Youth and Religion

Annual Review of the Sociology

of Religion

Editors
Enzo Pace, Luigi Berzano and Giuseppe Giordan

Editorial Board
Peter Beyer (University of Ottawa)
Anthony Blasi (Tennessee State University)
Roberto Cipriani (Università di Roma Tre)
Xavier Costa (Universidad de Valencia)
Franco Garelli (Università di Torino)
Gustavo Guizzardi (Università di Padova)
Dick Houtman (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)
Solange Lefebvre (Université de Montréal)
Otto Maduro (Drew University)
Patrick Michel (CNRS, Paris)
Ari Pedro Oro (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul)
Adam Possamai (University of Western Sydney)
Ole Riis (Agder University)
Susumu Shimazono (University of Tokyo)
William H. Swatos, Jr. (Augustana College)
Jan-Paul Willaime (EPHE, Sorbonne)
Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (University of Leipzig)
Linda Woodhead (Lancaster University)
Fenggang Yang (Purdue University)
Sinisa Zrinscak (University of Zagreb)

VOLUME 1
Annual Review of the Sociology
of Religion
Volume 1: Youth and Religion

Edited by
Giuseppe Giordan

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2010
This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1877-5233
ISBN 978 90 04 18790 0

Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

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 CONTENTS

Preface ................................................................................................. vii

Articles
Differential Reconstruction of Religions among Second
Generation Immigrant Youth in Canada .................................. 1
Peter Beyer

Youth, Spirituality, and Religion in Canada and Quebec .......... 29

Solange Lefebvre in collaboration with K. Gandhar
Chakravarty

Brazilian University Students and Religion .................................. 65

Ari Pedro Oro and Mauro Meirelles

Developments in Spirituality among Youth in Australia and

Other Western Societies ............................................................... 89
Michael Mason, Andrew Singleton and Ruth Webber

The Religiosity of Youth in Australia and Thailand .................... 115

Philip Hughes

Youth and Religion in Modern China: A Sketch of Social and

Political Developments ................................................................. 147
Fenggang Yang

Young People and Religion in France ........................................... 163

Céline Béraud and Jean-Paul Willaime

Youth and Religion in Finland ........................................................ 193

Kati Niemelä

(Dis)engagements with Christianity amongst Young People in

England and Scotland ................................................................... 219
Giselle Vincett and Sylvia Collins-Mayo
vi contents

German Youth: Neither Participants nor Partakers in

Religion? .......................................................................................... 251
Gert Pickel

The Quest for Religious Purity in New Age, Evangelicalism

and Islam. Religious Renditions of Dutch Youth and the
Luckmann Legacy .......................................................................... 289
Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn
de Koning and Ineke Noomen

Religion and Youth in Croatia ........................................................ 307

Dinka Marinović Jerolimov and Boris Jokić

Young Muslims of Italy. Islam in the Everyday Life and the

Public Visibility of a New Generation of Muslims ................. 329
Annalisa Frisina

Believers in Progress. Youth and Religion in Italy ...................... 353

Giuseppe Giordan

Notes
Lifestyles and Religion ...................................................................... 383
Luigi Berzano

Visual Sociology and Religion ......................................................... 403

Roberto Cipriani and Emanuela C. Del Re

Focus on
The United States: God Bless America .......................................... 421
William H. Swatos, Jr.

Religion in the Netherlands ............................................................. 439

Erik Sengers

Religion and Politics in Portugal: Religious Landscape and

Prospective Developments ........................................................... 461
Helena Vilaça

List of Contributors ........................................................................... 479

 PREFACE

Experiencing the Paradox: Within and Beyond Secularization

In recent months friends and colleagues have asked us why we thought

it was useful to found a new magazine concerning the sociology of reli-
gion. If the question may seem obvious, the answer is not. Of course
we too have asked ourselves such a question, and this has obliged us
to define the specificity of this new editorial initiative in the context of
the other well known journals of the sociology of religion.
We can affirm very schematically that the reason why the Annual
Review of the Sociology of Religion is published is that religion not
only has not disappeared from the public sphere and from the private
lives of people, but its role seems to be more and more visible and
important. At the same time, however, such role of religion is placed
in a very different context comparing with the context of the past
decades, and just this novelty makes it necessary to find new categories
and new instruments of analysis to interpret such persistence.
One of the most intriguing effects of the speed of the social change
that characterizes the contemporary epoch is to be found exactly in the
difficulty of describing and interpreting it in an appropriate way. It is
a difficulty that makes only partially usable words, concepts and theo-
ries that up to not long ago had a convincing explicative and heuristic
capacity: this is true for what concerns economy as well as for what
concerns politics, education, family and religion.
Particularly in the religious field, the secularization theory has been
the lens through which many scholars have read the destiny of reli-
gion in the modern world. We all know how such approach has often
hindered the comprehension of the transformations that were occur-
ring within a more and more complex and differentiated society. The
relation between religion and the modern world has not been resolved
with the disappearance of religion, but with the production of specific
religious forms, which manifest themselves not only in the new public
acknowledgment granted to the religious institutions, but also in the
spreading of new religious movements as well as in the appearance of
sects and magic and esoteric groups, in the diffusion of the Pentecos-
tal movements as well as in the rediscovery of the ancestral beliefs:
viii preface

the more “liquid” modalities of relativism go alongside with the more

rigid forms of fundamentalism.
As far as the relation with the sacred is concerned, then, it doesn’t
seem exaggerated to assert that we find ourselves at the conclusion of a
historical cycle and at the beginning of a new one: if the secularization
processes have brought us to a secular society, the unexpected effects
of such processes have given rise to the possibility of a postsecular
society. However this must not make us forget, and in this the paradox
lies, that some secularization processes are still present and operating
inside the postsecular epoch, but just these secularizing processes have
transformed and not eliminated the function of religion within our
society.
After all, actually, secularization has even had “religious” effects, and
these manifest themselves with rather different characteristics from the
typical religion of the traditional epoch. If in the pre modern epoch
religion appeared to be a coherent and structured whole, in the con-
temporary epoch we witness the explosion of “the religious”, which is
no longer to be found exclusively within the institutions which have
always codified and controlled it: from the search for meaning to the
multiplicity of aesthetic experiences, from the need of moral direc-
tions to the search for meaningful relationships, the relation with the
sacred develops according to often brand new and not always ortho-
dox modalities, but not for this reason less involving for the social
actor who makes them his own.
The specific religious forms of the postsecular epoch mark a turn-
ing point that compels us to understand religion in the contemporary
world within new coordinates: individualization of believing and cul-
tural pluralism.
The growing importance attributed to the individual, to his choices
and his values, the fact of believing that he is a holder of rights beside
being a holder of duties, has shifted the axis of legitimization of the
individual choices from the submission to the institutions to the free-
dom of choice of the subject himself. It is a complex process, often a
contradictory one, whose outcome anyhow always appears as a chal-
lenge to the “institutional model”, which has often trouble in keeping
up with the individual’s exigencies.
The affirmation of the “culture of the self ”, with its features of self
realization and personal wellbeing, redefines the relation with religion
and its moral directions in a much more ambiguous and temporary
framework: nevertheless, although “counting on oneself ” is a fragile
 preface ix

support when it comes to making important choices, it offers the sub-

ject the occasion to have an extremely flexible system of meanings
capable of quickly adapting to the ever new biographic and social situ-
ations in a world that changes with increasing speed. In such con-
text the individual interprets his existence no longer starting from the
objective roles that are imposed on him from the outside, but accord-
ing to the continuous search for tuning in with the “deep self ”. The
objective truth, so dear to the institutions, especially the religious ones,
gives way to the subjective authenticity, which becomes the yardstick to
judge the vital world inside which the subject lives. Reflecting becomes
the way to face everyday life: we might say that we are witnessing the
shift from exteriority to interiority, from the sometimes imposed for-
mal respect of external rules, to the attention to the exigencies rising
from self introspection.
But there is another issue, beside individualization, that contributes
to re-writing the context in which religion is placed in the contem-
porary world: the more and more evident comparison with others,
and this also as a consequence of the migrant flows that concern all
the western societies in a more or less substantial way. It is a form of
cultural pluralism bringing diversity with itself, hence the consequent
relativity, in understanding the everyday practices as well as even the
value references and the symbolic universes fostering the meaning of
living.
Such “pluralism of values” questions the legitimacy and the credibil-
ity of those institutions, including the religious ones, that have repro-
duced for centuries according to the criteria of stability: in a world
where all is relative, sooner or later even the believer questions himself
about the absoluteness of his own convictions and about the endur-
ance of his own beliefs, as well as about the meaning of the ritual
practices and the observance of the moral norms.
The pluralism in fact, that more or less concerns everybody’s every-
day life, leads to the “culture of pluralism” which consists in legitimat-
ing diversity, and this has relevant consequences at the level of the
judgements of values that the subject works out in consequence of
the comparison with the factual diversity: it is not difficult to imagine
how religious pluralism today is a decisive step in elaborating cred-
ible religious identities and represents a totally new challenge for the
institutions which up to not very long ago have run the relation with
the sacred in a more or less monopolistic way.
x preface

How is the relation with the sacred re-defined in an epoch charac-

terized by the pluralism of values and the social acknowledgment of
the freedom of choice of the subject? The Annual Review of the Soci-
ology of Religion has exactly the target of studying the most diverse
outcomes of such relation with the sacred in the postsecular epoch.
Actually one single topic will be dealt with each year, and this will
be done in a comparative way as far as possible, comparing different
social and cultural contexts, but even different theoretical approaches.
This very first issue highlights a particularly complex theme, the rela-
tion between the young and religion. We have gathered contributions
ranging from Canada to South America, from Australia to Europe,
passing by Thailand and China.
Beside the monographic part, in each issue there are also two more
sessions, one called “Notes”, in which we will introduce new theoreti-
cal approaches to the religious phenomenon, and another one, called
“Focus on”, where year after year the socio-religious situation of some
nations will be illustrated.
The success of the initiative depends, beside the quality of the
authors, even on the precious suggestions of the members of the Edi-
torial Board, and on the support of the publishers: our sincere thanks
to all of them.

Enzo Pace, Luigi Berzano, Giuseppe Giordan

 DIFFERENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIONS AMONG
SECOND GENERATION IMMIGRANT YOUTH IN CANADA

Peter Beyer

Introduction: 1.5 and Second Generation Immigrant Youth in

Global and Local Context

The question of how immigrants and their offspring are adapting in

Western countries is currently a topic of much discussion both inside
and outside academic circles. In light of more recent events in a num-
ber of European countries especially, policy makers, intellectuals, the
media, and members of the public throughout the so-called West and
beyond seem to have been publicly agonizing about what many of
them fear is the evident failure of segments of their relatively new
populations to become solidly integrated into the mainstreams of their
societies. As is usual in the post-9/11 context, Muslims, regardless of
their internal variety and regional or cultural origins, have come in
for particular scrutiny in this regard. Even more urgently, the locally
raised and locally born generations of Muslim migrants have become
the subject of special concern as young members of this demographic
group have revealed themselves to be among the prime perpetrators
of a number of sensational violent acts ranging from riots and assas-
sinations to terrorist bombings and clandestine cell formation. The
attitude seems to have been that, while it is perhaps understandable
that the first generation would have trouble adapting and would, as it
were, ‘bring their grievances with them’, the second generations should
have overcome this difficulty to ‘fit in’ to become ‘normal citizens’
and ‘adopt the values of the host society’. Events over the past few
years, such as the March 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings, the
November 2004 assassination of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands,
the London transit bombings in July of 2005, the riots in the suburbs
of Paris in the fall of that same year, and, in Canada, the June 2006
arrest of members of a terrorist cell, largely consisting of teenagers
and young adults, have called these assumptions into question, leading
various influential figures in several countries to call for a complete
rethinking of immigration and immigrant settlement policies. Such
2 peter beyer

voices, which have always been there, are now apparently being taken
much more seriously.1
In the social-scientific literature on immigrants in Western countries,
the questions of generations and youth have been a common focus, in
large measure because there are significant differences between these
groups and their older first generation relatives.2 The second and sub-
sequent generations grow up ‘adapting’ to the ‘new’ country and are,
in that respect, formally as comparable to the long-established native-
born as they are to their parents and grandparents. They provide a log-
ical bridge between the ‘immigrants’ and the ‘hosts’. Those who arrive
as immigrants at a young age, especially before puberty, are in most
senses generally more like their native-born siblings than their par-
ents and older siblings; and this feature points to the normally greater
adaptability or malleability of the young when it comes to adapting to
new circumstances. In the context of the larger question of immigrant
adaptation, integration, marginalization, assimilation, and transforma-
tion (of both them and their ‘host’ society), native-born generations
and the young are therefore of considerable interest in as much as
they embody the longer term consequences and implications of migra-
tion, in the present case of contemporary transnational migration in
particular.
Given the scientific importance of immigrant youth and second
generations, therefore, before any of the aforementioned events took
place, my colleagues and I had already joined those researchers in sev-
eral countries looking at these locally raised and locally born offspring
of more recent immigrant cohorts to the West.3 In our case, however,
we sought specifically to find out more about the religious lives of

1
To cite but two Canadian instances, see articles by Robert Sibley (2008), a col-
umnist for the Ottawa Citizen newspaper, and Mark Steyn (2006), a columnist for the
magazine, Maclean’s (the Canadian equivalent of Time). For an official response in
this atmosphere, see the report of Quebec’s Bouchard-Taylor commission on “reason-
able accommodation” (Bouchard & Taylor 2008).
2
For examples of research on this question before the current decade in various
Western countries, including Canada, see Kallen 1977; Bhatnagar 1984; Young 1991;
Portes & Zhou 1993; Maani 1994; Geschwender & Guppy 1995; Khosrokhavar 1997;
Beiser 1998; Vertovec & Rogers 1998; Zhou & Bankston III 1998. Only in a minority
of cases has this vast literature dealt with religion.
3
In Canada, not much research has yet been done on religion with respect to the
second generation, most research focussing on such issues as educational attainment,
income, and identity (e.g. Gosine 2000; Hanvey & Kunz 2000; Anisef & Kilbride 2003;
Abada, Hou et al. 2008; Corak 2008). Work on religion in this regard includes Eid
2003; Nayar 2004; Pearson 2004; Beyer 2005; Liao 2007; Ramji 2008.
 differential reconstruction of religions 3

this 1.5 and second generation in Canada.4 This group, especially as

concerns migrants of non-European origin, is for the most part still
quite young, given that the vast majority of their families only arrived
in Canada after 1970; but many of them have at least reached young
adulthood, and therefore it made sense to ask how they were relating
to and reconstructing the religions of their family heritages and gener-
ally how they were situating themselves within specifically Canadian
society. In what follows, I report some of the more salient results of
our research, outcomes that, I argue, hardly correspond at all with
the worries about them that recent events have raised in certain quar-
ters. These Canadian cohorts, including especially the Muslims among
them, are apparently ‘adapting and integrating’ very well, a dominant
tendency that does not, of course, exclude the possibility that tiny
minorities among them will go off on isolated and extremist paths, as
is perhaps attested by the 15 or so Toronto youth who were arrested
in June 2006 for being members of a terrorist cell, a group sometimes
called the ‘Toronto 18’.5 This outcome does not, of course, mean that
there are no challenges facing this new generation; nor does it mean
that one can generalize easily from this contemporary Canadian expe-
rience to analogous situations in other Western countries, whether the
United States, Australia, or Western European countries.
The ways that these Canadian youth are relating to the religious
heritages bequeathed to them by their families, while of course quite
varied, reveal certain commonalities or patterns that situate this pre-
vailing integration in the wider global context. Above all, how these
youth and young adults are relating to these religions has also to
do with how these religions have been and are being reconstructed
globally. The wider global reconstructions of Islam, Hinduism, and

4
‘Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada’: A research project funded by the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The author is the prin-
cipal investigator, with the collaboration of Rubina Ramji, Shandip Saha, and Leslie
Laczko at the University of Ottawa, Nancy Nason-Clark at the University of New
Brunswick, Lori Beaman and Marie-Paule Martel Reny at Concordia University in
Montreal, and John H. Simpson, Arlene Macdonald, and Carolyn Reimer at the Uni-
versity of Toronto.
5
Of the 18 men initially arrested, most were minors, under the age of 18, and most
had grown up in Canada. They would qualify as 1.5 or second generation immigrants.
The adults among them were first generation migrants as was the person who infil-
trated the group and informed the police. At the time of writing, the cases against
7 of them had been dropped, but as of summer 2010, almost all the rest have been
convicted.
4 peter beyer

Buddhism—another way of saying what these religions, sociologically

speaking, are—are having a significant influence on and are exempli-
fied in how these youth engage in their own understandings of and
participation in these religions. The particular roles that these religions
play or do not play in the lives of these youth vary as a function of the
global differences between these religions, in addition to being a reflec-
tion of their common experience as the Canada born or raised children
of post-1970 migrants to Canada and the proclivities of individuals in
their life-worlds. Given that none of these three religions has a sig-
nificant history in the Canadian context, the appropriation of Islam,
Hinduism, and Buddhism, as categories and as lived social realities, by
these Canadian youth should therefore be seen as an exemplification
of “glocalization”, the simultaneous and non-contradictory globaliza-
tion of these religions in Canada and their localization by them.

Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada:

Method, Data, and Limitations

Our research design called for semi-structured, in-depth interviews

with youth from three different religious backgrounds, Muslim, Hindu,
and Buddhist.6 Participants did not have to be practising one of these
religions, nor even identify themselves with one of them; they just had
to self-identify as having Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism as part of
their family religious background, have at least one immigrant parent,
and have been born in Canada or have arrived here as an immigrant
when they were under the age of 11 (our definition of the 1.5 genera-
tion). At the time of their interviews, conducted between spring 2004
and spring 2006, they were between the ages of 18 and 27. They were
recruited on university campuses mostly in Ottawa and Toronto, some
in Montreal. A total of 202 interviews were conducted, of which 93
were classified as Muslim, 57 as Hindu, and 47 as Buddhist. Five oth-
ers ended up falling outside the classification. The clear majorities in
each subgroup were women. Table 1 shows the distribution.

6
The reasons for the limitation to these three religions were purely practical, relat-
ing to the level of funding available from the SSHRCC for such research. A subse-
quent project, somewhat different in design, is currently being conducted with the
author again as principal investigator. This research includes Sikhs and a wide variety
of immigrant Christian populations.
 differential reconstruction of religions 5

Table 1. Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada

Participants by Gender, Religious Identity, and Urban Region
Total Muslims Hindus Buddhists Others
Women 127 58 39 28 2*
Men 75 35 18 19 3**
Totals 202 93 57 47 5
Urban region
Toronto 109 44 36 27 2
Ottawa 82 41 20 19 2
Montreal 11 8 1 1 1
* 2 Muslim women arrived as adolescents
** 2 Sikhs, 1 Baha’i
(Source: “Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada”)

As in all such research, it is important to address the question of how

representative the sample is. Here representation has two aspects: how
representative these 200 people are of their corresponding target pop-
ulations in Canada, and how representative those populations are of
analogous migrant sub-populations in other, especially Western coun-
tries. As regards the first, the self-selected volunteers knew that the
project concerned religion, and therefore the sample will be skewed
in favour of the religiously involved and interested. In this regard, the
distribution detailed in Table 1 already points to aspects of our con-
clusions: aside from women being more interested in religion than
men, so are Muslims more interested than Hindus, and these slightly
more than Buddhists. In addition, the focus on post-secondary institu-
tions as recruitment venues reflects previous research (see Beyer 2005)
which showed that Canadians with the targeted demographic char-
acteristics had post-secondary exposure at a level of 80–95%. Since
we were interested in all levels of religious involvement, including
none, university campuses appeared to be more appropriate places to
recruit and would give a broader cross-section of the population than
religiously identified institutions. The overall strategy nonetheless left
out significant minorities who may have shown different results. The
sample is skewed heavily towards the narrow age range that dominates
university student bodies in Canada, namely the 18–23 year-olds, but
with good representation of the slightly older demographic (24–27)
as well. About ¾ of the participants were in the younger age group.
As noted, however, this generation in Canada in the first part of the
6 peter beyer

decade was on the whole still quite young: in 2001, around 80% of
them were under 21 years old.
Turning to the matter of how representative the Canadian popula-
tion is of second generation migrants in Western countries in general,
overall Canadian immigration policy is of some consequence in this
regard. Put briefly, Canada since the late 1960s has pursued an immi-
gration policy designed to attract relatively well-educated and eco-
nomically competent people and their immediate families, irrespective
of their country or region of origin. In addition, Canada has since
the 1970s tried to implement an official multiculturalism policy which,
if it does nothing else, publicly welcomes and symbolically celebrates
the diversity of backgrounds, including religious, that characterize the
country’s more recent immigration cohorts. In terms of actual pro-
grams and policy, however, the official multiculturalism policy does not
encourage immigrants to remain separate and distinct within Canada,
but rather translates itself into a high emphasis on immigrant integra-
tion, stressing economic, political, and social integration in particular.
The effect has been that immigrants to Canada have arrived with lev-
els of education higher than the Canadian national average, a rela-
tively high level of competence in the dominant Canadian languages
of English and French, and the general social abilities that would lead
one to expect them to adapt more rapidly to Canadian circumstances
than was the case with previous waves of immigrants since the early
19th century. While this ‘comparative advantage’ has not prevented
the downward mobility of immigrants in the first decade or more after
their arrival (Pendakur 2000; Reitz 2001; Picot & Sweetman 2005), it
does ensure that the values and expectations for the second generation
are very high indeed, from their own families and from the public con-
text. In fact, as our research confirmed, a common reason that many
of Canada’s more recent immigrants decided to leave their countries
of origin for the West is very often expressly in order to enhance the
educational and general life-chances of their children, whether Canada
born or not. The level of education being attained by these children is,
as noted, for most subgroups (there are exceptions!) very high indeed
(cf. Abada, Hou et al. 2008; Corak 2008).
A further characteristic has to do with the fact that Canada lacks a
‘natural border region’, such as Mexico for the United States or the
Maghreb for Europe, from which the majority or at least plurality of
its immigrants could come under the current policies. Canada is in fact
‘protected’ on all sides from such a skewing of its immigrant sources:
 differential reconstruction of religions 7

by ice, ocean, or its highly border-conscious southern neighbour.

The result is that, although European immigrants are still overrepre-
sented, for the rest the source of immigration to Canada corresponds
roughly to where the bulk of the global population finds itself, above
all South Asia and East Asia. This means that, unlike European coun-
tries, Canada has a broad range of large categories of immigrants, and
this includes as concerns religious identity. Among immigrants, Chris-
tians still constitute the largest group and Roman Catholics the largest
within that tradition, but that reflects the global population. As the
second largest religious population in the world, Muslims are next,
followed at some distance by Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs. In con-
sequence, unlike in the United Sates or Western Europe, as concerns
religion, Canada’s post 1960s immigrants are a good mix, from which
no identity stands out as peculiarly dominant.7
All this is to say that generalizing from our data to the Canadian
immigrant population must be done with a modicum of caution, but
we must be especially hesitant about generalizing them to any other,
even Western, region of global society. At best, they tell us a good deal
about what is happening ‘out there’ in Canada among the 1.5 and sec-
ond generation of more recent immigrants; as for other countries, the
data at most provide a basis of comparison with research from those
regions. The Canadian case is a relevant one for the questions at hand,
but it is no more the model—or, for that matter, the exception—than
any other country or region where immigration has been an important
factor in increasing religious diversity over the past decades.

Common Characteristics of 1.5 and Second Generation Immigrants

in Canada

Above, I noted that the level of education among the Canadian sec-
ond generation varies to some degree according to the subgroup one
is talking about. In terms of religious background, however, the three

7
As of 2006, approximately 19% of Canada’s overall population consisted of immi-
grants. As of 2001, the census year in which religious identity was last asked, out
of a total population of a little over 29 million, about 580 thousand were Muslim,
and around 300 thousand each Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs. Those with no religion
amounted to about 16% of the population or about 4.9 million, some 100 thousand
identified with other religions (e.g. Aboriginal spirituality, paganism/wicca, Zorastri-
anism, Baha’i, Jainism) and the rest declared themselves Christian.
8 peter beyer

research groups of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists show hardly any

differences at all (Beyer 2005). That is as concerns level of education.
In terms of religion, however, it is a different matter entirely. If all
three subgroups are showing very high levels of educational attain-
ment, their relation to and style and level of practical involvement in
the religions of their respective heritages show rather different profiles
when comparing one group to another. In the bulk of what follows, I
outline these differences and suggest some of the reasons for them. To
contextualize those differences, however, it is important nonetheless
to begin by looking at some of the things that these participants had
in common, religiously and in related respects. Three general areas of
commonality are particularly evident from an analysis of the research
data and salient for understanding the differences.
To begin with religion, whether one is looking at those who are
involved and practising their religion, those who have only a general
identification, or those for whom religion has little to no relevance in
their lives, the dominant evaluation of religion overall was positive, as
were the attitudes toward religious diversity in Canada and around the
world. Although a minority felt that religion was a regrettable illusion
or a psychological crutch that some people seemed to need—and these
were mostly among Buddhist and Hindu men—very few expressed the
idea that the world would be a better place without it. The vast majority
declared, not only that religion was a good thing, but that there were no
bad religions. A great many felt that all religions were pretty much equal
in value, although, if they identified strongly, theirs was clearly the best
for them. Even and especially among those that were highly practising,
exceedingly few showed any intolerance toward other religions, and a
good number celebrated both the fact of religious diversity in Canada
and the prevailing religious pluralism. As one female Muslim interviewee
stated when asked her opinion about religious diversity in Canada,
I think it’s a good thing for Canada. I mean it’s always more exposure,
more ideas, more—even . . . if you don’t necessarily believe in another
religion, you can always take certain aspects of what they practice or
what they do if it’s a really good thing. I mean I see it as a good thing,
it’s just more diversity and more exposure to ideas you never would have
considered before had you been living in a small tiny bubble. (MF14)8

8
Interviews were generically coded according to religion, gender, and order of tran-
scription, not the order in which the interviews were conducted. MF14 is therefore the
14th Muslim female interview to be transcribed, and so on for all other quotations.
 differential reconstruction of religions 9

Moreover, with few exceptions, they all considered that people in Can-
ada were free to practice their different religions, although the major-
ity also maintained that Christianity was clearly the dominant and
privileged religion demographically, culturally, or legally. The reverse
side of this prevailing attitude was a virtually unanimous rejection of
religious extremism, and politicized religion in particular. The “bad”
in religion was correspondingly attributed to practitioners who dis-
torted their religion through violence and intolerance; it was generally
not regarded as an attribute of religion or a particular religion as such.
As one Muslim male put it,
I don’t think any religion itself is dangerous, it’s just the people in the reli-
gion that can distort it. I think in every religion there are bad people and
there are good people, just the people, but no religion is bad. (MM13)
In tune with these orientations, most participants also did not think
that religions or a particular religion should have more influence in
Canadian society or elsewhere, except as several and equal players.
A great many thought that religion was and should remain a private
affair, but one which people should be able to display and practice
publicly. In all these matters, of course, there were a few interviewees
who differed, but they were a very small minority of the sample.
Another strong commonality among all three groups was the very
high percentage of participants who were highly individualistic in terms
of what they felt was important in life and how to go about achiev-
ing the goals of life. Even and especially for those who were highly
religiously involved, this involvement was individually driven: most
participants felt that it was their responsibility to work their religious
lives out for themselves—and they were willing to let their eventual
children do likewise—most often learning from their parents and rela-
tions in many respects, but ultimately being responsible for their own
religious choices. There was very little evidence of an attitude which
says that ‘I do this because we do this’, and much more of one which
declares that ‘I do this because I have decided for myself that this is
the correct thing to do’. In general, being from an immigrant family,
regardless of specific background, did not mean that they had failed to
absorb key values of most Western societies, including Canada, here
an acceptance of the individual as the authentic centre of personal
life-construction (for similarities with Muslims in Europe, see Ver-
tovec & Rogers 1998). While group belonging, whether religious or
cultural, was quite important to the majority, this was always based
in individual choice. The fact that they belonged to particular cultural
10 peter beyer

and religious groups was something with which they were born and in
which they were raised; how important they considered such belong-
ing to be and what specifically they did in terms of it, this was their
own individual business. One Hindu participant put this in terms of
growing up:
. . Hinduism wasn’t really something that I questioned, . . . it was auto-
matic, it was a given, right? But then, after that, I [started asking] . . . is
Hinduism really the right way or is it not. . . . I’m still [in a] confused
phase, there are certain things I have decided, like I do believe there is
some form of higher form or some form of God, but I really don’t know
if . . . this fixed form of religion is the best way to go. (HF32)
Finally, connected with the preceding, is a generally high level of inte-
gration into the dominant Canadian society. Integration, in this case,
is structural, psychological, and cultural. Aspects of the latter I have
just outlined. With respect to the structural integration, the high levels
of postsecondary education are indicative, as are the so-far promising
signs in terms of economic integration. The second generations overall
have even higher levels of education than their parents—whose level
is already higher than the national average—but also tend to earn a
higher income than their parents or the population as a whole. To be
sure, there are significant differences from one immigrant subgroup
to another—the idea of ‘segmented assimilation’ has some validity in
Canada as it does elsewhere (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). There
is also at least some indication that the Muslim second generation,
whether the men or the women, fares somewhat less well than do the
Hindu or Buddhist (Beyer 2005). Overall, however, the current trend
is clear: the educational integration is thus far resulting in economic
integration (see Geschwender & Guppy 1995; Boyd & Grieco 1998;
Gosine 2000; Halli & Vedanand 2007; Corak 2008).
What I am calling psychological or identity integration is also evi-
dent, and clearly so, from the data analysed here. We asked all our inter-
viewees questions such as whether they felt accepted as a full member
of Canadian society; whether they had experienced discrimination on
the basis of their religious, cultural or physical differences and, if so,
how they interpreted that; whether they felt that Canada was accept-
ing of immigrants like themselves or their families; whether Canada
was succeeding or not in its officially avowed aim of constructing an
inclusive and multicultural society. The aim was to see how much they
felt integrated. As it turns out, they rarely felt like outsiders and very
few indeed expressed the desire to live somewhere else, such as the
 differential reconstruction of religions 11

country of origin of their families. To be sure, they usually recognized

their effective ‘minority’ status and many had known in their own lives
or in the lives of others like them a certain amount of discrimination;
but this they more often than not attributed to the ignorance of indi-
viduals, not to a general characteristic of a culture and society that
would not accept them as equally belonging in Canada. A great many,
in fact, averred that Canada was the best or one of the best countries
in the world, warts and all. As one particularly positive interviewee
put it in response to the question of whether he thought Canada was
welcoming of immigrants,
Yes, very much so. . . . [M]y family immigrated here because of all the
opportunities that lay here. . . [T]he way my parents have explained it to
me, they’ve always looked to Canada as a place of miraculous opportu-
nity. And I know people who came up here from China just like three
years ago, same thing, like they came up here for the opportunity. People
who came from Korea like last year. . . . they’re here for the opportunity
to make something of themselves, be better than they could have been
back home. [Q: Do you think that Canada is religiously tolerant?] Yes, I
do believe that. There’s always gonna be the odd person who’s not toler-
ant of people who aren’t like him or her, but yeah, I do believe that we’re
tolerant of religions. (HM04)
As with all these common characteristics, it must be emphasized, there
were of course notable exceptions, people who did not feel comfort-
able, who considered Canada to be a hypocritical, racist society that
did not welcome immigrants and only pretended to do so. Out of 200
interviews, however, these can be counted on one hand.9
While these commonalities are thus important, they only serve as
background for many of the remarkable differences that different par-
ticipants and different groups of participants also exhibited. It is to
some of these in relation to religion that I now turn, looking first at
the Muslims in our sample, then the Hindus, and finally the Buddhists.
As I attempt to show, in spite of the individualism, in spite of the

9
In this context, it is well to point out that some recent research purports to show
that the latter tendency is more important than our data make it look. One particular
report that garnered a great amount of attention in Canada is a 2007 article by Jeffrey
Reitz and Rupa Bannerjee (2007) which examined data from 2002 survey research
conducted by Statistics Canada (the Ethnic Diversity Survey). Looking at factors like
voting habits and feelings of belonging to Canada, their findings suggest that second
generation youth are not identifying with Canada as much as their parents or the
population as a whole, and are not voting in as great numbers. A close examination of
the data source, however, reveals these conclusions to be somewhat tendentious.
12 peter beyer

sometimes low level of involvement, which religious background one

is from seems by itself to make a significant difference in how one
constructs one’s religious/spiritual life and identity.

Muslims
Broad comparison of the three religious subgroups requires a kind of
global categorization or typology which serves to orient the general pat-
tern of commonality and variation within the subgroup. This categori-
zation must to a significant degree emerge from the data itself. One of
the notable features of our data is that this exercise could not be done
effectively by using one typology or continuum for all three religious
subgroups. To do so would merely miss the main characteristics of one,
two, or all three of the groups. For the Muslims, however, a rather com-
monly used prime axis of variation worked quite well, largely because the
Muslim participants themselves tended to use it. This is to distinguish
them according to their level of practice of Islam and identification with
Islam according to what one may call a ‘five-pillars orthodoxy’ model
(cf. Roy 2004). We thus arrived at a 10 point scale where 1 was assigned
to people who were non-religious and rejected a Muslim identity and
10 to participants for whom Islam was central, who were highly practis-
ing, avoided all forbidden moral behaviour—especially rules regarding
sexual behaviour and relations—restricted their social circle to Muslims,
and generally led a highly ‘sectarian’ lifestyle. For the purposes of this
report, however, I group these categories into three, those who were
highly involved (categories 7–10), those who were somewhat to moder-
ately involved (4–6), and those who were in effect non-religious (1–3).
A closer description of the category groupings reads as follows,
beginning with those Muslim participants who were deemed highly
involved. They adhere to a rather consistent standard of Muslim ortho-
doxy that locates the five pillars of confession, prayer, almsgiving, fast-
ing, and pilgrimage at the very centre of what it means to be Muslim;
and that emphasizes restricted sexual behaviour, endogamy, dietary
regulations, and a moral emphasis on peace, tolerance, justice, car-
ing for others, and a compassionate social order. One highly involved
female interviewee expressed it like this when asked what the chief
characteristics of Islam were:
I would say it’s modesty and being humble. Those are one of the main
characteristics. . . . And there’s of course the five pillars where you have
to pray five times a day, to believe in God, and Mohammed was the last
 differential reconstruction of religions 13

prophet of God, fasting during the month of Ramadan, paying charity

which is zakat, and going for hajj . . . if you can afford it. So those are the
5 pillars which you should follow, but there’s also things about being
humble, being modest, being honest. . . . personally to me, honesty’s a
huge thing. (MF05)
One should note, however, a virtually total absence of political Islamism
in this group or among any of the Muslim subcategorizations. As far as
militant Islamism especially is concerned, there was nearly unanimous
distancing and quite often outright condemnation. Most often, these
Muslim participants will locate Islam at the very centre of their lives,
at least claiming that it determines everything else in their lives, even
though they may guiltily confess that their actual behaviour in various
ways strays from this ideal. In tune with the general characteristics of all
participants that I emphasized above, and like Muslim participants that
we classified in the other categories, the way that these highly involved
Muslims come to their vision of what constitutes this ideal Islam is highly
individualistic, not in the sense that they will decide whatever they want,
but rather in the sense that the search for authentic Islam is in most
cases ongoing and derived from a variety of sources that they access
individually and directly. These include most especially the Qur’an, and
to a slightly lesser extent the Sunna, the opinions of their parents and
other close relations, and a variety of sources both printed and accessed
through cyberspace. Local imams and specific Islamic organizations
rarely had any influence, unless indirectly through these other means.
Corresponding to this highly individualistic, as opposed to communal
or group-oriented, style, the highly involved Muslims showed great vari-
ation on virtually every one of the details that composed their otherwise
common ‘orthodox’ model of Islam. Many details could illustrate this
variation including: the relative importance given to the different com-
ponents; which of the physical observances (e.g. with respect to clothing,
social life, and eating) were seen as essential and which more optional;
and how the ‘rules’ were to be applied in daily life. In only a very few
cases—clearly only in 2 cases, one male, one female—among the highly
involved did the combination amount to a classification of either 9 or
10, those who tended toward a ‘sectarian’ lifestyle. The vast majority,
by contrast, insisted that their strong identity as Muslims should in
no way hinder them from full participation in the surrounding soci-
ety, whether this meant socially, culturally, politically, or in terms of
profession. Although many had difficulty with certain features of that
surrounding society, ranging from personal sexual issues to geopolitical
14 peter beyer

ones, this only induced them to be selective in what they did; it did not
amount to a feeling of being an outsider and therefore keeping to one’s
own group.
The second category of Muslim participant, what we are calling the
moderately to somewhat involved, use the same standards, but do not
feel that they have to conform to them as strictly. For people in this
category, Islam and Muslim identity are often important, but they
are not deemed to be that which orients their lives at the most fun-
damental level; it is more one factor among several, others of which
might include career, personal taste, friends, and so forth. This group
includes everyone from those who aspire to highly involved status and
‘try their best’ in the meantime, to those who do little more than iden-
tify as Muslims and engage, if only occasionally, in specific religious
practises such as prayer or fasting during Ramadan. Comparing them
to the highly involved, this group lacked the high level of Islamic prac-
tise and the assertion of Islam as central in their lives. As a concrete
example, no women in this category wore the headscarf, but all could
understand and even admired women who did. Correspondingly,
quite a number of the highly involved wore the headscarf, but next to
none would condemn those who didn’t as ‘bad’ Muslims.
The third category consists of those who are clearly non-religious,
including those who rejected identification with Islam or as Muslim.
From the perspective of religious reconstruction, this group could not
even be said to be involved. What was relatively common in this group
was a lack of an explicitly Muslim upbringing or, as in the case of most
of the Iranians in the sample, a negative association of religion and
Islam with its authoritarian and often politicized versions.
Overall, among the 93 Muslim interviewees of Muslim background
in our sample, just a little less than half fell into the highly involved cat-
egory (see Table 2). This is a much higher percentage than one would
find in the general 18–27 year-old Canadian population, even account-
ing for a sample that is skewed in favour of the religiously interested.
Some of these participants were relatively more involved than their
parents, some less, but in general there was a high correlation between
the importance of Islam for them and their parents. In the majority
of these cases, the parents seemed to put a high importance on the
religious socialization of their children; in most cases this effort bore
fruit. The generally positive relation that one finds between current
religious importance and religious upbringing holds for this Muslim
sample as well. In addition, there is evidently no relation between
 differential reconstruction of religions 15

Table 2. Religious Involvement of Muslims According to Gender

Men Women Totals
Highly Involved 15 (43%) 29 (50%) 44 (47%)
Moderately to Somewhat 9 (26%) 19 (33%) 28 (30%)
Involved
Non-religious 11 (31%) 10 (17%) 21 (22%)
Totals 35 58 93
(Source: “Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada”)

level of involvement or practice among these Muslim young adults

and their integration into Canadian society, whether one is looking at
subjective senses of belonging and acceptance, concrete indicators like
educational attainment, or the sharing of core values like individuality
or a positive orientation to religious and cultural pluralism.
As for the rest of the Muslim participants, a little less than 1/3 fell into
the somewhat to moderately involved category and the remaining 1/5
were non-religious. Here again, there was a relatively high association
between the importance of religion in the family as they were growing
up and their current orientation. Of particular note with regard to the
non-religious category is that a very high proportion of these con-
sisted of participants from Iranian background. Of 11 participants of
Iranian origin, 6 women and 5 men, 5 of the women and 4 of the men
were non-religious, most of these not even considering themselves as
Muslims. The other two were only somewhat involved. Few of these
Iranian participants had a religious upbringing, undoubtedly reflecting
the emigration patterns from Iran after the 1979 revolution.
The gender division for the three categories was slightly skewed
towards women being in greater proportion in the more practising
categories, but not too much. The main difference was that women
were less frequently in the non-religious category and correspondingly
more in the somewhat to moderately involved category. Beyond that,
the relation of the women and the men to Islam was not all that dif-
ferent. Attitudes to questions of gender and sexuality, for instance,
were not that different; they did not differ noticeably in terms of how
many had restrictive attitudes towards sexual relations or ‘traditional’
attitudes about gender roles in religion or society.
Overall, then, using level of involvement according to five-pillars
orthodoxy standards as the prime axis of the Muslim continuum
worked quite well. It speaks not only to the very often high importance
16 peter beyer

that Islam has in the lives of the Canadian Muslim second generation,
but also to the prevalence of that standard vision of what constitutes
Islam among Muslims of all stripes. In other words, the reason that
the classification works as well as it does is because the participants
themselves have adopted it, irrespective of whether they put them-
selves inside it, and to what extent. The reconstruction of Islam in
the Canadian context, it seems, is very much aided and influenced by
a globally spread and globally available model of Islam that our par-
ticipants generally accept. The situation contrasts markedly with the
Hindus and Buddhists in our sample.

Hindus
If we were to use the same continuum for the Hindu and Buddhist
subgroups, the result would be that most would hardly appear on the
continuum at all, clustering at the non-religious to only somewhat
involved end. Rather than persist in applying a classification contin-
uum that uses some standard of orthodox involvement to find the pat-
terns of relation to their religious heritage in these groups, much more
can be gained by finding a different continuum, or at least a different
set of criteria. For the Hindus, the category that seemed to work far
better than orthodox religious involvement according to some stan-
dard of orthodoxy (for which the subjects themselves were also not
forthcoming in their own self-descriptions), is tellingly, that of culture.
Pursuing this strategy, the bulk of the Hindu-background participants
fell under what we are calling ethno-cultural Hindus: they considered
their Hindu identity to be important for themselves, but more as a
cultural identity which had a religious dimension, and only some-
times included a small amount of what one might call standard Hindu
practice or belief, such as temple worship, the regular performance of
puja and other rituals, adherence to some form of Vaishnava, Saivite
or other sub-identity, having a personal god/dess or following a spe-
cific guru, believing in the reality of the pantheon, and so forth. More
consistently valued were Hindu family connections, cultural practices
relating to art (e.g. classical dance), music, film (e.g. Bollywood), food,
and sometimes language. Just more than one half of our 57 Hindu
participants were comfortably slotted in this category (see Table 3):
being Hindu was more of a cultural feature and in that context only
sometimes the substantive practise of a clearly delineated and coher-
ently constructed religion. An intriguing example of this ‘cultural’ way
 differential reconstruction of religions 17

of understanding what counts as Hindu is the frequent admission

from these participants that their source of knowledge about matters
Hindu was not just or even primarily their family, certainly not the
priests at the local temple, and only occasionally sacred texts directly
and as such. Much more prevalent are precisely the cultural produc-
tions: Bollywood films; stories told by older family members, espe-
cially mothers, grandmothers, and ‘aunties’; the television versions of
the Mahabharata and Ramayana; and Hindu comic books relating the
same stories. As one participant succinctly put it,
When I was younger, I was hooked on those Mahabharata tapes and
Ramayana. That’s how I learned about [Hinduism]; and when I wanted
to learn more I would look up stuff and we had books at home and I
would just flip through them. (HF09)
Exposure to these ‘cultural’ sources means a reasonable level of what
one might call Hindu mythological familiarity, but does not translate
very consistently into regular ‘involvement’ in especially ritual life as
is the case with the majority of the Muslims. Another way of put-
ting the same conclusion, only from the other side, is that, although
most of these Hindu participants, like almost all participants across
the three religious categories, distinguished clearly between religion
and culture, they did so in favour of the cultural side, considering
the religion less important for themselves but identifying the cultural
explicitly as Hindu.
For the rest, 1/3 of the Hindu interviewees were completely non-
practising, whether religiously or culturally, but the remaining 1/7 was
highly involved in ritual practice. These two categories would have fit
nicely in a scale like the Muslim one, one divided according to level of
religious involvement. The small number of highly involved engaged
in regular religious practice such as the kind just mentioned—temple
worship, the regular performance of puja and other rituals at domestic
shrines, having a personal god/dess or following a specific guru; and
they adhered to some form of Vaishnava of Saivite identity and a cor-
responding belief in the various important gods and goddesses of these
traditions. The cultural dimensions, of course, were also important for
them; but unlike most of the Muslims, there was little practical divid-
ing of religion and culture so as to identify a ‘pure’ religious tradi-
tion in contrast to the ‘cultural’ admixtures typical of others, especially
their parents. The line between religion and culture was there, but far
less precise and far less important.
18 peter beyer

Table 3. Orientation to Religious and Cultural Identity among Hindu

Participants by Gender
Women Men Totals
Ethno-cultural Hindus 25 (64%) 5 (28%) 30 (53%)
Non-religious 8 (21%) 11 (61%) 19 (33%)
Highly Practising 6 (15%) 2 (11%) 8 (14%)
Totals 39 18 57
Source: “Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada”

In connection with this vagueness, of particular note among the Hin-

dus is that both the ethno-cultural Hindu and the religiously involved
Hindu categories were heavily dominated by women. By contrast, the
non-religious category consisted in majority of men. Thus, of the 39
female participants, 25 were in the ethno-cultural and 6 in the highly
practising categories; only 8 in the non-religious/non-cultural. Of the
18 males (note the low number that was even interested in participat-
ing in a project about religion), 11 were in this latter category, 2 in the
practising, and 5 in the ethno-cultural categories (see Table 3). What
seems clear is that the women much more than the men felt a respon-
sibility for carrying on and carrying forth the Hindu traditions and
identity, even if for most this was not a matter of perpetuating religion
and more one of culture. Many of the ethno-cultural Hindu women in
particular tended to view it as their particular responsibility to assure
that the Hindu cultural traditions and identity were passed on to the
next generation. And this well before any of them is seriously consid-
ering producing and raising that next generation. As one interviewee
expressed herself when asked about future marriage and children,
Culture first and foremost. I want to marry someone who’s Indian. I
want somebody of the same culture because there are things I want to
be able to share with them and I want to be able to pass on if I have
children, like the language, the silly things like the movies, . . . the clothes
and the customs. . . . I would like to marry somebody who’s Hindu though
because I have about a dozen versions of my religion and if I were to
marry somebody who’s not Hindu, that version would be further diluted
because I would want to teach my kids what’s involved with Hinduism
. . . and then give them the freedom to take it to whatever level they’re
comfortable with. (HF13)
It is almost as if the traditional Hindu concept of stridharma, namely
the religious duties assigned specifically to women, was manifesting
itself in this sample. Women, traditionally religiously and especially
 differential reconstruction of religions 19

ritually responsible for assuring the cosmic welfare or ‘spiritual health

and well-being’ of the family, maintain this sense of gender-specific
duty even without the religious worldview in which it has tradition-
ally been embedded. They (and eventually their children) may have
less appreciation for what they themselves recognize as the explicitly
religious aspects of their inherited traditions, many—unlike the par-
ticipant just quoted—may have no difficulty marrying outside their
group, but they feel it is their responsibility that their cultural and
religious identity and the appreciation for their cultural-religious tra-
ditions be passed on to their children, irrespective of who, culturally
and religiously speaking, their father is.
In general, one could conclude from the Hindu sub-sample, that the
second generation of Hindu background thus far is not contributing
meaningfully to the Canadian reconstruction of Hinduism as religion,
very much in contrast to their Muslim fellows. Whether this continues
into their more mature adulthood as they pursue careers and found
families of their own remains to be seen. In particular, given that so
many of the women, at least, feel a strong sense of responsibility for
perpetuating a highly valued religio-cultural identity, we will have to
see whether the explicitly religious aspects become more important
as these passing-on-to-the-next-generation tasks become more of a
concrete reality. They may. On the other hand, given the lack of a
clear and authoritative model for what it is that, religiously speaking,
is supposed to be passed on, there may be no exemplary path, or at
least no widely present exemplary path, to follow in this regard. It
could, of course, be that one develops among them, perhaps a neo-
Vedantic path that does not require the belief in supernatural beings
and the practise of regular ritual. There are traces of such an attitude in
the explanations of several of the Hindu participants. What is almost
completely absent, however—and not just less present like the sort of
bhakti devotionalism that some of them do represent—is the sort of
politicized Hinduism that has recently been so visible among Hindus
in India and in segments of the first generation of migrants. Only one
participant was overtly sympathetic to the sort of Hindu nationalism
espoused by such organizations as the Bharatiya Janata Party or the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. And she, like the two or three that vehe-
mently rejected politicized religion of any sort, was not among the
religiously practising.
Looked at from another angle, however, the relation of these Hindu
youth to the religious heritage of their families also parallels that of the
20 peter beyer

Muslims. It is at least arguable that the global reconstruction of Hin-

duism in the modern and global era resonates quite strongly with what
these young adults are doing, as much as is the case with the Muslim
participants and global Islam. What counts as Hinduism in today’s
world does not have a clear and coherent centre or a discursively and
practically dominant version. There is in fact not a very clear dividing
line that those who consider themselves Hindu make between Hindu
religion and Hindu culture, even though the sense that Hinduism is
a religion is clear for them (if not for some scholars). This seems to
apply not only in the Hindu heartland but also is the ‘diaspora’. In
this light, the dominance in our sample of Canadian Hindu youth of
‘ethno-cultural’ Hindus is a good reflection of a global situation. In
this context, it will be indeed very interesting to see what happens reli-
giously in the lives of these youth as they move into the ‘householder’
stage of their lives.

Buddhists
If the Hindu subgroup needed the substitution of a culture-oriented
continuum to make sense of their internal religious continuity and
variation, an altogether different classificatory scheme emerged from
the Buddhist-background group. Very few of our participants from
Buddhist backgrounds were in any sense ‘involved’ in Buddhism, if by
that is meant regular religious practice and the adoption of a world-
view centrally informed by traditional Buddhist precepts and concepts.
Rather than thereby write off these subjects as a-religious, analysis of
the data from their interviews suggests another approach focussing on
the indirect implication of Buddhist religious tradition in the world-
view construction of these participants. Accordingly, a closer exami-
nation of what these participants have to say about matters Buddhist
shows that, although they very often do not identify as Buddhist and
know very little about Buddhism, they are frequently engaged in what
one may call a broadly ‘spiritual’ search or at least spiritual interest,
but on a self-described Buddhist basis. This subgroup among the Bud-
dhists we therefore called ‘religio-culturally based religious seekers’.
Parallel to the Muslim and Hindu groups, about 40% of the Buddhists
could be classified under this category (see Table 4). Specifically, of the
47 Buddhist participants, 28 were women and the remaining 19 were
men. Of these forty-seven, 19 fell into this first category, 12 women
and 7 men. In terms of ethnic background, a little more than half of
 differential reconstruction of religions 21

these were of Southeast Asian (11) origin, the rest of Sri Lankan (3)
or East Asian (5: Chinese & Japanese) origin. How do they manifest
this ‘seekership’ on a Buddhist basis? First, it should be noted that, in
keeping with using this different approach to understand the patterns
among the Buddhists, these 19 include one or two who by other crite-
ria would be considered ‘highly-involved’; but only one or two. There-
fore, rather than giving this tiny minority its own category, it makes
more sense to put them in with the religio-culturally based spiritual
seekers because that is precisely what they also are; they just do it
in a more institutionally Buddhist mode. The rest may not consider
themselves Buddhist, but perhaps express the wish to ‘check it out in
the future’: to be positively oriented towards Buddhism, and to wish
to explore what their family subtradition has to offer. One participant
put it like this:
Y’know, . . . after I finish my BA, I want to travel, first across Canada . . .
and then . . . to Cambodia. And I’m thinkin’ that it might be fun to get
initiated as a monk, maybe just for a year, just to learn and see what I
have to offer. (BM03)
They may have a strong secular sense of values and morals, including
advocacy of social justice, sustainability, freedom, equality, peace, and
tolerant good will; but they will see a connection between these, their
basic value orientations, and their barely inherited Buddhism. As one
Buddhist participant put it,
I definitely consider myself an atheist, [but] I do believe in the precepts
and the value system of Buddhism. I find, because I have a Buddhist
upbringing, . . . like all the precepts and values of Buddhism, I find I like
to follow or want to follow because it’s just good moral value, like don’t
kill, don’t steal, don’t lie. . . . So that’s where I consider myself only in
the core idea of Buddhism which is mindfulness, like y’know, respect
everyone, value life. (BM08)
As with the ethno-cultural Hindus, one may speculate as to whether
this openness to Buddhism will translate itself into more active and
explicitly religious practice and involvement as this group gets older.
That remains to be seen, but one may also speculate that, if something
like this happens, it will definitely be on a more ‘western’ Buddhist
model, one emphasizing individual and engaged seekership and per-
sonal spiritual practice, rather than a ‘traditional’ one emphasizing rit-
ual practice, master/disciple relations, and a clear distinction between
monastic and lay Buddhist responsibilities and practices.
22 peter beyer

Table 4. Orientation to Religious and Cultural Identity among Buddhist

Participants by Gender
Women Men Totals
Religio-culturally based religious 12 (42.9%) 7 (36.8%) 19 (40.4%)
seekers
‘A little bit Buddhist’ 10 (35.7%) 12 (63.2%) 22 (46.8%)
Imitative Traditionalists 3 (10.7%) 0 (0%) 3 (6.4%)
Christians with Buddhist background 3 (10.7%) 0 (0%) 3 (6.4%)
Totals 28 19 47
Source: “Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada”

The other half of the Buddhist participants must also be understood

by different criteria. Accordingly, we have isolated three other sub-
categories. First, there are those we called ‘imitative traditionalists’,
people who, in express contrast to the seekership group, laid great
stress on simply continuing the traditions handed on to them by their
families, without much real reconstruction and noticeable adapta-
tion. There were only very few of these, however, 3 women, two of
Sri Lankan and one of Southeast Asian origin. Of the remaining 21,
twenty-two we classified, adopting a phrase from one of them, as ‘a
little bit Buddhist’.10 These participants were mostly of Chinese ethnic
background; they did, believed, or even knew in detail very little that
was specifically Buddhist. They nonetheless claimed that it was there in
their identities in some indirect, perhaps cultural, way. Most of these,
very typical for people in Canada of Chinese ethnic origin, claimed to
have no religion at all, but recognized that aspects of several religious
traditions, including Buddhism, were included within their inherited
cultural traditions. They gave no centrality to the Buddhist aspect,
however, in contrast to the religio-culturally based seekers. About 47%
of the 47 Buddhists fell into this category, 10 women and 12 men. One
notes that almost 2/3 of the men fell into this category and that it is the
one that best corresponds to the non-religious in the other two clas-
sification grids for Muslims and Hindus. The remaining 3 Buddhists
were not Buddhists at all, but rather Christians, and that for at least

10
The interviewee who used this phrase, when asked what the “little bit” was,
responded in somewhat typical fashion: “people have told me that I’m pretty open
and tolerant of almost anything, so, that’s part of it, and I also believe that, I dunno,
what’s that saying, that ‘if you do something bad, it will come back to you?’ ” (BF08)
 differential reconstruction of religions 23

one generation. They were also of Chinese ethnic origin. Buddhism for
them was little more than a bunch of superstitious practices carried
out by one of their grandparents; Christianity was the real religion.
As far as this category is concerned, it is notable that first, neither
the Muslim nor Hindu sub-samples captured people whose adherence
was actually to another religion; and second, that these participants
still came forward because they recognized themselves of Buddhist
background.
Overall, then, the Buddhist sub-sample shows a rather high correla-
tion between religious orientation and ethno-cultural origin. Rather
than pointing to some unique feature, however, it must be under-
lined that this is actually a feature of all three subgroups, but in dif-
ferent ways and less clearly in the other cases. Muslims do vary to
some degree according to ethno-cultural origin: Iranians were almost
entirely non-religious, Somalis generally very religious (but there were
only 3 in our sample), and South Asians on the whole more highly
involved than those originating from the broad belt from North Africa
to the Middle East. Hindus also show internal ethno-cultural varia-
tion, especially as concerns those who have come to Canada as twice-
migrants from East Africa or the Caribbean in contrast to those whose
families have come directly from India. Yet here there does not seem
to be a good correlation between such differences of origin and the
category into which an individual Hindu participants falls. Only the
Buddhists show this relatively consistent correlation, the only ambigu-
ous ones being those of Southeast Asian Chinese ethnic origin. This
group crossed the boundaries, finding their way into three of the four
categories that we isolated.
Another important common feature that applies to all the Buddhist
subgroups except those 3 who were in fact Christians is the way that
the participants were exposed to Buddhism as they grew up. In most
cases, their parents enjoined them to participate in what the family
considered Buddhist practice—temple visits, commemorating the
ancestors, etc.—but did not place much emphasis on explaining the
reason of these practices. Nor, when it came to it, did the parents in
most cases insist that the children keep up these practices except often
in the family context. Buddhist explanation was minimal; Buddhist
practice was desirable but ultimately optional. Leading a morally good
life and making a success of oneself, those were much more important.
This was combined with the attitude expressed by many interviewees,
that, in effect, Buddhism is not and religion should not be pushy or
24 peter beyer

aggressively trying to assert itself, but rather act as a background good,

as a source of morals and good life practice, and only for those who
felt the need or were so inclined as a defined set of practices and phi-
losophy in which one engaged ‘religiously’.
Looked at in a broader context, these various features can again,
as with the Muslim and Hindu cases, be seen as a reflection of what
Buddhism is globally. There is no clear and ‘orthodox’ model of Bud-
dhism that dominates globally. Only in a very few states like Sri Lanka
and Thailand does Buddhism have the status of a ‘national’ religion;
and in the areas where the vast majority of Canada’s Buddhists origi-
nate, Buddhism for most people is woven into the broader religio-cul-
tural fabric as a dimension of popular belief and practice. Only for the
minority is it a question of explicit and exclusive ‘adherence’. There
may be in process the construction of a global Buddhism in the form
of various movements ranging from what is sometimes called ‘West-
ern’ Buddhism to organizations like the Foguangshan, Xiji, and Soka
Gakkai; but most carriers of Buddhism do not (yet) participate in this
process, just as these Canadian second generation Buddhists do not in
any meaningful sense.

Conclusions

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis just pre-

sented, but perhaps the most important and most obvious is that the
relation of second generation immigrants in Canada to religion and
to the religions of their family heritages depends in no small way
on the specific religion that is involved. Muslims, Hindus, and Bud-
dhists showed different patterns of variation and similarity within
each group based on aspects of each religion. Thus, the contemporary
global dominance of an ‘orthodox’ model of what Islam is supposed to
be is having a direct effect on how the second generation of Muslims
in Canada is relating to that religious tradition. They have adopted the
model and judge themselves in terms of it. By contrast, Hindus and
Buddhists have no such dominant model upon which they can draw.
Another factor is that the three religions have a different relation to
that other broad category, culture, different from Islam and different
from one another. All of our participants drew a line between reli-
gion and culture. Most recognized that religion and culture nonethe-
less were very much related in concrete social reality. The Muslims,
 differential reconstruction of religions 25

however, tended to use that distinction to clarify what they meant by

Islam, what was and was not a core part of Islam: unnecessary addi-
tions or accretions were deemed ‘culture’, not religion. Hindus, on the
other hand, made the distinction far less sharply, and to the extent that
they did, tended to favour the ‘cultural’ end as more important and
closer to what identified them. In this case, rather than accepting that
culture inevitably had an effect on how religion was practised—the
Muslim pattern—religion was seen as at least an occasional, if not usu-
ally centrally important, aspect of cultural practice. It would probably
be going too far to assert that a neo-Vedantic vision of Hinduism is
behind this orientation, meaning that the ‘essence’ of Hinduism does
not require the elaborate edifice of devotional Hinduism but is rather
located at a philosophical level. Yet the conception of Hinduism as cul-
turally bound while still being identifiable religion is definitely present.
Buddhists, finally, largely had what one might call a ‘secularized lay’
orientation to their religion: ‘real’ Buddhist practice was the domain
of, if not just monks and nuns, then at least people who felt the need
or were so inclined; for the rest, it was a kind of background resource
that was always available when needed and somehow informed aspects
of life practice in an indirect but still avowed way.
If these conclusions speak to the differences among the three groups,
then just as important is what emerges with respect to their common-
alities. For all three groups, religion is something distinct, if at times
hard to define precisely. Religion is also a ‘privatized’ matter, not in
the sense of being restricted to some sort of ‘private sphere’, but rather
in the sense that its role was to give the lives of individuals and groups
meaning, structure, and purpose, not to impose itself on everyone as
some kind of authoritative system of belief and behaviour. Almost all
of our participants were not just tolerant of religious pluralism; they
more often than not celebrated it. Even those who were simply tolerant
had no wish to impose their religion on others. This to a large extent is
reflected in the absence of politicized religion among all three groups;
most went in the exact opposite direction: religion that was politicized
was bad religion, if it still qualified as religion at all. On the whole, one
might conclude that, to the extent that these youth are representative
of the second generation immigrant populations in Canada, and to
the extent that these populations represent the future directions for
religion in Canada, then this bodes well for the continuation of not
just the ideal, but also the reality of a multicultural and multi-religious
society; one in which religion is nonetheless a private and optional
26 peter beyer

matter; one in which religion is less a force for division and conflict
and more an actual medium of the integration of diverse populations.
This applies to the Muslims as to the two other groups: Islam for the
vast majority of Muslims is not a source for setting people apart, let
alone for radicalization; but rather, if these participants have anything
to say about it, a way of being religiously Canadian. Whether such
conclusions are in fact warranted over the longer term, remains to be
seen. The research that I have reported here needs to be repeated as
these generations reach mature adulthood; we need to keep an eye on
changing patterns of subsequent migration; and the research needs
to be expanded to include other religious and cultural groups such as
Sikhs and Christians, the missing groups of significant importance in
the Canadian religious and immigrant landscape (this, as I noted, our
group of researchers is currently doing). Only on that ongoing and
wider basis will we be able to know what present trends actually exist
and which one of them will continue.
There is, finally, the question of how this Canadian situation com-
pares to that in other Western countries that have experienced signifi-
cant immigration and religious diversification in the post-World War
II period. As noted at the outset, this sort of comparison must be done
with caution, because the patterns of immigration as well as the ways of
understanding and responding to that immigration in these countries
are often quite different. In certain respects, the Canadian situation
might be most comparable to that in the United States and Australia, the
other major historically European settler societies. Although migrants
to the United States who are Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu share most
of the characteristics of their counterparts in Canada, the patterns of
incorporation between the two countries are in many senses quite dis-
tinct, an impression that was shared by many of the participants in our
Canadian research (see Bloemraad 2006). Something comparable can
be said for Australia (cf. Bouma 2007). As concerns Western European
countries, the composition and socio-economic class of migrants has
been quite different, as have the political and cultural receptivity to
them. In that context, it is therefore likely that there will be similarities
and differences across these countries as concerns the central question
posed here, namely how the second generation of migrants is relating
to the religions of their heritages. Although here cannot be the place for
an extended discussion of this question, the little research that has thus
far been done on this question—mostly on European Muslims (see e.g.
Khosrokhavar 1997; Vertovec & Rogers 1998)—shows precisely that:
 differential reconstruction of religions 27

the Canadian case is similar in some senses those elsewhere, but also
sufficiently different that possible generalizations are few and the need
for comparative research high (cf. Kurien 2007, esp. chapter 10). The
reconstructions of religion in the contemporary global context depend
on the particular circumstance, and the Canadian case illustrates the
idea that general, global, or universal models in today’s global soci-
ety cannot be properly understood except as “glocalizations”, as also
dependent on local context.

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 YOUTH, SPIRITUALITY, AND RELIGION IN CANADA
AND QUEBEC

Solange Lefebvre in collaboration with K. Gandhar Chakravarty

If, in the 1960s, we referred to “the youth culture” (stressing its unisex
nature) then today, we have acknowledged that a plurality of “youth
cultures” continually abound; in tandem with an overflowing variety
of recreational activities and forms of cultural creativity; alongside the
global circulation of signs and symbols via mass media and informa-
tion technologies. Expanding networks of young immigrants have
likewise contributed to this extensive cultural dissemination. While
young people seem to have lent themselves easily to gaming and mass
consumption, they are nonetheless invested in countless avenues of
original, spontaneous, and sometimes ephemeral forms of cultural
expression. Amid such diverse, fluid realities, tracking the exact evo-
lutions of these permutations would prove virtually impossible.
In terms of religious affiliation, youth have been participating
less frequently in the array of formalized religious activities, which
has raised questions about faith and community involvement. Are
the majority believers or are they indifferent? How do they negoti-
ate the religious affiliations of previous generations? How do they
regard religious institutions? These questions are especially relevant
since adolescents have demonstrated a marked penchant for funda-
mental questioning, criticizing the past, ideological reflection, invest-
ing in symbols, and exploring mysteries. Despite the relative distance
from direct involvement in traditional religious activities, the spiritual
dimension of existence nevertheless touches, troubles, or impassions
youth at the crossroads of maturation, likewise influencing their intel-
lectual faculties and instinctual vitality.
In many ways, youth cultures and lifestyles intersect with religiosity
and spirituality, as well as religious experience and practice (Lefebvre
2008). This article presents certain particularities of the circumstances
in which teenagers and young adults find themselves in relation to
beliefs, spirituality, and religion. To accomplish this task, various types
of Canadian and Quebecois research have been examined, some of
which have been influenced by American and European scholarship.
30 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

The age cohorts under study vary considerably and cover several stages
of youth. The goal herein does not consist of comparing various studies
that ask differing questions, but rather to indicate the diverse manners
in which the current sociological research has observed, described, and
interpreted youth activity in relation to spirituality and religion. The
Post-war Context in Canada
Two major perspectives intersect on the question of youth and
religion in the context of modernized countries such as Canada. The
first perspective considers youth according to age and stages of life
in addition to respective sociocultural, anthropological, spiritual, and
religious traits. Under this rubric, the term “youth” roughly encom-
passes adolescents between the ages of twelve and twenty (sometimes
as young as eight) as well as young adults between the ages of twenty
and thirty-five. This approach explores the relationship between age
and lifestyle choices, cultural activities, traditions, innovations, val-
ues, spiritualities, and religions. In this respect, our hypothesis is that
youth are currently at a particularly effervescent stage in the search for
meaning and the exploration of religiousness. This declaration does not
however suggest that today’s youth are devoted religious practitioners.
While some certainly are, we must also take into account various expe-
riences and beliefs as adolescence and young adulthood have always
been intense developmental periods. A prototypical example: the first
known autobiography written in Western culture, Saint Augustine’s
Confessions (4th century), relates the intense spiritual quest of the
author during his late adolescence and young adulthood spent in the
pluralistic religious context of Late Antiquity. Let us also recall that
during the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote his masterpiece,
L’Émile, and declared the period of adolescence (15–20 years old) as
the age of religion, that is to say the age of rational choice for the God
of early modernity.1
The second perspective, however, incorporates the generational factor
by considering the impacts of previous generations on current societies,
especially since youth have indeed formed various social or historical
generations. Since the Second World War in particular, successive gen-
erations have been instrumental in the modification of certain spheres
of life including family, culture, education, politics, sexuality, leisure,
spirituality, and religion (Stoetzel 1983; Inglehart 1998).

1
In Lefebvre 2008, a chapter is consecrated to Augustine and Rousseau and their
insights on adolescence.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 31

Although several ways of treating the incontrovertible distinction

between spirituality and religion exist, a particular sociological prob-
lematic has frequently recurred in Western societies, one that signals
a post-war generational effect. In the Western world, after the Second
World War, the post-war generations have forged more individualized
relationships with religious institutions (Roof, Carroll, and Roozen
1995). Identifying oneself as “spiritual” instead of “religious” gener-
ally signifies someone not only less overtly community-oriented, but
also more implicitly concerned about maintaining a buffer between
themselves and religious authority.
Before we address specific studies, we will share certain general sta-
tistics about the religious climate in Canada at the turn of the mil-
lennium. Statistics Canada has produced a comparative study focused
on religious findings from the detailed decennial census reports of
1991 and 2001. In terms of religious affiliation, Canada had remained
majority Roman Catholic (43 percent) and Protestant (29 percent)—a
total of 72 percent; however, the overall percentages were lower than
in 1991 (45 and 35 percent respectively). Notable percentage increases
occurred in the following religious communities: Muslims (0.9 to 2
percent), Buddhists (0.6 to 1 percent), Hindus (0.6 to 1 percent), and
Sikhs (0.5 to 0.9 percent), as well as those who declare themselves

Table 1. Major Religious Denominations, Canada, 19911 and 2001

2001 1991 Percentage
change
Number % Number % 1991–2001

Roman Catholic 12,793,125 43.2 12,203,625 45.2 4.8

Protestant 8,654,845 29.2 9,427,675 34.9 –8.2
Christian Orthodox 479,620 1.6 387,395 1.4 23.8
Christian, not 780,450 2.6 353,040 1.3 121.1
included elsewhere2
Muslim 579,640 2.0 253,265 0.9 128.9
Jewish 329,995 1.1 318,185 1.2 3.7
Buddhist 300,345 1.0 163,415 0.6 83.8
Hindu 297,200 1.0 157,015 0.6 89.3
Sikh 278,415 0.9 147,440 0.5 88.8
No religion 4,796,325 16.2 3,333,245 12.3 43.9
1
For comparability purposes, 1991 data are presented according to 2001 boundaries.
2
Includes persons who report “Christian”, as well as those who report “Apostolic”,
“Born-again Christian” and “Evangelical”.
Source: Statistics Canada. 2003. Religions in Canada (2001 Census: Analysis Series).
Ottawa: Minister of Industry. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001015.
32 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

Table 2. Selected Protestant Denominations,1 Canada, 2001 and 1991

2001 1991 Percentage
change
1991–2001
United Church 2,839,125 3,093,120 –8.2
Anglican 2,035,500 2,188,110 –7.0
Baptist 729,470 663,360 10.0
Lutheran 606,590 636,205 –4.7
Presbyterian 409,830 636,295 –35.6
Pentecostal 369,475 436,435 –15.3
Mennonite 191,465 207,970 –7.9
Jehovah’s Witnesses 154,745 168,375 –8.1
Church of Jesus Christ 104,750 100,770 3.9
of Latter-day Saints
(Mormons)
Salvation Army 87,785 112,345 –21.9
Christian Reformed 76,665 84,685 –9.5
Church
Evangelical Missionary 66,705 44,935 48.4
Church
Christian and Missionary 66,280 59,240 11.9
Alliance
Adventists 62,875 52,365 20.1
1
Specific denominations with counts of 60,000 or more in 2001.
Source: Statistics Canada. 2003. Religions in Canada (2001 Census: Analysis Series).
Ottawa: Minister of Industry. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001015.

as No Religion (12.3 to 16.2 percent). Note that the category of No

Religion is difficult to define since, for example, the Chinese Confu-
cian population declares itself so, as do various other categories of
individuals.
Few Protestant groups witnessed a significant increase in overall
numbers, especially in the six largest denominations, with the notable
exception of the Baptists whose percentage change increased by 10
percent for an overall total of 729,470 adherents.
While the median age of 42 for all Protestant groups was significantly
above the national median of 37 for the entire Canadian population,
the smaller Protestant denominations that witnessed an increase in
membership—Adventists, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Mor-
mons, Hutterites—were generally younger (COD 2003: 7).
Other younger populations included Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and
those who declared No Religion.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 33

Table 3. Selected Religious Denominations by Median Age, Canada, 2001

Median age (years)
Presbyterian 46.0
United Church 44.1
Anglican 43.8
Lutheran 43.3
Baptist 39.3
Pentecostal 33.5
Jewish 41.5
Greek Orthodox 40.7
Buddhist 38.0
Roman Catholic 37.8
Hindu 31.9
No religion 31.1
Sikh 29.7
Muslim 28.1
Source: Statistics Canada. 2003. Religions in Canada (2001 Census: Analysis Series).
Ottawa: Minister of Industry. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001015.

Table 4. Persons Reporting No Religion by Age Groups, Canada, 2001

Total Population No religion
% %
Total age groups 100.0 100.0
0–14 years 19.4 23.1
15–24 years 13.5 16.2
25–44 years 30.5 35.0
45–54 years 14.9 13.2
55–64 years 9.6 6.3
65 years and over 12.2 6.2
Source: Statistics Canada. 2003. Religions in Canada (2001 Census: Analysis Series).
Ottawa: Minister of Industry. Catalogue no. 96F0030XIE2001015.

Among those that declared No Religion, almost 40% were 24-years-

old or less.
In terms of the overall population that declared No Religion, Yukon,
British Colombia, and Alberta ranked highest (37, 35, and 23 percent
respectively) while Quebec as well as Newfoundland and Labrador (6
and 2 percent respectively) represented the provinces with the lowest
percentage of No Religion adherents (COD 2003). On the national
level, before 1971, less than 1 percent of the population reported
34 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

themselves as No Religion; by 2001, this proportion had increased to 16

percent (COD 2003: 9). Note, that immigration has significantly con-
tributed to the No Religion category. For example, between 1991 and
2001, about 20 percent of Canada’s 1.8 million immigrants reported
No Religion. The majority of these individuals emigrated from Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, and China (COD 2003: 9).
Another study pertaining to the frequency of Canadian participa-
tion in religious ceremonies and services from 1985 to 2005—part
of Statistics Canada’s General Social Survey—has exhibited a reveal-
ing trend: religious attendance in persons aged 15 or more has sig-
nificantly dropped over the past two decades. In 2001, 43 percent
declared that they had not attended a religious service during the last
12 months; this figure was 26 percent in 1986 (COD 2003: 6). Also, in
2005, only about a fifth (21.1 percent) of the population aged 15 and
over claimed to participate in religious services on a weekly basis—a
significant drop from 30.3 percent in 1985. Finally, in 2005, about one
third (32.8 percent) of Canadians aged 15 and over reported that they
never attended religious services, up from 21.5 percent in 1985.
The statistics also reveal an intergenerational effect in the move-
ment towards No Religion. For the population aged 45 to 64 in 1985,
their weekly attendance has remained almost the same in 2005 as they
enter the 65 and over category; for those who never attended religious
services, however, a sharp spike can be observed in the same genera-
tion over the twenty-year span (15.7 to 25.5 percent). A similar trend
can be observed in 1985’s 25 to 44 age range as they enter the 45 to
64 age range twenty years later. As parents have distanced themselves
from regular attendance of religious ceremonies, it follows that the
demographic of teenagers who attended services “less frequently” has
fallen into the “never” category over time.

Table 5. Frequency of Religious Attendance1 (%), 1985 to 2005

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
At least once a week 30.3 27.8 26.5 25.3 21.1
Never 21.5 26.5 31.9 26.1 32.8
Less frequently2 48.1 45.7 41.6 48.6 46.1
1
Canadians aged 15 and over living in the 10 provinces, not including the institu-
tionalized population
2
Includes at least once a month, a few times a year, and at least once a year
Source: Statistics Canada. 2008. The General Social Survey: Matter of Fact. No. 3.
Catalogue no. 89-630-X. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 35

Table 6. Frequency of Religious Attendance1 (%), by Age, 1985 to 2005

1985 2005
15–24 25–44 45–64 65+ 15–24 25–44 45–64 65+
At least once a week 22.6 24.9 38.9 42.0 15.6 15.7 22.0 37.4
Never 22.4 25.1 15.7 20.8 33.1 36.0 32.6 25.5
Less frequently2 55.0 50.0 45.4 37.2 51.3 48.2 45.5 37.1
1
Canadians aged 15 and over living in the 10 provinces, not including the institutionalized population
2
Includes at least once a month, a few times a year, and at least once a year
Source: Statistics Canada. 2008. The General Social Survey: Matter of Fact. No. 3. Catalogue no. 89-630-X.
Ottawa: Statistics Canada.

Clark and Schellenberg performed further analyses that considered

four dimensions of religiosity: religious affiliation, frequency of atten-
dance at religious services, frequency of private religious practices, and
the perceived importance of religion (Clark and Schellenberg 2006).
Their general conclusions are as follows.
On a scale of 0 to 13, they measured the intensity of religiosity, from
a no religious to a high religious profile.2 Of the four dimensions of
religiosity, they found that 40 percent of Canadians have a low degree
of religiosity, 31 percent are moderately religious, and 29 percent are
highly religious. Religiosity is generally lowest among young people
(ages 15–29) and highest among older age groups (over 60). Men are
also much more likely to have low religiosity than women. Among the
factors related to higher religiosity are having both parents from the
same religion and a religious education. Also, people who immigrated
between 1981 and 2000 showed a higher general level of religiosity (41
percent), compared with 26 percent of people born in Canada. When
the overall demography of practicing adherents has been consulted, it
has demonstrated the fading of intergenerational transmission. Famil-
ial and social transmissions of regular practices have been diminish-
ing, especially in families with parents from different religions.
Among immigrants, the researchers found significant differences in
relation to their countries of origin. High levels of religiosity are most
prevalent among immigrants from Southern Asia (e.g. India and Paki-
stan); South-East Asia (e.g. the Philippines); the Caribbean; and Cen-
tral and South America. In contrast, high levels of religiosity are least

2
For an explanation of the religiosity index, cf. Clark and Schellenberg 2006: 8.
36 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

Table 7. Religiosity Index, Canada, 2002

Degree of religiosity
Low Moderate High Total
(0–5) (6–10) (11–13)
%
Total 40 31 29 100
Men 48* 28* 24* 100
Women 32 33 35 100
Age
15 to 29 48* 30* 22* 100
30 to 44 43 32 25 100
45 to 59 39* 31 30* 100
60+ 26* 30* 44* 100
Region of Residence
Atlantic 29* 35* 36 100
Quebec 39* 37* 24* 100
Ontario 37 30 33 100
Prairies 42* 28* 31 100
British Columbia 54* 22* 25* 100
Immigration Status
Canadian-born 41 32 26 100
Immigrated before 1982 33* 27* 40* 100
Immigrated 1982 to 2001 34* 25* 41* 100
Religion of parents
Both parents same religion 32 34 33 100
Parents from different religions 50* 28* 22* 100
Neither parents religious 85* 6* 10* 100
* Statistically significant difference from reference group in italic (p<0.05).
Source: Clark and Schellenberg. 2006. Who’s Religious? Canadian Social Trends.
Catalogue no. 11-008. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. From Statistics Canada, Ethnic
Diversity Survey, 2002.

prevalent among immigrants from Eastern Asia (e.g. China and Japan),
Western/Northern Europe (e.g. France and the United Kingdom), and
Eastern Europe (e.g. Hungary). These trends imply that some religions
gain active members through immigration, something that is certainly
true for Catholicism, but less so for mainline Protestantism.3

3
Lefebvre participated in a transnational study on Christianities and ethnicities in
Canada that provides an overview of the historical and present situation of diverse
churches. For more information, cf. Bramadat and Seljak 2008.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 37

Comparative Research from Bibby

The Albertan sociologist Reginald Bibby has provided an interdisci-

plinary analysis of some central questions regarding religion in Can-
ada. His findings represent the collaborative results of sociological
inquiry and theological interpretation. The titles of his works reflect
this approach, for example: Fragmented Gods (1987), Unknown Gods
(1993), Restless Gods (2002), and Restless Churches (2004). In short,
Bibby has observed that the gods, while still at work, are far from
omnipresent; they have become fragmented, misunderstood, and rest-
less. This section broaches some of his key findings.

The Religious Inheritors of the 1980s

In The Emerging Generation (1985), a book centred on youth, Bibby
reported few differences between the Canadian regions: when parents
adhered to a particular religion, their children usually followed. Although
widespread concerns about new religious movements, sects, and cults
have abounded since the 1970s, in reality, only a minority of believers
participated in these groups. Only about 2 percent of adolescents and
the same percentage of adults displayed a marked interest in alternative
religious groups.4 For most adolescents, religious institutions have suf-
fered the same fate as recreational associations centered on rules and
regulations. As young people have expanded their margin of freedom by
disassociating themselves from such frameworks, they have largely aban-
doned organized groups and churches. Most, however, have remained
in school, although what they appreciated most about school were the
relations they developed with their peers.5 Moreover, those frequent-
ing community groups generally received scorn from peers. 25 percent
of 16 to 19–year-olds claimed to visit religious institutions frequently,
but only eight percent admitted enjoyment. Their parents insisted that
they would rather their children attend religious services regardless
(Bibby and Posterski 1985: 45–9). Note that Quebec distinguished itself

4
The same phenomenon has also been observed in several European countries. The
attraction to unconventional beliefs has rarely been accompanied by direct adhesion to a
group organized around those beliefs. For more information about adherents of alterna-
tive religious groups, cf. Campiche 1997: 207–10, Beckford 1986 and Hoge 2001.
5
With regard to the decreasing popularity of organizations and associations among
adolescents, this result has been corroborated by a recent Quebecois study that found
that the participation of youth aged 13 or over in recreational organizations was sig-
nificantly lower than among children, cf. Lamy 2004.
38 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

from the rest of Canada as it reflected the lowest percentage of regular

religious participation yet simultaneously maintained one of the highest
rates of religious affiliation. In general, while adolescents occasionally
participated in religious activities, from the age of twenty, only about
one in six remained practicing. In relation to religions and stages of life,
Bibby has observed that for some who distanced themselves from reli-
gion towards the end of their adolescence, they had become more active
once they had gotten married and had children; for others, this distance
remained (Bibby and Posterski 1985: 125–8).
For Bibby, beliefs constitute ideas about the supernatural that can
be independent from paradigms of orthodoxy. This manner of envi-
sioning religious matters has allowed him to conclude that despite the
pessimistic predictions of several experts and laypersons, the level of
“belief ” among Canadian adolescents was in fact superior to that of
adults. Adolescents were more likely to believe in God (85 versus 81
percent), the divinity of Jesus (85 versus 68 percent), life after death
(80 versus 69 percent), and psychic phenomena (69 versus 58 percent).
40 percent of adolescents also believed in “invisible forces” or “mys-
terious powers.” In contrast, adolescents were more skeptical than
their predecessors with regard to astrology (Bibby and Posterski 1985:
116–7). Bibby has credited the vogue of ideas about the supernatural,
in part, to the cultural products of mass media. Mystical and fantas-
tical dimensions have indeed been prevalent, most notably, in film,
literature, games, and comics.

Fragmented Gods or Religion à la Carte (1988–2002)

In 2002, Bibby published a synthesis of the research he had conducted
over the twenty-five previous years in a book entitled Restless Gods.
He had based his sociology of belief on a consumerist model, one that
had been elaborated upon in Fragmented Gods (1987). The idea of a
“religion market” endured. In effect, despite the relative desertion of
regular church attendance, about 50 percent of the population claimed
to experience the presence of God (Bibby 2002: 147). In 1993, Bibby’s
research had already revealed “at least three important indicators of
latent spirituality—fascination with mystery, the search for meaning,
and religious memory”6 (Bibby 2002: 28).

6
For more on these findings, cf. Bibby 1993.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 39

Alongside this approach, Bibby had also evaluated the classic variable
of religious practice. Though the growing immigrant population, whose
overall religious practice has appeared more punctilious, has slightly
offset both the declining proportion of practice and the age factor, since
1984, the percentage of 15 to 19-year-olds who adhered to traditional
Protestantism and Catholicism has declined while the proportion of
teenagers who adhered to other religions or follow No Religion has been
increasing. In all the groups, however, the decline has to some degree
tapered off since the 1990s mainly because of a greater presence of ado-
lescents in the Canadian population. As of 2000, for the first time in
Canadian history, the proportion of adolescents who belonged to conser-
vative evangelic Protestant denominations was greater than that of their
peers who were affiliated with mainline Protestant denominations—54
and 46 percent respectively (Bibby 2002: 87).
Apart from this turnaround in Protestant adherence, since the 1980s,
adolescents have generally been increasingly identifying with more
than one religious group—a reflection of their general consumption
habits. Additionally, among adolescents that were firmly committed to
one particular faith tradition, a greater percentage attended religious
services with regularity in 2000 than in 1992, with the notable excep-
tions of the Roman Catholic population in Quebec and also within the
national Muslim and Jewish communities.
Bibby has also commented on the dimensions of religion that appeared
to have a certain vitality. First, the belief in supernatural phenomena:
in 2000, 81 percent of Canadians reported believing in God (Bibby
2002: 140) and 47 percent claimed to experience the presence of God
(Bibby 2002: 147). These figures have remained relatively stable since
1985. According to Bibby’s research, among adolescents, these percent-
ages were equal to or greater than those of adults (Bibby 2002: 29). For
example, in response to the enigma of life after death, 81 percent of
Canadians under the age of 35 responded that they think about the issue
often or sometimes versus 67 percent in the 35 to 64 age range and 64
percent in the over 55 demographic (Bibby 2002: 116).
Regarding specific ultimate questions, however—origins of the uni-
verse, one’s purpose, happiness, suffering, death—in 2000, fewer adult
Canadians were generally preoccupied with these lines of questioning
versus teenagers (Bibby 2002: 133–4). On the question of the exis-
tence of some form of transcendental justice, in 2000, just over 90
percent of Canadians of all ages reported that for certain “deplorable
acts, such as the raping and murdering of children, no human form
40 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

Table 8. Service Attendance of Teens by Group, 1984–2000: % Attending

Weekly
1984 1992 2000
NATIONALLY 23% 18 22
Protestant 26 30 48
Conservative 51 61 70
Baptist 30 55 54
Pentecostal 64 59 75
Mainline 17 16 23
Anglican 13 14 16
United 17 13 17
Lutheran 25 17 *
Presbyterian 17 34 40
Roman Catholic 28 21 21
Outside Quebec 37 27 31
Quebec 16 11 7
Other Faiths 13 15 21
Buddhist * 10 10
Jewish * 12 7
Muslim * 41 26
Native * 3 9
Hindu * * 44
Sikh * * 43
No Religion 3 2 3
* Numbers insufficient to permit stable percentaging.
Source: Bibby 2002: 88.

of justice seems to be enough” and 70 percent presented the view that

“some day injustices will be made right” (Bibby 2002: 176). For both
of these questions, the proportions were greater among women and
people aged under 35. On the question of the existence of a transcen-
dental order to the universe, 86 percent reported that they believed in
one—proportionately lower among youth (81 percent) and higher in
the older age ranges (Bibby 2002: 178). In terms of morality, in 2001,
both teenagers and grandparents revealed the least relativistic stance,
both at 65 percent, versus parents and young adults at 72 percent. 16
percent of teenagers perceived religion as a basis for their moral out-
look, compared with 26 percent of grandparents (Bibby 2002: 217).
Though the traditional purposes of organized religion have remained
in flux, the vast majority of Canadians continued to “evoke the gods”
for major life events. As of the early 1990s, for example, 88 percent of
adults and 80 percent of teenagers identified with a particular religious
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 41

group, usually the ones associated with their childhoods. They have
turned to organized religious institutions in a selective manner—to
fulfill their religious demands, particularly rites of passage. The rituals
and ceremonies of one’s own religious group have typically been taken
as normative while the religious practices of other groups have been
interpreted as strange or foreign. Religious memory has manifested
within this context (Bibby 2002: 30–4).
73 percent of Canadians claimed to have spiritual needs, the greatest
proportion among women (81 percent) for whom spirituality was also
more important—77 percent versus the national average of 70 percent
and 62 percent for men. A greater proportion of women also described
themselves as being spiritual people—66 percent versus the national
average of 58 percent and 49 percent for men. On these three ques-
tions regarding spirituality, the proportion of youth who responded
positively was consistently lower (Bibby 2002: 179).
Based on his findings, Bibby has controverted the positions of the
analysts that have predicted the impending disintegration of insti-
tutionalized religions. Bibby argues that they have overlooked three
key aspects: the latent loyalties of religious affiliates outside of active
involvement,7 sporadic or inconsistent involvement, and the openness
towards greater involvement among the inactive (Bibby 2002: 36–7).
One of Bibby’s research innovations in this domain was to ask Canadi-
ans if they would be more receptive to involvement in religious groups
if they found it to be worthwhile for themselves and their families. 37
percent of adolescents who attended services less than once a month
reported that they would, along with 55 percent of the teenagers who
attended services once a month or more—the comparable figure for
adults attending less than once a month was 62 percent (Bibby 2009:
181). Contrary to popular belief, hostility and indifference towards
religious institutions had not dominated the climate. Moreover, among
Canadians who declared themselves as No Religion, a strong return
towards the religion transmitted by their families has been observed,
particularly for rites of passage (Bibby 2002: 89).

7
In North America, the changing of religious affiliation has most often occurred
within the same larger religion to a different denomination, cf. Hadaway and Marker
1993. One nuance: this type of mobility has occurred less frequently among Fran-
cophone Quebecois; the new members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and evangelical
churches, for example, have tended to be formerly Catholic.
42 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

In regard to Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, whose numbers

have significantly increased because of immigration, six percent of 15
to 19-year-olds who came from these traditions pronounced them-
selves as either Protestant or Catholic (Bibby 2002: 83–4). Within the
context of the new host culture inside of which the new residents have
settled, the influence of their traditional religion has been significantly
less than in their countries of origin, thus the transplanted institutions
have often had difficulty engaging the interest of the community, espe-
cially members of the second generation. For more recent findings on
this subject, we refer to Peter Beyer’s article.

The Emerging Millennials (2009)

In his recent study of Canadian youths, Bibby’s tone has shifted. He
posed questions to 5,564 adolescents, including 818 students who
attended Aboriginal schools. Choice and personal freedom emerged as
dominant themes (Bibby 2009: 2). Like previous generations, though
the majority perceived their social realities relativistically, not every-
thing is relative for the Millennials (Bibby 2009: 5–7). For example,
over 80 percent reported that trust and honesty are “very important,”
while 75 percent ranked humor as equally essential (Bibby 2009: 9).
Even in this era of choice and overt relativism, some intrinsic moral
and social values have endured. Worth nothing is how intelligence,
creativity, and patience have been valued significantly less by the cur-
rent teenage generation (54, 51, and 44 percent respectively) and also
how females consistently raise the average in virtually every value-
oriented category.
Bibby has situated adolescents along the same religious genealogy as
the Baby Boomers: “the bottom line of the Boomer era is that spiritual
needs and fragmented beliefs persist, along with the desire for some
rites of passage [. . .]. Such is the religious context in which millennials
are emerging” (Bibby 2009: 165). If we take, for example, the atten-
dance percentages for just Catholicism—the largest representative reli-
gious denomination in Canada—overall attendance has continued to
fall dramatically.
Bibby has traditionally argued that despite the challenges that have
beset “organized religion in Canada, God has continued to do well
in the polls” (Bibby 2009: 166). Based on the Project Teen Canada
surveys of 2008, however, Bibby can no longer make this claim. Only
67 percent of teenagers reported believing in the existence of God or
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 43

Table 9. Attendance by Age Cohort, Quebec Catholics: 1975–2000 (%)

Quebec Rest of Canada
Weekly + Monthly + Weekly + Monthly +
1975 35 43 29 39
Pre-Boomers 48 52 33 43
Boomers 11 25 16 26
2000 18 23 22 30
Pre-Boomers 35 43 37 45
Boomers 14 21 20 30
Post-Boomers 4 9 10 17
Source: Bibby 2009: 165.

a higher power—less than in any previous survey. Only about 40 per-

cent claimed to have felt the presence of God or a higher power (Bibby
2009: 166). Not surprisingly, those who attended religious services fre-
quently were more likely to believe in God or a higher power.
Bibby has argued that teenagers learn about non-belief in a similar
sociological fashion as they learn about belief. While non-believers do
not necessarily translate into atheists, the percentage of adult atheists
has remained relatively stable, but the percentage of teenage atheists
has increased—from six to 16 percent since the mid-1980s. In 1984,
23 percent of Canadian teenagers attended weekly religious services;
in 1992, only 18 percent of teenagers did so. While weekly religious
attendance among teenagers surged back to 21 percent in both 2000
and 2008, the percentage of teenagers who never attended religious
services grew from 28 percent in 1984 to 40 percent in 2000 and 47
percent in 2008 (Bibby 2009: 178). These trends can be credited to the
persistent move away from organized religious practice over the span
of a generation.
Worth noting, however, is that teenagers who expressed belief in a
higher power or God were more likely to uphold a number of moral
and social values. These patterns have been consistent in Quebec and
elsewhere in Canada, among adults, and between females and males
(Bibby 2009: 172). Despite the religious drop off, spiritual ideals have
continued to contribute to stronger values—religious groups and the
belief in a higher power or God have certainly been factors.
Overall, Canadian Millennials have maintained a preoccupation
with ultimate questions. Almost 80 percent reported that they have
44 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

Table 10. Values of Theist and Atheist Teens: % Indicating “Very

Important”
Nationally Theists Atheists
Trust 84 88 78
Honesty 81 86 75
Concern for others 65 72 54
Politeness 64 71 57
Forgiveness 60 72 44
Working hard 55 61 49
Patience 44 55 35
Source: Bibby 2009: 171.

reflected on the purpose of life, the existence of suffering in the world,

and life after death, but this proportion has somewhat declined since
1984. Bibby has cited the “pace of life” as a source for this decline in
contemplation (Bibby 2009: 173).
Fascination with the supernatural in more general terms, however,
has endured, in part, because of the very media that contribute to
life’s quickened pace. Overall, however, the proportions on supernat-
ural beliefs have consistently declined since the 1980s (Bibby 2009:
174–5). Bibby has credited this decline to “the intense competition
for teens’ time and meditative and prophetic interests” (Bibby 2009:
175). The acknowledgement of spiritual needs has also declined, but
has remained above 50 percent with females more likely to report such
needs (Bibby 2009: 175).
To better ascertain the role of religious groups in teen life, Bibby
has employed three indicators: identification, involvement, and
salience. Overall, in 1984, 88 percent of Canadian adolescents iden-
tified with a religious group; this proportion was 68 percent in 2008.
Religious identification with Roman Catholicism and Protestantism
has sharply declined over the past two and a half decades (down
18 and 22 percent respectively), and as a result of ever-increasing
immigration, identification with “Other Faiths” has increased from
three to 16 percent. Those who declared No Religion have increased
from 12 to 32 percent (Bibby 2009: 176). If there had been a surge
of youth membership in newer evangelic Protestant denominations
in the 1990s and 2000, this interest has seemingly petered away with
the Millennials.
Teens in the North, British Columbia, and Alberta have remained
more likely to report themselves as No Religion—much like the adults
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 45

Table 11. Religion Identification of Teens: 1984–2008

1984 1992 2000 2008
Roman Catholic 50 41 39 32
Outside Quebec 29 24 23 23
Quebec 21 17 16 9
Protestant 35 28 22 13
United 10 4 3 1
Anglican 8 5 3 2
Baptist 3 2 2 1
Lutheran 2 1 1 1
Pentecostal 2 1 1 1
Presbyterian 2 1 1 1
Other/Unspecified 8 13 11 6
Orthodox – 1 1 2
Christian, unspecified – – – 3
Other Faiths 3 10 14 16
Islam <1 1 3 5
Buddhism <1 1 2 3
Judaism 1 1 2 2
Hinduism <1 <1 1 2
Sikhism <1 <1 1 2
Aboriginal Spirituality <1 <1 1 2
Other/Unspecified 2 5 4 2
None 12 21 25 32
Source: Bibby 2009: 176.

in these areas. There has also been a “significant intergenerational jump

in Quebec” (Bibby 2009: 177). Teens in Saskatchewan and Ontario
were least likely to identify with the No Religion category. Overall,
however, a greater proportion of teenagers identified with No Religion
compared to adults.
A key observation: though the percentage of adherents among many
groups—particularly Protestants—has been decreasing, the ones who
have remained identifying were more likely to participate in religious
services. Also, while teen Catholic attendance in Quebec has been
declining steadily since the mid-1980s, it has remained relatively stable
in the rest of Canada (Bibby 2009: 179).
In terms of salience, only 13 percent of teenagers reported that reli-
gious involvement is “very important” for them; combined with the
“somewhat important” category, the proportion reached 30 percent.
While teenagers generally found the notions of organized religion and
personal joy mutually exclusive, those who identified with a religious
46 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

Table 12. No Religion by Region

Teens Adults
NATIONAL 32 16
North 51 23
British Columbia 44 36
Alberta 38 23
Quebec 37 6
Manitoba 34 19
Atlantic 31 8
Saskatchewan 26 16
Ontario 23 16
Sources: Bibby 2009: 177.

group generally reported garnering a higher level of enjoyment from

participation. Those teens that identified with either evangelical Prot-
estantism or one of the Other World Faiths typically reported higher
levels of enjoyment than teens that identified with Catholicism or
Mainline Protestantism. In this vein, Bibby has discovered “consider-
able religious polarization among Canada’s teenagers” (Bibby 2009:
170). About one-third of teens in Canada reported tangible gratifi-
cation from religious activity, and yet another third—led particularly
by those in Quebec—reported little to no involvement with organized
religion (Bibby 2009: 180).
When Bibby asked teens about their openness to a greater degree
of involvement with religious groups if they found their activities
to be worthwhile, some slight increases occurred versus the data
of 2000 (Bibby 2009: 181). Furthermore, the desire for a religious
figure during certain rites of passage has remained high, even in
Quebec, though the overall percentages have declined somewhat
(Bibby 2009: 182).
According to Bibby, though God is still present, the younger gen-
eration has become less fascinated with those ultimate questions as
the products of mass media continually vie for their already spanned
attentions. Indeed, though Bibby’s latest research has conveyed a
great sense of hope for the moral and material futures of the Mil-
lennials, Bibby has also conceded that “God is slipping in the polls,”
thus leaving questions about the correlation of religion and civility
and whether the former is necessary for the cultivation of the latter
(Bibby 2009: 209).
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 47

The Quebec Case: Collective Emancipation from

Religious Superintendence

In socio-religious studies, Quebec has consistently been anomalous to

the religious and spiritual trends associated with the rest of Canada—
especially in relation to youth—while functioning as a kind of Cath-
olic post-Christian laboratory. In measuring the religious pluralism
of North American regions, researchers have observed that Quebec
has remained the most homogeneous.8 Contemporary Quebec soci-
ety, in many ways, represents the heart of Canadian moral liberalism
although until the 1950s the influence of a highly clerical Catholicism
had dominated the society, particularly the educational and political
systems. Although Quebec is majority francophone, it has nonetheless
benefited from the contributions of Protestantism and Judaism. As of
the 1950s, a rift between the general population and Catholic institu-
tions had formed via a profound disinterest on the part of a large
number of youths toward Christian responsibilities; the irrelevance
of the religious culture; the lack of an authentic attachment to the
Church; the individualization of faith; and the decrease in vocations
and religious practices9 (Hamelin 1984: 134).
The Catholic Church in Quebec has historically substituted for the
State not only because of a lack of socio-political elites, but also because
it was itself an obstacle to the emergence of liberal elites. While some
have mercilessly interpreted this period as the dominion of Quebecois
society by religion, others have discerned signs of a collective religious
revitalization thanks to the contribution of the Quebecois Church
towards the efforts of a French Canada that had been entangled in a

8
According to Statistics Canada, in 2001, about one half of all Roman Catholics in
Canada lived in Quebec, accounting in 1991 for 86 percent and in 2001 for 83 percent
of the total population of the province, the greatest proportion of all the Canadian
regions. All of the large Protestant denominations have decreased in adherence apart
from the Baptists whose adherence increased 29 percent to 35,000 members. The cen-
sus revealed about 85,500 Anglicans who remained the largest Protestant group in the
province despite an 11 percent decrease since 1991 primarily caused by Anglophone
migrations in North America. The Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and Sikh populations
have increased in the Greater Montreal Area, especially the Muslims (from 44,900
in 1991 to 108,600 in 2001), making Islam the third largest religion in Quebec. The
majority of the province is also francophone. For more information, cf. Olson and
Hadaway 1999: 490–508.
9
For more information, cf. Hamelin 2003: 4.
48 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

profound crisis since 1840 (Rousseau and Remiggi 1988). In any case,
this society that was strongly rooted in religion has since the Second
World War experienced a paradoxical situation whereby it is at once
attached to and resentful of the religious tradition that has largely
shaped its character.

From Emancipation to Pluralism

Gauthier has compared various studies undertaken since the 1960s
on religion and Quebecois youth.10 She has uncovered three distinct
phases: in the 1960s, the emergence of modern behaviours that favoured
reason and individual freedoms to the detriment of mass religion; in
the 1970s, a general silence on the subject of religion; and in the 1980s
and 90s, the appearance of multiple forms of religious expression.
From the 1940s, the religion of the masses has gradually yielded to
individualism and rationalism. In the context of Quebec, the youth,
rather than understanding this disaffection for religious practice as an
intergenerational conflict, had interpreted this outcome as a search for
authenticity. The Catholic Church as a normative source for guidance
had become devalued while the right to an individual relationship with
God or Jesus Christ had started to eclipse the status quo ante (Rioux
and Sévigny 1964; Sévigny 1971).
From the end of the 1970s, fervent discussions on the legitimacy of
confessional schools had begun. Despite the changing social climate,
the majority of young parents resulting from the Quiet Revolution
era of the 1960s preferred religious—rather than moral—education for
their children so long as they were also taught about inherent values
and could access rites of passage. Some even talked about a school
religion. For the parents, religion nonetheless remained an individual
choice that could be exercised outside of weekly religious practice,
something that had already started to become apparent when they
were themselves adolescents.
Amidst these tremors, Christian morality was often transmitted
without an explicit identification of the source, for example, ideas such
as respect for others; compassion; and openness to Transcendence.

10
These studies have focused on the youth of the 1950s and 60s, i.e. the Baby
Boomers that were born after the Second World War and their offspring of the 1980s
and 90s. For more information, cf. Gauthier 1996 and Gauthier 1997.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 49

To this end, the role of schools was paramount11 (Cadrin-Pelletier

and Nadeau 1992; Côté 1992): the fact that their parents could choose
between moral instruction or catechesis for their high school educa-
tion certainly resonated in the consciousness of the youth. In addition,
in the context of CEGEP social sciences and humanities courses for
students aged 17–20, some scholars have claimed that the anti-reli-
gious propaganda in the theories of Marx and Freud influenced young
minds, especially those concerned with metaphysical questions.
In the 1970s, the process of secularization already evoked intensi-
fied owing to the about-face of the Action Catholique des Jeunes (JEC).
The movement vigorously sought to permeate the terrestrial realities
of the evangelical spirit, thus modernizing the Catholic vision of faith
that had for a long time been centered on doctrines and sacramental
practices. Bélanger has observed that the JEC thus proposed a mystical
reality at work in the transformative actions that occurred following
the Quiet Revolution as a framework to account for the secular activi-
ties of student and community groups (Bélanger 1971). Nonetheless,
figures of authority and dogmatic institutions subsequently lost much
of their authority. In general, the erosion of the family and the Church
were correlated as religious rites have typically been experienced in the
context of family (Hervieu-Léger 1993).
Lefebvre has demonstrated that the children of Baby Boomers,
born in the 1960s and the early-1970s, have widened the trench
between social engagement and Catholicism. Although the elites
from Action Catholique often frame their social and political involve-
ment in the context of their religious faith and thus accept working
for lower salaries at community organizations (Lefebvre 2003), from
the 1990s especially, young adults have generally erased the explicitly
religious motivations of community engagement in favor of staunch
professionalism.12

11
Because religion in schools has always been critical in research on youth since the
1960s, it should be noted that the secularization of the public school system by 2000
would undoubtedly have significant consequences. Though the churches attempted to
compensate through Christian initiation projects and catechesis developed specifically
for youth audiences, adolescents (aged 12–20) were nonetheless increasingly under-
exposed to religious confessional education. In regard to the private confessional
educational system, it introduced Christianity variously in relation to an increasingly
multiethnic student body, notably in Montreal.
12
For more information, cf. Perreault 2002 and Grieu 1998.
50 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

Post-war Generations in Quebec

In the 1990s, Lefebvre participated in an interdisciplinary study that
was at once sociological, theological, and pastoral; it assessed the socio-
religious profiles of different age groups—teenagers, young adults,
Baby Boomers, and seniors.13 Some common traits emerged.
Three ideological currents surfaced in the narratives of the respon-
dents—secular, spiritual/religious, and Christian—which corresponded
to those developed around the time of the Second World War. The
secular current designates not only the promotion of a rationality res-
olutely detached from religious consideration, but also—in the classic
sense of the term—the privatization of faith; a separation between reli-
gion and daily life; and the drawing of boundaries at the perimeter of all
things religious. The spiritual/religious current is at once characterized
by the Christian heritage and secular rationality: it consists of develop-
ing one’s own way of life; using faith as a reference; and a subjective
vision of faith. Several subjects preferred the term “spirituality” instead
of religion, the latter being associated with an ensemble of constraints.
Christian references—when they occurred—acted only as filigree; they
functioned as a historical-biographical marker—particularly for rites
of passage, a cultural marker among the more educated, and a moral
reference for respondents preoccupied by the loss of meaning. Only a
minority spoke consistently about the Christian faith.
As discussed, one of the primary interests of this study resided in
a comparison of the different age groups. Illuminating in this regard
was the concept of a sociological generation that exists as a certain col-
lective in a given epoch, beyond its internal diversity, though oriented
by the same main historical references.14 Since the 1920s, successive
cohorts have forwarded worldviews that differ most notably on the
place of religion. A significant fracture has been discerned between
generations born before and after 1940/42, and a second between
generations born before and after 1958/60. The people surveyed who

13
The research was of a narrative type, and nearly 300 interviews were completed
over a period of four years, from 1989 to 1993. It questioned the meaning that the
respondents search for and give to life. Spiritual issues were often correlated to chal-
lenges at various stages of life. Concurrently, the different sociological generations
emerged. Note, however, that ethno-religious minorities were not part of the study.
For more information, cf. Lefebvre 2000.
14
The comparative studies of the research team on the values of nine countries
from Western Europe observed a similar phenomenon, cf. Stoetzel et al. 1983.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 51

were born before 1940 were raised inside of Christianity and remained
influenced by the religion and by the values of stability and continu-
ity. The next generation—the Baby Boomers—experienced a rupture
as they encountered two contrasting cultural universes: that of Chris-
tianity that has valorized self-sacrifice, and the new universe of secu-
larity that preached individual autonomy and personal development.
Folks born after 1958 encountered neither the antecedents of the Quiet
Revolution nor the process of secularization. By this time, the children
of the Baby Boomers had arrived at the stage of youth over the course
of fifteen years, thus inducing other generational changes. They, in
effect, further accentuated the distance with respect to religious orga-
nizations. Let us explore some of these upheavals as displayed during
stages of youth, as was revealed at the end of the 1980s and the begin-
ning of the 1990s.
For adolescents (ages 12–20), religion has usually been culturally
linked to the family and has been expressed through the parents’
model. As adolescents grow older, however, and their search for
autonomy becomes more pronounced, the majority have rejected the
societal model that links religion, culture, and family. The following
three steps estimate their religious trajectory.
Twelve to 14-year-olds have increasingly viewed religious ideals
with skepticism as they have perceived contradictions in the behaviors
of their parents, teachers, and society against the religious teachings
they had learned during childhood. Recurring social problems such
as unemployment, poverty, pollution, and the threat of nuclear war
have created anxiety and diminished their confidence in adults. Some
researchers have observed that this stage is occurring even earlier.
Next, around the ages of 15 and 16, adolescents will have started to
place the onus on themselves. When asked about who or what they
believe in, many responded: “myself.” Beyond the clichéd expectations
that adolescents would be materialistic, hedonistic, narcissistic, refrac-
tory, and focused on their looks and pleasure seeking, they have never-
theless attempted to root themselves inside a rapidly changing society
while integrating their own metamorphoses. Their imaginations have
followed various playful and cognitive paths as they have been inun-
dated with media—films, role-playing, literature, etc. The interviews
also revealed their attraction for the paranormal.
In the latter years of adolescence (ages 17–20), an interior process
of questioning will have occurred to identify and structure certain fun-
damental questions about metaphysics—for example, the purpose and
52 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

meaning of life. Today, a general sense of fragility in relation to the

threat of nuclear war, pollution, the AIDS epidemic, etc. has accompa-
nied this interiority. With regard to larger lines of affiliation—politics,
traditions, religions, ideologies—older teens have generally been suspi-
cious; their reservations, however, have allowed certain openings. For
example, a minority have invested their time into political or religious
movements or events; others have devoted themselves to environmen-
tal or humanitarian causes. Rare instances of religious conversions can
occur at this stage, or just afterwards, as a resolution for some of the
most thrumming questions. The majority have expressed the desire to
have a role in the world while succeeding in romantic pairings and
family life.
As evidenced by music videos, mystery games, and gang rituals,
many adolescents have been obsessed with the themes of death and
suffering. They have multitudinously expressed, via any number of
symbols, that life is essential and that death is frightening. Everyday,
they have been surrounded by media that have discussed war, geno-
cide, AIDS, natural disasters, suicide, and euthanasia.
After experiencing this inner turmoil ushered by values, contra-
dictory opinions, a hodgepodge of experiences, and spiritual reflec-
tion, young adults (ages 20–35) will have embarked on a variety of
journeys. Throughout the interviews, they often expressed their quest
for guidance, balance, and wisdom. They remained more sensitive to
faith—read confidence—in life, though their socioeconomic situations
were generally precarious. One respondent claimed to be uncertain as
to the meaning of faith, but remained confident that he could “move
mountains.” Many expressed the desire to demarcate themselves from
the norms of the previous generation. One respondent mentioned that
she has “left the door open”—she might return to her roots one day,
but she does not want to feel limited. Having matured in a climate
of planetary crisis, their beliefs have developed in relation to tangible
aspects of life.
Young adults have generally organized their faith around positive
references while ignoring the more tragic aspects of existence. The
following examples of diction often cascaded as indicators: harmony;
being OK with oneself; the natural order; self-confidence; quality of
life; energy; the essential; respect; hope; etc. The conflictual aspects
of life and death were often negated, for example, “the universe puts
everything into order,” “I don’t want to hear about death,” “Suffer-
ing has no meaning,” “Evil is an old meaningless idea. It’s about your
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 53

karma.” Young adults typically drew from certain schools of spiritual

thought to formulate their utopian conceptions about humanity, his-
tory, and the Absolute.
For many, referencing God contradicted the quest for happiness
and autonomy. No longer a personal God, divinity had become an
anonymous “force,” working discretely to organize history. For most,
a certain autonomy of critical thinking on religion interrupted their
gathering of faith. They repudiated the notion of a God to which
humanity is solely dependant. Some expressed interest in spiritual
growth; they believed that God escorts their futures. The transmis-
sion of religious beliefs preoccupied, to a greater extent, those with
children.
Even if these results were obtained years ago, most of the material
issuing from the qualitative interviews done since then have shown
comparable elements. The stage of life; the relationship with the fam-
ily; the quest for autonomy; and mass culture all seem to primarily
shape their universe of beliefs and their conception of divinity. As
Bibby’s recent book shows, there is an even more radical individu-
alization to religion emerging with the Millennials, making dynamic
religious choices even stronger. Nevertheless, the intergenerational
influence is still strong and the dynamic of religious choice itself is
being transmitted as a possibility in some families. In Europe, the
concept of de-traditionalisation has been employed to describe this
religious context defined by choice. The parents of very young chil-
dren have been increasingly postponing religious instruction until the
children become old enough—for example, during adolescence—to
decide for themselves whether they desire this type of education
(Boeve 2004).
Since 2000, as mentioned, the public school system has also been
secularized. In both public and private schools, confessional and moral
education (Catholic, Protestant, or neutral) were replaced, in Septem-
ber 2008, by a new ethics and religious culture program—the theme
of which consists of the art of living together while respecting our
differences. Clearly, Quebec has attempted to re-piece the fragmented
gods into a sort of glocal mosaic. In the future, verifying the conse-
quences of a religious pluralist education on children and adolescents
should prove compelling. Even if the program insists on Christianity
as a historical and patrimonial reference in the culture, it also teaches
fundamental elements of Judaism, indigenous spiritualities, Buddhism,
Hinduism, and secular conceptions of life.
54 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

What Do You Believe In?

