The Great Patriotic War of the

Soviet Union, 1941–45

This book consists of extracts from key documents, along with commentary
and further reading, on the ‘Great Patriotic War’ of the Soviet Union
against Nazi Germany, 1941–45.
Despite the historical significance of the war, few Soviet documents have
been published in English. This work provides translations of a range of
extracts from Soviet documents relating to the titanic struggle on the
Eastern Front during World War II, with commentary. This is the only
single-volume work in English to use documentary evidence to look at the
Soviet war effort from military, political, economic and diplomatic perspec-
tives. The book should not only facilitate a deeper study of the Soviet war
effort, but also allow more balanced study of what is widely known in the
West as the ‘Eastern Front’.
This book will be of much interest to students and scholars of military
history, Soviet history, and World War II history.

Alexander Hill is an Associate Professor in Military History at the Univer-

sity of Calgary, Canada.
Soviet (Russian) study of war
Series Editor: David M. Glantz
ISSN: 1462-0960

This series examines what Soviet military theorists and commanders learned
from the study of their own military operations.

1 Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience, Volume I

The initial period of war 1941
Harold S. Orenstein, translator and editor, with an Introduction by
David M. Glantz

2 Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience, Volume II

The Winter Campaign 1941–1942
Harold S. Orenstein, translator and editor, with an Introduction by
David M. Glantz

3 Red Armor Combat Orders

Combat regulations for tank and mechanized forces 1944
Joseph G. Welsh, translator and editor, with an Introduction by
Richard N. Armstrong

4 Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience, Volume III

Military operations 1941 and 1942
Harold S. Orenstein, translator and editor, with an Introduction by
David M. Glantz

5 The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies by V.K.

Triandafillov
William A. Burhans, translator, edited by Jacob W. Kipp, with an
Introduction by James J. Schneider

6 The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927–1991

The documentary basis, volume I, operational art 1927–1964
Harold S. Orenstein, translator, with an Introduction by David M. Glantz
 7 The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927–1991
The documentary basis, volume II, operational art 1965–1991
Harold S. Orenstein, translator, with an Introduction by David M. Glantz

8 Winter Warfare
Red Army orders and experiences
Richard N. Armstrong and Joseph G. Welsh

9 The Bear Went Over the Mountain

Soviet combat tactics in Afghanistan
Lester W. Grau

10 The Battle for Kursk 1943

The Soviet General Staff study
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, editor and translator

11 Kursk 1943
A statistical analysis
Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson

12 Belorussia 1944
The Soviet General Staff study
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, editor and translator

13 The Battle for L’vov, July 1944

The Soviet General Staff study
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, editor and translator

14 Stalin and the Soviet–Finnish War, 1939–40

Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shukman, editors

15 The Battle for the Ukraine

The Red Army’s Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, 1944
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, editor and translator

16 The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945

‘August Storm’
David M. Glantz

17 Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945

‘August Storm’
David M. Glantz
18 The War Behind the Eastern Front
Soviet Partisans in North-West Russia 1941–1944
Alexander Hill

19 Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918–1945

James Sterrett

20 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45

A documentary reader
Alexander Hill
The Great Patriotic War
of the Soviet Union,
1941–45
A documentary reader

Alexander Hill
First published 2009
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
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“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
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© 2009 Alexander Hill

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Hill, Alexander, 1974–
The great patriotic war of the Soviet Union, 1941–45 : a
documentary reader / Alexander Hill.
p. cm. – (Cass series on the Soviet (Russian) study of war)
1. World War, 1939–1945–Soviet Union–Sources. 2. World War,
1939–1945–Campaigns–Eastern Front–Sources. 3. Soviet
Union–History, Military–Sources. I. Title.
D764.H52 2009
940.53'47–dc22
2008024833

ISBN 0-203-89234-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-7146-5712-3 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-88637-2 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-7146-5712-7 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-88637-3 (ebk)
To the victims of the Great Patriotic War
Contents

Acknowledgements xi

Introduction 1

1 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 5

2 The Icebreaker controversy and Soviet intentions in 1941 22

3 Barbarossa 40

4 The Battle of Moscow 68

5 The tide turns: the Battle for Stalingrad 91

6 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 117

7 The siege of Leningrad 141

8 Lend-Lease aid, the Soviet economy and the Soviet

Union at war 163

9 The Soviet Partisan Movement 193

10 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 220

11 From the Vistula to Berlin: the end of the Reich 247

12 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 273

Conclusion 283
x Contents
Chronology of key events 292
Glossary 304
Notes 314
Bibliography 331
Index 341
Acknowledgements

This reader has benefited from the work of many Western and Russian and
Soviet scholars whose works are provided in the introduction and biblio-
graphy, as well as of course interaction with the students I have taught over
the seven years of my post-doctoral academic career to date. Before turning
to thanking specific individuals, a number of organizations and their staff
have made significant contributions to this reader. Over a number of years I
collected published materials specifically for this reader from the Russian
National Library in St Petersburg and the library of the School of Slavonic
and East European Studies in London in particular. Funding provided by the
University of Calgary allowed the purchase and acquisition of many of the
materials used to write this reader, and many of the later chapters were
written during a semester-long part-funded sabbatical during the second
half of 2007. A course release provided by the Centre for Military and Stra-
tegic Studies during 2006 facilitated the writing of some of the earlier
chapters.
As regards specific individuals, thanks certainly go to colleagues in Russia
who have provided assistance over the years, and in particular, in alphabeti-
cal order, Sergei Kudriashov, Nikita Lomagin and Mikhail Suprun. David
Glantz was able to find time during his busy writing schedule to look over a
draft of this reader minus introduction and conclusion. On specific issues I
would like to thank Arthur G. Volz for pointing out two errors in Nikolai
Simonov’s figures on T-34 production in Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR,
one of which I was aware of and the other not! I would also like to thank
Sofia Klimachevskaia-Djavakhia for assistance in the translation of medical
terminology in Chapter 7. My family have always been supportive of my
academic endeavours, even when living thousands of miles away, and I am
grateful for their continued support. The standard caveat on accuracy applies
with this reader as any other work – whilst I am grateful for any assistance
received any errors remain my responsibility.

Alexander Hill
May 2008
Introduction

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, or, in Western terms, the war
on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, saw horrendous carnage
over a vast geographical area and over a sustained period of time. Two ideo-
logically opposed regimes equipped with the modern weaponry that could
be provided in huge quantities by modern industrial states fought a struggle
for their very existences at the expense of millions of combatants, both vol-
unteers and conscripts, along with their civilian populations. Both sides saw
the war as inevitable. Whilst for Hitler German destiny lay in eastward
expansion, for Stalin a clash with fascism, an extreme expression of capital-
ism, was similarly inevitable. Nazi Germany struck first as Stalin and the
Soviet Union tried to buy time to rearm and reorganize in the light of war
experience, and, although not explicitly, make good the damage done by the
Great Purges. That German forces and their allies got so deep into the
Soviet Union, and that it took Soviet forces so long to eject them from
Soviet territory despite the relative initial lack of preparedness of Germany
for a sustained war, is certainly testimony to the quality of German arms in
the broadest sense. However, given Soviet long-term preparation for war, a
qualitative parity in many aspects of equipment and numerical superiority
without lower quality at least in armour and artillery, it is perhaps
surprising that German forces got as far as they did. They did not capture
Moscow and Leningrad and enslave the Soviet peoples for many reasons. In
addition to firing Soviet will to resist through brutal, racially driven occupa-
tion policy, after having squandered resources to halt the German advance
Soviet forces were able to recover a material superiority borne out of long-
term planning and a complete neglect of the Soviet consumer sector of the
economy, with a little help from their new allies, and then increasingly
effectively use these resources to defeat their opponent. Whilst Red Army
losses remained colossal throughout the war, the Red Army became a far
more effective fighting machine as the war progressed, that bore the brunt of
the fighting against German land forces.
Whilst the secondary literature available in English on the Soviet war
effort during the Great Patriotic War has increased significantly in the last
decade or so, thanks particularly to David Glantz, it remains difficult for the
2 Introduction
reader to examine the Soviet Union at war through documentary sources in
English translation.1 This documentary reader has therefore been written in
order to give students and a wider audience access to a range of documents
for the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War in translation and with
commentary. Such material has been available more widely in English for
Nazi Germany at war for some time,2 and providing this material for the
Soviet Union should therefore facilitate not only a deeper study of the Soviet
war effort for many students of the war but also more balanced study of what
is widely known in the West as the Eastern Front through documentary
materials for both protagonists.
This reader has been developed whilst teaching a final-year undergraduate
seminar course on the Great Patriotic War, for the first time at Newcastle
University, UK, whilst a temporary lecturer there during the 2002–03 acad-
emic year, and subsequently from 2004–05 onwards at the University of
Calgary, Canada, where the course has developed a more operational flavour
given the strength of the department in and student enthusiasm for military
history. Whilst the focus is operational, the operational military history is
set very much in its diplomatic, political, economic and to a lesser extent
social context. This contextual material certainly and necessarily broadens
the perspective of students keen to focus on the operational history to the
exclusion of other dimensions to the history of the Soviet Union at war, and
has proved successful in doing so particularly where it is obviously tied to
the operational history rather than the latter being tacked on, almost as an
afterthought, to the broader material.
The 12 chapters in this reader are intended, in the first instance, to
provide the focus for 12 seminars, with additional seminars on, for instance,
Russia during the First World War and the revolutions of 1917 and Civil
War and foreign ‘intervention’, should time allow and should students
require broader context.
Whilst this reader has been written primarily with student use in mind,
be this in upper-level undergraduate or graduate courses, it has also been
borne in mind that those outside the academic world with an interest in the
Soviet war effort, whether avid readers of the English-language literature on
the subject per se or wargamers and modellers, are also poorly served with
‘primary’ source materials for the Soviet side. It is therefore hoped that such
an audience will find this reader of value in providing a depth of under-
standing or food for thought, be it for wargaming, modelling activities or
otherwise, that is difficult to gain from the English-language secondary
literature and more ‘popular’ publications deriving their information from
undisclosed or dubious sources.
This reader was written to be used in conjunction with one or both of
what are currently the best of the general histories of the Great Patriotic
War readily available in English. David Glantz and Jonathan House’s When
Titans Clashed provides an excellent overview of Soviet operations during the
Great Patriotic War, and works well alongside Evan Mawdsley’s Thunder in
 Introduction 3
the East, which provides more of the strategic context, including diplomatic
and economic dimensions to the war, and benefits from a further ten years of
published research and publication of archival materials. Both of the above
have been cited frequently in the text supporting the documents presented
in this reader, and should be referred to regularly where broader context is
required. Details of these two works, and additional materials on the war as
a whole mentioned below, are provided at the end of this introduction.
Further reading specific to particular chapters is provided at the end of each
chapter.
As regards additional materials to be used alongside this reader, students
wishing to start with a summary of the course of the war and seeking a little
more economic and social context might benefit from starting with or refer-
ring later to Barber and Harrison’s The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945, unfor-
tunately out of print at the time this reader was in preparation but still
widely available through libraries. Indeed, Richard Overy’s Russia’s War
might also serve as a useful introduction to the Soviet Union at war, provid-
ing an excellent synthesis of the English-language literature up to the point
it was written. Other English-language works dealing with the war as a
whole that should be considered include, of the less recent literature,
Alexander Werth’s Russia at War, in which readers can benefit from sections
drawing on the keen insight of a journalist based in the Soviet Union during
the war, and John Erickson’s dense two-volume history of the war consisting
of The Road to Stalingrad and The Road to Berlin. More recent works, benefit-
ing directly or indirectly from documents released from Soviet archives from
the late 1980s onwards, include Geoffrey Roberts’s Stalin’s Wars, an inter-
esting rehabilitation of Stalin as war leader, and Chris Bellamy’s Absolute
War. Of the Soviet ‘memoirs’ dealing with the war as a whole available in
English, perhaps most useful remains Shtemenko’s The Soviet General Staff at
War, 1941–1945. Finally, for reference purposes, readers might like to
consult David Glantz’s three-volume reference history of the Red Army at
war, the first two volumes of which, Stumbling Colossus and Colossus Reborn,
have been published to date.

Core basic reading

David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London: Hodder
Arnold, 2005).

Additional basic reading

John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945: A Social and Economic
History of the USSR in World War II (London: Longman, 1991).
Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2007).
4 Introduction
John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany: Volume One (London: Wei-
denfeld and Nicolson, 1975).
John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Stalin’s War with Germany: Volume Two (London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1983), as well as other imprints.
Richard Overy, Russia’s War (London: Allen Lane, 1998) and other imprints.
Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War Two to the Cold War, 1939–1953 (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941–1945 (Honolulu, HI: University Press
of the Pacific, 2001), and earlier imprints by Progress Publishers.
Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945 (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964), and other
imprints.

For reference
David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1998).
David M. Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence, KS: Univer-
sity Press of Kansas, 2005).
1 Lenin, Stalin and the West
1917–391

The Soviet Russian republic that came into existence after the Bolshevik
seizure of power of October 1917, and that would become the Soviet Union
in 1924, was born into a hostile international environment. In late 1917 the
Bolsheviks had to deal with the German threat that had played a crucial role
in both bringing down the Tsarist regime and weakening the Provisional
Government. Peace with Germany with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in
March 1918 came at the temporary price of vast swathes of Russian imperial
territory, including the Ukraine, and marked the longer-term separation of
the Baltic Republics and Finland from the former Empire. The peace also
brought the Bolsheviks into direct confrontation with the Entente, deter-
mined to preserve an Eastern Front in the war against the Central Powers.
British and French input into the Civil War undoubtedly prolonged the
fighting, and would not be forgotten quickly by Soviet leaders.
Whilst by 1921 the Bolsheviks found themselves nominal masters of
much of the former Russian Empire, they faced a population and particu-
larly peasantry weary of the excesses of the politics of War Communism and
the bloodshed of war, prompting the Bolsheviks under Lenin’s leadership to
take a step back from propelling the fledgling republic towards commun-
ism, a key dimension of which, for many within the Party, was ‘forced’, or at
least intensified industrialization. War Communism was replaced by the
semi-capitalist New Economic Policy (NEP).
There was an uneasy peace not only in Soviet society and within the Com-
munist Party, but also between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.
Whilst both sought to normalize relations and particularly trade, the Soviet
Union was aware of the latent hostility towards the upstart republic, and the
capitalist world of the fact that for the Bolsheviks the international revolu-
tionary project was on hold rather than off the agenda. Under Lenin’s leader-
ship, the development of the Soviet military power required to spread
‘revolution’ by force, as attempted in Poland in 1920, was increasingly of
secondary importance to stability, both internally and in relations with
other powers. This situation was to remain under the collective leadership
following Lenin’s death in January 1924.2 With the rise of Stalin, however,
the pursuit of military power for use against an abstract capitalist threat
6 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
would become a key justification for the ending of NEP and the associated
projects of forced collectivization and industrialization from 1928 onwards,
Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’.

International relations and the ‘revolution from above’

For the Soviet Union, eventual conflict with the capitalist world was always
inevitable, even if, in the short term, undesirable. The capitalist threat to
the Soviet Union was, however, at least in Soviet eyes, to become more
significant with the apparently increasing prospects of revolution in capital-
ist countries associated with depression in the 1920s:

DOCUMENT 1: From the report of the Chairman of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars A.I.
Rikov at the IVth Congress of Soviets SSSR, 18 April 1927
Soviet foreign policy has recently been developing in conditions in which there has
been a growth in active hostility towards the Soviet Union from a whole host of coun-
tries. . . . Recently a number of [British] conservative newspapers have repeated that it
is necessary to ‘encircle the Soviet Union’, ‘destroy the Bolshevik menace’, ‘establish a
cordon sanitaire’, and alike. . . .
(Source: A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin, 1996, p. 667)

DOCUMENT 2: From the speech of V.M. Molotov at the tenth plenary session of the Executive
Committee of the Comintern, 9 July 1929
The situation is now such, that in all of the core capitalist countries of Europe events are in
progress, signifying the rise of revolutionary mood....
From what I have said, it follows that the most important responsibility of commu-
nist parties is . . . preparation for new revolutionary struggles on a massive scale. . . .
Now, more than ever before, the tactic of coming to terms with reformers, the tactic
of coalition between revolutionary organisations and the organisations of the reformers
is unacceptable and damaging. . . .
In conditions of the current period the question of strengthening the struggle
against social democracy has gained special significance. The struggle with social
democracy, and in particular with its left wing, . . . cannot but be the centre of attention
for communist parties. . . .
The increase in international revolutionary mood and the successful conduct of socialist
reconstruction in the USSR is indicative of the weakening progress of capitalism.... It
means that now the danger of a new imperialist war and a new intervention against the
Soviet Union is intensifying.
(Source: A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin, 1996, pp. 671–672)

Fearing revolution, capitalist powers were portrayed as likely to seek to

destroy the Soviet beacon for communism across Europe in order to forestall
revolution, although there is little or no evidence of concrete preparations.
The Soviet ‘war scare’ of 1927, which stemmed from a series of apparently
unrelated events and, in particular, the Arcos crisis with Britain, was suffi-
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 7
ciently serious to result in a British break in diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union.3 The Soviet response was both to strengthen the Soviet
economy and defence sector and to make certain that the Soviet rear in
future ‘war’ against the capitalist world was secure:4

DOCUMENT 3: Extracts from an article by Stalin on the threat of war, 28 July 1927
It can scarcely be doubted that the main issue of the present day is that of the threat of
a new imperialist war. It is not a matter of some vague and immaterial ‘danger’ of a
new war but of the real and actual threat of a new war in general, and of a war against
the USSR in particular. . . .
The fact that the initiative in this matter of creating a united imperialist front
against the USSR has been assumed by the British bourgeoisie and its general staff,
the Conservative Party, should not come as any surprise to us. . . .
The British Conservative government struck its first open blow in Peking with the
raid on the Soviet Embassy. . . .
This blow, as we know, failed.
The second blow was struck in London, by the raid on Arcos and the severance of
relations with the USSR. . . .
This blow, as we also know, failed.
The third open blow was delivered in Warsaw, by the instigation of the assassina-
tion of Voikov. Voikov’s assassination, organised by agents of the Conservative Party,
was intended by its authors to play a role similar to that of the Sarajevo assassination
by embroiling the USSR in an armed conflict with Poland.
This blow also seems to have failed. . . .
The task is to strengthen the defensive capacity of our country, to expand our national
economy, to improve our industry – both war and non-war – to enhance the vigilance
of the workers, peasants and Red Army men of our country. . . .
The task is to strengthen our rear and cleanse it of dross, not hesitating to mete out
punishment to . . . terrorists . . . who set fire to our mills and factories, for it is imposs-
ible to defend our country in the absence of a strong revolutionary rear.
(Source: J.V. Stalin, Works. Volume 9, 1954, pp. 328, 330, 331–332, 335)

Some indication of direct Soviet investment in defence, even during

the First Five Year Plan, the least obviously defence-oriented of the
three plans prior to the Great Patriotic War, is provided in Table 1.1.
The production of tanks continued to receive high priority, the
development of Soviet tank production by 1934 being the subject of
Document 4:

DOCUMENT 4: Basic indicators of the development of base motor-mechanization [of the Red
Army] for the period of time from XVI-XVII Party congresses: From materials of Gosplan
USSR, 11 January 1934
The qualitative development and quantitative distribution of technical weapons
resources has decisive significance in operational-tactical forms for the conduct of war,
the driving force of which is the motor. . . .
Bourgeois military specialists and the military headquarters of the capitalist states
8 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
consider that the modern army should have in the region of 10,000 tanks, 200,000
automobiles and 30,000 tractors in service. . . .
Up until 1929 a few tens of tanks, captured by the Red Army from the Whites . . .
were those sole examples, on which our Red Army learned.
Difficulty in the organisation of the production of tanks consisted of the fact, that
up until 1928–1929 we did not have an automobile nor tractor industry, nor the cor-
responding technical cadres.
With the aim of establishing the production of tanks, examples were purchased
abroad and from 1929/30 modern tank types were introduced into production. . . .
Dynamics in the growth of production of significant types:

1929/30 1930 1931 1932 1933

Tankettes T-27 and T-37 – – 365 1,593 1,072

Tanks T-18 and T-26 170 239 535 1,361 1,405
Tanks T-24 and BT 1 – 28 393 1,005
Tank T-35 – – – – 1
Artillery tractors – – – – 173
Tracked tractors 491 280 614 464 451

(Source: A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin, 1996, pp. 413–414)

Industrialization continued to be closely linked to the defence of the Soviet

Union throughout the 1930s, providing a sense of urgency that would
otherwise have been difficult to create. The Soviet regime, whilst advancing
the revolution as Stalin and much of the Party saw it, was also rectifying
weaknesses in the defence capabilities of the Soviet Union, heir to the
Russian Empire:

Table 1.1 Soviet orders for and production of key armaments 1929/30–1930/31

Product 1929/30 1930/31

■
Plan Actual % plan Plan Actual % plan

Artillery pieces 999 952 95.2 3,577 1,911 53.4

Artillery shells (1,000s) 2,365 790 33.4 1,690 751 44.4
Rifles (1,000s) 150 126 84.0 305 174 57.0
Machine guns (1,000s) 26.5 9.6 36.2 49.5 40.9 82.6
Cartridges (millions) 251 235 93.6 410 234 57.0
Aircraft 1,232 899 72.9 2,024 860 42.4
Tanks 340 170 50.0 1,288 740 57.4
Source: N.S. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e godi: tempi ekonomich-
eskogo rosta, struktura, organizatsiia proizvodstva i upravlenie (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), p. 84.
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 9

DOCUMENT 5: The Tasks of Business Executives. Speech delivered at the First All-Union
Congress of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry, 4 February 1931
One feature of the history of Old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered
because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by
the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the
Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists.
She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her – because of her backwardness:
because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness,
industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because it was prof-
itable and could be done with impunity. . . . Such is the law of exploiters. . . . You are
backward, you are weak – therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and
enslaved. You are mighty – therefore you are right; hence we must be wary of you.
That is why we must no longer lag behind. . . .
We are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good
this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.
(Source: J.V. Stalin, Works. Volume 13, 1954, pp. 31, 40–41)

Given the apparent urgency of the situation, longer-term defence concerns

such as the location of strategic industries had to be balanced not only with
shorter-term needs for equipment, but also the need for short-term achieve-
ments for political purposes. The latter meant, for instance, that strategic-
ally vulnerable concentrations of defence industrial capacity in the west,
particularly in Leningrad, could not be simply and cheaply transferred to
more secure locations.5 Whilst the Soviet Union might have been able to
afford to build the Baltic–White Sea Canal, the subject of Document 7, the
construction of which had been long discussed under Tsarist rule, cost and
the time for construction as a political rather than strategic issue were major
factors in what was actually constructed and in what time. The canal, as
finally constructed, was certainly not of the size and quality of construction
that naval commanders had in mind.
Whilst the Soviet Union would officially continue to seek to foster
revolution in the capitalist world through the Communist International or
Comintern, given her military weakness this activity could not, however, be
allowed to be sufficient to provoke capitalist powers into military activity
against a Soviet Union far from prepared for war. Almost as importantly,
such activity could not be sufficiently threatening to the West to hinder
trade and the Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology necessary for
industrialization and the defence sector. Diplomatic relations with Britain,
broken off in 1927 as a result of the Arcos crisis, were re-established in 1929
when a Labour minority government came to power, even if the resulting
‘thaw’ was short-lived. However, in addition to Soviet subversion, or at least
fears of it, Tsarist debt continued to be a stumbling block in both British
and French relations with the Soviet Union, or perhaps an excuse for pre-
venting improved relations to be applied by the anti-communist right when
10 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
Soviet attempts to settle the issue did not meet expectations. The Soviet
Union, more needing of the West than vice versa, continued to pursue
improved ties behind the scenes, whilst the intensity of anti-Western
rhetoric increased within the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, that continued ref-
erences to ‘capitalist encirclement’ were clearly principally intended for
domestic consumption is illustrated by the fact that during the show trials
of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet Union was careful not to sen-
tence foreign nationals accused of orchestrating the wrecking of Soviet
industry as severely as her own. For instance, the Metro-Vickers Trial of
April 1933 involved the accusation of ‘espionage, bribery and wrecking’
against six British engineers of Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company on
contract to the Soviet Union, the first charge having some foundation, if
broadly defined. Two of the accused were sentenced to two- and three-year
imprisonments respectively, although they actually only served two months
as a result of subsequent diplomatic activity.6 The Metro-Vickers affair was a
serious threat to both diplomatic and economic Anglo-Soviet relations,
resulting in short-term sanctions by the British, to which the Soviet Union
responded. Nonetheless, Metro-Vickers understandably continued to obtain
contracts with the Soviet Union given the priority accorded to the acquisi-
tion of foreign expertise and technology by the Soviet leadership.
The capitalist military threat, for planning purposes at this point still led
nominally by a Britain largely unaware that its intentions were quite so
aggressive, was characterized for the purposes of Soviet military-economic
planning in a memo of early 1930 by N. Snitko to his superior, the Chair-
man of the Defence Sector of Gosplan, the body responsible for Soviet eco-
nomic planning. Three future international scenarios in which the Soviet
Union would have to fight Western capitalist powers were considered
possible:

DOCUMENT 6: To the Chairman of the Defence Sector of Gosplan. Report on the character of
future war and the tasks of the defence sector. N. Snitko, 4/IV-1930
Political Situation
Variation in the political context of future war between the USSR and the encircling
capitalist powers is likely only in the detail, with basically only three significantly dif-
ferent variants possible:
The first, where the imperialists, having agreed some sort of temporary compromise
amongst themselves, organise an attack on the USSR with the aim of deciding by force
of arms the basic contradiction of the modern world order – the co-existence of two
fundamentally opposed economic systems. . . .
The second, where the imperialists start a new world war amongst themselves. We
may end up being dragged in to such a struggle either on the side of one of the coali-
tions, or, the most likely for us, as a third warring party, having both of the hostile
coalitions fighting amongst themselves as opponents. . . .
The third, is where the objective pace of developing relations between the USSR
and the external capitalist economic world ends up in a situation where the further
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 11
development of socialist society demands the expansion of its international reach. . . .
The adequate development of the revolutionary movement in capitalist society, a suffi-
ciently strong economic and political base and purely military preparation might place
before us the question of a move towards a military offensive against capitalism in
order to further world revolution.
(Source: O.N. Ken, 2002, pp. 365–366)

The first scenario was the situation that the Soviet Union claimed was
threatening in the late 1920s and early 1930s, requiring the strengthening
of Soviet armed forces as a matter of some urgency. Whilst the British-led
threat did not materialize in any tangible form, Japan was identified as a
concrete threat in the Far East in the early 1930s, particularly after her inva-
sion of Manchuria in 1931. However, the threat to Soviet security from
Japan was not a major identifiable factor driving Soviet rearmament in
general, although it was a factor stimulating Soviet naval development,
including such major projects as the opening of the Northern Sea Route
from the European north to the Far East.
Even with Adolf Hitler’s coming to power in Germany in 1933, it was,
according to the Russian historian Ken, not until the mid-1930s that Soviet
defence planning at the highest levels was focused on a specific threat, that
emerging from Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent Japan, rather than an
abstract ‘capitalist’ threat involving many possible combinations of powers
but usually including Poland and Britain.7
Perhaps the most prominent single capital project of the First Five-Year
Plan, with defence significance, was the Baltic–White Sea Canal. Whilst
justifications for its construction in the Soviet press were largely economic,
in private the Baltic–White Sea Canal had military strategic benefits, which
had been identified by Tsarist planners. These benefits were identified in
materials of the Council of People’s Commissars when the construction of
the canal was being planned:

DOCUMENT 7: Preparatory Materials of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR,

‘Towards a justification for the construction [obosnovaniiu sooruzheniia] of the Baltic–White
Sea Canal’, no later than May 1930
I. Composition [sostav] and purpose of the waterway
The route of the Baltic–White Sea Waterway: Port of Leningrad, River Neva, Lake
Ladoga, River Svir’, Lake Onega and the Onega–White Sea Canal, breaking through
to the White Sea at Soroka Bay.
Overall length of the waterway 906 km.
The Baltic-White Sea Waterway . . . is designed for the passage of ocean-going, lake
and river vessels, with a maximum draught of 5.5 m (18 feet).
The creation of this waterway provides:
II. In military-strategic terms:
The solution of a range of issues in the defence of the coastline from the Finnish border
up to the coastline of Siberia accessible by sea, including the White Sea.
12 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
The defence of the fishing industry in coastal waters and coastal commerce between
points along the coastline and river shipping routes into the heart of the country. This
task is to be achieved in the Northern Theatre, primarily through the ability to trans-
fer submarines and surface torpedo craft and cruisers from the Baltic to the White Sea.
The potential for our naval forces to operate on enemy lines of maritime communi-
cation . . . in the North Sea and eastern portion of the Atlantic Ocean.
The maintenance of our lines of communication with the outside world. Since the
Baltic and Black Seas are easily blockaded, free access to the ocean via the north would
acquire particularly great significance in wartime.
...
(Source: A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin, 1996, pp. 395–396)

The construction of the Baltic–White Sea Canal, for which planning was
underway in 1930 and construction completed in 1933, was primarily
aimed at security against Britain. Providing ‘the solution of a range of issues
in the defence of the coastline from the Finnish border up to the coastline of
Siberia accessible by sea, including the White Sea’, almost certainly bore in
mind the British attack on the naval base at Kronstadt and occupation of
Arkhangel’sk during the Russian Civil War. In considering ‘the defence of
the fishing industry in coastal waters and coastal commerce between points
along the coastline and river shipping routes into the heart of the country’,
fishing disputes with Britain in the far north during the 1920s and British
forays down the River Dvina during the Civil War were most probably at
the forefront of the minds of Soviet planners.
The Baltic–White Sea Canal was, as the Five-Year Plans themselves, a
major achievement, albeit one at the expense of many human lives as Gulag
labour was used for much of the new construction. However, as the Five-
Year Plans as a whole, success was not as significant as the propaganda sug-
gested. The military utility of the canal was certainly not as great as the
Soviet Navy had hoped, its limitations being noted by the British naval
attaché in Moscow in early 1937:

The direct transfer of the Baltic Fleet or part of its heavy forces from the
Gulf of Finland to the northern open seas and vice versa would be of
obvious strategic importance. The Kiel Canal can play the same role for
Germany, . . . but the White Sea Canal and its river system cannot do the
same for the Soviet Union. . . . Owing to ice conditions this route is not
available in the winter months, and during the ice-free period the very
maximum which the canal can safely transport is a large type submarine
or destroyer. For a larger type, such as the flotilla-leader Leningrad, the
locks may just have the requisite length and beam, but I doubt it; the
question of draught, however, would be the real obstacle. The draught
difficulty to some degree might be met in an emergency by the employ-
ment of some kind of floating dock specially constructed for the canal.8
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 13
National socialism and collective security
During the 1920s and early 1930s the Soviet Union had to some extent
been a pariah state in Europe. She did not, for instance, participate in the
League of Nations, forerunner of the United Nations and founded in 1919,
and maintained closer links with other pariah powers than the ‘victors’ of
the First World War. Hence through the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 the Soviet
Union and Germany co-operated not only politically and economically but
also militarily, sharing hostility to the Anglo-French alliance that had seen
both stripped of territory, and hostility to Poland, the key beneficiary of
their losses. The Soviet Union was also on sufficiently good terms with Mus-
solini’s Italy to seek Italian assistance in the construction of a new genera-
tion of destroyers for Soviet naval forces in the early 1930s, developing
relations in this sphere extending back to 1925 and culminating in the
Italian construction of the flotilla-leader Tashkent for Soviet naval forces,
handed over incomplete to the Soviet Union in 1939, and Italian assistance
in the construction of Type 7-series destroyers.9
The rise of National Socialism in Germany prompted a reorientation of
Soviet diplomatic activity towards what appeared to be conciliation with
the non-fascist capitalist powers, with the Soviet Union joining the League
of Nations in September 1934. At the same time the Soviet Union sought
security agreements with those capitalist powers that themselves felt most
threatened by the re-emergent German threat, namely France and the
young Czechoslovakia, with whom the Soviet Union signed mutual-
assistance pacts in 1935. Just how far these pacts were supposed to go was,
however, a matter for disagreement. For the French, and indeed British,
such agreements were part of the post-Versailles international system, the
web of agreements and pacts that were supposed to limit German ambi-
tions much more cheaply than the rearmament required to add credibility
to substantial and hopefully unnecessary commitments, along the lines of
which the Soviet Union was seeking. Differing views on the scope and
purpose of such pacts, as well as the strength of anti-Soviet feeling in
French conservative circles, influenced the time it took France and the
Soviet Union to actually sign the mutual-assistance pact of May 1935,
without many of the add-ons such as military assistance to the Red Army
that had been discussed during negotiations. That the pact was signed at all
had much to do with Hitler’s words and actions making it increasingly dif-
ficult not to sign. The new French Foreign Minister Laval was certainly
more interested in strengthening his hand in negotiations with Germany
than an agreement with the Soviet Union that might lead to significant
rearmament, military action and bloodshed.10
During the mid-1930s, whilst her rearmament progressed at an increas-
ing pace, the Soviet Union has been seen by most Western, Soviet and post-
Soviet Russian historians to have been genuinely seeking some sort of
‘collective security’ from a re-emergent Germany, be it as a short-term
14 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
measure or otherwise. Key proponents of this line in one form or another in
the West include A.J.P. Taylor, Jonathan Haslam, Geoffrey Roberts and,
perhaps most vociferously by virtue of his contrasting of genuine Soviet
efforts with British ideologically motivated intransigence, Michael Carley.11
Through ‘collective’ efforts the further spread of fascism in Europe was to be
prevented, and foreign Communist parties were instructed by the Soviet-led
Comintern to work with the ‘Social Democrats’ in the European democracies
in order to defeat the electoral threat from fascist parties, engaging in
‘popular front’ politics against the right. This can be contrasted with the
situation in 1933 when Hitler came to power in Germany and when
German Communist hostility towards the moderate socialists had been
encouraged.
In the introduction to his 1995 The Soviet Union and the Origins of the
Second World War, Geoffrey Roberts identifies a ‘German’ school of histor-
ians offering an opposing line to those identifying sincere Soviet attempts to
secure ‘collective security’.12 These historians, the most prominent of whom
is arguably Hochman, see the eventual Soviet signing of the Nazi–Soviet
Pact in 1939 as the result of a pro-German orientation, designed in part to
divide the capitalist West, continuing on from Rapallo despite the rise of
Hitler and behind the smokescreen of the quest for ‘collective security’. This
line is, however, very much a product of the Cold War and receives even less
support amongst academics today than it did in 1995, despite the publica-
tion in 1997 of the veteran exiled Soviet historian Alexander Nekrich’s
Pariahs, Partners, Predators, very much part of this school.13 Although the
‘German’ school receives little support from established historians, it is
widely accepted that, given the mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union
and the capitalist powers, British, French and Soviet leaders understandably
did not rule out some sort of ‘coming to terms’ with Nazi Germany if it was
in their perceived interests, that is delaying or preventing war. Despite the
input of ideologues on both sides, the leanings of diplomats towards one or
the other alternative need not have been due to ideological disposition or
some sort of grand scheme, but pragmatic assessment of the likelihood of
peace and stability being preserved in Europe, something both the Soviet
Union and the Anglo-French ‘bloc’ were seeking, at least in the short term.
Soviet pragmatism in the pursuit of short-term security, set in the
broader ideological context of the inevitable clash between capitalism and
communism, is emphasized by Pons in Stalin and the Inevitable War
1936–1941.14 His work represents something of a compromise between the
‘German’ and ‘collective security’ schools that can be termed the ‘realist’
school, incorporating a range of compromise positions. Pons, however,
places considerable emphasis on the longer-term expansionist dimension to
Soviet foreign policy, a tendency motivated by a fusion of Communist ideo-
logy and the Soviet Union’s pre-Versailles Tsarist heritage, something
apparent in Document 5. Certainly, as Ferris notes, to talk of a ‘realist’
school that does not consider ideology is nonsense in most instances, given
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 15
that very few statesmen are psychopaths genuinely intent on power for its
own sake. As he goes on to note, the noun ‘realism’ has to be combined with
an adjective, be it ‘Marxist-Leninist’, or indeed ‘Stalinist’ in the case of the
Soviet Union under Stalin.15 The diplomatic confusion and misunderstand-
ing created in negotiations with Britain and France by the pragmatic Soviet
advancement of foreign policy goals informed by the heady ideological brew
of the Stalinist international outlook is highlighted by Neilson. Both
Britain and France were committed to the post-Versailles order and had
foreign policies that varied as a result of Western pluralism, a very different
motor to their foreign policies from that of the Soviet Union, making under-
standing and agreement between them and the Soviet Union difficult at
best.16
Despite genuine Soviet efforts to promote ‘collective security’, something
not in conflict with the notion of ‘inevitable war’ if seen as a short-to-
medium term measure, with the threat of military action against a non-
compliant Germany being anathema to Britain and France, the Western
powers were more inclined towards appeasement of German and indeed
Italian ambitions. Many among British Conservatives and on the French
right were ultimately as, if not more, fearful of Bolshevism as National
Socialism, the apparent aims of which many in Britain at least sympathized
with. German re-occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 passed with
barely a murmur from the British, taking place behind the smokescreen of
the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935, itself only provoking
half-hearted sanctions from the League of Nations. After the outbreak of the
Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Britain and France proved willing to toler-
ate flagrant German and Italian intervention on the side of Franco in the
Spanish Civil War, towards whom there was considerable sympathy on the
right in Britain. Soviet unwillingness to wholeheartedly support the left in
Spain was to a significant extent in order to prevent a rift with these powers,
particularly France, which would threaten the alliances that were designed
to protect the Soviet Union from German ambitions in the east and prevent
the emergence of an alliance between fascist and other capitalist powers
against the Soviet Union.
The value of the Soviet Union’s mutual-assistance treaties would be put
to the test in September 1938, when, following on from the Anschluß with
Austria of March 1938, Hitler sought the Sudeten border region of the
young Czechoslovakia at the conference table in Munich, to which the Soviet
Union was not invited. The Soviet Union had also not been invited to
participate fully in other key international conferences of the 1930s, for
instance the London Naval Conference of December 1935–March 1936.
Whether this was because the Soviet Union was not taken seriously as a
major European and particularly naval power or because she remained a
political pariah to European conservatives is, from a Soviet perspective and
in the context of the current discussion, less important than the fact that the
Soviet leadership once again could claim to have been sidelined by Britain
16 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
and France. The Soviet Union was understandably increasingly sceptical of
the scope for Anglo-French commitment to a tripartite stand against
German ambitions.

The Munich crisis and the Nazi–Soviet Pact

British and French appeasement of Hitler at Munich led not only to German
acquisition of the Sudetenland but also the remainder of Czechoslovakia in
March 1939, including her substantial arms industry. Prime Minister
Chamberlain’s vacillation in taking action could not help maintain Soviet
confidence in an effective Anglo-French and Soviet alliance emerging against
Hitler’s ambitions. The Soviet Union could, with good reason, suspect that
Hitler’s attentions were being directed eastwards and towards her borders.
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was herself less than enthusiastic about inter-
vention, and certainly unilaterally. Whilst Soviet forces in Western border
regions were mobilized during the Munich crisis, there is little evidence
they were being readied for offensive action of any sort. According to
Steiner, even if the Czechoslovaks had made a stand, significant Soviet
support could not have been relied upon on the ground, with which Rags-
dale agrees, although, as he notes, serious preparations seem to have been
made to provide air support to Czechoslovakia in late September.17
It remains unclear what degree of Western support would have been
required for the Soviet Union to commit to military action, significant
stumbling blocks being Soviet relations with Poland and Rumania. Any
attack on Germany on the ground would have had to have been through a
hostile Poland and Rumania; the former would not countenance the transit
of Soviet forces through its territory lest they remain there indefinitely – the
Soviet invasion of Poland of 1920 was still a recent event. Poland also had
designs on Czechoslovak territory. Rumania’s position was less obvious, but
her poor transport network made her less desirable as a transit link to
Czechoslovakia anyway. The Soviet Union had not worked hard in the
longer term on trying to improve relations with either the Poles or Rumani-
ans, whom her regional policy was geared to undermine, giving some credi-
bility to Hochman’s argument that the Soviet Union shares at least some
responsibility for the failure of ‘collective security’ leading up to the German
occupation of Czechoslovakia.
A second issue restraining the Soviet Union from action against Germany
in late 1938 or indeed early 1939 was the fact that the Red Army was in a
state of turmoil, undergoing a massive enlargement after having suffered the
loss of experienced cadres during the Great Purges of 1936–38. Some indi-
cation of the damage done to the Soviet armed forces during the Great
Purges and towards the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union is provided in
Table 1.2, detailing damage done to upper command elements.
The damage caused by the Great Purges to the Soviet armed forces was a
significant factor in low estimations of Soviet military capabilities by the
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 17
Table 1.2 The destruction of the upper echelons of the RKKA in 1937–41

Category Number Shot Died in Suicide Returned % of

serving captivity from those
in 1936 captivity serving
alive in 1936
killed

Marshals of the
Soviet Union 5 2 1 – – 60
Army commanders
(1st and 2nd Rank) 15 19 – – 1 133
Flag Officer of the Fleet
(1st and 2nd Rank) 4 5 – – – 125
Corps commanders 62 58 4 2 5 112.6
Flag Officer (1st Rank) 6 5 – – 1 100
Divisional commanders 201 122 9 – 22 76
Brigade commanders 474 201 15 1 30 52.1
Total 767 412 29 3 59 65.6
Source: O.F. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA 1937–1938 (Moscow: Terra, 1998), p. 315.

Western powers at the time of the Munich crisis, being an additional reason or
justification for dismissing the value of Soviet participation in any deterrent
activity against Germany. The Great Purges were most probably launched in
1936–38, as the Russian historian Khlevniuk argues, as a result of the inter-
national situation.18 Whilst identification of internal opposition was nothing
new, dealing with it was now more urgent with war looming, during which
such elements might destabilize the Soviet rear and threaten Stalin’s position.
For the Soviet Union, particularly after Munich, it was crucial to buy
time to prepare for an inevitable clash with Nazi Germany. British and
French guarantees to Poland of March and indeed Rumania of April 1939
were understandably seen as of little significance to Soviet defence given
Anglo-French inactivity over Czechoslovakia, and in part because Poland
was seen as a potential German ally and hostile to the Soviet Union. At the
same time, Britain and France were justifiably seen as unenthusiastic about
reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on dealing with the German
threat during negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939. It is in the
context of diplomatic failure at the time of the Munich crisis of 1938, a cen-
tralization of control over foreign policy and British and French lack of
enthusiasm for agreement with the Soviet Union that the removal of the
pro-Western Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, in May 1939 should
be seen. His replacement by Molotov might have signalled to Germany that
the Soviet Union was more receptive to new proposals to pursuit of ‘collect-
ive security’ with Britain and France, but did not mean a fundamental shift
in policy and rule out agreement with Britain and France.19
18 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
Whilst the British had been dismissive of Soviet overtures in the spring
of 1939, they became more willing to enter into negotiations as the threat of
war became more serious during the summer. However, the issue of the
transit of Soviet troops through Poland or indeed Rumania remained, and
which the British and French were reticent to sanction without Polish and
Rumanian agreement. Voroshilov, the Soviet Commissar for War, would
subsequently lay the blame for the failure to halt Nazi aggression with
Czechoslovakia with the British, French and Poles, stating in an interview at
the end of August 1939, that:

The Soviet military mission thought that the USSR, having no common
frontier with the aggressor, could come to the help of France, England
or Poland only if its troops were allowed to pass through Polish terri-
tory, for there is no other way to come into contact with the troops of
the aggressor.20

Although it is completely obvious that this attitude was correct, the

French and British military missions did not agree with the Soviet mission
in this, while the Polish government openly stated that it did not need and
would not accept military aid from the USSR. This circumstance made mili-
tary co-operation between the USSR and these countries impossible.
At the same time it was apparent to Soviet negotiators that the British
and French were still not in any hurry to reach agreement. As Taylor noted
in his 1961 The Origins of the Second World War:

The diplomatic exchange shows that delays came from the West and the
Soviet government answered with almost breathtaking speed. The
British made their first tentative suggestion on 15 April; the Soviet
counter-proposal came two days later, on 17 April. The British took
three weeks before designing an answer on 9 May; the Soviet delay was
then five days. . . . Thereafter the pace quickened. The British tried again
in five days’ time; the Soviet answer came within twenty-four hours. . . .
If dates mean anything, the British were spinning things out, the Rus-
sians were anxious to conclude. There is other evidence that the British
treated negotiations in a casual way, more to placate public opinion
than to achieve anything.21

At the same time Soviet negotiators noted that the British and French had
no grand strategic plan for war against Germany, not surprising given that
British and French intentions were to take measures to avoid war well in
advance and to prevent the need for anything more than the most abstract
planning for it. Both were rearming, but deterrence was the principal
purpose of such efforts. The ‘Maginot’ mentality that indeed dominated
during the ‘Phoney War’ of late 1939 and early 1940 would, it apparently
seemed to Soviet observers, be likely to prevent significant Anglo-French
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 19
moves against Germany even in the event of war. For a Soviet Union not
deemed prepared for the inevitable war either by foreign observers or inter-
nally, a remaining option was to come to terms with Germany.
The Nazi–Soviet or Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 would result
in the two powers dismembering Poland, the Soviet Union providing Germany
with significant raw materials and even with very limited assistance in the war
against Britain and France in order to shift German attentions to the West and
away from the Soviet Union.22 The second possible international scenario iden-
tified by Soviet planners in 1930 was ‘where the imperialists start a new world
war amongst themselves’, a situation Stalin was now very much encouraging.23
At the same time as directing German attention to the West, against whom
she would most probably become embroiled in a protracted war, the Soviet
Union would be free to expand her borders in what was deemed by the pact and
subsequent additions as her sphere of influence.
The purpose of this expansion was subsequently argued by Soviet histor-
ians to be the provision of a defensive buffer zone between Germany and
Soviet territory of 1939.24 This argument was certainly consistent with
Stalin’s constant harking back to the Civil War in discussions on
contemporary defence matters.25 It does seem that the intention of negotia-
tions with Finland prior to the Soviet invasion of November 1939 was to
prevent her being the eventual launchpad for German invasion, with the
Soviet regime being only too aware of the historical precedent for this to
occur after the landing of German troops in Finland in February 1918 and
threat to Petrograd had hastened the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk:

DOCUMENT 8: To the Finnish government, from the government of the USSR, 14 October 1939
In the negotiations with Finland, the Soviet Union is primarily concerned with the
settling of two questions:
Securing the safety of Leningrad;
Becoming satisfied that Finland will have firm, friendly relations with the Soviet
Union.
Both points are essential for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the Soviet
Union against external hostile aggression. . . .
In order to fulfil this duty it is necessary:
To make it possible to block the opening of the Gulf of Finland by means of
artillery fire from both coasts of the Gulf of Finland . . . ;
To make it possible to prevent the access of the enemy to those islands in the Gulf
of Finland which are situated west and north-west of the entrance to Leningrad;
To have the Finnish frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia, a frontier which is currently
at a distance of 32 kilometres from Leningrad – i.e. within the range of shots from a
long-distance gun – moved somewhat further northwards and westwards.
The question of the Ribachii and Srednii Peninsulas is a special case, where the
frontier is unskilfully and artificially drawn and has to be adjusted in accordance with
the annexed map. . . .
[To be achieved by:]
20 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39
Leasing to the Soviet Union for a period of thirty years the port of Hango. . . .
Granting to the naval forces of the Soviet Union the right of using Lappohja Bay as
an anchorage.
Ceding to the Soviet Union, in exchange for other territories, the following territo-
ries: The islands, . . . part of the Isthmus of Karelia from the village of Lippola to the
southern border of the town of Koivisto, and the western parts of the Ribachii and
Srednii Peninsulas – in total 2,761 square kilometres, in accordance with the annexed
map.
In exchange for the territories mentioned in paragraph 3, the Soviet Union cedes to
the Republic of Finland Soviet territory of the districts of Repola and Porajärvi to the
extent of 5,529 square kilometres, in accordance with the annexed map.
(Source: A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin, 1996, pp. 483–484)

The occupations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia during the summer of

1940 were similarly justified by Soviet security concerns, an argument perhaps
given more credibility by the success of German operations in France.
However, the Soviet Union was not beyond opportunistic expansion, an
accusation appropriately applied to the Soviet acquisition of Bessarabia and
northern Bukovina from Rumania in June 1940. Indeed, the same might be
said of evidence of Soviet intentions in late 1939 to prosecute the war against
Finland to the point that Finland could be brought under Soviet control,
perhaps in a similar manner to the Soviet takeovers in the Baltic Republics.
The Soviet Union had most certainly not given up on the idea of spreading
‘revolution’ across Europe through force of arms – a task likely to be easier if
the capitalist powers were fighting or had fought amongst themselves. Indeed,
the third scenario identified in the planning memo of 1930 was for a situation
where there was the prospect of the Soviet Union pursuing the never-forgotten
international ‘revolution’, from a position of relative strength, where

the adequate development of the revolutionary movement in capitalist

society, a sufficiently strong economic and political base and purely
military preparation might place before us the question of a move
towards a military offensive against capitalism in order to further
world revolution.26

Guide to further reading

Foreign relations
M.J. Carley, ‘Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy,
1917–1941’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 12, Number 3 (September 2001), pp.
159–174.
J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39 (London:
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984).
J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984).
 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39 21
Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War 1936–1941 (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
G. Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations
and the Road to War, 1933–1941 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995).
Zara Steiner, ‘The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in
1938: New Material from the Soviet Archives’, Historical Journal, Volume 42, Number 3
(1999), pp. 751–779.

Military-industrial development and planning

Gunnar Åselius, ‘The Naval Theaters in Soviet Grand Strategy during the Interwar Period’,
JSMS, Volume 13, Number 1 (March 2000), pp. 68–89.
Mark Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War 1938–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1985).
Alexander Hill, ‘Russian and Soviet Naval Power in the Arctic from the XVI Century to the
Beginning of the Great Patriotic War’, JSMS, Volume 20, Number 3 (July–September
2007), pp. 359–392.
L. Samuelson, ‘Mikhail Tukhachevsky and War-Economic Planning: Reconsiderations on the Pre-
War Soviet Military Build-Up’, JSMS, Volume 9, Number 4 (December 1996), pp. 804–847.
L. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine – Tukhachevskii and Military Economic Planning
1925–1941 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
N.S. Simonov, ‘ “Strengthen the Defence of the Land of the Soviets”: The 1927 “War Alarm”
and its Consequences’, Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 48, Number 8 (1996), pp. 1355–1364.
David Stone, Hammer and Rifle – The Militarization of the SU 1926–1933 (Lawrence, KS: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 2000).
David Stone, ‘The First Five-Year Plan and the Geography of the Soviet Defence Industry’,
Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 57, Number 7 (2005), pp. 1047–1063.

The Red Army

Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet
Union, 1919–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist
State, 1917–1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
Roger Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925–1941
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996).

The great purges and the Soviet armed forces

Gunnar Åselius, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921–1941 (London: Frank
Cass, 2005).
O. Khlevniuk, ‘The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937–38’, in D.L. Hoffmann (ed.), Stal-
inism: The Essential Readings (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) and in J. Cooper,
M. Perrie and E.A. Rees (eds), Soviet History 1917–1953: Essays in Honour of R.W. Davies
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995).
V.S. Mil’bach, ‘Repression in the 57th Special Corps (Mongolian People’s Republic)’, JSMS,
Volume 15, Number 1 (March 2002), pp. 91–122.
V.S. Mil’bach, ‘Repression in the Red Army in the Far East, 1936–1939’, JSMS, Volume 16,
Number 4 (December 2003), pp. 58–130.
V.S. Mil’bach, ‘Political Repression of the Pacific Ocean Fleet Commanders and Chiefs in
1936–1939’, JSMS, Volume 21, Number 1 (January–March 2008), pp. 53–112.
Roger Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925–1941
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), Chapter 5.
2 The Icebreaker controversy and
Soviet intentions in 19411

During the second half of 1940 and early 1941, with Nazi Germany at the
height of its power, the Soviet Union was in the middle of the third, and the
most obviously defence-oriented, Five-Year Plan, due to be completed in
1942. The Second Five-Year Plan had seen considerable investment in
defence; figures for the production of weapons and weapons systems for 1937
and 1938 are provided in Table 2.1 which can be compared to figures in
Table 1.1 for 1929/30 and 1930/31 at the beginning of Chapter 1. Con-
tinued increases in production of key weapons systems such as tanks were
achieved in 1939 and 1940, for which figures are provided in Table 2.2.
The immediate likelihood of the Soviet Union taking pre-emptive offen-
sive action against Nazi Germany or more broadly against capitalist Europe
was made less likely than it otherwise might have been after the poor
performance of the Red Army during the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland
in September 1939, and the subsequent invasion of Finland in November
1939, during which the Red Army had suffered horrendous losses against a
poorly equipped, albeit in Karelia, well-fortified Finnish opponent. Table
2.3 gives details of Soviet losses during the war with Finland from 30
November to 13 March 1940.

Table 2.1 Soviet orders for and production of key armaments 1937–38

Product 1937 1938

■
Plan Actual % plan Plan Actual % plan

Artillery pieces 6,417 5,443 84.8 13,813 12,687 91.8

Artillery shells (1,000s) 8,855 4,924 55.6 16,065 12,426 77.3
Rifles (1,000s) 650 567 87.2 1,155 1,171 101.3
Machine guns 76,182 74,657 78.9 126,799 112,010 88.3
Cartridges (millions) 1,285 1,015 78.9 2,500 1,848 73.9
Aircraft 4,896 4,435 90.6 7,500 5,469 72.9
Tanks 2,030 1,559 76.8 2,375 2,271 95.6
Source: N.S. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e godi, p. 112.
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 23
Table 2.2 Soviet orders for and production of key armaments 1939–40

Product 1939 1940

■
Plan Actual % plan Plan Actual % plan

Artillery pieces 19,620 16,459 83.8 8,266 13,724 166.0

Artillery shells (1,000s) 25,095 18,099 72.1 22,195 14,921 67.2
Rifles (1,000s) 1,920 1,497 77.9 1,986 1,461 73.5
Machine guns 115,881 96,433 83.2 46,000 No data No data
Cartridges (millions) 2,160 2,194 101.5 3,143 2,820 89.7
Aircraft 9,091 10,758 118.3 13,864 10,565 76.2
Tanks 3,278 2,986 91.1 3,370 2,790 82.7
Source: N.S. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e godi, p. 129.

Table 2.3 Soviet irrecoverable losses in the Russo-Finnish War

Category Commanders NCOs Ranks Rank Total

unknown

Killed or died during 6,000 9,611 54,215 1,388 72,214

evacuation
Died in hospital of wounds 802 1,436 12,185 1,869 16,292
or disease
Missing in action 1,010 2,998 33,827 1,534 39,369
Total 7,812 14,045 100,227 4,791 126,875
Source: G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century
(London: Greenhill Books, 1997), p. 77.

Such dismal Soviet performance during the initial stages of her invasion
of Finland, bringing the Soviet Union the diplomatic embarrassment of
expulsion from the League of Nations for her aggression, encouraged the
German development of plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the
summer of 1941. Whilst Anglo-French intervention in Finland did not
materialize before the Finns had sued for peace with the Soviet Union in
March 1940 and Germany had subsequently invaded Norway in April, pre-
liminary British and French planning for such an operation was carried out,
with the landing of French mountain or Polish troops at Petsamo being dis-
cussed.2 Had such an operation taken place, it would have further compli-
cated the diplomatic and strategic situation in Europe, with the prospect of
the Nazi–Soviet Pact leading to joint military activities by the Soviet Union
and Germany against Britain and France!
Red Army failings in Poland and Finland came under considerable
scrutiny in the Soviet Union. One ramification of this Soviet military
experience was to strengthen the position of what could now be called the
24 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
officer corps vis-à-vis the ranks. Soviet ranks, such as brigade commander
[kombrig] gave way to traditional officer’s titles. There was also a move away
from dual command in the Red Army, where the decisions of military offi-
cers were subject to political scrutiny from commissars, something bad for
officer morale, given that officers were deemed the specialists in military
affairs, and unhelpful in their fostering of authority in a unit. On 12 August
1940 dual command, having been reintroduced in 1937, gave way once
more to unitary command:

DOCUMENT 9: On the Reinforcing of Unitary Command in the Red Army and Navy. Decree
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 12 August 1940
As a result of the institute of commissars having already fulfilled its basic purposes,
that is the command cadres of the Red Army and Navy have in the last few years been
strengthened, and at the same time with the aims of bringing about full unitary
command and the future raising of the authority of the commander – the fully
empowered leader of forces, carrying in the same way full responsibility for political
work in units – the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decrees:
Rescind ‘The situation regarding military commissars of the Workers’ and Peasants’
Red Army’, ratified by the Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples’
Commissars of the USSR of 15 August 1937 No. 105/1387.
Bring in to units (corps, divisions, brigades), . . . ships, . . . military-educational insti-
tutions and establishments of the Red Army and Navy the institute of deputy com-
manders (heads) of political departments.
Require military soviets of military districts, fronts and armies to carry out the daily
and active supervision of political work in corps, divisions and brigades.
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M. Kalinin
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, A. Gorkin
Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 August 1940.
(Source: KPSS o Vooruzhennikh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1981, pp. 289–290)

Whilst steps were being taken to improve the authority of officers, Soviet
military experience in the war against Finland and the war in the West had
to be analysed and conclusions applied to the development of Soviet armed
forces. This experience was the subject of a conference of the upper elements
of the leadership of the Red Army in December 1940. Summing up at the
end of the conference, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko pointed out
some of the key conclusions drawn:

DOCUMENT 10: Closing speech of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko at a conference
of the upper elements of the leadership of the Red Army, no later than 31 December 1940
Experience of the most recent wars and especially the Western-European war of
1939–1940 shows that in the sphere of military art substantial shifts are taking place.
...
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 25
The principal conclusion to be drawn is:
The high speed of an operation is the decisive condition for the success of the opera-
tion.
The high speed of an operation is provided for by the mass use of motorized units
and aviation, used to strike the initial blow and for the uninterrupted deep develop-
ment of the strike.
The decisive impact of aviation is achieved not through raids deep in the rear, but
in co-operation in the actions of forces on the battlefield, at divisional and army level.
...
The experience of war shows, that contemporary defence cannot be limited to a
single tactical zone of resistance, and that against new deep methods of breakthrough
second and perhaps third operational echelons, made up of operational reserves, special
anti-tank units and other means are required, operating from prepared rear-area defen-
sive anti-tank zones or defensive positions.
...
The fullest expression of the character of contemporary defence is found within the
bounds of army-level defensive operations.
...
The contemporary [offensive] operation most fully develops at front level.
It is conducted with the strength of a number of armies in co-ordination with
mobile groups, with strong close air support, and in specific circumstances naval
forces.
...
The most important task of the command and headquarters of armies and fronts is
the creation of overwhelming superiority of force on the main axis of attack. . . .
The breaching of enemy lines has raised the question of the co-ordination of
infantry, aviation, armour and artillery. . . .
[Timoshenko went on to highlight the weakness of Soviet training, a major stum-
bling block in increasing the effectives of Soviet forces:]
War against the White Finns revealed the ruinous state of our system of military
training. . . . Our commanders and headquarters . . . were unable to genuinely
command.
...
We have to openly and honestly admit, that work to reorganise the training system
. . . demands a considerable period of time and persistent efforts.
(Source: RA T.12 (1), 1993, pp. 338, 340–341, 343, 349, 359, 363)

Such conclusions fed in to reorganization, rearmament and training that

were far from complete in the summer of 1941. Soviet performance against
Japan at Khalkin-Gol in Manchuria in August 1939 had, however, been
more encouraging; along with their commitments in China, it encouraged
the Japanese decision to restrict their ambitions in the region, culminating
in the Soviet–Japanese non-aggression treaty of April 1941.
By mid-June 1941 the Red Army was, at least superficially on paper, an
impressive force. Prior to the German attack a considerable proportion of its
forces were massed on the Soviet–German border, with a second echelon
moving into position, for what reason is not entirely clear. With the focus of
26 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
Soviet military doctrine by this stage focused very much on the offensive and
her eastern front ostensibly a little more secure than it had been at the
beginning of the year, it is easy to see how it could be suggested that the
Soviet Union was massing forces for an attack, be it aimed at pre-empting
the now-delayed German invasion of the Soviet Union or part of longer-
term preparations for the third pre-war scenario mentioned above.
The argument that the Soviet Union was intending to attack Germany in
July 1941, as presented by the Soviet defector writing under the pseudonym
Viktor Suvorov in the mid-1980s, started a significant debate on Soviet
intentions in 1941 and beyond in Germany and the Soviet successor states,
particularly Russia, which only later received significant attention in the
Anglo-Saxon world. According to Suvorov, in his first article on the subject
in 1985, a TASS report of 13 June 1941, which sought to dispel rumours of
an imminent German attack on the Soviet Union, was a desperate attempt
to cover Soviet preparations for military action against Germany in July, for
which Soviet forces were moving into position and which was in full accord-
ance with the offensive thrust of Soviet military doctrine.3 His subsequent
work, largely only available in Russian, has to a large extent been geared to
elaborating on this thesis.4 Suvorov has at times presented interesting
though poorly thought out or linked snippets of information suggesting
that the Soviet Union had been engaged in longer-term preparation for this
invasion of Europe during the 1930s, culminating, in his view, in moves in
the summer of 1941. Extracts from the TASS report of 13 June are provided
below:

DOCUMENT 11: TASS communiqué – Soviet denial of reported disagreements between the
USSR and Germany, 13 June 1941, published in Izvestia, 14 June 1941
Even before the arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps, English ambassador to the USSR, in
London, and especially after his arrival, rumours began to appear in the English and
foreign press more broadly about the ‘proximity of war between the Soviet Union and
Germany’. . . .
Although these rumours are obviously absurd, responsible circles in Moscow have
all the same considered it necessary in view of the constant repetition of these propa-
ganda rumours spread by forces hostile to the Soviet Union and Germany, forces inter-
ested in the further expansion and spreading of the war, to authorize TASS to state
that they are clumsy fabrications.
TASS states that:
...
2. According to Soviet data, Germany, like the USSR, is also strictly observing the
stipulations of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, and therefore, in the opinion of
Soviet circles, rumours of Germany’s intention to break the pact and open an attack on
the USSR are devoid of all foundation; the recent transfer of German troops, freed
from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and north-eastern regions of Germany
is, it must be assumed, connected with other reasons which have no bearing on Soviet-
German relations;
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 27
3. The USSR, consistently with its policy of peace, has observed and intends to
observe the provisions of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, and therefore
rumours that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are lies and provocations;
4. The sole purpose of the summer call-up of Red Army reserves and forthcoming
exercises is in the training of the reserves and the testing of the railway system which,
as is known, takes place each year.
(Source: V.P. Naumov, 1998, p. 361)

Suvorov’s argument had considerable appeal to revisionist historians in post-

Soviet Russia, who were more than willing to adopt an argument running
counter to the Soviet image of the Soviet Union desperately seeking to pre-
serve peace. It also appealed to right-wing German historians such as
Joachim Hoffmann, who could present the German invasion of the Soviet
Union as a preventative strike.5 Suvorov’s argument was rapidly countered
by much of the established Russian historical community, with the support
of Western historians such as Gorodetsky on the diplomatic front and
Glantz on military issues. Glantz showed in Stumbling Colossus that the
Soviet Union was actually in no position to attack Germany in June 1941,
with Soviet forces for instance lacking the logistical capabilities for offensive
operations against German forces.6
Certainly, in late 1940, when the leadership elements of the Soviet
armed forces were considering the war in the West to date, the Red Army
was not deemed ready for offensive operations against a major European
power. General K.A. Meretskov’s opening paragraphs to his contribution to
the conference of the upper elements of the leadership of the Red Army in
December 1940, from which Document 12 is taken, stress the need to con-
tinue to improve the strength of the Soviet armed forces, albeit in the
‘shortest possible time’:

DOCUMENT 12: ‘Results and tasks of military preparation of the ground forces, VVS and
operational preparation of the officer corps’: General K.A. Meretskov’s introduction to a
conference of the upper elements of the leadership of the Red Army, no later than 24 December
1940
1939 and 1940 have passed by leaving a complex international situation. The majority
of peoples of the world have been dragged into a large-scale and difficult war by the
imperialists. . . .
At the same time, . . . our great people, under the leadership of the great leader
[vozhd’] Comrade Stalin, thanks to his wise strategy continue to remain outside the
war and as before continue confidently towards their goal, improving their material
condition and increasing the might of the armed forces of our country.
...
During the move westwards,7 and in responding to provocation in the Far East and
in Finland, the Red Army has gained considerable military experience of modern war.
During the fighting in the Karelo-Finnish theatre. . .
28 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
Alongside the successful fulfilment of broader tasks, in this war a number of inade-
quacies in organisational, operational-tactical and disciplinary questions emerged.
...
Under the direction of the People’s Commissar for Defence we must, in the shortest
possible time, reorganise our army, and genuinely bring it to a high state of military
readiness, to achieve a state of affairs whereby we are constantly ready at any time to
set forth [vistupit’ v pokhod] on the orders of the government.
(Source: RA T.12 (1), 1993, pp. 13–14, 29)

The Soviet Union was, however, gradually putting itself on what might be
considered a war footing, a strong indicator of which was the decision to
switch to an eight-hour working day, six-day working week in the summer
of 1940, and strengthen labour discipline:

DOCUMENT 13: On the move to an eight-hour working day, seven-day working week and the
forbidding of voluntary departure of workers and administrative staff from industrial concerns
and administrative establishments
Extract from the Decree of 25 June 1940
In accordance with the declaration of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions,
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decrees:
...
2. To move over, in all state, co-operative and public concerns and administrative
establishments, from a six-day working week to a seven-day week, considering the
seventh day of the week – Sunday – a day off.
(Source: Sbornik zakonov SSSR v dvukh tomakh, 1968, pp. 182–183)

Gabriel Gorodetsky’s Grand Delusion is a direct response to the Suvorov

thesis. Gorodetsky essentially reiterated the established Soviet line, with
minor embellishments and additional supporting material, that the Soviet
Union was desperate to ensure peace in the summer of 1941 without serious
intention of anything more than a spoiling attack, without examining Soviet
longer-term intentions, and in particular the ideological dimension to Soviet
foreign policy and the notion of spreading revolution by force.8 Perhaps the
most useful product of Suvorov’s work and the response from those such as
Gorodetsky has been intensification of debate over Soviet intentions during
the summer of 1941 and beyond, fuelled by sporadic new materials from
Soviet archives, which has led to a much more nuanced picture of Soviet
intentions emerging than that dominant in the mid-1980s and indeed por-
trayed by Gorodetsky.
First, it is apparent that the Soviet Union was preparing for war against
Germany, even if not in July 1941, and that such a war, in line with Soviet
doctrine, would involve initial offensive operations by Soviet forces. Second,
it became apparent that the Soviet military leadership had, understandably,
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 29
considered offensive operations against Germany in the summer of 1941,
and the Soviet leadership had started to intensify propaganda efforts to
prepare the Soviet population for war before switching abruptly back to a
line of preserving peace with Germany at all costs, presumably in the face of
the absence of the necessary military preparations.
Plans for operations against German forces massed on the Soviet border
dated 15 May 1941 appeared in Russian publications after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, as did the text of a speech made by Stalin to graduating
officers on 5 May, during which he can reasonably be seen to have been
preparing those present for war with Germany in the not-too-distant
future.9 A short extract from the speech of 5 May is followed by the bulk of
the operational plan of 15 May:

DOCUMENT 14: Third speech of I.V. Stalin to graduating officers, the Kremlin, Moscow, 5
May 1941
The policy of peace is a good thing. We have up to now, up to this time, carried out a
line – defence – up to the time when we have re-equipped our army, up until the time
we have supplied the army with the modern means of battle. And now, when our army
has been reconstructed, has been amply supplied [nasitili] with equipment for modern
battle, when we have become stronger, now it is necessary to go from defence to
offence [ot oboroni k nastupleniiu].
Defending our country, we must act offensively. From defence to go to a military
doctrine of offensive actions. We must transform our training, our propaganda, our
agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army and the
modern army is an offensive army.
(Source: Jürgen Förster and Evan Mawdsley, 2004, pp. 101–102)

DOCUMENT 15: Note by the People’s Commissar of Defence of the USSR and head of the
General Headquarters of the Red Army to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars
of the USSR I.V. Stalin with considerations for a plan for the strategic deployment of the armed
forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and her allies. No earlier than 15
May 1941
I provide for your consideration thoughts on a plan for the strategic deployment of the
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and her allies.
I. At the current time Germany has, according to the information provided by the Recon-
naissance Board of the Red Army, around 230 infantry, 22 armoured, 20 mechanized, 8
airborne and 4 cavalry divisions deployed, a total of around 284 divisions.
Of these, as of 15.5.1941, up to 86 infantry, 13 armoured, 12 motorized and 1
cavalry division, a total of up to 112 divisions, are concentrated on the borders of the
Soviet Union.
It is supposed, that in terms of the current political situation, in the event of attack
on the USSR Germany will be able to put up as many as 137 infantry, 19 armoured,
15 motorized, 4 cavalry and 5 airborne divisions against us, in all up to 180 divisions.
30 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
The remaining 104 divisions will be situated. . .
Most probably the principal strength of the German army in the form of 76
infantry, 11 armoured, 8 motorized, 2 cavalry and 5 airborne divisions, a total of up to
100 divisions, will be deployed to the south of Demblin for the striking of a blow on
the axis Kovel’ – Rovno – Kiev.
This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by a blow in the north from East
Prussia on Vilnius and Riga, and at the same time short, concentric blows from the
direction of Suvalki and Brest towards Volkovisk-Baranovichi.
In the south it figures that we can expect blows [by the Rumanian army, supported
by German divisions, in the general direction of Zhmerinka, at the same time as those
by the German army.
The possibility of a supporting blow by the Germans from behind the River San in
the direction of L’vov cannot be ruled out.] a) in the direction of Zhmerinka by the
Rumanian army, supported by German divisions; b) in the direction of Munkakh, L’vov; c)
Sanok, L’vov.
The likely German allies can field the following against the USSR: Finland – up to
20 infantry divisions, Hungary – 15 infantry divisions, Rumania – up to 25 infantry
divisions.
In all, Germany and her allies can deploy up to 240 divisions against the Soviet
Union.
Bearing in mind, that at the current moment Germany holds her army in a fully
mobilized state, with fully deployed rear-area services, she has the potential to antici-
pate our deployment and deliver a surprise blow.
In order to prevent this [and to destroy the German army], I consider it necessary,
not under any circumstances, to allow the initiative to be gained by the German High
Command, to pre-empt enemy deployment and to attack the German army at the
point at which she is deploying, and prevent her having the time to organise a front
and co-ordinate the different elements of her forces.
II. The first strategic aim for operations of forces of the Red Army is to be set as: the
destruction of the principal forces of the German army deployed to the south of
Demblin, with positions by day 30 of the operation along the front Ostrolenka, the
River Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreitsburg, Oppeln, Olomoits. The subsequent strategic aim
is: advancing from the Katovitse region in a northerly or north-westerly direction to destroy
major units of the Central and Northern wings of the German front and to seize the territories of
former Poland and East Prussia.
The most immediate task is to destroy the German army east of the River Vistula and on the
Krakow axis, to emerge on the Rivers Narev and Vistula and seize the district of Katovitse, for
which:
The principal blow by forces of the South-Western Front is to be struck in the direc-
tion of Krakow, Katovitse, cutting Germany off from her southern allies;
A supporting strike is to be made by the west wing of the Western Front in the
direction of Sedlets, Demblin, with the aim of pinning down forces around Warsaw
and co-ordinating with the South-Western Front in the defeat of enemy forces near
Lublin;
To conduct an active defence against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary and Rumania
and to be prepared to strike a blow against Rumania in favourable circumstances.
In such a manner the Red Army will commence offensive action along a front from Chizhov to
Motovisko with a force of 152 divisions against 100 German divisions. On the remaining sec-
tions of the state border provision is to be made for active defence.
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 31
III. Stemming from the stated plan for strategic deployment the following deploy-
ment of the Armed Forces of the USSR is envisaged:
Ground forces of the Red Army consisting of: 198 rifle divisions, 61 armoured divi-
sions, 31 mechanized division and 13 cavalry divisions (in total 303 divisions and
artillery regiments of the High Command Reserve) are to be distributed in the follow-
ing manner:
Principal forces consisting of 163 infantry, 58 armoured, 30 mechanized and 7
cavalry divisions (in total 258 divisions) and 53 artillery regiments of the High
Command Reserve are to be in the West, of which making up the Northern, North-
Western, Western and South-Western Fronts are 136 infantry divisions, 44 armoured
divisions, 23 mechanized divisions and 7 cavalry divisions (in total 210 divisions) and
53 artillery regiments of the High Command Reserve; making up the High Command
Reserve behind the South-Western and Western Fronts are 27 infantry, 14 armoured
and 7 mechanized divisions (a total of 48 divisions);
The remaining strength, consisting of 35 infantry, 3 armoured, 1 mechanized
and 6 cavalry divisions (in total 45 divisions) and 21 artillery regiments of the
High Command Reserve are allocated for the defence of the Far Eastern, southern
and northern borders of the USSR, of which: 22 infantry, 3 armoured, 1 mecha-
nized and 1 cavalry division (in total 27 divisions) and 14 artillery regiments
of the High Command Reserve are in the Far East and Trans-Baikal Military
District.
– In Central Asia – 2 mountain-rifle and 3 cavalry divisions (a total of 5 divi-
sions)
– In the Transcaucasus – 8 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions (a total of 10 divi-
sions) and 2 artillery regiments of the High Command Reserve
– For the defence of the Black Sea coastline and the Northern Caucasus and
Crimea – 2 rifle divisions
– On the White Sea coast – 1 rifle division.
...
2. The Air Forces of the Red Army made up of the currently available and combat-
ready 97 fighter air regiments, 75 light bomber regiments, 11 close air support regi-
ments, 29 long-range bomber regiments and 6 heavy bomber regiments (a total of 218
aviation regiments) are to be allocated according to the following:
a) The principal forces, consisting of 66 fighter air regiments, 64 light bomber regi-
ments, 5 close support regiments, 25 long-range bomber regiments (in total 165 avia-
tion regiments) are to be deployed in the west, of which:
– As part of the Northern, North Western, Western and South-Western Fronts –
63 fighter air regiments, 64 light bomber regiments, 5 close air support regi-
ments, 11 long-range bomber regiments and one heavy bomber regiment;
– Making up the High Command Reserve behind the South-Western and
Western Fronts are 14 long-range bomber regiments, 4 heavy bomber regiments,
a total of 21 aviation regiments;
b) The remaining strength consisting of 51 fighter air regiments, 11 light bomber
regiments, 6 close air support regiments, 4 long-range bomber regiments and 1 heavy
bomber regiment – a total of 53 aviation regiments – are to be left over for the defence
of the Far Eastern, southern and northern borders and the close air defence of Moscow,
of which:
32 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
– to be in the Far East and the Trans-Baikal Military District – 14 fighter air
regiments, 9 light bomber regiments, 5 close air support regiments, 4 long-range
bomber regiments and 1 heavy bomber regiment, a total of 33 aviation regi-
ments;
– in the Central Asian Military District – 1 fighter air regiment, 1 close air
support regiment, a total of 2 aviation regiments;
– in the Transcaucasus Military District – 9 fighter air regiments, 2 light bomber
regiments, a total of 11 aviation regiments;
– in the Arkhangel’sk Military District – 1 fighter air regiment.
For the defence of Moscow – 6 fighter air regiments.
...
In addition to the air forces mentioned, there are currently 52 fighter air regiments,
30 light bomber regiments, 4 close air support regiments, 7 long-range bomber regi-
ments and 22 long-range escort [regiments], a total of 115 aviation regiments, in the
process of forming and in no uncertain terms yet ready for combat, which can be
expected to be in a full state of readiness by 1.1.42.
...
IV. Composition and tasks of fronts deployed in the west . . . :
Northern Front (Leningrad Military District) – 3 armies, consisting of 15 rifle, 4
armoured and 2 motorized divisions, a total of 21 divisions, 18 aviation regiments and
the Northern Naval Fleet, with the basic tasks of which being the defence of the city
of Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov Railway, and with the Baltic Naval
Fleet to provide us with total supremacy on the waters of the Gulf of Finland. With
this very aim in mind the transfer of the northern and north-western shores of the
Estonian SSR to the Northern Front from the Pribaltic Special Military District is
envisaged.
The boundary for the front on the left – Ostashkov, Ostrov, Viru, Vil’iandi, the
Matasalu Inlet, and with the exception of the islands of Ezel’ and Dago alone.
Front headquarters – Pargolovo.
North-Western Front (Pribaltic Special Military District) – 3 armies, consisting of
17 rifle divisions [(of which 6 national)], 4 armoured and 2 motorized divisions, a total
of 23 divisions and 14 aviation regiments with the tasks: through stubborn defence to
solidly cover the Riga and Vilensk axis, not allowing the enemy to break out of East
Prussia; the defence of the western coastline and the islands of Ezel’ and Dago, with
the aim of preventing enemy landings.
Left border of the front – Polotsk, Oshmiani, Druskeniki, Margerabova, Lettsen.
Front headquarters – Ponevezh.
Western Front (Western Special Military District) – 4 armies, consisting of 31 rifle,
8 armoured, 4 motorized and 2 cavalry divisions, a total of 45 divisions and 21 avia-
tion regiments.
Tasks: the stubborn defence of the front Druskeniki-Ostrolenka, with the solid
defence of the Lidsk and Belostok axis;
With the transition of the armies of the South-Western Front over to the offensive,
with a blow by the left wing of the front in the directions of Warsaw, Sedlets, Radom,
to destroy the forces near Warsaw and the occupy Warsaw, [in order to assist] in co-ordination
with the South-Western Front to destroy the enemy in the Lublin-Radom region, to
move up to [viti na] the River Vistula and with mobile units to seize Radom [and to facilitate
this operation from the Warsaw and East Prussia direction].
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 33
Left border of the front – River Pripiat’, Pinsk, Vlodava, Demblin, Radom.
Front headquarters – Baranovichi.
South-Western Front – 8 armies, consisting of 74 rifle, 28 armoured, 15 motorized
and 5 cavalry divisions, a total of 122 divisions and 91 aviation regiments, with the
most immediate tasks:
Concentric blows by the armies of the left flank of the front to encircle and destroy
the key enemy concentration to the east of the River Vistula and in the Lublin area;
At the same time with a blow from the line Seniava, Peremishl’, Liutoviska to
destroy enemy forces on the Krakow and Sandomir-Keletsk axes and then seize the
Krakow, Katovitse, Kel’tse districts bearing in mind in the future to attack from this
area in a northerly or north-westerly direction in order to destroy the major force of
the northern wing of the enemy front and the seizure of the territories of what was
Poland and of Eastern Prussia;
To stubbornly defend the state border from Hungary and Rumania and be prepared
for the striking of concentric blows against Rumania from the Chernovitsi and
Kishinev regions, with the immediate aim of destroying the northern wing of the
Rumanian army and ending up on the line of the Moldova River and Iassi.
In order to provide for the carrying out of the plan expounded above it is necessary
to conduct the following activities in a timely manner, without which it will be
impossible to strike a surprise blow against the enemy be it from the air or on the
ground:
To conduct a concealed deployment of our forces under cover of the call up of
reservists for training;
...
V. The concentration of High Command Reserves.
In the High Command Reserve there are to be 5 armies concentrated:
2 Armies, consisting of 9 rifle, 4 armoured and 2 motorized divisions, a total of 15
divisions, in the region of Viaz’ma, Sichevka, El’nia, Briansk, Sukhinichi;
One army, consisting of four rifle, two armoured and 2 motorized divisions, a total
of 8 divisions, in the region of Vileika, Novogrudok, Minsk;
One army, consisting of 6 rifle, 4 armoured and two motorized divisions, a total of
12 divisions, in the region of Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berdichev and
One army, consisting of 8 rifle, two armoured and 2 motorized divisions, a total of
12 divisions, in the region of Belaia Tserkov’, Zvenigorodka, Cherkassi.
VI. Concealment of concentration and deployment.
In order to cover ourselves against a possible sudden strike by the enemy, the con-
centration and deployment of our forces and preparation for them to attack must be
covered, for which it is necessary to:
Organize the solid covering and defence of the state borders, utilizing for this all of
the forces of the military districts along the border and almost all of the aviation allo-
cation for deployment in the west;
To formulate a detailed plan for the air defence of the country and to bring AA
resources to full readiness.
On these matters instructions have already been handed out, and the development
of plans for the defence of the state border and AA will be fully complete by
01.06.1941.
...
At the same time it is necessary to take all the necessary measures to force through the construction
and arming of the fortified districts, to start the construction of fortified districts on the border
34 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
with Hungary during 1942, and in the same way to continue the construction of fortified dis-
tricts along the old state border.
VII. Tasks for the Navy are to be set in accordance with my instructions as already
confirmed by you.
VIII. The deployment of our forces and their operations are to be supplied with the
available supply stocks as follows:
Munitions – small calibre munitions for three weeks;
Medium calibre munitions for a month;
Heavy calibre munitions for a month;
Mines for half a month;
For AA fire –
37 mm for 5 days;
76 mm for one and a half months;
85 mm for 5 days;
Aviation munitions –
High-explosive bombs – for a month;
Armour-piercing bombs – for 10 days;
‘Bunker-busting’ bombs – for 10 days;
Fragmentation bombs – for a month;
Incendiary bombs – for a month and a half;
Fuel oils –
Petrol B-78 for 10 days;
Petrol B-74 for a month;
Petrol B-70 for two and a half months;
Automobile petrol for one and a half months;
Diesel fuel for a month.
Reserves of fuel allocated to western military districts are stored ‘in depth’ in the
necessary quantities (due to the lack of storage capacity on their territories) in internal
military districts.
IX. I request:
Confirm receipt of the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the
USSR and plan for projected military operations in the event of war with Germany;
In good time authorize the required conduct of concealed mobilization and hidden con-
centration of, in the first instance, all armies of the High Command Reserve and aviation;
Demand of the People’s Commissariat for Communications full and timely fulfilment
of railway construction according to the plan for 1941 and especially on the L’vov axis;
Require industrial concerns to fulfil plans for the production of material com-
ponents for tanks and aircraft, and similarly for the production and provision of muni-
tions and fuels strictly within the allotted timeframes.
...
People’s Commissar for Defence of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union – S. Timoshenko
Head of the General Headquarters of the Red Army
General of the Army – G. Zhukov
[Note: Text assumed to have been added by G.K. Zhukov appears in italics, that
assumed to have been deleted by him is inside square brackets.]
(Source: V.P. Naumov, kn.2, 1998, pp. 215–220. See also I.A. Gor’kov, 1995, pp. 303–309)
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 35
At the same time, Nevezhin presents evidence of a planned, if abortive, shift
in Soviet propaganda towards an anti-German stance compared to the placa-
tory line taken as a result of the Nazi–Soviet Pact.10 What is not apparent, as
Mawdsley discusses, is the extent to which these developments were geared
towards Soviet action within weeks or months, the latter placing the May
plan more in line with a gradual Soviet mobilization of forces, including the
transfer of units from the Far East, taking place before and after 15 May.11
What is certain is that Red Army mobilization was by May or June 1941 a
long way from the ambitious targets set in the 1941 general mobilization
plan for the Red Army that appeared in February 1941, superseding a
general mobilization plan of November 1937. The 1941 plan, or MP-41,
called for a Red Army of 300 divisions, provided with the equipment indi-
cated in Table 2.4 by 1 January 1942, compared to that available on 1
January 1941.
Whilst our picture of Soviet intelligence prior to mid-May does not
suggest that the Soviet Union was convinced of the imminence of the
German attack, a factor no doubt assisted by the delay in Operation ‘Bar-
barossa’ from mid-May to June, at least some in the Soviet Union had suffi-
ciently good intelligence from a variety of sources to be convinced by
mid-June 1941 at least that a German attack was imminent. Some examples
of intelligence on the German military build-up and information on incur-
sions into Soviet airspace by German aircraft are provided in the following
three extracts:

DOCUMENT 16: From information of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of
the Ukrainian SSR regarding German military activities and incidents on the border, 6 June
1941
According to observations of the 91st Rava-Russkii Border Detachment, in the border
zone the appearance of large tank formations of the German army is coming to an end.
16 medium tanks passed in the direction of Plazuv. From Tomasheva to Belz up to
a company of motorcyclists arrived, half a squadron of cavalry and up to two regiments
of infantry.
5 June 1941, between 2:00 and 6:00 up to 100 tankettes and a significant number
of medium tanks were on their way from Plazuv in the direction of Narol’. During the
day the movement of tanks continues in isolated groups.
...
Border incursion by a German aircraft
5 June 1941 at 11:43 on the sector of 93rd Leskovkii Border Detachment in the
region of the village of Pavlokom at a height of 4,000 metres a single-engined German
aircraft crossed the border.
Penetrating our territory from between 3 and 8 km . . .
The aircraft was not shot at.
Engagement [obstrel] of aircraft
5 June 1941 in the region of Dubov our single-engined reconnaissance aircraft,
flying along the border at a height of 2,500 metres, was shot at by machine gun fire
from the Rumanian side. . . .
36 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941
Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Ukrainian SSR, Colonel Strokhach.
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 1995, pp. 209–211)

DOCUMENT 17: From communication of the NKVD SSSR No. 1996/B to TsK VKP (b)
and SNK SSSR regarding breaches of the state border of the USSR from the German side from
November 1940 to 10 June 1941, 12 June 1941
In the recent past since October 1940 . . . from the German side 185 aircraft have
breached the border of the Soviet Union. During the last month and a half breaches of
our border by German aircraft have become particularly frequent. During May and 10
days of June 1941 91 German aircraft have breached the border of the USSR.
Penetrations of the border of the Soviet Union by German aircraft have do not have
the character of chance occurrences, confirmed by their direction and deep flights over
our territory. In a number of instances German aircraft flew over our territory to a
depth of 100 and more kilometres, and especially in the direction of districts in which
defensive works are being erected, and over points where there are large garrisons of
the Red Army.
...
Recently there have been a number of instances in which agents of German recon-
naissance organs, equipped with portable two-way radios, arms and grenades, have
been detained.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, Beria.
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 1995, pp. 220–221)

DOCUMENT 18: From communication of the NKVD USSR to TsK VKP (b) and SNK
USSR regarding breaches of the Soviet border by foreign aircraft from 10 to 19 June 1941, 20
June 1941
Regarding breaches of the border of the Soviet Union by foreign aircraft the NKVD of
the USSR informs, that from 10 to 19 June of the current year inclusive 86 instances
of breaches of the border by foreign aircraft have been determined by detachments of
the NKVD. Of these: from the Finnish side – 9 instances, from the German side – 63
instances, from the Hungarian side – 2 instances, from the Rumanian side – 12
instances . . .
Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Maslennikov.
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 1995, pp. 269–270)

That a German or Axis attack was imminent was not, however, a conclusion
reached by Stalin.12 The fact that an impending short-term intensification of
defensive measures was not taken (or at best half-heartedly and covertly) was
no doubt because, from Stalin’s perspective, if the Soviet Union was not in a
position to go on the offensive because her armed forces were simply not
ready, then she would have to seek to buy as much time as possible from the
Nazi–Soviet Pact. On Stalin’s insistence the Soviet Union would do all that
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 37
was possible not to provoke Germany into striking first, something she was,
according to the official Soviet line, not intending to do anyway.
The Nazi–Soviet Pact, in embroiling Germany in a war in the West,
was no doubt intended by Stalin and the Soviet leadership to buy more
time than the less than two years it had done by the summer of 1941.
Whilst France had been defeated more rapidly than expected by most
observers, Britain remained in the war and was, by mid-1941, starting to
receive significant US support through Lend-Lease. In the early summer
there were British warnings of German intention to invade the Soviet
Union, which, despite corroboration by other sources, were not taken seri-
ously by a Stalin seeing them as an attempt to provoke the Soviet Union
into joining the war before she was ready, and thus ignored. Stalin, it is
widely assumed, sought to convince himself that Germany would not
intentionally make the mistake of the First World War of fighting on two
fronts. This belief was reinforced by German talk of an invasion of Britain,
and despite fears of a British ‘coming to terms’ with Germany, particularly
after Hess, Hitler’s second-in-command in the Nazi Party, had made his
unauthorized flight to Britain in May 1941. The Soviet response to
intensified insecurity was to increase the flow of resources to Germany,
provided under the umbrella of the Nazi–Soviet Pact. With the war
against Britain continuing, Germany was seen by the Soviet Union as des-
perately short of the strategic resources being provided to them, and pre-
sumably would not be so foolish as to throw away the opportunity to
continue to receive them in the context of the drawbacks of a two-front
war. Soviet deliveries continued to roll across the Soviet–German border
right up to the invasion, for which the Soviet Union was not receiving
what she had been promised in return. Up until the point on 22 June
1941 that it was clear that German operations were not mere ‘provoca-
tion’, Stalin remained unwilling to allow subordinates to take reasonable
defensive measures in case they should provoke Germany or provide justi-
fication for German attack. Such concerns were present even in orders of
21 June 1941, not sent out to units until after midnight, and not to be
received by many units before the German attack struck.

Guide to further reading

The Red Army on the eve of war and the Suvorov debate
N.E. Eliseeva and David Glantz, ‘Plans for the Development of the Worker’s and Peasants
Red Army (RKKA) on the Eve of War’, JSMS, Volume 8, Number 2 (June 1995), pp.
356–365.
David Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 1998).
G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1999).
J. Hoffmann, ‘The Red Army until the Beginning of the German-Soviet War’, in H. Boog, J.
Forster, J. Hoffmann, E. Klink, R.-D. Muller, G.R. Ueberschar and E. Osers (eds),
Table 2.4 Red Army equipment as of 1 January 1941 and as expected by 1 January 1942, according to the 1941 general mobilization plan
(MP-41) of (no later than) 12 February 1941

Item Number Available on 1.1.1941 Expected from industry Planned availability

required during 1941 on 1.1.1942

Rifles (standard) 4,421,000 6,176,000 325,000 6,501,000

Heavy tanks (KV, T-35) 3,907 299 (of which 35 T-35) 900 1,199
Medium tanks (T-34, T-28) 12,843 562 (of which 447 T-28) 2,500 3,062
GAZ lorries 197,781 96,144 19,400 115,544
Battalion-level radio set 16-PK-RSB 33,813 20,814 5,020 25,834
Company-level radio set RRU, RBS 24,425 13,016 9,000 22,016
Motor-fuel/petrol tankers 34,165 9,156 1,250 10,406
Source: V.P. Naumov (ed.), 1941 god: V 2 kn. Kn.1 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnii fond ‘Demokratiia’, 1998), pp. 617–624.
 The Icebreaker controversy, 1941 39
Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 72–93.
Evan Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940–1941’, Inter-
national History Review, Volume 25, Number 4 (2003), pp. 818–865.
Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War 1936–1941 (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
C. Roberts, ‘Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941’, Europe–Asia
Studies, Volume 47, Number 8 (1995), pp. 1293–1326.
V. Suvorov (pseud.), ‘Who was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?’,
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Volume 130, Number 2
(1985), pp. 50–55.
T.J. Uldricks, ‘The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?’, Slavic Review,
Volume 58, Number 3 (1999), pp. 626–643.

The Red Army against Japan, Poland and Finland 1939–1940

Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shukman (eds), Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War
1939–1940 (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
Alvin D. Coox, Nomohan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1990).
Carl van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
M.I. Lukinov, ‘Notes on the Polish Campaign (1939) and the War with Finland
(1939–1940)’, JSMS, Volume 14, Number 3 (September 2001), pp. 120–149.
3 Barbarossa

Whilst Stalin could take much of the credit for the extent to which the
Soviet Union was strategically prepared for war, his desire to avoid provok-
ing Germany at almost any cost would nonetheless cost the Red Army
dearly in the first days of Operation ‘Barbarossa’ – the German-led invasion
of the Soviet Union. Only at 12:30 Moscow time on 22 June would the Red
Army be ordered to ready itself for attack – insufficient time for many units
to receive the order before they were hit only hours later.

DOCUMENT 19: Directive [Number 1] of the People’s Commissar of Defence S.K.

Timoshenko and Head of the General Headquarters Zhukov to commanders of border districts on
the bringing of forces to a state of readiness due to the possibility of attack by Fascist Germany on
the USSR, 21 June 1941
1. During 22–23 June 1941 there is the possibility of surprise attack by the
Germans on the fronts of the LVO [Leningrad-], PribOVO [Pribaltic Special],
ZapOVO [Western Special-], KOVO [Kiev Special-] and OdVO [Odessa] [Mili-
tary Districts]. An attack might start with provocative activities.
2. The task of our forces is not to give in to any sort of provocative activities, which
might lead to major complications. At the same time forces of the Leningrad, Prib-
altic, Western, Kiev and Odessa Military Districts are to be at full battle readiness
in order to meet the possible surprise blow by the Germans or their allies.
I order:
a) During the night of 22 June 1941 to covertly man firepoints of the fortified dis-
tricts on the state border;
b) Before dawn on the 22 June 1941 to disperse all aviation, including military, on
field aerodromes, and to carefully camouflage it;
c) To bring all units to battle readiness. Forces are to be held dispersed and camouflaged.
d) To bring anti-aircraft to battle readiness without additional personnel. To make
all preparations in blacked-out towns and installations;
e) No other actions are to be taken without special authorisation.
Timoshenko
Zhukov
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 1995, p. 298)
 Barbarossa 41
The German attack began in earnest at 3:00 a.m. when the first German
bombers struck. The navy was in a slightly better position to meet the German
invasion than the Red Army, although it would not be the initial focus of
significant German air activity. People’s Commissar for the Navy Kuznetsov
had ordered the navy over to Operational Readiness Number 1 (combat readi-
ness) at 23:50, with communication with naval assets being more effective than
with ground units, in part given their concentration in ports. Kuznetsov’s
initial order, simply ordering the military soviets of the fleets and flotillas that
they ‘Without delay go over to Operational Readiness Number 1’, was elabo-
rated on in a follow-up directive of 01:12, issued in the light of Document 19,
calling for such measures to be carefully concealed to avoid being provocative.

