The world of Kant’s scholarship was ellectrified in 1974, when

Giorgio Tonelli presented a brief summary ofhis life’s work. This

was a meticulous study: the plethora of sources shaping Kant’s
world, particulary the nature of scopeoflogic. Tonelli found widely
held interpretations of Kant to be inadequate, even wrong. At the
end of that brief sammary, given at the Fourth International Kant
Congress in Mainz, Tonelli promised to publish a book with the
detailed justification forthis of Kant, Hereis that book.
Tragically Tonelli's life was c h he had hoped to
inchide more chapters, the ev H des is ample in
the three he was able Kant scholars will find it
necessary to reconsider ns and assumptionsin
ight of this ground-)
Die Welt der Kor ls. Giorgio
Tonelli im ber sein
ar fir ihn
geistigen Welt
Logik und ihr
breit yertretene
eien. Am Schluft
on Internationalen Kant-
rgettagen9 prach Tonelli, ein Buch
dung dieses neuen Dee tiber
 GIORGIO TONELLI

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

WITHIN THE TRADITION
OF MODERN LOGIC
STUDIEN UND MATERIALIEN
ZUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE

Begriindet von Heinz Heimsoeth, Giorgio Tonelli und Yvon Belaval

Herausgegeben von Gerhard Funke und Rudolf Malter

Band 37
GIORGIO TONELLI

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

WITHIN THE TRADITION
OF MODERN LOGIC

Q
994
EEORG OLMS VERLAG HILDESHEIM - ZURICH - NEW YORK
 GIORGIO TONELLI

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

WITHIN THE TRADITION
OF MODERN LOGIC

A Commentary onits History

Edited from the Unpublished Works of

Giorgio Tonelli
by
David H. Chandler

Q
1994
GEORG OLMS VERLAG HILDESHEIM - ZURICH » NEW YORK
Das Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschutzt, Jede Verwertung auBerhalb der engen Grenzen des
Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulissig undstrafbar.
Dies gilt insbesondere fur Vervielfaltigungen, Ubersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen unddie
Einspeicherung und Verarbeitungin elektronischen Systemen.

© Georg Olms Verlag AG, Hildesheim 1994

Allle Rechte vorbehalten
Printed in the Netherlands
Gedruckt auf saurefrciemPapicr
Umschlagentwurf: Prof. Paul Konig, Hildesheim
ISSN 0585-5802
ISBN 3-487-09899-7
To my beautiful children, Courtney, Marisa and Aaron, who occa-
sionally questioned putting so much time into this editing project.
Such axiological skepticism is invaluable in pursuing a life of
virtue.
 CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...........-------++--- ix
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION i
ABBREVIATIONS
DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS ae z ose: OE
CRAPGET: secu waves wanes aes ee ae eee = xxi
Chapter... 2. ee eee eee eee ee xxv
Chapter TUE ae esecene sxenece euetece euese 2 enesere exevere XXxvii

PART ONE
SETTING THE CONTEXT

Giorgio Tonelli, “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradi-

tion of Modern Logic” .........-
Claudio Cesa, “In Memory of Giorgio Tonelli - ae
Norbert Hinske, “In memoriam Giorgio Tonelli” ..........- 27

PART TWO
THE WORK ITSELF

Chapter I: Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 37

Chapter II: Terminological and Conceptual Precedents to

Kant’s Use of the Terms Organon and Canon 133

Appendix A: Canonin the Seventeenth Century 193

Appendix B: Canonin the Eighteenth Century . 197
Appendix C: Criterion .............2.-- 203

vii
viii _Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Appendix D: Doctrine
Appendix E: Discipline

Chapter III: The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System of Phi-

losophy andtheInstitutional Situation of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason ........0 00.000 225

SubjectIndex . .
Person Index
Index of Kant’s Works . .
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Giorgio Tonelli provides the following acknowledgements for

Chapters I and II.
The research needed for [Chapter I] was made possible through
a J. S. Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship obtained in 1971. I
wish to express mygratitude to Professor N. Hinske and Dr.
H.-J. Engfer of Trier University for their assistance in obtaining
transcripts for sections ofthe Kant-Index.
Theresearch needed for [ChapterII] was made possible through
fellowship ofthe J, S. Guggenheim Foundation obtained in
1971,

First and foremost, thanks is due Professor Dr. Norbert

Hinske. He provided the opportunity to prepare this manuscript for
publication. But in so many other wayshis contribution has been
decisive as well: locating funding from the Stifterverbandfiir die
Deutsche Wissenschaft to work in Germany during the summer of
1987 tracking downvirtually all of Tonelli’s references; helping
with contacts and arrangements at the Herzog August Bibliothek
Wolfenbiittel; sharing amply ofhis time and expertise; checking
early drafts and making numerous suggestions, additions, correc-
tions; answering many questions; providing encouragement and
provingpatient in a very long project. Grazia Tonelli has been
generous with her support and help in unearthing hard to find
sources, only possible due to her own scholarly expertise and
detailed awareness of her husband's research. Professor Dr.
Claudio Cesa’s encouragement of and many contributions to this

ix
x Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

project have been crucial, not least of which was securing the
publisher. The splendid help of Dr. Peter Guyot, editor at Georg
Olms Verlag, was invaluable.
Maria Pohl of Miinster, Germany, provided expert help in
translating Professor Cesa’s memorial article from Italian. The
flexibility and generous support of Professor Dr. Harald Holz,
Direktor des Seminarsfiir Philosophische Grundfragen der
Theologie, and funding from the Heinrich Herz Stiftung in 1985-
1986 were the catalyst for this whole project. That year of post-
doctoral research into the antecedents of Kant’s logic was the
occasion to find this manuscript.
Franklin College has supported this project in numerous
ways: former Academic Dean, Lawrence Bryan, with his generous
encouragement in important ways; the aid of Faculty Development
Grants; the Maurice and Rose Johnson Endowed Chair in the
Humanities; my department colleagues, J. Thomas Howald, David
Carlson and Clifford Cain, whose constant intellectual stimulation
and encouragement are invaluable aids and a continuing source of
enrichment in both the life of the mind and the spirit; the unerring
stylistic and grammatical judgments of my colleague, English
Professor Kathy Carlson; Vicco von Stralendorff and Ron Schuetz,
Head Librarian and Reference Librarian respectively at Franklin
College; the Franklin College Computing Services Office. Barbara
Halporn and Nancy Boerner, Librarians for Classics, History of
Science, Philosophy, and Psychology at Indiana University in
Bloomington were of great assistance. A special indebtednessis
owed Dr. Solf, Leiterin des Bereichs Forschung und Kulturarbeit,
and Christian Hogrefe, Diplombibliothekar, at the Herzog August
Bibliothek Wolfenbiittel, headquarters during the summerof 1987.
Although publishing a bookis a collaborative process, I take
responsibility for mistakes that remain even after the help ofso
many generous people.
 EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

The world of Kant scholarship waselectrified in 1974, when

Giorgio Tonelli presented a brief summary of his life’s work. His
was a meticulous study: the plethora of sources shaping Kant’s
world, particularly the nature and scope of logic. Tonelli found
widely held interpretations of Kant to be inadequate, even wrong.
At the end of that brief summary, given at the Fourth International
Kant Congress in Mainz, Tonelli promised to publish a book with
the detailed justification for this rethinking of Kant. Hereis that
book.
Tragically Tonelli’s life was cut short. Though he had
hoped to include more chapters, the evidence Tonelli provides is
ample in the three he was able to complete. Kant scholars will find
it necessary to reconsider received interpretations and assumptions
in light of this ground-breaking work.
Therichness, complexity and development of Kant’s thought
can never be exhausted. New paradigms are indispensable in order
to deepen our understanding. This is perhaps the central signifi-
cance of Giorgio Tonelli’s life-long scholarly endeavors. Providing
the historical and conceptual details that suggest new interpretations
and approaches, it becomespossible to question some widely ac-
cepted assumptions and interpretations. What is undoubtedly most
valuable for English-speaking Kant scholarshipis that this brings us
ever closer to understanding ideas and their development in Kant
and his predecessors in their original historical context. Such a
hermeneutical principle is crucial in approaching any text. Very
specific studies in the original sources must be the foundation of
scholarship. On the other hand, the critical scholar mustdistinguish

xi
 >,
xii Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

carefully a source of an idea from merely the historical backgroung

for an idea. This distinction was perhaps occasionally blurred in
Tonelli’s corpus.
The memorial articles in Part One by Professors Claudio
Cesa and Norbert Hinske introduce Giorgio Tonelli. Tonelli’s
paper for the Fourth International Kant Congress in Mainz in April,
1974, is probably the best introduction to his magnum opus. Titled
“Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern
Logic,” it is the first public mention of this present work. With
that overview one can better appreciate the profound importance of
the detailed historical work Tonelli carries out in the three chapters
of Part Two.
Beyond this article, what do we know about the genesis of
the book? The manuscript from which the present book was prepar-
ed wassent to Professor Dr. Norbert Hinske by Mrs. Grazia
Tonelli. Single sheets of paper were inserted between chapters. On
them in handwriting were written, respectively: “Part I, Ch. I,”
“Part I, Ch. II,” and “Part Il, Ch. III.” Clearly more chapters
were planned.
Tonelli’s reference in Chapter I, footnote 130 below implies
that this part of Chapter I was completed before the Kant Congress
in 1974.
Hecites this book again in his 1978 Kant-Studienarticle
titled “‘Critique’ and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A Historical
Survey.” In footnote 16 he gives his forthcoming bookthetitle The
Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic, and
suggests it will appear as an Erganzung-Heft of Kant-Studien.
Though no mention is made of Part One, the footnote goes on to
cite Sections 2, 5, 6, 17 in Chapter I of the forthcoming book as
dealing with “catharticon.” This matches exactly the section num-
bers in the presenttext, clearly showing that Chapter I was wellin
hand when writing this 1978 article.
In the same article, footnote 226 mentions Part Two, Chap-
ter IV ofthis projected book. The bookis titled Kant’s “Critique of
 Editor’s Introduction xiii

pure Reason”within the Tradition of Modern Logic. There he

intended to deal further with “critique” as connected primarily with
logic. Tonelli deals with critique most extensively in Chapter I.
But as just noted, his references to specific sections of Chapter I
match in such detail, so if he had Chapter I in mind he surely would
have cited specific sections. This leads to the conclusion that he
began a Chapter IV but it is not included in the available manuscript
which forms the basis of this book.
In the next footnote, 227, Tonelli cites Part One, ChapterI,
Section 42 as dealing with “censure.” Again, this matches precisely
the section in the present book, reinforcing the conclusion that
Chapter I was firmly in place by 1978. In contrast to footnote 16,
these two citations near the end ofthe article include references to
the “Part” subdivision which was retained in the draft from Mrs.
Tonelli to Professor Hinske on which the present volume is based.
Since some of these chapters are obviously missing, this subdivision
into “Parts” has been dropped.
What we haveso far are three subtly different titles. By
using quotation marksin the last instance he seems to focus on
Kant’s critical activity, but specifically in the context of The Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. The first two references seem less bound by
this seminal work of Kant’s and have in mindthe critical activity
per se, which of course culminates in the first Critique. In any
case, there is still some fluidity vis-a-vis the title in 1978.
Professor Claudio Cesa, in his memorialarticle included in
Part One, provides helpful historical background. Theenthusiastic
reception Tonelli’s summary met with at the Fourth International
Kant Congress spurred him to work on this book again. As Cesa
suggests, Tonelli considered using the title Introduction to the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. Cesa says the work was almost two-thirds
complete whenillness forced Tonelli to stop. Cesa has confirmed
in correspondencethat this two-thirds estimate was his personal
recollection of conversations with Giorgio and may have been a
higher estimate than wasactually the case.
xiv Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

There are numerousother hints in the text as to its genesis

Tonelli’s reference in Chapter I, footnote 63, is accurate in Pointing
to Chapter III, § 3. But, it was obviously added later to Tonelli’;
draft of that chapter.
All the citations to Chapter I in Chapter II are accurate, so
Chapter I wasclearly in place before completing his draft of Chap-
ter II. However, Tonelli always cites Chapter I as an articletitled
“Organon, Canon, Discipline and Doctrine: The Meaning and
Background of Four Kantian Terms.” In the Tonelli manuscript
this was followed by “in: ” and then one and half blanklines.
Clearly he anticipated publishing Chapter I as an article at the time
of writing Chapter II. The abbreviated citation he providesforthis
“article” was “Tonelli, OCDD.”
The conclusion to Chapter I was obviously added laterin the
Tonelli manuscript. In referring to other chapters, only ChapterII
is cited and the sections match perfectly. This appearsto be late
attempt to integrate Chapter I with Chapter II, and mightalso
suggest his realization that it would be impossible to complete other
chapters he had earlier hoped to include.
In the Tonelli manuscript, Chapter I, footnote 127 reads:
“See Tonelli, TCP, §§ 13-14.” Clearly he did not think ofthis as
part of the same book yet. But this is an abbreviation forthetitle
of Chapter II: Terminological and Conceptual Precedents .. . .
Curiously the Tonelli manuscript for Chapter III, footnote 77,
makesa similar elusive reference “as we shall see elsewhere,” and
then has an incomplete citation: “See Chap. ,§ .”
In the manuscript for Chapter III, footnote 129, Tonellicites
his article “Kant’s Ethics as a Part of Metaphysics: A Possible
Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant’s ‘Dreams
of a Seer’,” as “not published at the time of this writing.” That
volume was published in 1974, indicating that this part of Chapter
Ill at least was written by 1974.
The goal has been not to tamper with the text except to
correct errors, makecitations consistent, or follow American Eng-
 Editor's Introduction xv

lish style when necessary, as established by The Chicago Manual of

Style (eliminating abbreviations like “i.e.,” and “viz.” for example).
The concern has been notto over-edit, to leave the Tonelli manner
of expression in tact.
Many timesit was very difficult to find the works cited by
Tonelli with the information he supplied--only initials for given
names, surnamesin the vernacular and no publishers. Consequently
the policy of making full bibliographic entries was adopted. 1) For
frequently cited worksthis is done in the “Abbreviations” section.
2) The full name (given name and surname)is supplied in its
vernacular spelling (vs. latin) at its first occurrence in each chapter.
3) Names, titles, places of publication, publishers appear as they do
onthe title page in the first footnote citation of each chapter. This
includeslatin names, places, publishers and often the letter “v” in
place of “u” or “i” in place of “j” in latin words. Variant spellings
ofan author’s nameare included in brackets if they were found
relevant in searching for the work. For latin namesof cities, the
modern name hasbeen included in brackets when it differs signifi-
cantly. Putting citations to old works into a modern formula is
difficult, since often it is unclear who wasthe printer or publisher
or distributor. Frequently the only citation onthetitle page is
“impensis” or “sumptibus,” with no publisher mentioned. In such
cases, these words have been used to introduce the person listed. 4)
Reprints not mentioned by Tonelli are included. 5) The edition of a
work is indicated by a superscript arabic numeral after the date of
publication, when this could be determined. 6) Each Appendix is
entirely independent, giving all works within each Appendix full
bibliographic citation at their first occurrence. This allows the
Appendices to be used on their own, independent of the text, facili-
tating quick reference.
At virtually every mention of the Jasche Logic Tonelli
includes the dates 1782 and 1790. Referring to two notebooks from
these years showsthat Tonelli does not seem to understand the
source of the Jasche Logic. The work of Terry Boswell provides
xvi Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

the most current estimate vis-a-vis the sources ofthis work. They
likely include students’ notes, Kant’s reflections, editorial audition,
by Jasche and material from Meier’s compendium onlogic, which
text Kant used in his logic courses for some forty years. See
Boswell’s “On the Textual Authenticity of Kant’s Logic,” History
and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1988), pp. 193-203; and his Quellen-
kritische Untersuchungen zum Kantischen Logikhandbuch (Frankfuy
am Main, Bern, New York,Paris: Peter Lang, 1991; in theseries
Studien zur Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, vol. 3).
At the time Tonelli wrote, the widely accepted date forthe
Wiener Logik and the Logik Pélitz was 1790. Thanksto subsequent
computeranalysis of word usage and frequency, the bestestimate
today is that they were written in the early 1780s. The most helpfy|
resource onthis issue is Norbert Hinske’s “Einleitung” in Kant-
Index, vol. 14: Personenindex zum Logikcorpus, ed. Norbert
Hinske, et al. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann
Verlag, Giinther Holzboog, 1991; in the series Forschungen und
Materialien zur deutschen Aufkldrung, Abteilung III: Indices, vol.
18), pp. ix-cv. Consequently, all Tonelli’s references to the dates
of these works have been dropped.
A complete bibliography of Tonelli’s writings wasfirst
published by Claudio Cesa at the conclusion of his memorialarticle
in the Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, LIX (LX1), Fasc. |-
IV (1980), pp. 40-46. This has been revised and updated for Kant
und sein Jahrhundert: Gedenkschrift fiir Giorgio Tonelli, ed.
Claudio Cesa, Norbert Hinske in collaboration with Sonia
Carboncini (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris,
Wien: Peter Lang, 1993; in the series Studien zur Philosophie des
18. Jahrhunderts, vol. 4).

Dr. David H. Chandler

Franklin College Professor of Philosophy
Eastertide, 1994 Johnson Chair in the Humanities
 ABBREVIATIONS

A = First edition (1781) of the Critique of Pure Reason.

AK.-Ausg. = refers to the standard edition of Kant’s works:

Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the K6niglich
Preufischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and successors
(Berlin et al.: Walter de Gruyter & Co. et al., 1900--).

B = Second edition (1787) of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Heimsoeth, 7D = Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik.

Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 4 vols.
(Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1966-1971).

Kemp Smith, Comm. = Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to

Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, Second Edition, Revised
and Enlarged (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1923;
reprinted Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press,
1962).
Kemp Smith, CPR = Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,
translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan &
Co., Ltd., 1929; reprinted New York, Toronto: St Martin’s
Press, 1965).

L. Bl. = Loses Blatt, Lose Blatter.

Lambert, Neues Organon or Architectonic = J{ohann] H[einrich]

xvii
xviii Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Lambert, Philosophische Schriften, 4 vols., ed. Hans-Werme,

Arndt (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965). The first two Vol-
umesreprint his Neues Organon oder Gedanken tiberdie
Etforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen
Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein (Leipzig: Johann
Wendler, 1764); the last two volumes reprint his Anlage zy,
Architectonic, oder Theorie des Einfachen und des Ersten in
der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnif, (Riga:
Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1771). In the reprintthis latter
is spelled Architektonic.

Prolegomena = Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden

kiinftigen Metaphysik.

Vaihinger, Komm. = Hans Vaihinger, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik

der reinen Vernunft, vol. I (Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1881);
vol. II (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlags-
gesellschaft, 1892; second edition ed. Dr. Raymund
Schmidt, Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Union Deutsche
Verlagsgesellschaft; reprint of the first edition, New York &
London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976).

Wolff, Werke = Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, ed. Jean

Feole, et al., <107 vols. > (Hildesheim, et al.: Georg
Olms, [1962]-<1990>). This yet to be completed multi-
volume work is made up of three Abteilungen, each witha
new set of volumes: I. Abt.: Deutsche Schriften; II. Abt.:
Lateinische Schriften; III. Abt.: Materialien und
Dokumente. Citations are made to the original workthen to
its reprint. Roman numerals refer to the Abteilung, arabic
numerals to the volume within an Abteilung.

= footnote
n.d.
i

= no name of publisher.

n.p. no place of publication.

Mi

= Universitatsbibliothek.

{] = within a quotation they are Tonelli’s addition. Outside of

quotations they are the addition of the editor.

& = additions of the editor within braces.

<> = projected completion date.

= a work or reference which was not found and thus the

editor has not verified its accuracy.
 DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant

INTRODUCTION. & 53 Ha64 HOE MOOG PSs Bees 37

1. Importance of the four terms. 2. The Announcement
of 1765: logic as critique and logic as organon; discipline
and doctrine. Kant’s letter to Mendelssohn of 1766: the
reform of metaphysics through a catharticon; practical meth-
od. -- 3. The Dissertation of 1770: a propaedeutic or
method for metaphysics, as ars docimastica ornegative
criterion. Metaphysics and mathematics as organonsfor
knowledge.

Il. KANT'S LECTURES 1770-1780 .............4- 41

4. Preliminary considerations. The Logik Blomberg of
1771: logic as dogmatic andas critical. Theoretical logic;
doctrine anddiscipline. 5. The Logik Philippi of 1772.
Natural andartificial logic. Natural logic as critique and
catharticon; artificial logic as doctrine and organon. The
distinction between natural and artificial logic abandoned. --
6. Transition between them. Theory. Logic as catharticon
of commonsense and as an organon. -- 7. Critique: ama-
teurish, expert, masterly. Theoretical logic, and practical
(empirical) logic (discipline). Epicurus and Locke. -- 8.
The Metaphysik L;, 1775-1780. Metaphysics asthe logic of
the pure use of reason, as organonof purerational concepts.

xxi
xxii Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Ontology and transcendental philosophy. -- 9. The Lectuy

on Philosophical Encyclopaedia of 1777-1780 (?). Philo} es
as the organonofthehistorical sciences. [General] logic jg
not an organon, but contains a canon. Analytic and dialec.
tic. Particular organons. Thecritique of pure reason, ana.
lytic and dialectic. Metaphysics as an organon. The Erhix
Menzer, 1780-1781: discipline and doctrine.

ll. KANT’S REFLECTIONS 1769-1778 .......--..., 49

10. In 1769. Critique of pure reason, metaphysics, ontolo.
gy versus logic (doctrine). -- 11. In 1772. Critique ofpure
reason or transcendental philosophy. General logic as an
organon; the sciences as organons. Metaphysics as organon
of wisdom andascritique of science; metaphysics notan
organon. -- 12, From 1773-1775. Generallogic as a canon
for doctrine; not an organon(dialectic). No practical logic.
Transcendental philosophy as a canon for transcendental
logic. -- 13. From 1775-1778. Transcendental philosophy
and its subdivisions. Critique of pure reason, ontology,
metaphysics, organon, discipline, canon, architectonic. -- 14,
Transcendental analytic and dialectic, logic of truth (as a
doctrine) and ofillusion (as a critique). The criterion. -- 15,
Doctrine, discipline, canon. -- 16. Organon, canon, archi-
tectonic.

Iv. THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: GENERAL VERSUS

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC ..........-++005 39
17. Critique. General and particular logic. Organon. Pure
and applied catharticon. The general form of knowledge
versusits content. -- 18. General form versus content of
knowledge. General logic as a canon versus organon. Ana-
lytic and dialectic. -- 19. Transcendental logic. Transcen-
dental form versus matter of knowledge. Organon and
transcendental dialectic. Transcendental analytic as a canon
 Detailed Contents xxiii

for the understanding and for Judgment, not for reason,

General logic is a canon for the understanding and for rea-
son, not for Judgment. Reason in transcendental logic.
Definition of canon. -- 20. Transcendental analysis as a
canon for the understanding and for Judgment. Mathematics
needs no canon.

A COMMENTARY ONA 10-16... 0-22.20 4--5- 66

21, The difficulties of A 10-16, Vaihinger’s interpretation.
Cautions about Kant’s procedure. -- 22. Critique, organon,
the system of pure reason, propaedeutic. -- 23. Kant’s
options. -- 24, Elimination of someoptions. Transcendental
philosophy andits relationship to the critique. -- 25. Its
relationship to the system of pure reason. -- 26. Possible
confusion between critique and transcendental philosophy. --
27. The subject matter of these sciences. Analysis and
synthesis. -- 28. Critique, canon and organon. One-sided
definition of the critique as merely negative. More on its
relationship to the organon and to transcendental philosophy.
-- 29. Definition of organon. Transcendental aesthetic as an
organon.

Vi. THE CRITIQUE AS A SPECIAL LOGIC......... 80

30. General versus transcendental logic. Misinterpretation
of their relationship. Transcendental logic as a special logic.
Grounds for this interpretation. -- 31, More on the notion of
organon. Meanings of this term after 1781. Other similari-
ties between special and transcendental logic. -- 32. Later
statements on the Critique of Pure Reasonasa special logic.
-- 33. Whatare the other kindsof special logic? Philology
as an organonforthe historical sciences. Mathematics as an
organon and the theory of method in the Jasche Logic. Each
science contains its particular logic. A two-tier conception
of organon. Someorganons do notbelongtologic. -- 34.
xxiv Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Practical and special logic. Dictionary and methodology,

VIL. THE CANON IN THE CRITIQUE ............,. 9

35. General logic as a canon. Critique and canon. Definj-
tion of canon. The canon in the Theory of the Elements, ..
36. The Theory of Method. General form of knowledge
versus content; transcendental form versus matter; material,
and formal conditions within the transcendental form. -- 37,
The canonsin the Critique. The Critique as the methodolo.
gy of metaphysics. Elemental factors. -- 38. More about
the relationship between critique and transcendental philoso.
phy. Structural versus procedural factors in the Critique,
Logic and ontology: their eventual merger.

VII. DISCIPLINE AND DOCTRINEIN THE CRITIQUE, . . 93

39. Definitions of discipline: a discipline for reason. -- 49,
Discipline in the Theory of Method. -- 41. Transcendental
logic as a discipline. Discipline versus organon. -- 42.
Censure and discipline. -- 43. Discipline versus canon.
More about the function of a canon. -- 44. Discipline versus
doctrine. Doctrine versus critique. The Analytic of Princi-
ples as a doctrine.

Ix. TERMINOLOGICAL SURVEY ...........-... 105,

45. Organon 1765 to 1776. -- 46. Organon 1775 to 1780.
-- 47. Organon in the Critique (1781) andlater. -- 48.
Survey ofresults. -- 49. Canon in 1773-1781. -- 50. Canon
after 1781. -- 51. Epicurus’ Canonica, 1772-1796. Conclu-
sion. -- 52. Discipline and doctrine until the Critique. -- 53.
Discipline, doctrine, censure, critique, in the Critique.
Discipline from 1781 to the Opus postumum. -- 54. Doc-
trine in the Critique. The Analytic of Principles as a doc-
trine. -- 55. Doctrine to 1790. -- 56. Doctrine from
1789-1790 to the Opus postumum.
 Detailed Contents xxv

x. CONCLUSION TO PARTONE .........----- 123

57. Origin of the meanings of organon: Kant, Lambert and
Bacon. -- 58. Kant, Lambert and special logics; the three-
tier conception of organon. -- 59. Philology and mathemat-
ics as organons: varioushistorical premises. Ontology as a
dictionary. Thetradition of Christian Thomasius. The
relationship between metaphysics and logic, a problem never
solved by Kant. -- 60. Precedents in modern Aristotelian-
ism. Kant’s Critique basically constructed as a treatise on
special logic, although profoundly molded by metaphysical
elements. -- 61. Canon. -- 62. Criterion, discipline, doc-
trine.

CHAPTER II
Terminological and Conceptual Precedents to Kant’s Use of the
Terms Organon and Canon

O. ORGANONIN THE ARISTOTELIAN AND BACONIAN

TRADITIONS] ....... 202-0000 eee eee eee 133
1. Introduction. 2. The Aristotelian tradition of organon.
-- 3. Bacon’s Novum Organum within his methodology. --
4. Bacon’s Novum Organum in particular. Bacon's influ-
ence. -- 5. Other worksentitled Organon. Some meanings
of the term in German philosophy.
tl. LOGIC GROUPED IN THREE WAYS] ........- 145
6. Reusch and his grouping of logic, mathematics and phi-
lologyas instrumental sciences. Convergenceofthree dif-
ferent traditions. -- 7. The connection between logic and
philology. Theseventeenth century: Bacon, the System-
atics, the Pansophists. -- 8. Ramists, Aristotelians,
 7
xxvi Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Eclectics. -- 9. The eighteenth century. -- 10. The con.

nection between logic and mathematics. -- 11. The cop,
tion between logic, mathematics and philology.

(I. ORGANON IN LAMBERT] ....-----......, 1

12. Lambert’s New Organon: its four parts andits gen
approach. -- 13. Different meanings of organonfor Lam.
bert. The organon as methodology. -- 14. Kant’s speciaj
logics and Lambert’s Architectonic. -- 15. D’Alembert ang
special metaphysics. British and French philosophical proj,
lems and their influence on Lambert and Kant. -- 16. Dis.
puted ground between logic and metaphysicsin the Aristote.
lian tradition. -- 17. Noology and gnostology. -- 18. The
Architectonic, ontology and logic. -- 19. Relationship with
the New Organon. The two-tier or three-tier organon, ~ 29,
Ontology as a dictionary in Lambert, in Thomasiusandhis
school. -- 21. Meaning of this doctrine. -- 22. Origin of
this doctrine. Kant’s Analytic as a dictionary. The method.
ology of Kant’s general logic as a dictionary. Ontology and
mathematics for Tetens.

{IV. THE HISTORY OF THE TERM CANON]........ 12%

23-24. Canon in Antiquity. -- 25-26. Canonandcriterion
in ancient philosophy in the tradition of the history of philos-
ophy: Diogenes Laertius, Justus Lipsius, Gassendi, Stanley,
Walch, Brucker, Darjes. -- 27. The different meanings of
canon in modern times. Canon in seventeenth-century phi-
losophy: it belongs to logic and ethics. -- 28. Otheruses of
canon. Canonin the eighteenth century.

[V. CRITERION, DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE]. .. . . 188

29. Criterion. -- 30. Doctrine and discipline.
 Detailed Contents xxvii

(VI. APPENDICES): 6264 65314 E968 Wales Wee wR HHA &

APPENDIX A: Canonin the Seventeenth Century.
APPENDIX B: Canonin the Eighteenth Century.
APPENDIX C: Criterion.
APPENDIX D: Doctrine.
APPENDIX E: Discipline.

CHAPTER III
The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System of Philosophy and
the Institutional Situation of the Critique of Pure Reason

THE PLAN UNTIL 1780's s say sae waee ees oe 225

1. Introduction. -- 2. The classification of the sciences
1769 to 1771. -- 3. In 1772. -- 4. Kant’s letter to Herz of
February 21, 1772. -- 5. Interpretation. -- 6-7. Kant’s letter
to Herz at the end of 1773. The Reflections of 1775-1778. -
- 8. The Metaphysik L, (1775-1780). -- 9. The Lectures on
Philosophical Encyclopaedia (1777-17802).

I. A COMMENTARY TO THE ARCHITECTONIC OF THE

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON .........5-++55 241
10. Introductory remarks. Survey of the Architectonic. --
11. Meaning of an architectonic; system, idea, whole; con-
struction work and biological metaphor. -- 12. The problem
of generation in Kant’s time. -- 13. Kant’s solution; Pre-
formism and Architectonic. -- 14. The term architectonic in
the philosophical tradition since Descartes. -- 15. Conclu-
sion. God as anarchitect. -- 16. System, whole, end (in-
ternal and external; essential and ultimate), idea. -- 17.
Schema; the architectonical procedure in philosophy, and the
Architectonic. -- 18. Terminological precedents of schema,
 7

xxviii _Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

schematism. -- 19. Casual versus providential development

of a schema. -- 20. The tree of science. Rational and his-
torical knowledge. -- 21. Philosophical and mathematical
knowledge. Learning philosophy and learningto philoso-
phize. Thetrue philosophy. -- 22. The scholastic and the
cosmic concept of philosophy; the ideal of a philosopher, -.
23. The mathematician, the naturalist and the logician yer.
sus the philosopher; the essential ends of human reason, --
24. The ultimate end in philosophy. Philosophyof nature
and of morals. Empirical philosophy and philosophy ofpure
reason. Critique and metaphysics. -- 25. Metaphysics of
nature and of morals. Ethics as a part of metaphysics. -- 26,
Kant’s attack against the “traditional definition” of meta-
physics. -- 27. Kant mistakenly takes Baumgarten’s defini-
tion as a traditional definition of metaphysics. -- 28. Further
subdivision of philosophy. -- 29. The term physiology. --
30. Hyperphysic, immanent. -- 31. Transcendental, tran-
scendent. -- 32. Precedents and originality of Kant’s classi-
fication. -- 33. Comparison with earlier classifications by
Kant. The place of logic. -- 34. The placeof rational
psychology, cosmology and theology. Cosmologyandratio-
nal physics. -- 35. Applied philosophy, empirical physics,
and empirical psychology.

Il. THE PLAN APTERA781 occ 6 6 6b avecens 6 8 earwrs 300

36. Reflection 5644. The Prolegomena (1783). The
Metaphysik Volckmann (1784-1785). -- 37. The Foundation
of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785): the tripartition of the
Greeks, and Kant’s new classification. -- 38. Comparison
with the Architectonic; the place ofthe critique of pure
reason. -- 39. Other differences. The critique of practical
reason. Later references to the tripartition of the Greeks. -
40. The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science (1786)
and theclassification of the knowledgeof nature. -- 41. The
 Detailed Contents xxix

Metaphysik von Schon (1785-17902). The Jasche Logic; the

new cosmic concept of philosophy. -- 42, The Metaphysik
L, (1790-1791): cosmopolitan classification, and recurrence
ofthe classification of the Architectonic -- 43-44. The First
Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (1790); the system
ofthe critique of pure reason. The evolution ofthe place of
aesthetics in Kant’s classification of the parts of philosophy.
-- 45. Practical versus technical: there is a practical psy-
chology. -- 46. The Second Introduction (1790). Compari-
son with the First. The critique of pure reason as a system
of its own. -- 47. Difficulties arising from the place of logic
in the First Introduction. -- 48. The Logik Dohna (1792). --
49. The Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793), and the Metaphysik
K, (after 1793). -- 50. The Metaphysik K3 (1794-17952),
and the Prize Essay on the Progresses of Metaphysics (1791-
1795).

fv. TABLES] § $04 see U5, 2,88 iG ts See le eee HONS 325
TABLEI ~ Classification of the Sciences in 1769
TABLE II _ - Classification of the Sciences in the Disserta-
tion of 1770
TABLEIII - Classification of Reflection 4163 (1769-1770)
TABLE IV Classification of Metaphysics in Reflection
4168 (1769-1770)
TABLE V Classification of Reflection 4161 (1769-1770)
TABLE VI - Classification of Philosophy According to the
Logik Blomberg (1771)
TABLEVII_ Classification of Philosophy According to the
Logik Philippi (1772)
TABLE VIII - Classification of Philosophy in Reflection
4150 (1769-1772)
TABLEIX - Classification of Philosophy in the Reflec-
tions of 1775-1778
TABLE X Classification of the Sciences According to
xxx Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Metaphysik L, (1775-1780)
TABLE XI - Subdivision of Transcendental Philosophyin
Metaphysik L, (1775-1780)
TABLE XII_ - Classification of the Sciences in the Lectures
on Philosophical Encyclopaedia ( 1777-1780)
TABLEXIII Classification of the Sciences According to
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781)
TABLE XIV Classification of Philosophy According to the
Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals
(1785)
TABLE XV_- Classification of the Knowledge of Nature in
the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science
(1786)
TABLE XVI Classification of Philosophy in Metaphysik
K; (1794-1795?)
 PART ONE

SETTING THE CONTEXT

 “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of
Modern Logic”
by Giorgio Tonelli”

It is obviously impossible to understand a book correctly, if

it is not clear what that book is about. It may seem strange, consid-
ering how much work has been done on Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason, that it has not yet been finally established what the subject
matter ofthis treatise is. According to an earlier interpretation,
dating from the beginningof the nineteenth century, andstill accept-
ed in the English-speaking countries, it is a treatise on the theory of
knowledge. Accordingto an interpretation dating from the twenties
of our century, and originating from Nicolai Hartmann, Max Wundt
and Heinz Heimsoeth, it is a treatise on metaphysics. It is my
contention that the subject matter of the Critique of Pure Reason
cannot beproperly defined as theory of knowledge (gnosiology,
epistemology), and that definingit as metaphysics is correct, but
only partially: in fact it is, in my opinion, treatise on logic as
muchas on metaphysics.

The Critique of Pure Reasonis not a treatise on the theory

of knowledge for the simple reason that a particular science called

* [Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz 6.-10. April 1974,

ed. Gerhard Funke,vol. III (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), pp.
186-191.]
2 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

theory of knowledgeneither existed in Kant’s time, nor existeq

before as an independent discipline; and Kantcertainly did not
introduceit, since it does not exist in his vocabulary. I do not
know whenthis new philosophical science wasestablished, but 1
suspect that it was brought about in the early nineteenth century
within the Kantian school, by some philosophers who tried, misun.
derstanding Kant’s teaching, to establish a status for their own
interpretation of his doctrines, according to which logic was ident.
fied with what Kant calls general logic: thus, the methodological
parts of logic had to be given a status of a new science, and the Cy.
tique of Pure Reason was wrenched fromits original context and
madeinto a theory of knowledge. This had, among other baneful
consequences, that of leading students to consider the Critique asa
gnosiology in general, and notonly, as expressly stated by Kant, as
a methodology of pure knowledge. Kantcertainly had to referin
his Critique to mixed knowledge as well, but this happened only
incidentally in connection with the proper theme ofthe inquiry.
This misunderstanding generated an infinite number offalse state.
ments aboutthe Critique, first and foremost the stale rigmarole that
the main purpose of the Critique was philosophically to foundthe
new Newtonian world picture. Disregarding the fact that Newton
thought his views had an adequate philosophical foundation by
themselves, Kant never presumed to teach scientists the methodolo-
gy of their science; and, anyhow, astronomy wasconsidered by
Kant as mixed, not as pure knowledge. What Kant intended to
found in the Critique was metaphysics and metaphysicsonly.
The subject matter posteriorly dealt with by the theory of
knowledge wasassigned until the end of the eighteenth century to
two sciences: logic and psychology. Thatit could belongto psy-
chology is easily understandable in our time; but thatit could be
considered as belonging to logic may seem rather strange in many
quarters. In connection with this, it must be kept in mindthat our
time’s view of logic, as formal logic, or as symbolic logic, was
completely foreign to philosophy until the beginning of the nine-
 Tonelli, “Kant’s Critique” 3
teenth century. Certainly, the elements of logic now called formal
were studied, and some logicians also developed a symbolic ap-
proach: but the point is that logic was never dissociated from the
methodological consideration of the substance of thought, thatis,
from subjects which we assign todayto the theory of knowledge,
and from others as well. Thus, the theory of sensible and rational
knowledge(including the theory of observation, experimentation and
induction, and sometimes of the origin of ideas), the theory of
vision (thatis, of the way of establishing a classification of things
in genuses and species), the theory of the methodsofinvention and
of demonstration (through analysis and synthesis), the theory of
teaching, of learning, of arguing, of writing andof criticizing
books, were usually included in logic. Sometimes the theorics of
the correction of errors and of verification were added. Ail the
topics I mention were generically referred to as practical logic or
method, although some of them werecalled “method” preeminently.
‘Thus, logic basically concerned also the origin, proper method,
extent and limits of human knowledge. This meant that works such
as Descartes’ Discourse on Method, Spinoza’s Deintellectus emen-
datione, Leibniz’ Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis and
Locke's Essay were considered as pertaining to logic. This is
confirmed by the perspective offered in that time by the historians
of that science, first and foremost Walch. As for Hume, he himself
defined as logic Book I of his Treatise.
That my reconstruction of this view ofthe history oflogic is
correctis also confirmed bythe perspective adopted by Wilhelm
Risse in his History of Modern Logic: in fact, | developed my
views on this subject keeping in close touch with Professor Risse at
the time when his work was in the making.
Anyhow, a discipline identifiable with the theory of knowl-
edgeis not listed in any of the numberlessclassifications of the
sciences produced from Antiquity to the endof the eighteenth
century.
Theclaim that the Critique of Pure Reason is a treatise on
4 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

metaphysics is certainly much better substantiated, and basically

correct, but still it is insufficient for the interpretation ofthat Work
and, if asserted exclusively, it becomes misleading. There is no”
doubt that there are fundamental metaphysical elements in the
Critique, and that the Critique is, in a certain way, included in
metaphysics, as a preparation to it: Kant is explicit on this poin, in
the Architectonic. But he is equally explicit on the pointthatthe
Critique is not ontology, physiology, cosmology, theology; and, in
the Introduction, he clearly distinguishes the Critique from transcen.
dental philosophy (ontology): the Critique covers a large part Ofthe
field of transcendental philosophy (such large part, that they were
very soon to be identified by Kant), but they are not the same
science,

pat

In fact, the Critique is a work on methodology, and, more

exactly, on the methodology of metaphysics. It has been argued
that the statement: “it is a treatise on method,” appears onlyin the
Preface to the second edition (1787). But, for those who are famil-
iar with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century terminology, this fact is
spelled out very clearly on many occasionsin the first edition, when
Kant compares the Critique to the “King’s road” or “high-road” of
metaphysics (Weg, Kéniglicher Weg, HeeresstraBe, Heeres-Weg,
sometimes Fufsteig): the terms way, road, high road, etcetera
traditionally and unequivocally referred, for obvious etymological
reasons, to method. And the study of method belonged to logic.
A careful reading of the Critique showsthat this workis one
of the “special logics” for the particular sciences, which Kant
opposes, as methodologies, to “general logic.” These speciallogics
are assigned to the sciences in question as part and parcels ofthem:
‘5ut still, they are the special logics (or methodologies) ofthose sci-
2nces. That Kant did not make this more clear, can be explained by
 Tonelli, “Kant’s Critique” 5

the fact, in the first place, that it seemed to him that he had made it
clear enough to those who understand the philosophical language of
his time; and, in the second place, that he usually cared very little
to explain what seemed very clear to him.
But conclusive evidence for this view is given by Kant’s
Reflection 5644 (AK.-Ausg. XVIII, pp. 285-286), dated by Adickes
in 1784-1785. There we read:

Transcendental philosophy precedes metaphysics, which, like

logic, does not deal with objects, but with the possibility, the
contentandlimits ofall knowledgeofpure reason. It is the
logic of pure rational knowledge (. . . ) . Critique is what in-
quires into the possibility ofthe object of metaphysics.
The dating and thestatus ofthis statement are confirmed by a pas-
sage in a course on metaphysics offered by Kant in 1784-1785, the
so-called Metaphysik Volckmann (opcit., p. 363), where Kant
dictated in class, in the introductory part of the course:

Transcendental philosophy is in connection with metaphysics

whatlogic is in connection with philosophy as a whole (. . . )
In connection with the pure use of reason, a special logic will be
necessary, which is called transcendental philosophy; here no
objects are considered, but rather our reasonitself, as it happens
in general logic. Transcendental philosophycould also be called
transcendental logic.
Hereit should be noticed that transcendental philosophy (or ontolo-
gy) is identified with the Critique: it is well known that Kant
identified them in the nineties, but actually this identification oc-
curred muchearlier--in fact, it is also in some Reflections prior to
1781. I shall add that the two statements quoted are by no means
isolated: only, they are those where the fact under consideration is
stated mostclearly.
 6 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Il

Referring the Critique of Pure Reasontoitslogical Mat

has in my opinion the mostfar-reaching consequencesonthey, 4
intelligibility, and on the historical and philosophical interpretation
of this work. The whole general structure ofthe Critique, Seen in
this light, does not appear any more as a personal, and largely
obscure and arbitrary, creation of its author, but as the meaningfy
outcome of somebasic traditions in the history of logic.
In the first place, the general division into Theory ofthe
Elements and Theory of Method reproduces on anotherplanethe
division of some German treatises on logic into a general and a
special logic. That in a work generally devoted to methodology or }
to special logic, such as the Critique, there is a particular section gq
method, is not astonishing: in the sametreatises many topics wer
considered as methodological (and they were frequently identical
with the scope of special logic), and then, among them, somewere
termed as method preeminently: so, the whole of the Critique isa
methodologyor a special logic, but in it the distinction betweenthe
comparatively “elemental” and the “methodological” is duplicated,
Moreover, the Architectonic is a typically methodologicalsubject;
the classification of the sciences had been frequently termed, in the
seventeenth century, method preeminently, and suchclassifications
in eighteenth-century Germany were usually included in logicas an
introduction toit.
The subdivision of Transcendental Logic into an Analytic
and a Dialectic originates from a particular Aristotelian tradition,
introduced in the sixteenth century, andstill sponsored in theeigh-
teenth century by Darjes, according to which this was the main divi.
sion in a treatise on logic: the Analytic as the logic oftruth, and
the Dialectic as the logic of probability. Kant took over these
denominations, with a change: the Analytic is still the logic of
truth, but, as the theory of probability belongs, according to Kant,
to Analytic (because the development of the mathematicaltheoryof
 Tonelli, “Kant’s Critique” 7

probability had subtracted thatfield from verisimilitude, replacing it

with a demonstratively established amount of chances), the Dialectic
is identified by him with thelogicofillusion.
The Critique opens with a Transcendental Aesthetic: now
according to Baumgarten, aesthetic, as the theory of the inferior
faculty of knowledge, wasthesister science to logic; and Kant
incorporatesit into his methodological work in order to establish the
borders betweensensibility and reason.
Moreover, the partition into Analytic of Concepts, Analytic
of Principles and Dialectic reproduces the usual division oftheoreti-
cal logic into theory of the concept, judgment and syllogism; and
the table of categories is notoriously established according to the
table of the forms of judgment, which belongsto general logic.
These analogies between logic and the Critique of Pure Reason,
which prompted some interpreters (for example, Kemp Smith)
harshly to rebuff Kant for having molded the Critique after such
extrinsic patterns, appear perfectly justified in this perspective: it is
quite natural that the structure of metaphysical thought conforms to
the general (logical) form of thought.
Moreelements can be brought forward: for example, terms
such as amphibole, analogy, analysis and synthesis, anticipation, a
priori and a posteriori, axiom, canon, hypothesis, maxim, paralo-
gism, postulate, et cetera are typical of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century logic, in that the corresponding notions had their institution-
al locus in logic.

IV

But I think that I can show that the very term critique, in the
sense in which Kant usesit, is connected with a particularlogical
tradition. In fact, the treatises on logic of moreor less remote
Aristotelian derivation could lay their major stress on one or more
of four particular aspects of that science: logic could be basically
 8 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

conceived either as a theory of invention, or as a theory of

stration, or as a theory of semantics, or as a theory of Verificay
and correction. In eighteenth-century Germany, it had been Pao
Leibniz a science of demonstration, of invention and of seman
simultaneously; for Wolff and his school, it was primarily a go
of demonstration; for Darjes, it was a science of invention anda
semantics; for J. Lange, it was a science of correction as a
Medicina mentis; Crusius’s logic was in an intermediate POSition
between demonstration, invention and correction.
Around the middle of the century the correction and verifi.
cation trend in logic was further developed abroad, underthe
of Art of Criticism, with the Italian Genovesi (Logica sive Ars
critica, 1745) and with the Portuguese Monteiro (Logicaseu Ars
critica, 1768): they both had an international reputation, and their
interest for the critique in this sense was accepted byseveral Cathy
lic German philosophers. It is most probably undertheir influence
that Kant adopted the term critique, in order to denote his methodg,
ogy ofverification and correction in metaphysics. Thus, thevery
title of Kant’s workis, in its specific meaning, of logical extraction,
or else we should assume that a very astonishing coincidencetook
place in that case.

v ‘
The many general and particular logical traits which are
present in the Critique of Pure Reason certainly reveala basic
logical matrix for that work; but this should not makeus overlook
its metaphysical matrix, which is no less important. The more,asit
must be pointed out that the relationship between these two compo-
nents, if put into the proper historical perspective, reveals some
fundamental aspects of the general significance of the Critique
within the development of the history of thought.
Oneof the important disputes within seventeenth-century
 Tonelli, “Kant’s Critique” 9

Aristotelianism concerns the “proper place” of the discussion of the

first logico-ontological principles and of the categories within the
body of a system of philosophy. Those who accepted the
“nominalistic” interpretation of Aristotle maintained that those
elements are logical, thatis, that they only are expressive of laws of
human thought, wherefore they do not belong to metaphysics:
Climent (1624) and Torrején (1626) sponsored this view. The
“realistic” school of thought, represented for example by Clement
Timpler (1608), Jakob Martini (1610) and Bartholomaeus Mastrius
(1678), contended instead that those elements are expressive of
characters of being, wherefore they primarily belong to meta-
physics, and only secondarily to logic, as the human concepts of
those characters. Of course, many philosophers held intermediate
positions. Thus, two main philosophical trends disputed the ground:
the one trying to absorb into logic some basic elements of meta-
physics, the other asserting their metaphysical independence from
human thought, and considering logic ancillary to metaphysics.
Within this frame ofreference, Kant obviously moves in the
first direction: the basic principles and concepts belong fundamen-
tally to human thought, and their metaphysical role is a function of
their logical status. Still, Kant’s thought manifests a tension in this
respect, which certainly corresponds to a sediment of unsolved
elements in his solution: in the Critique of Pure Reason, transcen-
dental philosophy or ontology is carefully distinguished from the
critique; whereas, in other periods, they are identified. In the first
case, Kant still endeavorsto preserve a difference between method-
ology and metaphysics; in the second case, ontology is absorbed
into the methodology of metaphysics, that is into logic, although
Kant may subsume the methodology of metaphysics to metaphysics,
according to his view that the methodology, or special logic, of a
science pertains to that science.
Anyhow, Kant’s position corresponds,historically speaking,
to a moreor less pronounced incorporation of ontology into logic;
and this fact has the greatest historical significance both as the
10 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

major precedent to Hegel’s analogous endeavor, and as q basic

alternative toit.
It is my intention to give a detailed explanation Of the
ters discussed in this paper in a book and in some articles, whi
will contain all the exact reference needed to make my Views
ceptable.
 “In Memoryof Giorgio Tonelli”
by Claudio Cesa”

I do not believe that Giorgio Tonelli had any teachers noris

it possible to classify his scholarly work in terms of any tradition or
school, not even in the “noble” sense of the phrase philosophical
historiography. Hisintellectual training was very long and uncom-
monly broad and varied. Moreover, during his whole life, until the
age of thirty-five, he was the eternal student always interested in
discussions, methods, concerts, exhibitions of art and new people.
Atthirty-five he had his first minor physical breakdown which kept
him from working for several months and forced him to concentrate
his writings, lectures andinterests on just one field, the history of
philosophical ideas. Sometimeshis friends were angry at him
because he never wanted to stop, which seemed to show that he
never wanted to cometo an end. Anothertime they even were
furious when, after one of his long conversations in which the
interlocutor was fascinated and even oppressed by an endless ac-
countoflectures, ideas, highly developed systems, they heard him
concludethat aboutthis topic he actually did not know anything yet
and that who knows, he might tackle this problem anew alterthree,
five or ten years.
Hisfirst printed words, those that he almost literally was
forced to write for academic reasons to obtain thetitle and rights of
a ‘university lecturer’, appeared to many critics more like an enor-
mous collection of material and a series of exact surveys on particu-

[Abstract in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana {Critical Journal of

Kalin Philosophy}, LIX (LX1), Fasc. 1-1V (1980), pp. 28-39.)
ot
 12 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

lar problems than like a mature treatise on history. Later on he sy

preferred very specific studies to more general ones, and his anjg
sometimes contained as much material as others would use for
whole books. A sad paradox in his life was that three years before
his death he was stopped in his work, right at the time when hewn
writing what he meant to be an introduction to the Critique of
of Pure
Reason, in which thirty years of research would have beensyn
sized. Meanwhile he had made a name for himself (to be honest,
more abroadthan in Italy) as an expert, even in matters of minor
importance, for philosophical ideas in seventeenth- and eighteenth.
century Europe and as oneofthe first cultivators ofthe history of
Germanliterature. His books, dozens ofarticles, bibliographical
contributions and his work as editor guarantee him an important
position in the philosophical culture of our time. Someone who ;
knew him intimately, who was his friend for morethan thirty yearg,
who was ableto follow the events ofhis innerlife will certainly
sadly regret the fact that this great specialist did not write down or
publish those “general ideas” as well about his method or abouthis
classification of historical material, which ideas he had thought
about so much and which were full of original and new elements,
His works, especially those of the last ten years, should be read
with patience andattention; in this way the reader can findhistori-
cal patterns which innovate, correct or indicate new developments in
research. One might find these patterns mentioned on a few pages
or presented in the neutral voice of a dictionary or in a chapter on
the general history of philosophy.
It would betotally wrong to consider Giorgio Tonelli only a
scholar--even though he himself would certainly have preferred this
title to “philosopher.” Likewise, it would not be right to conceal
the fact that he found full inner satisfaction and gratificationin the
dominance with which he moved in his field of study. Likewise, it
would be wrong to conclude from statements that gave evidence of
his lackofinterest or of knowledge with which heoften interrupted
discussions that did not seem productive to him because they were
 Cesa, “Ia Memory? 1
two general or because they were carried on without the neces@ary
knowledge about the facts, that he was an wnsociable and arrogant
bookworm. Finally, it would be entirely wrong to think of him as a
cynic (even though he enjoyed irritating these be called the
“good”), an insensitive man, only concentrated on his research
and/or his scholarly problems. If the loneliness and isolation which
he suffered from were the price he had consciously accepted ( pay
for his inner and outer freedom, thea there are many whe can
testify to his humanity, delicacy and psycholgival understanding.
which enabled him to perceive the needs of the interlocutor, friend
or student. Certainly what he demanded in personal relationships
was honesty. He easily accepted clear dissent (afterwards he event
made jokes about it) or fits of rage. He did not permit unfair or
dishonest behavior or behavior that appeared so. He ended some
relationships with friends of whom he had good memories just for
this reason. And there is no doubt that he had a lot of patience with
someone he considered his friend!
The assertion that he did not have any teachers may sound
Strange or arrogant. The years in which he, as a very young man,
attended the Faculty of Philosophy and the Training College for
Teachers in Pisa (1945-1949) were the years in which C. Luporini
and L. Scaravelli taught philosophy. Then, in the Spring of 1947,
I. De Negri retumed from the United States and G. Calogero took
up teaching again before he entered upon his new career as Director
of the Italian Institute of Culture in London. And although not
permanently employed, A. Carlini was still teaching classes and
giving lectures. Amongthe historians, at least W. Maturi and D.
Cantimori have to be remembered. Tonelli had personal contacts
with all these teachers that went beyond his usually attending their
classes. He was not, however, especially persevering and industri-
ous in class. Certainly he gained stimulations and ideas in these
14 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

classes--but he elaborated the fields of research and the methods

himself.
During the first two years of university he lived in the
Palazzo di Piazza dei Cavaliere, of which his father, the mathe.
matician Leonida Tonelli, had been director. The traditionof the
Training College for Teachersin Pisa attributes the organization
eventhe invention of three or four of those (maybe a bit boring)
jokes to him in which the students living on campus could get Tid of
their exuberance--but this is neither the place to confirm nor to
this. He gotuplate in the mornings, but then he studied till late g
night. At about two o’clock in the morning was the perfect time
him to inspire philosophical discussions with interlocutors who
participated one minute and fell asleep the next. But he alwayshag
very special relations with the Scuola Normale and its environs, a
mixture of attachment and intolerance. In the end, however, he
foundit so troublesome,that after the second year he brought up
health problems and was exempt from living on campus. More-
over, more than his comrades, he began to feel the isolation of
Italian culture and of the university instruction in Pisa. Hedid not
advocate political activity which others hoped might bring about
renovation. Rather, Tonelli wanted to come to know other coun-
tries, to live in the center of international culture, a wish that none
ofhis friends felt with the same intensity--not even those that fate
decided to send abroad for moretime than it sent him. He immedi
ately took the chance to change universities for his last years of
study, Paris for Pisa. In the subsequent decades he wouldhave to
return to Pisa many times.
In his first year of university he had taken mostof his
classes with C. Luporini. Later on he wasin the group, almosta
sect, of L. Scaravelli’s adherents. He was fascinated by Scaravelli’s
personality, but even more by his way oflogical interrogation or,
it wasalso called, “theoretical philosophy,” applied to texts in
class. These were almost the only lectures Tonelli attended regular
ly. Someonereading the lecture notes on metaphysical and tran-
 Cesa, “In Memory” 15

scendental deduction (nowcollected in Scaravelli’s edition of Kant’s

Works) might get a vague idea ofthe lectures. Scaravelli taught
how to analyze a text by dividing it into different parts. He taught
how to face the problem of internal “contradictions,” but he did not
approveat all of summaries. He seriously disliked them. This be-
came obvious when he was working on paraphrases or suggesting
them in a sometimes completely different terminology that should
serve as a means ofcontrol to guarantee consistency of argumenta-
tion. Scaravelli was certainly not a Kantian philosopher in the way
Tonelli was to become onelater. He had almostall his information
on the scholars who preceded him in his studies of Kant from De
Vleeschauwer’s great work. This work (now no longeravailable in
Pisa) was for his students something like a mythical collection of
everything known about Kant. Scaravelli, however, had the great
but all too rare ability of making the classics talk. He knew some
of them extremely well. And he hada passion for theory which he
hid underthe pretence ofnottalking philosophy in earnest. If you
look at Tonelli’s dissertation, titled “Introduction to the Critique of
Practical Reason: Kant’s Morality from 1784 to 1786,” it is easy
to trace Scaravelli’s influence, in method as well as in language.
The Preface says: “The general tenorof the workis that of looking
for speculative meaning in specific terms of logic.” The whole
work is an “internal” analysis of texts, mainly the Foundation of the
Metaphysics of Morals. If Tonelli had stayed in Pisa he would
probably have continued workingin this direction, but after study-
ing in Paris he spent some time in Basel, then Frankfurt, Vienna
and Gottingen (which became, maybefor the friendships he had
there, maybe for the library in PrinzenstraBe, one of the places he
returned to again and again). After that, except for the time he
spent in Italy at the Institute for Historical Studies in Naples and
Rome, he went to London, Baltimore and again, to Paris, where he
wasfor three years a scholarship student at C. N. R. S. [Centre
Nationale de RecherchesScientifiques]. It was in this decade of
 16 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

very intensive studies that he developed his final intellectuay 4.

tion.
Already while working on his dissertation hisintereg
gradually from the Critique of Practical Reason to the Critique g
Judgment. After receiving his doctorate Tonelli completely q a
his work on Kant’s idea of morality and concentrated on Kant’y.
aesthetics, mainly stimulated by his strong interestinliterature»
the fine arts. Originally this work was intended to be “theoretin,
as well, that is, it should have given an internal interpretation ofp
text. In December, 1950, he believed that anotherthree months ~
would have been enough for him to finish this work. Atthe sy
time, however, he devoted almost half of his day to compiling,
bibliography on “the history of culture,” which for him meant
leaving theory and “touching real things.” In Vienna,heread aj
about ethnography, psychology and psychoanalysis (“twofields
which are essential for the theory of history”), he took an i ‘
the history of architecture and he learned how to read musical —
scores. In June, 1951, there was little hope that he wouldfini
book very soon. He wrote to a friend: 4

I renounced fixing a date for the termination of the book on the

Critique ofJudgment. Maybe it will take me one year ortwo to
finish it, Meanwhile I will proceed with Kant’s other works [.
. ]. After about six months (or 60 months) of working onhis _
other works I will definitely return to the Critique ofJudgment.
Although he did not neglect academic contacts at universities
attended--in Frankfurt he talked about music with Th. W.
(for whose philosophical ideas he otherwise showed ironical
ference) and in Géttingen he became a good friend of H.
he spent most of his time watching and reading. In the Vi
military occupation he had the opportunity, for a very low pricé,|
buy a lot of works on Germanliterature of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Very soon he also felt the attraction of
 Cesa, “In Memory” 17

temporary literature. He had a brief fancy for Brecht’s poetry and

in the summerof 1952 he wrote:

Among works of other writers I boughtCarossa’s and Rilke’s;

the local libraries can keep the heavy volumes ofthe great
Nicolai Hartmann, the beautified monk of Gottingen and light of
the occident. But I defend poetry and I defend myself against
ontological chatter.
Hepointed outthat the systematic study oftheliterary texts was
directed “as well towards gaining categories ofaesthetic-literary
structure, to get prepared for possible studies of (the history of)
aesthetic psychology.”
Besides his library research in the years 1952-1955 (by the
end of 1952 he had completed a big bibliography on the Critique of
Judgment, which he tried, without success, to publish in subsequent
years), years “without majorcrises,” he had to face problems of
methodology which became more and moreserious. In London, in
March, 1954, he wrote this about his studies of the minor English
aesthetes of the eighteenth century:

Howis it possible that this confusion of apparently an-

titheoretical ideas could quietly grow in the works of the minor
writers? The lastillusions about implications or “necessary”
contradictionsare getting lost. After all, it should be possible to
take them out from the sociology of culture. [. ..] My mind
is swarming with ideas. Psychology opened up unexpected
horizons for me, andso I start again to “think,” after two or
three years of mere technical reflections, on the method of
writing history. Right now I am planning towrite an article
aboutthe influence oflogicalpositivism on the psychology of
ideas (a very bad influence) which would allow me (under the
pretenceofhistorical and psychological interest) to pillory the
old and the new formallogic and those whobelieve in it.

Foratleast another year there is almost no letter in which

Tonelli did not touchthis topic, developing very lucidly all the
18 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

alternatives. From Cambridge he wrote in July, 1954: :

Whatsense does it make to ask clever questions and tg

makesubtle distinctions between psychology and sociology whe,
thehistory of ideas is so backward? What I mean is: based on
good,solid philosophicalprinciples that were clear 50 years ag,
(simple research of sources, description of motifs, groups and
periods, such as the history of German psychology by Dessoir,
orthehistory of logic by Prantl, with the exception certainly of
the prattle of someonelike Cassirer, I mean all these thingsin
thepositive sense) you can still do everything, or almostevery.
thing. The motifs or periods discussed in a satisfactory way,
[however], based onthis mentality are very few. Butis not
extensive knowledgeof similar facts the indispensable base of
exact and subtle research? [ . . . ] This is the question that I ask
myself; and it is not something that should be madelight of,
since it concerns my aesthetic psychology if we decidethatit is 4
better to use ourlife to makefiling cards the way Adickes did it,
But “the temptation to try to change something in the way
writing history” did not leave him. Shortly after his arrival in the
United States in November, 1955, following a journey on @ rough
sea, he returned to his subject. }

Again, my mind is swarming with ideas. Notquite the ideas of

an expert--but how far away are those ideas from thereal {
centers of order and from healthy precision and application! I |
believethat I am still marking outthefield and carefully trying
to find the point from where to start (with what?). Theissues 1
am interested in are the psychology ofthe scientific mind and
the methodology of the humanities. I should be hanged if I
know whatthey mean.

Scholars he had come into contact with in thelast years,

someof them very famous, had reacted to his methodological
interrogation with deep indifference along with manifestations of
sincere respect and friendship. This as well helped to force upon
 Cesa, “In Memory” 19

Tonelli the decision “to makefiling cards.” Only A. Koyretried,

but without success, to get the [Presse Universitaire de France] to
accept a small book with thetitle Qu’ est-ce-que l’histoire de la
philosophie? that Tonelli had written in 1954-55. In Italy it was
even worse. L. Scaravelli, who expected a lot from his old, espe-
cially-talented student, did not approve of the permanent delay in
concluding the research for the Critique ofJudgment. Nordid he
approve the extension of his own method, which he used for the
theoretical analysis of texts, to the search of the sources. Between
1952 and 1954 their relationship had gradually cooled down. When
in the end, with the assistance of A. Guzzo, Tonelli managed to
publish (in the Acts of the Academyof Science of Turin) his first
important work, the memory of Kant from Metaphysical Aesthetics
to Psycho-Empirical Aesthetics, for weeks and weeks he expected a
letter from the old professor. I cannot say whetherthis letter was
ever sentornot.
The years from 1956 to 1958, which Tonelli spent between
Rome, Paris and Gottingen, were years of desperate work. Often
he spent whole nights sitting at his desk and he only got up in the
morning to go to the library. He began to long for a changein his
life, a life that had dragged on for ten years from one rented room
to the next, where often he did not have his booksand his records
because he left them, on every return, in his house in Pisa. Among
the projects to which he attached importance was primarily the
“thesis” he advocated at the Sorbonne on the pre-critical Kant, a
thesis that he had elaborated several times but never broughtto a
conclusion. In order to have preparatory work and a means of
control he got to work on the minute reconstruction, work by work,
of Kant’s mental development. After initially appearing separately
as articles in Filosofia, the first volume of Methodological and
Metaphysical Elements in Kant from 1745 to 1768 was published in
1959. The Preface and Introduction as well as the subtitle of this
volume (Essay on the Sociology of Knowledge) prove that the
methodological reflections of the previous years were not forgotten.
20 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

If it is true that the ambitious plan to define philosophica] Psyo

ogy, which means the mental dress or mental dresses of those.
cultivate that branch of knowledge called “philosophy,” haq al
been a topic to which Tonelli returned in private conversations
it is true that he put this problem aside and substituted a * Social Mey
of knowledge” which had hardly anything in common with fe
of the sametitle. It was rather in opposition to them. It was
neither a matter of taking a precise picture, moreorless ideologi.
cal, of a certain period of a society and from theretrying to ein
“culture,” nor a matter of reconstructing this “culture” through
major personalities. Instead it was a question of giving a “recon.
struction as complete as possible, of the sources and of the environ.
ment,” “which would include the examination of some hundreds o¢
personalities of the society and the exact study of dozensofthem»
In fact, this did not mean to contest Kant’s significanceand to
reduce him to a mere intersection of influences. Even in his early
pre-critical period he was respected as a “personality ofthefirst
rank,” while for the Kant after 1769, the “sociological” explanation
is not considered applicable any more. “It seems thatlater on Kany
is working on his ownbasis and that he is a lot more independent g
the influences of the society.”
All these considerations bear witness to the dialogue Tonelj
had primarily with himself, and to which, oncein a while, he
wanted to give a programmatic statement. After all, both thetext
and notes make the book an impressive documentofthe knowledge
Tonelli had of this subject. The reason why this book only found
echo with specialists is certainly that it does not make any conces-
sions to expository narration. Almost every single sentence contains
a note or an explanation. This book that only deals with theperiod
up to 1762 wasto be followed by a second volumethatcovered up
to 1768. But although more than half of it was completed, the
definitive writing was always postponed while studies expanded in
all directions. The writing was never brought to an end. When
Tonelli had become, after some bad luck, professor of modem and
 Cesa, “In Memory” 21

contemporary philosophy, he also received in 1959 the official

invitation to lecture on the same subject for the Department of
Literature at the University in Pisa. Reincorporation into the
department in which he had been a student, and more generally,
into the academic world--this step he had always dreamed ofin
previous years, not only as a material guarantee for existence but
also as a public acknowledgement of his work. But it did not give
him that peace of mind he had hoped it would. The instruction
satisfied him only partly, and in the following years he foundit
more and moredifficult. The impossibility of knowing exactly
when and under what circumstances he had received the professor’s
chair made him worried and uneasy. In the end it seemed to him
that the opportunities to teach philosophy werelimited, so he decid-
ed to take up the study of German literature. Because ofthe exten-
sive reading he had donein the previous ten years, not only of texts
but also of critical literature, he was nowin position to write very
rapidly two volumes, one on Christian Reuter and German Society
of the Seventeenth Century (1960), the other one on Poetry and
Thinking in Albrecht von Haller (1961). In 1962, he became pro-
fessor of the history of Germanliterature and taughtthis in the
Department of Language in Pisa. In 1963, two more volumes were
published: Heine and Germany and Aspects of German Poetry from
1895 to 1960. It would certainly be a mistake, but many madeit,
to consider these books only as “titles” necessary in an academic
operation, to make a career successful. In the book on Haller there
are somelines that, certainly involuntarily, appear autobiographical:

Wesaw how he submitted to a strict regimen of intellectual

work, which filled his day with studies and reading, and which
became a moral obligation. Thus, it seems understandable to us
that in the writer's own environment a profound contrast had to
emerge between a series of mistaken inclinations and the rational
norm which he had substituted for them. Thedistance from the
mother couatry which he had complained of before was not only
a physical distance. It was also and primarily a spiritual dis-
 22. Kant's Critique Within Modem Logic
tance, which had, on a material level, accompanied hus stay .¢ ,
foreagn city, and it was his retirement into an impersonal ang
unemotional sphere which prefers abstract to spiritual know}.
edge

Of course Tonelli, unlike Haller, did not regard Primitiy

as the “promised land,” but rather art and literature. He became
very critical and ironical, even wild, at his contemporaries’ Philo.
sophical confessions on the last things and on human destiny,
the other hand, he was willing to listen to them when they were
expressed in poetic images. Moreover, he was not interested in
poetry as a transfiguration of life as lived life, but ratherin life x
an adventure of phantasy and language which transforms and
the present significance of words and phrases. Sometimes he eve,
loved to read the verses aloud to feel the sweetness and the Violenge
of the words. People who wanted to be close to him hadtoread jj
favorite poets. Sometimes he quoted and parodied these poets for
his friends.
In 1969, Tonelli left Italy for good. Not only did he have
the impression that his way for a definite university career was
blocked in Italy, he was also angry and worried aboutthe student
riots which were particularly violent in Pisa at the time and which
he did not consider a temporary phenomenon. Theprofessorship te
received in Binghamton, New York, made an economically satisfac.
tory life possible and gave him the peace and quiet he needed for
his studies. In the environs of the city he had a house protected by
a woods and there he also had room for his large private library.
The approximately twenty articles that he published in the last ten
years ofhis life are only a small part of his entire work. When the
editor G. Olms, whose adviser and friend Tonelli had been for
many years, asked him to write an introduction for the reprint of
Maupertuis’ works, Tonelli realized that the size of this task grew
constantly. For the following two yearspart of his time was taken
by writing about Maupertuis and the philosophical life of Berlin.
Tonelli only wrote some chapters of this book, then confined him
 Cesa, “In Memory” 23

self to (besides the editing of the works) a bibliographical introduc-

tion and history of the texts. Tonelli was forced to interrupt his
work, so far the major work on Maupertuis, because he had to
prepare a report for the Kant Congress in Mainz (in April, 1974).
There he intended to present the basic conceptsofhis interpretation
of the Critique of Pure Reason. This time as well, the work grew
rapidly in his hands and he noticed with deep satisfaction that the
special research he had done in the previous decades could easily be
inserted into the general interpretation.
The text which he mailed for publication in the Proceedings
of the Congress is only a six-page summary of the main ideas which
served as an outline for the oral report. Unanimously this report
was considered the “high point” of the Congress, as a correspon-
dent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung put it. Tonelli started by
opposing vehemently the thesis that the Critique of Pure Reason was
a treatise on the theory of knowledge and refused the equally au-
thoritative formula which sees Kant’s work as the philosophical
foundation of the physical concept of the world as elaborated by
Newton. Tonelli said:

Disregarding the fact that Newton thoughtthat his views

had an adequatephilosophical foundation by themselves, Kant
never presumed to teach the scientists the methodologyoftheir
science; and, anyhow,astronomy was considered by Kantas
mixed, not as pure knowledge. What Kant intended to found in
the Critique was metaphysics, and metaphysics only.
Theclaim thatthe Critique of Pure Reason is a treatise
on metaphysics is certainly muchbetter substantiated, and
basically correct, but still it is insufficient for the interpretation
of the work, and, if asserted exclusively, it becomes misleading

--because the Critique is neither meant to be ontology nor theology.

[I]n the Introduction, he clearly distinguishes the Critique from

transcendental philosophy(ontology): the Critique covers a
 24 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
large part ofthe field of transcendental philosophy . . , but they
are notthe samescience.
In fact, the Critique is a work on methodology, and,
more exactly, on the methodology of metaphysics. . . [It is]
one of the “special logics” for the particular sciences, which
Kantopposes, as methodologies, to “general logic.” These
“special logics” are assigned to the sciences in question as part
and parcels of them: butstill, they are the speciallogics (or
methodologies) of those sciences.
Even though the definition of the Critique as methodology
and the distinction between logic and ontology permitted Tonel]j to
explain in the end the structure and organization of the workin
quite a satisfactory way, this, however, did notyet solvethe prob.
lem. Tonelli knew perfectly well that also in Kant was the ten
that “ontology is absorbed into the methodology of metaphysics,
that is, into logic,” which “has the greatest historical significance
both as the major precedent to Hegel's analogous endeavor,and as
a basic alternative to it.”
For nearly 20 years Tonelli had thought aboutthe Critique
Pure Reason. In previous articles and reviews he had already mage
some suggestions, but this was the first time that he talked aboutit
explicitly in a congress of specialists. The broad consenthe met
with made him take up again the work on his bookrightafter his
return to the USA. Hethought ofthe title Introduction tothe
Critique of Pure Reason. His intention was to write in a simple
style, without using too many technical terms, so that the book
would also be suitable for students. (The editor at Meiner had
suggested collecting in two volumes manyof his formerwritings
underthe title Kant and His Time. These writings had helped to
establish this technical apparatus.) The work wasprogressing
steadily and almost two thirds of the project was realized whenit
was interrupted by the disease he had suffered from since the
beginning of 1975, and which caused his death aboutthree years
later, on April 28, 1978.
 Cesa, “In Memory” 25
Manydifferentinte Tpre
tation:
ssible of this i
ncC omplete life o S, inevitably rhe torical,
f st udies. are
knows that Tonelli Su
himself and for cceeded in accomplishg, ‘omeone, however, who
ing ma
regretted the year e academic World, who knows th ny things for
th
s of desperate at Tonelli neve
r
day, the days when Studies,
where night was
the times of intell he ski) ~ Meals to have the Mo turned into
ectual tension in ney for books,
knowsall this will Every direction,
not dare make someone who
never regretted thos ese interpretations,
e years even thou Tonelli
disease and death. gh he paid for them
If there Wa s sot with
i

since his early youth ret

last years of his life. The los urned in the
s of Manyofhis fellow students
friends around hi and
might put an end mto mad ehim realize that wit
hislife as well, And he hin a short time death
was prepared for the
end, in so farasit is possible to be Prepared atal
l.
| “In memoriam Giorgio Tonelli June 10, 1928 - April 28, 1978”
by Norbert Hinske, Trier’

Shortly before completing his fiftieth year Giorgio Tonelli

suddenly passed away on April 28, 1978 in Binghamton (New
York) after an extended illness which overshadowed the last years
of his life. With his passing, philosophical-historical research loses
a scholar of rank, whose stupendous knowledgeoftheliterature in a
singular fashion has stimulated andfertilized research in the most
diverse areas. Hardly twenty years elapsed between his first book
on the development ofthe Kantian aesthetic published in 1955' and
his last lengthyarticles on analysis and synthesis,’ Kant’s concept of
critique and its antecedents? as well as d’Alembert.* But these few
years of a unique scholarly life were sufficient, one could say
without exaggeration, to disclose anew an enormous numberof old
texts and to change fundamentally the picture of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Tonelli’s lexicon of lexica in early modern

[Kant-Studien LXIX, 3 (1978), pp. 247-251.]

' Kant, dail’ estetica metafisica all’ estetica psicoempirica: Studi sulla
genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti, in Memoria dell’ Accademia
delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 111, Tomo 3, Parte II: Classe de scienze morali,
storiche e filologiche (Torino: Accademia delle Scienze, 1955), 345 pp.
2 “Analysis and Synthesis in XVIlIth Century Philosophy Prior to Kant,
in Archiv fiar Begriffsgeschichte XX (1976), pp. 178-213.
2 “‘Critique’ and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A Historical Survey,” in
Kant-Studien LXIX, 2 (1978), pp. 119-148.
+ “The Philosophyof d’Alembert: A Sceptic Beyond Scepticism,” Kant-
Studien LXVII (1976), pp. 353-371.
27
 9
28 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

times® alone has reclaimed an abundance of long since forgotte,

sources of research. As a result the history of ideas and of gop,
in many fields must well-nigh be rewritten. Here also, to be Sure
lies one of the reasons why Tonelli frequently has been Perceived’
troublesome. *
Giorgio Tonelli saw the history of philosophy from early on
in its complete European connections. He was a scholar whoin
superior way thoroughly knew the subject matter in the most divers
national cultures. Just as he published his works with equal facility
in Italian, French, German or English, so also he was interesteq in
the philosophy andliterature of all these countries andcultures,
Further, he took for granted that one read the authorsofthe Greek
and Roman world in the original.
An extraordinary breadth of study lay as the cornerstone of
this rare wealth of knowledge andinterests. It began with the end
of the Second World War in Pisa. From 1945 to 1948 Tonelli
simultaneously attended the university and the Scuola Normale
Superiore; changed in 1948/1949 to the University of Paris at the
Sorbonne for Koyre, Gouhier and Gueroult; continued in the Fall of
1949 at the University of Basel, where Tonelli attended the lectures
of Jaspers and Karl Barth; and ended up in 1950 in Frankfurt am
Main with Adorno. Years of intensive individual research followed,
making him familiar with virtually all the great libraries in Europe,
From 1950-1952 he worked in Vienna, Rome, Gottingen, coming
into contact there with Misch and Plessner. From 1952 to 1953 he
continued his studies at the “Istituto de Studi Storici,” the famous
“Istituto Croce” in Naples; from 1953 to 1955 in London; from
1955 to 1956 at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore (USA); and
from 1956 to 1959 at the “Centre National de la Recherche

5A Short-Title List of Subject Dictionaries of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth

and Eighteenth Centuries as Aids to the History of Ideas (London: The Warburg
Institute, University of London, 1971; in the series Warburg Institute Surveys,
IV), 64 pp.
 Hinske, “In memoriam” 29

Scientifique” in Paris. Atintervals in between he was again in

Gottingen as well as Berlin, Copenhagen and Lund.
Asa thirty-year old, Tonelli began teaching in 1959 at the
University of Paris as an unsalaried university lecturer (Privat-
dozent). In 1958 he received the libera docenza for the history of
philosophy in Rome. In 1962 healso received teaching authoriza-
tion for German languageandliterature, which he championed from
1962 to 1968 in Pisa both as researcher and teacher. Three books
and a large essay on Gottfried Benn’fall into this area ofinterest:
on Albrecht von Haller,’ Heinrich Heine’ and modern German
lyrics.? In 1969 he emigrated to the United States, repulsed by the
student unrest in Italian (and German) universities, whose character-
istic hostility to culture and scholarship he had recognized early and
clairvoyantly, but also because of sundry academicintrigue. There
he became professor of philosophyat the State University of New
York at Binghamton.
A characteristic tension for Tonelli--and at the same time an
important stimulus ofhis historical research--was a passionate desire
to understand. This desire made him pause in the reading of “clas-
sical” texts every step of the way and stumble over the familiar and
seemingly obvious. Whatto others appeared settled long ago,

‘ —“Appuntistilistici sul primo Benn,” in Annali della Facolta di magistero

[della Universita di Palermo](1961), pp. 3-32.
7 Poesia e pensiero in Albrecht von Haller (Torino: Edizionidi Filosofia,
1961), xii, 160 pp.; 2nd revised and expanded edition (Torino: Edizioni di
“Filosofia,” 1965), 180 pp.
* Heine e la Germania--Saggio introduttivo e interpretativo su “Atta Troll”
¢ “Deutschland, Ein Wintermarchen” (Palermo: Universit’ di Palermo, 1963),
233 pp. German translation by Lisel Bisanti-Siebrecht, Heinrich Heines politische
Philosophie (1830-1845) (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1975;in the
series Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 9, ed. Heinz
Heimsoeth et al.), VIII, 216 pp.
° Aspetti dellalirica tedesca, 1895-1960 (Palermo: Universita di Palermo,
1963), 182 pp.
 30 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
became a problem for him. His numerous investigations intg ti
principles of division and key concepts whichplay pivotal Tole jn”
the Kantian architectonic are clear examples ofthis. Neo-kantia.”
ism had generally seen in it only a “preference pushed too far for
symmetry andthe externals of taxonomy.”!° The historical Moti
which stand behind these classifications seem of no Consequence ie
Neo-kantianism. Tonelli made the architectonic the explicit focus
historical research, tracing back its origin and changes of Meaning
in often painstaking and detailed work with the original sources,
The profit of these investigations for a deepening appreciation of
subjects and texts in Kant’s philosophy is certainly not unimportant
to value.
In this connection should be mentioned first Tonelli’s large.
scale article on the historical source of the Kantian terms “analytic
and “dialectic,”'' which anticipates a single aspect of his contriby.
tion in “The Revival of German-Aristotelian Terminology in Kant
During the Formation of the Critique of Pure Reason.”"? Tonelli
traces back to Antiquity the history of this pair of concepts, display.
ing the changing meanings and the changing relation ofboth con-
cepts. In authors like Clauberg,'* Grosch’* or Darjes,’* to single oy
only a few examples, he reveals parallels to Kantian dialectic which
are equally interesting and informative. To be sure he disregarded
an obvious source for Kant like the Summary of the Theory of

10 Alois Riehl, Der philosophische Kritizismus, Geschichte und System, vol

I: Geschichte des philosophischen Kritizismus (Leipzig: W. Engelmann,1876;
1908), p. 14.
| “Derhistorische Ursprung der kantischen Termini ,Analytik’ und
,Dialektik’,” Archivfur Begriffsgeschichte, VII (1962), pp. 120-139.
"2 “Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-aristotelischen Terminologiebei Kant
wahrend der Entstehung der ,Kritik der reinen Vernunft’,” Archivfir
Begriffsgeschichte, IX (1964), pp. 233-242; cf. ibid., pp. 239-240.
“Derhistorische Ursprung,” p. 132, footnote 66.
\ Ibid., p. 137.
» pp. 135-136.
 Hinske, “In memoriam” 31
Reason by the Wolffian Meier,"* a difficulty which perhapsis
explained by the too overpowering abundance of subject-matter
which Tonelli was up against in increasing measures. The dense,
almost hectic style in many of his works, the concentrated succes-
sion ofcitations wasthe price of thinking that was involved in the
sources in ever new connections. But more important are the
motives which stand behind thatarticle; they were immediately
evident in the opening sentences. Tonelli writes:

Asis well known,two main sections ofthe Critique ofPure

Reasonare titled Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental
Dialectic. The terms analytic and dialectic are obviously no
neologisms. Nevertheless no onehas yet inquired into which
tradition Kant borrowed from. For all that, one could accept
that he learned these expressions voluntarily from older phi-
losophy and conferred a new meaning on them. In what follows
we will show that both terms and their specific use in Kant
originate from the German tradition of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. To be sure, Kant impregnates them with a
new meaning, but he remains entirely in the milieu of the indige-
noustradition.'7

For, and that is the result of the article,

the hypothetical andantithetical character of Kant’s Transcen-

dental Dialectic correspondswell to the conceptof logica
probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant
to takeover the Aristotelian term.'®

The same motives return twelve years later in a no less

"© George Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Halle: Johann
Justinus Gebauer, 1752; reprint in AK.-Ausg. XVI), § 6,p. 2; cf. AK.-Ausg.
XVI, p. 72.
‘7 “Der historische Ursprung,” p. 120.
" Ibid., p. 139.
32. Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

fundamental article on Kant’s practical philosophy, “Kant’s Ethic,

as a Part of Metaphysics.”'° The theme ofthis contribution js o
of the mostincisive innovations of Kantian philosophy, namely ind
conception of its own “practical” metaphysic. Tonelli rightly Points
out that in the sphere of moral philosophy a highly unusual, indeeg
dramatic transformation is thereby effected. Immediately at the
outset of his essay it says:

Oneofthe most remarkable traits of Kant’s system of philoso-

phyis the fact that ethics is classified as a part of metaphysics .
. . « It is just too bad that no commentator,as far as I know,
everstressed the importance ofthis fact, and ofthe underlying
problems; the fact was taken for granted, the problem ignored.
It is hightimeto call someattention to it.”°

That Tonelli therewith went into action vis-a-vis a central, always

overlooked problem of Kantian interpretation cannot be disputed.
Hardly less important is Tonelli’s activity as editorofrare
eighteenth-century texts. He became awareoftheir absolute neces.
sity in his own research, particularly his large-scale investigations
on method and metaphysics in the early Kant.” Inthis category
belong the publications furnished with comprehensive introduction
and bibliography: the Principal Philosophical Works ofChristian
August Crusius, which now will likely remain fragmentary for

1 “Kant’s Ethics as a Part of Metaphysics: A Possible Newtonian Sugges-

tion? With Some Comments on Kant’s ‘Dreams ofa Seer’,” in Philosophy and
the Civilizing Arts, Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider, ed. Craig] Wala
and John] P, Anton (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974), pp. 236-263
® Ibid., p. 236.
2| Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768: Saggio di
sociologia della conoscenza, vol. I (Torino: Edizioni di “Filosofia,” 1959; in the
series Studi e ricerche di storia della filosofia), XXII, 237 pp.
 Hinske, “In memoriam” 33

many years,” the works of Maupertuis” and the new edition of

Sulzer’s General Theory of the Fine Arts.“ Finally, in 1976, at the
time Tonelli was already severely ill, were published the two origi-
nal Kant lectures on anthropology edited by Starke.?5
The immense knowledge which Tonelli had assembled in his
decades-long historical researches madeit possible for him at the
same time to engage in Kant philology in the narrower sense with
great expertise, to rectify dating and to supplement or correct lists
of references. To his best laborsin this field belong his review of
the meritorious edition of lectures on encyclopedia by Gerhard
Lehmann.”° He correctly decoded literary allusion Kant makes to
Oswald’s An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (1766-
1772; German translation, 1774) and painstakingly analyzes the
Kantian table of categories (which in the Lecture on Encylopedia
still shows the same deficiencies as in the Pélitz Metaphysik). This
laid the foundation for a proper understanding of Kant’s “history of
development,” enabling a highly significant demonstration that the
Lecture is to be dated not in the time immediately after but immedi-
ately before the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason."

