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Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014

1982

Definitions of political power: a case study.

Thomas F. Gilmartin
University of Massachusetts Amherst

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 DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL POWER:

A CASE STUDY

A Thesis Presented

by

THOMAS F. GILMARTIN, JR.

Submitted to the Graduate School of the

University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

February 1982

Political Science
 DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL POWER:

A CASE STUDY

A Thesis Presented

By

THOMAS F. GILMARTIN , JR.

Approved as to style and content by:

11
 CHAPTER I

The issue of busing to achieve desegregation of the

Boston public school system has its roots in the U.S.

Supreme Court's landmark decisions in 1954 and 1955. Those

decisions in Brown vs. Board of Education, (347 U.S. 483 of

1954)^ and the findings a year later in Brown vs. Board of

2
Education, (349, U.S. 254) were the official beginnings of

a struggle between federal courts and communities charged

with desegregation of their schools. As Howard Ozmon re-

flects ,

The two Supreme Court decisions form

the legal backdrop from which busing
has become an issue of crisis propor-
tional to a moral crisis.

The Brown decision represented a mandate to American

society. They were the foundation of a series of court

rulings that led to Federal District Court Judge Wendell

Arthur Garritty, Jr.'s findings of June 1974. Ozmon con-

curs that

The direction Of that legal mandate

was to root out and invalidate as
unconstitutional any form of de jure
segregation of public schools, that
is segregation required and upheld
by law Lt

itself
In the Brown decisions the Supreme Court had limited
and
to de jure segregation in assaulting racial inequality
1
 2

upholding the equal rights protection of the Constitution's

fourteenth amendment. For the time being, de facto segrega-

tion remained unchallenged. However limited, the Supreme

Court reaffirmed its decision of 1954 a year later by

asserting that "once the state had undertaken the obliga-

tion to provide public education, it must be available to

5
all on equal terms"

Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court not only limited its

jurisdiction to de jure segregation, but delegated the task

of desegregation to lower courts. Little guidance was of-

fered except to require compliance with constitutional obli-

gabions to equal rights. In Briggs vs. Elliot, 1955, the

U.S. Supreme Court was more concerned with articulating what

it had not decided than with formulating a standard of dese-

gregation for lower courts to implement and school officials

to follow. The Court opinion claimed that it

has not decided that the federal

courts are to take over or regulate
the public schools ... has not decided
that states must mix persons of dif-
ferent races in the school or deprive
them of the right to choose the schools
they attend. What it has decided... is
that a state may not deny to any person
on account of race the right to attend
any school that it maintains. 7

The Court had concluded in this case that the U.S. Constitu-

tion forbade discrimination without demanding integration.

Busing orders and a more affirmative role for the Court and

local authority still lay in the distant future.

 3

The U.S. Supreme Court took its first steps toward for-
mulating a standard or offering guidance to lower courts in

the case of U.S, vs. Jefferson County Board of Education. 8

A duty for local school authority to assume an affirmative

role in eliminating segregation was inaugurated by this

court opinion. The court declared that "the only desegre-

gation plan that meets Constitutional standards is one that

9
works" . This new direction of the court received welcomed

support from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly reaffirmed the

responsibility of local school authority to end segregation.

Section 407 of the legislation "authorized the Attorney

General to maintain desegregation actions upon the receipt

18
of written complaints". Reflecting Congressional percep-

tion of popular disapproval of forced busing, the same sec-

tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically stated

that the Act did not empower anyone to issue a busing order.

Although this anti-busing sentiment was incorporated into

the legislation, the Congress did not and could not deny or

restrict the Court's power to insure compliance with Consti-

tutional standards. When the Court did discern busing as

necessary to achieve desegregation, it would reason that the

Civil Rights Act "in no way withdrew from the courts their
11
equitable remedial powers".

Although the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed the need

for an effective desegregation strategy by local school

 4

author it it had been ambiguous as to what was

,
and was not
affirmative action. Since the "Jefferson County" decision,
conflicting views over the exact nature of the affirmative

duty imposed upon school officials developed. In 1968, the

Supreme Court moved to eliminate some of the controversy.

Numerous freedom of choice" plans for desegregation were

ruled ineffective in ending segregation. That ruling came

in the case of Green vs. County School Board.
The freedom of choice plan to comply with the Consti-

tutional obligation to desegregate was deemed ineffective

because it did not guarantee desegregation. Black children

attending white schools faced unchecked intimidation, and

white children were simply transferred to predominantly

white schools whenever necessary to evade an influx of black

students. The unruly nature of the "freedom of choice" al-

ternative had, in this particular county, resulted in over-

lapping bus routes, drawn by school officials, that sustained

segregated schools. The Court concluded that local school

authorities were

charged with the affirmative duty

to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated, root and
branch 13
.

Busing orders were not specifically authorized because Kent

County, Virginia, was a rural area without segregated housing

patterns. It was not clear that forced busing was necessary

 5

i fenk-dy the particular case ider consideration. The

Court's implied authorization, however, was unquestioned.

Three years later, the Supreme Court explicitly de-

fended the use of busing to achieve desegregation. The case

of Swan vs. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 14 was

the first case in which a busing order came up for Supreme

Court review. In this case, the school board's plan for

desegregation included mathematic ratios for racial mixing

of school assignments. The plan was ineffective, however,

because it allowed for pupil assignment to the school near-

est a child's home. Given the existence of a segregated

housing pattern within the Charlotte-Mecklenburg area, this

provision of their plan had made it necessary to use busing

to achieve desegregation. The Supreme Court Swan decision

concurred with a lower court ruling that busing was indeed

necessary and constitutionally justified.

This U.S. Supreme Court decision represented the first

explicit authorization for a busing order. The constitu-

tional duty to provide equal rights and desegregate public

school systems now meant that "busing as a remedy might be

15"
constitutionally necessary in some circumstances". The

Court further ruled that:

school authorities have an obligation

to prepare students for a pluralistic
world by having a ratio of black and
white in each school reflecting the^g
portion of the district as a whole.

Further reflecting just how far the Court had altered its
 b

role since the Brown decisions, the Court added that

If school authorities failed in this

obligation, a district court had the
power to provide a remedy insuring a
unitary system. 17
Busing to achieve desegregation could only be limited by

consideration of the health of the children, distance tra-

veled, and time involved.

Since the Brown decisions, the Supreme Court had

focused only on the elimination of de jure segregation.

The inclusion of de facto segregation as properly subject

to redress under the fourteenth amendment right to equal

rights came in 1973. The case was Keyes vs. School District
1
#1. This was the first case in which segregation of a

non-statutory nature was reviewed by the Court.

The School authority was held responsible for the cre-

ation and elimination of a segregated school system even

though no clear motive to do so existed. In this case, the

Court chose to employ a looser standard of intent than in

the strict legal sense where motive is the central question.

The formulation of why the school district was responsible

stood as a guide for lower courts in assessing responsibi-

lity for de facto segregation. The Court argued that

School officials' actions and inactions

which have the reasonably foreseeable
effect of maintaining or increasing
school segregation and which actually
do cause segregation, create an infe-
rence of an intent to segregate. This
inference of de jure segregation may
be rebutted only by a convincing showing
 7

that legitimate policy reasons com-

pelled the challenged decisions.

In summary, the Brown decisions had ruled that segre-

gated school systems were unconstitutional. A year later

in Briggs vs. Elliot, the Court drew back from an active

role in desegregation by stating the U.S. Constitution did

not demand integration but merely forbade segregation.

The continuing reality of segregated school systems com-

pelled the Supreme Court into radically altering its early

passive role in desegregation. The aforementioned Jeffer-

son County Board of Education case established the validity

and necessity for a more affirmative role for local school

authority. Green vs. County School Board helped to articu-

late that role by ruling against "freedom of choice" dese-

gregation plans. In 1971, the case of Swan vs. Charlotte

formally justified busing orders as constitutionally accept-

able tools for desegregation. The Supreme Court extended

the constitutional obligation to desegregate to de facto

segregated school systems in the Keyes vs. School District

#1 ruling.

