria’s ability to make such
buttons was eliminated. The Western Allies were also dragging their feet
over denazification. In the circumstances Austria would have to wait for
freedom.107
The Russians pointed to cases of rape and theft by American
servicemen in Vienna in October. Over a number of days the Soviet-backed
Österreichische Zeitung reported beatings of black American troops by
their white comrades, robberies, hold-ups and sex crimes. On 16 September
Americans were alleged to have raided a nightclub shouting ‘Niggers out!’
The US minister, John Erhardt, neither accepted nor denied the stories. The
British were not well regarded in the East either - they were accused of
collusion with anti-Tito partisans who had been engaged in armed activity
and shoot-outs on the border with Carinthia.108 There was some fear that
Vienna would become the victim of a full-scale blockade, but the
Americans comforted themselves with the reflection that the operation in
Germany had not been a shining success. Feeding the Viennese was also the
responsibility of the Austrian government even if there were no airfields
suitable for the use of the Western Allies within Vienna. The ructions were
many and annoying, but the situation never came close to war as it did in
Germany, and the co-operation between the four powers continued.109
Chaos reigned too when it came to currency, with German Reichsmarks,
Occupation Schillings and Austrian National Schillings all in circulation.
None had any real purchasing power - for that you needed cigarettes. The
Schilling had been re-established in 1945, but its value plummeted and in
December 1947 a ‘new Schilling’ replaced it, at a value of three old ones.
Meanwhile the Allies continued to bleed the stricken state. In 1945 the
Allied armies of occupation absorbed 35 per cent of the Austrian budget.
With difficulty this was reduced to 15 in 1947. That year the Americans
dispensed with their share, but it was not until 1953 that the other powers
decided they could pay their own way.110
The Federal Republic
On 7 April 1948 General Robertson told the members of the Nordrein-
Westfalen Landtag that they were to make the best of the western part of
Germany for the time being; ‘the rest will come in time. We offer you our
good will and co-operation.’ The effect of the speech was to hearten the
Germans.111 Adenauer was in on the European movement from the start. In
May 1948 he was one of 800 delegates at the United Europe Congress in
The Hague. His adviser Herbert Blankenhorn would have carried with him
some of the ideas current at meetings of the Kreisau Circle during the war,
when the notion of removing borders was seen as a means of preventing
future wars. Sovereignty was also to be played down - as Adenauer himself
put it, ‘to secure common political and economic action’.112 Churchill
delivered a speech at the conference and received Adenauer personally.
Adenauer had sent a message to Churchill via Frank Pakenham: ‘We were
Hitler’s prisoners and but for Mr Churchill we would not be alive today.’
He was playing the victim card again.113
The London Conference of the Western Allies published the London
Agreements on 7 June. It proposed the setting up of a constituent assembly,
the defining of an Occupation Statute for the Allied armies and the creation
of a Ruhr authority to allocate coal and steel production. It was typical of
Adenauer that he was unconcerned about events in Berlin. The man of the
moment was Reuter. Adenauer was chiefly concerned with the Ruhr
authority, which he interpreted as an affront to German dignity. The
Versailles Treaty was ‘a bed of roses by comparison’.114 As a recent
biographer has written, given the situation in Berlin, Adenauer’s
protestations sounded like ‘complaints about the functioning of the parish
pump’.115 More important were the meetings to decide the form of the
future constitution. Documents were issued to the minister presidents of the
three Western zones. The Länder called a conference in Koblenz on 8 July
which was followed by another at Frankfurt that began on 20 July. On 10
August they met again on the Herreninsel in Lake Chiemsee. There was
little agreement between the CDU and the Bavarian CSU, and Adenauer
disliked the Bavarian party chairman, Josef ‘Ochsensepp’ Müller.
On 26 July the minister presidents agreed to summon a constituent
assembly to be called the Parliamentary Council in Bonn on 1 September. It
was to be a conference of party officials, arranged proportionate to seats in
the three Landtags. Bonn was not Adenauer’s idea. He would have
preferred Koblenz, which was in the French Zone.116 It was in Bonn that
one of the architects of the Grundgesetz or basic law came to the fore - Dr
Carlo Schmid. Schmid was the SPD’s constitutional expert and it was the
job of his committee to produce the legal foundations for post-war
Germany. The SPD scored a small victory over Adenauer, who was anxious
to prevent them from constituting a majority in the new Bundesrat, or upper
house (the lower house was to be the Bundestag). He was trying to exclude
Berlin from the body, both because of his animus against the city and
because its inclusion would mean that the SPD carried the day. The SPD,
however, succeeded in establishing that the size of the Land’s population
would decide how many delegates would go to the Bundesrat.
It was at this time that Blankenhorn entered the stage. He had been a
colleague and friend of Adam von Trott’s in the German Foreign Office,
and was well aware of the aims and ideologies of the Kreisauer. He was an
Anglophile, and fell out with Adenauer only when the latter opposed British
membership of the Common Market. Blankenhorn could do what Adenauer
could not: he could charm Allied generals and talk to journalists. Adenauer
was too much of a stuffed shirt to appeal to them.
The French were distressed to see the progress being made towards a
German government under the lead of Adenauer. Work was proceeding at
such a lick that the minister presidents of the Länder were worried about
taking the responsibility of splitting Germany in two. Not so Adenauer. He
thought Germany’s future lay in the west in the defence of Romano-
Christian culture. He knew that his bread was buttered in Paris. The French
nonetheless wanted him to slow down, and confine his attentions to the
basic law. When Clay and Robertson issued Bizonia Law 75 giving the
Germans the cue to decide the future of the Ruhr, the French uttered a last
gasp of fury embodied in a formal complaint from Schuman.117
Despite this, Adenauer was still flirting with the French. One of the
contacts he made at the time was with Schuman. They met first in October
1948 at Bassenheim in the French-administered Pfalz, in the residence of
the governor, Hettier de Boislambert. Adenauer had no desire to let the
Anglo-Americans know of his talks and travelled to the meeting wrapped in
a blanket with his Homburg pulled down over his eyes. The Ruhr was still a
sticking point. Schuman had to go carefully. Even after 1949 the Saar was
the cause of frequent friction between the French and Adenauer.118
The parliamentary capital had yet to be decided. Berlin was out, not just
because of Adenauer’s loathing of Prussia, but because it was behind
Russian lines and increasingly prone to Soviet intimidation. The natural
capital was Frankfurt, in that it had been a semi-independent imperial,
coronation city before 1806, and it was also the scene of the abortive
German parliament of 1848. After 1848, German liberals believed the
country had taken the wrong path - the path that led to the First World War
and the Second. It was also famously the birthplace of Goethe. Frankfurt
was the choice of the SPD. The CDU was for Bonn, a small city associated
with the archbishop of Cologne, and with the Prussian university founded
there in 1815. Bonn was the birthplace of Beethoven. The British decided in
Bonn’s favour by offering to make it autonomous and free from their
control. Frankfurt was administratively too important for the Americans to
relinquish it. The Germans could finally be masters in their small house.
OceanofPDF.com
Conclusion
The policy of constraint applied by the victors brings only fragile and misleading solutions . . . For
as long as there is reason for revenge, there will be a renewed risk of war. Germany was never as
dangerous as when she was isolated.
Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe, 2nd edn, Paris 1964, 107, 110
That means the old borders must fall and be replaced by new alliances, and a new, bigger empire
must unite the nations . . . That is the only way to end the feud properly to everybody’s advantage.
Ernst Jünger, Der Friede, Vienna 1949, 31
The Soviets had failed. They had failed twice: they had neither pushed
the Western Allies out of Berlin nor forestalled the creation of a Western
German state. The stage was now set for the division of Germany into two
camps, each with its own ideologically orientated government. On 8 April
1949 the Allies in Washington decided to transform their Military
Government into an Allied High Commission, and the French agreed to join
Bizonia, briefly to be called Trizonia. On 23 May 1949 the basic law or
Grundgesetz was signed in the presence of the three Western Allied
governors. The Federal Republic was waiting in the wings. Adenauer
claimed that the Grundgesetz constituted ‘a major contribution to the
reunification of the German people’.1 This was clearly untrue, and it is
interesting to speculate today how much Adenauer ever genuinely desired
to see the family reunited. Some maintain that Adenauer was biding his
time, waiting for the East to fall into his hands. For the time being,
however, Germany east of the Elbe was cast adrift and would not come
back into harbour until 1989, twenty-two years after Adenauer’s death.
Some would argue that Adenauer - indeed the West - was powerless to
alleviate the plight of those Germans caught behind the Iron Curtain, but
this is only true up to a point. There was another way: it was the solution
which, after 250 days of negotiation, resulted in the Austrian State Treaty in
1955. The Allies then packed their bags and went home. That solution was
presented to Germany too. On 10 March 1952 Stalin made Adenauer an
offer of an armed and unified Germany. The only condition he sought to
impose was that Germany - like Austria after 1955 - should not belong to
any military alliance. Stalin was still worried about security. Adenauer
pocketed the note. He said it contained nothing new. He thought it more
important to integrate his West German state with the West than to unite
with his brothers across the Elbe.2
The rest may be summarised. Elections in West Germany were set for
14 August 1949. Adenauer went into the lists claiming that the British were
funding the socialists, which made him more sour than ever, even if he
didn’t actually believe a word of it. The result was a hung parliament, with
the CDU/CSU winning 31 per cent of the vote and the SPD 29.2 per cent. A
coalition was inevitable. On 21 August Adenauer held a CDU coffee party
at his home in Rhöndorf. The leader of the FDP, or Free Democrats,
Theodor Heuss, was to be fobbed off with the ceremonial presidency.
Adenauer pushed the CSU aside to clasp the chancellor’s role for himself.
On 15 September it was put to a vote among the members of the Bundestag.
Adenauer secured the Chancellery by one vote - his own. Kurt Schumacher
dubbed him ‘the Allies’ Chancellor’.3 The new Germany could now start
work. The adoption of the basic law that month ended the military
occupation of Germany.
Adenauer’s election prompted an equal and opposite move in the East.
On 16 September a SED delegation arrived in Moscow to receive
instructions from the Politburo on how to cope with the creation of a ‘West
German imperialist state’ and to plan the creation of the German
Democratic Republic. It was much the same crew: Pieck, Grotewohl,
Ulbricht and Fred Oelssner on the German side, and Malenkov, Molotov,
Mikoyan and Kaganovitch on the Soviet. America was cast in the light of a
colonising power. The West German regime was to be unmasked as the
organ of the Western powers.4
The GDR was created on 7 October not only as a response to the FRG,
but also as a result of East Germany’s abandonment by West. At the end of
1949 the Soviet regime made promises that it did not keep, among which
was an agreement to release all German POWs, and to close the camps in
Germany. At the outset there had been eleven such establishments, but this
number was now reduced to just three. At their peak the camps had
contained 158,000 Germans. There were still 16,000 as 1949 turned into
1950, and the camps did not finally close until after Stalin’s death. As a
special treat the German delegation had asked for some translations of
Stalin’s speeches. The incentive was to be rid of the SBZ, which with time
the East Germans were, although no one can argue that Moscow failed to
keep them on a tight leash.
OceanofPDF.com
Notes
PREFACE
1 A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, 3rd edn. London 1991,
136-7.
2 Quoted in Ernst Jünger, Jahre der Okkupation, Stuttgart 1958, 130.
INTRODUCTION
1 Gerhard Ziemer, Deutsche Exodus: Vertreibung und Eingliederung
von 15 Millionen Ostdeutsche, Stuttgart 1973, 94. Ziemer’s figures are
based on those published by the Statischen Bundesamt in Wiesbaden in
1958.
2 See also Manfred Rauchensteiner, ‘Das Jahrzehnt der Besatzung als
Epoche in der Österreichischer Geschichte’, in Alfred Ableitinger, Siegfried
Beer and Eduard G. Staudinger, eds, Österreich unter alliieter Besatzung -
1945-1955, Vienna, Cologne and Graz 1998, 18-19.
3 Alfred Döblin, Schicksalsreise, Bericht und Bekenntnisse,
Frankfurt/Main 1949, 420-2.
4 Heinrich Böll, Kreuz ohne Liebe, Cologne 2003, 285-6.
5 Robert Jan van Pelt and Deborah Dwork, Auschwitz, 1270 to the
Present, New Haven and London 1996, 10.
6 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, introduced by C. W. Ceram and
translated by James Stern, London 1965, 139.
7 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd edn, London
and New Haven 2003, III, 1138.
8 David Blackbourn’s The Conquest of Nature, London 2005, sees early
Nazi tendencies in the desire to control Germany’s waterways.
9 Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four Power Control in Germany and
Austria 1945-1946, Oxford 1956, 28.
10 Ibid., 15.
11 Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany - An Account of
the American Occupation, 2nd edn, Columbia, Miss. 1999, 6-7. Davidson
possibly means Adam von Trott, who arrived in America in September
1939 - see Giles MacDonogh, A Good German: Adam von Trott zu Solz,
revised edn, London 1994, 307-19. It was Roosevelt who told J. Edgar
Hoover to have him closely followed: the president considered Trott a
threat to national security.
12 Curtis F. Morgan, Jnr, James F. Byrnes, Lucius Clay, and American
Policy in Germany, 1945-1947, Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter 2002,
2, 5.
13 Henric Wuermeling, Doppelspiel: Adam von Trott zu Solz im
Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich 2004, 142-4.
14 Davidson, Death and Life, 5; Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control,
34.
15 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 30-1, 36.
16 Ibid., 34; Paul W. Gulgowski, ‘The American Military Government
of United States Occupied Zones of Post World War II Germany in Relation
to Policies Expressed by its Civilian Governmental Authorities at Home,
During the Course of 1944/1945 through 1949’ (doctoral dissertation,
Frankfurt University) Frankfurt/Main 1983, 22.
17 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 18.
18 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 8-9.
19 Ibid., 7.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Hermann Graml, Die Alliierten und die Teilung Deutschlands.
Konflikte und Entscheidungen 1941-1948, Frankfurt/Main 1985, 27, 60.
22 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 41; Graml, Teilung Deutschlands, 53, 56.
23 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany - A History of the
Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949, Cambridge, Mass. and London
1995, 9; Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 52-3.
24 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 76.
25 John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance,
1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe, Leicester and
London 1990, 9.
26 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, New York and
Oxford 1996, 17.
27 Ibid., 19.
28 Oliver Rathkolb, ‘Historische Fragmente in die “unendliche
Geschichte” von den Sowjetische Absichte in Österreich’, in Ableitinger et
al., Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung, 139-42, passim.
29 Jean-Pierre Rioux, ‘France 1945: L’Ambition allemande et ses
moyens’, in Klaus Manfrass and Jean-Pierre Rioux, eds, France-Allemagne
1944-1947, Les Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent,
December 1989-January 1990/Akten des deutsch-französisch
Historikerkolloquiums, Baden-Baden, 2-5 December 1986, 37.
30 Ibid., 15.
31 Ibid., 25.
32 Ibid., 40.
33 Ibid., 26.
34 Ibid., 28.
35 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, London 1947, 25.
36 Rioux, ‘France 1945’, 40-1.
37 Ibid., 49.
38 Ibid., 50-1.
39 Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Der Weg nach Potsdam - Die Alliierten und
die Vertreibung’, in Wolfgang Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen
aus dem Osten. Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen, Frankfurt/Main 1985, 51-2,
55-6.
40 Andreas Lawaty, Das Ende Preussens in polnischer Sicht. Zur
kontinuität negativer Wirkungen der preussischen Geschichte auf die
deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen, Berlin and New York 1986, 56-7.
41 Ibid., 100.
42 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 29-30.
43 Detlef Brandes, ‘Die Exilpolitik von Edvard Beneš 1939-1945’, in
Arnold Suppan and Elisabeth Vyslonzil, eds, Edvard Beneš und die
tschechoslowakische Aussenpolitik 1918-1948, 2nd edn, Frankfurt/Main,
Berlin, Bern, Brussels, New York, Oxford and Vienna 2003, 159.
44 Ibid., 160.
45 Ibid., 161.
46 Manfred Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4: Österreich unter alliieter
Besatzung, Vienna 2005, 7-8.
47 Quoted in General Béthouart, La Bataille pour l’Autriche, Paris
1966, 15.
48 Quoted in ibid., 16.
49 Ibid., 10.
50 Otto von Habsburg, Ein Kampf um Österreich 1938-1945,
Aufgezeichnet von Gerhard Tötschinger, Vienna and Munich 2001, 26, 69.
51 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 14.
52 Ibid., 12.
53 Charmian Brinson, ‘Ein “Sehr Ambitioniertes Projekt” - Die
Anfänge des Austrian Centre’, in Marietta Bearman et al., Wien-London,
hin und retour: Das Austrian Centre in London 1939 bis 1947, Vienna
2004, 15.
54 Marietta Bearman, ‘Das kommende Österreich. Die Planung für ein
Nachkriegs-Österreich’, in Bearman et al., Wien-London, 222.
55 Ibid., 207.
56 Ibid., 212
57 Ibid., 207-8.
58 See Helene Maimann, Politik im Wartesaal, Vienna, Cologne and
Graz 1975 and F. C. West, Zurück oder nicht zurück?, London 1942.
59 Brinson, ‘Ein “Sehr Ambitioniertes Projekt”, 22-3.
60 Anthony Grenville, ‘Zeit der Prüfung, Zeit der taten, Zeit des
Triumphes und der Illusionen - Die politische Tätigkeit des Austrian
Centre’, in Bearman et al., Wien-London, 29.
61 Ibid., 47.
62 Eden to Ralph Murray, 10 September 1942, kindly communicated by
Johannes Popper von Podhragy; see also Peter Gosztony, Endkampf an der
Donau 1944/1945, Vienna, Munich and Zurich 1969, 209.
63 FAM, untitled document of 15 March 1943, communicated by
Johannes Popper von Podhragy.
64 Grenville, ‘Zeit der Prüfung’, 37.
65 Ibid., 35, 37, 38.
66 Ibid., 40.
67 Ibid., 41.
68 Ibid., 42.
69 Ibid., 43-4, 48.
70 Ibid., 49.
71 Charmian Brinson, ‘Die “Robinson Crusoes” von Paddington und
die Briten. Die Beziehungen zwischen Austrian Centre, Free Austrian
Movement und den britischen Gastgebern’, in Bearman et al., Wien-
London, 180, 181.
72 Ibid., 184.
73 See Christiane Maasburg, ‘Nikolas Maasburgs Rolle im Widerstand
und bei der Wiederherstellung eines unabhängigen Österreich’
(Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des Magistergrades der Philosophie,
University of Vienna 1996); Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl, eds, Das
Buch Hitler, Bergisch Gladbach 2004, 335 and n.
74 Rathkolb, ‘Historische Fragmente’, 142-5, 156-7.
75 Grenville, ‘Zeit der Prüfung’, 48, 52.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 1: THE FALL OF VIENNA
1 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 77-8, 91.
2 Ibid., 73.
3 Ibid., 71; Klaus Dieter Mulley, ‘Aspekte Sowjetische Besatzung in
Nieder Österreich’, in Ableitinger et al., eds, Österreich unter alliierter
Besatzung, 387.
4 Giles MacDonogh, Prussia - The Perversion of an Idea, London
1994, 384; Naimark, Russians in Germany, 91.
5 Adolf Schärf, Österreichs Wiederaufrichtung im Jahr 1945, Vienna
1960, 29, 31.
6 Ibid., 7.
7 Ibid., 33.
8 Alois Brusatti, ed., Zeuge der Stunde Null, das Tagebuch Eugen
Margaréthas 1945-1947, revised by Hildegard Hemetsberger-Koller,
Vienna 1990, 24.
9 Ibid., 28, 39.
10 Mulley, ‘Aspekte Sowjetische Besatzung’, 376.
11 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 22-3; Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 18.
12 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 29.
13 Josef Schöner, Wiener Tagebuch, ed. Eva-Marie Csáky, Franz
Matscher and Gerald Stourzh, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar 1990, 136.
14 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 33.
15 Oliver Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der zweiten
Republik - vertrauliche Berichte der US-MILITÄRADMINISTRATION aus
Österreich 1945 in englischer Originalfassung, Vienna, Cologne and Graz
1985, 158; Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 24-5.
16 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 29.
17 Schöner, Tagebuch, 137-8.
18 Giles MacDonogh, The Wine and Food of Austria, London 1992, 19.
19 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 25.
20 Ibid., 19-20.
21 Carl Szokoll, Die Rettung Wiens, Vienna 2001, 291.
22 Schöner, Tagebuch, 138-9.
23 Schöner, Tagebuch, 140.
24 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 23.
25 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 52, 61.
26 Schöner, Tagebuch, 162.
27 Willy Prinz von Thurn und Taxis, ‘Memoiren’, unpublished MS in
the possession of Princess Daria von Thurn und Taxis, Munich, 19-20, 24.
28 Ibid., 162-3.
29 Wolfgang Mueller, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945-
1955 und ihre politische Mission, Vienna 2005, 82-4; Christiane Maasburg,
‘Nikolaus Maasburg’, 72-3, 75, 77.
30 Schöner, Tagebuch, 141-2; Margarétha, Tagebuch, 32.
31 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 31.
32 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 25.
33 Schöner, Tagebuch, 144.
34 Ibid., 145.
35 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 33; Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 20.
36 Schöner, Tagebuch, 147, 172.
37 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 35; Schöner, Tagebuch, 148.
38 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 25; Schöner, Tagebuch, 148-9, 169.
39 Schöner, Tagebuch, 150-2.
40 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 32.
41 Ibid., 35, 39, 50.
42 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 37.
43 Ibid., 45-6.
44 Ibid., 58.
45 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 154-8; Rathkolb,
‘Historische Fragmente’, 147.
46 Schöner, Tagebuch, 165.
47 Ibid., 153-4.
48 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 42.
49 Schöner, Tagebuch, 158-60, 171.
50 Ibid., 164.
51 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 42-3, 48.
52 Ibid., 44-5.
53 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 52, 57.
54 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 46.
55 Schöner, Tagebuch, 165-6; Margarétha, Tagebuch, 42.
56 Schöner, Tagebuch, 167, 175.
57 Ibid., 181.
58 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 17.
59 Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Austrians - A Thousand-Year Odyssey,
London 1996, 377-8.
60 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 20.
61 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 115-17.
62 Schöner, Tagebuch, 182-3.
63 Ibid., 184.
64 Grenville, ‘Zeit der Prüfung’, 60.
65 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 60.
66 Schöner, Tagebuch, 191-2.
67 Ibid., 201; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 27.
68 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 114.
69 Ibid., 201-2; Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 27, 89; Rauchensteiner,
Stalinplatz 4, 21.
70 Schöner, Tagebuch, 205; Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 87.
71 Siegfried Beer, ‘Niederösterreich unter der Roten Armee’, in Ernst
Bezemek and Willibald Rossner, eds, Niederösterreich 1945 - Südmähren
1945, Vienna 1996, 140.
72 Béthouart, Bataille, 19.
73 Schöner, Tagebuch, 217-18.
74 Ibid., 225.
75 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 67-8.
76 Ibid., 233.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 2: WILD TIMES: A PICTURE OF
LIBERATED CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1945
1 Ursula von Kardorff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen 1942-1945, new,
unabridged edn, Munich 1994, 346.
2 Hans Graf von Lehndorff, Ostpreussisches Tagebuch: Aufzeichnungen
eines Arztes aus den Jahren 1945-1947, Munich 1961, 11.
3 Josef Henke, ‘Exodus aus Ostepreussen und Schlesien: Vier
Erlebnisberichte’, in Benz, Die Vertreibung, 93.
4 MacDonogh, Prussia, 380-1; Eberle and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler,
312-13.
5 Henke, ‘Exodus’, 95.
6 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 67-8.
7 Ibid., 68.
8 Ibid., 71, 75.
9 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 73. (The translation is by Robert
Conquest.)
10 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 70.
11 Ibid., 71, 77.
12 Ibid., 68, 72.
13 Ibid, 79-80.
14 Ibid., 85.
15 Fritz Gause, Die Geschichte der Stadt Königsberg in Preussen, 3
vols, Cologne and Vienna 1965-71, III, 172.
16 Marianne Peyinghaus, Stille Jahre in Gertlauken - Erinnerungen an
Ostpreussen, Berlin 1985, 90; Giles MacDonogh, review of The Amber
Room by Catherine Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy in Literary Review, June
2004.
17 Gause, Königsberg, III, 170n.
18 Ibid., 171.
19 Henke, ‘Exodus’, 97-9.
20 Ibid., 100-1.
21 Gause, Königsberg, III, 171.
22 Christian von Krockow, The Hour of the Women, translated by
Krishna Winton, London and Boston 1991, 67, 86.
23 Käthe von Normann, Ein Tagebuch aus Pommern, Munich 1987, 16.
24 Ibid., 16-17.
25 Ibid., 18-19.
26 Ibid., 21, 252.
27 Ibid., 26.
28 Carl Tighe, Gdansk - National Identity in the Polish-German
Borderlands, London and Concord 1990, 194.
29 Ibid., 195; Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1053.
30 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1052.
31 Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi
Germany, New Haven and London 2004, 324-5.
32 Brewster Chamberlin and Marcia Feldman, eds, The Liberation of
the Concentration Camps 1945: Eyewitness Accounts of the Liberation,
with an introduction by Robert H. Abzug, Washinton DC 1987, 91.
33 Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 327-8.
34 Tighe, Gdansk, 197-8.
35 Günter Grass, Die Blechtrommel, Darmstadt and Neuwied 1988,
485.
36 Giles MacDonogh, ‘Do Mention the War’, Financial Times
Magazine, 1 November 2002.
37 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1049-51.
38 Johannes Kaps, ed., Die Tragödie Schlesiens 1945/46 in Dokumente
- unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des Erzbishoftums Breslau, Munich
1952-3, 50-1.
39 Edward N. Petersen, Russian Commands and German Resistance:
The Soviet Occupation, 1945-1949, New York 1999, 224.
40 Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse, Microcosm: Portrait of a
Central European City, London 2002, 408.
41 Herbert Hupka, ed., Letzte Tage in Schlesien: Tagebücher,
Erinnerungen und Dokumente der Vertreibung, Munich and Vienna 1982,
12.
42 Ibid., 50.
43 Ibid., 51.
44 Ibid., 53, 55.
45 Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 332.
46 Michal Chilczuk in Chamberlain and Feldman, eds, Liberation, 27-8.
47 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1055.
48 Margret Boveri, Tage des Überlebens, Frankfurt/Main 1996, 163.
49 Ibid., 167.
50 Ruth Andreas Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, Frankfurt/Main 1985, 60.
51 Saul K. Padover, Psychologist in Germany - The Story of an
American Intelligence Officer, London 1946, 134.
52 Ibid., 218.
53 Ibid., 280-1; Kurt Buchholz, ‘Die ersten Amis sagten freundlich
“Hello”, Wiesbadener Tagblatt, 25 April 2005, kindly communicated by
Frau Gertrud Loewe.
54 Missie Vassiltchikov, Berlin Diaries, London 1985, 290, 294.
55 Ibid., 294.
56 Elena Skrjabina, The Allies on the Rhine 1945-1950, translated by
Norman Luxenburg, with a foreword by Harrison Salisbury, Carbondale
and Edwardsville 1980, 9-13.
57 Ibid., 17.
58 Ibid., 17, 29-30, 39, 41.
59 Carl Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht für das Kriegsministerium der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, edited by Gunther Nickel, Johanna
Schrön and Hans Wagener, Göttingen 2004, 18, 70.
60 Ibid., 69.
61 Ernst Wiechert, Jahre und Zeiten - Erinnerungen, Munich and
Vienna 1989, 408.
62 Ibid., 410.
63 Quoted in Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society
from Hitler to Honecker, New Haven and London 2005, 26.
64 Abraham J. Peck, ‘Befreit und erneut in Lagern: jüdische DPs’, in
Walter H. Pehle, ed., Der Judenpogrom 1938 - Von der
‘Reichskristallnacht’ zum Völkermord, Frankfurt/ Main 1988, 204-5.
65 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 316 n. 4, which gives the uncorrected text
from the diary.
66 Ibid., 317.
67 Ibid., 329, 331.
68 Ibid., 318.
69 Ibid., 322 and n. 2.
70 Ibid., 319-20.
71 Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart - Americans and the
Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps, New York and Oxford 1985, 80.
72 Paul Berber, Dachau 1933-1945 - The Official History, London
1975, 183.
73 Ibid., 89-93; Michael Selzer, Deliverance Day: The Last Hours at
Dachau, London 1980, 188-9. The latter is an unsatisfying book in that it
conceals the identity of the interviewees and creates conglomerate
characters. There are also large chunks of dialogue.
74 Ibid., 198, 201, 204; Abzug, Vicious Heart, 94-5.
75 Chamberlain and Feldman, eds, Liberation, 32.
76 Berber, Dachau, 199.
77 Ibid.
78 Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 330.
79 Brigitte Hamann, Winifred Wagner - A Life at the Heart of Hitler’s
Bayreuth, translated by Alan Bance, London 2005, 405.
80 Walter Lüdde-Neurath, Regierung Dönitz. Die letzten Tage des
Dritten Reiches, Göttingen 1951, 86.
81 Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, Stuttgart 1977, 242-4.
82 Ibid., 245.
83 Lüdde-Neurath, Regierung Dönitz, 95.
84 Ibid., 98.
85 Karl Dönitz, Mein Wechselvolles Leben, Zurich, Berlin and Frankfurt
1968, 210; Reimer Hanse, Das Ende des Dritten Reiches. Die deutsche
Kapitulation, 1945, Stuttgart 1966, 194.
86 Douglas Botting, In the Ruins of the Reich, London 2005, 138-40.
87 Hanse, Kapitulation, 196-8.
88 Boveri, Tage, 153.
89 Charles Whiting, Finale at Flensburg. The Race to the Baltic - The
British Army’s Last Campaign, London 1966, 152.
90 Hanse, Kapitulation, 186.
91 Ibid., 192.
92 Marlis Steinert, Capitulation 1945: The Story of the Dönitz Regime,
translated by Richard Barry, London 1969, 275, 277.
93 Leonard Mosely, Report from Germany, London 1945, 103.
94 Whiting, Finale at Flensburg, 150.
95 Ibid., 153.
96 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 251.
97 Lüdde-Neurath, Regierung Dönitz, 113-14.
98 Whiting, Finale at Flensburg, 160.
99 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 252.
100 Boveri, Tage, 152.
101 Whiting, Finale at Flensburg, 168.
102 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 252.