DOCUMENT 20: Directive to the military soviets of the KBF, SF, ChF and the commanders
of the Pinsk and Danube Flotillas on the possibility of surprise attack by the Germans
22 June 1941 01:12
During 22.6–23.6 there is the possibility of surprise attack by the Germans. The
German attack might start with provocative actions. Our task is not to respond to any
provocative actions that might lead to major complications. At the same time fleets
and flotillas are to be at full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise attack by the
Germans or their allies.
I order that, having gone over to Operational Readiness Number 1, that this
increase in readiness be carefully concealed. The conduct of reconnaissance in foreign
territorial waters is categorically forbidden. No other measures are to be taken without
special permission.
Kuznetsov.
(Source: RA T.21 (10), 1996, p. 12)

As the first German air attacks hit Soviet airfields during the early hours of
22 June, German artillery opened up on Soviet border positions. As dawn
broke, heavier air strikes hit a total of 66 Soviet airfields in border regions;
during the morning Soviet forces lost more than 1,200 aircraft.1 By the time
there could not be the slightest doubt that German operations were merely
some sort of provocation, on the evening of 22 June Stalin and Timoshenko
issued Directive Number 3 for a counter-offensive against the invading
forces, adding flesh to a somewhat vaguer Directive Number 2 that had been
issued early that morning. Both are provided below.

DOCUMENT 21: Directive Number 2 to the military soviets of the Leningrad-, Pribaltic-
Special-, Western-Special, Kiev-Special-, Odessa-Military Districts, VMF, on the German
surprise attack and the military objectives of the armed forces
No. 2 22.6.41 07:15
On the 22nd June 1941 at 4:00 in the morning, without cause, German aircraft attacked
our aerodromes and towns along the western border and subjected them to bombing.
42 Barbarossa
At the same time in a number of places German forces opened up artillery fire and
crossed our border.
Due to this unprecedentedly brazen attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, I
order:

1. Forces to pounce on [obrushit’sia] enemy forces with all strength and resources and
destroy them in those districts, where they have crossed the Soviet border.
In the future, without special authorization, ground forces are not to cross the
border.
2. Reconnaissance and fighting aircraft are to establish locations of the concentra-
tion of enemy aviation and concentrations of his ground forces.

With heavy blows bomber and ground-attack aircraft are to destroy aircraft on enemy
airfields and to bomb the principal concentrations of ground forces. Air strikes are to
be conducted into German territory to a depth of 100–150 km.
Königsberg and Memel are to be bombed.
Overflights of Finnish and Rumanian territory are not to be made without special
authorization.
Timoshenko, Malenkov, Zhukov
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, pp. 491–492)

DOCUMENT 22: Directive Number 3 to the military soviets of the North-Western, Western,
South-Western and Southern Fronts2
No. 3, Moscow, 22.6.41, map 1 000 0000
1. Having struck his principal blow from the Suvalki forward positions . . . during
22.6, having suffered heavy losses, the enemy has achieved limited successes. . . .
On the remaining sections of the state border with Germany and along the
whole state border with Rumania enemy attacks have been repulsed with heavy losses
for him.
2. Immediate tasks for forces for 23–24.6 are:

a) With concentrated focused blows forces of the North-Western and Western

Fronts are to encircle and destroy the Suvalki concentration of the enemy and by
the end of 24.6 have gained the Suvalki region.
b) With powerful concentrated blows mechanized corps and all aviation of the
South-Western Front and other forces of the 4th and 6th Armies are to encircle
and destroy the enemy concentration attacking in the direction of Vladimir-
Volinsk, Brodi. By the end of 24.6 the Lublin region is to be captured.
...
Timoshenko, Malenkov, Zhukov
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, pp. 493–494)

The same evening it was left to Molotov to announce to the Soviet people:
 Barbarossa 43

DOCUMENT 23: Extract from a broadcast speech by Chairman of the Council of People’s
Commissars and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, 22 June 1941
Citizens of the Soviet Union!
The Soviet government and its head Comrade Stalin have given me the task of
making the following announcement:
Today at four in the morning, without any claims having been presented to the
Soviet Union, without a declaration of war, German troops attacked our country. . . .
This unheard of attack on our country was perpetrated despite the fact that a treaty
of non-aggression had been signed between the USSR and Germany and that the
Soviet Government has most conscientiously abided by all provisions of that treaty.
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 2000, p. 14)

The Soviet leadership was quick to start to shift the country on to a wartime
footing, an initial element of which was the provision for military rule in
prefrontal areas outlined in Document 24:

DOCUMENT 24: From the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the
state of war, 22 June 1941
1. Military rule [voennoe polozhenie], in accordance with article 49 paragraph P of
the Constitution of the Soviet Union, is declared in specific areas or across the
USSR in the interests of the defence of the USSR and for the provision of social
order and state security.
2. In areas in which military rule has been declared all functions of state power in
the sphere of defence, provision of social order and state security are in the hands
of the military soviets of fronts, armies and military districts, and where there are
not military soviets, the upper command of military formations.
3. In areas in which military rule is declared, the military authorities (p. 2) have the
power to:
a) . . . mobilize civilians for labour service for the construction of defensive
works, the defence of transport arteries, other construction, means of com-
munication, power stations, the electricity grid and other important objects,
for participation in the struggle against fire, epidemics and natural disasters;
b) Establish obligations for the billeting of military units and institutions;
c) . . . ;
d) Commandeer transport resources and other such items for the needs of the
defence from state, social and co-operative concerns and organizations, and
from individuals;
e) . . . enforce curfews, limit traffic movement, and where necessary search and
arrest suspicious individuals;
f) Regulate trade and the work of trading organizations (markets, shops, ware-
houses . . .), communal enterprises (saunas, laundries, hairdressers and so
forth), and also establish norms for the distribution of foodstuffs and other
goods to the population;
44 Barbarossa
g) Prohibit entrance to and exit from areas declared under military rule;
h) To subject to administrative exile beyond the boundaries of areas defined to
be under military rule . . . those declared socially dangerous due to their crimi-
nal activities or links with criminal circles.
...
5. All local organs of state power . . . are required to render full co-operation with the
military authorities in the utilization of power and resources of a given area for the
defensive needs of the country and the provision of social order and security.
6. For not submitting to the instructions and orders of the military authorities, and
similarly for the committing of crimes in the area concerned, guilty parties face
criminal prosecution. . . .
7. . . . all crimes directed against defence, social order and state security are to be
handed over for consideration by military tribunals. . . .3
Additionally, the military authorities are given powers to transfer cases of
speculation, malicious hooliganism and other crimes for which provision is made
in the criminal codes of union republics to military tribunals, should they see it
as necessary.
(Source: KPSS o vooruzhennikh silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1981, pp. 291–293)

The military soviets to which the document refers were military-political

organizations down to front level, consisting of representatives of both military
decision makers, i.e. military officers, and their political overseers, be they from
GlavPU RKKA or the Party machinery, reflecting the importance of political
supervision of military decision making during wartime, something that would
increase dramatically as the situation at the front deteriorated.4
On 23 June, the day that Document 24 was actually published, the
Stavka GK or Headquarters of the High Command (sometimes translated as
Main Command Headquarters) was created to direct the Soviet military
effort, with a number of civilian ‘advisers’ attached:

DOCUMENT 25: On the joint decree of the SNK SSSR and TsK VKP (b) on the creation of a
Headquarters of the High Command, 23.6.1941
To military soviets of fronts, military districts and the VMF
The government of the USSR has decreed that a Headquarters of the High Command
of the armed forces of the USSR is to be created, made up of the following comrades:
People’s Commissar for Defence of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko
(Chairman), Head of the General Headquarters of the Red Army General of the Army
Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov, Marshal of the
Soviet Union Budennii and People’s Commissar for the Navy Kuznetsov.
Attached to the Headquarters an institute of permanent advisers is to be organized,
consisting of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulik, Marshal of the Soviet Union Shaposh-
nikov, Meretskov, Head of the VVS KA Zhigarev, Vatunin, Head of the PVO Voronov,
Mikoian, Kaganovich, Beria, Voznesenskii, Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Mekhlis.
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, p. 494)
 Barbarossa 45
Despite the creation of such a command, its key members were, as Mawdsley
notes, actually dispersed overseeing front-level operations – Timoshenko and
Shaposhnikov with the Western Front, Zhukov with the South-Western
Front, and his deputy, Vatunin, with the North-Western Front.5
The attentions of key civilian members and advisers would soon be drawn
away to what was effectively a war cabinet, the State Defence Committee,
formed on 30 June 1941, with Stalin at its head as chairman:

DOCUMENT 26: Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, TsK VKP (b)
and Sovnarkom SSSR, 30 June 1941
In view of the emerging state of emergency and in the interests of the rapid mobil-
ization of all of the strengths of the peoples of the USSR for the repulsing of the
enemy which has perfidiously attacked our Motherland, the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, . . . has recognized the necessity for:

1. The creation of a State Defence Committee made up of:

Comrade Stalin, I.V. (Chairman)

Comrade Molotov, V.M. (Deputy-Chairman)
Comrade Voroshilov, K.E.
Comrade Malenkov, G.M.
Comrade Beria, L.P.
2. All powers of the state are concentrated in the hands of the State Defence Com-
mittee.
3. All citizens and all Party, state, Komsomol and military organs are required
unquestioningly to carry out the decisions and decrees of the State Committee for
Defence.
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, p. 495)

On 10 July, ten days after the formation of the Headquarters of the High
Command (Stavka GK), it was reorganized as the Headquarters of the
Supreme Command (Stavka VK), to be reorganized again for the final time
for the duration of the war on 8 August as the Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command (Stavka VGK), with Stalin as self-appointed Supreme High
Commander of the Soviet armed forces at its head.6
The fact that Stalin did not chair the Headquarters of the High
Command of 23 June and did not make the address to the Soviet people on
the evening of 22 June helped to create the myth that, shocked by the
German invasion he had done so much to try to forestall, Stalin had lost
control of the reins of power during the first two weeks of the war. This
myth has subsequently been shown to be at best only partially true. Up to
28 June, as Stalin’s appointment diary shows, Stalin was busy meeting key
military, Party, government and security-services personnel. Some idea of
the institutional affiliations of visitors to Stalin during the first days of the
war is provided after their names and visiting times in Document 27:
46 Barbarossa

DOCUMENT 27: Extracts from the appointments journals of Stalin’s Kremlin office
22 June
Molotov 05:45–12:05 (NKO/MID)
Beria 05:45–09:20 (NKVD)
Timoshenko 05:45–08:30 (NKO)
Mekhlis 05:45–08:30 (GlavPU KA)
Zhukov 05:45–08:30 (GSh KA)
Malenkov 07:30–09:20 (VKP(b))
Mikoian 07:55–09:30 (SNK)
Kaganovich 08:00–09:35 (NKPS)
Voroshilov 08:00–10:15 (SNK)
Vishinskii 07:30–10:30 (MID)
Kuznetsov 08:15–08:30 (Either NK VMF or VKP(b))
Dmitrov 08:40–10:40 (Comintern)
Manuil’skii 08:40–10:40 (Comintern)
Kuznetsov 09:40–10:20
Mikoian 09:50–10:30
Molotov 12:55–16:45
Voroshilov 11:40–12:05
Beria 11:30–12:00
Malenkov 11:30–12:00
Voroshilov 12:30–16:45
Mikoian 12:30–14:30
Vishinskii 13:05–15:25
Shaposhnikov 13:15–16:00 (NKO)
Timoshenko 14:00–16:00
Zhukov 14:00–16:00
Vatunin 14:00–16:00 (GSh KA)
Kuznetsov 15:20–15:45 (VMF?)
Kulik 15:30–16:00 (NKO)
Beria 16:25–16:45

23 June
Molotov 03:20–06:25 (Stavka GK)
Voroshilov 03:25–06:25 (Stavka GK)
Beria 16:25–16:45 (Stavka GK)
Timoshenko 03:25–06:10 (Stavka GK)
Vatunin 03:30–06:10
Kuznetsov 03:30–05:25
Kaganovich 04:30–05:20
Zhigarev 04:35–06:10 (VVS KA)
Timoshenko 18:50–20:45
Merkulov 19:10–19:25 (NKVD)
Voroshilov 20:00–01:25
Voznesenskii 20:00–21:25 (SNK)
Mekhlis 20:55–22:40
Kaganovich 23:15–01:10
 Barbarossa 47
Vatunin 23:55–00:55
Timoshenko 23:55–00:55
Kuznetsov 23:55–00:55
Beria 00:00–01:25
Vlasik 00:50–00:55 (Stalin’s personal bodyguard –
Okhr. IVS)

28 June
Molotov 19:35–00:50
Malenkov 19:35–23:10
Budennii 19:35–19:50 (Stavka GK)
Merkulov 19:45–20:05
Bulganin 20:15–20:20 (SNK)
Zhigarev 20:20–22:10
Petrov 20:20–22:10 (Artillery construction)
Bulganin 20:40–20:45
Timoshenko 21:30–23:10
Zhukov 21:30–23:10
Golikov 21:30–22:55 (GSh KA)
Kuznetsov 21:50–23:10
Kabanov 22:00–22:10 (NK Electricity Production)
Stefanovskii 22:00–22:10 (Test pilot)
Suprun 22:00–22:10 (Test pilot)
Beria 22:40–00:50
Ustinov 22:55–23:10 (NK Munitions)
Iakovlev 22:55–23:10 (GAU NKO)
Shcherbakov 22:10–23:30 (Sovinformburo)
Mikoian 23:30–00:50
Merkulov 24:00–00:15
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, pp. 223–224, 228)

On 29–30 June, no such official meetings took place, at least not in Stalin’s
Kremlin office. Despite the blow no doubt felt by the fall of Minsk on 28
June, it seems that Stalin did not finally withdraw in despair to his dacha
outside Moscow until the evening of Sunday 29 June, after communications
had been lost with the Western Front, followed by a ‘stormy’ meeting of
political and military leaders that took place in the People’s Commissariat of
Defence, during which, according to A.I. Mikoian, Deputy Chairman of the
Council of People’s Commissars and frequent participant in meetings with
Stalin during the first days of the war, Zhukov purportedly sobbed.

DOCUMENT 28: Extract from the memoirs of A.I. Mikoian on Stalin’s leadership at the end
of June 1941
On the seventh day of the war, 28 June, fascist forces seized Minsk. Communications
with the Belorussian Military District were cut.
On the evening of 29 June Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and I gathered in Stalin’s
48 Barbarossa
Kremlin office. Detailed information on the situation in Belorussia had, at that time,
not come in. We were aware only that there were no communications with forces of
the Belorussian Front.
Stalin phoned the People’s Commissar for Defence Timoshenko. But he could add
nothing more on the situation on the western axis.
Alarmed by the way things had gone, Stalin suggested that we all head for the
People’s Commissariat for Defence and get to grips with the situation there.
At the commissariat were Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatunin. Stalin conducted
himself calmly, asking where the command for the Belorussian Military District was
and what sort of communications there were with it.
Zhukov reported, that communications had been lost and they had been unable to
restore them all day.
After that Stalin asked different questions: why had they allowed the German
breakthrough, what measures had been taken for the restoration of communications,
and so forth.
Zhukov replied on what measures had been taken, that people had been sent, but
how long it would take to reestablish communications nobody could say.
They talked for around half an hour, relatively calmly. Then Stalin blew up: what
sort of General Headquarters had they, what sort of Chief of Staff – that could lose
control in such a way and not maintain communications with the troops. . . .
Zhukov was of course no less worried than Stalin by the state of affairs, and Stalin’s
outburst was for him offensive. So this brave man burst into sobs [razridalsia] like an
old woman and ran out into a different room. Molotov followed after him. We were all
in a demoralized state. In about ten minutes Molotov brought in a superficially calm
Zhukov, but his eyes were still moist. It was agreed that to communicate with the
Belorussian Military District Kulik would go (this was suggested by Stalin). . . . Stalin
was very depressed. As he left the People’s Commissariat, he said the following phrase:
‘Lenin left us with a great legacy, but we his beneficiaries, have . . .’. We were shocked
by this utterance. Did it follow, that we had lost everything for good? We considered,
that he had said this for effect.
The following day, around four o’clock, Voznesenskii was with me in my office.
Suddenly there was a call from Molotov requesting that we call in on him.
We went. Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria were already with Molotov. We caught
their conversation. Beria said, that it is necessary to form a State Defence Committee. .
. . Voznesenskii and I agreed. It was agreed that Stalin be appointed head of the State
Defence Committee. . . . We decided to go to him. He was at the nearby dacha.
It was in truth Molotov, who said that Stalin was in such a state of mental and
physical exhaustion, that he wasn’t interested in anything, had lost the initiative, and
is in a bad way. . . .
We arrived at Stalin’s dacha. We found him in a small dining room sitting in an
armchair. He looked at us questioningly and asked, ‘Why have you come?’ His
demeanor was calm, but in a way strange, and his question was no less so. You see, as a
matter of fact, he should have summoned us.
Molotov said, on behalf of all of us, that we have to concentrate power in order that
things could be sorted out quickly, in order that the country be put on its feet. At the
head of such an organization should be Stalin.
Stalin looked surprised but did not offer any opposition. ‘OK’, he said.
(Source: V.P. Naumov, kn.2, 1998, pp. 497–498)
 Barbarossa 49
On 3 July an apparently reinvigorated Stalin would address the Soviet
people by radio:

DOCUMENT 29: Stalin’s speech on the German invasion of the Soviet Union (radio address,
Moscow, July 3, 1941)
Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and Sisters! Men of our army and navy! I am addressing
you my friends!
The perfidious military attack on our fatherland, begun on June 22 by Hitler’s
Germany, is continuing.
In spite of the heroic resistance of the Red Army, and although the enemy’s finest
divisions and finest air force units have already been smashed and have met their doom
on the field of battle, the enemy continues to push forward, hurling fresh forces into
the attack.
...
A grave danger hangs over our country.
...
All our work must be immediately reconstructed on a war footing, everything must
be subordinated to the interests of the front and the task of organizing the destruction
of the enemy.
...
The peoples of the Soviet Union must rise against the enemy and defend their rights
and their land. The Red Army, Red Navy, and all citizens of the Soviet Union must
defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for our towns and
villages, must display the daring initiative and intelligence that are inherent in our
people.
We must organize all-round assistance to the Red Army. . . .
We must strengthen the Red Army’s rear, subordinating all our work to this cause.
...
We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-
mongers, rumour-mongers, we must exterminate spies and enemy parachutists.
...
The collective farmer must drive off their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe
keeping of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property
which cannot be withdrawn, must be destroyed without fail.
In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla [partisan] units, . . . must be formed,
diversionist groups must be organized to combat the enemy troops, to foment guer-
rilla warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and tele-
graph lines. . . . In the occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the
enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step,
and all their measures frustrated.
This war with Nazi Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a
war between two armies, it is also a great war of the Soviet people against the German
fascist forces.
...
In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have loyal
allies in the peoples of Europe and America. . . .
In this connection the historic utterance[s] of the British Prime Minister Churchill
regarding aid to the Soviet Union and the declaration of the United States government
50 Barbarossa
signifying its readiness to render aid to our country, . . . can only evoke a feeling of
gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union. . . .
Comrades, our forces are numberless. . . .
The working people of Moscow and Leningrad have already commenced to form
vast popular levies in support of the Red Army. Such popular levies must be raised in
every city which is in danger of enemy invasion, all working people must be roused to
defend our freedom, our honour, our country – in our patriotic war against German
fascism.
In order to ensure the rapid mobilization of all forces of the peoples of the USSR
and to repulse the enemy who treacherously attacked our country, a State Defence
Committee has been formed in whose hands the entire power of the state has been
vested.
(Source: Joseph Stalin, 1944, pp. 9–16)

Of note in the above speech is Stalin’s referring to his audience as ‘brothers

and sisters’ – a departure from pre-war norms and a move away from Com-
munist terms and rhetoric in Soviet propaganda during the war, being
replaced, particularly as many non-Russian Soviet republics in European
Russia were under German occupation, by Russian nationalism. Also of note
is Stalin’s call for the population to take up arms against the invader on
occupied territory, echoing calls to local Party leaders made on 29 June in
Document 37. Finally Stalin mentions the raising of ‘popular levies’ or
militia units [narodnoe opolchenie]. Such inadequately trained and equipped
units would be thrown before German forces as they advanced on Leningrad
and Moscow, suffering horrendous losses for little military gain.
Whilst forces of the German Army Group Centre had seized Minsk, the
threat to the Ukrainian capital was also becoming stark, although on the
Kiev axis German forces faced vigorous if unsustained counter-attacks by
Soviet mechanized forces in the Dubno, Brodi, Lutsk and Rovno regions
between 23 and 29 June. These Soviet counter-attacks were to a large extent
unsuccessful because Soviet forces, typically short on fuel, were committed
piecemeal. There is only partial truth to suggestions made by Konstantin
Rokossovskii, then commanding 9th Mechanized Corps which counter-
attacked near Novgorod-Volinsk, that ‘German tank and motorized forma-
tions advancing on Kiev were provided with equipment that had far
superior qualities to our outdated T-26 and BT-series tanks’, although
German forces were indeed assisted by ‘a huge numerical superiority in
tanks’ and ‘widespread use of aviation, which bombed our columns unhin-
dered, especially there were the enemy struck’.7 However, the superiority in
tank strength was very much local8 and despite the dearth of radios for Red
Army tanks the T-26s and BT-series tanks could, if used effectively, have
been a match for the PzKpfw IIs, IIIs and 38(t)s that were the backbone of
German forces. German air superiority was, however, unquestionable, and
certainly should have been mitigated by the appearance of more, albeit often
outdated, Soviet aircraft over the battlefield, more of which could and
 Barbarossa 51
indeed should have survived the initial German aerial onslaught if they had
been dispersed on the basis of pre-war intelligence.
Rokossovskii’s 9th Mechanized Corps was, as he notes, hopelessly under-
strength on the eve of war with no more than a third of list strength in
terms of armour and with its motorized infantry lacking transport – most
Soviet units were in the process of reorganization and re-equipping. The
15th Mechanized Corps also in the south was in better shape, with more
than two-thirds list strength, including 64-KV series and 71 T-34 tanks –
vehicles that, even when deployed piecemeal, proved difficult to destroy.9
On 23 June T-34s of 15th Mechanized Corps had caused the German 197th
Infantry Division some concern, but were not deployed in sufficient strength
or with sufficient support to overcome German anti-tank defences.10
Despite Soviet counter-attacks on the German flanks that slowed the
German advance on Kiev, by early July the military situation seemed very
much favourable to Germany, prompting German General Franz Halder,
head of OKH, to comment in his diary entry for 3 July that, given the
destruction of such substantial Soviet forces west of the Dvina and Dnepr
Rivers, ‘it is probably no overstatement to say that the Russian campaign
has been won in the space of two weeks’.11 By 9 July German forces of Army
Groups Centre and North were making good progress towards Moscow and
Leningrad respectively, even if progress in the south was somewhat slower,
as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Certainly at this stage of the war the destruction of enemy forces was more
important than the conquest of territory, and Soviet mechanized forces
deployed in the border regions been decimated. Soviet air forces had been
similarly weakened, with German close-support aircraft able to rove fairly
freely looking for targets little concerned by Soviet fighters. Taking the
example of the South-Western Front, facing 1st Panzer Group: on the eve of
war the Kiev Special Military District (which would become the South-
Western Front on the outbreak of war) had 1,238 fighter aircraft available, of
which 356 were modern types, namely Yak-1, MiG-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, and
a total of 1,913 aircraft including light and medium bombers, ground attack
(65 Il-2) and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, long-range bombers of 2
DBAK (Long-range Bombing Aviation Corps) and 18 DBAD (Long-range
Bombing Aviation Division) under central control (DB-3, Il-4, TB-3 and 9
TB-7) were based in the military district at Kursk and Skomorokhi respec-
tively, brining total aircraft available to 2,333. Only 1,683 aircrews were
available for those aircraft under military district control, of which, whilst 92
per cent were considered fit for daytime flying in simple meteorological con-
ditions, only 30 per cent were considered trained for complex daylight con-
ditions, and 21.3 per cent for simple night flying.12 On 11 July the aircraft
shown in Table 3.1 were available or potentially available for operations.
Despite a lack of air cover, poor intelligence, command and control and
other such deficiencies in Soviet organization during the summer battles of
1941, many Soviet units fought bravely, inflicting casualties on German
52 Barbarossa

Figure 3.1 Changes in the frontline from the start of Operation ‘Barbarossa’ to the
eve of the Soviet counter-offensive below Moscow, 22 June to early
December 1941.
Key:

1. Murmansk 8. Kalinin 15. Stalingrad

2. Arkhangel’sk 9. Smolensk 16. Khar’kov
3. Tikhvin 10. Viaz’ma 17. Sevastopol’
4. Tallin 11. El’nia 18. Odessa
5. Novgorod 12. Briansk 19. Brest
6. Pskov 13. Tula 20. Warsaw
7. Staraia Russa 14. Voronezh 21. Kuibishev

forces that would have a cumulative impact. Perhaps the best-known

example of protracted Soviet resistance in the first weeks of Barbarossa was
the defence of the Brest Fortress, pockets in which continued to hold out
until late July, despite being well behind German lines. Nonetheless, the
resistance of many Soviet units was not so stubborn, understandable given
they were without air cover, often encircled, low on supplies, with poor
command and control over subordinate units and limited intelligence, and
consequently unaware that the German noose around them was more perme-
able that it might have seemed.
In order to increase discipline in the armed forces, within weeks of the
start of the war the Soviet leadership reintroduced dual command, returning
to the situation that had first existed during the Russian Civil War and
more recently between 1937 and 1940.
 Barbarossa 53
Table 3.1 Airpower of the South-Western Front as of 11 July 1941

Total aircraft for the South-Western Front

Type Serviceable Unserviceable Total

SB 14 24 38
Ar-2 2 2 4
Pe-2 6 6 12
Yak-4 5 5 10
MiG-3 10 3 13
I-153 66 20 86
I-16 105 26 131
I-15 9 4 13
Yak-2 2 2 4
Yak-1 14 8 22
Il-2 10 10 20
Su-2 6 21 27
Totals 249 131 380
Source: SBD 38, pp. 7–8.

DOCUMENT 30: Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the
reorganization of organs of political propaganda and the introduction of the institute of military
commissars in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, 16 July 1941
The war has increased the volume of political work in our army and demanded that
political workers do not limit their work to propaganda, but in the same manner take
upon themselves the responsibility for military work at the front as well.
From a different angle the war has increased the complexity of the work of the regi-
ment and division and demands that the commander of the regiment and division be
provided with full assistance from the direction of political workers not only in the
sphere of political work, but also in the military sphere.
All of these new responsibilities in the work of political workers associated with the
shift from peacetime to wartime demand that the role and responsibility of political
workers be raised to a similar level to that at which it stood during the Civil War
against the foreign military interventionists.
In accordance with this . . . the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decrees:
...
2. To introduce in all regiments and divisions, headquarters, military-educational
institutions and establishments of the Red Army the institute of military commissars,
and in companies, batteries and squadrons the institute of political supervisors
[politruki].
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 421)

Further details of the role of the commissar were provided in the same issue of
the journal Red Army Propagandist in which the above decree was published.
54 Barbarossa

DOCUMENT 31: The position of military commissars in the Worker’s and Peasant’s Red
Army (July 1941)
Confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
...
2. The military commissar is the representative of the Party and government in the
Red Army and along with the commander carries full responsibility for the carry-
ing out of a military task by a unit, for its resilience in battle and its unwavering
readiness to fight to the last drop of blood with the enemies of our Motherland
and with honour to defend every last inch of Soviet ground.
3. The military commissar is the moral leader of his unit (formation), the first line
of defence of its material and spiritual interests. ‘If a commander is the head
[glava] of the regiment, then the commissar of a regiment should be the father
and soul of his regiment’ (Stalin).
...
8. The military commissar must . . . carry out a merciless struggle with cowards,
panic mongers and deserters, spreading revolutionary order and military discip-
line with a firm hand. Coordinating his activities with the organs of the 3rd
Board of the Ministry of Defence, the military commissar is obliged to nip any
sign of treason in the bud.
9. The military commissar directs the activities of the political organs, and in the
same way the Party and Komsomol organizations of military units.
...
11. All orders for a regiment, division, board or institution are signed jointly by the
commander and military commissar.
(Source: KPSS o vooruzhennikh silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1981, pp. 305–306)

Also of significance for the political supervision of the armed forces was the
transfer of counter-intelligence in the armed forces and under the 3rd Board of
the Ministry of Defence mentioned in point 8 of Document 31 back to the
NKVD after a brief period of control by the People’s Commissariat for Defence.

DOCUMENT 32: Decree of the State Committee of Defence No. 187ss on the re-establishment of
organs of the 3rd Board of the NKO SSSR as special sections of the NKVD SSSR, 17 July 1941
1. To reestablish organs of the 3rd Board in both the field army and military dis-
tricts (from departments in divisions and higher) as special sections, and the 3rd
Board as the Board of Special Sections.
2. At the same time to subordinate the Board of Special Sections and special sec-
tions to the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and the representative of
the special section in a regiment and special section in a division to subordinate
to the appropriate commissar of a regiment or division.
3. The principal task of special sections during war is to be considered the decisive
struggle with espionage and treachery in units of the Red Army and the liquida-
tion of desertion directly in the prefrontal zone.
4. To give special sections the power to arrest deserters, and where necessary to
shoot them on the spot.
 Barbarossa 55
5. To require the NKVD to provide the special sections with the necessary armed
detachments from NKVD forces.
6. To require heads of rear area security to have direct communication with the
special sections and to render then full support.
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, Stalin
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 2000, pp. 337–338)

The security services would be responsible for enforcing Order Number 270
of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 16 August 1941 on
the armed forces, which made surrender tantamount to treason.

DOCUMENT 33: Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army
Number 270, 16 August 1941
Not only our friends, but also our enemies are forced to recognize that in our war of
liberation with the German-Fascist conquerors, units of the Red Army, the majority
by a huge margin, their commanders and commissars, are conducting themselves irre-
proachably, bravely, and at times heroically. Even those units of our army which are by
chance separated from the army and fall in to encirclement preserve the spirit of perse-
verance and bravery and do not surrender, trying to inflict even greater harm on the
enemy and to break out of encirclement.
...
But we cannot hide the fact that recently there have been a number of disgraceful
instances of surrender to the enemy. Individual generals have exhibited a poor example
to our forces.
...
Is it possible to tolerate cowards in the ranks of the Red Army, deserting to the
enemy and giving themselves up, or the sort of leaders of limited spirit, who in the
event of the first glitch at the front tear off signs of rank and desert to the rear? No, it
is not! If we give freedom to these cowards and deserters, in a short time they will
demoralize our army and ruin our Motherland. Cowards and deserters have to be
destroyed.
...
I order:
1. That commanders and political workers who tear off indicators of rank and desert
in battle to the rear or give themselves up to the enemy are to be considered
malicious deserters, the families of whom are subject to arrest as the family of a
deserter who has broken their oath and betrayed the Motherland.
All commanders and commissars of higher rank are required to shoot such
deserters from command-level ranks on the spot.
2. Encircled units and formations are to selflessly fight until the last possible moment,
taking care of equipment,... breaking through to their own lines from the enemy
rear, bringing defeat to the fascist dogs.
...
This order is to be read out to all companies, troops, batteries, squadrons, com-
mands and headquarters.
56 Barbarossa
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army:
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin.
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, pp. 423–424)

A rise in cases of self-mutilation in order to avoid the horrors of combat pre-

sumably led to the following additional crime for which the special sections
could mete out punishment, including summary execution:

DOCUMENT 34: Decree of the State Defence Committee No. 377 ss, 2 August 1941,
Moscow, Kremlin
NKVD Query
Special sections are permitted to arrest, and in necessary instances shoot on the spot in
the same manner as deserters, individuals who bring self-inflicted wounds upon them-
selves.
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin.
(Source: RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.5. l.176)

The stoicism of troops facing the Axis and particularly German advance
would be encouraged not only by the influence of commissars on comman-
ders but also by the use of blocking detachments of NKVD troops behind
the front lines to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of Red Army units,
as suggested by the requirement for NKVD troops for special sections in
Document 32 above. With the route to the rear blocked, courage in the face
of the enemy, or at least some relief from the tensions of the front line,
would be provided by the regulation vodka ration:

DOCUMENT 35: Decree of the State Defence Committee Number 562/ss ‘On the introduction
of vodka to the supplies of the active Red Army’, 22 August 1941
From 1 September 1941 the provision of 100 grammes a day of 40 percent proof
vodka per individual Red Army soldier and commander of forces in the front line of
the active army is to be introduced.
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, Stalin
(Source: A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin, 1996, p. 519)

As the Soviet leadership sought to stiffen the resolve of waverers in the

front line through fear or with vodka, many Soviet units fought on with
tenacity, even if with dwindling resources. Not only had the Soviet armed
forces lost huge numbers of men and vast quantities of materials at the
borders, but the Soviet capacity to replace the latter in particular was dete-
riorating in the short term at least. From 24 June the Soviet leadership was
making preparations for the evacuation of plant and materials from the
enemy advance, starting with the creation of a Council for Evacuation:
 Barbarossa 57

DOCUMENT 36: From the decree of TsK VKP (b) and SNK SSSR on the creation of a
Council for Evacuation, 24 June 1941
For the direction of the evacuation of population, institutions, military and other
goods, the equipment of industrial concerns and other valuables the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party and Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR decrees:

1. To establish a Council for Evacuation. . . .

2. To require the Council to start work immediately.
3. To establish that the decisions of the Council for Evacuation are to be signed by
its chairman and are compulsory.
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 2000, p. 62)

That which could not be relocated would be destroyed, as outlined in the

key joint directive by the Council of People’s Commissars and the Central
Committee of the Party of 29 June 1941,13 in which it was stated that:

DOCUMENT 37: To Party and Soviet organizations of prefrontal regions, 29 June 1941
4. In the event of the forced retreat of Red Army units it is necessary to remove
railway rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single steam engine, not a single
wagon, not to leave the enemy a single kilogram of grain, not a litre of fuel.
Kolkhoz peasants should drive away livestock, give grain over to the protection
of state organs for removal to the rear. All valuable resources, including precious
metals, bread and fuel, which cannot be taken away, should of course be
destroyed.
(Source: KPSS o Vooruzhennikh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1981, p. 298)

Whilst some resources were inevitably lost to Axis forces, and much was
destroyed which was earmarked for evacuation, Soviet achievements in relo-
cating whole factories from European Russia to, in many instances, the
eastern side of the Ural mountains were considerable. However, such facto-
ries would not be in operation for a number of months.14
At this point the Soviet Union had already requested a range of war
materials from the Anglo-Saxon powers, the terms under which they would
be provided being established during the first weeks of the war. Whilst the
issue of Allied aid to the Soviet Union will be examined in Chapter 8, at this
point it is worth noting that such aid would only start to play a significant
role in the fighting by the Battle for Moscow in late November and early
December 1941.
In the meantime, Soviet forces would have to manage with their own
resources, with tanks of any sort, and particularly modern tanks, being one
commodity in increasingly short supply as Soviet units were overrun and
many tanks were either destroyed by their crews or captured by Axis forces.
During the summer and autumn tanks were increasingly concentrated in
58 Barbarossa
battalion- and brigade-sized units for allocation by a Stalin attempting to
micromanage many aspects of the fighting at the front. Justification for
breaking up large armoured formations, initially reducing corps to divisions,
was provided in a directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of
15 July 1941.

DOCUMENT 38: Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to commanders of

the forces of fronts, armies and military districts, 15 July 1941
The experience of three weeks of war with German fascism allows us to come to a
number of conclusions, of critical importance from the point of view of the successful
conduct of operations by the Red Army and the improvement of its organization.
Firstly: The experience of war has shown, that our mechanized corps, as far too
massive amalgamations, are not very mobile, nimble and suitable for maneuver, not
including the fact that they are vulnerable targets for enemy aviation. The Headquar-
ters considers it necessary, at the first available opportunity . . . to disband the mecha-
nized corps, dividing them up into separate tank divisions, subordinate to army
commanders, and motorized divisions to be reformed as standard rifle divisions with
tanks. . . .
Secondly: Experience of war has shown, that an excess of large and cumbersome
armies with a large number of divisions significantly complicates the organization of
battle and the direction of forces in combat, especially when one keeps in mind the
youth and limited experience of our headquarters and commanders. The Headquarters
considers that it is necessary to gradually . . . prepare for a move to a system of small
armies with five or a maximum of six divisions without corps-level command and
direct subordination of divisions to the army command.
Thirdly: Experience has shown that rifle divisions have difficulty in countering the
activities of enemy armoured units in not having perhaps a small number of tanks at
their disposal. There is no doubt that our rifle divisions would fight better . . . if they
had at their disposal perhaps a company of medium or even light tanks. The
Headquarters considers it necessary where possible to attach at least a company of
medium or light tanks and where possible a platoon of KV (three tanks) to our rifle
divisions.
Fourthly: Our forces have to some extent underestimated the significance of cavalry.
In current circumstances at the front, where the enemy rear is extended for hundreds
of kilometers in forested regions and completely unprotected against major raids from
our lines, raids by Red cavalry . . . could play a decisive role in the task of disorganiz-
ing command and control and the supply of German forces. . . . It follows that gradu-
ally, . . . existing cavalry corps and divisions should be reformed into light cavalry
divisions of a raiding type, with three thousand men in each. . . .
Fifth: The experience of war has shown, that our aviation units, corps and multi-
regiment divisions, and regiments consisting of sixty aircraft, are very clumsy, cum-
bersome and unsuited to a war of maneuver, not mentioning that the cumbersomeness
of units inhibits the dispersal of aircraft on airfields and makes it easier for the enemy
to destroy them on the ground. VVS experience of the last few days has shown, that
regiments of 30 aircraft and divisions of two regiments without corps-level units is the
best form of organization for aviation. . . . The Headquarters considers it necessary to
 Barbarossa 59
gradually move to organizing aviation regiments with 30 aircraft (three squadrons),
and aviation divisions with two such regiments, without corps-level units.
...
Headquarters of the Supreme Command
(Source: V.P. Naumov (ed.), kn.2, 1998, pp. 471–472)

Despite horrendous Soviet losses, Soviet counter-attacks against the

advancing German forces were causing damage to the German spearheads.
One of the most prominent examples of these counter-attacks during the
summer of 1941 in the Soviet historiography is that which took place
between 12 and 14 August to the east of Staraia Russa, during which the
11th and 34th Armies of the North-Western Front attacked forces of the
German 16th Army as the 48th Army held defensive positions to the
north near Shimsk to the west of Lake Il’men’. Whilst such counter-
attacks suggested a relative cohesion to Soviet forces that had not existed
only weeks before and slowed down German forces, as well as whittling
away hard to replace strength, the costs of operations in the area were size-
able for Soviet forces. For instance, as of 1 September 1941, after German
forces had broken through defensive positions on 16 August forcing the
48th Army back on Chudovo and Kolpino, the 48th Army was down to
the strength (with official strength for such units as of 22 June 1941 in
brackets) shown in Document 39.

DOCUMENT 39: Report of the head of the Political Board of the Leningrad Front to the
command of the North-Western Front, 1 September 1941
Incorporated into the 48th Army, subordinated to the Leningrad Front, are: 1st
Mountain-Rifle Brigade, 21st Tank Division and 128th and 311th Rifle Divisions.
However the serious misfortunes which befell the Army in the fighting for Novgorod
and in the Liuban’ region have led to the loss of the bulk of its personnel and almost all
its equipment. On 1 September units of the Army had the following at their disposal:
Personnel

Unit Command Political Other NCOs Ranks Total

officers

1 128th Rifle 71 39 75 99 472 756 (14,448)

Division
2 1st Mountain 69 16 83 113 797 1,078
Rifle Brigade
3 311th Rifle 141 58 128 333 2,314 2,973
Division
4 21st Tank Division – All command 119 101 811 1,031 (10,419)

continued
60 Barbarossa
Armaments
Unit Rifles Automatic HMGs LMGs Artillery and
rifles mortars

1 128th Rifle 475 29 2 (174) 1 (392) 45 mm AT – 2

Division (10,240) Mortars – 16
2 1st Mountain
Rifle Brigade 601 – 6 5 76 mm artillery – 2
122mm howitzers – 3
3 311th Rifle
Division 2,842 2 12 13
4 21st Rifle
[sic] Division 350 – – 7
Total 4,268 31 20 26 Guns – 7
Mortars – 16

Munitions
Unit Rifle Shells Grenades Mines
cartridges

1 128th Rifle Division 62,000 – 20 Sufficient

2 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade 30,000 – – Not counted
3 311th Rifle Division 4,000,000 45 mm – – –
2,000
4 21st Rifle [sic] Division 53,000 – – –
Total 4,145,000 2,000 20 –

Transport resources

Unit Horses Light Lorries Special Tractors Motorcycles

vehicles

1 128th Rifle
Division – 2 65 (657 – 4 – –
auto-mobiles
+ tractors)
2 1st Mountain
Rifle Brigade 122 4 76 2 – –
3 311th Rifle
Division 730 5 136 2 2 2
(3,039)
4 21st Tank
Division – 1 40 (1,444 – 5 –
auto-mobiles
+ tractors)
Total 852 12 317 8 7 2
 Barbarossa 61
Radio sets
Unit Radio 4-A/rsb 5-AK/rb 6-PK

1 128th Rifle Division 1 2 –

2 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade – – –
3 311th Rifle Division 7 – –
4 21st Tank Division – 2 5
Total 8 4 5

(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 175–176. List strengths for 22 June 1941 from K.A.
Kalashnikov et al., 2003, p. 62)

Limited communications resources hampered Soviet command and control,

although it gave German intelligence fewer sources of information on
Soviet activities than they might otherwise have had, particularly where, at
the beginning of the war, Soviet radio procedures had on numerous occa-
sions been sloppy.15 On 14 September 1941 the 48th Army was disbanded
and the remnants used in the formation of the 54th Army.16 It can be
assumed that the 21st Tank Division had lost all of its tanks,17 with trained
tank crews subsequently being thrown into battle as infantry by many
fronts.

DOCUMENT 40: To commanders of the forces of fronts on the rules regarding the use of tank
crews, temporarily without vehicles, 10 July 1941
1. According to reports from fronts, the General Headquarters has become aware
that the crews of armoured units, temporarily without tanks, have been used in
the building of non-armoured units, which squander a well-trained contingent of
tank crews without absolute necessity. This has especially been the case on the
North-Western Front.
2. The People’s Commissar of Defence ordered:
a) That all tank crews be urgently removed from infantry and other units and be
concentrated in front reserves and replacement units, carrying out in the
process General Staff directive Number 946/org of 6.07.1941.
...
Sokolovskii.
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1)., 1998, p. 72)

The Soviet desperation to halt advancing German forces is indicated by the

mobilization of poorly trained militia units for the defence of Moscow and
Leningrad, mentioned by Stalin in Document 29 above. Such units were
mobilized from Moscow according to State Defence Committee decree
number 10 of 4 July 1941:
62 Barbarossa

DOCUMENT 41: On the voluntary mobilization of workers of Moscow and the Moscow Region
to militia divisions, from GOKO Decree Number 10 of 4 July 1941
In accordance with the desire expressed by workers and the suggestions of Soviet,
Party, union and Komsomol organizations of Moscow and the Moscow Region the State
Defence Committee decrees:
To mobilize 200,000 people from Moscow and 70,000 from the Moscow Region to
the militia divisions.
The mobilization of workers, administrative personnel and students of Moscow and
the creation of 25 divisions is to be conducted on district by district principles.
In the first instance the formation of seven divisions is to be carried out by 7 July.
The mobilized divisions are to receive a number and the name of the district, for
instance 1st Sokolnicheskii District Division.
...
The mobilization and barracking of units of the militia is to be conducted using the
building resources of the district soviets (schools, clubs and other buildings), with the
exception of buildings allocated as hospitals.
...
The Headquarters of the Moscow Military Region is to supply units with arms,
munitions and necessary items.
...
During the full period of mobilization in units of the militia the following mainte-
nance payments are to be preserved: for workers – to the sum of average wages, for
administrative personnel the sum of their salary, for students the sum of their grants,
and for the families of kolkhoz peasants financial assistance is to be determined accord-
ing to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet SSSR ‘On methods for the
determination of payments to the families of military personnel of the ranks and
NCOs during wartime’ of 26.VI 1941.
In the event of the disablement or the death of the mobilized the mobilized and his
family have the right to receive a pension on a par with someone called up into the
Red Army.
(Source: KPSS o vooruzhennikh silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1981, pp. 302–303)

Such poorly equipped and trained divisions of the opolcheniia were massacred
by German units before both Moscow and Leningrad, buying little time at
horrendous cost.
By the beginning of July German forces threatened both Moscow and
Leningrad, the noose around the latter threatening with the help of the
Finns to the north, although in the far south relatively organized resistance
had slowed the German advance more significantly.
The construction of the Mozhaisk line to defend Moscow was ordered on
16 July 1941, with the construction of the Luga line to defend the
approaches to Leningrad the subject of an order of 5 July (Document 97 in
Chapter 7). The Mozhaisk line was to be manned primarily by the militia
divisions and NKVD troops.
 Barbarossa 63

DOCUMENT 42: Decree of the State Defence Committee No. 172 ss concerning the Mozhaisk
defence line, 16 July 1941
1. The addition of ten militia divisions to the list of those armed is to be given pri-
ority and they are to be fully equipped [obmundirovat’].
2. These divisions are to be divided into two armies of five divisions and Comrade
Artem’ev [Commander of the Moscow Military District] is to be delegated to put
forward candidates for the posts of commanders of armies and chiefs of staff.
3. The aim of these divisions is the defence of Moscow on the Mozhaisk line, their
disposition along the Mozhaisk line.
4. ...
5. Making up the Mozhaisk defence line, in addition to ten militia divisions there
will be a further five divisions of the NKVD. . . .
6. To permit Comrade Artem’ev to take 200 85 mm AA guns from the Moscow
PVO and organize them into ten light artillery anti-tank regiments (with five
batteries in every regiment).
7. For each army of the Mozhaisk line (three armies in total) to organize one regiment
of army artillery per army, for example of 122mm howitzers, 152mm guns or how-
itzers and 203mm howitzers, and to also use naval artillery for this purpose. . . .
8. The organization of the Mozhaisk line and its artillery provision is to be organized
within a five-day period, that is by 21 July of this year.
9. To permit the command of the MVO to form ten militia battalions of 500 men
for the reinforcement of militia divisions.
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin
(Source: V.P. Eroshin et al., 2000, pp. 335–336)

Despite hastily prepared defences and the throwing in to the battle of

militia divisions in addition to newly created Red Army units, German
forces captured both Narva and Novgorod on the road to Leningrad on 17
August 1941; the capture of Schlissel’berg on 8 September signalling the
start of the blockade, the subject of Chapter 7. The German encirclement of
Leningrad had required armoured forces from Army Group Centre advanc-
ing on Moscow, which had also been redirected from the Moscow axis to
encircle substantial Soviet forces near Kiev and secure the ‘breadbasket’ of
the Ukraine for Germany. Whilst this redirection of forces from the end of
July weakened German moves towards Moscow, Soviet resistance near
Smolensk was also intense, with German forces under Guderian subse-
quently not having the resources to hold on to the bridgehead over the River
Desna 75 miles south-east of Smolensk, against which the Red Army was
able to concentrate significant resources.
64 Barbarossa

DOCUMENT 43: To the Head of Artillery of the Red Army on departure to the El’nia area,
1 August 1941
The People’s Commissar [of Defence] has ordered you to leave for El’nia now and assist
locally in the organization of the destruction of the enemy near El’nia with artillery
fire, mortar fire, . . . bearing in mind the need to destroy the enemy within the next
1–2 days. The People’s Commissar sees this matter as being of particularly great
significance.
...
Zhukov
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1), 1998, p. 107)

DOCUMENT 44: Military Situation Report of the Commander of forces of the Reserve Front
to the Supreme High Command on the conduct of operations in the El’nia region, 21 August
1941 04:45
Up to 20.8.1941 units of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front in the El’nia region have
not succeeded in fully encircling and destroying the German units.
19.8 in the region of Gur’evo, Sadki the enemy brought in as an addition the 137th
Infantry Division, previously in position before 43rd Army.
In the region of Klemiatino, Grichano the enemy brought in a new unit, the
number of which has not been ascertained.
For the last ten days of operations I personally have been with all divisions and
locally established the conditions in which the fighting was taking place and how
units were conducting themselves.
Soldiers and their commanders hold themselves and the majority in good order.
They are not afraid of losses and have already learnt the technical and tactical dimen-
sion to the destruction of enemy forces, but units are under strength and worn down
from enemy attacks and fire, which recently has not ceased at night.
Given the existing lack of strength of our units to conclusively encircle and destroy
4–5 German infantry divisions is not possible.
The continuation of the battle with current forces will result in the terminal loss of
fighting capability of the units in action.
We now have to reinforce units to at least 60% strength, bring in more munitions,
allow troops a short breathing space, thoroughly establish the location of enemy weak
spots, after which vigorously attacking.
I request your permission to:
...
4) Start the attack with fresh troops from the morning of 25.8.
...
Zhukov.
(Source: RA T.16 (5–1), 1998, pp. 363–364)

The eventual destruction of the German bridgehead near El’nia was por-
trayed as a significant Soviet victory by Soviet leaders:
 Barbarossa 65

DOCUMENT 45: Order of the military soviet of the Reserve Front to the troops due to the
expected victory near El’nia, Novo-Aleksandrovskoe, 7 September 1941
Comrade Red Army men, commanders, commissars, political workers and all of the
command personnel of the front!
After persistent and bitter fighting by the courageous units of our 24th Army a
significant victory is expected. In the El’nia region a crushing blow has been struck
against German forces. The broken enemy, having suffered huge losses, bleeding to
death, is retreating in disarray.
The High Command of the German Army saw the El’nia region as being of great
significance as a very advantageous position for further advance. The Fascist command
strove to hold the El’nia region in its hands regardless of the cost, not regretting the
loss of the lives of thousands of its soldiers and officers.
...
Comrade Red Army men, commanders, commissars, political workers! The military
soviet of the front congratulates you on your brilliant victory.
...
Commander of forces of the front, General of the Army, Zhukov
Member of the military soviet, Kruglov
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 425)

However, even this relatively minor success came at considerable cost:

DOCUMENT 46: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command directive Number 001805 to the
Western Front commander concerning a transition to the defence, 0335 hours, 10 September 1941
The prolonged offensive by Western Front forces on the well-dug-in enemy has led to
heavy losses. The enemy has withdrawn to prepared defensive positions and our units
are being forced to gnaw through them.
The Stavka orders that you cease further attacks on the enemy. . . .
B. Shaposhnikov
(Source: David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part II’,
2000, pp. 209–210)

DOCUMENT 47: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command directive Number 001941 to
the Reserve Front commander concerning shortcomings in the organization of the offensive, 0600
hours, 13 September 1941
The recent 24th and 43rd Armies’ offensive did not provide completely positive
results and led only to excessive losses both in personnel and in equipment.
The main reasons for the lack of success were the absence of the required attack
grouping in the armies, the attempt to attack along the entire front, and the insuffi-
ciently strong, overly short, and disgracefully organized aviation and artillery prepara-
tion for the infantry and tank attacks.
...
66 Barbarossa

B. Shaposhnikov
(Source: David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part II’,
2000, p. 210)

Even Zhukov, organizer of the attack, was not beyond criticism, although
with so few successes and with huge losses without success, the costs of this
victory would to a large extent be ignored.
Soviet operations near Kiev were less successful, with authorization to
withdraw coming too late to save the bulk of Soviet forces in the region, as
German forces tightened the noose at Lokhvitsa, 125 miles behind Kiev, on
15 September 1941. Soviet losses near Kiev were staggering. According to
Krivosheev, the ‘Kiev Strategic Defensive’ Operation from 7 July to 26 Sep-
tember saw the Soviet South-Western Front lose 531,471 troops as irrecover-
able losses, out of a total of 627,000. German forces claimed to have
captured 665,000 prisoners in the region.18
Nonetheless, German leaders were shocked by the Soviet ability to con-
tinue to throw new units in to the fighting, bringing about the gradual real-
ization that, for many, the war in the East would not be over before the
winter. Despite German losses and logistical difficulties in the vast expanses
of what was only the European part of the Soviet Union, the renewed
advance on Moscow, Operation ‘Typhoon’, started on 2 October 1941;
Operation ‘Typhoon’ proper being preceded by diversionary operations in
the south on 30 September, the official start of the defensive phase of the
Battle of Moscow in Soviet sources.

Guide to further reading

H. Boog, J. Forster, J. Hoffmann, E. Klink, R.-D. Muller, G.R. Ueberschar and E. Osers
(eds), Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998).
Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds), The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942 (Novato,
CA: Presidio, 1988).
‘Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War, Volume 34: Part IV, Opera-
tions of the North-Western Front, 15–23 June 1941’, JSMS, Volume 4, Number 4
(December 1991), pp. 674–737.
‘Combat Documents of the Soviet North-Western Front 24 June – 1 July 1941’, JSMS,
Volume 5, Number 1 (January 1992), pp. 115–157.
‘Combat Documents of the Soviet North-Western Front Armies 21 June – 1 July 1941’,
JSMS, Volume 5, Number 2 (June 1992), pp. 267–299.
David Glantz, ‘A Collection of Combat Documents Covering the First Three Days of the
Great Patriotic War’, JSMS, Volume 4, Number 1 (January 1991), pp. 150–190.
David Glantz, ‘A Collection of Combat Documents Covering Soviet Western Front Opera-
tions: 24–30 June 1941’, JSMS, Volume 4, Number 2 (June 1991), pp. 327–385.
David Glantz, ‘Combat Documents of Soviet Western Front Armies 22–30 June 1941’,
JSMS, Volume 4, Number 3 (September 1991), pp. 513–534.
 Barbarossa 67
David Glantz (ed.), The Initial Period on the Eastern Front 22 June-August 1941 (London: Frank
Cass, 1993).
David Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, KS: Uni-
versity of Kansas Press, 1998).
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part I’ [‘The Red
Army’s July Counterstrokes’], JSMS, Volume 12, Number 4 (December 1999), pp.
149–197.
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part II’ [‘The
August Counterstrokes’], JSMS, Volume 13, Number 1 (March 2000), pp. 172–237.
Curzio Malaparte, The Volga Rises in Europe (Edinburgh: Berlinn Limited, 2000).
4 The Battle of Moscow

With the redeployment of German armoured forces after the Kiev encir-
clement and from the Leningrad axis, 2nd Panzer Group resumed its
advance eastwards on 30 September 1941 in preparation for the start of the
principal thrusts towards Moscow by 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups – Opera-
tion ‘Typhoon’, commencing 2 October.
Within days 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups had encircled the bulk of Soviet
forces defending Moscow to the west. The principal pocket of Soviet forces,
containing the bulk of 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies, was that to the
west of Viaz’ma, created on 7 October when forces of 3rd and 4th Panzer
Groups linked up. German forces claimed to have captured 660,000 Soviet
POWs. The second pocket was created south of Briansk, trapping the
Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies, and netting the Germans another 100,000
Soviet POWs.
On 5 October, a German column was spotted about 90 miles east of the
‘Typhoon’ start line, and about one-third of the way from the line to
Moscow. The Mozhaisk defensive line, 120 miles behind existing Soviet
positions, the construction of which had been ordered in July, was hastily
readied to halt the German advance on the capital.
Whilst on many occasions German troops faced stubborn resistance, the
NKVD found numerous instances of desertion.

DOCUMENT 48: To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs SSSR General Commissar of
State Security Comrade Beria, [October] 1941
For information
From the start of the war up to 10 October of this year special sections of the NKVD
and blocking detachments of the NKVD for rear area security have held 657,364 ser-
vicemen separated from their units and running away from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people have been held by operational screens of the special sec-
tions and 407,395 by blocking detachments of NKVD rear-area security forces.
Of those held, 25,878 were arrested, the remaining 632,486 formed in to units and
sent back to the front.
Amongst those arrested by the special sections:
 The Battle of Moscow 69
Spies 1,505
Saboteurs 308
Traitors 2,621
Cowards and panicmongers 2,643
Deserters 8,772
Those spreading provocational rumours 3,987
Self-inflicted wounds 671
Others 4,371
Total 24,878

By order of the special sections and according to sentences of military tribunals 10,201
people have been shot. . . .
By front, these figures can be divided up as follows:

Leningrad [Front] Arrested 1,044

Shot 854 . . .
Karelian Arrested 468
Shot 263 . . .
Northern Arrested 1,683
Shot 933 . . .
North-Western Arrested 1,600
Shot 730
Western Arrested 4,013
Shot 2,136 . . .
South-Western Arrested 3,249
Shot 868 . . .
Southern Arrested 3,599
Shot 919 . . .
Briansk Arrested 799
Shot 389 . . .
Central Arrested 686
Shot 346 . . .
Reserve Army Arrested 2,516
Shot 894 . . .
Deputy head of the Board of Special Sections of the NKVD SSSR
Commissar of State Security 3rd Class, Mil’shtein
(Source: A.A. Pechenkin, 2000, pp. 37–38)

In the face of the loss of regular forces defending Moscow in the encir-
clements near Viaz’ma and Briansk at the beginning of the month, on 13
October the Mozhaisk defence line was manned by the following:
70 The Battle of Moscow

DOCUMENT 49: To the Head of the Headquarters of the Western Front on the composition of
forces on the Mozhaisk defensive line, 13 October 1941
In accordance with the report of the headquarters of the Moscow Reserve Front I can
provide you with a list of units and formations of the Mozhaisk defence line.
1. On the Volokolamsk axis ...: Divisional School, 316th Rifle Division; military school
of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR with 302nd Machine-Gun Battalion; 316th Rifle
Division with 1/108th Reserve Rifle Regiment; 41st Independent Anti-Aircraft
Division (two batteries); 584th Artillery Regiment Anti-Tank, a tank company, two
mortar companies, an independent artillery division, a sapper company of the Moscow
Military Engineering Academy, a division of ‘RS’ [Katiushas].
2. On the Mozhaisk axis . . . : 230th Reserve Regiment (without one battalion);
32nd Rifle Division; a composite battalion of the Military-Political Academy;
305th Machine-Gun Battalion; 1st and 2/27th Reserve Rifle Regiment; 3/230th
Reserve Training Rifle Regiment; a cavalry regiment; 121st, 367th, 408th, 421st
Artillery Regiments Anti-Tank; two mortar companies; a tank company; 59th
Independent Anti-Aircraft Division (2 batteries); 467th Independent Sapper Bat-
talion; 2 divisions ‘RS’; 20th Tank Brigade.
3. On the Maloiaroslavets axis . . . : 312th Rifle Division with 108th reserve Rifle
Regiment; Podol’sk Infantry Academy; Podol’sk Artillery Academy; 517th How-
itzer Regiment of the High Command Reserve; a tank company; 5 mortar com-
panies; 31 Independent Artillery Division; 222nd, 395th, 382nd, 452nd
Artillery Regiments Anti-Tank; two divisions ‘RS’; 538th Sapper Battalion; a
sapper company of the Moscow Military-Engineering Academy.
Sharokhin.
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1), 1998, p. 210)

Despite the first snow, followed by rain, and the increasingly heavy going as the
rasputitsa [time without rain] set in, and despite the ferocity of albeit limited
Soviet counter-attacks, the Mozhaisk line was effectively breached on 14
October when German forces took Kalinin; Soviet defences now increasingly
being focused on a line only 40 miles from the centre of Moscow.1
The breaching of the Mozhaisk line and evacuation of Moscow beginning
on 15 October saw panic hit the city, with a state of siege being announced
on 20 October 1941:

DOCUMENT 50: Decree of the State Defence Committee ‘on the evacuation of the capital of the
USSR, Moscow’
No. 801
15.X.41
Given the unfavourable situation in the region of the Mozhaisk defence line the State
Defence Committee decrees:
1. Make Comrade Molotov responsible for the announcement to foreign missions
that they must have evacuated to Kuibishev TODAY [chtobi oni segodnia zhe
evakuirovalis’]. . . .
 The Battle of Moscow 71
2. To evacuate the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and also the Government
headed by the Vice-Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Comrade
Molotov TODAY (Comrade Stalin will evacuate tomorrow or later, depending on
the situation).
3. Without delay evacuate organs of the Ministry of Defence to Kuibishev, and the
core of the General Headquarters staff [Genstab] to Arzamas.
4. In the event of the appearance of enemy forces at the gates of Moscow to require the
NKVD, that is Comrades Beria and Shcherbakov, to carry out the demolition of
industrial concerns, supply dumps and institutions which cannot be evacuated and
also the electrical equipment for the metro (with the exclusion of water pipes and
sewers).

Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin

(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, p. 506)

DOCUMENT 51: Decree of the State Defence Committee on the declaration of a state of siege in
Moscow, 19 October 1941
With the aim of . . . strengthening the rear of the armed forces defending Moscow and
in the interests of the prevention of the disruptive activities of enemy spies, saboteurs
and other agents of German fascism the State Defence Committee decrees:

1. From 20 October to introduce in Moscow and attached districts a state of siege.

2. To forbid any movement of the streets . . . from 12 o’clock at night to five o’clock
in the morning, with the exception of transport and persons with special passes
from the Commandant for Moscow. . . .
3. That responsibility for the preservation of strict order in the city and suburban
districts be passed to the Commandant of Moscow General-Major Comrade
Sinilov, for which the commandant will have at his disposal the internal security
forces of the NKVD, the militia [police] and volunteer worker detachments.
4. Those disturbing the peace should be quickly . . . handed over to the courts of the
Military Tribunals, and provocateurs, spies and other such agents of the enemy
engaged in the disruption of order should be shot on the spot.
...
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 427)

Whilst Soviet Party and government organizations were partly relocated to

Kuibishev, the fact that actually Stalin remained in the capital helped limit
any panic. The stabilization of the situation was assisted by the free reign
given to the NKVD.
As the evacuation of Moscow was being ordered, desperate and relatively
unco-ordinated Soviet counter-attacks continued to sap German strength,
with particularly desperate measures being taken on the Moscow axis, where
tank brigades, supported by the new Katiusha rocket launchers of ‘RS’, were
thrown against the German spearheads:
72 The Battle of Moscow

DOCUMENT 52: Directive of the command of forces of the Western Front to commanders of
the 16, 5 and 43 Armies on the destruction of armoured groups of the enemy, breaking through
towards Moscow, 15 October 1941
According to reconnaissance reports, enemy armoured groups up to the end of 15.10
have made it as far as: 1st group – Turginovo – up to 50 tanks; 2nd group – Loto-
shino, Osheikino – up to 100 tanks; 3rd group – Makarovo, Karacharovo – up to 100
tanks; 4th group – Borovsk region – up to 50 tanks with infantry; El’nia, Borodino –
up to 40 tanks. All of these armoured groups, are apparently well aware of the weak-
points in our defences and have the task, avoiding fortified areas, of breaking through
to Moscow.
I order:

1. Preparation for the interception of these enemy armoured groups with the aim of
destroying them, with:
a) 21st Tank Brigade to be given the task of conducting thorough reconnais-
sance of the nature of the region and dispositions of the Turginovo group of
tanks and, attacking from different directions, to destroy it;
b) 22nd Tank Brigade, strengthened by no less than an anti-tank regiment,
and with a division of RS, to be given the task of organizing an anti-tank
ambush in depth, in the region of Teriaevo, Suvorovo, firing upon them
from ambush positions before counterattacking and destroying them;
c) 20th Tank Brigade to move out before dawn on 16.10 to the Vasiukovo
area, strengthened with no less than an anti-tank regiment and an RS divi-
sion, with the task of firing on the enemy Makarovo group from ambush
positions and destroying it;
18th and 19th Tank Brigades are to be left directly behind the infantry on the
section Borodino, Znamenskoe;
d) 9th Tank Brigade, reinforced with an anti-tank regiment, is to move to the
line Mitenino, Mitiaevo with the task of, from ambush positions, of firing
upon the enemy tank group. In the region of Ermolino a tank battalion of
the motor rifle brigade, situated in Vorob’i, is to have the same task.
17th Tank Brigade is to be in 43rd Army command’s reserve for action princip-
ally in support of the left wing of the Maloiaroslavets Fortified District.

Aviation will support our tank ambushes, in the main on request of army comman-
ders. Identification of our tanks will be with a series of red flares and as backup, red
markers on the ground on the left hand side of our tanks. Acknowledge receipt and
implementation.
Zhukov
Bulganin
Sokolovskii
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 426)

Whilst in mid-October relatively few Soviet units stood between German

forces and Moscow, German strength had been whittled down by more than
 The Battle of Moscow 73
three months of fighting and Soviet forces kept finding sufficient strength to
prevent German forces making the final lunge forward to Moscow. German
forces destroyed division upon division of the Red Army, but the Soviet
replacement rate, even if the size and quality of divisions fell, was well above
German expectations. As Glantz and House note, by 1 December 1941 the
Soviet Union had deployed a further 97 existing divisions to the zone of
operations over those deployed there at the start of the war, as well as having
created an additional 194 divisions and 84 brigades from the mobilization
base. The Soviet Union had in fact created twice as many divisions as
German pre-war expectations – approximately 600 compared to an expected
force of about 300.2
Glantz’s characterization of the resulting situation is apt:

By late October the Wehrmacht and the Red Army resembled two
punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly
losing the power to hurt each other. Like prizefighters with swollen
eyes, they were unable to see their opponents with sufficient clarity to
judge their relative endurance.3

Both Soviet and German forces were suffering from a shortage in tanks. As
the Soviet Military Encyclopedia notes, under the heading ‘Tank Forces’, where
in mid-July the division was to become the largest armoured unit in the
Red Army (see Document 38, Chapter 3), by the onset of winter scarce
tanks were being parcelled out in brigades and increasingly battalions:

DOCUMENT 53: Extract from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia on tank forces
From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War Soviet auto-armour forces conducted
military operations in exceptionally difficult circumstances. In the western border mil-
itary regions there were only 1,475 new tanks (T-34 and KV); all of the remainder
were outdated types. In addition, at that time Soviet armoured forces were a state of
re-organisation and rearmament. Large scale losses of tanks at the beginning of the war
and the necessity for their rapid replacement led to reduction in the size of the tank
park of the field army. Already soon after the start of the war mechanized corps and
the tank divisions which made them up were disbanded. The basic organizational unit
in the auto-armour forces became the independent tank brigade and independent tank
battalion. On 1 December 1941 there were 68 independent tank brigades and 37
independent tank battalions in the Soviet army.
(Source: SVE 7, p. 670)

These tank brigades and battalions were parcelled out by the centre along
key axes, with the bulk of Soviet armoured strength being concentrated
before Moscow. According to Rotmistrov, at the end of November 1941
there were only 670 Soviet tanks for the fronts before Moscow, that is, the
recently formed Kalinin, and Western and South-Western Fronts, of which
Table 4.1 German tank and other armoured vehicle losses on the Eastern Front, June–November 1941 (initial force level 3,648)

June July August September October November Total

PzKpfw I 34 146 171 7 18 33 409

PzKpfw II 11 112 104 32 65 30 354
PzKpfw III 21 155 74 104 77 116 547
PzKpfw 38(t) 33 182 183 62 85 149 694
PzKpfw IV 15 109 68 23 55 38 308
Assault gun 3 11 26 12 23 10 85
ACV 1 17 12 17 14 6 67
Total 118 732 638 257 337 382 2,464
Resulting force level 3,530 2,889 2,262 2,044 2,480* 2,177 1,803
Source: Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘The Failure of the Economic “Blitzkrieg Strategy” ’, in H. Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV,
pp. 1120–1121 and 1129.
Note
* Including the addition of c.450 vehicles of 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions from reserves.
 The Battle of Moscow 75
only 205 were heavy or medium types. Most of this tank strength was con-
centrated with the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two
tank battalions (67 tanks) and the South-Western two tank brigades (30
tanks).4 Alternative figures suggest that of 667 tanks with front-line units of
the Kalinin, Western and right wing of the South-Western Fronts as of 1
December 1941, 607 were with the Western Front, of which 205 were KV
series and T-34s, with the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the South-
Western Front having 17 and 43 tanks respectively, none of which were
apparently KV series or T-34s.5 Either set of figures is a significant improve-
ment on the 141 heavy and medium tanks available to the Western, Reserve
and Briansk Fronts before Moscow as of 1 October 1941.6
Whilst Soviet armoured strength was increasing before Moscow, includ-
ing more capable medium and heavy tanks, despite the boost provided to
German armoured strength by the deployment of 2nd and 5th Panzer Divi-
sions from reserves in October, German strength was waning. Table 4.1
gives some indication of the deterioration of German tank strength between
June and November 1941.
As German forces pushed on towards Moscow, the twenty-fourth anniver-
sary of the October7 Revolution, which had brought the Bolsheviks to
power, approached. On the eve of the anniversary Stalin gave a speech, safe
below the ground in one of the showpiece stations of the Moscow Metro,
extracts of which are provided below:

DOCUMENT 54: Speech on the eve of the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution (speech
delivered at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet, 6 November 1941)
I already stated in one of my speeches at the beginning of the war that the war had
created a serious danger for our country. . . .
Today, as a result of four months of war, I must emphasize that this danger – far
from diminishing – has on the contrary increased. The enemy has captured the greater
part of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and Estonia, and a number of other regions,
has penetrated the Donbas, is looming like a black cloud over Leningrad, and is men-
acing our glorious capital, Moscow.
...
In four months of war we [have] lost 350,000 killed, 378,000 missing, and have
1,020,000 wounded men. In the same period the enemy lost over 4,500,000 killed,
wounded and prisoners. There can be no doubt that as a result of four months of war,
Germany, whose manpower reserves are already becoming exhausted, has been consid-
erably more weakened by the war than the Soviet Union, whose reserves are only now
unfolding to their full extent.
...
The defence of Leningrad and Moscow, where our divisions recently annihilated
some three dozen professional German divisions, shows that the new Soviet men . . . are
being and already have been forged in the fire of the Patriotic War and tomorrow will
be the terror of the German army.
...
76 The Battle of Moscow
Wherein lie the reasons for the temporary military setbacks of the Red Army?
One of the reasons for the setbacks of the Red Army consists in the absence of a
second front in Europe against the German-fascist troops.
...
The Hitlerite party and Hitlerite command . . . call for the annihilation of the great
Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinskii and Chernishevskii,
Pushkin and Tolstoi, Glinka and Tschaikovskii, Gorki and Chekhov, Sechenov and
Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov!
The German invaders want a war of extermination against the peoples of the USSR.
Well, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they shall have it.
...
It is a fact that Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have united
into a single camp which has set itself the task of crushing the Hitler imperialists and
their armies of conquest. . . .
The recent three-power conference in Moscow with the participation of the
representative of Great Britain, Mr Beaverbrook, and of the representative of the
United States, Mr Harriman, decided systematically to assist our country with tanks
and aircraft. As is known, we have already begun to receive shipments of tanks and
planes on the basis of this decision.
Still earlier Great Britain ensured to our country of such needed materials as alu-
minium, lead, tin, nickel and rubber.
If to this is added the fact that recently the United States decided to grant a billion
dollar loan to the Soviet Union. . .
...
Our whole country and all peoples of the USSR should organize into a single war
camp which together with our army and navy would wage a great liberation war for
the honor and freedom of our country, for routing the German armies.
...
Long live our Red Army and Navy!
Long live our glorious country!
Our cause is just; victory will be ours!
(Source: Joseph Stalin, 1944, pp. 17–32)

There are a number of valuable points that can be made with reference to
this speech. First, figures for Soviet and German casualties are symptomatic
of the unrealistic thrust of Soviet propaganda during the first months of the
war, a common theme in which was an absurdly distorted portrayal of events
at the front that can only have increased mistrust of the regime. Propaganda
would, however, increasingly focus on patriotic themes and on the cruelty of
the enemy, often without reference to socialism or communism. This shift is
apparent in this speech, where Stalin lists revolutionary figures such as
Plekhanov, Chernishevskii and Lenin alongside both Soviet and non-Soviet
writers such as Gorki and Chekhov, painters and musicians, and pre-
revolutionary military heroes such as Suvorov and Kutuzov, harking back to
the Patriotic War of 1812. With many non-Russian republics under
German occupation the patriotic focus is clearly on Russian nationalism.
This particular speech is also one of the few in which Stalin lavishes praise
 The Battle of Moscow 77
on assistance from his new-found Allies, despite noting the absence of a
‘Second Front’ against Germany in the West. This is arguably indicative of
the extent to which the Soviet Union needed Allied assistance – the first
British tanks, as noted below, arriving in time to participate in the Battle
for Moscow.
The stalled German assault of Moscow resumed in earnest in mid-
November, although clearly with inadequate resources, assisted, however
(initially at least), by the fact that increasingly freezing temperatures
brought the rasputitsa to an end. On 17 November 1941 the Stavka or
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued its ‘scorched earth’
order in an attempt to deny Axis forces shelter from the elements as the
winter set in.

DOCUMENT 55: Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Number 0428,
17 November 1941
I order:

1. That all populated areas in the German rear be utterly destroyed and burned for a
distance of 40–60 km in depth from the front and 20–30 km to the left and right
of roads. For the destruction of population centres within the radius concerned
aviation is to be committed immediately, along with the widespread employ-
ment of artillery and mortar fire, teams of scouts, ski troops, and suitably pre-
pared [partisan] diversion groups, equipped with Molotov cocktails, grenades and
explosives.
...
3. In the event of having to withdraw on a particular portion of the front our forces
are to take the Soviet population with them and must destroy, without exception,
all population centres, so that the enemy cannot make use of them.
...
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
Supreme Commander, I. Stalin
(Source: P.N. Knishevskii et al., 1992, p. 211)

Population centres were also the focus of a General Headquarters order of 24

November 1941 on the failure of the Red Army to fully utilize them, when of
tactical or operational significance, in defence – a failing not typically associated
with the Red Army given the subsequent stubborn defence of Stalingrad.

DOCUMENT 56: To military soviets of fronts and armies on the defence of population centres,
24 November 1941
Fighting on all fronts has shown, that up till now the military soviets of fronts and
armies and the commanders of formations have given little attention to the adaptation
of towns and population centres for stubborn defence. Often population centres and
towns are easily captured by the enemy without significant losses.
78 The Battle of Moscow
Towns which have been adapted demand considerable expenditure of military
strength and resources by the enemy. . . .
In order to destroy more enemy strength and resources the following are to be
carried out:
1. All population centres with operational or tactical significance in the wider
defensive system are to be prepared for defence, incorporating anti-tank and anti-
personnel obstacles in them.
2. The defence of population centres should in the first instance be based around
artillery and anti-tank guns. . . .
3. Every street should be barricaded. . . .
4. Barricades should be created using local resources. . . . Obstructions can be created
by destroying buildings after evacuating civilians from them first. . . .
5. In preparing buildings for defence, widespread use should be made of attics and
balconies with openings on to the street, basement windows, sewers and commu-
nications passages for town utilities.
6. Fighting for population centres should be stubborn, fighting for every street, for
every building, in order to destroy the maximum enemy human and other
resources.
7. In finally giving up a population centre to the enemy all utilities and essential
services to sustain life are to be destroyed . . .
B. Shaposhnikov
F. Bokov
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1), 1998, pp. 252–253)

Certainly, as the Red Army sought to deal with superior German command
and control and operational and tactical effectiveness, particularly in terms
of armoured forces, better use of urban areas to slow the German advance on
key axes might have been militarily effective, although the cost to the civil-
ian populations of such a policy, as the example of Stalingrad would illus-
trate, was exceedingly high.
Had German officers had a more accurate picture of Soviet reserves in
early November, and had they been able to get the decision past Hitler,
however unlikely that might seem with the benefit of hindsight, the
decision might and perhaps should have been taken to consolidate existing
positions with a view to resuming the offensive the following year. The
advance was nonetheless resumed. Whilst the Soviet General Headquarters
was encouraging commanders to make use of urban areas for defence, as they
approached Moscow German military leaders were certainly aware, as in the
case of Leningrad a few weeks earlier, of the need for infantry resources in
fighting for such cities that they did not possess.
German forces were not only overextended before Moscow, but also to the
south, where the Axis advance was actually halted first, with Soviet forces of
the South-Western napravlenie and Southern Front being able to report on 29
November that:
 The Battle of Moscow 79

DOCUMENT 57: Report of the military soviets of the South-Western napravlenie and
Southern Front to the Supreme High Command on the defeat of the enemy Kleist battle-group
and the course of fighting for the liberation of Rostov-on-Don, 29 November 1941
Armies of the Southern Front had broken through defensive positions of the enemy
with their left wing on the southern bank of the River Tuzlov . . . by the morning of
29.11, and applied heavy pressure on him in a southerly direction [towards Rostov].
The Novocherkassk group of 9th Army seized the Shchepkin district with a decisive
advance and with its 66th and 68th Cavalry Divisions broke in to the north-eastern
suburbs of Rostov.
Elements of 56th Army continued to engage in street fighting in the southern and
south-western extremities of Rostov. . . .
From the morning of 29.11 the VVS of the Southern Front conducted active opera-
tions. . . . As a result of these actions the resistance by the Kleist battle-group was
broken, and it began a retreat from Rostov to the west in disarray.
...
Timoshenko
Khrushchev
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 428)

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, commanding the German Army Group

South, was to resign over Hitler’s unwillingness to support a timely with-
drawal to positions 30 km west of Rostov.8
On the Moscow axis it was soon apparent to Soviet leaders that as the
German drive on Moscow resumed the threat from 3rd Panzer Group along
the highway between Moscow and Kalinin was the most serious, with fierce
fighting taking place near the Moscow–Volga Canal, over which German
troops gained a bridgehead. To the south, the town of Tula was of consider-
able significance to the defence of Moscow. The defence of Tula by 50th
Army saw German troops of 2nd Panzer Group attempting to encircle the
town with dwindling mechanized forces, whilst 4th Panzer Group attacked
eastwards towards the city, clearly running out of steam north-west of Naro-
Fominsk during the first days of December, where Soviet tanks were able to
push the weak German spearhead back.

DOCUMENT 58: Report to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the
Western Front from the head of the Auto-Armour Board of the Western Front, 31 January
1942, No. 61
. . . – ‘The activity of tanks on the front of 33rd Army’
1. The tank battle below Iushkovo 2–3 December 1941.
At approaching 12 hours and 30 minutes on 2 December 1941 forward units of the
enemy passed through Iushkovo and occupied Petrovskoe and Burtsevo. . . . At about
that time 136th Independent Tank Battalion, consisting of 22 tanks, approached
Alabino, the remaining tanks being left, as a result of technical failures, at different
points along the road between Moscow and Alabino. Ten tanks from this battalion
80 The Battle of Moscow
were separated off for action with the left flank of the Army with 113th and 110th
Rifle Divisions. The remaining tanks were sent to Petrovskoe.
At 1300 hours the tank battalion was met with artillery, mortar and tank fire from
Petrovskoe, and with two tanks knocked out, pulled back.... Only medium and light
tanks took part in the first attempt to capture Petrovskoe, the super-light tanks [malie]
still remained in Alabino.
At 1400 hours the commander of the battalion was given the order to immediately
attack the enemy in Petrovskoe. . . . The battalion knocked two [enemy] tanks out
straight away and 2 [were] burnt out, and occupied the south-eastern outskirts of
Petrovskoe. Further, meeting heavy anti-tank fire from Iushkovo and south-west of
Petrovskoe, the battalion could not move forward. Using sub-machine gunners the
enemy work their way around the left flank of 136th Independent Tank Battalion. . . .
In order to counteract the enemy four super-light tanks were sent to the northern edge
of the forest (200 m south-east of Petrovskoe), which halted the forward movement of
the enemy in that direction.
The battalion was forced to spend the evening and night defending Petrovskoe with
limited infantry support. . . .
The commander of 136th ITB was ordered to position his tanks during the night,
such that they covered each other with machine gun fire, and in addition, would not
remain in one place, but would constantly change positions. . . .
Towards the morning of 3 December units began to concentrate [in the area]. 18th
Rifle Brigade and 23rd and 24th Ski Battalions arrived, with 140th Independent Tank
Battalion approaching.
The commanders decision was as follows:
The tank group consisting of 136th and 140th Tank Battalions and 23rd and 24th
Ski Battalions was, with the ski battalions concentrated in the forest south-west of
Mamir’ and tank battalions from Petrovskoe, to advance concentrically on Iushkovo,
capture it and then, pursuing the enemy in the direction of Goloven’ka, Tashirovo,
restore the army’s position [i.e. eliminate the German penetration].
Approaching 1200 hours on 3 December 140th [Tank] Battalion had already
arrived and concentrated at start positions in the forest 200 m east of the platform
[halt] Alabino. The concentration of the infantry was delayed. . . . The possibility of
enemy penetration from Burtsevo to Mamir’ was countered by the positioning of four
tanks of 136th TB in ambush positions [v zasade] in the forest on either side of the
road 600m east of Burtsevo.
...
At the allotted time the infantry did not attack. The tank battalions acted alone
[Note – with limited infantry riding on tanks].
...
At 1620 hours 136th ITB moved out to the northern edge of Iushkovo. . . . The
enemy at speed fled from Iushkovo to the west, leaving behind four artillery pieces,
rifles and other trophies. It was already getting dark. The battalion was in need of fuel,
food for personnel, ammunition. . . .
140th ITB broke through to the western spur of Petrovskoe, destroying a number of
enemy firepoints, after which with tank-borne infantry it attacked the western spur of
Petrovskoe and the forest to the north-west, ejecting the remains of the enemy from
there and destroying two anti-tank guns. . . .
Enemy tanks near Iushkovo, totaling 12, were active on 3 December only against
136th ITB, after having lost four not entering into open combat again, but firing sta-
 The Battle of Moscow 81
tionary from the edge of the forest south-west of Iushkovo, where they maintained
until 1600 hours on 3 December, after which with the coming darkness departed to
the heights 210.8 and behind the River Nara.
Tank losses in the battle for Iushkovo and Petrovskoe were: four tanks knocked-out
(three repaired) and one got stuck in a hole. The tanks attacked without the expecta-
tion of infantry, utilizing the reduced morale of the enemy after two salvoes of RS.
(Source: V.M. Safir, 1997, pp. 84–91)

Soviet tank strength at the start of the battle was a total of 68 tanks for 5th
Tank Brigade and 136th and 140th Independent Tank Battalions and 31
tanks for 20th Tank Brigade, a total of 99.9
In true Soviet Five-Year Plan style, Zhukov and Bulganin would report
to the Supreme High Command that forces of the Western Front alone had
inflicted terrible, almost fantastic casualties on German forces:

DOCUMENT 59: Report of the Command of Forces of the Western Front to the Supreme High
Command on results of military activities for the period from 16 November to 10 December
1941, 12 December 1941
From 16.11.41 German forces, deploying 13 panzer, 33 infantry and five motorized
divisions against the Western Front, started a second general offensive against Moscow.
...
Up to 6.12 forces of the front engaged in a stubborn defensive battle, holding off the
advance of the flanking shock groups of the enemy and repelling the supporting blows
in the direction of Istrinsk, Zvenogorsk and Naro-Fominsk.
During these battles the enemy suffered substantial losses. From 16.11. to 6.12.
according to incomplete figures, and not including the activities of air forces, the
following were destroyed and captured by our forces: 777 tanks, 534 motor vehicles,
178 artillery pieces, 119 mortars, 224 heavy machine guns and 55,170 enemy troops
lost.
...
Zhukov
Bulganin
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 431)

In the north, south and centre German forces were halted, and on 5 and 6
December Soviet forces went over to the counter-attack with the start of the
‘Moscow Strategic Offensive’ Operation. In late November forces were
already being assembled for a counter-attack on the Moscow axis, in this
instance from behind the South-Western Front:
82 The Battle of Moscow

DOCUMENT 60: To the head of the Political Board of 20th Army and command of 61st
Army on the redeployment of 20th Army to Moscow, 28 November 1941
In accordance with the decision of the Stavka 20th Army is being redeployed to
Moscow.

1. Brigades that have not already detrained are to be redirected to Moscow whilst on
the move.
2. Having already detrained, 17th, 18th and 84th Brigades and 23rd and 24th Ski
Battalions . . . are to be sent to Moscow.
...
a) 17th and 18th Brigades and 23rd and 24th Ski Battalions are to load in the
region of Ranenburg Station. . . . Start of loading 20:00 29.11. Station for
detraining – Moscow.
b) . . .
c) 84th Brigade is to be sent . . . to Riazhsk. Station for loading – Riazhsk,
station for unloading – Moscow.
...
Deputy-head of the General Headquarters, Vasilevskii
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1), 1998, p. 255)

DOCUMENT 61: Letter of the commander of forces of the Western Front on the plan for a
counter-attack by the front, 30 November 1941
To the deputy-head of the General Headquarters, General-Lieutenant Comrade
Vasilevskii, 30 November 1941
I ask you as a matter of urgency to inform the People’s Commissar for Defence
Comrade Stalin of the plan for a counterattack by the Western Front and to issue the
necessary directive, in order that we can undertake the operation, otherwise prepara-
tions might be delayed.
Zhukov
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 428)

With the Soviet resource situation continuing to improve as the Germans

were suffering horrendous losses that they were clearly not able to replace,
the Soviet counter-offensive was launched on 5–6 December by a Stalin
increasingly confident that the tide of the war had turned, with 20th Army
participating in offensive operations in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk region.
One aspect of the defence of and counter-offensive before Moscow that has
remained largely hidden in the historiography is the contribution of Allied,
in particular British, aid to the Soviet defence of Moscow. The 136th
Independent Tank Battalion, playing a significant role in the elimination of
the German Naro-Fominsk penetration as described above, was at least in
part equipped with British Matilda tanks, at a time when there was a des-
perate shortage of Soviet medium and heavy tanks.
 The Battle of Moscow 83
Whilst the Soviet capital was defended with Soviet lives and in the main
with Soviet equipment, the desperate Soviet resource situation at the time
meant that relatively small quantities of Allied aid were of greater signific-
ance than Soviet authors suggested – if Allied aid was even mentioned by
Soviet authors it was suggested that Allied aid was arriving in such limited
quantities at this stage of the war as to be dismissible. Certainly, when
Allied, and in particular British, deliveries of key weapons systems for the
war as a whole are compared to Soviet production for the same period they
can understandably be viewed as being of little significance. If Soviet pro-
duction of tanks and self-propelled guns is taken as 110,340 for the whole
war,10 then 4,542 tanks supplied by Britain might seem trivial.11 However,
Soviet production of principal types of tanks and self-propelled guns (T-34,
KV series and light tanks) was in the region of only 4,649 for the second
half of 1941.12
Given the quality of the latest model Soviet tanks, namely the T-34 and
KV-1, Soviet authors could be particularly disparaging about Allied deliver-
ies of tanks early in the war on qualitative as well as quantitative grounds.
Under the provisions of the First Lend-Lease or Moscow Protocol, Britain
supplied Matilda (Mk II) and Valentine tanks to the Soviet Union.
However, whilst these models were inferior to the T-34, it worth noting
that Soviet production of the T-34 (and to a lesser extent the KV series), was
only just getting seriously underway in 1942,13 hence the relative inferiority
of British tanks to the Soviet armoured pool as a whole was less during this
period than it would be only a few months later after the First Moscow Pro-
tocol period to the end of June 1942. It is also worth noting that Soviet pro-
duction was well below plan targets. Production of the T-34 at Factory
Number 112, the conversion of which from producing submarines to tanks
was ordered on 1 July 1941, according to a GKO order of 9 July 1941 was
supposed to rise from ten units in August 1941 to 250 by December, a total
of 710 units over five months.14 The reality was, in itself, a significant
achievement given the conversion of this factory from the series production
of submarines to armoured vehicles, the production of 173 units to the end
of 1941.15 Production targets continued to be unrealistic into 1942, with
Factory Number 112 having targets to produce a total of 1,240 units during
June–September 1942 alone, while actual production was 2,584 for 1942 as
a whole.16 From 22 June to 31 December 1941, according to Krivosheev,
only 3,200 medium and heavy tanks were delivered to the Red Army,
figures including ‘Lend-Lease’ equipment starting to filter through.17
Simonov gives production of the T-34 and KV series for the second half of
1941 as 2,819 units, with Suprun noting 361 heavy and medium British
‘Lend-Lease’ tanks having reached the Red Army by this point, giving a
grand total of 3,180.18
The Matilda and Valentine had two-pounder main armaments increas-
ingly only satisfactory for light tanks, the absence of a high-explosive capa-
bility being a significant drawback that prompted Soviet attempts to
84 The Battle of Moscow
up-gun both, the Matilda with a 76 mm gun.19 Nonetheless, the armour of
the Matilda and Valentine tanks put them firmly in the heavy and medium
categories, respectively. Yet, even excluding the issue of main armament,
both the Matilda and the Valentine required modification for service in
Russian conditions.20 Whilst in British service in North Africa both faced
contemporary German tanks, in Soviet service they were, apparently, more
and more frequently used in defensive operations or for infantry support in
conjunction with Soviet tanks.21 This was certainly a realistic limitation
from the second half of 1942 onwards, but prior to this, Soviet stocks of
medium and heavy tanks did not always permit the relegation of British
tanks to supporting roles.
Whilst the Soviet Union had developed tanks that were far superior to
those in service in Britain and the United States, and indeed of such effec-
tiveness to drive Germany to produce the over-complicated Panther in
response to the T-34 and KV-1, not only did it not have the planned quan-
tities of these types, but was barely able to maintain force levels in the face
of horrendous losses. According to Krivosheev, the Soviet Union lost a stag-
gering 20,500 tanks between 22 June and 31 December 1941, of which
3,200 were either heavy or medium, with an initial stock of such types of
1,400. Only 5,600 tanks were received during the same period, of which, as
noted above, only 3,200 were medium or heavy tanks, including imports.22
By the end of 1941, Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of 750 promised, of
which 259 were Valentines and 187 Matildas, the remainder apparently
Tetrarch. Of these, 216 Valentines and 145 Matildas had been supplied to
the Red Army.23 With total Red Army tank stocks, as of 31 December, con-
sequently being in the region of 7,700 according to Krivosheev (or 6,347 on
1 December according to Suprun), of which only 1,400 were medium or
heavy models, then British deliveries to date represented in the region of
only 6.5 per cent of total Red Army tank strength, but over 33 per cent of
medium and heavy tanks, with British vehicles actually in Red Army hands
representing about 25 per cent of medium and heavy tanks in service.24
Given disruption to Soviet production and high losses, the Soviet Union
was understandably concerned to put British and US armour into action as
soon as possible, quickly attempting to amend any serious defects. A good
indication of Soviet efforts to this end can be gained from the service diary of
N.I. Biriukov, Military Commissar of the Main Auto-Armour Board of the
Red Army from 10 August 1941. According to Biriukov’s notes, the first 20
British Valentine tanks arrived at the tank training school in Kazan’ on 28
October 1941, at which point a further 120 were unloading at
Arkhangel’sk.25 Courses for the preparation of Soviet crews for Valentines
and Matildas had started during November whilst the first tanks, with
British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and
undergoing testing by Soviet specialists.26
According to the British Military Mission in Moscow, by 9 December
1941 about 90 British tanks had been in action with Soviet forces.27 On 20
 The Battle of Moscow 85
November 1941 Biriukov reported that the Soviet armoured units (shown in
Table 4.2) were equipped with British-supplied tanks.
Of the units in Table 4.2, the British Military Mission was referring to
146th Tank Brigade and 131st, 136th and 138th Independent Tank
Battalions. The first of these units to have been in action seems to have been
138th Independent Tank Battalion, which, as part of 30th Army of the
Western Front along with 24th and 145th Tank Brigades and 126th
Independent Tank Battalion, was involved in stemming the advance of
German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow
in late November. The exploits of 136th Independent Tank Battalion have
already been mentioned and at least in part described, and 131st Independ-
ent Tank Battalion was in action with the Western Front from early Decem-
ber with 50th Army to the east of Tula to the south of Moscow, with 146th
Tank Brigade also seeing action with 16th Army the Western Front from
early December in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate west of the
Soviet capital.28 It is reasonable to suggest that British-supplied tanks con-
stituted in the region of 30–40 per cent of the heavy and medium tank
strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941,
and that they made up a significant proportion of such vehicles available as
reinforcements at this critical juncture.
What had started as a Soviet counter-offensive to remove the threat from
Moscow soon developed into a counter-offensive across the whole front, with
Soviet forces lacking the concentration and logistical support in the face of
stubborn German resistance on key lines of communication to unhinge the
German defences. Operations to the south of Moscow near Orel, as described
and analysed by David Glantz, are a case in point. The ‘Oboian’–Kursk (Belgo-
rod) ‘Offensive’ of 3–26 January 1942, ‘Orel–Bolkhov Offensive’ Operation of

Table 4.2 Soviet armoured units equipped with British-supplied tanks, 20 November
1941

Name of unit ‘Matilda’ ‘Valentine’ Armoured

Mk-II Mk-III transporters
(carriers)

146th Tank Brigade – 21 10

139th Tank Battalion
146th Tank Brigade – 21
137th Tank Battalion
145th Tank Battalion 10
138th Tank Battalion 15 6
136th Tank Battalion 3 9
131st Tank Battalion 21
132nd Tank Battalion 2 19
Source: Biriukov, Tanki – frontu!, p. 57.
86 The Battle of Moscow
7 January–18 February and the ‘Bolkhov Offensive’ Operation of 24 March–3
April 1942 saw Soviet forces stabbing away at German defences with inade-
quate resources. In the latter two operations the Briansk Front squandered
more than 60,000 men killed, missing and wounded for only limited gains.29
The fact that the Soviet counter-offensive dragged on towards spring,
leading to a significant loss of resources with little prospect of major
progress, was certainly indicative of a lack of realism on the part of Stalin
and much of the military leadership, not only on the extent to which the
Wehrmacht had been bled dry by operations during 1941, but also of the cap-
abilities of the Red Army. Not only did Stalin’s insistence on offensive
operations across a broad front dilute Soviet strength, but also Soviet forces
were not yet as capable as their German counterparts in combined-arms
warfare, and in particular in support of armoured forces.

DOCUMENT 62: Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Number 57 of
22 January 1942 on the use of tank units and formations in battle
The experience of war has shown, that there are still a range of failings in the battle-
field use of tank forces, as a result of which our units lose large numbers of tanks and
personnel.
...