From merely ruling against the existence of segregated

schools in the 1954 landmark case, the Court had, in the

Keyes case, justified the possibility of a federal court

directly assuming responsibility for desegregating a school

system. For the Boston public schools, as well as others

throughout the county, the path to desegreg. 1

took as
 8

long as the Court's transformation of the

19b4 Brown deci-
sion.

It is ironic that the Boston public school system be-

came a center of national attention over the busing

issue.
Historically, Massachusetts and Boston have been leaders
in
educational reform and innovations regarding busing and

desegregation. In 1838 the Massachusetts legislature passed

the school union law. The unique legislation called for a

consolidation of smaller schools. Consolidation was dis-

cerned as a more efficient use of funds to improve the edu-

cational environment. In 1869, Massachusetts enacted pio-

neering legislation which enabled school authorities to use

tax money to provide transportation for school children.

In 1855, the city of Boston became the first to outlaw

20
school segregation. In 1965, the Massachusetts legisla-

ture was the first in making racially imbalanced schools

illegal. Before the enactment of the Racial Imbalance Act of

1965 and afterward as well, the Boston public school system

was segregated.

Boston is a city whose neighborhoods are clearly drawn

by racial and ethnic factors. The Civil Rights Commission

concluded that by at least the early 1960 's, if not before,

"discrimination against various groups has been a part of

21
Boston life" The Commission also determined that the

public school system was undeniably segregated. In 1960,

 y

almost 80% of elementary-level black pupils

attended schools
with a black majority student population.
Over 35% of the
black students attended schools of 90 to 100%
black enroll-
ment. A 1961 plan of open enrollment failed miserably
to
achieve desegregation.

An advisory committee to the State Board of Education

examined the problem and formally acknowledged the existence

of at .least 45 racially imbalanced Boston schools. Specifi-

cally, the task force found that the reality of de facto

segregation was harmful to both black and white children,

and recommended a short-term strategy of busing 5,000 pu-

2 2
pils. In 1963, half of the city's 5,000 black high school

and junior high students boycotted school to protest segre-

gation policies. A year later, a similar’ protest drew 14,000

students. The target of the protest and of increasing State

Board of Education pressure was the Boston School Committee.

By the mid-1960's, the five Boston school committee

members were being regul lrly returned to office. As Alan

Lupo ,
aide to Mayor Kevin White, contends,

the committee had come to symbolize

something ... to those white people
who... feared the growing power and
population of Boston's black cominun
ity. The committee symbolized
resistance . 23

The School Cominittee had little reservation about busing

black students past white schools with empty seats to other

black schools. By its method of pupil assignments, style of

 10

drawing district lines, and controlled

feeder patterns to
city-wide schools, the committee had created
and maintained
a segregated school system. 24

Despite Supreme Court rulings against school

segrega-
tion and the findings of the State Board of
Education task
force, the Boston School Committee remained opposed
to dese-
gregation. Determined to preserve the neighborhood school
and lo resist forced busing, the committee "maintained its

general position through 1965". 25 The school committee

even thwarted a popular, privately supported plan to desegre

gate called "Operation Exodus", which transported black stu-

dents to predominantly white schools with money and manpower

supplied by parents and concerned citizens. The program was

eventually undermined by the school committee, determined to

thwart any desegregation effort. Students participating in

"Operation Exodus" faced "locked doors, physical segregation

in separate classrooms. . .and desks unbolted from the floor

26
and removed from the classroom".
Iv

In 1965, the Massachusetts legislature attempted to end

segregation in state public school systems. The Massachu-

setts Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 was the first of its kind

in the nation. Spurred by the Supreme Court ruling in the

"Jefferson County" decision calling for an affirmative role

in dismantling segregated schools. Republican Governor John

Volpe and liberal Democrats in the legislature attacked de

facto segregation in the school systems of the state. The

 11

progressive legislation called for swift correction of

racially imbalanced schools, defined as schools with a

student population of more than 50% minority composition.

Strong penalties were provided for recalcitrant school

committees which failed to take appropriate action. The

act specifically proclaimed that "the commissioner of educa-

tion could refuse to certify all state aid for uncorrected

27
schools". This severe penalty for a continuation of

racially imbalanced schools was, however, accompanies! by

vague guidelines to follow. The act did not require inte-

gration of all-white schools and explicitly prohibited the

• 9 Q
involuntary, inter-district transportation of students.

The Boston school committee continued its fight against

integration and ignored the intent of the legislature.

Seven years after the passage of the act, the reality was

that "the number of racially imbalanced schools (in Boston)

2 9
had increased from 45 to 67".

The Boston school committee frustrated the spirit as

well as the letter of the Racial Imbalance Act in several

ways. It was able to do so because the committee controlled

local school policy. As Chairman John McDonough commented,

the responsibility of the committee

is to oversee and formulate and

direct the policy which will be
used in the school system or im-
posed in the school systems here
in the city of Boston. 33

The general strategy for obstruction developed as one of

 12

formulistic compliance followed by

procrastination and
evasion on technical grounds". 31 Black and
civil rights
leaders who petitioned the committee were
ignored. Debate
about desegregation was cut off by a majority
vote of the
committee members. So blatant was the committee's effort

to block desegregation that 671 Chinese

students were clas-
3 2
sified as white

The State Department of Education also had little

suc-
cess with altering the Boston school committee's anti-

desegregation policy. Charged with carrying out the poli-

cies of the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of

Education found himself opposing the Committee over elimina-

tion of racially imbalanced schools. Frustrated in his at-

tempts to eliminate Boston school committee resistance, he

terminated state aid to the city's school systems on two

3 3
separate occasions. Because the school committee refused

to formulate plans to do away with racially imbalanced

schools, the State Board formulated four plans of its own

between 19C7 and 1970. The committee response to another

plan in 1972 was a two-page report suggesting that a "free-

dom of choice" approach to desegregation be adopted. Three

months later, the committee submitted relevant data for

developing the plan. Similar alternatives had been declared

ineffective by the Supreme Court in 1968 in the case of Green

vs. County School Board.

Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld busing

 13

orders as constitutional, the State Board of Education

pre-
sented another short-term plan for reducing the racially

imbalanced schools. The plan intended to reduce that number

from 61 to 42 by reorganizing the grade structure and busing

19,000 students to different schools. In March of 1974, the

committee began to notify parents of pupil assignments pur-

suant to the state's plan. The reason for committee obedi-

ence was a state Supreme Court order to implement the plan.

After years of struggle

State education officials and state

courts had finally come around to
taking the hardest of hard lines
with the Boston School Committee." 1

Submission to the state plan appeared to be temporary, how-

ever, because new legislation modified the Racial Imbalance

Act in June of 1974. The modifications specifically with-

drew the State Board's power to redistrict and order busing.

Although the legislature negated the State Board's

short-term plan, Judge Wendell Garritty, Jr. promulgated

his findings and decision in the case of Tallulah Morgan,

et . al. vs. James Hennigan, et . al., during the same month.

Filed two years earlier by a local chapter of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the case

charged continual desegregation by the school committee.

The State Board of Education was also named as a co-defendant

with the committee, but Garritty ruled that "the state had

exercised all the authority it had within its limited juris-

 14

3 b
diction"

full responsibility, according to Garritty, lay

with
the school committee because:

the evidence was clear... that school

officials had knowingly carried out a
systematic program of segregation and
had intentionally maintained a dual
system. .and deliberately dragged
.

their feet in formulating plans to

lessen ... racial imbalance. 36

Rejecting the defense of uncontrollable policy decisions

due to segregated housing patterns, Garritty concluded that

the committee's argument had no "relevance to the defendant's

practices with respect to faculty and staff assignments,

open enrollment and controlled transfers or feeder patterns". 3 ^

Citing the Supreme Court ruling in the case of "School

District # 1" permitting a court to issue orders to accom-

plish what local authorities failed or refused to do, Gar-

ritty ordered that the most recent State Board of Education

short-term plan be put into effect by September of 1974.

