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Random documents with unrelated
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in order of sequence—that is, in Time. But there is no possibility of arranging its
parts in order of coexistence—that is, in Space. And it is just the same with odour.
Whoever thinks that sound and odour have Space for their form of intuition, may
convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the right and left sides of a
sound, or to imagine an odour turned the other way upwards.”—Principles of
Psychology , § 399.—Note.
As I thus dissent, not I think without good reason, from “the
metaphysical view of Space and Time” as “elements in all
phenomena,” it will naturally be expected that I dissent from the first
criticism which Dr. Hodgson proceeds to deduce from it. Dealing first
with the arguments I have used to show the in­comp­re­hens­ib ­ il­i­ty of
Space and Time, if we consider them as objective, and stating in
other words the conclusion I draw, that “as Space and Time cannot
be either nonentities nor the attributes of entities, we have no
choice but to consider them as entities.” Dr. Hodgson continues:―
“So far good. Secondly, he argues that they cannot be represented in thought as
such real existences, because ‘to be conceived at all, a thing must be conceived as
having attributes.’ Now here the metaphysical doctrine enables us to conceive
them as real existences, and rebuts the argument for {228} their in­con­ceiv­abil­ity;
for the other element, the material element, the feeling or quality occupying Space
and Time stands in the place and performs the function of the required attributes,
composing together with the space and time which is occupied the empirical
phenomena of perception. So far as this argument of Mr. Spencer goes, then, we
are entitled to say that his case for the in­con­ceiv­abil­ity of Space and Time as real
existences is not made out.”
Whether the fault is in me or not I cannot say, but I fail to see
that my argument is thus rebutted. On the contrary, it appears to me
substantially conceded. What kind of entity is that which can exist
only when occupied by something else? Dr. Hodgson’s own argument
is a tacit assertion that Space by itself cannot be conceived as an
existence; and this is all that I have alleged.
Dr. Hodgson deals next with the further argument, familiar to all
readers, which I have added as showing the insurmountable
difficulty in the way of conceiving Space and Time as objective
entities; namely, that “all entities which we actually know as such
are limited. . . . But of Space and Time we cannot assert either
limitation, or the absence of limitation.” Without quoting at length
the reasons Dr. Hodgson gives for distinguishing between Space as
per ceived and Space as con ceived, it will suffice if I quote his own
statement of the result to which they bring him: “So that Space and
Time as perceived are not finite, but infinite, as conceived are not
infinite, but finite.”
Most readers will, I think, be startled by the assertion that
conception is less extensive in range than perception; but, without
dwelling on this, I will content myself by asking in what case Space
is perceived as infinite? Surely Dr. Hodgson does not mean to say
that he can perceive the whole surrounding Space at once—that the
Space behind is united in perception with the Space in front. Yet this
is the necessary implication of his words. Taking his statement less
literally, however, and not dwelling on the fact that in perception
Space is habitually bounded by objects more or less distant, let us
test his {229} assertion under the most favourable conditions.
Supposing the eye directed upwards towards a clear sky; is not the
space then perceived, laterally limited? The visual area, restricted by
the visual apertures, cannot include in perception even 180° from
side to side, and is still more confined in a direction at right angles
to this. Even in the third direction, to which alone Dr. Hodgson
evidently refers, it cannot properly be said that it is infinite in
perception. Look at a position in the sky a thousand miles off. Now
look at a position a million miles off. What is the difference in
perception? Nothing. How then can an infinite distance be perceived
when these immensely-unlike finite distances cannot be perceived as
differing from one another, or from an infinite distance? Dr. Hodgson
has used the wrong word. Instead of saying that Space as perceived
is infinite, he should have said that, in perception, Space is finite in
two dimensions, and becomes indefinite in the third when this
becomes great.
I now come to the paragraph beginning “Mr. Spencer then turns to
the second or subjective hypothesis, that of Kant.” This paragraph is
somewhat difficult to deal with, because in it my reasoning is
criticized both from the Kantian point of view and from Dr. Hodgson’s
own point of view. Dissenting from Kant’s view, Dr. Hodgson says, “I
hold that both Space and Time and Feeling, or the material element,
are equally and alike subjective, equally and alike objective.” As I
cannot understand this, I am unable to deal with those arguments
against me which Dr. Hodgson bases upon it, and must limit myself
to that which he urges on behalf of Kant. He says:―
“But I think that Mr. Spencer’s rep­re­sen­ta­tion of Kant’s view is very incorrect; he
seems to be misled by the large term non-ego. Kant held that Space and Time
were in their origin subjective, but when applied to the non-ego resulted in
phenomena, and were the formal element in those phenomena, among which
some were phenomena of the internal sense or ego, others of the external sense
or non-ego. The non-ego to which the forms of Space and Time did not apply and
did not belong, was the Ding-an-sich, not the {230} phenomenal non-ego. Hence
the objective existence of Space and Time in phenomena, but not in the Ding-an-
sich, is a consistent and necessary consequence of Kant’s view of their subjective
origin.”
If I have misunderstood Kant, as thus alleged, then my comment
must be that I credited him with an hypothesis less objectionable
than that which he held. I supposed his view to be that Space, as a
form of intuition belonging to the ego , is imposed by it on the non-
ego (by which I understood the thing in itself) in the act of intuition.
But now the Kantian doctrine is said to be that Space, originating in
the ego , when applied to the non-ego , results in phenomena (the
non-ego meant being, in that case, necessarily the Ding-an-sich, or
thing in itself); and that the phenomena so resulting become
objective existences along with the Space given to them by the
subject. The subject having imposed Space as a form on the
primordial object, or thing in itself, and so created phenomena, this
Space thereupon becomes an objective existence, independent of
both the subject and the original thing in itself! To Dr. Hodgson this
may seem a more tenable position than that which I ascribed to
Kant; but to me it seems only a multiplication of in­con­ceiv­abil­i­ties. I
am content to leave it as it stands: not feeling my reasons for
rejecting the Kantian hypothesis much weakened.26
The remaining reply which Dr. Hodgson makes runs thus:―
“But Mr. Spencer has a second argument to prove this in­con­ceiv­abil­ity. It is this:
—‘If Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be {231} thought of;
since it is impossible for anything to be at once the form of thought and the
matter of thought.’ . . . . An instance will show the fallacy best. Syllogism is
usually held to be a form of thought. Would it be any argument for the in­con­ceiv­‐
abil­ity of syllogisms to say, they cannot be at once the form and the matter of
thought? Can we not syllogize about syllogism? Or, more plainly still,—no dog can
bite himself, for it is impossible to be at once the thing that bites and the thing
that is bitten.”
Had Dr. Hodgson quoted the whole of the passage from which he
takes the above sentence; or had he considered it in conjunction
with the Kantian doctrine to which it refers (namely, that Space
survives in con­scious­ness when all contents are expelled, which
implies that then Space is the thing with which con­scious­ness is
occupied, or the object of con­scious­ness), he would have seen that
his reply has none of the cogency he supposes. If, taking his first
illustration, he will ask himself whether it is possible to “syllogize
about syllogism,” when syllogism has no content whatever, symbolic
or other—has nonentity to serve for major, nonentity for minor, and
nonentity for conclusion; he will, I think, see that syllogism,
considered as surviving terms of every kind, cannot be syllogized
about: the “pure form” of reason (supposing it to be syllogism,
which it is not) if absolutely discharged of all it contains, cannot be
represented in thought, and therefore cannot be reasoned about.