1. Up to now co-operation between infantry and tank formations and units is poorly
organised with infantry commanders failing to establish concrete objectives and
hastily doing so; the infantry lagging behind in the attack and not reinforcing
advance positions captured by the tanks; in defence infantry not covering tanks in
defensive positions; and in retreat even failing to warn commanders of tank units
of the changed situation and throwing tanks into the arms of fate.
2. Tank attacks are not supported by our artillery, and artillery does not accompany
the tanks, as a result of which fighting vehicles are lost to enemy anti-tank
artillery.
3. Field commanders are extremely hasty in the deployment of tank units, throwing
them into action in packets as they arrive, not setting aside time for the conduct
of even the most elementary reconnaissance of the area and enemy positions.
...
I. Stalin
A. Vasilevskii
(Source: SBD 5, pp. 28–29)

Failings were not only with the infantry and artillery, as forces of the
Western Front were told:
 The Battle of Moscow 87

DOCUMENT 63: Order to forces of the Western Front, 19 February 1942 – On the
battlefield use of and preservation of tanks in units of the Western Front
Forces of the front are suffering large and unjustified losses. . . .
Commanders of tank units introduce brigades into battle without the appropriate
technical preparation, without having reconnoitred the terrain, without preparation of
the means of recovering tanks, attempting to reach objectives using only tanks,
without infantry. The provision of sapper, infantry and artillery . . . support is poor.
Tank crews themselves, having been given objectives, attempt to reach them
without the appropriate skills, in a straightforward manner, and most frequently
attacking frontally. Tankers do not study terrain for concealed approaches to enemy
positions and dead ground, as a result of this irresponsibility they suffer high casual-
ties. . . .
Tank losses on the Western Front are:
1st Guards Tank Brigade On 15.2. it had 28 tanks.
received 95 tanks
17th Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 30 tanks.
72 tanks
20th Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 18 tanks.
77 tanks
5th Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 9 tanks.
89 tanks
18th Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 15 tanks.
70 tanks
32nd Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 9 tanks.
53 tanks
2nd Guards Tank Brigade On 15.2. it had 16 tanks.
received 79 tanks
146th Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 12 tanks.
128 tanks
68th Tank Brigade received On 15.2. it had 16 tanks.
46 tanks
With units and with repair bases there are 264 tanks out of action.
Up to this point there are still 322 tanks out of action which have not been recov-
ered from the battlefield.
I order:
1. That military soviets discuss measures for the preservation of material assets and
personnel of tank units.
2. That the reasons for losses suffered are analysed.
3. That every instance of tank losses is investigated and reported within 48 hours to
the military soviet of the front.
Zhukov
(Source: P.N. Knishevskii et al., 1992, pp. 241–242)
88 The Battle of Moscow
Certainly the relative absence of radio sets hampered Soviet command,
control and co-operation between different arms,30 and when available they
were used without due regard for the fact that radio communications could
be intercepted by the enemy, despite orders to prevent this.31 In this
instance, 2nd Shock Army32 will be used as an example:

DOCUMENT 64: To the head of the Headquarters of the Volkhov Front on the forbidding of
open conversations using technical means of communication, 26 March 1942
According to reports in the hands of the General Headquarters of the Red Army,
within 2nd Shock Army there have been recent instances of the conduct of open con-
versations by telegraph and telephone on secret matters of an operational nature.
15.3.1942 General-Lieutenant Klikov passed orders to Colonel Amtiufeev, com-
mander of the 327th Rifle Division, openly by telephone.33
11.3.1942 The army command and commanders of headquarters revealed opera-
tional preparations in open conversation.
It is demanded that all commanders follow NKO Order Number 0243 and General
Headquarters Directive Number 10102.
...
Tikhimirov
Rizhkov
(Source: RA T.23 (12–2), 1999, pp. 67–68)

Such factors, combined with a lack of imagination on the part of many com-
manders, contributed to a squandering of lives that even the Red Army
could not sustain indefinitely.

DOCUMENT 65: Directive Number 3750 of the military soviet of the Western Front,
30 March 1942
To all commanders and commissars of divisions and brigades.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the military soviet of the
front receive numerous letters from Red Army men, commanders, and political
workers that bear witness to the criminally negligent attitude of commanders of all
levels to the preservation of Red Army men of the infantry.
In letters and discussions hundreds of instances are provided where commanders of
units and formations wipe out hundreds and thousands of people in attacks on intact
defences and intact machine guns, on unsuppressed firepoints during poorly prepared
attacks.
...
I demand:

1. That every instance of atypical infantry losses be investigated within 24 hours, . . .

informing a senior headquarters of the results. Commanders that criminally
throw units against unsuppressed enemy firesystems are to be held responsible
and demoted.
 The Battle of Moscow 89
2. Before an infantry attack enemy firesystems should be suppressed and neutral-
ized, for which every commander organizing an attack should have a carefully
formulated plan for the destruction of the enemy through fire and assault. Such a
plan should be confirmed by a senior commander. . . .
3. Personal explanation should be attached to reports on losses, explaining who is
responsible for atypical losses, what measures have been taken against the guilty
party so that it doesn’t happen again.

Commander of the Western Front

Zhukov
(Source: P.N. Knishevskii et al., 1992, pp. 228–229)

It should not, however, be forgotten that, at tactical and operational levels,

whilst the Red Army remained a relatively blunt instrument compared to
the Wehrmacht in late 1941 and into 1942, the more capable survivors of the
debacles of the summer and autumn of 1941 were rapidly learning the art of
modern warfare or losing favour with a Supreme Commander increasingly
more interested in results than political cronyism. Whilst, with the excep-
tion of communications and fighter aircraft, it is difficult to argue that there
was a meaningful technological gap between German and Soviet forces
during 1941 – and there was frequently local numerical parity, even in
tanks – the human factor, both in terms of the effectiveness of the individual
as part of the whole and of units and formations, was an area of Soviet weak-
ness. Low military effectiveness hit morale, and low morale hit military
effectiveness. In early 1942, with the next generation of Soviet fighter air-
craft entering service, with the T-34 tank available in increasing numbers
and with Allied aid starting to alleviate communications deficiencies,
Germany was losing any sort of meaningful technological edge, and the
overall numerical balance at the front was starting to shift noticeably in
Soviet favour. Only in the exploitation of these resources was the Red Army
still inferior to the Wehrmacht, but from Stalin down during 1942 the Red
Army would make major advances in closing the gap with the Wehrmacht in
this regard as well.

Guide to further reading

John Barber, ‘The Moscow Crisis of October 1941’, in J. Cooper, M. Perrie and E.A. Rees
(eds), Soviet History 1917–1953 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 201–218.
H. Boog, J. Forster, J. Hoffmann, E. Klink, R.-D. Muller, G.R. Ueberschar and E. Osers
(eds), Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998).
Roderick Braithwaite, Moscow 1941: A City and its People at War (New York: Vintage Books,
2006) and other editions.
Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds), The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942 (Novato,
CA: Presidio, 1988).
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part 3: The
90 The Battle of Moscow
Winter Campaign (5 December 1941-April 1942): The Moscow Counteroffensive’, JSMS,
Volume 13, Number 2 (June 2000), pp. 139–185.
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part 4: The
Winter Campaign (5 December 1941-April 1942): The Demiansk Counteroffensive’,
JSMS, Volume 13, Number 3 (September 2000), pp. 145–164.
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part 6: The
Winter Campaign (5 December 1941-April 1942): The Crimean Counteroffensive and
Reflections’, JSMS, Volume 14, Number 1 (January 2001), pp. 121–170.
Alexander Hill, ‘British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for Moscow, November-
December 1941 – A Research Note’, JSMS, Volume 19, Number 2 (June 2006), pp.
289–294.
Geoffrey Hosking, ‘The Second World War and Soviet National Consciousness’, Past and
Present, Volume 175, Number 1 (2002), pp. 162–187.
Klaus Reinhardt, ‘The Turning Point’, in J. Erickson and D. Dilks (eds), Barbarossa – The
Axis and the Allies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), pp. 207–224.
5 The tide turns
The Battle for Stalingrad

Whilst Soviet forces had held off the Wehrmacht before Moscow, Stalin’s
overambitious winter offensive did not reap the rewards that he had
expected. The Soviet winter offensive, which according to the Soviet liter-
ature took place from December 1941 to April 1942, had run out of steam
by March, with German forces still clinging tenaciously to a number of
forward positions projecting towards the Soviet capital, including those in
and around Rzhev and Viaz’ma. A resource situation shifting by many meas-
ures, including tank strength, in Soviet favour at the end of 1941 and
during the first weeks of 1942 had been squandered in operations along the
whole front. Soviet losses were heavy, as indicated in Table 5.1.
The Soviet Union’s manpower resources may have seemed limitless to the
Soviet leadership in the autumn and winter of 1941 (compared to the dearth
of tanks and aircraft), but by the summer of 1942, as the resource situation
improved, naval forces, largely immobilized in the Black Sea and Baltic,
along with the NKVD forces, were directed to contribute troops to the Red
Army.

Table 5.1 Soviet losses during offensive operations November 1941–April 1942

Operation When Troops Irrecoverable Sick and

committed losses wounded

‘Tikhvin Strategic 10 November– 192,950 17,924 30,997

Offensive’ 30 December 1941
‘Rostov Strategic 17 November– 349,000 15,264 17,847
Offensive’ 2 December 1941
‘Moscow Strategic 5 December– 1,021,700 139,586 231,369
Offensive’ 7 January 1942
‘Kerch’–Feodosiia 25 December– 82,500 32,453 9,482
Amphibious’ 2 January 1941
‘Rzhev–Viaz’ma 8 January– 1,059,200 272,320 504,569
Strategic Offensive’ 20 April 1942
Source: Krivosheev et al., Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 119–123.
92 The tide turns

DOCUMENT 66: Decree of the State Defence Committee on the manning of the field army,
GKO Number 2100ss, 26 July 1942
The State Defence Committee DECREES:
1. That the NKO (Comrade Shchadenko) be required, through cutbacks in and the
reorganization of rear-area units and the substitution of those in auxiliary posi-
tions with military personnel unfit for combat as a result of wounds and women,
to find 400,000 men by 1 September 1942 for combat units.
2. To cut the strength of the Navy to 450,000 men and require the People’s Com-
missar of the Navy, Comrade Kuznetsov, through those freed up by the cuts to
transfer 100,000 men in the ranks and NCOs who have received training and are
fit for front-line service to the field army by 25 August.
3. To require that from 10 August 1942 the NKO (Comrade Shchadenko) call up
all of those born in 1924, and, regardless of their place of work and position, send
them to:
a) Military academies and reserve units – 450,000 men
b) To the Navy – 100,000 men
c) To forces of the NKVD – 75,000 men
d) To forces of the Transcaucasian Front – 25,000 men
4. In exchange for the call up of those born in 1924 to free up the equivalent
number of men from the Navy, . . . from the NKVD, . . . from the Transcaucasian
Front, . . . a total of 200,000 men of the ranks and NCOs who have received train-
ing and are fit for front-line service, and hand them over for the manning of the
field army by 1 September 1942.
5. To require military soviets of fronts and armies to hand over those called up from
the prefrontal zone and born in 1924, by 10 August, for study in military acade-
mies and specialist reserve units (artillery, armour, communications etc) and
reserve rifle brigades....
6. To require the People’s Commissariats to hand over to the army, by 20 August:
a) 100,000 men in manual and administrative positions protected from call up
of age up to 35 years (Attachment 1: Breakdown for unprotecting positions
by ministry);
b) 50,000 men of call-up age and fit for service of age up to 45 years from
those provided to ministries for the workers colonies (Attachment 2: Break-
down of call up by ministry);
7. To require the NKVD (Comrade Beria) to transfer 35,000 men of call-up age and fit
for service and of up to 40 years old to the army from those in reserved positions in the
militia [police], camps, correctional-labour colonies and institutions of the NKVD.
8. To require the NKVD USSR (Comrade Beria) and the Procurator of the Union
SSR (Comrade Bochkov) to review cases of inmates of correctional-labour camps
and colonies of the NKVD of men up to 40 years of age and able to undertake
military service and sentenced for domestic and property crime, with the aim of
urgent release and the transfer of 30,000 men to the army.
The NKVD of the USSR (Comrade Beria) is to hand over and NKO (Comrade
Shchadenko) to call up 15,000 labour exiles of up to 35 years old and fit for
service to the ranks of the army.
...
Chairman of the State Defence Committee
I. Stalin
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, pp. 514–516)
 The tide turns 93
The mobilization of women for military service had begun on the second day
of the war with the call up of medical workers; a total of 41,224 of whom
were mobilized during the war. Women were also employed from the first
months of the war as radio operators, with approximately 10,000 young
male volunteer ‘radio enthusiasts’ and the same number of young women
being sought from the ranks of the Komsomol in a GKO decree of 19 August
1941. Young women were also sought during 1941 as drivers, with 14,430
women being sought as drivers in a decree of the end of August 1941 alone.
A GKO decree of 18 April 1942 sought 40,000 young women for rear-area
work in the VVS of the Red Army.1
Also, as in Britain, as the war progressed, Soviet women would be mobil-
ized for increasingly combat-oriented tasks such as in the AA system. From
the spring of 1942 young women would be employed, on a volunteer basis,
for example in the manning of observation posts, anti-aircraft batteries and
other such tasks, although in the Soviet case women could easily find them-
selves, particularly at this stage of the war, closer to the front line than
intended. The fulfilment of such tasks by women was predicted to allow the
release of enough men for 12 rifle divisions:2

DOCUMENT 67: State Defence Committee. Decree No. GOKO-1488ss of 25 March 1942. . . .
On the mobilization of young women [devushek] – from the Komsomol [komsomolok] to
units of the PVO
With the aim of a more coherent use of trained contingents and for the strengthening
of the field army with them the State Defence Committee decrees:

1. That in the air-defence forces of the territory of the country 100,000 Red Army
men be replaced by women in the following positions: telephonists, radio oper-
ators, anti-aircraft battery instrument operators, AA-gun spotters and observation
post personnel, some of the personnel of searchlight units, anti-aircraft machine
gun and barrage balloon crews, and also as various specialists in service units.
2. That the TsK VLKSM be required to mobilize 100,000 young women of the
Komsomol of ages 19–25 by 10 April 1942, of whom 40% should have full sec-
ondary education and the remainder with education to no less than 5–7 grade. . . .
3. That mobilized young women of the Komsomol be dispatched as replacements for
Red Army personnel in the home air-defence forces:
a) To the anti-aircraft artillery – 45,000
b) To anti-aircraft machine-gun units – 3,000
c) To searchlight units – 7,000
d) To barrage balloon units – 5,000
e) To observation posts – 40,000
...
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin.
(Source: Online. Available www.soldat.ru/doc/gko/scans/1488-01-1.jpg and 1488-02-1.jpg)
94 The tide turns
More limited in terms of numbers, and where the Soviet case differed from
other powers, was the deployment of a small number of women as front-line
pilots and snipers. The 588th Air Regiment (Night Light-bomber Air Regi-
ment) joined the field army in May 1942, to be followed by 587th Air Regi-
ment in January 1943, both of which were led and made up of female pilots.
Courses for female snipers from the end of 1942 led to the creation of a
Central School for the Preparation of Female Snipers, which sent 1,061
snipers and 407 instructors to the front.3 In fact, a volunteer rifle brigade
was formed, ‘as a means of coming to terms with the wishes of women to
defend their socialist Motherland bearing arms’, largely made up of female
personnel, according to a GKO decree of 3 November 1942.4
Another way of sparing manpower was to replace full rifle divisions on
quiet sectors of the front with reduced-strength but high firepower units:

DOCUMENT 68: State Defence Committee. Decree No. GOKO-1619ss of 18 April 1942. . . .
On the formation of units for fortified districts
The State Defence Committee decrees:

1. That the following be formed for fortified districts:

a) 100 independent machine gun-artillery battalions . . . of 667 men in each;
b) 15 independent trench-mortar companies . . . of 127 men in each;
c) 15 independent communications companies . . . of 188 men in each;
d) 15 headquarters units for fortified districts . . . with 93 men in each;
...
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin
(Source: Online. Available www.soldat.ru/doc/gko/scans/1619-01-1.jpg and 1619-02-1.jpg)

It was not, however, only manpower resources that were in increasingly

short supply. Horses and other transport resources were required not only to
keep the Red Army moving and supplied, but also by industry and agricul-
ture. For the State Defence Committee the latter could to a large extent
make do, with requests for transport going out to rear areas that simply
demanded specific numbers of horses and vehicles for the Red Army.

DOCUMENT 69: State Defence Committee. Decree No. GOKO-1914ss of 18 June 1942. . . .
On the mobilization of horses, auto- and horse-drawn transport for rifle divisions of the Reserve
Army . . . , the State Defence Committee decrees:
1. That the SNK of union and autonomous republics, oblast’ and krai-level executive
committees mobilize the following before 10 July of this year:
a) 45,000 artillery and cart horses . . . and 6,000 carts . . . ;
b) 3,000 lorries, 1,000 functioning light trucks and 3,000 immobile lorries. . . .
2. ...
3. That the head of GABTU (Comrade Fedorenko) set aside 1,200 tractors for the
 The tide turns 95
artillery regiments of the above divisions for artillery towing and spare parts and
tires for the repair of 3,000 immobile lorries by 15 July of this year.
...
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin
(Source: Online. Available www.soldat.ru/doc/gko/scans/1614-01-1.jpg)

Whilst manpower and indeed horses and other means of transport were
becoming resources requiring a little more care in their deployment than
had been the case during 1941 (although as regards manpower and, to a
much lesser extent, horses, unimaginative and costly frontal assaults, even
with dramatic artillery and armoured support, would take place through-
out the war), at least Soviet troops also had more and more effective
weapons to fight with, as quarterly figures for the production of the T-34
tank 1941–42 (with alternative annual figures in brackets) illustrate in
Table 5.2.
During the Soviet winter counter-offensive of 1941–42, Soviet armoured
resources had still been parcelled out in battalion- or brigade-sized forma-
tions in support of operations along the whole front, but were not effectively
co-ordinated with other arms. Against weak German spearheads before
Moscow as in Document 58 in Chapter 4, poorly supported Soviet tank
units could make some headway, but as German defences crystallized they
were vulnerable to piecemeal destruction. After the destruction of Soviet for-
mations of the summer and autumn of 1941, it would take time for the Red
Army, with a vast number of conscripts and rapidly promoted officers, to
recover and surpass even the experience in combined arms operations that
existed in June 1941. In the below note of 8 April 1942, the Stavka once
again (see Documents 62 and 63, Chapter 4) reminded heads of the head-
quarters of fronts of the necessity for the support of tanks with other arms,
although it should be noted that by the spring of 1942 Soviet offensive
operations did not have the resources they had enjoyed a couple of months
before:

Table 5.2 Soviet T-34 production 1941–42

1941 1942

First quarter 1,110 1,606

Second quarter 2,654
Third quarter 1,121 3,946
Fourth quarter 765 4,325
Total (Simonov) 2,996 (3,014) 12,531 (12,527)
Sources: M. Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War 1938–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), p. 251 and Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR, p. 163.
96 The tide turns

DOCUMENT 70: To heads of the headquarters of fronts on inadequacies in the battlefield use
of tank forces and measures for their elimination, 8 April 1942
Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 22 January 1942 No.
57 ‘On the use of tank units and formations in battle’ pointed out a range of major
inadequacies in the use of tank forces in battle with the utmost clarity.
This order demands of commanders organizing offensive operations the close co-
ordination of tanks with infantry, artillery and aviation, to make use of tanks en masse and
not to allow the introduction of tanks into battle without thorough reconnaissance.
. . . As before there are instances of the use of isolated tanks in battle, with poorly
organized co-ordination between infantry, artillery and tanks and the absence of
careful reconnaissance of enemy positions. . . . As a result of the incorrect use of tank
forces they suffer huge and unfounded losses of personnel and equipment, and don’t
have that military effect which they could if they were used properly.
...
It is necessary:

1. By order of military soviets of fronts and armies to conduct a thorough investiga-

tion of all factors in the incorrect use of tank units and the leaving behind of
tanks on enemy territory. Individuals guilty of these are to bear responsibility
[privlekat’ k otvetstvennosti].
2. ...
3. You are asked to report on measures taken in carrying out Order of the High
Command Number 57.

Vasilevskii
Bokov
(Source: RA T.23 (12–2), 1999, p. 78)

Whilst the Soviet Union lacked the armoured personnel carriers with which
German Panzergrenadier units and increasingly US infantry were equipped
(although they received significant numbers through Lend-Lease as the war
continued), and which facilitated the support of tanks by infantry, the Soviet
Union did receive lorries in large numbers from the United States, though
certainly not enough for the mechanization of most rifle divisions during
1942. Close support could be provided by SMG companies and other
infantry riding on tanks and disembarking at an opportune moment,
although casualties were particularly heavy. At the same time, the chassis of
outdated light tanks could be used as the basis for self-propelled guns for
the support of both infantry and armour, the SU-76 coming into large-scale
use in 1943, to be followed by heavier and better-protected assault guns and
tank destroyers as the war progressed.
For the purposes of deep offensive operations, the increasing number of
tanks available as 1942 progressed would allow their concentration in tank
and later mechanized corps, with supporting arms, combined into tank and
 The tide turns 97
mechanized armies, the equivalent of a German Panzer corps of the begin-
ning of the war. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia has the following to say
about tank armies formed and operating during 1942:

DOCUMENT 71: Extract from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia on the deployment of tank
armies
Tank army (TA), an operational formation of land forces, tasked during the years of
the Second World War with the solution of operational tasks both independently and
in co-ordination with other units and formations of a front (army group). In the Soviet
armed forces the first two tank armies (3rd and 5th) were formed in May-June 1942. . .
. An order of the People’s Commissar for Defence determined the following exemplary
makeup of a tank army: 3 tank corps, an independent tank brigade, 1–2 rifle divisions
and a range of other units. . . . In November 1942 during the counteroffensive near
Stalingrad 5th TA had 2 tank and 1 cavalry corps, an independent tank brigade and 6
rifle divisions.
The initial conception of the tank army was that they should independently break
through enemy defences using the strength of their rifle divisions and develop the
success of the offensive using tank corps at operational depth.
(Source: SVE 7, p. 660)

Whilst Soviet military theory was developing rapidly to the realities of

modern warfare after the debacles of the summer and autumn of 1941, the
effective translation of theory into practice would take considerable blood-
shed and the weeding out of less able commanders during the spring and
summer of 1942.
As the 1942 spring thaw, or rasputitsa, came, both sides took stock and
prepared for summer offensive operations. The Soviet expectation for the
summer was that the Axis would attempt to succeed in the task in which
they had failed in late 1941, that is the capture of Moscow, and Soviet forces
were deployed in strength to meet this threat. This appraisal of the situation
was fuelled by an elaborate German deception operation, codenamed
‘Kremlin’. At the same time as covering Moscow, as Mawdsley notes, Stalin
was keen to preserve the initiative even before any major summer efforts,
with the spring seeing local Soviet offensive operations from the continued
and poorly co-ordinated efforts to relieve the siege of Leningrad in the north
(covered in Chapter 7), to the continued throwing in of resources onto the
Kerch’ bridgehead in the Crimea. Both would end in disaster.
Most significant in terms of forces committed was the Soviet attempt to
expand and secure the Barvenkovo or Izium salient in the Ukraine through
operations northwards by forces from the salient and westwards by forces to
the east of the city of Khar’kov, the seizure of which was the focus of the
operation. Soviet operations starting on 12 May made less rapid progress
than had been hoped in covering the 25 miles to Khar’kov on the east–west
axis and 35 miles along the north–south one. On 17 May German forces
98 The tide turns
launched a pre-prepared plan for the elimination of the Barvenkovo salient,
which by the end of the month saw the destruction of 18–20 Soviet divi-
sions unable to extract themselves in time, including the strike force assem-
bled to attack Khar’kov from the south, all of which transpired despite
German forces lacking local numerical superiority.
Soviet losses were also heavy when German forces overran the poorly for-
tified Kerch’ bridgehead on the Crimea that had been retaken by Soviet
forces in December 1941 (after having been lost in November) and rein-
forced between January and May 1942 to a strength of 21 divisions with
350 tanks, and overrun in German operations that lasted only a couple of
weeks, launched on 8 May and concluded by 20 May. In just two weeks
Soviet forces had lost 162,000 personnel.
With the destruction of the Soviet Kerch’ bridgehead and the disbanding
of the Crimean Front, the now somewhat isolated fortress city of Sevastopol’
defended by the Coastal [Primorskaia] Army could be besieged, being taken
after intense fighting at the beginning of July, with German forces taking
another 90,000 prisoners; a total of about 150,000 Soviet personnel were
lost during the nine-month siege.5
Although the Axis offensive in the south that took German forces to the
gates of Stalingrad and the Caucasus mountains understandably dominates the
historiography of the war in the east during 1942, Soviet operations would con-
tinue across the whole front throughout the year. Dealing with the German
advance on the Caucasus and Stalingrad was in response to the German activity,
but Soviet offensive operations had been planned against the German Army
Group Centre for the summer on the Rzhev–Viaz’ma salient, then resumed in
November, before German forces eventually abandoned it in early 1943, along
with any hope of seizing Moscow. Fighting continued with considerable intens-
ity below Leningrad into the summer of 1942, with Soviet attempts to lift the
siege being resumed in January 1943. To the south, Soviet forces attempted to
destroy the Demiansk salient, to which German forces had clung during the
winter of 1941–42, with offensive operations in late 1942. The salient was not
destroyed, being abandoned by the Germans in early 1943.6
Only in the far north were things relatively quiet: Soviet offensive operations
during the winter of 1941–42 to deal with limited German incursions from
Norway had become bogged down like those across the front, in a context
where both sides found it difficult to concentrate and sustain large forces given
the few road and rail routes for supply and severe weather conditions. However,
even here German air and naval forces based in Norway fought to destroy
Allied shipping carrying aid to the Soviet Union via the ports of Murmansk
and Arkhangel’sk, with the destruction of the convoy PQ-17 in July 1942
being a major blow to deliveries for months afterwards and to British prestige.7
Despite plans to finally capture Leningrad in the summer of 1942, the
German focus for the summer campaigning season was primarily on the
securing of Caucasian oil, with any development having the potential for
Axis troops to threaten the Allies in Africa and the Middle East from both
 The tide turns 99
east and west, cutting the increasingly important route for aid to the Soviet
Union through Iran and possibly even bringing Turkey into the war on the
side of the Axis. Operations specifically towards Stalingrad were initially
about securing the rear and flanks of forces to the south.
Operation ‘Blau’ was launched on 28 June 1942, the first stage of which
was for the Soviet side the ‘Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Defensive’ Operation,
lasting from 28 June to 24 July, the end of which almost coincided with
Hitler’s Directive Number 45 of 23 July, Document 72 below.

DOCUMENT 72: Führer Headquarters, 23 July 1942. Directive

Number 45 for the continuation of Operation ‘Braunschweig’ [the Caucasus offensive]
I. In a campaign that has lasted little more than three weeks, the broad objectives that
I outlined for the southern flank of the Eastern Front have been largely achieved. Only
weak enemy forces from the Timoshenko Army Group have succeeded in avoiding
encirclement and reaching the far bank of the Don. . . .
A further concentration of enemy forces is taking place in the Stalingrad area, which
the enemy will probably defend tenaciously.
II. Aims of future operations.
A. Army.

1. The next task of Army Group A is to encircle enemy forces which have escaped
across the Don in the area south and south-west of Rostov, and destroy them. . . .
2. After the destruction of enemy forces south of the Don, the most important task
of Army Group A will be to occupy the entire eastern coastline of the Black Sea,
thereby eliminating the Black Sea ports and the enemy Black Sea Fleet. . . .
3. At the same time a force composed chiefly of fast-moving formations will give
flank cover in the east and capture the Groznii area. . . .
4. The task of Army Group B is, as previously laid down, to develop the Don
defences and, by a thrust forward to Stalingrad, to smash the enemy forces con-
centrated there, to occupy the town, and to block off the land bridge between the
Don and the Volga and communication along the Don.
Closely connected with this, fast-moving forces will advance along the Volga
with the task of thrusting through to Astrakhan and blocking the main course of
Volga in the same way. . . .
(Source: Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung, 1939–1945,
1965, pp. 227–229)

With the centre of gravity of Soviet forces further to the north, Axis forces
had advanced rapidly in the south as Soviet forces fell back, often in disarray.
For the Soviet side, the next phase of Operation ‘Blau’, only later ‘Braun-
schweig’, would last from 25 July until 18 November, and would be known
as the ‘Stalingrad Defensive’ Operation. After the fall of Rostov, still relat-
ively light Soviet forces in the south fell back towards Stalingrad and the
Volga in the face of Army Group B, which had, along with Army Group A
advancing to the south, been formed from Army Group South on 9 July.
100 The tide turns
Army Group A would make rapid progress until a combination of the Cau-
casus Mountains, deteriorating weather and extended supply lines would
halt the advance well short of the oilfields, before most of the Army Group
made its escape in early 1943 when its position became untenable due to
events to the north near Stalingrad.8
The Soviet 62nd Army had been ordered to occupy defensive positions on
the Don bend before Stalingrad on 11 July.

DOCUMENT 73: To the command of the 62nd Army on the occupation of the Stalingrad
defensive line, 11 July 1942, 00 h. 20 min.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. That rifle divisions of the army occupying outlying areas around Stalingrad
[obvod] and situated in the Stalingrad district rapidly be moved to occupy the
Stalingrad defensive line, prepared along the line Karazhenskii (on the Don, 18
km SW of Serafimovich), Evstratovskii, Kalmikov, Slepikhin, Surovikino Station,
Farm Number 2, . . . Suvorovskii Station.
2. The transfer of divisions is to start no later than 11.7.1942. . . .

The line is to be occupied by three divisions by the morning of 12.7 and the
remainder are to follow during 13 and 14 July.
...
On the authorization of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Head of the General Headquarters A. Vasilevskii.
(Source: RA T.23 (12–2), 1999, p. 229)

At this point, the defence was not based on nor planned to be based on the
city itself, as indicated by the fact that the city’s civilians were not evacuated
in time. Indeed, whilst 62nd Army became known for its defence of the city
itself, much of its summer strength would be encircled by German forces
away from the city.
The crumbling of Soviet resistance before Stalingrad had forced Stalin to
reiterate his famous Order Number 270 of 16 August 1941 (Document 33,
Chapter 3) in slightly modified form as Order Number 227 of 28 July 1942,
which became known as ‘Not a Step Back’ (Document 74), hardly suggest-
ing that German forces were being lured into some sort of trap with Stalin-
grad as the bait.

DOCUMENT 74: Order of the People’s Commissar of Defence of the USSR Number 227, 28
July 1942, Moscow
The enemy is throwing ever increasing forces at the front, and, not taking due
consideration of the huge losses he has suffered, he thrusts himself forward, tearing
into the depths of the Soviet Union, capturing new districts, ravaging and laying
 The tide turns 101
waste to our towns and villages, raping, robbing and killing the Soviet population. The
struggle is taking place in the region of Voronezh, on the Don, in the south at the gates of
the Northern Caucasus. The German occupiers are breaking through in the direction of
Stalingrad, towards the Volga, and hope, at any cost, to capture the Kuban’ and the
Northern Caucasus with their wealth in oil and bread. The enemy has already captured
Voroshilovgrad, Starobel’sk, Rossosh’, Kupiansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-
Don, and half of Voronezh. Elements of the Southern Front, following the lead of panic-
mongers, gave up Rostov and Novocherkassk without putting up serious resistance and
without orders from Moscow, drenching their banners in shame.
...
Certain unintelligent people at the front comfort themselves with talk that we can
retreat to the east even further, because we have a huge territory, vast quantities of
land, a large population, and we will always have surplus bread. With this they hope
to justify their shameful conduct at the front. But such conversations are deceitful and
false through and through, of benefit only to our enemies.
Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker should understand, that
our resources are not without limits. The territory of the Soviet State is not desert, but
people – workers, peasants, the intelligencia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers and
children. The territory of the Soviet Union, which has been seized and is in the process
of being seized by the enemy is bread and other foodstuffs for the army and the rear;
metals and fuel for industry; mills and factories, which are supplying the army with
arms and munitions; and railway lines. . . . We have already lost more than 70 million
of our population, more than 800 million puds of bread per annum and more than 10
million tons of metal per year. We now no longer have superiority over the Germans
in terms of population reserves, nor in reserves of bread. To retreat further means to
ruin oneself together with our Motherland. . . .
From this it follows, that it is time to put an end to the retreat.
Not a step back! Such should now be our principle call.
We must stubbornly defend every position, every metre of Soviet territory to the
last drop of blood, cling to every last scrap of Soviet soil and hold our ground until the
all other possibilities have been exhausted [do poslednei vozmozhnosti].
Our Motherland is living through difficult days. We must halt, and then repulse
and shatter the enemy. . . .
Can we survive this blow, and then repel the enemy to the west? Yes, we can. . . .
What exactly are we lacking?
We are lacking order and discipline in our companies, battalions, regiments, divi-
sions, tank units and squadrons. This is what at the moment is our main inadequacy.
We have to restore strict order and iron discipline in our army if we hope to save the
situation and hold on to the Motherland.
It is no longer acceptable to tolerate commanders, commissars, political workers,
units and formations which on their own initiative give up fighting positions. It is no
longer acceptable when commanders, commissars and political workers allow a few
panicmongers to determine the situation on the field of battle, and that they draw
others to retreat and open up the front to the enemy.
Panicmongers and cowards should be wiped out on the spot.
...
Commanders of companies, battalions, regiments, divisions and their equivalent
commissars, who retreat from fighting positions without higher orders, are traitors to
the Motherland. . . .
102 The tide turns
After their winter retreat under pressure from the Red Army, when discipline had
been shattered, in order to reassert this discipline the Germans took a number of
severe measures, leading to far from negative results. They formed more than 100 pun-
ishment companies from soldiers who had been found guilty of breaching discipline. . .
. They formed in addition a further dozen punishment battalions out of commanders. .
. . It now transpires, that German forces have excellent discipline, despite the fact that
they don’t have the superior moral aim of defending their motherland. . . .
Does it not follow that we should learn from our enemies in this regard . . . ?
I consider, that it follows.
The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders:

1. That military soviets of fronts and above all the commands of fronts:
a) Completely liquidate the idea amongst forces of retreat and with an iron fist
suppress propaganda that we apparently can and should retreat even further
to the east . . . ;
b) Without discussion remove commanders of armies from their posts who tol-
erate unauthorized withdrawals, . . . without order from front command, and
dispatch them to the High Command in order that they be brought to trial
by military tribunal;
c) Form within the boundaries of a front from one to three (depending on the
situation) punishment battalions (of 800 men each) are to be formed, to
which middle-ranking and senior commanders are to be sent and the corre-
sponding political workers of all types of unit who are guilty of breaching
discipline either through cowardice or a lack of resolve, and placed on the
most difficult sectors of the front, so that they might pay back the Mother-
land in blood for their crimes against her.
2. That military soviets of armies and above all commanders of armies:
a) . . . remove commanders and commissars of corps and divisions from their
posts who tolerate unauthorized withdrawals of forces from the positions
they occupy without the order of the army command, and dispatch them to
the military soviet of the front for trial by military tribunal;
b) Form within the boundaries of an army three–five well-armed blocking
detachments (with up to 200 men in each) and place them directly in the
rear of irresolute divisions and require, that in the event of panic and retreat
without order of units of the division that they shoot panicmongers and
cowards on the spot and in doing so assist honest troops of the division in
fulfilling their duty to the Motherland;
c) Form within the boundaries of an army from five to ten (depending on cir-
cumstances) punishment companies (with from 150 to 200 men in each)
and send rank and file Red Army men and NCOs. . . .
3. That commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:
a) . . . remove commanders of regiments and battalions. . . .
b) Render all possible assistance and support to the blocking detachments of
the army in maintaining order and discipline in units.
This order is to be read out to all companies. . . .
People’s Commissar of Defence
I. Stalin
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, pp. 435–436)
 The tide turns 103
Blocking detachments, the work of which was handled by much smaller
military police units in other armies, were therefore formed specifically in
response to Order Number 227 on the Stalingrad and Don Fronts. These
units seem to have been kept busy during the late summer and autumn, as
Document 75 suggests:

DOCUMENT 75: Note of the OO NKVD STF to UOO NKVD USSR on the activities of
blocking detachments of the Stalingrad and Don Fronts [no earlier than 15 October] 1942
In accordance with Order Number 227 of the NKO in active units of the Red Army
193 blocking detachments have been formed as of 15 October 1942. 16 of these have
been formed in units of the Stalingrad Front and 25 of the Don, a total of 41 units,
which are subordinated to the NKVD special sections of armies.
Blocking detachments have, from their formation (from 1 August to 15 October of the
current year) detained 140,755 service personnel running away from the front lines.
Amongst those detained: 3,980 were have been arrested, 1,189 shot, 2,776 sent to
punishment companies, 185 to punishment battalions, with 131,094 returned to their
units and or higher echelon units.
The bulk of detentions and arrests have been conducted by blocking detachments of
the Don and Stalingrad Fronts.
On the Don Front 36,109 persons were detained, 736 persons arrested, 433 persons
shot, 1,056 sent to punishment companies, 33 sent to punishment battalions, and
32,933 were returned to their units or to higher echelon units.
On the Stalingrad Front 15,649 persons were detained, 244 persons arrested, 278
persons shot, 218 persons sent to punishment companies, 42 persons to punishment
battalions, and 14,833 returned to their units or higher echelon units.
It is worth noting that blocking detachments, and especially detachments of the
Stalingrad and Don Fronts (subordinate to NKVD special sections of armies) during a
period of brutal fighting with the enemy played a valuable [polozhitel’nuiu] role in the
business of bringing order to units and the prevention of the disorganized retreat from
the positions they were occupying, and the return of a significant number of service
personnel to the front line.
(Source: Stalingradskaia epopeia, 2000, p. 222)

By the beginning of September, German forces were rapidly approaching the

city after the destruction of much of 62nd Army in forward positions on the
Don bend. The situation provoked the following telegram from Stalin to
Zhukov, now Deputy Commander-in-Chief with responsibility for the south:

DOCUMENT 76: Telegram of the Supreme High Commander to the representative of the
Supreme High Command on the rendering of assistance to Stalingrad. To General of the Army
Comrade Zhukov. 3 September 1942, 22:30
The situation with Stalingrad has deteriorated. The enemy is now only three versts9
from Stalingrad. They might take Stalingrad today or tomorrow if the northern group
of forces does not render immediate assistance.
104 The tide turns
You are to demand of the commanders of forces situated to the north and north-
west of Stalingrad to make haste in striking the enemy and to come to the aid of Stal-
ingraders.
Any sort of delay is forbidden. Delay is now tantamount to a crime. All aviation is
to be thrown in to aid Stalingrad. In Stalingrad itself little aviation remains.
Receipt and the taking of appropriate measures are to be communicated without
delay.
I. Stalin
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 436)

With the throwing in of Stavka reserves, Soviet resistance would solidify

along the Volga as intense resistance in the city of Stalingrad itself sucked
German units into what would be a seemingly bottomless pit for German
resources. During the second half of September and throughout October,
German forces sought to clear Stalingrad of the defending 62nd and 64th
Armies. Stalingrad’s three key factories, the Red October steel works, Stalin-
grad Tractor Factory and Barricade Ordnance Factory became battlegrounds.
Only on 14 October 1942, after much of the city was in German hands,
were orders were issued by the Supreme High Command making it plain
that the defence of built-up areas in and around Stalingrad was to be given a
high priority, particularly the fortification of the remaining Soviet positions
in the city of Stalingrad.

DOCUMENT 77: Extracts from the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command No. 170,655 of 14 October 1942 on measures for the defence of Stalingrad. To the
Commander of the Stalingrad Front, Comrade Eremenko
4. Immediately to start the construction of no less than three defensive military
belts, one after the other, and prepare all centres of population in the defensive
belt and along all lines for defence.
All towns and major population centres regardless of their distance from the
defence lines are to be readied for defence. The principal focus is to be on those
parts of Stalingrad still in our hands, with every house, every street and every dis-
trict becoming a fortress. In addition, the most decisive measures are to be taken
to clear the enemy from those areas of the city which he occupies and in addition
to securely fortify that recaptured behind you.
...
5. In preparing population centres for defence to supervise the following:
a) Every population centre, system of defensive positions and barrier on the
approaches to and in the centre itself is to be transformed in to a fortress,
capable of halting the movement of the enemy through it, and capable
of independently conducting defence for a sustained period, even if fully
encircled . . .
(Source: SBD 5, pp. 15–16)
 The tide turns 105
During the first half of October, German forces gained control of much of
the northern industrial district of the city, with the situation apparently
becoming increasingly desperate for the defenders but with German forces
being eaten up division by division, like their Soviet counterparts, in the
heavy street fighting. As of 15 October at 20:00, the NKVD would report
on the deteriorating situation around the Stalingrad Tractor Factory in the
north of the city:

DOCUMENT 78: Telegraph UNKVD S[talingrad]O to the NKVD USSR on the situation
in Stalingrad, 16 October 1942. To Comrade Beria
I am informing you of the situation in Stalingrad as of 15.X.1942 at 20:00. During
this 24-hour period the situation in the district of the tractor factory has deteriorated
sharply. The enemy has gone over to the offensive in the district of the Stalingrad
Tractor Factory and occupied the mining [gornii] and southern settlements and the ter-
ritory of the factory.
Fighting continues along the banks of the Volga. Enemy aviation has without pause
bombed . . . our troops, the crossings over and both banks of the Volga.
...
Voronin
(Source: Stalingradskaia epopeia, 2000, p. 228)

The next day, on 16 November, on behalf of the Headquarters of the

Supreme High Command, Vasilevskii would make threatening noises
regarding the apparent giving up of the Stalingrad Tractor Factory district
of the city, unaware of the cost of such success for German forces:

DOCUMENT 79: To the command of the 62nd Army regarding a report on the reasons for the
giving up of the Stalingrad Tractor Factory [STZ], 16 October 1942, 16:30
For a report to the Stavka you are to without delay report on the reasons for such a
rapid relinquishing control of the district of the STZ, on the situation in the city at
the time of receipt of this instruction and on your future intentions.
On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Vasilevskii
(Source: RA T.23 (12–2), 1999, p. 372)

However, whilst German forces continued to make gains, the steam was
rapidly running out of the German push through the city as reserves were
bled dry, with the Soviet counter-offensive outside the city looming on the
horizon.
As late as 5 July, the Soviet High Command had perhaps still seen Oper-
ation ‘Blau’ as the first stage of an attack on the Soviet capital.10 From
August, the Soviet leadership had started to fully appreciate the potential
significance of operations in the south relative to those closer to Moscow,
and to allocate resources accordingly.
106 The tide turns
During the summer, as Zhukov acknowledges, a counter-offensive on the
scale of that which took place from November near Stalingrad was not being
planned:

DOCUMENT 80: Extracts from the memoirs of Georgii Zhukov on the Soviet counter-offensive
near Stalingrad
There are suggestions, that the first notions of a future offensive operation were
developed in the High Command apparently still during August 1942. . . .
But these were not suggestions of a future counteroffensive operation, but merely a
plan for a counterblow with the aim of holding the enemy before Stalingrad. Nobody
in the High Command was thinking of anything more, because at the time we did not
have either the strength or the resources for more.
[On 13 November the counteroffensive, as prepared by the Stavka, was presented to
Stalin by Zhukov and Vasilevskii:]
Having completed preparation of the plans for the forces of the Stalingrad Front on
12 November, A.M. Vasilevskii and I phoned I.V. Stalin and said, that we need to person-
ally inform him of a number of issues associated with the forthcoming operations.
On the morning of 13 November we were with I.V. Stalin. He was in a good frame
of mind and in detail questioned us on the state of affairs near Stalingrad and on the
progress of preparation for the counteroffensive.
...
The Supreme Commander listened to us intently. Because he did not rush to smoke
his pipe, stroked his moustache and did not once interrupt our report, it was obvious,
that he was pleased. The conduct of such a massive counteroffensive signified, that the
initiative was passing to Soviet forces.
...
Whilst we were making our report, members of the State Defence Committee and
and number of the members of the Politburo were gathering in the office. We had to
repeat the basic points, which we reported in their absence.
After a brief discussion of the plan for the counteroffensive it was agreed upon in full.
Vasilevskii and I brought it to the attention of the Supreme Commander that the
German High Command would be forced to transfer units of their forces from differ-
ent regions, and in part from the Viaz’ma region, in support of their forces in the
south, once a serious situation had developed in the Stalingrad region and in the
North Caucasus.
So that this did not take place, it was necessary to quickly prepare and conduct
offensive operations in the region north of Viaz’ma, in the first instance to destroy the
Germans in the Rhzev salient. For this operation we suggested drawing on forces of
the Kalinin and Western Fronts.
That would be good – said Stalin. But which of you will take care of it?
Alexander Mikhailovich [Vasilevskii] and I had agreed in advance on our suggestion
on this point, and therefore I said:
– The Stalingrad operation is in all senses already prepared. Vasilevskii can take the
co-ordination of the activities of our forces in the Stalingrad region, and I can take
preparation for the offensives of the Kalinin and Western Fronts.
(Source: G.K. Zhukov, 1995, pp. 337 and 346–348)
 The tide turns 107
Whilst operations around Stalingrad had certainly gained considerable
significance, it is questionable, as Mawdsley notes, whether operations below
Moscow were deemed at the time to be in support of ‘Uranus’ at all or were,
in fact, seen as significant in themselves as a means for the Soviet Union to
seize the initiative in the centre, rather than simply responding to the Axis
attack in the south. The November offensive in the Viaz’ma region, Opera-
tion ‘Mars’, will be discussed below, but it is only with the failure of ‘Mars’
that the successful Stalingrad offensive would become the apparent focus of
Soviet efforts in late 1942, with failed operations below Moscow being all
but ignored in the Soviet historiography.
The Soviet counter-offensive against German forces at Stalingrad, Opera-
tion ‘Uranus’, began on 19 November 1942, with the front line situated as
illustrated in Figure 5.1. Soviet mechanized forces of the South-Western
Front to the north-west of the city made rapid headway against poorly
equipped German allies, in the first instance Rumanians, defending the

Figure 5.1 Changes in the frontline from the Soviet ‘Moscow Strategic Offensive’
Operation to the eve of the ‘Stalingrad Strategic Offensive’ Operation,
early December 1941 to mid November 1942.
Key:

1. Murmansk 10. Viaz’ma 19. Warsaw

2. Arkhangel’sk 11. Smolensk 20. Brest
3. Tikhvin 12. Kuibishev 21. Odessa
4. Novgorod 13. El’nia 22. Sevastopol’
5. Pskov 14. Briansk 23. Kerch’
6. Kalinin 15. Tula 24. Rostov-on-Don
7. Ivanovo 16. Orel 25. Maikop
8. Kazan’ 17. Voronezh 26. Groznii
9. Rzhev 18. Khar’kov
108 The tide turns
overexposed flanks of Axis forces. On 20 November a second thrust was
launched by the Stalingrad Front to the south of the city, with the two
pincers of the encirclement meeting up near Kalach on the Middle Don
River on 24 November, leaving German forces at Stalingrad encircled.
With Hitler having ordered German forces to stand fast, and after a relief
attempt had been launched, Soviet forces would expand upon the existing inner
layer of the encirclement during Operation ‘Little Saturn’, a scaled-down version
of Operation ‘Saturn’ that had been planned to turn the Stalingrad encirclement
and destruction of Army Group B into the destruction of all German forces in
the south, cutting off Army Group A at Rostov. German attempts to relieve
Stalingrad contributed to the impracticability of ‘Saturn’, as indeed did the ten
weeks it took for the Red Army to reduce the Stalingrad pocket. Whilst Glantz
is correct in suggesting that in 1942–43, as in 1941–42, ‘the Red Army had
repeatedly attempted to do too much too rapidly’, at least the decision to down-
scale ‘Saturn’ from an attempt to seize Rostov and destroy Army Group A to a
counter-attack against Manstein’s attempt to relieve Stalingrad was, as Mawds-
ley suggests, ‘symptomatic of a genuinely greater command flexibility and of
the maturity of the Stavka’s system’. On 2 February 1943 the elimination of the
pocket was complete, two days after the German commander, the recently pro-
moted Field Marshal von Paulus, had surrendered.11
On 2 February 1942 the Stavka representative on the Don Front, charged
with reducing the German pocket, and the commander of the front, Colonel-
General Rokossovskii, would report to Stalin:

DOCUMENT 81: Combat report of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
representative and commander of the Don Front on the liquidation of the encircled enemy forces
in the Stalingrad region, 2 February 1943, 18 h. 30 min.
In carrying out your orders, at 16:00 on 2.2.1943 forces of the Don Front completed
the defeat and destruction of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of enemy forces.
Completely destroyed and in part captured were: 11th Infantry Corps, 8th Infantry
Corps, 14th Panzer Corps, 51st Infantry Corps, 4th Infantry Corps, 48th Panzer Corps,
made up of 22 divisions: 44th, 71st, 76th, 79th, 94th, 100th Light Divisions; 113th,
376th, 295th, 297th, 305th, 371st, 384th, 389th Infantry Divisions; 14th, 16th, and
24th German Panzer Divisions; 1st Cavalry and 20th Infantry Rumanian Divisions.
...
More than 91,000 prisoners were taken, of whom more than 2,500 were officers and
24 generals. . . .
As a result of the total destruction of encircled enemy forces military operations in the
city of and region surrounding Stalingrad have ceased.
...
Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal of
Artillery Voronov
Commander of forces of the Don Front, Colonel-General Rokossovskii
...
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, pp. 440–441)
 The tide turns 109
The blow to German prestige for the loss of the bulk of 6th Army and elements
of 4th Panzer Army was immense, as indeed were losses in addition to those
captured in the city itself at the time of the final surrender. The German 6th
Army alone had suffered 147,000 killed and 91,000 taken prisoner.12
The Stalingrad counter-offensive was undoubtedly a success, and indeed a
turning point in the war in the sense that Axis forces would penetrate no
further into the Soviet Union.
Returning to the issue of Soviet military organization and the tank armies
considered at the beginning of this chapter, it is worth noting that whilst
their contribution to the encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad was
significant, they had not matured, in part for material reasons, into the tools
for the deep-bound or encircling sweeps that Soviet forces would be able to
make later in the war. As the Soviet Military Encyclopedia notes, continuing
its discussion of the development of tank armies from Document 71:

The experience of tank armies during the winter of 1942/43 showed,

that the incorporation into them of both rifle and tank formations, pos-
sessing differing capacities for maneuverability, critically complicated
the military use of such armies and the command of forces, particularly
at operational depth.13

Put simply, the tanks easily outran their infantry support. Only with the
greater availability of mechanized corps, the first of which was formed in Sep-
tember 1942 and which became a constituent part of tank armies, would
Soviet infantry, with supporting arms, be able to keep up with the armour and
strike at ‘operational depth’ into the enemy rear, providing a penetration for
general [obshchevoiskovie] armies to exploit,14 as described in an NKO order on
the use of tank and mechanized units of 16 October 1942, which provides a
useful summary of Soviet armoured doctrine at this stage of the war:

DOCUMENT 82: Order on the battlefield use of tank and mechanized units and formations,
Number 325, 16 October 1942
The conduct of the war with the German fascists has shown that in the case of the use
of tank units we still show significant weaknesses. . . .
The battlefield use of tank regiments, brigades and corps

1. Independent tank regiments and brigades are used for the strengthening of the
infantry on the principal axis and operate in close co-operation with them as tanks
providing direct infantry support.
2. Tanks operating together with the infantry have the principal task of the destruc-
tion of enemy infantry and should not be broken away from the infantry by more
than 200–400 m.
...
5. In the case of the appearance of enemy tanks on the battlefield the bulk of the fight-
ing with them should be undertaken by artillery.15 Tanks should engage enemy
110 The tide turns
tanks only in the case of an obvious superiority in strength and in the case of an
advantageous situation.
6. [Close air support]
7. [Use of speed, maneuver, cover and flanking and rear attacks]
8. Independent tank regiments and tank brigades are a resource for deployment by
army commanders to be provided to rifle divisions for their reinforcement.
9. Independent regiments of assault tanks [tanki proriva], equipped with heavy
tanks, are provided to the troops as a resource for strengthening them for the
breakthrough of enemy defences in close co-operation with the infantry and
artillery. After having carried out their task of breaking through fortified lines
heavy tanks are to be concentrated at rally points and to prepare for the rebuttal
of enemy counterattacks.
10. In defensive fighting tank regiments and brigades . . . are to be used as a resource
for the delivery of counterattacks against enemy units breaking into the defensive
depth. In certain instances tanks can be dug in as immobile firepoints. . . .
11. Tanks corps are subordinate to the commanders of fronts or armies and are used on the
principal axis of attack as an echelon for the exploitation of success in the defeat and
destruction of enemy infantry.
In offensive operations tank corps carry out the task of delivering a massive
blow with the aim of breaking up and encircling the principal grouping of
enemy forces and its destruction in co-operation with aviation and other ground
forces of the front.
A corps should not become entangled in tank battles with enemy tanks if there
is not an obvious superiority over the enemy. In the case of engagement with
large enemy tank units the corps should separate off anti-tank units and a portion
of tanks, . . . and the corps should use its principal strength, covered by these
resources, to move round and hit the enemy infantry with the aim of separating
them from the enemy tanks and paralyzing the activities of the enemy tanks. . . .
12. In defensive operations by the front or army a tank corps . . . is used as a powerful
resource in the counterattack from depth and is to be deployed in the rear areas of
the army beyond the reach of enemy artillery (20–25 km).
13. [Choice of suitable terrain and reconnaissance of this terrain for operations by a
tank corps]
14. In all types of action for a tank corps the decisive element is surprise. Surprise is
achieved through camouflage and deception [maskirovka], the extent to which the
location for deployment and redeployment is concealed, the use of night marches
and cover for concentration from the air.
The battlefield use of mechanized brigades and mechanized corps
1. The independent mechanized brigade is a tactical formation and is used by the
army command as a mobile reserve.
2. In the attack . . . mechanized brigades carry out the task of seizing and holding
key objectives until the arrival of remaining forces.
. . . strengthening existing success.
. . . protecting the flanks of advancing units.
3. In the pursuit of a retreating enemy a mechanized brigade seizes river crossings,
defiles, key road junctions . . . and co-operates in the encirclement and destruction
of the enemy.
4. In an army defensive operation a mechanized brigade is used for counterattack
against enemy breakthroughs.
 The tide turns 111
5. In mobile defence a mechanized brigade carries out the task of active defence
along a broad front and facilities the regrouping of units of the army.
6. The fundamentals of the activities of a mechanized brigade should be established
as – a high level of maneouver, courage, decisiveness and persistence in the
pursuit of objectives set for it.
Using its high level of mobility, a mechanized brigade should seek out enemy
weak points and inflict short, sharp blows on him.
7. A mechanized corps is a resource for the commander of a front or army and is used
on the principal axis as an echelon for development of successes of our forces and
the pursuit of the enemy.
The breaking up of a mechanized corps and subordination of individual brigades
to commanders of rifle divisions should not occur.
8. In the development of success in an offensive operation a mechanized corps, as a con-
centrated force of motorized infantry, tanks and supporting units, breaks forward,
and is able to achieve offensive goals independently against an enemy who has failed
to fortify himself.
9. The use of a mechanized corps as an echelon for the development of a break-
through should only take place after the penetration of the principal enemy
defensive belt by general formations and where infantry have reached the area in
which enemy artillery positions are located.
In special circumstances, in which the enemy defence is poorly provided for, a
mechanized corps can independently carry out the task of breaking through the
enemy front and the destruction of the enemy to the full depth of his defences. In
these instances a mechanized corps must be reinforced with indirect artillery
support, air support and where possible assault tanks.
...
People’s Commissar of Defence USSR, I. Stalin
(Source: RA T.13 (2–2), 1997, pp. 333–337.)

With the rise in the number of tanks being produced by Soviet industry, the
increase in trained cadres and increased experience of large tank and mecha-
nized formations, the conditions emerged for the formation of ‘single-type’
[odnorodnii sostav] tank armies with motorized infantry, assisted by the
increasing availability of Lend-Lease supplied lorries. Their formation
started in January 1943, when in GKO Order Number 2791, from which
Document 82 below is taken, the formation of ten such armies was ordered
by June 1943. Single-type TAs usually consisted of two tank and one mech-
anized corps, and independent tank and one to two self-propelled artillery
brigades, a range of artillery, AA guns, engineers and other units. On paper
they had about 800 tanks and SPs and up to 750 artillery pieces, mortars
and Katiusha rocket launchers.16
112 The tide turns

DOCUMENT 83: State Defence Committee. Decree GOKO No. 2791ss of 28 January 1943. .
. . On the formation of ten tank armies
During February–June 1943 ten tank armies are to be formed. . . .
In a tank army there are to be 430 ‘T-34’ and 210 ‘T-70’, a total of 640 tanks.
...
The Head of the Genshtab of the Red Army and front commanders are to provide . . .
25,500 men from the fortifed districts by 10 February for personnel for the tank and
mechanized corps.
...
Attachment No. 1. . . .
Inventory of formations and units making up a tank army

Titles of units and formations ... Number in Personnel list

army strength
I. Fighting units
1 Tank army headquarters ... 1 284
2 Tank corps ... 2 19,334
3 Mechanized corps ... 1 15,740
4 Motorcycle regiment ... 1 1,485
5 Anti-aircraft division ... 2 1,345
6 Tank-destroyer regiment ... 1 518
7 Howitzer regiment ... 1 1,025
8 Guards mortar regiment ... 1 808
9 Aviation-communication regiment U-2 ... 1 158
Total 40,697
II. Supporting units
1 Communications regiment ... 1 575
2 Engineers battalion ... 1 531
3 Automobile regiment ... 1 2,145
4 Repair and maintenance battalion (one
tank and one automobile) ... 2 532
Total 3,783
...
Total in army 46,121
(Source: Online. Available www.soldat.ru/doc/gko/scans/2791-01-1.jpg, 2791-03-1.jpg,
2791-06-1.jpg, 2791-07-1.jpg, 2791-08-1.jpg)

Such units, backed up by an increasingly mobile supply system, would

increase the extent to which Soviet forces could break through the German
defence in depth that focused on key communications arteries and that had
prevented Soviet exploitation of initial breakthroughs during the winter of
1941–42.
The success of the Stalingrad operation was considerably greater, despite
the impracticability of the broader encirclement of Operation ‘Saturn’, than
 The tide turns 113
the other large-scale Soviet operation of the period Operation ‘Mars’ (and
proposed follow-on Operation ‘Jupiter’). Operation ‘Mars’ or the ‘Rzhev-
Sichevka’ Operation was also launched in November 1942 but against the
German Army Group Centre, in the first instance aiming at the destruction
of 9th Army near Rzhev. As Glantz notes, the notion in Zhukov’s memoirs
that the ‘Rzhev-Sichevka’ Operation, as in Document 80, was devised
merely in order to pin German troops in the region seems to have been
developed after the failure of Operation ‘Mars’ and success of ‘Saturn’.
Glantz notes many factors going against Zhukov’s claim, perhaps the most
significant being the resources lavished on ‘Mars’ that exceeded those pro-
vided for Saturn, and included more than 2,352 tanks and almost 10,000
guns and mortars.17
After the start date for ‘Mars’ had been delayed from 12 October and in
the light of encouraging news from the south, Soviet forces of the Kalinin
and Western Fronts struck German forces in the Rzhev salient on 25
November. Weather suited to the defence hampered Soviet artillery prepara-
tions and the operation suffered from poor concentration and co-ordination
of forces. Struggling through deep snow, the Soviet advance became increas-
ingly bogged down as casualties mounted. By the end of the operation on 20
December 1942, Soviet forces in the region had suffered ‘catastrophic losses’
for little gain – with personnel losses of more than 100,000 killed and
missing and the loss of more than 1,600 tanks.18 Such losses certainly con-
tributed to the relative quiet of the region for months afterwards.
Despite the failure of Operation ‘Mars’, Stalin, Zhukov and other Soviet
commanders involved could bask in the success of Operation ‘Saturn’ and
the destruction of the German 6th Army in and around Stalingrad. Patrio-
tism, broadly defined, along with fear of the NKVD and the Germans, no
doubt contributed to Soviet victory at Stalingrad and associated operations,
but these factors would have been insufficient without a resource balance
shifting in Soviet favour. Whilst Soviet manpower resources were increas-
ingly a limiting factor, in terms of tanks and artillery the fact that the Red
Army could launch ‘Mars’ and ‘Saturn’ at the same time with such resources
committed was indicative of the growing Soviet superiority in tanks and
artillery in particular. At the same time, the Soviet military leadership was
becoming increasingly experienced in large-scale operations in increasing
depth (experience including failures such as ‘Mars’), the sustaining of which
from the railheads was increasingly assisted by the thousands of lorries pro-
vided by the Allies. The growing confidence of Soviet military leaders in
their abilities was shared by Stalin, who went as far as to allow the disband-
ing of dual command (see Document 30, Chapter 3) in October 1942:
114 The tide turns

DOCUMENT 84: On the establishment of full unitary command and the abolition of the
institute of commissars in the Red Army. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR, 9 October 1942
The system of military commissars established in the Red Army during the years of
the Civil War emerged on the basis of a certain lack of trust towards command cadres,
to the ranks of which old-school military specialists were attracted, who did not then
believe in the permanence of Soviet power and were even alien to it. During the years
of the Civil War military commissars played a decisive role in the task of strengthen-
ing the Red Army and the selection of commanders, in their political educations and
in the instilling of military discipline.
...
The Great Patriotic War with the German occupiers has tempered our command
cadres, pushing forward a deep layer of new and talented commanders, experienced in
battle and to the very end true to their military responsibilities and the honour of
command. In bitter fighting with the enemy Red Army commanders have shown their
loyalty to our Motherland, and acquired significant experience of modern war,
growing and becoming stronger in both military and political respects.
...
Hence, it has become inevitable that the institute of commissars in the Red Army
be disbanded and that unitary command be established, and responsibility for all
aspects of work with troops become the responsibility of commanders.
It therefore follows, that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decrees, that:

1. Full unitary command be established in the Red Army and that all aspects of
military and political life of a unit, formation or institution of the Red Army
become the sole responsibility of commanders . . .
2. The institute of commissars be dissolved. . . .
3. The institute of deputy commanders on political matters be introduced. . . .
4. The transfer of the most militarily prepared military commissars and political
workers, who have gained experience of modern war, to command responsibilities
be improved.
5. Military ranks and insignia common to the Red Army as a whole be established
for deputy commanders on political matters and other remaining political
workers.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

M. Kalinin
(Source: KPSS o Vooruzhennikh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1981, pp. 326–327)

Although the dissolution of the institute of commissars did not mean the
end to political supervision of the Red Army, with the special sections of the
NKVD continuing their work for the time being, the abolition of the insti-
tute of commissars was nonetheless a significant statement of confidence in
the Red Army command, whose position and status continued to be
strengthened during 1943, and in particular with the recognition of those in
 The tide turns 115
command positions from junior lieutenant to colonel as ‘officers’ rather than
simply ‘command elements’.19 The Red Army paid back this confidence
with the victory at Stalingrad, although given the strategic situation and
resource balance it is arguable that the German offensive was misguided and
doomed to failure in any reasonable scenario.
Germany and her Axis allies, it seemed, had been able to seize the initi-
ative with an operation of potential strategic significance, but in reality had
lost any significant chance to bring the war to a rapid close either at the
gates of Moscow or even during the first weeks of ‘Barbarossa’, when Soviet
resistance and the scale of Soviet reserves were revealed to be greater than
the wildly optimistic assessments that had led to the invasion in the first
place.
By the end of January 1943 Soviet forces had not only destroyed the
German 6th Army at Stalingrad but the land blockade of Leningrad had also
been lifted and a significant amount of additional Soviet territory liberated,
as an increasingly confident Stalin could report in an order of the Supreme
High Command of 25 January 1943:

DOCUMENT 85: Order of the Supreme High Command to forces of the South-Western,
Southern, Don, North-Caucasus, Voronezh, Kalinin, Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts,
25 January 1943
As a result of offensive operations over the last two months the Red Army has pene-
trated the defence of the German-fascist forces along a wide front, shattered one
hundred and two enemy divisions, seized more than 200 thousand prisoners, 13,000
pieces of heavy weaponry and many other pieces of equipment and moved forward up
to 400 kilometres. Our forces have won a serious victory. The advance by our forces
continues.
I congratulate our soldiers, commanders and political workers of the South-
Western, Southern, Don, . . . Fronts for their victory over the German-fascist occupiers
and their allies – the Rumanians, Italians and Hungarians20 – at Stalingrad, on the
Don, in the North Caucasus, below Voronezh, in the region near Velikie Luki and
south of Lake Ladoga.
I declare my appreciation to our command and our valiant soldiers, that have
destroyed the Hitlerite army on the road to Stalingrad, relieving the siege of
Leningrad and liberating the towns of . . . Nal’chik, Mineral’nie Vodi, Piatogorsk,
Stavropol’, . . . Rossosh’, . . . Velikie Luki, Shlissel’berg, Voronezh and many other
towns and population centres from the German occupiers.
Onward to the total defeat of the German occupiers and their driving out from the
four corners of our Motherland!
The Supreme High Commander
I. Stalin
Moscow, the Kremlin, 25 January 1943.
(Source: Prikazi Verkhovnogo Glavnokomanduiushchego v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini Sovetskogo
Soiuza (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 13. Online.
Available www.soldat.ru/doc/vgk/unnum1.html)
116 The tide turns
Stalin’s praise might have been generous and sincere, but the cost had been
high, and it would be more than two years before the suffering and blood-
shed would come to an end.

Guide to further reading

A. Beevor, Stalingrad (New York: Viking, 1998) and other editions.
H. Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf and Bernov Wegner, Germany and the Second World
War, Volume VI (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
W. Craig, Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad (New York: Reader’s Digest Press,
1973) and other editions.
David Glantz, ‘The Khar’kov Operation, May 1942: From the Archives, Part I’, JSMS,
Volume 5, Number 3 (September 1992), pp. 451–493 and maps pp. 494–510.
David Glantz, Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster (New York: Sarpendon, 1998)
and other editions.
David Glantz, Zhukhov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part 7: The
Summer Campaign (12 May–18 November 1942): Voronezh, July 1942’, JSMS, Volume
14, Number 3 (September 2001), pp. 150–220.
David Glantz, ‘The Red Army’s Donbass Offensive (February-March 1943) Revisited: A Doc-
umentary Essay’, JSMS, Volume 18, Number 3 (September 2005), pp. 369–503.
David Glantz, ‘Prelude to German Operation Blau: Military Operations on Germany’s
Eastern Front, April-June 1942’, JSMS, Volume 20, Number 2 (April–June 2007), pp.
171–234.
Joel S.A. Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East,
1942–1943 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998).
Geoffrey Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle that Changed History (Harlow: Longman,
2002).
6 The Battle of Kursk and the race
for the Dnepr

Despite widespread acceptance in both the former Soviet Union and the
West that the battle for Stalingrad constituted the turning point in the war
on the Eastern Front (which it indeed did in the sense that it marked the
furthest penetration eastwards of Axis forces), the Wehrmacht was far from
beaten in early 1943. Whilst the loss of 6th Army and elements of 4th
Panzer Army at Stalingrad was a major material and psychological blow to
the Wehrmacht, Army Group A had withdrawn from the North Caucasus and
escaped the threat of being cut off from the main German force.
In February 1943, after the remnants of 6th Army had surrendered at Stal-
ingrad, Soviet forces continued to advance westwards in the south and grand
plans were being drawn up for the effective destructions of Army Groups
Centre and North before the summer. Although Army Group Centre had sur-
vived the Soviet ‘Mars’ offensive in the Rzhev-Viaz’ma region in November
1942, with the Soviet advance to the south into the Kursk region, the flank of
German forces in the Briansk-Orel region, covering the Rzhev-Viaz’ma salient
from the south, was now threatened. Plans for the destruction of the bulk of
Army Group Centre, and indeed North, were, however, forestalled by German
withdrawals from the Rzhev-Viaz’ma and Demiansk salients respectively in
February–March. The shortening of German lines greatly enhanced the defen-
sive capabilities of both army groups.
In the south, however, the situation remained more fluid thanks to the
collapse of Axis forces near Voronezh, allowing the capture of Kursk and
Khar’kov by Soviet forces on 8 and 16 February 1943 respectively. Nonethe-
less, Soviet plans for a race to seize a bridgehead over the Dnepr River to the
west, behind which it was assumed German forces would retreat, were cur-
tailed by German counter-attacks that saw Khar’kov retaken by forces of the
Waffen SS on 16 March and saw the rapid Soviet reinforcement of what was
rapidly becoming the Kursk salient.1
Even without German counter-attacks, whether such ambitious Soviet
offensive plans were feasible from a supply point of view against all but the
most hopelessly optimistic assessments of enemy strength and intentions was
also, however, debatable. Document 86 illustrates both the scale of the logisti-
cal effort to sustain Soviet offensive operations in this period and the extent to
118 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
which the supply situation would have been a limiting factor on proposed
further Soviet offensive operations in the next few weeks, particularly in the
face of the rasputitsa, even if winter weather caused its own problems. Petrol,
required for lorries even if not Soviet tanks, was a particular problem.

DOCUMENT 86: Summary report on the work of the rear area of the South-Western Front in
the period of the January–February 1943 offensive operation, 20 February 1943
I. Preparation for the operation:
1. In making up the South-Western Front the following formations were included:
6th Army, numbering 60,000 men
1st Guards Army numbering 76,000 men
3rd Guards Army numbering 78,000 men
5th Tank Army numbering 73,000 men
Other front formations and units numbering 67,000 men
...
8. Supplies of material goods:
...
Available supplies of basic supply items with the troops and in supply dumps of
operational units as of 1 January 1943 can be characterized as follows [Figures for 1st
and 3rd Guards Armies have not been included separately, but are included in front
totals]:
...

Item 6th Army 5th Tank Army Front Total

supply for
With Supply With Supply dumps front
troops dumps troops dumps and in
transit

Munitions (unit = boekomplekt or BK):

Small arms 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.4 1.8
Artillery 0.8 1.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.1
Mortars 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.5 1.5

Fuels and lubricants (unit = complete refuel):

Petrol KB-70 0.8 5.2 0.9 0.1 1.7 4.7
Petrol (lower octane) 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 1.7 2.7
Diesel 0.7 0.4 1.6 1.0 1.0 5.4
Lubricating oil 0.9 3.5 1.1 0.7 4.8 11.6

Food supplies (unit = daily ration):

Bread 7.0 14.0 12.2 2.6 1.8 9.7
Grains 9.0 9.0 10.5 7.0 11.5 24.5
Meat 7.0 2.2 1.4 2.8 9.7 19.1
Fats 2.0 8.0 6.7 0.3 14.4 26.0
Tobacco 9.0 25.0 2.1 2.5 19.9 31.0
Fodder (grains) 6.0 1.0 0.2 17.0 11.0 26.0
Fodder (bulking) 27 60.0 0.2 1.5 6.8 33.7
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 119
Statistics by weight for operational units of supplies for 1 January 1943, in tonnes:

Item 6th Army 5th Tank Army Other units Front total
attached to front (overall =
15,800 tonnes)

1 boekomplekt 2,609 3,441 – 11,777

1 refuel 508 547 637 2,718
1 daily ration 201 320 240 1,305

...
Taking into account using up 0.2 BK of munitions, 0.25 refuels, 1 daily ration of
foodstuffs, that is 4,338 tonnes per day, then the front requires the following for sup-
plying its forces:

a) Standard railway trucks – 270 or 45 trains.

b) GAZ lorries – 3,615 for supply over 100 km. The number of lorries in working
order in army automobile battalions and in front reserves . . . comes to 950 vehi-
cles, that is 26% of requirement.
...
II. The conduct of operations
...
By 15 February forces of the South-Western Front had moved forward, compared to
the frontline on 1 January 1943:

a) To the west 250 km as the crow flies;

b) To the south 70–80 km as the crow flies.
2. Difficulties in repairing railway bridges totally destroyed by the enemy . . . meant
that during January and the first ten days of February the Rear Area Board of the front
was not able to move rear-area units and establishments to new locations nearer to the
troops, that significantly extended the distances over which they had to be shipped [by
road] and hampered the supply of the troops.
...
5. The distances over which supplies had to be shipped by road are characterized in
the following figures:

6th Army 5th Guards Tank Army

1. Distance from railhead bases to 130 310

forward supply dumps
Distance from forward supply 300 60
dumps to frontline troops
Total distance for road transport 430 370
120 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
6. Total front supplies of material resources in operational units of supply during the
period of operations:

Item Front supply as a whole in operational units of supply

On 1.1.1943 On 15.1.1943 On 1.2.1943

a) Munitions [selected 2.1 2.1 2.0

items] Rifle cartridges
. . . 76 mm shells [all types, 2.25 1.9 1.9
average]
152 mm shells 5.9 5.3 5.9

b) Fuel and lubricants

KB-70 4.7 2.6 5.26
Other petrol 2.7 2.1 3.4
Diesel 5.5 5.4 7.7
Lubricants 11.6 12.5 7.5

c) Foodstuffs
Bread 9.7 30.4 26.9
Grains 24.5 20.5 42.5
Meat 19.1 25.5 20.7
Fats 26.0 18.0 38.6
Tobacco 31.0 25.0 14.0
Fodder (grains) 26.0 48.5 47.0
Fodder (bulking) 37.7 34.6 30.6

...
7. Experience of military operations has shown, that the average daily use of material
resources can be expressed as: Munitions – 1/8 boekomplekt; Fuels and lubricants – 1/4
refuel; Foodstuffs – 1 daily ration, which in terms of weight means an average daily
demand of 3,464 tonnes.
...
Actual reserves of material resources:
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 121

Item Front total in operational units

On 1 February On 15 February On 1 March

a) Munitions [selected 2.0 2.4 1.90

items] Rifle cartridges
. . . 76 mm shells [all types, 1.9 1.8 1.45
average]
152 mm shells 2.2 2.5 1.8

b) Fuel and lubricants

B-70/KB-70 5.3 3.3 2.8
Other petrol 3.4 2.5 1.3
Diesel 7.7 6.4 10.0
Lubricants 7.5 6.4 2.8

c) Foodstuffs
Bread 26.9 32.0 28.2
Grains 25.0 19.4 14.0
Meat 20.7 15.6 9.7
Fats 28.6 18.8 16.1
Tobacco 14.0 4.3 10.4
Fodder (grains) 47.0 55.0 38.0
Fodder (bulking) 30.6 32.2 19.2

...
7. Numbers, condition and the work of vehicular transport:

The number and condition of vehicles expressed in terms of GAZ-AA lorries can be
characterized as follows:

As of On the books Under repair Operative

Front auto-transport

On 1 February 1943 2,999 658 2,341

On 1 March 1943 3,151 291 2,860
Army auto-transport
On 1 February 1943 1,159 179 980
On 1 March 1943 940 142 798
(%) 100 15 85

Supplies shipped by road transport:

122 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr

Item January February

Tonnes % of total Tonnes % of total

shipped shipped

Munitions 9,758 [43.8] 7,877 43.0

Foodstuffs 4,012 [18] 1,950 11.0
Fuels and lubricants 3,757 [16.9] 4,164 23.0
Clothing 164 0.7 1,266 6.5
Medical supplies 523 [2.4] 143 0.5
Trophy items 108 [0.5] 813 4.0
Grain and other freight 3,930 [17.7] 2,246 12.0
Total [22,252] 100.0 18,459 100.0

Conclusions:

. . . up to 15 February 1943 forces of the front successfully advanced, . . . 250 km to the

west and 70–80 km to the south as the crow flies. This was at the same time as, due to
the destruction of the railway bridge over the Don, with a width of 366 m, and a host
of other severe difficulties in the repair of the railways, the rear-areas of the front and
armies . . . were unable to follow behind the frontline forces. . . . As a result the rear of
the front was spread out over 400 km.
...
A particularly intense period for the work of auto-transport resources was during
the last ten days of January and the first ten days of February. At that time with a
depth for transshipment of 400 km, in order to provide the troops with 3,500 tonnes
of supplies per day, and with a 4–6 day turnaround for vehicles, the front required a
total of 11,500 GAZ lorries, but had – both front and army 3,000 . . . – a shortfall of
8,500.
On 5 February 1943, after the rolling out of the railway bridge in the Liska region
the front gained the possibility of relocating and re-siting railheads nearer to the
troops. However, there was a second task making the work of rail transport more diffi-
cult – not reducing the rate at which supply and operational trains were moving
through, whilst rapidly and directly moving rear-area supply dumps of the front and
armies forward, totally up to 5,000 truckloads in volume.
. . . Assisting the supply of troops was:
...
b) A significant volume of trophy material captured from the enemy was related to
the provisioning of troops – 6th Army was able for a month to almost completely
provide the troops with foodstuffs from trophy supplies.
...
10. The mobile field group of forces of General-Lieutenant Comrade Popov, organized
during the third ten-day period of January, was sufficiently well materially supplied.
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 123
The group was especially well supplied with foodstuffs, in the main either through
local resources or captured stocks.
The supply of munitions occurred without interruption. . . . At the end of the opera-
tion the supply of the group with auto-fuel was however somewhat worse, the supply
of which, especially in 3rd, 18th and 10th Tank Corps, as of 20.2.1943 did not exceed
0.5 of a refuel.
...
Head of the Headquarters of the Rear-area Board of the South-Western Front, Colonel
Smirnov
...
(Source: RA T.25 (14), 1998, pp. 354–370)

In early 1943, both militarily and logistically the Red Army had overex-
tended itself as it had during the same period the previous year, to a large
extent due to Stalin’s optimism for the prospect of a German collapse and
the relative capabilities of the Red Army. Nonetheless, the German position
was, despite the operational-level success at Khar’kov, and with the sub-
sequent front line at the end of March 1943 situated as in Figure 6.1, now
very much worse in a strategic sense than it had been a year before, both on
the Eastern Front and in the wider war. As Stalin noted in his May Day
Order of the Day for 1943:

DOCUMENT 87: Stalin’s Order of the Day for 1 May 1943

Order of the Day
Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, commanders and political workers, men
and women partisans, working men and women, men and women peasants, people
engaged in intellectual work; brothers and sisters who have temporarily fallen under
the yoke of the German oppressors! . . .
The winter campaign has demonstrated that the offensive power of the Red Army
has grown. . . .
Even for a counter-offensive on a narrow sector of the front in the area of Khar’kov
the Hitlerite command found itself compelled to transfer more than thirty fresh divi-
sions from Europe. The Germans calculated on surrounding Soviet troops in the area of
Khar’kov and arranging a ‘German Stalingrad’ for our troops. However, the attempt of
the Hitlerite Command to take revenge for Stalingrad has collapsed.
Simultaneously the victorious troops of our Allies routed the Italo-German troops
in the area of Libya and Tripolitania, cleared these areas of enemies and now continue
to batter them in the area of Tunisia, while the valiant Anglo-American aviators strike
shattering blows at the military and industrial centres of Germany and Italy, foreshad-
owing the formation of a second front in Europe against the Italo-German fascists.
(Source: Joseph Stalin, 1944, pp. 83–84)
124 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr

Figure 6.1 Changes in the frontline from the eve of the ‘Stalingrad Strategic Offen-
sive’ Operation of November 1942 to the end of 1943.
Key

1. Murmansk 7. Smolensk 13. Kirovgrad

2. Arkhangel’sk 8. Orel 14. Odessa
3. Novgorod 9. Kursk 15. Voroshilovgrad
4. Demiansk 10. Voronezh 16. Rostov-on-Don
5. Rzhev 11. Khar’kov 17. Kerch’
6. Vitebsk 12. Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii

Specifically on the Eastern Front, Axis forces were no longer in a position to

seize the strategic initiative, as representative of the Headquarters of the
Supreme High Command, Konstantinov, detailed in a report of 8 April
1943 concerned with future operations by Axis and Soviet forces during the
remainder of 1943:

DOCUMENT 88: Report by the representative of the Stavka VGK to the Supreme High
Commander on possible operations by the enemy and Soviet forces in the spring and summer of
1943, 8 April 1943
I hereby report my opinions on possible enemy operations in the spring and summer of
1943 and thoughts on our defensive fighting in the near future.

1. Having suffered heavy casualties in the winter campaign of 1942/43 the enemy,
apparently, will be unable to form significant reserves before the spring in order
to again advance with the aim of seizing the Caucasus and breaking through to
the Volga with the aim of a wide sweep around Moscow.
Bearing in mind the absence of substantial reserves, during the spring and first
half of the summer the enemy will be forced to conduct offensive operations on a
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 125
much narrower front and achieve goals in strict stages, with the basic aim of the
campaign being the capture of Moscow.
Given the presence of the enemy grouping against our Central, Voronezh and
South-Western Fronts at the present moment, I consider that the principal enemy
offensive operation will be conducted against these three fronts with the aim of
destroying our forces on this axis in order to gain freedom of maneuver around
Moscow by the shortest route.
2. It is apparent that during the first stage, having amassed maximum strength,
including up to 13–15 Panzer divisions, the enemy will strike a blow with heavy
aviation support with its Orlov-Kromi group in order to maneuver around Kursk
from the north-east and with the Belgorod-Khar’kov group from the south-east.
...
At the current time the enemy has up to 12 Panzer divisions before the Central and
Voronezh Fronts, and, moving up 3–4 Panzer divisions from other sections of the front
might be able to throw up to 15–16 Panzer divisions against our Kursk forces, with
around 2,500 tanks.
...
Konstantinov
(Source: RA T.15 (4–4), 1997, pp. 17–18)

German planning for operations against the Kursk salient was certainly
delayed by the need for German forces to replenish their strength, with
waiting for the end of the spring rasputitsa also certainly making sense for
the attacker. Hitler’s championing of the need to wait for new equipment to
be available in quantity for the forthcoming offensive, and in particular the
new Tiger tanks, also added to the delay, which saw Citadel put back from
mid-April to mid-July 1943.2
Stalin and the Soviet leadership could be ever more confident that the
focus of resources for the summer was on the correct region thanks to a range
of increasingly high-quality intelligence on different levels, whether from
Soviet agents in Europe and leaked or officially provided ULTRA intelli-
gence from the British, down to reconnaissance reports from partisans, the
VVS, RDF and the GRU. When the German attack came in July, Soviet
forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, and indeed the South-Western
Front, were well-prepared defensively for German operations either to pinch
the Kursk salient off or indeed encircle it through a wider sweep from posi-
tions south of Khar’kov, with forces massed in depth for both defence and
counter-attack. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide details of the force composition
and echeloning of the Central Front of the Kursk salient prior to the German
attack.
Soviet airpower had also recovered from its parlous condition during the
first year of the war. In July 1943 the Central Front alone was supported by
16th Air Army, consisting of 6th Fighter-, 6th Mixed-, 3rd Bomber Corps,
and three fighter divisions, two assault (ground-attack) divisions and one
night-bomber division – by the beginning of combat operations a total of
126 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
Table 6.1 Composition of the Central Front, Kursk salient, July 1943 (prior to
German attack)

Formations and units Number in Front reserve Total

three echelons

Rifle divisions 41 – 41
Rifle brigades 4 – 4
Motorized rifle brigades – 2 2
Tank brigades 2 13 15
Separate tank regiments 15 – 15
RGK field artillery regiments 27 – 27
Self-propelled artillery regiments 6 – 6
High-powered artillery brigades 2 2 4
Gun artillery brigades – 1 1
Anti-tank (tank-destroyer) artillery brigades 3 3 6
Separate anti-tank artillery regiments 6 4 10
Mortar brigades – 1 1
Guards mortar brigades 3 – 3
Guards mortar regiments 9 – 9
Separate guards mortar battalions 1 – 1
Army mortar regiments 16 6 22
Anti-tank rifle battalions 5 – 5
Note
Front reserve: 2nd Tank Army and 9th and 19th Tank Corps.

455 fighters, 241 ground-attack aircraft, 260 day bombers, 74 night

bombers.
According to Soviet sources, German strength opposite the Central Front
as of 4 July 1943 consisted of 24 infantry divisions (of which four were
engaged in anti-partisan operations), six Panzer divisions, one cavalry divi-
sion (engaged in anti-partisan operations) and two Panzergrenadier divisions
– a total of 267,000 men. In addition reinforcements included three heavy
panzer battalions (3  50 PzKpfw VI Tiger) and one tank destroyer regi-
ment (90 Ferdinand tank destroyers).3
The most recent Russian-language multi-volume history of the Great
Patriotic War suggests that the balance of forces at the start of July 1943,
excluding the Soviet strategic reserve, was as provided in Table 6.3.
In addition to forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, Soviet forces
defending the Kursk salient were backed by strategic reserves of the Steppe
Front, providing another 500,000 men, 1,400 tanks and self-propelled guns
and 2,800 artillery pieces and mortars.4
After a false alarm of German offensive operations in May prompting
spoiling air attacks by the VVS over a number of days from 6–8 May, it was
only on 2 July that the Stavka could give Soviet forces warning of the actual
German offensive, which began in earnest on 5 July after pre-emptive Soviet
Table 6.2 Distribution of forces of the Central Front to three defensive echelons prior to the German attack, Kursk salient, July 1943

Army Front width (km) First echelon Second echelon Third echelon

48th 40 3 rifle divisions 4 rifle divisions None

3 tank regiments
1 anti-tank brigade
13th 32 4 rifle divisions 3 rifle divisions 5 rifle divisions
1 artillery penetration 3 tank regiments 1 tank brigade
corps (2 artillery and 2 tank regiments
1 guards mortar division)
70th 62 4 rifle divisions 4 rifle divisions None
1 artillery division 3 tank regiments
1 anti-tank brigade
65th 82 6 rifle divisions 3 rifle divisions None
1 rifle brigade 4 tank regiments
60th 92 3 rifle divisions 2 rifle divisions None
2 rifle brigades 1 rifle brigade
1 tank brigade
1 anti-tank brigade
Front total 308 20 rifle divisions, 15 rifle divisions, 1 rifle 5 rifle divisions, 1 tank
(738,000 men) 3 rifle brigades, 1 artillery brigade, 1 tank brigade, brigade, 2 tank
preparation corps and 13 tank regiments, regiments
1 artillery division 3 anti-tank brigades
Sources: Adapted from David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank
Cass, 1999) pp. 11–14 and Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 132.
128 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
Table 6.3 Balance of forces on the Kursk axis at the beginning of July 1943

Central and 9th Army and Balance of forces

Voronezh Fronts 2nd Army (Army
Group Centre) and
4th Panzer Army
and Battle Group
Kempf (Army
Group South)

Personnel (000s) 1,336 900 1.4:1

Artillery pieces 19,100 c.10,000 1.9:1
and mortars
Tanks and self- 3,444 (including 2,733 (including
propelled guns >900 light tanks) 360 outdated
models) 1.2:1
Aircraft 2,172 (excluding c.2,050 1:1 (1.4:1 including
long-range and long-range and
night bombers, night bombers)
bringing total
to 2,900)
Source: Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. Voenno-istoricheskie ocherki. Kniga vtoraia.
Perelom (Moscow: Nauka, 1998), p. 259.

artillery bombardment of German troop concentrations and Soviet air strikes

on German airfields. It had been predicted that the strongest German thrust
would come from the north, whereas in fact it was from the south, where
German forces made strongest progress against the echeloned Soviet
defences. In the north, where German forces penetrated at most 8–12 km
into the Soviet defences, Soviet counter-attacks began on 6 July and had
halted the German advance by 12 July.5 In the south, Soviet counter-attacks
(‘active defence’) would start in earnest on 8 July.

DOCUMENT 89: Report of the command of forces of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme High
Commander on the military situation and thoughts on preparations for going over to the
offensive, 8 July 1943, 15:40
As of the end of 7.7.1943 it has been established from POWs and documents that in the
first echelon of the enemy before the Voronezh Front nine enemy Panzer divisions are
attacking, namely the SS Panzer Corps – four Panzer divisions, 48th Panzer Corps –
three Panzer divisions, and, in addition to these 3rd and 19th Panzer Divisions from the
south.
The principal thrust, by a force of no less than six Panzer divisions, is being struck
along the Oboian’ road.
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 129
In addition to the above, it has been established by aerial reconnaissance as of 18:00
that fresh enemy forces are approaching.

a) A column of up to 200 tanks and 700 vehicles from Akhtirka moving towards
Orlovka.
b) A column of up to 150 tanks and 1,000 vehicles from the Khar’kov direction
approaching Iakhontov.
c) A column of up to 400 vehicles and tanks from Murom approaching the Maslo-
vaia landing stage.

We consider, that the enemy is at the current time bringing 11 Panzer divisions
against the Voronezh Front, a total of more than 2,000 tanks, of which up to eight are
operating on the Oboian’ axis and up to three Panzer divisions against Shumilov.
Today the enemy is attacking, as before, with his principal thrust along the Oboian’
road against Katukov.
Our counterattack started at 12:30. . . .
(Source: Bitva pod Kurskom, 2006, p. 605)

Despite German forces suffering heavy losses on the Oboian’ axis, they were
nonetheless able to shift the principal thrust of the attack to the east towards
the railway junction of Prokhorovka and penetrate further into the Soviet
defences. The German thrust towards Prokhorovka would be met with
reserves from the Steppe Front, the commitment of which started on 10 July.

DOCUMENT 90: From a report by the senior officer of the General Headquarters attached to
the Voronezh Front to the head of the General Headquarters on defensive operations of forces of
the front from 4 to 23 July 1943, 23 August 1943
The conduct of operations from 4 to 23 July 1943
...
Strengthening of the Oboian’-Kursk axis . . . in the end forced the enemy by the
evening of 10.7.1943 to no longer strike further blows in the Oboian’ direction.
Not having achieved decisive success on the Oboain’-Kursk axis by the evening of
10.7.1943 the enemy had gone over to the defence and principal forces (. . . SS Panzer
Corps and 17th Panzer Division) were sent to Prokhorovka, and 48th Panzer Corps
was thrown in to the attack towards Ivnia and further to the west, attempting to turn
our flank from the west and north-east.
On the Ivnia axis the enemy met the organized defences of 6th Guards Army,
alongside which 184th, 219th and 309th Rifle Divisions of 40th Army and 204th
Rifle Division of 38th Army had been brought in.
In addition in order to strengthen 6th Guards Army 5th Guards Tank Corps
had been redirected, along with a number of anti-tank regiments and a regiment of
RS.
Further attacks by the enemy in this axis were repulsed with heavy losses for him.
On the Prokhorovka axis during 11 July the enemy regrouped his forces with the
aim, from the morning of 12 July, of decisively defeating our forces near Prokhorovka
130 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
and striking towards Mar’ino and moving round Oboian’ from the east and on to
Kursk.
As a result of the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command two
Armies were allotted to the Voronezh Front (5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies)
from the Steppe Front, which on 10 July started to redeploy to the battlefield.
(Source: RA T.15 (4–4), 1997, pp. 375–383)

The subsequent mass engagement of armour in the Prokhorovka region con-

stituted the largest such engagement of the Great Patriotic War and,
indeed, in history. Whilst the German attack would be blunted, Soviet
losses were heavy:

DOCUMENT 91: Report of the representative of the Stavka VGK to the Supreme High
Commander on military operations in the Prokhorovka region, 14 July 1943
I yesterday personally witnessed a tank engagement to the south-west of Prokhorovka
by our 18th and 29th Corps with more than 200 enemy tanks on the counterattack.
Simultaneously hundreds of artillery pieces and all our available RS batteries partici-
pated in the battle. As a result the battlefield was littered within an hour with burning
German and our own tanks.
Over two days of fighting 29th Tank Corps of Rotmistrov suffered 60% destroyed
and damaged tanks and 18th Corps lost up to 30% of its tanks. . . .
Vasilevskii
(Source: RA T.15 (4–4), 1997, p. 53)

Whilst Prokhorovka was a Soviet victory in the sense that German forces did
not succeed in reaching their objectives and German losses in the battle were
far more of a blow to overall German capabilities than those of the Red
Army, Soviet losses were certainly numerically greater; Soviet T-34 tanks
were forced to rush headlong across open territory to close the range with
the more powerfully gunned German Panther and Tiger tanks, although
figures for actual losses on both sides vary wildly.6
On 12 July, as the battle at Prokhorovka raged, Soviet forces launched
the first stage of their strategic offensive (Operation ‘Kutuzov’), to the north
of the Kursk salient against German forces in the Orel region – Orel falling
on 5 August. More overwhelming given the fact that both the Central and
Steppe Fronts involved had been heavily committed in operations near
Kursk, was the Soviet launching of a second offensive to the south of the
Kursk salient (Operation ‘Rumiantsev’), starting on 3 August and develop-
ing as in Document 91:
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 131

DOCUMENT 92: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 30160 to representatives of the
Stavka [Zhukov and Vasilevskii] on tasks for and the co-ordination of the activities of fronts
during the ‘Belgorod-Khar’kov’ and ‘Donbass’ Offensive Operations, 6 August 1943
The plan presented by Comrade Iur’ev for the conduct of Operation ‘Rumiantsev’ is
confirmed by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Commander, which at the same
time orders:

1. That Gagen’s 57th Army be transferred to forces of the Steppe Front from the
South-Western Front from 24:00 hours on 8 August with the task of striking
around Khar’kov from the south in co-operation with the main force of the
Steppe Front in the seizure of Khar’kov. . . .
2. The principal task of the South-Western Front is to be the striking of the prin-
cipal blow to the south in the general direction of Golaia Dolina, Kras-
noarmeiskoe and in co-ordination with the Southern Front to destroy the enemy
Donbass group of forces and to seize the Gorlovka, Stalino region.
3. The principal task of the Southern Front is to strike a principal blow in the
general direction of Kuibishevo, Stalino, where it is to close with the shock group
of the South-Western Front.
Preparations for the offensive of the South-Western and Southern Fronts are to
be completed by 13–14.8.1943. The plan . . . is to be submitted to Comrade
Alexandrov by 10.8 for confirmation by the Stavka.
4. Responsibility for co-ordination of operations is to be placed on: Comrade Iur’ev
between the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, and on Comrade Alexandrov between
the South-Western and Southern Fronts.
...
I. Stalin
A. Antonov
(Source: RA T.16 (5–3), 1999, p. 187.)

