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GOOGLE GEMINI
FOR
PYTHON
LICENSE, DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY, AND LIMITED
WARRANTY
By purchasing or using this book and companion files (the “Work”), you
agree that this license grants permission to use the contents contained
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information or products contained in it. This license does not permit
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without the written consent of the Publisher. Duplication or dissemination
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and subject to licensing terms for the respective products, and permission
must be obtained from the Publisher or the owner of the content, etc., in
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MERCURY LEARNING AND INFORMATION (“MLI” or “the Publisher”) and
anyone involved in the creation, writing, or production of the companion
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Companion files for this title are available by writing to the publisher at
[email protected].
GOOGLE GEMINI
FOR
PYTHON
Coding with Bard

Oswald Campesato
MERCURY LEARNING AND INFORMATION
Boston, Massachusetts
Copyright ©2024 by MERCURY LEARNING AND INFORMATION.
An Imprint of DeGruyter Inc. All rights reserved.

This publication, portions of it, or any accompanying software may not be reproduced in any way,
stored in a retrieval system of any type, or transmitted by any means, media, electronic display or
mechanical display, including, but not limited to, photocopy, recording, Internet postings, or
scanning, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

Publisher: David Pallai

MERCURY LEARNING AND INFORMATION
121 High Street, 3rd Floor
Boston, MA 02110
[email protected]
www.merclearning.com
800-232-0223

O. Campesato. Google® Gemini for Python: Coding with Bard.

ISBN: 978-1-50152-274-1

The publisher recognizes and respects all marks used by companies, manufacturers, and developers
as a means to distinguish their products. All brand names and product names mentioned in this book
are trademarks or service marks of their respective companies. Any omission or misuse (of any kind)
of service marks or trademarks, etc. is not an attempt to infringe on the property of others.

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based on the operation or functionality of the product.
 I’d like to dedicate this book to my parents
– may this bring joy and happiness into their lives.
CONTENTS

Preface

Chapter 1: Introduction to Python 3

Tools for Python
easy_install and pip
virtualenv
IPython
Python Installation
Setting the PATH Environment Variable (Windows Only)
Launching Python on Your Machine
The Python Interactive Interpreter
Python Identifiers
Lines, Indentation, and Multilines
Quotation and Comments in Python
Saving Your Code in a Module
Some Standard Modules in Python
The help() and dir() Functions
Compile Time and Runtime Code Checking
Simple Data Types in Python
Working With Numbers
Working With Other Bases
The chr() Function
The round() Function in Python
Formatting Numbers in Python
Working With Fractions
Unicode and UTF-8
 Working With Unicode
Working With Strings
Comparing Strings
Formatting Strings in Python
Slicing and Splicing Strings
Testing for Digits and Alphabetic Characters
Search and Replace a String in Other Strings
Remove Leading and Trailing Characters
Printing Text without NewLine Characters
Text Alignment
Working With Dates
Converting Strings to Dates
Exception Handling in Python
Handling User Input
Command-Line Arguments
Summary

Chapter 2: Conditional Logic, Loops, and Functions

Precedence of Operators in Python
Python Reserved Words
Working with Loops in Python
Python for Loops
A for Loop with try/except in Python
Numeric Exponents in Python
Nested Loops
The split() Function With for Loops
Using the split() Function to Compare Words
Using the split() Function to Print Justified Text
Using the split() Function to Print Fixed-Width Text
Using the split() Function to Compare Text Strings
Using the split() Function to Display Characters in a String
The join() Function
Python while Loops
Conditional Logic in Python
The break/continue/pass Statements
Comparison and Boolean Operators
The in/not in/is/is not Comparison Operators
 The and, or, and not Boolean Operators
Local and Global Variables
Uninitialized Variables and the Value None
Scope of Variables
Pass by Reference Versus Value
Arguments and Parameters
Using a while loop to Find the Divisors of a Number
Using a while loop to Find Prime Numbers
User-Defined Functions in Python
Specifying Default Values in a Function
Returning Multiple Values From a Function
Functions With a Variable Number of Arguments
Lambda Expressions
Recursion
Calculating Factorial Values
Calculating Fibonacci Numbers
Calculating the GCD of Two Numbers
Calculating the LCM of Two Numbers
Summary

Chapter 3: Python Data Structures

Working with Lists
Lists and Basic Operations
Reversing and Sorting a List
Lists and Arithmetic Operations
Lists and Filter-Related Operations
Sorting Lists of Numbers and Strings
Expressions in Lists
Concatenating a List of Words
The Bubble Sort in Python
The Python range() Function
Counting Digits and Uppercase and Lowercase Letters
Arrays and the append() Function
Working with Lists and the split() Function
Counting Words in a List
Iterating Through Pairs of Lists
Other List-Related Functions
 Using a List as a Stack and a Queue
Working with Vectors
Working with Matrices
The NumPy Library for Matrices
Queues
Tuples (Immutable Lists)
Sets
Dictionaries
Creating a Dictionary
Displaying the Contents of a Dictionary
Checking for Keys in a Dictionary
Deleting Keys from a Dictionary
Iterating Through a Dictionary
Interpolating Data from a Dictionary
Dictionary Functions and Methods
Dictionary Formatting
Ordered Dictionaries
Sorting Dictionaries
Python Multi Dictionaries
Other Sequence Types in Python
Mutable and Immutable Types in Python
The type() Function
Working with Bard
Counting Digits and Uppercase and Lowercase Letters
Bard Python Code for a Queue
Bard Python Code for a Stack
Summary

Chapter 4: Introduction to NumPy and Pandas

What is NumPy?
Useful NumPy Features
What are NumPy arrays?
Working with Loops
Appending Elements to Arrays (1)
Appending Elements to Arrays (2)
Multiply Lists and Arrays
Doubling the Elements in a List
Lists and Exponents
Arrays and Exponents
Math Operations and Arrays
Working with “-1” Subranges with Vectors
Working with “–1” Subranges with Arrays
Other Useful NumPy Methods
Arrays and Vector Operations
NumPy and Dot Products (1)
NumPy and Dot Products (2)
NumPy and the “Norm” of Vectors
NumPy and Other Operations
NumPy and the reshape() Method
Calculating the Mean and Standard Deviation
Calculating Quartiles With Numpy
What is Pandas?
Pandas Data Frames
DataFrames and Data Cleaning Tasks
A Labeled Pandas DataFrame
Pandas Numeric DataFrames
Pandas Boolean DataFrames
Transposing a Pandas DataFrame
Pandas DataFrames and Random Numbers
Combining Pandas DataFrames (1)
Combining Pandas DataFrames (2)
Data Manipulation with Pandas DataFrames (1)
Data Manipulation with Pandas DataFrames (2)
Data Manipulation with Pandas DataFrames (3)
Pandas DataFrames and CSV Files
Pandas DataFrames and Excel Spreadsheets
Select, Add, and Delete Columns in DataFrames
Pandas DataFrames and Scatterplots
Pandas DataFrames and Simple Statistics
Useful One-Line Commands in Pandas
Working with Bard
A Pandas DataFrame with Random Values
Pandas DataFrame and a Bar Chart
Pandas DataFrames and Statistics
 Summary

Chapter 5: Generative AI, Bard, and Gemini

What is Generative AI?
Key Features of Generative AI
Popular Techniques in Generative AI
What Makes Generative AI Unique
Conversational AI Versus Generative AI
Primary Objective
Applications
Technologies Used
Training and Interaction
Evaluation
Data Requirements
Is Gemini Part of Generative AI?
DeepMind
DeepMind and Games
Player of Games (PoG)
OpenAI
Cohere
Hugging Face
Hugging Face Libraries
Hugging Face Model Hub
AI21
InflectionAI
Anthropic
What is Prompt Engineering?
Prompts and Completions
Types of Prompts
Instruction Prompts
Reverse Prompts
System Prompts Versus Agent Prompts
Prompt Templates
Poorly-Worded Prompts
What is Gemini?
Gemini Ultra Versus GPT-4
Gemini Strengths
 Gemini’s Weaknesses
Gemini Nano on Mobile Devices
What is Bard?
Sample Queries and Responses from Bard
Alternatives to Bard
YouChat
Pi from Inflection
CoPilot (OpenAI/Microsoft)
Codex (OpenAI)
Apple GPT
Claude 2
Summary

Chapter 6: Bard and Python Code

CSV Files for Bard
Simple Web Scraping
Basic Chatbot
Basic Data Visualization
Basic Pandas
Generating Random Data
Recursion: Fibonacci Numbers
Generating a Python Class
Asynchronous Programming
Working with Requests in Python
Image Processing with PIL
Exception Handling
Generators in Python
Roll 7 or 11 with Two Dice
Roll 7 or 11 with Three Dice
Roll 7 or 11 with Four Dice
Mean and Standard Deviation
Summary

Index
PREFACE

This book starts with an introduction to fundamental aspects of Python

programming, which include various data types, number formatting,
Unicode and UTF-8 handling, and text manipulation techniques. In addition.
you will learn about loops, conditional logic, and reserved words in Python.
You will also see how to handle user input, manage exceptions, and work
with command-line arguments.
Next, the text transitions to the realm of Generative AI, discussing its
distinction from Conversational AI. Popular platforms and models,
including Bard and its competitors, are presented to give readers an
understanding of the current AI landscape. The book also sheds light on the
capabilities of Bard, its strengths, weaknesses, and potential applications. In
addition, you will learn how to generate a variety of Python 3 code samples
via Bard.
In essence, this book provides a modest bridge between the worlds of
Python programming and AI, aiming to equip readers with the knowledge
and skills to navigate both domains confidently.

