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 GEOFFREY P. MEGARGEE

AR F NNIH
COMBAT AND GENOCIDE ON THE EASTERN FR

"Elegant~y--researched and written ... this rna _ _ ____ __ _

8 bitter indictment of force without accountability" -CHOICE
 WAR OF
ANNIHILATION
COMBAT AND GENOCIDE ON
THE EASTERN FRONT, 1941

Geoffrey P. Megargee

ROWMAN & LITTLEHELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham' Boulder' !'.'ew York· Toronto' Plymouth. CK
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Published in the United States of America

by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, luc.
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Copyright © 2006 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

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The hardback edition of this book was preyiollsly cataloged by the Library .. I' C .. n~ress
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Megargee, Geoffrey P., 1959-

VITaI' of annihilation: combat and genocide on the Eilstern From, 1941 CrtlffrC\' P.
Megilrgee.
p. cm.-(Total war (Unlllllubered))
Includes bibliographical references and index.
l. World War, 1939-1945-Cmnpaigns-Eastern Front. 2. World War. : ;'3~-
1945-Atrocities-Europe, Eastern. 1. Title. II. Series.
D764.1\138.5 200(j
940 ..54'217-dc22 200:'-':':' ;:- ...

ISBN .. 13: ~)78 .. 0-7425 .. 44R 1-9 (cloth: alk. pilper)

ISBN-lO: 0 .. 742.5-44S1-8 (cloth: alk. paper)
ISBN.. 13: 97S .. 0-742.5-44S2-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-742.5 .. 44S2 .. 6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Printed in the United States of America

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I29i The paper lIsed ill this plIhlicationmeets the millinn::
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 CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS VJl

LIST OF AHBREVIATIONS IX

PREFACE Xl

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xv

THE ROOTS OF THE WAR

OF ANNIHILATION

2 PLANS AND PREPARATIONS, 1940-1941 19

.'3 INITIAL VICTORIES AND ATROCITIES,

JUNE TO AUGUST 43

4 THE SECOND PHASE: EXPANDING

CONQUESTS AND GENOCIDE,
AUGUST TO OCTOBER 73
5 THE FINAL DRIVE ON MOSCOW
AND SYSTEMATIC KILLING,
OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 99

6 FAILURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES,

TO EARLY 1942 129

CONCLUSION 149
 CONTENTS

APPENDIX I The Levels ofCommallcl 155

APPENDIX 2 Principal German Army COlllmands and Staffs

011 JUlie 22,1941 157

NOTES 159

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 165

INDEX 169

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 177

\ I
 ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

Map 1 Army Groups North and Center,june 22-ca.july 31 45

Map 2 Army Group South,June 22-ca.july 31 49

Map 3 Army Group North, ca. August I-September 1 75

Map 4 Army Group South, ca. August 1-25 77

Map 5 F:ncirclement in the Ukraine, August I2-September 20 84

Map 6 Army Groups North and Center, ca. October I-December 5 101

Map 7 Army Group South, ca. October I-November 25 106

All maps were created by the author using the Xara X I graphics program.

PHOTOGRAPHS

1 Hitler with Alfi'edjodl, chief of the OKW's Armed Forces

Command Stafr and the Fuhrer's principal military adviser. 20
2 A military planning session at the FUhrer's headquarters. 23
3 A horse-drawn artillery unit. 25
 II.I.USTRATIONS

4 Hermann Goring, commander in chief of the LuftwafIe and

Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan. 31

5 Reinhard IIeydrich, head ofthe SS Main Office for Reich Security. 35

6 A Gelluan armored unit advancing into Lithuania onJune 22, 1941. 46

7 A German infantry column advances as a colunm of smoke rises

in the background. 48

8 Wilhelm Ritter von Leeh, commander of Army Group N ortll. 53

9 A Illotor convo), navigates a typical road on the eastern fl·ont. 57

10 Wehrmacht soldiers burn a village in the Ukraine. 66

II Hermann Hoth, cOlllmander of Armored Group 3. 74

12 Ewald von Kleist, cOllllllander of Armored Group 1. 83

1.) Near Kiev, August 1941: A heavy halftrack tows two trucks and
a car along a Russian road after a summer rain. 87

14 Heinrich Himmler (second from left), head of the SS. 93

15 Men of an unidentified German unit carry out a mass shooting. 96

16 Heinz Guderian, cOlllmander of Armored Group 2. 104

17 Erich von Manstein, cOlllmander of Eleventh Army. 107

18 Ernst Busch, commander of Sixteenth Arm)'. III

19 Gerd VOll Rundstedt, commander of Arm}' Group South. 112

20 German police take aim at a group ofJews from Ivangorod

in the Ukraine. 122

21 Walter von Reichenau, commander of Sixth Army. 125

22 Fedor von Bock, colllmander of Army Group CeHter. 1.31

23 A lone Germall soldier looks out on the snowy lalldscape
southwest of Moscow. 133
24 GUnther VOiI Kluge, commander of Fourth Army (and £i·olll
December 19, Arm)' Group Center). 139
 ABBREVIATIONS

AWA Allgemeilll' Wdll"mflch!amt, the General Armed Forces OtIice

BA-MA Bunclesarchiv-Militararchiv, the fecleralmilitary archive in
Freiburg, Germany
IPN Instytut PaIllieci N arodowej
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NIOD Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
OKH Oberko1l1111flJ1do des Heeres, the army high cOlllmand
OKW Oberkom1l1aJ1do dl'l" fYehr1l1flch!, the armed forces high command
SD Sidzerheitsdiellsf, the Security Service, the SS intelligence branch
SS SrllllfzslaJJel, a Nazi Party organization that controlled the
police and the concentration camps, as well as its own military
formations. Led by Heinrich Himmler.
USHMM United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

IX
 PREFACE

he war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was arguably the most
T important aspect of the Second World vVar in the European theater. By far
the greatest part of the German army-the vVehrmacht-served on its eastern
front, and most of its losses occurred there. Without that commitment and those
losses, Germany's ultimate defeat at the hands of the western Allies would have
been problematic. For the USSR, although it emerged victorious, the war was
absolutely devastating. Hundreds of cities and towns lay in ruins at its end, and
somewhere between twenty-five and thirty million Soviet soldiers and civilians
died. The death ami destruction resulted not just from military operations, but
because of deliberate policies on the part of Nazi Germany. The Nazis aimed to
kill ofl' a large proportion of the Soviet population, including all the Jews and
Communists they could lay their hands on. They condemned millions more to
death through starvation, exposure, disease, and forced labor, as part of an ag-
gressive campaign to conquer the east and turn it into a vast colony for Ger-
many's future benefit. These were policies in which senior members of the Ger-
man military took an active role, from the planning phase right through
implementation, and in the end their military misjudgments and inhumanity
both contributed to Germany's defeat.

:,\1
 PREFACE

The historical literature on the Nazi-Soviet war has suffered from two funda-
mental weaknesses, both having to do with the connections between the cam-
paign's military and criminal aspects. The first concerns the German army's rep-
utation. Sometimes, contrary to the popular sayillg, the losers are the ones who
write the history books. This was the case after the Second World War, when
Fonner German generals set out to shape the historical image of that conflict.
They succeeded to a surprising degree, and that success is nowhere more evi-
dent than in the popular understanding of the war in the east. According to their
accounts, the \Vehrmacht fought a heroic battle against the forces of a harbaric,
totalitarian state, alld fought honorably, or at least as honorably as it could, given
the nature of its enemy. Furthermore, the generals maintained that the blame for
the war ami for Germany's defeat lay solely with Adolf Hitler, whom they in-
sisted they served only because duty delllanded it. Responsibility for an}' crimes
likewise rested with Hitler and his Nazi minions, especially the SS.
The facts are thoroughly at odds with this version of events. Most senior Ger-
man officers supported the attack against the Soviet Union and believed they
would add to the string of easy victories they had won since 1939. They also un-
derstood, well before the first soldier set foot across the border, that this was to be
a diflerent kind of war than they had fought hefore. This was to be, quite literally,
a T'cmich(lIl1[!,'skril'g, a war of an nih ilati 011, in which the army would take an active
role ill pursuillg Natiollal SocialisJII's racist goals. l\Iorcoycr, ",hen Germall), lost
the campaign and the war, it would do so IIOt (111)' because of I litler's inadequa-
cies, but also because its military leadership made fatal mistakes all on its own.
How did the dual myth of German military genius and moral correctness
come into being? Several factors contributed. First there was the fi.mdamental
difficulty of sorting Ollt such an enormous, complex, and distant series of events.
In this case, a unique set of circumstances, having to do with historical sources,
compounded the clifliculty. When Germany fell, the Allies captured literally mil-
liolls of pages of reports, speeches, memorandums, private and oflicial diaries,
orders, and other records. Not many scholars had access to this material, espe-
cially at first, and those \\'ho did required decades to make sense of the jumbled
mass. In the meantime, the surviving German military leaders brought out their
own version of reality in memoirs, letters, interviews, court testimony, and his-
torical studies-soJlle of which the U.S. Army sponsored-in a deliberate efIort
to shape the historical record of the war. Their material added to the sheer
weight of the available material, and it also provided, naturally enough, a clearer,
more comprehensive version of events than the raw records could give liS, at
least at first. Historians were thrilled to have such a resource at their disposal,
and Illany of their works relied heavily on the generals' accoLlnts.

