A Dictionary Of Cantonese Slang Christopher

Hutton Kingsley Bolton download

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-cantonese-slang-
christopher-hutton-kingsley-bolton-1710916

Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com

Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.

A Dictionary Of Classical Greek Quotations Marinos Yeroulanos

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-classical-greek-
quotations-marinos-yeroulanos-46096714

A Dictionary Of Vurs Vanuatu Catriona Malau

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-vurs-vanuatu-catriona-
malau-46394692

A Dictionary Of The Safaitic Inscriptions Ahmad Aljallad Karolina

Jaworska

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-the-safaitic-
inscriptions-ahmad-aljallad-karolina-jaworska-46827704

A Dictionary Of Proverbs Oxford Paperback Reference John Simpson

Jennifer Speake

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-proverbs-oxford-
paperback-reference-john-simpson-jennifer-speake-47471174
A Dictionary Of Albanian Religion Mythology And Folk Culture Robert
Elsie

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-albanian-religion-
mythology-and-folk-culture-robert-elsie-47548996

A Dictionary Of Interesting And Important Dogs 1st Peter J Conradi

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-interesting-and-
important-dogs-1st-peter-j-conradi-47562954

A Dictionary Of Mutual Understanding Jackie Copleton

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-mutual-understanding-
jackie-copleton-47988384

A Dictionary Of Literary Symbols 3rd Edition Michael Ferber

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-literary-symbols-3rd-
edition-michael-ferber-48075778

A Dictionary Of Atong A Tibetoburman Language Of Northeast India And

Bangladesh Seino Van Breugel

https://ebookbell.com/product/a-dictionary-of-atong-a-tibetoburman-
language-of-northeast-india-and-bangladesh-seino-van-breugel-48693006
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
 CHAPTER III

Foreign Commerce in 1865—The “Clyde” and “George W. Clyde,” and Introduction

of Compound Engines—Commerce of 1870—Merchant Marine—Lynch
Committee—Mr. Cramp and Committee—Lynch Bill—American Steamship
Company—Visit to British Shipyards—John Elder—British Methods—Interchange
of Methods—Merchant Marine continued—Dingley Bill—Defects—Act of 1891,
Providing Registry for Foreign Ships—“St. Louis” and “St. Paul”—Extract from
Forum—Remarks on Article—Committee of Ship-builders and Owners—New Bill
Introduced by Frye and Dingley—North Atlantic Traffic Association—New Ship-
yards—Tactics of North Atlantic Traffic Association—Our Navigation Laws, North
American Review—Mr. Whitney—Unfriendly Legislation—Mr. Whitney’s Letter—
Effects of Letter—Mr. Cramp’s Letter to Committee of Merchant Marine—
International Mercantile Marine.

