Discussion Note: Resolving the Probability Objection in

The Educative Matrix Using Transitive Natural Theology

and the Ultimate Goodness Principle
Kyle Alander
In my book The Educative Matrix, an objection arises concerning the integration of an
axiological theory (K) into theistic belief (T). Critics argue that if K has an extremely low
independent probability 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖, it could potentially reduce the intrinsic probability of theism.
This note addresses the objection by first explaining the initial contradiction that seems to arise
when combining T and K. Then, by employing the Transitive Natural Theology (TNT)
framework and emphasizing the role of the Ultimate Goodness Principle (UGP) within the S-
type World (S), we demonstrate that the intrinsic probability of theism remains unaffected. This
is achieved by recognizing that K is not independent but is constrained by the UGP, ensuring that
𝑃(𝐾) is not intrinsically improbable relative to the UGP. We also reinterpret confirmation rule 2
in light of this framework.

Introduction
In Chapter 5 of The Educative Matrix, I explore the intricate relationship between theism (T) and
axiological theories (K) that describe the best actions a divine being would perform. A
significant objection arises when considering that K, while entailed by T, appears to have an
extremely low independent probability 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖. The concern is that this low 𝑃(𝐾) would
reduce the intrinsic probability of theism 𝑃(𝑇), contradicting the assumption that 𝑃(𝑇) is at least
one-third (⅓).
This discussion note aims to:
1. Explain the Objection: Detail how the low independent probability of K seemingly
lowers 𝑃(𝑇).
2. Show the Initial Contradiction: Present the mathematical contradiction that emerges
under standard Bayesian reasoning.
3. Provide the Solution: Demonstrate, using the TNT framework and the role of the UGP
within S, how the contradiction is resolved by recognizing that K is not independent and
is constrained by the UGP.
4. Mathematical Proof: Offer a comprehensive mathematical proof supporting the
proposed solution, showing that 𝑃(𝐾) remains consistent with 𝑃(𝑇) when the UGP is
considered.
5. Philosophical Conformity to Confirmation Rules: Reinterpret confirmation rule 2 in
light of the UGP, ensuring the coherence and viability of integrating K into T.
1. The Objection Explained
The Core Concern
The primary concern centers on the relationship between theism (T) and an axiological theory
(K). Specifically, if K is entailed by T (i.e., 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑇) = 1), but K has an extremely low
independent probability 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖, then Bayesian probability suggests that the intrinsic
probability of theism 𝑃(𝑇) must also be low. This poses a challenge to the assumption that 𝑃(𝑇)
is at least one-third (⅓).

Why This Seems Problematic

1. Entailment Link: Since K is entailed by T, 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑇) = 1. If theism is true, then the
axiological theory K must necessarily hold.
2. Low 𝑃(𝐾): An extremely low 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖 implies that, independent of theism, the
probability of K is negligible.
3. Standard Bayesian Calculation: Using the Law of Total Probability without
considering the interdependence between K and T, the low 𝑃(𝐾) feeds back into
lowering 𝑃(𝑇). This creates a paradox where accepting T leads to an untenably low
1
𝑃(𝑇), contradicting the initial assumption of 𝑃(𝑇) = .
3

Illustrative Example
Consider K to be an axiological theory that outlines a specific and highly improbable moral
framework. If K is entailed by T but independently 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖 (e.g., 𝜖 = 10−10 ), then integrating
K into T suggests that theism should also have a very low probability, undermining the
1
foundational premise that 𝑃(𝑇) ≥ .
3

2. The Initial Contradiction

To elucidate the contradiction, we initially apply the Law of Total Probability without
considering the interdependence between K and T.

Assumptions
1. Intrinsic Probability of Theism:
1
𝑃(𝑇) =
3
2. Conditional Probabilities:
o 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑇) = 1 (K is entailed by T)
o 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ ¬𝑇) = 𝜖 (K has an extremely low probability given ¬𝑇)
3. Independent Probability of K:
𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖
Applying the Law of Total Probability
Without considering the interdependence, the Law of Total Probability states:
 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑇) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑇) + 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ ¬𝑇) ⋅ 𝑃(¬𝑇)
Substituting the given values:
1 2 1 2
𝑃(𝐾) = (1) ⋅ ( ) + (𝜖) ⋅ ( ) = + 𝜖
3 3 3 3
Given that 𝜖 is extremely small:
1
𝑃(𝐾) ≈
3
Contradiction
1
This calculation indicates that 𝑃(𝐾) ≈ , which contradicts the initial assumption that 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖.
3
The contradiction arises because, under standard Bayesian reasoning, the low independent
1
probability of K forces 𝑃(𝑇) to also be low, conflicting with 𝑃(𝑇) = .
3

3. Resolving the Contradiction with Transitive Natural Theology (TNT)

and the UGP
The Role of the Ultimate Goodness Principle (UGP)
The Ultimate Goodness Principle (UGP) states that a state of affairs (S) can be instantiated by
God if and only if, at some time, S permanently bears the axiological status of being good on the
whole. This principle serves as a crucial constraint on theistic actions and predictions, dictating
that any divine action must ultimately align with ultimate goodness.

Transitive Natural Theology (TNT) Framework

TNT offers a framework that recognizes K is not independent but is constrained by the UGP
within the S-type World (S). The key points are:
• K is Modeled within S: S embodies the UGP and models all acceptable axiological
theories K that are consistent with the UGP.
• K is Not Independent: K cannot be independently improbable if it aligns with the UGP
because the UGP constrains the range of acceptable K.
• Interdependence of T, S, and K: Theism (T) entails S (the UGP-constrained world),
which in turn entails K. Therefore, K's probability is intrinsically linked to T via S.
Integration of K into T via S and the UGP
In the TNT framework:
• S Includes the UGP: The S-type World incorporates the UGP, constraining any
acceptable axiological theory K.
• K's Probability Relative to the UGP: K is only improbable if it violates the UGP. Since
K is consistent with the UGP, 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ UGP) is not intrinsically improbable.
 • Reinterpreting 𝑃(𝐾): The independent probability 𝑃(𝐾) should be assessed relative to
the UGP, not in isolation.