Lemieux and Milot’s 1992 sociological study on “beliefs” eschewed the
question of fundamental beliefs and focused on those that exist in an
imaginary space that surpasses rationality and logic. The basic line of
inquiry asked: What do you believe in? What do the others around
you believe in? (Lemieux and Milot 1992: 60). From here, the study
ascertained that the beliefs of others hold neither authority nor coher-
ence in relation to one’s own, suggesting that beliefs are not neces-
sarily related to outside opinions. Moreover, the boundary between
disbelief and belief has been pushed outward to include a plurality of
beliefs, ones that are foremost sociological and anthropological before
imbibing religious meaning. Rather than functioning as mobilizing or
sources of engagement, these beliefs represented a pure discourse on
the imaginative universe of identity.
Lemieux has discussed the interactions between pre-modern, modern,
and post-modern religious life in Quebec.15 For him, the grand pre-mod-
ern narrative would survive alongside a religious modernity founded on
the functionality of beliefs, but in the context of religious post-modernity
composed of mass culture that exacerbates a subjectivity on the con-
stant quest for satisfactions; the proliferation of “mini-narratives;” and
the surpassing of the opposition between, on the one hand, modernity
and religion and, on the other, reason and belief.16
Towards a clearer vision, the researchers distributed the statements
on belief into signifying categories: traditional religion, i.e. Catholi-
cism, at 46 percent, the cosmos (25 percent), myself (18 percent), and
social life (11 percent). To define their beliefs, the respondents tended
to resort to one of three statement types: “It’s useful,” “I’ve experi-
enced it,” “It makes good sense.” Beliefs were of a functional and affec-
tive order, rather than rational. They could also simultaneously draw
from different vernacular referents, for example, if the religious pole

15
These three periods correspond to tradition, secularization, and spiritual plural-
ism respectively. For more on religious post-modernity in Quebec, cf. Jeffrey 1998.
16
Some years later, in a reflection on Catholicism in Quebec, Lemieux and Mont-
miny observed not the disappearance of the religion, but rather that its marginalization
though certain vital locations continued to thrive. They revised the expression popular-
ized by Bibby, “religion à la carte,” included in the 1992 survey, to the now preferred
expression “itinerary of meaning.” For them, beliefs could not be categorized through
the same logic as the market; rather, they represented an itinerant dynamic within the
loss of community and memory. For more, cf. Lemieux and Montminy 2000.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 55

attracted the majority of statements, the representative universes of

the interviewees were not necessarily of the same order. For example,
God and the angels could be defined as pure energy or Mass as a place
where positive energies are united. In other words, the respondents
were refashioning traditional elements of religion in a cosmic mould,
thus indicating a general distancing from the traditional precepts of
Catholicism, especially among youths.

A Sociocultural Reading of Youth and Religion in Quebec

A recent collection of research on youth and religion in Quebec
(Gauthier and Perreault 2008) provides additional perspective. In this
compendium, Lemieux has defined youth not as an age range, but
rather a mental state in search of meaning; youth is surpassed for indi-
viduals when they have developed the capacity to forego their instinc-
tual reactions in the search for meaning and channel this impulse into
a constructive act of intersubjectivity (Lemieux 2008: 40). Meunier has
confirmed Bibby’s finding that the young adults of the current genera-
tion—though the very idea of a “generation” may indeed be a myth—
have reflected the religious mores of the Baby Boomers, as transmitted
via the values of their parents, mass media, and the culture of con-
sumption (Meunier 2008: 44, 55). In light of this finding, Meunier has
discussed the possibility that intergenerational conflict may only be
a fiction propagated by identity-makers who wish to express dissent
(Meunier 2008: 46). Meunier has also drawn an intriguing parallel,
respectively comparing the dichotomous relationships with religion
between Anglophone and Francophone Quebecers to the larger trends
occurring in the United States, where weekly religious attendance
reached 43% in 1999, and France, where in 2001, for the first time,
the proportion of young adults who declared No Religion eclipsed that
of any religious denomination (Meunier 2008: 47–8).
Next, Martel-Reny has, like Bibby, also discovered that when pre-
sented with stimulating questions that do not impose a certain a priori
world view, youth have generally been frank and open about questions
on meaning and are also willing to learn about other world views (Mar-
tel-Reny 2008: 68). For socially withdrawn youth, Vultur and Paquette
have determined that religion occupies three functions: a response to a
situation of personal distress, an axis of self-identification, and a cre-
ative motor. Religion has functioned paradoxically for social dropouts
as at once a way to contest aspects of traditional and contemporary
56 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

society, yet also as a means to become more integrated within it by

becoming an individual consumer in the market logic of symbolic
goods (Vultur and Paquette 2008). In this vein, some non-traditional
venues have become sites of religiosity, for example, where martial
arts are practiced (LaRochelle 2008) and sub-cultural music venues
and events which despite their pretence of autonomy, subversion, and
marginality nonetheless engage in a type of religious system where the
culture becomes totalized and the adherents collectively allotted places
in the social order (Gauthier 2008). As religion has moved into the
heart of social life, organized religions have continually been pushed
to the margins. Yet, in the case of young Catholics—who understand
that they are in the margins—after taking a census of over 60 youth
groups and organizations in Montreal and Quebec, Perreault has con-
cluded that they have become mobilized by their faith and represent a
paradoxical vitality, or a fervent minority (Perreault 2008: 123–34).

Methodological Challenges

Religion and spirituality remain difficult entities to comprehend and

the research tools—interviews and questionnaires—have often proven
insufficient toward capturing all of their diverse manifestations. Are
they even adequate as revealers of the larger tendencies?17 As it stands,
these methods certainly reflect spontaneous or ephemeral occurrences
with difficulty.18 Beyond the classical indicators of religiosity (religious
practice, rites of passage), religion and spirituality are increasingly
revealed through various complex and novel ways.
Take, for example, the spontaneous demonstration in the wake of
the carnage perpetrated by a disturbed killer at the Polytechnic of

17
Khosrokhavar has addressed this methodological difficulty. For example, French
statistics have indicated a widespread secularization of Muslims. However pertinent
the statistics are, this approach cannot adequately represent minority phenomena that
may nevertheless bear social significance, such as the progress of Islam in the suburbs,
cities, or Muslim youth groups that are searching for social visibility. For more infor-
mation, cf. Khosrokhavar 1997.
18
Measuring the relative weight of an event proves difficult. In his essay on the
religion of young Catholics in France, Hébrard has rhetorically asked if one week with
the JMJ with 5 or 10 percent of a given age group would be a superior indication of
youth trends than a survey executed over ten years with a sampling of millions of
people. She has concluded that in sociological research, the subtle evolutions are best
revealed through symbolic events. For more, cf. Hébrard 1998.
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 57

Montreal on December 6th, 1989. To mourn their fourteen colleagues,

hundreds of students united on campus the next day and proceeded
to invent rituals.19 They cut fresh flowers and laid them in the snow,
lit candles, and then walked in procession to St. Joseph’s Oratory, a
Catholic landmark jutting from the mountain and in close proximity
to the university. A multi-ethnic, multi-religious group, they prayed
together in silence. After the testimonies, a lone voice sang the Our
Father, a priest chanted “Je verrai la bonté du Seigneur sur la Terre des
vivants,”20 and someone expressed the wish that the killer would one
day find himself in front of God.21 In short, this grave event sparked
the creation of a spontaneous religious ceremony. In addition to psy-
chologists, the Polytechnic requested a pastoral interreligious team
capable to respond to critical situations.
Next, suicides and accidental deaths have frequently been accompa-
nied by similar gatherings, supported by psychologists and community
or spiritual leaders.22 The latter have noted that adolescents usually cre-
ate their own rituals after the death of a peer: they often light candles,
put themselves into a circle, and recount stories about their deceased
friend.23 Sickness and death have often catalyzed demonstrations
of popular religiosity even among the most secularized individuals,
sometimes even in traditional forms once thought obsolete: pilgrim-
ages, novenas, rosaries, etc.24 During the Le Grand Reliquaire de Sainte
Thérèse de L’Enfant-Jésus exposition in Canada in 2001, nearly two
million people displaced themselves to visit the various relevant sites,
among which were entire families and many youths.25
Another difficulty in assessing spirituality and religious adherence
lies in the fact that for most people, at least in Quebec, these dimensions

19
For another example, cf. Davie 1993. Davie reports on the religious demonstra-
tions of a number of religious youth following the deaths of about a hundred soccer
fans, the subsequent creation of individual and communal rites, and the resulting
juxtaposition of traditional religion and sports.
20
I will see the goodness of the Lord in the Land of the living.
21
See, for example, Jules Béliveau, “La gent étudiante se regroupe dans la tristesse
et la réflexion”, La Presse, December 8, 1989.
22
As of 2000, non-confessional services have come to replace pastoral animation in
Quebec’s public schools. For more information, cf. Perreault 2002 and Grieu 1998.
23
These findings were collected from spiritual animators in the context of their
annual provincial conference, June 15–17, 2005.
24
The classifieds in large dailies have usually contained some “thanks” for granted
prayers or recommendations for prayers to obtain these favours.
25
Much of the ecclesial milieu that participated expressed their astonishment at
such a successful event, cf. Gauthier 2005 for testimonies.
58 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

of existence have been either strictly private, expressed discretely, or

never verbally formulated. A study conducted on young Catholic par-
ents who desired to have their baby baptized has reflected a marked
difference in the verbal responses obtained through conversations
and public expressions during sessions, and the written responses
obtained via questionnaires (Rivard 2004). Baptismal preparation usu-
ally involves a group of parents gathered around an animator who
mediates exchanges. A student who had been animating such events
for several years conducted the research. In light of his initial observa-
tions, he hypothesized a religious deculturation among young adults.
To advance his research, he designed semi-directive questionnaires to
which the participants provided written responses. To his surprise,
the sampling demonstrated a rather coherent biblical and theological
knowledge. Yet another intriguing observation: the major motivation
for baptism among young Catholic parents was the desire to belong to
a community, something rather at odds with the dominant theory of
the individualization of religion. The community has been perceived
as the larger family to which the child belongs, though regular atten-
dance has not been deemed a mandatory condition for belonging.
In regard to youth from ethnic or religious minorities or immigrant
groups, the research has been quite diversified. Currently, scattered
tensions persist in regard to students’ demands for the right to wear
religious symbols such as the kippah, the kirpan, or the hijab; when cit-
izens wish to establish a prayer centre in a particular location; or when
they deviate from the norms of the host society, for example, swim-
ming fully clothed or respecting their religious calendar. Sometimes
citizens who have felt slighted appeal to the Commission des Droits
de la Personne du Québec.26 In accordance with ethnic membership,
religion has held a variable place inside mentalities, but a majority of
minority people have integrated themselves into the Quebecois com-
munity, characterized by a certain discretion regarding religions. In
many communities, adolescents have avoided regular practice, while
others—converted or not—have resolutely affirmed their identity and
their religious convictions, notably through the wearing of religious
symbols and participation in religious associations.27 In certain cases,

26
For more information, cf. CAR 2003, Bourgeault et al. 1995, and McAndrew 2002.
27
LeGall, alongside numerous researchers on ethnicity, has approached the ques-
tion under the rubric of identification dynamics. The hijab, for example, can signify
 youth, spirituality, and religion in canada and quebec 59

an ethnicization of religion has also been observed.28 Certain families

have encountered serious conflicts of value with the host society as
they have strongly affirmed their convictions and religious practices.

Conclusion

Globally, Bibby has revealed that religious affiliations experience little

mobility regardless of the group. Spiritual beliefs have typically been
colored by ideas about the supernatural and have been more prevalent
among teenagers and young adults. Bibby has also somewhat surpris-
ingly discovered a strong moral vision, especially among teens. On
the whole, the frequency of formal religious practice has declined as
religion has become an increasingly individual affair; where devout
organized practice remains, however, an increase in attendance has
been noted. Nonetheless, for the emerging millennial generation, reli-
gion has become evermore optional and subjective.
The research conducted at the Université de Montréal has demon-
strated significant changes in intergenerational transmission, in many
ways accounting for the crisis of belief. From Europe to Canada, since
the Second World War, youth have inherited a critical and distanced
relationship with organized religion. Nevertheless, religion has mani-
fested through an infinitude of visages in the secular age of new media:
the words used to describe mystical and religious experiences now
tend to emanate from cultural references. The research of Lemieux and
Milot has demonstrated that beliefs, no longer static or dogmatic, are
in a constant state of flux and are accepted in a provisional manner—
that is until something more relevant arises. This individualistic atti-
tude has thus contributed to the disintegration of communities, the
erasure of mediation that link subject to imagination, and, finally, a
rupture between speech and action.
Beyond the surveys, statistics, and analyses, however, religiosity and
religion have continued to manifest in society in spontaneous and
ephemeral manners, sometimes too subtle to be accounted for through

the non-denial of identity and a defiance to discrimination. For more information,

cf. LeGall 2003.
28
This ethnicization places religion in the cultural sphere such that the religion’s
primary purpose is no longer to represent a heteronomous system, but more so a
dimension of cultural identity. For more information, cf. Eid 2003.
60 solange lefebvre and k. gandhar chakravarty

sociological research. At the horizon of this sociological reading, a heavy

tendency has remained since the Second World War to approach reli-
gion in a linear and teleological manner. As evidenced in the case of the
spontaneous religious demonstrations of mourning undertaken by stu-
dents, an approach that accounts notably for causes would certainly be
useful. Elbaz has concluded that the social sciences have followed a neo-
evolutionist path, one that has envisaged history as a linear route from
tradition to modernity and that postmodernism consists of the obfusca-
tion of these boundaries of continuity and transmission (Elbaz 1996). If
we consider the growth of youth adherence in conservative Protestant
groups, however, we are suddenly discussing patches of tradition within
the quilt of post-modernity.
The future consists of regarding “religion” as a path of commitment
(Lefebvre 2008). Contemporary sociological approaches typically distin-
guish between spirituality and religion while insisting on the institutional
dimensions and constraints that characterize the latter. We propose
defining spirituality as a relativistic, individual quest and religion—at its
best—as a voluntarily chosen route embarked upon by individuals that
has replaced the undertaking of a well-defined spiritual road, i.e. religion,
via a relativistic attitude that privileges no one way to garner meaning
from life; glimpse transcendence; or understand the divine. How these
poles will coincide—and intertwine—shall prove of great relevance in
the years to come.

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 BRAZILIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND RELIGION

Ari Pedro Oro and Mauro Meirelles

Introduction

The overall goal of this paper is to analyze Brazilian university stu-

dents’ contemporary religious practices and representations. More
specifically, it aims at understanding the role played by religion in the
representation systems and daily lives of students majoring in two dif-
ferent fields from various public and private universities in three Bra-
zilian metropolises.
These fields are Social Sciences and Medicine, and data covered were
gathered in research carried out between 2004 and 2005. This research
also probed other disciplinary fields such as the exact sciences, but
the two abovementioned academic segments stood out: one (Social
Sciences) for its greater distancing from religion and the other (Medi-
cine) for its greater closeness to it. Therefore, this analysis follows up
on a more extensive one (Oro, 2004), and is limited to the religious
behavior of university students from these two fields.
This research was carried out in the Brazilian metropolises of Porto
Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, and São Luís do Maranhão, respectively located
in Brazil’s southern, southeastern and northern regions.1 Altogether,
students from four public and six private universities were selected.2
No special reason undergirds the choice of these cities and institu-
tions, besides their regional importance and convenience.

1
This research was supported by the Fondazione Cassamarca, from Treviso, Italy,
as part of the Latin Brazil Program. Fieldwork was done by means of collaboration
among the following professors: Maria das Dores Machado, in Rio de Janeiro; Sergio
Figueiredo Ferretti, in São Luís, Maranhão; and Ari Pedro Oro, in Porto Alegre.
2
Research was carried out in the following public universities: Federal University
of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), in Porto Alegre; Federal University of Maranhão
(UFMA), in São Luís; Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), and Rio de Janeiro
State University (UERJ), in Rio de Janeiro. Private universities researched were: Cath-
olic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUC/RS), in Porto Alegre; São Luís University
Center, in São Luís; and the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC/RJ), Estácio
de Sá, Souza Marques, and Gama Filho, all in Rio de Janeiro.
66 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

Three variables were therefore contemplated in our research and

analysis: disciplinary field (Medicine and Social Sciences), geographic
location (Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, and São Luís), and the kind of
university (public or private).
In methodological terms, the same quantitative and qualitative
research tools were applied in all three cities: a survey questionnaire,
followed by a set of interviews.3 Ninety three Medicine and 96 Social
Sciences students answered the questionnaire. Of the 189 total, 94 were
students from public universities, and 95 from private institutions.
They were evenly distributed across the three cities (Porto Alegre:
61 students; São Luís: 64 students; Rio de Janeiro: 64 students), as well
as across all college years, in both majors. Likewise, fourteen students
were interviewed, 7 from each disciplinary field.
Research in the three cities sought to probe further into three issues:
student participation in religious rituals, their level of religious belief,
and circumstances in which they appealed to religion.
Our aim was to unveil the logic behind the two university segments’
sharply different stances towards the religious. Particularly, we sought
to understand their degree of commitment to a certain ideal of moder-
nity, relatively widespread in society, which builds on rationality,
science and technique as conditions for human ‘development.’ This
ideal simultaneously assumes, and even heralds, the receding of reli-
gious values from society, as well as the shrinking of religion’s social
legitimacy.
Before accessing these research data, let us better frame our theo-
retical assumptions.

Religion and Modernity

According to D. Hervieu-Léger, modernity is characterized by three

elements directly or indirectly associated with the social and cultural
withering of religion. The first is the connection between modernity
and rationality, or the imperious search for a coherent adaptation
between means and ends, one of the consequences of which is to dispel
the ignorance at the root of “irrational” behavior and beliefs. From this

3
Data gathering was carried out in two phases. The first, quantitative, involved the
application of a 36-question questionnaire. The second, qualitative, involved inter-
views including 10 semi-directed questions.
 brazilian university students and religion 67

perspective, rationalization rests on the development of science and

technique as conditions for global human progress. However, in this
case, argues the author, “rationality far from imposes itself uniformly
on all aspects of social life, and we are, in many respects, more aware
of it than ever before”4 (Hervieu-Léger, 1999:30). A similar statement
had been made a few years before by Jean Séguy, who stressed that
modernity does know thresholds, since it does not have equal impact
upon society, and may contradict itself in various ways. The plural,
asserts this author, is the stamp of modernity (Séguy, 1989).
The second element underscores that from this dream of rationaliza-
tion results a particular kind of relationship with the world epitomized
by a “fundamental affirmation: that of the autonomy of the individual
subject, capable of ‘making’ the world in which he lives and of him-
self constructing the meanings that give sense to his own existence”5
(Hervieu-Léger, 1999:30–31). Man as legislator of his own life seeks to
draw a line—according to the author, an inconsistent one—between
himself and tradition, where one supposedly lives under the empire of
“irrational” beliefs.
The third trait points towards modernity as a form of social organi-
zation marked by the differentiation of institutions and the specializa-
tion of various domains of social activity. In it, all spheres—economy,
science, esthetics, politics, the legal system, and so forth—would oper-
ate according to their own logic, as well as autonomously vis-à-vis
religious tradition.
Such emancipation process is commonly referred to as “secularization,”
and implies that social life is no longer, or is increasingly less, subject to
rules established by a religious institution. Religion has ceased to provide
individuals and groups with the ensemble of references, norms, values
and symbols with which to give sense to their lives and experiences. In
modernity, religious tradition is no longer a meaningful code imposed
on all6 (id. Ibid., pp. 32–33).

4
“. . . la rationalité est loin de l’imposer uniformément dans tous les registres de la
vie sociale et nous en sommes, à bien des égards, plus conscients que jamais”.
5
“. . . affirmation fondamentale: celle de l’autonomie de l’invididu-sujet, capable de
“faire” le monde dans lequel il vit et de construire lui-même les significations qui
donnent un sens à sa propre existence”.
6
“. . . implique que la vie sociale n’est plus, ou de moins en moins, soumise à des
règles édictées par une institution religieuse. La religion cesse de fournir aux individus
et aux groupes l’ensemble des références, des normes, des valeurs et des symboles qui
leur permettent de donner un sens à leur vie et à leurs expériences. Dans la modernité,
la tradition religieuse ne constitue plus un code de sens qui s’impose à tous”.
68 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

This perception of secularization as the autonomization of social

spheres and subjectification of beliefs—both movements taking place
in the context of state deregulation of the religious sphere—is enter-
tained, among others, by Bryan Wilson, Peter Berger, and Sabino
Acquaviva.
Indeed, according to B. Wilson, secularization is a “process by which
religious thinking, practices and institutions lose their significance
for the operation of the social system” (Wilson, 1998, p. 49). It is
above all in the fields of politics and social and techno-scientific behav-
ior that such process appears as irreversible—although not homoge-
neous—and impacts the organization of modern society’s collective
mentality and culture. P. Berger also sets forth the idea that secular-
ization “is the process through which sectors in society and culture
are subtracted from domination by religious institutions and symbols”
(Berger, 1985). For S. Aquaviva, secularization is about the recoil of
sacred values, myths and rituals in the industrialized West, something
which could be noted both from a statistic and an informative stand-
point (Aquaviva, 1961).
Marcel Gauchet may be seen as a current, sophisticated manifesta-
tion of this perspective on secularization. In two occasions, he wrote:
“We live today in an atheist society made up of and governed by a
majority of believers” (Gauchet, 1985, p. 112);
Not one of us can any longer conceive of our self, as a citizen, as com-
manded by the beyond. The City of man is the work of man, to the point
that it is henceforth impious, even for the most zealous of believers, to
mingle the idea of God to the order that binds us and to the disorders
that divide us. In one word, we have become metaphysically democratic7
(Gauchet, 1998, p. 8).
However, as D. Hervieu-Léger ponders, relations between religion
and modernity are, in fact, far more complicated than they seem. For
her, religion and modernity do not exclude one another; rather, they
entertain a complex and tense combination. This stems from the fact
that in the West, modernity sprang from within the religious view,
and walked away from it in order to achieve its autonomy. In other

7
“Nul parmi nous ne peut plus se concevoir, en tant que citoyen, commandé par
l’au-delà. La Cité de l’homme est œuvre de l’homme, à tel point que c’est impiété,
désormais, aux yeux du croyant le plus zélé de nos contrées, que de mêler l’idée de
Dieu à l’ordre qui nous lie et aux désordres qui nous divisent. Nous sommes devenus,
en un mot, métaphysiquement démocrates.”
 brazilian university students and religion 69

words, in modern societies “secular” history had been long thought of

in terms of the Kingdom Advent model. Therefore, modernity means
both rupture and continuity with the Judeo-Christian tradition. The
failures of reason and science notwithstanding, modernity continues
to nourish the dream of appropriately fulfilling the religious utopia,
projecting and promising, through various secular guises, a world of
abundance and happiness. Thus, its contradictions lay, on the one
hand, in the utopian aspirations modernity itself has engendered (and
which are always reinforced as science and technique advance), and,
on the other, in its inability to carry over a relation with the religious
universe of past societies (Hervieu-Léger, 1987).
D. Hervieu-Léger deploys the term secularization to express all this
complex process encompassing the relations between religion and
modernity. For her, secularization does not mean the absence or loss
of religion in modernity, as noted above, but refers to
the processes of reconfiguration of beliefs produced in a society whose
drive is the discontent with the expectations it arouses, and whose quo-
tidian condition is incertitude about the endless search for means to
satisfy them8 (Hervieu-Léger, 1999:42).
This perspective draws, to some extent, on the idea put forth by Jean
Séguy, according to which
modern rationality and its numerous, pregnant and omnipresent con-
sequences have played a major role in the phenomenon of religious
recession particularly visible in the West, where it has been under way
for centuries. But the phenomenon is not without limits: scientific and
technical rationality leaves room—not always and only interstitially—
for incertitude and fantasy (would scientific hypothesis be possible oth-
erwise?). Moreover, modern rationality carries, either in itself or in its
consequences, its own capacity for mythical and ritual inspiration (. . .),
a paradoxal capacity which deserves further scrutiny9 (Séguy, 1984,
p. 328).

8
“l’ensemble des processus de réaménagements des croyances qui se produisent
dans une société dont le moteur est l’inassouvissement des attentes qu’elle suscite,
et dont la condition quotidienne est l’incertitude liée à la recherche interminable des
moyens de les satisfaire”.
9
“. . . la rationalité moderne et ses conséquences, nombreuses, prégnantes, omni-
présentes ont bien joué un rôle capital dans le phénomène de récession religieuse
particulièrement visible en Occident, où il est en marche depuis des siècles. Mais le
phénomène ne va pas sans limites: la rationalité scientifique et technique laisse libre
un espace—pas toujours et seulement intersticiel—pour l’incertitude et le rêve (l’hy-
pothèse scientifique serait-elle possible autrement?); elle possède, de plus, soit en elle
70 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

According to this view, rationality and religiosity are two elements

which are structurally constitutive of socio-historical processes. They
would operate synchronously, contaminating each other, at times
more, at times less, according to the historical moment and to the
empirical finding that
times of economic prosperity and the corresponding scientific and tech-
nical development certainly favor the receding of the religious (. . .). On
the other hand, moments of crisis—global, economic, political, cultural,
and so forth—divest rationality, science, and technique of their aura
of necessity. By the same token, irrational speculations and repressed
knowledges gain importance, coming back with a vengeance10 (Séguy,
1984, p. 328).
Following Hervieu-Léger’s and Séguy’s thread, Pierre Sanchis high-
lights that secularization and re-enchantment cannot be seen as “two
opposite dynamics . . .” For him, “the apparently contrary movements
that imprint disenchantment and re-enchantment to contemporary
forms of the religious are intrinsically articulated . . .” (Sanchis, 2001,
pp. 41–42). Thus, according to this author, religious disenchantment
may be articulated and intermingled with religious re-enchantment.
These considerations were beacons for the analysis of data collected
in the field. Therefore, our research tools first attempted at capturing
the frequency of religious practice among the abovementioned Brazil-
ian university students.

Religious Practice

Firstly, data for religious belonging were shown as follows: 63% of stu-
dents declared themselves as Catholics; 20.6%, as non-religious; 8.4%,
as followers of Spiritism;11 5.8% as members of historical Evangelical

soit dans ses conséquences, une capacité propre d’inspiration mythique et rituelle (. . .)
capacité paradoxale dont l’étude reste à entreprendre.”
10
“. . . les époques de prospérité économique et de développement scientifique et
technique concomitant favorisent, certes, la récession du religieux [. . .]; par contre,
les périodes de crise globale, économique, politique, culturelle, etc. dénudent la ratio-
nalité, la science, la technique de leur aura de nécessité; alors prennent importance et
revanche les spéculations irrationennelles, les savoirs refoulés”.
11
Known in Brazil as Espiritismo, it was founded by the French thinker Allan
Kardec—thus its common name, Kardecist Spiritism. Its origins can be traced back
to 1857, when Kardec published the “Book of Spirits”. Spiritism was first introduced
in Brazil during the second half of the nineteenth century, and its wide acceptance
 brazilian university students and religion 71

churches;12 and finally, 2.1% as followers of Pentecostalism.13 None of

them declared membership in so-called Afro-Brazilian religions (Can-
domblé, Umbanda, Quimbanda), nor in other religions such as those
of Eastern origin.
The percentages obtained from university students can be contrasted
to Brazilian religious reality writ large as captured by a national census
survey carried out in 2000.14

Table 1. Religious Belonging among University Students and in Brazil

Religion Students (%) Brazil (%)
Catholic 63 73.6
Historical Evangelic 5.8 4.2
Pentecostal Evangelic 2.1 11.2
Kardecist Spiritism 8.4 1.3
No Religion 20.4 7.3
Other 0 2.4

in the country lasts till this day. Today, according to Emerson Giumbelli, “Official
statistics and other estimates indicate that there are between 2 and 4 million followers
of Spiritism in Brazil, clustered around thousands of cult centers. These figures do not
consider other millions of people who, even without declaring themselves as followers
of Spiritism, nonetheless take part in some of its practices.” (Giumbelli, 1997:15)
12
This term includes churches like Lutheran, Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, and
Seventh-Day Adventist.
13
Brazilian Pentecostalism is usually approached by means of the “three waves”
metaphor. The first wave covers the period between 1910 and 1950, and shows an
emphasis on glossolalia and Holy Ghost baptism. Churches representative of this
moment include the Brazilian Christian Congregation, founded in 1910 by Luigi
Francescon in São Paulo; the Assembly of God, founded in 1911 by Daniel Berg and
Gunnar Winter in Belém (Pará State); and the Foursquare Gospel Church, founded
in Canada and introduced in Brazil between the 1930’s and 50’s. The second wave
spans from 1950 until 1970, and it stresses divine healing. The foremost churches in
Brazil at this moment were Brazil for Christ, founded in 1956 by Manuel de Melo; and
God is Love, founded by David Miranda in 1962. The third wave, also known as Neo-
Pentecostal, began in the 1970’s and lasts until today. Its emphasis is on exorcism, a
theology of prosperity, and participation in politics, media, and the liberalization of
customs. Churches most representative of the Pentecostal profile are the Universal
Church of the Kingdom of God, the International Church of the Grace of God, and
Reborn in Christ.
There is obviously no clear-cut frontier between the three waves. But they do not
entirely overlap either: as Freston (1994) has noted, Brazilian Pentecostalism is pre-
cisely characterized by the interplay of styles stemming from all three waves.
14
A comprehensive national census is carried out every ten years by the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
72 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

It is noted that Catholicism and Pentecostalism are less represented

in universities than in the general population—besides, of course, the
aforementioned “other” religions, such as Afro-Brazilian and Eastern.
On the other hand, historical Protestantism and Kardecist Spiritism are
met with greater receptivity among university students as compared to
the Brazilian population at large. These findings resonate with these
religions’ prevalent social profile in Brazil. That is, while Pentecostal-
ism tends to spread in lower social strata, historical Protestantism and
Spiritism are better received among middle strata. Some authors argue
that Spiritism’s preferential clientele is indeed the urban, schooled
middle classes (Pierucci and Prandi, 1996; Giumbelli, 1995; Lewgoy,
2001). Catholicism, on its turn, crosscuts society as a whole. Finally, it
is noted that the percentage of students declaring to have “no religion”
is almost three times the average of Brazilian society. As will be seen
below, in both social groups it is less the case of individuals lacking
religious beliefs and values than individuals holding no institutional
religious attachment.
A second aspect of the field research was university students’ reli-
gious practice. By religious practice we mean their participation in
cults, masses, sacraments, sessions, meetings—in sum, religious ritu-
als. We clustered answers around three possibilities: somewhat assidu-
ous religious practice (daily, weekly, and monthly), sporadic religious
practice (annually or rarely), and no religious practice.
In our sample of university students, the third alternative was
salient: 39.2% declared they never take part in religious rituals, 35.4%
that they do it with some regularity, and 25.4% that they do it only
sporadically.15
Here are some of the statements students presented as justifications
for their lack of religious participation: “There is no need to participate
because religion is within each of us”; “It is not the frequency with
which one attends religious rituals that makes someone more religious
than others, but that in which one believes”; “One does not need to be
in church all the time in order to follow religious principles. You can
be a religious person without participating in all churches’ religious

15
The reader familiar with the Social Sciences literature on established religions
in Brazil will note that a very common situation will not be approached here, that of
double or even multiple religious participation. This entails some transit across the
different religious forms making up Brazilian religious pluralism.
 brazilian university students and religion 73

rituals”; “Religion is an individual matter. One can be religious with-

out being attached to a religious institution”.
If figures above are disaggregated, a difference is noted among Social
Sciences and Medicine students: while among the former the lack of
religious attendance predominated (45.8%), among the latter assidu-
ous religious participation prevailed in 37.5% of all cases.16
Therefore, it was found that almost half the Social Sciences students
declared that they never attend religious rituals, one third that they
participate up to once a month (33.3%), and one fifth that they partici-
pate only sporadically (20.8%). In Medical School, on the other hand,
more than one third of students declared they participate up to once a
month, and the other two thirds are evenly divided among those who
do not practice a religion, and those who do so only sporadically.
Another finding worth remarking is the distribution of students
across public and private universities. In this case, the highest rates of
students who declared to never attend religious rituals refer to public
universities (23.3%), versus 15.9% in private universities (39.2% of the
total). Twenty seven point seven percent of Social Sciences students
and 19.1% of Medicine students in public universities declared they
did not participate in rituals, in contrast with 18.9% of Social Sciences
students and 12.6% of Medicine students in private universities. Stu-
dents who declared participation with some frequency were evenly
distributed: around 18% of Social Sciences students in private univer-
sities, and of Medicine students in both private and public universities.
Again, those with the lowest rate (14.9%) are Social Sciences students
from public universities.
Graph 1 shows the geographic breakdown of students’ religious
practices.

16
These figures are only partially similar to those found by another research car-
ried out in 1999 and 2000 on the religious practice of Social Sciences students in six
Brazilian universities. According to it, frequent (weekly or monthly) participation of
students in religious meetings and activities amounted to 43.5%, and annual or even-
tual participation to 50.6%, of all cases.
These six Brazilian universities were: Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Fed-
eral University of Minas Gerais, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Federal Univer-
sity of Rio de Janeiro, Vale dos Sinos University, and the Catholic University of Rio
Grande do Sul. The results of this survey were presented in the second issue of Debates
do NER, a journal published by the Nucleus of Religious Studies (NER) of the Gradu-
ate Program in Social Anthropology of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
(Steil et alii, 2001, p. 25).
74 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

Graph 1. Religious Meetings Attendance

Percentage Frequency (%)
70
64,1
60

50
50

39,3 37,7
40 Regular attendance
34,4
32,8 Sporadic attendance
30 No attendance
25,6
23
20

10
3,1
0
PORTO ALEGRE SÃO LUÍS RIO DE JANEIRO

Source: Fondazione Cassamarca Research, 2003 (N=189)

The graph shows that the largest number of students who do not attend
rituals is from Rio de Janeiro (64.1%), followed by Porto Alegre (37.7%),
and São Luís (25.6%). Conversely, students who declared attendance to
rituals with some regularity, are mostly from São Luís (50.0%), followed
by those from Rio de Janeiro (32.8%) and Porto Alegre (23.0%).
These data can be further broken down as follows: no Social Sciences
student, in all three cities, declared to participate in religious cults on
a daily basis. In the southern city of Porto Alegre, no Social Sciences
student in either private or public universities declared weekly atten-
dance of religious rituals.
Summing up what was seen in this section: Social Sciences students
are indeed less participative in religious rituals than their Medical
School counterparts. Moreover, both Social Sciences and Medicine
students in public universities attend less. In regional terms, religious
attendance decreases as we move from Rio de Janeiro, in the Brazilian
southeast, to Porto Alegre, in the south, to São Luís, in the north.

What do Social Sciences and Medicine Students Believe In?

In order to unravel what students contacted by the survey believe

in, they were shown the ten most important beliefs comprising con-
temporary Brazilian religious pluralism. They were asked to position
 brazilian university students and religion 75

Graph 2. Do You Believe In . . .?

Percentage Frequency (%)
100

90

80
70

60
Social Sciences
50
Medicine
40
30

20

10
0
on

s
a
s
ary

s
t
us
d

cle
ur
int
os

ixá
rm
Go

ati
Jes

s/A
Gh
M

ira
Sa

Or
Ka

rn

M
gie
in

ly

ca
Ho
rg

in

er
Vi

Re

En

Source: Fondazione Cassamarca Research, 2003 (N=189)

themselves vis-à-vis each of these by means of multiple choice options.

Results showed that, for the entire sample of students, the three most
significant beliefs corresponded to the Holy Trinity (that is, they are
Christian beliefs): 91.5%, belief in God; 83.6%, belief in Jesus Christ;
70.4%, belief in the Holy Ghost. These three make up the “hard core”
of students’ beliefs. Other beliefs also scooped up from the Christian
tradition follow: belief in Mary, 63.0%; in saints, 56.1%; and in mira-
cles, 52.9%. In this second strip also appear beliefs from Eastern and
Spiritist traditions: belief in “energies”, 58.2%; in karma, 32.8%; and in
reincarnation, 32.8%. Belief in Afro-Brazilian divinities (orixás) ranks
last, having been mentioned by 12.7% of the students.
In terms of the two disciplinary fields, it is noted that Medicine stu-
dents are the ones who believe most in God (93.5% versus 89.6% of Social
Sciences students); in Jesus Christ (83.9% versus 83.3%); in Mary (64.5%
versus 61.5%); in saints (60.2% versus 52.1%); in “energies” (61.3% ver-
sus 55.2%); and in reincarnation (39.8% versus 26.0%). As compared to
their Medical School colleagues, Social Sciences students declared they
believe more in the Holy Ghost (71.9% versus 68.8% of Medicine stu-
dents); in orixás (15.6% versus 9.7%); and in miracles (54.2% versus
51.6%). Karma is evenly split across the two groups: 33.3% of Social
Sciences students and 32.3% of Medicine students believe in it.
76 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

Graph 3. Do You Believe In . . .? (%) Versus Geographic Location

God
100
Orixás 80 Jesus

60

40
Karma Holy Ghost
20
São Luís
0 Rio de Janeiro
Porto Alegre
Energies Virgin Mary

Reincarnation Saints

Miracles

Source: Fondazione Cassamarca Research, 2003 (N=189)

If the geographic variable is taken into account, these beliefs follow the
pattern already mentioned above, that is, a greater manifestation of
beliefs in São Luís, followed by Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre.
This graph shows that, outside the restricted field of Christian-
ity, belief in karma ranks highest among university students in Rio
(42.2%), followed by São Luís (28.1%) and Porto Alegre (27.9%). Belief
in reincarnation, on its turn, is held by 37.7% of students in Porto
Alegre, 34.4% in Rio de Janeiro, and 26.6% in São Luís. Belief in “ener-
gies” rates 68.9% in Porto Alegre, 60.9% in Rio de Janeiro, and 45.3%
in São Luís. Finally, belief in orixás amounts to 18.8% in São Luís,
14.8% in Porto Alegre, and 4.7% in Rio de Janeiro.
It is worth noting that beliefs in orixás, karma and reincarnation
greatly exceed the number of students who declared to be members
of Afro-Brazilian religions (whose gods are called orixás) or Spiritism
(which includes beliefs in karma and reincarnation). As was already
noted, no student declared belonging to Afro-Brazilian religions, and
Spiritists amounted to 8.4% of the total.
Therefore, the presence of Spiritism is relatively significant in the
university environment, in terms of both beliefs and belonging. This
finding had also been elicited by another research carried out among
Social Sciences students from the Federal University of Minas Gerais,
 brazilian university students and religion 77

in Belo Horizonte, Central Brazil. In that occasion, the following

explanation, with which we agree, was put forth by researchers from
that State:
regardless of their fundamental incompatibility, Spiritist beliefs do not
exclude Catholic beliefs in the Brazilian symbolic universe. Although the
specific values such Spiritist beliefs may have in Brazilians’ cosmovision,
behavior, and relationships are not known, they somehow interact. Per-
haps these inflated numbers of Spiritists among us are revealing a little
more of this Brazilians’ secret (Cardoso, Perez and Oliveira, 2001:89).
Moreover, Spiritist beliefs among university students need to be
understood within the context of an important tradition of Kardecist
Spiritism both in Porto Alegre and in Rio de Janeiro.17 Above all in
Rio de Janeiro, it is vital to note that both the city and the State of Rio
were historically significant for the establishment and development of
Spiritism itself (Giumbelli, 1995).
“Eastern” beliefs, on their turn, are made manifest in the notion
of “energy”, and even of reincarnation and karma, which are after all
associated with a notion of a vital and superior force. In this regard,
C. Campbell referred to the “Orientalization of the West,” whose effects
would stretch up to the very representation of God (Campbell, 1997). It
might be that the high percentage of belief in God is also associated with
such Orientalist conceptions of energy, power, and superior force.
The belief in orixás unveils, as Pierre Sanchis has suggested, the
presence of a Catholic-Afro-Brazilian culture in Brazil (Sanchis, 1997).
Its high incidence in the northern city of São Luís is no doubt associ-
ated with the long-term tradition of Afro-Brazilian religiosity in that
part of the country, especially the so-called Casa das Minas. The same
is true for Rio Grande do Sul’s university students—the 2000 Cen-
sus showed that this was the Brazilian State with the greatest relative
share of individuals declaring membership in Afro-Brazilian religions.
They comprise 1.6% of the State population, in contrast to 0.3% in the
country at large.18

17
According to Lewgoy, in Rio Grande do Sul Spiritism “appears as rationalist,
theistic, and laic. After a century among the inhabitants of Porto Alegre, it is mostly,
yet not exclusively, practiced by urban middle classes with high-school and higher
education.” (Lewgoy, 2001, p. 110)
18
For an analysis of data on Afro-Brazilian religions in the 2000 Census, see Prandi,
2003. For an analysis of the important Afro-religious presence in Rio Grande do Sul,
see Oro, 1988.
78 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

However, as was seen, no university student, from anywhere in Bra-

zil, has declared membership in Afro-Brazilian religions. This reasserts
the fact that if, on the one hand, most people who claim to belong to
Afro-Brazilian religions come from less privileged social strata, on the
other hand this religions’ beliefs traverse all social layers, reaching up
to even segments holding important social and symbolic capital such
as college students.
In sum, this section highlighted that Medicine students held higher
belief rates than Social Sciences students. Moreover, students from
public universities were shown to believe less than their private uni-
versity counterparts, and many of the latter’s beliefs were confessional.
Finally, for some of the variables, students from Maranhão’s capital in
northern Brazil were shown to be more faithful to traditional Chris-
tian and Afro-Brazilian religiosities than their colleagues in Rio de
Janeiro and Porto Alegre.

The Appeal to Religion

The quantitative survey tool showed the students four afflicting, exis-
tential situations, and asked them whether they would resort to reli-
gion in any of them. The interviewee had multiple choices, among
which: death of beloved ones, illness, love difficulties, and financial
crisis. The results have shown that 65.6% of the students appeal to
religion in case of death of a loved one; in illness, 63.5%; in moments
of financial distress, 43.9%; and in the case of love problems, 40.7%.
It is therefore before the mystery of death and when there is threat
to life, often in the case of illness, that university students are most
likely to appeal to religion. Religion is also a recourse in case of finan-
cial and emotional crises. In all these events, the appeal to religion
occurs less through participation in liturgical acts within sacred spaces
than through prayers.
The graph above shows that the Medicine students turn more to
religion in all four existential situations. The rates are as follows: death
of a loved one (68.8% versus 62.5% of Social Sciences students); illness
(64.4% versus 62.5%); financial distress (44.1% versus 43.8%); and love
crisis (46.2% versus 35.4%).
Therefore, this item further indicates what had been previously
found: Social Sciences students tend to keep religion at a greater dis-
tance not only when it comes to religious practice and manifestation
of beliefs, but also to resorting to religion in times of affliction.
 brazilian university students and religion 79

Graph 4. Appeal to Religion According to the Students’ Discipline

Percentage Frequency (%)
80

70

60

50
Medicine
40
Social Sciences
30

20

10

0
Death of loved Illness Financial Love
ones crisis difficulties

Source: Fondazione Cassamarca Research, 2003 (N=189)

Graph 5. In Which Situations Do You Appeal to Religion? (%)

Death of loved ones
80

60

40

20
Porto Alegre
Love difficulties 0 Illness São Luís
Rio de Janeiro

Financial distress

Source: Fondazione Cassamarca Research, 2003 (N=189)

80 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

Geographically, rates of religious appeal in moments of affliction total

35.2% among Porto Alegre students, 60.9% among Rio de Janeiro stu-
dents, and 63.2% among those in São Luís. Therefore, students from
the southern city of Porto Alegre are the ones less likely to turn to
religion in moments of affliction, whereas those in the northern city
of São Luís are the ones who are most likely to do it.

University Students, Religion, and Secularization

Let us now review the main findings of this research before moving on
to propose some explanations.
We have seen that Medicine students were shown to be more reli-
gious than their Social Sciences counterparts in terms of religious
practice, the system of beliefs, and motivations for appealing to reli-
gion. These students, besides holding beliefs from traditional Christian
culture, also tended to incorporate more symbolic elements stemming
from other religious horizons (such as Eastern) in their universe of
representations than those from the other disciplinary field.
A possible explanatory factor for these findings can be sought at the
particularities of Medical School itself. If, on the one hand, practitio-
ners of this field witness constant scientific and technological develop-
ment, on the other, they experience directly the impotence and finitude
of man. In other words, during their academic trajectory Medicine
students are faced with the contradiction of enjoying the fruits of sci-
entific evolution and technological and therapeutic advances, while
at the same time coming across outcomes which escape the control
of medical knowledge, therefore tragically resulting in death. In this
case, the paradox that shows them the limits of science also causes a
subjective experience of insecurity and uneasiness, as they question
themselves about life after death and thus become more open to the
supernatural world.19
Interviews with some students have shown, moreover, that this
proximity between medicine (science) and religion has a component

19
The porous frontier between medicine and religion has allowed, for instance, the
emergence of medical currents that bring into therapeutic practice religious elements
such as remote intercessory prayer, that is, (healing) prayers uttered by a group of
orators on behalf of unknown (ill) people without them knowing they are being the
subject of such prayers. On this topic, see Leibovici, 2001; Bishop and Stenger, 2004;
and Olshansky and Dossey, 2003.
 brazilian university students and religion 81

of symbolic critique to the Cartesian separation, so typical of Western

medicine, between body and mind, soma and psiqué, materiality and
spirituality. Another sign in our survey of such symbolic protest—of
the opening of Medicine students to the sacred—is the fact that these
students enter Medical School with a percentage of belief in God of
93.7%, and finish it with 100.0%.20 Of these, 52.4% believe in miracles
in the beginning of the course, and end it with a 60.0% belief rate.
Comparatively, the Social Sciences students interviewed began the
course with a percentage of belief in miracles of 60.6%, and ended it
with 47.2%.
As for the incorporation of beliefs from the Spiritist and “Eastern”
traditions into Medicine students’ symbolic repertoire, an explanation
could be sought in the fact that these traditions provide answers both
for primary and ultimate questions, and for the afflictions and limit
situations with which they are daily confronted. In the Christian con-
text from which these students originally came, these answers could
be shown to be lacking or insufficient. Be that as it may, students evi-
dently perform a religious bricolage with the Christian matrix in which
the “hard core” of their beliefs is rooted.
On the other hand, it was seen that Social Sciences students believe,
practice, and demand less from religion than their Medical School
colleagues. This is due to Social Sciences’ bent to relativism, criti-
cism, laicism, and secularism. Moreover, some of the most important
theories learned during the course aim precisely at demystifying the
religious fact, therefore leading some students to question their own
religious convictions and beliefs.
However, we have not found uniformity across students in Social
Sciences courses from different Brazilian universities. Social Sciences
students from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul are the
ones with the lowest rates of both religious participation and religious
belief, as compared to students from other courses in the same region,
southern Brazil. This fact had been noticed in another research on
Social Sciences students from six Brazilian universities that has already
been referred to. In that occasion, researchers from southern Brazil
raised the explanatory hypothesis of a “certain positivistic legacy that

20
Although, as was already noted, this survey did not capture exactly what the
dominant representation of God was—whether the Judeo-Christian tradition or
others, such as Superior Force or Superior Energy.
82 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

persists in the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul” (Steil, Alves

and Herrera, 2001:18).
As Bernardo Lewgoy highlights, this public university indeed cov-
eys “the image of a student campus which is laic and secularized,
where young scholars experiment an individualistic ethos wedded to
the exercise of freedom and criticism.” More specifically, the Social
Sciences course in this public university “represents the tradition of
a certain academic model which is laic, civic, and generically opposi-
tionist.” (Lewgoy, 2001, pp. 105–106). According to this author, such
a model needs to be understood within the historical context of Rio
Grande do Sul elites,
whose relationship to the Catholic religion has always been more reflex-
ive than traditional, at least since the establishment of Positivism dur-
ing the Old Republic. Not by chance, this project was connected to the
establishment of public education and, later on, of the university as a
strategic element for the political and intellectual elevation of the gaúcha
(Rio Grande do Sul) society (Lewgoy, 2001, p. 115).
Moreover, Lewgoy goes on, Rio Grande do Sul
was a stage for freemasons, anarchists, communists, Spiritists, and free-
thinkers, as well as for a strong political, civic, and oppositionist tradi-
tion which has always pervaded the university (Id. Ibid., pp. 115–116).
Such explanation is also valid regionally since, as we have seen, the
aggregate of students from Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro were
shown to be more laicized than their colleagues from São Luís, in the
northern region. This means students from Brazil’s Center-South are
the subjects of a de-traditionalizing attitude, made manifest in their
opening to other beliefs and systems of thought, be they political, ideo-
logical, or religious.
These outcomes therefore do not reproduce the commonly-held
idea that the “South” of Brazil is more “developed” and “modern,”
and, “as a result,” less religious than other Brazilian regions—which
are correspondingly seen as more “traditional” and religious. They
are rather about acknowledging regional specificities as cultural and
symbolic differences. In this case, the explanatory key is less rooted
in a supposed difference in terms of progress and development than
in cultural heterogeneity and in differences in mentality and religious
conceptions among diverse Brazilian regions.
Moreover, the rates of religious belief and practice by students from
private higher education institutions were found to be higher. Besides
 brazilian university students and religion 83

the aforementioned fact that public universities have a certain laic

character, two other hypotheses can be raised for the higher religious
frequency of students in private universities. The first relates to the
very nature of private institutions such as the Catholic University of
Rio Grande do Sul and the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro which
sustain a clear Catholic orientation, even including a Religious Cul-
ture requirement for all freshmen. The second hypothesis is that some
families might send their children to those private universities with
which they have some ideological affinity, as often happens in the case
of elementary and high schools.
Another salient aspect of our research data is the preferentially
immanent and pragmatic representation of religion shown by stu-
dents. The fact that these students come from a social stratum that
holds important social and symbolic capital does not impinge on the
possibility that they sustain a less secularized view of mundane afflic-
tion situations such as death, illness, and even emotional and financial
crises. Up to a point, university students share the general popula-
tion’s more or less widespread belief that “religion comforts”, “religion
heals”, “religion fixes it”. In other words, students represent religion
as a powerful symbolic source of meaning and solutions to existential
and immanent problems. In this case, it is evident that for current
and past university students, religion is not limited to this immanent
dimension, and is by no means a mystification. Similarly, religion is
always called forth along other laic ways of alleviating afflictions.
Moreover, such “instrumentalization” of religion and the belief in
miracles flash out the presence of certain magical elements in social
actors’ religious beliefs. Magic and religion are not, however, seen as
evolutionary steps, nor stand in opposition to rational and scientific
thought. As Marcel Mauss (1974) had stressed, magical thinking lives
side-by-side with technical-scientific thinking.21
Finally, as regards secularization, our research data indicate that
university students show at once high rates of religious beliefs and low
rates of religious practice. This finding may lend support to authors
such as Berger, Wilson and Gauchet, who, as was seen, cast secular-
ization as the diminishing importance of religion in the public space,
and its simultaneous privatization, that is, its withdrawal into the

21
According to Mauss, “Even though we think of ourselves as distant from magic,
we are still not so far apart.” (Mauss, 1974, p. 172)
84 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

subjective sphere. But on the other hand, our data have also shown that
young people tend to weave new religious configurations into their
symbolic fabric, and to articulate their universe of beliefs to empirical
reality more or less closely, depending on their existential experiences.
In this case, the greater resonance is with analytical perspectives such
as Jean Séguy’s and Daniele Hervieu-Léger’s, for whom secularization
is marked by a “rearranging” of the religious in the context of chang-
ing relations between modernity and religion as two spheres that are
not mutually exclusive, but combined in complex and tense ways.

Conclusion

Although the figures and findings presented here should not be taken
“literally,” as they do not stem from irrefutable statistical data—es-
pecially given our research’s limited sample—they may hint at some
trends which we, again, do not claim to generalize.
These caveats notwithstanding, it was found that Medicine and Social
Sciences students tend to reproduce inherited religious elements, and
to integrate into this symbolic universe other belief elements making
up Brazil’s current “religious market.” That is, they fundamentally
reproduce the repertoire of Christian beliefs, and partially integrate
into them other beliefs from Spiritism, Afro-Brazilian religions, and
Eastern religions.22 The latter, however, do not seem to override the
former; rather, they tend to reinforce them. This way, Brazilian uni-
versity students, who do not transcend much the context of national
religious culture, concur to the hegemony of Catholicism and Christi-
anity.23 Moreover, Brazilian students were shown to be, up to a point,

22
A similar acknowledgment of university students’ limited religious diversity was
present in M. Camurça’s analysis of the research data collected among Social Sciences
students at the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, Central Brazil, which
was referred to above (Camurça, 2001).
23
Precisely for this reason, Bizeul’s suggestion about contemporary Christianity
is valid in this case: it “is not (. . .) destined to disappear, as adepts of the New Age
assert. It persists as a fundamental horizon of meanings and beliefs to which young
people often make reference, even though by bits and pieces rather than as a coher-
ent whole. On the other hand, it is undisputable that Christianity has lost its previ-
ous monopoly over meaning . . .” (Bizeul, 2001, pp. 150–151) (“n’est pas (. . .) appelé
à disparaitre comme l’affirment les adeptes du ‘Nouvel Age.’ Il demeure un horizon
de sens et de croyances fondamental auquel les jeunes font souvent référence, mais
par bribes et non comme un ensemble cohérent. Il est indiscutable, par contre, que le
christianisme a perdu son ancien monopole du sens . . .”).
 brazilian university students and religion 85

individuals autonomous from religious institutions. They live their reli-

giosity according to the free choice model, which is manifest in their
low rate of religious practice. In other words, they are to some extent
“religious without institutional religion” (Novaes, 2001, p. 193), and
fit into the famous statement “believing without belonging” (Davie,
1996). The fact that their religious practice is increasingly reduced,
that is, their religious convictions are generally not accompanied by
an active participation in the life of a religious community, is not a
phenomenon exclusive to young people, nor to Brazil. In effect, it is,
as R. Campiche24 has noted, a component of religious modernity.
Therefore, we agree with the French sociologist that what pre-
vails today is not religious indifference, but rather a subjectification
of beliefs which is increasingly out of the controlling reach of great
religions (Hervieu-Léger, 1999). We therefore conclude that the Bra-
zilian university students probed in this research are not hostile to
religion. In fact, they were shown to be more religious than it would
have been thought at first. But their religiosity is, above all, that typi-
cal of religious modernity: privatized, individualized, pragmatic, and
immediacy-driven.25
Again, this is not exclusive to young Brazilians. For instance,
young people—but not only they—in Europe and North America also
show such individualized and pragmatic religiosity (Campiche, 2001,
p. 137). Therefore, it is wrong to speak of the abandonment of reli-
gion by young people. It is rather about acknowledging, among them,

24
In this regard, the Swiss sociologist wrote:
“Our contemporaries’ religiosity is also characterized by the fact that we practice
less, and therefore that we have less ties with religious institutions. But this behav-
ior does not mean that we don’t believe in anything. Most people do adhere to
religious convictions, only without actively participating in the life of a Church”
(Campiche, 2001:136) (“La religiosité de nos contemporains se caractérise aussi
par le fait qu’on pratique moins, donc qu’on a moins de liens avec les institu-
tions religieuses. Mais ce comportement ne signifie pas qu’on ne croit en rien; la
grande majorité de la population adhère à des convictions religieuses, mais sans
participer activement à la vie d’une Eglise”).
25
Such individualization is not, however, the same as individualism. Yves Bizeuil,
for instance, argues after U. Beck that most young people are “willing to invest in social
and eventually religious movements, always on the condition that their purposes are
convincing, and that their requirements for adhesion are not too constraining, at least
in the long term” (Bizeul, 2001:140). (. . . “disposés à s’investir dans des mouvements
sociaux et, le cas échéant, religieux, à condition toutefois que leurs objectifs soient
convaintants et que leurs conditions d’adhésion ne soint pas trop contraignants, du
moins dans la durée.”)
86 ari pedro oro and mauro meirelles

“changes in the ways of experiencing the religious (. . .), a reformula-

tion of the latter”26 (Bizeul, 2001, p. 150).

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 DEVELOPMENTS IN SPIRITUALITY AMONG YOUTH IN
AUSTRALIA AND OTHER WESTERN SOCIETIES

Michael Mason, Andrew Singleton and Ruth Webber

A New Youth Spirituality

Here we present a profile, based on recent research,1 of the chang-

ing patterns of religion and spirituality among young people in Aus-
tralia. Some of the most interesting developments are not unique to
Australia, but are taking place also in other Western countries. Com-
parisons show that in Australia, as in Western Europe and also in
North America, traditional religion is continuing to decline, especially
among youth,2 and a new, radically individualistic spiritual culture is
spreading throughout the West.
The term ‘spirituality’, long used for the personal, practical dimen-
sion of traditional religion, has now acquired the much broader sense
of ‘whatever inspires someone’—the personal vision from which they
derive their purpose and passion for life. The vision may be religious
or may stem from a secular source of inspiration such as the sense
of human kinship that motivates a campaign against poverty, or the
desire for fulfilment that drives the search for the ‘true self ’ (see Roof
1999, Hadaway and Marler 2002).
We will examine in turn the following related topics, comparing
recent Australian findings with those from other Western countries,
especially Britain, Canada and the US:

• traditional religions among youth

• alternative spiritualities
• spirituality and social involvement.

1
The Spirit of Generation Y study (Mason, Singleton & Webber 2007) was the first
comprehensive survey of religion and spirituality among youth in Australia based on
a nationally-representative probability sample.
2
‘Youth’ is used here to refer to various groups within the age range 13–29. The
Australian data are for those aged 13–24; those from other countries cover ranges such
as 13–15, 13–17, 15–19; the age-group most often used in reports from multi-nation
surveys is 18–29.
90 michael mason et al.

We will then be in a position to propose an interpretation of these

developments and to explore the consequences of the changes in
young people’s spirituality taking place across the Western world and
perhaps more widely.

Traditional Religions among Youth

The Spirit of Generation Y (SGY) survey of Australian youth in 2005

(Mason, Singleton and Webber 2007) found that the level of interest
in and involvement with traditional religion among young Australians
aged 13–24 was generally low. Just over half believed in God (51%);
32% were unsure and 17% said they did not believe.
Forty-six percent identified as Christian, 6% belonged to another
religion, and 48% did not identify with any religion. Among Chris-
tians, 21% were Catholic, 8% Anglican and 17% belonged to ‘Other
Christian’ denominations, a category including the Uniting and Ortho-
dox churches, and a number of conservative Protestant denomina-
tions. The principal religions other than Christianity were Buddhism,
Islam, Hinduism and Judaism. Most of those who still identified with
mainstream Christian denominations were only nominal or marginal
adherents; so although 46% of the age-group identified as Christian,
only 17% were regularly practising.
Those who belonged to conservative Protestant denominations
manifested much higher levels of religious belief and practice than
Catholics or Anglicans.
Youth who are Christian hardly differ, now, on most measures of
belief and practice, from their Baby-Boomer parents. But there are
major differences between the two generations in other respects: the
Boomers, when they were in their teens and early twenties, started
from a higher level of religiosity. Today’s youth, as they enter adult-
hood, are beginning from where their parents ended.

Australia, Britain, Canada and the US

David Martin (1978) drew attention to the similarities and differences
between Britain and these three of its former colonies: the United
States, Canada and Australia. Sharing a common language and many
elements of culture, these countries are also similar in having a Protes-
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 91

tant majority, but have been shaped very differently by their religious
histories and institutions.

At one extreme, Britain, with its established churches, shared the

European pattern of religious decline over several centuries, at the
other, the United States, with its firmly anti-establishment tradition,
has a multitude of denominations and sects thriving in hybrid vigour.
Between Britain and the US on this spectrum lie English-speaking
Canada and Australia. Since becoming independent these former col-
onies have had no established religion and until the nineteen-sixties,
showed high levels of religious belief, membership and participation,
not far below those of the US.
Fortunately, researchers in Britain, Canada and the US have also
recently conducted surveys on religion and spirituality which include
younger teenagers and utilise large, nationally-representative samples.
So it is possible to compare contemporary religion and spirituality in
some detail among teenagers across these very different countries.
Table 1 presents some comparable findings from these surveys. The
Values Survey in England and Wales covered only the 13–15 age-
group; so the first two columns compare Australian and British data
for that age range. Next, Australian 15–19 year-olds are compared
with Canadians 15–19, then Australians 13–17 with US teens of the
same age.
The Canadian figure on belief in life after death reported here is
for those who answered ‘Yes’ and ‘I think so’ combined, so Austra-
lian responses ‘Yes’ and ‘Maybe’ have been added for this comparison.
Canadian respondents were asked whether they believed in ‘God or a
higher power’. The 37% of Canadians who believe has declined from
54% in 1984. The Australian percentages of belief in life after death are
inflated by their very high level of belief in reincarnation (which is low
among US teens)! So we do not consider them ‘more religious’ than
Americans on this indicator.
On every item the English / Welsh teenagers were the least religious,
though by a small margin, the Australians came next, followed by the
Canadians, and the Americans were the most religious.
Next, we will see that there is a pattern of continuing change in
all four countries towards a common, and far less religious, spiritual
culture.
 92 michael mason et al.

Table 1. Teenagers in Australia, Britain, Canada, US: Religious Beliefs, Identification

Practices by Country (Percent of Age-Group within Country)
Selected Beliefs and Practices Aust Eng / W Aust Can Aust US
13–15 13–15 15–19 15–19 13–17 13–17
Believe in God – No 16% 26% 18% 16% 17% 3%
– Unsure 34% 33% 34% 48% 34% 12%
– Yes 50% 41% 47% 37% 49% 84%
No religious identification 44% 49% 51% 32% 48% 18%
Believe in life after death 59% 45% 75% 75% 56% 49%
Attend church – weekly 16% 13% 13% 21% 15% 40%
– less than weekly 47% 37% 45% 32% 46% 42%
– never 37% 49% 42% 47% 39% 18%
Pray privately once / week or – – 27% 30% 27% 65%
more
Sources: Australia: SGY survey (Mason, Singleton and Webber 2007: 84, 90, 96, 101); England and
Wales: Values Survey (Francis 2001: 27–44, 96); Canada: Project Teen Canada 2008 (Bibby 2009:
163–187); US: National Study of Youth and Religion (Smith 2005: 31–43).

Continuing Change
When the present contours of youthful religion are compared with
those of the nineteen-sixties, fifty years ago, there is evidence that a
change of quite dramatic scope and intensity has occurred in many
countries over the period.
The Australian SGY study reviewed earlier research and concluded
that a rapid and major decline in religious belief and practice had
taken place in the late nineteen-sixties and early seventies, as the
Baby-Boomers were coming of age, and that the decline was continu-
ing (Mason et al. 2007: 311–319).
For Canada, Bibby (2009) describes the very high belief, membership
and attendance levels prevailing at the start of the nineteen sixties, and
then notes: ‘But from the 1960s through 2000, the situation changed
fairly dramatically. . . . The key answers lie with the Boomers . . . [who]
were at the centre of the religious participation drop-off (Bibby 2009:
164–165). He shows that by the mid-seventies, their level of participa-
tion had decreased significantly compared with older adults. Further,
the decline was continuing: most Boomers did not return to church as
they aged, and the generation following them were even less involved.
The proportion of teenagers who definitely believed in God decreased,
during this later period, from 54% in 1984 to 37% in 2006 (Bibby
2009: 168).
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 93

Evidence from multi-nation surveys, although it does not reach

back to the early sixties or capture the major change between the mid-
sixties and early eighties, shows that the continuing decline in regular
attendance from the early eighties to the present is spread across a
wide range of countries, even including the US, which is so often held
up as the clearest example of an advanced nation where religion con-
tinues as vigorous as ever, untouched by the dead hand of secularisa-
tion. Changes taking place among US youth show that impression is
false.
Table 2 compares the proportion of youth in selected Western coun-
tries who attended a religious service at least once a month, across the
twenty-five years from 1981/82 to 2006.

Table 2. Youth Aged 18–29 in Selected Countries: Attendance at Religious

Services Monthly or More Often by Country and by Year of Survey
(Percent of Age-Group within Country in Survey Year), Sorted in
Descending Order by Proportion of Youth Attending Regularly in 2006
Year of Survey
Country 1981–82 2006
Poland – 64%
United States 53% 41%
Canada 36% 27%
New Zealand – 19%
Britain 17% 19%
Australia 44% 17%
Spain 34% 11%
Czech Republic – 7%
Norway 10% 7%
France 11% 6%
Sources: for 1981–82, World Values Survey (WVS); for 2006,
International Social Survey Program (ISSP).
How to read this table: 53% of US youth aged 18–29 attended
religious services once a month or more in 1981, 41% in 2006.
94 michael mason et al.

The table3 shows that in 2006 young people’s active participation in

traditional religion varied very widely across Western nations, depend-
ing on local historical and cultural factors. All of the countries listed
are, or were in the recent past, predominantly Christian. No country
has more than 7% of its under 30s identifying with other religions
(totalling Muslim, Hindu and all others). Over the past twenty-five
years, there was a marked decline in the proportion of youth attend-
ing religious services in Australia, Canada and the US, while the rate
stayed low in Britain and other countries where it had already reached
a low level before 1981. By 2006 the proportion was well below half in
these four nations.
Further evidence of decline in attendance among US youth comes
from the second wave of the National Study of Youth and Religion
(NSYR) study, which took place in 2005, only three years after the
original NSYR survey. The researchers report that: ‘The percentage of
adolescents reporting that they attended religious services once a week
or more declined by 13% in this three year time period. The percent-
age of adolescents who reported that they never attended increased by
10%’ (Denton et al. 2008:5).
There is an even more basic indicator of the decline of traditional
religion among youth than decreased attendance at religious services:
the increase in the number of those who have no religious identifica-
tion—who say that they do not follow any religion or belong to any
religious group or denomination; who either have not been raised in
any religious tradition, or while still in their teens or twenties, cease to
identify with the religion in which they were raised.
Table 3 shows the increase, between the early eighties and late nine-
ties, in the proportion of young people who stated that they did not
belong to any religious denomination, in Australia, Britain, Canada
and the US.
Again, the trend picked up in the multi-nation surveys is confirmed
by the more detailed studies in individual countries, and by Census

3
WVS and ISSP data were downloaded and analysed with SPSS to produce this
and similar tables, which are thus the responsibility of the authors. Cf. European and
World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981–2004 2006 and International
Social Survey Programme: Role of government IV 2006.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 95

Table 3. Youth Aged 18–29 in Selected Countries: Proportion Not

Belonging to a Denomination, by Country and by Year of Survey
(Percent of Age-Group within Country in Year of Survey)
Country 1981–82 1995–2000
Britain 14% 24%
Australia 5% 24%
Canada 13% 45%
USA 8% 32%
Source: European and World Values Surveys. Data for
Australia are from 1995, for Britain and the US from 1999
and for Canada from 2000.

counts in Australia, Canada and Britain.4 Youth and young adults are
the age-group most likely to declare no religious affiliation.
In Australia, the SGY study concluded: ‘There is a strong drift away
from Christianity among youth, evident in religious belief, identifi-
cation and practice: some previously attended more regularly, but
have stopped doing so; others once believed in God but now do not;
before they reach the age of 25, about 18% of those who were raised
in a Christian denomination no longer regard themselves as Christian’
(Mason et al. 2007: 302).
In Canada, ‘the proportion of the whole population responding in
the census that they had “no religion” jumped from less than 1% in
1961 to 16% by 2001’ (Bibby 2009: 164). Bibby found that among teen-
agers, the increase in ‘no religion’ was twice as large over a period only
half as long: from 12% in 1984 to 32% in 2008.
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008:36) notes that in
the US ‘Important generational differences in religious affiliation are
evident. For example, one-quarter of all adults under age 30 are not
affiliated with any particular religion, which is more than three times
the number of unaffiliated adults who are age 70 and older, and nine
percentage points higher than in the overall adult population’.

4
Earlier we stated that the SGY survey showed that 48% of Australian youth had
no religious identification, which does not agree with the figure of 24% shown in Table
3 from the WVS survey of 1995. The reasons for the difference are as follows: the SGY
survey took place 10 years later, and the proportion with no religious identification
increased over that period. Also, SGY surveyed a younger group aged 13–24, among
whom denominational identification was more tenuous, while the WVS figures are
for ages 18–29.
96 michael mason et al.

The first wave of the NSYR study of US teens aged 13–17 found
that 17% of those whose parents were members of Mainline Protes-
tant denominations declared that they had no religion, (the percentage
among Catholics was 12%); and after only 3 more years, the wave 2
re-survey found that 15% of those who had reported being Protestant
in Wave 1, now said they had no religious affiliation, bringing the total
of those declaring “no religion” to 24% (Smith 2005: 36; Denton et al.
2008:5).
The 2001 Census of England and Wales shows that those aged 16–34
are the age group most likely to have no religious affiliation.
However, young people in all four countries have not only become
significantly less religious in traditional ways; they show signs of con-
verging towards a common spiritual culture focussed on the autono-
mous individual.5

Individualism
A majority of Australian youth (13–24) in all Christian denomina-
tions agreed that it was ‘okay to pick and choose your religious beliefs
without having to accept the teachings of your religion as a whole’
and that ‘morals are relative, there are no definite rights and wrongs
for everybody’.
Surveys have always found considerable dissent from official church
teachings (especially moral demands) among less committed church
members; but now only the most highly committed resist the principle
that matters of belief and morality are for individuals to decide for
themselves; that there are no external authorities to which the indi-
vidual should defer.
The following table shows measures of religious individualism and
moral relativism among 13–17 year-olds in Australia and the USA.
Table 4 shows that US teenagers, despite higher levels of religious
belief and practice, are almost as individualistic as Australians. It was
particularly striking that two-thirds to three-quarters of US teens now-
adays disagree with the statement: ‘For believers to be truly religious
and spiritual, they need to be involved in a religious congregation’.

5
Steve Bruce (2002) comes to the same conclusion on religion in the West.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 97

Table 4. Youth aged 13–17 in Australia and US: Indicators of Religious Individualism by
Denomination Group and by Country (Percent of Denomination Group within Country)
Belief Conservative Mainline Catholic No
Protestant Protestant Religious ID
Many religions may be true AUS 51% 66% 76% 62%
(Agree) US 48% 67% 71% 62%
OK to pick and choose AUS 51% 69% 69% –
religious beliefs (Agree) US 36% 53% 54% 62%
AUS 29% 51% 62% 64%
Morals are relative (Agree)
US 36% 50% 51% 59%
Need to be involved in a AUS – – – –
congregation (Disagree) US 64% 72% 67% 84%
Sources: US: National Study of Youth and Religion (Smith 2005:31–71); Australia: SGY survey.
How to read this table: e.g. 36% of US teens (13–17) in conservative Protestant denominations strongly
agreed or agreed that ‘It’s okay to pick and choose your religious beliefs etc.’

On the basis of these and other survey measures, and thousands of

interviews, NSYR principal researcher Christian Smith concludes:
American youth, like American adults, are nearly without exception pro-
foundly individualistic, instinctively presuming autonomous, individual
self-direction to be a universal human norm and life goal. . . . Most sacred
of all American values is the inviolability of the individual conscience,
derived from liberal individualism (Smith 2005:143).
For US teens, Smith says, there are no obligations, only choices; the
individual is the authority over religion, not vice-versa; religion is
something one chooses to use, not something to which one devotes
oneself; you don’t have to be part of a religious community to practice
your religion; there are no right answers to religious questions—they
are matters of opinion, incapable of proof; no one has a right to judge
the chosen beliefs, commitments, desires or lifestyle of another; you
don’t have to be religious to be good, since decency is a simple matter
of common sense on which all can agree (Smith 2005: 144–147).
In the SGY survey and interviews, we found closely similar attitudes
among Australian teenagers (Mason et al. 2005: 323–336).
This individualistic outlook is so widespread, and so antithetical
to the emphasis of traditional religions on obligatory creeds and
moral codes, collective worship and communal belonging, that even
those who still identify with traditional religion are in many cases
98 michael mason et al.

practising instead an individualised spirituality—albeit one flavoured

with traditional themes. It also seems highly likely that the involve-
ment of US teens in traditional religions will continue to decline at
an accelerating rate, despite the strongly pro-religious US cultural
tradition which has so long succeeded in counteracting the forces of
secularisation.
Clearly, the worldview of younger Australians and Americans has
been shaped by some common influences that make them similarly
individualistic. Recent studies, which we cannot review in detail here,
show the same pattern emerging among Canadian and British youth,
and its effects on traditional religion (see Bibby 2009; Savage et al.
2006). As a result of the communications revolution, there is hardly
any country in the world whose youth do not show many of the basic
traits of globalised youth culture. We will return to this important
issue in our concluding section.
We have shown the declining role of traditional religions in Aus-
tralia and three closely related Western countries, and the rise of a
powerful global individualism in youth culture. In the next section,
we ask: as traditional forms of spirituality wane, have young people
turned instead to the alternative spiritualities available in the religious
marketplace? Most of these, after all, are well-tailored to suit the indi-
vidualistic turn in spiritual tastes. Or, are young people simply aban-
doning religion without feeling the need for an alternative?

Alternative Spiritualities

Much has been written about the changing spiritual landscape in late
modern societies, especially the emergence or re-invigoration of faiths,
spiritualities and spiritual practices that are outside the bounds of tra-
ditional, organised religion (see Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Heelas
2008; Partridge 2004; Tacey 2003). None of these new religious or
spiritual movements constitutes anything like a broad-based replace-
ment for traditional religion, but they do represent a proliferation
of spiritual choices. In this section we explore research findings on
youth’s response to the alternative religions and alternative spiritual
beliefs now on offer.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 99

Alternative Religions
Alternative religion refers in this context to ‘the range of faiths outside
the remit of traditional [religion]’ (Hunt 2003: xv). Like other Western
countries, Australia experienced an ‘alternative spiritual awakening’
in the 1960s and ’70s. Well-known alternative religious groups, such
as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (Hare Krish-
nas), the Unification Church (the Moonies) and Scientology were either
founded or gained significantly in popularity. From the late 1970s,
nature religions—witchcraft (Wicca), Druidism, Neo-Paganism—have
achieved considerable prominence in the West. While many new reli-
gions and faiths enjoy a high, if sometimes controversial, profile their
followers are only a small percentage of the total population (see for
example, Kosmin and Keyser 2006).
Among the alternatives, nature religions appeal particularly to
younger people. Among Australian youth, nature religions have more
adherents than other alternatives, such as Satanism, Rastafarian-
ism and Scientology. According to the 2006 Census, about 0.22% of
Australians aged 15–29 identify with a nature religion (the category
includes Pagans, Druids and Wiccans). What about other countries?
Smith and Denton (2005) report that only 0.3% of American youth
(aged 13–17) in the first wave of the NSYR sample identified them-
selves as a Pagan or Wiccan. Clearly, the profile of and media interest
in youth witchcraft and Paganism greatly exceeds the number of seri-
ous teen practitioners.
Berger and Ezzy (2007: 37) argue that witchcraft has a ‘larger impact
than its numbers would suggest, as many more people explore the reli-
gion than actually become witches’. Data from recent surveys of youth
in Australia and the US suggest that this exploration is not particularly
widespread or serious. Both the Australian SGY survey and the NSYR
asked participants about ‘dabbling’ in Paganism or Wicca. About 10%
of Australian youth have explored either of these two nature religions,
though only a minority were serious about this exploration, to the
extent of reading Pagan writings or attending some kind of ceremony.
Among US teens, about 3% try to ‘include in their own spirituality’
some kind of practice from witchcraft or Paganism (this figure does
not include those who already identify as Pagan or Wiccan) (Smith
2005: 78) It would seem that for the very large majority of youth in
Australia and the US, witchcraft, like other alternative religions, is a
distant curiosity at best. Both studies also concluded that very few
100 michael mason et al.

youth are ‘spiritual seekers’—engaged in a quest beyond the main-

stream traditions to discover a meaningful spirituality.

Belief in the Supernatural

Belief in the paranormal, occult and supernatural has long been part
of Western societies, co-existing alongside traditional religious beliefs.
These beliefs might include belief in ghosts, clairvoyance, astrology, evil
spirits, premonitions, and a little more recently, belief in UFOs. Per-
haps the broader turn away from organised religion has to an increase
in acceptance of supernatural beliefs, especially among youth?
The next two tables show levels of teenage belief in astrology and
contact with the dead in Australia, the US, Canada and the UK. These
data show that belief in the supernatural is reasonably strong in these
countries. We argue, however, that for most young people, these
beliefs are idly held superstitions, rather than strong beliefs that influ-
ence action.

Table 5. Teenagers in Australia, Britain, Canada, US: Belief in Astrology

(Percent of Age-Group within Country)
Question Asked Country, Age Yes Maybe
Date of Range
Survey
Do you believe in astrology Australia 13–17 24% 19%
(that starts and planets affect 2005
people’s fates?)
Do you believe in astrology USA 13–17 9% 31%
(that starts and planets affect 2003
people’s fates?)
Do you believe in astrology? Canada 15–19 47%
2008 (% ‘definitely’ +
‘I think I do’)
I believe in my horoscope UK 13–15 35% 33%
Late (‘unsure’)
1990s
Sources: Australia: SGY survey; England and Wales: Values Survey (Francis 2001: 195);
Canada: Project Teen Canada 2008 (Bibby 2009: 175); US: National Study of Youth and
Religion (Smith 2005: 43)
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 101

The table above shows that 24% of teens (13–17) in Australia definitely
believe in astrology, compared to 9% in the US. A higher proportion
of teens in the UK definitely believe in astrology. The published data
for Canada combines responses, so that 47% of teens aged 15–19 are
certain about or open to belief in astrology. Indeed, more than 40% of
youth in the UK, Australia and the UK are certain about or open to
belief in astrology. Notwithstanding these figures, it is reasonable to
assume that few youth are really serious about it. Bibby (2009) finds
that among Canadian teens aged 15–19, only 24% ‘check their horo-
scopes at least once a week’. Far fewer would have the resources or
inclination to pay for a professional casting (see Mason et al. 2007).
Another popular supernatural belief is the idea that those in the
earthly realm can contact the dead inhabiting the ‘spirit world’. Belief
in contact with the dead has, like astrology, become part of the fabric
of popular culture. The TV show, Crossing Over with John Edward,
hosted by medium John Edward has been a huge success, and realist
depictions of spirit activity has been a Hollywood staple, particularly
in the 1970s and 1980s (films such as the Poltergeist series, and The
Amityville Horror). The next table shows belief that it is possible to
contact the dead.

Table 6. Teenagers in Australia, Britain, Canada, US: Belief in ‘Contact with

the Dead’ (Percent of Age-Group within Country)
Question Asked Country, Age Yes Maybe
Date of Range
Survey
Do you believe in the possibility Australia 13–17 23% 19%
of communicating with the dead 2005
directly or through séances
Do you believe in the possibility USA 13–17 9% 30%
of communicating with the dead 2003
directly or through séances
We can have contact with the Canada 15–19 46%
spirit world 2008 (% ‘definitely’ +
‘I think I do’)
I believe it is possible to contact UK 13–15 31% 33%
the spirits of the dead Late 1990s (‘unsure’)
Sources: Australia: SGY survey; England and Wales: Values Survey (Francis 2001: 195);
Canada: Project Teen Canada 2008 (Bibby 2009: 175); US: National Study of Youth and
Religion (Smith 2005: 43).
102 michael mason et al.

Like belief in astrology, almost a quarter of Australian teens (and more

in the UK), definitely believe that contact with the dead is possible. Far
fewer in the US are definite about this belief. That said, the combined
totals of those who are certain about or open to a belief in the possibil-
ity of contacting the dead is around forty percent in each of these four
countries. Again, we might question the salience of this belief. It is one
thing to believe in the possibility of communicating with the dead,
another to actually act on it: to regularly by consulting a medium,
or participating in a séance. Most teens, probably believe merely that
contact is possible.
Bibby (2009: 174) makes the observation that ‘young people have
hardly abandoned the supernatural realm’. This would appear true also
of the UK and Australia, and to a lesser extent, the more religious US.
Is belief in the supernatural on the rise? One US national poll from
the mid 1970s indicated that almost a third of US adults believed in
astrology (Emmons and Sobal 1981). Data from the EVS and WVS
surveys show that in 1981 about a quarter of adults in Canada and
the UK, and slightly fewer in the US, believed in reincarnation. These
figures show is that if there was a substantial increase in belief in the
supernatural, this took place well before the current generation of
youth were born.
What about youth of today compared with youth in previous gener-
ations? Comparative data on Australian teens are not available. Bibby
(2009) found that more Canadian teens in 1987 than 2008 were cer-
tain about or open to belief in astrology, psychics and ESP. Belief in
contacting the spirit world is about the same. This suggests that some
beliefs come into fashion, or remain fashionable, while others fall out
of favour, rather than overall levels of supernatural belief being more
popular among the current generation of youth (see Bibby 2009).
Is it a replacement for religion? Scholars have questioned whether
belief in the supernatural is a ‘functional alternative to mainstream
religion’ (Emmons and Sobal 1981. See for example, Orenstein 2002;
Sjödin 2002; Glendenning 2006). Among Australian youth, according
to the SGY data, the most religious (orthodox religious belief and reg-
ular religious practice) are those most likely to reject outright a belief
in astrology, psychics, reincarnation or contact with the dead. Analysis
of NSYR data shows the same is true of US teens.6 But non-believers

6
NSYR data were downloaded and analyzed with SPSS to produce this finding,
which is thus the responsibility of the authors.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 103

are not interested in the supernatural either: the survey data also show
that the majority of non-believers in both countries also reject vari-
ous supernatural beliefs. The really religious and the decisively secular
have little interest in the supernatural.
But another important trend among youth is also evident, and this
is the popularisation of individualised, fragmented collections of opin-
ions that are not accompanied by any regular religious or spiritual
practice, nor are they linked to a coherent worldview. According to
Sjödin (2002: 76) ‘the process of individualisation in society means
that individuals can take their choice from among different offerings
and build their own individual view of life, often characterised by
fragments of different ideologies, which are combined into a personal
blend’. For many Australian youth, traditional religious beliefs are not
held exclusively, but in combination with supernatural beliefs (for a
full description, see Mason et al. 2007). This trend is also evident in
the US, but less so; strong religious practice and religious exclusivism
are more prevalent there than in Australia.
What is clear is that alternative religions and supernatural beliefs
are not taking the place of religion. For youth, alternative religions—
Witchcraft included—remain for most little more than a curiosity.
Many youth believe in the supernatural but these beliefs are low cost
and do not reflect a strong commitment to either spiritual practices or
a strongly defined or clearly articulated alternative spiritual worldview.
In the next section we consider the impact the rise of individualistic
spirituality is having on social involvement.

Spirituality and Social Involvement

Every form of spirituality expresses, or at least implies, an attitude to

the social world and a social ethic. Religion has a significant impact, for
good or ill, on the extent to which people contribute to their societies.
Not all forms of religion promote social concern. Some Christian
denominations have been notorious for keeping their members aloof
from a world seen as evil and under divine condemnation, and for
regarding misfortune as punishment for sin by a vengeful God. Other
religions, both Western and Eastern, regard others’ sufferings, or their
difficult lot in life, as their merited fate, with which it is useless, or
even wrong, to interfere. In this section, we refer to religions which
promote social involvement and beneficent concern for others. Fur-
ther, while religions of this kind have been found in many studies to
104 michael mason et al.

be an important contributor to civic engagement, they are not the only

influence promoting pro-social behaviour: the pathways to participa-
tion are wide and are influenced by many factors including families,
schools, clubs, churches and friends (Andolina et al. 2001; Anheier
and Salamon 1999; Lam 2006).
Religion influences social concern and generosity (Salamon and
Sokolowski 2004). Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink (2003: 488) found
that those who are non-religious are significantly less likely to give to
organisations that assist the poor, while among those who were reli-
gious, frequency of church attendance and the importance placed on
religious faith correlate with the amount of financial giving regardless
of religious identity. The same association between religion and giving
was found in Australia (Lyons and Nivison-Smith 2006a, 2006b). The
worldviews and values enshrined in religion and embraced by those
strongly committed to their faith encourage generosity and social
compassion, because they promote a focus on issues outside the self
(Crystal and DeBell 2002; Smith, 1999).
Religion not only promotes attitudes of social concern and generos-
ity among adults and adolescents, but also active ‘civic engagement’
defined as ‘individual and collective attitudes and actions addressing
issues of public concern’ (Crystal and DeBell 2002; Regnerus 2003;
Regnerus and Uecker 2007; Sinha, Cnaan and Gelles 2007; Smith
2005). Religion generates ‘social capital’ which results in young people
volunteering outside religious organisations as well as within them,
enlarging the pool of volunteers (Greeley 1997).
Political scientist Robert Putnam (2000) defined ‘social capital’ as
the inclination towards reciprocity arising from social networks, and
saw it not just as an asset for individuals but as a key component for
building and sustaining democratic society. Religion was a particu-
larly powerful instrument for generating social capital. He observed
that nearly half of all associational memberships in the US are church-
related, half of all personal philanthropy goes through religious insti-
tutions, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context.
Religion rivals education as a powerful correlate of most forms of civic
engagement, and it is an especially strong predictor of volunteering
and philanthropy.
However Putnam found that in the US, civic engagement had fallen
by 25 to 50 percent since the late 1960s. He referred to involvement in
politics, membership of unions, sporting clubs, social clubs, churches
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 105

and civic bodies. There was also a decline in charitable donations, and
even in the amount of time people spent with friends and family.
No doubt a large part of the decline in direct, face-to-face social
interaction is due to the development and spread of technologies
which enable each individual to conduct much of their education,
business, professional work, communication, shopping and entertain-
ment online.
But there are also cultural factors at work. From the Baby-Boomers
onward, a strongly individualistic style of spirituality has taken hold,
and has resulted in a greater preoccupation with the self and less con-
cern for the well-being of others, or for the condition of one’s society
as a whole.
What social attitudes and involvement do we find among today’s
Australian youth, as well as youth in other Western countries, and
how are these connected to their religion and spirituality? We will
present findings on young people’s social compassion and their
contributions of time and energy in volunteer work.

Social Compassion and Religion

In both the Australian and US youth surveys there was a clear link
between the level of religious commitment and the level of social com-
passion.
Table 7 shows the differences between US and Australian teens on
social concern and giving money to charity, and the relation between
these and the person’s level of religious commitment—measured by a
factor combining religious identification, beliefs and practices.

Table 7. Youth aged 13–17 in Australia and US: Social Compassion by

Level of Commitment and by Country (Percent of Age Group in Country)
Country Commitment Level
High Low
Cares very much about the needs of AUS 43% 22%
poor people US 69% 33%
Gave $20 or more of own money to AUS 58% 27%
a good cause in the past year US 65% 21%
Sources: US: National Study of Youth and Religion (Smith 2005); Australia: SGY
survey.
How to read this table: 43% of Australian youth aged 13–17 with high religious
commitment said they cared very much about the needs of poor people.
106 michael mason et al.

Both Australian and US teens were asked how much they ‘person-
ally care about the needs of the poor’. The table shows the proportion
who chose ‘care very much’. More US teens said they cared, and more
donated money, than Australian teens. Those whose religious commit-
ment was high were twice as likely to care very much or to donate, as
those whose commitment was low. Individual differences in religious
commitment clearly influence social compassion; so does nationality.
American youth are more religious than Australians, which would
explain part of the difference; but researchers have also noted that
social compassion within a society is affected by the country’s level of
welfare provision (Uslander 2002). Australia has a more generous wel-
fare safety net than the US, so that Australian teens are less confronted
by the obvious presence of the poor, and Americans more, which could
also contribute to their higher level of social compassion.

Volunteering and Religion

Is volunteering affected by religious commitment, as indicated by fre-
quency of prayer and church attendance, and identifying oneself as
religious, and how does this effect operate in Australia, Canada and
the US?
Table 8. Youth aged 18–29 in Australia, US and Canada: Volunteered at
Least Once in the Past Year by Religious Practices and by Country
(Percent of Youth in Country)
Religious Activities / Attitude Australia USA Canada
Prays once a week or more 64% 60% 73%
Prays rarely or never 37% 43% 61%
Attends church monthly or more 78% 75% 88%
Attends church rarely or never 45% 46% 60%
Describes self as very religious 73% 73% 77%
Does not describe self as religious 49% 50% 64%
Source: ISSP 1998. There were too few from Britain in the sample who had engaged in
these practices to include the UK in the comparison.
How to read this table: 64% of Australians who prayed once a week or more often,
volunteered at least once in the past year.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 107

Religiosity in all cases showed a positive impact on the propensity

to volunteer—church attendance seems to have been the best indi-
cator. Moreover religious commitment as shown by these indicators
appeared to have an effect of approximately the same magnitude
across the three countries. But clearly religion explains only a propor-
tion of the variance in volunteering: among the highly religious there
are still differences between countries; and even when they have little
or no religious commitment, a considerable proportion of youth give
time to volunteer activities. So other factors are at work as well. One
of them is that more young people go to private schools in Australia
than in the US and most of these schools are church-based, and have
programs that strongly encourage, or even require, volunteering and
community service. It is not our objective here to identify all the fac-
tors which promote social engagement, only to show that religion is
one of them, and a powerful one at that.

Individualism in Spirituality and Social Involvement

Studies of the reasons young people give for engaging in volunteer
activities have noted some changes in recent years as spirituality has
become more individualistic. In Australia, volunteering practices now
reflect some of the themes in contemporary spirituality: the impor-
tance of individual choice rather than accepting options arranged by
others; a preference for one-off or short term contributions so as to
‘keep options open’ and not get tied down by commitments; and ‘look-
ing after Number 1’: if people can see some benefit to themselves, they
are more likely to volunteer (ABS 2007; Mellor and Kennedy 2003).
Overwhelmingly the assistance Australians provide to others is to fam-
ily, friends, neighbours and colleagues (ABS 2007).
There is concern in many Western countries that levels of volun-
teering are dropping (Anheier and Salamon 1999). Australian youth
have a low rate of volunteering in comparison to other countries. The
IEA7 Civic Education Study of 14 and 17–19-year-old students in 28
countries found that Australian students’ scores were significantly
below the international mean on Civic Engagement (Mellor, Kennedy
and Greenwood 2002).

7
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.
108 michael mason et al.

Australian researchers, in a large-scale survey of volunteers, distin-

guished eight motives: a) values (such as altruism), b) advancement
of own career c) personal growth d) recognition (of one’s talents)
e) hedonistic f ) social g) reactive (‘I want to prevent others going
through what I went through’) h) reciprocity (exchange—contributing
in the hope of receiving later) (McEwin and Jacobson 1992; Esmond
and Dunlop 2002). They found that the most frequent motivation for
volunteering was value-based—reflecting a deeply held belief in the
importance of helping others. Next was reciprocity, then recognition
of one’s skills and contribution. Younger volunteers were more moti-
vated to improve their employment prospects through volunteering
than older volunteers. Among interview participants in the SGY study,
who were asked why they engaged in volunteer work, we found exam-
ples of each of the motives listed above.

Discussion

We have seen that among youth in Australia, and more generally

throughout the Western world:

• Traditional religion is continuing to decline.

• Individualism holds sway, not only alienating young people from
institutionalised religion but also impacting on their attitude to oth-
ers and their social involvements.
• ‘Spirituality’ no longer refers primarily to religion, but to the individ-
ual’s personally constructed vision of life and source of inspiration.
• Relatively few young people are ‘spiritual seekers’, seriously tak-
ing up ‘new religions’ or ‘alternative spiritualities’. Most show little
interest in spiritual matters, so are secular more by default than by
choice—indifferent to religion rather than hostile.
• Youth’s involvement in the social world is now much less influenced
by religious altruism. Several studies suggest that civic engagement,
in such forms as voluntary work, is seriously declining. Young peo-
ple’s social involvement is motivated more often than in the past by
self-interest.

We will discuss briefly the meaning of these developments and their

likely consequences.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 109

A New Spirituality?
Individualism is far from new.8 As a vindication of the dignity and
rights of the individual person, it has been at the centre of the demo-
cratic transformation of Western societies since the eighteenth cen-
tury. The sacredness of the person and the inalienable right to life,
liberty and other basic freedoms is at the heart of the political culture
of modern democracies and has long been interpreted, especially in
liberal Protestantism, as the core of the Christian Gospel.
But when not embedded in the context of citizenship and religious
altruism, individualism can also correspond to natural human ego-
tism—the tendency to act out of self-interest rather than to consider
others. There is a centuries-old philosophy defending this form of indi-
vidualism, in which the sovereign individual is not to be constrained
by social considerations. Humans are defined as self-sufficient in their
individual existence—social participation is an option, a choice rather
than a necessity.
While exalting the dignity and rights of the individual, religion was
also the chief restraint on the pursuit of self-interest without regard
for social obligations, and the rise of egotistical individualism is cor-
related with religion’s decline. Religious traditions recognised humans
as intrinsically social beings, able to reach fulfilment only in relation-
ships. Churches provided communal structures of belonging, and of
shared beliefs and ethics, celebrated and renewed in ritual. Religion
was the sheet-anchor of social order, linking it with transcendent real-
ity as its unchallengeable foundation and legitimation. Religion also
inculcated a social ethic prescribing the responsibilities of the citizen,
thus binding individuals into an organic social unity.
What is new is that the spiritual outlook of most young people in
Western countries is now more strongly shaped by individualism than
by traditional religion.

8
The classic study of the intellectual roots and current manifestations of
individualism in American life is Robert Bellah et al. Habits of the Heart: Individualism
and Commitment in American Life (1985). Most of Bellah’s analysis of individualism,
its philosophical heritage and its current effects, especially on religion, applies not just
to the US, but to Western society generally, especially to English-speaking nations.
110 michael mason et al.

Why Now?
Why have Western societies, and particularly youth, been turning
away from religion and becoming increasingly individualistic over the
past fifty years?
The network of influences is complex, not fully explored, and highly
controversial, and it is far beyond our scope to discuss it in detail here.
We can only list some of its components.

• In most of the countries of Western Europe, where religion had

been enfeebled by the stultifying effect of the religious monopoly
exercised by established churches, secularisation went hand in hand
with modernisation (Martin 1978; McLeod 2000; Berger, Davie and
Fokas 2009).
• But beyond Europe, in New World nations like the US, Canada and
Australia, traditional religion thrived until the nineteen sixties.
• From the mid-sixties till the late seventies, the ‘Baby-Boomer’ gen-
eration born in the post-World War II years were coming of age.
They constituted an unusually high proportion of their populations,
giving them greater social influence than young people usually pos-
sess. They enjoyed a prolonged adolescence while being educated,
and came into their teens and twenties in a time of peace and afflu-
ence, so were targeted by marketers who created a consumer youth
culture.
• The student revolts of the period, and youthful opposition to the
Vietnam War, shaped the Boomers self-consciousness as a genera-
tion who rejected the failed solutions of the past, and would create
a new future. The ‘cultural revolution’ which ensued across the West
entailed a wholesale rejection of past traditions and the authority
derived from them. Religious, civil and parental authorities were
attacked as oppressive. Youth began to drift from churches at rates
that varied according to the vitality and cultural support enjoyed by
religion in each society.
• These developments echoed round the world in the seventies and
eighties via the technologies available at the time, principally radio,
television and film.
• From the nineties onwards, the speed and density of global commu-
nication took a quantum leap forward, accelerated by the cybernetic
and communications revolutions. The youth counter-culture gained
a large share of the content.
 developments in spirituality among youth in australia 111

• At the same time, the invention and rapid spread of ‘individualising’

technologies’, especially the personal computer and later the inter-
net, reduced individuals’ need for social interaction.

Consequences for Society

Many young people are reluctant to get involved in collective action,
alliances and memberships, since these often involve institutions and
seem to them to limit freedom by imposing long-term responsibilities;
as a result, a host of secondary ‘mediating institutions’ located between
the individual and the State are ‘greying’ and withering away for lack
of support: local community organisations, service clubs, political
party branches, unions, churches, sporting organisations.
The decline of mediating structures leaves a concentration of power
in the hands of the State and large corporate interests, and consti-
tutes a threat to democratic freedoms, which depend on the commit-
ted involvement and activity of large numbers of citizens in voluntary
associations. Although most of these secondary organisations do not
have a directly political focus, they are capable of mobilisation, when
necessary, in defence of their rights against impositions by govern-
ments or corporations. Despite some outstanding exceptions, Austra-
lian youth are not much interested in citizenship, nor much engaged
in its activities.

Consequences for the Individual

It has long been an axiom of social science that humans are radically
social beings, whose personal sense of worth, meaning and purpose is
established in personal relationships and supported by belonging to
communities. In this light, the dependence of young people’s personal
identity on fragile primary relationships: family of origin, friendship
networks, and immature sexual partnerships—leaves them insecure,
but is strongly entrenched and resistant to change.
Critics have perhaps been too quick to apply moralistic labels like
‘the Me-generation’ to the Boomers and today’s youth, rather than
seeking to understand the factors which drive this inward focus, such
as fragility of identity and the loss of social trust. Youth are what
their parents and their society have made them. They have been given
responsibility for constructing themselves, which many would regard
as an impossible task. Perhaps we should refer to them as ‘individu-
alised’ rather than individualistic—it is more a fate than a choice, and
112 michael mason et al.

more a burden than a gift, for which they and society will pay a price
in years to come. They deserve and will need the understanding and
support of older generations.

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 THE RELIGIOSITY OF YOUTH IN
AUSTRALIA AND THAILAND*

Philip Hughes**

Introduction

This chapter explores the nature of religiosity among young people in

Australia and Thailand. In so doing, it reflects on how the nature of
religiosity relates to the broader cultural landscape. It will argue that
the forms that religion takes reflects not only that broader cultural
framework, but the ways that specific religions interact with the social
and cultural framework.
Australia and Thailand provide interesting case-studies outside the
dominant matrix of the United States and Europe where much of the
discussion on the nature of religion in modern and post-modern soci-
eties has taken place. Both have a dominant religious tradition: Chris-
tianity in Australia and Buddhism in Thailand. However, both have
significant communities of other religious groups. In Australia, the
Buddhist and Muslim communities have been growing rapidly and,
in recent years, the Hindu community even more rapidly (Hughes
2007). Most of those who are not Christian are first or second genera-
tion immigrants to Australia. There are also large numbers of young
Australians who are described in the Census as not religious or who
choose not to answer the question (which is specified as optional in
the Australia Census).

* ‘The Spirit of Generation Y’ study of youth spirituality in Australia was funded by

17 organizations and was undertaken by a research team consisting of Ruth Webber
(Australian Catholic University), Michael Mason (Australian Catholic University),
Andrew Singleton (Monash University) and Philip Hughes (Christian Research Asso-
ciation). Several additional projects were developed in Lutheran, Catholic and gov-
ernment schools in Australia which have been collectively described as the Schools
Spirituality Project. This project has been the sole responsibility of the Christian
Research Association.
** The study in Thailand was funded by the Department of History, the Church
of Christ in Thailand and the Humanities Department, Mahidol University. The Thai
research team included Dr Philip Hughes, Associate Professor Parichart Suwan-
bubbha, and Janram Chaisri.
116 philip hughes

Thailand has a Muslim community predominantly in the southern

part of the country. The Islamic community has been in the south of
Thailand for three or four hundred years. Thailand also has a small
Christian community, predominantly in the north of the country. The
Christian community is constituted mostly of families who converted
to Christianity, many of whom did so in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Hence, many Christians come from a heritage of three or
four generations of Christian faith. There are, however, also many
Karen, other Sino-Tibetan and various tribal groups living in Thailand
who are Christian. Some of these people have assimilated into Thai
society, although others remain distinct in the locations of the villages;
their dress, language and religious beliefs.
Between 2005 and 2008, large parallel surveys of young people
were conducted in both Australia and Thailand. In Australia, the first
survey of young people aged between 13 and 24 was conducted by
telephone interviews of a randomly selected group. Other similar web
surveys have since been conducted among 5500 young people in 28
schools around Australia in a project known as the Schools Spiritual-
ity Project.
The Australian survey was used as the basis for the survey of young
people in Thailand. Because of the different proportions of major reli-
gions and the very different religious practices and beliefs, the Thai
version was built on the model of the Australian survey rather than
simply attempting a word-for-word translation. This survey was dis-
tributed in a paper form and was completed by 3000 young people
aged between 13 and 24. To ensure broad coverage of young people,
stratified distribution methods were used. The survey was distrib-
uted to groups of young people in schools, tertiary institutions and
places of work in the urban and rural sectors of the north, north-east,
central and southern parts of Thailand. This method ensured that the
sample included over-representation of the Muslim and Christian
communities, enabling analysis of these groups of young people, as
well as the Buddhists. For a more accurate national picture of Thai
young people, the data were weighted for age, gender, region, and
religious identification using the 2000 national Thai Census as the
benchmark.
Both surveys were supplemented by face-to-face interviews. In Thai-
land, 80 face-to-face interviews were undertaken with a variety of Bud-
dhist, Islamic and Christian young people. In Australia, approximately
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 117

Table 1. Religious Identification of Young People Aged 15 to 24 in the

Censuses of Australia and Thailand
Religious Group Australia (2006 Census) Thailand (2000 Census)
Buddhist 2% 93%
Christian 57% 1%
Islam 2% 6%
Other Religion 2%
No Religion 23% 0%
Religion Not Stated / 13% 0%
Not Adequately
Described
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 2006, Table 20030-tsp-
Australia.xls and National Statistical Office of the Thai Government 2000, National
Population and Housing Census 2000.