Following Dr. Hodgson to his second illustration, I must express my
surprise that a metaphysician of his acuteness should have used it.
For an illustration to have any value, the relation between the terms
of the analogous case {232} must have some parallelism to the
relation between the terms of the case with which it is compared.
Does Dr. Hodgson really think that the relation between a dog and
the part of himself which he bites, is like the relation between
matter and form ? Suppose the dog bites his tail. Now the dog, as
biting, stands, according to Dr. Hodgson, for the form as the
containing mental faculty; and the tail, as bitten, stands for this
mental faculty as contained. Now suppose the dog loses his tail. Can
the faculty as containing and the faculty as contained be separated
in the same way? Does the mental form when deprived of all
content, even itself (granting that it can be its own content),
continue to exist in the same way that a dog continues to exist when
he has lost his tail? Even had this illustration been applicable, I
should scarcely have expected Dr. Hodgson to remain satisfied with
it. I should have thought he would prefer to meet my argument
directly, rather than indirectly. Why has he not shown the invalidity
of the reasoning used in the Principles of Psychology (§ 399, 2nd
ed.)? Having there quoted the statement of Kant, that “Space and
Time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions
themselves;” I have written―
“If we inquire more closely, this ir­rec­on­cil­abil­ity becomes still clearer. Kant says:
—‘That which in the phænomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its
matter ; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be
arranged under certain relations, I call its form .’ Carrying with us this definition of
form, as ‘that which effects that the content . . . . can be arranged under certain
relations,’ let us return to the case in which the intuition of Space is the intuition
which occupies con­scious­ness. Can the content of this intuition ‘be arranged under
certain relations’ or not? It can be so arranged, or rather, it is so arranged. Space
cannot be thought of save as having parts, near and remote, in this direction or
the other. Hence, if that is the form of a thing ‘which effects that the content . . . .
can be arranged under certain relations,’ it follows that when the content of con­‐
scious­ness is the intuition of Space, which has ‘parts that can be arranged under
certain relations,’ there must be a form of that intuition. What is it? Kant does not
tell us—does not appear to perceive that there must be such a form; and could
not have perceived this without abandoning his hypothesis that the space-intuition
is primordial.”
Now when Dr. Hodgson has shown me how that “which {233}
effects that the content . . . . can be arranged under certain
relations,” may also be that which effects its own arrangement under
the same relations, I shall be ready to surrender my position; but
until then, no analogy drawn from the ability of a dog to bite himself
will weigh much with me.
Having, as he considers, disposed of the reasons given by me for
concluding that, considered in themselves, “Space and Time are
wholly in­com­pre­hen­sible” (he continually uses on my behalf the
word “inconceivable,” which, by its unfit connotations, gives a wrong
aspect to my position), Dr. Hodgson goes on to say:-
“Yet Mr. Spencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the basis of his
philosophy. For mark, it is Space and Time as we know them, the actual and
phenomenal Space and Time, to which all these in­con­ceiv­a­bil­i­ties attach. Mr.
Spencer’s result, ought, therefore, logically to be—Scepticism. What is his actual
result? Ontology. And how so? Why, instead of rejecting Space and Time as the
inconceivable things he has tried to demonstrate them to be, he substitutes for
them an Unknowable, a something which they really are, though we cannot know
it, and rejects that, instead of them, from knowledge.”
This statement has caused me no little astonishment. That having
before him the volume from which he quotes, so competent a reader
should have so completely missed the meaning of the passages (§
26) already referred to, in which I have contended against Hamilton
and Mansel, makes me almost despair of being understood by any
ordinary reader. In that section I have, in the first place, contended
that the con­scious­ness of an Ultimate Reality, though not capable of
being made a thought, properly so called, because not capable of
being brought within limits, nevertheless remains as a con­scious­ness
that is positive : is not rendered negative by the negations of limits.
I have pointed out that―
“The error, (very naturally fallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating
the limits and conditions of con­scious­ness), consists in assuming that con­scious­‐
ness contains nothing but limits and conditions; to the entire neglect of that which
is limited and conditioned. It is forgotten that there is something which alike forms
the raw material of definite thought and remains after the definiteness which
thinking gave to it has been {234} destroyed”—something which “ever persists in us
as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape.”
This positive element of con­scious­ness it is which, “at once
necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible,” I regard as the
con­scious­ness of the Unknowable Reality. Yet Dr. Hodgson says “Mr.
Spencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the basis of
his philosophy:” implying that such basis consists of negations,
instead of consisting of that which persists notwithstanding the
negation of limits . And then, beyond this perversion, or almost
inversion, of meaning, he conveys the notion that I take as the basis
of philosophy, the “inconceivable ideas” “or self-contradictory
notions” which result when we endeavour to comprehend Space and
Time. He speaks of me as proposing to evolve substance out of
form, or rather, out of the negations of forms—gives his readers no
conception that the Power manifested to us is that which I regard as
the Unknowable, while what we call Space and Time answer to the
unknowable nexus of its manifestations. And yet the chapter from
which I quote, and still more the chapter which follows it, makes this
clear—as clear, at least, as I can make it by carefully-worded
statements and re-statements.

Philosophical systems, like theological ones, following the law of

evolution in general, severally become in course of time more rigid,
while becoming more complex and more definite; and they similarly
become less alterable—resist all compromise, and have to be
replaced by the more plastic systems that descend from them.
It is thus with pure Empiricism and pure Tran­scen­den­ta­lism. Down
to the present time disciples of Locke have continued to hold that all
mental phenomena are interpretable as results of accumulated
individual experiences; and, by criticism, have been led simply to
elaborate their in­ter­pre­ta­tions—ignoring the proofs of inadequacy.
On the other hand, disciples of Kant, {235} asserting this inadequacy,
and led by perception of it to adopt an antagonist theory, have
persisted in defending that theory under a form presenting fatal
inconsistencies. And then, when there is offered a mode of
reconciliation, the spirit of no-compromise is displayed: each side
continuing to claim the whole truth. After it has been pointed out
that all the obstacles in the way of the experiential doctrine
disappear if the effects of ancestral experiences are joined with the
effects of individual experiences, the old form of the doctrine is still
adhered to. And meanwhile Kantists persist in asserting that the ego
is born with intuitional forms which are wholly independent of
anything in the non-ego , after it has been shown that the
innateness of these intuitional forms may be so understood as to
escape the insurmountable difficulties of the hypothesis as originally
expressed.