'\11
 PREFACE

The problem with this situation was that the Germans' storics wcrc flawcd in
many ways. Thc mcn who providcd them were not scholars and oftell did 1I0t
have access to the original records. Illstead thcy had to rely 011 their memories,
and memories are notoriously unreliable: they rest upon initial perccptions that
are subjcct to a host of biases, anel they become incrcasingly distorteel with time.
Additionally, the generals had much to hide, especially in connection with their
politics and the crimes that their forces had committcd, amI so they conspired
to deceive their audiences on some poillts. Thus, for reasolls both innoccnt and
insidious, their accounts constitute a mix of truth, half~truth, omission, and out-
right lics that has been difficult to untangle. Professional historians, for their
part, skeptical though they were, often did not pick up on the problems in the
Germans' accounts. They also had trouble developing a halanced view of events,
sincc Soviet, British, and American records remained unavailable, as did Ger-
man records that the Soviets captured. And finally, the emerging Cold \Var
shapcd the history to a si)!;nificant de)!;ree. 'Vith increasin)!; anti-Communist sen-
timent came a ""illingncss Oil thc part of thc public and thc military, cspccially in
Gcnllany and Amcrica, to acccpt thc gcncrals' \"crsion of rcality. l\ml dcspitc thc
cnd of the Cold \Var this trend has continued, unfortullately, to the present day,
when onc-sided accounts by men such as Guderian, von Manstein, and von
Mellenthin still find a wide readcrship.
Since the 1960s, scholars have made great progress in tearing down the
myths and disseminating a more accurate dcpiction of the Nazi-Soviet war.
However, the second basic weakness in the literature remained: an artificial di-
vision bctween historics of the military campaigns and accounts of the Nazis'
crimcs. In part this was an outgrowth of the German generals' ellorts, in that they
had done their best to pretend that the military operations and the crimes did in-
cleed have no connection with one another. Most military historians, building
upon the generals' accounts, have displayed only a passing interest in German
occupation policies; they preferred to concentrate instead on the exciting sweep
of armies back and forth across the vast spaces of the Soviet Union. Historians
who concentrate on the crimes, on thc other hand, have often displayed only a
superficial understanding of military affairs. As a rcsult, each aspect of the war
has appeared to exist more or less in isolation from the other, ,,·hen in fact they
were inextricably linked.
This work aims to bring those two halves together within a brief account of
the initial campaign in the east. First I will provide some background on the
long-term trends in German thinking and bchavior that led up to the conflict. A
more detailed narrative will follow, starting with developments after the fall of
France in the sUlllmer of 1940, when Hitler had to decide what to do next in

XIII
 PREFACE

order to win the war. The account will continue through his decision to attack
in the east, cover the military plans that arose from that decision, and describe
the battles that followed, up until early 1942, after the Wehrmacht's plans for a
single-season victory had failed. Simultaneollsly, I will describe the Germans'
political, economic, and ideological plans for the territories they intended to
conquer, the ways in which those plans developed in those first crucial months,
and the links between the military and genocidal aspects of the conflict. Only in
this way is the course of the eastern war understandable, because of the ways in
which the military campaign and the policies of exploitation and murder af-
fected each other's development.
VVithin the work's larger scheme, I am going to attempt to answer several
questions about the German leaders' states of mind. What beliefs, attitudes, and
mental habits did they take into the campaign, and how did the military opera-
tions develop as a result? More specifically, why did Germany attack the Soviet
Union to begin with, and why did its leaders believe they would win'2 How did
their goals and expectations relate to their behavior toward their enemies, on and
ofr the battlclield? How and why did those goals, expectations, and hehaviors
change as the weeks passed? The answers to these questions will go far toward
explaining both the brutality and the ultimate outcome of the Nazi-Soviet war.
I encourage the reader to recognize what this book is not, as well as what it
is. It does not present both sides of the story, for one thing; for the lIlost part it
oilers the German point of view. Although I have added some material on Soviet
intentions aile! actions, for reasons of space I could not go into much detail. That
is a frustrating reality, since there are some difIerences in the two sides' percep-
tions of the campaign that have yet to be resolved, and also because the work
cannot adequately portray the courage and sacrifices of millions of Soviet citi-
zens, without which the Nazis would have won despite their missteps. Second,
this is a work of synthesis, not original scholarship; it does not uncover startling
new facts so much as put older discoveries together in a new way, and so it de-
pends upon the scholarship of dozens of other historians. At the end you will
find a bibliographic essay that discusses mall)' of their works, which you should
consult if you want to learn about the eastern campaign, or some aspect of it, in
more detail than this book can provide. These limitations notwithstanding,
however, I hope that by combining the themes ofWehrmacht military operations
and Nazi criminality in one compact work, I will be able to help students and
other interested readers to better understand this crucial part of the Second
World War.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

his work could never have come into being without the help ofa great many
T people who contributed in any number of ways. I wish to thank my col-
leagues in the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, including Paul Shapiro,
Peter Black, Martin Dean, Patricia Heberer, Wendy Lower, JUrgen Matthaus,
Benton Arnovitz, and Severin Hochberg, for their advice and support. Many
thanks also to Christopher Browning, Robert Citino, JUrgen Forster, Tim
Hogan, Peter Longerich, Randy Papadopoulos, Alex Rossino, Dennis Showal-
ter, Alan Steimveis, Nick Terry, Gerhard Weinberg, and Karl amI Sue Wick, who
have all given of their time and expertise to help ensure the manuscript's quality
and its author's sanity.
Special thanks go to the series editors, Michael A. Barnhart and H. P. Will-
mott, who conceived of the volume and helped to shape it; to David Glantz, who
provided photos from his personal collection as well as many insights into So-
viet operations; to Chik and Laurie Shank of Shank Design for their help with
the maps; and to the team at Rowman & Littlefield, including Laura Roberts
Gottlieb, Andrew Boney, Lynn WeberJen Linck, andJenni Brewer.
The stafl' members in the National Archives Still Pictures Branch, the Impe-
rial War Museum's Photograph Archive, and the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum's Library and Photo Archives performed an invaluable ser-
vice by making those institutions' enormous collections easily accessible.
I would also like to thank my new friend Jury Tyulyubaev for reminding me
of the role that the Soviet people played in winning the hattie against Nazism.
My father, Anthony Scherer Megargee, continues to be a source of inspiration,
support, and keen criticism. And, last but certainly not least, my wife Robin has
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

reacted to the long hours, the stress, and the delays to other necessary projects
that this work has entailed with boundless patience and encouragement. All of
these people helped make this work better. Any remaining deficicncies are Illy
responsibility alone.
The views expressed in this work are the author's and do not necessarily re-
flect those of the United States Holocaust Memorial Musculll.
 o
THE ROOTS OF THE
WAR OF ANNIHILATION

o understand what happened in the Soviet Union in the second half of

T 1941, we could begin our narrative in the latter half of 1940, as concrete
planning for the campaign began. To understand why it happened, however, we
must look farther back, to long-standing cultural and ideological trenels, to the
First vVorlel War and the rise of the Nazi Party, and to developments in the
opening months of the Second Worlel vVar. In doing so we ,viII find that Ger-
many attacked the USSR because of a complicated mix of reasons having to do
with ideas on race, nationality, warfare, ami domestic and international politics,
influences that interacted synergistically to lay the foundations for the events to
follow.