This action would be followed by the development and imple-

mentation of a full-term program for desegregation. The

school committee attempted to modify the plan, but was unsuc-

cessful. With little time to plan, the desegregation order

went into effect in September. Generally, implementation of

the plan went smoothly, with the highly publicized exceptions

at the Dorchester and South Boston high schools.

Impetus for the success of Phase II of the desegrega-

tion plan was the Attorney General's refusal to intervene on

 15

behalf of the committee by appealing Garritty ' s ruling to

the Supreme Court 38
. The Supreme Court also refused to hear

four appeals to Che Garritty decision. Still bitterly op-

posed to desegregation, the majority of committee members

had little choice but to accept the federal court ruling.

As John Kerrigan conceded, "It would appear that we he ve

exhausted some of our legal remedies ." 33 Although the com-

mittee found the implementation of the desegregation pl^n

distasteful, the plan did proceed. Chairman McDonough

admitted

...the school committee will do what

Judge Garritty directs them to do.
They will not, however, take this
plan in their arms as their own...
will not go any further than doing
what Judge Garritty directly orders. ^
Nineteen years after the first Supreme Court decision

in Brown vs. Board of Education and nine years after the

passage of the Racial Imbalance Law, the Boston public

school system took its first step toward desegregation. A

Federal district court judge had provided that leadership.

The U.S. Constitution defended his power to do so. Anti-

desegregation forces had confronted

a federal court order, and no mayor,

no school committee, no governor, no
president is going to stop it (dese-
gregation) now. ! 14

Our courts may not have the power of the purse, but "the
M 2
power of final decision is given to the judicial branch".
 CHAPTER I I

Until Judge Garritty's ruling in 1974, the Boston

school committee frustrated efforts to desegregate the

city's school system. Repeated attempts by the state

government and several pro-desegregation decisions by the

U.S. Supreme Court had not overcome the committee's resis-

tance to desegregation. In 1974, the direct involvement

ot the federal court ended the committee's power over the

desegregation question.

The intuitively correct understanding of who wielded

power with respect to the Boston busing issue is that the

school committee, until 1974, exercised power over the

state government and the U.S. Supreme Court. After June

1974, the federal court exercised power over the committee

and desegregation finally began. For now, the correctness

of this intuitive understanding of power shall be assumed

for the purposes of this thesis.

The following chapters of this thesis will examine

three definitions of power. Each definition will be stud-

ied to determine if the power of the school committee and

court is reflected. Definitions of power which do reflect

the intuitive understanding of power will be considered suc-

cessful definitions. Why some definitions do and do not

16
 17

succeed will also be explored.

Felix Oppenheim defines the exercise of power as: 1

P (a powerholder) exercises power

over R (a respondent) with respect
to X (an action of R) means that P
influences or coerces R to do X.

Oppenheim clarifies the definition by explaining

' influences R to do X' means that

P
P performs some action Y involving
a communication which causes R to
choose X

and that

P coerces R to do X if P does some-

thing which causes R’s attempt at
not doing X to fail and hence con-
strains him to do X.

(or)

’P restrains R from doing X' means

that P performs some action Y which
causes R's attempt at doing X to
fail

Applied to this case study, the Oppenheim definition

has some success. The intuitively correct understanding of

the committee’s power is reflected by Oppenheim ' s definition.

Employing the definition results in the true statement: The

Boston school committee (P) restrained the State government

and U.S. Supreme Court (R) from implementing a desegregation

policy until 1974. The school committee (P) did procrasti-

nate, ignore and evade (action Y) the direct orders of the

state government to desegregate which caused the state gov-

•
eminent ’
s (R) attempt to desegregate Boston schools to fail.

The committee’s tactics of evading and procrastinating are

 18

properly subsumed by Oppenheim's notion of action.

Both
'doing X' and refraining from doing X are actions,
according
to Oppenheim. The inaction by the committee is therefore

mirrored by the definition as well as its power to block

desegregation

The definition also mirrors the power of the federal

court ruling by Judge Garritty in 1974. Judge Garritty's

(F) ruling in favor of implementing the state desegregation

pllan (action Y) caused the school committee (R) to finally

begin desegregating the school system. More specifically,

the ruling by Garritty coerced rather than influenced the

committee to implement desegregation plans. Public state-

ments critical of the decision by committee members persis-

ted, but did not deter Garritty from actually implementing

his order to desegregate. Judge Garritty's (P) decision to

desegregate (action Y) left the committee (R) little choice

but to abandon segregation policies (R's attempt at not

doing X) and begin desegregation (X). The powerlessness of

the school committee after the Garritty ruling is faithfully

reflected by the definition.

The applied Oppenheim definition also correei ly states

the powerlessness of the state government to implement a

desegregation policy in Boston prior to 1974. Use of the

Oppenheim definition correctly states that: the state legis-

lature (P) passed the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 (action Y)

but did not cause the school committee (R) to desegregate

 19

the public school system (X). Likewise, the state Board of

Education (P) twice withheld state aid to the
committee
(action 1), but failed to constrain the committee
(R) to
desegregate (X). The powerlessness of the Supreme Court

is also captured by the definition. The statement "the

. >upr eme Court (I ) promulgated several pro— desegregation
decisions since 1954 (action Y) but did not influence or

coerce the School Committee (R) to desegregate the school

system (X)" can be derived from the Oppenheim definition.

Another merit of the Oppenheim definition is that it

correct ly differentiates between which form of power is and

is not relevant to the Boston busing issue. The power of

the committee was its ability to successfully restrain the

implementation of desegregation by the state government and

U.S. Supreme Court. The committee neither influenced nor

coerced the state or Supreme Court to cease their calls for

desegregation. Oppenheim' s definition accurately reflects

this in the statement: The Boston school committee (P) re-

fused to desegregate the school system (action Y), but did

not cause the state government or Supreme Court (R) to aban-

don its desegregation designs (X). The State Board of Edu-

cation, for example, drew up four desegregation plans which

were successively ignored by the committee. During that

period the State Board of Education did not acquiesce to

the school committee's anti -desegregation sentiment.

A potential problem with the Oppenheim definition is

 20

that, wuen applied to the case study, some actions which

intuitively are not instances of power may be
interpreted
as such. For example, the state's withholding of funds

from the committee to coerce its compliance with the

dese-
gregation mandate is properly understood as an unsuccessful

attempt by the state to exercise power. The state's threat

to do so, ind not the committee's defiance or indifference,

is an attempt to exercise power. However, the Oppenheim

definition appears to support the idea that the committee's

disregard of the possible state action is also an instance

of power.

According to the definition, the committee (P) caused

the state (R) to withhold state aid (X) by ignoring (action

Y) their threat to do so. Oppenheim does avoid this prob-

lem by (1) distinguishing between power and causation, and

(2) limiting actions which are instances of power to influ-

2
encing or coercive action. Oppenheim clearly states,

I am defining 'P exercised power

over R's doing X' not by P's ac-
tion Y causes R to do X, but P's
influence or coercive action Y
causes R to do X.

This clarification by Oppenheim is his basis for drawing a

definite distinction between the concepts 'causing 1

and

'exercising power'. Actions which are not influential or

coercive may cause response X or Y but do not properly stand

as instances of power. The indifference of the schoo] com-

mittee to the state threat to cut olf funds did cause the
 21

actual withholding of aid. However, because their action

was not influential or coercive, it does not stand as an

instance of power. The Oppenheim distinction thus elimin-

ates the problem of his definition applying to actions

which are intuitively not instances of power in this case

study

William Connolly suggests a different definition of

. Q
power. Connolly defines power as meaning
#

A exercises power over B when he

is responsible for some X that
increases the costs, risks, or
difficulties to B in promoting
B s desires
'

Advocating that a generally negative moral point of view

fashions the concept of power, Connolly argues that a wiel-

der of power is generally b Tamable for not respecting the

right of those over whom power is exercised. To exercise

power 1
, according to the Connolly perspective, one need only

increase the costs or risks to another doing something. The

respondent does not have to be prevented from doing X or be

compelled to do something. Applied to the problem of dese-

gregation in Boston, the Connolly definition does not func-

tion well.