The return of peace in 1865 found the country without sea-

commerce either coastwise or foreign. Such ships as had not been
taken up by the government had, with the exception of a few
whaling-vessels in the Pacific Ocean, been transferred to foreign
flags to save them from the ravages of Confederate pirates or
cruisers which, to all intents and purposes, so far as construction,
armament, equipment, and crews were concerned, were nothing but
British privateers in disguise. In the mean time England had taken
every advantage of the situation, and by 1865 had practically
absorbed all the magnificent ocean-carrying trade which the United
States enjoyed prior to 1860. American ship-building was at a stand-
still. The government at once threw upon the market all the ships
which it had taken up for gun-boats, auxiliary cruisers, transports,
etc., during the war. They were sold for anything that they would
bring, and they were bought up as a speculation by new companies
unfamiliar with the shipping business, and as a consequence they all
failed. The ships were obsolete or worn out and soon passed out of
existence. Certain coastwise lines continued to do a small business,
but little or no attempt was made to restore our foreign trade; first,
because none of the vessels which the government threw on the
market were in a condition to undertake it; and, second, because, in
consequence of the inflated prices of everything, any attempt to
compete either in seafaring labor or material with England would
have been absurd. Besides this, the whole energy and capital of the
country were immediately directed to an extraordinary expansion of
railway systems, so that the attention of the people was entirely
diverted from the sea and fixed upon the interior. For the next five or
six years little or no ship-building of any description was done
anywhere in the United States.
It was at this time that the Cramp Company considered it
indispensable to attach engine building to the construction of hulls,
as no satisfactory arrangement could be made to secure accurate
performance that involved two independent and diverse handicrafts
in the undertaking. They secured the services as engineer of Mr. J.
Shields Wilson, whose training in the I. P. Morris Company, and at
Neafie & Levy’s works had demonstrated his fitness for the post, and
as to whose methods they were familiar.
One of the first achievements of the new enterprise was the
design and construction of the compound engines for the “George
W. Clyde,” finished in the spring of 1872, the first present accepted
type of compound marine engines built in America. Immediately
following them in 1873 and 1874 were the four ships for the
American Line, the “Pennsylvania,” “Ohio,” “Indiana,” and “Illinois.”
The “George W. Clyde” was built for Thomas Clyde, who was the
first ship-owner to introduce screw propulsion in ocean commerce in
the United States by building the twin-screw steamship, the “John S.
McKim,” built in 1844, which he used in the trade of the Gulf of
Mexico and as a transport when the war with Mexico occurred.
Having built the first screw steamship, the “John S. McKim,” and
the first steamship with compound engines, the “George W. Clyde,”
Mr. Clyde responded with alacrity to the recommendations of Mr.
Cramp in favor of the use of the triple-expansion engines by building
the “Cherokee.”
The “Mascott” for Mr. Plant was built at the same time.
Mr. Clyde had formed the acquaintance of Mr. Ericsson soon after
his arrival in this country in 1839, just before the “John S. McKim”
was constructed, and became an early convert to his fascinations in
exploiting the superior merits of screw propulsions over every other.
The “John S. McKim” and engines were designed by Mr. Ericsson,
and built near Front and Brown Streets, Philadelphia.
Mr. Jacob Neafie, of Reaney, Neafie & Co., celebrated engine
builders, who began business soon after by constructing propeller
engines, had considerable practical experience in the construction of
the “John S. McKim’s” engines before Reaney, Neafie & Co. had
started business.
Mr. Ericsson had early secured the friendship of Commodore
Stockton, and had a boat built for towing purposes by the celebrated
ship-builders Lairds, of Berkenhead, called the “R. F. Stockton.”
Commodore Stockton had been already biased in favor of screw
propulsion on account of the invention of the screw propeller as it
practically exists to-day by John Stevens in 1803. Mr. Stevens was
the head and front of the organization of the bay, river, and canal
navigation between the two great cities of New York and
Philadelphia, of which Commodore Stockton was a member.
The successful introduction of screw propulsion in the United
States was certainly owing to the combined efforts of Stevens,
Ericsson, and Clyde.
Mr. Clyde was always to the front where new improvements were
to be made.
The Cramp Company, having taken the lead in these new
departures in engine construction at the beginning, have continued
to remain there. They have ceased to construct wooden vessels, sail
or steam, since the construction of the “Clyde,” of iron. This vessel
was for Mr. Thomas Clyde, and preceded the “G. W. Clyde.”
By 1870 the deplorable state of the American merchant marine
attracted the attention of the Administration and Congress. The
House of Representatives organized a select committee to
investigate the causes of its decline, with instructions to submit in its
report suggestion or recommendation of remedy. This is known in
Congressional history as the “Lynch Committee,” from its Chairman,
the Honorable John R. Lynch, Member of Congress, of Maine. This
committee surveyed the situation exhaustively, taking the
statements of a large number of ship-owners and ship-builders, and
while there was considerable divergence of views as to the sum-total
of causes, there was little or no diversity of opinion as to the most
immediate and effective remedy.
This committee, after thorough investigation and mature
deliberation, reported that, in view of the policy of foreign maritime
nations, particularly Great Britain, in the way of subsidies and other
methods of aiding and promoting their merchant marines, it would
be impossible for American ship-owners to compete with them in the
absence of similar expedients on the part of our own government. In
other words, the Lynch Committee reported in effect that the
primary requisite toward a resurrection of the American merchant
marine would be the adoption of a policy of subvention, or, as it is
commonly termed, subsidy.
However, while the Lynch Committee was logical in its suggestion
or recommendation of remedy, its investigations, so far as the sum-
total of the causes of decline were concerned, and its estimate of
those causes were incomplete and inconclusive, because it started
out with the dogma that the then existing depression of the
merchant marine was due wholly to the ravages of the war; and it
did not take into account the correlative or co-operative facts of the
situation, which were much broader and deeper in their application
and effect than the mere suspension or destruction of our merchant
marine by the war itself. In other words, the Lynch Committee failed
to grasp or appreciate the fact that, while the war was wrecking our
sea-going commerce, foreign maritime powers, and particularly the
English, were making the most gigantic efforts not only to take the
place of our ruined trade, but also to provide for a perpetuity of the
substitution, so that at any time between the close of the war and
the investigations of the Lynch Committee it had become impossible
for an American ship-owner to operate a ship or a line of ships in
any route of ocean traffic. By means of liberal subsidies under the
guise of mail pay, the British had in the interim covered every sea-
road and appropriated every channel of ocean commerce. This fact
the Lynch Committee seems to have ignored, although it was really
the prime factor in the situation, as it stood in 1870. Mr. Cramp, in
his statement before the Lynch Committee, went altogether out of
the beaten path pursued by most of the other ship-builders or ship-
owners who appeared. He said in effect that while the Civil War had
been an immediate cause of the destruction of our merchant marine
as it existed at the beginning of that struggle, still that was purely a
physical cause, and in the absence of other causes need not operate
after the war ended.
He called attention to the fact that the war had now been ended
five years, but that the condition of our merchant marine,
particularly in foreign trade, remained as pitiable as it had been in
the height of the struggle. This he said argued the existence of other
and more lasting causes than the simple destruction by war, whether
by the government taking up our merchant-ships for its own use, or
by the transfer of a great many of them to foreign flags to get the
benefit of neutrality, or by the actual depredations of Anglo-
Confederate privateers.
He explained that during our misfortune the English took every
advantage in the way of appropriating to themselves and to their
own ships the traffic which our ships had formerly carried; that when
the war closed, they had absolute command of the ocean-carrying
trade, our own as well as theirs.
 He said that not only did the British government subsidize and
otherwise aid their ships and ship-owners, but that they also brought
to bear all the tremendous resources of their navy to help and
encourage British ship-builders. Notwithstanding her enormous and
well-equipped public dock-yards, the English government built a very
large percentage of its hull construction in private shipyards, and not
only that, but all their marine-engine work was let out by contract to
private engine-builders, mainly independent establishments.
He stated that the result of this policy had been to develop the
industry of marine engine building in Great Britain to a degree
unknown anywhere else in the world.
On the contrary, our own government had done little for its navy
since the war, and what little it had done had been carried out
entirely in navy-yards.
This not only deprived private ship-building of the kind of aid and
encouragement which England lavished upon her private shipyards
and engine-shops, but the navy-yards themselves were a constant
menace to the good order and content of mechanics working in
private shipyards.
Moreover, he said that the same class of mechanics who,
immediately prior to the war, worked for $1.75 a day, now (1870)
demanded and received $3.00 to $3.50 a day; whereas ship-building
wages remained the same in England as in 1860.
He warned the committee that the day of wooden ships,
particularly steamships, was past, and that the iron ship had come to
stay, not only in England but everywhere else in the world.
He said that to enable the business of building iron ships and
heavy marine machinery to become firmly established in this
country, a very large amount of manufacturing machinery must be
supplied, and in view of the present outlook no one would invest any
considerable amount of capital in that direction without assurance of
some aid and encouragement from the government similar to that
which England rendered to her ship-building industry.
 He then dwelt at considerable length upon the demoralization
among mechanics produced by the government’s policy in confining
its naval construction to the navy-yards.
He reviewed briefly the struggle between the Cunard and Collins
Lines prior to 1858, and showed conclusively that the downfall of the
American Collins Line was due to the persistent and constantly
increasing subsidies lavished by the British government upon the
Cunard Line, which our government in 1858 met by withdrawing the
Collins subsidy and giving them instead the sea and inland postage
on mail matter actually carried. In this respect he said Congress
indirectly came to the aid of the Cunard Line and helped it to
overthrow the Collins Line. He hoped that the committee would give
these particular facts their earnest attention. He said that they did
not require deep or intricate investigation, because they were
matters of common notoriety, known to everybody who was at all
conversant with the commercial history of the country.
The admission of material for building iron ships free of duty, he
said, would be an advantage, of course, and many believed that if
our ship-builders could be relieved from the tariff and get their
material free they could compete successfully with foreign builders;
but the difference in wages was too great to be entirely overcome by
the mere admission of materials duty free. As for materials, he
would always prefer American iron for the construction of ships to
foreign iron, provided it could be got at the same, or very nearly the
same, price. There were many inconveniences, he said, attendant
upon sending abroad for iron plates. He informed the committee
that it was necessary to get the form of every plate and have it
sketched before it was ordered, and if, after doing that, we must
send abroad to have them made, very great inconvenience and
delay would result.
This statement of Mr. Cramp before the Lynch Committee, of
which the foregoing is only a synopsis, was really the key-note to all
subsequent argument in favor of government aid to American ship-
building and ship-owning. It presented the matter in a new light, or
a light which was new in 1870.

