Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Lessons from the 2019

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
of the MENA REGION

Working Paper
Amel Boubekeur Ishac Diwan

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Lessons from the 2019

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
of the MENA REGION

Working Paper
Amel Boubekeur Ishac Diwan

© All Rights Reserved. Beirut, May 2025.

This Working Paper is published by the Issam Fares Institute for Public
Policy & International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut
and is available on the following website: http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi.
The views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors, and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Issam Fares Institute for Public
Policy & International Affairs.

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

About the Authors

Amel Boubekeur is a political sociologist and a research fellow at the Middle
East Institute and the Arab Reform Institute. She is also the co-director of
the Research Group in Algerian Studies. She also teaches at the American
University of Paris (AUP). Her research focuses on Maghreb countries
politics, political economy and Islam in Europe. She has been a CNRS /
Iremam research fellow, a visiting fellow in the Middle East and North
Africa programme at the European Council of Foreign Relations, a research
associate at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and the Centre Jacques
Berque, a non-resident fellow at the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (SWP-Berlin), a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha
Center, a resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut and
the head of the Islam and Europe Programme at the Centre for European
Policy Studies in Brussels.

Boubekeur has taught at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS), Stanford

University, University of Caen, IREMAM, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
University, Cairo University and the Euro-Mediterranean University of Fez.
She is the author of “Whatever Happened to the Islamists?,” “European
Islam: The Challenges for Society and Public Policy,” and “Le voile de la
mariée”.

Amel Boubekeur is the author of three books and around 40 articles

(including in peer-reviewed journals Contemporary Islam, Mediterranean
Politics, The Journal of North African Studies, The Year of the Maghreb,
Archives en Sciences Sociales des Religions, History of Religions, etc). She
is a member of the Scientific Committee of the Journal of Law, Society and
Power (in Arabic) and she was previously a member of the Editorial Board
of the journal Politics, Religion & Ideology.

Ishac Diwan is a Professor of Practice in Economics at the American

University of Beirut since 2024. He is also the Research Director of the
Finance for Development Lab at the Paris School of Economics, and in
charge of the Political Economy program of the Economic Research Forum,
an association of Middle East social scientists. Diwan has held in recent
years teaching positions at Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, Columbia
University, School for International Public Affairs, and at the Harvard
Kennedy School.

Ishac Diwan received his PhD in Economics from the University of California
at Berkeley. He taught international finance at the New York University’s
Business School before joining the World Bank, working in the Research
Complex (1987-92), the Middle East department (1992-96), and the World
Bank Institute (1996-2002). He was the World Bank’s Country Director for
East (2002-07), and then West Africa (2007-11).

His current research interests focus on the political economy of the Middle
East, as well as on broader development issues, and international financial
issues. His recent (co-authored) books include A Political Economy of the
Middle East (Westview Press 2015); and Crony Capitalism in the Middle
East (Oxford University Press, 2019). He is widely published in a variety of
journals (see https://ishacdiwan.com/).

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Table of Contents

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Introduction 6

A Synthesis – Genesis, Character, and Impact of the Social Movements of 2019 7

First Panel: Rethinking the Social Movements of 2019-2020 10

Second Panel: Gender in Transformation & Politics 14

Third Panel: Where has the Thawra Gone? 19

Fourth Panel: What do we learn from the 2019 Social Movements 23

Speakers’ Biographies 28

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Introduction
The social movements that emerged in 2019 across Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan, often referred to as “Hirak” or “Thawra”,
marked a significant turning point in the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Building on the
legacy of the 2011 Arab Spring, these movements demonstrated a renewed push for political change and social justice. While they
did not achieve their immediate goals of regime change, they unleashed important social and political dynamics that are likely to
shape the region’s future for decades to come.

Between 2020 and 2022, the Economic Research Forum (ERF) organized a research program to create intellectual production useful
for the social movements in these four countries. The project involved multi-sectoral country teams focused on developing national
visions for the future. This effort resulted in numerous working papers and publications covering broad visions for the economy and
polity, as well as in specific sectors such as health, education, governance, democratization, and the environment.

As part of this process, a series of webinars organized by Amel Boubekeur and Ishac Diwan brought together research teams and
scholars from the four countries to compare notes and exchange ideas on the evolution of these social movements. The conversations
summarized in this paper brought together fifteen distinguished experts from academia and civil society.