350 interviews were conducted. Some of these occurred prior to the

surveys and helped shape the language of the surveys. Others occurred
following the surveys, allowing the themes and issues that emerged in
the surveys to be further explored and clarified.
What might one expect of young people’s religiosity? Down through
the centuries, it has been assumed that most religious ideas and prac-
tices would be absorbed by the young person from the family in which
they are raised. Religious beliefs and practices, along with most other
beliefs, values and behaviors, are shaped by the direct influences on
the child in the process of growing up. The content of religious faith
is further developed through the explicit teaching of school and reli-
gious community. Religious beliefs and behavior are strengthened by
the peer community, perhaps as that peer community is organized
through the religious community. (For a contemporary account of the
range of influences on the religious faith of young people, see Benson
2006.)
Recent work on spiritual development in Australia has recognized
that most young people move through a period in which they formu-
late their own religious views as part of the process of determining
their own identity and their independence (Cupit 2001). This process
sometimes involves some form of rejection or modification of the par-
ents’ attitudes, beliefs and practices.
While parents have a considerable influence, personal experiences
also play a part; drawing some into religious faith and driving some
away from it. Young people react in various ways to experiences of
118 philip hughes

health and sickness, of challenging and easy times in life. The mass
media, peers, partners, and work colleagues may all have an impact.
However, the shape of religious faith is also a product of the shape
of the weltanschauung and culture itself as Mary Douglas (1996) has
well illustrated. As culture changes, so different forms of religious faith
become more or less attractive and meaningful to people. At the same
time religious faith finds its form in relation to particular social and
political realities. It is influenced by the way that a society seeks to use
religion to provide legitimation and support, for example. (See, for
example, Martin 2005).
This paper describes religion among young people in Australia
and Thailand through a description of beliefs and practices, mostly
as described by the comparative surveys described above. The beliefs
provide an entry into young people’s cosmology. The practices give
an indication of what religious faith looks like in terms of behavior.
Added to this description will be a section on values and religious
faith. There are two reasons to include an extended discussion of val-
ues. The first is that both Thai and Australian young people say that
the major importance of religious faith lies in the values that religion
supports and encourages. Thai young people commonly say that reli-
gion teaches us to be good people. Australian young people have indi-
cated in their surveys that the major importance of religious faith is
in encouraging people to care for one another. The second reason for
including it is that the consideration of religion and values provides a
window through which we can see religion interacting with the wider
understanding of what is important in life.

Beliefs

Within Australia, there is considerable variety in the responses that

young people give to questions about religion. When asked whether
they believe in God,

• 52% said they did,

• 20% said they did not, and
• 28% were not sure.

There was an ambiguity in the ‘not sure’ responses. Sometimes they

meant that young people were not sure what they believed. On other
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 119

occasions, they could mean that the young people were not sure
whether what they believed in could appropriately be described as God
or not.
In the telephone surveys, this question was followed up at some
length. If they did believe in God, did they think of God as personal
or impersonal? If they were not sure, did they believe in some kind of
higher being or universal force? If they believed in a higher being or
universal force; did that being or force care for them or not? Of those
who were not sure, 62 per cent thought there might be a higher power
of some kind, 16 per cent thought this was not the case, and 22 per
cent did not know.
Certainly, this exploration of the belief of young people led to a
reduction in the numbers indicating that they were not sure. Although
there were many who said they thought there was something out
there, they were not sure what. Their answers reflected the fact
that, while the Christian faith is, for most of them, part of their cul-
tural heritage, many were not at all sure about its claims and its details.
If there was something out there, more than two-thirds of them
were not convinced that it was ‘God’ as described by the Christian
faith.
Inquiry about other beliefs also provided high levels of uncer-
tainty. Some said they believed. Some said they did not. A significant
group indicated that they did not really know whether they believed
or not.

Table 2. Australian Young People’s Responses to Questions about Various

Religious and Spiritual Beliefs
Belief Affirm Belief Unsure Reject Belief
Life after death 46% 27% 27%
Existence of angels 42% 20% 38%
Existence of demons or evil 34% 16% 49%
spirits
Astrology 23% 20% 57%
Reincarnation, that people 26% 24% 50%
have lived previous lives
Power of psychics and 21% 22% 57%
fortune-tellers
Source: National Telephone Survey of Australian Young People (2005).
120 philip hughes

The table above demonstrates that there were substantial differences

in belief among young people with substantial groups of young people
saying that they did and did not believe in these things. There was also
a significant portion of young people—close to quarter of them—who
on most of these matters simply said they did not know. A high pro-
portion of those who say they do not know whether they believe in one
of the items also said they did not believe in the others.
There is a lack of agreement on the nature of the world we live
in beyond the world of the everyday and the world described by sci-
ence. Religion has moved from describing the world to providing an
account of an additional dimension of ontology. This addition is seen
as a personal option—you can believe in it if you want to.
Indeed, this personal right to believe what one chooses is fiercely
defended by many young people. They are more certain of that right
than they are of what they believe! This was well expressed by one
young Australian person in an interview.
[Religion at school] confuses me. We’re told to believe in things some-
times. Like at our assembly last year our principal pretty much told us
we had to believe in God and the Church. Kind of annoying because we
all feel that we want to believe in what we want to. I was kind of con-
fused. I just kind of thought we don’t have to do that because you tell
us to. (15 year-old girl)
Some Australian young people are fervently religious. Many of these
are associated with religious minority groups such as Pentecostal and
Baptist groups. Some are involved with a more mainstream group:
Catholic, Anglican, or Uniting Church. Others are involved in another
religion: Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, or Hinduism. About 17 per cent
of Australian young people are frequently involved in a religious com-
munity. Most of the Christian and Islamic young people believe in
a personal God. Some of those surveyed not only had few doubts
themselves but they considered it wrong to question beliefs. In inter-
views, many of these young people spoke about the God who cared
for them on a daily basis. God was someone to whom they could turn
for support or direction, someone who would help them out if life got
tough.
There is, then, considerable variation in the religious beliefs held
by young Australians. On the one end of the spectrum are those for
whom belief provides a framework for their thinking about life. ‘God’
comes into their thinking about daily events. They see God as oper-
ating in the everyday world, looking after them in their daily activi-
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 121

ties and intervening to ensure that they are kept safe. In Pentecostal
churches people regularly give witness to how God has blessed them
in daily life. They speak of the ways in which God has ensured that
their study or business have proceeded well. Some of these people see
themselves as living in a world in which there are opposing forces of
good and evil, personified in ‘God’ and in evil spirits.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who think there may
be something beyond the everyday world, which may have initiated
creation, but which is largely irrelevant to everyday life. Or perhaps
there is some sort of transcend force or power.
For most Australian young people who believe in God, God is benef-
icent. They speak of God as one who looks after them and cares for
them. But their belief in God does not provide them with an alter-
native way of seeing life to those who do not. Rather, ‘God’ is one
additional element in their world, and, much of the time, largely in
the background. For some Australian young people, belief in God is
not very different from belief that there is life on Mars. It is a specu-
lation, an interesting possibility, rather than a belief that provides a
framework for life or a different set of glasses through which the world
is seen.
The nature of religious and spiritual belief in Australian society can
be illustrated from a survey conducted among adults in 2002 by Edith
Cowan University, Deakin University and Anglicare (Sydney). The
survey asked people about the resources they might use in times of
sickness. A wide range of secular, religious and spiritual sources were
put before people.

• 91% said they were comfortable in using general practitioners

• 35% naturopathic remedies
• 23% herbal remedies and flower medicine
• 9% reiki
• 8% feng shui
• 5% healing rocks and crystals
• 2% natural magic like spell-casting
• 25% prayer
• 4% Christian faith healers.

In other words, in times of sickness, most people turn to the resource

that is rooted in the scientific world. About a third of the population
is open to some sorts of naturopathic medicine, often as an addition to
122 philip hughes

what is suggested by the general practitioner. A quarter of the popu-

lation would turn to prayer as a resource, but again, in addition to
the general practitioner. And few people would try other options
such as those from the New Age movement such as reiki and healing
rocks.
For most Australians, the everyday world is seen mostly in the
terms that science has provided. Most people operate in that world
through the resources that have been developed from the scientific
framework. But many are open to the idea that there may be other
forces and influences in the world that are not part of that scientific
framework.
That survey showed that just 54 per cent of those who said they
believed in a personal God would turn to God in prayer during times
of sickness. For many others, God may be conceived in personal
terms, but either there is little confidence in God, or God is seen as
supporting the regularities of the world rather than as intervening in
the events of daily life.
Fifteen per cent of those who said they believed in some sort of
higher spirit or force would use prayer in times of sickness as would
4 per cent of those who said they did not know what to believe about
God. This was discussed with young people in the supplementary
interviews. Those young people who said they did not believe in God
but who prayed usually explained their behavior in terms of ‘it might
work’.
Such attitudes throw light on the nature of religious belief among
young Australians. There is an openness to God and to other spiritual
elements. For most young Australians, religious beliefs do not provide
the major framework through which life is seen. Science provides a
much more comprehensive framework. But religion and alternative
spiritualities postulate some additional elements or forces beyond sci-
ence. Some believe these additional elements are important, others
feel that they are worth considering if one gets into difficulty. Others
ignore them altogether.
In the National Telephone Survey (2005), Australian young people
were asked whether it was okay to pick and choose religious beliefs
without having to accept the teachings as a whole. Seventy-five per
cent of them agreed that it was okay. Interviews confirmed that some
young people were doing exactly that. “I have my own ideas that I
have pieced together” said one 17 year-old male, “rational thinking,
Christianity, Catholicism”. Others spoke of consciously combining
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 123

beliefs and practices from Buddhism alongside Christianity, or draw-

ing on ideas from Indian yoga traditions. They saw no problem in
being eclectic.
In so doing, they may draw on what traditions they choose, tak-
ing from them whatever fits. As the social theorist, Anthony Giddens
(1991) describes, many see this as an on-going project. They were
not making life-time commitments, but working out what best suited
them at the time. Some young people spoke of the possibility of new
answers being found in the future (Hughes 2007, p. 127).
The attitudes of many Australian young people reflect the picture
that Giddens (1991) draws of young people constructing their sense
of self as a continuing reflexive project. This process of construction of
something that is meaningful to them, rather than absorbing a system
of meaning their parents or community hand down to them, is a prod-
uct of post-traditionalism. Its roots can be found in the ways in which
children are brought up in contemporary Western societies where they
are taught from an early age to think for themselves, to work out what
they themselves think, what they want in life, rather than being taught
to accept what is given to them. It reflects a world which regards very
positively the critical and independent analysis individuals bring to
each situation.
At the same time, it reflects attitudes to religion in contemporary
Australia where it is seen as something personal. It is seen as fine for
those who are “into that sort of thing”, but there is no problem if it is
simply off the radar. Many contemporary Australians treat religion as
they would treat many other personal interests such as horse-riding
or playing lacrosse. If that is what you are into, that is fine for you. It
is an attitude which Smith and Denton have recently observed among
American young people (Smith and Denton 2005, p. 144).
The surveys and interviews found that not many young Australians
were strongly opposed to religion. They were concerned about extrem-
ism. Religion could be harmful, most of them said, but in moderate
doses, if that’s what turns you on, that’s fine for you.
Their attitudes also demonstrate the fact that most Australians see
religious faith as something personal. Few expect it to be part of the
public arena. While there are many politicians who have strong reli-
gious beliefs, Australians do not expect them to bring religion into
their politics. Religious principles do not generally form the basis for
politicians, social commentators, or others engaging in the public
square.
124 philip hughes

In Thailand, religion has not become privatized in quite the same

way. Politicians are expected to be religious. The King is the head of
religion and engages in a number of important public rituals. In the
public arena, Thai political structures are legitimized by reference to
Buddhist precepts and principles. Religion, and particularly Buddhism,
is considered inimical to the Thai national identity (Jackson 2002).
Reflecting this widespread affirmation of religion in Thailand, more
than 99.5 per cent of the 3000 young people we surveyed identified
with one major religion or another. Yet, many Thai young people
expressed doubts about the details of belief systems of the religions
with which they identified as shown in the following table.
The levels of doubt among the Thai Buddhist young people in the
major tenets of their religion were greater than among the Australians.
While few Thai young people rejected these major aspects of belief,
around half of them were not sure about belief in nirvana, karma,
and reincarnation. Nearly two-thirds are unsure about the existence
of heaven.
As in Australia, some Thai young people were confident of what they
believed. Forty per cent of young Buddhists confidently affirmed belief
in karma and reincarnation and 30 per cent in nirvana. In the religious
minority groups, basic beliefs were more widely held and there is not
the same level of doubt. Eighty per cent of young Thai Christians and
Muslims said they believed in God. Seventy-seven per cent of Muslims
and 73 per cent of Christians said they believed in heaven.
Despite their strong beliefs in their own religions, many Christian
and Islamic Thai young people remained open to some Buddhist
notions. Fifty-seven per cent of Christians and 43 per cent of Muslims
reject the notion of reincarnation. Nine per cent of Christians and
30 per cent of Muslims said they believed in it. Thirty-four per cent of
Christians and 27 per cent of Muslims said they were not sure.

Table 3. Responses of Thai Young People to Various Aspects of Religious

Belief
Belief Affirm Belief Not Sure Reject Belief
Reincarnation 41% 50% 9%
Heaven 28% 62% 10%
Nirvana 29% 59% 12%
Old karma 41% 48% 11%
Source: Survey on Religion of Thai Young People (2007).
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 125

Astrology is widely practiced by Buddhists although 62 per cent of

Buddhist young people said they were not sure of its validity. While
belief in it was affirmed by only 10 per cent of Christians and 12 per
cent of Muslims (compared with 28 per cent of Buddhists), another
35 per cent of Christians and 29 per cent of Muslims were ‘not sure’.
The patterns of response to karma among Christians and Muslims
were similar. While between 53 and 60 per cent of them rejected the
concept of karma, many were unsure and a few were happy to affirm it.
It is possible that these Thai young people are not affirming these
beliefs as part of their own beliefs but are indicating that they are open
to such ideas as appropriate for the people of other religions. In inter-
views that we conducted in Thailand, when we asked Buddhists about
Jesus or Christians about Buddha, they would generally simply say,
‘he is not of my religion’. They were not rejecting the other religion:
it simply was not theirs. In the national survey, 63 per cent of Thai
young people affirmed the statement ‘There is truth in all religions’.
Another 31 per cent said they were not sure or did not know.
In his interpretation of the Thai weltanschauung, Niels Mulder
(1992, chapter 2), argues that it consists of two fundamental arenas.
He describes these as the arena of moral goodness and the arena of
a-moral power. Buddhism, he says, dominates the arena of moral
goodness, virtue and wisdom, in its teaching about the Eightfold Path
and the ways to achieve liberation from the human condition of suffer-
ing (1992, p. 28). This teaching assumes the impersonal law of karma,
the law of moral causality.
The second arena of the Thai weltanschauung, he argues, is that of
‘power’ such as that of the spirits who are believed to be present every-
where and who can impact what happens in daily life. Every home,
office, hotel, village, town, school and university has a spirit shrine to
the ‘Lord of the place’, the local ruler. Thai people pay their respects
to these local rulers in return for their protection and wellbeing.
University students pay their respects to the local spirit ruler with the
hope that it may lead to better results in examinations. Business peo-
ple pay their respects with the hope that it may benefit the business.
Mostly these spirits are seen as benevolent, although they each have
their likes and dislikes and can be easily offended if they are ignored.
On the other hand, there are some that are dangerous and unpredict-
able and amulets are used to guard against their power.
Many spirits are believed to be the continuing presence of people
who have died. People seek the patronage of some of these spirits in a
126 philip hughes

way that can develop into a ‘cult’. In recent years, the spirit of the King
Rama V has become a major focus. Crowds of Bangkok people flock to
his statue to pay their respects and to seek his patronage and help.
The belief in spirits has its roots in animism. However, the lines
between animism and Buddhism are not clearly drawn in the Thai
understanding of the world. Buddha images, Buddhist stupas, and
Buddhist amulets, for example, are seen as sources of ‘a-moral’ power.
Indeed, there is no clear distinction between the respect for the spir-
itual power of the Buddha image and the respect for the Buddhist
teaching as represented by the image of the Buddha in the practices
and beliefs of most Thai people.
In a different way, the Christian and Islamic faiths also combine
such concepts of spiritual power and moral goodness. God is seen as
having greater power than any of the local spirits by the Christians
and Moslems. Allegiance to God supersedes obligations to the local
spirits. Indeed, some Thai who have become Christians have done so
as a way of dealing with local spirits with whom it was thought they
had developed bad relationships (Hughes 1982).
As shown in the following table, belief in the ‘house spirits’ which
has been a traditional part of the world for most Thai people is simi-
larly affirmed, doubted or rejected. There is some ambiguity about the
responses of people. They are not necessarily rejecting the existence of
the house spirits or the power of amulets. The responses may reflect
more a lack of confidence in how powerful spirits and amulets really
are. Many Thai young people continue to wear amulets and pay their
respects at the shrines of the spirits. Perhaps some do this in the same
spirit as some young Australians who pray; just in case it works. At
the same time, there is evidently a lot of doubt as to how important
are such powers in everyday life.

Table 4. Responses among Thai Young People to a Question on Belief in

the Power of the House Spirits
Response Buddhists Christians Muslims
Affirm belief 32% 11% 10%
Not sure 55% 31% 35%
Reject belief 12% 58% 52%
Source: Survey on Religion of Thai Young People (2007).
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 127

Table 5. Responses among Thai Young People to a Question on Belief in

the Power of Amulets
Response Buddhists Christians Muslims
Affirm belief 25% 8% 8%
Not sure 63% 35% 36%
Reject belief 12% 57% 56%
Source: Survey on Religion of Thai Young People (2007).

Religion does provide a little more of the framework of thinking for

most Thai young people. For many if not most Christians and Islamic
people, God is an active agent in the affairs of everyday life. For most
Thai Buddhists and some Christians and Islamic young people, the
moral causality of karma is seen as part of the way the world works.
While many accept the world as described by science and will turn to a
scientifically trained medical doctor in times of illness, moral causality
is seen as an additional factor, perhaps alongside the influence of local
house or village spirits, and perhaps the Great Spirit, God or Allah.
Religion and science are not seen as exclusive accounts of the world
but as describing different parts of it.
The idea of constructing their own beliefs is not one that young Thai
people contemplate or one that makes sense to them. Beliefs belong
to the religious traditions. They may have doubts about the details
of those traditions, but they are not free to de-construct them or to
construct their own faith using elements of them. Thai young people
see their identity as given to them rather than as constructed by them
and religion is one of those given elements. Movement from one reli-
gion to another is quite rare despite persistent attempts of evangelism
by Thai Protestant Christians. In our sample of 3000 young people,
70 had moved from Buddhism to Christianity and 20 from Christian-
ity to Buddhism. Just 4 young people had moved between Buddhism
and Islam.
On the other hand, the religious traditions are not simply being
accepted. As we have noted, there is widespread doubt about even
basic religious doctrines. If such doubt is not part of a general criti-
cal approach to religion arising out of it being seen as something
that can be constructed by the individual, then it signals that Thai
religious traditions are not sitting easily with other parts of the Thai
cosmology.
128 philip hughes

A couple of clues may be found in some responses to other questions.

Fifty per cent of young Thai people affirmed that science and religion
teach differently about the world. Another 36 per cent of young people
did not know whether they taught differently about the world or not.
Certainly, as Thailand becomes increasingly urbanized, its ways of life
dominated by contemporary technology, and its education focused on
a scientific understanding of the world, religious traditions are fitting
less comfortably in the world of young people.
The other problem is an internal one. Fifty-two per cent of Thai
young people said that the behavior of Thai religious leaders had
reduced their confidence in religion. Another 33 per cent were not
sure if it had reduced their confidence or not. There have been many
cases which have made the national media of religious leaders abusing
their power either financially or sexually. As in other parts of the reli-
gious world, such cases have had a considerable impact on the general
attitudes young people have to religion. There is considerable ferment
in contemporary Thai Buddhism including the development of a range
of reformist movements.

Religious Practices

Religious practices of Thai Buddhists and Australian Christians cannot

be easily compared because the practices and expectations are quite dif-
ferent in the two religions and two cultures. Thai Buddhism has never
expected weekly involvement of young people as have many Christian
denominations. On the other hand, it has been expected of young men
that they will be ordained as monks, or at least as novices, for a short
time in their lives as a period of intensive focus on religious faith.
In the survey of young people, 57 per cent of young male Buddhists
said they had been ordained. The ordination of women as nuns also
takes place but the expectations of women to do this are not as strong.
Twenty-one per cent of women in our sample had been ordained as
nuns. The period for which the person remains ordained can vary
greatly. Most are ordained for three months to one year. However,
others remain ordained for a life time.
Almost all Buddhist young people in Thailand said that they had
‘made merit’ sometime in the last twelve months. However, only 21
per cent said they had done so in the last month. There are many ways
of making merit. One of the most common is giving money or gifts
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 129

of some kind to a religious organization. Each day, monks walk the

streets of their village or city collecting the gifts of food from the local
people which constitute their supplies for the day. Ninety per cent of
the Buddhists said they had given food to the monks in the last year,
although only 17 per cent had done so in the last month. One member
of the family, often a female member, may be assigned this task on
behalf of the whole family.
Another means of making merit is by freeing caged birds or ani-
mals. Indeed, birds are caught for this purpose so that merit can be
made by freeing them. Eighty per cent of the Buddhists said they had
done this in the past year. Attending a service in a temple is another
way of making merit and 77 per cent had done that within the last
year, although only 10 per cent in the past month.
Some personal ceremonies are performed on special occasions such
as birthdays. Many Buddhists walk, perhaps with family or a group of
friends, around the holy stupa (or chedi) of a temple, meditating on
the Buddhist faith. Eighty-three per cent of Buddhists said that they
had performed such a practice within the past year. Thirteen per cent
had done so in the past month.
The major personal private practice is that of meditation. Again,
most Buddhists engaged in such practices occasionally: 83 per cent
said they had meditated by themselves within the past year. However,
only a few practice meditation on a daily or weekly basis. Eighteen per
cent said they had meditated within the last month.
Most Buddhist young people practice their faith from time to time.
More than half of all Thai men are ordained as monks for an intensive
focus on religious faith at least once in a life-time. They attend major
religious ceremonies. They occasionally engage in such personal public
practices as circulating the stupas. Most meditate occasionally and a
few do so frequently. In interviews with Buddhist young people, many
said that they were more actively involved in Buddhist activities when
younger. Many practice meditation and participate in some Buddhist
ceremonies at school or with their families. However, many reported
that, as they grew older, the pressures of work and study made it more
difficult to maintain high levels of involvement.
Islamic young people seem to manage a higher level of involvement
in religious practices, however. Within the past month,

• 56% said they had read the Koran,

• 44% had fasted,
130 philip hughes

• 31% had prayed in a mosque, and

• 25% had prayed by themselves.

Thai Christians also have high levels of involvement. Within the past
month,

• 67% said they had attend a service in a church,

• 65% had prayed by themselves,
• 57% had read the Bible, and
• 49% had attended a Christian youth group.

In Christianity in Australia, different denominations have different

expectations of what is practiced. Catholics are taught to attend Mass
every week. Most Pentecostals and Baptists are involved in a small
group during the week as well as attending a service on Sunday. In
the Uniting Church, attendance is often less than weekly, while among
Anglicans and the Orthodox, it is not unusual for people to attend
special festivals such as Christmas and Easter and only occasionally
at other times.
Overall, the National Telephone Survey of young people, among
those who identified with a Christian denomination and believed in
God found that,

• 50% said they prayed at least monthly and 28 per cent daily,
• 24% read the Scriptures, and
• 31% attended religious services.

Note, however, that 33 per cent of those who identified with a Chris-
tian denomination did not indicate they definitely believed in God and
were not asked. The actual proportions of the population engaging in
these practices, then, is likely to be a little higher than the figures here
suggest.
Rates of involvement among some young people are very much
higher. Fifty per cent of young people associated with Pentecostal
or Baptist churches, for example, attended church services monthly
or more often compared with less than half that proportion among
Anglicans, Catholic, and Orthodox.
Some young people had tried practices associated with other forms
of spirituality such as yoga and Eastern meditation. Fourteen per cent
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 131

said they had, at some point, intensively practiced yoga and 10 per
cent had intensively practiced Eastern meditation. However, not all
of these young people were practicing at the time of the survey. Inter-
views suggested that some had been encouraged by family members,
or occasionally friends, to try these practices. In many cases, these
practices were adopted as techniques to enhance physical health or
mental wellbeing.
Interviews revealed a widespread acceptance of there being a spiri-
tual dimension to life, and some young people were open to spiritual-
ity but were not open to religion. However, there was little evidence
of widespread involvement in alternative spiritual practices for spiri-
tual purposes. A range of New Age and other practices became com-
mon in Australia in the 1970s as part of the rebellion of the time
against traditional religion. Over recent decades, this rebellion has
weakened in its intensity and the New Age ideas have largely dissi-
pated into this general acceptance of the language of wellbeing. Addi-
tionally, a general interest in such practices as yoga and meditation
has happened in other parts of the world (Heelas and Seel 2003). For
young people, New Age ideas do not mark out a clear alternative to
Christian faith nor provide a distinctive set of practices. Many Chris-
tians practiced yoga and some combined Eastern, Christian and other
practices.
Another survey of the adult population in 2002 found that 4 per
cent of young people aged 18 to 29 were practicing Eastern medita-
tion, but that was no different from the proportion of people in their
50s who were practicing it. A similar proportion had participated in
a New Age seminar or workshop, but again the proportions were no
different from those of any other age group. About 9 per cent had read
New Age materials in the last 12 months, but again, the proportion
was similar to that in older age groups. As Eileen Barker comments
on English data, ‘spirituality’ means different things to different peo-
ple and is not a systematic or well-developed package (Barker 2008,
p. 200). Indeed, spirituality is generally regarded in an eclectic way in
that concepts and practices from different traditions of Buddhist and
Hindu, neo-pagan, environmental and first nation sources may play
some part.
Some authors have identified some of the cults that have emerged
recently in the Thai context, such as that which surrounded Rama
V, to be ‘New Age’ (Ekachai, 2001). In some ways, they share the
132 philip hughes

characteristic that they are not under the control of traditional reli-
gious authorities, that they tend to be developed as a personal passion.
On the other hand, they fit more comfortably into the Thai animistic
heritage rather than the Western New Age movement in that they are
seen as additional to traditional religion rather than alternative, that
they focus on particular spirits rather than a generalized spirituality
and they are not inherently eclectic in style as is the Western New
Age movement.
Yet, religion continues to be practiced in both places. Those whose
identity is formed by their involvement in minority religious groups
tend to have high levels of involvement in religious practices. Those
who belong to mainstream religious movements in both places tend
to have lower levels of involvement.
Among those who describe themselves as Christian in Australia,
there are, in fact, higher rates of practice than among Buddhists in
Thailand. While the most common practice is making merit (which
covers a multitude of possibilities) among Thai Buddhists, only 21 per
cent had done so in the last month, while 31 per cent of Australian
Christians had attend a church.

Values

In a national survey conducted in 1998, 55 per cent of Australians

said that the primary importance to them about religion was that it
gave them their values (Hughes and Bond 2003, p. 6) Even if they are
not sure about the existence of God, many Australian adults feel that
religion does encourage the values of care and compassion which are
seen as the basis of community and family life.
Some values are seen as important for social life but are not tightly
related to religion, however. Among these are tolerance and broad-
mindedness. Indeed, extreme religious views are seen as antithetical to
such values. The fact that some religious people are narrow-minded in
their acceptance of others, such as gay people, and some religions have
restrictive practices in regard to others, such as not allowing women to
take roles of leadership, means that religion is not affirmed broadly as
essential to the functioning of society. When asked about their opposi-
tion to religion, one-third of Australian adults said that they did not
agree with some of the values religions espouse (Bellamy, Black et al.
2002).
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 133

Young Australians are almost unanimous in saying that life is pri-

marily for enjoyment. Ninety-two per cent of the young Australians
surveyed in National Telephone Survey affirmed the statement that
‘the thing is to enjoy life and to make the best of it here and now’.
Interviews suggested that part of that enjoyment is feeling good about
one’s self, part of it is having good friends and good relationships
with the family, and another dimension is found in exciting activi-
ties. These, then, are the major components of the ‘good life’ and are
reflected in the values that were affirmed in the National Telephone
Survey and in the school-based spirituality surveys. In measuring val-
ues, a methodology based on the work of Milton Rokeach and modi-
fied by Salem Schwartz was used (Schwartz 1994). It involved asking
young people to score the importance of a range of values on a scale
from 1 to 10.
In both Thai and Australian questionnaires, questions were asked
about the influence of religion in daily life. The following table pres-
ents the comparative priority of values of young people who say that
religion has ‘no influence’, ‘some influence’, and ‘a lot of influence’ on
their daily lives.

Table 6. Mean Scores of the Importance of Various Values of Australian Young People
by the Extent to which They Claimed Religion Influenced Their Lives (Scale of 1 to 10
with 10 being Most Important)
Order of Mean Little or No Influence Some Influence by A Lot of Influence by
Priorities by Religion Religion Religion
1 Exciting life (8.56) Family (9.18) Family (9.46)
2 Family (8.46) Friends (8.78) Helping Others (8.81)
3 Friends (8.44) Exciting life (8.47) Friends (8.75)
4 Helping others (7.37) Helping others (8.23) Exciting life (8.74)
5 World peace (7.06) World peace (7.89) World peace (8.10)
6 Having money (6.95) National security (7.30) National security (7.55)
7 National security Social justice (7.24) Social justice (7.51)
(6.77)
8 Social justice (6.52) Care of the Spiritual life (7.33)
environment (6.88)
9 Care of environment Having money (6.39) Care of the
(6.05) environment (7.21)
10 Spiritual life (3.97) Spiritual life (6.38) Having money (6.31)
Source: Web-based school surveys in the Schools Spirituality Project.
134 philip hughes

The above table shows that, in general, the priority of various values
for those who say that religion influences them a lot and of those who
say it does not influence them are similar. In all three groups, the most
important values associated with personal life were family, friends and
excitement. These are the fundamental components for a good life and
are deeply rooted in the psyche of Australian young people.
The major four characteristics Australian young people want for the
world in which they live are:

• a world at peace
• a secure world (national security)
• a socially just world, and
• a world in which the environment is sustainable.

For all three groups, the order of priority of these characteristics

was identical. ‘Helping others’ was high on the list of priorities in
all groups, reflecting the fact that most Australian young people see
this as a major way of making the sort of world in which they want
to live.
In other words, it would appear that some of the basic priorities in
values among Australian young people are not influenced greatly by
religious faith. There are good arguments to say that they are devel-
oped within the early processes of child-rearing and are embedded in
the language that the child learns (see Douglas 1996, p. 62).
However, there are some differences in the list which are attrib-
utable to the influence of religion. The first was that the greater the
claimed influence of religion, the higher the scores for almost all
the values, irrespective of the fact that the list of priorities is similar.
Religion appears to give ‘moral seriousness’ to life. It contributed to
a higher scoring of the importance of most values, particularly the
pro-social values of family and friends. Most notable was the higher
priority given to helping others among those influenced more by reli-
gion. Not surprisingly, the value of the spiritual life was also affirmed
much more strongly by those who saw themselves as influenced by
religion. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the priority of ‘the spiri-
tual life’ in the total series of values was not far from the bottom of
the list even among those who said that they were influenced a lot by
religion.
Two other values had higher priority among those who were not
influenced by religion more among those who were: an ‘exciting life’
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 135

and ‘having lots of money’. Both of these values are associated with the
enhancement of personal life. Having money is often seen as opposed
to ‘spirituality’ in as far as ‘spirituality’ has to do with the non-material
dimension of life while money lies at the heart of the material dimen-
sion. ‘Excitement’ has to do with the search for a good life for oneself
through personal experience. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
the actual score for the importance of excitement was higher among
those who said they were influenced greatly by religion than by those
who said they were not.
A longer list drawn from the same values set was presented to the
Thai young people. The table below presents the list of values in order
of priority for those who said they were not influenced by religion,
compared with those who were influenced to some extent and those
who were influenced a lot.

Table 7. Mean Scores of the Importance of Various Values of Thai Young People by the
Extent to which They Claimed Religion Influenced Their Lives (Scale of 1 to 10 with 10
being Most Important)
Order of Mean Little or No Influence Some Influence by A Lot of Influence by
Priorities by Religion Religion Religion
1 Family (8.00) Family (8.18) Peaceful world (8.56)
2 Friends (7.84) Peaceful world (8.16) Inner peace (8.56)
3 Equality (7.80) Inner peace (8.00) Family (8.50)
4 Freedom (7.68) Cooperation (7.76) Equality (8.38)
5 Success (7.58) Equality (7.70) Cooperation (8.34)
6 Peaceful world (7.58) Success (7.68) Friends (8.26)
7 Cooperation (7.26) Friends (7.64) Religious faith (8.22)
8 Inner peace (7.18) National security Success (8.18)
(7.54)
9 Politeness (7.02) Freedom (7.34) National security
(8.12)
10 Creativity (6.84) Politeness (7.10) Politeness (7.92)
11 National security (6.74) Religion (6.94) Freedom (7.76)
12 Helping others (6.50) Beauty of the Helping others (7.20)
environment (6.38)
13 Exciting life (6.50) Helping others (6.30) Creativity (7.10)
14 Having lots of money Creativity (6.28) Beauty of the
(6.48) environment (7.06)
15 Beauty of the Having lots of money Having lots of money
environment (6.32) (6.16) (6.30)
16 Religious faith (6.22) Exciting life (5.56) Exciting life (5.84)
Source: Thai Spirituality Survey (2007).
136 philip hughes

The predominant picture of values in all three groups is similar. In

all three groups, the major elements of a good life include family and
friends, cooperation, equality, a peaceful world, and inner peace. The
Thai world focuses on a peaceful and harmonious existence at every
level:

• world peace,
• peace in the society (as indicated by the importance of cooperation)
• harmonious relationships with friends and family
• inner peace.

There are a range of characteristics of society which assist in achieving

that sort of world:

• equality
• cooperation among people
• politeness
• national security, and
• helping others.

The order of priority of these values is similar in each list as for Aus-
tralian young people.
As in Australia, religious faith adds ‘moral seriousness’ to the values.
Most values were affirmed more strongly by those who said they were
influenced by religion than by those who were not. There were three
values in the list which had high priority among those for whom reli-
gion was seen as more influential: inner peace, and, to a lesser extent,
world peace, and religious faith.
Several values to do with the enhancement of the life of the indi-
vidual have higher priority among those who are not influenced by
religion: freedom, success, and creativity. All three have to do with
the enhancement of the individual life rather than social relationships,
suggesting that religion does have some influence in encouraging
social rather than individual life.
While religion is often used in the legitimating of values, the value
systems of young Thai people are not based on specific religious teach-
ing or doctrines. This is illustrated in the comparison of the values
of Thai Buddhists, Christians and Muslims as shown in the following
table.
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 137

Table 8. Mean Scores of the Importance of Various Values of Thai Young People by
Religious Identification (Scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being Most Important)
Priority Buddhist Christian Muslim
1 Family (8.28) Family (8.78) Family (8.02)
2 Peaceful world (8.26) Inner peace (8.56) Peaceful world (7.86)
3 Inner peace (8.16) Peaceful world (8.54) Cooperation (7.80)
4 Cooperation (7.92) Cooperation (8.40) Equality (7.76)
5 Equality (7.92) Good friends (8.38) Inner peace (7.74)
6 Success (7.88) Equality (8.36) Religious faith (7.70)
7 Good friends (7.86) Success (8.22) Good friends (7.50)
8 National security (7.74) Politeness (8.20) Politeness (7.48)
9 Freedom (7.54) Religious faith (8.10) Success (7.40)
10 Politeness (7.32) Helping others (8.02) National security (7.16)
11 Religious faith (7.28) National security (8.00) Freedom (6.84)
12 Beauty of the environment Freedom (7.58) Helping others (6.82)
(6.64)
13 Creativity (6.56) Creativity (7.46) Creativity (6.64)
14 Helping others (6.52) Beauty of the Beauty of the
environment (7.02) environment (6.24)
15 Exciting life 6.56) Exciting life (7.00) Exciting life (5.56)
16 Lots of money (6.36) Lots of money (5.64) Lots of money (5.54)
Source: Thai Spirituality Survey (2007).

Young people of all three religious groups affirmed most strongly sim-
ilar values of family, peaceful world, inner peace, and a peaceful soci-
ety (as indicated by the importance of cooperation) and good friends.
Also affirmed strongly as means to achieve these peaceful environ-
ment were equality, politeness, national security, and helping others,
approximately in that order.
Most young people also want to be successful. This means success
in their studies and getting a good job. For many young people, the
desire for success is often closely tied to their sense of a harmonious
family life and has to do with being able to help their parents, siblings,
and in the long term, their own family. Other values associated with
self-enhancement generally have a lower rating: creativity, an exciting
life, and having lots of money.
There were a few areas in which the different religious groups had
different value priorities. The Buddhists rated more highly than the
other two groups the values of national security, success and free-
dom. Muslims and Christians tended to place greater importance on
religious and pro-social values than Buddhists. These differences can
 138 philip hughes

be explained in terms of the higher level of importance given to reli-

gion by Christians and Muslims than by Buddhists, partly because of
the ‘sect-type’ qualities of Christianity and Islam in the Thai context.
One place where explicit religious teaching may have an impact is the
higher value that Christians place on ‘helping others’.
The final illustration of the comparative impact of culture and reli-
gion on values is provided by a comparison of the values of Christians
in both countries. The status of Christianity in Thailand and Australia
is, of course, different in that Christianity is a minority religion with
low levels of nominalism in Thailand and a majority religion with high
levels of nominalism in Australia. In order to ensure the most accurate
comparison, the following table presents the values only of those Thai
and Australian Christians who attended church services monthly or
more often.
In many respects, the values of Thai Christians sit between those of
Australian Christians and Thai Buddhists. Family life is the top of the
list for both groups and in both countries. World peace is important
and is high on the list for all three groups, but highest in priority
among the Thai Buddhists.
The most striking differences between the Thai and Australian Chris-
tians are the place of having an exciting life and having good friends.
These are much more central to the understanding of the good life

Table 9. Values of Christians Who Attended Church Monthly or More Often in Australia
and Thailand and Values of Thai Buddhists Who Made Merit Monthly or More Often
Order of Priority Australia Christians Thai Christians Thai Buddhists
of Mean Scores
1 Family life (9.14) Family life (8.94) Family life (8.42)
2 Good friends (8.61) Cooperation (8.64) World peace (8.39)
3 Exciting life (8.19) World peace (8.58) Good friends (8.18)
4 World peace (7.91) Helping others (8.46) Cooperation (8.12)
5 Helping others (7.91) Good friends (8.44) National security (8.00)
6 Social justice (6.98) Religious faith (8.26) Religious faith (7.70)
7 National security National security Beauty of the
(6.82) (8.16) environment (7.12)
8 Spiritual life (6.76) Exciting life (7.02) Helping others (6.80)
9 Lots of money (6.29) Beauty of the Lots of money (6.38)
environment (7.00)
10 Care of the Lots of money (5.42) Exciting life (6.00)
environment (5.5)
Source: Thai Spirituality Survey (2007).
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 139

among Australian young people than among Thai. Religion is more

important to Thai young people than the spiritual life is for Austra-
lians. Note that there is no common word in Thai which is equivalent
to ‘spiritual’ in the Western context. The closest term is the word that
is used as the root of ‘psychology’: describing the ‘soul’ or spiritual
dimension of human life, a dimension that is simply part of human
life for the Thai, not a quality of life to be developed or enhanced as
it is for some Westerners. This fact, in itself, illustrates how values are
partly a product of the language. The language available has a very
significant influence on a culture’s values. Religious traditions interact
with these values rather than being the sole or even major source.

Discussion and Conclusions

In both Australia and Thailand a variety of attitudes to religion among

young people can be found. Some young people say religion is very
important while, for others, it has little, if any, importance. Based on
responses to the question ‘How important is religion in influencing
how you live?’ one can roughly distinguish the following groups.

Table 10. Different Attitudes to Religion among Thai and Australian Young
People (Estimated Percentage of the Total Populations of Young People)
Attitudes to Religion Thai Young People Australian Young People
among Different Groups
in the Population
Members of minority 5% 3%
religious groups who
say religion is very
important to them
Members of major 30% 14%
religious groups who
say religion is very
important to them
Those who say religion 60% 23%
is of moderate
importance to them
Those who say religion 5% 60%
has little or no
importance to them
Sources: Survey of Religion among Thai Young People (2007) and National Telephone
Survey of Australian Young People on Spirituality (2005).
140 philip hughes

In both countries, there are some young people who value religion
much more than others do. Those who belong to minority religious
groups generally rate the importance of religion far higher than those
who belong to majority religious groups. When religion provides them
with an identity over against the larger population, and/or when it
contributes to people feeling different from others marks social bound-
aries, then it tends to have greater importance to the members of reli-
gious groups. In Thailand, 80 per cent of Moslems and 60 per cent
of Christians said religion had a strong influence on how they lived,
compared with 32 per cent of the Buddhists. Similarly, in Australia,

• 74% of Baptists and Churches of Christ,

• 58 % of Pentecostals,
• 50% of Muslims, compared with
• 20% of Catholics and
• 19% of Anglicans said that religion had a great influence on how
they lived.

However, the importance of religious faith among minority religious

groups does not explain why religion has so much greater importance
among Thai young people than among Australian young people, or
why there is such a large group of Australian young people for whom
religion has little or no importance compared with Thailand.
The greater importance of religion in Thailand could be explained
in many ways. In Thailand, religion is seen as one of the three pillars
of Thai society and is considered an important part of being Thai. It is
seen as part of the social fabric contributing to moral values. On the
other hand, in Australia, religious faith is also widely seen as contrib-
uting to moral values, particularly the values of care and compassion
for others. What we have found, however, is that the values of those
who say they are influenced by religion are not very different from
those who say religion has very little or no influence on them although
religion is associated with taking moral values seriously, particular
pro-social and spiritual values.
It could be argued that religious faith is more integrated with basic
perceptions of life in Thailand than in Australia. There is widespread
belief in karma, or moral causality, among Thai young people which is
a way in which religion can be seen to contribute to moral seriousness.
Religion is also seen as providing guidance and direction in terms of
achieving the harmonious and peaceful life that Thai people aspire to.
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 141

It provides methods for achieving inner peace. It teaches good will and
politeness and cooperation which contribute to social harmony.
The primary understanding of the ‘good life’ among Australian
young people is rooted in the desire for a personal life that is enjoy-
able. Such a life, it is believed, is found through positive feelings about
the self, good friends and excitement in life. This understanding is
not related to religion and is seen by many people as contrary to the
ascetic and other-centered life that religious faith upholds as the ideal.
If religion fits into this understanding of the good life at all for Aus-
tralian young people, it is as the source of beneficent power which can
assist when the ‘good life’ is threatened.

Australian Approaches to Religion and Post-Traditionalism

The weaker status that religion has among Australian young people
could also be seen as evidence of the impact of modernity, or that the
processes of secularization are much more advanced in Australia than
in Thailand. Such an explanation suggests that one might expect reli-
gious faith to decline in importance in the future in both locations.
The vagueness about so many aspects of religious belief among Aus-
tralians could be taken as evidence of a weakening sense of the tran-
scendent as young people focus on the enjoyment of the here and now,
and see the means to this primarily in finding a place in the economy.
However, a closer look at the figures shows that the attitudes of young
Australians are not very different from that of their parents. There is
little evidence of an even, continuing slide into ‘no religion’. Rather,
there was a major cultural shift in the late 1960s and 1970s when many
people rejected religious faith, either for alternative forms of spiritual-
ity, or for a hedonistic life, or secularism (Hughes 1994). The results of
that cultural shift are still being worked out in the attitudes of young
people to religion today.
That shift can be loosely described as a movement into ‘post-tradi-
tionalism’. At the roots of the movement were declines in the size of
families (made possible by the availability of the pill) in which parents
then sought to cater for the needs of each individual child rather than
seeking the wellbeing of the family as a unit. From the earliest age,
children were asked to express their own preferences and opinions
rather than be subservient to the opinions and preferences of their
guardians and elders. Education sought to enhance the critical and
creative dimensions of this individual approach to life.
142 philip hughes

As traditions of many kinds, including those of the role of women

in the family and the nature of marriage, were critiqued, religious tra-
ditions were also questioned. As a consequence, religious faith among
Australian young people has become a personal option rather than
part of the accepted heritage. It also became seen as something the
individual could construct as the whole approach to life became a per-
sonal, reflexive construction. In these ways, the approaches to religious
faith among young people in Australia today reflect these general pat-
terns in the approach to life.
In many respects, most Australian young people take an approach
to life that ignores religion, and, for that matter, spirituality. But only
14 per cent of young people take what Barker would describe as a
‘hard secular’ approach in which God or a higher power is specifically
rejected. Rather, the majority of young Australians either fall into the
apathetic secular category, a category of disinterest in religion and spiri-
tuality rather than antagonism, or a soft secular category which is open
to spirituality but not frequently involved in traditional religions.
Some Australian young people do express some interest in spiritual
practices such as Eastern meditation and yoga but less than 4 per cent
are taking such practices seriously as providing not only techniques
for good health but a framework for thinking about life. Some young
people specifically entertain New Age ideas and read New Age books,
but again, these provide additional ways of seeing life and means
to holistic wellbeing rather than providing the basis for ontology or
values.
A few young people are involved in new religious movements from
Wicca to Eckankar. The Australian Census (2006) reported 8,208
involved in Wicca and 682 in Eckankar. The total number of Aus-
tralian young people involved such groups Australia wide is about
12,000, a tiny fraction of the population.
There is a fascination with ideas such as reincarnation and karma,
although interviews suggest that it is little more than a fascination.
Few young people embrace these concepts as part of an all encompass-
ing framework of how life operates. Rather, many young people feel
that there may be some truth in them and find occasional evidence of
their validity.
In the terms used by Douglas in identifying societies and their
respective cosmologies, Australia is weak in terms of the ‘social grid’
or shared systems of classification and weak in terms of ‘group’, the
pressure that individuals are able to exert over others. The radical
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 143

individualism of Australian society and the sense of egalitarianism

in regards to social pressures mean that religious faith has become
highly individualistic. There are low levels of involvement in religious
groups, in general, and few Australian young people are interested in
new religious movements. Religion and spirituality are seen as con-
structed by the individual. The subject is the person, who draws on
traditions as seen appropriate and helpful, often in an eclectic way.
Within the Australian context, truth is what works rather than a sys-
tematic set of beliefs which are adopted as a whole. Religious traditions
are options, possibilities within a broader context in which there are
many approaches to life.

Thailand Expressions of Modernity and Post-Modernity

The regular practice of religion continues but most Thai young people
say it is weakening. Fewer young people are joining the monkhood,
although it remains a common thing to do. Few attend services reg-
ularly at the temples, but young people who were not monks were
never expected to attend frequently. Mostly, there is involvement in
the major religious festivals and in occasional personal rituals such as
circling the stupas in the temples on birthdays. There is much doubt
about the validity of the ontology that has been a traditional part of
religion: about the existence of the heavens and even of nirvana.
Most Thai young people believe that by doing religious rituals, one
makes merit. Making merit is a good thing in that it is a way of stor-
ing up points, a little like accumulating points on a credit card. These
points will lead to good results. On the other hand, failure to build
these points is not, in itself, a serious offence. In a survey in 1980,
75 per cent of Thai people affirmed the law of karma (Hughes 1984),
p. 316). We have found just 41 per cent of young people affirming
karma in 2007.
Most young people say they have little time for religious activi-
ties. They used to have more time when they were at school. But the
demands of work and study mean that they rarely get to perform these
religious rituals. This, in itself, is significant. The rewards of working
are more tangible and more immediate than the rewards of religious
activities in their eyes. Hence, work and study takes precedence for
most young people. They are focused on this life and on achieving
a better life here and now. The major way of doing this is through
144 philip hughes

successful completion of studies and finding a good job. The means to

a good life are similar to those that dominate the minds of most young
people in Australia. Australian young people are not under quite the
economic pressure of Thai young people. Unemployment is not so
disastrous for Australian young people as for Thai. There is more selec-
tion in work and it generally pays better. Hence, young Australians are
a little more selective in what work they will do. They want a job that
interests them. Nevertheless, a major focus on achieving a better life is
through study and work for young people in Thailand and Australia.
In 1984, I argued that, in many ways, Thai society was strong both
in ‘grid’ and ‘group’, in its system of classifications and its social
hierarchy and that these were legitimated by the Buddhist teaching
about merit making and the laws of karma. However, I also noted that
there is a strong theme of individualism in Thai society and a con-
stant struggle for power and position which is reflected in the a-moral
animistic beliefs. How these two, quite different and often contrary
cosmologies co-exist has been on the major issues in interpreting Thai
culture (Hughes 1984).
While there remains a strong system of shared classifications in Thai
society, it has weakened somewhat. There is increasing freedom for
the individual in terms of the diversity of ways in which life can be
constructed. The developing Thai economy has brought with it a much
greater variety of occupational possibilities and possibilities in many
other areas of life.
The ‘big men’ of Thai society have long struggled for power and
there have been constant movement in such arenas as Thai political
life, although under the watchful eye of the stability of the Thai monar-
chy. Today, the Thai people themselves are increasingly playing a role
in those struggles for power. Recent changes in government have been
largely a product of mass demonstrations of people power.
In an unstable social environment, the cosmology itself has become
somewhat unstable. There is widespread doubt about its validity. The
result is not a secularism which rejects religion. That would not be pos-
sible in a nation where national identity was so closely tied to religion.
Nor is there the kind of constructionism apparent in Australia. That
kind of individualism is not acceptable in such a hierarchical society.
Rather, there are a great variety of reform movements in religion and
new religious movements, often animistic in nature revolving around
particular spirits, which provide ways in which Thai religion can be
expressed.
 the religiosity of youth in australia and thailand 145

Religious faith will continue to be passed on from one generation to

the next in both Australia and Thailand. But the forms it takes depend
on the structures of society and on general patterns in approaches to
life, to ontology and values. To some extent, it may also depend on
how religious institutions respond to those changes in society and
ways of thinking, and the extent to which they are able to maintain
their integrity in a changing world.

References

Barker, E. 2008. The Church Without and the God Within: Religiosity and/or Spiritual-
ity? The Centrality of Religion in Social Life: Essays in Honour of James A. Beckford.
E. Barker. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing.
Bellamy, J., A. Black, et al. 2002. Why People Don’t Go to Church. Adelaide, Openbook
and NCLS Research.
Benson, P. L. 2006. The Science of Child and Adolescent Spiritual Development: Defini-
tional, Theoretical and Field-Building Challenges. The Handbook of Spiritual Develop-
ment in Childhood and Adolescence. E. C. Roehlkepartain, P. E. King, L. Wagener and
P. L. Benson. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications: 484–498.
Cupit, C. G. 2001. Spiritual Development and the Public Educative Care of Chidren: A
Critical Evaluation of Biblical and Dynamic Systems Perspectives. Perth, Murdoch
University. Doctor of Philosophy.
Douglas, M. 1996. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. 3rd edition, London,
Routledge.
Ekachai, S. 2001. Keeping the Faith: Thai Buddhism at the Crossroads. Bangkok, Post
Books.
Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.
Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Heelas, P. and B. Seel. 2003. ‘An Ageing New Age?’ Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular
and Alternative Futures. G. Davie, P. Heelas and L. Woodhead. Aldershot, Ashgate.
Hughes, P. 1982. Proclamation and Response. Chiang Mai, Payap College.
——. 1984. “The Assimilation of Christianity in the Thai Culture.” Religion 14: 313–336.
——. 1994. A Maze or a System? Changes in the Worldview of Australian People.
Melbourne, Christian Research Association.
——. 2007. Putting Life Together: Findings from Australian Youth Spirituality
Research. Melbourne, Fairfield Press.
——. 2007. “What Do the 2006 Census Figures about Religion Mean?” Pointers 17(3):
1–6.
Hughes, P. and S. Bond. 2003. Exploring What Australians Value. Melbourne, Christian
Research Association and Sydney, NCLS Research.
Jackson, P. A. 2002. Thai-Buddhist Identity: Debates on the Traiphum Phra Ruang. Na-
tional Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today. C. A. Reynolds. Chiang Mai, Silk-
worm Books: 155–188.
Martin, D. 2005. On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory. Aldershot,
Ashgate.
Mulder, N. 1992. Inside Thai Society: An Interpretation of Everyday Life. Bangkok, Duang
Kamol.
Schwartz, S. 1994. “Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of
Human Values?” Journal of Social Issues 50(4): 19–45.
Smith, C. 2005. Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
 YOUTH AND RELIGION IN MODERN CHINA:
A SKETCH OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Fenggang Yang1

Youth may be Naturally Rebellious, But They Often

Herald a New Era of History

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese youth have pio-
neered multiple turns in regard to religion, from the radical antire-
ligious campaigns in the first quarter of the century to the zealous
worship of the Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao in the third
quarter of the century, from championing for liberal democracy in the
1980s to “jumping into the ocean of commerce” in the emerging mar-
ket economy. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese
youth are in the forefront of the great spiritual awakening that seems
to be sweeping the vast land of China. Within one hundred years,
the Chinese youth have turned around 180 degrees from the driving
force for total secularization to the driving force for religious awaken-
ing. This essay offers a sketch of the major historical developments of
youth and religion in modern China.

The New Youth in the New Culture and May-Fourth Movements:

Pioneers of Antireligious Campaigns

The Chinese empire existed and went on its own cycles of vicissi-
tude for millenniums before the modern European powers opened its
shores with gunboats in the mid-nineteenth century. In the seemingly
timeless imperial China, Confucianism was the ethico-spiritual ortho-
doxy, supplemented by the heterodoxies of Daoism (Taoism), Bud-
dhism, and numerous regional cults or folk practices (Weber 1951;
Yang 1961). Most Chinese did not consider Confucianism a religion,
and the notion of religion itself was a foreign one at the time. None-
theless, Confucianism functioned like an established religion in the old

1
I would like to thank Fan Jiang and Jun Lu for their research assistance.
148 fenggang yang

imperial China, sanctioned by the state examination system and the

patriarchal structure of society.
Following decades of humiliation inflicted by the colonialist pow-
ers of the modern West and Japan, the corrupt and incapable Qing
Dynasty was overthrown by a revolution led by Sun Zhongshan (Sun
Yat-sen), who was a Christian convert and once lived in Honolulu.
Following the revolution, the Republic of China was established in
1912, the first republic in Asia (Fairbank 1983). Joining the modern-
izing world and modeling on the United States of America, the Repub-
lic of China drafted a constitution that guaranteed religious freedom
without a religious establishment. In 1915, however, the Provisional
President of the Republic Yuan Shikai, a former general of the Qing
Dynasty, tried to restore the imperial system and proclaimed himself
as the new monarch. Correspondingly, an Association of Confucian-
ism (Kongjiao hui) was formed under the leadership of Kang Youwei, a
prominent intellectual and political reformer in the late Qing Dynasty,
to promote Confucianism as the state religion or some kind of the
state-sanctioned orthodoxy. But Yuan’s imperial dream was short-
lived, so was the restoration of Confucianism. Following the death of
Yuan Shikai in June 1916, the Republic’s constitution was restated. In
the following two decades, Chinese society fell into a period of com-
bating warlords without a strong central government. Interestingly,
the political and administrative vacuum left religion very much alone
without consistent regulations or the enforcement of thereof. Conse-
quently, various new and traditional religions flourished among the
populace amid social turmoil.
Meanwhile, in the mid-1910s, the educated class initiated the so-
called New Culture Movement, advocating vernacular literature, indi-
vidual freedom and women’s liberation from the patriarchal family,
egalitarian values, modern science, and democracy (Schwarcz 1986).
The flagship of the New Culture Movement is the New Youth (La
Jeunesse, or Xin Qingnian in Chinese) magazine launched in 1915 in
Shanghai. Provoked by the Association of Confucianism’s petition for
establishing Confucianism as the state religion, the magazine began
to mount attacks on Confucianism, blaming it for withholding China
from progress, democracy, and scientific development, and calling it
the religion of rites and proprieties (li jiao) as the religion of can-
nibalism. The New Youth rallied a circle of Chinese enlightenment
intellectuals, including the magazine’s founder Chen Duxiu, who later
 youth and religion in modern china 149

became the founder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921,

the Peking University President Cai Yuanpei, the philosopher and
essayist Hu Shih, the essayist Li Dazhao, who co-founded the CCP,
the novelists and essayists Lu Xun, Mao Dun, and many others. These
youthful leaders of the New Culture Movement called on inviting Mr.
De and Mr. Sai to China, hence, importing Democracy and Science
into Chinese society. Their writings inspired many young people,
especially the college students.
Following the end of the First World War, the Western Powers and
Japan conspired to transfer the German colonial rights of Shandong
Province on the east coast to Japan. Even though China had entered
the war on the side of the Allied Triple Entente, the feeble Chinese
government failed to win back its sovereignty of Shandong in the Ver-
sailles Treaty. Upon hearing about the failed negotiation at the Paris
Peace Conference, on May 4, 1919, students of Peking University,
Tsinghua University and other colleges in Beijing took to the street to
protest against the imperial powers and the Chinese government. They
shouted such slogans as “Fight for sovereignty against outsiders, Get
rid of national traitors at home.” The next day, Beijing students went
on strike. Students in other parts of the country soon followed suit.
Influenced by the New Culture Movement, the May-Fourth Move-
ment turned to blame Confucianism for the weakness of the Chinese
nation in facing up the modern colonial powers. One of the slogans
the May-Fourth movement was “Down with the Confucius family
shops,” referring to the tangible representations of Confucianism in
Confucius Temples, traditionalist schools, and patriarchal courts of
the Confucian literati. The patriotic movement became a broad social
and cultural movement of iconoclastic anti-traditionalism in general
and anti-Confucianism in particular (Lin 1979).
After taking down Confucianism, the spearhead of the students
turned toward Christianity, which was undergoing a period of rapid
growth after the Boxers Rebellion in 1900 (Yamamoto and Yama-
moto 1953). The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) of
China planned to sponsor a meeting of World Student Christian
Federation at Tsinghua University in Beijing in April 1922. The news
of this conference prompted roaring protests by non-Christian stu-
dents. In March 1922, Shanghai students formed the Anti-Christian
Student Federation and issued a statement entitled “Why we oppose
the World Student Christian Federation.” Christianity was regarded
150 fenggang yang

as “the slave of imperialists” and “a tool of imperialist invasion and

colonization.” Following this, Beijing students established the Great
Federation of Anti-Religionists and made a declaration asserting that
religion and mankind could not co-exist, and swearing to purge soci-
ety of the poisonous religion. In the following years, the anti-Christian
campaigns pressured the Chinese government to take back the educa-
tional institutions, which had been dominated by Christian missionary
organizations.
The “new youth” of the May-Fourth Movement generations not
only viewed Confucianism as the culprit of China’s backwardness, not
only regarded Christianity as the means of Western imperialism and
colonialism, in fact they believed that all religions were obstacles to the
democratic and scientific progress. Since the May-Fourth Movement,
it has become a norm for the modern intellectuals to be anti-religious.
They have campaigned to clean up the society of superstitions, includ-
ing all kinds of religious beliefs and practices.
Meanwhile, there were two tiny but significant minorities of the
intellectuals since the May-Fourth Movement. One small group of
intellectuals believed that Confucianism could be modernized to sup-
port modern, democratic and liberal society yet help to correct and
balance the tendencies of scientism and individualism resulted from
the European Enlightenment. After 1949, many of the young scholars
of new Confucianism fled to Hong Kong, Taiwan or the United States,
such as Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. They managed to maintain
Confucianism as a living intellectual tradition, and their disciples led
to revive Confucianism in Chinese societies in the last quarter of the
twentieth century. Another tiny minority of the educated youth were
Christians, including Song Shangjie (John Sung), who earned a Ph.D.
in chemistry at the Ohio State University, Ni Tuosheng (Watchman
Nee) and Wang Mingdao, who received modern education in China.
Beginning in the second quarter of the twentieth century, these ener-
getic and youthful evangelists labored at the bottom of Chinese soci-
ety to spread the Christian gospel. These Christian leaders maintained
substantial independence from Western missionaries and paid little
attention to the ongoing politics. The Christians under their leader-
ship or influence were steadfast and resilient throughout decades of
harsh suppressions by the Chinese Communists, eventually prepared
the road to Christian revivals in the late twentieth century.
 youth and religion in modern china 151

The Red Guards of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution:

Agents to Eradicate Religion and Worshippers of the Mao Cult

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in the

mainland. The CCP, as part of the Third International or Comintern
founded by the Soviet Bolsheviks (Rosenberg and Young 1982), inher-
ited and radicalized the anti-religious spirit of the New Culture and
May-Fourth Movements. Following the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, the CCP led the country to drive out Chris-
tian missionaries who were labeled as agents of imperialist invasion,
imposed restrictions on institutional religions of the five major reli-
gions of Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Islam, and Daoism,
and suppressed all other religions as feudalist superstitions and anti-
revolutionary forces. By the late 1950s, religious leaders, believers and
organizations of the five major religions had been brought under tight
control through the “patriotic” associations (Yang 2009a).
In 1966, the CCP launched the Cultural Revolution, beginning with
a national campaign to breakdown the Four Olds: old customs, old
culture, old habits, and old ideas (Spence 1999). Some Beijing high
school and college students first formed the Red Guards to fight for
the revolutionary ideals against feudalism, capitalism and the Soviet
revisionism. CCP Chairman Mao Zedong praised the Red Guards
and encouraged them to spread the Cultural Revolution to the whole
country. “When the Red Guard movement took off, ‘destroying the
four olds’ became one of the first ‘glorious tasks’ assigned this icono-
clastic shock force” (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008: 113). The Red
Guards went on a destructing spree, ransacking homes and temples,
smashing religious artifacts, burning religious scriptures and books,
and denouncing and torturing staunch religious believers. Temples,
mosques and churches were either torn down or converted to secu-
lar use. A ban of religion took effect throughout the country in 1966.
After an American delegation visited China in the early 1970s, one of
the visitors gave this report:
During our visit we saw almost no evidence of surviving religious prac-
tice. Among the three major religious groups of pre-liberation China,
the public practice of worship appears to have dwindled to little more
than token observances. . . . Occasionally, driving through the streets of
the cities, we saw church buildings, relics of former days, some of them
broken and abandoned, some converted to use as schools, clinics, kin-
dergartens or storehouses. . . . Some Chinese with whom we talked were
152 fenggang yang

curious about religion. They were amazed to learn that educated persons
in the West continue to believe and practice religion. For them, they
said, the study of scientific materialism had exposed the logical fallacies
and absurdities of religion. (MacInnis 1975: 249–252)
Ironically, while all conventional religions were eradicated from soci-
ety, the personality cult of Chairman Mao climaxed during the Cultural
Revolution (Jochim 1986; Overmyer 1986; Zuo 1991). CCP Chairman
Mao Zedong became worshipped by the people since the 1950s. “Long
live Chairman Mao” had been a popular slogan long before the Cul-
tural Revolution. In 1966, when Mao received and reviewed tens of
millions of Red Guards in the Tiananmen Square, these enthusiastic
young people from all over China felt as if they were seeing a god. In
ecstasy, they repeatedly shouted out “Long live Chairman! Long live!
Love live! Long long live!” Some popular songs and poems around that
time referred Chairman Mao as “the Red Sun” and “the savior of the
people.” Mao’s words were collected in the “Little Red Book,” which
became the sacred scripture that people carried around in person
for frequent recitation. To express their love, worship and loyalty to
“the Great Leader,” people wore Mao badges made in many kinds of
design and material. Many people also performed morning and eve-
ning rituals in front of a portrait of Mao, asking for instructions or
making a confession of “sins.” Before starting a class or a meeting,
people would stand up, facing Mao’s picture and shout in unison: “We
wish longevity to our Great Leader, the Reddest Sun in our hearts,
Chairman Mao!”
Beginning in 1968, tens of millions of the urban youth, including
the Red Guards, were sent down to the countryside to receive “re-edu-
cation from our poor and lower-middle peasants.” Almost all colleges
and universities were closed down or became dysfunctional. Following
the official ending of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, colleges and
universities were reopened in 1977. Tens of millions of the urban and
rural young people, including the accumulated sent-down youth in
the past 10 years, competed for college admission through the col-
lege entrance examination. Consequently, the three cohorts of college
students in 1977–1979 had a mixture of people in very different age:
Some were teenagers who just graduated from high school, many in
their twenties, and quite a lot in their thirties whose life had been
spent on farming and other manual labor.
In 1979, the new CCP leadership launched the economic reforms
and opening-up policies. Coming along with the economic reforms
 youth and religion in modern china 153

and opening up was the thought liberation campaign sanctioned by

the new CCP leadership, which set off a series of intellectual or cul-
tural movements that had tremendous impacts on college students
and other youths. “Scar literature” condemned the evils of the Cul-
tural Revolution and other leftist political campaigns. “Humanist lit-
erature” called for the return of humanity against political brutality.
“Hazy poetry” questioned clear-cut artificial normality. Various West-
ern philosophies and social theories, such as existentialism, psycho-
analysis, and Nietzschean philosophy, were reintroduced and aroused
fascination among college students and other young people.
Around 1980, a national debate was stirred up by a letter with the
penname Pan Xiao, which was published in the influential China
Youth magazine. Puzzled by the impracticability of CCP principle of
“serving the people heart and soul” as a whole philosophy of life, Pan
Xiao pondered whether he could justifiably live for himself. Being a
college student at this unsettling time, I still remember vividly the
heated discussions at dorms, in classrooms, and in youth magazines
and newspapers. The debate was liberating from the idealistic yet
impractical utopia, but most people also felt at loss for a clear mean-
ing and direction of life. By 1983, a follow-up debate initiated in the
similarly influential China Youth Daily refocused on the “spiritual pil-
lar” ( jingshen zhizhu) of life, in which many articles affirmed money
or personal fame as the legitimate pillar. The economic reforms, which
were moving away from the socialist central planning to a kind of
market economy, have socially legitimatized materialistic pursuits.
Subsequently, in the late twentieth century, responding to a question
such as “what do you believe?” many Chinese young people would
not hesitate to answer “I believe in myself,” or “I believe in money.”
Unsatisfied with the suggested solutions in the second debate, many
young people, including myself, embarked on spiritual searches for
alternatives both in personal beliefs and the social system.
One of the consequences of the thought liberation, economic
reforms and opening-up, and the debates among the youth was the
democracy movement beginning in the mid-1980s. The young people
had lost faith in the Communist utopia and trust in the CCP. They
aspired to strive for a democratic society. The students-led democracy
movement peaked in 1989 when college students occupied Tianan-
men Square on a hunger strike, demanding democracy and freedom.
However, the CCP responded by sending tanks to Tiananmen Square
and crushed the peaceful movement. The bloody Tiananmen Square
154 fenggang yang

suppression on June 4, 1989 might have triggered the domino col-

lapses of the Soviet Union and other Communist societies of East
Europe, but it also curtailed Chinese young people’s political aspira-
tions. Many democracy movement activists were imprisoned, exiled,
or hard-pressed into surviving in a mundane life. Following this, espe-
cially after 1992, when developing a market economy became the offi-
cial policy of the CCP, many college graduates and other young people
“jumped into the ocean of commerce” to pursue economic interest
and a better material life.
On the other hand, however, a gradual religious awakening had
begun to take place since the very beginning of the reform era. After
the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, the cult of Mao lost much of its
enchantment. Some former Red Guards began to openly question the
idolatry. Short of empirical studies of that era, the religious awakening
can be seen as it first reflected in literature and arts.
The 1981 novella “When the Sunset Clouds Disappear” (wanxia xiaoshi
de shihou) portrayed the protagonist, a Red Guard, as a man who had
struggled with notions of science and Marxist dialectic materialism for
many years. Fortuitously, he ran into a Buddhist monk on the holy
mountain of Taishan, and engaged in a long, enlightening conversa-
tion. . . . Religious clergy, once ridiculed and driven out of the public eye,
might hold some fascinating, enlightening truths to the questions with
which many young people were struggling. This idea itself was subver-
sive, but stimulated truth-seekers to search for religion as well as in other
realms. Ten years later, the celebrated novelist Zhang Chengzhi, once a
Red Guard himself, published the book The History of A Soul (xinling
shi), which features his embrace of his rediscovered Islamic identity.
Gao Xingjian, the best known Chinese writer in the West and winner
of the 2000 Nobel Prize in Literature, has also written novels exploring
spiritual themes with titles like The Soul Mountain and One Man’s Bible.
His characters were obviously spiritual seekers, but they commonly
ended up hopelessly wandering without finding a spiritual home. (Yang
2009a: 20)
Since the early 1980s, many Chinese intellectuals explored spiritual
issues and sought religious answers, including novelists (Li 1996), poets
(Yeh 1996), artists (Cai 2002), and academic scholars (Yang 2004).
While there is a lack of quantitative studies of the religious awaken-
ing in the 1980s and 1990s, these publications of creative writing both
reflected upon and contributed to the growing popular interest in reli-
gion in the reform era. It is evident that the Red Guard generation,
or more accurately, the generations that were afflicted by the Cultural
 youth and religion in modern china 155

Revolution, have turned away from total secularism toward spirituality

and religion despite the persistence of the atheist orthodoxy of Com-
munist ideology under Communist rule.

Chinese Youth in the Twenty-First Century:

Spiritual Seekers in the Forefront of a Great Awakening

Following thirteen years of the ban of all religions, in 1979, when the
CCP initiated economic reforms, Chinese authorities began to allow
a limited number of churches, mosques, and temples to reopen for
religious services (MacInnis 1989). The eradication measures dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution failed to reduce the number of religious
believers. Realizing this fact, the CCP restated the limited tolerance
policy in order to rally people of all walks for the central task of eco-
nomic development. At that time, the CCP leaders seemed to believe
that only some older people who were socialized before the People’s
Republic of China would still believe in religion, so that only a lim-
ited number of temples, mosques and churches would be enough to
meet their religious needs. They assumed that the young people, espe-
cially those who were “born in the new China, grew up under the red
flag,” and were educated from the kindergarten on with science and
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, would never want religion. In the first
few years of the tolerance policy, it appeared factual that almost all
the religious attendance was by older people. In the mid-1980s, when
I visited the Haidian Christian church on Sundays in the university
district of Haidian of Beijing, only half of the sanctuary was occupied
and most of the congregants were old women, with a few old men,
almost all of them with gray or white hair.
However, once the five religions became legalized again, when
more religious buildings were restored one by one, religious revivals
began to spread from one place to another. In the 1980s, many villages
turned to Christianity within a few years. Christianity has been the
fastest growing religion since the 1980s, first in the rural areas, then in
the urban areas as well (Hunter and Chan 1993; Yang 2009b).
Among the urban youth, the trickling spiritual awakening in the
1980s grew into waves by the beginning of the new century. Based
on my field work research both in China and among the Chinese in
the United States (Yang 1999, 2005), I find that 1989 is a watershed.
Since then, more and more young people have stepped into and joined
156 fenggang yang

Christian churches. By the year 2000, when I first started conduct-

ing fieldwork research on religion in various Chinese cities, I was
often startled to see the overcrowded buildings filled with enthusiastic
congregations. While the majority of the congregants were still older
people, an increasing proportion of the new converts to Christianity
were young people under age 30. From Shenzhen and Guanzhou in
the southern province of Guangdong to Wenzhou and Hangzhou in
the southeastern province of Zhejiang, from Shanghai to Beijing, from
Dalian in the northeast to Xi’an in the northwest, the fastest growing
segment of the Protestant churches was the “youth worship service” or
“youth fellowship group,” often with charismatic characteristics. The
Beijing church that I visited in the mid-1980s has built a new and spa-
cious sanctuary. The church offers multiple Sunday worship services
that are filled by people all year round, many of them are young and
now middle-aged people.
At the same time, the so-called “house churches” that are not
approved by the government have been growing even faster. Since
the 1950s, some Christians who refused to attend the government-
approved churches, which they regarded as compromised in beliefs
and practices, gathered at private homes for Sunday worship. Such
house churches survived the harshest suppression throughout the Cul-
tural Revolution period, and began to revive and spread in the 1970s.
Initially, house churches tended to be small, with one to three dozen
people. When a house church grew bigger, to avoid police attention
and for space and other pragmatic reasons, it would break into two
or more groups. Consequently, the house churches multiplied quickly
in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, the house churches in the cit-
ies began to attract more and more young people. Almost all of the
university campuses that I have visited, or learned about otherwise,
have had Christian Bible study and fellowship groups. In addition to
weekly Bible studies, they often organize large Christmas and other
festival celebrations, Bible schools, and evangelistic outreach activities.
The youth are not only seekers, but also active leaders in the con-
version to Christianity on a massive scale (Yang and Tamney 2006).
Today, some urban “house churches” meet at rented office buildings
with an attendance of a thousand or more. For example, the Shouwang
Church is a “house church” in the same university district of Haidian
in Beijing. Shouwang maintains a regular weekly attendance of 800 to
1000 people, with a majority of college students and young profession-
als. The authorities regard house churches and campus Bible study and
 youth and religion in modern china 157

fellowship groups as illegal and periodically crack down upon them.

However, in the reform era, the expansion of social space amid global-
ization, political restrictions seem to have achieved nothing but fueling
further disillusion of the CCP and greater thirst for seeking meaning
of life in religious organizations (Yang 2005).
The religious revivals have been observed on the ground in many
places by many people and happening to many different religions (e.g.,
Overmyer 2003; Yang and Tamney 2005; M. Yang 2008). In addition
to Christian growths, some Buddhist temples in China have ventured
to organize summer youth camps, which have also attracted many
college students and other youths (Yang and Wei 2005; Wei 2008).
The Confucianist rituals and folk religious “temple fairs” seem to have
many young participants as well (Billioud and Thoraval 2007, 2008,
2009; Chau 2006).
Interestingly, since the beginning of the new century, Chinese jour-
nals and magazines have published an increasing number of survey
reports focusing on religion among college students (Chen 2008). For
example, according to one article (Zuo 2006), a 1998 survey found
that 13.4 percent of college students in Beijing were religious believers;
a 2000 survey found that 11.8 percent of college students in Shang-
hai were religious believers. The latest survey of college students in
Shanghai (Huang et al 2009) finds that about 19 percent of the college
students admitted to belief in religion, among them, 4.9 percent were
Protestant Christian, 0.6 percent Catholic, 0.8 percent Muslim, 4.6
percent Buddhist, 0.8 percent Daoist, and 7.3 percent believing some
kind of folk religious gods. The survey also reports that among those
students without a religious identity, 67.5 percent expressed interest
in religion, especially in Christianity and Buddhism, and only 10 per-
cent of them said that they would never become religious believers. It
also says that the proportion of Christians among college students is
bigger than that of the general population and the majority of them
converted after entering college.
Certainly, caution has to be exercised in evaluating the validity of
these surveys published in China. First of all, there are probably some
methodological problems, such as the often unclear procedures of
sampling, questionnaire design, data processing, and statistical analysis
(Chen 2008). Second, propagating atheism is still a state mandate to all
of the educational institutions in China. Knowing the official position
toward religion, some respondents might be reluctant to reveal their
religious identity to the researchers. Third, the CCP regards religion as
158 fenggang yang

a politically sensitive topic and has imposed strict press censorship on

it, which might have forced the researchers to modify their reporting
of the findings. Lastly, almost all of such survey reports have included
a section of suggestions of countermeasures (dui ce) against the spread
of religion among the college students, indicating the primary motiva-
tion of conducting such surveys was to control and contain religion
among college students.
Nonetheless, these published survey reports provide us some glimpses
of religion among college students in China today: The proportion of
religious believers is substantial and on the rise; The majority of these
young people express interest in learning about religion; Christianity
is probably the largest and certainly the most active religion among
college students; Buddhism shows some competitive strengths; Many
Communist Party members or aspirants hold religious beliefs in spite
of the membership requirement of atheism.
It is also important to point out another fact. As far as I can tell,
most of the surveys of religion among the youth have been sponsored,
supervised, or carried out by the Chinese Communist Youth League
(CCYL), either through its Central Committee or provincial or munic-
ipal branches. This sponsorship often made the surveys explicitly for
the purpose of containing and reducing religion among the youth,
which may compromise the survey design itself and the reporting of
the findings. The CCYL is officially a preparatory organization for the
CCP for young people ages 14 to 28. Like the CCP, the CCYL is selec-
tive in membership, open only to people who, in principle, have dem-
onstrated their commitment to the Communist endeavor. Like the
CCP, CCYL members are required to openly denounce any belief in
gods, spirits, or ghosts, pay monthly membership dues, and participate
in organized activities (guo zuzhi shenghuo) such as study sessions.
Like the CCP, the CCYL committees and branches are instituted in
all grassroots work units, villages, high schools, and universities. The
grassroots Party and League branches are responsible for organizing
periodical study meetings for all members. By the end of 2003, there
were 68,232,000 CCP members and 3,341,000 grassroots branches,
71,070,000 CCYL members and 2,983,000 grassroots branches (Yang
2009).
Nevertheless, the survey findings confirm fieldwork observations by
many researchers: Although the dominance of atheism in the official
ideology continues in China today, the Communist atheism is evidently
 youth and religion in modern china 159

losing ground to religion. Religion has been growing, especially among

the young people. Religion has become uncontrollable and contain-
able, which is probably inevitable (Yang 2009a).

Conclusion

In the last a hundred years, youth have heralded dramatic changes

in China. In 1919, the May-Fourth Movement championed for the
new culture of democracy and science. The “new youth” pioneered
for modernization and secularization. First they rejected Confucian-
ism, blaming it as the culprit responsible for holding China back from
modernization. Then they turned to attack Christianity, accusing it
as a means of Western colonialism and imperialism. Furthermore,
they went all out against all religions as superstitions incompatible to
modern society.
The Chinese Communist Party inherited both the anti-religious
spirit of the May-Fourth Movement and that of the Soviet Bolshevik.
During the radical Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, all religion was
banned. At the same time, however, the personality cult of Chairman
Mao enchanted the nation, especially the zealous young Red Guards.
Only by the 1980s the Red Guard generation began to reflect and
examine their conscience. Gradually, more and more Chinese youth
began to turn to religion for meaning of life.
The gradual spiritual awakening in the 1980s and 1990s has become
a great religious awakening by the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Many college students have been attracted into Christian Bible
studies groups or Chan Buddhist summer camps. Young people
have become active participants in Christian churches and Buddhist
temples. In some university districts in metropolises of Beijing and
Shanghai, some “house churches” have hundreds of people in weekly
attendance, even though the authorities regard them as illegal and often
crack down upon them. The rapid Christian growth among the young
people is surprising to the Chinese Communist Party, which has been
trying hard to contain and control. However, the fire of revivalism
continues to spread throughout China.
Although quantitative studies of religion in China are still lacking,
existing empirical findings have sufficiently shown that more and more
Chinese youth have become religious believers, and the trend clearly
points to even greater growth of Christianity, Buddhism, and many
160 fenggang yang

other religions. It will be only a matter of time before the authorities

yield to the reality and grant greater religious freedom. Also, it will be
only a matter of time before religion becomes a significant social force
influencing the political process or democratization of China. In this
process, the Chinese youth are playing critically important roles.

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 YOUNG PEOPLE AND RELIGION IN FRANCE

Céline Béraud and Jean-Paul Willaime

“Age, in the broadest sense of the word, has become the status variable
that best predicts religious attitudes,” wrote Yves Lambert in a scru-
pulous study relying mainly upon the EVS1 data from 1981 and 1990
(1993: 525). From the outset, our late colleague stressed that the sur-
vey data available at that time made it possible to demonstrate, in the
context of “a cross-section of ages, generations and intergenerational
trends,” (1993: 538) that France, alongside Great Britain, Denmark
and the Netherlands, appeared to be one of the essentially secularised
countries “where generational effects and their resulting trends are the
most intense.” (1993: 552) Some years later, after considering the EVS
data from 1999, he reaffirmed this judgment: “France is one of the
countries where the change in attitudes between ages and generations
has been the most radical.” (Lambert 2004: 218) It therefore seems like
a particularly appropriate moment to take a new look at the relation-
ship between young people and religion in France. This also seems like
the right time to present the sociological research going on in this field
in France to researchers beyond the French-speaking world.
In this article, our goal is to present and analyse the principal data
currently available, making use of various quantitative and qualitative
surveys that offer valuable information on the religious attitudes of
young people in France, and on their relationship to religion in gen-
eral. From 2006 to 2009, the European REDCo2 programme focused
on the issue of religion in school. Within the framework of this pro-
gramme, the French participants carried out surveys among young

1
EVS: European Values Surveys. These surveys on the values of Europeans, carried
out in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008 (see below) and comprising some thirty questions
on religious attitudes, can be taken as periodic polls on religious belief. The resulting
data can be analysed both from a temporal point of view—comparing results from one
survey to the next—and from a geographical point of view, comparing results between
different European countries. In these surveys, the term “young people” refers to peo-
ple between 18 and 29 years of age.
2
REDCo stands for Religion in Education. A contribution to Dialogue or a factor of
Conflict in transforming societies of European countries. All the details of this European
research programme are presented in the third part of this article.
164 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

people from 14 to 16 years old that provided a wealth of information

on the religious attitudes of French youth, above and beyond the spe-
cific questions in the surveys dealing with religion in school life and
instruction. In Les jeunes, la religion et l’école (ed. Béraud/Willaime,
2009), this data has already been put to use, particularly by Séverine
Mathieu, in order to explore the relationship between young people
and religion. While one of our goals here is to analyse this data in
greater depth, we would especially like to resituate it within the con-
text of the research on young people and religion in France by calling
upon other sources of surveys and analyses. After consideration in the
first part of this article of the difficulties in defining and characterising
the category “young people,” we shall give an overview in the second
part of the state of research in this area, on the basis of data obtained
prior to the REDCo programme (the EVS data in particular). Finally,
in the third and last part, we will present and analyse the valuable
information that the REDCo data has given us on young people’s reli-
gious attitudes.

“Young People”: The Social Constitution of a Category and

its Sociological Construction

The category “young people” corresponds to different age groups

depending upon the source material in question. Whereas in the
REDCo surveys it refers to those from 14 to 16 years old, in many
other surveys—the EVS surveys in particular—it refers to young adults
from 18 to 29 years old. While we are conscious of the problems this
may pose, our data does not allow us to go into an analysis here of the
differentiations in attitudes between the 14–16, 16–18, 18–24 or 24–29
age groups. However, the REDCo survey of the 14–16 age group should
encourage us never to forget that this group consists of adolescents
who are often different people from one day to the next, who are not
necessarily as opinionated as their elders in the 18–29 age bracket of
the EVS surveys. Therefore, in the context of this article, we shall use
a variable for young people with flexible boundaries, depending upon
the data source; what is important is to identify significant changes in
comparison with other age groups. Focusing on “young people and
religion” also inevitably means confronting the need to distinguish
between effects related to age and those related to generations. Here,
we shall concentrate particularly on generational issues, given that the
 young people and religion in france 165

study of the relationship between young people and religion is a good

way of revealing the main changes today in how people are religious,
or not. The analysis of young people’s religious attitudes is one contri-
bution to the sociology of modern religion.
It is not an obvious matter to speak of “young people” and to claim
to be able to distinguish this category from other age brackets. Soci-
ologists specialising in this group have taught us to deconstruct and
to problematise this notion of “young people.” One such specialist in
France is Olivier Galland, who has written an authoritative work on the
subject, Sociologie de la jeunesse (2007, fourth edition). In this book,
Galland analyses in particular the profound changes taking place in
the way young people become socialised, the change from socialisation
by identification, relying on mechanisms of familial transmission, to
socialisation by experimentation, associated with processes of individu-
alisation in Western societies and the decline in these societies of the
processes of transmission. Although young people do not constitute
a homogenous population group and all kinds of economic, social,
cultural, ethnic, and other differences can mark the same age bracket,
all young people nevertheless participate “in a similar situation: living
with a transitory social status.” (Campiche, 1997: 27) The Swiss soci-
ologist adds, “The role of peers and the social and cultural environ-
ment, highly influenced by the media, grows stronger. As a result, the
mechanisms of socialisation by transmission and identification with
a family tradition are affected.” (Campiche, 1997: 23) This is all con-
nected with the delay in entering adult life, a result in particular of the
increase in the length of schooling. The increased time students spend
in schools and universities has greatly contributed to the appearance
of the “peer group as a new reference group,” thereby changing the
relationships between generations. More recently, in a very thought-
provoking book, Galland delineates the characteristics of today’s ado-
lescent culture; at the same time, he looks into the fears of young
French people. He emphasises the deep divisions that currently sepa-
rate youth culture and school life. Far from being a counterculture as
it was in the 1960s, today’s youth are full participants in the dominant
culture. “This new adolescent culture is very consumer-driven, based
on stylised appearances and tastes and served by specialised industries
with products adapted to this ‘segment’ of the ‘market’: TV and radio
shows, new means of communication (cellphones, Internet . . .), cloth-
ing, music.” (Galland 2009: 35) According to this sociologist of young
people, this culture cuts across more social classes than before: it is
166 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

relational (“being with” becomes more important than “doing with”),

imitative (“to be yourself, you first have to be like others,” as François
Dubet puts it), and sexualised (conspicuous sexualisation of appear-
ance). Liliane Voyé, in her comments on studies dealing with “Young
People and Religion in Quebec” (2008: 160–162), adds an additional
characteristic that we feel is important: the priority young people
give to participation through networks rather than groups, modes
of participation which are much more flexible and fluid and much
less territorialised. In Galland’s view, this overall change in adoles-
cent behaviour is the expression of “the weakening of the traditional
avenues of socialisation and of cultural transmission, that is the weak-
ening of the role of the family and the school in imparting cultural
norms and established values to adolescents.” (2009: 43). Galland goes
as far as to write the following, an exaggeration in our opinion: that
we “are witnessing today the implicit constitution of the young as a
kind of autonomous republic, whose ‘laws’ now have absolute domin-
ion over its ‘citizens.’ The adult universe has lost contact, morally and
culturally speaking, with this republic of the young.” (2009: 44). On
the basis of the REDCo data, we shall see that this point of view can
be substantially moderated. While acknowledging the fact that the
integrating role of churches, like that of schools, is greatly weakened
today, it is interesting to note that Galland agrees with sociologists of
religion when he says, “‘Believing without belonging’ is an expression
that well defines the religious attitude of young people. The integrating
role that religion supposedly has, which is based upon ritual and regu-
lar participation in a unified institution, therefore has little to do with
the ways in which young people participate in religions today. Actu-
ally, these new patterns of religious behaviour are in perfect keeping
with youth culture, which is based upon relationships between peers,
the sharing of emotions and occasionally the retreat into communities
of origin.” (2009: 51–52).
The 1981 EVS survey seemed to have made it clear that in Western
Europe, the younger one was, the less religious one was. In 1990, this
observation was confirmed, but two exceptions came to light: 1) the
marked increase in the feeling that “Churches respond to people’s spir-
itual needs”; 2) the rise of belief in the afterlife among young people.
In addition, apart from Christianity, sociologists noted at that time
the appearance of “believing without belonging” and the growth in
alternative belief systems (astrology, telepathy etc.) It became apparent
that each successive generation was less Christian than the previous
 young people and religion in france 167

one. Starting with the EVS data from 1999, one could observe that the
trend toward a lack of religious sentiment among young people was
being offset by other tendencies: “the effect of generational renewal no
longer necessarily implies a declining trend,” as Yves Lambert put it in
2004 (318). In particular, the data for France revealed that while the
decrease in identification with Catholicism continued among young
people in the 18–29 age bracket, there was on the contrary increasing
interest in religious ceremonies and some beliefs. “Whereas each new
generation had been starting out at a lower level of religious belief than
the previous one, young people born since 1964 show a certain stabi-
lisation (apart from religious affiliation, adherence to ritual and belief
in sin, which were still in decline), even renewed growth (preference
toward ceremonies for the deceased, beliefs connected with the after-
life).” (Ibid.) In his analyses, Yves Lambert even speaks of a “Christian
revival” in some countries (he adds, however, that it is “less apparent”
in France).
Starting with the 1990 EVS surveys, Régine Azria and Roland Cam-
piche (in Campiche, 1997: 55) also notice great disparities between
generations, for example concerning the importance of religion in
life: 34% for young people from 18–29 years old vs. 66% for those in
their sixties and older. On the basis of a factor analysis of this 1990
data, they describe different groups that make it possible to establish
a socioreligious classification system for young Europeans (in Cam-
piche, 1997: 87–96):

• non-religious: 23%
• religious: 11%
• heterodox believers: 10%
• non-religious humanists: 10%
• irregulars or the half-hearted: 23%
• ritualists: 24%

As they themselves pointed out, they had a reductionist way of naming

the groups that emerged from their analysis. On looking at this classifi-
cation, one is immediately struck by the fact that these different groups
do not necessarily seem to be mutually exclusive, even though they are
the empirical result of a statistical processing programme. Neverthe-
less, one of the advantages of such a classification is that it makes us
aware of the impossibility of reducing young people’s religious atti-
tudes to an alternative between “religious” and “non-religious.” Seen
168 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

this way, this classification system, whatever limitations it may have,

already makes it possible to measure the complexity in attitudes, and
their ambivalence. The 2008 EVS data for France3 and the quantitative
and qualitative REDCo data confirm, as we shall see, that it would be
far from the truth to reduce young people’s religious attitudes to a
simple “religious” / “non-religious” dichotomy. In our contribution
to this project, we would like to examine three questions in partic-
ular: 1) the question of religious affiliation among young people, or
more exactly, their identification with religion: the choice they make
between saying they belong to a religion, saying they are “confirmed
atheists” or saying they have “no religious affiliation”; 2) the question
of young people’s religious attitudes based on some indicators of prac-
tices and beliefs; 3) the question of the representation of religion, that
is the way young people see religion and its role, examined essentially
on the basis of the REDCo data.

Identification with Religion Among Young People in France,

their Beliefs and Practices: The State of Research on the Basis of the
EVS Data and Other Surveys

Identification with Religion Among Young People

What is the state of religious affiliation among the young, or more
exactly their identification with religion or philosophical worldviews?
If we wish to examine young people’s religious attitudes or, more gen-
erally, their relationship to religion, an initial indicator presents itself
to sociologists: the answers young people gave to questions in various
surveys that asked them if they were members of a religion or not and
if so, which one. Of course, this first indicator should be considered in
all its complexity and all its limitations: although it measures the con-
nection or the identification with institutionalised forms of religious
belief, it is difficult to use it to evaluate the relationships young people
have to religiosity in general, or to informal expressions of religious
sentiment. Nevertheless, it remains a relevant indicator, all the more
so given its use in several surveys and its ability to take account of cer-

3
To do so, we shall make use of the first analysis of the survey, by Pierre Bréchon
and Claude Dargent in La France à travers ses valeurs, ed. Pierre Bréchon and Jean-
François Tchernia (Paris, Armand Colin, 2009, pp. 227–266). We thank Pierre Bréchon
for sending us some additional sorted data.
 young people and religion in france 169

tain overall changes. But before we discuss young people and religion
in France, it may be useful to take a look back at the changes that have
occurred in the attitudes of French people as a whole regarding reli-
gion. Two recent surveys give us the necessary information: the 2008
EVS survey and the summary of the surveys conducted from 2005
to 2009 by the IFOP.4 According to these two sources of quantitative
data, three main characteristics typify the changes in French attitudes
regarding religious belief:

1) The noticeable decrease in French identification with Catholicism:

According to the IFOP data, the percentage of French people who
identify with Catholicism has gone from 76% in 1978 to 64% in
2009, a 12-point decline in thirty years (the percentage in 1952
was 81%). This decline is also very noticeable if we look at the per-
centage of the overall population who in French are called “mes-
salisants,” that is those people who go to Mass every Sunday: the
percentage went from 14% in 1978 to 4.5% in 2009 (in 1952 it was
27%). According to the 2008 EVS survey, the decrease in identi-
fication with Catholicism is even more pronounced: their results
show that 42% of French people declare themselves as Catholic in
2008, compared with 70% in the 1981 poll. The way in which the
question is worded is one reason why there are such differences
between results.5
2) The increased identification French people have with other religions,
even though this is not a large-scale phenomenon, quantitatively
speaking. According to IFOP, while 4% of French people in 1987
said they believed in some other religion than Catholicism, this
figure increased to 8% by 2009. Here, the EVS data corresponds
perfectly: 3% of French people said they had another religion in
1981, which went to 8% in 2008. This increase is mainly due to the

4
A French polling institution, L’Institut Français d’Opinion Publique.
5
Yves Lambert (1993: 535) had already pointed out that “regarding affiliation with
Catholicism, the way the question is worded has significant bearing on the percent-
ages.” He added: “The question, which has become rare, ‘To what religion do you
belong?’ which supposes the subject has one, obtains percentages that approach the
percentages of baptisms. The usual French question, ‘What is your religion, if you
have one?’ (or ‘Could you tell me what . . .’) yields slightly lower percentages. [. . .] The
European formulations, ‘Currently, do you belong to a religion (if so, which one?)’
(Eurobaromètres) or ‘Do you consider yourself as belonging to a religion?’ (1952 IFOP
survey on values), give percentages which are 15 to 20 points lower than the previous
questions.”
170 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

growing number of people who identify themselves as Muslims or

as evangelical Protestants.
3) The increase in those who say they have “no religion.” In the IFOP
surveys, the percentages of such responses went from 21% in 1987
to 28% in 2009, while in the EVS surveys, the increase was from
27% in 1981 (including 9% who were “confirmed atheists”) to 50%
in 2008 (with 17% “confirmed atheists”). Here again, there is a
notable disparity between the two sources.

In France, from 1981 to 2008, there has been a remarkable reversal

among the population. Whereas in 1981 17% of the population were
regularly observant Catholics and 9% were confirmed atheists (and
18% did not state a religion), the situation in 2008 is strictly the oppo-
site: 9% say they are regularly observant Catholics and 17% say they
are confirmed atheists (with 33% not stating a religion). These major
changes, characterising the population as a whole, are even more pro-
nounced if we take into account the data relating to young adults.
According to the 2008 EVS data, the French population, classified on
the basis of age, can be broken down as follows:

Identification with Religion According to Age

18–29 yrs. 30–44 yrs. 45–59 yrs. 60 yrs. and over
Catholic 23% 31% 41% 65%
Other religions 11% 12% 7% 4%
Confirmed atheists 27% 20% 16% 8%
No stated affiliation 40% 37% 36% 23%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: EVS 2008

If we look at the first column, people from 18 to 29 years old, it is read-

ily apparent that among this age group the absence of religious affilia-
tion comes out ahead (40%), followed by those who identify themselves
as “confirmed atheists” (27%), then by those who identify with Cathol-
icism (23%), and finally those identifying with other religions (11%;
Islam accounts for a little more than half of this percentage). Compar-
ing this column with that of people 60 years and older lets us measure
the extent of the transformations taking place regarding French atti-
tudes on religious affiliation. A real turnaround has taken place: for the
younger generations, Catholics are clearly in the minority. What pre-
 young people and religion in france 171

vails is a lack of affiliation. Moreover, those young people who identify

with the position of “confirmed atheist” are now more numerous than
those who consider themselves Catholics. We should also note that the
young who identify with other religions are now, at 11%, nearly half
as large a group as those considering themselves Catholic. In France, a
country often referred to as the “eldest daughter of the Church,” this
is a considerable change for Catholicism. In other words, the younger
one is, the less likely one is to be Catholic (the decline in affiliation is
linear according to the age groups) and the more likely one is to be a
“confirmed atheist” (more than three times as many among the young
than among those 60 and over) or to have “another religion” (nearly
three times as many among the young than among the oldest group).
This abandonment of Catholicism by the young is nothing new: “In
1988,” as Guy Michelat has already noted (Lambert and Michelat: 1992:
43), “69% of those from 18 to 24 years old called themselves Catholic
vs. 89% of those 65 years old and older.”
As for the survey among children from 12 to 15 years old, carried
out in 1990 by Françoise Champion and Yves Lambert,6 its breakdown
was as follows:

Religious Affiliations of Children from 12 to 15 Years Old

Catholics 62.5%
Muslims 5.5%
Protestants 2.5%
Jews 0.5%
Other religions 2.5%
No religion 26%

The Practices and Beliefs of Young People

Commenting the 2008 EVS data, Pierre Bréchon pointed out that in
France, “today, many young people have never experienced religious
socialisation in the family. Only 40% to 45% of children have been
baptised.” (Bréchon, Tchernia 2009: 229) Overall, from 1999 to 2008,

6
The survey was carried out by the “Facts and Opinions Institute” (l’Institut Faits
et Opinions) among a representative sample group of 705 French children from 12 to
15 years old, interviewed personally. The overall results from this survey were pre-
sented in Lambert and Michelat’s book, in the chapter entitled “Les 12–15 ans et la
religion” (1992: 65–92).
172 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

the percentage of observant people (who attend a religious service at

least once a month) has remained stable for the population as a whole:
12%. The same is true of the percentages of non-observant people and
those who attend services occasionally. That said, if we compare the
18–29 age bracket with those 60 and over, the change in the 2008 data
appears substantial: 8% of observant Catholics among young people
vs. 33% among the oldest group; 27% of confirmed atheists among
the young vs. 8% among those 60 and older. But this 2008 EVS data
also confirms what was becoming apparent in the 1999 EVS data: the
assumed correlation between youth and disinterest in religion no lon-
ger reflected reality. We may first note that the relationship between
age and religious involvement is not necessarily the same for each
religion: Claude Dargent observes that whereas for Catholics, “the
older one is, the more frequently one attends services,” the situation
is reversed for those who identify with Islam: 31% of those from 18
to 29 years old consider themselves regularly observant, vs. slightly
more than 20% of their elders (in Bréchon, Tchernia, 2009: 240). As
Dargent indicates, a generational effect is at work here: “Young people
who come from immigrant North African, African or Turkish families
consider themselves as Muslims more readily than their elders, and go
to prayer rooms more often.” (Ibid.) With the relative growth of evan-
gelical Protestantism, a similar observation may be made regarding the
Protestant minority. Out of 100 regularly observant people in 1981,
there were 95 Catholics, 3 Protestants and 2 from other religions. In
2008, the breakdown is 73 Catholics, 8 Protestants, 1 Jew, 9 Muslims, 4
from other religions and 6 without a religion. The religious landscape
in France therefore appears much more diverse when seen through the
mirror of the observant population.
In 1992, Guy Michelat also noticed changes taking place among
young people. He observed that “the combination that comes closes to
atheism, ‘existence of God improbable or out of the question’ / ‘there
is nothing after death,’ which is characteristic of those 55 and over
(70%) falls to 35% for those 25 and younger” (Michelat, ed. Lambert
and Michelat 1992: 51). Thus, as he put it, “those without religion are
less often atheist than they were before,” while “observant people seem
less involved in Catholicism than before.” (ibid.: 54) Other indications
reinforced the idea that the relative disinterest young people have in
the dominant religion and in institutionalized religion in general does
not mean a lack of interest in religious belief, or more generally, in
spirituality. Since 44% of people from 18 to 29 say they “have their own
 young people and religion in france 173

way of being in contact with spiritual forces without needing churches

or religious services,” and 40% of them demonstrate an “interest in the
sacred and the spiritual,” they do not differentiate themselves greatly
from their elders.
Although the 2008 data confirms the declining belief in God for
the population as a whole that was noted in the previous EVS surveys
(going from 62% in 1981 to 53% in 2008), two facts should be empha-
sized in the light of Claude Dargent’s work: 1) for the first time, there
are more people who believe in God (53%) than those who say they
belong to a religion (50%); 2) 25% of the people who identify them-
selves as “without religion” say they believe in God. Here, we have an
excellent illustration of the concept of “believing without belonging”
dear to Grace Davie. As for belief in God, the fact of thinking that
God is important or, on the contrary, that there is no God, spirit or
life force (a position that can be described as radical atheism), the
percentages correlate on the whole with age groups, as shown by the
following table:

Belief in God According to Age

18–29 yrs. 30–44 yrs. 45–59 yrs. 60 yrs. and over
Believe in God 41% 52% 55% 69%
Think that God is 25% 30% 36% 48%
important
No God, spirit or 30% 26% 25% 18%
life force
Source: EVS 2008

The 2008 EVS survey conducted in France reveals an interesting rever-

sal in the relationship between the level of education and belief in
God. Whereas, overall, if someone is young and has a high level of
education, they are less likely to believe in God (68% for those less
educated vs. 50% for those with higher levels of education) Dargent (in
Bréchon, Tchernia, 2009: 249) observes that this correlation is in fact
age-dependent: for people younger than 45, those with more educa-
tion believe more in God while for those 45 and older, the opposite is
true: those with less education believe more in God. We can also note
that whereas 41% of French people express interest in the spiritual, the
sacred, the supernatural, the breakdown according to educational lev-
els is 49% for people with more education vs. 36% for those with less
174 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

(while there was no correlation with age). So the trend, which may still
be observed on the whole, seems to be reversing itself: for the young-
est group surveyed, a higher level of education seems to be compatible
with belief in God and/or interest in the spiritual. This is also true for
more folkloric beliefs. For example, whereas 13% of those 60 and older
give positive answers to the question “Do you think a good luck charm
like a mascot or a talisman can protect you or help you?,” this is true
for 25% of those from 18 to 29 (28% of students).

Belief in Good Luck Charms According to Age

18–29 yrs. 30–44 yrs. 45–59 yrs. 60 yrs. and over
None 48% 55% 61% 64%
Very doubtful 27% 24% 21% 24%
Definitely 25% 21% 18% 13%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: EVS 2008

While “for previous generations, more education meant being more

doubtful about good luck charms—and even being opposed to them—
for young people today, it’s the opposite: those with more education
are the most receptive.” (Bréchon, in Bréchon, Tchernia, 2009: 256)
Does the uncertain and precarious status of young people make them
more receptive to these kinds of beliefs, in the current context where
people often construct their own belief systems? In any case, as Pierre
Bréchon points out, “the more insecure people feel, the more open
they become to good luck charms.” In their study of children from 12
to 15 years old and their relationship to religion, Françoise Champion
and Yves Lambert (in Lambert and Michelat, 1992: 91) noted at the
time that Christianity was not alone in showing signs of decline: this
was also true of “atheism” or “deism of the ‘Enlightenment’ variety,” in
other words currents of thought that are firmly opposed to all super-
stitions. On the basis of a 1989 survey, Guy Michelat had observed
that “beliefs in the paranormal are always more frequent among young
people (18–24 years old: 25%; 55 and over: 9%).” According to Jacques
Maître (in Michelat, Potel, Sutter, Maître, 1991: 317), “it is not possible
to completely compensate the declining influence of the Church by a
scientific, technological vision of the world: a no man’s land occupies
the intermediate zone to some degree.”
The work of Guy de Longeaux, who from 1998 to 2002 carried out
surveys among 281 students from 16 to 18 in their final year at six
 young people and religion in france 175

private Catholic high schools under contract with the State, makes it
possible to refine the analysis in a more qualitative fashion. Young
people in Catholic schools do not have a relationship to religious
belief that is fundamentally different from that of their peers in public
schools. It turns out that “the overwhelming majority of them have
problems regarding Christianity, and they occasionally reveal contra-
dictions between the religious position they have said is theirs and the
attitude they display in their statements. They demonstrate ambiva-
lence regarding religion.” (2005: 144–145) By inviting students to
classify some ten propositions dealing with religion as either “some-
what inspiring” or “somewhat depressing,” de Longeaux observes that
“the ones considered inspiring by the students are those that leave
room for independent thinking (‘freely chosen, personal beliefs’) and
interpersonal relationships (‘beliefs that can be observed while being
open to others,’ ‘large gatherings’)” (145); “all those that are consid-
ered the most ‘depressing’ are the ones that are institutional, imposed
upon the individual from the outside [. . .] such as ‘established’ dog-
mas and the institutional rituals that have become routine: the ‘usual
religious celebrations.’” As de Longeaux points out, this corresponds
with the observations of Guy Lescanne and Thierry Vincent (1997:
27–29) among young people from 15 to 19: “Refusal [. . .] to let oneself
be ‘taken in,’ ‘recruited.’ Expressions often encountered of a fear of
losing one’s freedom and identity within a group that would impose
its views. [. . .]. Many cannot tolerate the Church having the arrogant
pretension of possessing ‘the’ truth.” De Longeaux (2005: 147) sum-
marises the situation as follows: “So in one way of seeing it, religion
is considered favourably as an aid to personality development if it
encourages autonomy and relationships to others, as well as the sense
of being part of a long historical tradition. But religion is rejected as an
institution that imposes truths to be believed or conventional rituals,
using a special, arcane language.”
“In their survey of Catholic high schools in the Maine-et-Loire
department, Jean-Pierre Boutinet, Pierre Cousin and Michel Morfin
(1985: 131–132) had emphasised three characteristic features of young
people’s mindsets: relativism, concentration on the self and the prag-
matic assemblage of beliefs, on the basis of a fairly limited interest
in religion. The dominant attitudes regarding religion were inconclu-
sive: neither rejection nor affirmation, in keeping with a ‘culture of the
plausible,’ a ‘maybe’ culture that picks and chooses its menu, acquiring
validity through personal experience, a culture for which the ‘here and
now’ is what matters most.” (ed. Lambert and Michelat, 1992: 10).
176 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

Françoise Champion and Yves Lambert7 (in Lambert and Michelat

(eds.), 1992: 79) performed a factor analysis of data from a survey
conducted in 1990 among a representative sampling of French ado-
lescents from 12 to 15. The three main groups they derived from their
analysis remain relevant today. As confirmed by the results from the
REDCo surveys (see below), young people’s religious attitudes map
out a territory with three poles: two of which have clear-cut answers (a
“religious/observant” pole on one hand, and a “non-religious/non-ob-
servant” pole on the other), and one representing the unsure answers,
the largest portion of the results, referred to as the possibilist pole.
Between the poles of confirmed believers and confirmed atheists, a
“diffuse” form of religiosity is in evidence, seen as “a vague, uncertain
religiosity, but one that is very widespread” (79) which characterises
the religious attitudes of many young people.