The definition works best when the school committee

stands for A, the power wielder. The following statement

results

The school committee (A) exercised

power over the state government (B)
because it increased the costs, risks
 or difficulties to the state in pro-
moting the Racial Imbalance Act of
1965 and numerous desegregation plans.

No doubt surrounds the point that, until 1974, the school

committee increased the difficulties, costs or risks to the

state in securing a desegregated Boston school system. How-

ever, the Connolly definition does not entirely reflect the

full power of the school committee.

The school committee did more than increase the diffi-

culties, costs or risks to the state’s desegregation desires.

The school committee thoroughly frustrated and prevented the

state from realizing its desegregation designs. Although

successfully mirroring the intuitive assumption of the school

committee's power, the Connolly definition remains deficient

in capturing the full scope of the committee's action to be

explained as an instance of power.

Likewise, the definition only appears to reflect the

assumed power of Judge Garritty after 1974. The applied

definition creates the statement

Judge Garritty (A) ruled that the

state's desegregation plan be im-
plemented CX) which increased the
costs, risks, and difficulties for
the school committee (B) to perpe-
tuate a segregated school system.
scope
Again, the Connolly proposal does not capture the full

of action to be explained as an instance of power that

it

them-
should. By the admission of school committee members
for the com-
selves, the decision left no options available
 2 3

mittee to persist in its resistance to the desegregation

mandate. The decision did not merely increase the diffi-

culties, costs, or risks to the school committee. Judge

Garritty effectively eliminated the committee's power on

the issue. Desegregation finally began because the com-

mittee's power ended.

Another difficulty with the Connolly definition is the

result that both the state government and U.S. Supreme Court

can be understood as exercising power prior to 1974. This

is contrary to the assumed power of the school committee and

powerlessness of the state and Court prior to 1974. The

definition produces the statements:

The State Board of Education (A)

withdrew state aid to the School
Committee (X) which increased the
costs, risks, and difficulties for
the school committee (B) to perpe-
tuate a segregated school system.

and

The U.S. Supreme Court (A) promul-

gated several anti-desegregation
decisions since 1954 (X) which in-
creased the difficulties, risks,
and costs to the school committee
(B) continuing to resist desegre-
gation .

Both statements are true because the state and Court

did increase the costs, risks, and difficulties for the com-

mittee. By the Connolly definition, then, all three exer-

cised power over each other prior to 19/4. The problem is

that only the school committee prevailed with regard to the

 24

issue of desegregation. The intuitive assumption of the com-

mittee's power, prior to 1974, and powerlessness of the state

and Court means that the Connolly definition is unsuccessful.

Similarly, the intuitively correct assumption that the

school committee's power was terminated by Judge Garritty '

ruling in 1974 is not supported by the Connolly definition.

Long after the order to implement the state's Phase I plan

for desegregation,

the Boston school committee members

(A) continued to publicly criticize
CX) the Judge and the order which
increased the costs, risks, and dif-
ficulties for Garritty (B) lo imple-
ment the desegregation plan.

According to the definition, the committee exercised power

over Judge Garritty as Judge Garritty exercised power over

the committee with respect to the same issue. In conclu-

sion, the distinction between the power wielder and the

powerless is a distinction which the Connolly definition is

not equipped to make.

The Connolly definition could avoid the problems that

surface when applied to the Boston busing issue. The defi-

nition could distinguish between the power of the school

committee prior to 1974 and the powerlessness of the state

government. Connolly's definition could also completely

capture the entire scope of action it should to explain the

power of the school committee and Judge Garritty. lo over-

come these difficulties, a different understanding of the

 25

definition might be advanced. Instead of merely increasing

the costs, risks, or difficulties for another, to exercise

power might mean increasing the costs, risks, or difficulties

so that another actually did or did not do something.

Connolly, however, specifically rules out this interpreta-

4
tion or suggestion. Connolly states

...(the respondent's) conduct could

vary from my expectations, but as
long as the element introduced did
in fact increase the costs or risks
in meeting his interests, wishes or
obligations, I would have exercised
power over him.

The Connolly definition, therefore, cannot and does not suc-

ceed when applied to the case study under consideration in

this thesis.

Anthony de Crespigny suggests that intentional action

alone should stand as an instance of exercising power. De

, 5
Crespigny defines power as

the capacity of an actor to affect

the actions of others in accordance
with his own intention.

The basis of de Crespigny ' s definition referring only to

intentional action is ordinary language. To de Crespigny,

6
the idea of unintentionally exercising power

is confusing because it is unnatural

to talk of an exercise of power when
effects on conduct are produced which
are not in conformity with an actor's
intention

De Crespigny does agree with Partridge ,

however, that the

defensible.
idea of unintentionally exercising influence is
 26

Only when the question of exercising power is raised must a

reference to intention be made, according to de Crespigny.

Applied to the Boston busing issue, the de Crespigny

definition is successful. Both the power and powerlessness

of the school committee, state government and U.S. Supreme

Court is accurately reflected by the definition. Prior to

1974, the school committee was able to prevent the implemen-

tation of the desegregation plans by the state government

and the desegregation policy of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Clearly, the school committee's action was in accordance

with its intention to maintain a segregated, neighborhood

school system. The intent of the Supreme Court and state

government action to desegregate the schools did not affect

the school committee's decision to delay and avoid desegre-

gation .

In 1974, the Garritty ruling to begin desegregation did

affect the action of the school committee. Desegregation

finally began. The intent of Judge Garritty to fulfill the

desegregation mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court signaled an

end to the school committee's power with respect to desegre-

gation .

The de Crespigny definition of power appears to encoun-

ter a problem in explaining the power of Judge Garritty.

After the federal court ruling, the school committee, by the

members' own testimony, had no choice but to begin desegre-

g
gat ion De Crespigny maintains that
 27

when one actor exercises power in

relation to another, the behavior
of the latter is voluntary-~"volun-
tary" in the sense that, in prin-
ciple, it is subject to choice.

According to this criterion. Judge Garritty did not exercise

power over the School Committee because the committee's

action was not voluntary. Such a finding would mean the

definition did not successfully reflect the intuitively

correct assumption of Judge Garritty '

s power in 1974. This

difficulty is overcome, however 1

, because in principle, the

committee did actually have a choice of ignoring the court

and facing imprisonment

Having applied three definitions of power to the issue

of busing to achieve desegregation in Boston, I will examine

the question: Should only intentional action and Intended

effects be considered as instances of exercising power?

Examining the success and failure of the definitions, I will

determine what attention, if any, they pay to intention.

More importantly, I will try to determine whether a defini-

tion's success or failure results from including only inten-

tional action and effects or not. Answers to these questions

will, hopefully, be a starting point for fashioning yet

another viewpoint about political power.

 CHAPTER III

In this chapter of the thesis, the focus of attention

will turn directly to the question of intention in defini-

tion of political power. The role which intention plays,

if any, in the success or failure of the definitions ap-

plied to the Boston busing issue will be scrutinized. Whe-

ther or not a failure to pay attention to intended action

and effects commits a definition to counter-intuitive inter-

pretation shall also be examined. Such counter-intuitive

interpretation would offer support to the idea of limiting

political power to intentional acts because, as Champlin

points out /
A definition of power, however
coherent and faithful to the terms
it uses, is only the beginning; in
order to prove its usefulness, it
must aid political analysis.

Pursuant to this effort, an understanding of intention

shall first be suggested.