I am led to say this by reading the remarks concerning my own
views, made with an urbanity I hope to imitate, by Professor Max
Müller, in a lecture delivered at the Royal Institution in March,
1873.27 Before dealing with the criticisms contained in this lecture, I
must enter a demurrer against that interpretation of my views by
which Professor Max Müller makes it appear that they are more
allied to those of Kant than to those of Locke. He says:―
“Whether the pre-historic genesis of these congenital dispositions or inherited
necessities of thought, as suggested by Mr. Herbert Spencer, be right or wrong,
does not signify for the purpose which Kant had in view. In admitting that there is
something in our mind, which is not the result of our own à posteriori experience,
Mr. Herbert Spencer is a thorough Kantian, and we shall see that he is a Kantian in
other respects too. If it could be proved that nervous modifications, accumulated
from generation to generation, could result in nervous structures that are fixed in
proportion as the outer relations to which they answer are fixed, we, as followers
of Kant, should only have to put in the place of Kant’s intuitions of Space and Time
‘the constant space-re­la­tions expressed in definite nervous structures, congenitally
framed to act in definite ways, and incapable of acting in any other {236} way.’ If
Mr. Herbert Spencer had not misunderstood the exact meaning of what Kant calls
the intuitions of Space and Time, he would have perceived that, barring his theory
of the pre-historic origin of these intuitions, he was quite at one with Kant.”
On this passage let me remark, first, that the word “pre-historic,”
ordinarily employed only in respect to human history, is misleading
when applied to the history of Life in general; and his use of it
leaves me in some doubt whether Professor Max Müller has rightly
conceived the hypothesis he refers to.
 My second comment is, that the description of me as “quite at one
with Kant,” “barring ” the “theory of the prehistoric origin of these
intuitions,” curiously implies that it is a matter of comparative
indifference whether the forms of thought are held to be naturally
generated by intercourse between the organism and its environing
relations, during the evolution of the lowest into the highest types,
or whether such forms are held to be supernaturally given to the
human mind, and are independent both of environing relations and
of ancestral minds. But now, addressing myself to the essential
point, I must meet the statement that I have “misunderstood the
exact meaning of what Kant calls the intuitions of Space and Time,”
by saying that I think Professor Max Müller has overlooked certain
passages which justify my interpretation, and render his
interpretation untenable. For Kant says “Space is nothing else than
the form of all phenomena of the external sense;” further, he says
that “Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition;” and, to
repeat words I have used elsewhere, “He distinctly shuts out the
supposition that there are forms of the non-ego to which these
forms of the ego correspond, by saying that ‘Space is not a
conception which has been derived from outward experiences.’” Now
so far from being in harmony with, these statements are in direct
contradiction to, the view which I hold; and seem to me absolutely
irreconcilable with it. How can it be said that, “barring” a difference
represented as trivial, I am {237} “quite at one with Kant,” when I
contend that these subjective forms of intuition are moulded into
correspondence with, and therefore derived from, some objective
form or nexus , and therefore dependent upon it; while the Kantian
hypothesis is that these subjective forms are not derived from the
object, but pre-exist in the subject—are imposed by the ego on the
non-ego . It seems to me that not only do Kant’s words, as above
given, exclude the view which I hold, but also that Kant could not
consistently have held any such view. Rightly recognizing, as he did,
these forms of intuition as innate, he was, from his stand-point,
obliged to regard them as imposed on the matter of intuition in the
act of intuition. In the absence of the hypothesis that intelligence
has been evolved, it was not possible for him to regard these
subjective forms as having been derived from objective forms.
A disciple of Locke might, I think, say that the Evolution-view of
our con­scious­ness of Space and Time is essentially Lockian, with
more truth than Professor Max Müller can represent it as essentially
Kantian. The Evolution-view is completely experiential. It differs from
the original view of the ex­pe­rien­tial­ists by containing a great
extension of that view. With the relatively-small effects of individual
experiences, it joins the relatively-vast effects of the experiences of
antecedent individuals. But the view of Kant is avowedly and
absolutely unexperiential. Surely this makes the predominance of
kinship manifest.
In Professor Max Müller’s replies to my criticisms on Kant, I cannot
see greater validity than in this affiliation to which I have demurred.
One of his arguments is that which Dr. Hodgson has used, and which
I have already answered; and I think that the others, when
compared with the passages of the Principles of Psychology which
they concern, will not be found adequate. I refer to them here {238}
chiefly for the purpose of pointing out that when he speaks of me as
bringing “three arguments against Kant’s view,” he understates the
number. Let me close what I have to say on this disputed question,
by quoting the summary of reasons I have given for rejecting the
Kantian hypothesis:―
“Kant tells us that Space is the form of all external intuition; which is not true.
He tells us that the con­scious­ness of Space continues when the con­scious­ness of
all things contained in it is suppressed; which is also not true. From these alleged
facts he infers that Space is an à priori form of intuition. I say infers , because this
conclusion is not presented in necessary union with the premises, in the same way
that the con­scious­ness of duality is necessarily presented along with the con­‐
scious­ness of inequality; but it is a conclusion voluntarily drawn for the purpose of
explaining the alleged facts. And then that we may accept this conclusion, which is
not necessarily presented along with these alleged facts which are not true, we
are obliged to affirm several propositions which cannot be rendered into thought.
When Space is itself contemplated, we have to conceive it as at once the form of
intuition and the matter of intuition; which is impossible. We have to unite that
which we are conscious of as Space with that which we are conscious of as the
ego , and contemplate the one as a property of the other; which is impossible. We
have at the same time to disunite that which we are conscious of as Space, from
that which we are conscious of as the non-ego, and contemplate the one as
separate from the other; which is also impossible. Further, this hypothesis that
Space is “nothing else” than a form of intuition belonging wholly to the ego ,
commits us to one of the two alternatives, that the non-ego is formless or that its
form produces absolutely no effect upon the ego ; both of which alternatives
involve us in impossibilities of thought.”—Prin. of Psy., § 399.

Objections of another, though allied, class have been made in a

review of the Principles of Psychology by Mr. H. Sidgwick—a critic
whose remarks on questions of mental philosophy always deserve
respectful consideration.
Mr. Sidgwick’s chief aim is to show what he calls “the mazy
inconsistency of his [my] metaphysical results.” More specifically, he
expresses thus the proposition he seeks to justify—“His view of the
subject appears to have a fundamental incoherence, which shows
itself in various ways on the surface of his exposition, but of which
the root lies {239} much deeper, in his inability to harmonise different
lines of thought.”
Before dealing with the reasons given for this judgment, let me
say that, in addition to the value which candid criticisms have as
showing where more explanation is needed, they are almost
indispensable as revealing to a writer incongruities he had not
perceived. Especially where, as in this case, the subject-matter has
many aspects, and where the words supplied by our language are so
inadequate in number that, to avoid cumbrous circumlocution, they
have to be used in senses that vary according to the context, it is
extremely difficult to avoid imperfections of statement. But while I
acknowledge sundry such imperfections and the resulting
incongruities, I cannot see that these are, as Mr. Sidgwick says,
fundamental. Contrariwise, their superficiality seems to me proved
by the fact that they may be rectified without otherwise altering the
expositions in which they occur. Here is an instance.