THE TARGET AUDIENCE

This book is intended primarily for people who want to learn both
Python and how to use Bard with Python. This book is also intended to
reach an international audience of readers with highly diverse backgrounds
in various age groups. In addition, this book uses standard English rather
than colloquial expressions that might be confusing to those readers. This
book provides a comfortable and meaningful learning experience for the
intended readers.
DO I NEED TO LEARN THE THEORY PORTIONS OF THIS
BOOK?

The answer depends on the extent to which you plan to become

involved in working with Bard and Python, perhaps involving LLMs and
generative AI. In general, it’s probably worthwhile to learn the more
theoretical aspects of LLMs that are discussed in this book.

WHAT DO I NEED TO KNOW FOR THIS BOOK?

Although this book is introductory in nature, some knowledge of Python

3.x with certainly be helpful for the code samples. Knowledge of other
programming languages (such as Java) can also be helpful because of the
exposure to programming concepts and constructs.

DOES THIS BOOK CONTAIN PRODUCTION-LEVEL CODE

SAMPLES?
This book contains basic code samples that are written in Python, and
their primary purpose is to familiarize you with basic Python to help you
understand the Python code generated via Bard. Moreover, clarity has
higher priority than writing more compact code that is more difficult to
understand (and possibly more prone to bugs). If you decide to use any of
the code in this book, you ought to subject that code to the same rigorous
analysis as the other parts of your code base.

COMPANION FILES

All the code samples and figures in this book may be obtained by
writing to the publisher at [email protected].

If you are primarily interested in machine learning, there are some

subfields of machine learning, such as deep learning and reinforcement
learning (and deep reinforcement learning) that might appeal to you.
Fortunately, there are many resources available, and you can perform an
Internet search for those resources. One other point: the aspects of machine
learning for you to learn will depend on your career: the needs of a machine
learning engineer, data scientist, manager, student, or software developer
are all different.

Oswald Campesato
January 2024
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO PYTHON 3

his chapter contains an introduction to Python, with information about

T useful tools for installing Python modules, basic Python constructs, and
how to work with some data types in Python.
The first part of this chapter covers how to install Python, some Python
environment variables, and how to use the Python interpreter. You will see
Python code samples and also how to save Python code in text files that you
can launch from the command line. The second part of this chapter shows
you how to work with simple data types, such as numbers, fractions, and
strings. The final part of this chapter discusses exceptions and how to use
them in Python scripts.

NOTE The Python files in this book are for Python 3.x.

TOOLS FOR PYTHON

The Anaconda Python distribution is available for Windows, Linux, and

Mac, and it’s downloadable here: http://continuum.io/downloads
Anaconda is well-suited for modules such as numpy and scipy, and if you
are a Windows user, Anaconda appears to be a better alternative than working
from the command line.

easy_install and pip

 Both easy_install and pip are very easy to use when you need to install
Python modules. Whenever you need to install a Python module (and there
are many in this book), use either easy_install or pip with the following
syntax:

easy_install <module-name>
pip install <module-name>

NOTE Python-based modules are easier to install than modules with code
written in C because they are usually faster. However, they are more difficult
in terms of installation.

virtualenv
The virtualenv tool enables you to create isolated Python environments,
and its home page is here: http://www.virtualenv.org/en/latest/virtualenv.html
virtualenv addresses the problem of preserving the correct dependencies
and versions (and indirectly permissions) for different applications. If you are
a Python novice, you might not need virtualenv right now, but keep this tool
in mind.

IPython
Another very good tool is IPython (which won a Jolt award), and its
home page is here:

http://ipython.org/install.html

Two very nice features of IPython are tab expansion and “?,” and an
example of tab expansion is shown here:

$ ipython3
Python 3.9.13 (main, May 24 2022, 21:28:12)
Type 'copyright', 'credits' or 'license' for more information
IPython 8.14.0 -- An enhanced Interactive Python. Type '?' for help.
In [1]:

In [1]: di
%dirs dict dir divmod
 In the preceding session, if you type the characters di, iPython responds
with the following line that contains all the functions that start with the letters
di:

%dirs dict dir divmod

If you enter a question mark (“?”), ipython provides textual assistance,

the first part of which is here:

IPython -- An enhanced Interactive Python

=========================================

IPython offers a combination of convenient shell

features, special commands and a history mechanism
for both input (command history) and output (results
caching, similar to Mathematica). It is intended to be
a fully compatible replacement for the standard Python
interpreter, while offering vastly improved functionality
and flexibility.

The next section shows you how to check whether or not Python is
installed on your machine, and also where you can download Python.

PYTHON INSTALLATION
Before you download anything, check if you already have Python
installed on your machine (which is likely if you have a Macbook or a Linux
machine) by typing the following command in a command shell:

python -V

The output for the Macbook used in this book is here:

Python 3.9.1

NOTE Install Python 3.9 (or as close as possible to this version) on your
machine so that you will have the same version of Python that was used to
test the Python files in this book.

If you need to install Python on your machine, navigate to the Python

home page and select the downloads link or navigate directly to this website:
 http://www.python.org/download/

In addition, PythonWin is available for Windows, and its home page is

here:

http://www.cgl.ucsf.edu/Outreach/pc204/pythonwin.html

Use any text editor that can create, edit, and save Python scripts and save
them as plain text files (don’t use Microsoft Word).
After you have Python installed and configured on your machine, you are
ready to work with the Python scripts in this book.

SETTING THE PATH ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE (WINDOWS ONLY)

The PATH environment variable specifies a list of directories that are
searched whenever you specify an executable program from the command
line. A very good guide to setting up your environment so that the Python
executable is always available in every command shell is to follow the
instructions here:

http://www.blog.pythonlibrary.org/2011/11/24/python-101-setting-up-
python-on-windows/

LAUNCHING PYTHON ON YOUR MACHINE

There are three different ways to launch Python:

• Use the Python Interactive Interpreter.

• Launch Python scripts from the command line.
• Use an IDE.

The next section shows you how to launch the Python interpreter from the
command line, and later in this chapter you will learn how to launch Python
scripts from the command line and also about Python IDEs.

NOTE The emphasis in this book is to launch Python files from the command
line or to enter code in the Python interpreter.
The Python Interactive Interpreter
Launch the Python interactive interpreter from the command line by
opening a command shell and typing the following command:

python

You will see the following prompt (or something similar):

Python 3.9.1 (v3.9.1:1e5d33e9b9, Dec 7 2020, 12:44:01)

[Clang 12.0.0 (clang-1200.0.32.27)] on darwin
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>>

Now type the expression 2 + 7 at the prompt:

>>> 2 + 7
Python displays the following result:
9
>>>

Press ctrl-d to exit the Python shell.

You can launch any Python script from the command line by preceding it
with the word “python.” For example, if you have a Python script
myscript.py that contains Python commands, launch the script as follows:

python myscript.py

As a simple illustration, suppose that the Python script myscript.py

contains the following Python code:

print('Hello World from Python')

print('2 + 7 = ', 2+7)

When you launch the preceding Python script, you will see the following
output:

Hello World from Python

2 + 7 = 9

PYTHON IDENTIFIERS
 A Python identifier is the name of a variable, function, class, module, or
other Python object, and a valid identifier conforms to the following rules:

• It starts with a letter A to Z or a to z or an underscore (_).

• It includes zero or more letters, underscores, and digits (0 to 9).

NOTE Python identifiers cannot contain characters such as @, $, and %.

Python is a case-sensitive language, so Abc and abc different identifiers in

Python.
In addition, Python has the following naming convention:

• Class names start with an uppercase letter and all other identifiers with a
lowercase letter.
• An initial underscore is used for private identifiers.
• Two initial underscores are used for strongly private identifiers.

A Python identifier with two initial underscore and two trailing

underscore characters indicates a language-defined special name.

LINES, INDENTATION, AND MULTILINES

Unlike other programming languages (such as Java or Objective-C),

Python uses indentation instead of curly braces for code blocks. Indentation
must be consistent in a code block, as shown here:

if True:
print("ABC")
print("DEF")
else:
print("ABC")
print("DEF")

Multiline statements in Python can terminate with a new line or the

backslash (“\”) character, as shown here:

total = x1 + \
x2 + \
x3
 Obviously you can place x1, x2, and x3 on the same line, so there is no
reason to use three separate lines; however, this functionality is available in
case you need to add a set of variables that do not fit on a single line.
You can specify multiple statements in one line by using a semicolon
(“;”) to separate each statement, as shown here:

a=10; b=5; print(a); print(a+b)

The output of the preceding code snippet is here:

10
15

NOTE The use of semi-colons and the continuation character are discouraged
in Python.

QUOTATION AND COMMENTS IN PYTHON

Python allows single ('), double (") and triple ('" or """) quotes for string
literals, provided that they match at the beginning and the end of the string.
You can use triple quotes for strings that span multiple lines. The following
examples are legal Python strings:

word = 'word'
line = "This is a sentence."
para = """This is a paragraph. This paragraph contains
more than one sentence."""