Young People from 14 to 16 and Religion: The REDCo Data

A programme financed by the European Union8 gave us the oppor-

tunity from March 2006 to March 2009 to carry out the research
programme entitled the “REDCo project,” the acronym standing for
“Religion in Education. A contribution to Dialogue or a factor of
Conflict in transforming societies of European countries.” Under the
direction of Professor Wolfram Weisse (from the Faculty of Education
at the University of Hamburg), research teams from eight countries
participated: Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Russia, and Spain. The French team, mainly comprised
of sociologists, drew upon instructors and researchers both from the
EPHE (at the IESR or l’Institut européen en sciences des religions) and
from the GSRL (Groupe sociétés, religions, laïcité, a research group
jointly managed between the EPHE and the CNRS). The originality of
the REDCo programme was in concentrating on the opinions of ado-

7
See Françoise Champion and Yves Lambert’s study, Les 12–15 ans. Religion et
spiritualité. Analyse sociologique (Paris, Bayard Presse, 1990). The two authors present
an overview of the main results of this survey in the chapter entitled “Les 12–15 ans
et la religion” in Lambert and Michelat (eds.) 1992: 65–92.
8
Within the framework of the EU’s FP6 project for research and technological
development, in the programme entitled “Integrating and Strengthening the European
Research Area,” Priority 7: “Citizens and Governance in a knowledge-based society,”
section 7.2.1: “Values and Religions in Europe.”
 young people and religion in france 177

lescents from 14 to 16 years old, while taking account of the institu-

tional frameworks on the national and supranational levels (especially
the European Union and the Council of Europe),9 as well as the per-
sonal experience of teachers.10 The eight teams simultaneously collected
the convictions, opinions and perceptions of the participants, mainly
through two methods: semi-structured interviews (often accompanied
by classroom observations) and the completion of a quantitative ques-
tionnaire. In all, from Melilla to St. Petersburg, 962 adolescents (103
in France) were interviewed during the qualitative survey and 6513
questionnaires (including 851 for France)11 were filled out by young
people in eight different national contexts (or regional contexts in the
cases of Germany and Spain, and even local in the case of Russia).
Here we shall only examine the results for France, referring readers to
other publications for Europe-wide comparisons.
Eight French public schools took part in the qualitative survey. We
concentrated on students in the last year of middle school (troisième)
and the first year of high school (seconde), in order to get the views of
adolescents who were mostly between 14 and 16 years old (in accor-
dance with the European requirements). In all 103 interviews were
held during the autumn of 2006. The choice of six schools allowed us
to get a fairly good idea of the diversity of middle and high schools in
Paris and its suburbs. We also carried out surveys in two other schools:
a general high school in Metz and a vocational school in Rennes. We
therefore only performed a limited amount of work outside of Paris
during the first phase of the research. Most of the interviews (69) were
oral, held in small groups of two to four students on a volunteer basis.
In addition, one class filled out 34 written interviews. The quantitative
survey gave us the opportunity to expand the geographical scope of
our research, and also to include private schools (limited to Catholic
schools under contract with the State). The sample obtained may be

9
Robert Jackson, Siebren Miedema, Wolfram Weisse, Jean-Paul Willaime (eds.),
Religion and Education in Europe. Developments, Contexts and Debates (Münster/New
York/Munich/Berlin, Waxmann, 2006).
10
Anna van der Want, Cok Bakker, Ina ter Avest, Judith Everington (eds.), Teach-
ers Responding to Religious Diversity in Europe. Researching Biography and Pedagogy
(Münster/New York/Munich/Berlin, Waxmann, 2009).
11
We should add that 202 questionnaires were also filled out in three Jewish private
schools in the Paris region. For reasons of representativeness, they were not included
in the sample. However, they will be the subject of a comparative study by Joëlle
Allouche-Benayoun (in Béraud and Willaime (eds.), 2009).
178 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

considered a “purposive” or “judgmental” sample. In all, we analysed

851 questionnaires completed by students in 18 schools between Janu-
ary and March 2008. Students filled out the questionnaires in class,
usually in the presence of a teacher and one of the members of our
research team.
Although the survey concentrated for the most part on the relation-
ship between schools and religion, we were also interested in getting
the opinions of the adolescents surveyed on the role of religion in their
personal lives, as well as on the role of religion in European society.
We shall focus here on these two aspects of the research.12

Religious Affiliations of Adolescents and Importance Given to Religion

Religious affiliation Percentage (%)

Catholic 21
Christian 12
Protestant 2
Muslim 13
Jewish 1
Other religions 3
No religion 45
Source: 2008 REDCo Quantitative Survey

In the REDCo quantitative survey, nearly half of the French partici-

pants did not specify any religious affiliation. The largest number of
those surveyed gave Catholicism as their religion. Proportionally,
however, it only represents 21% of the total, which is a small frac-
tion for a country traditionally seen as having a Catholic majority.
As the question was an open one, 12% of the adolescents said they
were “Christian” without being more specific. This is typical of evan-
gelical Protestantism, so we may assume that some of those surveyed
belong to this denomination. From a statistical point of view, however,
we may also assume that a large number of those calling themselves
“Christians” are of Catholic origin, but that they now feel they have

12
An initial analysis of this data has been performed in French by our colleague
Séverine Mathieu (ed Béraud and Willaime, 2009).
 young people and religion in france 179

little connection to this religion. During the qualitative survey, many

adolescents even introduced themselves to us as “a bit Christian.”
Young Muslims represent 13% of our sample. This proportion13 is
higher than that typically seen in the other age brackets. For example,
in the 2008 EVS survey, followers of Islam only represent 4.5% of the
total. Though this is a higher percentage than that seen in previous
surveys, Pierre Bréchon considers it as underestimate (Bréchon and
Tchernia (eds.), 2009, p. 229). A methodological discrepancy of this
nature can be explained through two phenomena: the fact that Mus-
lims often belong to social groups with little cultural capital who don’t
always find it easy to participate in surveys, and the stigma attached to
stating an affiliation to a religion that for a long time has had only a
limited amount of social recognition. This, however, was not an issue
with the Muslim middle and high school students we interviewed, who
seem to be completely comfortable with their religious identity. During
the interviews, they freely discussed their beliefs and practices with us.
We should note that 68% of the young people we surveyed feel that
the family is an important information source on religious matters
(the religious community is considered one by 60%, the school by 37%,
newspapers and television by 33% and the Internet by 26%). Three-
quarters of those surveyed say that their parents have a similar opinion
to theirs on religion. We should also mention the role of grandparents,
which was often brought up during the semi-structured interviews—
regardless of the religious tradition in question—as responsible for an
introduction to religious socialization in early childhood:
“I had Catholic grandparents in my family. When I was little, they took
me to Mass and they’d say Grace before meals . . .” (Boy, no religion)
“My grandparents are very religious and when I was a little girl, they
signed me up for catechism and since I didn’t like it, I stopped going.”
(Girl, no religion)
“I learn things through my grandmother who’s an observant Muslim
and who went on the pilgrimage to Mecca.” (Girl, Muslim)
Although they recognise the informative role of the family, the par-
ticipants in the quantitative survey give cautious answers concerning
its influence on their own religious affiliation (or lack of one). For

13
This percentage corresponds to the results of the 2004 CSA/ Le Monde poll
among people from 18 to 24: 14% of those polled said they were Muslims. See Mathieu
(in Béraud and Willaime (eds.), 2009).
180 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

example, when asked to respond to the statement “Religion is something

one inherits from one’s family,” the proportion of those who agree
is the same as those who disagree (39%). In addition, 43% feel that
what they think about religion is open to change (29% say the oppo-
site and 32% have no opinion). So we see the coexistence among a
large number of the adolescents surveyed of support for the rhetoric
of religious individualism (affiliations and identities are a matter of
personal choice) as well as the recognition of the role family tradition
still plays in the matter.
The fact of considering oneself a follower of a religion, then specify-
ing if need be what denomination, movement or branch one belongs
to, is a classic indicator of religiosity. However, we may wonder about
the way the young people to whom we spoke understood these two
matters: were they seen from an institutional point of view (having
been baptised, for example), from a familial and cultural point of view
(having grown up in a Muslim family for example), or from the indi-
vidual point of view of personal convictions? The answers indicate
whether or not they consider themselves as part of an institutional sys-
tem, or whether or not they feel they are carrying on a family tradition.
But this relationship to religious belief “is not necessarily a structuring
element of personality.” (Campiche, 1997, p. 55) Moreover, it rules
out non-institutional forms of religiosity, whereas 36% of those who
participated feel that “you can be a religious person without belong-
ing to a particular faith community” (32% disagree and 24% have no
opinion). To get an idea of personal commitment, the indicator deal-
ing with the importance given to religion in everyone’s life may be
more relevant.
The answers to the question “How important is religion to you?”
confirm an overall trend toward a lack of interest: only a third of those
surveyed give it any importance (45% consider it to be slightly impor-
tant or unimportant; 23% have no opinion). In addition, only 15% of
them agree with the statement “Religion determines my whole life.”
The analysis of the answers based on what religion the participants say
they belong to gives interesting results. Catholics are more or less like
the group as a whole, as only 17% of them feel that religion determines
their whole life. However, 57% of the Muslim participants agree with
this statement.
As a result, it is not surprising that religion does not play an impor-
tant part in the conversations that the adolescents surveyed may have
with their peers, and that religion appears to be a marginal aspect
 young people and religion in france 181

of youth culture. This is one of the results of the qualitative survey.

However, sometimes students will spontaneously start talking about
religion with each other (with classmates who share their religion or
worldview, as well as with those who do not). That kind of discussions
takes place in a spirit of curiosity and openness, sometimes involving
a certain competitive spirit. It allows adolescents to strengthen their
identities and confirm themselves in their points of view regarding
religion.14

Religious Attitudes on the Basis of Certain Indicators of Beliefs

and Practices

Belief in God, Some Sort of Spirit or Life Force

There is a There is some I don’t really think there is
God sort of spirit or a God or any sort of spirit
life force or life force
Total 36% 29% 35%
Girls 38% 31% 31%
Boys 32% 27% 41%
Without religion 6% 32% 62%
Catholics 53% 35% 12%
Muslims 97% 2% 1%
Source: 2008 REDCo Quantitative Survey

Note that 6% of those who don’t state any religious affiliation believe
in God and 32% believe in some sort of spirit or life force. So those
without a religion are not all non-believers. Slightly more girls than
boys think there is a God (a difference of 6 percentage points)15 and
that there is some sort of spirit or life force (a difference of 4 percent-
age points). But the differences become important when we take into
account the religions of our young participants: 97% of the adoles-
cents who consider themselves Muslims say there is a God. 53% of
those who feel they are Catholic believe in God, and 35% of them
belief in a sort of spirit or life force (12% are non-believers). Here we
see a confirmation of the disparity noted by Claude Dargent in his

14
About “the validation of beliefs by the peer group” see Béraud, Massignon &
Mathieu (in Knauth et al. (eds), 2008: 64–65).
15
According to the 2008 EVS survey, the difference between the sexes reaches 12
points for those 18 and over (Dargent, in Bréchon & Tchernia 2009, p. 250).
182 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

analysis of the 2008 EVS data (in Bréchon & Tchernia (eds.) 2009,
p. 248), although the difference is greater among the participants in
our survey: in the EVS survey, 99% of the Muslims believe there is
a God vs. 83% of the Catholics. We may assume that a significant
number of the adolescents we surveyed who say they are Catholic do
so more out of a sense of family or historical tradition than by real
commitment to a belief.

“Sometimes I Have Doubts—Is There a God or Not?”

Agree No opinion Disagree
Total 44% 24% 32%
Without religion 43% 25% 32%
Catholics 60% 25% 15%
Muslims 13% 13% 74%
Source: 2008 REDCo Quantitative Survey

More than 40% of those surveyed agree with the following statement:
“Sometimes I have doubts—is there a god or not?” Here again, there is
a revealing distinction depending on the religion to which the partici-
pants say they belong. Whereas the belief in God among Catholics is
characterised by doubt, nearly three-quarters of the Muslims surveyed
believe firmly in his existence.
As seen in the following table, the levels of religious involvement
(both collective and individual) reflect the overall tendency among
young people toward disinterest in religion:

How Often Do You:

About About every About once Less than once Never
every day week a month a month
Pray 14% 8% 7% 14% 57%
Attend 2% 10% 9% 33% 46%
religious
events
Read sacred 4% 5% 7% 15% 69%
texts (e.g.
Bible, Qur’an)
for yourself
Source: 2008 REDCo Quantitative Survey
 young people and religion in france 183

46% of the adolescents from 14 to 16 surveyed never attend religious

ceremonies; 57% never pray; 69% never read sacred texts for them-
selves. Here again, Muslim adolescents stand out by the intensity of
their involvement, as shown by their level of prayer. Half of the Mus-
lims surveyed say they pray nearly every day, while this is true of only
18% of the Catholics. 16% of the girls pray, vs. 11% of the boys. So we
see a difference between the sexes, but only a slight one. In addition,
12% of those without a religion pray at least occasionally.

Perceptions of Religion and its Role in Society

In the qualitative survey, it was customary to begin the interview by
asking the adolescents what came to mind when they heard the word
“religion.” Two kinds of answers were given. Most of the middle and
high school students interviewed had developed a pluralistic point of
view16 incorporating several religions: typically Christianity, Islam and
Judaism. Buddhism is also mentioned occasionally. It benefits from a
very positive image (in line with conventional stereotypes, the adoles-
cents contrast the open nature of Buddhism with the supposed dog-
matism of the three monotheistic religions), but most often a poorly
informed one, as shown by one girl who told us she was interested
in “Buddha-ism.” Some adolescents only mentioned terms associated
with one religion: their own in the case of students who were them-
selves observant, especially Muslims.
In the definition they give of religion, young French people insist
more upon practices than beliefs.17 They often mention rites of pas-
sage (usually ones to which a friend had invited them—Bar/Bat Mitz-
vahs, communions, etc.—where they seem to remember the festive
and family-oriented aspects more than the religious dimensions) and
the main religious holidays of the year (Eid ul-Fitr, Yom Kippur, or
Christmas). According to several Muslim adolescents, religion is struc-
tured around what is permitted and what is prohibited, as a boy puts it:

16
A majority of the British adolescents surveyed also gave a pluralistic definition of
religion. The opinion of Spanish adolescents is somewhat different, as most of them
mention Catholicism, regardless of their own beliefs. To define religion, some refer to
the Crucifixion or the Virgin Mary. Only a minority have a more global vision, refer-
ring in particular to Judaism.
17
This distinguishes them in particular from their Spanish peers.
184 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

“What should and shouldn’t do, services, ceremonies, rituals, rules,

that’s religion!” Somewhat paradoxically, school life results in the vis-
ibility of some practices, which become topics of discussion for the
students: “Even though all the students stress the secular nature of
public school, they often discover the religions, the beliefs and espe-
cially the practices of others in the school context: the classroom, but
also the schoolyard or the cafeteria.” (Mathieu, in Béraud & Willaime
(eds.), 2009). For example, the adolescents interviewed often sponta-
neously brought up the absences of some of their classmates during
major non-Christian religious holidays, certain dietary restrictions or
the banning of headscarves at school by the law of March 15, 2004. The
interviews took place in the autumn of 2006, during Ramadan, which
was regularly mentioned by the young Muslims themselves but also
by their classmates. These often strict practices arouse the curiosity
of adolescents, and even fascinate them to an undeniable degree. For
example, one student interviewed, who said he was Christian, stated
that he tried to fast during Ramadan as well. The importance that the
middle and high school students we interviewed gave to Islam is one
of the main discoveries of our research. Séverine Mathieu (in Béraud
& Willaime (eds.), 2009) says that “Islam is increasingly becoming the
principal reference for religion,” and that this can be seen not only
among the students, but among the teachers as well. A phenomenon of
this nature is fostered by current international events (the participants
often mentioned the media, while maintaining a critical distance from
it at the same time), but also by the experience of religious pluralism
in schools.
Finally, the term “religion” is associated with both positive and neg-
ative emotions. Rites of passage (those of one’s own tradition and, to
a greater extent, those of other traditions) are unanimously described
as happy occasions. Some of those surveyed mention negative experi-
ences in the context of their own religion. Students would often tell us
of a confrontation with a particularly devout adult. One Muslim girl
discussed problems she had with a particularly zealous and intoler-
ant aunt who was a convert: “I’ve got an aunt that was nearly ruined
by religion [. . .] She became more and more of a fundamentalist; she
forbid others from talking about Islam [. . .] Once, she visited my
grandparents. She cursed my grandmother, saying she wasn’t prop-
erly observant. My aunt started wearing the headscarf down to here
[she indicates the lower part of the eyes]. She didn’t have one stray hair
 young people and religion in france 185

sticking out, it was scary [. . .].” Another girl, raised in a Catholic fam-
ily, describes the reasons behind her loss of interest in going to church
every Sunday: “I took my first Communion, I went to Mass, there
was a really nice priest, then someone replaced him who was kind of
sadistic, so I stopped going. And then I moved.” Adolescents belong-
ing to a particular religion may also have to endure other kinds of
negative experiences as a result of the pejorative stereotypes associated
with that religion. A girl told us that her feelings were hurt by a sort
of disqualification of Catholicism: she felt like she was an open target
for her classmates’ teasing: “Here [the public high school she attended],
if you say you go to Mass and receive the host, people sort of think
you’re an idiot.” The quantitative data confirms this uneasiness among
young Catholics: 27% agree with the statement “A student who openly
demonstrates his/her religious beliefs in school risks being mocked”
(compared with 23% of all the students participating and only 16%
of the Muslims surveyed). During the interviews, many young Mus-
lims complained about being seen sometimes as potential terrorists.
Young Jews brought up anti-Semitic prejudices targeting them. Occa-
sionally this hostility goes even further: it takes the form of shouting
matches (even in the classroom) and, less often, physical fighting. In
discussing this, the adolescents openly refer to “racism” and even “rac-
ism between religions,” thus making religious affiliation a question of
ethnicity. The last type of negative experience is when some nonreli-
gious adolescents consider religion as something imposed, expressing
a complete lack of interest in it. Any sort of religious experience, even
a minimal one that doesn’t personally involve them, is seen in a nega-
tive light. This was the case for one nonreligious boy: “I’ve had some
negative experiences [. . .] I’ve been to funerals a couple of times. They
really got on my nerves. What the priest talked about didn’t have any-
thing to do with what I think. I felt like he lived on some other planet
[. . .].” Rejection of religion was expressed when those interviewed
considered it as “manipulation,” “brainwashing,” “a scam,” or when
religious beliefs were seen as sources of conflict, war and hatred. Two
students answered the question “What is your religion?” by saying “I
am anticlerical.” One was even more specific: “Anticlerical, son of an
anticlerical.”
186 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

Statements Regarding Religion

Agree No Disagree
opinion
Religion is nonsense 17% 20% 43%
Without religion the world would be a better 27% 33% 40%
place
Religion makes people aggressive 21% 32% 47%
I respect other people who believe 85% 6% 9%
Religious people are less tolerant towards 18% 30% 52%
others
In my view, talking about religion 21% 25% 54%
only leads to disagreement
Religion doesn’t interest me at all— 35% 27% 37%
we have more important things to talk about
For me talking about religious topics is 34% 25% 41%
boring
My friends and I talk about how stupid 24% 27% 49%
religion is and what cruelties are carried
out in its name
To me talking about religion is interesting 65% 23% 12%
because people have different views
Learning about religions 16% 20% 64%
leads to conflicts in the classroom
People with different strong religious views 16% 25% 59%
cannot live together
I don’t like people from other religions 5% 11% 84%
and don’t want to live together with them
Respecting the religion of others 80% 14% 6%
helps to cope with differences
Religion is something private 52% 28% 20%
People from different religions can live 29% 42% 29%
together if the country has strict laws about
the role of religion in society
Religion is important in our history 80% 14% 6%
Source: 2008 REDCo Quantitative Survey

The quantitative survey gives us a better idea of the perceptions young

people from 14 to 16 have of religion and its role in society. A minority
of the participants agree with pejorative statements18 associated with
religion. In general, girls agree even less often than boys do; those sur-

18
These statements included in the quantitative questionnaire were verbatim quotes
taken from students during the qualitative phase of the research.
 young people and religion in france 187

veyed who say they have a religion (especially Muslims) agree less often
than non-religious participants. For example, 19% of the girls vs. 32%
of the boys agree with the following statement: “Without religion the
world would be a better place.” This is true of 20% of those surveyed
who have a religion (23% of the Catholics and only 5% of the Mus-
lims) vs. 37% of those who do not have one. Half of the participants
disapprove of the crudest stereotypes of religion, when it is associated
with cruelty or absurdity for example. The same percentage disagrees
with the statement “Religious people are less tolerant towards others.”
The approval levels are highest for the statements dealing with the lack
of interest in this topic during conversations with peers (35%) as well
as how boring the topic is (34%).
In general, the participants reject the image of religion as something
that leads to conflict: half of those surveyed disagree with the statement
“Religion makes people aggressive.” A comparable percentage of the
students surveyed do not feel that discussions with friends about reli-
gion lead to disagreement (54%); the percentage is even higher when it
comes to such discussions in class (64%). Students who have a religion
are more concerned about conflicts in the classroom than non-reli-
gious students (19% vs. 13%, 16% for those surveyed as a whole); the
issue is more important for Muslims (25%) than for Catholics (17%).
The participants in the survey seem to have confidence in the values
of pluralism. They do not like limiting their social interactions to their
own religious community: 84% of those surveyed disagree with the
statement “I don’t like people from other religions and don’t want to
live together with them.” Around 60% feel that the diversity of beliefs,
even strong ones, is not an obstacle to “living together.” Between
peers, differences of opinion on religion can even make conversations
interesting, according to 65% of the participants. They widely consider
respect to be important: 80% agree that “respecting the religion of
others helps to cope with differences.” The percentage is even slightly
higher when those surveyed speak for themselves regarding this gen-
eral principle: 85% say, “I respect other people who believe.”
Half of the participants feel that “Religion is something private”;
for them, the secular nature of schools means that religious matters
should not be discussed in class. But only 29% think that the country
should have “strict laws about the role of religion in society.” 80%
agree that “religion is important in our history,” which would indi-
cate support for instruction on religious phenomena in schools. In
the end, we may be pleased to see that the middle and high school
188 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

students who participated in the REDCo survey have adopted a recep-

tive attitude regarding the place of religion in school, but we may also
wonder about the rather consensual nature of their replies (Allouche-
Benayoun, in Béraud & Willaime (eds.), 2009). The survey took place
in class, in the presence of a teacher and a researcher from our team.
As a result, the wish to maintain a sense of goodwill in the classroom
may have led some students to moderate their responses, although we
made it clear each time that we wanted everyone’s point of view and
that there were no “right” or “wrong” answers.

Main Conclusions

The adolescents from 14 to 16 show a clear level of indifference to

institutionalised religion, especially Catholicism, as do young people
from 18 to 29. Among the adolescents (at an age where they are prob-
ably more concerned with family traditions than they will be a few
years later), half say they have a religion; less than half of young peo-
ple from 18 to 29 say so. Some of them just refer to themselves as
“Christian” in a fairly vague manner; a few even say they are “a bit
Christian.” This trend toward indifference does not preclude the exis-
tence of active and assimilated religious minorities. Strongly asserted
religious identities coexist with other viewpoints that are less resolved.
Young people who consider themselves Muslims are notable for the
importance they give to religion in their lives, for their beliefs, and for
the strictness of their rituals, which commands the respect of some
of their classmates. Among those who say they are Catholic, only a
minority demonstrate the same level of commitment to their belief
as their Muslim peers. Those surveyed often express doubts about the
existence or non-existence of God. Some of the participants say they
are open to change. But some religious minorities resist this relativism,
as shown by the young Muslims.
We find various signs of a tendency toward “religion off the beaten
track” (Lambert, 2003) among the young people surveyed, or toward
a mobile and flexible religiosity modelled on the two ideal-typical fig-
ures of the “pilgrim” and the “convert”19 (Hervieu-Léger, 1999). This
phenomenon is part of a religious environment that is more complex

19
The pilgrim travels alone and of his or her own free will. His or her practice
revolves around “sacred places” and “profound experiences”, not around day-to-day
 young people and religion in france 189

than what was foreseen some years ago by the theory of a decreasing
interest in religion (Berger, 1967). The analysis of the answers given to
the question dealing with belief in “God, a life force or a kind of spirit”
reveals that people without a religious affiliation are not necessarily
non-believers or even non-observant. Here we find another example
of the phenomenon of “believing without belonging” that the British
sociologist Grace Davie has observed (2004). Many of those surveyed
agree with the following statement: “One may be a religious person
without belonging to a particular community of faith.” The young
participants thus seem to have taken note of the phenomenon of “the
institutional deregulation of belief ” (Hervieu-Léger, 1999). Some ado-
lescents who do not claim any sort of religious affiliation say however
that they pray at least occasionally.
In the REDCo questionnaire, one question made it possible to eval-
uate how much borrowing from non-Christian belief systems takes
place, which is another example of “religion off the beaten track”: the
question regarding “some sort of spirit or life force.”20 The result is
fairly significant. For example, 29% of the adolescents surveyed feel
that “some sort of spirit or life force” exists, agreeing with an expres-
sion that has its roots in Asian or New Age religions. However, this
tendency toward “religion off the beaten track” among the adoles-
cent participants may be put into perspective through the impor-
tance they give to the family as a source of religious socialisation, as
well as through the importance of the traditions inherited from their
parents.
We should add that this lack of interest in institutionalised religion is
not associated with a large-scale acceptance of antireligious positions.
Those surveyed strongly reject the most hostile statements regarding
religions and religious people. This is another example of something
already observed in the EVS surveys: “Vague beliefs and religious indif-
ference are becoming much more prevalent among young Europe-
ans than the well-reasoned rejection of religious systems” (Campiche,
1997, p. 53). We may be able to establish a hypothesis of a break with
previous generations on this matter in the French context: older gen-
erations seem to have a more negative image of religions and their

living. The convert chooses to commit himself or herself; as a result, this commitment
acquires authenticity.
20
In surveys on religiosity, other indicators are often used: for example, belief in
reincarnation, or the practice of meditation.
190 céline béraud and jean-paul willaime

most ardent followers.21 In fact, the young people of today have a

relaxed attitude toward religion as a social and cultural phenomenon.
Although only a minority among them feel that religion is important
in their lives, an increasing number of them demonstrate an interest
in spiritual issues, in various unconventional ways. This should only
underline the need to widen the focus of research on “young people
and religion” to include extremely diverse forms of religiosity. This
attitude among young people does not keep them from being con-
scious of the role of religions in cultural heritage, which is asserting
itself at the very moment when religious institutions are becoming less
socially relevant and are losing their hold on the faithful (Boespflug,
Dunand & Willaime, 1996). The statement “Religion is important in
our history” obtains a very large majority of favourable responses.

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See for example the data from the ISSP survey in 1998 as analysed by Yves Lam-
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 YOUTH AND RELIGION IN FINLAND

Kati Niemelä

Introduction

In terms of Church membership, Finland is a fairly homogenous

country. Most Finns (80.6% in 2008) are members of the Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church of Finland (ELCF). Among the young Finns the
number of members of the ELFC is even higher than that. Of those 15
years old nearly 90 percent belong to that church. All other religious
groups each account for less than about one per cent of the popula-
tion. The next largest religious groups are Orthodox, Pentecostals and
Muslims. Seventeen percent of Finns do not belong to any registered
religious organisation. Their number has gradually risen.
Almost two out of three Finns consider themselves religious. How-
ever, public religious practice is at a low level in Finland. According
to the World Value Survey 2005 one out of six (14%) attend some
religious activity at least once a month. Almost half (45%) of Finns
attend religious observances less often than once a month, but at least
once a year. In Europe the comparison ranks very low, close to adja-
cent areas—the other Nordic countries, Russia and the Baltic States.
Although Finns are not very regular in attending public religious activ-
ities, nevertheless religion is a prominent part of many people’s lives.
Although public religious practice Finland ranks low in Europe, it is
placed well above the European average in terms of how many Finns
pray. All in all, Finnish religiosity is by nature private. (See Kääriäinen
& Ketola & Niemelä 2005)
This article is about youth and religion in Finland. First we shall
look at how young Finns, in general, differ from older generations.
From the point of view of these results we shall discuss whether there
is a generational change under way in Finland. After that we shall go
deeper into the religiosity of the young generation. We shall analyse the
changes in religiosity during teenage years. One distinctive feature of
youth and religion in Finland is that almost 90 percent of young Finns
attend Church confirmation training and are typically confirmed at
the age of 15. This is a very popular form of activity among the young
194 kati niemelä

people and often regarded as a part of youth culture. We shall analyse

the meaning of this confirmation period in the religious lives of young
people. Next we shall analyse young people’s relation to the Church
and its faith in general and in relation to other forms of religiosity or
spirituality. Last we shall discuss the changes in religious upbringing
which may be one factor explaining possible changes in religiosity.

Data

The results of this article are mainly based on five separate research
projects. First, in 2003 we started a three-year research project on
young adults aged 20 to 39 in the metropolitan area of Helsinki (Mik-
kola & Niemelä & Petterson 2006; 2007). This was a co-operation
project involving University of Helsinki, the Helsinki Parish Union,
the Church Research Institute, the Diaconial University College and
Efeko. The target group was chosen to be the urban young generation
because it was assumed that religious and other changes would mani-
fest themselves first within this group of people (see Mikkola 2003, 16;
Mäenpää 2006, 318). Therefore by analysing this group we assumed
that we could make some kind of predictions of the future develop-
ments within the population of Finland as a whole. The basic aims
of the project were (1) to increase and disseminate information and
understanding of young adults’ lives and life situations, (2) to increase
and disseminate information on young adults’ values and religiosity,
(3) to ascertain the numbers of young adults resigning from the Church
and joining the Church and the reasons for this, and to seek ways of
ensuring a positive development in Church membership and (4) to
learn about the relation between young adults’ experiences and expec-
tations and what the parishes are offering and to make development
proposals for the parishes’ activities for young adults. As a basis for
the research, telephone interviews were conducted with 1,000 young
adults living in Helsinki area and in addition to that 500 young adults
living in a district called Kallio, in the very centre of Helsinki. Further
with the telephone interviews, face-to-face interviews were conducted
with more than 100 young adults who had first participated the tele-
phone interviews. (Mikkola & Niemelä & Petterson 2007, 8).
Secondly, the results are based on a research project on resignations
from the Church in Finland. In 2003, after the renewal of the legisla-
tion on freedom of religion, the number of people leaving the Church
 youth and religion in finland 195

rose markedly. Since then (2003–2008) about one percent of Church

members have annually resigned from the Church. They are mainly
young people. We collected various statistical data and about 500 per-
sonal written stories on the subject “Why did I leave the church?”
from people who had left the Church. (See Niemelä 2006a, 2007)
Thirdly, the results are based on two projects on Church confir-
mation work. The first of these is a longitudinal study (2001–2006)
on young people (aged 15 to 20) who were confirmed in 2001 in the
Tampere parishes in Finland (see Niemelä 2008). Second is an inter-
national research project on confirmation work established in 2007
by the University of Tübingen (Germany). Seven countries (Finland,
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) and
their Lutheran churches (in Switzerland the Reformed Church) par-
ticipated the project. In these seven countries representative data was
collected from young confirmands (total number of respondents about
20,000) and their confirmation leaders (about 2,000 respondents). (See
Schweitzer & Ilg & Simojoki 2010)
The fourth source of data is the Youth Barometer Survey 2006 (Fin-
land) which focused on religion. The data was collected from 1,900
young Finns aged 15 to 29 in 2006.
When referring to Finnish religiosity in general, the results are either
based on our research on the topic (based on data collected over a long
period of time) (see e.g. Kääriäinen & Niemelä & Ketola 2005) or on
representative statistical data from all age groups in Finland collected
by the Church Research Institute. These are the Church Monitor Sur-
vey 2004 (N=2,555) and 2007 (N=4,000), the World Values Survey
2005 (Finland); Gallup Ecclesiastica 2003 and 2007.

Religiosity in Different Age Groups—Is there a Generational Change

in Religiosity in Finland?

Before going deeper into the religiosity of the young generation, we

shall take a general look at religiosity in different age groups in Fin-
land. The research data shows that older people in Finland are more
religious than younger generations regardless of what traditional
dimension of religion is analysed. The older the age group the more
important is the role of religion and the Church in their lives, and the
more faithful the people are to the Church and its traditional beliefs
and values. The difference in religiosity of different age groups and its
196 kati niemelä

mostly linear pattern can be seen in Table 1, examining the share of

those who believe in some sort of higher power and personal God who
answers prayers among the different age groups. The trend is the same
whatever dimension of religiosity is examined. Older people are more
active in private religious activity (e.g. praying) and in public religious
attendance (e.g. church attendance (see Table 2). On the other hand
the same “weaker religiosity” can be observed in many studies if resi-
dents of the metropolitan area are compared to those resident else-
where in Finland (see e.g. Niemelä 2003, 187; Kääriäinen & Niemelä
& Ketola 2005, 134; Mikkola & Niemelä & Petterson 2007). Residents
of the metropolitan area are less religious in a traditional sense than
those living elsewhere.

Table 1. Number of those who Believe (Firmly or to Some Extent) in Some

Sort of Higher Power and Personal God who Answers Prayers in Different
Age Groups in Finland (the Items are Not Exclusive). Church Monitor
Survey 2007, N = 3878. %
Believes in some sort of Believes in a personal God who
higher power answers prayers
15–19 57 38
20–24 58 36
25–34 59 37
35–44 65 40
45–54 70 47
55–64 71 52
65+ 75 57
Total 66 44

Table 2. Number of those who Attend Church Services at Least Once a

Month and those who Attend Less than Once a Year or Never in Different
Age Groups in Finland. Church Monitor Survey 2007, N = 3899. %
Prays Prays less than Attends religious Attends religious
daily once a year or services at least services less than once
never once a month a year or never
15–19 18 43 6 48
20–24 12 53 3 71
25–34 18 52 4 59
35–44 25 46 11 52
45–54 29 43 10 44
55–64 31 35 13 44
65+ 47 30 23 30
Total 22 43 11 46
 youth and religion in finland 197

These differences between old and young are not new: as long as there
has been research data available older people have been more reli-
gious than younger people. These differences have traditionally been
explained in three different ways: the traditional model focuses on
the development processes associated with the respective stages of life
(see e.g. Bahr 1970). Then the increase in religiosity occurring with
increasing age is explained by the fact that it is an outcome of the
development tasks accompanying ageing. The alternative life span
model attributes differences in ages to changes in social roles and not
to development processes associated with different stages of life (see
e.g. Chaves 1991). Here the changes in religiosity occurring with age
are attributed to changes occurring in the individual’s role, especially
in the family role. Then the main factors with bearing on religios-
ity are deemed to be having children and parenthood or the death of
one’s own parents. The third explanatory model attributes difference
in religiosity among people of varying ages to cohort effects; living and
maturing is not the same in all periods of life, and external factors have
many potential effects on different generations. This is the explanatory
model which has caused most disagreement among researchers, and
particularly with regard to the influence of secularization.
But to what extent is the observed decrease in religiosity among
Finnish young people and young adults a consequence of the influence
of a given age and especially of secularization and to what extent is it
simply a case of being younger?
Studies on the religiosity of Finns show, as might be expected, that
religiosity does indeed have a slight tendency to increase with age:
the generation which, while still of working age, has at least so far
become religiously more active as pensioners. The age cohort which
was around the age of 50 at the beginning of the 1990s, prayed more
actively some twenty years later when already at retirement age. There
are also more of those who believe in God and who could not imagine
resigning from the Church. It is only attendance at services which has
not increased. A corresponding increase in religiosity is also apparent
in all other age groups: The private practice of religion increases with
age, likewise the significance of belonging to the Church, even though
there is no increase in attendance a services or other religious par-
ticipation. (Niemelä 2003b, 199–200; Kääriäinen & Niemelä & Ketola
2005, 141–142)
Thus the optimists of the Church may console themselves that
young people have always been less religious but will duly become
more so as they grow older and that they can therefore stop reading
198 kati niemelä

this chapter here and now. However, there are also periodic differ-
ences in religiosity. Today’s young people are less religious than young
people a few decades ago. Comparison of the religiosity of differ-
ent groups over a period of twenty years shows that the differences
between age groups now apparent are not only a consequence of dif-
ferences developing with age, but to some extent also of differences
between eras and also to some extent of secularization—or at least
of a change in religiosity. The young people of today, like those of
working age and those who have retired, are also less religious and
less committed to the Church and its conceptions of faith than those
of the same age twenty years earlier. This change is most pronounced
among city dwellers. The change brought by the passage of time is very
obvious among young people and young adults. It is also obvious with
regard to churchgoing. The share of passive churchgoers and of those
who never go to church has increased among young people and young
adults. There has also been a decrease in the number of churchgoers
among those of working age. On the other hand, if religiosity is con-
templated from the perspective of private practice of religion, such
as praying, the differences are small or non-existent in all age groups
(Niemelä 2003b, 200–203; Kääriäinen & Niemelä & Ketola 2005,
143–144).
There is a strong link between the foregoing and the change other-
wise occurring in Finns’ religiosity in recent decades. In light of the
changes in recent decades, Finns’ religiosity is characterized by the
weakened position of religious institutions. This is seen first and fore-
most in people’s decreased membership of religious bodies, as also in
a reduction in the clear commitment among Finns to the teachings of
the Church and in participation in traditional forms of religion. (See
Kääriäinen & Niemelä & Ketola 2005, 82, 112–113.) These changes
are apparent in all age groups. However, at the same time activity in
praying has remained the same. Nor has there in recent decades been
any decline in the belief in the existence of God or some supernatu-
ral force. Likewise the share of Finns who believe that God is impor-
tant in their lives and who derive help from religion has remained
the same. However, at the same time, the share of those who believe
in the traditional teachings of the Church has declined (see Niemelä
2003a, 150–163; Kääriäinen & Niemelä & Ketola 2005, 100–109). Thus
this is not a matter of one-way secularization—hardly anyone believes
that (see Davie 2000; Davie 2006; Casanova 1994). Rather, religion has
become increasingly private.
 youth and religion in finland 199

Religious Change in Teenage Years

But what happens during teenage years and in late teens? Previous
research suggests that there is a decline in religiosity during these years.
Young people in their early teens are often reported to be more reli-
gious than those a bit older. Many studies have reported this decline
in youth in both religious participation and religious belief, being at its
lowest around late teenage years and about at the twenty years of age.
(See e.g. Hoge & Roozen 1979; Arnett 2004; Kääriäinen & Niemelä &
Ketola 2005; Mikkola & Niemelä & Petterson 2006). This age is fre-
quently accompanied by taking distance from religious authority and
by decrease in religious activity. For example, a recently published lon-
gitudinal research in America shows in a three-year-perspective that
between the age groups 13–17 and 16–20, there is a decline in beliefs,
religious affiliation and activity. Regarding specific beliefs, adolescents
seem to be shifting away from conventional religious beliefs. The shift
away from standard religiosity can also be seen in both their public
and private religious practices. (Denton & Pearce & Smith 2008). This
trend is also apparent in Finland (see Tables 1 and 2). Those 15–19
are more religious than those 20–24. It seems that religious activity is
at its lowest at that age (20–24). The same difference can be seen in
the results of the Youth Barometer. While 45 percent of those 15–19
regarded themselves as religious, only 40 percent of those 20–24 did
so. The youngest generation was also more likely to believe according
to the teachings of the church that those in young adulthood. Twenty-
two percent of those 15–19 believed that after death there will heaven
and hell depending on how you live, while only 15 percent of those
20–24 and 13 percent of those 25–29 did so. (Uskon asia 2006, 66, 78).
Those aged 15 to 19 are also more likely to believe according to the
teachings of the Church than those over 20. According to the Church
Monitor Survey 2007, 25 percent of those 15–19 believed firmly that
Jesus is the Son of God while only 17 percent of those 20–24 did so.
We shall illustrate the change in Finland in detail more by analys-
ing the activity in praying in each age group between the age 15 and
24. We have to be careful in this kind of analysis since the number of
respondents per age group in most surveys is rather low. However the
Church Monitor Survey 2007 allows this to some extent with the high
number of respondents (the total number of respondents is 4,000). In
most single age groups there are at least 50 respondents. The results
are not very decisive and there is some shifting in them, but the data
200 kati niemelä

shows in general that religious activity between 15 and 19 and is higher

than among those over 20 (see Table 3).

Table 3. Number of those who Pray Daily and those who Pray Less than
Once a Year or Never among those Aged Between 15 and 24. Church
Monitor Survey 2007. %
Prays daily Prays less than once a year or never N
15 19 36 78
16 16 42 64
17 22 53 60
18 16 42 67
19 16 48 44
20 11 52 61
21 14 43 56
22 13 54 71
23 14 64 59
24 7 54 83

Confirmation Work and Change in Religiosity

At the age of 15 most Finnish teenagers attend the Church confirma-

tion preparation and are confirmed. In 2008, a total of 57,626 young
people underwent confirmation preparation which amounts to 87.6
percent of the age cohort aged 15. The vast majority of confirmands
are 15 years old in the year when they are confirmed, only a small
number are older, like those taking confirmation training when in
national military service or others of adult age.
In Finland the popularity of confirmation work has remained sur-
prisingly constant since the mid-1970s. At the same time many other
Church activities have decreased in popularity. Most confirmation
groups are in the form of a camp (about 90% of young people attend
confirmation training which is mostly in this form). A very typical
way of organising these groups is to have several meetings during
the school year (for example 3–4 meetings on Saturdays) and then to
have a one-week camp period during the summer holiday. The con-
firmation ceremony is typically organised several days after the camp
period.
The confirmation period always has religious aims—as a part of
baptismal training it is based on Jesus’ commandment “. . . and teach-
ing them to obey everything I have commanded you . . .” (Matt. 28:20).
 youth and religion in finland 201

In Finland the main aim of the confirmation period is to strengthen

the confirmands’ faith in God (Elämä—Usko—Rukous 2001).
For many young people the confirmation period is a turning
point—at least for a short time. At the end of the confirmation period
the majority of young people frequently report that they experienced
something significant and that they want to be involved in the activi-
ties of the parish or at least in training to be a peer tutor during confir-
mation training. A Finnish longitudinal study in a 5-year perspective
indicated that the confirmation period may serve as a means of main-
taining and activating religious observance among young people and
preventing a retreat from religious authority and faith in general. The
research indicated that during the confirmation period there were both
positive and negative changes in religiosity, but positive changes were
by far more common. These changes partly faded afterwards, but after
five years they still affected young people’s perceptions of the Church
and religiosity. Table 4 illustrates these changes. The confirmation

Table 4. Attitudes of Young People to Christianity and Belief in God at the

Start of Confirmation Period (Mostly at the Age of 14), at the End of
Confirmation Period (Mostly at the Age of 15) and Five Years Later (Mostly
at the Age of 20). A Longitudinal Study on Confirmands in Tampere,
Finland. N = 269 (Includes only the Responses of those Young People who
Completed All Three Questionnaires). Niemelä 2008, 95. %
ATTITUDE TO At start of End of Five years after
CHRISTIANITY confirmation confirmation confirmation
period period period
Very positive 8 18 15
Fairly positive 35 44 35
Neither positive nor negative 42 32 40
Fairly negative 12 4 7
Very negative 3 2 3
BELIEF IN GOD
I am a believer 5 8 8
I do believe in God but am 35 43 40
not a “believer”
I don’t know if I believe in 39 30 28
God or not
I doubt if there is a God 9 11 10
I do not believe that there is 12 7 14
a God
202 kati niemelä

training changes young people’s attitudes in a more positive direction

and even though there is some fading after confirmation, the general
attitudes are still more positive at the age of 20 than they were at the
age of 15. However, in terms of doctrinal beliefs, there is more decline
after confirmation. At the age of 20, the young people are more scepti-
cal. The age around 20 seems frequently to be accompanied by taking
distance from religious authority and a decrease in religious activity.
(Niemelä 2008, 93–98).
The outcomes of the confirmation period were connected with the
quality of the training: experiences in the confirmation period corre-
late positively with religious outcomes. Those with a positive confir-
mation experience are, for example, more likely to remain members
of the Church and are more willing to take part in Church activities in
adulthood. (Niemelä 2006c; 2008).
An international comparative study shows that Finnish confirma-
tion work is very successful when compared to that of other coun-
tries. In no other country are the results in all levels that good (see
Schweitzer & Ilg & Simojoki 2010). There are several reasons behind
the success of these groups in Finland. Firstly, the confirmation system
enjoys strong support from families. It is regarded as important by
parents and grandparents and also regarded as an important tradi-
tion. Secondly, the confirmation system has reached a status as a part
of youth culture among the young people. It is regarded as something
“everybody does”. It unites the age group of 15. Young people are also
happy to participate and the period is something they look forward to.
Thirdly, the system itself is well organised, actively renewed and well
implemented. Young people who are confirmed are mostly satisfied
or very satisfied with their confirmation period. Only some 5 percent
express dissatisfaction. The young people are especially satisfied with
the camp period. The camp system itself can be regarded as an impor-
tant success factor. Fourth, the leaders and confirmation workers are
well trained and represent a wide range of professions while in some
countries the confirmation work is mainly lead by the clergy. There
are also many young volunteers working whose role and input are
seen as important by confirmands and leaders. Fifth, confirmation is
still seen as an important rite of passage even though it has lost its
official status in that manner. Young people are still granted rights by
confirmation: in order to be able to get married in church or to be able
to be a godparent, one has to be confirmed. These rights are regarded
as important.
 youth and religion in finland 203

Another distinctive feature of religious life of young people is that

the schools offer religious education starting in the first grade. Accord-
ing to the renewed Freedom of Religion Act of 2003 the pupils have
the right to receive “the teaching of their own religion”, i.e. teaching
groups are divided according to pupils’ religious background, each
group has a curriculum slightly different from each other, but the aims
of all curricula—13 different ones have been accepted—are based on
the needs of the common civil society. About 94 percent of all pupils
study in Lutheran groups. The research has shown that young people
find it easy to make a distinction between confirmation training and
religious education in school: the confirmation work concentrates
more on learning religion or about religion, the school teaching more
on learning from religion. (Innanen & Niemelä & Porkka 2010, 144).

The Young Generation and Church Membership

Young people’s connection to and perception of the Church reveals

many important features of the religiosity of the young generation in
Finland. As already stated, most young Finns are members of the Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Finland. Nearly 90 percent of those aged 15
belong to the Church. Most young people are also basically positively
disposed to the church. They regard it as a “quite all right” thing in
life. This is even the case in the Helsinki area, which is regarded as the
most challenging area for the Church. Only one percent of the young
adults belonging to the Church have a decidedly negative attitude to
the Church and seven percent a somewhat negative attitude (Mik-
kola & Niemelä & Petterson 2007, 82–82). However, the Church as an
organisation and membership of that organisation are not regarded as
personally important. Very few are active and many have in practice
no ties to the Church and the Church and its faith are distant and a
matter of indifference. For many the relation to the Church is some-
thing from which they do not feel they derive any benefit at all. (Mik-
kola & Niemelä & Petterson 2007, 83–84, 88).
Comparison of the image of the Church among Finns of different
ages reveals a great difference between young and old Finns regarding
the extent to which the Church is perceived to be needed (F=13.22***):
typically young people do not personally perceive the Church as a nec-
essary institution. Of Finns aged less than 30 only 12 per cent reported
that there is a clear need for the Church (chose number 5 on a scale
204 kati niemelä

1–5), while the corresponding figure for those over 70 years old was 58
per cent. However, there was no difference in the estimates of respon-
dents of different ages as to whether the Church is perceived to be
service-minded or the defender of the weak. (See Niemelä 2006b, 60;
the data used is from Gallup Ecclesiastica 2003.)
The weak personal tie to the Church is apparent in the young peo-
ple’s attitudes to Church membership. Among young people and
young adults, those who could not imagine leaving the Church are
clearly fewer than in older age groups. The connection between age
and Church membership is clearly linear: the older the person the
more likely s/he is to consider Church membership important, and
conversely the younger the person the weaker is his/her commitment
on average to Church membership (see Table 5). According to the
Gallup Ecclesiastica 2007 survey, of those under the age of 25 only one
in five (21%) could not imagine resigning from the Church. Likewise
of those over 65 three out of four (74%) could not imagine resigning
from the Church under any circumstances. Although among young
people only a fifth was strongly committed to membership, this does
not mean that all the others were considering resignation. Among
those aged 15 to 24 every tenth (11%) considered resignation likely,
in addition the same number had considered resignation but were not
sure about it.

Table 5. Commitment to Church Membership in Different Age Groups in

Finland. Gallup Ecclesiastica 2007, N = 793. %
I could not I have never I have I have often I am likely
contem- considered considered thought to leave
plate leaving leaving the leaving the about the church
the church Church and Church leaving,
under any do not see but always but I am
circumstances it as a likely decided not sure
prospect against it about it
15–24 20 38 18 13 11
25–34 21 36 21 13 9
35–44 31 24 25 18 2
45–54 38 28 14 8 1
55–64 67 20 19 4 1
65–75 67 21 7 4 1
75+ 78 9 13 0 0
 youth and religion in finland 205

As in the other Nordic countries, so also in Finland—membership of

the Evangelical Lutheran Church has been seen as a part of national
identity (see Gustafson & Pettersson 2000; Davie 2000; Sundback
2000). This attitude to Church membership, however, no longer
seems to describe the relation of the new generation to the Church.
Unlike their parents, young people no longer perceive membership of
the ELCF to be part of the Finnish way of life, and for them being a
member of the Church has hardly anything to do with being a good
citizen or a good Finn. For the older generations, however, being a
member of the Church was an integral part of the Finnish way of life.
This perception of Church membership as a part of the Finnish way of
life is particularly pronounced among those of pension age, of whom
half (50%) consider it a very important reason for belonging to the
Church. Among those under 25 years old only 11 per cent think in
this way. Among those aged 50–64 membership of the Church is still
clearly part of the Finnish way of life. The younger the age group, the
less important this is. In no other reason for belonging to the Church
do the views of the young generation differ so much from those of
older generations. (The difference between the different age groups.
F=33,19***. Source Gallup Ecclesiastica 2003 Survey.)
The young people are also not likely to identify themselves as
Lutheran, even if they are members of the Church and if they identify
themselves as Christians. Among the older age groups the bondage
home, church and fatherland is deeply ingrained. This connection is
the more tenuous the younger the age group is concerned. Among the
older age groups Lutheranism would therefore appear to be clearly a
characteristic pertaining to the national Finnish identity—a good Finn
is also a Lutheran. Lutheranism was also once one of the factors which
during the period of Russian domination distinguished Finns from
Russians and laid the foundations for a feeling of nationalism. Among
young people and young adults Lutheranism no longer appears to
have such a significance connected to a feeling of nationalism. (Nie-
melä 2006a, 195–196.) This being the case, membership of the Church
seems to be more of a personal choice for the young. From this it
follows that the threshold for the choice to resign from the Church,
for example, if an individual feels unable to commit to its message, is
lower than it is for older people.
206 kati niemelä

No to Institutions

The young people do not give the same importance to the concept of
Church as an institution as do older age groups. For the young genera-
tion faith is decidedly personal, and many young people do not feel
that they need the Church as an institution to strengthen their own
faith. Faith pertains to the individual and is a private matter. A distinc-
tion is made between faith and institution. According to the Gallup
Ecclesiastica 2003 Survey only one out of ten (11%) respondents under
25 years of age considered it an extremely important, and one out of
five (21%) a fairly important reason for belonging to the Church that
the Church strengthens belief in God. Among pensioners those con-
sidering this extremely or fairly important amounted to 72 per cent.
(Niemelä 2006a; 2007)
A critical attitude to institutions can also be seen in the young
adults’ somewhat low confidence in institutions in general. Not only
the Church, but also other traditional institutions, such as the political
parties and the trade union movement do not enjoy much trust among
young people. According to the Youth Barometer Survey 2006 of Finns
aged 15–29, those with high confidence in the Church amounted to
15 per cent, with a further 39 per cent reporting confidence to some
extent. Every fifth (18%) reported no confidence in the Church. The
share of young people with at least some confidence in the Church fell
14 percentage points in ten years between 1996 and 2006 (from 68%
to 54%). (Uskon asia 2006, 48–50.)
The new law of religious freedom was approved in Finland in 2003.
Under the new legislation leaving the church became easier. After
these changes there was a notable increase in the numbers of young
adults resigning. Approximately 70–80 percent of those leaving the
Church are young people in their twenties and thirties. (See Niemelä
2006a; 2007.)
The research based on letters and quantitative data permit the gen-
eralization that young people leave the Church primarily because they
cannot commit to the Church’s message and because for them the
Church lacks personal meaning. Thus membership of the Church is
seen to be at odds with the individual’s own thinking, and leaving the
Church is justified above all by honesty: because they cannot make a
commitment to the message of the Church, membership is seen as
insincerity towards oneself and others. Among older people such rea-
sons for leaving the Church are rare. (See Niemelä 2006a; 2007)
 youth and religion in finland 207

Young adults also frequently sense a conflict with some view or

decision of the Church. Disappointments with the intolerance of the
Church and inequality are very typical for young adults. Older people
on the other hand frequently resign because of personal disappoint-
ments with the Church. Among young people such disappointments
are rare. (See Niemelä 2006a, 2007)
But why do young people who are often critically disposed to institu-
tions want to be members of the Church? The research shows that the
reasons for being a member of the Church are on the whole very much
connected to the phase of life and emanate from the life situation.
The most important reason for young people to belong to the
Church is the option to be married in church. This is prominent above
all among those under the age of 30. The next important reason for
young people is the option for their children to have a Christian bap-
tism. This is prominent before and after age 30. Thus the young adults
stress as reasons for being members of the Church those things which
at a given stage of life are topical, getting married and the birth of
children and the Church rites associated with these. Among older age
groups the one reason deemed most important is the option of being
buried by the Church. (Niemelä 2006a, 179–186; 194–195.)
The Church members were classified using K-means cluster analysis
into different groups according to why they belonged to the Church
i.e. what issues they consider important for their Church member-
ship. (See Niemelä 2006a, 181–186, 197.) The groups and their per-
centage shares in the total population are: members emphasising the
spiritual mission of the Church (29%), members emphasising Church
rites (28%), members emphasising the Church’s aid function (27%)
and those as members with loose justification (16%). i.e. members who
have no particular reason for their own membership. Among young
people throughout Finland there are more members than in other age
groups who stress Church rites and more for whose Church member-
ship there does not appear to be any reason. In the young age groups
there are fewer members who stress the spiritual task of the Church
than there are in the older age groups. (Niemelä 2006a, 195.)

Alternative Channels for Spiritual Growth

Young people in Finland prefer to describe themselves as spiritual

rather than as religious. Of the young adults in the metropolitan area
208 kati niemelä

Table 6. Religious Identity of Young Adults in Helsinki Metropolitan

Area. Telephone Survey Young Adults in Helsinki Metropolitan Area 2004,
N = 1,000
Spiritual Non-spiritual Total
% % %
RELIGIOUS 37 8 45
(Religious and (Religious,
spiritual) non-spiritual)
NON-RELIGIOUS 34 21 55
(Spiritual, (Non-religious,
non-religious) non-spiritual)
Total 69 31 100

69 per cent consider themselves spiritual, and 45 per cent consider

themselves religious (the items are not exclusive). Among those who
have resigned from the Church the corresponding figures are 73 and
21 per cent. Of those belonging to the Church 46 per cent considered
themselves religious and 64 per cent spiritual. (Niemelä 2006d)
When the two main aspects of religious identity—religious and
spiritual—are crosstabulated we come out with four groups among
urban young adults (see Table 6): those who identify themselves as

“religious and spiritual” (with 37% of urban young adults identifying

themselves as such)
“religious but non-spiritual” (8%)
“spiritual but non-religious” (34%)
“non-religious—non-spiritual” (21%). (Niemelä 2006d)

When discussing what is religious and what is spiritual we get into lin-
guistic difficulties: What do people mean when they use these terms?
What does it mean to be spiritual or religious or both or neither of
these? Clarity in this can be achieved by scrutinizing differences in
religious attitudes between those who identify themselves as religious
or spiritual or both/neither. How do these people differ from each
other? These four groups are next examined more closely.
Religious and spiritual (37%) respondents are more likely to be
female. Forty-four percent of urban young females identify themselves
as such and 31 percent of males. They have typically not lived in the
Helsinki metropolitan area all their lives and are likely to be more than
 youth and religion in finland 209

30 years old. They are more common among those with children than
without and most common among those who are at home with their
children. They typically regard faith and religion as a somewhat or
quite an important part of their lives. They most actively seek different
parts to their worldview from different sources and are most interested
in buying spiritual literature. They tend to subscribe at some level to
typical Christian beliefs. Of the four groups they are most likely to
believe in supernatural phenomena like ghosts and superstition. They
typically belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church (82%) or some
other denomination (10%). They are typically active or quite active in
their private and public religious activities.
Religious—non-spiritual (8%) respondents are clearly the smallest
group among the urban young adults. Only 6 percent of males and 9
percent of females identify themselves as religious, but not as spiritual.
They are most often found among those who have lived in Helsinki
metropolitan area only for a short while. Among them, the role of
institutional religion is strongest and they are least interested in alter-
native religious movements. They are most often members of a church,
87 percent belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 8 percent to
another denomination. Only 5 percent do not belong to any denomi-
nation. Out of the four groups they agree most with Christian belief
statements. They are typically active or fairly active in their private
and public religious practices. Out of the four groups, they are most
likely to think that there is only one true religion in the world. They
typically regard faith and religion as a very or quite important part of
their lives.
Spiritual—non-religious (34%) respondents form the second largest
group among young urban adults with 34 percent of males and 33
percent of females. They are most typically under 30 years and have
lived in Helsinki metropolitan area for more than 20 years or all their
lives. They are passive in their religious observance and are most in
disagreement with a statement that there is only one true religion.
They typically disagree with Christian belief statements or deem them
unlikely. Twenty-six percent of them are not members of any religious
organization, while 74 percent belong to the Evangelical Lutheran
Church. Faith and religion do not play a big role in their lives: most
of them regard these as totally or somewhat unimportant.
Non-spiritual—non-religious (21%) respondents are clearly least
interested in all kinds of spiritual and religious matters. They account
210 kati niemelä

for 29 percent of males and 14 percent of females. They are most com-
mon among those who have lived in Helsinki metropolitan area for
more than 20 years or all their lives. They are very doubtful about the
existence of God or any kind of higher force. They typically disagree
with all kinds of belief statements. They are extremely passive in their
private religious observance, but still one fourth of them have attended
church within the last 12 months. Even though they are religiously
very passive, 77 percent are still members of a religious organization,
mostly of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.
The examination above shows that the differences between those
identifying themselves as religious and/or spiritual adhere to the very
same line typically in use in research in the sociology of religion. For
those identifying themselves as only religious the role of institutional
religiosity is strongest. On the other hand those identifying themselves
as both spiritual and religious are most open to alternative religious
movements. The relationship to religion of those identifying them-
selves as only spiritual is the most relativistic and they believe least of
all that there is only one religion that can purvey the truth. (Niemelä
2006d)
Those young adults considering resignation from the Church very
seldom described themselves as religious; less than one fifth of these
reported that they were religious. However, the majority of them (62%)
described themselves as spiritual. (Niemelä 2006d)
Many young people have an open-minded and relative attitude to
religion. No religion is considered to represent the only real truth, but
many feel that in religions there is something from which they think
they can absorb influences. A quarter (29%) of the young adults in the
metropolitan region was interested in taking on broad influences from
different religions. Equally many were interested in matters pertain-
ing to spirituality and happy to seek for new elements for their world
views. The young adults particularly keen to take on broad influences
from other religions are those on the edge of Church membership,
i.e. those either considering resignation from the Church or those
considering joining it. They are also the most interested in alternative
religious movements and world views. All in all one quarter (24%)
was interested in buying literature on spirituality. (Mikkola, Niemelä
& Petterson 2007, 78–79).
Basic attitudes to Christian beliefs are somewhat selective and skep-
tical, especially among those 20 to 24. Only about one in six of those
between 20–24 (and one in four of those 15 to 19) firmly believe in
 youth and religion in finland 211

most teachings of the Church (like God as Creator or Jesus as the Son
of God). Yet most young people consider that the teachings of Jesus
are appropriate as a guideline in life for our own times. In other words,
many more believe in Jesus’ guidelines for living than believe in His
divinity or in the Virgin birth. (See e.g. Gallup Ecclesiastica 2007).
Where is the spiritual searching of young people channeled if not
through the traditional religious beliefs and institutions? The research
data show that there is very little support for folk beliefs such as witch-
craft, ghosts or astrology among young people—much less than there
is support for Christian beliefs. However, it is worth noting that in
contrast to Christian beliefs, young adults in Helsinki metropolitan
area and especially in the district of Kallio believe in certain folk beliefs
slightly more often than do other Finns. Young adults throughout the
metropolitan area believed more generally than other Finns above all
in the existence of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and ghosts, and
that it is possible to influence another person’s life through witchcraft.
All in all just over one tenth of the young people believe firmly or to
some extent in ghosts and witchcraft. As many as one quarter of young
Kallio adults and one fifth of young adults in the metropolitan area
believe to some extent in UFOs. Of the beliefs elicited, belief in UFOs
was the only one reported more by young men than young women.
Every fourth young man in the metropolitan region considered that
the existence of UFOs was at least probable; the corresponding fig-
ure for women was 13 per cent. (Mikkola, Niemelä & Petterson 2007,
80–82).

Decline in Religious Upbringing

One explanation for the declining role of religious institutions and the
drifting of the young generation away from traditional religiosity has
been sought in the decline of religious upbringing. One of the main
reasons for young people being less religious in the traditional sense
has been seen in the fact that young people are no longer brought
up to be religious as were former generations. Religiosity is no lon-
ger something to be inherited from one’s parents but something to be
constructed through one’s own personal search. The French sociologist
Danièle Hervieu-Léger calls this the breaking of the chain of memory.
The countries of modern Europe are increasingly incapable of sus-
taining the memory which is the cornerstone of individuals’ religious
212 kati niemelä

Helsinki metropolitan area Finland

80 %
68 % 70 % 72 % 75 %
70 % 66 % 66 %
56 % 57 % 57 % 59 %
60 %
50 %
44 %
40 %
31%
30 %
20 %
10 %
0%
18–24 years 25–34 years 35–49 years 50–64 years over 65 years Total

Figure 1. Share of those Receiving Religious Upbringing at Home Among

Different Age Groups Living in the Metropolitan Area and in Finland as a
Whole. World Values 2005

existence. Religion is more a matter of experience and social ties than

of a tradition handed down from generation to generation. Religion
nowadays, argues Hervieu-Léger, is a private matter and many par-
ents let their children find and choose their religion for themselves
irrespective of the religion of the parents. The notion of a self-selected
religion puts personal experience and the authenticity of the individu-
al’s own search before the religion offered by tradition and institution.
(Hervieu-Léger 2000, 123–140; 1998.)
To what extent have Finns received religious upbringing in their
homes? Comparison of people of different ages shows a gradual decline
in religious upbringing at home. Of all Finns 66 per cent reported
according to the World Values Survey 2005 that they had received
religious upbringing. Among pensioners 75 per cent of all Finns had
received religious upbringing, of those less than 25 years of age, 56
per cent. The share of those receiving religious upbringing in their
homes was especially low among young people and young adults in
the metropolitan area. The rural way of life would appear to retain
traditional religiosity much better. Of those living in rural areas more
than 70 per cent of all age groups received religious upbringing in
their homes. In the metropolitan area among those under 25 years
of age only every third (31%) respondent reported receiving religious
upbringing at home. The share diminishes dramatically the younger
the age group concerned (see Figure 1).
 youth and religion in finland 213

According to the telephone interviews of young adults aged 20–39

in Helsinki area less than half (46%) felt they had received religious
upbringing as children; the younger the respondent the smaller the
share receiving religious upbringing. Among those under 30 years old
42 per cent reported receiving religious upbringing, among those over
30 year old 50 per cent. (Mikkola & Niemelä & Petterson 2007, 102–
103). The same difference in age groups can be seen in the results of
the Youth Barometer on religiosity in the homes of those aged 15–29.
(Uskon asia 2006, 69.)
Every fourth (25%) respondent in Helsinki area had received reli-
gious upbringing from both parents. Of those resigning from the
Church only 13 per cent had received religious upbringing from both
their fathers and their mothers. Every fourth had received religious
upbringing from only one parent and two out of three from neither of
the parents. Of those belonging to the Church every fourth (25%) had
received religious upbringing from both parents and every third (31%)
from one parent. (Mikkola & Niemelä & Petterson 2007, 103).
What then does the religious upbringing given at home contain?
Some response to the question is available from the Youth Barometer
Survey of 2006, to which 1,900 young Finns aged 15 to 29 responded.
These young people and young adults described the religiosity of their
homes as follows:

We talked about religion in my childhood home: 53%

We respected the day of rest: 38%
The children attended Sunday school: 37%
We said grace before eating: 14%
We attended church regularly: 11%
We had prayers at home: 6%. (Uskon asia 2006, 70–71.)

Most Finnish people are involved in one way or another in Church

activities when they are young. Of young adults living in the metropol-
itan area and also specifically in a district of Kallio, nine out of ten had
attended confirmation classes. Two respondents out of three had been
involved in day clubs or Sunday school and almost half in youth clubs.
Every fourth had participated in Church youth groups and every fifth
had been a peer tutor in confirmation classes. (Mikkola & Niemelä &
Petterson 2007, 104). However, there has been a clear decline in atten-
dance in various children’s and youth groups during the end of 20th
and beginning of 21st century (Kirkon tilastollinen vuosikirja 2007).
214 kati niemelä

Of those young people who were confirmed in 2007 in Finland, only

about one third (38%) had attended Church children’s or youth groups
(like day clubs) before the age of 10 and 18 percent after the age of 10.
Over half (59%) had attended neither. (Niemelä 2009).
Overall the majority of the young adults do indeed, to some extent,
have backgrounds with elements of religion and church orientation,
and many of them have had at least some form of religious upbring-
ing. But does religious upbringing and education have any significance
at the stage when young adults are building their own independent
lives? To what extent can religious attitudes be explained by religious
upbringing in childhood? And where are religious attitudes accounted
for by various demographic considerations such as gender, age, place
of residence, family situation and the duration of residence in the met-
ropolitan area? This was scrutinized using stepwise regression analy-
sis of the data obtained through the telephone interviews with young
adults (see Table 7). The explanatory variable was the individual’s view
of the importance of religions/faith in his/her life.

Table 7. Factors Explaining the Importance of Religion/Faith in the Entire

Metropolitan Area among those Aged 20–39. Stepwise Regression Analysis.
N = 1,000, R = .391, R2 = 0.153 Adj R2 = 0.149. F = 34.41***. (Telephone
Survey Young Adults in Helsinki Metropolitan Area 2004, N = 1,000)
B Beta t p
(Constant) 2.28 10.04 <.001
Has had a religious upbringing 0.73 0.29 9.63 <.001
Number of children 0.12 0.10 2.87 <.001
Years of residence in Helsinki –0.14 –0.15 –4.69 <.001
area
Gender –0.27 –0.11 –3.63 <.001
Age 0.02 0.10 3.08 .002

The factor emerging as the most powerful explanatory variable for

religious attitude was religious upbringing in childhood. Other sta-
tistically significant explanatory variables were gender, age, number
of own children and duration of residence in the metropolitan area.
These factors explained 15 per cent of the individual’s current attitude
to religion. The younger the individual and the longer the duration
of residence in the metropolitan area the less importance attached to
religion. On the other hand, if the respondent had children and was
a woman, the more likely s/he was to attach importance to religion.
 youth and religion in finland 215

However, the factor by far more significant among all of these was
whether or not the respondent had received religious upbringing in
childhood. Almost half (40%) of the young adults who had had reli-
gious upbringing in their homes considered faith an important part
of their life. Of those young adults in whose homes there had been no
religious upbringing only 15 per cent considered religion an important
part of their lives. (Niemelä 2006d.)
The influence of religious upbringing in the home was particularly
strong when both father and mother had been actively involved. This
is obvious, for example, when the religious identity of the young adults
is considered. Seventy-two percent of those who had had a religious
upbringing from both parents regarded themselves as religious, while
52 percent of those who had had a religious upbringing from only one
parent and 27 percent of those who had had a religious upbringing
from neither of the parents did so. (Niemelä 2006d)
The Youth Barometer survey 2006 also shows that religiosity in the
home was closely connected to the religiosity of young people. There
was a strong connection between the age of the parents and the religi-
osity of the home: the earlier the parents of the respondent had been
born, the more religious the respondent considered the parental home
to have been. (Uskon asia 2006, 71.)

Conclusion

The results on youth and religion in Finland show that during the
life period called “youth” there are changes in religiosity. In general
it is the older people who are more religious than the young, but this
linear trend does not cover the youngest age group. Around the age
of 15 and immediately thereafter young people tend to be more reli-
gious than after the age 20. Around the age 20 and 25, young people
seem to be less religious than during any other time in life. This age
seems to be frequently accompanied by taking distance from religious
authority and a decrease in religious activity. Later in life religiosity
tends to increase again. However, the young generation today, as well
as the older generation, is less religious in terms of institutional religi-
osity than were the previous age cohorts. People of all age groups are
less bound to the Church as an institution and less active in attending
church. However, in terms of private religious activity no such decline
is reported.
216 kati niemelä

At the age of 15 most young Finns attend Church confirmation

training. The research shows that this period activates the religiosity of
many young people and also makes their attitudes towards the Church
more positive. Even though these changes fade away afterwards to
some extent, confirmation training may serve as a means of main-
taining and activating religious observance among young people and
preventing a retreat from religious authority and faith in general.
All in all, young people are likely to describe their religious identity
more openly than older age groups. They are not only likely to identify
themselves as spiritual, but not religious, but also as Christians but
not as Lutherans despite of being members of the Lutheran Church.
Thus, they do not want to commit themselves to a religious organiza-
tion or to describe their religiosity in terms of a religious institution
unless they see this to be personally important. Young adults do not
generally consider religious institutions necessary for their own faith.
Faith is seen as a personal matter which needs no hierarchical struc-
tures. The critical attitude to institutions does not only appear in the
relation to the Church, but also in attitudes to other traditional insti-
tutions. Membership of the Church seems to be more of a personal
choice for the young. From this it follows that the threshold for the
choice to resign from the Church, for example, if an individual feels
unable to commit to its message, is lower than it is for older people.
Faith and spirituality are deeply personal matters for young people.
Against such a background it is easy to understand why it is first and
foremost young adults who easily resign from the Church: The main
reason for respondents to leave the Church was “the Church has no
meaning for me”.
Young adults are reluctant to act contrary to their own values. This
can be seen in the fact that they do not want to be members of the
Church if the Church is seen to represent values which a young adult
cannot accept. Many young adults also do not wish to belong to the
Church if they do not believe in its teachings. Even if the Church is
perceived as a good organization necessary in many ways, many young
adults feel they cannot belong if they cannot commit to the spiritual
message and values of the Church. Young people are no longer will-
ing to “belong without believing”—the term through which the Finn-
ish and Nordic religiosity and church membership have often been
described (see eg. Gustafsson & Pettersson 2000).
In general the attitude of young people to the Church and religion is
mainly positive, but relative and critical. Religions are thought to con-
 youth and religion in finland 217

tain something valuable, although none of them alone represents the

whole truth. Especially around the age of 20 to 24 distance is clearly
taken from religious authorities.
Religious upbringing is clearly declining. This is most obvious in big
cities. It is one important factor which explains the general decline in
religiosity of all age groups compared to earlier ones and also one fac-
tor explaining the declining religiosity of younger generations.

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 (DIS)ENGAGEMENTS WITH CHRISTIANITY AMONGST
YOUNG PEOPLE IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND

Giselle Vincett and Sylvia Collins-Mayo

According to the 2001 UK Census, 62% of British 16–34 year olds

(around 8.9 million people) described themselves as ‘Christian’ (Office
for National Statistics, 2001). However, church censuses conducted by
the UK organization Christian Research suggest that the proportion
of the general population attending church on any given Sunday is
about 6.3% in England (Brierley 2006) and 11.2% in Scotland (Brierley
2003). This raises questions around the extent to which young people
are engaged with Christianity in Britain, and what forms this engage-
ment might take. We explore these points in this paper. We begin
by mapping some of the broad generational experiences that have
impacted young people’s relationships to Christianity and the Church
in the post war era, and by considering the trends in religiosity that
these have produced. We then go on to look at more specific details of
British young people’s Christian beliefs, practices and affiliation, tak-
ing into account some of the variation which occurs around key socio-
logical variables such as gender, ethnicity and social class. The third
section considers some of the patterns and processes of faith trans-
mission as they pertain in the British context. Finally, having set out
a general profile of young people’s engagement (and disengagement)
with Christianity we close by considering three case studies to translate
the broad picture into the specifics of young people’s daily lives. The
first is based in Scotland and looks at young churchgoing Scots. The
second considers young people in England, but this time those who
are unchurched. Finally we consider the relationship between social
class and young people’s Christian engagement by focusing on early
findings from a study examining religious engagement amongst young
people in areas of social deprivation in England and Scotland.1

1
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each have historically specific
religious patterns. Here we deal primarily with England and Scotland.
220 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

Generational Experiences and Religious Change

One of the ways in which discussions around religious change have

been couched is in terms of differences between cultural generations,
which approximate to 20-year birth cohorts. Following Mannheim
(1952) a ‘generation’ refers to a group of people who live through a
particular set of socio-historic circumstances and events during early
adulthood (around the ages of 17–25) which comes to shape their
world view. Consequently each generation develops values, attitudes
and behaviours that are in some ways distinctive from those developed
by earlier or later cohorts. These experiences, in turn, may help shape
how individuals think about and practice religion or spirituality. The
most commonly discussed generational bands in the British and north
American literature are those of the post-war era: the ‘Boomer genera-
tion’, referring to those born between 1946 and 1963 when there was
an increase in the birth rate or ‘baby boom’; ‘Generation X’,2 born
between 1964 and 1981;3 and ‘Generation Y’ or ‘Millennials’ born after
1982. We provide a brief sketch of each below. Whilst broad gener-
ational descriptions can be criticised for over-generalising common
characteristics and glossing important intra-generational distinctions
(Lynch 2010), they do at least provide an initial orientation for the
points made later in this article.

Boomers
Boomers reached their mid-teens in the 1960s and 70s and they are
usually associated with the counter-culture movement—‘a diverse
range of loosely related anti-establishment, non-conformist and bohe-
mian factions’ (Osgerby 1998: 82)—and its aftermath. They were a
generation disillusioned with institutions and external authorities and
keen to pioneer ways of living which celebrated freedom, self-realiza-
tion and autonomy (Hilborn and Bird, 2002: 122–131). The archetypal
Boomer in his/her youth was politically active, idealistic and optimis-
tic—the civil rights movement, anti-Vietnam war demonstrations and
the rise of second-wave feminism were key political focal points of the

2
The epitaph ‘Generation X’ is normally associated with the title of a novel by
Douglas Coupland (1991), said to have captured the mood of young people born
during this period.
3
Dunn (1993) puts the last year of GenX as 1976.
 (dis)engagements with christianity 221

Boomer era. Boomers also witnessed a liberalization of attitudes in

terms of relationships and sexual ethics, associated with greater acces-
sibility to easy birth control and changes in the law which legalised
homosexuality (1967) and made divorce (1969) and abortions (1967)
easier to attain.
In rejecting institutional authorities, many young Boomers moved
away from the Church, which was perceived as out of touch with mod-
ern times. For some, rejecting traditional religion led to an exploration
of alternative spiritualities. For the majority, however, the move away
from church meant putting religion into the background of everyday
life. Young people did not necessarily stop believing, but the moral
authority of the Church was weakened such that belief had less impact
on everyday life. Despite church efforts to retain young people, atten-
dance overall continued to decline.

Generation X
If Boomers were leaving church in the 1960s and 1970s, Generation
X young people did little to reverse the trend in the 1980s and 1990s.
By the early 1980s much of the Boomer optimism had disappeared
in the wake of a worldwide economic downturn in the 1970s and the
failure of Boomers’ to realise their utopian ideals. Drawing on Nelson
and Cowan (1994), Hilborn and Bird describe GenXers in the United
States as
marked by a decline in real wages and an increase in the length of the
average working week; by a rise in young adult poverty and a corre-
sponding fall in actual income; by the threat of AIDS; by the highest-ever
divorce and suicide rates; by over qualification for available specialist
jobs; by spiralling violence in schools and by an ever-widening pattern
of drug abuse. (2002: 135–6).
In Britain there were similar social and economic problems and an
increasing sense of unease. The Thatcher government of the 1980s pro-
moted individualism, freedom and enterprise which on the one hand
created a culture of conspicuous consumption for those in work with
money to spare, but on the other hand led to a reduction in welfare
support for young people (Hackett 1997: 82). As a result, Richter and
Francis (1998) suggest that Generation X developed a more pragmatic
and less idealistic approach to life than Boomers. The Church was
not seen as having the answers to social problems. Rather, Genera-
tion X young people are characterised as wanting to work out their
222 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

own answers, find their own sources of meaning (Lynch, 2002: 31),
and as drawing on a wide range of cultural resources in order to do
so. The expansion of popular culture, aided by developments in infor-
mation and communications technology, particularly the internet,
was significant in this respect. This had at least two effects on youth
religion. First, the creative consumption of popular culture itself pro-
vided young people with frameworks of meaning that obviated the
need for church. As Beaudoin puts it, for ‘a generation of kids who
had a fragmented or completely broken relationship to “formal” or
“institutional” religion, pop culture filled the spiritual gaps’ (1998: 21).
Second, for those who wanted an explicitly religious element to their
world view, it gave young people access to a broader range of spiri-
tual ideas which they could draw on in their own quest for meaning.
Consequently belief became more hesitant and heterodox as personal
choices needed to be made in the face of diversity.

Generation Y
Generation Y are the young people of late 1990s and the ‘noughties’
of the 21st century. Writing about this generation as it is emerging
in the United States, Howe and Strauss (2000) describe it as a gen-
eration ‘on the rise’. They reject the label ‘Generation Y’ for today’s
young people, instead, today’s teenagers are ‘Millennials’ and they are
different! They are close to their families not estranged from them;
they are a sheltered, confident and optimistic generation (Howe and
Strauss, 2000: 6–12). Millennials are encouraged to work hard, achieve
good school grades and jobs. They are conventional in their attitudes
and can see the value of social rules—not for them the counter-
culture of the Boomers, nor the pessimism of GenX. Some of these
characteristics could also be used to describe Generation Y in Britain
(Collins-Mayo et al. 2008). However, in Britain there are concerns
around young people’s physical and mental health and lack of social
mobility (Margo and Dixon et al. 2006), which are likely to be exacer-
bated by the current global recession.
An important feature of the turn of the 21st century is that reli-
gion has been put back on the public agenda in Britain. Generation
Y live in a global society and cannot fail to notice the significance of
religion around the world. It is brought close to home through the
religiously motivated violence of radicalised young people. Increasing
religious diversity in the youth population also raises the profile of
 (dis)engagements with christianity 223

religion. Migration and high birth rates amongst minority religious

groups have impacted on the religious demography of Generation Y.
In Britain, a third of the Muslim population are aged 0–15 years and
just over a third 16–34 years. This compares with 18% of the Chris-
tian population being under 16 years old and only 21% falling into
16–34 age bracket (ONS 2001). Religious diversity is therefore very
apparent in some British schools and colleges (particularly in Lon-
don and cities in the Northwest), and needs to be catered for in the
classroom. The salience of religion—or more broadly ‘spirituality’ in
various guises—has also been prominent in popular youth culture for
Generation Y, from Harry Potter magic, teenage witches and Buffy the
Vampire Slayer to the religio-spiritual symbolism in elements of club
culture. The long term consequences of this new salience of religion
for young people and their relationship to Christianity and the Church
have yet to be seen.

Religiosity Trends
The above provides a qualitative and necessarily selective description
of the three post-war generations. Voas (2009), using the European
Social Survey (ESS) data for 2002/3 has mapped religiosity (i.e. level
of religious commitment measured as a combined scale of belief, affili-
ation and practice) quantitatively by 5-year birth cohorts in 20 coun-
tries across the continent. Birth years ran from pre-1920s to 1984 and
therefore only just touch on Generation Y. The salient feature of Voas’
study is that younger people in all the countries under consideration
tend to be less religious than older people. Moreover, ‘the rate of decline
seems to have been essentially constant both over time and across
Europe’ (Voas 2009: 158). The United Kingdom falls into the group of
countries that consistently scored below average religiosity across the
cohorts.4 Since ‘religion’ in Europe primarily refers to Christianity, the
pattern Voas detects fits with the sense of generational disengagement
from Christianity described above. Interestingly, Voas notes that for
the least religious European countries the generational decline is less
for those born from the early 1960s onwards (i.e. Generations X and
Y in our terms) suggesting that there might be some ‘bottoming out’
of religious disengagement. However, Voas argues that even if this is

4
Only the 1917 and 1943 cohort exceeded the average level of religiosity in UK.
224 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

the case the residual level of religiosity is very low indeed (2009: 160).
A ‘bottoming out’ observation is also made by Kay and Francis (1996)
in relation to English young people (1996). Francis surveyed 11–16
year olds in two schools every four years from 1974 to 1994 in order
to assess their attitudes towards Christianity using a scale comprising
24 items related to ‘God, the Bible, Jesus, school religion, church and
prayer’ (1996: 38). He found that over 20 years there was an erosion
of positive attitudes towards Christianity, in part due to young people
drifting away from church attendance. Francis notes that the sharpest
decline in attitudes occurred between 1974 and 1986. From then on
the decline was much less. Indeed, Francis concludes for the period
1986 to 1996 ‘there has not been further deterioration in pupil attitude
toward Christianity’ (Kay and Francis 1996: 43).
Alongside interest in generational differences, it is relevant to con-
sider how engagement with Christianity might vary as a result of dif-
ferent stages in the lifecycle. Is it the case that as young people age and
experience significant life events (such as birth or death) they become
more religious? Using longitudinal data as well as cross-sectional data
from the British Household Panel Surveys (BHPS), Voas and Crockett
(2005: 15) conclude that whilst some people may become more reli-
gious as they go through life, there is little evidence for such an ‘age
effect’ overall. Individual respondents ‘did not change substantially
during the decade’ (1991–2000); and ‘people in 1999–2000 were less
religious than those at the same age in 1991–2.’ Since the survey only
included respondents aged 18 an above, Voas and Crockett’s analysis
does not reach as far as Generation Y. However, without further evi-
dence there is no reason to suppose that an age effect will assert itself
on Generation Y. In fact, Kay and Francis (1996) suggest religious
attitudes are more or less established by the time young people leave
secondary education. Drawing on a series of studies of 7–16 year olds,
they note that a steady decline in positive attitudes towards Christi-
anity occurs between the first year of compulsory education and the
last—with the last year showing the sharpest drop. In other words:
‘Growing up means becoming indifferent to religion’ (1996: 31). Kay
and Francis suggest that the main explanation for less positive atti-
tudes towards Christianity lies in a gradual socialisation into an adult
world where Christianity is largely irrelevant in much of life. Only by
staying involved with church-related groups is this decline likely to
be mitigated. We will look more closely at socialisation and religious
transmission in Britain in section 3 below.
 (dis)engagements with christianity 225

A Profile of Young Christian Britain

Having outlined some overall generational trends, in this section we

consider variation in the nature of young Britons’ Christian affiliation,
practice and belief, paying particular attention to gender, ethnicity and
social class.

Affiliation
The 2006 British Social Attitude Survey indicates that amongst 18 to
24 year olds only 27% identify themselves as Christian, compared to
59% who describe themselves as being of ‘no religion’ (NCSR5 2008).
This suggests that an old tendency to nominal affiliation (especially
to the established Church of England) may be in decline. Moreover,
because previous generations moved away from church, fewer and
fewer young people have had a religious identity ascribed to them in
infancy or early childhood by way of a ‘Christening’ (i.e. infant bap-
tism). Church of England figures for 2006, for example, record 143
infant baptisms per 1000 live births, compared to a rate of 229 ten
years earlier (Church of England 2009). The move away from ascribed
religious identity and nominal affiliation reflects the cultural shifts ini-
tiated by Boomers and developed by GenXers toward greater individ-
ual autonomy and ‘authenticity’ in matters of religion. Religion, like so
much else in a consumer orientated society, is a matter of individual
choice. Most parents who are not religious themselves prefer to wait
and let their children make up their own minds about what religion, if
any, they wish to belong to. The life stage transition into parenthood, as
Voas and Crockett (2005) suggests, does not require a religious rite of
passage or return to church. That said, forward thinking parents with
an eye on their children’s transition from home to school may still opt
to baptise their babies in order to meet the entrance requirements for
church schools which often have very good educational reputations.
Just as the numbers of infant baptisms have fallen, so too have con-
firmations in the Church of England. 2006 saw 29,000 confirmations
compared to 41,000 in 1997.6 Moreover, the age of confirmands has

5
NCSR—National Centre for Social Research. Original data creators, depositors or
copyright holders, the funders of the Data Collections (if different) and the UK Data
Archive bear no responsibility for their further analysis or interpretation.
6
These figures include the Diocese in Europe.
226 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

increased. Whereas in 1997 the majority of confirmands were aged 12

to 15 years, in 2006 just under a third fell into this age band, compared
to 39% who were over 20 years old (Church of England 2009). Taking
all this evidence together one could argue that for many of the 27% of
young people who do still choose to call themselves Christian despite
the lack of cultural pressure to do so, affiliation may be more thought
through and significant than it has been for young people in previous
generations. We explore this possibility in more detail below in our
case study on young churchgoers.

Practice
When it comes to churchgoing, young people have a wide range of
options available to them. The two largest denominations in England
are the established Anglican Church—the Church of England, and the
Roman Catholic Church, but there is also a large number of much
smaller Protestant free churches (such as Methodist, Pentecostal and
Baptist churches), and an increasing number of new churches (for
example, Newfrontiers, Vineyard and Pioneer churches). The largest
denomination in Scotland is the national Church of Scotland (Presby-
terian) to which 42% of the Scottish population as a whole is affiliated
(Scottish Executive 2005); Roman Catholicism is the second largest
denomination. Wales has a mix of non-conformists and Anglican
churches (the Church in Wales and the Church of England).7 Despite
the possibilities offered by different denominations, teenagers and
young adults are the least churched age group in Britain. A represen-
tative survey of 7000 adults in the United Kingdom (which includes
Northern Ireland as well as Britain) commissioned by Tearfund in
2006 makes the point (Ashworth and Farthing 2007). The survey asked
people to report their typical frequency of attendance and the results
indicated that only 10% of 16–24 year olds classified themselves as
‘regular churchgoers’ (attending church at least once a month) com-
pared to the average for all age groups of 15%. On the other hand,
45% of 16–24 year olds said they had “never been to church and were
unlikely to do so” (2007: 9), compared to 32% for the respondent
group as a whole (2007, 41).

7
Whilst the Church in Wales was disestablished in 1920, Brown (1993) suggests
there remains confusion about the identity of the Church in Wales and its relationship
to the Church of England amongst fringe members.
 (dis)engagements with christianity 227

The 2005 English Church Census (Brierley 2006) found similarly low
levels of church attendance amongst young people in England. Overall
the Church Census suggested 6.3% of the population (3.2 million peo-
ple) were in church on a ‘typical’ Sunday (Brierley 2006: 12). Of these,
6% were young people aged 11–14 years and 5% young people aged
15–19. Those in their twenties made up a further 7%. The number of
attendees in each of these categories was down in 1998, although the
rate of decline was reduced compared to previous decades. In other
words, the Church Census points to the same ‘bottoming out’ effect
noted earlier. Looking at the two largest denominations in England,
Roman Catholic churches have a slightly younger profile than Anglican
churches. However, it is the Orthodox, Pentecostal and New Churches
which seem most adept at attracting young people, and which there-
fore have the youngest profile (Brierley 2006: 124). In Scotland, the
picture is similar despite the difference in denominations. Voas writes,
‘the proportion of individuals raised with no religion increased from a
negligible level at the beginning of the 20th century to half the popu-
lation by the end of it’ (2006: 111) and he reports that the current
level of baptisms in the Church of Scotland ‘is identical to that for the
Church of England’ having shown ‘unrelenting’ decline since the late
1950s (113).
Apart from routine church attendance as an aspect of young peo-
ple’s engagement with Christianity, it is important to consider a range
of para-church activities which either supplement regular worship or
attract those on the fringes of the Church. Such activities include pil-
grimages, youth camps and conferences. The Anglican-led Walsing-
ham Youth Pilgrimage hosted around 900 young people from across
Britain in 2008 (The Shrine of Our Lady of Walsingham 2009) and
each year many hundreds of British youth travel to France to attend
the Roman Catholic shrine in Lourdes and the ecumenical Taizé com-
munity. The World Youth Day events in Australia (Roman Catholic)
attracted over 70,000 international pilgrims from different countries
and over 400,000 people attended the Final Mass (Catholic Church in
England and Wales 2009). Annual youth camps such as Soul Survivor
and !Audacious also draw in several thousand young people each year.
In addition, family orientated Christian conferences such as Spring
Harvest, Greenbelt and Grapevine all have popular dedicated youth
programmes. These events have in common a scale of community
(albeit temporary) which serves to strengthen the plausibility of faith
through peer support and communal experience.
228 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

Many young people whether they see themselves as religious or not

(or indeed whether they believe in God or not) pray from time to
time. Francis and Robbins (2006) suggest that as many as 29% of non-
churchgoing young teenagers pray at least occasionally, and 3% pray
almost daily. We comment on this aspect of young people’s practices
below in the case studies of unchurched young people and in those
from socially deprived areas.

Belief
When Grace Davie (1994) introduced the phrase ‘believing without
belonging’ to describe the British public’s religiosity it immediately
attracted academic and church attention. Whilst its nuances were and
continue to be debated, it remains the case that more people in Brit-
ain believe in God (of whatever sort) than go to church on a regular
basis. A YouGov poll in 2007, for example, found that 18% of 18–29
year olds ‘believe in a personal God who created the world and hears
my prayers’; a further 7% ‘believe in a God who created everything
but then left us to get on with it’; and 24% ‘believe in “something” but
I’m not sure what’ (YouGov 2007). An older but much more extensive
data base on young people’s beliefs is Francis’ Teenage Religion and
Values Survey. This survey, built up throughout the 1990s, recorded
the beliefs and attitudes of over 33,000 13 to 15 year olds in England
and Wales. Some of the results relating to religious and supernatural
beliefs are presented in Table 1 below.
Three things stand out from Table 1. The first is that young people
are less inclined to agree with statements specific to scripture (Jesus
rising from the dead and God making the world in six days) than
around more general religious statements (belief in God and life after

Table 1. Religious and Supernatural Beliefs (Francis, 2001: 36, 40)

Yes (%) ? (%) No (%)
I believe in God 41 33 26
I believe that Jesus really rose from the dead 30 42 28
I believe in life after death 45 38 17
I believe God punishes people who do wrong 20 38 42
I believe that God made the world in six days 20 40 40
and rested on the seventh
I believe in my horoscope 35 29 36
I believe in the Devil 22 28 51
 (dis)engagements with christianity 229

death) or even belief in horoscopes. The second is that the majority of

young people disagree with the uncomfortable statements concerned
with God punishing wrong and belief in the Devil. The third observa-
tion is that the young people in this survey show quite a lot of uncer-
tainty across all the items. It may well be that this indecision is a result
of young people failing to give much thought to religion, rather than
their being stuck in a theological conundrum. Since most of society
operates on secular terms there is no reason why they should have.
This was the conclusion reached by Savage et al. (2006). In a qualita-
tive study of 15 to 25 year olds’ world views, they found that young
people generally failed to respond to religious and spiritual prompts
or draw upon them in their discussions concerning how they relate
to the world. In other words, the young people utilised an essen-
tially secular world view to orientate their everyday lives, which the
researchers called the ‘Happy midi-narrative’. In this world view life
is made happy and meaningful primarily through good relationships
with family and friends and creative self-reflexive engagement with
popular culture. This does not mean that religion disappears entirely.
As we have seen above, young people may still believe and even par-
ticipate in church occasionally, but it is largely irrelevant to day to day
life. Only when the young person experiences very hard times such
that the meaning provided by family and friends breaks down, does
religion resurface (Collins-Mayo et al. 2008, Collins 1997). This way
of relating to Christianity resonates (albeit in a slightly more secular
form) with Smith and Denton’s description of young people’s religion
in the United States. They describe an implicit creed relating to what
they call Moralistic Therapeutic Deism:
1. A God exists who created and orders the world and watches over
human life on earth.
2. God wants people to be good, nice, and fair to each other, as taught
in the Bible and by most world religions.
3. The central goal of life is to be happy, to feel good about oneself.
4. God does not need to be particularly involved in one’s life except
when God is needed to resolve a problem.
5. Good people go to heaven when they die (Smith with Denton 2005:
163)
On the basis of the above, most young people in Britain might best be
described as disengaged from Christianity; to the extent that they are
not hostile to it and will occasionally draw upon Christian memories,
they might also be described as ‘vicariously religious’, i.e. happy for
230 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

others to keep the Church going and for it to be there for them should
they ever need it (Davie 2007). Only a minority remain engaged in a
serious way, and this engagement varies according to gender, ethnicity
and social class.

Gender Differences
Historically there has been a significant gender difference between
religiosity levels of Christian women and men in the UK, with women
more likely to attend church. Crockett and Voas (2006) present evi-
dence that tracks the gender split in church attendance from the early
20th century to the present. Their work highlights the erosion of reli-
gious piety amongst women, which has declined sharply with each
succeeding generation. For example, in the early 20th century, women
born between 1900 and 1919 were 51% more likely to attend church
than men. This gap narrowed to 39% for those born between 1960
and 1970 (583). Church censuses reveal that the gap appears to con-
tinue to narrow, especially among younger age groups. In fact, in the
2005 English Church Census young men aged 15–19 outnumbered
young women’s attendance levels for the first time (Brierley 2006:
130–131). Similarly the Scottish Census of 2001 (Scottish Executive
2005) clearly shows a narrowing of the gender gap. For example, for
all ages over 50, at least 10% more men report having ‘no religion’
than women. In contrast, for ages 0–15 approximately 1% more boys
report ‘no religion’ than girls aged 0–15, but about 1% more young
women aged 16–29 report ‘no religion’ than young men of the same
age (13).
Changes in women’s lives over the last century have had a profound
impact on women’s religiosity. Penny Marler (2008) demonstrates that
women’s employment in the public sphere, declining fertility rates,
postponement of first marriage and childbirth, and better contracep-
tion all strongly correlate with women’s religious membership change.
Whereas women were historically conceived of as the guardians of
piety (Brown 2001), most women’s lives are no longer structured
around home and church. That is, women are less likely to be (or to
stay) traditionally religious because they now spend more time work-
ing and studying outside the home.8 This means that whereas in the

8
Whilst these conclusions fit well for Christian women, or women with a Chris-
tian family background, they do not apply to women of some other religions (Islam
 (dis)engagements with christianity 231

past, women’s gender identities and performances fit well with the
gender expectations of the churches, women may now find it harder to
reconcile their changing values around equality and male and female
roles with the traditional values and family patterns of religious insti-
tutions (Aune et al. 2008, Aune and Vincett 2010).
While the evidence suggests that gender differences in church atten-
dance are declining, it remains rare for most boys to describe them-
selves as religious or to admit to religious beliefs and it may be more
costly socially for them to do so. For example, Francis and Robbins’
survey of young people aged 13–15 in urban areas in the late 1990s
revealed that 40% of boys and 46% of girls said they believed in God
(2005: 62–3). In research with young people in Scotland, boys con-
sistently reported being bullied or teased for their Christian beliefs
or for their attendance at church or church associated groups and
young people invariably claimed that they thought it was harder to
be a boy in the Church than to be a girl. One reason for this is that
although gender performances and expectations for girls and women
have changed radically over the last 40 years, they have not changed as
much for boys. Whilst young men in general support gender equality
(Huntley 2006: 47), they are less likely to believe in sharing domestic
duties equally with a working partner (50), for example. As Huntley
writes, societal views ‘about what a man is and how he should look and
behave’ have not altered significantly (55). For many or most young
people, churches are not only associated with older generations, but
with ‘grannies’, or in other words with a particular form of femininity.
The result is that religious affiliation for the majority of young men
continues to be ‘counter-cultural’ (Aune and Vincett 2010).

Ethnic Differences
Whilst most churches between 1998 and 2005 were experiencing
shrinking attendance, amongst the non-White population in Eng-
land numbers actually increased by 19% (85 000 people) (Brierley
2006: 91). In large part this was due to the migration of non-White
populations into England. Of these, Black churchgoers made up the
largest proportion and indeed Black churchgoers accounted for 10% of

especially) where women’s economic activity rates are much lower, partly because the
proportion of stay-at-home mothers is higher (see Scottish Executive 2005: 46 and
Hussain 2008).
232 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

the entire English churchgoing population in 2005. This is significant

given that the Black population formed only around 3.8% of the Eng-
lish population as a whole (Brierley 2006: 91). In terms of denomina-
tion, the majority of Black people in England attend Pentecostal and
Seventh-day Adventist churches, whilst most Indians attend Roman
Catholic churches. There is a strong regional element to the profile
of non-White churches. Black churches, for instance, are particularly
significant in London. Indeed, inner London Black churchgoers out-
number White churchgoers. Moreover, London is home to two of the
Black mega-churches: Kingsway International Christian Centre which
sees 10 000 people through its doors each week, and Kensington Tem-
ple Elim which caters to a more modest 3000 people.
All ethnic groups witness a decline in church attendance amongst
young people as they enter their teens. Nevertheless Black youth are
more likely to maintain contact with the Church than their White
peers (Brierley 2006). This may be because church is a more signifi-
cant part of community life amongst the Black population as a whole,
when compared with the White community, or because Black major-
ity churches offer a style of worship that attracts young people. Brown
(2009) reports that an expressive style of worship that draws upon
Black cultural heritage and therefore affirms ethnic as well as religious
identity is less alienating to Black young people than White major-
ity church styles are to young people of all ethnicities. It is also the
case that many successful Black music artists began their career in
church which can boost the appeal of church for some young people.
Certainly, from the outside Black churches can look vibrant and fun
to young people, though they may not necessarily attend them. The
following quotations from Samantha and Bianca, both white teenagers
illustrate the point (Collins 1997: 218):
I think Black people that go to church, they seem to have more fun. It’s
not as boring, they seem to enjoy it more . . . they seem to show their
feelings more than what we do. (Samantha).
I suppose if you had the celebrations like most Black people, they’re
all into music in the church, . . . it would probably be more exciting
because you’re getting into the mood and you’re sort of joining in with
everything. But when you’re actually at church you sit down and don’t
get any say in it apart from “Amen” and other things. (Bianca).
As Samantha and Bianca suggest, one reason that Black churches may
seem appealing to young people is their expressive and participa-
tory qualities. As Savage et al. write of Generation Y, ‘it is abstract,
 (dis)engagements with christianity 233

one-way “communication” that fails to communicate to Generation

Y’ (2006: 148).

Class Differences
Francis’ (2001) Teenage Religion and Values Survey indicates that
young people from working class backgrounds (as determined by their
father’s occupational category) hold less favourable attitudes towards
the Church. For example, 48% of young people in social classes 4 and
5 said that they believed they could be a Christian without going to
church, compared to 56% from professional classes 1 and 2; 55% of
working class young people thought that ‘Church is boring’ compared
to 11% from professional classes; and 37% of working class young
people thought that ‘Christian ministers/vicars/ priests do a good job’
compared to 42% of middle class young people. However, Francis and
Robbins (2005) found that young people with unemployed fathers
(taken as an indicator of social deprivation), were ‘more open to both
traditional religion and to non-traditional religion’ (90), with higher
rates of some doctrinal belief and higher rates of belief in horoscopes
and fortune tellers (91 and below). These results imply two things: first,
that young people from socially deprived or excluded backgrounds are
less engaged with churches than socially included youth; and, second,
that these young people may be more likely to espouse a privatised
religiosity or spirituality.

Table 2. Religious and Supernatural Beliefs by Social Class (Francis, 2001: 127)
1 & 2 (%) 3N (%) 3M (%) 4 & 5 (%) X2 P<
I believe in God 47 42 39 38 135.1 .001
I believe that Jesus 35 30 29 28 100.9 .001
really rose from
the dead
I believe in life after 44 47 44 46 16.6 .001
death
I believe that God 20 20 19 21 5.4 NS
made the world
in six days and
rested on the
seventh
I believe in my 27 34 38 38 213.9 .001
horoscope
I believe in the Devil 21 23 21 21 11.4 .01
234 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

Other, more indirect, indicators for attitudes towards Christianity

according to class come from data which show socio-economic clas-
sification according to occupation of adherents. In Scotland, only 9%
of Church of Scotland or Roman Catholic adherents work in ‘Rou-
tine occupations’ and even fewer have never worked or are long-term
unemployed (3% and 5% respectively) (Scottish Executive 2005: 57).
By contrast, the majority of adherents in both the Church of Scotland
and the Roman Catholic Church are employed in ‘lower managerial
or professional occupations’ (57).
Fahmy (2006), drawing upon data from the Millenium survey on
poverty and social exclusion in Britain (Pantazis et al. 2006), reports
that only 4% of socially deprived young people (aged 16–24) in Brit-
ain participate in a religious group or organisation (364), though
14% (ages 18–24) use services provided by a place of worship (360).
Results from studies elsewhere corroborate these findings. In a study
conducted by the University of Pennsylvania Center for the Study of
Youth Policy, Cnann et al. found that ‘family income was significantly
associated with participation in a religiously based social activity’ with
young people from higher income families more likely to participate
(2004: 192). Further, they found that ‘level of parental education was
also strongly associated with participation in religiously based social
activity’ (193) and attendance at religious services (190). In a study
of US high school students in the late 1990s, Wallace Jr. et al. (2003)
found that while there was no clear pattern in the relationship between
socio-economic status and personal religious belief, ‘attendance and
affiliation are linked to this indicator’ (113). As we have shown, other
factors such as ethnicity and gender combine with class to make
measurements of religious engagement more complicated. Below we
explore the possibility that young people from socially deprived areas
may tend towards a privatised religiosity and some of the ways in
which such young people appear to engage with religious institutions
or groups.

Transmission

There is strong evidence that parental religiosity is the most important

predictor and influence on a young persons’ religiosity (Gunnoe and
Moore 2002, Cnaan et al. 2004, Regnerus et al. 2004, Smith and Den-
ton 2005, Voas and Storm 2008). In the US, Cnaan et al. (2004) found
 (dis)engagements with christianity 235

a strong ‘correlation between parent and youth participation in wor-

ship services’ (189) and Regnerus et al. (2004) indicate that the rela-
tionship between parental attendance and a young persons’ attendance
was the ‘strongest’ indicator for youth religiosity (31). Similarly, Gun-
noe and Moore (2002), using longitudinal data from the US National
Survey of Children, found that ‘religiosity during young adulthood is
best predicted by the presence of religious role models during child-
hood and adolescence’ (620). In Europe, a study from the Netherlands
(a country which shows similar levels of church attendance and non-
attendance to the UK—Davie 2002: 6) also confirms that young people
are less likely to disaffiliate if their parents attend church frequently
(Need and Dirk de Graaf 1996: 92).
In a recent study from Scotland, Hopkins et al. (2009) provide some
evidence to show that whilst parental transmission is important, it is
more complex than is sometimes assumed. The researchers suggest
that young people rarely follow a simple pattern of one-way transmis-
sion. Rather, Hopkins et al. argue that transmission of religiosity for
young people can be characterised in several ways:
1. correspondence with familial religiosity. These young people empha-
sised the influence of their parents on their religiosity, but often
mentioned non-traditional methods and sites of transmission, as well
as the importance of others in influencing their religiosity. That is,
young peoples’ religiosity appeared to be shaped by a ‘broad range
of actors in different everyday sites, many of which are beyond the
familial home or church’;
2. compliance: some young people ‘went along’ with parental religious
activities, but expressed strong doubts in their individual interviews.
Young people dealt with these doubts in different ways;
3. covert: some young people admitted to hiding their doubts and their
religious differences from some or all of the adults in their lives;
4. challenging: other young people openly questioned parental beliefs;
5. conflicting: young people demonstrated that ‘the transmission of reli-
gion often involved processes of negotiation and resistance, as young
people engaged with, modified and sometimes rejected the perspec-
tives of adults about religion and religious practice’. In fact, the agency
of young people in making their own religious choices and develop-
ing their own religious beliefs was often emphasised by participants
and some young people clearly developed their religiosity outside of,
or in conflict with, parental religiosity.
This work highlights the complex positionalities of young people, who
may move back and forth between the above positions, or, hold several
different stances at the same time during the process of transmission.
236 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

However, as we have discussed, in the UK the majority of young

people have had little or no contact with church. In a study on religious
socialisation conducted in the southwest of England, Levitt argued that
Christianity has become removed from everyday life (1995: 531) for
most families partly because parents have a liberal attitude towards
religion, viewing it as ‘an optional, voluntary activity’ (532). Levitt
claims that parents prioritise ‘individual autonomy and freedom of
belief ’ (533). Religious education in schools and church activities for
young children are seen as acceptable (531, 533) and parents assumed
that young people had enough exposure to Christianity (primarily
through religious education in schools) to make up their own minds
about whether or not to be religious. In this way, parents shied away
from further religious education or attendance so as not to ‘indoctri-
nate’ children (533). Levitt’s findings chime with Davie’s theory of a
British tendency to be ‘vicariously religious’ (2007), as well as Smith
and Denton’s theory of ‘Moralistic Therapeutic Deism’ (2005) outlined
above, whilst at the same time offering some evidence for how such
approaches to religion may be transmitted.
If many parents in the UK then are leaving religious transmission
to schools, how well do schools transmit religiosity? Some evidence
comes from Francis and Brown, who, in the early 1990s, found that
‘after controlling for the influence of other factors, attendance at nei-
ther Roman Catholic nor Church of England schools appears to exert
any additional influence on adolescent practice of private prayer’
(1991: 119). Indeed, attendance at a Church of England school appears
to ‘exert a small but statistically negative influence on adolescent atti-
tudes towards prayer’ (120). In a more recent study, Francis and Rob-
bins (2005) found that while young people in both Church of England
schools and Roman Catholic schools were more likely to believe in
God and in life after death than young people in non-denominational
schools, they were also more likely to believe in fortune tellers and their
horoscopes (110–111, 121). However, ‘there were no significant differ-
ences between the proportions of young people [in Church of England
schools and non-denominational schools] who regard the Church as
irrelevant for life today . . ., [or] who regard the Bible as irrelevant for
life today’ (110). Similarly, the ‘differences in negativity toward tradi-
tional religion are only marginally lower’ amongst young people who
attend Roman Catholic schools versus non-denominational schools
(121). These results suggest that attendance at a denominational school
 (dis)engagements with christianity 237

promotes personal belief, but does not necessarily promote church

attendance or a positive attitude towards church.
Cnaan et al. argue that ‘the influence of parents on subjective religi-
osity is not nearly so dominant as it appears with attendance, a more
public form of being religious due partly to parental control’ (2004:
34). Gunnoe and Moore (2002) found that in older adolescence, ‘peer
religiosity emerged as the better predictor’ of religiosity (621), an
influence which Regnerus et al. also acknowledge as strong (2004: 34).
Smith and Denton (2005) similarly point to the way in which ‘religious
teenagers tend to make most of their friendships with other religious
teens . . . Religious . . . identities thus tend to cluster around and be rein-
forced by close friendship networks (58).
Meanwhile, O’Connor et al. (2002) compared the religiosity of
young people with their religiosity 22 years later and found that ‘the
only aspect of youth that proved to be a significant predictor [of later
religiosity] was the amount of involvement in church youth programs’
(730). In the UK and Australia, Voas and Storm (2008) looked at the
possible influence of extended family relationships in transmission.
Drawing upon data from the International Congregational Life Survey,
they point to the significance of grandparents in the church attendance
of young people. They surmise that in some cases where parents have
disaffiliated, grandparents are taking responsibility for the religious
socialisation of young people. They stress that the trend appears to be
stronger in England than in Australia, perhaps because of higher levels
of disaffiliation amongst the parents of young people in England.