ARMORED CRUISER BROOKLYN

It might be remarked here, in referring to his statement that “the

form of every plate must be sketched before it is ordered, etc.,” that
Mr. Cramp himself was the originator of that system in this country, a
system of ordering plates sheared to sizes at the mill. (See
“American Marine,” W. W. Bates.) Until he established this
innovation, plates for building iron vessels had been rolled as nearly
as possible to the sizes required and then sheared and trimmed at
the shipyard. This itself was a very remarkable and striking
innovation, and was immediately taken up by all iron ship-builders in
the country, and is now the universal practice.
The legislative result of the first effort of Congress to take
cognizance of the condition of the merchant marine was the bill
introduced by Mr. Lynch, February 17, 1870.
Mr. Lynch’s bill, although it may be described as the pioneer effort
for the resurrection of the American merchant marine, proposed in
concise form and plain, easily comprehensible terms, without any
unnecessary verbiage or circumlocution, as practical and as sensible
a system of subvention as has ever been put forward since. It was
comprehensive in its scope, universal in its application, and liberal in
its provisions. Later bills, more elaborately framed and more diffuse
in their verbiage, have hardly improved upon the simple matter of
fact form in which Mr. Lynch embodied his proposed policy.
This was the beginning of a Parliamentary war between American
ship-owners on the one hand and the influence of foreign steamship
companies on the other; a war which has at this writing lasted more
than thirty years.
One subsidy was granted by Congress at this early date, that of
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company; but hardly had that subsidy
begun to operate, when an exposure of certain methods by which it
was procured brought about a great public scandal, which for the
time-being put a peremptory end to the whole policy.
Whether the charge that the Pacific Mail subsidy was obtained by
corrupt methods was true or not, the means in obtaining it were no
more corrupt than those which have been employed by foreign
steamship interests to defeat legislation in Congress favorable to
American shipping from time to time ever since.
Notwithstanding these discouraging conditions, a group of
Pennsylvania capitalists formed “the American Steamship Company,”
and decided in 1871 to try the experiment of an American Line to
Liverpool. They contracted with the Cramp firm for four first-class
steamships, to be superior in sea speed, comfort, and other
desirable qualities to any foreign steamship then in service. These
four ships were designed by Mr. Cramp, and built under his
superintendence between 1871 and 1873 inclusive, and were put in
service under the names of the “Indiana,” “Illinois,” “Pennsylvania,”
and “Ohio,” now commonly known as the old American Line. That
these ships were designed with the highest degree of ability and
constructed with the utmost skill is sufficiently attested by the fact
that they are all in serviceable condition at this writing (1903), over
thirty years old. These ships broke the record in speed which was
held by the “City of Brussels,” and consumed less than half of the
coal in doing it.
As soon as the construction of these ships had been awarded to
his Company, Mr. Cramp determined to examine the conditions of
marine-engine development abroad, and with that object in view
sailed immediately for Europe. His narrative of the trip and its results
are as follows:
 VISIT TO BRITISH SHIPYARDS.

“When the organization of the Company was perfected, the compound

engine as developed by John Elder had made its appearance, and a fierce
opposition to its introduction was made by engine-builders in Great Britain
generally.
“Its advocates were among the ablest engineers in that country, foremost
among whom was Mr. MacFarland Gray, whose unassailable attitude in its
favor in the columns of ‘Engineering’ vindicated its claims and successfully
established its introduction. While the idea was an old one and had been
introduced before Watt’s time, it failed, as most improvements do when they
do not get into proper hands to be developed.
“To John Elder belongs the credit of its permanent and practical
introduction into ocean navigation, and but little improvement has been made
in his work up to this time.
“Mr. B. H. Bartol, who occupied a high position for intelligence and sagacity
in the business world and as a practical marine engineer of the highest
attainments, was one of the directors of the new steamship company, and,
desiring that the ships should be in advance of the times, he recommended
that I should go to Great Britain and make an exhaustive examination of the
compound-engine question.
“Mr. J. Shields Wilson, who had been selected by me as the engineer of our
Company, which had recently added engine building as a department of its
business, accompanied me. Mr. Wilson had already gone very deep into the
investigation of the compound question, and had acquired a strong bias in its
favor; and he had already designed the compound engines for the ‘George W.
Clyde.’
“Mr. Bartol recommended the steamship company to appropriate $10,000 to
pay our expenses in the investigation, arguing that the money could not be
spent in a better way, and that they could not get another party better
equipped than we were to undertake it. He also stated that he would oppose
the construction of any steamers until he became convinced that they would
be of the most advanced type in everything that pertains to most modern
requirements.
“The money was promptly appropriated, and with Mr. Wilson I took passage
in the ‘Italy,’ the first trans-Atlantic steamer with compound engines of John
Elder’s make and type, whose reported performance in economical coal
consumption was considered at that time marvellous.
“We soon made the acquaintance of the chief engineer of the ship, whose
name also was Wilson, and Mr. Wilson practically lived with him. He was
permitted to take cards under varying conditions, and secured an accurate
account of coal consumption and of all other matters likely to be of interest.
“When we arrived at Liverpool, we visited the Lairds’, being the first English
shipyard that either of us had ever visited.
“We then visited every great marine engine and ship-building works on the
Thames and Clyde, beginning with the Thames, whose shipyards at that time
stood higher in the art of ship-building and in the proficiency of marine-
engine construction than the Clyde shipyards. When we started on our tour
we determined to adhere to a fixed policy and procedure wherever we went,
which was to frankly praise whatever we thought deserving of it and to
adversely criticise whatever we thought deserved such criticism; and
particularly to make no secret of the principal object of our visit.
“Our Company was practically unknown then in Great Britain, and
steamship building was supposed to be an unknown art in America; but we
were received with much cordiality and frankness, probably from mere
curiosity, if nothing else.
“Fortunately for us, we visited the works of Mr. Zamuda first, where a
capable engineer was delegated to show us around. It having been noticed
that we had registered our names, one as ship-builder and constructor and
the other as marine engineer, the Superintendent was anxious to have our
dimensions taken. There was no time wasted, and our questions and remarks
covering everything in sight or in the field of ship-building methods were
showered on him in a deluge. He had expected to get through with us in a
very short time, thinking that a sort of perfunctory visit ‘in one door and out
at the opposite’ would be sufficient; but finding that he had been mistaken,
he sent a boy out with a note and soon received an answer. We spent the
greater part of the morning there. When it became noon, he explained that
he had sent a note out to Mr. Zamuda, stating that we were well up in
everything pertaining to the business, etc. Mr. Zamuda’s reply was to send us
in to him when we were through. He received us with much consideration and
politeness, invited us to take luncheon with him, and devoted much time to
questions as to wages of workmen, materials, and where they were secured,
prices, character of output, etc.
“When he found that we were doing considerable in the way of iron ship-
building, principally coastwise, he was much astonished to know that most of
the workmen as well as Mr. Wilson and myself were native to the soil, and he
had much to say on the subject.
“When he had finished with us, and after we had informed him of the
purpose of our visit and that we wanted to see the principal shipyards in the
country, he stated that he would facilitate our purpose by giving us letters to
the Superintendents of the principal places; explaining that they would take
time to show us what was worth seeing, while, if we went to the office, we
would only be hurried through in a careless manner.
“It was due to this act of kindness on his part that our visits afterward were
so successful in the acquisition of valuable information, and as to the
generous hospitalities that we received. We visited first the Thames Iron
Works, John Penn & Sons, Mandsleys, and others. From the Thames we went
direct to the Clyde, where we visited the Thompsons, the Lairds, Tod and
McGregor, John Inglis, Elders, and some others.
“The consensus of opinion of the different shipyards on the subject of
compound engines was, as a rule, unfavorable. We found that the opposition
was principally due to the fact that the change from the old type to the new
involved important and radical modifications in the constructions of boilers
and of engines, so they hesitated to discard their old plans, patterns, and
methods, the value of which they were sure of, and to grope into an unknown
field of augmented costliness.
“Of course, these arguments to us were not convincing, and as we
advanced to the north we found ourselves quite biassed in favor of the new
type. Whatever doubts we may have had up to the time of our arrival at the
Fairfield Works, they were forever removed when we visited their magnificent
erecting shop. We saw there thirteen compound engines in various states of
completion, with their various parts ready for assembling, some about ready
for installation in the ship, the whole exhibiting everything in the way of finish
and arrangement both in their various parts and in the whole erection. Up to
this time we had encountered engines of the oscillating type, the trunk, the
plain vertical, and horizontal in every varying form and construction. It was
the same old story,—an old one before we left home; and now, without any
preparation whatever for it, this vision of thirteen actualities of the new
departure burst upon our view. We spent the entire day there, the
Superintendent affording us every opportunity to examine the parts and
discuss the subject. We found as much novelty in the boiler construction as in
the engine.
“An old Philadelphia boiler had made its appearance here as ‘the Scotch
Boiler’; this differed from the old one only in the thickness of the plates, due
to the necessities of the use of higher steam.
 “After this there was nothing to be seen, and we hastened home, and in a
very short time the Elder type of compound engines was under construction
for our new ships practically before any of the various shipyards in Great
Britain other than John Elders’ took hold of them.
“To John Elder belongs the entire credit of introducing and perfecting the
compound engine, and there has been but little improvement in his work up
to this time. MacFarland Gray at that time was a persistent advocate of this
engine, and his work on ‘Engineering’ was of great value. He took especial
pains to aid us in our investigations.
“This trip was a most useful one besides the investigation of compound
engines; it gave us an opportunity of examining every method pertaining to
hull construction and equipment there, and to discuss all of the problems and
methods belonging to it.
“Two great changes in mechanical method and practice in certain details of
engine building took place in Great Britain as a result of our visit, and the
arrival of the ‘Pennsylvania,’ the first of the American Line; although we took
no active measures in that direction.
“We found during this trip that the art of flanging boiler-plates in Great
Britain was entirely unknown, and that all British boiler-heads were secured to
the side plates and to the furnace ends by means of angle bars in the
corners, a crude and primitive method of construction. It was impossible for
us to understand this backwardness or ignorance on the part of the British, as
the flanging of boiler-heads had always prevailed here.
“We called the attention of the British builders generally to this superiority
in boiler construction, but little or no attention was paid to what we said at
that time; but when the four ships of the new line arrived in Liverpool,
draughtsmen from all quarters were sent to make sketches of the boiler work,
and of many other devices new to them, besides the boiler construction, one
of which was the use of white metal in bearings and journals. This feature in
the engine construction the British had not taken up when we visited their
works.
“We can claim to have introduced boiler flanging and the use of white metal
in British ship construction on account of our recommendations, and the
practical illustration of their utility on the arrival of the ships of the American
Line.
“The builders there, however, were very slow in the general adoption of
these methods. At first boiler-heads were delivered at engine-works flanged
by the mills that made the plates, and Sampson Fox added boiler flanging to
his business of making corrugated furnaces. Having seen a boiler furnished
with corrugated furnaces by Sampson Fox in England, I introduced them in
 two yachts built for George Osgood and Charles Osbourne, the first furnaces
of the kind in America. These yachts were known as the ‘Corsair’ and the
‘Stranger.’”