103 Steinert, Capitulation 1945, 280.
104 Whiting, Finale at Flensburg, 168.
105 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 253.
106 Steinert, Capitulation 1945, 281.
107 Lüdde-Neurath, Regierung Dönitz, 123.
108 Botting, Ruins,140-1.
109 Elisabeth Ruge, ed., Charlotte Gräfin von der Schulenburg zur
Erinnerungen, Hamburg 1992, 70-90 passim.
110 Jünger, Okkupation, 11, 17.
111 Ibid., 19.
112 Ibid., 28.
113 Ibid., 32-4.
114 Ibid., 48-9.
115 Herzogin Viktoria Luise, Ein Leben als Tochter des Kaisers,
Göttingen 1965, 320-4.
116 Friedrich Wilhelm Prinz von Preussen, Das Haus Hohenzollern
1918-1945, Munich and Vienna 1985, 247.
117 Ben Shepherd, After Daybreak - The Liberation of Belsen, 1945,
London 2005, 8.
118 Eberle and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler, 348.
119 Shepherd, After Daybreak, 42.
120 Ibid., 41.
121 Susanne Kirkbright: Karl Jaspers - A Biography, Navigations in
Truth, New Haven and London 2004, 187-8.
122 Ibid., 190, 192.
123 Richard von Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten: Erinnerungen, Berlin 1997,
95-6.
124 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 410.
125 Jünger, Okkupation, 202.
126 F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany 1945-1949, Stanford 1962,
16-17.
127 François-George Dreyfus, ‘Les Dernières Operations militaires
françaises et l’avenir des relations Franco-Allemandes’, in Manfrass and
Rioux, eds, France-Allemagne, 13.
128 Hans Rommel, Vor zehn Jahren. 16/17 April 1945: Wie es zur
Zerstörung von Freudenstadt gekommen ist, Freudenstadt 1955, 27.
129 Ibid., 26.
130 Hans Joachim Harder, ‘Militärische Operationen in der Endphase
des Krieges: die deutsche Sicht’, in Manfrass and Rioux, eds, France-
Allemagne, 31.
131 R. F. Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, Chicago 1947, 57.
132 Ibid., 56-7.
133 Harder, ‘Militärishe Operationen’, 32.
134 Willis, The French in Germany, 18.
135 Petra Weber, Carlo Schmid, 1896-1979. Eine Biographie, Munich
1996, 191-2.
136 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 397.
137 Ibid., 397-9.
138 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1050.
139 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 105.
140 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 39.
141 Ibid., 24-5.
142 Ibid., 41-3.
143 Béthouart, Bataille, 51-2.
144 The full list is reproduced in Josef Müller, Bis zur letzten
Konsequenz: Ein Leben für Frieden und Freiheit, Munich 1975, 364-7.
145 Ibid., 267; Kurt von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, translated by
Franz von Hildebrand, New York 1946, 286.
146 Ibid., 288.
147 Ibid., 270.
148 Ibid., 271.
149 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 3-5.
150 Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 201.
151 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 31-3.
152 Ibid., 203.
153 Ibid.
154 Lewis Weinstein witnessed his vomiting: see Chamberlain and
Feldman, eds, Liberation, 46.
155 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 26-30.
156 Padover, Psychologist, 284.
157 Volker Mauersberger, Hitler in Weimar - Der Fall einer deutschen
Kulturstadt, Berlin 1999, 295-300; Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1051; Eberle
and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler, 348; Berber, Dachau, 182.
158 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1055.
159 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 49, 52.
160 Schöner, Tagebuch, 178.
161 Quoted in Mauersberger, Hitler, 296.
162 Ibid., 300.
163 Padover, Psychologist, 293-6.
164 Ibid., 293-4.
165 Peterson, Russian Commands, 331.
166 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 72.
167 Ibid., 74, 78.
168 Ibid., 80; Marianne Günther: Peyinghaus, Stille Jahre in
Gertlauken, 206.
169 Peyinghaus, Stille Jahre in Gertlauken, 217.
170 Tisa Hess Schulenburg, The First Days and the Last, London 1948,
25.
171 Ibid., 26.
172 Ibid., 27.
173 Tisa von der Schulenburg, Ich hab’s gewagt - Bildhauerin und
Ordensfrau - ein unkonventionelles Leben, Freiburg im Breisgau 1981, 177.
174 Abzug, Vicious Heart, 62, 68.
175 Schulenburg, Ich hab’s gewagt, 181.
176 Jenny Williams, More Lives than One: A Biography of Hans
Fallada, London 1998, 245.
177 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 360-2.
178 Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1945 - Die letzten Aufzeichnungen,
Hamburg 1977, 442; Padover, Psychologist, 200.
179 Beer, ‘Niederösterreich’, 136.
180 Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of Lucius D. Clay: Germany
1945-1949, Bloomington and London 1974, I, 47.
181 Carl Zuckmayer, ‘Jugend in Niemandsland’, in Deutschlandbericht,
228-34; Krockow, Hour of the Women, 75.
182 Wilhelm Turnwald, ed., Dokumente dur Austreibung der
Sudetendeutschen, Munich 1951, 152.
183 Fritz Löwenthal, Der neue Geist von Potsdam, Hamburg 1948, 118.
184 Ernst von Salomon, The Answers - to the 131 Questions in the
Allied Military Government ‘Fragebogen’, preface by Goronwy Rees,
translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon, London 1954, 410.
185 James Stern, Hidden Damage, London 1990, 318.
186 Werner Schwipps, Die Königl. Hofund Garnisonkirche zu Potsdam,
Berlin 1991, 100-1.
187 Ibid., 104; Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1180.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 3: BERLIN
1 G. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections of the Marshal of the
Soviet Union, 2 vols, Moscow 1985, II, 383.
2 Ibid., 392, 394.
3 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 20.
4 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 396.
5 Quoted in Alexandra Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis - A History of Berlin,
London 1998, 606.
6 Boveri, Tage, 106-8.
7 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 86.
8 Ibid., 44.
9 Botting, Ruins, 87.
10 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 14.
11 Boveri, Tage, 123.
12 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 63.
13 Nicolas Nabokov, Old Friends and New Music, London 1951, 211.
14 Boveri, Tage, 246.
15 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 42.
16 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 21.
17 Boveri, Tage, 128.
18 Ibid., 128-9.
19 Cyril Buffet, Berlin, Paris 1993, 359.
20 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 46.
21 Ibid., 53-4.
22 Boveri, Tage, 120.
23 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 46-7.
24 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 22.
25 Ibid., 24.
26 Eberle and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler, 411.
27 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 50, 123, 134.
28 Boveri, Tage, 129.
29 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 70.
30 Boveri, Tage, 254.
31 Ibid.
32 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 82.
33 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 77.
34 Ibid., 145.
35 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 35.
36 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 60-1.
37 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 14, 16.
38 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 144, 150, 186.
39 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 22.
40 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 80, 83, 150.
41 Boveri, Tage, 245.
42 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 124.
43 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 94.
44 Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 617.
45 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 131.
46 Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 616.
47 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 358.
48 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 26.
49 Kay Summersby, Eisenhowever was my Boss, Watford 1949, 230.
50 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 397-401.
51 Hedda Adlon, Hotel Adlon - Das Berliner Hotel in dem die grosse
Welt zu Gast war, Munich 1997, 315; Peter Auer, Adlon, Berlin, Berlin
1997, 217.
52 Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution, translated by C. M.
Woodhouse, introduction by Günter Minnerup, London 1979, 287.
53 Ibid., 311-12.
54 Ibid., 299.
55 Ibid., 315.
56 Ibid.
57 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 253, 292.
58 Dietrich Staritz, Geschichte der DDR, Erweitete Ausgabe,
Frankfurt/Main 1996, 273; Buffet, Berlin, 366.
59 Leonhard, Revolution, 303.
60 Ibid., 315-16; George Clare, Berlin Days 1946-1947, London 1989,
30-2.
61 Peterson, Russian Commands, 44-5.
62 Golo Mann, The History of Germany since 1789, Harmondsworth
1987, 817.
63 Leonhard, Revolution, 306.
64 Ibid., 326.
65 Ibid., 332, 337.
66 Buffet, Berlin, 358.
67 Boveri, Tage, 133.
68 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 36.
69 Davidson, Death and Life, 74-6.
70 Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 609-10.
71 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 135.
72 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 106.
73 Buffet, Berlin, 363-4.
74 Clare, Berlin Days, 47.
75 Ruth Gay, Safe among the Germans: Liberated Jews after World War
II, New Haven and London 2002, 111-12, 151.
76 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 12-13, 15.
77 Ibid., 27, 38, 84.
78 Boveri, Tage, 144-5.
79 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 168.
80 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 32.
81 Boveri, Tage, 214.
82 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 84, 102, 110.
83 Boveri, Tage, 207-8.
84 Ibid., 262, 286.
85 Ibid., 209-10.
86 Ibid., 209.
87 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 17.
88 Frank Howley, Berlin Command, New York 1950, 29, 34.
89 Ibid., 41.
90 Ibid., 46.
91 Ibid., 11.
92 Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 627, 629; Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin,
74.
93 Buffet, Berlin, 358; Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 75.
94 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 436; Howley, Berlin Command, 57.
95 Howley, Berlin Command, 66-72.
96 Boveri, Tage, 234-5.
97 Howley, Berlin Command, 22-3.
98 Boveri, Tage, 237-8, 263, 267.
99 Howley, Berlin Command, 79, 87.
100 Ibid., 238-9.
101 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 36.
102 Ibid., 82.
103 Buffet, Berlin, 362.
104 Boveri, Tage, 165.
105 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 45.
106 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 87.
107 Boveri, Tage, 269, 272.
108 Howley, Berlin Command, 12.
109 Ibid., 30, 41,
110 Ibid., 39.
111 Klaus Lang, ‘Lieber Herr Celibidache . . .’ - Wilhelm Furtwängler
und sein Statthalter - Ein philharmonischer Konflict in der Berliner
Nachkriegszeit, Zurich and St Gallen 1988, 11-12.
112 Ibid., 13, Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 97.
113 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 356.
114 Ibid., 359.
115 Ibid., 362-3.
116 Renée Bédarida, ‘Une Française à Berlin en 1945’, in Manfrass and
Rioux, eds, France-Allemagne, 149.
117 Ibid., 150.
118 Nabokov, Old Friends, 211; MacDonogh, A Good German, 73.
119 Bédarida, ‘Une Française’, 150-1.
120 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 160.
121 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 114.
122 Ibid., 139, 141.
123 Clare, Berlin Days, 59.
124 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 16.
125 Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, translated by Richard
and Clara Winton, London 1976, 66.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 4: EXPULSIONS FROM
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND
YUGOSLAVIA
1 Theodor Schieder, ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutscher Bevölkerung
aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, vol. IV/1: Tschechoslowakei, Berlin 1957, 4.
2 Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and
the Expulsion of the Germans - Background, Execution, Consequences,
with a foreword by Robert Murphy, London 1979, 27.
3 Rudolf Jaworski, ‘Die Sudetendeutscher als Minderheit, in der
Tschechoslowakei 1918-1938’, in Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung, 29; for the
treatment of German-speaking Jews after the war, see Melissa Müller and
Reinhard Piechocki, Alice Herz-Sommer: ‘Ein Garten Eden inmitten der
Hölle’, Munich 2006, 308-9.
4 Ibid., 30.
5 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, xi and n. 8, xiv.
6 Schieder, ed., Tschechoslowakei, 6.
7 Thurn und Taxis, ‘Memoiren’, 33.
8 E. Franzel, Die Vertreibung Sudetenland 1945/1946. Nach
Dokumenten des Bundesministeriums für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge and
Kriegsgeschädigte, Bonn; Nach Dokumenten aus dem Bundesarchiv in
Koblenz, Fragebogen Berichten des Bundesarchivs, Erlebnis und
Kreisberichten, Bad Nauheim 1967, 108-9.
9 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 56; Zbyněk Zeman with Antonin Klimek, The Life
of Edvard Beneš 1884-1948 - Czechoslovakia in Peace and War, Oxford
1997, 225-6, 237.
10 Franzel, Sudetenland, 20.
11 Ibid., 240.
12 Ibid., 242.
13 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 65.
14 Karl Peter Schwarz, ‘Mit der Vertreibung vollendet’, in Suppan and
Vyslonzil, eds, Beneš, 180.
15 Franzel, Sudetenland, 23-4, 218.
16 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 527-56 - the ‘Kaschauer’ Statutes and
Beneš Decrees are printed in full; Zeman and Klimek, Beneš, 245.
17 Schwarz, ‘Vertreibung’, 180.
18 Franzel, Sudetenland, 33, 104.
19 Alois Harasko, ‘Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen. Sechs
Erlebnisberichte’, in Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung, 107.
20 Zeman and Klimek, Beneš, 246.
21 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 66.
22 Ibid.; Franzel, Sudetenland, 22.
23 Zeman and Klimek, Beneš, 248.
24 Alice Teichova, ‘Die Tschechen in der NS-Kriegswirtschaft’, in
Suppan and Vyslonzil, eds, Beneš, 172-3; Franzel, Sudetenland, 19.
25 Schieder, ed., Tschechosowakei, 17.
26 Theodor Schieder, ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen Bevölkerung
aus der Tschechoslowakei, vol. IV/2, Berlin 1957, 789.
27 Ziemer, Deutsche Exodus, 73.
28 Ibid., 18.
29 Franzel, Sudetenland, 55-6.
30 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Kurt Schmidt, 366, 375, 402-3.
31 Franzel, Sudetenland, 22.
32 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 18-19, Dr Hans Wagner, 38, 226-7.
33 Margarete Schell, Ein Tagebuch aus Prag, Beiheft II, Dokumente der
Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, Kassel 1957, 9.
34 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Ludwig Breyer, 333-4; Schell, Tagebuch,
74.
35 Schell, Tagebuch, 24, 34.
36 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 15, Franz Rösch, 15-16, 28; Thurn und
Taxis, ‘Memoiren’, 34.
37 Zhukov, II, 410.
38 Schell, Tagebuch, 12 n. 1.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 10.
41 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Hildegard Hurtinger, 14, Hans Wagner,
39, 42; Schieder, ed., Tschechoslowakei, 63 n. 1; Thurn und Taxis,
‘Memoiren’, 35.
42 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Dr Hans Wagner, 39, Sebastian Herr, 50,
Kurt Schmidt, 404.
43 Schell, Tagebuch, 20.
44 Schieder, ed., Tschechoslowakei, 62; Thurn und Taxis, ‘Memoiren’,
33.
45 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 3-8, 21, 22, 23, 25-6.
46 Ibid., 20, 29.
47 Ibid., 9-10, 13.
48 Ibid., 26-38.
49 Quoted in Ibid., 42.
50 Ibid., 20, 24-5, 40.
51 Schell, Tagebuch, 89-90.
52 Schöner, Tagebuch, 255, 258.
53 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 45.
54 Ibid., 16-17, 41.
55 Ibid., Franz Mauder, 338-9.
56 Franzel, Sudetenland, 97.
57 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 64.
58 Botting, Ruins, 229-30.
59 Harasko, ‘Sudetendeutschen’, 109-10.
60 Ibid.
61 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 63-75, 76, 77, 78.
62 Franzel, Sudetenland, 117.
63 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Else Köchel and Franz Kaupil, 279-81.
64 Ibid., Erika Griessmann, 313-15.
65 Franzel, Sudetenland, 21.
66 Jünger, Okkupation, 193.
67 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 128-35, Edouard Fritsch, 162, 350, 353-
4, Karl Oberdörfer, 389.
68 Ibid., Dr E. Siegel, 147, Hans Strobl, 161.
69 Ibid., Otto Patek and Rudolf Berthold, 290-1.
70 Ibid., Marie Weiss, 206.
71 Ibid., A.R., 200-2, Franz Wagner, 214.
72 Ibid., Gregor and Johann Partsch, 250-5.
73 Harasko, ‘Sudetendeutschen’, 110-11.
74 Franzel, Sudetenland, 72.
75 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Alfred Latzel, Karl Schneider and Karl
Froning, 229-50.
76 Ibid., Anton Watzke, 184, Adolf Aust, 203.
77 Ibid., Franz Limpächer, 317-19, 429, 432.
78 Ibid., Dr Karl Grimm, 85-101, Eduard Kaltofen, 182. Der Neue
Brockhaus encyclopaedia gives the 1939 population figure as 36,500, of
whom 16,000 were Germans.
79 Ibid., 85-7.
80 Pre-war population from Brockhaus; Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, the
judge Dr Franz Freyer, 105; Harasko, ‘Sudetendeutschen’, 116.
81 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Dr E. Siegel, 148.
82 Ibid., 105-10, passim.
83 Ibid., 121-3, 124.
84 Harasko, ‘Sudetendeutschen’, 113-15. SS men were identified by the
blood group tattooed in their left armpit.
85 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Eduard Grimm, 217-18, 328.
86 Ibid., 124-5.
87 Ibid., 48-50, F. Fiedler, 190.
88 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1056.
89 Franzel, Sudetenland, 222-3.
90 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Marie Weiss, Josef Zillich and Emilie
Dotzauer, 206-7.
91 Ibid., Dr E. Siegel, 139-61 passim, Franz Richter, 397.
92 Ibid., Dr E. Siegel, 143.
93 Tom Lampert, Ein einziges Leben: Geschichten aus der NS-Zeit,
Munich 2003, 168-9. I am grateful to my friend Ursula Heinzelmann in
Berlin for sending me this book. See also Hans-Günther Adler,
Theresienstadt 1941-1945, Tübingen 1955.
94 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, 18, Dr E. Siegel, 153, 160, 216.
95 Ibid., 80-2, quoting Die Brücke, 10 June 1951.
96 Ibid., Dr E. Siegel, 146, Franz Richter, 397.
97 Ibid., Hans Freund, 17.
98 Schell, Tagebuch, 270-5, passim.
99 Turnwald, ed., Dokumente, Alfred Latzel, 235, Franz Richter, 399,
Max Griehsel, 470; Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 281-2.
100 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 148.
101 Ibid., 149.
102 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 619.
103 Ibid., I, 312.
104 Zeman and Klimek, Beneš, 247.
105 Harasko, ‘Sudetendeutschen’, 107.
106 Theodor Schieder, ed., Dokumentation der Vertreibung der
Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa: Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Ungarn,
Düsseldorf 1956, 41E-45E, 50E, 60E.
107 Ibid., 62E, 65E.
108 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 14.
109 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 313-14.
110 Theodor Schieder, ed., Dokumentation der Vertreibung der
Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa: Das Schicksal der Deutschen in
Rumänien, Berlin 1957, 6E, 41E, 63E.
111 Theodor Schieder, ed., Dokumentation der Vertreibung der
Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa: Das Schicksal der Deutschen in
Jugoslavien, Düsseldorf 1961, 76E, 82-83E, 108-9.
112 Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, ‘Menschen oder Nationen? Die
Vertreibung der Deutschen aus tschechischer Sicht’, in Benz, ed., Die
Vertreibung, 143-4.
113 Franzel, Sudetenland, 24.
114 Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, ‘Menschen oder Nationen?’, 148-9.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 5: HOME TO THE REICH!
RECOVERED TERRITORIES IN THE
PRUSSIAN EAST
1 Wolfgang Benz, introduction to Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung, 7.
2 Ibid., 8.
3 Ziemer, Deutsche Exodus, 63.
4 See Egbert Jahn, ‘On the Phenomenology of Mass Extermination in
Europe: A Comparative Perspective on the Holodomor’, in Manfred Sapper
and Volker Weichsel, eds, Sketches of Europe: Old Lands, New Worlds,
Berlin 2005, a special edition of Osteuropa, 183-220.
5 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 86-7.
6 Ibid., 88-9.
7 Ibid., 92-3.
8 Ibid., 98.
9 Ibid., 109-11
10 Ibid., 112, 115, 117.
11 Ibid., 118.
12 Ibid., 119-22, 128.
13 Ibid., 131, 133-4.
14 Ibid., 163.
15 Ibid., 136-9.
16 Ibid., 139-40.
17 Ibid., 145.
18 Ibid., 152-3.
19 Ibid, 156-7.
20 Gause, Königsberg, III, 174; MacDonogh, Prussia, 386; ‘Stalin
ordino: deportateli tutti, la Prussia dev’essere Sovietica’, Corriere della
Sera, 25 May 1993; ‘Zum Schluss Schokolade’, Der Spiegel, 28 June 1993.
21 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 187.
22 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 164.
23 Ibid., 159-60.
24 Ibid., 168-70, 175.
25 Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, ‘Ein Brief aus Ostpreussen in her Weit ist
der Weg nach Osten - Berichte und Betrachtungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten,
Munich 1988, 18.
26 Ibid., 19.
27 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 202.
28 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 187; Naimark, Russians in Germany, 74.
29 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 183-5.
30 Ibid., 192.
31 Ibid., 194-6.
32 Kaps, Tragödie, 152-4, 156; Tighe, Gdansk, 205.
33 Kaps, Tragödie, 164-5.
34 Hupka, Letze Tage, 39.
35 Michael Luke, Hansel Pless - Prisoner of History, London 2001,
215-16.
36 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 66-7.
37 Normann, Tagebuch, 132-5.
38 Davies and Moorhouse, Microcosm, 409-10.
39 Ibid., 411.
40 Tighe, Gdansk, 206-7.
41 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 12.
42 Kaps, Tragödie, 73.
43 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 23.
44 Normann, Tagebuch, 201.
45 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 200.
46 Ibid., 34.
47 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 206.
48 Ibid., 202.
49 Ibid., 45, 124.
50 Ibid., 202, 204.
51 Ibid., 254.
52 Kaps, Tragödie, 138, 418; Hupka, Letzte Tage, 223.
53 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 75.
54 Kaps, Tragödie, 177.
55 Davies and Moorhouse, Microcosm, 413.
56 Ibid., 414.
57 Kaps, Tragödie, 292.
58 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 148.
59 Kaps, Tragödie, 75.
60 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 135, 200.
61 Tighe, Gdansk, 215.
62 Giles MacDonogh, Frederick the Great, London 1999, 269, 274;
Klaus Ullmann, Schlesien-Lexikon, Mannheim 1985, 118; Hupka, Letzte
Tage, 293.
63 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 47.
64 Kaps, Tragödie, 74, 139.
65 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 179-80.
66 Kaps, Tragödie, 358.
67 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 38.
68 Kaps, Tragödie, 417-20; Hupka, Letzte Tage, 136.
69 Kaps, Tragödie, 175.
70 Ibid., 252, 484.
71 Ibid., 180.
72 Ibid., 184.
73 Ibid., 178-85.
74 Ibid., 184.
75 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 46.
76 Kaps, Tragödie, 189.
77 Ibid., 157, 165.
78 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 23-5.
79 Ibid., 26-7.
80 Ibid., 67.
81 Ibid., 39.
82 Ibid., 63, 80.
83 Ibid., 68.
84 Ibid., 68, 78.
85 Kaps, Tragödie, 223-30.
86 Ibid., 497, 502.
87 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 85, 86.
88 Ibid., 80-1.
89 Ibid., 89-92.
90 Ibid., 92.
91 Ibid., 44-5, 105; van Pelt and Dwork, Auschwitz, 334.
92 Kaps, Tragödie, 148, 150.
93 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 96-7.
94 Josef Foschepoth, ‘Potsdam und danach: Die Westmächte, Adenauer
und die Vertriebenen’, in Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung, 82.
95 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 243.
96 Kaps, Tragödie, 75.
97 Ibid., 359.
98 Ibid., 131-2.
99 Ibid., 132-3.
100 Ibid., 404-5.
101 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 149.
102 Gerhart Pohl, Bin ich noch in meinem Haus? Die letzte Tage
Gerhart Hauptmanns, Berlin 1953, 24-5.
103 Grigori Weiss, ‘Auf der Suche nach der versunkenen Glocke.
Johannes R. Becher bei Gerhart Hauptmann’, in Erinnerungen an Johannes
R. Becher, Frankfurt/Main 1974, 217.
104 Pohl, Bin ich noch, 44-5.
105 Ibid., 50.
106 Hupka, Letzte Tage, 302-3.
107 Pohl, Bin ich noch, 72-3.
108 Ibid., 54. Pohl’s petits nègres have a certain sameness that makes
them suspicious.
109 Ibid., 66.
110 Ibid., 69.
111 Weiss, ‘Auf der Suche’, 227.
112 Ibid., 233.
113 Kaps, Tragödie, 420-1; Ullmann, Lexikon, 20; Hupka, Letzte Tage,
313-14, 316-17.
114 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 302.
115 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 139-40; Giles MacDonogh, The Last
Kaiser: William the Impetuous, London 2000, 123.
116 Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung, 8.
117 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 236.
118 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 147.
119 Ibid., 152.
120 Ibid., 155.
121 Davies and Moorhouse, Microcosm, 422.
122 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 15.
123 Ibid., 16.
124 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 173.
125 Ibid., 188.
126 Lehndorff, Tagebuch, 204.
127 Normann, Tagebuch, 268.
128 Henke, ‘Exodus’, 99.
129 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 189.
130 Kaps, Tragödie, 87.
131 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 197.
132 Normann, Tagebuch, 270.
OceanofPDF.com
PROLOGUE TO PART II
1 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 13.
2 Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People: Germans under the British
1945-1950, London and Chester Springs 2001, 13.
3 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 105.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 6: LIFE IN THE RUSSIAN ZONE
1 Peterson, Russian Commands, 7.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 13.
4 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 24-6.
5 Ibid., 16.
6 Gregory Klimov, The Terror Machine - The Inside Story of Soviet
Administered Germany, translated by H. C. Stevens with an introduction by
Edward Crankshaw and Ernst Reuter, London n.d., 103.
7 Ibid., 26-7, 30-1.
8 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 69; Peterson, Russian Commands, 14;
Hans Borgelt, Das war der Frühling in Berlin. Die goldene Hungerjahre.
Eine Berlin Chronik, Munich 1983, 38.
9 Leonhard, Revolution, 302.
10 Williams, More Lives than One, 247-8.
11 Boveri, Tage, 165.
12 Leonhard, Revolution, 341-2.
13 Boveri, Tage, 217-19.
14 Quoted in Naimark, Russians in Germany, 142-3.
15 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 108.
16 Franz Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüge durch die Landschaften
meines Lebens, privately printed, Munich 2000, 161-4.
17 Ibid., 143.
18 Ibid., 163.
19 Harald von Koenigswald, ed., Besuche vor der Untergang - aus
Tagebuchaufzeichnungen von Udo von Alvensleben. Frankfurt/Main 1968,
147.
20 Ibid., 162.
21 Borgelt, Das war der Frühling in Berlin, 45.
22 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 116.
23 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 80-1.
24 Michael Cullen, Der Reichstag - Die Geschichte eines Monumentes,
Stuttgart 1990, 399.
25 Nikolaus Bernau, ‘Der Ort des Souveräns’, in Fördverein Berliner
Stadtschloss, Das Schloss? Eine Ausstellung über die Mitte Berlins, Berlin
1993, 75.
26 There have been moves to rebuild all three. The decision to put back
the Berlin Schloss was approved by the German parliament, but so far the
project has been stymied by lack of funds in a bankrupt city. In 2005 it was
ruled that the exterior of the city palace in Potsdam would be re-erected to
house the provincial parliament or Landtag. For the time being the plans to
rebuild the Garrison Church remain on the drawing board.
27 Alan Balfour, Berlin: The Politics of Order, 1737-1989, New York
1990, 187.
28 Buffet, Berlin, 363.
29 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 10-11.
30 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 16; Löwenthal, Potsdam, 16.
31 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 19.
32 Ibid., 20-3.
33 Ibid., 24-5.
34 Ibid., 34, 41, 44.
35 Klimov, Terror Machine, 118-20; Peterson, Russian Commands, 104.
36 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 72.
37 Ibid., 97.
38 Ibid., 113-18.
39 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 42, 44.
40 Ibid., 85.
41 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 53.
42 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 105.
43 Ibid., 92, 94-6, 116.
44 Klimov, Terror Machine, 117.
45 Ibid., 221.
46 Ibid., 208, 219.
47 Michel Bar-Zohar, The Hunt for German Scientists, translated by
Len Ortzen, London 1967, 9.
48 Ibid., 151-3, 161, 168.
49 Klimov, Terror Machine, 222-5.
50 Jana Urbancová and Claus Josef Riedel, Riedel od roku 1756,
exhibition catalogue, Jablonec (Gablonz), 19 August-27 October 1991, 14.
51 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 237-40, 248-9; Petersen, Russian
Commands, 123; Jünger, Okkupation, 293.
52 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 355-7, 360-2, 374.
53 Peterson, Russian Commands, 46.
54 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 376; Peterson, Russian Commands,
25.
55 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 378.
56 Ibid., 381-2.
57 Löwenthal, Potsdam, 201-2.
58 Alexander Behrens, Johannes R. Becher, eine politische Biographie,
Cologne, Weimar and Vienna 2003, 223.
59 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater - Cultural and Intellectual
Life in Berlin 1945-1948, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1998, ix.
60 Behrens, Becher, 223.
61 Ibid., 225.
62 Clare, Berlin Days, 62.
63 Ibid., 81.
64 Schivelbusch, Cold Crater, 31, 36-7.
65 Zuckmayer, ‘Bericht über das Filmund Theaterleben’, in
Deutschlandbericht, 156-204.
66 Clare, Berlin Days, 64.
67 Behrens, Becher, 229.
68 Schivelbusch, Cold Crater, 40, 45.
69 Ibid., 231-3.
70 Lang, ‘Lieber Herr Celibidache’, 21.
71 Ibid., 28-9.
72 Clare, Berlin Days, 81; Lang, ‘Lieber Herr Celibidache’, 33.
73 Clare, Berlin Days, 105-7.
74 Speer, Diaries, 104.
75 Clare, Berlin Days, 182-4.
76 Speer, Diaries, 44.
77 Boveri, Tage, 159.
78 Lang, ‘Lieber Herr Celibidache’, 59.
79 Ibid., 71
80 Schivelbusch, Cold Crater, 56.
81 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 92; Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 364.
82 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 105.
83 David Pike, The Politics and Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany,
1945-1949, Stanford 1992, 189-92.
84 Clare, Berlin Days, 128.
85 Williams, More Lives than One, 252.
86 Ibid., 256-7.
87 Erinnerung an Johannes R. Becher, 189.
88 Carsten Wurm, Jeden Tag ein Buch - 50 Jahre Aufbau-Verlag 1945-
1995, Berlin 1995, 11-12.
89 Ibid., 10, 119.
90 Behrens, Becher, 234.
91 Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 624.
