The Exile Question in Chilean Politics

Author(s): Alan Angell and Susan Carstairs

Source: Third World Quarterly , Jan., 1987, Vol. 9, No. 1, The Politics of Exile (Jan.,
1987), pp. 148-167
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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ALAN ANGELL AND
SUSAN CARSTAIRS

The exile question in Chilean

politics

The Chilean Government of President Pinochet has used exile as one of

its instruments of social and political control. A fiercely authoritarian
Government, it employs a variety of methods to try to ensure the
necessary social tranquility to pursue its goal of creating a free market
economy and a 'liberal' state. Thirteen years after the coup of 1973,
there is neither social peace in Chile nor a free market economy, let
alone a liberal state by any definition. Political protest, beginning in
May 1983, has periodically shaken the country, reaching a climax in the
massive demonstration of rejection of the government and its policies
on 2-3 July 1986.1 The government's main answer to this protest is
repression. Exile is one form of repression, and it continues to cause
acute human suffering for thousands of Chileans. Exile is no political
novelty in Chilean history. It has been used by governments following
periods of political conflict in 1851, 1859, 1891 and 1927-31. But the
sharp contrast with the present is that in previous cases amnesty
followed quickly.

The coup of 11 September 1973 and its consequences

The exile question cannot be isolated from the politics of the Unidad
Popular (Popular Unity, UP) and from the aims of the military plotters
who overthrew President Allende. From 1970 to 1973, the brief UP
government embarked upon a programme of fundamental political,
economic and social change. Allende and his governing coalition of six
parties (basically the Socialist and Communist parties) intended to
transform Chile peacefully-the so-called 'Chilean road to socialism'.
Whatever the failures of that government, and the reasons for failure,

' A comprehensive set of essays on the Pinochet government is Military Rule in Chile:
Dictatorship a?ld Oppositions, J Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds) London and
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. A recent assessment of the regime is Alan
Anoell, 'Why is the transition to democracy proving so difficult in Chile?' Bulletini of Latin
American Research 5(1) 1986.

148 TWO 9(1) January 1987/ISSN 0143-6597/87. $1.25

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

its supporters and members had a vision of a new society, a different

economic system and a fundamentally distinct political order.
In the eyes of the military who came to power, the supporters of
Allende were not just political opponents but dangerous
revolutionaries. To 'restore' traditional values in Chile, military action
could not be limited; it had to be massive and drastic because a military
at war with the forces of international communism must use all means at
its disposal to 'save' the nation.
Although Chilean political life has seen outbreaks of violence,
nothing compares with the intense repression that followed the coup.
Numbers of victims are always difficult to estimate, but thousands were
killed, perhaps as many as 30,000 people. In the first six months
following the coup, there were as many as 80,000 political prisoners,
though not all being held at the same time. This scale of repression did
not continue, but torture of political suspects, imprisonment, exile and
even murder were vital elements of political control centralised in the
DINA (National Intelligence Department), later renamed the CNI
(National Information Centre).
There are several reasons why the coup was so brutal. Even though
Chile had no powerful urban guerrilla movements to compare with those
in Argentina (the Montoneros) or Uruguay (the Tupamaros). Talk of
arming the workers was mostly speculation; some political activists
undoubtedly possessed weapons, but the scale was tiny compared with
those of the armed forces. However, social disintegration and
polarisation had sharpened and civil war seemed imminent. In these
circumstances, members of the UP were defined as the enemy, not as
mere political opponents. Secondly, the military in Chile had left
intervention very late, and a more interventionist military such as in
Argentina or Brazil would probably have intervened much earlier when
the political temperature was lower.
Thirdly, the brutality of the coup reflects the feeling that military
involvement with politicians as had occurred with the UP Government
was a grave mistake. Initially at least, solutions had to be military and
not political. Fourthly, the coup was a move against all politicians, and
not just those on the left. The plotters aimed to abolish political parties,
not to do a deal with right-wing parties, however much those parties
supported them. The Christian Democrats and President Frei (1964-70)
were seen as the 'Kerenskys' of the Chilean process; they had prepared
the way for the communist takeover. Finally, the intention of the
military was to eliminate entire political and social movements. The

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

military did not assume that the parties of the left were creatures of a
small political class. Alien parties had to be rooted out; after all, they
had had decades in which to flourish.
Given this analysis, exile was politically justified and convenient for
the regime. Exiles were not seen as 'true' Chileans, but as agents of
sinister foreign powers. The fear of exile was manipulated to exact
political passivity from those who might be tempted into opposition,
and exile was less likely to produce international criticism than
imprisonment in Chile.
This article will outline the size of the exile problem, and attempt to
assess its political significance. Our argument is that in the overall
political battle being fought in Chile today, exile is only one of a number
of issues at stake, and is far from being the most important. It is easier to
overlook the suffering of Chileans abroad than the plight of the
shanty-town dwellers subject to constant police harassment; or of
political activists like the three communists brutally murdered in 1985;
or the eight Chileans who lost their lives in the protests of 2-3 July 1986,
one of whom was an exile. But exile has had an impact on the ideas and
behaviour of political parties, including the left, though not a uniform
impact on all parties.
It is unknown exactly how many Chileans have suffered exile since
1973, nor how many are still in exile. In mid-1986, the authorities
admitted that 3,717 cannot return, while the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees talks of 30,000 and the Comite Pro-Retorno
in Chile estimates the numbers at between 100,000 and 200,000. The
government denies that there is any pressure from the exiles themselves
to return. Of the 6,000 authorisations granted since 1985, it claims that
only 949 have returned.2
It is not easy to produce accurate information on the size of the exile
population, or of its composition and distribution, but in the following
section we summarise the general picture.

