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Academic Freedom and the Telos
of the Catholic University
This page intentionally left blank
Academic Freedom and the Telos
of the Catholic University
KENNETH GARCIA
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE TELOS OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
Copyright © Kenneth Garcia, 2012.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-1-137-03191-4
All rights reserved.
First published in 2012 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-44091-7 ISBN 978-1-137-03192-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137031921
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Garcia, Kenneth N.
Academic freedom and the telos of the Catholic university /
Kenneth Garcia.
p. cm.
1. Academic freedom. 2. Catholic universities and colleges.
3. Scholars—Religious life. I. Title.
LC72.G35 2012
378.1⬘213—dc23 2012011142
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: September 2012
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my wife Elizabeth, and my children Meghan,
Katie, Gabriel, Mary, and Michael, for their
patience and support over the years.
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Preface ix
1 The Current State of Catholic Higher Education 1
2 The Medieval Liberal Arts and the Journey of
the Mind to God 21
3 Berlin: The Prototype of the Modern University 35
4 Academic Freedom and Religion in America 55
5 The Pursuit of Intellectual and Spiritual Wholeness,
1920–1960 79
6 The Consequence of Caesar’s Gold 103
7 “The Direction toward Which Wonder Progresses” 129
8 Implications for Faculty Development and the Curriculum 147
Notes 165
Selected Bibliography 195
Index 207
This page intentionally left blank
Preface
Following the Second Vatican Council (1961–1965), Catholic colleges and
universities went through extensive academic and administrative changes
that provoked heated debates over the nature and mission of the Catholic
university. The debates covered numerous questions. What is the purpose
of Catholic higher education and how does it differ from secular higher
education? What is the relation of Catholic theology to modern thought
and culture? How should the Catholic university relate to the Church’s
Magisterium (is it autonomous or beholden to the local bishop)? Are theo-
logians free to dissent from Magisterial teachings? Should speakers hostile
to Catholic teachings be given a forum to speak at Catholic universities?
And a question central to this book, should academic freedom as under-
stood in the modern American university prevail also in Catholic universi-
ties? Many of these questions are still unsettled.
This book presents a theologically grounded understanding of aca-
demic freedom that builds on, completes, and transforms the prevailing
secular understanding. Academic freedom in the secular university, while
rightly protecting scholars from external interference by ecclesiastical and
political authorities, is constricting in practice because it tends to prohibit
most scholars from exploring the relationship between the finite world and
the infinite, or God. This constricted understanding contrasts starkly with
the ideal of academic freedom at the time of its birth in early nineteenth-
century Germany, where it meant both the freedom of the scholar to pursue
studies unencumbered by external interference, and the freedom to pursue
knowledge beyond the boundaries of specific academic disciplines to an
ultimate horizon. Even more, it conflicts with the traditional Christian
understanding of the mind’s natural desire for knowledge of God, a desire
that cannot come to rest in knowledge of finite things in themselves. The
mind must continually move forward to ever-greater knowledge of both
the finite world and the divine reality that generates, founds, and com-
pletes finite understanding.
x Preface
Unfortunately, the concept of academic freedom became restricted in
the early twentieth century, at least in the American context. Since the
Second Vatican Council, most Catholic colleges and universities have
rightly adopted the principle of academic freedom. Ironically, though, the
version they adopted was a secular one, with the result that it has become
difficult to relate theological knowledge to knowledge in other disci-
plines, in spite of earnest efforts by Catholic university educators to do so.
Whenever discussions arise about the need to integrate theological insight
into the framework of other academic disciplines, they inevitably become
mired in fruitless debates between the autonomy of the scholar, on the one
hand, and the threat of heteronomous church interference in academic life,
on the other, as if these were the only alternatives. As a result, theology and
other academic disciplines remain isolated from one another, inhabiting
separate disciplinary islands. Theology, rather than being an integral part
of all knowing and learning, resides at the margins of university life.
I propose a theonomous alternative to these fruitless debates. This the-
onomous alternative can be stated as follows: there is at the heart of all
inquiry, whether the inquirer is explicitly aware of it or not, a dynamism
(an intellectual and spiritual eros, in the words of many church fathers)
whose source and goal is the divine. To claim that scholars should remain
within their specialized domains, in the realm of the finite, is to make a
philosophical and epistemological claim about the human mind. I chal-
lenge that claim from a Christian perspective. There is an inner teleol-
ogy driving us toward ever-greater understanding, toward completeness
of understanding within an ultimate horizon. Although scholars in non-
theological academic disciplines cannot discover divine reality through
their methods of inquiry, their inquiries, if not truncated, lead up to the
limits of scientific and humanistic knowledge and to larger questions
about purpose, meaning, and ultimately, God. These inquiries lead to
the edge of disciplinary islands, to the point where the infinite sea of the
divine beckons as a horizon that is distant yet luminous and alluring.
The fostering of the mind’s movement toward that horizon is the true
telos of the Catholic university. Not all scholars must pursue the trajec-
tory toward ultimate truth, but all must be free to do so, and that is the
essence of a theologically grounded understanding of academic freedom.
Moreover, in the Catholic university there must be scholars in all disci-
plines who can make connections between disciplinary knowledge and
religious truth, and bring insights from the Catholic tradition to bear on
some of the courses they teach. It is time, therefore, for Catholic colleges
and universities to adopt a properly theological foundation for academic
freedom and to incorporate that understanding into their mission state-
ments and, more importantly, into their institutional policies and bylaws.
Preface xi
This foundation advances the mission of the Catholic university by ensur-
ing that faculty and students may progress toward intellectual and spiri-
tual wholeness.
This book is primarily theological, yet I draw on historical perspectives
from the broader Catholic liberal arts tradition—ancient, medieval, and
modern. I then review the history of how academic freedom developed,
first in the nineteenth-century German university, then in the modern
American university. The book is not a practical, “how to” book, even
though I do suggest, in the final chapter, some practical implications that
flow from its theological foundation, and then offer some concrete steps
colleges and universities can take to strengthen their Catholic character.
These steps are suggestive, not prescriptive, and I invite scholars in the dis-
ciplinary trenches and administrative units to ponder how the implications
of a theological understanding of academic freedom can best transform the
disciplinary cultures and curricula in their own institutions.
There are several audiences for this book. Primary among them are
scholars and administrators in Catholic colleges and universities, as well
as bishops and clergy who are concerned with strengthening the Catholic
character of these institutions. For more than four decades now they have
argued among themselves over how to maintain the Catholic ethos of their
institutions while still upholding academic freedom and fostering openness
to modern, pluralistic thought. The book will also be of interest to educa-
tors in other Christian colleges who face the same challenges as those in
Catholic universities. Finally, any scholar—religious or secular—wishing
to champion the integrity of academic freedom rightly understood, will find
the book’s thesis stimulating, even if controversial.
My sincere hope is that this book will advance the conversation about
Catholic higher education beyond customary liberal-conservative disputes
and lead to a more holistic understanding of academic inquiry. I do not
argue for either liberal or conservative ideological positions. Instead, I offer
an alternative that is grounded in the best features of the entire Catholic
tradition. I have endeavored to base my arguments on historical develop-
ments, to draw on thinkers throughout Christian history (Catholic and
non-Catholic), and to offer a solution to the dilemmas facing Catholic
higher education today.
This book came about as a result of a long and often desultory intel-
lectual and spiritual journey. Unschooled in things religious while young,
I underwent a transformative religious conversion as a young man, one
which led me to experience the interconnectedness of all things and their
grounding in an all-encompassing spiritual reality. This drew me, eventu-
ally, into the Catholic Church and later, into Catholic universities where
I hoped to deepen that religious experience. Surely, I reasoned, study in
xii Preface
the Catholic university would entail a search for wisdom that was at once
spiritual and intellectual. I would gain a grounding in the Great Tradition
of philosophers (Christian and non-Christian), mystics, saints, and theo-
logians who had pursued academic life as a quest for Wisdom. I had
read Jean LeClerq’s The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, which
describes how medieval monastics engaged both Greco-Roman classics
and Christian literature within the context of a life of study, contempla-
tion, and the search for wisdom. I naively hoped to experience a similar
engagement, though updated with the study of modern sciences, social
sciences, and humanistic learning. I was disappointed. Apart from hav-
ing departments of theology or religious studies, and sponsoring regular
liturgies, I discovered that the curricula in Catholic universities were not
much different than those in their secular counterparts. Things spiritual
inhabit a sphere severed from the academic and intellectual, including to
some extent even theology departments, which have become isolated from
the broader circle of sciences. I was puzzled: if the telos of Catholic univer-
sity education is intellectual and spiritual wholeness, why are intellectual
attainment and spiritual quest disconnected? Why must we bracket spiri-
tual from intellectual eros while engaged in academic inquiry? And can
anything be done to remedy this state of affairs? This book is my modest
attempt to contribute to the ongoing conversation about the nature and
mission of Catholic colleges and universities, and to offer a more holistic
understanding of their finality.
Every scholar is indebted to numerous people without whom one’s book
could never be written. First and foremost, I am grateful for the patience
and forbearance of my wife and children who endured many missed week-
end outings and summer vacations during the years I labored over this
book. I dedicate this book to them.
I am grateful to Larry Cunningham, Cyril O’Regan, Matt Ashley,
Melanie Morey, Kent Emery, Mark Roche, and the late Fred Crosson, all
of whom read and critiqued some or all the chapters and whose advice and
insights were invaluable. Thanks also to Krista Duttenhaver who pointed
me to the educational writings of the German idealists, which form the
basis of chapter 3, “Berlin: the Prototype of the Modern University.”
I have been blessed to work in a unique office at the University of Notre
Dame—the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA)—which
has placed me in contact with scholars from numerous academic disci-
plines in the humanities, social sciences, and fine arts, and whose engag-
ing scholarship has enhanced my own. Most importantly, I am grateful
to the various directors of ISLA who over the years have allowed me the
time and provided me the resources to carry out the research for this book.
Special thanks go to Christopher Fox, Julia Douthwaite, Cindy Bergeman,
Preface xiii
Julie Braungart-Rieker, Gretchen Reydams-Schils, Ruth Abbey, Agustin
Fuentes, and Tom Merluzzi for their encouragement and support. Greg
Sterling, Maura Ryan, and Dan Myers in the dean’s office of the College
of Arts and Letters generously approved summer research leaves so that
I could begin and finish this manuscript. Thanks also to Liz Rulli and
Heather Boyd in Notre Dame’s Office of Research for funding portions of
the research through the Kobayashi Research Travel Fund.
I am grateful to many archivists at Catholic colleges and universities for
their generous assistance over the years: to Kevin Cawley of the University
of Notre Dame; the late Nicholas Varga at Loyola College of Baltimore;
J. Leon Hooper at the John Courtney Murray Archives at the Woodstock
Theological Center; and to archivists at Fairfield University, Mount St.
Mary’s University, the College of Notre Dame in Baltimore, and the
University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, whose names I have forgotten but
whose helpfulness and generosity I remember well.
Portions of chapter 1 and chapter 7 first appeared as “Academic Freedom
and the Service Theologians Must Render the Academy” in Horizons: The
Journal of the Catholic Theology Society (Spring 2011), 75–103. I am grate-
ful to Anthony Godzieba for permission to use that material here.
Without the support of John Cavadini, Joseph Wawrykow, and Don
Pope-Davis, who helped facilitate my entrance into the theology doctoral
program at the University of Notre Dame, the dissertation on which this
book is based could not have been written. Thank you for your confidence
in me. I am also grateful to Burke Gerstenschlager and Kaylan Connally
at Palgrave MacMillan for their expert editorial assistance.