Case Studies

Scottish Churchgoers
This case study is drawn from recent research examining the religious
lives and meaning making of young Christians in Glasgow, Scotland.9
Participants were between the ages of 16–27, from diverse denomina-
tional and socio-economic backgrounds. Young people were first asked

9
This project and the one described in 4.3 were funded by the UK Arts and
Humanities Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council. The
research team consists of Giselle Vincett, Elizabeth Olson, Peter Hopkins and Rachel
Pain.
238 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

to participate in group work and, later, volunteers participated in two

interviews: one with a parent or guardian to investigate religious trans-
mission and identity formation, and one with the young person alone
to examine the young person’s belief and meaning-making systems.
Although in the research project, young people came from a range of
affiliation levels, here we present findings from only the regular church
attendees.
In Glasgow, and the UK in general, young people live in a society
that is both more religious (in terms of pluralism), and less religious
(in terms of flight from the churches) than ever before. Any religious
identity is therefore formed and performed in this new and constantly
shifting context. Here we focus on three key findings about the reli-
giosity of young churchgoers. First, we look at the marginality of the
identity of being a young practicing Christian in Britain today. Second,
we examine the way in which young people emphasize plurality, choice
and mobility affects how they define both ‘church’ and ‘attendance’.
And third, we briefly examine the ways in which the young Chris-
tians in this sample placed a high premium on the lived expression of
Christianity.
As we have outlined above, although most people in the UK claim
a Christian identity, only a small minority attend church. Certainly for
the young people of this study, being a practicing Christian was a mar-
ginal identity and an identity consciously formed against the majority
of their peers. As Father John, a Roman Catholic university chaplain,
put it, ‘the choice [to come to church or not] is more obvious to them’
than to previous generations. Young people repeatedly stressed that
amongst most of their peers, attending church was seen as ‘not cool’
and many spoke of instances of being teased or bullied because of their
religion. However, the very fact that their religiosity was perceived of
as marginal was used by young people to help reinforce and reframe
their identity using a discourse of ‘authenticity’ and, ironically, poach-
ing on the greater cultural capital which ‘alternative’ spiritualities have
in youth cultures (Partridge 2005).
Almost without exception, those young people who are commit-
ted Christians wished to reframe church spaces and affiliation. Young
people often attended multiple churches, and/or attended Christian
youth festivals and pilgrimages, sometimes crossing denominational
boundaries in order to do so. This use of multiple Christian spaces
and communities reflects the way in which ‘consumerism has become
central to the social and cultural life of technologically advanced soci-
 (dis)engagements with christianity 239

eties’ (Lyon 2000, 74): choice, fluidity and pluralism are central to this
approach and young people put together their religious identities using
the consumer skills which are almost required of their generation.
Such plurality points to the ways in which young people appear to be
both flattening denominational difference in the interests of a slippery
notion of ‘authenticity’ and re-thinking the meaning of ‘church’.
Other researchers of religious young people have noted the impor-
tance of a discourse of ‘authenticity’ (Flory and Miller 2008, Bracke
2008), though what it actually means to the young people who use the
term remains largely unexplored. Taylor has investigated what he calls
‘the culture of authenticity’ (2003[1991]), and argues that although the
concept can have a moral basis, it is most often ‘displaced’ from the
moral and built upon self-culture (26–29). In the Glasgow research,
‘authenticity’ was expressly and consciously bound up with the moral.
For participants it meant: living one’s beliefs every day, rather than
simply being a ‘Sunday Christian’; being willing to stand up for one’s
beliefs even when marginalized by them; and ‘working out’ problems
ethically. The young people who participated in this research were
emphatic that ‘to be a Christian is to actually do something about it’.
In this way, they are like the young Christians Flory and Miller (2008)
call ‘innovators’ who prioritize a faith which must be lived out ‘within
the surrounding community and culture’ (45). It is interesting that the
way in which young people tested the ‘truth’ of their faith was in the
lived expression of it rather than through doctrine or tradition. A dis-
course of authenticity also serves to affirm and consolidate the young
people’s marginal identity.
Many young people went further than simply attending multiple
churches. Christian festivals, youth groups, even conversations in cof-
fee shops and pubs were often considered more ‘genuine’ examples
of church than traditional congregations or services. Young people
frequently drew a distinction between types of church wherein one
‘sits down and listens’ and a form of church wherein questions may
be asked or participation is interactive. The former was associated with
older generations and with church as ‘obligation’. The latter, which
was preferred, was associated with requiring more ‘critical thought’
as well as more individual responsibility. Church located in young
peoples’ everyday spaces was seen as more ‘relevant’ and as enabling
interaction with secularized Christians and religious others rather than
‘Christian Christians . . .who don’t like any other religion [and always]
socialize in their little Christian bubble’.
240 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

Redefining ‘church’ so as to include alternative church spaces and

forms points to the way that young Christians use mainstream popular
youth culture (clubs, pubs, coffee shops) for Christian purposes. Simi-
larly, young Christians stressed the importance of music in helping
to reinforce and define their identity. Like other young people, music
forms a kind of ‘soundtrack’ to their lives (Savage et al. 2006: 42), but
here the music they listen to is Christian, either explicitly or implic-
itly. Walking down the street listening to Christian music on their
iPods insulates and separates out young Christians from secular cul-
ture (the ‘sexual propaganda’ and the glorification of ‘violence’, as one
young man put it). But because the Christian bands play music which
sounds either like mainstream, or, like alternative or ‘indie’ music, it
enables young people to appropriate the cultural capital encoded in
that music. In this way, the marginality of being a young Christian in
a largely secular culture is ameliorated or, often, reframed as an ‘alter-
native’ (i.e. ‘cool’) identity.

English Non-Churchgoers
Our second case study reflects the views of the majority of youth who
do not go to church. The data is taken from a project involving over
300 young people who attended faith-based youth clubs in England
(Collins-Mayo et al. forthcoming). Here we concentrate on 53 non-
churchgoers aged 11 to 23 who participated in an extended case study
of 13 youth clubs as part of research. 49% were female; 70% White
and 30% Black or dual heritage. The clubs were run by church or para-
church organizations, but their provision of personal and social infor-
mal education catered for youth of all faiths and none. The clubs all
had a Christian ethos but differed in the extent to which they included
an overt Christian presence. Some appeared indistinguishable from
secular clubs, others provided obvious opportunities for young people
to talk or think about spirituality, faith and values. Young people’s
participation in faith-related interventions was voluntary; there was
no aggressive proselytizing in any of the clubs.
Part of the research focused on what non-churchgoing young people
in these clubs thought about Christianity. At the beginning and end of
a term (3 months), the young people were asked to grade their interest
in Christianity on a scale of 1 (no interest) to 10 (very interested) and
to explain their answer in qualitative interviews. The results indicated
that non-churchgoing youth were largely indifferent to religion, spiri-
 (dis)engagements with christianity 241

tuality and Christianity, as they did not have much impact on their
daily lives. However, when asked to think about these things for the
purposes of the study they were moderately interested to do so. The
average score on the Christianity item was 5.5 out of 10 at the begin-
ning and end of the term. Three main reasons for interest were given,
none of which pertained directly to an interest in personal faith:
(a) Life and society. The young people recognised that religion is part
of the late modern world and were interested to hear other people’s
ideas in open conversation. Respect for differing views was crucial
in these discussions. The young people were opposed to having
beliefs pushed on them and did not want to push their views on
others. Autonomy and personal authenticity in belief, as with the
Scottish churchgoers above, were important to the young people in
this study; more important than being ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. In other
words, internal truth trumped external truth embodied in religious
institutions.
(b) Guidelines for living. Whilst some of the young people in the study
had been put off Christianity because they had experience of an over-
controlling church in childhood, for the most part the young people
were neither hostile to church, nor to Christian ethics. Indeed they
recognised a role for religion in providing a moral framework for
societal living. Moreover, they expected Christians in their personal
morality to live by the teachings of their church, otherwise they
were perceived as being hypocritical. For themselves, Christianity
was seen as providing guidelines—not rules—for living, which are
culturally based. In practice this meant being a ‘good’ person. The
important point here is that young people located moral authority
primarily within themselves.
(c) Identity. The third point of interest related to matters of religious
identity passed on to them by parents or grandparents. Whilst there
was no normative pressure to retain a nominal Christian identity if
they had no contact with church, several did do so. Sixteen year old
James is a case in point. He felt that all religions are cultural expres-
sions of the same thing. However, since he had been christened in
infancy he said, ‘even though I don’t follow it, I am Christian’. He
went on to make an analogy with supporting a football team: ‘You
don’t want to support someone else’s team because you don’t live
there’. In the same way, he would not want to take on another reli-
gion. Insofar as the young person had a nominal Christian identity
there was some interest in finding out more about it.
Non-churchgoers had little day-to-day interest in Christianity, yet
they did see the Church as important for family occasions associated
with birth, deaths and marriages, or family traditions such as going
to church for midnight Mass at Christmas. In addition, many of the
242 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

young people drew on their fading memory of cultural Christianity

in order to pray (Collins-Mayo 2008). Twenty-four percent of non-
churchgoing young people in the wider study said that they prayed
at least once a month. Kira (16 years), for instance, said the Lord ’s
Prayer every night before going to sleep: ‘And I say the one that goes,
“Keep me in your sleep, if I should die before I wake up, pray the Lord
my soul to keep”’. As noted earlier, the prevalence of prayer has been
found in other studies of young people (Francis and Robbins 2006).
What is particularly significant about these young people’s prayers is
that they were said primarily for family and friends in times of diffi-
culty, or to help the young person cope with personal problems. Prayer
was not dependent on whether or not the young person believed in
God, but was seen as a positive and practical way to support those they
cared about. As such, prayer served to uphold the significance of fam-
ily, friends and reflexive self as the main (secular) nexus of meaning
and purpose for non-churchgoing young people (Savage et al. 2006,
Collins 1997).

Social Class
One major finding from the Glasgow young Christians research
outlined in 4(a) above was the apparent difference between socially
included young people and young people from socially excluded or
deprived areas.10 As we have shown, young people from such areas
may claim a Christian identity, but are largely unaffiliated. For them,
participation in church youth groups is likely to be ‘mostly about the
basketball’. Thus there appear to be some significant differences in the
reasons behind unaffiliation of young people from these areas and in
the ways in which these young people engage with religious institu-
tions. The Glasgow research prompted the research team to design
a project looking specifically at the religiosity and/or spirituality of
young people in economically deprived areas in the UK. This project
focuses upon neighbourhoods in urban Glasgow and Manchester, two

10
The UK Social Exclusion Task Force defines social exclusion by quoting Levitas
in Pantazis et al. (2006): ‘Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process.
It involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability
to participate in the normal relationships and activities available to the majority of
people in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural, or political areas. It affects
both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole’
(Social Exclusion Task Force 2009).
 (dis)engagements with christianity 243

cities which score highly on multiple indices of deprivation (see, for

example, Glennerster et al. 1999 and Scottish Executive 2003).11 Here
we present early findings from this project.12
In one group work session, two young men spoke about their sense
that they did not fit in with traditional church communities:

M1: As soon as you walk in the door . . . it is . . . you just walk in the
door and they’re like . . .
M2: They look at you as if you’re not meant to be there.

These young men felt that church members made assumptions about
them (which were not true) based upon the fact that they were a
young person from a particular area, or, on how they were dressed.
Both young people and service providers from socially deprived areas
emphasise the prejudice that others (especially outsiders, but also older
generations) have about young people from such neighbourhoods.
These assumptions can limit youth participation in certain spaces
and shrinks the spaces which are considered safe. This can affect how
young people engage with and frame everyday spaces, including sacred
spaces. Here, the socially included Generation Y stress on mobility and
choice is constrained, as MacDonald and Marsh argue (2001: 382). For
these young people, their agency is ‘bounded’ (383) by general and
persistent insecurity (see also Leonard 2006), which, we suggest, affects
religious engagement.
In conversations with young people from socially included areas,
participants often pointed to green spaces, such as parks, as places
where they might encounter the sacred. However, young people from
areas of deprivation appear to have quite a different relationship with
green spaces. Young people claim that parks in their neighbourhoods
are commonly the preserve of gangs, places where one is likely to be
attacked (‘bottled’), or, simply, spaces over which one has little control.

11
The UK and Scottish Executive governments use complex indicators to measure
social exclusion, including household income levels, neighbourhood unemployment
rates, education rates, life expectancy, housing, fuel, poverty, crime rates (Department
of Work and Pensions 2007).
12
This research started in January 2009, the findings presented here are drawn from
interviews conducted as part of the previous research project, interviews with key
community stakeholders (church leaders, youth leaders and so forth), and interviews
conducted so far with young people in these areas. As such, this section should be
considered early findings.
244 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

One young woman told us that although she used to love to go to

certain parks to lie and watch the sky or to make daisy chains, these
places have disappeared under recent ‘regeneration’ schemes and the
parks that have been created ‘look nice’ but are frequented by people
she’d rather not encounter (in part because of previous bullying).
In such a context, church spaces might be expected to be viewed as
safe and as places where one might encounter the sacred. Certainly,
many young people are happy to use church spaces as safe places to
come together and as sites of stability which enable them to be ‘differ-
ent’ from others in their area. Seventeen year old Jack, drew a compar-
ison between himself and ‘a guy that lives round the corner from me
and . . . I’m pretty sure he’s got the same background as me, but he’s
just a nightmare. He’s just . . . he smokes, he drinks, he hangs about late
at night. He’s up to no good . . .and he didn’t go to the [church affili-
ated youth group]’. Another young man, 16 year old Robert, pointed
to the way in which his church has given him opportunities that he
would otherwise never have had: trips outside of his area, access to
computers and the internet, references for university and work appli-
cations. As one minister put it, ‘the church can be a stepping stone
to the middle class’. Services and youth programmes offered by reli-
gious institutions may thus promote the agency of young people from
socially deprived areas and may also offer models of adulthood based
upon Christian values.
However, the fact that young people are often happy to use such
spaces and programmes does not necessarily indicate an engagement
with Christianity as such and church leaders stress that few young
people who come to youth programmes also attend church services.
It was a surprise, then, to find that some young people from socially
deprived areas, retain not only a belief in God but pray daily or fre-
quently. As 16 year old Andrew put it, God is a friend and ‘you can’t
say you’re friends with somebody when you never speak to them’.
Smith (2005) claims that US youth see God as a kind of ‘cosmic thera-
pist or counselor’ (148). While this may be true, young people from
socially deprived areas struggle with a great deal of uncertainty and
violence in their lives. God may thus enable young people to nego-
tiate the constraints and instability of their neighbourhoods, whilst
also providing an ideal model of relationship. Similarly, church leaders
have repeatedly told us that the church remains a place where people
come in crisis, or, to help them understand death, findings which
chime with those of Savage et al. (2006) in their work with socially
 (dis)engagements with christianity 245

included youth. Here, however, it must be stressed that two indicators

of social deprivation are the increased prevalence of suicide and low
life expectancies, making death and times of crisis more common in
such areas than in socially included areas.13

Conclusion

Four main points stand out concerning young people’s relationship to

Christianity in England and Scotland. First, Christian practice is left
to an engaged minority. The majority are not hostile to the Church
but are largely indifferent to it and disengaged. Private religiosity in
the form of belief and prayer is only very loosely Christian, but it is
often the only point of spiritual reference for young people in times of
crisis or difficulty. Second, religious autonomy and authenticity which
took on importance with the Boomer generation is central to Genera-
tion Y’s relationship to Christianity. Young people’s beliefs and prac-
tices reflect individual choices that ‘sit well’ with the person’s sense
of self. For some non-churchgoing young people who retain Chris-
tian affiliation the authenticity of Christian identity (albeit nominal)
lies in its relationship to familial identity and tradition. For young
churchgoing Christians, authenticity resides in their choosing a faith
and consciously living out its ethic. Third, and a consequence of the
individualisation that goes with autonomy and authenticity, is that
the transmission of Christian faith in England and Scotland is muted.
Parents in the home, teachers and peers at school, youth workers in
youth clubs are all wary about imposing religious ideas and identities
on young people. Disengagement is therefore almost inevitable. How-
ever, there is some evidence that the decline in Christian religiosity is
‘bottoming out’, albeit at a very low level of engagement. Finally, to
fully appreciate young people’s relationship with Christianity we need
to take into account diversity. Generation Y are not a homogenous
group. We have mentioned social class, gender and ethnicity; other
variables could have been considered and will be an important focus
of research in the future.

13
Socially deprived areas often have significantly lower life expectancies than the
national average, as well as higher murder and suicide rates.
246 giselle vincett and sylvia collins-mayo

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uk/education/youth_pilgrimage.htm), accessed 29th June 2009.
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Patterns’. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45(1): 107–118.
——. 2009. ‘The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe’. European Sociological
Review 25(2): 155–168.
 (dis)engagements with christianity 249

Voas, D. and A. Crockett. 2005. ‘Religion in Britain: Neither Believing Nor Belonging’.
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Voas, D. and I. Storm. 2008. ‘Intergenerational Transmission of Churchgoing in Eng-
land and Australia’. Birmingham: paper presented at the annual conference of the
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US Secondary School Students: Current Patterns, Recent Trends, and Sociodemo-
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archives/press-archives-social-Main.asp?dID=2007, accessed 29th June 2009.
 GERMAN YOUTH: NEITHER PARTICIPANTS NOR
PARTAKERS IN RELIGION?

Gert Pickel

Introduction—Do Today’s Youth Indicate the Level of Secularization?

When speaking of Christian religion in Germany, we mostly do so by

referring to the numerous ways of reflecting its seemingly persistently
progressing loss of meaning. Apparently, fewer denominational mem-
bers, decreasing church attendance rates, the discontinuation of reli-
gious traditions and an increasing indifference with regard to faith in
God set the scene. However, this scenario—commonly referred to as
secularization—is questioned almost as frequently as it is conjured up
(Luckmann 1967). Critiques are particularly suspicious of the assump-
tion of an overall loss in faith. For example, following Thomas Luck-
mann’s privatization thesis (1967), supporters of the individualization
thesis of religion do assume that people are increasingly turning away
from church, however, they do not believe that subjective religiosity
is decreasing—according to them, religion is rather changing in form.
Supporters of the religious market model (Finke/Stark 2006; Froese/
Pfaff 2009; Iannaccone 1991; Stark/Bainbridge 1987; Stark/Finke 2000)
take on a different position equally critical of the secularization theory.
They believe that the religious vitality of a society—and by society they
mainly mean citizens’ actions—depends on the supply on the religious
market place where churches and other religious organizations com-
pete with one another. They hold the following assumption: if there is
a great diversity of suppliers on the religious market due to few regula-
tions by the state, then we may expect an increase in religious vitality.
However, if the state regulates the religious market (either by imposing
restrictions or by promoting religion) then religious vitality is likely to
decrease. Based on the assumption of inopportune conditions on the
religious market (low diversity of suppliers of religious goods and con-
current fairly far-reaching regulations of the religious market by the
state), they also make a rather bleak forecast of the future (medium
term) development of religious vitality in Germany.
252 gert pickel

Where do teenagers and young adults come in in these scenarios? In

news articles in the German media, there are two main contradictory
points of view: some lament a massive decline in Christian faith among
the young generation. In accordance with the line of reasoning of the
classic secularization theory, they speak of a consistent continuation
of the loss of importance of religion in society. What is more, this
discontinuation of religious traditions becomes particularly apparent
among the youth, as they hardly share the convictions of the Christian
churches let alone feel a bond towards their institutions. Changes in
values, individualization, and rationalization have disrupted the trans-
mission of Christian religious traditions in the course of socialization
and have encouraged secularization. Thus, it is hardly surprizing that
the youth are increasingly irreligious—not only in East Germany but
also in West Germany.
Others make out a renewed interest in religiosity and spirituality (see
Streib 2008) particularly among the youth. Don’t more and more young
adults look for a sense of meaning and security in times of an increas-
ingly less subjectively perceivable and comprehensible modernity and
thus turn away from present modernity as shaped by materialism and
cold rationality? Consequently, in the youth phase of life, a great num-
ber of religious forms and patchwork religions arise. These are likely
to point the way for the future of the religious landscape. And doesn’t
the youths’ susceptibility to so-called youth religions, alternative forms
of religiosity or occultism reflect particularly the young adults’ open-
mindedness toward a broader—and sometimes dangerous—spectrum
of spiritual offers? From this perspective, it becomes evident that tra-
ditional Christian beliefs are no longer as important in the lives of the
young adults. However, they are being replaced by a great diversity of
individual and plural religious convictions. The current scientific litera-
ture on religion and youth (Gensicke 2006; Ziebertz 2003, 2008, 2009;
Feige/Gennerich 2008) points out the abundance of the different kinds
of individualized religiosity of young adults. The German Shell’s most
recent panorama study1 (Hurrelmann/Albert 2006) on the values and
behavior of the youth and young adults also takes the same line. It
considers de-institutionalization,2 religious diversification (pluraliza-

1
A panorama study provides a broad descriptive account of the current situation
of a particular social group—in this case the youth.
2
This development is not particular to the field of religion. Other traditional social
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 253

tion) and religious individualization to best describe the patterns of

religiosity among the German youth.
What about the current state of religiosity of the German youth?
Are they mostly irreligious or are they increasingly becoming irreli-
gious? Do they continue the secularization process of previous genera-
tions or are they developing a broad range of individualized religiosity
which may even provide a basis for a revival of religion? Or does
the observable plurality of different types of religiosity among the
youth represent transitional stages rather than permanent “patchwork
religions”?
In this article, I seek to answer these questions by referring to several
recently published empirical studies on the relation of youth and religion
in Germany. In order to do so, I cover the following related questions:
(1) What is the current state and development of Christian religiosity
and bonding to the church among the German youth? (2) How about
the development of religiosity of the youth beyond Christian religiosity?
(3) What kinds of religiosity do German youth adhere to? (4) What are
the predictions for the future of religiosity among the youth?
In order to answer these questions, we first have to clarify two issues:
who does ‘the youth’ refer to and what kinds of explanatory patterns
exist regarding the development of religiosity in society.

Prerequisites—Youth, Religiosity and Theories of the

Sociology of Religion

Who Does ‘The Youth’ Refer To?

One of the prerequisites of exploring the youth phase of life is the
determination of the part of society referred to in the analysis. With
regard to this particular phase of life, this is quite a task due to the
fact that youth has been considered to be an independent phase of life
since fairly recently (see Chart 1). In addition, during the course of the
past decades, this phase of life has been differentiated to a consider-
able extent. Only since the beginning of the last century, ‘the youth’
has found its place between childhood and adulthood. This was mainly
due to the necessity of having a phase of moratorium which provides

institutions also lose importance among the young citizens in the course of value
changes toward increasing self-realization.
 254 gert pickel

the necessary time to acquire differentiated abilities essential to meet

the requirements of modern times.3
In the course of educational expansion, the knowledge which had
to be conveyed increased. Thus, the youth phase of life has extended
its boundaries more and more since the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. During the last thirty years, the phase of life itself was also dif-
ferentiated further. This is related to the temporal disaggregation of
development tasks (Erikson 1959) in the state of adulthood—i.e. post-
adolescence (see Kenniston 1968). This phase is characterized by the fact
that certain attributes which characterize a person as an adult have been
acquired while others have not. Four characteristics particularly serve
to distinguish adults from the youth: (1) moving away from one’s par-
ents and establishing one’s own household; (2) financial independence;
(3) having a partner; (4) taking up employment. So-called ‘kippers’4
or ‘boomerang kids’ would be a typical case of young adults, who are
financially independent, have a partner but have not distanced them-
selves spatially from their parents’ home (out of laziness). In accor-
dance with observations of these development phases, childhood, youth
and post-adolescence are considered separately nowadays. In addition,
their existence is considered to be constitutive for modernity.

Chart 1. Historical Comparison of the Extension of the Youth Phase of Life

1900 childhood adulthood Æ

1950 childhood youth adulthood Æ
1980 childhood youth adulthood Æ
2000 childhood youth post-adolescence adult-
(early adolescence) hoodÆ
(late adolescence)
from 2020 childhood Early youth Post-adolescence
on adolescence (late adolescence)
Age 4 8 12 16 18 20 24 26 28 30
Source: Own compilation based on Hurrelmann 2007: 17.

3
The development of an (educational) moratorium can be considered to have first
occurred primarily among the bourgeoisie. On the one hand, they had the crucial
resources at their disposal so as to be able to go without the labor of the youth, on
the other hand, they realized intellectually that the accumulation of knowledge might
pay off in the future.
4
This is a term used mostly in the British context for young adults over 18 who
are still living at home.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 255

What remains is the issue of clearly distinguishing these phases

from one another. The changes in status which constitute the mem-
bership in a certain phase can occur at different points in the lives
of different individuals. Consequently, it is the change in status itself
and not a clearly defined age limit which causes a person to be con-
sidered to be in a certain phase of life. However, it is hardly pos-
sible or perhaps even impossible to account for varying changes in
status which do not necessarily occur simultaneously, when carrying
out cross-societal empirical analyses. For pragmatic reasons, we refer
to a rough determination of age limits in order to define the above-
mentioned phases of life. Due to the fact that many changes in status
occur at certain intervals, most youth researchers have agreed on the
age limits as presented in Chart 1 based on current trends in society.
However, these are subject to change over time. In summary, ‘youth’ is
a social construct which strongly depends on the historical and socio-
structural context.

The Theories of the Sociology of Religion

As mentioned in the introduction, the sociology of religion comprises
various theoretical models reflecting different positions. Due to the
fact that the main debate in the modern sociology of religion centers
on these three theoretical approaches, it is necessary to outline them
more in detail in the following chapter.
For many decades, secularization theory was the main explanatory
model in the sociology of religion. It points out a continous decrease
in the relevance of church and religion in modern societies (Berger
1967; Bruce 2002; Dobbelaere 2002; Pickel 2009; Pollack 2008; Wilson
1982; Voas 2008), resulting from a decline in existential threats in the
European welfare states (Norris/Inglehart 2004) as well as a tension
due to processes of rationalization and functional differentiation of
modern societies inherent in modernization (see Stolz 2008). In the
course of privatization, religion is increasingly being driven out of
public life (Berger 1967), it continuously loses relevance in the every-
day lives of the people and the norms set by the religions decreasingly
succeed in committing the members of society to them. In addition,
the number of people turning away from the social form of religion—
the churches—is constantly growing. With a certain time lag, this
loss of the communal basis of religion (Bruce 2002: 19–21) may even
256 gert pickel

lead to a decrease in faith and subjective religiosity in modernizing

societies.5
Another approach, the religious market model,6 considers the situ-
ation in the USA as a prime example of the social development of
religion and religiosity7 and points to a historically developed path
peculiar to Europe.8 According to the proponents of this approach
(Iannaccone 1991), Europe’s status as an exceptional case merely dis-
tracts the attention from the generally valid relationship between reli-
gious supply and religious demand. According to the market model,
religious vitality—the main issue of the two approaches—is mainly
determined by the supply of the churches and the degree of regula-
tion of the market by the state (Stark/Bainbridge 1987; Stark/Finke
2000). The monopoly churches can no longer satisfy the continually
widening interests of the individualized believers. If the religious mar-
ket continues to be limited to established suppliers (churches), this will
inevitably lead to a decrease in religious vitality among the citizens.
Competitors on the religious market and the subsequent competition
can revive religious vitality as the believers will find suitable religious
offers which they have been seeking. In sum: in contrast to Peter L.
Berger’s (1967: 127–154) assumption that increasing pluralization
causes religion to lose plausibility, increasing religious pluralism has
a positive effect on religious vitality. Thus, modernization does not
necessarily lead to a loss of relevance of religion in society, due to the
fact that everyone is in search of a religious model in order to find an
answer to the ‘ultimate’ questions of meaning. The constant demand
reduces the variance of religious vitality as determined by the supply,

5
Hardly any of the prominent secularization theorists (Wilson 1982: 150–151;
Bruce 2002: 41–43) assume that religiosity will vanish entirely. Rather, they believe that
a certain number of religious persons will remain in modern societies (even though
this group of persons will be diverse and will not be particularly large) due to the
inevitability of questions of meaning and the necessity to provide for contingencies.
6
Occasionally, this approach is also referred to as the Rational Choice theory of
religion.
7
In return, proponents of the secularization theory have accused supporters of the
market model of choosing an ‘exceptional case’ and have argued that their research
results depended on this selectively drawn sample (Bruce 2002).
8
Other sociologists of religion such as Davie or Hervie-Leger share the assump-
tion of a special historical development in Europe. Particularly Grace Davie (2001,
2002) repeatedly underlined the status of “Europe as an exceptional case” and advised
against generalizing European empirical results.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 257

which is why this approach is also called the “supply-side-approach”

(Stark/Iannaccone 1994).
The proponents of a third standpoint, who also argue against the
secularization theory, differentiate between the developments on the
personal level of faith and one’s commitment to the church (Luckmann
1967; Pollack/Pickel 2007). This approach is discussed in particular
in the European realm under the term thesis of religious individual-
ization (Davie 1994). As in the case of the market model, individual
religiosity is conceived as an essential anthropological constant. The
social form of religion may lose importance, however, individual reli-
giosity merely modifies its form (see Luckmann 1967; see also Cipriani
2001). It may but does not necessarily have to manifest itself publicly,
e.g. in new religious movements or other kinds of collective or indi-
vidual spiritual practices. The latter result in an “invisible religion”,
which suggests a loss of faith even though the loss does not actually
occur. The proponents of the individualization thesis agree with the
secularization theorists in so far as they also make a bleak forecast
regarding the development of church integration. However, they
believe that this loss of relevance does not apply to the subjective level
of religiosity.
Apart from their different explanations, the proponents of the mar-
ket model and the supporters of the individualization thesis mainly
agree in one respect—they both rebut the secularization theory as
an unsuitable explanatory model for the development of religion in
societies today. They particularly criticize the assumption about the
inevitability of the decline of the social form of religion as well as the
fateful (negative) relationship between religion and modernity and its
(supposed) focus on sociological indicators related to the church. At
the same time, they often neglect the fairly high complexity of the
explanatory factors included in the secularization theory (rationaliza-
tion, urbanization, socio-economic development, dissolution of social
networks and social milieus, functional differentiation, privatization),
which may in addition occur on different levels (social secularization,
organizational secularization, individual secularization; Dobbelaere
2002; see also Pickel 2009).
How far do these approaches assist in considering the religiosity of
the German youth? First, the three approaches provide helpful guide-
lines for assessing the empirical results. They thus prevent us from
making up ad hoc explanations and enable us to systematically inter-
pret the development on the religious sector for young people. Second,
 258 gert pickel

Chart 2. Basic Theoretical Lines of Thought in Contemporary Sociology of Religion and

their Assumptions Regarding the Development of Religiosity
Secularization Theory Individualization Thesis Market Model
Pluralization Thesis
Representatives Brian Wilson Thomas Luckmann Rodney Starke
Steve Bruce Grace Davie Roger Finke
Peter L. Berger Hervieu-Leger Laurence Iannaccone
Main Tension between Individuals’ basic Individuals’ general,
Assumption modernity and religion religious orientation as constant need for
an anthropological religion
constant
Theory of classic modernization Individualization theory Supply-oriented market
reference theory theory and pluralization
thesis
Main Hypothesis Continuous loss of Loss of relevance of Supply on the religious
relevance of religion institutionalized religion; market determines the
as a social authority continued existence of extent of religiosity and
conveying a sense of private forms of religion bonding to the church in
meaning society
General forecast Continuous downward Continued existence Development of
for Germany and trend of all kinds of of private religious religiosity depends
Europe religion, religiosity and practices and on religious supply
bonding to the church simultaneous decrease and the degree of
in dedication to the pluralization of society
churches
Forecast regarding Cohort-specific Loss of traditions Mostly age-independent
the development of decrease in religiosity among the youth due to revitalization of religion
religiosity among and bonding to the decreasing dedication to after the cessation of
the youth church; young people church institutions and repressions with the
are increasingly simultaneous increase establishment of a
irreligious in participation in new religious market
religious movements and
increasing spirituality

Source: Own compilation.

due to the fact that they refer to social processes, they relate the lifestyle
of the youth to the lifestyle of adults. Third, they integrate the debate
on the religiosity of the youth into the debates in the field of the sociol-
ogy of religion. This in turn enhances the sociological and theoretical
status of research on the youth which is frequently rather isolated. Due
to our focus on the German youth, two out of the three approaches
seem to be appropriate for further analyses—secularization theory and
the individualization thesis. However, as I seek to determine the most
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 259

sustainable explanatory approach, I first need to establish how I actu-

ally measure religiosity empirically.

What is Religion—And How Can We Measure It?

We have to keep in mind that the sociology of religion does not intend
to reproduce a system of religious convictions and truths. Rather, it
is concerned with individuals’ attitudes toward religion in society.
It is mainly about the collective expansion of religious practices and
people’s beliefs. In light of the above-mentioned debate between the
proponents of the secularization theory and the individualization the-
sis, we also need to distinguish between bonding to the church (i.e.
individuals’ actions related to organizations) and subjective religiosity.
Third, it is useful to differentiate between the dominant characteris-
tics of Christian religiosity in Europe and non-christian religiosity. In
order to grasp this multitude of characteristics, we need to extend our
methodology beyond simply considering church attendance, praying
or denominational membership.
Charles Glock’s dimension-based model (1954) which was pre-
sented in the 1950s, has established itself as a useful guideline for
assessing religiosity. He distinguishes five dimensions of religiosity
which closely relate to one another in terms of content. They include
religious knowledge, religious beliefs (which Glock refers to as reli-
gious ideology), socially shared or individually practiced religious
rituals, religious experience and religious consequences. Huber (2003)
modified the dimensions due to the fact that the status of religious
consequences was a bit unclear with regard to their relation to the
social environment and because the difference between individuals’
prayers and collective rituals were a bit blurred particularly in Protes-
tantism. Thus, we refer to the following multidimensional structure of
religiosity in our analysis: (1) religious knowledge, (2) religious ideology
(religious beliefs, e.g. the belief in God), (3) religious experience, (4) reli-
gious rituals (e.g. church service or sacraments) and (5) religious devo-
tion (prayer).9 Religious rituals and devotions reflect the individuals’

9
It seems suitable to refer to a pragmatic concept of religiosity which closely follows
Christian convictions in order to consider the development of religiosity and bonding
to the church among the German youth as it takes into account these dimensions of
religiosity. This also appears to be sensible in light of the fact that this article focuses
260 gert pickel

collective and individual religious practices. This distinction also

served as a basis for the most recent data collection—the Bertelsmann
religion monitor (BertelsmannStiftung 2009).
This approach consciously refers to a substantial rather than a func-
tional concept of religion. It is difficult to almost impossible to make
empirical statements about (a functionally determined) religiosity as it
is either invisible or does not take on a particular form. At this point,
Detlef Pollack’s thoughts (2003) are helpful, as he considers religiosity
to consist of two components: First, the individual has to be concerned
with a religious question (usually it is the question of the meaning
of life or the question of how to overcome existential risks). This in
turn has to be met with religious responses. Only if both components
occur, may we speak of religiosity. The advantage of this approach
is that it allows us to consider religiosity in terms of non-Christian
forms. In addition, it permits us to take into account that there may
in fact be people who do not have any religious beliefs at all.10
Our interest in the development of the youth raises the question of
the correct approach. On the one hand, there are special youth stud-
ies which focus on certain age groups between 13 and 29 years of age.
Researchers can make particularized statements regarding this phase
of life unlike researchers who use general population surveys, as the
latter surveys’ samples only include a limited number of young adults
and frequently do not include any young persons under the age of 18.
However, many of these studies remain very general with regard to
questions of religiosity or bonding to the church or researchers carry
out only limited (mostly descriptive) analyses of the relevant questions.
This is one of the main shortcomings of the current occupation with
religion in the youth phase of life. The rather superficial consideration
is seldom accompanied by a reference to the main theoretical lines of
the sociology of religion. Consequently, the majority of explanations are
rather ad hoc in character. Due to a lack of comparison with other age
groups, the interpretations tend to imply that the youth are an entirely
independent and different generation. Researchers quickly fall in with
the interpretation of an individualized youth without presenting any
hard evidence. Due to a lack of systematic comparisons of religiosity

more on changes in the population on the whole rather than ‘qualitative’ changes in
nuances of faith.
10
Based on the experience with East Germans, this category is essential.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 261

among the youth and adults it remains unclear whether the religious
state among the young people is special or whether it hardly differs. In
addition, youth studies suffer from the problem of the great diversity
of age groups: for example, the senior researchers of the most recent
Shell youth studies (2002, 2006) decided to focus on the age groups
between 13 and 25 years of age. Before 1986, they drew their samples
from the age groups between the age of 15 and 26 and in 1991 they
drew samples from the age group between the age of 13 and 20. The
German Youth Institute decided to focus on the age groups between
the age of 15 and 28 in their surveys while the choice of age groups in
other studies varies rather unsystematically. These decisions result in a
lack of comparability of the results as well as a lack of clarity regarding
the definition of ‘the youth’. For pragmatic reasons, we do not have a
choice but to consider members of the narrowly construed youth phase
as well as post-adolescence to be part of the youth in general when tak-
ing on a broad approach to the topic. We should keep this ‘imprecision’
in mind in the following interpretations as it may prove to be a relevant
indication of the pluralization of the youth. However, I would like to
say in advance that ‘the youth’ as such does not exist.
In this article, I combine several data sets which are currently avail-
able. This allows me to make statements regarding the current state
and development of religiosity among the German youth. I mainly use
quantitative data as I would like to illustrate the youth phase of life in
Germany rather than analyzing psychological explanations of religios-
ity in detail. Consequently, I use a broad range of data which includes
and combines the results of general population surveys (particularly
the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) from 1990 to 2008, the
study on “Church and Religion in an enlarged Europe (C&R) 2006”)
as well as special youth studies (Shell Youth Study from 2006 and the
Sinus Milieu Study U27 (Sinus 2008).

The Starting Point—Membership, Religious Practices and

Faith in God

The Dimension of Religious Practices Among the Youth—Participation

in Religious Rituals
Without a doubt, German society has become more plural with regard
to religious denominations during the past years. Increasing migration
has led to a rise in the number of young Muslims and members of the
262 gert pickel

Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, still the vast majority of the German

youth are members of one of the two traditional, established Chris-
tian churches—the Catholic and the Protestant church. Based on the
assumptions of the secularization theory and the individualization the-
sis, I would expect religious practices to decrease among the youth as
both approaches agree that the bonding to the church is decreasing
across generations.
We see the expected decrease in denominational affiliation in West
Germany: since 1980, the number of members of the denominations
has decreased by ten percentage points (i.e. by more than 150 per-
cent!) (Chart 3). Young adults in West Germany are also increasingly
without denominational affiliation. In 2006, far more 18- to 25-year-
olds indicated that they were not affiliated with any denomination
compared to the years before. This is also the case with regard to 14-
to 17-year-olds in the Shell youth study. This reflects a continuous
process of de-confessionalization which is in line with the assumptions
of the secularization theory. This result is far from trivial. A simple
comparison of the differences of the age groups at a single point in
time would suggest a more favorable development: the highest rate of
persons without denominational affiliation is not among the young-
est group of citizens but among those who are 30 to 40 years of age.
Occasionally, this leads researchers to conclude that we are experi-
encing a revitalization or return of religion. However, this approach
seems to lead to wrong conclusions when comparing it to the results
of analyses over time. Apparently, changes in denominational mem-
bership do not just result from cohort effects. Due to the fact that the
same cohorts have considerably lower membership rates at later points
in time, we may conclude that the changes are also determined by life
cycle effects.
The decrease in the rate of denominational membership among the
young citizens may be due to two reasons: First, according to insights
from the sociology of youth, young adults leave their families fairly
late. Nowadays, they often do so as late as at the beginning of their
thirties. Due to the fact that the attitude toward institutionalized forms
of religion is highly influenced by the socialization by the parents, it
is only then that the young adults are no longer subject to the social
control by their parents who are mostly religious. As the social control
ceases, young adults take the step of leaving the church. They no lon-
ger have to justify their decision to their parents as these are no lon-
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 263

Chart 3. Lack of Denominational Affiliation in East and West Germany

According to Age (in %)
West Germany East Germany
1980 1986 1991 1994 2000 2004 2008 1991 1994 2000 2004 2008
18–20 4 4 5 6 7 12 17 75 82 82 82 87
21–25 7 7 9 9 10 17 21 71 73 80 81 86
26–30 12 12 12 13 11 14 20 76 73 78 70 78
31–35 10 11 13 18 20 17 21 77 74 84 68 79
36–40 9 14 15 15 19 21 18 76 73 85 86 81
41–45 5 10 20 15 17 18 21 70 78 82 87 82
46–50 6 8 13 14 19 22 17 65 84 75 80 80
51–55 5 7 11 17 15 18 17 61 69 77 79 79
56–60 5 8 8 8 11 19 19 61 63 62 73 73
61++ 4 8 7 5 8 11 11 40 50 49 57 65
Overall 6,5 9 11 12 13 16 16,5 65 69 71 73 74,5
n= 2951 3095 1510 2341 2016 1970 1908 1543 1107 1097 958 905
Source: Own calculations based on the ALLBUS 1991, 1994, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008.

ger aware of the related actions.11 Second, when leaving their parents,
young adults enter a phase of life during which they are subjected to
many social pressures. They have to learn a trade or take up an occupa-
tion, a lot of the time they have a family or at least a partner and they
have to begin to “stand on their own two feet” financially. Compared
to all this, religion and religious activities fade into the background in
their everyday lives. In Germany, this may also be due to the fact that
they are confronted with the financial burden of the church tax when
earning their own money for the first time.12 This serves as an addi-
tional reason for leaving one of the Christian churches at this point
in their lives.
In East Germany, where hardly anyone was a church member even
before 1990, the situation is a bit different. Despite the downward trend,
adults and the youth continue to sustain a culture of denominational

11
There are quite a few persons who hide the fact that they left the church from
their parents until old age as their parents would not understand why they did so.
Usually, they seek to prevent possible conflicts among the generations in their family
of origin which may arise due to their decision.
12
At least more than half of the people who left the church name the church tax as
a reason according to the survey on church membership by the Evangelical Church
in Germany (EKD).
264 gert pickel

membership in West Germany contrasting the culture of non-denomi-

national affiliation in East Germany (see Pickel 2000: 207). In the new
Bundesländer, barely every fifth young adult is a church member. The
fact that there is no general trend to return to religion even twenty
years after the major political change clearly destroys the hope of the
major Christian denominations in Germany. This becomes particu-
larly evident among the group of young adults. On the contrary, in
East Germany, the number of denominational members continues to
decrease particularly among the 18- to 25-year-olds. Hence, one of our
major conclusions is that even among the youth, the churches fail to
commit the people to their faith.
We should find similar trends regarding the active participation of
young adults in church activities. In this case, average annual church
attendance seems to be a suitable indicator.13 The result (Chart 4) con-
firms the distribution of denominational membership. It elucidates the
differences in church activities among young Germans. Across all age
cohorts, the rate of church service attendance has decreased even more
so than the membership rates. According to analyses by the Allens-
bach Institute, between 1952 and 1999, regular church service atten-
dance among the 16- to 29-year-old members of the Catholic Church
decreased from 52 to 10 percent. Among Protestants of the same age,
regular church service attendance decreased from 12 to 4 percent. The
results of the Shell youth studies on church service attendance and
prayer confirm these results (Fuchs-Heinritz 2000: 162) for younger
age groups. Hence, between 1985 and 2000, regular church service
attendance (once per month) fell from 27 percent among the 18- to
25-year-olds to 16 percent in the same age group (1991: 21 percent).
In addition to the process of de-confessionalization, there is an even
more pronounced process of distancing from the church. This phe-
nomenon pertains to all age groups in Germany, i.e. including young
people—to the same extent. The age distribution supports the above-
mentioned life cycle based explanation: only when young people leave
their parents and escape from their parents’ social control do their
activities in church markedly decrease. A cohort-specific analysis of
the data—not presented here—shows that this effect leads to a con-
tinuous decrease in church membership from one generation to the

13
Due to the fact that it also includes peripheral church members, it is more con-
vincing than the rate of regular church-goers which is usually applied. However, struc-
turally, the results point in the same direction.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 265

Chart 4. (Detailed) Church Attendance in East and West Germany According to Age
1980 1991 1994/ 2000/ 2006/ 1991 1994/ 2000/ 2006/
1996 2002 2008 1996 2002 2008
18–20 9 12 11 5,5 5,5 3,5 4 4,5 2
21–25 6,5 10 8 6 5,5 2,5 4 2 2
26–29 6,5 7 9,5 6 5,5 4 3,5 2 1
30–45 11 8 11 7 7 2,5 4 2 3
46–60 16,5 12 14 11 9 3 4 2,5 3
61++ 19 18 21 14 13 6 6 4 3,5
Overall 13 12 13,5 9,5 9 3,5 4 3 3
Source: Own calculations based on the ALLBUS 1980, 1991, 1994, 1996; 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008.

next. This development is superimposed in part by the above-

mentioned life cycle effect; however, we do not question it funda-
mentally. Indications of a possible (also life cycle based) return to the
church in old age do not compensate for the loss of bonding to the
church across generations.
Apart from the debate about a decreasing church attendance rate
and religiosity, from time to time, researchers point out that church-
related rituals celebrating turning points in one’s life remain very
popular—even among non-Christians. Chart 5 reflects the fact that
Germans still treasure the main Christian rites of passage (baptisms,
weddings, funerals). However, it also shows that the extent to which
the rituals have been celebrated has dropped considerably across the
cohorts. Thus, in 2002, only three out of five persons in the age cohort
from 1975 to 1984 (i.e. the 18- to 27-year-olds) stated that they had
their children baptized or intended to do so. This group also voices the
wish for a Christian funeral far less often than the older generations.
This also appears to lose relevance in the course of life as reflected
by the development among the age cohorts between 1982 and 2002
in West Germany. Thinking ahead, we would expect only half of the
West German and only a quarter of the East German youth to indicate
that they wish for a Christian funeral during the upcoming years.
The desire to have a church wedding has decreased almost as steeply
as the wish for a Christian funeral. Here, the age cohorts as well as
the different dates within the age cohorts also differ. They thus indi-
cate a discontinuation of the tradition of this Christian ritual. What
is remarkable is the fact that the wish for a Christian funeral appears
to slowly increase in East Germany, while the level of the willingness
to carry out the other two rituals is decreasing even further below
 266 gert pickel

Chart 5. Religious Rituals in East and West Germany According to Age Cohorts
Have you had your children Would you like a Christian Would you like a church
baptized? funeral? wedding?
WG EG WG EG WG EG
cohort 1982 1992 2002 1992 2002 1982 1992 2002 1992 2002 1982 1992 2002 1992 2002
1984–1975 – – 61 – 12 – – 57 – 29 – – 63 – 14
1974–1965 – 78 78 14 12 – 53 54 20 20 – 61 60 8 17
1964–1955 88 88 89 15 14 71 60 63 18 19 70 67 66 13 20
1954–1945 89 89 89 25 26 77 63 64 18 23 80 73 74 15 23
1944–1935 95 95 95 40 36 87 75 74 31 37 87 87 86 36 34
1934–1925 97 97 97* 56 69* 88 81 81* 23 54* 89 86 86* 62 72*
1924–1915 98 98* 85* 93 84* 45* 86 83* 65*
1914–1905 98* 95* 90*
Overall 95 92 91 36 29 86 68 65 25 29 85 76 73 32 30

Source: Own calculations based on the ALLBUS 1982, 1992; 2002; * = open end cohort.

one third of the population. Even though the number of East Ger-
mans who fall back on Christian rites of passage is a bit higher than
the number of members of the Christian denominations, the process
of discontinuation of Christian traditions also becomes apparent in
this case. In addition, regarding participation, the decrease in activi-
ties does not just result from the fact that people turn away from the
church. It also occurs within the two major Christian denominations.
Thus, the number of participants and partakers in the different forms
of church-related activities has markedly decreased over the years—
particularly among the younger members. Between 1982 and 1992,
the number of 18- to 27-year-olds who participated in activities by the
Protestant church (choir, church festivals, bible study etc.) decreased
from 18 to 8 percent according to the third church membership survey
of the Evangelical Church in Germany. Other Christian associations
similarly suffer from the extinction of activists and volunteers particu-
larly among the young generations. This not only immensely cut back
church activities; it is also relevant with regard to civil society (see
Putnam 2000; Pickel/Gladkich 2009).
Why this massive distancing from the church? Are there specific
reasons why youth are turning away from the Christian churches? The
discrepancy between the search for identity of the youth on the one
hand and the respective offers of the Christian churches on the other
hand is particularly crucial. In general, the offers of the established
Christian churches are considered to be inadequate. Thus, in 2006,
two thirds of those questioned in the Shell youth study agreed with the
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 267

statement “The church does not provide answers to current questions”

and “The church has to change if it seeks to continue to exist.” In its
current form, the church is not very well approved of by the young
citizens. At the same time, the same number of people—more than 60
percent—among the 16- to 25-year-olds thinks that it is good that the
church exists. On the one hand, in Germany, the Christian churches
appear to have a rather unfavorable image among the young people.
However, this does not always go hand in hand with people question-
ing its existence. On the other hand, the youth and young adults pretty
much agree that many things related to the church today are not up-
to-date and should be changed.
Chart 6 points out the main focus of the critique using the example
of the protestant church: in the church membership study of the EKD,
the respondents criticize an overly bureaucratic order of the church
as an organization, its frequently apparent distance from the everyday
lives of the individuals and its overt conformism to the social system.
Overall, the youth and young adults consider and evaluate the degree
of institutionalization or the perception of the church as an institution
as unfavorable. Hence, the differences between people’s values and the
values of the church cause the critical attitudes as outlined here. They
mainly result from the individuals’ desire for self-realization on the
one hand as opposed to the traditional, hierarchical and patronizing
organization called church on the other hand. Qualitative interviews
show that the image of the Christian churches in Germany mainly
consists of people relating the church to past witch trials and crusades.
It is judged to be old, traditional, outdated, old-fashioned, hierarchical,
not up-to-date, and not modern—i.e. the opposite of what young peo-
ple in modern societies strive to be. Two things are worth mentioning:
on the one hand, again, the 18- to 29-year-olds take on a particularly
critical stance toward the church (in this case the Protestant church),
on the other hand, people mostly evaluate the social services provided
by the Christian churches very positively, unlike the general image of
the church in Germany.
Considering this critique, it is hardly surprizing that very few young
people profess their faith and allow religion to play an important
and visible role in their everyday lives. The unfavorable image of the
church results in the fact that religious youth and young adults tend
to withdraw themselves. Religion is a private matter and is kept out
of public debates. At the same time, people begin to accept secular-
ity as the predominant pattern of communication in modernity and
 268 gert pickel

Chart 6. Critique of the Protestant Church (Only Members of the Protestant Church)
14–17 18–29 30–39 > 40 overall
. . . is too rigid and bureaucratic 3,8 4,5 4,2 3,8 3,9
. . . conforms too much to the state 3,7 4,4 4,0 3,7 3,8
. . . only preaches morals 3,8 4,4 3,8 3,4 3,7
. . . fails to pertain to the everyday lives of 4,0 4,2 3,8 3,3 3,6
the individuals
. . . leaves too little room for questions or 3,8 4,1 3,7 3,4 3,6
doubts
. . . has a hostile attitude toward desires and 3,5 4,2 3,8 3,2 3,6
sex
. . . is too imprecise regarding its 3,4 3,9 3,5 3,3 3,4
declarations of belief
. . . does not take on political responsibility 3,6 3,8 3,5 3,0 3,3
. . . does not take on social responsibility 3,5 3,7 3,5 3,0 3,2
. . . is simply outdated 3,5 4,0 3,4 2,9 3,2
. . . is misogynistic 3,3 3,6 3,4 2,8 3,0
. . . is actually unnecessary 3,4 3,3 2,9 2,5 2,7
Source: EKD church membership survey 3 (1992: 119); arithmetic means on a scale from 7 = completely
agree, to 1 = do not agree at all.

increasingly realize that religion is no longer part of public life. I call this
the “religious spiral of silence”.14 As people gain the impression that their
environment is secular and that religious topics do not belong in the pub-
lic sphere, they take up the habit of not addressing religious topics pub-
licly. As many do so, this in turn reinforces people’s impression that their
environment is secular or that religious topics are unacceptable outside
the private sphere. Here, Jose Casanova’s (1994) considerations apply: if
people are convinced that modern society is secular, then this turns out to
be the case in reality, as people act according to this presupposition.
The following two interview segments from the Shell youth study in
2006 provide poignant examples for this interpretation: “I do believe
that many don’t admit that they’re interested in it, because they are
ashamed to tell their cool friends who are totally not interested in it.
Maybe they’re scared that they won’t accept them the way they are

14
I do so with reference to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s (1984) thoughts in the
1980s. She noticed that supporters of the party which was likely to lose during the
upcoming federal elections were far less willing to make statements in public than
supporters of the party which was likely to win. However, this behavior reinforced the
impression that the party which was likely to win would actually win while the party
which was likely to lose would actually lose.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 269

anymore if they admit that they’re interested in religion and ques-

tions of faith” (Maithe, 16 years). In addition to a similar reference to
the “religious spiral of silence”, the second statement also addresses
the image of the church. “I guess many teenagers believe in God but
they don’t want to show it in public because they are scared of being
laughed at by others. That’s why they don’t dare to profess their faith.
They are mainly scared of being laughed at because the church has
such a bad image of being a nerdy institution” (Sven, 16 years) (see
Fischer et al. 2000).
Both statements confirm the lack of willingness to debate religious
topics in public and to profess one’s religious faith openly or even
boldly—religiosity has become a private matter. This does not imply
that religiosity has simply vanished from people’s lives. However, due
to privatization, people’s social environment and their community no
longer reassure them (publicly) in their faith. In general, it is much
more difficult to maintain beliefs if one cannot or can only seldom
reassure oneself of the correctness and meaningfulness of one’s faith.
In addition, it is evident that religious thoughts only play a minor
role in rational everyday life in order to justify one’s decisions. It
has become inopportune to provide religious justifications for one’s
behavior to friends and acquaintances. On the contrary, this appears
to be peculiar or unacceptable in society. One should draw upon ratio-
nal arguments to justify one’s behavior. This decision results in clear-
cut consequences: fully in line with the secularization theory, religious
norms are no longer as important in structuring everyday life and
are vanishing from the public realm. Based on these observations,
we would expect people to continue to distance themselves from the
church and to cease following Christian traditions rather than for the
process to reverse and for a return of religion to occur.
How about individual religious practices? The secularization theory,
as well as the individualization thesis, assumes that religion is being
privatized. This process leads to a decrease in collective religious prac-
tices. However, it does not necessarily induce a collapse of individual
religious practices (particularly Protestant Christians like to point this
out). One of the main religious practices is prayer. Even here we see
a significant decrease. In the Shell youth study, the number of youth
and young adults who indicated that they pray on a weekly basis
decreased from 36 to 28 percent from 1997 to 2006. Other analyses
confirm this downward trend in the practice of praying: overall, reli-
gious practices—both collective practices in the sense of integration in
270 gert pickel

the church and the use of religious rituals as well as individual practices
such as prayer—are continuously on the decline among the German
youth. However, in West Germany, still more than half of the young
people indicate that they carry out or intend to carry out religious prac-
tices. In conclusion: During the last decades, the religious practice of
the German youth has been characterized by de-confessionalization,
distancing from the church and a discontinuation of Christian religious
traditions.

The Dimension of Faith—Subjective Religiosity Among the Youth and

Young Adults
The supporters of the secularization theory as well as the advocates
of the individualization thesis mostly agree on the loss of relevance of
the church in modern societies. Both approaches assume an increasing
individualization. However, they come to different conclusions: The
proponents of the secularization theory assume that individualization
will lead to a loss in faith in the long run. As religious knowledge and
religious traditions die out, as the communal bases of religion cease
to exist and as people increasingly interpret life from an innerworldly
perspective, Luckmann (1967) concludes that there is an increasing
discrepancy between institutionalized bonding to the church and sub-
jective religiosity. The latter establishes itself in realms beyond the
“holy cosmos” (Berger 1967) of Christianity and thus becomes largely

Chart 7. Indicators of Religiosity in East and West Germany

According to Age
West Germany East Germany
RS RImp Faith Reli RS RImp Faith Reli
18–21 39 30 47 55 25 14 37 26
22–25 48 32 45 55 24 23 41 36
26–29 48 23 48 61 24 22 45 36
30–45 66 38 66 73 24 21 35 41
46–60 73 49 75 85 33 15 30 31
61++ 76 58 84 85 60 36 54 61
Overall 68 45 71 78 47 23 40 42
Source: Own calculations based on C&R 2006; values indicate those agreeing with the
statement; RS = I was raised in faith; RImp = religion plays an important role in my
life, belief = belief in God or a higher being; Reli = professed to be religious (reference
groups: do not know whether I am religious, I am not religious).
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 271

invisible. Most certainly, religiosity does not vanish entirely; it does

not even decrease, but changes its form instead.
At first sight, the numbers draw a different picture: among young per-
sons, subjective religiosity (mostly interpreted as Christian) is less pro-
nounced than among older age cohorts. The threshold appears to be
at about the age of 30, i.e according to most recent findings, at the
point in the lives of young adults when they leave their parents. It
is important to note that there is a clear relation between their (self-
reported) religiosity and religious socialization (Pearson’s r >.46).
Young adults who believe that they were raised in faith are far more
likely to feel connected to religion in the future at least with regard to
their attitudes. However, the extent to which this feeling of closeness
to religion—which results from one’s upbringing—causes religion to
take on an important social role in one’s everyday life is limited. The
rate of those who consider religion to be important in their lives lies
below the rate of those who experienced religious socialization. The
youth and young adults are increasingly less willing to believe in a
particular form of transcendency, whatever it may be.
The changes in the rates of those agreeing with the different pre-
defined answers reveal a diffusion of faith: Overall, a majority of people
in East and West Germany believe in a generic divine power rather
than in a personal God. Particularly the youngest groups are fairly
unsure about their faith (Gensicke 2006: 208; see also Pickel 1995).
While the number of those who do not know what to believe in
decreases between the age of 12 and 25, apparently, this fairly regu-
larly evolves into a belief in a divine power or no belief at all. This in
turn may be due to a life cycle effect. However, cohort analyses with
indicators of subjective religiosity show that subjective faith and self-
reported subjective religiosity more or less continuously decrease
across generations. As Chart 10 indicates, these observations also apply
to other statements of subjective religiosity: thus, only very few among
the youth and young adults believe in angels, even fewer believe in evil
spirits or Satan. The German youth hardly acknowledge the threaten-
ing part of the afterlife. The collapse in faith between the age of 12 to
17 and 18 to 25 is particularly remarkable. Almost ten percent of the
West German and five percent of the East German teenagers lose faith
in God’s omnipotence during this time span. The only exception is the
belief in an afterlife which is more common. Interestingly, more than
half of the East German youth believe in an afterlife. However, we do
not know exactly what this statement stands for.
 272 gert pickel

Chart 8. Belief in God, 2006, According to Age Cohorts (in %)

Shell youth study 2006 „C&R“ 2006
12–14 15–17 18–21 22–25 18–25 26–35 36–45 46–60 61++

West Germany

I believe in a personal God 41 31 32 29 22 25 32 24 32

I believe in a divine power 15 19 23 26 29 37 32 51 52
I don’t really know what to 29 27 25 21 10 12 9 6 4
believe in
I don’t believe 15 23 20 24 39 26 27 19 12

East Germany

I believe in a personal God 9 13 11 12 18 13 11 9 20

I believe in a divine power 5 12 8 11 21 26 24 21 34
I don’t really know what to 27 10 17 11 13 4 8 6 4
believe in
I don’t believe 59 65 64 66 48 57 57 64 42

Source: Shell youth study 2006; C&R 2006.

Chart 9. Statements on Religiosity by 12- to 25-year-olds

Stars

Clairvoyance/Telepathy

Destiny/Fate

Angel and good spirits

Satan and evil spirits

Afterlife

God intervenes in the world

World was created by God

0 20 40 60 80
West 12-17 West 18-25 East 12-17 East 18-25

Source: Own computations based on the Shell youth study, 2006.

 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 273

Until now, we have focused on Christian religiosity. However, the

indicators we used are only suitable to a certain extent to disprove the
thesis of individualization of religion as proponents of this approach
assume that the change in religion increasingly manifests itself outside
religion and the Christian churches. Precisely these areas are particu-
larly difficult to grasp—measuring individualized religiosity is highly
contested both with respect to the range of identifiable objects as well
as its status as a religious and functional equivalent of religion. Thus,
it remains to be seen in how far astrology, homeopathy or even soccer,
celebrity cult or body cult can be considered to be religious.
Chart 10 lists some of the most common alternatives to Christian
religiosity. Indeed, initially we do not find the same pattern among
the age cohorts—the number of those agreeing with the statements
on belief in magic or astrology is highest among the youngest West
German groups. Wohlrab-Sahr (2009: 156) also discerned a somewhat
higher interest in magic, spiritualism and occultism based on the data
of the Bertelsmann religion monitor (only two thirds of the 18- to
29-year-olds as opposed to 80 percent of the entire population do not
believe in it). These data point to the fact that the youth are somewhat
more open to alternative religious phenomena. What set us think-
ing is the fact that (a) there is no systematic surplus of young adults,
(b) the highest number of those who are ‘modern’ according to the
individualization thesis and the largest number of individualized syn-
cretists (UR) is among the older age groups, and (c) the overall rate of
agreement remains low. This is confirmed by the fact that the extent
to which 12- to 25-year-olds believe in other alternative forms of faith
such as stars or telepathy is hardly any greater, as shown in Chart 10.
Particularly the East German youth are united in their refusal of all
forms of any kind of religious statement. As there is no (negative)
relation between the belief in these “alternative” forms of religiosity
and Christian religiosity, and as the self-assessment as a spiritual per-
son without religiosity hardly occurs in general and does not occur
to a greater extent among the younger groups compared to the older
age cohorts, we would argue that there is little evidence in favor of
a substitution of Christian religiosity by these non-Christian forms of
religiosity.
This is no final proof of the invalidity of the individualization the-
sis. According to Luckmann, private religiosity often expresses itself
invisibly to the observer. Thus, the means of the classic sociology of
religion do not suffice to detect it. This assumption may actually be
274 gert pickel

Chart 10. Non-Christian Religiosity in East and West Germany

According to Age
West Germany East Germany
Magic Astro Amu UR Magic Astro Amu UR
18–21 21 30 21 18 9 14 11 14
22–25 16 18 16 20 24 14 21 17
26–29 13 13 22 18 19 26 19 13
30–45 18 17 28 25 10 15 10 15
46–60 12 20 28 31 4 14 17 13
61++ 5 16 23 29 5 19 17 20
Overall 12 18 25 27 8 16 16 16
Source: Own computations based on C&R 2006; values indicate those agreeing with the
statement; Magic = belief in magic; Astro = belief in astrology; Amu = belief in amulets;
UR = my religious convictions stem from different lives.

true in part. But we also know that the social relevance of religion
has decreased among the youth and young adults due to the retreat of
religion into the private sphere. According to 70 percent of the 18- to
29-year-olds, life follows the laws of nature and nine out of ten believe
that they can find the meaning of life within themselves. Simply put:
young people make decisions pragmatically related to their everyday
lives here on earth rather than basing them on religious norms (which
may be rooted in the afterlife). Referring to the most recent Shell youth
study, Gensicke (2006: 234) considers the youth’s low assessment of
the belief in God to be the counterpart to their high assessment of
the quality of life of their earthly existence. Wohlrab-Sahr (2009: 160)
shows that “overall, those who are not religious rather belong to the
objective, rational type”.
Taking the high relation between bonding to the church, religious
practices and indicators of subjective religiosity into account (correla-
tion coefficient above p=.55, Pearson’s r), it seems rather improbable
for both young and older citizens to have a stable individual religiosity
which is entirely detached from their relation to the church. A large-
scale pluralization of religious lifestyles among the youth is more likely
to occur. In the long run, this will lead to a diffusion of faith, religious
indifference and even an inferior relevance of religion in the everyday
lives of the people. Thus, individualization is not a counter concept to
secularization. Rather, under the conditions of plural modernity, indi-
vidualization as a preliminary stage to secularization sums up current
trends more adequately.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 275

Religious Pluralization Among the German Youth and a Decline in

Values?
One of the main focuses of interest of current analyses in the field of
youth studies is the illustration of the above-mentioned plurality of pro-
cesses of religious group formation. On behalf of the youth association
of the German Catholics, the market research institute Sinus identi-
fied seven clearly distinguishable lifestyles among the youth aged 13 to
27 in 2007. Each of these related differently to religion and religiosity.
Based on their empirical analyses; the 2006 Shell study as well as Feige/
Gennerich (2008) conceptualized different types of varying lifestyles. If
we consider, for example, the results of the Sinus milieu study U27,
which are currently being discussed in the Catholic church, we notice a
change from rather traditional groups of the “traditionals”, “bourgeois”
or “consumption-oriented materialists” to ‘new’ social milieus of “exper-
imentalists” or “modern performers”. According to Sinus researchers,
particularly the pragmatic modern performers represent the main group
currently increasing in size among the German youth.
Their attitude toward religion is characterized by alternative move-
ments and a detachment from traditional Christian religion. They
feel superior to and distance themselves critically from the Christian
value system. According to the researchers, religious movements can
also be found among the “experimentalists”. However, these occur
mostly outside the Christian churches. In addition, interest in them
is often short-lived in the course of people’s lives, i.e. “experimental-
ists” as well as “modern performers” often pursue a secular course
when entering adulthood. In order to prevent misunderstandings,
I would like to highlight that almost all of the youth seek meaning in
life as well as a reduction in existential risks. However, there are fewer
and fewer of those who use the services provided by the organized
religions and the number of those who fall back on transcendental
solutions is shrinking.
Overall, it has become apparent that the number of members of
the groups who feel close to Christianity due to their socialization
(“traditionals”, “bourgeois”) is in decline while those social milieus
who detach themselves from the church and religion are growing. It
remains to be seen in how far milieus such as the “modern perform-
ers”, the “experimentalists” or the “post-materialists” bear the poten-
tial for individualized forms of religiosity. Clearly, most groups share
a critical or disinterested attitude toward institutionalized Christian
 276 gert pickel

Chart 11. Types of Religiosity Among the Youth—Sinus Milieu Study U27
Share in % Life Value Pattern Attitude toward the
church

Traditionals 4 Live a moral life Responsibility Great closeness

Have success in one’s Recognition Church as a
career Conformity community
Social embeddedness Sustenance of culture
Bourgeois 14 Participation in trends Conformity Simple membership
Be trendy and modern Materialism Church as the
In search of goals for Planning community of choice
the future
Consumption- 12 In search of social Materialism High indifference
Oriented acceptance and Self-sufficiency Practical detachment
Materialists contacts as well as Modernity
detachment from the
parents
Post-materialists 6 New thought forms, Self-realization Critical distance
discover new things, Idealism Selective choice of
be different, determine Authenticity church values
one’s own point of view Church has more
potential
Hedonists 26 Detachment + Self-realization High indifference
Resistance, create a Live one’s life Church is
refuge in one’s life Autonomy old-fashioned
Church is an
impediment
Modern 25 Pragmatic Pragmatism Defensive distance
Performers perspective and Market Feeling of superiority
openness for options, orientation Alternative approach
seek to be the best Flexibility
Experimentalists 14 In search of exotic and Creativity Indifference
eccentric experience of Provocation Church is not of
self-awareness Seek experience interest

Source: Own compilation; BDKJ-Journal 17: 3–4: 4, 6, 13.

religion. This result comes as no surprise due to the predominant

worldly and pragmatic orientation among the different social milieus
of the youth. In addition, there is hardly any interest in new forms of
religious expression.
Despite the inconsistency of terms which is quite common in life-
style research studies, we can compare the results of these three recent
youth studies. They all indicate a trend toward an emphasis or over-
emphasis of individualization and self-realization as the main values
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 277

Chart 12. Types of Religiosity Among the Youth

Sinus Milieustudy U27 Feige/Gennerich Shell Study Consequences for
2008 2008 2006 Religion and the church
13–27 Ca. 14–26 12–25
Traditionals Integrated Inconspicuous Religious in a Christian
sense, active in church
Status-seeking Passively religious, uncritical
membership
Bourgeois Religious in a Christian
sense, peripheral church
membership
Consumption-Oriented Materialists Detachment from religion,
Materialists worldly
Hedonists Disinterested in religion,
worldly
Modern Performers Autonomists Self-confident Detachment from the church
doers Open to religion, superior
detachment
Post-materialists Humanists Detachment from the
church, open to religion
Experimentalists Idealists Detachment from the church
Religiously indifferent and
searching
Source: Own compilation.

shared by the members of this generation across almost all social

milieus. It is almost inconceivable for the youth to justify personal
decisions with anything but a reference to individual decision-making.
In contrast, references to the necessity or social desirability of actions
or even religious reasons are no longer socially acceptable. The com-
munity is considered to be a realm of “accepted individualism” (Feige/
Gennerich 2008: 195). As indicated by the limited plurality of deter-
mined lifestyles, this does not imply that socio-structural relations
to society have disappeared. Rather, again and again, we find social
groups who share value patterns and modes of behavior that distin-
guish or even separate them from other lifestyle groups. The spread
of individualization in society is not to be equated with egoism or
isolation (see Beck 2008). It is a commonly shared value pattern which
influences everyone but does not necessarily distinguish them.
278 gert pickel

Consequently, we are not only witnessing a general process of

individualization in society, the processes of pluralization are also
characteristic of the situation of today’s youth in Germany. However,
the analysis of the different social milieus and lifestyles indicates an
increasing secularization in the sense of a loss of relevance of religion
in society. Particularly the groups with a pragmatic, worldly approach
to decision-making—and a predominantly areligious or indiffer-
ent attitude toward religion—are gaining members, while traditional
Christian groups are noticeably losing ground. At the same time, the
members of the new social milieus show only a limited or temporary
openness to movements searching for any kind of religiosity. Particu-
larly among young citizens, there are indications of a superior com-
bination of different religious offers in order to overcome existential
risks. However, due to the simultaneous inclusion of secular offers,
these lead to more secular vs. ‘somewhat’ religious persons in the long
run. The frequently cited “patchwork religion” is increasingly being
replaced by “patchwork secularity” which combines different, mostly
worldly, life coping strategies.
In contrast, another form of pluralization is apparently assert-
ing itself. In our introduction, we pointed out the increasing rel-
evance of religious orientations of migrants or their descendants.
Thus, the number of youth with a Muslim and Christian-orthodox
background is increasing (according to the Shell youth study 2006,
these accounted for nine percent of the youth). What is interesting
about this development is the fact that all surveys unanimously dis-
cern a remarkably higher degree of religiosity among the members
of these groups compared to the German youth (Gensicke 2006;
Raithel/Mrazek 2004). In the Shell youth study 2006, Gensicke (2006:
222–223) identifies a belief in a personal God among 48 percent of
the special sample of foreigners. This is about 17 percentage points
higher than the value in the West German sample and four times
higher than the value in the East German sample. As this group is
more traditional, we will witness the development of another group
in the medium term. This group will be characterized by a high religi-
osity but it will also differ in certain respects with regard to the value
patterns of the other social milieus. Currently, it is not foreseeable
how this will affect the religious landscape in the Federal Republic of
Germany. According to the findings of the religion monitor, at least
three quarters of the 18- to 29-year-olds in Germany consider them-
selves to be open to other religions (Ziebertz 2008: 51). This lets us
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 279

hope for a peaceful co-existence instead of a “Clash of Civilizations”

(Huntington 1996).
Do the decrease in religion and the cessation of the binding charac-
ter of Christian religious norms imply a decrease in values among the
German youth in modern times?
It should be noted that there is a widespread change in values which
has particularly affected the young generation which in turn has influ-
enced German society: at the end of the past millennium, rates of self-
realization largely displaced traditional values (peace and order). For
young people, their own position in life is a central issue and they seek
to determine it themselves. This also affects family values for example.
People have increasingly begun to determine values themselves instead
of being directed by others. Due to the emergence of economic prob-
lems in the past decade, many have taken on a pragmatic attitude and
take no issue with combining materialistic and conventional value
patterns (performance, success) with the individualistic goal of self-
realization. It is not without reason that the Shell study 2002 describes
today’s youth as a “pragmatic generation”. This also indicates that the
youth are primarily worldly oriented in modern times.
Gensicke’s remark with regard to the 15th Shell youth study is also
worth mentioning (2006: 173–175): moral values such as loyalty or
responsibility have gained in importance among the youth. “Believing
in something” has also become fashionable once again (in 2002 and
2006 at least 60 percent agreed). However, this refers to general values
and moral premises which are seldom related to religion or the church.
This leads to an utterly important conclusion: according to young Ger-
mans in East and West Germany, one can have morals without adher-
ing to a religion or being religious. Thus, in many cases, morals have
become detached from religion. This leads to similar values among the
religious and secular youth. In the meantime, formerly religious values
are passed on in society on a secular course and as part of a secular
understanding—if we apply a substantial, narrower concept of religi-
osity.15 Speaking with Pollack (2003): the German youth may indeed
continue to have religious questions (regarding the question of how

15
According to the functional concept of religiosity, many ways of dealing with
existential risks—be they transcendental, immanent or otherwise, are considered to be
religious. However, the discriminatory power of this approach is so low that it hardly
allows us to make statements which would permit us to lead discussions with regard
to a particular content.
 280 gert pickel

Chart 13. Values and Religiosity Among the Youth and Young Adults 2006
West Germany East Germany
Belief Divine Don’t Don’t Belief Divine Don’t Don’t
in God know believe in God know believe
Good family life 94 86 88 83 99 90 94 89
Diligence and ambition 83 82 79 77 93 80 82 85
Strive for security 85 81 81 72 86 75 86 82
Respect law and order 88 81 77 75 85 75 88 81
High living standard 65 65 65 64 61 72 67 67
Independence 83 87 83 86 87 87 82 87
Act environmentally 67 65 58 53 74 58 69 56
friendly
Enjoy life to the full 71 71 72 74 73 80 72 71
Help the socially 58 56 47 50 62 58 57 47
disadvantaged and
marginal groups
Source: Own computations, Shell study 2006; values on a scale from 1 to 7, values from 5 to 7 were
combined.

to overcome existential risks), however, seeking religious answers has

become much more rare. Consequently, secularization would not lead
to a loss of values but to a change in values at most. Compared to
the past, this change in values causes different issues to be relevant in
answering these questions of meaning. Less and less, transcendental
and religious explanations serve as answers even though they have not
disappeared entirely.16 However, in Germany, it is questionable, in how
far these values can take on a civil religious character (Bellah 1967).

Conclusion: The German Youth—Individualized, Pluralized, but no

Longer Religious

Concerning the religious practices of the youth and young adults in

Germany, we would like to maintain the following: in contrast to many
contrary reports in the media or even in some scientific publications,
the development of religiosity and bonding to the church among the
German youth and young adults hardly differs from the development
in the general population. Thus, we cannot simply speak of a return of

16
This leaves the option of assessing these new values to be negative from a norma-
tive perspective.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 281

religion among the youth. Even though the rates of church attendance
and religiosity are not the lowest among the youth compared to the
general population, this may not be interpreted as an increase in religi-
osity: only when they leave their parents does religiosity decrease among
the youth. This results from a number of factors: they no longer need
to fulfill their parents’ social desirability regarding their religious inte-
gration in church; the older they grow, the less concrete their image of
God; they are increasingly faced with the pluralism of a modern and
frequently secular society; they are confronted with the manifold chal-
lenges in the new phase of life of post-adolescence. When they enter
the phase of post-adolescence, young people do not become irreligious
over night. Instead, due to their newly won freedom of decision-mak-
ing, they can now draw their own conclusions from their doubts in the
(Christian) faith and the church (i.e. leave the church, attend church
service less frequently). Even though they may have had these doubts
before, they did not express or act upon them out of consideration for
their parents. This development is caused by a life-cycle effect which is
rooted in the social embeddedness of the youth.17
This does not imply that the religious thoughts and deeds do not dif-
fer across the generations. Compared to older citizens, young people
are far more open to syncretic and individualized forms of religiosity.
In this respect, the sphere of religion does not necessarily differ from
other social sub-systems such as politics or leisure time. According
to youth researchers’ results, the youth and young adults have always
been more open to try things. Individualization is an important indi-
cation of the development of individuals’ own identity, which they
often develop by distancing themselves from their parents. This in turn
leads to an experimental stage where the youth develop a high degree
of pluralization of lifestyles compared to society on the whole. Conse-
quently, different types of religiosity among the youth have been iden-
tified which reflect a fairly large range of religious movements. This
process of pluralization should not lead us to conclude that religion
is returning among the youth, as non-religious or atheist groups also

17
According to the life cycle, in the phase of parenthood, some people may return
to religion or even to church. This underlines the importance of parents’ socialization
as this usually occurs with reference to the religious traditions they were taught by
their parents. Frequently, peer groups prevent the manifestation of religious convic-
tions as the peers often avoid the topic of religiosity. The school as a religious social-
ization authority is mainly relevant with respect to religious knowledge.
282 gert pickel

contribute to this plurality of lifestyles.18 In addition, I did not confirm

the persistence of these patterns of orientation during the course of
people’s lives. Rather, frequently, they are intermediate religious stages
in a temporary experimental phase. Unlike researchers who assume that
these patterns can be used to predict future developments, I believe
that they do not necessarily lead to stable religious convictions. A lot
of the time, when leaving the phase of post-adolescence to become
a “full-blown” adult (for example because one has had a child), one
often returns to one’s parents religious traditions or becomes secular.
Thus, in the youth phase of life, invisible or alternative forms of
religiosity are more common than in the general population. However,
they are no serious substitute for the decrease in traditional religion.
Put differently: the current discontinuation of traditions in the religious
sector does not automatically lead to new forms of religion. Rather,
religious indifference increases. This does not imply that alternative
forms of transcendency or the necessity to provide for contingencies
will disappear entirely. Occasionally, they can gain a foothold in soci-
ety. However, while these groups establish themselves, the number of
those who choose an “exit-option” to leave religion also increases at
the same time.19 All of my observations indicate a continuous pro-
cess of secularization from one generation to the next. Even though
individualization does occur particularly among the youth and young
adults, most (but not all) of the time, this process is a transitional
phase resulting in a rather areligious or indifferent attitude toward
religion.
The discontinuation of Christian traditions, rituals and practices
precedes the loss of subjective religiosity. This particularly results from
the fact that the knowledge about the Christian religion as well as the
communal basis of religious traditions are increasingly vanishing. Thus,
we may hardly expect a return to religious patterns of interpretation if
people hardly or do not know what religion is and what it contains. At
least in West Germany, many religious Christian elements still exist,
as the process of secularization is not to be equated with the state of

18
Decisively antireligious attitudes which may be observed from time to time do
not have a great influence on the overall picture of religiosity among the youth as
many of those (temporally limited) viewpoints indicate rebellious behavior against the
parents. Here, the process of finding oneself—even within the framework of shared
peer groups—is particularly relevant.
19
At this point, we would like to add that Karel Dobbelaere (2002) believes a trans-
formation of religion, as well as a loss of faith describe possible future developments.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 283

secularity itself. However, the tension between the modern/modern-

izing world and one’s own religiosity causes religious knowledge and
religious faith to become more diffuse, leads to privatization without
social relations and reassurance of one’s faith, religious indifference,
and—in the end—to secularization.
In addition, it is likely for secularization to continue as socially
accepted world interpretations are secular and worldly. In a secular
environment and in everyday life, where religion is a private matter,
which is hardly ever shown in public, it is not only difficult to main-
tain and pass on religious traditions but it is also challenging to main-
tain and cultivate the belief in transcendency. Dobbelaere (2002: 169)
refers to this trend as “compartmentalization” and Casanova (1994)
considers this to effectively reflect the myth of secularization. Ziebertz
(2009: 79) points out that the “sacred canopy” of religion which used
to predominate is being replaced by a secular canopy. The “religious
spiral of silence”, which proved to be particularly common among the
youth and young adults, is indicative of this process. A lot of the time,
it is only possible to take a clear stance on religion, spirituality or tran-
scendency if they are fashionable or if they determine one’s identity in
opposition to conventional adults.
In line with this observation, Christian religiosity, which is consid-
ered to be old-fashioned, is in a particularly precarious situation as it
cannot hope for such processes to take place.20 This in turn explains
the temporally limited willingness to take part in occult groups, for
example. Thus, in the medium term, the “religious spiral of silence”
leads to a persistent discontinuation of traditions and thus furthers
secularization, as secularization in the minds leads to actual seculariza-
tion in the sense of a loss of relevance of religion in everyday life. Even
though these groups may continue to feel the need for religiosity in
order to be able to provide for contingencies, it is limited to the private
realm, it is not sustained socially and it is of secondary importance in
organizing everyday life.
Considering the German situation, we have to draw a distinction:
East Germany’s initial position differs from the West German context,
as the former part of the country has a culture of non-denominational
affiliation if not a lack of religiosity altogether (see also Wohlrab-Sahr

20
I do wonder, however, whether the profession of Christian faith in a largely non-
church related environment may in turn characterize an isolated position.
284 gert pickel

2009: 158–160; Pickel 2000). With regard to developments of religi-

osity, this context clearly differs from the culture of denominational
membership in West Germany. Particularly the massive erosion of
religious knowledge is a solid foundation for secularization in East
Germany. Other forms of providing for contingencies or of searching
for transcendency have not by any means replaced religiosity. Rather,
in everyday life, the majority of the youth and young adults can only
base their decisions on a rational, worldly interpretation of life. In
West Germany, religious convictions continue to exist culturally in
individualized rational decision-making processes thanks to processes
of socialization—even though these convictions are on the decline.
Concerning the future of East Germany, we assume that it will be a
non-religious area without Christian traditions. Single instances of a
return to Christian traditions are far outweighed by additional pro-
cesses of a discontinuation of traditions from generation to genera-
tion. So far, other kinds of beliefs have also failed to fill this gap.
These considerations show that we have to be careful when making
generalized statements regarding an almost fully individualized reli-
giosity among the youth and its indication of a return of religion. At
present, when making these statements, people often follow the trend
of identifying new religious developments in the “post-secular” (Hab-
ermas 2001) age rather than present truly new and helpful empirical
insights. Without a doubt, processes of individualization and plural-
ization occur across society. However, in the end, they usually (though
not always) lead to a greater indifference toward religion and have
actually never increased the number of religious persons in German
society. Surely, they lead to an erosion of Christian traditions and
practices and a decreasing relevance of religion in everyday life. This
limits but does not annihilate the probability of people falling back on
culturally acquired habits in times of personal crisis.21 The question
of overcoming existential risks and the question of the meaning of
life can but do not have to be answered religiously. Consequently, we
should not be misled by the large number of participants in religious
“mega-events” such as the World Youth Day by the Catholic church,
the German ecumenical church congress or highly frequented events

21
Youth religions—a highly debated topic in the 1970s and 1980s—or sects which
have continued to exist are too small to be of any major importance to the religious
landscape in Germany. Spectacular reports about the fate of individual members of
sects provide no indication of their social relevance.
 german youth: neither participants nor partakers? 285

by organizations such as “ProChrist”—currently, we cannot foresee a

return to religion among the German youth.

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 THE QUEST FOR RELIGIOUS PURITY IN NEW AGE,
EVANGELICALISM AND ISLAM
RELIGIOUS RENDITIONS OF DUTCH YOUTH AND THE
LUCKMANN LEGACY

Johan Roeland, Stef Aupers, Dick Houtman, Martijn de Koning

and Ineke Noomen

Introduction

Even though it is beyond doubt that the once virtually omnipresent

churched Christian religiosity has lost much of its former appeal in
particularly the Northwestern-European countries (e.g., Norris and
Inglehart, 2004), there are other and arguably more interesting stories
to tell about the fate of religion in the West than that of its inevitable
decline. These other stories address the changing shapes of religion
among the remaining faithful, and the younger generations among
them in particular (e.g., Achterberg et al., 2009).
To gain insight into religion’s changing character in the contem-
porary West, this article discusses contemporary religious discourses
and practices among youngsters in the Netherlands, where the Chris-
tian churches have lost even more of their former appeal and legiti-
macy than almost anywhere else in the Western world. Substantially,
we address New Age spirituality, Evangelicalism and Islam, the three
most popular, vital and visible strains of religion among contempo-
rary Dutch youth. The three are nowadays not only embraced much
more enthusiastically by the younger generations than any other type
of religion, but moreover attain some striking features in their hands
that serve to set them apart from the traditional types of church-based
or mosque-based religion embraced by older generations of faithful.
Research has indicated that in the Netherlands and most other
Western countries post-Christian spiritualities of life (‘New Age’) are
more popular among the younger generations than among the elderly
(Houtman and Aupers, 2007; Houtman and Mascini, 2002), while
in Christian circles Evangelicalism is the single type of religion that
today manages to arouse great enthusiasm among the young (Roeland,
2009). Although, needless to say, Evangelicalism is quite distinct from
290 johan roeland et al.

New Age spirituality and sets itself decidedly apart from it, we will see
that there are nevertheless striking resemblances between the two that
account for their popularity among the young. Likewise, the Islamic
discourses and practices found among particularly Moroccan-Dutch
youngsters, in particular those involved in Salafi networks, differ strik-
ingly from these of their parents and equally strikingly resemble what
we find among New Agers and Evangelicals.
From a theoretical point of view, the common features New Age,
Evangelicalism, and Islam attain in the hands of contemporary Dutch
youngsters highlight some major weaknesses in Thomas Luckmann’s
(1967) classical account of modern religion as radically privatized.
This is not without significance, because his The Invisible Religion is
arguably the most important book in sociology of religion since World
War II and has shaped sociology of religion more than any other book
during the last four decades.
Luckmann’s main argument is that, although structural differentia-
tion in modern society inevitably results in an erosion of the Christian
monopoly, this does not simply mean the end of religion. Instead, he
maintains, a ‘market of ultimate significance’ emerges, where religious
consumers shop for strictly personal packages of meaning that remain
without wider social and public significance. Ever since the appear-
ance of Luckmann’s book, accounts of modern religion as radically
privatized, fragmented and socially and publicly insignificant have
almost attained the status of sociological truisms. Modern religion has
hence endlessly been understood as ‘almost an exclusively psychologi-
cal phenomenon, with very limited and indirect social consequence’,
as Besecke (2005: 187) rightly points out, adding that ‘Luckmann’s
characterization of contemporary religion as privatized is pivotal in
the sociology of religion; it has been picked up by just about everyone
and challenged by almost no one’ (Ibid.: 186). We demonstrate in this
paper, however, that this is not at all what we find among young Dutch
New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims: their religion is neither ephem-
eral and superficial (section 2), nor socially unorganized (section 3),
nor publicly insignificant (section 4).
Luckmann’s book is hence just as much to be praised for its much-
needed widening of sociology of religion’s scope beyond the study
of firmly institutionalized Christian religion (Aupers and Houtman,
2009) as it is to be blamed for the relentless portrayal of modern reli-
gion as ‘socially insignificant’, ‘uncommitted’, and ‘strictly personal’.
Indeed, we will argue in this paper that the Luckmann legacy may have
 the quest for religious purity 291

blinded sociologists of religion to processes of religious revitalization

and rejuvenation that are taking place right before their eyes in West-
ern countries like the Netherlands. Although, needless to say, much
more research is needed to draw up a fair balance of the empirical
correctness of the Luckmann legacy, we underscore that what follows
is based on years of empirical research in each of the three religious
subcultures in the Netherlands (e.g., Aupers, 2004; Aupers and Hout-
man, 2006; Bartels and De Koning, 2006; De Koning, 2008a; Houtman
and Aupers, 2007; Houtman and Mascini, 2002; Noomen et al., 2006;
Roeland, 2008, 2009).

Religious Privatization or Religious Purification?

New Age Spirituality: ‘Eternal Spiritual Wisdom’

Ever since the appearance of Luckmann’s book New Age spirituality
has been understood as, the best example of a modern type of reli-
gion that constitutes nothing more than an incoherent collection of
strictly personal spiritual ideas and practices. Participants in the spiri-
tual milieu, it has been repeated again and again, tend to draw upon
multiple traditions, styles and ideas simultaneously, combining these
into idiosyncratic packages. New Age has thus been understood as a
‘consumer religion par excellence’ (Possamai, 2005: 49), ‘pick-and-mix
religion’ (Hamilton, 2000), ‘do-it-yourself religion’ (Baerveldt, 1996)
or a ‘spiritual supermarket’ (Lyon, 2000). Every single person in the
spiritual milieu, Possamai maintains, constructs a ‘subjective myth’ and
it is as if ‘every human being should have his own paradigm’ (2005:
57) , while Steve Bruce (2002: 99) characterized New Age as a ‘diffuse
religion’, noting that ‘there is no (. . .) power in the cultic milieu to
override individual preferences’.
These relentless portrayals of New Age spirituality as religiously
incoherent blatantly miss the shared and undisputed discourse of
‘self-spirituality’ in the holistic milieu, a discourse that paradoxically
demands and hence produces these omnipresent practices of individ-
ual bricolage. Ironically, then, these practices stem from a shared and
morally binding religious discourse that insists that one should ‘follow
one’s personal path’ and ‘listen to one’s inner voice’, rather than ‘prov-
ing’ its non-existence (Aupers and Houtman, 2006). This uncontested
discourse of ‘self-spirituality’ postulates that the sacred cannot be
found ‘out there’, like the transcendent personal God of Christianity
292 johan roeland et al.

or Islam, but rather ‘in here’ (Heelas and Houtman, 2009). In Heelas’
(1996: 19) words: ‘[. . .] the most pervasive and significant aspect of the
lingua franca of the New Age is that the person is, in essence, spiritual.
To experience the ‘Self’ itself is to experience ‘God’, ‘the Goddess’,
the ‘Source’, ‘Christ Consciousness’, the ‘inner child’, the ‘way of the
heart’, or, most simply and [. . .] most frequently, ‘inner spirituality’’
(emphasis in original). Put crudely, then, New Agers believe that peo-
ple do not have one, but two selves: they contrast a ‘mundane’, ‘con-
ventional’, ‘unnatural’ or ‘socialized’ self, demonized as the ‘false’ or
‘unreal’ product of society and its institutions, with a ‘higher’, ‘deeper’,
‘true’, ‘natural’, ‘authentic’ or ‘spiritual’ self.
This spiritual self is conceived as laying hidden behind, beyond, or
underneath the mundane self, residing in the deeper emotional lay-
ers of consciousness and understood as representing the person one
‘really’ or ‘at deepest’ is. It is believed to be intimately tied up with a
universal power, life force or energy (mostly referred to as ‘ki’ or ‘chi’)
that holistically permeates and connects ‘all’, that is, nature, society,
and the cosmos. One’s feelings, intuitions, and experiences are under-
stood as emanations of this spiritual self, so that acting according to
them is understood as connecting to this whole. According to New
Agers, one should hence ‘follow one’s heart’: do what ‘feels good’ and
refrain from what ‘feels bad’. ‘The basic idea’, again in Paul Heelas’
words (1996: 23), ‘is that what lies within—experienced by way of
‘intuition’, ‘alignment’ or an ‘inner voice’—serves to inform the judg-
ments, decisions and choices required for everyday life’. In New Age
spirituality, in short, taking one’s personal feelings and intuitions seri-
ously is conceived as bringing life into line with who one ‘essentially’
or ‘at deepest’ is, and consequently as connecting to ‘all that exists’ (see
also Hanegraaff, 1996).
This New Age discourse understands established religious tradi-
tions as flawed and alienating renditions of this eternal spiritual truth,
because these have buried the latter under layers of dogma and doc-
trine, imposed upon the laity by powerful and dogmatic priesthoods.
Religious traditions are as such not rejected tout court, but rather seen
as placing too much emphasis on ritual conformity and institutional
side issues, while ‘deep down’ they all refer to this same eternal and
universal spiritual wisdom. In effect, New Age understands established
religious traditions and institutions as alienating and misleading to
the extent that they define themselves as conflicting with and superior
to one another. They are seen as ‘manmade’ and hence ‘artificial’ and
 the quest for religious purity 293

‘inauthentic’ corruptions that have subordinated the eternal spiritual

wisdom to institutional interests (Hanegraaff 1996: 325). Practices
of individual bricolage are hence rooted in the so-called philosophia
perennis or ‘perennial philosophy’ that stems from Western esoteri-
cism and maintains that ‘there are many paths, but just one truth’.

Evangelicalism: ‘Going One’s Own Way with God’

Something similar goes for Protestant Evangelicalism. The conviction
that faith is primarily and eventually exclusively about the ‘heart of
the believer’, i.e., about personal commitment rather than mere con-
formity to religious institutions, of course is and always has been a
decisive feature of Protestantism. Although this emphasis on the heart
of the believer has not prevented Protestantism from accepting all
sorts of mediations between God and the individual, the conscious-
ness and faith of the ‘single individual’ (Weber 2002[1930]: 60) and
his or her immediate and unmediated relationship to God have always
constituted Protestantism’s single locus of practice and belief, in effect
downplaying the relevance of supra-individual mediations and insti-
tutions (Keane, 2007). Evangelicalism, embraced enthusiastically by
many young Dutch Protestants today, epitomizes and radicalizes this
decisive feature of Protestantism (Roeland, 2009).
Contemporary Dutch Evangelicalism emphasizes the individual
believer’s personal relationship with God as the core of faith, not infre-
quently as a reaction to a firmly institutionalized Protestantism that is
held to be too much preoccupied with the organization of the church
or the righteousness of dogma. Much like New Agers, Evangelicals
hence feature a Jamesian aversion to—or, at the very least, relativiza-
tion of—the ecclesiastical organization of faith. ‘It is all’, to quote a
respondent from Roeland’s (2009) study of Evangelical youngsters in
the Netherlands, ‘about your personal life. It is not about the church
you attend. It is all about your personal relationship with God. Your
personal relationship with Jesus. Your personal relationship with the
Holy Spirit.’ This young man exemplifies the Evangelical conviction
that church authorities and dogmas are subordinated to the individual
believer’s faith and his or her personal relationship with God. Faith is,
to quote another respondent, primarily about ‘going one’s own way
with God’ and the compass to guide one on one’s path is found in
one’s personal feelings and experiences rather than in the authority of
the church and its religious doctrines.
294 johan roeland et al.

Contemporary Dutch Evangelicalism pushes the typically Protestant

impetus towards the ‘purification’ of religion to its limits, spawning a
radical religious individualism, i.e., an authentication of unmediated,
experiential faith and a primacy of the epistemological principle of
the authority of the self (Campbell, 2007: 344 ff; Van Harskamp, 2000;
Versteeg, 2009). Given this emphasis on personal feelings and experi-
ences it is hardly surprising that spokesmen (spokeswomen can hardly
be found in these circles) of more traditional and conservative strains
of churched Protestantism point out Evangelicalism’s resemblance to
the type of New Age spirituality discussed above. They observe that
Evangelicalism, just like New Age, encourages practices of ‘bricolage’
and ‘pick ‘n’ choose religion’ and lament its detrimental consequences,
particularly the erosion of church authority and dogma. The conser-
vative Protestant theologian Horton, for instance, was quoted in the
Dutch orthodox Protestant newspaper Het Reformatorisch Dagblad
(January 9, 2008) as saying that he considered Evangelicals ‘religious
zappers’, who ‘compose their own religious cocktail, which is drenched
by emotionalism’. Orthodox observers like Horton hence suggest that
the Evangelical search for authentic and purified faith ends up in mere
hyper-individual subjective preferences (Cotton, 1995), similar to the
portrayal of New Age as radically fragmented and individualized in
the sociological literature.

A Quest for Pure Islam

Contemporary renditions of Islam as found among Moroccan-Dutch
youth feature a similar quest for religious purity beyond established
Islamic traditions and institutions. Already from the 1990s onwards,
researchers have witnessed an increasing salience of Muslim iden-
tity and Islam among Moroccan-Dutch youth (e.g., Bartelink, 1994;
Buitelaar, 2002; Phalet, Lotringen, and Entzinger, 2000; Sunier, 1996),
understood back then as an attempt to escape the impossible choice
between ‘being Moroccan’ and ‘being Dutch’ (De Koning, 2008a;
Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2006; Ketner, 2008). This strategy backfired
however when after ‘9/11’ the focus of media and politics shifted to
Islam and Muslims and their alleged lack of loyalty, and even threat, to
Dutch society (Vliegenthart, 2007). Since then, Islam has increasingly
been portrayed as prone to terrorism, intolerance, and oppression of
women, and Moroccan-Dutch youth feel that they have come to be
treated less willingly by the native Dutch. This situation only aggra-
 the quest for religious purity 295

vated after Pim Fortuyn’s election campaign and subsequent assassina-

tion in 2002; public statements by critics of Islam like Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
Theo van Gogh, and Geert Wilders; the release of Hirsi Ali’s anti-Islam
movie Submission in 2004 and finally the murder of Van Gogh in that
same year.
In short, Moroccan-Dutch youth have increasingly come to expe-
rience the Dutch Islam debate as a struggle against their religion,
which forces them to once again make an impossible choice—this
time between ‘being Muslim’ and ‘being Dutch’. This has made them
increasingly self-conscious about their religious identity and has drawn
them into debates about ‘what Islam really says’ about, for instance,
violent attacks against non-believers, homosexuality, the position of
women, living as a Muslim in a non-Islamic country, and so on. In
this context, the Islam of their parents has lost its ‘self-evidence’ and
‘naturalness’ and their own Islamic identities are increasingly actively
constructed and negotiated. This applies to girls in particular, because
much more than boys they find their behavior and attire scrutinized
by other Dutch Moroccans and the native Dutch alike. They challenge
the latter’s stereotypes of ‘oppressed Muslim women’ and criticize the
gender inequalities they experience in their relations with the former.
More than anything else, the increased salience of Islamic identi-
ties among Dutch Muslim youth has spawned a quest for ‘real’ or
‘true’ Islam, understood as more ‘pure’ than the compromised and
particularistic Islam preached in most Dutch mosques. The latter is
understood as diluting the message of ‘true’ Islam in such a way that
it ‘offends neither God nor the West’, thus compromising ‘true’ Islam
by selling out in exchange for financial subsidies or mere approval of
the Dutch authorities. Differences between various strains of Islam in
the Netherlands, a consequence of immigration from various Islamic
countries (particularly Morocco and Turkey) and regions with distinct
cultural and religious traditions, undermine the plausibility and legiti-
macy of each of these even further. If young Muslims find out from
their classmates that, for instance, ‘Moroccan Islam’ differs in crucial
ways from ‘Turkish Islam’, it becomes quite clear to them that these
cannot both claim to represent ‘true Islam’.
Precisely this awareness sparks a desire to separate truth from falsity
that results in a process of religious ‘purification’ that is not unlike
what we find among New Agers and Evangelicals. Because the estab-
lished traditions and institutions are different among themselves, they
come to be understood as shaped by historically grown traditions
296 johan roeland et al.

and/or (in the case of Islam) national cultures, and hence as ‘false’
and ‘inauthentic’. In the case of Islam, this spawns strongly felt needs
among Moroccan-Dutch youth to disentangle national culture and
Islam, resulting in an ongoing purification of their cultural repertoires.
Needless to say, this quest for ‘pure’ Islam is accompanied by major
debates and conflicts about who interprets Islam ‘correctly’ and hence
represents ‘the truth’—particularly between youth on the one hand
and their parents and, more generally, the older generation of Dutch
Muslims, on the other (De Koning, 2008a).
This search for ‘true’ and ‘pure’ Islam is particularly salient among
those who adhere to Salafism, an Islamic purification movement that
has been active throughout the ages. It stresses the doctrine of the
unity and uniqueness of God, or tawhid, as its main tenet and claims
that the golden period of Islam ended after the first three generations
of Muslims (around 810 AD), referred to as the ‘pious forefathers’
(al-salaf al-salih) (Meijer, 2009). The Salafi movement wants to revital-
ize Islam on the basis of an idealized and homogenized understanding
of Islam as it existed in its early years, aiming to cleanse its contempo-
rary manifestations from allegedly non-Islamic accretions like Sufism,
Shi’a Islam, and local practices and doctrines held to have diluted and
sullied its true message (Meijer, 2009). The Salafi movement is nowa-
days decidedly transnational, consists of local and global branches,
and is characterized by a network structure. Although Salafi networks
all share the doctrine of the unity and uniqueness of God, they differ
widely in their strategies that may, depending on local circumstances,
range from quietist to political and sometimes violent activities of
da’wa—mission—and jihad (De Koning, 2009b).
Not unlike what we have seen for New Age and Evangelicalism,
many elderly first-generation Dutch Muslims accuse their Salafist off-
spring of creating massively individualized renditions of Islam through
copy-pasting texts from Islamic scholars and the Quran, and sometimes
also secular political ideologies. They regard the resulting pastiches as
outcomes of a fatal combination of all-too-easy Internet access (and
hence access to a world of sources), ignorance about Islamic tradi-
tions, and emotional outrage about local and global Muslim predica-
ments. National Muslim organizations (Nederlandse Moslim Raad,
2007), intelligence and security services (AIVD, 2006) and research-
ers (Meijer, 2006) nonetheless understand these youthful practices of
copy-pasting as creating a dangerously radicalized Islam.
 the quest for religious purity 297

Although the quest for ‘pure’ Islam is not restricted to the Salafist
movement, the latter has been the most successful in attracting Dutch
Muslim youth, Moroccan-Dutch in particular. This is because the
Salafist movement not only teaches its doctrines and practices, but also
carves out a social space where Muslim youth can feel accepted and
can express, nurture and enhance their faith (imaan), which is under-
stood as being endangered by secular Western society. Participants of
the movement typically conceive of their identities in terms of a con-
version from ‘sleeping Muslims’ to ‘returning to Islam’, with Salafism
offering the latter in its ‘real’, ‘authentic’, and ‘unpolluted’ form.

Religious Purity beyond Traditions and Institutions

Young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims all feature a critical
stance vis-à-vis established religious traditions and institutions. They
understand these as ‘manmade’ and hence ‘artificial’ and ‘inauthentic’
renditions of a ‘pure’ and ‘eternal’ religious or spiritual truth. New
Agers embrace the perennialist understanding that all religious tra-
ditions are essentially perverted and distorted versions of the eternal
spiritual wisdom that can be found within the self; young Evangeli-
cals want to go beyond the church and its dogmas to establish a per-
sonal and unmediated relationship with God; young Salafist Muslims,
finally, are critical of the culturalized religions of their parents and aim
to return to ‘pure’ Islam.
It is clear that these religious purification processes do not entail the
strictly personal, ephemeral, uncommitted, and superficial religiosities
emphasized in the Luckmann legacy. They do, after all, not so much
entail moves away from established religious traditions and institu-
tions to less committing positions, but rather moves beyond these to
more committing ones. They entail, in other words, a search for eternal
and solidly grounded religious truths that lie beyond the flawed and
particularistic institutions and traditions in the real world. This is not
a postmodern flight to the surface (Jameson, 1991; Possamai, 2005),
but a quest for ‘solid’, ‘deep’ and ‘real’ foundations in a world ruined
by religious complacency and shiftlessness.
298 johan roeland et al.

Sociality beyond Church and Mosque

Introduction
The second major assumption of Luckmann’s The Invisible Religion is
that contemporary religion lacks social organization. The implicit point
of reference here is, of course, the Christian church with its strong
social grip on its members. After the loss of the Christian monopoly
in the West, Luckmann maintains, institutionalized Christianity made
way for an open spiritual marketplace in which individuals could seek
for spiritual meaning. Just like Luckmann’s assumption of contempo-
rary religion as ephemeral and fragmented, this dichotomy between
‘thick’ and ‘greedy’ religious institutions that sustain social cohesion
on the one hand and freely roaming and socially disembedded individ-
uals on the other is also taken for granted in much of the literature.

Networked Sociality
Notwithstanding their aversion to particularistic religious traditions
and ‘thick’ religious institutions, however, the spiritual and religious
quests of young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims are certainly
not socially detached ones. New Agers, for instance, relentlessly seek
for spiritual inspiration at festivals that are the Dutch equivalents of
better-known international ones like Body-Mind-Spirit (United King-
dom) or Burning Man (United States); they visit spiritual centers
(Aupers, 2005), of which Glastonbury (Scotland) is the internation-
ally best-known example; they participate in discussion groups about
New Age bestsellers like The Celestine Prophecy or The Secret; and they
participate in group trainings and courses where they intimately sup-
port one another and experience ‘inner spirituality’ in a, quite literally,
collective embrace. In a similar vein, young Evangelicals visit musical
events and large festivals in the Netherlands, where they sing, dance,
praise the lord and experience ‘togetherness’, ‘sociality’ and ‘collec-
tive effervescence’ in a truly Durkheimian fashion. And although the
search for ‘pure’ Islam leads young Muslims away from the mosques
and imams of their parents, it simultaneously reunites them into all
sorts of discussion groups, loosely-knit networks and online commu-
nities on the Internet, as well as in lecture circles and Islamic courses
in people’s homes (De Koning, 2008a, 2009b).
In contemporary Dutch religion we are hence not so much witness-
ing the withering away of the social, as the Luckmann legacy suggests,
 the quest for religious purity 299

but rather the radical transformation of its organizational forms (cf.