Who are the exiles and where are they?

The coup of 11 September 1973 was far more violent than generally

2 All figures in this paragraph are quoted in El Mercurio (Santiago) 12 June 1986, p 6; and Hoy
(Santiago) No 467, 30 June 1986, p 25. This issue of Hoy contains an interview with the priest in
charge of the Pastoral del Exilio. The Church has played the principal role in defending the basic
human rights of Chileans, including the right to live in Chile.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

expected. By 1973 many people saw that a military takeover was a real
possibility but few were prepared for the ferocity and thoroughness with
which it was carried out. The widespread use of tanks and aircraft
against an unarmed civilian population, and the initial twenty-four-hour
curfew, created a climate of fear for thousands of people which turned
into a nightmare as news of many detentions spread by word of mouth
while the state-controlled media suppressed all reports of repression.
As news of detentions and brutality spread, people began to seek help
from foreign embassies and churches. The earliest systematic reaction
was the establishment of the National Refugee Commission (CONAR) a
few months after the coup, by a group including Bishop Helmut Frenz,
the representative in Chile of the Lutheran churches. This small
group-in effect the precursor of the Committee for Peace in Chile-
acted as a liaison between potential refugees and embassies, often
conducting people to asylum in foreign embassies at grave personal risk.
In the early months the first organised effort was on behalf of foreigners
in Chile. There was a large number of refugees from the military
dictatorship in Brazil, and UP sympathisers from other Latin American
countries. According to the UNHCR mandate, clear channels existed to
assist this group and by March 1974 3,400 people had been moved from
Chile.
A special programme of assistance was soon established through ICEM
(the Inter-governmental Committee on European Migration) to
overcome UNHCR'S procedural difficulties in dealing with those seeking
asylum within their own country. By the end of 1974 a total of 6,700
people had been resettled. Initial assistance went to people who feared
detention or re-arrest, but increasing numbers of detainees were in
prisons and concentration camps throughout Chile. In December 1974
an agreement was signed between ICEM (the International Committee of
the Red Cross), CONAR and the Chilean government to allow for the
transfer to exile of those detained without trial under the provisions of
the State of Siege. This was followed by a similar agreement in April
1975 permitting those who had been tried and sentenced to apply under
Decree Law 504 to have their sentence commuted to exile. Once visas
were negotiated for prisoners, ICEM handled their travel arrangements
and in total assisted around 3,000 prisoners to leave under this
programme.
In March 1978 the government issued an amnesty for all crimes
committed since the coup. This measure attracted much domestic
criticism as it was seen as designed primarily to extricate officials from

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

increasing pressure over the issue of disappeared prisoners. Initially,

the Interior Ministry spoke of 2,071 people who would benefit under the
amnesty, of whom 1,021 were already in exile. In fact, those in exile
were required to ask for permission if they wanted to return and it was
by no means guaranteed. In April 1978 a veteran Communist Party
member was refused entry, and many people continued to opt for exile.
By May 1978, 153 prisoners had left through ICEM as a result of the
amnesty; the overall total is probably around 300.
As well as those seeking asylum directly within Chile, there were
many thousands who fled to neighbouring countries, and as early as
1974 there were estimated to be at least 15,000 Chilean refugees in
Argentina and 1,500 in Peru. The numbers for Argentina are especially
difficult to establish. There is a continuous migratory flow from Chile to
Argentina and many people undoubtedly fled across the border,
particularly from country areas where repression is less well
documented, and have never registered themselves formally with any
official body. Within Argentina the political situation deteriorated
throughout 1975, and with the 1976 military coup many refugees there
were in real danger. UNHCR offered assistance but as their reception
hostels became a target for attack from right-wing groups, many people
were unwilling to register themselves formally. The UNHCR appealed to
member countries to take in refugees and people gradually obtained
entry visas and left mainly for Europe, other countries of America and
Australia. The final figures for official resettlement are around 30,000
Chilean exiles. The difficulty in reaching a realistic total lies in different
governments' attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. In the UK,
for instance, where controls are strict, the number of Chileans
additional to the official figures would be fairly small. In other countries
the discrepancy is likely to be enormous. It has proved difficult to obtain
detailed figures from UNHCR of final numbers. To provide some measure
of the magnitude of the discrepancy we have used figures from ICEM of
their total resettlement from Latin America from October 1973 to May
1979. The bulk of these numbers are Chileans and most refugee
transfers were completed by the end of 1979. These figures thus provide
us with a reasonable guide to the final situation. The official figure for
France is 3,030 whereas the Chilean Commission for Human Rights in
its 1982 annual report estimated 15,000. For Spain the official figure is
204 whereas the Interior Ministry in 1984 estimated the Chilean
population at 25,000. Venezuelan and Canadian ICM figures from 1979
are officially 507 and 405 respectively but the Chilean Commission for