The discussions, held over two years, punctuated the main phases of the Hirak/Thawras.The first two meetings reflected the happiness
of people coming together in the public squares, and the enchantment of the early political gains. The discussion in this first phase
focused on the genesis of the movement, the characteristics of the participants, the implication of the large women participation, and
the movements’ demands.

Over time, spring turned to winter, first with the onset of Covid19, then followed by harsh repression, ushering autocratic restorations
in Algeria and Iraq, civil war in Sudan, and economic collapse in Lebanon. The focus of the last 2 discussions shifted to the reasons
for the failure of the movements to achieve tangible goals, and finally, to the implications for the future.
Today, the echoes of the 2019 uprisings can be seen in the continuing unrest in Syria and Lebanon. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria
has exposed the limits of authoritarian resilience, demonstrating that brute force cannot indefinitely suppress public dissatisfaction.
In Lebanon, political paralysis and economic collapse have led to a long-awaited shift in governance, with the appointment of Nawaf
Salam as prime minister, made possible by the election to Parliament in 2022 of a group of MPs issued from the 2019 uprisings. The
Hirak movements did not bring immediate systemic change, but they contributed to the erosion of old regimes, the delegitimization
of entrenched elites, and the cultivation of a new political consciousness across the region. The crises in Syria and Lebanon today
illustrate both a reckoning with the past and a continuation of the struggles that began in 2011. They serve as a reminder that the
forces unleashed by these movements remain active, and that the drive for change among the youth is far from over.
In what follows, we start with drawing a short synthesis of the main points raised in these discussions, organized thematically. We
then follow with a summary of the four discussions themselves. Our hope is that two years after the close of this chapter in these
countries’ history, there would be sufficient distance to draw the main lessons for the future.

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

A Synthesis – Genesis, In Algeria, Naoual Belakhdar highlighted the massive presence

of women in the Hirak, which corresponded to a simultaneous

Character, and Impact of

renewal of the feminist movement. She observed: “This led
to contradictory dynamics between celebrations of women’s
role and paternalistic idealization or violent exclusion. Strong
the Social Movements of feminist groups emerged - they have even been accused of
diverting the Hirak from its objective. But they managed to

2019 resist, keep their ground, and create self-defense groups - such as
shelters for young girls.” The Algerian case demonstrated how
women’s participation challenged both the authoritarian political
Genesis and Characteristics of the Movements system and patriarchal societal norms. Women used their bodies
to perform resistance, such as wearing traditional clothes and
The 2019 movements emerged from a context of long-standing painting Amazigh symbols when carrying the Amazigh flag was
grievances and broken social contracts between states and prohibited.
citizens. During the inaugural panel titled “Rethinking the Arab
Social Movement of 2019-2020” (June 14, 2021), Ishac Diwan In Iraq, Zahra Ali emphasized the importance of space in shaping
identified three main sources of discontent across the region: the protests and the feminist imagination. She noted: “In Sahat
al-Tahrir as in the main squares all around the country, people
• Persistence of repression and lack of freedom under occupied and re-appropriated these spaces, creating a kind of
authoritarian regimes. utopian, miniature society where people meet to negotiate a new
• Gradual rollback of the state and deterioration of public social contract, while offering each other all kinds of services.”
services. This re-appropriation of public space became a powerful symbol
• High unemployment and frustrated expectations among of the movements’ aspirations for a new social and political
educated youth. order, with women playing a central role in this transformation.