John D. Burzynski’s photograph of the “Word of Life” mural on the
front of Notre Dame’s Hesburgh Library adorns the cover of this book.
Burzynski’s photograph beautifully captures the amber background light
emanating from Christ and the scholars in a way other photographs of the
mural do not. The mural, created by artist Millard Sheets, depicts Christ
surrounded by many generations of great scholars, thinkers, and teach-
ers, both Christian and non-Christian. Christ is the central figure toward
whom they all move in procession; he is the great teacher, the “universal
pedagogue.” The inscription on a marker near the mural reads as follows:
With [Christ] in spirit are gathered the saints, the scholars, the scribes, and
the teachers stretching through time, who have dedicated themselves to the
preservation of truth . . . and the preparation of men’s minds to receive that
truth. Their knowledge, their thoughts, their written word, which through
the ages have illuminated and enriched the understanding of their own and
succeeding generations, is the treasure house of knowledge housed within
the walls of this [library].
xiv Preface
Scholars in Catholic colleges and universities today are the heirs of these
great scholars and thinkers. The faithful passing on of the great wisdom
tradition we have received from them, and the vigorous engagement of
that tradition with the thought of our own time, is the mission we hold
in trust.
Chapter 1
The Current State of Catholic
Higher Education
Scholars and administrators in American Catholic colleges and universi-
ties have participated in long and serious reflections since the 1960s about
the nature and mission of the Catholic university. What distinguishes
it from other kinds of universities? Does the adjective “Catholic” mean
simply adding something to secular academic discourse, or does it imply
something about the way scholars should conduct inquiry and the kind of
questions they bring to their subject matter? Is there a telos to the inqui-
ries of the human mind—and therefore a telos to university education—
that should inform the mission and curriculum of Catholic universities? Is
there a theological basis for academic freedom, or must we rely on secular
principles? What is the relation of Catholic spirituality and theology to
nontheological academic disciplines? Can academic pursuits be truly com-
petent and satisfactory without the undergirding of a spiritual dimension?
These are the questions explored in this book.
Catholic authors across the centuries have acknowledged that schol-
arly effort and spiritual progress complement one another, and they have
pursued both as interrelated endeavors. At the same time, the relationship
between them has sometimes been tense. How do we do justice to one
without doing a disservice to the other? A settled Catholic principle is the
indissoluble unity between the knowledge of reason and the knowledge
of faith.1 Can faith and reason work together successfully? How should
Christians relate their faith to the philosophical currents of the surround-
ing culture? Christians have oscillated between suspicion of secular or
worldly knowledge, on the one hand, and an excessive accommodation
to the spirit of the age, on the other. Between these, the prudent course
2 Academic Freedom
has been to maintain a dialectical relationship between Catholic thought
and the surrounding culture, between religious knowledge and knowledge
gained through analytical reason, carefully discerning in non-Christian
thought what is complementary and what is contradictory to Catholic
teachings. In spite of the tensions that naturally arise in this process, the
dominant rule in Catholic universities has been a mutually informing and
challenging engagement. This encounter is not always a comfortable pro-
cess—for either side—but it is undertaken in the certainty that all truth is
one and that truth discovered through reason cannot, in the end, contra-
dict religious truth.
Discussions about the relationship of spirituality and theology to non-
theological academic disciplines are not undertaken without some anxi-
ety. Many scholars fear it may lead to heteronomous church intervention
in academic matters. Since the Second Vatican Council, Catholic college
leaders have endeavored to prevent such intervention. In the 1967 “Land
O’Lakes Statement,” the presidents of Catholic universities worldwide
declared that “the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and
academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or cleri-
cal, external to the academic community itself.”2 The essential element
of this statement is that the Catholic university, like any university, must
be free of heteronomous church or state intervention. Scholars must have
autonomy to pursue their subject matter to its conclusion, to publish the
results of their investigations, and to freely debate the soundness of the
conclusions. While this statement rightly rejects heteronomy, it implic-
itly assumes that autonomy—as understood by academics in the modern
university—is the only alternative to heteronomous church control. I will
challenge that assumption.
In the years before and after the “Land O’Lakes Statement,” scholars at
Catholic colleges and universities extensively discussed the nature and role
of academic freedom and autonomy within the Catholic university.3 None
of these discussions, however, grounded academic freedom in Catholic
theological principles and, specifically, in a theological anthropology that
understands the human person as oriented to God. Nor did they base their
views in a theological epistemology that seeks to understand the dyna-
mism of the mind as a desire for knowledge of God—a desire that pervades
all inquiry. I will attempt to do so in this book.
It is widely recognized that the religious and the academic are not well
connected in the academy. For a variety of reasons, academic disciplines
have become increasingly specialized, fragmented, and secularized over the
past two centuries. Theology and philosophy, once integral components of
all higher learning, have gradually been severed from other disciplines and
have even split within themselves, while efforts to form broad, integrating
The State of Catholic Higher Education 3
structures of knowledge have steadily waned.4 Even so, integrated learn-
ing remains the ideal in Catholic institutions, as it was for John Henry
Newman over a century ago. Newman believed that all branches of knowl-
edge form part of a whole and, taken together, “form one integral subject
for contemplation,” with each branch contributing a piece of the whole.
Among these branches of knowledge, theology and philosophy should
serve as integrative discourses.5
This book focuses on the telos of the Catholic university in the modern
world, founded on a theological understanding of the telos of the human
mind seldom considered by most modern Catholic educators. Theodore
Hesburgh’s essay “The Challenge and Promise of the Catholic University”
articulates what may be the mainstream Catholic vision for a model
Catholic university in the modern world. A central principle in Hesburgh’s
thought is that “a great Catholic university must begin by being a great
university that is also Catholic.” Hesburgh understands “a great univer-
sity” in terms of the “modern world of the university” and of the way the
modern university is understood and universally recognized.6 The univer-
sity may have its roots in the medieval church, but the modern university
is an altogether different reality from its medieval ancestor. Only once
this modern university is established can we add whatever adjective we
like (American, Catholic, British) to it.7 Hesburgh makes the common
assumption that the university in the “modern sense” is characterized by
academic freedom, open debate over disputed positions, and a desire to
pursue truth wherever it may lead.
Some scholars question whether the modern university is really open to
the free pursuit of truth, especially when that pursuit tends toward the reli-
gious. Disciplinary communities in the academy, notes Mark U. Edwards,
have become largely secular and “set and enforce standards for scholarship
and teaching” that tend to “exclude explicitly religious discourse from most
scholarship and much teaching.”8 Douglas and Rhonda Jacobsen point out
that secularism has become an ideology that is not neutral to religion and
actively seeks its exclusion in public life and in the academy.9 To the extent
that individual academic disciplines within Catholic universities mirror
the standards of the broader disciplinary communities dominated by secu-
lar ideologies, they also exclude religious discourse and are sometimes even
hostile to it. David Schindler challenges the assumption that the modern
research university is a place of free and neutral scholarship. The modern
university, in its assumptions and structures, is not a neutral forum for
analyzing, defending, or criticizing the variant and often conflicting lines
of debate and inquiry. It has certain assumptions built into its structure
that already disadvantage Catholic thought.The modern university as we
know it, claims Schindler, is thoroughly secular and already excludes the
4 Academic Freedom
religious dimension in education and inquiry.10 The religious dimension
may only be added to the basic operation of secular rational discourse.
Hesburgh affirms the view that philosophy and theology are needed
to complete other studies and that unless theology engages all other disci-
plines at the highest intellectual level, we will end up with knowledge that
detaches moral, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions.11 Drawing on John
Henry Newman, he writes that theology must be more than a peripheral
concern in a Catholic university—that it “must be engaged on the highest
level of intellectual inquiry so that it may be in living dialogue with all
the other disciplines in the university.”12 This remains an ideal in most
Catholic institutions, yet few would argue that this engagement occurs to
a significant extent today. Most Catholic college and university adminis-
trators are aware that educators in Catholic colleges and universities are
failing to foster dialogue between Catholic thought and nontheological
disciplines. Unfortunately, most of those same administrators lack a clear
sense of how to do so and what it is that would make a Catholic univer-
sity—other than having a theology department—different from its secular
counterparts.13 The modern American research university is secular at its
core and is structured—as Edwards, the Jacobsens, and Schindler have
argued—to prohibit the very dialogue with theology and philosophy that
many Catholic educational leaders advocate.14
Some claim that ideals of social justice and service to the poor are what
make Catholic colleges unique among institutions of higher education, but
as Melanie Morey and John Piderit point out, all universities, secular as well
as Catholic, have a concern for instilling a sense of service and social concern
in their students.15 There is nothing uniquely Catholic about concern for
social justice and service, even though the motivation for incorporating these
ideals may be distinct. Though social justice and service are necessary aspects
of being Catholic, they are not sufficient in themselves. Unfortunately, the
mutual engagement of theology and other disciplines that many Catholic
university leaders advocate rarely takes place nor has there been a coherent
theory for how that can be done. In this regard, the goals articulated by Fr.
Hesburgh and others, though partially realized, have yet to be fully accom-
plished. In this book, I hope to contribute to the furtherance of those goals.
Even adding a theological dimension, as Hesburgh advocates, is not
acceptable to most scholars in today’s academy. Most academics insist that
scholars remain within the realm of the empirically knowable and the
realm of purely (secular) rational discourse. Using the scientific paradigm
that arose during the Enlightenment, which understands truth as that
which is verifiable through empirical observation and measurement, the
depth dimension of existence is excluded from study. To experience that
depth dimension requires a contemplative, spiritual stance toward exis-
tence that is different from, though not contradictory to, the objectifying,
The State of Catholic Higher Education 5
analytical stance employed by scientific reason. To exclude such a contem-
plative stance from academic inquiry is to restrict the realm of what the
human mind and spirit can experience.
Kant perhaps best articulated the Enlightenment conception of ratio-
nal, scientific knowing in his Critique of Pure Reason.
This domain [human understanding] is an island, enclosed by nature itself
within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth—enchanting name!—sur-
rounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where
many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive
appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew
with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never
abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion. Before we venture on
this sea, to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there
be any ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance
upon the map of the land which we are about to leave, and to enquire, first,
whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it contains—are not,
indeed, under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no
other territory upon which we can settle.16
As for Kant, so for secular, rational thinking today: academic inquiry must
remain on the island of the finite world and of secular, rational discourse.
Venturing out is not a legitimate activity and is to be excluded from the
academy. Kant’s island can serve as a metaphor for modern academic dis-
ciplines. The human mind is limited to studying the phenomenal world,
beyond which there is nothing knowable. Only what is available to the
human reason can be considered true knowledge; religious knowledge is
outside the scope of human reason and therefore not accessible.
Remarkably, some Catholic college leaders in the late twentieth century
adopted a similar view: that the border between island and ocean ought
to remain impermeable within academic inquiry itself, and spiritual life
must be restricted to the margins of campus life—to the chapel, to campus
ministry, or perhaps to centers or institutes separated from the ordinary
academic life of the university. Michael J. Buckley, S. J., recounts how the
late Timothy Healy, S. J., former president of Georgetown University, sug-
gested that the life of the church and the life of the academy are extrinsic
to one another. Healy wrote, “Education [is] principally a secular business,
and the university a secular entity with a secular job to do,” while conced-
ing that “the Church can deeply influence how that secular job is done.”17
In other words, the church, representing the religious dimension, works on
the university from the outside. Healy’s extrinsicist position is no anomaly
in the modern Catholic university;18 indeed, some say it has become the
norm, and no one seems quite sure whether or how the religious dimension
ought to be integrated into the core of academic life itself.