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

Human Rights put Venezuela at 80,000 and Canada at 12,000.3

The latest estimate from the Chilean Commission for Human Rights
in its 1982 annual report is 163,686, while an article appeared in a
Chilean weekly, Hoy, in January 1984 which gave a total of 179,268.
Also in 1984 a study was carried out in Chile and abroad by the Centre
for Research and Development in Education (CIDE) which gave a total of
200,000-250 ,000.4
It is even more difficult to be precise about exactly who the refugees
are. About 3,000 went to exile directly from prison, and many others
had experienced short periods of detention and been released inside the
country. Many fled from detention orders issued against them or
because they heard that they were being pursued by the secret police.
Others left the country due to fear of persecution or the very real
difficulties of subsistence in Chile for people dismissed from their jobs,
either for political reasons or because of the drastic changes in economic
policy brought about by the new regime. There have been attempts to
look at the exiles as two separate groups-those motivated by political
reasons and those with a purely economic motivation-but it is very
difficult to evaluate this clearly as circumstances are so confused and
motivation inevitably mixed.
The point is often made, probably accurately, that a larger proportion
of middle-class and professional people found refuge than the working
class. Accepting the inaccuracy caused by larger numbers of working-
class exiles not being among official figures, the following analysis of the
social status of exiles was carried out by CIDE in 1984 based on interviews
with 800 families in six countries (Venezuela, Canada, Spain, France,
Sweden and the German Democratic Republic).
The vast majority of exiles are related to the political parties that
formed the UP alliance, and the revolutionary party the MIR (Movement
of the Revolutionary Left). There were a number of prominent
Christian Democrat (Partido Democratica Christiano, PDC) exiles, but
they comprised a small proportion of the total number. The major
parties of the UP were the Socialist and Communist Parties, part of
the Radical Party, and the much smaller MAPU (United Popular Action

3 All figures in this paragraph are drawn from Provisional Report on Movements Effected by the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration under the Special Programme for
Resettlement from Latin American Countries (June 1979); and, Insercion Laboral para el
Retorno: el caso de los exiliados Chilenos, Santiago: Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo de la
Educacion (CIDE), 1984.
4 All figures in this paragraph are taken from CIDE (Op. cit.) and an article by Alfonso Alacalde in
Hoy, January 1984.

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

Table 1: Occupational status of refugees: 1984 (in percentages)

University educated 53.6 Without university

Managers 3.2 education 43.7
Engineers, architects 7.9 Tech qualification 5.9
Social professions 11.8 Technician without
Teachers 9.9 qualification 5.6
Other 6.0 Admin and clerical 15.6
Skilled manual 16.6
Unskilled manual 6.1
Other 3.8

Source: Patricia Cariola and Josefina Rossetti, Insercion Laboral Para el Retorno: el
caso de los Exilados Chilenos, Santiago: CIDE 1984.

Movement) and the Christian Left. Although many politicians were

killed in the coup, the General Secretaries of the parties survived and
went into exile; in the case of Luis Corvalan of the Communist Party
(CP), this was only after long imprisonment and a much publicised
East-West exchange. There were various attempts to set up central
bodies for the whole of the opposition. The Chilean Trades Union
Congress (the CUT, Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile) based in
Paris was a centre for a while, as was Chile Anti-Fascista, based in
Berlin. None of these groups, however, was able to maintain a
continuous unifying force over a disparate and embattled exile
community.
The majority of refugees are probably from the Socialist Party (PS), a
party with a substantial mass membership in Chile but with little or no
preparedness for illegal organisation. The CP was probably under-
represented among exiles because of its former experiences with
underground operations; it had been banned from 1948 to 1958. Of the
smaller parties, MIR and MAPU were probably over-represented among
exiles, the latter because of its high middle-class intellectual
membership with easier access to friends abroad than the average
working-class party member. MIR members experienced very heavy
repression because of their policy of armed resistance to the military
junta. In so far as it is possible to construct a chronology of repression
between different parties, MIR appears as the major target in the first few
years, culminating in September 1975 with the death of the General
Secretary, Miguel Enriquez, in a gun battle with the military. In 1976
the CP and the PS became targets as their central committees were
infiltrated and assassinated.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

It is hard to make a geographical division of party sympathies among

exiles. Sweden was outstanding in responding swiftly to urgent cases,
and therefore initially may have received a higher proportion of MIR
members in need of immediate assistance. The numbers of refugees in
the USSR are small and probably all communists, though among the
larger population of East Germany there are a substantial number of
socialists, most notably Clodomiro Almeyda, Allende's former Foreign
Minister. Paris was always seen by Chilean intellectuals as the cultural
centre of Europe and they opted for France when they had a choice.
Cuba was particularly sympathetic to MIR.