DEEP BACKGROUND

Generalizations are dangerous things, and the broader they are, the more flaws
there are in thelll. To attribute a set of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to an en-
tire nation is to bring up endless exceptions. To then state that such attitudes,
beliefs, anel behaviors determined the course of a nation's history is doubly fool-
hardy, not just because of the initial generalization but because history is a thing
of endless contingencies and possibilities. With all that said, however, we may
speak of deeply held ideas that shape a nation's destiny, even if they do not de-
termine it.
In Germany's case, particular ideas about race, culture, and nationhood that
had been evolving since at least the nineteenth century laid the groundwork for
 CH.\PTER I

the emergence of Nazism and, too, for the eventual contlid with the Soviet
Union, in all its brutality. Put simply, by 1900 many Germans had come to be-
lieve in their complete superiority over other peoples, while they also felt that
Germany stood under threat from all sides. Foreigners, and especially the Slavs
and Jelvs of celltral alld eastern Europe, became the focus of increasing distrust
and hostility. A growing number of Germans believed that conflict with the Slavs
was inevitable and that the Jews, too, represented a mortal danger. One should
bear in mind that similar beliefs were common among European peoples in this
heyday of\Vestern imperialism and racism. Certainly, in their feelings of superi-
ority, the Geflllans did not outshine the British and French, and the Russians
also displayed their own special chauvinism. What, then, explains the fact that
these common attitudes took a particularly evil turn in Germany?
To a large extent, the answer lies in the experience of the First World War and
its aftermath, which amplified and sharpened some Germans' prejudices. Ger-
many suffered the loss of between 1.8 and 2 million mell killed and over .5.5 mil-
lion wounded in the war, while the home front experienced severe food shortages
and civil unrest. The continuing shock to the German system over those four
years would be diflicult to exaggerate. Mall), Germans reacted, ill part, with in-
creasing calls for conformity and with suspicion of anyone who seemed not to fit
in, such as the Jews. Some people suspected the Jews of profiteering and malin-
gering. The army even sponsored a 'jew count" ill 1916, in order to determine
what proportion ofJews was serving at the front. (The result, which showed that
a h/~he,. proportion of Jews than non~Jews was servillg, did not hecome public
during the conflict.) In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers
were gaining their first direct experience with the lands to the east, and what they
saw often shocked them. The Russian Empire, which included part of the old
Polish state, contained a large rural population that was terribly poor by German
standards, and the dislocations and disruptions of war made conditions worse.
The local population, Jew and gentile alike, seemed alien and primitive to the
Germans. Under the comhined influence of prejudice and experience, many
German soldiers saw the eastern peoples as latently crimillal, inferior, dirty, and
diseased. From the top command down, many believed that their role was to
bring "civilization" to the region, but that mission gave way in part to feelings of
frustration, hopelessness, ami disgust as attempts to "reform" the inhabitants-
attempts that were often clumsy, offellsive, and even brutal-failed. Many Ger-
mallS concluded that the easterners were beyond reforming, and that filture at-
tempts to control the area would have to take a more absolute form.
The war's end in November 1918 was an additional, terrible hlow to the Ger-
lIIan nation. For four years the army high cOlllmand had assured the country that
 TilE Il 0 () T S () F TilE W.l R 0 F .l 1'i NIH 1 I, A T ION

it was winning the war. Broad areas of France and most of Belgium were still in
German hands, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had taken a huge swath of terri-
tory from the defeated Russians, including what is today Poland and Ukraine.
The sudden word of the armistice, the abdication of the Kaiser, the creation of a
republic, and the accompanying violent political upheavals created an atmo-
sphere of uncertainty that bordered on panic. Later the mood became one of
deep anger with the outcome of the war and the iruustice (at least in Gcrmans'
eyes) that the peace of Versailles forced upon the nation. This was the ground in
which the myth of the "stab in the back" grew. According to this, the German
Right's version of reality that the senior army leadership consciously dissemi-
nated, thc army had not been defeated in the field; instead, Jews and Leftists had
taken control of the government and signed a treasonous peace. A new epithct,
'Jewish-Bolshevik," arose to describe the villains. German Jews found them-
selves excluded from a wide range of organizations, including veterans' groups
and, with rare exceptions, the military. EasternJews who attempted to immigrate
to Germany, whcn they got in at all, had to cope with rcgistration and sometimes
internment in concentration camps, where the poor conditions led to high rates
of illness-thus tending to confirm some people's belief that they were disease
carricrs to start with. Hostility also took more violcnt turns as well. Right-wing
activists-including some army officers-targeted prominentJews for assassina-
tion, while the so-called Freikorps fought pitched battles with Leftist revolu-
tionaries at home as well as with Poles on the eastern frontier.
One should not exaggerate these trends or make their outcome seem in-
evitable. Most German Jews, for example, lived comfortable, middle-class lives
and e,uoyed good relations with their gentile neighbors, even for some time af~
ter the National Socialists came to power ill 1933. Antisemitism appeared to be
much worse in some other cOllntries and was COHlmon almost everywhere. The
trends were important, however, in that they reflected the attitudes and inten-
tions of those who would eventually make policy in Germany.
The urge to fight "Jewish Bolshevism" helped form the basis for a natural al-
liance between the military, which was overwhelmingly conservativc, and the
Nazi Party, even before thc lattcr took power. Thc supposed link betwecnJcws
and the Left gave the military added incentive to carry out its own antisemitic
measures and to support those that the Nazis eventually implemented in civil-
ian society. At the same time, the emergence of the Soviet Union stood out as
an additional threat to the east. Some officers favored friendly relations with the
USSR, and there was even some secret military cooperation during the 1920s.
Over time, however, the dominant line of thought in military circles came to
correspond with Hitler's. He believed that a German aristocracy had governed