Despite German reserves having been drawn into the Donbass by a Soviet
feint, and the growing mass of artillery support provided for the initial
breakthrough, as to the north of Kursk Soviet commanders operating on the
Khar’kov axis had to commit tank corps for the initial penetration of
German defences. Despite desperate German counter-attacks, Khar’kov was
in Soviet hands by 28 August.7
Document 92 is of interest in highlighting the role of Stavka representa-
tives on the spot in co-ordinating increasingly complex combined-arms and
deep-penetration operations by more than one Soviet front – more inform-
ally carrying out the function of the napravlenie commands introduced and
disbanded in 1941 – that had formally brought more than one front under a
single commander. As Shtemenko, Head of the Operations Department of
the Genshtab from May 1943, suggests, some of the front commanders saw
the presence of the Stavka representative as unnecessary interference, at
least post-war, even if he at least goes on to suggest that, on balance, the
132 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
Stavka representatives served a valuable role. Similarly, Genshtab ‘Officers of
the General Staff’ served important functions as emissaries lower down the
chain of command in sharing hard-won experience with fresh units earlier
in the war whilst keeping the Stavka informed of events at the front, a role
of less importance as a greater number of front and army commanders and
their staffs gained experience in the handling of the forces under their
command.
Certainly by mid-1943 the Genshtab and Stavka of the Supreme High
Command were working increasingly effectively in the broad planning and
co-ordination of Soviet operations, the Genshtab playing a key role advising
Stalin as Supreme Commander. Shtemenko suggested that it was about
halfway through 1942 that ‘the organizational forms of the General Staff
fitted the nature of the work to be done’, by which time ‘rush jobs’ in plan-
ning ‘had become a thing of the past’.8
Whilst the Soviet leadership could be pleased with the progress of Soviet
operations in the aftermath of the German Operation ‘Citadel’ against the
Kursk salient, Soviet losses continued to be considerable against typically
stubborn German resistance, as illustrated by Table 6.4 for the fighting up
to late August 1943 in the immediate north and south of the Kursk salient.
In the aftermath of the operations shown in Table 6.4, and with the
Soviet recapture of the Donbass, German thoughts, with Hitler’s agreement,
were on stabilizing the front along what would be termed the Panther Line:
a defensive line running from Narva in the north all the way down to the
Dnepr River for much of its length, with additional fortifications further
south. On 15 September Hitler in fact agreed in principle to withdrawal
behind the Ostwall, as yet existing in practice largely only given the fact that
even without fortification of the west bank the Dnepr River was an impos-
ing obstacle.
For the Soviet side, during continued bloody fighting in the Ukraine
during August and early September 1943, the race was on to reach the
Dnepr and throw bridgeheads over it before the German defence crystallized
against what constituted a Soviet general offensive in the region, made up of
a series of multi-front operations along the lines of the aftermath of the
encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad.9
Rapid success, in terms of breaching the as-yet weak German Ostwall, was
achieved in the far south, where Soviet forces were able to advance much
further east without having to cross the Dnepr, in mid-October penetrating
the Ostwall as it crossed the steppe between Zaporozh’e and Melitopol’.
Soviet sources perhaps downplayed the superiority enjoyed in armour at the
start of the operation, one Soviet source suggesting that 778 tanks and
assault guns [sturmovie orudii] of the Southern Front faced ‘up to 300’
German equivalents, against which the German 6th Army could apparently
field in the region of 65 tanks [Kampfpanzer] and 98 assault guns [Stur-
mgeschütze], figures perhaps not including lightly armoured tank destroyers
[Panzerjäger]. The Southern Front (from 20 October 4th Ukrainian Front),
Table 6.4 Soviet strengths and irrecoverable losses for the ‘Kursk Strategic-Defensive’ Operation and subsequent offensives

Front ‘Kursk Strategic-Defensive’ ‘Orel Strategic-Offensive’ ‘Belgorod-Khar’kov

Operation (5–23 July 1943) Operation – ‘Kutuzov’ Strategic-Offensive’
(12 July–18 August 1943) Operation – ‘Rumiantsev’
(3–23 August 1943)
■ ■
Strength Irrecoverable losses Strength Irrecoverable losses Strength Irrecoverable losses

Central Front 738,000 15,336 645,300 47,771 – –

Voronezh Front 534,700 27,542 – – 739,400 48,339
Steppe Front – (09.07–23.07) – – 404,600 23,272
27,452
Western Front (left wing) – – (12.07–18.08) 25,585 – –
233,300
Briansk Front – – 409,000 39,173 – –
Totals 1,282,700 70,330 1,387,600 112,529 1,144,000 71,611
Source: Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 132–134.
134 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
had soon bypassed the entrance to the Crimean Peninsula and advanced to
eventually secure a bridgehead over the lower Dnepr where it enters the
Black Sea by the end of November, forward Soviet KMGs advancing up to
250 km during a seven-day period.10 The speed of the Soviet pursuit was,
however, hampered by logistical problems in the face of the German
‘scorched earth’ policy. Similar problems were experienced to the north, for
instance in providing fuel for forward units and given the fact that artillery
units lagged far behind forward units in what was now the rainy season or
rasputitsa, which prevented Soviet forces from seizing large bridgeheads over
the Dnepr ‘on the march’ in late September and early October. Nonetheless,
many footholds were seized on the western bank of the river, such as that
obtained by elements of 13th Army of what was, at the time, the Voronezh
Front, near the then relatively unknown town of Chernobyl:

DOCUMENT 93: Summary report of the Head of Engineers of 13th Army to the Head of
Engineers of the 1st Ukrainian Front on engineering support for the forcing of the Dnepr off the
march by the army in September 1943, 21 November 1943
Before approaching the Dnepr River forces of the army had forced the River Desna
near Korop, the River Seim, the River Desna on the Chernigov sector, Morovsk. . . .
Engineering reconnaissance established that the enemy had not constructed defen-
sive positions on either the eastern or western bank of the Dnepr. Only on isolated
sectors of the front line, near railway or wooden bridges, and similarly from settle-
ments situated near the river, did the enemy subject us to machine gun fire. From the
rear artillery and mortar fire targeted the river and the approaches to it.
All the bridges and barges had been destroyed. Many fishing boats had been dis-
abled. There were relatively few in working order.
There was lumber for the construction of rafts in sufficient quantities.
The width of the Dnepr varied on different sectors from 190 to 350 m. The banks of
the river sloped gently, were sandy, and covered in small bushes, allowing for good
cover. Reconnaissance confirmed locations for crossing points and marked out the
routes for columns to move up to them, which in future, after improvement and
repair, would serve as permanent roads.
...
By 24:00 21.9.43 army forces of the left flank consisting of 17th Guards Rifle Corps
and by 24:00 22.9.43 on the right flank, consisting of 15th Rifle Corps, reached the
Dnepr. 28th Rifle Corps covered the right flank on the army from the north given the
threat to the flank from enemy counterattack given that the army had moved forward
deep into enemy territory.
...
At daybreak 22.9.43 units of 17th Guards Rifle Corps . . . and at daybreak on
23.9.43 units of 15th Rifle Corps, . . . off the march and on a wide front, started to
force the Dnepr.
By this time 25 rafts made of wood and barrels had been collected, 42 fishing boats,
two barges and four A-3 assault boats. The overall capacity of these resources was 45.5
tonnes with two barges with a capacity of 85 tonnes.
...
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 135
The enemy put up heavy defensive fire, . . . but was forced out of these areas by units
crossing to the north and south of them.
Forward units, with artillery support, successfully pushed inland to the west,
widening the captured bridgehead. In order to allow the crossing of the main force and
for the crossing of transport resources the construction of pontoon and wooden bridges
started. [Army] river crossing resources that arrived on the scene were used for ferry-
ing. By this time [27.9.43] all engineering units had arrived. . . .
In total, in this period [27.9.43] there were 12 crossing points in operation.
The overall capacity for all the crossing points was 483 tonnes, including using
army engineering resources – 356 tonnes, and resources found locally – 127 tonnes for
a single crossing. These resources were capable of allowing in a single crossing, using
all crossing points: personnel – 1,850 men, divisional artillery and vehicles – 85, anti-
tank guns – 45, heavy machine guns – 185, carts – 72. . . .
Head of Engineers of the forces of 13th Army, Colonel Kolesnikov
(Source: SBD 30, pp. 5–8)

One of these smaller bridgeheads to the north of Kiev proved to be particularly

valuable, 5th Guards Tank Corps of the Voronezh, later 1st Ukrainian Front,
covertly redeploying and being thrown across the Liutezh bridgehead on the
junction of 38th and 60th Armies to the south of that seized by 13th Army.
Despite inevitable losses as tanks sank in the soft ground of what was marshy
terrain and hence relatively poorly defended by German forces, the bridgehead
was consolidated and then expanded as 3rd Guards Tank Army and forces of
38th Army were thrown across the Dnepr, supported by the advance of 60th and
13th Armies to the north. Soviet forces broke out of the bridgehead on 3
November and had seized the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, by 6 November – the eve
of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution.11 The 3rd Guards Tank Army
pressed forward, only to be halted by German counter-attacks, with German
forces actually retaking Zhitomir and pushing Soviet forces back, but with Soviet
troops nonetheless having held a huge bridgehead that could be exploited during
the next wave of offensive operations beginning before the end of the year.
Meanwhile, to the south, a second large bridgehead over the Dnepr was
being carved out by Soviet forces of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian) and South-
Western (3rd Ukrainian) Fronts, from Cherkassi in the north to Zaporozh’e in
the south. Plans for the extension of small, existing bridgeheads and deep pene-
tration to the west by forces of the Steppe Front are provided in Document 94:

DOCUMENT 94: Plan of the Command of the Steppe Front of 1 October 1943 on the conduct
of offensive operations including the forcing of the River Dnepr
I. The immediate task of the Steppe Front: the destruction of the Kirovograd-Krivoi
Rog grouping of enemy forces and entry in to the rear areas of the Dnepropetrovsk
grouping.
II. Stages of the operation
First stage. Forcing of the Dnepr River. . . . Seizing and supporting a bridgehead on
136 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
the right bank of the River Dnepr for the subsequent advance. Time allotted up to 5
October 1943.
Second stage. Advance with the aim of destroying the enemy Kirovograd-Krivoi
Rog grouping of forces and enter into the rear of the Dnepropetrovsk grouping. By
19–20 October to have reached the front line Bolshoi Viski, Ingulo-Kamenka,
Shevchenkovo, Krivoi Rog.
III. Grouping of Armies for the conduct of the operation and their compositions.

1. The thrust for the destruction of the Kirovograd grouping of the enemy is to be
struck by four Armies. General direction of the blow: Znamenka, Kirovograd:
a) 52nd Army – five rifle divisions. . . .
b) 4th Guards Army – six rifle divisions. . . .
c) 5th Guards Army – seven rifle divisions and one artillery
division. . . .
Artillery grouping:
82 mm and 120 mm mortars – 424
Light artillery (excluding 45 mm) – 493
Heavy – 90
Total artillery pieces and mortars – 1,007
d) 53rd Army – seven rifle divisions. . . .
Artillery grouping:
82 mm and 120 mm mortars – 463
Light artillery (excluding 45 mm) – 373
Heavy – 36
Total artillery pieces and mortars – 872
2. Blow in the general direction of Piatikhatka, Krivoi Rog, with the aim of entry
into the rear areas of the Dnepropetrovsk grouping of enemy forces to be struck
with three Armies.
a) 37th Army – eight rifle divisions. . . .
b) 7th Guards Army – eight rifle divisions and one artillery
division. . . .
c) 57th Army – six rifle divisions. . . .
4. Use of motor-mechanized formations.
1st and 7th Mechanized Corps are allocated for use in the frontal zone of 37th
Army in the general direction of Annovka, in order to encircle Krivoi Rog from
the west.
5th Tank Army will be used to encircle Kirovograd from the west.
(Source: SBD 24, pp. 5–7)

The delayed Soviet advance in this sector was, however, halted short of its
objectives by the end of December by the redeployment of German
armoured forces from further south, as 40th and 17th Panzer Corps cut off
and destroyed forward mechanized units of 5th Guards Tank Army advanc-
ing on Krivoi Rog, with forward elements of 7th Guards Army suffering a
similar fate at Novgorodka in the face of forces of 40th and 3rd Panzer
Corps.12 Once again, however, Soviet forces held on to a huge bridgehead
over the Dnepr, with the two key bridgeheads leaving German forces
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 137
holding sections of the Dnepr north and south of Korsun’ vulnerable to
encirclement.
Little mention has been made of the Soviet Navy up to this point. That
the Soviet Navy was certainly not a priority during the war is highlighted
by the transfer of naval productive capacity from shipbuilding to tanks and
other land-weapons systems, as in the case of the conversion of Factory
Number 112 from submarine to tank production (see Chapters 4 and 8). As
for existing capabilities, the bulk of the Baltic Fleet, the largest of the pre-
war Soviet fleets, was bottled up for most of the war in Leningrad and at
Kronstadt after the costly evacuation of forward-deployed units from Tallinn
in the face of the German advance. Plans were made for its scuttling should
the Germans have taken the city (see Chapter 7) and significant numbers of
sailors transferred to the Red Army (see Document 66, Chapter 5). The
second largest Soviet pre-war fleet was the Black Sea Fleet, which, although
successfully supporting the ‘Kerch’-Feodosiia’ Operation from 25 December
1941 to 2 January 1942, suffered heavy losses in supporting and then evacu-
ating personnel from both Odessa in 1941 and Sevastopol’ during 1942 (see
Chapter 5). Despite limited naval resources in the region, the Axis was able
to dominate the Black Sea for much of the war through airpower. Even when
German air superiority was challenged and subsequently lost, the Black Sea
Fleet, as all Soviet fleets with the exception of the Northern Fleet, remained
relatively inactive. Perhaps the best explanation for this inactivity, other
than the relative backwardness of the Soviet Navy compared to other arms
until Allied aid and accrued experience started to have an impact (see
Chapter 8), was that warships were such large units to lose that few com-
manders were willing to fully exploit them after the horrendous losses of
1941 lest they fall foul of Stalin’s wrath. This fear of losses applied even to
the Northern Fleet during the ‘Petsamo-Kirkenes’ Operation of October
1944, even when it enjoyed overwhelming superiority over German forces in
the region (see Chapter 10). A good illustration of the attitude towards
naval forces of Stalin and other Soviet military leaders is provided in Docu-
ment 95, concerned with the operations of the remnants of the Black Sea
Fleet in October 1943. During the night of 6 October 1943 the Flotilla
Leader Khar’kov and the destroyers Besposhchadnii and Sposobnii shelled the
ports of Feodosiia and Yalta in the Crimea, still in Axis hands, and enemy
shipping. Early in the morning, as the warships were making their way back
to the Soviet port of Tuapse in the North Caucasus, with fighter cover, they
were attacked by German JU-87 dive bombers, the end result being, after
additional air attacks, the sinking of all three vessels with the loss of 780
lives.13
138 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr

DOCUMENT 95: Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Commander Number
30221 to the Black Sea Fleet and forces of the North-Caucasian Front, to the People’s
Commissar for the Navy on the co-ordination of the military activities of fleet and front,
11 October 1943
According to information received, operations of the Black Sea Fleet of 6 October that
ended in failure, and with the unnecessary deaths of personnel and the loss of three
major warships, were conducted without the knowledge of the command of the
North-Caucasian Front, despite the fact that the Fleet was subordinated to him in an
operational sense.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. That the commander of the Black Sea Fleet agrees on all operations intended to
be conducted with the commander of the North-Caucasus Front and that no
operations be conducted without his agreement.
2. That the core forces of the Fleet be used to support the military operations of
ground forces. Long-distance operations with significant surface forces are to be
conducted only with the agreement of the Headquarters of the Supreme High
Command.
3. That responsibility for the operational use of the Black Sea Fleet be given to the
commander of the North-Caucasian Front.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Commander

I. Stalin
A. Antonov
(Source: RA T.16 (5–3), 1999, p. 221.)

Consequently, whilst the Black Sea Fleet would support the landing of
Soviet forces for a second time on the Kerch’ Peninsula during the Kerch’-
El’tingen landings of 21 October to 11 December 1943, German support of
forces in the Crimea after it had been cut off from the main body of Axis
forces and the eventual evacuation during 1944 would not be interdicted by
Soviet surface forces. The Kerch’-El’tingen landings, whilst conducted only
a short distance from Soviet bases across the Kerch’ Straights on the Taman’
Peninsula, nonetheless involved the landing of four rifle divisions, involving
a total of 119 launches and 159 other support and transport vessels, 667
artillery pieces of more than 76 mm calibre and 90 RS launchers providing
supporting fire, and covered and supported by more than 1,000 aircraft of
the 4th Air Army.14
Just as naval forces were relatively little-used, so were other ‘novelty’
troops such as airborne forces. The limited impact of their use during the
Moscow counter-offensive of 1941–42 did not stop their being used in the
expansion of the Dnepr River crossing near Bukrin during the second half of
October 1943, during which Soviet paratroops, much like their British
counterparts would be just under a year later during Operation ‘Market
 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr 139
Garden’ in the Netherlands, were too widely dispersed during drops for
rapid concentration where needed. Whilst elements of the more than two
brigades were dropped behind Soviet lines, and others into the Dnepr,
inadequate intelligence saw the remainder dropped in areas in which
German armoured forces were deployed, namely 24th Panzer Corps, with
19th Panzer Division in position in the area before the first drops, with
other elements of the corps in transit to the area. Many airborne troops
ended up, as in the winter of 1941–42, dispersed in forested areas and
engaging in partisan warfare. For Stalin this was the last point at which
highly trained airborne forces would be used in any numbers during the
war.15
At the end of 1943 the Wehrmacht was spent as an offensive military force
able to conduct more than local counter-attacks in order to contain increas-
ingly deep Soviet penetrations into German defences. Local Soviet numerical
superiority was commonplace by this stage of the war, with the qualitative
divide between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht of the first months of the
war now no longer the norm. The limited number of elite German Panzer
and Panzergrenadier divisions being transferred from one Soviet break-
through to another represented an ever-smaller proportion of German forces.
The apparently dramatic battlefield performances of these Wehrmacht and SS
units was in reality exaggerated partly by the fact that the ostensibly larger
Soviet units they destroyed or halted (that typically had smaller basic com-
plements than their German equivalents anyway), were far more hopelessly
under strength than they were. For example, 18th and 29th Tank Corps of
5th Guards Tank Army (2nd Ukrainian Front) operating on the Krivoi-
Rog–Kirovograd axis, were, by 8 December 1943, down to 37 and 22 tanks
and self-propelled guns compared to an authorized complement of 257.16
Nonetheless, whilst German ‘fire-brigade’ units still achieved much in the
aftermath of Operation ‘Citadel’ during the second half of 1943, they would
prove increasingly inadequate during 1944.

Guide to further reading

H. Boog, Werner Rahn and Reinhard Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, Volume VI
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
Anders Frankson and Niklas Zetterling, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Abingdon: Frank
Cass, 2004).
David Glantz, ‘Soviet Operational Intelligence in the Kursk Operation, July 1943’, Intelli-
gence and National Security, Volume 5, Number 1 (1990), pp. 5–49.
David Glantz, ‘The Defensive Battle for the Kursk Bridgehead, 5–15 July 1943’, JSMS,
Volume 6, Number 4 (December 1993), pp. 656–700.
David Glantz, ‘The Battle of Kursk (Continued): Tank Forces in Defense of the Kursk
Bridgehead’, JSMS, Volume 7, Number 1 (January 1994), pp. 82–134.
David Glantz, ‘Prelude to Kursk: Soviet Strategic Operations, February–March 1943’, JSMS,
Volume 8, Number 1 (January 1995), pp. 1–35.
David Glantz, ‘The Red Army’s Donbass Offensive (February–March 1943) Revisited: A
Documentary Essay’, JSMS, Volume 18, Number 3 (September 2005), pp. 369–503.
140 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr
David Glantz and Jonathan House, The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1999).
David Glantz and Harold Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for Kursk, 1943: the Soviet
General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
Timothy Mulligan, ‘Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle’: Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk,
1943’, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 22 (1987), pp. 235–260.
Steven H. Newton (trans. and ed.), Kursk: The German View (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press,
2002).
7 The siege of Leningrad

During Operation ‘Barbarossa’, the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, the
focus of the attention of the German Army Group North was the city of
Leningrad, previously called St Petersburg and then Petrograd, the capital city
of Russia until 1918 and birthplace of the Russian revolution. The Soviet
government had long feared the threat to Leningrad from the north through
Finland (see Document 8, Chapter 1), with a precedent having been set with
the landing of German troops in Finland in February 1918. Similarly, with
the advance from the south in early 1918, German forces had come within
striking distance of the city from this direction as well. With the buffer zone
of the Baltic Republics secured in the summer of 1940, Leningrad seemed
much more secure from the south than it had with the prospect of foreign
forces using them as a launchpad. However, by late June it was apparent that
German progress to the south of the city was such that Leningrad was vulner-
able from both Finland and the south. The first line of defence for Leningrad
from the south would be the so-called Pskov–Ostrov Fortified Region:

DOCUMENT 96: To the military soviets of the Leningrad Military District and North-
Western Front on preparation of defensive positions along the line Pskov, Ostrov, Opochka,
Sebezh, 29 June 1941
The People’s Commissar for Defence decrees:
1. To re-subordinate the Pskov-Ostrov Fortified District to the military soviet of
the North-Western Front.
2. Using the resources of construction battalions, the Directorate of Field Construc-
tion [UPS], construction sites and the local population to build, in addition to the
Fortified Districts fortified field positions on the line Pskov, Ostrov, Opochka,
Sebezh. In the first instance anti-tank obstacles are to be constructed and all rein-
forced concrete positions of the Fortified Districts are to be brought to readiness.
3. . . .
4. Time for preparation of the line is no later than 2.7.1941
5. . . .
6. Work is to be organized such, that the line is in a state of permanent readiness.
N. Vatunin
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1), 1998, p. 53)
142 The siege of Leningrad
However, as early as 4 July the Northern Front was being informed of the
necessity for a defence line well behind the Pskov–Ostrov positions given
the likelihood of imminent enemy breakthrough in the Pskov region, the
new defence line to be along the line Kingisepp–Luga–Novgorod:

DOCUMENT 97: Directive of the Main Command Headquarters to the military soviet of the
Leningrad Military District on preparation of a defensive line on the approaches to the city of
Leningrad, 5 July 1941
For the covering of the city of Leningrad and principal axes from the south-west and
south, that is – Gdov-Kingisepp-Leningrad; Luga-Leningrad; Novgorod-Leningrad;
Vishnii Volochek-Leningrad, the construction of a defensive line along the front
Kingisepp, Tolmachevo, Ogoreli, Babino, Kirishi and onwards along the western
banks of the River Volkhov is required. A cut-off [otsechnaia] position [is to be pre-
pared] along the Luga-Shimsk line.
The axes Gdov-Leningrad; Luga-Leningrad; Shimsk-Leningrad should be covered
the most soundly.
...
[In] the first instance anti-tank obstacles should be constructed [with] the simulta-
neous construction of field positions.
...
The Leningrad Region Council of Worker’s Deputies and the Leningrad Region
Committee VKP(b) are to provide the labour, transport, machinery, tools and mater-
ials for the construction of the line from construction organizations and the local pop-
ulations of the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Region.
The construction of the line should start immediately. Construction is to be com-
pleted by 15 July 1941.
Zhukov
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 10–11)

With the Germans having captured Pskov on 9 July and moving in the
direction of Luga, and with increasingly heavy fighting between Finnish
forces and 7th Army between Lake Ladoga and Onega, a unified command
for the region, bringing together the North-Western and Northern Fronts
and the Baltic and Northern Fleets, was introduced on 10 July. This
napravlenie command was led by Voroshilov, a close crony of Stalin who
owed his position more to political reliability than ability. In order to slow
German forces on the key Luga axis, the Luga Operational Group had been
formed by the Northern Front on 5 July and had been in action against
German forces near the town on 12 July. Meanwhile, during early July the
progress made by the German 18th Army through the Baltic Republics had
been rapid, forcing the Soviet 8th Army back in relatively good order
towards Leningrad. The 18th Army now added a western threat to the city,
forcing the creation of the Narva Operational Group on 14 July, the same
day that German forces crossed the Luga River south of Kingisepp. Whilst
intense fighting continued near Luga and Kingisepp, Soviet forces (34th and
 The siege of Leningrad 143
11th Armies) counter-attacked to the east of Staraia Russa on 12 August.1
Whilst failing to halt the German advance, this attack at least sucked in
German forces from the Moscow axis and was part of a crucial and gradual
whittling down of German strength, although such incremental damage was
less noticeable than the penetration of German forces to the north-west of
Novgorod, prompting a blunt request from the Stavka to the North-
Western Front:

DOCUMENT 98: To the command of forces of the North-Western Front regarding the holding
of Novgorod, 16 August 1941
The town of Novgorod is not to be given up and is to be held to the last soldier.
B. Shaposhnikov
(Source: RA T.23 (12–1), 1998, p. 123)

By 18 August, the spectre of the encirclement of Leningrad by 4th Panzer

Group and 16th Army had reared its head; the High Command in Moscow
was concerned that the North-Western napravlenie, still led by Stalin’s crony
Voroshilov, was doing little to prevent this:

DOCUMENT 99: Directive of the Supreme High Command Number 001029 to the military
soviet of the North-Western napravlenie on measures for the prevention of the encirclement of
Leningrad, 17 August 1941
The High Command considers the most dangerous direction of enemy attack to be the
eastern axis Novgorod, Chudovo, Malaia Vishera and onwards across the River
Volkhov. If the Germans are successful in this direction, then it will mean the envel-
opment of Leningrad from the east, the cutting of communications between Leningrad
and Moscow and a critical situation for the Northern and North-Western Fronts. In
this event it is likely that the Germans will unify their front with the front of the
Finns in the area of Olontsa. It seems to us that the head of the North-Western
napravlenie does not see this critical danger and therefore is not taking any sort of
special measures for its liquidation.
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, p. 13)

However, on 20 August Chudovo still fell to German forces. On 23 August,

the Northern Front became the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts, separating off
the Finnish threat to the north-east of Leningrad from responsibilities for its
immediate defence to the north and south, but no doubt adding further con-
fusion to a chain of command that had been tinkered with far too often in
recent weeks. Indeed, on 30 August the unwieldy North-Western napravle-
nie was to be disbanded, the day that German forces broke through the Neva
River near Ivanovskoe and captured the key railway junction of Mga, sever-
ing the last rail connection between Leningrad and the remainder of Soviet
144 The siege of Leningrad

Figure 7.1 The Leningrad blockade and relief routes to the city from September
1941–January 1943.

territory. German forces reached Lake Ladoga on 8 September and captured

Schlissel’berg, cutting off Leningrad’s land communications in their
entirety, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Soviet attempts by 54th Army to the east to de-blockade Leningrad from
10 September failed, with the German forces below Leningrad and the
Oranienbaum pocket to the west of the city below Kronstadt, which had
come into being on 16 September, going over to the defensive towards the
end of the month, leaving Leningrad isolated.
After 5 September, Leningrad became a secondary concern to Moscow in
German strategy, even if this would not be noticeable to Soviet leaders for
some time.2 The Leningrad leadership had been intensifying the construc-
tion of defences for the city from 3 September, with plans for the destruction
of much of the city in the event of German capture, for which instructions
were issued on 13 September, the same day that Zhukov took over
command of the Leningrad Front from Voroshilov. The plan included the
destruction of the Baltic Fleet:

DOCUMENT 100: Report of the deputy People’s Commissar of the Navy to the Supreme High
Command on the plan for action in the event of the necessity to pull out of Leningrad (regarding
ships and vessels), 13 September 1941
I. General situation
1. In the event of having to pull out of Leningrad all ships of the navy and merchant
fleet, as well as fisheries and technical vessels are to be blown up.
2. This destruction is to be conducted with the aim that:
a) The enemy is not given the possibility of using them.
b) To rule out the possibility that the enemy might sail freely in the Kronstadt-
Leningrad region and make use of [waterways and port facilities].
 The siege of Leningrad 145
3. The destruction is to be carried out with the greatest possible damage being
inflicted for the longest possible period, that is objectives and ships are to be
blown up and sunk.
4. Destruction is to be carried out according to a strictly sequential plan from the
moment at which the High Command gives the signal.

II. Organization of preparations

1. Preparations for destruction and actual destruction is to be conducted by district:

a) Kronstadt district (including Kronstadt itself, the military port of Oranien-
baum . . .);
b) Leningrad port . . . ;
c) The mouth of the River Neva . . . ;
d) Shipyards (Factories Numbers 190, 189, 196, 194, 5, 205, 273 and 270).
2. All vessels face destruction regardless of ownership.
3. The destruction of shore facilities (cranes, berths, docks . . .) is to be carried out by
their respective institutions on the order of and according to the plan of the City
Committee of the VKP(b).
4. Depending on the operational situation destruction and sinking might take place
only in a district under direct threat of occupation by the enemy, in the event of
which a variant of the plan is to be worked out for the withdrawal of ships from
dangerous to less dangerous districts, and also the withdrawal of vessels from
Leningrad to Kronstadt should they no longer be able to remain in the former.
5. All preparations for destruction are to be worked out by the Headquarters of the
KBF together with the Headquarters for Maritime Defence of the city of
Leningrad (clandestinely).
...
Deputy People’s Commissar for the Navy, Admiral Isakov
(Source: V.P. Gusachenko et al., 2000, pp. 88–90)

With Leningrad encircled and with the continued threat that German and
Finnish forces might seize the city, on 20 September 1941 the State Defence
Committee set up an air-bridge to bring military supplies into the city,
without mention at this stage of evacuations on return flights.

DOCUMENT 101: State Defence Committee. Decree No. GKO-692ss of 20 September 1941. .
. . On the establishment of an aerial transport link with the city of Leningrad
The State Defence Committee Decrees:

1. To give the Civilian Air Fleet responsibility for transport by air to Leningrad: of
fuses, shells, cartridges, explosives, small arms, motors, communications equipment,
optical equipment, parts in short supply for military vehicles and precious metals,
and from Leningrad: tank guns F-32, radio sets, telegraph and telephone sets, elec-
trical equipment for aircraft,... and parts in short supply for the M-8 and M-13.
That Comrade Khrulev be given the power to decide upon the actual list and
quantity of items to be delivered by air to and from Leningrad.
146 The siege of Leningrad
2. That the quantity of goods shipped be established up to 1 October 1941 as 100
tonnes and from 1 October 1941 as 150 tonnes per day, based on one return
flight for all aircraft and a second return flight for half of the aircraft.
...
4. For the provision of this route with PS-84 aircraft the GUGVF is to set aside 50
aircraft. . . .
5. From 22 September 1941 flights to Leningrad are to take place from Moscow air-
fields. From 25 September 1941 flights are to take place from the following home
airfields:
Velikoe selo – 10 PS-84 aircraft
Bol’shoi Dvor – 10
Shibenets – 10
Podborov’e – 15
Khvoinaia – 10
Kashin – 10
...
6. . . . The loading and unloading of aircraft at these airfields is to be the respons-
ibility of the Main Board of the Rear of the Red Army.
7. ...
8. That commander of the VVS Comrade Zhigarev remove from the Reserve,
Western and Leningrad Fronts up to 30 aircraft of types I-153 and I-16, and con-
centrate them by 23 September at the airfields at Kaivaks and Plekhanovo with
the task of escorting these transport aircraft to Leningrad and back.
...
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin.
(Source: Online. Available www.soldat.ru/doc/gko/scans/0692-01-1.jpg and 0692-02-1.jpg)

Whilst German forces were able to seize Tikhvin on 9 November in an

attempt to link up with the Finns and widen the encirclement to include
the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga, they were dangerously overextended, with
Soviet counter-attacks by 54th and 52nd Armies on both flanks. Whilst
Tikhvin was recaptured by Soviet forces on 8 December, poorly co-ordinated
Soviet attempts to de-blockade Leningrad during November failed.3 Stalin
was impatient for results, on 8 November pressing the new commander of
the Leningrad Front, Khozin, for forces from Leningrad to cross the Neva
and join up with units of 54th Army:

DOCUMENT 102: Record of a conversation by direct line of the Supreme High Commander
with the command of the Leningrad Front, 8 November 1941
Leningrad: On the line ZHDANOV, KHOZIN.
Moscow: On the line STALIN. We are very concerned by your sluggishness in the
business of the conduct of the operation of which you are well aware. . . . If in the space
of the next few days you do not break through to the east then you will destroy the
Leningrad Front and the people of Leningrad. We are told, that after artillery prepara-
tion the infantry are indecisive in advancing. But you ought to know, that the
infantry, without tanks, will not go. . . .
 The siege of Leningrad 147
ZHDANOV: The advance of the infantry comes up against fairly solid defensive posi-
tions. . . . As regards tanks, then even with the measures we have taken, we have only
succeeded in getting seven [tanks] . . . across to the left bank, which were knocked out
fairly quickly. As regards KV [tanks], then up to this point then it has not proved pos-
sible to get a single one across. . . . We are inhibited by the limited numbers of our
forces. We are taking measure to reduce rear-area forces (artillery) by 8,000 men, com-
munications troops by 5,000, anti-aircraft troops by 8,000 and sending them as
infantrymen. . . .
STALIN: It is necessary to decide between captivity on the one hand, and the sacrific-
ing of a number of divisions on the other. I repeat – make sacrifices and force a corri-
dor through to the east, in order to save your front and Leningrad. . . . Take measures to
get KV tanks across to the other side of the river. . . . Try to separate off groups of
jaegers [okhotnikov], the bravest men, and make up one or two independent regiments
of them. Explain the great significance of that feat which is demanded of them in order
to force through a corridor. . . .
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 61–63)

Three volunteer regiments supported by up to 40 tanks made it across the

river to attack between 9 and 11 November but failed to make headway,
whilst 54th Army’s attentions were divided between the relief of Leningrad
and the containment of the German thrust towards Volkhov. Whilst the
Soviet winter counter-offensive would see the elimination of the German
penetration in the Tikhvin direction, preventing German forces joining with
the Finns in Karelia and sealing Leningrad off completely, the over-
ambition of Soviet operations that sought the destruction of Army Group
North meant that a resource balance shifting in Soviet favour was, as along
the whole front, not effectively utilized. The relief of Leningrad, the
expected by-product of broader Soviet operations, did not take place, nor
would it for more than another year.
In the city, other than the prospect of the enemy capturing Leningrad,
two concerns became the focus of government attention. First, the food situ-
ation could only deteriorate from the end of August, and with the deterio-
rating food situation and enemy threat there were concerns for social order.
Norms for the distribution of bread to the population started to drop as
winter approached, as Table 7.1 indicates, reaching a low of 250 g per day
for workers, and only 125 g per day for other civilians.
The food situation was made significantly worse by the failure to protect
existing resources from air attack, 8 September seeing the destruction of the
antiquated Badaev warehouses, in the attack on which an estimated ‘3,000
tons of flour and about 2,500 tons of sugar’ were lost, although during the
worst months of the winter about 700 tons of ‘blackened, dirty and scorched
sugar’ would be reclaimed and turned into ‘candy’.4
With the German capture of the last railway link to the city at the end of
August and the subsequent capture of Shlissel’berg, the principal means of
bringing food and other supplies into the city was across Lake Ladoga,
148 The siege of Leningrad
Table 7.1 On the shipping of goods across Lake Ladoga. Report of the Headquarters
of the Leningrad Front to the Headquarters of the Rear of the Red Army,
8 December 1941 – norms introduced for the supply of the population of
Leningrad with bread per day during the initial period of the blockade

From what Group of the population

date norm
introduced Workers Administrative Dependant Children up to
(grammes) (grammes) (grammes) 12 years old
(grammes)

18.7.41 800 600 400 400

2.9.41 600 400 300 300
12.9.41 500 300 230 200
2.10.41 400 200 200 200
13.11.41 300 150 150 150
20.11.41 250 125 125 125
Source: Volkovskii (ed.), Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh, p. 669.

although the infrastructure for such convoy operations did not exist on
either the eastern or western banks of the lake, and took time to develop.
The seriousness of the situation prompted the temporary use of aircraft for
bringing in supplies and further removal of ‘valuable goods’ from the
city:5

DOCUMENT 103: Decree of the State Defence Committee No. 871ss on the allocation of
aviation for the delivery of supplies to Leningrad, 9 November 1941
1) The GUG VF (Comrade Kartushev) is required to allocate 24 ‘Douglas’ transport
aircraft in addition to the 26 already working on the Leningrad service starting on
the morning of 10 November this year up to 14 November inclusive . . . , in order
that for the supply of foodstuffs to Leningrad and the removal of valuables 50
‘Douglas’ aircraft are working, with the condition that every aircraft does on
average no less than one and a half round trips per day.
2) The VVS (Comrade Zhigarev) is to:
a) Allocate 10 TB-3 aircraft . . . , with the condition that every aircraft does no
less than a round trip per day;
b) Organise air cover by fighter aircraft, allocating an air regiment in addition
to those already operating.
3. It is established that for the five-day plan for shipments to Leningrad no less than
200 tonnes per day of foodstuffs are to be delivered . . .

Chairman of the State Defence Committee

I. Stalin
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 64–65)
 The siege of Leningrad 149
The volume of materials that could be brought in was not only very limited,
but German air superiority made such operations risky. Indeed, by mid-
November supplies delivered by air had not even reached the quantities
aimed for in Document 103 above.

DOCUMENT 104: Record of conversation between Molotov and the command of the Leningrad
Front
16 November 1941
...
Gusev. . . .
4. We are receiving foodstuffs in ‘Douglases’, however not in the quantities established
by the GKO. We have yet to receive all the ‘Douglases’. In order to increase the turn-
around speed of the ‘Douglases’ and make no less than two flights per day we have
decided to ship the foodstuffs in the ‘Douglases’ from Novaia Ladoga, that straight
away increases the quantity and rate of delivery of provisions.
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 71–72).

The situation would be eased when Lake Ladoga had frozen and the subse-
quently legendary ‘Ice Road’, better known as the ‘Road of Life’, could be
opened. As the lake froze, there would of course be a period when shipments
either by boat or road were not possible, and the air bridge was the only
source of new supplies. The decision to establish communications across the
ice was taken by the military soviet of the Leningrad Front on 13 November.
Towards the end of November, communications across the frozen lake were
being established, with the first 60 lorries with supplies for the city crossing
the ice on 22 November, establishing the viability of further exploitation of
this link.

DOCUMENT 105: Decree of the military soviet of the Leningrad Front No. 00419
24 November 1941

1. For the shipment of provisions, fuel and munitions to Leningrad and the evacua-
tion of population and material items from Leningrad a front-line automobile
road is to be constructed by 30 November on the route: Zebor’e Station, Serebri-
anskaia, Velikii Dvor, Lakhta, Nikul’skoe, Shan’govo, Eremina Gora, Novinka,
Iamskoe, Korpino, Novaia Ladoga, Kobona, with an average turnaround at each
end of 2,000 tonnes per day with the opening of a transshipment base at Zabor’e.
2. The construction of the road is to be the responsibility of a of the Leningrad
obkom VKP (b) (Comrade Vorotov) with time for completion before 1 December
1941.
...
5. The Chairman of the Executive Committee (Ispolkom) of the Leningrad City
Council of Worker’s Deputies is to:
a) Mobilize 500 lorries of varied types from the civilian economy and one
150 The siege of Leningrad
hundred tankers (working) with drivers by 25 November for the period of
the functioning of the road, and transfer them to the 17th Independent
transport Brigade (OATB) for use on the road;
b) Set aside in the charge of the commander of the road Comrade Shilov the
necessary inventory and equipment [iz rascheta] for ten feeding points each
with the capacity for 4,000 persons each, by 27 November 1941;
c) Set aside in the charge of the independent transport brigade a one off alloca-
tion of 3,000 sets of rubber tires for the autopark of the road by 25 Novem-
ber.
6. The head of the Auto-Armour Board of the Leningrad Front, Colonel Dement’ev
is to be allocated 1,000 lorries and 100 tankers with drivers from the army trans-
port of the Leningrad Front by 26 November, to be handed over to the command
of the 17 OATB for work on the road.
...
Commander of forces of the Leningrad Front
General-Lieutenant Khozin
Members of the military soviet of the front
Secretary of the TsK VKP(b) Zhdanov
Divisional Commissar Kuznetsov
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 233–235)

The road across Ladoga, and indeed the air bridge, allowed the evacuation of
some of Leningrad’s population to the east:

DOCUMENT 106: Report of the [Leningrad] City Evacuation Commission, 26 April 1942
1. The evacuation of the population of Leningrad has had two phases:
a) The first period – evacuation before the blockade of the city;
b) The second – evacuation during the blockade.
2. Evacuation of the first period continued from 29.VI.1941 to 27.VIII.1941 and
has two specific characteristics:
a) The first – unwillingness to evacuate from the city;
b) The second – a large number of children were evacuated from Leningrad to
districts of Leningrad Region (easterly and south-easterly), meaning that
175,400 children were returned back to Leningrad.
3. During the period from 29.VI to 27.VIII.1941 from Leningrad the following
were evacuated:
a) 395,091 children, of whom 175,400 were returned to Leningrad, the result
395,091 – 175,400 = 219,691 people.
b) Leningrad residents – 104,691 people;
c) Workers and administrative personnel, evacuated with industrial concerns –
164,320 people.

Total: 488,703 people.

In addition, during the same period 147,500 people were evacuated to Leningrad
from the populations of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Karelo-Finnish SSRs.
 The siege of Leningrad 151
1. The second phase of the evacuation has had three stages:
a) First stage – the evacuation by water across Lake Ladoga to Novaia Ladoga,
and then by road transport to Volkhov Station;
b) Second stage – evacuation by air transport;
c) Third stage – evacuation by the ice road across Lake Ladoga.
By water transport 33,479 people were evacuated.
Of these 14,854 people were not from the Leningrad population.
35,114 people were evacuated by air.
16,956 of these were not from the Leningrad population.

From the end of December 1941 on foot or by motor transport outside that offi-
cially organized 36,118 people were evacuated.
(Population not from Leningrad)
From 22.I.1942 to 15.IV.1942 554,186 people were evacuated on the ice road, of
whom:
1. 66,182 people were workers and administrative personnel.
2. 193,244 people were families of workers or administrative personnel.
3. 92,419 people were students of vocational colleges.
4. 37,877 were young specialists, students, professors, lecturers and research
workers with families.
5. 4,442 people were pupils and teachers of (military) specialist schools.
6. 12,639 people were children from children’s homes.
7. 7,343 people were invalids of the [Great] Patriotic War.
8. 8,135 people were population from the evacuation points of the city (previously
evacuated to Leningrad from districts of the oblast’).
9. 35,713 were wounded Red Army personnel and commanders of the RKKA.
10. 1,150 people were prisoners.
11. 8,825 people were specialist contingent (administrative exile) from the city.
30,489 people from the oblast’.
12. 27,274 people were kolkhoz peasants from the Karelian isthmus.

Total evacuated for the period from 29.VI.41 to 15.IV.42 1,295,100, of whom:
a) 970,718 people were from the population of Leningrad
b) 324,382 people were population of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and
Karelo-Finnish SSR, previously evacuated to Leningrad, population from
districts of Leningrad oblast’ and wounded Red Army personnel and
commanders.
...
Chairman of the Leningrad Evacuation Commission, Popkov
Members – Smirnov, Motilev, Lagunov, Vorotov
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 692–696)

A significant number of those evacuated to the Soviet rear were Finns and
‘Germans’ moved for security reasons:
152 The siege of Leningrad

DOCUMENT 107: Report by the Leningrad NKVD on evacuations from Leningrad and
outlying districts, 4 April 1942, No. 10448
To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs . . . Comrade Beria
By decision of the military soviet of the Leningrad Front the NKVD board for
Leningrad oblast’ exiled 39,075 persons from the city and nearby districts from the
second half of March, including:
Compulsory evacuation [evakuirovano v obiazatel’nom poriadke] of Finns and Germans
35,162 people.
Administrative exile [Vislano v administrativnom poriadke] of socially dangerous ele-
ments 13 people.
All of this contingent were sent:
To Krasnoiarskii krai – 26,283 people.
To Irkutsk oblast’ – 9,488 people.
To Omsk oblast’ – 3,304 people.
Additionally, as a result of the exceptional significance of Kronstadt as a strongpoint
and naval base on the approaches to Leningrad, 431 people were removed from Kron-
stadt, of whom:
67 people – anti-Soviet elements subject to administrative exile.
75 people – the product of the compulsory evacuation of Germans and Finns.
289 people – socially dangerous elements removed as part of the general evacuation.
As they left Finns and Germans evacuated from prefrontal districts handed over live-
stock and dwellings to local Soviet organizations. According to incomplete figures the
following were handed over:
Cows – 1,020
Horses – 134
Small livestock – 92
Dwellings – 7,540
During the conduct of the exiling and evacuation there were no incidents and dis-
plays of anti-Soviet sentiment.
Head of the Board of the NKVD for Leningrad oblast’
Komissar for State Security 3rd Class
(Kubatkin)
(Source: N.A. Lomagin, 2004, p. 37)

Whilst Zhdanov reported to Malenkov on 25 December that the food situ-

ation had improved, such that 100 g could be added to the bread rations of
workers and 75 g for the remainder, making 300 and 200 g respectively,
such statements hid the absence of other foodstuffs and indeed the inability
to deliver rations to all.6 Food deliveries across Ladoga would, as Table 7.2
shows, consistently improve month by month in early 1942 before the thaw,
assisted greatly by the reopening of the railway line through Tikhvin to
Volkhov in January 1942 and the extension of the railway all the way to
Ladoga during February, and the improvement of communications between
the shore of the lake and the city.
 The siege of Leningrad 153
Table 7.2 Goods shipped across the ice road from 24 November 1941 to 21 April
1942 (according to figures of the Leningrad Front) by month

Month Quantity of Including

goods per month
in tonnes Foodstuffs Munitions Other goods
and fodder

November–December 1941 16,499 15,125 713 661

January 1942 52,934 42,558 4,794 5,582
February 86,041 67,198 9,953 8,890
March 118,382 88,607 9,105 20,770
April 87,253 57,588 7,345 22,320
Total 301,109 270,976 31,910 58,223
Source: Volkovskii (ed.), Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh, p. 670.

Although the tonnage being delivered to the city might have improved,
according to the NKVD, whilst flour was delivered to the city during the
first half of January, no other foodstuffs reached the city.7 By this stage many
were beyond relief and increased deliveries from the second half of January
came too late for many; the number of deaths in the city rose from 4,162 in
June 1941 to 52,881 in December, to 101,583 in January 1942 and
107,477 the following month, as shown in Table 7.3.
In addition to the increasing number of deaths brought about primarily
by the shortage of food, additional casualties were caused by German
bombing and shelling as shown in Table 7.4, which, in addition, disrupted
the flow of supplies into the city.
Some appreciation of the horrors of life in the city during the winter of
1941–42 can be gained from the personal diaries of those that experienced
the blockade, the example here being that of A.I. Vinokurov, a school-
teacher:

DOCUMENT 108: Extracts from the diary of Aleksei Ivanovich Vinokurov, Leningrad,
2 January–1 February 1942
January 1942
Thursday 2 January
Today, after a break of two days, they gave us electricity in our block for three hours.
What an amazing thing electric light is!
...
Sunday 5 January
The water and drainage have not been working for a few days. . . .
154 The siege of Leningrad
Monday 6 January
I found out about the death of S.N.F., the Physics teacher, today. The poor soul died of
emaciation, leaving behind a wife bloated from hunger and three children, the fate of
which is beyond doubt.
...
Monday 8 January
M.V.P., the teacher of Mathematics, died.
It is strange, but in the last few days news of death no longer disturbs as it did
before. Death has become a day-to-day occurrence. We have got used to it. On the
street just about every hundred metres or so there lies the body of someone who has
either died or starvation or frozen to death. The public has got so used to this, that
they walk by unconcerned. I met with the director of the school, A.V.U. He is bloated
from hunger. I tried to convince him that it is better to be without possessions than
dead.
...
Sunday 12 January
Every day there are fires. There is no water so nothing to put them out with. . . .
Wednesday 15 January
Tomorrow I will go to school. I measured the distance from home to school on a map
of the city . . . ; there and back is about 12 kilometres. It will be difficult to walk there
and back in such freezing temperatures with such sustenance.
16 January
Classes started up again at school. The pupils understand all too well, that under
current circumstances there cannot be serious classes, but according to old habits they
continue to adhere to the crazy demands of GORONO [City Department of People’s
Education]. The temperature in classrooms does not get above 2–3 degrees C. Every-
one sits there in hats and winter coats. It is natural, that the children are more con-
cerned with the receipt of lunch in the school canteen, consisting of muddy water
smelly of shit, masquerading as soup, and sweets, than classes.
Friday 17 January
I traveled to the [River] Neva for water. . . .
18 January
I spent the whole day on the registration of ration cards.
19 January
My female neighbour, S.A.B., died. Mortality in the city has reached a massive scale.
During the last week 12 people have died in our block and three have gone missing,
probably having died somewhere on the street. Their relatives tried to find them but
with no success. In our [communal] flat the number living here has decreased by half;
two have been killed at the front, three have died of emaciation, and one is in the Red
Army.
In some flats there is already nobody left.
20 January
...
It is difficult to understand for what purpose grocery shops open up daily. The shop
assistants have absolutely nothing to do. For all of January the population has not
received any sort of groceries other than bread. . . .
The trams have not been running since the first days of December. The rails are not
visible. They lie under a thick layer of snow. . . .
Friday 23 January
 The siege of Leningrad 155
The frost has got more severe. The temperature has reached -30 C. Lessons in school
have been cancelled. They essentially weren’t taking place anyway. Only 5–6 people
were in every class, the remainder going to school solely in order to receive soup and
sweets.
24 January
The bread ration has been raised. Workers will be given 400 g of bread each per day,
white-collar workers 300 g each, and dependants and children 250 g each.
25 January
On the streets there are long queues for bread. . . .
26 January
As before there are long queues for bread. One has to stand in line from 6–7 in the
morning until the middle of the day in order to receive bread. To stake your claim on
a place in line after 10 in the morning is meaningless, because by the evening the
baker no longer has any bread.
...
February 1942
1 February
...
I am deathly tired today, barely being able to get myself back home under my own
steam. Near the Petropavlovsk hospital I saw three naked corpses. They had fallen out
of a vehicle – a lorry . . . , and were lying on the street for the whole day (nobody was
interested in them). Only rarely would an inquisitive woman, halting for a minute and
glancing at the blue-green bellies, express any sympathy for the victims of this silent,
meaningless cruelty taking place before our very eyes. [Underlined in the original by
the NKVD investigator.]
(Source: Blokadnie dnevniki i dokumenti, 2004, pp. 236–245)

Vinokurov’s diary is available to us from the archives of the FSB, successor

to the NKVD and KGB. Vinokurov was arrested on 12 February 1943 and
subsequently charged with ‘counterrevolutionary anti-Soviet agitiation’ and
holding ‘defeatist perspectives on the war’, amongst other ‘crimes’ under
Article 58 of the criminal code of the RSFSR, to be shot on 19 March 1943.
He was rehabilitated in 1999, rehabilitation indicating that after review it
was decided that he had been executed as a traitor without due foundation
and for ‘political’ reasons. The usual paranoia of the NKVD had plenty of
scope for finding ‘traitors’ during the blockade as the following statistics
indicate, in addition to a desperate population being willing to risk life to
acquire food and possibly therefore save it:
Table 7.3 On deaths and reasons for them for the second half of 1941 for 15 districts of Leningrad according to the city statistical board,
31 October 1942

Cause of death July August September October November December

Total deaths Infants up ■ Total deaths Total deaths

■ ■ Total deaths Total deaths Total deaths
■ ■ Infants up
to one year to one year

Total deaths 4,162 1,211 5,357 6,808 7,353 11,085 52,881 5,959
Typhoid and paratyphoid 6 – 11 15 3 6 10 –
Typhus – – – – – 1 – –
Measles 14 2 35 53 369 481 467 112
Scarlet fever 6 2 8 12 20 13 21 1
Whooping cough 34 20 58 73 77 98 121 65
Diphtheria 24 4 33 56 86 65 86 14
Flu 7 – 7 11 41 72 276 27
Dysentery 40 11 204 190 195 124 359 108
Hemocolitis 26 7 38 57 36 45 69 14
Malaria – – 2 – 1 – 4 1
Tuberculosis (lungs) 404 12 364 382 466 535 1,572 1
Tuberculosis (other) 74 6 69 56 63 65 111 6
Croupos/lobar pneumonia 51 – 46 66 152 231 414 11
Other forms of pneumonia 358 222 336 565 1,098 1,836 4,528 2,392
Toxic dyspepsia 523 489 937 373 211 203 614 551
Acute gastro-enteritis
(children under 3 years) 331 245 742 651 569 598 1,501 1,082
Acute gastro-enteritis 28 – 93 70 65 131 585 –
(children of 3 years
and older)
Source: Volkovskii (ed.), Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh, pp. 700–701.
 The siege of Leningrad 157
Table 7.4 From a report of the Leningrad PVO on the results of aerial attacks and
artillery bombardment from 4 September 1941 to 1 March 1942, 11
March 1942. II. Number of artillery rounds and aerial bombs

Artillery rounds High-explosive bombs Incendiary bombs

From 4–15.IX [1941] 550 418 11,509

From 16–30 IX 1,664 830 3 893
From 1–15 X 1,867 635 34,906
From 16–31 X 1,425 325 8,081
From 1–15 XI 2,256 603 5,962
From 16–31 XI 2,859 442 –
From 1–15 XII 1,180 224 1,779
From 16–31 XII 576 16 70
From 1–15.I.42 337 – –
From 16–31.I 678 – –
From 1–16.II 486 – –
From 16–28.II 1 580 – –
Total 16,158 3,493 66,200
III. . . . Losses

Wounded Killed Total

From 4–30.IX [1941] 5,886 1,302 7,188

From 1–15 X 2,226 584 2,810
From 15–31 X 1,004 224 1,228
From 1–15 XI 2,957 905 3,862
From 15–31 XI 1,940 825 2,765
From 1–15 XII 1,015 446 1,461
From 15–31 XII 515 197 712
From 1–15.I.42 27 83 110
From 16–31.I 288 34 322
From 1–15.II 72 25 97
From 16–28.II 95 36 131
Total 16,025 4,661 20,686
Source: Volkovskii (ed.), Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh, pp. 680–685.

DOCUMENT 109: From a report by the head of the UNKVD LO to A.A. Zhdanov on
numbers arrested and the confiscation of weapons from them during the war, 2 April 1942
The NKVD Board has arrested 7,942 people during the Patriotic War.
Amongst those arrested are:
276 Spies
1,327 Traitors to the Motherland
277 Terrorists
48 Saboteurs
158 The siege of Leningrad
146 Wreckers
224 Participants in opposition groups
During the period concerned 334 anti-Soviet groups were liquidated, during which
1,183 people were arrested.
The militia [police] arrested 18,548 people.
Arrests can be broken down by the nature of the crime:
For theft of social property – 5,349 people
Speculation – 959 people
Banditry and brigandage – 1,684 people
For other criminal offences – 10,556 people
Criminal and bandit groups liquidated – 696
Total arrests – 26,493 people
After sentencing by military tribunals during this period 3,727 people were shot.
...
Weapons seized from criminal elements and individuals, not having permission for
them:
Military rifles – 890
Revolvers and pistols – 393
Machine guns – 4
Grenades – 27
Hunting rifles – 11,172
Small-calibre rifles – 2,954
Cold weapons – 713
Rifle and revolver cartridges – 26,676
Head of the Board of the NKVD for the Leningrad Region
Commissar for State Security 3rd Rank, P. Kubatkin
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 689–690)

Given the desperation of the food situation, it is perhaps not surprising that
cannibalism reared its head in the city:

DOCUMENT 110: On cases of cannibalism. Extracts from reporting notes of the Military
Procurator A.I. Panfilenko to A.A. Kuznetsov
In the special conditions created by the war with fascist Germany in which Leningrad
finds itself, a new type of crime has emerged. All [murders] with the aim of eating the
meat of the victim, given the special nature of the threat, qualify as banditry (Article
59-3 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR).
...
From the moment that such crimes appeared in the city of Leningrad, that is from
the start of December 1941 to 15 February 1942 investigations by organs [of state
security] led to the bringing to justice for these crimes of 26 people in December
1941, 366 in January 1942, and 494 for the first 15 days of February 1942.
...
In isolated incidences, those committing these crimes not only ate the meat of
corpses themselves but also sold the meat to others.
...
 The siege of Leningrad 159
Amongst those brought to justice . . . there were specialists with higher education.
...
Of 886 people brought to justice . . . , only 2% had previous convictions.
As of 20 February 1942 311 people were sentenced by military tribunals for the
above crimes.
Military Procurator for the city of Leningrad
Brigade Military Lawyer, A. Panfilenko
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 679–680)

By November 1942, norms for bread rations had reached 400 g for workers,
300 for administrative personnel and 250 g for the remainder, but at the
expense of other foodstuffs, and hardly enough to lift the mood in the city.
By mid-June a pipe along the bottom of Ladoga laid as a result of a GKO
decision in late April was supplying 300–400 tonnes of fuel a day to the
city, and in September the city was receiving electricity from across the
water.8 The winter of 1942–43 would not be a repeat of 1941–42, but nor
would it be a pleasant one by the standards ‘enjoyed’ by the remainder of the
Soviet population.
There were further attempts to relieve the blockade during 1941, part of
the Soviet front-wide counter-offensive of the winter of 1941–42. The ambi-
tious Liuban’ offensive by forces of the Volkhov Front and 54th Army of the
Leningrad Front, stemming from a Stavka directive of 17 December 1941 to
lift the siege of the city and destroy German forces below Leningrad, did not
limit itself to creating some sort of corridor for the establishment of land
communications with the city as the offensive of early 1943:

DOCUMENT 111: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 005826 to the command of the
Volkhov Front on the transition to a general offensive, 17 December 1941 20 h. 00 min.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. That forces of the Volkhov Front consisting of 4th, 59th, 2nd Shock and 52nd
Armies go over to a general offensive, having the aim of destroying the enemy
defending the western bank of the river Volkhov. . . .
Further operations are to consist of an advance in a north-westerly direction,
encircling the enemy defending below Leningrad, in co-ordination with forces of
the Leningrad Front.
...
5. 2nd Shock Army, consisting of 327th Rifle Division, 22nd, 24th, 25th, 3rd,
57th, 53rd, 58th, and 59th Rifle Brigades, six ski battalions, two independent
tank battalions . . . is to advance in the direction of Chashcha Station, . . . with a
further blow towards Luga.
...
I. Stalin, B. Shaposhnikov
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 79–80)
160 The siege of Leningrad
In seeking to destroy the ‘Liuban’–Chudovo’ concentration of German
forces, the aim was nothing less than the effective destruction of the German
18th Army, and was representative of the unrealistic nature of Soviet opera-
tional planning during this period. Continued hounding by the Stavka
pushed forces of the Volkhov Front to press on, despite the fact that any
momentum and surprise had long gone:

DOCUMENT 112: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 170126 to the command of the
Volkhov Front on the destruction of the Liuban’–Chudovo grouping of the enemy, 26 February
1942 02 h. 30 min.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command does not oppose the suggested
strengthening of the Liuban’ and Chudovo groupings of 2nd Shock Army and 59th
Army.
The Stavka however at the same time categorically demands that under no circum-
stances are offensive operations by 2nd Shock and 59th Army on the Liuban’ and
Chudovo axes to be discontinued in expectation of reinforcement, on the contrary, it is
to be demanded of them that they have reached the Liuban’-Chudovo railway by
March, so that after their reinforcement and no later than 5 March the Liuban’-
Chudovo grouping of the enemy has been liquidated.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin
B. Shaposhnikov
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, p. 92)

The 2nd Shock Army would eventually suffer the same fate as forces
engaged in operations to seize Khar’kov to the south during the spring of
1942, much equipment and many personnel not escaping to Soviet lines
after the German encirclement, including the commander of 2nd Shock,
Lieutenant-General A.A. Vlasov, captured by German forces on 12 July,9
the day before the Stavka request below:

DOCUMENT 113: To the Head of the Headquarters of the Volkhov Front on measures for the
clarification of the situation for forces of the 2nd Shock Army, 13 July 1942
The exit [from encirclement] of groups of and individual soldiers of units of 2nd Shock
Army still continues. . . .
Nonetheless, the Headquarters of the Volkhov Front . . . has not reported anything
on the situation for units of 2nd Shock Army remaining in encirclement.
Take urgent action for the collection of materials from the questioning of those
breaking out of encirclement, and through the personal questioning of commanders,
and by 20.7.1942 present your conclusions on these materials.
Tikhimorov
Rizhkov
(Source: RA T.23 (12–2), 1999, p. 238)
 The siege of Leningrad 161
In mid-1942 a second, more realistic Soviet operation was launched to relieve
the siege of Leningrad, the ‘Siniavino’ Operation, beginning in mid-August,
which pre-empted and stalled the proposed German operation ‘Northern
Lights’, an attempt to execute a close encirclement of the city from the east that
would cut Leningrad off from her lifeline across Lake Ladoga. Whilst the Soviet
operation for the relief of Leningrad sucked German troops intended to execute
‘Northern Lights’ into defensive operations, during which they suffered high
casualties, and prevented operations for the proposed close encirclement to be
launched, it nonetheless failed to break through heavily fortified German posi-
tions of the Shlissel’berg corridor below Lake Ladoga.
Only in January 1943 would the land blockade finally be lifted with
Operation ‘Spark’ [‘Iskra’], the objective of which was a repeat of the unsuc-
cessful attempt to relieve the blockade of the summer of 1942. Operation
‘Spark’ started on 12 January 1943 and had led to a breakthrough of
German positions below Lake Ladoga and the linking up of forces of the
Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts by 18 January, allowing a railway line to be
laid along the five to seven-mile wide corridor to the city, albeit one under
constant German bombardment:10

DOCUMENT 114: Letter of the military soviet of the Leningrad Front to the commander of
the 63rd Guards Rifle Division on the military achievements of the division and with
congratulations on its reorganization as a guards division, 21 January 1943
The military soviet of the Leningrad Front warmly congratulates you and salutes you
and all the personnel of the units entrusted to your command on the reorganization of
your division as the 63rd Guards Rifle Division.
In bitter fighting to break the enemy blockade, units of your division in the first
wave of the shock group of 67th Army, having overcome the River-Neva line broke
through heavily fortified enemy positions, destroying the Mar’ino strongpoint and
developing a thrust in the direction of Worker’s Settlement Number 5, on the second
day of fighting broke through to a depth of 7 km. Having cut off the Shlissel’berg
enemy grouping and facilitating the development of the penetration of neighbouring
divisions to Shlissel’berg, on 18 January units of your division were the first to join up
with forces of the Volkhov Front and with those same forces played a leading role in
the fighting for the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad.
...
Honour and glory to the commanders and guards, first to break through the enemy
blockade of Leningrad!
...
Commander of the forces of the Leningrad Front, Colonel-General L. Govorov
Member of the military soviet of the front, Secretary TsK VKP(b) A. Zhdanov
...
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, p. 337)

The complete relief of the blockade would have to wait another year.
162 The siege of Leningrad
Guide to further reading
J. Barber and A. Dzeniskevich (eds), Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941–1944 (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
R. Bidlack, ‘The Political Mood in Leningrad during the First Year of the Soviet-German
War’, Russian Review, Volume 59, Number 1 (2000), pp. 96–113.
David M. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941–1944 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2002).
Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York and Evanston: Harper
and Row, 1969) and many other editions.
C. Simmons and N. Perlina (eds), Writing the Siege of Leningrad – Women’s Diaries, Memoirs and
Documentary Prose (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005).
8 Lend-Lease aid, the Soviet
economy and the Soviet Union at
war

Given the legitimating role that eventual victory in the Great Patriotic War
would play for the Soviet regime, and the terrible cost the Soviet population
would pay for victory, it is understandable why the role of Allied aid in the
Soviet war effort was played down in Soviet writing on the war, to the point
that it was almost ignored. This is particularly understandable in the
context of Cold War animosities. Aid, provided by the United States,
Britain and the Commonwealth, was provided in the main without charge
under the US Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 or its principles as described
below and adopted by the British. Whilst the capitalist world could be
accused of providing material assistance to the Soviet Union to save the lives
of its own troops, it could not reasonably be accused of profiteering at Soviet
expense. Military and associated aid, provided at Soviet request, was a stark
reminder of the limitations of the Soviet system under Stalin and the debacle
faced by the Soviet Union as a result of Soviet foreign and defence policy on
the eve of war.
Despite considerable political and academic interest in ‘Lend Lease’ in the
United States particularly during the Cold War, a lack of detailed informa-
tion on the Soviet war effort in general and Soviet use of Allied aid in
particular prevented Western authors from coming to a balanced assessment
of the significance of Allied aid for the Soviet Union during the war. With
not only Western but also most Soviet authors denied access to relevant
archival materials, detailed analyses of the application of Allied aid were
kept out of Soviet historical monographs. Analysis of the significance of
Allied aid for the Soviet war effort in general works and even more focused
journal articles often did not go further than the frequently cited claim,
attributed to the wartime First Vice-Chairman of the Council of People’s
Commissars Voznesenskii, that Allied aid represented ‘only 4 per cent’ of
Soviet production during the war.1 The following extract is perhaps not
typical of much work published in the 1970s and 1980s that follows the
above characterization, but represents the most balanced Soviet appreciation
of Lend-Lease aid. During Khrushchev’s premiership and a brief period
afterwards, that is, from at the earliest 1956 to the mid-1960s – a period
known as the ‘thaw’ – historians were allowed much more leeway in what
164 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
they wrote. The example here is from the six-volume ‘official’ history of the
Great Patriotic War, the last volume of which was completed in 1965:

DOCUMENT 115: Extract from the concluding volume of the Khrushchev-era ‘official’ Soviet
history of the Great Patriotic War on the significance of Lend-Lease aid for the Soviet war effort
Bourgeois propaganda of the post-war years spent not inconsiderable energy in order
to convince the world that the growth of the material means [osnashchennost’] of the
Red Army during the war was achieved to a large extent thanks to deliveries of
weapons, technical equipment, and a variety of materials by the Allied countries –
USA and Britain. Of course these deliveries were not inconsequential, especially the
supply to troops and the rear of automotive transport, fuels and lubricants (from the
USA and Britain 401,400 automobiles and 2,599,000 tons of oil products). But if
speaking of the general increase in the armament of the Red Army, then the assistance
of the Allies played, overall, an insignificant role.
During the war years 489,900 artillery pieces of all calibres, 136,800 aircraft and
102,500 tanks and self-propelled guns were delivered by Soviet industry. From the
USA and Britain during the same period 9,600 artillery pieces, 18,700 aircraft and
10,800 tanks were received. . . . In addition it was often the case that the Allies sent us
already outdated examples of weapons. For instance tanks and a large proportion of the
aircraft did not fully satisfy demands of weapons required by the character of military
activity on the Soviet-German front.
(Source: Istoriiia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945, 1965, p. 48)

Photographs of Allied equipment in Soviet use were not intentionally pub-

lished in Soviet works. Mention of Allied aid would creep into military
memoirs, but only apparently on the understanding that the value of Allied
equipment was denigrated or at least compared unfavourably to Soviet
equivalents, to which there appear to have been few exceptions. The follow-
ing example, concerned with the conversion of a Soviet unit to British-
supplied Hurricane fighter aircraft in the summer of 1942, is not unusual.
The author, Kaberov, using the device of fictitious dialogue, reports on the
assessments of Soviet pilots on the aircraft concerned:

Vladimir Konstantinovich brought the machine in to land.

‘Thank you’, he said, climbing out of the cockpit. ‘Of course, it’s not
a Yak, but with the types of cannon that have now been fitted in to the
Hurricane, I think it is possible to use it in aerial combat.’
. . . I thought that the name ‘Hurricane’ hardly matched the technical
qualities of the machine. . . .
Yefimov, our Commissar, got it right: ‘The aircraft is fine; it’s metal,
so it won’t catch fire. You can shoot from it. But instead of manoeuvra-
bility and speed – you’ll have to use your Russian wits!’2

Whilst a considerable English-language literature emerged during the Cold

War on the diplomatic dimensions to ‘Lend-Lease’ aid to the Soviet Union
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy 165
during the Great Patriotic War (of which key works appear in the section on
further reading for this chapter), as a result of the lack of access to Soviet
sources there is very little on the value of Allied aid to the Soviet war effort.
There is certainly little that focuses on British aid alone, with the exception
of Beaumont’s Comrades in Arms. In more general Western literature, such as
Overy’s Russia’s War, and indeed much post-Soviet work in Russian, includ-
ing Sokolov’s article translated into English in the Journal of Slavic Military
Studies, both in the Further Reading section, it is often assumed that ‘Lend-
Lease’ aid only became of significance to the Soviet war effort as deliveries
increased from 1943 onwards, in particular in facilitating the forward move-
ment of the Red Army with lorries and other transport resources. The value
of arms provided by Britain and the United States, with the possible excep-
tion of aircraft, is often played down, and in particular the significance of the
relatively small quantities being delivered during the period of the First
Moscow Protocol (agreement), covering the period to 30 June 1942, the
only period during which Britain bore the heavier burden in the provision of
aid than the United States.
This chapter will examine the scale and importance of Lend-Lease aid for
the Soviet war effort during three phases of the war: the first phase, up to
November 1942, during which Germany was able to take the strategic initi-
ative; a second phase from November 1942 to July 1943, during which the
Axis could take the initiative only at an operational or at best operational-
strategic level; and a third, from August 1943, during which the Soviet
Union certainly held the strategic initiative against an Axis only able take
the offensive at an operational level and even then in response to Soviet
activity. These three phases coincide approximately with four different
Allied aid protocols or agreements with the Soviet Union, covering the
period up to June 1942 (the 1st (Moscow) Protocol); from July 1942 to June
1943 (the 2nd (Washington) Protocol); with the final two protocols from
July 1943 to June 1944 and June 1944 to the end of the war (the 3rd and
4th London and Ottawa Protocols, respectively) being taken together.

Britain, the United States and aid to the Soviet Union

At the beginning of June 1941 Britain still stood alone against Nazi
Germany. Whilst the level of participation of the United States short of war
was, by this point, significant, the United States was far from prepared for
intervention in Europe, even without war in the Pacific. At the beginning of
September 1940, the ‘destroyers for bases’ agreement was finally signed by
Britain and the United States, with Britain paying a high price for 50 badly
needed World War I-vintage destroyers, exchanged for 99-year leases on
bases in the Caribbean. Safe after his November 1940 presidential election
victory, President Roosevelt could increasingly move to make commitments
to assist the British (with whom relations were ever more tense as ad hoc
agreements for the delivery of war materials on a ‘cash-and-carry’ basis led to
166 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
the rapid loss of British assets worldwide) that were more substantial than
the ‘destroyers for bases’ agreement. The US Lend-Lease Act or Public Law
11 came into force in March 1941, allowing the executive, for a two-year
initial period, to authorize the manufacture or procurement of items for
transfer to any nation whose defence was deemed vital to that of the United
States. By this point Britain’s gold reserves were depleted and a considerable
proportion of her overseas assets had been sold off to pay for purchases from
the United States. With Britain facing practical bankruptcy, war materials
provided under the Lend-Lease Act were crucial in sustaining Britain’s war
effort. Materials provided by the United States to the United Kingdom were
to be categorized as expended, returnable, military and non-military, with
payment only to be required for the latter, be it in reverse ‘Lend-Lease’, the
exchange of information or technology, or ultimately post-war settlement.3
The US political establishment was initially far more sensitive towards
the issue of aid to the Soviet Union than to Britain, given the strength of
anti-Soviet feeling brought about to a large extent by Soviet activities under
the auspices of the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939, including the occupa-
tion of the Baltic Republics. Attempts were made by those most critical of
the Soviet Union to exclude her from future use of the Lend-Lease Act even
before German troops crossed the Soviet frontier. Nonetheless, immediately
after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and initial Soviet approaches
to the United States, the US government thawed frozen Soviet assets
totalling $40 million and opted not to apply the provisions of the Neutral-
ity Act of November 1939 obstructing the sale of arms to her. This allowed
the Soviet Union to purchase war materials from the United States subject
to export permit. The first Soviet order was received by the United States on
30 June and a Soviet military mission arrived in the United States on 26
July 1941. Nonetheless, even if purchased and not under the Lend-Lease
Act, opposition to assistance to the Soviet Union was significant, and in July
1941 Congress reviewed legislation introduced pre-emptively to exclude the
Soviet Union from Lend-Lease and indeed ensure the application of the Neu-
trality Act to her. Given the Soviet Union’s long-term shortage of hard cur-
rency and diminishing gold reserves, the amount of military aid that could
be provided to the Soviet Union by the United States would be strictly
limited unless it could be provided under the Lend-Lease Act. Such a move
would require negotiation with the Britain, which in the short term at least
would have to pass over some material originally destined for her.4
By late summer 1941, a considerable range of Soviet requests for aid had
been received by both the British and Americans. As early as 29 June 1941,
the Soviet Union had requested 3,000 modern fighter aircraft and 3,000
bombers from the British, as well as items such as ASDIC (sonar) sets and
anti-aircraft guns. Also significant were Soviet requests for raw materials
such as aluminium and rubber.5 Only on 6 September would responses to
Soviet requests for aid from the United Kingdom be formally considered to
be on a ‘Lend-Lease’ basis, on which date Prime Minister Churchill’s often-
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy 167
reproduced letter of 4 September was received by Moscow. In this letter,
responding to Stalin’s use of the word ‘sell’ with regard to UK fighter deliv-
eries to the Soviet Union in his message to Churchill of 3 September,
Churchill pointed out that ‘any assistance we can give you would better be
upon the same basis of comradeship as the American Lend-Lease Bill, of
which no formal account is kept in money’. Up to this point all items or
materials were apparently deemed to be either purchased on credit with the
expectation of eventual payment, be this in gold or raw materials, or, in the
instance of the first 200 Tomahawk fighters, a ‘gift’ from the United
Kingdom.6 Extracts from the two letters are reproduced as Documents 115
and 116 below:

DOCUMENT 116: Personal Message from Stalin to Churchill, sent 3 September 1941
Please accept my thanks for the promise to sell to the Soviet Union another 200
fighter aeroplanes in addition to the 200 fighters promised earlier. I have no doubt
that Soviet pilots will succeed in mastering them and putting them to use.
I must say, however, that these aircraft, which it appears we shall not be able to
use soon and not all at once, . . . cannot seriously change the situation on the Eastern
Front.
...
I think the only way [to seriously change the situation] is to open a second front
this year somewhere in the Balkans or in France, . . . and to supply the Soviet Union
with 30,000 tons of aluminium by the beginning of October and a minimum monthly
aid of 400 aeroplanes and 500 tanks (of small or medium size).
(Source: Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents
of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Volume
1, 1957, pp. 27–28)

DOCUMENT 117: Message from Churchill to Stalin, received 6 September 1941

3. About supplies. We are well aware of the grievous losses which Russian industry
has sustained, and every effort has been and will be made by us to help you. . . .
For our part we are now prepared to send you, from British production, one-half
of the monthly total for which you ask in aircraft and tanks. We hope the United
States will supply the other half of your requirements.
...
6. In your first paragraph you used the word ‘sell’. We had not viewed the matter in
such terms and have never thought of payment. Any assistance we can give you
would better be upon the same basis of comradeship as the American Lend-Lease
Bill, of which no formal account is kept in money.
...
4 September 1941
(Source: Correspondence . . . Volume 1, 1957, pp. 29–30)
168 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
Table 8.1 indicates the extent to which supplies received by the Soviet
Union during the war were purchased, as during the first few weeks of the
war for instance, or received through ‘Lend-Lease’ or the British and Com-
monwealth equivalent (described here for Britain and Canada as ‘mutual
aid’).
Whilst Soviet requests for some items such as raw materials or naval sup-
plies could be met immediately from British and Commonwealth stocks, the
delivery of significant numbers of weapon systems such as tanks and aircraft
was more complicated. British plans to equip her own forces were dependent
on US supplies, and the addition of the Soviet Union into the equation
required co-ordination between the two Anglo-Saxon powers prior to discus-
sion with the Soviet Union.
Whilst the British government was relieved that the Soviet Union was
now in the war and hopeful that she would remain so, members were also
concerned that aid to Russia from the United States would not be to the
detriment of British military priorities. This thought can only have been
made all the more unpleasant by the fact that Britain had considered going
to war against the Soviet Union in early 1940 in order to aid the Finns (see
Chapter 2). Of particular concern were deliveries of aircraft, in particular
medium and heavy bombers, which would be one of the few means for
British forces to take offensive action against the Axis outside North Africa.
As a result of Anglo-American discussions prior to the October 1941
Moscow Conference, certain Soviet requests for aid had been turned down.
At this point in the war, neither the British nor the Americans were willing
to supply the eight destroyers requested by the Soviet Union,7 nor indeed
did it seem likely that the nine minesweeping trawlers requested could be
supplied, although the United States was apparently ‘looking into the possi-
bility of production of the latter’. Nonetheless, the United States and
Britain went to the negotiating table in Moscow willing to provide 400 air-
craft and 500 tanks per month, the provision of which, if cuts to allocations
to the British and US forces were not to be severe, would require significant
increases in US output.8 British estimates of her future loss of aircraft
strength due, to a large extent, to deliveries to Russia stood at 13 per cent
for medium and heavy bomber squadrons, 14 per cent for light bombers and
9 per cent for fighters.9
The Moscow Supply Conference between the Soviet Union, United States
and Britain took place between 28 September and 1 October, and saw US
commitments under the First Moscow Protocol covering the period to 30
June 1942 to supply 1,500,000 tons of supplies to the Soviet Union paid
for, in part, by cash advances on gold deliveries and future supply of raw
materials from the Soviet Union. Attempts in Congress to specifically
exclude the Soviet Union from the second Lend-Lease appropriation failed,
and on 28 October it was passed into law, with the President preserving the
right to designate Lend-Lease countries. By this point, US neutrality was
increasingly a myth, with US warships convoying non-US merchantmen as
Table 8.1 Import dynamics to the Soviet Union from 22 June 1941 to 1 July 1945 according to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign
Trade (thousands of rubles)

1941–45 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 (to 01.07)

Total 1,290,494.9 4,504.5 169,529.1 338,966.1 459,194.3 318,300.9

From the US Total 968,053.0 1,133.7 120,789.3 273,642.2 319,311.1 253,176.7
Lend-Lease 957,351.3 – 114,453.9 270,842.7 319,226.4 253,174.9
Soviet account 10,701.7 1,133.7 6,335.4 2,799.5 84.7 1.8
From the UK Total 200,416.3 3,370.8 48,739.8 58,856.3 651,154.8 24,294.6
Mutual aid 187,625.5 3,370.8 48,621.9 52,762.9 58,567.8 24,294.6
Credit 12,790.8 – 117.9 6,093.4 6,586.9 –
From Canada Mutual aid 122,025.6 – – 6,467.6 74,728.4 40,829.6
Source: RGAE f.413.o.9.d.548.l.189.
170 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
far as Iceland and with the US establishing a presence in Iran on the basis of
a Presidential Directive of 13 September. On 7 November 1941 Roosevelt
finally declared the defence of the Soviet Union essential to that of the
United States, and incorporated the Soviet Union in the provisions Lend-
Lease Act.10 Nonetheless, even meeting commitments under the First
Moscow Protocol to supply 1,500,000 tons of goods to the Soviet Union by
30 June 1942 was a challenge to the US administration as the industrial
giant started to flex its muscles. This left the United Kingdom as an equal
partner in the provision of aid to the Soviet Union for the period of the First
Protocol, even if some weapons supplied by Britain to the Soviet Union were
from British Lend-Lease allocations or previous direct purchases from the
United States (a good example of US-manufactured equipment being sup-
plied to the Soviet Union as British aid are the 200 Tomahawk fighters
mentioned above).
In addition the British would play the dominant role in the delivery of
aid during the First Protocol period. Where supply routes via Iran and
Alaska would require development, materials were largely delivered to the
Soviet ports of Arkhangel’sk and Murmansk via the increasingly perilous
route round German-occupied Norway, from which German submarines,
surface ships and aircraft could launch attacks on these ‘northern’ or ‘Arctic’
convoys.11

First Moscow Protocol commitments and aid

In terms of basic weapons systems, the United Kingdom and United States
had committed in Moscow to supply the Soviet Union with 200 aircraft
each per month until the end of June 1942, along with 250 tanks, giving
totals of 3,600 and 4,500 respectively over a nine-month period. However,
initial British deliveries of tanks would be 300 per month ‘decreasing to 250
as American supplies increase’. For the aircraft, the commitment was to
supply, in full, the quantity requested by the Soviet Union. However, the
requested ratio of 300 light/medium bombers to 100 fighters would be
replaced by 200 fighters per month from the United Kingdom and 100 of
each from the United States in order to satisfy British demands to be able to
preserve the expected rate of expansion of her bomber forces.12 The relative
significance of British deliveries would be increased temporarily during
December 1941 by US reaction to the outbreak of war with Japan, as up to
17 December 1941 US supplies destined for the Soviet Union were
unloaded from merchant vessels and provided to US forces:
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy 171

DOCUMENT 118: From a report of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR
A.I. Mikoian to Stalin and Molotov on the fulfilment of responsibilities for the supply of
weapons, equipment and war materials to the USSR for October–December 1941 following the
three-power Moscow Conference, 9 January 1942
British deliveries
. . . Assessing British deliveries as a whole, . . . recognition follows, that Great Britain is
fulfilling her obligations more or less accurately and carefully, the same however
cannot be said of the USA, on which, see below.
American deliveries
The requirements of the USA for monthly deliveries of aircraft total 600 for three
months.
...
In the following clarification for monthly deliveries the Americans have given new
figures for their aircraft deliveries, that is:

October November December Total

Total (aircraft) 128 107 160 395
Including:
Fighters 93 107 100 300
Bombers 5 – 60 65
Reconnaissance 30 – – 30

In fact only 204 have been shipped.

These include:
131 fighters.
43 bombers.
30 reconnaissance aircraft.
Of the 204 shipped aircraft:
95 have arrived in the Soviet Union.
106 are en route.
Including 8 to arrive on 12.1.1942.
3 loaded on transports but not yet sent.
Hence, unshipped aircraft . . . total 396.
Such a large number of unshipped aircraft can be explained by the fact that,
between 13 and 17 December the American government recalled almost all aircraft
supplied from those situated in US ports at that time. This meant a total of 447 air-
craft of 457 situated in ports. The large number of aircraft in US ports on 15 Decem-
ber 1941 that had yet to be dispatched was due to 152 Aerocobra fighters being sent
to ports without propellers, armament or spares. In addition, for a long period the
American government did not provide a sufficient number of transports and, in the
end, recalled all of the aircraft to be sent. In doing this a portion of the aircraft were
actually unloaded from transports. . . .
In the same way the number of tanks to be supplied has fallen well short.
The USA . . . was required to supply 750 tanks for a three-month period.
On 31 October the American government provided a new monthly figure for deliv-
eries of tanks, that is: In October 166 tanks, in November 207 tanks, and in Decem-
ber 300 tanks, a total of 673 tanks.
172 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
In reality only 182 have been supplied.
Of these: Medium – 72 tanks.
Light – 110 tanks.
Of these: Arrived in the Soviet Union – 27 tanks.
En route – 139 tanks.
In ports – 16 tanks.
...
Overall US deliveries are being conducted most unsatisfactorily.
...
A. Mikoian.
(Source: G.N. Sevost’ianov, Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia. 1939–1945, 2004, p. 192)

As discussed briefly in Chapter 4 with reference to tanks, when Allied, in

particular British, deliveries of key weapons systems for the war as a whole
are compared to Soviet production for the same period they can understand-
ably be viewed as being of little significance. However, as shown, during the
Battle for Moscow in late 1941 the Soviet resource situation was so dire that
relatively small inputs of tanks were of some significance. This situation
would continue well into 1942. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show tanks and aircraft
delivered to the Soviet Union for 1941, with Soviet production figures for
the same period, as well as force levels as of 22 June 1941, losses for the first
six months of the war, and numbers available (including foreign supplies) on
1 January 1942.
A steady stream of British-supplied tanks continued to be provided to
Soviet units during the spring and summer of 1942. From 10 May 1942
British tanks were being sent to reinforce the Briansk and Kalinin Fronts and
South-Western napravlenie, with the South-Western napravlenie to receive 90
Matildas and 70 Valentines during May 1942.13 According to Suprun,
immediately prior to July 1942 and therefore at the end of the First Moscow
Protocol period, the Red Army had 13,500 tanks in service, of which 2,200
or 16 per cent were imported, and of which over 50 per cent were British.14
However, mechanical problems, in part due to Soviet unfamiliarity with this
new, foreign equipment, kept in the region of 50 per cent of imported tanks
out of service at any one time up to the end of 1942. Soviet sources did,
however, note the general relative reliability of Leyland engines of Matildas
compared to Soviet models.15
Whilst by late 1942 Soviet production lessened the significance of British
tank supplies, aircraft deliveries, the importance of which arguably exceeded
tanks during the First Moscow Protocol period, remained significant into
1943. Soviet combat aircraft production from the end of June 1941 to the
end of June 1942 was in the region of the 16,468 aircraft given by
Harrison.16 By the end of June 1942 the UK had delivered 1,323 fighter air-
craft, or about 8 per cent of Soviet production from the start of the war.17
Given that Soviet combat-aircraft losses for this period at best approached
domestic supply, and were particularly severe for the first six months of the
Table 8.2 Allied tank deliveries compared to supplies to the Red Army for the second half of 1941, force levels on 22 June 1941, losses to
the end of 1941 and numbers available (including foreign supplies) on 1 January 1942

Heavy Medium Light Total

Number available 22.06.41 500 900 21,200 22,600

Received by Red Army 22.6–31.12.41 (inc. Allied) 1,000 2,200 2,400 5,600
Losses 22.6–31.12.41 900 2,300 17,300 20,500
Arrived from UK 187 (Matilda II) 259 (Valentine) 20 (Tetrarch – 466
via Persian Gulf)
Arrived from US 27 (M3 Light) 27
Total arrived from Allies 187 259 47 493
Number available 01.01.42 (inc. Allied) 600 800 6,300 7,700
Sources: Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 252; ‘Iz spravki Narodnogo komissara vneshnei torgovli SSSR A.I. Mikoaina . . .’, in Sevost’ianov
(ed.), Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia, p. 193; Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941–June 1942’, Journal of Mili-
tary History, Number 71 (July 2007), p. 788; Suprun, Severnie konvoi, p. 49; and TNA FO 371/29582 and FO 371/32859.
174 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
Table 8.3 Allied aircraft deliveries compared to Soviet supplies to the Soviet VVS
for the second half of 1941, force levels on 22 June 1941, losses to the end
of 1941 and numbers available (including foreign supplies) on 1 January
1942

Fighters Bombers Total combat Total aircraft

aircraft

Number available 11,500 8,400 20,000 32,100

22.06.41
Received by VVS 6,000 2,500 9,900 11,000
22.6–31.12.41
(inc. Allied)
Losses 5,100 4,600 10,300 10,600
22.6–31.12.41
Arrived from UK 711 (484 0 711 711
Hurricane, 216
Tomahawk,
11 Aerocobra)
Arrived from US (P-40) 5 (B-25) >90 > = 95
[extra to + or inc. 5
protocol] O-52 [extra
to protocol]
Total arrived <806 5 >801 > = 806
from Allies
Number available 7,900 3,700 12,000 21,900
01.01.42 (inc. Allied)
Sources: R.C. Lukas, The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945 (Tallahassee, FL:
Florida State University, 1970) pp. 29, 54, 61 and Appendix A; TNA FO 371/29582 and FO
371/32859; RGAE f.413.o.9.d.539.l.19, RGAE f.413.o.9.d.540.l.23; Krivosheev, Soviet
Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 254; ‘Iz spravki Narodnogo komissara vneshnei torgovli SSSR
A.I. Mikoaina . . .’, in Sevost’ianov (ed.), Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia, p. 192; and Suprun,
Severnie konvoi, p. 49.

war, British deliveries alone were of some significance, especially when the
particularly high Soviet losses of the first weeks of the war, depleting pre-
war stocks, are taken into account. As early as 12 October 1941, 126th
Fighter Air Regiment of the PVO was operating with Tomahawks, the first
Soviet unit to be equipped with this aircraft.18 PVO use of Allied aircraft
during 1941–45 is indicated in Table 8.4. As with much Western equip-
ment, the process of training, conducted by 27th Reserve Air Regiment that
was formed in August 1941 for the task of conversion to Allied aircraft, was
hampered by a lack of technical documentation, particularly in Russian.19
Tomahawks (P-40s) also served in late 1941 in defence of the ‘Doroga
zhizni’ or ‘Road of Life’ across the ice of Lake Ladoga to the besieged
Leningrad:
Table 8.4 Aircraft in service with the Soviet PVO, 1942–45

Type of aircraft Available 1942 1943 1944 1945

on 1.1.42 ■ ■ ■
Total Written off Total Written off Total Written off Total Written off

I-153 264 143 52 39 15 17 17 – –

I-16 411 333 131 131 69 97 94 3 1
MiG-3 351 409 192 215 215 83 83 – –
LaGG-3 170 418 172 252 68 165 108 57 57
Yak-1 136 261 119 336 113 303 201 121 91
Yak-7 – 109 17 559 136 493 199 288 74
Yak-9 – – – 108 9 671 81 876 49
LaGG-5 – – – 343 104 608 159 400 63
LaGG-7 – – – – – 47 – 98 1
Hurricane 99 468 121 823 242 975 204 760 42
Tomahawk 39 56 15 43 11 31 4 27 –
Kittyhawk – 98 56 383 62 910 90 844 11
P-39 – 12 3 65 10 597 110 682 18
Spitfire V – – – 20 3 19 7 12 1
Spitfire IX – – – – – 297 – 825 7
Kingcobra – – – – – 5 – 54 –
Total 1,470 2,307 879 3,317 1,057 5,318 1,357 5,047 415
Of which Lend-Lease 138 634 195 1,334 328 2033 415 3,204 79
% Lend-Lease 9.4 27.5 22.2 40.2 31.0 38.2 30.6 63.5 19.0
Source: I. Izotikov, ‘Na kakikh samoletakh letal Pokrishkin, ili ne boites’ britantsev, dari prinosiashchikh?’, in Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oboroni, Number 4
(1991), p. 35
176 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy

DOCUMENT 119: Order of the Commander of the VVS of the Leningrad Front to Air Forces,
8 December 1941
The task of covering the road transport route sustaining the Leningrad Front and the
city of Lenin on the section mis Osinovets, Zabor’e Station is allocated to the VVS LF
by the Military Soviet of the Leningrad Front. For the covering of this route 159th IAP
39th IAD, 13th IAP 13th AE VVS KBF are allocated.
I order:

1. ...
2. 159th IAP consisting of 20 Tomahawk aircraft is to cover the road transport
route on the section including Eremina Gora, including Zabor’e Station. Airfields
as bases: Shugozero – 6 aircraft, Podborov’e – 14 aircraft.
3. Start for covering the route from 12 December 1941.
...
Commander of the VVS of the Leningrad Front, General-lieutenant of Aviation,
Novikov
Military Commissar of the VVS of the front, Brigade Commissar Ivanov
Head of the headquarters of the VVS of the front, General-Major of Aviation, Rib-
al’chenko
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 242–243)

Even without 154th Fighter Air Regiment, also equipped with P-40s and also
committed to the defence of the ice road, the 20 Tomahawks of 159th Fighter
Air Regiment represented, according to the Commander of the VVS for the
Leningrad Front (later Marshal) Novikov, almost 14 per cent of the fighter
strength of the front as of the end of November (20/143) and more than 11 per
cent of the total air strength of the front (20/175) at the end of December 1941.20
Those aircraft types supplied by Britain either from domestic production or
from British orders from the United States such as the Kittyhawk/Tomahawk
and Hurricane were inferior to the latest marks of the German Bf109, and
indeed in aspects of performance to the latest Soviet types. Britain was reticent
to supply Spitfires to the Soviet Union given her own needs.21 However, the
Hurricane was, for instance, both rugged and tried and tested, superior to
many Soviet pre-war designs still being operated on the periphery and
arguably at least as useful at that point to many potentially superior Soviet
designs such as the LaGG- and MiG-3s and developments that were suffering
considerable teething troubles in early war production aircraft. Initial Soviet
concerns focused on its armament and armour. Not only was the armour
plating protecting the pilot seen as inadequate against medium-calibre
ammunition at ranges of 50 to 200 m, but also the all-machine gun-armament
was seen as weak. The latter was to prompt a Soviet programme of re-
armament to two 20 mm cannon and two 12.7 mm heavy machine guns.22
However, according to Soviet experts, 80 per cent of the specialist equipment
of British aircraft such as the Hurricane, for example radio and navigational
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy 177
equipment, was of such value that it was recommended for manufacture by
Soviet industry.23
Document 120 gives some indication of the range of supplies, including
tanks and aircraft, as well as their destinations within the USSR, being sup-
plied to the Soviet Union under the first aid protocol, in this case arriving
with the convoy PQ-12 in March 1942:

DOCUMENT 120: Secret. State Defence Committee. Decree No. GOKO 1497s of 26 March
1942, Moscow, Kremlin, concerned with the distribution of Allied aid arriving with convoy
PQ-12
To confirm the following plan for the distribution of armaments, equipment and
materials arriving from abroad with the 12th convoy:
1. Aircraft
[Model] [Total] [Destination] [Number]
Hurricane 136 VVS Karelian Front 60
6th AK PVO (Moscow) 40
22nd Reserve Air
Regiment (Ivanovo) 36
Curtiss P-40E24 44 VVS Karelian Front 10
27th Reserve Air
Regiment (for the
Leningrad Front) 20
6th AK PVO (Moscow)
for 126th Air Regiment 14
Aerocobra25 20 22nd Reserve Air
Regiment (Ivanovo) for
assembly 20
Cartridges VVS Karelian Front 800,000
Depot Number 50 (Bui) 4,900,000
Depot Number 53 (Seima) 4,857,000
Merlin engines 4 VVS Karelian Front 2
VVS VMF 2
Propellers 12 VVS Karelian Front 4
Depot Number 28 (Iaroslavl’) 8
Radiators 47 boxes VVS Karelian Front 14
Depot Number 28 (Iaroslavl’) 33
Spares VVS Karelian Front 30%
Depot Number 28 (Iaroslavl’) 70%
2. Tanks
Valentine26 43 For the formation of 170th, 59th, 201st, 177th,
103rd Tank Brigades
Matilda27 75 For the formation of 186th, 184th, 140th, 136th
Tank Brigades
American M-328 44 For the formation of 137th and 179th Tank
Brigades
Bren Gun Carrier 53 For the equipping of tank brigades
178 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
Prime Movers with 6 GABTU for evacuation
3-ton crane and winch companies29
Tanks are distributed equipped with arms and munitions.
...

4. Communications equipment
Radio sets Mk- 300 NK VMF 200
111–18 (received
earlier by the NK
VMF
Main Board of 100
Communications
of the Red Army)
Telegraph cable 24,000 km Karelian Front 2,500 km
(including
1,500 km 7th Independent Army 1,000 km
arriving via Iran)
...

5. Automobiles
Lorries and spares 3 374 For distribution
for them according to
(including 1,680 Appendix 1
arriving via Iran)
Reconnaissance 128 For the equipping 80
cars Bentam [sic]30 of tank brigades
GUSKA for the 48
fitting of radio sets
and handing over to
commanders of
armies with a
machine each
6. Naval weapons
Parts for ASDIC31 sets To the Communications Department of the
Northern Fleet (for construction)
Station for the determination To the Northern Fleet for setting
of the magnetic field of a ship up at Poliarnoe33
... ...
32
Spares for trawlers Northern Fleet
...

7. Supply items for quartermasters

Boots 119,611 pairs For the distribution by the Quartermaster
General of the Red Army
Blankets 600 tons As above
Knitted items 46 tons As above
Red Cross items 128 tons As above
Leather 243 tons To the People’s Commissariat of Light Industry
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy 179
8. Metal-cutting tools – 312 items
People’s Commissariat In accordance with GOKO 239 items
for the Aviation decrees Numbers 1283,
Industry 1038, 1039
...

9. Various items of equipment

People’s Commissariat Presses (including for 14 items
for the Aviation Factory Number 30 – 5
Industry items)
...

10. Metals
Main Engineering Barbed wire 2,314 tons
Board of the Red Army
...
People’s Commissariat Duraluminum34 339 tons
for the Aviation Industry
...
People’s Commissariat Aluminium 2,991 tons35
for Foreign Trade. . .
...