6 Academic Freedom
In spite of such reticence and uncertainty, integrated learning remains
the ideal, if not the reality, in many Catholic institutions, as it was for John
Henry Newman. In an 1856 sermon preached at the Catholic University
of Ireland, Newman said that the various human faculties (intellectual,
moral, spiritual, and emotional) were, in the beginning, “blended together”
by God and made to “conspire into one whole, and act in common toward
one end.” Human sinfulness sunders their integrity. The consequent sepa-
ration of faculties within each individual has its counterpart in the external
world, where each faculty is served by a separate institution. The university
is the institution that serves the intellectual faculty. Newman would have
his hearers recognize how detrimental this situation is for the health of
our souls. Moreover, “what makes [this situation] worse is, that these vari-
ous faculties and powers of mind have so long been separated from each
other . . . that it comes to be taken for granted that they cannot be united.”19
The reason the church creates Catholic universities, says Newman, is “to
reunite things which were in the beginning joined together by God [i.e., the
intellectual, spiritual, and moral], and have been put asunder by man.”20
He then gives us his ideal.
I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy
an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is, that they should be
found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I
want to destroy that diversity of centers, which puts everything into confu-
sion by creating a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the
same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devo-
tion. It will not satisfy me, what satisfies so many, to have two independent
systems, intellectual and religious, going at once side by side, by a sort of
division of labour, and only accidentally brought together. It will not satisfy
me, if religion is here, and science there, and young men converse with
science all day, and lodge with religion in the evening. It is not touching
the evil, to which these remarks have been directed, if young men eat and
drink and sleep in one place, and think in another: I want the same roof to
contain both the intellectual and moral discipline.21
Newman was not responding specifically to Kant but to the general philo-
sophical currents of his day. Over a century later, the German theologian
Karl Rahner, using Kant’s island metaphor—and in explicit disagreement
with Kant—maintained that everyone is called to explore beyond the
island.
In the ultimate depths of his being man knows nothing more surely than
that his knowledge, that is, what is called knowledge in everyday parlance,
is only a small island in a vast sea that has not been traveled. It is a floating
The State of Catholic Higher Education 7
island, and it might be more familiar to us than the sea, but ultimately it is
borne by the sea . . . Hence the existentiell question for the knower is this:
Which does he love more, the small island of his so-called knowledge or
the sea of infinite mystery? Is the little light with which he illuminates this
island—we call it science and scholarship—to be an eternal light which will
shine forever for him? That would surely be hell.22
Christopher Schiavone summarizes the difference between Kant and
Rahner: “For Rahner, to be rational is to acknowledge that the limits of
all those finite particulars found on the island, as well as of the island
itself, are only known in relation to the unlimited depth and breadth of the
sea.”23 Paul Tillich maintained that Kant confined modern thought to a
“prison of finitude,”24 to what Rahner might have called a “hellish island”
where truth, goodness, and beauty are caged in a phenomenal world devoid
of transcendence. The island metaphor is illuminating for our topic, and
I will employ it regularly in this book when discussing disciplinary spe-
cialization and the intellectual secularization of the academic mind and
curriculum in both Catholic and non-Catholic colleges. The metaphor
has limitations, though, suggesting a boundary where the spiritual world
of God begins and the “natural” world ends. This too, is inadequate. The
light of God is not outside the island. It is the light that illuminates its very
life; it is the light of the mind, as Augustine proclaimed,25 that generates a
desire to know the island in its full relation to what is ultimate. Switching
metaphors, the divine is the ocean that surrounds and undergirds the
island; it is also the source of the rain that falls on the island, of the springs
that well up in it, and of the streams that flow from it. Ultimately, they all
come from one source.
The current understanding of academic freedom (and its practice) is
inadequate for the Catholic university. True academic freedom must be
founded on the theological principle of the human being as made in the
image of God, as oriented to God. The human mind possesses a dynamic
desire for the divine that cannot rest until it knows and understands the
subject of its study in relation to God. This dynamic orientation to and
desire for God is a form of spirituality—a spirituality of the inquiring and
wondering mind.26 Hence, spirituality must be a foundational component
of academic inquiry, not only in theology, but in all inquiry. Integrating
spirituality into academic inquiry and basing academic freedom in the
desire of the mind for God does not undermine the secular principle of
academic freedom commonly understood in American society; rather, it
builds on, completes, and transforms it.
As noted earlier, the attempt to couple intellectual and spiritual effort
in the academy evokes anxiety in those who fear heteronomy. I propose an
8 Academic Freedom
alternative to the fruitless dialectic between an absolute autonomy on the
part of scholars, on the one hand, and a heteronomous control of academic
inquiry by religious authorities, on the other. This alternative is a theono-
mous approach to academic inquiry. Theonomy, a term coined by Paul
Tillich,27 refers to a spiritual dynamism operating from within intellectual
effort, grounding reason in its own spiritual depth.Theonomous reasoning
does not undermine the autonomy of reason; rather, it refers to a process
in which the Spirit immanent in everyone steadies, guides, and orients
reason, not as an extrinsic power working through external authorities but
as the immanent, divine ground of reason within each scholar. It is in this
general sense that I use the term “spirituality” in this book.
Tillich, of course, views theonomy from a Protestant perspective:
there is a direct, unmediated relationship between the individual and
God. Catholics would view it as not only including direct relation to and
awareness of God but also grounded in and mediated through tradition.
Theonomous thinking within the Catholic tradition means more than the
isolated individual in direct and personal relationship with God through
his or her subjective awareness. It involves that awareness as a prius but then
finds itself inextricably immersed within the framework of an ongoing tra-
dition that informs one’s subjective spiritual consciousness. Direct spiritual
experience is inevitably mediated and formed by language, culture, and
tradition. The presence of God—the Word as image at the center of our
being—is, as it were, implicit and inchoate. Inculturation into a theological
tradition forms an explicit awareness of that inner Word, and this affects
the way Catholics view the world and approach their inquiry into it.
Some will say that the influence of a tradition obviates any possibility
of independence of mind. But such a claim is belied by the many profound
and independent minds throughout Christian history who developed tra-
dition in new and fruitful ways, yet encountered opposition from ecclesi-
astical authorities.28 Moreover, if postmodernism has taught us anything,
it is that there is no consciousness that is not influenced by some tradition.
Everyone is raised in a tradition—whether religious or secular— that helps
form one’s experience and serves as a background understanding of life,
so much so that most people assume their background view is objective
reality. If Catholic perspectives do not influence students in the Catholic
university, some other philosophical perspective will.
Theonomy implies an integration of both theology and other academic
disciplines with spirituality as a basic element of academic inquiry. Here
I am referring to spirituality, not as external practices and rituals uncon-
nected to intellectual life (as important as those are) but as a quest for truth
guided by a spiritual dynamism, an eros toward God that illuminates the
mind and prevents scholarship from resting on merely finite ends, even
The State of Catholic Higher Education 9
while including such finite ends as stations along the way.29 It requires
grounding academic freedom in a theological anthropology that under-
stands humans as having a desire for knowledge of God because they are
made in the image and likeness of God. This is the foundation for under-
standing the dynamism of inquiring into and knowing the nature and
cause of all things in relation to God. This desire may be either implicit or
explicit, but it is always present. There is an unthematic awareness of God
present in the mind that propels the desire for ever fuller knowledge. God
illuminates the mind right from the start, is the engine driving inquiry,
and is the direction toward which inquiry ultimately moves. In the felici-
tous phrase of Michael Buckley, God is “the direction toward which won-
der progresses.”30 And who will argue that academic inquiry does not have
its origins in wonder?31
This idea of the mind’s dynamic drive is not new; in fact, it is almost
as ancient as the church itself. Catholic thinkers have always attempted
to appropriate what was true and good in the thought of non-Christian
sources and to adopt truth arrived at by natural reason. According to
Justin Martyr (ca. 114–165 AD), truth can come from non-Christian
sources because all humans participate in the Logos, or reason, of God.
Seeds of this Logos (logos spermatikos) are spread throughout the universe
and implanted in the minds of all human beings. As a result, everyone has
access to this divine reason, or Word—even non-Christians.32 For Origen
(ca. 185–254 AD), each intellect was created in the image of God—as a
participation in the Logos—and can therefore recover the “original state
of contemplative likeness to God.”33 All education and culture ( paideia)
should be oriented to leading us on this ascent to and reunion with God.
A dynamism in the movement from one academic discipline to another
orients and guides us toward an ultimate horizon. The basis of this dyna-
mism is love or, in Origen’s term, eros.34 Eros designates the longing and
desire that impel us dynamically toward the object of our desire; we are not
satisfied until we have achieved union with it.
Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 332–395 AD), like his predecessor Origen,
emphasized the role of desire in the search for God. All rational creatures
desire goodness, beauty, and wisdom, which can never be attained fully;
hence, we never grow weary of searching for them. Whoever “pursues
true virtue participates in nothing other than God, because He is Himself
absolute virtue. Since, then, those who know what is good by nature desire
participation in it, and since this good has no limit, the participant’s desire
itself necessarily has no stopping place but stretches out with the limit-
less.”35 This concept of limitless desire of the intellect and soul pervaded
the writings of many of the church fathers and extended well into the
thought of the high Middle Ages (see chapter 2).
10 Academic Freedom
The concept of the desire of the mind for God, once a commonplace
for patristic and medieval thinkers, became suspect and all but rejected
by scholastic thinkers in the early modern and modern periods. When
acknowledged at all, it was presented as a mere velleity or “non-repug-
nance” for God rather than as an active, spiritual, and intellectual dyna-
mism operating within the human mind. The concept was retrieved by
authors in the twentieth century, and I will draw on it as the basis for
formulating a Catholic foundation for academic freedom and autonomy.
When speaking of theonomous thinking, I am not referring to the sci-
ence of theology as it is normally conceived and practiced today: as a sepa-
rate science reflecting on Christian revelation. In the thought of Thomas
Aquinas, theology, whose source is supernatural revelation, is a science set
off from philosophy, whose source is natural reason. Theology as a science
based on supernatural revelation is a form of knowing superadded to the
kind of knowing that occurs through natural reason. In contrast, by “the-
onomous thinking,” I mean an awareness of the divine as both the source
and end of all knowledge.36 It refers to the desire of the mind for God as it
moves through all reality. In this sense, it is closely related to spirituality.
Thomas Aquinas had distinguished the natural from the supernatural
and reason from revelation, but he also recognized the natural orientation
of the mind to the divine. In numerous writings, he points out that the
mind has a natural desire to know God, that we must pursue this desire
until it is satisfied.37 Moreover, God’s light is present in all knowing. “All
knowers,” he writes, “know God implicitly in all that they know.”38 This
is an insight founded in the theology of Augustine. God is the light of
the mind that enables us to know the truth of any particular thing, says
Augustine.39 This guiding and illuminating presence of the divine in all
intellectual activity is what I mean by theonomous. Theonomous thinking
should be active in all inquiry. By this I do not mean that all scholars must
integrate spirituality and theology into their studies; only that some, in
every department, should (more on this in chapters 7 and 8).40
God’s light is always present as a criterion and orientation to the mind.