:3
 CHAPTER I

Russia before 1917, but that the Bolshevik Revolution had put the Jews in
power over the mass of Slavs, who were, by his definition, incapable of ruling
themselves. And since Bolshevism was, by its nature, an avowedly expansionist
ideology, most German oflicers came to the conclusion that the USSR was a
danger to Germany and to Western civilization more generally. In their Weltan-
schauung, or world view, antisemitic, anti-Slav, and anti-Marxist elements thus
combined in a new way to snpport expansion to the east, which had long been
a goal of the German Right in any case.
Expansion was also, of course, one of Nazism's central goals. By the early
1920s, Hitler had combined his hatred of the Jews and of the supposedly Jewish-
dominated Soviet state with existing calls to conqucr additional Lebensraum, or
living space, in the east. He tied this idea in with Romantic notions having to do
with blood and soil, and with German eastward migration going back as much as
six centuries, but his strongest reasons were more immediate. In his view, Ger-
many needed more land in order to support a growing population and take up a
position as a world power. "The right to possess soil can become a duty if with-
out extension of its soil a great nation seems doomed to destruction," he wrote in
lvleill Kallltif. "And most especially when not some little nigger nation or other is
involved, but the Germanic mother oflile, which has given the present-day world
its cultural picture." Such expansion could have only one target: "If we speak of
soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal
border states."i
That the quest for LebensraulIl would require aggressive war was a fact that
the military accepted as a matter of course, for a variety of reasons. First, a grow-
ing lllunber of right-wing Germans believed ill a loose ideology that we now
know as Social Darwinism, which applies elements of Charles Darwin's evolu-
tionary theory of biology to human societies. According to this belief system,
conflict is inevitable, between individuals and nations as between animal
species, and ollly the strong deserve to survive. This was a fundamental prillci-
pIe of Nazism. Hitler wrote in his second (unpublished) book that politics must
always be "the struggle of a nation for its existence" ill which such ideas as an al-
ternative between peace and war "immediately sink into nothingness."~ So, too,
did concerns over the rights of other peoples disappear: since Germans were
clearly superior, they deserved to take what they needed, by force if necessary,
no matter what the consequences for their opponents.
In the aftermath of the Great War, the brutality inherent in this approach he-
came a domillant theme in itself, a broad social movement of which the Nazis
took adyantage. In a concrete sense, the war had brought previously unimagined
violence alld destructioll into people's lives. The effects were profoulld. For the
 Another Random Document on
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means, afford us melancholy examples. Foreign influence will gain
admittance to your national councils; the First Consul, or his
interests, will be represented in the Congress of the United States;
this floor may become the theatre of sedition and intrigue. You will
have a French faction in the Government, and that faction will
increase, with the rapidly increasing population of the Western
world. Whenever this period shall arrive, it will be the crisis of
American glory, and must result, either in the political subjugation of
the Atlantic States, or in their separation from the Western country;
and I am sure there is no American who does not view as one of the
greatest evils that could befall us, the dismemberment of this Union.
Honorable gentlemen may wrap themselves up in their present
imaginary security, and say that these things are afar off, or that
they can never happen; but let me beseech of them to look well to
the measures they are now pursuing, for, on the wisdom, the
promptness, and energy of those measures, will depend whether
they shall happen or not. And let me tell them, sir, that the want of
firmness or judgment in the cabinet, will be no apology for the
disgrace and ruin of the nation.
Mr. Breckenridge observed, that he did not mean to wander in the
field of declamation, nor, after the example of the honorable
gentleman who had preceded him, endeavor to alarm or agitate the
public mind; that he should endeavor to strip the subject of all
improper coloring, and examine dispassionately the propriety of the
measures which the Senate were called upon to sanction. He would
be very brief.
What is the true and undisguised state of facts? Early in the session,
the House of Representatives were informed, by a communication
from the President, of the conduct of the Intendant at New Orleans.
This communication stated, that he had taken measures to attempt
a restoration of the right which had been violated; and that there
were reasons to believe that the conduct of the Intendant was
unauthorized by the Court of Spain. Accompanying this message
were official papers, in which it appeared that the Governor of New
Orleans had strongly opposed the conduct of the Intendant,
declared that he was acting without authority in refusing the deposit,
and indicated a disposition to oppose openly the proceeding. The
Spanish Minister who resides here, also interposed on the occasion,
and who stands deservedly high in the confidence of his
Government, was clearly of opinion, that the Intendant was acting
without authority, and that redress would be given so soon as the
competent authority could interpose. From this state of things, and
which is the actual state at this moment, what is the course any
civilized nation who respects her character or rights, would pursue?
There is but one course, which is admitted by writers on the laws of
nations, as the proper one; and is thus described by Vattel, in his
book, sec. 336, 338:
"A sovereign ought to show, in all his quarrels, a sincere desire of
rendering justice and preserving peace. He is obliged before he
takes up arms, and after having taken them up also, to offer
equitable conditions, and then alone his arms become just against
an obstinate enemy, who refuses to listen to justice or to equity. His
own advantage, and that of human society, oblige him to attempt,
before he takes up arms, all the pacific methods of obtaining either
the reparation of the injury, or a just satisfaction. This moderation,
this circumspection, is so much the more proper, and commonly
even indispensable, as the action we take for an injury does not
always proceed from a design to offend us, and is sometimes a
mistake rather than an act of malice: frequently it even happens,
that the injury is done by inferior persons, without their sovereign
having any share in it; and on these occasions, it is not natural to
presume that he would refuse us a just satisfaction."
This is the course which the President has taken, and in which the
House of Representatives have expressed, by their resolution, their
confidence.
What are the reasons urged by the gentlemen to induce a different
proceeding, an immediate appeal to arms? You prostrate, say the
gentlemen, your national honor by negotiating, where there is a
direct violation of a treaty! How happens it that our national honor
has, at this particular crisis, become so delicate, and that the
feelings of certain gentlemen are now so alive to it? Has it been the
practice of this Government heretofore to break lances on the spot
with any nation who injured or insulted her? Or has not the
invariable course been to seek reparation in the first place by
negotiation? I ask for an example to the contrary; even under the
Administration of Washington, so much eulogized by the gentleman
last up. Were not the Detroit, and several other forts within our
territory, held ten or a dozen years by Great Britain, in direct
violation of a treaty? Were not wanton spoliations committed on
your commerce by Great Britain, by France, and by Spain, to the
amount of very many millions; and all adjusted through the medium
of negotiations? Were not your merchants plundered, and your
citizens doomed to slavery by Algiers, and still those in power, even
Washington himself, submitted to negotiation, to ransom, and to
tribute? Why then do gentlemen, who on those occasions approved
of these measures, now despair of negotiation? America has been
uniformly successful, at least in settling her differences by treaty.
But the gentleman is afraid that if we do not immediately seize the
country, we shall lose the golden opportunity of doing it. Would your
national honor be free from imputation by a conduct of such
inconsistency and duplicity? A minister is sent to the offending
nation with an olive-branch, for the purpose of an amicable
discussion and settlement of differences, and before he has scarcely
turned his back, we invade the territories of that nation with an army
of fifty thousand men! Would such conduct comport with the genius
and principles of our Republic, whose true interest is peace, and who
has hitherto professed to cultivate it with all nations? Would not such
a procedure subject us to the just censure of the world, and to the
strongest jealousy of those who have possessions near to us? Would
such a procedure meet the approbation of even our own citizens,
whose lives and fortunes would be risked in the conflict? And would
it not be policy inexcusably rash, to plunge this country into war, to
effect that which the President not only thinks can be effected, but is
now actually in a train of negotiation? If, on the other hand,
negotiation should fail, how different will be the ground on which we
stand! We stand acquitted by the world, and what is of more
consequence, by our own citizens, and our own consciences. But
one sentiment will then animate and pervade the whole, and from
thenceforth we will take counsel only from our courage.
But to induce us to depart from this proper, this safe, and honorable