11. Petroleum products and chemicals

...
USG KA Aviation lubricant 236 tonnes
...
People’s Commissariat Toluol36 1,965 tonnes
for Munitions
...
People’s Commissariat Perspex37 86 tonnes
for the Aviation Industry

12. Foodstuffs
Board for Provisions of Sugar 429 tonnes
the Red Army
People’s Commissariat Sugar 628 tonnes
of the Food Industry Cocoa beans 400 tonnes
Narkomzagu38 Wheat 1,530 tonnes
Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin.
(Source: Alexander Hill, ‘The Allocation of Allied “Lend-Lease” Aid . . .’, 2006, pp. 732–737)

Whilst the number of lorries delivered to the Soviet Union during the First
Moscow Protocol was neither as significant relatively or absolutely as it
would be during subsequent protocols,39 even during the First Lend-Lease
Protocol period lorries were a scarce resource carefully allocated by the
centre, as the appendix on page 181 to the above decree suggests.
180 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
It is important to remember, especially given the historiography of ‘Lend-
Lease’ in Soviet literature, that ‘Lend-Lease’ aid items were requested by the
Soviet Union. Whilst models of weapons systems supplied might not always
have been those desired, for example Hurricanes instead of Spitfires,
nonetheless what was requested was subject to genuine need. In this context,
raw materials not subject to any quality concerns (be they justifiable or not),
such as aluminium and rubber requested from the Allies and supplied in
significant quantities by Britain and the Commonwealth, should be seen as
having been of significance. Some 18,000 tons of aluminium was promised
by Britain during the First Moscow Protocol period, of which 14,147 tons
had been supplied by the end of June 1942. Soviet production of aluminium
was 67,600 tons for the whole of 1941, dropping to 51,700 tons for 1942
(see Table 8.7). During the same period, 34,856 tons of rubber was deliv-
ered, compared to 54,000 tons initially promised and revised down to
42,000 tons in the light of the war with Japan. Also worthy of note were
medical supplies from the United Kingdom and India, although deliveries
fell far short of Soviet demands.41
A range of items were delivered by Britain to the Soviet Union that,
whilst the Soviet Union was able to produce, could not be produced in the
desired quantities whether due to the loss of plant or the disruption caused
by its evacuation, possibly in the context of limited initial capacity. An
example of aid in this category is telecommunications equipment. A
significant shortage of field telephone sets for the Red Army was high-
lighted in a GKO order of 20 July 1941. Whilst the People’s Commissariat
for Communications could be ordered to seize 20,000 standard sets from
subscribers in order to free up field sets at supply dumps, hospitals, air
defence sites and other rear-area objectives, such a solution was only a stop-
gap. Production of field sets was ordered to be re-established at the
Gor’kovsk Factory Number 197 of the People’s Commissariat for Electrical
Industry, in part because field telephone production was disrupted due to
the evacuation of Factory Number 8 from Leningrad to Molotov, with pro-
duction scheduled to be restored at this factory in September with a planned
output for that month of 5,000 units.42 Actual output for this factory for
November was only 1,000 units, prompting fresh exhortations from GKO
on 6 December 1941 to increase production; existing production at all facto-
ries being described as ‘extremely unsatisfactory’, with their directors being
reminded of their ‘personal responsibilities’ for the fulfilment of these mili-
tary orders.43 In this context ‘Lend-Lease’ aid could, to some extent, make up
for shortfalls in Soviet production. Whilst only 2,010 field telephones and
7,565 km of cable had been delivered through Arkhangel’sk by the end of
navigation during 1941, these items were delivered outside the Moscow
Protocol in response to urgent Soviet request. The Soviet Union had in fact
asked for 6,000 field telephones per month at the end of September 1941.44
Britain could offer only 2,000 immediately, with the promise of similar
quantities in future months.45 Whilst it was subsequently decided that the
DOCUMENT 121: Attachment Number 1 to GOKO Decree Number 1497s of 26 March 1942, concerned with the distribution of motor vehicles arriving with
convoy PQ-12
Distribution of Automobiles

Type of unit and board Total Including 2.5 tonne 3 tonne For what purpose allotted
1.5 tonne Ford, Studebaker and Bedford
Dodge, Chevrolet, International
Bedford

Arrived in Murmansk and southern ports

1 Mortar units 703 441 – 262 For the installation of M-8 and
M-13 [rockets] and the
40
equipping of rockets regiments
2 Tank brigades 1,150 990 160 – For artillery, mobile kitchens
and the equipping of tank
brigades
3 Artillery units 421 – 421 – For the towing of artillery and
equipping of artillery regiments
4 Auto-battalions RVGK 250 250 – – For the equipping of battalions
5 GUVVS Red Army 400 400 – – For fuel lorries, mobile starters,
mobile repair shops and oxygen
stations
6 Main Board of 200 200 – – For radio stations
Communications
7 GVKhU Red Army 150 150 – – For mobile dispensing stations,
decontamination stations and
other chemical-related machines
8 Main Artillery Board 100 100 – – For sound locators and AA gun
directors . . .
Total 3,374 2,531 581 262

(Source: Hill, ‘The Allocation of Allied “Lend-Lease” Aid . . .’, pp. 737–738)
182 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
United States would take over the whole order, nonetheless these 2,000
phones and an additional 2,000 were shipped by Britain by the end of the
First Protocol period, along with 19,125 miles of cable and 400 switch-
boards.46 During 1942, 23,311 field telephones would be delivered through
Murmansk alone by the United States and Britain, along with more than
280,000 km of field-telephone cable.47
The Soviet Union experienced similar production and supply problems to
those for land-line communications with radio sets, sustaining horrendous
radio equipment losses during the retreat of the summer and autumn of 1941.
According to Krivosheev, whilst 37,400 sets were available to the Red Army
on 22 June 1941, by 31 December 1941 total stock was only 19,300 due to
losses of 23,700 and new supplies totalling only 5,600 sets.48 Whilst only 333
separately listed sets had been supplied by Britain through Arkhangel’sk by
the end of navigation of 1941, British equipment such as tanks and aircraft
was typically supplied with radio sets, contrary to the Soviet norm.49
The import of such items as metalworking machinery highlights the fact
that ‘Lend-Lease’ aid items were at times a factor in increasing Soviet
production or establishing the production of new items. With convoy PQ-
12 alone, arriving in March 1942, 312 metal-cutting machine tools were
delivered (see Document 120), in addition to a range of other items for
Soviet industry such as machine presses and compressors. The principal
recipient of the metal-cutting tools in this instance was the People’s Com-
missariat for the Aviation Industry, receiving 239 tools. The number of
machine tools delivered by Britain was, even in terms of Soviet wartime pro-
duction, limited. Britain shipped 1,210 machine tools during the period of
the First Protocol, compared to Soviet production (excluding presses) for
1941 of 44,510 and 1942 of 22,935.50 However, the raw figures ignore the
fact that the Soviet Union could request specific items that it may or may
not have been able to produce for itself. Additionally, many of the British
tools arrived in early 1942, during the first quarter of which Soviet produc-
tion was, according to Suprun, only 2,994. The impact of relatively small
numbers of machine tools ordered according to requirements should not, as
Suprun goes on to suggest, be underestimated. For instance, the handing
over of 40 imported machine tools to Aviation Factory Number 150 in July
1942 was apparently crucial in enabling the factory to reach projected capac-
ity within two months.51
During the first Lend-Lease protocol period British supplies of basic
weapons systems were significant when Soviet production was recovering
from the loss and relocation of industrial capacity as a result of the Axis
invasion. British aid would also go some way to compensating for unrealistic
planning in the Soviet Union, both in topping up Soviet production and
providing scarce resources on demand, even if with delay, which could, as in
the case of machine tools, unclog bottlenecks and put unused capacity in the
system to use. Perhaps also important, although difficult to assess, was
the psychological impact of British readiness to support the Soviet Union for
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy 183
the Soviet population and indeed the leadership. Particularly early in the
war, the Soviet population was reminded that it was not alone in the fight
against Nazi Germany, but was now part of an alliance that would have
seemed unthinkable only months before when there was the genuine
prospect of the Soviet Union and Germany both being at war with Britain
and France had the latter countries intervened in Finland. For the Soviet
leadership, it was clearly comforting to be increasingly aware that, despite
pre-war animosities, the West was willing to provide, with few questions
asked and without financial recompense, not only equipment and raw mater-
ials, but also the latest technology. The praise that Stalin lavished on his
allies in November 1941 would not be repeated later in the war:

DOCUMENT 122: Extract from a speech made by Stalin on the eve of the twenty-fourth
anniversary of the October Revolution, 6 November 1941
The recent three-power conference in Moscow with the participation of the
representative of Great Britain, Mr Beaverbrook, and of the representative of the
United States, Mr Harriman, decided systematically to assist our country with tanks
and aircraft. As is known, we already have begun to receive shipments of tanks and
planes on the basis of this decision.
Still earlier, Great Britain ensured the supply to our country of such needed mater-
ials as aluminium, lead, tin, nickel, and rubber.
If to this is added the fact that recently the United States decided to grant a billion
dollar loan to the Soviet Union, it can be confidently said that the coalition of the
United States, Great Britain and the USSR is a real thing which is growing and which
will continue to grow for the benefit of our common cause of liberation. Such are the
factors determining the inevitable death of German fascist imperialism.
(Source: Joseph Stalin, 1944, pp. 30–31)

Before looking at aid delivered during the Second and Third Protocol
periods, it is worth noting that high-technology items such as RADAR and
ASDIC sets, in the development of which the Soviet Union lagged far
behind Britain, the United States and Germany, were also being delivered to
the Soviet Union during the First Protocol period, and assisted in the
technological advancement of the Soviet Union as the war progressed. As an
initial example of the sort of RADAR technology provided to the Soviet
Union during the first year of the war, we will take British GL-2 sets. These
sets were provided to the Soviet Union for the purpose of air defence. Whilst
the effectiveness of such early ‘gun-laying’ radars was limited to giving
accurate range and limited elevation data, their use by the sea gave increased
effectiveness in determining elevation.52 These sets were of sufficient per-
ceived value to the Soviet Union to be the subject of a GKO order of 10
February 1942, requiring that Soviet industry copy the GL-2 set as the
SON-2, importing key components and indeed allocating 100 metal-
cutting machine tools from imported supplies for the establishment of
184 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
production.53 Six GL-2 or SON-2 sets arrived at Murmansk with the convoy
PQ-13 in March 1942 with more following.54
More significant were ASDIC and RADAR for naval use, examples of
which arrived during the First Protocol period but took time to install on
Soviet ships and for Soviet crews to master. Where basic weapons systems
supplied by Britain were an important top-up to Soviet production during
the First Protocol period, and could be deployed and used effectively by
Soviet units in a short space of time as shown with tanks in Chapter 4, it can
be argued that in additional to the supply of raw materials and machinery,
British aid had the most significant impact (albeit not always immediately)
in technological areas where British expertise and production were most
advanced compared to the Soviet Union, generally on the periphery of the
Soviet war effort.
The geographical area in which ‘Lend-Lease’ aid from Britain during the
first year of the war can be argued to have had the most significant impact
on the Soviet war effort was in the far north, and in particular for the
Northern Fleet. Much of the material initially requested by the Soviet
Union from Britain was naval, in the development and production of which
Britain maintained a considerable technological lead in many spheres. The
Soviet Union was also willing to cut the production of naval equipment at
the beginning of the war and transfer capacity to other, more pressing
needs on land, as in the case of Factory Number 112 switching capacity
from the production of submarines to tanks (see Table 8.6 below). Whilst
the historical and wartime neglect of naval forces made sense in the 1930s
and during the summer and autumn of 1941 when the focus was on the
Red Army, with German forces turned back before Moscow and with the
significance of northern waters for the delivery of Allied aid and for Soviet
internal communications naval forces had a role to play in the Soviet war
effort. ‘Lend-Lease’ ships, aircraft and equipment, when combined with its
own war and, to some extent, British experience, would go some way to
make up for the relative Soviet neglect of naval forces since the October
Revolution.

Lend-Lease aid during the second and third Lend-Lease

protocols
From the second Lend-Lease protocol onwards, the Allies were able to
exploit shipment routes to Iran and the Far East in addition to the perilous
Arctic route. Weapons received by the USSR via the different routes are
illustrated in Table 8.5.
Whilst, as Table 8.4 illustrates, Lend-Lease aircraft deliveries continued
to be of significance to the Soviet Union after the period of the First Proto-
col, during the Second Protocol tank deliveries from Britain and the United
States were of less importance to the Soviet war effort given the staggering
increases in Soviet production achieved during 1942 and 1943. Production
Table 8.5 Weapons imports to the Soviet Union by route, 22 June 1941 to 1 July 1945 (000s tons)

Total 1941–45 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

1,517.0 26.2 200.3 447.2 533.8 309.5

Tonnage (000s tons) % 100

Via Soviet northern ports Tonnage 600.2 26.2 168.0 114.9 188.7 102.5
% 39.6 99.6 83.9 25.7 35.3 33.1
Via Soviet Baltic ports Tonnage 0.1 – – – – 0.1
% 0.01 – – – – 0.03
Via Soviet Far Eastern ports Tonnage 284.9 – 5.2 75.9 69.0 134.8
% 18.8 – 2.6 17.0 12.9 43.6
Via Soviet Arctic (Northern Sea Route) Tonnage 38.79 – 1.0 18.7 18.4 0.6
% 2.5 – 0.5 4.2 3.5 0.2
Via Black Sea ports Tonnage 24.3 – – – – 24.3
% 1.6 – – – – 7.8
Via Iran Tonnage 511.0 0.1 18.8 222.1 233.6 36.4
% 33.7 0.4 9.4 49.7 43.8 11.8
Under own power or by air Tonnage 56.0 – 6.3 15.3 23.6 10.8
% 3.7 – 3.1 3.3 4.4 3.5
Other Tonnage 1.8 – 1.0 0.3 0.5 –
% 0.1 – 0.5 0.1 0.1 –
Source: RGAE f.413.o.9.d.555.l.17.
186 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
Table 8.6 Soviet T-34 production, 1940–45

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Total production 117 3,014 12,527 15,821 14,648

Factory Number 183
(Khar’kov) 117 1,560 – – –
Factory Number 183
(evacuated to N. Tagil) – – 5,684 7,466 6,583
Factory Number 174 (Omsk) – – 417 1,347 2,163
Factory Number 112 (Sormovo) – 173 2,584 2,962 3,619
Kirov (Cheliabinsk) – – 1,055 3,594 445
UZTM (Sverdlovsk) – – 257 452 –
STZ (Stalingrad) – 1,256 2,520 – –
Source: Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR, pp. 163–164 (amended).

of the T-34 will serve as an example, as provided in Table 8.6. Such

increases in production were, however, at the expense of other heavy indus-
trial products, in particular lorries. Table 8.7 gives an indication of the cost
to production in other areas of the Soviet economy of the German invasion
and focus on the production of key weapons systems.
Particularly hard hit by the loss of labour, plant and indeed territory was
Soviet agriculture. The Soviet Union lost the Ukrainian ‘bread basket’ for
much of the war, with agriculture elsewhere being hit by the loss of adult
male labour to the Red Army which was not replaced by the intensified use
of remaining land through mechanization or greater use of fertilizers, for
instance. Even horses for use in the fields were in high demand from the Red
Army throughout the war (see Document 39, Chapter 3 and Document 69,
Chapter 5), as motor and horse-drawn transport resources were required in
the civilian economy to get produce to railheads and local population
centres. Table 8.8 illustrates the agricultural crisis that hit the Soviet Union
during the Great Patriotic War, just as it was starting to recover from the
self-inflicted crisis of collectivization from the late 1920s.
Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union introduced rationing in stages during
1941, which soon applied to the urban population across Soviet territory and
the rural population with the exception of collective farmers. Official rations
were not, however, always available, and many Soviet citizens not in the Red
Army, key manual occupations or privileged white-collar positions did not
receive minimum nutrition from their rations. Auxiliary farms, for instance
belonging to factories, private allotments and purchases from kolkhoz
markets at unregulated prices would save some, but starvation was a stark
reality for many in the Soviet rear, and not just in besieged Leningrad. There
was inevitably a thriving ‘black’ market.55 Allied food aid undoubtedly
made an important contribution to the Soviet war effort. The United States
 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economoy 187
alone shipped more than 4.5 million tons of food to the Soviet Union during
the war, with much provided in the form of concentrated (often dried) high-
calorie foods. Such non-perishable foodstuffs, including tinned goods, were
particularly valuable to the advancing Red Army from mid-1943 (the start
of the Third Protocol) onwards.56
During 1941 and 1942, when Soviet units were on the defensive or falling
back on railheads, the absence of local automotive transport production was
perhaps not critical given the more pressing need for tanks and other weapons
to stop the enemy, but by the time Soviet troops had gone over to the sustained
offensive from mid-1943 transport resources were an issue of considerable oper-
ational significance. Without the means to keep advancing Soviet units sup-
plied beyond railheads that were often considerable distances from mobile
forces, and which in the face of German scorched-earth policy would take time
to extend into formerly occupied territory, lorries gained great significance.
Without motor vehicles, bounding Soviet deep-offensive operations would not
have been possible, making it more likely that even the fairly immobile
German infantry divisions of the latter half of the war could have pulled back
to form successive defensive lines. The importance of imported motor vehicles
for the Red Army vehicle park, as well as the overall increase in vehicles avail-
able and the extent to which motor vehicles were drained from the Soviet
economy for the use of the Red Army, is apparent in Table 10.3.
Also of considerable significance in maintaining the momentum of the
Soviet advance was, as indicated above, the ability to supply by rail as far as
possible (see for example Document 143, Chapter 10). Soviet heavy industry
had focused to such an extent on the production of armoured vehicles and
weapons that the production of track and locomotives had been neglected,
with much of the former destroyed where possible by the retreating Axis
forces and where a significant quantity of rolling stock had either been cap-
tured or destroyed during the German advance. Table 8.9 below provides
details of US Lend-Lease shipments for six key items for the war as a whole,
including locomotives, compared to Soviet production for the period
1941–45, and in many ways illustrates both Soviet economic achievements
despite the damage caused to her economy by the German invasion and the
importance of Lend-Lease aid for the Soviet war effort.
It would be difficult and unconvincing to argue that ‘Lend-Lease’ aid
‘saved’ the Soviet Union from defeat in 1941 or, indeed, at any point during
the war. Axis forces were halted before Moscow with Soviet blood, and to a
large extent with Soviet-manufactured arms and equipment. Soviet troops
continued to fight largely with Soviet-produced arms, even if they were
increasingly frequently ferried into battle, resupplied and mounted on US-
supplied lorries.
Lend-Lease aid provided during the period of the First Moscow Protocol
certainly had a far more significant impact on the Soviet war effort and
indeed on front-line capability both during and after the Battle for Moscow
than the Soviet and indeed Western historiography would suggest. What is
Table 8.7 Soviet civilian industrial production of key products, 1940–45

Product 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Crude Steel (000s tons) 18,317 17,893 8,070 8,475 10,887 12,252
Pig iron (000s tons) 14,902.3 13,815.6 4,779.1 5,591.1 7,296.4 8,802.7
Tubular steel (000s tons) 966.1 780.3 280.9 370.4 482 571.4
Rolled metal (000s tons) 13,113 12,588 5,415 5,675 7,278 8,485
Rails (000s tons) 1,360 874 112 115 129 308
Wire (000s tons) 680 649 210 191 224 350
Aluminium (000s tons) 60.1 67.6 51.7 62.2 82.7 86.7
Nickel (000s tons) 10.3 11.3 8.9 13.4 15.8 18.4
Coal (000s tons) 165,923 151,428 75,536 93,141 121,470 149,333
Oil (000s tons) 31,121 33,038 21,988 17,984 18,261 19,436
Petrol (000s tons) 4,435 4,306 2,537 2,782 3,792 3,159
Diesel fuel (000s tons) 629 936 209 478 535 518
Mineral fertilizer (000s tons) 3,237.7 2,674.4 364.4 539.3 775.6 1,121.2
Toluene (000s tons) 37.9 57.9 38.1 39.8 38.3 33.5
Lathes 58,437 44,510 22,935 23,281 34,049 38,419
Mainline steam locomotives 914 708 9 43 32 8
Mainline freight trucks 30,880 33,096 147 108 13 819
Lorries/buses 139,879 118,704 32,409 46,720 55,167 69,662
Cars 5,511 5,472 2,567 2,546 5,382 4,995
Caterpillar tractors 26,530 23,827 3,520 1,063 2,889 6,562
Wheeled tractors 5,119 0 0 0 265 1,166
Tractor ploughs 38,438 18,527 1,338 3,056 3,371 8,474
Horse ploughs 34,252 36,495 1,212 41,736 35,638 39,230
Tractor seed drills 21,426 13,173 0 0 504 1,578
Horse seed drills 10,927 15,591 33 151 1,648 3,289
Cranes 454 350 1 26 62 57
Elevators (loading) 513 268 12 11 9 44
Commercial timber (million cu. m.) 117.9 115.1 48.2 43.4 52.4 61.6
Leather footwear (000s pairs) 211,033 157,687 52,675 55,804 67,423 63,115
Granulated sugar (000s tons) 2,165 523 114 117 245 465
Refined sugar (000s tons) 628 638 14 28 25 54
Tinned goods (millions tins) 1,113 926 485 546 557 558
Flour (millions tons) 29 24 16 13 13 15
Source: Harrison, Accounting for War, pp. 195–197.
190 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
Table 8.8 Soviet agricultural production, 1940–45

Product 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Grains (millions of tons) 95.5 55.9 29.7 29.4 49.1 47.2

Potatoes (millions of tons) 75.9 26.4 23.8 34.9 54.9 58.1
Other vegetables
(millions of tons) 13.7 5.5 4.3 6.7 10.2 10.3
Sunflower seeds (000s tons) 2,636 909 283 784 1,042 843
Sugar beets (millions of tons) 18 1.9 2.1 1.3 4.1 5.5
Milk (millions of tons) 33.6 25.5 15.8 16.4 22 26.4
Meat (live weight) (000 tons) 7,502 7,044 3,405 3,288 3,632 4,690
Eggs (billions) 12.2 9.3 4.5 3.5 3.6 4.9

Source: Harrison, Accounting for War, p. 262.

perhaps of particular note is not only the speed with which Britain in
particular was willing and able to provide aid to the Soviet Union after
initial hesitation, but how quickly the Soviet Union was able to put foreign
equipment to use.
During the second protocol the quantity of Allied aid being shipped to
the Soviet Union increased significantly, as indeed did the number of routes
via which it was delivered, and coincided with the period during which the
Soviet Union was wresting the strategic initiative from the Wehrmacht.
During this period the United States overtook the United Kingdom as the
dominant provider of aid. Whilst the importance of Allied tanks declined
compared to the first protocol, given the re-establishment of evacuated plant
and then dramatic increase in Soviet production, the importance of Allied
aircraft remained high and the delivery of Allied lorries started to have an
impact on the mobility of the Red Army. Such vehicles, along with radio
sets, had an increasingly significant impact on Soviet operational effective-
ness and the command and control of Soviet forces.
During the third and fourth protocols, the import of weapons systems
was far less important than the role of Lend-Lease supplies not only in main-
taining the momentum of the Red Army advance through the provision of
lorries and other transport resources, but also through the provision of non-
perishable foods. Such foods for the Red Army to some extent released local
stocks for civilian use. During the third and fourth protocols, Lend-Lease aid
can be said to have allowed the Soviet Union to continue to focus on the
production of key weapon systems without this focus leading to an economic
imbalance that would have started to create bottlenecks or forced the re-
allocation of valuable Soviet resources from the production of weapons
systems.57
Table 8.9 Comparison between Soviet production and US Lend-Lease aid for key items, 1941–45

Item Lend-Lease shipments 1941–45 Soviet production 1941–45

Tanks and self-propelled guns 1,683 light, 5,489 medium, 115 heavy, 1,807 104,477 (July 41–September 45)
‘gun-motor carriages’ = 9,094
Trucks 433,967, including 49,250 quarter-ton 4  4 322,662 (January 41–December 45)
Command (Jeep), 104,485 2.5 ton 6  6 Cargo
Studebaker
Boots and shoes 302,445 pairs boots and 14,604,766 ‘shoes’ 396,704 (January 41–December 45)
(including 13,470,936 Russian Service)
= 14,907,211
Steam locomotives 1,908, including 1,685 2–10–0 105-ton 800 (January 41–December 45)
60″ gauge
Aircraft (military) 11,450, including 865 medium and 3,066 117,591 (July 41–September 45)
light bombers, 6,695 fighters and 739 transport
aircraft (708 C-47)
Sources: Harrison, Accounting for War, pp. 180 and 195–198 and Office, Chief of Finance, War Department, Lend-Lease Shipments. World War II (Washing-
ton, DC: 31 December 1946).
192 Lend-Lease aid and the Soviet economy
Guide to further reading
J. Barber and M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945 (London: Longman, 1991),
chapters 7–11.
J. Beaumont, Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941–1945 (London: Davis-Poynter,
1980).
M. Harrison, ‘Resource Mobilization for World War II: the USA, UK, USSR and Germany,
1938–1945’, Economic History Review, Volume XLI, Number 2 (May 1988), pp. 171–192.
M. Harrison, Accounting for War. Soviet Production, Employment and the Defence Burden,
1940–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Alexander Hill, ‘The Allocation of Allied “Lend-Lease” Aid to the Soviet Union arriving with
Convoy PQ-12, March 1942 – A State Defense Committee Decree’, JSMS, Volume 19,
Number 4 (December 2006), pp. 733–734.
Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941-June 1942’,
Journal of Military History, Volume 71, Number 3 (July 2007), pp. 773–808.
R.H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1969).
Richard C. Lukas, Eagles East: The Army Air Force and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945 (Tallahas-
see, FL: Florida State University Press, 1970).
R. Munting, ‘Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941–1945’, Soviet Studies,
Volume 36, Number 4 (1984), pp. 582–593.
Jacques Sapir, ‘The Economics of War in the Soviet Union during World War II’, in I.
Kershaw and M. Lewin (eds), Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 208–236.
B.V. Sokolov, ‘The Role of Lend-Lease in Soviet Military Efforts, 1941–1945’, JSMS, Volume
7, Number 3 (September 1994), pp. 567–586.
H.P. Van Tuyll, Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union 1941–1945 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1989).
V.F. Vorsin, ‘Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through “Lend-Lease” ’, JSMS, Volume 10,
Number 2 (June 1997), pp. 153–175.
9 The Soviet Partisan Movement

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin and the Soviet leader-
ship sought to foster resistance to the Axis invasion not only at the front line
but in Axis rear areas. Whilst the Soviet authorities could utilize the
Russian tradition of partisan warfare on which they had drawn during the
Civil War and intervention, with the shift in Soviet doctrine in the late
1930s towards a primacy of the offensive, preparations for partisan warfare
on Soviet territory in the event of foreign invasion were curtailed. As Pan-
teleimon Ponomarenko, wartime head of the partisan movement recalled:

DOCUMENT 123: Retrospective comments by Panteleimon Ponomarenko, wartime head of the

partisan movement, on pre-war preparations for partisan warfare
Despite a rich tradition and experience of partisan warfare and underground activity in
previous wars, we did not have a single academic work putting this experience in
context. The preparations being carried out during peacetime for partisan warfare were
cut short in the mid-1930s, and caches of weapons, supplies and technical equipment
created for this end were liquidated. The reason for this was without a doubt the unreal-
istic thrust of our military doctrine, stating that if the imperialists unleash war against
the Soviet Union, then it will only take place on enemy territory. Even if it wasn’t
accepted unconditionally by the military leadership in planning, this doctrine was
nonetheless promoted in the press and in the speeches of prominent political and mili-
tary figures, and supplanted the idea that war could be transferred to our territory.
(Source: P.K. Ponomarenko, 1965, p. 34)

Most of those involved in such preparations seem to have perished during

the Great Purges of 1936–38.1
As the scale of the Axis invasion of 22 June 1941 became apparent, the
Soviet leadership sought to resurrect previous plans to hamper an enemy
advance through partisan activity:
194 The Soviet Partisan Movement

DOCUMENT 124: Directive of the SNK SSSR and TsK VKP (b) to Party organizations of
the prefrontal zone on the decisive reorganization of all work onto a war footing, 29 June 1941
The Sovnarkom SSSR and TsK VKP (b) requires all Party, Soviet, union and Komsomol
organizations to bring an end to placidity and a carefree attitude and mobilize all of
our organizations and all the force of our people for the total defeat of the enemy. . . .
The Sovnarkom of the Union of SSR and TsK VKP (b) demands of you, that:
...
5. In districts occupied by the enemy you create partisan detachments and diversion
groups for the struggle with units of the enemy army; for the stirring up of partisan
war here, there and everywhere; for the destruction of bridges and roads; for the dis-
ruption of telephone and telegraph communications; the raizing of supply bases and so
forth. In occupied areas intolerable conditions are to be created for the enemy and
those locals assisting him. . . .
For the timely direction of all of these activities, underground cells and safe houses
are to be created in every town, district centre, worker’s settlement, at every railway
station and on sovkhozi and kolkhozi, under the supervision of the First Secretaries of
regional and district Party committees.
...
Stalin . . . Molotov. . . .
(Source: RA T.20 (9), 1999, pp. 17–18)

More detailed instructions were provided on 18 July in a decree concerned

specifically with partisan warfare:

DOCUMENT 125: Decree of the TsK VKP (b) on the organization of the struggle in the rear
of German forces, 18 July 1941
In the struggle with Fascist Germany, which has seized part of Soviet territory, the
struggle in the rear of the German army has acquired especially great significance. . . .
In order for this struggle in the rear of the German army to acquire the largest pos-
sible scale and greatest intensity it is necessary for the leaders of republican, regional
and district Party and Soviet organizations to take on the organization of this under-
taking on the ground themselves; personally organising work in the German-occupied
districts, leading groups and units of self-motivated fighters who are already waging
the struggle to disorganise enemy forces and for the destruction of those who have
seized our territory. Meanwhile there have still been a number of certainly not isolated
instances where the leaders of Party and Soviet organisations of the districts threatened
by the German fascists have shamelessly left their posts and retreated deep into the
rear to quiet locations, in the process becoming deserters and pitiful cowards. In the
face of this heads of republican and regional organisations of the Party have not been
taken energetic measures in a number of instances with these shameful facts.
The TsK VKP (b) demands of all Party and Soviet organisations, and above all of
their leaders, that they bring and end to this intolerable situation and warns, that our
Party and government will not stop at less than the most severe measures in regard to
such self-serving individuals and deserters, and expresses confidence that Party organi-
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 195
sations will take all measures for the purging of Party organisations of these degener-
ates. . . .
In accordance with the above the TsK VKP (b) demands of the TsK of national
Communist parties, regional and district Party committees of occupied areas and those
threatened with occupation that they carry out the following:
1. Send the most reliable Party, Soviet and Komsomol leadership elements, and, at the
same time, loyal non-Party comrades familiar with conditions in the district to
which they are being sent, for the organisation of underground communist cells
and the direction of the partisan movement and struggle to create diversions in
districts occupied by the enemy. The assignment of workers to these districts
should be thoroughly prepared for and well concealed, with this end in mind it
following that every group (2–3-5 persons) that is sent should have a single point
of contact, with groups sent not having contact between themselves.
2. In districts threatened with enemy occupation leaders of Party organisations
should without delay organise underground cells. . . .
For the facilitation of the wider development of the partisan movement in the
enemy rear Party organisations should in all haste organise armed bands and
diversion groups from amongst participants in the Civil War and from those
comrades that have already proved themselves in the destruction battalions, in
militia units and also from amongst the NKVD, NKGB and others. In these
groups communists and Komsomol members not used for work in the underground
cells should be inserted.
Partisan units and underground groups should be provided with weapons,
munitions, money and valuables, with supplies being buried and hidden in
appropriate locations in advance.
In the same way it is necessary to take care to organise communications
between underground cells and partisan detachments and Soviet-held districts,
for which they are to be supplied with radio equipment – couriers, codes and
similar are to be used – and likewise provide for the distribution and printing of
leaflets, slogans and newspapers in the field.
...
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
(Source: RA T.20 (9), 1999, pp. 18–20)

As mentioned in point two, partisan units were to draw on the so-called

‘destruction battalions’ that had been charged with such activities as com-
bating enemy agents parachuted into the Soviet rear. On 24 June 1941, the
SNK SSSR had passed a special decree, ratified by the Politburo, ‘On action
to be taken in the struggle with enemy parachutists and saboteurs in the
prefrontal zone’, providing the foundation for an NKVD order of 25 June
1941.2
Important in fulfilling the requirements of the decree of 18 July was the
streamlining of the Party hierarchy undertaken from 4 July 1941 in the
Leningrad region with the establishment of troiki led by the first secretary of
the raikom to take decisions on behalf of the local Party and state apparatus.3
In the light of the decree of 18 July such troiki would be expected to remain
on occupied territory and co-ordinate the fledgling partisan movement.
196 The Soviet Partisan Movement
Although many Party personnel fled in the face of the German advance,
or evacuated during the first weeks of the war prior to the order of 18 July,4
after 18 July Party personnel, along with state and NKVD officials, were
frequently formed into partisan units on the Soviet side of the front and sent
back to the district from which they had retreated as partisans. For example,
there is the case of the Sebezh partisan detachment. Prior to the occupation
of Sebezh by German forces on 7 July 1941, members of the executive com-
mittee of the local district soviet, the district Party committee and local
NKVD personnel retreated with the Red Army to Velikie Luki where a par-
tisan detachment was formed from the ‘Party-Soviet active’ and on 11
August despatched back to Sebezh district.5 This unit consisted of:

DOCUMENT 126: Composition of the Sebezh partisan detachment, August 1941

1. Vinogradov Head of the district office of the NKVD
2. Krivonosov Secretary of the district committee of the VKP(b)
3. Petrov Secretary of the district committee of the VKP(b)
4. Kulesh Secretary of the district committee of the VKP(b)
5. Feschenko Chairman of the district executive committee
6. Petrov Chairman of the Sebezh town council
7. Morgo Head of the district education office
8. Stepashkin Acting head of the district branch of the state procurement
agency
9. Sidorov Chairman of the Sovinskii ‘parish’ council
10. Tumashev Chairman of the kolkhoz ‘Comintern’
11. Nikiforov Kolkhoz chairman
12. Mitinskaia Head of the district health department
13. Kuz’mina District censor
14. Grigor’ev Driver for the district executive committee
(Source: ‘Sekretariu Kalininskogo obkoma VKP(b) tov. Vorontsovu. Ot Sekretariu Sebezhskogo
RK VKP (b) Petrova V.E. . . . 15 noiabria 1941 g., gor. Kashin. Dokladnaia zapiska’,
RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.347.l.25)

Some partisan detachments or diversion groups, sometimes called partisan-

diversion groups, were formed primarily on the initiative of the NKVD. In
fact, a directive of 29 July for the NKVD/NKGB of the Kalinin region had,
in the light of the failure of many partisan detachments formed under Party
auspices, suggested by implication that partisan detachment be formed
solely from personnel from the destruction battalions, a responsibility of the
NKVD, and from members of the NKVD and NKGB. Such detachments
would, however, require the assistance of military formations for supply and
equipment.6 On 25 August 1941, NKVD operational groups tasked with
dealing with the threat from enemy parachutists and other saboteurs in the
Soviet rear, and established as a result of an NKVD order of 25 June 1941,
were reorganized as more significant fourth departments in the hierarchy of
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 197
republican and regional NKVD apparati, and sought to raise and dispatch
NKVD partisan detachments to the enemy rear.7 An example of a detach-
ment formed on the initiative of the NKVD is one formed on 4 September
1941 by the Kalinin region NKVD. This 24-strong ‘partisan-diversion
group’ was, after due preparation, on 12 September despatched for opera-
tions in the enemy rear in the Idritsa area on the border with Belorussia.8
Meanwhile, whilst the Party and NKVD were taking measures for the
establishment of a front in the enemy rear with varying degrees of co-
operation between them depending on location, the Red Army through the
military soviets was taking steps to establish a presence on enemy-occupied
territory. The military soviets, re-established in 1937 at the beginning of
the Purges, were a key vehicle for political influence over the Red Army,
with, at front level for instance, both the civilian Party apparatus and polit-
ical organs of the Red Army being represented. They were indeed useful
organs for the co-ordination of different arms, for instance at front level for-
mally bringing together front commanders, commanders of artillery and of
the air armies, and hence had value in operational planning.9 Given both the
political sensitivity of a partisan movement that gave its members unprece-
dented scope for independent action and hence required close political
supervision, and political and military interests in its activities, the military
soviets were, if they had the time after dealing with other concerns, the most
suitable existing organs for directing partisan activity. Without sufficient
time for dealing with detailed issues concerning the partisan movement, the
military Soviets kept track of and facilitated partisan activity before their
respective fronts and armies through subordinate organs. Initially of particu-
lar importance were the political boards of fronts and armies, under the Main
Political Directorate headed until 1942 by Lev Mekhlis.
With the Party, NKVD and political administration of the Red Army all
sponsoring partisan detachments, or, in some instances where they were
well-trained and equipped, what might be described as ‘special forces’ units,
it became increasingly apparent that command and control needed to be
more unified, in particular for partisan units. Apparently moves had been
taken within days of the German invasion to provide some sort of central
direction to the organization and activities of partisan detachments. Accord-
ing to Ponomarenko, who at the end of May 1942 would become a key
figure in the further development of the partisan movement, before the end
of June 1941 the Central Committee of the Party had taken the decision to
establish a special commission for the direction of underground activity on
German-occupied territory. Ponomarenko was, it seems, to have been a
member of this commission, along with Mekhlis. Of this Ponomarenko only
apparently became aware after the war since no further action was taken.10
On 12 August 1941 General I.V. Boldin was apparently approached by
Stalin with the suggestion that Boldin assume the position of head of a
board for the direction of the partisan movement being set up in Moscow.11
Other than being seen as politically reliable, Boldin had on 10 August 1941
198 The Soviet Partisan Movement
just escaped with 1,650 men from 45 days on German-occupied territory
following encirclement, which was no doubt an important factor in his
being approached.12 Boldin apparently turned down the position on the
grounds that he ought to remain with the field army.13 High-level
consideration of the need for a central organization for the co-ordination of
the partisan movement seems subsequently to have been postponed until the
end of the year.14
During 1942 and into 1943 considerable progress was made in providing
the Soviet partisan movement with a coherent and effective organizational
structure to replace a situation where in many areas the Party, NKVD and Red
Army were all involved in fostering partisan activity in the German rear. These
organizations were engaged in the development of partisan units in the German
rear at best without effective liaison with other organizations concerned, at
worst in competition with each other. On 30 May 1942, a GKO order was
given for the creation of a Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement
[Tsentral’nii shtab partisanskogo dvizheniia, or TsShPD], a body that would take
overall responsibility for the partisan movement across the Soviet Union:

DOCUMENT 127: GKO Decree Number 1837ss on the formation of a Central Headquarters
of the Partisan Movement attached to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, 30
May 1942
1. With the aim of unifying the direction of the partisan movement in the enemy
rear for the further development of the movement a Central Headquarters of the
Partisan Movement is to be created, attached to the Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command.
...
3. In its practical activities in the direction of the partisan movement the Central
Headquarters of the Partisan Movement should proceed from the assumption that
the principal task of the partisan movement is the disorganisation of the enemy rear:
a) The destruction of enemy lines of communication (the blowing up of
bridges . . .);
b) The destruction of means of communication (telephone, telegraph, radio
stations);
c) The destruction of supply dumps . . . ;
d) The attacking of headquarters and other such military objectives in the
enemy rear;
e) The destruction of material assets on enemy airfields;
f) The informing of Red Army units of the location, strength and movement
of enemy forces.
4. The staff of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement is to consist of
P.K. Ponomarenko (TsK VKP(b)) (in charge of the headquarters), V.T. Sergienko
(NKVD), and T.F. Korneev (Reconnaissance Board of the NKO).
Chairman of the State Defence Committee
I. Stalin
(Source: RA T.20 (9), 1999, pp. 114–115)
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 199
According to Ponomarenko, appointed head of the TsShPD, he had first
actually been approached by Stalin regarding the creation of such a head-
quarters in November 1941. However, despite arrangements for the central
training of radio operators and other preparatory work, ‘without warning a
decree ordering the curtailment of the organization of the headquarters was
received’. According to Ponomarenko, the reason for this decree was ‘a mem-
orandum by Beria regarding the inexpediency of the creation of such a head-
quarters, since, in his opinion, he himself could provide leadership for the
movement, without a specialist headquarters’.15 No doubt Beria intended to
use the Fourth Departments and special-section apparatus of the NKVD
(OO/NKVD) as a vehicle for organization and control.16 Certainly, with
high expectations for the December 1941 Soviet counter-offensive, the need
to further develop organs of the partisan movement could have been seen to
have passed.17
The eventual creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Move-
ment in May 1942 would be followed in September 1942 by what can be
deemed the basic Union-wide instructions for the conduct of partisan
warfare for the remainder of the war:

DOCUMENT 128: Order of the People’s Commissar of Defence Number 00189 on the tasks of
the partisan movement. 5 September 1942
The history of war teaches us that victory over invaders is often achieved not only
through the struggle of the regular army but simultaneously through a popular parti-
san movement. . . .
That was how it was during the Patriotic War of 1812. . . .
That was how it was during the [Russian] Civil War. . . .
Currently, . . . the people’s [norodnoe] partisan movement on our territory temporarily
occupied by the German invaders is becoming one of the decisive factors in victory
over the enemy.
...
It is necessary, above all, to achieve a state of affairs where the partisan movement
has developed more broadly and deeper. . . . The partisan movement should become a
genuine movement of the whole people [vsenarodnoe].
The basic tasks of partisan activity are: the destruction of the enemy rear. . . .
At the current time the destruction of enemy supply lines is of considerable import-
ance. . . .
I order:

1. With the aim of disrupting movement by rail and the collapse of regular transporta-
tion in the enemy rear with all means available it is necessary to provoke railway
accidents, blow up railway bridges, blow up and burn down station facilities, to blow
up, set fire to and shoot up steam engines, wagons and cisterns at stations and on
sidings....
2. The taking of all opportunities to destroy enemy garrisons, headquarters. . . .
3. The destruction of supply dumps. . . .
4. The destruction of telephone and telegraph lines. . . .
200 The Soviet Partisan Movement
5. The attacking of airfields and the destruction of aircraft. . . .
6. The destruction of all kinds of economic commands, enemy foragers, commands
and agents for the seizure of grain. . . .
7. . . .
8. Mercilessly kill or capture fascist political figures, generals, significant bureau-
crats and traitors to the Motherland. . . .
9. Partisan detachments and individual partisan are to conduct uninterrupted recon-
naissance work in the interests of the Red Army:
a) To carefully select persons capable of conducting covert reconnaissance work
...;
b) Constantly keep track of the location and movement of enemy forces and
supplies by rail and road . . . ;
c) Establish the precise locations of enemy troops and headquarters . . . ;
d) Reconnoitre enemy airfields and establish their locations, the number and
types of aircraft. . . .
e) Organise the reconnaissance of towns and major population centres with the
aim of establishing the number of troops in their garrisons, . . . anti-aircraft
defences. . . .
f) To clarify where and what sort of defensive lines have already been con-
structed, their composition in an engineering sense, weapons, communica-
tions, whether they are garrisoned;
g) To follow and precisely establish the results of bombing by our aviation;
h) Take all opportunities to seize orders, reports, operational maps and other
such enemy documents. . . .
10. Leadership organs of the partisan movement and commanders and commissars of
partisan units are, alongside their military functions, to foster and conduct polit-
ical work amongst the population. . . .

Through the combined activities of the Red Army and partisan movement the
enemy will be destroyed.
People’s Commissar for Defence
I. Stalin
(Source: ‘Prikaz Narodnogo komissara oboroni ot 5 sentiabria 1942 goda’, 1975, pp. 61–65)

Soviet historical works on the partisan movement tended to be rather bom-

bastic on the significance of the resultant and increasingly well-organized
partisan movement for the Soviet war effort from 1942. This was unsurpris-
ing given the ‘legitimacy’ the Communist Party gained from the idea that
even under conditions of German occupation the Party was able to gain the
support of, and organize, the population against the invader. Soviet histor-
ians tended to emphasize a groundswell of popular pro-Soviet sentiment on
German-occupied territory, making the partisan movement a genuinely
popular mass movement, as well as emphasizing the role of the Communist
Party in turning a willing population into an organization making a
significant military contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. It was the
six-volume Soviet ‘official’ history of the war published between 1961 and
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 201
1965 that really enshrined the notion of a Communist-led vsenarodnoe move-
ment in the Soviet historiography of the war. In typically bombastic fashion,
the second volume of The History of the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 states
that the partisan movement was:

A genuinely popular movement, a force founded on . . . continuous com-

munication between the Party and the people. . . . Gradually growing in
strength, the partisan movement became one of the most important
political and military-strategic factors contributing to the victory of the
Soviet Union over fascist Germany.18

According to the Soviet historian of the partisan movement in the Leningrad

region, Petrov, partisans of the Leningrad region alone killed 104,242 ‘Hit-
lerites’, destroying 105 enemy aircraft, 327 tanks and 4,503 automobiles.19
At the end of the war the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement
would claim that, from the start of the Great Patriotic War until 1 Septem-
ber 1944, Ukrainian partisans killed or wounded 464,682 enemy soldiers
and officers, police and Soviet traitors, 200,322 during train derailments, of
which there were apparently 4,958, including 61 ‘armoured’ trains. Ukrain-
ian partisans also claimed to have destroyed or damaged 211 aircraft and
1,566 tanks and other armoured vehicles.20
These losses for the Axis war machine and benefits to the Red Army were,
however, apparently achieved at a remarkably low cost by the standards of
the slaughter at the front. In the case of the Leningrad region, according to
Petrov 13,000 ‘Soviet patriots gave their lives in the struggle against the
Hitlerite occupiers’,21 of whom, according to alternative figures, 4,326 were
partisans identified as such by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan
Movement and lost up to 15 February 1944,22 out of a total of 39,905 total
official participants in the Leningrad partisan movement from the start of
the war.23 As of 15 February 1944 the partisan movement as a whole,
excluding the Ukraine, had apparently lost 30,047 killed and missing, out
of a total of 208,206 official participants.24 These figures, including Petrov’s
broader notion of ‘Soviet patriots’ as opposed to ‘partisans’, do not, however,
fully account for civilian casualties of the partisan war.
Particularly during 1941, when the fledgling partisan movement was
considerably less effective as a weapon of war than it would be by 1943,
civilian casualties during anti-partisan operations indicate that German
forces were at least over-zealous and often simply murderous in dealings
with the civilian population under the guise of anti-partisan measures, as
indicated in Table 9.1. However, as Petrov’s figures above for losses of
‘Soviet patriots’ compared to official partisan losses for the Leningrad
region at least suggest, many Soviet citizens were certainly killed, in addi-
tion to official partisan losses, who considered themselves or were at
least considered by partisans as participants, even if non-combatant, in the
partisan war.
202 The Soviet Partisan Movement
Table 9.1 From a report of the Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heersgebietes Nord provid-
ing summary data on Soviet citizens taken prisoner and killed by the
security divisions concerned up to 30 September 1941, 29 October 1941

Prisoners Shot, killed or hanged Grand total

281st Security Division

Red Army men 418 26 444
Partisans 129 174 303
Suspect civilians 686 66 752
Women 32 4 36
Total 1,265 270 1,535
285th Security Division
Red Army men 9,397 (including – 9,397
action near Luga
and Wyritza)
Partisans 140 410 550
Suspect civilians 87 – 87
Women – – –
Total 9,624 410 10,034
207th Security Division
Red Army men 17,542 1,085 (shot as 17,542
irregulars)
Partisans 3,094 187 3,281
Total 20,636 1,272 20,823
Grand total 31,525 1,952 32,392
Source: Norbert Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung – Dokumente zur Besatzungspolitik der
faschistischen Wehrmacht auf Sowjetischem Territorium 1941 bis 1944 (Berlin: Militärverlag der
DDR, 1980), p. 114.

Certainly, as illustrated below for the region below Leningrad, at no point

is it reasonable to state that German forces were fighting a ‘partisan war
without partisans’, as the German historian Heer has put forward, suggest-
ing that German anti-partisan operations were more about a German war of
annihilation against the population of the Soviet Union than a security-
motivated response to a genuine military threat.25 Table 9.2 provides the
strength of the partisan movement for the Leningrad region throughout the
occupation.
The complexities of the partisan war, and in particular differentiating
between combatant and non-combatant, a crucial issue in determining ‘parti-
san’ losses, are perhaps best illustrated through the following example. In the
spring of 1943, the German anti-partisan operation ‘Spring Clean’ was carried
out by troops of the German 281st Security Division in the southern sector of
the area occupied by Army Group North, as illustrated in Figure 9.1. Forces
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 203
Table 9.2 Partisans and the number of partisan detachments active in the Leningrad
region from 10 December 1941 to 15 January 1944

Date Number of active Number of Average

partisans detachments detachment size

10.12.41 2,430 59 41
01.01.42 2,391 76 31
01.02.42 3,017 83 36
01.03.42 3,459 89 39
25.03.42 4,095 105 39
[04.42]
[05.42]
01.06.42 4,982 60 83
01.07.42 5,024 54 93
20.07.42 5,185 92 56
15.08.42 5,700 102 56
15.09.42 5,001 203 25
15.10.42 5,129 206 25
15.11.42 2,723 46 59
01.12.42 2,472 61 41
01.01.43 2,756 60 46
01.02.43 4,667 67 70
[03.43]
30.04.43 2,876 64 45
[05.43]
01.06.43 4,300 65 66
01.07.43 4,415 66 67
01.08.43 4,338 66 66
01.09.43 5,297 75 71
01.10.43 4,836 72 67
01.11.43 11,343 72 158
01.12.43 13,169 77 171
01.01.44 20,662 116 178
15.01.44 25,062 182 138
Source: Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 165.

committed included Cossack cavalry, available artillery and anti-aircraft

guns used in a ground role, and limited armour,26 apparently supported by
aircraft.27 German operations led to the following report from the 12th
Kalinin Partisan Brigade led by Moiseenko:

27.4.1943. Partisan brigade commander Moiseenko informs us that the

partisan brigades of Maksimenko, Babakov and Karlikov have been
broken. They have both dead and wounded, and some taken prisoner.
Some of the partisans have made their way to the Soviet rear.28
204 The Soviet Partisan Movement

Figure 9.1 Disposition of Soviet partisan detachments on German-occupied ter-

ritory of the Leningrad region, February 1943.
Key:
1. Kingisepp 4. Shimsk 7. Idritsa
2. Strugi Krasnie 5. Kudever’ 8. Pustoshka
3. Sol’tsi 6. Loknia 9. Novosokol’niki

More detailed Soviet description of the development of the operation adds

weight to a conclusion that this operation at least was both targeted at and
caused considerable damage to known and significant partisan forces:

DOCUMENT 129: To the Head of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement,
General-Lieutenant Comrade Ponomarenko P.K. Report on the partisan brigades of Bobakov,
Karlikov, and Maksimenko, 12 May 1943
According to personal reports of those making their way to Soviet lines . . . the follow-
ing has been established:
On 18 April 1943 the enemy conducted offensive operations with from 4–5,000
men against the partisan brigades of Maksimenko, Karlikov, Shipovalov and Moi-
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 205
seenko with the aim of completely destroying them and establishing normal move-
ment and other activity in the Novorzhev-Opochka region.
On 19–20 April, after fighting in the region of the villages of Chernoiarovo, Aga-
fonovo, Melikhovo and Gusevo that are situated 12 km south of Novorzhev, the
brigades decided to redeploy in an organised manner and move to forest situated in a
region . . . 2–5 km north of Kudever’ . . . where the above brigades, with transport for
the sick and wounded consisting of up to 50 carts, concentrated.
Having given the partisans the opportunity to evacuate to this area, on 21.4.1943
the enemy resumed offensive operations against the brigades from the Loknia,
Bezhantsi, Kudever’ and Novorzhev directions with a force of up to 5,000 Germans
and a squadron of Russians – Cossack traitors to the Motherland, and artillery. Offen-
sive operations were supported by three aircraft and tanks. Having encircled the parti-
sans in the forest the enemy blocked them in and subjected them to mortar-artillery
fire and tightened the encirclement. . . .
Given the difficult situation created, a meeting of the command-political cadres
took place, at which it was decided to take up defensive positions and during 21–22
April the brigades took part in intensive defensive fighting with the enemy. Having
used up all of their munitions in the fighting it was decided that all the remaining
surviving personnel of the brigades would make their way out of encirclement in small
groups during the night of 22.4.1943.
...
During the night of 25.4.1943 the brigades were heading for Soviet lines, leaving
behind up to 1,500 horses and more than 100 seriously wounded and ill.
During the night of 25.4.1943 having forced the river Puzno and crossing the
Loknia-Novosokol’niki railway line . . . the partisans came across a strong blocking
force of regular German troops, as a result of which partisans of the retreating
brigades, . . . a total of up to 500 men, were scattered in the forest and only with day-
break were small groups and individuals able to cross the front line. . . .
According to command elements crossing the front line a significant proportion of
local partisans, after having crossed the Loknia-Novosokol’niki railway line and having
come under enemy fire split up in the forest, threw away their weapons and sought
refuge in local houses.
(Source: RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.353.ll.14–15)

From Soviet statistics it can be calculated that German forces were operating
against, at one time or another during the operation, in the region of 2,455
partisans according to data for 1 March 1943.29 With the conclusion of the
primary operation on 25 April, 281st Security Division claimed to have
killed (confirmed) 424 of the enemy, having taken 61 prisoners and seized
‘considerable weapons and munitions of all types’.30 An alternative German
source on which the former is based claimed:
206 The Soviet Partisan Movement

DOCUMENT 130: 281st Security Division. 1a. War diary. 657/43. Secret. Ostrov,
25.4.1943. Re: Operation ‘Spring Clean’ of the 281st Security Division from 18–22.4.1943
Provisional combat report for Operation ‘Spring Clean’ of the 281st Security Division
in the Kudever’ region
...
22.4 . . .
Overall outcome for the period from 18–22.4
Enemy losses: 424 bandits shot during the fighting (confirmed), with a further 141
estimated killed, 61 taken prisoner.
Spoils: 5 HMGs, 6 LMGs, 7 light mortars, 3 anti-tank rifles, 122 rifles, 11 SMGs,
142 hand grenades, a variety of munitions and explosives, 389 horses and 25 carts.
...
Our own losses: 11 killed, 45 wounded (apart from 5 killed and 21 wounded from
local units). . . .
(Source: US NA T-315 1872 91–3)

During Operation ‘Spring Clean’ it is certainly reasonable to assume that

more than 100 partisan were killed by troops of 281st Security Division on
the basis of weapons recovered and where partisan units admitted ‘heavy . . .
fighting’ for the loss of 11 Germans killed and 45 wounded.31
Given that the area in which the anti-partisan operation had taken place
had already been defined as hostile by the Germans, it is unsurprising that
operation ‘Spring Clean’ was to be followed up by an operation in the
Kudever’ area in order to properly ‘cleanse’ the area [Säuberung] and in order
to gather ‘men fit for work and combat between 14 and 65 years old’.32 The
fact that at least some local partisans had abandoned their weapons and
taken to the villages, a situation unlikely to escape German attention, could
only serve to justify such German operations.
Whilst such German military pressure was often insufficient either to
destroy partisan detachments or to force partisans to leave the occupied ter-
ritory altogether, it still exacted a considerable price on partisan strengths,
for little cost to German forces.
Beyond such individual operations in which German losses against
lightly armed and poorly supplied partisans tended to be minimal, calculat-
ing casualties caused by partisans is not straightforward. That a significant
proportion of those casualties inflicted by partisans on the German war
machine were not inflicted on security forces such as those employed during
‘Spring Clean’ is certainly the case. In late 1941 approximately 4,000 parti-
sans of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions fighting against forces of Army
Group North faced no more than a total of 30,000 security troops, whose
numbers declined dramatically during the winter, as shown below.33 For the
whole of 1942 Leningrad partisans alone claimed to have killed 28,450
Germans and destroyed 70 tanks and 19 aircraft, where partisan strength
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 207
reached a high of 5,700 on 15 August 1942 from a low of 2,391 on January
1942 (Leningrad region partisan losses for 1942 were no lower than 1,267
killed and 286 missing according to Soviet figures).34 Yet in 575 anti-
partisan ‘operations’ between 29 December 1941 and 28 September 1942,
281st Security Division, one of three allocated to Army Group North, lost
only 161 men, with 128 wounded and 12 missing.35
Undoubtedly, many of those killed in partisan attacks other than on
trains or on troops in transit by road were not actually German troops that
could otherwise have been fighting at the front. Local garrisons of security
troops were made up of troops that were certainly not the best the Wehrma-
cht had to offer. The most combat-effective elements of the Security Divi-
sions were soon fighting on the front line, as for example the 368th Infantry
(Jaeger) Regiment of 281st Security Division, fighting ‘almost without inter-
ruption’ at the front as part of 30th Jaeger Division from July 1941. Replace-
ments received by the end of November 1941 were deemed unsuitable for
aggressive anti-partisan operations.36 Increasingly, guard duties were carried
out by local collaborators, who would not otherwise have been deployed to
the front.
The military effectiveness of the partisan movement cannot reasonably be
measured simply in terms of the direct destruction of enemy forces, to a
large extent because of problems in calculating the actual casualties brought
about specifically by partisan activity. As the above figures provided for
Ukrainian partisans suggest, a significant proportion of German losses were
undoubtedly brought about during attacks on trains, and losses to front-line
units in transit are difficult to distinguish from losses in combat at the front,
an area where further detailed research might be revealing.
There are, however, other key measures of partisan military effectiveness
– the extent to which partisans tied down German resources in rear-area
security that might have been used for some other purpose even if not in
front-line combat, and the extent to which their activities disrupted front-
line operations, be this through hampering the ability to move reinforce-
ments to where they were needed in a timely manner, and indeed the
withdrawal of German forces, and German ability to resupply front-line
troops.
As has already been suggested when looking at German losses due to par-
tisan activity, many of those troops committed to anti-partisan work would
not otherwise have been deployed at the front at the time they were engaged
in anti-partisan work in the absence of the partisan threat (even if, as the
German manpower situation deteriorated, fewer combat-effective troops
were in front-line combat). Additionally, the numbers of troops committed
to anti-partisan work for a sustained period remained relatively small com-
pared to the size of the Wehrmacht and the size of the territory concerned
throughout the occupation. At the beginning of Operation ‘Barbarossa’, the
Wehrmacht allocated nine security divisions to rear-area security, that is
207th, 281st and 285th for Army Group North; 213th, 286th and 403rd
208 The Soviet Partisan Movement
for Army Group Centre; and 221st, 444th and 454th for Army Group
South, with a total of 15 security divisions being created for service on
former Soviet territory.37 Based on an initial total of in the region of 11,449
men for 281st Security Division on 1 June 1941, this gives a total of
approximately 100,000 troops initially committed. The attentions of all
three security divisions allocated to Army Group North were, for instance,
focused on Russian territory of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions by the
end of the year. Even before fighting had begun, 281st Security Division was
down to 7,827 men; at the end of 1941, on 21 December, 7,053 men
according to its war diary.38 As noted above, around 4,000 Soviet partisans
operating against Army Group North faced no more than 30,000 security
troops at the end of 1941, with the security divisions being assisted by
forces of the Reichsführer SS, in this case elements of Einsatzgruppe A and 2nd
SS Brigade, for instance.39 Before the widespread use of collaborators, the
situation for the Army Group Centre Rear Area on 5 October 1941, where
‘after static rail line guards were posted there were too few troops remaining
to mount any offensive action against the partisans or exercise effective
control’, was certainly not an exaggeration.40 It is also worth noting that not
only were limited numbers of increasingly second-rate troops allocated to
rear-area security, but they were also poorly equipped, particularly with
regard to transport resources.41
Whilst partisan strength dropped dramatically during the winter of
1941–42, the fall in available security forces was even more dramatic.
Howell suggests that of 34 battalions initially allocated to rear-area security
for Army Group North, all but four were in front-line service by the spring
of 1942 – on 22 April 1942 only elements of 207th and 281st Security
Divisions were actually engaged in rear-area security duties.42
By 1 October 1943, according to Ponomarenko, there were 14 German divi-
sions allocated to rear-area security, of which six were security divisions (201st,
203rd, 207th, 281st, 285th, 286th), four he describes as Luftwaffe field divi-
sions (153rd, 388th, 390th, 391st) that were in fact field training divisions,
and four reserve divisions (141st, 143rd, 147th, 151st). In addition, German
allies provided security troops – another 14 divisions, nine of which were Hun-
garian, three Rumanian and two Slovakian, along with 3rd Rumanian Moun-
tain Corps.43 This list ignores non-divisional units of up to regimental strength,
where, for instance, partisans identified 356th Infantry Regiment, apparently of
228th Infantry Division, as operating in the Ostrov region deep in the rear of
Army Group North in the summer of 1943, where the division had apparently
been disbanded.44 Whilst all these divisional types had seen or would shortly
see front-line service, most were operating in rear-area security roles due to
their apparent inadequacies in front-line roles. Despite increasing partisan
strength, Army Group North could not field more regular troops against the
partisans in late 1943 than late 1941, with somewhere between 25,000 and
30,000 troops in regularly organized units down to below company strength
being available for security functions in late 1943.45
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 209
Anti-partisan operations did on numerous occasions, however, temporar-
ily draw off troops from front-line service, as in the case of the front-line-
capable 2nd SS Brigade mentioned above. Partisans, for instance, identified
(‘confirmed’) 27th Infantry Regiment of 12th Infantry Division in the rural
Kudever’ district of the Army Group Rear Area of Army Group North in
December 1943.46 Even in the autumn of 1941, at least 691st Infantry Reg-
iment of 339th Infantry Division seems to have been deployed in a rear-area
security role in the Rear Areas of Army Group Centre, before the crisis
period of the Soviet winter counter-offensive of 1941–42.47
Many local security functions were carried out by former Soviet collabor-
ators, who undoubtedly suffered heavily in partisan raids and who certainly
made up a significant proportion of ‘enemy’ losses reported by partisans,
only sometimes distinguished from German losses. The 281st Security Divi-
sion alone could claim 778 EKA [Einwohner-Kampf-Abteilung] personnel and
480 OD [Ordnungsdienst] personnel carrying out security and police func-
tions within its jurisdiction in March 1943.48 On the territory of Army
Group North more reliable security and police units from the Baltic
Republics were frequently deployed in significant numbers. Kalinin parti-
sans, for instance, identified the 273rd, 515th and 615th Latvian Police Bat-
talions as operating on the territory of Army Group North in the summer of
1943.49 Partisan activity also undoubtedly tied down non-combat units such
as those identified by partisans in intelligence reports, for example construc-
tion and railway units that could have been deployed on other tasks had it
not been for acts of sabotage.
A significant proportion of the casualties inflicted by partisans on
German and allied forces did not actually damage German front-line opera-
tions through depriving them of troops committed permanently to security
duties, or indeed draw substantial forces away from front-line duty for sus-
tained periods of time, as was the Soviet intention. Arguably far more
significant than killing or tying down second- or even lower-grade units was
partisan disruption of German lines of communication through rear areas.
Summary data for the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement of
April 1944 presented in Table 9.3 suggests that Leningrad partisans alone
‘destroyed’ 1,050 steam locomotives and a staggering 18,643 railway trucks.
Ukrainian partisans claimed to have brought about a total of 4,958 train
derailments up to 1 September 1944, including 61 armoured trains.50 Once
again, these figures are exaggerated, although damage done to German com-
munications was at times significant.
Much of the damage to German railway communications, broader troop
movements and resupply efforts took place either during focused operations
such as during the ‘War of the Rails’ of the summer and autumn of 1943, or
later in the war when the numerical balance between partisan and security-
force strength was most favourable to the partisans. Of the 1,050 locomo-
tives claimed as ‘destroyed’ by Leningrad partisans, only 66 were supposedly
‘destroyed’ during 1941, rising to 266 for 1942 and 440 for 1943, with 278
210 The Soviet Partisan Movement
Table 9.3 From a report of the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement
on enemy losses, suffered as a result of the activities of partisans of the
Leningrad region during the war, 4 April 1944

Destroyed 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total

Rails – – 65,363 85,541 58,563

Trains 69 297 466 274 1,106
Locomotives 66 266 440 278 1,050
Railway trucks 870 3,970 5,374 8,429 18,643
Railway trolleys 4 11 3 4 22
Railway bridges 1 20 97 83 201
Road bridges 320 137 447 276 1,180
Telephone lines (km) 20 15 612 1,506 2,153
Telephone exchanges 452 133 4 4 593
Aircraft 71 19 6 5 101
Tanks 70 70 34 53 227
Armoured cars 28 8 6 11 53
Artillery pieces 5 42 31 130 208
Heavy machine guns 30 67 48 32 177
Tractors 48 17 34 18 117
Automobiles 1,632 534 543 1,821 4,530
Horses 253 656 651 1,539 3,099
HQs and garrisons 8 8 94 31 141
Railway stations/halts 5 – 28 15 48
Radio stations 15 22 2 6 45
Germans killed 11,493 28,450 35,985 28,314 104,242
Supply dumps 120 50 111 45 326
Armoured trains – 1 4 5 10
Source: V tilu vraga: Bor’ba partisan i podpol’shchikov na okkupirovannoi territorii Leningradskoi
oblasti. 1944 g.: Sbornik dokumentov (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1985), p. 249.

for 1944 where much of the Leningrad region had been liberated by the
spring.51
In late 1941, when partisan units remained small in size, German security
forces focused on railway security at the expense of other dimensions to rear-
area security, given the supply crisis. As Howell notes, on 20 December 1941,
281st Security Division ordered, in order to secure the Pskov–Ostrov–Rezenke
and Pskov–Dno railway lines, that ‘all bridges and culverts less than 40 feet
long were to have double sentries, longer structures to be guarded by a squad
of one non-commissioned officer and six men’. In addition,

all stretches of rail in closed terrain were to have one sentry every 100
yards; in open terrain every 200 yards; sentries were to remain in sight
of one another. . . . This security schedule was not to be deviated from,
even if the last man in the division was used.52
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 211
Only during 1942 would increasingly large, well-trained and equipped par-
tisan units start to do significant damage to the German transportation
network in rear areas. In the Army Group North rear areas, partisan attacks
on railway lines and bridges increased during the summer of 1942, with a
particular increase in the number of partisan attacks being noticed between
May and June. From 1 May to 31 July, in the rear of 16th Army partisans
destroyed ‘30 bridges, broke rails in 84 places, and damaged or destroyed 20
locomotives and 113 railroad cars’. Attacks on railway lines were not,
however, necessarily on the key transport arteries, and less well-defended
road bridges were, at least in the Opochka region, apparently more likely to
be hit than rail bridges.53
Order Number 00189 of the People’s Commissar for Defence entitled
‘On the tasks of the Partisan Movement’ (Document 128) increased the
emphasis of partisans on attacks on railway lines, with, for instance, a series
of derailments taking place on key railway lines in the rear areas of Army
Group North in September–October 1942, with 16 derailments on the key
Pskov–Dno–Staraia Russa line in September and six in October. Nonethe-
less, this intensity of attack could not be maintained, no doubt to a large
extent because partisan strength dropped dramatically during the winter of
1942–43 as it had done during 1941–42, with 5,700 partisans officially
accounted for on 15 October 1942 for the Leningrad region, dropping to
2,472 on 1 December 1942. This was in part due to greater German ability
to track down partisans in the snow, who were increasingly vulnerable to
attack when tied to the shelter of base camps, and vulnerable to the elements
when not. Many partisans sought to return to Soviet lines during the winter
months, much to the consternation of the Central Headquarters of the Parti-
san Movement:

DOCUMENT 131: From the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement . . . to the
Representative of the Central Headquarters . . . on the Kalinin Front . . . and the Representative
. . . on the Western Front, February 1943 (exact date unknown)
Recently, and despite TsShPD order number 0061 of 6.11.1942 categorically forbid-
ding the voluntary evacuation of partisan units and brigades across the front line, there
have been instances of voluntary withdrawal to our rear areas. . . .
Ponomarenko
(Source: RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.67.l.75)

Even Ponomarenko, head of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Move-

ment, was forced to admit to Stalin that, before the start of the ‘War of the
Rails’, ‘despite the considerable importance of the partisan struggle against
[enemy] lines of communication disorganization of enemy movement on the
railways has still not reached such an extent as to have operational impact
on the German front line’.54 This would change as an increasingly strong
212 The Soviet Partisan Movement
partisan movement was thrown into intensive operations aimed at destroy-
ing railway track faster than the Germans could replace it in the summer of
1943.
Ordered on 14 July 1943, what would subsequently be described as the
‘War of the Rails’ began on 21 July for Orlov partisans and 3 August for
Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk and Belorussian partisans:

DOCUMENT 132: Order of the head of the TsShPD on the partisan war of the rails on enemy
lines of communication, 14 July 1943
Through their activities to destroy enemy communications Soviet partisans are render-
ing considerable assistance to the Red Army in the task of defeating the German occu-
piers.
...
The huge size of the partisan movement at the current time allows for massive and
simultaneous blows against railway lines with the aim of totally disorganizing them
and the disruption of enemy front-line operations.
Such a blow should be struck against the enemy through a war of the rails, that is
with a massive and simultaneous destruction of rails. The enemy is currently experi-
encing a shortage of railway track.
Spare rails and many rails from stations and branch lines have been expended on the
resurrection of sections blown up by partisans.
...
I order:

1. Partisan formations and detachments in the vicinity of railway lines to conduct

systematic and simultaneous destruction of rails on enemy railway lines by break-
ing rails in half.
...
3. In order to ensure a surprise blow the first operation is to be conducted simultan-
eously and on the signal of the Central Headquarters, after which activities to
destroy rails are to be conducted without respite and with all means.
4. Commanders of partisan detachments are to keep track of and inform partisan
headquarters of the buildup of enemy trains for bombing by Soviet aviation.
5. The recording of the number of rails broken by every partisan detachment and
brigade.
...
7. Heads of regional and republican headquarters of the partisan movement . . . are
with all haste to start the supply of materials for and preparations for the opera-
tion. Readiness for delivery of the blow is to be communicated by the TsShPD.
Orientate yourselves for the conduct of the operation between 27–30 July of this
year.
...
P. Ponomarenko
(Source: RA T.20 (9), 1999, pp. 300–302)
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 213
By 15 August the TsShPD was communicating the following results from
the initial phase of the ‘War of the Rails’:

DOCUMENT 133: Communication of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on

a number of results of the operation ‘War of the Rails’. 15 August 1943
The Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement developed a plan for the disrup-
tion of the functioning of enemy railway lines through a massive, systematic destruc-
tion of rails.
...
On 3 August 1943 the operation began with a simultaneous blow by Leningrad,
Kalinin, Smolensk and Belorussian partisans. Orlov partisans began the operation on
21 July 1943 as directed by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement.
According to figures received up to 13 August 1943, the following rails were
destroyed by partisan detachments:
Leningrad region 3,271
Kalinin region 7,224
Smolensk region 8,279
Orlov region 7,935
Belorussian SSR 75,227
Ukrainian SSR 7,000
On the sections of railway below:
Leningrad-Narva 22
Leningrad-Pskov 1,869
Leningrad-Novosokol’niki 476
Pskov-Veimarn 82
Pskov-Rezekne 822
Polotsk-Molodechno 5,834
Polotsk-Novosokol’niki 1,226
Novosokol’niki-Rezekne 6,869
Dugavpils-Vitebsk 2,073
Novosokol’niki-Orsha 793
Krulevshchizna-Lintupi 1,617
Minsk-Vilnius 1,686
Minsk-Smolensk 1,548
Orsha-Lepel’ 2,128
Minsk-Gomel’ 5,666
Mogilev-Timkovichi 7,179
Luninets-Gomel’ 22,013
Luninets-Lida 3,581
Mogilev-Kirov 3,612
Orsha-Unecha 3,033
Orsha-Zhlobin 7,751
Gomel’-Briansk 5,106
Starushki-Bobruisk 8,210
Brest-Luninets 336
Briansk-Kirov 539
Kletnia-Zhukovka 525
214 The Soviet Partisan Movement
Briansk-Roslavl’ 121
Unecha-Mikhailovskii Farm 1,150
Briansk-Mikhailovskii Farm 5,648
Navlia-L’gov 421
On the railway lines of the Ukrainian SSR 7,000
Total destroyed 108,936
...
At the same time, in the process of conducting the operation, the following were
destroyed:
Railway bridges 57
Bridges on unpaved roads 33
Water towers 8
Water-pressure towers 1
Steam locomotives 17
Wagons and trucks 288
Tank 17
Automobiles 149
In fighting during the conduct of the operation on the railway lines 540 German sol-
diers and police were killed.
Partisan losses: Killed – 22 persons, wounded – 87 persons.
(Source: RA T.20 (9), 1999, pp. 304–306)

Whilst the above figures are certainly exaggerated, they do give some indi-
cation of the areas in which partisan attacks were most heavy. Certainly the
rear areas behind Army Group Centre were worst hit as German troops
withdrew in the face of the Soviet counter-attack after the German attack on
the Kursk salient had been blunted. According to German sources, during
the night of 2–3 August partisans behind Army Group Centre, that is in the
Army Group Centre Rear Area and Reichskomissariat Weissruthenien, set
10,900 demolition charges and mines, 8,422 of which detonated, the
remainder disarmed (of which 6,519 detonations were for the Army Group
Centre Rear Area). For August the total was 15,977 detonations (12,717 for
the Army Group Centre Rear Area) with an additional 4,528 removed by
the Germans. According to Howell, the effect of these demolitions ‘while
never disastrous, was considerable’, although a total of 2,951 supply and
troop trains were successfully moved during the month in the area con-
cerned.55
Across the front, as German fortunes waned at the front and partisan
strength increased – the relationship between the two being strong –
German and allied forces were only able to provide viable security for an
increasingly limited number of railway lines. The onset of winter, in bur-
dening a growing partisan movement with increasingly complex supply
issues, had some impact on the frequency and intensity of partisan attacks.
However, the tide of the war had clearly turned against Germany and this
had an impact on Soviet incitement to join or assist the partisans, or face
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 215
punishment later. The prospect of Soviet victory gave the partisans new
recruits and helped, on the surface at least, ease the tension between hungry
partisans and the civilian population on which they depended for most of
their food, increasing partisan effectiveness.56 The State Defence Committee
certainly made it plain through partisan units, building on pre-war legisla-
tion, that the treasonous behaviour of one family member was enough to
implicate the rest of a family, and conversely that the patriotic conduct of a
family member, including participation in or at least support for the parti-
san movement, could exonerate them from the crimes of a close relative:

DOCUMENT 134: Decree of the State Defence Committee ‘On members of the families of
traitors’, No. GOKO-1926ss. 14 June 1942
Top Secret
Adult members of the families of persons (military and civilian) sentenced by judi-
cial organs or special tribunal of the NKVD USSR to capital punishment according to
Article 58-1 ‘a’ of the criminal code of the RSFSR and equivalent articles of the crimi-
nal codes of other union republics – i.e. for espionage in German interests or those of
other countries fighting us; for going over to the enemy, betrayal or collaboration with
the German occupiers; service in administrative or punitive organs of the German
occupiers on territory seized by them; and for attempted treason against the Mother-
land and treasonous intentions [izmennicheskie namereniia] are subject to arrest and exile
to isolated regions of the USSR for a term of five years.
The families of those sentenced in absentia to capital punishment . . . for voluntary
retreat with forces of occupation during the liberation of territory seized by the enemy
are also subject to arrest and exile to isolated regions of the USSR for a period of five
years.
...
Members of families of traitors to the Motherland are considered to be: Mother,
father, husband, wife, sons, daughters and brothers and sisters if they lived together
with the traitor against the Motherland or were being supported by him at the time
the crime was committed or were being supported by him at the moment of his
mobilization in to the army. . . .
Families of traitors to the Motherland are not subject to arrest and exile if, after
necessary investigation, it is established that a family member is amongst the ranks of
Red Army personnel, partisans, individuals co-operating with the Red Army and par-
tisans during the enemy occupation, and also those awarded orders and medals of the
USSR.
(Source: I.N. Kuznetsov, 1997, pp. 69–70)

The order ‘On the tasks of the Partisan Movement’ also increased emphasis
on serving the needs of the Red Army in other ways, in particular in provid-
ing intelligence. After a period during which the Red Army, NKVD and
Party were all sponsoring partisan units in the German rear during 1941
and into 1942, during the second half of 1942 the organizational structure
of the partisan movement under the Central Headquarters of the Partisan
216 The Soviet Partisan Movement
Movement sought to foster links between the partisan movement and Red
Army through the military soviets and operational groups at front and army
level respectively – a process of integration very much along the lines of a
model established in the Leningrad region during late 1941.57 The potential
value of partisan intelligence reaching the Red Army through the above
organization is obvious but difficult to measure – partisans frequently iden-
tified regular and front-line-capable units resting, being redeployed or
engaged in anti-partisan operations in the German rear. For instance, the
loss of 27th Infantry Regiment to 12th Infantry Division, identified as being
in the Kudever’ region in December 1943, would have been a major blow to
the strength of the division.58 The effectiveness of this intelligence provision
increased as more partisan units were equipped with radios, for instance, the
timeliness of intelligence allowing better use of Soviet airpower, although
German intelligence also gained a better appreciation of partisan activities at
the same time.59
Better partisan communications also facilitated attempts to co-ordinate par-
tisan sabotage activities with Red Army operations, a co-operation noticeably
more effective by the time of the Soviet winter offensive of 1944 below
Leningrad, compared to attempts at co-ordination during the Moscow counter-
offensive of 1941–42.60 Andrianov suggests that the first attempt to co-ordinate
partisan attacks with Red Army operations was planned during November for
21–31 December 1941 for operations against German forces in and near Demi-
ansk, although he suggests that the frequency and scale of such co-operation
was limited until 1943 to activity barely of operational significance. In 1943,
for instance during the summer ‘War of the Rails’, large-scale partisan activity
behind more than one front and to a considerable distance behind German lines
was of operational and even operational-strategic significance, being geared to
the hampering of German movement in the face of the Soviet counter-offensive
in the aftermath of the German Operation ‘Citadel’.61
Whilst the broader impact of the partisan movement on the German
economy is not the principal concern of this chapter, it is worth noting that
given the extent to which the Wehrmacht was forced to ‘live off the land’ in the
east, partisan disruption of the German collection of agricultural products and
other resources (e.g. lumber) from the occupied territories of the east is of some
significance. As indicated in Table 9.4 as early as 19 June 1942 WiIn Nord
considered agricultural activity in all areas of the Army Group North Rear Area
to have been at least partially disrupted, with agricultural activity having been
considered impossible in a number of districts of the Kalinin region in the
south of the area occupied by Army Group North in the border region with
Belorussia. It is in this broader economic sense that the partisan movement
probably had the most sustained influence on the German military effort, con-
tributing, along with broader German administrative weakness on occupied
territory, to the fact that German grain collection from the occupied territories
was never as great as had been predicted.62
Limited German authority over the hinterland also limited the extent to
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 217
Table 9.4 WiIn Nord. Chefgruppe La. Pleskau, 19 June 1942. Situation Report
Degree to which the cultivation [Bewirtschaftung] of particular districts in
the Army Group Rear Area is hampered

Unhindered Partially hampered Severely hampered Impossible [all

indicated to be moving
towards ‘severely
hampered’]

Gdow – eastern sector Jam Osmino

Seredka – eastern Strugy – western Sebesh – currently
sector [arrow to sector
‘severely hampered’]
Karamischewo Novosselje Idriza – currently
Soschichino Ljady Pustoschka –
currently
Slawkowitschi Pljussa
Noworschew Kudewer
Opotschka [arrow to
‘severely hampered’]
Krasnoj [arrow to
‘severely hampered’]
Luga
Puskinskiy-Gori
Source: TsGA SPb f.9789.o.1.d.3.l.107.

which German forces could mobilize the local population for labour service
for the Wehrmacht, and indeed for labour service in the Reich, for which over
one million people were mobilized by the Wehrmacht during 1942–43, as
indicated in Table 9.5. Such unpopular mobilization certainly seems to have
increased the number of potential recruits to partisan units; intensive mobil-
ization often coincided with German withdrawal, hence with the increased
prospect of SMERSH investigation into the conduct of Soviet citizens
during the occupation, which led to a surge in partisan recruitment, as
Table 9.2 suggests for the Leningrad region.
These new recruits could increasingly be incorporated into partisan units
in relatively safe base areas. German security resources were focused on
keeping key railway arteries open, very rapidly to the exclusion of other
tasks. In doing so, German forces enjoyed short–medium-term success with
limited resources in achieving their aim of keeping key supply arteries to the
front open. In focusing on this key task, German forces were, however,
despite sporadic large-scale anti-partisan operations such as ‘Spring Clean’,
providing base areas for partisans in the hinterland where Soviet power
could be rebuilt and from which increasingly large, well-equipped and
organized partisan units could attack and often overwhelm the defences of
the precious transport arteries.
218 The Soviet Partisan Movement
Table 9.5 Ostarbeiter recruitment/conscription for Army Groups North, Centre and
South for 1942 and 1943

Time period Ostarbeiter Approx. Ostarbeiter as %

recruited/ population as of total
conscripted of March 1943 population as of
(millions) March 1943

Army Group North 1942 50,490 4

1943 4,557 1.26 Insignificant
Army Group Centre 1942 114,706 2.3
1943 91,225 c.5.0 1.8
Army Group South 1942 636,603 10.6
1943 113,780 c.6.0 1.9
Total 1,011,361 12.26 8.3
Source: R.-D. Müller, Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten
1941–1943 – Der Abschlussbericht der Wirtschaftstabes Ost . . . (Boppard: Harald Boldt Verlag,
1991), pp. 519 and 549–550.

That the Soviet historiography of the partisan movement inflated the

achievements of the partisans whilst at the same time downplaying the
human cost of their activities is beyond doubt. However, in ‘clinical’ terms
the Soviet partisan movement was, by Soviet standards, a cost-effective
means of causing military and economic damage to the German war effort
on the Eastern Front. Even if going as far as to assume that for every offi-
cially recognized partisan three or even five unofficial ‘partisans’ or civilians
were killed, then by the standards of the slaughter at the front, a total of
around 120,000–180,000 killed for Soviet territory (excluding the Ukraine)
compares favourably, given damage done by the partisans to a range of
Soviet front-line operations during the war. Soviet forces facing Army
Group North alone (taken as the North-Western, Leningrad and Volkhov
Fronts) suffered 476,450 irrecoverable losses (including 213,557 killed)
during 1942 for little territorial gain and where total losses inflicted on
Army Group North for 1942 were 259,950, including, however, losses
caused by partisan activity.63

Guide to further reading

J. Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1964).
Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair – Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge,
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).
H. Boog, J. Forster, J. Hoffmann, E. Klink, R.-D. Muller, G.R. Ueberschar and E. Osers
(eds), Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998).
 The Soviet Partisan Movement 219
A. Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941–1945 – A Study of Occupation Policies (London: Macmil-
lan, 1981).
A. Dallin, Odessa, 1941–1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule (Iasi: Center
for Romanian Studies, 1998).
L. Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944 (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
Alexander Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front – The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West
Russia 1941–1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
E.M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944. Department of the Army Pamphlet
20-244 (August 1956), printed in D.S. Detwiler, World War II German Military Studies,
Volume 18 (New York: Garland, 1979; Eastbourne: Naval and Military Press, 2006).
T. Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire – German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union
1942–1943 (New York: Praeger, 1988).
J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919–1945 – A Documentary Reader. Volume 3: Foreign
Policy, War and Racial Extermination (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1988).
T. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policy in Occupied Russia (Oxford: Berg, 1989).
Ben Shepherd, War in the Wild East – The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004).
Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas – Soviet Partisans in World War II (Lawrence, KS: Univer-
sity of Kansas Press, 2006).
J. Steinberg, ‘The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the Occupied
Soviet Union, 1941–4’, English Historical Review (June 1995), pp. 620–651.
K. Ungváry, ‘Hungarian Occupation forces in the Ukraine 1941–1942: The Historiographi-
cal Context’, JSMS, Volume 20, Number 1 (January–March 2007), pp. 81–120.
10 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing
Blows’ of 1944

In early November 1944 in a speech to Moscow Party and Soviet officials

Stalin catalogued the victories that the Red Army had scored over the
Wehrmacht and her allies since the beginning of the year:

DOCUMENT 135: Speech delivered by Stalin on the eve of the 27th anniversary of the October
Revolution, 6 November 1944
The decisive successes achieved by the Red Army during the past year and the expulsion
of the Germans from the boundaries of our Soviet territory were brought about by a series
of crushing blows inflicted by our troops upon the German troops, begun as far back as
last January and subsequently developed throughout the course of the year under review.
The first blow was delivered by our troops near Leningrad and Novgorod last January,
when the Red Army demolished the Germans’ permanent defences and pushed the
Germans into the Baltic regions. The result of this blow was the liberation of the
Leningrad Region.
The second blow was delivered on the River Bug last February and March, when the
Red Army routed the German troops and pushed them beyond the Dnestr. As a result of
this blow, the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnepr was liberated from the German
fascist invaders.
The third blow was delivered in the region of the Crimea last April and May, when
the German troops were thrown into the Black Sea. As a result of this blow the Crimea
and Odessa were liberated from German oppression.
The fourth blow was delivered in the region of Karelia last June, when the Red
Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Viborg and Petrozavodsk and pushed the
Finns into the interior of Finland. The result of this blow was the liberation of the
greater part of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic.
The fifth blow was inflicted on the Germans last June and July, when the Red Army
utterly routed the German troops at Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Moghilev, and culminated in
the surrounding of thirty German divisions near Minsk. As a result of this blow our
troops: a) completely liberated the Belorussian Soviet Republic; b) reached the Vistula and
liberated a considerable part of the territory of our ally, Poland; c) reached the Niemen
and liberated the greater part of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic, and d) forced the
Niemen and reached the frontiers of Germany.
The sixth blow was delivered in the region of Western Ukraine last July and August,
when the Red Army defeated the German troops at L’vov and hurled them beyond the San
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 221
and the Vistula. As a result of this blow: a) Western Ukraine was liberated, and b) our
troops forced the Vistula and formed a powerful bridgehead on the other side, west of San-
domierz.
The seventh blow was delivered last August in the region of Kishinev-Iassi, when
our troops utterly routed the German and Rumanian troops, and culminated in the
surrounding of twenty-two German divisions near Kishinev, not counting the Ruman-
ian divisions. As a result of this blow: a) the Moldavian Soviet Republic was liberated;
b) Rumania, Germany’s ally, was put out of action and she declared war on Germany
and Hungary; c) Germany’s ally, Bulgaria, was put out of action and she too declared
war on Germany; d) the road was opened for our troops into Hungary, Germany’s last
ally in Europe, and e) it became possible to extend a helping hand to our ally,
Yugoslavia, against the German invaders.
The eighth blow was delivered in the Baltic regions last September and October,
when the Red Army defeated the German troops at Tallinn and Riga and expelled
them from the Baltic regions. As a result of this blow: a) the Estonian Soviet Republic
was liberated; b) the greater part of the Latvian Soviet Republic was liberated; c)
Germany’s ally, Finland, was put out of action and she declared war on Germany, and
d) over thirty German divisions were cut off from Prussia and held between pincers in
the area between Tukums and Libau, where our troops are driving the last nail into
their coffin.
Last October our troops launched the ninth blow between the Tisa and the Danube,
in the region of Hungary, with the object of putting Hungary out of the war and of
turning her against Germany. As a result of this blow, which has not yet been com-
pleted: a) our troops rendered direct assistance to our ally, Yugoslavia, in expelling the
Germans and liberating Belgrade, and b) our troops obtained the opportunity of cross-
ing the Carpathians and of extending a helping hand to our ally, the Czechoslovakian
Republic, part of whose territory has already been liberated from the German invaders.
Finally, at the end of last October, a blow was dealt the German troops in North
Finland, when the German troops were kicked out of the region of Pechenga and our
troops, pursuing the Germans, entered the territory of our ally, Norway.
(Source: Adapted from J.V. Stalin, 1947, pp. 156–160 and Mawdsley, 2005, p. 292).

The first blow mentioned by Stalin, later to become a ‘Stalinist’ blow in

Soviet propaganda, was the ‘Leningrad–Novgorod Strategic Offensive’ Oper-
ation, which began on 14 January and lasted until 1 March 1944. After the
siege of Leningrad had been partially lifted in January 1943 (see Chapter 7),
during the remainder of 1943 the front before Army Group North had been
relatively quiet, although high-intensity, if local, operations near the railway
junction of Mga to the south of Lake Ladoga during the summer had kept
German troops pinned down at high cost for the attacking Red Army forces,
which lost 21,000 men for little gain. In early October, however, forces of
the Kalinin Front had managed to seize the key railway junction of Nevel’,
following the seizure of Velikie Luki in January 1943, both on the boundary
between Army Groups North and Centre. This penetration threatened the
rear of Army Group North, raising the possibility that the Army Group
might be cut off by further penetrations on this axis and prompting talk of a
222 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
withdrawal to the Panther Line (Ostwall) positions to the east, running in
part along Lake Peipus. These withdrawals had not, however, been under-
taken by January 1944, when the Soviet offensive below Leningrad started.1
Prior to the start of the offensive, the Soviet 2nd Shock Army had been
covertly moved into the Oranienbaum pocket to the east of Leningrad, and
it was 2nd Shock that started the offensive as it broke out of the pocket and
struck in a south-easterly direction. The next day the Leningrad Front joined
the offensive, as did forces of the Volkhov Front near Novgorod.
Whilst German defences below Leningrad were substantial – German
forces had literally had years to consolidate them on many sectors of the
front – and the offensive was launched in winter, the Soviet offensive in the
region also lacked the drive that was typically exhibited elsewhere. This
situation is often attributed in the literature, and quite reasonably so, to the
fact that the forces and officers near Leningrad had not accrued the
experience of deep penetration operations with increasingly effective com-
bined arms tactics, as had been learnt to the south at considerable cost in
human life. Consequently, whilst German forces lost a considerable amount
of heavy equipment immediately below Leningrad, the bulk of 18th Army
was able to withdraw in good time, including from exposed positions to the
south-east of Leningrad in and around Mga – one of the increasingly rare
occasions that Hitler sanctioned withdrawal to the west. The after-action
report by the commander of the Volkhov Front (Document 136) was, there-
fore, wildly optimistic in claiming the routing [razgrom] of the German
18th Army, even if the tally for trophy equipment captured was more realis-
tic and more difficult for commanders to fudge.

DOCUMENT 136: Report of the commander of the Volkhov Front to the Supreme High
Commander on the results of the Novgorod-Luga, Tosno and Liuban’-Chudovo operations of the
Volkhov Front from 14 January to 12 February 1944, 13 February 1944
1. Forces of the Volkhov Front, together with the Leningrad Front, routed [raz-
gromili] the enemy’s 18th Army and at the current time are mopping up its rem-
nants, at the same time engaged in fighting with 16th Army.
Completely destroyed were: 28th Light; 1st and 2nd Luftwaffe Field Divisions,
the ‘SS’ Police Division, infantry divisions: 401st, 101st, 95th, 625th, 661st
along with 121st Construction and 657th, 236th and 232nd Security Divisions;
657th, 656th and 676th Sapper Battalions and 651st Special Punishment Battal-
ion. The enemy is attempting to reconstitute 28th Light Division from the rem-
nants of other divisions. Routed: 121st, 21st and 8th Light and 15th Latvian
Infantry Divisions. The Spanish Legion, Cavalry Regiment ‘Nord’ and 639th
Field-Training Regiment. 212th, 24th, 290th and 13th Luftwaffe Field Divi-
sions suffered heavy losses.
2. During the period from 14 January to 12 February 1944 (28 days of operation)
our forces overcame the defensive belt of the enemy in difficult-to-traverse
forested and marshy areas to a depth of 140 km, and occupied 779 population
centres and the major towns of the Leningrad region: Novgorod, Luga, Mga,
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 223
Tosno, Chudovo, Liuban’ and the district centres of Oredezh and Batetskaia. 750
km of railway lines were liberated.
3. Trophies seized: Various artillery pieces – 521, . . . various machine guns – 1,760,
mortars – 243, tanks and armoured cars – 31, rifles and SMGs – 7,465, . . . 5
million rifle cartridges, 121,000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, . . . 538
motor vehicles and tractors, 5 steam locomotives. . . . In the fighting 82,000
enemy soldiers and officers were killed, 3,200 were taken prisoner, 336 horses
seized.
4. Destroyed in the fighting: Various artillery pieces – 562, various machine guns –
2,042, mortars – 335, tanks and armoured cars – 128, rifles and SMGs – 6,440,
motor vehicles and tractors – 1,178, . . . aircraft – 35.
...
Commander of the forces of the Volkhov Front
General of the Army K. Meretskov
(Source: N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), 2004, pp. 620–621)

Whilst many of the units mentioned in Document 136 did not exist as units
of the number and type specified, and Soviet assessment of German casual-
ties is perhaps based on extrapolation from the misleading picture of
German units ‘routed’, destroyed or suffering heavy losses, nonetheless 18th
Army did suffer heavily in the fighting. According to German sources, from
10 January to March 1944, in opposing the offensive Army Group North
incurred losses of 17,772 killed and 69,995 wounded, with 11,154
missing.2 In February, the Volkhov Front was dissolved after Leningrad had
finally been declared free on 26 February (see Chapter 7), with the pursuit of
German forces towards the Panther Line after the fall of Luga on 12 Febru-
ary being undertaken by forces of the Leningrad Front in the north and then
with forces of 2nd Baltic Front in the south of the region. By the 1 March
Soviet forces had reached the outskirts of Pskov and Ostrov to the south of
Lake Peipus, but in heavy fighting during March and the first half of April
were unable to break through German positions near Pskov, with a similar
stalemate setting in to the north of the lake near Narva.3
The second blow, and in some ways first in terms of the start date for
operations, had been the ‘Dnepr–Carpathian Strategic Offensive’ Operation
actually started before the end of 1943, on 24 December, when forces of the
1st Ukrainian Front started the ‘Zhitomir-Berdichevskaia’ Operation with
the aim of destroying the German 4th Panzer Army and providing for the
security of the recently recaptured Kiev region and the development of
future operations through an advance to the Bug River. The ‘Dnepr–
Carpathian Strategic Offensive’ Operation did not, of course, consist merely
of this operation, but in fact a series of front-level operations including the
subsequent ‘Kirovograd’, ‘Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii’, ‘Rovno-Lutsk’ and
‘Nikopol’sk-Krivoi Rog’ Operations, the series of operations that lasted
until 17 April 1944 and saw the Red Army enter ‘foreign’, i.e. non-Soviet
territory as of 1940.
224 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
The ‘Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii’ Operation is probably the most noted of
the operations making up the ‘Dnepr–Carpathian Strategic Offensive’ Oper-
ation in both Western and Soviet literature, given the encirclement of a size-
able German force. As with other operations to a greater or lesser degree, it
started with attempts to deceive the enemy as to Soviet intentions – all such
activities being covered by the Russian term maskirovka. A report on opera-
tional ‘deception’ activities by the 2nd Ukrainian Front, produced after the
encirclement, gives some idea of the sort of measures being taken by Soviet
forces:

DOCUMENT 137: Report on measures for the operational maskirovka of forces of the 2nd
Ukrainian Front in the ‘Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Offensive’ Operation
1. General situation and plan
After the capture of Kirovograd and the rout of encircled German forces in the
Lelekovka region (north-west of Kirovograd) the 5th Guards Tank Army . . . moved its
formations to the Gruzkoe district (west of Kirovograd).
In the period of preparation for offensive operations against Lebedin and Shpola in
order to encircle German forces in the area west of Smela along with forces of the 1st
Ukrainian Front the 5th Guards Tank Army concentrated in the district of Kamenka,
Verbovka, Tomashevka. Artillery support was also concentrated in the same area.
In order to hide preparations for the operation, the relocation of the tank army and
in order to mislead the enemy the following deception plan was adopted:
. . . Tanks and artillery were redeployed to new areas in the main at night and in fog,
and were concentrated in forested areas or population centres.
On the front line of 5th Guards Tank Army measures were taken to deceive the
enemy into believing that tanks and artillery were concentrated elsewhere.
All of these measures confused the enemy on the principal axis of our attack and hid
the redeployment of 5th Guards Tank Army and artillery support from the Gruzkoe
district.
2. The development of deception activities
...
The headquarters of engineers decided upon decoy concentration areas and provided
for the creation of dummy tanks and artillery pieces, dummy soldiers, false supply
dumps and signs of tank and artillery.
The headquarters of armoured forces provided each deception area with two tanks
for the imitation of day-to-day activity and the creation of noise and tracks.
The head of communications troops provided for imitation of the work of headquarters’
radio units of tank units and formations from tank army down to battalion level.
The head of artillery provided for decoy artillery positions with roaming artillery
pieces.
(Source: SBD 27, pp. 95–96)

As a result of the operation, at the end of January two German corps had
been encircled, a total of six divisions, including one SS, near the town of
Korsun’. Hitler, predictably, ordered forces there not to attempt to break
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 225
out and fantasized that the Korsun’ pocket might become a ‘Fortress on the
Dnepr’. German attempts to punch through to the pocket with 3rd Panzer
Corps failed – such a plan had similarly failed in more favourable material
circumstances at Stalingrad. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the per-
sonnel from the pocket, even if without the bulk of their equipment, were
able to break out across steppe to German lines. German sources claim
36,262 troops escaped from the pocket during the principal breakout on
16–17 February, with more than 4,000 wounded having been flown out
before 11 February. The Soviets would eventually claim 18,000 prisoners.4
Zhukov, the representative of the Stavka responsible for the co-ordination of
the activities of the two fronts involved, was chided by Stalin for the initial
failure to seal the pocket.