Maffesoli, 1996). Young New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims are
connected through and embedded in networked forms of sociality.
They are all three particularly strongly present as virtual communi-
ties on the Internet and New Agers (neo-pagans in particular) were
even among the ‘first religious subcultures to colonize cyberspace’
(Davis, 1998: 184). In these online communities they exchange infor-
mation, shape and re-affirm their pagan identities and even perform
collective online rituals (e.g., Noomen et al., 2006; Penzack, 2001;
Radde-Antweiler, 2006). Some of them even consider the Internet
their ‘church—in lack of a better word’ (Nightmare, 2001). Likewise,
Evangelicals and Muslims (Becker, 2008; Benschop, 2005; De Koning,
2008b) use web forums and chat groups to exchange ideas, to ‘bond’
and ‘bridge’ and to express and re-affirm their religious identities.
The Internet provides young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and
Muslims the opportunity to immerse themselves in social networks
without losing their personal freedom, in short. As one of the pagan
respondents of Macha Nightmare (2001: 65) notes: “If I want to learn
about spirituality and have access to the Internet, I will be drawn to
choose bits from a large number of sources, rather than taking all
my information from one source. The resulting mix will be uniquely
my own, rather than something dictated by an individual tradition.”
Online networked types of sociality hence do not entail the strict social
obligations of traditional communities. They are of a more voluntary
nature and people can easily join in and leave as they wish. It is up
to individual believers to decide on the degree and nature of their
engagement; one may stick to a particular chat room and become a
loyal visitor, or may visit it only occasionally while surfing the web.
Although these ‘light’ organizational forms clearly differ markedly
from firmly organized churches and mosques, it is equally clear that
they contradict the notion that contemporary religion outside the
boundaries of these established institutions entails nothing more than
individuals who ‘do their own thing’ in splendid isolation of like-
minded others (Besecke, 2005). These social forms are simply better
adapted to these contemporary strains of religion, that all feature a
marked aversion to established religious traditions and institutions.
Even though Evangelicalism is often organized in churches besides
the aforementioned types of organization, these are no longer (what
Weber has called) ‘hierocratic’ organizations, i.e., bodies characterized
by a top-down, hierarchical structure and governed by authoritative
300 johan roeland et al.

leaders with much power to control the community of believers. And

even though the Salafi movement consists of several competing, and
sometimes even plainly hostile, networks characterized by fission and
fusion, each of these nonetheless features striking ideals of friendship,
brotherhood and sisterhood (De Koning, 2009a). Contemporary quests
for religious purity are, in short, no tragically isolated and privatized
activities on a ‘market of ultimate significance’.
The networked sociality that constitutes the major social shape of
religion among Dutch religious youth is easily overlooked by sociolo-
gists of religion, because it transcends the dichotomy between ‘thick’
and ‘greedy’ religious institutions on the one hand and self-contained
and socially disembedded individuals on the other—a dichotomy that
is not only central to Luckmann’s classical analysis, but also to much of
classical and modern sociology in general (Maffesoli, 1996). We hence
conclude with Besecke (2005) that beyond this increasingly inappli-
cable dichotomy, there are vibrant social conversations about religion
and spirituality going on that need to be taken much more seriously
than sociologists of religion have typically done in the past.

Pure Religion’s Social and Public Significance

The third claim that undergirds Luckmann’s privatization thesis is

that modern religion remains firmly embedded in the private domain
and hence lacks social and public significance (see also Bruce, 2002;
Wilson, 1976). Again, this is not what we find among young Dutch
New Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims. Although they no longer con-
sider the demands made by particularistic religious traditions and
their institutions legitimate, so that these have lost their ability to
guide them in deciding the type of lives they need to live, this does not
mean that religion tout court has lost its ability to do so. Indeed, for
the new religious purists, the ethical demands made by ‘pure’ religion
or spirituality have replaced these made by fossilized traditions and
institutions, motivating them even more than the latter to live their
lives according to these. Entailing a revitalization and rejuvenation of
religion, religious purification hence endows religion with new and
increased moral fervor.
This is even the case with New Age, allegedly the most privatized and
least socially significant religion of the three cases under study (e.g.,
Bruce, 2002). The demand of being true to the inner self, of taking
 the quest for religious purity 301

one’s feelings, emotions, and intuitions seriously, means after all that
basically everything—from sexuality to work—attains spiritual mean-
ing and significance, making this type of religion even more difficult to
expel from the public domain than traditional churched Christianity.
“Indeed there would seem to be no activity, no matter how prosaic,
whether it be gardening, flower arranging, or even shopping, that is
not now being presented [. . .] as if it were also a spiritual exercise,
something capable of leading to self-discovery and personal growth”,
Colin Campbell rightly notes (2007: 37). The social and public signifi-
cance of New Age spirituality that results from such an ‘essentially
spiritual approach to life’ (Ibid.: 38) is particularly visible in the major
role it has meanwhile come to play in the worlds of human resource
management and business leadership (Aupers and Houtman, 2006;
Costea et al., 2007).
The same goes for Evangelicalism: the experience of God’s con-
tinuous presence in one’s personal life spawns a strongly felt need
to let Him guide one in all of one’s life—in socializing with others,
in selecting a spouse, in making choices in one’s education or pro-
fessional career, etcetera (Roeland, 2009). Much of Evangelicalism’s
increased visibility and vitality in the Dutch religious landscape takes
the shape of a call for re-establishing religion as a moral resource for
politics. Indeed, a recent analysis of Dutch survey data covering the
period 1970–1996 demonstrates that while the number of Christians
has declined steadily in this country, this process has coincided with
a strengthening of the call for religious de-privatization and hence a
larger role for religion in politics (Achterberg et al., 2009). Although it
yet needs to be demonstrated that the latter trend is due to the Evan-
gelicalism found among young Protestants, the latter are clearly much
less likely than other and older Christians to accept the ‘secularist
truce’—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom, yet
bans religion from the public sphere by relegating it to the private
realm (see also Taylor, 2007).
The young generation of Moroccan-Dutch Muslims, finally, is also
much more occupied with their religious identity than the older gen-
erations. Their quest for a purified Islam motivates them, too, to color
more and more aspects of their private and public lives with their
newly found pure Islam. It is a mere commonplace that Salafism in
particular asserts the public relevance of ‘true’ Islam for law and poli-
tics in western societies. Although most Salafi networks were quietist
until 2000, they meanwhile feature prominently in the media and in
302 johan roeland et al.

political debates about Islam and radicalization. While the ongoing

Dutch Islam debate has almost by definition turned Islam into a pub-
lic religion by making every single articulation of Islam a matter of
public debate (Buijs, 2009; Buitelaar, 2008; De Koning, 2008a; Vliegen-
thart, 2007), the quest for ‘pure’ Islam in particular troubles opinion
leaders who regard it as invariably radical, violent and intolerant (e.g.,
Hirsi Ali, 2007). As the principal targets of these critiques, Salafi orga-
nizations have been further stimulated to defend themselves against
these charges by secular and anti-Islamic critics and to speak out for
instance, about proposals to ban the face veil (niqab) or about Dutch
foreign policies (De Koning, 2009b).
If we understand secularization in classical Weberian terms, i.e.,
as a decline of the influence of religious worldviews on social action
(Chaves, 1994), we must conclude that the purification of religion
invokes processes of de-secularization—processes that contradict the
claim that contemporary religion remains firmly embedded in the
private domain and lacks social and public significance. The purified
religious worldviews of young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals and
Muslims are after all highly salient to them and as such motivate them
to make major efforts to live their private and public lives accordingly.
Religious purification, in short, works against religious privatization
by spawning processes of de-secularization and de-privatization.

Conclusion: In Search of Religious Purity

After their path-breaking joint book The Social Construction of Reality

(1966), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann went different ways in the
sociological study of religion with The Sacred Canopy (Berger, 1967)
and The Invisible Religion (Luckmann, 1967). While they agreed about
the erosion of the Christian monopoly and the concomitant emer-
gence of religious pluralism, they disagreed about the latter’s implica-
tions for the future of religion. Berger heralded the coming of a secular
age and Luckmann expected merely religious change. According to
Berger, who assumed that the existence of competing or even incom-
patible religious truth claims would undermine the plausibility of each
of the competitors, religious pluralism would result in secularization.
According to Luckmann, as explained above, religion does not—and
indeed cannot—disappear, though it does disappear from the public
domain and become privatized.
 the quest for religious purity 303

While our research among young Dutch New Agers, Evangelicals

and Muslims confirms that firmly institutionalized particularistic reli-
gious traditions have become less plausible and legitimate, it also sug-
gests that both Berger’s and Luckmann’s ideas about the consequences
of this circumstance for the future of religion are flawed. Among reli-
gious Dutch youth, religious pluralism after all invokes neither radi-
cally privatized, ephemeral, uncommitted, and superficial religiosities
(Luckmann), nor a full-out collapse of religious faith and a transition
to secularism (Berger). Rather than a flight away from religious tradi-
tions and institutions towards either socially uncommitted ‘consumer
religions’ (Luckmann) or a secularist outlook (Berger), we find zealous
quests for ‘real’ and ‘pure’ religious truths that are solidly founded
beyond the existing range of ‘implausible’ and ‘inauthentic’ religious
traditions and institutions.
It is particularly striking to find that contemporary religious move-
ments as far apart as New Age and Islamic Salafism have this hunt for
‘real’ or ‘pure’ religion in common. The two have after all often been
portrayed as diametrically opposed extremes on a continuum rang-
ing from respectively socially uncommitted relativism and individual-
ism to blindly committed absolutism and collectivism (e.g., Bauman,
1997). And although there is no doubt that they are in many ways
radically different, they are nonetheless basically identical in their
understanding of historically grown and manmade religious tradi-
tions and institutions. They both conceive of the latter as degenerated,
diluted and distorted renditions of the ‘real’ religious truth, which has
become buried under institutional side issues, and hence as flawed,
corrupted and perverted excuses for the original, imposed upon the
laity by corrupted regimes and priesthoods that are more interested
in power than in religious piety and purity.
Despite his classical analysis of the progressive disenchantment
of the world, the resulting processes of religious purification in New
Age, Evangelicalism and Islam alike are consistent with Max Weber’s
(1963[1922]) sociology of religion, in particular his ideas about ‘cul-
tural rationalization’ (Campbell, 2007). Weber’s sociology of religion
after all assumes a universal human need of giving meaning to an
essentially meaningless world and is hence based on a conception
of culture as ‘the endowment of a finite segment of the meaningless
infinity of events in the world with meaning and significance from the
standpoint of human beings’ (Schroeder, quoted by Campbell 2007:
11). If religion loses its plausibility, it is hence not simply discarded,
304 johan roeland et al.

but a process of religious reconstruction is sparked so as to regain

lost religious plausibility (Campbell, 2007). Such a process of ‘ratio-
nalization’ is precisely what we find in progress among young New
Agers, Evangelicals and Muslims in the Netherlands. Exactly because
today’s religiously pluralist world embarrassingly exposes the particu-
larisms of a wide range of Islamic, Christian and other religious tradi-
tions and institutions, these lose their binding power, as Berger (1967)
and Luckmann (1967) were both right to emphasize. This does how-
ever not produce a turn away from religious committedness, but rather
a zealous hunt for ‘real’ religious truth in New Age, Evangelicalism
and Islam alike, whatever the further differences between the three
may be.

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 RELIGION AND YOUTH IN CROATIA

Dinka Marinović Jerolimov and Boris Jokić

Social and Religious Context of Youth Religiosity in Croatia

During transitional periods, the post-communist countries of Central

and Eastern Europe shared several common characteristics regarding
religious change. These can be roughly summarized as the influence
of religion during the collapse of the communist societal system; the
revitalization of religion and religiosity; a national/religious revival;
an increase in the number of new religious movements; the politiciza-
tion of religion and “religionization” of politics; and the aspirations of
churches to regain positions they held in the pre-Communist period
(Borowik, 1997, 1999; Hornsby-Smith, 1997; Robertson, 1989; Michel,
1999; Vrcan, 1999). In new social and political circumstances, the posi-
tion of religion, churches, and religious people significantly changed
as these institutions became increasingly present in public life and the
media, as well as in the educational system. After a long period of
being suppressed to the private sphere, they finally became publicly
“visible”. The attitude of political structures, and society as a whole,
towards religion and Churches was clearly reflected in institutional
and legal arrangements and was thus reflected in the changed social
position of religious communities.
These phenomena, processes and tendencies can be recognized
as elements of religious change in Croatia as well. This particularly
refers to the dominant Catholic Church, whose public role and impor-
tance in society significantly increased in the post-communist period.
Several factors have been particularly influential in this respect: the
openness and positive discourse of the leading political structures
towards religion and particularly the Catholic Church;1 the activity

1
Between 1996 and 1998 the Republic of Croatia and The Holy See have regulated
the status and activities of the Catholic Church in Croatia under the following inter-
national agreements: the Treaty on spiritual instruction of Catholic believers who are
members of the armed forces and police services of the Republic of Croatia, the Treaty
on co-operation in education and culture, the Treaty on legal issues, and the Treaty
308 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

and the role of the Catholic Church in the struggle for the indepen-
dence and international recognition of Croatia; the role and activity
of the Catholic Church and other religious communities during and
after the 1990–1995 war; and the accompanying national and religious
homogenization.
Although religious tradition has been reaffirmed as a part of cul-
tural and social life in the new social and political circumstances, the
revitalization of religion in Croatia did not occur through the rapid
expansion of some form of religion à la carte, or religious bricolage.
On the contrary, it has been developed within a framework of re-tradi-
tionalisation, re-totalisation and re-collectivisation (Vrcan, 1999) and
has resulted in a substantial increase of declared traditional church
religiosity, especially Catholicism. This increase appeared to be the
dominant characteristic of religious change in Croatia during the last
decade of the 20th century. This change was evident in the 2001 Cen-
sus, where 88% of Croatian citizens declared themselves as Catholics,
as well as in religious research from 2004,2 where 89% of respondents
declared themselves as Catholics, 78% stated themselves religious, 94%
were baptized, 85% had first communion, 83% had a religious upbring-
ing in the family, 82% believed in God and 27% regularly went to
church (Marinović Jerolimov, 2005). These results confirmed the level
of religiosity established during the 1990s amongst the adult and youth
population as well (Črpić & Kušar, 1998; Marinović Jerolimov, 1999,
2000; Zrinšćak, Črpić, & Kušar, 2000).3
The religious research efforts carried out in Croatia in the last two
decades clearly indicate that youth express significantly greater religi-
osity after the 1990s than during communism. According to the com-
parative analysis of research from 1986 and 1999,4 religious affiliation,
religious self-identification, religious beliefs, and religious practice
significantly increased amongst young people (Goja, 2000; Marinović

on economic issues. Later, the Croatian Government signed the agreement on mutual
interest with 13 other religious communities in 2002/2003.
2
This refers to the research Social and religious changes in Croatian society, carried
out by the Institute for Social Research in 2004 on a representative sample (N=2220)
of the Croatian adult population.
3
Although the differences between age groups are significantly smaller today, the
confirmed pattern of increase in religiosity with aging is still evident.
4
This research was from the surveys Position, consciousness and behavior of youth
in Croatia carried out in 1986 and Value system of youth and social changes in Croatia
carried out in 1999, both by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb.
 religion and youth in croatia 309

Jerolimov, 2002).5 Although the level of religious practice did not fol-
low the high level of confessional and religious self-identification and
beliefs, the increase supports previous findings of the revitalization of
religiosity at the individual level.6
These findings are not only important due to the fact that youth
represent a resource that will carry and transmit the dominant social
and cultural values but also because young people should be consid-
ered as the source of innovation and can be viewed as the future of
society. In addition, research has indicated that youth has proved to
be a good indicator of the relevance of new social trends and a predic-
tor of social and societal changes (Ilišin, 2007; Tomić-Koludrović &
Leburić, 2001).
As early as the 1970s, a diverse youth scene had developed in Croa-
tia and was beginning to shape social initiatives. In the 1980s, youth
represented an important part of the independent political public with
innovative ideas (Tomić-Koludrović, 1993). A large body of sociologi-
cal research of youth in former Yugoslavia from 1986 depicted Croa-
tian (and Slovenian) youth as ideologically, politically and culturally
more open and libertarian and generally adopting more post-materi-
alist values and postmodern culture than the youth from other parts
of the former Yugoslavia (Tomić-Koludrović, 1993).
In new social circumstances, the youth in post communist Croatia
have to cope with the influence of the rapid global changes of the
modern world that make different societies risky to live in; the tran-
sitional and transformational character of society; and the grave con-
sequences of the 1990–1995 war for independence. Burdened with
problems that arise as the result of political changes, the transition
to a market economy and changes of social structure (“winners and
losers”), Croatian society did not succeed in forming a coherent new
system of dominant social values. This anomie resulted in a prevailing
acceptance of the strongest and most visible value pattern offered—a
religious and national one.

5
For instance, the number of Catholics increased from 64 percent to 89 percent,
while there were 77 percent of those who believe in God, 63 percent believed in God’s
creation of men and the world and 61 percent in life after death. In comparison, in the
1984 survey Socio-cultural development in Croatia, young respondents (18 to 29 years
old) reported the following level of basic church beliefs: 20% believed in God, 15% in
God’s creation of men and the world, and 9% believed in life after death.
6
Nevertheless, the EVS 1999 showed that Croatia belongs to the most religious part
of the Europe in regards to religious practice (Baloban, Črpić, 2005).
310 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

According to some authors, this return to a dominant traditional

value orientation places the Croatian population in a peculiar spot
between traditionalism and modernism. This specific mixture of
patriarchal and liberal orientations, followed by an intense increase
of ethnocentrism, indicates the replacement of the communist state
with one of “liberal half-modernization” (Županov, 1995, 1995a; Ilišin,
1999). Not surprisingly, in this context, religious respondents (primar-
ily convinced believers) more readily accept attitudes that form the
traditional, patriarchal, autocratic and ethnocentric value orientations
than non-religious ones (Bahtijarević, 1991; Labus, 2000; Marinović
Jerolimov, 2000).7 This trend is also applicable, although to a lesser
extent, to youth. According to comparative analysis, privacy (the ten-
dency of withdrawal into the individual world that has characterized
Croatian youth for at least two decades) no longer forms a separate
factor connected to the values of individuality. Instead, it is connected
with traditional “firm” values of religion and nation that usually form
the model of values connected to traditionalism (Ilišin, 2007:271).
Although youth in Croatia share some lifestyle characteristics with
youth in Western post-industrial societies (appearance, hedonist orien-
tation, leisure time activities) and the “Mediterranean” model of pro-
longed youth (prolonged living with parents, prolongation of formal
education, delayed entry to the labour market etc.), they differ consid-
erably from their Western counterparts with regards to the personal,
social and cultural context in which they live. They are mostly raised
in families where traditional relations prevail, are more dependent
economically upon their parents and are generally less independent
and individualized (Tomić-Koludrović & Leburić, 2001). In general,
life in a social context marked by national and religious homogeniza-
tion, political authoritarianism, cultural re-traditionalization, impov-
erishment and dominance of materialistic values has halted the initial
formational process of a new type of post-materialistic values amongst
the youth population (Tomić-Koludrović, 1999).
However, one might legitimately pose the question: If, and in what
way, has this value reorientation, along with a significant increase
in declared religiosity, affected the life and values of young people?

7
Although religion and religiosity are themselves part of the traditional value sys-
tem, some socio-cultural characteristics of the people that are the basis for acceptance
of this orientation have to be considered (rural environment, regional status, older age,
lower level of education), and these are also indicators of higher religiosity.
 religion and youth in croatia 311

Namely, despite considerable religious resurgence and the fact that

traditional values are more accepted amongst those who are more
religious, research on adult and youth populations in Croatia has
confirmed that religious respondents deviate from the values of tra-
ditional church moral norms. Results indicated that this discrepancy
is particularly evident regarding the Church’s attitudes toward sexual-
ity, reproduction and marriage8 (Baloban & Črpić, 1998, 2000, 2000a;
Goldberger, 2005; Marinović Jerolimov, 2002). Unlike the “European
pattern”, where this discrepancy follows an overall trend of decline
in church-oriented religiosity, religious adherence, religious belief and
religious practice (Davie, 1999; Berger, 1999), such discrepancy in
Croatia is situated within an overall revitalization of traditional church
religion and religiosity.9
One potential explanation for this disparity is the evolving under-
standing of human sexuality in the second part of the 20th century,
particularly evident through the feminist movement and the movement
for the rights of homosexuals. In this period, marriage, family and
sexual relations all underwent a process of liberalization, the divorce
rate increased as did common-law marriage, remarriage after divorce,
and the development and usage of contraceptives. In addition, the age
of first sexual intercourse decreased while the social tolerance towards
differing lifestyles increased. In Croatia, where Catholics are the dom-
inant religious group, it is of vital importance to take into account
the ways and means through which the Catholic Church continues to
confront these changes and challenges to its teachings.10 In line with
its mission, the Catholic Church has proactively engaged in teaching

8
The Catholic Church expresses its stand in different documents like Canon stat-
ute (1996), Documents of the Second Vatican Council (1972), Encyclical letters (Pope
John Paul II, 1987), etc.
9
Concerning the individual morals index (solutions and practices that are the leg-
acy of former socialist period), the EVS from 1999 pointed that Croatia, together with
other countries having higher than 70% Catholic population, and other transitional
Eastern European countries showed the lowest level of permissiveness understood as
a personal choice (Baloban, Črpić, 2005:238).
10
There are many encyclicals and documents where these attitudes are declared:
Arcanum divinae sapientiae (1880), Casti Connubii (1930), Humanae vitae (1968),
Persona humana (1975), Evangelium vitae (1995), Odgojne smjernice o ljudskoj
ljubavi. Obrisi spolnog odgoja / Educational guidelines on human love. Contours of
sexual education. (1983), Ljudska spolnost: istina i značenje. Odgojne smjernice u
obitelji / Human sexuality: thruth and meaning. Educational direction for the family
(1995), Dar života. Naputak o poštivanju ljudskog života u nastanku i o dostojanstvu
rađanja. Odgovori na neka aktualna pitanja / The gift of life. Instruction on respect for
312 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

and public discussions concerning individual, social and legal aspects

regarding marriage, abortion, divorce, contraception, the introduction
of sexual education in schools, artificial fertilization, and homosexuals
and their rights to marriage and adoption. Besides the influence of tra-
ditional Catholic values promoted in the democratic post-communist
system and through the activity of the Catholic Church, global modern
secular values, together with legal arrangements and practices that are
the legacy of the former socialist system, create the frame from which
attitudes toward sexuality, reproduction and marriage are formed.
A critical element to the delivery of the Catholic Church’s mis-
sion and position on issues of sexuality, reproduction and marriage is
Religious Education (RE) (Jokić, 2005). Most young people in Croatia
undergo confessional religious instruction (RE), which was introduced
in primary and secondary schools in 1992. Catholic RE was formally
introduced into the Croatian educational system in the 1991/1992
school year, nearly coinciding with the formation of an independent
Republic of Croatia. The subject is formulated on the basis of the
‘Contract between the Holy See and the Republic of Croatia regarding
Cooperation in the Fields of Education and Culture’ from 1996. This
special contract was based upon three premises. First, both the Croa-
tian constitution and the laws of the Holy See grant a formal legisla-
tive right for a contract of this kind. The second premise expresses the
view that a contract is needed because of the historical and current
role of the Catholic Church in Croatia in the area of education. The
third premise is based on the fact that a majority of the population
belongs to the Catholic Church. The form and nature of Catholic RE
in Croatian elementary schools is clearly explicated in the ‘Contract
on Catholic Religious Education in Public Schools and Religious Educa-
tion in Public Preschools’ from 1999. Based on the existing models of
RE, it might be argued that RE in elementary education in Croatia is
‘education into religion’ (Hull, 2001), denominational in its approach
(Schreiner, 2002) or explicit and confessional (Ashton, 2000). Razum
(2008), coming from a Catholic theological stance, defines RE in Croa-
tia as a strictly confessional model or ‘school catechesis’. From the first
grade onwards, RE is one of the elective subjects offered to pupils in
elementary education that, once chosen, becomes obligatory (Razum,

beginning of human life and dignity of birth. Answers to some current issues. (1987)
itd. (Selling, 2001, Baloban, Črpić, 2000).
 religion and youth in croatia 313

2008). In 2006, 87.7 percent of elementary education pupils attended

RE (ibid). In each grade, 70 teaching hours are devoted to RE per
year. Teachers of the subject are both lay theologians approved by the
Catholic Church and members of the clergy (ibid). Both the very high
percentage of pupils attending the subject and its ‘obligatory’ character
makes its ‘electiveness’ somewhat relative. The teaching on marriage is
introduced form the first grade onwards, whereas the topic of sexuality
is present from the fifth grade (Jokić, 2005). The issue of homosexu-
ality is briefly covered in the 8th grade within an extremely negative
discourse.
Drawing upon the discussion presented in the preceding pages, the
aim of this paper is twofold:

1) to compare Croatian youth’s self-reported religiosity and religious

practice at three historical time points (1986, 1999 and 2004) and,
2) to determine whether and how indicators of religiosity are con-
nected with differences in attitudes towards “marriage and repro-
duction” and “homosexuality” in three age groups of Croatian
youth.11

Data and Method

This paper presents and analyses data from the Youth and European
integration processes survey carried out by the Institute for Social
Research in Zagreb in 2004 with a representative sample of Croatian
youth aged 16 to 30 (N=2003). The data from the 2004 effort were
compared with similar indicators from two other research efforts car-
ried out by the Institute in 1986 (Position, consciousness and behaviour
of youth in Croatia—N=1250) and in 1999 (Value system of youth and
social changes in Croatia—N=1700).
On the basis of the statistical and logical criteria, participants were
divided into three age groups, as presented in Table 1:

11
We should keep in mind that all these issues are sensitive and intimate, and
that participants have no experience in some of them. An especially complex issue is
abortion, not just as a sensitive ethical and moral issue but also as a legal and medi-
cal issue.
314 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

Table 1. Age Distribution

Age group N %
16–20 672 33.5
21–25 771 38.5
26–30 560 28.0
Total 2003 100

Besides religious affiliation, two basic indicators of religiosity were

probed in the questionnaire: religious self-identification and partici-
pation in religious practice. In addition, several questionnaire items
probed attitudes towards some fundamental issues in the area of sexu-
ality, reproduction and marriage.

Religious Self-Identification
Religious self-identification was assessed on a six level categorical scale
which enabled differentiation along a continuum of religiosity and
non-religiosity. The scale, along with the frequency of the responses
for each category, is presented in Table 2.
Due to the nature of the categories and the distribution of responses,
categories 3 and 4, and categories 5 and 6, were merged for further
analytical examination. This resulted in the reconceptualised four-level
scale of self-identified religiosity presented in Table 3, which has been
used in further statistical procedures.

Table 2. Initial Religious Self-Identification Scale

Category %
1. I am a convinced believer and I accept everything my religion 41.0
teaches
2. I am religious although I do not accept everything my religion 32.0
teaches
3. I think a lot about it, but I am not sure whether I believe or not 10.4
4. I am indifferent towards religion 5.5
5. I am not religious, even though I have nothing against religion 9.5
6. I am not religious and I am opposed to religion 0.6
 religion and youth in croatia 315

Table 3. Reconceptualised Religious Self-Identification Scale

Category %
1. Convinced believer 41.0
2. Religious person who does not accept everything his/her religion 32.0
teaches
3. Uncertain and/or indifferent 15.9
4. Not religious and/or opposed to religion 11.1

Religious Practice
As an indicator of religious practice, an item probing the frequency
of church attendance was used. The four response options were: more
than once a week, once a week, one or two times a month, only for
major religious holidays and never. This categorization proved to be
adequate in the context of Catholic religion in Croatia.

Attitudinal Measures
Attitudes toward sexuality, reproduction and marriage were probed
through a series of seven items on a four-point Likert-type scale
probing whether the presented concepts were acceptable to partici-
pants. Response options ranged from ‘completely unacceptable’ to
‘completely acceptable’. The seven items were factor analysed using
principal component analysis with Oblimin (oblique) rotation. Factor
analysis resulted in a two factor solution with four items falling in the
first factor and three in the second, explaining a total of 64.11 percent
of the variance for the entire set of variables. These factors were named
‘Marriage and Reproduction’ and ‘Homosexuality’. The commonalities
ranged from 0.52 to 0.75 and the KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity
indicated that these sets of variables were adequately related for factor
analysis. The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Factor Analysis of Items Covering Attitudes Towards ‘Marriage

and Sexuality’ and ‘Homosexuality’
Marriage and Homosexuality Communality
Reproduction
Sexual intercourse before 0.72 0.53
marriage
Divorce 0.74 0.58
Birth of extramarital 0.78 0.64
children
316 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

Table 4 (cont.)
Marriage and Homosexuality Communality
Reproduction
Living in extramarital 0.80 0.69
communion
Homosexual experiences 0.75 0.59
Legal right of the 0.85 0.72
homosexuals to adopt
children
Legal rights of the 0.83 0.75
homosexuals to marry
Eigenvalues 3.16 1.33
Explained Variance 45.08 19.03
Total Variance Explained 64.11
Reliability (Cronbach α) 0.78 0.76

The reliabilities of the factor scales were analyzed separately for each
factor and resulted in acceptable Cronbach α coefficients of 0.78 and
0.76. Pupils’ answers on items in each of the scales were summated
and divided by the number of items, forming a scale ranging from
one to four.

Results

Differences in Self-Identification and Religious Practice

The first aim of the research was to compare the self-reported religios-
ity and religious practices of Croatian youth at three points in recent
history (1986, 1999, 2004). Graph 1 presents this comparison regard-
ing the religious self-identification of Croatian Youth.
Immediately visible is the difference in patterns of responses from
1999 and 2004 and those in 1986. The first pattern is characterized by
elevated frequencies of ‘convinced believer’ and ‘religious’ responses,
where over two thirds of participants at both time-points fall, and a
much smaller frequency of ‘not religious’ and ‘opposed to religion’
responses. In contrast, the research from 1986 demonstrates the
dominance of non-religiosity amongst participants, with almost half
of the respondents choosing ‘not religious’ and ‘opposed to religion’
positions and approximately one third of respondents choosing the
first two options. Responses in the two middle categories (‘not sure’
 religion and youth in croatia 317

Graph 1. Religious Self-Identification of Croatian Youth in 1986, 1999 and

2004 (%)

40

30

20

10

0
Convinced Not Opposed to
Religious Not sure Indifferent
believers religious religion
1986 12 17 18 5 35 13
1999 33 34 14 6 12 1
2004 41 32 11 6 9 1

and ‘indifferent’) stayed at approximately similar levels at all three

research points. These results indicate a considerable discrepancy in
the responses of Croatian youth at three historical points. Of interest
is that, in less than 20 years, there was a sharp increase in ‘convinced
believers’ and a similarly steep reduction of those who expressed
themselves as non religious. Therefore, according to this indicator, it
might be claimed that the dominant non-religiosity characteristic for
the period before Croatian independence quickly turned to a domi-
nant and significant religiosity in 1999, which increased even further
in 2004.
Of further interest was the examination of whether such a difference
existed with regards to religious practice, observed at the individual
level through the frequency of mass/church attendance. Graph 2 rep-
resents this data from 1986 and 1999.
Here, the data reveals an increase of self reported mass/church atten-
dance in all categories of attendance, and a sharp drop of those who
do not attend, over time. The increase is most readily evident in the
‘once a week’ category. Here, the number of those who frequently go to
church doubled, while the percentage of those that never go to Church
decreased by more than half—from 45% in 1986 to 20% in 1999. If we
consider the first two categories as an indicator of frequent attendance,
then it might be argued that the dominant pattern of attendance at
318 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

Graph 2. Youth’s Mass/Church Attendance (%)

50

40

30

20

10

0
Only for more
A few times a Once or twice a
Once a week important I do not attend
week month
holidays
1986 1 12 9 33 45
1999 3 24 15 38 20

both time points is that of the “occasional practitioners”.12 However,

it is also interesting to note that, despite its sharp rise, the increase in
religious practice did not follow the extremity of the change observed
in self reported religiosity. To a certain extent, this might reflect the
more nominal form of religiosity typical of Croatian youth.
In order to gain insight into changes in religious self-identification
at different stages in the life course of Croatian youth, we compared
the responses from three age groups (presented in Table 5) in the 2004
survey.

Table 5. Religious Self-Identification and Age in Croatia in 2004 (%)

Religious Age TOTAL
Self-identification
15–19 20–24 25–29
Convinced believer 50,3 38,5 36,0 41,7
Religious 25,8 35,1 36,2 32,3
Uncertain 16,5 15,4 16,2 16,0
Not religious 7,4 11,0 11,6 10,0
TOTAL 100 100 100 100

12
In 2004, the answers were different (frequently, occasionally and never), so the
results are not strictly comparative. Nevertheless, they do show a general trend. For
instance, 22% of respondents reported frequently going to church, 54% reported occa-
sionally and 24% reported never going to church. These findings confirm the dominance
of occasional practitioners, but also a slight increase of those who never go to church.
 religion and youth in croatia 319

Table 6. Religious Practice and Age in Croatia in 2004 (%)

Church attendance Age TOTAL
15–19 20–24 25–29
Often 28,6 17,9 19,6 21,9
Sometimes 52,1 54,9 54,7 53,9
Never 19,3 27,2 25,7 24,2
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Chi-square testing reveals a statistically significant difference in reli-

gious self-identification between the three age groups (χ2=37,809; df=6;
p<0.001). The core of the difference is in the tendency of the youngest
group to declare themselves as convinced believers. In the two other
groups, the answers on the religious spectrum (convinced believer
and religious) tend to be split. In addition, the number of individuals
selecting the ‘not religious’ option was significantly higher amongst
respondents older than 20 years then in the youngest cohort.
Table 6 presents the distribution of answers regarding church/mass
attendance across all age groups.
Once again, there is a statistically significant difference between all
three age groups (χ2=31,31; df=4; p<0.001). Again, the youngest cohort
was considerably different from the other two groups in their report-
ing of more frequent church/mass attendance. The design of the study
does not allow for inferences behind these results to be made.
In conclusion, the results indicate that, amongst Croatian youth,
self-reported religiosity has increased over the years. This has been
especially evident with respect to religious self-identification and less
so regarding religious practices. Furthermore, an exploration of the
2004 data reveals that younger individuals tended to report more
extreme positions regarding religious self-identification and religious
practice.

Attitudes Towards Marriage, Reproduction and Homosexuality

One interesting analytical element of the present study was to deter-
mine if and how this resurgent religiosity influenced the percep-
tions and thoughts of participants regarding the issues of marriage
and reproduction, issues that play a pivotal role in the lives of young
people. Furthermore, the question arises as to whether these atti-
tudes are in line with the Church’s position and teaching, as com-
municated through media and mainstream education. In order to
probe these issues, a series of Factorial ANOVAs were conducted
320 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics: Attitudes Towards Marriage and Reproduction

Group M SD N Religious M SD N
identification
15–20 2.88 0.79 664 Convinced 2.76 0.79 822
believer
21–25 3.14 0.73 765 Religious 3.21 0.66 637
26–30 3.14 0.73 559 Uncertain 3.25 0.66 316
Not religious 3.42 0.66 197

with age and self-reported religious identification serving as fixed fac-

tors and dimensions of ‘Attitudes towards marriage and reproduc-
tion’ and ‘Attitudes towards homosexuality’ serving as dependent
variables.
Descriptive statistics regarding attitudes towards marriage and
reproduction, grouped according to participant age and self reported
religious identification, are presented in Table 7.
Factorial ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of age: F(2,
1960)=8.93, p<0.01, η2=0.09. The Duncan post hoc test revealed that
the core of the difference lies in the more conservative position of the
youngest group. However, a very small effect size indicates that this
difference is somewhat marginal. There is a slightly larger main effect
of self reported religious identification: F (3, 1960)=68.28, p<0.01,
η2=0.09. Here the post hoc tests indicated a clear difference between
groups of youth with different religious identification. Namely, those
who declared themselves as ‘convinced believers’ held the most conser-
vative attitudinal position on the dimension ‘Marriage and Reproduc-
tion’. Interestingly, the other groups did not differ between each other.
Finally, the interaction between the age and self reported religious
identification was not significant: F(6, 1960)=0.59, p>0.05, η2=0.004.
All these elements are visible in Graph 3.
Descriptive statistics regarding participants’ attitudes towards
homosexuality, grouped according to age and self reported religious
identification, are presented in Table 8.
Factorial ANOVA indicated a lack of significant main effect of age:
F(2, 1963)=2.05 , p>0.05, η2=0.02. There is a significant main effect of
self reported religious identification: F(3, 1963)=34.28, p<0.01, η2=0.04.
The Duncan post hoc test revealed that the core of the difference lay
in the more conservative position of the group of convinced believers.
However, a very small effect size indicates that this difference is very
 religion and youth in croatia 321

Graph 3. Estimated Marginal Means on Attitudinal Dimension of ‘Marriage

and Reproduction’
Attitudes Towards Marriage and Sexuality
15,00

Religious identification
14,00 Convinced believer
Religious
Estimated Marginal Means

Uncertain
Not religious

13,00

12,00

11,00

10,00

16-20 21-25 26-30

Age groups

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics: Attitudes Towards Homosexuality

Group M SD N Religious M SD N
identification
15–20 1.76 0.79 664 Convinced 1.55 0.73 826
believer
21–25 1.77 0.73 765 Religious 1.81 0.83 638
26–30 1.68 0.73 559 Uncertain 1.91 0.86 315
Not religious 2.09 0.91 196

marginal. Once again, there was a non-significant interaction between

age and self reported religious identification: F(6, 1963)=1.23, p>0.05,
η2=0.004. These described effects are visible in Graph 4.
322 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

Graph 4. Estimated Marginal Means on Attitudinal Dimension of

‘Homosexuality’
Attitudes Towards homosexuality
2,20

Religious identification
Convinced believer
Religious
Estimated Marginal Means

2,00
Uncertain
Not religious

1,80

1,60

1,40

1,00 2,00 3,00

Age groups

Conclusion

According to the data presented, young people in Croatia today report

significantly greater levels of religiosity than twenty years ago. In com-
parison to 1986, religious affiliation in 1999 increased by 26%, religious
self-identification increased by 40% and participation in religious prac-
tice increased by 25%. The research from 2004 confirmed the stabiliza-
tion of religiosity expressed through these indicators. Although based
on a few partial indicators, this finding indicates that the religiosity
of young people today does not differ as significantly from that of the
“adult” population as it used to. Moreover, with the introduction of
religious instruction into the official school curriculum, including the
sacrament of first communion, the process of the institutional support
of religious orientation has been focused on young people in particu-
lar. Bearing in mind that religion was also widespread amongst young
people in the communist period in Croatia (who were, together with
Slovenians, the most religious part of the young population in the
 religion and youth in croatia 323

former Yugoslavia), the increase in their religiosity in changed social

conditions should not come as a surprise. At the end of the 1980’s,
an increase in religiosity amongst young people (who had been, up to
that point, the most non-religious part of the population in Croatia)
was already evident. Arguably, this was an indicator of the forthcom-
ing religious changes. The participants in the 2004 research grew up
in the context of the breakdown of one state and system, in a war
and post war period. General uncertainty and narrowed perspectives
caused by turbulent social and political events, unbalanced social and
political “development”, poverty, and confusion were the character-
istics of society in which these generations grow up. Apart from the
national-religious identification, society did not offer youth many
other coherent value bases that would prepare them for the further
development of a democratic, pluralistic, civil society. Bearing in mind
the significantly changed status of religion and the Church (churches)
in society, the freedom to express religiosity, together with a strong
social and political promotion of the desirability of religiosity, the
question about the quality of youth religiosity arises. Is it primarily
socially established (family and national) a priori, or is it the result of
their personal choice?
The results of the present study pointed to several interesting find-
ings. First, there is a difference between age groups concerning reli-
gious self-identification. To a large extent, the youngest respondents
(15 to 19 years) more often identified themselves as convinced believ-
ers than the other two age groups. Group differences proved to be
much smaller concerning religious practice. The analysis of attitudes
signaling the acceptance of values concerning marriage, reproduction
and homosexuality indicated the relatively liberal position of young
people in Croatia. It seems that attitudes on these dimensions deviate
significantly from the teachings and position of the Catholic Church
in this respect. Importantly, however, the youngest respondents dif-
fered from the other two age groups in that their position seemed to
be more in accordance with Catholic moral teachings. The analysis
concerning religious self-identification showed that the acceptance of
a liberal position regarding these attitudes increases as self reported
religious self-identification decreases. In general, convinced believers
are most likely to hold positions in accordance with the moral teach-
ings of Catholic Church. The significant difference between convinced
believers and religious individuals who do not accept everything their
religion puts forth raises the question as to the proportion of young
324 dinka marinović jerolimov and boris jokić

people who are under the influence of Church on these issues. There
was no statistically significant interaction between age groups and reli-
gious self-identification on the attitudinal dimension of “marriage and
reproduction”. In general, the youth in Croatia express extremely neg-
ative attitudes on the attitudinal dimension of “homosexuality”. The
homogeneity of attitudes in all age groups in this respect confirms this
finding. Although convinced believers have the most conservative atti-
tude, it is surprising to see a similarly conservative position amongst
non-religious respondents. There is no significant interaction between
age groups and religious self-identification on the “homosexuality”
dimension as well.
The traditional value pattern that dominates Croatian society in gen-
eral, together with exposure to the structural teachings of the Catholic
Church through confessional RE in public schools, can help explain
the conservative position amongst the youngest group of respondents.
Additionally, the tendency of younger respondents to report extreme
positions concerning different attitudes is also well documented. On
the other hand, older groups (20–24 and 25–29) are obviously influ-
enced by life experiences, especially when it comes to the “marriage
and reproduction” dimension.
Clearly, a considerable proportion of young people do not find it
contradictory to consider themselves as religious and to hold attitudes
opposed to those of their religion and Church in the area of sexuality
and marriage. Secular ideas and values are adopted and exist alongside
religious values, a position indicative of a kind of relativism of values,
or the parallel existence of value orientations that can, on a theoreti-
cal level, only be in opposition. The question arises as to whether this
implies the state of “internalization of objective confusion” described
by F. Radin (1988), when he examined the value orientations of young
people in the 1980’s, or the beginning of a post-modernist eclectic
consciousness, especially amongst some of the educated urban youth.
However intensely “immersed” in the traditional; semi-modern, con-
fused society—under the assumption of greater pluralism, democra-
tization, and development of civil society, including the globalization
process—could evidence a new and different value system as well as
different models of spirituality. The increased religiosity of young peo-
ple will be faced with such challenges (as will all traditional religion
and the Church). Although to the greatest degree, it “lives” as a family
and cultural tradition, religion gives moral and emotional support to
some people and, as such, has different functions in their lives: spiri-
 religion and youth in croatia 325

tual search, explanations for the creation of man and the world, life
and death. Whether young people, both religious and non-religious,
are going to be more open to the other and the different in the future
is not easy to predict.
To the degree that the religiosity of young people is a part of the
family and wider cultural and national tradition, a stabilizing of the
religious structure of young people can be assumed. The possible long-
term impact of confessional religious instruction through the educa-
tional system could support this tendency. At the same time, however,
youth religiosity could be faced with great challenges that youth in
modern (and post-modern) western societies have already been faced
with. Bearing in mind the present tension (and competition) between
sacred and secular realms at the level of moral values, greater individu-
alization and privatization of religiosity could be expected as well.

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conjecture or fundamental change in political attitudes?). Politička misao 32(3–
4):72–82.
 YOUNG MUSLIMS OF ITALY.
ISLAM IN THE EVERYDAY LIFE AND THE PUBLIC VISIBILITY
OF A NEW GENERATION OF MUSLIMS

Annalisa Frisina

Muslims in Italy. Young Muslims of Italy?

Islam in Italy: A Plural Phenomenon

It is by now widely known that Islam is the second largest religion
in Europe and Italy, but how many Muslims there actually are is still
open to debate, as quantifying religious identifications is an ardu-
ous task. Statistics, in fact, in most cases use geographical origin and
nationality as their criteria. Thus it is necessary to bear in mind that
statistics tell us about religious identities assigned from outside, which
certainly outnumber those which are chosen or claimed.
The latest report by Caritas/Migrantes (2008) tells us that most
Muslims are immigrants primarily for economic reasons. They num-
ber 1,250,000 and live in the areas where the greatest employment
opportunities are found, i.e. in the north of the country and to a lesser
extent in central and southern Italy. The number of Italians who have
converted to Islam, in contrast, is approximately 10,000. The major-
ity of immigrants are of the Christian faith (with a growing Ortho-
dox component), and Muslims make up around a third of the total
of 3,987,100 immigrants (who constitute around 6% of the Italian
population).
The common perception is that the number of Muslims in Italy is
much higher, as certain commentators and politicians paint the phe-
nomenon in terms of an invasion, fuelling growing fears in an inter-
national context characterised by terrorism and war.
What does it mean to be Muslim? There exists a plurality of ways of
believing and living the Islamic faith, and this diversity within Islam is
present among Muslims in Italy too (Pace 2004, p. 110). It is enough
to consider the numerous national origins of immigrants in Italy: they
are not, in fact, individuals primarily of Turkish origin, as in Germany,
or mainly from the Maghreb region, as in the case of France, but are
from a much wider range of different countries. Among the most
330 annalisa frisina

significant (in descending order) in fact we find Morocco, Albania,

Tunisia, Senegal, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Iran,
Nigeria, Turkey and Somalia. Islam therefore extends greatly beyond
the Arab nations, being widespread throughout the five continents,
and in Italy, in addition to the Islam of the Maghreb region and that
of the Middle East, we find the Islam of the Balkans, the Islam of the
Indian subcontinent and the Islam of sub-Saharan Africa. These reali-
ties differ from each other: for example Islam in the Balkans frequently
constitutes more a measure of national than of religious identifica-
tion. African Islam too has its own peculiarities: for example, most
of the Senegalese Muslims present in Italy belong to the Mouride
brother-hood, the Muridiyya, the bearer of a mystical Islam, struc-
tured in organisational terms around a master’s relationship with his
disciples and characterised by strong solidarity between its members
(Schmidt di Friedberg 1994; Riccio 2004). In the eyes of other Mus-
lims this Afro-Islam appears heterodox, and for them the emphasis
shifts from the affective dimension of the relationship with God to
orthopraxis, i.e. the practical observance of a body of rules. The plu-
rality of Islam in fact has to do not only with geographical origin, but
also with the different expressions of religiosity (Saint-Blancat 1999,
pp. 119–140), the different political orientation of Muslims and the
multitude of Islamic organisations. With regard to the latter aspect,
in Italy the main socio-religious actors competing to represent Islam
are: the Unione delle comunità ed organizzazioni islamiche (UCOII,
Union of Islamic Communities and Organisations), which expresses
a neo-traditionalist current and is the most widespread organised
group in the country; the Centro culturale islamico (Islamic Cultural
Centre), better known as the Moschea di Roma (Mosque of Rome),
which is connected with the embassies of immigrants’ countries of
origin and is funded by a Saudi NGO; the Comunità religiosa islamica
italiana (COREIS, Italian Islamic Religious Community), which is the
expression of a group of Italian converts and draws upon the Sufism
and esoterism of R. Guénon; the Associazione dei Musulmani Italiani
(Association of Italian Muslims), an organisation of Somali Muslims
who became Italian citizens during the colonial experience (Guolo
2005). These organisations vie with each other publicly to obtain offi-
cial recognition for Islam on the part of the Italian State, but still find
it hard to acknowledge each other and trade accusations of lack of
representativeness of Muslims in Italy, of social dangerousness and
finally lack of adhesion to what each considers to be the true Islam.
 young muslims of italy 331

In addition to this public, organised Islam, there exists an everyday

Islam made up of men and women for whom Islam provides first of
all a wholly ethical or spiritual reference. They are less visible Mus-
lims, who live their faith more at the individual than the community
level. In fact, although the homo islamicus is widely represented as a
subject completely determined by “religious tradition” (Rivera 2002),
processes of secularisation impact the religiosity of Muslims in Europe
(Babès 2000; Roy O. 2000) and this entails an individualisation of faith
and thus a further internal diversification of Islam in Italy. Today, in
fact, we are witnessing a remarkable proliferation of faith which mani-
fests itself beyond the great codes of meaning prescribed by religious
institutions and this complexity of contemporary religious belonging
regards Muslims too. Paths of religious identification are therefore
plural and the main protagonists of these transformations underway are
young people. In Italy, the settlement of immigrant families is a recent
phenomenon compared with other European countries and the first
generation of young Muslims born in Italy is still small in number,1
although increasingly significant from the social point of view, as we
shall see in the following paragraphs.

Young Muslims of Italy Association

Among the social religious actors in Italy, the Young Muslims of Italy
association (Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, GMI) is the first organized
voice representing a growing population, the sons and daughters of
immigrants. The association was founded soon after 9/11 and, within
the few years since, it has gained a remarkable public visibility (Frisina
2006 and 2007), openly challenging the dominant collective represen-
tation of Italy as a monolithically Catholic country.
The founders of the GMI grew up in the world of Islamic associa-
tions and in 2001 they felt the need to break away from the UCOII
(Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy), the main
association of Islamic immigrants in Italy, culturally connected to
Muslim Brothers’ Movement. The GMI founded its association2 in a
climate of growing insecurity and suspicion towards Islam.

1
Official statistics do not yet exist. However an initial estimate by the Agnelli
Foundation puts the number of young Muslims at around 300,000.
2
The association has grown by about 350 members a year since 2001. The majority
of members are 16–18 years old, the leaders between 19 and 30. There are more girls
332 annalisa frisina

The “eyes of the other” drove their process of individualization: feel-

ing constantly under scrutiny and living with the daily burden of stig-
matization because they were different, they entered the public space
introducing themselves as Italian citizens of Islamic faith, with a view
to “reinventing” a more inclusive national identity and promoting
their bid for social inclusion.
GMI has tried to pass from being the object of the debate to tak-
ing an active part, with access to the mass media, which are the main
vehicle of the stereotypes and prejudice against Islam (Said 1997), and
which continue to represent Italy as a monolithically Catholic coun-
try and Islam as a threatening “other”. They act as a pressure group
and have sent hundreds of e-mails and written many press releases to
protest against television programs that feed a climate of fear and sus-
picion towards Italian Muslims. In the last few years, GMI representa-
tives have appeared on talk shows, variety shows and, occasionally, in
the news. They have also managed to attract the interest of the press,
giving many interviews with the main national newspapers and show-
ing the peaceful face of Islam. The GMI has also been committed to
civic education, e.g. participating in the National Youth Forum (www.
forumnazionaledeigiovani.it), attending a course on Human Rights
Education (in Spain in December 2004) and a course on Active Citi-
zenship Education (in Estonia in August 2005). But the best school for
learning to become citizens still seems to be participation on a local
level. In the towns where they live, GMI members have had a leading
role in many cultural events, especially in schools. They have been seen
as experts on Islamic matters and begun to work as mediators, becom-
ing more professional day by day. The local level has also been strate-
gic in developing ties with society and enabling voluntary work, often
within Catholic-oriented associations. In addition, the GMI have been
very busy in the inter-religious dialogue, taking part in many meet-
ings. These meetings were generally held with various youth groups

than boys and the former are more active locally, but all 5 elected presidents have been
male: they are mainly the sons of Moroccan immigrants, but the leadership includes
a significant Near Eastern component (the current president is of Egyptian origin).
Most members are attending secondary school, while the leaders are at university
(both scientific and humanistic faculties). Their fathers are mainly blue-collar workers
and small traders, and their mothers are generally housewives and home helps. The
most active local sections with the largest numbers are in Lumbardy, Emilia, Romagna
and Piedmont, while there are none in Southern Italy.
 young muslims of italy 333

of Catholic associations, and the ACLI (Italian Christian Workers’

Associations) in particular, but also with Waldensian and Buddhist
groups, and with the Union of Young Italian Jews (UGEI). At the first
meetings of young Muslims with young Jews, only the leaders were
relating to one another, while the members of the two associations
clearly remained diffident, but later on the commitment spread to the
less active members as well. With time, the objectives changed slightly:
in addition to learning more about each other’s religion, there was a
move to openly exchange views on issues that mattered to both par-
ties, starting with the limits of Italian secularism, without hiding the
conflictual element that existed. There were two challenges: (i) to work
together, by talking to each other, to develop a religious pluralism and
shared values; (ii) to promote a greater religious equality, focusing on
the hegemony of Catholicism and contesting those who use it in the
political arena as an ethnic, discriminatory tool.
Within the association, the GMI aimed to nurture a sense of “belong-
ing to Europe” in its young members and to harmonize their Islamic
religiosity with their Italian social life. Conferences and workshops are
used to help participants reflect on how to avoid falling into the trap
of responding to discrimination by isolating themselves, and how to
defend their rights as Italian citizens of Islamic faith. The focus is to
empower, to strengthen their self-esteem and to encourage members
to take an active part in society. When it came to religious education,
these young people were intolerant of the educators from the associa-
tions linked to UCOII and progressively sought alternatives. One of
the strategies was to increase the space for debate rather than holding
lessons; another was to invite scholars (even non-Muslims) who could
provide the conceptual tools for grasping the changes underway among
European Muslims; another was to seek international exchanges with
young Muslims from other countries.
The core reason for disagreement with the adults’ associations was
because the GMI rejected the symbolic violence intrinsic in the dichot-
omous logic that set the Muslims (with a positive polarity) against the
Italians (with a negative polarity). The GMI’s efforts went above all
into striving to gain a cultural influence, exemplified in the language
issue: should they use Italian or Arabic during educational meetings?
For the young people born or brought up in Italy, the answer was
simple: Italian, because this is the language they know better. Their
Italian also contains a juvenile jargon that emphasizes the generational
dimension: for instance, some GMI members have coined the term
334 annalisa frisina

“iguana” for the Muslim Brothers, an imaginative transliteration of the

Arabic word for brothers, ikhwan.
The adults’ associations, like many responsible of the mosques,
have continued to invite educators from their countries of origin, who
mainly speak Arabic. The language is certainly also metaphoric and
it refers to a problem of interpretative traditions of Islam that many
young people consider obsolete, too rigid and conservative.
They affirmed their will to move away from their elders’ associations
in order to build an “Italian Islam” that would differ in some ways
from that of their immigrant parents, becoming more independent
and autochthonous.

Italian Islam?
We have become accustomed to thinking about Islam in terms of
otherness, yet Italian and Islamic histories are interweaved through
both ancient and modern ties. With regard to the past, recalling Sicily
under Arab rule helps us to comprehend that the presence of Islam
has not been just an enemy but also a source of cultural and artistic
enrichment. With regard to the present day, it is necessary to consider
three phenomena: conversions to Islam on the part of Italian citizens,
the emergence of exogamous couples—in faith terms—in which one
of the partners is Muslim, and the birth of a generation of children of
immigrants who define themselves as Italian Muslims. These are all
indicators that Muslims have come to be regarded not just as foreign-
ers but as blends and Islam becomes a native presence, so much so
that scholars have begun to speak of Italian Islam (Allievi 2003). Nev-
ertheless, this does not mean that these new Muslims feel an exclusive
sense of belonging to Italy in geographical terms, nor that today there
exists an Italian model of recognition of Islam that is more significant
than local or regional models (Perocco 2004). Just as when one speaks
of European Islam, discussions of Italian Islam aim to underline the
fact that the cultural horizon has changed with regard to Islam in
immigrants’ countries of origin and above all that principles such as
pluralism, secularism, democracy and human rights can be subscribed
to by Muslims. Yet are we sure that the main laboratory for these cul-
tural transformations is taking place at the national level?
The “Council for Italian Islam” established in September 2005 by the
Minister of Home Affairs Pisanu (subsequently reactivated by Minister
Amato and not by accident silent under Minister Maroni, representing
 young muslims of italy 335

the Lega Nord-Northern League) does not appear to have been able to cre-
ate a public sphere of debate for Muslims in Italy, while its main achieve-
ment seems to be that of reassuring Italian public opinion, showing an
Islam that is capable of working together with institutions. Despite pushes
to create a nation-based system of Islamic representation on the part of
various European countries (Roy 2003, p. 92; Pace 2004) and the empha-
sis placed on the development of a “moderate Islam,” which is loyal
towards the nation-State, there are those who call for a conception of
a post-national Islam (Salih 2004), pursued by young cosmopolitan
people capable of multiple affiliations and allegiances.
Empirical studies conducted with Muslim youth in Italy (Frisina
2007; Maddanu 2009), associated and otherwise, show in fact that the
dimension which most stimulates the development of a theological
renewal is the European one and more in general that of the diaspora
(Saint-Blancat 2002), while the dimension which most encourages
the learning of democratic practices is the local one. Young people
learn pluralism above all by taking part democratically in the life of
the schools, neighbourhoods and towns which they inhabit. And they
attempt to legitimise religiously their social practices as best as they
can, on the one hand by re-appropriating discourses which circulate
at the transnational level, and on the other by trying to find answers
at the personal level, through daily dialogue with their peers and in
part with adults.
The absence of a systematic, legitimate structure for religious trans-
mission has fostered elsewhere a creative process whose main partic-
ipants are Muslim intellectuals who, by removing the monopoly of
the ulema, i.e. of specialists in theology, have submitted the Koran
to a close literary and historical analysis (Benzine 2004). Educated
at the school of human and social sciences, they have directed their
critical spirit at both traditionalist readings of Islam and at the arro-
gance of imposing a single version of Western modernity. These new
voices of Islam (Noor 2002) were often persecuted in their countries
of origin, but found space in European and American universities and
lived their exile as a resource for fostering a cultural production with-
out borders. Of these we might mention A. An-Na’im (Sudan/USA),
N. H. Abu Zayd (Egypt/Holland), A. Soroush (Iran/USA), M. Arkoun
(Algeria/France), yet as it is impossible to mention them all, it may be
helpful to recall some of their ideas which challenge the monolithic,
static versions both of Islam and the conquests of Western modernity.
Shari’a (Islamic law) is seen as a human interpretation of the voice of
336 annalisa frisina

Allah, God; therefore it may be contested and it is deemed necessary to

conceive different versions of it which are appropriate to new histori-
cal, social and political contexts. Human rights may be sanctioned by
several sources, secular as well as religious, and are destabilising ideas
also for the Western societies which claim to promote them. Their
criticism thus spares neither those Islamic states which refute the uni-
versality of these principles, nor those Western nations which do not
acknowledge their internal contradictions (whether historical, such as
the colonialism which sprang from the Enlightenment, or contempo-
rary, such as the problem of reconciling human rights with the limita-
tions created by nation-states, i.e. whether and how to guarantee them
for non-citizens).
In Italy we find young people who are beginning to discover these
new thinkers of Islam, studying them at university. This new knowl-
edge would appear to become an instrument of emancipation, serving
a faith which is able to combine with “freedom”.
I thought I was free, but I realised it was not the case. I’m talking first of
all about my independence, from the personal point of view. My freedom
of thought requires study . . . I studied the history of Islam differently at
university and this made me doubt what I knew. For example, I was
taught that the kalifs were enlightened, but on studying more objectively
I learned about their fights for power, violence . . . Studying scholars such
as Abu Zayd helped me as well . . . I once considered him impious, but
now I see him as one who chose freedom (Anouar, 21 years old, grown
up in Italy, of Moroccan origin).
These new voices are very precious in a global scenario where the de-
legitimization of the religious authorities has given rise also to phe-
nomena such as learning on the internet and the self-proclamation of
leaders through the mass media, very often leading to dogmatic and
neo-fundamentalist versions of Islam (Roy 2003, pp. 69–80). Despite
its democratic potential, nowadays Internet often seems to transmit
a legalist version of Islam centred on the definition of what is allow-
able (halal ) and what is not (haram) for a good Muslim. The GMI
website could give this impression too, whereas in meetings with GMI
members in flesh and blood, the religious debate was more elaborate
and complex. The public image presented often differs from private
experience: the former focuses on strict rules to follow, the latter on a
personal ethic with doubts and possible negotiations.
On the one hand, the resistance of adults and conflicts between
the leaderships of Islamic associationism until now have hindered
the emergence of a pluralist perspective of Islam in the Italian public
 young muslims of italy 337

sphere. In other words, awareness of plurality exists, but what is lack-

ing is public recognition of pluralism in which different voices have
equal dignity and where dissent is not experienced as a betrayal. On
the other hand the climate of Islamophobia present in Italian soci-
ety (Massari 2006) has certainly not encouraged self-criticism and has
driven a number of Muslims in Italy into defensive positions. Yet the
Young Italian Muslims (G.M.I.) and many other youths already rep-
resent the signal for a profound cultural change which is underway,
taking place quietly every day at the level of everyday life.

Islam in Everyday Life

Everyday Ijtihad
According to M. Talbi, the Tunisian intellectual who has dedicated
himself to promoting a “modern Islam” (2005), ijtihad (the interpre-
tive endeavour) cannot be considered the exclusive domain of religious
scholars of the past: today it becomes the “right of every Muslim”.
Through his “vectorial reading of the Koran”, Talbi has attempted to
show the necessary historical contextualisation for understanding the
deep, universal meaning of Islam.
Without knowing Talbi or other intellectuals who sustain this inno-
vative thesis, young Muslims who were born or brought up in Italy,
whether members of the Association of Young Italian Muslims (GMI)
or not, appear convinced of their right to engage in “interpretive endea-
vours” in order to bring the Islamic message up to date. What many
of them emphasise is the need to “find valid reasons” for religious
practices and the desire to seek “a personal pathway” to faith. It is not
so much a question of being able to interpret texts (this challenge con-
cerns a small minority of youths who have the cultural skills—starting
from language skills—to do so), but of being able to place oneself criti-
cally before tradition and religious authority in general, so as to be able
to “reterritorialise the Revelation” (Saint-Blancat 2002) in such a way
that it speaks to individual Muslims living in Europe today.
In the exchange of ideas set out below3 the value placed on the inter-
pretative plurality present in Islam clearly emerges, and this recognition

3
Part of a focus group which I organised in Milan on 09.09.2004 on the theme
“What is public life for me?” made up of 6 young people who have grown up in Italy
since childhood, aged between 19 and 25: two young women of Syrian origin and a
338 annalisa frisina

entails “feeling more free” at the everyday level and being able to “be
Muslim differently” from the way in which parents and “Arab nations”
in general live their faith.

– Personally, I don’t think it’s necessarily true that I need an institu-

tion . . . or an authority or someone who tells me exactly how to live.
There are some shared rules of living that all Muslims respect and
they are obvious. The Koran is a very practical book, it says nearly
everything . . . There are margins of interpretation though, choices to
make too, decisions that are down to the individual . . . And it’s not
necessarily true that a Muslim who doesn’t go to discos is better
than one who goes but who does other things to . . . Who’s to tell me
that one Muslim is better than another? No one. So since there’s no
one who can set him/herself up as a judge, this means that there
isn’t an answer that must necessarily be right for everyone. This
goes for the sphere of public life too, in dealing with others, in dis-
cussions, there’s a margin of individuality, individualism, personal
choices, and this obviously does not make me a better or a worse
Muslim, it makes me, me. At least that’s how I live it (Nouha, 19,
born in Italy, of Egyptian origin).
– If I think about the four law schools of Islam, it seems to me they are
founded in a traditional way. We were born here. We have under-
stood, we were taught that it is not like this and that’s all. You have
to reason. There is more than one choice, different interpretations,
because maybe you interpret something in one way, while someone
else could interpret the same thing in a different way . . . I feel that
Islam in Europe is a new way of living for the Muslim. It is different
from the Islam there is in Saudi Arabia! What for them is something
absolutely just for us is something unimaginable. Here too there are
parents who say “If you do that you’ll all go to hell!” only because
they are shut in by their way of thinking. We in Europe have the
advantage that we have opened up more. We live religion in this
new context. I’m really happy with that, because in the end I have
found out that mine is not a closed religion . . . Because very often
I see that Islam in the Arab countries is strict . . . Either you are a

young man of Tunisian origin belonging to the Association of Young Italian Muslims
(GMI), two women of Egyptian origin and a man of Bosnian origin who were not
members of the association.
 young muslims of italy 339

saint, you go to the mosque every day, I mean you must not even
laugh, or you do what you feel like doing, without problems! No,
actually shades of meaning, choices, are important. We have grown
up among others, through education we have gradually learned to
choose . . . (Amr, 21, raised in Italy, of Tunisian origin, GMI).

As Saint-Blancat (2004, 236) points out, in the experiences of young

Muslims who have grown up in Europe we find reflected the same
processes of change regarding religion in contemporary society that
affect their peers, with whom they share concerns and aspirations:
the same individual search for meaning, the same distrust of institu-
tionalised forms of religion, the same bringing into question of sys-
tems of reproduction of authority, the same tendency to seek social
ties and interactions on the basis of elective affinities (Campiche 1997;
Hervieu-Léger 2003).
The daily ijtihads of young Muslims thus seem to be an expression
of these new generational sensibilities. These interpretations do not
produce an “Islam savant” (Marongiu 2002), but they become a way of
dealing with daily doubts and uncertainties in a “conscientious” man-
ner. Young people do not deny the gaps in their knowledge of their
religion, but with the tools they have at their disposal they question
themselves regarding how they want to be Muslims. As we shall see,
many emphasise what for them is more important: the spirit rather
than the letter, pureness of heart as opposed to ritual practices.

The Search for a Spiritual Islam

I asked over fifty young people (aged between 17 and 30, raised in
Italy since childhood) who defined themselves as Muslims the question
of what that means for them. From their answers it emerges first of
all that being Muslim does not coincide with the practice of religious
rules. Most of the young people met in fact described themselves as
practising little and made reference above all to two of the Five Pillars
of Islam:4 prayer, which they rarely conduct at the prescribed hours
(those who pray say that they do so “in their own way” and hardly
ever five times), and fasting in the month of Ramadan, which when

4
The Five Pillars are: profession of faith, five daily prayers, ritual giving of alms,
fasting during the month of Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca.
340 annalisa frisina

it is observed is “not very strict”. With regard to attending mosques,

this takes place generally around the times of the main religious obser-
vances (Eid al-Fitr, end of Ramadan, and Eid-al Adha or Eid al-Kabir,
the Festival of Sacrifice) which are recognised as important moments
for coming together and joining one’s family.
What is often criticised is the tightening of the normative version of
religion: orthopraxis without intention makes no sense.
Tariq Ramadan also wrote it in his book “To be a European Muslim”:
Muslims today have confined Islam within the legitimate or the illegiti-
mate, in responding to what are the questions of the West. The core of
Islam in contrast is serenity, happiness and many other things, but not
legalism. Today a Muslim when he prays seems like a robot. You see?
Programmed, rigid. He’s not at peace with himself, you can tell. Prayer
instead is a relationship with God, you have to be at ease, you’re con-
nected with God . . . While the Muslim is more concerned with keeping
his hands straight, his feet straight . . . With exterior things! (Rachid, 21
years old, born in Italy, of Moroccan origin).
A girl might be in a long dress and, wear the veil, but have an evil heart.
It is very personal, appearances can be deceptive! It is not just a matter
of wearing the hijab, to me that makes no difference . . . What matters
is how you behave (Naima, 20 years old, born in Italy, of Moroccan
origin).
This interiorized religiosity has always existed in Islam, not only in
mystical tradition but also amongst “common Muslims”, especially
women (Babès 2000, p. 180). Young Muslims revitalize this memory in
contraposition to those who bring the Islamic faith down to the strict
opposites of halal-haram. Islam for these young people appears to be
a spiritual resource, which allows them to feel at peace with themselves
and helps them in moments of difficulty, but also becomes a source of
ethical commitment, of responsibility and social commitment.
I’m non-practising, but I believe in God (. . .). The important thing is
right conduct towards others, everyone, not just towards Muslims. This
is to be Muslim and so there’s nothing to be ashamed of. (Zeitouna, 21,
born in Italy, of Moroccan origin)
I don’t think that a non-practising Muslim isn’t Muslim. Because Islam
comes from the word salaam, it comes from the word for peace . . . That
many-coloured flag is mine. For the Muslim who does his bit every
day so that there may be peace . . . (Lotfi, 30, raised in Italy, of Tunisian
origin).
As happens among young people in other European countries, the
religious experience of a number of young Italian Muslims appears to
 young muslims of italy 341

stimulate a civic conscience, of an individual who acts for the common

good. The relations between religion and citizenship thus become sig-
nificant: religious identification does not simply fit into a secularised
discourse concerning citizenship, but it is participation itself that is
seen as a moral pledge (Fadil 2006, p. 76).
For many young people met during the research, the pledge to “walk
in the path of God” is realised above all through dialogue focused both
inwardly and outwardly.
If we have a dialogue with the Jews, with the Union of Young Italian
Jews, why shouldn’t we have a dialogue with the Sufi, with COREIS? But
our parents, or the UCOII, don’t accept these arguments (Said, 20, raised
in Italy, of Moroccan origin, Young Italian Muslims—GMI)
The question we have to ask ourselves is not ‘what religion are you?’ but
‘what spirituality are you?’ (. . .). I think that non-believers also live with
their own spirituality, their own way of relating to a supreme power
called Nature and with the rest of humanity.
For the believer the relationship with others translates into a strength-
ening of faith, given that diversity is the will of God, the Creator. (. . .).
Thus engaging in dialogue for believers also means adoration, obedience
to His will. (Chaouki 2005, p. 58)
Why don’t we try and understand? “I have created you diverse and
numerous so that you can know each other and also put you to the test,
competing in good works” (Koranic citation, editor’s note). So sometimes
God leaves us to our own destiny to see our behaviour. “All believers are
brothers.” He didn’t say “all Muslims are brothers.” (. . .). He didn’t say
“you blacks are brothers.” He said “All believers are brothers.” . . . Believ-
ers can be Jews, they can be Christians, they can be Muslims, Buddhists
and those who believe in human values too. (Baha, 29, raised in Italy, of
Senegalese origin)
Ordinarily brotherhood is first of all Islamic, between those who are
alike, or reference is made to the religions of the book, that is, Juda-
ism, Christianity and Islam. Here, in contrast, belief is reinterpreted
in an innovative way and brotherhood is extended to other faiths and
to atheists too. Those narratives make it possible also to reflect upon
multiple belongings, a frequent experience for young people who feel
part of the Umma, the imagined community that includes all Muslims
of the world, but who also see themselves with other ties of loyalty and
solidarity.
All of the young Muslims interviewed believe in the oneness of God,
but often draw neither precise boundaries nor hierarchies of truth
between the various institutional religions, in a way comparable to
what is happening among their Italian peers of other faiths.
342 annalisa frisina

We have the same God. We say that God has 99 names . . . What does
it matter if we add yours too? I mean, let everyone call Him what they
want! (Jamila, 20, born in Italy, of Moroccan origin)
I’m not so religious, I never pray . . . I believe in God though, I believe in
Mohammed and in Jesus too . . . I believe in all religions, but I’m Muslim.
(Salim, 19, born in the U.S.A., raised in Italy, of Egyptian origin)
In Islamic doctrine the prophet Mohammed is considered the seal of
the prophecy and Islam the religion which comes after Judaism and
Christianity to provide humans with the most exhaustive version of
the divine message. Many young people in the research believe all of
this, but from their conversations there clearly emerges “a belief in
the relative” (Pace 1997), typical of modern societies where plural-
ism (Berger 1994) profoundly transforms religious forms and content.
There are also those who go a step further and imagine another type
of education for their sons that gives more space for exchanging ideas
with other faiths.
A thing I want to teach my sons is something important I have learnt
about religions. I wish they could come into contact with all religions
(. . .). My parents would not allow me to learn about the Christian reli-
gion (the Catholic one) at school, but I have always learnt about it.
I think it is right to exchange ideas with each other. In the end, there’s
not much difference between the three monotheistic religions. The same
theme appears . . . Maybe someone uses different clothes . . . someone
wears the veil! But in the end the theme is the same, love each other
(Leila, 19 years old, grown up in Italy, of Moroccan origin).
This way of thinking is stigmatized by the parents (and by the adults
generally), by the mosques and by the associations, and its position
remains weak because it stems from the younger people, who have
few theological tools to legitimate it. Through daily confrontations
and negotiations, those who believe “differently” continue to consider
themselves as Muslims and focus on the meaning of respect5 and their
right to express the most authentic message of Islam according to their
own experiences.

5
The comments on respect can be distinguished in various ways: self respect, to
avoid demeaning acts, to face difficult situations with dignity; respect for the parents
who brought them into the world and emigrated with all the sacrifices that entailed;
and respect for others, since “harming another is tantamount to harming yourself ”,
because “we are all human beings”.
 young muslims of italy 343

Generational and Gender Conflicts/Negotiations

At the European level a gradual de-ethicnisation of Islam has mani-
fested itself: young Muslims have striven to distinguish between what
they consider the traditional customs of their parents’ countries and
the authentic principles of the Islamic religion (Saint-Blancat 2004).
This task of religious reformulation has proven to be particularly
important for the emancipation of young women from family imposi-
tions. Young Muslim daughters of migrations have in fact learned to
criticise the instrumental use that families may make of the Koran in
order to reproduce the patriarchal model of authority and the hier-
archy between the sexes (Werbner and Modood 1997). There are by
now numerous empirical studies which show how it is possible to be
female, “Muslim and modern” (we would cite, among others, Göle
1993; Salih 2008). This means that the search for meaning and indi-
vidual autonomy may pass for a renewed Islamic religiosity. Even the
hijab, the headscarf, may assume the significance of an assertion of
religiosity in the face of an assimilationist context and in many cases
helps women to legitimise their own morality towards the family, thus
making it easier for them to go out into public space. In addition,
confronted by parents—above all those fathers who interpret Islam in
patriarchal terms—there are young European Muslim women, who
in a similar way to that which has occurred and continues to occur
within other lines of belief, dispute the authenticity of a reading that
sacralises the subordination of women. For example, to those who
wish to have their daughter break off her studies for her to be married,
they respond by referring to the Sunna and citing dictums in which
the Prophet Mohammed affirms that the pursuit of knowledge is the
duty of every Muslim, men and women alike, and that the women’s
consent is required for a marriage to be valid. In any case it would be
extremely reductive to represent all immigrant families as custodians
of traditions, as we find comparable transformations and gender con-
flicts in their countries of origin, and parents cannot all be assigned to
a single category. Nonetheless, where such tensions arise we find vari-
ous tactics and strategies used by young women in order to broaden
their spheres of action. For young women who were born or grew up
in Italy, the most common clashes concern clothing, spare time, how
and how long to continue their studies, and if, when and (above all)
who to marry.
344 annalisa frisina

Through the example of marriage choices we see, then, what negoti-

ations are underway between Muslim daughters and parents and what
kinds of individual and collective resources can be of help to them.
Parental expectations regarding their future spouse can be questioned
in a more or less radical manner. While the ideal candidate for many
parents is still a Muslim from their own country of origin, daughters
may instead: 1) choose whom they prefer from among young men of
the same origin as the parents; 2) choose to marry a Muslim of differ-
ent origin; 3) choose to marry a non-Muslim; 4) choose not to marry;
5) choose to live as a couple and family outside marriage. The first
and second cases are very common, while the other cases occur less
frequently but point to potential future transformations. In addition,
the way in which negotiations take place is essential for understanding
their outcome.
Tactical negotiations are conducted without the reasons of the two
parties in conflict being truly shared, and bring with them frustration
and feelings of guilt, and after a period of apparent calm may lead to a
breaking off of relationships. Strategic negotiations make it possible for
the parties in conflict to review the issue by means of an interpretive
framework that can be shared by both parents and children, and give
more lasting results. Empirical research (Frisina 2007) shows that stra-
tegic negotiations are conducted through arguments of the religious
type, so that parents and children still have a shared memory, a line
of belief in which they rewrite themselves in different ways (Hervieu-
Léger 1996). With regard, for example, to the future husband’s nation
of origin, the argument advanced by young women is that what their
parents request, i.e. that the spouse’s country of origin be the same
as that of their parents, is simply tradition and not religion. By partly
accepting the view of the previous generation, that is that the woman
can only marry a Muslim, they maintain that a good Muslim may be
of any nationality and that even among their compatriots there are
untrustworthy types. Faced with the fear of their parents that their cul-
tural memory will be lost, they argue that rather than repeat by heart
things that they do not understand it is preferable for them to dedi-
cate themselves to understanding their meaning, their spirit, through
study. In addition, they claim that in this way exchanges with their
parents’ country of origin are chosen and not endured and this certainly
makes the positive aspects more desirable. This seems to be the strategy
that is most in vogue today among young women in the Association of
Young Italian Muslims (G.M.I.), who choose an Italian Muslim, i.e. the
 young muslims of italy 345

young son of immigrants who was born or who grew up in Italy, or the
son of Italians who has converted to Islam. In any case, given that in demo-
graphic terms there are still few young Italian Muslims, there are those
who extend their horizons towards Europe in order to seek a suitor, who
may also be a distant cousin liked by the family too: the important thing is
that he has grown up in countries where immigration is more established
and young Muslims have (by this time) become native Europeans. How-
ever, with regard to the future husband’s religious denomination, there
are young women who maintain that this prohibition is not written in any
part of the Koran and that it is merely a custom that it is only men who
can marry a Jewish or Christian woman while for women this possibility
is still prohibited. The resistance of parents and Islamic associationism—on
the part of youth associations too—is still very strong on this subject and
their main argument is that according to the Muslim perspective religion
is transmitted via the paternal line. Nevertheless this diffidence in the face
of inter-faith marriages goes far beyond the Islamic religion (in spite of
the fact that there is no empirical evidence that these marriages fail more
often than others) and the question of religious education for children in a
pluralistic setting is a still-open challenge for many Italian parents.
These conflicts can also be very painful, made more acute by a histori-
cal and political phase in which talk of a clash of civilisations circulates, in
which it is a struggle to recognise the values that religions share, and in
some couples the alternative to the couple breaking off their relationship
with each other or the older generation becomes the more or less authen-
tic conversion of the betrothed to Islam. Marrying a non-Muslim, or not
marrying and/or choosing the path of living together, are still very much
minority choices among young Muslim women in Italy, and they are likely
to be stigmatised. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that elsewhere they
are becoming more significant: for example, between 10 and 15% of young
American Muslim women and 30% of young Canadian Muslim women
are married to non-Muslims (Haddad & Smith 1996, p. 26); cohabitation
with a non-Muslim is on the rise among young European Muslim women
of Maroccan origin (Ouali 2003, p. 77). These cultural changes are slow,
yet among young women who were born and who grew up in Italy
new female subjectivities are emerging which through their public vis-
ibility show novel ways of becoming part of the Islamic line of faith
once again.
346 annalisa frisina

The Public Visibility of a New Generation of Muslims

New female Muslim figures are emerging in Italy, publicly claiming

multiple belongings and capable of multiple loyalties and criticisms.
Far from being the passive victims of orientalist views of colonial ori-
gin (Said 1991) and of their side effects on women (Ahmed 1995),
they strive daily in their cultural creativity to resist the representations
of their inferiority and they denounce “the hypocrisy of the assumed
neutrality and equality of individuals in the public sphere, or the arti-
ficial nature of the boundary between the public and private spheres,
shedding light on the classic opposition of secularism and religiosity”
(Salih 2008, 144).
As examples, it is worth mentioning two young Italian Muslim
women, Randa Ghazy and Sumaya Abdel Qader, who have become
popular in the Italian public sphere thanks to their recently-published
books. “Perhaps I Won’t Kill Anyone Today” (Ghazy, 2007) tells the
story of Jasmine, a young Muslim of Egyptian origin who “oddly
enough, is not a terrorist”. Jasmine feels “like a djinn”, good, often
angry because she is misunderstood, but also proud of being “differ-
ent, not inferior” and of resisting to Oriana Fallaci’s rethorics. She
rebels against her friend’s decision to accept a marriage arranged by
her parents, and against the autochthonous admirer who perpetuates
stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims. Her main weapon is irony.
The veil is like depilatory wax: do it, whenever you want, ignore what
others expect from you. When you feel you can do it, when it is not too
great a sacrifice. Men would always like us perfectly depilated. Forget it.
I’M NOT A FEMINIST, BUT . . . Muslim men should spend more time
on a self-examination instead of spending their time checking what a
woman says, what she wears, how she laughs, how many times a month
she plucks her eyebrows, maybe things would turn out better (p. 16,
block letters as in the original)
Anything a Muslim woman says, beware, beware, she creates a scandal.
As if she had a note on her forehead saying: WORK IN PROGRESS,
EMANCIPATION PROCESS RUNNING, and as if anyone trying to
break with certain traditions were to cause a spreading uneasiness.
So, OK, reform. But how? Jasmine can go out with Thomas for example?
[. . .] Can Jasmine tell her mother without fear that she was talking to a
young man who was chatting her up? And her father? What length of
skirt is allowed? Below the knee? And slightly over? Can wine vinegar
be used to dress food? Cakes and snacks with a low alcohol content?
Can’t you even eat those? And what about the lard in certain types of
 young muslims of italy 347

bread? Does that send you straight to hell? To list just some of the most
trivial dilemmas. And is it credible that it’s an ordinary young Mila-
nese girl who raises these dilemmas? Or isn’t she a true Muslim? But in
the end who decides? Is there like a licence, a certificate? If there is, let
me know, for god’s sake, I’d really like one” (pp. 147–8, capitals as in
the original).
“I Wear Veil and Adore Queen” (Abdel Qader, 2008) tells the story of
Sulinda, a young Muslim girl of Palestinian/Jordanian origin who feels
part of a new generation of Italians and refuses to be classified on the
basis of her immigrant parents origins. Sulinda goes regularly to the
mosque and she wants access to the tools and places where she can
nurture her faith and hand it down to her daughters, but in modern-
day Italy this is by no means easy.
I was persecuted by victimism up until high school. Until rage and pride
burst inside me and I decided to turn into an attacking position. Stop
suffering in silence! Then there was that new element that made me an
easy target: the veil [. . .] The change came when the professor of religion
asked me one day to join her in the classes to talk about Islam and Arabs.
That’s easy, I thought, so I can skip the maths and Italian lessons . . . The
illusion soon disappeared, when I realized I was completely ignorant
about Arab history and culture. For many religious questions I had no
answers, and where was I supposed to find them? The mosque was just a
hole where nobody was prepared to teach the young. My mother told us
what she knew. My poor dad was always at work (p. 136 and 144–5).
(Her daughter Shadia, 6 years old) has a keen spirit of observation and as
soon as she enters the mosque she asks, ‘Why is it so disgusting here and
the church is so beautiful instead?’ It’s true. It is impossible not to won-
der why, when we are in an industrial shed converted into a mosque,
where it is very cold in winter and very hot in summer, humid, dark,
with no garden, no grass, nothing attractive. How can I answer her? That
the Local Council or Municipal Authorities won’t give us permission
to build a real mosque? Or that somebody has instilled people with so
much fear that as soon as we think about building an Islamic place of
worship or community center, a generalized psychosis and panic spread
everywhere so that nobody has the courage to issue any permits? She
would not understand and I would risk transmitting to her a sort of rage
and hatred against the institutions that they would deserve but that it is
neither right nor constructive. I restrict myself to telling her, “We are
looking for a new place that will be beautiful”. I hope I won’t have to lie
forever. (pp. 120–121)
Ever since she was little, one of my many sisters has been mad about
the police. She dreamed of becoming a policewoman [. . .]. It’s a shame
that she can’t make her dream come true. Firstly, because like me (born
348 annalisa frisina

in Italy, editor’s note) she still doesn’t have Italian nationality. Secondly,
because she wears that blessed veil! To tell the truth I think that it’s more
difficult to solve the first problem [. . .]. Her disappointment was deep
when she understood the way things were. She felt almost betrayed by
the country for which she would have given everything, even her own
life [. . .]. I think that in Italy there aren’t laws that discriminate against
those who have a different faith. The problem lies in applying what the
law already provides for. (pp. 78–9).
Randa Ghazy and Sumaya Abdel Qader work with “Yalla Italia! Il
primo mensile delle seconde generazioni” (“The first magazine for
second generations” www.yallaitalia.it) on the editorial staff made up
of Italian Muslims (with parents from the Maghreb or Mashreq) a
large majority of whom are female. It is a publishing initiative of a
non-profit weekly (“Vita”), which between 2007 and the present has
published 18 topic-based issues. The first topic to be dealt with was
“Laughing as Muslims” in connection with the affair involving the
Danish cartoons of Mohammed, to show young Muslims’ sense of
humour and sensitivity with regard to “sacred and profane” subjects.
Other topics have included: family relationships, holidays in the par-
ents’ country of origin; the impact of 9/11 on their lives; Ramadan as
experienced in Italy; television; their predictions for the future; faith
and love; feeling “half Italian” due to difficulties in obtaining Italian
nationality, despite being born and raised in Italy; dealing with taboos
(such as homosexuality for example); the desire to talk after YallaIta-
lia’s first year (for example “don’t call us moderate . . .”); self-criticism
amongst Muslims (with a focus on female voices of courage, in order
to reflect on the construction of a “free, modern Islam”); food; fash-
ion and consumption; multilingualism; personal reflections after the
Israeli siege of Gaza; leaders in the Islamic world; and finally books
that have changed their lives. What connects these extremely disparate
subjects is the way in which they are presented: a pluralist perspective
is offered, in which different points of view are legitimate; and above
all, Islam is depicted through familiar, personal experiences, showing
how there are significant transformations under way, with their main
protagonists being young Muslims who have grown up in Italy.

Conclusions: A New Generation of Muslim Italians

According to Lambert (2004), generation has come to replace social

class as the main factor of religious differentiation in present-day
 young muslims of italy 349

Europe. Do young Muslims who have grown up in Europe consti-

tute an exception? No, Saint-Blancat tells us (2004, 244): we also find
among them “the tendency towards an autonomous spirituality and the
development of a religiosity ‘off the beaten track’ which is a resource
of meaning and ethics”. Is this also true of young Muslims who have
grown up in Italy? In the light of what we have said before now, we
think that it is. However, a number of clarifications need to be made.
First of all, the limitations of the research on which I have based
my arguments need to be made clear. It is the first piece of research
to be carried out in Italy on young Italian Muslims, conducted using
a qualitative method,6 and it would be opportune to extend this work
to a broader sample of young people, also taking in contexts of social
marginalisation which I have only touched upon in my research. Per-
haps “reactive” religious affiliations, more closed and self-referential,
would emerge, of those who for example experience the pluralist con-
text as a threat, who have not had the opportunity to or been able to
forge ties with their peer group and take refuge in affiliations with
neo-traditionalist groups/movements. It is also possible that neo-com-
munity trends may emerge in the future in the face of an economic crisis,
which risks fuelling xenophobia with the complicity of a large part of the
media and Italian politicians.7
Finally, there are the limitations of the Italian secular state model, in
which the Catholic church continues to be hegemonic and the restric-
tive Italian law regarding nationality based primarily on jus sanguinis
continues to make immigrants’ children “Italians with a residence per-
mit” (Pace & Frisina, 2010). These structural limitations in the long-
term may have a negative influence on young people who wish to

6
I used participant observation with the Young Italian Muslims (GMI) from 2001
to 2005; 58 in-depth interviews and 4 focus groups with young people who define
themselves as Muslims, balanced in terms of gender and age (17–30), predominantly
of working-class social rank and an average-to-high level of education. I have contin-
ued to gather documentation until the time of writing (6/2009) and through informal
contacts with representatives of the Young Italian Muslims (GMI) I have been able to
follow the association’s developments. I am currently carrying on this work by inter-
viewing young Muslims in the North-East, where the Lega Nord (Northern League)
exerts a strong political and cultural influence.
7
Recently episodes of racial violence have taken place in Italy, and have regarded
the children of immigrants too (for example the death of Abdul Graibe, sept. 2008, in
Milan . . .). In addition, in June 2009, the father of Randa Ghazy was beaten up by an
Italian family who shouted at him “Go back to your country”. A few days earlier he
had given an interview to a journalist and to the question of whether he felt integrated
he replied: “I don’t feel integrated, I’m 100 per cent Italian!”
350 annalisa frisina

see themselves recognised as citizens and live their faith “on an equal
footing”.
In any case, new research on young Italian Muslims is being con-
ducted (Maddanu 2009) and is currently confirming the consider-
ations made hitherto.

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 BELIEVERS IN PROGRESS
YOUTH AND RELIGION IN ITALY

Giuseppe Giordan

Introduction

The young, a resource that is becoming numerically rarer and rarer in

the Italian society, today appear to be scarcely protagonist and active
in the public scene. The most widespread images picture them as peo-
ple who are not very keen on growing up, coping with worrisome
occupational precariousness, rather late in the evolution of the most
important stages of life (namely concluding their studies, entering the
work market, leaving their own family of origin, assuming responsi-
bilities and autonomy, creating their own family . . .), they do not seem
to be very incisive and determinant in the various sectors of society.1
The research “Young People in Aosta Valley: social, cultural and
religious belongings” is part of this framework of reflection about the
condition of the young in Italy: this chapter will illustrate the data
that have emerged concerning the relation between the young and
religion.
The survey was carried out in May 2006 in the Valley of Aosta,
the smallest Italian region, situated in the north-west of Italy, in a
mountainous area at the foot of Mont Blanc; the survey involved some
4,000 adolescents between the ages of 14 and 19 by means of a ques-
tionnaire of 125 questions. The main characteristic of the interviewees
is that they are not just a sample, but nearly the totality of the young
inhabitants of the Valley of Aosta (82.2%) attending Upper Secondary
Schools.2

1
See Franco Garelli (2008).
2
To confront with the national data we will refer to the researches of the IARD
Institute, that has carried out an inquiry on the condition of the young in Italy every
3–4 years, from the first years of the 80s till today (Buzzi, Cavalli, De Lillo 2002 and
Grassi 2006), and the data of a research carried out in 1994 by the Catholic University
of Milan (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995). To confront with other
local situations we will refer to Garelli 2006b (province of Cuneo), Corvo 2005 (dio-
cese of Belluno), Castegnaro 2006 (diocese of Venice) and Castegnaro 2007 (diocese
of Concordia-Pordenone).
354 giuseppe giordan

The current chapter, then, first of all means to illustrate the estrange-
ment of the young inhabitants of the Valley of Aosta from religion or,
even when they call themselves Catholic, from the religious practice.
Secondly, we will try to demonstrate in what way, however, although
the young go to church and attend the rites scarcely or discontinuously,
religion still constitutes a cultural factor that is capable of influencing
the personal configuration of the system of values strongly and, then,
the life style of these young people who often call themselves non-
believers or believers “in their own ways”: we will see how religion
interacts with the system of values and the behaviours of the individu-
als influencing ideas, opinions, sociality, behaviours.
Then we will dwell upon the free research of meaning of these young
people who make use of their forefathers’ faith freely, integrating it
with other sources, beliefs, suggestions, through a creative, mobile3 and
personal research process. Actually we will observe the young people
of the Aosta Valley through the lens of spirituality: a few profiles will
emerge that can be brought back to the relation between the religious
and the spiritual dimensions of believing.
Finally in the last part we will see how the personal beliefs play
a determining role in structuring the ideas of the young concerning
“the different”, in particular concerning those who belong to different
religions: actually we will consider the interaction between spirituality
and pluralism, analysing the different relation modalities that emerge
according to whether the other religions are perceived as causes of
conflict or as resources for comparison.

The Difficult Relation with the Church

According to some researchers, the religiousness of the young in Italy

is characterized by the primacy of emotions, by the search for authen-
ticity and for a personal internal dimension, and by scarce participa-
tion in group activities (Grassi 2006); besides, in a post secular epoch
(Barbano 1990, Berzano 1994), a certain number of young people are
still to be found within Catholicism persevering in attending reli-
gious rites, devoting themselves to voluntary activities and becoming

3
The image of movement seems to be the most appropriate way to read and inter-
pret the contemporary religiousness of the young even in Italy (Garelli and Ferrero
Camoletto 2003).
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 355

Table 1. Religious Identification (Percentage, N = 3,896)

To which religion do you presently belong?
Catholic 78.7% (3,066)
Protestant—Evangelical 0.7% (27)
Anglican 0.0%
Orthodox 0.5% (19)
Jewish 0.2% (7)
Muslim 1.1% (43)
Buddhist 0.5% (19)
Hinduist 0.1% (3)
Jehovah’s Witnesses 0.7% (27)
New Age 0.5% (19)
Other religion 2.6% (101)
I don’t belong to any religion 14.5% (565)
Total 100.0 (3,896)

enthusiastic over the life of the community or on the occasion of

extraordinary events such as the World Days of Youth (Garelli and
Ferrero Camoletto 2003, Garelli 2006a and 2006b).
When we investigate the religiousness of the Italian young people,
the main question is not so much with which religion they identify
themselves, considering the prevalence of Catholicism in the national
territory, but rather describing the different modalities of practising
and believing, that they often live in a free and autonomous way in
relation to such identification.4
The young in Aosta Valley are not different from the Italians of the
same age: nearly eight out of ten (78.7%) affirm they belong to the
Catholic religion (Tab. 1). This is a percentage that appears to be even
higher than the latest recordings at national level.5
Then, the reference point of the young in Aosta Valley, at least for
what concerns the basis of their identification, remains to be the reli-
gion of their forefathers, the religion in which they have been educated
and in which they have grown up. The other religions gather rather
low adhesion percentages altogether (6.9%), and anyway in line with

4
About the religious bricolage and the “do it yourself” religion, please see Lucà
Trombetta 2004.
5
In the IARD 2004 research, concerning young people of the age between 15 and
20, 68% declare they are Catholic (Grassi 2006), while in the previous IARD 2000
report the percentage was 80.8% (Buzzi, Cavalli, de Lillo 2002).
356 giuseppe giordan

the national average (6.8%, Grassi 2006): their heterogeneity, however,

makes it difficult to trace a significant profile. Still in line with the data
recorded in Italy a percentage of interviewees is found (14.5%) stating
they do not belong to any religion.6
The high identification with Catholicism of the young in Aosta
Valley would seem to show the endurance of the social and cultural
“scenery” (Garelli 1986) that has found in the Catholic religion one
of the most characterizing7 elements: to many, then, religion seems to
be limited to a generic declaration of belonging, it is a religion that
stands in the background, a common sense religion, useful to pro-
vide a shared code of identification rather than, as we will see later,
a conscious and personal choice. Such hypothesis is supported also
by the high percentage of young people declaring that they belong to
their own religion on account of tradition or education (33.9%), or
“for a personal conviction, but not in an active way” (25.2%). A more
marked and convinced form of identification instead is expressed by
one young individual out of ten (11.6%), who joins actively and owing
to personal firm belief.
The importance attributed to the Catholic religion, however, is
placed in a different perspective, considering how the attitude towards
the Catholic Church has modified in the course of time: nearly one
young interviewee out of two (48.8%) affirms that he has distanced
himself from religion; 22.9% have alternated moments of greater or
lesser vicinity, and 19.2% have not substantially modified their own
attitudes towards the Church. Little less than one young interviewee
out of ten (9.1%) affirms he has approached the Church. Comparing
such percentages with the national ones or with those of other local
contexts, some more marked distance is kept by the young of Aosta
Valley towards the religious institution.8

6
In the IARD 2000 research (Buzzi, Cavalli, de Lillo 2002) 15.6% of the 15–34 year
olds stated they didn’t belong to any religion; such percentage has grown in the IARD
2004 report (Grassi 2006) to 17.3% (12.8% concerning the 15–20 year olds). In Cuneo
the 15–29 year olds who declare they do not belong to any religion are 14% (Garelli
2006b). In 1994, the 18–21 year old Italians who declared they did not belong to any
religion were 12.3% (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995).
7
To investigate the role of religion in the culture of the Valley of Aosta more
deeply, we refer to Cuaz (1998).
8
In the Venice diocese (Castegnaro 2006), four young people out of ten among
those of 18–29 years of age affirm they have distanced themselves from the Church,
and two out of ten do so in the Concordia-Pordenone diocese (Castegnaro 2007); in
1994 the national percentage of the people between 18–21 was 21% (Cesareo, Cipriani,
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 357

The first ambit in which the importance of the sense of belonging

we have just examined is accurately verifiable is that of the religious
practice, where just in the age range taken in consideration by us we
notice a substantial decrease:9 this phenomenon is only partially expli-
cable with the shift to the Upper Secondary school,10 the meeting with
different social and cultural contexts and the will, typical of the ado-
lescents, to dispute the received precepts and to differentiate from the
adult world.
As it can be easily foreseen, while age rises, the number of those
people who participate less frequently in Sunday Mass increases: if
those of 14–15 years of age who never or nearly never participate is
38.1%, the percentage among the 18 year olds increases to 56%, to get
to 61.3% among the 20 year olds (Fig. 1).
In conformity with what was pointed out in the IARD 2004 research
(Grassi 2006), even among the young people from Aosta Valley, what
influences the religious practice is not declaring oneself to be or not to
be Catholic, but rather the place occupied by religion in one’s life: as it
is well highlighted by the profiles of spirituality that we will illustrate
further on, the more important a young individual believes religion
to be in his life, the more frequently he attends Sunday Mass. And we
may make the same consideration concerning the frequency of prayer
and the participation in religious groups.
For what concerns the latter aspect, about one young individual in
Aosta Valley out of ten affirms he participates in groups, associations,

Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995). In the IARD 2004 research 37% of the 15–20 year old
Italians affirm that their trust in the Catholic Church has diminished in the last five
years, while it has augmented for 12.7% and has remained the same for 49.3% (Grassi
2006).
9
At the age of 14–15 the young Catholics massively abandon the regular practice
of the Sunday Mass: the confirmation rite, celebrated at this age or just before in the
great majority of the Italian dioceses, is lived by a consistent part of adolescents as a
sort of “leave” from the ecclesial life.
10
At the age of 14–15 the Italian students shift from the Lower Secondary school
(middle school) to the Upper Secondary school (high school): the passage is particu-
larly crucial because just on the threshold between pre-adolescence and adolescence
they shift from a generic school that is the same for everybody to a school chosen by
the students themselves, a school addressing each student towards his own profes-
sional future or to a specific area of study. In the Valley of Aosta this passage is even
harder because all the Upper Secondary schools are situated only in the central part of
the Valley. And the students living in the lateral valleys must then leave, together with
the middle school, also the group of their peers and their rural social environment of
reference, to spend the whole week in boarding schools and halls of residence in the
central part of the Valley.
358 giuseppe giordan

Figure 1. “Excluding Weddings and Funerals, How Frequently do you Partici-

pate in Mass or, if you are not Catholic, in other Religious Rites?” (According
to Age; Percent values; N = 3,896)

70

60

50
Never or nearly
40 never
30 Every week

20

10

0
14–15 16 year 17 year 18 year 19 year 20 year
year olds olds olds olds olds
olds

or movements of religious inspiration discontinuously or regularly:

6.7% participate in parish groups for activities such as catechesis,
prayer, liturgy, charity and singing; 3.7% in associations or Catholic
movements at national level (Azione cattolica, Comunione e liberazi-
one, Acli, Scout); 1% participate in other Catholic groups or associa-
tions of local nature (family groups, groups reading the Bible). Those
who participate in non Catholic groups and associations are 1.4%.
Besides the topics of religious character are those which are dis-
cussed the least in the friendly groups and, if on one side the young
who participate in religious associations are those who mostly wish
to know and associate with other groups, on the other hand the reli-
gious associations are those offering the most reduced grade of appeal
among the young of Aosta Valley.
In conclusion, the religious practice of the young in the Valley of
Aosta records a marked level of disaffection leading to percentages of
regular attendance that are lower than the national average and lower
than in other particular zones. This, as we will see, does not mean
however that the young do not ask themselves questions of religious
and of existential nature, and that they are not in search of their own
spirituality; maybe the desertion of the practice implies a certain dif-
ficulty on part of the agencies of religious socialization in intercepting
the need for meaning of these young people effectively.
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 359

The “Cultural Religion”

As we have seen, to the young of Aosta Valley, faith and the relation
with the Catholic Church seem to have lost that central position that
their grandparents and their parents had granted to them.
However, the data concerning these young, although discordant,
shows the persistence of the role of an institutional Church that makes
its weight felt in the fields of culture, identity and values, if not exactly
as the foundation of sense and meaning for one’s life.
The cultural relevance of the Catholic Church emerges in the first
place in the degree of trust that the young affirm they have in such
institution; in the second place it emerges from the importance that
they assign to the role of the parish in their territory; moreover, from
the holding of the belief in some dogma of faith of the Catholic reli-
gion. In the end, the belief is still capable, as we will see, to influence
values and social behaviours.11
In the first place, although they do not have great confidence in
the institutions in general, the young of the region put the Catholic
Church among the ones they trust the most, together with the school
and the police (see Fig. 2).
The Catholic Church, the school and the police are those institu-
tions to which high percentage of young people affirm they grant their
confidence (with a preference for the school). The Church and the
school actually are two classical agencies of the socialization to norms
and values.
In the second place, a large majority (58.2%) of the young of Aosta
Valley believe that the social life of the village or of the quarter would
suffer from the closure of their own parishes,12 acknowledging in this
way at least a social primacy, if not an existential or religious primacy,
to the phenomenon of the religious associations.
In the third place, facing the enunciation of some beliefs drawn
from the Catholic doctrine, we notice a weakening process in the secu-
larization and the percentages of convinced and non convinced people

11
See Scalon (2008, pp. 65–80).
12
The strong relevance of the parish on the territory of the Valley of Aosta emerges
even if we compare with the 1994 national research of the Catholic University: between
the 18–21 year olds, in that case, the percentage of those who believed that the social
life of the quarter or of the village would resent negatively from the closure of the
parish was 35.3% (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995).
 360 giuseppe giordan

Figure 2. Confidence in the Institutions: Low/None—Medium—High

60 56,8
51,3
50 46,7 45,6 44,6
42,8
39,6 38,4 38,2 40,1
40 36,7
30,8 31,5
30 28,7
25,7 26,8
22 24,8 23,6 23,2
21,2 23,3 23,4 21,2 22,4
19,8 20,6 21,2 20,6
20 17,7 16 17,9
15,1 15,1 14,1
10,4
10

0
ia
s

ch

e
ce
s

ise
ry
t

ol
tie

en

en

on

lic
lle
ed

en
cia
ur

ho
pr
ar

nm

am

Po
ni

Va
M

sid
Ch

er
di

Sc
lP

U
rli
er

nt
Ju

sta
re
ica

ic
ov

Pa

eE
ol

Ao
of
lit

th

at
wn
Po

Ca

iv
To

Pr

Low/none Medium High

tend to balance: about one interviewee out of two believes that God’s
Word is revealed in the Holy Writings (51.5%) and that miracles oper-
ated by God exist (50.9%), together with paradise (52.3%) and the
devil (48.5%). We may find traces of the religious socialization they
had passed through in their infancy, and perhaps even of the need of
spirituality that urged in many of these young people in the percent-
ages of those who believe in the immortality of the soul (54.9%), in
Jesus’ resurrection (59.4%) and in the fact that Jesus Christ is God’s
son (64.7%).
Lastly, we analyse the interaction between faith, behaviours and
value styles. As we can see in Table 2, the trust in the institutions is
linked to religiosity positively, but this is true only for some institutions
and, among them, specifically for the order institutions: the Church in
primis, then the school, then the police and finally the judiciary.
Furthermore (Table 3), the interpersonal trust—or in other words
the trust inside the restricted circles of people—does not always appear
to be disconnected from religiosity. Or better, it appears to be dis-
connected from the “macro” circles (Italian, Swiss, French, European,
world citizens), but it seems to be somehow positively linked to reli-
gion, and at this time in particular to the religious practice (rather
than to the importance assigned to religion in life or to the fact of
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 361

regarding oneself as agnostics or believers). In the case in point, the

more often they attend the religious rites, the more probable it is that
these young people foster an attitude of trust in the micro circles, from
the very restricted ones (neighbours and inhabitants of their hamlet),
to little wider circles (people of their Town) up to definitely wider ter-
ritories (inhabitants of their mountain area community and even of
the Valley of Aosta).

Table 2. Trust in the Institutions with Respect to the Relation with Religion
(Percent Values)
Attendance to religious rites
Never Some time Some time At least
a year a month once a week
Trust in the Church 11 28,5 49.8 72
Trust in the school 29.5 40.9 45.4 54.9
Trust in the judiciary 18.3 21.6 26.2 26.2
Trust in the police 25.2 32.9 36.4 37.6
Trust in your local 16.7 23.8 30.2 32.1
government
Trust in your regional 17 24.6 30.3 28.8
government
Belief in God
Atheo- Believers Believers without
agnostic with doubts
doubts
Trust in the Church 20.9 27.5 63.5
Trust in the school 35.9 38.9 53.5
Trust in the judiciary 20.7 22.1 25.7
Trust in the police 28.5 33.1 37.4
Importance of religion in life
Non Quite Important
important important
Trust in the Church 8.8 45.7 68.1
Trust in the school 32.8 44.5 51.4
Trust in the judiciary 19.2 24.7 25.1
Trust in the police 26.9 35.4 36.2
Trust in private enterprise 19.9 20.1 25.3
Trust in your local 18.7 28.1 29.1
government
Trust in your regional 18.4 28.9 28.7
government
362 giuseppe giordan

Table 3. Trust in the Circle of People with Respect to Religious Practice

(Percent Values)
Attendance to religious rites
Never Some time a Some time a At least once
year month a week
Trust in neighbours and 18.3 24.9 30.9 31.5
inhabitants of the
hamlet
Trust in the people of your 9.5 10.5 16.3 18.8
Town
Trust in the inhabitants 6.3 8.6 13.2 14.9
of the Mountain Area
Community
Trust in Val d’Aosta 8.6 12.3 14.6 17.6
inhabitants

With religiosity also the sense of identity-belonging grows (especially

at the local level, but not only). As a matter of fact such feeling turns
out to be directly proportionate to the intensity with which one’s reli-
gious faith is lived, both from the point of view of religious attendance
and, more in general, with respect to the importance assigned to reli-
gion in one’s life.
The sense of “regional” belonging instead is much less clearly defined
comparing with the local, that is to say sub-regional, sense of belong-
ing; it too however grows in a linear way as the religious practice and
the importance assigned to religion in life grow.
The religious factor influences even the perception that the single
individuals have of the peculiarity of life in Aosta Valley.13 The most
religious subjects think that the Valley of Aosta is characterised by a
high quality of life, by diffused economic welfare, and believe that the
Valley on the whole is a favourable environment as to interpersonal
relations. This impression is invigorated with the religious practice
and in the individuals who consider themselves believers without any
doubts as well as in those who assign importance to religion in their
lives (tab. 4).

