IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA

AT TANGA
(CORAM; LILA, J.A.. KENTE J.A. AND MGEYEKWA J J U

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 97 OF 2023

FREDDY JANG'ANDU...................................................................... APPELLANT
VERSUS
ROBERT SHELUKINDO SHEKUSA (AS A LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE LATE YOSIA SHEKUSA MAZUNDE)..................................RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the Decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Tanga)
(Mansoor, J.)

Dated the 3rd day of March, 2023

in
Misc. Land Application No. 16 of 2021

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

i 2 th & 2 9 t h M a y 2025

KENTE, J.A:

This appeal arises from a ruling by the High Court of Tanzania (sitting

at Tanga), in Miscellaneous Land Application No. 16 of 2021 dated 3rd March,

2023. The appellant had, before the High Court, unsuccessfully applied for

enlargement of time within which to appeal against the decision of the District

Land and Housing Tribunal for Lushoto (the DLHT) denying him an extension

of time within which he could appeal to the said Tribunal to challenge the

decision made by the Vuga Ward Tribunal dated 11th July, 2019 in Land Case

No. 1 of 2018. The DLHT had, earlier on, declined the appellant's application
on the grounds that he had failed to account for each day of the delay to

take the necessary steps in the pursuit of the intended appeal.

The dispute between the parties herein relates to a piece of land

located at Bazo Area, Kweputu Village, in Lushoto District, Tanga Region. All

along, the appellant's claim has been that he purchased the said piece of

land from the late Yosia Shekusa Mazunde in June 2011 for TZS 500,000.00

which was paid by way of instalments. We should make the point here that,

it appears from the record that, at the time of death of Yosia Shekusa

Mazunde who died intestate on 19th November, 2013, the appellant was

already in occupation of the disputed land.

Feeling that the beneficiaries of the deceased's estate had been

deprived of their entitlement and, when they failed to resolve the dispute

over the ownership of the disputed piece of land with the appellant, one of

the said beneficiaries namely Rachel Yosia Shemuango decided to assert their

claimed right by commencing an action in the Ward Tribunal at Vuga. She

claimed for the return by the appellant of the disputed land which she

believed to be the property of her deceased father. However, in the course

of the hearing, it was found that the suit could not proceed in the name of

Rahel as she was not the administratrix of her deceased father's estate.

Accordingly, upon advice by the Ward Tribunal, one Alfred Philipo Shekusa

was duly appointed the administrator of the estate of the late Yosia Shekusa
Mazunde by the Soni Primary Court in Probate and Administration Cause No.

4 of 2019.

After the said appointment and, having taken over the role of the

plaintiff in the above -named suit, the proceedings before the Ward Tribunal

resumed. At the end of the trial in which a number of witnesses testified, the

Ward Tribunal found that indeed the land in dispute belonged to the late

Yosia Shekuza Mazunde and that it had never been sold to the appellant who

claimed to have purchased it.

Following the above decision by the Ward Tribunal, Alfred Shekusa

applied for execution of the decree which was in his favour. In response, the

appellant vainly sought to resist the intended execution by which he was

required to yield up vacant possession of the disputed land to the

beneficiaries of the estate of the late Yosia Shekuza Mazunde.

Dissatisfied by this turn of events, the appellant applied for stay of

execution in Miscellaneous Land Application No. 57 of 2021 but all to no vail

as the said application was struck out by the DLHT on 25th August 2021.

Aggrieved with the above outcome, but still desirous of pursuing what

he believed to be his rights, the appellant vainly applied to the DLHT seeking

an order for extension of time within which to appeal against the decision of

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the Ward Tribunal which had decided that the disputed land belonged to the

late Yosia Shekuza Mazunde.

Undaunted by the continuous defeat and, as expected, the appellant

who was once again behind schedule, applied to the High Court seeking for

enlargement of time with a view to appealing the decision made by the DLHT

denying him an extension of time to appeal against the Ward Tribunal's

decision. But then, as nature would have it, during the pendency of the

application before the High Court, the respondent Alfred Philipo Sekusa

passed on whereupon the present respondent was appointed and

subsequently impleaded in this dispute as administrator of the estate of the

late Yosia Shekuza Mazunde.