Intentional action is behavior which an agent self-

consciously performs in pursuit of some interest, usually

2
formed as a result of some deliberation. In contrast,

unintentional action is behavior whose effects or possible

effects an agent is unaware of, or did not self-consciously

interests; and
plan; which may or may not be in the agent's
28
 ‘9

which is usually done without deliberation. 3

Intended
effects are consequences of an action which an agent self-

consciously hopes will occur and tries to bring about be-

cause they are consistent with his or her interests. Unin-

tended effects are consequences of an action which an agent

does not expect will happen but do, or which in agent knows
4
will happen but does not intend.

According to the findings of Chapter II of this thesis,

Felix Oppenheim* s definition of power enjoyed the most suc-

cess when applied to the Boston busing issue. The power of

the school committee was mirrored by the definition, as was

its eventual .powerlessness in 1974. The power of Judge

Garritty, and the powerlessness of the Supreme Court and

state government were also reflected by the definition.

Oppenheim specifically rejects the idea of limiting his

definition of power to intentional action. According to

Oppenheim, several examples of unintended action that should

be comprehended as instances of power would not be if the

definition of power applied only to intentional activity.

This position is defended by Oppenheim despite his own view

concerning a paradigmatic case of exercising power. As

5
Oppenheim points out,

...The paradigmatic case of exer-

cising power, especially in the
political sphere, is: R wants to
do X, this is contrary to some pur-
pose of P; P therefore wants R not
to do X; P therefore deliberately
performs some action Y which influ-
ences of coerces R not to do X.
What I shall argue is that the Oppenheim definition impli-

citly does and must limit itself to intentional activity,

despite Oppenheim' s insistence to the contrary.

As was noted earlier, the Oppenheim definition encoun-

tered the potential problem of equating "power" with social

causation. In this case study, action which is not under-

stood as an instance of power might be construed as such by

the Oppenheim definition. The example I employed was the

school committee's refusal to begin desegregation after the

State Board of Education threatened withdrawal of state aid

to the city school system. According to the Oppenheim defi-

nition, the action of the school committee might be construed

as an instance of power because it did cause the state to

carry through with its threat. The school committee's (P)

refusal to begin desegregation (X) caused the state (R) to

choose to withdraw state aid (Y). The Oppenheim remedy to

this potential problem is also the basis of my argument that

unintentional action should be excluded from his definition.

To avoid equating all causal relationships with his

definition of power, Oppenheim distinguishes between any

action X or Y and influence or coercive action X or Y . Even

though some action X or Y might and does cause another ac-

ire Lve
tion, according to Oppenheim, only the influence or co

action may properly stand as an instance of power. ihis

distinction between causing and exercising power rescues his

definition from equating any and all causal relationships as

 31

instances of power being exercised. Because of this distinc-

tion, the school committee's refusal to begin desegregation

cannot, by Oppenheim's definition, be correctly understood

as an instance of power with respect to the withholding of

funds by the state. The school committee's refusal, although

causing the state to carry through with its threat, was not

a coercive or influential action. This application of the

Oppenheim position to the Boston busing issue is quite simi-

lar to the example Oppenheim uses to illustrate the distinc-

tion between causing and power.

In the example advanced by Oppenheim, two persons want

to enter a post office. One person (R) sees the other (P)

try to open the door but finds it locked. Seeing that P can-

not enter the post office, R w alks on by the post office.

Oppenheim correctly states that P caused R to bypass the

g
post office and that

since P's action involved no com-

munication, P exercised no influ-
ence over R, and as there was no
coercion, P exercised no power
either

What do the two examples reveal about the basis of

making the distinction between causing and exercising power?

If a reference to intention is not the basis of distinction,

then the continued inclusion of unintended acts in the deii-

nition entangles the Oppenheim definition with the very

problem the distinction is designed to avoid. Continued

inclusion of unintended action would mean that P, who unin-

 32

tentionally caused R to bypass the post office, and the

school committee, which unintentionally caused the state

to
withhold funds, can both be understood as exercising power.

Wi thout reference to intention alone, the Oppenheim distinc-

tion between causing and exercising power cannot be drawn.

It the distinction cannot be drawn, then the Oppenheim defi-

nition of power becomes equated with social causation.

The single path open for Oppenheim to make the distinc-

tion without reference to intention is the appropriateness

of the notions 'unintended influence' and 'unintended coer-

cion' . Only if both notions are defensible, can the distinc-

tion between cause and power be drawn without exclusive

reference to intention. I do not think these notions can

be successfully defended.
/
In the Oppenheim example of the man bypassing the locked

post office door, every ingredient of influence, as defined

by Oppenheim, is present except one. The missing criterion

is that P's action did not involve a communication. The rea-

son no communication was involved, despite the fact that R

"got the message" ,

is that P did not convey a signal to R

that the door was locked. P's actions signaled R that the

door was locked, but P did not communicate with R because P's

actions were not intended as a message to R. Oppenheim con-

cede;., that intention is a central part of the concept 'com-

1
munication' by pointing out

...the act of communication is

 33

usually done with some intention

(but) the message being communi-
cated may have an effect quite
different from that intended by
the sender.

Unable to think of an act of communication, in contrast to

noise or someone overhearing a conversation, which does not

involve intention, I conclude that Oppenheim's definition of

influence must refer to only intended action.

If unintended effects of an act of communication are

to be understood as instances of exercising power, Oppen-

heim's definition encounters the same serious problem.

Writing about which effects of behavior are appropriately

O
comprehended as exercises of power, D.M. White contends that

...there is no genuine issue about

whether some state of mind (or ana-
logue thereto) is required, for if
there were, then a distinction be-
tween personal power and causation
could hardly be sustained.

The distinction could not be sustained because a definition's

ability to discriminate between exercising and failing to

exercise power would be eliminated if any effect stood as an

instance of power.

The response of another must be relevant to the intended

message or act and consistent with that intent. If such a

requirement is not maintained in a definition of power’, then

any response, including ignoring, disagreeing, and even no

response would stand as an instance of exercising power.

Power then does become equated with all causal relationship^

 34

The ability to discern when someone failed to exercise

power
is lost. This loss is demonstrated by Terrence Ball's cri-

ticism of Robert Dahl for suggesting that a teacher exer

cises power over a student whether or not the student com-

plies with the order to read a book. 9

As Ball claims ,

To. avoid absurdities of this sort,

one must refer to (someone's) in-
tention with respect to (another's)
behavior

If absurdities of this kind are not avoided, then the

success of the Oppenheim definition, when applied to the

Boston busing issue, is compromised . The state, rather

than tailing to exercise power when it threatened to cut

off funds, would be perceived as exercising power with re-

spect to causing the committee to choose to refuse. Con-

trary to the findings of Chapter I, the state legislature

and Supreme Court could also be viewed as exercising power

because their actions had the unintended effect of stiffen-

ing the school committee's resistance to desegregation.

The inclusion of unintended effects of communication

as instances of influence, therefore, also risks equating

Oppenheim' s definition of power with social causation. If

the definition of exercising political power cannot include

reference to any and all effects, then it should not include

both intended and unintended effects Failure to pay exclu-

sive attention to intentional acts and effects also seriously

undermines the success Oppenheim' s definition enjoyed when

 35

applied to the Boston busing issue.

The awkwardness of including unintentional action and

effects as instances of coercion, as defined by Oppenheim,

is even more apparent. The Garritty ruling is a clear exam-

ple of coercion as defined by Oppenheim. Judge Garritty

ruled in favor of implementing state desegregation plans

which caused the school committee's attempt at not desegre-

gating to end, and hence constrained the school committee

to desegregate.

The distinction between causing and coercing cannot be

established without reference to intention. All actions

which obstruct another's attempt at not doing X and con-

strain another to do X are not instances of coercion.