A string literal that begins with the letter “r” (for “raw”) treats everything
as a literal character and “escapes” the meaning of meta characters, as shown
here:

a1 = r'\n'
a2 = r'\r'
a3 = r'\t'
print('a1:',a1,'a2:',a2,'a3:',a3)

The output of the preceding code block is here:

a1: \n a2: \r a3: \t

Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
affectionate to others than man? Yet what is more savage against
them than anger? Mankind is born for mutual assistance, anger for
mutual ruin: the former loves society, the latter estrangement. The
one loves to do good, the other to do harm; the one to help even
strangers, the other to attack even its dearest friends. The one is
ready even to sacrifice itself for the good of others, the other to
plunge into peril provided it drags others with it. Who, then, can be
more ignorant of nature than he who classes this cruel and hurtful
vice as belonging to her best and most polished work? Anger, as we
have said, is eager to punish; and that such a desire should exist in
man’s peaceful breast is least of all according to his nature; for
human life is founded on benefits and harmony, and is bound
together into an alliance for the common help of all, not by terror,
but by love towards one another.

VI. “What, then? Is not correction sometimes necessary?” Of course

it is; but with discretion, not with anger; for it does not injure, but
heals under the guise of injury. We char crooked spearshafts to
straighten them, and force them by driving in wedges, not in order
to break them, but to take the bends out of them; and, in like
manner, by applying pain to the body or mind we correct dispositions
which have been rendered crooked by vice. So the physician at first,
when dealing with slight disorders, tries not to make much change in
his patient’s daily habits, to regulate his food, drink, and exercise,
and to improve his health merely by altering the order in which he
takes them. The next step is to see whether an alteration in their
amount will be of service. If neither alteration of the order or of the
amount is of use, he cuts off some and reduces others. If even this
does not answer, he forbids food, and disburdens the body by
fasting. If milder remedies have proved useless he opens a vein; if
the extremities are injuring the body and infecting it with disease he
lays his hands upon the limbs; yet none of his treatment is
considered harsh if its result is to give health. Similarly, it is the duty
of the chief administrator of the laws, or the ruler of a state, to
correct ill-disposed men, as long as he is able, with words, and even
with gentle ones, that he may persuade them to do what they
ought, inspire them with a love of honour and justice, and cause
them to hate vice and set store upon virtue. He must then pass on
to severer language, still confining himself to advising and
reprimanding; last of all he must betake himself to punishments, yet
still making them slight and temporary. He ought to assign extreme
punishments only to extreme crimes, that no one may die unless it
be even to the criminal’s own advantage that he should die. He will
differ from the physician in one point alone; for whereas physicians
render it easy to die for those to whom they cannot grant the boon
of life, he will drive the condemned out of life with ignominy and
disgrace, not because he takes pleasure in any man’s being
punished, for the wise man is far from such inhuman ferocity, but
that they may be a warning to all men, and that, since they would
not be useful when alive, the state may at any rate profit by their
death. Man’s nature is not, therefore, desirous of inflicting
punishment; neither, therefore, is anger in accordance with man’s
nature, because that is desirous of inflicting punishment. I will also
adduce Plato’s argument—for what harm is there in using other
men’s arguments, so far as they are on our side? “A good man,” says
he, “does not do any hurt: it is only punishment which hurts.
Punishment, therefore, does not accord with a good man: wherefore
anger does not do so either, because punishment and anger accord
one with another. If a good man takes no pleasure in punishment,
he will also take no pleasure in that state of mind to which
punishment gives pleasure: consequently anger is not natural to
man.”

VII. May it not be that, although anger be not natural, it may be

right to adopt it, because it often proves useful? It rouses the spirit
and excites it; and courage does nothing grand in war without it,
unless its flame be supplied from this source; this is the goad which
stirs up bold men and sends them to encounter perils. Some
therefore consider it to be best to control anger, not to banish it
utterly, but to cut off its extravagances, and force it to keep within
useful bounds, so as to retain that part of it without which action will
become languid and all strength and activity of mind will die away.
In the first place, it is easier to banish dangerous passions than to
rule them; it is easier not to admit them than to keep them in order
when admitted; for when they have established themselves in
possession of the mind they are more powerful than the lawful ruler,
and will in no wise permit themselves to be weakened or abridged.
In the next place, Reason herself, who holds the reins, is only strong
while she remains apart from the passions; if she mixes and befouls
herself with them she becomes no longer able to restrain those
whom she might once have cleared out of her path; for the mind,
when once excited and shaken up, goes whither the passions drive
it. There are certain things whose beginnings lie in our own power,
but which, when developed, drag us along by their own force and
leave us no retreat. Those who have flung themselves over a
precipice have no control over their movements, nor can they stop
or slacken their pace when once started, for their own headlong and
irremediable rashness has left no room for either reflexion or
remorse, and they cannot help going to lengths which they might
have avoided. So, also, the mind, when it has abandoned itself to
anger, love, or any other passion, is unable to check itself: its own
weight and the downward tendency of vices must needs carry the
man off and hurl him into the lowest depth.

VIII. The best plan is to reject straightway the first incentives to

anger, to resist its very beginnings, and to take care not to be
betrayed into it: for if once it begins to carry us away, it is hard to
get back again into a healthy condition, because reason goes for
nothing when once passion has been admitted to the mind, and has
by our own free will been given a certain authority, it will for the
future do as much as it chooses, not only as much as you will allow
it. The enemy, I repeat, must be met and driven back at the
outermost frontier-line: for when he has once entered the city and
passed its gates, he will not allow his prisoners to set bounds to his
victory. The mind does not stand apart and view its passions from
without, so as not to permit them to advance further than they
ought, but it is itself changed into a passion, and is therefore unable
to check what once was useful and wholesome strength, now that it
has become degenerate and misapplied: for passion and reason, as I
said before, have not distinct and separate provinces, but consist of
the changes of the mind itself for better or for worse. How then can
reason recover itself when it is conquered and held down by vices,
when it has given way to anger? or how can it extricate itself from a
confused mixture, the greater part of which consists of the lower
qualities? “But,” argues our adversary, “some men when in anger
control themselves.” Do they so far control themselves that they do
nothing which anger dictates, or somewhat? If they do nothing
thereof, it becomes evident that anger is not essential to the conduct
of affairs, although your sect advocated it as possessing greater
strength than reason . . . . Finally, I ask, is anger stronger or weaker
than reason? If stronger, how can reason impose any check upon it,
since it is only the less powerful that obey: if weaker, then reason is
competent to effect its ends without anger, and does not need the
help of a less powerful quality. “But some angry men remain
consistent and control themselves.” When do they do so? It is when
their anger is disappearing and leaving them of its own accord, not
when it was red-hot, for then it was more powerful than they. What
then? do not men, even in the height of their anger, sometimes let
their enemies go whole and unhurt, and refrain from injuring them?
“They do: but when do they do so? It is when one passion
overpowers another, and either fear or greed gets the upper hand
for a while. On such occasions, it is not thanks to reason that anger
is stilled, but owing to an untrustworthy and fleeting truce between
the passions.

IX. In the next place, anger has nothing useful in itself, and does not
rouse up the mind to warlike deeds: for a virtue, being self-
sufficient, never needs the assistance of a vice: whenever it needs
an impetuous effort, it does not become angry, but rises to the
occasion, and excites or soothes itself as far as it deems requisite,
just as the machines which hurl darts may be twisted to a greater or
lesser degree of tension at the manager’s pleasure. “Anger,” says
Aristotle, “is necessary, nor can any fight be won without it, unless it
fills the mind, and kindles up the spirit. It must, however, be made
use of, not as a general, but as a soldier,” Now this is untrue; for if it
listens to reason and follows whither reason leads, it is no longer
anger, whose characteristic is obstinacy: if, again, it is disobedient
and will not be quiet when ordered, but is carried away by its own
wilful and headstrong spirit, it is then as useless an aid to the mind
as a soldier who disregards the sounding of the retreat would be to
a general. If, therefore, anger allows limits to be imposed upon it, it
must be called by some other name, and ceases to be anger, which I
understand to be unbridled and unmanageable: and if it does not
allow limits to be imposed upon it, it is harmful and not to be
counted among aids: wherefore either anger is not anger, or it is
useless: for if any man demands the infliction of punishment, not
because he is eager for the punishment itself, but because it is right
to inflict it, he ought not to be counted as an angry man: that will be
the useful soldier, who knows how to obey orders: the passions
cannot obey any more than they can command.

X. For this cause reason will never call to its aid blind and fierce
impulses, over whom she herself possesses no authority, and which
she never can restrain save by setting against them similar and
equally powerful passions, as for example, fear against anger, anger
against sloth, greed against timidity. May virtue never come to such
a pass, that reason should fly for aid to vices! The mind can find no
safe repose there, it must needs be shaken and tempest-tossed if it
be safe only because of its own defects, if it cannot be brave without
anger, diligent without greed, quiet without fear: such is the
despotism under which a man must live if he becomes the slave of a
passion. Are you not ashamed to put virtues under the patronage of
vices? Then, too, reason ceases to have any power if she can do
nothing without passion, and begins to be equal and like unto
passion; for what difference is there between them if passion
without reason be as rash as reason without passion is helpless?
They are both on the same level, if one cannot exist without the
other. Yet who could endure that passion should be made equal to
reason? “Then,” says our adversary, “passion is useful, provided it be
moderate.” Nay, only if it be useful by nature: but if it be disobedient
to authority and reason, al that we gain by its moderation is that the
less there is of it, the less harm it does: wherefore a moderate
passion is nothing but a moderate evil.