DOCUMENT 138: Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Commander Number
220021 to the Stavka representative on the destruction of the Korsun’ grouping of enemy forces,
12 February 1944, 16:45
The breakout of enemy forces of the Korsun’ grouping from the Steblev salient in the
Shenderovka direction took place because:
Firstly, despite my personal instructions, you did not have a thought out general
plan for the joint destruction of the Korsun’ grouping of the Germans by the 1st and
2nd Ukrainian Fronts;
Secondly, the weak 27th Army was not reinforced in good time;
Thirdly, decisive measures were not taken for the destruction of the Steblev enemy
salient, from which one could most likely have expected an enemy breakout attempt.
I ought to point out to you, that I placed responsibility on you for the task of co-
ordinating the activities of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, and it is obvious from
your report today that despite the critical circumstances, you are insufficiently well
informed on the situation: you are unaware of the enemy occupation of Zhilek and
Novo-Buda; you are unaware of Konev’s decision on the use of Rotmistrov’s 5th
Guards Tank Corps for the destruction of the enemy breaking through to Shen-
derovka.
Forces and resources of the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the left wing of
the 2nd Ukrainian Front are sufficient to liquidate the enemy penetration and the
destruction of the Korsun’ grouping.
I demand of you that you focus on the carrying out of this task.
I. Stalin
A. Antonov
(Source: RA T.16 (5–4), 1999, pp. 41–42)

Command of all forces was given to Konev of the 2nd Ukrainian Front,5 and
by 17th February, after the principal German breakout from the pocket, he
would report:
226 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944

DOCUMENT 139: After battle report of the Commander of forces of the 2nd Ukrainian
Front of 17 February 1944 to the Supreme High Commander on the conclusion and results of
the destruction {razgrom] of the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii grouping of enemy forces
I report:

1. In carrying out your order [of 12 February], on 17 February 1944 forces of the
front fully defeated [razgromili], destroyed and in part imprisoned the encircled
enemy grouping, consisting of nine infantry and one Panzer division and a Panz-
ergrenadier brigade.
2. All enemy attacks from outside the encirclement to break through to it were suc-
cessfully repulsed by our forces with the enemy suffering heavy losses in equip-
ment and personnel.
3. With the remnants of his strength the enemy, with a force of 8–10 thousand
men, from 5–7 artillery batteries and 12–15 tanks from the encircled force
started to break out of the encirclement between three and six o’clock on 17 Feb-
ruary on the defensive sector of 180th Rifle Division of 27th Army . . . , situated
to the west and south-west. . . .
4. Forces of the front: 52nd, 4th Guards and 27th Army, elements of 5th Guards
Tank Army and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps smashed the advance. Consequently
the enemy, penetrating into the depths of our positions, was broken up in to
separate groups, destroyed and captured. . . .

The enemy left all of his heavy equipment. . . .

Konev. . .
(Source: Document 5, in ‘Korsun’-Shevchenkvskaia operatsiia v dokumentakh
(24 ianvaria-17 fevralia 1944 g.)’, Vizh, Number 2 (1984), p. 44)

Although the fighting around the Korsun’ pocket receives much attention in
the popular Western literature on the exploits of the Wehrmacht on the
Eastern Front, the next of the ‘Stalinist blows’ of 1944 would see far more
serious German and Axis losses.
The third blow would see the final liberation of the Crimea by forces of
the Independent Maritime Army that had been landed at Kerch’ the previ-
ous year (see Chapter 6), 4th Ukrainian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and Azov
Flotilla. German and Rumanian forces holding the peninsula had been cut
off from the main body of Axis forces by the Soviet advance in the south of
the Ukraine in November 1943, and the defences of the Perekop Isthmus
held initial Soviet attempts to retake the territory off the march. By the
spring of 1944, up to 165,000 German and 65,000 Rumanian troops
holding the Crimea served little strategic purpose – the principal justifica-
tion for leaving them there in late 1943 – something of a smokescreen for
Hitler’s obsession for holding territory per se was the claim that the Crimea
would have provided a base for Soviet bombing of the crucial Rumanian oil-
fields. By the spring of 1944, these could conveniently be bombed from
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 227
Soviet airfields with 4th Ukrainian Front further west, and – indeed, more
effectively given the weakness of Soviet strategic bombing – by US bombers
based in Italy.
A planned offensive to liberate the Crimea finally began on 8 April and
lasted until 12 May 1944. After two days, defences on the Perekop
Isthmus had been breached, with Sevastopol’ finally falling after a battle
lasting less than a week. Belatedly Hitler authorized an evacuation of
troops, after some had been pulled out anyway, with up to 130,000 being
evacuated by sea and a further 21,000 by air – an embarrassment for the
Soviet side given the superiority of the Black Sea Fleet, now with superior
air cover compared to 1941, over the paltry German and Rumanian naval
forces in the region. Nonetheless, 17th Army defending the Crimea had
incurred losses of around 53,500 men killed, missing or captured from 8
April to 13 May 1944, with a further 22,000 Rumanian losses.6 Soviet
forces had lost considerably fewer men as irrecoverable losses (see Table
10.4 below) in what had ended up being an unusually economical opera-
tion by Soviet standards.
As was the case in the North Caucasus, in the Crimea in May 1944 the
returning Soviet security services (now the NKVD and NKGB) set about
punishing the indigenous population en masse for collaboration with the
Germans. A GKO decree of 11 May 1944 required that all Tatars be
deported from the Crimea to the Uzbek SSR.7 By 20 May, after a two-day
operation, the head of the NKVD, Beria, received the following:

DOCUMENT 140: Telegram from the Deputy People’s Commissar NKGB B.Z. Kobulov and
Deputy People’s Commissar NKVD I.A. Serov to the People’s Commissar NKVD L.P. Beria on
the conclusion of the operation for the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, 20 May 1944
With this telegram I am reporting, that . . . the operation for the deportation of the
Crimean Tatars finished today, 18 May, at 16:00. A total of 180,014 persons were
deported, loaded into 67 trains, of which 63 trains have already been dispatched to
their final destinations, with the remaining four to be similarly dispatched today.
In addition, the District Military Commissariats of the Crimea have mobilized six
thousands Tatars of conscription age. . . .
Of the 8,000 special contingent sent on your instructions for use by the Moscow-
Coal Trust 5,000 are Tatars. Hence, 191,044 persons of Tatar nationality have been
deported from the Crimean ASSR.
During the deportation 1,137 persons from amongst anti-Soviet elements were
arrested, and during the period of the operation 5,989.
During the deportation of the Tatars the following weapons were seized: mortars –
10, machine-guns – 173, SMGs – 192, rifles – 2,650, munitions [boepripasi] – 45,603.
In total during the period of the operation the following were seized: mortars – 49,
machine-guns – 622, SMGs – 724, rifles – 9,888, and munitions – 327,887 items. . . .
Simferopol. Kobulov, Serov
(Source: N.L. Pobol’ and P.M. Polian, 2005, pp. 501–502)
228 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
The fourth blow would lead to Finland withdrawing from the war, the Finns
having put out tentative peace feelers in February 1944, but were under heavy
German pressure to remain in the war. In the summer of 1941 Finnish troops
had advanced to the 1940 Finnish border, stopped and dug in. The Soviet
‘Viborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive’ Operation, which took place from 10 June to
9 August 1944, caught the Finns off guard. This was certainly not going to be
a repeat of the Soviet military debacle of the winter of 1939–40, partly because
it was not winter, but also because the Red Army was now a very different crea-
ture. Within only a fortnight Soviet troops north of Leningrad had advanced as
far as Viborg and what was the border in June 1941, and a second phase of
Soviet operations saw Soviet troops to the east advance from the River Svir’ to
the Karelian capital, Petrozavodsk. Whilst the success of Soviet operations in
Karelia was certainly a factor in the Finns seeking, with far more resolve than in
February, to extricate themselves from the war, the success of Soviet troops
against forces of Army Group North to the south during July was also import-
ant in physically isolating the Finns from their German allies. In late August
the decision was taken to leave the war; in early September the breaking off of
diplomatic relations with Germany was followed by an armistice in which the
Soviet Union added the Petsamo region (still in German hands), reparations
and a base outside Helsinki to the spoils of 1940, but without Finland being
subject to full Soviet occupation.8
The fifth blow is arguably individually the most significant of the ‘Stalin-
ist blows’ of 1944, seeing the effective destruction of Army Group Centre as
a fighting force worthy of the Army Group designation.
Between 7 August and 2 October 1943 Soviet forces had engaged in
heavy fighting with Army Group Centre (Operation ‘Suvorov’) that saw the
final recapture of Smolensk on 25 September and the rail junction of Nevel’
further north on the boundary between the German Army Groups North
and South, but at the heavy cost of 107,645 irrecoverable losses, which at
this stage of the war with Soviet forces advancing meant mostly killed rather
than POWs.9 Subsequently, the focus of Soviet attentions had been to the
north and south, a trend that German intelligence saw as likely to continue
during May and June 1944. Army Group Centre remained relatively weak,
particularly in armour despite the inevitable pleas from commanders lower in
the chain of command, who were at least aware that something was afoot from
the forward deployment of infantry and artillery before their positions, even if
they were unaware of the preparations taking place in the Soviet rear. Such
junior concerns could be dismissed as predictable bleating from those who
were not concerned with the broader picture, particularly given that the
German command not only had Soviet operations to the north and south on
the Eastern Front to worry about, but also Allied operations in Italy and, after
6th June 1944, what in Soviet terms constituted a genuine ‘Second Front’ in
France. Glantz and House note that when a battalion commander of the
German 12th Infantry Division of Army Group Centre described the threat
before his division to General Martinek of 39th Panzer Corps whilst he was
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 229
inspecting the unit, the latter cited the proverb ‘Whom God would destroy,
he first strikes blind’; in fact, it would take days for the German command to
fully appreciate the significance of Soviet operations against the Army Group.
Operation ‘Bagration’ began in earnest on 23 June 1944, at which point in the
war the front-line situation in the East was as illustrated in Figure 10.1.10
In the summer of 1944, Soviet forces were able to concentrate tremen-
dous material resources against German forces, assisted by increasingly
sophisticated maskirovka, counter-intelligence against German stay-behind
agents and the fact that German aerial reconnaissance was increasingly ham-
pered by Soviet air superiority where it mattered.
The Red Army was able, in considerable secrecy, to concentrate over-
whelming force on the key axes. As an illustration of Soviet ability to con-
centrate force on the key axes of attack, Table 10.1 provides the correlation
of forces on the axis of attack of 11th Guards Army of 3rd Belorussian Front
to the north of Minsk. It is important to note that the correlation for tanks

Figure 10.1 Changes in the front line from late 1943 to the end of 1944.
Key:

1. Kirkenes 12. Bobruisk 23. Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii

2. Murmansk 13. Kursk 24. Kirovgrad
3. Arkhangel’sk 14. Warsaw 25. Stalingrad
4. Helsinki 15. Lutsk 26. Zaporozh’e
5. Leningrad 16. Prague 27. Sevastopol’
6. Tallin 17. Vienna 28. Odessa
7. Riga 18. Budapest 29. Bucharest
8. Königsberg 19. L’vov 30. Sofia
9. Vilnius 20. Kishinev 31. Belgrade
10. Vitebsk 21. Iassi
11. Minsk 22. Rovno
Table 10.1 Correlation of forces on the principal axis of attack (Orsha axis) of 11th Guards Army (15 km width) of 3rd Belorussian Front on
23 June 1944

Forces and weapons Enemy Soviet forces

■
Density per 1 km frontage Overall Density per 1 km of frontage Overall Superiority over enemy

Divisions 10 km per 2 divisions 1.4 km per division 11 –

division +1 regiment
+2 battalions
Combat troops 1,888 28,320 7,915 118,729 4.2:1
MMGs/HMGs 120 1,800 274 4,107 2.3:1
Mortars 14.5 218 77.4 1,161 5.3:1
AT guns 12 181 32 482 2.7:1
Artillery (76 mm
and above) 14.6 220 80 1,193 5.4:1
RS 3.6 54 24 360 6.6:1
Tanks and SPs 4.7 70 24.7 371 5.3:1
Source: David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass,
2001), p. 48.
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 231
and self-propelled guns does not include those forces allocated for the devel-
opment of the penetration of German defences. The total strengths for Army
Group Centre and the forces of the 1st–3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts
facing them during June before the commencement of the Soviet offensive
are provided in Table 10.2.
With the meagre resources, particularly armour, available to Army Group
Centre (where the so-called 3rd Panzer Army was reliant for mobility on
60,000 horses!), German forces could not hope to mount any sort of mobile
defence between the fortified towns [feste Plätze] that Hitler had ordered be
held rather than allow a withdrawal westwards. As the offensive got under-
way, Soviet mobile forces penetrated deep into the German defences, bypass-
ing centres of resistance for later reduction and then pressing on in pursuit
of those German troops that had escaped encirclement to the west, well
beyond the sort of distances it was expected Soviet troops would be able to
pursue them without some sort of halt for consolidation. Minsk, capital of
the Belorussian SSR, fell on 3 July, leaving a huge German pocket, the bulk
of 4th Army, to the east. Soviet reinforcement during the operation took
forces committed to over two million, as shown in Table 10.4 below.11
Between 22 June and 10 July, German forces of Army Group Centre lost
in the region of 264,444 men according to statistics compiled during 1944,
of whom 6,622 were counted as killed, 22,165 wounded and 235,657
missing – mainly killed and POWs. The German 4th Army suffered most
heavily, with 5,315 recorded as killed, 16,870 wounded and 108,485
missing. A total of at least 28 German divisions had ceased to exist as effect-
ive fighting units; Soviet sources claimed 25 German divisions ‘routed’ [raz-
gromleno] or completely destroyed during June and 28 during July. Not that
Soviet losses were light – as Table 10.4 below shows, during an operation

Table 10.2 Strengths of Army Group Centre and the forces of the 1st–3rd Beloruss-
ian and 1st Baltic Fronts facing them during June 1944

Soviet 1st Baltic, 2nd and German ‘White Russian Balcony’

3rd Belorussian and 1st (4th and 9th Armies and 3rd
Belorussian (left wing) Panzer Army)

Personnel 1,254,300 (22.06.1944) 336,573 (01.06.1944)

Artillery pieces 4,230 45–57 mm AT, 2,589
10,563 76 mm+ field
artillery, 11,514 82–
120 mm mortars, 2,306
RS launchers, 2,303 AA
Tanks 2,715 118
Self-propelled guns 1,355 (SAU) 377 (Sturmgeshütze)
Aircraft 5,327 602
Sources: DDRudZW8, p. 532 and ‘Belorusskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 6 (1964),
p. 77.
Table 10.3 Number and origin of vehicles in the Red Army vehicle park 1941–45 (thousands)

Vehicle 22 June 1941 1 January 1942 1 January 1943 1 January 1944 1 January 1945 1 May 1945

Domestic 272.6 317.1 378.8 387.0 395.2 385.7

Percentage of total park 100.0 99.6 99.7 77.9 63.6 58.1
Imported – Negligible 22.0 94.1 191.3 218.1
Percentage of total park – Negligible 5.4 19.0 30.4 32.8
Captured – 1.4 3.7 14.9 34.7 60.6
Percentage of total park – 0.4 0.9 3.9 6.0 9.1
Total 272.6 318.5 404.5 496.0 621.2 664.4
Of which replacement of – 159.0 66.2 67.0 32.6 27.0
losses during previous period
Soviet production during
previous period:
Lorries – 59.3* 32.4 46.7 55.2 –
Cars – 5.5 2.6 2.6 5.4 –
Allied deliveries during – 0.4 32.5 95.1 139.6 –
previous period
Sources: Vorsin, ‘Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through “Lend-Lease” ’, pp. 164 and 169; Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 257; and
Harrison, Accounting for War, p. 197.
Note
*Annual production for 1941 (see Table 8.7) divided by two.
Table 10.4 Soviet strategic offensive operations and losses during 1944

Strategic offensive Principal forces Numerical Max. distance Irrecoverable Total losses (inc.
operation involved strength advanced/time losses sick and wounded)
frame

‘Dnepr–Carpathian’ 1st, 2nd, 3 rd, 4th 2,406,100 450 km/116 days 270,198 1,109,528
Ukrainian Fronts
(+15.03–05.04 2nd
Belorussian Front)
‘Leningrad–Novgorod’ Leningrad and Volkhov 822,100 280 km/48 days 76,686 313,953
Fronts, Baltic Fleet
(+ 1st Shock Army,
2nd Baltic Front
14.01–10.02, and
2nd Baltic Front
10.02–01.03)
‘Crimean’ 4th Ukrainian Front, 462,400 260 km/35 days 17,754 84,819
Independent Maritime
Army, 4th Air Army,
Black Sea Fleet, Azov
Flotilla
‘Viborg–Petrozavodsk’ Karelian and Leningrad 451,000 250 km/61 days 23,674 96,375
Fronts, Baltic Fleet and
Ladoga and Onega Flotillas
‘Belorussian’ 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian 2,331,700 600 km/68 days 178,507 765,815
and 1st Baltic Fronts,
Dnepr Flotilla
‘L’vov–Sandomierz’ 1st Ukrainian Front 1,002,200 350 km/48 days 65,100 289,296
Table 10.4 continued

Strategic offensive Principal forces Numerical Max. distance Irrecoverable Total losses (inc.
operation involved strength advanced/time losses sick and wounded)
frame

‘Iassi–Kishinev’ 2nd, 3rd Ukrainian 1,314,200 320 km/10 days 13,197 67,130
Fronts, Black Sea Fleet,
Danube Flotilla
‘Baltic’ Leningrad Front, 1st, 1,546,400 300 km/72 days 61,468 280,090
2nd, 3rd Baltic Fronts
(14.09–20.10.44), 39th
Army, 3rd Belorussian
Front (01.10–31.10.44)
and Baltic Fleet
‘East Carpathian’, 1st and 4th Ukrainian 378,000 110 km/51 days 28,473 131,910
‘Belgrade’ and Fronts and 1st
‘Budapest (to Czechoslovak Army
13.02.45) Strategic Corps
Offensive’ Operations 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian 300,000 200 km/23 days 4,350 18,838
Fronts, Danube Flotilla
2nd and 3rd Ukrainian 719,500 400 km/108 days 80,026 320,082
Fronts, Danube Flotilla
‘Petsamo–Kirkenes’ Karelian Front and 133,500 150 km/23 days 6,084 21,233
Northern Fleet
Totals 825,517 3,499,069
Source: Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 140–152.
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 235
extending officially until the end of August Soviet forces lost 178,507
personnel as irrecoverable losses, losing a staggering 2,957 tanks and self-
propelled guns during the operation.12
In the end it was logistical problems as much as German resistance that halted
the Soviet advance – hardly surprising with supply lines extending as much as
400km from principal supply bases to forward units. As the Soviet General Staff
Study on the operation comments with regard to the Soviet 43rd Army:

DOCUMENT 141: Extract from the Soviet General Staff study on the ‘Belorussian Strategic
Offensive’ Operation (‘Bagration’) on supply issues
With the lines of communication so stretched out, shortcomings in motor vehicle
transport were sharply felt.
To provide the rapidly advancing forces with all necessities, decisive measures were
undertaken to mobilize motor vehicle and cart transport. . . . For example, the 43rd
Army was forced to resort to transporting divisional artillery by horse, and having
freed-up motor vehicles to transport cargoes, to create motor vehicle supply groups
from divisional motor transport, mobilize local cart transport, organize a cart battalion
with 1,000 carts, and exploit captured motor vehicles more extensively.
Considerable difficulties also arose during the operation in connection with provid-
ing forces and rear area services with POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) products.
Fuel reserves continuously declined, and by 14 July the 43rd Army has only a total of
0.5 petrol refuellings and 0.2 motor oil replenishments. This led to interruptions in
motor-vehicle transport and in the resupply of armies with ammunition.
(Source: D.M. Glantz and H.S. Orenstein (eds. and trans.), Belorussia 1944, 2001, p. 208).

Nonetheless, in one fell swoop Belorrussia had been all but liberated and the
‘Lublin–Brest’ Operation in July and early August saw the Red Army advance
deep into Polish territory, with the town of Lublin falling to Soviet forces on 24
July 1944 and a further advance taking the Red Army to the gates of Warsaw,
seizing bridgeheads to the north and south of the city over the Vistula. Soviet
lead units approached the fortified suburb of Praga, part of the city of Warsaw
but on the eastern bank of the Vistula where the remainder was on the western
side, on 31 July 1944; the following day saw the start of the Warsaw Uprising
by the Polish Home Army tied to the government in exile in London rather
than the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee that had taken up seat in Lublin
after its capture by the Red Army. Soviet assistance to the uprising was limited
– Soviet forces did not punch through to the insurgents in any strength, and
only started regular airdrops of supplies and munitions in mid-September. A
single battalion of Soviet-sponsored Polish troops did make it across the Vistula
to aid the uprising, according to Document 142:
236 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944

DOCUMENT 142: From a report of member of the Military Soviet of the 1st Belorussian
Front, General-Lieutenant K.F. Telegin to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army on
the situation in Warsaw and assistance to the insurgents (by direct transmission), 16 September
1944, 14:00–15:00
This is General-Lieutenant Shikin.
Greetings Comrade Telegin!
I would like to report what you know about the situation in Warsaw as it stands
today.
Greetings! This is Telegin.
Reporting on the situation in Warsaw.
1. Reconnaissance troops of the 1st Polish Army managed this evening to break
through to the western bank of the Vistula in the region of the southern bridge. A
Colonel Radoslav was brought to our side of the river by the scouts along with two
rank-and-file insurgents.
Radoslav is the leader of a group of insurgents about 150-strong, continuing to hold
out in that area, he himself and his people belonging to the Security Corps, loyal to
the Lublin government. . . .
From the start of our offensive operations the Germans increased their stranglehold
on the district, bombing and shelling daily and using tanks against the insurgents,
inflicting significant losses on the insurgents and pressing them in to a single quarter
against the river (Quarter Number 71 of the plan of Warsaw). The situation for the
group became critical.
Today a single battalion of the Polish Army was sent across the other side of the
river, and cleared Quarter Number 71 of Germans and firmly holds it along with the
insurgents. . . .
(Source: Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, 1999, kn.3, p. 461)

Whilst Soviet supply lines were seriously extended and Soviet forces faced
stiff German opposition in the region, nonetheless Soviet forces probably
could have broken into the city in late August or September had there been
compelling reason to do so. There was however, no compelling reason to
squander resources on a frontal assault on a major city in order to save insur-
gents whose uprising was timed to seize the city just before the arrival of
Red Army troops, to the political detriment of the position of the pro-Soviet
Polish Committee in Lublin. Soviet troops would not advance on this sector
of the front again until early 1945.13
The ‘L’vov–Sandomierz Strategic Offensive’ Operation became the sixth
blow of 1944, and saw Soviet mechanized and armoured forces similarly
advancing large distances in short periods of time, in this instance as much
as 50–65 km per day on the approaches to the Vistula River much further
south, over which they were able to seize a bridgehead at Sandomierz. The
operation saw the encirclement of a significant German force consisting of
Korpsabteilung C of 13th Corps, made up of three units of regimental
strength, along with an infantry division, security division, and most noted
in the wider Western literature, the 14th Waffen SS Division, ‘Galicia’, a
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 237

Figure 10.2 Rail transport and the Soviet ‘L’vov–Peremishl’ Operation, July 1944
(see Document 142).

unit drawing on what in Soviet terms were western Ukrainians, but more
importantly marking a volte-face in German and particularly SS policy on
the deployment of substantial units of eastern origin in front-line roles. The
pocket saw a German loss of 40,000 men and much equipment.14
Given the distances being advanced by Soviet forces, as in the case of the
‘Belorussian’ Operation, careful logistical preparations were important for
the Red Army to be able to advance as far as it could in a single operational
bound, as is apparent from Documents 85 (Chapter 6) and 142 (below).
Whilst Document 86 above is concerned with transport from railheads to
front-line troops, Document 143 is concerned with the maximization of
railway capacity to railheads as deep in newly liberated territory as possible
during the ‘L’vov–Sandomierz’ (or ‘L’vov–Peremishl’ ’) Operation, and then
the transfer of this material to front-line troops by road. Of particular note
in this document, to which Figure 10.2 relates, and something that fre-
quently appears in similar documents, is the extent to which German forces
had developed the capacity of the Soviet rail system on occupied territory
over that which had existed in the summer of 1941:

DOCUMENT 143: Rail and road transport in order to provide material support for Soviet
forces during the ‘L’vov–Peremishl’ ’ Operation, July 1944
Material Support
. . . The plan envisioned . . . :
...
All rear service area organs were redeployed closer to the forces prior to the offen-
sive. The rear service areas of larger formations were partially relocated in the rear
service regions of smaller formations (the front’s rear service units to the army rear
service areas and the army rear service units to the forces’ rear service area):
238 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
The front was based on four railway lines . . . :
1. Kiev-Zhitomir-Novograd-Volinskii-Shepetovka-Ternopol’;
2. Kiev-Fastov-Berdichev-Shepetovka-Staro-Konstantinov-Grechani;
3. Kazatin-Zhmerinka-Grechani-Ternopol’; and
4. Shepetovka-Zdolbunov-Kivertse.
In addition, two sets of trains per day were provided for the 1st Ukrainian Front
along the line running from Zhmerinka to Mogilev-Podol’skii, Sadagura and
Kolomiia. . . . The front had five motor-vehicle roads at its disposal. . . . In addition, each
army had its own motor-vehicle road.
In preparing railway lines for the 1st Ukrainian Front’s offensive operation, primary
attention was focused on increasing the carrying capacity of the railway sectors. The
following measures were undertaken to this end:
Restoration of the secondary route in the Kazatin-Zhmerinka sector, which
increased the carrying capacity of the entire line (Kazatin-Zhmerinka-Ternopol’);
Restoration of the railway bridge across the Dnestr River at Zaleshchiki; . . .
As a result of these measures we succeeded in increasing the carrying capacity of the
railway sector by a factor of 1.5–2. The average capacity of two-way sectors was 24
pairs of trains a day (12 for one-way sectors). The capacity in individual sectors
(Shepetovka-Zdolbunov) was 36 pairs of trains.
The training of railway units for swift restoration of railway lines during the opera-
tion was an important mission. Air reconnaissance, during which the principal railway
junctions were photographed, was conducted to obtain data on the condition of
railway sectors on enemy territory and the travel capacity of junctions and large sta-
tions. Aerial photography established, that in comparison with 1941, in many sectors
the enemy had done considerable work to develop travel capacity. . . . Table 7 shows
which sectors were to be restored, their length, and their rate of restoration.
In all, the front had at its disposal 56,331 lorries (74 percent of those authorized), of

Sector Sector Restoration Rate of

length (km) period restoration
(days) (km/day)

Zviniache–Saperzhanka–L’vov 116 12 9.7

Saperzhanka–Kristinopol’–Rava Russkaia 90 9 10.0
Radzivilov–Krasne 55 6 9.2
Ternopol’–Krasne–L’vov 133 14 9.5

which 50 percent were placed in reserve. A great deal of repair work was done on
motor-vehicle transport to bring it in to order. The manufacture and restoration of
deficient parts on the spot played a significant role in the repair of motor-vehicle trans-
port. . . . As a result of all this repair work, the motor-vehicle park achieved 91 percent
technical readiness.
Road work also consumed a large quantity of forces and equipment. . . .
(Source: D.M. Glantz and H.S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for L’vov, July 1944,
2002, pp. 36–39)
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 239
The growth in the Red Army vehicle park during the war, facilitating the
bounding Soviet advance by 1944, is apparent in Table 10.3.
It is worth noting that, given the dramatic increase in size of the Red
Army from a list strength of 3,334,400 for the third quarter of 1941 to a
high list strength of 6,714,300 for the third quarter of 1944,15 the increase
in available vehicles was proportionally not dramatically greater than the
increase in manpower, even if imported motor vehicles were typically larger
and had a greater capacity than Soviet vehicles available in 1941. Con-
sequently, therefore, the considerable reliance that the Red Army, as did the
Wehrmacht, placed on horses and on the infantry marching from railheads
continued throughout the war. Table 10.3 also highlights that a consider-
able number of motor vehicles that were used by the Red Army were drawn
from the wider Soviet economy rather than new Soviet production, Allied
imports or captured stocks (see Chapter 8).
As the fourth blow, the seventh ‘Stalinist blow’ would result in the loss of
another German ally in the east, in this case Rumania. The brief
‘Iassi–Kishinev Strategic Offensive’ Operation lasted from 20 to 29 August
1944. Whilst the operation has received relatively little attention from
historians, and Soviet success was achieved where the Soviet numerical
advantage was, where it mattered, overwhelming – by now the norm – it
was nonetheless a significant operational-strategic achievement in a very
short space of time – perhaps even strategic if knocking Rumania out of the
war is considered, although it was not expected by either the Germans or the
Soviets that Rumania would crumple so quickly.
Whilst the Wehrmacht was still millions strong on paper, in the absence of
the armoured forces for a mobile or elastic defence and particularly given
Hitler’s obsession with holding ground per se, it was forced to commit the
bulk of front-line troops to creating some sort of defensive line, based on
strongpoints, with limited and typically somewhat less than mobile reserves.
The first line of German defences was inevitably poorly manned, with Soviet
reconnaissance forces often penetrating deeply into them before the start of
primary operations. This German practice did serve some purpose, provid-
ing something of a tripwire in the event of a major assault. Nonetheless,
with the low strength and poor mobility of German forces, combined with
often poor operational-strategic dispositions – occupied with a view to
holding onto territory rather than sound defence, in this case with the polit-
ical concern for Rumanian reaction to the loss of those territories acquired
from the Soviet Union after June 1941 – the inevitable encirclements of the
last few months continued.
In the case of the Soviet ‘Iassi–Kishinev Strategic Offensive’ Operation,
most of the reformed German 6th Army was to be encircled; the previous
formation having been lost at Stalingrad. The fact that the Soviet 2nd and
3rd Ukrainian Fronts were considerably weaker than they had been only a
few months before, having lost amongst other formations 5th Guards Tank
Army, might have lulled the German High Command into a false sense of
240 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
security on this sector of the front, but the German Army Group South
Ukraine had lost numerous divisions, including the bulk of its armour, in
the light of the collapse of Army Group Centre to the north.
As the Soviet operation broke through German and Rumanian defences
on the far left and right of the principal fortified positions of the ‘Trajan’ and
associated positions, there was little German and Rumanian forces could do
as forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front raced southwards to the west of Iassi as
forces of 3rd Ukrainian Front pushed south-west and east from bridgeheads
over the Dnestr. Army Group South Ukraine had only two German panzer
(13th and 20th) and one Rumanian armoured (1st Rumanian) division and
the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division by 15 August, where the Soviet 2nd
Ukrainian Front’s mobile force alone could deploy 6th Tank Army along
with 18th and 23rd Tank Corps. The two fronts together deployed a modest
but nonetheless overwhelming total of 1,428 tanks and 446 SPs, against the
155 tanks and 324 SPs of Army Group South Ukraine as of 1 August, down
from 424 tanks and 430 SPs on 11 July. Only three days into the operation,
the Rumanian dictator Marshal Antonescu was overthrown in the name of
the young king, and very soon Rumania was fighting on the side of the
Allies and the Soviet Union, albeit paying particular attention to territorial
squabbles with its old rival Hungary that remained allied with Germany.16
The eighth blow saw the ‘liberation’ of the bulk of the Baltic Republics
by Soviet troops in the period from 14 September to 24 November 1944;
not that the bulk of the local population probably saw it in such terms, in a
region where collaboration with the Germans was relatively enthusiastic,
including participation in the foreign-manned Waffen SS units that had
appeared as German fortunes waned. On 14 September Soviet forces of the
Leningrad Front, now freed from the responsibility of dealing with Finland,
started the process of ‘liberating’ Estonia, striking from jumping-off points
west of Narva (captured in July) and near Tartu (taken in August), with
Tallinn falling by 23 September. Subsequent operations saw Soviet troops
push on to the coast to the west and amphibious operations saw the recap-
ture of most of the Baltic islands, with a German garrison on the largest of
these holding out until late November before being evacuated by sea (timid-
ity in the use of Soviet naval forces not being confined to the Arctic or Black
Seas). Whilst being pushed back by forces of the Leningrad Front, a more
serious threat for the survival of Army Group North had developed in the
south, where during the later stages of the ‘Belorussian Strategic Offensive’
Operation, in penetrating as far as the gates of Riga, Soviet forces now
threatened to cut Army Group North off by land from Army Group Centre
and the Reich. Heavy defences for the city of Riga and a fresh infusion of
armour from Army Group Centre prevented this taking place in late Sep-
tember, but German forces were not in a position to stop Soviet forces rede-
ploying to strike westwards towards the coast, with Soviet lead units having
penetrated to the coast north of Memel by 10 October after only five days of
operations; Memel itself held out until the end of the year when much of the
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 241
garrison was evacuated by sea. Army Group North was now finally isolated,
at least by land, and certainly no longer able to make a major contribution
to the German war effort as an entity. However, the German navy (or Kriegs-
marine) was able to sustain the remaining forces of what became Army
Group Kurland that had retreated into the Kurland Peninsula. Despite the
pulling out of much of the Army Group’s manpower as the situation deteri-
orated to the south, at the end of the war more than 200,000 German troops
in the pocket were taken prisoner.17
In the far south, the ninth blow actually consisted of more than one stra-
tegic offensive operation, the ‘East Carpathian’ and ‘Belgrade Strategic
Offensive’ Operations, taking place from 8 September to 28 October and 28
September to 20 October respectively, followed by the ‘Budapest Strategic
Offensive’ Operation that started on 29 October 1944 and saw Soviet troops
bogged down in fierce fighting until 13 February 1945.
The ‘East Carpathian Strategic Offensive’ Operation aimed to destroy
German forces in the East Carpathian region and link up with the abortive
Slovak uprising against the Germans. Had the uprising and the Soviet
operations somewhat dependent on it been more successful, it would have
allowed Soviet forces to avoid and isolate Hungary in their drive to secure
Eastern Europe. According to Soviet accounts the failure of the Slovak upris-
ing to draw in key Slovak army units (Slovakia had been given a measure of
independence under German overlordship), in particular the ‘Slovak Corps’
based around the towns of Prešov and Košice and ideally situated and
intended to secure key mountain passes for advancing Soviet troops, was a
key factor. That the Germans were able to disarm the corps was a major
factor in the failure of Soviet operations to break through the stiffly defended
mountain passes to pockets of territory held by the rebels deep in the
German rear, although the fact that Soviet operations were launched with
relatively little preparation on the back of the ‘L’vov–Sandomierz’ Operation
and without the overwhelming superiority in manpower in difficult moun-
tainous terrain was also important.18
In the aftermath of the Rumanian collapse and the failure of the ‘East
Carpathian Strategic Offensive’ Operation and Slovak uprising, Soviet
forces continued their advance towards Austria and the Reich through
Hungary. Initially, Soviet forces were able to advance quickly through
open country along the Rumanian border in early October, and it was
hoped that the Rumanian collapse would be mirrored in Hungary.
However, whilst representatives of the conservative Horthy government
negotiated a separate peace with the Soviet Union in Moscow – the inten-
tion to seek peace being announced by radio on 15 October – SS ‘comman-
dos’ toppled the government by seizing Horthy’s headquarters in Budapest
and facilitated the establishment of a fascist Hungarian government.
Despite some defections to the Soviets, the bulk of the Hungarian Army
continued to fight for the Axis alongside German units – and against
Hungary’s local rival Rumania.
242 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
With Soviet patience for a Hungarian collapse exhausted, the first
attempt to seize Budapest, on a narrow front with a force based on two
mechanized corps of 46th Army of Malinovskii’s 2nd Ukrainian Front,
started on 28 October; on 4 November the Stavka noted the poor chances of
success for the operation without support, against what were strong Axis
(German and Hungarian) forces in the region:

DOCUMENT 144: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 220256 to the Command of forces
of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the organization of the advance on Budapest, 4 November
1944, 20:00
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Commander considers an attack on a narrow
front with a force of only two mechanized corps with only limited infantry could lead
to unjustified losses and place forces active on that axis under threat of flank attack by
enemy forces from the north-east.
Given this, the Stavka orders:

1. That the right wing of the front (7th Guards, 53rd, 27th and 40th Armies) be
moved to the western bank of the River Tisa with the aim of conducting an
advance on a wide front and destroying the Budapest grouping of enemy forces
with a blow by the right wing of the front from the north and north-east in co-
operation with a blow by the left wing of the front (46th Army and 2nd and 4th
Guards Mechanized Corps) from the south.
(Source: RA T.16 (5–4), 1999, p. 165)

After further abortive attempts to seize Budapest by the 2nd Ukrainian

Front, forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were to participate in the capture of
Budapest and destruction of Axis forces in the region, having first crossed
the Danube, to the south-west of Budapest.

DOCUMENT 145: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 220280 to the Command of forces
of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts and Stavka representative on the transfer of 46th Army
and on the tasks of the fronts in the capture of Budapest, 12 December 1944, 04:00
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Commander orders:

1. Shlemin’s 46th Army consisting of ten rifle divisions, 2nd Guards Mechanized
Brigade, 7th Breakthrough Artillery Division and with all army support units, . .
. is to be transferred from 2nd Ukrainian Front to 3rd Ukrainian Front. . . .
3. With the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts the Budapest group of
enemy forces is to be destroyed and the city of Budapest captured, for which:
a) The command of forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, continuing the advance
by its left wing on Budapest, with a force of two-three rifle corps, 6th
Guards Tank Army and Group Pliev, . . . is to strike [to the east of
Budapest] . . . with the aim of occupying the northern bank of the Danube
on the Nesmei-Esztergom sector and to prevent the retreat of the Budapest
enemy grouping to the north-west; . . .
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 243
b) The command of forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front is to strike from the Lake
Velence region [between Lake Balaton and Budapest] in the direction of
Bicske with 46th and 4th Guards Armies, with 18th Tank Corps, 2nd
Guards Mechanized Corps, 7th Mechanized Corps and 5th Guards Cavalry
Corps, with the aim of moving round the enemy Budapest grouping from
the west. Part of the force committed is to advance on Budapest from the
west and in co-ordination with the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front
capture it.
4. The advance is to start . . . 19–20.12.1944.
5. Plans for the operation are to be submitted to the General Headquarters
15.12.1944.
(Source: RA T.16 (5–4), 1999, p. 181)

Budapest was finally encircled on 26 December, but with the city prepared
for a stubborn defence that would see much of it destroyed and the loss of
many civilian in addition to military lives, this would be the first time that
the Red Army would have to besiege a major enemy city.

DOCUMENT 146: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 220286 to the Commanders of
forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts on the use of artillery in the fighting for Budapest,
26 December 1944, 22:10
According to available information the Germans have decided to hold the city of
Budapest for as long as possible, having fortified major buildings in advance and
having occupied all positions in the city suited for defence.
In order that the Germans do not have the possibility of carrying out this plan, to
avoid heavy casualties to our forces and speed up the capitulation of the group of
German forces encircled in Budapest, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Com-
mander orders that for the destruction of the enemy spread around major buildings
across Budapest, and also in the fortress on the western bank of the Danube, artillery
of all calibers is to be used, including the largest, as well as airpower and groups of
sappers. Artillery of all calibers, up to and including the largest, is also to be used to
accompanying the infantry in street fighting with the aim of destroying centres
[ochagi] of resistance with direct artillery fire.
(Source: RA T.16 (5–4), 1999, p. 184)

The western part of the city, Buda, finally fell on 13 February 1945 –
leaving only ruins.19 The region had not seen the end of bloodshed, however,
since the last significant counter-offensive by German forces would take
place in the Lake Balaton region in March 1945 (see Chapter 12), causing
little trouble to Soviet forces whilst finally wiping out the last remnants of
German armoured forces, by this time hopelessly short of fuel.
The last of the ‘Stalinist’ blows of 1944 took place in the far north with
the ‘Petsamo–Kirkenes Strategic Offensive’ Operation, lasting from 7 to 29
October 1944 and seeing the liberation of Soviet Arctic territory and Soviet
244 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
troops occupying the Finnmark region of northern Norway. German troops
of 20th Mountain Army were in the process of beginning evacuation from
the region when the Soviet offensive started – German stockpiles of nickel,
the mining of which was now the principal reason for holding on to the
Petsamo region, having been deemed sufficient to allow the more expedient
use of forces for the defence of naval bases on the Norwegian coast (for offen-
sives by new German submarine types now no longer able to operate from
French bases).20
Despite the availability of more than 300 large and medium vessels to
the Northern Fleet, including the battleship Arkhangel’sk and cruiser Mur-
mansk, supported by more than 563 aircraft for the Fleet alone, the North-
ern Fleet was unable to prevent the withdrawal of considerable German
assets by sea, just as the Soviet 14th Army and marines of the Northern
Fleet were unable to prevent the withdrawal of German forces westwards
from the Petsamo region. The battleship Arkhangel’sk, actually the British
battleship Royal Sovereign provided to the Soviet Union in lieu of Italian
warships as reparations after the Italian surrender, ‘lay idle’ at the Northern
Fleet’s base during October, with the cruiser Murmansk (the US Milwaukee)
apparently not once having put out to sea. Aircraft of the Northern Fleet
were able to inflict significant losses on German shipping, but opportunity
was undoubtedly lost to use surface and submarine forces to good effect.
Most probably, as the Russian historian Suprun notes, limited use of naval
assets was due to fear of losing vessels, particularly late in the war, and
what he describes as the ‘Beria syndrome’ – particularly in the aftermath of
losses in the Black Sea in October 1943 (see Chapter 6).21 Document 147
provides details of Red Army losses and some indication of German losses
during ground operations.

DOCUMENT 147: War Diary of 14th Army for October 1944

...
Losses of Army forces during the period of offensive operations:
During the month of October 1944 army losses were:

Killed a) Officers 367

b) Sergeants 1,335
c) Ranks 3,105
Missing a) Officers 6
b) Sergeants 86
c) Ranks 238
Wounded a) Officers 809
b) Sergeants 2,820
c) Ranks 7,007
Sickness with hospital evacuation a) Officers 139
b) Sergeants 512
c) Ranks 1,777
 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944 245

Date Establishment Beds made Beds Subject to

number of beds available occupied evacuation to
the deep rear

As of 6.10.44 5,795 5,795 1,375 203

11.10.44 6,225 7,013 2,908 839
15.10.44 6,785 8,519 4,828 1,962
20.10.44 6,815 8,523 5,312 2,099
25.10.44 7,345 10,912 5,860 2,088
31.10.44 8,875 10,097 5,757 1,198

...
A significant role in the transfer of troops across water obstacles and the seizing of
bridgeheads was played by special purpose motorized battalions (Ford amphibian vehicles).
Results of the activities of engineer and sapper units:
In facilitating the advance of forces of the army, and their forward movement and
passage across water obstacles engineer and sapper units:
Cleared mines from a) 107 square km of territory, b) 598 km of road, c) 357 buildings
and fortifications. Enemy mines cleared 15,671, including 11,482 anti-tank mines.
...
Permanent bridges erected – 34
Pontoon bridges erected – 29
Bridges repaired – 6
Quays repaired – 3
Footbridges constructed – 32
...
Use of medical facilities of the army:

From 28.10.44 the evacuation of wounded by sea via the port of Linakhamari began.
...
Overall results of army offensive operations:
...
During the period from 7 to 29.10.44, during offensive operations, the following
losses were inflicted on the enemy:
Destroyed:
Artillery pieces of various calibers – 257
...
Rifles and SMGs – 7,000
...
Horses – 2,150
...
Aircraft – 127
Tanks – 12
Radio stations – 36
During offensive operations the enemy lost (killed) 28,910 soldiers and officers.
Captured:
Artillery pieces of various calibers – 210
...
246 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944
Rifles and SMGs – 7,395
...
Horses – 450
...
Aircraft – 17
Tanks – 5
Radio stations – 19
...
1,579 soldiers were taken prisoner, including:

a) Died of wounds during evacuation – 341

b) Destroyed [unichtozheno] given the impossibility of evacuation – 212
...
(Source: A.A. Gorter et al., 2005, pp. 218–245)

The year 1944 had seen Soviet troops recapture almost all the territory
incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 and saw the heart ripped out of
the Wehrmacht and the loss of two German allies in the far north and far
south of the theatre of operations. Soviet losses had continued to be horrific
throughout 1944, as Table 10.4 indicates, but from a purely military view-
point at least the Red Army had much to show for them. Soviet forces were
now within striking distance of the Reich, and the end of the war was at
least in sight.

Guide to further reading

‘1st Ukrainian Front’s L’vov-Perymyshl’ Operation (July–August 1944)’ [Documents], JSMS,
Volume 9, Number 1 (March 1996), pp. 198–252.
James F. Gebhardt, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic,
October 1944, Leavenworth papers, Number 17 (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1990).
David M. Glantz, ‘The Red Army’s Lublin-Brest Offensive and Advance on Warsaw (18
July–30 September 1944): An Overview and Documentary Survey’, JSMS, Volume 19,
Number 2 (June 2006), pp. 401–441.
David M. Glantz, Red Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Rumania, Spring 1944
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007).
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General
Staff Study (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001).
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for L’vov, July 1944:
The Soviet General Staff Study (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002).
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for the Ukraine: The Red
Army’s Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Offensive, 1944 (The Soviet General Staff Study)
(London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003).
Steven H. Newton, Retreat from Leningrad: Army Group North, 1944–1945 (Atglen, PA: Schif-
fer Publishing, 1995).
Krisztián Ungváry, trans. Ladislaus Löb, The Siege of Budapest: One Hundred Days in World War
II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).
11 From the Vistula to Berlin
The end of the Reich

At the end of 1944, despite still being relatively bogged down in Hungary
in the south, the Red Army was readying itself for the final blows of the war
on the principal Berlin axis, operations that had been in the planning phase
from October 1944. In November, Zhukov took over command of the 1st
Belorussian Front standing before Warsaw from Rokossovskii, who took over
2nd Belorussian Front on Zhukov’s right flank facing the southern portion of
East Prussia (Pomerania).1 To the south of 1st Belorussian Front was Konev’s
1st Ukrainian Front that had seized the Sandomierz bridgehead over the
Vistula, threatening southern Poland.
The Red Army that was poised at the gates of Warsaw was larger, more
confident, better equipped and more far more capable a machine compared
to its Wehrmacht nemesis than it had been in 1941. The Red Army and its
leadership, tempered by more than three years of war, were also far more
trusted by Stalin. Whilst discipline remained harsh, gone were the commis-
sars of the period of defeat to the eve of the Stalingrad counter-offensive (see
Documents 30 and 84, Chapters 3 and 5 respectively), all Soviet military
leaders were now officers rather than simply command elements (see Chapter
5) and at the end of 1944 officers and ranks alike could be trusted to press
home their attack with, in the main, only the mechanisms for maintaining
discipline that could be expected in most armies. On 29 October 1944 the
blocking detachments that had encouraged hundreds of thousands of Red
Army men forward to their deaths were dissolved.

DOCUMENT 148: Order of the People’s Commissar of Defence Number 0349, 29 October
1944 (on the dissolution of independent blocking detachments)
In line with changes in the general situation at the front the necessity for the future
sustaining of blocking detachments has subsided.
I order:

1. Independent blocking detachments are to be dissolved by 13 November 1944.

Personnel from the dissolved detachments are to be used as replacements for rifle
divisions.
248 From the Vistula to Berlin
2. You are to report on the dissolution of the blocking detachments by 20 Novem-
ber 1944.
People’s Commissar of Defence
Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Stalin.
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, pp. 452–453)

However, whilst those that had survived the slaughter of the war to date
enjoyed a certain trust, those that had been taken prisoner during the first
cataclysmic weeks and months of the war, many of whom had survived the
horror of German POW camps during the winter of 1941–42, and a sub-
stantial number captured during the summer retreat in the south during
1942, were not so fortunate. Branded as traitors thanks to Order Number
270 of 16 August 1941 (see Document 33, Chapter 3), many POWs and
indeed Ostarbeiter (see Table 9.5), would find themselves under the suspi-
cious eyes of the NKVD:

DOCUMENT 149: Special communiqué by L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and
G.M. Malenkov on the work of verification-filtration points for the processing of Soviet citizens,
2 January 1945
The NKVD of the USSR reports, that for the time during which checking-filtration
points for the processing of Soviet citizens returning to the Motherland have been
functioning, as of 30 December 1944 96,956 persons have been received and
processed.
...
Of this number 38,428 persons have been provided with authorization and sent on
to places of permanent residency; 5,827 persons of conscription age have been handed
over to voenkomati; and 43,693 persons have been sent for the conduct of further verifi-
cation to special camps of the NKVD.
Of those checked 153 persons have been uncovered and arrested as German stooges,
traitors and betrayers of the Motherland.
(Source: Lubianka, 2006, p. 485)

Able-bodied men were certainly in high demand with the Red Army. It was
certainly the case that many formations were in the position of the divisions
of the Soviet 8th Army of 1st Belorussian Front described by Shtemenko,
where, having reached the Oder during the ‘Vistula–Oder’ Operation, they
could only apparently muster ‘two battalions apiece, with only 22–45 men
per company’.2
Whilst Red Army manpower shortages meant that suitable returnees
from German captivity or labour service would be sent to the Red Army, the
Red Army faced an opponent that was now resorting to throwing even less
military-capable personnel into front-line combat, in form of the Volksturm,
than the Soviet Union had with the opolcheniia or militia of 1941. The
increasingly poorly trained and equipped bulk of the Wehrmacht could do
 From the Vistula to Berlin 249
little but delay the Soviet tide and inflict more agony on a Red Army that
had already suffered losses that had not been, and thankfully have yet to be,
suffered by any army in a single war. A dwindling pool of German mobile
units formed around a battle-hardened core of veterans was now only able to
launch counter-attacks penetrating at best tens of kilometres behind the
Soviet front line. However, it would still take the Red Army, aided by her
allies in the West, another four months to finally bring the war to an end.
German forces were now fighting on home territory, far more urbanized and
suited to the defence than the vast expenses of most of the Soviet Union, and
were fearful of Soviet occupation. Whilst the Panzer divisions were but
shadows of their 1943 equivalents, and the Luftwaffe increasingly absent
from the skies, the still-numerous German infantry, equipped with a
plethora of anti-tank weapons, would take an exacting toll on Red Army
personnel desperate to survive what would clearly be the last months of
the war.
On 12 January 1945, forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front began the dra-
matic ‘Visula–Oder Strategic Offensive’ Operation with the ‘Sandomierz–
Silesian’ Operation, advancing rapidly towards the Oder River in Silesia
and destroying 4th Panzer Army in the process. At the same time, 3rd
Belorussian Front (Cherniakhovsksii) attacked German forces in East
Prussia as Rokossovskii’s 2nd Belorussian Front attacked in Pomerania. All
of these attacks were geared to paralysing German ability to shift forces to
meet the Soviet threat on any particular axis, in particular the key Berlin
axis, on which the Soviet advance by 1st Belorussian Front began on 14
January.
By this stage of the war, the Soviet numerical advantage was so over-
whelming that, even with those forces tied down besieging fortified towns
and cities or dealing with local German counter-offensive operations, the
Red Army could launch multi-front operations that could bound forward
until a combination of extended supply lines and the need for replacement
troops in the face of stiffening enemy resistance brought a halt. Table 11.1
gives Soviet forces for the 1st Belorussian and Ukrainian Fronts at the start of
the ‘Vistula–Oder’ Operation. Overwhelming Soviet superiority is further
highlighted by the resources that could be thrown into operations away
from the principal axis, for example in the ‘East Prussian’ Operation in
Table 11.2.
On paper, in terms of numbers of divisions, the German Army Group A,
facing 1st Belorussian Front, did not look anything like as weak as it was in
reality. Table 11.3 gives the strength in terms of divisions and brigades of
Army Group A, according to Soviet sources, at the start of the Soviet
‘Vistula–Oder’ Operation. However, not only were German divisions hope-
lessly understrength, but short of fuel and operating in an environment
where Soviet air superiority meant that limited reserves were vulnerable
whilst moving up to face an enemy penetration if they were deployed too far
back where they would have some room to manoeuvre. Forward deployment,
Table 11.1 Operational density of infantry, tanks and artillery of Soviet forces at the beginning of the ‘Vistula–Oder’ Operation, January
1945

Front 1st Belorussian 1st Ukrainian

Width (km) Overall 230 250

Breakthrough sector 30 (excluding 4 km 36 (excluding 3 km
breakthrough breakthrough
sector for 47th Army) sector for 60th Army)
Number of rifle divisions Overall 68 66
Breakthrough sector 37 34
Concentration of infantry Overall 3.4 3.8
(km per rifle division) Breakthrough sector 0.8 1.06
Number of guns and mortars Overall 13,706 13,717
(excluding AT, RS and AA) Breakthrough sector 7,318 8,626
Concentration of artillery for Overall 60 55
1 km of front Breakthrough sector 244 239
Number of tanks and SPs Overall 3,220 3,244
Breakthrough sector 2,942 3,181
Concentration of tanks and Overall 14 13
SPs for 1 km of front Breakthrough sector 98 88
Source: ‘Vislo-Oderskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 1 (1965), p. 75.
 From the Vistula to Berlin 251
Table 11.2 Soviet forces at the start of the ‘East Prussian’ Operation (as of 10
January 1945)

Resources 3rd Belorussian 2nd Belorussian 43rd Army Total frontline/total

(1st Baltic including rear area
Front) services

Personnel
(frontline) 483,978 671,016 67,662 1,222,656/1,669,105
Tanks 836 1,178 21 2,035
SPs 762 1,017 45 1,824
AT
(45–57 mm) 1,611 2,088 286 3,985
Artillery
(76 mm+) 4,213 5,793 778 10,784
Mortars
(82–120 mm) 4,490 5,411 756 10,657
RS batteries 567 970 26 1,563
AA 704 1,026 114 1,844
Motor vehicles 23,069 32,864 3,948 59,881
Source: ‘Vostochno-Prusskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 2 (1965), pp. 81–82.

however, would mean that they might very well not engage the principal
Soviet thrust and faced encirclement if engaged with Soviet supporting
thrusts, as would be the case with 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions of 24th
Panzer Corps deployed near the Sandomierz bridgehead at the start of the
‘Vistula–Oder’ Operation.3
Not that the Wehrmacht had sufficient mobile reserves to effectively halt
major Soviet thrusts even if they could be positioned appropriately: not only
had precious armoured forces just been squandered in the west during the
December 1944 Ardennes offensive, but also in Hungary in January when at
the beginning of January 1945 4th SS Panzer Corps, transferred from Army
Group Centre (which together with Army Group A defended the key Berlin
axis), attempted to relieve Budapest, the fall of which would not take place
until 13 February, when 2nd Ukrainian Front could report as follows:

DOCUMENT 150: From a combat report of the command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the
Supreme High Command on the liberation of Budapest, 13 February 1945
I report: forces of the left wing of the front, having broken through a range of strong
fortified defensive lines both on the approaches to and within the city of Budapest, as a
result of fierce street fighting over many days, having to storm every building and
block, by 10:00 on 13 February of the current year defeated the encircled enemy
grouping . . . , fully occupying the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest – one of the
most important rail and road centres of Europe. . . .
Table 11.3 Grouping and operational density of German forces at the start of the Soviet ‘Vistula-Oder’ Operation, January 1945

Army 9th 4th 17th (and one division Army Group Total for Army Group A
facing 4th Ukrainian A reserves (excluding 1st Panzer Army
Front) and 1st Hungarian Army facing
4th Ukrainian Front)

Number of units Infantry divisions

(all types) 8 7 5 2 22
Panzer divisions – – – 4 4
Motorized divisions – – – 2 2
Infantry brigades 1 1 – – 2
Total divisions 8 7 5 8 28
Total brigades 1 1 – – 2
Width of front (in km) 230 160 90 – 480
Number of km per division 27 23 18 – 17
Source: ‘Vislo-Oderskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, p. 72.
 From the Vistula to Berlin 253
An enemy group of up to 7,000 persons breaking out is being successfully destroyed
in the forests to the north-west of Budapest.
During the period of struggle for the capture of Budapest by forces of the front, of
the encircled enemy group the following were destroyed: soldiers and officers –
49,982, tanks and self-propelled guns – 203, artillery pieces of various calibers – 367,
armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers – 253, . . . aircraft – 189.
According to incomplete figures, 127,202 soldiers and officers have been captured,
tanks and SPs – 269, artillery pieces of various calibers – 1,257, armoured cars and
armoured personnel carriers – 83, . . . aircraft – 15, . . . motor vehicles – 5,153, horses –
1,585. . . .
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 453)

It is difficult to argue that the holding of Budapest had a significant influ-

ence on the length that the Third Reich survived, and German operations in
the region continued to have little apparent purpose even after its fall. At
the beginning of March 1945, remaining assets of the 6th SS Panzer Army,
having been pulled out of the west after the Ardennes offensive, would
strike Soviet forces in the Lake Balaton region to the south-west of
Budapest, along with yet another reformation of 6th Army, and to little
gain.
To the north, the collapse of the German Army Group A in the face of
1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts had meant that from about 18
January Soviet forward elements could aim to race forward to breach the
Oder River running in a north-westerly direction from south-western
Poland towards Berlin, along which German forces were attempting to form
some sort of defensive line. The redeployment of the German Grossdeutsch-
land Panzer Corps from East Prussia to Lodz to the south-west of Warsaw, at
which lead elements detrained on 16 January, did little to relieve the situ-
ation; follow-on elements did not even make it to Lodz as their trains were
intercepted by advancing Soviet forces. Elements of the German 4th and 9th
Armies making it to the Oder were not given any reprieve, being thrown
back into the fighting to hold some sort of Oder line, along with forces
pulled out of the Kurland pocket by sea.
Soviet General Staff plans for operations in Germany of October–November
1944 had contemplated that Soviet forces would take Berlin in a two-stage
but near continuous operation lasting 45 days. Despite Zhukov’s suggestion
that his forces press on beyond the Oder in February, supported with
Konev’s agreement by the continued advance of Konev’s forces to the south
towards the Elbe River, the advance of 1st Belorussian Front was halted in
early February. Konev’s forces continued to advance to the Western Neisse
River, running southwards from the section of the Oder before Berlin, and
then also halted. Whilst the manifold possible reasons for the halt are dis-
cussed by Mawdsley in some detail,4 Shtemenko had the following to say on
the matter in his memoirs:
254 From the Vistula to Berlin

DOCUMENT 151: Comment by the then head of the operations department of the Soviet
General Staff Shtemenko on the reasons for the halt of the 1st Belorussian Front along the Oder
at the beginning of February 1945
On February 1st, 1945, the 5th Assault [Shock] Army, and then the 8th Guards
Army, of the 1st Belorussian Front, struck across the Oder and secured some not very
large bridgeheads near the fortress of Küstrin. The fortress itself however remained in
enemy hands. . . .
On this [Oder] line the Soviet armies were stopped.
The operational situation was developing unfavourably to us. The 1st Belorussian
Front, which was straining towards Berlin, but at present lacked the strength to
capture it, had pushed ahead. On the Berlin sector it had, in effect, only four field
armies and two tank armies, all of them under strength. . . . Two of them . . . had been
compelled to leave some of their forces to deal with the encircled garrison at Poznan,
and another . . . had to maintain the siege of Küstrin while simultaneously attacking
Berlin.
(Source: S.M. Shtemenko, 1970, pp. 308–309)

Shtemenko goes on to highlight a number of reasons for the halt other than
the supposedly weak Soviet spearhead on the Oder, such as:

1 A growing threat to the extended flanks of 1st Belorussian Front from

German forces to the north, in Pomerania, against which Zhukov was
forced to turn his attention. On 17 February German forces in fact
launched a counter-attack from the Stargard area.
2 A poor supply situation that meant that supplies were being shipped by
road from railheads east of the Vistula, particularly hampering the effec-
tiveness of Soviet artillery support.
3 Growing Luftwaffe activity from permanent airfields in the Berlin area
where VVS aircraft were operating from hastily prepared forward bases
in poor weather conditions.5

In his memoirs Zhukov also notes that, despite weak German defences for
Berlin at the end of January, Soviet intelligence, now considerably weaker
than it had been on former pre-1940 Soviet territory where human intelli-
gence from partisans was of considerable value (see Chapter 9), indicated
that four Panzer and up to 5–6 infantry divisions were being transferred
from the West, with other units being transferred from the Baltic Republics
and East Prussia.6 Certainly, in the absence of concrete intelligence as to
where some of these units that were actually being transferred were being
sent, it would have made sense to assume that they were all destined for the
defence of Berlin – now only 60–80 km from the front-line along the Oder.
Soviet forces of 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts would spend February
and March in operations in Pomerania and East Prussia, fighting what had
been Army Group Centre, now cut off from the main German force along
 From the Vistula to Berlin 255
with what was now Army Group Kurland. At the same time 1st Ukrainian
Front continued operations in Silesia. The semi-official post-Soviet Russian-
language history of the Great Patriotic War has the following to say about
operations during this period:

DOCUMENT 152: Concluding remarks on Soviet operations in Eastern Pomerania and Silesia
during February and March 1945 from the semi-official post-Soviet Russian-language history
of the Great Patriotic War
Having defeated major enemy forces in Eastern Pomerania and Silesia, the Red Army
had thwarted the intention of the German High Command to strike a blow on the
flanks of our forces on the approaches to Berlin. Having seized a line along the Oder
and Niesse Rivers they had created favourable circumstances for the final blows against
Germany and in Czechoslovakia. Now, having liberated Pomerania and Silesia Soviet
forces at last had the possibility of continuing the advance on the Berlin axis.
(Source: Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina . . . Kniga tret’ia. 1999, p. 252)

Whether such a cautious approach was necessary is certainly debatable –

Soviet forces would lose thousands of men in the destruction of German
forces in eastern Pomerania and in the reduction of fortified German posi-
tions in East Prussia. Such Soviet operations did, however, create the situ-
ation whereby German formations with at least limited mobility that had
been substantial in February–March, and continued to appear on Hitler’s
maps as such, were now of little or no operational significance. Also import-
ant, however, was the fact that in the west, by the time the Red Army
resumed its advance on Berlin, the Allies had crossed the Rhine and con-
tributed to the stranglehold on the heart of the Reich.
Whilst the need to protect the flanks of the principal thrust by Soviet
forces on the Berlin axis provided understandable grounds for delay in the
capture of Berlin, this need only have concerned German forces with some
sort of mobility, not those units bottled up in fortress cities that were not on
major road and rail junctions along principal axes of advance, the capture of
which would contribute to easing Soviet supply problems. The eventual
capture of the fortress city of Königsberg, on the back of successful opera-
tions by Cherniakovskii’s 3rd Belorussian Front against German forces of
Army Group North (previously Army Group Centre until it was cut off
from the principal Berlin axis in mid-January), constituted a major and
arguably unnecessary operation that would not see the city fall until 10
April 1945, and with the loss of thousands of Soviet lives.
Before Cherniakhovskii, like Vatunin another young rising star, was
killed by German artillery on 18 February, forces of the 3rd Belorussian
Front had reached the city and succeeded in cutting it off from the sea via
Pillau. Details of the defences of the city are provided in Document 153:
fighting in such urban conditions even without particularly thoroughly pre-
pared defences had proved so effective in whittling down the strength of the
256 From the Vistula to Berlin
German 6th Army and elements of 4th Panzer Army in the autumn and
winter of 1942 at Stalingrad that fortresses such as Königsberg would sim-
ilarly soak up Soviet resources.

DOCUMENT 153: Details of the German defences of Königsberg from guidelines from the
operational department of the headquarters of 11th Guards Army on the storming of the city and
fortress, 10 February 1945
NKO SSSR. Operational department of the headquarters of the 11th Guards Army,
Number 076, 10 February 1945. . . .
I. Introduction
...
The carrying out of this task is associated with a new form of operations for us – . . .
street fighting, with the following specific characteristics:
a) Limited vision and fields of fire;
b) The possible use by the enemy of all types of engineered defensive works and
positions based on existing structures;
c) The impossibility of the widespread use of large units of infantry and tanks; addi-
tionally, fighting within the city will inevitably break in to a series of individual
encounters; the result of such fighting will frequently be decided by independent
activity by small units acting on their own initiative, especially assault groups;
d) Complexity in the use of artillery and tanks;
e) Complexity in the observation and direction of the activities of units.
...
II. Characteristics of the defences of Königsberg
The fortress of Königsberg consists of two citadels and two defensive belts.
The outer defensive belt is 6–7 kilometres from the centre of the city.... It consists of
12 basic and three additional forts and a system of established and field fortifications.
...
Each fort has ramparts with open firepoints and strongpoints for direct fire by 9–10
anti-tank and field artillery pieces for each.
In front of each fort there is an anti-tank ditch ten metres wide and three metres
deep. In the gaps between forts one-two lines of trenches have been dug, protected on
some sectors by barbed-wire obstacles and minefields. On particularly important
sectors there are, in addition, machine-gun bunkers [DOT and DZOT].
The internal defensive belt extends from the external side of the ring road and con-
sists of 24 earthen forts with prepared firepoints and bunkers for personnel.
Directly inside the city for its complete depth the enemy has created strongpoints,
consisting of separate brick buildings suited to the defence and whole city blocks.
In every strongpoint there is two-level defence – on the lower floors there are posi-
tions to fire along the streets and on the upper floor and in lofts there are positions for
firing on the streets, courtyards and neighbouring buildings from above.
The approaches to the strongpoints and the gaps between them are covered by a
system of ditches, obstacles and barricades, mined streets and objects.
The southern sector of the outer ring is defended by units of the 69th, 549th and
56th Infantry Divisions, 73rd and 74th Fortress Machine-Gun Battalions and by ele-
ments of 6th and Grossdeutschland Panzer Divisions.
(Source: SBD 1, pp. 93–95)
 From the Vistula to Berlin 257
Before the final storming of the fortress city in April, two divisions of
German reinforcements pulled out of Memel allowed German forces to re-
establish the link between port and city in mid-February, with another
German pocket having by this time formed to the south-west of the city
centred on the town of Heiligenbeil – it was during the reduction of this
pocket that Cherniakhovskii was killed. Under Vasilevskii’s command 3rd
Belorussian Front regrouped and on 12 March set about destroying the
German East Prussian pockets along the coast. Whilst by 29 March
the Heiligenbeil pocket had been destroyed, some troops made it across the
water to Königsberg, the final assault on which had started on 6 April. By
this point Soviet forces had accrued considerable experience in the reduction
of such fortified urban areas – experience bought at the cost of tens of thou-
sands of lives and literally thousands of armoured vehicles, the use of which
in urban fighting requiring particularly close co-operation between arms if
losses were to be kept in check. The following four documents highlight
some of the problems of and ‘solutions’ developed for fighting in urban
areas:

DOCUMENT 154: Directive to armoured and mechanized forces of the 1st Belorussian Front
on the organization and conduct of fighting for German cities and major towns, 20 February
1945
...
2. Tanks and self-propelled guns are used in the main as part of assault groups (a
reinforced rifle platoon or company) and assault detachments (up to a reinforced
rifle battalion). 2–3 tanks or self-propelled guns are allocated to an assault group.
A company of tanks or battery of self-propelled guns is to be allocated to an
assault detachment.
3. Tanks and self-propelled guns operating with assault groups or detachments are
to advance with the group (detachment), supporting them with fire from a posi-
tion along the street. . . . Particular attention is to be paid to the use of concen-
trated machine-gun fire. The distance between tanks and self-propelled guns
moving along a street should provide for support for the lead tank in order to
protect it from the throwing of grenades, Molotov cocktails and from destruction
by Panzerfaust. The normal distance should be considered 75–100 m. Under no
circumstances should tanks and self-propelled guns advance ‘bumper-to-bumper’.
If one tank advances along the left side of the street, firing upon houses on the
right side of the street, then the other advances along the left side. All tank
hatches should be closed.
...
5. . . . Buildings of average strength and enemy-occupied barricades are to be
destroyed by fire from tanks and self-propelled guns (76 and 85 mm). For the
destruction of particularly strong buildings heavy tanks are to be used (IS-122)
and heavy assault guns (ISU-122, ISU-152).
Flame tanks are to be used, supported by artillery and battle tanks, for the
flushing out of the garrisons of strongpoints, DZOT, DOT.
...
258 From the Vistula to Berlin
9. In street fighting the carefully organized observation and reconnaissance of
objectives is of decisive significance; from this starting point efforts by comman-
ders of all ranks should be directed towards the realization of close co-operation
with the infantry.
...
10. In organizing this co-operation the question of target identification, the identifi-
cation of positions reached by the infantry and reliable communications with the
infantry are to be carefully worked out. In street fighting such means as coloured
rockets and tracer fire are to be put down by the infantry in the direction of
targets identified. Communication via runners acquires particular significance in
street fighting. . . .
11. Each tank or self-propelled gun is to be reinforced by a covering group of 4–5
men with SMGs for the constant protection of the vehicle and destruction of
groups of enemy tank hunters armed with Panzerfaust grenade launchers.
(Source: SBD 10, pp. 98–101)

DOCUMENT 155: Temporary instructions of the Command of 6th Army of 11 March 1945
on the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in street fighting (based on experience of street fighting
for the city of Breslau)
I. The Enemy
In the fighting for the city of Breslau the enemy has shown stubborn resistance to
the advance by our forces. All brick or stone buildings were prepared for defence,
streets and squares criss-crossed with obstacles and barricades. Tightly packed build-
ings within blocks or thick brick or stone walls along streets and within blocks
exclude the possibility of maneuver by tanks and self-propelled guns within city
blocks.
On barricades, against obstacles, in the cellars of buildings and on the ground and
higher floors of buildings the enemy positions small-caliber cannon, machine-guns and
sub-machine gunners with Panzerfausts and grenades, the last two being used in large
quantities and are one of the principal enemy means in the struggle with our tanks
and SPs.
On the appearance of our tanks and SPs on enemy-occupied streets, the enemy fires
Panzerfausts at our vehicles from the upper floors of buildings.
...
III. The role of tanks and SPs as part of an assault battalion

1. Experience of recent days in the city of Breslau has shown, that it is most appro-
priate to use tanks and SPs in a decentralized manner in street fighting, that is
groups of 2–3 vehicles as part of the assault battalions of regiments, in close co-
operation with artillery, sappers and flamethrowers.
2. Tanks and SPs, advancing in appropriate order 100–200 m behind the infantry,
with 20–30 m between each tank, are to destroy enemy firepoints, machine
gunners and troops equipped with Panzerfausts spread throughout buildings
through the destruction of the walls of buildings and other structures with direct
fire.
3. Typically one tank or SP is firing, and behind it an advancing SP (tank) observes
 From the Vistula to Berlin 259
the enemy and is prepared to open fire on buildings from which the first SP is
fired upon by Panzerfausts.
4. . . . tanks and SPs . . . should be no closer than 150 m from enemy forward posi-
tions. . . .
5. The movement of tanks and SPs from one firing position to another is carried out
when the infantry have cleared all floors of a [nearby] building of the enemy and
where the subsequent firing position and approaches to it have been reconnoi-
tered and checked by sappers.
...
9. Street junctions should be crossed by tanks and SPs at maximum speed in order
to avoid destruction by enemy flanking fire and only after careful observation and
reconnaissance.
(Source: SBD 21, pp. 145–147)

DOCUMENT 156: Directive to forces of the 8th Guards Army on the capture and blockading
of buildings turned into strongpoints by the Germans (on the basis of experience in fighting for
Poznan), 16 February 1945
1. The choice of objective for attack
...

b) In the first instance it follows that the following should be chosen:

– objectives where their fall would force the enemy to vacate a number of
other buildings;
– objectives that might be suitable starting points for further offensive
operations.
c) As a rule, buildings that are connected to other buildings should be
attacked simultaneously. In order to hinder enemy fire support and counter-
attack from nearby buildings, on the flanks of attacking units covering fire
should be provided or flanks should be screened by smoke.
2. Reconnaissance of the object under attack and approaches to it
a) Any sort of attack should be preceded by well-organised reconnaissance.
...
5. The timing of the start of an attack
a) The best time to seize a building is the period before dawn, in order that the
approach to the objective be covered by darkness, as the attack itself, and
the battle within the objective and its consolidation be carried out in day-
light. . . .
6. Forces and resources to be allocated to the attack, and the subdivision of them
into groups
a) In the struggle for the capture of a building where reliance is on surprise a
small group of carefully-picked soldiers and NCOs is required, along
with an officer. In circumstances where the element of surprise is
missing the assault group should be sizeable, as available fire-support and
reserves.
b) . . . in all instances an assault group should include artillery up to 152 mm
calibre for direct fire, sappers for the creation of access points, flamethrowers
. . . , tanks or self-propelled guns. . . .
260 From the Vistula to Berlin
c) The assault group should be split into subgroups:
– a number of assault subgroups (of three-five men) . . .
– a number of covering subgroups (of five-seven men) . . .
– a support group consisting of artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns . . .
– a reserve group. . . .
(Source: SBD 11, pp. 23–26)

DOCUMENT 157: Directive of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the use of artillery in street
fighting for major population centres, April 1945
In the fighting for Budapest there were a number of specific uses of artillery that
should be considered in the conduct of street fighting for major population centres.
...
III. Methods for using artillery in street fighting

1. ...
A variety of artillery resources should accompany assault groups for use against
a variety of targets. Small calibre and regimental artillery should fire upon
windows, embrasures, through holes in walls and such, and 76 mm guns and 122
mm howitzers should destroy the walls of buildings and cellars. . . .
For the destruction of major buildings 152 and 203 mm artillery pieces should
be used. . . . At the same time mortars should be used to provide covering fire in
order to destroy the enemy in attics and courtyards, for the isolation of buildings
under attack, and also for firing upon streets running transversely.
2. Varied munitions should be used against buildings: through windows and holes
high explosive rounds should be used, against walls armour-piercing and bunker-
busting munitions. For the creation of fires within buildings hollow-charge pro-
jectiles for 76 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers should be used.
For firing upon windows in multi-level buildings 37 mm anti-aircraft guns
should be deployed. . . .
(Source: SBD 4, pp. 95–98)

The fortress city of Königsberg finally fell on 10 April after intense street
fighting, yielding over 90,000 prisoners, but still leaving a pocket to the
west of the city on the Samland Peninsula, containing nine German divi-
sions, the destruction of which, culminating in the capture of the port and
naval base of Pillau, took place between 13 and 25 April. Perhaps the only
argument that might be put forward for these costly operations was to
prevent forces being transferred to the principal axis – as indeed troops had
been from Kurland. Had the Soviet Baltic Fleet, run down after its retreat to
Kronstadt and Leningrad during the first weeks of the war, been more
effectively used (with the acceptance of at least some losses of shipping,
which could have been limited by the Soviet air superiority in the region),
then the withdrawal could have been more effectively hampered and the
Baltic pockets contained. In reality Soviet surface vessels of any size did not
Table 11.4 Soviet losses of personnel and equipment during the ‘Vistula–Oder’, ‘East Prussian’ and ‘East Pomeranian Strategic Offensive’
Operations, January–April 1945

Operation

‘Vistula–Oder’ (12 ‘East Prussian’ (13 ‘East Pomeranian’ Totals

January–3 February January–25 April (10 February–4
1945) 1945) April 1945)

Personnel Strength 2,203,600 1,669,100 996,100 –

Irrecoverable losses 43,476 126,464 55,315 225,255
Total losses (inc. sick 194,191 584,778 234,360 1,013,329
and wounded)
Selected equipment losses Tanks and SPs 1,267 3,525 1,027 5,819
Combat aircraft 343 1,450 1,073 2,866
Source: Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 154–156 and 263.
262 From the Vistula to Berlin
interfere with German shipping in the southern Baltic, even if Soviet sub-
marines took their toll on German transports involved in evacuations from
East Prussia, with the loss of many civilian lives.
Soviet losses of personnel and equipment during the ‘Vistula–Oder’, ‘East
Prussian’ and ‘East Pomeranian Strategic Offensive’ Operations running
from January into April 1945 are provided in Table 11.4. Whilst the Red
Army had made great strides in the use of tanks and their co-ordination
with infantry and artillery, including in urban environments, it is tempting
to argue that many of the issues identified in Document 158 below, which
contributed to the continued high losses for the Red Army, were as a result
of cultural factors that could not easily be dealt with, even with appropriate
changes in force structure and organization:

DOCUMENT 158: Order Number 052 of 27 February 1945 to forces of 1st Shock Army on
the organization and conduct of preparations for operations in March 1945
Recent attacks by forces of the army during the February operation of 1945 have
shown that many units participating in the breakthrough of enemy defences suffer
from a number of inadequacies in their preparations and training in order to be able to
conduct offensive operations in complex military conditions and with stubborn enemy
resistance.
The basic and substantial inadequacies have been as follows:
...

2. Regimental and battalion artillery as a rule lags behind the advancing infantry,
limiting the rate of advance by the infantry, which sometimes gives the enemy
the opportunity to solidify his tactical defence in the rear and prevent our units
reaching objectives for a given day.
3. The infantry is unable to independently deal with enemy counterattacks with
tanks and self-propelled guns with the weapons provided. Amongst infantry and
artillery units there have been instances of tank fright.
...
6. The artillery has not learned to independently engage enemy firepoints in order
to support the infantry’s advance. Artillery officers are not good at following the
course of the fighting and poorly and belatedly react to enemy fire and counterat-
tacks. . . . As a rule, commanders of artillery units wait for fire requests or tasks
from officers of the rifle formations, and the latter do not call up artillery fire
directly from attached or supporting artillery units, but through senior infantry
officers.
...
8. Units do not know to how use radio communications appropriately, with radio
being particularly poorly used at regiment-battalion level. As a rule the bulk of
radio exchanges are conducted in open text.
(Source: SBD 13, pp. 121–122)
 From the Vistula to Berlin 263
Perhaps the only issue identified in Document 175 that could have been
dealt with without major changes in military and to some extent broader
Soviet culture was the capability of Soviet infantry against tanks. The leg-
endary Russian initiative and ‘make-do’ might have been acceptable in
pursuit of clearly defined goals established by higher authority, but initi-
ative amending or deviating from goals set from above was a risk that was
typically not worth taking. Certainly routeing fire-support requests through
senior officers would allow someone else to take the blame for friendly-fire
incidents, and at the same time make it more likely that fire support would
be provided by artillery officers seeking the appropriate level of authoriza-
tion before risking being blamed for firing upon their own forces. As for the
capability of Soviet infantry against the relatively few effective German
tanks and self-propelled guns, those who have miniature wargamed will
appreciate the extent to which, after tank armour increased significantly as
the war progressed and Soviet anti-tank rifles became all but obsolete, Soviet
infantry lacked the capability to engage enemy tanks with the equivalent of
the German Panzerschreck or Panzerfaust, US Bazooka or even British PIAT.7
Their ability to draw on anti-tank and artillery resources for the destruction
of the limited number of enemy tanks, tank hunters and assault guns would
have been improved by better use of by now relatively abundant communi-
cations resources. Soviet fear of enemy interception of radio communica-
tions, whether or not the enemy would have time to use uncoded
communications to their advantage before the information was redundant,
along with broader issues surrounding lower-level initiative, seems to have
limited the effective use of radio communications.
Nonetheless, despite the continued failings of the Red Army and high
casualties, what was undoubtedly a Soviet juggernaut ploughed on. Whilst
it was by no means certain that the capture of Berlin would mean the end of
German resistance given rumours of a German ‘Alpine redoubt’ to which
Hitler would presumably retreat, the capture of Berlin would nonetheless
have been an immense psychological blow to German society with or
without Hitler’s death there. It would also bring prestige to a Red Army
that had borne the brunt of the fighting against German land forces since
the summer of 1941, and ensure the Soviet Union a powerful position in
post-war Germany and indeed Central Europe.
In late March 1945 the Stavka began planning operations against Berlin
in a climate of increasing mistrust between Stalin and the Allies, with fears
that separate peace agreements between the Germans and the Allies in the
west, or at least a German collapse in the west, whether in collusion with
the Allies or not, would allow Allied forces to launch themselves from their
Rhine bridgeheads towards Berlin.8
Initial orders for the capture of Berlin, on the approaches to which Soviet
forces remained along the Oder and Neisse Rivers as in Figure 11.1, were issued
to 1st Belorussian Front under Zhukov’s command as shown in Document 159.
264 From the Vistula to Berlin

Figure 11.1 The ‘Berlin’ (‘Strategic Offensive’) Operation 16 April to 8 May 1945.

DOCUMENT 159: Directive of the Stavka VGK Number 11059 to the command of forces of
the 1st Belorussian Front on preparations and the conduct of operations for the capture of Berlin,
2 April 1945
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. To prepare and conduct an offensive operation with the aim of capturing the
capital of Germany, the city of Berlin, and no later than on the twelfth-fifteenth
day of the operation take up positions along the Elbe River.
2. The principal thrust is to be struck from the bridgehead on the River Oder west
of Küstrin with the forces of four regular and two tank armies.
On the breakthrough sector five-six artillery breakthrough divisions are to be
used, creating an artillery concentration of no less than 250 guns of 76 mm and
above for one kilometer of front to be broken through.
3. For support of the principal grouping of the front from the north and south two
supporting blows are to be struck with a force of two armies for each. The first –
from the region north-west of Berwalde in the general direction of Eberswalde . . .
; the second from the bridgeheads on the River Oder north and south of Frank-
furt on the Oder in the general direction of Fürstenwalde, Potsdam, Branden-
burg, enveloping Berlin from the south.
4. Tank armies are to be introduced on the axis of the principal thrust after breaking
through defences in order to provide for the success of the envelopment of Berlin
from the north and north-east.
5. Second-echelon armies are to be used for the development of success on the prin-
cipal axis.
(Source: RA T.16 (5–4), 1999, p. 223)
 From the Vistula to Berlin 265
Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front was to be supported by both Konev’s 1st
Ukrainian Front to the south and Rokossovskii’s 2nd Belorussian Front to
the north along the Baltic coast, both of which were to press on to the Elbe
River to the west of Berlin. Zhukov had the following to say on the plan-
ning for the Berlin operation in his memoirs:

DOCUMENT 160: Extracts from the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov on the planning of the
Soviet Berlin offensive of April 1945
On 1 April the Supreme High Commander heard A.I. Antonov’s report on the overall
plan for the Berlin operation, and then my report on the offensive plans of 1st
Belorussian Front and I.S. Konev’s plan for offensive operations by 1st Ukrainian Front.
The Supreme Commander did not agree with the dividing line between 1st
Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts indicated on the Genshtab map by a line from
Gross Gastrose to Potsdam and he crossed out the boundary line from the Niesse to
Potsdam and accentuated the line only as far as Lübben.
He then directed Marshal I.S. Konev:
In the event of stubborn resistance by the enemy of the eastern approaches to Berlin,
as will probably be the case, and the possibly holding up of the offensive by 1st
Belorussian Front, 1st Ukrainian Front is to be prepared to strike a blow with its tank
armies from the south towards Berlin.
...
It was decided that the advance on Berlin was to start on 16 April, without waiting
for 2nd Belorussian Front’s participation, which, by all confirmed accounts, would not
be in a position to advance from the Oder any earlier than 20 April.
On the night of 2 April at the Stavka and in my presence the Supreme Commander
signed the directive of the 1st Belorussian Front for the preparation and conduct of the
operation. . . .
(Source: G.K. Zhukov, 1995, pp. 226–227)

Red Army victory was guaranteed by the overwhelming force that was
deployed by the three fronts committed to the operation, as indicated in
Table 11.5.
The principal German forces facing the Soviet offensive against Berlin were
3rd Panzer Army to the north-east, 9th Army in the centre immediately to
the east of Berlin and 4th Panzer Army to the south-east. According to Soviet
figures, 3rd Panzer Army could field a total of 12 divisions, of which six were
standard infantry and two motorized, but, despite its designation, none were
Panzer; 9th Army could field a total of 16 divisions, of which nine were stan-
dard infantry, along with one Panzer and four motorized; and 4th Panzer
Army could field a total of 13 divisions, of which nine were standard
infantry, one Panzer and one motorized. According to Mawdsley, 3rd Panzer
could field 242 tanks and 9th Army 512 tanks, for which fuel was scarce
with no sizeable reserves in rear areas. Table 11.4 above gives Soviet forces
to be committed at the beginning of the Soviet operation and not total
266 From the Vistula to Berlin
forces available to the three fronts – a total in fact, as noted in a footnote to
the Soviet table on which Table 11.5 is based, of 6,250 tanks and self-
propelled guns, if those initially in rear areas are considered.9
After forces of 1st Belorussian Front had redeployed from operations in
Pomerania after 29 March, the last major offensive of the war in the west
actually began on 14 April 1945 with reconnaissance-in-force10 by elements
of 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. The principal attack began for
these two fronts, as planned, on 16 April, followed by 2nd Belorussian Front
to the north on 18 April. As in Document 159 above, the principal thrust
was to be by 1st Belorussian Front on the most direct route to Berlin, that is,
from the Küstrin bridgehead westwards through German positions on the
Seelow Heights, by now thoroughly prepared for defence. The Soviet attack
began in darkness, as described in Zhukov’s memoirs:

DOCUMENT 161: Description by Marshal Zhukov of the start of principal offensive

operations by 1st Belorussian Front on 16 April against German positions on the Berlin axis
At precisely three minutes prior to the start of the artillery preparation we all left the
dugout and took up our positions in the observation post. . . .
From there, during the day one could see all of the territory along the Oder. At this
time early morning mist hung in the air. I glanced at my watch: it was precisely 5
o’clock.
At that very moment the area was brightly lit up by the firing of the many thou-
sands of artillery pieces, mortars and our legendary Katiushas, on the heels of which the
sound of the shots rang out and the immense force of the explosions of the shells and
bombs reverberated around us. In the air the perpetual drone of bombers grew in
strength.
From enemy positions there were a few bursts of machine gun fire during the first
seconds, and then they fell silent. . . . During the powerful 30-minute artillery prepara-
tion the enemy did not fire once. This was testimony to his full suppression and disar-
ray of the defensive system. As a result it was decided to cut short the time for the
artillery preparation and with haste start the general offensive.
Thousands of multicoloured rockets howled. On this signal 140 searchlights came
to life, situated every 200 metres. More than 100 billion candles lit up the battlefield,
blinding the enemy and picking out objectives for our tanks and infantry out of the
darkness. It was a picture of colossal and impressive force, and perhaps, during the
whole of my life, I do not recall an equivalent sensation.
The artillery still further increased its fire, and the infantry and tanks threw them-
selves forward in unison. . . . By daybreak our forces had occupied the forward positions
and started to attack the second line.
(Source: G.K. Zhukov, 1995, pp. 243–244)

Whilst Mawdsley suggests that Zhukov’s ‘tactical innovation’ in the use of

searchlights had little impact, Glantz and House suggest that the search-
lights actually ‘added to the confusion’ of darkness, fog and smoke, going on
to suggest that the Soviet artillery preparation – all 2,450 railway wagons or
 From the Vistula to Berlin 267
Table 11.5 Forces of 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts at the start of
the ‘Berlin’ Operation

Forces Fronts Totals

(including
2nd Belorussian 1st Belorussian 1st Ukrainian army and
front rear-
areas)

Personnel 314,000 768,100 511,700 1,593,800

(c.2,500,000)
Tanks 644 1,795 1,388 3,827
SPs 307 1,360 667 2,334
AT guns 770 2,306 1,444 4,520
Field artillery
(76 mm +) 3,172 7,442 5,040 15,654
Mortars (82 mm +) 2,770 7,186 5,225 15,181
RS launchers 807 1,531 917 3,255
AA guns 801 1,665 945 3,411
Motor vehicles 21,846 44,332 29,205 95,383
Aircraft
(serviceable)
– of which: 1,360 3,188 2,148 6,696
Fighters 602 1,567 1,106 3,275
Ground-attack 449 731 529 1,709
Bombers 283 762 (+800
with 18th
Long-Range
Air Army) 422 1,467
Reconnaissance 26 128 91 245
Source: ‘Berlinskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 4 (1965), p. 81.

almost 98,000 tons-worth of it according to Zhukov – caused more prob-

lems than it solved in churning up the terrain for the Soviet tanks, with
Soviet forces not having progressed up the actual heights – poor going for
the tanks – by late morning.11
With Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front apparently still bogged down in the
German defences on 17 April, in not establishing a clear demarcation of
responsibilities between 1st Belorussian Front and 1st Ukrainian Front to the
south, as Zhukov noted above, Stalin gave Konev the opportunity to race
Zhukov’s forces for Berlin, and indeed even Rokossovskii’s 2nd Belorussian
Front was directed towards Berlin on 18 April. Konev apparently issued the
following order in the early hours of 18 April:
268 From the Vistula to Berlin

DOCUMENT 162: Directive Number 00215 of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the redirection of
forces towards Berlin, 18 April 1945, 02:47
In carrying out the orders of the Supreme High Command I order:

1. The command of the 3rd Guards Tank Army: During the night of 17–18 April
1945 force the River Spree and develop a powerful thrust in the general direction
of . . . the southern suburbs of Berlin. The task of the Army is to break through to
the city of Berlin from the south on the night of 20–21 April 1945.
2. The command of the 4th Tank Army: During the night of 17–18 April force the
River Spree north of Spremberg and develop a powerful thrust in the general
direction of . . . Luckenwalde. The task of the Army is to have seized the Beelitz,
Treuenbritzen, Luckenwalde region by the end of 20 April 1945. During the
night of 21 April Potsdam and the south-western portion of Berlin are to be
occupied. The redirection of the Army in the direction of Potsdam in the
Treuenbritzen region is to be supported by 5th Mechanized Corps. Reconnais-
sance is to be conducted in the Senftenberg, Finsterwalde, Hertsberg directions.
3. On the principal axis the armoured fist is to push forward boldly and decisively.
Towns and major centres of population are to be avoided as is getting caught up
in sustained frontal attacks. I require that you are fully aware, that the success of
tank armies depends on bold maneuver and decisive action.

Point 3 is to be passed down to commanders of corps and brigades.

...
Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Konev.
(Source: I.S. Konev, 1966, p. 119)

However, by 18 April 1st Belorussian Front had overcome the Seelow

defences and by 25 April 2nd Belorussian Front was once again directed to
head due west rather than towards Berlin. By 24 April, forces of 1st
Belorussian Front had wheeled round the city from the north and met up
with elements of 1st Ukrainian Front to the south, encircling Berlin, where
unbeknown to Soviet forces Hitler had chosen to remain.
Towards the end of the war in the west, it is worth taking stock not only
of how Stalin’s leadership style had changed, but how those surrounding
him and participating in day-to-day decision making had changed. To start
with, the Stavka was no longer dominated by the old guard of the 1930s, as
it had been in the summer of 1941 (see Document 25, Chapter 3). On 17
February 1945, Stavka membership was as follows:

DOCUMENT 163: Decree of the State Defence Committee Number 7550s on the composition of
the Stavka VGK, 17 February 1945
Contrary to the Decree of the State Defence Committee of 10 July 1941 the Stavka of
the Supreme High Command is made up of the following:
 From the Vistula to Berlin 269
The Supreme High Commander and People’s Commissar for Defence, Marshal of the
Soviet Union I.V. Stalin;
Deputy People’s Commissar for Defence and Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K.
Zhukov;
Deputy People’s Commissar for Defence and Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M.
Vasilevskii;
Deputy People’s Commissar for Defence and General of the Army N.A. Bulganin;
Head of the Genshtab of the Red Army and General of the Army A.I. Antonov;
Head of the Navy and People’s Commissar for the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N.G.
Kuznetsov.

Chairman of the State Defence Committee, I. Stalin

(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, p. 536)

Document 181 provides a list of visitors to Stalin in his Kremlin office for
the period from 25 April – the date on which Soviet and American forces
met on the Elbe River – and 2 May, the day on which the Berlin garrison
would finally surrender.