Return

Although the political situation in Chile has not changed dramatically,

there has been a continual trend towards return. Throughout the late
1970s people were formally invited to return, subject to the provisions
of two Decree Laws (81 and 604) which effectively gave the government
complete discretion to refuse entry to applicants suspected of being a
potential threat to state security. A slight trend towards return can be
observed from the late 1970s when the economy started to experience
its short-lived 'boom', but many were refused entry and others objected
as a matter of principle to submit to this procedure.
This situation continued until October 1982, when Pinochet
convened a short-lived commission to examine the problem of exiles. A
list was issued in December 1982 of 125 people authorised to return, and
this was followed throughout 1983 and part of 1984 by the issuing of a
series of lists covering about 4,000 people. In September 1984 the policy
changed and a list was made of 4,942 people not allowed to return.
During 1985 this list was subjected to three major revisions and 1,347
names were removed. In 1986 there were three amendments in the
period up to June, each of approximately 50 names bringing the total of
those excluded down to 3,717. Many criticisms of the lists were made as
they have included children, people who have already returned to Chile
and dead people. Some people who had appeared on the lists as
authorised have been refused entry. Since February 1985 the
government has given a formal guarantee that those not named in lists
will be allowed to return, but there is still some understandable
apprehension on the part of exiles about trusting such statements.
From 1976 to May 1985, 2,112 people returned to Chile through ICEM
and the UNHCR. Others finance their own return or receive assistance

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

from the country of asylum, and the overall figure has been estimated by
CIDE at between 2,640 and 3,017. While there has been a steady trickle of
returnees, most of those who have gone back have done so from 1983
onwards when the relaxing of certain restrictions in Chile and the
growth of the opposition gave people the confidence to go back.
Numbers have declined again with the reinstatement of the State of
Siege in November 1985 and the clear determination of Pinochet to hold
on to power.

Exile politics

Although exiles were scattered in a number of countries, they were

sufficiently numerous to form communities which could reflect upon
their experiences. The question that was uppermost in their minds was:
'why did we fail?'.
The tragedy of exile is first and foremost of human suffering.
Isolation, depression, family break-up, suicide and despair were bitter
products of an exile that dragged on year after year.5 But the tragedy
was also political, in two senses. Firstly, the very centrality of the
question of why they failed, intensified the ideological divisions that had
always been present in the UP coalition-above all in Allende's own
Socialist Party. Did the government proceed too fast, or too slow? Was
the economic policy correct? These and other questions were endlessly
debated, but in the absence of any obvious way of resolving the dispute
they were debated fruitlessly.
In another sense, the tragedy was greater because the issues being
discussed in exile were less and less those being discussed in Chile. In the
years immediately following the coup, Chileans both in exile and at
home were preoccupied with questions related to the failure of the UP
Government. But for exiles, tension arose from the pressures to
integrate into their host society, in which the issues of Chilean politics
were fairly marginal, or to remain in a kind of ghetto where the political
issues remained centred on the events of 1973.
In Chile a new generation of adults grew up without real memory of
these years, and the memories of older people began to fade. The
central questions of 1986-how to remove Pinochet, construct a united
opposition and devise a stable and popular alternative-are not best

- A moving account of exile is contained in one of the chapters of the book by Patricia Politzer,
Miedo en Chile, Santiago: CESOC, 1985.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

answered with reference to what went wrong in 1973. There are positive
lessons to be learnt from the experience of the UP and some have
undoubtedly been learnt, but Chile has changed greatly since 1973. The
trade union movement is now much weaker, the population of the
shanty-towns much larger and poorer, social divisions are wider, the
economy has changed in many ways and the international context is
distinct. It is far from easy to analyse these changes from inside Chile,
but how much more difficult it is to make sense of them in exile.

Exile as a means of political control

Discussions of exile tend to concentrate on the view from exile and the
impact on the community abroad. This would be a one-sided
perspective in the case of Chile, for exile is used deliberately by the
government to strengthen its grip over political life. The government
uses the exile issue in its 'divide and rule' tactics. For example, it may
announce the publication of a list of those entitled to return and then
delay the specific list, which is in any case less complete than hoped for.
Permission to return may be granted and then capriciously withdrawn,
or exiles may be allowed to return and are then expelled. There is little
hope of legal redress as the courts, in spite of some positive
developments in recent years, have been faithful to the government's
wishes in this area.6
Although this issue is crucial for exiles, it is not the only area of abuse
of human rights and other issues concern human rights campaigners
in Chile. It is not the central political issue for the opposition in Chile,
including the Church which has made no secret of its distaste for exile.
Trade union rights are constantly under assault, organising parties is
dangerous, economic hardship is a permanent concern for the growing
numbers of poor and unemployed, and university students are
constantly agitating for respect for basic academic freedom. With these
preoccupations, the opposition can devote only limited resources to
exert pressure on the government to allow exiles to return.
A weak government, or a government responsive to international
concern, would be very vulnerable to pressure on this issue. Allowing

6 The government announced in mid-1986 amid a mixture of surprise and derision, the creation of
a Commission on Human Rights. One of its members, a Supreme Court judge, has already
stated in a press interview that he thinks exile is justified if the government thinks that the person
concerned is a potential terrorist. The fact that it does not not have to be legally proved reflets
the supine attitude of some judges-though there are notable exceptions-before the
government, Emilio Filippi, 'El Exilio y la Comisi6n'. Hoy, 7 July 1986, p 5.