For the concept of coercion to be applied, rather than

the concept 'cause', someone must first be aware that ano-

ther is not attempting to do X. Having decided that the

other's doing X is desirable, someone then deliberately per-

forms some action that both stops another from not doing X,

and constrains, not causes, the other to do X. As Terrence

" 0
(his emphasis)
1

Ball claims ,'

...there can be no unintentional or

unconscious exercise of power, as no
one unintentionally exercises his
j udgement

The central ingredients of intention, awareness and deliber-

ation, characterize the concept of coercion. How else can

the distinction between causing and coercion be designed?

 36

The very idea of someone coercing another to do some-

thing contrary to or in the absence of the power-wielder '

intent or interest suggests counter-intuitive possibilities.

Without reference to intention, the following example can

be understood (incorrectly) as an instance of coercion.

The school committee coerced the state to withhold the

funds because,

the school committee (P) refused

to begin desegregation which caused
the state's threat to withhold funds
(X)* to fail, thus constraining the
state to withhold funds.

The intuitively correct understanding is that the school

committee caused, not coerced, the state to carry through

with its threat. The school committee did not coerce the

state to do so because the school committee could not have

viewed the actual withholding as desirable. The relation-

ship between intention and coercion is further supported by

Oppenheim's use of the term "constraint" instead of cause.

Constraining someone to do X, in contrast to causing another

to do X, connotes a description of the action as deliberate

and consciously performed.

Unintended effects of an act of coercion are clearly

possible and frequently encountered. What is not so clear

is whether the presence of unintended responses allows the

the
*The state was only threatening to withhold funds.
state was attempting to coerce the school committee to
begin desegregation and continue financial support
 37

concept of coercion to still apply. The very structure of

the Oppenheim definition of coercion seems to exclude
unin-
tended effect as instances of coercion. The definition
refers to someone constraining another to do X, not A, B,...
W or Y and Z. Thus, if someone refuses to do X and chooses

action A or W, the other has failed to exercise coercive

power. This facet of the definition prevents the definition

from becoming equated with social causation. The limitation

builds into the definition a firm groundwork for drawing and

implementing the necessary distinction between causing and

exercising power. The limitation also implies a commitment

to intention.

Judge Garritty' s ruling, for example, was an instance

of successful coercion with regard to the school committee

ultimately implementing desegregation plans. The continued

public criticism of the ruling by school committee members;

the limited but violent opposition to the ruling; and the

media's preoccupation with publicizing the violent minority

reaction were all unintended effects of the Garritty deci-

sion. To defend inclusion of unintended effects as instances

of coercion would infer that Judge Garritty coerced the media

to downplay the generally smooth implementation of the dese-

gregation plan; coerced community members to violently pro-

test the Garritty ruling; and coerced school committee mem-

bers to persist in their public criticisms of Judge Garritty

and desegregation. That such statements overtax the concept

of coercion reveals the fundamental relationship between

coercion and intention.

In conclusion, Oppenheim has drawn a distinction be-

tween causing and exercising power. It is a distinction

which must be drawn in order to prevent his definition of

political power from becoming equated with social causation.

The distinction cannot be made without reference to inten-

tion. As Champlin reasons, (my emphasis

When we say 'A has power over B' we ,

mean not simply that B can be caused

to do something by A, but more impor-
tantly that A is in a position to get
what he wants, to satisfy his purposes
- "

or desires :if this is not so, we

find it strange to discuss the situa-
tion in terms of power at all.

William Connolly's definition of power encountered

serious difficulties when applied to the Boston busing issue.

The definition could neither distinguish between the power-

ful and powerless, nor entirely explain why an action did

represent an instance of power. Connolly is a theorist who

advocates the necessity for definitions of political concepts

remaining closely associated with ordinary discourse. The

failure of the definition in this case study raises the pos-

sibility that Connolly's definition of political power is

founded upon a misperception of ordinary language.

In a value-laden ordinary discourse, a moral point of

view bears a constitutive relationship with a concept

according to Connolly. A concept has the criteria it does

. . 12
because of the moral point 01 view. As Connolly maintains,
 39

The distinctions among such notions

as persuasion, coercion, manipulation
and conditioning are built around,
and reflect shared moral considera-
ions
1

. Without the moral point of

view embodied in each, there would
be little reason to distinguish
among them.

To fashion a definition without regard to or in contradic-

tion of the moral point of view generally associated with a

concept is to transform the concept. To transform the con-

cept is to alter the action which the concept informs, and

the investigator must explain. Why then has the Connolly

definition failed when applied to the Boston busing issue?

The definition's failure can be explained by Connolly's

view that an agent need only raise the costs, risks and dif-

ficulties to exercise power over another. An amendment is

necessary to enable the Connolly definition to distinguish

between the power wielder and powerless, and to entirely

describe an action which is intuitively viewed as an instance

of power. That amendment would alter the definition and

more precisely mirror ordinary discourse. That amendment

would read:

Someone (A) exercises power over

another if he or she is responsible
for some action which raises the
costs, risks, or difficulties to
another (B) doing X, so that B
does not do X.

As amended, the definition could avoid the problems encoun-

tered when applied to the Boston busing issue and function

successfully
 40

Rather than understanding the state and Supreme Court

as exercising power over the school committee prior to

1974,
the amended definition would correctly mirror the former's

powerlessness. The following accurate statements could

then be derived from the amended definition:

The Supreme Court (A) ruled favorably

on desegregation questions, but did
not raise the costs, risks, or diffi-
culties for the school committee's (B)
segregation policy (X) so that the
school committee abandoned those segre-
gation policies.

and

The state government (A) passed the

Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 and with-
drew state aid from the school commit-
tee, but did not raise the costs, risks,
or difficulties for the school commit-
tee's (B) segregation policy (X) so
that the school committee abandoned
those segregation policies.

The amended Connolly definition could also entirely

capture an action which did stand as an instance of power.

The full extent of the school committee's resistance to de-

segregation prior to 1974 is revealed by the proposed amend

ment . This is an advantage over the original Connolly defi

nition because the school committee thoroughly frustrated

or restrained efforts to initiate desegregation plans.

Thoroughly frustrating state attempts to implement desegre-

gation plans is more than raising the costs, risks, and dif

ficulties for the state to do so. The following statement

accurately and fully reflects the full scope of the school

 41

committee and its power:

The school committee (A) delayed,

procrastinated, and evaded the state
(B) demands to begin desegregation
(X) which raised the costs, risks,
and difficulties for the state (B)
to implement desegregation plans,
so that the state (B) did not im-
plement their desegregation plans (X).

The amended Connolly definition more aptly reflects

the view of political power drawn from ordinary discourse.

An examination of ordinary discourse would suggest that the

idea of someone failing to exercise political power is

clearly possible and widely employed. Applied to the

Boston busing issue, the original Connolly definition could

not mirror this idea. By the original definition, failing

to exercise power meant that someone failed to raise the

costs, risks, or difficulties to another's doing or not

doing something. The common understanding is that someone

fails to exercise power if that someone does not or cannot,

but has tried to compel another to do or not do something.

This prevalent view is captured by the amended definition,

but is related to the original Connolly proposal. The rela-

tionship is that failing to compel another to do or not to

do something generally implies that the costs, risks, or

difficulties have not been raised enough by the frustrated

power wielder.

Connolly's interpretation of the ordinary discourse

implications regarding unintended actions is also contest-

abxe . Connolly includes unintended action as instances of

exercising political power because persons are generally

held responsible for unintended actions. It is empirically

accurate that people are blamed or praised for actions

which they did not intend. The comprehension of unintended

actions as instances of political power, however, is not so

clear

The Connolly reasoning blurs and ignores a relevant

distinction inherent within ordinary discourse. That gener-

ally shared distinction is that persons are held less respon-

sible for unintended actions than for intentional acts. For

example, persons convicted of manslaughter usually receive

less punishment than convicted murderers. The lesser punish-

ment can be explained by an absence of intention. The cri-

teria of the crime 'manslaughter' also involve an absence

of intention. This differing degree of responsibility for

unintended acts is the basis for usually excluding unintended

acts from the idea of political power. To intentionally

raise the costs, risks, or difficulties for someone doing or

not doing something so that the other does or does not do

something, entails a greater blame or praise than uninten-

tionally doing so. Only the former example is appropriately

understood as an instance of exercising political power. In

the words of Terrence Ball (his emphasis), "The idea of

exercising power has the element of intention built into it.