XI. “But,” argues he, “against our enemies anger is necessary.” In no

case is it less necessary; since our attacks ought not to be
disorderly, but regulated and under control. What, indeed, is it
except anger, so ruinous to itself, that overthrows barbarians, who
have so much more bodily strength than we, and are so much better
able to endure fatigue? Gladiators, too, protect themselves by skill,
but expose themselves to wounds when they are angry. Moreover, of
what use is anger, when the same end can be arrived at by reason?
Do you suppose that a hunter is angry with the beasts he kills? Yet
he meets them when they attack him, and follows them when they
flee from him, all of which is managed by reason without anger.
When so many thousands of Cimbri and Teutones poured over the
Alps, what was it that caused them to perish so completely, that no
messenger, only common rumour, carried the news of that great
defeat to their homes, except that with them anger stood in the
place of courage? and anger, although sometimes it overthrows and
breaks to pieces whatever it meets, yet is more often its own
destruction. Who can be braver than the Germans? who charge
more boldly? who have more love of arms, among which they are
born and bred, for which alone they care, to the neglect of
everything else? Who can be more hardened to undergo every
hardship, since a large part of them have no store of clothing for the
body, no shelter from the continual rigour of the climate: yet
Spaniards and Gauls, and even the unwarlike races of Asia and Syria
cut them down before the main legion comes within sight, nothing
but their own irascibility exposing them to death. Give but
intelligence to those minds, and discipline to those bodies of theirs,
which now are ignorant of vicious refinements, luxury, and wealth,—
to say nothing more, we should certainly be obliged to go back to
the ancient Roman habits of life. By what did Fabius restore the
shattered forces of the state, except by knowing how to delay and
spin out time, which angry men know not how to do? The empire,
which then was at its last gasp, would have perished if Fabius had
been as daring as anger urged him to be: but he took thought about
the condition of affairs, and after counting his force, no part of
which could be lost without everything being lost with it, he laid
aside thoughts of grief and revenge, turning his sole attention to
what was profitable and to making the most of his opportunities,
and conquered his anger before he conquered Hannibal. What did
Scipio do? Did he not leave behind Hannibal and the Carthaginian
army, and all with whom he had a right to be angry, and carry over
the war into Africa with such deliberation that he made his enemies
think him luxurious and lazy? What did the second Scipio do? Did he
not remain a long, long time before Numantia, and bear with
calmness the reproach to himself and to his country that Numantia
took longer to conquer than Carthage? By blockading and investing
his enemies, he brought them to such straits that they perished by
their own swords. Anger, therefore, is not useful even in wars or
battles: for it is prone to rashness, and while trying to bring others
into danger, does not guard itself against danger. The most
trustworthy virtue is that which long and carefully considers itself,
controls itself, and slowly and deliberately brings itself to the front.

XII. “What, then,” asks our adversary, “is a good man not to be
angry if he sees his father murdered or his mother outraged?” No,
he will not be angry, but will avenge them, or protect them. Why do
you fear that filial piety will not prove a sufficient spur to him even
without anger? You may as well say—“What then? When a good
man sees his father or his son being cut down, I suppose he will not
weep or faint,” as we see women do whenever any trifling rumour of
danger reaches them. The good man will do his duty without
disturbance or fear, and he will perform the duty of a good man, so
as to do nothing unworthy of a man. My father will be murdered:
then I will defend him: he has been slain, then I will avenge him,
not because I am grieved, but because it is my duty. “Good men are
made angry by injuries done to their friends.” When you say this,
Theophrastus, you seek to throw discredit upon more manly
maxims; you leave the judge and appeal to the mob: because every
one is angry when such things befall his own friends, you suppose
that men will decide that it is their duty to do what they do: for as a
rule every man considers a passion which he recognises to be a
righteous one. But he does the same thing if the hot water is not
ready for his drink, if a glass be broken, or his shoe splashed with
mud. It is not filial piety, but weakness of mind that produces this
anger, as children weep when they lose their parents, just as they do
when they lose their toys. To feel anger on behalf of one’s friends
does not show a loving, but a weak mind: it is admirable and worthy
conduct to stand forth as the defender of one’s parents, children,
friends, and countrymen, at the call of duty itself, acting of one’s
own free will, forming a deliberate judgment, and looking forward to
the future, not in an impulsive, frenzied fashion. No passion is more
eager for revenge than anger, and for that very reason it is unapt to
obtain it: being over hasty and frantic, like almost all desires, it
hinders itself in the attainment of its own object, and therefore has
never been useful either in peace or war: for it makes peace like
war, and when in arms forgets that Mars belongs to neither side, and
falls into the power of the enemy, because it is not in its own. In the
next place, vices ought not to be received into common use because
on some occasions they have effected somewhat: for so also fevers
are good for certain kinds of ill-health, but nevertheless it is better to
be altogether free from them: it is a hateful mode of cure to owe
one’s health to disease. Similarly, although anger, like poison, or
falling headlong, or being shipwrecked, may have unexpectedly done
good, yet it ought not on that account to be classed as wholesome,
for poisons have often proved good for the health.

XIII. Moreover, qualities which we ought to possess become better

and more desirable the more extensive they are: if justice is a good
thing, no one will say that it would be better if any part were
subtracted from it; if bravery is a good thing, no one would wish it to
be in any way curtailed: consequently the greater anger is, the
better it is, for who ever objected to a good thing being increased?
But it is not expedient that anger should be increased: therefore it is
not expedient that it should exist at all, for that which grows bad by
increase cannot be a good thing. “Anger is useful,” says our
adversary, “because it makes men more ready to fight.” According to
that mode of reasoning, then, drunkenness also is a good thing, for
it makes men insolent and daring, and many use their weapons
better when the worse for liquor: nay, according to that reasoning,
also, you may call frenzy and madness essential to strength, because
madness often makes men stronger. Why, does not fear often by the
rule of contraries make men bolder, and does not the terror of death
rouse up even arrant cowards to join battle? Yet anger, drunkenness,
fear, and the like, are base and temporary incitements to action, and
can furnish no arms to virtue, which has no need of vices, although
they may at times be of some little assistance to sluggish and
cowardly minds. No man becomes braver through anger, except one
who without anger would not have been brave at all: anger does not
therefore come to assist courage, but to take its place. What are we
to say to the argument that, if anger were a good thing it would
attach itself to all the best men? Yet the most irascible of creatures
are infants, old men, and sick people. Every weakling is naturally
prone to complaint.

XIV. It is impossible, says Theophrastus, for a good man not to be

angry with bad men. By this reasoning, the better a man is, the
more irascible he will be: yet will he not rather be more tranquil,
more free from passions, and hating no one: indeed, what reason
has he for hating sinners, since it is error that leads them into such
crimes? now it does not become a sensible man to hate the erring,
since if so he will hate himself: let him think how many things he
does contrary to good morals, how much of what he has done
stands in need of pardon, and he will soon become angry with
himself also, for no righteous judge pronounces a different judgment
in his own case and in that of others. No one, I affirm, will be found
who can acquit himself. Every one when he calls himself innocent
looks rather to external witnesses than to his own conscience. How
much more philanthropic it is to deal with the erring in a gentle and
fatherly spirit, and to call them into the right course instead of
hunting them down? When a man is wandering about our fields
because he has lost his way, it is better to place him on the right
path than to drive him away.

XV. The sinner ought, therefore, to be corrected both by warning

and by force, both by gentle and harsh means, and may be made a
better man both towards himself and others by chastisement, but
not by anger: for who is angry with the patient whose wounds he is
tending? “But they cannot be corrected, and there is nothing in them
that is gentle or that admits of good hope.” Then let them be
removed from mortal society, if they are likely to deprave every one
with whom they come in contact, and let them cease to be bad men
in the only way in which they can: yet let this be done without
hatred: for what reason have I for hating the man to whom I am
doing the greatest good, since I am rescuing him from himself?
Does a man hate his own limbs when he cuts them off? That is not
an act of anger, but a lamentable method of healing. We knock mad
dogs on the head, we slaughter fierce and savage bulls, and we
doom scabby sheep to the knife, lest they should infect our flocks:
we destroy monstrous births, and we also drown our children if they
are born weakly or unnaturally formed; to separate what is useless
from what is sound is an act, not of anger, but of reason. Nothing
becomes one who inflicts punishment less than anger, because the
punishment has all the more power to work reformation if the
sentence be pronounced with deliberate judgment. This is why
Socrates said to the slave, “I would strike you, were I not angry.” He
put off the correction of the slave to a calmer season; at the
moment, he corrected himself. Who can boast that he has his
passions, under control, when Socrates did not dare to trust himself
to his anger?