Joseph Pieper reminds us that the close link between intellectual attain-
ment and spiritual wonder has always characterized the best thinking in
the Catholic tradition.41Gerald McCool points out that “the activity of the
human mind, ordered to truth by its very nature, [is] a participation in the
light of truth communicated by the Word of God himself,” and that Word
is, as Clement said, the “Universal Pedagogue.”42 Such thinking is the ideal
to which the Catholic university should aspire.
Most scholars stop short of incorporating theonomous thinking into
scholarship within their disciplines. That is a loss to the academy. Can
we regain such a theonomous approach when the norms of contemporary,
The State of Catholic Higher Education 11
mainstream academic inquiry systematically exclude it? I believe we can,
but it will be no easy task. To do so, I propose to reappropriate the Christian
concepts of divine illumination (from Augustine) and of the desire of the
mind for God (from the church fathers and Thomas Aquinas) as founda-
tions for articulating the intimate relation between spirituality, theology,
and finite academic disciplines.43 These concepts can also help us move
toward an understanding of academic freedom that is more productive and
comprehensive than assumptions currently prevalent in academe.
After the Second Vatican Council (1961–1965), Catholic universities
made tremendous academic progress. Their academic quality improved
dramatically—they cast off heteronomous control by the church and
became places of robust academic inquiry. These are positive developments
to be praised by all. Hesburgh’s goal of integrating disciplines in a theolog-
ical vision remains a key goal of Catholic universities. This goal, however,
is yet unrealized and I will argue that there is a reason why this is so. As
Edwards, Schindler, and the Jacobsens point out, the very structure of the
modern American university prohibits that integration from taking place.
Even in Catholic colleges and universities, we see the discipline of theology
sitting alongside, and largely unconnected to, other academic disciplines
that have become largely secularized. I contend, therefore, that academic
freedom in the modern Catholic university requires a more sound theo-
logical foundation.
At present, serious discussions about the nature of the Catholic univer-
sity and about the relation of spiritual life to academic inquiry are at an
impasse, trapped in a fruitless dialectic between claims of autonomy and
fears of heteronomy. How have we arrived at this impasse, and what can
be done to move the discussions forward and foster both true academic
freedom and a linkage among spirituality, theology, and other areas of aca-
demic inquiry? How are we to integrate academic disciplines into a broader
philosophical and theological vision in an academic world dominated by
presuppositions that would exclude such views as illusory, nonintellectual,
and intrusive? How might we do so without repeating the mistakes of the
past? I will attempt to show a way.
Chapter Summaries
I will challenge three major assumptions often taken for granted in
Catholic higher education today. First, I challenge the assumption that we
should base the modern Catholic university on the secular university in its
current form. Second, I challenge the assumption that the term “modern”
12 Academic Freedom
university implies an essentially secular research university to which reli-
gious knowledge may be added. Finally, I question the adequacy of the
prevailing concepts of autonomy and academic freedom as developed in
America during the twentieth century. In the Catholic milieu, we cannot
rely solely on contemporary theories and educational realities when trying
to assess the telos of the Catholic university. We must also draw on wisdom
from the Catholic tradition—not as a trump card—but as a partner in
conversation with contemporary thought and realities.
In chapter 2, “The Medieval Liberal Arts and the Journey of the Mind
to God,” I examine the ways in which three medieval thinkers—Augus-
tine, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas—conceptualized the relation
between the spiritual life, theology, and academic studies. My goal is to
analyze their theories of the liberal arts to see if we can gain insights into
the purpose of higher learning that can be appropriated today. I will also
examine their attitudes on how the scholar ought to approach studies.
Even though they lived in different historical and cultural circumstances
than our own, we find principles in their work that can help us think
more fruitfully about the proper telos of the modern Catholic university.
Appropriating the wisdom of the tradition does not mean reverting to cur-
ricular forms that existed in earlier periods; rather, it means appropriating
timeless principles to use in contemporary settings. For example, Thomas
Aquinas held that our intellectual drive cannot be satisfied by knowledge
of things finite and must always go beyond the finite to knowledge of
God. Nonetheless, he gave the disciplines plenty of “elbow room” to work.
Augustine and Bonaventure believed the mind is made in the image of
God, with a desire to know all things in relation to an ultimate horizon, or
God. These remain valid principles today.
Having reappropriated principles from the tradition, we must acknowl-
edge the validity of Hesburgh’s insistence that we take the modern uni-
versity as a norm in its own right. We must, however, carefully scrutinize
what is meant by the “modern” university or the university “in the modern
sense.” In chapter 3,“Berlin: The Prototype of the Modern University,” I
explore the question of whether we should accept the modern, American,
secular university as the norm and standard for Catholic universities and
then try to graft a Catholic dimension onto it. My answer is no. I argue
that we can find alternative principles in the creation of the University
of Berlin, the first modern research university, founded in 1810. I focus
particularly on the German idealist philosophers J. G. Fichte, Friedrich
Schelling, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and G. W. F. Hegel. The German ide-
alists were concerned about the fragmentation of knowledge, the severance
of reason and faith, and the detachment of the finite from the infinite and
attempted to reunite them within the university curriculum. Their goal
The State of Catholic Higher Education 13
was to create a comprehensive philosophical system that would encompass
and orient all particular sciences within the totality of knowledge. The
scholar was to grasp how the finite world was related to the infinite, or
Absolute, integrating all the fragmented disciplines of the university into
a unity. Scholars required the freedom to pursue the whole of knowledge,
not merely some finite corner of it, and this was an essential aspect of
academic freedom.
The German idealists were not without their flaws, and I critique those
flaws. Their overarching philosophical systems tended to predetermine
how the various other sciences should be approached and even what consti-
tuted valid findings in the sciences. Their commitment to academic free-
dom was not always firm. In spite of their flaws, however, there is much
we can learn from them. They advocated the unity of knowledge. They
believed that the Absolute, or God, is what is disclosed in all of nature, in
human history, and the workings of the human mind. Specialization, they
held, is necessary and fruitful as long as a unity of vision holds together the
ever-diversifying array of particular knowledge. Philosophy, they believed,
and for some theology as well, must be not just one discipline alongside
others, but must play an architectonic role in the circle of sciences.
In chapter 4, “Academic Freedom and Religion in America,” I trace
how the concept of academic freedom developed in America. The German
ideal of the unity of knowledge, and the ideal of placing specialized stud-
ies within a broader philosophical and theological context, did not long
survive in America. The ideal of academic freedom took on uniquely
American historical characteristics. The ideal was transformed and, I
contend, seriously restricted, confining freedom of inquiry primarily to
scholarly work within academic disciplines. This had several causes. First,
conflicts between science and religion increased during the nineteenth cen-
tury. To avoid conflict, scientists began limiting their research to natural
phenomena. At first this did not imply a rejection of religious teachings,
but merely a prescinding from consideration of religious and philosophi-
cal questions in favor of focusing on finite phenomena. This was perfectly
legitimate. Methodological agnosticism and methodological atheism could
be compatible with either theism or atheism. It was not long, however,
before naturalistic methodologies, valid in themselves, became naturalistic
philosophies, and many scientists began openly to deny the existence of
the divine.
Second, there was increasing disciplinary specialization. Throughout
most of the nineteenth century, scholars had the freedom to adopt schol-
arly methods from any field and to conduct research across disciplines
as they wished. This freedom to roam began to change gradually in the
late nineteenth century. Scholarly competence required restricting oneself
14 Academic Freedom
to one’s discipline, as Jon Roberts and James Turner have shown.44 The
unity of knowledge began to be divided into separate territories. Freedom
to inquire on disciplinary islands without interference gradually came to
imply prohibition against inquiry beyond them.
Third, Catholic scholastic thought contributed in its own way to the
severance of scientific inquiry from theology. Some forms of scholasticism
contained a dualism of orders: the order of nature and the order of the
supernatural. In the cognitive realm, there was a correlative epistemologi-
cal dualism: knowledge that has its source in the natural reason, on the one
hand, and knowledge that has its source in supernatural revelation, on the
other. The order of nature has its own laws, its own finality, and natural
beings seek merely natural ends. The natural reason, in turn, has its own
ends and scope that do not extend to the divine unless illuminated by
supernatural grace. Catholics, therefore, no longer searched for the divine
presence in the world; instead they searched for it outside the world in a
separate realm or in a highly subjective and affective interior realm. This,
too, contributed to secularism, to the concept of a natural world devoid of
the divine.
Finally, Catholic thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was largely antithetical to modern thought. Catholic intellectu-
als who engaged modern thought were sometimes censored, and modern
culture was often condemned. Non-Catholic academics in America could
not help but observe the attitudes and repressions in the Catholic intel-
lectual world, so they instinctively rejected as heteronomous the religious
dimension of academic life. As a consequence, they developed their meth-
ods of inquiry and principles of academic freedom largely without regard
to, and sometimes in hostility to, religious ways of knowing.
In chapter 5, “The Pursuit of Intellectual and Spiritual Wholeness,
1920–1960,” I examine developments in American Catholic higher edu-
cation during the period when Catholic educators attempted to integrate
knowledge into a coherent Christian worldview. Closely connected to this
was a renewed emphasis on the spiritual dimension of all learning and an
attempt to integrate spiritual and intellectual life. They often did so awk-
wardly, though, attempting to force all knowledge from the various disci-
plines into a procrustean bed of neoscholastic philosophy. What didn’t fit
that neoscholastic framework was to be excluded. The problem with these
approaches was not the desire to integrate the religious with the academic,
but the fact that they did not give the academic disciplines “elbow room,”
to use Newman’s term. Some Catholic educators blurred the distinctions
between their own disciplines and scholastic philosophy to such an extent
that they confused them. They also blurred the distinction between edu-
cation and catechism in their zeal to integrate all knowledge within a
The State of Catholic Higher Education 15
theological vision. They claimed to be basing their views on the thought
of Thomas Aquinas, but Thomas allowed wide leeway to academic disci-
plines to explore reality according to their subject matter and particular
methods. Unfortunately, many American Catholic educators were not well
grounded in Thomas’s own thought. Because of these shortcomings, and
the poor academic quality of Catholic colleges and universities in general,
many Catholic educators rebelled against the Catholic educational system
following the Second Vatican Council.
In chapter 6, “The Consequence of Caesar’s Gold,” I focus on some of
the dramatic changes—both positive and negative—in Catholic colleges
and universities following the Second Vatican Council. On the positive
side, the Council called on Catholics to engage modern thought and cul-
ture, and to collaborate with their non-Catholic peers for the betterment of
society. Catholic colleges liberated themselves from heteronomous church
control, improved their academic quality, and adopted principles of aca-
demic freedom.
There was also a negative side. Because Catholic educators did not have
their own theological framework for understanding academic freedom—
or better, didn’t employ the principles they did have in the tradition—they
adopted the dominant secular principles, often uncritically. A major spur
to this ready adoption of secular principles was a series of court cases in
which Catholic universities were challenged in their right to receive public
funds. To be eligible for these funds, Catholic college leaders across the
country severed their ties with their founding religious orders, downplayed
their emphasis on the spiritual dimension of academic life, and adopted
secular principles of academic freedom. The results of these court cases
were profound and far reaching, moving Catholic universities in the direc-
tion of secularization.
However, an opposite trend was occurring simultaneously. During the
same time that these court cases were taking place, leaders of Catholic uni-
versities worldwide began meeting to discuss the implications of Vatican
II for Catholic higher education. In a series of documents beginning with
the “Land O’Lakes Statement” in 1967, Catholic educators reaffirmed the
spiritual dimension of academic life and insisted that theology must assist
in the development of the individual disciplines, to help them move beyond
their finite concerns to theological concerns. Ironically, while these college
leaders were affirming the spiritual and theological dimension of academic
life in these documents, many of them were simultaneously removing such
language from their mission statements and catalogues in order to qualify
for federal and state funds.