92 Behrens, Becher, 239-40.
93 Ibid., 241-2.
94 Ronald Taylor, Berlin and its Culture, New Haven and London,
1997, 228.
95 Ibid., 244-66.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 7: LIFE IN THE AMERICAN ZONE
1 John Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, Boston 1946, 248-50; Summersby,
Eisenhower was my Boss, 235.
2 Kay Summersby Morgan, Past Forgetting - My Love Affair with
Dwight D. Eisenhower, London 1977, 198.
3 Klimov, Terror Machine, 136.
4 Stern, Hidden Damages, 350.
5 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 244, 247.
6 Ladislas Farago, The Last Days of Patton, New York, St Louis, San
Francisco and Toronto 1981, 59-64; Carlo d’Este, A Genius for War: A Life
of George S. Patton, London 1995, 738.
7 D’Este, Patton, 712.
8 Farago, Last Days, 68.
9 D’Este, Patton, 766.
10 Trevor Royle, Patton - Old Blood and Guts, London 2005, 194-6.
11 D’Este, Patton, 755.
12 Farrago, Last Days, 156.
13 D’Este, Patton, 755.
14 Davidson, Death and Life, 77.
15 Farago, Last Days, 1.
16 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 7.
17 Ibid., 351.
18 Ibid., 459, 463.
19 Salomon, The Answers, 422.
20 Padover, Psychologist, 314-16.
21 Salomon, The Answers, 422; Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans, New
Haven and London 2003, 67.
22 Marta Krauss, Heimkehr in eines fremdes Land - Geschichte der
Remigranten nach 1945, Munich 2001, 63-5.
23 Stern, Hidden Damage, 71
24 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 7.
25 Ibid., 71.
26 Ibid., 80.
27 Hanns Mayer, Im guten Ratskeller zu Bremen, 5th edn., Bremen
1985, 110-11; information from Dr Carl-Ferdinand von Schubert at
Maximin-Grünhaus.
28 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 263.
29 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 41.
30 Ibid., 69.
31 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 92-3.
32 Ibid., 102-3.
33 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 4, 15, 46.
34 Ibid., 50-1, 57.
35 Ibid., 53-4; Salomon, The Answers, 415, 408.
36 Salomon, The Answers, 320, 321.
37 Stern, Hidden Damage, 216-17.
38 Boveri, Tage, 283-4.
39 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 72-6.
40 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 75.
41 Ibid., 115.
42 Ibid., 95-6. 248.
43 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 59-60.
44 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht 20-1.
45 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 94-6, 101.
46 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 32 See also Saul K. Padover,
Experiment in Germany. The Story of an American Intelligence Officer,
New York 1946; also John Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, Boston 1946.
47 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 36-8.
48 Ibid., 42.
49 Peterson, Russian Commands, 254.
50 Boveri, Tage, 320-1.
51 Stern, Hidden Damage, 198.
52 Ibid., 324-5.
53 Salomon, The Answers, 416-17; Goedde, GIs and Germans, 84;
Naimark, Russians in Germany, 106 n. 172.
54 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 73.
55 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 109, 111; Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin,
163.
56 Davidson, Death and Life, 55.
57 Skrjabina, Allies on the Rhine, 86-7.
58 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 59.
59 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 102.
60 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 86.
61 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 102.
62 Stern, Hidden Damage, 313.
63 Müller, Bis zur letzten Konsequenz, 304-6.
64 Ibid., 307.
65 Ibid., 311.
66 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 82, 89-90.
67 Müller, Bis zur letzten Konsequenz, 323.
68 Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben, Munich and
Landsberg am Lech 1996, 40-2.
69 Ibid., 48.
70 Ibid., 51.
71 Frederic Spotts, Bayreuth - A History of the Wagner Festival, New
Haven and London 1994, 200.
72 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, 412-13.
73 Spotts, Bayreuth, 201.
74 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüge, 185.
75 Ibid., 56, 90
76 See Zuckmayer, ‘Bericht über das Film- und Theaterleben’.
77 Zuckmayer, ‘Allgemeiner Bericht über die Filmsituation in
Deutschland’, in Deutschlandbericht, 185-204.
78 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 121-2.
79 Ibid., 57, 14.
80 Ibid., 84-5; see also Helmuth James von Moltke, Letters to Freya
1939-1945, edited and translated by Beate Ruhm von Oppen, London 1991,
393.
81 Reinhard Lettau, ed., Die Gruppe 47. Bericht, Kritik, Polemik,
Neuwied 1967, 22, 35.
82 Stern, Hidden Damage, 280-1.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 8: LIFE IN THE BRITISH ZONE
1 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 99.
2 Victor Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, London 1947, 17.
3 Ibid., 29.
4 Lord Longford, Avowed Intent, London 1994, 103-5. Longford’s book
is particularly unsatisfying, especially given that he was minister during
currency reform and the Berlin crisis, yet mentions neither.
5 Ibid., 156.
6 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 53-4.
7 See Weeks’s biography in DNB 57. There is remarkably little written
about these significant British post-war administrators.
8 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 82.
9 See his biography in DNB 16. Douglas did write volumes of
autobiography: Years of Command, London 1966, covers the period.
10 Peter Merseburger, Der Schwieriger Deutsche - Kurt Schumacher.
Eine Biographie, Stuttgart 1995, 197-8.
11 His biography is in DNB 47.
12 Clare, Berlin Days, 146.
13 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 63.
14 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 53, 60, 62, 67.
15 Ibid., 140-2; Tom Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, London 1981, 130.
16 Robert Birley, The German Problem and the Responsibility of
Britain, The Burge Memorial Lecture, London 1947, 5.
17 Ibid., 7-9.
18 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 163-5.
19 Ibid., 171.
20 Krauss, Heimkehr, 74-5.
21 Clare, Berlin Days, 162; See also Balfour and Mair, Four Power
Control.
22 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 173-5, ‘Secret Retreat Marks 60
Years of Diplomacy’, in BBC News Online, 12 January 2006. See Richard
Mayne, In Victory, Magnanimity, In Peace, Goodwill: A History of Wilton
Park, London 2003.
23 See A. G. Dickens, Lübeck Diary, London 1947.
24 Ibid., 164, 173.
25 Corine Defrance, La Politique culturelle de la France sur la rive
gauche du Rhin, 1945-1955, Strasbourg 1994, 52.
26 Clare, Berlin Days, 15, 35; author’s own visits to the Marlborough
Club.
27 Ibid., 37, 40.
28 Ibid., 42.
29 Botting, Ruins, 293-5.
30 Speer, Diaries, 79.
31 MacDonogh, The Last Kaiser, 173-4.
32 George Drower, Heligoland - The True Story of the German Bight
and the Island that Britain Betrayed, Stroud 2002, 217.
33 Ibid., 219.
34 Ibid., 226-7.
35 Ibid., 235.
36 ‘Der besessene Besitzer’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16
December 2005 - kindly communicated by Angela Bohrer.
37 Schulenburg, Ich hab’s gewagt, 183-4; Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 63.
38 Schulenburg, Ich hab’s gewagt, 186-7.
39 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin - Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, London
1983, 265.
40 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, London 1968, 437.
41 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 75.
42 Ibid., 79. Gollancz fails to recognise the Emperor Fritz.
43 Herzogin Viktoria Luise, Ein Leben, 333. See Frieda Utley, The High
Cost of Vengeance, Chicago 1949.
44 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 191-4.
45 Ibid., 214-15, 221, 236; see also Ralf Richter, Ivan Hirst, 2nd edn,
Wolfsburg 2004.
46 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 98.
47 Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 68-9.
48 Interview with Karl-Heinz Bohrer, November 2004.
49 Charles Williams, Adenauer - The Father of the New Germany,
London 2000, 289.
50 Ibid., 295.
51 Ibid., 296.
52 Merseburger, Schumacher, 202.
53 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 60.
54 Quoted in MacDonogh, Prussia, 6.
55 Ibid., 297.
56 Ibid, 300-1.
57 Ibid., 302; confirmed in Heinrich Böll’s short story ‘Als der Krieg zu
Ende war’ (When the War was Over), 1962.
58 Williams, Adenauer, 305.
59 Merseburger, Schumacher, 200.
60 Gilbert Ziebura, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945:
Mythen und Realitäten, Pfullingen 1970, 57.
61 Ibid., 59.
62 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 387; Ziebura, Die deutsch-
französische Beziehungen, 62.
63 Ibid., 325-6.
64 Merseburger, Schumacher, 7.
65 Ibid., 212.
66 Ibid., 299-300.
67 Ibid., 282.
68 Willi A. Boelcke, Der Schwarzmarkt 1945-1948 - Vom überleben
nach dem Kriege, Brunswick 1986, 78.
69 Merseburger, Schumacher, 238.
70 Ibid., Schumacher, 224.
71 Ibid., 318.
72 Ibid., 320; Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 49.
73 Clare, Berlin Days, 188.
74 Ibid., 169.
75 Ibid., 130.
76 Herzogin Viktoria Luise, Ein Leben, 330.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 9: LIFE IN THE FRENCH ZONE
1 Davidson, Death and Life, 82.
2 Defrance, La Politique culturelle, 29.
3 Stern, Hidden Damage, 161.
4 Frank Raberg, ‘Landesregierungen und französisch Besatzungsmacht:
Aus den Kabinettsprotokollen von Baden und Württemberg-Hohenzollern’,
in Kurt Hochstuhl, ed., Deutsche und Franzosen im zusammenwachsenden
Europa, 1945-2000, Stuttgart 2003, 14.
5 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 400; Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control,
106.
6 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 23.
7 Young, France, 52, 58.
8 Edgar Wolfram, ‘Die französische Politik in besetzten Deutschland:
neue Forschungen, alte Klischees, vernachlässige Fragen’, in Hochstuhl,
ed., Deutsche und Franzosen, 66.
9 Ibid., 60.
10 Weber, Schmid, 193-4, 220.
11 Ibid., 286.
12 Willi A. Boelcke, ‘Industrie und Technologie in der französische
Besatzungszone’, in Manfrass and Rioux, eds, France-Allemagne, 177-8.
13 Ibid., 178-9.
14 Ibid., 181-5.
15 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 81.
16 Bar-Zohar, Hunt for German Scientists, 133-5.
17 Skrjabina, Allies on the Rhine, 42, 55, 58, 60.
18 Interview with Karl-Heinz Bohrer, November 2004.
19 Paul Falkenburger, ‘Souvenir d’un ancient curateur adjoint de
l’université de Freibourg’, in Manfrass and Rioux, eds, France-Allemagne,
285.
20 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 35.
21 Young, France, 76.
22 Ibid., 88-9.
23 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 88-9.
24 Young, France, 102-4.
25 Ibid., 106-7.
26 Ibid., 117.
27 Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman, Paris 1988, 74.
28 Ibid., 74-6.
29 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 288.
30 Young, France, 145.
31 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 1004, 1056-7.
32 Defrance, La Politique culturelle, 30-1.
33 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 404.
34 Ibid., 429-30.
35 Ibid., 431-2.
36 Ibid., 413.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 10: AUSTRIA’S ZONES AND
SECTORS
1 Béthouart, Bataille, 73.
2 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 279.
3 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 76.
4 Ibid., 86, 87, 89.
5 Schöner, Tagebuch, 242.
6 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 68, 71.
7 Ibid., 72.
8 Ibid., 90.
9 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 31-2.
10 Schöner, Tagebuch, 249.
11 Ibid., 283.
12 Private information.
13 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 49-50.
14 Beer, ‘Niederösterreich’, 156.
15 Franzel, Sudetenland, 117.
16 Schöner, Tagebuch, 290-1; Rathkolb, ‘Historische Fragmente’, 154;
Margarétha, Tagebuch, 84.
17 Magarétha, Tagebuch, 89-90.
18 Michael Gehler, ‘“Kein Anschluss aber auch kein chinesische
Mauer”. Österreichs aussenpolitische Emanzipation und die deutsche Frage
1945-1955’, in Ableitner et al., eds, Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung,
206.
19 Ibid., 207.
20 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 122.
21 Rauchensteiner, ‘Jahrzehnt’, 24; Rauchsteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 60.
22 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 61; Gehler, ‘“Kein Anschluss”’, 208.
23 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 113.
24 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 277.
25 Papers kindly communicated by Podhragy’s son, Johannes.
26 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 292.
27 Renner, World Review, May 1938. Document communicated by
Johannes Popper von Podhragy.
28 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 110.
29 Ibid., 40.
30 General Mark Clark, Calculated Risk, London 1956, 411.
31 Ibid., 412; Béthouart, Bataille, 25-6; Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 293.
32 Beer, ‘Niederösterreich’, 139.
33 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 111.
34 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 106.
35 Reinhold Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria: The Political
Reports and Analyses of Martin F. Herz, Political Officer of the US
Legation in Vienna 1945-1948, Salzburg 1984, 94.
36 Ibid., 427.
37 Hermann Riepl, ‘Die Neubilding der Niederösterreichisches
Landesregierung und der Wiederaufbau der Niederösterreichisches
Landesverwaltung im Jahre 1945’, in Bezemek and Rossner, eds,
Niederösterreich - Südmähren, 88.
38 Alfred Ableitinger, ‘Grossbritannien unter der zweite
Kontrollabkommen: Genese und Gehalt des britischen
Regierungsentwurfes’, in Ableitinger et al., eds, Österreich unter alliieter
Besatzung, 98.
39 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 122-3, 143-4.
40 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 160.
41 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 185-6; Rauchensteiner,
Stalinplatz 4, 58.
42 Siegfried Beer, ‘Die Besatzungsmacht Grossbritannien und
Österreich 1945-1949’, in Ableitinger et al., eds, Österreich unter alliierter
Besatzung, 59.
43 Quoted in The Patriot, 2 August 1945.
44 Rathkolb, ‘Historische Fragmente’, 151.
45 Béthouart, Bataille, 28.
46 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 105.
47 Ibid., 105, 107, 109, 112.
48 Ibid., 117; the last epithet the author learned from his Viennese
godfather on a visit to Vienna in 1969.
49 Clark, Calculated Risk, 416-18.
50 Ibid., 434.
51 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 22.
52 Ibid., 420.
53 Ibid., 76.
54 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 55.
55 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 23, 32-3, 34, 53.
56 Ibid., 418-19.
57 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 125, 128; Béthouart, Bataille, 83.
58 Béthouart, Bataille, 86.
59 Ibid., 75-6.
60 Ibid., 77.
61 Clark, Calculated Risk, 446.
62 Ibid., 421-2.
63 Communicated by Sebastian Cody.
64 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 140.
65 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 200; Byrnes, Speaking
Frankly, 160.
66 Margarétha, Tagebuch, 149.
67 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 75.
68 Ibid., 74; Béthouart, Bataille, 96.
69 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 80.
70 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 281, 292.
71 Clark, Calculated Risk, 431.
72 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 83.
73 Ibid., 94-6.
74 Peter Leighton-Langer, X Steht fur unbekannt - Deutsche und
Österreicher in den britischen Streitkräften im zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin
1999, 237-8.
75 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 325.
76 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 282, 291, 293.
77 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 47; Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 130-1.
78 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 76-7.
79 Ibid., 116-17.
80 The author’s maternal grandfather’s family is a case in point. Before
1938 they owned a substantial corner of the Kärntnerstrasse and the
Weihburggasse in the centre of Vienna. On the site was the department store
Modehaus Zwieback, the restaurant Zu den drei Husaren and the Palais
Pereira. After the war the family managed to regain the department store,
which they resold in 1957. On the other hand they were not compensated
for their lost palace and the restaurant was later sold by Göring’s favourite
restaurateur, Gustav Horcher, to Egon Födermayr. In the immediate post-
war years it had been Renner’s canteen. See Tina Walzer and Stephan
Templ, Unser Wien - Ariesierung auf Österreichisch, Berlin 2001, 42-3, and
the Grundbücher (Land Register) for 2 and 4 Weihburggasse as well as 11,
13-15 Kärntnerstrasse.
81 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 97; Clark, Calculated Risk, 424.
82 Clark, Calculated Risk, 424 n. 1.
83 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 134, 154.
84 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 102.
85 Clark, Calculated Risk, 425.
86 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 9.
87 Zuckmayer, ‘Allgemeiner Bericht über die Filmsituation in
Deutschland’.
88 Quoted in Marietta Bearman and Charmian Brinson, ‘Keine einfache
Sache’, in Bearman et al., Wien-London, 238.
89 Charmian Brinson, ‘Ein Stück wahrer Kultur, ein Stück Wien, ein
Stück Leben’, in Bearman et al., Wien-London, 171.
90 Walter Binnebös, Galoppsport in Wien, Vienna 1980, 147-8.
91 Rathkolb, ‘Historische Fragmente, 148; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz
4, 36.
92 Information from Georg Stiegelmar, the late Helmut Osberger and
Erich Salomon.
93 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 125; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 48.
94 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 134.
95 Beer, ‘Niederösterreich’, 146, 148, 155-6, 165-6.
96 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 38; Andrew Gibson-Watt, An
Undistinguished Life, Lewes 1990, 173.
97 Gibson-Watt, Life, 183.
98 Beer, ‘Grossbritannien’, 52-3.
99 Ibid., 63.
100 Helmut Eberhart, ‘Weideraufbau in Nachkriegszeit - Das Tagebuch
von Anton Pirchegger’, in Siegfried Beer, ed., Die ‘Britische Steiermark’
1945-1955, Graz 1995.
101 Stefan Karner, ‘“Ich bekam zehn Jahre Zwangsarbeit”: zu den
Verschleppungen aus der Steiermark durch sowjetische Organe in Jahre
1945’, in Beer, ed., Die ‘Britische Steiermark’, 249-50; Othmar Pickl, ‘Das
Kriegsende 1945 und die frühe Besatzungszeit im mittleren Mürztal’, in
Beer, ed., Die ‘Britische Steiermark’. 250.
102 Beer, ‘Grossbritannien’, 57.
103 Alfred Ableitinger, Siegfried Beer and Eduard G. Staudinger,
Besatzungszeit in der Steiermark, Graz, Esztergom, Paris and New York
1994, 15.
104 Ibid., 17.
105 Beer, ed., Die ‘Britische Steiermark’, 25; Siegfried Beer, ‘Die
Briten und der Wiederaufbau des Justizwesens in der Steiermark 1945-
1950’, in ibid., 113-14.
106 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 40.
107 Gibson-Watt, Life, 172.
108 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 24-6.
109 Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Austria as a Special Case in Cold War
Europe - A Personal Note’, in Ableitinger et al., eds, Österreich unter
alliierter Besatzung, 282.
110 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 58.
111 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 314-15.
112 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 67.
113 Arthur Radley, ‘The British Military Government in Steiermark
[sic] 1945-1946, Personal Reminiscences’, in Beer, ed., Die ‘Britische
Steiermark’, 586-7.
114 John Corsellis and Marcus Ferrar, Slovenia 1945: Memories of
Death and Survival after World War II, London and New York 2005, 8.
115 Gibson-Watt, Life, 178.
116 Corsellis and Ferrar, Slovenia, 19.
117 Ibid., 43.
118 Ibid., 45.
119 Gibson-Watt, Life, 179.
120 Corsellis and Ferrar, Slovenia, 47.
121 Gibson-Watt, Life, 173.
122 Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, London 1977, 220-1.
123 Ibid., 225-6, 229; Thurn und Taxis, ‘Memoiren’, 28-9.
124 Corsellis and Ferrar, Slovenia, 49.
125 Ibid., 50; Gibson-Watt, Life, 179.
126 Corsellis and Ferrar, Slovenia, 52, 59, 186.
127 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 44; Ralph W. Brown III, ‘A Cold War
Army of Occupation’, in Ableitinger et al., eds, Österreich unter alliierter
Besatzung, 349-50; Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 246.
128 Quoted in Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 45.
129 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 168-70.
130 Ibid., 303.
131 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 46.
132 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 7.
133 Brown, ‘Cold War Army’, 355-66.
134 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 55.
135 Clark, Calculated Risk, 414; for Hitler’s use of the building, and the
French furniture: Eberle and Uhl, Das Buch Hitler, 113.
136 Clark, Calculated Risk, 415.
137 Ibid., 415.
138 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 243.
139 Ibid., 255.
140 Clark, Calculated Risk, 420-1.
141 Ibid., 432.
142 Günter Bischof, ‘Der Nationale Sicherheitsrat und die
amerikanische Österreichspolitik im frühen Kalten Krieg’, in Ableitinger et
al., eds, Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung, 112, 116.
143 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 243.
144 Ibid., 49-55.
145 Ibid., 69-71.
146 Béthouart, Bataille, 42.
147 Ibid., 47.
148 Béthouart, Bataille, 54.
149 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 41-2.
150 Béthouart, Bataille, 55.
151 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 371.
152 Béthouart, Bataille, 59.
153 Ibid., 67.
154 Ibid., 67-8; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 64; Otto von Habsburg,
Kampf um Österreich, 72, 75; Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 334.
155 Habsburg, Kampf, 78.
156 Denys G. C. Salt, ‘Reminiscences of Styria’, in Beer, ed., Die
‘Britische Steiermark’, 592.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 11: LIFE IN ALL FOUR ZONES
1 Clare, Berlin Days, 17-18.
2 Stern, Hidden Damage, 284.
3 Ibid., 286.
4 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 97-9.
5 See Heinrich Böll, Wanderer, kommst du nach Spa, Munich 2004;
interview with Karl-Heinz Bohrer, November 2004. Norbert Mühlen,
L’Incroyable Famille Krupp, Paris 1961, 197.
6 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 132, 133-4; Zuckmayer,
Deutschlandbericht, 149.
7 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 137, 144, 161-3.
8 Quoted in Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 272.
9 Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 94.
10 Quoted in Williams, More Lives than One, xiii.
11 Borgelt, Das war der Frühling in Berlin, 69; Krauss, Heimkehr, 56-
7, 73.
12 Ernst Jünger, Der Friede. Ein Wort an die Jugend Europas. Ein Wort
an die Jugend der Welt, Vienna 1949, 83, 87.
13 Jünger, Okkupation, 147.
14 Jünger, Der Friede, 10.
15 Ibid., 21.
16 Ibid., 16.
17 Ibid., 76.
18 Karl O. Paetel, Ernst Jünger. Die Wandlung eines Deutschen
Dichters und Patrioten, New York 1946, 10.
19 Salomon, The Answers, 524.
20 Ibid., Goronwy Rees preface, viii.
21 Ibid., 545-6.
22 Michael Kennedy, Richard Strauss, Oxford 1995, 107-12.
23 Leighton-Langer, X, 231.
24 Hans Habe, Im Jahre Null. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutscher
Presse, Munich 1966, 50, 53, 70, 79; Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 363, 364 n.
1.
25 Zuckmayer, ‘Bericht über das Filmund Theaterleben’.
26 Georg Stefan Troller, Das fidele Grab an der Donau - Mein Wien
1918-1938, Düsseldorf and Zurich 2004, 96.
27 Habe, Im Jahre Null, 119-20.
28 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 1066.
29 Schulenburg, Ich hab’s gewagt, 200.
30 Ibid., 206.
31 Clare, Berlin Days, 158-9.
32 Stern, Hidden Damage, 167.
33 See Inge Scholl, Die Weisse Rose, Frankfurt/Main 1988.
34 Stern, Hidden Damage, 175.
35 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 337.
36 Ibid., 363; Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 65.
37 Schulenburg, Ich hab’s gewagt, 185.
38 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 57.
39 Ibid., 104.
40 Ibid., 105-6.
41 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 339.
42 Chamberlain and Feldman, eds, Liberation, 71-2; Leighton-Langer,
X, 228.
43 Leighton-Langer, X, 229.
44 Ibid., 230.
45 Normann, Tagebuch, 207-8.
46 Stern, Hidden Damage, 343-4, 350.
47 Clare, Berlin Days, 152.
48 Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason, 2nd edn, London 1982, 129.
49 Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 205.
50 Ibid., 206.
51 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1228.
52 Ruth Gay, Safe among the Germans: Liberated Jews after World War
II, New Haven and London 2002, x-xi, 70, 72.
53 Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 206.
54 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1132.
55 Ibid., 1229; Peck, “Jüdische DPs’, 206.
56 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1234.
57 Ibid., 1134.
58 Ibid., 65.
59 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 111-12.
60 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 131.
61 Ibid., 257.
62 Gay, Safe, 104-5.
63 Ibid., 59-60, 63, 103.
64 Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 207.
65 Gay, Safe, 56; Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 208.
66 Shepherd, After Daybreak, 44.
67 Ibid., 71.
68 Ibid., 72.
69 Ibid., 92.
70 Ibid., 116.
71 Ibid., 118, 133.
72 Ibid., 134.
73 Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 206.
74 Gay, Safe, 68; Peck, ‘Jüdische DPs’, 209.
75 Gay, Safe, 81, 83.
76 Ibid., 86-7; 96-7.
77 Ibid., 89.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 12: GUILT
1 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 330.
2 Ibid., 332, 334.
3 Normann, Tagebuch, 61.
4 Stern, Hidden Damage, 307.
5 Jünger, Okkupation, 130.
6 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 72, 74.
7 Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage. Für Völkermord gibt es keine
Verjährung, Heidelberg 1946, 13
8 Ibid., 19.
9 Ibid.
10 Quoted in Kirkbright, Jaspers, 141, 193.
11 Ibid., 197, 195; quoted in Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 245;
Jaspers, Schuldfrage, 28-9.
12 Norbert Trippen, Josef Cardinal Frings (1887-1978). Sein Wirken für
das Erzbistum Köln und für die Kirche in Deutschland, Paderborn, Munich,
Vienna and Zurich 2003, 132.
13 Ibid., 142.
14 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 76; conversation with Karl-Heinz
Bohrer, 12 January 2005.
15 Kirkbright, Jaspers, 190.
16 Stern, Hidden Damage, 79-81.
17 Interview with Karl-Heinz Bohrer, November 2004.
18 Abzug, Vicious Heart, x.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 134-7.
21 Ibid., 128-32; Farago, Last Days, 58.
22 Shepherd, After Daybreak, 74-7.
23 James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and
Denazification in American Occupied Germany, Chicago and London 1982,
11, 14.
24 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat
to Victory, Detroit 1977, 115, 59; Frank M. Buscher, The U.S. War Crimes
Trial Program in Germany, 1946-1955, New York, Westport and London
1989, 19.
25 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 35.
26 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 324.
27 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 82.
28 Stern, Hidden Damage, 120.
29 Justus Fürstenau, Entnazifizierung. Ein Kapitel deutscher
Nachkriegspolitik, Neuwied and Berlin 1969, 25.
30 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 339.
31 Jünger, Okkupation, 153.
32 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 116.
33 Krauss, Heimkehr, 51.
34 Emmy Goering, My Life with Goering, London 1972, 142.
35 Margret Boveri, Der Verrat im XX. Jahrhundert - für und gegen die
Nation, Hamburg 1956, 14.
36 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 253-4.
37 MacDonogh, A Good German, 71; see also R. G. S. Weber, The
German Student Corps in the Third Reich, London 1986.
38 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 103.
39 MacDonogh, Prussia, 192-3; Hansgeorg Model, Der deutsche
Generalstabsoffizier. Seine Auswahl und Ausbildung in Reichswehr,
Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr, Frankfurt/Main 1968, 135-9.
40 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 326 n. 1, 333.
41 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüge, 166.
42 Peterson, American Occupation, 174, 216; Tent, Mission on the
Rhine, 51.
43 Tent, Mission on the Rhine, 54-5.
44 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 273.
45 Clare, Berlin Days, 26-8.
46 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 104.
47 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 328-9; Timothy R. Vogt, Denazification
in Soviet-Occupied Germany 1945-1948, Cambridge, Mass. and London
2000, 7-8
48 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 174.
49 Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, 182-3, 221; Wolfgang Krüger,
Entnazifiziert!: Zur Praxis der politischen Säuberung in Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Wuppertal 1982, 14-15.
50 Vogt, Denazification, 2-3, 71.
51 Krüger, Entnazifiziert!, 11.
52 Clare, Berlin Days, 112-13.
53 Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 91.
54 Ibid., 91-2.
55 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 251-2.
56 Ibid., 309.
57 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 140-1; Zuckmayer, ‘Jugend im
Niemandsland’.
58 Franz von Papen, Memoirs, translated by Brian Connell, London
1952, 577-8.
59 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 261-2.
60 Goering, My Life with Goering, 168.
61 Nike Wagner, The Wagners - The Dramas of a Musical Dynasty,
London 2000, 226.
62 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, 403; Spotts, Bayreuth, 199.
63 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, 406, 408.
64 Ibid., 410-11.
65 Franz Endler, Herbert von Karajan: My Autobiography, London
1989, 46.
66 Lang, ‘Lieber Herr Celibidache’, 48-50.
67 Ibid., 58.
68 Davidson, Death and Life, 127-8.
69 Peterson, Russian Commands, 84-5.
70 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 46-7.
71 Ibid., 102.
72 Ibid., 130, 141.
73 Ibid., 433; II, 624.
74 Ibid., 224-5.
75 Peterson, American Occupation, 93.
76 Buscher, War Crimes Trial Program, 49, 60.
77 Clare, Berlin Days, 206-10.
78 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 98-100.
79 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 110.
80 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 147-8.
81 Ibid., 209, 243.
82 Ibid., 109, 112.
83 Ibid. 153, 152 n. 1.
84 Ibid., 390.
85 Béthouart, Bataille, 120.
86 Richard Dove, Foreword to Bearman et al., Wien-London, 11.
87 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 115-17.
88 Blake Baker, ‘Zur Arbeit der Field Security Service im Steirischen
Grenzland’, in Beer, ed., Die ‘Britische Steiermark’, 608.
89 Beer, ‘Die Briten’, 130-1.
90 Ibid., 122.
91 Beer, ‘Grossbritannien’, 65 n. 67.
92 Beer, ‘Die Briten’, 122-3.
93 Ibid., 125.
94 Wolfgang Muchitsch, ‘Das Volksgericht Graz’, in Beer, Die
‘Britische Steiermark’, 43.
95 Beer, ‘Die Briten’, 153.
96 Lorenz Jäger, Adorno - Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2003,
223.
97 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 18-19.
98 Victor Gollancz, Leaving them to their Fate: The Ethics of
Starvation, London 1946, 4.
99 Ibid., 5-6, 12, 18.
100 Bullock, Bevin, 265.
101 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 24.
102 Ibid., 18.
103 Ibid., 14-15, 17.
104 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 415.
105 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 11.