Mr. Sidgwick points out that, when treating of the “Data of
Psychology,” I have said (in § 56) that, though we reach inferentially
“the belief that mind and nervous action are the subjective and
objective faces of the same thing, we remain utterly incapable of
seeing, and even of imagining, how the two are related” (I quote the
passage more fully than he does). He then goes on to show that in
the “Special Synthesis,” where I have sketched the evolution of
Intelligence under its objective aspect, as displayed in the processes
by which beings of various grades adjust themselves to surrounding
actions, I “speak as if” we could see how con­scious­ness “naturally
arises at a particular stage” of nervous action. The chapter he here
refers to is one describing that “dif­fer­en­ti­a­tion of the psychical from
the physical life” which accompanies advancing organization, and
more especially advancing development of the nervous system. In it
I have shown {240} that, while the changes constituting physical life
continue to be characterized by the simultaneity with which all kinds
of them go on throughout the organism, the changes constituting
psychical life, arising as the nervous system develops, become
gradually more distinguished by their seriality . And I have said that
as nervous integration advances, “there must result an unbroken
series of these changes—there must arise a con­scious­ness.” Now I
admit that here is an apparent inconsistency. I ought to have said
that “there must result an unbroken series of these changes,” which,
taking place in the nervous system of a highly-organized creature,
gives coherence to its conduct; and along with which we assume a
con­scious­ness, because con­scious­ness goes along with coherent
conduct in ourselves. If Mr. Sidgwick will substitute this statement
for the statement as it stands, he will see that the arguments and
conclusions remain intact. A survey of the chapter as a whole,
proves that its aim is not in the least to explain how nervous
changes, considered as waves of molecular motion, become the
feelings constituting con­scious­ness; but that, contemplating the facts
objectively in living creatures at large, it points out the cardinal
distinction between vital actions in general, and those particular vital
actions which, in a creature displaying them, lead us to speak of it
as intelligent. It is shown that the rise of such actions becomes
marked in proportion as the changes taking place in the part called
the nervous system, are made more and more distinctly serial, by
union in a supreme centre of co-ordination. The introduction of the
word con­scious­ness, arises in the effort to show what fundamental
character there is in these particular physiological changes which is
parallel to a fundamental character in the psychological changes.
Another instance of the way in which Mr. Sidgwick evolves an
incongruity which he considers fundamental, out of what I should
have thought he would see is a {241} defective expression, I will give
in his own words. Speaking of a certain view of mine, he says:―
“He tells us that ‘logic . . . contemplates in its propositions certain connexions
predicated, which are necessarily involved with certain other connexions given:
regarding all these connexions as existing in the non-ego —not, it may be, under
the form in which we know them, but in some form.’ But in § 473, where Mr.
Spencer illustrates by a diagram his ‘Transfigured Realism,’ the view seems to be
this: although we cannot say that the real non-ego resembles our notion of it in
‘its elements, relations, or laws,’ we can say that ‘a change in the objective reality
causes in the subjective state a change exactly answering to it—so answering as
to constitute a cognition of it .’ Here the ‘something beyond con­scious­ness’ is no
longer said to be unknown, as its effect in con­scious­ness ‘constitutes a cognition
of it.’”
This apparent inconsistency, marked by the italics, would not have
existed if, instead of “a cognition of it,” I had said, as I ought to have
said, “what we call a cognition of it”—that is, a relative cognition as
distinguished from an absolute cognition. In ordinary language we
speak of as cognitions, those connexions in thought which so guide
us in our dealings with things, that actual experience verifies ideal
anticipation: marking off, by opposed words, those connexions in
thought which mis -guide us. The difference between accepting a
cognition as relatively true and accepting it as absolutely true, will
be clearly shown by an illustration. There is no direct resemblance
whatever between the sizes, forms, colours, and arrangements, of
the figures in an account-book, and the moneys or goods, debts or
credits, represented by them; and yet the forms and arrangements
of the written symbols, are such as answer in a perfectly-exact way
to stocks of various commodities and to various kinds of
transactions. Hence we say, figuratively, that the account-book will
“tell us” all about these stocks and transactions. Similarly, the
diagram Mr. Sidgwick refers to, suggests a way in which symbols,
registered in us by objects, may have forms and arrangements
wholly unlike their objective causes and the nexus among those
causes, while yet they are so related as to guide us correctly in our
transactions {242} with those objective causes, and, in that sense ,
constitute cognitions of them; though they no more constitute
cognitions in the absolute sense, than do the guiding symbols in the
account-book constitute cognitions of the things to which they refer.
So repeatedly is this view implied throughout the Principles of
Psychology , that I am surprised to find a laxity of expression raising
the suspicion that I entertain any other.
To follow Mr. Sidgwick through sundry criticisms of like kind, which
may be similarly met, would take more space than I can here afford.
I must restrict myself now to the alleged “fundamental incoherence”
of which he thinks these inconsistencies are signs. I refer to that
reconciliation of Realism and Idealism considered by him as an
impossible compromise. A difficulty is habitually felt in accepting a
coalition after long conflict. Whoever has espoused one of two
antagonist views, and, in defending it, has gained a certain
comprehension of the opposite view, becomes accustomed to regard
these as the only alternatives, and is puzzled by an hypothesis which
is at once both and neither. Yet, since it turns out in nearly all cases
that, of conflicting doctrines, each contains an element of truth, and
that controversy ends by combination of their respective half-truths,
there is a priori probability on the side of an hypothesis which
qualifies Realism by Idealism.
Mr. Sidgwick expresses his astonishment, or rather bespeaks that
of his readers, because, while I accept Idealistic criticisms, I
nevertheless defend the fundamental intuition of Common Sense;
and, as he puts it, “fires his [my] argument full in the face of Kant,
Mill, and ‘metaphysicians’ generally.”
“He tells us that ‘metaphysicians’ illegitimately assume that ‘beliefs reached
through complex intellectual processes,’ are more valid than ‘beliefs reached
through simple intellectual processes;’ that the common language they use refuses
to express their hypotheses, and thus their reasoning inevitably implies the
common notions which they repudiate; that the belief of Realism has the
advantage of ‘priority,’ ‘simplicity,’ ‘distinctness.’ {243} But surely this prior, simple,
distinctly affirmed belief is that of what Mr. Spencer terms ‘crude Realism’, the
belief that the non-ego is per se extended, solid, even coloured (if not resonant
and odorous). This is what common language implies; and the argument by which
Mr. Spencer proves the relativity of feelings and relations, still more the subtle and
complicated analysis by which he resolves our notion of extension into an
aggregate of feelings and transitions of feeling, lead us away from our original
simple belief—that (e.g. ) the green grass we see exists out of con­scious­ness as
we see it—just as much as the reasonings of Idealism, Scepticism, or Kantism.”
On the face of it the anomaly seems great; but I should have
thought that after reading the chapter on “Transfigured Realism,” a
critic of Mr. Sidgwick’s acuteness would have seen the solution of it.
He has overlooked an essential distinction. All which my argument
implies is that the direct intuition of Realism must be held of superior
authority to the arguments of Anti-Realism, where their deliverances
cannot be reconciled . The one point on which their deliverances
cannot be reconciled, is the existence of an objective reality. But
while, against this intuition of Realism, I hold the arguments of Anti-
Realism to be powerless, because they cannot be carried on without
postulating that which they end by denying; yet, having admitted
objective existence as a necessary postulate, it is possible to make
valid criticisms upon all those judgments which Crude Realism joins
with this primordial judgment: it is possible to show that a
transfigured interpretation of properties and relations, is more
tenable than the original interpretation.