XVI. We do not, therefore, need an angry chastiser to punish the

erring and wicked: for since anger is a crime of the mind, it is not
right that sins should be punished by sin. “What! am I not to be
angry with a robber, or a poisoner?” No: for I am not angry with
myself when I bleed myself. I apply all kinds of punishment as
remedies. You are as yet only in the first stage of error, and do not
go wrong seriously, although you do so often: then I will try to
amend you by a reprimand given first in private and then in public.[4]
You, again, have gone too far to be restored to virtue by words
alone; you must be kept in order by disgrace. For the next, some
stronger measure is required, something that he can feel must be
branded upon him; you, sir, shall be sent into exile and to a desert
place. The next man’s thorough villany needs harsher remedies:
chains and public imprisonment must be applied to him. You, lastly,
have an incurably vicious mind, and add crime to crime: you have
come to such a pass, that you are not influenced by the arguments
which are never wanting to recommend evil, but sin itself is to you a
sufficient reason for sinning: you have so steeped your whole heart
in wickedness, that wickedness cannot be taken from you without
bringing your heart with it. Wretched man! you have long sought to
die; we will do you good service, we will take away that madness
from which you suffer, and to you who have so long lived a misery to
yourself and to others, we will give the only good thing which
remains, that is, death. Why should I be angry with a man just when
I am doing him good: sometimes the truest form of compassion is to
put a man to death. If I were a skilled and learned physician, and
were to enter a hospital, or a rich[5] man’s house, I should not have
prescribed the same treatment for all the patients who were
suffering from various diseases. I see different kinds of vice in the
vast number of different minds, and am called in to heal the whole
body of citizens: let us seek for the remedies proper for each
disease. This man may be cured by his own sense of honour, that
one by travel, that one by pain, that one by want, that one by the
sword. If, therefore, it becomes my duty as a magistrate to put on
black[6] robes, and summon an assembly by the sound of a trumpet,
[7] I shall walk to the seat of judgment not in a rage or in a hostile

spirit, but with the countenance of a judge; I shall pronounce the

formal sentence in a grave and gentle rather than a furious voice,
and shall bid them proceed sternly, yet not angrily. Even when I
command a criminal to be beheaded, when I sew a parricide up in a
sack, when I send a man to be punished by military law, when I fling
a traitor or public enemy down the Tarpeian Rock, I shall be free
from anger, and shall look and feel just as though I were crushing
snakes and other venomous creatures. “Anger is necessary to enable
us to punish.” What? do you think that the law is angry with men
whom it does not know, whom it has never seen, who it hopes will
never exist? We ought, therefore, to adopt the law’s frame of mind,
which does not become angry, but merely defines offences: for, if it
is right for a good man to be angry at wicked crimes, it will also be
right for him to be moved with envy at the prosperity of wicked
men: what, indeed, is more scandalous than that in some cases the
very men, for whose deserts no fortune could be found bad enough,
should flourish and actually be the spoiled children of success? Yet
he will see their affluence without envy, just as he sees their crimes
without anger: a good judge condemns wrongful acts, but does not
hate them. “What then? when the wise man is dealing with
something of this kind, will his mind not be affected by it and
become excited beyond its usual wont?” I admit that it will: he will
experience a slight and trifling emotion; for, as Zeno says, “Even in
the mind of the wise man, a scar remains after the wound is quite
healed.” He will, therefore, feel certain hints and semblances of
passions; but he will be free from the passions themselves.

XVII. Aristotle says that “certain passions, if one makes a proper use
of them, act as arms”: which would be true if, like weapons of war,
they could be taken up or laid aside at the pleasure of their wielder.
These arms, which Aristotle assigns to virtue, fight of their own
accord, do not wait to be seized by the hand, and possess a man
instead of being possessed by him. We have no need of external
weapons, nature has equipped us sufficiently by giving us reason.
She has bestowed this weapon upon us, which is strong,
imperishable, and obedient to our will, not uncertain or capable of
being turned against its master. Reason suffices by itself not merely
to take thought for the future, but to manage our affairs:[8] what,
then, can be more foolish than for reason to beg anger for
protection, that is, for what is certain to beg of what is uncertain?
what is trustworthy of what is faithless? what is whole of what is
sick? What, indeed? since reason is far more powerful by itself even
in performing those operations in which the help of anger seems
especially needful: for when reason has decided that a particular
thing should be done, she perseveres in doing it; not being able to
find anything better than herself to exchange with. She, therefore,
abides by her purpose when it has once been formed; whereas
anger is often overcome by pity: for it possesses no firm strength,
but merely swells like an empty bladder, and makes a violent
beginning, just like the winds which rise from the earth and are
caused by rivers and marshes, which blow furiously without any
continuance: anger begins with a mighty rush, and then falls away,
becoming fatigued too soon: that which but lately thought of
nothing but cruelty and novel forms of torture, is become quite
softened and gentle when the time comes for punishment to be
inflicted. Passion soon cools, whereas reason is always consistent:
yet even in cases where anger has continued to burn, it often
happens that although there may be many who deserve to die, yet
after the death of two or three it ceases to slay. Its first onset is
fierce, just as the teeth of snakes when first roused from their lair
are venomous, but become harmless after repeated bites have
exhausted their poison. Consequently those who are equally guilty
are not equally punished, and often he who has done less is
punished more, because he fell in the way of anger when it was
fresher. It is altogether irregular; at one time it runs into undue
excess, at another it falls short of its duty: for it indulges its own
feelings and gives sentence according to its caprices, will not listen
to evidence, allows the defence no opportunity of being heard, clings
to what it has wrongly assumed, and will not suffer its opinion to be
wrested from it, even when it is a mistaken one.

XVIII. Reason gives each side time to plead; moreover, she herself
demands adjournment, that she may have sufficient scope for the
discovery of the truth; whereas anger is in a hurry: reason wishes to
give a just decision; anger wishes its decision to be thought just:
reason looks no further than the matter in hand; anger is excited by
empty matters hovering on the outskirts of the case: it is irritated by
anything approaching to a confident demeanour, a loud voice, an
unrestrained speech, dainty apparel, high-flown pleading, or
popularity with the public. It often condemns a man because it
dislikes his patron; it loves and maintains error even when truth is
staring it in the face. It hates to be proved wrong, and thinks it more
honourable to persevere in a mistaken line of conduct than to retract
it. I remember Gnaeus Piso, a man who was free from many vices,
yet of a perverse disposition, and one who mistook harshness for
consistency. In his anger he ordered a soldier to be led off to
execution because he had returned from furlough without his
comrade, as though he must have murdered him if he could not
show him. When the man asked for time for search, he would not
grant it: the condemned man was brought outside the rampart, and
was just offering his neck to the axe, when suddenly there appeared
his comrade who was thought to be slain. Hereupon the centurion in
charge of the execution bade the guardsman sheathe his sword, and
led the condemned man back to Piso, to restore to him the
innocence which Fortune had restored to the soldier. They were led
into his presence by their fellow soldiers amid the great joy of the
whole camp, embracing one another and accompanied by a vast
crowd. Piso mounted the tribunal in a fury and ordered them both to
be executed, both him who had not murdered and him who had not
been slain. What could be more unworthy than this? Because one
was proved to be innocent, two perished. Piso even added a third:
for he actually ordered the centurion, who had brought back the
condemned man, to be put to death. Three men were set up to die
in the same place because one was innocent. O, how clever is anger
at inventing reasons for its frenzy! “You,” it says, “I order to be
executed, because you have been condemned to death: you,
because you have been the cause of your comrade’s condemnation,
and you, because when ordered to put him to death you disobeyed
your general.” He discovered the means of charging them with three
crimes, because he could find no crime in them.

XIX. Irascibility, I say, has this fault—it is loth to be ruled: it is angry

with the truth itself, if it comes to light against its will: it assails
those whom it has marked for its victims with shouting and riotous
noise and gesticulation of the entire body, together with reproaches
and curses. Not thus does reason act: but if it must be so, she
silently and quietly wipes out whole households, destroys entire
families of the enemies of the state, together with their wives and
children, throws down their very dwellings, levels them with the
ground, and roots out the names of those who are the foes of
liberty. This she does without grinding her teeth or shaking her
head, or doing anything unbecoming to a judge, whose countenance
ought to be especially calm and composed at the time when he is
pronouncing an important sentence. “What need is there,” asks
Hieronymus, “for you to bite your own lips when you want to strike
some one?” What would he have said, had he seen a proconsul leap
down from the tribunal, snatch the fasces from the lictor, and tear
his own clothes because those of others were not torn as fast as he
wished. Why need you upset the table, throw down the drinking
cups, knock yourself against the columns, tear your hair, smite your
thigh and your breast? How vehement do you suppose anger to be,
if it thus turns back upon itself, because it cannot find vent on
another as fast as it wishes? Such men, therefore, are held back by
the bystanders and are begged to become reconciled with
themselves. But he who while free from anger assigns to each man
the penalty which he deserves, does none of these things. He often
lets a man go after detecting his crime, if his penitence for what he
has done gives good hope for the future, if he perceives that the
man’s wickedness is not deeply rooted in his mind, but is only, as the
saying is, skin-deep. He will grant impunity in cases where it will hurt
neither the receiver nor the giver. In some cases he will punish great
crimes more leniently than lesser ones, if the former were the result
of momentary impulse, not of cruelty, while the latter were instinct
with secret, underhand, long-practised craftiness. The same fault,
committed by two separate men, will not be visited by him with the
same penalty, if the one was guilty of it through carelessness, the
other with a premeditated intention of doing mischief. In all dealing
with crime he will remember that the one form of punishment is
meant to make bad men better, and the other to put them out of the
way. In either case he will look to the future, not to the past: for, as
Plato says, “no wise man punishes any one because he has sinned,
but that he may sin no more: for what is past cannot be recalled,
but what is to come may be checked.” Those, too, whom he wishes
to make examples of the ill success of wickedness, he executes
publicly, not merely in order that they themselves may die, but that
by dying they may deter others from doing likewise. You see how
free from any mental disturbance a man ought to be who has to
weigh and consider all this, when he deals with a matter which
ought to be handled with the utmost care, I mean, the power of life
and death. The sword of justice is ill-placed in the hands of an angry
man.