After hearing the parties, the learned High Court Judge could not

accept the appellant's contention that he was prevented from appealing the

decision of the DLHT in time on account of illness and waiting to be issued

with the documents that were necessary for the intended appeal. The learned

High Court Judge begun by laying a foundation that, in any application for

enlargement of time, the applicant is saddled with a duty to furnish a good

and sufficient cause to account for the delay involved. Subsidiary to the above

requirement, the learned Judge was mindful of the position obtaining under

our jurisprudence that, in an application for extension of time, the applicant

is required not only to furnish sufficient reason that explains the delay but

also to account for each day of the delay.

Proceeding from the above position of the law, the learned Judge went

on to reject the appellant's contention that he could not appeal within the

prescribed time as he was yet to be availed with the copy of the proceedings,

ruling and order that were necessary for him to pursue a meaningful appeal.

While rejecting the above explanation by the appellant, the reasoning of the

Judge was that, there was no law which required the appellant to attach

copies of the proceedings, judgment and decree or ruling and order as the

case may be to an appeal from the DLHT to the High Court which is supposed

to be lodged in the DLHT by way of a petition of appeal.

The learned Judge also refused to accept the appellant's explanation

that he could not appeal in time on account of illness and old age. Taking

into account the fact that the appellant had not attached to his affidavit any

medical chit showing that indeed he had fallen sick in the month of November

2020, the learned Judge took the view that the allegations of sickness were

not substantiated as they were not supported by any sufficient evidence in

the form of medical proof.

The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court and

has appealed against it on the grounds that:

5
 1. The learned High Court Judge fe ll into error when she refused to
allow the application fo r extension o f tim e in a dispute which was so
serious thereby occasioning injustice to him ;
2. By refusing to grant the application, the learned High Court Judge
took a rig id approach to the law a ll the more so because the judge
had h erself confirm ed the appellant's claim when she opined in the
course o f her ruling that the disputed piece o f land was vended
law fully to the appellant and that;
3. By refusing to allow the application the appellant was deprived o f
the ownership o f the disputed land while the refusal order opened
the door fo r the respondent to execute an undeserving decree.

Before us, the parties appeared in person without any legal

representation. Being lay, on being called upon to address the Court, they

had nothing substantial to augment their respective written submissions

which they had filed earlier on in terms of rule 106 (1) of the Tanzania Court

of Appeal Rules, 2009.

Going by his written submissions, it is certainly clear that the argument

of the appellant in support of the three grounds of appeal was anchored on

the principle that, while extension of time is granted by the court in the

exercise of its discretion which must be exercised judiciously depending on

the available evidence and the circumstances of each case subject to a good

and sufficient cause being furnished by the applicant, there are some

circumstances other than the requirement to furnish sufficient and good

6
cause which a court may have to take into consideration in determining an

application for extension of time. The case of Juto Ally Komba v. Aloyce

Msafiri Musika, Civil Application No. 484 of 2020 was cited as authority in

support of the above proposition.

That apart, in what appears to have been a total departure from what

the appellant had deponed in the supporting affidavit, he also contended in

his written submission but without elaborating, that the decision by the Ward

Tribunal was tainted with illegality a fact which was, in his understanding, a

good cause for enlargement of time. It was further argued that denying the

appellant an extension of time had the cumulative effect of denying him a

fair hearing before a decision could be made that affected him.

For his part, the respondent in his written submissions was relatively

very brief. But all in all, he saw it differently. Citing several instances in which

the appellant had been undisputedly dilatory in the pursuit of his rights, the

respondent submitted that, the appellant cannot be heard to say that he was

denied of his right to be heard as he was the author of his own misfortune

when he decided to act sluggishly. Upon the above submissions, we were

urged to dismiss the three grounds of appeal as well as the entire appeal

allegedly for want of merit.