The construction of the four pioneer ships went on as it had

begun, without promise of aid from the government, which steadily
maintained its attitude of neglect as to the national merchant
marine, while hundreds upon hundreds of millions in the shape of
guarantee bonds and public land grants were poured out by the
Congress in favor of western railroads, but not one dollar for the
merchant marine.
Still, notwithstanding these discouraging conditions, Mr. Cramp did
not abate in the slightest degree his endeavors to keep the needs of
the country in the direction of a national merchant marine before
Congress and the public. A compilation of the articles he published
and of his statements before the committees of both Houses of
Congress would, on the whole, fill several volumes like this one. It is
therefore impracticable to reproduce here the actual text of his
arguments and his expositions.
Newspaper organs of the foreign steamship interests published in
this country denounced him as a “subsidy beggar” and other like
epithets, which was all that they had to offer in answer to his
deductions and arguments; but even that did not disturb the even
tenor of his way.
Finally, in the Forty-seventh Congress, a joint select committee of
three Senators and six Representatives was organized, of which
Nelson Dingley, of Maine, was chairman; and this organization led to
the formation of a new standing committee of the House known as
the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Mr. Dingley’s
committee spent an entire summer in going from point to point on
the sea-board and taking testimony and statements of all classes of
business men interested in any way or informed to any responsible
degree as to the condition of the merchant marine and as to the
possible or probable means to bring about its resurrection.
 The investigation of the Dingley Committee led to the formulation
of a comprehensive measure known as the “Dingley Shipping Bill.” It
was thoroughly and exhaustively discussed through three
Congresses, until finally, in the last hours of the short session of the
Congress ending March 4, 1891, a bill was passed providing for a
meagre and wholly insufficient subsidy in the shape of special pay
for carrying the ocean mails of the United States. This bill was not
only meagre in its provisions, but it was not comprehensive in its
application. It did not result in any immediate increase of foreign
tonnage. The following year, however, Mr. Cramp, in a spirit of
meeting the free-ship people half-way, agreed to a compromise
which provided that certain ships of foreign (British) registry might
be admitted to American registry, provided their owners would
contract to build two ships of equal class and tonnage in the United
States. This was the act by virtue of which the English steamships
“New York” and “Paris,” belonging to the International Navigation
Company, an American corporation and owned by American capital,
were brought under the American flag, and the “St. Louis” and “St.
Paul” were contracted for and built to meet the condition imposed by
this law.
The principal dimensions and qualities of these ships are as
follows:

Length between perpendiculars, 535 feet 8 inches.

Length over all, 554 feet 2 inches.
Extreme beam, 62 feet 9 inches.
Depth from first deck to flat keel, 42 feet 4 inches.
Depth of hold for tonnage amidships, 23 feet 2 inches.
Height of bow above water-line at load draught, 39 feet.
Number of decks, 5.
Number of water-tight compartments exclusive of ballast tanks, 12.
Gross register, 10,700 tons.
Load displacement (about), 15,600 tons.
 Dimensions of main dining-saloon, 109 feet 4 inches by 46 feet.
Dimensions of second cabin, 39 feet 6 inches by 56 feet.
Seating capacity of main saloon, 322.
Seating capacity of second cabin, 208.
Berthing capacity of steerage (about), 900.