course of proceeding, which is pursuing by the President, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania first, and the gentleman from
Delaware again told you, that by such pacific measures you will
irritate the Western people against you; that they will not be
restrained by you, but will either invade the country themselves, or
withdraw from the Union and unite with those who will give them
what they want. Sir, said Mr. B., I did not expect to hear such
language held on this floor. Sir, the gentleman from Pennsylvania
best knows the temper and views of the Western people he
represents, but if he meant to extend the imputation to the State I
have the honor to represent, I utterly disclaim it. The citizens of
Kentucky value too highly their rights and character to endanger the
one or dishonor the other. They deal not, sir, in insurrections. They
hold in too sacred regard their federal compact to sport with it. They
were among the first to oppose violations of it, and will, I trust, be
the last to attempt its dissolution. The time indeed was, when not
only irritation but disgust prevailed in that country; when, instead of
sending fifty thousand men to seize on Orleans, an attempt was
meditated, and a solemn vote taken in Congress to barter away this
right for twenty-five years. The time indeed was, when great
dissatisfaction prevailed in that country, as to the measures of the
General Government; but it never furnished there, whatever it might
have done elsewhere, even the germs for treasons or insurrections.
The people I have the honor to represent are not accustomed to
procure redress in this way. Instead of trampling on the constitution
of their country, they rally round it as the rock of their safety. But,
unhappily, these times have passed away. Distrust and
dissatisfaction have given place to confidence in, and attachment to
those in whom the concerns of the nation are confided. I ask no
reliance on my opinion for this fact, but appeal to the memorial of
the Legislature of Kentucky to the present Congress, for the truth of
this assertion. In this disposition of mind, therefore, and from the
sound sense and correct views and discernment of their true
interest, which the people of Kentucky possess, I have no hesitation
in pledging myself, that no such precipitate and unwarranted
measures will be taken by them, as predicted by the gentlemen in
the opposition.
But he begged leave to ask gentlemen who hold such language,
would the Western people, admitting they were to withdraw from
the Union, be able to accomplish the object? Could they alone go to
war with France and Spain? Could they hold Orleans, were they to
take possession of it, without the aid of the United States? Admitting
they could hold it, what security would they have for their
commerce? A single ship of the line would be able completely to
blockade that port. See, also, the Havana, one of the safest and
strongest of the Spanish ports, and so situated as to possess every
advantage in annoying our commerce. Are the gentlemen, therefore,
really serious when they endeavor to persuade us that the Western
people are in such a state of fury and mad impatience that they will
not wait even a few months to see the fate of a negotiation, and, if
unsuccessful, receive the aid of the whole nation, but that they will
madly run to the attack without a ship, without a single cannon,
without magazines, without money or preparation of any kind; and,
what is worse, without union among themselves; and what is still
worse, in face of the laws and constitution of their country? It is
impossible. Such a desperate project could not come to a successful
issue; for should they even obtain the right by their own exertions
alone, they could not expect long to enjoy it in peace, without
descending from that exalted, that enviable rank of one of the
independent States of United America, to the degraded, dependent
condition of a colonial department of a foreign nation.
Although he thought it incumbent on us, for the reasons he had
stated, to try the effect of negotiation, yet, should that fail, he
thought it incumbent on us also to be prepared for another resort.
He considered this right, and upon a different footing from what we
ever enjoyed it, so all-important, so indispensable to the very
existence of the Western States, that it was a waste of words and
time to attempt to portray the evils which a privation of it would
produce; and he rejoiced to find that gentlemen with whom he had
not been in the habit of voting on most political subjects so perfectly
accord with him, that our precarious tenure of it must be changed.
He hoped they were sincere in their declarations. If they were, the
only difference between us now is, what are the proper means to
obtain this great end? The course pursued by the President was, in
his opinion, the only true and dignified course. It is that, and that
only, which will certainly attain the object; and is the only one which
will tend to unite cordially all parts of the Union. But we ought to be
prepared, in case of a failure, instantly to redress ourselves. This,
instead of having an evil, would, in his opinion, have a good effect
on the negotiation. It would show, that although we are willing
amicably to adjust our differences, yet that we are not only resolved
on, but prepared for that resort which cannot fail to restore our
violated rights. With that view, he would offer the following
resolutions, as substitutes for those proposed by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
He moved that the whole of the resolutions be struck out, excepting
the word "Resolved," and the following be substituted in their place
—after the word "Resolved:"
"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby
authorized, whenever he shall judge it expedient, to require of the
Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to
organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to
march at a moment's warning, eighty thousand effective militia,
officers included.
Resolved, "That the President may, if he judges it expedient,
authorize the Executives of the several States, to accept, as part of
the detachment aforesaid, any corps of volunteers; who shall
continue in service for such time, not exceeding —— months, and
perform such services as shall be prescribed by law.
Resolved, "That —— dollars be appropriated for paying and
subsisting such part of the troops aforesaid, whose actual service
may be wanted, and for defraying such other expenses as, during
the recess of Congress, the President may deem necessary for the
security of the territory of the United States.
Resolved, "That —— dollars be appropriated for erecting at such
place or places on the Western waters, as the President may judge
most proper, one or more arsenals."
Mr. Clinton.—The importance of a free navigation of the Mississippi
has been duly appreciated by the Government, and a constant eye
has been kept upon it in our negotiations with foreign powers. An
attempt was, indeed, made under the Old Confederation to barter it
away for twenty-five years, which, however, was effectually
controlled by the good sense and patriotism of the Government. By
the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783, by the Treaty of
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with her in 1794, and by the
Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation with Spain, in 1795, the
right of a free navigation of the Mississippi is recognized, and
declared to exist from its source to the ocean, in the citizens of the
United States. By the 22d article of the Treaty with Spain, it is
declared that, "in consequence of the stipulations contained in the
4th article, his Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the United
States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their
merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export
them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for
the hire of the stores. And his Majesty promises either to continue
this permission if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to
the interests of Spain; or, if he should not agree to continue it there,
he will assign to them, on another part of the lands of the
Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." The 22d article, granting
the right of deposit, is, therefore, founded upon the 4th article
recognizing the right of free navigation, and is intended to give full
and complete efficacy to it. By a proclamation of the Intendant of
the Province of Louisiana, dated the 16th of October last, the right
of deposit is prohibited. The reason assigned for this daring
interdiction is, that the three years for which it was granted having
expired, it cannot be continued without an express order from the
King of Spain; and at the same time no equivalent establishment is
assigned, according to the stipulations of the Treaty.
There can be no doubt but that the suspension of the right of
deposit at New Orleans, and the assignment of another place equally
convenient, ought to have been contemporaneous and concurrent;
that the conduct of the Intendant is an atrocious infraction of the
treaty, and that it aims a deadly blow at the prosperity of the
Western States; but it is extremely questionable whether it was
authorized by the Government of Spain or not. On this subject I am
free to declare that I entertain great doubts, which can only be
cleared up by the course of events, or perhaps it will be enveloped
in darkness. On the one hand, the terms of the proclamation,
indicating a misunderstanding of the treaty, the remonstrances of
the Governor of the Province, whose authority does not extend to
commercial and fiscal affairs, over which the Intendant has an
exclusive control, and the prompt and decided assurances of the
Spanish Minister near the United States, would induce a belief that
the act of the Intendant was unauthorized. On the other hand, it
cannot readily be believed that this officer would assume such an