13
The principal component analyis of the facts in this case highlights the presence
of three dormant attitudes that Scalon has defined as “Welfare and life quality”, “Indi-
vidualism and closing up” and “Tradition and roots”. See Scalon (2008, pp. 80–84).
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 363

Table 4. Characteristics of Life in Aosta Valley with Respect to Some

Control Variables
Belonging Welfare Individualism Tradition
Religious pratice (rites)
Never 43.7 58 48.4
Some time a year 60.6 47.6 60.2
Some time a month 63.9 41.5 69.6
At least once a week 63.2 43.9 69.3
Belief
Atheo-agnostic 53 53.1 58.2
Believers with doubts 55.5 47.5 60.6
Believers without doubts 63.9 47.9 64.2
Importance of religion
Non important 50.7 53.8 54.8
Quite important 61.1 46.5 65.5
Important 60.3 45.4 66.3
The table only shows the values that significantly draw away from average in the Val-
ley of Aosta.

The less religious subjects on the contrary tend to describe the reality
in which they live with a critical and negative attitude, underlining
the egoistic and opulent lifestyle of the inhabitants of the region, their
individualistic spirit and their narrow-mindedness; they maintain
that these negative aspects are caused by the exaggerated importance
awarded to money and to property and that these aspects in turn are
the cause of the restriction of the human and personal growth of the
people in the Valley of Aosta.
Besides, another tendency is noticed: a sensitive attitude towards
the positive contribution granted by tradition to the lifestyle in the
Valley of Aosta. In this case by “tradition” we refer in particular to the
pride of the people from Aosta Valley (that is to say to the attachment
to their historical and ethnic-cultural peculiarity), to the importance
attached to the local culture, as well as to the relevance of the sacrifices
made by the previous generations and to the awareness of how far
these sacrifices have contributed to producing the present widespread
welfare. This attitude seems to be particularly felt by the religious
subjects, and it grows in a clear and progressive way as the religious
364 giuseppe giordan

practice grows together with the religious faith and the importance
assigned to religion in one’s life.

Spirituality Profiles

To record the discrepancy between declaring one’s belonging to the

Catholic Church and practice, and to emphasize the importance of the
forefathers’ faith as a cultural element of the formation of the young of
Aosta Valley, however, is not sufficient to offer an exhaustive picture
of the modalities of relating to the sacred of these adolescents. Actually
many questions have highlighted a wish and a quest for sense, at least
in some of these young people, that we haven’t been able to treat in the
previous paragraphs, and that we will therefore treat here now.
For what concerns the youngest ranges of the population, the soci-
ology of religion has already pointed out how, in the religious ambit,
the dimension of experience is getting more and more important: the
religiosity of the young, as a matter of fact, seems to be characterized
by the primacy of experience with respect to beliefs and practice. Such
dimension shows how the deep dynamics of contemporary believing
privileges an “inductive” perspective, measuring and calibrating the
contents of faith starting from everyday experiences: it almost means
that it is no longer a matter of verifying how far faith is capable of
changing one’s life, but rather a matter of ascertaining how far, actu-
ally, the experiences of everyday life are capable of changing one’s way
of believing. A type of faith that, as Garelli (2006c, p. 157) has pointed
out would seem “to perform more a function of accompanying the
human events than a function of orienting one’s life choices”.
The analysis of the religious experience, even for what concerns the
young in Aosta Valley, highlights the centrality of the subject and of
his autonomy in relation to the believers’ community and its rituality,
its dogma and its moral norms: in their quest for meaning in a frag-
mented and pluralist world, the young build their own routes cutting
them out to their own measure. They also meet the Church religion,
and they use it according to whether this religion is capable or not of
meeting their demands. In other words, faith does not seem to have
been banned from the world of the young of Aosta Valley: but it repre-
sents a resource to which they resort in a free and sometimes creative
way, for this reason “I believe in my own way” has been the expres-
sion that has recurred many times both in the focus group and in the
interviews carried out in depth.
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 365

Figure 3. Importance of Religion in One’s Life: “Not Very Important” +

“Irrelevant”—Comparing Surveys (Percent Values)

52.40%
44.80%

35%

25.40% 23.30%

Cattolica IARD 2004 Cuneo 2004 Venezia 2005 Valle d'Aosta

1994 18–21 15–20 year 16–29 year 18–29 year 2006 14–19
year olds olds olds olds year olds

A first datum about the great questions of existence tells us how they
are not outside the horizon of these young people, but that on the con-
trary they are well present in their everyday lives: four interviewees of
the Valley of Aosta out of ten affirm they often think of the meaning
and the purpose of life, and four more “sometimes” think of them; the
others never or rarely do.
However, religion seems to take a less important place in the life of
the young of Aosta Valley than for the Italians of their age (Fig. 3). As
a matter of fact religion holds an important or a very important place
in the life of 18.7% of the interviewees, comparing with 34.1% of the
15–20 year olds in the IARD 2004 research, quite important for 28.8%
(against 42.4% of the 15–20 year old Italians), while it holds a not so
important place or it is totally irrelevant for 52.4%, against 23.3% of
the 15–20 year old Italians (Grassi 2006).
This datum might seem in contrast with the fact that a clear major-
ity of young people of Aosta Valley ask themselves questions about the
sense of life; as a matter of fact, however, one might assume that these
young people tend to link the words “religion” and “faith” closely to
something established, mandatory, and perhaps for this reason scarcely
appealing, and that on the contrary they prove to be more open in
front of such terms as “sense of life”, “prayer” and “spirituality”.
 366 giuseppe giordan

Figure 4. Frequency of Personal Prayer—Comparing Surveys (Percent Values)

IARD 2004 19,1

15–20 year olds 23,5

Cuneo 2004 23,5

16–29 year olds 22,7

Venezia 2005 18,4

18–29 year olds 34,6

Aosta Valley 2006 19,2

14–19 year olds 32,4

Never At least once a day

The prayer actually turns out to be a popular practice and if, even in
this case, the young of the Valley of Aosta who affirm they never pray
are many more than the Italian ones, the percentage of those who pray
every day, even many times a day, lines up with the national percent-
age and highlights the fact that the prayer is part of the daily practice
for one young individual out of five (Fig. 4).
What has been said before clearly brings to the surface how the
frequency of the personal prayer appears to be definitely higher than
the regular practice: this datum is in line with the individualization
of belief and of one’s relation with God, and even in agreement with
the need of spirituality highlighted by the contemporary sociological
literature (Heelas and Woodhead 2005, Smith and Lundquist Denton
2005, Wuthnow 1998 e 2005).
Why do these young people pray? Which motivation urges them to
do so? The answer that most frequently recurs is “to obtain help and
comfort especially during difficult moments” (31%), followed by the
request for forgiveness (15.8%), by the wish to reflect and make things
clear within oneself (13.6%) and to feel closer to God (13.1%).
To confirm the wish for freedom of these young people that mani-
fests itself even in the ambit of the prayer, eight out of ten choose to
be spontaneous, using their own expressions and words; about one
out of three pray with reflections about life and about what happens
around him, or reciting known wordings; four out of ten privilege
“keeping silent, listening, contemplating” and a minority (6.4%) reads
and meditates upon the Bible or other religious texts.
They do not seem then to be young people totally unrelated to the
call of the sacred: maybe they choose such personal ways and modali-
ties that are not easily located in the classic categories used by the
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 367

Table 5. Spirituality Profiles—Typologies with Regard to Frequency of

Personal Prayer, Questioning about the Meaning of Life, and the Importance
Attributed to Church for one’s Spiritual Growth (Percent Values; N=3,721)
Referring Those who question themselves Those who don’t question
to a Church about the meaning of life themselves about the meaning
for one’s of life
spiritual
growth Those who Those who Those who Those who
pray don’t pray pray don’t pray
Important Church Critical people Traditionalists Identitary
spirituality 6.6 (257) 15.2 (592) believers
12.9 (502) 12.2 (467)
Not Private Personal quest Occasional Indifferent
important spirituality 13.6 (530) believers people
7.4 (288) 7.8 (304) 24.3 (945)

sociologists of religion. For this reason the concept of spirituality has

seemed to us particularly useful to draw out eight “spirituality pro-
files”: these profiles are perhaps capable of returning to us some snap-
shots that give reason in a synthetic way for what the young people of
Aosta Valley have said to us concerning their religiosity. To build up
these profiles, we have used three questions: the prayer, the reflection
about the meaning of life and the importance granted to the Church
as the reference point of one’s spiritual growth (Tab. 5).
As we will see immediately, the emerging profiles allow us to illus-
trate different modalities of religious and ethical behaviour in a coher-
ent way, and are also capable of telling us something about the role
played by religion with regard to the representation of identity. Another
non negligible element is also the distinction between the religious and
the spiritual dimensions, a theme today particularly debated in the
sociology of religion. Thus some profiles come out that are not exclu-
sively defined by the relation of the subjects with the institution, but
by the free research of meaning that joins the most various modalities
of believing together. Young people are variously then “in search for
themselves”, in conclusion, and in search for their own reasons of life,
or for their own reference points and their own values.
The most numerous group (Fig. 5), and as we have underlined many
times this datum is a peculiarity of the Valley of Aosta comparing with
the national panorama, appears to be what we have called the group
of the “indifferent people” (24.3%), followed by the “traditionalists”
(15.2%), by the group of the “personal quest” (13.6%), by those liv-
ing the “Church spirituality” (12.9%) and the “identitary believers”
368 giuseppe giordan

Indifferent Church
people spirituality Private
24% 13% spirituality
7%

Critical people
7%
Identitary
believers
12% Personal quest
14%
Occasional Traditionalists
believers 15%
8%
Figure 5. Spirituality Profiles—Typologies with Regard to Frequency of Per-
sonal Prayer, Questioning about the Meaning of Life, and the Importance
Attributed to Church for one’s Spiritual Growth (Percent Values; N=3,721)

(12%); the least numerous ones are the “occasional believers” (7.8%),
the group of those we have defined as “private spirituality” (7.4%)
and the “critical people” (6.6%). Even in this situation we notice some
polarization between those who often question themselves, often pray,
believe that referring to a Church is important, and those who affirm
they never question themselves, never pray and do not believe that
referring to a Church is important because they are indifferent to the
spiritual themes.
If we wish to try to unify some of these profiles excluding the indif-
ferent ones, who feel equally distant both from religion and from spir-
ituality, we may group on one side the identitary ones, the occasional
ones and the traditionalists in only one group under the “religion”
heading, and on the other side the profiles of Church spirituality, pri-
vate spirituality, critics, personal research in only one group under the
“spirituality” heading. The former group would consist of 35% of the
interviewees, while the latter would consist of 40%: while a traditional
reading of the data puts in evidence, as we have seen in paragraphs 2
and 3, a growth in secularization and a general estrangement of these
young people from religiosity, reading the data oriented according to
the theory of spirituality, we will obtain, beside a percentage of young
people who feel they are extraneous to any research and any relation
with the sacred (the indifferent people), a greater percentage of young
people (75%) who consider their relation with the sacred vital, both
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 369

when they prefer the not too free neither too binding but reassuring
ways, run through by other people (“religion”), and when they prefer
the impervious but free ways of their personal research, even within
their forefathers’ faith (“spirituality”).
We cannot here dwell on the detailed description of the single profiles,
who however have turned out to be strongly discriminating and clearly
outlined, but we can add, in support of our reading of the data, that
the young interviewees have not appeared to be disoriented in front of
the question: “What is spirituality?”. The answer modalities that recur
with the highest frequency have been “to believe in God and follow his
commandments” (18.2%), but also “to try to be a good person, to lead a
good life” (10.8%) and “to tend towards a state of harmony and internal
peace” (10.5%), “to search for the deep meaning of life” (9.8%) and “to
help the others, to engage oneself for the others” (9.7%).

The Relation with the Other Religions

A special place in the beliefs is occupied by the persuasion of the truth

of one’s religion, a theme that can be connected to the identification
with one’s belief as well as to the attitude regarding other religions.
Six young people of Aosta Valley out of ten (59.6%) think that all
religions contain important truths; one out of ten claims that “only
one true religion exists, but there are important truths even in other
religions”; about two young people out of ten (18.8%), more boys than
girls, on the contrary are convinced that no religion contains impor-
tant truths (Fig. 6).
Re-codifying this question with the datum of religious belonging
shows some surprises: indeed 65% of the Catholics (against 44.2% of
those who belong to other religions) believe that important truths are
present in all religions, while among those who belong to other religions
one interviewee out of four believes that true religion is only one (against
11.2% of the Catholics). This datum seems to mean that the Catholics
are less afraid of confronting with the variety of beliefs than those who
belong to other religious confessions, even if this fact can be led back to
the greater need of the religious minorities of asserting their identity by
juxtaposition, in a context that is Catholic by a large majority.
Another important question, nowadays more and more relevant even
for its implications in the public sphere, is the question of the relation
with the other religions: in order to investigate this matter, we have
370 giuseppe giordan

Figure 6. Comparing Surveys about the Religions’ Truth Relation

(Percent Values)

Valley of Aosta 2006 18,8

14–19 year olds 59,6

Catholic University 2,7

1994 18–21 year olds 30,3

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

All religions contain important truths No religion contains important truths

chosen to relate some of the questions tackling the theme of pluralism

with the dimension of the practice, meant as the indicator of one’s reli-
gious identity; then we have tried to see how practice interacts with plu-
ralism. From principal component analysis three factors have emerged
that we have named “practice”, “pluralism” and “identity” (Tab. 6).

Table 6. Principal Components Analysis: Practice, Pluralism, Identity

Component
practice pluralism identity
Mass ,834 –,014 ,034
Prayer ,685 –,146 ,168
Confession ,778 ,050 –,045
Parish Groups ,671 –,047 –,043
Teaching other –,007 ,722 ,173
religions
Religions as menace to –,070 ,347 ,669
identity
Religion as enrichment ,171 –,547 –,245
Religions as cause of –,028 ,009 ,709
conflict
Religions as possibility ,108 –,474 –,034
of free research
Only one religion –,079 ,050 ,109
composed of few
basic beliefs
Crucifix in public –,262 –,070 –,516
places
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 371

Table 6. (cont.)
Component
practice pluralism identity
Non Christian temple ,008 ,690 ,251
in one’s village
Dialogue on religious –,040 ,654 -,300
issues
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 9 iterations.

The first factor (Fig. 7), that about practice, is characterized by the
variables concerning exactly the religious practice: in particular, the
frequent attendance to the Sunday Mass (or to the rites of one’s reli-
gion), to one’s personal prayer, to confession and the high participa-
tion in the parish groups.
The “pluralism” factor (Fig. 8) distinguishes individuals who judge
the teaching of other religions at school negatively, as well as building
a non Christian temple in their country, and those who have never
talked about religious matters with people belonging to different reli-
gions, from those who believe that the presence of many religions
in the society is a cultural enrichment, and those who are in favour
of the freedom of researching precepts that are peculiar to other
religions.
The “identity” factor (Fig. 9) distinguishes those who believe the
presence in the society of various religious groups to be a menace for
the Italians’ identity and a cause of conflict, from those who don’t
want to make religion a reason for division and then believe that it is
not right to expose the crucifix in public places.
From these three dimensions five groups have been worked out14
(Fig. 10): the most numerous one is that of the “non pluralists and
identitary ones”, followed by the “non identitary church-goers”; then

14
For what concerns the influence of the factors in the group formation, the group
of the “neither pluralists nor identitaries” is prevalently influenced by positive values
of the pluralism factor and by negative values of the identity factor; the “non plural-
ist and identitary” group is characterized by positive values both of the pluralism
factor and the identity factor; the “non identitary church-goers” group is influenced
by positive values of the practice factor and negative values of the identity factor; the
“identitary church-goers” react positively both to the practice factor and the identity
factor; the “pluralists” are characterized by positive values of the practice factor and
negative values of the pluralism factor.
372 giuseppe giordan

Figure 7. Influence of the “Practice” Factor on Groups

4,00
Factor 1:
PRACTICE

1.063
2,00

0,00

783

842
-2,00

-4,00

Neither pluralists Non pluralists Non identitary Identitary Pluralists

nor identitary and identitary church-goers church-goers
people people
Ward Method

Figure 8. Influence of the “Pluralism” Factor on Groups

2,00

1,00

0,00

-1,00

-2,00
Factor 2: PLURALISM

-3,00

Neither pluralists Non pluralists Non identitary Identitary Pluralists

nor identitary and identitary church-goers church-goers
people people
Ward Method
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 373

Figure 9. Influence of the “Identity” Factor on Groups

4,00
Factor 3: IDENTITY

1.599
2,00

269
0,00

-2,00

-4,00

Neither pluralists Non pluralists Non identitary Identitary Pluralists

nor identitary and identitary church-goers church-goers
people people
Ward Method

those who are “neither pluralists nor identitary”, the “pluralists” and
the “identitary church-goers”. Afterwards we will present them start-
ing from the group who seem to be the least open to religious plural-
ism up to the group that seems to be the most open.

Neither Pluralists nor Identitary People

The first group, representing 18.5% of the young of Aosta Valley,
includes those who don’t want that religions different from the Catho-
lic one are taught at school, those who are contrary to building a non
Christian temple in their village, and those who have never debated any
religious questions with people belonging to religions different from
theirs; however, they believe that it is not right to expose the crucifix in
public places. Actually they are those young people who are contrary
or not interested in meeting the various religious groups present in
the territory of the Valley of Aosta who attend the same schools they
374 giuseppe giordan

Neither
pluralists nor
identitary people
18%
Pluralists
16%
identitary
church-goers
15%

Non pluralist
Non identitary and identitary
church-goers people
20% 31%

Figure 10. Typologies of Young People from Aosta Valley With Regard to
“Practice”, “Pluralism”, “Identity” Factors (val. %; n. cases 2.751)

attend every day; at the same time, however, they do not feel the need
to maintain their own identity, maybe in contrast with the others’
identity. Most of them (65.8%) do not question themselves about the
meaning of life and do not consider the reference to a Church impor-
tant (61.3%). No great differences of gender are recorded in this group,
since the boys are a percentage only slightly larger than the girls. Four
young people of this group out of ten attend vocational schools, three
attend lycée schools, and one out of four attends a technical school.

Non Pluralist and Identitary People

The most numerous group is that of the “non pluralist and identitary
ones” (30.4%), and is composed of a majority of males; it records the
highest percentage of young people who never or nearly never think of
the meaning of life, and is one of the highest percentages of those who
do not consider referring themselves to a Church important. Similarly
to those who are “neither pluralist nor identitary ones”, they show a
closure as to confronting with religions different from their own: like
them, actually, they are contrary to teaching other religions at school
and to building a non Christian temple in their village, and have never
debated any religious matters with people of different beliefs. Unlike
those who belong to the first group, however, these young people feel
the necessity of remarking their own identity in front of “the different”
for fear of losing it: actually they believe that the presence of vari-
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 375

ous religious groups in the society is menacing for the Italian identity
and a possible cause of conflict. Even in this group, as in the previous
one, the students of the technical and vocational schools are the most
numerous.
It is interesting to notice how the majority of the “identitary ones”
is to be found in this group that is not characterized by the religious
practice; besides, as we will see when we analyse the next two groups,
those who practise acknowledge themselves more in non identitary
kinds of sensitivity rather than in identitary ones. Then it seems that
to want to remark one’s Catholic identity in juxtaposition with the
others are not so much those who attend, the convinced ones, the
believers tout-court, but rather those who live religion as a form of
ethnic-cultural belonging, or a form of civil religion.

Non Identitary Church-Goers

This group, prevalently composed of girls (65%), is characterized by
high religious practice plus a non excluding and non opposing look
towards the other religious groups. It is the second group as to num-
ber (19.7%), after that of the “non pluralist and identitary people”. It
is formed by those who attend religious rites regularly, pray every day,
confess and take part in parish groups. This substantial and coherent
identification with the Catholic belief however does not accompany
the wish to show their option of faith publicly: as a matter of fact they
do not believe it is right to expose the crucifix in public places.
Together with the “pluralists”, they are the group in which the lycée
students are present in the highest percentage: almost six out of ten
“non identitary church-goers” actually attend a lycée (58.5%). They are
the group, together with the “identitary church-goers” among which
are recorded the highest percentages of those who live in that part that
we have called montagne (the side valleys) in comparison with those
who live in the plaine (the central valley).
The “non identitary church-goers”, as well as the “identitary church-
goers” and the “pluralists”, are those who question themselves the most
about the meaning of life; then, since this group and the next one are
made up of the church-goers, it is not surprising that they consider the
reference to the Church important.
In this group it becomes apparent how the deep and convinced
belonging to one’s religion, evidenced by constant practice, does not
obstruct the dialogue with the other religions: on the contrary, it seems
376 giuseppe giordan

to be a reliable resource for most church-goers, and a secure reference

point for open and serene confrontation.

Identitary Church-Goers
The fourth group, 14.9% of the interviewees, gathers the young
church-goers who see in the religious pluralism a menace for the Ital-
ian identity and a cause of conflict for our society. Being composed of
girls by a slight majority, as mentioned before, the group consider the
reference to the Church important and question themselves about the
meaning of life.
The “identitary church-goers”, who record the lowest percentage
of residents in the urban area of Aosta, complete the picture of the
church-goers: the high attendance to Mass, the prayer and the con-
fession, as well as the participation in religious groups, in this case
go along with the worry that the other religions are a dangerous ele-
ment for our society. While perhaps the “non identitary church-goers”
might be placed at the side of the “Church spirituality” of the spiritual-
ity profiles, the “identitary church-goers” seem to be more similar to
the “traditionalists” and the “identitary ones”.

Pluralists
The last group, that of the “pluralists”, is formed by 16.5% of the inter-
viewees, who are convinced that the growing variety of religious groups
in Italy is a source of cultural enrichment and that the people, even if
they profess a particular doctrine, should feel free to draw teachings
from other religious traditions.
Two individuals belonging to this group out of three are girls (65.6%)
and practically six out of ten attend a lycée (59.2%). It is the group in
which we notice the presence of more “mature” young people (18–20
year olds) and of residents in the plaine of the Valley of Aosta.
But what personal relation do these young people have with the
world of faith and spirituality? We know that they are not character-
ized by the religious practice and we can say that they do not feel linked
to an institution in their spiritual path since they are those who, after
the “neither pluralist nor identitary” ones, consider the reference to
a Church less important. The “pluralists” however are certainly those
who most question themselves about the meaning of life and search
for answers with regard to the great questions of existence.
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 377

Conclusions

The study of the relation of the young and religion in the context of the
Valley of Aosta offers us the chance to verify how the secularization
process leads to rather different outcomes. Contrary to what its con-
ceivers predicted, the performance of the modernization processes has
not coincided with the disappearance, or the privatization of the reli-
gious phenomenon (Casanova 1994). Surely, the secularization process
has primed a decomposition dynamic within the religious field, with
which, however, more or less unexpectedly, a re-composition dynamic
has coincided. Decomposition/re-composition, therefore, more than
presence/absence, seem to be the keys capable of interpreting the com-
plexity of the relation with the sacred in the contemporary epoch.
This evidently does not mean to deny the crisis that seems to involve
the religious institutions which have administered the dimension of
the sacred for centuries, in some cases under a monopoly system, and
specifically in the Catholic ambit it does not mean to deny the decrease
of the Sunday practice, as well as the desertion of confession, the lack
of interest in the directions of moral character that come from the
doctrine of the Church or the decrease of sacerdotal and religious
vocations.
Nevertheless the reference to the Church has not disappeared and,
even more, the dimension of the search for a sense in life seems to
motivate the tension towards the transcendent that has often faded
contours, sometimes institutionally not correct, but not for this rea-
son less relevant at the personal level of belief. It is a research that
sometimes develops within, but more often outside the proposals of
the traditional Churches. It is a situation that is described in terms of
“light religiousness” (Garelli 2006c) and of “flexible belonging” (Grassi
2006).
If on one side there are many who distance themselves from the
Church and let their reference to God fade away, on the other side
there are people who question themselves, who do not give their beliefs
and their adhesion to a Church for granted: if the generic adhesion to
a Church can be given for granted, almost as if it were a matter of
following the flow of tradition automatically, to believe in a conscious
and active way today seems to be a much more demanding fact than
in the past, and in any case a fact that cannot be given for granted. A
new kind of reflexive believer seems to come out, who thoroughly sifts
378 giuseppe giordan

what he believes through his everyday experiences, and who seems

to assume his own responsibility for the choice of what he considers
credible and what instead he leaves aside.
The young in Aosta Valley are no exception in this respect, even
if with some peculiarities that make them unique compared to their
contemporaries of the rest of Italy. First of all a high identification
with Catholicism is recorded among the young of the Valley of Aosta,
definitely higher than the national average. This datum must be put in
perspective with the information the young have provided to us con-
cerning their belonging: one young individual out of three states that
he belongs to his own religion owing to tradition or education, and
one out of four for a personal conviction but not in an active way.
Indeed the comparison between these two data is sufficient to sup-
port the hypothesis that Catholicism represents an ethnic-cultural
reference more than a specifically religious element for a substantial
part of the young of the Valley of Aosta. A cultural reference, that
towards the Catholic Church, that seems to find a confirmation even
in the positive opinion expressed about the presence of the parish in
one’s everyday context. But the fact that it is mostly a kind of cultural
identification and not a real personal involvement is demonstrated by
the judgment about how the attitude towards the Catholic Church has
modified in the course of time: practically one young individual out of
two declares he has distanced himself from it, and this is beyond all the
data we have at our disposal concerning analogous researches carried
out in Italy. It is without doubt, therefore, that an important role in
the culture of the Valley of Aosta is acknowledged to the Church, but
for most people its function seems to finish here, in its role of “identity
bulwark”, more useful to explain the past rather than the present.
Shifting then from the attitudes to the acted behaviours, the pecu-
liarity of Aosta Valley is confirmed further by the low attendance at
Sunday Mass: in this respect, it seems that the 14 year olds of Aosta
Valley anticipate the desertion that in other Italian contexts is recorded
to happen at about 18–19. The high identification with Catholicism,
then, is followed by a much more faded and inattentive adhesion, and
if we take into account the limited participation in associations and
groups of religious character, such adhesion is even sporadic.
There are other elements that make the study of the socio-religious
situation of the young of Aosta Valley interesting: the percentage of
those who affirm they believe in the existence of God is up to the
national average, while a significant difference is noticed in those who
 believers in progress. youth and religion in italy 379

affirm they do not believe in Him (the people of Aosta Valley are many
more). This difference is even more marked if we analyse their state-
ment about the importance of religion in their lives.
It almost seems that a polarization has happened between those who
believe and consider religion important in their lives, and those who
do not feel at ease in this position, with a relevant loss of balance
in favour of the latter. Perhaps the result of such polarity is also a
reduction of the “grey zone of religiosity” (Garelli 2006c): there are the
doubtful, those who believe in a swinging way, but they are fewer than
in other regions of Italy just owing to this firm position.
Besides there is another element that seems to characterize the reli-
giousness of the young of Aosta Valley: however the gathered data are
dealt with, hence both in the perspective of the spirituality profiles
and in the typology built up with the principal component analysis
on the approach to pluralism, it clearly more and more emerges how
those who practise religion do so for a convinced, motivated, personal
choice; then the constant practice would denote maturity and integra-
tion of the religious and spiritual element into one’s life, and hence it
would denote even a more mature and convinced elaboration process
of one’s form of belonging.
It is to be added to this ascertainment that the majority of those
who practise in a significant way are open to confronting other reli-
gions without any draw backs, that is to say that the more rooted one
is in one’s belief, the less one fears confronting identities and experi-
ences different from one’s own. On the other hand, it seems to clearly
emerge how he who refers to religion to safeguard his own identity is
often an uncertain believer and a desultory church-goer.
In conclusion, we may say that the large majority of the young
of the Valley of Aosta between the age of 14 and 20 know what the
Catholic Church is, and consider it a valuable source of social and cul-
tural identity; actually, however, these young people themselves do not
often go into a church, and many of those who go, do so not through
the main gate (correct belief, constant rituality, respect of the moral
indications), but through one of the side doors (research for meaning,
need of identification . . .). Finally, once they have got in, only few of
them head for the first benches: the others reach the back, waiting to
realize whether it is worth while to stay or definitely go out.
And the “Church religion”, in any case, does not satisfy those who
question themselves about the meaning of their existence and believe
they have a spiritual life: many, whether or not they attend the religious
380 giuseppe giordan

rites, interrogate themselves about the great questions of life, and con-
sider themselves in search for meaning and a spiritual life that makes
them feel well with themselves and with the others, and “have a good
life”. The distinction between religion and spirituality, then, seems to
loom up even in the context of the Valley of Aosta, in a perspective of
coexistence and not of juxtaposition.

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 LIFESTYLES AND RELIGION

Luigi Berzano

Lifestyle, as a word and as a concept, has by now been included into

the language and into the interpretative models of the social sciences,
especially for what concerns research about the condition of the young.
The concept, apparently a self-evident, common-sense concept, actu-
ally is a trans-disciplinary concept, used in economics, psychology,
anthropology and sociology. As a matter of fact, it is applied both to
the individual and to the collective dimensions, both to the behaviours
and the consumptions, both to the aspirations and the identity projects
of the individuals.1 The growing attention towards the aesthetization
process of everyday life, the research for emotional experiences and
the personalization of one’s social and religious belongings does noth-
ing but transform more and more the contemporary man in homo
aesteticus, worried about stylizing even his own everyday life.
The purpose of this essay is to point out the usefulness of the con-
cept of lifestyle even for the analysis of new spiritualities. This requires
going beyond the two sociological models that have always been used
to analyse lifestyles: the deterministic models that consider lifestyles
as social forms depending on the economic stratification and on the
ascribed cultural structure to which they belong, as well as the models
considering lifestyles solely as consumption indicators and immedi-
ately depending on them.
The former models consider a lifestyle as depending on social stand-
ing and on its objective indicators: occupation, education, income, dis-
posable goods. The International Encyclopoedia of the Social Sciences
defines lifestyle as an indicator of social status to order a population
hierarchically. According to this definition social conditions, such

1
In this essay we refer only to the sociological definitions of lifestyle. In the socio-
logical tradition we always find the twofold generalizing and individualizing function
of lifestyle. This is the double function that is to be found even in the etymology of
style: from the Greek stylos, meaning the column of a monument and its system of
general architectural rules; and from the Latin stilus, designing the personal tool used
to write and individualize a thought.
384 luigi berzano

as belonging to a class or to a social group, explain specific clothing

styles, place of residence, education and consumptions.
The latter models analyse lifestyles as synecdoche of the consump-
tion behaviours. The market, for instance, uses lifestyles as a useful
instrument to detect the habits, the attitudes, and the spending capacity
of a population. Today, however, the complexity of the social systems,
including the religious ones, the autonomy of their single sub-systems
and the diminishing number of groups with fixed status, weaken the
structural links even in the consumptions and grant greater autonomy
in the existential choices to each individual. Additionally a culture of
consumptions is rising in which the two dimensions, instrumental
and expressive are two equally present elements. In this transforma-
tion of consumptions from values of use to values of exchange, an
interest for the lifestyles analysis is also to be found, as personal bio-
graphic resources, even as spiritual resources, through which the indi-
vidual explores various modalities of realization and expression of his
identity.
This essay proposes two hypotheses.
1. The former hypothesis indicates that some types of lifestyles are a
whole of practices that are not produced according to top down models
(standing and ascribed belongings → lifestyles), but rather according to
horizontal models (lifestyles → lifestyles). According to this reproduc-
tion modality of lifestyles, even the religious individual, rather than
adopting a lifestyle through tradition or through an ascribed cognitive
frame based on values, prefers to build his own lifestyle through inter-
action with other individuals. Through them the individual builds his
own individuality with his look, his clothes, with his everyday practices.
The attention to making a “tailor made” lifestyle for oneself, involv-
ing all ages and ambits (including the religious ambit), although it
can present the negative dimension of imitation and assembling, how-
ever involves even the positive dimension of research, risk, personal
participation in building one’s identity (Giddens, 1991). Within this
former hypothesis (horizontal interpretative model ), the definition of
lifestyle includes the following four elements: 1) a set of practices, 2) to
which the individual assigns a unitary sense, 3) which presents itself as
a distinctive model shared inside a group or sub-culture or spirituality,
4) without having its generative element, neither in a pre-determined
socio-structural condition nor in a pre-existing cognitive frame based
on values.
 lifestyles and religion 385

2. The latter hypothesis of this essay indicates that the lifestyles, as

identified above, today represent the specific social form of some new
forms of spirituality. I refer here to the definition “new spirituality”
that emerges from the recent theoretical proposals of research car-
ried on by Wade Clark Roof (1999), Elizabeth Lesser Random (1999),
Robert Wuthnow (2001), Giuseppe Giordan (2004), Paul Heelas and
Linda Woodhead (2005). According to these scholars the new spiritu-
alities are characterized, on one side by the greater autonomy of the
single religious individuals in choosing how to believe, how to pray
and how to behave; on the other side by the different legitimation that
the religious individuals themselves give to their acting and to their
religious identities: that is to say legitimation of a spirituality that does
not descend any longer from the ascribed religious institution or from
the institution to which they belong, but is rather based on the valida-
tion of a community or a movement.
Applying these two hypotheses to the contemporary new spirituali-
ties, we may formulate the following definition of spirituality:
Spirituality as lifestyle is a whole of religious practices to which the indi-
vidual assigns a unitary sense, that appears to be a distinctive model
shared within a community or a movement, without having its genera-
tive element and its validation criterion set in a pre-existing and ascribed
Church or religion
a. By the term “practice” we mean a social activity habitually car-
ried on by a person or by a group.2 It is the concept that today is
used by sociologists dealing with the “communities of practices”.
The practices are often placed in everyday life and, although they do
not constantly descend from an explicit reflective process, however
they depend on individual choices and have specific meaning for the
acting individuals. Moreover this does not mean that values, atti-
tudes and sensitivities3 cannot emerge in parallel as distinctive traits
within a lifestyle. The concept of practice recalls that of the habitus
in Bourdieu’s theory. But already in the scholastic philosophy, Saint
Thomas Aquinas wrote about the force of the habitus in structuring

2
On this subject please see the entry Pratique by P. Ansart in Dictionnaire de soci-
ologie, Le Robert/Seuil, Paris, 1999.
3
D. Chaney (1996: 8) has defined the concept of sensitivity as “an answer modal-
ity to events, actions or phenomena possessing a certain system of coherence since,
identifying a kind of sensitivity, it is possible to explain or foresee the answers to new
situations”.
386 luigi berzano

the habitual behaviour of the individual. Practice, for its everyday

repetitiveness, causes strengthening of everyday actions and intensive
accumulation of individual resources (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:
chapter II).
b. The individual assigns a unitary meaning to the whole set of
practices of a lifestyle. Let us here distinguish between “sense” and
“meaning”. Meaning refers to the expressive content communicated
by each practice, and then to the interpretation given by the individual
to each component of the lifestyle; sense refers to the interpretation
that the same individual provides to the whole set of practices form-
ing the lifestyle. The fact that the individual assigns a unitary sense
to the lifestyle does not mean that he reconnects it to values or judg-
ments outside it; on the contrary, it means that he considers it as an
organic cultural form. It is a matter of unitary sense, then, because the
multifarious practices globally considered may be read using the same
interpreting model in parallel, in so far as each of such practices stands
in a reciprocal relation with the others and can acquire its full meaning
only within such frame of relations.
c. In order to speak about lifestyles in the sociological sense it is
necessary that this particular profile of practices in reciprocal relation
is shared by a community or spirituality. Then, even if we admit that
each individual develops his own lifestyle, or that he finds a unitary
sense for that complex of differentiated practices that somehow char-
acterize his existence, we have a lifestyle only where it is possible to
observe a sharing of such practices and of the unitary sense assigned
to them by a collectivity.4
d. Two specific statements are added to these three elements indi-
cating the contents of the concept of lifestyle: a lifestyle has its gen-
erative element neither in a previous cognitive frame based on values,
nor in a pre-determined socio-structural condition. On one side, then,
we cannot think of lifestyles as a precipitate to the level of the prac-
tices, of a frame of values and knowledge, that is to say of a frame of
notions concerning being and having to be. On the other side we can-
not consider lifestyles as cultural expressions of the social position of
the individual, which can certainly influence their development, first

4
For this reason Reimer (1995: 125) writes that “the analysis of the lifestyles should
then show similarities and differences between groups of individuals rather than simi-
larities and differences between individuals”.
 lifestyles and religion 387

of all taking the shape of a frame of possibilities and opportunities,

but that however cannot render an account of it and at least cannot
represent its generative element. Then this means that, on the whole,
the sense of the lifestyle, as well as its foundations cannot be searched
outside it and out of its essential components, but on the contrary they
appear as essentially endogenous.
We will now consider the two formulated hypothesis in the next
two paragraphs and after, in the third paragraph, we will propose a
few application cases.

Lifestyles from the Top Down Theories to the Interactionist

Horizontal Theories

The studies on lifestyles—from Weber, Simmel, researches of the Chi-

cago School, up to Bourdieu, Dumazedier, Giddens—have indicated
the priority dependence of the lifestyles on the social classes or on
standing. We wonder here whether, even among these authors, some
elements are lacking, indicating that it is not so much the social-eco-
nomic and cultural identity that produces the lifestyle and the identity,
but, rather, it is the lifestyle that produces identity. Let us consider
the works of Weber, Simmel, Bourdieu, of the interactionists of the
Chicago School and of Giddens.
In Weber we find the first useful data for our hypothesis. Weber
considers both lifestyles dependent on the social class and lifestyles
dependent on the individual’s acting. It is to the latter ones that we
refer. It is the lifestyles—Weber sometimes calls them “rules of life”,
“ways of behaving”—that stratify the status groups deep down inside
them. It is not the status groups that produce the lifestyles, but it is these
latter ones—being the fruit of specific training routes of education—
that make the belonging to a certain status visible. The factors that cut
the class differences transversely are the cultural, aesthetic, religious,
political affiliations. Even in this respect, according to Weber, culture
has an active integrating force. The importance that Weber assigns
to human interaction is to be underlined here, meant both as social
action endowed with sense and as social relation including behaviours
reciprocally meaningful and influential. In this way we have in Weber,
passing from class to status, a sequential model in which the lifestyle
is of performative nature and for this reason it is partly independent,
according to the following model:
388 luigi berzano

social class → lifestyle → status5

In Weberian sociology the data of representation, conscience, and
mentality become formal products of the human interaction, whose
objective existence mainly depends on the fact that they have a mean-
ing or a value for man. Their relation with the individual is based on
the fact that such products as “meanings” of a state of social relations
are understood by man and are worth for him. The persistence and
the permanence of the significant data, on which a state of social rela-
tions is set, are in relation with the persistence and the permanence of
their meaning for man and for his social acting, since it is endowed
with sense. The substitution of the psychological individual with the
“comprising one” by Weber is such that even the data of social interac-
tion (actions, relations, values and symbols) are transformed in data of
contextual social situation in which not only the status, the positions
and the roles are given, but also the meanings and those schemes of
cultural meaning that are here defined as lifestyles.
According to Simmel the lifestyle has the function of highlighting
its bearer, even if the satisfaction it causes is destined to other people.
“Being-for-oneself and being-for-others are reciprocally dependent
as to purpose and means”(Simmel, 1989: 316). The lifestyle has the
double function of characterizing a group cementing its unitary nature
ab intra and, at the same time, of differentiating it ab extra from
other groups. Dealing with the two central themes for every social
evolution—individualization and differentiation—Simmel notices how
they are originated by the need to affirm one’s personality through
differentiation, to the point that the need for differentiation is by
far greater than that of individualization. Simmel exemplifies all this
analysing the religious disputes, in which the crucial datum of the uni-
fying elements is forgotten to the benefit of that of differentiation and
splitting.
This relative independence of the lifestyles of the social classes and
the observation that the members of a class or of a social group must

5
In The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber (1961: part I, chap-
ter IV; part II, chapter VIII) often notes that all the reformed doctrines tried to fill
in the gap between doctrine and everyday behaviours. As a matter of fact everyday
life developed with lifestyles that were far away from the inducements of the Puritan
theologians. The irregularity of people’s lifestyles was such that the official ethics itself
set places and situations of “ordered disorder” in which the alternativeness and the
transgression of the individual could periodically explode.
 lifestyles and religion 389

not share the same lifestyle is the first interesting element for our
hypothesis of a horizontal theory of the lifestyles. A second element is
ascertaining that in the contemporary societies, in which a great vari-
ety of lifestyles is available, each of them separates from its content and
sets itself to the individuals with the nature of the consumptions. In
such way the lifestyle becomes “objective”, and, as such, independent
from the cognitive dimensions based on values of those who adopt it.
This objectivization of the lifestyles assumes the form of a veritable
market of lifestyles that the individuals adopt, making it their own and
connoting it with personal meanings and values.
In this divarication between the cognitive dimension based on val-
ues which is incorporated in the objective culture, and the dimension
of the single experiences (lifestyles) of the individuals, is the peculiar-
ity of the condition of the contemporary individual. In this, actually,
the presence of the objective culture and of the impersonality of the
relations is counterbalanced, according to Simmel, by the stylization
of the interiority with which the individuals try to express their own
subjectivity (Frisby, 1985: 65ss). To Simmel the emblematic figure of
this context is the individual living in a metropolis, who knows the
disorienting over-excitement of fashions and consumptions, together
with the fragmentation of the lifestyles. The objective culture—re-
calling Dilthey’s Erfharung—is the culture that by now is fixed and
incorporated in man’s works, including the behaviours and the routine
practices; and, as such, it is the culture that has become thing that
exists independently from the life of the person who has produced it.
The subjective culture, on the contrary, is that which is produced by
actual individuals through their own everyday experiences and prac-
tices. Simmel analyses the presence of “a style” in the traditional soci-
eties and the increasing number of “styles” in the modern societies.
The traditional societies were formed around a common culture as
their target and the relative way of living. Modernity is the decline and
the relativization of this common culture. Modernity is the situation
in which “the style” doesn’t exist any more, supplanted by “the styles”.
This is the situation pointed out by those who say “today there is no
fashion any more: there are only fashions”; “each one can be anyone”;
“no rule, only choices”.
Central in Simmel is the notion of human interaction: a society exists
where more individuals get into an interactions system, from which
the most varied forms of social relations come out, from the simplest
ones, such as the dyad and triad relations, to the most complex such
390 luigi berzano

as fashion. All of them reproduce horizontally rather than vertically,

just because they are the product of relations and imitation. “Those
who are dressed the same way, behave in a relatively homogeneous
way” (Simmel, 1985: 91).
A further contribution to our hypothesis is that of Pierre Bourdieu
with his works about forms of distinction and taste. To understand the
indications of the French sociologist it is useful to remember his “con-
structivist structuralism” of the “twofold view” both on the objective
and the subjective lives of the individuals. The objective life is made
up by the field, that is to say by the social structures dominating the
social actors, without keeping into account their experience and their
acting; the subjective life is made up by the habitus, that is to say by
the individuals’ dispositions and by their preferences in influencing
taste in consumptions, in cultural practices and in ways of spending
their free time.
In the meeting between the field and the habitus resides the main
mechanism of production of the social world. Even the lifestyles are
the result of the interiorization of the social structures and of the
externalization of the personal tastes of the individual. This co-natu-
rality between habitus and lifestyle recalls Simmel: “A piece of clothing
worn for a long time has somehow grown up with the body, it owns
an intimacy that is in contrast with the essence of elegance. As a mat-
ter of fact elegance is something for the others, it is a social concept
that draws its value from the general recognition” (Simmel, 1989: 317).
The habitus, defined as such, is a structuring mechanism, acting from
the inside of the individuals, although it is not strictly individual, and
it makes the regularity and the predictability of social life possible.
Being a product of the interiorization of the external structures, the
habitus reacts to the solicitations of the field in a generally systematic
and coherent way. As a creator of behaviours, strategies, adaptations
and innovations, although within the limits of the structures of the
field, the habitus is endowed with practical rationality immanent in a
specific field. Concerning the relation between the habitus and the field
it happens that the habitus concurs to determining what determines
it, that is to say the field. The habitus is then the sedimented, virtual
dimension that is situated deep inside the body of the social individual.
Having been produced by a certain number of social effects and being
at the same time the producer of the individuals’ practices, the habitus
results to be a sort of “generative grammar of practices”.
Bourdieu introduces here the distinction between opus operatum
and modus operandum, indicating with the former the whole of the
 lifestyles and religion 391

behaviours of the individuals, and with the latter the logic generat-
ing them. His concern is to establish general laws that explain modus
operandum, in other words the production of lifestyles. And these are
not reproduced automatically and deterministically, but through the
habitus.
In this interpretation, in which we find the datum of the reproduc-
tion of the lifestyles through the individuals’ acting and their “face
to face” interactions, however, we have to observe that Bourdieu’s
theory appears to be still characterised by elements of the structural-
ist determinism. The action maintains a subordinate position, being
limited to bringing up-to-date cultural schemes made objective and
deeply rooted in the class structures. Bourdieu, then, has contributed
to enriching constructivism, however continuing to maintain it within
a device of predominant objective structures.
In this reconstruction of the sociological interests for the lifestyles,
we now introduce the sociological tradition that, starting at the begin-
ning of the XXth century, has then joined the symbolic interactionism
and the Chicago School. The potentiality of this tradition resides in
the possibility of considering the lifestyles as forms of social relations
and as social situations of the reciprocity of perspectives. The central
datum of interactionism refers to the interaction processes in which
the individuals, in common, settle open rules dependent on constant
reciprocal approval. The privileged research areas of symbolic interac-
tionism have been the interaction processes of the groups, of the fami-
lies, of the gangs, of the sub-cultures. Here the analysis of the lifestyles
is added. All the dimensions of interactionism may be even referred
to the lifestyles, besides being referred to a group or a movement or
to a sub-culture. In such way it is possible to analyse the lifestyles, not
only for what concerns their dimension of individuality, but also for
what concerns the social situation of the reciprocity of perspectives, that,
especially among the young, appear today in horizontal forms (peer
groups, friends, sub-culture, fashion and trends), more than in verti-
cal forms (institutions, systems of values, ideologies, political parties,
Churches).
Among the researchers of the Chicago School, mostly Park and Bur-
gess have considered the contextual social situation as the “typical”
situation of the social relation in which significant data and products
of the human interaction take place (Park and Burgess, 1921). In these
authors’ opinion this is a process of horizontal, rather than of verti-
cal type. The former process refers to the network of contacts and
actual exchanges or even only a reference network that the individuals
392 luigi berzano

try to maintain reciprocally. The latter concerns the contacts and the
exchanges that an individual maintains with social classes, institutions
or value systems placed above him.
Even our definition of lifestyle requires that we consider the inter-
subjective meaning that lifestyles have, since they are “inside” the situ-
ation of social relation. This involves that they are analysed as specific
processes of the human interaction. Here we remember just one: that
of the situational approach. “An attitude cannot be understood but
in relation to a situation; situation that is a whole set of values and
attitudes which the individual and the group have to come to terms
with in an activity process, and in relation to which this activity is
organized” (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1968: vol. I, 68). This humanistic
coefficient is what distinguishes the social data from the natural ones
which are independent from the individuals’ experience.
Among the recent studies, we are lastly interested in the structuring
of the lifestyles by Anthony Giddens who proposes to keep together
both the active element coming from the experience of the social actors,
and the routinizing and structuring dimensions that influence the indi-
vidual and the collective behaviours (Giddens, 1991). The lifestyles of
an individual appear to be both a form of action and transformation
of the life conditions of the individual and an outcome of the same
life conditions. The making of the lifestyles derives from four factors.
1. In the post-traditional context each individual must choose among
multifarious alternatives. 2. In the “pluralization context of the ways
of life” each individual must choose among different lifestyle worlds,
according to the differentiated activity in which he lives 3. In the con-
text in which everything appears as project and change, even the indi-
vidual realizes that he is undergoing continuous training in work, in
religion, in his own body. 4. In the mass-media society the electronic
media alter the “situational geography” of the social life eliminat-
ing the traditional connection between “physical environment” and
“social situation”.

New Spiritualities as Lifestyles

The traditional spiritualities have always represented some spiritual

ways of life, indicating sensitivity, languages, attitudes, peculiar com-
munity forms; each of them had its own style showing a peculiar reli-
gious “excellence way”. Nearly always the spiritualities were formed
 lifestyles and religion 393

in juxtaposition with a religious mainstream. Which transformations

affect the new spiritualities today? On the basis of the previous notes,
we can deduce how much the concept of lifestyle may represent an
analytic category of interest for the analysis of such spiritual trans-
formations. First I will present a few significant elements to work
out an analytic model, drawing up a list of a few application cases
afterwards.
The analytic model for the analysis of spiritualities as lifestyles takes
inspiration from the Diltheyan concepts of Erlebnis and of Erfahrung
(Dilthey, 1954). Dilthey composes the Erlebnis, as a typology, to mean
the experience of the individuals in its immediacy and singularity and
the Erfahrung to mean the experience as elaboration, practice and
acquisition of capabilities. The word Erfahrung is more ancient than
Erlebnis; and the history of the two words is meaningful for history
in general.
Erfahrung is the accumulation of experiences, in other words of the
objectivated experience. It is what remains in the movement. It is a
present past, whose events have been conglobated and can be remem-
bered. The word derives from the verb Erfahren: to pass through.
Erfahrung is a tradition widening out in time. It is a process in which
memory is active as the faculty of connecting different lives in a conti-
nuity endowed with sense. The Erfahrung is possible only when accu-
mulated experience exists, helping the individual in the course of his
life. It is a gift that sediments slowly and whose bearers in the past
were pre-eminently the old. The contents of the individual past are
joined with those of the collective past. Once all this happened with
the support not only of habit, but also of a symbolic order guaranteed
by a ritual system. With modernity the Erfahrung is becoming less
and less relevant, because the historical conditions that made it pos-
sible are lacking. The atrophy of modernity, of which Walter Benjamin
writes, refers to the Erfahrung, meant as long tradition, as memory,
as synthesized past made available for the present (Benjamin, 1962).
When this experience is squeezed into the present, because the past
doesn’t teach anything any longer, then it turns to the Erlebnis, to the
immediate experience.
Erlebnis is the lived and immediate experience, it is the exact con-
tent of conscience; it is being alive (leben) while something is hap-
pening. It is a precise act of one’s conscience, a vivid being there. The
Erlebnis, is always a subjective fact; there is no “collective memory” in
it which the individual may rejoin. The memory of the Erlebnis does
394 luigi berzano

not grow in the humus of collective memory. The Erlebnis is typical of

the generations of young people who find themselves living in situa-
tions in which the contents of available culture are constantly deprived
of meaning because of change.6 Here we assume that in the present
phase the spirituality lifestyles represent a social form of Erlebnis of
modernity. Here we may point out four elements.
I) In traditional societies, spiritualities have been forms of the
Erfahrung. They were “long spiritual traditions” composed of values,
knowledge, behaviour norms, languages, symbols. It was possible to
take part in them through a long socialization or conversion process.
Nowadays spiritual Erlebnis prevails, being composed of more imme-
diate and interactionist elements, as happens for the “short traditions”.
They are the spiritualities searching for a more direct, spontaneous and
deep spiritual experience (Roof, 1999). These spiritualities radicalize
the neo-Durkheimean model of the individual’s right to choose, shap-
ing a further model that Charles Taylor defines “post-Durkheimean
model” (Taylor, 2007: 612). The life or the religious practice I am tak-
ing part in must be not only the result of my choice, but must also
speak my language; it must also be endowed with sense in terms of
my spiritual development, in the way I interpret it. A particular turn-
ing point between Erfahrung and Erlebnis happened in the Catholic
Church in the decades after 1960 (Vatican Council II and the ’68 pro-
tests). And it is in that period that change has become the rule and
the collapse of the imagery of continuity occurred, that had formed
the symbolic armour of the traditional spiritualities. Even in the ambit
of spirituality, the authorities who pretended to impose norms to
people’s conscience and behaviours were disputed, in the name of the
individual’s autonomy and of the rights of subjectivity. However, it is
to be acknowledged that even today some of these spirituality lifestyles
are becoming enriched with elements of normativeness and universal-
ity, transforming into something that is meaningful not only for the
single individual, but for everybody, according to processes such as
that of objectivation of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966).
II) The present multiplication of the tastes and of the spiritual
sensitivities is referable to the growing religious pluralization of the
societies, such as the European ones, that once were characterized by

6
This is the situation as interpreted by P. Berger e T. Luckmann (1966: 140ss) in
terms of “cognitive pluralism”.
 lifestyles and religion 395

the mainstream of only one majority religion. To it we must add the

greater religious differentiation of the single individuals who belong
to more religious worlds at the same time. The multiplication of the
spiritualities follows the “pluralization of the worlds of life” that com-
pels the individual to reside in different physical ambients and social
places. Then the spiritualities multiply in as many forms as are the
dispositions and the individual religious interests and in as many new
situations involving transcendence (needs for the sacred, religiosity,
morals), ethics (genetic manipulations, sexuality, illness, environment,
ethnic differences), the social element (prevalence of the individualis-
tic ego, interculturality, globalization). It seems that various forms of
spirituality exist: new age, esoteric, magic, spiritistic, astrologic, thera-
peutic, “spirituality of dwelling”, “spirituality of research“, “research
of one’s own deep self ”, “research of syntony with oneself ” and
many others. Not only the sociologists but also the philosophers have
analysed this historical phase of “volatilization” of the spiritualities
without a Church. Slavoj Zizek has analysed seemingly atheist and
secular lifestyles, when they meet contexts such as the mysticism of
the internet and of consumerism, showing how all these beliefs, often
unconscious, are much closer to the religious field than one might
imagine (Zizek, 2005). In this acceptation, the spiritualities as life-
styles themselves are sources of identity and of autonomous symbolic
codes.
III) Spirituality with few rules and many collective choices. The
lifestyle of the spiritualities, as all fashions, is objective, “at the dis-
posal” of the person who adopts it, who makes his own use of it and
endows it with personal meanings and functions, independently from
the original cognitive dimension based on values. To these individu-
als the idea of accepting a spirituality that does not represent one’s
own life and sensitivity appears to be incomprehensible. Spiritualities
have always represented reactions to the mainstream of all the great
religions and were born to live different sensitivities, although they do
not detach from the Institutions. Nowadays, however, this differen-
tiation from the mainstream is particularly radical and represents the
“unlimited pluralism” of which Charles Taylor speaks (Taylor, 2007:
part IV). Recalling Simmel, we may say that even an “objectivity of the
style” exists in the spiritualities and that such objectivity transforms
the spiritualities into lifestyles. The objectivity and the impersonality
of the spiritualities enable their adaptation to the greatest number of
people. This is the very course of fashion. Even Simmel considered
396 luigi berzano

style and fashion as “functional equivalents”, since both performed

individualization and socialization functions.
IV) In the traditional society it was the religious institutions’ task to
produce individual identities; nowadays it is the interacting individual
identities that often produce religious institutions such as the spiritual-
ity lifestyles. Here is the problem of the acknowledgment and the vali-
dation of the new spiritualities. Even religion is a system in which each
particular item (groups, believers, practices, beliefs, experiences, etc.),
gets its distinctive value from its relation with the other items, most
of all from those who have the power to legitimate it authoritatively.
According to some recent sociologists, the relation between religion
and new spiritualities is to be found between behaviours legitimated
by religious institutions and behaviours legitimated either individually
or by the consonance with other behaviours.7 We must not forget the
hypothesis according to which lifestyles of individuals belonging to
a religious group can refer to a cognitive dimension based on values
peculiar to another group or tradition. This is the most general interest
of the sociology of religion concerning the analysis of the multifarious
forms of validation systems, validation requirements and validation
criteria (Hervieu-Léger, 1999: chapter IV).

Fields of the Lifestyle Spiritualities

Lifestyle Spiritualities of the Great Spiritual Events

A significative field in which the spiritualities as lifestyles are repro-
duced is that of the great religious happenings, such as the World
Youth Day (WYD) promoted in the Catholic ambit or the Yearly
European Meeting of Taizè (YEM) in the Protestant ambit. In these
happenings the behaviours and the religious identities assume tran-
sitory, horizontal, interactive, experimental forms. They are forms
partially analogous to the mass trends and the fashions, in which the
formation and the diffusion of the trends takes place on account of
vicinity, through mimesis, more than of dependence and conversion to
a new cognitive system based on values (Garelli e Ferrero Camoletto,
2003; Hervieu-Léger, 1999: chapter III).

7
In particular they are the American sociologists W. C. Roof and R. Wuthnow
recently introduced in Italy by G. Giordan (2006).
 lifestyles and religion 397

The spirituality that is to be found in these meetings knows the

emotional dimension that increases through the collective dynamics
of the witnesses, of the sharing of the “spiritual gifts”, of the “we” lived
and represented. It is true that the Catholic world has always known
the great mass mobilizations of the Jubilees, the pilgrimages and the
processions; but what is peculiar in the WYDs is their temporal and
structural provisional character. They do not necessarily require last-
ing socialization, symbolic continuity and spiritual faith; their consti-
tutive datum is the intense emotional, total experience in the situation
and in the time during which they are taking place.8 They are spiritual
happenings of the Erlebnis type. In all these spiritual happenings what
prevails is festive rituals and large mass sharing, aesthetic experiences
in music, in languages and in organization forms. The participation
in these happenings is necessarily limited to ambits and practices that
are easily accessible. For this reason it builds transitory identities. But,
in any case, such participation represents a form through which the
young manifest themselves and confirm that they too “are there”, with
the double function of identification and of outdistancing: the former
function involving those who are part of the event, the latter address-
ing those who watch them.
We can assume that even the historical Churches, those based on
formal institutions and movements, are today regenerating on the
basis of the practices, the experiences and the spiritual messages and
also of the new spiritualities of the great happenings.

Aesthetization of the Lifestyle Spiritualities

Simmel had already pointed out the growth of the aesthetization pro-
cess of reality, with the growing importance of style, fashions, pub-
licity, research of experiences and of newer and newer trends. The
aesthetization of religion is part of this general tendency of aesthetiza-
tion of everyday life. Even the aesthetization of religion nowadays puts
in the foreground the importance of form and style, of new experi-
ences and emotions. Rather than adopting a religious lifestyle without

8
Recalling Durkheim, we may say that in such events made of rituals, music and
songs, intense feelings and excitement experiences are generated, as “liquid emotions”.
These musical happenings and festive moments, from the 60s onwards after the great
Woodstock music festival, have become more frequent and more mass events as it
happens in the recent transnational connections.
398 luigi berzano

reflecting, through tradition and habit, the individual prefers to build

a style of his own for himself, indicating his own individuality through
it. Within the Catholic religion itself, the tendency of single individu-
als or groups to differentiate (as in the case of the spiritualities) nev-
ertheless joins up with the tendency of assuming acknowledged and
legitimated styles.
An aesthetic and experiential dimension of new spiritualities is
found in those situations in which even “the religious element” is
involved in the more general process of aesthetization of reality: the
charm of sacred places, ancient traditio, neo-monachism, music and
art, peak experience, etc. These are all situations in which intense spir-
itual feelings are produced, everyday time (profane) is transformed
into festive time (sacred), the erosion of the institutional links of the
historical religions become looser, the process of dissipation of the
religious systems in systems of secular or quasi-religious meanings is
resisted against. It is a feeling, already present in the past, but that
today appears to be new, because it is no longer extended to single
events and particular times, but is extended to all reality (Baudrillard,
1982). This atmosphere does not lead to the eclipse of the sacred; on
the contrary it reproduces new experiences and religious feelings. In
this precisely resides the interest of the phenomenologic research of
the religious symbolic goods constituting styles and tastes.

Lifestyle Spiritualities of Health

The stress on the self, its integrity and authenticity present in some
groups and movements seems to shape a new spirituality in which the
link between spiritual health and physical health recalls flows, energies
and spiritual cultures. The refrain “take care of yourself ” appears to be
the new prayer of this spirituality. Health and salvation are interwoven
forming a state of wellbeing in which there isn’t any more distinc-
tion between the physical and the spiritual dimensions. In order to
ensure this wellbeing of the body and the spirit, a wide therapeutic
network has formed. At the basis stands a system of needs concerning
nourishment, health, sexuality, relations with the others, spirituality.
The first argument inspiring every therapy is holistic, opposed to any
rigid dualism between body and spirit, man and world, man and God.
The English word “health” comes from the anglo-saxon root hal (all )
and from Greek holos (all). Even the English word holy (sacred, saint)
derives from the same root holos. From the holos root then derive both
 lifestyles and religion 399

the words meaning the body sphere and those meaning the spiritual
sphere. Even the word wealth (richness) derives from holos. Health,
spirituality and wellbeing therefore have the same origin in the princi-
ple of totality. The individual in good health and feeling good is, then,
the holistic individual; the one in whom the physical, psychic and spir-
itual dimensions are well integrated. The concept of holos is like the
carrefour where spirituality, health and prosperity meet. It is a holistic
characteristic to safeguard both the health and the satisfaction of the
individuals as well as their material success. The adopted therapies are
numerous: soft medicines, soft gymnastics, psychological techniques,
meditations, therapeutic practices. In all of them the same principle is
predominant: “to find one’s health means to find one’s self ”.
Neither a single authority nor a single truth is present in this spiri-
tual adventure. The religious knowledge is without any doctrine and
dogma. Hence the eclectic interest for the most varied spiritual routes
between the East and the West, past and present. In the psychologi-
cal field this attitude leads to a high emotional and volatile sensitiv-
ity while making the most of one’s existence through multifarious
techniques to widen one’s conscience and one’s self realization. In the
spiritual field it leads to a kind of religiosity in which the rule is “let
each one find one’s own way”. This subjectivity in the religious field
proposes a religiosity infused with multifarious religions and in which
beliefs, symbols and practices flow, according to each one’s prefer-
ences, but not institutionally organized.

Supportive Spirituality
As opposed to the past, in which the spiritualities had, most of all, ab
intra finalities for the growth of the personal formation, the supportive
spirituality manifests its most innovative aspect in assuming ab extra
finalities, that is to say for social works. In the European Catholic con-
text the supportive spirituality has many links with the “social saints”
who confronted with the “social question” of last century. It is a spiri-
tuality that expresses solidarity towards the poor and deep aspiration
to solidarity in general. An ethos prevails in it where evangelic belief,
social professionalism, political engagement, experimentation of new
forms of presence and witness are mixed together. Nowadays the new
social problems are the old and the new poverties, the deviance of the
young, emigrations, social exclusion, insecurity, territorial mobility of
large masses, neo-marginalizations.
400 luigi berzano

The supportive spirituality is the spirituality that witnesses the God

of the last ones: “the closer to God, the closer to the last ones”. From
this concept, experiences, structures, free refectories and communities,
reception centres derive that, combining emotion, feeling and enter-
prising spirit, have welcome the fringe ones, the defeated, the border-
line ones. The force of this spirituality resides in this opening towards
those who live, suffer or die in the borders of society. He who lives this
spirituality sometimes sacrifices part of his own traditional identity in
the risky indistinction of working in the border areas.
Since Council Vatican II the supportive spirituality has assumed the
first line of the constitution Gaudium et spes as its basic inspiration:
“The joys and the hopes, the sadness and the anguish of the men of
this time, especially of the poor and of all those who suffer, are also
the joy and the hope, the sadness and the anguish of Christ’s disci-
ples, and there is nothing of genuinely human that doesn’t find an
echo in their heart”. With the same language the supportive spiritual-
ity defines the social problems as “signs of the times”. This is actually
the way of speaking of a catholic priest responsible for a community
of drug addicted: “There are Christians who lose their faith because
they cannot reconcile the deep wounds suffered by the human kind
and their faith in God; and there are other Christians who consider
such wounds as “signs of the times” that arouse the sense of universal
solidarity. God’s sanctuary in man’s heart is the deep aspiration to the
liberation of the victims and to the reconciliation of the human family
in love, justice and peace. God lives in this passion of ours. And we,
opening up to God through prayer, do not turn our shoulders to the
suffering human kind. The closer we are to God, the solider and closer
to the others we are”.

References

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Flanagan, K., Jup, P. 2007. A Sociology of Spirituality, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate

Publishing.
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Roof, W. C. 1999. Spiritual Marketplace. Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American
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Simmel, G. 1989. Sociologia, Comunità, Milano.
——. 1985. La moda, Editore Riuniti, Roma.
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nia Press, Berkeley.
 VISUAL SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION

Roberto Cipriani and Emanuela C. Del Re*

Foreword

The Sorbonne University in Paris offered its students Durkheim’s

sociological and methodological thoughts, which stated that “to be
something . . . is all that is given by observation” [Durkheim 1895: 27]
more or less at the time when on the other bank of the Seine, in Bou-
levard des Capucines—not far from the Opéra Garnier—the Lumière
brothers were mesmerizing their audience by showing them for the
first time the magic of cinema. That was on December 28, 1895. Only
today—that is, more than a century later—temporal coincidence finds
concrete and diffused opportunities to apply an approach that can be
at the same time sociological and visual.
Intellectuals, with a few exceptions, have for a long time avoided
dirtying their hands with the tools of cinematography and/or pho-
tography (seen as merely technological). Photography and cinematog-
raphy were in fact considered as rather unreliable, artificial, yielding
manufactured data, therefore not adhering to reality, easily modifi-
able, i.e., not objective and not fit for scientific experiments, which
should instead be not easily susceptible to strong reservations and
perplexities.
Photography and cinematography (as well as videography, today),
are usually qualified as arts, which they certainly are. However, this
does not preclude the possibility of their being also truly scientific
tools. Indeed, they can even be a scientific-methodological option per
se, with their own conceptual and operational endowment, in par-
ticular when their application transcends mere descriptions (which
anyway—it must be emphasized—are never entirely neutral) and poses
analytic and interpretive questions aimed at a better understanding of
social issues.

* Foreword and paragraphs 1 to 3 (pp 403–411) by Roberto Cipriani;: paragraphs

4 to 7 (pp 412–417) by Emanuela C. Del Re.
404 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

As the keywords of present day methodology seem to be triangula-

tion, multi-method perspective, and connection between qualitative
and quantitative approaches, visual sociology offers opportunities that
were hitherto unfeasible.
Moreover, the growth of visual sociology goes hand in hand with
a continuous re-discovering of qualitative analysis, after the long
quanto-frantic parenthesis that invested sociology both in North-
America and in Europe. This could also corroborate a hypothetic
further development: the future of sociology will be more and more
characterized by choices of qualitative and iconic nature (notably
because of the importance that the language of images has acquired in
contemporary cultures, at all latitudes). A clear clue to this is offered
by the editing policies of some publishers specialized in the social sci-
ences, that are now investing more and more in the fields of images
and quality.
One thing must at once be made clear: there is a lot of catching up to
be made in the field of visual sociology, just as there was in the field of
qualitative sociology until recently. The fundamental theoretical issues
need clarifying, methodology must be studied, and several empirical
field-research experiences are needed to define the key-points to solve,
and above all to define what contribution visual sociology can give to
research. Besides, when the discourse particularly concerns religious
phenomenology, it is surprising to note how limited is the space that
has been reserved until now to visual analysis, in a field which is so
rich in symbolic elements: rites, liturgies, manifest and exteriorized
behaviors, visible power and legitimation structures, allusions to the
stratification of participation and affiliation.
There are very few sociologists of religion able to use both numeric
solutions and digital tools, statistical frequency and cross fading,
focalized interviews and video filming focusing on the eyes of the
interviewee. In short, what appears to be lacking is not only some
basic technical competence in the use and meaning of what one sees,
but even a fundamental sensitivity towards a methodology which is
not regarded as classic, although some classic authors have been out-
standing precursors in this field: the couple Gregory Bateson-Mar-
garet Mead [1942], for instance, or the pioneer intuition of Howard
(Howie to friends) Becker [1982] and a contemporary classic such as
Bourdieu [1965].
 visual sociology and religion 405

Stagnation and Dynamics of Visual Sociology (of Religion)

The practice in recent decades has led some sociologists who were par-
ticularly interested in religious facts to take and collect pictures, and
to film (at the beginning on film and then on magnetic tape or digital
form). They would photograph and film the phenomena which con-
stituted the object of their studies: from festivals to pilgrimages, from
popular religious rites to sumptuous public liturgies, from forms of
possession to processions. All was filmed and photographed in order
to, rather clearly, glamorize the results of the investigation, support-
ing them with beautiful color images, faces of significant subjects with
intriguing unique expressions, pan shots of masses in action during
a festival. However, the absence of theoretical-methodological inten-
tionality was evident in the rather superficial presentation of the iconic
materials, accompanied, at the best, by concise and often misleading
captions. In other words, it was clear that no preliminary theoreti-
cal effort had been made as regards the images to film, the explana-
tion to be provided and the motivations to be proposed, the use of
the material through the dissemination of the iconographic data, and
the involvement of the subjects-characters in the analysis of the event
under examination.
While some appreciable attempts have been made in the anthro-
pological field [De France 1982; Boogart, Katelar 1983; Chiozzi 1993;
Ruby 2000; Canevacci 2001; Faeta 2003; Pink 2005, 2006, 2009] the
same cannot be said about sociologists, despite a long series of sugges-
tions deriving from other scientific domains. Leonard Henny [1980;
1986] constitutes a case per se: editor of the International Journal
of Visual Sociology and promoter of a visual sociology critically and
actively engaged in social issues (from the Vietnam war to the use of
videos by governors aimed at self-legitimation, to peace and ecology,
from black power to the interactive use of videos, from the interpreta-
tion of mass media first as a weapon and then as a tool for the diffu-
sion of ideas): “video as an organizing tool has proven to be useful,
provided that it plays only a part in a well thought-through strategy
of community work. ‘Instant video’ as has happened in the sixties, has
less and less chance of succeeding, since people have become used to
sophisticated video programs on television. Very few people will now
watch a program just because it is on video (as a novelty). They tend
to only really watch it as long as it is watchable and/or relevant to their
concerns” [Henny 1983: 175].
406 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

Peter Berger’s remark [1977: 7] that: “the relation between what we

see and what we know is never settled”, has not been much heeded by
visual sociologists in the following decades, except in some rare cases,
in Italy and elsewhere [Mattioli 1991; Faccioli, Harper 1999; Faccioli,
Losacco 2003; Mattioli 2007; Kissmann 2009; Knoublach, Schnettler,
Raab, Soeffner 2009; Harper 2010].
The most significant developments are in fact related to method-
ological and operational aspects [Bauer, Gaskell 2000; Rose 2007;
Stanczak 2007; Banks 2008; Heath, Luff, Hindmarsh 2009; Mitchell
2009]. In this regard, updates and discussions are welcomed mainly in
specialized reviews: Studies in Visual Communication; Visual Anthro-
pology Review (which is the organ of the Society for Visual Anthropol-
ogy, a section of the American Anthropological Association; there is a
Visual Sociology Study Group also in the British Sociological Associa-
tion; a Thematic Group—TG5, Visual Sociology—has been founded in
2009 within the International Sociological Association); Visual Stud-
ies (the review of the International Visual Sociology Association, an
institution that was founded in 1981: www.visualsociology.org). Yet,
it is above all through Internet that it is possible to get a rough picture
of the development of visual sociology in the last few years (a useful
example of its characteristic as an hypertext able to connect theories,
concepts, methods, authors, researches, experiences is VisualWikipe-
dia, or VisWiki: www.viswiki.com/en/Visual_Sociology; see also the
forum administered by two Italian scholars, Giuseppe Losacco and
Nicola Vivarelli of the University of Bologna: www.comte.tv/visual_
sociology_forum.htm).
There are also audiovisual products specifically focusing on themes
related to the visual approach [Coover 2007], as well as to the disci-
pline of sociology of religion itself, whose methods and interpretations
they present through Comte, Durkheim and Weber [Sociology of Reli-
gion 2007].

From Descriptive Ethnography to Visual Hermeneutics

There is, in fact, no shortage of resources to start new theories and

methodologies and engage in the consequent debate and updating on
fresh development in the field. However, the obstacles posed by a rigid
traditional methodology have still to be overcome. Such methodology
is static, strongly centered on procedures, and does not make room for
 visual sociology and religion 407

alternative experiments which it labels as “non-scientific”, considering

them as deprived of the necessary rigor, rhapsodic in their conduc-
tion, erratic when not erroneous in their results. Thus the bulwark of
the established sociological tradition still resists innovation and the
spreading out of new methods and techniques. The monopoly of the
“true” and approved sociology is still in firm hands. That is why new
trends have difficulties in asserting themselves and in consolidating.
Still, problems remain the same as they were in the “Methodologi-
cal Rules” of Durkheim’s tradition. If the visual datum is to be con-
sidered at the same level as the other data, then there should be no
particular problem in treating it: it is as important as an answer to a
questionnaire or the information that emerges in a life history. But, if
the datum’s importance is questioned, then issues related to its nature,
its reliability, its peculiar character emerge: frequency and percentage
on one side, and a picture or a video photogram on the other, dif-
fer. Between them there is a substantial difference: quantitative data
in general constitute a homogeneous reference point for any scholar
(although there are exceptions), while iconic data, based on images,
carry ambiguities, lend themselves to multiple interpretations, sug-
gesting a myriad of different routes that can even be in opposition to
one another.
Let us take as an instance the video-graphic gathering made by a
still camera during a religious event: a person appears performing a
certain action that could be praying, judging from the attitude per-
ceptible at first sight. However, who can tell us that the real intention
of that person who shows him/herself in a praying attitude is that of
invoking a divinity, a superior entity, a saint? Could it not be, instead,
a usual posture of the subject that has been filmed who might then not
be praying but be engaged in another action, the meaning of which
we cannot understand as it is alien to our usual way of conceiving
the act of praying? Of course we have other certainties—taking for
granted that the video-graphic material has not been subjected to any
manipulation in the mean time—although our certainties are limited
to a few aspects only: the subject was there, seemed to belong to a
gender (male or female, except in case of masking or disguises), was
standing (or not), was alone (or surrounded by others), was looking in
a certain direction (admitting that such aspect would be clearly under-
standable), was wearing certain clothes, characterized by a single (or
by multiple) chromatism; seemed to be an adult (or maybe a young,
or an elderly, person). Beyond these observations, not much can be
408 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

added, unless the character was known by the researcher who had met,
interviewed, or consulted him/her before.
What emerges here is that the iconic fragment can provide some
details but no complete information, sociologically relevant per se.
Further work is necessary in fact to contextualize the images, to insert
them in wider dynamics, in order to read them together with other
images and/or data of any nature, so that it is possible to subsequently
proceed to a sufficiently motivated, grounded, credible interpretation.
The scientific route leading from the visual data to their collocation
in an overall framework, first of explanations and then of interpreta-
tions, is neither unique nor necessary as if it had been fixed once for
all in a canonical form.
First of all, the aim at the basis of the research must be defined in
relation to the visual datum: must it be accepted as it is, or must we
elaborate it (albeit being aware of the risk of interference to which we
expose ourselves)?
Secondly: should one work on the visual data collected or made
available by others (whether they are the subjects involved in the
research themselves or the researchers that have been on the same field
before us), or should one privilege one’s own direct findings, one’s
own visual materials?
Above all, it is essential to define very clearly the role of the visual
research in the whole of the empirical study to be carried out.
There are scholars who are used to historical-diachronic operations
aimed at the gathering of pre-existing documents in order to get sci-
entific suggestions. There are also those who opt for an action that
is completely free from previous data, from the existing reality, and
then strike out in completely new directions for research. In this case,
it is true that on the one hand the researcher gives up on a patri-
mony already acquired and that can be added to; on the other hand,
however, the researcher acquires a higher degree of neutrality, because
the visual material produced by others is always constructed, ideologi-
cally oriented, a fruit of previous root choices, which are selective and
therefore partial.
But then, there is another knot to unravel. Must the research be
based only on visual materials or must it make use of other sources,
other tools? Undoubtedly visual research is in itself rather complex
and difficult to manage; nonetheless it is better to widen the method-
ological horizon to include other investigation solutions, both quan-
titative and qualitative, using a triangulation key, mixed approach,
 visual sociology and religion 409

multi-method, levering on various opportunities, so as to obtain more

convincing and less weak results at the level of scientific reliability.
Moreover, the visual approach is decidedly satisfying as regards
some fundamental criteria of scientific research in general and of soci-
ological research in particular: it permits the tracing back of research
findings, their modifiability in progress, and so on. Once a patrimony
of images has been acquired, it remains available to everyone, allowing
additional close examinations, further results, and alternative inter-
pretations that may even be in contradiction with those previously
sustained by the same researcher and/or by others.

The Visible Religion

As it is well known, for a long time the visibility of religion has been
the object of discussions, in the sense of attitudes not always perceiv-
able or understandable, and of behaviors not always univocal in their
intrinsic meaning. On the invisibility of religion, on the other hand,
sociologists specializing in this sector have had long to struggle with
an issue that was in fact never posed as a problem by Thomas Luck-
mann [1967], the author to whom the theory of invisible religion was
attributed. The choice of the fortunate title of the volume had been
made by the publisher and had no textual confirmation in the content
of the work. The thesis so concisely expressed in the volume’s title was
misleading, and not even sustainable from a sociological perspective,
in terms of a non-event (how can something which is not visible be
studied? Sociology is everything but a study of the abstract).
Visual sociology today offers the possibility of developing discourses
different from the traditional ones: it has the capability for getting to the
bottom of matters usually marginalized. In fact, visual tools, from pho-
tography to videos, from documentaries to research films, open up new
horizons for analysis, for which appropriate methods have been avail-
able for some time, and results that can be shared at scientific level.
The exponential growth of methodological resources in qualitative
sociology itself has increased the opportunities for research and empir-
ical experiences [Losacco 2003], especially thanks to the advancement
provided (since the 1960s) by the new theoretical formulation known
as Grounded Theory [Glaser, Strauss 1967]. This theory eliminates the
need of recourse to the initial working hypotheses, and starts from the
available data to build up the theory, allowing for computer-assisted
410 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

elaborations. These find the most adequate support in the specifically

“dedicated” software called NVivo. The new recent version, NVivo 8,
offers the possibility for carrying out research projects also through
images. Ultimately, a new promising horizon seems to be opening up
also for the sociology of religion, hopefully with the support of new
interdisciplinary studies [Morgan 2007, 2008; Rose 2007].

Religion and Visual Representation

Technological advancement in visual research tools—such as NVivo—

goes together with the massive technological advancement that is invest-
ing the whole of world society, and religion within it. This involves
a number of consequences and changes observed and somehow
experienced by sociologists. Today’s information society constitutes
a true revolution in terms of communication, and most importantly
in terms of representation and self-representation: the technologically
induced reconfiguration of the social transforms humanity, as Cas-
tells affirms [1996]. This is why May’s definition of the communities
in which Internet plays a crucial role as “virtual communities” [May
2002: 85], for example, is misleading as it does not take into account
the fact that this new form of communication cannot be divorced from
all social dynamics and interactions of which Internet is an expression,
although, of course, it is able to create—and impose—new languages, as
well as rituals and other, and changes the interpretation of social ties.
Religion is deeply involved in these changes. Pilgrimages, for
instance, have been significantly transformed through the redefinition
of time and space (i.e., distance) derived from access to the new media
[Cipriani 2003]: a pilgrimage can be organized leaving little space to
the unexpected, and the “experience” can be shared with a worldwide
community, without limits, except for technological codes and know
how. The believer is transformed into a producer of religious facts and
materials (videos, photos, and blogs) though inter-subjectivity is medi-
ated through technology.
This leads to the notion of ‘post-representational society’, in which
everyday social relations are adapted to current communication codes.
This would explain why religious issues are often neglected [Mellor
2004: 370] in the name of a wider perspective based on the need to
contextualize them to better understand the “intimate connections
between religion, society and the real dangers and opportunities fac-
 visual sociology and religion 411

ing human beings in the world today” [Zizek 2002: 30]. In the post-
representational world, inter-subjectivity might well be mediated by
technology [Lash and Featherstone 2001: 17], but this cannot lead to
forms of sociological reductionism by which the religious fact becomes
a mere sub-category of communication techniques.
Visual sociology can and should contribute to this debate, although
it still often proposes more questions than solutions. Despite the possi-
ble inferiority complex arising from the success of Cultural and Media
Studies that seem to have overshadowed it since the 1990s, visual soci-
ology can definitely find today a new dimension within the informa-
tion society, especially when studying religion within it and focusing
on the issue of representation. The new dimension of visual sociology
should result from the exploration of the new developments, avoid-
ing “methodological purism” [Becker 1995], because all images—in a
wide sense—provide extraordinary material for the understanding of
social life.
In this essay we shall focus on videos, which have constituted a real
revolution for the social sciences [Secrist, de Koeyer, Bell and Fogel
2002] not forgetting other visual expressions that we consider as an
intrinsic part of the wider concept of “visual”. The use of video in qual-
itative research is often subject to criticisms: it is seen as the expression
of “naturalistic naïveté”, posing epistemological problems that can be
summarized as a “crisis of representation”, regarding the awareness of
the constructive feature of data social scientists produce [Schnettler
and Raab 2008]. This can be overcome by the awareness of the real
opportunities that video-recording offers to research, within its limits
and critical aspects: it reproduces “a version” of reality; it is tied to the
reactivity to the camera; it requires extreme care in editing procedures,
selection and focusing.
Video data are used in a vast range of research areas, including reli-
gion, given also that all religious expressions in the media age make
use, now more than ever, of new communication forms and technolo-
gies, at the institutional as well as at the most inner level [Deacy and
Arweck 2009]. The visual culture of religion is a relatively recent field of
studies that focuses on aspects of the phenomenal, transcendental and
material expressions of religion that can be visually comprehended (see
for example: http://www.visual-religion.co.uk). Given that media and
religion together form a highly interactive space, each influencing the
other in ways not entirely explored, as Hoover affirms [Hoover 2001],
the contribution of visual sociology in this field can be significant.
412 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

Whose Eye?

Making research films is as exacting as writing a research paper or

a book [Sooryamoorthy 2007]. As regards religion, film-making is
very important [Wright 2007], and the production is very vast (see
the richness of the program of Religion Today Film Festival, Trento,
Italy; http://www.religionfilm.com/, and the list of documentaries on
religion in: www.der.org).
In this field it is very difficult to draw a clear definition of cinema-ver-
ité, documentary, and especially to identify truly sociological produc-
tions, as aesthetic and emotional demands also in scientific production
are very stringent today. The American documentary production on
religious issues, for instance, is publicized in a very sensational style,
as in the case of “With God on our side” (http://firstrunfeatures.com/
withgodonoursidedvd.html; see also Sociology Through Documentary
Film in: http://sociologythroughdocumentaryfilm.pbworks.com/).
Besides, the whole of visual sociology is facing the challenge posed
by the small media by which materials that were once confined to
the local level are now available globally. Interesting examples such
as online autobiographies (see for example: Visual Auto-documentary
and Illustrated Biographies, in: www.documentedlife.com/otherpeople.
htm) must be taken into serious consideration by sociologists [Pauwels
2008]): people put their photos and videos as illustrated autobiogra-
phies online, the way they want them to be, which imposes a recon-
sideration of the role of sociologists, because the “object” is changing,
especially as regards the need for self-representation.
In the field of religion, in this sense, believers are now more active
participants (the access to cameras or video-cameras has expanded
immensely in the world because of the lower prices and the diffusion
of culture and skills of technology). Participants to religious events are
thus able to produce their own interpretation of reality and self-rep-
resentation through self-produced visual materials. If one digits “pro-
cesión religiosa” in Spanish on CLIPTA—a search engine specializing
in videos—some 2500 videos appear, most from YouTube; the same
happens when doing the same in English, Italian, French. Most of the
videos are amateur, biographical. Religion in visual terms has become
a way of expressing one’s ideas through one’s own visual production.
A 21 year old Albanian, nicknamed 3pllM, shows his video “The Truth
about Religion in Albania” on YouTube expressing his critical views
by putting his filming (edited with still photographs) online [www.
 visual sociology and religion 413

youtube.com/watch?v=KB279j-Sk-w]. It has been viewed by 11.590

visitors between April 2008 and September 2009.
Photo albums and home-made videos are no longer just personal
portraits of reality, but opinions. Self-representation has become a sig-
nificant urge for those who were until now the “object” of research.
Self-representation is self-awareness. Visual sociology should engage
in the analytical systematization of these deeply meaningful, albeit
sometimes improvised, materials.
In terms of production, the panorama of visual sociology is chang-
ing. The film production on the Indian Khumb Mela pilgrimage
[Amado 1979; Del Re, Gustincich 1995] is now enriched by produc-
tions by Indian directors themselves, who offer different perspectives.
Uddin’s film, for instance [Uddin 2001], has an added value because
it is available also in Hindi.
Many eyes are now looking analytically at the same object at the
same time. The products of these analyses vary according to their “dis-
tance” from the “object” that emerges in the representation they offer.
This distance ranges from scientific (participant) observation, to an
exercise of self-representation.

The “Object” Becomes the Subject

In defining the concept at the basis of the exhibition she curated in

2008 [Goldsmiths Centre in Textiles (University of London, UK)],
the Serbian researcher Nela Milić explained what its title “Balkanizing
Taxonomy” implicitly means: the notion of Balkan identity is endan-
gered by the impulse to create a stable taxonomic account of Eastern
European subjects. The items on show—traditional textile artefacts
from the Balkans—were hidden in light safe boxes sewn out of black
felt, visible only through small peep-holes, and the photographs (old
portraits of women wearing traditional costumes) were placed in glass
jars, in this way symbolically widening the gap between the (Western)
self and the (Balkan) other. “Taxonomy” is an incisive way of defining
the feelings of those who have been the object of visual sociology and
anthropology until now. It must not be read as a mere metaphor; rather
it brings about important theoretical and methodological questions.
A number of issues emerge for visual sociologists, amongst which:
(a) the concept of “other” must include the modes of self-represen-
tation and (b) reflexivity; (c) visual sociological products are now in
414 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

competition with other materials (such as fiction and small media),

that stress upon (d) the need to reconcile film-making and scientific
production.
Visual sociology offers a privileged terrain of analysis as the world
of visual communication is particularly rich in productions realized in
the so called third countries. These productions are particularly inter-
esting because in many cases they are the expression of conditions
deriving from: past regimes and conflicts (the Balkans); controversies
in society and repression (Iran); colonization, proposing post-colonial
self-representations (for instance Mexico and Africa); real or perceived
cultural marginalization (Macao); radical social-economic changes
(China). Visual sociology as a discipline is new to many of these
countries, although the tradition of documentaries is present. Visual
sociology in these countries today often implies a re-interpretation of
consolidated traditions and is therefore the result of a delicate process.
Religious themes in some cases are even more complicated—because
of forced atheism, fundamentalism and other.
Chia e tazi pesen? (Whose is This Song?) by the Bulgarian director
Adela Peeva [2003], European Film Award in 2003, is an outstanding
example of self-representation: in the film she travels through the Bal-
kan region asking people which country does a famous song belong to.
In each country people say it belongs to them, reacting very emotion-
ally when Peeva says that other Balkan people affirm that it belongs
to their national patrimony. The importance of the documentary lies
in the fact that it has raised great discussions in the Balkans on the
concept of national identity and common historical past, aiming at
reconciliation with a common cultural heritage (see the blog: www.
globalvoicesonline.org/2009/01/20/balkans-whose-is-this-song). The
“timeless time” offered by information exchange [Lyon 2000: 121] par-
adoxically can provide an exceptional opportunity in this case, recon-
ciling past and present and projecting the “vision” towards the future.
There is a need for re-appropriation of self-representation, that is not
only the need to produce a new representation to avoid being repre-
sented only by external eyes, but also to move a step forward from the
criteria of self-representation to which these populations were forced
in the past under difficult historical circumstances.
In Albania, for instance, there has always been a great documen-
tary tradition, not only ethnographic but also sociological, in a way,
although sociology was unknown to the country until the fall of the
regime in 1991 (reflections on society consisted exclusively in Marxist-
 visual sociology and religion 415

Leninist studies, also at University level). It is not by accident that after

the fall of the regime the level of self-representation has reached high
peaks as in the documentary Një Tokë që Lundron (A Floating Land) by
Ervin and Ibrahim Muco [1997] that showed the tragedy of hundreds
of people who drowned in the Adriatic Sea trying to flee from the vio-
lent unrests that had infested the country. Nevertheless, when the first
showing of an external eye on the most inner aspect of society—the
Albanian North Eastern mountains and their customary law and the
rebirth of a religious festival after forty years of atheism—was set up in
Tirana in 1993, in the photographic and video exhibition “Bread, Salt
and Heart” [Del Re 1993; Del Re, Gustincich 1993a]—responses were
strong and diversified. There were lively debates in the country on the
issue of representation by an external eye, and on whether it was right
and feasible at that time to define and impose limits and criteria to
representation, as it had been under the regime.
In Romania there are a number of initiatives related to visual soci-
ology. In Visual anthropology in Romania, about Romania, and for
Romanians published in her blog “Romania revealed”, Alina Stefanescu
refers to the holistic dimension of anthropology and lists a number
of initiatives, aimed at representing and self-representing Romania
[http://alina_stefanescu.typepad.com]. The University of Bucharest
hosts a Centre for Geopolitics and Visual Sociology coordinated by Ilie
Badescu (http://www.unibuc.ro/en/cc_cgsv_en). There are also ini-
tiatives on the visual anthropological perspective on religious visual
practice in South Eastern Europe which express the need for the study
of new visual material forms of religious activities experienced by
Orthodox Christian devotees as a result of Romania opening to global
communication. New visual media, including Internet and television
(there was only a 3 hour per day broadcast before 1989, against four
State and six private channels today) are seen as privileged objects of
analysis [Hanganu 2008]. This interest for a new visual interpretation
of society is emerging also in Russia [see: www.visualresearch.ru]. In
Serbia, Albania, Romania, Russia (now also in Kosovo) the need for
self-representation is strongly felt—also in religion—with a common
denominator offered by the changes occurred since 1989.
In other parts of the world, the context is different but the urge is
the same. In Iran video-documentary production is abundant, also on
religious issues; “now documentary filmmakers (in Iran) are taking
up their cameras like pens, observing and recording the world around
them, and testing the limits of what is allowed” [Vaziri 2003]. Thagi
416 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

and Amir Amirai, Iranian-British documentarists, add to this discus-

sion with their films on “Holy Places” in the world [Amirani 1995].
Since 2007, the Macao Cultural Centre organizes “Local Docu Power”,
opening the recruitment for local productions [see: www.ccm.gov.mo/
prog09/LDP09/LDP09e.pdf]. In China documentary films have been
important since 1949, and today have become a medium where public
concern and alternative voices can be heard [Chu 2009]. Film produc-
tion on sociological themes, including religion, is rich and well studied
in Africa [Diawara 2007; Petty 1989].

Visual Sociology and Religion are Movement

Marginalizing visual sociology would be difficult today. Scientists are

reconciling themselves with the issue of reflexivity, with their shyness
in using the camera—probably due to a lack of know how [Grady
2001: 84]—and distance from the “other” in visual products (in this
sense there are interesting experiments such as giving the camera to
the “subjects” of the research as in Maquilàpolis [De La Torre, Funari
2006]). This “two-way system” by which the “other” is looked at by us,
and at the same time consciously looks at us, imposes a major theo-
retical as well as methodological introspection. Moreover, new tech-
nologies have brought about a revolution, that has radically changed
the concept of “other” and the way the “other” perceives himself as
“other”. Without detracting from what is consolidated and from the
achievements of the long tradition of the use of visual in social sciences
and in sociology, new formulas must be found and are in progress.
This is probably the most important change visual sociology is
undergoing at present. On the one hand it contributes to the fixation
of moments in the social context and in particular in religious events,
as it freezes a situation that might undergo changes in the future and
therefore it constitutes an invaluable reference point. On the other
hand, it is movement, caused by the advent of these new subjects in
its world, which produces movement as it aims at self-representing,
reconciling past and present and then (finally) moving on.
Between gender analysis and video-hermeneutics, a question arises:
to what extent technical constructions of reality alter the forms of
human self-interpretation and self-representation? Mei Po Kwan
affirms that the visual materials we analyse are not mere visual facts,
rather they are: “representations in which the collaboration of strate-
 visual sociology and religion 417

gies of self-representation of those involved were part of their making”

[M. P. Kwan 2008: 619]. Harper in fact [1998] stresses the need for
developing a “newly integrative visual sociology” which includes the
redefinition of the relationship between the researcher and the “object”
in the form of a collaborative approach.
Sociology of religion contributes to this movement in visual sociol-
ogy, and vice versa. Religion in fact constitutes the perfect arena where
all the components of the analysis here proposed can meet and be re-
organized. Visual sociology must identify the added value it can offer
in a world of images and producers of images, to come to terms with
the issue of its competitiveness, not to be marginalized. If visual soci-
ology is truly “multiple, aware of its context, inclusionary, horizontal
and caring” [Jay 1994: 275], then it can definitely compete, especially
in the field of religion.

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Amado, P. 1979. Khumb Mela, CNRS AV (SERDDAV), France.
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420 roberto cipriani and emanuela c. del re

Del Re, E. C. (with F. Gustincich), 1993a, The Mountains, the qiri and the Blessed Vir-
gin. Rebirth of an Albanian Religious Festival, C.A.T.T.I.D., University “La Sapienza”
of Rome.
——. 1995. Sangam. A River of Humanity at the Khumb Mela, C.A.T.T.I.D., University
“La Sapienza” of Rome.
Muco, E. and I. 1997. Një Tokë që Lundron (A Floating Land), Albania.
Peeva, A. 2003. Chia e tazi pesen? (Whose is This Song?), Adela Media Film and TV
Production Company, Belgium/Bulgaria.
Skaggs, C., Van Taylor, D. and Pomeroy, A. 2004. With God on Our Side, Lumière
Production For Channel 4, UK.
Uddin, N. Khumb Mela, Song of the River, Samsara films, http://www.kmp2001.com/
kumbh_mela_dvd_documentary.html#synopsis

Filmography by Roberto Cipriani

– Rossocontinuo, 1990, LADIS and CATTID, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, in
cooperation with T. Occhiello, 52 minutes.
– Cerignola sullo schermo, 1996, in cooperation with T. Occhiello, 76 minutes.
– Las fiestas de San Luís Rey, 1998, Centro Teatro Ateneo dell’Università di Roma “La
Sapienza”, in cooperation with T. Occhiello, 50 minutes.
– Il viaggio, 1998, Laboratorio Audiovisivo del Dipartimento di Sociologia dell’Uni-
versità “La Sapienza” di Roma, with participation of C. Canta, 21 minutes.
– I giorni di Camaldoli, 2008, Università Roma Tre and LUMSA di Roma, in coope-
ration with F. Bocci, 36 minutes.
– Semana Santa en Sevilla, 2009, with participation of Isidoro Moreno, in cooperation
with G. Bonavolontà and M. Pesce, 23 minutes.
– Fuego en fiesta, 2009, with participation of Xavier Costa, in cooperation with
G. Bonavolontà and M. Pesce, 18 minutes.

Filmography by Emanuela C. Del Re

– In the Name of the Elohim. The Raelian Movement: a UFO Cult, 1993, C.A.T.T.I.D.,
University “La Sapienza” of Rome, 38 minutes.
– The Mountains, the qiri and the Blessed Virgin. Rebirth of an Albanian Religious
Festival, 1993, C.A.T.T.I.D., University “La Sapienza” of Rome, in cooperation with
F. Gustincich, 45 minutes.
– Sangam. A River of Humanity at the Khumb Mela, 1995, C.A.T.T.I.D., University
“La Sapienza” of Rome, 45 minutes.
 THE UNITED STATES: GOD BLESS AMERICA

William H. Swatos, Jr.

The formal separation of state and religion in the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution, one of nine amendments added to
the Constitution within two years of its ratification (collectively known
as the Bill of Rights), is central to any understanding of the religious
situation in the U.S. even to the present day. The same amendment
provides for freedoms of speech and press, peaceable assembly, and
petition of grievances—all within less than fifty words. The religion
section actually contains two clauses: the first provides that the “Con-
gress shall make no law regarding the establishment of religion,” while
the second states that it shall not make any law “prohibiting the free
exercise” of religion. These are generally known as the “establishment”
and “free exercise” clauses, even though the first is, in fact, a non-estab-
lishment provision. There were no significant contests with respect to
the interpretation of these provisions for almost a century—the first
being a test of “free exercise” with regard to Mormon polygamy. Issues
of what actually constituted a “religion” were not taken up until the
middle of the twentieth century.
These fundamental rights continue to structure the religious situa-
tion in the United States, albeit loosely. The religious worldview that
underlies them, however, cannot be seen to be anything other than
Protestant—and that of a particular sort. The conscience of the reli-
gious (or irreligious) individual is the basis for his or her religious (or
irreligious) life, both privately and publicly. The idea that a religious
institution (e.g., “the Church”) is the ark of salvation, hence deserves
state support for the good of the people, is far from American sympa-
thies. The contemporary religious historian Catherine Albanese (2006)
has referred to this as America’s “public Protestantism”—an idea oft
merged in the same breath with a quip usually ascribed to the Anglo-
American G.K. Chesterton that “in America even the Catholics are
Protestants.” The same can be said for other state church traditions and
world religions hence, for example, the phrase “Protestant Buddhism”
that appears rather frequently in American writings about Buddhist
“churches” in the US. Muslim congregations of long standing in the
422 william h. swatos, jr.

US have also conformed to this norm, though it has been challenged

by small radical Muslim sects in recent years.

A Nation of Immigrants

If one pushes history back far enough, a case can be made that almost
everyone in the United States is of immigrant descent. That is, even
“Native” Americans are almost certainly persons whose ancestors
migrated across what is now the Bearing Strait and headed south. Evi-
dence also indicates the possibility of contacts between both Icelandic
(Norse) and Irish (Celtic) seafarers with those among these ancient
migrants who had settled on the eastern seaboard prior to the mer-
chant adventurers from mainland Europe. The standard account of
the “founding” of American colonies by Europeans tends to focus on
the Pilgrims and Puritans of New England, but with the geographic
expansion of the United States, today the oldest churches of the
United States are not in New England but in Texas and New Mexico,
and they are Catholic, not Protestant. Sites from these same Hispanic
first settlements can also be found in Florida and parts of Louisiana,
where French is still spoken. Alaska can claim Orthodox roots. In this
respect, the Pilgrim saga is more a part of a national myth than it is
an accurate description of a “first.” What is true about the Anglo-
based east coast of the U.S., however, is that these settlers brought
with them a sense of an alternative way of configuring government
and religion to the dominant model that existed in the Europe they
had left—rooted far more in English Independency than in strict Puri-
tanism, and epitomized in John Locke’s “social contract” theory. By
the time of the framing of the Constitution, with some details still to
be worked out on the field of combat during the Civil War, Ameri-
cans had generally bought into the idea that people could govern their
civil lives apart from supernatural considerations, and yet continue to
practice religion publicly according to the dictates of their conscience
or emotions or both. It took at least twenty-five years before the full
stabilization of these premises occurred generally, with respect to reli-
gion—and a few outlying New England districts held out for longer.
With respect to civil rights, on the other hand, the matter was not fully
settled until the 1970s.
Because the United States simultaneously received immigrants and
expanded its own territory, there was a two-fold entrance of large num-
 the united states: god bless america 423

bers of Roman Catholics into the country, largely from three locales
to three locales: Irish immigrants, who came mainly to the east coast,
especially from Maryland north;1 Germans, primarily coming up the
Mississippi River into the Midwest:2 Spanish and French Catholics, as
a result of the annexation of Louisiana, Texas and other parts of the
Southwest. In general, however, American Catholics have embraced
easily the democratic ideas of church government that characterize
organized American religious bodies—so much so, in fact, that the
Polish National Catholic Church, a American break-off body led by a
strong-minded Roman Catholic priest and facilitated by Episcopalian
sympathizers, actually exported itself back to Poland (though not with
resounding success). The democratic ethos did not, on the other hand,
extend itself nearly as quickly to African slaves in the colonies; neverthe-
less, the battle over abolition began in the churches well before it did on
the field of battle—most clearly testified by the fact that most Protes-
tant denominations subsequently divided along North/South lines after
the Civil War concluded. Among the major Christian denominations
that had Negro members, only the Episcopalians and Roman Catholics
remained united in a single body after the Civil War.
Later immigration would bring increasing numbers of southern and
eastern Europeans and Scandinavians. The majority of the former were
Roman Catholic, while the majority of the latter were Lutheran. In the
Roman Catholic case, it quickly became clear that “ethnic” parishes
had to be formed or they would lose these new immigrants. Lutherans
formed nationality parishes with less controversy, and the denomina-
tion remained largely divided along these lines into the 1970s—today
combining into two major branches: the Lutheran Church in Amer-
ica, consisting of the majority of Scandinavian-descent branches, lib-
eral Germans, and English Lutherans; the Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod as the conservative German branch. The use of native languages
continues to persist, at least at times, in both of these branches. The

1
Maryland is often cited as a “Catholic colony,” which is not true. It was in fact
simply the most Catholic-tolerant colony, then state, because it was religiously toler-
ant as a whole. As a result of this, in part, the Methodist Church was also founded
there and it was a major site of early Unitarianism.
2
The earliest German immigrants were to Pennsylvania and were primarily Prot-
estant sectarians. Their influence was so strong at the founding of the Republic that
the choice of English as the national language by the Continental Congress defeated
German by only one vote.
424 william h. swatos, jr.

Catholic Church, by contrast, made the language shift from Latin to

English at the time of Vatican II with relatively little use of immigrant
tongues, ultimately leading to the closing of many ethnic parishes
as the parishioners themselves left their urban enclaves and entered
mainstream suburban American society. A short-term immigrant
wave into the Catholic Church reemerged at the time of the Viet Nam
war and its aftermath, and today immigrants from the Indian subcon-
tinent, sub-Saharan Africa, and some of the Roman-affiliated Eastern
Church bodies constitute the major immigrant groups from outside
the western hemisphere. The major immigrant group of concern to
the Catholic Church in the US today, however, are Hispanics—and the
concern is double in the sense, on the one hand, of direct ministry to
these people, many of whom have inadequate documentation to qual-
ify for US citizenship, and on the other, of pentecostal/neo-pentecostal
churches, the attraction of which is far more quantitatively significant
than were Protestant attempts at outreach to Catholic immigrants in
prior generations.
Finally we should note that even before its founding as an inde-
pendent country the United States has always had a visible Jewish
population. This group continued to rise with the general eastern
European immigration of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century waves, to be further increased with the rise of Nazism—so
much so that by the 1950s the US had become the largest Jewish
nation in the world, a distinction it held into the first years of the
twenty-first century. Like their Christian counterparts, Jews also broke
into different denominations—principally Reform, Conservative, and
Orthodox—although in practice it was more likely for most of this
period for a particular synagogue to be cited by its ethnic background
rather than its specific institutional affiliation. One synagogue would
be known as a “Polish synagogue,” another as “German,” another as
Lithuanian, and so on. Only as intranational mobility grew in the last
quarter of the twentieth century did this custom begin to decline. Jews
also biologically reproduced throughout this period at a rate below not
only Catholics but also Protestants, and except for continued immi-
gration would have not replaced themselves in the population across
the coming generations. With the exception of a few Reform congre-
gations, there was little effort to reach out to non-Jews as potential
converts; this has changed somewhat in the last decade, though the
primary efforts of current Jewish outreach remain directed toward
non-observant Jews.
 the united states: god bless america 425

Protestant-Catholic-Jew

Protestant-Catholic-Jew was the title of a book published by Will Her-

berg in 1955. It was simultaneously an attempt to describe and critique
the American religious situation—in general, it was more successful
in achieving the former than the latter. What Herberg was in many
respects presaging was the notion of “civil religion” that would became
the entré for Robert Bellah as the major interpreter of religion in the
United States as a whole during the second half of the twentieth-cen-
tury, particularly with the publication of the multi-authored volume
Habits of the Heart in the 1980s. Strictly speaking, one might say that
both Habits and the civil religion essay were as much about politics
as religion, and this would be true, providing that one understands
that at the core of the American practice of both religion and politics
lies a “peculiarly American” understanding of how both contribute
to American society and culture, hence how each should relate to the
other. This American view was contrasted to an older, primarily Euro-
pean, view that in some respects held religious specifics as much more
intimately tied to the conduct of daily interaction among persons than
was the case in the US. In the sociological literature this can also be
traced back to Max Weber’s essays on the Protestant ethic in the United
States—that religion served a background function to commerce and
that being a church member certified a person’s place in economic
relationships. Instead of a foreground to emphasize difference, the
American socio-religious order served as a background to facilitate
economic exchange. Belonging to any one of a number of religious
communities certified a person’s worth in the public sphere—a view
that was further reinforced by Benton Johnson’s essay, “Do Holiness
Sects Socialize in Dominant Values?” a neo-Weberian demonstration
that indeed they did.
But the 1950s are also now a bygone half-century. Changes have
taken place especially in the denominational ecology of the United
States, especially since the mid-1970s. While it would be wrong to say
that any single event could account for this, an intersection of events
did take place across these years that had a significant effect on US reli-
gious membership and activity. The period from about 1943 to 1962
constituted the post-War American “baby boom”—a generation of
children who would be dubbed “the boomers.” They differ from their
parents primarily in the fact that they never experienced either global
conflict or economic depression. Some boomer parents were old enough
426 william h. swatos, jr.

to have experienced both World War I as preadolescent children and

World War II as relatively youthful adults—and the Great Depression
besides. To both these parents and their children, the 1950s seemed rela-
tively idyllic, atomic bomb scares notwithstanding. This period was a
heyday of growth for the historic American Protestant denominational
churches. Children teamed into Sunday school programs, and an era
of single-parent earners, housewives took on a variety of both social
and religious activities in the context of their local churches. Seminaries
in the mainstream rethought traditional theological categories and doc-
trines, and an era of ecumenical good will increasingly settled over the
land, further enhanced by the call of Pope John XXIII for an ecumenical
council of the Roman Catholic Church.
The ease was shattered in three directions: (1) The civil rights move-
ment, especially in the US south, with considerable involvement on the
part not only of black clergy, but of northern white clergy as well, in
spite of the fact that most northern Protestant churches were no more
integrated than those in the south. (2) The assassination of President
John Kennedy, in what was otherwise visioned as Camelot—coupled
with the rise of the communist regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba and a
nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union that had already made a sci-
entific “first strike” by putting a satellite into space. (3) The escalation
of military hostilities in Southeast Asia, eventually termed the Viet
Nam War, which reached its high point in the removal of the student
draft deferment program and confrontations on American university
campuses in which the military were ordered to fire on unarmed stu-
dents, and they did. Hence American citizens were killed by American
citizens for the crime of public protest of American policies. It seemed
as though liberal Protestantism—and the “gospel of ‘plastics’” that it
had propounded was exhausted by the Nixon White House, which had
its ultimate effect in his own resignation and years of destabilization
that followed, including the ineffectiveness of Democrat Jimmy Carter
with respect to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran.