To elucidate the matter, let us take the most familiar case in which
the indirect judgments of Reason correct the direct judgments of
Common Sense. The direct judgment of Common Sense is that the
Sun moves round the Earth. In course of time, Reason, finding some
facts at variance with this, begins to doubt; and, eventually, hits
upon an hypothesis which explains the anomalies, but which denies
this appar­ent­ly-cer­tain dictum of Common Sense. What is the
reconciliation? It consists in showing {244} to Common Sense that the
new interpretation equally well corresponds with direct intuition,
while it avoids all the difficulties. Common Sense is reminded that
the apparent motion of an object may be due either to its actual
motion or to the motion of the observer; and that there are
terrestrial experiences in which the observer thinks an object he
looks at is moving, when the motion is in himself. Extending the
conception thus given, Reason shows that if the Earth revolves on its
axis, there will result that apparent motion of the Sun which
Common Sense interpreted into an actual motion of the Sun; and
the common-sense observer thereupon becomes able to think of
sunrise and sunset as due to his position as spectator on a vast
revolving globe. Now if the astronomer, setting out by recognizing
these celestial appearances, and proceeding to evolve the various
anomalies following from the common-sense interpretation of them,
had drawn the conclusion that there externally exist no Sun and no
motion at all, he would have done what Idealists do; and his
arguments would have been equally powerless against the intuition
of Common Sense. But he does nothing of the kind. He accepts the
intuition of Common Sense respecting the reality of the Sun and of
the motion; but replaces the old interpretation of the motion by a
new interpretation reconcilable with all the facts.
Everyone must see that here, acceptance of the inexpugnable
element in the common-sense judgment, by no means involves
acceptance of the accompanying judgments; and I contend that the
like discrimination must be made in the case we are considering. It
does not follow that while, against the con­scious­ness which Crude
Realism has of an objective reality, the arguments of Anti-Realism
are futile, they are therefore futile against the conceptions which
Crude Realism forms of the objective reality. If Anti-Realism can
show that, granting an objective reality, the interpretation of Crude
Realism contains insuperable {245} difficulties, the process is quite
legitimate. And, its primordial intuition remaining unshaken, Realism
may, on reconsideration, be enabled to frame a new conception
which harmonizes all the facts.
To show that there is not here the “mazy inconsistency” alleged,
let us take the case of sound as interpreted by Crude Realism, and
as re-interpreted by Transfigured Realism. Crude Realism assumes
the sound present in con­scious­ness to exist as such beyond con­‐
scious­ness. Anti-Realism proves the inadmissibility of this
assumption in sundry ways (all of which, however, set out by talking
of sounding bodies beyond con­scious­ness, just as Realism talks of
them); and then Anti-Realism concludes that we know of no
existence save the sound as a mode of con­scious­ness: which
conclusion, and all kindred conclusions, I contend are vicious—first,
because all the words used connote an objective activity; second,
because the arguments are impossible without postulating at the
outset an objective activity; and third, because no one of the
intuitions out of which the arguments are built, is of equal validity
with the single intuition of Realism that an objective activity exists.
But now the Transfigured Realism which Mr. Sidgwick thinks “has all
the serious incongruity of an intense metaphysical dream,” neither
affirms the untenable conception of Crude Realism, nor, like Anti-
Realism, draws unthinkable conclusions by suicidal arguments; but,
accepting that which is essential in Crude Realism, and admitting the
difficulties which Anti-Realism insists upon, reconciles matters by a
re-inter­pre­ta­tion analogous to that which an astronomer makes of
the solar motion. Continuing all along to recognize an objective
activity which Crude Realism calls sound, it shows that the
answering sensation is produced by a succession of separate impacts
which, if made slowly, may be separately identified, and which will, if
progressively increased in rapidity, produce tones higher and higher
in pitch. It {246} shows by other experiments that sounding bodies
are in states of vibration, and that the vibrations may be made
visible. And it concludes that the objective activity is not what it
subjectively seems, but is proximately interpretable as a succession
of aërial waves. Thus Crude Realism is shown that while there
unquestionably exists an objective activity corresponding to the
sensation known as sound, yet the facts are not explicable on the
original supposition that this is like the sensation; while they are
explicable by conceiving it as a rhythmical mechanical action.
Eventually this re-inter­pre­ta­tion, joined with kindred re­in­ter­pre­ta­‐
tions of other sensations, comes to be itself further transfigured by
analysis of its terms, and re-expression of them in terms of
molecular motion; but, however abstract the interpretation
ultimately reached, the objective activity continues to be postulated:
the primordial judgment of Crude Realism remains unchanged,
though it has to change the rest of its judgments.
In another part of his argument, however, Mr. Sidgwick implies
that I have no right to use those conceptions of objective existence
by which this compromise is effected. Quoting sundry passages to
show that while I hold the criticisms of the Idealist to be impossible
without “tacitly or avowedly postulating an unknown something
beyond con­scious­ness,” I yet admit that “our states of con­scious­ness
are the only things we can know;” he goes on to argue that I am
radically inconsistent, because, in interpreting the phenomena of
con­scious­ness, I continually postulate, not an unknown something,
but a something of which I speak in ordinary terms, as though its
ascribed physical characters really exist as such, instead of being, as
I admit they are, synthetic states of my con­scious­ness. His
objection, if I understand it, is that for the purposes of Objective
Psychology I apparently profess to know Matter and Motion in the
ordinary realistic way; while, as a result of subjective analysis, I
reach the conclusion that {247} it is impossible to have that
knowledge of objective existence which Realism supposes we have.
Doubtless there seems here to be what he calls “a fundamental
incoherence.” But I think it exists, not between my two expositions,
but between the two con­scious­nesses of subjective and objective
existence, which we cannot suppress and yet cannot put into
definite forms. The alleged incoherence I take to be but another
name for the inscrutability of the relation between subjective feeling
and its objective correlate which is not feeling—an inscrutability
which meets us at the bottom of all our analyses. An exposition of
this inscrutability I have elsewhere summed up thus:―
“See, then, our predicament. We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. We
can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations
of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer;
and when we have got the final answer of the second, we are referred back to the
first for an interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ; then we find
the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may continue for ever without coming
nearer to a solution.”—Prin. of Psy. § 272.