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

exiles to return would not have a major political impact on the strength
of the opposition, assuming that a few key leaders were still exiled, but it
would be a gesture warmly approved in human terms, not just in Chile
but abroad. Occasionally the government makes gestures, but only
token ones, to try to deflect attention from other areas such as torture
and mass arrests. Chile has been constantly criticised by international
organisations for its abuse of human rights, and even the USA has
joined in this criticism.7 By making concessions to exiles, Pinochet can
claim that he is solving the problems of political order in Chile, but he
cannot allow return without control because that would be tantamount
to admitting that Chile was not surrounded by potential enemies.
Pinochet is part prisoner of his own rhetoric: if negotiation is defined as
a climb-down, then supporters may draw the wrong conclusions from
humanitarian gestures.
Chile has been internationally isolated almost since the day of the
coup, and this weakens the ability of the international community to
persuade the government to change its policy.
The US government is still the single most important foreign
influence in Pinochet's Chile, in spite of the limited trade between the
countries and the US embargo on arms sales to Chile since 1977. The
activities of the US Ambassador Harry Barnes, appointed in mid-1985,
are a sharp contrast with those of his predecessor. Barnes has spent
considerable time meeting opposition politicians and stressing his
government's commitment to support for human rights and a peaceful
return to democracy.
However, other less public reassurances are probably being given to
the regime; in the present climate of political uncertainty, any prudent
US government would want to keep its options open. The economic
relations between the USA and Chile are of less importance than they
used to be, but Chile is the world's largest single exporter of copper, a
product that still has strategic and economic importance. There is
increasing private investment, mostly North American, in the copper
sector, and the USA presumably seeks a political outcome that
safeguards investment in, and the supply of, copper. Moreover, the
USA has recently gained the agreement of the Pinochet Government to
establish a satellite tracking station on Easter Island. This has been
opposed by nationalist opinion across the political spectrum in Chile, and
again the USA will want to safeguard its base there.
7 In March 1986, the USA approved the UNHCR report which criticised the Chilean government's
continued abuse of human rights.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

The major political opponent of the Pinochet Government is the

PDC, and it makes sense therefore for the USA to make overtures to
the PDC. The USA will also want to ensure that the CP remain far from
power, and a continuation of the Pinochet regime would be preferable
to a CP government. Pursuing a clear foreign policy in these
circumstances is far from easy.
The single issue on which Chile is most vulnerable is repayment of its
huge US $23 billion foreign debt, most of which is debt to private
international banks rather than the US or other foreign governments.
Neither the international banks nor the IMF are likely or willing to
make loans to Chile, conditional on human rights issues, let alone take
up the question of exile.8 International criticism from other sources or
countries is attributed by the government to the activities of
international communism, and are used to further justify authoritarian
measures.
The exile question would receive more political prominence if there
was an undisputed national figure in exile, ready and able to return. But
there is no exile leader who commands the kind of support that Benigno
Aquino in the Philippines, or Juan Domingo Per6n in Argentina or
Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela did when they were in exile. The two
major political figures of recent Chilean history, Salvador Allende and
Eduardo Frei, are both dead. The government has assassinated two
possible leaders of the opposition-General Prats, a former
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, in Buenos Aires in 1974,
and the Socialist leader Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1977-and
seriously wounded Bernardo Leighton, a well-respected Christian
Democrat, after an attempt to kill him in Rome.

Exile and the political parties

All parties and persuasions have had to rethink their basic political
beliefs in the last two decades. Some 200,000 Chileans (at the very least)
have been scattered in countries all over the world, and they have often
been politically experienced and intellectually aware of the major

' The US did refuse to approve credits to Chile at meetings of the Inter-American Developmen
Bank in February 1985, and of the World Bank in March and May 1985. This action was aimed at
getting Pinochet to lift the state of siege he had declared in November 1984. It was successful,
though the effects were only marginal as the country is still governed under emergency decrees.
The US cannot push such measures too far, especially as Chile is a model 'debtor' country,
unlike, say, Argentina or Mexico. Carlos Portales, 'De 1985 a 1986: Estados Unidos y la
Transici6n a la Democracia en Chile'. Cono Sur (Santiago) 5(2) April 1986.

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

debates in world politics. They have had an impact on societies that

received them, above all those societies where the political
configuration bore some resemblance to that of Chile-notably Italy
and France. In both those countries the debate on the 'lessons of Chile'
led to a rethinking of political strategies on the Left, and the Chilean
exiles were deeply affected by the political discussion around them. The
debate over Eurocommunism seemed to result in the victory of a more
moderate and pragmatic Left which gave great weight to the
maintenance of a democratic system, even at the cost of abandoning
goals of state control over the economy and greater equality. The
European Left developed ideas on planning, the desirability of the
mixed economy and the need for cooperation between capital, labour
and the government that have profoundly affected the Chilean exiles,
especially those in the socialist parties.