XX. Neither ought it to be believed that anger contributes anything

to magnanimity: what it gives is not magnanimity but vain glory. The
increase which disease produces in bodies swollen with morbid
humours is not healthy growth, but bloated corpulence. All those
whose madness raises them above human considerations, believe
themselves to be inspired with high and sublime ideas; but there is
no solid ground beneath, and what is built without foundation is
liable to collapse in ruin. Anger has no ground to stand upon, and
does not rise from a firm and enduring foundation, but is a windy,
empty quality, as far removed from true magnanimity as fool-
hardiness from courage, boastfulness from confidence, gloom from
austerity, cruelty from strictness. There is, I say, a great difference
between a lofty and a proud mind: anger brings about nothing grand
or beautiful. On the other hand, to be constantly irritated seems to
me to be the part of a languid and unhappy mind, conscious of its
own feebleness, like folk with diseased bodies covered with sores,
who cry out at the lightest touch. Anger, therefore, is a vice which
for the most part affects women and children. “Yet it affects men
also.” Because many men, too, have womanish or childish intellects.
“But what are we to say? do not some words fall from angry men
which appear to flow from a great mind?” Yes, to those who know
not what true greatness is: as, for example, that foul and hateful
saying, “Let them hate me, provided they fear me,” which you may
be sure was written in Sulla’s time. I know not which was the worse
of the two things he wished for, that he might be hated or that he
might be feared. It occurs to his mind that some day people will
curse him, plot against him, crush him: what prayer does he add to
this? May all the gods curse him—for discovering a cure for hate so
worthy of it. “Let them hate.” How? “Provided they obey me?” No!
“Provided they approve of me?” No! How then? “Provided they fear
me!” I would not even be loved upon such terms. Do you imagine
that this was a very spirited saying? You are wrong: this is not
greatness, but monstrosity. You should not believe the words of
angry men, whose speech is very loud and menacing, while their
mind within them is as timid as possible: nor need you suppose that
the most eloquent of men, Titus Livius, was right in describing
somebody as being “of a great rather than a good disposition.” The
things cannot be separated: he must either be good or else he
cannot be great, because I take greatness of mind to mean that it is
unshaken, sound throughout, firm and uniform to its very
foundation; such as cannot exist in evil dispositions. Such
dispositions may be terrible, frantic, and destructive, but cannot
possess greatness; because greatness rests upon goodness, and
owes its strength to it. “Yet by speech, action, and all outward show
they will make one think them great.” True, they will say something
which you may think shows a great spirit, like Gaius Caesar, who
when angry with heaven because it interfered with his ballet-
dancers, whom he imitated more carefully than he attended to them
when they acted, and because it frightened his revels by its
thunders, surely ill-directed,[9] challenged Jove to fight, and that to
the death, shouting the Homeric verse:—

“Carry me off, or I will carry thee!”

How great was his madness! He must have believed either that he
could not be hurt even by Jupiter himself, or that he could hurt even
Jupiter itself. I imagine that this saying of his had no small weight in
nerving the minds of the conspirators for their task: for it seemed to
be the height of endurance to bear one who could not bear Jupiter.
XXI. There is therefore nothing great or noble in anger, even when it
seems to be powerful and to contemn both gods and men alike. Any
one who thinks that anger produces greatness of mind, would think
that luxury produces it: such a man wishes to rest on ivory, to be
clothed with purple, and roofed with gold; to remove lands, embank
seas, hasten the course of rivers, suspend woods in the air. He
would think that avarice shows greatness of mind: for the avaricious
man broods over heaps of gold and silver, treats whole provinces as
merely fields on his estate, and has larger tracts of country under
the charge of single bailiffs than those which consuls once drew lots
to administer. He would think that lust shows greatness of mind: for
the lustful man swims across straits, castrates troops of boys, and
puts himself within reach of the swords of injured husbands with
complete scorn of death. Ambition, too, he would think shows
greatness of mind: for the ambitious man is not content with office
once a year, but, if possible, would fill the calendar of dignities with
his name alone, and cover the whole world with his titles. It matters
nothing to what heights or lengths these passions may proceed:
they are narrow, pitiable, grovelling. Virtue alone is lofty and
sublime, nor is anything great which is not at the same time tranquil.

[1] Here a leaf or more has been lost, including the fragment cited in Lactantius,
De ira dei, 17 “Ira est eupiditas,” &c. The entire passage is:—“But the Stoics did
not perceive that there is a difference between right and wrong; that there is just
and unjust anger: and as they could find no remedy for it, they wished to
extirpate it. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, declared that it ought not to be
destroyed, but restrained. These I have sufficiently answered in the sixth book of
my ‘Institutiones.’ It is clear that the philosophers did not comprehend the reason
of anger, from the definitions of it which Seneca has enumerated in the books ‘On
Anger’ which he has written. ‘Anger,’ he says, ‘is the desire of avenging an injury.’
Others, as Posidonius says, call it ‘a desire to punish one by whom you think that
you have been unjustly injured,’ Some have defined it thus, ‘Anger is an impulse of
the mind to injure him who either has injured you or has sought to injure you.’
Aristotle’s definition differs but little from our own. He says, ‘that anger is a desire
to repay suffering,’ ” etc.

[2] Ovid, “Met.” vii. 545-6.

[3] τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν of the Stoics.

[4] The gospel rule. Matt, xviii. 15.

[5] Divitis (where there might be an army of slaves).

[6] “Lorsque le Préteur devoit prononcer la sentence d’un coupable, il se

depouilloit de la robe pretexte, et se revêtoit alors d’une simple tunique, ou d’une
autre robe, presque usée, et d’un blanc sale (sordida) ou d’un gris très foncé tirant
sur le noir (toga pulla), telle qu’en portoient à Rome le peuple et les pauvres
(pullaque paupertas). Dans les jours solemnelles et marqués par un deuil public,
les Senateurs quittoient le laticlave, et les Magistrats la pretexte. La pourpre, la
hache, les faisceaux, aucun de ces signes extérieurs de leur dignité ne les
distinguoient alors des autres citoyens: sine insignibus Magistratus. Mais ce n’étoit
pas seulement pendant le temps ou la ville étoit plongée dans le deuil et dans
I’affliction, que les magistrats s’habilloient comme le peuple (sordidam vestem
induebant); ils en usoient de même lorsqu’ils devoient condamner à mort un
citoyen. C’est dans ces tristes circonstances qu’ils quittoient la prétexte et
prenoient la robe de deuil perversam vestem. (No doubt “inside out.”—J. E. B. M.)
”On pourroit supposer avec assez de vraisemblance que par cette expression,
Séneque a voulu faire allusion à ce changement . . . . . Peut-être les Magistrats qui
devoient juger à mort un citoyen, portoient ils aussi leur robe renversée, ou la
jettoient ils de travers ou confusément sur leurs épaules, pour mieux peindre par
ce desordre le trouble de leur esprit. Si cette conjecture est vraie, comme je serais
assez porté à croire, l’expression perversa vestis dont Séneque s’est servi ici,
indiqueroit plus d’un simple changement d’habit,” &c, (La Grange’s translation of
Seneca, edited by J, A. Naigeon. Paris, 1778.)
[7] “Ceci fait allusion à une coutume que Caius Gracchus prétend avoir été
pratiquée de tout tems à Rome, ‘Lorsqu’un citoyen,” dit il, “avoit un procès criminel
qui alloit à la mort, s’il refusoit d’obéir aux sommations qui lui étoient faites; le
jour qu’on devoit le juger, en envoyoit des le matin à la porte de sa maison un
Officier I’appeller au son de la trompette, et jamais avant que cette cérémonie eût
été observée, les Juges ne donneroient leur voix contre lui: tant ces hommes
sages,’ ajoute ce hardi Tribun, ‘avoient de retenue et de precaution dans leurs
jugements, quand il s’agissoit de la vie d’un citoyen.’ ”

“C’étoit de même au son de la trompette que l’on convoquoit le peuple, lorsqu’on

devoit faire mourir un citoyen, afin qu’il fût témoin de ce triste spectacle, et que la
supplice du coupable pût lui servir d’exemple. Tacite dit qu’un Astrologue, nommé
P. Marcius, fût exécuté, selon l’ancien usage, hors de la porte Esquiline, en
presence du peuple Romain que les Consuls firent convoquer au son de la
trompette.” (Tac. Ann. II. 32.) L. Grom.

[8] I.e. not only for counsel but for action.

[9] Prorsus parum certis (i.e., the thunderbolts missed their aim in not striking him
dead).
 THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE DIALOGUES
OF L. ANNAEUS SENECA,
ADDRESSED TO NOVATUS.
OF ANGER.