Carrying a little further this simile, will, I think, show where lies
the insuperable difficulty felt by Mr. Sidgwick. Taking x and y as the
subjective and objective activities, unknown in their natures and
known only as phenomenally manifested; and recognizing the fact
that every state of con­scious­ness implies, immediately or remotely,
the action of object on subject or subject on object, or both; we may
say that every state of con­scious­ness will be symbolized by some
modification of xy —the phenomenally-known product of the two
unknown factors. In other words, xy′ , x′y , x′y′ , x″y′ , x′y″ , &c., &c.,
will represent all perceptions and thoughts. Suppose, now, that
these are thoughts about the object; composing some hypothesis
respecting its characters as analyzed by physicists. Clearly, all such
thoughts, be they about shapes, resistances, momenta, molecules,
molecular motions, or what not, will contain forms of the subjective
activity x . Now let the thoughts {248} be concerning mental
processes. It must similarly happen that some mode of the unknown
objective activity y , will be in every case a component. Now suppose
that the problem is the genesis of mental phenomena; and that, in
the course of the inquiry, bodily organization and the functions of
the nervous system are brought into the explanation. It will happen,
as before, that these, considered as objective, have to be described
and thought about in modes of xy . And when by the actions of such
a nervous system, conceived objectively in modes of xy , and acted
upon by physical forces which are conceived in other modes of xy ,
we endeavour to explain the genesis of sensations, perceptions, and
ideas, which we can think of only in other modes of xy, we find that
all our factors, and therefore all our in­ter­pre­ta­tions, contain the two
unknown terms, and that no interpretation is imaginable that will not
contain the two unknown terms.
What is the defence for this appar­ent­ly-circ­u­lar process? Simply
that it is a process of establishing congruity among our symbols. It
is finding a mode of so symbolizing the unknown activities,
subjective and objective, and so operating with our symbols, that all
our acts may be rightly guided—guided, that is, in such ways that
we can anticipate, when, where, and in what quantity some one of
our symbols, or some combination of our symbols, will be found. Mr.
Sidgwick’s difficulty arises, I think, from having insufficiently borne in
mind the statements made at the outset, in “The Data of
Philosophy,” that such conceptions as “are vital, or cannot be
separated from the rest without mental dissolution, must be
assumed as true provisionally ;” that “there is no mode of
establishing the validity of any belief except that of showing its
entire congruity with all other beliefs;” and that “Philosophy,
compelled to make those fundamental assumptions without which
thought is impossible, has to justify them by showing their congruity
with all other dicta of con­scious­ness.” In {249} pursuance of this
distinctly-avowed mode of procedure, I assume provisionally, an
objective activity and a subjective activity, and certain general forms
and modes (Space, Time, Matter, Motion, Force), which the
subjective activity, operated on by the objective activity, ascribes to
it, and which I suppose to correspond in some way to unknown
forms and modes of the objective activity. These provisional
assumptions, having been carried out to all their consequences, and
these consequences proved to be congruous with one another and
with the original assumptions, these original assumptions are
justified. And if, finally, I assert, as I have repeatedly asserted, that
the terms in which I express my assumptions and carry on my
operations are but symbolic, and that all I have done is to show that
by certain ways of symbolizing, perfect harmony results—invariable
agreement between the symbols in which I frame my expectations,
and the symbols which occur in experience—I cannot be blamed for
incoherence. On the contrary, it seems to me that my method is the
most coherent that can be devised. Lastly, should it be said that this
regarding of everything constituting experience and thought as
symbolic, has a very shadowy aspect; I reply that these which I
speak of as symbols, are real relatively to our con­scious­ness; and
are symbolic only in their relation to the Ultimate Reality.
That these explanations will make clear the coherence of views
which before seemed “fundamentally incoherent,” I feel by no means
certain; since, as I did not perceive the difficulties presented by the
exposition as at first made, I may similarly fail to perceive the
difficulties in this explanation. Originally, I had intended to complete
the Principles of Psychology by a division showing how the results
reached in the preceding divisions, physiological and psychological,
analytic and synthetic, subjective and objective, harmonize with one
another, and are but different aspects of the same aggregate of
phenomena. But the work was already {250} bulky; and I concluded
that this division might be dispensed with, because the congruities
to be pointed out were sufficiently obvious. So little was I conscious
of the alleged “inability to harmonize different lines of thought.” Mr.
Sidgwick’s perplexities, however, show me that such an exposition of
concords is needful.

I have reserved to the last, one of the first objections made to the
me­ta­phys­ic­ o-the­o­lo­gi­cal doctrine set forth in First Principles , and
implied in the several volumes that have succeeded it. It was urged
by an able metaphysician, the Rev. James Martineau, in an essay
entitled “Science, Nescience, and Faith;” and, effective against my
argument as it stands, shows the need for some development of my
argument. That Mr. Martineau’s criticism may be understood, I must
quote the passages it concerns. Continuing the reasoning employed
against Hamilton and Mansel, to show that our con­scious­ness of that
which transcends knowledge is positive , and not, as they allege,
negative , I have said:―
“Still more manifest will this truth become when it is observed that our
conception of the Relative itself disappears, if our conception of the Absolute is a
pure negation. It is admitted, or rather it is contended, by the writers I have
quoted above, that contradictories can be known only in relation to each other—
that Equality, for instance, is unthinkable apart from its correlative Inequality; and
that thus the Relative can itself be conceived only by opposition to the Non-
relative. It is also admitted, or rather contended, that the con­scious­ness of a
relation implies a con­scious­ness of both the related members. If we are required
to conceive the relation between the Relative and Non-relative without being
conscious of both, ‘we are in fact’ (to quote the words of Mr. Mansel differently
applied) ‘required to compare that of which we are conscious with that of which
we are not conscious; the comparison itself being an act of con­scious­ness, and
only possible through the con­scious­ness of both its objects.’ What, then, becomes
of the assertion that, ‘the Absolute is conceived merely by a negation of
conceivability,’ or as ‘the mere absence of the conditions under which con­scious­‐
ness is possible?’ If the Non-relative or Absolute, is present in thought only as a
mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative becomes
unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is absent from con­scious­‐
ness. {251} And if this relation is unthinkable, then is the Relative itself unthinkable,
for want of its antithesis: whence results the disappearance of all thought
whatever.”—First Principles , § 26.
On this argument Mr. Martineau comments as follows; first re-
stating it in other words:―
“Take away its antithetic term, and the relative, thrown into isolation, is set up
as absolute, and disappears from thought. It is indispensable therefore to uphold
the Absolute in existence, as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes our
whole intellectual domain. Be it so: but when saved on this plea,—to preserve the
balance and interdependence of two co -relatives,—the ‘Absolute’ is absolute no
more; it is reduced to a term of relation: it loses therefore its exile from thought:
its dis­qual­i­fi­ca­tion is cancelled: and the alleged nescience is discharged.
“So, the same law of thought which warrants the existence, dissolves the
inscrutableness, of the Absolute.”—Essays, Philosophical and Theological pp.
186–7.
I admit this to be a telling rejoinder; and one which can be met
only when the meanings of the words, as I have used them, are
carefully discriminated, and the implications of the doctrine fully
traced out. We will begin by clearing the ground of minor
misconceptions.