Connolly's inclusion of unintended effects as instances

 43

of exercising power also represents a departure from ordinary

discourse. Unlike Oppenheim, Connolly restricts the appli-

cation of the concept 'power' to only those effects which

were known, or which someone could reasonably have been ex-

pected to know about. Connolly does correctly reason that

someone may exercise power in such a situation that, "...A

intends to help C, and in the process knowingly takes action

that harms B severely ... We would conclude that A had exer-

cised power over B..."

14 ....
This distinction between intended

and known consequences is a valid one. The distinction is,

however, an irrelevant one with regard to establishing a

foundation for the inclusion of unintended effects as in-

stances of exercising power. The legal concept of trans-

ferred intent reveals that known consequences are generally

treated as if they were intended.

15
According to the legal concept of transferred intent ,

if someone performs an action which results in consequences

which the agent knows would happen, or could have reasonably

been expected to know would occur, then such consequences

are treated as if they were intended. A person is held re-

sponsible for known consequences of an action in the same

manner as if they were intended. D.M. White echoes this

holder
general understanding when he writes about an of lice
can reason-
who habitually makes decisions with effects he
_ . 16
ably be expected to know about. As D.M. White contends,

...(the officeholder) must realize

 that any habitual decision he makes
will have effects. If he does not
take the slight trouble of finding
out what these effects are, the
matter should be treated as if he
did have a favorable attitude
towards them.

In our society, the legal concept of transferred intent

accurately reflects generally shared understandings. Its

ability to do so lies in the empirically verifiable fact

that laws in our society are fashioned by elected represen-

tatives who are held periodically accountable to the people

they represent. The legal concept of transferred intent, as

an indicator of shared views which shape and govern the for-

mulation and use of concepts like political power, reveals

that the distance between knowing and intending is not suf-

ficient to warrant the inclusion of unintended effects as

instances of power.

Complementing the claim by Ball that intention is built

into exercising power is my argument that intention is clear

ly built into the concept ’political'. Connolly's own under

standing of what is political explicitly refers to concepts

which are identifiable with the idea of intention. Connolly

repeatedly employs the concepts 'decision' and 'choice'.

Examples of political action which Connolly suggests are,

1 ^
(my emphasis)

...actions that involve a decisi on

or choice among viable options. .

considerations or motives partici-

pants make i"n selecting one avail-
able option over others ... extent
 to which decision outcome affects
the interests, wishes, values...

According to the Connolly perspective, a political action

is the outcome of a person's choice or decision, not the

result of an irrational moment or impersonal factor or so-

iv

cial structure. Robert Dahl's criteria of what is politi-

cal express agreement with Connolly. Dahl maintains that 18,

Political action, like other human

actions, consists in making deci-
sions--in somehow choosing among
alternatives and then trying to
make one's choice effective.

The relationship between the criteria of intention discussed

earlier and the criteria of political cannot be denied.

This relationship is further support for referring exclusive-

ly to intentional action in formulating a definition of poli -

tical power

In conclusion, the Connolly definition does not pay

enough attention to ordinary discourse. Recognizing a

necessity to mirror the implications of ordinary discourse

in a definition of political power, Connolly overlooks sev-

eral significant features of ordinary discourse. Only an

amended form of the Connolly definition is able to support

a discrimination between exercising and failing to exercise

political power. Altering the definition to more accurately

reflect generally shared views which fashion the concept of

power is needed to permit the Connolly definition to reflect

this common understanding. The Connolly definition similai ly

ignores the pervasive distinction between responsibility

for unintended and intended action. The lesser responsi-

bility for unintended acts explains why the concept of poli-

tical power generally applies to intentional acts alone.

After all, the question is how to define political power.

De Crespigny's definition of power obviously pays at-

tention to intention. This definition of power faces none

of the problems encountered by the Oppenheim or Connolly

definitions. Specifically limiting the definition of power

to intended acts effectively eliminates the possibility

that the definition will be equated with any causal relation-

ship. Any action (X) causing response (Y) can not be pro-

perly understood as an instance of power by the de Crespigny

proposal unless the action and effects are intended.

The de Crespigny understanding of political power dis-

tinguishes between exercising power and failing to exercise

power. Unlike the Connolly definition, applying the de

Crespigny definition to the Boston busing issue reflects the

powerlessness of the state government and Supreme Court prior

to 1974. Prior to 1974, the intent of the state government

and U.S. Supreme Court to desegregate public schools did not

affect the actions of the school committee. Because the

school committee maintained, even increased the segregation

in the school system in spite of the state and

Supreme Court

failed
intention to the contrary, the state and Supreme Court

to exercise power over the school committee.

 The single difficulty with the de Crespigny definition

is the requirement that the respondent's action must be

voluntary, in principle, for the concept 'power' to be ap-

propriate. According to de Crespigny, all human action is

voluntary. If one human exercises power over another, then

the action of the latter must be voluntary. The de Crespigny

requirement is contrary to the general understanding of

exercising power as revealed by such philosophically diverse

theorists as Oppenheim and Connolly.

According to Oppenheim, 19

By restraining R from doing X, P

not only exercises power in that
respect, but also makes R unfree
to do X.

Connolly concurs with Oppenheim and fashions his understand-

ing of power from the person over whom power is exercised.

Connolly maintains^

For those tacitly or explicitly com-

mitted to the principle that persons
are worthy of respect, the distance
between persuasion and manipulation
is a moral distance; it reflects the
judgement that there is a moral pre-
sumption against the latter that does
not obtain for the former.

This problem with the de Crespigny definition is trouble-

some. The de Crespigny requirement means that the action

must be voluntary in principle. As illustrated earlier,

Judge Garritty did exercise power over the school committee

according to the de Crespigny definition. The school commit-

tee's compliance with the ruling was voluntary, in principle.

 4 8

because the committee members could have chosen to defy the

order

Thus de Crespigny's position raises interesting ques-

tions as to when an action is and is not voluntary. The

school committee did not freely comply. If truly free, the
committee would have continued its segregationist ways.

This difficulty with the de Crespigny definition, however,

does not disturb its success in the case study. The school

committee could have, in principle, defied the order because

that option was not eliminated by the order. The federal

court order raised the costs of defiance enough so that the

committee members complied.

The significant problem with the de Crespigny definition

is a difficulty shared by the Connolly and Oppenheim defini-

tions as well. That problem is a failure to define political

power specifically. All three theorists disregard the impli-

cations that a criteria of the concept 'politics' could have

on a definition of power. Only Connolly has developed an

explicit understanding of what is political. This Connolly

understanding does not, as I have argued, find expression in

his definition of political power, as I argue it should. Ig-

noring what is political and the effects the concept 'poli-

tical' entail for a definition of political power involves

that concept with relationships not usually understood as

political

It is odd to think of someone who intentionally signals

another that the post office door is locked as
exercising
political power over that person if he bypasses the post

office. It is just as awkward to think that children, who

raise the costs and difficulties to their parents' effort

to have them do well in school have exercised political

power over them. Has a person who asks another to answer

the telephone, thereby affecting that person's actions in

accordance with his intentions, exercised political power

over that person who answers the telephone? I think not.

These examples support the claim that more is needed

than just limiting the concept 'political power' to inten-

tional action, as the Connolly and Dahl criteria have done.

A more basic problem is, as Terrence Ball contends, compre-

hending "...power over as paradigmatic of all intelligible

talk about political power". 21 The solution is what Part-

ridge would term a "field" or "zone of acceptance" 2 2 , not

for the notion of power, but for the concept 'political',

i.e., a clear understanding of under what circumstances the

concept 'political power' is appropriate.