Book II.
My first book, Novatus, had a more abundant subject: for carriages
roll easily down hill:[1] now we must proceed to drier matters. The
question before us is whether anger arises from deliberate choice or
from impulse, that is, whether it acts of its own accord or like the
greater part of those passions which spring up within us without our
knowledge. It is necessary for our debate to stoop to the
consideration of these matters, in order that it may afterwards be
able to rise to loftier themes; for likewise in our bodies the parts
which are first set in order are the bones, sinews, and joints, which
are by no means fair to see, albeit they are the foundation of our
frame and essential to its life: next to them come the parts of which
all beauty of face and appearance consists; and after these, colour,
which above all else charms the eye, is applied last of all, when the
rest of the body is complete. There is no doubt that anger is roused
by the appearance of an injury being done: but the question before
us is, whether anger straightway follows the appearance, and
springs up without assistance from the mind, or whether it is roused
with the sympathy of the mind. Our (the Stoics’) opinion is, that
anger can venture upon nothing by itself, without the approval of
mind: for to conceive the idea of a wrong having been done, to long
to avenge it, and to join the two propositions, that we ought not to
have been injured and that it is our duty to avenge our injuries,
cannot belong to a mere impulse which is excited without our
consent. That impulse is a simple act; this is a complex one, and
composed of several parts. The man understands something to have
happened: he becomes indignant thereat: he condemns the deed;
and he avenges it. All these things cannot be done without his mind
agreeing to those matters which touched him.

II. Whither, say you, does this inquiry tend? That we may know what
anger is: for if it springs up against our will, it never will yield to
reason: because all the motions which take place without our
volition are beyond our control and unavoidable, such as shivering
when cold water is poured over us, or shrinking when we are
touched in certain places. Men’s hair rises up at bad news, their
faces blush at indecent words, and they are seized with dizziness
when looking down a precipice; and as it is not in our power to
prevent any of these things, no reasoning can prevent their taking
place. But anger can be put to flight by wise maxims; for it is a
voluntary defect of the mind, and not one of those things which are
evolved by the conditions of human life, and which, therefore, may
happen even to the wisest of us. Among these and in the first place
must be ranked that thrill of the mind which seizes us at the thought
of wrongdoing. We feel this even when witnessing the mimic scenes
of the stage, or when reading about things that happened long ago.
We often feel angry with Clodius for banishing Cicero, and with
Antonius for murdering him. Who is not indignant with the wars of
Marius, the proscriptions of Sulla? who is not enraged against
Theodotus and Achillas and the boy king who dared to commit a
more than boyish crime?[2] Sometimes songs excite us, and
quickened rhythm and the martial noise of trumpets; so, too,
shocking pictures and the dreadful sight of tortures, however well
deserved, affect our minds. Hence it is that we smile when others
are smiling, that a crowd of mourners makes us sad, and that we
take a glowing interest in another’s battles; all of which feelings are
not anger, any more than that which clouds our brow at the sight of
a stage shipwreck is sadness, or what we feel, when we read how
Hannibal after Cannae beset the walls of Rome, can be called fear.
All these are emotions of minds which are loth to be moved, and are
not passions, but rudiments which may grow into passions. So, too,
a soldier starts at the sound of a trumpet, although he may be
dressed as a civilian and in the midst of a profound peace, and camp
horses prick up their ears at the clash of arms. It is said that
Alexander, when Xenophantus was singing, laid his hand upon his
weapons.

III. None of these things which casually influence the mind deserve
to be called passions: the mind, if I may so express it, rather suffers
passions to act upon itself than forms them. A passion, therefore,
consists not in being affected by the sights which are presented to
us, but in giving way to our feelings and following up these chance
promptings: for whoever imagines that paleness, bursting into tears,
lustful feelings, deep sighs, sudden flashes of the eyes, and so forth,
are signs of passion and betray the state of the mind, is mistaken,
and does not understand that these are merely impulses of the
body. Consequently, the bravest of men often turns pale while he is
putting on his armour; when the signal for battle is given, the knees
of the boldest soldier shake for a moment; the heart even of a great
general leaps into his mouth just before the lines clash together, and
the hands and feet even of the most eloquent orator grow stiff and
cold while he is preparing to begin his speech. Anger must not
merely move, but break out of bounds, being an impulse: now, no
impulse can take place without the consent of the mind: for it
cannot be that we should deal with revenge and punishment without
the mind being cognisant of them. A man may think himself injured,
may wish to avenge his wrongs, and then may be persuaded by
some reason or other to give up his intention and calm down: I do
not call that anger, it is an emotion of the mind which is under the
control of reason. Anger is that which goes beyond reason and
carries her away with it: wherefore the first confusion of a man’s
mind when struck by what seems an injury is no more anger than
the apparent injury itself: it is the subsequent mad rush, which not
only receives the impression of the apparent injury, but acts upon it
as true, that is anger, being an exciting of the mind to revenge,
which proceeds from choice and deliberate resolve. There never has
been any doubt that fear produces flight, and anger a rush forward;
consider, therefore, whether you suppose that anything can be either
sought or avoided without the participation of the mind.

IV. Furthermore, that you may know in what manner passions begin
and swell and gain spirit, learn that the first emotion is involuntary,
and is, as it were, a preparation for a passion, and a threatening of
one. The next is combined with a wish, though not an obstinate one,
as, for example, “It is my duty to avenge myself, because I have
been injured,” or “It is right that this man should be punished,
because he has committed a crime.” The third emotion is already
beyond our control, because it overrides reason, and wishes to
avenge itself, not if it be its duty, but whether or no. We are not able
by means of reason to escape from that first impression on the
mind, any more than we can escape from those things which we
have mentioned as occurring to the body: we cannot prevent other
people’s yawns temping us to yawn:[3] we cannot help winking when
fingers are suddenly darted at our eyes. Reason is unable to
overcome these habits, which perhaps might be weakened by
practice and constant watchfulness: they differ from an emotion
which is brought into existence and brought to an end by a
deliberate mental act.

V. We must also enquire whether those whose cruelty knows no

bounds, and who delight in shedding human blood, are angry when
they kill people from whom they have received no injury, and who
they themselves do not think have done them any injury; such as
were Apollodorus or Phalaris. This is not anger, it is ferocity: for it
does not do hurt because it has received injury: but is even willing to
receive injury, provided it may do hurt. It does not long to inflict
stripes and mangle bodies to avenge its wrongs, but for its own
pleasure. What then are we to say? This evil takes its rise from
anger; for anger, after it has by long use and indulgence made a
man forget mercy, and driven all feelings of human fellowship from
his mind, passes finally into cruelty. Such men therefore laugh,
rejoice, enjoy themselves greatly, and are as unlike as possible in
countenance to angry men, since cruelty is their relaxation. It is said
that when Hannibal saw a trench full of human blood, he exclaimed,
“O, what a beauteous sight!” How much more beautiful would he
have thought it, if it had filled a river or a lake? Why should we
wonder that you should be charmed with this sight above all others,
you who were born in bloodshed and brought up amid slaughter
from a child? Fortune will follow you and favour your cruelty for
twenty years, and will display to you everywhere the sight that you
love. You will behold it both at Trasumene and at Cannae, and lastly
at your own city of Carthage. Volesus, who not long ago, under the
Emperor Augustus, was proconsul of Asia Minor, after he had one
day beheaded three hundred persons, strutted out among the
corpses with a haughty air, as though he had performed some grand
and notable exploit, and exclaimed in Greek, “What a kingly action!”
What would this man have done, had he been really a king? This
was not anger, but a greater and an incurable disease.

VI. “Virtue,” argues our adversary, “ought to be angry with what is

base, just as she approves of what is honourable.” What should we
think if he said that virtue ought to be both mean and great; yet this
is what he means, when he wants her to be raised and lowered,
because joy at a good action is grand and glorious, while anger at
another’s sin is base and befits a narrow mind: and virtue will never
be guilty of imitating vice while she is repressing it; she considers
anger to deserve punishment for itself, since it often is even more
criminal than the faults which which it is angry. To rejoice and be
glad is the proper and natural function of virtue: it is as much
beneath her dignity to be angry, as to mourn: now, sorrow is the
companion of anger, and all anger ends in sorrow, either from
remorse or from failure. Secondly, if it be the part of the wise man to
be angry with sins, he will be more angry the greater they are, and
will often be angry: from which it follows that the wise man will not
only be angry but irascible. Yet if we do not believe that great and
frequent anger can find any place in the wise man’s mind, why
should we not set him altogether free from this passion? for there
can be no limit, if he ought to be angry in proportion to what every
man does: because he will either be unjust if he is equally angry at
unequal crimes, or he will be the most irascible of men, if he blazes
into wrath as often as crimes deserve his anger.

VII. What, too, can be more unworthy of the wise man, than that his
passions should depend upon the wickedness of others? If so, the
great Socrates will no longer be able to return home with the same
expression of countenance with which he set out. Moreover, if it be
the duty of the wise man to be angry at base deeds, and to be
excited and saddened at crimes, then is there nothing more unhappy
than the wise man, for all his life will be spent in anger and grief.
What moment will there be at which he will not see something
deserving of blame? whenever he leaves his house, he will be
obliged to walk among men who are criminals, misers, spendthrifts,
profligates, and who are happy in being so: he can turn his eyes in
no direction without their finding something to shock them. He will
faint, if he demands anger from himself as often as reason calls for
it. All these thousands who are hurrying to the law courts at break of
day, how base are their causes, and how much baser their
advocates? One impugns his father’s will, when he would have done
better to deserve it; another appears as the accuser of his mother; a
third comes to inform against a man for committing the very crime
of which he himself is yet more notoriously guilty. The judge, too, is
chosen to condemn men for doing what he himself has done, and
the audience takes the wrong side, led astray by the fine voice of
the pleader.