® Christian August Crusius, Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, ed. Giorgio

Tonelli, 3 vols. (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1964-1969).
2 Plierre] L{ouis] Moreau de Maupertuis, Oeuvres, with an introduction by
Giorgio Tonelli, 4 vols. (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1965-1974).
* Johann Georg Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der schénen Kinnste, with an
Introduction by Giorgio Tonelli, 5 vols. (Hildesheim and New York: Georg
Olms, 1967-1970).
Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde, Nach handschrifilichen Vorlesungen
herausgegeben von Fr. C Starke, Im Ankang Immanuel Kants Anweisung cur
Menschen- und Weltkenntnifs, with a preliminary remark by Giorgio Tonelli
(Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1976).
% Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen itber Enzyklopadie und Logik, vol. 1:
Vorlesungen ilber Philosophische Enzyklopddie, ed. Gerhard Lehmann (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1961).
2 Filosofia XII (1962), pp. 511-514; ef. ibid., p. 513.
 34 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Hardly less important, however, are his numerous addendato the

edition of Kantian lectures still in the midst of being published in
the fourth section of the Academy Edition.”
Whoever knew Giorgio Tonelli better also knew the
black melancholy of the historian which lay over his work. To the
collection of verse by [Christian] Morgenstern, which he enjoyeq
citing, belongs the poem “Deception:”

Perhaps everything is notclear,

nothing perhaps is explicable,
and consequently,that which is, shall be and was,
in the worst case is superfluous.
Incidently, in a private entry, he has once again intensified this
verse not accidentally:

Everythingperhapsis unclear,
Everythinginexplicable,
Andthat which is and has been,
Is at best, superfluous.
The believer will hope that such melancholy is notthelast
wordthat is said about humans. Atthe least a philosophical-histori-
cal investigation whichstrives to do justice to the norms ofschol-
arship can hardly do without the work of Giorgio Tonelli, as frag-
mentary as it may be.

% Filosofia XVII(1967), pp. 899-901; Philosophy and History [German

Studies, Section I] 7 (1974), pp. 21-29.
 PART TWO

THE WORK ITSELF

 CHAPTERI

ORGANON, CANON, DISCIPLINE, DOCTRINE IN KANT

I. INTRODUCTION

When Kanttries to explain what his Critique of Pure

Reasonis intended to be, he usually employs two pairs of
opposed terms, canon versus organon, and discipline versus
doctrine: the Critique is a canon, not an organon; it is a
discipline, not a doctrine.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to clarify the
meaning of these terms for Kant, in his developmentup to
the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781.
However, a survey ofthe later use of these termsshall also
be included. The scrutiny of the evolution of these terms in
Kant shall require a careful examination of one of the most
controversial passages of the Critique of Pure Reason (A
10-13), where I hope to be able to show that the inconsisten-
cies pointed out by several authoritative commentators do not
exist. It shall also entail a detailed discussion ofthe relation-
ship between general logic and the Critique, and some con-
siderations on the Critique in general as a work on the meth-
odology of metaphysics.

In the early sixties, Kantstill defines logic as an

instrument’ and conceives it in a traditional way. In the

‘Logik Herder, 1162-1764, AK.-Ausg. XXIV.1, p. 3.

37
38 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Announcement of his courses, published in 1765, Kant dist

guishes between two kinds oflogic. The first is a critique’
and prescription (Vorschrift) of common sense (gesunden
Verstandes), as an introduction to science (logica naturaliy
in the school terminology). The secondis a critique ang ’
prescription of science proper (Jogica artificialis), whereos it
is the organon, in order to make the procedure (Verfahren)
of science regular, and to understand the nature of the disc}.
pline, together with the means for its improvement. The
exposition of metaphysics shall be followed by someconsig.
erations on the particular method of this science, asits Orga.
non. This shall follow, and not precede the exposition of
metaphysics in a course on philosophy, because it would be
impossible to explain this organon before examplesofits
application have been offered. Otherwise Kant, in this
course, shall expound thefirst kind oflogic only? The
terms discipline and doctrine are used synonymously with
science.*

2 AK.-Ausg. Il, pp. 310-311.

3 Ibid., ll, pp. 307-310, 312. Discipline has already been used with the
meaningofscience in 1762 (pp. 280-281), and shall recur in 1768 (p. 377) and in
1770 (Dissertation, § 23) with the same meaning. Doctrine had already been
used as science in 1755 (AK.-Ausg. I, p. 416). See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 15,
Reflection 1575 (1766-1769?) and p. 19, Reflection 1579, 1. 1-2 (1760-17702). 4
distinction between a doctrine, discipline and science is introduced in the Meta-
physik Herder (1762-1764), AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.1, p. 156, but no explanation for
it is given. Another distinction between (1) critique, (2) discipline as doctrine or
instruction (Unterweisung) and (3) scienceis present in AK.-Ausg. XV, pp. 271-
272,Reflection 626, butthe dating ofthis Reflection is very uncertain (1762-
17722). Logic as organon is mentioned in AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 7, Reflection 1561.
On p. 18, Reflection 1579, 1. 28 - p. 19, 1. 4, the logic of commonsense (=
natural logic) is defined as a critique, while logic as a science (= artificial logic)
is a doctrine. The first is a catharticon of commonsense, the same as grammar,
the latter is an organon. Later additions to the same Reflection, containing a
distinction between doctrine and discipline, have a very uncertain dating. They
as

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 39

In a letter to Mendelssohn of April 8, 1766, Kant

writes that he considers metaphysics as a very important
discipline (disciplin), but that he finds it necessary to strip it
ofits dogmatic clothes, treatingits alleged tenets in a skepti-
cal way. This negative procedure is a preparation for posi-
tive progress in that science. An uncorrupted and unlearned
commonsense needs an organon; but the false tenets of a
perverted talent (such as those of metaphysics) require a
catharticon.* Hebelieves that he had developed important
views establishing the method (Verfahren) ofthis discipline
of metaphysics, views which are not only general perspec-
tives (Aussichten), but which can be used practically (in der
Anwendung)as the proper standard of evaluation (Richtmaas)
of metaphysical tenets.’
The meaning ofthese statements is clear to those who
are familiar with eighteenth-century philosophical terminolo-
gy. Studying the method of science belongs in principle to
the science of logic, which includes methodology. Method-
ological precepts which can beput into practice belong to
that section of logic which is called practical logic, a section
of which is frequently identified with methodology. So Kant
here simply underlines the fact that the precepts he has in
mind constitute a genuine methodology, because they can be
applied. Furthermore, this methodology shall not be an
organon, an instrument ofinvention, intended to acquire

suggest thatlogic as a disciplineis critique, and as a doctrine is organon.

‘The Platonic and Aristotelian psychological notion of catharticon seems
to havebeenlittle used in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. See
also myarticle “*Critique’ and Related TermsPrior to Kant: A Historical Sur-
vey,” in Kant-Studien LXIX, 2 (1978), § 2. Kant sometimes used the spelling
“catharcticon,” which I shall transcribe as “catharticon.” Note that the term
Unteil is translated by “judgment,” the term Urteilskraft by “Judgment.”
5 AK.-Ausg. X, pp. 70-71.
40 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

positive knowledge, but a standard oftruth intended to

purify metaphysics (as a catharticon) from its erroneous
tenets. Therefore it has a negative function, Preliminary to
the elaboration of a genuine metaphysics. In other words i
is chiefly a criterion of evaluation, or, as we shall see later,
a canon.
Actually Kant shall be in doubt for several years as ‘
the proper wayofclassifying this methodology: assuch, jt
belongsto logic, and will finally be defined as logic. But
insofar as it is a special methodology for metaphysics, it cay
also be considered as belonging to metaphysicsas a prepara.
tion for it. This definition of logic as a part of metaphysics
can also be justified with the meaningattributed to metaphys.
ics by Condillac and d’Alembert, whoidentified it with the
study of the cognitive powers of the human mind, or with
methodology.°

3. The term organon reappears in Kant's Dissertation of

1770. Here, Kant states that metaphysics must be preceded
by a propaedeutic or method, establishing the difference
between sensitive (sensitiva) and intellectual knowledge (§§
8, 23, 24, 30). Establishing this difference is a part of
method in general, but it is that part which lies at the foun-
dation of the entire method of metaphysics (§§ 23, 24). It is
an art of appraising (artem docimasticam),’ providing a

° See myarticle “The Problem of the Classification of the Sciences in

Kant’s Time,” Rivista critica distoria della filosofia, XXX, 3 (1975).
7 The terms docimasticus, ars doctimastica do not appearin ancient Latin
or in philosophicaldictionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so we
can infer that it was used very seldom. It obviously derives from the Greek
Soxipadtw, “to test” and it is defined by Alexander Gottlieb Bavmgarteninhis
Acroasislogica. In Christianvm L. B. de Wolff (Halae Magdebvrgicae: Impensis
Carol. Herm. Hemmerde., 1761; reprint Wolff, Werke, III:5), p. 207, § 594:
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 41

criterion (criterium) or touchstone (Lydium lapidem) for

metaphysics (§ 24). This correspondsto thefirst aim of
intellectual knowledge, whichis refutative (elencticus). Its
second aim is dogmatic (dogmaticus) inasmuchasit further
elaborates on the universal principles of pure understanding,
as they are offered by ontology and rational psychology.
These principles establish an ideal of perfection, which on
the theoretical plane corresponds to God, on the practical
plane to morals (§ 9). As for metaphysics, it is the organon
ofall intellectual knowledge (§ 7), containing the first princi-
ples of the pure use of the understanding (§ 8); whereas,
mathematics is the organonofintuitive knowledge (§ 12).
Thus, it seems that in fact within philosophy three
different levels are distinguished: (1) propaedeutics or the
science of method, which is merely refutatory or negative,
and which is occasionally called a discipline,* (2) metaphys-
ics as an organonforintellectual knowledge, containing the
first principles of the pure use of the understanding, and
corresponding to ontology and rational psychology, and (3) a
dogmatic science of God and ofmorals.

Il. KANT’S LECTURES 1770-1780

An important source ofinformation about the use of

“DISPUTATIOantithesin per quaestiones probansest

SOCRATICA; cuiusfinis primarius est exercitium, est
GYMNASTICA, cuiusfinis primarius est docere, est
DIDASCALICA,cuius finis primarius est examen s. crisis
virium in disputante, est DOCIMASTICA; cuius denique finis
primarius est, alteri negotium facessere, est ERISTICA.”
See Kant’s letter to Lambert of September 2, 1770; AK.-Ausg. X, pp.
97-98.
Ce —"
42. Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

the terms in question is the notes taken in Kant’s courses o,

logic in the early seventies. But it must be kept in ming
Kant, on these occasions, was lecturing on that kind of logic
heshall later define as general, versus the special logic em.
bodied in the Critique of Pure Reason. Therefore, the Way
these terms are used in connection with general logicis jn-
dicative of their overall meaning, but does not correspond to
the way in which Kant applies them to the methodology of
metaphysics.
Somestatements concerning our problem can be
found in the Logik Blomberg of 1771. Unfortunately, the
text of this notebook in general, and of the pertinent Passag-
es in particular, is rather corrupted (and in part patently con-
tradictory), so that only vague notions can be hypothetically
gathered fromit.
Logic is either dogmatic, insofar as it procures
knowledge, orcritical, inasmuch asit sets rules for the
evaluation of a knowledge already established. It seems that
both kinds of logic are an organon, andthatall logic is or
should becritical.? Logic is either theoretical (doctrine) or
practical (discipline). A merely theoretical logic is a theory,
not an organon. However, there is a propaedeutical logic
which is not an organonbuta critique. Assuch, it is an
introductory science. Theoretical logic is not merely cri-
tique; it is a doctrine, being demonstrable.'® The rules of
logic can be knowna priori; to that extent, logic is a doc-
trine. But logic also teaches the use ofthe rules in question,
and thereforeit is a discipline, or an instruction (Unterweis-
ung)."' Kant, in this lecture, was clearly contrasting the
characteristics of traditional logic with those ofthat kind of

AK.-Ausg. XXIV.1, p. 20.

Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., p. 24.
 Organon, Canon,Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 43
logic he sponsored. Butthe studenttaking the notes partially
confused the two aspects.

5. Another notebook, the so-called Logik Philippi

(1772), provides more extensive and more reliable informa-
tion. Kant introducesthe traditional distinction in general
logic between natural andartificial. Thefirst is simply the
exercise of commonsense (gemeine, gesunde Vernunft;
gemeiner, gesunder Verstand). The second requires an edu-
cated mind (gelehrte Vernunft, gelehrter Verstand) in order
to be understood. The formerderives its rules from ex-
perience, the latter from general principles. The formeris
only a critique, and is used as a catharticon in order to
purify the mind from errors and prejudicesin the basic
thinking necessary for the conductoflife. The latter is not
only a critique, but also a doctrine, “a connection of univer-
sal rules through which onelearns a certain exertion of the
mind”; andit is an instrument (Hiilfsmittel) or organon of
the sciences (that is, of learned thinking).'?
After more considerations aboutlogic in general,
Kant discusses the character of the logic he intends to teach
in his course, using an angle whichis different from that of
the preliminary distinction between natural andartificial
logic. In fact, this distinction does not stand a closer scruti-
ny, as Kant argues, in that a merely natural logic is not a
science and cannotbethe object of Kant’s course, while on
the other handa strictly philosophical artificial logic would
be incomprehensible, because logicis a propaedeutic (Vor-

2 Ibid., p. 314. See also p. 317. Kant employs here the terms Verstand
and Vernunft as synonymous. Therefore, I translate both of them with “mind,”
unless they are qualified as gemein or gesund, in which case I translate them as
“common sense.” That demonstrable(artificial) logic too is a critique, is stated
on p. 317.
 7
44 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

bereitungsmittel) to all other sciences, and does not pres,

pose any scientific knowledge. Now, if an introduction ¢,
science is already strictly scientific, an introduction to thi.
introduction should be required in order to make it inteltigs,
ble to the unlearned public.”

6. Kantsolves the problem by establishing that artific,

logic should begin with an analysis of common sense,tha
is, of the rules of natural logic. As a result, natural logic
shall gradually be given an artificial formulation, so that
constant use of natural logic is necessary in order to con-
struct a comprehensibleartificial logic or theory ofrationaj
knowledge. A theory is defined as a set of tenets (Lehrsatze
dogmata) proven or demonstrated a priori independently of
experience, and suited to be taught.* So from now on,the
subject of Kant’s discourse shall be artificial logic, which he
simply calls logic. But as this logic contains in itself some
transitional characteristics of natural logic, we shall not be
surprised if the clear-cut distinction between the two kinds of
logic is not strictly respected in what follows.
Logic is indispensable to commonsense as a general
catharticon. It cannot transform an idiot into an intelligent
person, but it can improve a corrupted mind. Further, it
establishes the borders of the use of commonsense in philos-
ophy andin the sciences, where a good deal of common
sense is required. But, obviously, commonsense is not
sufficient for philosophical and scientific knowledge, and
logic has to clarify to what extent we mayrely onit. In so
doing, logic is not an organon. This obviously concernsthe
natural logic aspect. In philosophy and in the sciences,logic

2 bid., p. 316.
™ Ibid., pp. 316-317. See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 29, Reflection 1596.
_ EO———

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 45

is an organon--itcriticizes them. This concernstheartificial

logic or demonstrable critique aspect. !*

7. Critique maybe either (1) amateurish, if the critic is

not able to explain the reasons for the judgment, as happens
in natural logic and aesthetical criticism, or (2) expert, if the
critic can explain the judgmentby appealing to already estab-
lished formulas or canons, but without being able to suggest
any improvement, or (3) masterly, if the critic can improve
the productcriticized, andif the critic is the inventor of for-
mulas andrules ofcriticism which are generally received.
Suchcritics were Leibniz and Wolff.'*
Logic is either theoretical or practical. The former
studies, throughrational principles, the notions of truth and
falsehood; the latter studies, through empirical principles, the
meansto satisfy the conditions established by the first. That
is, it teaches the rules one mustfollow in orderactually to
distinguish what is true from whatis false. It is a practical
discipline teaching the subjective rules of the human mind.
Theprinciples ofpractical logic are still very defective, and
mostly tautological.'? But thereislittle to do in order to
improveit; in fact, the application of rules cannot properly
be taught, becauseall we can teach are rules not their appli-
cation."*
In a short survey of the history of logic, Kantstates
that Epicurus’ logic was merely negative and intended to

'SAK.-Ausg. XXIV.1, p. 317. See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 27, Reflection

1589.
"6 AK.-Ausg. XXIV.1, pp. 317-318. See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, pp. 25-26,
Reflection 1585.
""AK.-Ausg. XXIV.1, pp. 318-319. On p. 321 Kant mentions a disciplina-
ris philosophy whichis a system ofpropositionsteaching how to philosophize.
% bid., p. 339.
46 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

preventerror and confusion. His teachings, or canones,

were empirical, and were merely an organon for Physicg,1s
Locke’s logic is not dogmatic, but critical. His Contribution
is essential to open new waysto the mind; he establisheq
completely new criteria.”

8. The course on metaphysics known as Metaphysik Ly

(taught sometime between 1775 and 1780) contains only a
few indications. Here Kant simply calls metaphysics the
methodology of metaphysics. He states that while general
logic studies (in general) the use of the understanding and of
reason, pure metaphysicsis a logic studying the pure use of
the understanding and of reason. The problem is whether
metaphysics is a dogmatic science, or rather a mereinstruc-
tion (Anweisung) and organon. The answeris thatit is an
instruction on how to deal with pure rational concepts. Pure
metaphysics is divided into ontology, cosmology, andnatural
theology. Ontology studies the most general properties of
things. In this science, the understanding inquiresinto the
way it could reach those pure rational notions.”! Transcen-
dental philosophy studies the pure intuitions and concepts. It
is divided into the theory of the understanding, or transcen-
dental logic, and the theory of sensibility, or transcendental
aesthetic. Transcendental logic, or ontology, which studies
the rules of the use of pure understanding and ofpure rea-
son, is divided into a transcendental analytic anda transcen-
dental dialectic.” It is apparent at least that the meaning of
pure metaphysics and ontology are not clearly established.

Ibid., p. 336.
® Ibid., p. 338. See also Logik Blomberg, ibid., p. 37: Locke's philoso-
phyis critical, and his Essay is the foundation for all true logic.
2 AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.1, pp. 173-174.
2 Ibid., p. 185.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 47

Thefirst is sometimes more than a logic of the pure use of

the understanding; the second is identified on one occasion
with transcendental logic, and on another occasion with
transcendental philosophy, which includes a transcendental
aesthetic.

The Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopaedia (1777-

1780?)”3 are morehelpful. Here, Kant divides the sciences
into sciences of learning andsciences of insight (Einsicht).
The former are the historical sciences, and they have an
organon, which is philology. Thelatter are either philosoph-
ical or mathematical.% General logic is the science of think-
ing in general, and it neither concerns the objects, nor the
understanding (Verstand) itself. It is an analysis of common
sense, not an organon, and it contains a canon for the proper
use of the understanding and of reason in general. This
canon does not derive from experience. It can be demon-
strated a priori, so that it does not derive from psychology.
General logic, if conceived as an organon, would derive
from psychology. General logic has two parts, an analytic
and a dialectic.*
The first part of logic, or general logic according to a
different passage, studies the form of the use of the under-
standing in general. It is “the autonomous form, the canon
and the basic law of reason.” The second part of general
logic studies the use “of the understanding and of reason in
general.” It seems to be the samething asdialectic, or the

Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen uber Enzyklopadie und Logik, vol. 1:

Vorlesungen ber Philosophische Enzyklopidie, ed. Gerhard Lehmann (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1961). Forthe dating, see myreview in Filosofia XIII (1962),
pp. 513-514.
Kant, Vorlesungen iber Enzyklopddie, p. 31.
bbid., p. 39.
48 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

logic ofillusion, namely the art of making plausiblean,

absurd proposition.” The logic of the presenttimeis re.
duced to a canon, or to a negative science, providing a
standard for testing whether knowledge respects “the form
the intellect and of reason.” Dialectic has almostdisa
ed: in fact, “an organon [in general] ofthe understanding -
and ofreason is impossible,” as it should offer the means
for
acquiring knowledge in general. It is possible to have q
particular organon (or special logic) for each science, “py
not a logic as an organonof the understanding andofr
in general.” Kant adds that, at present, research about an
organon is being made. “Lambert wrote such an organon,
but it is divided [into sections], and he considers eachking
of knowledge in particular [particular organons].””” The
most important thing for metaphysics is the critique ofpure
reason, whichestablishes the idea, the extent, the origin and
nature of metaphysics. The critique of pure reason must
precede metaphysics, andit is divided into an analytic and
dialectic. Metaphysics is an organon intended to prevent
illusions and to show how far the powers ofreason can
reach.”
It seems to me that what Kant meansis thefollowing
Logicis traditionally divided into an analytic and a dialectic;
but in general logic, only an analytic is admissible, anditis
whatis called general logic itself, while in general logic a
dialectic, or a science concerning the use of the understand-
ing and ofreason in general (or a general organon)is impos-
sible. An organonis possible only for each sciencein par-
ticular, as a special logic. Now the special logic of meta-
physicsis the critique of pure reason, andthis special logic

% Ibid., pp. 55-56. See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 23, Reflection 1579.
a Kant, Vorlesungen uber Enzyklopadie, p. 57.
Ibid., p. 60.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 49

is divided again into an analytic and a dialectic. In this case,

both parts of logic are admissible. A metaphysic as an
organon follows the critique.” In conclusion, general logic
has an analytic only, while the special logic of metaphysics
has both an analytic and a dialectic,
The Ethik Menzer (1780-1781) contains a definition
of discipline and doctrine. In education, discipline is nega-
tive, doctrine is positive. The first must precede thelatter.
Discipline cultivates the temperament and the heart, doctrine
cultivates the character. Discipline means severity (Zucht),
which limits unruly freedom; it is a compulsion (Zwang), but
it should not be excessive, lest it suppress freedom. Doc-
trine or teaching (Unterweisung) is obtained in three ways:
by instruction (Belehrung) through nature and experience, by
communication of knowledge (Erzdhlung), and by reasoning
(Raisonnement oder Verniinftein)°

Ill. KANT’S REFLECTIONS 1769-1788

10. Another important source of information is Kant’s

Reflections, ordered according to Adickes’ dating, which is
not unquestionablebut still is the most reliable we have. In
1769, critique of pure reason and metaphysics are used as

® Particular logic as an organon for each science seems to be divided, in its

section concerning philosophy,into a preliminary critique, whichis not an orga-
non, and metaphysics (notin the sense of metaphysics in general, but as general
or pure metaphysics) which is an organonfor the other parts of philosophy. On
the critique as a particular logic, see below § 30.
» Immanuel Kant, Eine Vorlesung Kants uber Ethik, ed. Paul Menzer
(Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, 1924), pp. 314-316.
50 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

synonyms.*! Metaphysics is restricted to ontology. Gene,

al logic studies the objective laws of reason, metaphysics
subjective laws of reason.” They are parts of the philosopy
of pure reason,™ but logic is dogmatic while metaphysics is
critical, zetetical, skeptical, problematic, and therefore sup.
jective.** Metaphysics is the critique of human reason,
whichis subjective and problematic. Logic is the general
doctrine of human reason and is objective and dogmatic,
Logic andethics are two disciplines.** Metaphysicsis not a
doctrine.” In 1769 moral philosophy was not considered a
part of metaphysics.

Tt, In 1772, the critique of pure reason is considered as q

preparation for metaphysics,** but, as we shall see,it shall
be considered sometimes as a part of metaphysics. Critique
of pure reason and transcendental philosophy are syn-
onyms.*? General logic is the instruction (Anweisung)for the
use of the understanding, or the general organonofallsci-
ences which study the use of the understanding in connection
with different objects. These sciences are themselves organ-
ons either of ability (Geschicklichkeit) or of prudence (Klug.
heit); metaphysics alone is the organon of wisdom (Weis-
heit). The theoretical use of metaphysics is merely negative,

AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 368, Reflection 3964. See also p. 359, Reflection

3946; . 361, Reflection 3949; p. 370, Reflection 3970.
Ibid., p. 367, Reflection 3959.
Ibid., p. 356, Reflection 3939.
Ibid., p. 361, Reflection 3949.
Ibid., pp. 365-366, Reflection 3957.
Ibid., p. 370, Reflection 3970; p. 362, Reflection 3951.
Ibid., p. 368, Reflection 3964.
Ibid., p. 562, Reflections 4465, 4466.
Ibid., p. 558, Reflection 4455.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 51
cathartical; but metaphysics is dogmatic in connection with
the will. Here, ethics is considered to be a part of meta-
physics. Metaphysicsis a critique of science and an organon
of wisdom.*! But wealso read that metaphysics is not an
organonfor other sciences, it is only a propaedeutic for
wisdom. Onone occasion, metaphysicsis called the orga-
non of wisdom.‘

12. In 1773-1775 more information is offered. General

logic contains rules a priori abstracted from the natural use
of the mind (from examples in concreto) through common
sense, although in fact these rules are a priori, and therefore
are self-evident once they have been known. As these rules
are a priori, they constitute a canon for doctrine, since
doctrine is a science a priori. Thatis, they are a criterion
(Richtschnur) whose task is to judge whether the form of
rational knowledgeis correct (rules of judgment--Beur-
theilung), and this is a critique, or an analytic of common
sense. General logic is not an organon, unlessit is an orga-
non for the critique. Thatis, it is an organon for the form,
not for the content of intellectual knowledge. The critique
referred to here is a critique of knowledge in general, not of
the knowledge of pure reason in particular. General logic
does not contain prescriptions (Vorschriften) or “rules pre-
ceding the use,” in order to construct (Construction) knowl-
edge or to produce (hervorbringen) someactions of the
understanding. If general logic pretended to be an organon
for doctrine, it would bean artificial dialectic, or a logic of
illusion (Schein). The general logic in question is theoreti-
cal, not practical. The rules of a practical logic would

© Ibid., pp. 552-553, Reflection 4445.

a Ibid., p. 558, Reflection 4457.
a Ibid., p. 559, Reflection 4459, and p. 558, Reflection 4457.
52 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

derive from psychology, and are subjective and empirica,

but there is no such thing as practical logic. Transcendent,
philosophy is the canon forall real (versus formal) use of
understanding. Transcendental logic needs a canon, because
it also contains principles derived from commonsense Which
generate a natural dialectic.

13. In 1775-1778 he offers more particular details about

transcendental philosophy, whichis tentatively subdivided jy
several different ways. (1) General metaphysics,ortran-
scendental (pure) philosophy, is divided into critique of
pure reason and an ontology.“ (2) Another subdivisionligs
(as parts of a science whose nameis not announced)a logic
of pure reason, which is only a critique, and an organon,
which is further divided into a discipline and a canon. (3)
The nomothetic®® or legislation of pure reason, which seems
to be the same thing as transcendental philosophy,”is divid-

“® AK.-Ausg. XVI, pp. 31-34, Reflections 1601-1608; p. 36, Reflection

1612. See AK.-Ausg. XVII, pp. 543-544, Reflection 4432 (1771-1778), where
the term doctrine is referred to as Naturkunde,ornatural history, a collection of
empirical facts, versus a theory of nature whichis called a discipline.
“ AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 9, Reflection 4851. See also p. 100, Reflection
5130.
45 [bid., p. 52, Reflection 4988. The phrase transcendentallogic appears
on p. 17, Reflection 4877.
“ Cf. Joh. Micraelii [Johannes Micraelius], Lexicon philosophicum termino-
rum philosophis usitatorum (1653; Stetini [Stettin]: impensis Jeremiae Mam-
phrasii, Typis Michaelis Hdpfneri, 16622; reprint Diisseldorf: Stern-Verlag
Janssen & Co., 1966), p. 893: “NOMOTHETICAestin politicis suprema
nomothetae seu LLatoris, id est, principis potestas, qva potest leges ferre
civibus.”
“7 See AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 30, Reflection 4925: “Philosophyisthe legis-
tation (nomothetic) of human reason.” Sothe legislation of pure reason should be
the same thing as transcendental philosophy.
=_~'

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 53

ed into a negative part (discipline), a positive part (canon),

and architectonics.** A distinction is added between tran-
scendental philosophy and metaphysics (metaphysica propria)
or organon,® which elsewhere seems to correspond to a
distinction between critique, or transcendental philosophy
and organon, or metaphysics.The organon contains a
discipline and a canon as criterion (criterio) and norm.*!
(4) Transcendental philosophy must have asits sections a
critique, in order to distinguish it from empirical philosophy,
a discipline, a canon, and an architectonic.** Kant, in a
1776letter to Herz, attributed exactly the same sections to
the science whosetask is to establish the extent, the subdivi-
sions, the limits and the entire contents of the field of pure
reason.*?
To sum up, the general science in question is called
either general metaphysics, or transcendental philosophy, or
both. However, transcendental philosophy is occasionally
identified with the first part of this science, more frequently
called critique of pure reason, and occasionally logic of pure
reason. Metaphysics is also the name for a second part of
this science, which is called organon as well, and on one
occasion, ontology. Elsewhere, ontology seems to be identi-
fied with transcendental analytic (see below, § 14). This
secondpart is subdivided into a discipline and a canon. A
final section called architectonics makes its appearance on
someoccasions.

Ibid., p. 70, Reflection 5039.

Ibid., p. 22, Reflection 4895.
Ibid., p. 22, Reflection 4897; p. 52, Reflections 4986, 4988.
st Ibid., p. 52, Reflection 4986.
2 Ibid., p. 11, Reflection 4858.
3 AK.-Ausg. X, p. 199; letter N. 112 to Marcus Herz, of November 24,
1776.
 >
54 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
We also can find very divergent statements, for
example that metaphysics is not an organon, but a canon of
reason, and that ontology is (at least partially) a doctrine.«
Either Kant is still hesitating on the useof some basic terms
or the dating of the Reflections in question is not correct.
In 1774 and in 1777, Kant announces to some ofhis
correspondents the imminent publication of a work called
Critique of Pure Reason, but he does not specify its rela-
tionship to transcendental philosophy.**

14. The critique, or the first part of transcendental philos-

ophy, is further subdivided into a section concerning imma-
nent knowledge a priori, called analytic, and a section on
transcendent knowledge a priori, called dialectic.* On
another occasion, transcendental analytic, where the under-
standing ponders itself, is also called the logic oftruth.
Transcendental dialectic, where the understanding considers
the objects, is also called the logic of illusion (Schein).”
The first is a doctrine of truth, while the secondisa critique
of illusion.* On this occasion, the term critique is applied
to dialectic only. We are probably on the way leading
toward the abandonmentof the term critique as title of
only the first section of the work Kant is preparing. Tran-
scendental analytic considers whatall transcendental knowl-
edge has in common, its elements, or the mere concepts
prior to any judgment. They cannot be false, so it is a logic
of truth, considering knowledgein general: it provides a

* AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 14, Reflection 4865, and p. 9, Reflection 4851.

* AK.-Ausg. X, p. 165,letter from Lavater of April 8, 1774; p. 169, letter
from Hartmann of September 4, 1774; p. 213, letter to Herz of August 20, 1777.
* AK.-Ausg. XVIII, pp. 99-100,Reflection 5127.
7 Ibid., p. 22, Reflection 4896.
* Ibid., pp. 76-77, Reflection 5063.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 55

criterion (Richtschnur) for truth.Transcendental dialectic

concerns propositions, and considers them problematically
together with the propositions contrary to them. Proposi-
tions can become dogmatic only after they have been put in
accordance with the canon.” Philosophical dialectic, the
science for dispelling illusion, is divided into a propaedeut-
ical part containing the criterion (Criterium) of truth, and a
skeptical part uncovering theorigin ofillusion and so pro-
tecting truth from it. Philosophical dialectic is opposed to
sophistical dialectic, which is “an art of [producing]illusion
[deception].”*' Thelatter is an artificial dialectic, while the
formeris a natural dialectic, containing the true subjective
principles and consequences.
It is clear that at this point the final plan for the
future Critique of Pure Reasonhasbeenalmostentirely
established, apart from some oscillations in terminology. In
fact, the only sections which have not yet been introduced
are the first, Transcendental Aesthetic, and the last, The
History of Pure Reason, although Kant had mentioned a
transcendental aesthetic in 1772.

15. Now weshall proceed to consider the indications

% bid., pp. 32-33, Reflection 4934,

© Ibid., p. 57, Reflection 5004.
— bid., p. 39, Reflection 4952. Sophistical dialectic is also termed a
technique of appearance or a sophistical art, pp. 76-77,Reflection 5063
© Jbid., p. 31, Reflection 4929; p. 59, Reflection 5012. It is beside the
point here further to expand on the description ofanalytic and dialectic. For
other details see p. 31, Reflection 4929; p. 32, Reflection 4931; p. 35, Reflection
4938; p. 40, Reflection 4953; pp. 51-52, Reflection 4985; p. 57, Reflection 5003;
p. 74, Reflection 5054; p. 75, Reflection 5058; p. 85, Reflection 5092; p. 93,
Reflection 5114.
© See below, Chap.Ill, § 3.
56 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Kantprovides in this period for specifying the meaning of

doctrine, discipline, canon, and organon.
‘Wesaw that on one occasion analytic is termed the
doctrine oftruth (see above § 14). Elsewhere, Kant states
that the analysis (Zergliederung) of transcendental concepts ig
the whole of the ontological doctrine, while the synthesis
contains nothing butantitheses.* It is clear thatin this case
it is the transcendental analytic which is considered as a
doctrine. But on another occasion the possibility of a tran-
scendental doctrineis flatly denied.
Otherwise, Kant establishes that a doctrine of pure
reason must be preceded bya critique,® but he does notsay
whether, after a critique has been developed, a doctrine can
still be considered as possible. Elsewherehestates that a
critique must beestablished before a canon can be estab-
lished, but it never becomesa doctrine.” But we saw in §
14 that a part of the critique, the analytic, is a doctrine, a
position which recurs in the Critique of Pure Reason.® The
organon of pure reason doesnotcontain a doctrine, which
would be objective.” Occasionally, the “doctrinal method of
metaphysics usually [taught in] the schools” is blamed.”
A doctrine is somethingpositive, a disciplineis

% AK.-Ausg. XVIII,p. 68, Reflection 5034. On ontology as analysis (Auj-

sung), see AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 726, Reflection 4781 (1773-1779).
“ AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 22, Reflection 4897. P. 52, Reflection 4988 is not
very clear. According to its grammatical structure,it states that the logic of pure
reason is not a doctrine, because it contains negative tenets only; but, according to
the sense, the statement about not being a doctrine probably refers to the organon,
“ Ibid., p. 21, Reflection 4892.
© Ibid., pp. 78-79, Reflection 5070.
“ For an explanation, see § 54 below.
© AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 52, Reflection 4986,
™ Ibid., p. 84, Reflection 5089.
>

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 57

something negative.” A doctrine corresponds to dogmatic
knowledge, a discipline tocritical knowledge. A discipline
does not increase knowledge,it prevents error. It concerns
the rules of the subject, not of the object; that is, it concerns
not the objective, but the subjective use of reason. Meta-
physics is the foundation ofa discipline, not of a doctrine.”
Furthermore:

What was considered at the beginningas a doctrine of

pure reasonis notits discipline,i.e., its correction
(Zucht) and chastisement (animadversion). Disciplineis
a limitationofthe powers or inclinationsofthe mind
(Gemitth) withintheir proper borders. Disciplineis
negative. The mind (Geist) does not only need to be
instructed: institution (Institution); but also to be disci-
plined, i.e. to be disaccustomed from its bad habits
(unarten).”>

Kant offers some examples of tenets belonging to this

discipline. For instance, it is impossible to replace phenom-
ena in space with intellectual concepts, because this would be
possible only if phenomena were nothing but confused repre-
sentations of those concepts.”
It is not impossible to reconcile the apparently con-
flicting statements as to whethertranscendental philosophy
is, or contains, or lays the foundation for, a doctrine. The
analytic may contain positive tenets or doctrines about the
nature of the mind, but transcendental philosophy does not

a Ibid., p. 52, Reflection 4989.

n Ibid., p. 14, Reflection 4865.
n Ibid., p. 71, Reflection 5044. See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 19, additions
to Reflection 1579 probably written between 1770 and 1778. See also p. 20.
” AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 80, Reflection 5074. See also p. 84, Reflection
5089.
 “y
58 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

lead to any positive tenet concerning the objects, considereg

as things in themselves.

16. As for the term organon, Kant repeats that Philosophy

is an organon for wisdom, concerning the destination of
human nature, and the limits and purposes of the human
powers.”* However,this is clearly a much larger meaningof
the term organon than that with which we have just met.
Another description is much better suited to the case under
consideration:

Thelogic of pure reason, which is merely critical, is

followed by the organon, which is didactical, and which
does not merely correct judgment[as logic does], but
which leads [reason’s] procedure (Verfahren)."° The
organon ofpure reasonis a direction (Anleitung) for
determining (bestimmen) the limits and rules of it.””
The organonis a practical logic.”*

As for canon, we already knowthatthe propositions

of transcendental philosophy can become dogmatic only if
they are in accordance with the canon.” The canonis the
criterion and norm of pure reason.*° The canonofthe em-
pirical use of reason concernsthe distributive unity or uni-
versality (universalitas, or distributivetotality) of experience,
while the canon of the rational or pure use of reason con-

Ibid., p. 87, Reflection 5100.

sz,R2aae

id., p. 52, Reflection 4988.

Ibid., Reflection 4986.
Ibid., Reflection 4989.
Ibid., p. 57, Reflection 5004.
Ibid., p. 52, Reflection 4986.
 Organon, Canon,Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 59
cerns the universality (universitas, orcollective totality) of
things in general.*!
It is not my task here to inquire into the notion of
architectonic. It shall suffice to mention that the architecton-
ical technique of science consists in submitting the science to
the functions of imagination, and subdividing it, for exam-
ple, into a table of categories.”

In all sciences, especially of reason, the idea of the

science, the general project,its outline within the whole
ofall knowledge . . is the first thing one has to look
for. This is architectonical."*

This obviously corresponds to the use of the term

architectonic in the Critique of Pure Reason, whereit de-
notes the section devoted to the classification of the parts of
philosophy.

IV. THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: GENERAL VERSUS

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

17. In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781, the situation

undergoes substantial changes, the most conspicuous of
which are briefly summarized. First, as on some previous
occasions (see below § 26), critique is now a term covering
all the field hitherto assigned to transcendental philosophy
(and this term, too, as we shall see, acquires a different
meaning). Second, what waspreviously called critique is

* AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 711, Reflection 4759.

® AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 26, Reflection 4911.
© AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 537, Reflection 2835, 1. 29-31 (1773-17772, 1769-
17712).
 60 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

nowcalled transcendental logic. Finally, a transcendental

aesthetic is prefixed as a first section of the whole, though
this third point does not concern us here.
It will be expedient to commence our examination by
establishing the status of logic within the new frame of
reference. Logic concerns either the general or the special
use of the understanding. The first containsall absolute and
necessary rules of thinking in general, disregarding the
differences between the various objects of thought, and can
be termed elementary logic (Elementarlogik). The second
concerns the rules for thinking correctly about @ certain kind
of object, and can be termed the organonofthis or that
science. In the schools it is mostly taught first, as a propae-
deutic to the sciences, althoughit is the last thing human
reason reaches (in connection with a certain science), “when
a science has already been completed for a long time, and
only needs some finishing touches to correct and perfectit”
(A 52; B 76). Later (1790), Kant shall attribute to the
organon an analogous but more productive task (see § 33).
In anycase, it seems clear that on this occasion the organons
of the specific sciences are not conceived as instruments for
extending knowledge, but only for verifying and correcting
it.
General logic is further divided. (1) General pure
logic is merely concerned with principles priori, and it is a
canonof the understanding and of reason (though not of
Judgment),™ but in connection with the general formalaspect
of their use only. It is a demonstrated doctrine, and it cer-
tainly mustbe entirely a priori. (2) General applied logic
concerns the rules for the use of the understanding under

“Forthe explanation why general logic is not a canon ofJudgment

(Urtheilskrafi), see A 132-135; B 171-174.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 61

subjective empirical conditions, which are established by

empirical psychology. It concerns the rules of the use of the
understanding disregarding the differences ofits objects.
Therefore, it is neither a canon of the understanding in
general, nor an organonfor particular sciences, but it is a
catharticon of commonsense (gemeiner Verstand). It can
neverbe a true and demonstrative science, as it requires
empirical principles. Its objects are attention, the origin of
error, the state of doubt, of scruple (Scrupel), of conviction,
etc. (A 52-55; B 77-79).
So general applied logic is not a subject of interest in
the Critique, and thus the expression general logic shall
henceforth mean general pure logic. In the following, we
shall not confuse this general pure logic with the pure use of
the understanding and of reason, because general pure logic
concerns both the pure and the empirical use of them.
General logic disregards all content (Inhalt) of knowl-
edge, and only considers the logical (general) form of the
relationship of the parts of knowledge to each other, thatis,
the form ofthinking in general. But, as the origin of our
knowledge is empirical as well as pure, there should be
another kind of logic which would not make abstractions
from all content of knowledge, and would also consider the
origin of our knowledge of objects. It would distinguish
what in knowledge is transcendental from whatis empirical,
and this distinction would only belong to the critique of
knowledge, without concerning the relationship of knowledge
to its object (A 55-57; B 79-81). As we hope to establish
the presence of concepts which mayberelated a priori to ob-
jects, as acts of pure thought, weare anticipating the idea of
a science of that knowledge which belongs to pure under-
standing and to pure reason, whereby wethink of objects
entirely a priori. This science, establishing the origin, extent
and objective validity of that knowledge, should be called
62 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

transcendental logic, because it concerns the lawsofthe

understanding and of reason (and notofsensibility, other-
wise it would not be logic only), but only insofar as they are
related to objects a priori. This is unlike general logic,
which is related to the empirical as well as to the pure use of
intellect and reason, disregarding the difference betweenthe
two uses (A 57; B 81-82).*°

18. General logic is at least the negative criterion or

touchstone for truth, because onehasfirst of all to appraise
the general form of all knowledge (subjective truth) before
examining the positive truth of its content (objective truth).
But, prior to this appraisal through general logic, the content
of knowledge ofthe objects had to be acquired independently
of general logic. General logic, afterwards, can utilize and
connect this content of knowledge according to logical laws,
or, even better, it simply can test it (its general form) ac-
cording to those laws. So, general logic is a canon for
appraisal (Beurtheilung),*° founded on the resolution or
analysis of the general formal operations of the understand-
ing and reason. Therefore this part of general logic may be
called analytic. But general logic cannot actually produce
new content for knowledge; it cannot be an organonor an
instrument for extending knowledge. If it is misused, if it is

There is an obvious grammatical mistake in Kant’s sentence, AK.-Ausg.

IV, p. 51, 1. 32: it should read werdeninstead of wird, because the subject (sie)
refers either to Gesetzen, or to Verstand and Vernunft, and they are plural. Kemp
Smith, in CPR, p. 97, corrects the text to this effect. The German editors of the
Critique seem notto have noticed this point. Besides, on line 33, the term
Vernunft in Vernunfterkenntnisse must be taken in its frequentextensive meaning
ofintellect plus reason,orelse the words Verstandes und are missing before
Vernunfterkenntnisse.
It must be noted that Beurtheilung, appraisal, is not the same thing as
Urtheilskraft, Judgment. See n. 63.
-

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 63

used as an alleged organon, it is called dialectic, and is

nothing but a logic ofillusion (Schein), only conducive to
empty talk (Geschwatzigkeit) (A 58-62; B 82-86)."”

19. Transcendental logic studies, in the first place, the

elements of pureintellectual knowledge, and thereforeits
first section is entitled transcendental analytic. This is a
logic of truth--a bodyof rules for appraising the truth of the
content of knowledge insofar as this content consists of pure
intellectual elements. However, in the content of knowledge
(versus the general form of knowledgestudied by general
logic), a furtherdistinction is introduced. Elements which
are merely pure priori intellectual (transcendental) forms
within this content are set off from the matter of this content,
which is provided by experience, and which therefore is a
posteriori. Now, the use of those transcendental formal
elements of pure understanding is legitimate only insofar as
they are applied to the materials of experience. If the under-
standing uses these elements beyond the borders of experi-
ence, it makes a material use of its merely transcendental
formal principles, and this is totally misleading. In so do-
ing, transcendentallogic is used as an organon for a univer-
sal and unlimited use of the understanding, and this is an
improperordialectical use of pure understanding. As this

* Onthe origin of this division into analytic and dialectic, see my articles
“Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini ,Analytik’ und ,Dialektik’,”
Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte, V1l (1962), and the continuation of the di ssion in.
“Kant unddie antiken Skeptiker,” Studien zu Kantsphilosophischer Entwicklung,
ed. Heinz Heimsoeth (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967; in the series Studien und
Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 6, ed. Heinz Heimsoeth, et al.),
§ 6ff. Kantadopts the old distinction between analytic, the logic of truth, and
dialectic (or topic), the logic of probability. But he goes on to assign the doctrine
ofprobability to the analytic as a part of the logic oftruth, while dialectic is
considered by him asthe logic of appearance.
™E
64 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
dialectical use occurs, the second section of transcendental
logic shall be a transcendental dialectic, a critique Of dialec.
cal illusion, or of the pretensions of the understanding and of
reason to discover and extend knowledge throughtranscen.
dental principles only (A 62-64; B 87-88).
Kant states that transcendental logic is only a canon
for the appraisal (Beurtheilung) of the empirical use ofthe
understanding (A 63; B 88). But what Kant means more
precisely is that transcendental logic is a canon only insofar
as it is a transcendental analytic. In fact, he states elsewhere
that understanding and Judgmenthavethe canon oftheir
objectively valid and true use in the analytic part of transcen.
dental logic, while speculative reason has no canon, because
its attempts to extend speculative knowledge beyond the
borders of possible experience only result in a dialectic. On
the contrary, formal or general logic, because it abstracts all
content of knowledge, can offer in its analytic a canon for
the general form of reason too (A 131-132; B 170-171).¥
These considerations do not exhaustthe description of
the part played by reason in transcendental logic or rather of
the extent of the study of pure reason within transcendental
logic (hinted at in A 57; B 81-82, and again, as we justsaw,
in connection with transcendental dialectic). On a certain
occasion, Kant seems to refer transcendental logic to the
understanding only (A 62; B 87), but this is obviously a
transient oversimplification. I shall reconsider this problem
below (§§ 40-41). Moreover, in some passages I quoted (A
57; B 81-82, and A 62; B 87), Kant should have referred
transcendental logic to Judgment as well, but he probably
neglected to mention Judgment for the sake of simplicity, or
perhaps because at that point he had not yet discussed the

See also A 796; B 824. Butthis is not the case for Judgment: A 132-
135; B 171-174,
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 65

notion of Judgment, which is expounded in A 132-134; B

171-173. But also later, A 796; B 824, herefers again to
the analytic as a canon for the understanding, without
mentioning Judgment.
A canonis defined as “the compass (Inbegriff) of the
a priori principles of the correct use of certain cognitive
faculties in general.” But, “where no correct use of a cogni-
tive faculty is possible, there is no canon.” So, speculative
reason has no canon, because it does not produce any syn-
thetic knowledge (A 796; B 824)."

20. Another pointin the statement above which needs

someclarification, is that transcendental logic is a canon for
the appraisal of the empirical use of the understanding (A
63; B 88). On the contrary, looking backwards, Kant later
states that “transcendental analytic was a canon of pure
understanding; because this [the understanding] only is
capable of true synthetic knowledgea priori” (A 796; B
824). On the other hand,

The Analytic of Principles will therefore be a canon for

Judgment only, because it teaches how to apply, to
appearance, theintellectual concepts which contain the
condition for a priori rules (A 132; B 171).
Now, if we take these statements at face value, we should
conclude that the canonin question is a canon for empirical
knowledge, as well as for pure knowledge of the understand-
ing. This wouldlead us to the very widespread andtotally
erroneousinterpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a
theory of knowledgein general, an interpretation which Kant
flatly denies. He states that there is no need fora critique of

® See Heimsoeth, 7D, p. 750, n. 163.

 — Logic :
ritique ue Within Modem
's CriCtiq .

sat enghtadJom2SB tUya

66 Kant’s

ra oin
consid eri
ideri ng
n i s
alytic as 2
the ea rt ne s doe
D Howe,
xals0
s not
il
nec
I
ess
t
arily Mean, an
anything more than canonof
application PI
n aa pplica
fact es 0One, because here o
pure un ieee refer to possible, not enna© me Ce. Ong
that syne Sorell ge aPtio
of B e Ba sl e doc
i
tri nes is
it doe
o r as abe
insofa eea‘ d he
©is obieobjectively ins
valid only its se
oF pos sib le exp eri enc e, that 18, os
Pa appe at - est is
ments can be Fee eine pea r an 5
necessary for the synthe e tvalidity of analyt
:
ic as a canonn for the
. Thus, th y
I oughits
e the und ers tan din g is established thr
—n e as q
ty as a ca no n for emp iri cal use. But its validity
validi ablished for the sake
of
is not est
canon for empirical use as its
for the sake of founding
empirical use, but rather
for the pure use of the
consequence the validity of a canon”
hematics, because
understanding (in metaphysics, not in mat st be added that
o, it mu
mathematics does notneed it). Als
understanding (A
the ideas of reason are a canon for the
329; B 385).

Vv. A COMMENTARYON A 10-16.

21. After this preliminary comparative exploration of the

nature of general and transcendental logic, which provides

© See also Prolegomena, pp. 327-328 (§ 40). Compare Vaihinger, Komm.,

I, pp. 476-477, and Heimsoeth, 7D, pp. 653-654. As soon as 1772 Kant had
stated that metaphysics is not an organonfor the other sciences: AK.-Ausg. XVII,
p. 559, Reflection 4459.
°! See Heimsoeth, 7D,p. 58.
PO

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 67

some examplesofthe use of the terms organon and canon,

let us consider the Critique of Pure Reason from a more
general viewpoint,asit is presented by Kantin the last
pagesof the Introduction to thefirst edition, one of the most
controversial passages of the Critique. My interpretation of
someof the basic points in question shall try to smooth away
someofthe difficulties found in them by Vaihinger,” which
led him to the conclusion that the text under consideration is
a “patchwork”ofthree different layers in Kant’s thought. I
want to makeit clear that the interpretation I offer does not
in the least claim to exhaust the other problemsinvolved in
this passage. The reader acquainted with Vaihinger’s com-
mentary will notice in myinterpretation a continuous implicit
criticism of some ofhis alwaysintelligent and competent
views, which are very instructive and helpful even when they
cannotbe accepted.
In my opinion, the basic thing one must rememberin
order to understand this passage, is that what Kant has in
mind on this occasion is to write an introduction to his work.
Thatis, his task is to acquaint the reader with the general
problem heintends to deal with in his book. In order to
help the reader better realize the scope of this problem, he
confronts us with it as an open question. In fact, Kant estab-
lishes a basic alternative in the possible answer, and tries to
keep this alternative open althoughheis steering, through a
series of “ifs” and “perhaps,” toward his own solution

* Vaihinger, Komm., 1. pp. 450ff. Kemp Smith, Comm., pp. 7Off,offers

nothing but a simplified version of Vaihinger’s interpretation, but this simplifica-
tion amounts to stiffening Vaihinger’s interpretation, which in its original version,
although very speculative,is definitely softer and ready to admit the validity of
altemative options.
68 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

This accounts for at least some of the internal tensions of

this tormented passage.”
It is certainly confusing that Kant, in the Preface to
the first edition (A XXI), simply announces some basic trai
of the solution in question without the cautions hewil]
in the Introduction, so that, in order to understand the latter
onehaseither to forget the Preface, orto take step bac.’
wards from it. But this is certainly a venial sin, if compareg
with other confusing traits of Kant’s work.

22; Through a preliminary discussion whichI cannot

analyze here, Kant advances “the idea of a special science
which may be used for the critique of pure reason,” where
“pure reason is that which containsthe principles for know.
ing anything absolutely a priori” (A 11). Now,

‘An organonofpure reason would be the compass of

those principles, whereby all kinds ofpurea priori
knowledge can be acquired and actually established.
The exhaustive application of such an organon would
produce a system of pure reason.
By “all kinds of pure a priori knowledge” Kantimplicitly
refers both to that kind of pure a priori knowledge which
afterwards shall be termed immanent, and to that which shall
be termed transcendent. In fact, the possibility ofthelatter
cannotberuled outat this stage of the inquiry because a
distinction between these two kinds of knowledgehas notyet

% Vaihinger, Komm., I., p. 451, was close to this view at a certain pointas
he wrote: “Es handelt sich hier immer noch um die Frage nach den Grenzen ...
noch nicht um die Antwort.” Unfortunately, he did not insist on this course, and
proceeded to look for answers only, instead of realizing that the questioningand
the tentative answers were going on hand in hand for a while.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 69

been introduced. We can say that the organon in question

should then be an ars inveniendi for this knowledge.

But as this would be asking rather much, and as it is

still even (auch) doubtful whether in general, and in
whichcases in particular, extending our knowledge in
such a way be possible: so we can regard « science of
the mere appraisal (Beurtheilung) of pure reason, of its
sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to the system of
pure reason, which should be called not a doctrine, but
a critique ofpure reason. Actually, its utility would be
only negative, it would be used not for the extension,
but for the purification of the use of our reason, pre-
serving it from errors, whichis already a very great
gain.

Thus far, Kant has made the following points: (1) He

has announced certain special science which may be used
for the critique of pure reason; he has explained rather
clearly what he means by pure reason; he has not explained
what he means by critique; and he has not announced the
name ofthis special science. (2) He has announced the
name of another science, the organon. He has explained
whatit should be, and whatit should be used for, but he has
not stated whether he considers elaboration of an organon as
a possible enterprise. The verbs he uses are in the subjunc-
tive mood. (3) He has announced the nameofa third sci-
ence, the system of pure reason, which would be(also in the
subjunctive) the result of the organon. The subject matter of
this third science has been defined very vaguely while defin-
ing the organon.
Atthis point, hardly anything has been established,
with the possible exception of a not quite explicit interest in
promoting a science called the system of pure reason. But
70 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
nothing has been decided as to the way of Promotingjt,
After this noncommittal opening, Kant makes a first
move. Implicitly referring to the notion of organon throy,
the phrase “extending knowledge,” he raises, as we haveugh
seen, the question whetherthis extension is possible at all,
and, if it is, how far. The study of this possibility Teceives
name--critique of pure reason. This identifies it with that
special science Kant mentioned at the beginning. Thetay
of this science is also described as the assessmentofthe
sources and limits of pure reason, and it is assigned a Merely
negative function, as all this science is. Forit is to consides
whether extending our pure knowledgea priori is uncondj-
tionally possible (which cannot be excluded as yet), or congj.
tionally possible (limitation), or unconditionally impossible,
In fact, this science should be introductory (propaedeutic) tg
the system of pure reason. It could have several results
from what we know so far. (1) An organon, and a complete
system of pure reason as its product, are possible. In this
case, the would-be negative science could not negate any-
thing, and the critique of pure reason would benothing but
self-defeating exertion of the mind. (2) A limited organon,
conducive to a limited system of pure reason, is possible,
(3) An organon ofpure reason is not possible, buta limited
system of pure reason can be established in some other way,

* Therefore, Vaihinger’s contention (ibid., pp. 459-460)that Kant here has

established the following sequel of sciences is nothing but a product ofhis imag-
ination: (1) a critique of pure reason, (2) an organon, (3) a system ofpure
reason. It is true that he also includes as a foundation for this interpretation the
following sentence (which I have not yet analyzed): “Da dieses aber sehrviel
verlangt ist. . . welches schon sehr viel gewonnenist.” But mypointis that this
sentence has to be connected with what follows rather than with whatprecedes it,
although after it ends a different attitude sets in.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 71

(4) Neither an organon nora system of pure reasonis atall

possible.”
Thusfar, all options are open, inclusive ofthefirst,
which would amountto the failure, or to the superfluity of a
critique of pure reason as a science. In fact, as Kant refers
to the critique, heis still using verbs in the subjunctive
mood.

24, The following sentences introduce the new concept,

transcendental, whose development is marked bya rather
important change. Kant implicitly does not question two
basic points: on the one hand a critique of pure reason as a
science shall prove to be both necessary andeffective, and,
on the other hand, a limited system of pure reason is not
impossible. In other words, options oneandfourlisted
above are henceforth tacitly discarded. Obviously, Kantis
leading the reader toward his own solution of the problem,
whichis partially anticipated as an underlying assumption.
But morehasto be said. Kant is also keeping in mind the
Architectonic of Pure Reason, and in particular a philosoph-
ical science heclassifies in that section of the Critique, the
so-called transcendental philosophy or ontology (A 845-846;
B 873-874), which he announcesat this point without calling
it ontology.
Now, either to prevent the possible occurrence of
confusion, or as a means for better clarifying the notion of a
critique of pure reason, Kant here goes out of his way in
order to contrast the critique to transcendental philosophy.
That this course should prove to be a major source of confu-
sion for the reader, is just one of the many ironies of

%S After this analysis it should be clear also that if the sentence referred to
above in n. 94, which I am discussing now, were connected with what precedes
it, the trinitary schemeestablished by Vaihinger could find no justification.
 Modern Logic
n Kant’s Critique within
i
i ensuing
vever, this con: fusion i S not
: 5 w (§ 26), the dively
see
nistorysMONA wwe shall belo
scenden, Net;
pure reason and tranon
een critiqueerof for Kant Philoss,
ees a matt of continuous hesitati
, he was thi
aa se very likely that, on this occasion
ming in
e to clari fy the subject for his own
me first plac el fit,
but settled, this intendeg
“ ce the matter was all ed within the general tifigg
Se was very poorly integrat se %
and was ther efor e subject to some
ihe discussion, Ous
. .
misunderstandings. thread o¢
‘Thus, Kant seemingly interrupts the of transcg, his
ing a definition to discus Nden,
reasoning by flatly introducnece
not be ssary for US
Fortunately, it will S the tal,
the sty
various meanings of this term, which is one of
(4, Mbling
blocks of the Critique. Kant proceeds by stating
woul d be ea 12)
al concepts
that a system of transcendent led
hy.
transcendental philosop usion Mayo¢g,
In this respect, a dangerous conf
philosophy with the system ur:
identifying transcendental ven Pure
This confusion can be
reason mentioned above.*’ e
ion of the Passage in Guer
right now by a close examinat
on:
which concems
I call all that knowledge transcendental, concept
not so much the objects, as our a priori s of
objects in general. A system of such concepts could be
called transcendental philosophy (A 11-12).

Twopoints have to be made here. First, the defini.

tion of transcendental in general is broader than thatof the
immediately subsequent use of this adjective as applied to
philosophy. In fact, transcendental in general refers both to

96 See Vaihinger, Komm., 1, p. 467-469.

a Vaihinger warns against this confusion atthis point: ibid., p. 460.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 73

objects and to the a priori concepts of objects (although it

refers “not so much” to the formeras to the latter), while
transcendental whenreferring to philosophy concerns those
concepts only. Second, the a priori concepts, which are the
subject matter of transcendental philosophy, are concepts of
objects in general.’ Or, as Kant adds below, insofar as the
synthesis a priori is concerned,transcendental philosophy
should contain only its principles. Now, nothing says that
the system of pure reason (1) does not concern objects as
such, (2) does not concern concepts of objects in particular,
and (3) only expoundsprinciples.

Ds Besides, the confusion referred to above is obviously

out of the question if we refer to the classification of the
parts of philosophy offered in the Architectonic (A 840-847;
B 868-875). However, the distinction between transcenden-
tal philosophy and the system ofpure reason should not be
interpreted as if these two sciences had nothing in common.
On the contrary, according to the Architectonic, they are
related as a part is related to the whole. The system oftran-
scendental philosophyis a section of the system of specu-
lative metaphysics stricto sensu, which in turn is a section of
pure rational philosophy. Therefore, it is not astonishing if
Kant on someoccasionsrefers indifferently to transcendental
philosophy or to the system of pure reason, for what they
have in common.” In fact, over-stressing the difference

Compare ibid., p. 472.

Iam objecting, atleast in connection with thefirst edition ofthe Cri-
tique, to Vaihinger’s contention that transcendental philosophyandthe system of
pure reason, although distinguished in the Introduction, tend afterward to be
identified: ibid., pp. 473-474. This occurs because he thinks thathe is entitled
radically to distinguish the two sciences from each other, so that, when that
radical distinction shows not to hold, he has the impression that they are being
identified.
74 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

betweenthese two sciences only increases the apparen,

inconsistency of the passage under examination." Q, th
other hand, it is true that the conceptof a system of pure’
reasonas it is used in the Introduction (A 11-12) is diffe,
from its equivalent as it appears in the Architectonic, In
fact, this final notion of the system is the result of a Brad
process of definition elaborated through the whole work, I
this respect, I will only recall the basic fact thatthe systen"
of pure reason, mentioned in the Introduction, has not yet
been qualified in connection with the distinction between
immanent and transcendent knowledge. Thatis,it has not
yet been appraised and limited by thecritique. But I do ng
think this will prove to be prejudicial to the interpretation of
the passage under consideration which, far from requiring
more precise notion of this system, intentionally retains jts
vagueness. Yet, within this vagueness, it is obviously legit.
mate to lend it a meaning approximately consistent with jts
future relationship to transcendental philosophy as establish
in the Architectonic.

26. Anotherinherent dangeris that of a confusion be-

tween transcendental philosophy and thecritique of pure
reasonitself. That Kant would Jater assert their identity’jg
a fact that should not by itself concern us now. But, con-

19 As happens to Vaihinger,ibid., p. 460.

1 See Kemp Smith, Comm., p. 72, where he quotes a passage written in
1799. But already in 1783-1784, Kant used the term transcendental philosophy as
an equivalent ofcritique (of pure reason): AK.-Ausg. XVIII, L. Bl. N. 5644, p
285, 1. 23-27, p. 286, 1. 1-2 (the “critique of reason in general” whichshould
precedetranscendental philosophy, p. 285, I. 28, is obviouslythe same as generd
logic). But on this occasion, there is also a tentative distinction between critique
(ofpure reason) and transcendental philosophy; p. 286, 1. 5-7. See also Meta-
physik Volckmann (1784-1785), AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL.1, p. 360, 1. 4-9; p. 363, |. 25
- p. 364, 1. 3. Prolegomena, p. 279 (§ 5); compare pp. 371-372.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 75

sidering that their identity had already been introduced be-

fore 1781,‘ the general pattern suggests a persistent tenden-
cy in Kant’s thoughtto identify them. Atthis point, howev-
er, this puzzle is more helpful than intriguing. It does not
jeopardize the distinction between the two sciences, whichis
very sharply established in A 12, but it helps to explain the
presence ofthe title Division of Transcendental Philosophy
in A 13 (suppressed in the second edition), where actually
one would expectto find a Division of the Critique of Pure
Reason. It also helps explain the fact that the following
section of the Introduction (A 13-16) is constructed on the
implicit presupposition of a close structural analogy between

"See Vaihinger, Komm., I, pp. 153-154, 472-473. In Kant's letter to

Herz of Feb. 21, 1772 (AK.-Ausg. X,p. 131, 1. 37 - p. 132, |. 18), transcenden-
tal philosophyandcritique ofpure reason appear to be very similar things, but
they are notexplicitly identified. But this explicit identification occurs in another
letter sent to Herz in late 1773 (ibid., p. 145, 1. 17-19), and in AK.-Ausg. XVII,
p. 558, Reflection 4455 (1772). In the Metaphysik L, (1775-1780), transcendental
philosophy is divided into transcendental logic (which includes an analytic and a
dialectic), and transcendental aesthetic (see above § 8). We saw that in the
Reflections of 1775-1778, Kant discussed a transcendental philosophy, whereof
the critique should be the first section. But, in 1774 and in 1777, Kant had an-
nounced the immanent publication of a work called Critique ofPure Reason to
some of his correspondents: see above §§ 12-13. In the Lectures on Philosophi-
cal Encyclopaedia (1777-17802), Kant mentioned a critique of pure reason which
shall precede metaphysics, but he did not mentiontranscendentalphilosophy: see
above, § 9. [In this onereference Tonelli gives the date of the Lectures on
Philosophical Encyclopaedia as 1777-1778. All othercitations of this work date
itas “1777-17802.” Norbert Hinske mentions in his “In memoriam” article
(included in Part One above) that Tonelli was able to show, in his review ofthe
commendable editionof this Lecture by Gerhard Lehmann,that this work is to be
dated immediately before the publication ofthe Critique of Pure Reason. That
meansprior to 1781. Professor Hinske suggests that Th. G. Hippel must have
had the Lecture in front of him in 1778, given the striking parallels. See Hinske's
review in Deutsche Literaturzeitung fir Kritik der internationalen Wissenschaft 85,
No. 6 (June, 1964), pp. 486-489.]
 16 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

the critique of pure reason and transcendental philosophy.

One would not take this analogy for granted on the founda-
tion of what precedesit in the Introduction, and that could
be seriously challenged on various grounds."

27. After having given a preliminary definition of tran-

scendental philosophy, Kant proceeds (A 12) to establish its
difference from a critique of pure reason. Expounding the
whole bodyof transcendental philosophy, Kant argues,
would be superfluous for his present purpose. This whole
body should expound in its entirety the foundation of the
analytic as well as of the synthetic knowledgeof objects in
general. Butall we need atthis stage is only to establish
that area of analytic knowledge which is required in orderto
foundthe principles of the synthesis a priori in their entirety.
In fact, the core of the present task consists in establishing
thelatter.
So the critique, now termed transcendental, should
correspond to transcendental philosophy minus a part of the
analytic concepts or principles. As for transcendental philos-
ophy, it must be kept in mind howits field was delimited
above (§ 24) versus that of the system of pure reason.
Kant addsthat the transcendental critique is not a
doctrine, because its aim is not that of extending, but only of
correcting human knowledge, and shall provide the touch-
stone for the validity or invalidity of all knowledgea priori.

Sothatthis critique is a preparation, if possible, for an

' See also Vaihinger, Komm., I, pp. 479-480; Heimsoeth, 7D. pp. 651-
652, Amongother things (according to A 154; B 193),the study of synthetic a
priori judgments is accomplished in the Transcendental Logic. So, besides the
Dialectic, the entire Theory of Method seems not to have a counterpart in
transcendental philosophy.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 77

organon, and, if this should provenotto be feasible,

then, atleast, if possible, for a canon of that knowl-
edge, according to which, no doubtthe complete system
of pure reason could be expounded, whether it consist
in extending our knowledge,or simply in limitingit,
both analytically and synthetically (A 12).

28. These considerations open several problems. It is

evident that Kant is proceeding to elaborate on alternatives
two and three listed above (§ 23). This meansheis still
trying to keep somedifferent options open, instead of antici-
pating his precise final solution. Moreover, alternative three
is now specified as implying a canon. It is just too bad that
on this occasion Kantneglects to say what a canon should
be. Anyhow, given what we know from subsequentstate-
ments, a canonis a part ofthecritique itself. There is no
indication that an organon could belongto the critique,
unless we refer back to somestatements of 1775-1778 (com-
pare § 13). This would not be quite appropriate, however,
because there the canon was part of the organon, not an
alternative to it. Butit is not difficult to make sense of this
passage. Thecritique couldeither lead to establishing anoth-
er science, the organon; or, should this prove to be impossi-
ble, it could prepare and develop within itself a substitute for
it, called canon. As weare goingto see next, the foregoing |
definition of the critique as a merely negative science (A 11)
has to be considered as very one-sided. Considering this
fact, the incorporation of an organon, should it be possible,
into the critique itself, cannot yet be ruled out as an abstract
possibility at least.
Butthere is another more intriguing problem. The
critique is meant to encompassthe principles of the syn-
thesis. Still, these are defined above (A 9-10) as the princi-
ples for extending our speculative knowledge, while the cri-
tique’s use is explicitly referred to as merely negative (A 11).
 >
7% Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
However, it may be easily argued that, if the general ain, a
the critique is basically a negative one, nonetheless the
critique may have to include for this purpose some,or
positive doctrines. In fact, the critique is not a piece of ”
Pyrrhonian skepticism, whose process and results would be
merely destructive. But the foregoing consideration Taises g
further problem. If the critique contains the principles Of the
synthesis, which are the principles for extending our
tive knowledge, how can we justify the sharp distinction be.
tween the critique and the organon, if the latter’s task is to
extend knowledge? The answer can be that the critique con.
tains the principles for the aforesaid extension, inclusive of
the negative criteria for limiting, and of the positive criterig
(canon) for assessing it insofar as this extension is legitimate,
However, this is different from an artificial methodology of
invention of particular truths on the foundation ofthose
principles (organon), which is, as we shall see later, Not only
impossible, but superfluous (§ 44). In fact, the human ming
extends ad abundantiam pure a priori knowledge through a
natural inclination, which proceeds through natural logic of
invention.
Moreover, it is clear that describingthecritique asa
merely negative science is anyhow a gross oversimplifica-
tion, insofar as it shall contain a canon, but there are also
other reasons.'* The sameis true for another reason,in the
description of critique as a counterpart to transcendental
philosophy minus a complete developmentoftheanalysis.
In fact, it is hard to conceive a transcendental philosophy,as
it is defined here, containing a section devoted to the refuta-
tion of errors. So the critique, from this pointof view,

‘4 Vaihinger, Komm., 1, pp. 463-467, 474-476. See also Roger Verneaux,

Le vocabulaire de Kant. Doctrines et méthodes, vol. 1 (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne,
1967), pp. 31-33.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 79

discusses more topics than transcendental philosophy," rot

to mention the entire Theory of Method, which again clearly
exceeds the range of transcendental philosophy as an onto-
logy. However, considering how little we know about what
Kant had in mind in 1781 with regard to transcendental
philosophy,it is better to refrain from further speculations.
Another problem is raised by alternative three. Kant
expresses his conviction that at least this alternative is valid,
that establishing a canon for the system of pure speculative
reason shall be possible. But later (A 796; B 824) he de-
clares that there is no canon for speculative reason. I think
that Vaihinger'® is right in explaining that on the first occa-
sion Kant means by reason, as he frequently does, intellect
plus reason, while on the second he means reason stricto
sensu.

29. At this point, it is possible to gain a better insight

into the basic notions I planned to clarify. As we have seen,
the Introduction defines an organon of pure reason as “the
compassofthose principles, wherebyail kinds of pure a
priori knowledge can be acquired and actually established”
(§ 22). But it is left undecided whether this organon is
possible or not.
The term organon suddenly reappears in the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic, where Kantstates that this science is as
certain “as can be required from a theory, which should
serve as an organon” (A 46; B 63). Strictly speaking, here
Kant does not say that transcendental aesthetic is an organon,
but only thatit is as certain as that. But, if otherwise this
passage should suggest that transcendental aesthetic is an

15 Vaihinger, Komm., 1, pp. 481-482.

6 Ibid., pp. 460-461.
80 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

organon, at least in some respect, a further question Temaj

unanswered: an organon for what? Certainly notfor py
scendental knowledge. Couldit be an organon for pure i
ition? But, as with mathematics, pureintuition does nop”
seem to need any organon. Asfor particular Metaphysicay
natural science, which is also founded (partially) on Pure
intuition, if it has an organonatall, this should be mathe,
ics and nottranscendental aesthetics, according to Kant’s
position in 1786.'” But then he does not mentionthe term
organon, and at any rate we do not know what he thought on
this subject in 1781. Could transcendental aesthetic be useg
as an organon for empirical intuition, as a part, or as a
foundation, of one or more ofthe sections of special logic
which correspondto the organons forparticular, and, in this
case, empirical sciences (see § 17 above)? This is nothing
but a conjecture.
As for transcendental analytic, we know thatit is
only a canon and cannotlegitimately be used as an organon
(see § 19; A 63; B 88). In general, the use ofall Philosophy
of pure reason is perhaps merely negative, because it cannot
be used as an organon for extending (pure a priori) knowl-
edge (A 795; B 823).

VI. THE CRITIQUE AS A SPECIAL LOGIC

30. Disregarding that dubious passage about transcenden-

tal aesthetic quoted above, it seems quite clear thatthere is
no organon for pure a priori knowledge. Therefore the

AK.-Ausg. IV, pp. 469-470 (Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Natur-

wissenschaft, 1786). Compare De mundi sensibilis, where mathematics is defined
as the organonofintuitive knowledge (§ 12). Butin that time metaphysics too
wasconsidered as an organon (§ 7).
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doct
rine in Kant 81
critique of pure reason neither can be developed into
an
organon, norcan it be followed by an organonforthat
purpose. It seems that, unfortunately, establishing this
point
has misled the interpreters in connection with a question
which, in myopinion, is basic--that of the connection be-
tween general and transcendental logic. Both Adickes and
Kemp Smith take careto distinguish special logic from
transcendental logic. The fact that they do not agree on the
precise structure ofthis distinction reveals that their ideas on
the subject are not quite clear.'* Their stumbling block was
certainly the fact that Kant describes special logic as an
organon (A 52; B 76). Although Kemp Smith points out
quite correctly that in general, and on this occasion in partic-
ular, the distinction between canon and organon is not very
clear, and that here he would rather have expected Kant to
describe special logic as a canon,'” he fails to overcome the
obstacle. It is my contention that transcendental logic in
particular, and thecritique of pure reason in general, belong
to the class of special logic. Moreprecisely, they are a
special logic for metaphysics. My conviction is based on
several different grounds.
(1) A special logic is mentioned in the Critique of
Pure Reason onlyin the passage under consideration. Onall
other occasions, general logic is contrasted with transcen-
dental logic only, as if logic were subdivided dichotomously
and not trichotomously. In the Logic edited by Jasche,
general logic is contrasted with transcendental logic only.'"”
There is hardly any mention ofa special logic elsewhere,

See Kemp Smith, Comm., pp. 168-169, where also Adickes’ view is
related.
9 Ibid., p. 170.
AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 15.
82. Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
with the exception of the texts referred to in two and seven
below.
(2) In the Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopaedia,
1777-1780? (see § 9), a distinction is introduced between
general logic, which cannot be an organon, and thespecial
organons for each science. These organons are ways for
acquiring (extending) knowledge. General metaphysics,
which follows a critique, is considered an organon, but in a
negative and limiting sense (obviously, for philosophy). So
we can infer that metaphysics as methodology is oneofthe
special organons, thatit belongs to special logic. Ofcourse,
this assumption presupposes that the term organonis used in
two different ways at the sametime, both for extending and
for limiting knowledge.