The Socialist Party

Political parties play a central and dominant role in the organisation of
political life in Chile-even after thirteen years of dictatorship.9
Electoral competition has been fierce in the past, and is likely to be as
fierce in the future. Most social organisations, such as trade unions,
have been closely linked to one or more parties, and still maintain these
links, though with greater autonomy. One of the major aims, if not the
major aim, of the dictatorship was to break the hold of parties over
political life in Chile, and a principal method used was to exile leaders.
Although this aim has clearly not been achieved, the impact of
repression and of exile has had important effectsd on the parties.
The party most affected by exile and repression has been the PS, the
largest party on the Left under Allende and always more divided and less
cohesive than its major rival on the Left, and CP. The PS is now divided
into two major blocs-the party of Ricardo Nufiez, which forms part of
the Democratic Alliance along with the PDC, and the party of Almeyda,
which forms part of the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) along
with the Communist Party. There are factions and divisions within these
two main blocs.
These divisions are hardly surprising given the brutal political assault
by the Pinochet regime on the party. In the words of one of the major
leaders of the moderate (Nunez) Socialists, Ricardo Lagos:
How can a party exist when practically all of its leadership has been exiled,

9 See the chapter on opposition parties in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Militar y Rule in Chile . . .

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

imprisoned or 'disappeared'? All the regional committee of La Serena, of

Atacama, of Calama, of Autofagasta, of Iquique, died. In Chile, there are only
two parties that managed to maintain a unified leadership in the period of
dictatorship-the PDc and the Communist Party. The rest were incapable of
overcoming the organic crisis created by the dictatorship, and we were no
exception. This explains the diaspora of socialism today.W'
Apart from the murder of Allende, Jose Toha' and Orlando Letelier,
those socialist leaders who escaped a similar fate have not been allowed
to return. Amongst them are Carlos Altamirano, a former Senator and
Secretary-General of the party, and Clodomiro Almeyda, Allende's
Foreign Secretary. Even moderate socialists such as former Secretary-
General Aniceto Rodriquez have not been allowed to return. The
suffering this causes is immense, and Aniceto Rodriguez writes from
Venezuela: 'This illegal and inhumane sanction of exile continues
crushing me worse than a sentence of perpetual imprisonment-yet I
have committed no crime."' Chilean socialism after 1973 entered a
period of profound self-analysis, and this process produced two major
rival interpretations of policies for the future-one towards a
'Eurosocialist' tendency, the other towards closer alliance with the
communists. This debate took place largely in exile after the party in
Chile was subject to fierce repression, and in effect these rival
interpretations were imported back into Chile as party activity of a
subdued kind gradually became possible in the 1980s.
The first major statement agreed in a clandestine meeting in Chile
stressed, according to Carmelo Furci: 'an organisation based on
Leninist democratic centralism homogeneous in its ideology and
programme, a party that must constitute the disciplined and
homogeneous revolutionary vanguard of the masses. 12 But this
apparently clear ideological line conflicted with the confused reality of
the party; various exile groups claimed to be the authentic leaders of the
party, and links with the small underground movement in Chile were
complicated and tenuous. 13
From the interview in Que1 Pasa? (Santiago) 27 March 1986, p 26.
Hoy, 30 June 1986, p 26.
12 Carmelo Furci, The Crisis of the Chilean Socialist Party in 1979, Working Paper No 11, Institute
of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1984. This is an invaluable source on the 1979
split. See also the exile publication Chile-America (Rome), Dossier No 54-55, 1979. An
interesting reflection on the past, present and future of Chilean socialism is to be found in the book
by the exiled socialist Jorge Arrate, La Fuerza Democrdtica de la Idea Socialista, Santiago:
Ediciones Ornitorrinco, 1985.
13Aniceto Rodriguez a former secretary-general of the party, exiled in Venezuela, complained
bitterly that in six years of exile (1973-9) there were only two apparently representative
assemblies-in Cuba and Algiers. But both in his opinion were used by manipulative minorities
trying to prolong their power. See Chile-America, op. cit., p 112.