That is where Catholic universities find themselves today, on the one
hand, wanting to integrate the religious with the academic and, on the
16 Academic Freedom
other, dependent on federal funds, on rankings, and on the desire for pres-
tige from their secular counterparts, and therefore often downplaying the
religious. Morey and Piderit’s recent study of Catholic higher education
shows that most administrators and faculty in Catholic universities are
poorly trained in connecting knowledge in the various disciplines with the
Catholic intellectual tradition.45 Most Catholic universities have strong
departments of theology, but these sit alongside, though mostly uncon-
nected to, other academic disciplines. The other departments remain, for
the most part, confined to Kant’s island. In the final two chapters, I offer
an alternative vision.
In chapter 7, “The Direction toward Which Wonder Progresses,” I
argue that academic freedom in the Catholic university must refer to a
specific instance of religious freedom: the freedom to pursue the spiritual
dynamism of the mind wherever it will go, as well as the freedom not to go
there. Grounding academic freedom in theological principles will enable
Catholic universities to foster a robust Catholic intellectual and spiritual
life that permeates scholarly inquiry without undermining freedom of
inquiry and expression. In this concluding chapter, I draw on the work of
Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, and Michael Buckley to develop a theology
of academic freedom and to formulate a theonomous alternative to the
fruitless dialogue between autonomy and heteronomy, moving us beyond
the current impasse.
This theonomous alternative can be stated as follows: there is at the
heart of all inquiry, whether the inquirer is explicitly aware of it or not, a
dynamism whose source and goal is the divine. To claim that scientists and
other scholars must remain within their specialized domains, in the realm
of the finite, is to make a philosophical and epistemological claim about
the human mind. I challenge that claim from a Christian perspective.
An inner teleology drives us toward ever-greater understanding, toward
completeness of understanding within an ultimate horizon. And although
scholars cannot discover divine reality in its fullness through their disci-
plinary methods of inquiry, their inquiries, if not truncated, lead up to
the limits of scientific knowledge and to the larger questions about God.
They lead to the edge of disciplinary islands, where the infinite sea of the
divine beckons. This movement of the mind toward an ultimate horizon
is the true telos of the Catholic university. Not all scholars must pursue
this trajectory toward an ultimate horizon, but all must be free to do so.
That is the essence of a theologically grounded understanding of academic
freedom.
I will argue for a structure, a framework, in which teaching and inquiry
in a Catholic university ought to occur.The Catholic intellectual, artistic,
and theological tradition must be in regular dialogue with all academic
The State of Catholic Higher Education 17
disciplines. No one thinker or school of thought within the Catholic tradi-
tion should dominate or exclude all others, as did neoscholastic thought
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Instead, authors from
the entire tradition (e.g., Justin, Origen, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas,
Bonaventure, Nicholas of Cusa, Newman, et al.) should be studied in any
Catholic university, for both their content and their method of approach-
ing different subject matters. None of them should be the sole lens through
which we must view the world. Rather, their views are among the vari-
ous lenses through which all students in a Catholic university explore the
world.
For the past 40 years, and especially since the publication of Ex Corde
Ecclesiae in 1990, Catholic colleges and universities have struggled to
enhance their Catholic character, to integrate faith and reason, and to
maintain scholarly excellence and academic freedom. Morey and Piderit’s
2006 work demonstrates that they are struggling without much success,
notwithstanding their public relations statements to the contrary. They
are, for the most part, stuck at an impasse. In chapter 8, “Implications
for Faculty Development and the Curriculum,” I attempt to move the
discussions forward and offer some general, but practical, suggestions for
improving Catholic institutions.
A few clarifications about terms used in this book are in order. First,
by “university” I mean Catholic higher education generally, both Catholic
research universities and Catholic liberal arts colleges. I believe the prin-
ciples I advocate are applicable to all, though colleges and universities may
certainly adopt and incorporate them differently. My proposals are aimed
primarily at undergraduate rather than graduate education, though I
believe the principles may also be applied, in appropriate disciplines, at the
graduate level. Among these Catholic colleges and universities, I have some
in mind more than others. Catholic higher education is not monolithic:
there are research universities and liberal arts colleges; there are traditional,
conservative colleges and more liberal, pluralistic institutions. Some have
the liberal arts at their core, while others focus more on professional train-
ing. Morey and Piderit have developed a typology of the various kinds of
Catholic institutions of higher education: (1) Catholic immersion universi-
ties, (2) Catholic persuasion universities, (3) Catholic cohort universities,
and (4) Catholic diaspora universities.
Catholic immersion universities seek to be pervasively Catholic; to
recruit committed Catholic students, faculty, and administrators; and
to thoroughly integrate spiritual, moral, and academic life. Residential
dorm life is expected to follow church teachings, and students are strongly
encouraged to attend Mass regularly. These universities, though now few in
number, seek to create a strong Catholic culture amid a secularized—and,
18 Academic Freedom
I might add, increasingly pagan—society.46 Examples of immersion uni-
versities are Franciscan University of Stuebenville (Ohio), Ave Maria
University (Florida), Thomas Aquinas College (California), and Thomas
More College of Liberal Arts (New Hampshire).
Catholic persuasion universities attempt to appeal to both Catholic
and non-Catholic students and faculty and to present the teachings of the
Catholic faith gently but persuasively while respecting and fostering the
pluralism of modern intellectual, cultural, and religious life.47 They are
concerned with conforming to mainstream academic standards and trends
within American higher education generally, but they seek to add a signifi-
cant Catholic component to that education and to maintain a majority of
Catholics on the faculty and in the student body. Most mainstream Catholic
colleges and universities belong in this category: most Jesuit colleges and
universities, the University of Notre Dame, St. Bonaventure University,
the Catholic University of America, and the majority of Catholic liberal
arts colleges that do not fit into the immersion type.
The Catholic diaspora and cohort universities are characterized by
increasing dilution of Catholic teachings and identity. Demographically,
only a minority of students and faculty are Catholic, but these institu-
tions seek to give students at least some background knowledge of Catholic
teachings. They also seek to instill in their students moral values that are
consonant with church teachings in the hope that students will carry these
values into life after graduation.
It is the Catholic persuasion universities that I have primarily in mind
in this book. They have moved, to varying degrees, down the path toward
secularization and are struggling today to define and strengthen their
Catholic character. Many of the changes these institutions have made
during the past four decades—openness to and engagement with modern
thought, respect for and fostering of pluralism, ecumenism, and a dra-
matic increase in academic quality—have unquestionably been benefi-
cial. Nonetheless, by most accounts—and by their own admission—these
institutions are in an uphill battle to maintain their Catholic character.48
I believe my proposals will be equally useful for the more traditional,
immersion universities, though their challenges are different. In their case,
it is not secularization and loss of Catholic identity that they must struggle
against but heteronomous tendencies and resistance to a serious engage-
ment with modern life, thought, and culture.
Second, a disclaimer is in order. In parts of this book, I critique the cur-
rent state of Catholic higher education, leaving me open to the suspicion
that I might be working from a conservative, pre-Vatican II perspective.
I am not. I do not long for some “golden age” of Catholic higher educa-
tion that, in fact, did not exist. I do not think a return to neoscholastic
The State of Catholic Higher Education 19
dominance is the answer to what ails Catholic higher education. On the
contrary, I believe neoscholasticism had many defects, and it is no surprise
that many Catholic educators rebelled against it after the Second Vatican
Council. So while I criticize some aspects of the contemporary Catholic
university scene, I praise others. I also criticize many aspects of Catholic
higher education prior to the Second Vatican Council, while I commend
others. My goal is to draw on the best of the Catholic tradition (and other
traditions) in hopes we might move beyond the conventional conservative-
liberal dichotomy that characterizes much discussion of Catholic universi-
ties today.
I draw on Catholic thinkers throughout the tradition, even from tra-
ditions within Christian history that many consider rival or incompat-
ible traditions (e.g., Augustinian and Thomistic, Nouvelle Theologie and
Transcendental Thomism). In spite of differences in their approaches,
they have far more in common than in what separates them, and I draw
on the commonalities to frame the argument of this book. Rival schools
of thought in the Catholic tradition argue over how knowledge of God
becomes known to us. Do we have direct access to divine illumination,
or does illumination come only through institutionalized mediation and
special revelation? Is knowledge of God immediate or remote? Is it some-
how connatural to us, even if only unthematically and implicitly—as the
presupposition of all search for truth—or must it come in mediated form,
through the church’s avenues of grace? Does this illumination arise at the
beginning of our search for truth or at the end? Or both?
Countless volumes have been written on these questions, and I have no
intention of rehearsing the controversies or taking sides. Both perspective
contain valid elements. Catholic thinkers from the Patristic period have
held that God is present to the mind, unthematically and amorphously,
right from the start, as the source of wonder, the engine driving inquiry,
the criteria by which we judge truth from falsehood, and the direction
toward which inquiry ultimately moves. This view is more characteris-
tic of the Augustinian-Bonaventuran tradition. At the same time, what
is unthematic and dimly intuited, seeks to become explicit and thematic.
Therefore, a fuller understanding of God emerges only at the end of our
inquiry and searching, and even then, only through Revelation vouchsafed
through the church. This view is more characteristic of the Thomistic
school of thought. These positions, though they have different emphases,
are not mutually exclusive. Elements of both traditions can be found in
the writings of Thomas, and are present in both the Nouvelle Theologie
and Transcendental Thomism of the twentieth century. Both dynamics
are present in the process of knowing and understanding, as they are in
most of the great theologians—Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas, Henri
20 Academic Freedom
de Lubac, Karl Rahner, and Michael Buckley, on whom I draw equally to
frame this book.
Finally, a note about what this book does and does not cover. The
intent of the book is to formulate an understanding of academic freedom
that ensures scholars in nontheological disciplines the freedom to pur-
sue knowledge beyond the limited domain of their academic disciplines
(beyond Kant’s “island of finitude”) and move toward the theological and
spiritual. All scholars must be free to follow their innate sense of wonder
beyond their academic disciplines toward an ultimate horizon, or God.
The book does not address controversies over the relation between theolo-
gians in Catholic universities and the church’s Magisterium. The extent to
which Catholic theologians may dissent from the church’s official teach-
ings is a highly contested issue that has been debated exhaustively over the
past four decades, without definite resolution. It will, and must, continue
to be discussed. This issue, however, is not the focal point of this book.
This topic is complex and highly controversial, deserving of a thorough
separate treatment; indeed, it would require an entire volume to treat it
fairly and thoroughly. The more limited scope of this book should generate
sufficient discussion and controversy for one short volume.
Chapter 2
The Medieval Liberal Arts and the
Journey of the Mind to God
This chapter examines the ways in which three medieval thinkers—
Augustine, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas—conceptualized the rela-
tionship between the spiritual life, theology, and academic studies. Many
scholars today would question whether it is legitimate to examine ancient
and medieval texts to help illuminate our current academic situation.
Even Theodore Hesburgh claims that the medieval university was an alto-
gether different reality from the modern university. In order to build great
Catholic universities, he says, we must begin by building great universities
in “the modern sense.”1 After all, our mental and cultural horizons today
are totally different from what they were in the patristic and medieval peri-
ods. The horizons of the past may be of historical and antiquarian inter-
est, but do they have relevance for fashioning a Catholic university today?