31. (3) In the Reflections from 1775-1778 (see § 13), an

organonfor philosophy, consisting in a discipline and a
canon, followsthe critique of pure reason. Metaphysics is
occasionally identified with this organon, but sometimesit
includesasits first part the critique. Anyhow, the term
organon seems to be the equivalent ofa discipline plus a
canon(§ 16). So, ina period close to that of the Critique of
Pure Reason, the term organon is not explicitly and exclu-
sively referred to extending knowledge, andits positive
function seems at least on some occasions to coincide with
that of canon.
(4) In the passage of the Critique of Pure Reason
under consideration (A 52; B 76; compare § 17), the notion
of organonin special logic is not provided with the connota-
tions of an ars inveniendi, of extending knowledge. Onthe
contrary, although it is taught first in the schools, as a pro-
paedeutic, it is in fact brought aboutat the final stage of a
science, andits task is that of correcting and perfecting
(Berichtigung und Vollkommenheit) that science. Thus, it
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 83

seems that the term organon, onthis occasion, is still used in

the 1775-1778 (and probably also earlier) meaning of disci-
pline plus canon suchas wefind in the Reflections. It does
not have the meaning ofan instrument for extending knowl-
edge, as wefind it does in the Lectures on Philosophical
Encyclopaedia of 1777-17802, and in othersections of the
Critique. So, this meaning of organon can be applied to the
Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, as we shall see below
(§§ 33, 34), the notion of special logic as it is defined in the
Critique is very similar to that of a kind ofpractical logic.
In the Reflections from 1775-1778, we meta practical logic
also called organon, which is defined as an instrument for
establishing the limits and the rules of pure reason--thatis,
not for extending knowledge(§ 16).
Besides, also after 1781, the term organon has two
different meanings. In the Logic edited by Jasche we find
that general logic is not an organonin that it does not lead to
extending knowledge.''' But Kant adds that this logic can be
called an organononly insofar as it serves of course not to
extend, but to assess (Beurtheilung) and to correct (Bericht-
igung) our knowledge." So the meaning of organon as
discipline plus canon, although these terms are not used on
this occasion, is preserved together with the other one."
The Logik Dohna (1792) establishes that mathematics is a
doctrine as well as an organon; that is, it makes the content
of knowledgepossible. General logic is not an organon,
because it has no (it does not consider) objects. If it is used
as an organon, it producesa dialectic, or a logicof illu-

" Dbid., pp. 13, 19-20.

"2 bid., p. 13.
"3. For another attribution ofthe function of “correction” to logic as a
canon, see Logik Politz, AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, pp. 504-505.
 oo’

84 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

sion.'" In the Wiener Logik we read thatthe theory of

method, in general logic, is the form ofa system of know.
edge, andthatit is possible to outline special theories of
method for the particular sciences. They would be technical
logics or organons, which can be expounded onlyatthe eng
ofthe science they concern, contain all technical terms, ang
are mostly dialectical."* So it seems that in this late periog
special logic, in its different branches, was partially assimi-
lated to the theory of method in general logic (as a dictio-
nary), and was considered as exposed to the dangers(dialec.
tic) inherent to an organon ofgeneral logic.
In conclusion, the term organon was always used by
Kant at least with two different meanings: (1) as an instru.
ment for extending knowledge; (2) as an instrument for
assessing and correcting knowledge. As we found clear
indications that the second meaning is attributed to special
logic in the Critique, there is no obstacle to considering the
Critique as a kind of special logic, although in 1777-1780,
the special logics of each science seemed to be considered as
an instrument for extending knowledge (§ 9). The second
meaning of organon could also offer an explanation for the
use of the term organon in connection with transcendental
aesthetic (see § 29). .
If we rememberthat much morecrucial, and much
morefrequently used terms in the Critique are used by Kant
in that careless way in regard to their meaning, which so
mucharoused the indignation of the most authoritative com-
mentators, this ambiguity in the meaning of organonis not
astonishing. A fortiori, as the term organonafterall is
employed only in a few cases in the Critique.

"4 Ibid., pp. 695-696, [779].

"S [bid., p. 795.
ae

Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 85

(S) In the Critique of Pure Reason, the term propae-

deutic is used only in connection with special logic, and with
the critique of pure reasonitself (A 11), This is at any rate
an indication ofa relationship between them.
(6) Special logic and transcendental logic have anoth-
er basic connotation in common. Special logic is contrasted
with general logic in that the latter does not concern the
different nature of its objects, while the former contains “the
tules for thinking correctly a particular kind of objects” (A
52; B 76). Now, transcendental logic does not abstract from
all content of knowledge: it concerns the rules of the pure
thinking of an object (A 55; B 80). Thatis, it is the science
of the pure knowledge whereby wethink of objects entirely a
priori. It deals with the lawsof the understanding and of
reason insofar as they are referred to objects a priori (A 57;
B 81). So it is quite clear that transcendental logic concerns
our knowledge ofa very special kind ofobjects.
32. (7) A few years after the Critique was published,
more precisely on two different occasions between 1783 and
1785, Kant explicitly identifies transcendental philosophy
with a certain kind oflogic, and on oneof these occasions
with a certain special logic. At this time transcendental phi-
losophy is almost entirely a synonym ofcritique of pure
reason.''®
Metaphysics is preceded by transcendental philosophy,
which, like logic, does not concer objects, but the
possibility, the compass and the limits of all knowledge
of pure reason (also of pure mathematics). It is the
logic ofpure rational knowledge. What [general] logic
is in respectof all knowledge, that is transcendental

€ See above, n. 101.

86 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
philosophyin respect of pure knowledgea priori.'!7
So, the first part of metaphysics is the whole
determination of our pure reason, the determination of
its nature, and of the limits ofits power. This part can
be called transcendental philosophy orthe critique of
pure reason, where reasonis its own object [that is, the
object ofreason itself].!"*
Transcendental philosophyis, in respect of
metaphysics, what [general] logic is in respect ofphilos-
ophy as a whole. [General] logic contains theuniversal
rules of our understanding, whether[its knowledge be]
founded on experience or not, and so it is an introduc-
tion to philosophy as a whole. Transcendental philoso-
phy is an introduction to pure philosophy, which is a
part of the entirety of philosophy. . . . In respect of the
pure use of reason, however, a special logic shall be
needed, which is called transcendental philosophy.
Here not the objects are considered, but rather our rea-
sonitself, as also happens in general logic.'!®

In these passagesthe situation is slightly different

from that of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here Kant con-
siders the critique of pure reason as a science which does not
concern objects, just as general logic does not. Butitis
clear that these passages substantially agree with those in the
Critique, where the fact that “a special kind of objects” is
studied in special and in transcendental logic simply means
that these kinds of logic study special ways of thinking about
someobjects, for example, in transcendental logic, the pure
a priori thinking of an object. Conversely, in 1783-1785,
the special study of the pure use of reason maybesaid not
to consider any object in particular, but is nevertheless

AK.-Ausg. XVIII, pp. 285-286, Reflection 5644 (1783-1784).

AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.1, p. 360, 1. 4-9 (Metaphysik Volckmann, 1784-1785).
Hn id., p. 363, 1. 11-25.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doetrine in Kant 47
related to that specific kind of object which belongs to pure
philosophy.
Some ofthese grounds for considering the Critique of
Pure Reason as a special logic are mere indications, But I
think thatat least ground seven is very strong, and that all of
them taken together are quite conclusive. Other confirma
tions shall follow below.

33. Atthis point, one could wonder what are the other
kindsof special logic Kant had in mind, In the Lectures on
Philosophical Encyclopaedia, Kant describes philology as the
organon for correcting or extending the historical sciences,'””
and refers to Lambert's Newes Organonas a collection of
special organons (see above § 9), In the Logicedited by
Jasche, Kant states that mathematics is an excellent organon
for extending the rational empirical sciences concerning the
physical world,'?! a statement which is repeated in later
courses onlogic.'*
In the Logik Busolt (1790), Kant maintains that an
organon(for a certain science) is possible only after that
science has been discovered and developed to a certain
extent, and that the aim of the organon is to perfect the
science in question. Bacon, for instance, wrote an Organum

'® Kantmeans obviously human, not natural history, but he should have
properly qualified which kindof history he meant, because in his time the term
history alone usually referred to both. See myarticle “The Problem.”
"1 AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 13. In fact, the rational pure sciences, or pure
philosophy, have no organon. This includes the transcendental metaphysics of
nature (AK.-Ausg. IV, pp. 469-470). The empirical science concerning the mind,
empirical psychology, is not a rational science, because mathematics cannot be
applied to its object (ibid., pp. 468, 471).
"See A711; B 739; Logik Politz, AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 505; Logik
Dohna (1792), ibid., pp. 695-696.
 OY
88 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

of the sciences, which, among other things, teaches how to

develop or extend physics.'*
In the Logic edited by Jasche, Kant does not Mention
special logic. But he introduces a quite traditional distinetion
betweentheoretical and practical logic, in order to establish
that general logic (this is one of the very few occasions
wherethe expression general logic appearsin this work)
cannot havea practical section. “This would be a contradic.
tio in adjecto, as a [general] practical logic presupposes the
knowledgeof a special kind of objects, upon whichit is
applied.”!* General logic, considered as practical, only cay
be a “technique oflearning in general,” or an “organon of
the scholastic method” (that is, of the method for teaching)
corresponding to thatsection of general logic which, under
thetitle “theory of method,” is a mere list of definitions of
logical (methodological) terms. But, properly speaking, “we
can call each science a practical logic, because in each one
we must havea [special] form of thinking.”"* Now,the
teference to a special kind of objects, or else to a special
form ofthought, clearly points out that what Kanthas in
mind here is what he elsewhere terms special logic (compare
§§ 31-32). What he means is that each science is initself,
or contains as an introduction, its own practical logic, that
is, a real methodology, which is more than a merelist of
definitions. In fact, the critique of pure reason shall belong,
accordingto the classification of the sciences offered in the

'SAK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 610. Compare B XII.

1 AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 17, 1, 32-34. Theterm applied (angewandr) does not
refer to applied logic. The distinction between pure and applied logic is a
different thing, discussed on the next page.
"8° Jbid., p. 17. 1. 37 - p. 18, 1. 10.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 89

Architectonic, to the heading of Philosophy, notto that of

logic."
It must be noticed thatthere is no indication here that
the practical logics which belongto each science should
serve to extend knowledge. Thefact that these practical
logics are more than a mere vocabulary does not imply that
they, or at least some of them, are anything more than
meansofcorrection and verification. Mathematics, as we
saw above, is termed in the same work an organon for
extending somesciences. But mathematics can certainly not
be considered a branch oflogic, and the same is true for
philology. So these are instrumental sciences, or organons,
which do notbelong to logic, and which help to extend
knowledge. Logic, as an organon, is either a mere vocabu-
lary within general logic, or within the special logics of the
sciences. As such, it may also include a vocabulary, but is
certainly more than that, though presumably without claiming
alwaysto be an instrumentfor extending those sciences.
However, it must be kept in mind that in 1777-1780 Kant, as
we already saw, and asI shall explain elsewhere,'”’ inter-
preted logic as a series of organons for each kind of knowl-
edge. Hedid this in reference to Lambert's Architectonic
(1771), which was a treatise on methodology. Now, Lam-
bert conceived this kind of logic as a logic for extending
human knowledge. So, inasmuch as Kant had Lambert’s
example in mind, he should have conceived at least some of
the special logics as instruments for extending knowledge,
while others--first and foremost the methodology of meta-
physics--could have been labeled organons in the corrective
sense of this term.

"Butsee below, § 34.

‘7 See Chap. II, §§ 13-14.
90 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

I shall add a further remark. If, accordingto the

Logic edited by Jasche, each science has its own Practical
logic or organoninitself, then the rational empirical scien
concerning the physical world havein the first place Mathe-
matics as an organonforall sciences ofthat class (see
above). In the second place, each one of those sciences has
in itself a special organon of its own. The same should
apply to the sciences concerning human history, which have
an organonfortheir class, philology (see above). Andit
would be surprising if each of them should notbe considereq
as having its own special organon. This two-tier conception
of organon wasalready present in 1772, as we saw above (§
11) with the difference that there was a general organon,
logic, plus a series of special organons. But, properly
speaking, in the Logic of Jasche general logic also can be
termed an organon, in a corrective and limiting sense (§ 31),
So, after all we are confronted here with a three-tier concep-
tion of organon: (1) a general organon belongingto general
logic; (2) a special organon, mathematics; and (3) a more
particular or specific organon, the practical logic of each
science. Only the second meaning seems tobean instrument
for extending knowledge.
To get back to the point, I shall add thatin theintro-
ductory section to the Transcendental Theory of Method of
the Critique, Kant states that this theory of method concerns
the formal'® conditions for a complete system of pure rea-
son. It performs, with respect to the transcendental in par-
ticular, the task of that would-be (general) science they
pretend to teach in schools under the nameof practicallogic
(as a part of general logic). General logic in fact can offer
in the field of methodology nothing but a series of definitions

'% The formreferred to here is not the same as that whichis studied by
general logic: see above, § 19.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 91

of technical terms (A 707-708; B 735-736). Incidentally,

this is the only occasion where Kant mentions practical logic
in the Critique. So it seemsthat in the Critique methodology
and certain sense of practical logic are synonyms. We
shall see very soon that the Critique as a whole can be
considered a methodologyin the broad sense ofthis term (§§
37-38). Now, wejust saw that, according to the Logic
edited by Jasche, special logic and practical logic are de
facto very muchthe samething.

34. Thus, the notion of practical logic as it should be, not

as it is taught in the schools, helps us realize the nature of
special logic. Not that special logic may be simply and
always identified with a valid substitute for general practical
logic. In fact, if the Critique of Pure Reason as a wholeis
one special logic, it prefixes a Theory of the Elements to the
Theory of Method, which latter can be termed a special
practical logic. Thus,atleast in the case of the special logic
of pure philosophy, this special logic is more than just a
special practical logic, but the latter correspondsatleast to a
section of the former. Still, on the other hand weshall see
(1) that the Critique as a whole is a methodology in a broad
sense (see § 37), and (2) that the special logic or organon of
a certain science (in accordance with the Wiener Logik,
whereit is called technical logic) is supposed to contain
among otherthings a list of all technical terms of method
(see § 31). Now, Kant indirectly states in the Critique,
referring at least to the Analytic of Concepts, that the latter
is a vocabulary ordictionary (Wérterbuch), although incom-
plete (A 83; B 109). According to the Lectures on Philo-
sophical Encyclopaedia (1777-17802), the whole Analytic of
 ?
92 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

the Critique is a dictionary of pure reason!” Therefore, y,

can conclude once more that(1) the notion ofspecial logic *
as dictionary plus methodology stricto sensu is Virtually the
samething as practical logic; (2) the Critique, being a dictig.
nary plus a methodologystricto sensu, and being on the
whole a methodology in a broad sense, is one practical logic
Ofcourse, the argumentfor this second conclusionpresy ,
poses the very plausible hypothesis that Kant in 1781 already
had in mind what he wrote about technical logic in the Wien.
er Logik.
Thusfar, I think that I have justified attributing to the
class of special logic at least the Transcendental Logic and
the Transcendental Theory of Method in the Critique. As
for Transcendental Aesthetic, its relationship to the whole of
the Critique as seen from this particular viewpoint needs for
its clarification the discussion of problems which belong toa
different context, and which I plan to study elsewhere.'° Qp
that occasion I will also describe the considerable impactof
the classification of the Critique as one special logic on the
interpretation of the Critique itself as a whole, and of many
ofthe specific conceptual structures it contains.

VII. THE CANONIN THE CRITIQUE

35. After this digression, which originated in the study of

the concept organon, I shall proceed to add some more de-
tails and to draw some conclusions about the other elements

"> Op. cit., p. 60.

In myarticle “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reasonwithin the Tradition of
Modern Logic,” in Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz 6.-10.
April 1974, ed. Gerhard Funke, vol. III (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1975), pp. 186-191 [included in Part One above].
 Orgation, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 93

of interest here, namely canon, discipline, and doctrinein

the Cririque.
We know that general logic is a canon"! of the un-
derstanding and of reason (but not of Judgment) in respect of
the general form of thought (§§ 17-19). Further, the tran-
seendental analytic is a canon for the appraisal of the legiti-
mate empirical and pure use of the understanding and of
Judgment in respect of the transcendental formal elements of
thought, and that this use is legitimate insofar as they are
applied within the range of possible experience (§§ 19, 20).
In the Introduction to the Critique, Kant announces that the
critique is intended to be a preparation for a canon--if not for
an orpanon--of pure knowledge a priori. Here the notion of
canonis sharply contrasted with that of organon (§§ 27-28).
Actually the Critique will not only prepare, but deliver a
canon for the pure use of the understanding, of Judgment
and ofpractical reason. As occurs in someother respects
(like describing the Critique as merely negative, see § 28),
Kant’s overall statements about the Critique can be seen to
be grossly oversimplified or one-sided.
A canonin general is defined as the compass of the a
priori principles of the correct use of certain cognitive facul-
ties in general. Where no correct use of them is possible,
there is no canon (§ 19). In fact, for pure speculative reason
there is no transcendental canon (§ 28); but there is such a
canon for pure practical reason (A 797; B 825).
It is sufficient to throw glanceat the table of con-
tents of the Critique in orderto notice that the term canon
appears in sectiontitles only in the Transcendental Theory of
Method, where we find the Canon of Pure [practical] Rea-
son. But we know that both booksof the Transcendental

"See Heimsoeth, 7D, pp. 750, 764-765.

 *¥
94 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Analytic are also canons, the onefor the understanding, the

other for Judgment, although they do notbear this title,
one is for pure knowledgea priori, the other for empirical
knowledge(see §§ 54-55). And the transcendental concepts
of reason (the ideas) are a canon for the wide and Consistent
use of the understanding. Not that the understanding may
knowthrough these ideas any more objects than it knows
through its own concepts. But they provide it with a better
and deeper knowledge of them, not to mention the fact that
perhapsthese ideas make possible a passage from the con-
cepts of nature to the practical concepts, and provide a con-
nection between the speculative knowledge of reason and
moral ideas (A 329; B 385-386).
By themselves, these tenets do notraise anyreal
problem. After all one can consider the canonic function of
the Transcendental Analytic as only one aspectof the subject
matter of that division (Abteilung) of Transcendental Logic,
Butit may be perplexing to notice that while the canonsof
the Analytic belong to the Transcendental Theory ofthe
Elements, and the canonofpractical reason belongs to the
Transcendental Theory of Method, the Theory of Method is
given within the Critique a status which is basically different
from that of the Theory of the Elements.

36. In fact, Kant states that the task of the Theory of the
Elementsis to appraise the materials of pure priori knowl-
edge, in order to establish the extent of whatcould be built
with them. The task of the Theory of Method is to establish
a plan for the building itself, to determine the formalcondi-
tions of a complete system of pure reason (A 707-708; B
735-736).
This distinction needs some clarification. As we saw
above (§§ 17-18), general logic studies the general form
(versus the content) of knowledge in general. Now, the
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 95

content of knowledgeis subdivided (§§ 18-19) into a tran-

scendental form (which is not to be confused with the gen-
eral form), consisting in the pureintellectual elements of
knowledge, and a maiter deriving from experience. The task
of transcendental logic is to appraise the truth value ofthat
transcendental form, butalso, actually, to offer an inventory
of its basic elements atleast (§ 27).
But, according to the newly introduced distinction,
the Transcendental Logic in fact is concerned only with the
pure a priori materials making out that transcendental form,
which, of course, are not the matter deriving from experi-
ence. The preeminently formalconditions of that transcen-
dental form are dealt with in the Theory of Method.'?
Thus, a basic distinction is introduced between the elemental
and the methodological sections of the Critique (see also §
40).
37. Now, it is in the Theory of Method that the problem
of a canon gains such an importance that this term appears as
the title of a chapter, and of the subsections to it. This
seems to sanction the fact, otherwise suggested by the very
function of a canon, as Kant describesit, that a canon is a
preeminently methodological notion. Nevertheless, a canon,
or, more precisely, three canons appear to be contained in
the Transcendental Logic. This would imply that the defini-
tions of the Theory of the Elements as the study of the a
priori materials, and of the Theory of Method asthe study of
the formal conditions of pure knowledge, only mean that on
the whole each theory is basically concerned with a certain
kind of factor seen from a certain angle. But this neither
excludes from any oneofthe two parts the consideration of

im See ibid., pp. 646-647.

96 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

different factors, nor the study of the same factors from a

different angle. Beside the question of canons,it is easy tg
recognize in the Transcendental Dialectic a procedure and a
state of mind similar to part of the Discipline of Pure Rea-
son, which belongs to the Theory of Method. And weshal]
see very soon that, although Disciplineis thetitle of a chap.
ter in the Theory of Method, the Theory ofthe Elements
already contains the discipline of pure reason in the sense
thatit is applied to the content of knowledge through pure
reason (see § 40).
But I would say that this sort of overlapping manifest.
ly works much morein the sense that there are methodologi-
cal factors and viewpoints in the Theory of the Elements,
than in the sense that there are elemental factors and view-
points in the Theory of Method. So the methodological
character is the most general and striking feature of the
Critique, which is not surprising at all."°* Nevertheless, this
impression could be substantiated only by a very detailed
examination of the Critique as a whole, establishing, among
other things, a more circumstantial and sophisticated descrip-
tion of the elemental factors gua elemental. Incidentally, the
dominance of the methodological aspect on the whole, if
confirmed, could perhaps be balanced by the much greater
extent of the elemental section (in comparison with the
exclusively methodological), in terms not only of the number
of pages devoted to it, but also of the actual multiplicity,

1m Occasionally, Kant seems to refer to the whole of the Critique as a

theory of method (A 82-83; B 108-109). In the secondedition appears the
famous definition of the Critique as a treatise on method (B XXII). See also
Heimsoeth, 7D, pp. 645-647, and Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer, “Le sensdela
methode dansle Discours de Descartes et la Critique de Kant,” in Studien zu
Kantsphilosophischer Entwicklung, ed. Heimsoeth, op. cit.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 97
complexity and importance ofthe elemental notionsit de-
scribes.

38. Theproblem oftherelationship between elemental

and methodological factors in the Critique is certainly one of
the basic questions raised by this work. In fact, it directly
concernsthe thorny issue ofthe relationship betweencritique
and transcendental philosophy(see § 26). It is unlikely that
this problem shall ever be solved, because of Kant’s conflict-
ing statements on the subject. The question concerns the
relationship between the positively structural and the merely
procedural factors within the Critique, if these expressions
may be allowed. In the wholetradition of Western logic
from Antiquity to Kantat least, these two factors haveal-
ways beenclosely interconnected. Thisis true not only in
respect of the connection between theoretical and method-
ological factors in logic, but in particular in respect of the
connection between ontological and specifically logical fac-
tors in logic.'* In the Critique, the two different respects of
the connection converge. The logical-theoretical and the
ontological factors tend to be, or are, identified in whatI
called the structural factors of this work, insofar as the
Critique partially overlaps transcendental philosophy (§ 26).
Only in 1781, Kant clearly establishes (temporarily) a dis-
tinction between these two sciences, in spite of what they
have in common. The Critique is assigned to the logical-
procedural, versus the ontological, aspect. A few years
later, however, these two sciences seem to be much more
extensively identified with each other (see § 32), but at the
expense of the ontological aspect. In fact, they are reduced
to the common denominator oflogic.

™ Ibid., § 2.
 Fy
98 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
The nature and the developments of this problem,
whatever they may turn out to be, are exceedingly momen,
tous. In fact they could offer the only plausible explanation,
as far as I know, for Hegel’s unification of logic and Ontoly,
gy under the common denominatorof logic. This basic
character of Hegel's philosophy has hitherto been chiefly
considered as either a personal illumination one should take
for granted in spite (or because) of its scarce intelligibility,
or as one of the most arbitrary and preposterous confusions
which ever occurred in the history of philosophy.

VIII. DISCIPLINE AND DOCTRINE IN THE CRITIQUE

39. The concept we will examine now is discipline,

Discipline, together with canon, is one of the chapters ofthe
Theory of Method. At the beginning of this chapter Kant
does his best in order to prevent any ambiguity with this
term:

1am well aware that in the terminology ofthe

Schoolsthe term discipline is commonly used as a
synonym ofinstruction (Unterweisung). But there are
on the contrary so many other cases where discipline as
severity (Zucht) is carefully distinguished from instruc-
tion as reaching (Belehrung), and alsothe nature of
thingsitself commandsthat we should preserve the only
expressionssuitable for this distinction; so that I wish
that the former term [discipline] never be used in any
but the negative sense. (A 711; B 739, footnote)
Anotherdefinition is “[t]he compulsion (Zwang), by
which the constanttendencyto infringe certain rulesis re-
strained and finally extirpated, is called discipline” (A 709,
B 737). Sodiscipline contributes negatively to the “educa-
 Organon, Canon,Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 99

tion (Bildung) of a talent,” while culture (Cultur), which is

only intended to procure a certain capability (Fertigkeit), and

ee
doctrine contribute positively to it (A 709-710; B 737-738).
Kantalso addsthat sometalents, such as imagination and wit
(Witz), obviously need a discipline. But it may seem strange
that even reason, “whose propertaskis to prescribe a disci-
pline forall other endeavors, shoulditself need a disci-
pline.”"5

40. Reason needs this “humiliation” in order not to go

astray into that field where it is not controlled by the touch-
stone of experience or of pureintuition, where it tends to
expand beyond thelimits of possible experience (A 710-711;
B 738-739. Compare A 795; B 823).

Particular errors can be eliminated by censure (Censur),

and their causes by a critique. But where, as in pure
reason, a wholesystemofillusions and deceptions
occurs . . . then a quite special and negative legislation
seems to be required, establishing, as it were, a system
ofprecautions and self-monitoring under the title of a
discipline, founded on the nature ofreason and ofthe
objects ofits pure use . . . (A 711; B 739).
But it is proper to note that in this second main
division ofthe transcendental critique I do not direct the
discipline of pure reason to the content(Inhalt), but
merely to the method of knowledge through pure rea-
son, The former has already been donein the Theory
of Elements. But though the use of reason is so simi-
lar, whateverbe the object to which it is applied, when

5 See Heimsoeth, 7D, p. 653 and n. 13 there, for other passages where
Kantmentionsthe limitation of powers. Reasonis not the onlydisciplining
power. For example, subtilty (Scharfsinnigkeit) moderates wit. Or Judgment
bounds andlimits the play ofsensibility. See my article “Kant’s Early Theory of
Genius (1770-1779),” in Journalof the History of Philosophy, IV (1966), p. 124,
 100 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
this use has to be transcendentalit is all the same so
essentially different from every other [use], that without
the admonitory negative teachingofa discipline, spe-
cially devised for the purpose, the errors cannotbe
avoided, which must necessarily arise from improperly
pursuing those methods which otherwise are suitable to
reason,but not in this case (A 712; B 740).
Weshall meet below another meaning ofthe term
censure, as attributed to the skeptics (§ 42)."° The term
censure is not specifically philosophical, butit is traditionally
connected with the notion ofcritique in otherfields.'”
The contrast between the Theory of the Elements
studying the content of pure knowledgea priori, and the
Theory of Method studying the method or formalconditions
of the same, is already familiar to us (see § 36). Aswell,
wehaveseen that the Theory of the Elements also contains
methodological factors and has a directly methodological
function of its own (see § 37). It is true Kantstates thatin
the Theory of the Elements the discipline of pure reasonis
directed not to the method, but to the content of knowledge
through pure reason. Nevertheless, imposing a discipline, a
compulsory restraint of the cognitive process, always bears
more the character of a procedural than of a structural or
elemental factor (see § 38).

41. In fact, as we know, transcendental logic also studies

the laws of reason (§§ 17, 19), but it provides a canon for
the use ofthe understanding and of Judgment, not ofreason
(§ 19). The whole of the transcendental logic, in connection

"6 See also §§ 41, 43. For therelationship betweencritique anddiscipline,

see § 53.
7” On theterm censure, and its connection with critique, see my essay
“‘Critique’ and Related Terms,” § 14.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 101
with the speculative use of pure reason, is nothing but a
discipline (A 796-797; B 824-825). It seems that, within
transcendental logic, the problems raised by reason are more
specifically dealt with in the Transcendental Dialectic (§ 19),
in a way whichin part is explicitly analogous with the case
of the Discipline belonging to the Theory of Method. The
analogy in mind here is with the discipline of the polemical
use of reason, where the specific antithetic of reason, arising
from a contradiction within reasonitself is discussed (A
738ff; B 766ff). The relationship between the Transcenden-
tal Dialectic as a discipline of reason, and the Discipline of
Reason in the Theory of Method obviously raises many far-
reaching and difficult problems'* which exceed the scope of
the present inquiry.
From a certain viewpoint, discipline is contrasted
with the notion of organon, while we are more used to
consider the latter as opposed to the notion of canon (see §§
18-19, 22-24), In fact, as Kantstates at the beginning of the
Canon of Pure Reason:

‘The greatest and perhapsthe sole use of all philosophy

ofpure reason is therefore only negative; since philoso-
physerves, not as an organon for extending, but as a
disciplinefor limiting (pure reason], and, instead of
discovering truth, it has only the modest merit of
guarding against error (A 795; B 823).
Beyondthis discipline there is no other censure of
pure reason. Kant resumesthis line of thought further
down, with a metaphorical turn. In regard to its polemical
use of the discipline of pure reason, the discipline is exerted
by “the claims ofits [reason’s] fellow-citizen,” and reason is

"See Heimsoeth, 7D, p. 655ff.

 _ os
102 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

not submitted to the “censure of a judge” (A 739; B 767)8

In fact, there is nothing superior to reason.

42. The term censure, which we already met in contrast

with discipline (§ 40) as a casual and irregular versus a
systematic emendation, deserves some attention. A certain
meaning of censure, different from that discussed above,is
identified with the role of skepticism in the developmentof
philosophy. Skepticism is the censure of dogmatism, but
this stage must be overcomeby thecritique, whichis dif-
ferent from a merely skeptical censure, because through the
critique of reason

notits [reason’s] present bounds (Schranken), butits

determinate limits (Grenzen), not its ignorance onthis
orthat point, butits ignorance in respectofall possible
questions of a certain kind, are demonstrated from
principles, and not merely conjectured (A 761; B 789).
Butthis [the skeptic’s censure] cannot decide
anything in respect of those expectationsof reason
whichlead it to hope for better success in its future
attempts, and to build claims on this foundation; so that
mere censure never can terminate the dispute on the
rights of human reason (A 764; B 792).

However, Kantattributes to metaphysics, which is

prevalently negative, the function of censorship (Censoramt,
obviously not in the skeptical sense, see § 41) in thescientif-
ic commonwealth, preventing fruitful labor from being
diverted from its aim (A 851; B 879). Within metaphysics,
the important negative use of transcendental theologyisthat
of being “a constant censor of our reason,” andits transcen-
dental criterion (Richtmaf), insofar as reason hasto do with

"See ibid., pp. 691-693.

 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 103

pure ideas (A 640; B 668). Later (1787), Kant will add that
rational psychologyis not a doctrine but a discipline (B 421).

In conclusion, it seemsthatif discipline is a kind of

systematic and demonstrative censure, occasionally the term
censure may be used instead ofdiscipline, as in the case of
transcendental theology.
As for the relationship between discipline and canon,
the first is a systematic science providing a merely negative
criterion radically forbidding a certain use of the cognitive
powers. This total prohibition applies to the transcendental
speculative use of reason only, and to sciences, such as
transcendental theology and rational psychology, which
derive from that use. In fact, there is no discipline for the
understanding nor for Judgment. A canon, on the contrary,
is the compassofthe a priori principles of the correct use of
certain cognitive faculties. It is established in order to
appraise their correct use (see § 35), insofar as these facul-
ties legitimately provide positive knowledge. However, a
canon does not extend knowledge; it is not an organon. It
simply assesses the validity of knowledge already acquired.
As we know, the system of pure philosophy cannot have an
organon--butit also does not need it, because ofthe natural
(and excessive) inclination of reason toward extending pure
knowledge a priori."° To put it in scholastic terms,artificial
logic of invention for metaphysics is impossible, butits task
is performed ad abundantiam bya natural logic of invention.

44, As we have seen (§ 39), the term discipline is also

contrasted with the term doctrine; the latter contributes

i) Ibid., pp. 652-653, 744-765. See also A 795-796; B 823-824.

Oe ™
104 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

positively to the education oftalent.'! Elsewhere, doctrine

is contrasted with critique. Philosophy as a doctrine,asit ig
intended to extend the understanding in the field of pure
knowledgea priori, is superfluousorrather ill-suited, which
simply means that an organon for philosophy is both impos-
sible and superfluous (see §§ 28-30). The critique is not a
doctrine, because it is not to extend pure a priori knowledge
(A 11-12).The task of philosophy is to try, as critique,
to prevent the blunders of Judgment (A 135; B 174).'8
General logic is a doctrine of the general form of
thought, and is a canon for reason too. Transcendental
logic, in its analytic, provides a canon for the objectively
valid, and therefore true, use of the understanding and of
Judgment, but not of reason. The Analytic of Principlesis a
doctrine of Judgment, insofar as it provides a canon for
applying intellectual concepts to appearances (A 130-132; B
169-171). So the Analytic of Principles mayalso becalled
Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment (A 137, 148; B 176,
187). Now it seemsto be clear that the status of doctrine is
granted to the Analytic of Principles, in that it studies certain
cognitive functions insofar as they can be applied to appear-
ances, to wit actual or possible experience (insofar as their
use is objectively valid (A 156; B 195). This means thatthe
factors discussed in the Analytic of Principles are notused in

‘| Kemp Smith's translation of Elementarlehre and Methodenlehre as

Doctrine of Elements and Doctrine of Method in CPR is very misleading.
Doctrin, translated by him as “doctrine,” is not a synonymofLehre, which |
translate as “theory.”
‘© On the relationship between doctrine and extending knowledge, see §§
54-55 below.
‘© What Kant writes aboutphilosophy here is to be explained either as one
ofhis frequent understatements about the task of metaphysics, or as a use of the
term philosophy restricting it to the meaningof critique of pure reason.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 105

pure knowledge a priori. Thus, the contention that the

Critique is not a doctrine is justified insofar as the Critique’s
aim is to establish a methodology of the philosophy of pure
reason (see §§ 54-55). If the Critique contains a section
which is a doctrine for empirical knowledge, this happens
because the study ofthe methodologyof pure philosophical
knowledge a priori requires, for a better clarification, the
study of some methodological factors involved in other kinds
of knowledge. Likewise, the Critique contains a discussion
of some factors belonging to the methodology of mathemat-
ics, although mathematics is a pure knowledge a priori which
does not belong to philosophy, and which at any rate needs
no critique.

IX. TERMINOLOGICAL SURVEY

45. Weshall proceed now to comparethe different mean-

ings which the four terms under consideration have in the
Critique, with those present in Kant’s earlier thought, and
with those which occur after 1781.
In Kant’s Announcement oflectures in 1765, artificial
logic is identified with organon, butit is impossible to make
out whether Kant conceives this organon as an instrument for
extending knowledge (§ 2). In the Dissertation of 1770,
Kantstates that metaphysicsis the organonofall intellectual
knowledge, and that mathematics is the organonofintuitive
knowledge (§ 3), but he does not specify the function of an
organon. According to the Logik Blomberg (1771), logic is
an unspecified organoninsofar as it is practical logic; but
there is a propaedeutical logic which is not an organon (§ 4).
The Logik Philippi (1772) states thatartificial logic is an
unspecified organon (§ 5). In the Reflections of 1772,
general logic is termed the general unspecified organonofall
 oS
106 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

those sciences which study the use of the understanding in

connection with different objects. These sciences are ther.
selves organons either of ability or of prudence. Metaphys-
ics is the organon of wisdom, which probably meansthat it
is an organon for moral philosophy (§ 11). Between 1773
and 1775, some Reflectionsinstruct us that general logicis
not an organon, unlessit is an organon forthe critique, in a
negative, limiting sense. Otherwise, if considered as an
organon for extending knowledge, it would generate a dialec-
tic (§ 12).

46. In the Metaphysik L, (1775-1780), metaphysics, con-

ceived as the methodology of metaphysics, is an unspecified
organon(§ 8). The Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopaedia
(1777-1780?) teach that philology is an unspecified organon
for the historical sciences (concerning human history). Gen-
eral logic is not an organon; if conceived as an organon, it
would derive from psychology. An organon of the under-
standing and ofreason in general, as a means for acquiring
knowledge, is impossible, but a particular organonfor each
science is possible. The context suggests that these particu-
lar organons are mostly considered as instruments for ex-
tending knowledge. Metaphysics, conceived as a methodolo-
gy of metaphysics, is an organonintended to prevent illu-
sions and to show how far the powers of reason can reach (§
9). It is clear that in this case the organonis conceived as a
kind of negative and limiting science, so that in this course
oflectures, both meanings of organonare used.
The Reflections from the years 1775 to 1778, and
someletters, offer important clarifications. The organon is
sometimesidentified with metaphysics, sometimes contrasted
with it, and sometimesit is a part of general metaphysics
(transcendental philosophy). Anyhow, organonis a term
inclusive of a discipline and of a canon; thatis, it is not
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 107

conceived as an instrumentfor extending knowledge (§§ 13,

16). As such, the organonis termed a practical logic; phi-
losophy is an organon for wisdom (§ 16).

47. In the Critique we learn that special logic corresponds

to a series of organons forthis or that science (§ 17), but it
seems thatin this case an organonis not conceived as an
instrument for extending knowledge. If general logic is
misused as an organon, or as an instrument for extending
knowledge, it generates a dialectic (§ 18). The same occurs
if transcendental logic is used as an organonfor the unlimit-
ed use of the understanding (§ 19). The possibility of an
organonofpure reason as the compass ofthe principles
necessary for acquiring pure knowledge a priori (§ 22)is
discussed, and dismissed in the Introduction to the Critique
(§§ 23, 24, 28). Transcendental aesthetic seems to be con-
sidered at a certain point as an organon, but the meaning of
the passage in question is obscure (§ 29). ‘Transcendental
logic is only a canon (§ 19), and this implies that it is not an
organon (for extending knowledge). The Transcendental
Theory of Method is certainly not an organonas an instru-
ment for extending knowledge (§§ 36-37, 41).
According to the Logic edited by Jasche, general
logic is not an organonas an instrument for extending
knowledge. But it can be called in general an organonin the
corrective and limiting sense (§ 31). Mathematics is an
organon for extending knowledge in somesciences, butit is
obviously not a part of logic. General logic as practical
logic is an “organon of the scholastic method,” a mere list
of definitions of terms. Besides, each science has its own
practical logic, which is another kind of organon, although
the term organon does notappear on this occasion (§ 33).
According to the Logik Busolt (1790), organons for
each particular science are possible, but it is not clear
108 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

whether these organons are conceived in the correcting and

limiting, or in the extending sense, or in both (§ 33). The
Logik Dohna teaches that mathematics is an organon, while
general logic is not (§ 31). The Wiener Logik teachesthat
particular organons for each science, also called technical
logics, are possible, but it seems that they are conceived as
dictionaries of technical terms (§ 31).
In the Streit der Fakultdten (1798) an organon of
religion is mentioned.’ According to the Opus postumum,
mathematics is an organon for natural science, and promotes
knowledge a priori."

48. To sum up, the term organon is used by Kant with at

least three different meanings: (1) as an instrument for
extending knowledge (a) in general, (b) as a particular in-
strument, orseries of particular instruments, for a particular
science or for someparticular sciences; (2) as an instrument
for correcting and limiting a certain kind of knowledge, both
in general, and for a particular science; (3) as list, ora
non-alphabetically ordered dictionary of technical terms.
These meanings, one and twoin particular, are frequently
used in the same work or period. Most unfortunately, Kant
is not very careful in calling the attention of the readerto the
particular meaning he attributes to this term onthedifferent
occasions where it appears.
Thefirst two meanings appear comparatively early,
being established since 1773-1775. Earlier the term was
used in an unspecified way. The third meaning doesnot
appear before 1782.
The first meaning creates major problems: is such an

“4 AK.-Ausg. VII, p. 37.

“5 AK.-Ausg. XXI, pp. 194, 209.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 109

organon possible? In which respect? Since 1773-1775,

general logic is not an organonin this sense. But between
1773 and 1775 it may becalled an organonin the second
sense. Between 1775 and 1780, an organonin thefirst sense
is impossible in general, but organonsas instruments for
particular sciences are possible. Metaphysics is frequently
considered as an organonin the second sense. Organon in
the second sense is identified once with practical logic, and
on some occasions with the discipline plus the canon.
In the Critique, both general and transcendental logic
cannot be an organon in the first meaning, otherwise they
generate a dialectic; but, implicitly, they can be an organon.
Particular organons in the second meaning forthe different
sciences are possible, and they are called special logic. The
Theory of Method is not an organonin the first sense as an
instrument for particular sciences, but implicitly it could be
considered as an organonin the second sense. If the Cri-
tique as a whole can be considered the second kind of orga-
non, this also implies thatit is at the same time partially an
organonin the third sense (see § 34). It is my contention
that the Critique is a special logic for the system of pure
reason.
The Logik Philippi (1772) offers another example of
the second meaning of organon as applied to special logic in
the case of Epicurus (see below § 51).
In the Logic edited by Jasche, general logic, as theo-
retical, is not an organonin the first, but in the second
sense; as practical it is an organonin the third sense. Math-
ematics is an organonin thefirst sense, being an instrument
for particular sciences. Besides, there are particular special
logics for each science, which are conceived as organonsin
the second sense. In 1794-1796, particular organons for
each science seem to be conceived as organons in the third
sense.
 ON
110 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

Notall organons belong to logic: in 1777-1780, phi-

lology is termed an organon (most probably in thefirst
meaning)forthe historical sciences. In the Logicedited by
Jasche, and in later courses on logic," mathematics is an
organoninthe first sense (see § 47). Mathematics had
already been defined as an unspecified organon in the Dis-
sertation of 1770. Sometimes (1772, 1775-1778) philosophy
is considered as an unspecified organon for wisdom. Other
sciences are considered in 1772 as unspecified organons
either for ability or for prudence.
49. The term canon appears for the first time between
1773 and 1775 in Kant’s Reflections. General logic, being a
compass ofa priori rules, is termed a canonorcriterion for
doctrine (§ 12). Between 1775 and 1778, the canon, follow-
ingthe discipline,is a part of the organon belongingto
general metaphysics or transcendental philosophy, although
the use of the latter phrase is not consistently established.
Discipline and canon are preceded by a critique, and some-
times followed by an architectonic (§ 13). Canon is the
criterion and norm of pure reason, and the propositions of
transcendental philosophy can become dogmatic only if they
are in accordance with this canon. There is also a canon for
the empirical use of reason (§ 16).
In 1781, thetitle Critique of Pure Reason, already
announced previously, is finally established asthat of the
science inquiring into the possibility of a system of pure
reason, and the Critique is sharply distinguished from tran-
scendental philosophy. In the Critique, general logic is
considered as a canon for the understanding and for reason,
but not for Judgment, in respect of the general form of

See n. 122 above.

 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 111

thought. Transcendental analytic is a canon for the appraisal

of the legitimate (pure and empirical) use of the understand-
ing (Analytic of Concepts) and of Judgment (Analytic of
Principles) in connection with the transcendental formal
elements of thought. The transcendental concepts of reason,
or ideas, studied in the Transcendental Dialectic, are a canon
for a better, not larger, use of the understanding in transcen-
dental knowledge, and for finding a passage from speculative
to practical knowledge. A canon in general is defined as the
compass of the a priori principles of the correct use of cer-
tain cognitive faculties in general. There is no transcenden-
tal canon for pure speculative reason, but there is such a
canon for pure practical reason in the Theory of Method (§
35). Canon is a preeminently methodological term although
it is also applied to somesections of the elemental part of the
Critique (§ 37). As for the contrast between discipline and
canon, see §§ 43, 53.

50. After 1781, the use of this term remains consistent.

In the Logic edited by Jasche, general logic is a canon as the
science of the necessary laws of thought, ruling all uses of
the understanding and of reason. These laws do not derive
from anything else, and they are a priori.” Aesthetics is a
mere critique of taste, and it is not a canon (law), but only a
norm (example or criterion), since its principles are empiri-
cal, and it has no rules a priori. But generallogic is not
mere critique; it is a canon, which can subsequently be used
as a critique.'** Also, a definition of canon is offered:

"" AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 13.

'* Ibid., p. 15; compare p. 17. See also AK.-Ausg. IV, p. 387 (Grund-
legung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785); AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 45, Reflection 1628
(after 1780), where amongother things, the canonas a doctrine (in logic)is
opposed to the exemplar(in aesthetics); and p. 43, Reflection 1627 (after 1789).
 >
112 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

canons “are universal aphorisms, which serve as a founda-

tion for the sciences, and which express something lofty ang
well-considered.”"“?
Once,in 1785, one ofthe formulations of the moral
law is called “the canon of moral assessment (Beurtheil-
ung).”1
In the Logik Pélitz, a canonis defined as “a science
offering the principles a priori, ruling the correct use of the
powers of our understanding,” or as “a prescription founded
on pure reason, without which no correct use of the under-
standing is possible.” General logic is a canon ofthe under-
standing and ofreason; it corrects, but it does notextend our
knowledge. General logic, as a canon, is a demonstrative
science, and criterion (Richtschnur) of our understand-
ing.'S' The sameis repeated in the Logik Busolt (1790),
with the addition that aesthetics is not a canon.'? In the
tract Uber eine Entdeckung (1790), we read that the canonof
the critique consists in the answer to the following question:
howis synthetic knowledge a priori possible?"®* The Logik
Dohna (1792) repeats that general logic is a science founded
onprinciples a priori. Thus it is a doctrine, which is a
canonof the understanding and ofreason; it is a demonstra-
ted critique. It is not an organon. Logic as a canon is used
analytically, as an organon, dialectically.'* In the tract Das
magin der Theorie (1793) a canon ofpractical reason is

“© AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 77
"© AK.-Ausg. IV, p. 424 (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten). In the
same work, the definition of general logic as a canon reappears on p. 387.
‘S| AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, pp. 504-506.
12 Jbid., pp. 610-611.
"8 AK.-Ausg. VIIL, p. 227.
‘St AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, pp. 694-695. Compare p. 779. Obviously Kant
refers to the first meaning of organon,see § 48.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 113

mentioned; the same occursin the Verktindigung (1796). On

the latter occasion, the canonis the highest principle of
morality.'** The Wiener Logik restates the same points of
the Logik Dohna, adding that general logic is not only (gar
keine Kritik) a critique, because it is a demonstrated doctrine
which precedes the assessment (compare § 54). But, as an
analytic, it is used as a critique of knowledge in respect of
its truth. Only the dogmatic ortheoretical part of general
logic, the Theory of the Elements, is a canon. The practical
or technical part, the Theory of Method, is not a canon. It
is only a prescription of (conventional) rules or terms for use
in the schools.'** In the Opus postumum we read that mathe-
matics is not a canon for philosophy or for natural science. '*”

51. Almostat the beginning of each course on general

logic, Kant offers a surveyof the history of logic. In the
Logik Blomberg (1771), Kant praises Epicurus as the ancient
philosopher who did in Antiquity what Descartes did in mod-
ern philosophy, namely, improve the traditional method of
philosophy.'** Since the Logik Philippi (1772), Kant refers
more precisely to the canons of Epicurus, whose logic “was
merely negative and consisted of a few propositions. Its pur-
pose wasto protect human reason from errors and confu-
sions.” He adds:

The canons of Epicurus. He expounded [in his philoso-

phy]the theories which are founded on experience. Of
course such a logic had to be very usefulfor the under-
standing through the confirmation of knowledge through

AK.-Ausg. VIII, pp. 277, 420.

AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, pp. 792-794.
AK.-Ausg. XXI, pp. 194, 209.
AK.-Ausg. XX1V.1, pp. 35-37.
114 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
sensible cases. But basically it was only an organon of
physics.'*
It is obvious that here it is the second meaning of organon
which is meant (see § 48), since it is negative, and used for
confirmation.
The Logic edited by Jasche underlines the Telationship
between the logic of Kant and Epicurus:

Logic . . . as a general propaedeutic to all use

of the understanding andofreason,is only a general
act of reason (canonica Epicuri), in order to make
knowledge in general conform to the form ofthe under-
standing... .'°

Immediately thereafter follows the definition of general logic

as a canon (§ 50). Also in later courses on logic, Epicurus’s
canonic is mentioned. '*!
In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) wefinda
statement which is probably the mostinteresting about Epi-
curus’s canonic:

. according to the canonic of Epicurus, anything

which cannot confirm its objective reality through
evident examples broughtforward in experience, is
excluded as an empty cavil, evenif it is very much
involved in the interest of the practical (pure) use [of
reason], andif it would notcontradicttheoretical [rea-
son], simply because it is actually prejudicialto the
interest of speculative reason,in thatit suppresses the
limits (Grenzen) whichit [reason] poses toitself, and

19 Ibid., p. 336.
1@ AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 13.
"| AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 509 (Logik Pélitz); p. 796 (Wiener Logik).
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 115

surrenders it to all nonsense and folly of the imagina-

tion.'*

Canonis unfortunately one of the few terms Kant used with

a fairly constant meaning throughout his philosophical ca-
reer.

52. The terms discipline and doctrine must be examined

together, as they are very closely interrelated. In fact, when
they appear for the first time in 1765, they are synonyms,
and their meaning is that of science (§ 2). In the Reflections
of 1769, logic is termed “the general doctrine of human
reason,” which is objective and dogmatic, while metaphysics
is not a doctrine (§ 10). In 1770, general phenomenology,
which is a merely negative science preceding metaphysics, is
termed a discipline (§ 3). Both terms reappear in 1771
(Logik Blomberg), where they are contrasted with each
other. General logic, as theoretical, is a doctrine or science,
insofar as it is (its rules are) demonstrated. In this respectit
is contrasted with the critique (general logic is not merely a
critique, it is a doctrine). Discipline denotes general logic as
practical, as a science, insofar as it is apt to teach the use or
application of the rules it comprehends, and this is an in-
struction (Unterweisung) (§ 4). This meaning ofdiscipline is
preserved in the Logik Philippi (1772), where Kant states
that practical logic, which is a discipline, is oflittle or no
use, and gives somereasons forthis uselessness (§ 7). This
tenet he maintained for the rest of his career.
In the Reflections of 1773-1775, the rules of general
logic constitute a canon for doctrine: doctrine is a science a
priori (§ 12). According to the Reflections of 1775-1778,
the discipline is that part of transcendental philosophy which

'@ AK.-Ausg. V, p. 120.

116 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
is negative, as contrasted with the canon, Which i6 periting
Occasionally, both of them are subordinated to the firm
meaning of organon (4 13). A discipline is a critical kay,
edge, which does not increase knowledge, but prevents
extor. It concerns the rules of the subject, not of the chien,
that is, it concernsthe subjective use of ream. Metaphyse
is the foundation of a discipline, not of a doctrine. A diy4.
pline is the correction and chastisement of pure reaum, {1
limits the powers of the mind within their suitable borders,
by diverting it from bad habits. Kant alw gives some exam
pies of tenets belonging to this discipline of pure reaum (4
15). The Ethik Menzer (1780-1781) defines discipline and
doctrine from an educational viewpoint. Discipline means
severity and compulsion in the training of moral behavior,
while doctrine means teaching as an acquisition of know\-
edge ($ 10).
33. In the Critique, dixipline is contrasted with doctrine
(canon and censure as well). Kant announces that he will
use the term discipline in a merely negative sense, as severi-
ty and compulsion for the “education of talent.” He explict-
ly rules out its other meaning as instruction. Doctrine, on
the contrary, is a positive contribution to culture (% 39),
Censure consists in the elimination of particular and occa-
sional errors, but discipline is a special negative legislation
esablishing 2 system of precautions against that system of
illusions which occurs in pure reason. Discipline is a term
belonging to methodology, and is the title of a section in the
Theory of Method, although it is also applied to some ele
mental sections of the Critique ($ 40). In fact, the whole of
tranwendental logic, in connection with the speculative use
of pure reason, is a discipline. But it seems that the disi-
pline of transcendental logic centers on transcendental dialec-
tic. Philosophy is not an organon for extending knowledge,
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 117
but it is basically a discipline for the limitation of pure
reason (% 41). Sometimes the terms discipline and censure
seem to be synonyms (§ 42).
Asfor the contrast between discipline and canon, the
former corresponds to a negative criterion radically forbid-
ding a certain use of the cognitive powers. The latter is an
instrument for assessing the correct positive use of certain
cognitive faculties, insofar as this use is legitimate ($ 43).
There is also a certain contrast between critique and
discipline. The critique eliminates the causes of particular
errors, and is the foundation for a certain kind of censure (§
40). But that kind of censure which is exerted by the skep-
tics is not founded on critique, because its foundation does
not rest on a demonstration from principles. This demon-
stration takes place only in the critique, delimiting the extent
of our ignorance in respect of all possible questions, but
hereby also establishing the field of legitimate positive
knowledge (§ 42). Thus, it appears that the critique can
found not only a non-skeptical censure (§ 40), but also a
discipline or a system of precautions--and, of course, a
canon. Only it is not clear whether the critique which
founds a non-skeptical censure is the same thing as the
critique which founds a discipline. In the nineties, a distinc-
tion between two kinds ofcritique is introduced (§ 50), but
we have no evidence allowing us to predate this distinction
as early as 1781.
In the Prolegomena (1783) weread that a discipline
throughcritique is necessary for metaphysics." The Cri-
tique of Practical Reason states that we are under the dis-
cipline of reason, and mentions a discipline of morals.’ In

“| AK.-Ausg. IV, p. 362.

'@ AK.-Ausg. V, pp. 82, 86.
 >

118 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

the Critique ofJudgment, taste is defined as the discipline o,

constriction (Zucht) of genius; culture as a discipline frees
the will from lusts (Begierden).'* In the Prize Essay on the
Progresses of Metaphysics (1791-1795) the final stage of
metaphysics, as theory of wisdom (Weisheitslehre), is de-
fined as a practical-dogmatic discipline. This is opposed to
dogmatic metaphysics, which pretends to bea theoretical-
dogmatic doctrine, and the theory of doubt, whichis a skep-
tical discipline." In the Pedagogy, discipline is mentioned
very frequently in a merely educational sense, whichis also
present in Religion Within the Borders of Reason Only
(1793) and in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797).'° The
Opus postumum discusses a discipline of legal theory and
physics."

54. As for the term doctrine, we knowthatit is in 1765 a

synonym ofdiscipline and of science (§ 2). In 1769, Kant
states that metaphysics, as a critique of human reason, is not
a doctrine (§ 10). In 1771, logic is said to be a doctrine
becauseits rules are established a priori (§ 4). In 1772,
artificial logic is termed a doctrine, and an organonofthe
sciences (§ 5). Between 1773 and 1775, generallogicis
defined as a canon for doctrine; doctrine is a science a priori
(§ 12). Between 1775 and 1778 the analytic, which is a part
of the critique, is considered as a doctrine or logic oftruth
(§ 14), but the critique as a whole never becomes a doctrine.
A doctrine is something positive, and corresponds to dogmat-
ic knowledge. Metaphysics is not the foundation of a doc-

‘© Jbid., pp. 319, [417], 432.

"6 4K.-Ausg. XX, p. 273, 1. 7-10.
"© AK.-Ausg. VI, pp. 58, 180, 217, 452, 485.
'® AK.-Ausg. XX1, pp. 178, 180, 289, 361, 506, 525; AK.-Ausg. XXII, p
265.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 119

trine (§ 15). In 1780-1781, the pedagogical meaning of the

term doctrine is explained (§ 9),
In the Critique of Pure Reason, doctrine denotes a
kind of knowledge whichcontributes positively to the educa-
tion oftalent (§ 39), and consists in an extension of knowl-
edge. In this respect, it is contrasted with critique, and with
discipline in particular (§ 44).
General logic is a demonstrated doctrine of the gener-
al form of thought (§ 44). The Analytic of Principles, which
is nothing but a canon for Judgment, is a transcendental
doctrine of Judgment. It is a canon for Judgment only, in
that it teaches how to apply to appearances, the intellectual
concepts which contain the a priori condition for rules (A
132; B 171). In fact, philosophy is superfluous, or misused,
if it is considered as a doctrine intended to extend the under-
standing in the field of pure knowledgea priori (A 135; B
174).

Buttranscendentalphilosophy has the pecu-

liarity [which general logic has not]of being able to
indicate a priori, beside the rule (orrather the universal
condition for rules), which is given in the pure concept
of the understanding, also the instance to which the rule
hasto be applied . . . . [In fact transcendental philoso-
phy] mustalso expound in universal, but adequate cri-
teria (Kennzeichen), the conditions under which objects
[of experience] can be given in harmony with those
concepts, otherwise the concepts in question would be
void of all content, and therefore mere logical forms,
andnotpureintellectual concepts (A 135-136; B 174-
175).

Thus, the transcendental doctrine of Judgment shall

contain (1) a section on the sensible conditions of the use of
pureintellectual concepts, or schematism, and (2) a section
on the synthetic judgments deriving a priori from pure intel-
 Os
120 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

lectual concepts under these conditions, and whichlie a

priori at the foundation ofall other knowledge. These judg.
ments are the principles of pure understanding (A 136; B
175). Without them, intellectual concepts would have no
objective validity, no sense and no meaning (A 156; B 195),
It is clear that the Analytic of Principlesis a doctrine
insofar as it provides principles for extending objective
empirical knowledge. Thus,there is no contradiction with
the statement that the Critique does not provide any means
for extending pure a priori knowledge. Now,it is necessary
for the Critique to establish a schematism, as well as these
principles, although the Critique is a methodology of meta-
physics and not of empirical knowledge. This is necessary
because the validity of the pure intellectual concepts listed in
the Analytic of Concepts as a foundation for the validity of
metaphysics depends on the validity of the same concepts as
conditions under which possible or actual objects of experi-
ence can be given. Forthis it is necessary to establish the
schematism, and the principles which are needed for extend-
ing empirical knowledge.
Thus, when Kant writes that the Critique is not a
doctrine, this is not true for all parts of that work. This is
another example of the inaccuracy in many of Kant’s state-
ments,
But the Critique as a whole is intended to be the
methodology of the philosophy of pure reason, and therefore
it is not a doctrine, except incidentally, as in the Analytic of
Principles (§ 44; see also §§ 22, 27).
According to the Logic edited by Jasche, general
logic is a doctrine, a demonstrated theory (a dogmatic sci-
ence a priori), or a doctrine for a canon of the use of the
understanding and of reason, while aesthetics is merely a
critique. Knowledge founded on empirical principles cannot
be a science or doctrine. General logic is a merely theoreti-
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 121

cal and universal doctrine, not a practical art or organon.'*”

In the second edition of the Critique (1787), we learn
that rational psychologyis not a doctrine, but only a disci-
pline, because its positive tenets cannot be demonstrated, and
its function consists in establishing that such positive tenets
are not valid (B 421; compare B 399-401). This seems to
imply that the metaphysics of nature and of morals are doc-
trines. In the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant states that a
critique of the cognitive power has no domain in respect of
the objects. Thus it is not a doctrine, but its task is only to
inquire whether a doctrine is possible in that respect.'*

56. From the First Introduction to the Critique of Judg-

ment (1789? 1790?), we gather that the system of the cri-
tique of pure reason, to whichthe critique of Judgment
belongs, is not a doctrine. Philosophy, as a doctrinal sys-
tem, concerns nature and freedom only.'® In the Preface to
the Critique of Judgment, Kant declares that with this work
he has completed his critical task, and that he will now pro-
ceed to carry out his doctrinal task,'” expounding the meta-
physics of nature and of morals in a final and complete
form. In the third Critique wealso learn that a doctrine
must have determining (bestimmend) principles.'"" Teleology
does not belong to any doctrine; it belongs only to the cri-
tique.'”
Later, Kant repeats that general logic as a doctrine is
a canon of the understanding and of reason. A doctrine is a

AK.-Ausg. IX, pp. 14-16.

AK.-Ausg. V, p. 176.
AK.-Ausg. XX, p. 205; compare p. 242.
AK.-Ausg. V, p. 170.
Ibid., p. 194.
Ibid., p. 417.
 Ss
122 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

demonstrated discipline. Discipline, in this case, clearly

means positive knowledge, as in Kant’s earlier period (see §
52). Mathematics is a doctrine and an organon simultane-
ously.!? Logic is a demonstrated science; a science founded
on principles a priori is a doctrine. If the rule of judgment
precedes the actual judgments, this rule is a doctrine; ifthe
actual judgments precedetherule, this rule is a critique."
In the Prize Essay on the Progresses of Metaphysics (1791-
1795), Kant states that dogmatic metaphysics would be a
theoretical-dogmatic doctrine (see § 53). In the Metaphysics
of Morals (1797), we read that the theory ofvirtue is a
doctrine. But, in this context, it seems that the term doctrine
simply indicates that that theory is not innate, and must be
learned." In the Opus postumum,in spite of some indeci-
sion, transcendental philosophy is termed a doctrine of rea-
son, both theoretical and practical (philosophy of nature and
philosophy of morals).'”° It is clear that here transcendental
philosophy is something different from the critique in gen-
eral.
To sum up, doctrine means for Kant a positive dog-
matic knowledge founded on determinantprinciplesa priori,
and having a domain in respect of the objects because its
principles can be referred to possible or actual experience.
It extends, or helps to extend legitimate and demonstrative
knowledge. The three Critiques in general are not a doc-
trine; only the Analytic of Principles in the first Critiqueis a

"3 AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, pp. 694-695 (Logik Dohna, 1792).

14 Ibid., p. 793 (Wiener Logik).
15 AK.-Ausg. V1, p. 477.
"8 AK.-Ausg. XXI, pp. 6, 91, 95, 102, 104, 106, 117, 119, 133, 135, 619,
622; AK.-Ausg. XXII, pp. 172-174, 197, 317, [321], 335, 352-353, 361, 370,
373, 377-378, 380, 382-384, 389, 391, 393, 395-396, 398, 400, 407-408, 451,
459-460, 462, 470, 478, 482, 484, 500.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 123

doctrine. The metaphysics of nature and of morals, and

general logic are doctrines; rational psychologyis not.

X. CONCLUSION TO PART ONE

The different meanings Kant gives to the term orga-

non after 1777-1780 can be easily accounted forif their his-
torical precedents are considered. These meanings are
basically (1) an instrumentfor extending knowledge, (2) an
instrumentfor correcting and limiting knowledge and (3) a
non-alphabetically ordered dictionary of ontological or meth-
odological terms.'” Lambert’s different uses of the term
organon in his New Organon (1764) andin his Architectonic
(1771) are probably the best points of departure for a further
discussion. For him, organonis (1) an instrument for ex-
tending knowledge (invention), (2) an instrument for seman-
tics, (3) an instrument for demonstration and (4) an instru-
ment for correction.’ Moreover, Lambert explicitly accepts
the view that his ontology-methodology, the Architectonic,'”
is in part a kind ofdictionary.'*°
Kant doesnotattribute to the organon any semantic
function. But, considering that a theory of languageis
totally absent from Kant’s logic and methodology,it is not
astonishing that he does not follow Lambert on this point.
Still, Kant’s notion of organon is more specialized than that
of Lambert. Kant’s organon is not an instrument of demon-
stration, and it is a methodology, not a general theoretical

"7 See above, § 48.

™ Chap. II, §§ 12-13.
'® On the relationship between Lambert's Architectonic (1771) with his New
Organon (1764), see Chap.II, §§ 14, 18, 19.
“© Jbid., § 20.
124 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

logic. This is more difficult to explain, if we assumethat

Kant developed his notion of organon according to a per-
spective conditioned by Lambert. But we shall notice thatin
Lambert's notion of an organonthe theoretical and the meth-
odological aspects of logic are merged, and this may be
easily interpreted as an overall orientation ofhis logic to-
wards methodology.'*! Moreover, in his Architectonic,
Lambert takesparticular care in stressing the methodological
aspect of this work (the “use of concepts”), thereby inten-
tionally replacing the traditional “topics” through series of
particular methodologies." Lambert does not use the term
organonon this occasion, as this would have amounted to a
reproduction of his New Organon, and this was only partially
(if at all) his intention. After all, the formal-demonstrative
aspect and the corrective aspect of the Phanomenologie of
his New Organon had notbeen replaced by the Architecton-
ic. But, as topics is traditionally a term denoting, among
other things, special logic or methodology, a critical reader
may easily have reached the conclusion that Lambert’s Ar-
chitectonic was his real organon, if this organon is conceived
as a methodology, and in particular as a methodology for
extending knowledge.
Tf so, it is plausible to infer that, as the theory of
demonstration is traditionally the core of theoretical logic, a
logic conceived as a methodology, and called organon,
should not include that theory, which Kant in fact finds
convenientto locate in general logic. This explanation can
be supplemented by a reference to Bacon’s notion of an
organon, which Kantcertainly kept in mind while estab-
lishing the structure of his Critique. For Bacon, the new

Ibid., § 13.
2 dbid., § 14.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 125

organonis notidentical with logic. It is only a part, its task

being corrective and inventive,

58. In this perspective, Lambert’s theories also help us to

realize how Kantarrived at the idea that a general (exten-
sive) organon is impossible. Lambert’s Architectonic is a
series of particular methodologies, while the possibility of a
general methodology is denied by him. Besides, a funda-
mental function of the Architectonic is to be a research on
the “use of concepts,” as Lambert puts it." This may be
interpreted as aiming at establishing (1) how the concepts
can beused in order to extend knowledge (invention) and (2)
howfar it is licit to extend knowledge through the concepts
in question (limitation and correction). Thus, this accounts
for two of the functions probably attributed by Kant to the
particular organons. D’Alembert’s influence'®’ most proba-
bly concurred with that of Lambert in motivating Kant’s
acceptance and personal adaptation of this important point to
his views.
Another element which presumably was atleast
partially suggested by Lambert is Kant’s two- or three-tier
conception of organon. First, there is a general corrective
and limiting organon within general logic. Second, there is
an organon for extending knowledge, corresponding to two
particular (instrumental) sciences, mathematics and philolo-
gy. Third, there are the special logics or organons of each
science, which can beeither extensive, or corrective, or
both. Now, examining Lambert’s works from his viewpoint,
Kant could consider the New Organon as a kind of general
methodology, whosecorrective aspect had not beenentirely

16 Ibid., §§ 3-4.
wee Ibid., § 14.
is Ibid., § 15.
 “N

126 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

superseded by the Architectonic. He could consider the

Architectonicitself as a series of special logics or organons
either extensive, or corrective, or both.'** Furthermore, '
Lambert had established a parallelism between applied logic
and mathematics,'*” so that mathematics was implicitly grant.
ed by Lambert the status of an organon.

59. However, Kant’s assumptionthat philology and math.

ematics are akin to logic in their methodological functionis
better understood if we consider it as the outcomeofthe
developmentof some different and rather old traditions.
Someof them related logic to grammar andrhetoric (philol-
ogy),'** somerelated it to mathematics. Amongthelatter,
Kantpossibly knew Gassendi’s position,"® and certainly was
awareof that of Reusch, who was one of the most prominent
Wolffians.' What else Kant knew ofthe othertraditions in
question is impossible to establish even hypothetically, but
they were so numerous and extended in such different areas
that he certainly was reached by someoftheir echos. How-
ever, Reusch’s position, combined with that of Lambert,
might be enough to explain the process leading Kant to
develop his views on this subject. But it must be noticed
that there are some obvious differences between Kant’s and
Reusch’s position. For Kant, philology is an organon for
some sciences, and mathematics is an organon for other
sciences. Reusch does not introduce this limitation, although
we may think that he implicitly recognized it. Moreover,
Kantobviously introduces a special methodology for meta-

See above, §§ 33, 47-48,

Chap. II, §§ 10, 19.
Ibid., §§ 6-9.
Ibid., § 10.
Ibid., §§ 6, 11.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 127

physics, not to mention the basic difference between Kant’s

and Reusch’s general doctrines on logic and methodology.
Another elementpresent in Kant in 1790 and proba-
bly earlier is that the special organon for certain sciences can
be established only after those sciences have reached a cer-
tain stage of development, in order further to improve
them.'*' Now Lambert had madethis point in connection
with the methodology of mathematics.!”
A further point where the impact of Lambert’s tenets
was also reinforced and modified by an analogous, although
different tradition, is the conception of an organon or meth-
odology as a dictionary of ontological terms. Along this
line, Kant found clear and famous precedents in the early
school of Christian Thomasius.' An offspring, in this
respect, of the most radical nominalistic tradition, Thomasius
considered ontological notions to be a series of human con-
structs expressive througharbitrary terms of a human mental
ordering of things not corresponding to an order of being.
Thus, he debased ontology toa series of definitions, to a
non-alphabetically ordered dictionary of terms with merely
instrumental character, and therefore appended it to logic.
A similar conception of ontology suited Kant’s pur-
poses, and was adopted by him in that he declared the Ana-
lytic of Concepts to be a dictionary of terms.'™ Certainly,
the question of the relationship between logic and metaphys-
ics was not settled once and for all through this simple solu-
tion. On the contrary, this was to be a central and most in-
triguing problem for Kant during his entire philosophical
career, as it was later for Kant’s interpreters, until the pres-

See above, §§ 2, 17, 33.

Chap. II, § 18.
Ibid., §§ 20-22.
See above, § 34. Compare Chap. II, § 22.
128 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

ent. In fact this question corresponds, in its most Specific

terms, to the relationship betweencritique of pure Teason
and transcendental philosophy or ontology, a relationship
which underwent many momentousvicissitudes during the
evolution of Kant’s thought."**

The relationship between logic and metaphysics haq

originated one of the major discussions in modern Aristote.
lianism and in somerelated trends. The problems of the
first principles, of the basic notions and of the nature of
knowledge, were disputed ground betweenthe twosciences,
The nominalistic tradition tried to confine these subjects to
logic, while an irenic trend proposed as a partial solution the
institution of two new sciences, noology and gnostology.
These were intended to provide a neutral frameofreference
for someofthe subjects in question, without prejudice to any
ofthe basic alternatives.'% This attempt was doomed to fail,
Its analogy with that nineteenth-century sciencecalled theory
of knowledge is probably very superficial. Moreover, a
similar ambiguity was present, for different reasons,in the
British and French philosophy of that time. The borders
between logic and metaphysics had been eroded, and meta-
physics was frequently conceived of as a mere methodology
for the sciences.'*? Lambert himself brought about, as we
have seen, a kind of merger between ontology and meth-
odology, which, if it did not offer any clear solutionto the
problem, was highly indicative of the tensions with which
the disputed elements were loaded in Germany too.'*
However, it was a state of affairs analogous to those

See above, §§ 24-27.

Chap.II, §§ 16-17.
Ibid., § 15.
Ibid., § 18.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 129

described that generated one of the major ambiguities in

Kant’s thought. To whatextent is the Critique of Pure
Reason a treatise on methodologyrather than on metaphys-
ics? To what extent doesthis treatise on methodology con-
tain structural elements of metaphysical extraction? In fact,
as I tried to prove,'® institutionally, the Critique belongs to
the field of logic, not to that of metaphysics. And I will
show in the next chapterhow deeply the Critique was
moulded on the pattern of sometraditional structural ele-
ments of logic, since it was intended to bea treatise on logic
sui generis. But it would be a major mistake to forgetthat if
the Critique, as a methodology, belongs to the field of logic,
as a special methodology for metaphysics, it is also con-
structed in accordance with the blueprint of the major meta-
physical problems atstake in that time, ontological, cosmo-
logical, psychological and theological. To realize this is
comparatively easy, but to draw the due consequences from
this perspective is a task which shall probably never be
completely and satisfactorily performed. In fact, it amounts
to producing a complete inventory ofthe origin of the ele-
ments composing the Critique, and to establishing the geneti-
cal order and the interrelationship of these elements. This is
the more difficult, as Kant himself was certainly only partial-
ly aware of the extraction and of the traditional connotations
of the concepts with which he was dealing.

61. As for the term canon, we disregard the multifarious

non-philosophical meanings ofthis term. Its basic logical
meanings are as a standard oftruth or else as a cognitive
principle or rule within a science, that is, as a principle or

See above, §§ 30-34.

Chap. II, §§ 23-24, 27-28.
130 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

tule of a science insofar as they are regarded as cognitive

principles for establishing or developing that science. The,
are not considered as ontological principles ofthe things
studied by that science, although in fact they also may be
very frequently identical with them. These logical meanings
were transmitted to modern philosophy from the philosophy
of Antiquity. This term was very widely used in German
seventeenth-century philosophy, where its ancientethical
meaning as a standard of behavior, is also present. In eigh-
teenth-century Germanythis term is much less frequently
used, and seems to have been regarded as obsoletesinceit
was sometimes mentioned in connection with “old metaphys-
ics”; only its logical meaning seems to have survived. In
other countries, the term in question seems to havealmost
entirely disappeared.7”
This wouldsufficiently account for Kant’s use of
canon. Asa logical term, meaning a positive standard of
truth, it is quite suitable to the Crisique. As an obsolete
term, it was selected by Kant, together with many other
terms of old, in order to denote with an ancient and venera-
ble expression one of the new concepts ofhis philosophy.””
Its very infrequent use in Kant’s ethics, as a principle for
moral discernment (1785) or as the highest principle of
morality (1795),?°° may be explained either through Kant’s
knowledge of this use of the term in seventeenth-century
philosophy, or as an extension of its logical meaning.
But another element precedes more exactly Kant’s use
of this term. Within the tradition of the historiography of

™ See myarticle “Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-aristotelischen Ter

minologie bei Kant wahrend der Entstehung der ,Kritik der reinen Vernunft’,”
Archivfir Begriffsgeschichte, 1X (1964).
22” See above, § 50.
3 Chap. II, §§ 25-26.
 Organon, Canon, Discipline, Doctrine in Kant 131

philosophy, from Diogenes Laertius to Gassendi, Stanley,

Christian Thomasius, Walch and Brucker, canon was
knownas the typical term for Epicurus’ logic. His logic was
considered to be very simplified, because it refrained from
the complications of the Aristotelian and other logical tradi-
tions, and to be a corrective logic, basically intended as a
methodology for physics. The Thomasian school, to which
Walch and Brucker belonged, was particularly sympathetic to
this approach in logic, and so was Kant, although on a
different plan. The fact that Kant referred to Epicurus in
this respect proves that he was fully aware ofthe historical
tradition in question,” and this must have been a more
specific ground for him to select canon as one of the key
terms ofthe Critique, and to apply it to general logic as
well.

62. The term criterion, sometimes used by Kant as a

synonym ofcanon, also derives from ancient logic, whereit
already was a synonym ofcanon, particularly in connection
with Epicurus. But the term criterion is traditionally not
committed to one or to a few philosophical schools. Its use
is not very widespread in seventeenth-century German phi-
losophy, and it did not grow obsolete in eighteenth-century
Germany.Soit lacks the connotations typical of the terms
Kant preferred to use as key words, and this explains its
vicarious function in Kant’s terminology. Actually, as Crite-
rium, Kriterium, Kennzeichen, Richtschnur, it appears more
frequently than canon in Kant’s works, but its meaning is
less formal and less specific than that of canon, which is

™ See above, § 51.

5 Chap. II, § 28.
* For a history of the term critique, see my essay “‘Critique’ and Related
Terms.”
 oY
132 Kant’s Critique Within Modem Logic

institutionalized as the title of one of the sections of the

Critique. Criterion, in fact, is for Kant a more generic
synonym of canon, and this also explains why Kant could
use it more frequently than canon, as it could be applied in
many morecontexts. It is perhaps instructive to note that,
etymologically, xpi7jpcor is related, through xpivw and
xpireoc, to xpirixd¢. After so many centuries, the term
reappeared in the Critique, and it probably was used in
connection with “critica” since the seventeenth century at
least.2”
As for doctrine, Kant’s use of this term” is compara-
tively independent, and an almost certainly unconscious
revival of a meaning it had acquired in Antiquity, as theo-
Tetical scientific knowledge. In the seventeenth century it
had rather expressed a kind of non-scientific or pre-scientific
erudition. For Baumgarten and Meierthis term hadrecoy-
ered a part of its scientific dignity, but it still fell short of
the meaning Kantattributed to it.?”
Discipline was used by Kant from the Critique on-
wards with the traditional meaningof “strict educational
tule” or “correction,” as a merely negative or limiting part
of methodology, while earlier for him it had meant generi-
cally science.Kant may have been induced to adoptit,
and to give it a certain prominence in the Critiqueinits
educational meaning, by the echo of another meaningit
received in the Middle Ages, andstill partially retained in
Riidiger’s school. There the adjective disciplinalis meant
demonstrative or more scientifically adequate knowledge;
but this is only a hypothesis.

27 See above, §§ 52-56.

Chap. II, § 30.
® See above, §§ 52-53.
#0 Chap. II, § 30.
Ibid.
 CHAPTERII

TERMINOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PRECEDENTS

TO KANT’S USE OF THE TERMS ORGANON AND CANON

[I. ORGANON IN THE ARISTOTELIAN AND

BACONIAN TRADITIONS]

As we haveseen in Chapter I, among the key words

in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason the terms organon and
canon play an important role. The Critique rules out the
possibility of providing an organon for extending knowledge
in the field of metaphysics, but it provides a canon, or more
exactly, several canons, as a rule (sometimescalled criteri-
on) for assessing the validity and extent of knowledge.
Likewise, the Critique is not a doctrine for extending pure
knowledgea priori; however, it contains a discipline with a
merely negative or limiting function, for establishing the
borders of pure knowledgea priori.
But it must be noticed that Kant’s use of someof the
terms I mentioned is neither clear nor consistent in the Cri-
tique, at least prima facie. Soit is necessary, in order to
understand this usage, to examine the meaning of these terms
through the entire philosophical career of Kant. This greatly
clarifies the issues at stake, as well as contributes to a better
understanding of the meaning ofthe Critique as a whole.
The Critique shall reveal itself as a treatise belonging to that
branch of logic which was called by Kant speciallogic, as a
special logic for metaphysics. In the process, among other

133
 ™

134 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

things, several different meanings of the term organon as

used by Kant are established, namely (1) as an instrument
for extending knowledge, (2) as an instrumentfor appraising
and correcting extant knowledge, and (3) as a dictionary of
technical terms of a certain branch of philosophy.’ Howey-
er, additional research is needed in order insofar as possible
further to improve our understanding ofthese basic
Specifically, we need to reconstruct the historical back-
ground of the terms in question. This task will proveto be
very remunerative in connection with organonand quite
useful in connection with canon. Asfor criterion, doctrine
and discipline, it will only provide a certain linguistic frame
of reference, which shall yield some indications in respectto
Kant’s terminological habits without being very illuminating
in respect to the concepts themselves. As for organon and
canon, the historical precedents shall clarify the meaning
attributed to them by Kant, shall provide some explanation
for their adoption by him, and shall add some basic histor-
ical perspective to our understanding of the Critique. Thisis
the purpose ofthe present chapter.