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

The major split came in 1979, following a session of the central

committee of the party in Algeria in 1978. It was a complicated event
involving ideological differences, personal ambition, problems of
communication and, presumably, foreign influences on the major
groups inside the party, not least through financial pressure-though
details of that kind of activity are shrouded in mystery.
The pro-communist wing of the party appointed Clodomiro Almeyda
as Secretary-General, and this group forms part of the MDP alliance in
Chile today. The more moderate socialists continued with Carlos
Altamirano as Secretary-General, but this group was much more a
'federation of various ideological tendencies, . . . united in rejecting the
Leninist party style.'14 This tendency was weakly represented in Chile at
the time of the split in 1979, but it has developed rapidly since then,
though autonomously from the exiled leaders; Altamirano has little
influence on, or authority over, the moderate (Nunez) socialists in the
Democratic Alliance.
The Nufiez socialists seem to be more influenced by intellectual and
comparative examples than by a unified line of leadership coming from
exile, and they support a less utopian and less sectarian version of
socialism. Ricardo Lagos, for example, stresses the necessity of
constructive dialogue with the entrepreneurial sectors: 'this is the
influence of European Socialism on Chilean Socialism today.'15 He
points to another major influence, that of Gramsci, in the sense that he
sees socialism not as a seizure of state power, but as the widespread
diffusion of socialist values. 6 This kind of analysis has been refinforced
by the entry into the Socialist party of important sectors of the
intelligentsia, once part of the MAPU party.
This moderate group has made inroads amongst the intellectuals, but
the Almeyda socialists remain the dominant group with the rank-and-
file. Their view of socialism remains intransigent. Almeyda defends his
beliefs by the ideas expressed in the Communist Manifesto, Marxism-
Leninism, and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. The ideas of this
group reflect the belief that permanent gains for the working class can
only be secured by effective control over state power, which is
understandable in the context of the bitter repression that they have
suffered. Their criticism of the moderate socialists is that they run the

14 Furci, Crisis . . ., p 12.

15 Interview in Que Pasa?, 27 March 1986, p 27.
16 This is also the sentiment of one of the major theoreticians of Chilean socialism, Raul Ampuero.
Chile-America, op. cit., p 94.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

risk of becoming a mere appendage of the Christian Democrats, and

that their ideas are little more than thinly disguised social democracy.
The Almeyda socialists argue that they represent the historic tradition
of Chilean socialism.17 Of course, this group is in danger of becoming
an appendage of the communists, but their more radical policy seems to
have greater appeal to the popular base of the party, though only a free
election would demonstrate that.
Chilean socialism has always been receptive to outside influences,
and has often divided over questions of ideology and of political
alliance, above all with the CP. Exile has increased the variety of
ideological influences on the party, and has given rise to two very
different versions of socialism. Without the unifying process of electoral
competition with other parties, without the strong impulse for unity that
comes when the rank-and-file are able to participate fully in party
activities, and with the primacy of ideological dispute that affects parties
in exile, it seems that two distinct varieties of socialism will persist in
separate parties.

The other parties

The CP suffered a huge loss of middle level leaders after the coup, but
several dominant figures in the party were either abroad at the time of
the coup (Volodia Teitelboim), or were released from Chile (Luis
Corvalan). The exile leaders are firmly in control with the backing of
Moscow. The CP copes reasonably well operating clandestinely, having
had experience when banned in Chile for ten years after 1948. Exile
does not mean loss of funds, international support and prestige, or
contradictory pressures leading to splits. But there is tension between
the exile leadership-with its background in congress or the union
movement and adept in the Popular Front style of politics-and the
rank-and-file in Chile, increasingly drawn from the young and
unemployed poor of the shanty-towns who are prone to see violence as
the basic political tactic.18
The CP shifted towards a more insurrectionary tactic in 1980, when it
argued that violence was a legitimate tactic in the struggle to overthrow
Pinochet. It seems that the change reflected a shift in the attitude of the
international communist movement which emphasised the armed

17 See the interview with Almeyda socialist, German Correa, in Hoy, 23 September 1985.
'8 The Secretary-General of the CP, Luis Corvalin is reportedly seriously ill in exile in Moscow.
Partly as a result of the need to think about a successor, also on the agenda is the question of
moving the party leadership back to Chile. Hoy 7 July 1986, p 11.

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

struggle to achieve socialism, rather than the peaceful path. The

communist movement was anxious not to be always last on to the
revolutionary barricades, as happened in the movement that overthrew
President Somoza in Nicaragua, but there are also internal reasons for
the change. The social base of the party has changed with the decline in
the power of organised labour and the rise of radical unemployed youth
in the shanty-towns. Anxious to tap this potential source of opposition
to Pinochet, the party was prepared to use political tactics appropriate
to those who could exercise influence not by going on strike but by
organising protest in the shanty-towns. Moreover, this strategy appears
to be paying dividends in increased support for the CP and the small
urban guerrilla group unofficially associated with it, the Frente
Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez.
However, this change of line is not necessarily any more than a tac-
tical change which can be altered again if circumstances dictate. Many ex-
perienced cadres of the CP are old-style union leaders whose approach
emphasises patient work in the factories rather than impatient violence
in the shanty-towns. After all, historically the CP has been rather
unsuccessful in attempting insurrection, but relatively successful in
engineering broad alliances of the kind embodied in the Popular Front
and the Popular Unity. Chile is not Nicaragua or El Salvador, and the
Frente Patriotico is not the Sandinista movement. It is doubtful if the
ideological commitment of the unemployed youth is the unwavering,
often life-long allegiance that has characterised communist militants in
the long history of that party in Chile.
Exile has not had the same disunifying effect on the CP which it has
had on the PS. The reasons are fairly clear. The CP has long been an or-
thodox party, very loyal to Moscow, and most leaders were exiled in the
USSR or Eastern Europe. Even more than before the CP depends
upon Moscow for support, not least of all for financial support. As
Valenzuela and Valenzuela point out, the communists have 'benefited
significantly from access to highly powerful short-wave radio broadcasts
from Moscow to Chile, which have kept the regular party leadership
before militants and followers while providing them with information
on the internal situation and party activities.' 19
The PDC has suffered from fewer traumas than the parties of the left.
It has remained the largest party of the opposition, and this has led to
increased international support and prestige for the party. The number