ARMORED CRUISER NEW YORK

The propelling machinery is a pair of vertical inverted quadruple-

expansion engines, to carry a working steam-pressure of two
hundred pounds and develop from 18,000 to 20,000 collective
indicated horse-power. These are the largest and most powerful
marine engines ever built in America, and, as the principle of
quadruple expansion has never before been applied on so large a
scale, its results in this case have been watched with interest by the
entire profession of marine engineering.
Structurally, the art of naval architecture has been exhausted in
their design, and the skill of the best mechanics in the world was
tried to the utmost in their construction. Whatever may have been
their performance as to speed and time of passage, nothing is
hazarded in saying that in safety, seaworthiness, and comfort they
are not surpassed by anything afloat.
In the general public or patriotic sense the chief element of
interest in these ships is the fact that they represent the inception of
an effort to restore the prestige of the United States as a maritime
commercial power. The condition of affairs existing at the time the
new American Liners were projected was the culminating point of
our feebleness on the ocean.
The Act of 1891 was framed to expire by its own limitation in ten
years from its date. Taken in connection with the Act of 1892,
already referred to, it brought about the construction of two first-
class American trans-Atlantic greyhounds (the “St. Louis” and “St.
Paul”). Other companies or lines running to the West Indies, Mexico,
and South America were also stimulated to build a few new ships,
but, generally speaking, the effect of both these acts was limited,
and produced no serious impression for the better on the American
merchant marine in general.
This fact became evident very soon after these acts went into
effect, and it became clear that a broader and more comprehensive
policy must be adopted in the same direction if any great or lasting
improvement of the condition of our merchant marine was to be
expected.
This led to the framing of a new act, thoroughly comprehensive in
its scope and universal in its application, on lines similar to those of
the Dingley Bill of 1882, but broader.
Prior to 1891, Mr. Cramp had confined the statements, deductions,
and arguments based upon his experience and observation wholly to
hearings before committees of Congress, with now and then a
newspaper interview, which in the nature of things must be
transitory and soon forgotten. But in the fall of 1891 he determined
to place his knowledge before the public in a more permanent form.
This he began with a paper in the Forum for November of that year.
The limits of this Memoir do not admit of the reproduction of this
paper in its entirety. It filled sixteen pages of the Forum. The
summary of the conclusion, however, may be reproduced. After an
exhaustive analysis of the existing conditions and their causes,
together with a survey of the probable effects of the act approved
the previous March (March 3, 1891), Mr. Cramp summed up as
follows:
“The commercial disadvantages resulting from a monopoly of our ocean-
carrying trade by foreign fleets attracted public attention many years ago.
From the first there was practical unanimity as to the existence of these
disadvantages, and a like concurrence in the opinion that ‘something ought to
be done’ to improve the situation; but upon the question of remedy there
have always been wide divergences of view. It having been generally
conceded that the remedy must at least begin in national legislation, the
dispute has been simply as to what the character of that legislation should be.
A certain faction contended that nothing was required beyond a simple repeal
of the navigation laws, to permit the free importation and registry of foreign-
built vessels; and bills to that effect have been introduced, and in many cases
discussed, in nearly every Congress since 1870. In no case has a bill of this
character passed both Houses of Congress, and but once has the measure
received a majority in either House. That was in the Forty-seventh Congress,
when a ‘Free Ship Amendment’ was proposed by Mr. Candler, of
Massachusetts,—a bitter opponent of American ship-building,—to what was
known as the ‘Dingley Shipping Bill,’ and Mr. Candler’s amendment was
attached to the bill by a small majority. The result of this amendment was to
kill the bill. It is not my purpose to discuss the merits of this proposition,
further than to say that whatever increase in American tonnage might accrue
from it would be gained at the expense of the destruction of American ship-
building. That may be set down as an axiom to be observed as a necessary
factor in every discussion of the subject. As pointed out at the beginning of
this paper, the ship-building industry in Great Britain has been developed to
such enormous proportions, and the facilities of construction enlarged to such
a scale, that our own comparatively few and feeble shipyards would be
instantly overwhelmed in the competition the moment our market was thrown
open to them to unload their old and worn-out wares on American ‘bargain-
hunters.’
“This fact is now so well understood, that I think there is no hazard in
saying that a large majority of the best minds of all parties are convinced that
the experiment of trying to augment our merchant marine by a policy
calculated to destroy our ship-building industry would not be conducive to the
general public interests.
“The other mode of remedy advocated has been that of adopting, in behalf
of our own shipping, a policy similar to the one which has produced such
striking results elsewhere; that is to say, public encouragement to the
ownership and operation of American-built vessels in the foreign trade. This
subject has for many years claimed a large share of the attention of Congress,
commercial organizations, and the press. Its discussion has taken a wide
scope, involving several exhaustive inquiries by congressional committees,
numerous petitions and resolutions from boards of trades and chambers of
commerce, with almost innumerable papers in the public prints, and speeches
in our public halls; the whole forming what may be called the ‘Literature of
our Merchant Marine.’ Its volume is so vast, that but the barest reference to
its details can be made here. Suffice it to say, that it covers every conceivable
point at issue; and it has been so universally published, that no person of
ordinary intelligence and education can have excuse for ignorance or
misinformation on the subject.
“The results of this agitation and discussion have been bills in Congress
from time to time, providing for a more liberal and enlightened policy on the
part of the government toward the national merchant marine. Some of these
bills proposed special compensations to particular lines for carrying the mails.
Such bills have failed in consequence of the objection that they involved the
principle of special legislation. Other measures proposed a general bounty
based upon tonnage and distance actually travelled in foreign trade. This plan
at the outset seemed more popular than any other, and there was at one time
strong probability of its enactment into law. But it finally failed, partly on
account of clashing of diverse interests, and partly by reason of ‘party
exigencies,’ real or supposed, in the House of Representatives. It is hardly
pertinent at this time to point out the benefits that would have accrued,
directly and incidentally, to every branch of our national life and industry, from
a tonnage law properly administered. I have never hesitated, and do not now
hesitate, to declare that ten years of its operation would result in placing our
merchant marine in the foreign trade on a footing second only to that of
Great Britain in amount, and vastly superior to it in character and quality of
vessels. And I still hope to see such a policy adopted at no distant day.
“I have gone into detail to this extent because it seemed necessary to do so
in order to show that, loud as has been the outcry of ‘subsidy’ raised against
the act recently passed, it is still, as a matter of fact, less liberal than existing
provisions of the British government for their own ships already in the trade
to be competed for.
 “Thus far I have dealt with facts only; and I have been careful to avoid any
matter susceptible of controversy. In conclusion, I will venture a few
deductions of my own, based upon the foregoing statements of simple facts. I
will assume at the start that our internal development of farms, workshops,
mines, railways, coastwise, lake, and river commerce, etc., has reached a
point at which capital has reached its zenith of profitable investment in them,
and must look for some new field, not only for further original investment, but
also for the protection or betterment of investments already made. In my
judgment, our energy and enterprise during the last twenty-five years have
exhausted all the large chances of fortune within the boundaries of the United
States. Our existing industries of every description represent an enormous
volume of local ‘plant’ and productive organizations quite up to our local
requirements for some time; hence it is necessary to seek outlets for an
inevitable surplus of product, and, in default of such outlet, there must be a
plethora of production which is bound to result in stagnation, or, in other
words, national apoplexy. For this there can be but one preventive, ‘an ounce’
of which is said on traditional authority to be ‘worth a pound of cure,’ and that
is in the development and retention of external market outlets. It is my
opinion that we can never secure these until we can ourselves command the
avenues to them. Commerce has its ‘strategy’ no less than war. In war,
strategy depends on lines of operation and communication. At this time we
possess neither for either commerce or war. Our great rival controls both in
every sense of the word. To-day we could not even defend our own coasts
against her obsolete iron-clads in war, and we cannot control our own foreign
commerce as against the poorest and least seaworthy of her myriad of ‘ocean
tramps.’ If, for any reason, she were to withdraw from our trade the vessels
which, by virtue of our acquiescence, do all our trans-Atlantic fetching and
carrying for us, our peerless nation would be laid helpless under an embargo
compared to which that of Jefferson’s administration would be but a mere
trifle of annoyance. It has seemed strange to me that so little attention is paid
to this fact. What would our political independence be worth, if
circumstances, likely to occur at any moment, should visit upon us the
consequences of our commercial servitude to England? and in a less, though
still important, degree to Germany?
“This is a plain statement of fact that I do not think any reasonable person
will have the temerity to dispute. For the present I have only to add, that we
have done nothing as yet to lift this yoke from our necks. It cannot be done
except by restoring our merchant marine and our naval power to their former
status upon the high seas. The attempts thus far made in that direction are
but feeble. I am not sanguine that they will be strong in our time, but I hope
so. It may be that this result will not come until we have received a sterner
lesson of our weakness and helplessness than any one now anticipates.
 “This pitiable condition on the ocean is emphasized by the contrast of our
unrivalled power, resource, and enterprise within our own borders. It seems,
indeed, the strangest anomaly of modern civilization, that the most
enlightened, most ambitious, most energetic, most productive, and internally
most powerful nation on the globe should be externally among the weakest,
most helpless, and least respected.
“The sole remedy for this situation is ships with seamen to handle them,
whether for peace or for war; whether to carry our enormous exports, and
bring our immense imports, and receive therefor the tremendous tolls which
now flow into foreign coffers, or to vindicate the majesty and power of our
flag abroad in the world to a degree befitting our status in the community of
nations.
“There is no lack of raw material, no lack of skill to fashion it into the
instruments of commerce. We have the iron and the steel; we have the men
to work them into the finished forms of stately ships; we have the money to
promote the most colossal of enterprises by sea. All we need is assurance of a
steady national policy of liberal and enlightened encouragement, based upon
a patriotic common consent, and elevated above the turmoils of politics or the
squabbles of parties. One decade of such a policy would make us second only
to Great Britain on the high seas, either for commerce or for defence; and
two decades of it would bring us fairly into the twentieth century as the
master maritime power of the globe.”