2. The term organon is obviously of Aristotelian origin.

But it is necessary to clarify the manner by which it was
transmitted to Kant, and the extent to which these precedents
justify the different meanings Kant givestoit.
WilhelmRisse? lists 15 editions (inclusive oftransla-

‘See Chap. I.
Wilhelm Risse, Bibliographia logica: Verzeichnis der Druckschriften zur
Logik mit Angabe ihrer Fundorte, vol, 1: 1472-1800 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
1965; in the series Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol.
1, ed. Heinz Heimsoeth, et al.). [It has been impossible to match Tonelli’s
numbers of editions for Aristotle’s Organon in a few instances: the one eigh-
teenth-century text and the 41 commentaries on the Organon in the seventeenth
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 135

tions) of the Organon, or ofparts of it, in the fifteenth

century, 73 in the sixteenth century, 13 in the seventeenth
century. In the eighteenth century there is only one, repro-
ducing the Greek text, published by Zweybriicken (Bavaria)
in 1791, As for the commentaries on the whole or on parts
of the Organon, the figures are the following(inclusive of
the first editions of older commentaries, but exclusive ofall
neweditions and reprints ofall commentaries): fifteenth
century, 42; sixteenth century, 133; seventeenth century, 41;
eighteenth century, four. One of those published in the eigh-
teenth century, a bulky treatise on the Caregories, was writ-
ten by Paul Rabe, professor of philosophy at K6nigsberg
University from 1703-1713.° An anonymous commentary on
the Typics had also appeared in 1680, entitled Dialectica
Regiomontana.*
These figures shall suffice to give an idea of the
extent and continuity of the Aristotelian tradition. To them,

century(fone counts the Organon itself, Logica, Analytica priora, Analytica

pesteriona, Topica, Sophistici elenchi, but excludes Logica vetus, Isagoge
porpiynii and Peri hermenias—see pp. 279-282 in Risse). But the confusion
aacreases. For example, Tonelli says that Risse lists 73 editions of the Organon
inclusive oftranslations, or parts ofit, in the sixteenth century. When one
exchades the Opera (37), Predicamentis (8), Hermenicas (5), Dialectica (13), ars
disserendi (3), rep. sophist. (3), de demonstratione (6), de reprehensionibus
fallacibus (1) and de enuntiatione (1); and when one includes the Organon (32),
Logicorwn (19), Topica (10), Analytica priora (13), Categoriae (8), Interpretionis
G3), Elenchor. (6) and Analytica posteriora (13) one gets a total of 104, versus
Tonelli’s figure of 73. Whatever the exact figures, of course Tonelli’s general
point vis-a-vis the extent and continuity ofthe Aristotelian tradition remains
unaffected. ]
> Pauli Raben, Primitiae professionis logico-metaphysicae, sive commen-
tarii in librum categoriarum Aristotelis (Regiomonti [KSnigsberg]: Georgiana,
ejus§; Sumptibus, 1704).
* Dialectica Regiomontana, Hoc est, Compendivm Topicorym Aristotelis,
ed. Joh. Eberhardo Busmanno (Helmestadii: Typis & sumtibus Henrici Davidis
Miilleri, 1680).
 >

136 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

‘one could add thosetreatises on logic of Aristotelian inspira.

tion, listed by Risse in the work just mentioned, and studieg
by him in his famous Die Logik der Neuzeit.’ The Aristote.
lian tradition had been particularly strong in K6nigsberg, ang
some of Kant’s teachers in that university were among the
last German Aristotelians.® Obviously, for the Aristotelian
tradition organon was a synonym forlogic in general.
Some authors gavethe title organon to one oftheir
own works, but this of course does not mean that they were
Aristotelians. So did the Aristotelian Claude Aubery in
1584,” and Philippe Canaye in 1589,* a Frenchman, whose
bulky work wasofstrict Aristotelian observance.° Johann
Jakob Beurer, a professor of Latin at the University of
Freiburg in Breisgau, published in 1597 a work on method-
ology with thattitle.'°

3. Bacon’s Novum Organum appeared in 1620. Because

5 Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, vol. I: 1500-1640 (Stuttgart-Bad

Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Giinther Holzboog), 1964); vol. II:
1640-1780 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Giinther
Holzboog), 1970).
¢ See myarticles: “Conditions in Kénigsberg and the Making of Kant's
Philosophy,” in Bewuft sein. Gerhard Funke zu eigen, ed. Alexius J. Bucher,
Hermann Drie, and Thomas M. Seebohm (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert
Grundmann, 1975); and “Das Wiederaufleben der deutsch-aristotelischen Ter-
minologie bei Kant wahrend der Entstehungder ,Kritik der reinen Vernunft’,” in
Archivfiir Begriffsgeschichte, 1X (1964).
7” Clav. Alberii [Claudius Alberius, Auberius, Aubéri, Aubery], Organon
(Morgiis: Ioannes le Preux, 1584). Aubéri was a French Swiss.
* Philippes Canaye, L’Organe, c'est @ dire, l'instrvmentdv discovrs(Paris:
n.n., 1589*; republished [Geneve]: Povr Iean de Tovrnes, 1627).
* Risse, Die Logik, vol. I, pp. 64-65.
"© Joanne lacobo Bevrero, MEQOAIKH: sive de vsv organi logit
genere rervm, et scientiarvm (Hanoviae: Apud Guilielmum Antonium,1597).
 cemendous importance, this work hel, 7
of 3. Spor the term organum diff t from {0 establish a
é gstorelian tradition. It will be sui

gored : um is intend-
ooexponnd only @ portion of Bacon’s new |
fact, the No vwn Organum is onl
pesowrIn
tiO aon aneSha
y Pare tis of th
aahing pe Bacon actually gave it
x= oak Part Two shou -Y in two books of
ld have been. The in isms
stewere
oF pletion, should have containe an
neog of philosophy d exposition of both the
, andphilosophy itself
ae or logical, par . The method-
t of the Instau
ratio Was notrestricted
° we Organum, Part One co
ntained a classification of the
oes inclusive of an exp
lanation ofits grounds.”? Its
— was analogous to that ofB
acon's Advancement of Lear
Se published in 1605), and in fact Bacon pr n-
ye23 as an abridged Latin ver oduced it in
sion ofthat work. The classi-
jea tion of the sciences is a meth
odological subject tradit
ion-
ally pertinent to logic. Part Three should
have contained a
ai mation of natural history, and this
is a descriptive task.
But it had to be preceded by a sho
rt section containing the
more special rules of method pertainin to
g natural history,

ee
Paolo Rossi, Francesco Bacone: Dalla magia alle scienza (Bari:
uae. 1957), pp. 446-452 (Chap. VI, § 2). (Francis Bacon: From Magic to
Swny, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 189-192.]
© Flultoa] H[eary] Anderson, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Chicago:
Te University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 145-147.
TN
138 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

whichis the only portion of this part Bacon actually wrote,"

Part Four seems to have been conceived asa series of typical
examples of the new method’s application to the materials
collected in Part Three, in so far as this method teaches one
how to reach byinduction the universals on the foundation
of the particulars offered by natural history. The paradig-
matic function of this part is clear. It seems, though, thatit
should not have been a mere application of rules established
in the Organum, butthat it should have introduced some new
principles of ordering of its own. If so, the methodological
function of Part Four should not have been merely parad-
igmatic.'* As for Part Five, it should have been a survey of
the experimental knowledge gained by Bacon’s predecessors,
also assessing its residual value. But a sectionofit should
have been devoted to corrective methodology, as a refutation
of the erroneous methods of those philosophers." Part Six,
for the few indications Bacon gives about it, should have
been an exposition of the true new philosophy according to
the method already established in thefirst five parts.'* It
might have been the only part of the Jnstauratio not contain-
ing new methodological precepts (butthis is dubious--see
below).

4. As for Part Two, the Organum, its methodological

precepts would have been applied in different ways in Parts
Three to Six. The Organum, in its present provisional
shape, is divided into two books: Book Oneisessentially a
corrective logic (theory of the idola); Book Twois a meth-
odology of experimental invention. But none of these func-

8 [bid., pp. 259-261.

“© [bid., pp. 280-281.
'S [bid., pp. 282-283.
'© [bid., pp. 288-289.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 139

tions is restricted to the Organwm: Part Five also should

have contained a polemical corrective section, applying, and
possibly developing, the corrective precepts of the Organum,
and in Parts Three and Four more inventive precepts should
have been added. Butall this concerns inductive invention.
The theory of deductive invention as well should have been
expounded within the Organum in its final version, but in its
present shape it is merely hinted at.'7 It is quite possible that
the Organum, in its final version, would not have exhaust-
ively treated deductive invention, since it did not exhaus-
tively treat, as we haveseen, inductive invention. Then,
Part Six would probably have been the most suitable place
for completing this aspect of methodology, since for Bacon
the process of deductive invention seems to be identical with,
or closely connected to, the process of demonstration.'*
Thus, Bacon’s Organum is not conceived as a treatise
on logic in general, but as a treatise on methodology, and on
a part of methodology. In its present shape, basically, it is
partially corrective, and partially inventive, but it is not
conceived as the only corrective and inventive part of meth-
odology. As corrective, it is termed“... doctrina. . . de
expurgationeintellectus . . . "!9 a metaphor which reminds
one of Kant’s catharticon.””
Works on logic by Bacon were published twenty-one
times between 1605 and 1696, Between 1696 and 1730
there were no editions, but in 1730, 1740, 1753, 1765, and
1778 his Works were reprinted. In 1756, 1758, and 1763

7 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, ed. with introduction, notes, etc. by

Thomas Fowler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1878), p. 353 (Lib. Il, § X), editor’s
n. 55. Compare p. 407 (Lib. II, § XXI).
® Rossi, op. cit., p. 455 (pp. 189-190 in the English translation}.
Bacon, op. cit., p. 171 (Distributio Operis).
® See Chap.I, § 17.
 >

140 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

there were reprints of the De Dignitate; in 1762 and 1779 of
the Novum Organum.” The existing studies on Bacon’s
influence, albeit far from exhaustive, leave no doubtabout
the enormousprestige he enjoyed in Britain and on the
continent, a prestige which was revived in the eighteenth
century by the new wave of empiricism.”
Frequently, Bacon’s Novum Organum wascorrectly
recognized to be not a methodologyforall sciences in gener-
al, but a methodology for natural philosophy in particular.
This is, for example, Jakob Brucker’s opinion.”

| See Risse, Bibliographia, p. 239.

= See R{eginald] W[alter] Gibson, Francis Bacon: A Bibliography of His
Works and of Baconiana to the Year 1750 (Oxford: Scrivener Press, 1950;
*Supplement, Oxford, 1959); Nicol{aus] Hieron[ymous] Gundling, Vollstandige
Historie der Gelahrheit, Oder Ausfihrliche Discourse, vol. III (Franckfurt und
Leipzig: Wolffgang Ludwig Spring, 1735), pp. 3236-3237; Stephen Beasley
Linnard Penrose, Jr., The Reputation and Influence of Francis Bacon in the
Seventeenth Century (Ph.D.Dissertation, 1934, Columbia University); Gaston
Sortais, La philosophie moderne depuis Bacon jusqu’a Leibniz, vol. 1 (Paris: P.
Lethielleux, [1920]), pp. 426-523; Herschel [Clay] Baker, The Wars of Truth:
Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952); Richard Foster Jones, Ancients
and Moderns: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth-
Century England (St. Louis: Washington University Press, 19617; [unabridged
and unaltered republication, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1982]); Paolo
Rossi, Clavis universalis: arti mnemoniche e logica combinatoria da lullo a
leibniz (Milano-Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1960); Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The
Problemof Certainty in English Thought, 1630-1690 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1963; 19707; [in the series International Archives of the History of Ideas,
vol. 3}; Robert Hugh Kargon, Atomism in Englandfrom Hariot to Newton
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Risse, Die Logik, passim; Wilbur Samuel
Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1956), passim.
® Jacobi Brvckeri, Historia critica philosophiae a tempore resvscitatarym in
occidente litterarvm ad nostra tempora, vol. IV,Pt. II (Lipsiae: Apvd Bernh.
Christoph. Breitkopf, 1744), p. 99.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 141

The halo surrounding the term organon because ofits

Aristotelian and Baconian glory makeit fashionable as title
for different works. Gaspare Schott produced an Organum
Mathematicum,™ Johann Joachim Becher a Novwn Organum
Philologicum,”> which is a kind of systematic Latin and
German dictionary. It is interesting to notice that these
works treat sciences which Kant would later term organons,
although there is no indication that Kant knew these works.
But we will see below that there were sometraditions amply
justifying a link between logic on the one hand, and mathe-
matics and philology on the other hand (see §§ 7-11). Much
more important, albeit presumably ignored by Kant, was
Richard Burthogge’s Organum Vetus & Novum.” It is well
knownthat Burthogge is in a certain way a precursor of
Kant’s methodology.
Later books with the same title are a Disputatio de
Organica generali by Johann Heinrich Ténnies, a treatise on
methodology,”’ and Johann Bernhard Basedow’s Organon

* Gaspare Schotto, Organum Mathematicum (Herbipoli [Wirzburg]:

Sumptibus Johannis Andreae Endteri, & Wolfgangi, Excudebat Jobus Hertz,
1668).
% Jfoannis] J[oachimi B[echeri], Novum Organum Philologicum Pro
Verborum Copia in quavis Materia acquirenda, Das ist: Neuer Werkzeug der
Wohlredenheit (Francofurti ad Moenum [Frankfurt a. Main]: Impensis Joan.
Davidis Zunneri, Typis Wendelini Méwalti, 1674).
% [Richard Burthogge, Organum Vetus & Novum. Or, A Discourse of
Reason and Truth. Wherein The Natural Logick common to Mankindeis briefly
and plainly described (London: Printed for Sam. Crouch, at the Princes Arms,
1678).] There is a new edition, with introduction and notes, by Margaret W.
Landes, in Richard Burthogge, The Philosophical Writings (Chicago and London:
The Open Court Publishing Company, 1921).
This work was quoted by Johann Nicola[uJs Tetens, Gedancken uber
einige Ursachen, warum in der Metaphysik nur wenige ausgemachte Wahrheiten
sind, als eine Einladungs-Schrift zu seinen den 13ten October aufder neuen
 >
142 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

erleichterter Untersuchung der Religionen.* Johann

Heinrich Lambert’s Neues Organon shall be discussed later,
Even though the eclectic Rudolph Goclenius (1613)
defined dialectic, or logic, as doctrina organica,” not all
Aristotelians identified logic with the organon. For example,
in 1636 Abraham Calov, who taught for someyears at
K6nigsberg University, called organica that part of method
which concernsnot the general precepts, but the special
precepts for each science, like how to order each science
systematically.*° On the other hand, the well-knowneclectic
Johannes Micraelius (1653) extended the meaning of Philoso-
Phia organica seu instrumentalis, also called canonicam and
philologiam,incorporating within it grammar, rhetoric (or
oratory), poetry and logic (or dialectic).**

Batzowschen Academie anzufangenden Vorlesungen (Biitzow und Wismar: Berger

und Boedner, 1760), p. 26, wherefrom Tetenscites a list of simple ideas obtained
byabstraction. I never could obtain, or bibliographically establish, this work by
Ténnies (see below n. 81). Still, Tetens’ information shouldbe reliable, as he
had known Ténnies personally during the time he spentin Kiel. On Tonnies’
logicvery little is known,because his othertreatise on logic also vanished. See
Francesco Barone, Logicaformale e logica trascendentale, vol. 1: Da leibniz a
kant (Torino: Edizioni di “Filosofia,” 1964), p. 63.
® Johann Bernhard Basedow, Organon erleichterter Untersuchung der
Religionen, 2 vols. (Altona: In Commission bey David Iversen, 1765-1766).
® Rodolphi Goclenii, Lexicon philosophicvm, qvo tangvm clave philoso-
phiaefores aperivntvr (Francofvrti: Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis
Petri Musculi & Ruperti Pistorij, 1613; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms,1964),
p. 282.
% Abraham Calovi, Scripta philosophica, vol. II (Lubecae: Impensis
Joachimi Wilden, Literis Alberti Hakelmanni, 1651), pp. 581, 584.
3 Joh. Micraelii, Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum
(1653; Stetini [Stettin]: impensis Jeremiae Mamphrasii, Typis Michaelis
Hépfneri, 1662%; reprint Diisseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co., [1966], in the
series Instrumenta philosophica, Series lexica, vol. 1), pp. 1004-1006; compare p.
1002.
 Precedents to Kant's Use of Organon and Canon 143
Pierre Gassendi (1658) related and accepted the
various traditional denominations of logic, giving them an
interpretation, according to his quite respectable knowledge
of the history oflogic:

As logic, it is defined as the art of thinking (ratioci-

mandi); as dialectic, as the art ofarguing (disserendi)|;]
as organic, as the art directing the actions of the mind
(dirigendi actiones Mentis); as canonic, the art of
distinguishing truthfrom falsehood(Ars veri, & falsi
diimdicandi): because all these definitions, and others
similar to them, come tobe the same."

The art “directing the actions of the mind” is a tradi-

tional name for that part of logic which concerns method.
If, in Gassendi’s opinion, all these arts “come to be the
same,” nevertheless they reflect different views of logic,
eachstressing one of its aspects. Gassendi unifies them
within his own corrective concept of logic. It is interesting
to see that for Gassendi the term organon refers to methodol-
ogy. He probably had Bacon in mind.
For the Cartesian Etienne Chauvin (1692) not only
method, but all elements of logic are instruments.’ The
eclectic Johann Gottlieb Heineccius (1728) termed logic

® Petri [Pierre] Gassendi, Opera omnia in sex tomosdivisa, vol. | (Lygdvni

{Lyon}: Sumptibus Lavrentii Anisson, & Ioan, Bapt. Devenet., 1658; reprint
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Giinther Holzboog), 1964),
p. 32 (Syrtagmatis).
® The first edition was Stephanus [Etienne] Chauvin, Lexicon rationale sive
Thesaurus philasophicus (Rotterodami: Apud Petrumvander Slaart, 1692); see
the second edition, Stephani Chauvini, Lexicon philosophicum secundis curis
(Leovardize [Leeuwarden]: Excudit Franciscus Halma, 1713; reprint Diisseldorf:
Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co., [1967]; in the series Instrumentaphilosophica,
Series lexica, vol. II), pp. 404-405.
 >
144 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
instrumental philosophy,™ an ancient and commondenoming.
tion indeed. The Wolffian George Friedrich Meier defineg
logic as an instrument for philosophy and for the sciences,%
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1761) identified logic with
organon,”but also with the following: dialectic (as logic
was called in the Platonic, in part of the Scholastic, and in
the Ramistic traditions), the art of reason (Philosophiaratio.
nalis, Vernunft-lehre, the usual term for logic), analytic (as
in Honoré Fabri),” the sense of truth and falsehood (as in

™ Jo. Gottl. Heineccii, Elementa philosophiae rationalis et moralis (172

Francofvrti cis Viadrum [Frankfurt an der Oder]: Impens.Io. Christ. Kleibii,
1752"), pp. 3-4.
38 George Friedrich Meier, Vernunftlehre (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer,
1752), p. 11, § 11.
% Alexander Gottlieb Bavmgarten, Acroasis logica. In Christianvm L.B,
de Wolff (Halae Magdebvrgicae: Impensis Carol. Herm, Hemmerde., 1761;
reprint Wolff, Werke, IIl:5), § 9. This definition was accepted by Gottlob
Samuel Nicolai, Vertheidigung gegen den Herrn Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten
- und die Herrn Verfasser der Abhandlungen und Urtheile iiber das Neueste aus
der Gelehrsamkeit (Wittenberg und Zerbst: Sam. Gottfr. Zimmermanns Witwe,
1761), pp. 49-50. He also referred to logic as dialectic, canonic, critique and
analytical method of philosophizing. Alexandri Bavmgarten, in his posthumous
Sciagraphia Encyclopaediaephilosophicae, ed. Joh. Christian Foerster (Halae
Magdebvrgicae: Impensis Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 1769), § 6, called logic
“philosophiam organicam s. instrumentalem.”
»” See Hon{oratus] Fabry [in Petro Mosnerio], Philosophiae Tomys Primys:
qvi complectitvr scientiarvm Methodum sex Libris explicatam: logicam analyti-
cam, duodecimLibris demonstratam, & aliquot Controuersias logicas, breuiter
disputatas. Auctore Petro Mosnerio Doctore Medico. cvncta excerpta ex prae~
lectionibus R. P. Hon. Fabry. Soc. lesv. (Lvgdvni [Lyon]: Sumptibus Ioannis
Champion, 1646), p. 4, where hedivides logic into Elementaris, simple series of
definitions, and Analytica, “quaeartificium Logicum demonstrat...” The
same volumecontains the LogicamAnalyticam edited by Petro Mosnerio on the
foundation ofnotes taken in Fabri's courses. See Risse, Die Logik, vol. Il, pp.
156-164, and also pp. 165-166, for Thomae Lushingtonii [Thomas Lushington-
ius}, Logica analytica, De principiis, regulis, & usu Rationis rectae (Londini:
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 145

Andreas Riidiger),”* the science of the sciences, and the

medicine of the mind (as in Ehrenfried Walter von
Tschirnhaus and Joachim Lange).” In 1769, Johann Georg
Heinrich Feder termed logic an organon.”

[Il. LOGIC GROUPED IN THREE WAYS]

6 More important is what we read in Joannes Reusch’s

“Logic (1734):

Famous LANGE deems that MATHEMATICStoo can

be included in instrumental philosophy: because the
knowledgeof quantity greatly contributes to the knowl-
edge of qualities and to an easier application ofthe
instruments to any matter whatever . The philologi-
cal disciplines, and logic, can also be called instrumen-
tal philosophyin particular, because they concen the
instruments of human knowledgein particular.*!

ee
typis Abraharni Miller, 1650). Both Fabri and Lushingtonius followed the
geometrical method and conceived logic basically as a science of demonstration.
% Andreae Riidiger [Ridigeri, Ruediger], De sensu veri et falsi (Halae:
Typis Johannis Gruneri, 1709).
» (Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus], *Medicina mentis, (Amstelaedami:
Albertum Magnum & Joannem Rieumerts Juniorem, 1687). [The mostaccessible
edition is his Medicina mentis, sive artis inveniendi praecepta generalia (Lipsiae:
Apud J. Thomam Fritsch, 1695; reprint E. W. von Tschimnhaus, Medicina mentis
at corporis (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964))]. Joachimi Langii, Medicina
mentis, qua praepostera philosophandi methodo (Berolini: Impensis Officinae
Libr. Orphan. Hall., Typis Joh. Wesselii, 1704).
© Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Logik und Metaphysik (1769; Gottingen
und Gotha: Johann Christian Dieterich, 17744), p. 18.
“| ToannePetro Revschio, Systema logicvm antiqviorvm atqve recentiorvm
item propria praecepta exhibens (Ienae [Jena]: Ex Officina Ioannis Rvdolphi
Crékeri, 1734'; 17412), § 84. Reusch was an independent Wolffian. See Johann
146 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
This passageis especially significant in connection with
Kant. Asfar as I knowit is the only revival in eighteenth-
century philosophy before Kant of an old doctrine connecting
logic, philology and mathematics as preliminary sciences
whose knowledge is needed in order to proceed to the study
of other sciences (see § 11). Reusch himself seems notto
have been conscious of those precedents, because he takes
for granted the instrumental character of logic and philology,
and in so doing he is consciously following an old tradition
still alive in his time. But he needs to appeal to the authori-
ty of Johann Christian Langein ordertentatively to propose
this larger grouping.
In fact, we can speak ofnotless than three different
traditions or groupsoftraditions. The first connects logic
and someother studies which were occasionally referred to
as philology (basically grammar andrhetoric). The second
groups together logic and mathematics. The third groups
together logic, mathematics, grammar and rhetoric. The
first and the third traditions, at least, were already estab-
lished in Greek antiquity, and continued through the Middle
Agesto the Renaissance.

Ts As for the connection between logic and philology, I

shall not search further back than Bacon. In the Advance-
ment of Learning (1605), he listed under the heading of
Rational HumanPhilosophy (logic) the different kinds of
logic (both the traditional, and the one he meant tointro-
duce), invention, judgment, the art of memory, grammar,

Christian Langen, 1669-1723, a professor at Giessen University, Protheoria

ervditionis hvmanae vniversae: Oder Fragen von der Gelehrsamkeit der
Menschen ins gemein (Giessen: Henning Millen, 1706), Chap. X, [especially
pp. 611-620, 636-640}.
_—_ 1 s~ a

Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 147

the doctrine of method, rhetoric, criticism and pedagogics.””

Thuslogic and the philological sciences belong to the same
class, together with some othersciences.
In the German “systematic” school, Bartholomeus
Keckermann, in a work posthumously published (1613) by
his disciple Johann Heinrich Alsted, accepts the Platonic
division of knowledge into propaedeutic (xpoxacdeiav) and
paedeutic (xarde(av). Thefirst includes logic, rhetoric and
grammar.*? Elsewherehelists four disciplinae directiuae,
directing the mind through instruments. Three of them
direct cogitation (grammar, rhetoric, poetry); the fourth
directs intellection (logic). Alsted, underthetitle poietic
arts, collected mnemonics, lexicography, grammar, rhetoric,
logic, oratory and poetry.‘

“Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, collected and ed. James
Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, vol. VI (New York:
Hurd and Houghton; Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1872), pp. 260-309. [Numer-
ous facsimile reprints of the 1857-1874edition are more readily accessible. For
example, in one reprint(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, G.
Holaboog, 1963), this same passage is foundin vol. III, pp. 383-419]. Compare
De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), Liber[translated as Of the Dignity and Ad-
vancement ofLearning, Books] V and VI.
© Bartholomaei Keckermanni, Systematis Systematvm, vol. II (Havoviae:
Apud Haeredes Gvilielmi Antonii, 1613), pp. 8a-b.
“ Bartholomaei Keckermanni, Systema Systematvm, vol. | (Hanoviae:
Apud Haeredes Gvilielmi Antoni, 1613), p. 2a.
“Johanne Henrico Alstedio, Philosophia digne restituta: libros quatuor
praecognitorum philosophicorum complectens (Herbornae Nassoviorum [Herborn
in Nassau}: {Laurentii Petrei], 1612), Chap. XIV, p. 400. Rhetoric is defined as
“ars tradens modum ornate dicendi,” and studies the tropes. Oratory is the “ars
copiose dicendi,” and studies inventio, dispositio, elocutio, and promulgatio.
[Tonelli’s citations were never precisely matched. Risse does notlist other
editions of the work. Pp. 404-405 come the closestin discussing the difference
between oratory and rhetoric and how the Greeks did notdistinguish between
them; p. 419 comes closestto the “tropes” reference; p. 102 comes close to his
 OO os
148 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

The German “pansophic” trend is related to the “sy,

tematic,” with a significant survival of eclectic Ramism, ang
a strong pedagogical commitmentinspired by Wolfgang
Ratke. Ratke himself had divided (1612) the Dogmatica into
liberalis and instrumentalis. The latter were either rationis
(logic), or orationis (rhetoric, poetry, grammar). Asfor
the pansophists, Georgius Andreas Fabricius (1624)includes
under artes generales two species: rationis (logic), and
orationis (grammar and rhetoric). Oratory and poetry are
located nearby.” Under the heading of Pansophia specialis
liberalis instrumentalis, Heinrich Nicolai (1646) lists the
following as “necessary”: grammar, lexicography, logic,
mnemonics. As “voluptuary,” he lists rhetoric, oratory and
poetry.“* Johann Heinrich Biesterfeld (1661), a pansophist
of Lullian extraction, divides logic into pure (grammar,
thetoric, dialectic), and mixed (oratory, poetry, semantics as
a theory ofsigns).? Pansophy and Lullianism are also
combined in the famous Catholic philosopher Father Athana-

reference on rhetoric; pp. 344-346, 376-378, 381, 399-400 are also relevant.]
“Josef Dolch, Lehrplan des Abendlandes: Zweieinhalb Jahriausende
seiner Geschichte (Ratingen: Aloys Henn, 19657; [same paginationin the
unaltered reprint of the 1971 third edition, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1982]), pp. 277-279, 284.
© Georg. Andreae Fabrici, Thesaurus philosophicus sive tabulae totius
philosophiae systema praeceptis et exemplis (Brunsvigae [Braunschweig]: Typis
et Sumptibus Andreae Dunckeri, 1624), p. 2.
“Henrico Nicolai, Pansophia liberalis (Dantisci [Danzig, Gdansk]: Ex
Tygographeo Georgii Rhetii, 1646), Introduction, (pp. 2-3), § 1.
© ‘Joh. Henrici Bisterfeldii, Bisterfeldius redivivus: seu operum, vol. |
(Hagae Comitvm [S’Gravenhage]: Ex Typographia Adriani Vlaco, 1661), pp. 28-
30 [see especially p. 33]. ‘The author died in 1655. He was also involved in
magic. For the origin of terms like semantics or semeiotics, see Lia Formigari,
Linguistica ed empirismo nel Seicento inglese (Bari: Laterza, 1970), p. 173, n.
72.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 149

sius Kircher (1669) who grouped grammar, rhetoric, poetry,

logic and dialectic under the heading scientia sermocinatrix
vocalis.© Finally, Valerius Jaschius (1677) divided the
instrumenta pansophiae propria into mentis (logic), and oris
(grammar,rhetoric, poetry, music).

8. William Ames,a Scotsman teaching in Holland, was

probably the last representative of Ramism on the continent.
Healso was connected with the pansophic tradition. In 1643
he divided Pansophia generalis into dialectic, grammar and
rhetoric. **
This trend also foundsignificant support among the
Aristotelians. The Fleming Pierre de Bert (1604) put to-
gether logic, grammar andrhetoric as disciplina Organicae.**
In Germany, Christoph Scheibler (1618) considered as artes
liberales in oratione grammar,rhetoric and poetry, and in
ratione logic.* About the same time, Jakob Martini termed
grammar, logic and rhetoric res Philosophicae Instrumen-

*® Athanasii Kircheri, Ars magna sciendi (Amstelodami: Apud Joannem

Janssonium & Waesberge, & Viduam Elizei Weyerstraet, 1669), Lib. V,Pt. I,
Cap. I, p. 211. Logic “[iJntellectualium operationum uti dirigibiles sunt, artem
praescribit,” while dialectic “[tJerminos Logicae & Syllogisticam Artem dictat.”
5! Valerio Jaschio [Jasche], Synopsis Pansophiae (Colbergae [Colberg]:
Imprimebat Bergerus Campius, 1677), p. 6.
2 Guilielmi Amesii, Magni Theologi Ac Philosophi acutissimi, Philosophe-
mata (Lugduni Batavorum [Leiden]: Ex Officina Justi Livii, 1643), “Technomet-
ria,” in the diagram on p. 100.
Petri Berti [Petrus Bertius], Logicae peripateticae (Lvgdvni Batavorvm
{Leiden}: Ex Officina Iohannis Pati, 1604), pp. 4-5.
Christophoro Scheiblero, Philosophia compendiosa, seu philosophiae
synopsis (1618; Marpurgi [Marburg]: Ex Typographeo Casparis Chemlini, 1627),
Liber I, CaputII, pp. 1-2.
 oN
150. Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
tales Valentin Fromme (1631) considered logic, grammar
and rhetoric as operabile performam intentionalem.* Fo,
Michael Eifler (1652), the scibile instrumentale is a synonym
for organica and philologiam.” Michael Watson (1658)
listed under the heading of Dialectica the following sciences.
logic or topic, analytic, rhetoric and poetry, to which he
added didactics, dialogics, mnemonics and a few others.*
For Georg Meier, the cognoscibile instrumentale speciale is
either “necessary” (grammar, lexicography, logic, mnemon-
ics) or “voluptuary” (rhetoric, oratory, poetry).”
Some German eclectics support similar positions. In
the 1604ff edition of Theodor Zwinger’s Theatrvm hvmanae
vitae, volume four is devoted to the habitibus organicis:
grammar,rhetoric, poetry and logic.” Theodor Ebert, in
1619, divided the organicae disciplinae into orationis

58 Jacobo Martini, Paedia, seu prudentia in disciplinis generalis (n.p.:

Sumptibus viduae Clementis Bergeri, Typis haeredum Christiani Tham, 1631), p.
705. 1 could notestablish the date of the first edition, which must have appeared
at the beginningofthe century. [Tonelli gives the date of publication as 1681.]
% Valentino From, Gnostologia (Wittebergae [Wittenberg]: Typis &
‘Sumptibus Johannis Haken, 1632), p. 145. Later, in Valentino Frommen,
Isagogephilosophica (Brandenburgi: Typis Matthaei Millleri, 1665), Liber I,
CaputII, pp. 33-34, he called logic an instrumenta rationis, grammar and rhetoric
orationis instrumentum.
% Michaelis Eifleri, Primordia Pansophiae ({Regiomonti {KGnigsberg}]:
Literis Reusnerianis, 1652), p. 56.
Michaelis Watsonii, Unio Sapientiae sive Synopsis Totius Philosophiae
(Bremae: Impensis Erhardi Bergeri, 1658), Secs. I-Il [especially Sec. Il, Chaps.
U-Vil}.
% Georgio Meiero, Gnostologia (Wittebergae [Wittenberg]: Typis &
Impensis Jobi Wilhelmi Fincelii, 1662), p. 607.
© Theodori Zuingeri, Theatrvm hymanae vitae, 29 vols. (Basileae [Basel]:
Sebastianvm Henricpetri, 1604°ff), pp. 1081-1083. Thefirst edition of 1565 and
with Conrado Lycosthene, was in one volume, underthe title Theatrvm vitae
hymanae(Basileae [Basel]: loan. Oporinvm, Ambrosivm et Avrelivm, 1565).
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 151
(grammar, rhetoric, poetry), rationis (logic) and utriusque
(history).Andreas Reyher (1633)listed grammar, logic,
rhetoric and poetry as disciplina liberalis instrumentalis.”
For Johann Justus Winckelmann (1662), logic, rhetoric and
grammar were instrumentales Disciplinae.” We already
know that Micraelius (1653) had included grammar in the
philosophia organica, and that Becher (1674) had called
philosophy an organon (see §§ 5-6).

9. Considering now the other major trends and personal-

ities in seventeenth-century philosophy which offered a
classification of the sciences, I will mention the Gassendist
Gilles de Launay (1668), who divides logic in general into
grammar,rhetoric and logic proper. Adrian Heereboord, a
Dutch Cartesian who retained important Aristotelian ele-
ments, offered a classification of the sciences and the arts
which heattributed to Aristotle. The arts are grammar,
thetoric and logic.® Thomas Hobbes (1651) classified
poetry, rhetoric, logic and jurisprudence as sciences of

‘| Theodoro Eberto, Manuductionis Aphoristicae ad discursum artium et

disciplinarum methodicum (Freiburgio-Silesio: Literis Viduae Voltzianae, 1619),
not paginated. See §§ 43-45 and chart following § 72.
Andrea Reyhero, Margarita Philosophica in annulo, sive synopsis totius
philosophiae (1633; Gothae: Typis & Sumtibus Autoris, Apud Salomonem
Reyherum, Exscripta & Joh. Michaele Schallio, 1669). See Caput I, “De Discipli-
nis liberalibus,” Thesis I, pp. 1-2.
© Johannis Justi VVynkelmanni, Hortus et arbor Philosophiae (Darmstadii:
Typis Abelianis; Francofurti: apud Hermannum Velsteinium, 1662), p. 106.
“ [Gilles de Launay {pseudonym for Pierre Daniel Huet)], Dissertation de
la philosophie en general (Paris: C. Barbin, 1668], p. 11. I could not, however,
find any passage in Gassendi supporting this view.
“ Adriano Heereboord, EPMHNEIA Logica, seu synopseos logicae (1650;
Cantabrigiae [Cambridge]: Ex Officina Joan. Hayes, 1680), pp. 2-3.
152 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

discourse.” Pierre Poiret (1692) called both grammar

(including rhetoric andcriticism) and logic instruments.*7
Johannis Sperlette, a French protestant and a Cartesian,
professor in Germany, listed (1696) grammar,rhetoric ang
dialectic as speculative (rational and theoretical) arts, versus
metaphysics, which is contemplative. Christian Thomasius
(1688) grouped grammar (with poetry) as instrumental phi-
losophy; history, rhetoric and logic are grouped as “philo-
sophics,” what he calls “today’s metaphysics.” Metaphys-
ics, which does not include theology and natural philosophy,
is merely conceived as a vocabulary of terms, and as such
cannotbe separated from logic.”
In the eighteenth century, the Encyclopédie grouped
under logic the art of thinking (or logic proper), the art of
remembering (mnemotechnics), and the art of communi-

Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. William

Molesworth, vol. Ill: Leviathan (London: Printed for John Bohn, 1839; reprint
Aalen: Scientia, 1962), pp. 71-73. [See especially p. 73.]
* Petri Poiret, De eruditione solida, superficiaria, et falsa (Amstelodami:
Apud Andream Petri, 1692), Liber Secundus, pp. 150-151, § 24.
— JohannisSperlette, Opera Philosophica, vol. I (1696; Berolini: Impensis
Joh. Mich. Riidigeri, 1703), pp. 222-223. [This precise reference was not found
in the 1703 edition of Sperlette’s Opera philosophica, vol. I. He comes closest
on p. 9, distinguishing theoretical or speculative philosophy (metaphysics,
mathematics, natural philosophy and physics) from practical philosophy (logic,
ethics).]
© Christiani Thomasii, Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam,seu lineae
primaelibri de prudentia cogitandiet ratiocinandi(initially published by the
authorin Lipsiae, 1688; Halae Magdeburgicae: Prostat in Officina Libraria
Rengeriana, 1702), pp. 54, 67, 102, Cap.II, §§ 18 [the previous paragraphis
numbered 16,the subsequent one 18, so this should be § 17, though it is not so
numbered], 66-68, Cap. V, § 3.
 precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 153

_. jnclusive of grammar,rhetoric and 7 Thi

catine ification of the corresponding selof feces
is a srcation. I expounded elsewhere the
clas ion of quite significant
the Encyclopédie’s
system of the Sciences.”!
diffs! Germany, Carl Friedrich Flagel (1760) classified
oteristics
OF the theory of Signs, Philology
and logic
char the heading oforganic philosophy.” Baumgarten,
nde! ous work published in 1770, listed in a
thumor™ under Philoso-
iti i
Pn2 organica 1) the sensitive, a) aesthetics, b) ars signandi
phi versal philology (inclusive of grammar, orthograph
oFFigraphy, oratory), and 2) theintellectual or join *
As for the connection betweenlogic and mathematics
0; articular, it occurs muchless frequently. In the Middle
in e John Scotus Eriugena, Hugh of St. Victor
and Thierry
AeCpartres had recognized a similarity betwee
n logic and
thematics. Gilberfs t Porreta identified them. In the
renaissance, Georgius Valla (1501) considered
mathematics

prot,Rond d'Alembert, Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire

is a
ee Nciences, des arts et des métiers, vol. I (Paris: Chez Briasson,
raisonné 4“ton, Durand, 1751), “Systéme figuré des connoissances humaines,”
a vaen pp. xivi and xlvii and after the “Discours préliminaire” maps this
OL ue my article “The Problem ofthe Classification of the Sciences in
"ae." Rivista critica di storia della filesofia, XXX, 3 (1975). § 6.
Kans Tn priedrich Flogel, Einleitung in die Erfindungskunst (BreBlau und
suipaigs Johann Ernst Meyer. 1760), pp. 105-107, §§ 118-120.
i exandri Gottlieb Bavmgarten, Philosophia generalis, ed. Toh. Christian
roaster Halae Magdebvrgicae: Impensis Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 1770), C.
eel, § 147. See also his Sciagraphia encyclopaediae, §§ 5-1.
* G. Schrimpf, “Disciplina, doctrina,” in Historisches Worterbuch der
pritosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter, vol. 2 (Basel/ Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1972),
pp. 257-258.
 a ON
154 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

as part and parcel of dialectic.” Bacon states mathematics

and logic are subservient to physics. Mathematics is an
appendix and an aide to physics, metaphysics, mechanics ang
magic; implicitly, this is true for logic too.” In Thomas
Campanella’s opinion (1638), logic is an instrument for
metaphysics, mathematics for physics and ethics for juris-
prudence.” For Descartes (1647), the propaedeutic to true
science includes provisional ethics (in order to rule one’s
conduct while learning the sciences conducive to a perfected
ethics), logic (Descartes’ rules of method) and some basic
mathematics. The Discourse on Method, which was fol-
lowed in its first edition by the famous essays on dioptrics,
meteorology and geometry, was considered to be the founda-
tion of this preliminary instruction, exclusive of provisional
ethics, which simply consisted in following the moresof
one’s community.”* As we saw above (§ 5), Schott wrote an
Organon of mathematics (1668). That is, he gave mathemat-
ics the traditional name logic. In the eighteenth century
examplesof this connection are rare. Probably Joachim
Georg Darjes (1742) grouped logic with mathematics, but he
preferred not to doit explicitly.” In 1753, Tonniesclassi-
fied logic and arithmetic under the heading Philosophia

% Georgii Vallae, De expetendis, etfugiendis rebvs opvs, in qvo haec

continentvr ((Venetiis: Aldus Manutius I. for Johannes Petrus Valla, 1501)],
Libri I, Cap. XXII.
7% Francis Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum, Liber II, Caput VI [translat-
ed as Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, Book III, Chap. VI).
7 Thomae Campanellae, Vniversalis philosophiae, sev metaphysicarvm
rervm (Parisiis: Philippe Burelly, 1638), Lib. V, Cap.III, Art. 1, pp. 350-351.
% René Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam & Paul
Tannery, vol. IX-2 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), pp. 13-14 (Preface to the French
translation of the Principia).
® See myarticle “The Problem,” § 3.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 155

prima instrumentalis, or Organica.” In fact, for him there

was even a Closer connection between logic and mathemat-
ics, as he tried to develop logic on an arithmetical model."!
In 1768 he endeavoured, in a work on theoretical grammar,
to apply the same approachto language." So,in a certain
sense, he was moving beyond a simple connection between
arithmetic and logic toward a grouping to include grammar
as well. But it must be noted that in so doing, he was mov-
ing toward a reduction of logic and grammar to a mathemati-
cal model, and this certainly was very far from Kant’s inten-
tions. Likewise, the numerous attempts by Darjes, Gottfried
Ploucquet, Lambert, and others to establish a combinatoria
or kind of languageallowing logical operations on a math-
ematical model in Kant’s time,®or earlier,“ can be consid-
ered as only partially or indirectly indicative of the trend in
question. So far as Kantis concerned, the trend consists in
juxtaposing, not in merging, logic, mathematics and the
foundations of language. Onthe other hand, this approach
did not prevent its sponsors from establishing a more tradi-

® Ibid., p. 271, Table XI B.

“ *Johann Heinrich Ténnies, De logica ad exernplar arithmeticae instituen-
da disputatio (Kiliae [Kiel]: n.n., 1753). This work seems to be lost. Neither I
nor Risse couldfindit in spite of a long search. Risse, Bibliographia, gives as a
date 1752 andas a title De logicae scientiae ad exemplar arithmeticae ratione.
We know about this work and about the pointin question through Lambert. See
Lambert, Architectonic, vol. I, Vorrede, p. XX, and elsewhere. See Barone, op.
cit. vol. I, p- 63.
2 Johannes Henr. Toennies, Grammatica universalis (Kiliae [Kiel]: Typis
Gottfr. Bartschii, 1768), p. 57.
® Barone,op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 60-62.
“ See Rossi, op. cit., and Danielis Georgii Morhofii [Daniel Georg
Morhof], Polyhistor, literarius, philosophicus et practicus (Lubecae: Sumptibus
Petri Boeckmanni, 1747‘;reprint Aalen: Scientia, 1970), Tomus I, Lib. II, Cap.
V: “Dearte Lulliana similibusque inventis.”
 oN

156 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

tional kind of parallelism between logic and mathematics.
Besides Ténnies and probably Darjes, this is the case for
Lambert, whoin 1764 stated that each science is a kind of
applied logic, in the same way as some sciences are applica-
tions of mathematics.

1, As for the connection between logic, mathematics and

philologyall together, they were already grouped in Anti-
quity in that curriculum ofartes liberales. Througha tradi-
tion transmitted by Martianus Capella, this was handed down
to the Middle Ages, where it was called Trivium (grammar,
rhetoric, dialectic) and Quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry,
music and astronomy, or the mathematical arts). Actually,
the liberal arts never corresponded to a real organization of
university teaching.** Towards the end of the Middle Ages
they constituted the core of those disciplines taught in the
philosophical faculties as a propaedeutic to the higherfacul-
ties, namely medicine, jurisprudence and theology."’ In the
early Renaissance (circa 1400), Vittorino Ramboldini da
Feltre adopted the seven arts as a foundation for the curricu-
lum ofhis famous high school. Again they had been low-
ered to the status of a propaedeutic. John Major (1528)
listed and defined the liberal arts, but he added that they had
been supplemented by other arts. Ramus andhis school
considered the Trivium as artes exotericae or sermocinales,
and the Quadrivium, supplemented by otherarts like ethics

% Lambert, Neues Organon, vol. 1, p. 287.

Walter J[ackson] Ong, Ramus. Method, and the Decay ofDialogue:
From the Art ofDiscourse to the Art of Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1958; reprint New York: Octagon Books, A Division of Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1979), p. 138.
* Dolch, op. cit., p. 143.
® Ibid., p. 179.
ae re i

Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 157

and physics, as artes acroamaticae. However, according to

Walter J. Ong, the seven liberal arts were listed, in works
on education or on theclassification of knowledge, by hun-
dreds of authors during the following centuries.”
During the seventeenth century these listings grow
more and more obsolete. I mention those by the Lullian
Pierre Morestellus,® and by the eclectic Jakob Thomasius,”"
Christian Thomasius’ father and Leibniz’ teacher. Gassendi
referred the liberal arts to Antiquity:

It was obvious for the ancients that mathematics was not

a part ofphilosophy, but added, in its four parts, to
grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, it completed the
encyclopaedia, that is, the circle ofthe liberal arts.”
However,two sixteenth-century Ramists elaborated a |
more sophisticated doctrine of the liberal arts as propaideia.
Bernhard Copius (1588) listed as such dialectic, grammar,
thetoric and mathesis (arithmetic and geometry), versus a
paideia consisting of physics, ethics, history and poetry.”
Henningus Reimmannus (1599)called the propaedeutic arts
(grammar,rhetoric, logic and mathesis) the “instruments” of

Ong,op. cit.
Petro Morestello, Regina omnivm scientiarvm (Rothomagi[Rouen]:
Apud Romanvm de Beavvais, 1632), fol. 131.
% [See the charts on thelast four pages of his unpaginated] Preface to his
new edition ofthe old and famous workby Joan. A. Wower [Wouwer], De
Polymathia Tractatio (Lipsiae: Sumptibus Laureatii Sigismundi Comeri, Literis
Christiani Michaelis, 1665). The first edition of Wower’s work was published in
1604.
2 Gassendi, op. cit., p. 27 (De Philosophia universe).
*® Bemhardo Copio, Idea sive partitio totius philosophiae, ex Platone
potissimum & Aristotele collecta (Marpurgi [Marburg]: typis Pauli Egenolphi,
1588), fol. 12 r.
158 Kant’s Gritigue Within Modem Logic
the paiieie™ Copius’ theory was still referred to, and
rejected, by Keckermann,™ but it certainly was entirely
forgotten Ister. As it is not very likelythat in the eighteenth
Centary the old doctrine of seven arts was considered to be
aaything more than an antique, if it was remembered at all,
we must reach the conclusion that Reusch’s doctrine was an
oxiginal combination of the first and second traditions,rather
than 2 revival of the third. Suill, it is interesting to note asa
cazse of cultural convergence, that Reusch was preceded in
this by an old and glorious, albeit obliterated, tradition.

[II ORGANON IN LAMBERT]

12. After these considerations I retum to the central
question, the meaning of the term organon in general.
Kant’s admiration for Lambert is well known. So we shall
P2y special attention to Lambert’s New Organon, or
Thoughts about the Search and the Designation of the Truth
and its Distinction from Error and Illusion, of 1764, and to
his Foundation of an Architectonic, or the Theory of the Sim-
lest and of the First in Philosophical and Mathematical
Knowledge. of 1771. Lambert's logical theories are so
complex and so sophisticated, that it would be absurd to try
to describe them here in detail. Therefore, I shall confine
myself to pointing out those few traits which are most direct-
ly connected with my subject.
The title of the New Organon could be slightly mis-
Ieading. In fact it stresses the inventive (Search), the seman-

“ Heaningo Rennemanno (Reimmannus, Reancmannus}, Philosophiae

rameae insvperabile scurm | (Frascoferti: Collegio Musarum Paltheniano,
1599), pp. 41-45.
© Keckermann, op. cit., vol. Il, pp. (Sb-9a).
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 159
tic (Designation) and the preservative and corrective (Dis-
tinction from Error) aspectof the treatise, while seemingly
ignoring the role of the demonstrative process. On the
contrary, the formal theory of demonstration is thoroughly
treated in Part One (Dianoiologie), together with the theory
of invention. But the approachis, or is intended to be,
methodological rather than theoretical in Part One as a
whole.® Part Three, titled Semiotic, is a theory of language
and of signs in general. For Wolff and Crusius, this section
belonged to theoretical logic. Part Four, the Phanomeno-
logie, is basically devoted to the theory of illusion, with a
section on probability. This corrective function oflogic,
traditionally attributed to practical logic, had received its
theoretical foundation in the last section of Part Two, the
Alethiologie. Part Two is very important, as it also estab-
lishes the basic connection between logic and ontology. It
does this through the theory of the composition of ideas, and
of their resolution into a series of simple ideas, which mostly
represent the fundamentals of being. This topic, in the
Aristotelian tradition, belonged to theoretical logic, because
the discussion of the transcendentalia and of the categories
was a part of the section on concept in the handbooks on
logic. Wolff had excluded it from logic, but Crusius had
reintroduced it as the theory of first concepts, included in
practical logic. Now, the logical function of this inquiry in
the New Organon consists in providing a material foundation
for truth by retracing the simple elements which are the
components of each concept and proposition, and by estab-
lishing their ontological validity. And this is basically a
demonstrative function, in addition to the formal rules of
demonstration expounded in the Dianoiologie. In fact,

% Lambert, Neues Organon, vol. I, pp. (v-vi). (Vorrede)

160 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
Lambert is probably the most important precursor of Kant ay
for theorizing the distinction between a form and a matter of
knowledge in Kant’s sense, although Lambert’s interest in
establishing this distinction stemmed from his concern with
the combinatoria.”’ Nevertheless, his logic remains, asal]
logics of that time, strongly content-related even in its mere.
ly formal aspects. Moreover, some basic dimensions ofhis
logic directly bear on the matter of knowledge, that is, on
metaphysical subjects. This is the case with the theory of
simple ideas in the Alethiologie in connection with psycholo-
gy as well as with the theory of language in the Semiotic.

13. This is the general structure of the work that Lambert

entitled New Organon. Buteachof its four parts is called a
meansorinstrument, in other words, an organon.”* Thus,
we havein fact four different organons, lending fourdif-
ferent meanings to this term. But, as the work is also
termed organon as a whole, we must add a fifth, more gen-
eral meaning: logic in general. Now, the meaningsof the
four kinds of special organons correspondto the description
I gave of eachpart of the treatise. As for the fifth meaning
of the term, I shall add to what I wrote above on the general
notion of logic in Lambert another important characteristic.
The author suppresses the traditional distinction between
theoretical logic and practical logic or methodologyin the
broad sense. He retains the term method, but usually only
in its stricto sensu, as analytic and synthetic, and occasional-
ly as mathematical method. But where he writes, as we saw

” See, for example, Neues Organon, vol. I, pp. 287-291, Architectonic,

vol. Ill, pp. XVII, XXII and Architectonic, vol. IV, pp. 233-235. Lambert's
notion of form is very complex, and would require for its clarification a lengthy
analysis which I cannot undertake here.
% Neues Organon, vol. I, p. (3).
y SO
Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 161

above, that the Dianoiologie is predominantly methodologi-

cal, he certainly uses the term method in a broader sense.
Now, the factthat the distinction between theoretical and
practical logic is suppressed, while an extensive discussion is
devoted to topicstraditionally belonging to both of them,
seems to meto reveal a methodological approach on the
whole. This view is supported, in the Organon itself, by the
stress laid on the question of its application:

Thenature of an organonimplies thatit be

possible to applyit to each part of human knowledge,
and thus in allsciences, and that one shall develop an
ability in its use, if one does not wantto lag behind.
Therefore I could not do withoutderiving the explana-
tory examples from the sciences, where the organon is
applied to particular cases and parts.°?

Perhaps Kant had this passage in mind, as he taught

(in 1777-1780):

‘An organon ofeach sciencein particular is

quite possible. . . . Lambert wrote such an organon,
butit is divided [into sections] and he considers each
kind of knowledge in particular.!°
14, Kant referred to the special logics which he consid-
ered to be the methodologyof each science.'*' But his con-
siderations, perhaps suggested by the passage from the Orga-
non quoted above, in fact do not apply to the Organon. It is

* Ibid., p. (14).
“Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen ber Enzyklopddie und Logik, vol. 1:
Vorlesungen iiber Philosophische Enzyklopddie, ed. Gerhard Lehman (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1961), p. 57.
"8! See Chap. I, § 33.
162 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
a general logic, not a series of special logics, since each i
of the four parts or instruments of the Organon apply to all
sciences in general. What Kant had in mind wasrather
Lambert’s Architectonic, as we shall see. From Kant’s
viewpointat least, it can be considered an appendixto the
Organon, or even as the real “organic” (methodological)
part of the Organon, if a general methodology, according to
Kant’s opinion, is impossible. It cannot be taken for granteg
that Kant knew Calov’s doctrine about special logics (see §
5) or if he did, that he attached any importance to it.
Lambert states that the task of his Architectonic
consists in establishing (1) the origin of ourontological
concepts through different methods, and the way we gain
them,'” and (2) the immediate use of these concepts. From
the latter viewpoint:

The majority of the principal sectionsof the

[Architectonic] can be considered as particular systems,
and as such each of them can be read byitself. E.g., I
can propose toan expert in physicsthat he readfirst the
19th and the 21st Sections, about causes and effects,
and about signs and their meanings . . . . To an expert
in mathematics I shall not only propose, but recom-
mendthathe read the entire Part Four, whose objectis
quantity, if he wants to enlargethefield of mathemat-
ics. 1

In fact, each science has “its own metaphysic,”'™

because it has its own requirements (Exfordernisse).

102 Lambert, Architectonic, vol. III, pp. V-IX.

103 Ibid., pp. X-X1.
108 Ibid., p. XII.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 163
Bylisting such requirements one finds more
exactly the clue, which onehas to follow [in order to
develop the science in question]... . Such a clue is
completely different from the common topics. The
subject matter and the orderof the exposition in each
particular science must be determined by the ends it has
to serve, and these ends have something peculiar for
each [science], so that no general mold is admissible
whereall of them can be cast, if each [science] has to
take its genuine shape.!°

Now, topicsis traditionally a synonym for dialec-

tic.! This helps us realize how Kant cameto the idea that
no dialectic as an organon for extending knowledgeis possi-
ble in general logic, but that each science must have its own
methodology.'”

15. A similar position had also been sponsored by

d’Alembert in 1767. Heattacked the notion of a general
metaphysic as a science of God, the soul and freedom, but
supported the view that each abstract science has its own
metaphysic:

15 Jhid., pp. 35-36. Compare p. 40.

"% See myarticle “Der historische Ursprung derkantischen Termini
,Analytik’ und ,Dialektik’,” Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte, VII (1962). In the
seventeenth century, andlater, the term topics was still used fordialectic. See
Jacobi Thomasii, Erotemata Logica pro incipientibus (Lipsiae: Sumptibus Georgii
Heinrici Frommanni, Literis Johann-Erici Hahnii, 1670), pp.(iii-iv), in the
Praefatio.
"© See Chap. I, §§ 18, 33. But, in so far as dialectic is conceived as a
logica probabilium (rather than as an ars inveniendi), Kant rejects it for other
reasons. See my essay “Kant unddie antiken Skeptiker,” in Studien zu Kants
philosophischer Entwicklung, ed. Heinz Heimsoeth (Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
1967; in the series Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol.
6, ed. Heinz Heimsoeth, etal.), §§ 12-14.
164 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Properly speaking, there is no [abstract] sci-
ence which does not haveits metaphysic, if one means
by this term the general principles upon which a science
rests, and whichare, as it were, the germ of thepartic-
ular truths[this science] encompasses and expounds;
and onehas to start from these principles in order to
discover new truths, or onehas to refer back to them,
in order to put into the crucible the truths which one
thinks one has discovered. '*

In fact, all of the Elémens de philosophieare series of

particular methodologies, intended as instruments for both
invention and assessment.
It is proper to refer to d’Alembert atthis pointfor
another reason. In his terminology and his environment,
metaphysics had acquired a new meaning, whilestill retain-
ing the usual one on certain occasions. It now meant meth-
odology of knowledge at large, a science hitherto considered
as a part, and sometimesas the true object oflogic.'” This
new use of the term was certainly connected with the con-
temporaneouscollapse oftraditional metaphysics, andpartial
collapse of traditional logic, in Britain and France. In the
fluid situation which ensued, many ambiguities arose.
Now, an analogous ambiguity appears in both Lam-
bert and Kant. Although the first retained traditional view

‘Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Essai sur les Elements de Philosophie, edited

with an introduction by Richard N. Schwab, vol. II (Paris: Jean-Francois
Bastien, 1805; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), pp. 356ff, § XV. This
doctrine becomes very explicit in the additions of 1767 (the Eclaircissement), but
it could also be suggested bythe original text of 1759. Lambert declares that his
Architectonic was entirely written in 1764, and does not mention d’Alembert
amongthe authorities whoinspired him (Lambert, Architectonic, vol. Il, p. V),
so that, if we haveto believe him, d’Alembert did notinfluence him. But Kant
certainly knew d’Alembert’s work very well.
0 See myarticle, “The Problem,” § 8.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 165

of logic, the second changed it into his general logic. Both

intended not to abolish metaphysics, but to strengthen it
through a basic reform. Nevertheless, the new range of
problems raised by British and French philosophers, so
difficult to settle within the moretraditional framework of
Lambert’s and Kant’s thought, was used by them as a lever-
age for their projected reforms. It is no wonder if, as a
result, the borderline between logic and metaphysics was
eroded and blurred.

16. This happened fortiori as a similar ambiguity had

appeared, for completely different reasons, in sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century Aristotelianism. In fact, the discussion
of the supra praedicamentaor transcendentalia, of the cate-
gories, of the praedicabilia or postpraedicamenta, and of the
first principles, took place both within the framework of
general metaphysics or Philosophia Prima and logic. Usual-
ly this took place at the beginning, and in the section devoted
to the study of concepts. A lengthy debate took place about
the locus proprius of these subjects, whether they belonged
to logic or to metaphysics. As the problems involved are
extremely complicated, I will briefly describe only the terms
of the debate concerning the categories and merely hint at
the other developments.
The medieval realist tradition conceived the catego-
ries as concepts expressing an orderof being intrinsic to
things. Thatis, it received them as genera summa. But,
according to the nominalist tradition they were mere mental
constructions, or concepts of a mental order which did not
correspond to an order of things; therefore they were not
166 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

genera summa."° According to the Renaissance nominalis,

tradition, represented by Jacobus Zabarella (1578), Canaye
(1589), Julius Pacius (1597), Joachim Climent (1624) and
Petrus Torrején (1626), the categories only belongto logic
because they merely represent our way of conceiving
things.'"! On the contrary, the realist tradition, representeg
by Hieronymus Balduinus (1562), Keckermann (1614), who
was notan Aristotelian but accepted the Aristotelian catego.
ries, Clement Timpler (1608), Jakob Martini (1610) and
Bartholomaeus Mastrius (1678), supported the view that
Aristotle’s book on the categories was a book on metaphys-
ics. The categories primarily belong in metaphysics, being
the real genera summaofthings.'? They are also, but
secondarily, studied in logic as human concepts. Nicolaus
Godinho (1591), Timpler (1612) and others went to great
lengths discussing the question of the proper placeof the
categories. '"3

17. A trend within German Lutheran Aristotelianism tried

to solve the problems concerning the properplace for ques-

"0 See Risse, Die Logik, vol. Il, pp. 347-348. On the categories in modem
philosophy, see myarticle “La tradizionedelle categorie aristoteliche nella
filosofia moderna sino a Kant,” Stvdi vrbinati di storia, filosofia e letteratvra,
XXXII, Nuova Serie B, N. 1-2 (1958), pp. 121-143.
"! On Zabarella, see Risse, Die Logik, vol. 1, p. 280; Canaye, op. cit., pp.
13-14; Iv1. Pacii [Giulio Pace, Julius Pacius a Beriga], In Porphyrii Isagogen, et
Aristotelis Organvm, commentariusanalyticus (Francofvrti: Apud Heredes
Andreae VVecheli, Claudium Marnium, & Iohan. Aubrium, 1597), p. 26.; on
Climent, see Risse, Die Logik, vol. II, p. 315; on Torrején, see Risse, ibid., vol.
I, p. 348.
12 In Risse, ibid., see p. 245 for Balduinus; pp. 446-447 for Keckermann;
p. 469 for Timpler; p. 503 for Martini; and p. 439 for Mastrius.
"3 Jbid., p. 379, for Godinho; Clemente Timplero, Logicae systema
methodicvm (Hanoviae: Typis Haeredum Guilielmi Antonii, 1612), pp. 77-82.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 167

tions like thefirst principles, the origin of knowledge, by

assigning them to special science, usually called Intelligen-
tia or Noologia. This was developed by Georg Gutke
(1625), Fromme(1631), Calov (1650), Eifler (1651), Johann
Geilfus (before 1662), Georg Meier (1666), Georg Wagner
( 1670). Calov and Eifler taught at Kénigsberg Universi-
ty.
Within this same trend another independent science
was established called Gnostologia, as the study of what can
be known (cognoscibile) qua tale, of the notion and possibili-
ty of knowledge,ofthe relationship between concept and
thing represented, of abstraction, analogy, etc. After Calov
(1633)and Eifler (1656), this science was developed by
Georg Meier (1662) and Wagner (1670). Meier and Wagner
added to the other subjects studied byit a detailed classi-

Georgii Gutkii, Habitus primorvm principiorum, seu intelligentia

(Berolini: Sumptibus Johannes Kallij, Bibliopola, Typis Georgij Rungij, 1625);
From [Fromme], Gnostologia,(in spite ofits title, this work concerns the
problems of noology, notthose of the science later developed under the nameof
gnostology); Abraham Calovi, Noologia, seu habitus intelligentiae, in Scripta
philosophica, vol. 1 (Lubecae: Impensis Joachimi Wilden, Literis Alberti
Hakelmanni, 1651); Michaelis Eifleri, Inrelligentiaesubtilitatem ({Regiomonti
{Kénigsberg}]: Praelo Reusneriano, 1651); Johannis Geilfusi, Intelligentia, seu
primorymprincipiorum habitus (Tubingae: impensis Joh. Georgi Cottae, 1662;
the date ofthe first edition is unknown); Georgi Meieri, Intelligentia, sive
Noologia (Wittebergae [Wittenberg]: Impensis Haered. Jobi Wilhelmi Fincelii,
1666); *Georgius Wagner, Synopsis noologica (Wittebergae [Wittenberg]: n.n.,
1670). {The only lead to date is in the British Museum, General Catalogue of
Printed Books: Photolithographic edition to 1955 ({London}: The Trustees of
the British Museum, {1959-66}). It has an entry for “Wagner (Georg) of
Wallrode.” He was the professor supervising the dissertation of a Gottfridus
Thomae. Thomae wrote Disputatio Noologica repraesentans principia
philosophiae et theoreticae et practicae. Wittebergae {Wittenberg}: n.n., 1668).
See Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tiibingen:
J.C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1939), pp. 246-254, 255-256, 259-260.
"5 Wundt, ibid., pp. 133, 136.
168 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

fication of human knowledge,""* traditionally considered tg

be a part of methodology or logic. The independent status
of gnostology as a whole was very controversial. For the
majority of the other philosophersatthattime,it belongeg
either to logic, metaphysics, or physics.'"”
This episode probably marks the most importantang
the mostself-conscious attempt within modern philosophy
prior to the nineteenth century to establish a science, or
more exactly, two sciences, concerning the fundamentals of
knowledge, and independent of both logic and metaphys-
ics."* This attempt temporarily failed. In fact, during the
eighteenth century it was not repeated. An independent
theory of knowledge was established only after Kant, but
Kant himself never thoughtofit, at least consciously. Stil,
this attempt is a clear symptom oftheinstability of thesitua-
tion, and contributed to the erosion of the borderline between
logic and metaphysics.
Kant’s Aristotelian teachers at K6nigsberg Univer-
sity!’ had certainly made him acquainted with those old dis-

he Gnostologia, in Scripta philosophica; Michaelis Eifler,

Gnostica delineata ([Regiomonti {Kdnigsberg}]: Praelo Menseniano, 1656);
Georgio Meiero, Gnostologia; Georgius VVagnerus, Synopsis gnostologica
(Wittebergae [Wittenberg]: Johannis Borckardi, 1670). See Wundt, op. cit., pp.
256-260. Henrico Nollio’s [Heinrich Nolle] [NMETIKH,seu ars et per propriam
indagationem et per revelationem aliquid discendi (Steinfurti: excudit Theoph.
Caesar, 1617), concemsa different subject. See Wundt, op. cit., p. 239.
17 For a survey of the discussions, see Georgio Meiero, Gnostologia, pp.
Iff, 1Sff, 413ff. Later, Calvinist Samuele Strimesio [Samuel Strimes,Strime-
sius], Lineae gnostologicae, seu logicae peripateticae reformatae rudimenta
(Francofurti ad Viadrum [Frankfurt an der Oder]: Sumptibus Johannis Volcker,
1697)protracted the discussion. In his opinion, as well as that of his teacher, 6.
Valandus, gnostology belonged to logic. See Wundt, op. cit., p. 96.
18 See Wundt,ibid., pp. 151ff, 227ff.
"9 See Chap.Il, n. 6.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 169

cussions, the more as Paul Rabe, professor in K6nigsberg,

had published there in 1704 one of the mostdetailed exami-
nations of the categories.'° So, most probably both of these
seasoned quarrels, and the new British and French problems
about the relationship between logic and metaphysics, are
reflected in Kant’s indecision about the relationship between
the critique of pure reason and transcendental philosophy or
ontology.'?! Moreover, as weshall see below (§§ 19-21),
the nominalistic trend already mentioned produced Christian
Thomasius’ doctrine of ontology as a dictionary attached to
logic. Thus, it also contributed to Kant’s notion ofa critique
of pure reason.

18. It is certain, in my opinion, that Lambert’s Architec-

tonic in particular also contributed significantly to the cause
of Kant’s perplexity about the relationship betweencritique
and ontology. In fact, the Architectonic is defined, at the
very beginning, as a “new enquiry into the fundamentals of
metaphysics,”'?? and Lambert refers to it on several occa-
sions as an ontology.'”? Actually, the questions considered
in it correspond to those oftraditional ontology. But Lam-
bert orders them, or at least intends to order them, according
to a different prospect, so as to produce an ontology suited
to serve as an organonforthe other sciences. This, of
course, contributes to making the borderline between ontolo-
gy and logic more fluid. Lambert himself states that some
of the subjects he treats in this work are more logical than

™® See Chap. II, n. 3.

See Chap. I, §§ 24-28.
™ Lambert, Architectonic, vol. I, p. III.
"8 Ibid., pp. VIII, 13, 48, 58, 120-121; vol. IV, pp. 136, 139, Actually,
for Wolff and Baumgarten, architectonic was an adjective referring to ontology.
See ibid., vol. III, Introduction by Hans-Werner Arndt, p. XIII.
170 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
ontological,!* and that he has to confront the problem of
how to translate some propositions from logical into met,
physical terminology.'? But it is clear that the series of
metaphysics suited to each one of the sciences included in
the Architectonic correspond to a series of organons. am,
bert, who considers his Architectonic in general as “a geny.
ine organon,”!”states this explicitly at least in connection
with Part Four of this work, which concerns quantity, and
whichis termed “general mathematics” or “organon ofthe
quantities.”!7”_ He stresses the fact that, in order to actualize
this purpose, his exposition of the problems in question shal]
be very different from those which can beordinarily found
in treatises on metaphysics.’ Incidentally, Lambert remarks
that this kind of organon can beelaborated only on the
foundation of an extensive knowledge of mathematics, in
order to promote the further development ofthis science,"
This is reminiscent of an analogous position taken by Kant in
1790 in connection with special logic.”

19. Atthis point a further problem arises. Lambert's

Architectonic reveals itself as the “real” organon, while
“general topics” is considered to be impossible (see § 14).
But the New Organon definitely was, among otherthings, a
“general topics,” in so far as it was a general instrument of
invention. Thus I must assume that Lambert considerably

Ibid., pp. XV, 121.

Ibid., vol. IV, p. 89.
Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 40.
Ibid., vol. IV, p. 301; compare p. 310.
Ibid., p. 322.
Ibid., p. 310. The sameis stated more in general, ibid., vol. Ill, pp.
See Chap. I, § 33.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 171
changed his methodological views from and repealed some
basic tenets of the New Organon. 1 assume this occurred
while working on the Architectonic, which was written in
1764, immediately after the completion of the New Organon,
and occasionally modified during the following two years."
He did not announceit openly in the Architectonic or else-
where, but this is in fact what happened.
In what perspective does the New Organon appear
from the new viewpoint? The Architectonic had two basic
functions (see § 14): (1) to establish the origin and the
making of our ontological concepts; (2) to establish the use
of these concepts (for extending knowledge). Now, thefirst
function is not only a preparation for the second. It has a
purpose of its own: that of assuring the objective validity of
knowledge by retracing its foundation in simple elements of
undisputed ontological validity. This is basically a demon-
strative function’? which supplements the first attempt to-
ward establishing the same material foundation for truth in
the Alethiologie of the New Organon (compare § 12). But in
the Architectonic the study of simple notions and their com-
bination into complex ones does not only serve the purpose
of providing the material foundation for a process of demon-
stration, It also is basically aimed towards establishing the
material foundation for a process of invention.
Thus, only two functions of the New Organon are not
taken over by the Architectonic: the semantic and the cor-
rective (compare § 12). The inventive function of the New
Organon is patently exploded. As for the demonstrative
function, in so faras it is formal, it is not replaced. But in
so far as it is material, the Alethiologie is practically super-

"Lambert, Architectonic, vol. Ill, pp. V, XIII, and Amdt's Introduction,

pp. VIIff.
‘= Ibid., Arndt’s Introduction, pp. XIff.
 YS

172 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

seded. Most probably its deficiency has to be attributed, the

same as for the inventive function, to the impossibility of
producing a general methodology for this purpose.
To sum up, if the Architectonic replaces somefunc-
tions of the New Organon througha series of special organ-
ons, someother tasks can still be reserved for the New
Organon as a general logic. Itstill offers a set of rules for
formal demonstration, and a theory of language and correc-
tion. From Kant’s viewpoint, this corresponds to the dis-
tribution between general and special logic, although he
deprived general logic of the sections on semantics and the
psychological theory of correction. Moreover, Kantcould
also find in Lambert a parallelism between applied logic and
applied mathematics (see § 10).'°? The two-tier or even
three-tier conception of organon which emerges in Kant'*
was probably the result of a suggestion orof a series of sug-
gestions advanced by Lambert.

20. There is a last point in the Architectonic whichoffers

a clue for reconstructing trait of Kant’s Critique, namely
that the Analytic of Concepts is conceived as a dictionary."*
Lambert writes:

I shall not be worried in the least by the

reproachthat [in mytreatise] ontologyis nothing but a
philosophical dictionary. I do not consider this reproach

Applied mathematics, in this sense is not the same as mathematics as an

organonof quantities. The second teaches how to find new applications of
mathematics or how to apply mathematics to sciences hitherto studied in a non-
mathematical way. See Lambert, ibid., vol. IV, pp. 301-302, 310. The first
simply consists in the further application of mathematicsto sciences where the
way ofits application has already been found.
"See Chap. I, § 33.
"5 See Chap. I, § 34.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 173

as outrageous. In fact, as many ontological terms and

propositions occur even in everyday life, and these
terms are not defined in the grammatical dictionaries, a
specifically ontological dictionary, and in general a
philosophical dictionary, are alwaysusefulfor reference.

He adds that, of course, his Architectonic shall be more than

a dictionary, because it shall explain the concepts and things
themselves more than the terms, and because it shall show
how these concepts can be used.
What Lambert writes on this subject is not so impor-
tant in itself. Its importance is in connection with that kind
of ontology treated as a dictionary to which herefers. In
fact, this was the way Christian Thomasius and most of his
followers conceived of ontology--a conception which obvi-
ously had beenattacked by both the Aristotelians and the
Wolffians.
Actually, it was Jacob Thomasius, Christian’s father,
whoraised the issue. Hestates that metaphysics, if deprived
of natural theology,'”’ is nothing but a dictionary which is
attached, or subordinated to logic in the same way as a Latin
dictionary is attached to a grammar. The meaning of the
term dictionary as used here, is a list of definitions of terms,
but not in alphabetical order. This dictionary is an instru-

'% Lambert, Architectonic, vol. III, pp. VIII-IX. Compare vol. IV, p. 252.
"=" In his time psychology was a part of metaphysics only occasionally, as it
was mostly conceived as an independentscience, accordingto Aristotle’s De
Anima, So there was general metaphysics or philosophia prima or ontology, and
special metaphysics or theology. But there was also a strongtendency, initiated
by the Calvinists, to restrict metaphysics to ontology only. See Wundt, op. cit.,
pp. 159-160.
 174 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

mental discipline.'* The relationship betweendiction

grammar hints at the fact that some Latin and German dt
naries of that time contained a grammarorwere attached
it.
Christian Thomasius walked in his father’s footstep
As we know, in his handbook on methodology Published
1688, he classified “today’s metaphysics” asa part of inst
mental philosophy, following grammar, andpreceding hist,
ry, rhetoric and logic.'*° Now, his metaphysics is Nothing
but a dictionary of terms, useful in preventing error Tather
than in reaching the truth. Metaphysics cannot be Separate

88 Jacobi Thomasii, op. cit., Praefatio, pp. (1-2):

“Voluit eam [metaphysicam] olim Aristoteles Theologiam esse
naturalem. Sed ab hujus consilio aberrantes Scholastici
perfecerunt, ut posteaqvam abilla tandem Pnevmaticam revul-
simus, merum remanserit Lexicon Philosophicum,. . . Jam qvia
Lexico qvalicung; Philosophicocarere studiosa Juventus nullo
modopotest: causa est, cur huic errori nec periculoso, neqve
hactenus & Scholis exterminato, praesertim si res sit nobis cum
incipientibus, faveamus. Caetertm in hance fortunam conjecta
Metaphysica subnectetur commodissimé, vel connecteturetiam,
Logicae, tanqvam aliqvid ab hac non minis propinqvisfinibus
distans, qvam qvibus 4 Grammatica separatur Lexicon Latinae
Lingvae . . . . Ita mihi nata haec Erotemata sunt. In qvibus
fecit ea san’, qvam huic Lexico cum Logica intercedere dixi,
affinitas, ut admiscerentur qvaedam a Logicis minim?aliena
[Nota:] ut cap. XV. de necessaria propositione: cap. XX. de
oppositis.”
See also pp. 78-79. This Lexicon is a disciplina instrumentalis, p. 86.
99 See, for example, [Kaspar Stieler], Der Teutschen Sprache Stammbaun
und Fortwachs oder Teutscher Sprachschatz, vol. III (Nirnberg: in Verlegung
Johann Hofmanns, Buch- und Kunsthindlers daselbst; Gedruck: zu Altdorf:
Heinrich Meyern, 1691; reprint Miinchen: Késel-Verlag, 1968).
‘© Christiani Thomasii, Introductio, p. 67 (pp. 68-69 in the 1688 edition)
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 175

from logic, in thatit belongs to the theory of concepts.'*'

Among Christian Thomasius’ followers, Johann Franz Budde
considered ontology or general metaphysics only as a series
of definitions contained in the fourth part of his Instrumental
Philosophy orlogic.” Special metaphysics was entitled by
him theoretical philosophy. Joachim Lange reduced ontolo-
gy to series of definitions as an appendix to his Logic,
called “Appendicis pars posterior de Supervacuis, Continens
Doctrinam Syllogisticam et Ontologicam,”'? and Johann
Walch classified a similarly conceived ontology as instru-
mental philosophy together with logic, hermeneutics and
didactic.“ Johann Jacob Syrbius also treated ontology as a
dictionary, but he attached it to metaphysics."* Ridiger, on
the contrary, retained a moretraditional treatment of ontolo-
gy, which waslater to producethe highly speculative meta-
physics of Crusius.

‘4 Ibid., p. 54 (Cap. Il, § 18; p. 55 in the 1688 edition): “Locé Metaphys-

icae, primariae ex scientiis secundum Aristotelem, exhibent Lexicon Philosophi-
cum terminorum, magis ad aberrandum A veritate quam ad eam consequendam,
.; p- 102 (Cap. V, § 3; p. 106 in the 1688 edition): “Caeterum & veritas
Metaphysica . . . A Logica non esse secernendam,sed & quia supra conceptum de
rei existentia retulimus ad primam mentis operationem.”
'@ Jo, Francisci Bvddei [Buddeus], Elementa philosophiae instrvmentalis,
seu institvtionvm philosophiaeeclecticae, vol. I (1703; Halae Saxonvm: Typis et
impensis Orphanotrophii, 1719"), pp. 271ff.
‘© Joachimi Langii, Medicina mentis, pp. 663ff. [The 1708 edition has a
slight variance in thetitle, Medicina mentis, qua, praemissa medica sapientiae
historia, as well as in the nameofthis appendix, here called “Appendix de
Supervacuis, Continens Doctrinam Syllogisticam & Ontologicam,” pp. 661ff.]
‘4 Johann Georg Walch, Einleitung in die Philosophie (1727; Leipzig: Joh.
Fried. Gleditschenssel. Sohn, 1730), p. 45.
\5 To. Iacobi Syrbii, Institvtiones philosophiae primae (lenae [Jena]: Apvd
lo. Felicem Bielckivm, 1719), p. 516: “Philosophiae primae appendix vel, si
manis, pars tertia quaeest ontologiae seu philosophiae primae verbalis succincta
delineatio.”
176 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

21. It is obvious that Jacob and Christian Thomasius’

notion of ontology was generated during a crisis of the
Aristotelian tradition, where Aristotelianism was attacked jp
a very radical way withtraditional nominalistic ammunition
(see § 16 above). Declaring ontology to be nothing more
than a list ofarbitrary definitions amounts to reducingall
general metaphysical concepts to human constructions
despoiled of any connection with the reality of things. Thus,
metaphysicsis positively valid only as special metaphysics,
or as the cognition of a being, namely God. This being, of
course, is conceived through ontological and thereforearbi-
trary human notions. But, in so far as these notions referto
an individual as existing, they provide us with a piece of
knowledge which is substantially correct, albeit expressed in
merely human terms. Likewise, if a particular language
enables us to describe a certain matter of fact in a way which
is adequate to our purposes, the knowledge it providesis
valid, although we are notallowed to think that the words
composing that language are individually identical or analo-
gous to the real characters of the matter of fact in question,
Norshould wethink that these words, abstractly considered,
are anything more than a convention, or correspond toa real
state of affairs.

22. It is historically instructive to see how the aftermath

of nominalism, independently developing into at least two
different traditions, finally converged in Kant. The one
tradition leads through Gassendi to Locke and Hume, the
other climaxes in Christian Thomasius. In his Transcenden-
tal Analytic, Kant produced his ownontological dictionary.
Its terms, deprived of intrinsic metaphysical validity, are
adequate to the elaboration of a valid metaphysic of nature
and of morals, in so far as they correspond to universal and
necessary functions of the human mind. As Thomasius and
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 177

nis followers had done, Kant separated this version of ontol-

ogy from metaphysics. Thatis, he separated that part of the
Critique of Pure Reason which corresponded to transcenden-
tal philosophy, namely the Analytic.’ Hetransferred it to
logic, or more precisely, to the special logic of metaphysics,
namely the Critique. Obviously, Kant’s position is very
distant from the twotraditions mentioned above. But I think
it is safe to assumethat he foundin the early Thomasian
school a sourceofinspiration for a more adequate formula-
tion of his own position through the idea of an ontological
dictionary. Its terms, albeit not conventional, are not ex-
pressive of any absolute truth, but, if properly used, can
yield an adequate metaphysical knowledge of the human
world. Lambert’s implicit allusion to Thomasian ontology
showsthat this school of thought, famous in Germany during
the first decades of the eighteenth century, had not been
forgotten, andstill played a certain role at the time of the
making of Kant’s philosophy, although Lambert obviously
could not be as sympathetic towards it as Kant most probably
was.
Kant used the same device, namely the reduction to a
dictionary, in order to dispose of another subject which in
his opinion did not allow a more merciful treatment. This
was the theory of method in general logic, as we find it in
Kant’s Logic edited by Jasche. Kant most probably did not
know that he had a predecessor in Fabri, who, in 1645, had
restricted logic to the analytic, and had taken care of the
other logical operationsby listingtheir definitions in a kind
of dictionary called Logica elementaris.'"”
Before proceeding to consider further subjects, I
shall mention the fact that Johann Nicolaus Tetens, in a tract

“See Chap. I, §§ 24, 26-28.

“Fabry, op. cit., p. 4. See Risse, Die Logik, vol. Il, pp. 156ff.
 >
178 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
published in 1775, apprears to have accepted someof
Lambert’s views. He terms ontology Grundwissenschafi,
as Lambert had done,andstates that it is as importantfor
metaphysics as arithmetic and geometry are for natural
philosophy. Ontology and logic seem to be on the same
plane.'#? Bacon is referred to with praise."