In determining this appeal, it is important that in order to facilitate a

proper appreciation of the ruling of the High Court the subject of the appeal
before this Court, we have to start with a restatement of the law which is

that, the grant of an extension of time to file appeal out of time is within the

discretionary power of the court. Obviously, the court's discretion has to be

exercised judiciously upon the available evidence but in the end, each case

turns on its own set of circumstances and facts. But of paramount importance

and this is the heart of any application for enlargement of time, is the need

for sufficient reason to be put forward by the applicant to explain the delay

involved throughout the entire period concerned. That is essentially what we

said in the case of Rudolf Temba and Another v. Zanzibar Insurance

Corporation [2008] T.L.R. 321.

As it will be noted, in the application before the High Court, the

appellant grumbled that the delay to appeal was due to the unavailability of

copies of the DLHT ruling and drawn order which were finally made available

to him on 5th November 2020 and his falling sick on 6th through to 26th

November, 2020. As stated earlier, after hearing the parties and considering

all the circumstances surrounding this case, the learned High Court Judge

was not satisfied that the appellant had furnished sufficient reason and

accounted for the delay involved. To recapitulate, whereas in the first place,

the High Court Judge took the view that there was no legal basis upon which

the appellant could be heard to say that he was waiting for the copies of

ruling and drawn order to be issued to him, in the second place, the learned

8
Judge found that evidence was lacking to support the appellant's allegations

of indisposition in the month of November, 2020.

The learned Judge justified her findings in the preceding paragraph by

reviewing the procedure applicable to appeals from the DLHT to the High

Court and evaluating the evidence which she found lacking to support the

appellant's allegations of illness. The filing of an appeal from the DLHT to the

High Court, she said and correctly so in our view, does not require the

intending appellant to append the copies of the impugned ruling and drawn

order to the petition of appeal.

On our part, we have no reason to fault the findings by the High Court

Judge. Considering the appellant's dilatory approach to this matter, we are

disinclined to hold that he had furnished any sufficient reason to account for

delay and finally to explain the delay for each of the days involved in the

relevant period. Like the learned High Court Judge, we do not agree with the

appellant that it was necessary for him to append copies of the impugned

ruling and drawn order to the petition of appeal which he was by law required

to lodge in the DLHT. Likewise, we take the view that, in the absence of a

medical certificate or sick note to prove illness as a reason for failure to

initiate the appellate process, it cannot be said even with the slightest degree

of certitude that the appellant was precluded from filing appeal in time on

account of indisposition. The point that we wish to drive home from the above
9
discussion is that, illness which is an unavoidable aspect of human life must

not be pleaded on flimsy grounds and turned into a maze for evasion of one's,

responsibilities under the law. It should always be remembered that in any

application of the present nature, it is that not enough to plead indisposition

as the appellant had done in this case without going far to lead evidence in

support of the allegation.

On the flip side, while we are mindful that a factor such as illegality of

the decision sought to be challenged on appeal is of great importance and

can, in certain circumstances, constitute the basis for extension of time, we

are reluctant to deal with the appellant's belated complaint that the decision

of the Ward Tribunal which is sought to be appealed against was tainted with

illegality. We say so because, the said complaint was not raised before the

High Court so as to call on the learned High Court Judge to pronounce herself

on whether or not the impugned decision of the Ward Tribunal was prim a

facie tainted with illegality as alleged by the appellant. That being the case,

it would not be appropriate in the circumstances of this case for this Court to

decide the legality or otherwise of the decision of the Ward Tribunal which is

attacked on appeal for the first time.

As a consequence of our holdings herein-above, we are compelled to

determine the substantive issues raised in this appeal in the negative. That

is to say, the learned High Court Judge was on firm ground when she found
10
that, the appellant could not appeal to challenge the decision of the DLHT

within the prescribed period because of his own tardily response to court

orders that were adverse to him. The net result of our preceding

determination is that, there is no merit in the entire appeal which is doomed

to fail as we so hold.

The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that, the appeal is hereby

dismissed with costs.

DATED at TANGA this 28th day of May, 2025.

S. A. LILA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

P. M. KENTE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

A. Z. MGEYEKWA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

Judgment delivered this 29th day of May, 2025 in the presence of the

Appellant and Respondent, via Teleconferencing is hereby certified as a true

CO py Of r v r in in a l

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