The issue of busing to achieve desegregation in Boston

is a helpful pathfinder through this difficulty. This case

study did not encounter the problem of whether or not the

relationships under scrutiny were properly discerned as pol

tical. The reason this was not a question is the the rela-

tionships in the case study were unquestionably political.

Elected government officials at different levels of govern-

 50

ment confronted each other over a question of desegregation.

Ihe judicial branch of federal government promulgated pro-

desegregation rulings which formed a backdrop for the con-

frontation in Boston. A federal court judge eventually

resolved the confrontation between state and local officials.

The issue itself seemed political because it affected a

large segment of the community which was comprised of dif-

ferent groups who held opposing views on t he question.

This character of the Boston busing issue, the parti-

cipants, and its effects reinforce Sheldon Wolin's under-

standing of political. Arguing that politics is synonymous

with the public, common, or general, Wolin reasons that 2 3

...political authority is distin-

guished from other forms of auth-
ority in that it speaks in the
name of a society ... concerned
with those general interests
shared by all members of the com-
munity.

Having presented a "field" for the concept ’political',

I would amend the successful de Crespigny definition by

specifically incorporating the concept 'political' into the

definition of power. Therefore, the de Crespigny definition

would be amended to read,

...the capacity of an actor to

affect the actions of others in
accordance with his own inten-
tions, and with regard to a poli-
tical issue.

At the very least, this thesis has added yet another

"contestant" in the ongoing debate over defining the concept

'political power' . Avoiding the difficulties encountered

by the other definitions examined in this study and remain-

ing close, if not identical to, everyday language, this

definition of political power acknowledges an admonishment

offered by Champlin. As Champlin observes,^'

While ordinary discourse about

power flows smoothly, scientific
studies of power grounded on ex-
plications appear full of limita-
tions, ambiguities and inconsis-
tencies .
 CHAP «T»
X E R I

FOOTNOTES

1 . Robert B. McKay, "Court, Congress and School Desegrega-

tion" in lor enc e H. Levison, School Desegregation
,
te

(Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 60-62

2 . 1975 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights:
.

Desegregation of
Boston Public Schools, p. XIX.

3 . Howard Ozmon, Busing: A Moral Issue (Indiana: Phi Del

ta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1972), p. 11.

4 . Ozmon , P- 14 .

5. McKay P- 52 .

6 . McKay P- 62-63

7 . McKay P- 62 .

8 . Ibid.

9 . McKay , P- 67 .

10. Ibid.

11. Ozmon , P- 11 .

12 . McKay , P* 64 .

i
1 CO
— Ibid.

14 . McKay , P- 61.

15. Ibid .

1
i cn
— Ozmon , P- 11.

17 . 1977 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: A Statement on

Metropolitan Desegregation, p. 77.
i
—
CO
Ibid.

19. 1977 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 78.

20. Ozmon , P- 22 .

21. 1975 Commission on Civil Rights, p. XV.

5 2
 53

2 2 . Ozmon , p . 23

23. Alan Lupo ,

Liberty's Chosen Home (Boston: Little, Brov;n
Co. , 1977 ) , p. 141.

24. 1976 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Desegregation of

the Nation's Public Schools, p. 16.

2 5 . Ozmon , p . 24

2 6 . Lupo , p . 15 7.

27. 1975 Commission on Civil Rights, p. XV.

28. 1976 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 16.

29. Lupo, p. 149.

30. Hearing before U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Tran-

script, Boston, Mass., (June 16-20, 1975), p. 451.

31. 1976 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 16-17.

32. Lupo, p. 149.

33. Transcript of hearing, 1975, p. 546.

34. Lupo, p. 154.

35. Transcript of hearing, 1975, p. 546.

36. Lupo, p. 156.

37 . Lupo , p . 157

38. 1976 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 22.

39. Transcript of hearing, 1975, p. 459.

40. Transcript of hearing, 1975, p. 457.

41. Lupo, p. 179.

42. McKay, p. 60.

 CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Ielix Oppenheim, "Power Revisited", The Journal of Poli-

tics, vo 1 40
. 1978 p. 591.
, ,

2. Oppenheim, p. 598.

3. William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse

,
(Lexington, Mass.: D.S. Heath and Company, 1974)^ pT 102.

4. Connolly, p. 100.

5. Anthony de Crespigny, "Power and its Forms", in de

Crespigny and Wertheimer, Contemporary Political Theory,
(New York, Atherton Press, 197 0), p 40 .

6. de Crespigny, p. 42.

7. P.H. Partridge, "Some Notes on the Concept of Power", in

de Crespigny and Wertheimer, Op Cit p. 32. . .

8. de Crespigny, p. 40.

54
 CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. John R. Champlin (Ed.), Power (New York: Atherton Press,

1970) p. 5

2. Bruce Aune " Intention" Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol.

, , ,

4 (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1972), p. 200.

Here, Aune allows for the possibility of intentions
forming "themselves as effortlessly and as unconsciously
as beliefs"
Stuart Hampshire, in Thought and Action also acknowledges
that intentions may sometimes proceed from the uncon-
scious .

3 . Aune p 200
,
.

According to Aune, an intention may not be carried out

effectively or efficiently and therefore may sometimes
entail unplanned, even unwanted effects or contrary to
the intended ones.

4. Connolly, p. 105-106.
Here, Connolly speaks of A intending to help C, but "in
the process knowingly takes action that harms B severely"
Connolly maintains that A exercises power over B, even
though A did not intend to do so.

5. Oppenheim, p. 598. «

6. Oppenheim, p. 600.

7. Oppenheim, p. 601.

8. D.M. "Power and Intention", The American Political

VJhite,
Science Review Sept. 1971, p. 758.
,

9. Terrence Ball, "Power, Causation and Explanation", Polity

(Winter 1975), p. 205.

10. Ball, p. 202.

11. Champlin, p. 4.

12. Connolly, p. 12.

13. Ball, p. 202.

14. Connolly, p. 105-106.

55
 55

15 . Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law (New York: The Founda-

tion Press, Inc., 1969),' p. 822-824. and
Wayne R. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law (St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co. ,'"197 2 ) p. 252-254.
,

(see also Chapter I of this thesis, footnote #19)

On page 252, LaFave writes (my emphasis):

"In the unintended viction (or bad

aim) situation--where A aims at B
but misses, hitting C--it is the
view of the criminal law that A is
just as guilty as if his aim had
been accurate."

16. D.M. White, p. 756.

17. Connolly, p. 12-13.

18. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice Kali, 1963), p. 93.

19. Oppenheim, p. 595.

20. Connolly, p. 94.

21. Ball, p. 203.

22. de Crespigny, p. 30.

23. Champlin, p. 12.

24. Champlin, p. 3.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aune, Brace. "Intention". Encyclopedia of Philosophy :

MacMillan Publishing Co., 1372.

Ball, Terrence. "Power, Causation and Explanation". Polity,

1975.

Champlin, John R. Power. New York: Atherton Press, 1970.

Connolly, William E. The Terms of Political Discourse .

Lexington, Mass.: D.S. Heath and Co., 1974.

de Crespigny, Anthony. Contemporary Political Theory . New’

York: Atherton Press, 1970.

Dahl, Robert. Modern Political Analysis . New Jersey:

Prentice Hall, 1963.

Lafave, Wayne. Handbook on Criminal Law . St. Paul, Minn.:

West Publishing Co., 1972.

Levinson, Florence H. School Desegregation . Chicago: Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1976.

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Co. ,
1977 .

Oppenheim, Felix. "Power Revisited". The Journal of Poli -

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,

Ozmon Howard. Busing: A Moral Issue Indiana: . Phi

,

Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1972.

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, . ,

U.S. Commissions on Civil Rights: De segregation of Boston

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A Statement on Metropolitan Desegregation 1977. ,

Desegregatio n of the Nation's Public Schools 19/6 ,

Hearing Before U.S. Commission o n Civil Rights, ran^u

ipt i ,

Boston 1975. ,

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57