[IV. THE HISTORY OF THE TERM CANON]

23. The term canonis not less ancient than organon. Its
evolution within the field of philosophyis less dramatic,
although canon is much more prolific of metaphorical mean-
ings outside of philosophy.
Herbert Oppeloffers a quite interesting surveyofthe
different uses of this term in Antiquity.'*! The original
meaning of the Greek xavav seems to have been “shaft,”
“bar,” “beam” (pp. 4-5). As “stick” it was used to denote a
standard of linear measure used in construction (p. 10), ora
ruler for mathematicians (p. 12). Polyclitus wrote a work
called Canon, being a study of the numerical correlations of
proportions in sculpture and architecture (p. 14). The theo-

‘© Johann Nicolas Tetens, Uber die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie

(Biitzow und Wismar: in der Berger- und Boednerschen Buchhandlung, 1775;
new ed. Wilhelm Uebele,together with vol. I of his Philosophische Versuche
(Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1913; in the series Neudrucke seltener philosoph-
ischer Werke, ed. Kantgesellschaft, vol. IV), pp. 18, 23, and passim (pagination
ofthe originaledition). Lambert is referred to on p. 81.
1 Ibid., pp. 18, 24, 21.
‘9 Jbid., pp. 31, 33, 34.
‘S| Herbert Oppel, KANN. Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes und
seiner lateinischen Entsprechungen (Regula-Norma), Inaugural-Dissertation,
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitit zu Berlin (Leipzig: Dieterich’sche Verlags-
buchhandlung, 1937; Philologus, Supplementband XXX, Heft 4).
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 179

rists of music used an instrument called canon in order to

measure the intervals of sounds, whose invention was attrib-
uted to Pythagoras, who seems to have founded the theory of
music, called xavovxy (pp. 17-18). The same term was
used by the Sophists to denote certain stylistic rules of dis-
course (p. 23), while Euripides applied it to ethics, as a
natural capacity for distinguishing good from evil (p. 23).
For Aristotle it was also applied to moral judgment, butthis
judgment was considered to be approximate, versus the
connotationofstrict rule attributed till then to the term in
question (p. 30). The Stoics also used canon as a standard
of judgmentboth in logic and in ethics, but they preferred to
use a synonym, xp77puov, criterion (p. 31). Democritus
(according to Sextus Empiricus) was the author of a work
called either Kavaév or Kavoveg, concerning thereliability of
knowledge, andestablishing rules for it from a psychophysi-
ological point of view (good health ofthe sensory organs),
so that that work was considered as belonging to physics
(pp. 33-35). Epicurus used the term to the same effect, but
from a logical-psychological point of view. His logic was
called xavovixyj, and Epicurus’ work on this subject was
entitled The Canon. Its task wasto establish the real exis-
tence of things perceived, as they are perceived; its standard
was soughtin the senses, andtheir rules werealso called
xpwtiipua (pp. 35-37).
24. In ancient legal thought, a canonis a rule establishing
the border between right and wrong (pp. 52-53). Philo uses
it to denote the decalogue, a revealed religious law (pp. 58-
60). For St. Paul, the canonis the rule of Christian ethics
(pp. 60-61), while Clement of Alexandria calls the Gospel
canon (p. 61). The grammarians of the imperial period use
this term to meana rule of grammar (pp. 65-66), while the
astronomersuseit to indicate a table listing the times of
 ON
180 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
motionof the heavenly bodies(p. 66). In the language of
the Christian Church, canon also means a rule of penance ©.
71).
In Latin, canonis translated as “regula” or “norma,»
as concerning, for example, instruments used in construction
work in orderto build in a straight line (pp. 74, 76-79).
Cicero, speaking of Epicurus,translates canon with “regu-
la,” and criterion with “judicium” (p. 81). “Regula” and
“norma” are also used by Lucretius as current Epicurean
terminology (p. 82). Cicero also employs “regula” to denote
the moral rule, conceived accordingto the thoughtofthe
Middle Stoa (p. 89). Seneca mentions a “moral rule,” (pp,
91-92) while in the philosophy of law and in practical juris-
prudence a “regula” is a juridical principle endowed with
universal validity (pp. 94-98). Petronius mentionsa stylistic
“regula” of rhetoric, the same as Quintilian and Pliny the
Younger (pp. 103-105).
The term canonitself appears in Latin law. It means
either a tax paid in kind, or the rent periodically paid by a
tenant."
Weare, of course, basically interested in thestrictly
philosophical meaningsofthis term (andoftheinterrelated
criterion), especially in connection with the Epicurean tradi-
tion, to which Kant referred in this respect.'?

25. Diogenes Laertius mentions a canonor criterion of

truth in connection with the Stoic school. The criterion in

132 Ch. Mortet, “Canon,” Pt. V, in La grande encyclopédie inventaire

raisonné des sciences, des lettres et des arts (Paris: H. Lamirault et C*., 1886-
1902).
13 See Chap. I, § 51.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 181

question should be “right reason.”'* The same meaning of

canon as Criterion of truth is mentioned in connection with
Epicurus.'*° Justus Lipsius, the great reviver of Stoicism,
expounds the canonsorcriteria of the Stoics.'%* Gassendi
also mentions canons andcriteria in Stoic and Epicurean
logic. The logic of Epicurus is called Canonicam and con-
sists in a few rules.'*” Gassendi himself, in his revival of
Epicurean thought, used in his ownlogic the phrase “criteri-
on of truth” and divided his subject into sections called
canons.'** ThomasStanley discusses the “logical criterion”
of the Stoics, offers a detailed exposition of Epicurus’
Canonick, andofits canons orcriteria,which are men-

' Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book VII, Chaps. 1,

41-42, 49, 54.
S Jbid., Book X, 29-31.
'% Ivsti Lipsi, Manvdvctionis ad stoicam philosophiam (Antverpiae [Ant-
werp]: Ex Officina Plantiniana, Apud Ioannem Moretum, 1604; published also
the same year Parisiis: Ex Officina Plantiniana, Apud Hadrianvm Perier, via
Jacobea), Lib. II, 6.
' Gassendi, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 49, 52-56. This is De logicae origine, et
varietate, published in 1658, Chaps. VI, VII.
1 [bid., pp. 69-72 (this is De logicaefine, published in 1658, Chap. II),
pp. 92ff, passim (this is Institvtionis logicae, also published in 1658).
19 Thomas Stanley [Thoma Stanleio], The History of Philosophy: Contain-
ing the Lives, Opinions, Actions and Discourses of the Philosophers of Every Sect.
Originally published in 1655, it appeared in numerous editions, both in English
and Latin (as Historia philosophiae). In the secondedition (London: Printed for
Thomas Bassett, at the Georgein Fleetstreet, Dorman Newman,at the Kings
Arms, and Thomas Cockerill, at the Three Leggsin the Poultery, 1687; reprint
New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1978; in theseries British Phi-
losophers and Theologians of the 17th & 18th Centuries, ed. René Wellek), see
pp. 429-430, 851-856. [In thethird edition (London: Printed for W. Battersby at
Thavy’s Inn-gate, near St. Andrew's Church in Holbourn, Hugh Newman, Tho.
Cockerill, Herbert-Walwynin the Poultry, and A. and J. Churchil in Pater-
Noster-Row, 1701; reprint Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1975; in the
 Os
182 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

tioned also by Christian Thomasius in 1688,'° and by Watch

in 1726.'%' Walch’s opinion is particularly authoritative, as
he is the author of the first important History of Logic.
Hewrites in his Dictionary that Epicurus restricted his logic
to a few canons, but this did not mean atall that he despiseg
logic. Though Epicurus attacked the logic of the Stoics, he
did not attack logic in general. In fact, his canonic

is such, that he deserves the greatest praise among the

ancients for his logical doctrines, because he considered
in particular the distinctive characters of truth and false-
hood, which was a question to whichlittle attention had
been hitherto paid.’

His canons, in fact, are criteria of truth.’ Thus,

Walch considers the correctiveor critical use of logic (pro-
viding the criteria of truth) as the basic function ofthis
science, in accordance with thetradition established by
Christian Thomasius.

series Anglistica & Americana, A Series of Reprints Selected by Gernhard

Fabian, Edgar Mertner, Karl Schneider and Marvin Spevack, vol. 152), see pp.
309, 549-554.]
“© Chr. Thomasii, Introductio, pp. 106-107 (pp. 110-111 in the 1688
edition).
‘1 Johann Georg Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon, vol. 1 (1726; Leipzig: in
Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775*; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968), s.v.
“Canonica,” “Criterium der Wahrheit.” The Stoics are mentioned in thelatter
article, but in a way which doesnotindicate that “Criterium” (Walchalsouses
the German “Kennzeichen”) is a specifically Stoic term, as it is also used in
connection with Plato, the Skeptics, Descartes and others.
'@ Jo, Georgii Walchii, Historia logicae, in his Parerga academica ex
historiarvm atqve antiqvitatvm monimentis collecta (Lipsiae: Svmtv lo. Frieder.
Gleditschii B. Filii, 1721).
‘8 Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon, vol. 1, s.v. “Canonica.”
' Ibid., s.v. “Criterium der Wahrheit.”
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 183
Brucker mentions Pythagoras’ canonic or musical
26.
theory,'® and the logical canons of Democritus, who is
considered in this respect to be a precursor of Epicurus.'®
The latter

restored to the concepts and rules oftruth that part of

philosophy which concernsdialectic [= logic], previ-
ously marred by the philosopher'sevils, and expressed
in his canonic the best part of rational philosophy,
eliminatingall trifling questions. '7

According to Epicurus,

there is a need for an established series of a few rules

or canons, expressive of what one should think of the
terms, and of the rule of judgment, as an approach or
introduction to the natural, or less important part [of
philosophy).'°*

Brucker’s assessmentreflects his Thomasian educa-

tion. Logic should be simplified, and reduced to its correc-
tive function. Epicurusis praised for having followed this
line, since his logic consists in a few rules, as an introduc-
tion to natural philosophy. Thus wefind in Bruckerall
characteristics attributed by Kantto Epicurus’ logic, includ-
ing Kant’s explicit sympathy for his approach, which stems
from similar reasons.'® Brucker also uses in this respect the
term criterion.'"° However, this term is also used in connec-

Brucker, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 1057, 1059.

Ibid., p. 1186.
Ibid., p. 1256.
Ibid.
See Chap. I, § 51.
Brucker, op. cit., vol. I, p. 1257.
184 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
tion with the Cyrenaics, the First Academy, the New Acage.
myandthe Stoics.!7!
Darjes, in the survey of the history oflogic attacheg
to his Logic (1755), mentions the canons and criteria ofthe
Stoics, as well as that Epicurus’ Canonica consists of a few
canons. !72
It is interesting to note that within this historical
tradition the ethical and legal meanings of canonpresentin
Antiquity are not preserved. The pattern established by
Diogenes Laertius is worked upon, but is not basically ex-
tended.

27; It is superfluous for our purpose to follow the use of

the term canon in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. It will
be sufficient to remind the reader that Avicenna was the
author of a famous Liber canonis, a treatise on medicine,
and that Aquinas used this term to mean rule, prescription
(for example, the canon missae), list and table ofcontents.'”
In modern times canonis used with series of dif-
ferent meanings: (1) canon or church law (apostolic canons,
canons of the Councils); (2) the collection of the authenti-
cally inspired books of the Bible; (3) the essential part ofthe
Mass; (4) a list of the saints acknowledged by the Church;
(5) a customary payment to some religious account, (6) the
yearly rent paid by a tenant; (7) a rule or table in mathemat-
ics; (8) the rule for finding Easter in the calendar; (9) a

Ibid., pp. 594, 732, 765, 915.

'2 Joachimi Georgii Darjes, Via ad veritatem commoda avditoribys methodo
demonstrata (1755; lenae [Jena]: Impensis Io. Gvilielmi Hartvngii, 1764), pp.
239, 252.
In Ludwig Schiitz, Thomas-Lexikon (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schéningh.,
1895; reprint Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, Giinther Holzboog, 1958), see
“Canon.”
 : A i js
ently to mean ru , : om, Phy, canoni
axi
fi le, axio : s : e: Plo y
jon with logic, metaphysi :‘axim, or pri ciple, i
onnection | > physics, ethics, ete,174
pasic meaningsare
a principle, as logical
insofarthe and ethical.”
it is termed a tule o
In ffact, But the
an axion
sidered notas a law intrinsic to things, but

poth m oe
ethical, andthis is what the logi
of the term have in common.
Chauvin (1692):
RULE (regula), or canon, j
about things, some undoubted proposition ne natement
man must conform his opinions and actions Trevt
two [kinds of canon]: the theoretical, which belarus
the understanding, and serves to know the truth; ae a
practical, which belongs to the will... A particular
art is assigned to treat each of them. In fact. lo; ie “
whichis defined as the art directing the human mind to
think well, . . . expoundsthecriteria of truth and the
rules of knowledge . . . . And ethics . . . is a kind of
art, which . . . incites to prosecute the good and the
honest... .175

Thus, the term canon appearingin a science other

than ethics is used in its logical meaning, in so far as a
proposition of that science is a cognitive rule within that
science. Of course, there are rules also in the fine and
mechanical arts, as principles directing the actualization of a

a
™ See Appendix A.
"S Chauvini, op. cit., see “REGULA.” See also Micraelius in Appendix A.
 >

186 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

productofa certain art, and this can probably be considereg

as a third kind of rule. In any case, these rulesare also
principles of human action. The same may apply to canon jn
mathematics, in so far as mathematics is considered an
instrumental science. It is in this sense that Alsted called
that part of the introduction (praecognitorum) to philosophy
which prescribes the method of studying philosophy “Canon.
ica.” It is divided into three sections on the purpose, the
difficulties, and the means of studying philosophy. For
example, sin and arrogance, amongothers, are difficulties,
while sanctity and diligence are among the means."
In seventeenth-century Germanyat least four works
appeared with the term canon in its philosophical sense in
their title: by Johann Lippius (1616), Nikolaus Hunnius
(1621), HieronymusPraetorius (1626), and Johann Ernst
Pfuel (1669).!77
In eighteenth-century philosophy the use of the term
canon is muchless frequent than in the seventeenth centu-
ry.” It retains the meaning of rule or cognitiveprinciple in

116 Alstedio, op. cit., Lib. IV, pp. 422-424.

in Johannis Lippi, Canonesin virtutum ac bonarum artiumstudio acstadio
qvotidie observandi (Erfurti: Typis Martino - Wittelianis, impensis Johan.
Bischoffs, 1616); Nicolao Hunnio, Canoneslogici, primam mentis operationem
dirigentes (VVitebergae: Ex Typograhéo Augusti Boreck, Impensis Pauli
Helvwvichij, 1621); Hieronymi Praetori, Canonum metaphysicorum pars generalis
(ena: Sumptib. Jobannis Reiffenbergeri, Excudebat Vidua Weidneriana, 1626);
Joan. Em. Pfuel, Breviarium logicum, per praecepta et canonesin artatum hoc
opus concinnatum (Grypsvaldi [Griefswald]: Typis Matthaei Doischeri, 1669).
'% The numberof references I give here for the use ofthe term canonin the
eighteenth century would not be misleading. I searched eighteenth-century au-
thors much morethoroughly than seventeenth-century authors for the use ofthis
term. So further research in the eighteenth century would not yield many more
references, while in the seventeenth century it would enormously increase the
numberofreferences given here.
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 187

the few authors whouse it. In Germany those are the

Thomasians Budde (1703) and Syrbius (1719);'” the Wolff-
ians Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1722) and Gottlieb Friedrich
Hagen (1734) in works on logical subjects, and Johann Ernst
Schubert (1739).'*° Later this term is retained only by Cath-
olic philosophers, such as Angelus Winckler (1755) and
Stephan Wiest (1776), whoare still under the influence of
Catholic Scholasticism.'*' In other nations, only the example
of Antonio Genovesi (1745) has some importance.'*? The
fact that in Diderot’s Encyclopédie (1765) logic is defined as
canonic art is probably a reminiscence of Gassendi. Other-
wise, the term is used either in connection with Epicurus
(and occasionally with the Stoics), or in connection with the
“old metaphysics” andin particular, with some of their
traditional canons, with the specific implication that the term
has grown obsolete.'** This term, insofar as I know,is not
used in ethics. The fact that in somecasesit is used in

1» Bvddei, op. cit.; Syrbii, op. cit., Pt. II: Metaphysica.

"© Georgius Bernhardus Biilffinger[Bilfingeri], De axiomatis philosophicis
articulos generales (Tubingae: Literis Josephi Sigmundi, 1722). This work of
Bilfinger is included as the third Dissertationes Philosophicas in Georgii Bern-
hardi Bilfingeri, Varia in fasciculos collecta (Stuttgardiae: Sumtibus filiorum
beati Christophori Erhardti, 1743); Gotlib Frider. Hagen, Meditationes philoso-
phicae de methodo mathematica (Norimbergae [Nimberg]: Sumtibus Ioannis
Stein, 1734); Ioannis Emnesti Schvberti, Institvtiones metaphysicae (Helmstadii et
Halae: Svmptibvs Carol. Herman. Hemmerde, 17623).
"| Angelo Winckler, Dissertatio critico-philosophica (Ratisbonae [Regens-
burg]: Typis Joannis Viti Radlmayr, 1755); Stephanus Wiest, Initia philosophiae
purioris cum positionibus mathematicis (Ratisbonae [Regensburg]: Apud Ioan.
Leopold. Montag, 1776).
‘2 Antoni Genuensis, Elementorum artis logicocriticae libri V (first German
edition Coloniae Agrippinae [KéIn]: Sumptibus Joannis Wilhelmi Krakamp, &
haeredum Christiani Simonis, 1753).
"8 See Appendix B.
 oS

188 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

metaphysics, or is referred to “old metaphysics,” does not
contradictits traditional cognitive (logical) meaning, for the
Teason given above.
Thus the term canon must have appeared to Kant as
an obsolete term, and also as a term related to logic. Both
characteristics made it suitable for a new use in the Critique.
Kant preferred to revive old terms, of course giving them a
new meaning, in order to express his new concepts. Fur-
ther, he conceived the Critique as a work on logic. Thefact
that this term was preeminently connected with Epicurus
certainly increased Kant’s interest in it, as Epicurus’ logic
was traditionally described as a merely corrective methodolo-
gy of physical knowledge, refraining from the cavils of
theoretical logic.

[V. CRITERION, DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE]

29. The term criterion also deserves someattention, al-

though Kant does notgive it a particular preeminence. As
we have seen (§§ 23-25), in Antiquity criterion was a syn-
onym for canon, in the logical meaning ofthis term. This
relationship between the two terms in modern thoughtcan be
established in the same respect through the dictionaries of
Goclenius (1613), Micraelius (1653), Chauvin (1692), and
Walch (1726). This relationship is frequently supported by
referring to Epicurus, who, according to the tradition, used
both terms with the same meaning in his logic. But the use
of the term criterion is both broader and narrowerthan that
of canon. It is narrower insofar as it applies to logic only,
although Goclenius referred to a possible (or actual?) use of
it in ethics, disregarding the many non-philosophical mean-
ings of canon, which never were lent to criterion. Further,
it was not used by the “old metaphysicians” to indicate their
 Precedents to Kant’s Use of Organon and Canon 189

principles. It is broader insofar as canon is used in connec-

tion with Epicurus and sometimes Democritus and the Stoics,
because ofits historical association with them, while cri-
terion also belongsto the terminology referred to Plato,
Aristotle and others. Thus, not being historically committed
to a certain schoolorto certain schools, criterion could also
be employed in connection with otherthinkers like
Descartes.
The term canon was used much morebythe “old
metaphysics” than wastheterm criterion. Thus, criterion
survived muchbetter in Germany, which was where the “old
metaphysics” school of thought metits ruin. In the eighte-
enth century, canon sounded old-fashioned, but criterion was
retained as a usable term. It seems that in France and Brit-
ain it was used verylittle in that century. In these two
countries the majority of the technical terms of seventeenth-
century philosophy were shunned, regardless of their doctrin-
al affiliation, as philosophy strove to use only vernacular
terms in order to become moregenerally intelligible. For
example, in Britain, criterion tends to be replaced by stan-
dard. Nevertheless, in Germanythe old criterion is some-
times “Germanized” as Kriterium, and more frequently
replaced by Kennzeichen. Kant himself uses not only Crite-
rium or Kriterium, but frequently Kennzeichen and some-
times Richtschnur.

30. As for discipline,'* Kant, at the time of the Critique

of Pure Reason, established its meaning in conformity with
one ofits traditional senses, that of correction or stern rule
in education, and used it in order to denote a negative,

14 See Appendix C.
18s See Appendices D and E.
 >
190 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
merely limiting part of methodology. Earlier, he had used jt
in the sense of science. Over the course oftime, discipline
had been on some occasions a synonym for doctrine or
science, and on other occasions it had denoted a stringent,
genuinely scientific method. “Disciplinalis” had been a
synonym for demonstrative in the Middle Ages. Still, in
Riidiger and his school, it denoted a more adequate knowl-
edge, allowing oneto penetrate to the essence of things.
Therefore it provided demonstrative truths aboutessences in
those sectors of human cognition where this is possible.
That Kant may have beenpartially induced to adoptthis term
in its meaning of “correction” in his methodology by the
other methodological meaning of the same term, is a hypoth-
esis which as far as I know can neither be proved nordis-
proved.
APPENDICES
 APPENDIX A: CANONIN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Jonam Hoeckerum [Jonas Hoecker], Clavis

philosophi
(1596; Tvbingae: Typis Theodorici Werlini,
Impensis Totuinnis
femeris 1620), see for example pp. 136,
479,

_. lodoci Lorichii Johann Lorich], Thesavrvs nowss vtrivsqve

theologiae theoricae et practicae (Fribvrgi Brisgoiae [Freiburgi.
Breisgau]: Excudebat Martinvs Béckler, 1609), s.v. “Canon”:
“Canon graeca VOX est, latiné Regula... . Regula autem a regendo
nomen habet, qudd normam praebeatrect2, beneg; viuendi.... ”
Here the ethical meaning of the term reappears.

Bartholomaei Keckermanni [Bartholomaeus Keckermann],

Opervm omnivm qvae extant, vol. Il (Genevae: Apvd Petrvm
Avbertvm, 1614), frequently uses the term canon to mean principle
or rule.

Rodolphi Goclenii [Rudolph Goclenius], Lexicon philosophi-

cvm, qvo tanqvm clave philosophiae fores aperivntvr (Francofvrti:
Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperti
Pistorij, 1613; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), s.v. “Can-
on”: “Canon norma est vel regula. Canon est examen trutinae,
quam normalem esse oportet.” In practice he uses the term canon

193
 os
194 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

to denote a general proposition, as, for example, pp. 51, 55

53], 59, 67, 99, 118.18 Use,

= *Francis Bacon, Jnstaurationis magnae pars sexta. Philoso,

Phia secundade vita activa, lists a series of propositions calleq
“provisional rules” or “canones mobiles” (“mobiles” in as far as
“Nie enim adhuc pronuptiamus”). [For Bacon’s use of “canones
mobiles”, see Fancis Bacon, Historia vitae et mortis. Sive titviys
secyndysin historia naturali et experimentali ad condendam philos,,
phiam: quae est Instaurationis magnae parstertia, in The Works of
Francis Bacon, collected and ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie
Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, vol. III (New York: Hurd and
Houghton; Boston: Taggard and Thompson, 1864; republished st,
Clair Shores, MI: Scholarly Press, 1983), pp. 483-485.]

~ The term is frequently used by Joh. Conradi Dannhaweri

[Johann Conrad Dannhauer], Epitome dialectica (Argentorati
[Strasbourg]: Typis Wilhelmi Christiani Glaseri, 1634). [See also
his Decas diatribarvm logicarvm in sex syllogas distributa: in
quibus canones logici praecipuam habentes difficultatem potissimun
ex Aristotele dijudicantur, enodantur, resolvuntur (Marpurgi
Cattorum {Marburg}: Impensis Nicolai Hampelii, 1632*), which is
bound together with the Epitome.]

= Abraham Calovi, Scripta philosophica, vol. I (Lubecae:

186 [Tonelli cites Rodolphi Goclenii {Rudolph Goclenius}, Conciliator

philosophicus (Cassellis {Kassel}: Ex officina typographica Mauritianaoper
Wilhelmi Wesselii, 1609) as using the term canon to denote a general proposition
This use of the term was not found there at all. These pages from his Lexicon
philosophicum do match Tonelli’s claim.]
>
Appendices 195

Impensis Joachimi Wilden, Literis Alberti Hakelmanni, 1651),

which includes his Gnostologia (1633).

- Michaelis Eifleri, Recognita methodologia particularis

(Regiomonti Borussorum [K6nigsberg]: Praelo Reusneriano, 1653).

sie Joh. Micraelii [Johannes Micraelius], Lexicon philosophicuwn

terminorum philosophis usitatonan (1653; Stetini [Stettin]: impensis
Jeremiae Mamphrasii, Typis Michaelis Hépfneri, 16627; reprint
Disseldorf: Stem-Verlag Janssen & Co., [1966]; in the series
Instrumenta philosophica, Series lexica, vol. 1), pp. 232-233, lists
the following meanings: (1) as regula in general, “Canon hinc est
omnis regula, omne axioma, omnis maxima, omne denig; praecep-
twm, juxta qvod aliqvid aut statuendum aut agendum est” (so that
the ethical meaning is included); (2) in architecture; (3) in politics,
rent is paid by a tenant; (4) in scriprura sacra; (5) in jus canoni-
cum. Compare pp. 687, 755, 893 (norma), 1004 (logic as canoni-
cam), 1211.

- Joh. Henrici Bisterfeldii Johann Heinrich Biesterfeld],

Bisterfeldius redivivus: seu operum, vol. Il (Hagae-Comitvm
[S’Gravenhage]: Ex Typographia Adriani Vlacq., 1661), in his
Logica, p. 318, defines the canons of method (versus axioms), and
uses the term frequently. See, for example, pp. 348-350. One of
the works contained in volumeII is entitled Ars seu Canones de
reductione ad Praedicamenta.

- Iohannis Amos Comenii [Johannes Amos Comenius], De

rerum humanarum emendatione, vol. Il (Pragae: Sumptibus
Academiae Scientiarum Bohemoslovacae, In Academia, h.e., In
 ern Logic
196 Kant’s Critique Within Mod
ae, 1966),
Aedibus Academiae Scignigeatn Bohemoslovac ty
example, pp. 80, 869, e

i Meiero,
it Gnostollogia N. Bae [Witt
i (Witteberga ‘
- Georgio
Typis & Impensis Jobi Wilhelmi Fincelii, 1662), passing te),

wis God. Guil. Leibnitii ia nal Leibniz), be

“ hica, ed. J[ohann] E[duar rdmann, 2 vols. ra
sa
ee Sumtibus G. Eichleri, 1839-1840; supplemented
ed. Renate Vollbrecht, Aalen: Scientia, 1959), p. 59 (whieh rine
stilo philosophico Nizolii, 1670); and his Mathematische Schrig
Ww. Sen
vol. VII, ed. Cfarl] I[mmanuel] Gerhardt (Halle: H,
1863; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962), p. 217. t,
rm

APPENDIX B: CANONIN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

s Jo. Francisci Bvddei [Johann Franz Budde, Buddeus], Ele-

menta philosophiae instrvmentalis, seu institvtionvm Philosophiae
eclecticae, VOl. I (1703; Halae Saxonvm: Typis et impensis
Orphanotrophii, Glavcha-Halensis, 1719”), pp. 271, 273, 275, 282,
784-286, 295, 297 (Logic).

s Io. Jacobi Syrbii [Johann Jakob Syrbius], Institvtiones philo-

sophiae primae(Ienae [Jena]: Apvdlo. Felicem Bielckivm, 1719),
jn the “Philosophiae primae appendix vel, si manis, pars tertia quae
est ontologiae seu philosophiae primae verbalis succincta delin-
eatio,” pp. 555, 562, 567, 572, 580. It is used for ontological prin-
ciples like “ex nihilo nihil fit.”

os Georgii Bernhardi Bilfingeri [Bilfinger, Biilffinger], Varia in

asciculos collecta, vol. I (Stuttgardiae: Sumtibusfiliorum beati
Christophori Erhardti, 1743), Dissertationes Philosophicas 3: De
axiomatis philosophicis articuli generales (1722), passim.

- Christian Wolff referred to the Canones or Grund-Lehren of

the old scholastic metaphysics in Ausfihrliche Nachricht von seinen
eigenen Schrifften, die er in deutscher Sprache von den verschied-
enen Theilen der Welt-WeiBheit heraus gegeben (1726; Franckfurt

197
 oo”
198 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
am Mayn: Joh. Benj. Andrea und Heinr. Hort., 1733°; reprin,
Wolff, Werke, 1:9), p. 213. On his use of the canonsin Question
see Francis Ruello, “Christian Wolff et la Scolastique,” Traditig”
XIX (1963), pp. 412-425. ,

=> Gottlib Frider. [Gottlieb Friedrich] Hagen, Meditationes

Philosophicae de methodo mathematica (Norimbergae [Niirnberg]:
Sumtibus Ioannis Stein, 1734), pp. 152ff, “Canones de definitione,»

= Ioanne Petro Revschio [Joann Peter Reusch], Systema metg-

physicvm antiqviorvm atqve recentiorvm item propria dogmata et
hypotheses exhibens (lenae [Jena]: Ex Officina Ioannis Rvdolphi
Crékeri, 1735), §§ 32, 283.

-- Nicolai Hieronymi [Nikolaus Hieronymus] Gundling, Colles.

ivm historico-literarivm oder Ausfihrliche Discourse tiber die Vor-
nehmsten Wissenschaften und besonders die Rechtsgelahrheit(Bre-
men: Nathanael Saurmann, 1738), p. 496, on Epicurus’ Canonic,

-- Ioannis Ernesti Schvberti [Johann Ernst Schubert], Institvtio-

nes metaphysicae (1739; Helmstadii et Halae: SvmptibvsCarol.
Herman. Hemmerde, 17623), pp. 285, 338, 667.

2 [Jean Pierre] de Crousaz, La logique, ou systeme derefle-

xions, vol. V (Lausanne & Geneve: Marc-Mich. Bousquet & Comp.,
1741‘), p. 141. He mentionsthat in ancient disputations the canons
were “... certains principes dont on étoit convenu... .”
 Appendices 199
2 Sam[uel] Christi[an] Hollmanno, Philosophiae rationalis,
qvae logica (1746; Goettingae: Svmtibvs vidvae Abrami Vanden-
hoek, 1767*), Prolegomena, § VII, on Epicurus’ Canonica, refer-
ring to Diogenes Laertius, Gassendi and Stanley.

ss Antonii Genuensis [Antonio Genovesi], Elementorum artis

logicocriticae libri V, (1745; first German edition Coloniae
Agrippinae [K6In]: Sumptibus Joannis Wilhelmi Krakamp, &
haeredum Christiani Simonis, 1753), pp. 10ff, Epicurus’ Canonica
and canons are discussed; pp. 65f, Canones memoriae. See also pp.
85, 129, 205-206, 259, 268.'%”

{Ephriam] Chambers, A Supplement to Mr. Chambers’s

Cyclopaedia: or, Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, 2 vols.
(London: Printed for W. Innys, et al., 1753), s.v. “Canonica,”
which refers to Epicurus’ logic. Otherwise, in the older section
published in 1728, he defines canon: “ .. . in Trigonometry, and
Algebra, a general Rule for the Solution ofall Cases, of a like
Nature with the present inquiry... .”

- Angelo Winckler, Dissertatio critico-philosophica de Philo-

sophia Scotistica 4 Novatorum convitiis vindicata (Ratisbonae
[Regensburg]: Typis Joannis Viti Radlmayr, 1755), Pars I, Sectio
I: “Quaenam sint media, & Canones philosophandi in genere.”
They are listed: “Canon I™: §. 4. Primaria Veritatis Philosophi-

"7 [Tonelli cites an edition of this work published in 1748. Risse, Biblio-
graphia logica, vol. I, p. 59, does notlist any edition from that year. Sincethe
“see also” pages match exactly the Coloniae Agrippinae, 1753 edition,it is cited
instead.
200 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

cae inquirendae via est ratio, instrumentalis, & secundaria Sensyy »

ete. A,

oe Johann Christian Eschenbach, Metaphysic oder Hauprwisse

Schaft (Rostock: Anton Ferdinand Rése, 1757), pp. 72-73: *
“Canones metaphysicorum de causis,” for example “exnihilonj
fit.”

ae Denis Diderot, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Encyclopédie, oy

Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, vol, 1x
(Neufchastel: Chez Samuel Faulche & Compagnie, 1765), s.v.
“Logique” (anonymous), where logic is defined as “l'art canon-
ique.” The same in [Fortuné Barthélemy] de Felice (ed.), Encyclo.
pédie, ou Dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances
humaines, vol. XXVI (Yverdun: n.n., 1773), s.v. “Logique.”

a Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Logik und Metaphysik (1769.

Géttingen und Gotha: Johann Christian Dieterich, 1774*), pp. 235-
236, § 3, refers to Epicurus’ Canonic: “Es gereichet ihm zum
Verdienste, daB er die ZuverlaBigkeit und Wichtigkeit dersinnlichen
Erkenntni8 behauptet hat; ob er wohl zu weit darinne gieng.”

= Gottlieb Schlegel, Abhandlung von den ersten Grundsiizenin

der Weltweisheit und den schénen Wissenschaften (Riga: Johann
Friedrich Hartknoch, 1770), p. 18, refers in connection with logic
to the Canonic of the Epicureans.

= Johann Heinrich Lambert, Architectonic, vol. Il, pp. 186ff,

 Appendices 201
refers to the “canonsofthe old metaphysicians,” Forinstance, “If
a contradiction is posited, also the contradictory elements are posit-
ed,” or “If the thing founded is posited or removed, the foundation
also is posited or removed, and vice versa.”

= [Johann Tobias Sattler], Zweytes Sendschreiben an Herrn

Alexander von Joch beyder Rechte Doctor von Alexander von Frey
Keiner Rechte Doctor ({Leipzig]: n.n., 1771), p. 60, mentions one
of the canons of the Stoics. [This is bound with his Erstes Send-
schreiben so can bedifficult to find.]

ae Anton Friedrich Biisching, GrundriB einer Geschichte der

Philosophie und einiger wichtigen Lehrsdtze derselben, vol. 1
(Berlin: Joh. George Bosse, 1772), p. 249, expounds Epicurus’
canonic, as “eine kurzgefaBte Logik” which “sie Regeln enthielt,
wie man den Verstand zur Erkenntnis des wahren und falschen
geschickt machensollte.” [See also § 52.]

a Johann Nicolas Tetens, Uber die allgemeine speculativische

Philosophie (Biitzow und Wismar: in der Berger- und Boedner-
schen Buchhandlung, 1775; new ed. Wilhelm Uebele, together with
vol. | of his Philosophische Versuche (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard,
1913; in the series Neudrucke seltener philosophischer Werke, ed.
Kantgesellschaft, vol. IV)), p. 13 (pagination of the original edi-
tion), mentions “the metaphysical canon of the immutability of the
natures and specifics of things.”

Stephanus Wiest, Initia philosophiae purioris cum positioni-

bus mathematicis (Ratisbonae [Regensburg]: Apud Ioan. Leopold.
Montag, 1776), in his Logic establishes the canons of the correct
202 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
use ofthe senses (p. 32); and in his Pneumatology establishes a
canon veritatis (p. 191).

roftoe
lor
[et
nA

at
100M
 APPENDIX C: CRITERION

odolphi Goclenii [Rudolph Goclenius i i j-

com, * rangvm clave philosophiae fores Pierce
He viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperti
1i, 1613; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), s.v. “Cri-
Peiii? which is defined as “Normam seu Regulam seu instrumen-
tert judicij seu iudicandi, quod vel ad actionem adhibetur, vel ad
am cognitionem.”
sol
Joh. Micraelii [Johannes Micraelius], Lexicon philosophicum
norum philosophis usitatorum (1653, Stetini [Stettin]: impensis
zermin ae Mamphrasii, Typis Michaelis Hépfneri, 16627; reprint
Jeremi
pissel dorf; Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co., [1966]; in the series
Instrumenta philosophica, Series lexica, vol. I), p. 343: “xpurjpra
sunt regulae & normaecertitudinis: ceu sunt alc®oig seu exper-
jentia: yang seu intellectus ordinis: & c&pxoi seu principia.”

- In the major Frenchdictionaries of the seventeenth century

“criterium” is not listed:

= Pierre Richelet, Dictionnaire de la langue frangoise,

ancienne et moderne (Paris: Aux Dépens de la Compagnie,
1740). [This is also true ofthe earlier edition ofthis work,
Dictionnaire francois, contenant des mots et les choses,
plusieurs nouvelles remarques sur la langue francoise

203
 oS

204 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

(Geneve: Jean Herman Widerhold, 1680; Teprint Hildes-
heim, New York: Georg Olms, 1973), which is more
Teadily accessible. ]

* Antoine Fureti[@]re, Le Dictionaire universel (A La

Haye, et a Rotterdam: Chez Arnout & Reinier Leers, 1690;
Teprint Paris: SNL - Le Robert, 1978).

ae Le grand dictionnaire de l’académie frangoise [Dic-

tionnaire de l’académie frangaise] (Paris: Chez la veuve de
Jean Baptiste Coignard, et Chez Jean Baptiste Coignard,
1695; reprint Genéve: Slatkine Reprints, 1968).

~ [Thomas Corneille], Le dictionnaire des arts et des

sciences (Paris: Chez la Veuve de Jean Baptiste Coignard,
et Chez Jean Baptiste Coignard, 1694; reprint Genéve:
Slatkine Reprints, 1968).

= [Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus], Medicina mentis, sive

artis inveniendi praecepta generalia (1687; Lipsiae: Apud J.
ThomamFritsch, 1695; reprint E. W. von Tschirnhaus, Medicina
mentis et corporis, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964)), pp. 34-35,
establishes a “veritatis & falsitatis criterium.”

- Stephani Chauvini [Etienne Chauvin], Lexicon philosophicum

secundus curis (1692; Leovardiae [Leeuwarden]: Excudit Francis-
cus Halma, 17137; reprint Diisseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co.,
[1967]; in the series Instrumenta philosophica, Series lexica, vol.
Il), s.v. “Criterium”: “est id, ad quod mens nostra suam compar-
ans sententiam, hanc veram esse indubitanter cognoscit.” There
follows a detailed discussion ofthe criteria of truth in the Epicure-
ans and Cartesians.
 Appendices 205

Gottlieb Gerhard Titio, Ars cogitandi, sive scientia cogitatio-

L jzantium (Lipsiae: Sumpt. Haered.
Lanckisianorum, Excu-
nut C08reinricus Richterus, 1702), Cap, IL
it Joh.ia oftruth which he divides
I, pp. 34ff, discusses
into ¢; Titeria (1) of judgment,
the Oe Cartesian criterion ofclearness and distinctness;
jixe tion; (3) of proof; (4) of defense (2) of
against counter arguments
peyghout he uses the term principle rather
than criterion].
on

Io. Francisci Bvddei [Johann Franz Budde, Buddeus],

Ele-
- hilosophiae instrvmentalis, seu institvtionvm Philosophiae
nee vol. I (1703; Halae Saxonvm:
Typis et impensis
electotrophii, Glavcha-Halensis, 1719”), pp. 144-14
6, 151, uses
orpterm criterium.
the

John Harris, Lexicon Technicum: or, an Universal English

tionary ofArts and Sciences: Explaining not only the TERMSof
Die put the ARTS Themselves (London: Printed for Dan. Brown,
me 1704; reprint New York and London: Johnson Reprint
tals 1966; in the series The Sources of Science, No. 28), s.v-
ORITERIUM or Criterion is a Judgment made of the Truth or
Falshood [sic.] of a Proposition, the Nature or Qualities of any
Effect, &c.”

God, Guil. Leibnitii [Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz], Opera

philosophica, ed. J[ohann] E[duard] Erdmann, 2 vols. (Berolini
[Berlin]: Sumtibus G. Eichleri, 1839-1840; supplemented reprint
ed. Renate Vollbrecht, Aalen: Scientia, 1959), p. 496: La droite
Raison” is a sufficient “criterion” or “Juge des controverses.
(Théodicée, 1710)
 ON
206 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

om Christiani Wolffii, Ratio praelectionum wolfianarum (1718;

Halae Magdeburg.: Prostatin officina Rengeriana, 1735”; reprint
Wolff, Werke, 11:36), p. 125, criticizes Tschirnhaus’ criterion (see
above).

oa [Pierre Daniel] Huet, Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de

esprit humain (Amsterdam: Chez Henri du Sauzet, 1723; reprint
Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1974), Livre I, Chapitre
VIII, pp. 70-74, lists three kinds ofcriteria of truth: those in con-
nection with the person who knows, the means of knowledge, and
that according to which the knowledgeis constituted.

se Johann Georg Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon,vol. I (1726;

Leipzig: in Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775‘; reprint Hildesheim:
Georg Olms, 1968). See above, § 25.

0 {Jean Pierre] de Crousaz, Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien &

moderne (La Haye: Chez Pierre de Hondt, 1733), p. 68 and pas-
sim, discusses the criterion oftruth.

~ Johann Lorenz [von] Mosheim, Sitten-Lehre der Heiligen

Schrift, vol. 1 (Helmstadt: Christian Friedrich Weygand, 1742), p.
163: God’s law in our soul “ist die Richtschnur, die den Verstand
in seinen Untersuchungenleiten und fiihren mu8.”

-~ Sam[uel] Christif{an] Hollmanno, Philosophiae rationalis,

qvae logica (1746; Goettingae: Svmtibvs vidvae Abrami Vanden-
rr

a ip Appendices 207
767). Pars ll, Cap. II: “Deveritatis omnis eriterj
noksoendi aE In § 125a criterion is cofiiahe nee
uo verum a falso discemi exacte Possit ed as indi-
oe
cium to the external senses, thecriterion should Shia § 136, as
eher there are things withoutth le mi: ish (1)
w yr body : exist, and (3) wheth ind, (2) whether the senses
“demtity te sea OUEsenses deci
e the principle of identity is the highest cia foe In §
veusses
i the criteria of Epicurus and De: Scartes, » $160

Christiano Io. Antonio Cor

vino, Instievti i i
jasionalis (lenae“ Dena]: Apud lo.
aeAd
am. Melchioris, Vidvam.
Melchioris,Vidv
1747), § 655: Mind; €x quo aliquid potest agnosci, vocaturam, ,
criterium, Sie nota.

_ samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the Engii:

j (London: Printed by W. Strahan, For J.
and ec
1755; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968; in the series
Anglistica & Americana, vol. 1), s.v. “Criterion":
“A mark by
which any thing is judged of, with regard to its goodness or bad-
ness.

~ Godofredo [Gottfried] Ploucquet, Fynda menta philosophiae

specul ativae (Tubi ngae: Apud Joh. Georg . Cotta, 1759), p. 245, §
793, discusses a criterion allowingoneto distinguish existing from
nonexisting objects.

ee
"® [In the 1767 edition looked atin the UB, Géttingen, § 158 was simply
missing. It was confirmed in the 1746 edition.]
 ™

208 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

ne Dominico Beck, Philosophia rationalis systematice adorn,

vol. I (Salisburgi: Typis Joannis Josephi Mayr, 1763), Caput; ”
“De veritate Logica, ejus Demonstratione & Criterio.” Hedis.
cusses the criteria offered by Plato, the Epicureans, Aristotle,
Descartes, Leibniz.

_ Johann Heinrich Lambert, Neues Organon, vol. I (1764), P.

109: “Die Criteria oder Kennzeichen sind Eigenschaften oder
Verhiltnisse, woraus man schlieBen kann, da die Sacheoderihre
Theile solche sind, die man schon unter einem andern Namen
kennt.” See also pp. 294, 299, 301, 303. Compare Architectonic,
vol. II (1771), pp. 214-215, 217, 225, 476.

_ [Johann Heinrich {Jean Henri} Samuel] Formey, Entwurf

aller Wissenschaften. Zum Gebrauche der Jiinglinge, und allerdie
sich belehren wollen, trans. from French F. J. Bierling, vol. III
(Berlin: Joachim Pauli, 1767), pp. 30-32: the principle ofcontra-
diction as a feeling of evidenceis insufficient as a criterion for
truth--an intuition is needed; p. 37: the criterion of truth in itself is
the determinability of a predicate through the conceptof the subject;
pp. 45-46: a definition of the Kennzeichen or criterium oftruthis
established.

= James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of

Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh:
Printed for A. Kincaid & J. Bell, Sold, at London, by E. & C.
Dilly, in the Poultry, 1770), Pt. I, “Of the Standard of Truth,” uses
the term standard instead ofcriterion [though Pt. II, Chap. III is
titled “Recapitulation and Inference. Criterion of Truth”).
yy ed
Appendices 209
: Bu rkhaeuse° r, Instit: utione.S logi. cae, Parti
Nicol a u s
rit a Se ctio
t a y Tobiae Gothcebhcrait er io no r
eu 1ff, on
(aiternest 3v10, itt, 1771), Pp. 17og y an d hypothesis m wr.
e
G o e m ec
0, coilnnit
7 obab ti on , an al
i P - 269of-2pr
s Mtncriteria
tlio
pr
y.

jnte™

Goth a: erJs] n Chsi

oh,anRe vi
170)vo,l. 3
stiadenrDiPhetilerosicoph,hie,
rion 1 10
~ tingehruisndtoph Me in
ic Christe3h >
k me ta ph ysics. See also
Co ae 10 Se
logie zum Gebrauche seiner
Rue Abns der Psycho ian Dieterich
nciygen (Got d nGofothra:estaJoblha
tingen uernio is nn
hi ngChthriesttruth of sensation;
sen at
wore. 78, on the critn . riteriwm) of truth for general ideas is
crit
7) Vpere thtoe th
17 possibility k io
iner them(K
te

Jacobo Zallinger [Jakob Anton von Zallinger Zum Thurm]

jpeerpreration naturae, seu Dhilosophia newtoniana methodo exposita,
a (Augustae Vindelicorum [Augsburg]: Sumptibus Josephi
wolff, 1773), pp- 105ff, §§ 74ff,lists the differentcriteria of truth:
of sense, of reason, of authority, of commonsense.

Stephanus Wiest, Initia philosophiae purioris cum positioni-

nae =[Regensb urg]: Apud Ioan. Leopold.
bus mathematicis (Ratisbo = =
tag, 1776), P- 45, where immediate evidence is a criterion of
Mont
truth.
 APPENDIX D: DOCTRINE

Doctrina and disciplina are, since Cicero, synonymsofars,

poth in the meaning ofits cognitive content, and as a particular kind
ofinstruction. Doctrine is more specifically used in a strictly
intellectual sense, denoting not only the transmission of knowledge,
and the knowledge so acquired (contentofthe teaching), but also
the ensuing subjective result of it, as an enrichmentof the personali-
ty (versus its native powers). As acquired knowledge,it refers to
theoretical and scientific knowledge, versus lore or empirical knowl-
edge which is acquired by practice. As a transmission of knowl-
edge, it refers to the teaching process, versus the learning process.
In Christian authors, it refers to teaching in general, as well as
teaching a particular subject like the doctrine of the Trinity. In the
Middle Ages the theoretical-scientific aspect of the term doctrine is
stressed, referring to knowledge obtained through a rational method.
For Aquinas, “sacra doctrina” meanstheologyasa science, butit
also includes the facts of sacred history, which cannot be a science
in the Aristotelian sense.

- See G. Jiissen, “Disciplina, Doctrina,” Historisches

Worterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter, vol. 2 (Basel/Stutt-
gart: Schwabe & Co., 1972), pp. 259-261.

~ In modern times the ancient meaningsessentially survive.

See [Albert Burer], Thesavrvs lingvae latinae (1573; Basileae

211
 os

212 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

[Basel]: Froben, 1578), s.v.: “Doctrina . oa (bax, Sbaype

d:dacxadta). Moddpro actu ipso docendiaccipitur, moddpro '
disciplina.”

= Ioan. [Johannes] Baptistae Bernardi [GiovanniBattista

Bernardo], Seminarium totius philosophiae, vol. I (Venetiis: Apud
Damianum Zenarium, 1582), s.v., gives a large numberof defini.
tions. For example, “Doctrinae eiusdem est natura rei considerare
cuius principia per se, & causas considerat. Alexand. aphrod. in 3
metaph.” “Doctrina est actus a praeceptore in discipulum proce-
dens. Ioan. gram. in pri. post. cap. 1. char. 2. columna 3.” “Doo.
trina, disciplina, & scientia subiecto sunt vnu, differunt tamen
secundum quid. Alb. magn. in post. c. 173. col. 2.” “Doctrina eg
actio eius, que aliquid cognoscere facit. Diuus Thomasin posterior,
charta 37. columnaI.”

= For Scipione Claramontio [Simeone Chiaramonti], De

methodo ad doctrinam spectante (Caesenae [Cesena, Italy]: Carolus
Nerius Cameralis Typographus excudebat, 1639), p. 32, doctrine
meansscience.

- Joh. Micraelii [Johannes Micraelius], Lexicon philosophicum

terminorum philosophis usitatorum (1653; Stetini [Stettin]: impensis
Jeremiae Mamphrasii, Typis Michaelis Hépfneri, 16627; reprint
Diisseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co., [1966]; in the series
Instrumenta philosophica, Series lexica, vol. I), s.v. “Disciplina”:
“DISCIPLINA, doctrina & scientia unum & idem sunt. Nam
scientia, qvatenus illam magister docet, dicitur doctrina; qvatenus
discitur 4 discipulo, dicitur disciplina.”
> Oo
Appendices 213
piierre] Godartij [Godartius], Lexicon philosophicym
item
~gtissima totivs philosophiae svmma, vol. I (Parisiis:
ea Joann Apud ,
is om ome. - Robertvm I. B. de la Caill
e, 1675),
‘0: “D re 8 acilitas producendae scientiae; vel actu-

Brig scientiae Proce.

Antoine Fureti[@]re, Le Dictionna
ire universel, (A La H:
~ potterdam: Chez Arnout & Reinier Leers, 1690; cepeiad Paris:,
et Rot Le Robert , 1978), s.v. “Doctrine”: “Scavo
ir, érudition, ce
on a appris en lisant, ou voyant le monde.”
,
gq

The same in Le grand dictionnaire de l’académie frangoise

ppietionnaire de 1 ‘académie francaise] (Paris: Chez la veuve de
j Baptiste Coignard, et Chez Jean Baptiste Coignard, 1695?;
reprint Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1968).

in the seventeenth
= For the German “Doktrin” as “Lehre” uch, vol. 1
dwor terb
sches Frem “Doktrin.”
century, See Hans Schulz, Deut1913
Karl J. Trii bner , ), s.v.
(straBburg:

Dictionnaire universel francois et latin, vulgairement appelé

Dictionnaire de Trévoux (Trévoux: Estienne Ganeau, 1704; new
and enlarged edition, Paris: Par la Compagnie des Libraires
Associés, 1771), S-v.:

“Ces mots doctrine, savoir, science, ont chacun leur idée propre
qui les caractirise. Le savoir dit quelque chose de plus étendu
que l’érudition, principalementdans ce qui est de pratique. La
science enchérit par la profondeur des connoissances, avec un
rapport particulier & ce qui est de spéculation. Doctrine ne se
dit, proprement, qu’enfait de moeurs & de Religion.”
 os”
214 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
= Samvele Christiano Hollmanno, Dissertationis Philosophicae
de vera philosophiae notione eivsqve ab aliis scientiis omnibvs
discrimine posterioris sectio prior (Vitembergae [Wittenberg]:
Typis Ephraimi Gottlob Eichsfeldii, 1733), pp. 21-22, § Ix:

* ... philosophia non melius definiri posse videtur, quam

doctrina, vel scientia, qua ea, quae homini, qua tali, & in
quocunque statu spectato, adfelicitatem suam promovendam vel
scienda, vel agenda sunt, ex rationis solius principiis distincte
traduntur.”

=~ George Friedrich Meier, Vernunftlehre (Halle: Johann Jus-

tinus Gebauer, 1752), pp. 646-647: “Doctrin” is defined as

“ .. . ein Inbegrif dogmatischer Wahrheiten, welcher einen

besondern Namen bekomt, oder welche von einer Sache handeln
.... Alle Theile der Gelehrsamkeit, welche Wissenschaften
sind, haben eine Verwandelung ausgestanden. In ihrer Geburt
waren sie Doctrinen. Die Gottesgelehrten, zum Exempel,
samleten die dogmatischen Wahrheiten aus der Bibel, und
brachtensie unter gewisse Titel. Hernach kamen methodische
Képfe, und ordneten die Doctrinen nach einer Lehrart zusam-
men, und so bekamensie die Gestalt der Disciplinen, bis sie
endlich in Wissenschaften verwandelt worden, nachdem sie
demonstrirt worden.”

rt Alexander Gottlieb Bavmgarten, Acroasis logica. In

Christianvm L. B. de Wolff (Halae Magdebvrgicae: Impensis Carol.
Herm. Hemmerde., 1761; reprint Wolff, Werke, III:5), § 355:
“DOCTRINA *(eine Lehre) est vel dogma, vel complexus DOG-
MATVM **(gemeiner Satze) seu propositionum communium.” §
356: “DOCTRINA methodice proposita, IN FORMAMDISCI-
PLINAE . . . et disciplina demonstrata IN FORMAM SCIENTIAE
REDIGITVR. ...”
y
Appendices 215
hnson, A Dictionary of th ,
samuel Jo i e English Language, vol.
~yao aqdon: Printed by W. Strahan, ForJ, and p. Knapton, et al.,
reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968; in the series Anglist-
1 , americana, VOl. 1), 8.v. “Doctrine”; «1. Theprinciples or
ice ons of any sect or master; that which is
taught... . 2. The
aeaf teaching.
[Btienne Bonnot] de Condillac
, Oeuvres Philosophiques de
- ndillac, ed. Georges Le Roy, vol
Co rns (Paris: Presses Univer . 3: Dictionnaire des
sitaires de France, 1951; in the
syne Corpus général des philosoph
es JSrangais, Auteurs modernes,
seni’XXII p. 510, s.v. “Science”
: “Enfin la doctrine est la
vol. issance des maximes ou précep
tesrelatifs aux moeurs et ala
o n” This dictionary, composed between 1758 and 177
5, was
remy published in 1951.
 APPENDIX E: DISCIPLINE

e Cicero Disciplina has

sine - been a Synonym ofars
, a togeth er
on 5
fociring. | Laterit slowly
i acquired the '¢ |. larger meaning
sci-
with stressing its educational aspect. If doctrine (from scare
end,” ty teach) Tefers to the teaching aspectofthis process,
mi sipliNe (from discere, meaningto learn)refers to its learning
disoF From this arise the extended meanings ofstrict trainin
spec 6m chastisement, which it retains in
those European lan.
baatas where it survives.
8

See Otto Mauch, Derlateinische Begriff DISCIPLINA. Eine

WortuntersuchUng, Inaugural-Dissertation, Universitat Basel (Frei-
bore in der Schweiz: Paulusdruckerei, 1941).

It is the meaning attributed by Kantto this term at the time

of the Critique tf Pure Reason, and assuch it does not present
particular semantic difficulties. ’ However, it is instructive to explore
the evolution of the other meanings of the sameterm, in the first
initially
place in order to reconnect them with the meaning Kant
gave, and in the second place in order to contrast them with the
final meaning Kant adopted.
Discipline is used by Boethiusin connection with the qua-
drivium, or the four mathematical liberal arts, not the trivium.
Consequently, it acquires a connotation of methodological stringen-
cy which is particularly expressed by the adverb “disciplinaliter.”

217
 os”
218 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
The quadrivium is conceived by Boethius as a propaedeutic to the
theoretical sciences. Cassiodorus strengthens the distinction be-
tween the four disciplines and the three arts. See Mauch, ibid.
In the Middle Ages the scientific aspect of this term is
stressed, for example by Eriugena, Hugh of St. Victor, and Thierry
of Chartres, who also add logic to the mathematical disciplines,
Gilbert Porreta identifies mathematics and logic, and considers
discipline as a theory ofabstraction. As such it has a propaedeut-
ical function, establishing a methodologically founded conceptual
basis for a science. For Clarenbaud of Arras, “disciplinalia” ac-
quires the meaning of demonstrative science. Aquinas followsthe
sameline, substituting “scientia” and “demonstrativus” for “disci-
plina” and “disciplinalis.”

- See G. Jiissen and G. Schrimpf, “Disciplina, doctrina,”

Historisches Wérterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter, vol. 2
(Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1972).

bd In German, “Disziplin” appears with the meaning of

“Zucht” since the fourteenth century, and is generally used in this
waysince the sixteenth century. See Hans Schulz, Deutsches
Fremdworterbuch, vol. 1 (StraB8burg: Karl J. Triibner, 1913).

ss But the other meanings deserve more attention. The more

specific medieval sense of demonstrative science survives only
partially. Educationally, “Disciplina . . . (ué&@voic, roudeia,
pabureia, c&ywry) dicitur in discipulo, sicut doctrina in magistro,”
in [Albert Burer], Thesavrvs lingvae latinae (1573; Basileae [Basel]:
Froben, 1578).
 Appendices 219
‘The same occurs in:

_ Georgio Meiero, Gnostologia (Wittebergae

[Wittenberg]: Typis & Impensis Jobi Wilhelmi Fincelii,
1662), p. 229, §§ 3-4.
zis P[itrre] Godartij [Godartius], Lexicon philosophicvm
item, accvratissima totivs philosophiae svmma,vol. 1
(Parisiis: Apud Viduam Ioannis de la Caille, & Robertvm I.
B. de la Caille, 1675), s.v.

on Stephani Chauvini [Etienne Chauvin], Lexicon

philosophicum secundis curis (1692; Leovardiae [Leeuwar-
den]: Excudit Franciscus Halma, 1713; reprint Diisseldorf:
Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co., [1967; in the series Instrumenta
philosophica, Series lexica, vol. II), s.v.

= See also Ioan. [Johannes] Baptistae Bernardi [Giovanni

Battista Bernardo], Seminarium totius philosophiae, vol. | (Venetiis:
Apud Damianum Zenarium, 1582), s.v.: “Disciplina est quaedam
receptio scientie, & modus, secundum scientiam. Simp. in 5. phys.
tex. 31. char. 316. columna secunda.”

- Rodolphi Goclenii [Rudolph Goclenius], Lexicon philosophi-

cvm, qvo tanqvam clave philosophiae fores aperivntvr (Francofurti:
Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperti
Pistorij, 1613; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964): “Disci-
plina est Scientia acquisita in discente. . . . Disciplina interdum
accipitur pro arte vel scientia. Interdum specialiter pro Arithmetica
& Geometria, &c. quae Graecis w&bnac.”
220 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
= The meaning ofscience as opposed to ars reappears in
*Jacobus Matthiae, Librum de recte tradendis disciplinis & attibys
(Hafniae [Copenhagen], 1630).'°

Valentino From [Fromme], Gnostologia (Wittebergae

[Wittenberg]: Typis & Sumptibus Johannis Haken, 1632), p. 77:
“Disciplina est tractatio rerum in uno summo & ejusdem naturae
objecto convenientium, certis & sufficientibus praeceptis ordinaté
conformata, ad erudiendum hominem.”

~ Carolo de BeauuAis [Cardinal de Beauvais], De disciplinis,

et scientiis in genere. Et de recto ordine quo sunt in scholis &
Academiis docendae, & a juventute discendae (Londini: Excudebat
E. G. & vaenum dantur apud Johannem Hardestie, 1648), is a Latin
translation from a Frenchoriginal entitled *Des Arts et Sciences
Humaines (Rouen, 1638). Thus, discipline is a synonym ofart.

- Andreae Ridigeri [Andreas Riidiger, Ruediger], De sensu

veri etfalsi (1709; Lipsiae: Apud Johan. Christophorvm Coer-
nervm, 1722), pp. 364ff. The “ratiocinatio disciplinalis” is distin-
guished from the “ratiocinatio metaphysica.” The formerincludes
the “ratiocinatio causalis,” “practica” and “probabilis,” which
“adaequate rerum quoque tum physicarum, tum moralium,
essentiam perscrutari docent.” The “ratiocinatio metaphysica” can
establish only the existence of its objects. The term “disciplinalis”

‘© [Tonelli cites this as “I. Mattia, De recte tractandis disciplinis et artibus

(Hafniae, 1630).” This has been changed to match thecitation in Christian
Gottlieb Jocher, Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon, vol. 3 (Hildesheim: Georg
Olms, 1961), p. 292. No further leads have been found.]
yy

Appendices 221
here some of its medieval meaning, as a morescientific kind
efpowleds
S

Johann Georg Walch, Philosophische. i

phsches Lexicon, vol. 1 (1726;
age i Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 17754; reprint iesae ,
aveinom 1968), . S-V-! ,
_. bedeutet nicht nur die Unterweisung und Zucht
sondern auch die Lebrsitze selbst, nach denen jemand _
Snterwiesen wird. In Ansehung dieser letztern Bedeutung
kommt solckes auch bey den Philosophen vor, wenn sie einen
adern Theil ihrer philosophischen Lehren eine Disciplin
ennen, welche Bedeutung sich auch auf die ander Theile der
Gelehrsamkeit erstrecket, da8 man theologische, juristische und
medicinische Disciplinen hat.”

walch, @ Thomasian, refers to a part of philosophy according to the

gistinction established by Riidiger.

August Friedrich Miiller, Einleitung in die philosophischen

improved edition, Leip-
Wissenschaften, vol. I (1728; enlarged andbey
zig: 2U finden bey dem Autore, gedruckt Bernhard Christoph
preitkopf, 17337), PP- 35-37: “Disziplin” means “gelehrte Wissen-
or transcen-
schaft.” The sciences are either disciplinal (disziplinal)
are mathematics, physics and ethics, and in
dental. The former
be
them both the existence of their objects, and how they exist, can
known. In the latter, metaphysics or theology, orfirst philosophy,
but in which
only the existence of its objects can be known byus,
way these objects exist cannot be known. See vol. Il, pp. 5-6, 173,
a follower of Riidiger, and the meaning he
303-306. Miller was
gives to “disciplinal” derives from Riidiger.
 ’
222 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

no? Nicol{aus] Hieron[ymous] Gundling, Vollstdndige Historie

der Gelahrheit, oder Ausfithrliche Discourse, vol. I (Franckfurt und
Leipzig: [Wolffgang Ludwig Spring], 1734), the note on p. 8
implies that “Disziplin” is the same as “Wissenschaft.”

- ForChristian August Crusii [Crusius], Weg zur Gewifheit

und Zuverldpigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnip (Leipzig: Johann
Friedrich Gleditsch, 1747; reprint Crusius, Die philosophischen
Hauptwerke, ed. Giorgio Tonelli, vol. 3 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
1965)), within philosophy there is a distinction between metaphysics
and disciplinal philosophy. The latter includes physics (withteleol-
ogy), logic, and telematology (or the theoretical study of the will)
together with practical philosophy. Metaphysics studies the neces-
sary theoretical truths, and disciplinal philosophy studies those
truths whichare either contingent or practical (§§ 11-17). In the
discussion of the notion of certainty, Crusius terms “disciplinal
certainty” that certainty which arises when the understanding per-
ceives thatit is impossible forit to think in a different way, al-
though this compulsion doesnot arise merely from the principle of
contradiction (§ 423). The latter use of the term disciplinal seems
to be related to its medieval sense, as demonstrative, but it haslittle
or nothing to do with the sense given to this adjective as attributed
to a part of philosophy.

~ The sameuse of the phrase “disciplinal philosophy” can be

found in the logic of a pupil of Crusius, Joh[ann] Pet[e]r Andr[eas]
Miiller, Von dem menschlichen Verstande und den nothwendigen
Vernunftwahrheiten die man den zufiilligen entgegen setzt (Halle:
Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1769), p. 3. In Crusius, who waseducat-
ed in the tradition of Riidiger, the use of the term disciplinal as
attributed to certainty still conforms to the meaning ofthis term
established by thelatter. But this use, as applied to some parts of
y

Appendices 223

pil08°P hy,“cal,is logical

different from Riidiger’s and Miller's use, in that
and practical truths are better known than the
P raphy! nysics. So the use ofdisciplinal as Teferring to
is ‘eowledge practically disa a higher
ppearsin this case,
in
Jso, Crusius’ teacher, Adolph Friedrich Hoff
A Lehre, Darinnen die Kennzeichen des Wahrenmann,
yernunti- ‘Aus den und
Gesezen des menschlichen Verstandes hergelei
pulsereipzig: Zu finden bey dem Auto tet
re, 1737), “Eingang, von
werde! jlosophischen Wissenschafften Uberhaup
t,” pp. 30ff, §§ 22ff,
een ass
1
fied the parts of philosophyin the same way.
ha

For Georg Friedrich Meier, see Appendix D.

For Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, see Appendix D.

Pfeter] Ahlwardt, Einleitung in die Philosophie (Greifswald

ei ipzig: Johann Jacob Weitbrecht, 1752), p. 4: “Eine Dis-
und AP . ein Innbegriff gewisser Wahrheiten, welche mit
pl genau verkniipfet sind, indem sie nureinen einzigen
an
Hauptvo rwurf haben. »
 CHAPTERIII

THE EVOLUTION OF KANT’S PLAN FOR A SYSTEM OF

PHILOSOPHY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION OF
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

I. THE PLAN UNTIL1780

In the first chapter I tried to show that the Critique of

Pure Reason was basically considered by Kant as the special
logic or methodology for metaphysics. In orderto gain a
deeper insight into the meaningofthis fact, it is necessary to
proceed now to study the Critique’s place within the spec-
trum ofthe philosophical sciences, thatis, to explore its
specific location andtask within the system ofphilosophy, as
Kant conceived it. Unfortunately,the Critique of Pure
Reasonitself does not convey an adequate body ofinforma-
tion on this subject. The Architectonic, which is the section
of the Critique devoted to this topic, explains it very inade-
quately, in thatit is both incomplete and unclear. Therefore
it shall be necessaryto resort to doctrines belonging to other
phases of Kant’s thought in ordertoclarify those ofthe
Architectonic. Only, as happens with most of Kant’s doc-
trines, theclassification ofthe parts ofphilosophy under-
goes, in the course oftime, an evolution which poses several
important problems. Thus, it would be misleading to com-
pare the Architectonic with other phases of Kant’s thought
without havingclarified in the first place the development of
the problem in question, andthis shall be mytask at this

225
226 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

point. Some pertinent elements which have been analyzed in

Chapter I, shall merely be summarized.
Moreover, after the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781,
Kant’s conception of a philosophical system underwent a
significant evolution, both in the task and thesituation ofthe
Critique itself. 1 will retrace the course of this program, in
orderto clarify the meaning of the Critique in general, and
to contribute to a more adequate understanding of Kant’s
thought after 1781.

3. According to the Reflections of 1769, the philosophy

of pure reason includes among other sciences general logic,
which is considered to be dogmatic, and studies the objective
laws of reason, and the critique of pure reason, which is a
synonym of metaphysics. The latter is restricted to ontolo-
gy, studies the subjective laws of reason, is critical, zeteti-
cal, skeptical, problematic.’ A comprehensiveclassification
of the sciences is offered at this time (see Table I).?
In the Dissertation of 1770, three levels are estab-
lished in pure philosophy: (1) propaedeutics orthe science
of method, which is merely negative or elenchtical; (2) meta-
physics as an organon forintellectual knowledge, which
contains the first principles of the pure use of the under-
standing, including ontology and rational psychology; (3) a
dogmaticscience of God and of morals.? The propaedeutic
establishes the distinction between sensitive and intellectual
knowledge. According to Kant, this distinction should not

‘Chap. I, § 10.
2 This Table has beenestablished in accordance with AK.-Ausg. XVII, p-
353, Reflection 3931; p. 356, Reflection 3939; p. 361, Reflections 3948, 3949;
pp. 362-363, Reflections 3951, 3952; pp. 364-366, Reflection 3957; p. 367,
Reflection 3959; p. 368, Reflection 3964; p. 370, Reflection 3970.
> Chap. 1, § 3.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 227

be considered, as Wolff did, to be merely logical. Thatis, it

does not merely depend onthedistinctness or confusion of
knowledge, but on the origin of knowledge.* Kantis refer-
ring to the fact that Wolff did not consider in his Logic the
problem ofthe origin of knowledge. Rather, he studied this
within metaphysics, both in his Empirical Psychology and in
his Rational Psychology.’ The problem ofthe clarity and
distinctness of notions is extensively treated by Wolff in his
Logic® and was considered in general as a typically logical
subject.” Even so, both the above-mentioned works provide
a shorter examination ofit as well.*
Moreover, Kant lists the natural sciences, which are
either mathematical (non-empirical) or empirical (empirical
philosophy). Among the former are geometry, pure mechan-
ics and arithmetic. Among thelatter, physics and empirical
psychology.* However, Kant does notoffer here a regular
classification, and this could explain the fact that logic and

‘Dissertation, §§ 7-8, AK.-Ausg. Il, pp. 394-395.

$ Christiano Wolfio, Psychologia rationalis (1734; Francofurti & Lipsiae:
Prostat in officinalibraria Rengeriana, 1740; reprint Wolff, Werke, 11:6), § 64,
where are also quoted the sections of Wolff's Psychologia empirica (Francofurti
& Lipsiae: Prostatin officina libraria Rengeriana, 1732).
* Christiano Wolfio, Philosophia rationalis sive Logica (Francofurti &
Lipsiae: Prostat in officinalibraria Rengeriana, 1728; reprint Wolff, Werke,
:1.2), §§ 77-79. An entire chapter is devoted to this subject.
7 See Io. Georgii Walchii [Johann Georg Walch], Historia logicae, in his
Parerga academica ex historiarvm atqve antiqvitatvm monimentis collecta (Lip-
size: Svmty Io, Frieder. Gleditschii B. Filii, 1721), where a section is devoted
(pp. 664-665)to Leibniz's Meditationes de cognitione, veritate & ideis, the
classical text expounding the doctrine in question, and which text is considered a
milestone in the history of logic.
‘Wolff, Psychologia empirica, §§ 30ff, Psychologia rationalis, § 195.
° Dissertation, § 23, AK.-Ausg.Il, pp. 410-411; § 5, pp. 393-394; § 15 C-
D,pp. 402-404 (cf. AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 353, Reflection 3932 (1769-1771)); § 12,
pp. 397-398; § 7, pp. 394-395.
228 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

general natural science are not assigned a place. Thesystem

of the sciences, as implicitly established in the Dissertation,
is summarized in Table II.
Reflection 4163, dated 1769-1770, providesa differ-
ent and partial classification, where logic is assigned place,
Here, propaedeutic is termed general phenomenology, and
there appears a science called noology, which is probably the
equivalent of ontology. See Table III.'°
In a letter to Lambert on September 2, 1770, Kant
states that metaphysics should be preceded by a merely
negative propaedeutical discipline, called general phenome-
nology. Here the validity and the boundaries of the prin-
ciples of sensibility should be established, in order to prevent
them from being confused with judgments concerningthe
objects of pure reason."!
Reflection 4168, also from 1769-1770,” offersa clas-

10 AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 440, Reflection 4163. Kant wrote in 1770 about

general phenomenology (AK.-Ausg. X, p. 98, I. 17-22):
“It seems thata quite particular, although merely negative
science . . . must precede metaphysics, where the validity and
the borders ofthe principles of sensibility are determined,in
orderto preventthem from bringing confusioninto the judg-
ments and objects of pure reason, as has almost always happened
hitherto.”
Noology was a science introduced by seventeenth-century German Aristotelians.
One of the most important treatises on noology had been written by Abraham
Calov,the great metaphysician of Kénigsberg. Noology was thescience studying
thefirst principles of knowledgeand of being. See Max Wundt, Die deutsche
Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),
1939), p. 259.
” AK,-Ausg. X, p. 98.
12 AK.-Ausg. XVII, pp. 441-442. See also p. 441, Reflection 4166, andp.
434, Reflection 4149. Accordingto p. 470, Reflection 4231, physiologyofthe
internal sense correspondsto psychology, and the physiology of the external sense
corresponds to physics.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Pian for a System 229

sification of metaphysics summarized in Table IV, Keflec-

tion 4161, deriving from the same period,”lists some set-
ences to be found in Table V, but this seems to be a classifi-
cation of the traditional sciences rather than of the sciences
Kant planned to develop.
The Logik Blomberg (1771) provides a classification
of philosophy founded on the different powers of the human
soul." It is reproduced in Table VI,

3. The Logik Philippi (1772) offers a different classifi-

cation, founded on the nature of the principles of each philo-
sophical science (see Table VII)."° Aesthetics is mentioned
later,'* but it does not receive a place in this obviously
partial classification. Logic is explicitly considered as a part
of philosophy," butit is applied to all sciences, and is a
preparation to them.'* Knowledge of nature (Naturkunde) is
divided into natural history, mathematics and the philosophi-
cal knowledge of nature.!?
In the classifications of 1771 and 1772 the special
propaedeutical science for metaphysics does not appear. In
fact, in the Reflections of 1772, this special science tends to
be included in metaphysics. Occasionally, the critique of
pure reason is distinguished from metaphysics as a prep-
aration to it. But this may mean that it is a part of meta-

3 Ibid., p. 439.
“ AK,-Ausg. XXIV.1, p. 31.
\S bid., pp. 313-314.
'* pbid., pp. 317, 344.
" bid., pp. 315, 316, 319.
" Ibid., pp. 316, 339.
” Ibid., p. 319. The term Naturkunde is used instead of Naturlehre (nat-
ural science) because the corresponding concept includes natural history which is
4 Kunde, a lore, not a theory or a science proper.
 230 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

physics which is a preparation to the other parts of meta-

physics.”° In fact, the critique of pure reasonisalso identi-
fied with transcendental philosophy, and metaphysicsis a
critique whose taskis to inquire into merely rational know|-
edge, independent of all experience, and into the origin,
conditions and limits of this knowledge.” Metaphysics itself
is a propaedeutic of wisdom, not an organon for the other
sciences. The basic problems of this propaedeutic are the
existence of God and a future life. Wisdom has otherpracti-
| cal sources in ethics, independent of logical rigor, but meta-
physics has the task of protecting wisdom against the en-
croachmentsofa deceitful use of reason (see also § 7).”
However, metaphysics is dogmatic in connection with the
will.? This seemsto imply that ethics is a part of metaphys-
Ics.
On the contrary, the theoretical part of metaphysicsis
merely negative, only presenting a wrong useof reason,
trespassing on its own borders. Thus, theoretical metaphys-
ics is nothing but a catharticon.** Transcendental metaphys-
ics is a critique of science and an organon for wisdom. But
there is also an applied metaphysics containing many dog-
matic theories.2> Sometentative tables of contents of pure
metaphysics confirm that this science corresponds to the
future Critique of Pure Reason. One ofthemlists as its

® Cf. Chap, I, § 11.

2% AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 558, Reflection 4455. This Reflection presents an
alternative where Kant’s choice is obvious. See ibid., pp. 552-553, Reflection
4445.
2 Ibid., pp. 559-560, Reflection 4445. Wisdomis obviously a synonym of
moral philosophy: see p. 172, Reflections 3643 (1764-1775), 3644 (1770-1778),
and 3646 (1772? 1776-17782); pp. 562-563, Reflections 4467, 4471.
> Cf. Chap. 1, § 11.
™ AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 553, Reflection 4445.
% Jbid., p. 558, Reflection 4457.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 231
parts Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Logic, Tran-
scendental Critique (Dialectic?), and Transcendental Archi-
tectonic.”© Anothertable of contents certainly referred to
pure metaphysics, listing a genetic part (sensibility and
reason), and a zetetic part (analysis--principle of contradic-
tion, synthesis, antithesis).7” See also § 7 below. Later, in
1773-1775, Kant lists a transcendental thetic, establishing the
principles of pure reason, and transcendental antithetic,
concerning their natural (that is, non-critical) use.”
A Reflection dated between 1769 and 1772” offers
anotherclassification of the parts of philosophy which is
summarized in Table VIII.

4, In his famous letter to Herz on February 21, 1772,

Kant expoundsthe plan of a work which hehad intended to
write, whose title should have been The Boundaries of Sensi-
bility and of Reason. It should have contained a theoretical
part, divided into (1) phenomenologyin general, and (2)
metaphysics according to its nature and method; and a practi-
cal part, divided into (1) the universal principles of feeling,
of taste and of sensible appetition (Begierde), and (2) the
first principles of morality.*° Here, the propaedeutical sci-
ence is once more distinguished from metaphysics. But Kant
adds that at a certain point he had been confronted with a
new problem concerningintellectual knowledge. If the

* Jbid., p. 560, Reflection 4460; p. 622, Reflection 4643. P. 557, Reflec-

tion 4454, states that there are two methodsin the critique of metaphysics. The
first uncovers paralogisms, the second opposesconflicting demonstrations. The
second method is the best.
7 Ibid., p. 560, Reflection 4460.
* Ibid., p. 656, Reflection 4676, 1. 24-25.
» Ibid., pp. 434-435, Reflection 4150.
* AK.-Ausg. X, p. 124.
a Mase SSMERETS: ” a

232 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

activity of the subject is the foundation ofintellectual repre-

sentations, how can these be in accordance with the objects?
Kant, in his own way, outlines the solutions Plato, Male-
branche, and Crusius gave ofthis problem, but herejects
them as inadequate. He does not say what his own solution
is, but proceeds to explain that this prompted him toclarify
the origin of intellectual knowledge, in order to establish the
nature and the boundaries of metaphysics. Thus he could
establish a classification of the concepts of pure reason, or
categories, which are the subject matter of transcendental
philosophy, and he essentially changed the subdivisions of
metaphysics. In conclusion, he is now writing a critique of
pure reason, expounding the nature of knowledge both
theoretical and practical, insofar as it is merely intellectual.
He has almost completed first section, concerning the
sources, the method and the boundaries of metaphysics.
Upon completion he will proceed to write the second section,
on the pure principles of morality.*

This important letter, written at the beginning of

1772, can account for some of the doctrinal changes which
are evident in the Reflections written in that same year (see §
3). According to Kant’s report, he intended atfirst to treat
in two different sections phenomenology and metaphysics
according to its nature and method. And we knowthat in
1770-1771 (see § 2), phenomenology was considered a
propaedeutic, establishing the boundaries of the principles of
sensibility. But, after Kant’s new discovery, phenomenology
disappears, and the propaedeutical task is taken care of by
the critique of pure reason. This critique seemsprimarily to
concern the nature ofintellectual knowledge, but certainly

” Ibid., pp. 125-127.

 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 233

(asa Reflection of 1772 states, see § 3) also contained a

section on the boundaries of sensibility. Thus, metaphysics
has absorbed the propaedeutical science, connecting it with a
new section it developed on the nature ofintellectual knowl-
edge. This newstate of affairs is mirrored in the Reflections
of 1772 (see § 3).
Unfortunately, the information Kant provides on this
evolution is so scarce, that it is impossible to ascertain what
actually happened. From whatKant writes to Herz, the
most likely supposition to advance is that the basic new
discovery is the clue (Leitfaden) for establishing the table of
categories. Now, if we are to assume with reasonable likeli-
hood that this clue is the same as in the Critique of Pure
Reason, that it consists in the derivation of the categories
from the forms of judgment, we can draw someinteresting
hypothetical conclusions. At this point Kant may be con-
vinced he discovered, in the forms of judgment, the reason
for the basic harmony between pureintellectual thought and
thought in general or general logic. But, if this is true, then
this meansthatthe intellectual foundation of metaphysics
rests now on a closer connection between metaphysics and
general logic than had hitherto been suspected. This could
be the reason why the preliminary section of metaphysics
now acquires the character of a particular science closer to
general logic, and is therefore a propaedeutic to metaphysics
proper. As such, it is unified with the other propaedeutics,
that is, with the study of the principles of sensibility, into the
critique of pure reason.