106 Ibid., 12.
107 Ibid., 23-4.
108 Ibid., 38-9.
109 Ibid., 53-7.
110 Ibid., 64.
111 Ibid., 66-7.
112 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 72.
113 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 29.
114 Ibid., 13-14.
115 Jünger, Okkupation, 240.
116 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 151-2, 161, 166, 179, 207.
117 Ibid., 212.
118 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 74.
119 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 264-5.
120 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 35-6.
121 Ibid., 164; Davidson, Death and Life, 137.
122 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 48-9, 50-4, 59-60, 64.
123 Ibid., 60, 65-6, 70; Davidson, Death and Life, 159.
124 Zuckmayer, ‘Deutschland, Sommer 1948: Jüngstes Gericht oder
Stunde Null?’, in Deutschlandbericht.
125 Trippen, Frings, 251.
126 Ibid., 174-5.
127 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 240.
128 Paul Dahm, Joseph Kardinal Frings, Erzbischof von Köln, Munich
1957, 4-5.
129 Ibid., 21-2.
130 Quoted in ibid., 22.
131 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 43, 45.
132 Davidson, Death and Life, 21, 54.
133 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 41-2.
134 Radley, ‘British Military Government’, 583.
135 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 29.
136 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 332; Clare, Berlin Days, 34, 55.
137 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 44; Boveri, Tage, 286; Clare, Berlin
Days, 16, 55, 60.
138 Clare, Berlin Days, 54.
139 Ibid., 17-18.
140 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 82; Stern, Hidden Damage, 273.
141 Stern, Hidden Damage, 286.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 13: BLACK MARKET
1 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 167, 169; Heinrich Böll, When the War
was Over.
2 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüger, 171.
3 Heinrich Böll, ‘Wanderer, kommst du nach Spa . . .’, in his
Erzählungen, Munich 1997, 14-15.
4 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 192.
5 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 335-6.
6 Ibid., 211-13.
7 Stern, Hidden Damage, 130-5.
8 Ibid., 68.
9 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 122.
10 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 6.
11 Hans Habe, In American Uniform, quoted in ibid., 123.
12 Ibid., 12.
13 Zuckmayer, ‘Jugend in Niemandsland’.
14 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 142.
15 Ibid., 152.
16 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 76-8.
17 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 119.
18 Jünger, Okkupation, 235-6.
19 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 143-9.
20 Ibid., 155.
21 Cullen, Reichstag, 399-401.
22 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 92, 94-5.
23 Ibid., 102.
24 Ibid., 170.
25 Mosely, Report from Germany, 46-7, 55, 80-1.
26 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 260; Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 164.
27 Boelcke, Schwarzmarkt, 206-7.
28 Skrjabina, Allies on the Rhine, 81.
29 Davidson, Death and Life, 84-5.
30 Klimov, Terror Machine, 178.
31 Ibid., 128, 134, 160.
32 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 116, 130.
33 Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Der Al Capone vom Alexanderplatz’, in
www.luise-b erlin.de
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 14: LIGHT FINGERS
1 Konstantin Akinscha and Grigori Koslow, Beutekunst - Auf
Schatzsuche in russischen Geheimdepots, Munich 1995, 61, 68.
2 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 68, 84, 268; Keeling, Gruesome Harvest,
40.
3 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 24, 97-100.
4 Ibid., 103-5.
5 Ibid., 94-5, 113-15.
6 Ibid., 112-13, 116.
7 See Giles MacDonogh, Translator’s Preface to Henrik Eberle and
Matthias Uhl, eds, The Hitler Book, London 2005.
8 Eberle and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler, Afterword, 462-78 passim.
9 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 95, 122-3.
10 Friedrich, Shauplatz Berlin, 33.
11 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 126-7.
12 Ibid., 129-33; A. A. Löwenthal, ‘Der Hitler-Affe: Ein Zwischenfall
in Schlesien’, in Gesammelte Schriften, Tübingen 1965, VI, 636-43.
13 Giles MacDonogh, ‘Parlour Games’, Guardian, 20 December 2003.
Damon de Laszlo, the artist’s grandson, maintains that it is doubtful that
Red Army officers carried swords, and it may well be that the damage to
the painting was incurred in quite another way. On the other hand, we know
that the Russians carried all sorts of weapons as trophies.
14 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 106-9, and author’s visits to
Rheinsberg.
15 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 145-8.
16 Ibid., 151. Akinscha and Koslow have Rudolf ’s name as Robert. See
Sophie Lillie, Was einmal war: Handbuch der enteigneten
Kunstsammlungen Wiens, Vienna 2003, 439-42, 463-5.
17 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 136, 138-9, 172-5, 176.
18 Ibid., 160-1.
19 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 167-8.
20 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 167; Giles MacDonogh, ‘Vichy’s
last stand: a prince’s story’, Financial Times, 5 October 1996 - interview
with Friedrich Wilhelm Fürst von Hohenzollern; MacDonogh, Frederick
the Great, 8; see E. Grosetti and M. Matronola, Il bombardimento di Monte
Cassino, diario di Guerra, Montecassino 1997.
21 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 232.
22 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 173.
23 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüge, 156-7.
24 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 273; Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 40;
Botting, Ruins, 16.
25 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüger, 187-8.
26 Ibid., 182-4.
27 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 107.
28 Meehan, Strange Enemy, 119, 121, 125.
29 Clare, Berlin Days, 28-9.
30 Meehan, Strange Enemy, 210-11.
31 Bar-Zohar, Hunt for German Scientists, 132.
32 Franz Kurowski, Alliierte Jagd auf deutsche Wissenschaftler. Das
Unternehmen Paperclip, Munich 1982, 8.
33 Bar-Zohar, Hunt for German Scientists, 10.
34 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 149.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 15: WHERE ARE OUR MEN?
1 Arthur L. Smith,‘Die Vermisste Million’ - Zur Schicksal deutscher
Kriegsgefangener nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich 1992, 10.
2 Wolfgang Benz and Angelika Schardt, eds, Kriegsgefangenschaft:
Berichte über das Leben in Gefangenlagern der Alliierten von Otto
Engelbert, Kurt Glaser, Hans Johnitz und Heinz Pust, Munich 1991, 7.
3 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 20; Kurt W. Böhme and Helmut Wolf,
Aufzeichnungen über die Kriegsgefangenschaft im Westen, Munich 1973,
xiii.
4 Ibid., xiv.
5 Davidson, Death and Life, 5; Smith, Die vermisste Million, 18, 21.
6 Speer, Diaries, 41.
7 Benz and Schardt, eds, Kriegsgefangenschaft, 7.
8 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, xiv.
9 Jäger, Adorno, 224.
10 Smith, Die Vermisste Million, 57, 62, 63 n. 29.
11 Benz and Schardt, Kriegsgefangenschaft, 8.
12 De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, xxv.
13 Ibid., 8-9.
14 Ibid., 10; Erich Maschke, ed., Zur Geschichte des Deutschen
Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, vol. XV: Die deutschen
Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges - Eine Zusammenfassung,
Munich 1967, 35.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 9 n. 2.
17 James Bacque, Other Losses - An Investigation into the Mass Death
of German Prisoners of War after World War II, London 1991, 45.
18 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 11, 101.
19 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 252, 267.
20 Benz and Schardt, eds, Kriegsgefangenschaft, 7-8.
21 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 30.
22 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 225.
23 Kurt Glaser, ‘Kriegsgefangener auf drei Kontinenten’, in ibid., 202.
24 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 142.
25 Ibid., 143-4.
26 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 24.
27 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 225.
28 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 25.
29 Ibid., 40 n. 13; Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 225-6.
30 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 37.
31 Ibid., 43-6, 86.
32 Ibid., 26.
33 Farago, Last Days, 153n.
34 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 47.
35 Salomon, The Answers, 440.
36 Ibid., 442.
37 Ibid., 447.
38 Ibid., 453.
39 Hans Johnitz, ‘In amerikanischer und franzözischer
Kriegsgefangenschaft’, in Benz and Schardt, eds, Kriegsgefangenschaft, 85-
6.
40 Salomon, The Answers, 498.
41 Ibid., 505-6.
42 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 258-9.
43 Salomon, The Answers, 536.
44 Schwerin von Krosigk, Memoiren, 259, 262.
45 Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War
European Thought, 3.
46 Salomon, The Answers, 541.
47 Papen, Memoirs, 578-9.
48 Salomon, The Answers, 542; Speer, Diaries, 25.
49 Salomon, The Answers, 543-4.
50 Webmaster Kriegsgefangener.de
51 Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, Hitler’s Last General - The Case
against Wilhelm Mohnke, London 1989, 265.
52 Preussen, Hohenzollern, 191-2; information from the late Prince
Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg.
53 Herzogin Viktoria Luise, Ein Leben, 318.
54 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüger, 158.
55 Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, edited by R. H. C. Steed, London
1951, 280-1; Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 578.
56 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 269.
57 R. T. Paget, Manstein - His Campaigns and his Trial, London 1951,
109.
58 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 270-1, 282.
59 Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, 134.
60 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 1054-5.
61 Gibson-Watt, An Undistinguished Life, 170.
62 Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 62-5.
63 Ibid., 70.
64 Ibid., 66.
65 Ibid., 66-7.
66 Shepherd, After Daybreak, 55.
67 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 210.
68 Ibid., 225.
69 David Irving, Göring - A Biography, London 1989, 478.
70 WW2 Memories Project - Le Marchant POW Camp; Terence Prittie
in http://www.royalpioneercorps.co.uk/rpc/history germanguns.htm
71 Leighton-Langer, X, 239-42.
72 Brian Bond, ‘Brauchitsch’, in Correlli Barnett, ed., Hitler’s
Generals, London 1990, 95.
73 Rowland Ryder, Ravenstein - Portrait of a German General, New
York 1978, 170-1.
74 Ibid., 171.
75 Samuel W. Mitcham, Jnr, ‘Arnim’, in Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals,
353.
76 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, xiii.
77 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 24.
78 Glaser, ‘Kriegsgefangener’, 208-12, 215, 218, 225.
79 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 170.
80 Ibid., 174.
81 Ibid., 174, 178.
82 Ibid., 175, 180-1.
83 Dahm, Frings, 27-8, 34.
84 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 90-1.
85 Ibid., 91.
86 Ibid., 95, 190, 265; Document, BBC Radio 4, 9 January 2006,
dedicated a programme to British torturers, and mentioned Scotland in that
context.
87 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 97.
88 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 24.
89 Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 27-8.
90 Ibid., 38.
91 Ibid., 70, 73, 76-7.
92 Ibid., 86.
93 Ibid., 68.
94 Ian Cobain, ‘The Interrogation Camp that Turned Prisoners into
Living Skeletons’, Guardian, Saturday 17 December 2005. I am grateful to
Nick Jacobs for drawing my attention to this article; Document, BBC Radio
4, 9 January 2006; see also Meehan, Strange Enemy People, 82-6, who saw
the papers long before the newspapers or the BBC.
95 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 30-1.
96 Salomon, The Answers, 530-1; the events are substantiated by a film
in the American archives that was seen by Jeremy Murray-Brown in July
1992 - untitled web document; see also Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret,
London 1974, and Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta; also Botting, Ruins; Keeling,
Gruesome Harvest.
97 Salomon, The Answers, 534; Murray-Brown, op. cit.
98 Johnitz, ‘Kriegsgefangenschaft’, 102.
99 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 285n.
100 Ibid., xiii; Smith, Die vermisste Million, 31.
101 Smith, Die vermisste Million, 32; Maschke, Zusammenfassung,
197.
102 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 226.
103 Salomon, The Answers, 362.
104 Johnitz, ‘Kriegsgefangenschaft’, 102.
105 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 427.
106 Ibid., 427, is another case.
107 Ibid., 391.
108 Ibid., 102, 114.
109 Ibid., 275, 279, 282.
110 Ibid., 284, 290.
111 Ibid., 290-2, 293-4; The Progressive, 14 January 1946, quoted in
Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 21.
112 Böhme and Wolf, Aufzeichnungen, 291.
113 Ibid., 217.
114 Ibid., 223-4.
115 Ibid., 219-22.
116 Ibid., 251-5.
117 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 226.
118 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 18.
119 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 224.
120 Ibid., 196-7.
121 Krockow, Hour of the Women, 202.
122 Herzogin Viktoria Luise, Ein Leben, 324-5.
123 Samuel W. Mitcham, Jnr, ‘Kleist’, in Barnett, ed., Hitler’s
Generals, 259.
124 Ibid., 260.
125 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 236.
126 Ibid., 317.
127 Heinz Pust, ‘Als Kriegsgefangener in der Sowjetunion.
Errinerungen 1945-1953’, in Benz and Schardt, eds, Kriegsgefangenschaft,
22, 29.
128 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 180-1.
129 Pust, ‘Sowjetunion’, 32.
130 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 331.
131 Pust, ‘Sowjetunion’, 33-5.
132 Ibid., 43-4.
133 Ibid., 75-6.
134 Ibid., 81-2.
135 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 789-80.
136 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 225.
137 Ibid., 196-7.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., 225.
140 Ibid., 224.
141 Information from my friend Janez Fajfar, general manager of the
Villa Bled Hotel, who showed me the room and Tito’s desk. The former
POWs frequently returned to point out to their wives and children their
portraits among the figures in the battle scene.
142 Maschke, Zusammenfassung, 197.
143 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 88.
144 Wolfgang Borchert, Das Gesamtwerk, Hamburg 1970, 102.
145 Ibid., 172.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 16: THE TRIALS
1 Davidson, Death and Life, 100 n. 4; Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, 29-
30.
2 MacDonogh, The Last Kaiser, 422, 423, 424; Hilberg, Destruction,
III, 1142.
3 Davidson, Death and Life, 105; Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1142; papers
released by the National Archive at the end of 2005 show that Churchill had
always been in favour of executing the Nazi leaders. The fact that only the
second tier of Nazis were captured may have altered his thinking in favour
of a trial: Sunday Times, 1 January 2006.
4 Paget, Manstein, 139.
5 Ibid., 155; this was from Paget’s defence submission.
6 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1145.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 1099.
9 Ibid., 1130-1, 1152.
10 Quoted in Paget, Manstein, 67, also 154.
11 Ibid., 68.
12 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 441.
13 Paget, Manstein, 86-7.
14 Ibid., 69-70.
15 Ibid., 80.
16 Information from Ian Maxwell, who also informed the author that his
father had told him that Trevor-Roper was called in to interrogate major war
criminals.
17 Leighton-Langer, X, 235.
18 Ibid.
19 West, The Meaning of Treason, 132-3.
20 Papen, Memoirs, 551.
21 Peter Padfield, Himmler - Reichsführer SS, London, 1990, 610.
22 Ibid., 609-11; Anthony Read, The Devil’s Disciples - The Lives and
Times of Hitler’s Inner Circle, London 2003, 914-15.
23 Willi Frischauer, Goering, London 1950, 277.
24 Irving, Göring, 465-70; Frischauer, Goering, 274-6.
25 Irving, Göring, 470-1, 478; Goering, My Life with Goering, London
1972, 136.
26 Frischauer, Goering, 280.
27 Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 3.
28 Speer, Diaries, 65.
29 Papen, Memoirs, 541.
30 Speer, Diaries, 3.
31 Irving, Göring, 477, 480.
32 Papen, Memoirs, 563.
33 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1157.
34 Speer, Diaries, 37.
35 Papen, Memoirs, 546.
36 Karl Dönitz, Mein Wechselvolles Leben, Zurich, Berlin and Frankfurt
1968, 212-14.
37 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 296-7.
38 Speer, Diaries, 3.
39 Peter Padfield, Hess - The Führer’s Disciple, London 1995, 303-4,
312.
40 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1156.
41 Irving, Göring, 484.
42 Ibid., 489; Papen, Memoirs, 574.
43 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 146.
44 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 298-9.
45 Papen, Memoirs, 559.
46 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 301, 305.
47 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1149.
48 Irving, Göring, 487.
49 Padfield, Hess, 310-11; G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, New York
1947, 45-6.
50 Frischauer, Goering, 291.
51 Ibid., 295; Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, 50.
52 See Peter Maguire, Law and War, New York 2001. I am grateful to
Sebastian Cody for directing me to this work.
53 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1149; Tom Lampert, Ein einziges Leben -
Geschichten aus der NS-Zeit, Munich 2003, 204-29, portrays von dem Bach
as a man suffering from psychosomatic illness as a result of the demands
made upon him by Himmler.
54 Irving made this statement in The Reichsmarschall’s Table, BBC
Radio 4, 15 March 2005, written and presented by Giles MacDonogh, and
produced by Dennis Sewell.
55 Irving, Göring, 492-3; Frischauer, Goering, 292; Walter Görlitz,
‘The Desk Generals - Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont’, in Barnett, ed., Hitler’s
Generals, 153-4.
56 Speer, Diaries, 13.
57 Papen, Memoirs, 551-3.
58 Frischauer, Goering, 296.
59 Papen, Memoirs, 565.
60 Irving, Göring, 495; Frischauer, Goering, 297.
61 Frischauer, Goering, 295; Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 9.
62 Frischauer, Goering, 297.
63 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1136.
64 Speer, Diaries, 52.
65 Ibid., 45.
66 Ibid., 499.
67 Skrjabina, Allies on the Rhine, 77.
68 Helmuth Auerbach, ‘Que faire de l’Allemagne’, in Manfrass and
Rioux, eds, France-Allemagne, 293.
69 Speer, Diaries, 4.
70 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 147.
71 Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1151.
72 Ibid., 11, 14.
73 Werner Maser, Nürnberg, Tribunal der Sieger, Munich and Zurich
1979, 7; Read, The Devil’s Disciples, 923.
74 Speer, Diaries, 11.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 17: THE LITTLE FISH
1 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 247 and n. 3; Buscher, War Crimes Trial
Program, 30.
2 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 420.
3 Maser, Nürnberg, 434-42.
4 Speer, Diaries, 26.
5 Ibid., 32.
6 Ibid., 35.
7 Eberle and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler, 236.
8 Mühlen, Krupp, 195.
9 Ibid., 200.
10 Hans Laternser, Verteidigung deutsche Soldaten: Pläydoyers vor
Alliierten Gerichten, Bonn 1950, 111, 126, 146-7, 153.
11 Ibid., 339.
12 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 262, 310.
13 Mühlen, Krupp, 213.
14 Ibid., 220.
15 Ibid., 214.
16 Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 343.
17 Carl Haensel, Das Gericht vertagt sich. Tagebuch eines Verteidigers
bei den Nürnberger Prozessen, Wiesbaden and Munich 1980, 17.
18 Margret Boveri, Der Diplomat vor Gericht, Berlin and Hanover,
1948, 44.
19 Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten, 119; Boveri, Der Diplomat vor Gericht, 18.
20 Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten, 121.
21 Quoted in Boveri, Der Diplomat vor Gericht, 17-18.
22 Ibid., 29.
23 Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten, 122.
24 Boveri, Der Diplomat vor Gericht, 17.
25 Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten, 122; Boveri, Der Diplomat vor Gericht, 18.
26 Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten, 125-6.
27 Paget, Manstein, 171.
28 Ibid., 169-72. It should be said that this sort of argument has always
been very pleasing to the revisionists, and that Paget is quoted and lauded
on David Irving’s website for saying that the figure of six million murdered
Jews was incorrect; Hilberg, Destruction, III, 1158.
29 Earl F. Ziemke, ‘Rundstedt’, in Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals, 201.
30 See Shepherd, After Daybreak, 166-75.
31 Tighe, Gdansk, 201.
32 Eberle and Uhl, eds, Das Buch Hitler, 238-9; MacDonogh, Prussia,
376.
33 Paget, Manstein, 77.
34 Ibid., 78, 79.
35 Shelford Bidwell, ‘Kesselring’, in Barnett, ed., Hitler’s Generals,
288.
36 Berber, Dachau, 200.
37 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 278.
38 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 1041-3.
39 Buscher, War Crimes Trial Program, 38.
40 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 880-1, 889.
41 Ibid., 1007; Robert Wistrich, Who’s Who in Nazi Germany, London
1995, 142-3.
42 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 283; Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 671.
43 Sayer and Botting, Mohnke, 91-2.
44 Ibid., 183n.
45 Ibid., 226.
46 Ibid.
47 Hamann, Winifred Wagner, 420-1.
48 Ibid., 423-5.
49 Ibid., 428-9.
50 Ibid., 438.
51 Ibid., 352.
52 Ibid., 345.
53 Idem, 356-8.
54 Fürstenau, Entnazifizierung, 231.
55 Maser, Nürnberg, 433; Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 344.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 18: PEACEMAKING IN POTSDAM
1 Hanna Grisebach quoted in Inge Hoeftmann and Waltraud Noack, eds,
Potsdam in alten und neuen Reisebeschreibungen, Düsseldorf 1992, 226.
2 Hanna Grisebach, Potsdamer Tagebuch, with an Afterword by Hilde
Domin, Heidelberg 1974, 23.
3 Ibid., 22.
4 Ibid., 48.
5 Ibid., 29, 32.
6 Quoted in Hoeftmann and Noack, eds, Potsdam, 235.
7 Grisebach, Tagebuch, 35.
8 Ibid., 38-9.
9 Ibid., 44.
10 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 438.
11 See Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens:
Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941-1945, Berlin 1986; Hugh
Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, 7th edn, London 1995, 29;
MacDonogh, Translator’s Preface to Eberle and Uhl, The Hitler Book, xx.
12 Eberle and Uhl, Das Buch Hitler. See in particular the editors’
Afterword, 495-6.
13 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 429, 453.
14 Ibid., 430.
15 Ibid., 435.
16 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 17.
17 Zhukov, Reminiscenses, II, 433.
18 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 19.
19 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 39.
20 Young, France, 61.
21 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 18, 21; Bullock, Bevin, 17.
22 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 434, 437.
23 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 331, 334.
24 Bullock, Bevin, 17.
25 Henry H. Adams, Harry Hopkins, New York 1977, 391.
26 Averall Harriman Foreword to ibid., 19.
27 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 440.
28 Adams, Hopkins, 392.
29 Ibid., 382.
30 Ibid., 377.
31 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 57-9.
32 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 22-4.
33 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 52-3; Naimark, Russians in Germany, 146.
34 Henke, ‘Potsdam’, 54.
35 Akinscha and Koslow, Beutekunst, 99-100.
36 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 11-12.
37 Quoted in Boveri, Tage, 157, 170.
38 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 50-1.
39 Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 629, mentions the geraniums; Harry S.
Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols, vol. I: 1945, Year of Decisions, London 1955,
268, the other flora.
40 Zhukov in Hoeftmann and Noack, eds, Potsdam, 240.
41 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 441-3.
42 Grisebach, Tagebuch, 49-50.
43 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 441.
44 Truman, Memoirs, I, 258.
45 Ibid., 262.
46 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 94.
47 Truman, Memoirs, I, 266, 265.
48 Truman in Hoeftmann and Noack, eds, Potsdam, 245.
49 Truman, Memoirs, I, 265.
50 Foschepoth, ‘Potsdam’, 71-2.
51 Ibid., 72-4.
52 Truman in Hoeftmann and Noack, eds, Potsdam, 246; Truman, I,
267.
53 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 85.
54 Truman, Memoirs, I, 279.
55 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 68.
56 Truman, Memoirs, I, 270.
57 Ibid., 275.
58 Grisebach, Tagebuch, 47.
59 Kardorff, Aufzeichnungen, 337; Amanda Holden, The New Penguin
Opera Guide, London, 2001, 1037.
60 Truman, Memoirs, 278.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 281, 285.
63 Ibid., 286; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 68-9; Davidson, Death and
Life, 64.
64 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 79-80; Truman, Memoirs, I, 293.
65 Truman, Memoirs, I, 293.
66 Ibid., 294.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 295.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 296.
71 Bullock, Bevin, 24.
72 Ibid., 22.
73 Truman, Memoirs, I, 297.
74 Ibid., 297-8.
75 Ibid., 300.
76 De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, 50.
77 Truman, Memoirs, I, 303, 305; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 76.
78 Truman, Memoirs, I, 315-16.
79 Ibid., 317; Bullock, Bevin, 25.
80 Truman, Memoirs, I, 322-3.
81 Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin, Manchester and New York 1993, 144-5.
82 Ibid., 145-6.
83 Bullock, Bevin, 25.
84 Weiler, Bevin, 147-8.
85 Ibid., 148-9.
86 Bullock, Bevin, 25.
87 Truman, Memoirs, I, 327.
88 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 451.
89 Truman in Hoeftmann and Noack, eds, Potsdam, 251.
90 Grisebach, Tagebuch, 70.
91 Truman, Memoirs, I, 329-30.
92 Kaps, Tragödie, 69.
93 Truman, Memoirs, I, 329-30.
94 Ibid., 331.
95 Bullock, Bevin, 28; Truman, Memoirs, I, 335.
96 Truman, Memoirs, I, 341.
97 Davies and Moorhouse, Microcosm, 414-15.
OceanofPDF.com
98 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 448.
99 Ibid., 414-16.
100 Truman, Memoirs, I, 337.
101 Ibid., 338.
102 Ibid., 339-40.
103 Zhukov, Reminiscences, II, 416-17.
104 Young, France, 62.
105 Ibid., 62, 64.
106 Davidson, Death and Life, 60.
107 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 73.
108 Kennan, Memoirs, 258-9.
109 Ibid., 263-6.
110 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 92, 103.
111 Grisebach, Tagebuch, 54.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 19: THE GREAT FREEZE
1 Mastny, Cold War, 23.
2 Ibid., 4, 6.
3 Young, France, 70-1.
4 Ibid., 74.
5 Buffet, Berlin, 360; Ritchie, Faust’s Metropolis, 638.
6 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 207.
7 Weiler, Bevin, 153-4.
8 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 133.
9 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II: 1946 - 1953, Years of Trial and
Hope, London 1955, 100.
10 Kennan, Memoirs, 257.
11 Clare, Berlin Days, 193.
12 Weiler, Bevin, 154.
13 Kennan, Memoirs, 258.
14 Bullock, Bevin, 9, 11.
15 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 48.
16 Weiler, Bevin, 154.
17 Kennan, Memoirs, 253-4.
18 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, vii-viii.
19 Ibid., 5, 8.
20 Siegfried Beer, ‘Die Besatzungsmacht Grossbritannien und
Österreich 1945-1949’, in Ableitner et al., Österreich unter alliierter
Besatzung, 47.
21 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 111-12, 118.
22 Graml, Teilung Deutschlands, 165, 182.
23 Ibid., 48-50; David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan
O.M., 1938-45, London 1971, 778.
24 Foschepoth, ‘Potsdam’, 76, 79.
25 Bullock, Bevin, 268; Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 255.
26 Ibid., 257.
27 Weiler, Bevin, 159-60.
28 Bullock, Bevin, 309.
29 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 319; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 190-1.
30 Morgan, Byrnes, Clay, 319.
31 Ibid., 334-5, 338; Weiler, Bevin, 160-2.
32 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 192; Gulgowski, ‘American Military
Government’, 10.
33 Keeling, Gruesome Harvest, 10.
34 Dos Passos, Tour of Duty, 321-2.
35 Graml, Teilung Deutschlands, 105-7, 109.
36 Rathkolb, ‘Historische Fragmente’, 146.
37 Alfons Gruber, Geschichte Südtirols - Streifzüge durch das 20.
Jahrhundert, Bolzano 2002, 103.
38 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 90.
39 Rathkolb, ed., Gesellschaft und Politik, 192.
40 Ibid., 406.
41 Schärf, Wiederaufrichtung, 121.
42 Béthouart, Bataille, 109.
43 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 90.
44 Ibid., 107.
45 Denis Mack Smith, Modern Italy: A Political History, New Haven
and London 1997, 421-2.
46 Buffet, Berlin, 366-7.
47 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 90.
48 Speer, Diaries, 62.
49 Staritz, DDR, 18.
50 Davidson, Death and Life, 129.
51 Brigadier-General Frank Howley, Berlin Command, New York 1950,
10.
52 Ibid., 136.
53 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Streifzüge, 174.
54 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 83-4.
55 Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, 50, 100.
56 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 105; Christabel Bielenberg, The Past is
Myself, London 1985, 285.
57 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 151-2.
58 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 86.
59 Speer, Diaries, 29-31.
60 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 158-9, 161.
61 Speer, Diaries, 34.
62 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 166.
63 Mastny, Cold War, 25. On Soviet Russia’s long-term plans, see
Wolfgang Mueller, ‘Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a
Secondary Theatre of the Cold War, 1938-1953 ⁄ 1955’, Cold War History,
vol. 6, no. 1, February 2006, 63-84.
64 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 113.
65 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 170-1.
66 Ibid., 172-3.
67 Ibid., 174-6.
68 Zuckmayer, Deutschlandbericht, 87.
69 Bethouart, Bataille, 87.
70 Obituary, Josefine Hawelka, The Times, Saturday 26 March 2005.
71 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 213, 226, 230.
72 Ibid., 248.
73 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 182.
74 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 198.
75 Clark, Calculated Risk, 439-42.
76 Mastny, Cold War, 26-9.
77 Ibid., 40-1.
78 Balfour and Mair, Four Power Control, 279.
79 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 111-12.
80 Ibid., 112.
81 Ibid., 361-2.
82 Wagnleitner, ed., Herz, 401-3, 606-7.
83 See Staritz, DDR, 15.
84 Ibid., 17.
85 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 186, 198.
86 Staritz, DDR, 18.
87 Ibid., 21.
OceanofPDF.com
CHAPTER 20: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT AND
THE BEGINNINGS OF ECONOMIC
RECOVERY
1 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 434, 439.
2 Ibid., 441.
3 Ibid., 444-5.
4 Ibid., 447.
5 Ibid., 452.
6 Ibid., 453-4.
7 Mastny, Cold War, 48.
8 Davidson, Death and Life, 224.
9 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 274, 276, 302; Skrjabina, Allies on the
Rhine, 82, 95.
10 Skrjabina, Allies on the Rhine, 114; Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin,
230.
11 Howley, Berlin Command, 186.
12 Ibid., 329.
13 Staritz, DDR, 23.
14 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 249.
15 Ruge, ed., Schulenburg, 92.
16 Willy Brandt and Richard Lowenthal, Ernst Reuter. Ein Leben für
die Freiheit, Munich 1957, 358-60.
17 Mastny, Cold War, 41.
18 Ibid., 48.
19 Howley, Berlin Command, 177.
20 Kennan, Memoirs, 420; Bullock, Bevin, 574.
21 Bullock, Bevin, 571.
22 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 478, 483.