immense responsibility, and encounter an event so big with
important consequences, not only to his country but to himself,
without knowing explicitly the intentions of his Government. Such,
then, is the true state of the Spanish aggression: an important right
had been secured to our citizens by the solemnity of a treaty. This
right had been withdrawn by an officer of the Spanish Government,
and whether this aggression was directed by it or not, is not as yet
known. Other aggressions have, indeed, been stated by the
honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Ross,) in order to
darken the picture, and with the manifest design of exasperating our
feelings, inflaming our passions, and prompting an immediate appeal
to the sword.
As to the nature, character, and tendency of the remedy proposed,
there can be but one opinion. It proposes to enter the country of a
foreign nation with a hostile force, and to seize a part of its territory.
It is not preceded by a formal declaration, and cannot, therefore,
come under the denomination of a solemn war, but it partakes of the
character of a war not solemn. It answers to the definition of war, by
Burlamaqui, "a nation taking up arms with a view to decide a
quarrel;" to that given by Vattel, who represents it to be "that state
in which a nation prosecutes its right by force." A state of general
hostilities would as necessarily follow as an effect would follow a
cause; no nation would submit to the irruption of a hostile army
without repelling it by force; the proud Castilian, as described by the
gentleman from Delaware, would revolt at the insult; the door of
negotiation would be effectually closed, and as the appeal would be
to arms in the first instance, so the controversy must be finally
decided by the preponderance of force. It would, therefore, not only
have impressed me with a more favorable opinion of the honorable
mover's candor, but also of his decision and energy as a statesman,
if he had spoken out boldly, and declared his real object. War is
unquestionably his design—his wish. Why, then, mask his
proposition? Why combine it with considerations connected with
negotiation? Why not furnish the American people at once with the
real and the whole project of himself and his friends? If it is
bottomed on patriotism and dictated by wisdom, it need not shrink
from the touch of investigation—it will receive their approving voice,
and be supported by all their force. The resolution is then to be
considered as a war resolution; in no other light can it be viewed; in
no other light ought it to be viewed; and in no other light will it be
viewed by the intelligence of the country. In this point of view, I will
proceed, said Mr. C., to consider its justice and policy; its conformity
with the laws and usage of nations, and the substantial interests of
this country.
I shall not attempt to occupy your attention by threadbare
declamation upon the evils of war, by painting the calamities it
inflicts upon the happiness of individuals, and the prosperity of
nations. This terrible scourge of mankind, worse than the famine or
pestilence, ought not to be resorted to until every reasonable
expedient has been adopted to avert it. When aggressions have
been committed by the sovereign or representatives of a nation,
negotiation ought in all cases to be first tried, unless the rights of
self-defence demand a contrary course. This is the practice of
nations, and is enjoined by the unerring monitor which the God of
Nature has planted in every human bosom. What right have the
rulers of nations to unsheath the sword of destruction, and to let
loose the demon of desolation upon mankind, whenever caprice or
pride, ambition or avarice, shall prescribe? And are there no fixed
laws founded in the nature of things which ordain bounds to the fell
spirit of revenge, the mad fury of domination, and the insatiable
thirst of cupidity? Mankind have not only in their individual character,
but in their collective capacity as nations, recognized and avowed in
their opinions and actions, a system of laws calculated to produce
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And it may be safely
asserted, that it is a fundamental article of this code, that a nation
ought not to go to war, until it is evident that the injury committed is
highly detrimental, and that it emanated from the will of the nation
charged with the aggression, either by an express authorization in
the first instance, or by a recognition of it when called upon for
redress, and a refusal in both cases to give it. A demand of
satisfaction ought to precede an appeal to arms, even when the
injury is manifestly the act of the Sovereign; and when it is the act
of a private individual, it is not imputable to his nation, until his
Government is called upon to explain and redress, and refuses;
because the evils of war are too heavy and serious to be incurred,
without the most urgent necessity; because remonstrance and
negotiation have often recalled an offending nation to a sense of
justice, and a performance of right; because nations, like individuals,
have their paroxysms of passion, and when reflection and reason
resume their dominion, will extend that redress to the olive-branch,
which their pride will not permit them to grant to the sword;
because a nation is a moral person, and, as such, is not chargeable
with an offence committed by others, or where its will has not been
consulted, the unauthorized conduct of individuals being never
considered a just ground of hostility, until their sovereign refuses
that reparation for which his right of controlling their actions, and of
punishing their misconduct, necessarily renders him responsible.
These opinions are sanctioned by the most approved elementary
writers on the laws of nations.
If I were called upon to prescribe a course of policy most important
for this country to pursue, it would be to avoid European
connections and wars. The time must arrive when we will have to
contend with some of the great powers of Europe, but let that
period be put off as long as possible. It is our interest and our duty
to cultivate peace, with sincerity and good faith. As a young nation,
pursuing industry in every channel, and adventuring commerce in
every sea, it is highly important that we should not only have a
pacific character, but that we should really deserve it. If we manifest
an unwarrantable ambition, and a rage for conquest, we unite all the
great powers of Europe against us. The security of all the European
possessions in our vicinity will eternally depend, not upon their
strength, but upon our moderation and justice. Look at the Canadas
—at the Spanish territories to the South—at the British, Spanish,
French, Danish, and Dutch West India islands—at the vast countries
to the West, as far as where the Pacific rolls its waves; consider well
the eventful consequences that would result if we were possessed
by a spirit of conquest; consider well the impression which a
manifestation of that spirit will make upon those who would be
affected by it. If we are to rush at once into the territory of a
neighboring nation, with fire and sword, for the misconduct of a
subordinate officer, will not our national character be greatly injured?
Will we not be classed with the robbers and destroyers of mankind?
Will not the nations of Europe perceive in this conduct the germ of a
lofty spirit and an enterprising ambition which will level them to the
earth, when age has matured our strength and expanded our
powers of annoyance, unless they combine to cripple us in our
infancy? May not the consequences be, that we must look out for a
naval force to protect our commerce; that a close alliance will result;
that we will be thrown at once into the ocean of European politics,
where every wave that rolls, and every wind that blows, will agitate
our bark? Is this a desirable state of things? Will the people of this
country be seduced into it by all the colorings of rhetoric, and all the
arts of sophistry—by vehement appeals to their pride, and artful
addresses to their cupidity? No, sir. Three-fourths of the American
people (I assert it boldly, and without fear of contradiction) are
opposed to this measure. And would you take up arms with a
millstone hanging around your neck? How would you bear up, not
only against the force of the enemy, but against the irresistible
current of public opinion? The thing, sir, is impossible; the measure
is worse than madness; it is wicked beyond the powers of
description.
It is in vain for the mover to oppose these weighty considerations by
menacing us with an insurrection in the Western States, that may
eventuate in their seizure of New Orleans without the authority of
Government; their throwing themselves into the arms of a foreign
power; or in a dissolution of the Union. Such threats are doubly
improper—improper as they respect the persons to whom they are
addressed, because we are not to be deterred from the performance
of our duty by menaces of any kind, from whatever quarter they
may proceed; and it is no less improper to represent our Western
brethren as a lawless, unprincipled banditti, who would at once
release themselves from the wholesome restraints of law and order;
forego the sweets of liberty, and either renounce the blessings of
self-government, or, like Goths and Vandals, pour down with the
irresistible force of a torrent upon the countries below, and carry
havoc and desolation in their train. A separation by a mountain, and
a different outlet into the Atlantic, cannot create any natural collision
between the Atlantic and Western States; on the contrary, they are
bound together by a community of interests, and a similarity of
language and manners—by the ties of consanguinity and friendship,
and a sameness of principles. There is no reflecting and well-
principled man in this country who can view the severance of the
States without horror, and who does not consider it as a Pandora's
box, which will overwhelm us with every calamity; and it has struck