6 In another letter to Herz, written toward the end of

1773, Kant states that he is about to publish a book. He

eo,
* Ibid., pp. 136-139.
234 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

presumably refers to the Critique of Pure Reason, which he

mentions later. He also says that he does notintend to
hasten, because his task is very difficult. He has to reform a
science, metaphysics, cultivated by fifty per cent of the
philosophers, and he is certain to have founda principle
(Lehrbegriff) which shall enable him to solve the riddle. He
has planned an entirely new science which he is about to
develop completely. But it is very difficult to organize its
subdivisions. Thus, he hopes to reform philosophy forever,
making it much moreuseful to religion and to morals. He
also describes the plan of his work: philosophy is transcen-
dental philosophy ora critique of pure reason, and meta-
physics, which is further divided into metaphysics of nature
and of morals.
In the Reflections of 1775-1778, Kantoffers on
several occasions general orpartial classifications of the
parts of philosophy which are rather consistent, and which
are summarized in Table IX. This diagram suggests sever-
al considerations. In the first place, general logic is no
longerclassified as a part of philosophy,asitstill was in
Tables III, VI, and VII.™ It is considered a propaedeutic for
beginners, and it is contrasted with logic as an architectonic,
which is for masters.** Now the architectonic is referred to
as philosophy proper. In fact, Kant states that there are two
kinds of techniques, the first mechanical or a posteriori (art),
and the secondarchitectonical or a priori (science). It isa

3 See AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 9, Reflection 4851, 1. 12-24; p. 10, Reflection

4852; p. 11, Reflection 4855; p. 18, Reflection 4880, 1. 9-12; p. 20, Reflection
4889 (1776-1778); p. 27, Reflection 4897; p. 54, Reflection 4993; p. 72, Reflec-
tion 5048; pp. 99-100, Reflection 5127; p. 100, Reflection 5130 (1776-1783).
See also, for a partially different classification, p. 11, Reflection 4855.
™ This is explicitly stated ibid., p. 11, Reflection 4855, 1. 2.
% Ibid., p. 13, Reflection 4861.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 235

great advantageif science can be made technical. In this

case, that would mean making it architectonical, or reducing
it to the functions of imagination, by introducing into science
some subdivisions which correspond to these functions, like
the table of categories. What is mechanical is made by
sight, what is architectonical is made on the foundation of a
principle. We could infer that general logic, as an art
(since sometimes Kantcalls it Vernunftkunst, the art of
reason”) is considered a mechanical technique, and therefore
is empirical. But of course there is also another kind of
general logic treated as a science, which founds pure philos-
ophy, according to the hypothesis advanced in § 5 above.
Moreover, it becomes clear what Kant means as he states
that it is very important to make the science of reason archi-
tectonically technical. Logicians attempted in vain to reach
this aim through syllogism, an aim which was attained in
mathematics through infinitesimal calculus. What took place
in calculus should also take place in the critique of pure
reason.** Whatis architectonical in a science is the idea or
the general plan ofit, and this must precede the science.”
In the speculative field, the understanding has a pure and
architectonical use, while there is an empirical and architec-
tonical use of reason only in the practical or moral fields.
Wolff enlarged our knowledge, but did not exercise the
critique; his works are useful as storehouses of reason, not

* Ibid., p. 26, Reflection 4911. See also AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 477, Reflec-
tion 2703 (1764-1777).
* ‘See, for example, AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 30, Reflection 4927.
® Ibid., p. 34, Reflection 4937.
» AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 537, Reflection 2835, |. 29-31 (1773-1777? 1769-
1712),
* AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 91, Reflection 5109,|. 5-9; p. 44, Reflection 4970,
1. 18-19; AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 707, Reflection 4758, 1. 12-14 (1772-1778).
 236 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

as architectonic of reason.’ Lambert, on the contrary, was

both an analyst and an architectonical mind;God is both
the architect and the creator of the world.“

Another element which should be noticed is the

ambiguity of the term metaphysics, which sometimes without
further specification refers to what is otherwise called gen-
eral metaphysics, and also to whatis called special meta-
physics. The meaningofthe term metaphysicsis still fluid,
asit shall be for a long time.“ In the Critique of Pure
Reasonit will have at least three different meanings(about
which see Table XIII).
Thecritique of pure reason is considered a part of
general metaphysics, as in Tables I, IV, VI, VII, versus
Tables III and VIII, where metaphysics is an ontology
clearly distinct from the critique. Kant also describes the
aim ofgeneral metaphysics. It is (1) to establish theorigin
of synthetic a priori knowledge; (2) to conceive (Einsehen)
the restrictive conditions of the empirical use of human
reason; (3) to show the independence of ourreason from
these conditions; that is, to show the possibility of an
absolute use of reason; (4) to extend, in this way, the use of
reason beyond the borders of the sensible world, althoughin
a merely negative way; thatis, to eliminate the obstacles
opposed to this by reasonitself; (5) to show the conditions of
the absolute unity of reason, so that reason may be a

“ AK.-Ausg. XVIII, p. 68, Reflection 5035.

a Ibid., p. 21, Reflection 4893, 1. 8-9.
© AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 605, Reflection 4597, 1. 15-16. Cf. p. 461, Reflec-
tion 4217, I. 3-5 (1769-1770). See also Dissertation § 20 (AK.-Ausg. Il, p. 408,
1, 17-19). But in 1770the human ingenium architectonicum means chimerical, a8
in ibid., § 28 (p. 416, 1. 30-33).
For a further ambiguity, see Chap. I, § 13.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 237

complete principle of practical unity, that is, of the harmony

of the sum total (die Summe)of all ends.*5 Kantalso states
that the content of ontology is the analysis of transcendental
concepts, whereas the synthesis only contains antitheses (see
also § 3, Reflection 4460).
In Table IX, transcendental philosophy is a synonym
for general metaphysics. This should be kept in mind, in
view of the meaning the former term acquires in the Critique
of Pure Reason, where itis identified with ontology. Other-
wise, Table IX showsa striking similarity with the classifica-
tion of philosophy in the Critique (see Table XIII), with but
one more exception, namely the distinction between a tran-
scendental and a natural cosmology and theology. All I can
add in this respect is that Kantstates that, among the parts of
metaphysics, physics and psychologyare called rational,
while theology is called natural, because in the former the
object is given by the senses and knownby reason, whereas
in the latter the object is known by reason according to the
analogy of the senses.‘” Possibly Kant conceived the distinc-
tion between natural and transcendental cosmology and
theology in accordance with the distinction between natural
and transcendental theology in the Critique of Pure Reason
(see § 34).
Finally, I will relate anotherclassification of phi-
losophy according to a different principle, which Kant ad-
vances once. Moral philosophy teaches how to be happy
through principles a priori, without caring about the means
for reaching this end. Prudence (Weltklugheit) teaches how I

© AK.-Ausg. XVIII, pp. 5-6, Reflection 4869,1. 6.

“ Ibid., p. 68, Reflection 5034. See also AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 726,
Reflection 4781, I. 9-10 (1773-1779): “Ontology concerns the complete analysis
(Auflasung), cosmology the complete connection (Verbindung).”
“ AK.-Ausg. XVIII, pp. 59-60, Reflection 5014.
 238 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

can be happy throughprinciples a posteriori, without caring

for the problem of merit. Wisdom (Weisheit) teaches how I
can be happy because I deserve to be, through principles a
priori and a posteriori. It concerns the destination of my
nature, the limits (Grenzen) and ends of my powers (see also
§3).8

8. The Metaphysik L, (1775-1780) offers another classi-

fication of the sciences summarized in Table X.The basic
differences from Table IX are that (1) a critique of pure
reason does not appear; (2) cosmology and theology belong
here to pure philosophy; (3) there is no distinction between a
natural and a transcendental cosmology and theology; (4)
rational physics is called pure somatology. Besides, meta-
physics is restricted to pure philosophy. The term “tran-
scendental philosophy” appears in Heinze’s summary ofthe
missing parts of the Metaphysik L,, and it was mostprobably
in the original text as a science whose subdivisions are
rendered in Table XI.°° Transcendental philosophy doesnot
find its place in Table X, probably because Kanthad notyet
introduced that concept in his course, and had offered atfirst
a more traditional general classification. After that concept
had been introduced, it seems that ontology is considered as

* [bid., p. 87, Reflection 5100. On wisdom,see also p. 6, Reflection

4849, |. 31-32,and p. 7, |. 17-19 (1776-1779); and AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 744,
Reflection 4843 (1775-1778).
© AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL-1, pp. 173-175, 177. The classification expounded
on p. 177 does not coincide with that on pp. 173-175, although it presents some
interesting characteristics. It deviates so much from all prior classifications that I
must conclude the passage containingit is corrupted, the more so as it classifies
the same Theologia naturalis in two different locations, and that it mentions a
Psychologia naturalis, a term which does notappear elsewhere, and which is
clearly spurious.
® Ibid. p. 185.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 239

a part of the critique of pure reason, which is not mentioned,

and which was probably considered as identical to transcen-
dental philosophy.
The way Kant defines metaphysics, which here means
general metaphysics, is quite interesting. “As [general] logic
treats the [general] use of the understanding and of reason,
so metaphysics is a logic of the use of pure understanding
and of pure reason.” “Metaphysics is an instruction about
how to proceed with pure rational concepts, and a logic of
the use of pure understanding and of purereason. ”*!
Empirical psychologyis not a part of metaphysics.”
Kant does not give any reasonfor this, butit is clear that it
is because empirical psychology is an empirical science.

9, Theclassification of the sciences contained in the

Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopaedia (1777-17807)is
rendered in Table XII.*? General logic is not assigned a
place in this classification, butit is treated before metaphys-
ics in the course of the lectures. Logic is said to be, in
connection with the use of the understanding, what grammar
is in connection with language.
Metaphysics refers both to pure and applied philoso-
phy, but metaphysics properincludes rational psychology
and physics only.*°

‘ Ibid., p. 173, 1. 11-13, and p. 174, 1. 2-4.

2 bid., p. 175, 1. 9-10.
® Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen uber Enzyklopddie und Logik, vol. 1:
Vorlesungen tiber Philosophische Enzyklopadie, ed. Gerhard Lehman (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1961), pp. 31-32, 36-38. Empirical psychology and empirical
physics, listed on p. 37, certainly belong to history, qua natural history.
Ibid., pp. 39-57.
S Ibid., p. 39,1. 17.
* Ibid., p. 37, 1. 23-25; cf. p. 60, 1. 14-15, where the critique of pure
treason precedes metaphysics.
240 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

Transcendental philosophy, critique of pure reason

and ontology are synonyms.

Ontologycontains no objects, it only contains concepts,

lawsand principles of pure thought . . . . Thus, tran-
scendental philosophy is the critique of pure under-
standing and of pure reason.*”

The task ofthe critique of pure reason is “to establish the |

idea, the extent, the origin and the nature of [reason]. This |
is architectonical.”** A mathematician is a great architect; |
Wolff was not an architectonical philosopher. |
Cosmology and transcendental theology belong to
ontology; as for natural theology, it belongs to applied meta-
physics.© But natural theologyis not listed with the other
parts of applied metaphysics, probably because, as a non-
critical science, it is not accepted in Kant’s own system.
Rational psychology deals with things like the spirituality and
simplicity of the soul.
I did not list practical anthropology togetherwith the
other two sections of practical philosophy in Table XII.
Although Kant mentions them all together, he probably con-
ceived practical anthropology to be an empirical psychology
ofethics,® as in the Critique of Pure Reason (A 842-849; B
870-877).
Onthe whole, this classification is very similar to
that expounded in Table X.

81 [bid., p. 37, 1. 30-34.

% Ibid., p. 59, 1. 7-10.
% Ibid., p. 38, |. 27; p. 34, 1. 26-27.
© [bid., p. 37, 1. 38 - p. 38, 1. 1.
‘| bid., p. 37, 1. 13-15.
© [bid., p. 38, 1. 9-10.
-
The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 241

I. A COMMENTARY TO THE ARCHITECTONIC OF THE

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

A section of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Archi-

tectonic of Pure Reason, is devoted to the problem of the
classification of the parts of philosophy. The importance of
this section was grossly underestimated for a very long time.
For example, Kemp Smith wrote that “[t]he section is of
slight scientific importance, and is chiefly of interest for the
light which it casts upon Kant’s personality.” He adds:
“Moreoverthe distinctions which Kant here draws are for
the most part not his own philosophical property, but are
taken over from the Wolffian system.”® Both affirmations
are totally untrue. Recently, Heinz Heimsoeth indicated the
importance of the entire Theory of Method of the Critique,™
and wrote a careful commentary on the Architectonic, which
I do not intend to duplicate in the following. Thus, while
commenting on the Architectonic, I will not repeat most of
Heimsoeth’s important remarks, but I will try to supplement
them, mostly by proceeding in different but not conflicting
directions.®
The Architectonic is a fairly difficult text, even ac-
cording to the general standard of the Critique. Not only
does it require for its intelligibility the understanding of
some major problems in Kant’s philosophy, butits literal
meaning too is frequently very unclear. As happens on
numerous occasions, here as well Kant does not take the
trouble to expound his views in an easy and orderly way.

e Kemp Smith, Comm., p. 579.

“ Heimsoeth, 7D, p. 829.
‘s For the sake ofprecision, and for the commodity ofthe reader, when
teeded I will add to the standard A and B pagination. Page andline references to
AK.-Ausg. III and IV will be made, simply referring to them as III or IV.
242 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Following the meanderings of his thoughtrather than the

commonsense of the reader, he produces a text which on
many occasions is hard to understand, if not definitely
misleading.
I will give, in the first place, a survey ofthe course
of Kant’s thoughtin this section of the Critique. At the
beginning, Kant discusses the notion of an architectonic and
the problems connected with it (A 832-835; B 860-863).
Thenheestablishes his specific purpose for this occasion
(Il, p. 540, 1. 23-29). There follows a first division of all
knowledgeinto historical and rational (A 835-837; B 863-
865. III, p. 540, 1. 30 - p. 541, 1. 17), and a seconddivision
of rational knowledgeinto philosophical and mathematical (A
837; B 865). After this, Kant discusses the principle andthe
meaning ofa subdivision of philosophy (A 838-840; B 866-
869. III, p. 542, I. 3 - p. 543, 1. 17) and offers first tenta-
tive subdivision into philosophy of morals (A 840; B 868.
Il, p. 543, 1. 18-28). But he immediately interrupts this line
of thought in order to introduce a more fundamentalsub-
division of philosophy into pure and empirical (III, p. 543, 1.
24-26). There follows a subdivision of pure philosophy into
critique and metaphysics, and of metaphysics into metaphys-
ics of nature and metaphysics of morals (A 841-842; B 869-
870. Ill, p. 543, 1. 27 - p. 544, 1. 24). A long discussion of
the character and definition of metaphysics comes next (A
842-845; B 870-873. IV, p. 544, 1. 25 - p. 546, 1. 15).
Then, metaphysics is subdivided (A 845-846; B 873-874).
Afterwards, Kant proceeds to examine somepossible objec-
tions against this subdivision. How is knowledge priori of
objects possible? Where should empirical psychology be
located (A 847-849; B 875-877. III, p. 547, 1. 16 - p. 548, |.
28)? Some more remarks about metaphysics conclude the
Architectonic (A 849; B 877 to the end).
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 243

il. I will examine now Kant’s general notion of architec-

tonic. The Architectonic is a necessary section of the Theo-
ty of Method, as it is the art of making systems. Systematic
unity is that which transforms ordinary knowledgeinto sci-
ence, that which transforms the mere aggregate of ordinary
knowledge into a system (A 832; B 860). The term aggre-
gate as contrasted with system, is also replaced here by the
term rhapsody. A system is defined as the unity of multifar-
ious knowledge under an idea. This is the concept of reason
(Vernunftbegriff) of the form of a whole, insofar asit deter-
mines a priori the scope ofits manifold content, and the
position which the parts occupyrelative to one another.
Thus, the scientific concept of reason contains the form of
the whole, which must agree with the unity of the end,
which is also contained in that concept. In this way, the
wholeis articulated, not accumulated, the same as the body
of an animal. Growth is not the addition of some limb, but
the strengthening of each one of them without changingtheir
proportion (A 832-833; B 860-861).
Kant proceeds to explain his notion of architectonic
using two metaphors. Thefirst derives from construction
work or architecture properly, the second from biology. A
third metaphor of poetic origin, the rhapsody, is used by
way of contrast. The construction work metaphor, stated
more explicitly later (A 834; B 862. III, p. 540, 1. 7-10), is
implicit in the very term architectonic, and is quite obvious.
The third metaphor (repeated twice in III, p. 538, 1. 26 and
p. 540, I. 8), the rhapsody, simply refers to a “piecemeal
collection of verses.” The second, biological metaphor, is

See Antoine Fureti[?]re, Le Dictionnaire universel (A La Haye, et a

Rotterdam: Chez Amnout & Reinier Leers, 1690; reprint Paris: SNL - Le
Robert, 1978), s.v. “Rapsodeurs”: “C'est ainsi qu’on appelloit ceux qui
chantoient anciennemeantles Pogsies d’Homere .... ” S.v. “Rapsodie”:
 244 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

explicit in the comparison with an animal body already

mentioned, but also later, in a reference to the theory of

“Recueil de plusieurs passages, pensées & autoritez qu’on

rassemble pour en composer quelque ouvrage. Les Politiques de
Lipse sont une Rapsodie, ot il n’a mis que des conjonctions &
des particules. L'Iliade d’Homere est intitulée Rapsodie. Quand
on veut mespriser l’ouvrage d’un Auteur, on dit que ce n'est
qu'une Rapsodie, qu'il n’y a rien de son invention.”
Le grand dictionnaire de Vacadémiefrangoise [Dictionnaire de 'académie
francaise] (Paris: Chez la veuve de Jean Baptiste Coignard, et Chez Jean Baptiste
Coignard, 1695%; reprint Gendve: Slatkine Reprints, 1968), s.v. “Rapsodie”:
“Recuéil, ramas de Vers. Etc'est dans ce sens qu’on a appellé I'lliade, La
Rapsodie d’Homere. Maintenantle mot de Rapsodie parmi nous ne se prend que
pour un mauvais ramas, un mauvais ouvrage soit de Vers, soit de Prose.”
[Thomas Corneille], Le dictionnaire des arts et des sciences (Paris: Chez la
Veuvede Jean Baptiste Coignard, et Chez Jean Baptiste Coignard, 1694; reprint
Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1968), s.v. “Rapsodeurs”:
“Nom qu'on donnoit anciennement a ceux qui chantoient les
posies d’Homere, dontI’Iliade estoit intitulée Rapsodie, de
pérrew, Coudre, & de G5, Chant, parce qu’onpretend qu'elle
est composée de diverses pieces separées dont on a fait un seul
corps.”
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, vol. II (London: Printed
by W.Strahan, For J. and P. Knapton,et al., 1755; reprint Hildesheim: Georg
Olms, 1968; in the series Anglistica & Americana, vol. 1), s.v. “Rhapsody”:
“Any numberofparts joined together, without necessary dependence or natural
connection.” He also quotes “a rhapsody of words” (Shakespeare), a “rhapsody
ofdifficulties” (Hammond), “a rhapsodyoftales” (Locke), “a rhapsody of
eveningtales” (Watts). In Greek, Aoyqdia meansrecitation of an epic poem; a
payw5é¢ recited poems,especially the Homeric, as contrasted with the bard,
whosang them accompanied byhis lyre. Rhapsodical is contrasted with
architectonical by Alexandri Gottlieb Bavmgarten, Metaphysica (Halae
Magdebyrgicae: Impensis Carol. Herman. Hemmerde, 1739;is identical in the
1757!and 1779” editions, the latter reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), §
592: “Maior facultas fingendi FERTILIS (foecunda), ad chimaeras procliuis,
EXORBITANS (extrauagans, rhapsodica), ab iis cauens ARCHITECTONICA dici
potest.”
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 245

generation (A 835; B 863. Ill, p. 540, 1. 12-23). However,

this metaphor is already implicit in the very term architec-
tonic, which is polysemic. In fact, it was also used in a
certain theory of generation;® andit is also implicit in con-
trast with the term aggregate, which in the chemistry of that
time meant inorganic (versus organic) substance.*

® See [Denis] Diderot, [Jean Le Rond] d’Alembert, Encyclopédie, ou

Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, vol. 1 (Paris: Chez
Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durand, 1751), s.v. “Architectonique,” by d’Alem-
bert:
“est ce qui donne & quelque chose une formeréguliere, con-
venablea la nature de cette chose, & a l’objet auquelelle est
destinée: ainsi la puissanceplastique qui, selon quelques philo-
sophes, changeles oeufs des femelles en créatures vivantes de la
mémeespece, est appellée par ces philosophesesprit architec-
tonique.”
See also Encyclopédie, vol. XII (Neufchastel: Chez Samuel Faulche &
Compagnie, 1765), s.v. “Plastique.” The trend in question is represented, among
others, by Jules-César Scaliger and J.-B. van Helmont. See Jacques Roger, Les
sciences de la vie dans la pensée francaise du XVIIFsiecle: La génération des
animaux de Descartes a l’Encyclopédie ({Paris]:_ Armand Colin, 1963), pp. 97,
1.
® See Diderot, d’Alembert, Encyclopédie, vol. III (Paris: Chez Briasson,
David, Le Breton, Durand, 1753), s.v. “Chymie,” by I’Abbé Lenglet du Fresnoy.
But see also, more generally, Fureti[&]re, op. cit., s.v. “Aggregé”: “On dit en
Physique, un aggregé paraccident, c’est a dire, par hasard, d’un corps composé
de parties qui ne luysont pas toutes essentielles, mais dontplusieurs y ont été
jointes par hasard.” See also E{phriam] Chambers, Cyclopaedia: or, An Univer
sal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (London: Printed for James and John
Knapton,et al., 1728), s.v. “Aggregation”:
“.... in Physicks, a Species of Union, whereby several things
which have no natural Dependence or Connection with one
another, are collected together, so as in some Sense to constitute
one... . Thus, a Heap of Sand, or a Mass of Ruins, are
Bodies by Aggregation.”
Forthe contrast between aggregate and whole for example, see Johann August
Heinrich Ulrich, Erster Umrif einer Anleitung zu den philosophischen Wissen-
246 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

12. The comparison with an animal body in general and

with generation in particular is of the greatest importance, or
rather, it is much more than a metaphor. Itis a structural
analogy between some fundamental elements of Kant’s phi-
losophy. In fact, between 1770 and 1780, Kant had devel-
oped a theory aboutgenius ororiginal, creative ideas, both
in science and in art. They are conceived as wholes preced-
ing the component parts, or as systems (versus aggregates),
architectonically introduced, which cannot be accounted for
on the basis of psychological determinism alone. Likeliving
beings, whose presence cannot be explained through physical
mechanism alone, theyall presuppose a purposeful process
as their source. Free moral actions also share this metaphys-
ical structure. Kant had probably drawninspiration from
some of Swedenborg’s doctrines” for the parallelism be-
tween ideas of genius, organisms andfree actions, but the
basic line of thought, in both Kant and Swedenborg, derived
from contemporary theories of life and generation.”

schaften, vol. I Jena: Christian Friedrich Gollner, 1772), p. 326.

Georgio Tonelli, “Kant’s Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779),” Journal
of the History of Philosophy, IV (1966), 8§ 8, 9, 16, 19, 21-25.
® Georgio Tonelli, “Divinae Particula Aurae; Genial Ideas, Organism, and
Freedom: A Note on Kant’s Reflection N. 938,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy, VII (1969), pp. 193ff.
71" Emanuel Rédl, Geschichte der biologischen Theorien in der Neuzeit, vol.
I (Leipzig und Berlin: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1913; reprint Hildesheim, New
York: Georg Olms, 1970); Erik Nordenskidld, The History of Biology: A
Survey, trans. Leonard Bucknall Eyre (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1949;
in the series Chapters in Modern Biology and Biometrics); Thomas S. Hall, Ideas
of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology 600 B.C. - 1900
A.D., vol. I: From Pre-Socratic Times to the Enlightenment (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1969); [Noél] Joseph [Terence Mont-
gomory] Needham, A History of Embryology (Cambridge: University Press,
1959%; [reprint New York: AmoPress, 1975; in theseries History, Philosophy
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 247

Swedenborg, however, had givenuphis original strict mech-

anism in favor of vitalism, whereas Kant never went so far.
There were traditionally two contrasting approaches
to the problem ofthe origin ofliving beings. According to
the first, called epigenesis, a new living being could be
actually generated by another, or by the copulation of two
other, living beings. In its more extreme version, this doc-
trine maintained thatlife can directly originate from lifeless
matter (generatio aequivoca), as with micro-organisms from
broth. According to the second, called preformationism or
evolution, new life cannot be brought aboutby lifeless mat-
ter nor by other living beings. All the germs of future living
beings were created at the beginning of the world, and sub-
sist in a microscopic sire (either as eggs or as spermatic
beings) until, under favorable circumstances, they commence
to develop into a regular plant or animal.
These two approachesare variously combined with
the two traditionally fundamental attitudes in biology, vital-
ism and mechanism. Thatis, some epigenists and some
preformationists are vitalists, and some others are mecha-
nists. Still, the preformationist approach is more character-
istic of strict mechanism. Since the mechanical laws are not
considered by many mechanists as capable of bringing about
life, many mechanists preferred to completely renounce any
rational explanation of life. Instead they accounted forlife
through an original creative act followed by simple mechani-

and Sociology of Science: Classics, Staples and Precursors); Roger, op. cit.;
Emile Guyénot, Les sciences de la vie aux XVIF et XVIII sidcles: Didée d’évolu-
tion (Paris: Albin Michel, 1957; in the series !'évolution de l'humanité, troisiéme
section: le libéralisme et le rationalisme novateur, vol. 68); Giovanni Solinas, Il
microscopio e le metafisiche: Epigenesi ¢ preesistenza da Cartesio a Kant
(Milano: Feltrinelli, 1967); Karl Roretz, Zur Analyse von Kants Philosophie des
Organischen (Wien: In Kommission bei Alfred Hélder, 1922).
248 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

cal growth, rather than to admit the interference of a non-

mechanical biological force with the laws of mechanism.”
In Kant’s time, the most important epigenists were John
Turberville Needham, Maupertuis and Caspar Friedrich
Wolff; all were vitalists. Needham also believed in spon-
taneous generation. Preformation had amongits most
famoussupporters Haller and Bonnet, who were both mecha-
nists. Buffon, a vitalist, held an intermediate position.”

13. It is probably because ofhis strict mechanism that

Kant, who had declared as early as 1763 that mechanism
cannot accountfor life, seemed to incline toward prefor-
mationism in the middle seventies.” It is also remarkable
that in 1755, in his General Natural History and Theory of
the Universe, Kant had employed a preformationist meta-
phor. To explain the teleological order of the physical
universe he used the typical term “to implant,” einpflanzen.
God wisely established at the very beginning some pur-
poseful universal laws, and then the whole disposition of
bodies derived from themin strictly mechanical way.”

™ Needham, op. cit., p. 207.

% Radi, op. cit., pp. 231-233, 235-237, 241-243. Needham,op. cit., pp.
205-223. Needham is wrong in considering Maupertuis as a mechanist, on which
see Roger, op. cit., pp. 477-479. Still, Maupertuis did not completely discard the
hypothesis of a mechanical explanationoflife.
™ Tonelli, “Kant’s Early Theory of Genius,” op. cit., §§ 22-23. As early
as 1755, Kant considered very unlikely a mechanical explanationoflife. See
Roretz, op. cit., p. 108; also AK.-Ausg. I, p. 230. But heis positive aboutit in
1763; see AK.-Ausg. Il, pp. 105-108, 114-115. Preformationism is tentatively
accepted in AK.-Ausg. XVII, p. 591, Reflection 4552 (1772-1776). See also p.
585, Reflection 4534 (1772-1778).
% Georgio Tonelli, Elementi metodologicie metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al
1768: Saggio di sociologia della conoscenza (Torine: Edizioni di “Filosofia,”
1959; in the series Studi e ricerche di storia della filosofia), Chap. Ul, § 17.
 4

The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 249

Now, in the Architectonic, another preformistic meta-

phor is used. The systems ofthe different sciences seem to
grow casually, as worms doaccording to the generatio
aequivoce theory. Butin fact they “all have had their
schema, as the original germ, in the sheer self-development
of reason” (A 835; B 863. III, p. 540, 1. 12-20). The terms
“original germ” and “self-development” (in der sich blog
auswickelnden Vernunft)”® are characteristic of preforma-
tionism.
Considering the close structural relationship between
ideas of reason and organic life, Kant seems definitely to
incline towards a general preformationist position. Accord-
ingly, non-mechanical events, such as the idea of a system,
or of a living being, do not depend on particular power
interfering with, or supplementing, the course of the me-
chanical laws of nature. Instead, they seem to depend on
germs predisposed by someentity at the beginning of time.
The laws of nature accountfor their development in strictly
mechanical way, because they transform those germs into
regular beings, deterministically actualizing purposeful pat-
terns which recondition the action of those laws.
Free actions werestill considered to be interruptions
in the deterministic course of natural causation at the time of
the Critique of Pure Reason, as is well known. Thus, it
appears that the preformistic model had not yet been ex-
tended to them.
It must be added that the same biological metaphor
shall be used in the second edition of the Critique in order to
explain anotherof its basic elements (B 167).

* Kantis careful, in this particular context, about writing auswickelnden

‘asad of entwickelnden. Entwickelung (evolution) was a term used in connection
with epigenesis. Later, when he uses the term Entwickelung (IV, p. 546, |. 1), he
lus obviously abandoned the terminology connected with the metaphor.
250 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

14, The term architectonic denotes for Kant the highest

principle of system, and therefore of method. Thus,it is
both the conclusion, with the exception of the last historical
section, and the climax of the Theory of Method. As we
shall see elsewhere, according to a longtradition theclassifi-
cation of the sciences was a prominent part of method or
logic.” The terms architect, architectonic, architectonical,
had beentraditionally used in philosophy with some specific
systematic or methodological meaning.
A famousinstance occurs in Descartes’ Notes to the
“Seventh Objection” to the Meditations (1642),” where the
example of an architect building a chapel is developed at
great length in order to explain the first foundation and the
method ofphilosophy. Earlier (1632), the great Aristotelian
of Kénigsberg, Abraham Calov, had expounded the orderof
a system and theclassification of the sciences in his treatise
on method.” But he pointed out that establishing the objects
and the borders of the different sciences, as well as the rules
and general axioms governing those sciences (the “architec-

7 [Tonelli has only “See Chap. , § .” as the entry here. Chap. I, § 33

seems the most likely reference, in part because a footnote there will send one on
to Chap. II, §§ 13-14. Chap. I, § 34 should also be considered. Of course
Tonelli provides extensive historical backgroundin his article “The Problem of
the Classificationof the Sciences in Kant’s Time,” Rivista Critica de Storia della
Filosofia I, 3 (1975).]
7 René Descartes, Ocuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam & Paul
Tannery, vol. VII (Paris: J. Vrin, 1973), pp. 536-561. Diderot probably has this
passage in mind when he mentions the “orgueilleux architectes” who haveerected
“tousles édifices de la philosophie rationnelle.” See [Denis] Diderot, Oeuvres
philosophiques, ed. Paul Vernitre (Paris: Garnier Fréres, 1961), p. 191, § XXI
(De Vinterprétation de la nature, 1754).
”® Abraham Calovi, Scripta philosophica, vol. Il (Lubecae: Impensis
Joachimi Wilden,Literis Alberti Hakelmanni, 1651), pp. 627, 635 (Tractatus
novus de methodo docendi & dispurandi).
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 251

tonical prescription of the disciplines”), rather belongs to

metaphysics and to noology.*° In fact, the last section of his
metaphysics, or the “dprorx Objectorum Disciplinarum
determinatio,” is devoted to this task.’ Kant may have had
Calov in mind when he set system in opposition to aggre-
gate. Calov, in his treatise on method, describes a system of
sciences as an aggregate. A careful exploration of seven-
teenth-century Aristotelianism would probably establish that
Calov was by no meansthe only philosopher holding these
doctrines.
A different but pertinent and important use of the
term architectonical is made by Leibniz, whostates that the
mind(esprit) can imitate God, producing something which
resembles his works. This happens in dreams, in voluntary
actions, and in scientific discovery. In so doing, it is archi-
tectonical.*? God is the architect of the universe.“ This

® Jbid., p. 584:
“Distinguas verd hic inter praescriptionem dedisciplinis Method-
icam, & praescriptionem disciplinarum Architectonicam. Illam
dico, quae praecepta tradit de methodo servanda,in disciplinis
& omni tractatione, quod est organicurn. Hanc vero, quae
praescribit leges disciplinis, quas ultra, citrag; nequit consistere
rectum. Unde quamvisinter alia etiam ordinetdisciplinas ad
ductum primorum principiorum, tamen idfacit non organic’, sed
Monarchic® per modum regiminis. Ista ergo praeceptio debetur
scientiarum reginae [metaphysics], gua determinationem, ejusg
Consiliario Noologiae seu habitui intelligentiae, gud praeceptor-
um rationem.”
lbid., pp. 338ff (Metaphysica Divinae, Pars Specialis, 1650).
= Ibid., pp. 625ff (de Methodo).
® God. Guil. Leibnitii [Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz], Opera philosophica,
ed, J[ohann] E{duard] Erdmann (Berolini [Berlin]: Sumtibus G. Eichleri, 1839-
1840; supplemented reprint ed. Renate Vollbrecht, Aalen: Scientia, 1959), p.
717, § 14:
“L’esprit n’a pas seulement une perception des ouvrages de
 252 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

illustrates the use of architectonical in connection with the

notions of spontaneity and creativity. Kant makes such a
connection in the case of the genius who introducesan origi-
nal idea in philosophy. Thus,this provides a terminological
precedentlinking Kant’s pre-critical theory of genius and
ideas to his notion of an architectonic (see § 12).
Johann Jacob Syrbius published in 1719 a general
treatise on philosophy whose first part, containing the “foun-
dation, principles and method of all knowledge,” wascalled
Architectonica.**
In 1729, Wolff declares that ontology is an architec-
tonical science since it has a methodological function, direct-

Dieu; maisil est méme capable de produire quelque chose qui

leur ressemble, quoiqu’en petit. Car, pour ne rien dire des
merveilles des songes, ob nous inventons sans peine, et sans en
avoir méme la volonté, des choses auxqelles il faudroit penser
long-tems pourles trouver qusnd on veille; notre ameest
architectonique encore dans les actions volontaires, et découvrant
les sciences suivant lesquelles Dieu a réglé les choses, (pondere,
mensura, numero) elle imite dans son département, et dans son
petit Monde oi il lui est permis de s’exercer, ce que Dieu fait
dans le grand” (Principes de 1a nature et de la grace, fondés en
raison, ca. 1714).
See p. 712, § 83 (Monadologie, 1714). See also Nouveaux Essais, LIV, Chap.
IV, § 27, and Die philosophischen Schrifien, ed. C[arl] I[mmanuel] Gerhardt, vo.
VII (Berlin: Weidman, 1875-1890; reprint Hildesheim, New York: Georg
Olms, 1978), p. 273 (Tentamen Anagogicum).
“ Leibniz, Opera philosophica, p. 717, § 15 (Principes) and p. 712, § 87
(Monadologie).
* Jo, Iacobi Syrbii, Institiones philosophiae primae novaeet eclecticae
Quarum pars prima, seu Architectonica (lenae [Jena]: Apvdlo. Felicem
Bielckivm, 1719), pp. 2-3. For Syrbius, a follower of Christian Thomasius, the
foundation and methodology of knowledge consists in the developmentof the
notion of person, human intellect (which foundsrational philosophy), human will
(which founds moral philosophy), etc.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 253

ing the mindin the invention oftruth in all sciences."

Meier develops in 1752 a parallel between an architect
(Baumeister) and the constructor of a system who proceeds
not piecemeal, but upon the consideration of the whole.*”
Baumgarten calls architectonic the philosophia generalis,
which is the science of the general predicates of philosophy,
commonto several parts of it. Thatis, it is a kind of meth-
odological introduction to philosophy, also containing a

% Christian. Wolfio, Horae subsecivae Marburgenses, Trimestre vernale [in

the editor’s Introduction this appears as Trimestre Brumale] (Francofurti &
Lipsise: Prostat in Bibliop. Rengeriano, 1729; reprint Wolff, Werke, 11:34.1),
pp. 314-316. Ontologyis an architectonicalscience:
“Est aliquis usus philosophiae primaesingularis, qualem dis-
ciplina quaedam alia praeter ipsam non agnoscit. Consistit
autem in eo, quod principia ontologica dirigantintellectum in
veritate cognoscenda, sive ea a nobisinvestigari, sive ab aliis
investigata dijudicari debet.”
Therefore, the ontological notionsare directrices, that is, they are such,
“per quas apparet, quo cogitationes sintdirigendae, ut reper-
iatur, quod quaeritur. Notiones adeo directrices viam quasi
monstrant, qua sit eundem, ne ad devia deflectamus, vel lucem
affundunt, ut via illa appareat, quae absqueillis minime con-
spicitur.”
Here “way” is a clear reference to method. [Atthis point Tonelli says “See
Chap. , §.” Clearly this refers to Chap. I, § 2.] According to [Johann Heinrich
{lean Henri} Samuel] Formey, Entwurf aller Wissenschaften. Zum Gebrauche
der Jiinglinge, und aller die sich belehren wollen, trans. from French F. J.
Bierling, vol. IV (Berlin: Joachim Pauli, 1768), p. 317, Wolff had called archi-
tectonic a notyet existing science which should assess the perfection of composite
things. I could not, however, find a correspondingpassage in Wolff.
"George Friedrich Meier, Vernunftlehre (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer,
1752), pp. 150-152, § 134.
254 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

classification of the sciences.** But he also had called ontol-

ogy an architectonic as such.”
In the Encyclopédie, de Jaucourt called method “the
architecture of the sciences,” inasmuch as it determinestheir
field and their borders.”

15. But there is no doubt that a very important precedent

to Kant’s use of the term is Lambert’s workentitled Archi-
tectonic (1771), which is a kind of ontology expounded from
a methodological point of view, and with a methodological
purpose. I described more extensively the general character
of that work in Chapter II." In the Preface to the Archi-
tectonic, Lambert explains that he derived the title of his
work from Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, and adds:

It is derived from architecture, andit has a

similar meaningin connection with the edifice of
human knowledge, in particularas it refers to the first
foundations, to the first disposition,to the materials,
to their preparation and order in general, and with the
intention of producing a purposeful whole.”

* Alexanderi Gottlieb Bavmgarten, Philosophia generalis, ed. lob. Chris-

tian Foerster (Halae Magdebvrgicae: Impensis Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 1770),
$1.
® Bavmgarten, Metaphysica, § 4, [He does not dothis in the 1739! ed-
ition, but does in the other editions checked, namely 1757‘, 1768° and 1779”.]
® Diderot, d'Alembert, Encyclopédie, vol. X (Neufchastel: Chez Samuel
Faulche & Compagnie, 1765), p. 460, s.v. “Méthode (Arts & Sciences)” by L.
de Jaucourt: “La méthode est comme l'architecture des Sciences; elle fixe
P’étendue & les limites de chacune,afin qu’elles n’empiétent pas sur leur terrein
respectif; car ce sont comme des fleuves qui ontleur rivage, leur source, & leur
embouchure.”
9! See Chap. II, §§ 14-19.
* Lambert, Architectonic, vol. I, pp. XXVIII-XXIX.
OG

The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 255

Lambert’s precedentis important in order to under-

stand Kant’s position. Lambert establishes a connection
between the notions of architectonic, end or purpose and
whole, though Meier also had connected this term with the
notion of whole. All authors I have mentioned, with the
exception of Leibniz, consider architectonic to pertain to
method. But a major point for Kantis that the architecton-
ic’s task is to establish a classification of the sciences. In
Kant’s time this is hinted at by de Jaucourt. For Baum-
garten, classifying the sciences is only one ofthe tasks of the
philosophia generalis (and Meierrefers generically to a
system). Thus, in this basic respect, the only clear prece-
dent to Kant’s use of this term is in Calov, and possibly
other Aristotelians sharing his views. Kant had probably
been informed ofthis by his Aristotelian teachers at Kénigs-
berg University.
An importantassociation of the term architectonic is
the fact that, according to tradition of Platonic origin, God
wascalled the architect of the universe, from Plato to Kant’s
time.”

® This metaphor appearsin the Timaeus and Philo. See Max Pohlenz, Die
Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, vol. 1 (Géttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1959, 19785), p. 372. See also, among manyothers: Leone Ebreo
[Hebreo, Leo Hebraeus], Dialoghi d’ Amore [1535], ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidel-
berg: Carl Winters Universitatsbuchhandlung; London: Oxford University Press;
Paris: Les Presses Universitaires; Amsterdam: Menno Hertzberger, 1929), vol.
Il, p. 72, and vol. III, p. 107; Baltasar Gracién, Obras Completas, ed. Arturo del
Hoyo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1960), p. 533 (El Criticén, 1, 1651); Radulphi Cud-
worthi [Ralph Cudworth], Systema intellectuale hujus universi [1678], trans.
Joannes Laurentius Moshemius, vol. [I (Lugduni Batavorum [Leiden]: Apud
Samuelem et Johannem Luchtmans, 1773), p. 564 (he also develops, pp. 695-696,
\ comparison between the systemic precepts of logic and the parts of a building in
their disposition “ad unum totum”); [Nicolas] Malebranche, Oeuvres Completes
de Malebranche, ed. André Robinet, vols. XII-XIII (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965; in the
256 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Kant himself had used this metaphor duringthe pre-

critical period™ and in the Dissertation of 1770 (§ 20).
Creative genius, or, as we saw in Leibniz, the architectural
activity of the soul, traditionally had been compared to
God's creative activity.°* This is one morelist establishing
the connection between Kant’s Architectonic and the doctrine
of ideas of genius.

16. Resuming now the examination of the text, I shall

refer back to some concepts described in § 11.
Architectonic has been defined basically throughthe
notion of a system, and the latter throughthe notion of an
idea. In turn, an idea is explained as the conceptof reason
of the form of a whole. Such a concept determinesa priori,
that is, logically precedes both the scope of the manifoldit

series Bibliotheque des textes philosophiques, ed. Henri Gouhier), p. 206

(Entretiens sur la métaphysique & sur la religion, 1688); Francis Hutcheson, An
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue (London: Printed by
J. Darby, for Will. and John Smith, 1725; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
1971), [especially p. 96]; Michaél Gottlieb Hanschius [Hansch], Godefridi
Guilielmi Leibnitii principia philosophiae, more geometrico demonstrata
(Francofurti et Lipsiae: Impensis Petri Conradi Monath., 1728), p. 56; [Jean]
Morin, Abregé du mécanismeuniversel, en discours et questions physiques
({Chartres: J. Roux, 1735]; Chez Andre’ Cailleau, Place de Sorbonne au coin de
la rué des Magons: S. André, 1740), pp. 7, 10 [the only reference is to God as
“I'Auteurde I’Univers,” “Créateur,” and “I’Auteurde la nature”); G. F. Meier,
Vernunftlehre, §§ 1-6, 36. See also Giorgio Tonelli, Kant, dall’estetica meta-
fisica all’estetica psicoempirica: Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771)
sulle suefonti, in Memorie dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie Ill,
Tomo 3, Parte II: Classe de scienze morali, storiche filologiche (Torino:
Accademia delle Scienze, 1955), pp. 40-41.
* See Tonelli, Kant, dall'estetica, p. 252.
% See Giorgio Tonelli, “Genius, Renaissance to 1770,” Dictionary of the
History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, vol. Il
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973).
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 257

contains and the orderofthe parts of the manifold in their

relationship to each other. Kant addsthat, insofar as this
concept of reason contains that form of a whole (preceding
its parts), it can agree with an end. Nowit is well known
that for Kant an end is defined as a whole precedingits
parts. It is clear this meansthat the agreement between the
form of a whole and an end is an agreement between the
form of a whole preceding its parts and a substantial whole
preceding its parts. This substantial whole is not only the
form ofan end, but an actual, particular end. Kant adds (A
832; B 860. III, p. 539, 1. 2-4) that all parts of the whole
refer to the unity of the end, and that the parts in question
also refer to each other in the idea of the end. This seems to
mean that in a merefinalistic relationship each one ofthe
parts refers to the end, without establishing any particular
connection between the parts themselves. But in this organic
finalistic relationship, an idea or rational concept of the end
intervenes, which establishes a determined connection be-
tween the parts. In fact, we have to do with an end whichis
not actualized through a series of means independent of each
other, or only loosely interconnected, such as, for example,
the different actions of a craftsman whobrings abouta pro-
duct of his art (external finality). Here the actions can be
performed within certain limits, independently of each other
and in different orders. On the contrary, the end we are
considering (internal finality) can be brought about only
through a close interdependencyandan established recipro-
cal order among the means, amongtheparts of the whole.
In this case the parts are the particular philosophical scienc-
es. Likewise in a living body, its end or life can be brought
about only through an organicorderofits parts.
In this process, the basic notion of a whole preceding
its parts is further determined as the notion of an end. This
end is further determined as organic (internal versus external
258 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

finality), and this, as the structure of a concept, is identified

with an idea of reason.
But it must be noted that the end in question is not
the ultimate end (Endzweck). Actually it is not one end, but
it corresponds to the essential ends of human reason (A 832;
B 860. Ill, p. 538, 1. 27; cf. A 839-840; B 867-868. III, p.
542, 1. 27, and p. 543, 1. 7, 9). The ultimate end is men-
tioned later, and kept in the vague perspective of a future
development of philosophy. Thus, in this context, the unity
of the end is actually taken to mean the unity of a plurality
of ends.

17. The next notion introduced by Kant is that of a sche-

ma, which is needed by the idea in order to beactualized, as
the scope of an essential manifold and as the order ofthe
parts insofar as they are determined by the end as principle
of this determination. Kant stresses that what is meant here
is not a schema established empirically, according to pur-
poses (Absichten) which come up casually in a numberthat
cannot be known beforehand. In other words, it is nota
technical schema. It is a schema derived from an idea, from
a basic end (Hauptzweck) of reason,* which founds an
architectonical unity (see also § 23; cf. A 847; B 875).
This can be connected to a distinction introduced by
Kant in a Reflection during 1775-1778 (see § 6), between
two kinds of technique in science. The one is mechanicalor

This Hauptzweck of reason(III, p. 539, 1. 15) should not be confused, as

Kemp Smith does in his translation, with the Endzweck (III, p. 543, |. 9), other-
wise theclassification ofthe sciences offered in the Architectonic would notbe
whatit is, but it would be that one which is subordinated to moralphilosophy(III,
p. 543). This interpretation is confirmed in a closely related passage, “ein
Ganzes nach den Zwecken der Vernunft architektonisch zu entwerfen”(III, p-
540, 1. 11-12).
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 259

a posteriori, the other is architectonical or a priori. Both

introduce subdivisions into a science, a mechanical technique
corresponding to whatis called here technical, and an archi-
tectonical technique to whatis called here architectonical.”
But what is a schema? Kantexplainsthatit is “the
outline (Umrif) and the division of the whole into parts”
(Glieder, parts of an organic body, limbs). The Latin word
monogramma is added as an explanation to “outline.” Now,
monogramma means “a single letter which contains many,” a
letter which stands for the whole name of somebody.”
Thus, a schemais the outline of something which is much
more complicated. Metaphorically, it is a simple symbol
representing a much more complex reality. In fact, the clas-
sification of philosophy which Kantoffers here is nothing but
the skeleton of a system ofphilosophy, the blueprint forit.
It must be clear that any regular science is architectonical as
a whole, that it derives from an idea accordingto principles.
Thus, the whole of philosophy, inclusive of the Critique of
Pure Reason, is elaborated and ordered architectonically, as
an organic whole preceding the parts. The special task of
the Architectonic is to provide the outline of the system, and
to expound the general principles of its organization. That
is, it is an architectonic preeminently, providing the master
plan for the actualization of the system which proceeds
architectonically as well, which is to say, according to that
plan. This actualization basically consists in organically
developing each part ofthat plan in its details, in developing
each single philosophical science in its divisions and subdivi-

% See also AK.-Ausg. XV1, p. 477, Reflection 2703 (1764-1777), where

there appears an opposition between technical and architectonical.
® ‘Aegidii [Egidio] Forcellini, Totius latinitatis lexicon (Patavii [Padua]:
Typis Seminarii, Apud Joannem Manfré, 1771), p. 109, s.v. “Monogramma”:
“simplex littera plures continens, ex quibus aliquod nomen significatur.”
260 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

sions, and in substantiating each subdivision with the perti-

nent elements in their due order. Thus, the whole body of
philosophy is generated according to a method expounded in
the Architectonic, supplemented, of course, by the other
methodical precepts contained in the Critique, thatis, on the
foundation ofthe basic idea, and of the principles established
by it.
This should help in realizing the enormous impor-
tance of the Architectonic within the economy ofthe Cri-
tique, and of Kant’s philosophy in general. It is the section
where the procedure generating the wholeis studied in its
principles, and whereits actualization is planned in its main
lines.
Thus, the development of each philosophical science,
inclusive of the Critique itself, is conceived as a prosecution
of the Architectonic, which is, as it were, the “germ” of
them all. All the details within a science are established and
organized according to the same principles. So the arrange-
mentof the Critique, or rather the whole of the Critique
itself, inclusive of all its particular doctrines, should flow, in
theory at least, from the same source. This is explicitly
stated by Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason.”

18. I cannot undertake here a discussion ofthe similari-

ties between the schema in question and the “transcendental
schema” in the Schematism of the Pure Conceptsof the
Understanding, because this would presuppose an extensive
examination ofthe latter, which does not belongto the scope
ofthe present research. But I will try to establish a basis for
better understanding the notion of schema in general by
examining its antecedents.

” AK.-Ausg. V, p. 10.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 261

In Greek, oxfjpa means figure, form, habit, form of

speech orofsyllogism, rhetorical, grammatical figure, etc.
Also the term oxnportopég is used, as configuration, fig-
ure, form, etc. In Latin, schema means, among other
things, rhetorical figure, emblem; and schematismus is a way
ofdiscovering through figures, rhetorically or emblematical-
ly.'!” It seems that, in modern languages, schema was gen-
erally received only in English in the eighteenth century.
Dyche defines it as “a draught, model, or representation of a
building, &c. or a geometrical figure constructed and laid
down, or method whereby any thing may be done or ex-
ecuted... .”! For Johnson, it is “[a] plan; a combination
of various things into one view, design, or purpose; a sys-
tem.” Or “[a] project; a contrivance; a design.”' In philo-
sophical language, Rudolph Gocleniuslists ¢xnuaricudc as
“the constitution of a geometrical schema” or as “schema,
that is, figure or habit of an oration . . . . The Analytics
receiveit as type [figure], or diagram.”!> The same appears

"© Forcellini, op. cit., p. 54, s.v. See also AmbrosiCalepini [Ambrosius
Calepinus Bergomates}, *Dictionum latinarum e greco pariter diriuantiur (Regi
[Reggio d’Emilia, Italy]: n.n., 1502; a later edition, Dictionarivm decem
lingvarvm (Lvgdvni {Lyons}: n.n., 1585), is reprinted in Calepinus, Latin-
Magyar Szétdra, ed. Melicii Jénos (Budapest: Kiadja a Magyar Tudomdnyos
Akadémia, 1912), s.v.
"Thomas Dyche and William Pardon, A New General English Dictionary
(London: Printed for Richard Ware, 1740°; reprint Hildesheim, New York:
Georg Olms, 1972; in the series Anglistica & Americana,vol. 81), s.v.
“scheme.”
' Johnson,op. cit., s.v. “scheme.” “Schematism”is defined as a *[c]om-
bination of the aspects ofheavenly bodies;particular form or disposition ofa
thing.”
'® Rodolphi Goclenii [Rudolph Goclenius], Lexicon philosophicvm graecvm
(Marchiobvrgi [Marburg]: Typis Rudolphi Hutwelckeri, Impensis Petri Mvscvli,
1615; reprint in his Lexicon philosophicvm, qvo tangym clave philosophiaefores
‘aperivntvr (Francofvrti: ‘Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi
262 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

in Johannes Micraelus.'* Jakob Martini uses this term to

mean diagram.'° Christian Thomasiusrelates that for Carte-
sians the term signified the impression or image made upon
the brain by a sensory perception.'® For Wolff, a schema or
schematism is a figure or drawing accompanying the demon-
stration of a theorem in geometry.'”
Joachim Georg Darjes uses the term in a very pecu-
liar way connected although notidentical with that of the
Cartesians. He argues that non-spontaneous material beings
(substances) offer to spontaneous beings (souls) the occasions

& Ruperti Pistorij, 1613; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964)), s.v.

“cxnparicuoc.”
‘Joh. Micraelii [Johannes Micraelius}, Lexicon philosophicum terminorum
philosophis usitatorum (Stetini [Stettin]: impensis Jeremiae Mamphrasii, Typis
Michaelis Hopfneri, 1662°; reprint Diisseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen & Co.,
[1966]; in the series Jnstrumenta philosophica,Series lexica, vol. 1), s.v.
5 See Jacobi Martini, Institvrionvm logicarum libri VII, revised edition
((Wittenberg]: Sumtibus Pauli Helvvigy [Helwig], 1614), pp. 27, [120-121, 150},
160, 169, [172-172 foldout], 174, [177, 185, 188, 190, 192, 193-194, 195-196}.
(This is an exhaustive list of diagrams wherehe uses the term schema. ]
‘6° Christiani Thomasii, Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam, seu lineae
primae libri de prudentia cogitandi et ratiocinandi(Lipsiae: Apud Autorem,
1688; Halae Magdeburgicae: Prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1702), pp.
80-81 (Cap. Ill, §§ 29, 33]:
“Cogitatio est actus mentis, quo homo vel mens in cerebro de
schematibus & motu corporum externorum per organa sensuum
cerebro impressis aliquid per modum discursus & orationis
verbis constantis vel affirmat vel negat vel quaerit . . . . Dico:
de schematibus,id est, de imaginibus, uti Cartesiani loquuntur,
moddper imagines intelligas etiam schemata reliquorum
sensuum preter visum, secus ac faciunt CARTESIANI . . . .
107 Christiani L. B. de Wolf, Meletemata mathematico-philosophica quibus
accedunt dissertationes (Halae Magdeburgicae: in bibliopoleo Rengeriano, 1755;
reprint Wolff, Werke, 1:35), Sect. I, pp. 136-137 (Ratio praelectionum, 1719).
Christiani Wolffii, Ratio praelectionum wolfianarum (Halae Magdeburg.: Prostat
in officina Rengeriana, 1735*; reprint Wolff, Werke, 11:36), p. 35, § 37.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 263

to perceive, since they movein a certain way which affects

the latter. This is what is called “material ideas,”! the
most traditional term used by Cartesians to denote modifica-
tions of the brain corresponding to representations in the
soul. But in order to makethis possible, a finite spontane-
ous being (or soul) must be connected with a continuum
composed of non-spontaneousbeings (material substances),
where the motions in question take place. This continuum is
the schemaofthe representation.!” This schema, in fact, is
the body connected with the soul." Abstractly speaking, the
schemais, for Darjes, a metaphysical presupposition en-
abling the soul to be affected by sensibility. This is
probably the reason Ploucquet employed the term schem-
atism in order to denote an organized body."
In the Encyclopédie, a schematism is an emblematic

8 Joachimo Georgio Daries, Elementa metaphysices, 2 vols. (Ienae [Jena]:

ApvdChrist. Henr. Cvnonem, 1743). See vol. I, §§ 120-122 (Elementa monad-
ologiae).
1 Daries, Elementa metaphysices, vol. 1, § 123:
“Et ita incidimus in notionem continui, quod schema reprae-
sentationis a Philosophis dicitur. Est enim schema repraesenta-
tionis seu perceptionis continuum ab eiusmodi entium non-spon-
taneorum nexu constitutum, cuius ope connexorum motusita
determinari possint, ut enti spontaneo percipiendi occasionem
praebere valeant.”
See also §§ 124-127.
"0 Daries, Elementa metaphysices, vol. Il, §§ 34-41, 117-123 (Elementa
psychologiae).
™ Godofredi Ploveqvet, Principia de svbstantiis et phaenomenis (Franco-
fvrti et Lipsiae: in bibliopolio Bergeriano, 1753', 1764), § 399. See also his
Fyndamenta philosophiae speculativae (Tubingae: Apud Joh. Georg. Cotta,
1759), p. 279, §§ 892-895.
264 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

figure used in the art of memory in orderto retain certain

concepts. !!?
As we know, Kant uses the term schema to mean a
plan, a compendius representation, in the Architectonic,'
Therefore he was unaffected by the most specific philo-
sophical use ofthis term in his time. It is worthwhile
remembering that in 1786 he termed the table of categories a
schema.""*

"2 Diderot, d'Alembert, Encyclopédie, vol. 1, s.v. “Art mnemonique,” by

the Abbé Yvon. Onecan use
“certaines figures & schématismes, qui font qu’une chose se
grave mieux dans la mémoire . . . . II y a mémedes auteurs
qui, par une prédilection singuliere pourles figures, ont appliqué
ces schématismes a des sciences philosophiques. C’estainsi
qu’un certain Allemand, nommé Winckelmann, a donnétoute la
logique d’ Aristote en figures.”
‘The reference is to Johann Justus Winkelmann [Winckelmann], Logica
memorativa (Hallae Saxonum: Joh. Georgii Schvvanderi, 1659).
'8 | do notthink that Kant potentially means by schema diagram ofthe
sciences. In fact, the only diagrams heoffers in the Critique, of the forms of
Judgmentandthecategories, are called tables (Tafel). This agrees with the Latin
expression methodus tabularis, or method ofteaching through diagrams, an ex-
pression whichis usual in the eighteenth century. See Christian. Wolfio, Horae
subsecivae marburgenses anni M DCC XXX, trimestre brumale (Francofurti &
Lipsiae: Prostatin bibliop. Rengeriano, 1731; reprint Wolff, Werke, 11:34.2), pp.
468ff: “Tabularum Mnemonicarum constructio & usus”; Johann Bernhard
Basedow, Theoretisches System der gesunden Vernunft, ein akademisches Lehr-
buch (Altona: In Commifion bey David Iversen, 1765), p. 104 (Tabellen);
ColumbaniRoesser,Institvtiones logicae (Wircebvrgi [Wirzburg]: Impensis &
Typis Ioannis lacobi Stahel, 1775), p. 108 (Tabella); A{dolf] F[riedrich von]
Reinhard, Sammlung juristischer, philosophischer und kritischer Aufsdtze, vol. |,
oder der Sammlung vermischter Schriften, vol. II (Biitzow und Wismar: in der
Berger und Boednerischen Buchhandlung, 1777), pp. 67-68: “Gedankeniiberdie
tabellarische Lehrart, besonders in der Rechtsgelehrsamkeit.”
14 AK.-Ausg. IV, pp. 473-474.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 265

Kant proceeds, stating (A 834-835; B 862-863) that

19.
all those whotry to constitute a science must have an idea of
the science as a foundation. Butthis idea, in the case of the
originator of this science and frequently also ofhis latest
followers, is not distinct (deutlich). Thus it cannot deter-
mine the proper schemaofthis science,its content, system-
atic unity and limits.
It seems that the consequences are twofold: in a first
stage, the order of the science in question is rhapsodical,
properly speaking it is not an order; in a secondstage,it is
technical, not architectonical (see § 17).
Thus, the fact that the idea is unclear causesin first
stage simply a lack of order, andin a secondstage it causes
the order of that science to be empirical (technical), and not
apriori. In so doing, Kant develops a theory notquite of
error, because the temporarysolutions are not absolutely
wrong--they are contingently inadequate stages of the mani-
festation of the truth. Rather, he developsa theory of the
inadequacy of the preliminary stages of the science in ques-
tion. As the idea is still indistinct, the originator of that
science and his followers are groping for a schemaor order.
Atfirst, they do not achieve anyorderat all, and subse-
quently they only reach a spurious order. But, as Kant
states, although the different stages of a science, the different
“systems” ofit, seem to be brought about casually, at first
mutilated (verstiimmelt), later more complete, they all had
their schema astheir original germ in the sheer self-
developing reason. So, not only is each one organized
within itself according to an idea, but also the different
sciences are subordinated and unified as members of a whole
in an overall system of human knowledge. It is possible to
establish this overall system now, when so many materials
have been collected, or it can be obtained from the ruins of
older wrecked edifices.
 266 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Kant’s representation of this process is somewhat

ambiguous. It is not clear whetherthe preliminary stagesof
the elaboration of a science which seem to be casual
(scheinen wie Gewiirme), are casual or not. That they are
not casual is suggested by the image of the germ ofreason,
which develops in them. That they are casual is suggested
by the imageofthe old, ruined edifices which seem notto
have any intrinsic value except as a source of materials for a
newconstruction. Theissue at stake is not central, butis
better understood asa significant trait of Kant’s philosophy
of history. Does the idea of reason providentially direct the
seemingly rhapsodic andtechnical orders of organization
toward its aims? Or are these orders merely casual, but still
useful as a fortuitous collection of materials for the architec-
tonical schema? solution is suggested by The History of
Pure Reason (A 852; B 880), where the imageofthe ruined
edifices reappears. Studied in a wider context, this section
can be interpreted as a gradual and providential self-revela-
tion of reason. This is accomplished through “the difference
in the idea” (die Verschiedenheit der Idee, A 853; B 881),
through the different shapesattributed to the idea which is
notyetdistinct."

20. At this point (A 835; B 864. III, p. 540, 1. 23) Kant

commenceshisclassification of knowledge, which, in his
words, has a commonroot and two stems. Here Kant adopts
a very ancient image, that of the tree of science, already
used by, among others, Raymond Lull, Francis Bacon, Des-

ns For a comparative study ofthe different texts where Kant gives some
cues for a solution of this problem,see Sergio Givone, La storia dellafilosofia
secondo Kant (Milano: U. Mursia & C., 1972), passim, and especially pp.
104ff.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 267

cartes,!"° Chambers,"Diderot,"!® and d’Alembert!’® in their

discussionsofthe classification of the sciences.
Thefirst andbasic distinction is that into rational and
historical (or empirical) knowledge. Here wefind the first
appearance of those basic principles ofclassification, or
rather of organization, which are necessary to the genuine
architectonic procedure, accordingto the distinct idea. Such
a division musttake place “according to principles” (III, p.
539, 1. 25-27; cf. p. 541, 1. 16-17). I shall discuss below (§
26) the peculiar character of this principle ofclassification.
At this point, Kant embarks on a discussion clarifying
the distinction between the rational and the historical. In the
course of this discussion he finds it expedient to introduce a
second distinction, dividing rational knowledge into mathe-
matical and philosophical (A 837; B 865), thereby clarifing
an issue central to the problem debated. But the problem in
question shall be for a while (until A 840; B 868) his main
line of thought.
Kant arguesthat learning one of the systems of philo-
sophy extant in the present state of knowledge corresponds to
acquiring historical, not rational (and therefore not philo-
sophical) knowledge. If a philosopher like Wolff works out
his own original system of philosophy, then he knows to

© See Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis: arti mnemoniche e logica combina-

toria da lullo a leibniz (Milano-Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1960), pp. 47-48, 51-
52, 60-62, 64 (Lull and others), 75 (Lavinheta), 152-153 (Bacon), 160
(Descartes).
"" Chambers, Cyclopedia, ThePreface,” p.ii.
ue Denis Diderot, Encyclopédie ou dictionaire raisonné . . . proposés par
souscription (Paris: Briasson, David l’ainé, Le Breton, Durand, [before May 1,]
1751), usually referred to as Prospectus de l’Encyclopédie, p. 2 and passim.
49 Diderot, d'Alembert, Encyclopédie, vol. 1, pp. xlvii-xlvix: “Explication
détaillée du systeme des connoissances humaines” (Discours préliminaire],
passim.
268 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

philosophize, because he is the originator of a system, and as

such he fosters the progress of reason towards a greater
distinctness of the idea of philosophy. But each system has a
rational cognitive value only as a part of this process, as a
step towards the making of the true, final philosophyof the
future. Therefore, simply learning Wolff's system does not
produce as such any philosophical knowledge. It amounts to
learning a false system, without enabling oneto criticize it in
order to step forward towards the truth. This conclusion is
expressed by Kant in an aphorism which reflects oneofhis
profound convictions, and which he repeats several times
during his career: one can learn to philosophize, but one
cannotlearn philosophy.
Thus, whatcan berationally learned at present about
philosophy is only how to develop or to perfect it, by criti-
cally examining the extant systems, in order eventually to
acquire the capability of producing a system of one’s own,
nearerto the truth.
One can wonder whetherit is possible to say that the
originator of a system of philosophy rationally knows their
own philosophy, because they have certainly not learned it,
but they have produced it on the foundation ofan idea of
reason, albeit not yet distinct. It seems that, according to
Kant, such an originator does not know any philosophy, all
the same, because their philosophy is not the true one. That
is, for such a person, philosophy actually does not yetexist
(A 838; B 866). Still, they are “merely a plaster-cast of a
living man” (III, p. 541, 1. 11-12). In fact, if the originator
does not know any philosophy, at least they know to philo-
sophize, because they are making some progress in the direc-
tion of the true philosophy.

21. It is at this point that Kant finds it expedient to con-

trast philosophical with mathematical knowledge. The latter
 The Evolution of Kant's Plan for a System 269

proceeds through construction ofits concepts, and this im-

plies that all its concepts are provided with a foundation in
pure intuition, which prevents delusion and error. Philoso-
phy, on the contrary, does not enjoy this privilege.
This explains why mathematics can be learned as a
rational knowledge. Whatthe studentlearns in it is the
genuine science of mathematics which can be further devel-
oped, but which cannotbe perfected any further in its extant
parts because already it is thought, taught, and learned with
its genuine procedure.
Kant could have added that this also explains why
mathematics was established of old as a science, while phi-
losophy still has to receive its foundation; but this is implicit.
Kant proceeds (A 838; B 866) bystating that the true
philosophy does not exist yet. Thus, it is clearly impossible
to learn it. But then, how is anybody, including Kant him-
self, justified to speak about it? Because one refers to an
archetype which allows them to judge orassess all attempts
at philosophizing (that is, it is the foundation ofa critique of
pure reason). This archetype is “a mere idea of a possible
science which nowhereexists in concreto, but to which, by
many different paths, we endeavor to approximate.” Kant
adds, first “until one true path, overgrown by the products
of sensibility, has at least been discovered”; secondly, “and
the image (Nachbild, ectype), hitherto so abortive, has
achieved likeness to the archetype.”
Thus, the philosophizing of the past, the rejection of
old and the construction of new systems, has been possible
on the foundation of this concealed archetype, as a tentative
approximation of it. But Kant himself is, of course, in a
better position than philosophers of the past. In fact, as for
the first condition, Kant presumes to havesatisfied it. He is
convinced he discovered the “high road” to metaphysics.
But he has not yetsatisfied the second condition. Thatis,
270 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
although hehas established the true philosophical method, he
has not yet produced the bodyof true philosophy. In fact, if
he had, he would have “personified . . . the ideal philoso-
pher”; but “it would be very vaingloriousto entitle oneself a
philosopher, and to pretend to have equalled the pattern
which exists in the idea alone” (A 839; B 867).
This means in thefirst place that Kant has established
a schemaof the idea of philosophy in general, as expounded
in the Architectonic, and an actualization of this schemain
its methodological section, namely the Critique of Pure
Reason itself. But he has not yet established a body of
philosophy, the actualization of the whole schema expounded
in the Architectonic. And, even if he had produced by 1781
this body of philosophy, he would probablyassert that the
methodological section of it is final, but that the other sec-
tions are only tentatively established. This is questionable,
because in the Preface of 1781 he asserts that metaphysics
promises “in a short time, such completion as will leave no
task to our successors save that of adapting it in a didactic
manner. . . ” (A XX). In fact, it is possible that Kant did
not claim to be a philosopher only out of modesty (in order
not to be “vainglorious”), while he left it to the public to
decide whether he wasor not.
However, as long as this body of philosophy has not
yet been produced, it shall be impossible to learn philoso-
phy. It may seem to be an obvious implication that after-
wards it will be possible. Still, this is not true. In fact, we
read in the Jasche Logic:

Butalso supposingthat there were really one

[genuinephilosophy]: yet, nobody wholearned it
would be entitled to call themself a philosopher, because
Ce

The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 271

their knowledgeofit would still be only subjective-

historical.'”°

This explains why Kantrepeats on many other occa-

sions that it is impossible to learn philosophy, even after
completing important sections of his own system. More-
over, Kant stated as late as 1790-1791 that there was notrue
philosophy as yet.'2! As we are going to see (§ 24), Kant
after all did not think that the schema offered in the Archi-
tectonic was perfectly adequate to the idea of philosophy.
That schema would enable him to establish the basic sections
of the true philosophy, butit would notallow him to order
the philosophical truths he had secured into an absolutely
valid and final system.

2: Kant adds: “Hitherto (Bis dahin) the concept of phi-

losophy has been a merely scholastic concept” (III, p. 542, I.
19-20). The reason is that hitherto the concept of a system
of philosophy has onlytaken careof the logical perfection of
philosophy, its systematic unity (A 838; B 866). This scho-
lastic concept corresponds to a technical schema in the
classification of the sciences (see §§ 17, 19).'But there is
another concept of philosophy, a cosmical concept (concep-
tus cosmicus) which alwayslay at the foundation of the term
philosophy as notyet distinct idea of it. This was especial-
ly true when this concept was considered as personified in a

1 AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 25, 1. 34-36.

"\ Metaphysik L>, AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.2, p. 534, 1. 21-22.
"2 This is clear if we compare the footnoteto page A 840; B 868. III, p.
543, , . 32-34, where the scholastic concept (Schulbegriff) of a scienceis described
as “eine von den Geschicklichkeiten zu gewissen beliebigen Zwecken,” with A
833; B 861. Ill, p. 539, I. 19-21, where the technical schema is said to depend on
the contingent use of knowledge “zu allerlei beliebigen auferen Zwecken.”
272 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

certain individual, so that the archetype wasrepresented in

the ideal of a philosopher. “On this view, philosophyis the
science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends
of human reason,” but it would be vainglorious “to pretend
to have equalled the archetype which is only in the idea” (4
838-839; B 866-867).
Wecan ask atthis point if Kant thinks hehas reached
this “cosmical concept.” Certainly not, or at least notyet,
as we saw above. But, if not, does this mean thathis con-
cept of philosophy, or that his schema of theclassification of
the sciences, is only a “scholastic concept,” a technical
schema? Certainly not. How does one reconcile these two
seemingly conflicting positions? By qualifying the adverb
“Hitherto” used by Kant, in connection with the two condi-
tions we have seen. Condition one, reaching the true path to
philosophy, has been satisfied; condition two, producing the
true body of philosophy, has not yet beensatisfied. Thus
Kant’s concept of philosophy is no longer the “scholastic
concept” ofit, but rather an architectonical schema. Never-
theless, the true body of philosophy has not yet been pro-
duced by him. Kant is abovetraditional philosophy, but he
has notyet attained the true philosophy, although he is on
the right path towards it (see also § 24).
An ideal, referring here to the true philosopher, is an
idea not only in concreto but also in individuo or personified
(A 568; B 596).'?? Now, the true philosopher, orthe teach-
er, furthers the “essential ends of reason,” as a “legislator of
human reason.” This ideal (actualized idea) cannot be found
anywhere, but the idea of the philosopher’s legislation is

"Forthe antecedents oftheterm ideal, see myarticle, “Ideal in Philoso-

phyfrom the Renaissance to 1780,” in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas:
Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener, vol. Il (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973).
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 273

present in human reason as a notyetfully distinct idea. So

Kantintends to determine more precisely, moredistinctly,
“what philosophy prescribes as regards systematic unity, in
accordance with this cosmical concept” (A 839; B 867).
This confirms the interpretation given above, that Kant’s
schema is not technical, but architectonical, in conformity
with the “cosmical concept” of philosophy.

B. The ideal of a teacher is contrasted by Kant with the

personalities of a mathematician, a naturalist, and a logician.
The former (the mathematician and naturalist) are excellent
in rational knowledge; the latter (the naturalist and logician)
are not only that, they are excellent in philosophical knowl-
edge as well. But they all are only “artificers in the field of
reason” (Vernunftkiinstler, A 839; B 867). This definition is
rather intriguing, because Vernunftkunst in eighteenth-century
German is a synonym of logic,’ and Kant himself had used
the term with that meaning (see § 6). Thus one can wonder
what Kant means bystating that the mathematician, naturalist

"™ See [Kaspar vonStieler], Der Teutschen Sprache Stammbaum und

Fortwachs oder Teutscher Sprachschatz, vol. I (Niimberg: in Verlegung Johann
Hofmanns, Gedruckt Heinrich Meyern, 1691; reprint Miinchen: Késel-Verlag,
[1968]; in the series Deutsche Barock-Literatur, eds. Martin Bircher and
Friedhelm Kemp, vol. 1), col. 1011; Johann Christoph Adelung, Grammatisch
tritisches Worterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, vol. IV (1774-1786; Leipzig:
Breitkopf und Hartel, 18017; reprint Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1970),
sv.,¢0]. 1102. Michael Christoph Hanow published Entwurf der Erfindungs-
Kunst, als der Vernunft-Kunst erster Abschnitt (Danzig: mit Schreiberischen
Verlag und Schriften, 1739), and Entwurf der Lehr-Kunst, als der Vernunft-Kunst
anderer Abschnitt (Danzig: mit Schreiberischen Verlag und Schriften, 1740).
Alexander Gottlieb Bavmgarten, Acroasis logica. In Christianvm L. B. de Wolff
(Halae Magdebvrgicae: Impensis Carol. Herm. Hemmerde., 1761; reprint Wolff,
Werke, 11:5), § 9, gave ars rationis as a synonym oflogic. However, the
German term Vernunftlehre is more usually employed to mean logic.
274 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

and logician are logicians all of them, and nothing butthat.

But the selection of the term Vernunftkinstleris not casual,
The “artificers in the field of reason” are contrasted with the
ideal of the teacher of philosophy in the same wayasthe
“systematic unity” or “logical perfection” of knowledge(III,
p. 542, 1. 21-22; my emphasis) is contrasted with the cos-
mical concept of philosophy above. Thus, Kantselects the
term Vernunftkinstler in order to denote a use of general
logic which does not aim towards any higher end.’ think
this means that the mathematician, naturalist and logician
(that is, the student of general logic) do not go beyondthe
use of the rules of general logic, plus some special method-
ology for mathematics and for the natural sciences, in order
to cultivate their sciences. They do not need therules of
transcendental logic and of the Theory of Method in the Cri-
tique.”* Thus, on the foundation ofthe precepts these “logi-
cians” can teach, philosophy can neverreach its architecton-
ical schema. It can reach a systematic unity, but not an or-
ganic systematic unity. Of course, this concerns philosophy,
not mathematics, natural science, or general logic. Through
the precepts of general logic these latter can achievetheir
own particular architectonical order according to the distinct
representation of their own idea.
These considerations have been introduced by Kant in
order to establish the principle of the architectonical schema
of philosophy, which is not simply that of a systematic unity
as an end in itself (III, p. 542, 1. 19-23). It is also a system-
atic unity of knowledge from the viewpoint of the “essential

"5 This term reappears with the same meaningin Jasche’s Logic, AK.-Ausg.
IX, p. 24, |. 6-8, but the doctrine there expounded is different. See below, § 41.
"% General logic as a science needs for its elaboration the rules of general
logic itself, because this elaboration consists in the transition from natural to
artificial logic. See Chap. I, §§ 5-6.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 275

ends of human reason,” that is, of the “legislation of human

reason.” These essential ends makeout the “single superior
and inner end” (III, p. 539, 1. 23), or “basic end” (III, p.
539, 1. 15), which founds the architectonical unity (see §
1s

24. At this point, Kant introducesa short digression,

contrasting the “essential” or “single superior and inner
end,” or “basic end” with another kind of end, termed the
“ultimate end,” which establishes the perfect systematic unity
of reason. Thelatter is the “human destination,” and the
philosophy dealing with it is moral philosophy (A 840; B
868). In this way, Kant suggests a further and highest view-
point in philosophy, according to which it seems that the
supreme conceptin philosophy should not be metaphysics--as
it is according to the Architectonic (see below)--butethics.
No further information is provided here about this highest
viewpoint, nor about its connection with the “essential
ends.” Weshall find it developed later, about 1790, in a
slightly different way (see §§ 42, 43). Thus, the concept of
the perfect systematic unity of reason is not merely hinted at
as a transitory diversion only, but represents a basic doc-
trine, although Kant never tried, as far as we know, to
develop it extensively and precisely in its connections with
his other ideas. But this is a further and decisive reason
which explains why Kant never thought that he had produced
the true and final body of philosophy (see §§ 22, 23). First
and foremost, he had not yet produced the perfect schema.

"Theessential ends ofreason, first mentioned in III, p. 538, 1. 27, make

up the “unity of the end,” III, p. 539, 1. 2. Theessential ends become the center
of Kant’s line of thought in III, p. 542, 1. 27 (see also I. 37, and p. 543, 1. 7),
described also as “subordinate ends” (J. 9), versus the “highest ends” (I. 7),
namely the “ultimate end” (I. 9). See also n. 96.
276 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
The schema expounded in the Architectonic is Superiorto the
schemas produced by all other philosophers, because it is not
“scholastic” or technical, but “cosmical” or architectonical,
However, it has not yet “equalled the archetype which is
only in theidea” (§ 22).
Kantproceeds now to divide philosophyaccording to
the principle of the “legislation of human reason” (orofthe
“essential ends”), which imposesits law in twodifferent
fields, the law of physical nature, and the law of morals.
Thus philosophy has two objects: physical nature and free-
dom. Before the architectonical schema was established they
were introduced as two different systems, but finally they are
unified into one single philosophical system (A 840; B 869).
Kantis hinting again at unification of metaphysics and ethics
underthe heading of metaphysics (see below). This subdivi-
sion is interposed here because it is an alternate subdivision
to the following one, that into pure and empirical philoso-
phy. In fact, both pure and empirical philosophy can be
subdivided into philosophy of nature and philosophy of
morals, just as both philosophy of nature and philosophy of
morals can be subdivided into pure and empirical.
Atthis point, in fact, the alternate subdivision of
philosophy into philosophy of pure reason and empirical
philosophy is introduced. Thelatter should not be confused,
as Kemp Smith does,!with historical or empirical knowl-
edge. Actually, empirical philosophy is termed “rational
knowledge (Vernunfterkenntnif) from empirical principles,”
and we knowthathistorical knowledge is not rational, but
just empirical in all its extent.
Kant now proceeds to subdivide the philosophy of
pure reason into a propaedeutic (the critique of pure reason)

"Kemp Smith, Comm., p. 580.

 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 277

and a science (metaphysics) containing all philosophical

knowledge of pure reason in a systematic connection, true as
well as apparent (scheinbar) knowledge (A 841; B 869).
The last specification is quite important, because it allows an
account of the absence of someof the parts of metaphysics
listed here from the system ofphilosophy actually produced
by Kant. Furthermore,it is added that there is a more
general sense of metaphysics (which I call Metaphysics I),
inclusive of the critique of pure reason as well as the inquiry
about all which can be knowna priori. Thus, I shall call
metaphysics distinguished from critique Metaphysics II.