These observations, though written and printed in 1891, are as

true and pertinent now as they were then; and they will remain true
and pertinent indefinitely because they embody the practical logic of
a situation; they point out the consequences it entails, and they
suggest the only remedy that has been approved by the cumulative
experience of other nations. The lines of fact are broad, plain, and
unmistakable. No one disputes them.
As before remarked, a quite brief experience demonstrated that
the Ocean Mail Pay Act of March 3, 1891, was both inadequate in its
scope of operation and insufficient in its volume of aid to produce
any marked betterment of the condition of our foreign trade. The
restricted nature of its application and the comparatively small
amounts paid were not sufficient to encourage the establishment of
new lines, the opening of new sea routes, or the construction of new
and up-to-date vessels under the American flag. One result of this
development was the formation of a committee, composed of the
most prominent ship-builders and ship-owners in the country, known
as the Committee on the Merchant Marine. Of this committee Mr.
Cramp was one of the originators, and always among the most
prominent and active members. Its object was to concentrate the
power of individuals in a concerted body for the purpose of
furnishing facts and disseminating knowledge with regard to the
condition of the merchant marine and its needs not only in
Congress, but also among the people throughout the country.
Hitherto the efforts of individuals had been exerted singly and often
divergently; but it was hoped and believed that, by the organization
of this committee and through the concerted action which would
result from its deliberations and researches, a harmonious and
uniform scheme might be brought forward which would ultimately
command the public support of all men animated by a patriotic
desire to see the American flag restored to its former proud rank on
the high sea.
The first result of this policy was the formulation of a bill based
upon tonnage and distance travelled. It was to some extent
analogous to the system then prevailing in France commonly known
as the tonnage bounty system.
When this bill was first brought forward, being introduced by Mr.
Frye, of Maine, in the Senate, and by Mr. Dingley, in the House of
Representatives, the foreign steamship owners or their agents in this
country at once became greatly alarmed. They had not offered a
very vigorous resistance to the passage of the Ocean Mail Pay Act of
1891, because their knowledge of the business and their keen sense
of the situation taught them that there was not much danger to their
interests in that bill. They made a show of opposing it, of course, but
they spent very little money or time and made no really determined
effort to beat it. In fact, the foreign steamship owners and the
managers of the foreign lines which were doing the ocean-carrying
trade of the United States realized before that bill became a law
what it took our people two or three years to find out. But when the
tonnage bounty bill was brought forward, with the general
applicability of its provisions to all kinds of vessels engaged in the
foreign carrying trade, and proposing, as it did, a rate of bounty
which would have gone far toward equalizing the difference in cost
of seafaring labor and subsistence as between American and foreign
ships, the owners and managers of the steamship lines[1] and tramps
that were carrying the commerce of the United States determined
that it must be beaten at all hazards and at any cost. This struggle
began in 1894. The original tonnage bill passed the Senate, but was
smothered in the House. The owners and managers of the foreign
steamship lines could not control the Senate, but they appeared able
to affect the action of the House of Representatives negatively, at
least, if not positively.
1. These managers of foreign lines proceeded systematically. Whatever may
have been the activity of their competition for the carrying trade of the
United States, they were unanimous in their determination to prevent the
growth of an American merchant marine. Acting under the guise of a
pretended business combine, which, for convenience, they termed “The
North Atlantic Traffic Association,” they raised funds, hired lobbyists,—among
whom appeared ex-officials of positions as high as the Cabinet,—and by
every possible means known to modern ingenuity thwarted every effort of
those favoring American interests, both in and out of Congress. This
combination has no reason for existence except that of organized and
systematic lobbying against American interests in the corridors and
committee rooms of the American Congress.
A similar measure was brought forward again in the Congress
elected with President McKinley in 1896, and the bill passed the
Senate, again to meet the same fate as its predecessor in a
Republican House of Representatives with a thorough working
majority, notwithstanding that the policy of aid to American shipping
had been a cardinal plank in the platform of that year, upon which
that House had been elected. The defection was almost wholly
among Western Republicans.
 BATTLESHIP NEW IRONSIDES