First, let it be observed that though I have used the word Absolute
as the equivalent of Non-relative, because it is used in the passages
quoted from the writers I am contending against; yet I have myself
chosen for the purposes of my argument, the name Non-relative,
and I do not necessarily commit myself to any propositions
respecting the Absolute, considered as that which includes both
Subject and Object. The Non-relative as spoken of by me, is to be
understood rather as the totality of Being minus that which
constitutes the individual con­scious­ness, present to us under forms
of Relation. Did I use the word in some Hegelian sense, as
comprehensive of that which thinks and that which is thought about,
and did I propose to treat of the order of things, not as
phenomenally manifested but as noumenally proceeding, the
objection would be fatal. But the aim being simply to formulate the
order of things as present under relative forms, the antithetical Non-
relative here named as {252} implied by the conception of the
Relative, is that which, in any act of thought, is outside of and
beyond it, rather than that which is inclusive of it. Further, it should
be observed that this Non-relative, spoken of as a necessary
complement to the Relative, is not spoken of as a conception but as
a con­scious­ness ; and I have in sundry passages distinguished
between those modes of con­scious­ness which, having limits, and
constituting thought proper, are subject to the laws of thought, and
the mode of con­scious­ness which persists when the removal of limits
is carried to the uttermost, and when distinct thought consequently
ceases.
This opens the way to the reply here to be made to Mr.
Martineau’s criticism—namely, that while by the necessities of
thought the Relative implies a Non-relative; and while, to think of
this antithesis completely, requires that the Non-relative shall be
made a conception proper; yet, for the vague thought which is alone
in this case possible, it suffices that the Non-relative shall be present
as a con­scious­ness which though undefined is positive. Let us
observe what necessarily happens when thought is employed on this
ultimate question.
In a preceding part of the argument criticized, I have, in various
ways, aimed to show that, alike when we analyze the product of
thought and when we analyze the process of thought, we are
brought to the conclusion that invariably “a thought involves
relation , difference , likeness ;” and that even from the very nature
of Life itself, we may evolve the conclusion that “thinking being
relationing, no thought can ever express more than relations.” What,
now, must happen if thought, having this law, occupies itself with
the final mystery? Always implying terms in relation, thought implies
that both terms shall be more or less defined; and as fast as one of
them becomes indefinite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and
thought becomes indistinct. Take the {253} case of magnitudes. I
think of an inch; I think of a foot; and having tolerably-definite ideas
of the two, I have a tolerably-definite idea of the relation between
them. I substitute for the foot a mile; and being able to represent a
mile much less definitely, I cannot so definitely think of the relation
between an inch and a mile—cannot distinguish it in thought from
the relation between an inch and two miles, as clearly as I can
distinguish in thought the relation between an inch and one foot
from the relation between an inch and two feet. And now if I
endeavour to think of the relation between an inch and the 240,000
miles from here to the Moon, or the relation between an inch and
the 93,000,000 miles from here to the Sun, I find that while these
distances, practically inconceivable, have become little more than
numbers to which I frame no answering ideas, so, too, has the
relation between an inch and either of them become practically
inconceivable. Evidently then this partial failure in the process of
forming thought-relations, which happens even with finite
magnitudes when one of them is immense, passes into complete
failure when one of them cannot be brought within any limits. The
relation itself becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of
its terms becomes unrepresentable. Nevertheless, in this case it is to
be observed that the almost-blank form of relation preserves a
certain qualitative character. It is still dis­tin­guish­able as belonging to
the con­scious­ness of extensions, not to the con­scious­nesses of
forces or durations; and in so far remains a vague­ly-ident­i­fi­able
relation. But now suppose we ask what happens when one term of
the relation has not simply magnitude having no known limits, and
duration of which neither beginning nor end is cognizable, but is also
an existence not to be defined? In other words, what must happen if
one term of the relation is not only quantitatively but also
qualitatively unrepresentable? Clearly in this case the {254} relation
does not simply cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a
certain class, but it lapses completely. When one of the terms
becomes wholly unknowable, the law of thought can no longer be
conformed to; both because one term cannot be present, and
because relation itself cannot be framed. That is to say, the law of
thought that contradictories can be known only in relation to each
other, no longer holds when thought attempts to transcend the
Relative; and yet, when it attempts to transcend the Relative, it must
make the attempt in conformity with its law—must in some dim
mode of con­scious­ness posit a Non-relative, and, in some similarly
dim mode of con­scious­ness, a relation between it and the Relative.
In brief then, to Mr. Martineau’s objection I reply, that the insoluble
difficulties he indicates arise here, as elsewhere, when thought is
applied to that which transcends the sphere of thought; and that
just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations to
the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it out of such
materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have
simultaneously to symbolize the connexion between this Ultimate
Reality and its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connexions
among the phenomenal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr.
Martineau’s criticism adumbrates, is that the law of thought fails
where the elements of thought fail; and this is a conclusion quite
conformable to the general view I defend. Still holding the validity of
my argument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of
their own principle the Relative is not at all thinkable as such , unless
in contra­dis­tinc­tion to some existence posited, however vaguely, as
the other term of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it is
consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought
inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not only does the
product of thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the
process of thought becomes a dim {255} symbol of a process; and
hence any predicament inferable from the law of thought cannot be
asserted.
I may fitly close this reply by a counter-criticism. To the direct
defence of a proposition, may be added the indirect defence which
results from showing the untenability of an alternative proposition.
This criticism on the doctrine of an Unknowable Existence
manifested to us in phenomena, Mr. Martineau makes in the
interests of the doctrine held by him, that this existence is, to a
considerable degree, knowable. We are quite at one in holding that
there is an indestructible con­scious­ness of Power behind
Appearance; but whereas I contend that this Power cannot be
brought within the forms of thought, Mr. Martineau contends that
there can be consistently ascribed certain attributes of personality—
not, indeed, human char­ac­ter­is­tics so concrete as were ascribed in
past times; but still, human char­ac­ter­is­tics of the more abstract and
higher class. His general doctrine is this:—Regarding Matter as
independently existing; regarding as also independently existing,
those primary qualities of Body “which are inseparable from the very
idea of Body, and may be evolved a priori from the consideration of
it as solid extension or extended solidity;” and saying that to this
class “belong Triple Dimension, Divisibility, In­com­pres­si­bil­i­ty;” he
goes on to assert that as these―
“cannot absent themselves from Body, they have a reality coeval with it, and
belong eternally to the material datum objective to God: and his mode of activity
with regard to them must be similar to that which alone we can think of his
directing upon the relations of Space, viz. not Volitional, to cause them, but
Intellectual, to think them out. The Secondary Qualities, on the other hand, having
no logical tie to the Primary, but being appended to them as contingent facts,
cannot be referred to any deductive thought, but remain over as products of pure
Inventive Reason and Determining Will. This sphere of cognition, a posteriori to
us,—where we cannot move a step alone but have submissively to wait upon
experience, is precisely the realm of Divine originality: and we are most
sequacious where He is most free. While on this Secondary field His Mind and ours
are thus contrasted, they meet in resemblance again upon the Primary: for the
evolutions of deductive Reason there is but one track possible to all intelligences;
no {256} merum arbitrium can interchange the false and true, or make more than
one geometry, one scheme of pure Physics, for all worlds: and the Omnipotent
Architect Himself, in realizing the Kosmical conception, in shaping the orbits out of
immensity and determining seasons out of eternity, could but follow the laws of
curvature, measure, and proportion.”—Essays, Philosophical and Theological , pp.
163–4.