25. At this point, the subdivision of philosophy into

philosophy of nature and philosophy of morals is introduced
into pure philosophy (Metaphysics II). Thedistinction is
between a theoretical metaphysics of nature and practical
metaphysics of morals. Thelatter is pure ethics without any
anthropology or empirical condition in it. Theoretical meta-
physics is also called “metaphysicsstrictly speaking” (which
I call Metaphysics III). Pure ethics is not subdivided any
further here, because this does not belong to the present
theoretical purpose (A 842; B 870).
Kant’s subordinationof ethics to metaphysicsis one
of the moreoriginal and striking features ofhis classification
of the sciencesin this initial formulation. This trait appeared
very early in Kant’s thought, being present before 1770. I
tried elsewhere to reconstructits origin and its early motiva-
tion."° As for its motivation in 1781, this is a difficult

"Georgio Tonelli, “Kant’s Ethics as a Part of Metaphysics: A Possible

Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant’s ‘Dreams of a Seer’” in
Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts, Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider,ed.
C{raig] Walton and J{ohn] P. Anton (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press,
1974), pp. 236-263.
 ™
278 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

problem to solve, indeed oneofthe central problems in

Kant’s philosophy. It is certainly possible to anticipate in
1781 thejustification Kant himselfoffers for it in 1787, that
ethics becomesa pillar of metaphysics inasmuch asit be-
comes the only argument for God’s existence and for the
immortality of the soul."° Butit is also possible to advance
anotherjustification. Kant suggested but did notdevelop the
idea that both nature and freedom are objects ofthe “legi-
slation of human reason,” justification which depends on
the “Copernican revolution” itself (A 840; B 868). In
Kant’sphilosophy, the opposition between the physical
world, which imposesits intrinsic laws on the human mind
inquiringinto it, and the ethical world whereit is the human
mind which imposes the moral lawintrinsic to it as a dictate
ofconscience, disappears. Both the physical and the moral
laws originate in the nature of the human mind. Thus, meta-
physics and ethics are unified in the cosmical concept of
philosophy under the heading of metaphysics, andin the
superior concept founded on the destination of humans,
under the heading of moral philosophy.
26. There follows a long digression (A 842-844; B 870-
872) onthedistinction between metaphysics(in general,
Metaphysics I is meant) as a science entirely a priori, and
the empirical sciences. Of course, mathematics too is
entirely a priori, but it is not considered here. Kant
capitalizes on the novelty of his own philosophical principles
in order to showthatthey allow an original distinction
between metaphysics and the empirical sciences. This
distinction, as a principle for organizing the architectonical

"© Ibid., pp. 260-261

 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 279

schema of the sciences, establishes for the first time the

“genuine idea” of metaphysics.
Kant refers generically to the incapacity of his prede-
cessors to draw this border adequately. In fact, it seems to
me that only those of them who accepted the doctrine of
innate ideas or of the production ofrational ideas by the
mind, such as Spinoza, could have introduced a distinction
similar to that established by Kant, although Kantobviously
would have considered it invalid.” Anyhow, Kant does not
consider this circumstance, throwsall of his predecessors in
one pot, and attributes to them the definition that “metaphys-
ics is the science ofthe first principles of human knowl-
edge.” In this way, metaphysicsis defined not by a certain
kind of knowledge,butonly bya certain degree of generality
of its notions--a degree which cannotbe delimited definitely.
Thus, bythis definitionthe field of metaphysics is not prop-
erly determined (A 843; B 871).
Moreover, in Kant’s opinion, an insufficient distinc-
tion between metaphysics and mathematics blurred the line
separating these sciences (A 844; B 872). Kantis referring,
of course, to the question of the mathematical method in
philosophy, which wasin his time one of the major differ-
ences between Wolff and his opponents.
I cannot undertake here to write a history of the
definitions of metaphysics in order to assess the adequacy of

™\ For a review of German seventeenth-andeighteenth-century thinkers

who accepted the doctrineofinnate ideas, see Georgio Tonelli, “Leibniz on
Innate Ideas and the Early Reactions to the Publication of the Nouveaux Exsais
(1765),” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, XI (1974), pp. 437-454.
"2 See Giorgio Tonelli, “Der Streit fiber die mathematische Methode in der
Philosophie in der ersten Halfte des 18. Jahrhunderts und die Entstehung von
Kants Schrift Gber die ,Deutlichkeit’,” Archivfar Philosophie, IX (1959), pp. 37~
66.
280 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Kant’s view of his predecessors’ tenets. It would be an

enormoustask, and out of proportion with what is needed
for interpreting Kant’s hasty remark. Therefore I will con-
fine myself to examining a few examples.
Amongthe lexicographers, Micraelius defines meta-
physics as the science considering “the things above the
natural bodies.”? For Etienne Chauvin, it is “a certain
universal philosophy which studies whatall things, God and
the creatures, the spirits and the bodies, have in common.”!
Johann Georg Walchdiscusses extensively the different
meanings of metaphysics in the course of the history of
philosophy, and offers two “modern” definitionsofit: “the
doctrine of being . . . and ofits properties,” as separated
from natural theology; “the science of the general being of
all things and ofthe basic difference between spirit and
matter.”

27. After those listed in the philosophicaldictionaries, I

will relate the definitions of a few basic German eighteenth-
century philosophers. For Andreas Riidiger, metaphysics is
“the science of the first causes of things, whereof although
we cannotbetter know the essence, at least we know the
existence.”"° For Wolff, it is the “science ofbeing, of the

"™ Micraelius, op. cit., s.v. “Metaphysica,” p. 770.

'* Stephani [Etienne] Chauvini, the first edition was titled Lexicon rationale
sive Thesaurus philosophicus (Rotterodami: Petrum vander Slaart, 1692). See
the secondedition, Lexicon philosophicum secundis curis (Leovardiae
[Leeuwarden]: Excudit Franciscus Halma, 1713"; reprint Diisseldorf: Stern-
Verlag Janssen & Co., 1967), pp. 402-403.
"5 Johann Georg Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon, vol. 11 (1726; Leipzig:
in Gieditschens Buchhandlung, 1775‘; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968),
s.v. “Metaphysik,” pp. 119ff.
16 Andreae Ridigeri [Ruediger], Philosophia pragmatica (Lipsiae: Apud
Joh. Christoph. Coernerum., 1723), Sect. I, Pt. I, Artic. I, Cap. I, § 1, p. 3.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 281

world in general andof thespirits.” Ontology is defined by

him as “that part of philosophy, which deals with being in
general and with the general affections of being.""” In
Georg Bernhard Bilfinger’s opinion, metaphysics studies the
most general ideas of things, the highest genuses, the most
general principles and propositions, the presuppositions of
physics and ethics, the general knowledgeofthings created
and of God.'* Ludwig Philipp Thiimmig defines ontology as
“the science of being in general,” and metaphysics as “the
science of being and of the world in general and of immate-
rial things.”"° Joann Peter Reusch defines metaphysics as
“the science of being and of the world in general and of the
spirits,”“° and Friedrich Christian Baumeister as the science
dealing with what things, material and immaterial, have in
common.'*' For Baumgarten, metaphysicsis “the science of
the first principles in human knowledge.”"? His pupil Georg
Friedrich Meier defines it as “the science which contains the

"Christiano Wolfio, Philosophiarationalis sive Logica: Praemittitur

Discursus Praeliminaris (Francofurti & Lipsiae: Prostatin officina libraria
Rengeriana, 1730°; reprint Wolff, Werke, II:1.1), §§ 79, 73.
'* Georgii Bernhardi Biilffingeri, Dilucidationes philosophicae de Deo,
anima humana, mundo, et generalibus rerum affectionibus (Tubingae: Sumtibus
Joh. Georgii & Christiani Godof. Cottae., 1725; 1740*; [the first edition is re-
printed under the name Georg Bernhard Bilfinger in Wolff, Werke, II1:18]), § I.
"9 Ludovici Philippi Thiimmigii, Institutiones philosophiae Wolfianae, vol. 1
(Francofurti & Lipsiae: Prostantin Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1725; reprint
Wolff, Werke, I11:19.1), §§ 1, 3: “Institutiones ontologiae, seu philosophiae
primae.”
ry Joanne Petro Revschio, Systema logicvm antiqviorvm atgve recentiorym
item propria praecepta exhibens (Ienae [Jena]: ex officina Ioannis Rvdolphi
Crikeri, 1734!), § 71
“| Frid, Christiani Bavmeisteri, Institvtiones philosophiae rationalis methodo
violfi conscriptae (Vitembergae [Wittenberg]: Svmtibvs Ioannis loachimi
Ahlfeldii, 1735), p. 31, § 45, Schol. 2.
‘2 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, op. cit., § 1.
282 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
first grounds, orthe first basic truths ofall human knowl-
edge.”For Samuel Christian Hollmann, metaphysicsis
the science which deals with the things which are common to
material and immaterial things, wherefrom the mostgeneral
truths are derived.'* For Darjes, it is “the speculative
science concerning those things which are possible on the
foundation of being in the proper sense as such, and of its
various kinds.”'*S Christian August Crusiusstates that meta-
physics is the science of necessary truths (versus contingent
truths), while ontology considers the general essence of
things and those properties which can be deduced a priori.'
It is clear that Kant has in mind Baumgarten’s and
Meier’s definition of metaphysics, which he attributestoall
his predecessors. According to Kant’s interpretation of that
definition, as the science of the most universal notions, he
could also have considered it as included in one ofthe defi-
nitions given by Walch, a part of Bilfinger’s definition, and
that of Hollmann, as well as the definitions given by Wolff,
Thiimmig and Crusius of ontology, though not of metaphys-
ics. I shall add that Johann Christoph Gottsched defined
ontologyasthe science studyingthe first principles of all our

"© Georg Friedrich Meier, Metaphysik, vol. I (Halle: Johann Justinus

Gebauer, 1755), § 3.
‘4 Sam{uel] Christian. Hollmanno, Pavilo vberioris in vniversam philoso-
phiam. Introdvctionis. Pars I: Philosophia rationalisqvae logica (1734;
Gottingae: Apvd Abraham Vandenhceck, 1746), p. 36, § 26.
'S" Daries, Elementa metaphysices, vol. 1, “metaphysicae praecognoscenda,”
p. 6, §1V (Philosophiam primam).
' Christian August Crusii, Entwurfder nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten
(Leipzig: verlegts Johann Friedrich Gleditsch, 1745; reprint Crusius, Die
philosophischen Hauptwerke, ed. Giorgio Tonelli, vol. 2 (Hildesheim: Georg
Olms, 1964)), §§ 1, 5.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 283

knowledge."7 However,it cannot be denied that Kant in-

dulges here in one of his sweeping generalizations about the
past, deformingit as bestsuits his theoretical purpose. Not
that the definition of metaphysics given by other thinkers
could have been more acceptable to him, but they should
have been attacked ona different ground. This is true espe-
cially for Crusius’ definition, which seems to delimit the
field of metaphysics very distinctly. This is also a further
example of Kant’s reliance on Baumgarten as a preeminent
representative of dogmatic metaphysics.

28. After this, Kant proceedsinhis classification of the

parts ofphilosophy (A 845; B 873), subdividing speculative
metaphysics or metaphysics of nature (Metaphysics III) into
transcendental philosophyorontology, and rational phys-
iology of pure reason. The formerconsidersthe understand-
ing and reason in a system of all concepts andprinciples,
which are referred to objects in general. Thelatter refers
them to nature, or to a conteatofpossible given objects,
either of the senses orof pure intuition. In physiology, the
use of reasonis either physical (immanent), or hyperphysical
(transcendent). The formerconsiders nature insofar asits
knowledgecan be applied in experience (see § 33), the latter

Johann Christoph Gottsched, Erste Griinde der gesamten Weltweisheit,

vol. I (Leipzig: Verlegts Bernhard Christoph Breitkopfen, 1733; reprint Frankfurt
a. Main]: Minerva G. M. B. H., 1965), § 8. [Moredirectly to the point is §
211 in vol. Il, where he defines metaphysics as “the science studying the first
principles ofall our knowledge.” Hegoes on to say he will study this or explain
it mainly in the first part, called ontology. The summary in the margin says:
“Philosophia prima seu Ontologia.” ‘The 1762”edition ofthis work is available
both in Johann Christoph Gottsched Ausgewahlte Werke, ed. P. M. Mitchell (Ber-
lin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983; in the series Ausgaben Deutscher
Literatur des XV. bis XVIII. Jahrhunderts, ed. Hans-Gert Roloff), and in Wolff,
Werke, I1:20.1.)
 y
284 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
considers that connection (Verkniipfung) of the objects of
experience which goes beyond experience.
Immanent physiology (A 846; B 874) has asits ob-
jects corporeal nature (rational physics, involving the exter-
nal senses), thinking nature, or the soul, according toits
basic concepts (rational psychology, involving internal
sense). Transcendent physiology considerseithertheinternal
connection of the objects of experience, as physiology of
nature as a whole (der gesammten Natur, rational cosmo-
logy, or transcendental knowledge of the world), or the
nexus (Zusammenhang)of nature as a whole with a being
abovenature(rational theology, or transcendental knowledge
of God),
These further subdivisions raise several problems,
both terminological and substantial. The first concern some
typical Kantian terms, such as physiology, hyperphysic,
immanent, transcendental, and transcendent.

29. In the Critique, the Prolegomena, and elsewhere,

physiology is the study of nature, both physical and psycho-
logical, or the study of the nature of any object.'** It does
not mean, in a proper or metaphorical sense, the science
studying the functionsof living body. This particular
connection with the notions of organism andoflifeis totally
absent. This is also true for the passages where Kant states
that Locke studied the “physiology of human understand-
ing,” or where Locke anda physiological procedure are

'® D. A. Rees, “Kant's ‘Physiologyof the Human Understanding’ and the

Classification of the Sciences,” Journal of the History of Ideas XIII.1 (1952), pp.
108-109, See also A 347, 535, 550; B 405, 563, 578, and Prolegomena, pp.
302-304, 305-307 (§§ 21, 23, 24), and below,Tables IV, VIII, XIII. Only once
in the Critique, A 688; B 716, does Kant refer to the physiology der Artze.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 285

related.” On these occasions, Kant meansthat Locke stud-

ied the human mind asa part of nature, as if it were an
object legislated upon by another agent, and notas the legis-
lative agent itself.
This meaning of physiology does not conform with
the eighteenth-century use of that term, whichis generally
the biological (or rather medical) sense.’ In fact, Kant

ce
\ See A IX, 86-87; B 118-119; AK.-Ausg. XVIII, Reflections 4851, 4866,
4893, Frangois Duchesneau, “Kantet la ‘physiologie de l’entendement humain’,”
“Auten des 4, Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz 6.-10. April 1974, ed.
Gerhard Funke, vol. II.1 (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), pp. 270-
216, is misled into believing that, in connection with Locke, Kant refers meta-
phorically to biological physiology. This is confirmed by the Metaphysik Volck-
mann (1784-1785), where the physiology of reasonis defined as “the inquiry on
the origin of ourconcepts, how weobtain them,” and as “a consideration of the
nature of reason, how it produces in us concepts andaffects.” Locke and Leibniz
are referred to in this context. Kant argues thatthis physiology considers a
quaestio facti, whereas thecritique of reason considers a quaestio juris, or to
what these concepts entitle us. See AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL.1, pp. 376-377. It is
interesting to note that according to a certain tradition Locke had operated an
anatomy of human understanding. See [Frangois Marie Arouet de] Voltaire,
Lattres philosophiques ou lettres anglaises, ed. Raymond Naves (1734; reprint
Paris: Garnier Freres, [1956]), p. 63 (Letter 13). Also [No8l Pluche], Histoire
du Ciel, vol. Il (La Haye: Chez Jean Neaulme, 1740), pp. 434-435:
“Il est fort inutile de discuter métaphysiquement avec Mr. Lock
ce que c’est que notre Entendement, & de quelles pitces il est
composé. C’est comme si I’on se mettoit & dissequerles pitces
de la jambe humaine pour apprendre & marcher.”
Also Lambert, Architectonic, vol. 1, § 7: “Undin dieser Absicht kann man
sagen, daB Locke die menschlichen Begriffe anatomirt, Leibnitz aber dieselben
analysirt habe.”
1% Hans Schulz, Otto Basler, Deutsches Fremdworterbuch, vol. I (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1942), s.v. “Physiologe.” The term physiology in this
sense appears in titles of workssince the sixteenth century: see Robert Watt,
Bibliotheca Britannica; or A GeneralIndex to British and Foreign Literature, vol.
IV (Edinburgh: Printed for Archibald Constable and Company, Edinburgh; and
286 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

adopts an old and much more infrequent meaninglisted by

Micraelius and Walch. It is the Stoic physiology, in the
sense oftheoretical philosophy in general,'*! made famous by
Justus Lipsius.'*? This sense survived in English until the
eighteenth century. Its most conspicuous occurrence in
Englandis probably Walter Charleton’s treatise on meta-
physics and natural philosophy.'*? But another important
precedent hasto bereferred to, that of Johann Magirus. He
was a German Aristotelian, and his work, studying both

Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, & Green, London, 1824), s.v. “Physiolo-
gy.” [The entry is unaltered in the reprint of the 1829 edition (New York: Burt
Franklin, 1965; in the Burt Franklyn Bibliography & Reference Series, # 75).| In
Martini Lipenii (Lipen, Lipenius), Bibliotheca realis philosophica (Francofurti ad
Moenum [Frankfurt a, Main}: Cura & Sumptibus Johannis Friderici., Typis
Aegidii Vogelii., 1682), “Physiologica” merely contains a reference to the Biblio
theca realis medica (Francofurti ad Moenum [Frankfurt a. Main]: Cura & sump-
tibus Johannis Friderici., Prelo Johannis Nicolai Hiimii, 1679), of the same
author. The French seventeenth-century dictionaries list the term in its medical
sense. See Plierre] Richelet, Seconde partie du Dictionnaire Frangois, vol. 11
(Geneve: Chez Jean Herman Widerhold, 1679; reprint Genéve: Slatkine Re-
prints, 1970), s.v. “Phisiologie”; Fureti[2}re, op. cit., s.v. “Physiologie”;
Comeille, op.cit., s.v. “Physiologie.” ‘The same in Dyche and Pardon, op.cit.,
s.v. “Physiology.”
S| Micraelius, op. cit., p. 1010: “Physica, physiologia, vel universam
significat philosophiam theoreticam, ut apud Stoicos: vel scientiam de constitu-
tione corporis humani, ut apud medicos ....” Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon,
vol. Il, pp. 444-445, writes the same.
Ivsti Lipsi, Physiologiae Stoicorvm libri sres (Antverpiae [Antwerp]: Ex
officina Plantiniana, Apud Ioannem Moretum, 1604).
15 Walter Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana: or a
Fabrick of Science Natural, Upon the Hypothesis ofAtoms, vol. 1 (London:
Printed by Tho: Newcomb,for Thomas Heath, 1654; [reprint with Indexes and a
new Introduction by Robert Hugh Kargon, New York and London: Johnson
Reprint Corporation, 1966; in the series The Sources ofScience, No. 31]).
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 287

physical nature and the natureofthe soul, appeared in at

least twelve editions until 1642.'*
In this case, as in manyothers, Kant adopts a glori-
ous but obsolete term in order to denote one of the new
concepts he introduces.'** In fact, Kant’s physiology repre-
sents a very unusual grouping ofsciences, for which no
precise precedent can be found. The moststriking feature of
this grouping is the fact that theology is subordinated to the
study of nature in general, as if God werea part of nature.
This is a very meaningful element, which can lenditself to
some suggestive interpretations of this aspect of Kant's
thought.

30. The term hyperphysic is very seldom used. Rudolph

Goclenius (1613) employed it to denote things preternatural,
such as miracles and ghosts; Johann Jakob Schmidt (1731)
used it referring to miracles; also Israel Gottlieb Canz (1737)
used it probably in the same sense.'*© The Germanic equiva-

'* Joannis Magiri, [Medici et Physiologiae {peripateticae libri VI}}, In

physiologiam suam Peripateticam Commentarius (Lichae (Lich, Hesse]: Con-
radum Nebenium, & VVolgangum Kezelium, 1601). The second edition was
published in Francofurti: Conr. Nebenius, 1603: Wolfg. Richter. For the dif-
ferent editions, see Hermann Schilling, Bibliographisches Handbuch zur Ges-
chichte der Psychologie: Das 17. Jahrhundert (Giessen: Universititsbibliothek,
1964; [in the series Berichte und Arbeiten aus der Universitdtsbibliothek Giessen,
vol. 5}), p. 138.
‘8 Johnson,op.cit., s.v. “Physiological” and “Physiology.” He quotes
Boyle, Glanville, and Bentley.
1% Rodolphi Goclenii, Physicae generalis libri II. e rervm natvra,et
rationali experientia depromti (Francofvrti: Impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperti
Pistorij, 1613), pp. 4-5, 19-23. Johann Jacob Schmidt, Biblischer Physicus, oder
Einleitung 2ur biblischen Natur-Wissenschaft und deren besondern Theilen . . .
zusammt dem biblischen Hyperphysico von den Wunderwercken der H. Schrift
(Leipzig: b Schuster, 1731). J. Th{eophilo Israel Gottlieb] C[anz], Philoso-
phiae wolffianae Ex Graecis et Latinis . . . consensvs cvm theologia (Francofvrti
EE

288 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

lent of the term, Ubernaturlehre, has nothing to do withit,
as it is a synonym of metaphysics.'*” This term appears also
in Kant’s Reflection 4161 (see Table V), together with the
term hypophysics, whereof I do not know anyprecedent.
Hyperphysics appears also in Kant’s lectures Metaphysik
L,,'® andlater, as is well known, in the Foundation of the
Metaphysics of Morals, together with hypophysics.'?
Immanent was very muchused in the seventeenth
century, and before, as a synonym for internal. As the op-
posite of transiens or transitivus, it referred to a causeor an
action, which is practically the same. As such, it appears in
the philosophical dictionaries of Goclenius, Micraelius,
Chauvin and Walch.'® Spinoza, for example, sees God as

et Lipsiae: n.p., 1737), p. 399, § 16.

"7 [Johann Gottfried Zeidler], Die WohlEhrwirdige/Grofachtbare und
Wohigelahrte Metaphysica oder Uber-Naturlehre (Urbs {Halle]: n.p., 1699);
AugustFriedrich Miiller, Einleitung in die philosophischen Wissenschaften, vol. II
(1728; enlarged and improved edition, Leipzig: auf des Autoris Kosten, druckts
Bernhard Christoph Breitkopf, 1733), p. 12.
"8 AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL.1, p. 174, but in connection with metaphysics as
“super physic” or “theological physics.”
© AK.-Ausg. IV, p. 410.
'® Goclenii, Lexicon philosophicvm, s.v. “Actio”; Micraelius, op.cit., s.v.
“Actio”; Chauvini, op. cit., s.v. *Actio”:
“Ratione Subjecti actio est vel immanens, vel transiens ... .
Primd,strictiori modo; atquesic ea est actio, cujus terminus
manetin principio, 8 quo manat . . . . cujusmodi sunt actiones
vitales, cognitiones, & volitiones tantim. Secundo,latiori modo
omnis illa actio dicitur immanens, quae in eodem supposito, seu
in ecodem agente, & quo editur, recipitur . . Ex quibus
deducitur actionem franseuntem, pro duplici oppositione, posse
etiam dupliciter accipi. Primo, actio transiens dici potest illa,
quae a diversa potentia editur, & recipitur in divers, licet
recipiatur in eodem supposito: quo modo deambulatio est actio
transiens. Secundd . . . quae recipitur in supposito diverso ab
 The Evolution of Kant’s
Plan for a System 289
aust iramanens omnium rer
um." In France and Britai
te term was introduced in the ordina language, and w .
ed in thelinguistic dictionaries." ry
Chambers defines “
aeanent actions as “[those] which are receiy’d
within the
gent that produced them: as are all vital Acti
ons, Cogita-
gc... - And Transient, which passinto ano
tion, ther,"
notes that the term derives from the French give
ats synonyms “Intrinsick; inherent; internal,” and quo s
Johnson
tes
assages from Glanville and Southerne containing it."
P However, in eighteenth-century philosophy this
term was very little used. I have found it a few times in
165 and twice in France,’ in the traditional
Germany,

calefactio est actio transiens, non

eecemm deambulatio.” a
oes
sun, Pitsopnis Lexicon, vol l 8. “Acto.” But there i another se of
ee in Christophori Scheibleri (Christoph Scheibler], Opera philesoph-
tis 0"ancofurti: Sumptibus Balthasaris Christophori Wustii, Typis Hinrici
fail '1665), p- 190 (In the Commentariorum topicorum section of Pt. IV, Opus

losic™:1 Materia est immanens vel transiens. 8. Materia

transiens est, ex qua res fit, & e& tran smut ata comp onitur. Sic
Vinum est materia aceti, quisquiliae murium, &c. Vocatur &non
vateria transmutationis, 9. Materia immas nens lapid est, ex qua
tnutata res comp onit ur, sic mate ria domu sunt es, ligna.”
1s) Baru ch Spin oza, Ethi ca, L. I, Prop . XVII I; Epist ola XXIII.
© Furetifé|re, op. cit., s.v. “immanent”; Corneille,op.cit., s.v. “Imma-
'® Chambers, op. cit., vol. I, p. 27b, s.v. “Action.” See also Dyche and
nent.”

Pardon, op. cit., s.v. “Immanent.”

6” Johnson, op. cit., s.v. “Immanent.”
“A. F, Miller, op. cit., vol. Il, p. 154 (actio immanens and transeuntis)
{This does not occur on p. 154. From the discussion at the bottom of p. 15S
shout a division into “die innerlichen und Auserlichen zwecke,” p. 156 may be
correct}; Joanne Adamo [Johann Adam] Morasch, Philosophia atomistica, Pars
Secunda, seu Physica universalis ({Ingolstadt]: Typis Godefridi Zipper, 1731), p.
 ON
290 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
meaning, which appearsalso in Kant in 1763-1764.197

46 (motus internus immanens, that is, which does notderive from an extrinsic
principle); Darjes, Elementa metaphysices, vol. Ontologiae § 21 (“actiones in
immanentes et transeuntes”); Sam{uel] Christian. Hollmanno, Pavllo vberioris in
vniversam philosophiam. Introdvetionis, Pars Il: Prima philosophia, qvae
metaphysica (Gottingae: Apvd Abraham Vandenhoeck, 1747), p. 648, § 362;
Joh{ann] Petfe]r Andrfeas] Miller, Von dem menschlichen Verstande und den
nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten die man den zufalligen entgegen setzt (Halle:
Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1769), pp- 310-311: the actions of God are either
immanentes or transeuntes; an immanent action is such, “welche bloB zu dem
innerlichen Zustandedes thitigen Wesens GOttes gehdret”; Nicolaus Burkhaeuser,
Institutiones metaphysicae, Pars I: De ente, sive ontologia (Wirceburgi [Warz-
burg]: Sumptibus Tobiae Goebhardt, Typis Francisci Emesti Nitribitt, 1771), §
601 (actio immanens and transiens); Godofredo Ploveqvet, Institvtiones philoso
phiae theoreticae sive de arte cogitandi, notionibys rervm fundamentalibys, deo,
vniverso, et speciatim de homine (Tvbingae: n.p., 1772), Ontol., p. 193, § 69.
A. F,Miller was a pupil of Riidiger, and J. A. P. Miller was a pupil of Crusius;
Morasch and Burkhaeuser were Catholics; Darjes, Hollmann and Ploucquet were
eclectics. As it seems, the traditionofthe term in question was preserved by
schools of thought other than the Wolffian.
1 Etienne [Bonnot] de Condillac, Oeuvres complates de Condillac, Tome Il:
Traité des Systemes, 1749 (Paris: Ch, Houel, 1798), Chap. X, Art. III: “Quoi
que Spinosa veuille dire par les mots de cause immanente et de cause passagére
qu'il n’a pas définis, on connoit le peu de solidité des propositions sur lesquelles
il s’appuie.” [A reprint ofthe Paris 1821-1822 edition, vol. I (Gentve: Slatkine
Reprints, 1970) is much more accessible, Two changes in the text quoted occur,
though not relevant to Tonelli’s point: “dire” is repeated and “connoit” is spelled
“connait.”} This shows that the terms in question were not any more currently
understood in their philosophical meaning. M[arquis] L. M. d{e] Bloutteville},
Dissertations philosophiques, sur plusieurs sortes de sujets, Comme sur les Idées
innées, U'Infini, &c. & autres Matieres analogues a celles-la. Recueil od on
trouve, a la fin, un Postcrit sur le Spinozisme, vol. 1 ({Paris}:_n.p., 1777), p.
671: “correlation. . . immanente” opposed to “émanente,” the same for
“plénitude.” Boutteville shows in general a remarkable knowledgeof school
philosophy.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 291

This is one more example of Kant's procedure of

utilizing classical, but moreor less obsolete, terms in an in-
novative way. In fact, immanent as the opposite of tran-
scendent, is entirely new; still, the connection with the older
meaning is evident. Immanent is something that “does not
go beyond,” is no longer beyond the agent, but beyond the
world of possible experience.

31. The history of the term transcendental was recently

explored by Norbert Hinske, who established that Kant’s use
of this term does not derive from the tradition of the “tran-
scendentals” of seventeenth-century Aristotelianism,'® but
more importantly from a meaningofthat term established in
Kant’s time by Wolff, Darjes, Baumeister and Baumgar-
ten.’° The evolution of the term transcendent was studied
long ago by Ferdinandus Schmidt. He noted thatthis term,
current in the seventeenth and very little used in the eigh-
teenth century, had been adopted, in Kant's time by Lam-
bert. According to Schmidt, Lambert’s meaningis similar to

‘Immanuel Kant, Aus den Vorlesungen der Jahre 1762 bis 1764. Auf
Grund der Nachscriften Johann Gottfried Herders, ed. Hans Dietrich Irmscher,
Kantstudien, Ergédnzungshefte 88 (Kiln: Kélner Universitits-Verlag, 1964), p.
91,
'® See Hinrich Knittermeyer, Der Terminus transszendentalin seiner
historischen Entwickelung bis zu Kant, Inaugural-Dissertation (Marburg:
Buchdruckerei von Joh. Hamel, 1920).
'@ Norbert Hinske, “Die historischen Vorlagen der kantischen Transzenden-
talphilosophie,” Archivfur Begriffsgeschichte XII (1968), pp. 102-103, 106-107.
See also his “Verschiedenheit und Einheit der transzendentalea Philosophien,”
Archivfiir Begriffsgeschichte XIV (1970); and Kants Weg zur Transzendental-
philosophie: Der dreiigjdhrige Kant (Stuttgart, Berlin, Koln, Mainz: W.
Kohlhammer, 1970).
OS
292. Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

that used by Kant.'” But this is not true for Lambert’s

definition of transcendent quoted by Schmidt, namely “a
general concept . . . which we can call transcendent,
inasfar as it represents similar things in the corporeal and in
the intellectual world.”'”' By “intellectual world” Lambert
meanssimply the psychological world. He explains, for
example,that the notion of power (Kraft) is transcendent,
because it applies both to a moving or material power, as
well as to a cognitive or spiritual power.'? Lambert adds
that transcendent concepts are similar to abstract concepts,'”
and sometimesthat they are called metaphorical.'* Now,
this definition of transcendent has nothing to do with the
Kantian, unless we assumethat Kant misread Lambert’s
expression “intellectual world,” interpreting it according to
his own definition of this term. But this is rather unlikely,
because Lambert makes very clear what he means byit,
using the term in this sense rather frequently."
However, there is another definition offered by Lam-
bert which may lead to one of Kant’s meanings of this term.
“Thus wewill call transcendentall which does nottakeinto
accountour senses, andalso all which doesnottake into

" Ferdinandus Schmidt, De origine termini Kantiani “transcendens,”

Dissertatio inauguralis (Marburgi: Cattorum, 1873), pp. 32-33. Schmidt refers
only to onepassage in Lambert, from the New Organon.
'" Lambert, Neues Organon, vol. I, p. 484, § 48.
‘2 Jbid., p. 510, § 104. Another exampleis that phenomenology is “a
transcendent optics,” Newes Organon, vol. Il, pp. 220, 273. Later, Lambert adds
another, butsimilar meaning of transcendent, namely what belongsto logical,
metaphysical and moral truth. See his Architectonic, vol. Il, p. 117 [and also
Architectonic, vol. 1, p. 338].
"Lambert, Neues Organon,vol. I, pp. 533-534, § 155; vol. Il, p. 281.
"% Lambert, Architectonic, vol. I, pp. 63, 65, 109;vol. Il, p. 173.
"Lambert, Architectonic, vol. I, pp. XVII-XVIII, 25-26, 33-34, 42, 49,
57, 11, 72, 77, 79, 83, 118, 223, 289, 290, [292-293]; vol. I, pp. 49-50.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 293

account our concepts, but which in itselfis true and real.”!”*

Or “in metaphysics one considers an order which is tran-
scendent, or necessarily belongs to things in them-
selves, and it has been called metaphysical truth.”'” Here
Kant, without misreading Lambert, only had to replace with
his owncritical notion of “thing in itself” or of “truth” those
of Lambert, in order to obtain oneof his basic meanings of
transcendental. But this is not exactly the meaning used in
Kant’s Architectonic, as “going beyond (dbersteigen) all
experience” (A 845-846; B 873-874), in the sense of
“reaching something absolute beyond finitude.”
I will note another peculiar aspect of Kant’s use of
transcendent andtranscendental in the Architectonic. They
seem, on this occasion, to have the same meaning. Tran-
scendent physiology is composed of transcendental knowl-
edge of the world and transcendental knowledge of God (A
846; B 874).

32. Some general comments on Kant’s classification of

the sciences, as expounded in Table XIII, are appropriate at
this point, first and foremost in connection with the clas-
sifications elaborated by other authors in Kant’s time,'” but
also referring to earlier classifications offered by Kant him-
self.
The distinction betweenhistorical or empirical and
rational knowledge is quite old, and wasa basic trait in the

% Lambert, Architectonic, vol. 1, p. 293. See p. 292: “Und in diesem

Verstande ist der Begriff Wahrheit aufeine gedoppelte Art transcendent, weil wir
denselben von den Sitzen auf die Begriff, und von diesen auf die Dingeselbst
transferiren .. . .
"7 pid., p. 338.
™ See Tonelli, “The Problem.”
 oo”

294 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

classification of Wolff and his school.'” There is, of course,
a basic difference in this respect between Wolff and Kant.
For Wolff, all rational knowledgeis sensible and rational at
the same time, because all knowledge stems from the sens-
es,!” whereas for Kant the basic section ofrational knowl-
edge is pure rational knowledge.
Also, the subdivision of rational knowledge into
philosophical and mathematical is present in Wolff and his
school, in Crusius and in some others.'*' Butit is justified
as a distinction between the knowledgeof qualities versus the
knowledge of quantities, and not through the Kantian concept
of “construction,” which belongs to mathematics and notto
philosophy.
Thesituation is different with the subdivision of
philosophical knowledge into pure and empirical. Again for
Wolff,’a section of philosophy is called “experimental,” or
a posteriori, versus that section which proceeds primarily a
priori. In the first place, the distinction here is founded on a
different principle, that of the logical quality, and notthe
origin of knowledge, because for Wolff all knowledge stems
from the senses. But a part ofit, having been fully ana-
lyzed, and thus reduced to its principles, is expounded a
priori on the foundation of those principles. In the second
place, evenin the a priori section there are irresoluble ele-
ments a posteriori. Notorious here is the concept of con-
sciousness as a foundation for rational psychology and for
the notion of God in theology. So, the distinction is only
approximate. Thus, it is comprehensible thatit is in this
respect in particular that Kant extols the originality and the

' bid., Table I. See also Table XV, the classification of Schiitz.
"© See Tonelli, “Leibniz on Innate Ideas,” pp. 445, 451.
‘Tonelli, “The Problem,” Tables I, VII, XV.
12 bid, Table I.
y

The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 295

riority of his own principles ofclassification (A -

- B 870-871). However, from the next a,
oe principle employed is different, in that it concerns the
Fad of objects known, and not any more the particular way
of knowing them. 5
Furtheroriginal traits are, of course, the appearance
of a critique of pure reason, and, as pointed out above, the
subordination of ethics to metaphysics. Also the notion of
physiolzy: divided into immanent and transcendent, is
FPriginal. ‘This physiology includes theology, thus subor-
ginating it to the study of nature.

Comparing nowtheclassification of the Architectonic

33. with Kant’s earlier classifications, it is eviden
t thatit is very
1780 (Table
similar to those of 1775-1778 (Table IX), 1775-
XII there is
X) and 1777-1780 (Table XI). In Tables I and
pure reason and ontolo-
no distinction between the critique of logy
gy, but this distinction appears in Table IX. Physio
Tables IX
appears since 1769-1770 (Table IV), and later in
s
and XII. Onall these occasions physiology is, or belong
ysics. Applie d
to, applied philosophy or applied metaph
l psychol-
philosophy, including pure somatology and rationa not
ophy is
ogy, appears also in Table X. Applied philos
ange-
clearly defined in the Architectonic. Still, the term
immanent
wandt is explicitly used in connection with
an applied
physiology (A 845; B 873. III, p. 546, 1. 28) and
is mentioned
logy,
philosophy, certainly referring to physio
p. 548, |. 14-15) . Applied philoso-
later (A 848; B 876. Ill,
by philoso-
phy is unknown in the classifications established
n subdivision,
phers of Kant’s time, and it is a quite Kantia
betwe en pure and
as it presupposes a clear-cut distinction
empirical philosophy.
Archi-
A conspicuous trait of the classification of the
it. Logic is
tectonic is the absence of generallogic from
296 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
listed in Kant’s classifications only until 1772 (see Tables
II, VI, VI), and disappearsafterwards until 1785 (see §
37). This is certainly due to the fact that generallogicis, as
Kant frequently states, a preliminary scienceto all other
sciences." Therefore it cannotbe listed in anyparticular
place in the subdivision of knowledge.

34. Theclassification of the Architectonic may appear

rather strange to those who know Kant's philosophy as a
whole. Apart from the very special question of ontology, a
rational psychology, a cosmology and a theology were never
produced by Kant. But it must be kept in mind that, as Kant
writes, the scope of metaphysics which heintends to de-
scribe in the Architectonic encompasses “the true as well as
theillusory” philosophical knowledge (A 841; B 869. III, p.
543, 1. 30 - p. 544, 1. 1). Now, transcendental physiology
(cosmology andtheology) certainly does not belong to true
philosophy--whatis said aboutit in the Critique of Pure
Reasonis all that is needed.'* The sameis true forrational
psychology, because, for Kant, as a science it is not possi-
ble. Psychological knowledge is not capable of a mathema-

"© Chap. I, §§ 3, 5, 6,9, 17, 32. See also AK.-Ausg.IX,p. 13, 1. 8-9; p.
15, 1. 33-34; p. 19, 1. 5-6 (Jiische’s Logic). AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 503, 1. 22-24
(Logik Politz); p. 610, 1. 34-35 (Logik Busolt, 1790); p. 694, 1. 16-17 (Logik
Dohna, 1792); p. 794, 1. 22-24 (Wiener Logik). AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 44, Reflec-
tion 1628, I. 15 (1780-1789): logic is the propaedeutic ofall sciences. The same
is found, ibid., p. 49, Reflection 1629, 1. 13-14, in a later addition, but here Kant
adds that logic is a part ofphilosophy. In AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.1, p. 363, 1. 12-13,
the Meraphysik Volclonann (1784-1785), Kant states that logic is an introduction to
philosophy as a whole, not only to pure philosophy. Darjes too had not assigned
a place to logic in his classification. See Tonelli, “The Problem,” § 3.
"4 In the classification of Table XII (1777-1780), cosmologyand transcen-
dental theology are included, together with ontology, in the critique of pure
reason.
yy

The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 297

7 tional psychology cannot bi
sical wea tment; only Tahoné’
pill is thus FP
a discipline." ey pb Dea
So, nothing can be
goctsi' a this subject either, beyond what wefind in the
written itself. Thus, the diagram in Table XIII is not
critia io correspond to the reality of Kant’s philosophy, in
inte’ nly true parts of Metap hysics I are thecritiqu e of
hysi :
the OFson, ontology, metaphysics of nature as rational
thal
pu eS ‘only, and the metaphysics of morals. This cor-
by Kant,""° with
ads to the system actually developed
know, was soon to
as we
xception of ontology which,
ed into the critique of pure reason. Moreover,
sophy, as Kant planned to
sn 1781, transcendental philocalle
ualize it, would not have been d ontology. In the
transcendental philosophy
troduction, expounding what
does not use this term, andlater
¥ 1d be (A 13-14), Kant ontology”
0947 3 303) he claims that the “proud name of t-
humble name of a mere analy
Could be replaced with “the ,
ic of pure understanding. rational psy-
In fact, in the Critique of Pure Reason
the
ogyare grouped together as
chology, cosmology and theol no objec -
ideas,” of which
three “titles of all transcendental 92. See B
334-335; B 391-3
tive deduction is possible (A
672; B 700). Kant explicitly denies
395, Footnote, and A
cosmology (A 408; B 435)
the possibility of rational pure
See A 638; B 666). But
and of theology (A 636; B 664.
theology within the
the negative use of transcendental
to be very important (A
critique of pure reason is considered
rational and tran-
640; B 668). Parenthetically, the terms
Kant mentions a
scendental seem to be synonyms, since

oe
"Ss AK.~Ausg. IV, p. 471, and B 421. as
“6 Yn fact, Kant announcesin the Critique only a Metaphysics of Nature
constituting the “system of pure (speculative) reason” (A XX1).
298 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
transcendental psychology (Seelenlehre) and rational
cosmology (A 334-335; B 391-392).
In Table IX there appears a distinction between tran-
scendental and natural cosmology and theology, a distinction
whichis notlisted in Table XIII. In the Critique, there is no
distinction between transcendental and natural cosmology,
but there is a distinction between transcendental and natural
theology. Transcendental theology concerns concepts such
as theoriginal being, the most real being, the being of be-
ings. Whoacceptsit is called a deisr. Natural theologyis
founded on “a concept borrowed from nature (from the
nature of our soul)--a conceptof the original being as su-
premeintelligence.” Who accepts it is called a theist (A
631; B 659. Cf. A 814; B 842. B 71. A 580; B 608. A
604; B 632). Why this distinction is not introduced in the
Architectonic is not explained.
Thedistinction betweena rational cosmology and a
rational physics is a trait of Kant’s classification which is not
without precedents in his time--although none of the prece-
dents producedefinitions of those sciences identical to the
onesoffered by Kant. However, someauthors, such as
Darjes, Ténnies, Baumgarten and Schiitz seem to distinguish
a physics which is not empirical from a metaphysical cos-
mology.'*”
35. After having expounded his classification, Kant pro-
ceeds to discuss somedifficulties (A 847-848; B 875-876).

"7 See Tonelli, “The Problem,” Table V1, for Darjes, wholists transcen-
dental cosmology and someother sciences correspondingto rational physics
within metaphysics; Table XI, for Tonnies, who distinguishes cosmology from
physics; Table XIV, for Baumgarten, who distinguishes cosmological somatology
from ontological physics; Table XV,for Schiitz, who distinguishes cosmology
from somatology.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 299

In the first place, he offers an explanation of the fact that

immanentphysiologyis classified as a part of metaphysics.
Actually, as we know (§ 26), metaphysics corresponds to the
scope of pure knowledge, whereas rational physics and psy-
chology are supposed to contain knowledge about objects
given a posteriori. Kant’s justification is that those sciences
derive from experience only what is needed in orderto give
an object in general of the external and ofthe internal sens-
es. That is, they derive the mere concept of matter and the
mere conceptofa thinking being in general. Otherwise,all
the principles ofthis applied philosophy(see § 33) are a
priori, and derive from pure philosophy. Thus,applied phi-
losophy can be considered as belonging to the knowledge of
pure reason, or to metaphysics.
Onthe contrary, empirical physics (empirische
Naturlehre), being built on empirical principles, is different
from applied philosophy, with whichit is connected, but
with which it should not be confused. This certainly means
that empirical physics is a part of empirical philosophy,
although Kant doesnotstate it explicitly."
The samejustification given for including physiology
in metaphysicscertainly goes for including the metaphysics
of morals there too. Thelatter also presupposes notions of
empirical origin,at least that ofa thinking being (A 14-15; B
28-29).
Kant raises a second point concerning empirical psy-
chology, which doesnot belong together with metaphysics
but rather with empirical physics, for the same reason. This
needs to be explained, because, according to Wolff and his
school, empirical psychology wasclassified as a part of
metaphysics. In Kant’s view this is wrong, and can be

"Therefore Kemp Smith, Comm. p. 580, mistakenly subordinates it to

historical knowledge.
CO

300 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

admitted only as a provisional distortion, for reasons of mere
expediency, until empirical psychology is fully developed
into an extensive anthropology, to match empirical physics.
Kantconsidered this developmentpossible, because of the
interest recently aroused by empirical psychology, “from
whichin ourtimes such great things have been expected” in
Germany (A 848; B 876).In fact, he will contribute to it
himself, composing his extensive Pragmatic Anthropology.
Also in this respect, the plan announced by Kant in the
Architectonic corresponds to his own actual philosophical
development.

Ill. THE PLAN AFTER1781

36. Reflection 5644 (1783-1784),'™ with a few differen-

ces follows the pattern of the classification of the Critique
(Table XIII). The term physiology, whether immanent or
transcendent or both, does not appear. The section corre-
sponding to it is repeatedly referred to as an application of
metaphysics. Transcendental philosophy or ontology is also
termed pure or universal metaphysics. Transcendental phi-
losophy is called “the logic of pure rational knowledge.”!*

‘Kant hints at the mid-eighteenth-century philosophical trend in Germany.

See Giorgio Tonelli, “La philosophic allemande de Leibniz 4 Kant,” Histoire de
la Philosophie, vol. Il: De la renaissance a la révolution kantienne, ed. Yvon
Belaval (Paris: Gallimard, 1973; [reprint Bruges: Sainte-Catherine, {1981}; in
the Encyclopédie de la pléiade, vol. 36]), pp. 745-746. On Kant's empirical
psychology, see Norbert Hinske, “Kants Idee der Anthropologie,” Die Frage
nach dem Menschen, Festschrift fiir Max Miller zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Heinrich
Rombach (Freiburg/ Miinchen: Karl Alber, 1966).
' AK.-Ausg. XVIII, pp. 284-287. Some additionsderive from 1785-1789.
91 Tbid., p. 285, 1. 23-27; p. 286, 1. 15-16.
 The Evolution of Kant's Plan for a System 301

It must be preceded by thecritique of reason in general.'”

But this critique seems toreferto the critique of pure rea-
son, because the latter is said to be thefirst task to perform,
that is, inquiring into the possibility of metaphysics.'”
Thus, a distinction betweencritique of pure reason and
transcendental philosophy seems to persist, although consid-
ering the latter as a kind oflogic is obviously a step towards
their identification.
Also in the Prolegomena (1783),'™ the distinction bet-
ween critique of pure reason andtranscendental philosophy
is preserved. The Prolegomena itself is intended as a prepa-
ration for the critique. The latter must have been completely
worked out before metaphysics could be approached; the
critique is an “entirely new science” (pp. 261-262; see pp.
365, 371). But metaphysics mustalso be preceded bytran-
scendental philosophy, which is itself a part of metaphysics,
and which is not yet in existence. It would be an “entirely
new science,” establishing the possibility of the other sec-
tions of metaphysics (p. 279). The only peculiar task which
Kant explicitly attributes to transcendental philosophy is that
of entirely developing the praedicabilia following the catego-
ries (p. 324). Thus far, Kant proceeds in accordance with
the doctrines expounded in the Introduction to the Critique.
In this respect, the situation changes with the Mera-
physik Volckmann (1784-1785). Here transcendental philoso-
phyis explicitly identified with the critique of pure reason; it
is a propaedeutic to metaphysics proper. In fact, metaphys-
ics stricto sensu corresponds to applied metaphysics. Tran-

% Ibid., p. 285, 1. 28.

% Ibid., p. 286, 1. 1-2.
'% The citations from the Prolegomena, as well as the Foundation of the
Metaphysics of Morals and The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science later
on in this section,all refer to AK.-Ausg. IV.
 Wy
302 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
scendental philosophy couldalso be called pure metaphysics,
but it is better to term it transcendental philosophy. The
term ontologyis used only to denote traditional ontology,
whose topics properly belong to applied metaphysics,"
Transcendental philosophy is a special logic for metaphysics
which could also be called transcendental logic.’ Asis
apparent, transcendental philosophy, orthe critique of pure
reason, is in an intermediate position between logic and
metaphysics. Being a special logic for metaphysics, it be-
longs to the latter, according to Kant’s doctrinethat the
methodologyofa science belongsto that science.'” But
simultaneously it is more properly to be considered logic.
Anotherinteresting remark is that every empirical
rational science must be directed by a branch of metaphysics,
such as physics, moral philosophy, politics, and even mathe-
matics.Obviously, these branches of metaphysics belong
to applied (orstricto sensu) metaphysics, whereas transcen-
dental philosophy is the logic or methodology of metaphysics
itself. This confirms the fact that the critique of pure reason
is a methodologyfor metaphysics only; the foundationsof
the other sciences are provided by applied metaphysics.
This point shall be stressed again soon (see § 39).

8 AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.1, pp. 360-361. See p. 364, I. 2-11, and p. 378, 1.

8-10. On p. 363, 1. 30-32, Kant states that transcendental philosophy is also
called ontology, but introduces a distinction between them, whereby ontologyis
conceived in a traditional, non-Kantian sense. See p. 366, | 12-13. Further-
more, on pp. 390-391, Kant explains that, for the same reason, ontology is not an
appropriate name for the subject matter of transcendental philosophy.
'% Ibid., p. 363, 1. 12-13, 21-26.
"Cf. Chap. I, § 30. See also AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 17, 1. 34~p. 18, L 2: and
p. 18, 1. 32-36 (Jaische's Logic). A practical logic does not belong to general
logic, but each science has in itself its own practical logic or technique. ‘The
same is repeated in the Logik Palitz, AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 507, |. 30-37.
'* AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL1, pp. 362-363.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 303

Theclassification of the parts of philosophy offered

by this text coincides with the Architectonic, with the differ-
ence that the term physiology, immanent or transcendent or
both, is not used.'® Empirical philosophy is termed applied
philosophy, whichshall not be confused with applied meta-
physics, because metaphysics as a whole is termed pure
philosophy.””

37. An important evolution in Kant’s classification of

philosophy occurs in the Foundation of the Metaphysics of
Morals (1785). At the very beginningofthis work, Kant
declares that “[a]ncient Greek philosophy was divided into
three sciences: physics, ethics and logic. This division is
perfectly adequate to the nature of the thing.” He adds that
it is only necessary to makeits principle clear, in order to
establish its exhaustiveness andits further subdivisions (p.
387). The principle, in fact, is twofold. First the distinction
of philosophy into the formal, concerning the form of under-
standing and of reason without considering their objects,
which is logic, and the material, which considers particular
objects, and which concernseither nature (physics) or free-
dom (ethics). Second, philosophyis divided into the empiri-
cal and the pure, which is merely founded on principles a
priori. Thelatteris either logic, merely formal, or meta-
physics, limited to particular objects. Metaphysics is either
metaphysics of nature (rational physics), or metaphysics of
morals (rational ethics, p. 388). Logic has no empiricalpart

'® Ibid., pp. 364-366. However,on p. 377, 1. 11-14, Kant mentions a

physiology of reason (see n. 149 above), mentions an empirical physiology or
physics and mentionsa rational physiology or psychology.
* Ibid., p. 359, 1. 18-31. Here Kant seemsto unify historical knowledge
(Natur Geschichte) and empirical philosophy. ‘This is not astonishing, considering
the kinship between those two branches of knowledge.
 >
304 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

(or more exactly, counterpart). If it were not merely a

priori, it would not be a canon for understanding and for
reason, which is valid for all kinds of thinking, and which is
demonstrated. On the contrary, the metaphysics ofnature
has as its empirical counterpart empirical physics. Likewise,
an empirical ethics, called practical anthropology, corre-
sponds to the metaphysics of morals (pp. 387-388). The re-
sulting diagram is presented in Table XIV.
Many comments are necessary in orderto interpret
this apparently sweeping transformation. In the first place,
attributing the tripartition to Greek philosophy in generalis
one ofKant’s typical historical deformations. He should
have known better. Jacobus Bruckerattributes the triparti-
tion in question to the Stoics only, and relates otherclassifi-
cations attributed to Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the
Cyrenaics.?"

38. Theclassification of Table XIV, allegedly founded on

the aforesaid tripartition, looks atfirst sight very different
from that of the Architectonic. In fact it does not involve
any basic change, but merely a changein the principle of
classification. This becomes clear whenit is realized that
the Architectonic offers a classification inclusiveofall the
traditional spurious parts of philosophy, whereas the Founda-
tion establishes a classification which only lists the legitimate
parts ofit, and which therefore closely reflects the structure
of Kant’s own system. In fact, rational psychology, cosmol-

%! Jacobi Brvckeri, Historia critica philosophiae a tempore resvscitatarym in

oceidente litterarvmad nostra tempora, vol. | (Lipsiae:. Apvd Bemb.Christoph.
Breitkopf, 1742), pp. 9-10.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 305

ogy and theology are notlisted.*” It may be surprising not

to find transcendental philosophy, but we know (see § 36)
that this science had been identified in 1784-1785 with the
critique of pure reason. Nordoes the critique appear, but it
is easy to assign it a place as a propaedeutic to metaphysics
in general, although Kantinexcusably neglects to mention it
in this context. As an alternative hypothesis, the critique
could be considered now by Kantas part oflogic, as is
suggested in the Metaphysik Volckmann (§ 36), where we
read amongother things that in transcendental philosophy
“not objects, but our reasonitself is examined, as happens in
general logic.”*° This description could agree with that of
“formal philosophy” offered in the Foundation. Also, the
critique of pure reasonlater shall be related to general logic
rather than to metaphysics (see § 50; also § 48). However,
this point is not clear. Anyhow, general logic is assigned a
precise and prominent place in this classification, and this is
indeed a significant difference from the Architectonic. I
cannotfind any explanation for this unless we accept the
view that now the critique of pure reason is a part oflogic,
and that general logic, being morestrictly connected toit, is
not considered any moreas a propaedeutic to all sciences,
but as a part of philosophy proper, as will be the case some
years later (see § 48).
Another difference is the fact that empirical psychol-
ogy is not considered any more as a counterpart of the pseu-
do-science rational psychology, but as the counterpart of the
metaphysics of morals, under the name ofpractical anthro-
pology.

™ If Kant, in his lectures on metaphysics, entitled some sections “psycholo-

zy,” “cosmology” and “theology,” this obviously depends on the fact that he had
to follow the order of Baumgarten’s textbook.
™ AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.1, p. 363, 1. 22-25.
ee os
306 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

39, It is also interesting to note that the task ofthe meta-

physics of nature and of morals is described as clarifying
“how much pure reason can perform in both cases [thatis,
in empirical physics and in anthropology}, and whatare the
sources of its instruction a priori” (p. 388, 1. 37 - p. 389, 1.
2). Thus, those metaphysics, and notthecritique of pure
reason, are the methodologies of the empirical sciences.
‘This point had also been made in the Metaphysik Volckmann
(§ 36).
But by far the greater novelty advanced in the Foun-
dation is the announcement ofthe necessity ofa critique of
pure practical reason. It is not mytask in this contextto
interpret this major revolution in Kant’s thought. Fortunate-
ly this doesnot raise at this pointanydifficulty in connection
with the classification of the parts of philosophy, because
Kant clearly considers the critique ofpractical reason as
united with the critique of pure speculative reason “in a
commonprinciple” (p. 391). Thus, the problem ofthe
location ofthe second Critique is identical with that of the
location ofthe first.
Referring to the tripartition of “ancient Greek philos-
‘ophy”as a foundation for his ownclassification, is one of
Kant’s frequent expedients aimed at conferring the prestige
of a noble pedigree to his own doctrines. In the following
years Kantwill refer again and again to thetripartition ofthe
Ancients. This occurs in the Metaphysik von Schon (1785-
17902), where the term physiology reappears, but refers to
general physics only;in the Logik Dohna (1792);*8 in
the Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793); and finally in the

* bid. p. 468, 1. 37 - p. 469.1. 4.

* AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2,p. 699, 1. 15-16.
% AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL.2, p. 616, 1. 29-32,
y
The Evolution of Kant’s
Plan for a System 307
mesaphysik K, (after 1793). Inthe twola
st texts
ant expresses the view thatthe tripartition of the Anci
ents
js n° twn
the same thing as, and has to be rejected in favorof,
bipartition into formal and material Phil
miej
his osophy. ,
s, the claim that Kant’s own classification derives-
the ancient cone has beengiven up.
from
‘The reason forthis is notclear to me. It may simply
¢ that Kantrealized a very simple truth, that the basic
b rinciple
ofthe classification of the Foundation, subdivid
ing
hilosophy into formal and material, did not find any prec
Feat in ‘Greek philosophy or, indeed, e-
in later classifications.
tn fact, this principle is also new in respectto the
course of
Kant’s thought, and is undoubtedly an original
element
emerging in the Foundation. Thedistinction between form
and matter in philosophy is obviously very ancient, and
Joaded with an enormous numberofdifferent meanings. It
is also dominant--and hasa variety of meanings--in Kant’s
philosophy prior to the Foundation. Butthe point is that it
had never been used before asa principle of classification in
the sciences.

The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science

(1786) offers some important clarifications. At the very
beginning of this work, Kant establishes a classification of
the knowledge ofnature, and in so doing he rearranges his
general classification of knowledgefrom this particular
viewpoint (pp. 467-470). This special classification, ex-
pounded in Table XV, deserves careful comment.
Many general traits coincide with the classification
of the Architectonic: the “historical lore of nature” corre-
sponds to “historical or empirical knowledge” in Table XIII;

* Ibid., p. 709, 1. 1-4.

SO

308 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

“applied natural science” corresponds to “empirical philoso-
phy”; within “pure natural science,” the “general (transcen-
dental) metaphysics of nature” corresponds toatleast a part
of “transcendental philosophy,” which, as we know,has by
now been identified with the critique of pure reason, inas-
muchas it deals with the table of categories (p. 473, 1. 35 -
p. 474, 1. 1). Physiology is not mentioned, but this term
had not been used by Kantin his classifications after 1781.
“Particular metaphysical natural science” corresponds to
“immanent physiology.” Their descriptions coincide, in that
their only empirical elements are the concepts of matter and
of a thinking being (p. 470, 1. 1-7; see A 848; B 876). A
counterpart to “transcendent physiology” does not appear in
1786, but we must consider this new classification to be in
the spirit of the classification found in the Foundation
(1785). In this respect, the classification of Table XV in
fact conformsto the classification of Table XIV. The obvi-
ous difference, that in 1786 rational psychology appears, is
easily explained away bythe fact that Kant makesit clear
that this is a spurious science (p. 471, 1. 11-12). On the
contrary, there is no explanation for the fact that empirical
psychologyis considered again in 1786 as part of the knowl-
edge of nature and not any more, as in 1785, as an empirical
philosophyof morals. But this is a minor variance indeed.
From the standpoint of the omission of cosmology
and theology, and the inclusion ofrational psychology, it
maybe said that the classification of 1786 strikes a middle
way between those of 1781 and of 1785.
A further inquiry into the position of transcendental
philosophy in 1786 would be outoforder, because the par-
ticular angleof theclassification in question does not allow
any clear inference as to the whole of Kant’s system of
knowledgeat this time. But what we have seen suggests that
 The Evolution of Ka
nt’s Plan for a System
mM 309

thinks at least the core of transcenden tal phi

tgs Philosophy
ne to metaphysics and not to logic,
e Metaphysik von
al remnts already
some elements Known,Kecins30?)
alreadySnown. confirms
Knowledgeis divided into
tational and historical,” rational knowledge into philosophi
y and mathematical.”” Transcendental Philosoph: ake, .
called ontology or pure metaphysics, includes ranecident
logic and transcendental aesthetics, and this implies thatit is
;dentified with the critique of pure reason. Applied meta-
physicsis divided into rational physics and rational psycholo-
gy; but empirical psychology does not belong to metaphys-
jes. Kant also lists cosmologyandtranscendental cosmolo-
gy, cosmotheology and theology. All this constitutes pure
philosophy. .
The doctrines of the Logic edited by Jasche are not
easy to interpret.”"' The divisions of knowledgeinto histori-
cal and rational, and of a priori knowledge into philosophical
and mathematical, are repeated in conformity with the Archi-
tectonic (pp. 22-23).
Butthe classification of the parts of philosophy which
Kant offers here is entirely new. Kant opposesthe “artificer
of reason” (Vernunftkinstler) or “philodox” to the “practical
philosopher, the teacher of wisdom through teaching and
through example.” The former provides a “scholastic con-
cept” of philosophy, the latter a “cosmical concept,” also
called “philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense.”
From the standpoint of this cosmical concept, philos-
ophy is divided in accordance with four fundamental ques-
a
eo Ibid., p. 463, 1. 6-7.
=» Ibid., p. 464, |. 21-22.
210 Ibid., pp. 470-471.
Citations refer to AK.-Ausg. IX.
SS’=S«SC~——~—~—~—~—~—~—S—S—S—~SsSs<CSsti‘“

310 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

tions: (1) What can I know?--Metaphysics. (2) Whatshall 1

do?--Moral Philosophy. (3) What can I hope for?--Religion,
(4) Whatis man?--Anthropology. But, fundamentally, ev-
erything belongsto anthropology (pp. 24-25).
This new important doctrine likely derives from
around 1790, because beforethattime it does not appear
elsewhere, whereas weshall find it again in the Metaphysik
Ly of 1790-1791 (§ 42).7? Actually, a germ ofthis theory
appears in the Architectonic, where Kant mentionsthe “ulti-
mate end” of human reason, which establishes its perfect
systematic unity in accordance with the “human destination”
(§ 24). That moral philosophyis there considered to be the
science concerning the human destination, whereas here it is
anthropologyis after all a minor difference. This anthropol-
ogy obviously has nothing to do with empirical psychology
norwith practical nor pragmatic anthropology. But what is
intriguing is the fact that in the Architectonic there are clear-
ly three stages of philosophical elaboration: thatof the
Vernunftkinstler, that of the cosmical concept, which directs
the classification of knowledge offered in the Architectonic,
and thatof the ultimate end which is merely hinted at (§§
22-24). But now wefind in the Jasche Logic that the third
stageis called “cosmical concept,” generating an entirely
newclassification. Theclassification of the Architectonic,
or its subsequent evolutions, on the other hand, seems to be
located in thefirst stage. The “scholastic conceptofphilos-
ophy,” belongingto the “artificer of reason,” produces “a
systematic connection (Zusammenhang) of these modes of
philosophical knowledge,orits junction (Verbindung)in the

22 The cosmic conceptofphilosophyis also hinted at in the Wiener Logik,

AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 798, |. 10, and p. 799, 1. 18, and is probably referred to
also in the Prize Essay on the Progresses of Metaphysics, AK.-Ausg. XX, pp.
273, 293.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 311

idea of a whole.” Thus, philosophyalso gives a systematic

unity to all other sciences (p. 24, 1. 20-28).
This means either that Kant has oversimplified his
thought onthis occasion, orthat his thought has undergone a
certain evolution. What seemsto be clear is that the ideal of
a higher kind of philosophy superior to his own is gaining
momentum in Kant’s mind, a great, albeit very undetermined
design which he does not seem to havetried actually to
develop.

42. The Metaphysik L, (1790-1791) offers a very peculiar

combination ofdifferent elements. I prefer to examineit at
this point, rather than after the chronologically earlier Intro-
ductions to the Critique of Judgment, because of the striking
similarity of some elements to some doctrines expounded in
the Jasche Logic. After the usual distinction betweenhistor-
ical and rational knowledge,?"the distinction between scho-
lastic and cosmopolitan philosophy is introduced, and the
cosmopolitan classification is developed in a way whichis
practically identical to the cosmical concept of the Jasche
Logic." Oneinteresting clarification is added: “Philoso-
pher is a higher denomination, and means one who knows the
wisdom, which nobody can properly pretend to be.””!>
Thus, the cosmopolitan concept ofphilosophy is put in an
almostentirely utopian perspective, which helps to under-
stand why Kant nevertried to work it out moreprecisely.
He foundthathis task, after all, was limited to the correct
development of scholastic philosophy. In fact, he goes on to
offer anotherclassification of philosophy whichis similar to
the Architectonic, with some transformations and impreci-

9 AK.-Ausg. XXVIIL.2,p. 531.

24 Jbid., pp. 532-534.
25 Ibid., p. 534, 1. 6-7.
OO

312 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

sions which suggest that the student who took the notes must
havedoneit rather poorly in this section. What in 1781 was
called “empirical philosophy” is called here “applied philos-
ophy,” and includes empirical physics and empirical psychol-
ogy. The critique of pure reason is the same thing as tran-
scendental philosophy, which is also called ontology. Meta-
physics includes ontology, cosmology and theology. The
term physiology is reintroduced as an overall denomination
of all sciences having nature as an object, and includes
rational physics and rational psychology. But, immediately
afterwards, these two sciences are said to belong to cosmolo-
gy, which therefore seems to be identical with physiology.
Moral philosophy is mentioned, but it is not assigned a
precise place.”"® Theresult is a simplified version of the
classification in the Architectonic. Thecritique of pure
reason is not distinguished from transcendental philosophy.
There is no rational cosmology, but cosmologyis identified
with physiology, to which theology is no longer subor-
dinated. As it appears, the classification of the Architectonic
had not been superseded by that of the Foundation in 1785.
It wasstill used by Kant with some changes, if he felt more
inclined to offer a classification accounting for the traditional
state of philosophy in his time, rather than give his own
view of that science. This explains why the Architectonic
wasnotbasically reformed in the 1787 edition of the Cri-
tique, although Kant should haveintroduced into it some
change, identifying the critique of pure reason with tran-
scendental philosophy according to his more recent views.
Whyhedid not do this in the Architectonic and, even more
importantly, in the Introduction to the Critique, is one ofthe

46 Ibid., pp. 540-542.

 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 313

many problems in Kant’s philosophy for which I cannot find

a solution.

43. The problem oftheclassification of philosophyis

considered again in the two Introductions to the Critique of
Judgment. The First Introduction was probably written
towards the end of 1789, the Second Introduction in March,
1790.77 In this, as in many otherrespects, they present
important differences from each other.
Theclassification of the First Introduction clearly
derives from that of the Foundation (1785). There philoso-
phy is divided into formal or logic, and real. The real
(called material in 1785) is further subdivided into theoretical
or philosophyof nature, and practical or philosophy of
morals.”"*
But a basic difference emerges at the very beginning.
Kant writes:

If philosophyis the system of rational knowledge

through concepts, it is already sufficiently distinguished
from a critique of pure reason, in that the latter is a
philosophical inquiry into the possibility ofthat kind of
knowledge, but does not belong in such a system as a
part of it, whereas it [the critique] outlines and assesses
in thefirst place the very idea ofthe former [the sys-
tem].29

27 See Giorgio Tonelli, “La formazionedel testo della Kritik der Urteils-
kraft,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XXX (1954), and my review in
Philosophy and History, I (1968) 167-172,of Immanuel Kant, Erste Einleitung
in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Norbert Hinske, et al. (Stuttgart: Friedrich
Frommann, 1965).
8 AK.-Ausg. XX, p. 195, 1. 10-20.
2 Ibid., 1. 4-9.
314 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

The critique of pure reason makes upa system ofits

own, different from the system of doctrinal philosophy.” It
is composed ofthe critique of pure theoretical reason, which
lays the foundation for the philosophy ofnature, ofthe cri-
tique of practical reason, which lays the foundation for the
philosophy of morals,”! and ofthe critique of Judgment, to
which no part of doctrinal philosophy corresponds.””
I cannot undertake here to expound the basic concepts
ofthecritique of Judgment. Asthey are well known,I can
take them for granted, and they do not raise any particular
problem in this context. But I must remark that the section
of the third Critique which deals with aesthetic judgment is
the outcomeofa very long elaboration,initiated during
Kant’s pre-critical period. From the time of the Observa-
tions on the Feeling of the Beautiful and of the Sublime of
1764 on, Kant never ceased developing his aesthetic ideas.
The Reflections on Anthropology of the Nachlaf bear wit-
ness, as do the notes of the various courses on anthropology
offered by Kant. In 1765, aesthetics was classified by Kant,
obviously in accordance with Baumgarten and Meier, as a
counterpart to logic.”

But it was about then that a fundamental evolution in

Kant’s thought began, whereby the development ofaesthetic
ideas had a basic part in the “Copernican revolution” of
1769. Thus,aesthetics was for someyearsstrictly con-
nected with the methodology of metaphysics. On June 7,
1771, Kant writes to Herz that he is busy writing a work on

Ibid., p. 205, 1. 17-19.

RERBE

Ibid., p. 202, |. 1-6.

Ibid., pp. 202-205.
AK.-Ausg. Il, p. 311.
See Tonelli, Kant, dall'estetica, Chaps. III and IV.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 315
the limits of sensibility and of reason, which also would
include an outline of the theory oftaste, of metaphysics and
of morals.”5 On February 21, 1772,in anotherletter to
Herz, Kant again announces a work onthe limits of sensibil-
ity and of reason, divided into twosections, the first theo-
retical, including phenomenologyin general, and the nature
and method of metaphysics, the secondpractical, including
the general principles offeeling, of taste and of sensible
appetition, and the first principles of morals.” This clearly
suggests that aesthetics is now considered by Kantas closely
related to the methodological core ofhis projected system,
rather than as a simple counterpart of general logic. But
very soon Kantsplits the subject matter of aesthetics into a
transcendental aesthetic, which is incorporated into the cri-
tique of pure reason, anda critique of taste.”’ Thelatter is
again considered merely as a counterpart of general logic,”
as is stated very clearly in the Anthropologie Brauer
(1779),”* in the Logic edited by Jasche,”° and in the Logik
Pélitz.*' This parallelism between general logic and aes-
thetics no longer appearsin later texts.”? In fact, probably
in 1790 a further important evolution takes place. The cri-
tique of taste acquires a new and morespecific systematic
function, as the problem of beauty is related now to other

AK.-Ausg. X.2, p. 123, 1. 1-6 (Letter 67).

SRB

Ibid., p. 129, 1. 28-35 (Letter 70).

See A 21; B 35, footnote.
a This is also suggested in AK.-Ausg. XVI, p. 44, Reflection 1628, 1. 21-
23 (1780-1789).
= Otto Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der ,Kritik der
Uneilskrafi’ (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1901), p. 192.
x0 AK.-Ausg. IX, p. 15, 1. 5-13.
at AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 505, 1. 17-19.
m It is perhapsunclearly hinted atin the Wiener Logik, ibid., p. 792, 1. 27-
29.
316 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

problems. These new problems include the possibility of

moral freedom (in connection with some questions opened,
but notsettled, by the Critique of Practical Reason), the
methodology of empirical knowledge and teleological judg-
ment.” Thus, the critique of taste, now enlarged into cri-
tique of judgment, is connected once more with the meth-
odological core of the system, is not any more a mere coun-
terpart of general logic and becomes a section in the system
of the critique of pure reason.

45. Another important novelty consists in a new and more

careful definition of practical. At first, Kant still mentions a
“practical part of the philosophy of nature”** obviously
corresponding to experimental physics. But very soon he
warns that the term practical cannot be properly used in this
sense.This term is to be confined to the lawsestablished
by freedom.* Likewise, the norms or hypothetical impera-
tives rulingthe actualization of the actions decided upon by
freedom are notpractical, but theoretical. There is not such
a thingas practical psychology,”and the problematic im-
peratives orrules of prudence are pragmatic,”* notpractical.
The correct denomination of this kind of proposition is tech-
nical.”°
Thus, the classification of the Foundation is further

®} On the chronology ofthe transformationof the “critique of taste” into a

“critique of judgment,” see Tonelli, “La formazione.”
AK.-Ausg. XX, p. 197, 1. 7-8
25 Thid., p. 198, 1. 17-19.
26 Thid., p. 199, 1. 18-20.
2” [bid., p. 199, 1, 7.
28 Ibid., p. 200, |. 11-13. Here, Kant explicitly says that he corrects a
mistake he made in the Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals.
2° Ibid., pp. 199-201, in particular p. 199, 1. 30 - p. 200, I. 1.
 The Evolution of Kant's Plan for a System 317

corrected. There is not such a thing in an empirical phi-

losophy of morals as a practical anthropology (as in Table
XIV). Empirical psychology, or anthropology, are, together
with empirical physics, the parts of empirical theoretical
philosophy, or the empirical philosophy of nature.
This important development is closely connected with
somebasic concepts elaborated in the Critique of Judgment,
chiefly with that of a “techniqueof nature.” But we do not
need to study this problem here.

46. The Second Introduction (1790) to the Critique of

Judgment reproduces the classification of the First Introduc-
tion, with some terminological changes and with one major
difference: logic is not mentioned.
Thecritique of pure reason (ErkenntniBvermdgens) is
distinguished from philosophy,” andis divided into three
parts: the critique of pure intellect (which replaces the
phrase “pure theoretical reason”), of pure Judgment and of
pure reason (which replaces the phrase “practical reason”).™*
Philosophyis divided into theoretical (philosophy of nature)
andpractical (moral philosophy).All empirical philoso-
phyis theoretical, not practical.? Those normsor prescrip-
tions (Vorschrifien) whichare called technical in the First
Introduction (§ 45) are now termed technical-practical, and
are considered as merecorollaries of theoretical philosophy.
The laws (Gesetze) dictated by freedom, on the other hand,
are termed moral-practical, and constitute practical philoso-
phy.

AK.-Ausg. V, p. 176, 1. 24-26.

ESSER

p. 179, 1. 10-12.
Ibid., pp. 171, 174, 1. 23-25.
Ibid., p. 172, |. 37-39.
Ibid., pp. 172-173.
OO

318 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic

‘The disappearance of logic from the classification is
in my opinion a fact of major importance. In order correctly
to interpret this evolution it must be kept in mind that the
First Introduction was replaced by the Second Introduction
not only, as later stated by Kant, because it was too long™*
but also because Kant had to correct many basic aspects of
it. Even so, some obviously incompetent commentators
maintain that there is no difference between the two Intro-
ductions. The excessive length certainly was one of the
Teasons for the replacement, as is proven by the fact that
Kantlater thought that the First Introduction sill contained
some good things not included in the Second. But this
does not exclude that Kant must have considered some doc-
trines expounded in the First Introduction as definitely
wrong. In my opinion, this is the case with the question of
logic.
There is no doubt that making the critique of pure
teason (in more traditional terminology, the three Critiques)
independentof philosophy, and only in the First Introduction
emphatically calling it a system of its own (see § 43), is of
major importance. It can be explained by considering that
the insertion of a critique of Judgment disrupted the parallel-
ism between the first and the second Critique on the one side
and, on the other side, theoretical and practical philosophy.
This parallelism allowed the first and the second Critiques to
be considered methodologies of the metaphysics of nature
and of morals and, as such, as part and parcel of those
sciences. But the critique of pure reason now contains a
section, the critique of Judgment, which does not find any
correspondence in the system of “doctrinal philosophy.”

* See Gerhard Lehman's "Einleitung,” AK.-Ausg. XX, p. 477.

Ibid.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 319

Thus, while preserving the function of necessary propae-

deutic or introduction to that system, the critique has ac-
quired a more independentstatus, and has been rounded into
a systematic wholeofits own. This late view of Kant was
to be excessively stressed by his school, to be unduly applied
to the interpretation of the Critique of 1781 and also to be
actually misrepresented. Thus, it probably accounts, at least
partially, for the interpretation ofthe first Critique as a
science whichis neither logic nor metaphysics, but a theory
of knowledge.
47. This upheaval in Kant’s thought, according to the
viewsof the First Introduction, raises 2 major, dramatic dif-
ficulty. If the system ofthecritique precedes, as a propae-
deutic, doctrinal philosophy, and if general logic is a part of
thelatter, the critique is a propaedeutic to general logic as
well, and a basic dimension of Kant’s thought is overturned.
Onthe one hand, this dimension is historical, corresponding
to the actual development of Kant’s thought, and to making
the first Critique a special logic. But this dimensionisfirst
and foremostessentially systematic. If the critique lays at
the foundation of general logic, and not vice versa, all those
basic elements of the critique which are taken for granted,
because they are molded on the structure of general logic,
are deprived oftheir professed justification. Or, at leastit
would have been necessary for Kant, in order to save the
situation, to elaborate a rather complicated theory involving
a kind ofcircularity betweencritique and general logic. But
in fact he did not developit, and preferred instead, in the
Second Introduction, to cut the knot by not including general
logic in philosophy. This can only be taken to mean that
logic hereby has beenrestored to the condition of general
propaedeutictoall sciences, inclusive of the critique of pure
reason, returningto the starus quo ante
 oy
320 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
This is not to say that a circularity between critique
and general logic did not exist de facto all through the devel.
opment of Kant’s critical period. That logic whichis laid by
Kant at the foundation ofhis critique certainly was largely
shaped by him in accordance with concepts derived from the
solution of problems belonging to the critique properly. This
becomes more and more evidentin the later versions of
Kant’s logic. But what matters from the standpoint of the
present discussion is the de jure aspect of the question, that
is, not the actual state of affairs, but what Kant pretends this
state of affairs is. This cannot be reconciled with the classi-
fication offered in the First Introduction, which was there-
fore modified in the Second.

48. The Logik Dohna (1792) in this respect represents a

Stage backwards. After the usual division of knowledgeinto
rational andhistorical,” Kant expoundsa classification of
the parts of philosophy which reproduces that of the Founda-
tion of 1785 (Table XIV), with the substantial difference that
empirical philosophy is called empirical physics, and is
divided into the doctrine of bodies (Kérperlehre) and psy-
chology. There is the terminological difference that instead
of metaphysics of nature and of morals, Kant uses the ex-
pression “material theoretical and practical philosophy,” and
metaphysicsis identified with pure natural science, not with
moral philosophy.** Thus, psychology is not connected to
morals, as in 1785, but to empirical natural science, as in
the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science of 1786
(Table XV), or to empirical theoretical philosophy, asin the
Introductions to the Critique of Judgment.

™1 AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2, p. 697.

#8 Ibid., p. 699.
> ee
The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 321!
There is no evident explanation of why Kantpro-
duced this classification instead of that of the Second Intro-
duction to the Critique of Judgment. It is possible he did so
because he thought that explaining his most recent classifica-
tion would have beentoo difficult for the students. Howev-
er, there is probably more than that. In fact Kant states very
clearly that logic is a propaedeutic for all sciences, but it is
not a propaedeutic for philosophy, because it is a part of
philosophyitself.“ Thus, it may be supposed that Kant was
already dissatisfied with the classification of the Second
Introduction, because it did not make logic a part of philoso-
phy, and returned therefore to a modified version of the
classification of 1785. Only the situation at this pointis
different, because the critiques of pure and ofpractical
reason can no longer be accommodated in the classification,
like in 1785, as methodologies for the two sections of meta-
physics. We have now, after the Critique of Judgment, a
different structure and function for the critique of pure rea-
son in the three Critiques, but this problem is simply ignored
by Kant. It certainly would have been too difficult to dis-
cuss this question in class, so Kant does not mention it. But
he must have had solution to the problem in mind, only
this solution cannotbe easily guessed. Was the critique of
pure reason considered a part of logic? This is the only
option which does notimply that the classification is inade-
quate. Otherwise, a critical part of material philosophy
should have been inserted before the two doctrinal sections.
But this is mere conjecture.

49. The Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793)repeats the clas-

® Ibid, p. 697, |. 3-8.

 ee ™
322 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
sification of the Logik Dohna.?® Butin this course of lec-
tures Kantalso mentions the Critique of Pure Reason, in the
sense of 1781 (because he dividesit into Transcendental
Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic), and termsit a “propae-
deutic to transcendental philosophy.”**' Kant, discussing
Wolff's classification of metaphysics, states that ontology (in
Wolff's sense) can also be called transcendental philoso-
phy.However, Kantlater provides his ownclassification
of metaphysics, meaning, as we saw above, a pure philos-
ophy of nature. He divides it into the critique of pure reason
orontology, containing immanenttranscendental concepts,
and transcendent philosophy, which includes cosmology and
natural theology.*? The critique of practical reason could be
accommodated in the classification analogously, butthere is
no place left for the critique of Judgment. All this makes
methink, after all, that Kant, in both the Jasche Logic and
the Metaphysik Dohna, selected to offer to his students an
earlier and easier version of his system than that of the third
Critique.
Theclassification of the Dohna notebooks seems to
have been reproduced in the Metaphysik K, (after 1793), but
for this we only have a short and possibly imprecise summa-
ty by Heinze.?™

50. The Metaphysik K; (1794-1795?) contains much more

interesting elements. Unfortunately, its section pertinent to
our problemis preserved only in an excerpt by Arnoldt, who
provides a diagram of the classification of the parts of phi-

2 AK,-Ausg. XXVIII.2, p. 616.

2! Jbid., p. 651, 1. 24-30.
22 Jbid., p. 617, |. 9-12.
28 Jbid., p. 656, 1. 22-24.
24 Jbid., p. 709, |. 1-3.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 323

losophy.** But this diagram doesnotquite correspond to his

description of the same, which follows. I summarized this
description in Table XVI.?%*
It is evident atfirst sight thatthis classification in-
cludes the spurious philosophical sciences, such as meta-
physical cosmology andrational theology, in line with the
classification of the Architectonic.
But the striking and momentous element is that this
classification accommodatesboth general logic and the cri-
tique of pure reason as a propaedeutic to transcendental
philosophy, andthat the critique does not belong to meta-
physics. It is termed “a higher logic of reason,” in
Arnoldt’s wordsat least.?” This is clearly the reason why
Kantreintroduces an ontology or transcendental metaphysics
as distinguished from the critique. As for the critique, there
is no reason to rule out thatit is conceived now in accor-
dance with the Critique ofJudgment. But it is of basic
importance that nowthecritiqueis clearly related to logic,
rather than to metaphysics. Other changes are of minor
importance: the term transcendent covering physical cosmol-
ogy as well, and the term cosmology extended to cover what
in the Architectonic had been called immanentphysiology.
A last work we have to examine is the Prize Essay on
the Progresses of Metaphysics (1791-1795). Here, the
critique of pure reason and transcendental philosophy are
identified again.?* Otherwise Kant on this occasion, for
obvious reasons, proceeds in accordance with a classification
of the traditional parts of philosophy, rather than in
accordance with his own system.”