23 Mastny, Cold War, 50.
24 Ibid., 49.
25 Bullock, Bevin, 566, 573; Graml, Teilung Deutschlands, 199.
26 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, I, 206, 201.
27 Ibid. 567; II, 612.
28 Quoted in Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade. Berlin in 1948.
The Year the Cold War Threatened to Become Hot, London 1989, 138.
29 Mastny, Cold War, 46-7.
30 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 597, 599.
31 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 220-8.
32 Truman, Memoirs, II, 131.
33 Young, France, 198-9.
34 Howley, Berlin Command, 3-4.
35 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 600-2.
36 Ibid., 602-5.
37 Ibid., 605.
38 Ibid., 605, 607.
39 Ibid., 618, 621 n. 2; Davidson, Death and Life, 211.
40 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 649-50, 661, 677.
41 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 238.
42 Volker Koop, Tagebuch der Berliner Blockade. Von Schwarzmarkt
und Rollkommandos, Bergbau und Bienenzucht, Bonn 1998, 11.
43 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 236.
44 Ibid., 237, 238.
45 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 700.
46 Howley, Berlin Command, 196-7, 199-200.
47 Bullock, Bevin, 573 and n. 1.
48 Weiler, Bevin, 179.
49 Bullock, Bevin, 576.
50 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 238-9.
51 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 166-7.
52 Truman, Memoirs, II, 130.
53 Ibid.
54 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 248; Howley, Berlin Command, 239.
55 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 246.
56 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 709, 711, 714.
57 Staritz, DDR, 26
58 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 248.
59 Staritz, DDR, 23.
60 Howley, Berlin Command, 209.
61 Lang, ‘Lieber Herr Celibidache’, 110.
62 Koop, Tagebuch, 18, 24.
63 Truman, Memoirs, II, 130.
64 Howley, Berlin Command, 202.
65 Truman, Memoirs, II, 132.
66 Ibid., 135.
67 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 746.
68 Davidson, Death and Life, 217; Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 242.
69 Truman, Memoirs, II, 132.
70 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 763-4.
71 Koop, Tagebuch, 41.
72 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 798, 820.
73 Ibid., 824.
74 Ibid., 831-2.
75 Ibid., 834, 844.
76 Mastny, Cold War, 52.
77 Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 260.
78 Buffet, Berlin, 369.
79 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 185, 187; Howley, Berlin Command,
218.
80 Koop, Tagebuch, 55-6.
81 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 856-7.
82 Ibid., 858, 860.
83 Truman, Memoirs, II, 136.
84 Davidson, Death and Life, 209.
85 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 908.
86 Koop, Tagebuch, 124-5.
87 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 928.
88 Howley, Berlin Command, 226.
89 Tent, Mission, 288.
90 Koop, Tagebuch, 133, pours a little cold water on this ‘legend’.
91 Davidson, Life and Death, 216; Clare, Berlin Days, 185; Tusa and
Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 330, 389-90.
92 Staritz, DDR, 33.
93 Koop, Tagebuch, 139.
94 Speer, Diaries, 115.
95 Ibid,, 122.
96 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 1015.
97 Ibid., 1063.
98 Kennan, Memoirs, 429.
99 Ibid., 431-2.
100 Mastny, Cold War, 62.
101 Tusa and Tusa, Berlin Blockade, 395.
102 Clark, Calculated Risk, 429-30.
103 Smith, ed., Clay Papers, II, 625; Brook-Shepherd, Austrians, 395.
104 Béthouart, Bataille, 153.
105 Ibid., 157.
106 Ibid., 162.
107 Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 130.
108 Wagnleitner, Herz, 240-2, 249-53.
109 Ibid., 523-4; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 152.
110 Béthouart, Bataille, 115; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz 4, 82.
111 Williams, Adenauer, 328.
112 Ibid., 332.
113 Ibid., 331.
114 Ibid., 332.
115 Ibid., 333.
116 Ibid., 334.
117 Young, France, 204-7.
118 Poidevin, Schuman, 77.
CONCLUSION
1 Williams, Adenauer, 341.
2 Dönhoff, Weit ist der Weg nach Osten, 305-6.
3 Staritz, DDR, 34.
4 Ibid., 34-5.
5 MacDonogh, The Last Kaiser, 196; the idea that the Kaiser was
interested in European unity has been severely mocked by Volker Ulrich in
Die Zeit: see ‘Der Kaiser lacht!’, 16 March 2000.
6 Poidevin, Schuman, 84.
7 Young, France, 41.
8 Jünger, Der Friede, 56, 60, 63.
9 Young, France, 9-10.
10 Ibid., 10-11.
11 Poidevin, Schuman, 84.
12 Gollancz, In Darkest Germany, 16.
13 Robert Birley, Britain in Europe: Reflections on the Development of
a European Society, Reith Lectures, London 1949, 1-2.
14 Young, France, 11, 13.
15 Ibid., 229.
16 Margret Boveri, Der Verrat im XX. Jahrhundert - für und gegen die
Nation, Hamburg 1956, 8; Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande,
Paris 1995, 467.
17 Clark, Calculated Risk, 447-8.
18 Döblin, Schicksalsreise, 412, 408.
OceanofPDF.com
Further Reading
There is no book in English that covers the whole period, the four-
power military occupation of Germany and Austria between the years 1945
and 1949. Douglas Botting’s In the Ruins of the Reich dwells on the early
period, but omits Austria; while the dated but still useful Four Power
Control in Germany and Austria by Michael Balfour and John Mair
(Oxford 1956) finishes with the creation of Bizonia at the end of 1946. The
former is strongest on chaos, the latter is best on administration. There are,
however, some excellent monographs covering the individual German
zones: Norman M. Nairmark’s The Russians in Germany (Cambridge,
Mass. and London 1995), Edward N. Peterson’s Russian Commands and
German Resistance: The Soviet Occupation 1945-1949 (New York 1999)
and Gregory Klimov’s Terror Machine (London n.d.) all cover the east. On
the US Zone there is Edward N. Peterson’s American Occupation of
Germany (Detroit 1977). More recently Petra Goedde has looked at
occupation from a woman’s angle in GIs and Germans (New Haven and
London 2003).
The British Military Government is detailed in Patricia Meehan’s
excellent book A Strange Enemy People: Germans under the British 1945-
1950 (London and Chester Springs 2001). What is missing is a study of the
French ZOF: John Young’s France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance
(Leicester and London 1990) is not really that, because it is more concerned
with foreign policy than with administration. There is no book in French
either, where the literature is largely confined to the cultural achievements
of the French occupation.
Nor is there much on Austria. The standby is Gordon Brook-Shepherd’s
Austrocentric The Austrians - A Thousand Year Odyssey (London 1996),
which explains the political background to the State Treaty, but does not
offer much on the events of April 1945. The best source in English is
probably Reinhold Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria (Salzburg
1984), a compilation of the reports filed by the American OSS man Martin
Herz. Mark Clark’s account, Calculated Risk (London 1956), was written at
the height of the Cold War, and it shows.
There is a similar lack of documentation in English on events in
Czechoslovakia. The best remains Alfred M. de Zayas’s Nemesis at
Potsdam (London 1979). All the rest is in German. For a few pages of
Czech perspective, see Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek, The Life of
Edvard Beneš 1884-1948 (Oxford 1997).
De Zayas also provides material on the events in the Prussian east.
Count Hans Lehndorf ’s unbelievably moving East Prussian Diary was
published in English in 1963. It should be reissued. We also possess
Christian von Krockow’s Hour of the Women (London 1991), which charts
the fortunes of his sister Libussa in Pomerania.
Two books record the fates of individual cities: Danzig is covered by
Chris Tighe’s Gdansk - National Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands
(London and Concord 1990), and Breslau’s fate is recounted in Microcosm:
Portrait of a Central European City by Norman Davies and Roger
Moorhouse (London 2002).
The anonymous Woman in Berlin (London 1965) is a graphic account of
the Russian arrival in the city. There is also an abridged edition of Ursula
von Kardorff’s Diary of a Nightmare (London 1965). The most recent
German edition, however, has restored the full text. Wolfgang Leonhard’s
Child of the Revolution was translated by C. M. Woodhouse (London 1979)
and is the standard account of the arrival of the Moscow-based German
communists.
There are a few serious American studies of denazification: James F.
Tent’s Mission on the Rhine (Chicago and London 1982) and Timothy R.
Vogt’s Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany (Cambridge, Mass. and
London 2000). The most relaxed account of denazification is George
Clare’s Berlin Days (London 1989). On individual cases Brigitte Hamann’s
Winifred Wagner - At the Heart of Hitler’s Bayreuth (London 2005) is
highly recommended.
For the pursuit and conviction of Nazi war criminals there is an
emotional account by Tom Bower (Blind Eye to Murder, London 1981). R.
T. Paget’s argument in Manstein - His Campaigns and his Trial (London
1951) is still cogent. G. M. Gilbert’s Nuremberg Diary (New York 1947) is
another old book that has its uses. There are also the translated memoirs of
the Nazis who served custodial terms: Speer (1976) and Papen (1952), as
well as Peter Padfield’s life of Hess (1995) and lives of Göring by David
Irving (1989) and Willy Frischauer (1950). Frank M. Buscher’s US War
Crimes Trial Program in Germany (New York, Westport and London 1989)
presents an academic approach. On the treatment of POWs there is nothing
in English, and the leading American expert - Arthur L. Smith - publishes in
German. The best there is can be found in Ernst von Saloman’s highly
coloured account of his own imprisonment: The Answers (London 1954).
Robert H. Abzug gives details of the grisly discovery of the inner
workings of the camps in his Inside the Vicious Heart (New York and
Oxford 1985), as does Brewster Chamberlin and Marcia Feldman’s The
Liberation of the Concentration Camps (Washington DC 1987), to which he
provides an introduction. Ben Shepherd’s After Daybreak (London 2005) is
specifically about the freeing of Belsen. On the surviving Jews there is Ruth
Gay’s Safe among the Germans (New Haven and London 2002).
Victor Gollancz’s two polemics on the treatment of the Germans still
make for salutary reading: Leaving them to their Fate: The Ethics of
Starvation (London 1946) and In Darkest Germany (London 1947).
Marlis Steinert provides a scholarly account of the Flensburg regime in
Capitulation 1945: The Story of the Dönitz Government (London 1969).
Frank Howley’s account of the airlift, Berlin Command (New York 1950),
should be read with caution. Ann and John Tusa’s Berlin Blockade (London
1989) is a still fresh general survey.
On culture in the Soviet Zone the best sources are David Pike’s Politics
and Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany (Stanford 1992) and Wolfgang
Schivelbusch’s In a Cold Crater (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1998).
I have also found Jenny Williams’s More Lives than One: A Biography of
Hans Fallada (London 1998) useful. The rather muted cultural policy in the
British Zone is easily gleaned from George Clare. The best source for
America is Carl Zuckmayer’s report - Deutschlandbericht, für das
Kriegministerium der Vereinigten Staaten von America (Göttingen 2004).
The outstanding book on Soviet policy is Vojtech Mastny’s The Cold
War and Soviet Insecurity (New York and Oxford 1996), and more recently
I have found Geoffrey Roberts’s Stalin Wars: From World War to Cold War,
1939-1953 (New Haven and London 2006) extremely useful. Something
can be gleaned from Georgi Zhukov’s Reminiscences (Moscow 1985). For
the roles of other Cold Warriors, see Curtis F. Morgan Jnr’s James F.
Byrnes, Lucius Clay and American Policy in Germany 1945-1947
(Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter 2002) or Byrnes’s own account in
Speaking Frankly (London 1947). For Clay’s role in Germany there is Jean
Edward Smith’s The Papers of Lucius D. Clay (Bloomington and London
1974). Truman covers his back in his two-volume Year of Decisions and
Years of Trial and Hope (London 1955). They are very useful for Potsdam.
George Kennan’s Memoirs (London 1968) provide the dissenting view.
Ernest Bevin’s time as foreign secretary is amply covered by Alan Bullock
(London 1983) and in less detail by Peter Weiler (Manchester and New
York 1993). Charles Williams provides a useful, recent account of the rise
of Adenauer (London 2000).
More detailed references and non-English sources will be found in the
notes.
OceanofPDF.com
Index
Aachen
Abramski, Stanisław, Bishop of Katowice
Abzug, Robert H.: Inside the Vicious Heart
Acher, Achille von
Ackermann, Anton
Adelheide camp
Adenauer, Konrad: forced retirement; resumes mayoralty of Cologne;
dealings with British; and formation of German Federal Republic;
suppresses political rivals; antipathy to Schumacher; on return of German
POWs; visits Russia; protests at dismantling of German industries; attends
United Europe Congress (May 1948); relations with French; and Ruhr
authority; and German reunification; made Chancellor; favours European
union
Adler, Guido
Adler, Viktor
Agee, James
Ahrenshoop (seaside resort)
Albrecht, Professor (of Prague)
Alexander, Field Marshal Haroldt Earl
Alexander, Peter A.
Allied Control Council: established; and Potsdam Agreement; meets in
Berlin; constitution; French obstruct
Allied High Commission: formed from Military Government
Althof’s travelling circus
Altmann, Karl
Alvensleben, Bodo von
Alvensleben, Captain von
Amelunxen, Rudolf
American Forces Network
American Military Government (AMG)
American zone (Germany): material plenty in; refugees in; cooperation
with British and French zones; HQ at Frankfurt-am-Main; civil
administration; US separation from Germans in; extent; anti-frat order
relaxed; theft and plunder in; rapes in; German marriages to US
servicemen; ‘occupation children’ born in; political life in; denazification;
culture in; industrial dismantling prevented; Jewish DP camps in;
internment of Nazis in; food donations in; rations and shortages in; and war
crimes trials; see also United States of America
Amery, John
Andernach camp
Andersch, Alfred
Andrus, Colonel Burton C.
Annan, Noël, Baron
Antipenko (Zhukov’s adjutant)
Ardennes: US campaign in (1944-5)
Arendsee, Marthe
Arendt, Hannah: Organised Guilt and Universal Responsibility
Arnim, General Hans-Jürgen von
Arnold, Karl art: plundered and destroyed
artists: colony at Ahrenshoop
Astafiev, Major
Atlantic Charter (1941)
Atlantic Pact (1949)
Atrocities Committee Austria
Attlee, Clement (later 1st Earl): plans occupation; dislikes Germans;
succeeds Churchill as Prime Minister; at Potsdam Conference; favours
withdrawing from Germany
Auden, W. H.
Auerbach camp
Aufbau (periodical)
Aufbau Verlag
Augsburg
Augstein, Rudolf
August William, Prince of Prussia (‘Auwi’)
Auschwitz: liberated; reused by Poles
Aussig (Ustí nad Labem), Czechoslovakia
Aust, Adolf
Austin, Sergeant-Major
Austria: Allies’ view and policy on post-war settlement; elite purged by
Nazis; German annexation (Anschluss, 1938); Jews in; attempts to form
fighting units with Allies; doubts on independence from Germany; denies
war guilt; Russians capture and occupy; political parties formed; declaration
of independence from Germany; forms interim government (1945); Nazis
and Nazism in; German-speaking refugees in; territorial demands; divided
into occupation zones; industrial plant and property removed and
confiscated; communists in; free elections (1945) and Figl government;
under Allied administration; food shortage and supply; receives foreign aid;
four-power Agreement on (1946); State Treaty (1955); Germans expelled;
property claims and restitution; Soviet zone; vineyards; British zone;
American zone; borders agreed; Russian DPs in; French zone; Habsburgs
banned; refugees and DPs in; denazification; capital punishment in;
elections (October 1949); German POWs in; and South Tyrol; peace treaty
proposed; Soviet kidnappings in; Soviet obstructionism in; currency; see
also Upper Austria; Vienna
Austrian Centre
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)
Austrian Socalist Party (SPÖ)
Avenarius, Johannes
Bach-Zelewski, Erich von dem
Bacque, James: Other Losses
Bad Kreuznach-Bretzenheim camp
Bad Nenndorf
Bad Oeynhausen
Baden
Baden-Baden
Bader, Untersturmführer
Badoglio, Marshal Pietro
Baeck, Leo
Bähr, Erna (‘Bärchen’)
Balfour, Michael
Baltic States: German-speaking population
Barkow
Barnetson, Major William
Barraclough, Brigadier John
Baruch, Bernard
BASF, Ludwigshafen
Bauer, Christoph
Bauer, Otto
Baum, Otto
Baur, Hans
Bavaria
Baxa, Captain
Bayreuth
Bayrische Volkspartei (BVP)
Becher, Johannes R.; Manifest des Kulturbundes zur demokratischen
Erneuerung Deutschlands
Becher, Lily
Beck, Colonel-General Ludwig
Becker, Frau (of Brandenburg)
Becker, Hans von
Beckmann, Christel
Bédarida, Renée
Beethoven, Ludwig van
Beheim-Schwarzbach, Martin
Behr, Fritz
Bekessy, Imre
Belgium: POW camps in; post-war trials
Belokopitov, Andrei
Belsen see Bergen-Belsen
Ben-Gurion, David
Beneš, Edvard
Benn, Gottfried
Berchtesgaden
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp: Jewish prisoners in; British enter;
as Jewish DP camp; newsreel photographs from; Germans forced to visit;
food rations; Gollancz visits; SS prisoners in; culprits tried and punished
Berger, Gottlob
Bergius, Friedrich
Berlin: French granted sector; Soviet conquest and occupation of;
ceasefire signed (2 May 1945); rape in; illegitimate children; Western Allies
arrive in; surrender document signed in; communist-nominated
administration; local elections (September 1945); rubble cleared and city
reorganised; food shortages and subsistence; isolation; disease; Allied
Control Council established in; US-RUSSIAN conflicts in; partition into
zones; burial of dead in; houses requisitioned by Allies; mortality rate under
occupation; music and concerts; conditions (1945-6); German refugees in;
Kommandatura in; Russian dominance in; deputy military governors
(DMGs); Soviet administrative structure; arts and culture in; homes
restored; monuments destroyed; industries removed by Russians to east;
British in; Soviet blockade and Allied airlift (1947-8); denazification in;
deaths from TB; black market in; crime in; art treasures plundered; Truman
visits; severe winters; elections (May 1946); (October 1946); and Allied
disagreements; Reuter’s mayoralty; Western zone prosperity; Allied
military strength in; police; Russians cut off milk supply; Soviet military
strength in; currency circulation; Soviet-inspired violence in; Western
demonstrations for democratic freedom; divided; tuberculosis; housing;
road traffic resumes
Berlin, Irving
Berlin Free University
Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra
Berling, General Zygmunt
Bernadotte, Count Folke
Berry, Sir Vaughan
Bersarin, Colonel-General Nicholas E.
Bersin, Sergeant
Besser, Walter
Béthouart, Lieutenant-General Emile-Marie: on destruction in Vienna;
status in Vienna; meets Clark; Koniev meets; acquires Palais Lobkowitz in
Vienna; visits Mauthausen; on Archduke Otto; on punishment of Nazis; on
hardships in Vienna; and Koenig
Bevin, Ernest: declines to defend Austria; as Foreign Secretary; and
Pakenham; on French communists; and Ruhr; at Potsdam; hostility to
Soviet Russia; on maintenance of Hess; favours divided Germany; favours
remaining in Germany; and cession of South Tyrol to Austria; and
Molotov’s wish for unified Germany; invites US to station B-29 bombers in
Britain; refuses communication with Russians during Berlin blockade
Biberteich camp, Czechoslovakia
Bidault, Georges
Biddle, Francis
Biel, Heinz
Bielenberg, Christabel
Bierut, Bołesław
Big Lift, The (film)
Bildt, Paul
Bimko, Dr Hadassah
Birley, Sir Robert
Biscari
Bismarck, Prince Otto von
Bizonia (US-British zones)
black market: transactions; development and operation; and crime
Blaha, General
Blanckenburg family
Blankenhorn, Herbert
Blaschtowitschka, Dr
Blaskowitz, General Johannes
Blomberg, Field Marshal Werner von
Bluméon
Blum, Moritz
Bogomolov, Alexander
Bohle, Ernst
Bohlen, Charles (‘Chip’)
Bohlen und Halbach, Gustav von
Böhler, Josef
Böhm, Johann
Böhm, Karl
Böhm-Baweerk family
Bohrer, Karl-Heinz
Boislambert, Hettier de
Böll, Heinrich: Die Botschaft; ‘Geschäft ist Geschäft’ in Wanderer
kommst du nach Spa, Erzählungen; Kreuz ohne Liebe; ‘Kumpel mit dem
langen Haar’; ‘Lohengrins Tod’; ‘Mein Onkel Fred’; ‘When the War Was
Over’
Bolling, General Alexander
Bolzano-Bozen
Bongers, Else
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich
Bonin, Colonel Bogislaw von
Bonn: as West German capital
Borchard, Leo
Borchert, Wolfgang: Draussen vor der Tür (play; filmed as Liebe 1947)
Bormann, Martin
Bornholm (island), Denmark
Borotra, Jean
Böttner, Professor Arthur
Boveri, Margret: reaches Teupitz; disparages Dönitz; in Charlottenburg;
on Red Army soldiers’ behaviour; on women working in Berlin; meets
surviving Jews; on food shortage; on Americans in Germany; crosses into
Franconia; attends Berlin concert; on Bamberg; on Western Allies’
plundering; on Fragebogen; on shortage of German men; on prisoners in
Soviet Union; on accused at Nuremberg; on arrests in Potsdam; on number
of French arrests; Tage des Überlebens
Bradley, General Omar
Brandenburg
Brandt, Karl
Brandt, Willy
Brauchitsch, Field Marshal Walther von
Braun, Eva
Braunschweig, Eberhard von
Brech, John
Brecht, Bertolt
Breker, Arno
Bremen: ceded by British to Americans
Brenner
Breslau (Wrocław)
Briand, Aristide
Bridgend, South Wales
Britain: policy on Germany; advance into Germany and central Europe;
wartime alliance with USSR; refuses to recognise Renner regime in
Austria; dispute with Yugoslavia over Trieste and Carinthia; and Dönitz
government; and Princess Victoria Louise; arrival in Berlin; popularity in
Berlin; and development of German constitution; complains of Russian
thefts; forms Rhineland-Westphalia, 255; reputation; dealings with
Adenauer; supports Schumacher; Austrian policy; presence in Austria;
administration in Vienna; and deportation of Cossacks to Russia; employs
German and Austrian Jews in army; suspicion of Jewish influx into
Germany; changes policy on fraternising with Germans; treatment of
German POWs; POW camps in; and Nazi war criminals; and war crimes
trials; ends war trials; general election (July 1945); policy at Potsdam;
economic and financial weakness; rejects People’s Congress; and Berlin
airlift; Adenauer opposes entry to Common Market; effects of war on; post-
war retribution; decline as power
British Austrian Legal Unit (BALU)
British Control Commission
British Free Corps
British zone (Germany): German refugees in; co-operation with
American and French zones; tolerance; denazification; military government
in; education in; industrial plant removed; culture in; food and clothing
shortages in; thefts in
Britten, Benjamin
Brno, Czechoslovakia: death march
Broch, Hermann
Brost, Erich
Brown, Ralph
Brüning, Heinrich
Brunner, Alois (‘Jupo’)
Brunswick
Brunswick, Ernest-Augustus, Duke of
Brussels Pact (1948)
Brüx (Most), Czechoslovakia
Bryant, Lieutenant-Colonel George (born Breuer)
Buchenwald concentration camp
Büderich camp
Bugner, Helene
Bühler (state secretary)
Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai Alexandrovich
Bulgarians: population transfer (1913)
Bumballa, Raoul
Burgenland
Bürklin, Wilhelm Burschenschaften (student corps)
Busch, Field Marshal Ernst
Bussche-Streithorst, Axel Freiherr von dem
Byrnes, James: on Roosevelt’s anger with Germans; and Polish borders;
policy on Germany; and Austrian settlement; accompanies Truman to
Potsdam Conference; on Churchill at Potsdam; and Bevin’s hostility to
Soviet Russia; at Moscow CFM (December 1945); offers to merge
American zone with British; and German curency reform
Čabrinovič, Nedeljko
Cadogan, Sir Alexander
Cailliau, Madame Alfred (née de Gaulle)
Calmon, Major
Canada: German POW camps in; tries German war criminals
Canaris, Admiral Wilhelm
cannibalism
Cannon, General John
Caprivi, Georg Leo, Graf von
CARE see Co-operative of American Remittances to Europe
Carinthia
Carpenter, Len
Carr, Edward Hallett
Carsten, F. L.
Casablanca Conference (1943)
Cassel
Celibidache, Sergiu censorship: in Soviet zone
Chaloner, Major (of Hanover Information Council)
Chapigneulles, Major
Charlemagne, Emperor: crown discovered
Cheetham, N. J. A.
Cherrière, General P. R. P.
chewing gum
children: conditions and life
Chotinsky, Fyodor
Christian Democratic Union (CDU): formed; leaders; and Berlin
elections (1946); demands national representation; in West German
elections (1949)
Christlich-Sozial Union (CSU)
Chuikov, Vassily
Churcher, Brigadier John Bryan
Churchill, Mary
Churchill, Rhona
Churchill, (Sir) Winston S.: on treatment of Germans; drafts Atlantic
Charter; as premier (1940); hostility to Prussians; apprehensions over
Soviet Russia; and Polish borders; promises to free Austria from Prussians;
and Dönitz government; sends ‘iron curtain’ telegram to Truman; protests at
British treatment of German leaders; approves expulsion of Germans in
central Europe; Fulton speech (1946); and British entry into Vienna; Horthy
writes to; Göring quotes; intercedes for Kesselring; hostility to Russians;
pleads for French zone in Germany; at Yalta; at Potsdam Conference;
concern for weakened British economy; loses premiership to Attlee; and
granting of Königsberg to Russia; supports Byrnes; addresses United
Europe Congress (May 1948) cigarettes: as currency cinema: in Soviet
zone; in American zone; in Austria
Civil Affairs Division (CAD; US War Department)
Clare, George: finds Jewish survivors; with British in Berlin; on
Neumann’s satire; attends theatre; meets Karl Arnold; shares rations with
children; and denazification; on German-speaking colleagues; on Karajan;
and Austrian Nazis; and Anglo-German fraternising; and German scientists
Clark, Clifford
Clark, General Mark: aggressiveness; on Soviet looting; on Figl;
administration in Vienna; relations with Koniev; anti-Soviet stance; on
Austrian food supply; popularity in Austria; and Austrian culture; on
Moscow Conference (1947); and Austrian airlift; doubts over Allied
achievements
Clarke, Eric
Clay, General Lucius: and arrest of Dönitz; and absence of Nazi
underground movement; heads US mission in Berlin; relations with
Russians; and expulsion of ethnic Germans from central Europe; authority;
in Frankfurt-am-Main; attitude to Russians; on anti-frat order; background;
policy on Germany; and retention of German industry; and appointment of
German political leaders; denies Ruhr benefits to Russians; Schumacher
negotiates with; on French depredations in Baden-Württemberg; differences
with Koenig; on French demands for coal; prevents dismantling of German
industrial sites; and French customs wall in Saar; praises RIAS; favours
German self-government; and denazification process; and food shortages;
attempts to stop use of cigarettes as currency; requests relief from USA; and
German art treasures; denies looting charges against soldiers; apologises for
US interrogation methods; on Russia’s German POWs; and German POWs
in Poland; and Nuremberg trials; calls for execution of Malmédy murderers;
and agreement on Berlin; meets Zhukov; supports Byrnes; antipathy to
French; favours inter-zonal co-operation; and currency reform; and Soviet
blockade in Berlin; on US military strength in Berlin; and Berlin airlift;
concedes Soviet request for currency circulation; and founding of West
German state; and Soviet-provoked rioting in Berlin; and Berliners’ anti-
communist demonstrations; on proposed Soviet air force manoeuvres over
Berlin; and founding of Free University in Berlin; counters Russian
condemnation of Dresden bombing; honoured in Berlin; on future of Ruhr
Clemenceau, Michel
Clift, Montgomery
Cold War: Stalin disfavours; beginnings; develops
collective guilt
Cologne: destruction; Adenauer in; slowness in recovery
Cominform: established
Communist Party of Germany (KPD): refounded; and Berlin elections
(1946); renamed SED
concentration camps: reused by Allies; Jews in; categories of inmates;
liberated; killing methods; inmates ordered to be killed; in Austria; Czech;
in Silesia; in Russian zone; German disbelief in; tours; trials of
administrators; see also individual camps
Concordia Bureau
Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM): Moscow (December 1946);
decided at Potsdam; first meeting (London, 1945); London (January 1947);
Moscow (March 1947); London (November 1947); London (February
1948); London (July 1948)
Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Conrad, Josef
Control Commission Germany (CCG)
Control Council see Allied Control Council
Co-operative of American Remittances to Europe (CARE)
Cossacks: fight against Red Army; repatriated to Russia under Yalta
Agreement
Council of Europe: formed
Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany
(CRALOG)
Couve de Murville, Maurice
Cranborne, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Viscount (later 5th Marquess of
Salisbury)
crime: and black market; theft
Croats
Croy, Princess Agathe
Cullis, M. F.
Cultural Alliance see Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung
Deutschlands
Curzon, George Nathaniel, Marquess
Cuxhaven
Czechoslovakia: territorial claims; settlement and minorities problem;
formed (1919); Germans occupy (1939); Sudetenländers (German minority)
in; communists take over (1948); liberated (1945); purge (1945); revenge
and atrocities against Germans; rapes in; concentration camps; American
zone; suicides; torture in; expulsion of Germans and minorities; People’s
Courts; German POWs in; post-war government; under Soviet influence;
effects of peace settlement on; see also Prague
Dachau concentration camp
Dahrendorf, Gustav
Dahrendorf, Ralf, Baron
Dalade, Colonel
Daladier, Edouard
Dalton, Hugh
Danzig (Gdansk)
Darré, Walter
‘death marches’
De Gasperi, Alcide
de Lancie, John
Deleuze, Major
Dempsey, General Sir Miles
denazification
Devers, General Jacob
Dibelius, Otto
Dick, Professor Walter
Dickens, A. G.