'9 Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Military Rule in Chile. .. p 211.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

of PDC exiles have been fewer and their period of exile shorter, and the
presence of such obviously moderate leaders as Jaime Castillo in
Venezuela and Andres Zaldivar in Madrid (where he was President of
the Christian Democratic International) has been designed to improve
the image of the PDC with foreign governments and to intensify the
international isolation of Chile, though there is some evidence of
tension between the exiled leaders and those who remained in Chile.
Exiled leaders often lived in comparative comfort, though they still had
to suffer the unique problems that exile brings. Those who remained in
Chile sometimes resented the return of exiles to positions of power in
the party. The major dilemma for the party, however, is whether to
move to the right or the left in Chile and this is only marginally affected
by the issue of exile.
The effect of exile upon the Radical Party has been broadly similar to
that of the PS, but the Radicals were so badly divided before 1973 that
the loss of support and the divisions of the party have been exacerbated
and not caused by exile. The Radical Party in Chile, led by Enrique
Silva Cimma, forms part of the Democratic Alliance and advocates poli-
cies similar to those of European social democracy. But the party in exile
is dominated by one of the Vice-Presidents, Anselmo Sule, whose
position is closer to that of the MDP and the communists, and whose
power in the party is partly based upon control of the international
funds that help to keep the party alive-for example, from the Socialist
International, of which the Radical Party is a member.2('
The Radical Party divided into three distinct parties during the UP
Government, and its electoral support declined considerably. As a
weak party whose electoral base is uncertain, the additional problem of
exile contributes to continuing uncertainty and impedes the unity of the
old Radical constituency.
The effect of exile on the union movement is by now fairly marginal.
Most union leaders of any importance on the left were killed or removed
from their unions after the coup. The real weakness of the unions is the
product of systematic policy by the government and would not be
changed by the return of those union leaders still in exile. Immediately
after the coup, many union leaders were removed from their posts, or
murdered or exiled. The government dismantled protective union
legislation established by the workers after years of struggle. In 1979 the

20 The ascendancy of the Silva Cimma wing seems assured with his recent election in July 1986 as
one of the Vice-Presidents of the Socialist International. Que Pasa, 26 June 1986.

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 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY

government promulgated its Labour Plan which made effective

collective bargaining all but impossible, and gave employers almost
complete rights to dismiss workers at will. Moreover the union world
has changed in many ways since the coup and returning leaders might
not always find that they enjoyed the same prestige as they did under
the UP. Attempts to recreate the old CUT in exile have not been notably
successful. A new generation of union leaders has emerged-men like
Manuel Bustos of the textile workers, Rodolfo Seguel of the copper
workers and Jose Ruiz di Giorgio of the petroleum workers. Although
these men, apart from Seguel, had union experience before 1973, it is
only after the coup that they emerged as leaders. Their leadership stems
from their contacts with the rank and file in Chile, not from links with
union movement in exile.

Conclusions

A final solution to the problem of exile is highly unlikely unless the

regime of General Pinochet is replaced by a democratic government.
After the protests of 2-3 July 1986, such a change looks more likely than
at any time since 1973. But the odds are against complete change while
the monolithic unity of the army remains intact. Even if Pinochet stands
down in 1989 (when the Constitution comes into force and the choice of
President has to be ratified by a plebiscite), the problem of exile would
remain unless the authoritarian Constitution is also dismantled.
Exile is not a capricious excess of authoritarian rulers in Chile: it is an
intrinsic and indispensable part of that authoritarian system of rule. The
rulers of Chile define their opponents as anti-patriotic and as agents of
foreign powers. It is quite logical, by this reasoning, that such people be
exiled, forbidden to return and in extreme cases even deprived of their
nationality. War demands such extreme measures, and the rulers of
Chile see themselves as engaged in a war against international
communism.
If exiles are allowed to return tomorrow, it is difficult to envisage any
dramatic change in the politics of Chile. The parties of the left would be
reinforced by the return of prominent leaders, but such returns would
be unlikely, for example, to bridge the gap between the rival socialist
parties or alter the policy direction of the CP. After all, there is no one
like Peron ready to return in triumph to assume political leadership of
the left as he did in Argentina in 1973.
The effect of exile on the political parties has already been described.

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 THE EXILE QUESTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS

It is only one factor that has produced policy changes, changes of style,
new ideas and new partners in the shifting world of Chilean party
competition. Quite how permanent those changes are will only be
known once free competitive elections are held, and the population can
respond to the programmes offered by the parties.

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