Ibid., p. 822.
Ibid., pp. 822-824.
Ibid., p. 822, 1. 26.
AK.-Ausg. XX, p. 272, 1. 32-34.
Ibid., pp. 281-282, 295-297.
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 325

TABLEI - Classification of the Sciences in 1769

1

ure mathematics (objective and absolutely

cas
Q

rue)

critical and subjective,

[ r
e
| Metaphysics (Ontology)
| as critique ofpure reason
I
I
|
l
pure philo-
sophy I
I
i | Logic
I dogmatic, |
| absolutely |
| true and 4
Jtobjective | Pure Moral
| Philosophy
LE

pure philosophy, objective and dogmatic as general

science of nature (Transcendental Physiology)
326 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLE II - Classification of Sciences im the Dissertation of 1770

=
| elenchtical - Propaedeutic
|
|
4 [Ontotogy
| lem I
Philosophy | | Meta- 4
| | physics | Rational
| dogmatic 4 Psychology
|Ps
|
|™Moral Philosophy

—
| Geometry
= |
| pure + Pure Mechanics
| [Mathematics] |
| Arithmetic
L

—
| Physics
empirical
i |
| Empirical Psychology
LL
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 327

TABLEIU - Classification of Reflection 4163

(1769 - 1770)

Logic
Iu
I
universal rules
[wr | General Phenomenology
| of knowledge I
| [Ss
General Noology
|
|
|
|
Sciences of pure reason
|
|
|
|
| rc
| theoretical - Metaphysics
| particular rules
| of knowledge: 4
|4Applied Noology |
|
| practical - Moral Philosophy
328 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEIV Classification of Metaphysics in Reflection 4168

(1769 - 1770)

=
| Ontology - principles ofthe
| knowledgeofpure reason
rm
| the simple | universal 4
| objects of + metaphysics |
| pure reason L— | General Theology -
| | first principle of all beings
| | known by pure reason
| =
|
|
Metaphysics Cc
concerning | the internal
| | sense [Rational
| | Psychology]
| |
| [PtPhysiology 4
| | |
| the objectsof the | | of the external
| senses, whose | | sense [Rational
| foundation ,-— | | Physics)
| is known | particular | uC
| through | or applied 4 Pneumatology
|Pepure reason | metaphysics |
bo |
|
|SSomatology
 -enmmmmerns) |||
The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 329

TABLEV - Classification of Reflection 4161

(1769 - 1770)
zl

hysics - studies the nature of existent/empirical objects

[-- jc a i lil a rei

Metaphysics - studies the nature of possible rational objects

Sciences

Hyperphysics- studies what, among existent things, depends

on thecause of nature [= God]

pophysics - studies whatis existent without having its

x=
s

determiningreasonin nature (causal events, occult

qualities)
330 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEVI- Classification of Philosophy According to the

Logik Blomberg (1771)

1
| in general - Logic
|
|
Understanding 4 ofits universal objects
| - Metaphysics
|
|
| of its corporeal objects
- Physics
L
Philosophy - Sciences
(for the use of) 4 Feeling - Aesthetics

Appetition - Moral or Practical Philosophy

an
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 331

TABLE VII - Classification of Philosophy According to the

Logik Philippi (1772)

rc
Logic - concems the objective laws of the use of reason,
a a er

derived partially from reason, partially from experience

Metaphysics - concernsthe lawsofpure reason, derived from

reason alone

Philosophy

Physics - derives its principles from experience

loral Philosophy - derives its principles from reason

332 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEVIII - Classification of Philosophy in Reflection 4150

(1769 - 1772)

“| Transcendental (it does not concern

| any sensible object)
|
|
| theoretical
| | —
| | | Physiology
I | |
| | Metaphysics | Mechanics
| pure 4 | (thas as an object 4
| | | the universal of the | Pneumatology
| | |objects of the senses) |
| | | Natural Theology
| | uu
| | practical
| uu
Philosophy
|
|
|
| P
[ sPsychology
| |
| empirical 4
= |
\*Physies
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 333

TABLEIX - Classification of Philosophyin the Reflections of

1775 - 1778

i cas
| pure, or Transcendental | Critique of Pure Reason
| Philosophy,or (general) 4
| Metaphysics - subjective | Ontology
| (reason andits notions u
| are its objects)
|
|| —
| concerning experi-
—
| Rational Physics
| | ence: Rational Phys- 4
| | iology- immanent | Rational
rational I | Psychology
| | —
| | —
| rm | — | Transcendental
| | Sensations | Cosmology +
| | | | | Natural
| | | | ca
| | | concerning ideas:
I | | transcendent
| | | —
| | | | Transcendental
Philosophy || | | Theology 4
| oe | Natural
| applied, or Metaphysics, or —_
| Special Metaphysics - objective
| (applied by reasontodifferent objects)
ee |
|
| Feelings - Metaphysics of Morals
lL

empirical [experimental] Physics, [etc]

r
334 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEX - Classification of the Sciences According to

Metaphysik L, (1775 - 1780)

=
| Ontology - con-
| siders all things
| one by one
|
| Metaphysics
=

ee
| Cosmology - con-
| siders all things as
r= | coordinated
| Pure Philosophy - the
| understanding reflects on
I its own nature Natural Theology
| | - considers all
| | things as
| | subordinated
— | | =
pure 4 |
| | Moral Philosophy
| Ls
| Pure Mathematics
rational _ —
| | Pure Somatology
| — |
| | Applied Philosophy +
Sei ces | | |
| | applied | Rational Psychology
| uu | La
| | Applied Mathematics
| Le

|
| empirical
 The Evolution of Kant’s Pian
for g System 335

TABLEXI- Subdivision of Tra

in Metaphysik L, (1778.rypntt losophy
nse,

=
| of Concepts
:
(analytic part) f
ro |
Analytic 4 |
|
|
[7Theory of |
| | ofPrine’
rinciph
| Understanding - 4 f
| Transcendental | (vats ma) |
| i i
| Logic or Ontology |
|| ||
|
| Le.
Dialectic |
Transcendental +
Philosophy i

Theory of Sensibility - Transcendental Aesthetics

336 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEXII- Classification of the Sciences in the Lectures

on Philosophical Encyclopaedia (1777 - 1780?)

—
| pure, Transcendental Philosophy, or Cri-
= | tique of Pure Reason, or Ontology (Cosmol-
| oferudition - | ogy, Transcendental Theology)
| History |
| |
| — |
| | theoretical: cc
| | Understanding - | Rational Psychol-
| | Metaphysics | ogy (internal
| | | | sense)
| | | applied Rational Phi- |
Sciences | | losophy(its object is | Physics (external
| | | an object ofthe 4 senses)
| =, | | senses) - this is |
| | Philosophy | Metaphysics proper | (Natural Theol-
| | | i | ogy)
lof | | —
| conception |
| Cinsicht) | —
Lu | | | Transcendental Practical Philosophy
| | | (considers the use of freedom in
| | | general)
I | practical: |
| | Will - 4
| — |
I | Rational Practical Philosophy or
| | Metaphysics of Morals (considers
| | the good use offreedom)
| es
| Mathematics
Le
 The Evolution of
Kant’s Plan for
a System 337

E XIII- Classification of the

Sciences According to the
TAB! LU Critique of Pure Reason (1781)

historical or empirical
|| |aaath
mathe matiean
onnat le
| Empirical Physics
snowed | _
| | from empirical ‘
i | | principles: Empirical |
| | | Philosophy Empirical Psychology
[=rational |
| |
| philosophical
uc | —
| Propaedeutic: Critique of Pure Reason
|
| ofpure reason:
|MMetaphysicsI
| ‘oa
| | Metaphysics of Morals
| |
| | =
| MetaphysicsII | Transcendental
u | | Philosophy:
| | Ontology
| |
Metaphysics III: Metaphysics
| of Nature (Speculative
|Metaphysics) |
|
| Physiology
Nee

(next page)
338 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEXIII (cont.)

=
| Transcendental Philosophy:
| Ontology a
| | Rational Physics
| - |
MetaphysicsIII | immanent +
(cont.) | | |
| | |
| | | Rational Psychology
| | —
| Physiology 4
i |
I
|
| r=
| Rational (transcendental)
| Cosmology
|
|
|
Le |
|
| Rational(transcendental)
| Theology
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 339

TABLE XIV Classification of Philosophy According to the

Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

—
| formal - Logic
|
|
4 —
a oni irc

| | of nature -
| | Rational Physics
| material - 4
| Metaphysics |
uw | of morals -
| Rational Ethics
uw
Philosophy

—
ofnature - Empirical Physics
es

empirical -
material only

of morals - Practical Anthropology

uC
340 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

TABLEXV- Classification of the Knowledge of Nature in the

Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science(1786)

-
| description of nature
| historical |
| lore of 4
| nature | Natural =
| | History | General Metaphysics
| Le | of Nature - Transcen-
| | dental - no determined
| | empirical object
| |
| [pepure - i
| | science pro- |
Lore of Nature | per (entirely 4
(Naturlehre) | founded on -
| | principles a | General Physics
| | priori) | |
| | ! particular metaphysical
| | | natural science ~
| | | particular objects
| rational lore of nature, [enempirically given
or natural science !
Waturwissenschah) |
| Psychology
| uu.

I
| -
| applied - Natural | eg: Chemistry [Experi-
| science improper | mental Physics,etc.]
| or Knowledge 4
[@(Wissen) of Nature |
| Empirical Psychology
 The Evolution of Kant’s Plan for a System 34]

TABLEXVI - Classification of Philosophy in

Metaphysik K, (1794 - 1795?)

immanentpart: Ontology (Elementar

or Transcendental Metaphysics)

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INDICES
 SUBJECT INDEX

ability, 50, 106, 110 285n, 292n, 293n; see also Method,
gesthetic, xxix, 7, 16-19, 27, 45, 111- Ontology, Philosophy, Schema
112, 120, 153, 229, 314-315, 330; architecture, 178, 195, 243, 253-254,
transcendental, xxiii, 46-47, 55, 60, 256
75n, 309, 314-315, 335; transcenden- Aristotelian, xxv-xxvi, 6-7, 9, 30-31,
tal aesthetic as an organon, 79-80, 84, 39n, 128, 131, 133-134, 135n, 136-
107 137, 141-142, 149, 151, 159, 165-
aggregate, 243, 245-246, 251 166, 168, 173, 176, 211, 228n, 250-
amphibole, 7 251, 255, 286, 291; see also Catego-
analysis, xxiii, 15, 44, 47, 62, 78, 231, ries, Organon
736-237, 246n, 285n; and synthesis, ars inveniendi, 69, 82, 163n
xxiii, 3, 7, 27, 56, 231, 237 ars docimastica, xxi, 40
analytic, xxii, 30-31, 51, 56-57, 62, 64,
66, 76, 113, 118, 135n, 144, 150,
166n, 177, 261, 335; and dialectic, biology, xxvii, 243-249, 285; mechan-
xxii, 6, 30-31, 46-49, 54-55, 63n, istic, 246-249; see also Evolution
75n, 112; and synthetic, 76-77, 160, bipartition, 307
335; transcendental, xxii, 46, 53-54,
56, 63-65, 80, 93, 104, 111; see also
Doctrine Calvinist, 168n, 173n,
anthropology, 240, 277, 300, 304-306, canon, Vii, xiv, xxi-xxvii, 7, 37, 40, 45-
310, 314, 317, 339 48, 51-53, 56, 58, 62, 64-65, 67, 77-
Antiquity, xxvi, 3, 30, 97, 113, 130, 78, 80, 92-93, 95-96, 110-113, 115-
132, 156-157, 178, 184, 188 116, 129-134, 142-143, 144n, 188-
antithesis, 56, 231, 237 189; and doctrine, 110, 111n, 112,
architect, xxvii, 236, 240, 250-251, 115, 118, 120-121; as dogmatic, 55,
253, 255-256; see also God 58, 110, 113; of Epicurus, 113-114,
architectonic, xxii-xxiii, 30, 53, 59, 131, 179-184, 187-188, 198-201; as
110, 169n, 234-236, 240-300; Lam- method, 111, 186, 195, 198; history
bert’s Architectonic, xvii, xviii, xxvi, of, 178-188; and organon, xxii-xxiii,
89, 123-126, 155n, 158, 160n, 162, 37, 46, 52-53, 77, 81-83, 93, 101,
164n, 169-173, 200, 208, 254-255, 103, 106-107, 109-110; in the seven-

345
346 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
teenth century, 193-196; in the eigh critique, xxi-axiv, xxviii, 5, 7-9, 27,
teenth century, 197-202; see also Cri- 38, 42, 45, 51, 54, 56, 61, 65,, 110-
77-18,
terion, Discipline, Judgment, Laws, 82, 93, 99-100, 102, 105-106
Logic, Metaphysics, Reason, Science, 113, 115, 117-118, 120-122, 131n,
Transcendental Philosophy, Under- 144n, 235, 242, 319-320; see also
standing Doctrin e, Judgment, Logic, Metaphys-
Cartesian, 143, 151-152, 204-205, 262- ies, Method, Ontology, Organon, Rea-
263 son, Science, Taste, Transcendental
categories, 9, 159, 165-166, 169, 232, Philosophy
301; Aristotle's Categories, 135, 166; Cyrenaics, 183, 304
table of, 7, 33, 59, 233, 235, 264,
308
catharticon, xxi, 38n, 39-40, 43-44, deist, 298
50-51, 61, 139, 230 dialectic, xxii, 30, 48, 51-52, 54-55, 63,
censor, 102 83-84, 106-107, 109, 135, 142-144,
censure,xiii, xxiv, 99-103, 116-117 148-150, 152, 154, 156-157, 163,
combinatoria, 140n, 155, 160, 267n 183, 194, 231, 335; transcendental,
commonsense, xxi, 33, 38-39, 43-44, 54-55, 64, 116; see also Analytic
47, 51-52,61, 209, 242 dichotomy, 81
Copernican revolution, 278, 314 dictionary, xxiii, xxv, axvi, 84, 91-92,
cosmology,xxviii, 4, 46, 129, 237-238, 108, 123, 134, 141, 172, 182, 188,
240, 296-298, 304-305, 308-309, 312, 199, 203, 205, 207, 215, 280, 288-
322-323, 333-334, 341; metaphysical, 289; ontologyas a, xxiii, xxv-xxvi,
298, 323, 341; natural, 237-238, 298; 123, 127, 169, 172-177
rational, 284, 296-298, 304-305, 312, discipline, vii-viii, xiv, xxi-xxii, xxiv-
338; transcendental, 237-238, 296- xxvii, 2-3, 37-39, 41-42, 45n, 50, 56,
298, 309 98-102, 132, 134, 145, 147, 149-151,
cosmopolitan, xxix, 309, 311 153n, 156, 173, 174m, 188-189, 217-
criterion, vii, xxi-xxii, xxv-xxvii, 40-41, 223, 228, 251; and canon, 52-53, 82-
46, 53, 55, 58, 102, 110-112, 119, 83, 101, 103, 106, 109-111, 116-117;
133-134, 180, 183, 185, 188, 203- and doctrine, xxi-xxii, xxiv-xxvi, 37- .
209; and canon, 131-132, 180-183, 38, 39n, 42, 49, 52n, 56-57, 98-105,
188-189; negative, xxi, 62, 78, 103, 115-116, 118-119, 121-122, 133-134,
117; history of, 188-189; see also 188-189, 211-212, 214-215, 217-218,
Truth 297; and method, 116, 132, 189-190,
critical, xxi, 44, 46, 50-51, 53, 58, 116, 217-218; see also Metaphysics, Orga-
121, 182, 231, 240, 268, 293, 320, non, Reason, Science, Transcendental
325; vs. dogmatic, 42, 46, 50, 57, Philosophy
226; pre-critical, 19-20, 252, 256, doctrine, vii-viii, xxii, xxiv, xxvii, 37-
314; see also Logic 38, 50-51, 54, 56-57, 78, 83, 93, 119- '
 Subject Index 347
172, 132, 139, 153m, 175, 211-215, Snostology, xxvi, 128, 150n, 167-168,
4318-320; analytic as, 56-57, 63n, 118; 195-196, 219-220
js. critique, xxiv, 69, 76, 104-105, God, 41, 163, 176, 206, 226, 230, 278,
115, 118-120, 122; logic as, 42-43, 280-281, 284, 287-288, 290n, 293-
50, 104, 112-113, 115, 118-123, 142; 294, 329; as architect, 236, 248, 251,
ind method, 211, 214; see also Can- 255-256
on, Discipline, Metaphysics, Reason, grammar, 38n, 126, 142, 146-153,
Science 155-157, 173-174, 179, 239
dogmatic, 39, 51, 148; see also Canon,
Critical, Knowledge, Logic, Meta-
physics historical, 6, 8, 27, 30, 123, 319
history, xxv-xxvi, 16-17, 151-152, 157,
174, 211, 266, 336; natural, 520, 137-
eclectic, xxvi, 142-143, 148, 150, 157, 138, 194, 229, 239n, 340; research,
175n, 197, 205, 252n, 290n 29-30, 33, 39, 63n; of terms, 30, 178-
education, 49, 99, 104, 116, 118-119, 188, 221, 279, 291; ofthought, 8, 16,
132, 157, 189, 217-218 131, 134
Epicurean, 180-181, 200, 204, 208, 304 hyperphysic, xxviii, 283-284, 287-288,
epigenesis, 247-248, 249n 329
epistemology, 1 hypophysic, 288, 329
error, 3, 43, 46, 56-57, 61, 69, 79,
99-101, 113, 116-117, 158-159, 174,
265, 269 ideas, history of, xxvi, 11, 18, 28, 250;
ethics, xiv, xxvi, xxviii, 32, 50-51, 130, see also Logic, Organon
152n, 154, 156-157, 179, 184-185, illusion, xxii, 17, 48, 55, 64, 99, 106,
187-188, 193, 195, 221, 230, 240, 116, 158-159; logic of, 7, 48, 51, 54,
275-278, 281, 289n, 295, 303-304, 63, 83
339 instruction, 38n, 42, 46, 49-50, 98,
evolution, biological, 247, 249n; of 115-116, 154, 211, 239, 306
thought, vii, xxvii, xxix, 128, 178, instrumental, xxvi, 38, 40, 43; see also
217, 225-226, 233, 291, 303, 310- Logic, Philosophy, Science
311, 314-315, 318 intuition, 46, 208; pure, 46, 80, 99,
269, 283
invention, 3, 8, 40, 78, 103, 123, 125,
falsehood, 45, 143-144, 182 138-139, 146, 159, 164, 170-171,
First Academy, 183 244n, 253

generation, xxvii, 244-249 judgment (Uneil), 7, 39, 45, 51, 54,

genius, 99, 118, 246, 248n, 252, 256 58, 119, 122, 146, 179, 183, 205,
348 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
228, 233, 314, 316-317 68, 74; intellectual andsensitive, 40-
Judgment (Unteilskraft), xxii-xxiii, 39, 42, 63, 95, 105, 226, 231-233; mathe-
60, 62n, 64-65, 93-94, 99n, 100, 103- matical and philosophical, xxviii, 229,
104, 110-111, 119, 121, 264n,314, 242, 267-268, 273, 277, 294, 296,
317; canon of, 60-61, 65, 94, 100, 309-310; negative and positive, 40,
104, 111, 119; critique of, 121, 314, 103, 117, 122
318, 322 Kénigsberg, 135-136, 142, 150n, 167-
jurisprudence, 151, 154, 156, 180 169, 195, 228n, 250

knowledge, xxi, 40, 42, 48-49, 51, 54, laws, 111, 206, 240, 247-249, 276,
59, 117, 145, 147, 161, 164, 167-168, 278, 316-317; canon, 111-112, 179-
176-177, 179, 185, 188, 190, 206, 180, 184; of reason, 9, 47, 50,62,
223, 227, 228n,230, 232, 235, 243, 85, 100, 226, 330; see also Reason
252, 254, 265-266, 271-272,274, liberal arts, 156-157, 217
279, 281-283, 296, 307-308, 310, logic, xxviii-xxix, 1-2, 4-5, 7-9, 37-38,
327-328, 340; a priori, 54, 76, 108, 60, 97, 129, 228-229, 255n, 273, 300-
242; pure a priori, 68, 70, 78-81, 86, 302, 313-314, 317-319, 327, 330-331,
93-94, 100, 103-105, 107, 119-120, 339; applied and pure, 88n, 126, 145,
133; for correcting and extending, 3, 156, 172; artificial and natural, xxi,
57, 60, 62,64, 69-70, 77-78, 80, 82- 38, 43-45, 103, 105, 118, 274n; and
84, 87, 89-90, 101, 103-110, 112, canon,xxii-xxiv, xxvi, 48, 60n, 62,
114, 116, 119-120, 122-126, 133-134, 64-65, 93, 107, 110-112, 114-115,
139, 163, 171; critical, 57, 116; dog- 118, 120-121, 131, 179, 182, 184-
matic, 57, 118, 122; intuitive, 41, 80, 185, 186n, 187-188, 194-195, 199-
105; pure, 2, 85, 95, 299; of pure 201; courses on, 42, 87, 105, 110,
reason; 5, 51, 85, 299;scientific, 44, 113-114; critical and dogmatic, xxi,
61, 85, 132, 211, 221, 243; specula- 42, 46, 50, 113, 115, 120, 226, 325;
tive, 64, 77-78, 94, 111; synthetic a as critique, xxi-xxii, xxv, 38, 52, 113,
priori, 65-66, 73, 76, 112, 119, 236; 115, 177, 225, 301-302, 305, 321,
theory of, 1-3, 23, 44, 65, 128, 168, 323, 341; general, xxii-xxiv,xvi, 2,
319; transcendental, 55, 61, 72, 80, 4-7, 24, 37, 42-43, 46-49, 50-51, 60,
111, 284, 293; content and form of, 64, 74n, 81-86, 88-90, 94, 104-105,
xxii, xxiv, 51, 61-64, 83, 85, 94-96, 108-109, 113, 119-120, 123-124, 131,
99-100, 160; empirical and pure, 61, 163, 165, 172, 226, 233-235, 239,
65, 94, 105, 120, 294, 308, 316; his- 214, 295-296, 302n, 305, 315-316,
torical and rational, xxviii, 44, 51, 85, 319-320, 323; groupingsof, 145-158;
242, 267-269, 273, 276, 293-294, history of, 3, 6-9, 18, 45, 97, 113,
299n, 300, 303n, 307, 309, 311, 320, 130-131, 137-139, 143, 164, 166,
337; immanent andtranscendent, 54, 168, 179, 181-184, 188, 227n,273,
 Subject Index 349
403; as instrumental, 143-152, 154, Organon, xxi, xxiii, xxv, 41, 80, 83,
175; and metaphysics, xxii, xxv-xxvi, 87, 89-90, 105, 107-110,122, 125-
9, 24, 40, 42, 46-49, 81, 127-129, 126, 154, 170, 172n; see also Knowl-
3, 135n, 152, 154, 165-166, 168- edge
i 173-175, 177, 222, 225, 233, mechanics, 154, 184-185, 227, 234-235,
i: 292n, 302-303, 309, 319; and 258-259, 326, 332
odology, xxvi, 2-4, 6-9, 39-40, metaphysics, 162, 209, 227, 263, 269-
40, 88 90-92, 97, 123-124, 126-127, 270, 288, 293, 331-332; applied, 230,
129, 137, 143, 147, 154, 161, 164, 240, 295, 300-303, 309, 333; and
i 177, 188, 225, 250, 302; and canon, 66, 185, 187-189, 197, 200-
on, Xxi-Kxiii, 38-39, 42-45, 47- 201; classification of, xxix-xxx, 152,
3, 56n, 58, 60-63, 81-84, 88-91, 154, 168, 174-175, 228-240, 242,
105-110, 112, 118, 121, 124-126, 251, 275-279, 283, 286, 295-296,
136-137, 142, 144-145, 149, 153, 298-299, 301-302, 308-310, 312, 319,
160, 172; practical and theoretical, 322-323, 327-328, 334, 336-341;
uti, xxiii, 3, 7, 39, 42, 45, 51-52, 58, courses on, 5, 38, 46, 239, 288, 304-
$3, 88-92, 105, 107, 109, 115, 123- 305; and critique, xxii, xxv, xxviii, 1-
124, 159-161, 188, 302n; propaedeuti- 2, 4-5, 8, 23-24, 37, 48-52,75, 81-
cal, 42, 85, 105, 114, 234, 296n, 305, 82, 104n, 117-118, 120, 129, 133,
319, 321, 323; special, xxiii, xxv- 177, 226, 229-230, 231n, 234, 236,
mwvi, 4-6, 9, 24, 42, 48-49, 60, 80- 239n, 242, 277, 297, 300-302, 305,
89, 91-92, 109, 124, 133, 161-162, 321-323, 325, 336-337; as dictionary,
170, 172, 177, 302, 319; technical, 173-176; disciplineof, 39, 57, 116-
$4, 91-92, 108, 235;transcendental, 118, 220-222, 228, 251; and doctrine,
xsii-xxiv, 5, 46-47, 52, 59-60, 62-66, 50, 56-57, 115-116, 118-119, 121-
75, 81, 85, 95, 100-101, 104, 107, 122; dogmatic, 46, 51, 118, 122, 230,
109, 116, 230, 274, 302, 309; see 283; general, 49, 52-53, 82, 106, 110,
also Doctrine, Mathematics, Ontology, 173n, 175, 236, 239; methodology of,
Philosophy, Reason, Truth xxi, xxiv, 4, 8-9, 24, 32, 37-40, 42,
logical positivism 17, 46, 56, 82, 89, 106, 120, 126-129,
Lutheran, 166 163-164, 225, 231-232, 302, 314-315;
ofnature and of morals, 32, 50-51,
121-123, 176, 230, 234, 242, 246,
mathematics, 6, 47, 66, 105, 127. 160, 275-278, 292n, 297, 299, 303-306,
162, 170, 178, 184, 186, 217, 221, 308, 315, 318, 320, 333, 336-337,
221, 235, 269, 278-279, 302, 325- 339, 341; and organon, xxi-xxii, 38,
326, 334, 337; andlogic, xxvi, 89, 41, 46, 48-51, 53-54, 66n, 78, 80n,
126, 141, 145-146, 153-156, 172, 82, 105-106, 109-110, 133, 170, 226,
218, 273-274; logic and philology, 230; practical, 32, 276; propaedeutic,
xav-xxvi, 125-126, 141, 145-157; as 40, 51, 228-230, 233, 301, 305; pure,
350 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

46-47, 49n, 230-231, 238, 302-303, 327

309; science of, 39, 277, 279-283,
329-330, 336; special, xxvi, 40, 173n,
175-176, 236; speculative, 73, 152n, ontology, xxi-xxii, xxvi, 4, 23, 41, 50,
175, 283; andtraditional, xxviii, 56, 53-54, S6n, 177, 228, 281-282; as
129-130, 164, 187-189, 197, 201, architectonic, 169, 252-254, 341; as
279-283; transcendental, 87, 230, 323, critique of pure reason, 295, 296n,
333, 340-341; see also Catharticon, 297, 312, 322-323, 325, 336; logic
Logic, Ontology, Philosophy, Reason, and, xxiv, xxvi, 9, 24, 46, 97-98,
Transcendental Philosophy 127, 159, 169, 175, 178, 309; and
method, xxv-xxvi, 2, 4, 39-41, 78, 95- metaphysics, 46, 50, 52, 169, 173n,
96, 100, 125, 128, 252, 264n, 270, 175-176, 178, 226, 236-237, 281-283,
214, 279; and architectonic, 249-255, 296-297, 298n, 302, 309, 312, 321,
260, 270; in Bacon, 137-140; and 325-326, 328, 333-334, 337-338, 341;
critique, 91-92, 96, 105, 120, 129, see also Dictionary, Transcendental
231n, 270, 316, 321; in Lambert, 123- Philosophy
128, 159-162, 171-172, 254; and or- organism, 246-247, 284
ganon, xxvi, 40, 123-124, 127, 136- organon, vii, xvii-xviii, xxi, xxiii, 37,
143, 171-172; theory of, xxiii, 84, 88, 69, 79; in Aristotle, xxv, 133-136;
90-91, 96-97, 177; science of, 41, 141-142; in Bacon, xxv, 87-88, 124-
226; see also Canon,Discipline, Doc- 125, 133, 137-141, 143; critique and,
trine, Logic, Metaphysics, Organon, xxiii-xxiv, 32, 42, 51, 53, 70, 76-78,
Reason, Science 81, 84, 93, 106, 109; and dialectic,
Middle Ages, 132, 146, 153, 156, 184, xxii, 62, 83, 112; and discipline, xxiv,
190, 211, 218 52-53, 82-83, 101, 106, 109, 117;
mnemonic, 140n, 147-148, 150, 264n, history of, xxiv-xxvi, 108-109, 123,
267n 133-145, 158-178; in Lambert, xxvi,
moral, xxviii, xxx, 15-16, 32, 41, 50, 48, 87, 123-127, 142, 155n, 158-163,
94, 106, 112-113, 116-118, 121-123, 169-172, 291n; particular, xxii, 48,
130, 143n, 176, 179-180; see also 80, 106, 108-109, 125; for philos-
Metaphysics, Philosophy ophy, 82, 87n, 104; for sciences, xxii,
60-61, 87, 90-91, 107-109, 114, 118,
125-127, 161, 169; two- and three-
naturalist, xxviii, 273-274 tier, xxiii, xxv-xxvi, 90, 125, 172; of
New Academy, 183 understanding and reason, 48, 63,
Newtonian, xiv, 2, 32, 277n 106; see also Aesthetic, Canon, Logic,
nominalism, 9, 127-128, 165-166,169, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Method,
176 Philology, Philosophy, Reason
nomothetic, 52
noology, xxvi, 128, 167, 228, 251, pansophic, xxv, 148-149
 Subject Index 351
Jogism, 7, 231m scholastic concepts of, xxviii-xxix,
gogy, 119, 147-148 271-274, 276, 278, 309-311; empirical
enomenology, 115, 228, 231-232, and pure, xxix, 53, 86, 87n, 91, 226-
92n, 315, 327 227, 236, 238-239, 242, 276-277,
ilology, xxvi, 33, 89, 125, 141-142, 295, 296n, 299, 303, 308-309, 312,
145-147, 150, 153, 156; as an orga- 317, 320, 325-326, 332-334, 339;
non, xxii-xxiii, xxv, 47, 87, 90, 106, seventeenth and eighteenth century,
109-110, 126; see also Mathematics axvi, 12, 27, 39, 40n, 130-131, 146,
philosophize, xxviii, 45, 268 151, 184, 186, 189, 273, 280, 289,
ilosophy, ancient, xxvi, 113, 130, 300n; see also Knowledge, Organon,
157, 303, 306-307; applied, xxviii- Reason, Transcendental Philosophy
xxix, 239, 295, 299, 303, 312, 333- physical, 23, 87, 90, 188, 246, 248,
334, 336; architectonic and,xxvii, 53, 276, 278, 283-284, 287, 323
234, 245n, 252-253, 259-260, 270, physics, 46, 88, 114, 118, 131, 152n,
272-274, 276, 310; British and 154, 157, 162, 168, 179, 221-223,
French, xvi, 128, 165; classification 27-228, 237, 280-281, 288n, 302-
of, xxviii-xxx, 41, 52-54, 59, 73, 223, 303, 330; empirical, xxviii, 299-300,
225, 229, 231-232, 234, 237, 241- 303n, 304, 306, 312, 316-317, 320,
242, 255, 259, 272, 276-277, 283, 333, 339-340; rational, xxviii, 238-
295-296, 303-309, 311-313, 320-341; 239, 284, 297-299, 303, 309, 312,
German, xxx, 8, 130-131, 186, 273, 338-339
280-281, 300n; history of, xxvii, 28, physiology, xxviii, 4, 179, 228n, 246n,
98, 130, 181n, 279-280; instrumental, 283-287, 293, 295-296, 299-300, 303,
144-145, 147-149, 152, 155, 174-175, 306, 308, 312, 323, 325, 332, 337-
195, 203-204, 212, 219; andlogic, 5, 338
85-86, 137, 146, 175, 229, 234, 296n, pneumatology, 202, 332
302, 309, 318-319, 321; and meta- poetry, 17, 21-22, 142, 147-152, 157,
physics, 152, 175, 222, 238-239, 242, 243
215, 334; moral, xxix, 32, 50, 106, postulate, 7
230n, 237, 242, 252n, 258n, 275-278, preformationism, preformism, xxvii,
302, 310, 312, 317, 320, 325-327, 247-249
330-331, 334, 339; and organon, 53, probability, 159, 209; logic of, 6-7,
58, 82, 103-104, 106-107, 110, 116, 63n, 163n
134, 151, 153; practical, 32, 152n, propaedeutic, xxi, xxiii, 40-43, 51, 55,
222, 240, 309, 317-318, 320, 330, 60, 69-70, 82, 105, 114, 147, 154,
332; system of, viii, xxvii, 9, 32, 103, 156-157, 218, 226, 228-234, 276,
225-226, 259, 267-268, 271, 272-277, 296n, 301, 305, 319, 321-323, 326,
313-314; true, xxviii, 138, 268-272, 337; see also Logic, Metaphysics
275, 296; ultimate/essential end in, prosody, 153
xxviii, 258, 272, 274-276; cosmic and psychology, 2, 39n, 47, 106, 129, 160,
352. Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
172, 173n, 179, 209, 228n, 238n, 239, 303, 305, 331, 341; and meta-
246, 263n, 292, 305n, 320, 341; em- physics, xxi, 48, 50, 106, 118, 226,
Pirical, xxviii, 61, 87, 227, 239-240, 230, 239, 328, 331, 333; method of
242, 299-300, 305, 308-310, 312, pure, 2, 91, 100, 105, 120, 316; orga-
317, 326, 332, 337, 340; practical, non of, 48, 56, 58, 68-71, 79-80, 106-
xxix, 316; rational, xxviii, 41, 103, 107, 117; philosophy ofpure, xxviii,
121, 123, 226, 227, 237, 239-240, 50, 80, 101, 105, 120, 226, 276-277;
284, 294-297, 299, 303n, 304-305, practical, 93-94; pure, 5, 53, 61, 68-
308-309, 312, 326, 328, 333-334, 338 70, 83, 85-86, 96, 99-100, 228, 231,
prudence, 50, 106, 110, 237, 316 216-277, 283, 299, 306, 317, 325,
purpose, 246, 249, 255, 261 327-328, 331, 337; science of, 59,
235, 243, 266, 325, 327; and sensibi-
lity, 7, 62, 231, 233, 236-237, 315;
Quadrivium, 156, 217 speculative, 64-65, 79, 93-94, 101,
103, 111, 114, 116, 306; system of,
xxix, 256-258, 265, 268, 275, 283;
Ramism, xxv, 144, 148-149, 157 system ofpure, xxiii, 68-74, 76-77,
realist tradition, 9, 165-166 79, 90, 94, 99, 109-110, 116, 297;
reason, 249, 265, 333; art of, 144, system ofthe critiqueof pure, xxix,
156n, 235; artificer of, 273-274, 309- 121, 313, 315, 317-318; and transcen-
310; and canon, xxii-xxiii, 47-48, 54, dental logic, xxiii, 64, 100-101; as
58, 60, 62, 64-66, 79, 93-94, 100, transcendental philosophy, 52-53, 72-
104, 110-113, 120-121, 180, 304; 76, 85-86, 122, 232, 234, 240, 305;
critique of, 66, 102, 118, 285n, 301; use of(empirical and pure), xxi, 5,
critique ofpractical, xxvii-xxviii, 114, 46-48, 57, 60, 62, 86, 99, 114, 116,
117, 260, 306, 314, 317, 321-322; 235-236, 239, 283, 331; see also
critique of pure, xxii, xxvii-xxviii, 48- Organon
50, 52-53, 68-72, 74-76, 81-82, 85- Renaissance, 146, 153, 156, 166, 184,
86, 88, 104n, 120-121, 128, 169, 226, 256n, 2720
229-230, 232-236, 238-240, 269, 276- rhapsody, 243, 244n, 264-265
277, 295, 297, 301-302, 305-306, rhetoric, 126, 140n, 142, 146-153,
308-309, 312-319, 321-323, 325, 333, 156-157, 174, 180, 261
336-337, 341; disciplinefor, xxiv, 96,
99-101, 116-117; and doctrine, 56-57,
112, 120, 122; essential ends of, schema, xxvii-xxviii, 119-120, 249,
xxviii, 258, 272-276, 310; ideas of, 258-265;architectonical, 264, 266,
66, 94, 103, 111, 249, 258, 266, 268; 270-274, 276, 278-279;technical,
laws of, 50, 62, 85, 100, 226, 331; 258, 271-273, 276; transcendental,
andlogic, 50, 52-53, 56n, 58, 62, 64, 260
86, 93, 104, 111-112, 115, 121, 226, scholastic, xxviii, 88, 103, 107, 144,
 Subject Index 353

\74n, 187, 197, 271-272, 276, 309- synthesis, see Analysis, Knowledge
4311; see also Philosophy system, xxvii-xxix, 45n, 72, 117, 153,
chool, X*Vis 2, 8-9, 11, 38, 56, 60, 82, 198, 208, 225, 228, 240-241, 243,
90-91, 98113, 127, 131-132, 147, 246, 249-251, 253, 255-256, 259,
156, 177, 180, 189-190, 290n, 294, 261, 265, 267-269, 271, 273-277,
299, 319 283, 297, 304, 308, 310-311, 313-
cence, classification of, xxvii, xxix- 316, 318-319, 322-323; see also
xxx, 6, 137, 150-152, 229, 238-239, Philosophy, Reason
750-255, 257-260, 264-267, 269, 271- systematic school, xxv, 147-148
272, 216-277, 279, 283, 286-287,
293, 296, 298-299, 301-303, 305,
308, 310-311, 318-319, 321, 323, Tables, viii, xxix-xxx, 155n, 226, 228-
325-327, 329-330, 332, 334, 336, 229, 231, 236-240, 284n, 288, 293,
340; critique of, xxii, 38, 51, 230; 294n, 295-298, 300, 304, 307-308,
discipline, doctrine or canon, 38, 51, 317, 320, 323, 325-341
103, 111-113, 118, 120, 122, 129- talent, 39, 99, 104, 116, 119
130, 132, 185, 212, 213, 218, 221; taste, 118, 231; critique of, 111, 315-
dogmatic, 41, 46, 120, 226, 325-326; 316
empirical, 87, 90, 239, 265, 278, 302, teleology, 121, 222, 248, 316
306, 320, 225-326, 334; historical, theist, 298
xxii-xxiii, 47, 87, 90, 106, 110; in- theology, 4, 23, 152, 156, 211, 221,
strumental xxv, 89, 125, 144, 186; 287, 288n, 295, 305, 308-309, 312,
method of, 163, 302, 306; natural, 44, 328; natural, 46, 173, 174n, 237-238,
417-48, 50, 221, 227-228, 274, 308, 240,280, 295, 298, 322, 332-333,
312, 320, 326, 340; negative, 48, 70, 336; rational, xxviii, 129, 284, 294,
77-78, 106, 115, 228n; see also Meta- 296-297, 305, 323, 338, 341; tran-
physics, Method, Organon, Reason scendental, 102-103, 237-238, 240,
scruple, 61 296-298, 333, 336, 338
semantics, 8, 123, 148, 159, 171-172, theory, xxi, 6-8, 30, 41-42,44, 46,
217 52n, 79, 95, 104, 118, 120, 122-124,
sensibility, 7, 46, 62, 99n, 228, 231- 138-139, 148, 153, 158-160,172,
233, 263, 269, 315, 335 174, 179, 182, 218, 229, 244-246,
skepticism, 39, 50, 55, 78, 100, 102, 248-249, 252, 265, 315, 319, 335; see
117-118, 182n, 226 also Knowledge
sociology, 17-20, 32n, 247n-248n Thomasian, 131, 177, 183, 186, 221
somatology, 238, 295, 298n, 328, 334 topics, 124, 135, 163, 170
sophist, 55, 135n, 179, 208 touchstone, 41, 62, 76, 99
Stoic, 179-184, 187-188, 201, 286, 304 transcendental philosophy,xxi-xxii,
syllogism, 7, 149n, 175, 235, 261 Xxx, 4-5, 9, 23-24, 46-47, 52, 72-74,
synthetic, see Analytic, Knowledge 119, 232, 238, 309, 332, 335; and
354 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

canon, xxii, 52, 58, 110, 113, 178, understanding, 46-48, 54, 64, 85-86,
184, 186, 199;and critique, xxiii- 103-105, 106-107, 113-114, 119, 222,
xxiv, 5,9, 24, 49n, 50, 52-54, 59, 283-284, 285n, 303, 330, 334-336;
71-72, 74-16, 78-79, 85-86, 89, 97, canon of, xxii-xxiii, 47, 52, 60, 65-
104-105, 110, 122, 169, 177, 230 66, 93-94, 100, 104, 110-112, 120-
234, 239-240, 300-302, 305, 308-309, 121, 185, 304;principles ofpure,
312, 317-318, 322-323, 333, 336; and 120;pure, 41, 63, 239-240, 297; pure
discipline, 52, 101, 115, 117; and conceptof, 119, 260;use of, 41, 46-
doctrine, 57, 104, 119, 121-122; and 48, 50, 60-61, 65, 93, 106, 111, 226,
metaphysics, xxii, 5, 49n, 52-53, 73, 235, 239; see also Organon
85-86, 106, 110, 234, 237, 283, 300- universality, 58-59
302, 308-309, 333, 336-338; and
ontology, xxi, 4-5, 9, 23, 52, 71, 79,
128, 169, 175-176, 237-238, 240, vitalism, 247-248
283, 297, 300, 302n, 309, 312, 322-
323, 331, 335-338; see also Reason
trichotomous, 81 will, 51, 118, 185, 222, 230, 252n, 336
tripartite, xxviii, 304, 306-307 wisdom,xxii, 50-51, 58, 106-107, 110,
Trivium, 156, 217 118, 230, 238, 309, 311
truth, 40, 45, 56, 78, 95, 101, 113, Wolffian, 31, 126, 144-145, 173, 187,
129-130, 140n, 141n, 143-144, 158- 241, 290n
159, 164, 171, 174, 177, 182-183,
185, 190, 222-223, 253, 265, 268,
271, 282, 292n, 293, 307; criterion zetetical, 50, 226, 231
of, 55, 62, 180-182, 185, 204-206,
208-209; logic of, xxii, 6, 54, 63, 118
 PERSON INDEX

‘Adelung, Johann Christoph, 273n (Bavmgarten, Alexandri Gottlieb),

‘Adickes, Erich, 5, 18, 49, 81 xviii, 7, 40n, 132, 144, 153, 169n,
‘Adomo, Th. W., 16, 28 214, 223, 244n, 253-255, 273n, 281-
Ahlwardt, Peter, 223 283, 291, 298, 305n, 314
‘Alsted, Johann Heinrich (Alstedio, Beattie, James, 208
Johanne Henrico), 147, 186 BeauuAis, Carolo de (Cardinal de
Ames, William (Amesii, Guilielmi), 149 Beauvais), 220
Anderson, Fulton Henry, 137n Becher, Johann Joachim (Becheri,
Aquinas, 184, 211, 218 Joannis Joachimi), 141, 151
Aristotle, xxv, 9, 134-136, 151, 157n,
Beck, Dominico, 208
166, 173n, 174, 179, 189, 208, 304 Belaval, Yvon, 301n
Amdt, Hans-Werner, xviii, 169n, 171n Benn, Gottfried, 29
Amoldt, Emil, 322-323 Bentley, 287n
Aubery, Claude (Alberii, Clav.; Bemardo, Giovanni Battista (Bernardi,
Alberius, Claudius; Auberius, Aubéri), Toan. [Johannes] Baptistae), 212, 219
136 Bert, Pierre de (Bertii, Petri; Bertius,
Avicenna, 184 Petrus), 149
Beurer, Johann Jakob (Bevrero, loanne
Tacobo), 136
Bacon, Francis, xxv, 87-88, 124-125, Biesterfeld, Johann Heinrich (Bister-
133, 136-141, 143, 146, 147n, 153- feldii, Joh. Henrici), 148, 195
154, 178, 194, 266, 267n Bilfinger, Georg Bernhard (Bilfingeri,
Baker, Herschel Clay, 140n Georgii Bernhardi; Bilffinger, Geor-
Balduinus, Hieronymus, 166 gius Bernbardus; Bilffingeri, Georgii
Barone, Francesco, 142n, 155n Bernhardi), 187, 197, 281-282
Barth, Karl, 28 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus,
Basedow, Johann Bernhard, 141-142, 217-218
264n Bonnet, 248
Basler, Otto, 285n Boswell, Terry, xv-xvi
Baumeister, Friedrich Christian (Bav- Boutteville, Marquis L. M. de, 290n
meisteri, Frid. Christiani), 281, 291 Boyle, 287m
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb Brecht, Berthold, 17
355
356 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Clauberg, 30
Brucker, Jakob (Brvckeri, Iacobi), xxvi,
131, 140, 183, 304 Clement of Alexandria, 179
Budde, Johann Franz (Buddeus; Bvddei, Climent, Joachim, 9, 166
lo. Francisci), 175, 186, 197, 205 Comenii, Iohannis Amos, 195-196
Buffon, 248 Condillac, Etienne Bonnotde, 40, 215,
Burer, Albert, 211-212, 218 2900
Burkhaeuser, Nicolaus, 209, 290n Copius, Berard (Copio, Benhardo),
Burthogge, Richard, 141 157-158
Bisching, Anton Friedrich, 201 Comeille, Thomas, 204, 244n, 286n,
Busmanno, 135n 2890
Corvino, Christiano Io. Antonio, 207
Crousaz, Jean Pierre de, 198, 206
Calepini, Ambrosii (Calepinus Crusius, Christian August (Crusii), 8,
Bergomates, Ambrosius), 261n 32-33, 159, 175, 222-223, 232, 282-
Calogero, G., 13 283, 290n, 294
Calov, Abraham (Calovi, Abraham), Cudworth, Ralph (Cudworthi,
142, 162, 167, 168n, 194-195, 228n, Radulphi), 255n
250-251, 255
Campanella, Thomas (Campanellae,
Thomae), 154 D'Alembert, Jean Le Rond, xxvi, 27,
Canaye, Philippe, 136, 166 40, 125, 153n, 163-164, 200, 245n,
Cantimori, D., 13 254n, 264n, 267
Canz, J. Theophilo Israel Gottli , 287, Dannhauer, Johann Conrad (Dann-
288n haweri, Joh. Conradi), 194
Capella, Martianus, 156 Darjes, Joachim Georg [Ioachimi
Carlini, A., 13 Georgii] (Daries, Ioachimo Georgio),
Carossa, 17 xxvi, 6, 8, 30, 154-156, 184, 262-
Cassiodorus, 218 263, 282, 290n, 291, 296n, 298
Cassirer, Emst, 18 De Negri, I., 13
Cesa, Claudio, vii, ix-x, xii-xiii, xvi, 11 Democritus, 179, 183, 189
Chambers, Ephriam, 199, 245n, 267, Descartes, René, xxvii, 3, 96n, 113,
289 154, 182n, 189, 207-208, 245n, 250,
Charleton, Walter, 286 266-267
Chauvin, Etienne {Stephanus} (Chauvini, Dessoir, 18
Stephani), 143, 185, 188, 204, 219, De Vieeschauwer, Herman Jean, 15,
280, 288 96n
Chiaramonti, Simeone (Claramontio, Diderot, Denis, 153n, 187, 200, 245n,
Scipione), 212 250n, 254n, 264n, 267
Cicero, MarcusTullius, 180, 211, 217 Diogenes Laertius, xxvi, 131, 180, 184,
Clarenbaud of Arras, 218 199
 Person Index 357

pole Josef,, Fr14an80co,is15, 6n

285n
Gassendi, Petri [Pierre], xxvi, 126, 131,
es neau 143, 151, 157, 176, 181, 187, 199
be
pyche, ‘Thomas, 261, 286n, 289n Gebhardt, Carl, 255n
Geilfus, Johann (Geilfusi, Johannis),
167
geen, Theodor (Eberto, Theodoro), Genovesi, Antonio (Genuensis, Antonii),
150, 1510 8, 187, 199
breo, Leone (Hebreo, Leone), 255n Gerhardt, Carl Immanuel, 196, 252n
Je, Jean, xviii Gibson, Reginald Walter, 140n
fifler, Michael (Eifleri, Michaelis), Givone,Sergio, 266n
150, 167, 168n, 195 Glanville (Joseph), 287n, 289
gngfer, H.-J. ix Goclenius, Rudolph (Goclenii, Rodol-
picurus, xxi, xxiv, 45, 109, 113-114, phi), 142, 188, 193-194, 203, 219,
M31, 179-184, 187-189, 198-201, 207 261-262, 287-288
Eriugena, John Scotus, 153, 218 Godartij, P. (Godarti, Pierre; Godar-
Eschenbach, Johann Christian, 200 tius), 213, 219
Euripides, 179 Godinho, Nicolaus, 166
Gottsched, Johann Christoph, 282-283
Gouhier, Henri, 28, 256n
Fabricius, Georgius Andreas (Fabrici, Gracién, Baltasar, 255n
Georg. Andreae), 148 Grosch (Johannes Andreas), 30
Fabri, Honoré (Fabry, Honoratus), Gueroult, 28
144, 145n, 177 Gundling, Nicolai Hieronymi (Nikolaus
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich, 145, 200 Hieronymous], 140n, 198, 222
Felice, Fortuné Barthélemy de, 200 Gutke, Georg (Gutkii, Georgii), 167
Feltre, Vittorino Ramboldini da, 156 Guyénot, Emile, 247n
Flogel, Carl Friedrich, 153 Guzzo, A., 19
Forcellini, Aegidii [Egidio], 259n, 261n
Formey, Johann Heinrich [Jean Henri]
Samuel, 208, 253n Hagen, Gottlieb Friedrich (Gottlib
Formigari, Lia, 148n Frider.), 187, 198
Fowler, Thomas, 139n Hall, Thomas S., 246n
Fresnoy, Langlet du, 245n Haller, Albrecht von, 21-22, 29, 248
Frey, Alexander von, 201 Hanow, Michael Christoph, 273n
Fromme, Valentin (From, Valentino; Hanschius, Michaél Gottlieb (Hansch),
Frommen, Valentino), 150, 167, 220 256n
Funke, Gerhard, In, 92n, 136n, 285n Harris, John, 205
Fureti(2Jre, Antoine, 204, 213, 243n- Hartmann, Nicolai, 1, 17
245n, 286n, 289n Hartmann, 54n
Heereboord, Adrian [Adriano], 151
358 Kant’s Critique Within Modem Logic
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 10, Valerius), 149
24, 98 Jaspers, Karl, 28
Heimsoeth, Heinz, xvii, 1, 29n, 63n, Jaucourt, L. de, 254-255
65n, 66n, 76n, 93n, 95n-96n, 99n, Jéch, Alexander von, 201
101n-103n, 134n, 163n, 241 JBcher, Christian Gottlieb, 220n
Heine, Heinrich, 21, 29 Johnson, Samuel, 207, 215, 244n, 261,
Heineccius, Johann Gottlieb (Heineccii, 287n, 289
Io. Gottl.), 143-144 Jones, Richard Foster, 140n
Heinze, 238, 322 Jiissen, G., 211, 218
Helmont, J.-B. van, 245n
Herz, Marcus, xxvii, 53, 54n, 75n, 231-
234, 314-315 Kargon, Robert Hugh, 140n, 286n
Hinske, Norbert, vii, ix, xii-xiii, xvi,Keckermann, Bartholomeus (Kecker-
27, 75n, 291, 300n, 313n manni, Bartholomaei), 147, 158, 166,
Hippel, Th. G., 75n 193
Hobbes, Thomas, 151-152 Kemp Smith, Norman, xvii, 7, 62n,
Hoecker, Jonas (Hoeckerum, Jonam), 67n, 74n, 81, 104n, 241, 258n, 276,
193 299n
Hoffmann, Adolf Friedrich, 223 Kircher, Father Athanasius (Kircheri,
Hollmann, Samuel Christian (Hollman- Athanasii), 148-149
no, Samuel Christian [Samvele Chris- Knittermeyer, Hinrich, 291n
tiano}), 198, 206-207, 214, 282, 290n Koyre, A., 19, 28
Howell, Wilbur Samuel, 140n
Hoyo,Arturo del, 255n
Huet, Pierre Daniel, 15in, 206 Lambert, Johann Heinrich, xvii-xviii,
HughofSt. Victor, 153, 218 xxv-xxvi, 41n, 48, 87, 89, 123-128,
Hume, David, 3, 176 142, 155, 156, 158-165, 169-173,
Hunnius, Nikolaus (Hunnio, Nicolao), 177-178, 200-201, 208, 228, 236,
186 254-255, 285n, 291-293
Hutcheson, Francis, 256n Landes, Margaret W., 141n
Lange, Joachim (Langii, Joachimi), 8,
145, 175,
Inmscher, Hans Dietrich, 291n Lange, Johann Christian (Langen,
Johann Christian), 145n, 146
Launay, Gilles de, 151
Jische, Gottlob Benjamin, xv-xvi, xxiii, Lavater, J. C., 54n
xxix, 81, 83, 87-88, 90-91, 107, 109- Lavinheta, 267n
111, 114, 120, 177, 270, 274n, 296n, Lehmann,Gerhard, 33, 47n, 75n, 161n,
302n, 309-311, 315, 322 239n, 317n
Jaschio, Valerio (Jasche; Jaschius, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 3, 8,
 Person Index 359
45, 1400, 157, 196, 205, 208, 227n, Mendelssohn, Moses, xxi, 39
951-252, 255, 256n, 279n, 285n, Menzer, Paul, xxii, 49, 116
394n, 300n . Micraelius, Johannes (Micraelii, Joh.),
Lipen, Martin (Lipenii, Martini; 52n, 142, 151, 185n, 188, 195, 203,
Lipenius), 2860 212, 262, 280, 286, 288
Lippius, Johana (Lippi, Johannis), 186 Misch, 28
Lipsius, Justus (Lipsi, Ivsti), xxvi, 181, Monteiro, 8
286 Morasch, Joanne Adamo [Johann
Locke, John, xxi, 3, 46, 176, 244n, Adam], 289n-290n
284, 2850 Morestellus, Pierre (Morestel; More-
Lorich, Johann (Lorichii, Iodoci), 193 stello, Petro), 157
Lucretius, 180 Morgenstern, Christian, 34
Lull, Raymén (Raymond Lully; Ray- Morhof, Daniel Georg (Morhofii,
mundus Lullus), 140n, 148, 155n, Danielis Georgii), 155n
157, 266-267 Morin, Jean, 256n
Luporini, C., 13-14 Mortet, Ch., 180n
Lushingtonius, Thomas (Lushingtonii, Mosheim, Johann Lorenz von (Mos-
Thomae), 144n-145n hemius, Joannes Laurentius), 206,
Lycosthene, Conrado, 150n 2550
Mosnerio, Petro, 144n
Miller, August Friedrich, 221, 288n-
Magirus, Johann (Magiri, Joannis), 286, 290n
287n Miiller, Johann Peter Andreas, 222-223
Major, John, 156 290n
Malebranche, Nicolas, 232, 255n Miller, F. Max, 300n
Martini, Jakob [Jocobo, Jacobi], 9, 149,
150n, 166, 262
Mastrius, Bartholomaeus, 9, 166 Needham,John Tuberville, 248
Matthiae, Jacobus, 220 Needham, Noél Joseph Terence Mont-
Mattia, 1., 220n gomory, 246n-248n
Maturi, W., 13 Newton, Isaac, xiv, 2, 23, 32n, 140n,
Mauch, Otto, 217-218 27In
Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau de, Nicolai, Heinrich {Henrico}, 148
22-23, 33, 248 Nicolai, Gottlob Samuel, 144n
Meier, Georg (Meieri, Georgi; Meiero, Nolle, Heinrich (Nollio, Henrico), 168n
Georgio), 150, 167, 168n, 196, 219 Nordenskidld,Erik, 246n
Meier, George Friedrich, xvi, 31, 132,
144, 214, 223, 253, 255, 256n, 281-
282, 314 Ong, Walter Jackson, 156n, 157
Meiners, Christoph, 209 Oppel, Herbert, 178
360 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Oswald, 33 Henningo; Rennemannus), 157, 158n
Reinhard, Adolf Friedrich von, 264n
Reusch, Joann Peter (Revschio, loanne
Pace, Giulio (Pacii, Ivl. a Beriga; Petro), xxv, 126-127, 145-146, 158,
Pacius, Julius a Beriga), 166 198, 281
Pardon, William, 261n, 286n, 289n Reuter, Christian, 21
Paul, St., 179 Reyher, Andreas (Reyhero, Andrea),
Penrose, Steven Beasley Linnard, Jr., 151
140n Richelet, Pierre, 203-204, 286n
Petronius, 180 Riehl, Alois (Aloys), 30n
Pfuel, Joan, Em. [Johann Ernst}, 186 Rilke, Rainer Maria, 17
Philo, 179 Risse, Wilhelm, 3, 134, 136, 140n,
Plato, 39n, 144, 147, 157n, 182n, 189, 144n, 147n, 155n, 166n, 177n, 199n
208, 232, 255, 304 Ritter, Joachim, 153n, 211, 218
Plessner, H., 16, 28 Roeser, Columbani, 264n
Pliny the Younger, 180 Roger, Jacques, 245n, 247n-248n
Ploucquet, Godofredo [Gottfried] Roretz, Karl, 247n-248n
(Ploveqvet, Godofredi), 155, 207, Rossi, Paolo, 137n, 139n, 140n, 155n,
263, 290n 267
Pluche, Noél, 285n Riidiger, Andreae [Andreas] (Ridigeri,
Pohlenz, Max, 255n Andreae; Ruediger, Andreas), 132,
Poiret, Petri [Pierre], 152 145, 175, 190, 220-223, 280, 290
Polyclitus, 178 Ruello, Francis, 198
Porreta, Gilbert, 153, 218
Praetorius, Hieronymus (Praetori,
Hieronymi), 186 Sattler, Johann Tobias, 201
Prantl, 18 Scaliger, Jules-César, 245n
Pythagoras, 179, 183 Scaravelli, L., 13-15, 19
Scheibler, Christoph (Scheibleri,
Christophori; Scheiblero,
Quintilian, 180 Christophoro), 149, 289n
Schlapp, Otto, 315n
Schlegel, Gottlieb, 200
Rabe, Paul (Raben, Pauli), 135, 169 Schmidt, Ferdinandus, 291-292
Rédl, Emanuel, 246n, 248n Schmidt, Johann Jakob, 287
Ramus,Petrus, xxv, 144, 148-149, 156- Schott (Kaspar, Gasparis, Gaspar]
157 (Schotto, Gaspare), 141, 154
Ratke, Wolfgang, 148 Schrimpf, G., 153n, 218
Rees, D. A., 284n Schubert, Johann Ernst (Schvberti,
Reimmannus, Henningus (Rennemanno, Ioannis Eesti), 187, 198
 g, Hermann, 287n
Hans, 213, 218, 285n
gchul2, iudwig, 184n, 294n, 29g orreién, P,
cae Richard N., 164n Tschimh, Be 06
Sc 145, ;

Giovanni, 247n
solinass Gaston,
is, 140n
, Johannis, 152
er Baruch (Benedict), 3, 279,
stanley» Thomas (Stanleio, Thoma), Vaihin
vi, 131, 181, 199 68n, ger,
709-7Hans,
60" exviii 3;
a 66n,67,
ae, Fr., C. 33 Valandus, G., 168n
stieler, Kaspar von, 174n, 273n Valla, Georgius (Vallae,
surimes, Samuel (Strimesio, Samuele; 1540 Georgii), 153,
Strimesius), 1680 Van Leeuwen, Henry
sulzer, Johann Georg, 33 Verneaux, Roger, 78n G.. + 140n
gwedenborg, Immanuel, 246-247 Voltaire, Fran gois Marie Aro
gyrbius, Johann Jakob (Syrbii, To. 285n uet de,
Jacobi), 175, 186, 197, 252

Wagner, Georg [Georgius] (V Vagnerus,

qetens, Johann Nicolafu]s, xxvi, 141n- Georgius), 167, 1681
142n, 177-178, 201 Walch, Johann Georg (Walchii, Io.
Thierry of Chartres, 153, 218 Georgii), xxvi, 3, 131, 175, 182, 188,
Thomasius, Christian (Thomasii, 206, 221, 227n, 280, 282, 286, 288,
Christiani), xxv-xxvi, 127, 131, 152, 289n
157, 169, 173-177, 182, 252n, 262 Watson, Michael (Watsonii, Michaelis),
Thomasius, Jakob (Thomasii, Jacobi), 150
157, 163n, 173, 174, 176 Watt, Robert, 285n-286n
Thiimmig, Ludwig Philipp (Thimmigii, Wiener, Philip P., 256n, 272n
Ludovici Philippi), 281-282 Wiest, Stephan [Stephanus], 187, 201-
Timpler, Clement (Timplero, Cle- 202, 209
mente), 9, 166 Winckelmann, Johann Justus (Winkel-
Titio, Gottlieb Gerhard, 205 mann; VVynkelmanni, Johannis Justi),
Tonelli, Grazia, ix, xii 151, 264n
Tonelli, Leonida, 14 Winckler, Angelo [Angelus], 187, 199-
Tonnies, Johann Heinrich (Toennies, 200
Johannes Henr.), 141, 142n, 154, Wolff, Caspar Friedrich, 248
362 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Wolff, Christian (Wolf, Christiani L. B. Yvon, Abbé, 2640
de; Wolffii, Christiani; Wolfio,
Christiano), xviii, 8, 31, 40n-41n, 45,
126, 144, 145n, 159, 169n, 173, 187, Zabarella, Jacobus, 166
197-198, 206, 214, 227, 235, 240- Zallinger, Jacobo (Jakob Anton von
241, 252-253, 262, 264n, 267-268, _Zallinger Zum Thurm), 209
273n, 279-282, 283n, 290n, 291, 294, Zeidler, Johann Gottfried, 288n
299, 322 Zwinger, Theodor (Zuingeri, Theodori),
Wower, Joan. A. (Johan{n] von; 150
Wouwer), 157n
Wundt, Max, 1, 167n, 168n, 173n,
228n
 INDEX OF KANT’S WorKs

qe bi

General Natural History and Theory of the Universe (Allgemeine Naturgeschichte

‘ind Theorie des Himmels)--AK.-Ausg. I (1755)
230 248n

A.New Expositionof the First Principles ofMetaphysical Knowledge (N

ige (Nova
Dilucidatio)--AK.-Ausg. I (1755)
416 38n

The Only Possible Premise for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (Der
einzig mdgliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes)--AK.-
Ausg. I (1763)
105-108 248n
114-115 248n
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and of the Sublime (Beobachtungen
ther das Gefithl des Schénen und Erhabenen)--AK.-Ausg. Il (1764)
314

363
364 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals
(Untersuchung uber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsdtze der natilrlichen Theologie
und der Moral)-AK.-Ausg. I (1764)
280-281 38n

Announcement (Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem

Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766)--AK.-Ausg. II (1765)
xxi, 38, 105
307-310 38n
310-311 38n
312 38n

Dreams ofa Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics (Traume eines

Geistersehers, erldutert durch Traume der Metaphysik)--AK.-Ausg. II (1766)
xiv, 32n, 277m

On the Ultimate Foundation of Regions in Space (Von dem ersten Grundedes

Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume)--AK.-Ausg. Il (1768)
377 38n

Dissertation, or The Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
(De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilisformaet principiis)--AK.-Ausg. 11 (1770),
xxi, xxix, 105, 110, 226, 228, 326
§5 2210
§7 80n, 2270
§8 40
§12 80n, 227m
§15C-D 227m
§ 20 236n, 256
§23 38n, 40, 227n
§ 24 40
§ 28 236n
§30 40
 Index of Kant’
8 Works 365
eye of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft AK.-Ausg.11 ana ty a
ciate 1786)
785+

prefte? Aix 4,285n19, 68, 279

Axx 270
A XxI 68, 297n
Bx 88n
B xi 66
B Xxil 96n

satroawetio?
bi 4, 19, 23, 23, 93 93, 107, 301, 312
4,
‘A 10-13 37
‘4 10-16 xxiii, 66-80
All 68, 77-78,85
‘A 11-12 72, 74, 104
Al2 72, 15-11
AL 75
A 13-14 297
A 13-16 75
‘4 14-15; B 28-29 299
transcendental Theory of Elements
xxiv, 6, 91, 94-96, 100, 104n, 113

Transcendental Aesthetic
7, 55, 79, 92, 231, 322
A 21; B 35n 315n
A 46; B63 719
B71 298

Transcendental Logic
6, 76n, 92, 94-95, 231, 322
A 52; B76 60, 81-82, 85
A 52-55; B 77-79 61
A 55; B 80 85
A 55-57; B 79-81 61
366 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Transcendental Logic (cont.)
A 57; B81 85
A 57; B 81-82 62, 62n, 64
A 58-62; B 82-86 63
A 62; B 87 64
A 62-64; B 87-88 64
A 63; B88 64-65, 80

Transcendental Analytic
6, 31, 91, 93-94, 176-177

Analytic of Concepts
7, 91, 111, 120, 127, 172, 335
A 82-83; B 108-109 96n
A 83; B 109 91
A 86-87; B 118-119 2850
B 167 249

Analytic ofPrinciples
xxiv, 7, 65, 111, 119-120, 122
A 130-132; B 169-171 104
A 131-132; B 170-171 64
A 132; BTL 65, 119
A 132-134; B 171-173 65
A 132-135; B 171-174 60n, 64n
A 135; B 174 104, 119
A 135-136; B 174-175 119
A 136; B 175 120

Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment

104
Schematism ofthe Pure Concepts of the Understanding
260
A 137; B 176 104
System ofAll Principles of Pure Understanding
A 148; B 187 104
A 154; B 193 76n
A 156; B 195 104, 120
A 156-157; B 195-196 66
 Index of Kant's Works 367
pe Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and
mena
Nou A 247; B 303 297

‘transcendental Dialectic
6-7, 31, 76n, 96, 101, 111, 230-231
A 329; B 385 66
A 329; B 385-386 94
A 334-335; B 391-392 297-298
B 395n 297
B 399-401 121
A 347; B 405 284n
B 421 103, 121, 297n
A 408; B 435 297
A S53: 563 284n
A 550; B 578 284n
A 568; B 596 272
A 580; B 608 298
632 298
A 631; B 659 298
A 63 664 297
A 63 666 297
A 640; B 668 103, 297
A 672; B 700 297
A 688; B 716 284n
Transcendental Theory of Method
xxiv, 6, 76n, 79, 90-96, 98-101, 104n, 107,
109, 111, 113, 116, 241, 243, 250, 274
A 107-708; B 735-736 91, 94

Discipline of Pure Reason

96, 98, 101, 116
Aq 737 98
A 709-710; B 737-738 99
A 710-711; B 738-739 99
ATl 66, 87n, 98-99
A712; B 740 100
A 738ff; B 766ff 101
A 739; B 767 102
368 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Discipline of Pure Reason (cont.)
A 761; B 789 102
A 764; B 792 102
CanonofPure [practical] Reason
93, 95, 98, 101, 132
A795; B 823 80, 99, 101
A 795-796; B 823-824 1030
A 796; B 824 64n, 65, 79
A 796-797; B 824-825 101
A 797; B 825 93
A 814; B 842 298
Architectonic of Pure Reason
xxvii-xxix, 4, 6, 59, 71, 73-74, 89, 225, 231,
241-300, 303-305, 307-308, 310-312, 323
A 832; B 860 243, 257-258, 275n
A 832-833; B 860-861 243
A 832-835; B 860-863 242
A 833; B 861 27in, 275
A 834; B 862 243
A 834-835; B 862-863 265
A 835; B 863 245, 249
A 835; B 864 266
A 835-837; B 863-865 242
A 837; B 865 242, 267
A 838; B 866 268-269, 271, 274
A 838-839; B 866-867 272
A 838-840; B 866-869 242
A 839; B 867 210, 273
A 839-840; B 867-868 258
A 840; B 868 242, 267, 271n, 275-276, 278
A 840-847; B 868-875 B
A 841; B 869 277, 297
A 841-842; B 869-870 242
A 842; B 870 277
A 842-843; B 870-871 295
A 842-844; B 870-872 278
A 842-845; B 870-873 242
A 842-849; B 870-877 240
 Index of Kant’s Works 369
‘architectonic of Pure Reason (cont.)
A 843; B 871 279
A 844; B 872 279
A 845; B 873 283, 295
A 845-846; B 873-874 71, 242, 293
A 846; B 874 284, 293
A 847; B 875 258
A 847-848; B 875-876 298
A 847-849; B 875-877 242
A 848; B 876 295, 300, 308
A 849; B 877 242
A851; B 879 102
History of Pure Reason
55, 250, 266
A 852; B 880 266
A 853; B 881 266

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic (Prolegomena zu einer kinftigen

Metaphysik)--AK.-Ausg. 1V (1783)
xviii, xxviii, 117, 284, 301
261-262 301
279 74n, 301
302-304 284n
305-307 284n
324 301
327-328 66n
362 1170
365 301
371 301
371-372 740

Foundation ofthe Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der

Sitten)--AK.-Ausg. 1V (1785)
Xxviii, xxx, 15, 288, 301n, 303-308, 312-313,
316, 320, 339
387 111n, 112n, 303
387-388 304
370 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals (cont.)
388 303
388-389 306
391 306
410 288n
424 1120

Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science (Metaphysische Anfangsgrande der

Naturwissenschafi)--AK.-Ausg. 1V (1786)
xxviii, xxx, 80n, 301n, 307-309, 320, 340
468 87n
469-470 80n, 87n
470 308
471 87n, 308
473-474 264n, 308

Critique of Practical Reason (Second Critique, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft)-~

AK.-Ausg. V (1788)
15-16, 114-115, 117, 260, 306, 316, 318
10 260n
82 1170
86 1170
120 114n

Second Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (Second Introduction, 1790),

xxix, 311, 313, 317-321
171 317n
172 317n
172-173 317n
174 317n
176 317n
179 3170

Critique of Judgment (Third Critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft)--AK.-Ausg. V (1790)

16-17, 19, 118, 121, 314, 317, 321-323
170 121n
176 12In
 Index of Kant’s Works 371
Critique of Judgment (cont.)
194 121n
319 118n
417 118n, 121n
432 118n

Religion Within the Boarders of Reason Only (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen
der blofen Vernunft)—AK.-Ausg. VI (1793)
118
58 118n
180 118n

Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten)--AK.-Ausg. VI. (1797)

118, 122
217 118n
452 118n
477 122n
485 118n

The Strife of the Faculties (DerStreit der Fakultaten)--AK.-Ausg. VII (1798)

108
37 108n

Pragmatic Anthropology (Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht)—AK.-Ausg.

‘VII (1798)
300

On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been
Made Superfluous by an Earlier One (Uber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue
Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine dltere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll)-—
AK.-Ausg. VIII (1790)
112
227 112n
372. Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Concerning the Old Saw: That May be Right in Theory But it Won't Work in
Practice (Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein)--AK.-
Ausg. VIII (1793)
112-113
2n 113

Proclamation of the Immanent Conclusion of a Treaty ofEternal Peace in

Philosophy (Verkiindigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Tractats zum ewigen
Frieden in der Philosophie)--AK.-Ausg. VIII (1796)
113
420 113n

Jéische Logic (Logik, herausgegeben von Gottlob Benjamin Jasche)--AK.-Ausg. IX

xv-xvi, xxiii, xxix, 81, 83, 87-88, 90-91, 107,
109-112, 114, 120-121, 177, 270-271, 309-
311, 315, 322
13 83n, 87n, 111n, 114n, 296n
14-16 121n
15 81n, 111n, 296n, 315
17 88n, 111n
17-18 88n, 302n
18 88n, 302n
19 29€n
19-20 83n
22-23 309
24 274n, 310-311
24-25 310
25 271in
71 112n

Pedagogy (Pédagogik, herausgegeben von Friedrich Theodor Rink)--AK.-Ausg.

Ix
118
Correspondence (Briefwechsel)--AK.-Ausg. X
39, 53-54, 228, 231, 233-234
70-71 39n
 Index of Kant’s Works 373
Correspondence (cont.)
97-98 41n
98 228n
123 314-315
124 231n
125-127 232n
129 315
131-132, 750
136-139 233n
145 750
165 S4n
169 S4n
199 53n
213 S4n

Reflections on Anthropology (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie)--AK.-Ausg. XV

314
626 38n
938 246n

Reflections on Logic (Reflexionen zur Logik)--AK.-Ausg. XVI

49-52, 59, 106, 110, 115, 118
p. 72 3in
1567 38n
1575 38n
1579 38n, 48n, 57n
1585 450
1589 450
1596 44n
1601-1608 52n
1612 52n
1627 Iiin
1628 111n, 296n, 315n
1629 296n
2703 235n, 259n
2835 59n, 235n
374 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic
Reflections on Metaphysics, Part 1 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik)--AK.-Ausg. XVI
45, 49-50, 59, 105-106, 115, 118, 226, 229-
230, 232-233
3932 2270
3939 50n, 226n
3946 50n
3948 226n
3949 50n, 2260
3951 50n, 226
3952 226n
3957 50n, 2260
3959 50n, 226n
3964 On, 226
3970 50n, 226n
4149 228n
4150 xxix, 231, 332
4161 xxix, 229, 288, 329
4163 xxix, 228, 327
4166 228n
4168 xxix, 228, 328
4217 236n
4231 228n
4432 S2n
4445 Sin, 230n
4454 231n
4455 50n, 75n, 230
4457 Sin, 2300
4459 Sin, 66n,
4460 231n, 237
4465 50n
4466 50n
4467 230n
4471 230n
4534 248n
4552 248n
4597 236n
4643 231n
4676 231n
4758 2350,
4759 59n
 Index of Kant’s Works 375
Reflections on Metaphysics, Part I (cont.)
4781 S6n, 237n
4843 238n

Reflections on Metaphysics, Part 2 (Reflexionen zur Metaphysik)--AK.-Ausg.

XVIII
52-59, 82-83, 106-107, 110, 115-116,118,
234-238, 300
4849 238n
4851 52n, 54n, 234n, 285n
4852 2340
4855 234n
4858 S3n
4861 234n
4865 54n, 57n
4866 285n
4869 237n
4877 S2n
4880 234n
4889 234n
4892 56n
4893 236n, 285n
4895 S3n
4896 54n
4897 S3n, 56n, 234n,
4911 59n, 235n
4925 52n
4927 235n
4929 5Sn
4931 55n
4934 55n
4937 235n
4938 SSn
4952 55n
4953 550
4970 2350
4985 5Sn
4986 53n, 56n, 58n, 58
4988 52n, 53n, 56n, 58
376 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
Reflections on Metaphysics, Part 2 (cont.)
4989 57n, 58
4993 234n
5003 SSn
5004 55n, 58n
5012 5Sn
5014 2370
5034 56n, 2370
5035 2360
5039 532
5044 57
5048 234n
5054 S5n
5058 5Sn
5063 54n, 550
5070 S6n
5074 SIn
5089 56n, S7n
5092 55n
5100 58n, 238n
5109 235n
Sil4 5Sn
5127 54n, 234n
5130 52n, 234n
5644 xxviii, 5, 74n, 86n, 300

First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment (First Introduction; Erste Einleitung

in die Kritix der Urteilskraft)--AK.-Ausg. XX (1789)
xxix, 121, 311, 313-320
195 313n
197 316n
198 316n
199 316n
199-200 316n
199-201 316n
200 316n
202 314n
202-205 314n
205 121n, 314n
242 121n
 Index of Kant’s Works 377
p
_ e aMet c apheysics (Prrei
eissscschhririft uber diei Fortschritte
oi xxix, 118, 122, 323
ey 3230
381-282 118n, 310n
508 323 n
305-297 310 n
323n

opus postumum, First Half--AK.-Ausg. XX1

xxiv, 108, 113, 118, 122
194, 209 108n, 113n
178, 180, 289, 361, 1180
506, 525
6, 91, 95, 102, 104, 122n
106, 117, 119, 133,
135, 619, 622

pus postumum, Second Half--AK.-Ausg. XXIL

118, 122
265 118n
172-174, 197, 317, 122n
(321), 335, 352-353,
361, 370, 373, 377-378,
380, 382-384, 389, 391,
393, 395-396, 398, 400,
407-408, 451, 459-460,
462, 470, 478, 482, 484,
500

Lectures on Logic (Vorlesungen uber Logik)-AK.-Ausg. XX1V.1

Logik Herder (1762-1764)
3 37n
378 Kant's Critique Within Modern Logic
‘Logik Blomberg (1771)
xxi, xxix, 42-43, 105, 113, 115, 229, 330
20 42n
pay 42n
26
3
35-37
37
Logik Philippi(1772)
xxi, xxix, 43-46, 105, 109, 113-115, 229, 331
313-314 229n
314 43n
31S 2290
316 44n, 2290
316-317 44n
317 43n, 45n, 2290
317-318 45n
318-319 45n
319 229n
321 45n
336 46n, 1140
338 46n
339 45n, 229n
344 229n

Lectures on Logic (Vorlesungen ilber Logik)—AK.-Ausg. XXIV.2

Logik Palitz (1772)

xvi, 112, 315
503 296n
504-505 83n
504-506 112n
505 87n,315n.
507 3020
509 1140
 Index of Kant’s Works 379
Logik Busolt (1790)
87-88, 107-108, 112
610 88n, 296n
610-611 112n

Logik Dohna (1792)

xxix, 83-84, 108, 112-113, 320-322
694 296n
694-695 112n, 1220
695-696 84n, 87n
697 320n-321n
699 306n, 320n
7719 84n, 112n

Wiener Logik
xvi, 84, 91, 108, 113
792 315n
792-794 1130
193 122n
794 296n
795 84n
796 114n
798 310n

Lectures on Metaphysics and Rational Theology (Vorlesungen ilber Metaphysik

und Rationaltheologie)--AK.-Ausg. XXVUI.1
Metaphysik Herder (1762-1764)
156 38n

Metaphysik L, (1775-1780)
xxi, XxWii, Xxix-xxx, 46, 75n, 106, 238-239,
288, 334-335,
173 239n
173-175 46n, 238n
174 239n, 2880
175 239n
177 238n
185 46n, 238n
380 Kant’s Critique Within Modern Logic

Metaphysik Volckmann (1784-1785)

Xxviii, 301-302, 305-306
359 303n
360 740,86n
360-361 302n
362-363 302n
363 5, 86n, 302n, 3050
363-364 T4n
364 302n
364-366 303n
366 302n
376-377 285n
377 303n
378 302n
390-391 302n

Metaphysik von Schdn (1785-1790?)

XxViii-xxix, 306, 309
463 309n
464 309n
468-469 306n
470-471 309n

Lectures on Metaphysics and Rational Theology (Vorlesungen aber Metaphysik

und Rationaltheologie)-—-AK.-Ausg. XXVIII.2.1
Metaphysik L, (1790-1791)
xxix, 33 (Politz), 310-312
531 31ln
532-534 311n
534 311n, 271n
540-542 312n
Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793)
xxix, 306, 321-322
616 306n, 322n
617 322n
651 322n
656 322n
y |

Index of Kant's Work

s 381
sik K, (after 1793)
metaphy xxix, 322
109 307, 322n

Metap hy ysik Ky (1794-17952) xainexn, 322-323

822
$2-824 an
323n

rauer Anthropology (Anthropologie Brauer, 1779)

315

4 Lecture of Kant’s on Ethics (Eine Vorlesung Kants dber Ethik or Ethik Menzer,
1780-1781) ”
xxii, 116
314-316 49n

Lectures on Anthropology (Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde)

33n

Lectures on Encyclopedia and Logic (Vorlesungen uber Enzyklopddie und Logik),

vol. I; Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia (Vorlesungen uber Philosophische
Enzyklopdidie, 1777-1780?)
xxi-xxii, xxvii, xxx, 33, 47, 750, 82-83, 87,
106, 239-240, 336
31-32 239n
36-38 239n
37 239n-240n
38 2390 |
390 239n
39-57 2390
57 161n
59 240n
60 91-92n, 239n |