Diels, Rudolf
Dietrich, Landrat (of Ruppin)
Dietrich, Otto
Dietrich, General Sepp
Diewald (Austrian lawyer)
Dimitrov, Georgy displaced persons (DPs): in central Europe; looting
and killing by; rapes by; in black market
Ditzen, Rudolf (Hans Fallada)
Ditzen, Suse
Dix, Otto
Dix, Rudolf
Dixon, Specialist Sergeant Shirley
Djilas, Milovan
Dmowski, Roman
Dobbek, Dr
Döblin, Alfred; Berlin-Alexanderplatz
‘Doktora’ (of Königsberg)
Dollfuss, Engelbert
Dombrowski (Polish policeman)
domobranci (Slovenian home guard)
Dönhoff, Marion, Gräfin
Dönitz, Admiral Karl
Donnedieu de Vabres, Henri
Donovan, William
Dortmund
Dos Passos, John: on US Military Government HQ in Frankfurt; on co-
operation between Western zones; on Vienna; on Fragebogen and
denazification; and US hatred of Germans; on DPs’ lawlessness; on Rhine
Meadow camps; reports Nuremberg trials; interviews Clay
Douda (Czech police director)
Douglas, Marshal of the RAF Sir Sholto
Draht, Andreas
Drambusch (forester)
Draper, General William
Dratvin, General M. I.
Dresden
Dresden Gallery
Drobner, Bolesław
drugs
Dubensky, William
Dubois, Lieutenant Herbert
Duermayer, Heinz
Dunbaugh, Captain Frank M.
Dunn, Thomas
Duppau, Czechoslovakia
Düsseldorf
Dyck, Dr van
Dymshitz, Colonel Alexander
Dyszkant, Dr
East Germany see German Democratic Republic
East Prussia: Soviet offensive and destruction in; German population;
religious faith; refugees from; starvation in; Stalin’s view on at Potsdam;
Germans driven from; Russians appropriate part; see also Prussia
Ebensee, Austria
Eberle, Henrik and Matthias Uhl (eds): Das Buch Hitler (The Hitler
Book)
Ebert, Friedrich
Eclipse, Operation
Eden, Anthony (later 1st Earl of Avon): and transfer of Germans from
East Prussia; disdain for Austria; recognises Austrian claim to
independence; and Nuremberg trials; at Potsdam Conference; supports
Italian claim to South Tyrol
Edler, Franz
Ehrenburg, Ilya
Eichmann, Adolf
Eigruber, August Gauleiter
Einsiedel, Horst von
Eisenerz Trial (1946)
Eisenhower, General Dwight D.: declares war ended; orders Dönitz’s
arrest; visits concentration camp; in Frankfurt-am-Main; reputation; and
anti-frat order; and US pillaging; and Göring’s capture; and agreement on
Berlin; and territorial allocations at Potsdam; Truman visits in Frankfurt;
threatens to scrap Control Council; federal officials quit under
Eisler, Hans
Emery, Major
Engelbert, Otto
Epenstein, Hermann von
Erdmannsdorff, Otto von
Erhard, Ludwig
Erhardt, John
Erlach, Albert von
Ermland
Erzgebirge, the
Esser, Hans
Esser, Heinz
Eulenburg, Siegfried
European Advisory Commission (EAC)
European Union (earlier Common Market)
Falkenburger, Paul
Falkenhausen, General Alexander von
Fallada, Hans see Ditzen, Rudolf
Fandrich (judge)
Farmer, Captain Walter
Faulhaber, Cardinal Michael
Fechner, Max
Fediunsky, General I. I.
Fegelein, Hermann
Fegelein, Waldemar
Fehrer, Franz
Feitenhansl, Karl
Felix, Leo (‘Felix Field’)
Feuchtwanger, Lion
Février, Jacques
Fichte, Paul
Fiedler, Ludwig
Field Security Service (FSS; British)
Fierlinger, Zdenek
Figl, Leopold
Filippov, Captain films see cinema
Final Solution; see also Jews
Fischer, Ernst; The Rebirth of My Country
Fischhorn Castle, near Zell-am-See
Fitsch, Eduard
Fläschner, Hans
Flensburg
Flick Group
Flieder, Paul
Flory, General L. D. (Les)
Flossenbürg concentration camp
Foord, Brigadier E. J.
Forrestal, James
Forst, Willy
Forster, Albert
Foster, Norman, Baron
Fragebogen
France: revenge acts against Germany; goals for defeated Germany;
seeks recognition as great power; claims to Rhine and Ruhr; demands for
zone of occupation in Germany; employs German forced labour; granted
sector in Berlin; and Austrian settlement; repossesses country after
liberation; advance to Austria; forces in occupation of Rhineland; advance
on Baden; undisciplined behaviour; arrival in Berlin; administration in
Berlin; sympathy towards Germans; creates Rhineland-Palatinate; plans for
Rhineland; favours united Europe; opposes German unity; atrocities against
Germans; policy on Germany; jurisdiction over German territory; acquires
Saar; demands coal from Germany; in Austria; removes Austrian industrial
plant; administration in Vienna; Austrian view of; cultural activities in
Vienna; on German guilt; and denazification; and German POWs; not
invited to Potsdam; and Polish settlement; treaty with Soviet France -
continued Russia (1945); friction with Soviet Russia; approves of German
territorial concessions in east; rights to Saar; opposes Truman Doctrine; and
Soviet claims to Ruhr; forms Trizonia with USA and Britain; non-
participation in Berlin airlift; attitude to and relations with Adenauer; post-
war arrests and trials; effect of peace settlement on
Frank, Benno
Frank, Hans
Frank, Karl-Hermann
Frankfurt-am-Main; Städel Gallery
Franz, Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein
Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia: body moved and reinterred
Frederick Leopold, Prince of Prussia
Frederick William I, King of Prussia: body moved and reinterred
Free Austrian (World) Movement (FAM; FAWM)
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ): formed
Freisler, Roland
Freiwaldau (Jeseník), Czechoslovakia
French zone (ZOF; Germany): refugees in; co-operation with British
and American zones; numbers of French in; exports to France; industrial
plant transferred to France; treatment of Germans in; German youth
admiration for French; culture in; food shortages in; supposed market for
babies; black market in; and Berlin airlift
Freud, Anton
Freudenstadt
Freudenthal, Czechoslovakia
Freund, Hans
Frey, Hans
Freyberg, General Sir Bernard
Freytag, Gustav Frick, Wilhelm
Friede, Dieter Friedeburg, Admiral Hans von
Friedrich, Ruth Andreas: in Brandenburg; welcomes end of Reich; on
life in occupied Berlin; sees Americans in Steglitz; and denazification and
Fragebogen; and disposal of dead; at killing of Borchard; on influx of
Königsberger; and death of Bersarin; and cultural events; on German GI
brides; on French influence on German youth; on theft of wood from grave;
and Russian occupation of Chancellery; on returning German POWs; on
Nuremberg trials; and Truman’s visit to Berlin; welcomes Potsdam
Agreement; in severe winter (1946-7); on resurgence of Nazism in
Hamburg; on Berlin blockade; and Berlin airlift; flees to West; Schauplatz
Berlin
Friedrich Wilhelm von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince
Frings, Cardinal Joseph, Archbishop of Cologne
Fritsch, General Werner von
Fritzsche, Hans
Froning, Karl
Fuernberg, Friedl
Fugger von Glött, Prince
Funk, Walter
Fürstenstein, Silesia
Furtwängler, Wilhelm
Fyfe, Sir David Maxwell
Galen, Clemens August, Graf von, Bishop of Münster
Gamelin, General Maurice Gustave
Ganeval, General Jean
Gangl, Major
gangs: in central Europe
Gans, Major Hiram
Garibaldi, Sante
Gasperi, Alcide De see De Gasperi, Alcide
Gaulle, Charles de: proposes indefinite occupation of Rhineland; and
changes to Germany; claims German labour for France; orders Lattre de
Tassigny to cross Rhine; and French independence; advocates co-operation
with Germany; Soviet hostility to; favours Germany as confederation;
Hopkins negotiates with; Roosevelt disdains; on Potsdam agreement to
create central agencies in zones; supports European union
GDR see German Democratic Republic
Gebauer, Alfred
Geneva Convention; and Nuremberg trials
George, Heinrich
German Democratic Republic (GDR; East Germany): lawyers in;
founded; Russians introduce new currency
German Federal Republic (FDR; West Germany): beginnings; created;
Russians oppose; administrative structure and constitution; adopts basic
law; elections (August 1949)
Germans: minorities in non-German states; ordered to visit
concentration camps; suicides after defeat; Czech atrocities against;
expelled from central and eastern Europe; resettlement; in Poland; abducted
to develop industry in Russia; work for Allies; expelled from Austria;
property assets and restitution; disbelieve atrocity stories about Nazis
Germany: wartime casualties; and Atlantic Charter; divided between
Allies; proposed division into small states; Allies demand unconditional
surrender; destruction of towns and cities; evacuates prisons; industrial
plant removed; forms interim government under Dönitz; surrenders (8 May
1945); communists in; Allied fraternising forbidden; policy in
Czechoslovakia; internal deportations; Soviet administrative structure in;
wine plundered; industrial survival; US policy on; currency reformed and
stabilised; French changing policy on; Allied disputes over industrial
activity; literary revival; Jews in; and collective guilt; starvation policy in;
food riots and demonstrations; plague of wild boars; prisoners of war;
military organisation and command; tries Nazi war criminals; lawyers
absolved of Nazi crimes; dissolved as independent nation; discussed at
Potsdam Conference; divided at Potsdam Conference; boundaries; severe
winter (1946-7); Transitional Law passed (1947); split into East and West;
economic recovery; proposed rearmament; effects of war and peace
settlement on
Gernrode, Saxony
Gerö, Dr Joseph
Gertner, Wolfgang
Gessner, Adrienne
Gibson-Watt, Andrew
Gilbert, Felix
Gimborski, Cesaro
Gladow, Werner
Glasenbach, Austria
Glaser, Kurt
Glatz, Silesia
Gleiwitz, Silesia
Glum, Friedrich
Goebbels, Joseph: hopes for Western Allies to attack Russians; predicts
rape by Red Army; on killing of Oppenhof; and behaviour of occupying
Russians; body found; suicide; propaganda films; Rhineland origins; and
Furtwängler; Attlee believes in Soviet hands; on ‘iron curtain’
Goebbels, Magda
Goedde, Petra: GIs and Germans
Gofman, K.
Gollancz, Sir Victor; The Ethics of Starvation; In Darkest Germany
Gomułka, Władisław
Gorbatov, Colonel-General Boris
Gordow, General
Göring, Edda
Göring, Emmy
Göring, Hermann: four-year economic plan; and satire; protects
Karajan; property houses Jewish DPs; art collection; capture and trial at
Nuremberg; attitude to colleagues; suicide; and Winifred Wagner; on
dissolution of Allied coalition
Görlitz
Gotthelft, Ille
Gottschee
Gouliga, Captain Alexander
Graf, Willi
Grass, Günter: xiii, 249; Im Krebsgang; The Tin Drum
Graz
Great Escape (Stalag Luft III, Silesia)
Greece: population transfer with Turks; communists in; in US sphere of
influence
Greene, Graham
Greene, Hugh Carleton
Gregor, Carl
Greifenberg
Greisser, Arthur
Grese, Irma
Griehsel, Max
Griessmann, Erika
Grillparzer, Franz
Grimm, Dr Carl
Grimm, Eduard
Grinberg, Zalman
Grisebach, August
Grisebach, Hanna
Gros, Professor (of France)
Grosz, George
Grotewohl, Otto
Group
Gruber, Karl
Gruenther, General Alfred
Grünberg, Lower Silesia
Gründgens, Gustaf
Grüssau monastery, Silesia
Grynspann, Herschel
Günsche, Otto
Günter, Prince von Schönburg-Waldenburg
Günther, Marianne
Gusen concentration camp
Gutmann, Rudolf
Guyot (French torturer)
Habe, Hans (Janos)
Habermas, Jürgen
Habsburg, Karl Ludwig von
Habsburg, Otto von
Habsburg, Robert von
Hackmüller (Baldur von Schirach’s secretary)
Haffner, Sebastian
Hague Conventions
Hahn, Otto
Halder, General Franz
Halem, Nikolaus von
Halifax, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood t Earl of
Hamburg: destruction; British in; accommodation shortage
Hamelin
Hammerstein-Equord, Baron
Hammerstein-Equord, Colonel-General Kurt von
Hanke, Gauleiter Karl
Hanover; liberated and occupied
Harcourt, Robert d’
Hardenberg, Graf Carl-Hans von
Hardman, Rev. Leslie
Harriman, Averell
Harris, Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Hartheim concentration camp
Harwood, Ronald: Taking Sides
Hassell, Ulrich von
Haubach, Theodor
Hauptmann, Gerhart
Hausenstern, Wilhelm
Häussermann, Ernst
Hautmann, Rudolf
‘Haw Haw, Lord’ see Joyce, William
Hawelka, Josefine and Leopold
Hedy, Sister
Heidelberg
Heiden, Konrad
Heilig, Bruno: Men Crucified
Heimpel, Professor
Heine, Heinrich
Heinrich, Theodore (‘Ted’)
Heisenberg, Werner
Heligoland
Henderson, Sir Nevile
Henderson, (Sir) Nicholas Hengher, Sofie
Henlein, Konrad
Henry V (film)
Hentig, Hartwig von
Hentschel, Volker: Ludwig Erhard
Herbert, General Sir Otway
Herbruck, Franconia
Hermann-Göring-Werke, Linz
Hermann-Neisse, Max
Hermes, Andreas
Hermine of Reuss, Princess (Kaiser’s second wife)
Hernnstadt, Rudolf
Herrell, Captain (Günzburg commandant)
Hertz, Gustav
Herz, John
Herz, Martin
Herzfeld, Wieland
Hess, Fritz
Hess, Otto
Hess, Rudolf
Heuss, Theodor
Heydrich, Reinhard
Heym, Stefan
Hildebrandt, Friedrich
Hildebrandt, Richard
Hildesheim
Himmler, Heinrich: hopes for Western Allies attacking USSR; and
Eichmann’s anti-Jewish activities; and Höss’s attempted escape; Dönitz
spurns; swallows cyanide; bargains with Jews; and extermination of
inmates of camps; authority; capture and suicide; invoked at Nuremberg;
and Ohlendorf
Hindenburg, Oskar von
Hindenburg, Paul von; bones moved
Hindenburg (Zaborze)
Hirst, Major Ivan
Hitler, Adolf: votes for; hopes for Allies to attack Russia; suicide; and
July assassination plot (1944); dismisses Hohenzollern princes from army;
orders Himmler to kill inmates of camps; body not found; and ethnic
Germans from Romania; disparages Knappertsbusch; bones offered to
Austria; German opposition to; and Winifred Wagner; fate investigated;
remains removed by Russians; accepted as Chancellor; authority; deposes
Horthy; policy on ethnic Germans (‘Heim ins Reich’); Mein Kampf
Hlond, Cardinal Augustus
Hochberg family
Hoechst factory, Dortmund Hoegner, Wilhelm
Hoepner, General Erich
Hofer, Andreas
Hofer, Franz
Hofer, Karl
Hoffmann, Heinrich
Hohenschönhausen concentration camp
Hohenzollern family
Holborn, Hajo
Holland: POW deaths in; post-war trials in
Hollos, Julius
Holstein
Honecker, Erich
Honner, Franz
Hood, Samuelh Viscount
Hoover, Herbert: diet
Hope, Bob
Hopkins, Harry
Hoppe, Paul Werner
Hörnle, Edwin
Horst-Glaisenau, Edmund (General Glaise von Horstenau )
Horthy, Admiral Miklós
Horwell, Captain
Höss, Obersturmbannf ührer Rudolf
Hotek, Damian
Howley, Colonel Frank
Huber, Kurt
Hubert, Prince of Prussia
Huch, Ricarda
Hulbert, Wing Commander Norman
Hull, Cordell
Humboldt, Wilhelm: archive destroyed
Hungary: Swabians (ethnic Germans) expelled; territories; truce signed
Hurdes, Felix
Hussels, Dr
Huylers (US confectioners)
Hyde, Lieutenant-Colonel Harford Montgomery
Hyde White, Wilfrid
Hynd, John
Ida zu Stolberg-Rossla, Princess
IG Farben (company)
Iglau (Jihlava), Czechoslovakia
Ilg, Ulrich
Innitzer, Cardinal Theodor
Innsbruck; University of
Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (IARA)
International Military Tribunal see Nuremberg trials
International Red Cross see Red Cross
Iran: Soviet troops in
‘iron curtain’
Irving, David
Ismay, General Sir Hastings
Italy: and South Tyrol; evacuated by Allies (1946); cedes African
colonies; recovers Trieste
Itter, Schloss, near Kitzbühel
Ivanov, Makar
Jackson, Peter ( formerly Jacobus)
Jackson, Robert H.
Jacobs, Bruno
Jakupov, Lieutenant-Colonel
Jaspers, Gertrud (‘Trudlein’)
Jaspers, Karl
Javorička, Czechoslovakia
JCS see Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jecklen, Friedrich
Jena
Jenkins, Newell
Jerz, John
Jesse, Willi
Jewish Brigade
Jews: Western Allies and; in Austria; in concentration camps; in Berlin
administration; survivors; houses requisitioned by Allies; as administrators
in Russian zone; stolen property and restitution; in British army; position in
Germany; emigrate to Palestine; refugees and DPs; newspapers; revenge
acts; Nazi persecution of; paintings safeguarded; and Nuremberg trials;
interrogate Nazis for trial; Ohlendorf on; see also Final Solution
Jodl, General Alfred
Joham, Josef
John George, Prince of Saxony
Johnert, Hans
Joint Chiefs of Staff documents: JCS JCS 1779
Joos, Joseph
Jouhauxéon
Jouvet, Louis
Joyce, William (‘Lord Haw Haw’)
Jugl, Josef
Jülich
Jung, Rudolf
Jünger, Ernst: author meets; American soldiers billeted on; on dead in
Pforzheim; letter from Sophie Podewils; reputation; on collective guilt; and
Fragebogen; on food rations; arrested; favours European union; Der
Friede; On the Marble Cliffs
Jünger, Ernst, Jr: killed
Junkers
Jusek (executioner’s assistant)
Justi, Ludwig
‘K., H.’
K, Sonja
Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich
Kahane, Rabbi
Kaisen, Wilhelm
Kaiser, Jakob
Kálal, Major (commandant of Theresienstadt)
Kaliningrad see Königsberg
Kállay, Miklós
Kaltenbrunner, Ernst
Kaltofen, Eduard
Kameke, Frau von (of Potsdam) Kanaltal (Fella river)
Karajan, Herbert von
Kardorff family
Kardorff, Ina von
Kardorff, Konrad von
Kardorff, Ursula von: flees to Berlin; in Jettingen; traces mother; on
conditions in Berlin; crosses into Russian zone; visits theatre; praises BBC
programme on July Plot; on treatment of Jews; and German guilt; on
Fragebogen; and ban on fraternising; and allocation of zones; on Potsdam
Conference; Berliner Aufzeichnungen, 1942-1945
Kardorff-Oheimb, Siegfried and Kathinka
Karin II (Goering’s yacht)
Karzin, Alfred
Kästner, Erich
Katscher, Paul
Katyn massacre (1940)
Kaunitz College
Keating, Senator Kenneth
Keelhaul, Operation
Keeling, Ralph F.: Gruesome Harvest
Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm
Keller, Karl
Kempner, Robert
Kendal, Major (born Knobloch)
Kennan, George F.
Keppler, Wilhelm
Kerr, Alfred
Kertész, Imre
Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert
Keyes, General Geoffrey
Keynes, John Maynard, Baron
Kiep, Otto
King, Harry
Kinsky, Graf Heinrich
Kirchheimer, Otto
Kiridus, Johann
Kirschbaum, Joseph
Kisch, Egon Erwin
Kitzbühel
Kladno, Czechoslovakia
Klagenfurt
Klahr, Alfred
Klaus, Marianne
Kleber, Andreas
Kleiber, Erich
Klein, Dr Fritz
Kleist, Field Marshal Ewald von
Klemm, Herbert
Klemperer, Otto
Klemperer, Victor
Klering, Hans
Klimov, Gregory
Kling, Alfred
Knappertsbusch, Hans
Knoechlein, Fritz
Knott, Otto
Koblenz
Koch, Gauleiter Erich Koch, Ilse
Koch, Karl
Koeltz, General Louis Marie
Koenig, General Pierre
Koeppler, Heinz
Kogon, Eugen; Der SS-Staat
Kokorin (Stalin’s nephew)
Koller, Karl
Komotau, Czechoslovakia
Koniev, General Ivan
Königsberg (Kaliningrad)
Konrad, Father Joachim
Kopelev, Lev
Kopf, Maximilian
Koplenig, Johann
Korean War (1950-3)
Körner, Paul
Körner, General Theodor
Košice Statutes (Czechoslovakia, 1945)
Kotikov, Major-General A. G.
Kouril, Jan
Kovner, Abba
Kozeluhová, Helena
Kraemer, Fritz
Kraft, Walter
Kramer, Josef
Krauland, Peter
Krauss, Klemens
Krebs, General Hans
Krebs, Willi
Kreisau Circle
Kremen, Ottokar
Krenek, Ernst
Krockow family
Krockow, Libussa von
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Alfried
Krupps works, Essen
Kubuschok, Dr (Breslau lawyer)
Kuckhoff, Adam and Greta
Kuhn, Richard
Kühnemann, Eugen
Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands
Külz (of CDU)
Kumm, Otto
Kundt, Ernst
Kunschak, Leopold
Künstner, Willi
Kurasov, Vladimir
Lafferanz, Bodo
Laffon, Emile
Lahousen, General-Major Erwin von Lais, Dr
Lammers, Hans
Lamsdorf (Lambinowice) camp, Silesia
Landsberg, Bavaria
Langham, Lieutenant Richard
Langoth, Franz
Langwasser, Nuremberg
La Rocque, Colonel de
Lasch, General Otto
Lasche, Siegfried
Lasky, Lieutenant-Colonel Wolf
Laternser, Dr H.
Lattre de Tassigny, Marshal Jean de
Latzel, Alfred
Laue, Max von
Laval, Pierre
Lawrence, Sir Geoffrey (later Baron Trevethin and Oaksey)
Lazarev, Viktor
Leahy, Admiral William D.
Lease-Lend Agreement (US-British): ends (1945)
Leber, Annedore
Leclerc, General Jacques Philippe, vicomte de Hauteclocque
Le Corbusier (Charles Edouard Jeanneret)
Ledenfels (musician)
Lederer, Captain
Leeb, Field Marshal Wilhelm, Ritter von
Legge, Walter
Lehndorff, Graf Hans
Lehndorff, Graf Heinrich
Lehndorff, Mausi
Leipzig
Leonhard, Wolfgang
Lepman, Yella
Lerchenfeld concentration camp, Czechoslovakia
l’Estrange, Captain de
Lettau, Reinhold
Leudesdorff, René
Leuschner, Wilhelm
Leverkühn, Dr Paul
Levin, Mayer
Levin, Sub-lieutenant
Ley, Robert
Liberal Democratic Party (LPD)
libraries: in American zone
Lidice massacre
Limpächer, Franz
Lincke, Paul
Lindbergh, Charles
Linford, Major
Linz, Austria
Lippmann, Walter
List, Eugene
List, Field Marshal Wilhelm
literature: in American zone; revival in Germany
Litvinov, Maxim
Livonius, Herr von (of Grumbkow)
Lloyd, Colonel Glynn
Lloyd George, David
Lockwenz, Dr
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Lods, Marcel
Loeser, Ewald
Loewenstein, Dr Karl
Löhr, Colonel-General Alexander
London Agreements: 1944 June 1948
London Statute (1945)
Longfordh Earl of see Pakenhamt Baron
Lorbeer, Hans
Lothar, Ernst
Louis Ferdinand, Prince of Prussia
Löwenstein, Prince Hubertus zu
Löwenthal, Fritz
Lower Saxony
Lübeck
Ludin, Hanns
Ludshuveit, Lieutenant Yevgeny
Ludwig, Leopold
Ludwigshafen
Ludwigslust
Lukács, Georg
Lundwall, Dr Erich
Lurçat, Jean
Lusset, Félix
Luxembourg: POW deaths in
Lynch, Pat
Lyndon, Major
Lyne, Major-General Lewis Owen
M., Christel
M., Doris von
Maasburg, Nikolaus von
McCloy, Ellen
McCloy, John
McClure, General Robert
McCreery, General Sir Richard
Machold, Reinhold
Mack, Sir Henry
Maclean, Donald
Macmillan, Harold (later 1st Earl of Stockton)
McNarney, General Joseph T.
McNeil, Hector
Mader, Helene
Mafalda, Princess of Hesse
Mahr, Franz
Mainz; university
Mair, John
Maisky, Ivan
Makins, Roger
Malenkov, Georgy
Malmédy massacre and trial
Maltheuren concentration camp, Czechoslovakia
Malzacher, Hans
Mander, Sir Geoffrey
Mann, Erika
Mann, Golo
Mann, Heinrich
Mann, Klaus; Auf der Suche nach einem Weg
Mann, Thomas
Manstein, Field Marshal Fritz Erich von
Marcuse, Herbert
Marek, Police Captain Anton
Marek, Max
Margarétha, Eugen: on arrival of Russians in Vienna; on looting; on
American advance; dismissed from job; hears rumour of Schuschnigg’s
poisoning; on Vlasov’s approach; on judging Nazis; on Viennese self-
interest; accommodates English troops; on Austrian elections (1945); on
Soviet occupation of eastern Styria
Markgraf, Paul; police force
Maron, Karl
Maršálek, Hans
Marshall, General George S.
Marshall Plan (1947): Soviet reaction to; anti-communist aims;
initiated; supported by London conference
Marwitz, family von der
Mary, Princess of Hesse
Masaryk, Jan
Mastny, Vojtech
Matchbox, Operation
Matzkowski, Hermann
Mautern bridge, Austria
Mauthausen concentration camp
Maxwell, Robert
Mayer, Milton
Mayer, René
Mecklenburg
Meissen
Meissner, Otto
Mendelssohn, Felix
Mendelssohn, Peter de
Mengele, Josef
Menne, Bernhard
Mensdorff, Graf Albert
Menuhin, Yehudi
Merton, Richard
Merz von Quirnheim, Colonel
Metternich, Prince Paul von
Metternich, Princess Tatiana von
Meyer, Kurt
Meyer, Oskar
Michel, Heinrich
Mielke, Erich
Mierendorff, Carlo
Mikesch, Stanislaus
Miklos, Béla
Mikoyan, Anastas
Milch, Field Marshal Erhardt
Minden
Mitscherlich, Alexander
Mohapl, Major
Mohnke, SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm
Molkenthin (reporter)
Molo, Walter von
Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: and Sudeten Germans; criticises Western
Allies’ policy on Germany; on number of German prisoners in Russia; and
Potsdam Agreement; at Potsdam Conference; and French demands; favours
East-West cooperation; Bevin challenges; breaks off talks with West (June
1947); and Soviet hostility to West; demands control of exports from
Western Berlin; and government of East Germany
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939)
Moltke, Helmuth James von
Mondorf
Mondwurf, Friedhelm
Monnet, Jean
Mons, Belgium
Monte Cassino abbey, Italy
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Lawt Viscount: accepts
German surrender; orders non-destruction of German weapons; Churchill
protests to over treatment of Germans; as first military governor; promises
to restore party politics; keeps Ruhr coal in Germany; broadcast speech on
imprisoning General Staff officers; and food rationing; and ban on
fraternising; disapproves of Nuremberg trials; Himmler requests meeting
with; Josef Kramer appeals to; favours attacking Russians; and settlement
of Berlin
Monticault, Alain de
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFAA; American)
Morgan, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick
Morgenthau, Henry: ‘pastoralisation’ plan for Germany; de Gaulle
rejects plan; proposes separation of Austria from Germany; Clay rejects
proposals; and denazification; and violence against German prisoners;
resigns; and Polish territorial demands; Germany is our Problem
Moroccan troops
Moscow: Conference of Foreign Ministers: (December 1946); (March
1947)
Moscow Declaration (30 October 1943)
Mosely, Leonard
Müller (German clockmaker)
Müller, Heinrich ‘Gestapo’
Müller, Josef (‘Ochsensepp’)
Mumm, Brat von
Munich
Munich Agreement (1938)
Münsterlager
Mürau bei Hohenstadt, Czechoslovakia
Murphy, Colonel Michael
Murphy, Robert
Muscovites (German communists)
music: in Soviet zone; in American zone; in British zone; in Austria;
denazification of composers
Mussolini, Benito
Nabokov, Nicolas
Nagel, Otto
Naimark, Norman M.: The Russians in Germany
Napoleon I (Bonaparte), Emperor of the French
National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD)
Natzwiller concentration camp
Nazis: employed in Russian zone; opposition to; and Fragebogen; tried
and sentenced; see also denazification
Neave, Major Airey
Neisse, Silesia
Nemmersdorf
Nerwig, Klaus and Frau
Neudörfl, Rudolf
Neues Österreich (newspaper)
Neumann, Franz Leopold
Neumann, Günter
Neurath, Constantin von
Neuss, Silesia
Neustadt, Upper Silesia
Neveu, Ginette
Newman (US governor of Hessen)
newspaper press; Jewish
Nicholls, Jack
Nicols, Philip
Nicolson, Nigel
Niehoff, General Hermann
Niekisch, Ernst
Niemöller, Martin
Nieusela, Hans-Günther
Night of the Long Knives (1934)
Nikitchenko, General Iona
Nikolsburg, Czechoslovakia
Noiret, General Roger
Nolde, Emil
Nordhausen-Dora
Normann, Käthe von
Normann, Philipp von
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Nüll, Edwin von der
Nuremberg Laws
Nuremberg trials: Paul Schmidt at; Göring and; and executions;
established and constituted; treatment of accused; conduct of; sentences;
lesser trials; and severe winter (1946-7)
O5 (Austrian resistance group)
Occupation Marks (currency)
Ochab, Edward
Ödenburg (Sopron)
Oelssner, Fred
Ohlendorf, Otto
Ohrdruf labour camp
Olbricht, General Friedrich
Oldenburg-Januschau, Elard von
O’Neill, Con
opera: in Soviet zone; in American zone
Opfer der Fascismus (OdF)
Oppenhoff, Franz
Oradour-sur-Glane, France
Oran: French fleet sunk by British
Oranienburg
Osberger family
Oscar, Prince of Prussia
Ostpolitik
Ottilinger, Frau
Oulman, Gaston
Padover, Saul
Paget, Reginald
Pakenham, Francis Aungier Pakenham t Baron (later 7th Earl of
Longford)
Pal, Rahabinode
Palestine: Jewish refugees emigrate to
Palmer, Rex
Pałucki, Władysław
Pancrác (Pankratz), Czechoslovakia
Pannwitz, General Helmuth von
Papagos, Field Marshal Alexander
Papen, Franz von: arrested, tried and acquitted; and Schwerin von
Krosigk; retried and sentenced after Nuremberg acquittal; membership of
Berlin Herrenklub; claims US guards offer suicide means; attends mass
Paris peace conference (1946)
Parker, John J.