During the contest over the bill in the Congress under

consideration, the tactics of the foreign steamship owners and
managers, personally as well as through their hired agents, were a
disgrace to the good name of American legislation. They threw off all
disguise and openly lobbied on the floors and in the corridors and
committee rooms of the House to prevent consideration of the bill.
In that Congress there was every prospect that if the Senate Bill
could be brought up for consideration it would pass with some
trifling amendments, which could easily be adjusted in conference
committee. The whole strategy of the alien shipping interests was to
prevent consideration, which they ultimately succeeded in doing by
working upon the susceptibility or the apprehensions of certain
Republicans from the far Western States.
In 1898, the tonnage bounty bill in a modified form was brought
forward again; this time with a limitation of the amount to be
expended under its provisions in any one fiscal year to nine millions
of dollars, but it met the same kind of opposition that had beaten its
two predecessors, and it shared their fate, passing the Senate and
being denied consideration in the House.
Finally, in the Congress elected in 1900 and assembling in 1901, a
tonnage bill still further modified was brought forward and passed
the Senate. For a time it was believed that the alien ship-owners and
managers would not be able to beat this bill as they had its
predecessors, and strong hopes were indulged by its friends that it
would receive consideration in the House. Even up to the last few
weeks of the closing session of the Fifty-seventh Congress which
expired March 3, 1903, the Chairman of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and other advocates and friends of the bill believed that they
would be able to get a rule for its consideration even at the last
moment. But that hope, like all the others, passed away.