Before the major criticism which I propose to make on this
hypothesis, let me make a minor one. Not only of space-re­la­tions,
but also of primary physical properties, Mr. Martineau asserts the
necessity: not a necessity to our minds simply, but an ontological
necessity. What is true for human thought, is, in respect of these,
true absolutely: “the laws of curvature, measure, and proportion,” as
we know them, are unchangeable even by Divine power; as are also
the Divisibility and In­com­pres­si­bil­ity of Matter. But if, in these cases,
Mr. Martineau holds that a necessity in thought implies an answering
necessity in things, why does he refrain from saying the like in other
cases? Why, if he tacitly asserts it in respect of space-re­la­tions and
the statical attributes of Body, does he not also assert it in respect of
the dynamical attributes of Body? The laws conformed to by that
mode of force now distinguished as “energy,” are as much necessary
to our thought as are the laws of space-re­la­tions. The axioms of
Mechanics lie on the same plane with the axioms of pure
Mathematics. Now if Mr. Martineau admits this—if he admits, as he
must, the corollary that there can be no such manifestation of
energy as that displayed in the motion of a planet, save at the
expense of equivalent energy which pre-existed—if he draws the
further necessary corollary that the direction of a motion cannot be
changed by any action, without an equal reaction in an opposite
direction on something acting—if he bears in mind that this holds
not only of all visible motions, celestial and terrestrial, but that those
activities of Body which affect us as secondary properties, are also
known only through other forms of {257} energy, which are
equivalents of mechanical energy and conform to these same laws—
and if, lastly, he infers that none of these derivative energies can
have given to them their characters and directions, save by pre-
existing forces, statical and dynamical, conditioned in special ways;
what becomes of that “realm of Divine originality” which Mr.
Martineau describes as remaining within the realm of necessity?
Consistently carried out, his argument implies a un­iv­ ers­al­ly-in­ev­i­ta­ble
order, in which volition can have no such place as that he alleges.
Not pushing Mr. Martineau’s reasoning to this conclusion, so
entirely at variance with the one he draws, but accepting his
statement just as it stands, let us consider the solution it offers us.
We are left by it without any explanation of Space and Time; we are
not helped in conceiving the origin of Matter; and there is afforded
us no idea how Matter came to have its primary attributes. All these
are tacitly assumed to exist uncreated. Creative activity is
represented as under the restrictions imposed by mathematical
necessities, and as having for datum (mark the word) a substance
which, in respect of certain characters, defies modification. But
surely this is not an interpretation of the mystery of things. The
mystery is simply relegated to a remoter region, respecting which no
inquiry is to be made. But the inquiry must be made. After every
such solution there arises afresh the question—what is the origin
and nature of that which imposes these limits on creative power?
what is the primary God which dominates over this secondary God?
For, clearly, if the “Omnipotent Architect himself” (to use Mr.
Martineau’s somewhat inconsistent name) is powerless to change
the “material datum objective” to him, and powerless to change the
conditions under which it exists, and under which he works, there is
obviously implied a power to which he is subject. So that in Mr.
Martineau’s doctrine also, there is an Ultimate {258} Unknowable; and
it differs from the doctrine he opposes, only by intercalating a
partially Knowable between this and the wholly Knowable.
Finding, as explained above, that this interpretation is not
consistent with itself; and finding, as just shown, that it leaves the
essential mystery unsolved; I do not see that it has an advantage
over the doctrine of the Unknowable in its unqualified shape. There
cannot, I think, be more than temporary rest in a proximate solution
which takes for its basis the ultimately insoluble. Just as thought
cannot be prevented from passing beyond Appearance, and trying to
conceive the Cause behind; so, following out the interpretation Mr.
Martineau offers, thought cannot be prevented from asking what
Cause it is which restricts the Cause he assigns. And if we must
admit that the question under this eventual form cannot be
answered, may we not as well confess that the question under its
immediate form cannot be answered? Is it not better candidly to
acknowledge the incompetence of our intelligence, rather than to
persist in calling that an explanation which does but disguise the
inexplicable? Whatever answer each may give to this question, he
cannot rightly blame those who, finding in themselves an
indestructible con­scious­ness of an ultimate Cause, whence proceed
alike what we call the Material Universe and what we call Mind,
refrain from affirming anything respecting it; because they find it as
inscrutable in nature as it is inconceivable in extent and duration.

P OSTSCRIPT .—With the concluding paragraph of the foregoing

article, I had hoped to end, for a long time, all controversial writing;
and, if the article had been published entire in the November
number of the Fortnightly , as originally intended, the need for any
addition would not have been pressing. But while it was in the
printer’s {259} hands, two criticisms, more elaborate than those dealt
with above, made their appearance; and now that the postponed
publication of this latter half of the article affords the opportunity, I
cannot, without risking mis­in­ter­pre­ta­tions, leave these criticisms
unnoticed.
Especially do I feel called upon by courtesy to make some
response to one who, in the Quarterly Review for October, 1873, has
dealt with me in a spirit which, though largely antagonistic, is not
wholly unsympathetic; and who manifestly aims to estimate justly
the views he opposes. In the space at my disposal, I cannot of
course follow him through all the objections he has urged. I must
content myself with brief comments on the two propositions he
undertakes to establish. His enunciation of these runs thus:―
“We would especially direct attention to two points, to both of which we are
confident objections may be made; and although Mr. Spencer has himself
doubtless considered such objections (and they may well have struck many of his
readers also), we nevertheless do not observe that he has anywhere noticed or
provided for them.
 “The two points we so select are:―
“(1) That his system involves the denial of all truth.
“(2) That it is radically and necessarily opposed to all sound principles of
morals. ”
On this passage, ending in these two startling assertions, let me
first remark that I am wholly without this con­scious­ness the reviewer
ascribes to me. Remembering that I have expended some little
labour in developing what I conceive to be a system of truths, I am
surprised by the supposition that “the denial of all truth” is an
implication which I am “doubtless” aware may be alleged against
this system. Remembering, too, that by its programme this system is
shown to close with two volumes on The Principles of Morality , the
statement that it is “necessarily opposed to all sound principles of
morals,” naturally astonishes me; and still more the statement that I
am doubtless conscious it may be so regarded. Saying thus much by
way of repudiating that latent scepticism {260} attributed to me by
the reviewer, I proceed to consider what he says in proof of these
propositions.
On those seeming incongruities of Transfigured Realism
commented on by him, I need say no more than I have already said
in reply to Mr. Sidgwick; by whom also they have been alleged. I will
limit myself to the corollary he draws from the doctrine of the
Relativity of Knowledge, as held by me. Rightly pointing out that I
hold this in common with “Messrs. Mill, Lewes, Bain, and Huxley;”
but not adding, as he should have done, that I hold it in common
with Hamilton, Mansel, and the long list of predecessors through
whom Hamilton traced it; the reviewer proceeds to infer from this
doctrine of relativity that no absolute truth of any kind can be
asserted—not even the absolute truth of the doctrine of relativity
itself. And then he leaves it to be supposed by his readers, that this
inference tells especially against the system he is criticizing. If,
however, the reviewer’s inference is valid, this “denial of all truth”
must be charged against the doctrines of thinkers called orthodox,
as well as against the doctrines of those many philosophers, from
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