Patton, General George S.: visits concentration camp; army in
Czechoslovakia; attitude to Germans; character and manner; reputation; on
Jewish DPs; relieved of command for comment on Nazis; and treatment of
German POWs; orders killing of POWs at Biscari; hostility to Soviet
Russia; on results of war settlement
Patzak, Julius
Paulus, Field Marshal Friedrich
Pauly, Max
Pavlov (interpreter)
Pawlowsky, Dr
Payne Best, Captain Sigismund
Pearson, Lieutenant-Colonel
Pechtel, Ursula
Peenemünde
Peiper, Jochen
Pelican, Fred (born Friedrich Pelikan)
People’s Congress for Unity and Just Peace
Perl, William
Pétain, Marshal Philippe Peters, Dr Theofil
Petersen, Rudolf
Petznek, Frau (née Archduchess Elisabeth)
Pfitzner, Hans
Pfitzner, Josef
Pforzheim
Philby, Kim
Philip, Prince of Hesse
Picht, Georg
Pieck, Wilhelm
Pierrepoint, Albert
Pillau, East Prussia
Pinson (French ex-Jesuit)
Piquet, Gabriel, Bishop of Clermont-Ferrand
Pirchegger, Anton
Pirzio-Biroli, Fey
Plathe
Plattling camp
Plattner (anti-Nazi Tyrolean)
Pleiger, Paul
Pless family
Plettenberg, Graf
Pliever, Theodor; Stalingrad
Podewils, Sophie Dorothea
Podhragy, Baron Leopold Popper von
Pohl, Gerhart
Pohl, Oswald
Pohrlitz camp, Czechoslovakia
Poland: Nazi death camps; border disputes and agreements; Stalin’s
policy on; territorial claims; soldiers liberate Teschen; allocated former
Teutonic regions at Yalta; General Gouvernement; resettlement programme;
claims Breslau; Miliz (organisation); partition; treatment of Germans; racial
minorities in& n; religion in; German disdain for; and deportation of
Germans; anti-semitism in; German POWs in; trial and punishment of war
criminals; Lublin government; Churchill attempts to settle; occupies Silesia;
discussed at Potsdam Conference; as buffer for Soviet Union; effects of
peace settlement on
Pollack, James K.
Pollitzer (or Pollitt), E. H.
Pomerania: disease in; Soviet conquest and occupation of; Germans in;
religious faith
Poncet (French adjutant)
Popławski, Jan-Ludwig
Portman, Sergeant
Postelberg (Postoloprty), Czechoslovakia
Potsdam: Garrison Church;
destruction and conditions;
Russians in
Potsdam Conference (1945): and policy on occupation; and situation in
eastern Europe; and expulsion of Germans; and territorial allocations;
Agreement; and German coal supply; and Austrian question; on feeding of
Germans; Stalin’s dominance at; inter-Allied differences; France excluded;
agenda; and Polish settlement; arrangements; on transfer of populations;
assessed
Potter, Captain Merle
Prague: uprising (1945); Germans occupy (1939); German population;
atrocities against Germans; Red Army in; torture in; coup (March 1948);
see also Czechoslovakia
Praxmarer, Konrad
Preetorius, Emil
Priess, Hermann
Princip, Gavrilo
prisoners of war (POWs): German; in American camps; in British
camps; in Belgium; tried and sentenced for war crimes; in French camps; in
Russian camps; in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia; released; rights
Privalov, General Pjotr
Probst, Christoph
prostitution
Pruša, Alois and daughters
Prussia: suicides in; Adenauer and; ends as state; see also East Prussia
Pryce-Jones, Alan
publishing: in Soviet zone
Pulitzer, Joseph
Pünder, Hermann
Pust, Heinz
Puttkamer family
Puttkamer, Jesko von
Puttkamer, Robert von
Quadt-Isny, Eugen, Graf
Quebec Conference (1943)
Rabinovich, Leonid
radio
Radio in American Sector (RIAS)
Radio Liberty
Radley, Arthur
Raeder, Admiral Erich
Rahm, Karl
Ransbach
rape see women
Rath, Ernst vom
Rathenau, Walther
Rattenhuber, Johann
Rauschning, Hermann
Rave, Paul Ortwin
Ravensbrück concentration camp
Ravenstein, Lieutenant-General Hans von
Rawdon, Sergeant R.
Reber, Samuel
Reckzeh, Dr
Red Army: captures and occupies Vienna; rapes ; advance and
behaviour in Europe; compared to American negroes; in occupation of
Berlin; and liberation of Prague (1945); in Prague; behaviour in
Czechoslovakia; in Königsberg; depredations in Silesia; looting in Austria;
see also Soviet Russia
Red Cross
Red Orchestra
Rees, Goronwy
Regensburg
Rehrl, Josef
Reichskristallnacht (1938)
Reichskulturkammer (RKK)
Rein, Dr (prison doctor)
Reinhardt, Professor (conductor)
Reitlinger, Major
Reitsch, Hanna
Remagen
Rendulic, Colonel-General Lothar
Renner, Karl: heads post-war Austrian government; favours admitting
German refugees to Austria; attacked by Podhragy; supports Anschluss;
mistrusted by Western powers; and Charlemagne’s crown; resists
confiscation of Zistersdorf oilfields; French attitude to; and South Tyrol
Rettig, Gerhard
Reuter, Ernst
Revers, General Georges
Reynaud, Paul
Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung (newspaper)
Rheinberg camp
Rhine Meadow camps (POWs)
Rhineland: French claims on; liberated by Western Allies; in British
zone; French development plans for
Rhineland-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen)
Ribbentrop, Joachim von
Richter, Hans Werner
Richter, Father Helmut
Richtrmoc (president of Society for Czech-German Friendship)
Riddleberger, James
Riedel, Claus
Riedel, Walter
Riess, Curt
Ripka, Hubert
Ritter, Karl
Roberts, Frank
Robertson, General Sir Brian
Robertson, Sir William
Robinson, Captain (USA)
Röhm, Ernst
Rohracher, Andreas, Archbishop of Salzburg
Rohrscheidt, Hans von
Rohwohlt, Ernst (publisher)
Roman Catholicism: in Poland
Romania: German community evicted
Rome, Treaty of (1957)
Rooks, Major-General Lowell
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: anti-German views; drafts Atlantic Charter;
restrains French ambitions; death; concessions to Stalin; and Polish borders;
and transfer of German subjects; and denazification; favours shooting
leading Nazis; at Yalta; and control of Königsberg; and division of world
with Soviet Russia
Rosche, Dr
Rosenberg, Alfred
Rosensaft, Josef
Rosenzweig, Alfred
Rösner, Johann
Ross, A. D. M.
Rosterg, Sergeant Wolfgang
Rothenberger, Curt
Rothenstein camp, East Prussia
Rothschild family
Royall, General Kenneth
Rügen (island)
Rühmann, Heinz
Ruhr: Poles in; in British zone; Russian claims on; French claims on;
coal production; administrative authority proposed; Germans given cue to
decide future
Runciman, Waltert Viscount
Rundstedt, Field Marshal Gerd von
Russell, Bertrand
Russell of Liverpool, Edward Frederick Langley RussellBaron
S., Leni
Saar
Saaz, Czechoslovakia
Sachsen-Anhalt
Sachshausen concentration camp
Salomon family
Salomon, Ernst von: and local civil administration under occupation;
Wehrpass destroyed by GI; on rapes by Americans; detained and mistreated
by Americans; on POW treatment in France; Der Fragebogen (The
Answers)
Salvator, Hubert
Salzburg; Festival
San Francisco Conference (1944)
Sargent, Sir Malcolm
satire: in Soviet zone
Sauckel, Fritz
Sauerbruch, Ferdinand
Sauken, General Dietrich von
Saxony
Sayn-Wittgenstein, Prinz zu see Franz, Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein
Schacht, Hjalmar
Schäffer, Fritz
Schärf, Adolf
Scharoun, Hans
Scharp (prisoner in Russia)
Schaumburg-Lippe family
Schell, Margarete
Schell, Peter, Baron von
Schellenberg, Walther
Scherber, Professor and Mrs
Schernstein, Herbert
Scheunemann, Wolfgang
Schicketanz, Franz
Schiffer, Eugen
Schilling, Klaus
Schirach, Baldur von
Schirach, Henrietta von
Schlabrendorff, Fabian von
Schlegelberger, Franz
Schleswig-Holstein
Schliemann, Heinrich: treasures from Troy
Schlüter, Andreas
Schmid, Carlo
Schmidt, Guido
Schmidt, Paul
Schmitt, Carl
Schmitt, Heinrich
Schmittlein, Raymond
Schmitz, Bruno
Schmitz, Richard
Schmorrell, Alexander
Schmorrell, Natascha
Schnabel, Peter Joseph
Schnabel, Wilhelm
Schnetzer, Max
Schnitzler, Arthur
Schnurre, Wolfdietrich
Schöbritz concentration camp, Czechoslovakia
Scholl, Hans and Sophie
Scholz, Willi
Schönburg-Waldenburg, Prince von see Günter, Prince von Schönburg-
Waldenburg
Schöner, Josef: in liberated Vienna; on Mensdorff; on arrest of von
Papen; on Austrian puppet government; and status of South Tyrol; attends
concert; on rapes in Austria; and partition of Vienna; on Austrian soldiers’
support for Hitler; told of treatment of Czech Germans; on German refugees
in Vienna; Wiener Tagebuch 1944/1945
Schönerer, Georg von
Schöninger, Johann
Schörner, Field Marshal Ferdinand
Schramm, Percy
Schröder (Balt bandit)
Schröder, Louise
Schröder, Paul
Schubert, Franz
Schubert, Hans
Schubert (Schöninger’s assistant)
Schuh, Karl
Schulberg, Stuart
Schulenburg, Charlotte von der
Schulenburg, Fritz-Dietlof von der
Schulenburg, Jonny von der
Schulenburg, Mathias von der
Schulenburg, Tisa von der
Schumacher, Kurt
Schuman, Robert; Pour l’Europe
Schumy, Vinzenz
Schuschnigg, Kurt von
Schuster, Claud
Schuze-Boysen, Harro
Schwarz, Joachim
Schwarzkopf, Elisabeth
Schweder, Bernhard
Schwerin von Krosigk, Graf Lutz
scientists: abducted by Russians; abducted by Americans; French
remove; abducted by British
Scotland, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Paterson
Seegebarth, Hauptmann Wilfried
Seghers, Anna
Seibert (of Völkische Beobachter)
Seidel, Anna
Seidl, Pater Joseph
Seitz, Karl
Selvester, Captain
Sely, Major Kaye (born Karl Seltz)
Semionov, Vladimir
Semler, Johannes
Senfft, Baron von
Serebriensky, Colonel
Serov, General I. A.
Severing, Karl
Seyss-Inquart, Arthur
Shabalin, General
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force)
Short, Dewey
Siebken, Bernhard
Siegel, Dr E.
Sigmaringen
Silesia: Soviet conquest and occupation of; German population;
religious repression in; concentration camps; Germans expelled from;
turned over to Poles
Silkin, Sam
Simonov, Konstantin
Sinzig
Skrjabina, Elena
Slavs: Nazi disdain for
Slovenia
Smersh (Soviet Military Intelligence): and fall of Berlin; and protection
of Berlin flak-tower treasures
smuggling: between zones
Smuts, Field Marshal Jan
soap
Sobelev, A. A.
Sobottka, Gustav
Socialist Party (SPD)
Socialist Unity Party (SED): formed; Grotewohl leads; and Berlin
elections (1946); as ‘Russian party’; and future structure of Germany;
attends People’s Congress, East Berlin 1948, 516; propaganda campaign
against Westerners in Berlin; committed to Eastern orientation; violates
Berlin town council; leaders summoned to Moscow
Sokolova, Natalia
Sokolovsky, Colonel-General V. D.: Clay likes; as assistant to Zhukov;
attends Kommandatura; walks out of Control Council; and Berlin blockade
and airlift; and Berlin mob riot; replaced by Chuikov
Solf, Hanna and Wilhelm
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander
Sombart, Nicolas
Sombart, Werner
Soswinski, Ludwig
Soucek Case (Austria, 1946) South Tyrol: status
Soviet Russia: ideology; allocated share of German territory and
resources; European claims; advance against Germany; Western Allies
refrain from attacking; post-war settlement of Austria; alliance with Britain;
favours independent Austria; occupation of Vienna; recognises Renner’s
regime in Austria; dismantles and confiscates German and Austrian
industrial plant; Churchill’s post-war anxieties over; in Mecklenburg;
administration amd dominance in Berlin; food supplies in Berlin; resists
Western Allies’ presence in Berlin; conflict with Americans in Berlin;
requisitions Berlin houses; Berliners’ dislike of; rumoured dispute with
Western Allies; administrative structure in Germany; promotes arts in
Berlin; Germans abducted to develop industry in; seizes German scientists;
develops atomic bomb; claims on Ruhr; nationals repatriated from west;
hostility to de Gaulle; occupation of Austria; plunders Austria; aims in
Austria; opposes foreign aid to Austria; Austrian zone; atrocities in Styria;
and return of Russian POWs; attempts to reclaim citizens in Austria;
believes in German collective guilt; smuggling from; refugees in Germany;
art plunder; destroys treaures in Berlin; looting; treatment of German
POWs; and Nuremberg trials; antisemitism; suspicion of Western
antagonism; at Potsdam Conference; treaty with France (1945); perceived
as threat by West; differences with French; and Berlin election (May 1946);
and spread of communism; US hostility to; Western suspicion of; and
dissolution of wartime Allied coalition; proposes pan-German committees;
and Austrian war guilt; kidnappings in Austria and Berlin; blockade in
Berlin; obstructs creation of Western Germany; quits Conference of Foreign
Ministers; cuts off Berlin milk supply; introduces new currency; violent
tactics in Berlin; offers all-German government; abuses Anglo-Americans;
maintains POW camps after creation of GDR; as post-war enemy; effects of
war and settlement on; see also Red Army; Soviet zone
Soviet zone (Germany): created; administration and appointments; land
reform in; money reintroduced; smuggling and corruption in; pillaging;
elections (October 1946); illicit crossing of border from West; police force
purged and reconstituted; rail travel in; concentration camps (Spetzlager);
culture in; releases minor Nazis
Spaatz, General Carl
Spann, Rafael
Speer, Albert: in Dönitz government; resigns; searched; transferred to
Spandau; and Berlin Chancellery; on drunken British guard; capture, trial
and interrogation; and Nuremberg executions; use of slave labour; in severe
winter 1946-7, on Berlin airlift; in detention; Spandau: The Secret Diaries
Speer, Margarete
Spiegel, Der (magazine)
Spiel, Hilde
Sprang (prisoner in Russia)
Spranger, Eduard
Springer, Axel
Stack, Brigadier Robert
Stahlberg, Werner
Stahmer, Otto
Stalin, Josef V.: military successes; on Poland and Baltic states;
territorial claims in Europe; relations with Western Allies; Roosevelt makes
concessions to; policy on Austria; condones rape by Red Army; on
treatment of Austria; reinstates Renner as chancellor in Austria; opposes
Dönitz government; and domination of Berlin; rumoured anti-British
speech; and administration of Russian zone; and Red Army behaviour in
Austria; agrees to feed Viennese population; forms buffer zone to satellite
states; and Hitler’s suicide; and plundered art in Germany; conduct of war;
at Potsdam Conference; discusses UN Charter; and French; and Polish
settlement; Western Allies mistrust; demands part of German fleet at
Potsdam; on Attlee; on custody of war criminals; avoids further war;
Byrnes and; and beginnings of Cold War; and CFM in London 1947, 509;
breach with Tito; favours German unity; and founding of GDR; obstructs
creation of West Germany; and Berlin blockade; offers to lift Berlin
blockade for free circulation of currencies; offers armed and unified
Germany to Adenauer; achieves Soviet security
Stalingrad: battle of (1942-3); German prisoners
Stange, Wilhelm
Starbroke, Captain
Starke, Gerhard
Starlinger, Professor Wilhelm
Stasi (Ministry of State Security, East Germany)
Stauffenberg, Colonel Graf Claus Schenk von
Steel, Christopher
Steele, General Sir James
Steengracht von Moyland, Freiherr Gustav Adolf von
Stegerwald, Adam
Stein, Frau von (Lehnsdorff’s aunt)
Steiner, Frank
Steinhardt (assistant mayor of Vienna)
Stelzl, Johann
Stephens, Colonel Robin
Stern, James: on post-war fatalities; observes boys playing at bombing;
on Americans’ behaviour in Germany; sees German destruction; on black
market; hears Ledenfels play Beethoven at Auden’s house; on plunder by
Moroccans; on feral children; on Schmorrell family; visits Prince Fugger
von Glött; and German knowledge of atrocities; and Fragebogen; on
prostitutes; gives chewing gum to children; on Polish DPs; The Hidden
Damage
Sternheim, Carl: Der Snob
Stettin
Stevens, Major Richard H.
Steyr (motor manufacturer)
Stiegelmar family
Stiller, Obersturmführer
Stillfried, Major
Stimson, Henry L.
Stolp (Słupsk)
Stolz, Otto
Storm, Ruth
Strachey, John
Strang, Sir William (later Baron)
Stránský, Jaroslav
Strasbourg
Strauss, Emil Georg von
Strauss, Richard; Die Metamorphosen
Streicher, Julius
Stremer Jewish Murder Case (Austria)
Stroop, Jürgen
Strüder, Dr (of Frankfurt)
Stuckart, Wilhelm
Stülpnagel, General Carl-Heinrich and Frau von
Stumm, Johannes
Stumpff, General Hans-Jürgen
Sturgkh, Graf Alfred
Stuttgart
Stutthof concentration camp
Styria
Sudetenland
Suhr, Otto
Suhrkamp, Peter
Sulzbach, Herbert
Summersby, Kay
Sunisch, Ernestine
Susmann, Herr (of Teupitz)
Svoboda, General Ludvik
Swabians (ethnic Germans in Hungary)
Sweet, Paul
Swinemünde
Switzerland: and Austrian territorial claims; responsible for German
POWs
Szokoll, Major Carl; Die Rettung Wiens
T-Force (British)
Talizy: ‘Antifa’ school
Taylor, A. J. P.
Taylor, Colonel Telford
Tedder, Marshal of the RAF Arthurt Baron
Tegel: airfield opened
Teheran Conference (1945)
Tempelhof (Berlin airfield): Howley visits
Templer, General Sir Gerald
Tetschen, Czechoslovakia
Thadden, Elisabeth von
Thadden-Trieglaff, Frau von
theatre: in Soviet zone; in American zone; in Vienna
Thekla, Leipzig
Theresienstadt concentration camp
Thibaut, Jacques
Thierack, Otto-Georg
Thiess, Franz
Third Man, The (film)
Thomas, General Georg
Thomas, Captain Michael Alexander ( formerly Ulrich Holländer )
Thomasdorf camp, Czechoslovakia
Thompson, Commodore C. R.
Thompson, Dorothy
Thon, Harry
Thorez, Maurice
Thuringia
Thurn und Taxis, Alexander, Prince
Thurn und Taxis, ‘Hansi’, Prince
Thurn und Taxis, Willy, Prince
Thyssen, Fritz
Tichy, Lieutenant
Tiessen, Heinz
Tietjen, Heinz
Tito, Josip Broz: friction with Soviet Russia; Stalin restrains; partisans
in Carinthia; claims to Trieste; fights domobranci; summer palace; breach
with Stalin
Tolbukhin, Marshal Fyodor Ivanovich
Tolomei, Ettore
Tomeš (Theresienstadt assistant commandant)
Toscanini, Arturo
Toynbee, Arnold
transit camps: in Silesia
treks: by refugees
Treuter, Dr Helmut
Trevor-Roper, Hugh; The Last Days of Hitler
Trier
Trieste: British-Yugoslav dispute over; reverts to Italy
Trizonia (British-French-US zones)
Troller, Georg Stefan
Trotha, General Ivo Thilo von
Trott, Adam von
Truka (Czech Little Fortress guard)
Truman, Harry S.: accepts Russian occupation of Mecklenburg and
Saxony; Churchill sends ‘iron curtain’ telegram to; wariness of Soviet
Russia; Doctrine; and German art treasures; and Morgenthau’s isolation;
and trial of German war criminals; agrees to fall back to Yalta-agreed line;
and exclusion of French at Potsdam; at Potsdam Conference; relations with
Russians; relations with Churchill; accepts Morgenthau’s resignation;
demands complete disarmament of Germany; and Polish frontiers; meets
Bevin; ends Lease-Lend; and South Tyrol; supports holding Berlin; and
Berlin blockade and airlift; federal officials dismissed and resign
Truscott, General Lucien
Tsarskoe Selo: Amber Room
tuberculosis (TB)
Tübingen
Tulln, Austria
Tulpanov, Sergey I. (‘the Colonel’ or ‘the Tulip’)
Tunner, Major General
Turks: population transfer (1913)
Turnwald, Wilhelm
typhus
Tyrol; see also South Tyrol
Udet, Colonel-General Ernst
Ukraine: kulaks in
Ulbricht, Walter: arrives in Berlin; and land reform; encourages culture;
denies Russian rapes; and founding of GDR; provokes riots in Berlin; in
East German government
Ulitzka, Carl
Ullstein publishing family
Ullstein, Heinz
Ullstein, Hermann
Union of Independents (Austrian party)
United Europe Congress, The Hague (May 1948)
United Nations: Declaration upholding Atlantic Charter; Charter
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)
United States of America: policy on occupation and treatment of
Germany; advance and occupation in western Europe; refuses to recognise
Renner regime in Austria; rapes by soldiers; rejects Dönitz government;
black soldiers in Germany and Austria; and discovery and liberation of
concentration camps; post-war deaths in Germany; conflict with Russians in
Berlin; administers zone in Berlin; food plenty in Berlin; attitude to
occupied Berlin; Berliners’ attitude to; liberation of western
Czechoslovakia; United States of America - continued and Czech
expulsions; sends food parcels to Europe; seizes German scientists; favours
Adenauer; desire to withdraw from Germany; advance on Vienna; in
Austria; administration in Vienna; radio stations; Jews serve in army;
propaganda campaign in Germany; denazification programme; ban on
fraternising with Germans; and German art treasures; art plunder and
pillaging; retrieves and preserves stolen treasures; treatment of German
POWs; prisoner-of-war camps; interrogation and torture methods; trial and
punishment of Nazi war criminals; conduct of war; and Dachau trial;
Bulganin declares enemy; policy on Germany at Potsdam Conference;
possesses atom bomb; drops atom bombs; hostility to Soviet Russia; and
Berlin airlift; post-war dismissals and resignations; see also American zone
Unverzagt, Wilhelm
Upper Austria
Upper Silesia
uranium: mined in Erzgebirge
Üxküll-Gyllenbrand, Gräfin Alexandrine von
Vaihingen
Valchař (Czech Little Fortress guard)
Vansittart, Robert, Baron
Vassiltchikov, Princess Marie (‘Missie’)
Veesenmayer, Edmund
Veltheim, Hans-Hasso von
Veltheim, Otti von
venereal diseases
Venlo Incident (1939)
Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (VVN)
Vermehren, Isa
Versailles, Treaty of (1919)
Victoria, Princess
Victoria Louise, Princess (Duchess of Brunswick)
Vienna: partition and occupation; falls to Red Army; foreign workers in;
looting; under Soviet occupation; women raped; cultural life; May Day
parade (1945); destruction; housing; rationing and food supply; Western
Allies advance on; zoned between Allies; concern for return to normality;
administration under occupying powers; Soviet monument in; communist
failure in 1945 election; lawlessness and banditry in; discussed at Potsdam
Conference; food shortage in British sector; in severe winter (1946-7);
blockade threatened; see also Austria
Vietinghoff, General Heinrich von
Vilfan, Josef
Villach, Carinthia
Vlasak Karel
Vlasov, General Andrei
Vogel, Hans
Voikova (Russian camp)
Voizard (governor of Tyrol-Vorarlberg)
Volga Germans
Volkspolizei (Vopos)
Volkswagen factory, Wolfsburg
Völpel, Gustav
Vom Ghetto zur Freiheit: Die Zukunft der Juden im befreiten Österreich
(pamphlet)
Vorarlberg
Voroshilov, Kliment Yefremovich
Vorys, John
Voss, Admiral Hans Erich
Vrša, Commandant
Vyshinsky, Andrei
Wabra, Dr Franz
Wagner, Franz
Wagner, Friedelind
Wagner, Hans
Wagner, Josef
Wagner, Richard
Wagner, Wieland
Wagner, Winifred; trial
Wagner, Wolfgang
Waite, Air Commodore Reginald Newnham
Wallenberg (village)
Wallenberg, Major Hans
Walser, Martin
Walter, Bruno
Wandel, Paul
Warlimont, General Walther
Warner, Major Frederick (born Manfred Werner)
Warsaw Uprising (1944)
Waterhouse, Ellis
Watt, Donald Cameron
Watzka, Maximilian
Watzke, Anton
Wechsberg, Joseph
Wedel, von (Prussian escapee)
Wedgwood, Colonel Josiah Clement (later 1st Baron)
Weeks, General Sir Ronald
Wegener, Paul
Wegner, Franz
Weidling, General Helmuth
Weimar
Weimar, Grand Duchess of
Weinberger, Lois
Weinhand, Franz
Weis, Franz
Weisenborn, Günther; Berliner Requiem
Weiss, Dany
Weiss, Grigori
Weiss, Martin
Weiss, ‘Uncle Toni’
‘Weisse Rose’ Movement
Weissenheim, Austria
Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von
Weizsäcker, Ernst von
Weizsäcker, Richard von; Vier Zeiten: Erinnerungen
Wellesz, Egon
Wells, Dr C. J. I.
Wendt, Erich
Wensich, Franz
Werewolves
Werl, near Dortmund
Werner, Dr Arthur
Werth, Alexander
Wesen, Hans
West, F. C.
West Germany see German Federal Republic
Western European Union
Wetzelsdorf, Austria
Weygand, General Maxime
White, Harry Dexter
Wichmann, Lily
Wiechert, Ernst
Wiesbaden
Wiesbaden Manifesto
Wieselmann, Flight Sergeant
Wiesenstein, Haus, Silesia
Wiesner (Czech camp commandant)
Wilhelm Gustloff (ship)
Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands
Wilkinson, Colonel Alexander
Wilkinson, Peter
Willenbucher, Dr
William II, Kaiser
Williams, Charles: Adenauer
Williams, Air Marshal Sir Thomas Melling
Wilson, Woodrow
Wilton Park, Buckinghamshire
Winchell, Walter
Winckelnkemper, Peter
Winterton, Major-General Sir John
Wirths (prisoner in Russia)
Wisliceny, Dieter
Witgenstein, Werner
Witzleben, Field Marshal Erwin von
Woermann, Ernst
Wolf, Markus
Wolff, Jeanette
Wolff, Karl
Wolfsberg, Austria
Wollin, Poland
Woman in Berlin, A (anon.)
women: raped ; attracted to conquerors& n; commit suicide; clear
Berlin rubble; and hairdressing; abused in Prague; work for Allies; as voters
in Austrian election; dehumanisation of Jewish; and ban on fraternising; in
Berlin elections
Worden, Blair
Württemberg
Würzburg
Wyand, Paul
Xavier, Prince of Bourbon-Parma
Yalta Conference (1945): Roosevelt attends; defines Allied zones;
allocates former Teutonic regions to Poland; agrees deportation of Russian
citizens; and use of German POWs as forced labour; and Polish boundaries;
Truman promises to accept agreement; agreement on Ruhr reparations to
Russia
Yorck, Marion, Gräfin
Ysenburg, Prince
Yugoslavia: dispute with Britain over Trieste; ethnic Germans expelled;
claims part of Carinthia; vetoes Austria’s aid from UNRRA; nationals
deported; threat to Venezia-Giulia; German POWs in; Stalin refuses to
discuss at Potsdam; Soviet Russia backs demands for reparations
Yurasov, Vladimir
Zabern incident (1913)
Zaglauer (Austrian hangman)
Zahn, Werner
Zborowski, Helmut von
Zelder, Irene
Zelenka, Professor (of Prague)
Zerbst
Zetterberg, Frau
Zheltov, Colonel-General A. S.