DOCUMENT 164: Visitors to Stalin in his Kremlin office, 25 April [US-Soviet meeting on
the Elbe River] to 2 May [surrender of the Berlin garrison] 1945
25 April 1945
Beria 22:40–00:30
Vishinskii 23:35–00:15
Malenkov 00:20–00:50
Mikoian 00:20–00:50
Khrushchev 00:30–00:50

26 April 1945
Vishinskii 22:15–23:30
Bulganin 22:40–23:30 (GKO)
Antonov 22:40–23:30
Shtemenko 22:40–23:30
Malenkov 00:05–00:10
Beria 00:05–00:10

28 April 1945
Beria 23:20–23:35
Malenkov 23:20–23:35
Antonov 23:30–01:05
Bulganin 23:30–01:15
Voronov 23:30–23:35 (NKO)
Shtemenko 23:30–01:05
Osokin 23:30–23:35 (?)
Vishinskii 24:00–01:00
Beria 00:30–01:15
270 From the Vistula to Berlin
Malenkov 00:30–01:15
Voronov 00:30–00:40
Osokin 00:30–00:40

30 April 1945
Malenkov 19:30–20:15
Beria 19:30–20:15
Vishinskii 19:30–20:15

2 May 1945
Vishinskii 17:10–19:15
Beria 17:55–19:25
Malenkov 17:55–19:25
Serov 18:45–19:15 (NKVD)
Meshchik 19:00–19:15 (?)
Antonov 19:00–19:15
Shtemenko 19:00–19:25
(Source: I.A. Gor’kov, 2002, pp. 466–467)

Whilst Document 181 does not cover Stalin’s meetings elsewhere, in particu-
lar at the People’s Commissariat for Defence, nonetheless it does highlight the
importance of the General Staff in military decision making with frequent
visits by General Staff officers such as Shtemenko, head of the operations
department of the Genshtab from May 1943, and Antonov, a predecessor of
Shtemenko as head of the operations department, and from February 1945
head of the Genshtab as a whole. Heads of the different ‘arms’ and services such
as Voronov, head of the Main Artillery Board of the Red Army (and previously
of the PVO), unsurprisingly continued to make frequent visits, with some
notable changes in personnel: Zhigarev, head of the VVS in June 1941 having
been moved to command the VVS of the Far-Eastern Front in April 1942, not
having escaped responsibility for the virtual destruction of the VVS during the
first days of ‘Barbarossa’, but did escape with his life and relatively minor
demotion, to be replaced by Novikov. Novikov’s less frequent appearances in
the list of visitors to Stalin’s Kremlin office can be explained by the almost
total Soviet air supremacy by April 1945. Kuznetsov remained in command of
the navy, but headed a force that had very much a peripheral role in Soviet
victory and had a tarnished reputation with Stalin through heavy losses of
major units in the retreats of 1941 and 1942 and the subsequent apparent
squandering of major units (for example, see Document 95, Chapter 6).
Notably absent are many of Stalin’s closest colleagues or even cronies of the
Civil War era or, in the case of Mekhlis, the 1920s. Where applicable all had
tarnished their reputations as military leaders during 1941–42, even if not
losing Stalin’s ‘trust’. Voroshilov lost his place on the State Defence Committee
in November 1944, having been excluded from decision making for some time.
Of Stalin’s peers, only Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, Vishinskii and, to a slightly
 From the Vistula to Berlin 271
lesser extent, Mikoian remained prominent; Malenkov, Molotov and Beria
being part of a Politburo-dominated inner core of the State Defence Committee
that tended to meet in Stalin’s Kremlin office. Whilst not making the inner
core, capable organizers such as Mikoian and Vosnesenskii retained prominence
throughout the war. Although not appearing in Document 164 above, it is
worth noting that, of the post-Great Purges ‘old guard’, Timoshenko had a
least preserved a position as a Stavka representative at front headquarters level in
1945, even if he was no longer at the heart of decision making.
Beria, head of the NKVD, and along with Malenkov and Molotov as close
as Stalin got to friendship, remained particularly prominent throughout the
war and, by Stalin’s standards, trusted, but even he had seen a no doubt suspi-
cious or at least cautious Stalin chip away at his empire or dilute his authority
(although the repeated separation of the NKGB from NKVD in 1943 left the
latter in the hands of Beria’s trusted ally Merkulov until 1946), for instance, in
removing counter-intelligence in the armed forces from his empire (the special
sections of the NKVD becoming the NKO-run SMERSH).12
The entrusting of counter-intelligence in the Red Army to the NKO was
certainly symptomatic of the general improvement in trust of the Red Army
and the rise of a younger generation of leaders such as Zhukov and Bulganin
(the latter gaining a place on the GKO in place of Voroshilov in November
1944, and indeed becoming something of a core member), and on their heels
figures such as Rokossovskii and Konev, whose personal ascendancies ran
alongside that of the Genshtab and the Red Army as a whole. Vatunin, very
much a rising star whose name appears more than once in entries for 1941,
and who was at the time head of the operations department of the Genshtab,
was killed whilst commanding the 1st Ukrainian Front in 1944.13
On 26 April Soviet forces set about the destruction of the Berlin garrison
and capture of Berlin, with Soviet reconnaissance troops raising the Soviet
red banner over the Reichstag on 30 April, even if fighting for the Reichstag
continued until the morning of 1 May. The Soviet command was informed
of Hitler’s suicide of 30 April the following day during negotiations for sur-
render with the new German Chief-of-Staff, General Krebs – a surrender
forced on the Berlin garrison if not the entire Wehrmacht the next day.14

DOCUMENT 165: From a combat report of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front on the
military activities of forces of the front and the capture of Berlin, 3 May 1945
1. On the left wing of the front the enemy continues to retreat in a westerly direc-
tion, offering only weak resistance to our advancing forces.
The encircled garrison of Berlin, led by General of Artillery Weidling, along with
his headquarters, ceased resistance and gave themselves up to our forces. Isolated
groups of the encircled garrison that are attempting to break out in a westerly direc-
tion are being destroyed by our forces in the Spandau region and further west.
2. Having broken the resistance of the encircled enemy forces of the front have fully
occupied the German capital – the city of Berlin. . . . According to provisional
figures for 2.5.1945 from the enemy forces of the Berlin garrison more than
272 From the Vistula to Berlin
64,000 soldiers and officers have been taken prisoner. . . . The tallying up of
POWs in Berlin continues.
On the left wing of the front forces continue to forcibly advance and, encoun-
tering only weak enemy resistance within a single day have advanced 50 km in
the Wilsnack region (12 km south-east of Wittenberg) and forward units have
linked up with American forces.
...
Commander of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.
Zhukov
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 455)

Despite the fall of Berlin, Hitler’s death and the final surrenders of the
Wehrmacht of 7 and 8 May,15 sporadic German resistance continued for days,
with particularly heavy fighting in and around the Czechoslovak capital
Prague taking place on 9 May.

DOCUMENT 166: From the combat report of the headquarters of 4th Guards Tank Army to
the commander of forces of 1st Ukrainian Front Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, 9
May 1945, 21:30
1. During the morning and first half of the day on 9.5.1945 groups of SS of the
Führer [begleit] Regiment, Das Reich Panzer Division, 20th Police Regiment and
an SS security battalion along with two construction battalions and other units
resisted the activities of our forces in the Prague region.
2. Forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army continued to forcibly develop their advance
on Prague and at 04:00 on 9.5.1945, with the 62nd and 63rd Tank Brigades,
10th Tank Corps and 70th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade, broke in to the city
and fought groups of SS in order to clear the city. By 12:30 the city of Prague
had been fully cleared. . . .
During 9.5.1945 forces of the army captured the following on the approaches
to and in Prague: 35 serviceable aircraft in the eastern suburbs of Prague, up to
500 motor vehicles and more than 5,000 POWs. The surrender of enemy forces
continues.
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 455)

Some of those engaged in the fighting around Prague during the last days of
the war in the west would not, however, get to savour the end of the war
against Nazi Germany for long, as they would be redeployed to the Far East.

Guide to further reading

Anthony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall, 1945 (New York: Viking, 2002) and other editions.
O.A. Rzheshevskii, ‘The Race for Berlin’, JSMS, Volume 8, Number 3 (September 1995), pp.
566–579.
Tony Le Tissier, Zhukov at the Oder: The Decisive Battle for Berlin (New York: Praeger, 1996)
and other editions.
12 The Soviet invasion of
Manchuria

After the liberation of Prague brought the war in the west against Nazi
Germany to an end, as a result of agreement confirmed at the February 1945
inter-Allied Yalta conference, Soviet forces were to be committed to the war
in the Far East against Japan within three months of the defeat of Nazi
Germany. Whilst the possibility remained for Soviet participation in an
assault on the Japanese home islands, in the first instance Soviet troops
would be committed to operations in Manchuria, on Sakhalin and the Kurile
Islands.
In order to build up substantial forces for the war against Japan, between
May and 8 August 1945 the Soviet Union transferred more than 403,000
men, 2,119 tanks and self-propelled guns, 17,374 motor vehicles and
36,000 horses to the Far East from the west via the Trans-Siberian Railway.1
The Japanese were aware that the Soviet Union was amassing troops in the
Far East during the summer of 1945 and certainly expected eventual Soviet
operations against them. Whilst some were unconvinced of the sincerity or
practicality of the Soviet Yalta commitment to participate in the war in the
Far East within three months of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviet
failure to promptly renew the April 1941 neutrality pact in April 1945
understandably heightened concerns. Actual Soviet strength in the region by
August was, however, underestimated by Japanese intelligence by as much
as 30–50 per cent, allowing many Japanese planners and intelligence officers
to convince themselves that a Soviet invasion was not imminent, given their
assessments of the forces required for such an undertaking. Less favourable
assessments of the situation and the recall of Soviet embassy personnel and
their dependants from Japan on 24 July 1945 had failed to significantly
increase Japanese front-line readiness.2 Shortly after the pulling out of
embassy personnel Soviet forces were to finalize plans for the invasion of
Manchuria.
274 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria

DOCUMENT 167: From a directive of the Stavka VGK to forces of the Far Eastern Front,
28 July 1945
. . . the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. By 1 August to have undertaken and completed all the necessary preparations
amongst forces of the front for the organization [gruppirovka] of troops, . . . with
the aim, on the special order of the Supreme High Command, to undertake offen-
sive operations.
2. During preparations for the operation you are to make sure of the following:
a) The aim of the operation is to be: active co-operation with forces of the
Trans-Baikal Front and the Primorskaia [coastal] group of forces in the total
defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army and capture the Harbin region.
b) The conduct of offensive operations on the Sungari axis by forces of 15th
Army in co-operation with the Amur Flotilla.
No less than three rifle divisions are to be allotted to the conduct of the opera-
tion, along with the bulk of the artillery of the High Command, tanks, aircraft
and bridging equipment, with the first task being the forcing of the Amur River,
the capture of the Tungchiang Fortified District and by the 23rd day to have
reached the Chiamussu region.
For future development you should consider operations along the River
Sungari towards Harbin.
...
6. All preparations are to be conducted in the strictest secrecy.
Access to full operational plans is to be given to: the commander, members of
the military soviet, the head of front headquarters and the heads of the operational
divisions of front headquarters.
Heads of different elements of forces and their support staff are to be allowed to
prepare specific elements of the plan without familiarization with the general
tasks of the front.
Commanders of armies are to be given instructions in person in oral form. . . .
Rules for access to army-level plans are to be as those for fronts.
All documentation for plans of military operations is to be stored in the personal
safes of military commanders of fronts and armies.
7. Correspondence and conversations on questions concerned with the plan for the
operation are to be conducted solely through the head of the General Headquar-
ters of the Red Army.
Stavka of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin
Antonov
(Source: O.A. Rzheshevskii, 1990, p. 456)
 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 275
On 7 August, no doubt in light of the United States dropping the first
atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August, orders went out for Soviet forces
in the Far East to finally ready themselves for offensive operations only two
days later on 9 August.3 Table 12.1 provides Soviet figures for manpower
committed at the start of the operation, along with equipment available to
them. According to figures provided by Krivosheev, 638,300 troops of the
Trans-Baikal Front, 334,700 of the 2nd Far-Eastern Front and 586,500 of
the 1st Far-Eastern Front, in addition to naval forces and a small Mongolian
force, participated in the ‘Manchurian Strategic Offensive’ Operation.4
According to figures provided by Glantz, the Japanese forces in Table
12.2 were available to defend against Soviet attack. Despite on paper
seeming an impressive force, experienced Japanese troops had long since
been transferred to meet the US and British threat elsewhere, along with
more capable air assets. Replacement troops were at best poorly trained, and
in fact the Japanese did not consider any of the infantry divisions available
to face the Soviets as combat-ready.5
In terms of armour, Japanese weakness was more pronounced than in
terms of manpower. The Soviet 1st Far-Eastern Front alone could deploy a
total of 1,809 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 18 were KV, 560 T-
34, 390 T-26, 186 BT-7, 189 ISU-152, 63 SU-100 and 403 SU-76. The
bulk of this strength would be deployed on the key Mutanchiang axis,
where 1st Red Banner and 5th Armies would strike with forces including
1,094 tanks and self-propelled guns. Much of this strength would be used to
support rifle divisions, with each rifle division on the principal axis being
provided with a 65-tank armoured brigade and a 21-strong ISU-152 self-
propelled gun regiment, which, along with their independent SU-76 self-
propelled gun sections gave a rifle division a total of 99 tanks and
self-propelled guns. Deeper penetration operations were, according to what
was now standard practice, to be conducted by a forward mobile group, 10th
Mechanized Corps, consisting of one tank and two mechanized brigades,
along with three self-propelled artillery and an independent tank and
Guards mechanized regiment, an independent communications battalion
and other supporting units, with 110 T-34, 31 BT-7, 110 T-26, 63 SU-100
and 57 SU-76.6
The 1,155 tanks available to the Japanese were not concentrated in units
of significant size apart from two brigades, and models available were vastly
inferior to the T-34s that were the mainstay of Soviet forces in the Far East.
Such was the weakness of Japanese tanks armed at best with a 57 mm main
gun but more typically 37 mm, that the Soviet Union could deploy T-26s
and BT-7s that had been in the Far East since before the German invasion of
June 1941. Whilst Japanese artillery remained a threat, as regarding specifi-
cally anti-tank weapons her infantry divisions could at best field 37 mm
anti-tanks guns, which would require a lucky hit to knock out a T-34.7
Soviet air support was also not only qualitatively but quantitatively far
superior to that available to the Japanese, the latter apparent by comparing
Table 12.1 Troops and military equipment of the Trans-Baikal and 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts at the start of the ‘Manchurian’ Opera-
tion

Trans-Baikal Front 1st Far Eastern Front 2nd Far Eastern Front Total

Personnel 654,000 586,589 337,096 1,577,725

Personnel in frontline units 416,000 404,056 238,926 1,058,982
Personnel in rear-area units 238,040 182,533 98,170 518,743
Tanks 1,751 1,201 752 3,704
Self-propelled guns 665 659 528 1,852
Anti-tank guns (45 and 57 mm) 1,360 1,539 808 3,707
Field-artillery (76 mm and above) 3,075 3,743 1,604 8,422
Mortars (all types) 3,922 4,879 2,829 11,630
RS launchers 583 516 72 1,171
AA guns 601 504 1,280 2,385
Source: ‘Kampaniia Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil na Dal’nem Vostoke v 1945 g. (Fakti i tsifri)’, Vizh, Number 8 (1965), p. 68.
 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 277
Table 12.2 Japanese forces facing the Soviets in the Far East, summer 1945

Total Japanese 1,217,000 men, 1,155 tanks, 5,360 guns, 1,800 aircraft
strength

Made up of 993,000 Japanese 214,000 auxiliaries

■
713,000 in 280,000 in 170,000 44,000 Inner-
Manchuria southern Korea Munchukuoan Mongolian
(Kwantung and on Sakhalin Army Forces
Army) and the Kuriles
Source: Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. 28.

Table 12.3 Aircraft strengths of Soviet fronts and naval forces at the start of the
‘Manchurian Strategic Offensive’ Operation

Aircraft type Trans- 1st Far 2nd Far Pacific Northern Totals
Baikal Eastern Eastern Fleet Pacific
Front Front Front Flotilla
(12th Air (9th Air (10th Air
Army) Army) Army)

Fighters 499 536 823 461 178 2,497

Ground-attack 197 193 178 194 46 808
Bombers 440 352 198 342 62 1,364
Torpedo – – – 138 – 138
Reconnaissance 40 62 40 84 31 257
Artillery-spotter – 35 39 – – 74
Transport 189 15 24 – – 228
Source: ‘Kampaniia Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil na Dal’nem Vostoke’, p. 68.

overall Japanese strength above to Soviet strength in Table 12.3. However,

Drea suggests that the Kwantung Army actually had only 180 combat air-
craft.8 According to Marshal P.S. Kirsanov, Soviet superiority in the air was
further enhanced by the fact that, presumably after the start of hostilities,
the Japanese command pulled back the bulk of their limited air assets to
bases in South Korean and Japan, meaning that Soviet air forces met even
less opposition than expected and could focus more on the support of ground
troops.9
In order to capture Manchuria, and in the process destroy the Kwantung
Army, the broad Soviet plan was, as summarized by Glantz and along the
lines outlined in Document 167, that:

The Trans-Baikal Front would attack eastward into western Manchuria,

while the 1st Far Eastern Front would attack westward into eastern
278 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria
Manchuria. These two attacks would converge in the Mukden,
Changchun, Harbin, and Kirin areas of south central Manchuria. The
2nd Far Eastern Front would conduct a supporting attack into northern
Manchuria, driving southward to Harbin and Tsitsihar. Timing of on-
order operations against southern Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles would
depend on the progress of the main attacks.10

Hence Soviet forces of the Trans-Baikal Front and 1st Far Eastern Front were
to encircle the bulk of the Kwantung Army through bold deep penetration
operations, particularly by the Trans-Baikal Front in the west, assisted by
operations of 2nd Far Eastern Front that would pin Japanese forces and con-
tribute to the prevention of their orderly withdrawal (see Figure 12.1).
Having encircled the bulk of the Kwantung Army the Trans-Baikal and 1st
Far Eastern Fronts were to advance on the Laiotung Peninsula and Port
Arthur, lost to Russia, as south Sakhalin, after defeat in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904–05. As it happened, the second phase of the Soviet operation
would barely get started before Japanese forces capitulated.11

Figure 12.1 The Soviet ‘Manchurian Strategic Offensive’ Operation, 9 August to

2 September 1945.
Key:

1. Chita 7. Seoul a. Chinese forces

2. Blagoveshchensk 8. Changchun b. Mongolia
3. Khabarovsk 9. Tsitsihar c. Amur Flotilla
4. Peking 10. Harbin d. Far Eastern Fleet
5. Port Arthur e. Soviet advance
6. Mukden f. Japanese retreat
 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 279
Having gained tactical and operational surprise during the invasion of
Manchuria on 9 August 1945, with the successful development of opera-
tions on the mainland Soviet forces commenced operations against Japanese
forces on South Sakhalin with forces of 16th Army of the 2nd Far Eastern
Front in co-operation with the Northern Pacific Flotilla of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet on 11 August, to be followed by landings on the Kurile Islands by
forces of 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet from 18 August.12
Whilst Soviet forces had gained tactical and operational surprise in
Manchuria, the Japanese did at least have plans on how to deal with a Soviet
invasion that was expected eventually, even if not until the spring of 1946
according to some, more optimistic estimates of the summer of 1945.13
Faced with superior forces the Japanese were well aware that holding the
Red Army on the borders was not feasible for any sustained period, and
hence the eventual Japanese plan was to hold key fortified positions, for
instance the particularly dense fortifications in the Eastern Highlands facing
1st Far Eastern Front, and key positions covering the passes through the
Greater Khingan Mountains across which forces of the Trans-Baikal Front
would have to advance, both to delay the Soviet advance and whittle down
Soviet strength. The bulk of Japanese forces were to conduct an orderly
withdrawal into the southern portion of the interior where Soviet forces,
with their strength sapped and at the end of extended supply lines, could be
held.14
The Soviet advance was, in reality, more successful that Soviet or Japanese
expectations.
Despite having to advance across mountainous terrain following by the
barren expanses of the Central Plains, with poor lines of communications
and in particular problems in keeping troops and vehicles supplied with
water, the advance of the Trans-Baikal Front was particularly dramatic in its
speed and depth. Bypassing key Japanese positions, as Glantz notes, 6th
Guards Tank Army had proved able to cover 350 km of rough terrain in
only three days after the start of operations on 9 August. After 12 August,
with Soviet troops deep in the Japanese rear, ‘only logistical difficulties
limited the Soviet advance’, with Japanese troops unable to form any sort of
viable defensive line.15
The dramatic rate of the advance of the Trans-Baikal Front was assisted by
the fact that, in the face of weak Japanese anti-tank capabilities and the con-
centration of the bulk of Japanese forces in the region along a particularly
limited number of avenues of advance, this front could deploy tanks in the
first echelons of the attack without fear of them being bogged down in the
sort of anti-tank defences faced in the West, with the subsequent advance
greatly assisted by Soviet airpower:
280 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria

DOCUMENT 168: Extract from the entry in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia on the
‘Manchurian Operation’ of 1945
One specific dimension to the operational organization of forces of the Trans-Baikal
Front was the large number of tank armies and cavalry mechanized groups in the first
echelon, which played a major role in the achievement of the rapid rate of advance of
the troops. Aviation was certainly a powerful military resource that had significant
impact on the course of operations, with more than 22,000 sorties being launched.
Aviation was widely used for reconnaissance, the dropping of troops and the delivery
of supplies, and especially fuel for the tank armies. During the operation 16,500 men,
about 2,780 tons of fuel, 563 tons of munitions and about 1,500 tons of other supplies
were delivered by air.
(Source: SVE 5, p. 130)

Unsurprisingly it was the Trans-Baikal Front which received the bulk of the
fuel flown in by air to sustain the advance – a total of 2,456 tons.16
As forces of the Trans-Baikal Front advanced across the mountains and
broke in to the Central Plain, forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front faced denser
Japanese defences. Indeed, relatively few Japanese troops were in the west
given the perception that the terrain and associated logistical problems
made large-scale Soviet operations there unlikely. Despite the greater con-
centration of Japanese forces on the eastern sector of the front, in well-
prepared positions, as Glantz notes, ‘forward detachments of reinforced tank
brigades swept through and around Japanese defensive lines, preempting
any systematic defense. Follow-on rifle forces crushed or bypassed any estab-
lished defences.’17
With Soviet forces deep in the heart of Manchuria the widespread surren-
der of Japanese forces began, according to Soviet sources, on 19 August.
Between 18 and 27 August Soviet forces were either transported in by air or
forward mobile detachments of the ground forces sent in to towns such as
Harbin, Mukden and Port Arthur, as yet still not occupied by Soviet forces,
in order to ‘speed up’ the surrender of Japanese forces and ‘prevent them
from evacuating or from damaging material assets’ before the final Japanese
surrender on 2 September.18 In the light of the Japanese capitulation pro-
posed Soviet landings on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido did not
take place.
The success of Soviet operations and the inadequacy of Japanese forces in
Manchuria against a Red Army schooled in and equipped for the war in the
West are illustrated by figures, at the time they were reported provisional,
provided by 1st Far Eastern Front for enemy and its own losses for the period
from 9 August to 1 September 1945:
 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 281

DOCUMENT 169: Report of the command of forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front to the High
Command of Soviet forces in the Far East on enemy losses, trophy items captured and losses of
Soviet forces from 9 August to 1 September 1945, 2 September 1945
I report:

1. Overall enemy losses are 322,500 soldiers, officers and generals, of whom more
than 65,000 soldiers and officers were killed during the fighting of the period
from 9.8 to 20.8, and in fact in the Mutanchiang region, according to General-
Lieutenant Shimizu Noritsune in command of 5th Army, more than 40,000 sol-
diers and officers were killed.
For the whole period from 9.8. to 1.9.45 257,225 men were captured, of whom
43 were generals, 8,058 officers and 249,124 men.
Amongst those captured officers and men are: 236,216 Japanese; 9,297
Manchurians; 6,788 Koreans; 4,924 Chinese.
Amongst the captured generals: Commander of the 1st Army Group General
Kita Seiichi; . . .
During the actual fighting 1st Far Eastern Front took more than 7,000 prison-
ers, the remainder giving themselves up after the capitulation of the Japanese
Army. . . .
2. For the period from 9.8 to 1.9.45 forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front captured the
following trophy items:
Aircraft of various types – 359 (of which some were serviceable)
Tanks – 120
Armoured cars – 18
Artillery pieces of various calibers – 705
Self-propelled guns – 15
Mortars and grenade launchers – 1,117
LMGs – 1,651
HMGs – 881
Motor vehicles – 1,417
Steam locomotives – 35
Railway trucks – 5,526
Tractors – 51
Horses – 6,948
Supply dumps of various types – 441 and a lot of other military supplies
The tallying up of trophy items continues.
3. Forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front lost 17,225 men in the period from 9.8 to
1.9.45, of whom: 3,254 were killed and 13,867 wounded.
Losses of horses were 260.
Material losses were: artillery pieces – 8, mortars – 17, tanks and armoured cars
hit my artillery fire and burnt out on the battlefield – 31. Aircraft (shot down in
aerial combat, by AA fire or destroyed on the ground) – 53. Losses due to acci-
dents or catastrophes – 12. Total aircraft lost – 65.

Meretskov
(Source: RA T.18 7(2), 2000, pp. 130–131)
282 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria
The Soviet Union suffered a total of 12,031 irrecoverable personnel losses
during the ‘Manchurian Strategic Offensive’ Operation as a whole between 9
August and 2 September 1945, during which, according to Krivosheev,
total losses of tanks and self-propelled guns for three fronts were only 78.19
According to Soviet sources, a total of 83,737 Japanese troops were killed
and 594,000 taken prisoner during the ‘Manchurian’ Operation as a whole.20
Japanese sources suggest that in the region of 21,000 Japanese troops were
in fact killed.21
In Manchuria, Soviet forces gained the upper hand over the Japanese on a
number of levels from the operational-strategic down to the tactical. At the
operational-strategic level they had achieved surprise, particularly in the
west, thanks to their ability to deploy troops over terrain and distances well
beyond Japanese expectations and planning. This ability to deploy and
sustain large mechanized forces across difficult terrain contributed to Japan-
ese paralysis at an operational level, where Japanese forces proved unable,
even in the east, to block or counter-attack against the flanks of Soviet pene-
trations with any strength. At the tactical level, Soviet forces used ‘small,
task-oriented assault groups with heavy engineer and firepower support’
rather than the human waves that had characterized Soviet tactics at the
beginning of the Great Patriotic War, and where possible probed, bypassed
and penetrated through the cracks of even more dense defences rather than
hurling themselves against them. Relying more on machines than human
lives, Soviet commanders exercised initiative much further down the chain
of command than they had done earlier in the war.22
The rivers of blood spilled over years in the war against Nazi Germany
had at least contributed to what, by Soviet standards, was a relatively blood-
less success in the east, even if lives lost there might seem to have been lost
to little purpose compared to the increasingly obvious need to defeat Nazi
Germany as the true nature of the regime was revealed to Soviet citizens
after June 1941.

Guide to further reading

Edward J. Drea, ‘Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of
Manchuria, 1945’, Military Affairs (April 1984), pp. 66–73.
David Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth
Paper Number 7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command
and General Staff College, February 1983).
David Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945, Leaven-
worth Paper Number 8 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army
Command and General Staff College, June 1983).
David Glantz, Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: ‘August Storm’
(London: Frank Cass, 2003).
Conclusion

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union had undoubtedly
recovered the Great Power status that its Tsarist predecessor had last most
obviously enjoyed from about 1813–14 until the Crimean War of 1853–56.
Whilst Soviet victories at the end of the Great Patriotic War continued to
be won at horrendous human cost, they were nonetheless arguably being
won (particularly given the fact that Soviet forces faced a prepared enemy on
the defensive in an increasingly built-up landscape) more economically in
terms of the shedding of Soviet blood than they had been earlier in the war.
This was to a large extent thanks to the recovery of the Soviet armaments
industry after the shock of invasion and associated loss of territory, but also
because the resultant equipment was being used more effectively. Soviet
losses of men and material continued, however, to be staggering until the
end of the war, particularly when compared to those of British, Canadian
and American forces in the west – losses on a scale not simply explainable by
the greater scale and ferocity with which the war was being fought in the
east. Alongside the 557,643 Soviet troops killed in action or dying during
casualty evacuation from January–May 1945, more than total British and
Commonwealth losses for the whole war, during the same period the Red
Army lost 13,700 tanks and self-propelled guns and 27,000 motor vehicles.1
Whilst the Red Army certainly remained the massive and slightly
unwieldy juggernaut of the German memoir-influenced Western historiog-
raphy of the 1950s and 1960s,2 it was no longer quite such the crude instru-
ment that had whittled down German strength during the summer of 1941
and eventually halted the increasingly feeble German spearheads before
Moscow. Later in the war, unsupported or at best poorly supported frontal
assaults by Soviet infantry were increasingly infrequent and tanks were no
longer being thrown into battle in battalion-sized packets, instead being
deployed en masse but in genuinely combined-arms tank and mechanized
corps and indeed armies, able to make deep penetrations into multi-layered
if weakly manned German defences that could no longer depend on power-
ful mobile reserves. Such Soviet penetrations were increasingly spearheaded
by mobile groups led by officers showing an initiative that few would have
been willing to show in the political climate engendered by the purges at
284 Conclusion
the start of the war. Nonetheless, the thousands of Soviet troops killed in
capturing fortified cities such as Königsberg and Budapest did so for little
military purpose.
In the light of the strength of the Soviet war machine during the second
half of the war in the east, it is easy to forget that Soviet and indeed Allied
victory was not and certainly had not always been all but inevitable. Ignor-
ing Hitler’s decision to turn his attentions eastwards in 1941 rather than
knocking Britain out of the war3 – one counter-factual that might very well
have influenced the outcome of the war in a single stroke, it is important to
note, as Overy does in Why the Allies Won, that:

Battles are not pre-ordained. If they were, no one would bother to fight
them. The decisive engagement at Midway Island was won because ten
American bombs out of the hundreds dropped fell on the right target. . . .
The bombing offensive, almost brought to a halt in the winter of
1943–4, was saved by the addition of long-range fuel tanks to escort
fighters, a tiny expense in the overall cost of the bombing campaign.4

However, whilst German victory might have seemed very much a possible
outcome in the early summer of 1941, at the beginning of the Great Patri-
otic War German strength, no matter how it is measured, was certainly
nothing like as overwhelming as Allied strength in 1944–45. Short of the
invention of a wonder weapon such as the atomic bomb, the like of which
Hitler dreamt and only the vast resources of the United States could develop
in time to deploy against Japan in August 1945, the chances of a surprise
German victory were diminishing rapidly during 1943 and particularly in
1944. The benefit of counter-factuals is that they bring us to consider the
relative importance of variables in what did happen, and the list of what
Allied powers might have done differently in 1939–42 to prevent German
successes is far longer than any list that can be devised as to what Germany
could have done differently in late 1943–45 in order to stave off defeat.
By the time of the Allied landings in Normandy, Soviet ascendancy in
the east was obvious and German defeat a question of ‘when’ rather than
‘whether’. Once the Soviet Union became embroiled in the Second World
War, the bulk of German divisions was undoubtedly fighting and destroyed
on the Eastern Front. The concluding volume of the Khrushchev-era official
Soviet history of the Great Patriotic War provides the data in Table C.1 to
illustrate the extent to which, throughout the war, the bulk of German
ground forces at least were concentrated against the Soviet Union. The data
presented certainly highlights the basic fact that the bulk of German ground
forces fought the Red Army from June 1941 throughout the war, even if the
June 1944 invasion of Normandy led to the fact that by 1 January 1945, the
Western Allies were facing more than 37 per cent of German ground
strength measured in divisional equivalents. However, German resources
thrown into the closing stages of the campaign in North Africa and the air
 Conclusion 285
war in the Mediterranean and then over Europe from 1942 onwards were
substantial, the latter tying down increasing German resources from 1943
onwards.5 However, as figures provided by Mawsdley suggest, the Soviet
Union was certainly killing far more German ‘military personnel’ than the
Western Allies between the third quarter of 1941 and third quarter of 1944,
with the final quarter of 1944 being the only possible exception where
223,000 German troops were killed in the ‘East’, compared to 224,000 on
other fronts.6 With the exception of the Italians, Germany’s allies were also
tied down on the Eastern Front. However, the Soviet official history cer-
tainly exaggerates the importance of the Red Army holding down German
allies in the East where the Finns, Rumanians and Hungarians were not
interested in fighting, and indeed keen not to fight, the Western allies – in
the case of the Finns, and to a lesser extent Rumanians, the key concern was
regaining territory lost to the Soviet Union in 1940.7
Despite the recent rediscovery of the contribution of the Red Army to the
defeat of Nazi Germany in the Western popular historiography of the war,
there is no doubt when considering the Western Front and Allied aid to the
Soviet Union that Nazi Germany and her allies was defeated by a genuine
coalition of powers that held together throughout the war, despite Hitler’s
hopes of driving a wedge between its disparate elements. Whilst the
Western Allies only belatedly committed sufficient land forces to occupy a
significant proportion of German divisions, and the Soviet Union almost
alone faced significant German land forces before the spring of 1943, the
Western-Allied contribution to the defeat of Germany even before D-Day
nonetheless went beyond strategic bombing and the air war. Allied aid had
certainly been important in helping the Soviet Union survive the winter of
1941–42, had allowed Soviet industry to focus on the production of key
weapons systems and increasingly had a major impact on Red Army mobil-
ity and communications, even if the chances are that without this aid the
Red Army would still have held Moscow and gradually pushed the German
invaders back. That Japanese forces did not take advantage of German inva-
sion and attack the USSR from Manchuria in late 1941 or the autumn of
1942 owes much to the success of Soviet arms at Lake Khasan and Khalkin
Gol in 1938 and 1939 respectively, but also to the commitment of better
elements of Japanese air and ground forces to the war against the Western
Allies after December 1941.
Whilst the Red Army held the Wehrmacht before Moscow and Stalingrad
and then pushed it back at least in part beyond the pre-1939 Soviet border
before D-Day, during this period the Western Allies were nonetheless gath-
ering strength and indeed the will before, in June 1944, finally making a
major land commitment to the war – the ‘Second Front’ for which Stalin
had been pushing for some time. Whilst operations in Sicily and Italy from
July and September 1943 respectively failed to draw off sizeable German
assets, it has to be remembered that the United States was engaged in a
war on two fronts, and in the lead up to D-Day the Western Allies were
Table C.1 German divisional equivalents on the ‘Soviet–German’, ‘other fronts’ or on ‘occupied territory or in Germany’ according to the
Soviet Khrushchev-era official history of the Great Patriotic War

Date Total German ‘On Soviet– % of total ‘On other % of total On ‘occupied % of total
‘divisions’ German front’ German divisions fronts’ German divisions territory or in German divisions
Germany’

22 June 1941 217.5 153 70.3 2 0.9 62.5 28.8

1 May 1942 236.5 181.5 77 3 1.1 52 21.9
1 July 1943 297 196 66 8 2.7 93 31.3
1 January 1944 318 201 63.3 19.5 6.1 97.5 30.6
1 June 1944 326.5 181.5 55.6 81.5 25 63.5 19.4
1 January 1945 314.5 179 57 119 37.8 16.5 5.2
Source: Istoriiia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini. . . . Tom shestoi. Itogi. . ., p. 26.
 Conclusion 287
building up resources for an amphibious assault on enemy-held shores on a
scale without precendent. Subsequent Soviet claims of Allied prevarication
may have contained some truth – the Allies were not going to launch them-
selves at Normandy without due preparation just to please Stalin. However,
in some ways the Western Allies were doing what Stalin had been doing
from September 1939 until the German-led invasion – building up
resources with the knowledge that premature commitment was unnecessary
with German forces committed elsewhere. One might also argue, however,
that Soviet commitment to dealing with the National Socialist threat had
been more serious than that of the Western powers during the 1930s, and in
particular by September 1938, prompting the signing of the Nazi–Soviet
Pact to buy time – both the Western allies and the Soviet Union could cer-
tainly make claims that the other had vacillated and stood by at key
moments when their earlier intervention could have been significant.
In terms of what actually happened, the Soviet Union paid a far higher
human and material cost during the war than her Allies, albeit one that
might have been reduced had it not been for the Great Purges and failure to
take relatively rudimentary preparations to meet German invasion. In
explaining why this was the case and moving beyond tactical and opera-
tional practice, it has to be borne in mind that whilst the Soviet Union did
not join the war until June 1941, Soviet forces could not retreat behind the
English Channel but were locked in continuous combat for almost the next
four years, on a scale that would only be matched in the west in the latter
stages of the war, and in combat of a far more sustained ferocity.
The scale of killing on the Eastern Front, particularly if the Final Solution
is included, has seen no equal in history to date. Estimates of total Soviet
losses have risen since the end of the war, when in 1946 Soviet losses were
publicly admitted to having been seven million killed, despite the regime
being aware of at least 15 million deaths. The official figure for losses was
increased to 20 million or more under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, increasing
again to 26–27 million or more during Gorbachev’s perestroika. It was
during this period that a commission of the Ministry of Defence, working in
co-operation with other agencies, would report that 8,668,400 Soviet mili-
tary personnel were either killed, died of wounds or did not return from cap-
tivity – a figure taken as undermining the total Soviet figure of 20 million
killed and leading to a figure of 27 million Soviet deaths as a result of the
war being announced by Gorbachev on the eve of Victory Day (9 May) in
1990. This figure has been widely accepted since then.8 Of these 8,668,400
Krivosheev suggests that 5,177,410 were killed in action or died during
casualty evacuation in the war against Germany, with a further 1,100,327
dying in hospital of wounds and 540,580 as non-combat losses, due, for
example, to disease and accidents.9
In the region of 4,559,000 Soviet troops were accounted for as missing in
action or POWs during the war, according to figures once again provided by
Krivosheev; Streit suggests that 3,350,000 POWs were taken in 1941 alone,
288 Conclusion
of whom nearly 60 per cent had died by 1 February 1942.10 As Krivosheev
discusses, not all of these were Red Army personnel – indeed German claims
for POWs taken often exceeded Red Army forces in a given area, with many
construction workers and other auxiliary personnel under army supervision
not appearing in Red Army statistics for losses but counting as POWs in
German statistics. Additionally, according to Krivosheev, many liable for
military service who found themselves on Axis-occupied territory were also
apparently imprisoned, although a significant number of non-Russian
POWs and even some Russians, possibly wounded, were subsequently
released back into the population.11 According to Soviet statistics, there
were 1,836,000 POW returnees to the Soviet Union from German camps at
the end of the war, and a further 939,700 had been redrafted into the Red
Army either from camps or having been released into the civilian population
of occupied territory during the war, leaving 1,783,300 from the 4,559,000
total, of whom 673,000 died in captivity according to German figures and
with about half of the remainder having died in German captivity according
to Krivosheev – perhaps these individuals being the ‘approximately
600,000’ POWs that would fall victim to SS extermination, according to
Streit. That leaves 500,000 of those ‘missing’ who had, according to
Krivosheev, in fact largely been killed.12 Whilst assessment of who died and
how during the Great Patriotic War is a complex problem with no conclu-
sive figures,13 the finer calculations do not change the broad thrust of the
statistics – that tens of hundreds of thousands of Soviet service personnel
died during battle or as a result of wounds sustained, with hundreds of thou-
sands more dying in German captivity.
War-related civilian losses are an even more complex issue given the sheer
scale of population displacement during the war in the east making it diffi-
cult to keep track of population, some of whom were killed by military
action, in German atrocities, as part of the Final Solution or died of starva-
tion on both sides of the front line in both German and NKVD camps, even
if many deaths in the latter were ultimately the result of German action
given that wartime mortality rates in the camps far exceeded those immedi-
ately before and after the war.14
To losses of human life and the demographic implications of a low
wartime birth-rate have to be added reduced numbers of livestock and
horses; the slaughter of the latter at the front was significant owing to the
reliance that both sides placed on horse-drawn transport and given that their
importance for agriculture had increased during the war due to the loss of
male labour to the Red Army15 and reallocation of tractor production to
tanks.16 As a result of the fighting and scorched-earth policies on both sides,
but particularly wholesale by Germany in retreat, damage to infrastructure
and other material assets, whether industrial or housing stock, was tremen-
dous. According to Soviet figures 1,710 towns and other urban settlements
were ‘fully or partially reduced to ruins or razed, along with 70,000 villages
and hamlets’; Stalingrad, Sevastopol’, Novorossiisk and Kerch’ were all but
 Conclusion 289
ruins. Along with damage to industrial concerns that could not be evacu-
ated, thousands of kilometres of railway line, hundreds of bridges and vast
quantities of agricultural equipment had been destroyed.17 Soviet recovery,
both demographically and materially, would be a long process.18
German military deaths, whilst colossal by the standards of Britain and
the United States, were significantly lower than those for the Soviet Union,
particularly when considering that Germany was fighting against the
Western Allies as well as the Soviet Union, and even if Soviet deaths
amongst POWs are not considered. According to figures provided by
Mawdsley, 2,742,000 German military personnel were killed in the ‘East’
from the third quarter of 1941 to the end of 1944, compared to 766,000 on
‘other fronts’ for the same period, with a further 147,000 killed prior to this
period. Total German losses for 1945 are given as 1,230,000. This leaves us
with a figure of 4,885,000 for the war as a whole.19 Amongst other figures,
Krivosheev gives a figure of 2,007,000 killed on the Eastern Front to the
end of April 1945 according to an OKH memorandum of 10 May 1945,
excluding deaths amongst POWs, given as 450,600 for the war in the east
as a whole according to Soviet figures. This figure does not include deaths
amongst those counted as missing in action – 2,610,000 being counted as
missing or POWs in the OKH figures. If subtracting 1,939,000 German
returnees from Soviet captivity and 450,600 that died in captivity according
to Soviet figures then this leaves another 220,400 unaccounted for in this
rather crude analysis, many undoubtedly killed.20 Either way, the number of
German troops that were killed in action and died as Soviet POWs was far
lower than the corresponding figures for Soviet forces, although the addition
of casualties from amongst Germany’s allies does change the picture to some
extent.21
The horrendous loss of human life on the Eastern as compared to the
Western Front, not counting the millions of maimed and other wounded,
certainly owed much to German National Socialist ideology, whether most
obviously in the Final Solution, in the more complex issue of Soviet POW
deaths and in particular during the winter of 1941–42, or simply in the
uncompromising manner in which the Nazi leadership prosecuted a war
inspired not only by racial ideology but vehement anti-communism. At the
same time Nazi Germany was fighting a regime that, whilst lacking the
same racial-ideological component, not only saw fascism as the most threat-
ening form of capitalism (as it was indeed proving), but that had been
willing to sanction the sacrificing of hundreds of thousands of its own cit-
izens in an attempt to eradicate real, potential and imagined opposition
during the Great Purges. It is therefore no surprise that Stalin and his
regime squandered human life, particularly during the first half of the war
before it became more scarce, with abandon, much as Hitler would be
willing to squander German lives as Nazi fortunes waned as the war pro-
gressed. That lives were squandered in order to defend the Soviet Union
from what, as German occupation policies soon proved, a threat even more
290 Conclusion
brutal than the Stalinist regime, goes some way to legitimize Soviet losses –
the end justifying the means – but that does not change the fact that
German resources, including significant numbers of divisions late in the
war, were being more effectively destroyed in human-cost terms by the
Western Allies, the difference arguably not explained alone by systemic and
broader cultural factors.
Both Hitler and Stalin are inevitably the focus of more attention in
military-historical literature than other wartime leaders such as Churchill
and Roosevelt, given the extent to which they personally were able and
willing to make decisions, with little consultation and often then with ‘yes’
men in their entourages, that could send hundreds of thousands of men to
their deaths. However, whilst Hitler’s tendencies in this direction became
more extreme as the German position deteriorated, after the Soviet position
had improved with the Soviet counter-offensive below Moscow Stalin’s
leadership would show the opposite trend. Having held much of the
responsibility for lack of Soviet short-term preparations to meet the inva-
sion, the decision not to pull troops back from Kiev in the summer of 1941
and the decision to undertake a sustained counter-offensive across a broad
front after more localized successes at the gates of Moscow, near Tikhvin and
Rostov-on-Don, Stalin started both to consult more widely and learn from
mistakes. The influence of his pre-war and often Civil War cronies such as
Voroshilov and the old guard such as Budennii declined rapidly, making
way for capable commanders such as Zhukov, Vasilevskii, Konev and
Rokossovskii22 as Hitler was dismissing competent commanders one by one.
Hence, whilst taking much of the blame for the debacles of the summer and
autumn of 1941 and summer of 1942, Stalin could legitimately claim some
credit both personally and in recognizing able subordinates for eventual
Soviet military victory, aided by economic foundations laid down during the
Five-Year Plans that Stalin had personally driven forward, once again amidst
considerable human, particularly peasant, suffering.23 Perhaps one of Stalin’s
greater successes was the realization that the Soviet people were often not
fighting for Stalin and socialism per se, but for Rodina – the motherland,
and narod – the people, often tied to family, friends and comrades-in-arms,
with the Russians more the vanguard of the Soviet people than of the prole-
tariat.24
During the 1930s the Soviet Union was perhaps the most ‘militarized’ (in
the broadest possible sense) society in the world when one takes into account
such factors as defence and related spending, the size and equipment of its
armed forces, the importance of foreign threats in propaganda and the scale
of conscription and military training or preparation for non-regular troops.
In order to play a crucial role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, as is apparent
in the material presented in this reader, the importance of the creation and
deployment of military power in Soviet society increased during the Great
Patriotic War to a level without comparison in the West with the possible
exception of the last months of the Nazi regime. Having defeated Nazi
 Conclusion 291
Germany, with an Eastern European empire to hold on to and with chal-
lenging capitalist hegemony with the assistance of military power, even if by
proxy, being a real possibility and ideological obligation, the Soviet super-
power continued to use a vast proportion of the state budget on defence
spending. Maintenance of her newly re-acquired Great Power or superpower
status was, initially from the end of the war up until the mid-1950s at least,
at the expense of the peasantry as had been the case in the 1930s. Increas-
ingly, defence spending was one of a number of major economic burdens on
the shoulders of an increasingly inefficient system in which resources were
also being thrown at the agricultural sector and attempts to provide Soviet
‘consumers’ with the housing and other consumer goods to placate them in a
society less reliant on terror as a basic tool of governance and motivational
tool than it had been under Stalin. As foreign-currency oil revenues col-
lapsed in the mid-1980s, the scale of the economic burden of maintaining a
Soviet military might, sustained increasingly ineffectively for new genera-
tions by pride in wartime achievements, became apparent. Residual Soviet
pride in the achievements of the Great Patriotic War won at such high cost
could not prop up Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe nor indeed the Soviet
Union itself, but pride in wartime achievements remained a significant
element in attempts by the Putin regime to rekindle Russian national pride,
despite the fact that the Great Patriotic War had ended more than 60 years
before.
Chronology of key events

1917–38
October 1917 The Bolsheviks seize power in Petrograd – the
October Revolution
1917–21 The Russian Civil War is fought by the Bolsheviks
against internal opponents and foreign
‘intervention’
1921 The New Economic Policy is introduced into
Russia
1924 Death of Lenin
The Soviet Union is officially established
1928 Official start of the First Five-Year Plan for the
development of the Soviet economy
1929–30 Period of mass collectivization of Soviet
agriculture
1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria
1933 Adolf Hitler comes to power in Germany
1934 The Soviet Union joins the League of Nations in
an attempt to check the rise of Nazi Germany
1935 The Soviet Union sign mutual-assistance treaties
with France and Czechoslovakia
1936 Germany reoccupies the Rhineland
1936–38 Period of the ‘Great Purges’ in the Soviet Union
1937 ‘Dual command’ is reintroduced in the Red Army
March 1938 German Anschluss with Austria
July–August 1938 Border clash between Soviet and Japanese forces at
Lake Khasan at the junction between Korea,
Manchuria and the Soviet Union
September 1938 Germany acquires the Sudeten region of
Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference
 Chronology of key events 293
1939
March Germany seizes the remainder of Czechoslovakia
April Britain and France make guarantees for Polish
security
Summer Abortive negotiations between Britain, France and
the Soviet Union over containing Nazi Germany
August Major clash between Soviet and Japanese forces at
Khalkin-Gol on the border between Mongolia and
Manchuria is a Soviet victory
23 August Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
1 September Germany invades Poland
3 September Britain and France declare war on Germany
17 September The Soviet Union invades Poland
28 September German–Soviet Treaty, with secret protocols, sees
Germany and the Soviet Union carve up Eastern
Europe
30 November Soviet invasion of Finland

1940
12 March Soviet peace treaty with Finland
April German forces seize Denmark and Norway
May–June German forces seize the Low Countries and France
June Soviet forces move into the Baltic Republics and
the Soviet Union acquires Bessarabia and northern
Bukovina from Rumania
July–October The Battle of Britain
12 August ‘Unitary command’ is introduced in the Red Army
September Italian forces invade Egypt
18 December Initial German order (Directive Number 21) for
Operation ‘Barbarossa’ – the invasion of the Soviet
Union – signed by Hitler

1941
April Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact
5 May Stalin speech to graduating officers on the need for
a new ‘offensive’ orientation for the Red Army
15 May Plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army
proposes pre-emptive offensive action against
German forces on the Soviet border
14 June TASS communiqué published in Pravda denying
aggressive intentions on the part of the Soviet
Union or Nazi Germany towards the other
294 Chronology of key events
22 June (a.m.) The German invasion of the Soviet Union,
Operation ‘Barbarossa’, begins. (p.m.) Red Army
ordered to counter-attack
23 June Headquarters of the High Command [Stavka GK]
created for the co-ordination of the Soviet military,
headed by Timoshenko
23–29 June Major tank engagements in the Dubno, Brodi,
Lutsk and Rovno regions between Soviet
mechanized forces of the South-Western Front and
1st Panzer Group of Army Group South
24 June Council for Evacuation created to organize the
removal of industry from areas threatened by the
German advance
28 June Minsk, capital of Belorussia, falls to German forces
of Army Group Centre
29–30 June Stalin, in crisis, retreats to his dacha
30 June Creation of the State Defence Committee [GKO]
under Stalin for the co-ordination of the Soviet war
effort
Creation of the first seven militia divisions
[narodnogo opolcheniia] in Leningrad
3 July Stalin makes his first radio speech of the war to the
Soviet people, addressing them as ‘brothers and
sisters’
5 July Stavka GK orders the creation of the Luga defence
line for the defence of Leningrad from the south
9 July Pskov falls to German forces of Army Group North
10 July Headquarters of the Supreme Command [Stavka
VK] replaces the Stavka GK as Stalin replaces
Timoshenko as head of the Red Army and Stavka
The GKO orders the creation of napravlenie
commands for the co-ordination of multiple fronts,
namely the North-Western under Voroshilov (to
27 August 1941); Western under Timoshenko (to
10 September 1941 and again from 1 February–5
May 1942 under Zhukov); and South-Western
initially under Budennii (to 23 June 1942, with
the exception of 1 October to 24 December 1941)
Start of what became known in the Soviet Union as
the ‘Battle of Smolensk’, primarily fought by
forces of the Western Front, lasting until 10
September 1941 and culminating in the El’nia
counter-attack
12 July Agreement between the United Kingdom and Soviet
Union on joint action in the war against Germany
 Chronology of key events 295
16 July ‘Dual command’ reintroduced into the Red Army
GKO decree on the construction of the Mozhaisk
defence line for the defence of Moscow
Smolensk falls to German forces of Army Group
Centre
17 July Military counter-intelligence (special sections)
transferred from the NKO to NKVD
18 July Party decree on ‘the organization of the struggle in
the rear of German forces’ seeks to develop partisan
activity under Party auspices
30 July German order (Führer Directive Number 34) leads
to Army Group Centre going over to the defensive
on the Moscow axis
8 August Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
[Stavka VGK] replaces Stavka GK as Stalin
becomes Supreme High Commander of Soviet forces
12 August Soviet counter-attack by forces of the North-
Western Front south-east of Staraia Russa
16 August Order Number 270 of the Stavka VGK makes the
surrender of Red Army personnel tantamount to
treason
30 August German forces of Army Group North sever rail
communications between Leningrad and the rest of
the Soviet Union
Soviet ‘El’nia’ Operation by forces of the Reserve
Front
31 August The first significant British convoy delivers aid to
the Soviet port of Arkhangel’sk
8 September German forces of Army Group North reach Lake
Ladoga and capture Schlissel’berg, cutting off land
communications between Leningrad and the rest of
the Soviet Union. The siege or blockade of
Leningrad begins
Soviet forces destroy the El’nia bridgehead near
Smolensk of forces of Army Group Centre
19 September German forces capture Kiev, capital of the Ukraine
30 September Start of Soviet ‘Moscow Strategic Defensive’
Operation (to 5 December 1941) in the face of
German operations by 2nd Panzer Group as a
precursor to the start of the principal phase of
Operation ‘Typhoon’
2 October The German advance on Moscow resumes with the
start of the principal phase of Operation ‘Typhoon’
by 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups
5 October German forces of 2nd Panzer Group take Briansk
296 Chronology of key events
7 October German forces of 2nd Panzer Group take Orel and
3rd Panzer Group take Viaz’ma
14 October German forces of 3rd Panzer Group take Kalinin
15 October GKO decree on the evacuation of Moscow
16 October Rumanian and German forces capture Odessa
25 October German 6th Army takes Khar’kov
7 November Soviet Revolution Day parade takes place in
Moscow with troops drawn off from and returning
immediately to the front line
US Lend-Lease aid is formally extended to the
Soviet Union
15 November Final German push on Moscow begins
17 November Stavka VGK order on a ‘scorched-earth’ policy as
Soviet forces retreat before Moscow
Soviet forces begin the ‘Rostov Strategic Offensive’
Operation in the south (to 2 December 1941)
20 November German forces of Army Group South capture
Rostov-on-Don
26 November British intercepts indicate that German forces
encountered British-supplied tanks in Soviet
service for the first time
29 November Soviet forces of the Southern and Trans-Caucasian
Fronts recapture Rostov-on-Don
5 December Start of the ‘Moscow Strategic Offensive’
Operation by Soviet forces, primarily the Western
and Kalinin Fronts
7 December Japanese forces attack the US naval base at Pearl
Harbor
8 December German forces go over to the defensive below Moscow
9 December Soviet forces recapture Tikhvin, preventing
German forces from linking up with the Finns on
the River Svir’ and cutting Soviet forces off from
the Lake Ladoga lifeline to Leningrad
11 December Germany declares war on the United States
16 December Kalinin is recaptured by Soviet forces of the
Kalinin Front
Hitler orders that German forces stand fast in the
face of the Soviet counter-offensive below
Moscow
25 December Start of the Soviet ‘Kerch’–Feodosia Amphibious’
Operation in the Crimea by the Trans-Caucasian
Front
 Chronology of key events 297
1942
8 January The Soviet ‘Moscow Strategic Offensive’ Operation
develops into the overambitious ‘Rzhev–Viaz’ma
Strategic Offensive’ Operation that lasts until 20
April 1942
17 March The Soviet 2nd Shock Army and much of 59th
Army are encircled in operations below Leningrad
5 April German Führer Directive Number 41 for offensive
operations in the south
12–29 May Significant encirclement of Soviet forces during
offensive operations near Khar’kov
30 May Creation of a Central Headquarters for the Partisan
Movement (TsShPD) to organize and co-ordinate
partisan activity
28 June Operation ‘Blau’, the German summer offensive of
Army Group South begins – the beginning of the
Soviet ‘Voronezh–Voroshilovgrad Strategic
Defensive’ Operation to 24 July 1942
4 July Sevastopol’ captured by the German 11th Army
The British convoy to Arkhangel’sk PQ-17 scatters
in the face of German attacks and the threat from
Tirpitz, resulting in the loss of most of its merchant
ships and the temporary cessation of convoys
6 July Voronezh captured by the German 6th Army
17 July Beginning of the Soviet ‘Stalingrad Strategic
Defensive’ Operation, to 18 November 1942
23 July German Directive Number 45 for the continuation
of Operation ‘Braunschweig’ (the Caucasus
offensive) directs Army Group A towards the
Caucasus and B towards Stalingrad
German forces recapture Rostov-on-Don
25 July Beginning of the Soviet ‘North Caucasus Strategic
Defensive’ Operation that lasts until 31 December
1942
28 July Order Number 227 of the People’s Commissar for
Defence calls for ‘not a step back’ in the face of the
renewed German advance
30 July ‘Rzhev–Sichevka’ Operation of Soviet forces of the
Kalinin and Western Fronts against Army Group
Centre to 23 August 1942
19 August ‘Siniavino’ Operation of Soviet forces of the
Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts seeks to de-blockade
Leningrad, to 10 October 1942
British and Canadian forces raid Dieppe
298 Chronology of key events
1 September German forces reach the outskirts of Stalingrad
5 September Order Number 189 of the People’s Commissar for
Defence ‘on the tasks of the partisan movement’
seeks to make the partisan movement more
valuable to the Red Army
7 September German forces capture the Black Sea port of
Novorossiisk
9 October ‘Unitary command’ is re-established in the Red
Army
14 October German offensive operations within Stalingrad see
most of the city in German hands by the end of the
day
23 October Start of Allied offensive operations at El Alamein
8 November Operation ‘Torch’ – British–US landings in north-
west Africa
19 November Soviet forces begin Operation ‘Uranus’, the initial
encirclement of German forces at Stalingrad and
the first phase of the ‘Stalingrad Strategic
Offensive’ Operation by forces of the South-
Western, Don and Stalingrad Fronts
24 November Soviet forces encircle the German 6th Army along
with elements of 4th Panzer Army when Soviet
spearheads link up at Kalach-on-Don
25 November Soviet forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts
begin Operation ‘Mars’ against the German Army
Group Centre, to 20 December 1942
16 December Soviet forces launch scaled-down operations
(Operation ‘Little Saturn’) for the destruction of
German forces of Army Groups A and B in the
south
27 December Hitler authorizes the withdrawal of Army Group
A from the North Caucasus

1943
13 January Beginning of the Soviet ‘Voronezh–Khar’kov
Strategic Offensive’ Operation by forces of the
Briansk, Voronezh and South-Western Fronts that
sees the effective destruction of 2nd Hungarian
and 8th Italian Armies (to 3 March 1943)
18 January Leningrad blockade partially lifted with the
recapture of Schlissel’berg during Operation
‘Spark’ of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts
25 January Soviet forces of the Voronezh Front recapture
Voronezh
 Chronology of key events 299
2 February German forces of 6th Army at Stalingrad surrender
Soviet offensive operations directed on Khar’kov
begin
8 February Soviet forces recapture Kursk
14 February Soviet forces of the Southern Front recapture
Rostov-on-Don
16 February Khar’kov recaptured by Soviet forces of the
Voronezh Front
20 February German forces begin withdrawal from the
Demiansk salient
1 March German forces begin withdrawal from the
Rzhev–Viaz’ma salient
3 March Soviet forces of the Western Front recapture Rzhev
12 March Soviet forces of the Western Front recapture Viaz’ma
16 March German forces recapture Khar’kov
13 May Axis forces in North Africa surrender
4 July German forces begin Operation ‘Citadel’ against
the Soviet Kursk salient
10 July British and US forces invade Sicily
11–12 July Major tank battle near Prokhorovka on the
southern side of the Kursk salient
12 July Soviet forces of the Central, Briansk and Western
Fronts begin Operation ‘Kutuzov’ or the ‘Orel
Strategic Offensive’ Operation to the north of the
Kursk salient
13 July German forces go over to the defensive in the
Kursk region
14 July Major partisan offensive against German lines of
communication, that would later be described as
the ‘War of the Rails’, ordered to begin on 21 July
for Orlov partisans and 3 August for Leningrad,
Kalinin, Smolensk and Belorussian partisans
3 August Soviet forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts
begin Operation ‘Rumiantsev’ or the
‘Belgorod–Khar’kov Strategic Offensive’ Operation
to the south of the Kursk salient
5 August Soviet forces of the Briansk Front recapture Orel
7 August Soviet forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts
begin Operation ‘Suvorov’ in the Smolensk region
12 August Hitler takes the decision to form a defensive line,
the Ostwall, along the Dnepr River
13 August Start of the Soviet ‘Donbass Strategic Offensive’
Operation (to 22 September 1943)
28 August Khar’kov recaptured for the final time by Soviet
forces and remains in Soviet hands
300 Chronology of key events
9 September British and American landings on mainland Italy
at Salerno
15 September German forces start to withdraw behind the so-
called Ostwall
16 September The Black Sea port of Novorossiisk is finally
recaptured by Soviet forces
17 September Briansk recaptured by Soviet forces
22 September Soviet forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts
seize a number of bridgeheads over the Dnepr
River that are contained by German forces
25 September Smolensk recaptured by Soviet forces of the
Western Front
26 September Soviet forces make major gains on the western
bank of the lower Dnepr River during the ‘Lower
Dnepr Strategic Offensive’ Operation (to 20
December 1943)
20 October Major renaming of Soviet Fronts: the Kalinin,
Baltic and Central Fronts become the 1st and 2nd
Baltic and Belorussian Fronts respectively, and the
Voronezh, Steppe, South-Western and Southern
Fronts become the 1st–4th Ukrainian Fronts
respectively
2 November Forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front seize a
substantial bridgehead over the Dnepr to the north
of Kiev and begin to break out the following day
6 November Soviet forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front recapture
Kiev
12 November Soviet forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front recapture
Zhitomir
19 November German forces recapture Zhitomir
24 December Start of the Soviet ‘Dnepr’–Carpathian Strategic
Offensive’ Operation (to 17 April) by the 1st–4th
Ukrainian Fronts that sees the liberation of much
of the remainder of the Ukraine on the western
side of the Dnepr River and Soviet forces
penetrating Romanian territory
31 December Zhitomir recaptured by Soviet forces of 1st
Ukrainian Front

1944
24 January ‘Korsun’–Shevchenkovskii Offensive’ Operation,
part of the ‘Dnepr–Carpathian Strategic Offensive’
Operation, of forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian
Fronts (to 17 February 1944)
 Chronology of key events 301
27 January Blockade of Leningrad formally lifted during the
‘Leningrad–Novgorod Strategic Offensive’
Operation by forces of the Leningrad and Volkhov
Fronts
8 March German Führer order on the holding of feste Plätze
or ‘fortified places’ for the slowing down of the
Soviet advance
10 May Soviet forces recapture Sevastopol’ during the
‘Crimean Strategic Offensive’ Operation by forces
of the 4th Ukrainian Front and Independent
Maritime Army
6 June D-Day landings in Normandy by British,
Canadian and US troops
10 June Soviet forces of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts
begin the ‘Viborg–Petrozavodsk Strategic
Offensive’ Operation against Finnish forces (to 9
August 1944) that is crucial in forcing Finland out
of the war
23 June Soviet forces of the 1st Baltic and 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Belorussian Fronts begin the ‘Belorussian Strategic
Offensive’ Operation (to 29 August 1944) that saw
the liberation of Belorussia, the destruction of
much of the German Army Group Centre and
Soviet forces penetrate Polish territory
3 July Minsk is recaptured by Soviet forces of the 2nd and
3rd Belorussian Fronts
13 July Soviet forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front begin the
‘L’vov–Sandomierz Strategic Offensive’ Operation
(to 29 August) that sees Soviet forces seize a
bridgehead over the Vistula River
21 July Pskov recaptured by Soviet forces of the 3rd
Belorussian Front
24 July Lublin captured by Soviet forces of the 1st
Belorussian Front
1 August Start of the abortive Warsaw uprising by the
Polish Home Army (to 2 October 1944)
20–29 August The brief Soviet ‘Iassi–Kishinev Strategic
Offensive’ Operation sees the Soviet liberation of
Moldavia and tears open German–Rumanian
defences in the south
23 August Coup in Bucharest sees overthrow of Marshal
Antonescu in favour of king
29 August Start of the abortive Slovak uprising (to 27
October 1944)
8 and 28 September Soviet forces begin the ‘East Carpathian
302 Chronology of key events
1944 Strategic Offensive’ (to 28 October 1944) and
‘Belgrade Strategic Offensive’ (to 20 October
1944) Operations respectively that saw Soviet
troops entering Czechoslovakia and clear German
forces from much of Yugoslavia in liaison with
Yugoslav forces
5 September Ceasefire between Soviet and Finnish forces
13 October Riga recaptured by Soviet forces of the 2nd and
3rd Baltic Fronts
20 October Yugoslav partisans and Soviet forces of 3rd
Ukrainian Front capture Belgrade
29 October Soviet forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts,
with the participation of Rumanian troops, launch
the ‘Budapest Strategic Offensive’ Operation (to
13 February 1945)
16 December German forces in the West launch an offensive in
the Ardennes region, which is halted by 24
December 1944

1945
12 January Soviet forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st
Ukrainian Fronts launch the ‘Vistula–Oder
Strategic Offensive’ Operation (to 18 February
1945) that saw Soviet forces seize a number of
bridgeheads over the Oder River and the
destruction of considerable German forces
13 January Soviet forces of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts
(to 25 April 1945) saw Soviet forces capture much
of East Prussia at considerable cost
10 February Official start of the Soviet ‘East Pomeranian
Strategic Offensive’ Operation (to 4 April 1945)
that saw Soviet forces, initially of 2nd Belorussian
Front, clear much of the Baltic coastlines of Poland
and eastern Germany and any threat to Soviet
forces on the Berlin axis from the north
16–20 February German counter-attack near Stargard in Pomerania
further diverts Soviet attention from the Berlin
axis
1 March Soviet forces of 1st Belorussian Front start
participation in the ‘East Pomeranian Strategic
Offensive’ Operation
6–15 March German offensive by 6th SS Panzer Army near
Lake Balaton in Hungary
16 March Soviet forces of 3rd Ukrainian with elements of 1st
 Chronology of key events 303
Ukrainian Front launch the ‘Vienna Strategic
Offensive’ Operation (to 15 April 1945)
10 April Königsberg captured by Soviet forces of 3rd
Belorussian Front
16 April Soviet forces of 1st Belorussian along with 1st
Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian Fronts launch the
‘Berlin Strategic Offensive’ Operation (to 8 May
1945)
26 April Meeting of Soviet and US forces in the region of
Torgau on the Elbe River
2 May Berlin garrison surrenders
6 May Forces of 1st, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts launch
the last Soviet operation of the war in Europe with
the ‘Prague Strategic Offensive’ Operation (to
11 May)
7 May ‘Initial’ German surrender to the Allies takes place
at Rheims, to take effect the following day
8 May ‘Final’ German surrender to the Allies takes place
at Karlshorst to take effect the following day
9 May Soviet troops land on the Danish island of
Bornholm
11 May Conclusion of Soviet operations against residual
German opposition in the Prague region
6 and 9 August United States drops atomic bombs on the Japanese
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
9 August Soviet forces of the Trans-Baikal and 1st and 2nd
Far-Eastern Fronts launch the ‘Manchurian
Strategic Offensive’ Operation against Japanese
forces in Manchuria, on South Sakhalin and the
Kurile Islands (to 2 September)
2 September Japanese surrender
Glossary

AA Anti-aircraft
ACV Armoured Command
Vehicle
AK armeiskii korpus Army corps
army Military formation typically
consisting of a number of corps
and supporting units
army group German military formation
consisting of a number of
armies; until late in the war,
equivalent in strength to more
than one or a large Soviet front
ASDIC Allied Submarine British term for what is now
Detection Investigation more typically called SONAR
Committee
ASSR Avtonomnaia Sovetskaia Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Sotsialisticheskaia Republic
Respublika
AT Anti-tank
battalion Military unit typically
consisting of a number of
companies or equivalent (for
most German unit types an
Abteilung)
Bolsheviks Informal title for VKP(b)
brigade Military unit typically
consisting of a number of
battalions or equivalent
boekomplekt boevoi komplekt A quantity of munitions for a
given weapon or tank or other
weapons systems (e.g. for a tank
the maximum number of shells
and machine-gun ammunition
 Glossary 305
that could be carried), or indeed
requirement for a whole units or
formation
ChF Chernomorskii flot Soviet Black Sea Fleet
commissar Political officer, formally down
to battalion level, with shared
responsibility for decision-
making with a commanding
officer between 16 July 1941
and 9 October 1942. Below
battalion level political officers
were known as politruki.
company Military unit consisting of a
number of platoons or
equivalent
Comintern Communist International Organization established by the
Bolsheviks in 1919 for the co-
ordination of the activities of
foreign communist parties.
Disbanded in 1943
corps Military formation typically
consisting of a number of
divisions or equivalent and
supporting units
DBAK/DBAD dal’nebombardirovochnii Long-Range Bomber Aviation
aviatsionnii korpus/ Corps/Long-Range Bomber
dal’nebombardirovochnaia Aviation Division
aviatsionnaia diviziia
DDRudZW8 Das Deutsche Reich und See Bibliography
der Zweite Weltkrieg.
Band 8
division Military unit typically
consisting of a number of
brigades or equivalent. A full-
strength German infantry
division was larger than a
Soviet infantry division,
particularly during late 1941
and early 1942
DOT/DZOT dolgovremennaia ognevaia Permanent Fire-Point/Wood-
tochka/derevo-zemlianaia Earth Fire-Point
ognevaia tochka
Einsatzgruppe National Socialist field
formation under the authority of
the Reichsführer SS for the
306 Glossary
elimination of enemies of
National Socialism, on Soviet
territory initially in particular
commissars and Party officials,
but increasingly involved in the
killing of Jews and anti-partisan
warfare
EKA Einwohner-Kampf- Locally recruited militia-type
Abteilung units for security duties on
German-occupied territory
fortified ukreplennii raion Prior to and on the outbreak of
district the Great Patriotic War, these
were frontier-defence zones
manned at brigade or
regimental strength whose
principal unit was the machine-
gun battalion. From 1942
fortified regions served as low-
manpower high-firepower
formations for the holding of
quiet sectors of the front
front Soviet military formation
consisting of a number of armies
and typically equivalent in
strength to an early-war
German army or later-war
German army group
FSB Federal’naia Sluzhba Federal Security Service –
Bezopasnosti Russian successor to the KGB
GABTU Glavnoe avtobronetankovoe Main Auto-Armour Board of
upravlenie the Red Army
GAU Glavnoe artilleriiskoe Main Artillery Board of the Red
upravlenie Army
Guards First given as an honorary title
to Soviet units that had excelled
in battle in September 1941, as
the war progressed guards units
and formations made up an
increasing proportion of Soviet
forces and tended to be larger
and better-equipped than their
regular counterparts
GAZ Gosudarstvennii State Automobile Factory
avtomobil’nii zavod
Genshtab – see GSh KA
 Glossary 307
GKO/GOKO Gosudarstvennii Komitet State Defence Committee –
Oboroni effectively the Soviet war
cabinet, chaired by Stalin
GlavPU KA Glavnoe politicheskoe Main Political Directorate of the
upravlenie Krasnoi armii Red Army. Responsible for
ideological work within the Red
Army, which to a large extent
meant discipline, including the
appointment and supervision of
political officers below front
level and appointing political
members to military soviets
Gosplan Gosudarstvennii State Planning Commission
planovaia komissia (attached to the Council of
[pri Sovnarkome SSSR] People’s Ministers of the
USSR)
GRU Glavnoe razvedivatel’noe Main Reconnaissance Board (of
upravlenie the Red Army)
GSh KA General’nii shtab General Headquarters of the
Krasnoi armii Red Army
GU Glavnoe upravlenie Main Board or Central
Administration of . . .
GUGVF Glavnoe upravlenie Central Administration of the
Grazhdanskogo Civilian Air Fleet
vozdushnogo flota
Gulag Glavnoe upravlenie Central Administration for
ispravitel’no-trudovikh Corrective Labour Camps and
lagerei i kolonii Colonies
GUSKA Glavnoe upravlenie Main Board of Communications
sviazi Krasnoi armii of the Red Army
GVKhU Glavnoe voenno- Main Military Chemical Board
khimicheskoe upravlenie (of the Red Army)
HMG Heavy machine gun
ITB Independent Tank Battalion
Jaeger [Regiment/Division] German ‘light’ infantry
Journal of Slavic
JSMS Military Studies See Bibliography
KB-70 70-octane fuel, used by Soviet
aircraft and with imported motor
vehicles. Imported aircraft
demanded 80–100 octane fuel
KBF Krasnoznamennii Soviet Baltic Fleet
Baltiiskii flot
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi
Bezopasnosti
308 Glossary
KMG konno-mekhanizirovannaia Cavalry-Mechanized Group
kruppa
kolkhoz kollektivnoe khoziaistvo Collective farm
Komsomol – Kommunisticheskii soiuz Communist Youth League
see also molodozhi
VLKSM
KV Kliment Voroshilov Soviet heavy tank named after a
Soviet marshal and close
associate of Stalin
Lend-Lease US system of providing aid
without payment or credit
introduced in March 1941 with
Britain in mind and extended to
the Soviet Union in November
1941
LMG Light machine gun
Luftwaffe The German air force
Luftwaffe Infantry divisions organized by
field division the Luftwaffe from surplus
personnel that proved less
effective than most Wehrmacht
divisions and tended to be
relegated to second-line and
security duties
MID Ministerstvo Ministry of Foreign Affairs
inostrannikh del
military soviet Councils at front and army level
consisting of military and
political members, the latter
functioning as the equivalent of
commissars in providing Party
supervision over decision-
making. They did, however, at
times serve a useful role as
bridges between civilian
organizations and the Red
Army, in particular in providing
material support. Military
Soviets also played a role in the
development and effective
functioning of the partisan
movement, the latter organized
under Party auspices, in
particular in facilitating partisan
co-operation with the Red Army
 Glossary 309
Narodnoe
opolchenie –
see opolchenie
NCO Non-commissioned officer
NEP The New Economic Policy from
1921
NK/Narkom Narodnii komissar or People’s Commissar or People’s
Narodnii komissariat Commissariat – equivalent of a
minister or ministry
NKO Narodnii komissariat
oboroni
NKGB Narodnii komissariat People’s Commissariat for State
gosudarstvennii bezopasnosti Security – a new ministry that
acquired responsibilities,
including foreign intelligence
and counter-espionage on Soviet
territory, from the NKVD for a
brief period in early 1941 and
then again from 1943–46
NKPS Narodnii komissariat People’s Commissariat for
putei soobshcheniia Transport [lit. Routes of
Communication]
NKVD Narodnii komissariat People’s Commissariat for
vnutrennikh del Internal Affairs
OATB Otdel’naia avto- Independent Auto-Transport
transportnaia brigada Brigade
oblast’ Soviet administrative region
OD Ordnungsdienst Local ‘police’ on German-
occupied territory
OKH Oberkommando des Heeres German High Command of the
Army, increasingly as the war
progressed only concerned with
the Eastern Front
OO NKVD Osobii otdel NKVD Special Section of the NKVD –
responsible for counter-
intelligence in military units
from 1941–43. Replaced by
SMERSH
opolchenie Hastily trained Soviet militia
units thrown before the German
advance in 1941
OVO Osobii voennii okrug Special military district – a
military district located in
sensitive border regions
Ostarbeiter Workers, initially recruited and
310 Glossary
then conscripted from German-
occupied territories in the East
for labour in Germany
Panzerfaust German recoil-less hollow-
charge disposable infantry anti-
tank weapon responsible for the
destruction of huge numbers of
Soviet tanks in 1944–45
People’s Commissariat – see NK
POW Prisoner of War
PVO protivovozdushnaia oborona Air defence – Soviet air defence
forces – including anti-aircraft
guns and fighter aircraft
PzKpfw Panzerkampfwagen Tank
raion Soviet administrative district
rasputitsa Russian term for the period in
autumn and spring when dirt
roads became difficult going due
to rain and the spring thaw
respectively
RDF Radio-Direction Finding
regiment Military unit consisting of more
than one battalion or equivalent,
often with supporting units, and
roughly equivalent in strength
to a brigade
Reichsführer SS Head of the SS
RGAE Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii Russian State Archive for the
arkhiv economiki Economy
RGASPI Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii Russian State Archive for
arkhiv sotsial’no- Socio-Political History
politicheskoi istorii
RKKA Rabochaia i krest’ianskaia Workers’ and Peasants’ Red
krasnaia armiia Army
RS Reaktivnie snariadi Soviet rocket artillery, typically
known as katiusha
RSFSR Rossiiskaia Russian Socialist Federated
Sotsialisticheskaia Soviet Republic – formally
Federativnaia Sovetskaia incorporated in to the USSR in
Respublika 1924
RVGK Rezerv Verkhovnogo Reserve of the Supreme High
Glavnokomandovaniia Command
SAU samokhodnaia Self-propelled, typically tracked,
artilleriiskaia ustanovka artillery or anti-tank gun
SBD Sbornik boevikh dokumentov See Bibliography
 Glossary 311
SF Severnii flot Soviet Northern Fleet
SMERSH Smert’ spionam Lit. death to spies – Soviet
military counter-intelligence
from 1943
SMG Sub-machine gun
SNK – see Sovnarkom
SONAR Sound Navigation Underwater detection device
And Ranging
Sovinformburo News and propaganda agency
formed on the outbreak of the
Great Patriotic War that
subsequently became the
Novosti news agency
Sovnarkom Sovet narodnikh komissarov Council of People’s Commissars
– effectively the highest tier for
the Soviet governmental, as
opposed to Party, structure
sovkhoz sovetskoe khoziaistvo Soviet farm on which those
working the land were not
stakeholders as in a kolkhoz, but
were paid wages
SP – see SAU
SS Schutzstaffel German National Socialist
security, and increasingly
military organization (see
Waffen SS)
SSSR – see USSR
Stavka GK Stavka Glavnogo Headquarters of the High
Komandovaniia Command (established 23 June
1941)
Stavka VK Stavka Verkhovnogo Headquarters of the Supreme
Komandovanniia Command (established 10 July
1941)
Stavka VGK Stavka Verkhovnogo Headquarters of the Supreme
Glavnogo Komandovanniia High Command (established 8
August 1941)
STZ Stalingradskii Stalingrad Tractor Factory
traktornii zavod
Supreme Soviet The equivalent of the Soviet
parliament, to which the
Sovnarkom was theoretically
answerable
SVE Sovetskaia Voennaia See Bibliography
Entsiklopediia
T-34 Legendary Soviet medium tank
312 Glossary
in production throughout the
war that proved far superior to
available German types when
first encountered during 1941
TA Tank Army
TASS Telegraf’noe agenstvo Telegraph Agency of the Soviet
Sovetskogo Souiza Union – responsible for the
dissemination of news outside
the USSR
TB Tank Battalion
TsGA SPb Tsentral’nii Central State Archive of St
gosudarstvennii arkhiv Petersburg
Sankt Peterburga
TsK Tsentral’nii komitet Central Committee (of the
Communist Party) – Party
equivalent of the Supreme
Soviet
TsMVS Tsentral’nii muzei Central Museum of the Armed
vooruzhennikh sil Forces (photograph source)
TsShPD Tsentral’nii shtab Central Headquarter of the
partisanskogo dvizheniia Partisan Movement
TsVMM Tsentral’nii voenno- Central Naval Museum
morskoi muzei (photograph source)
US NA United States
National Archives
USG KA Upravlenie snabzhennia Board of Fuel Supply of the Red
goriuchim Army
USSR Union of Soviet Formed in 1924
Socialist Republics
Vizh Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal See Bibliography
VKP(b) Vsesoiuznaia All-Union Communist Party
kommunisticheskaia (Bolsheviks)
partiia (bolshevikov)
VLKSM Vsesoiuznii Leninskii All-Union Leninist Communist
kommunisticheskii soiuz Union of Young People – see
molodezhi also Komsomol
VMF Voenno-morskoi flot The Soviet navy
VO voennii okrug Military district – military-
administrative region, converted
to a front if playing a front-line
role in wartime
voenkomat voennii komissariat Military Commissariat – local
organs responsible for the
registration and mobilization of
conscripts in to the Red Army
 Glossary 313
Volksturm German equivalent of the
opolchenie
VVS Voenno-vozdushnie sili Soviet air forces
Waffen SS Conventional armed forces
formed under the auspices of the
Reichsführer SS even if under
Wehrmacht operational control.
Increasingly prevalent from
1943 onwards
Wehrmacht The German armed forces,
although often used with
reference to the army (Heer)
WiIn Wirtschaftsinspektion Army-Group level military-
economic organ with
responsibilities for the economic
exploitation of occupied
territories in the interests of the
Wehrmacht
Notes

Introduction
1 It is worth mentioning David M. Glantz, Companion to Colossus Reborn: Key Documents and
Statistics (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), as one of the few useful
collections of documents and statistics available in English.
2 Good examples being H.R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives, 1939–1945
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd, 1964) and J. Noakes and G. Pridham (eds), Nazism
1919–1945 – A Documentary Reader. Volume 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1988).

1 Lenin, Stalin and the West 1917–39

1 This chapter is based on material first presented as ‘Stalin and the West’, in Gordon
Martel (ed.), A Companion to International History, 1900–2001 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007),
pp. 257–268.
2 On the conflict between diplomatic stability and destabilization of, in this instance,
Poland in the early–mid 1920s, see D. Stone, ‘The August 1924 Raid on Stolpce,
Poland, and the Evolution of Soviet Active Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security,
Volume 21, Number 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 331–341.
3 See H. Flory, ‘The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927’, Journal
of Contemporary History, Volume 12, Number 4 (October 1977), pp. 707–723.
4 See N.S. Simonov, ‘ “Strengthen the Defence of the Land of the Soviets”: The 1927 “War
Alarm” and its Consequences’, Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 48, Number 8 (1996), pp.
1355–1364. See also Lennart Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and
Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
5 On the issue of the location of defence industries, see David Stone, ‘The First Five-Year
Plan and the Geography of Soviet Defence Industry’, Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 57,
Number 7 (November 2005), pp. 1047–1063.
6 Gordon W. Morrell, ‘Redefining Intelligence and Intelligence Gathering: The Industrial
Intelligence Centre and the Metro-Vickers Affair, Moscow 1933’, Intelligence and National
Security, Volume 9, Number 3 (July 1994), pp. 520 and 531 note 6.
7 O.N. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie i politicheskie resheniia (konets 1920 – seredina 1930-
Kh godov) (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskovogo universiteta v Sankt Peterburge,
2002). For an English-language overview of this important work, see my review in
Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 28, Number 5 (October 2005), pp. 894–895.
8 [N252/40/38] ‘Viscount Chilston to Mr Eden. – (Received January 15.), Moscow,
January 12, 1937’, in D. Cameron Watt (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports
and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II. From the First to Second World
War. Series A. The Soviet Union, 1917–1939. Volume 14. The Soviet Union,
Jan.1937–Dec.1938 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), pp. 6–7.
 Notes 315
9 J. Rohwer and M.S. Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Ship-
building Programmes, 1935–1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 34–35, 45–46, 51–52.
10 See Peter Jackson, ‘France’, in Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds), The Origins of
World War Two: The Debate Continues (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),
pp. 94–98.
11 A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961); J.
Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39 (London:
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984); G. Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second
World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933–1941 (London: Macmillan
Press Ltd, 1995); M.J. Carley, ‘Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet
Foreign Policy, 1917–1941’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 12, Number 3 (September
2001), pp. 159–174.
12 Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, pp. 3–4.
13 J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984); A.M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German Soviet
Relations, 1922–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
14 Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War 1936–1941 (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
15 John Ferris, ‘Image and Accident: Intelligence and the Origins of World War II,
1933–1941’, in John Robert Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy – Selected Essays (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2005), p. 107.
16 See Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
17 Zara Steiner, ‘The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis
in 1938: New Material from the Soviet Archives’, Historical Journal, Volume 42, Number
3 (1999), pp. 751–779; Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of
World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 120.
18 O. Khlevniuk, ‘The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937–38’, in D.L. Hoffmann (ed.),
Stalinism: The Essential Readings (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) and in J.
Cooper, M. Perrie and E.A. Rees (eds), Soviet History 1917–1953: Essays in Honour of R.W.
Davies (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995).
19 Albert Resis, ‘The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-aggression
Pact’, Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 52, Number 1 (2000), pp. 33–56.
20 Press interview by Voroshilov, Commissar for War, on the Anglo-French–Soviet military
negotiations, 27 August 1939 (Mirovoe khoziaistvo, 1939, 9, p. 11), in J. Degras (ed.),
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Volume III 1933–1941 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1953), pp. 361–362.
21 Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 231.
22 See, for instance, from a largely German perspective, T.R. Philbin III, The Lure of
Neptune: German-Soviet Naval Collaboration and Ambitions, 1919–1941 (Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina, 1994).
23 Ken, Moblilizatsionnoe planirovanie, p. 365.
24 See for instance V. Sipols, Taini diplomaticheskie: Kanun Velikoi Otechestvennoi voinoi.
1939–1941 (Moscow: TOO ‘Novina’, 1997), pp. 160–165.
25 For an illustration of this regarding Finland, see M. Jakobsen, The Diplomacy of the Winter
War: an Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1961), pp. 115–119.
26 Ken, Moblilizatsionnoe planirovanie, p. 366

2 The Icebreaker controversy and Soviet intentions in 1941

1 Elements of this chapter were first published as ‘The Icebreaker Controversy and Soviet
Intentions in 1941: The Plan for the Strategic Deployment of Soviet Forces of 15 May
and Other Key Documents’, JSMS, Volume 21, Number 1 (January–March 2008),
pp. 1–16.
316 Notes
2 See Alexander Hill, ‘The Birth of the Soviet Northern Fleet 1937–1942’, JSMS, Volume
16, Number 2 (June 2003), pp. 70–71. For a broader perspective on British, German and
Soviet interests in the region, see Patrick Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers,
1890–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
3 V. Suvorov (pseud.), ‘Who was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or
Stalin?’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Volume 130,
Number 2 (1985), pp. 50–55.
4 Available in English is V. Suvorov, Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1990). His work in this field continued in Russian with Den’-M
(Moscow: AST, 1995).
5 J. Hoffmann, Stalin’s War of Extermination, 1941–1945: Planning, Realization, and Docu-
mentation (Capshaw, AL: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001). See also J. Hoffmann, ‘The
Red Army until the Beginning of the German-Soviet War’, in H. Boog, J. Forster, J.
Hoffmann, E. Klink, R.-D. Muller, G.R. Ueberschar and E. Osers (eds), Germany and the
Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998), pp. 72–93.
6 D. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 1998).
7 I.e. in particular into Poland.
8 G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1999).
9 See Jürgen Förster and Evan Mawdsley, ‘Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches
on the Eve of Barbarossa’, War in History, Volume 11, Number 1 (2004), pp. 61–103.
10 V.A. Nevezhin, ‘The Pact with Germany and the Idea of an ‘Offensive War’ ’, JSMS,
Volume 8, Number 4 (December 1995), pp. 809–843. See also V.A. Nevezhin, Sindrom
nastupatel’noi voini. Sovetskaia propaganda v predverii ‘sviashchennikh boev’, 1939–1941 gg.
(Moscow: ‘AIRO-XX’, 1997).
11 Evan Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940–1941’,
International History Review, Volume 25, Number 4 (2003), pp. 837–838. See also P.N.
Bobilev, ‘Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano. K voprosu o planirovanii v General’nom shtabe
RKKA vozmozhnoi voini s Germaniei v 1940–1941 godakh’, Otechestvennaia istoriia,
Number 1 (2000), pp. 41–64.
12 For a useful discussion of such intelligence in decision making in Europe prior to the
outbreak of the Second World War and the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, see John
Ferris, ‘Image and Accident: Intelligence and the Origins of World War II, 1933–1941’,
in John Robert Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy – Selected Essays (Abingdon: Routledge,
2005), pp. 99–137.

3 Barbarossa
1 David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 49.
2 According to V.P. Naumov (ed.), 1941 god: V 2 kn. Kn.1 and Kn.2 (Moscow: Mezhdunar-
odnii fond ‘Demokratiia’, 1998), pp. 439–430, which also provides this document in
Russian, on the document it was noted ‘sent at 21:15 on 22 June 1941’.
3 See David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 382–383.
4 Ibid., pp. 379–382.
5 See Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London:
Hodder Arnold, 2005), p. 65.
6 See Glantz, Colossus Reborn, pp. 370–373.
7 K.K. Rokossovskii, Soldatskii dolg (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni
SSSR, 1968), pp. 22–23.
8 A total of 3,648 tanks, self-propelled guns and other armoured vehicles were initially
 Notes 317
committed by the Wehrmacht to Operation ‘Barbarossa’ (see Table 8, Chapter 4), com-
pared to a Red Army tank strength of 22,600 tanks on 22 June 1941 according to
Krivosheev (500 ‘heavy’, 900 ‘medium’ and 21,200 ‘light’ – although the latter included
BT-7 ‘cruiser’ tanks that could have been classified as ‘medium’ and certainly had arma-
ment to challenge the PzKpfw 38(t) and PzKpfw III, even if their armour was light).
G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London:
Greenhill Books, 1997), p. 252.
9 Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 265 and Rokossovskii, Soldatskii dolg, p. 13.
10 On this and other counter-attacks in the region, see Glantz and House, When Titans
Clashed, pp. 53–55.
11 Ibid., p. 58.
12 K.A. Kalashnikov et al. (eds), Krasnaia armiia v iiune 1941 goda (statisticheskii sbornik)
(Novosibirsk: ‘Novosibirskii khronograf’, 2003), p. 155 and M.A. Bobrov, ‘Strategich-
eskoe razvertivanie VVS Krasnoi armii na zapade strani pered Velikoi Otechestvennoi
voinoi’, VIZh, Number 5 (2006), p. 5.
13 A different extract from this document also appears in Chapter 9.
14 See Chapter 8.
15 See Nachal’nikam shtabov frontov o zapreshchenii peregovorov otkritim tekstom po tele-
fonu i apparati morze, 19 iiulia 1941 g., in RA T.23 (12–1), p. 73.
16 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945 gg.: Deistvuiushchaia armiia (Moscow: Animi
Fortitudo, Kuchkovo pole, 2005), p. 165.
17 21st Tank Division actually started the war with 200 tanks rather than the 375 required
for it to be full strength. See Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 265.
18 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 79–81 and Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and
Combat Losses, p. 114. On the disparity between German and Soviet figures for POWs
taken in such instances, see the Conclusion.

4 The Battle of Moscow

1 Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London: Hodder
Arnold, 2005), pp. 94–100 and 105, and David Glantz and Jonathan House, When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1995), pp. 79–81.
2 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 68.
3 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 81–82.
4 P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972), p. 113.
5 Not including 9th, 17th and 24th Tank Brigades. ‘Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period
kontrnastupleniia)’, Vizh, Number 1 (1967), p. 92.
6 ‘Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period oboroni)’, Vizh, Number 3 (1967), p. 71.
7 Celebrated in November due to the shift from the Gregorian calendar in use at the time
of the Revolution.
8 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 90.
9 V.M. Safir, ‘Oborona Moskvi. Narofominskii proriv 1–5 dekabria 1941 goda (chto bilo i
chego ne bilo v deistvitelnosti)’, Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, Vipusk 1 (1997), p. 83.
10 N.S. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e godi: tempi ekonomich-
eskogo rosta, struktura, organizatsiia proizvodstva i upravlenie (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), p.
164.
11 M. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag 1997) p. 358.
12 Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR, p. 162.
13 Ibid., pp. 163–164.
14 Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Oboroni ‘Ob organizatsii proizvodstva sred-
nikh tankov T-34 na zavode “Krasnoe Sormovo”, No. 1 ss, 1 iiulia 1941 g.’, in I.A.
Gor’kov (ed.), Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni postanovliaet (1941-1945). Tsifri, dokumenti
(Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2002), pp. 495–497 and GKO. Postanovlenie No. GOKO-
318 Notes
82/ss ot 9 iiulia 1941 g. Moskva, Kreml’. Ob obespechenii proizvodstva tankov T-34 na
zavode ‘Krasnoe Sormovo’, RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.1.l.272.
15 Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR, p. 163.
16 GKO. Postanovlenie No. GOKO-1880/ss ot 5 iiunia 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml’. O
proizvodstve tankov T-34. RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.38.l.266 and Simonov, Voenno-
promishlennii kompleks SSSR, p. 163.
17 Along with 2,400 light tanks. G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in
the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), p. 252 and Simonov, Voenno-
promishlennii kompleks SSSR, p. 162.
18 Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR, p. 162 and Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi
1941–1945, p. 52.
19 N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich, 2005), pp. 55
and 71.
20 It was, for instance, soon identified that the pneumatic transmission on Matildas could
not stand up to the temperatures to which they were subjected in Russia, and required
replacement with mechanical alternatives. Not only were the track plates on Valentines
considered too narrow, and suitable only for summer conditions, but spurs were con-
sidered necessary in Russian conditions and had to be manufactured locally. British-
supplied track pins were considered weak and difficult to replace. Ibid., pp. 62 and
68–69 and Secret Cipher Telgram. From: 30 Military Mission. To: The War Office. Recd
22/11/41. TNA WO193/580.
21 Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945, p. 52.
22 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 252 and Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie
konvoi 1941–1945, p. 52.
23 Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945, pp. 49 and 52.
24 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 252 and Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie
konvoi 1941–1945, p. 53.
25 Biriukov, Tanki – frontu!, pp. 16 and 47.
26 Ibid., pp. 51–55.
27 Secret Cipher Telegram. From: 30 Military Mission. To: The War Office. Recd 11/12/41.
TNA WO193/580.
28 Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki, pp. 106–119.
29 See David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part 3:
The Winter Campaign (5 December-April 1942): The Moscow Counteroffensive’, JSMS,
Volume 13, Number 2 (June 2000), pp. 139–185.
30 See Chapter 8.
31 It is important to note that the key issue here, as can be noted in Document 64, was dis-
closing information by radio that the enemy had time to act on.
32 See Chapter 7.
33 Telephone here need not, and most probably does not, refer to a land-line.

5 The tide turns – the Battle for Stalingrad

1 N.A. Kirsanov, ‘Mobilizatsiia zhenshchin v Krasnuiu armiiu v godi fashistskogo nash-
estviia’, Vizh, Number 5 (2007), pp. 15–17 and Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni.
Postanovlenie No. GOKO-1618ss ot ‘18’ aprelia 1942 g. . . . O zamene v tilovikh chasti-
akh i uchrezhdeniiakh VVS KA voenno-sluzhashchikh muzhchin zhenshchinami. Online.
Available www.soldat.ru/gko/scans/1618-01-1.jpg (accessed 2 May 2008).
2 N.A. Kirsanov, ‘Mobilizatsiia zhenshchin v Krasnuiu armiiu’, pp. 15–16.
3 Ibid., p. 16.
4 Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No. GOKO-2470ss ot ‘3’ noiabria
1942 g. . . . O formirovanii zhenskoi dobrovol’cheskoi strelkovoi brigade. Online. Avail-
able www.soldat.ru/gko/scans/2470-01-1.jpg (accessed 2 May 2008).
5 Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London: Hodder
 Notes 319
Arnold, 2005), pp. 136–151 and David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans
Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1995), pp. 105–116.
6 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 152–155 and Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
pp. 136–139.
7 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 178–179 and Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
p. 107.
8 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 157–159 and Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
pp. 117–122.
9 A versta was equivalent to 3,500 feet or just over 1,000 metres.
10 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 117.
11 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 161–162 and 176. Glantz and House, When Titans
Clashed, pp. 133–134, 139–141, 158.
12 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 141.
13 SVE 7, p. 660.
14 SVE 5, p. 271.
15 Including both anti-tank guns, known as ‘anti-tank artillery’, and other artillery
resources.
16 SVE 7, p. 660.
17 David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars,
1942 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), pp. 18–24.
18 Ibid., p. 319.
19 See David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 475–476.
20 On the contribution made by Rumanian forces to the Axis effort on the Eastern Front,
see Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Craciunoiu, Third Axis, Fourth Ally:
Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945 (London: Arms and Armour,
1995). On the Italian contribution see MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal
Armed Forces, Fascist Regime and the War of 1940–1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000).