Must we not instead bring contemporary realities and thought structures
to bear on contemporary issues? For certain, we must attend to contempo-
rary experience and realities in the work of Catholic universities. Yet in the
Catholic intellectual milieu the teachings of the tradition must also have a
place in any discussion, not as a trump card or a model to which we must
blindly adhere but as a partner in conversation. How then shall we draw
on the tradition for enlightenment and guidance?
Michael Buckley’s writings on Catholic universities can serve as a point
of departure. In The Catholic University as Promise and Project, Buckley
highlights three ways of attempting to understand the distinctive nature
of a Catholic university.2 First, one may simply describe Catholic universi-
ties as they exist today and conclude that their common characteristics
are what make for a Catholic university. The weakness of this descriptive
22 Academic Freedom
approach, says Buckley, is that it fails to take into account degradations
from long-standing Catholic ideals that may have taken hold in universi-
ties due to excessive accommodation to the zeitgeist. A second option is to
adopt a prescriptive definition or model, based on idealized characteris-
tics, which all particular institutions should seek to realize. The weakness
of such ideal models is that they seldom take into account cultural, eco-
nomic, and intellectual realities existing at any given time in history. They
aim to fashion institutions in conformity to some “eternal” or theoretical
model, which may never come about in reality.3
In distinction to these two options, Buckley argues for a third way, a
“dialogic” approach, which combines the de facto situation of Catholic
universities as they presently exist with normative statements of origins
and finality from the tradition. Drawing on Hans Georg Gadamer, he
claims we must create a “conversation” or “dialogue” in which “classic
statements of purpose, often from the past, are presented to the questions
that emerge from the present; and at the same time the present situation
is itself questioned and opened by the issues that these great and classic
articulations of purpose pose.”4
I will follow such a dialogic approach in this chapter, reviewing classic
texts of Augustine, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas to see what we can
learn from them. Can we find, in spite of the vast differences in historical
and cultural reality that separates our way of thinking from theirs, some-
thing in common among them that might serve as a conceptual frame-
work for Catholic higher education, something that will serve us better
than the norms and standards of the modern, secular university?5 I argue
that we can and that this norm is a theonomous approach to inquiry.
There is a dynamism in the movement from one academic discipline to
another that orients and guides us toward an ultimate horizon. Desire
impels us dynamically toward complete knowledge and truth, and it is not
satisfied until we attain it, even though only asymptotically. This concept
of limitless desire of the intellect and human spirit pervaded the writ-
ings of the church fathers and extended well into the thought of the high
Middle Ages.
Augustine: The Restless Desire of the Mind
For Augustine, God is the light by which all things are known. All acts
of knowing, including the sciences, are possible because of the Truth
that resides already within our minds. Because we are made in the image
and likeness of God, the eternal Logos dwells in the depths of our spirit,
Journey of the Mind to God 23
making us able to discern the truth not only of what lies within us but of
the world around us. God’s wisdom is everywhere and comes to us from
everywhere because the Word became flesh and dwells in the world. God
“externalizes” his wisdom in the created world, just as we externalize our
thoughts in the form of speech and writing or in creative works.6
The natural world points to God, yet before the human mind can even
know and understand things in the natural world fully, one must turn
inward, to the inner self. One can only hear and understand the “spoken
word,” or Logos, of the natural world if one tests created realities against
the truths within oneself. In other words, there is a Logos structure to real-
ity that the human mind can discover and recognize because that structure
is also in our minds, enabling us to recognize the truth of things when
encountering them in the external world. Without the image of Truth that
resides within each of us, we could not discern the truth of the natural
world. We would have no criteria to judge the adequacy of our concepts
of reality.7 Were it not for the Truth within us, we could never pronounce
judgment regarding the truth or falsity of any theorem or conclusion. The
eternal Logos, in Augustine’s thought, is that Truth. The Logos, or Word
is “the principium or the beginning point of knowledge”; it is “the precon-
dition of all scientia,” for all knowing.8
Inquiry must take us beyond knowledge of the natural world in itself.
Whatever subject matter the scholar attends to and loves, he must move
beyond it to the wisdom of God, which is the true culmination of his prog-
ress in knowing. Augustine here implies a dynamism in the human mind
that leads ever toward God, regardless of the subject matter one studies.
This does not mean that we neglect to focus our minds on the material
creation; we must do so to get on in life. But we must do it in such a way
that the mind’s attention is not limited to investigating and understanding
the natural, social, and cultural realms as ends in themselves. The goal is to
“do whatever we do in the reasonable use of temporal things with an eye to
the acquisition of eternal things, passing by the former on the way, setting
our hearts on the latter to the end.”9 There are traces of God infused every-
where in the universe, and anyone with an attentive mind can discover
them. Even the ancient Egyptians, with their “abominable practices” and
beliefs, were nonetheless able to mine nuggets of truth from “the ores of the
divine providence” that they discovered in the natural world.10
Theology and philosophy (which in ancient times included the natural
sciences) are a unity in Augustine’s thought.11 Intellectual work is always
joined and subsidiary to spiritual effort. Augustine distinguishes between
the mind’s knowing of finite reality and the knowing of the divine, and
he gives separate names to the different ways of knowing: ratio inferior
(science, or scientia) and ratio superior (wisdom, or sapientia). Scientia is
24 Academic Freedom
a rational cognition of the finite, temporal world; sapientia is cognizance
of the full or eternal Truth. The former uses the method of investigation,
the latter, intuition. They have different ends: scientia has practical ends of
improving agriculture, curing the sick, and building better societies, while
the end of sapientia is the contemplation of God.12 But while Augustine
was willing to separate these functions of the mind analytically, he insisted
that they are not “two parallel or concurrent mental procedures, nor . . . two
distinct and autonomous spheres of intellectual activity.” Rather, they are
“two consecutive steps in the only valid field of intellectual activity there
is, which is the quest for saving, divine truth.”13 They work “in a helpful
partnership.”14 We must not separate rational activity about finite things
from contemplation of the divine. We must look at the mind in its whole-
ness not its logically separate functions.
Augustine had high regard for natural reason, but reason was never “to
be taken in isolation from the illuminating activity of God. Even reason
wholly occupied with creatures and directed away from the Creator by the
power of the will is yet empowered by divine illumination to apprehend
the creatures which enthrall its interest.”15 Augustine’s general conception
of knowledge is that God, as the uncreated light within us, is that which
illuminates all that we know; is the Truth by which we judge the truthful-
ness or falsity of all things in the sciences, aesthetics, and ethics. As the
sun is to our perception of sensible things, so God, the uncreated light, is
the cause of all certain knowledge in the sciences. All intellectual know-
ing presupposes “the informing of our minds by the Truth apprehended
a priori.”16 Reason is never unaided in its quest for Truth. “The divine
informing by the eternal Word is the precondition of all scientia.”17 This
is true even though we are fallen. The image of God in human minds can
never be completely erased. There is always some awareness of God in our
consciousness, even if at a subconscious level. There always remains a trace
of love for the Truth, a desire for God.
The error that scholars commit is to use the divine light within them
to learn about the natural world through scientia, but then forget to give
thanks to the divine Light itself, and fail to pursue their scholarship
beyond the natural world to its ultimate end.18 For Augustine, reason is
flawed because our will and actions are corrupted, and until we can submit
our pride and will to Christ, our knowledge will always remain defective,
imprisoned, and enthralled in things finite.19
Full knowledge, according to Augustine, cannot be had through ratio-
nal thinking alone. Desire, or love, must precede knowing. This desire
(eros) leads to wonder, exploration, and understanding. Rational thought
is driven by desire and the affections, even though we may be unaware
that they are the engine behind our intellectual pursuits. The practical
Journey of the Mind to God 25
and theoretical functions of the mind are integrated, not separate, aspects
of the mind.20
Augustine discusses how the liberal arts themselves may be a path-
way to divine Wisdom, and his epistemological principles in De Trinitate
and the Confessions provided the foundation for his successors to do so.
Bonaventure and St. Thomas built on that foundation in theorizing about
the curriculum in the schools and universities of the thirteenth century.
Bonaventure: The Mind’s Journey to
God through the Liberal Arts
Bonaventure considered the spiritual life the foundation of all academic
inquiry, as he makes clear in The Journey of the Mind into God. I emphasize
this point because there is a common misconception today that the Journey
is directed primarily to those engaged in a spiritual journey rather than
to scholars in the academy. This misconception is based on the assump-
tion that intellectual and spiritual journeys are necessarily separate, even
opposed to one another. Today’s theologians often place the Journey in the
category of “spiritual theology,” appropriate for those on a spiritual quest
but not for academics in the university.
Ewert Cousins’s translation of the Journey helps maintain this miscon-
ception by translating the title of Bonaventure’s work to The Soul’s Journey
into God, even though the original Latin is Itinerarium mentis in Deum.
He defends his translation of the Latin word mens (mind) as “soul” by
arguing that our current word “mind” has connotations of purely cognitive
and abstract thinking, whereas the medieval word mens “encompassed the
soul in its three faculties of memory, intelligence and will, which constitute
the soul as image of God.”21 Cousins has a valid point, and we must bear it
in mind when we use the word “mind” in the medieval context. However,
translating the Latin word mens as “soul” is equally misleading because the
word “soul” today has a spiritual and affective as opposed to intellectual
connotation. For Bonaventure, the word mens integrates the intellectual
and spiritual. In the Journey, he was indeed describing a spiritual journey,
par excellence, but even more, he was describing an integrated spiritual
and intellectual journey for scholars in the academy.
This is apparent in the way he holds intellectual and spiritual effort in
balance in the prologue, in which he urges the reader to not believe “that
reading is sufficient without fervor, speculation without devotion, inves-
tigation without wonder, observation without exultation, intelligent work
without piety, knowledge without love, understanding without humility,
26 Academic Freedom
and study without divine grace.”22 These pairings, or poles, when analyzed
closely, reveal how Bonaventure sees their relation:
Reading is not sufficient without Fervor
Speculation is not sufficient without Devotion
Investigation is not sufficient without Wonder
Observation is not sufficient without Exultation
Intelligent Work is not sufficient without Piety
Knowledge is not sufficient without Love
Understanding is not sufficient without Humility
Study is not sufficient without Divine Grace
If we glance down the list of activities in the left-hand column, we see at
once that they are activities undertaken by scholars. Bonaventure is not
telling his readers to abandon those academic activities in favor of the
spiritual virtues in the right-hand column. Rather, he urges students to
integrate the poles. The Journey itself, with its elements of scholastic theo-
logical concepts and its motifs and images of spiritual journey and desire,
is an excellent integration of the two.
For Bonaventure, the liberal arts are more than a tool for helping us
better understand and teach Scripture (as Augustine taught). When
approached rightly, they are themselves a pathway to God. In De reduc-
tione artium ad theologiam, Bonaventure says that God is the source of all
illumination of knowledge in the world: “The manifold Wisdom of God,
which is clearly revealed in Sacred Scripture, lies hidden in all knowledge
and all nature . . . It is likewise evident how wide is the illuminative way
and how in everything which is perceived or known God Himself lies
hidden within.”23 By sharing in God’s light, we are able to investigate and
know the various aspects of reality on which the liberal arts focus. For
Bonaventure, divine illumination allows the investigator to better under-
stand reality in the context of the divine economy. This is the meaning of
the reductio: tracing all knowledge in the liberal arts to its source in the
divine light. It is the eternal light of the Godhead that informs the various
sciences, and so even the liberal arts, often conceived as secular sciences,
must be placed in a broader spiritual framework.24
The presence of God suffuses creation and readily offers itself to those
who study it attentively. Created things, says Bonaventure, lead us to God;
they “signify the invisible things of God . . . because God is the origin,
exemplar and end of every creature, and every effect is the sign of its cause,
the exemplification of its exemplar and the path to the end.”25 Therefore,
students in a Catholic university, even those in nontheological sciences,
should be taught how to be attentive to those hints.