Zhukov, Marshal Georgi Konstantinovich: in occupation of Berlin; at
signing of German surrender; authorises formation of German anti-fascist
parties; control in Berlin; protects Hauptmann; Patton disparages; and
Soviet art; tells Stalin of Hitler’s suicide; and return of Russian POWs;
protests at supposed British reserving of German army; and Allied
agreement on Berlin; at Potsdam Conference; given US Legion of Merit;
meets Clay; on Attlee at Potsdam Conference; on Polish border agreement;
and Western arming of Germans
Ziemer, Gerhard: Deutsche Exodus
Zimmermann (killer)
Zitzewitz, Elvira von
Zöberlein, Hans
Zuckmayer, Alice
Zuckmayer, Carl: and German awareness of moral bankruptcy;
emigrates and flees to USA; sees destruction in Germany; on Werewolves;
admires Russian contribution to arts; on German attitude to Americans; and
revival of professional life; and German women’s attitude to German men;
criticises US policy in Germany; reports on state of theatre and film; on
Austrian culture; and German children’s behaviour; and success of Neue
Zeitung; on German opponents of Hitler; on Jewish DPs; and German
collective guilt; and denazification; witnesses food demonstration in
Munich; advocates treating Germans with kindness; on black market; on
man-in-street; on Polish theft of circus pig; on German ovens; on severe
winter (1946-7); Deutschlandbericht für das Kriegsministerium der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika; Der Hauptmann von Köpenick; Des
Teufels General
Zuffenhausen camp
Zühlsdorff, Volkmar von
Zweig, Arnold
OceanofPDF.com
a
Gerhard Ziemer gives the figure of 2,280,000, Alfred de Zayas
2,211,000.
b
To some extent he based the book on his own family. As a teenager the
author was privileged to meet his two brothers. One had literally shot
himself in the foot to avoid fighting Hitler’s war.
c
At this stage the Soviet share included eastern Germany within its 1937
borders. Much of this was later hived off and awarded to Poland.
d
This is disputed. Michael Balfour says Morgenthau wrote the first draft:
Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four Power Control in Germany and
Austria 1945-1946, Oxford 1956, 20 n3.
e
This was an Anglo-American brassière: the French word applies to a
baby garment, and has no lumps.
f
Once again Bavaria was seen as the harmless part of Germany. The
monster was always Prussia.
g
The assistant Soviet commander in Germany, Sokolovsky, specifically
mentioned the Herrenvolk to justify the rapes. (See Norman M. Naimark,
The Russians in Germany - A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945-1949, Cambridge, Mass. and London 1995, 79.)
h
In February 1943 Hitler drove past a group of Russian slave-labourers
working on the road outside Zaporozhe. Filled with loathing he remarked,
‘It is quite right to make Slavs do this, these robots! Otherwise they would
have no right to their share of the sun!’ Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl,
eds, The Hitler Book, translated by Giles MacDonogh, London 2005, 102.
i
A variant on a Venetian dish, risibisi (rice and peas), and popular in
Vienna. The author came across it as a child, at a rare surviving Jewish
home in the 2nd Bezirk.
j
Schärf had suffered at the hands of Dollfuss’s Corporate State when he
had been put in the concentration camp at Wöllersdorf, and again under the
Nazis when he had spent a few months in captivity after the Anschluss.
k
From Parteigenosse: Party comrade of member of the Nazi Party
(NSDAP).
l
G’schaftlhuber, a busybody; Adabei, from auch dabei, meaning also
present: someone who doesn’t want to miss the party.
m
O + the fifth letter of the alphabet = Oe, or Ö (Austria).
n
This was Willy Prinz von Thurn und Taxis’s view (‘Memoiren’,
unpublished MS, 25).
o
The socialist had supported the Anschluss with Germany. The
communists had not.
p
This now seems unlikely.
q
The equivalent of the Royal National Theatre performing in a music
hall.
r
The Tyrolean innkeeper Andreas Hofer had fought Napoleon, and was
shot by the French in 1810.
s
See below pp. 82-4.
t
The Josefstadt is where Anna Schmidt is engaged as a soubrette in The
Third Man.
u
Romanian-born Colonel General Alexander Löhr was handed over to
the Yugoslavs by the British, and later executed for ordering the
bombardment of Belgrade. Colonel General Lothar Rendulic, born in
Wiener Neustadt, was sentenced to twenty-five years for war crimes. He
was released in 1951.
v
Brunswick’s palace was pulled down and replaced by a shopping centre.
w
Lasch was sentenced to death in absentia and his family arrested. Koch
escaped from Pillau after telling the population to stand firm.
x
The irony was that the room had been made for the Royal Schloss in
Berlin - another victim of the war - and Prussia’s first king, the spendthrift
Frederick I. His austere son, Frederick William, gave the room to Peter the
Great in exchange for a squad of tall soldiers, a commodity he valued more
highly than amber.
y
The sexual attraction of conquerors to the women of the defeated should
have appealed to the ‘psychologist’. The straitlaced Helmuth James von
Moltke had been shocked when he visited Paris in August 1940 to find the
women ‘positively queuing up to get a German soldier into bed’ (Letters to
Freya, London 1991, 97).
z
Mainz was bombed early on in the war, and grass was already growing
on the ruins.
aa
Zuckmayer called his parents ‘the Badgers’.
ab
Jürgen von Kardorff had died in action in Russia in 1943; Graf Fritz-
Dietlof von der Schulenburg together with Nikolaus von Halem, Ulrich von
Hassell, Julius Leber, Werner von Haeften, and Claus von Stauffenberg had
all died as a result of their roles in 20 July 1944; Bernhard von Mutius,
Dietrich von Mandelsloh, Graf Wolf Werner von der Schulenburg, Martin
Raschke, Josias and Werner von Veltheim had all died as soldiers in the
war. The Lehndorffs and the Schweinitzes were noble Prussian families. For
Graf Heinrich von Lehndorff-Steinort see below p. 164; the others,
presumably, died in Hitler’s war.
ac
The inmates were recognisable by the coloured triangles they wore. The
original concentration camp prisoners were political: they wore red; anti-
social groups such as drunks, beggars and the ‘work-shy’ wore black; the
professional criminal, green; Jehovah’s Witnesses, lilac; returned emigrants,
blue; homosexuals, pink. It should be recalled that homosexuality was also
illegal in Britain until the 1960s. The Jews wore two triangles stitched
together to make a Star of David, one yellow and one with the colour of the
crime that had given the pretext to incarcerate them. See Bruno Heilig, Men
Crucified, London 1941, 73-4. The lion’s share at Dachau was made up of
44,401 ‘reds’. There were 22,100 Jews, 1,066 ‘blacks’, 759 ‘greens’, 126
Wehrmacht men, 110 ‘pinks’ including one who had been readmitted after
discharge, 85 ‘lilacs’ and 16 ‘blues’.
ad
See below pp. 82-4.
ae
There is a photograph of this.
af
An allusion to Schiller’s play of that name.
ag
R. F. Keeling (Gruesome Harvest, Chicago 1947, 56-7) gives the
official figure as 1,198, but the Germans thought it more like 5,000.
ah
In 1939 there were nearly 3,000 prisoners. Just under a thousand of
these were ‘greens’ or criminals, and 688 were political prisoners. There
were 930 ‘anti-socials’, 143 Jehovah’s Witnesses and 51 homosexuals.
(Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart, New York and Oxford 1985,
106.)
ai
Literally ‘Oxen Joe’. As a boy, Müller had looked after the cows on his
parents’ Bavarian farm.
aj
An atomised sweet omelette filled with raisins and a favourite of the
Emperor Franz Joseph - hence the name.
ak
There can have been very little left of the town. The Allies had bombed
it relentlessly. Only a thin strip of old houses remained when the author
visited it in the early 1990s.
al
The monument had been built in 1927 to commemorate the German
victory over the Russians in 1914 - which had actually been achieved
elsewhere. The battle was deemed to have been won in Tannenberg to
compensate for the resounding defeat inflicted on the Teutonic Knights by
the Poles in 1410.
am
Hindenburg and his wife for good; Frederick William and his son
returned after much controversy in 1991. The remains of the Garrison
Church having been dynamited in the 1960s, Frederick William was
reburied in the Friedenskirche. Frederick the Great finally achieved his
original wish and was interred on the terrace at Sanssouci, next to his dogs.
an
The two kings were moved again in 1952, when they were sent to Burg
Hohenzollern near Hechingen in Württemberg. It was here that Frederick
the Great’s coffin collapsed, and a new one had to be made.
ao
Information from Prince Friedrich Wilhelm von Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen, 14 May 1996. The prince told the author he had noticed the
theft when the coffin was changed in 1952.
ap
This had been going on for days, despite the draconian methods the
Party used to deter soldiers and civilians from leaving.
aq
When the British architect Lord Foster adapted the building for use by
the Bundestag, the more decorous graffiti were retained; the obscenities,
however, were scratched out. (Author’s visits to the Reichstag building, see
Financial Times, 9 August 2002 and 2 September 2004.) ‡ From the
German word Uhr, meaning watch.
ar
Almost certainly a reference to Tolstoy’s The Cossacks.
as
James Stern found an echo of this in bombed-out Nuremberg. He
observed two boys playing in the sand. They had built a castle. Suddenly
one of the boys began to make a wailing noise like a siren: ‘Ich bin ein
Amerikaner!’ The other jumped up with a tin can filled with sand: ‘Ich bin
ein Engländer!’ They flapped their arms and cried, ‘Boom! Boom! Boom!’
and launched their sand at the castle.
at
Procopius, The Secret History, trans. G. A. Williamson, London 1990,
41, has just three ways: ‘And though she brought three openings into
service, she often found fault with nature, grumbling because nature had not
made the openings in her nipples wider than is normal, so that she could
devise another variety of intercourse in that region.’
au
Eisenhower’s mistress, Kay Summersby, was there and took a dim view
of the Russian women soldiers in their knee-length skirts: ‘No British,
American or French girl would been caught dead in their uniforms’
(Eisenhower was my Boss, Watford 1949, 224).
av
See below Chapter 20.
aw
Howley must be confused: in our more prosperous times a kilo of rye
flour would require 700 ml of water for a 1.6 kg German rye Landbrot: it is
therefore more than a third water and may be happily kept for a week.
ax
At Advent a ramshackle Christmas market appeared by the ruins of the
Schloss. It was a refreshing symbol of the return of normality.
ay
In the Czech lands in the west, the Germans made up just over a third of
the population in the 1930 census, with roughly two-thirds of these in
Bohemia and the rest in Moravia. In Czechoslovakia as a whole, Germans
were 22.53 per cent of the population, with Czechs and Slovakians making
up 66.24 per cent together. There was a significant Magyar minority in
Slovakia. Of these 3,318,445 people, 3,231,688 had Czech nationality.
(Theodor Schieder, ed., Tschechoslowakei, Berlin 1957, 7.)
az
The German population was declining. In 1920 it had been 23.64 per
cent. In the German core, towns had seen the Czech communities grow: in
Aussig they had advanced from 10 per cent in 1910 to a third in 1930; in
Brüx from 20 per cent to a third; in Reichenberg the Germans had declined
by 10 per cent; in Troppau the Czechs had been 10 per cent, now they were
a third, and so on. (Schieder, ed., Tschechoslowakei, 10.)
ba
See above p. 44.
bb
Kaschauer in German, from the German name of the town, Kaschau.
bc
From Part One of Goethe’s Faust. Gretchen asks Faust the question he
most dreads: whether he believes in God.
bd
Not to be confused with the town of Tábor.
be
‘Swabian’ is a Hungarian word for an ethnic German. In 1910 they had
been nearly 10 per cent of the population, but by the census of 1941 they
were down to 4.8 per cent (719,449 people). The principle denominations
were Bannater Schwaben, and Batschka-Deutsche from the Balkan areas, as
well as the Germans on the eastern side of the Neusiedlersee around
Ödenburg (Sopron) and the Schwäbische Türkei.
bf
They kept themselves aloof, generally in small communities such as
Villany on the southern border, and rarely dared to speak German. In the
author’s experience many of their children have only a rudimentary
knowledge of the language now.
bg
The list of those to be expelled runs to 16.5 million people: 9.3 million
within the 1937 Reich borders and 7.2 outside. There were 2,382,000 East
Prussians, 1,822,000 East Pomeranians, 614,000 in Brandenburg east of the
Oder, 4,469,000 Silesians, 240,000 in Memel and the Baltic States, 373,000
in Danzig, 1,293,000 in Poland, 3,493,000 in Czechoslovakia, 601,000 in
Hungary, 509,000 in Yugoslavia and 785,000 in Romania. The Russians
were not planning to export their 1.8 million Volga Germans, but they were
due to be resettled.
bh
After the Second World War the Poles demanded the return of their
countrymen in the Ruhr, many of whom had lived there for generations.
bi
Village near Preussisch Holland. The Schloss by Jean de Bodt survived,
and was even restored in the 1980s.
bj
Yet when the author visited the city in 1992 a tiny band of Germans had
somehow managed to re-establish themselves in Kaliningrad, and even had
their own church and pastor. They were naturally one of the first stops for
the many Heimatgruppen who wanted to visit the city where they had been
born and grew up.
bk
See below p. 374.
bl
This was true only up to a point: half a million largely Catholic
Germans remained in Upper Silesia, because the Poles refused to recognise
their nationality, and there were the ‘autochthones’ in East Prussia. Most of
these left before the 1980s. As many as 30,000 remain around Olszstyn.
bm
There were unsuccessful attempts to bring Gimborski to trial in the
1960s.
bn
The ‘giant mountains’ (sic) rise to over 1,600 metres.
bo
(1887-1954). Avenarius was an expressionist painter famed for his
illustrations to Hauptmann’s works.
bp
Compare Eisenhower, below p. 227.
bq
The poet walked in the woods near by, as the town belonged to Weimar.
It was here he wrote ‘Über allen Gipfeln’.
br
Mendelssohn’s music had been taken out of mothballs by Leo Borchard.
See above p. 120.
bs
And future: it is now the popular Hotel Bogota.
bt
The process of humiliating the great conductor was admirably
dramatised in Ronald Harwood’s play Taking Sides.
bu
A modernistic cinema constructed in the 1920s. It is still there, although
it was severely altered in the 1960s.
bv
From which it was evicted when the building returned to its original
owners in 1995.
bw
Not to be confused with the Colonel Harlan Sanders of Kentucky Fried
Chicken fame. Colonel Sanders was a ‘Kentucky Colonel’, a purely
honorary rank he shares with the author.
bx
In her earlier and more respectful volume, Eisenhower was my Boss
(235), she says the office was ‘large enough for an auditorium’.
by
Or one of them: see below Chapter 19
bz
The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy.
ca
It is a moot point whether the CSU is really seen as anything other than
a Catholic Bavarian force.
cb
They were popular with the ‘lofty animals’ of the Party: Martin
Bormann had one in his house in Berchtesgaden and Goebbels one in his
Berlin home.
cc
In Zuckmayer’s case the question was whether he was still a German,
and whether he would consider coming back to Germany to live.
cd
See below p. 390.
ce
Under Salic Law a woman could not inherit the throne of Hanover.
cf
There may be a case for seeing a Carthusian ‘mafia’ at the heart of
British Military Government. Robert Birley (see below) had been
headmaster of Charterhouse since 1935.
cg
The former Ulrich Holländer, son of the Berlin writer Felix Holländer.
As a Jewish refugee he had served in the British Pioneer Corps.
ch
See below Chapter 20.
ci
The Americans were eventually allotted Tulln, the French Götzendorf
and the British the partial use of Schwechat - now the main airport for the
city. Eventually the British and the French shared Schwechat.
cj
They were all citizens of Austria-Hungary before 1918.
ck
Schärf was also from Nikolsburg.
cl
The Kanaltal along the Fella river, around the now Italian town of
Tarvisio; for Gottschee see p. 503.
cm
A lot of this would have been formerly Jewish owned.
cn
Clark says this was Koniev, but Koniev had yet to be appointed.
co
There were an estimated 9,000 unburied bodies in the city (Adolf
Schärf, Österreichs Wiederaufrichtung im Jahr 1945, Vienna 1960, 24).
cp
See below p. 309.
cq
These establishments lived on to the 1960s, possibly later, providing the
Viennese with wholesome food at subsidised prices.
cr
The pun just about works in English: ‘Viennese old-timers and Viennese
without timers, vote ÖVP!’ The Russians had stolen their watches.
cs
When Holly Martins goes to the Russian 2nd Bezirk to flush out his
friend Harry Lime in The Third Man, men can be seen clearing rubble by
the Reichsbrücke. It is not said whether they were Nazis.
ct
A plebiscite carried out in the wake of the Treaty of Saint-Germain on
10 October 1920 had given the region to Austria.
cu
See below pp. 368-9.
cv
Douaumont was one of the bloodiest battles in the Verdun campaign;
Langemarck near Ypres witnessed the killing of the flower of German
youth in October and November 1914.
cw
Zuckmayer exaggerates. Such figures were certainly to be seen on
Berlin’s Sophienstrasse after 1918.
cx
He had forgotten Erich Kleiber.
cy
Given that at a national level the police was gleichgeschaltet, or
incorporated in the SS, Clay’s figures seem conservative.
cz
See below p. 508.
da
See below p. 455.
db
The ‘Volksgerichthof’ in Nazi times had tried the enemies of the state.
There were no appeals and frequent death sentences.
dc
See below Chapter 16.
dd
The jewellery has been consumed as butter, The Meissen cups are worn
as shoes. Behold the new man step out the gutter, Ancient heirlooms put to
better use.
de
The Tauschzentral was a sort of pawn shop where goods were
exchanged for money or food, an official version of the black market,
established in all four zones. It was hoped that its presence would gradually
eliminate the latter. Unfortunately, however, the Tauschzentral would
neither sell food nor accept it in payment for goods.
df
In 1999 an assistant director of the Hermitage in St Petersburg told the
author that the pictures were still there, and that they had been in the
museum from the day they were removed from Germany. It was not
Russian policy to give them back.
dg
Now the Bode Museum. It was in the Soviet Sector.
dh
Almost certainly Langwasser. See below p. 403.
di
The Russians were quite capable of doing this too: at Katyn they
murdered a large percentage of the Polish officer corps.
dj
In the British Library, for example, the books are stored under the ‘Cup’
shelfmark, normally reserved for pornography, and users of the books are
required to sit at a special table where they can be monitored more closely.
dk
For Rheinwiesenlager and Rheinberg, see below pp. 398-400.
dl
Incidentally a very National Socialist method of preventing anyone
from opting out of difficult decisions.
dm
Schwerin von Krosigk was a ministerial director - or under-secretary of
state - in Brüning’s government. He entered the cabinet under Papen.
dn
See below p. 413.
do
MI5 had another interrogation centre at Latchmere House in the London
suburbs - Camp 020. This was commanded by Colonel Robin Stephens
until his transfer to Bad Nenndorf.
dp
See above pp. 305-7.
dq
The verb to ‘resettle’ had a particularly lethal significance when the
Nazis applied it to the Jews.
dr
This went back to the First World War. There was generally a certain
empathy between Germans and black American troops. See above pp. 241-
2.
ds
The word Wackes, meaning an imbecile, was responsible for the so-
called Zabern Incident in 1913, when the German army’s treatment of the
Alsatian locals led to mass demonstrations, and there was a vote of no-
confidence in the German chancellor in the Reichstag.
dt
See above p. 224.
du
Sir Bernard Freyberg’s bombing of the Benedictine abbey of Monte
Cassino killed around 400 Italian civilians who had taken refuge there, and
not one German.
dv
Information from Blair Worden, August 2004: Worden is Lord Dacre’s
literary executer. The Last Days of Hitler was not intended for publication
and Trevor-Roper was surprised when British intelligence consented. Any
interrogations he carried out were concerned with the report. They had
nothing to do with collecting evidence for Nuremberg or other trials.
dw
Göring had been left the medieval castle by Hermann von Epenstein,
the Jewish doctor who was his mother’s lover and Hermann’s godfather.
Hermann’s Christian name was most probably in homage to the doctor and
freshly minted nobleman. David Irving, Göring: A Biography, London
1989, 26-7.
dx
The castle was owned by Hermann Fegelein’s brother Waldemar.
Hitler’s brother-in-law Hermann Fegelein had been executed in the
Chancellery garden a few days before. The castle was teeming with further
SS men, something calculated to make Göring no more comfortable.
dy
In June 1940, Göring told Hitler he had had two Catholic priests sent to
a concentration camp because they had failed to rise when he entered a
Rhineland inn. He gave orders that they should have to give the Nazi salute
to one of his old caps every day. Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl, eds, Das
Buch Hitler, Bergisch Gladbach 2004, 123.
dz
Those who had enforced the ban on the NSDAP were singled out for
particularly harsh treatment: politicians, judges and the guards at the
Corporate State’s own concentration camp at Wöllersdorf in Lower Austria.
The hangman who had executed the Nazi participants in the assassination of
chancellor Dolfuss in 1934 did not survive the first night in Dachau. See
Bruno Heilig, Men Crucified, London 1941.
ea
Horthy had been Hitler’s ally, but Hitler had had him deposed after he
started negotiating with the Allies. One reason why the two fell out was
Horthy’s refusal to ‘deport’ Hungary’s large Jewish population. Hitler had
him interned in 1944. He did not return to Hungary and died in Estoril,
Portugal in 1957.
eb
Blomberg had been out of the picture since January 1938, and had not
even played a role in the Anschluss. Hitler managed to push him out of the
way when it was discovered that he had married a former prostitute. His
conscience cannot have been said to be clear, however, as it was he who
brought the army in behind Hitler, in recompense for the murder of Röhm
and the others who would have had the SA take over from the traditional
Wehrmacht. The Night of the Long Knives had seen the killing of army
officers as well, but Blomberg was happy to celebrate its success with a
slap-up meal with Göring at Horcher’s restaurant in Berlin.
ec
Blaskowitz’s suicide is odd for the fact that he was one of the few
generals to file a formal complaint about the activities of the SS, in this case
after the invasion of Poland. There was a rumour that he did not take his life
at all, but was murdered by SS men.
ed
Papen remembered things differently: he was third, after Schacht and
Speer. Streicher came last, ‘a position which could have been occupied by
almost any of the other Gauleiters’. (Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London
1952, 547.) Speer, on the other hand, recalled that it was Seyss who had
won the intelligence competition. He modestly concealed his own place in
the line-up. (Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, London 1976, 9.)
ee
He was murdered by the IRA in 1979.
ef
The Berliner Zeitung reported that it had taken Ribbentrop 14 minutes
45 seconds to die, and Jodl a little longer. Ruth Andreas Friedrich,
Schauplatz Berlin, Frankfurt/Main 1985, 148.
eg
A spring festival to commemorate a plot to massacre the Jews.
eh
Kesselring’s sentence was commuted to life. Both he and List were
released in 1952.
ei
There must have been some truth in these allegations. When the author
was living in France in the early 1980s he met two people who had
witnessed massacres carried out by Allied troops: a man who had been
eighteen at the time, and a woman who had been a child of six. She had run
out of the house to find British paratroops bayoneting German POWs in her
garden. A British friend of the author’s who had studied at Heidelberg
before the war and was intelligence officer to his regiment, told him that he
was unable to interrogate a single prisoner after the massacre at Oradour-
sur-Glane, because the British soldiers had killed the lot.
ej
See above p. 70.
ek
Eisenhower’s secretary - and mistress - Kay Summersby says the
medals were handed to the Western Allies in Frankfurt, when Zhukov
returned their visit.
el
In German they are called the Lausitzer or Görlitzer Neisse and the
Glatzer Neisse. The Glatzer Neisse joins the Oder at Schurgast in Upper
Silesia, the Polish Skorogoszcz. In Polish the river is called the Kłodzka.
em
The part of the Yalta Agreement would result in the deaths of thousands
of Russians and Yugoslavs.
en
The population east of the Bug was mixed, and the Poles were not
intending to permit any Germans to remain east of the Oder-Neisse. This
way the problem of racial minorities was solved.
eo
Any areas where there had been substantial minorities of Poles were
awarded to Poland at Versailles.
ep
At the beginning of June there were 800,000 Germans left in East
Prussia and 65 per cent of the Germans were still in Silesia. Half the
Germans in Pomerania had moved out, but only 30 per cent of those in
Brandenburg. In the Sudetenland only 3 per cent had left so far. (Gerhard
Ziemer, Deutsche Exodus: Vertreibung und Eingliederung von 15 Millionen
Ostdeutsche, Stuttgart 1973, 87-8).
eq
Polish-East German agreement was not made until 1951 when an
accord was signed in a villa in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder. The place later
became the House of German-Soviet Friendship and a plaque was set up to
mark the spot. It was one of the few restaurants in Frankfurt when the
author ate there on 17 August 1991, the day of the Moscow Coup.
Bewildered Soviet soldiers wandered around the garrison. Soljankasuppe
seemed appropriate: it was the one culinary contribution made by the
Russians in the long years of occupation.
er
The Anglo-Americans had taken the decision to award part of their
zones to the French. The Soviets were indifferent.
es
Cf. the Deutschlandslied: ‘Von der Etsch bis an der Memel’ - Germany
ran from the Adige to the Memel, on the Lithuanian border.
et
See below pp. 527-8.
OceanofPDF.com
Copyright © 2007 by Giles MacDonogh
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the
case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address Basic Books, 387 Park Avenue South,
New York, NY 10016-8810.
Books published by Basic Books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations,
institutions, and other organizations. For more information, please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Books
Group, 2300 Chestnut Street, Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or call (800) 810-4145, ext. 5000, or e-mail
[email protected].
eISBN : 978-0-465-00620-5
OceanofPDF.com
The post-war territorial adjustments significantly reshaped the geopolitical landscape of Central Europe, particularly with shifts in regions like Mecklenburg and Vienna. In Mecklenburg, the Western Allies held territory that was initially allocated to the Soviets, leading to strategic maneuvers and tensions over ultimate control . The adjustment of zones, including the shift of Eastern Mecklenburg to Soviet influence, exemplified the territorial bargaining and realignment that characterized the immediate post-war period. Similarly, in Vienna, Soviet control established significant socio-political dynamics, as the city was eventually divided into sectors controlled by each of the Allied powers, reflecting both cooperation and territorial division . These adjustments not only influenced the political realities in these areas but also laid the groundwork for future Cold War divisions, illustrating the critical impact of territorial decisions on broader geopolitical alignments in Central Europe .
The Soviet occupation of Vienna in 1945 had a profound impact on the local civilians. As Soviet troops entered Vienna, the populace responded with a mix of cautious optimism and apprehension. The Viennese tried to communicate with the Soviets in Slavic languages and attempted to earn their favor, indicating a desire for peaceful coexistence . Despite initial fears of violence or worse, as fueled by propaganda, the mood was unexpectedly relaxed with reports of the Viennese feeling liberated . However, incidents of theft and forced labor by Soviet soldiers were still prevalent, as illustrated by accounts of civilians being forced to dig graves or losing personal belongings like watches . Schöner’s observations reflect the complex reality faced by Viennese civilians under Soviet occupation, balancing relief at the war's end with the hardships of occupation .
The French desire to annex German territories, such as the Rhineland, significantly impacted post-war diplomatic relations within the Allied Control Council. France's ambitious territorial claims, articulated by de Gaulle, aimed at increasing French security and economic capacity while satisfying a public demand for punitive measures against Germany . This strained relations, especially with the Americans, who were focused on balancing reconstruction with the containment of Soviet influence, rather than redrawing European borders extensively . France's actions, such as the occupation of Stuttgart meant for the American Zone, exemplified its willingness to assert its claims, leading to friction with other Allies over zone demarcations and raising questions about the coherence of the Allied occupation strategy . Ultimately, these ambitions necessitated complex negotiations and compromises within the Council to maintain unity among the Allies while addressing French territorial aspirations .
Churchill's advocacy for French inclusion among the victorious powers during the Yalta Conference had profound implications on post-war peace agreements. His insistence on involving France in the peace process was partly strategic, aimed at ensuring Western European stability and creating a balance against Soviet expansion . This decision led to the eventual allocation of a French occupation zone in Germany, further complicating Allied negotiations as France's aspirations for expanded control often clashed with American and British plans . The decision to include France among the decision-making powers also affected the dynamics within the Allied Control Council, as France sought to exert influence disproportionate to its wartime contributions, thereby complicating the inter-Allied harmony necessary for the implementation of uniform policies across Germany . This advocacy by Churchill thus demonstrated a commitment to maintaining a united front among Western Allies, but also introduced complexities in reconciling diverse national interests within the post-war order .
Austria faced significant socio-political challenges during the Soviet occupation due to the presence of a large population of foreign workers. These workers, forced into Austria under Nazi labor policies, contributed to a volatile social climate as looting and violence became common in areas like Vienna. The foreign workers were often armed and easily recognizable, leading to increased tension among the local populace . Additionally, they were suspected of being major contributors to post-war disorder, further complicating efforts to restore law and order in the country . Despite the widespread longing for peace, the socio-political environment was destabilized by such tensions and the integrated efforts required to manage rumors about allegiance and criminal activities, reflecting a broader challenge in harmonizing diverse groups within the liberated zones .
French political ambitions in post-war Europe, particularly under de Gaulle's leadership, exacerbated geopolitical frictions between the Allied powers through aggressive territorial and political maneuvers in German territories. France's aspiration to annex parts of Germany, like the Rhineland, and its demand for significant control over the occupation zones highlighted conflicting interests with the Americans and British, who were more focused on stabilizing Europe without significantly altering borders . The occupation of Stuttgart by French troops against American orders intensified diplomatic tensions, as it represented a unilateral assertion of power conflicting with the Allies' agreed-upon post-war plans . These ambitions strained Allied relations, necessitating complex negotiations to accommodate France’s goals within the broader framework of unified Allied administration, complicating the processes of demilitarization and denazification in occupied Germany .
Denazification and political rebuilding varied significantly across the Allied occupation zones in Germany, with the British zone adopting a notably slower and more cautious approach. The British took their time to restore political freedom, with political parties only becoming legal again in September 1945, months after other zones had permitted political activities . While the Americans enforced denazification more rigorously and allowed greater political expression, the British maintained a stricter control, arguably due to their cautious stance toward reestablishing political structures potentially influenced by former Nazis . The distinct strategies reflected varied priorities and concerns about the future of Germany, where the British were more pragmatic and uncertain about the immediate re-introduction of political liberties compared to their American counterparts .
The Western Allies' strategies during the final stages of World War II led to significant friction, particularly with France, due to territorial and political disagreements. When French troops occupied Stuttgart, an area meant to be part of the American Zone, de Gaulle refused American orders to vacate until the occupation zones were finalized, reflecting France's assertive stance . Additionally, France's demand for German labor and de Gaulle's ambitions to annex parts of Germany like the Rhineland exacerbated tensions, particularly with the Americans who were managing the post-war restructuring . The strategic objective of the Western Allies not to escalate tensions with the Soviet Union also clashed with certain desires, such as Churchill’s inclination to use territorial gains as leverage against Soviet advances, further highlighting intra-Allied diplomatic challenges .
Stalin's strategic decisions regarding Austria had a significant impact on Soviet-Austrian relations starting in 1945, initially characterized by occupation dynamics and political maneuvers. By appointing Karl Renner, a figure associated with Austria's Anschluss, Stalin aimed to install a compliant regime that would facilitate Soviet influence while appearing to support Austrian sovereignty . Renner's socialist credentials and previous legislative experiences were intended to align with Soviet objectives of establishing Austria as a neutral and socialist-friendly state, minimizing Western infiltration. Despite initial compliance, Soviet/Austrian relations evolved with increasing discrepancies as Austria sought to navigate local governance amidst the occupation pressures. The decisions taken by Stalin initially supported Soviet interests but laid the groundwork for Austria's later push towards independence and neutrality officially formalized in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, demonstrating a complex interplay of foreign dominance and local aspirations for neutral governance .
De Gaulle's push for a separate French zone of occupation was driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and nationalistic motivations. Firstly, he aimed to establish a significant French influence in post-war Germany by controlling areas like the Rhineland, Saar, and other regions, thereby enhancing France's security and economic interests. This was aligned with appeasing the French desire for revenge after the war, as reflected by a 1945 poll showing substantial popular support for harsh measures against Germany, including splitting the country and annexing territories such as the Saar . Additionally, de Gaulle’s rejection of Morgenthau’s plan to ‘pastoralise’ Germany highlights his understanding of the importance of German industry to France’s economic recovery .