VIII. Why need I dwell upon individual cases? Be assured, when you
see the Forum crowded with a multitude, the Saepta[4] swarming
with people, or the great Circus, in which the greater part of the
people find room to show themselves at once, that among them
there are as many vices as there are men. Among those whom you
see in the garb of peace there is no peace: for a small profit any one
of them will attempt the ruin of another: no one can gain anything
save by another’s loss. They hate the fortunate and despise the
unfortunate: they grudgingly endure the great, and oppress the
small: they are fired by divers lusts: they would wreck everything for
the sake of a little pleasure or plunder: they live as though they
were in a school of gladiators, fighting with the same people with
whom they live: it is like a society of wild beasts, save that beasts
are tame with one another, and refrain from biting their own species,
whereas men tear one another, and gorge themselves upon one
another. They differ from dumb animals in this alone, that the latter
are tame with those who feed them, whereas the rage of the former
preys on those very persons by whom they were brought up.

IX. The wise man will never cease to be angry, if he once begins, so
full is every place of vices and crimes. More evil is done than can be
healed by punishment: men seem engaged in a vast race of
wickedness. Every day there is greater eagerness to sin, less
modesty. Throwing aside all reverence for what is better and more
just, lust rushes whithersoever it thinks fit, and crimes are no longer
committed by stealth, they take place before our eyes, and
wickedness has become so general and gained such a footing in
everyone’s breast that innocence is no longer rare, but no longer
exists. Do men break the law singly, or a few at a time? Nay, they
rise in all quarters at once, as though obeying some universal signal,
to wipe out the boundaries of right and wrong.

“Host is not safe from guest,

Father-in-law from son; but seldom love
Exists ’twixt brothers; wives long to destroy
Their husbands, husbands long to slay their wives,
Stepmothers deadly aconite prepare
And child-heirs wonder when their sires will die.”

And how small a part of men’s crimes are these! The poet[5] has not
described one people divided into two hostile camps, parents and
children enrolled on opposite sides, Rome set on fire by the hand of
a Roman, troops of fierce horsemen scouring the country to track
out the hiding-places of the proscribed, wells defiled with poison,
plagues created by human hands, trenches dug by children round
their beleaguered parents, crowded prisons, conflagrations that
consume whole cities, gloomy tyrannies, secret plots to establish
despotisms and ruin peoples, and men glorying in those deeds
which, as long as it was possible to repress them, were counted as
crimes—I mean rape, debauchery, and lust . . . . . Add to these,
public acts of national bad faith, broken treaties, everything that
cannot defend itself carried off as plunder by the stronger, knaveries,
thefts, frauds, and disownings of debt such as three of our present
law-courts would not suffice to deal with. If you want the wise man
to be as angry as the atrocity of men’s crimes requires, he must not
merely be angry, but must go mad with rage.

X. You will rather think that we should not be angry with people’s
faults; for what shall we say of one who is angry with those who
stumble in the dark, or with deaf people who cannot hear his orders,
or with children, because they forget their duty and interest
themselves in the games and silly jokes of their companions? What
shall we say if you choose to be angry with weaklings for being sick,
for growing old, or becoming fatigued? Among the other misfortunes
of humanity is this, that men’s intellects are confused, and they not
only cannot help going wrong, but love to go wrong. To avoid being
angry with individuals, you must pardon the whole mass, you must
grant forgiveness to the entire human race. If you are angry with
young and old men because they do wrong, you will be angry with
infants also, for they soon will do wrong. Does any one become
angry with children, who are too young to comprehend distinctions?
Yet, to be a human being is a greater and a better excuse than to be
a child. Thus are we born, as creatures liable to as many disorders
of the mind as of the body; not dull and slow-witted, but making a
bad use of our keenness of wit, and leading one another into vice by
our example. He who follows others who have started before him on
the wrong road is surely excusable for having wandered on[6] the
highway. A general’s severity may be shown in the case of individual
deserters; but where a whole army deserts, it must needs be
pardoned. What is it that puts a stop to the wise man’s anger? It is
the number of sinners. He perceives how unjust and how dangerous
it is to be angry with vices which all men share. Heraclitcus,
whenever he came out of doors and beheld around him such a
number of men who were living wretchedly, nay, rather perishing
wretchedly, used to weep: he pitied all those who met him joyous
and happy. He was of a gentle but too weak disposition: and he
himself was one of those for whom he ought to have wept.
Democritus, on the other hand, is said never to have appeared in
public without laughing; so little did men’s serious occupations
appear serious to him. What room is there for anger? Everything
ought either to move us to tears or to laughter. The wise man will
not be angry with sinners. Why not? Because he knows that no one
is born wise, but becomes so: he knows that very few wise men are
produced in any age, because he thoroughly understands the
circumstances of human life. Now, no sane man is angry with
nature: for what should we say if a man chose to be surprised that
fruit did not hang on the thickets of a forest, or to wonder at bushes
and thorns not being covered with some useful berry? No one is
angry when nature excuses a defect. The wise man, therefore, being
tranquil, and dealing candidly with mistakes, not an enemy to but an
improver of sinners, will go abroad every day in the following frame
of mind:—”Many men will meet me who are drunkards, lustful,
ungrateful, greedy, and excited by the frenzy of ambition.” He will
view all these as benignly as a physician does his patients. When a
man’s ship leaks freely through its opened seams, does he become
angry with the sailors or the ship itself? No; instead of that, he tries
to remedy it: he shuts out some water, bales out some other, closes
all the holes that he can see, and by ceaseless labour counteracts
those which are out of sight and which let water into the hold; nor
does he relax his efforts because as much water as he pumps out
runs in again. We need a long-breathed struggle against permanent
and prolific evils; not, indeed, to quell them, but merely to prevent
their overpowering us.

XI. “Anger,” says our opponent, “is useful, because it avoids

contempt, and because it frightens bad men.” Now, in the first place,
if anger is strong in proportion to its threats, it is hateful for the
same reason that it is terrible: and it is more dangerous to be hated
than to be despised. If, again, it is without strength, it is much more
exposed to contempt, and cannot avoid ridicule; for what is more
flat than anger when it breaks out into meaningless ravings?
Moreover, because some things are somewhat terrible, they are not
on that account desirable: nor does wisdom wish it to be said of the
wise man, as it is of a wild beast, that the fear which he inspires is
as a weapon to him. Why, do we not fear fever, gout, consuming
ulcers? and is there, for that reason, any good in them? nay; on the
other hand, they are all despised and thought to be foul and base,
and are for this very reason feared. So, too, anger is in itself hideous
and by no means to be feared; yet it is feared by many, just as a
hideous mask is feared by children. How can we answer the fact that
terror always works back to him who inspired it, and that no one is
feared who is himself at peace? At this point it is well that you
should remember that verse of Laberius, which, when pronounced in
the theatre during the height of the civil war, caught the fancy of the
whole people as though it expressed the national feeling:—

“He must fear many, whom so many fear.”

Thus has nature ordained, that whatever becomes great by causing

fear to others is not free from fear itself. How disturbed lions are at
the faintest noises! How excited those fiercest of beasts become at
strange shadows, voices, or smells! Whatever is a terror to others,
fears for itself. There can be no reason, therefore, for any wise man
to wish to be feared, and no one need think that anger is anything
great because it strikes terror, since even the most despicable things
are feared, as, for example, noxious vermin whose bite is venomous:
and since a string set with feathers stops the largest herds of wild
beasts and guides them into traps, it is no wonder that from its
effect it should be named a “Scarer.”[7] Foolish creatures are
frightened by foolish things: the movement of chariots and the sight
of their wheels turning round drives lions back into their cage:
elephants are frightened at the cries of pigs: and so also we fear
anger just as children fear the dark, or wild beasts fear red feathers:
it has in itself nothing solid or valiant, but it affects feeble minds.

XII. “Wickedness,” says our adversary, “must be removed from the

system of nature, if you wish to remove anger: neither of which
things can be done.” In the first place, it is possible for a man not to
be cold, although according to the system of nature it may be
winter-time, nor yet to suffer from heat, although it be summer
according to the almanac. He may be protected against the
inclement time of the year by dwelling in a favoured spot, or he may
have so trained his body to endurance that it feels neither heat nor
cold. Next, reverse this saying:—You must remove anger from your
mind before you can take virtue into the same, because vices and
virtues cannot combine, and none can at the same time be both an
angry man and a good man, any more than he can be both sick and
well. “It is not possible,” says he, “to remove anger altogether from
the mind, nor does human nature admit of it.” Yet there is nothing
so hard and difficult that the mind of man cannot overcome it, and
with which unremitting study will not render him familiar, nor are
there any passions so fierce and independent that they cannot be
tamed by discipline. The mind can carry out whatever orders it gives
itself: some have succeeded in never smiling: some have forbidden
themselves wine, sexual intercourse, or even drink of all kinds.
Some, who are satisfied with short hours of rest, have learned to
watch for long periods without weariness. Men have learned to run
upon the thinnest ropes even when slanting, to carry huge burdens,
scarcely within the compass of human strength, or to dive to
enormous depths and suffer themselves to remain under the sea
without any chance of drawing breath. There are a thousand other
instances in which application has conquered all obstacles, and
proved that nothing which the mind has set itself to endure is
difficult. The men whom I have just mentioned gain either no
reward or one that is unworthy of their unwearied application; for
what great thing does a man gain by applying his intellect to walking
upon a tight rope? or to placing great burdens upon his shoulders?
or to keeping sleep from his eyes? or to reaching the bottom of the
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