Journey of the Mind to God 27
Bonaventure considered God to be present in our mental processes as
we explore the liberal arts. If fact, human creativity and intellection are
a participation in the very life of the Trinity in its own creativity and are,
at their core, deeply spiritual endeavors. Therefore, Bonaventure’s order-
ing of the various branches of knowledge does not present a curriculum
composed of “secular” sciences followed by a study of theology. Rather, he
demands that we integrate a theological dimension—what I have called a
theonomous approach—to the study of all aspects of reality and the vari-
ous sciences, both theoretical and practical. In this regard we can see that
Bonaventure’s journey into God through the liberal arts is an intellectual
journey and a spiritual journey simultaneously.
Bonaventure’s thought on higher studies is an excellent example of a
theonomous approach to the intellectual life: one’s entire being is suffused
with the divine light. That light both orients the mind’s journey and is the
journey’s end. His close-knit integration of intellectual and spiritual effort
combines both Platonic and Aristotelian Christian traditions, which were
sometimes perceived as antagonistic during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. Bonaventure’s contemporary, Thomas Aquinas, also attempted
to integrate these two strands.
Thomas Aquinas and the Natural
Desire of the Mind
A common theme in Thomas Aquinas’s writings is that the human mind
naturally desires to know God. This desire cannot come to rest in any
knowledge of finite things in themselves. The mind must continually
move forward to ever-greater knowledge of both the finite world and the
divine reality that generates, founds, and completes the finite.26 The intel-
lect does not reach its goal until its natural desire comes to rest in God.27
The mind has proximate ends toward which it is temporarily oriented.
Proximate ends in cognitive understanding possess real value. The various
sciences differentiate themselves according to their subject matter, which
is abstracted from the whole of reality and must be studied in accordance
with methods appropriate to that subject matter. Nonetheless, knowledge
of any subject matter, in itself,cannot satisfy the mind because that knowl-
edge is incomplete apart from its relation to God.28 The ultimate end—
knowledge of God—subordinates all proximate ends, and nothing moves
toward a proximate end except insofar as it is a step on the way toward the
final end.29
28 Academic Freedom
Jean-Pierre Torrell claims that, for Thomas, the natural human desire
to know the divine essence “is one with the very being of man, such that his
intellect cannot stop before being filled with the knowledge in itself of
the Being who is at the source of his [own] being and every being.”30 The
result, writes Torrell, is “an irresistible attraction inscribed in man’s very
nature to become like God in the way that an image resembles the model
on which it is made.”31 It is God’s free gift that awakens this desire and
prompts the mind’s journey toward its fulfillment.
On these principles, Thomas bases his view of the architectonic role
of philosophy (understood as metaphysics, or divine science) among the
sciences. The practical arts and sciences, he says, are valuable goals and
objects worthy of our attention because they are means to something
greater. Philosophy “is wholly ordered to the knowing of God as its ulti-
mate end; that is why it is also called divine science.” So divine knowledge
is “the ultimate end of every act of human knowledge.”32
The sciences, of course, have their own distinct subject matter and
methods. The fact that the ultimate goal of the sciences is always knowl-
edge of God does not mean that every act of knowing and each inquiry
into a given subject matter must explicitly refer to God, to the first and
final cause. Most of the time, students and scholars will focus on proximate
ends and secondary causes. In the overall scheme, though, the ultimate end
must be kept in view. For Thomas this is done sequentially, beginning with
the natural sciences and progressing to more abstract disciplines as the
student matures. Learning, then, is a continuum through which we seek
knowledge of different aspects of the one reality, the entire natural-divine
continuum, if you will. We begin with natural sciences because they focus
on physical objects in the world and are readily understandable to the stu-
dent. To study physical objects, we abstract them from their surroundings,
from all the other things to which they are related, so as to better focus
on the essence and function of the object at hand. Mathematics abstracts
lines, numbers, and shapes from physical objects and focuses only on those
abstractions. Philosophy abstracts the essences—the regularities, the con-
stants, the universal elements—from particular things to understand their
essence rather than their changing and accidental manifestations. So one
progresses through natural science to mathematics, philosophy, and finally
to theology. Each of these fields of study has its own subject matter and
methods. That does not mean, however, that we should disassociate the sci-
ences from philosophy and theology. Philosophy and the sciences may be
distinct from theology, but God is never far from the human mind. In all
knowing, said Thomas, God creates a natural light within us and directs
it to the truth.33 In De veritate, Thomas writes that “all knowers know
God implicitly in all they know.”34 This idea has similarities to Augustine’s
Journey of the Mind to God 29
theory of illumination, in which God’s light is the medium through which
all learning occurs and the criterion by which all approaches to truth are
judged.35 God is always at work in the mind.36 So much is this the case that
all perception of truth on the part of the human mind should be ascribed
primarily to God.37
Truth, said Thomas, is the conformity of mind to reality. All things are
related, ultimately to God, so cannot be separated in reality. The analytical
reason—what Thomas called the ratio —can abstract things temporarily
from their broader context and from the things they are related to. It can
prescind from considering their relation to other things and study what
things are in themselves, in their finite manifestations. That is what natu-
ral scientists do. The synthetic reason, on the other hand—what Thomas
called the intellectus —functions differently. It may distinguish the various
characteristics of things but must always relate things to essential being. For
“when that which constitutes the intelligibility . . . of a nature and through
which the nature itself is understood, has a relation to and a dependence
on something else, clearly we cannot know the nature without the other
thing.”38 Synthetic reason, or intellectus, places all knowledge gained from
the particular sciences into a broader philosophical understanding.
In Thomas’s thought, it is primarily philosophy that inquires into the
questions of meaning and the divine. But not only philosophy. “Really to
possess a science,” says Ralph McInerny, commenting on Thomas, “con-
sists not only of mastery of a subject matter but also in seeing its rela-
tion to the ultimate end of human life, such knowledge as we can attain
of the divine.”39 The basic and comprehensive principles that underlie an
understanding of all things, said Thomas, must be studied not only in
one particular science, that is, in philosophy or theology, but rather must
“be investigated in every particular science” even though they properly
belong to philosophy.40 The question, from a Thomistic perspective, is not
whether the continuum of learning should be followed to its full extent, to
its end in philosophy and theology. The question is how much the philo-
sophical and theological aspects should be integrated into nonphilosophi-
cal and nontheological parts of the curriculum in order to set the stage for
further studies in philosophy and theology.
The Science of Theology
Though the focus of this book is not on the science of theology per se,
Thomas’s description of how theology relates to other disciplines illus-
trates how he conceived the overall trajectory and goal of the curriculum.
30 Academic Freedom
Theology as a discipline incorporates the other sciences into itself without
becoming subsumed by them or intermingled in such a way that it loses
its character. Some of Thomas’s contemporaries feared that by using and
engaging philosophical and scientific currents of thought, theology would
be diluted or made to conform to philosophical principles. Thomas dis-
agreed, and he used the metaphor of water and wine to make his point
(wine being understood as theology and water as the philosophical sci-
ences). Theology does not mix water with wine but transforms it into
wine.41 By incorporating philosophy—understood in the medieval period
as encompassing all the sciences—into a broader theological framework,
theology transforms philosophy.
Thomas accomplishes this incorporation of all sciences into theology
within both the Summa Theologia and the Summa Contra Gentiles, in
which all subjects are subsumed under and viewed from a theological per-
spective. Both summas follow a threefold, Trinitarian framework. First,
they treat of God in himself; second, they treat of the coming forth of the
universe—of creatures, including human beings—from God; and finally,
of the “ordering of all things to God as to their end,” that is, the return of
all things to God through Christ.42 There is no subject matter that does
not fit into this order of things. Theology studies God in himself and his
relations to the world. The natural sciences—natural philosophy during
Thomas’s time—cover the physical universe, its forces, the motion of plan-
ets and stars, the way elements combine to form larger wholes, and bio-
logical life. The social sciences—to apply the principle to today’s academic
disciplines—study humans in their intrapsychic development, their social
organization, and their political structures and then attempt to discern
which structures will best facilitate human flourishing.43 The humanities
study the human spirit and its various expressions in literature, the arts,
and philosophical reasoning.44
In each academic discipline, scholars must study their subject matter
in accordance with the methods best suited to understanding one portion
of the continuum of reality abstracted from the whole. They must often
prescind from relating their subject matter to other areas of reality and to
the divine life. But if inquiry is not to be frustrated, they must ultimately
move beyond disciplinary knowledge to an all-encompassing theological
framework. Once they do that, the academic disciplines are transformed
into good wine.The entire curriculum of the Catholic university, therefore,
should be directed to theological ends, with all academic disciplines incor-
porated into a broader theological framework in which theology serves
as the culmination of, and framework for,university studies. Integral to
Thomas’s thought was a vigorous engagement of theology with non-Cath-
olic forms of thought—with the philosophical and scientific currents of his
Journey of the Mind to God 31
time. Thomas took these currents seriously, engaged them, and attempted
to respond to the challenges they posed to Christian theology. He did not
merely exclude, ignore, or condemn them. He incorporated them dialogi-
cally into his broader Christian thought.
The Autonomy of the Sciences and
the Mind’s Desire
How are we to square the medieval concept of the mind’s journey to God
through the arts and sciences with the modern notion of the autonomy of
the sciences? Is it not a settled principle that each academic discipline is
autonomous, with its own defined subject matter and methods? Are schol-
ars not free to pursue knowledge within their disciplines without taking
theological concerns into account? Is not the modern university founded
on this principle? The answer is yes, but a brief examination of the prin-
ciple underlying the autonomy of the sciences is warranted here. This prin-
ciple is not problematic in the abstract sense, but in the concrete, we must
bear in mind that it is not the “science” or “academic discipline” itself that
possesses autonomy.45
The sciences are abstractions conceived by scientists, who, in agreement
with one other, have decided to focus on, and limit their inquiries to, a
restricted dimension of reality. The study of that specific dimension of
reality and the methods used to study it constitute a science or an academic
discipline. We cannot, however, claim that the sciences are agents in pos-
session of autonomy: they possess no free will, desires, or goals; they make
no decisions on which they act. It is the individual scholars in those aca-
demic disciplines who possess autonomy and who have a right to freedom
of inquiry. This means they must be able to freely investigate the particular
area of reality that falls within the scope of their discipline in accordance
with the methods agreed upon by scholars in the field. This is what is
normally meant by “academic freedom.” Yet we must not lose sight of a
deeper truth: these individual scholars are oriented to God. In their minds
is implanted a natural desire to know reality beyond their limited academic
disciplines. The offer of God’s self extends to them in their total human
existence not just to some self-enclosed “spiritual” corner of it. The dimen-
sion of reality they investigate is not independent of other dimensions of
reality. The subject matter they study is part of a continuum, connected to
the whole of material and divine reality. These scholars therefore must be
equally free to explore the relationship of the restricted dimension of real-
ity that is the object of their academic discipline to ever-wider and deeper
32 Academic Freedom
dimensions of reality, and to pursue their inquiries to their ultimate end.