4. Mathematical Proof
Goal
Demonstrate that when K is constrained by the UGP within S, the intrinsic probability of theism
𝑃(𝑇) remains unaffected by the low independent probability 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖 because K is not
independent but is conditional on the UGP.

Proof Steps
1. Define the Variables:

o 𝑇: Theism
o 𝑆: S-type World incorporating the UGP
o 𝐾: Axiological Theory consistent with the UGP
o UGP: Ultimate Goodness Principle
2. Establish Relationships:

o 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑆) = 1: K is entailed by S (since S includes the UGP, which constrains K)

o 𝑃(𝑆 ∣ 𝑇) = 1: S is entailed by T
o 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑇) = 1: Since T entails S and S entails K
o 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ ¬𝑆) = 0: If the UGP is not in place (¬𝑆), K is impossible
o 𝑃(𝑆 ∣ ¬𝑇) = 0: Without T, S (which includes the UGP) is not instantiated
3. Reevaluating 𝑃(𝐾) Relative to the UGP:

Since K is only possible if it aligns with the UGP, and the UGP is part of S, we assess 𝑃(𝐾)
as:

𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ 𝑆) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑆) + 𝑃(𝐾 ∣ ¬𝑆) ⋅ 𝑃(¬𝑆) = (1) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑆) + (0) ⋅ (1 − 𝑃(𝑆)) = 𝑃(𝑆)

4. Compute 𝑃(𝑆):

Since 𝑃(𝑆 ∣ ¬𝑇) = 0:

𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑃(𝑆 ∣ 𝑇) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑇) + 𝑃(𝑆 ∣ ¬𝑇) ⋅ 𝑃(¬𝑇) = (1) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑇) + (0) ⋅ (1 − 𝑃(𝑇)) = 𝑃(𝑇)

Therefore:

𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑃(𝑇)

5. Consistency of Probabilities:
1
Since 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝑇) = , the probability of K is intrinsically linked to 𝑃(𝑇) and is not
3
independently low. The initial assumption that 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖 is incorrect when K is
constrained by the UGP within S.
 6. Addressing the Initial Contradiction:

The initial contradiction arose because we treated K as independent and assigned

𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖. However, since K is constrained by the UGP in S, K is not independently
1
improbable. Instead, 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝑇) = , resolving the contradiction.
3

Conclusion of the Proof

By recognizing that K is not independent but is constrained by the UGP within S, we show that
𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝑇), and the intrinsic probability of theism remains unaffected. The low independent
probability 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝜖 does not apply in this framework.

5. Philosophical Conformity to Confirmation Rules

Reinterpreting Confirmation Rule 2
Original Rule: The probability of the axiological theory (A), 𝑃(𝐴), must not be zero and must
not be intrinsically improbable.
Reinterpreted Rule in Light of the UGP: The probability of K must be non-zero and not
intrinsically improbable relative to the UGP.

Ensuring Conformity within TNT

1. (T&A) are Relevant to Each Other:

o K is directly modeled within S, which is fully entailed by T. The UGP constrains

K, ensuring a meaningful connection between T and K.
2. The 𝑃(𝐴) is Non-Zero and Not Intrinsically Improbable Relative to the UGP:

o Since K is consistent with the UGP, it is not intrinsically improbable. The

1
probability 𝑃(𝐾) = 𝑃(𝑇) = reflects this.
3
3. (E&K) Doesn't Decrease the 𝑃(𝐴):

o Evidence E consistent with K and the UGP does not decrease 𝑃(𝐾). The TNT
framework maintains 𝑃(𝐾) when T is considered.
4. (E&K) Doesn't Entail a Violation of the UGP:

o K is constrained by the UGP, ensuring no violation occurs.

5. (E) is a Prediction of (T&A):

o Evidence E logically follows from the combination of T and K within the UGP-
constrained S.
6. 𝑃(𝐸 ∣ 𝑇&𝐴) > 𝑃(𝐸 ∣ 𝑇&¬𝐴):

o The probability of observing E is greater when both T and K (consistent with the
UGP) are true than when T is true without K.
The Role of the UGP in Constraining K
By incorporating the UGP into S, we ensure that any acceptable K must be consistent with the
UGP. This constraint means that K cannot be independently improbable unless it violates the
UGP, which it does not. Therefore, 𝑃(𝐾) remains non-zero and not intrinsically improbable
relative to the UGP.

Conclusion
The objection concerning the integration of an axiological theory with an extremely low
independent probability into theistic belief is resolved by recognizing that K is not independent
but is constrained by the UGP within the S-type World (S). This means that K's probability is
intrinsically linked to 𝑃(𝑇) and is not independently low.
By reinterpreting confirmation rule 2 to account for the UGP, we ensure that K must be both
non-zero and not intrinsically improbable relative to the UGP. The TNT framework, with the
UGP's inclusion, maintains both mathematical consistency and philosophical coherence,
reinforcing the robustness of theistic belief in the face of probabilistic challenges.

Final Remarks
By considering the interdependence of T, S, and K, and recognizing the constraining role of the
UGP, we demonstrate that the initial contradiction is resolved. The probability of K is
intrinsically connected to the probability of T, and any low independent probability assigned to
K is inappropriate when K is consistent with the UGP.
This approach aligns with the confirmation rules and upholds the integrity of the mathematical
relationships within the TNT framework, ensuring that integrating K into T is both
mathematically sound and philosophically coherent.