6 The Battle of Kursk and the race for the Dnepr

1 See Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London:
Hodder Arnold, 2005), pp. 249–262.
2 Ibid., pp. 263–264.
3 David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for Kursk, 1943:
The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 17 and 25.
4 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. . . . Kniga vtoraia. Perelom, p. 259.
5 See David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped
Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 166 and Mawdsley, Thunder
in the East, p. 266.
6 Some idea of the scale of Soviet tank losses at Prokhorovka and in subsequent operations
can be gleaned from Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 245–246. For a German analysis
highlighting how heavy Soviet losses were compared to German, see DDRudZW8, pp.
120–135.
7 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 168–170.
8 S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941–1945 (Moscow: Progress Publish-
ers, 1970), pp. 116–117 and 140–143.
9 According to orders of the end of September forcing the Dnepr on a ‘wide front’ in order
to limit German ability to concentrate against particular bridgeheads, whilst at the same
time destroying any German footholds on the Soviet side of the river to prevent German
counter-attacks on Soviet flanks and into the Soviet rear. ‘Bitva za Dnepr v dokumen-
takh’, Vizh, 1983, Number 10, pp. 35–36.
320 Notes
10 V. Kazantsev, ‘Melitopol’skaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia (v tsifrakh)’, Vizh, Number 7
(1977), p. 69 and DDRudZW8, p. 382 and map p. 352.
11 See ‘Kievskaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia v dokumentakh’, Vizh, Number 11 (1983), pp.
54–59.
12 See Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 172–174; DDRudZW8, maps pp. 350
and 352; Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. . . . Kniga vtoraia. Perelom, pp.
291–323; and Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 277–278.
13 V.A. Zolotarev and I.A. Kozlov, Tri stoletiia Rossiiskogo flota, 1941–1945 (Moscow: AST;
St Petersburg: Poligon, 2005), pp. 517–519 and A.B. Shirokorad, Korabli i katera VMF
SSSR 1939–45 gg. Spravochnik (Minsk: Kharvest, 2002), pp. 240 and 248.
14 SVE 4, pp. 147–148.
15 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. . . . Kniga vtoraia. Perelom, p. 300 and
DDRudZW8, pp. 364–366 and map p. 351.
16 Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 280.

7 The siege of Leningrad

1 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 81–83 and David Glantz and Jonathan House, When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1995), pp. 51–52, 63, 75–77. Reference has been made in this chapter to F.F.
Viktorov et al., Istoriia Ordena Lenina Leningradskogo voennogo okruga (Moscow: Voennoe
izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1974).
2 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 84–85.
3 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 90–91 and 129–131.
4 See Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York and Evanston:
Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 288–295.
5 See N.L. Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada. Kn. 1. (2-e izd) (St Petersburg: Izdatel’skii Dom
‘Neva’, 2004), pp. 126–128.
6 Ibid., p. 130.
7 Ibid., p. 131.
8 Ibid.
9 For a sympathetic treatment of Vlasov, see Catherine Andreyev, Vlasov and the Russian
Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Émigré Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987).
10 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 178–180.

8 Lend-Lease aid, the Soviet economy and the Soviet Union at war
1 M. Harrison, Accounting for War. Soviet Production, Employment and the Defence Burden,
1940–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 134.
2 Igor Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight: Memoirs of a Russian Fighter Pilot 1941–1943
(Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), p. 141. First published in Russian in 1975.
3 See A.P. Dobson, US Wartime Aid to Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1986), Chapters 1
and 2 and R.H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), Chapter 1.
4 See Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chapter 2.
5 ‘Most Secret. Hist. (R) 1. September 18, 1941. War Cabinet. Assistance to Russia. 29th
June. TNA PREM 3/401/1’.
6 ‘Most Secret. Hist. (R) 1. September 18, 1941. War Cabinet. Assistance to Russia. 25th
July and 4th September. Foreign Office to Moscow. TNA PREM 3/401/1’.
7 Destroyers would in fact only be supplied to the Soviet Union in summer 1944 in lieu of
the Soviet share of the Italian fleet. The Soviet Northern Fleet received Town Class ships
that had been supplied to Britain under the ‘destroyers for bases’ agreement, albeit with
weapons and electronics fits appropriate to that stage of the war. See Arnold Hague,
 Notes 321
Destroyers for Great Britain: A History of the 50 Town Class Ships Transferred from the United
States to Great Britain in 1940 (London: Greenhill Books, 1990).
8 ‘Secret. D.O. (41) 11. September 22, 1941. War Cabinet. Conference on British-United
States Production and Assistance to Russia. TNA PREM 3/401/7’.
9 Ibid., Enclosure IV.
10 Jones, The Roads to Russia, Chapter 2.
11 Accessible accounts of these convoys are provided in Paul Kemp, Convoy! Drama in Arctic
Waters (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999) and Richard Woodman, Arctic Convoys
(London: John Murray Ltd, 1994).
12 ‘(Cypher). Special (Lord Beaverbrook). From British Supply Mission, Moscow, to Foreign
Office. Lord Beaverbrook. No. 42 Linen. 3rd October, 1941. TNA WO193/580’, and
‘Secret. W.P. (41) 238. October 8, 1941. War Cabinet. Moscow Conference. TNA
PREM 3/401/7’.
13 N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich, 2005), pp.
148–149.
14 M. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag 1997), p. 123.
15 Ibid., p. 52.
16 M. Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1985), p. 251. See also G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat
Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), p. 254.
17 ‘Most Secret. W.P. (42) 417. September 17, 1942. War Cabinet. Report on fulfillment of
the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941 – June, 1942. TNA PREM 3/401/7’, p. 17.
18 A.G. Federov, Aviatsiia v bitve pod Moskvoi (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 92–93.
19 Ibid., and V. Romanenko’s clearly well-informed but unfootnoted ‘P-40 v Sovetskoi avi-
atsii’. Online. Available http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/articles/romanenko/p-40/index.htm
(accessed 2 May 2008).
20 Romanenko, ‘P-40 v Sovetskoi aviatsii’ and A.A. Novikov, V nebe Leningrada (zapiski
komanduiushchego aviatsiei) (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), p. 230.
21 Nonetheless, by late 1942 they were being supplied in small numbers. On 3 November
1942, 49 of 150 promised had been dispatched to the Soviet Union, with the remainder
due to be sent by the end of the month. Extract from ‘A.B.E. (42) 21st meeting held on
Tuesday, 3rd November, 1942. Supplies of Aircraft to the USSR. TNA AIR 20/3904’.
22 ‘Secret Cipher Telgram. Recd. AMCS 0112 hrs. 4.7.42. To: Air Ministry. From: 30
Mission. TNA AIR 20/3904’ and ‘Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No.
GKO-1291ss ot 16 favralia 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml’. O perevooruzhenii samolotov
“Kharrikein”. RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.21.l.96’.
23 Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, p. 51.
24 Known as Kittyhawk with the British. A P-40 airframe with an up-rated engine and
additional armament over P-40A-Cs.
25 Popular with Soviet forces in part by virtue of being geared towards low-level perform-
ance, and with a heavy armament including a 37 mm cannon firing through the propeller
hub.
26 The Valentine-equipped tank brigades mentioned in the document eventually found
their way, in the first instance, into the following units: 170th–40th Army, Briansk
Front as of 1 June 1942; 59th–(11th TK) 5th Tank Army, Briansk Front as of 1 July
1942 (in some sources from 6 June 1942); 201st–61st Army, Briansk Front as of 1 May
1942; 177th–53rd Army, North-Western Front as of 1 June; 103rd–3rd Tank Corps,
Briansk Front as of 1 June then 3rd Tank Corps, 61st Army, Western Front as of 1 July
1942. See Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba – Voenno-istoricheskii
otdel, Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, chast’ II (Ianvar’-dekabr’ 1942 goda) (Moscow: Voennoe
izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1966).
27 The Matilda-equipped tank brigades mentioned in the document eventually found their
way, in the first instance, into the following units: 186th–10th Tank Corps, 16th Army,
Western Front as of 1 August 1942; 184th–3rd Shock Army, Kalinin Front as of 1 June
322 Notes
1942; 140th–51st Army, North Caucasus Front as of 1 June 1942; 136th–14th Tank
Corps, North Caucasus Front as of 1 August 1942. See Boevoi sostav.
28 The M3 Light-equipped tank brigades mentioned in the document eventually found
their way, in the first instance, into the following units: 137th–51st Army, North Cauca-
sus Front as of 1 June 1942; 179th–3rd Tank Army, Western Front as of 1 August 1942.
See Boevoi sostav.
29 Evacuation companies. Part of a broader drive in early 1942 to improve the recovery and
repair of tanks from the battlefield, including the creation of 63 mobile repair bases in a
GKO decree of 15 February 1942. ‘Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie
No. GKO-1287ss ot 15 fevralia 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml’. O formirovanii . . . 63 podvizh-
nikh remontnikh baz no polevomu remontu tankov. . . . RGASPI f. 644.o.1.d.21.ll.87-8’.
30 Bantam BRC quarter-ton ‘jeep’.
31 The British equivalent of SONAR. Prior to the war Soviet destroyers were not fitted with
any form of active underwater detection device. Repair offered an opportunity for the
fitting of ASDIC sets to Soviet vessels, the destroyer Gromkii for instance being fitted
with ASDIC during repairs at Factory No. 402 at Molotovsk from 20 June to 9 October
1942. See L.G. Shmigel’skii, ‘Molotovskii zavod No. 402 i severnie konvoi’, in Severnie
konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 3 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 2000), p.
82 and A.V. Platonov, Entsiklopediia Sovetskikh nadvodnikh korablei 1941–1945 (St Peters-
burg: Izdatel’stvo ‘Poligon’, 2002), p. 178. By this point the Soviet ‘guardship’ Groza
had apparently used ASDIC (Drakon-128s) to locate, attack and damage a German U-
boat on 10 September 1942. See R.I. Larintsev, ‘Lend-lizovskie postavki na Severnii flot i
ikh effektivnost’ ’, in M.N. Suprun (ed.), Voina v Arktike (1939–1945 gg.) (Arkhangel’sk:
Pomorskii gosudarstvennii universitet, 2001), p. 268 and Platonov, op. cit., pp. 254 and
259.
32 Trawlers were in short supply in the Soviet Navy, and both trawlers and sweep gear were
requested under ‘Lend-Lease’. See Hill, ‘The Birth of the Soviet Northern Fleet
1937–1942’, pp. 65–82. In March 1942 the first of seven British ‘TAM’ type trawler
conversions delivered in February–March 1942 were incorporated into the Northern
Fleet, with the first ‘MMS’ type purpose-built naval trawlers arriving with the convoy
PQ-18 in September 1942. See Shirokorad, Korabli i katera VMF SSSR, pp. 500–503.
33 Principal base of the Northern Fleet, near Murmansk.
34 A high-strength alloy of aluminium, manganese, magnesium and copper used in aircraft
manufacture.
35 Amongst other things of considerable value in aircraft manufacturing, 18,000 tons of
aluminium was promised by Britain and the Commonwealth during the First Moscow
Protocol period to the end of June 1942, of which 14,147 tons had been supplied by the
end of June 1942. ‘Most Secret. W.P. (42) 417. September 17, 1942. War Cabinet.
Report on fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941 – June, 1942. TNA PREM
3/401/7’, p. 18 and Harrison, Accounting for War, p. 195.
36 A solvent used in the manufacture of TNT.
37 Used for the manufacture of aircraft canopies and other similar applications.
38 Narodnii Komissariat Zagotovok – People’s Commissariat for Procurement.
39 V.F. Vorsin, ‘Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through “Lend-Lease” ’, JSMS, Volume
10, Number 2 (June 1997), pp. 153–175.
40 During March, 750 imported ‘Studebaker’ and ‘International’ lorries were allocated to
the formation of artillery regiments for the High Command (RVGK) reserve. ‘Gosu-
darstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No. GKO-1421ss ot 11 marta 1942 g.
Moskva, Kreml’. Ob obespechenii mekhtiagoi i avtotransportom formiruemikh artilleri-
iskikh polkov reserva Glavnogo komandovanii. RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.24.l.47’.
41 ‘Most Secret. W.P. (42) 417. September 17, 1942. War Cabinet. Report on fulfillment of
the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941 – June, 1942. TNA PREM 3/401/7’, p. 18 and
Harrison, Accounting for War, p. 195. Whilst not within the scope of this reader, it is
worth noting that raw materials were provided to the Western Allies under reverse Lend-
 Notes 323
Lease. To 30 June 1942, these included 20,243 tons of chrome ore and 10,000 railway
sleepers, excluding supplies for the Middle East. ‘War Cabinet. Report on fulfillment of
the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941 – June, 1942’, p. 25.
42 ‘Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No. GKO-227ss ot 20 iiulia 1941 g.
Moskva, Kreml’. O postavke Narkomatu Oboroni sredstv sviazi.RGASPI
f.644.o.1.d.3.l.209’.
43 ‘Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No. GKO-998ss ot 6 dekabria 1941
g. Moskva, Kreml’. O plane proizvodstva i postavkakh osnovnikh sredstv sviazi dlia
Glavnogo Upravleniia Sviazi KA v dekabria 1941 goda. RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.16.l.62’.
44 Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 3, p. 328 and ‘Secret Cipher
Telegram. To: No. 30, Military Mission, Moscow. From: The War Office. Recd.
1435/30/9/41. TNA WO 193/580’.
45 ‘Secret Cipher Telegram. From: The War Office. To: No. 30 Military Mission, Moscow.
Desp. 2145 1/10/41. TNA WO 193/580’.
46 ‘Secret Cipher Telgram. From: Beaverbrook Mission. To: The War Office. Recd 2225
2/10/41. WO 193/580’ and ‘Most Secret. W.P. (42) 417. September 17, 1942. War
Cabinet. Report on fulfillment of the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941 – June, 1942.
TNA PREM 3/401/7 p. 19’.
47 Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), p.
220.
48 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 258.
49 Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 3, p. 328.
50 ‘Most Secret. W.P. (42) 417. September 17, 1942. War Cabinet. Report on fulfillment of
the Moscow Protocol, October, 1941 – June, 1942. TNA PREM 3/401/7’, p. 22 and
Harrison, Accounting for War, p. 196.
51 Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, p. 122.
52 Louis Brown, A Radar History of World War II – Technical and Military Imperatives (Bristol
and Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999), pp. 59–60.
53 ‘Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni. Postanovlenie No. GKO-1266ss ot 10 fevralia 1942
g. Moskva, Kreml’. O priniatii na vooruzhenie voisk PVO Krasnoi Armii i Voenno-
Morskogo Flota Stantsii Orudiinoi Navodki (SON-2) i organizatsii otechestvennogo
proizvodstva SON-2. RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.21.l.31’.
54 Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 2, p. 220.
55 Barber and Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, pp. 79–87.
56 Roger Munting, ‘Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941–1945’, Soviet
Studies, Volume XXXVI, Number 4 (October 1984), p. 588. For more information on
‘Lend-Lease’ food supplies to the Soviet Union in Russian, see M.N. Suprun, ‘Prodo-
vol’stvennie postavki v SSSR po Lend-lizu v godi Vtoroi mirovoi voini’, Otechesvennaia
istoriia, Number 3 (1996), pp. 46–54.
57 A good example here would be the production of boots for Red Army troops increasingly
well-supplied with weapons.

9 The Soviet Partisan Movement

1 See Alexander Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in
North-West Russia, 1941–1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2005), Chapter 3.
2 ‘Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) o meropriiatiiakh po bor’be s parashiutnimi
desantami i diversantami protivnika v prifrontovoi polose, 24 iiunia 1941 g.’, and ‘Prikaz
NKVD SSSR No. 00804 o meropriiatiiakh po bor’be s parashiutnimi desantami i diver-
santami protivnika v prifrontovoi polose, 25 iiunia 1941 g.’, in Eroshin et al. (eds),
Organi gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. . . . Tom II. Nachalo. Kniga pervaia (22 iiunia – 31
avgusta 1941 goda), pp. 64, 77.
3 I.P. Petrov, Partisanskoe dvizhenie v Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1973),
p. 22.
324 Notes
4 According to Petrov, prior to the order of 18 July, the Leningrad obkom VKP(b) had
ordered the evacuation of Party personnel with Soviet forces. Ibid., p. 25 note 1.
5 Sekretariu Kalininskogo obkoma VKP(b) tov.Vorontsovu, ot sekretaria Sebezhskogo RK
VKP(b) Petrova, V.E., pred. RUK’a Sebezhskogo raiona Feshchenko T.S., nach. Sebezh-
skogo NKVD Vinogradova V.Ia. 15 noiabria 1941 g., gor. Kashin. Dokladnaia zapiska.
RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.347.l.25.
6 ‘Direktiva UNKGB i UNKVD po Kalininskoi oblasti No. 807 nachal’nikam MRO
NKGB, GO i RO NKVD o merakh po uluchsheniiu organizatsii partisanskikh otriadov
i diversionnikh grupp, napravliaemikh v til protivnika, 29 iiulia 1941 g.’, in Eroshin et
al. (eds), Organi gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. . . . Tom II. Nachalo. Kniga pervaia (22 iiunia –
31 avgusta 1941 goda), p. 417.
7 ‘Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001151 ob organizatsii 4-x otdelov pri NKVD-UNKVD
respublik, kraev i oblastei, 25 avgusta’, in Eroshin et al. (eds), Organi gosudarstvennoi
bezopasnosti. . . . Tom II. Nachalo. Kniga pervaia (22 iiunia – 31 avgusta 1941 goda), p. 158.
8 V otdel kadrov Obkoma VKP(b) [Kalininskoi oblasti]. Ot komandira partisano-
diversionnoi gruppi Timofeeva I.V. 29.XI.41g. RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.347.l.46.
9 SVE 2, pp. 201–202. In English, see C. Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland
1939–1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 208.
10 G.A. Kumanev, ‘Otvet P.K. Ponomarenko na voprosi G.A. Kumaneva. 2 noiabria 1978
g.’, Otechestvennaia istoriia, Number 6 (1998), p. 141.
11 Ibid.
12 David Glantz, ‘Boldin’, in H. Shukman (ed.), Stalin’s Generals (New York: Grove Press,
1993), pp. 48–49.
13 Kumanev, ‘Otvet P.K. Ponomarenko . . .’, p. 141.
14 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, Chapter 9.
15 Ponomarenko, ‘Bor’ba sovetskogo naroda . . .’, p. 34.
16 See R. Stephan, ‘Smersh: Soviet Military Counter-intelligence during the Second World
War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 22 (1987), pp. 585–613.
17 V.I. Boiarskii, Partisani i armiia: Istoriia uteriannikh vozmozhnostei (Minsk: Kharvest;
Moscow: AST, 2003), p. 260.
18 Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945. Tom vtoroi (iiun’ 1941 g. –
noiabr’ 1942 g.) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1961),
p. 119.
19 Drawing on summary data from the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement.
Petrov, Partisanskoe dvizhenie v Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 437.
20 P.K. Ponomarenko, Vsenarodnaia bor’ba v tilu nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov
1941–1944 (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 434.
21 Petrov, Partisanskoe dvizhenie v Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 439.
22 ‘Iz otcheta o rabote Otdela kadrov Tsentral’nogo shtaba partisanskogo dvizheniia za
period s 15 iiunia 1942 g. po 15 fevralia 1944 g., 28 fevralia 1944 g.’, in RA T.20 (9),
p. 485 and Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 176.
23 RA T.20 (9), p. 480.
24 RA T.20 (9), pp. 481 and 485–486.
25 Hannes Heer, ‘The Logic of the War of Extermination’, in Hannes Heer and Klaus
Naumann (eds), War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941–1944
(London: Berghahn Books, 2004), p. 95.
26 281. Sicherungs-Division. Abt. Ia Tgb.Nr. 88/43 gKdos. Ostrow, den 14. April 1943.
Betr.: Unternehmen ‘Frühjahrsbestellung’. Divisionsbefehl. US NA T-315 1872 102-3.
27 According to partisan sources supported by three aircraft, probably primarily for recon-
naissance. NKO SSSR. Shtab voiskovoi chasti No. 00128. 12 maia 1943. Nachal’niku
Tsentral’nogo shtaba partisanskogo dvizheniia . . . Donesenie o partisanskikh brigadakh
Bobakova, Karlikova, Maksimenko. RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.353.l.14.
28 Operativnaia svodka No. 39 Kalininskogo shtaba partisanskogo dvizheniia, 3.5.1943.
RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.345.l.67ob.
 Notes 325
29 Brigade of Bobakov, 364; Karlikov (Boidin) 956; Maksimenko, 347; Moiseenko
(Lazarenko), 143; Shapovalov, 645. Vedomost’ boevogo i chislennogo sostava partisan-
skikh otriadov Kalininskogo fronta, po sostoianiiu na 1 marta 1943g. Kalininskaia
oblast’. RGASPI f.69.o.1.d.359.l.13. It is worth noting that the brigade led on 1 March
1943 by Boidin had only a single radio set, with the the brigade of Lazarenko being
without radio communications.
30 281. Sicherungs-Division. Abt. Ia. Ostrow, den 25.4.1943. Divisions-Tagesbefehl. US
NA T-315 1872 82.
31 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, pp. 140–141.
32 281 Sicherungs-Division. Abt. 1a. Tgb.Nr 642/43 geh. Ostrow, den 24.4.1943. Betr.:
Unternehmen ‘Holzktion’. Divisionsbefehl. US NA T-315 1872 90.
33 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 86.
34 V tilu vraga: Bor’ba partisan i podpol’shchikov na okkupirovannoi territorii Leningradskoi
oblasti. 1944 g.: Sbornik dokumentov (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1985), p. 249 and Hill, The War
Behind the Eastern Front, p. 176.
35 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 117.
36 Ibid., p. 48.
37 N. Miuller [Müller], Vermakht i okkupatsiia (1941–1944) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974),
p. 107.
38 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 48.
39 Ibid., p. 86.
40 E.M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944. DA Pam 20–244 (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 1956), p. 73.
41 See, for instance, Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, pp. 47–48 and B. Shepherd, War
in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2004), pp. 76–77, 104–105.
42 Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, p. 85 and Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front,
p. 94.
43 Ponomarenko, Vsenarodnaia bor’ba, p. 377.
44 Reconnaissance summary material, presumably of the Central Headquarters of the Parti-
san Movement, in the personal fund of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, RGASPI
f.625.o.1.d.38.l.332 and S.W. Mitchum, Hitler’s Legions: German Army Order of Battle,
World War II (London: Leo Cooper/Secker and Warburg, 1985), p. 174.
45 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 160.
46 Reconnaissance summary material, presumably of the Central Headquarters of the Parti-
san Movement, in the personal fund of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, RGASPI
f.625.o.1.d.38.l. 337 and Mitchum, op. cit., p. 50.
47 Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, p. 73 and Shepherd, War in the Wild East, p. 92.
48 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 95.
49 Reconnaissance summary material, presumably of the Central Headquarters of the Parti-
san Movement, in the personal fund of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, RGASPI
f.625.o.1.d.38.l.331.
50 Ponomarenko, Vsenarodnaia bor’ba, p. 434.
51 V tilu vraga . . . 1944, p. 249.
52 Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, p. 76.
53 Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, p. 94 and Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front,
p. 132.
54 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, pp. 132–133 and 139.
55 Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, pp. 163–165.
56 Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, pp. 173–180 and Hill, The War Behind the Eastern
Front, pp. 154–160.
57 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, pp. 75 and 121–122.
58 Reconnaissance summary material, presumably of the Central Headquarters of the
326 Notes
Partisan Movement, in the personal fund of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, RGASPI
f.625.o.1.d.38.l. 337.
59 See Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, p. 168.
60 See, for example, G.L. Weinberg, ‘The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area of Smolensk Oblast’, in
J. Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, WI: University of Wiscon-
sin Press, 1964) pp. 411–422; Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, pp. 77–80 and
182–188; and Shepherd, War in the Wild East, p. 122.
61 V. Andrianov, ‘Operativnoe ispol’zovanie partisanskikh sil’, Vizh, Number 7 (1969),
pp. 24–27.
62 Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, pp. 100–102.
63 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 166, 175, 179 and W. Haupt, Army
Group North – The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military
History, 1997), p. 382.

10 The ‘Ten “Stalinist” Crushing Blows’ of 1944

1 Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London: Hodder
Arnold, 2005), p. 270 and DDRudZW8, map p. 347.
2 DDRudZW8, p. 294.
3 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 288–289 and David Glantz and Jonathan House,
When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1995), pp. 192–193.
4 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 278 and DDRudZW8, pp. 394–419 and map p. 354.
5 Document 4 of 12 February 1944, in ‘Korsun’-Shevchenkovskaia operatsiia v dokumen-
takh (24 ianvaria-17 fevralia 1944 g.)’, Vizh, Number 2 (1984), p. 43.
6 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 285–286 and Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
p. 191 and DDRudZW8, pp. 486–490.
7 ‘Postanovlenie GOKO No. 5859ss “O Krimskikh Tatarakh”, 11 maia 1944 g.’, in N.L.
Pobol’ and P.M. Polian (eds), Stalinskie deportatsii. 1928–1953 (Moscow: MFD: Materik,
2005), pp. 497–499.
8 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 292–295.
9 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 270–271 and G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties
and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), pp. 134–135.
10 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 203.
11 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 299–307 and Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
pp. 204–210 and DDRudZW8, p. 532.
12 DDRudZW8, p. 556, ‘Belorusskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 6 (1964), p. 82
and Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 145 and 263.
13 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 324–333.
14 DDRudZW8, pp. 692–694.
15 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 101.
16 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 338–343 and DDRudZW8, map p. 794 and
pp. 736 and 739, and ‘Iassko-Kishinevskaia operatssia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 8
(1964), p. 89.
17 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 310–313 and Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
pp. 226–229.
18 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 353–355 and SVE 2, pp. 375–376.
19 On the campaign in Hungary, see Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 348–351.
20 See Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 [German
Report Series] (Eastbourne: Antony Rowe Ltd, undated), pp. 300–301.
21 See Mikhail Suprun, ‘Operation “West”: The Role of the Northern Fleet and its Air
Forces in the Liberation of the Russian Arctic in 1944’, JSMS, Volume 20, Number 3
(July–September 2007), pp. 433–447.
 Notes 327
11 From the Vistula to Berlin – the end of the Reich
1 For Rokossovskii at least, as his memoirs suggest, this transfer constituted a demotion,
despite Stalin’s apparent reassurance that ‘if you and Konev don’t advance, then Zhukov
won’t either’. Rokossovskii’s reminiscence of his days commanding the 7th Samara
Cavalry Division on the same page, during which period Zhukov was one of his brigade
commanders, is quite possibly a veiled means of highlighting his chagrin at being
replaced by Zhukov. See K.K. Rokossovskii, Soldatskii dolg (Moscow: Voennoe
izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1968), p. 297.
2 S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941–1945 (Moscow: Progress Publish-
ers, 1970), p. 310.
3 See David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped
Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), pp. 241–247.
4 See Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London:
Hodder Arnold, 2005), pp. 366–370.
5 Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, pp. 309–311, 315.
6 G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmishleniia. V trekh tomakh. Tom 3 – 12-e izdanie
(Moscow: AO Izdatel’stvo ‘Novosti’, 1995), pp. 202–203.
7 Where the German Panzerfaust was effectively a miniature recoil-less gun, the US
Bazooka and German Panzerschreck launched rocket-propelled projectiles. The British
PIAT relied on a large spring and small explosive charge, meaning no backblast as the
Panzerfaust and no smoke as the Bazooka and Panzershreck, although range was short.
8 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 386–390.
9 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 390 and ‘Berlinskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh,
Number 4 (1965), p. 81.
10 By now standard Soviet practice whereby Soviet rifle battalions would penetrate German
defences across a broad front (so that the enemy would not be able to identify where the
main blow would fall), in order not only to clarify the nature of the German first line of
defence, but where applicable to occupy it where German troops had fallen back to posi-
tions to their rear. See SVE 7, p. 33.
11 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 390; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed,
p. 263; and Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmishleniia. . . . Tom 3, p. 244.
12 See Robert Stephan, ‘Smersh: Soviet Military Counter-intelligence during the Second
World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 22 (1987), pp. 585–613.
13 Particularly useful in the preparation of this section was analysis provided in I.A.
Gor’kov, 2002 and Viktor Cherepantov, Vlast’ i voina. Stalinskii mekhanizm gosu-
darstvennogo upravleniia v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Izvestiia’,
2006).
14 O.A. Rzheshevskii (gen. ed.), Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945. Sobitiia. Liudi.
Dokumenti (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literature, 1990), p. 264.
15 See Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 394–395.

12 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria

1 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. . . . Kniga tret’ia. Osvobozhdenie, p. 388.
2 Even the dropping of the first US atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August did not
apparently raise Japanese readiness. See Edward J. Drea, ‘Missing Intentions: Japanese
Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945’, Military Affairs, April 1984,
pp. 66–70.
3 O.A. Rzheshevskii (gen. ed.), Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945. Sobitiia. Liudi.
Dokumenti (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literature, 1990), p. 458. On 5 August the
Primorskaia Group had become 1st Far-Eastern Front and the Far-Eastern Front had
become 2nd Far-Eastern Front. Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. . . . Kniga tret’ia.
Osvobozhdenie, p. 391.
328 Notes
4 G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London:
Greenhill Books, 1997), pp. 160–161.
5 Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth Paper
Number 7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and
General Staff College, February 1983), p. 32.
6 V. Ezhakov, ‘Boevoe primenenie tankov v gorno-taezhnoi mestnosti po opitu 1-go
Dal’nevostochnogo fronta’, Vizh, Number 1 (1974), p. 78.
7 Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. 32.
8 Drea, ‘Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria,
1945’, p. 68.
9 ‘Primenenie aviatsii v Man’chzhurskoi operatsii’ [interview with Marshal of Aviation P.S.
Kirsanov], Vizh, Number 8 (1985), pp. 22–24.
10 Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. 71.
11 Ibid., pp. 72–77.
12 See SVE 8, pp. 635–636 and SVE 4, pp. 531–532.
13 Drea, ‘Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria,
1945’, p. 69.
14 Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. 33.
15 Ibid., pp. 92–94.
16 ‘Kampaniia Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil na Dal’nem Vostoke’, p. 68.
17 Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. 138.
18 SVE 5, p. 130.
19 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 161 and 264.
20 I.M. Tret’iak, ‘Razgrom Kvantungskoi armii na Dal’nem Vostoke’, Vizh, Number 8
(1985), p. 17.
21 Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p. 219.
22 Ibid., pp. 156–158.

Conclusion
1 G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London:
Greenhill Books, 1997), pp. 96, 252, 257.
2 Some idea of the views of German officers of the Red Army can be gleaned from Chapter
19 of B.H. Liddell Hart’s The Other Side of the Hill: The Classic Account of Hitler’s War
through the Eyes of German Generals (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1983), pp. 329–339, first
published in 1948, with a revised and enlarged edition in 1951. In the examples cited
there was certainly agreement on an improvement in Soviet staff work and the use of
tanks over time, with the use of infantry on the offensive being singled out for wide-
spread criticism.
3 Or at least, if talk of continuing the war from Canada was more than rhetoric, seizing the
British mainland that would prove to be such a useful staging post for US military
might.
4 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Pimlico, 1996), p. 320.
5 A particularly strong case for the importance of the Allied air war for the defeat of Nazi
Germany is made by Philips P. O’Brien in, ‘East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi
Germany’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 23, Number 2 (June 2000), pp. 89–113.
O’Brien suggests, for example, that between January and November 1943 3,936 German
aircraft were lost in the Mediterranean theatre, compared to 3,773 on the Eastern Front,
with over 54 per cent of Luftwaffe operational front-line strength in the West by 1
January 1944 with a further 10 per cent in the Mediterranean, with the air war against
the Western Allies soaking up an even more substantial proportion of productive efforts
when AA guns are included. For a more moderate relative assessment of the importance
of the Allied air war compared to the fighting on the ground on the Eastern Front, see
Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 321–323.
 Notes 329
6 Figures for 1945 are overall German losses without distinction between the ‘East’ and
‘other fronts’. See Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945
(London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), p. 404 and below.
7 The Soviet 12-volume Brezhnev-era official history of the war, cited in a later article,
gives a total of 190 German and allied divisions in the East for 22 June 1941, peaking at
266 for November 1942, with 245 for 1 January 1944. Subtracting the appropriate
figures in Table C.1 from the above gives 27.5 German-allied divisions for 22 June 1941
and 44 for 1 January 1944 (the Khrushchev-era Soviet official history notes a peak of
72.5 non-German Axis divisional equivalents operating on the Eastern Front in Novem-
ber 1942). However, only Italian forces were theoretically redeployable to other theatres
at the beginning of the war (and indeed in November 1942). As Knox notes, in
August–September 1942 the Italian 8th Army had a significant 229,000 men in south-
ern Russia, along with 18,000 lorries and artillery tractors, 946 artillery pieces, almost
300 47 mm anti-tank guns, 52 modern anti-aircraft guns and around 50 MC200 and
MC202 fighter aircraft. As Knox goes on to add,
even a fraction of the materiel and skilled manpower deployed in Russia would
have significantly increased the mobility, firepower, and tactical skill of the experi-
enced but attenuated Italian divisions and air units that accompanied Rommel in
the final Axis drive on Egypt.
A not dissimilarly sized force was finally lost to Anglo-American forces in Tunisia in May
1943. With only very limited German-allied Italian forces fighting the Allies after Sep-
tember 1943, almost none of the German-allied divisions in the later figure were even
theoretically redeployable to face the Western Allies.
See A.V. Usikov and V.T. Iminov, ‘Rol’ i mesto sovetsko-germanskogo fronta v Vtoroi
Mirovoi voine’, Vizh, Number 5 (2005), p. 5; Istoriiia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini. . . . Tom
shestoi. Itogi. . . , p. 26; and Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, pp. 83–86.
8 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. Voenno-istoricheskie ocherki. Kniga chetvertaia.
Narod i voina (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), pp. 282–284.
9 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, p. 96.
10 Ibid., p. 235 and Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV, p. 1176.
11 See, for example, Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front, p. 38.
12 Krivosheev, pp. 235–237 and Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV,
p. 1172.
13 The above figures, for example, perhaps incorrectly list some of those POWs (along with
other Soviet citizens, e.g. Ostarbeiter) who remained in the West after the war as having
been killed. Indeed, post-war Soviet statistics suggested 451,000 did not return to the
Soviet Union, according to alternative figures perhaps as many as 688,000. See A.A.
Sherviakov, ‘Gitlerovskii genotsid i repatriatsiia sovetskogo nasileniia’, in Liudskie poteri
SSSR v period vtorio mirovoi voini. Sbornik statei (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo ‘Russki-
Baltiiskii informatsionnii tsentr BLITS’, 1995), p. 180.
14 During the war mortality rates amongst the civilian population in Soviet rear areas rose
across the board according to statistics provided by registry offices (ZAGS), with 1942
unsurprisingly being particularly bad. Poor diet and nutrition certainly contributed to
higher mortality rates. See various articles on civilian losses in the Soviet rear in Liudskie
poteri SSSR, pp. 124–173. Calculating civilian deaths on Axis-occupied territory, particu-
larly in the light of forced-labour recruitment from these areas and the issue of living
non-returnees to the Soviet Union at the end of the war, is particularly difficult. The
situation in the Gulag camps is easier to assess, with mortality rates leaping at the begin-
ning of the war before declining as the war progressed and arguably the food situation,
particularly bad in 1942, improved. In 1940 46,665 Gulag prisoners died, compared to
100,997 for 1941 and 248,887 in 1942 (where the camp population was 1,500,524 on 1
January 1941, 1,415,596 on 1 January 1942 and 983,974 on 1 January 1943). See V.N.
330 Notes
Zemskov, ‘Smertnost’ zakliuchennikh v 1941–1945 gg.’, in Liudskie poteri SSSR,
pp. 174–175.
15 At the beginning of the war there were 4,826,907 personnel, largely men, in the Red
Army and navy with a further 74,945 servicemen and ‘military-construction’ workers
serving in formations under civilian departments but being provided rations by the
People’s Commissariat for Defence. During the war, a further 29,574,900 personnel,
largely men, were called up/mobilized. See Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses,
p. 91.
16 Also many existing tractors, particularly tracked, were used by the Red Army. On the
use of horses by the Wehrmacht, see R.L. Dinaro and Austin Bay, ‘Horse-Drawn Transport
in the German Army’, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 23 (1988), pp. 129–142.
Other than cavalry, of decreasing importance as the war progressed, photographs rarely
show horses in use by the Red Army. However, in June 1941 a Soviet rifle division alone
had a list strength of more than 3,000 horses and in September 1943 the Soviet Southern
Front had 62,121 horses accounted for. See Kalashnikov et al., Krasnaia armiia v iiune
1942 goda, p. 62 and Kazantsev, ‘Melitopol’skaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia v tsifrakh’,
p. 67.
17 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. . . . Kniga chetvertaia. Narod i voina, p. 294.
18 As a starting point in English, see Susan J. Linz (ed.), The Impact of World War II on the
Soviet Union (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985) and more recently, Juliane
Fürst (ed.), Late Stalinist Russia: Society Between Reconstruction and Reinvention (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2006).
19 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 403–405.
20 See Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 272–278.
21 Krivosheev gives those killed, died of wounds and missing in action on the Eastern Front
as 863,700 for Hungary, 93,900 for Italy, 681,800 for Rumania and 86,400 for Finland.
Ibid., p. 278.
22 For biographies of these figures see, in the first instance, Shukman (ed.), Stalin’s Generals.
23 For a positive assessment of Stalin’s wartime leadership, see Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s
Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2006). More critical but nonetheless balanced is Evan Mawdsley, ‘Stalin: Victors are not
Judged’, JSMS, Volume 19, Number 4 (December 2006), pp. 705–725. For an extremely
negative and academically weak but nonetheless influential assessment see Dmitrii
Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy (ed. and trans. Harold Shukman) (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991). Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs have also had a signific-
ant impact on assessments of Stalin’s leadership. See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev
Remembers (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1970) and other editions.
24 The Russian term narod was arguably more akin to the German Volk, even if with less of
a racial component, than the people as in ‘the British people’. On Soviet and Russian
nationalism and other motivating factors during the war, see Geoffrey Hosking, ‘The
Second World War and Soviet National Consciousness’, Past and Present, Volume 175,
Number 1 (2002), pp. 162–187 and Roger Reese, ‘Motivations to Serve: The Soviet
Soldier in the Second World War’, JSMS, Volume 20, Number 2 (April–June 2007),
pp. 263–282.
Bibliography

Materials consulted in the writing of this documentary reader are listed

below. Additional materials may be found in the introduction and further
reading sections for each chapter.

Archival materials

Central State Archive for St Petersburg (TsGA SPb):

f.9789.o.1 – Agricultural directorate of the German economic inspectorate ‘Nord’ [WiIn
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Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History (RGASPI):

f.69.o.1 – Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement
f.644.o.1 – State Defence Committee
f. 625.o.1 – Ponomarenko, Panteleimon Kondrat’evich (1946–1981).

Russian State Archive for the Economy (RGAE):

f.413.o.9 – Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR

United Kingdom National Archives (UK TNA):

AIR 20 – Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence: Papers accumulated by the Air Historical
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FO 371 – Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966
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T-315 German Field Commands: Divisions
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N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich, 2005).
‘Bitva za Dnepr v dokumentakh’, Vizh, 1983, Number 10, pp. 35–39.
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V.P. Eroshin, I.N. Stepanov, S.B. Shurigin and V.P. Iampol’skii (eds), Organi gosudarstvennoi
bezopasnosti. . . . Tom I. Nakanune. Kniga vtoraia (1 ianvaria – 21 iiunia 1941 g.) (Moscow:
A/O ‘Kniga i biznes’, 1995).
V.P. Eroshin, A.A. Zdanovich and V.P. Iampol’skii (eds), Organi gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. . .
. Tom II. Nachalo. Kniga pervaia (22 iiunia – 31 avgusta 1941 goda) (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo
‘Rus’ ’, 2000).
V.P. Gusachenko, V.V. Korovin, I.I. Avdeev, V.P. Iampol’skii (eds), Organi gosudarstvennoi
bezopasnosti SSSR. . . . Tom II. Nachalo. Kniga vtoraia. 1 sentiabria-31 dekabria 1941 goda
(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Rus’ ’, 2000).
‘Keivskaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia v dokumentakh’, Vizh, Number 11 (1983), pp. 54–59.
A.F. Kiselev and E.M. Shchagin (eds), Khrestomatiia po otechestvennoi istorii (1914–1945 gg.):
Uchebnoe posobie dlia studentov vuzov (Moscow: Gumanitarnii izdatel’skii tsentr VLADOS,
1996).
P.N. Knishevskii , O.I. Vasil’eva, V.V. Visotskii, S.A. Solomatin (eds), Skritaia pravda voini:
1941 god. Neizvestnie dokumenti (Moscow: ‘Russkaia kniga’, 1992).
‘Korsun’-Shevchenkovskaia operatsiia v dokumentakh (24 ianvaria-17 fevralia 1944 g.)’, Vizh,
Number 2 (1984), pp. 41–44.
KPSS o Vooruzhennikh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza: Dokumenti 1917–1981 (Moscow: Voennoe
izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oboroni SSSR, 1981).
I.N. Kuznetsov (ed.), Bez grifa ‘Sekretno’ (Novosibirsk: 1997).
N.A. Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada. Dokumenti, prilozheniia. Kn. 2. (2-e izd) (St Petersburg:
Izdatel’skii Dom ‘Neva’, 2004).
Lubianka. Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR ‘Smersh’. 1939-mart 1946 (Moscow: MFD: Materik, 2006).
V.P. Naumov (ed.), 1941 god: V 2 kn. Kn.1 and Kn.2 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnii fond
‘Demokratiia’, 1998).
A.A. Pechenkin, ‘Po zakonam voennogo vremeni. Iiun’-dekabr’ 1941 g.’, Istoricheskii arkhiv 3
(2000), pp. 66–81.
N.L. Pobol’ and P.M. Polian (eds), Stalinskie deportatsii. 1928–1953 (Moscow: MFD: Materik,
2005).
‘Prikaz Narodnogo komissara oboroni ot 5 sentiabria 1942 goda “O zadachakh partisanskogo
dvizheniia” ’, Vizh, Number 8 (1975), pp. 61–65.
Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia:
T.12(1). Nakanune voini. Materiali soveshchaniia visshego rukovodiashchego sostava RKKA
23–31 dekabria 1940 g. (Moscow: ‘Terra’, 1993).
T.13 (2–2). Prikazi Narodnogo komissara oboroni SSSR 22 iiunia 1941 g. – 1942 g. (Moscow:
TERRA, 1997).
 Bibliography 333
T.15 (4–4). Kurskaia bitva. Dokumenti i materiali 27 marta – 23 avgusta 1943 g. (Moscow:
TERRA, 1997).
T.16 (5–1). Stavka VGK. Dokumenti i materiali. 1941 god. (Moscow: TERRA, 1998).
T.16 (5–3). Stavka VGK. Dokumenti i materiali. 1943 god. (Moscow: TERRA, 1999).
T.16 (5–4). Stavka VGK: Dokumenti i materiali 1944–1945 (Moscow: TERRA, 1999),
T.18 7 (2). Sovetsko-iaponskaia voina 1945 goda. . . (Moscow: TERRA, 2000).
T.20 (9). Partisanskoe dvizhenie v godi Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini 1941–1945 gg.: Dokumenti i
materiali (Moscow: Terra, 1999).
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(Moscow: TERRA, 1996).
T.23 (12–1). General’nii shtab v godi Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini: Dokumenti i materiali. 1941
god. (Moscow: TERRA, 1998).
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god. (Moscow: TERRA, 1999).
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T.25 (14). Til Krasnoi Armii v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941–1945 gg.: . . . (Moscow:
TERRA, 1998).
O.A. Rzheshevskii (gen. ed.), Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945. Sobitiia. Liudi. Doku-
menti (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literature, 1990).
Sbornik boevikh dokumentov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini. Vipusk 1, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, 21, 24, 27, 30,
38 (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oboroni Soiuza SSR, 1947–1959).
Sbornik zakonov SSSR v dvukh tomakh. Tom 2. Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Presidiuma Verk-
hovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1938–1967 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Izvestiia Sovetov deputatov trudi-
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G.N. Sevost’ianov (ed.), Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia. 1939–1945 (Moscow: MFD, 2004).
Stalingradskaia epopeia: . . . (Moscow: ‘Zvonnitsa-MG’, 2000).
N.L. Volkovskii (ed.), Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh rassekrechennikh arkhivov (Moscow: OOO
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V tilu vraga: Bor’ba partisan i podpol’shchikov na okkupirovannoi territorii Leningradskoi oblasti.
1944 g.: Sbornik dokumentov (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1985).

Published documents in German

Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung, 1939–1945: Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrma-
cht (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1965).
Norbert Müller, Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung – Dokumente zur Besatzungspolitik der faschistis-
chen Wehrmacht auf Sowjetischem Territorium 1941 bis 1944 (Berlin: Militärverlag der DDR,
1980).
R.-D. Müller, Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten 1941–1943 –
Der Abschlussbericht der Wirtschaftstabes Ost . . . (Boppard: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1991).

Published documents in English

D. Cameron Watt (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign
Office Confidential Print. Part II. From the First to Second World War. Series A. The Soviet Union,
1917–1939. Volume 14. The Soviet Union, Jan.1937-Dec.1938 (Frederick, MD: University
Publications of America, 1986).
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Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the
USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.
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1945) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1957).
J. Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Volume III 1933–1941 (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1953).
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Eve of Barbarossa’, War in History, Volume 11, Number 1 (2004), pp. 61–103.
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General
Staff Study (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001).
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Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for L’vov, July 1944:
The Soviet General Staff Study (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002).
David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein (trans. and eds.), The Battle for the Ukraine: The Red
Army’s Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Offensive, 1944 (The Soviet General Staff Study)
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Memoirs in Russian
I.S. Konev, Sorok piatii (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1966).
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Memoirs in English
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1970).
 Bibliography 335
Other books in Russian
Atlas ofitsera (Moscow: Voenno-topograficheskoe upravlenie, 1947).
Bitva pod Kurskom: ot oboroni k nastupleniiu (Moscow: AST: B66 Khranitel’, 2006).
Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii, chast’ II (Ianvar’-dekabr’ 1942 goda) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo
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V.I. Boiarskii, Partisani i armiia: Istoriia uteriannikh vozmozhnostei (Minsk: Kharvest; Moscow:
AST, 2003),
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Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Izvestiia’, 2006).
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I.A. Gor’kov, Kreml’. Stavka. Genshtab (Tver’: ‘RIF LTD’, 1995).
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(Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2002).
A.A. Gorter, V.T. Gorter and M.N. Suprun, Osvobozhdenie Vostochnogo Finnmarka,
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noiabr’ 1942 g.) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1961).
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estvennoi voini (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministerstva oboroni Soiuza SSR, 1965).
K.A. Kalashnikov, V.I. Fes’kov, A.I. Chmikhalo, V.I. Golikov (eds), Krasnaia armiia v iiune
1941 goda (statisticheskii sbornik) (Novosibirsk: ‘Novosibirskii khronograf’, 2003).
O.N. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie i politicheskie resheniia (konets 1920 – seredina 1930-Kh
godov) (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskovogo universiteta v Sankt Peterburge, 2002).
Liudskie poteri SSSR v period vtorio mirovoi voini. Sbornik statei (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo
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N.L. Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada. Kn. 1. (2-e izd) (St Petersburg: Izdatel’skii Dom ‘Neva’,
2004).
N. Miuller [Müller], Vermakht i okkupatsiia (1941–1944) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974).
V.A. Nevezhin, Sindrom nastupatel’noi voini. Sovetskaia propaganda v predverii ‘sviashchennikh
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I.P. Petrov, Partisanskoe dvizhenie v Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1973).
A.V. Platonov, Entsiklopediia Sovetskikh nadvodnikh korablei 1941–1945 (St Petersburg:
Izdatel’stvo ‘Poligon’ 2002).
P.K. Ponomarenko, Vsenarodnaia bor’ba v tilu nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov 1941–1944
(Moscow: Nauka, 1985).
P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972).
Severnie konvoi: Issledovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 2 (Moscow: Nauka 1994).
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2002).
N.S. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e godi: tempi ekonomicheskogo
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TOO ‘Novina’, 1997).
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nie (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).
Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina. 1941–1945. Voenno-istoricheskie ocherki. Kniga chetvertaia. Narod i
voina (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).
Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941–1945 gg.: Deistvuiushchaia armiia (Moscow: Animi Forti-
tudo, Kuchkovo pole, 2005).
F.F. Viktorov, N.I. Barishnikov, N.F. Vargin, L.G. Vinnitskii, I.I. Evstiukhin, O.S. Zhitskov
et al., Istoriia Ordena Lenina Leningradskogo voennogo okruga (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo
Ministerstva oboroni SSSR, 1974).
V.A. Zolotarev and I.A. Kozlov, Tri stoletiia Rossiiskogo flota, 1941–1945 (Moscow: AST; St
Petersburg: Poligon, 2005).

Other books in German

Karl Heinz Frieser, K. Shmider, K. Schönherr, G. Schreiber, K. Ungváry, B. Wegner, Das
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Band 8. Die Ostfront 1943/44 (München: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 2007).

Other books in English

John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945 (London: Longman,
1991).
H. Boog, J. Forster, J. Hoffmann, E. Klink, R.-D. Muller, G.R. Ueberschar and E. Osers
(eds), Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998).
Louis Brown, A Radar History of World War II – Technical and Military Imperatives (Bristol and
Philadelphia, PA: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999).
A.P. Dobson, US Wartime Aid to Britain (London: Croom Helm 1986).
C. Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
J. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39 (London:
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984).
David Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth
Paper Number 7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command
and General Staff College, February 1983).
David Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 1998).
David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars,
1942 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence, KA: University
Press of Kansas, 2005).
David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1999).
 Bibliography 337
Arnold Hague, Destroyers for Great Britain: A History of the 50 Town Class Ships Transferred from
the United States to Great Britain in 1940 (London: Greenhill Books, 1990).
M. Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1985).
M. Harrison, Accounting for War. Soviet Production, Employment and the Defence Burden,
1940–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
W. Haupt, Army Group North – The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer
Military History, 1997).
Hannes Heer, ‘The Logic of the War of Extermination’, in Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann
(eds), War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941–1944 (London:
Berghahn Books, 2004), pp. 92–126.
Alexander Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West
Russia, 1941–1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984).
J. Hoffmann, Stalin’s War of Extermination, 1941–1945: Planning, Realization, and Documenta-
tion (Capshaw, Ala.: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001).
E.M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944. DA Pam 20–244 (Washington DC:
Department of the Army, 1956).
M. Jakobsen, The Diplomacy of the Winter War: an Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1940
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
R.H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1969).
MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime and the War of
1940–1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London:
Greenhill Books, 1997).
B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill: The Classic Account of Hitler’s War through the Eyes
of German Generals (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1983).
R.C. Lucas, The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945 (Tallahassee, Florida: Florida
State University, 1970).
Evan Mawdlsey, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945 (London: Hodder
Arnold, 2005).
S.W. Mitchum, Hitler’s Legions: German Army Order of Battle, World War II (London: Leo
Cooper/Secker and Warburg, 1985).
Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
A.M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German Soviet Relations, 1922–1941 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997).
Office, Chief of Finance, War Department, Lend-Lease Shipments. World War II (Washington
DC: 31 December 1946).
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Pimlico, 1996).
T.R. Philbin III, The Lure of Neptune: German-Soviet Naval Collaboration and Ambitions,
1919–1941 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1994).
Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War 1936–1941 (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
G. Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations
and the Road to War, 1933–1941 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995).
338 Bibliography
J. Rohwer and M.S. Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding
Programmes, 1935–1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York and Evanston: Harper
and Row, 1969).
Patrick Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers, 1890–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997).
Lennart Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Plan-
ning, 1925–1941 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
B. Shepherd, War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004).
H. Shukman (ed.), Stalin’s Generals (New York: Grove Press, 1993).
A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961).
Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 [German Report Series]
(Eastbourne, UK: Antony Rowe Ltd, undated).

Journal articles and selected book chapters in Russian

V. Andrianov, ‘Operativnoe ispol’zovanie partisanskikh sil’, Vizh, Number 7 (1969),
pp. 24–27.
‘Belorusskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 6 (1964), pp. 74–86.
‘Berlinskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 4 (1965), pp. 79–88.
P.N. Bobilev, ‘Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano. K voprosu o planirovanii v General’nom
shtabe RKKA vozmozhnoi voini s Germaniei v 1940–1941 godakh’, Otechestvennaia
istoriia, Number 1 (2000), pp. 41–64.
M.A. Bobrov, ‘Strategicheskoe razvertivanie VVS Krasnoi armii na zapade strani pered
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voinoi’, 2006, Number 5 (2006), pp. 3–7.
V. Ezhakov, ‘Boevoe primenenie tankov v gorno-taezhnoi mestnosti po opitu 1-go Dal’nevos-
tochnogo fronta’, Vizh, Number 1 (1974), pp. 77–81.
‘Iassko-Kishinevskaia operatssia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 8 (1964), pp. 36–41.
I. Izotikov, ‘Na kakikh samoletakh letal Pokrishkin, ili ne boites’ britantsev, dari prinosi-
ashchikh?’, Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oboroni, Number 4 (1991), pp. 33–36.
‘Kampaniia Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil na Dal’nem Vostoke v 1945 g. (Fakti i tsifri)’,
Vizh, Number 8 (1965), pp. 64–73.
V. Kazantsev, ‘Melitopol’skaia operatsiia (v tsifrakh)’, Vizh, Number 7 (1977), pp. 63–71.
N.A. Kirsanov, ‘Mobilizatsiia zhenshchin v Krasnuiu armiiu v godi fashistskogo nashestviia’,
Vizh, Number 5 (2007), pp. 15–17.
G.A. Kumanev ‘Otvet P.K. Ponomarenko na voprosi G.A. Kumaneva. 2 noiabria 1978 g.’,
Otechestvennaia istoriia, Number 6 (1998), pp. 133–149.
R.I. Larintsev, ‘Lend-lizovskie postavki na Severnii flot i ikh effektivnost’ ’, in M.N. Suprun
(ed.), Voina v Arktike (1939–1945 gg.) (Arkhangel’sk: Pomorskii gosudarstvennii univer-
sitet, 2001), 263–270.
‘Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period kontrnastupleniia)’, Vizh, Number 1 (1967), pp.
89–101.
‘Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period oboroni)’, Vizh, Number 3 (1967), pp. 69–79.
P.K. Ponomarenko, ‘Bor’ba Sovetskogo naroda v tilu vraga’, Vizh, Number 4 (1965), 26–36.
‘Primenenie aviatsii v Man’chzhurskoi operatsii’ [Interview with Marshal of Aviation P.S.
Kirsanov], Vizh, Number 8 (1985), pp. 20–24.
 Bibliography 339
V.M. Safir, ‘Oborona Moskvi. Narofominskii proriv 1–5 dekabria 1941 goda (chto bilo i
chego ne bilo v deistvitelnosti)’, Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, Vipusk 1 (1997), pp. 77–125.
A.A. Sherviakov, ‘Gitlerovskii genotsid i repatriatsiia sovetskogo nasileniia’, in Liudskie poteri
SSSR v period vtorio mirovoi voini. Sbornik statei (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo ‘Russki-Baltiiskii
informatsionnii tsentr BLITS’, 1995), pp. 178–181.
L.G. Shmigel’skii, ‘Molotovskii zavod No. 402 i severnie konvoi’, in Severnie konvoi: Issle-
dovaniia, vospominaniia, dokumenti. Vip. 3 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag 2000), pp. 68–102.
M.N. Suprun, ‘Prodovol’stvennie postavki v SSSR po Lend-lizu v godi Vtoroi mirovoi voini’,
Otechesvennaia istoriia, Number 3 (1996), pp. 46–54.
I.M. Tret’iak, ‘Razgrom Kvantungskoi armii na Dal’nem Vostoke’, Vizh, Number 8 (1985),
pp. 9–19.
‘Vislo-Oderskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 1 (1965), pp. 71–81.
Vostochno-Prusskaia operatsiia v tsifrakh’, Vizh, Number 2 (1965), pp. 80–90.
A.V. Usikov and V.T. Iminov, ‘Rol’ i mesto sovetsko-germanskogo fronta v Vtoroi Mirovoi
voine’, Vizh, Number 5 (2005), pp. 3–8.
V.N. Zemskov, ‘Smertnost’ zakliuchennikh v 1941–1945 gg.’, in Liudskie poteri SSSR v period
vtorio mirovoi voini. Sbornik statei (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo ‘Russki-Baltiiskii informat-
sionnii tsentr BLITS’, 1995), pp. 174–177.

Articles in Russian available through the internet

V. Romanenko, ‘P-40 v Sovetskoi aviatsii’. Online. Available http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/
articles/romanenko/p-40/index.htm (accessed 2 May 2008).

Journal articles in English

M.J. Carley, ‘Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy,
1917–1941’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 12, Number 3 (September 2001), pp.
159–174.
Edward J. Drea, ‘Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of
Manchuria, 1945’, Military Affairs (April 1984), pp. 66–73.
John Ferris, ‘Image and Accident: Intelligence and the Origins of World War II,
1933–1941’, in John Robert Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy – Selected Essays (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2005), pp. 99–137.
H. Flory, ‘The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927’, Journal of
Contemporary History, Volume 12, Number 4 (October 1977), pp. 707–723.
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part II’, JSMS,
Volume 13, Number 1 (March 2000), pp. 172–237.
David Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Part 3: The
Winter Campaign (5 December-April 1942): The Moscow Counteroffensive’, JSMS,
Volume 13, Number 2 (June 2000), pp. 139–185
Alexander Hill, ‘The Birth of the Soviet Northern Fleet 1937–1942’, JSMS, Volume 16,
Number 2 (June 2003), pp. 65–82.
Alexander Hill, ‘British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for Moscow, November–Decem-
ber 1941 – A Research Note’, JSMS, Volume 19, Number 2 (June 2006), pp. 289–294.
Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941-June 1942’,
Journal of Military History, Volume 71, Number 3 (July 2007), pp. 773–808.
340 Bibliography
Alexander Hill, ‘Stalin and the West’, in Gordon Martel (ed.), A Companion to International
History, 1900–2001 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 257–268.
Peter Jackson, ‘France’, in Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds), The Origins of World War
Two: The Debate Continues (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 86–110.
O. Khlevniuk, ‘The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937–38’, in D.L. Hoffmann (ed.), Stal-
inism: The Essential Readings (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 83–104.
Evan Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940–1941’, Inter-
national History Review, Volume 25, Number 4 (2003), pp. 818–865.
Gordon W. Morrell, ‘Redefining Intelligence and Intelligence Gathering: The Industrial
Intelligence Centre and the Metro-Vickers Affair, Moscow 1933’, Intelligence and National
Security, Volume 9, Number 3 (July 1994), pp. 520–533.
Roger Munting, ‘Soviet Food Supply and Allied Aid in the War, 1941–1945’, Soviet Studies,
Volume XXXVI, Number 4 (October 1984), pp. 582–593.
V.A. Nevezhin, ‘The Pact with Germany and the Idea of an “Offensive War” ’, JSMS, Volume
8, Number 4 (December 1995), pp. 809–843.
Philips P. O’Brien, ‘East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany’, The Journal of Strategic
Studies, Volume 23, Number 2 (June 2000), pp. 89–113.
Albert Resis, ‘The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact’,
Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 52, Number 1 (2000), pp. 33–56.
N.S. Simonov, ‘ “Strengthen the Defence of the Land of the Soviets”: The 1927 “War Alarm”
and its Consequences’, Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 48, Number 8 (1996), pp. 1355–1364.
Zara Steiner, ‘The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in
1938: New Material from the Soviet Archives’, Historical Journal, Volume 42, Number 3
(1999), pp. 751–779.
R. Stephan, ‘Smersh: Soviet Military Counter-intelligence during the Second World War’,
Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 22 (1987), pp. 585–613.
D. Stone ‘The August 1924 Raid on Stolpce, Poland, and the Evolution of Soviet Active
Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 21, Number 2 (Spring 2006), pp.
331–341.
David Stone, ‘The First Five-Year Plan and the Geography of Soviet Defence Industry’,
Europe–Asia Studies, Volume 57, Number 7 (November 2005), pp. 1047–1063.
Mikhail Suprun, ‘Operation “West”: The Role of the Northern Fleet and its Air Forces in the
Liberation of the Russian Arctic in 1944’, JSMS, Volume 20, Number 3 (July–September
2007), pp. 433–447.
V. Suvorov (pseud.), ‘Who was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?’,
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Volume 130, Number 2
(1985), pp. 50–55.
V.F. Vorsin, ‘Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through “Lend-Lease” ’, JSMS, Volume 10,
Number 2 (June 1997), pp. 153–175.
Index

aircraft, German: Bf109 176 Cherniakhovskii, I.D. 255, 257

aircraft, Soviet: Ar-2 53; DB-3 51; Churchill, W. 49, 166–7, 290
I-15/I-153 53, 146, 175; I-16 53, 146, Comintern 6, 9, 14, 46, 305
175; Il-2 51, 53; Il-4 51; LaGG-3 51, command and control (Soviet) 51–2, 61,
175, 176; LaGG-5 175; LaGG-7 175; 78, 190, 197; and radio
Li-2 (‘Dakota’) 148–9; MiG-1 51; communications 38, 50, 61, 88, 178,
MiG-3 51, 53, 175, 176; Pe-2 53; 182, 190, 216, 262–3, 318, 325
PS-84 146; SB 53; Su-2 53; TB-3 51, commissars see institute of commissars
148; TB-7 51; U-2 112; Yak-1 51, convoys (Northern) 170, 185, 295, 297,
53, 175; Yak-2 53; Yak-4 53; Yak-7 321n11; PQ-12 177, 181–2; PQ-13
175; Yak-9 175; see also VVS 184; PQ-17 98, 297; PQ-18 322n32
aircraft, Soviet – Lend-Lease: Aerocobra counter intelligence (Soviet): and
(P-39) 171, 174–5, 177; Hurricane German stay-behind agents 229;
164, 174–5, 176, 177, 180; P-40 responsibility for in military units
167, 170, 174, 174–5, 176–7, 54–5, 114, 271
321n19; Spitfire 175, 176, 180
Antonescu, I. 240, 301 deception see maskirovka
Antonov, A.I. 131, 138, 225, 265, Demiansk 98, 117, 124, 216, 299
269–70, 274
Arkhangel’sk 12, 52, 84, 98, 107, 124, Einzatzgruppen 208, 305–6
170, 180, 182, 229, 295, 297 El’nia 52, 64–5, 72, 107, 294–5
evacuation, civilian: German 262; of
Baltic–White Sea Canal 9, 11–12 Leningrad 145, 149–52; of Moscow
Beria, L.P. 36, 44–8, 68, 71, 92, 105, 70–1, 296; Soviet 56–7, 180, 294,
152, 199, 227, 244, 248, 269–71 296, 324n4
Berlin 229, 264; see also Red Army
(operations) feste Plätze 231, 301
blocking detachments 56, 68–9, 102–3, Final Solution 287–9
247–8 Finnish forces 30, 36, 42, 62, 115,
Brest 30, 52, 52, 107, 213 142–3, 145–7, 220, 228, 285, 296,
Brezhnev, L.I. 287, 329n7 301–2, 330n21
Briansk 33, 52, 68–9, 107, 117, Führer directives: Number 21 293;
213–14, 295, 300 Number 34 295; Number 41 297;
Brodi 42, 50, 237, 294 Number 45 99, 297; see also feste
Budapest 229, 241–3, 251, 253, 260, Plätze
284
Budennii, S.M. 44, 47, 290, 294 Genshtab (GSh KA), role and
Bulganin, N.A. 47, 72, 81, 269, 271 significance of 131–2, 270–1
Bulgaria 221 German Army see Wehrmacht
342 Index
GKO (State Defence Committee): Konev, I.S. 225–6, 247, 253, 265,
composition 45, 270–1; creation and 267–8, 271–2, 290, 327n1
function 45, 48, 50, 294, 307 Königsberg 42, 229, 255–7, 260, 284,
Great Britain see Churchill; Stalin, and 303
the Allies Krebs, H. 271
guards units, Soviet: creation of 161, Kronstadt 12, 137, 144–5, 152, 260
306 Kulik, G.I. 44, 46, 48
Guderian, H. 63 Kursk 51, 117, 124, 125–6, 127–8,
Gulag 12, 92, 307, 329n14 130–2, 133, 214, 229, 299
Küstrin 254, 264, 264, 266
Halder, F. 51 Kuznetsov, A.A. 46–7, 150, 158
Hitler, A.: and delay to ‘Citadel’ 125; Kuznetsov, N.G. 41, 44, 46–7, 92,
leadership 290; no retreat 79, 108, 269–70
224–6, 231, 239, 296; sanctioned
withdrawals 132, 222, 227, 298–9; labour camps see Gulag
suicide 271; see also feste Plätze; Führer Lend-Lease see aircraft; motor vehicles;
directives PVO; railways; tanks; United
Holocaust see Final Solution States
horses, transport role: German 210, Lenin, V.I. 5, 48, 76, 292
223, 231, 239, 245–6, 253, 330n16; Leningrad 52, 107, 124, 144, 204; siege
Japan 281; Soviet 60, 94–5, 186, of 97–8, 115, 143–61, 186, 221–3,
205–6, 235, 239, 281, 273, 288, 295–8, 301; significance 9, 141, 144;
330n16 threat to through Finland 19–20,
Horthy, M. 241 141; see also motor vehicles; railways;
Hungarian forces 30, 36, 208, 221, Red Army (operations)
240–2, 252, 285, 298, 330n21 logistics see supply
lorries see motor vehicles
institute of commissars: and dual Lublin 30, 32–3, 42, 235–6, 301
command 24, 52–6; and unitary Luftwaffe 249, 254, 308; air assets
command 24, 113–14 drawn to West 328n5: first days
intelligence: German 35–6, 61, 216, ‘Barbarossa’ 41, 50; overflights Soviet
228–9; Soviet 29–30, 35, 41–2, territory pre-‘Barbarossa’ 35–6; and
51–2, 72, 125, 129, 134, 139, 209, siege of Leningrad 149; and Soviet
215–16, 236, 238–9, 254, 271, 277, naval losses 137–8
280, 307, 309 (and deployment tanks Luga (line) 62, 142, 294
86–7, 96, 110; partisans and 198, L’vov 30, 34, 220, 229, 237, 238
200, 209, 215–16; and urban warfare
258–9) Malenkov, G.M. 42, 44–8, 152, 248,
Italian forces 115, 285, 298, 269–71
329–30n14 maskirovka 110, 224, 229
Mekhlis, L.Z. 44, 46, 197, 270
Kaganovich, L.M. 44, 46 Meretskov, K.A. 27, 44, 223, 281
Kalinin, M.I. 24, 114 Merkulov, V.N. 46–7, 271
Katiusha see RS Mikoian, A.I. 44, 46–7, 171–2, 269,
Kerch’ 97–8, 107, 124, 138, 226, 288 271
Khar’kov 52, 97–8, 107, 117, 123, 124, military soviets 24, 41–4, 65, 77, 79,
125, 129, 131, 160, 186, 296–7, 299 87–8, 92, 96, 102, 141–3, 149–50,
Khrushchev, N.S. 79, 163–4, 269, 284, 152, 161, 176, 197, 236, 274,
286, 287, 329n7, 330n23 307–8; and military rule (voennoe
Kiev 30, 50–1, 52, 63, 66, 68, 107, 135, polozhenie) 43–4; and the partisan
124, 223, 237, 238, 290, 295, 300 movement 197, 216
Komsomol 45, 54, 62, 93, 194–5, 308, Minsk 33, 47, 50, 52, 107, 124, 213,
312 220, 229, 229, 231, 294, 301
 Index 343
Molotov, V.M. 45–8, 70–1, 149, 171, 233, 301; ‘Dnepr–Carpathian’ 223–4,
194, 248, 270–1 233, 300; ‘Donbass’ 131, 299; ‘East
Moscow 52, 107, 124, 229; 7 Carpathian’ 234, 241, 301; ‘East
November 1941 parade 296; siege Pomeranian’ 261, 262, 302; ‘East
and evacuation 70–1; see also Red Prussian’ 249, 251, 261, 262;
Army (operations) ‘Iassi–Kishinev’ 234, 239, 301;
motor vehicles, Soviet: availability 38, ‘Jupiter’ 113; ‘Kerch–Feodosiia’ 91,
60, 94–6, 111, 113, 119, 121–2, 137, 296; ‘Kiev Defensive’ 66;
165, 178–9, 181, 186–7, 188, ‘Kirovgrad’ 223;
190–1, 232, 235, 238–9, 251, 267, ‘Korsun–Shevchenkovskii’ 223–4,
273, 283, 322n39; and siege 300; ‘Kursk Defensive’ 133;
Leningrad 144, 149–50 ‘Kutuzov/Orel’ 130, 133, 299;
Mozhaisk (line) 62–3, 68–70, 295 ‘Leningrad–Novgorod’ 221, 233,
Murmansk 32, 52, 98, 107, 124, 170, 301; ‘Little Saturn’ 108, 298; ‘Lower
181–2, 184, 229, 322n32 Dnepr’ 300; ‘Lublin–Brest’ 235;
‘L’vov–Sandomierz/L’vov Peremishl’
narodnoe opolchenie 50, 61–3, 195, 248, 233, 236–7, 237, 241, 301;
294, 309, 313 ‘Manchurian’ 275, 276, 277, 278,
Narva 63, 132, 142, 204, 213, 223, 240 280, 282; ‘Mars/Rzhev–Sichevka’
Nationalism, Soviet/Russian: in 107, 113, 297–8; ‘Moscow
propaganda 50, 76 Defensive’, 295; ‘Moscow Offensive’
navy see Soviet Navy 81, 91, 107, 296–7;
NKGB 195–6, 227, 271, 309 ‘Nikopol’sk–Krivoi Rog’ 223; ‘North
NKVD 36, 46–7, 54–6, 62–3, 68–9, Caucasus Defensive’ 297;
71, 91–2, 102–3, 105, 113–14, ‘Oboian–Kursk (Belgorod)’ 85;
152–3, 155, 157–8, 195–9, 215, ‘Orel–Bolkhov’ 85;
227, 248, 269–71, 288, 295, 309; ‘Petsamo–Kirkenes’ 137, 234, 243;
and the partisan movement 195–9; see ‘Prague’ 303; ‘Rostov’ 91, 296;
also Beria; blocking detachments; ‘Rovno–Lutsk’ 223;
special sections ‘Rumiantsev/Belgorod–Khar’kov’
Novgorod 52, 59, 63, 107, 124, 142–3, 130, 131, 133, 299; ‘Rzhev–Viaz’ma’
204, 220, 222 91, 297; ‘Sandomierz–Silesian’ 249;
Novikov, A.A. 176, 270 ‘Siniavino’ 161, 297; ‘Spark’ 161,
Novorossiisk 288, 298, 300 298; Stalingrad Defensive’ 99, 297;
‘Stalingrad Strategic’ 107, 124, 298;
Odessa 52, 107, 124, 137, 220, 229, ‘Suvorov’ 228, 299; ‘Tikhvin’ 91;
296 ‘Uranus’ 107, 298;
OKH 51, 289, 309 ‘Viborg–Petrozavodsk’ 228, 233,
OO/NKVD see special sections 301; ‘Vienna’ 302; ‘Vistula–Oder’
operations, German: ‘Barbarossa’ 35, 248–9, 250, 251, 252, 261, 262,
40–67, 52, 115, 141, 207, 270, 302; ‘Voronezh–Khar’kov’ 298;
293–4, 317n8; ‘Blau’ 99, 105, 297; ‘Voronezh–Voroshilovgrad Defensive’
‘Braunschweig’ 99, 297; ‘Citadel’ 99, 297; ‘War of the Rails’ 209,
125–32, 139, 216, 299; ‘Kremlin’ 211–13, 216, 299; ‘West’ 326n21;
97; ‘Northern Lights’ 161; ‘Spring ‘Zhitomir-Berdichevskaia’ 223
Clean’ 202–6, 217; ‘Typhoon’ 66, opolchenie see narodnoe opolchenie
68–81, 295 Order Number 189 (NKO) 199–200,
operations, Soviet: 211, 215, 298
‘Bagration/Belorussian’ 229, 233, Order Number 227 (NKO) 100–3, 297
235, 237, 240, 301; ‘Baltic’ 234; Order Number 270 (Stavka VGK)
‘Belgrade’ 234, 241, 302; ‘Berlin’ 55–6, 100, 248, 295
264, 267, 303; ‘Bolkhov’ 86; Orel 85, 107, 117, 124, 130, 296, 299
‘Budapest’ 234, 241, 302; ‘Crimean’ Ostarbeiter 218, 248, 309, 329n13
344 Index
Ostwall 132, 222, 299–300 Guards Tank 242, 279; 6th Tank
240; 7th 142; 7th Guards 136; 7th
Panzerfaust 257–9, 263, 310, 327n7 Independent 178; 8th 142, 248; 8th
Panzerschreck 263, 327n7 Guards 254, 259; 9th 79; 9th Air
Paulus, F. 108 277; 10th Air 277; 11th 59; 11th
Petsamo 23, 228, 243–4 Guards 229, 230, 256; 12th Air 277;
Polish forces 23, 235–6, 301 13th 127, 134–5; 14th 244; 15th
Ponomarenko, P.K. 193, 197–9, 204, 274; 16th 85, 279; 16th Air 125;
208, 211–12 18th Long-Range Air 267; 20th 82;
prisoners of war (POWs): Soviet in 24th 64–5; 27th 225–6; 30th 85;
German hands (fate of 248, 287–9, 33rd 79; 34th 59; 37th 136; 38th
329n13: and major encirclements 66, 129, 135; 39th 234; 40th 129,
68, 317n13: as source intelligence 321n26; 43rd 64, 235, 251; 46th
128); German in Soviet hands (fate of 242; 47th 250; 48th 59–61, 127;
289; Stalingrad 108) 50th 79, 85; 51st 322n27; 52nd 136;
propaganda, Soviet: and abortive 53rd 136, 321n26; 54th 61, 144,
preparation for war 29, 35; lack of 146–7, 159; 56th 79; 57th 131, 136;
realism in early war 75–6; see also 59th 160, 297; 60th 127, 250; 61st
Nationalism 82, 321n26; 62nd 100, 103, 105;
Pskov 52, 107, 141–2, 204, 210–11, 65th 127; 67th 161; 70th 127;
213, 223, 294, 301 Coastal (Primorskaia) 98;
PVO 310; ground use AA guns 63; Independent Maritime 226, 233, 301
Lend-Lease aircraft and 174, 175, Red Army, formations and units,
177; women serving in 93 battalions: 23rd Ski 80, 82; 24th Ski
80, 82; 126th ITB 85; 131st ITB 85,
radio communications, Soviet: Lend- 85; 132nd ITB 85; 136th ITB 79–82,
Lease and 176, 178, 182, 190; 85, 85; 137th Tank 85; 138th ITB
procedures 61, 88, 262–3, 318n31; 85, 85; 139th Tank 85; 140th ITB
shortages in 38, 50, 61, 88, 182, 216, 80–1; 145th ITB 85; 302nd
325n29 Machine-Gun 70; 305th Machine-
railways: availability of rolling stock Gun 70; 467th Indep Sapper 70;
187, 188, 191; importance for 538th Sapper 70
logistics 27, 32, 34, 57, 101, 119, Red Army, formations and units,
122, 187, 204, 217, 223, 237–8, brigades: 1st Guards Tank 87; 1st
237, 266, 273; partisan ops versus Mountain Rifle 59–61; 2nd Guards
German 199–200, 204, 209–14, 210; Mech 242; 2nd Guards Tank 87; 3rd
and siege of Leningrad 143, 144, 147, Rifle 159; 9th Tank 72, 317n5; 17th
152, 161 OATB 150; 17th Rifle 82; 17th Tank
reconnaissance see intelligence 72, 87, 317n5; 18th Rifle 80, 82;
Red Army, formations and units, 18th Tank 72, 87; 19th Tank 72;
armies: 1st Czechoslovak 234; 1st 20th Tank 70, 72, 81, 87; 21st Tank
Guards 118; 1st Polish 236; 1st 72; 22nd Rifle 159; 22nd Tank 72;
Shock 233, 262; 2nd Shock 88, 24th Rifle 159; 24th Tank 85,
159–60, 222, 297; 2nd Tank 126; 317n5; 25th Rifle 159; 32nd Tank
3rd Guards 118; 3rd Guards Tank 87; 53rd Rifle 159; 57th Rifle 159;
135, 268; 3rd Shock 321; 3rd Tank 58th Rifle 159; 59th Rifle 159; 59th
322n26; 4th Air 138, 233; 4th Tank 177; 62nd Tank 272; 63rd
Guards 136; 4th Guards Tank 272; Tank 272; 68th Tank 87; 70th SP
4th Tank 268; 5th Guards 136; 5th Artillery 272; 84th Rifle 82; 103rd
Guards Tank 136, 139, 224, 226, Tank 177; 136th Tank 177; 137th
239; 5th Shock 254; 5th Tank Tank 177; 140th Tank 177; 145th
118–19, 136, 321n26; 6th 118–19, Tank 85; 146th Tank 85, 85, 87;
122, 258; 6th Guards 129; 6th 170th Tank 177; 177th Tank 177;
 Index 345
179th Tank 177; 184th Tank 177; 301–3; 3rd Ukrainian 135, 233–4,
186th Tank 177; 201st Tank 177 239–40, 242–3, 300, 302; 4th
Red Army, formations and units, corps: Ukrainian 132, 226–7, 233–4, 252,
1st Mech 136; 2nd DBAK 51; 2nd 300–1, 303; Baltic 300; Belorussian
Guards Mech 242–3; 3rd Bomber Air 300; Briansk 69, 75, 86, 133, 172,
125; 3rd Tank 123, 321n26; 4th 298–9, 321n26; Central 69, 125,
Guards Mech 242; 5th Guards Cav 126, 126–8, 133, 299–300; Don 103,
226, 243; 5th Guards Tank 129, 130; 108, 115, 297; Far Eastern 274;
5th Mech 268; 6th Fighter Air 125; Kalinin 73, 75, 106, 113, 115, 172,
6th Mixed Air 125; 7th Mech 136, 211, 221, 296–8, 300, 321n27;
243; 9th Mech 50–1; 9th Tank 126; Karelian 69, 143, 177–8, 233–4,
10th Tank 123, 272, 275, 321n27; 301; Leningrad 59, 69, 115, 143–4,
11th Tank 321n26; 14th Tank 146, 148, 149–50, 152, 153, 159,
321n27; 15th Mech 51; 15th Rifle 161, 176–7, 218, 222–3, 233–4,
134; 17th Guards Rifle 134; 18th 240, 297–8, 301; North Caucasus
Tank 123, 130, 139, 240, 243; 19th 115, 138, 322n27; Northern 31–2,
Tank 126; 23rd Tank 240; 28th Rifle 69, 142–3; North-Western 31–2, 42,
134; 29th Tank 130, 139; 45, 59, 61, 69, 218, 321n26; Reserve
Czechoslovak 234 64–5, 70, 146, 295; Southern 42, 69,
Red Army, formations and units, 78–9, 101, 115, 131–2, 296,
divisions: 7th Breakthrough Artillery 299–300, 330n16; South-Western
242; 7th Cavalry 327n1; 18th DBAD 30–3, 42, 45, 51, 53, 66, 69, 73, 75,
51; 21st Tank 59–61, 317n17; 31st 81, 107, 115, 118–23, 125, 131,
Indep Artillery 70; 32nd Rifle 70; 135, 294, 298, 300; Stalingrad
41st Indep AA 70; 59th Indep AA 103–4, 106, 108, 297; Steppe 126,
70; 63rd Guards Rifle 161; 66th 129–31, 133, 135, 299–300; Trans-
Cavalry 79; 68th Cavalry 79; 110th Baikal 274–5, 276, 277, 277–80,
Rifle 80; 113th Rifle 80; 312th Rifle 278, 303; Transcaucasian 92, 296;
70; 128th Rifle 59–61; 180th Rifle Volkhov 88, 115, 159–61, 218,
226; 204th Rifle 129; 309th Rifle 222–3, 233, 297–8, 301; Voronezh
129; 311th Rifle 59–61; 316th Rifle 115, 125–6, 128, 128–31, 133, 134,
70; 327th Rifle 88, 159 298–300; Western 30–2, 42, 45,
Red Army, formations and units, 47–8, 65, 69–70, 72–3, 75, 79,
fortified districts 33–4, 40, 94; 81–2, 85–9, 106, 113, 133, 141,143,
Maloiaroslavets 72; Pskov-Ostrov 141 146, 294–300, 321–2n26
Red Army, formations and units, fronts: Red Army, formations and units,
1st Baltic 231, 231, 233–4, 251, military districts: Arkhangel’sk 32;
300–1; 1st Belorussian 231, 231, Central Asian 32; Far Eastern 31;
236, 247–9, 253–4, 263–8, 264, Kiev Special 40, 51; Leningrad 32,
267, 271–2, 301–2; 1st Far Eastern 40, 141–2; Moscow 63; Odessa 40–1;
275, 276, 277, 277, 278, 303; 1st Pribaltic Special 32, 40; Trans-Baikal
Ukrainian 134–5, 223–5, 233–4, 31–2; Transcaucasus 32; Western
237–8, 247–9, 253–4, 264, 265–8, Special (‘Belorussian’) 32, 40, 47–8
267, 271–2, 300–3; 2nd Baltic 223, Red Army, formations and units,
233–4, 300–2; 2nd Belorussian 231, napravlenii: North-Western 142–3,
231, 233–4, 247, 249, 251, 254, 294; South-Western 78–9, 172, 294;
264, 265–8, 267, 301–3; 2nd Far Western 294
Eastern 275, 276, 277, 278, 278–9, Red Army, formations and units,
303; 2nd Ukrainian 135, 139, 224–6, regiments: 22nd Reserve Air 177;
233–4, 239–40, 242–3, 251, 260, 27th Reserve Air 174, 177; 27th
300, 302–3; 3rd Baltic 223, 233–4, Reserve Rifle 70; 121st AT Artillery
300–2; 3rd Belorussian 229, 230, 70; 126th Fighter Air 174, 177;
231, 231–4, 249, 251, 254–5, 257, 154th Fighter Air 176; 159th Fighter
346 Index
Red Army continued 322n31; guardship Groza 322n31;
Air 176; 222nd Rifle 70; 230th Khar’kov 137; Leningrad 12; Sposobnii
Reserve Rifle 70; 367th AT Artillery 137; submarines 83, 184, 262;
70; 395th AT Artillery 70; 382nd Tashkent 13; Town Class destroyers
Rifle 70; 408th AT Artillery 70; 165, 320n7; Type-7 destroyers 13
421st AT Artillery 70; 452nd Rifle special sections 54–6, 68–9, 103, 114,
70; 584th AT Artillery 70; 587th Air 199, 271, 295, 309
94; 588th Air 94 SPs, German, (Sturmgeschütze): Ferdinand
Riga 30, 32, 221, 229, 240, 302 126
Rikov, A.I. 6 SPs, Soviet: SU-76 96, 275; SU-100
Rokossovskii, K.K. 50–1, 108, 247, 275; ISU-122 257; ISU-152 257, 275
249, 265, 267, 271, 290, 327n1 Stalin, I.V. 1, 3, 5–9, 14–15, 17, 19,
Roosevelt, F.D. 165, 170, 290 27, 29, 36–7, 40–1, 43–50, 54–6,
Rostov-on-Don 52, 79, 99, 101, 107, 58, 61, 63, 71, 75–7, 82, 86, 89,
108, 124, 290, 296–7, 299 91–5, 97, 100, 102–4, 106, 108,
Rovno 30, 50, 229, 237, 294 111, 113, 115–16, 123–5, 131–2,
RS (Katiusha) 310; use 70, 72, 81, 111, 137–9, 142–3, 146, 148, 159–60,
129–30, 138, 230–1, 251, 266, 267, 163, 167, 171, 179, 183, 193–4,
276 197–200, 211, 220–1, 225, 247–8,
Rumanian forces 30, 33, 35–6, 42, 263, 267–71, 274, 285, 287,
107–8, 115, 208, 221, 226–7, 289–91, 293–5, 307–8, 327n1; 5
239–41, 285, 296, 301–2, 319n20, May 1941 speech 29, 293; 3 July
330n21 1941 speech 49–50, 294; and the
Rundstedt, G. von 79 Allies 49–50, 76–7, 123, 166–7,
Rzhev 91, 98, 107, 113, 117, 124, 299 183, 263, 285; confidence in officer
corps 113–14, 132, 268–71, 290;
‘scorched-earth’ policy: German 134, military leadership 58, 86, 91, 123,
187, 288; Soviet 49, 57, 71, 77–8, 146, 290, 294–5, 330n18: reaction to
144–5, 288, 296 loss of communications with W. Front
Sevastopol’ 52, 98, 107, 137, 227, 229, 47–8, 294
288, 297, 301 Stalingrad 52, 77–8, 97–101, 103–9,
Shaposhnikov, B.M. 44–6, 65–6, 78, 107, 113, 115, 117, 123, 124, 132,
143, 159–60 186, 225, 229, 239, 256, 285, 288,
Shcherbakov, A.S. 47, 71 297–9
Shtemenko, S.M. 3, 131–2, 248, 253–4, Staraia Russa 52, 59, 143, 211, 295
269–70 Stargard 254, 264, 302
Slovak/Slovakia 208, 241, 301 State Defence Committee see GKO
SMERSH 217, 271, 309, 311 Stavka GK: composition 44; formation
Smolensk 52, 63, 107, 124, 213, 228, 44–5
294–5, 300 Stavka VGK: formation 45; increased
Soviet Navy (VMF): limited use of assets realism in operational planning 108;
137, 260, 262; requests for vessels to late-war composition 268–9; role
Allies 168, 322n32; SONAR/ASDIC Stavka reps to fronts 131–2
and 166, 183–4, 322n31 Stavka VK: formation 45
Soviet Navy (VMF) fleets: Baltic 12, 32, supply, as limiting factor in ops:
41, 137, 142, 144–5, 176, 233–4, German 98, 100, 210, 214; Soviet 98,
260, 307; Black Sea 41, 99, 137–8, 112, 117–23, 214, 235–6, 249,
226–7, 233–4, 305; Northern 32, 41, 254–5, 279; see also horses; motor
137, 142, 178, 184, 234, 244, 311, vehicles; railways
322n32: Pacific 277–8, 279
Soviet Navy (VMF), vessels: battleship Tallin 52, 137, 221, 229, 240
Arkhangel’sk 244; Besposhchadnii 137; tanks, German: PzKpfw I 74; PzKpfw
cruiser Murmansk 244; Gromkii II 50, 74; PzKpfw III 50, 74, 317n8:
 Index 347
PzKpfw IV 74, 38, 50, 74: V Panther Group Centre 50–1, 63, 98, 113,
84, 130; VI Tiger 125–6, 130; see also 117, 128, 208–9, 214, 218, 221,
SPs 228–9, 231, 231, 240, 251, 254–5,
tanks, Soviet: BT series 8, 50, 275, 294–5, 297–8, 301; Army Group
317n8: IS series 257; KV series 38, Kurland 241, 254; Army Group
51, 58, 73, 75, 83–4, 147, 275, 308; North 51, 117, 141, 147, 202,
production of 83–4, 95, 186; T-18 8; 206–8, 211, 216, 217, 218, 218,
T-24 8; T-26 8, 50, 275; T-27 8; T- 221, 223, 228, 240–1, 255, 294–5;
28 38; T-34 311; T-35 8, 38; T-37 8; Army Group South 79, 99, 128, 208,
T-70 112; use 38, 51, 73, 75, 112, 218, 294, 296–7; Army Group South
130, 275 Ukraine 240
tanks, Soviet – Lend-Lease: Matilda Wehrmacht, formations and units,
(MK II) 82–5, 172, 173, 177, brigades: 2nd SS 208–9
318n20, 321–2n27; Valentine (MK Wehrmacht, formations and units, Panzer
III) 83–5, 173, 177, 318n20, groups: 1st 51, 294; 2nd 68, 79,
321n26; M3 173, 322n28 295–6; 3rd 68, 79, 295–6; 4th 68,
Tikhvin 52, 107, 146–7, 152, 290, 296 79, 143, 295
Timoshenko, S.K. 24–5, 34, 40–2, Wehrmacht, formations and units,
44–8, 79, 99, 271, 294 regiments: 20th SS Police 272; 27th
trucks see motor vehicles Infantry 209, 216; 356th Infantry
Tula 52, 79, 85, 107 208; 368th Infantry 207; 639th Field
Training 222; 691st Infantry 209;
United Kingdom see Great Britain Cavalry ‘Nord’ 222; SS Führer [begleit]
United States see Roosevelt; Stalin, and 272
the Allies Wehrmacht and allies, formations and
urban warfare 104–5, 77–8, 243, 249, units, armies: 1st Hungarian 252;
251, 254–60, 262, 283–4 2nd Hungarian 298; 1st Panzer 252;
2nd 128; 3rd Panzer 231, 231, 265;
Vasilevskii, A.M. 82, 86, 96, 100, 4th 231, 231, 252; 4th Panzer 109,
105–6, 130–1, 257, 269, 290 117, 128, 223, 249, 256, 265, 298;
Vatunin, N.F. 44–8, 141, 255, 271 6th 109, 113, 115, 117, 132, 239,
Viaz’ma 33, 52, 68–9, 91, 98, 106–7, 253, 256, 296–7, 299; 6th SS Panzer
107, 117, 296, 299 253, 302; 8th Italian 329n7; 9th 113,
Vishinskii, A.I. 46, 269–70 128, 231, 252, 265; 11th 297; 16th
VLKSM see Komsomol 59, 143, 211, 222; 17th 227, 252;
VMF see Soviet Navy 18th 142, 160, 222–3; 20th
Volksturm 248, 313 Mountain 244
Voronezh 52, 101, 107, 115, 117, 124, Wehrmacht and allies, formations and
297–8 units, battalions (Abteilung): 73rd
Voronov, K.E. 18, 44–6, 48, 142–4, Fortress Machine-Gun 256; 74th
270–1, 290, 294, 308 Fortress Machine-Gun 256; 273rd
VVS 313; and ‘Doroga zhizni’ 146, 148, Latvian Police 209; 515th Latvian
176; early-war losses 41, 51, 53, 174; Police 209; 615th Latvian Police 209;
early-war reorganization 58–9; and 651st Special Punishment 222; 656th
Kursk salient 126–8; see also aircraft Pioneer 222; 657th Pioneer 222;
676th Pioneer 222
Waffen SS 117, 236, 240, 313 Wehrmacht and allies, formations and
Warsaw 7, 30, 32, 52, 107, 229, units, corps: 3rd Panzer 136, 224; 3rd
235–6, 247, 253, 301 Rumanian Mountain 208; 4th
Wehrmacht, formations and units, army Infantry (Army) 108; 4th SS Panzer
groups: Army Group A 99–100, 108, 251; 8th Infantry 108; 11th Infantry
117, 249, 251, 252, 253, 297–8; 108; 13th Infantry 236; 14th Panzer
Army Group B 99, 108, 298; Army 108; 17th Panzer 136; 24th Panzer
348 Index
Wehrmacht and allies continued 208; 228th Infantry 208; 232nd
139, 251; 39th Panzer 228; 40th Security 222; 236th Security 222;
Panzer 136; 48th Panzer 108, 128–9; 281st Security 201–2, 202, 206–10;
51st Infantry 108; Grossdeutschland 285th Security 202, 208; 286th
Panzer 253; ‘Slovak Corps’ 241; SS Security 207–8; 290th Luftwaffe Field
Panzer 128–9 222; 295th Infantry 108; 297th
Wehrmacht and allies, formations and Infantry 108; 305th Infantry 108;
units, divisions: 1st Luftwaffe Field 339th Infantry 209; 371st Infantry
222; 1st Rumanian Armoured 240; 108; 376th Infantry 108; 384th
1st Rumanian Cavalry 108; 2nd Infantry 108; 388th Field Training
Luftwaffe Field 222; 2nd Panzer 74, 208; 389th Infantry 108; 390th Field
75; 3rd Panzer 128; 5th Panzer 74, Training 208; 391st Field Training
75; 6th Panzer 256; 8th ‘Light’ 222; 208; 401st Infantry 222; 403rd
10th Panzergrenadier 240; 12th Security 207; 444th Security 208;
Infantry 209, 216, 228; 13th 454th Security 208; 549th Infantry
Luftwaffe Field 222; 14th Panzer 108; 256; 625th Infantry 222; 657th
14th Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ 236; 15th Security 222; 661st Infantry 222; Das
Latvian 222; 16th Panzer 108, 251; Reich Panzer 272; Grossdeutschland
17th Panzer 129, 251; 19th Panzer Panzer 256; Spanish ‘Blue’ 222; SS
128, 139; 20th Rumanian Infantry Police 222
108; 21st ‘Light’ 222; 24th Luftwaffe Weidling, H. 271
Field 222; 24th Panzer 108; 28th women: in military service 92–4; and
‘Light’ 222; 30th Jaeger 207; 44th the partisan war 123, 202
‘Light’ 108; 56th Infantry 256; 69th
Infantry 256; 71st ‘Light’ 108; 76th Zhdanov, A.A. 44, 146–7, 150, 152,
‘Light’ 108; 94th ‘Light’ 108; 95th 157, 161
Infantry 222; 100th ‘Light’ 108; Zhigarev, P.F. 44, 46–7, 146, 148,
101st Infantry 222; 113th Infantry 270
108; 121st Construction 222; 121st Zhitomir 135, 238, 300
‘Light’ 222; 137th Infantry 64; 141st Zhukov, G.K. 34, 40, 42, 44–8, 64–6,
Reserve Infantry 208; 143rd Reserve 72, 81–2, 87, 89, 103, 106, 113,
Infantry 208; 147th Reserve Infantry 131, 142, 144, 225, 247, 253–4,
208; 151st Reserve Infantry 208; 263, 265, 266–7, 269, 271–2, 290,
153rd Field Training 208; 197th 294, 327n1; 15 May war plan and 34;
Infantry 51; 201st Security 208; and El’nia counterattack 64–6; and
203rd Security 208; 207th Security Moscow counterattack 82; and
202, 208; 212th Luftwaffe Field 222; Stalingrad encirclement and
213th Security 207; 221st Security Operation ‘Mars’ 106–7, 113