me with not a little astonishment that, on the agitation of almost
every great political question, we should be menaced with this evil.
Last session, when a bill repealing a Judiciary act was under
consideration, we were told that the Eastern States would withdraw
themselves from the Union, if it should obtain; and we are now
informed that, if we do not accede to the proposition before us, the
Western States will hoist the standard of revolt and dismember the
empire. Sir, these threats are calculated to produce the evils they
predict, and they may possibly approximate the spirit they pretend
to warn us against. They are at all times unnecessary, at all times
improper, at all times mischievous, and ought never to be mentioned
within these walls.
Mr. J. Jackson, of Georgia.—Coming from a State, at the extreme of
the Union in the South, and excepting the States immediately
interested in the navigation of the Mississippi, the most concerned,
on the present occasion, of any in the Union, he hoped it would not
be deemed improper in him to offer his sentiments on the resolution
before the Senate; for, sir, no event can affect the settlers on the
Mississippi, no change of masters can take place there, without the
shock being felt on the frontiers of Georgia. The nation which holds
New Orleans must eventually possess the Floridas, and Georgia
cannot remain an indifferent spectator; in case of war, the blow
struck on that river will be vibrated on the Saint Mary's, and the
attack on the one will be seconded by an attack on the other.
The gentlemen from Kentucky and Tennessee have not those fears
expressed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania; they have declared
their citizens satisfied with negotiation in the first place, and the
conduct pursued by the Executive. He could say the same, as
respects the citizens of the State he represents, and begged leave to
read a letter on the subject, from a respectable gentleman of
Georgia, applauding the appointment of Mr. Monroe. [He here read a
letter expressing the approbation generally expressed at the
nomination.]
That there has been an indignity offered to the United States by the
Spanish Government of New Orleans, he should not deny; so far, he
joined the gentlemen on the other side, as not only to declare that
sense of it, but to assert that the withdrawing the right of deposit,
given under the fourth article of our treaty with Spain, concluded at
San Lorenzo el Real, prior to the pointing out another place for that
purpose, is such a violation of our right, and such an insult to the
dignity of the nation, as ought not to be put up with in silence. We
ought, we are bound to demand a restoration of that right, and to
secure it to our Western citizens, let the risk be what it may, if it
even extends to life and fortune. He cordially agreed with the
gentleman who had preceded him, (Mr. Mason,) that it is a
momentous subject; but could not consent to go at once to war,
without trying, in the first place, every peaceable mode to obtain
redress.
The first part of the resolution declares, that the United States have
an indisputable right to the free navigation of the river Mississippi,
and to a convenient place of deposit for their produce and
merchandise, in the island of New Orleans. Now, sir, the former part
of this resolution is not affected by any proceedings of the Spanish
Government. You are as perfectly in possession of the right as you
ever were; your vessels are at this moment freely navigating that
river; you have not heard of a single interruption; you have not
learnt that the Spaniards, so far from interrupting that navigation,
have ever doubted your right. Why then, sir, resolve on the assertion
of rights which are not questioned, but of which you are completely
in possession! He could compare it to no other case than that of a
man in private life, in peaceable possession of his house, resolving
on and publishing his own right to it, and thereby rousing the
suspicions of his neighbors to doubt the title to it. Passing over the
latter division of the first resolution, and which he acknowledged to
be the fact, let us consider the second proposition, "That the late
infraction of such their unquestionable right, is an aggression hostile
to their honor and interest." Sir, after a declaration of this kind, can
you retract? You cannot; it is in fact a declaration of war itself. Many
of the courts of Europe would consider it so, and have engaged in
war for less cause of offence than this resolution contains. You
pronounce at once, without knowing whether the proceedings at
New Orleans were sanctioned by the Court of Spain, that that nation
is in a state of hostility against your honor and interest, which
declaration, coupled with the following resolution, "That it does not
consist with the dignity or safety of this Union to hold a right so
important by a tenure so uncertain," is a direct insult to that nation.
But if war is not to be found in those resolutions, is it not in the fifth
resolution, "That the President be authorized to take immediate
possession of such place or places in the said island, or the adjacent
territories, as he may deem fit or convenient." Is this not war? If it
be not, he knew not what war was! And now let us inquire, if we
should be justified in adopting those measures, on the grounds of
public or private justice, or the laws of nations.
Sir, the going to war has always been considered, even among
barbarous nations, a most serious thing; and it has not been
undertaken without the most serious deliberation. It was a practice
among the Romans, prior to undertaking a war, to consult the
faciales on the justice of it; and, after it had been declared just, to
refer it to the Senate, to judge of the policy of it; and unless the
justice and the policy were both accorded in, the war was not
undertaken. If this was the case then among barbarous nations,
shall we, who call ourselves a civilized nation, not well weigh the
justice and the policy of going to war, before we undertake it?
As to national honor and dignity, he believed we have all a proper
sense of it, and he would be one of the last on this floor to put up
with insult and indignity from any nation; but, as much as we had
heard of it, he did not think we ought, without negotiation, to resent
every injury by war. In many cases, national honor is only a
convertible term for national interest; and he begged leave to relate
an anecdote of a celebrated soldier on this head. After the failure of
the attempted storm of Savannah, in the year 1779, Count
D'Estaing, who was wounded in the attack, and lay in that situation
about five miles from Savannah, was visited by Governor Rutledge
and other gentlemen of South Carolina and Georgia. The Governor
having perceived some movements in camp indicative of a retrogade
motion, told the Count that his own honor and the honor of France
were concerned in his remaining and taking the city. The Count very
mildly replied, "Gentlemen, if my honor is to be lost by not taking
the city, it is lost already; but I deem my honor to consist in the
honor of my country, and that honor is my country's interest!" The
time of operation in the West Indies was arrived, and the Count re-
embarked his troops.
Now, sir, is it not our duty to consult our country's interest, before
we take this rash step, which we cannot recall? Peace is the interest
of all republics, and war their destruction; it loads and fetters them
with debt, and entangles not only the present race, but posterity.
Peace, sir, has been the ruling policy of the United States throughout
all her career. If we show the citizens that we are not willing to go to
war, and load them with taxes, they will all be with us, when a
necessity for war arrives. What, sir, was the policy of America, from
the commencement of the Revolution? At that day, did we hastily go
to war? No; we tried every peaceable means to avoid it, and those
means induced a unanimity in the people.
At the commencement many States were exceedingly divided, in
some a majority were against us; yet, seeing the moderation and
justice of our measures, and the rashness and tyranny of the British
cabinet, they came over to our side, and became the most zealous
among us. At the present moment, sir, the people are averse to war,
they are satisfied with the steps of the Executive, they wish
negotiation. If you adopt these resolutions, they will be still divided;
if you negotiate, and fail in that negotiation—if you cannot obtain a
redress of the injury which they feel as well as you, they will go all
lengths with you, and be prepared for any event; you will have this
advantage, you will be unanimous, and America united is a match
for the world. In such a case, sir, every man will be anxious to
march, he would go himself if called on, and whether the sluggish
Spaniard or the French grenadier commands New Orleans, it must
fall; they will not be able to resist the brave and numerous hosts of
our Western brethren, who are so much interested in the injury
complained of. He was himself of opinion that New Orleans must
belong to the United States; it must come to us in the course of
human events, although not at the present day; for he did not wish
to use force to obtain it, if we could get a redress of injury; yet it will
naturally fall into our hands by gradual but inevitable causes, as sure
and certain as manufactures arise from increased population and the
plentiful products of agriculture and commerce. But let it be noticed,
that if New Orleans by a refusal of justice falls into our hands by
force, the Floridas, as sure as fate, fall with it. Good faith forbids
encroachment on a pacific ally; but if hostility shows itself against
us, interest demands it; Georgia in such case could not do without it.
God and nature have destined New Orleans and the Floridas to
belong to this great and rising empire. As natural bounds to the
South, are the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mississippi, and
the world at some future day cannot hold them from us.