L’chaim

While all of this was going on, however, a fourth event was in the
brewing that would create a new alliance—an alliance that would have
been unimaginable in the sanguine 1950s—which would in turn create
a whole new world of “Protestant-Catholic-Jew.” It came in the 1970s
 the united states: god bless america 427

when the United States Supreme Court reversed long-standing stat-

utes and permitted abortion on request (often thereafter called “abor-
tion on demand”). The initial reaction to this decision (in the case Roe
v. Wade 1973) was relatively disorganized, but across the decade of the
1980s and forward a new phalanx of Protestant-Catholic-Jew emerged
centering around sex-and-gender issues that has simultaneously cre-
ated new intradenominational hostilities and interdenominational alli-
ances, as Baptist and Pentecostal preachers march arm-in-arm with
Roman Catholic bishops and Orthodox Jewish rabbis. Let us call this
the Life Coalition. This group represents a growth shift that is most
likely to continue into the next generation as a result of fertility pat-
terns that only indirectly relate to the abortion question itself.
The first contributing factor is the continued growth of the Roman
Catholic Church, which is now the largest single religious denomi-
nation in the United States. Growth of the Roman Catholic Church,
however, has come in specific ways, especially across the last decade-
and-a-half. Hispanic Roman Catholics are a case in point. Although
some books about Hispanic immigrants to the U.S. make it sound as
if they are all becoming Pentecostal, this is only to be cited in terms of
comparative defection rates. As a whole, Hispanic Americans remain
predominately Roman Catholic. Moreover, it is specifically the His-
panic population within the Roman Catholic Church that accounts
for its growth: non-Hispanic Roman Catholics have a birth rate that is
slightly lower than that of Protestants. Hence there is a specific connec-
tion between (both legal and illegal) Hispanic immigration to the U.S.,
the growth of the Roman Catholic Church, and pro-life movement in
the Roman Catholic Church. Roman Catholic Hispanics marry earlier
and have children earlier than both non-Hispanic Roman Catholics
and non-Roman Catholic Hispanics.
The second contributing factor is a shift that began with the confron-
tations of the civil rights/anti-Vietnam War movements of the 1960s
and is most explicitly marked by the Southern Baptist Convention sur-
passing the United Methodist Church as the largest Protestant denomi-
nation at the end of the 1960s.3 Other liberal denominations have seen
similar patterns: The United Church of Christ (successor church to the
Pilgrims) lost 15% of its members in the decade of 1990–2000 alone,

3
Though originating in the US South, the Southern Baptist Convention is a
national-level denomination with missionary thrusts throughout the world.
428 william h. swatos, jr.

while the Roman Catholic Church in the same decade gained 16.2%—far
more actual members than in the UCC as a whole! The Episcopal (Angli-
can) Church has lost 45% of its membership from 1960 to the present.
Sixty percent of Southern Baptists attend church weekly as compared
to only a third of Episcopalians. That means that there are 12,000,000
Southern Baptists in church on a Sunday as compared to 600,000 Epis-
copalians: 20 times the difference! Some claim that the bases for these
differences among Protestants are in polity—that the congregational-
type polity is more attractive to American democratic ideals. Yet this
argument is belied by the fact that two of the fastest growing denomi-
nations have episcopal polities: the Roman Catholics and the Latter-day
Saints (Mormons). By contrast, the successor Baptist body to what could
be called the post-Civil War northern equivalent within that denomi-
nation, numbers less than two million members—hence two historic
congregational-polity denominations are actually each smaller than the
Episcopal Church. Rodney Stark has recently speculated that the inde-
pendent evangelical/pentecostal churches (megachurches) at present
may, if they were united into a single denomination, actually surpass
the Southern Baptists in total membership. Hence, official polity differ-
ences cannot in themselves explain American denominational growth
and decline. Virtually all of the large-growth religious bodies are also
pro-life bodies either explicitly or implicitly (i.e., by stressing familism
as a major part of their program, while not speaking “authoritatively” on
matter of abortion). Tables 1 and 2 display current religious-affiliational
and growth-and-decline data in the United States.4
The pro-life question thus becomes something of a major “litmus
test” within American religious life that overarches the once more sig-
nificant Protestant-Catholic divide, while at the same time allowing for
shades of difference. This difference is especially heightened when the
“pro-life” position is slightly enlarged to include not only the very rigid

4
It may be noted that in the 20 years between McKinney and Roof’s American
Mainline Religion (1987) and the Pew Forum’s U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (2008),
the No Preference category more than doubled (from 6.9 to 16.8%). By phrasing the
option as “No Preference,” however, these surveys avoid the matter of atheism or even
anti-religionism. Hence, it cannot be assumed that this difference represents a turn
against “the religious,” though it may well mark a turn against “organized religion.” By
category, the largest percentage loss over the period was among Jews at 26%, but Jews
are also the smallest category among those measured. The smallest percentage loss
was among Roman Catholics, at 4.8%. The “All Others” category also lost affiliation
at 18.75%, notwithstanding significant rises among non-European immigration rates.
Protestants lost 11%, which would be by far the greatest in real numbers.
 the united states: god bless america 429

Table 1. Membership of American Religious Bodies at the Turn of the

Twenty-first Century*
Roman Catholic Church 62.00
Southern Baptist Convention 19.90
National Baptist Conventions 13.50
United Methodist Church 10.40
Jewish 6.14
Church of God in Christ 5.50
Evangelical Lutheran Church 5.11
African/Colored Methodist 4.55
Latter-day Saints (Mormon) 4.22
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 3.14
Assemblies of God 2.60
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod 2.52
Episcopal Church 2.31
Buddhist 2.00
American Baptist Churches 1.77
United Church of Christ 1.70
Muslim 1.60
Churches of Christ 1.56
Pentecostal Assemblies 1.50
Disciples of Christ 1.44
Baptist Bible Fellowship 1.20
Hindu 1.10
Jehovah’s Witnesses 1.04
* In millions. Data derived from both actual denominational records and estimating
sources; kindred groups combined in some cases. See Finke and Scheitle 2005, Jones
et al. 2002, Linder 2003.

all circumstances but also allowing for a decision to abort when the life
of the mother is at stake; that is, the adding of this qualifier—one that
confronts the fact that somebody is certainly going to die in the preg-
nancy, hence a choice has to be made—the majority of all American
Evangelicals and Catholics are pro-life in this sense. That means that
the majority of all Americans who claim any religion are pro-life, since
the majority of Americans who claim any religion are either Evangeli-
cal or Catholic. In general, Orthodox Jews join them on this point. It
sometimes surprises people from outside the US that Americans can be
simultaneously pro-life and support capital punishment.5 The logic for

5
The Roman Catholic church has taken a relatively strong stance against capital
punishment via its concept of a “consistent life ethic,” as contrasted to evangelical
Protestantism, nevertheless it continues to recognize the right of the state to inflict
capital punishment and in that sense consents to it, albeit regretfully. Among the
430 william h. swatos, jr.

Table 2. Growth, Decline, and Participation Among American Christian

Religious Bodies*
Growing Churches 1990–2000 (percent)
Salvation Army 225.0
Latter-day Saints (Mormon) 19.3
Assemblies of God 18.5
Roman Catholic Church 16.2
Declining Churches 1990–2000 (percent)
United Church of Christ –15
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) –12
United Methodist Church –7
Weekly Church Attendance (percent “weekly or almost every week” 2002, 2005
[Gallup])
Churches of Christ 68
Latter-day Saints (Mormons) 67
Southern Baptists 60
Methodists 44
Presbyterians 44
Lutherans 43
Episcopalians 32
* See Jones et al., 2002; Religion News Service, 2006.

this, however, is really at the center of American civil religion or what

might be called the American Creed: Everybody deserves a chance to
make something of him/herself. People who fail do not deserve much
pity. These two statements, taken together, are nothing more or less
than the secularized “Protestant” ethic of Weberian fame, but in fact
not so much secularized as ecumenized or civil-religionized—that is,
built into American civil religion and in that sense shared across the
culture by its continued core: Protestant-Catholic-Jew.
Two other factors, of lesser importance, certainly, but not to be
ignored, may be mentioned: first, the immigration of Russian and
other Eastern European Jews from the Nixon administration forward.

major traditions, however, it is most likely Catholics who will join liberal Protestants,
liberal Jews, and humanists in protesting at executions. John Simpson (1995) has also
pointed out, using different scholars’ use of the same data, that how multi-choice
items are reduced to two-way, for-against positioning, by both activists and social
scientists, can serve to construct quite different images of public opinion.
 the united states: god bless america 431

Whereas Jews were actually not replacing themselves in the US popu-

lation prior to this period, these new immigrants (as virtually all other
US immigrant groups before and after them) almost as soon as they
arrived decided to have children (or more children). As a whole, these
Jews are more observant than their US-born counterparts. Although
Jews quantitatively still remain a relatively tiny proportion of the total
US population and relatively speaking the least practicing among reli-
gious groups, the practice of those who do practice has taken a more
conservative turn—restoring customs practically abandoned by the
1960s in many places and instituting efforts to “re-convert” Jews who
have abandoned core religious practices. The other factor is the rise
of militant Islam and the reactive effect on the mainstream Protes-
tant-Catholic-Jewish traditions as a whole—that is to say, a height-
ened awareness of Jews and Christians generally to their own religious
identities. The glib maxim of “I’m ok, you’re ok” doesn’t quite hold up
when “your” compatriots are painting my country as “The American
Satan.” This has produced a clear reclaiming of American “chosen-
ness” which is to say a revival of American “civil religion” as a piety as
well as a belief system. This is most explicitly evidenced in the revival
of the song “God Bless America,” sometimes in actual substitution for
the National Anthem, and of a newer, kindred song “God Bless the
USA,” a video clip of which is now included in U.S. citizenship natu-
ralization ceremonies. Americans believe in America. And they believe
that God believes in America.

The Almighty Dollar

What some outside the US perceive to be the strange combination

of opposition to abortion and support for capital punishment again
interfaces with American civil religion in questions of economics—the
“essential” goodness of capitalism and, most recently, the distinction
between capitalism and the economic ethics of Islam. One might want
to say that both Judaism and Catholicism have “made their peace”
with capitalism, though Catholicism still maintains a stronger social
justice orientation than its evangelical compatriots who, if not sup-
porting directly the gospel of wealth, hardly ever speak against it. The
modern concept of the gospel of wealth can be best epitomized in the
life and work of John D. Rockefeller—a faithful Baptist layman who
as a youth saved dimes to give to his church, taught a Sunday school
432 william h. swatos, jr.

class much of his adult life (attending one when he did not himself
teach), opposed drinking and gambling, gave generously to Christian
causes—who summed the whole matter of his life quite succinctly
in five words: “God gave me my money” (Josephson 1962: 318). In
phrases like “The Lord helps those who help themselves,” the Protes-
tant ethic is semi-secularized, but just as much so, money making is
sacralized, and sociocultural change is legitimated in some measure
by the extent to which it introduces some combination of cost-saving
and money-making. A measure of this can be observed by the extent
to which the more labor-saving devices that are introduced, the more
hours Americans work, and the more likely it is that women—freed of
the drudgery of household chores—will enter paid employment out-
side the home, while the remaining household duties will be turned
over to “homecare professionals.”
Churches themselves enter into this marketplace in several ways.
The most obvious is the religious publications market (including reli-
gious music as CDs, for example). It is true, of course, that churches
and religious organizations have historically sold limited items pri-
marily to members of their congregations, but also at times to the gen-
eral public. The Catholic bookstore, for example, was a staple at least
in medium-sized cities, while major urban areas often had a Catho-
lic publishing house. Today’s market in the United State, however, is
much more extensive both in the variety of denominational affiliations
represented and in the kinds of merchandise available. Not only have
some individual churches created their own sales areas, but virtually
every shopping mall in American has at least one store selling what
is broadly defined as “Christian” merchandise. Unlike the religious
“bookstore” of old, most of these Christian bookstores derive more
than two-thirds of their income from non-book materials. These items
include stuffed animals and plush toys, picture frames and plaques,
greeting cards and postcards, toys and games, videos, music media,
jewelry, and so on. The evangelical Protestant publisher Zondervan
has been recently owned by the media mogul Rupert Murdock.
This is not to say, however, religious publishing is by any means dead.
The religious publishing industry sold more than $685 million worth
of books in 1986. By 1999 the figure was $1.22 billion; by 2004, $4.34
billion. In 2005 the Economist magazine estimated that all “religious
products” as a whole in the US had sales amounting to more than $8
billion. At the same time, it should be said that the line between reli-
 the united states: god bless america 433

gious and secular publishing becomes increasingly blurred. Obviously

Bibles and The Catechism of the Catholic Church could not be held to
be anything but religious works in both the 1950s and the 2000s; but
what about convicted Watergate conspirator Chuck Colson’s tale of
his conversion? Or what about his programs for reforming America’s
prisons—or society in general? There are Christian self-development
books of many sorts—diets, workouts, memory enhancement, and so
on—not to mention the Left Behind series. A more multifaith society
has also brought religious books more into the mainstream beyond the
Christian bookstore outlets. A Buddhist monk writes the introduction
to a new edition of a book by the Cistercian monk Thomas Merton. At
a general bookstore one may find a scholarly study of American Hin-
dus, a work on Celtic mythology, another on Native American ethnol-
ogy, a history of the diffusion of Islam, and an anthology of reflections
from many traditions to give to a grieving widow or widower.
The sheer size of the American religious market and the fact that
it is not subsidized or regulated by the government makes it in some
respects potentially the closest to a pure market in American soci-
ety today—perhaps in the world today. The government’s hands are
largely kept off most religious marketing.6 What can be sold is what
will be bought, and what will be bought is what can be sold, without
interference from third-party programs. The government will nei-
ther decide to build a church nor fund it. (Though local zoning codes
may still be invoked, as may access and fire codes). It will not decide
whether or not a pipe organ is installed. It cannot insist that certain
books be used. It does not set salaries for employees, nor can it gener-
ally invoke “fair labor” laws. Ministers may work for no money at all
or be paid $1,000,000 a year. They are “self-employed persons,” who
must do their own income-tax accounting and pay their own Social
Security, not subject to government withholding. If their church doc-
trine opposes social programs, they do not have to pay into Social
Security at all. Ministers of religion are exempt from military service,
though they are free to candidate for the military chaplaincy, if their
denomination has a certifying process, and if they are accepted they

6
There are a few exceptions to this rule—for example, food items that are sold
beyond the place of manufacture (such as Easter or Christmas confections), fireworks
and some incense products, electric appliances (praying-hand lamps).
434 william h. swatos, jr.

will be both commissioned as military officers and paid by the US

government.7
Although more regulated today by governmental agencies than pre-
viously and receiving more competition from government agencies
than previously, institutions of religious higher education remain an
important part of the American educational scene—from such highly
recognized Catholic institutions as the University of Notre Dame and
Georgetown University and Baptist Baylor University to smaller Prot-
estant liberal arts colleges and fundamentalist Bible colleges, as well
as an increasing number of “Christian” schools and academies in the
elementary grades to complement an already-existing, though much
diminished Catholic school system. Some of these institutions accept
state and federal funding. Others refuse. Those who refuse have greater
latitude in curriculum and requirements, particularly once students
reach adult status. Budgets at the largest of these schools run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars and include massive external research
grants, while smaller schools struggle to operate on far more limited
budgets than their secular counterparts.

A Nation of New Immigrants

We end where we began because a new chapter is unfolding in Ameri-

can society inasmuch as immigrants are entering the US from locales
heretofore unknown. We have already spoken of the shift in Roman
Catholic immigration—and particularly a European immigration that
spread both south and east across the first two centuries of American
history—to encompass Hispanic Americans from Central and South
America. In American society today, new immigration has brought
new populations of both Judeo-Christian and non-Judeo-Christian
backgrounds.
Among Christians, one of the most significant groups is Arab Chris-
tians. This group has not been unknown in the US heretofore, but
the numbers have swelled significantly—and in areas of the country

7
Note that it is the denomination, not the US government that does the certifying.
A currently interesting case in this regard exists in regard to Wicca: the US govern-
ment accepts Wicca as a legitimate religious preference, but the Wiccans as of this
writing have been unable among themselves to develop an agreed-upon certifying
process, hence they have no chaplains. (Chaplains currently facilitate Wiccan rites to
be performed by volunteer Wiccan adherents.)
 the united states: god bless america 435

where they have been present in significant numbers in the past. For
example, southern California now has two Chaldean (Iraqi) Catho-
lic dioceses, where these people were virtually unknown on Ameri-
can soil twenty years ago. Indeed, the Christian depopulation from
much of the Middle East has affected a number of western nations,
but this move is particularly noticeable. Historically Arab Christians
were more likely to have settled in the Detroit area or have stayed at
an east-cost port-of-entry locale.
But the story goes the other way as well. For example, my col-
leagues and I intentionally chose in our Sociology of Religion text to
feature an Albanian mosque in southwest Florida to emphasize that
there were historically Muslim Europeans, who have also experienced
dislocation.8 One interesting comparative point in my own observation
is how easily Albanian Muslims were integrated into American society
as practicing Muslims, whereas there is great suspicion of Arabs, even
extending to Arab Christians, who actually outnumber Arab Muslim
immigrants 2:1 in the United States, unless the Christians are explicit
in their religious preference (for example, by wearing Christian jew-
elry, having crucifixes in their homes, Christian automobile insignias,
etc.). Undoubtedly this also is affected by the massive emigration of
Christian Arabs from the Middle East, in the sense that those who see
current television news photos from the Middle East are unlikely to
see distinctly Christian imagery or activity, with the possible exception
of Christmas or Holy Week services, principally in Jerusalem.
Equally significant, however, has been immigration from the region
of the Indian subcontinent—of Hindus, Muslims, and also Zoroastri-
ans—in great numbers, to both rural and urban areas. Because these
religions are not only different from the Judeo-Christian core but also
are connected with areas of the world with which the United States
sees itself engulfed more and more in unending conflict, accommo-
dation has sometimes been quite difficult, and the phrase “Goddamn
Muslims” is hardly rare, especially in regard to small convenience
store operators and similar small-scale enterprises like tobacco stores
and liquor stores. Comparably, there is a greater tendency for Zoro-
astrians and Hindus to be professionals, hence to build houses of

8
I wish to acknowledge formally the good spirit of my colleagues with respect to
this essay, inasmuch as a great deal of what appears here is dependent upon our work
together on that text (Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto 2008).
436 william h. swatos, jr.

worship in larger cities. The Hindu tendency to be a “feast” tradition

rather than a weekly (or more often) worship tradition also makes
their religious presence-of-difference less visible on a regular basis.
Additionally, almost daily media reports of Islamic terrorists create an
obviously negative image not only of the specific persons involved but
also of their religious tradition as a whole. By the same token, Ameri-
cans are often unaware of actual practicing Muslim congregations in
their own cities and towns. At one point I surprised a Midwestern
Anglican bishop by telling him that there were four active Muslim
congregations in his see city—the same number of congregations as
the Anglicans had (though none nearly as large as the largest Angli-
can congregation in that city). In this particular city, the Muslim con-
gregations largely organized along ethnic lines—Middle Eastern, East
Indian, Indonesian, and African (the lattermost being very clear that
it was not a “Black Muslim” congregation—i.e., not Wallace Fard’s
“Nation of Islam”).
Of greater importance, perhaps, but less likely to get media atten-
tion is the phenomenon religion scholars have dubbed “Protestant
Buddhism”—the fact that Buddhist congregations have been particu-
larly successful at adapting to the organizational life-form of the Prot-
estant Christian congregation. In worship, education, fellowship, and
service there has been a relatively smooth adaptation of Buddhists to
the lifestyle of Christian congregationalism. Buddhist seem comfort-
able adapting English words to describe their places of worship: they
are as likely to say that they worship in a Buddhist “church” as in a
temple and will refer to one or another activity, including “Sunday
school” as going on at their “church” or among their “congregation.”
Although there are some differences by ethnicity, the general ten-
dency is to accommodate to American language forms and architec-
tural structure without cultural resistances that might require special
language. As a result, although numbers are small, Buddhist churches
seem to be showing a growth pattern more consistent with Ameri-
can denominationalism in general than any other non-Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition. In part, this reflects a longer heritage of Buddhism in
the United States—stretching back to the early twentieth century—
and therein an effort especially on the part of Japanese Americans to
accommodate as much as possible to American norms, especially in
the wake of World War II (although the pattern was already present
well before that event). Protestant Buddhism is particularly significant
inasmuch as its suggests that acceptance under the historic Protestant-
 the united states: god bless america 437

Catholic-Jew umbrella in part involves an acceptance of American civil

religious norms of not only the letter of the law but its implementation
as well in specific cultural forms. We all know, for example, that laws
against speeding in the United States not only refer to driving too fast
(but allow some leeway) but also prohibit going too slow, and regard-
less of slow or fast, no one may drive his or car in reverse on a public
highway, no matter how good a driver (in reverse) the person may
be. It is precisely when those elements of cultural conformity, bound
up “in, with, and under” the rubric of civil religion are breached that
religious antagonism grows and potential acts of discrimination or
violence may occur.

Religious America vs. Secular Europe?

In a recent volume, Peter Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas have
attempted to raise questions about how religious the United States is
and how secular Europe is. The book certainly has merits, especially
for those who are genuinely ignorant of the changes that have gone on
in the two macrosocietal geographical spaces separated by the Atlan-
tic. I don’t think, for example, Americans are as a whole aware of
the amount of Muslim penetration of Europe, nor of the potential
this raises for historically core European societies if Turkey should be
admitted to the European Union. And although American communi-
ties from coast-to-coast have been known for having “village atheists,”
a systematic American atheism does play at all through the popular
mainstream—and especially not in politics. Indeed, the most success-
ful rhetoric from all sides in opposing Marxist-Leninism was the single
phrase “godless communism.”
What the book fails to grasp is the depth and strength of American
civil religion—whether or not Robert Bellah got every minute detail
absolutely right in his description (and inasmuch as civil religion in
America is a continuously evolving product, certainly there would
need to be adjustments to the thesis to fit 2010 exactly). Not only does
America have a black president, but perhaps far more significant is
the fact that it has a president named Barak Obama and that he for all
intents and purposes kicked off his presidential campaign in Berlin.
Equally significant, too, is that he abandoned his church’s pastor when
the reverend decided to turn the campaign into a bully pulpit for rac-
ism, that the nation waited with President Obama to see his choice
438 william h. swatos, jr.

for a place of worship, and that no one complained when he chose

the same quasi-military chapel where George W. Bush worshiped, “far
from the madding crowd,” in order to have his time with God. If that’s
not civil religion, I don’t know what is, and there is simply nothing like
that in Europe. Without civil religion in America as a backdrop, the
peculiarities of American religion can never be understood.

References

Albanese, Catherine L. 2006. America: Religion and Religions. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Bellah, Robert N. 1967. “Civil Religion in America.” Dædalus 96 (Winter): 1–21.
——. Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Stephen M. Tipton.
Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. 1985. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
Berger, Peter, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas. 2008. Religious America, Secular Europe:
A Theme and Variations. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Christiano, Kevin J., William H. Swatos, Jr., and Peter Kivisto. 2008. Sociology of Reli-
gion: Contemporary Developments, 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Finke, Roger, and Christopher P. Scheitle. 2005. “Accounting for the Uncounted:
Computing Correctives for the 2000 RCMS Data.” Review of Religious Research
47: 5–22.
Herberg, Will. 1983. Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociol-
ogy. 1955. Reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, Benton. 1961. “Do Holiness Sects Socialize in Dominant Values?” Social
Forces 39: 309–16.
Jones, Dale E., Sherri Doty, Clifford Grammich, James E. Horsch, Richard Houseal,
Mac Lynn, John P. Marcum, Kenneth M. Sanchargrin, and Richard H. Taylor. 2002.
Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States, 2000: An Enumera-
tion by Region, State, and County Based on Data Reported for 149 Religious Bodies.
Nashville, TN: Glenmary Research Center.
Josephson, Matthew. 1962. The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists. 1934.
Reprint, San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Linder, Eileen W., ed. 2003. Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches: 2003.
Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2008. U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: 2008.
Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
Religion News Service. 2006. “Gallup: Churches of Christ Have Most Frequent
Attenders.” Christian Century 123 (May 16): 15.
Roof, Wade Clark, and William McKinney. 1987. American Mainline Religion: Its
Changing Shape and Future. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Simpson, John H. 1995. “The Mood of America in the 1980s: Some Further Observa-
tions on Sociomoral Issues.” Pp. 69–84 in Steve Bruce, Peter Kivisto, and William
H. Swatos, Jr., eds, The Rapture of Politics: The Christian Right as the United States
Approaches the Year 2000. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Weber, Max. 1998. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 1904–06. Reprint,
New York: Oxford University Press.
 RELIGION IN THE NETHERLANDS

Erik Sengers

Introduction

The image most non-Dutch people have of the Dutch religious situa-
tion is that of a Protestant, Calvinist-dominated country. Some even
know that there is a great multitude of Calvinist sects and that this
seems to be typical for the country. But this image is only a fragment
of reality. Most people are astonished when they hear that the Roman
Catholic Church has been the biggest church in the Netherlands since
the census of 1910 and is currently larger than all Protestant groups
together. Then they are surprised to hear that the Christian character
of the country has disappeared for the most part: the churches are
rapidly losing members, their social organizations are being dissolved,
church participation is in decline, and churches now play a marginal
role in public and political debates. Finally they are amazed when told
that around half of the population is not organizationally involved in
religion at all. It has once been said that all Dutchmen are Calvinists
by nature, that they—whether they believe or not, whether they are
Calvinist or papist—all share characteristics like frugality, commerce,
sincerity, and consistency (Van Heek 1954: 128–132). This might be
true, but not as an indication of their religious preferences.
This paper gives an overview of the religious situation in the Neth-
erlands—or Holland as most people call it. After starting with a short
historical overview from the mid-19th century onwards, it will then
give some detailed statistical information on the current situation.
Here, attention will be paid to Christian religious praxis, the religios-
ity of the Dutch in general, and the situation of world religions. Then
there will be some attention given to the relationship between state
and religious institutions; only a short paragraph because the situation
is quite liberal. In the conclusion, I will sketch an outline for the future
of religion in the Netherlands.
440 erik sengers

Pillarization

A modern history of religion in the Netherlands should start with ‘pil-

larization’. This is a word used to describe the relationship between
religious organizations and society in some European societies dur-
ing the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Pillarization means that
religious organizations (quasi-religious organizations like the social-
ist movement also acted in this way) establish themselves in modern
society through a variety of social organizations. These range from
media, youth work, health care, leisure, to last but not least, political
organizations. One characteristic of these organizations is that they
are exclusive: they refer to organizations with the same worldview,
and individuals can be members of the organizations of only one
subculture, not two. Whether pillarization originated from the need
to defend a group against the evils of modernity, or to emancipate a
group of second-class citizens in broader society, to pacify the vari-
ous groups in society while at the same time reach national unity, or
whether it was functionally to accommodate modernity and religion
(Hellemans 1990) is a matter of discussion and perspective. The fact
is that the arrangements resulting from the pillarized situation domi-
nated the view and place of religion in the Netherlands long after it
had ended.
Pillarization, and with that the modern history of Dutch religion,
started when discontented groups broke with the official reformed
church in 1834 and 1886. The reformed church—never the state
church, but the ‘public’ church, used for public functions by the
political elite that at the same time tolerated other religions—became
increasingly influenced by the state and modernist theology after its
reorganization in 1815 by King William I of Orange. In particular Rev.
Kuyper, the leader of the second schism, fulminated against this trend
and demanded sovereignty in religious circles. Paired with a vision
of Christians active in society in order to bring their fellow citizens
back to Christianity, he founded a university, the Vrije Universiteit
(‘free from state and church’), a newspaper and a political party to
attain these goals and was active as scientist, publicist, and politician
himself. Within a few decades, these neo-Calvinists were a social and
political factor to be reckoned with (Van Eijnatten/Van Lieburg 2005:
278–289).
This success stimulated Catholics to do the same. Catholics were
second-class citizens since the installation of the Reformation (this
 religion in the netherlands 441

varied per province and city; in 1648 the Eighty Years’ war with Spain
ended which consolidated the position of the Reformed Church). Never
totally forbidden nor persecuted, they could practice their religion as
long as they paid fees to the local government and were not publicly
visible. In 1795 the Dutch Republic surrendered to French troops and
was succeeded by the Batavian Republic and later the Dutch Kingdom.
These both gave Catholics full civil rights and reduced the role of the
Reformed Church, but Catholics still suffered from social discrimina-
tion and low social status. Only in 1853, after the government decided
to no longer interfere in inner-church policies on the basis of the lib-
eral constitution of 1848, was the Catholic hierarchy re-established.
During the entire 19th century, some Catholics agitated for more pub-
lic visibility, activity and self-assurance of Catholics in Dutch society.
This movement gained support from ultramontanist Roman policies
after the First Vatican Council (1870–1871) and after the publication
of the social encyclical Rerum Novarum. Within a few decades, Catho-
lic institutions: schools, charity organizations, cemeteries, newspapers,
a political party, youth and women organizations, devotional clubs,
labor organizations, welfare associations (such as those dealing with
alcohol abuse), and the funniest one: a Catholic goat-breeding asso-
ciation were scattered throughout the whole country (Sengers 2003:
65–116).
After 1917 pillarization became institutionalized in the public
sphere. The stimulus came from the discussion about schools. As
the government raised the qualifications of public schools with pub-
lic funds, the religious schools felt disadvantaged and demanded the
same rights. At the same time, parliament could not agree about the
question of general suffrage. It was decided to exchange the two: secu-
lar parties accepted funding of religious schools, religious parties (esp.
neo-Calvinist and Catholics) accepted general suffrage (Oud/Bosmans
1990: 208–223). The model that regulated the funding of religious
schools (the government subsidizes activities in the social sphere—not
churches directly—and is allowed to check quality and qualifications)
became the dominant model for other sectors—especially charity and
welfare—and for non-religious organizations as well. But the deal of
1917 also had another consequence. With general suffrage, modern
political parties and political mobilization entered the political arena.
Moreover, by now it became clear that religious parties were a signifi-
cant factor in society. They dominated government without interrup-
tion for almost 90 years, either together or in coalition with secular
442 erik sengers

(liberal or socialist) parties. This of course determined the position of

‘religion’ and religious organizations for a long time. But the religious
parties never changed the liberal constitutional framework, because
they did not have the necessary 2/3 majority and because they were all
dependent on this framework for their success.
Since 1870, and especially since 1917, the religious groups grew
enormously in number and participation. Only in the 1930 census,
the number of non-churched peaked over 10% (14.4%), to grow
to 17.0% in the 1947 census and 18.3% in the 1960 census. About
75–80% of the population belonged to one of the three main churches:
Catholic, Reformed, or neo-Calvinist, with the proportion of Catho-
lics growing to 40.4% in 1960 (Faber/Ten Have 1970: 28). Religious
participation skyrocketed—data for the Catholic Church are the best
available and used here as an illustration for the whole country. In
1960 ‘regular’ Catholic church attendance was 87.0%, almost all par-
ents had their children baptized, almost every Catholic child attend a
Catholic school, and when couples decided to marry in church next
to their civil marriage they were also married in the Catholic Church.
The number of regular and secular ordinations grew from an average
of 58.6 pa between 1853–1860 to 430.2 pa between 1936–1940. In the
period 1934–1940 alone 4,593 young women entered a religious order.
These numbers were so high that the religious had to be sent out in
the mission, as there was no work for them at home. In 1966, the
majority of Catholics still firmly believed in the official church teach-
ings, with missionary intentions. They were firmly attached to pillar-
organizations in the 1950s, and even the percentage of mixed marriages
declined to 4.5% in the 1960s (Sengers 2003: 5–18, 92–98, 199–204).
The situation in other churches was comparable, especially in the neo-
Calvinist church while the Dutch Reformed Church steadily declined
as a result of modern theology and internal secularization.
After 1960 the pillarized system crumbled because it could not
adapt to the new social circumstances (see Ter Borg 2008). This is
first because of growing ecumenical cooperation which had already
started in the 1930s with collaborative attempts to re-Christianize
the nation and was intensified by the experiences of World War II.
Between 1940 and 1945, Catholics grew to be good patriots (see the
examples of bl. Titus Brandsma and Cardinal De Jong) and neo-
Calvinists were forerunners of the resistance against German occu-
pation. After the war there were serious attempts to reorganize the
political landscape by founding two parties, whereby the Catholics
 religion in the netherlands 443

were supposed to merge with the Social Democrats. This only suc-
ceeded at the individual level and was forbidden by the bishops in a
pastoral letter of 1954. But this letter could not stop increased (ecu-
menical) cooperation and thus secularization of the religious profiles.
Another factor is that people were fed up with the social control and
paternalism that went together with the pillar organizations. As a
result of better education they knew themselves what was good for
them and they opposed the leaders of their subculture more and more.
Together with this the 1960s were the point where the emancipation
of different groups was attained. Catholics, neo-Calvinists and Social-
ists, to name the most important ones, had succeeded in becoming
average, respected citizens. This reduced the need for mobilization
of these groups. Finally, there were two external factors responsible
for the decline of the pillarized system. First, with the introduction
of consumer goods, especially television, it became easier to become
informed about groups other than one’s own. The increased amount
of leisure time and growing mobility (cars) caused Dutchmen to meet,
irrespective of group borders, in neutral spaces. For the first time, a
truly national culture grew that undermined subgroup loyalties. Sec-
ond, the state increasingly gained influence in the pillar organizations.
The government demanded higher levels of qualifications and pro-
fessionalization, thus causing the religious aspects of these organiza-
tions to decline. Later, the state demanded ecumenical cooperation to
increase efficiency. The organizations, almost completely funded by
the state, followed these rules and finally disappeared for the most
part, leaving the churches on their own.
Pillarization has had enduring consequences for Dutch society. Even
after the 1960s, pillarization dominated the way religion in Dutch soci-
ety was perceived and organized. The first consequence has been for
the religious organizations, especially churches, themselves. The hey-
day of pillarized society is still in their memory, and function (albeit
unconsciously) as the norm for religious participation and social influ-
ence. But these days are over and will not return. The amount of par-
ticipation during the period 1870–1960 was extraordinary in history,
and had to decline in one way or another to a more normal level.
Another consequence for the churches is their material heritage. The
period until 1970 was also a time of church construction to adapt to
the growing numbers of church attendants and suburbanization of
the population. Now most of these buildings are empty, churches are
suffering from the financial burden. However, there is growing protest
444 erik sengers

against the demolition of these monuments and landmarks. A second

consequence is the development of civil society in the Netherlands.
The state had outsourced many of its activities to civil (e.g. religious)
organizations and supported these financially. This gave the civil soci-
ety importance and power, and until this day—although the role of
the state has increased enormously—the state cannot manage without
organizations in the civil society. Finally, pillarization was also impor-
tant in the way religion was perceived to be by the general population
and in politics. Religion was just there, one expressed it in one’s own
organizations, one was tolerant and irenic in relation to other reli-
gions, and the state supported religions as a way of active pluralism
and fostered the subgroups. This was still the dominant framework
when the pillars crumbled and new groups, especially Islam, entered
Dutch society. The framework of pillarization thus had enormous con-
sequences for the integration of these newcomers: the ethnic groups
were made responsible for the welfare of these newcomers, religion
and ethnicity were seen to be closely linked together, religious schools
and socio-religious activities were subsidized, and religious concerns
were taken seriously. Immigrants were seen as members of a social-
religious group, instead of individuals (Rath et al. 1996). Only in recent
years, since it is now thought that this has hindered integration and
caused many social problems, has this policy changed.

Current Religious Situation

To describe the current situation of religion in the Netherlands, we

can rely on several quantitative studies that have appeared in recent
years. The most important ones are Godsdienstige veranderingen in
Nederland by Becker and De Hart (2006) from the Social and Cul-
tural Planning Bureau SCP, God in Nederland (2007, a longitudinal
research project of private media partners) and the exploration of the
Scientific Council for Government Policy WRR with the title Geloven
in het publieke domein (2007). The results of these surveys differ a little
bit, and sometimes more, because the questions each survey asked dif-
fer (Becker 2003, for a discussion see Becker/De Hart 2006: 37–44).
Together however, they give a good overview of the current situation.
I will present the situation of the Christian churches first, because,
despite enormous decline, they are still the main players in the reli-
gious field. Then I will sketch the religion of Dutchmen in general and
 religion in the netherlands 445

unorganized spirituality. In the last two paragraphs, I will present new

spirituality and immigrant world religions.

Christian Churches
The first way to gain insight into the situation of Christian Churches
is through their membership figures. Since 1985, civil authorities no
longer register church membership and therefore one has to rely on
data from the churches themselves. On the Protestant side this leads
to difficulties, since the Protestant Church in the Netherlands does not
have a good functioning membership registration. Also some smaller
churches have a malfunctioning membership administration. Table 1
lists some of the major denominations. Despite decline, the Roman
Catholic Church (RCC) is still the biggest church, followed by the Prot-
estant Church in the Netherlands (PCN). This church is a merger of
the Dutch Reformed Church, the neo-Calvinist Gereformeerde Kerken
(Reformed Churches) in Nederland and the Evangelical-Lutheran
Church that fused 2004. Other important groups are pietistic Calvin-
ists and liberals (Dutch Episcopal Church, Arminians, and Menno-
nites), many of them genuine Dutch in origin.
On the basis of these data, one can conclude that only a minor-
ity of the Dutch population belongs to a Christian Church. Becker
and De Hart calculate this proportion for 2004/2005 to be 45.4%.
Surveys however, where people can indicate for themselves whether

Table 1. Membership of Christian Churches in the Netherlands1

SCP 2004/2005 WRR 2006
RCC 4,644,800 4,406,000
PCN 2,002,155 1,944,000
Pietistic reformed 203,526 221,000
Liberals 20,398 19,000
Others 146,162 156,000
Total Christian churches 7,403,500 7,132,000
Sources: Bernts et al. 2006: 91; Becker/De Hart 2006: 30–31.

1
The order/index has been copied from Bernts et al.; the data of Becker/De Hart
have been adjusted to this order.
446 erik sengers

they belong or wish to belong to a certain denomination, point to a

lower church membership. In God in Nederland Dekker lists 16% for
the RCC, 14% for the PCN and 9% others, ergo 61% are unchurched
(Dekker 2007: 14). Kronjee and Lampert (2006: 176) calculate in the
WRR-exploration only 28% organized believers (25% Christians and
3% others) and so 72% are unorganized.
Membership alone does not tell much about the position of the
traditional church corporations in society. Everyone who attends
an ordinary church service on Sunday will notice that attendance is
lower than membership figures suggest. As an index of commitment
we can take church attendance. The Catholic Statistical Church Insti-
tute KASKI (www.ru.nl/kaski, cited in Becker/De Hart 2006: 32) has
quite precise figures on weekly church attendance for Catholics (8% in
2004); Attendance for the PCN is estimated, at 21%. Another way to
get some impression of church attendance is through surveys:

Table 2. Church Attendance of Church Members (Percentage)

2a: God in Nederland
RCC PCN Others
Regular 25 40 72
Sometimes 36 23 13
Almost never 27 20 9
Never 12 17 6
Source: Dekker 2007: 18.

2b: Religieuze veranderingen

Regular attendance 20042
Catholics 19
Dutch reformed 46
Neo-Calvinists 63
Others 61
Source: Becker/De Hart 2006: electronic supplement p. 6.

2
‘Regular attendance’ is according to the definition of the SCP at least once every
two weeks.
 religion in the netherlands 447

It is clear that a majority of church members do not attend Sunday

services regularly, except for ‘others’ whereby it is not clear who these
are. Closer research reveals that it is mainly older people who attend
church services. The data of the SCP suggest an increase in church
attendance of church members in the last years, even among younger
church members, and it will be interesting to observe whether this
trend continues.
In addition to church attendance, the commitment of church mem-
bers is also expressed by their adherence to Christian doctrines. The
SCP makes no difference in this respect between members of different
denominations and concludes that nucleus members adhere more to
traditional doctrines than unchurched members—which is obvious.
The most compact index for adherence to religious doctrines in the
SCP-publication is ‘orthodoxy’. This index is the result of a compiled
adherence to several dogmas: belief in life after death, heaven, hell, the
devil, Adam and Eva, the Bible as word of God, the efficacy of prayer
(see Becker/De Hart 2006: 79). The orthodoxy among church mem-
bers declined sharply between 1965 and 1970 and since then varies
between 75–80%. Striking is that the orthodoxy of younger genera-
tions of church members has increased during the last years and cur-
rently is higher than older generations (Becker/De Hart 2006: 63–69
and 74–76). God in Nederland gives detailed information about the
adherence to doctrines per denomination. They show that in particu-
lar the adherence of Catholics is especially low compared with other
church members (see also Schepens 2009).

Table 3. Adherence to Orthodox Doctrines and Religious

Self-Identification, Per Denomination (Percentages)
RCC PCN Other church Non-churched
members
Theists 27 58 79 8
Christ is the Son of God 55 84 84 20
Praying: several times a day 22 43 65 6
Life after death 39 63 84 29
Life after death: heaven 53 78 75 29
Religious: for sure/yes 92 93 94 43
Faith very important 20 27 60 9
Source: Dekker 2007: 42–56.
448 erik sengers

Traditional Christian churches are generally in decline. In contrast, the

vitality of Christian migrant churches is striking, but we know little about
their membership numbers. The first one to estimate this was Ferrier
(2002: 30–31): she stated the number of migrant Christians was
800,000. Subsequent estimations were much lower: Wijsen (2003)
estimated 640,000 immigrant Christians, Stoffels (2008: 14–16) calcu-
lated 516,500 non-western Christian immigrants and 1,314,500 if the
European migrants were included. But the exact number of immigrant
Christians is uncertain due to bad administration and illegal residency,
let alone making conclusions about their participation. The range of
immigrant churches is diverse. Some of them have been in the country
for centuries, like the Wallons (French-speaking Calvinists), orthodox
Armenians, English-speaking Calvinists and Anglicans, Germans that
laid the basis for the Lutheran church, and others. However in recent
times, the variety has increased due to economic and political migra-
tion. Some of them have become organized in Catholic communities
like the Vietnamese, Poles, and Ethiopians. But many more have orga-
nized themselves in independent (Pentecostal, Evangelical) communi-
ties of African origin. Especially the district of Amsterdam South-east
is famous for its variety in this respect.

Religiosity of the Dutch

Because church membership is increasingly less important, there are
other ways to describe the religious composition of the Dutch popula-
tion, for example by using religious profiles. Several profiles are in use to
characterize Dutch religious preferences. Dekker (2007: 62–64) distin-
guishes between ‘transcendent-religious convictions’ (39%), ‘transcen-
dent non-religious convictions’ (11%), ‘immanent convictions’ (12%)
and nonreligious (38%). It is obvious that church members are to be
found primarily in the first category and non church-members in the
last. A quite novel categorization—for the sociology of religion—has
been presented by the WRR-exploration. They discern several groups
on the basis of life style and value-orientation (in the same way as used
by the marketing bureau Motivaction; Kronjee 2006). Their portrait of
the religious situation of the Dutch is presented in Table 4.
The doctrines of the Christian churches are subscribed to by a
minority, but a substantial minority of the Dutch population in gen-
eral. From the historical perspective however, these doctrines have
found less adherence.
 religion in the netherlands 449

Table 4. Categories of World Views Among the Dutch

Religious category non-religious category
Unorganized 26% Non-religious, 18%
spiritual not humanist
Christians 25% Non-religious, 16%
moderate humanist
Other organized 3% Non-religious, 12%
spirituals humanistic
Source: Kronjee/Lampert 2006: 176.

Table 5. Adherence of the Dutch with Christian Doctrines, and Religious

Self-Identification
Religieuze God in
veranderingen (2002) Nederland (2006)
Life after death 49 40
– not sure 31
Heaven 40
Hell 18
Devil 17
Adam and Eve 24
Bible as the Word of God 31 24
– partially/in a certain sense 27
Praying makes sense 39
Religious miracles 43
Theists 24
‘There must be something’ 36
Christ as the Son of God 40
– extraordinary gifted 29
Religious person: certainly 31
– yes/more or less 31
Faith has a great meaning 42
– more or less 19
Sources: Becker/De Hart 2006: 66; Dekker 2007: 43, 49, 52, 55.

When the Christian faith is taken as a point of reference, the conclu-

sion is that the religiosity of the Dutch has declined. On the other hand,
research data point to a shift to a more liberal, personal, vague, search-
ing, ‘post-modern’ way of believing. It is evident that the unchurched
hardly attend church services, do not visit a cleric when they have
problems of conscience, and hold the opinion that religiosity has little
450 erik sengers

to do with churches. But what should one think of the following con-
clusions that can be found in God in Nederland (Dekker 2007: 29, 30,
42, 44, 47, 49, 54, 56):

6% of the unchurched hold the opinion that churches offer a lot, 25%
is the opinion that these offer enough.
8% of the unchurched would like to have a life-cycle ritual in a church,
16% want to have a ritual in a church but in their own way, and 28%
want to have a ritual but not in a church.
8% of the unchurched can be characterized as theist and 34% believe
that there must be ‘something’.
20% of the unchurched believe that Christ is the Son of God or sent by
God, 35% of them believe that he is a special person with extraor-
dinary gifts.
46% of the unchurched say they pray once in a while.
29% of the unchurched believe in life after death.
43% of the unchurched consider themselves religious, for 21% faith
has a great or very great meaning.

These data that comply with data from the SCP reveal some doctrines
that can reckon with substantial adherence among the unchurched
(37% believe in life after death, 25% in heaven, and 31% that reli-
gious wonders exist; the adherence to ‘devil’ and ‘hell’ is much lower—
compare Sengers 2008). Striking is also that religious orthodoxy
among younger generations of unchurched is higher than among older
generations (Becker/De Hart 2006: 65, 69).

New Spirituality
We can conclude that Dutchmen are in no way irreligious, and at
the same time we can conclude that the churches are not capable of
organizing their spirituality. Therefore we can ask the question if and
so where the spiritual energy is expressed, is it with alternative forms
of spirituality? The first large-scale survey that investigated the exten-
sion of the ‘alternative sector’ was done by the staff of the SCP in 1997
(Becker/De Hart/Mens 1997). They distinguished three elements of
the paraculture, defined as “the free market of subcultural, alternative,
exotic and esoteric goods of the mind”. The three elements that were
looked at were ‘worldviews and their movements’, ‘individually expe-
rienced interests and ideas’ (among them New Age), and superstition.
 religion in the netherlands 451

There are many remarks that can be made about this categorization,
which in my view is not clear and exclusive enough. The conclusion
of this survey was that many alternative movements are known by the
general public, and a part of it is interested in it, but that there is no
‘circulation of the saints’: alternative spirituality is not an alternative
to church religiosity.
The ‘new spirituality’ is more a cultural trend then an institutional
trend, and should be investigated as such. This is what God in Neder-
land does in its chapter on ‘postmodern spirituality’ (De Hart 2007).
In this chapter De Hart first distinguishes three elements in this kind
of religiosity: 1. that religiosity is something personal, 2. that one has
to experience the truth in oneself, 3. that religion is a quest. Then he
asks where people experience this kind of spirituality: through belief
in God or a higher power, did you have a mystical experience, do
you pray (as a religious experience or as a ‘psycho technique’), do
you visit holy places, do you perform privatized rituals (e.g. light a
candle), do you feel one with unknown others at certain moments, and
do you believe in magic. Adherence to these items varied per group,
but was highest among the group of church members and religious
unchurched. In the last stage he filters out the group of adherents to
‘new spirituality’ by distinguishing the group that had scored high on
every item. His conclusion is that 8% of the people in his survey can
be characterized as such. They are to be found mainly among ‘religious
unchurched’, but also partly among church members.

World Religions
According to public opinion, Islam is perceived as the fastest growing
religion in the Netherlands. When the media reported that the number
of Muslims had crossed the magical border of one million, many were
anxious about a Muslim take-over. But this estimation was too high,
as all immigrants from Islamic countries (many of them not Muslim,
e.g. socialists from Iran and Christians from Turkey) plus their off-
spring in the second and third generations (some of the secularized)
were counted as Muslims—apostates and converts were not included.
The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) made a new calculation on the
basis of survey data assembled while researching the life-situation of
the Dutch population, in combination with other data. This method is
also used to make a ‘census’ without interviewing people at home. The
estimation of the CBS is much lower than others: 857,000 (5.3%) in
452 erik sengers

2006 (Van Herten/Otten 2007). The two largest ethnic groups of Mus-
lims are Moroccans and Turks who came to the Netherlands as labor
migrants; a specific group is the one consisting of Surinamese Mus-
lims that came after the independence of this former colony. There are
about 453 mosques in the Netherlands; over half of them are of Tur-
kish origin. Most Muslims in the Netherlands are Sunnites (Bernts/De
Jong/Yar 2006: 113–126).
The number of Muslims is not the only prejudice that circulates. It
is also thought that the religious adherence of Muslims to their reli-
gion has increased. And indeed, ethnographic and other research show
that Muslims, especially young ones, identify very strongly with their
religion. When asked: ‘do you feel Muslim?’ almost everyone answers
‘yes’. But the same research reveals that they use this identity marker
in a complex way to protect themselves against discrimination from
society at large and their parents’ high demands, while at the same
time Muslim identity connects them to young people of other ethnici-
ties and to Muslims abroad (see Ketner 2008; De Koning 2008; Lubeck
2002). Identifying oneself as ‘Muslim’ has in the first instance noth-
ing to do with religious practice. Moreover, it is difficult to generalize
about this religion, as there are so many theological schools and ethnic
traditions, and there are important differences between first and sec-
ond generations and those who are socialized in Islam and those who
have converted. A good example is the secondary analysis done by the
SCP (Phalet/Haker 2004; Phalet/Van Praag 2004). See table 6.
These data clearly show that there is secularization (in the classical
sense) among Muslims in the Netherlands: the longer they are in the
country, the higher their education, and the more they participate in
the working process (in other words: the more modernized they are),
the less involved they are in their religion, the sooner they accept a
non-Muslim as partner, the lower their preference for an Islamic pri-
mary school.

The difficulties experienced by counting the number of Muslims are

even higher when trying to establish the number of adherents to other
world religions. The WRR-exploration states that the number of Hin-
dus is estimated by the CBS at 100,000, but the Hindu-council itself
gives this number at 215,000. According to Buddhist organizations,
there are about 170,000 Buddhists in the Netherlands. The number of
Jews that are members of a religious organization is 9,000—but the
 religion in the netherlands 453

Table 6. Religious Adherence of Turks (T) and Moroccans (M) Age 18–60 According
to Background Characteristics (Percentages).
Weekly Membership Against Preference
mosque religious non-Muslim Islamic primary
attendance organization as partner school
2002 daughter
T M T M T M T M
Generation
2nd generation 37 32 3 0,4 66 64 22 28
Migrated after age 6 37 35 7 1 66 63 22 30
Imported partner 37 43 6 1 67 67 26 30
1st generation > 1981 40 39 7 2 60 70 28 36
1st generation < 1981 47 46 11 2 68 66 24 33
Education
Tertiary 29 26 6 2 42 55 15 24
Higher secondary 32 22 4 1 60 65 17 24
Lower secondary 31 24 7 1 63 60 18 21
Primary/none 49 49 8 1 70 68 31 38
Labor participation
Not active 46 36 7 1 67 78 24 26
Jobless 49 37 9 2 71 60 25 30
School going 27 14 1 1 57 60 13 15
active > 12 hours 35 37 7 1 60 66 21 31
Source: Phalet/Van Praag 2004: 11. Italic numbers are not significant.

data of these organizations are not all from the same year. The number
of halachic Jews is estimated at 30,000, the number of father-Jews at
13,000 (Bernts et al. 2006: 138). Only among Jews—as far as I know—
has an ordinary survey been held (Solinge/De Vries 2001), and that is
why we can say a bit more about their religious life. Jews appear to
be a very secularized group, less religious than the average Dutchman.
Religion also appears to play a minor role concerning the identity of
Jews: the experience of the Second World War is much more impor-
tant in this respect. As far as regular customs were in use (e.g. on
Friday evening) these were not combined with religion. Finally there
were small indications that younger generations, as among Christians,
showed some signs of a religious revival.
454 erik sengers

Church and State

The relationship between churches and the state in the Netherlands

(Van Bijsterveld 2008) is not subject to special laws—not even in the
constitution—or agreements like a concordat. In the modern Dutch
state (since the revolutionary constitution of 1798), the relationship is
arranged by four principles. The first principle is equality: All religious
bodies in the Netherlands are considered to be equal and membership
in a church can be of no advantage or disadvantage for an individual.
The second principle is freedom. Citizens of the Netherlands are free
in the individual and collective exercise of their faith, and the state will
not interfere in this sphere. The third principle is the civil law. The
operating of the churches, both in their internal as in their external
functioning is limited by civil law. Though they have a special posi-
tion within this, the general principles are applicable to them as well.
Later, as a result of the mobilization of the Catholics and neo-Calvin-
ists in Dutch society, a fourth principle was added to these three: the
state has to promote participation of religious groups in society and
to guarantee religious pluriformity. These principles do not mean that
there is a separation of church and state, on the contrary: relationships
between the churches and the state were very close between 1800 and
1980. The state arranged church membership administration, paid the
clergy, financed church buildings and many religious social organiza-
tions, promoted modern theology in the early 19th century and sup-
pressed orthodox tendencies, limited the freedom of processions for
the Catholics, the King gave a new constitution the Protestant Church
in 1815, and all this was administered between 1800 and 1870 by
two state ministries—one for the Catholics, one for the Protestants.
It is only since 1985 that these bonds between church and state have
become less strong (Sengers 2003a: 67–70, 129–131, 152–153). Today,
church and state are more independent than separate.
If we follow the six points of Chaves and Cann (1992) in describ-
ing the relationship between state and church (religious organization),
we can reduce them in two remarks concerning the Dutch situation:
about the relation of the church and the state and about the financing
of the church. As follows from the previous paragraph, there is no
state church in the Netherlands. Registration, let alone acknowledge-
ment of religious institutions, is out of the question: every religious
body that considers itself as a church corporation is recognized as
such by law and its organizational units. The state does not appoint
 religion in the netherlands 455

or approve church leaders, neither on a lower level (local priests or

reverends), nor on a higher level (bishops, deacons). There is how-
ever some control by the state of the professional qualifications of the
clergy who work, for example, in the army and in prisons. Here, it is
important to become recognized as a ‘sending institution’: a religious
body that is granted the right to admit their pastors into these institu-
tions. To become accepted as such, these religious institutions need to
have a stable and transparent organization, to be representative of a
certain world-view or religion, with a certain amount of members, and
they have to train their pastors at state-recognized institutions. But
this definition is not restricted to just pastors of Christian churches:
recognition is now open to the Catholic and Protestant church but the
inclusion of humanists, and Islam and Buddhism is well under way.
Concerning the financial aspect as well relationships between
churches and the state are almost absent. The state does not pay the
salary of church personnel—except for the clergy in the institutions
mentioned above—, there is no system of church tax, and the state
in no way whatsoever subsidizes the churches—except in the case of
some monumental church buildings. The churches completely finance
their operations through collections and fund raising actions. The most
important of these is the national fund-raising action called Church
Balance. Using the same fundraising material, local congregations of
five denominations (the Protestant Church in the Netherlands, the
Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church, the Mennonite Soci-
ety and the Arminian Fraternity) motivate their members to donate
money to the church. The RCC collects about 55 million Euros with
Church Balance, the PCN around 50 million Euros. The state does
however finance religious institutions in their social sphere. Religious
primary and secondary schools (of every Christian denomination and
non-Christian religions) are completely financed by the state when
they comply with certain standards. The same holds true for higher
education, for example the two Catholic universities in Tilburg and
Nijmegen, the Protestant university (VU) in Amsterdam and the theo-
logical and professional education both at state and private institutes
of higher education. But as these educational institutions in general
are at a distance from the church, it cannot be said that in this case
‘the church’ is being subsidized by the state. Slightly different is the
situation in the case of broadcasting. Here the state pays Christian
churches and other religions when they can prove they have a sub-
stantial membership in Dutch society, to use national mass media for
456 erik sengers

religious programs. These programs are however broadcast only a few

hours each week and not at prime time, and thus this cannot be seen
as a privilege.

The Future of Dutch Religion

The religious field in the Netherlands has undergone immense changes

in the modern era. From a society dominated by religion and reli-
gious institutions, indeed a pious country that nobody expected to
change, Holland was transformed into an overwhelmingly secular
country, with waning religious institutions, and in recent years even
hostility towards some religious expressions. But the picture beneath
the surface is more complex. First of all religion in general is not in
decline and the Netherlands is not a completely secularized country.
On the contrary, there is an ongoing liberalization of religious world-
views and individualization of religious practice (that especially affects
institutionalized religions), but for many religion has not disappeared
from the scene as an important factor. This process appears in every
religion: charismatics in Christianity as well as in Islam and Judaism
are examples of individualization as well as sacralization. Also out-
side institutionalized religions there appears to be a cultural openness
for religious items. Second, there is a slight tendency toward younger
generations appearing to be more religious than older generations.
This is also something that appears to be the case in every religion.
Whether this trend will continue, and if it will lead to more religious
clashes, is unclear as well. Third, the Christian sector is in decline,
but some groups, for example the orthodox-protestants and the char-
ismatic churches (especially immigrant churches) are still growing.
Finally, this country has always been and still is a very pluriform reli-
gious country, the liberal constitution offering freedom to a variety of
expressions of every world religion.
It is very difficult to predict the future of Dutch religion in the
current state of affairs. There are two factors that are important to
reckon with, one external and one internal—and they interact with
one another. The internal factor is the ability of the religious organiza-
tions to revive themselves: Are they able to invent new symbols, new
words, new rituals, new items of social critique, and a new relationship
with the state and with broader society that can raise the adherence
of existing members and attract new members? There are some signs
 religion in the netherlands 457

that religions are experimenting with innovations at this moment. In

Catholicism and Protestantism, evangelical movements like Alpha,
Evangelical Alliance, Catholic Charismatic Renewal, Neo Catechu-
menal Way and many others are trying to attract the lukewarm and
to connect them more strongly to the religious community. They are
small, but they have a clear vision and their influence might be big-
ger than the numbers suggest. In Islam there is a discussion going on
about how to reconcile Islam with European modernity. Discredited
by ultra-radicals, more moderate groups are experimenting with forms
to guide and inform young people, that allow equal participation of
women, and that bring about a positive relationship with government
and society. Other religions might have examples like these as well
however I am not well-informed on this field and therefore cannot
comment on these here. If religions thus succeed to renew themselves,
in a way that appeals to large portions of the population, they might
become more important factors in the future.
The external factor is the reaction of society and the state. The posi-
tion of religion is a matter of debate at this moment. The discussion
has been launched by demands of Islamic groups, but as a result of the
equality of religions, every measure against Islam has consequences for
other groups as well—and thus for the freedom of religion in general.
The position of Islamic primary schools, for example, has resulted in a
discussion on the freedom of education in general. The (approximately
60) Islamic schools have been suspected 1. of supporting anti-modern
and anti-western feelings (an accusation that was denounced by the
intelligence service), 2. of creating a separation between immigrants
and inhabitants and 3. of having poor organization and curriculum.
Local governments want more power to intervene in these schools,
but national laws inhibit this. The discussion about Islamic schools has
thus spilled over into a discussion about the necessity of denomina-
tional schools in general. Another example is the role of foreign pas-
tors. Afraid that foreign imams who are not well-versed in the Dutch
culture will hinder their followers integration into Dutch society,
or even use hate speech and so ignite anti-Western feelings in their
followers, the government has tightened the regulations concerning
foreign pastors. But this means at the same time that it is more diffi-
cult for the Catholic Church to import priests from abroad, and that
immigrant churches are having difficulties in getting the pastors they
need. Currently, there also is a debate about insulting God, or better
said insulting religious feelings. The idea is that this law should be
458 erik sengers

abolished, in the name of freedom of expression (i.e. here the ability

to insult Muslims), and that religious feelings are not something which
should be specially protected. During its history, the law has been used
once, and without effect, but in the current context it has become a
symbol of liberals and seculars against the influence of religion on
society. Christian and religious groups of course oppose the attempts
to abolish this law. Finally, there is a discussion going on about the
position of religious organizations in the media, whether they should
hold their special position or not. In short, there is a debate between
the secular and the religious part of the country, a debate with social
and political consequences that has not yet come to an end. How it
will end depends not only on national, but also international factors
such as the declarations of the pope, the position of Christian right in
America and the activities of Islamic terrorists.

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 RELIGION AND POLITICS IN PORTUGAL: RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Helena Vilaça

Religious Landscape Developments

Religion in Figures
Collective confessions are a crucial matter: firstly, because they are
the most distinctive comparison instrument between societies; sec-
ondly because they hide important dimensions of religious reality
(Vilaça, 2001). The declared religion essentially means a feeling of
cultural belonging, which is not necessarily related to orthodox faith
itself. Being born Portuguese still means, for the great majority (86%),
being born Catholic. The declared confession is in a certain sense a
cultural indicator, while the religious practice reveals the degree of
integration in church and an expression of religious involvement and
socialization.
In spite of that, Portuguese society, in line with western predomi-
nant tendencies, prefigured a progressively diverse religious world.
The roots of this transition go back to the end of the 19th century but
the social and public impact has been particularly visible only over
last three decades. Although the statistical importance of established
groups and movements is insignificant, the symbolic and media weight
is indisputable.
The novelty of phenomenon imposes an incursion by the histori-
cally predominant traces, which configured the Portuguese religious
frame. We will begin with a statistical approach based on the invento-
ries of the population. In 1900—according to the information gathered
during the monarchy and during a time when Catholicism was “the
religion of the Kingdom”—national identity coincides with religious
identity: the number of Catholics was 99.9% (Table 1). Four decades
later, there was a decrease of Catholics in over 6 %, and an increase of
persons “without religion” by 4.5%. These figures related to atheism
and agnosticism reveal above all the consequences of secularist and
anticlericalist education of the First Republic in the 40’s generations.
462 helena vilaça

Table 1. Population According to the Answer to the Question on Religion

in the Census of 1900, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1981, 1991 e 2001
Census Total Catholic Other Without DK/NA
religions religion
1900 5 423 132 5 416 204 5 012 1 454 462
(99,87%) (0,09%) (0,03%) (0,01%)
1940 722 152 7 191 913 63 060 347 284 119 895
(93,13%) (0,81%) (4,49%) (1,55%)
1950 8 510 240 8 167 457 342 783
(95,97%) (4,03)
1960 8 889 392 8 701 898 39 747 147 774
(97,89%) (0,44%) (1,66%)
1981 7 836 504 6 352 705 115 398 253 786 1 114 615
(81,06%) (1,44%) (3,23%) (14,22%)
1991 8 376 840 6 524 908 149 850 225 334 1 476 748
(77,89%) (1,76%) (2,68%) (17,62%)
2001 8 699 515 7 353 548 216 158 342 987 786 822
(84,53%) (2,49%) (3,94%) (9,04%)
Source: INE, General Census of Population (Vilaça, 2006: 160).

Contrary to predominant tendencies in other countries of the Euro-

pean continent and to tendencies which would come to nourish the
thesis of secularization; in 1950 and in 1960 an increase of the Catholic
population takes place. Beginning with a percentage of 93% in 1940,
the number of Catholics increased to 96% in 1950 and to 98% in 1960.
Oppositely, those “without religion”, which had been ignored in 1950,
diminished by almost 3% in comparison to 1940.
The incorrectness of data relating to the Census of 1950 and 1960
suggests a clear interference in the production of information during
the New State—a type “of symbolic power” exercised by the manipula-
tion of data—and the need to use Catholicism as the ideological legiti-
mization of Salazar dictatorship (Esteves, 1986; Vilaça, 2006).
It is only after the revolution of April 1974 that we witness a reversal
in the increase of the total number of Catholics in inventories. Between
1960 and 1981 the Catholic population drops from 98% to 81%, thus
showing a decrease of 17%. From 1981 to 1991 there is only a decrease
of 3%. However, in 2001 the percentage of Catholics stabilizes in 85%,
partly due to the lower number of non-respondents and a better qual-
ity data collection in the census.
In geographical terms, the Portuguese religious map continues along
the same lines: the north and the islands (Azores and Madeira) are
regions with a higher number of well brought-up Catholics but mem-
 religion and politics in portugal 463

Figure 1. Population Trends of Non-Catholic Religion, Between 1981 and 2001

140000
1981
120000 1991
2001
100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0
0rthodox Protestant Other Jews Muslims Other non
Christian Christian

bership to the Catholic Church decreases the further south one goes.
Several sociological inquiries (França, 1993; Pais, 1998; Pais, Cabral
and Vala, 2001) support this information and demonstrate that belief
and religious practice follow the same coordinates.
Facing indicators of pluralism, we considered the distribution of the
last census. The simple visualization of Figure 1 allows us to conclude
that, excluding the Jews, each of the non Catholic categories grew in
Portugal, in last two decades of the century. Between 1981 and 2001
the growth rate of religious minorities was 87.2%. Data show the total
superiority of Christian confessions, particularly the «other Chris-
tians». The nonexistence of discriminated official information (Vilaça,
2006: 281) makes it impossible to examine, in this respective and sta-
tistical form, evolutionary weights of the different evangelical groups
within “other Christians”. We know that they generally do not identify
with Protestant designation, although they do belong to groups affili-
ated with: the Evangelical Alliance, new Pentecostalism (IURD and
Church of Manna, for instance), Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses or
Seventh Day Adventists.
Conversely, concerning the Jews and in connection with migratory
fluxes, growth became evident among Muslims, other non-Christians,
and Orthodox. This last group had exponential growth (Table 2), espe-
cially between 1981 and 1991, period when the rate is 341.5%.
Initially, the growth of the Muslim community in Portugal is
related to the end of colonial empire and the immigration of Por-
tuguese Muslims from Guinea and Mozambique. The strong core of
464 helena vilaça

their concentration is in the area of Lisbon, which is explained by the

working market conditions. Between 1981 and 2001, the percentage of
this religious group almost doubled in this zone, representing 10% of
the minority world in the Region of Lisbon today.
Also remarkable is the growth rate (250%) of “other non-Christian”.
In this last category the following groups are included among oth-
ers: Hindis, Buddhists, Baha’is, spiritualists, afro-Brazilian religions,
supporters of the New Age, and the undefined. The Region of Lisbon
is also the most inhabited by the followers of “other non-Christian”
religions. As capital of the country, Lisbon is a cosmopolitan region
which promotes a globalized social context and better conditions for
the right to difference in the religious market.
The presented figures about religious groups in this space and
time in Portuguese society should to be understood as indicators
of a tendency toward pluralisation and toward dilative religious
reconstruction.

Democracy and Pluralisation

The changes in political power in 1974 substantially contributed to the

reconfiguration of the Portuguese society as a whole, religious field
included. New democracy allowed an unknown freedom of expres-
sion and a diversification of the religious goods market (Vilaça, 1997:
40). Among the groups who arrived post-April 25, we can point out
the Mormons, the Moonies and the Transcendental Meditation prac-
titioners, who settled here in the late seventies. Regarding factors that
relate to the numerical size and smaller public of certain groups, for
example; movements of Eastern influence, such as Krishna, or groups
typically New Age (the New Acropolis), and with their irregular activ-
ity, we cannot fix an exact date of settlement. Scientology was set up
in the mid-nineties and recognized as religion in 2008.
Similarly, the Muslim community increased in Portuguese society
during that time due to decolonization, which led—as mentioned
above—to the arrival of many Muslims, mainly from Guinea and
Mozambique. There was also in this period a reversal of Portuguese
migration flow: Portugal thus becoming a host country. The coun-
try was no longer alien to greater openness and liberalization brought
about by the new system of government, together with the country’s
economic development and further integration into the European
 Table 2. Growth Rate of Non-Catholic Population, in Portugal, Between 1981 and 2001
Religious Population Population Population Change in Growth Change in Growth Change in Growth
group in 1981 in 1991 in 2001 population rate of population rate of population rate of
by religious population by religious population by religious population
group by religious group 1991/ by religious group by religious
1981/1991 group 1981/ 2001 group 1991/ 1981/2001 group 1981/
1991 (%) 2001 (%) 2001 (%)
Orthodox 2 564 11 319 17 443 8 755 341.46 6 124 54.1 14 879 580.3
Protestant 39 212 36 932 48 301 –2 280 –5.81 11 369 30.78 9 089 23.18
Other 59 995 79 441 122 745 19 446 32.41 43 304 54.51 62 750 104.59
Christian
Jews 5 493 3 519 1 773 –1 974 –35.94 –1 746 –49.62 –3 720 –67.72
Muslims 4 335 9 134 12 014 4 799 110.7 2 880 31.53 7 679 177.14
Other non 3 895 9 455 13 882 5 560 142.75 4 427 46.82 9 987 256.41
Christian
religion and politics in portugal

Total 115 494 149 850 216 158 34 356 34.36 66 308 44.25 100 664 87.16
Source: INE, General Census of Population (Vilaça, 2003)
465
466 helena vilaça

Union. More recently, there has been more immigration from the east,
which has resulted in a projection of the Orthodox Churches.
Within the new scenario, it is essential to consider the role of migra-
tion (and everything that involves the phenomenon in terms of cul-
ture, ethnicity and religion), the media and cyberspace, and how all
this is resulting in the production of new cognitive frameworks and
new symbolic universes, and how they in turn give rise to new atti-
tudes towards the pluralisation of society.

Portuguese Attitudes about Pluralism

As for specifics, one must emphasize that national identity continues

to be deeply connected to a Catholic cultural universe that was par-
ticularly evident in Religious and Moral Pluralism Survey (RAMP).
Although that research took place in 1998 it remains the more com-
plete data concerning pluralism values in Portugal.
Veracity of religion was one of the questions in the survey that
brings us more directly the issue of pluralism. We would begin by
pointing out that almost all the Portuguese see religion as an institu-
tion producing truths, which also means as a guideline for human
conduct. Only 4% consider that there are important truths in any reli-
gion (half the average of the countries of the RAMP). Although we
find a uniform distribution for all other options—only one religion is
true, there are truths in other religions, (. . .) in many or (. . .) at all—it
is remarkable that a quarter of respondents understand that there is
only one true religion (Table 3).

Table 3. True Religion

a.v. % Cumulative %
There’s only one true religion 246 25,4 25,4
We can find truths in other religions 185 19,1 44,6
There are truths that can be found in many 255 26,3 70,9
religions
There are truths that can be found in all 244 25,2 96,1
religions
There is no truth in the existing religions 38 3,9 100
Total 968 100 –
Source: Vilaça, 2006.
 religion and politics in portugal 467

Table 4. True Religion According Religious Practice

Religious practice
Regularly Occasional Rare Null Total
a.v. % a.v. % a.v. % a.v. % a.v. %
There’s only one true 123 39,7 90 26,5 14 8,9 20 12,3 247 25,5
religion
We can find truths in other 78 25,2 63 18,5 29 18,5 16 9,8 186 19,2
religions
There are truths that can be 62 20 91 26,8 56 35,7 45 27,6 254 26,2
found in many religions
There are truths that can be 47 15,2 92 27,1 47 29,9 59 36,2 245 25,3
found in all religions
There is no truth in the – – 4 1,2 11 7 23 14,1 38 3,9
existing religions
Total 310 100 340 100 157 100 163 100 970 100
Source: Vilaça, 2006.

Only in other Catholic countries, such as Poland and Italy, that also
participated in the study, is there a similar position in the defence
of religious orthodoxy.1 This most orthodox attitude prevails among
regular practitioners (Table 4), concluding, once again, that this atti-
tude is higher among respondents who do not practice at all (12.3%)
compared to those who rarely practice (8.9%). It seems that, regard-
less of the manner of belief, religion is seen as socially relevant in the
broadest sense.
Leaving the issues pertaining to religion in the strictest sense aside,
and considering other types of questions which deal with more dif-
fuse beliefs, we enter a parallel world of beliefs. Items listed in the
questionnaire in this area are scarce and do not allow a clear distinc-
tion between what can be seen as superstition, popular religiosity, and
New Age spirituality. For this reason the term “parallel beliefs” seemed

1
Belgium, although Catholic, moves away of the other countries where Catholi-
cism is the dominant religion, revealing in many respects, similar to the Netherlands.
This is explained in part by its historical and geographical proximity and the high
secularism that has pushed the Catholic Church to the phenomenon of pillarisation.
About the specificity of the Belgian society, see, for example, Dobbelaere, Creyf &
Billiet (1978) and Voyé et al. (1985).
 468 helena vilaça

Table 5. Indicators of Pluralism

1-Totally Disagree 2 3 4
a.v. % Cum. a.v. % Cum. a.v. % Cum. a.v. % Cum.
% % % %
Right girls wear 458 46,9 46,9 62 6,4 53,3 31 3,1 56,4 81 8,3 64,7
head cover
Right to use of 727 74,2 74,2 74 7,6 81,8 27 2,7 84,6 49 5 89.6
soft drugs
Right to prevent 863 87,7 87,7 45 4,6 92,4 17 1,7 94,1 24 2,4 96,5
the transfusion
of blood
Right to commit 855 87,7 87,7 41 4,2 91,9 19 2 93,9 25 2,5 96,4
suicide
Variety of religious 267 27,8 27,8 137 14,2 42 103 10,6 52,6 188 19,5 72,1
groups: cultural
enrichment
Variety of 124 12,7 12,7 70 7,2 19,9 64 6,6 26,5 130 13,4 39,9
religious groups:
the cause of
conflict
Freedom to 102 10,4 10,4 35 3,5 13,9 26 2,6 16,5 132 13,5 30
learn from
other religious
teachings
Right to the cult 89 9,1 9,1 18 1,8 11 31 3,1 14,1 117 12 26,1
of Jehovah’s
Witnesses
Right to the cult of 85 9,9 9,9 27 3,1 12,9 32 3,7 16,6 162 18,7 35,3
Scientologists
Source: Vilaça, 2006.

more accurate and broader for beliefs imposed by formal religion. Not
only is it interesting to note that, for example, 77% of individuals have
a sacred object, but also that nearly 30% believe, without any doubt,
in the power of this object. The belief is intensified with the religious
practice. We think that this is an indicator of popular Catholicism and
the importance of the cult of saints and, especially, of the Virgin Mary
in Portuguese society.
Due to the simple descriptive analysis, carried out using indicators to
measure the vicinity of beliefs and attitudes to the dominant religious
“norm”, i.e. the Christian orthodoxy, it seems that the Catholic identity
prevails, but remains permeable to outer beliefs. The terms religious
 religion and politics in portugal 469

5 6 7-Totally agree Average Standard-deviation

a.v. % Cum. a.v. % Cum. a.v. % Cum.
% % %
77 7,9 72,6 80 8,2 80,7 188 19,3 100 3,25 2,47

29 3 92,5 29 3 95,5 44 4,5 100 1,82 1,68

7 0,7 97,2 8 0,8 98 19 2 100 1,34 1,12

7 0,8 97,2 12 1,3 98,5 15 1,5 100 1,34 1,11

91 9,5 81,6 65 6,8 88,4 112 11,6 100 3,35 2,04

163 16,7 56,6 148 15,2 71,8 274 28,2 100 3,27 2,07

138 14,1 44,1 180 18,3 62,5 368 37,5 100 5,23 1,96

146 14,9 41 156 16 56,9 421 43,1 100 5,43 1,90

119 13,7 49 135 15,6 64,6 307 35,4 100 5,12 1,94

bricolage and religion à la carte, respectively Thomas Luckmann and

Reginald Bibby,2 seem particularly appropriate to translate the cur-
rent reality of religion. Referring to these terms, Riis (1999: 5) affirms
that they “implicitly admit the expectation that individuals associate
themselves with a specific name that calls to represent the universal
truth. However, [he adds] a global history provides many examples
of functional mix of religions particularism”. We see that religious

2
Riis here refers to the work of R. W. Bibby (1987). Fragmented Gods: The Poverty
and Potential of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Irwin Publications.
470 helena vilaça

practice within a religion with a universalist character (Catholicism),

often combines with private belief, as in the case of reincarnation; the
belief in the power of good luck charms; in reading the horoscope.
In order to measure the attitudes towards pluralism, we have analy-
sed more specifically the following indicators (Table 5): freedom to
learn from other religious teachings; the right to the cult of Jehovah’s
Witnesses; the right to the cult of Scientologists; the right for girls to
wear head scarves; the right to use soft drugs for religious purposes;
the right to prevent blood transfusions; the right to commit suicide;
the diversity of religions in society as a means of cultural enrichment;
and the diversity of religions as a means of conflict. The RAMP sought
to test questions of a religious nature that have confronted—and still
does—the European societies in terms of ethical and legal challenges.
There is, first, a set of similar results in matters relating to the accep-
tance of religious practices usually associated with non-Christian reli-
gious groups, sects and new religious movements (NRMs), i.e., groups
with different rituals and beliefs from the dominant religious cultures.
Concerning the right to consume soft drugs, to prevent blood trans-
fusions or the right to commit suicide, 74% of respondents totally
disagree but the intolerance becomes much smaller when the permis-
sion of girls to wear head coverings in school is at question. This data
reveals the difficulty of integrating this last indicator in a particular
dimension of diversity to build, as it breaks away from the levels of
(in)tolerance detected for the other three indicators.3
We observed that gender does not affect attitudes towards pluralism
and age varies only when taking into account the tolerance in the use
of soft drugs as religious practice. Here, we can observe an increased
acceptance of this practice as younger individuals are examined. There
is a similar trend, measuring the association between the variable con-
cerning the respondents’ age groups and the agreement with the free
learning of other religious teachings or even with the free cults of Sci-
entology and Jehovah’s Witness.

3
The responses of the individuals stood on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 showed a
total disagreement with the practices undertaken and 7 showed complete agreement,
had been obtained for the “use of soft drugs” an average of 1.82 with a d.p. of 1.68;
“prevent blood transfusions” with a average = 1.34, d.p. = 1.12; “allow suicide” with
a average = 1.34, d.p. = 1.11 and “head covered in girls’ with a average = 3.25, d.p. =
2.47.
 religion and politics in portugal 471

Most notable, however, is the fact that respondents aged over 60

have levels of intolerance that are significantly different from other
age groups. We believe that, beyond the generational factor, normally
associated with more conservative attitudes, the fact that these older
individuals have also lived part of their adult lives before the 1974 Rev-
olution should be taken into account, because it was a time of a major
isolation of Portuguese society before the introduction of diversity.
The education variable proved to be more influential for the answers
to questions related to indicators of pluralism. Individuals with higher
education levels correlated to higher levels of tolerance in a more sig-
nificant number of cases than those found in the answers given by
respondents with lower education levels.
For the criteria of “tolerance of freedom of learning from other reli-
gious teachings”, the trend is towards greater tolerance, as we looked
at individuals with sporadic religious practices or even null (Table 6).
This analysis continues to support the hypothesis that individuals with
an established religious habitus, most covered by the orthodoxy of the
Church in praxeological terms, show lower levels of tolerance than
those with more practical distance, that is, holders of more autono-
mous habitus.

Table 6. Freedom to Learn from Other Religious Teachings, According to

Religious Practice
Religious practice
Regularly Occasional Rare Null Total
a.v. % a.v. % a.v. % a.v. % a.v. %
Freedom 1-Totally
38 12,2 42 12,2 8 5,1 13 7,9 101 10,3
to learn disagree
from other 2 21 6,8 11 3,2 1 0,6 2 1,2 35 3,6
religious 3 15 4,8 8 2,3 1 0,6 2 1,2 26 2,7
teachings 4 47 15,1 42 12,2 24 15,3 19 11,5 132 13,5
5 40 12,9 57 16,6 27 17,2 13 7,9 137 14
6 58 18,6 65 19 26 16,6 29 17,6 178 18,2
7-Totally
92 29,6 118 34,4 70 44,6 87 52,7 367 37,6
agree
Total 311 100 343 100 157 100 165 100 976 100
Source: Vilaça, 2006.
472 helena vilaça

Official and Legal Relationship Between the State and

Religious Institutions

Until the republican revolution of 1910, the Roman Apostolic Catho-

lic Religion had always been considered the Kingdom’s Religion. The
alteration to the status quo occurred only at the beginning of the 20th
century with the first attempts to separate secular from religious power,
a manifestation of the contrasting tendencies of the Portuguese politi-
cal system. Therefore, we will consider three different types of separa-
tion according to three different moments. The first moment will be
described as secularist separation, and it corresponds to the first years
of the Republican regime. It was followed by a phase of separation/
complicity characteristic of the “Estado Novo” dictatorship—particu-
larly until the mid 1950’s. Finally, and from 1974 onwards, we arrive
at the present-day situation, which could be designated as institutional
separation—not necessarily a total separation as Hasquin (1994) sug-
gested—characteristic of the plural and democratic regimes. We shall
now make a general description of those moments and the specificity
of each separation policy.

Secularist Separation
The establishment of the Republican regime in 1910 initiates a new
type of relationship between the political and religious spheres based
on the Law of Separation between State and Church. The second
decade of the 20th century in Portugal is characterized by a project to
constitute a secular anti-clerical society based on scientific and positiv-
ist doctrines, as well as events such as the establishment of the Paris
Commune and the III French Republic (Costa, 1995: 724). In their
most radical speeches, they proclaimed the end of religion. This is
unquestionably the most hostile period between the Catholic Church
and the State4 in the history of Portugal, during which the religious
problem of separation of powers is not only questioned in its legal

4
The Catholic Church faced threats on several fronts. Teixeira Fernandes (1999:
20) mentions some of the contours assumed by this conflict: a Pastoral from 1910 in
which the Episcopate denounces the anti-Catholic measures: “the eradication of the
Society of Jesus and of the other religious orders, the abolition of the religious vow,
the end of the holy days, the interdiction of catholic teachings at public schools, the
closing of the Faculty of Theology, the introduction of divorce and the Law of Separa-
tion of powers“.
 religion and politics in portugal 473

and political perspectives, but also and above all in ideological terms.5
There is a new belief in a terrestrial paradise.
In essence, the Separation Law of 1911—inspired by the French
legislation of 1905—was based on a “secularization of symbolical
practices” (Catroga, 1988: 241–273). This would be achieved by con-
verting the catholic calendar into a secular one, and by establishing
a new secularist religiosity. This included the secularization of public
schools—and in particular universities—, the elimination of Catholi-
cism and the establishment of a pantheist doctrine (the cult of the tree
is an example), and the introduction of register offices as an alternative
to the passage rites performed and monopolized by religion.

Separation/Complicity
The situation created by the First Republic was, nevertheless, transi-
tory. The establishment of a military dictatorship in the late 1920’s,
and the 1933 Constitution, rehabilitates the image and power of the
Catholic Church. The State adopted an ideology strongly influenced by
Catholicism, based on the symbolical representation that the Shrine of
Fátima would assume in terms of the close relationship between the
“Estado Novo” and the Catholic Church (Esteves, 1986: 72 and Silva,
1994: 162).
One of the singularities of the Portuguese dictatorship was the adop-
tion of a symbolic universe built upon a set of elements specific to a
traditional catholic rural world. During this period, Catholicism was
never again to be considered the State’s official religion, although there
was an obvious approximation confirmed by the 1940 Concordat.
A few years before the Concordat and the Missionary Agreement
were signed, the 1935 constitutional revision already defined the
“Christian principles and moral, which are traditional to the Country”
as guidelines. Soon, this would have repercussions in public schools, as
schooling independent of any religious cult evolved into an education
guided by Christian principles of a specifically Catholic orientation.
Ultimately, this approach became the ethical basis for public and pri-
vate affairs. The Concordat signed with the Holy See helped to con-
solidate the Church’s position by establishing its right to be financed
by the State. The State particularly supported the expenses of sending

5
Cf. Catroga (1988), Costa (1995) and Fernandes (1999: 19–21 and 324).
474 helena vilaça

teachers to public schools (recognising the Catholic guidance in their

management), and priests to the army and to asylums.6
All these events seem to corroborate the fact that the expression ( for-
mal) separation/complicity reflects that period’s relationship between
political and religious powers. Therefore, we believe that it is not pos-
sible to subscribe to the thesis, which claims that Portugal experienced
some sort of “non-confessional and secular” (Cruz, 1998) regime, with
no particular religious association.

Institutional Separation
April 1974 marks the end of the “Estado Novo” regime and the
approval of the new Constitution by Parliament two years later, ensur-
ing the establishment of a democratic State. Within this new politi-
cal context religious freedom is now based on prevailing democratic
values, promoting freedom and equality for all citizens and abolishing
any discriminatory laws.
The Constitution of 1976 includes both public and private aspects
(Machado, 1996: 187–188) concerning the choice and practice of a
religion. It establishes the inviolable right to freedom of conscience,
religion and cult (41st article—1) in the field of individual rights, stat-
ing that “no one shall be persecuted, deprived of his rights or exempted
of his obligations and civic duties due to his personal convictions or
religious practices” (2nd article).
In the collective sphere, the Constitution establishes the principle of
separation between State and any religious denomination: “churches
and other communities are separated from the State and are free to
decide their organization and cult practice” (41st article: 4). On the
other hand, it establishes the neutrality of the State determining that it
cannot “assume the right to programme education and culture accord-

6
Cf. 18th and 21st Articles from the 1940 Concordat. Citation from Machado
(1996:121). Apart from the aspects mentioned in the text there are others worth men-
tioning. According to the Concordat, the State attributes juridical statute conveyed
by International Law to the Catholic Church; ensuring the right to decide its internal
organization—including the right to control its own property and conduct collec-
tions among its followers; establishes fiscal exemptions for the clergymen and for the
Church’s properties (temples, seminars); attributes the clergymen similar rights to
those benefited by the public authorities and recognises the civil effect of religious
marriages. On the other hand, the State should be consulted regarding the designation
of bishops by the Holy See. The Missionary Agreement defines the cooperation rules
for overseas colonies.
 religion and politics in portugal 475

ing to any religious orientations. Public education will be non-confes-

sional” (43rd article: 2–3).7
In spite of the mentioned secularization of the Portuguese State
and the rights and liberties consecrated in the Constitution, the fact
remains that the current religious freedom law goes back to 1971, and
is therefore prior to the establishment of the democratic regime. This
fact contradicts the above-mentioned constitutional principles. On the
other hand, the freedom of speech of the last three decades enabled
minority religious communities to present openly their demands. These
minorities manifested the need to improve the right of equal opportu-
nities for all religious groups; a privileged if not unconstitutional situ-
ation if one considers the Concordat signed with the Catholic Church.
But strategically they did not actually attack the Concordat; they only
applied for equal rights.
In April 1996, twenty years after the approval of the 1976 Constitu-
tion, a Committee for the Revision of the Religious Freedom Law was
officially created. According to the Ministry of Justice, this Committee
was constituted in view of the “urgent need to revise the basic legisla-
tion on religious freedom”. In fact, the constitutional principle, which
establishes religious freedom, never had a practical application.
The Committee’s first decision regarding the Revision of the Reli-
gious Freedom Law was to request proposals from a total of almost
four hundred religious groups and associations registered at the Min-
istry of Justice. After two years of intensive work, the final draft of the
Law was presented to the Ministry of Justice on the 16th April 1998.
It was discussed and voted on by the Parliament in 2003.
In short, the document proposed the following:
In terms of individual rights no one can be privileged or discriminated,
deprived of any right or exempted of any duty on account of his reli-
gious practices or convictions (article 2nd);
The State will not discriminate any religious community nor will it adopt
any religion (articles 2nd and 4th);

7
Inversely, the principle of separation is materialized in the political sphere by the
interdiction of political parties to use any designation that may “directly relate to any
church, as well as any symbol which may be associated to religious symbols” (article
51st—3).
476 helena vilaça

Religious communities may apply for a juridical statute.8 The State also
grants the specificity of the Concordat and associated legislation. Reli-
gious groups have confirmed their right to fiscal exemptions,9 to teach,10
to have access to the mass media,11 to perform religious services in the
armed forces, in prisons and in hospitals. These services are paid by the
State;
The possibility of some religious groups—considered by the public opin-
ion as sects—to acquire the same statute as traditional Christian denom-
inations (Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox), and other religious groups
(Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus);
According to a policy of “common interest”, the State has the right to
celebrate agreements with individual denominations or with associations
of religious groups. Such agreements must be sent to the Justice Minister
and approved by the Parliament. The criteria for their approval or rejec-
tion is the number of followers, the time they have been established in
the country and the consonance of their internal rules and activities with
the Portuguese Law;
Jews, Muslims and Hindus have the right to give their children born in
Portugal names according to their religious traditions;
The religious groups have the right to keep their worship days and their
national festive days, as well as the right to be declared “conscientious
objectors”;

8
In order to be recognized by the State, and according to the 1971 Law a religious
denomination must have a minimum of 500 signatures. The new Law changes this,
establishing that a request to the Justice Minister will be sufficient. However, four
conditions must be fulfilled: the declaration of the definite religious denomination’s
designation, its doctrinal principles, a summary description of the religious cult, and
the settlement time of the group (30 years in the country or 60 abroad).
9
The religious institutions legally recognized are free from taxes and exempt
from national, regional or local contributions on places of cult, buildings or facilities
directly associated to social or religious purposes. They are also free from conveyance,
inheritance and donations taxes whenever they will be used for religious purposes
(article 31st).
10
The recognition of Protestant Theological Schools as Higher Education Institu-
tions is still an issue of debate and therefore is not contemplated in the law. The
Evangelical Theology Seminary, the Baptist Seminary and the Biblical Institutes find
themselves in this situation.
11
The new Law also gives religious groups the right to use public radio and televi-
sion services to broadcast their programmes. Presently, Catholics and other religious
groups already have programmes on Sundays. The Catholic Church has twenty-two
and a half more minutes for daily programmes on the National Television Service
(RTP) and other religious groups will have seven and a half minutes (Evangelical Alli-
ance, Portuguese Council of Christian Churches, Orthodox Church, Adventist Union,
Mormons, and Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and Baha’i communities).
 religion and politics in portugal 477

Legal permission to kill animals for religious purposes;

Legal recognition of religious marriages;
The Ministry of Justice will create a Committee for Religious Freedom
(article 51st), a consultative organ in matters related to religious freedom
and agreements between the State and religious denominations.
As above mentioned, only in 2003 and after the Concordat Revision
the new law of Religious Freedom was approved in the Portuguese
Parliment. This leads us to conclude with Pierre Bourdieu (2001: 73)
that like any other field, the field of religion is made of an “accumu-
lated history”, i.e. the maintenance of a dominant religious culture,
attitudes and routine religious representations of the moment.

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 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Stef Aupers is Associate Professor in Sociology at Erasmus Univer-

sity Rotterdam. Much of his research deals with tendencies of ‘re-
enchantment’ in the modern world. He has published in Dutch and
international journals like Asian Journal of Social Science, Journal of
Contemporary Religion and Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
on New Age spirituality, conspiracy culture and Internet culture. He
is currently working on a monograph on online computer gaming and
on a translation of his dissertation, titled Under the Spell of Modernity:
Sacralizing the Self and Computer Technology (forthcoming with Ash-
gate, 2009).

Céline Béraud is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology

at the University of Caen, full member of the CERReV (University of
Caen) and associate member of the CEIFR (EHESS-CNRS). Most of
her researches deal with French contemporary Catholicism. She has
published Le métier de prêtre. Approche sociologique (Paris, Éd. de
l’Atelier, 2006) and Prêtres, diacres, laïcs. Révolution silencieuse dans le
catholicisme français (Paris, PUF, « Le Lien social », 2007). As a mem-
ber of the REDCo project she has edited two books : with P. Valk,
M. Friederichi and G. Bertram-Troost (eds), Teenager’s Perspectives
on the Role of Religion in their lives, Schools and Societies. A European
Quantitative Study (Münster, Waxmann, 2009) and with J.-P. Wil-
laime (eds), Les jeunes, l’école et la religion (Paris, Bayard, 2009).

Luigi Berzano is Professor of the Sociology of Cultural Processes at

the Political Science Faculty of the University of Turin. He is member
of the Scientific Council of the Religion Section of the Italian Soci-
ology Association. His research interests include social movements,
sociology of leisure and lifestyles, religious transformations between
innovation and fundamentalism. His publications include: New Age
(2002), Religiosità del Nuovo Aeropago (1994), and Damanhur: Popolo
e comunità (1998).

Peter Beyer is professor of religious studies at the University of

Ottawa, Canada. His specializations include religion and globalization,
480 list of contributors

sociological theory of religion, religion and migration, and religion in

Canada. Publications include Religion and Globalization (Sage, 1994),
Religion in the Process of Globalization (ed., Ergon, 2001), Religions in
Global Society (Routledge, 2006), Religion, Globalization, and Culture
(ed. with Lori Beaman, Brill, 2007), and Religious Diversity in Canada
(ed. with Lori Beaman, Brill, 2008). He is currently completing a series
of research projects on the religious expression of second generation
immigrant young adults in Canada.

K. Gandhar Chakravarty is currently pursuing a PhD in Religious

Studies at Université de Montréal. His research focuses on contempo-
rary naziritism, *Ibandla lamaNazaretha*, and Rastafari. As a Research
Assistant for the Chair of Religion, Culture, and Society, he also works
on issues related to diversity management.

Roberto Cipriani is Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Depart-

ment of Sciences of Education at the University of Rome 3. He has
served as editor-in-chief of International Sociology. He has been presi-
dent of the International Sociological Association Research Committee
for the Sociology of Religion and member of the Executive Committee
of the International Association of French Speaking Sociologists, and
of the International Institute of Sociology, as well as president of the
Italian Sociological Association and a Directeur d’Études at Maison des
Sciences de l’Homme in Paris. His publications include: Sociology of
Religion: An Historical Introduction (2000) and The Sociology of Legiti-
mation (1987, Current Sociology 35:2).

Sylvia Collins-Mayo is Principle Lecturer in Sociology at Kingston

University. She completed her PhD on young people’s faith at the Uni-
versity of Surrey in 1997. Her post-doctoral research interests have
continued to focus on youth religion with particular reference to the
everyday faith of young people from Christian backgrounds. She is
co-author of Making Sense of Generation Y, CHP (2006) and The Faith
of Generation Y, CHP (2010) and is co-editor of Religion and Youth,
Ashgate (2010).

Emanuela C. Del Re is an expert in sociology of religion, geopolitics

and security issues, who has carried out long field researches since
1990 in conflict areas, the Balkans in particular, focusing on social,
political and economic transformations. In her researches she has
 list of contributors 481

always recurred to audiovisuals, and has filmed documentaries. She is

lecturer at the Faculty of Communication Sciences of the University
“Sapienza” of Rome. She is member of international think tanks and
Networks and member of the editing Committee of the Italian Geo-
political Review Limes. She is the chair and founder of EPOS Interna-
tional Mediating and Negotiating Operational Agency.

Annalisa Frisina, Ph.D. in Sociology, is a Researcher at the University

of Padua. She teaches Qualitative Methods of Social Research and is a
member of the Laboratory on Religions at the Department of Sociol-
ogy. She has written a monograph on young Muslims (Giovani Musul-
mani d’Italia, Carocci, 2007) and is writing a book on focus groups
(Il Mulino, in press). Her main research interests are young people,
religious and cultural diversity in everyday life, secularism and citizen-
ship from below.

Giuseppe Giordan, is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Padua.

He is General Secretary of the International Society for the Sociology
of Religion (ISSR/SISR), Secretary of the Italian Sociological Associa-
tion Section on the Sociology of Religion, and Book Review Editor of
Religioni e Società. His main works include Identity and Pluralism:
The Values of Postmodern Time, and the edited volumes: Tra religione
e spiritualità: Il rapporto con il sacro nell’epoca del pluralismo (2006);
Vocation and Social Context (2007) and Conversion in the Age of Plu-
ralism (2009), volumes 14 and 17 in the Religion and the Social Order
series (Brill).

Dick Houtman is Professor in Cultural Sociology at Erasmus University

Rotterdam and member of the editorial boards of Politics and Religion
and Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. The ‘spiritualization’
of religion and the ‘culturalization’ of politics constitute his principal
research interests. Recent papers have been published by Social Forces
(2009), Journal of Contemporary Religion (2006, 2009), Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion (2002, 2007, 2009), British Journal of Crimi-
nology (2006, 2008), Politics and Society (2007) and European Journal
of Political Research (2006).

Philip Hughes is senior research officer of the Christian Research Asso-

ciation (Australia) which is an inter-denominational body responsi-
ble to Catholic, Anglican and Protestant denominations. He is also
482 list of contributors

a research fellow at Edith Cowan University, Perth. He has written

many books about religion in Australia and was editor of ‘Australian
Religious Communities: A Multi-media Exploration’ that gives an
account of more than 170 religious groups in Australia. His interest
in religion in Thailand spans more than 25 years and he has published
several articles about Christianity and Buddhism in Thailand.

Boris Jokić is a research associate at the Institute for Social Research

in Zagreb, Croatia. He received his B.Sc. in Psychology from the Uni-
versity of Zagreb and his MPhil and PhD from the University of Cam-
bridge (United Kingdom). His doctoral work is on the coexistence of
scientific and religious worldviews of preadolescents and adolescents
in Croatia. His research interests are in science-religion field as well as
in the cognition and learning of children of elementary school age.

Martijn de Koning is Postdoc Researcher at Radboud University

Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and involved in the research program
Salafism as a Transnational Movement. In 2008 he defended his PhD
thesis on religious beliefs and identity formation of Moroccan-Dutch
youth in the Netherlands. His current project on the rise of the Salafi
movement in the Netherlands focuses on themes such as subjectivity,
radicalization, media practices and public religion. He also maintains
a research weblog in which he covers the main debates about Islam in
Europe and discusses issues relevant to his research.

Solange Lefebvre, Ph.D. in Theology, D.E.A. in Social Anthropology, is

Full Professor at the Faculty of Theology and Sciences of Religion, is
holding the Chair Religion, culture and society, and was also director
of the Centre d’étude des religions de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRUM)
since its foundation in 2000 until December 2008. Its regrouped near
eighty Professors from a variety of disciplines. She works on religious
diversity in Canada, religion in the public arena, and generational rela-
tions and youth. She published Cultures et spiritualités des jeunes (Bel-
larmin 2008), and Le Patrimoine religieux du Québec (2009) and is
preparing a book on the management of religious diversity.

Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Ph.D., is a scientific advisor at the Insti-

tute for Social Research in Zagreb, Croatia. Her main fields of interest
are traditional church religiosity, new religious movements and youth
religiosity. She teaches Sociology of religion at doctoral studies at Uni-
 list of contributors 483

versity of Zagreb. Together with Irena Borowik and Siniša Zrinščak

she coedited the book Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation
(2004) based on ISORECEA conference, published two books about
Religious communities in Croatia in 1991 and 2008 and published
numerous scientific articles in the field of sociology of religion. She is
the principal investigator of the ISSP for Croatia.

Michael Mason, PhD is a Senior Research Fellow at Australian Catho-

lic University’s Quality of Life and Social Justice Research Centre in
Melbourne. He has been a principal investigator in several national
sociological surveys on religion and spirituality, and has a particu-
lar interest in multidisciplinary and mixed-methods research. He has
postgraduate qualifications in sociology, religion studies and theology.
His research interests are in sociology of religion, religion in Australia,
and religious experience. He is a Catholic priest of the Redemptorist
order.

Mauro Meirelles holds a degree in Social Sciences and a Master’s

degree in Education from the Federal University of Rio Grande do
Sul (Brazil). He was a substitute teacher (assistant) at the Federal Uni-
versity of Rio Grande do Sul from 2005 to 2007. He is taking his PhD
in Social Anthropology at UFRGS and works at the Center for Studies
of Religion with Professor Ari Pedro Oro. Mauro Meirelles has experi-
ence in Education and Anthropology, especially in software develop-
ment and research methods. His main area of expertise lies in studies
of Anthropology and Politics and in construction and production of
statistical indicators.

Kati Niemelä, ThD, MEd, is a senior researcher at the Church Research

Institute in Finland and an adjunct professor of religious education at
the University of Helsinki. Her main research interests are youth and
religion, church confirmation training, church membership and disaf-
filation and church personnel and career development. In those areas
she has published numerous books and articles.

Ineke Noomen (1979) is PhD Student at the Department of Sociology at

Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Amsterdam School for Social
Science Research (ASSR) in the Netherlands. In 2004 she received her
MA degree (cum laude) in Arts and Culture Studies, at the Faculty of
History and the Arts at Erasmus University. She is currently working
484 list of contributors

on her dissertation about religion and spirituality on the Internet in

the research program Cyberspace Salvations: Computer Technology,
Simulation and Modern Gnosis.

Ari Pedro Oro is Professor of Anthropology at the Federal University

of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil. He took his doctorate at
Sorbonne Nouvelle, in Paris, in 1986. He has published Avanço Pente-
costal e Reação Católica (1996), Religião e política no Cone-sul (2006),
Latinidade da América Latina (2008) and América Latina: identidades
e representações em cinco países (2010) . He is currently researching
the relationships between religion and politics in Brazil as well as the
transnationalization of Afro-Brazilian and Pentecostal religions in
Brazil and the Mercosur countries.

Gert Pickel Prof Dr., is Professor of Sociology of Religion, University

of Leipzig, Faculty of Theology, Department of Practical Theology. He
is member of the boards of the working group “sociology of religion”
of the German association of sociology, the working groups “research
on democracy” and “politics and religion” of the German association
of political science. His main research interests are sociology of reli-
gion and youth, religion and politics, comparative social and political
science, comparative research methods. Selected publications: Reli-
gionssoziologie. Eine Einführung (2010), Wiesbaden (i.p.); Church and
Religion in Contemporary Europe (2009), Wiesbaden (with Olaf Mül-
ler); Religious Individualization or Secularization? Testing hypotheses
of religious change—the case of Eastern and Western Germany (2007),
«British Journal of Sociology» (with Detlef Pollack).

Johan Roeland is Postdoc Researcher in Sociology at Erasmus Univer-

sity Rotterdam and researcher at the Reformed University Zwolle, the
Netherlands. He is currently finishing his dissertation, titled Selfation:
Dutch Evangelical Youth between Subjectivization and Subjection, in
which he discusses tendencies of subjectivization in evangelicalism as
it takes shape among Dutch youngsters.

Erik Sengers is assistant professor at the faculty of social sciences,

department sociology, of VU University Amsterdam. His disserta-
tion was about the history of the Dutch Catholic Church since 1790
from rational-choice perspective. Since then, he continued to publish
 list of contributors 485

about Catholicism, religious market and religious marketing, and the

relationship between church/religion and modern society. His cur-
rent research is about the changing position of mainline churches in
Europe in the context of globalization.

Andrew Singleton, PhD is a Senior Lecturer in the Sociology Pro-

gram, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University. His
research interests include youth spirituality, alternative religions, and
men and masculinity. Andrew has published extensively in these areas
both nationally and internationally. He teaches units on contempo-
rary religion and spirituality, men, masculinity and society, and social
research methods.

William H. Swatos, Jr., has served as Executive Officer of the Associa-

tion for the Sociology of Religion since 1996, prior to which he served
for six years as editor of Sociology of Religion. He is also executive offi-
cer of the Religious Research Association, adjunct professor of sociol-
ogy at Augustana College (Illinois), and senior fellow of the Center
for Religious Inquiry Across the Disciplines at Baylor University, serv-
ing as managing editor of the Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on
Religion. He is author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of over twenty
books including the Encyclopedia of Religion and Society (1998). His
current research centers on pilgrimage religiosity, secularization and
resacralization, reflected in his most recent book, On the Road to Being
There: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Late Modernity, also published in
the Religion and the Social Order series (2006).

Helena Vilaça, PhD in Sociology (University of Porto), is an Assis-

tant Professor at the same institution. Researcher at the Institute of
Sociology of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Porto, her scien-
tific work focuses on religion. She has been involved in many national
and international projects: “Religious and Moral Pluralism”, “Church
and Religion in an enlarged Europe” and “Religious communities and
Eastern European immigrants”. Member of the Portuguese Sociologi-
cal Association and of the International Society for the Sociology of
Religion, she has organized two major international scientific meetings
on religion and has published Da Torre de Babel às terras prometidas:
pluralismo religioso em Portugal (2006).
486 list of contributors

Giselle Vincett is a research fellow at the University of Edinburgh.

Giselle’s work has focused on a wide range of contemporary expres-
sions of religion and spirituality in the UK. She has published on alter-
native spiritualities (including contemporary paganisms), gender and
religion and liberal Christianity. Most recently, she has been research-
ing the religion and spirituality of young people, especially in areas of
deprivation. Her most recent publication, Spirituality, appeared with
Linda Woodhead in the 2nd edition of Religions in the Modern World
(Routledge 2009).

Ruth Webber, PhD is a Professor in the School of Arts and Sciences,

and Director, Quality of Life and Social Justice Research Centre at
Australian Catholic University. Her research has focused on youth
spirituality, youth violence and substance abuse, intellectual disability,
family breakdown, and social policy. She has published extensively on
‘at risk’ youth and social policy both nationally and internationally.
Social justice is of paramount importance to her research activities and
community service. She is on the editorial board of two journals, is a
board member of two large welfare organizations and has postgradu-
ate qualifications in education, psychology and sociology.

Jean-Paul Willaime is Research Director at l’Ecole Pratique des Hautes

Etudes, Department of Religious Studies, Sorbonne, Paris. He is mem-
ber of the Research Centre (EPHE-CNRS) Group Societies, Religions,
Laïcities (GSRL) and Director of the European Institute of Religious
Studies. Since 2007, he is President of the International Society for the
Sociology of Religion. His fields of research in sociology of religion are:
protestantism, ecumenism, religions and school education, Europe
and religions, sociology of religions: history and theories. His main
publications include Profession: pasteur (1986); Sociologie des Reli-
gions (3rd ed., 2004); Sociologies et religion: Approches classiques (with
D. Hervieu-Léger, 2001); Europe et religions. Les enjeux du XXIe siècle
(2004); Sociologie du Protestantisme (2005).

Fenggang Yang is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center

on Religion and Chinese Society (CRCS) at Purdue University. His
research focuses on religious change in China and immigrant reli-
gions in the United States. He is the author of Chinese Christians in
America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities and is fin-
 list of contributors 487

ishing a new book on the survival and revival of religion in China

under Communist rule. He has received two “Distinguished Article
Awards”: “Transformations in New Immigrant Religions and Their
Global Implications” and “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Reli-
gion in China”.