To go back a little, it may be worth while to remark here that the

national misfortune did not even end with the failure of these bills,
and the consequent continued depression or paralysis of the
American foreign carrying trade. There was from time to time
sufficient prospect, or at least possibility, of the passage of a
practical and effective law for the aid and encouragement of
American shipping to induce the investment of a large amount of
capital by sanguine persons in new ship-building plants of
considerable magnitude, whereby the trade as it stood was not only
greatly overdone, but the skilled ship-building labor of the country
was overdrawn. There seemed to be a theory that plenty of money
to invest in plant or to sink in unprofitable enterprises could be
depended on to make up for the lack of experience in the
management of shipyards and want of skill in ship-building labor.
The result was disastrous not only to the investors in the stock and
bonds of the new shipyards, but also to the entire ship-building
industry, as it had been developed on a practical and legitimate
basis.
 With the final failure of all legislation to promote American
commerce in the foreign carrying trade, there was no resource left
for either the new shipyards or the old except such work as the
coastwise trade might provide and the construction of naval vessels.
As for the coastwise trade, it was already well provided with new
and highly serviceable steamships likely to fill the demands of the
traffic for several years to come, so that little or no new work could
be expected from that quarter.
The naval programme did not in any year put forward as many
ships as there were ship-yards. The government itself seemed to
adopt the policy of fostering and promoting the new shipyards at the
expense of the old, whereby the former were overloaded with work
which they could not do, and they invariably became so hopelessly
delinquent as to make the time clause of the contracts an utter
farce. New shipyards, which had never completed a ship of any
description, were loaded with 15,000 and 16,000-ton battleships of
the most complex and difficult construction, requiring the highest
skill and the most approved experience in every respect to carry on
the work required for their completion.
It is not necessary to particularize further on this point, except to
say that very large and important vessels, awarded to new and
inexperienced concerns with a contract time for completion of three
years, could not by any possibility be finished inside of six or seven.
So the question naturally has arisen as to whether, in the formulation
of its ship-building programmes or in its output of awards to
contractors, the government really desires to augment its naval force
in the shortest possible time or to figure as a good Samaritan toward
new, inexperienced, unskilled, and needy shipyards, owners, and
managers. Such a policy is based upon the fundamental error that
what is called “plant” makes a shipyard. The real shipyard is not
merely ground, waterfront, buildings, and machinery, commonly
called plant; but with a thoroughly organized personnel in staff and
working-men; with a generation or more of training and experience
behind them. That is a complete shipyard. So far as mere plant is
concerned, the size of a new shipyard or the amount of money spent
on it cannot create a range of capabilities. The indispensable and
over-ruling requisite is the trained staff and trained men that are in
it. The lay-out of land, buildings, and machinery is but a small factor
in the operation of an effective shipyard. Another thing to be
primarily considered is that there are no enterprises of industrial,
railroad, or mining interest that can be compared with a large
modern shipyard for intricacy of professional and mechanical
subdivisions in its organization.
Every handicraft or mechanical pursuit is to be found in such a
shipyard or closely correlated with and contributory to it. The
grouping of these diverse elements into a harmonious working whole
needs the hand not only of a master, but a master of long
continuous training; and in the adjustment of the various parts of
the group, it is time, experience, and knowledge of the men
composing it which are indispensable.
Returning now to the main theme, it seems proper to explain what
the real bone of contention is in this struggle between the impulse of
American patriotism and the greed of foreign ship-owners. It all goes
back to the fundamental navigation laws of the United States which
prohibit the registry of any foreign built ship under the American flag
except in certain cases provided by law, which are not sufficiently
numerous to be formidable.
In their warfare against government aid and encouragement to
American shipping, the foreign ship-owners and ship-builders have
not met the issue squarely or fairly face to face. They have invariably
resorted to a subterfuge which is commonly known as the doctrine
of free ships, the meaning and significance of which are not
understood by the general public, and its consequences are realized
most imperfectly, if at all.
The phrase viewed as a glittering generality is seductive, and it is
regarded by many people as a mere proposition to enable American
ship-owners to buy their ships where they can get them the
cheapest, as the saying is. It is a curious fact that, with all the
learning and the so-called logic of political economists, they have
never yet, from Adam Smith down, clearly defined to us what really
constitutes cheapness in all its elements, or what constitutes the
reverse, or costliness. A mere difference in dollars and cents for a
given thing to perform a certain work by no means expresses the
difference. It may, and often does in fact, befog or confuse the
mind. A bad or poorly constructed thing may be called cheap, and a
good, well-constructed thing may be termed costly, measured by
dollars and cents, and yet practically, in view of efficiency, durability,
and all the other elements of desirability, the so-called costly thing
may be actually cheaper than the so-called cheap thing, both being
intended for the same purpose.
A free ship law, or the repeal of our existing navigation laws,
would unquestionably load our registry with ships cheap in dollars
and cents, but they would prove dear in everything else. In order to
do what lay in his power to correct these misapprehensions and
clear away this fog of ignorance on that particular subject, Mr.
Cramp, in the North American Review for April, 1894, printed a
paper entitled “Our Navigation Laws.”
In the course of this paper he called attention to certain facts of
permanent historical value which there seemed a tendency to forget
or ignore:
“At the time of the Franco-German War of 1870-71, even so sturdy a patriot
as General Grant, then President, was persuaded for a time that it would be a
good thing for our commerce, as a neutral nation, to permit American registry
of foreign-built vessels, the theory being that many vessels of nations which
might become involved in the struggle would seek the asylum of our flag.
“Actuated by powerful New York influence, already conspicuously hostile to
the American merchant marine, General Grant, in a special message,
recommended that Congress enact legislation to that end. This proposition
was antagonized by Judge Kelley, of Pennsylvania,—always at the front when
American interests were threatened,—in one of his most powerful efforts,
couched in the vehement eloquence of which he was master, which impressed
General Grant so much that he abandoned that policy, and subsequently
adhered to the existing system.
“I will not stop here to point out in detail the tremendous political and
diplomatic advantage which England would enjoy when dealing with other
maritime powers, if she could have always at hand an asylum for the lame
ducks of her commercial fleet in time of war. Her ocean greyhounds, that
could either escape the enemy’s cruisers or be readily converted into cruisers
themselves, might remain under her flag; but all her slow freighters, tramps,
and obsolete passenger boats of past eras would be transferred by sham
sales to our flag, under which they could pursue their traffic in safety during
the war under peace rates of insurance, and without any material diversion of
their earnings, which would of course be increased by war freight rates,
returning to their former allegiance at the end of the war. The lack of such an
asylum amounts to a perpetual bond to keep the peace.
“From the end of the Civil War to about 1880 there was but feeble effort to
revive ship-building in this country. All our energies of capital and enterprise,
as I have remarked elsewhere, were directed to the extension of railways in
every direction, to the repair of the war ravages in the South, to the
settlement of the vast territories of the West,—in a word, to purely domestic
development, pending which England was by common consent left to enjoy
her ocean monopoly.
“Such was the state of affairs in 1883-85, when the adoption of the policy
of naval reconstruction offered to American ship-building the first
encouragement it had seen in a quarter of a century.
“When we began to build the new navy, every English journal, from the
London Times down, pooh-poohed the idea that a modern man-of-war could
be built in an American yard, modern high-powered engines in an American
machine-shop, or modern breech-loading cannon in an American forge. Many
of the English ship-builders rubbed their hands in actual anticipation of orders
from this government for the ships and guns needed; and they blandly
assured us that they would give us quite as favorable terms as were accorded
to China, Japan, and Chile. And, to their shame be it said, there were officers
of our navy who not only adopted this view, but did all they could to commit
our government to the pernicious policy.
“In 1885, when Secretary Whitney took control of the Navy Department,
the efforts of English ship-builders to secure at least a share of the work were
renewed. By this time the English were willing to admit that the hulls of
modern ships could be built in the United States; but they were satisfied that
our best policy would be to buy the necessary engines, cannon, and armor
from them. Secretary Whitney, however, promptly decided that the only article
of foreign production which the new navy needed was the plans of vessels for
comparison. This was wise, because it placed in the hands of our builders the
results of the most mature experience abroad, at comparatively small cost.
But one of the earliest and firmest decisions of Mr. Whitney was that our naval
vessels, machinery and all, must be built at home and of domestic material.
 “The efforts of the English builders to get the engine-work for our new navy
were much more serious and formidable than is generally known. A prominent
member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs proposed an amendment to
a pending naval bill empowering the Secretary at his discretion to contract
abroad for the construction of propelling machinery for our naval ships. The
language was, of course, general, but every one knows that the term ‘abroad’
in this sense would be synonymous with Great Britain, and nothing more.
“Mr. Whitney promptly met this proposition with a protest in the shape of a
letter to the Naval Committee dated February 27, 1886. He said that, so far as
he was concerned, he would not avail himself of such a power if granted.
There was no occasion for such power; and it could have no effect except to
keep American builders in suspense, and thereby augment the difficulty of
obtaining capital for the enlargement of their facilities to meet the national
requirements. Mr. Whitney’s protest was so vigorous that the proposition died
from its effects in the committee and has been well-nigh forgotten. The
proposer himself became satisfied that he had been misled by the
representations of naval officers who were under English influence, and did
not press his amendment.
“I have brought these facts forward for the purpose of emphasizing my
declaration that the promotive influence behind every movement against our
navigation laws is of British origin, and whenever you put a pin through a
free-ship bill you prick an Englishman.
“The portion of Mr. Whitney’s letter referring to the proposed free-engine
clause in the Naval Bill of 1886 was as follows:
“‘I think our true policy is to borrow the ideas of our neighbors as far as
they are thought to be in advance of ours, give them to our ship-builders in
the shape of plans; and, having this object in view, I have been anxious to
acquire detailed drawings of the latest machinery in use abroad, and should
feel at liberty to spend more in the same way in getting hold of the latest
things as far as possible for the purpose of utilizing them. We have made
important accumulations in this line during the last six months. I think I ought
to say to the committee that I have placed myself in communication with
some of the principal marine-engine builders of the country within the last
three months for the purpose of conferring with them upon this subject. I
detailed two officers of the navy,—a chief engineer and a line officer,—who,
under my directions, visited the principal establishments in the East. They
recognize that in the matter of engines for naval ships we are quite
inexperienced as compared with some other countries. It is this fact,
doubtless, which the committee has in view in authorizing the purchase and
importation of engines for one of the vessels authorized to be constructed
under this act. If the committee will permit me to make the suggestion, I find
 myself quite satisfied, after consultation with people engaged in the industry
in this country, that it would not be necessary for me to avail myself of that
discretionary power in order to produce machines of the most advanced
character. Our marine-engine builders in general express their inability at the
present moment to design the latest and most approved type of engines for
naval vessels,—an inability arising from the fact that they have not been
called upon to do anything of importance in that line. At the same time, they
state that if they are given the necessary time, and are asked to offer designs
in competition, they would acquaint themselves with the state of the art
abroad and here, and would prepare to offer to the government designs
embodying the latest improvements in the art. And they are ready to
construct at the present time anything that can be built anywhere else if the
plans are furnished. As I find no great difficulty in the way of purchasing plans
(in fact, there is an entire readiness to sell to us on the part of the engine-
builders abroad), I think the solution of the question will be not very difficult,
although it may require some time and a little delay.’”

At this writing (1903), only eighteen years have elapsed since the
date of Secretary Whitney’s letter. The wisdom of his policy needs no
eulogy beyond the history of the development of steam-engineering
in the United States during that brief period. In fact, no other eulogy
could be a tenth part as eloquent as that history is.
The policy of Secretary Whitney was in fact an echo of the sturdy
patriotism that framed the Act of December 31, 1792, dictated by
the same impulse of national independence and conceived in the
same aspiration of patriotic pride.
Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.

More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge

connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and

personal growth every day!

ebookbell.com