That means asking and exploring the larger questions about the relation
of a particular realm of reality to the whole, and to its divine ground. This
does not mean that every scholar must pursue inquiry to its ultimate end,
but that everyone must be free to do so, without impediments of narrow
disciplinary strictures.
I believe it is more fruitful to speak of the autonomy of the individual
scholar to pursue his or her inquiries to their ultimate end than to speak of
the autonomy of the sciences. For Thomas, each science grasps its object
using a mental abstraction by which it focuses only on some features of
an object or realm of reality, while excluding from consideration other
features that also belong to that object or realm of reality. That does not
mean, however, that scholars should remain imprisoned in the realm of a
particular science, or even of several sciences studied in an interdisciplin-
ary fashion. Indeed, if Thomas is right that we have an insatiable desire to
know more, then every scholar is called to move beyond all disciplines to
the whole of knowledge.
Eros and Telos
The three Catholic thinkers explored in this chapter lived in very differ-
ent cultural and historical circumstances from ours. They wrote largely
for those dedicating their lives to a religious vocation rather than for lay-
persons, who today make up most of the faculty in Catholic universities.
Moreover, they do not agree with one another on all things. Nonetheless,
some timeless principles emerge from their writings that can be applied to
Catholic higher education today.
First, Christian thinkers must be open to non-Christian thought and
must display a willingness to discern what is good and true in it, even
while rejecting what is false. As a tradition develops, it must be able to
incorporate the thought, cultures, and practices it encounters into a unity,
transforming them, purifying them, and enlarging itself in the process.
This power of assimilation forbids any peremptory dismissal of ideas con-
trary, or even foreign, to one’s tradition. There is no justification in the
Christian tradition for closing our minds to the streams of thought in the
surrounding culture, no matter how unsettling those streams may be.46
We must study and know those streams of thought, feel their sway over us,
and finally discern their flaws and know where they contradict Christian
principles. Then we must appropriate what accords with the tradition and
reject what is corrupt and pernicious.
Journey of the Mind to God 33
Second, desire, or eros, guides intellectual inquiry. There is no such
thing as disinterested scholarship unmoved by some dynamism.
Third, and following logically on the second principle, there is a telos to
intellectual inquiry that takes one beyond the finite, a goal toward which
eros moves. That goal is a comprehensive, ever-widening realm of knowl-
edge that terminates only when we gain a knowledge of God, or wisdom.
Fourth, any inquiry that stops short of that ultimate goal must be con-
sidered an aborted instance of the intellectual drive desiring to come to
full term.
Finally, one cannot reach that goal without integrating spiritual and
intellectual effort. In none of these authors do we find the idea of a uni-
versity (or school of higher learning) with purely secular learning uncon-
nected to spiritual effort and limited to the finite, temporal realm. There
is a telos to academic inquiry that incorporates proximate ends of a specific
academic discipline, but also leads to an ultimate end—God.
By insisting that we begin with the autonomy of the academic disci-
plines, as understood in the modern, Kantian sense, Catholic universities
are at a disadvantage, for in that modern university, theology and spiritual-
ity are already proscribed, and the individual sciences are considered totally
autonomous and unrelated to theology.47 By overdetermining the founda-
tional role of autonomy, the engagement of theology with other academic
disciplines that many Catholic educators advocate rarely occurs. The ideal
of an education completed by philosophy and theology sits side by side
with different and often contradictory principles: increasing specialization
and the fragmentation of knowledge; independence of the empirical sci-
ences from any philosophical or theological framework; research as the
dominant goal of the scholar to the neglect of teaching and integrative
knowledge; and the use of strictly disciplinary criteria rather than broader
philosophical criteria in judging scholarly competence, teaching, and
research.
Appropriating the wisdom of the tradition does not mean reverting to
a curricular form that existed in earlier periods. We must, as Hesburgh
insists, take the modern university seriously. At the same time, we must
keep the realities of the modern university in creative dialogue with wis-
dom from the past. This dialogue with tradition is the Catholic way.
Chapter 3
Berlin: The Prototype of the
Modern University
In the previous chapter I examined the thought of three medieval thinkers
in order to discover if there are principles from the Catholic tradition that
can help inform Catholic higher education today. In doing so, I made clear
that ideals from the past must not be used to hinder or suppress knowledge
and inquiry in the present. Nor can we merely replicate curricular forms
from the past, such as the trivium and quadrivium or the Ratio studiorum
as models for today. We must draw on principles from the tradition, but
we must also build on universities as they exist in the modern world, and
that means taking core principles of the modern university seriously. But
which core principles?
The University of Berlin is universally considered the first modern
research university, and its founding in 1810 provides us with a logical
starting point for discussing the nature of the modern university and the
modern ideal of academic freedom during their formative stages. All subse-
quent research universities were, to some extent, modeled on Berlin. In this
chapter I will explore the philosophical principles underlying the founding
of Berlin, focusing particularly on the unity of knowledge (i.e., the relation
of specialized knowledge to the whole of knowledge), academic freedom,
and the role of theonomous thinking in specialized academic disciplines.
My purpose is not to propose the University of Berlin or German Idealism
as the paradigm for the modern Catholic university; rather, it is to demon-
strate that the “modern university” has a deeper, and even more spiritual,
foundation than that which has developed in American higher education.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, German intel-
lectuals recognized the need for serious reform of existing universities
36 Academic Freedom
for a number of pressing reasons. New developments in science and phi-
losophy, and a growing interest in fostering research began to replace
existing views of science and philosophy, which were based on an amal-
gam of Aristotelianism, classical studies, scholasticism, and orthodox
Protestantism. Traditional teaching methods and curricula were no lon-
ger suitable for the spirit of the new scientific age. The new educational
theories of Rousseau and Pestalozzi had arisen, causing scholars to rethink
and transform teaching methods. Many Enlightenment thinkers wanted
universities to become purely research academies, with theology excluded
entirely, since it dealt with realms of knowledge inaccessible to critical
reason. Scholars and intellectuals therefore called for major reforms of
education.
Carrying out substantial reforms of existing institutions with entrenched
ways of thinking and acting was no easy task. The French Revolution,
however, had undermined traditional power structures and institutions,
and educational reformers in Prussia found an opportunity to create an
entirely new institution based on modern principles. The creation of
the University of Berlin gave the philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte,
Friedrich Schelling, and Friedrich Schleiermacher an opportunity to pro-
pose blueprints for an ideal university. In the first decade of the nineteenth
century, all three wrote brief treatises setting forth the philosophical prin-
ciples on which the new university should be founded.1 I will examine
these principles, the order of the curriculum arising from them, and their
concept of academic freedom. I will also examine the thought of G. W. F.
Hegel, who, though not one of the contributors to the founding of Berlin,
taught at Berlin beginning in 1818, attempted to influence its course, and
wrote extensively about the ideals of a university education.2
Berlin was founded on several principles that affected its organization:
(1) the unity of research and teaching; (2) academic freedom, encompassing
both the freedom to learn (Lernfreiheit)and freedom to teach (Lehrfreiheit),
which grew directly out of the Enlightenment principle of the autonomy of
reason; and (3) the centrality of the arts and sciences,3 with philosophy as
the architectonic discipline.4 Equally important, the German idealists were
concerned about the fragmentation of human knowledge, the severance of
reason and faith, and the detachment of the finite from the infinite, of
subjective from objective, and of thought from reality—separations within
the consciousness of Western thought that had been developing for some
time as religious thought became severed from philosophical and scientific
thought. How did they attempt to reconnect these poles in the university?
Which subjects should be included and which left out? How should knowl-
edge be organized, and how should the various branches of science relate to
one another? What is the relation of philosophy to other sciences, and what
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[10] Commodore Senhouse, who succeeded temporarily to the
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[11] In a proclamation issued in 1844 it was said, "Remember
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[12] It is impossible to review, however summarily, the events of
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[13] This convenient term, borrowed from the French, saves
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[14] "Mr Lay, who has been officiating as consul for some weeks,
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it ebbs and flows, daily sweeps up to his door; and all efforts to
obtain even decent accommodation in the city, where he is
entitled to demand it, or in any but this pestilent locality, have
been in vain."—'Times' Correspondent, Hongkong, October 22,
1844.
[15] See this whole transaction described in his characteristic
manner by De Quincey in his brochure on China, originally
published in Titan, 1857.
[16] See Appendix I.
[17] See Appendix II.
[18] See Appendix III.
[19] See Appendices I., II., and III.
[20] The annual value of the whole foreign trade with China,
imports and exports, is now about £70,000,000.
[21] His predecessors had been governors of Fort William in
Bengal.
[22] Eastern countries send to Europe half of the whole
consumption of the West—China yielding 35 per cent to 40 per
cent of the entire supply, Japan 12 per cent.
[23] It is worth notice that this consistent opponent of the opium
trade during fifty active years should have come under the ban of
the Anti-Opium Society in England when the discussion of this
important question degenerated into a mere polemic.
[24] Import duty had been regularly levied on opium for a
hundred years, the prohibition of importation having been
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[25] During the last two decades important factors—such as
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movements of gold and silver that they bear no such simple
relation to the "balance of trade" properly so called as was
formerly the case.
[26] See Appendix IV.
[27] For interesting details of the smuggling organisation which
lasted up to the middle of the present century, see 'Smuggling
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[28] The modern ship carries 70 to 75 per cent of dead-weight
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combined about double.
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steel steamship as the permanent carrier, and the white-winged
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crews, numbering about thirty-three all told, equal to that of a
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"carrying on" under a heavy press of canvas.
[31] China in 1857-58. Routledge.
[32] The Fankwae at Canton.
[33] Apart from their liberality in the conduct of business, the
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favours, are so remarkable as to be incomprehensible to the
Western mind. An account of them would read like a "fairy tale."
[34] The Straits of Malacca, &c. By J. Thomson.
[35] The tonnage entered and cleared for the year 1898
amounted to 17,265,780, of which one-half was under the British
flag.
[36] Nomenclature alone sufficiently attests this fact—whether of
the ships that carried them or of the lands they christened, as
Natal, Trinidad, &c. The gigantic cross carved in the granite face
of Table Mountain (it is said) by Vasco da Gama proclaimed to the
wide ocean the sanctity of his mission. English adventurers were
strongly imbued with the same pious spirit. Down to our own day
marine policies open with the words, "In the name of God,
Amen"; while the bill of lading, which within the past generation
has become packed with clauses like a composite Act of
Parliament—all tending to absolve the owner from responsibility
as carrier—formerly began with the words, "Shipped by the grace
of God," and ended with the prayer that "God would send the
good ship to her desired port in safety."
[37] "Verily," writes Wingrove Cooke, "Sir John Bowring, much
abused as he is both here and at home, has taken a more
common-sense view of these matters than the high diplomatists
of England and France."
[38] Before the conclusion of his second mission Lord Elgin's
opinion of at least one of those whom at the outset he disparaged
had undergone considerable modification. "Parkes," he wrote in
1860, "is one of the most remarkable men I ever met for energy,
courage, and ability combined. I do not know where I could find
his match."
[39] Lord Elgin protested against the use of this tabooed term,
but took no exception to the statement as to his having obeyed
the commands of the Imperial Commissioners.
[40] 'The Scotsman,' September 18, 1858.
[41] It seems to have been a general opinion at the time that
Lord Elgin was deterred from proceeding to Peking by the
protestations of his learned advisers, who declared that his doing
so would "shatter the empire."
[42] Sir Hope Grant's Journal.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Vol. ii. p. 224.
[45] Peking and the Pekingese.
[46] Kunshan or Quinsan.
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