Thursday, February 24.

Mississippi Question.

Agreeably to the order of the day, the Senate resumed the

consideration of the resolutions respecting the indisputable right of
the United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi, together
with the proposed amendments thereto.
Mr. Wells, of Delaware, said,—Gentlemen have persuaded
themselves that the conduct of the Intendant is not authorized by
the Spanish or French Government; but what reason have they
assigned us in support of this opinion? They tell us of the friendly
assurances received from the Minister of His Catholic Majesty
resident near our Government; and they place considerable stress
upon the circumstance of the Governor of New Orleans disapproving
of what the Intendant has done. I will not stop to speak of the
imprudence of reposing themselves upon the assurances of a
Minister, perhaps expressly instructed to mislead them. But why
have they trusted to the imaginary collision of sentiment between
the Governor and Intendant of New Orleans? Do not gentlemen
know that our Government is in possession of testimony,
demonstrating beyond all kind of doubt, that this is not the fact?
Have they not seen the letter of the Governor of New Orleans to the
Governor of the Mississippi Territory? In this letter I learn that the
Governor comes out and acknowledges his co-operation with the
Intendant, justifies the breach of the treaty, and declares that these
instruments cease their binding force the moment it suits the
interest of either party to break through them. Alas! the history of
the world furnishes us too many evidences of this melancholy truth.
But this is the first time that any nation has had the hardihood to
avow it. No, sir, even Carthage herself, who became proverbial for
her disregard of treaties, never attained to a point so profligate. If I
am incorrect in my statement, honorable gentlemen, who have
easier access to the sources of official information than is permitted
to us, will set me right. Why has this document been so sedulously
kept from the public eye? Why it should be even now so carefully
locked up, is a mystery not for me to unravel.
I see no other course for us to pursue than that pointed out by the
resolutions. Our interests, our honor, and our safety, require it to be
adopted. I am aware that the alarm of war will be rung through the
country. I know full well the pains that will be taken to impress an
opinion upon our fellow-citizens that we are the friends of war. This
we cannot help: the danger with which our country is threatened,
will not permit us to shrink from the discharge of our duty, let the
consequences to ourselves be what they may. Let me ask you with
my honorable friend from New Jersey, (Mr. Dayton,) what stronger
evidence can we give you of the sincerity of our intentions than the
resolutions themselves? So far from cramping, or diminishing the
power of gentlemen opposed to us, in a crisis like the present, we
only offer to strengthen their own hands. Had the advice of an
honorable gentleman near me (Mr. Morris) been listened to, when
you were disbanding your army, this crisis would not have
happened. Had you then posted at the Natchez, as he
recommended, a thousand soldiers, the navigation of the Mississippi
would not now have been interrupted. He foretold you what would
happen, and his prediction has been literally fulfilled.
There is but one fault I find with these resolutions, which is, they do
not go far enough. If I could obtain a second, I would move an
amendment explicitly authorizing the taking possession of both the
Floridas as well as the island of New Orleans. In one respect I
entirely accord with the honorable gentleman from Georgia, (Mr.
Jackson,) and I admire the manly and decisive tone in which he has
spoken upon this subject. We both agree that the Floridas must be
attached to the United States; but we differ in point of time. The
violent aggression committed upon our rights, and the extent of the
danger with which we are threatened, in my humble opinion, would
amply justify our taking possession of them immediately. Look at the
relative situation of Georgia, the Mississippi Territory, and the
Floridas, and it will require very little of the spirit of prophecy to
foretell that we shall, ere long, be compelled to possess ourselves of
them in our own defence.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris.—Mr. President, my object is peace. I could
assign many reasons to show that this declaration is sincere. But can
it be necessary to give this Senate any other assurance than my
word? Notwithstanding the acerbity of temper which results from
party strife, gentlemen will believe me on my word. I will not
pretend, like my honorable colleague, (Mr. Clinton,) to describe to
you the waste, the ravages, and the horrors of war. I have not the
same harmonious periods, nor the same musical tones; neither shall
I boast of Christian charity, nor attempt to display that ingenuous
glow of benevolence so decorous to the cheek of youth, which gave
a vivid tint to every sentence he uttered; and was, if possible, as
impressive even as his eloquence. But, though we possess not the
same pomp of words, our hearts are not insensible to the woes of
humanity. We can feel for the misery of plundered towns, the
conflagration of defenceless villages, and the devastation of cultured
fields. Turning from these features of general distress, we can enter
the abodes of private affliction, and behold the widow weeping, as
she traces, in the pledges of connubial affection, the resemblance of
him whom she has lost for ever. We see the aged matron bending
over the ashes of her son. He was her darling; for he was generous
and brave, and therefore his spirit led him to the field in defence of
his country. We can observe another oppressed with unutterable
anguish: condemned to conceal her affection; forced to hide that
passion which is at once the torment and delight of life; she learns
that those eyes which beamed with sentiment, are closed in death;
and his lip, the ruby harbinger of joy, lies pale and cold, the
miserable appendage of a mangled corpse. Hard, hard indeed, must
be that heart which can be insensible to scenes like these, and bold
the man who dare present to the Almighty Father a conscience
crimsoned with the blood of his children.
Yes, sir, we wish for peace; but how is that blessing to be preserved?
I shall here repeat a sentiment I have often had occasion to express.
In my opinion, there is nothing worth fighting for, but national
honor; for in the national honor is involved the national
independence. I know that a State may find itself in such
unpropitious circumstances, that prudence may force a wise
government to conceal the sense of indignity. But the insult should
be engraven on tablets of brass, with a pencil of steel. And when
that time and chance, which happen to all, shall bring forward the
favorable moment, then let the avenging arm strike him. It is by
avowing and maintaining this stern principle of honor, that peace can
be preserved. But let it not be supposed that any thing I say has the
slightest allusion to the injuries sustained from France, while
suffering in the pangs of her Revolution. As soon should I upbraid a
sick man for what he might have done in the paroxysms of disease.
Nor is this a new sentiment; it was felt and avowed at the time when
these wrongs were heaped on us, and I appeal for the proof to the
files of your Secretary of State. The destinies of France were then in
the hands of monsters. By the decree of Heaven she was broken on
the wheel, in the face of the world, to warn mankind of her folly and
madness. But these scenes have passed away. On the throne of the
Bourbons is now seated the first of the Gallic Cæsars. At the head of
that gallant nation is the great—the greatest—man of the present
age. It becomes us well to consider his situation. The things he has
achieved, compel him to the achievement of things more great. In
his vast career, we must soon become objects to command
attention. We too, in our turn, must contend or submit. By
submission we may indeed have peace, alike precarious and
ignominious. But is this the peace which we ought to seek? Will this
satisfy the just expectation of our country? No. Let us have peace
permanent, secure, and, if I may use the term, independent. Peace
which depends, not on the pity of others, but on our own force. Let
us have the only peace worth having, a peace consistent with honor.
Before I consider the existing state of things, let me notice what
gentlemen have said in relation to it. The honorable member from
Kentucky has told us, that indeed there is a right arrested, but
whether by authority or not is equivocal. He says the representative
of Spain verily believes it to be an unauthorized act. My honorable
colleague informs us there has been a clashing between the
Governor and Intendant. He says we are told by the Spanish Minister
it was unauthorized. Notwithstanding these assurances, however, my
honorable colleague has, it seems, some doubts; but nevertheless
he presumes innocence, for my colleague is charitable. The
honorable member from Maryland goes further. He tells us the
Minister of Spain says, the Intendant had no such authority, and the
Minister of France, too, says there is no such authority. Sir, I have all
possible respect for those gentlemen, and every proper confidence
in what they may think proper to communicate. I believe the
Spanish Minister has the best imaginable disposition to preserve
peace; being indeed the express purpose for which he was sent
among us. I believe it to be an object near to his heart, and which
has a strong hold upon his affections. I respect the warmth and
benevolence of his feelings, but he must pardon me that I am
deficient in courtly compliment; I am a republican, and cannot
commit the interests of my country to the goodness of his heart.
What is the state of things? There has been a cession of the island
of New Orleans and of Louisiana to France. Whether the Floridas
have also been ceded is not yet certain. It has been said, as from
authority, and I think it probable. Now, sir, let us note the time and
the manner of this cession. It was at or immediately after the treaty
of Lunéville, at the first moment when France could take up a distant
object of attention. But had Spain a right to make this cession
without our consent? Gentlemen have taken it for granted that she
had. But I deny the position. No nation has a right to give to another
a dangerous neighbor without her consent. This is not like the case
of private citizens, for there, when a man is injured, he can resort to
the tribunals for redress; and yet, even there, to dispose of property
to one who is a bad neighbor is always considered as an act of
unkindness. But as between nations, who can redress themselves
only by war, such transfer is in itself an aggression. He who renders
me insecure; he who hazards my peace, and exposes me to
imminent danger, commits an act of hostility against me, and gives
me the rights consequent on that act. Suppose Great Britain should
give to Algiers one of the Bahamas, and contribute thereby to
establish a nest of pirates near your coasts, would you not consider
it as an aggression? Suppose, during the late war, you had conveyed
to France a tract of land along Hudson's River, and the northern
route by the Lakes into Canada, would not Britain have considered
and treated it as an act of direct hostility? It is among the first
limitations to the exercise of the rights of property, that we must so
use our own as not to injure another; and it is under the immediate
sense of this restriction that nations are bound to act toward each
other.
But it is not this transfer alone. There are circumstances both in the
time and in the manner of it which deserve attention. A gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Wright) has told you, that all treaties ought to be
published and proclaimed for the information of other nations. I ask,
was this a public treaty? No. Was official notice of it given to the
Government of this country? Was it announced to the President of
the United States, in the usual forms of civility between nations who
duly respect each other? It was not. Let gentlemen contradict me if
they can. They will say perhaps that it was the omission only of a
vain and idle ceremony. Ignorance may indeed pretend that such
communication is an empty compliment, which, established without
use, may be omitted without offence. But this is not so. If these be
ceremonies, they are not vain, but of serious import, and are
founded on strong reason. He who means me well acts without
disguise. Had this transaction been intended fairly, it would have
been told frankly. But it was secret because it was hostile. The First
Consul, in the moment of terminating his differences with you,
sought the means of future influence and control. He found and
secured a pivot for that immense lever, by which, with potent arm,
he means to subvert your civil and political institutions. Thus, the
beginning was made in deep hostility. Conceived in such principles, it
presaged no good. Its bodings were evil, and evil have been its
fruits. We heard of it during the last session of Congress, but to this
hour we have not heard of any formal and regular communication
from those by whom it was made. Has the King of Spain, has the
First Consul of France, no means of making such communication to
the President of the United States? Yes, sir, we have a Minister in
Spain; we have a Minister in France. Nothing was easier, and yet
nothing has been done. Our First Magistrate has been treated with
contempt; and through him our country has been insulted.
With that meek and peaceful spirit now so strongly recommended,
we submitted to this insult, and what followed? That which might
have been expected; a violation of our treaty. An open and direct
violation by a public officer of the Spanish Government. This is not
the case cited from one of the books. It is not a wrong done by a
private citizen, which might, for that reason, be of doubtful nature.
No; it is by a public officer,—that officer, in whose particular
department it was to cause the faithful observance of the treaty
which he has violated. We are told indeed that there was a clashing
of opinion between the Governor and the Intendant. But what have
we to do with their domestic broils? The injury is done, we feel it.
Let the fault be whose it may, the suffering is ours. But, say
gentlemen, the Spanish Minister has interfered to correct this
irregular procedure. Sir, if the Intendant was amenable to the
Minister, why did he not inform him of the step he was about to
take, that the President of the United States might seasonably have
been apprised of his intention, and given the proper notice to our
fellow-citizens? Why has he first learnt this offensive act from those
who suffer by it? Why is he thus held up to contempt and derision?
If the Intendant is to be controlled by the Minister, would he have
taken a step so important without his advice? Common sense will
say no. But, the bitter cup of humiliation was not yet full. Smarting
under the lash of the Intendant, the Minister soothes you with
assurances, and sends advice-boats to announce your forbearance.
But while they are on their way, new injury and new insult are
added. The Intendant, as if determined to try the extent of your
meekness, forbids to your citizens all communication with those who
inhabit the shores of the Mississippi. Though they should be
starving, the Spaniard is made criminal who should give them food.
Fortunately, the waters of the river are potable, or else we should be
precluded from the common benefits of nature, the common bounty
of heaven. What then, I ask, is the amount of this savage conduct?
Sir, it is war. Open and direct war. And yet gentlemen recommend
peace, and forbid us to take up the gauntlet of defiance. Will
gentlemen sit here and shut their eyes to the state and condition of
their country? I shall not reply to what has been said respecting
depredations on commerce, but confine myself to objects of which
there can be no shadow of doubt. Here is a vast country given away,
and not without danger to us. Has a nation a right to put these
States in a dangerous situation? No, sir. And yet it has been done,
not only without our consent previous to the grant, but without
observing the common forms of civility after it was made. Is that
wonderful man who presides over the destinies of France, ignorant
or unmindful of these forms? See what was done the other day. He
directed his Minister to communicate to the Elector of Bavaria, his
intended movements in Switzerland, and their object. He knew the
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