Gilbert Achcar elaborated on the economic dimension: “The In Sudan, Nada Ali highlighted the role of women, particularly
rollback of the state accelerated from the 90s onward with the tea sellers, in the recent uprising. She noted that women’s
implementation of neoliberal reforms. The private sector did participation was not initially framed in feminist terms, but
not pick up and compensate for the withdrawal of the state and as the movement progressed, women realized the need for
remained dominated by crony capitalism. The region ended with greater representation: “After the start of negotiations with
rates of growth per capita lower than most of Asia and Africa, Bashir’s security committee, women realized that there were not
resulting in the highest regional rate of youth unemployment represented, and they organized a demonstration at Midan al-
in the world.” A key feature of the 2019 movements was Etissam, the headquarters of the Sudanese army, to demand a
their largely leaderless and decentralized nature, especially in more meaningful role.” The Sudanese case also demonstrated
Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon. This characteristic, seen as both how women’s participation in preparing and distributing food
a strength and weakness, allowed for the emergence of a new during the protests became a form of political action, allowing
political culture and national identity from the bottom-up. for the sharing of experiences and ideas for a future Sudan.
However, it also made it difficult to translate street protests into
concrete political change. The movements were characterized In Lebanon, Rola El-Husseini noted that women played a
by massive popular participation across social classes, including crucial role in making the demonstrations feel safer, which
significant involvement of women and youth. In the context attracted families with children. Women also acted as “shields,”
of Sudan, Ibrahim El Badawi noted that: “the protests were protecting male protesters from security forces: “We saw several
predominantly led by young people under 30 who demonstrated instances of women surrounding men to diffuse tensions. They
an unprecedented willingness to sacrifice their lives.” wanted to ensure that the demonstrations did not become violent
and give reason for the former warlords who are in charge to
The demands focused on fundamental political change rather instigate a new civil war.”
than just reforms, with protesters recognizing that meaningful
change could not be achieved under existing regimes. There Across all four countries, the movements saw women reclaiming
was a strong emphasis on anti-corruption and calls for an end public spaces that were often forbidden to them, challenging
to crony capitalism and sectarian political systems. Eva Bellin patriarchal norms, and bringing issues such as gender-based
highlighted the importance of non-violence in the demonstrations violence and LGBTQ+ rights to the forefront of political
and the role of the coercive apparatus in determining the success discourse. The increased visibility and participation of women
or failure of the movements: “The nature of the coercive in these movements have had lasting impacts:
apparatus and its relationship to the regime is crucial in shaping
the trajectory of these movements.” • Challenging traditional gender roles and stereotypes
• Bringing women’s rights and gender equality to the center
Women’s Empowerment and Gender Dynamics of political debates
• Fostering new forms of feminist organizing and solidarity
A significant aspect of the 2019 social movements across the • Highlighting the intersectionality of gender issues with
MENA region was the unprecedented participation and visibility broader political and economic demands.
of women. This marked a notable shift from previous movements
and highlighted the intersectionality of gender issues with However, challenges remain. In some cases, women’s
broader political and social demands. participation was met with backlash, including increased
repression and attempts to sideline gender issues in favor of

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

broader political goals. The long-term impact of women’s Women’s empowerment: The movements saw unprecedented
involvement in these movements on gender equality and participation of women, challenging patriarchal norms. Strong
women’s rights in the region remains to be seen, but it has feminist groups emerged, managing to resist, keep their ground,
undoubtedly opened new possibilities for feminist activism and and create self-defense groups.
gender-inclusive political change.
Weakening of old ideologies: Both Arab nationalism and
Reasons for Limited Success political Islam have been challenged by new forms of civic
activism. While political Islam has mobilized millions over the
Despite their size and intensity, the movements largely failed past 40 years, this phase may be coming to an end.
to achieve their core demand of fundamental political change.
Several reasons can be identified for this limited success: Need for economic vision: Future movements will need clearer
economic programs to address underlying grievances. The
State repression: Regimes used various tactics to suppress economic question is a crucial part of the reflection moving
the movements, from violent crackdowns to taking advantage forward.
of the COVID-19 pandemic to clear the streets. In Algeria,
there was a significant campaign of repression, with political Importance of organization: While leaderless movements can
demonstrations being forbidden. Political demonstrations were spark change, organized political forces are needed to sustain it.
already forbidden in Algiers since the so-called Black Spring Several participants noted the emergence of new political parties
2001. The Hirak managed to circumvent the de facto prohibition and civil society organizations in the aftermath of the protests.
and to impose people‘s presence in the street in 2019. The
regime took advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to bring the Gradual change: Given the resilience of regimes, change is
Hirak to a halt in March 2020. Before the official prohibition, likely to be a long-term process requiring strategic patience.
demonstrators themselves decided to observe a sanitary pause. Arab revolutions should be viewed as a protracted process that
The regime took advantage of the self-imposed demobilisation. may unfold over decades.

Leaderless nature: While initially a strength, the lack of Broader Implications and the Value of
clear leadership became a constraint on achieving results. The Cross-Country Dialogue
leaderless nature of the movements, particularly in Lebanon,
mirrored a romanticized view of such movements, which, as The discussions also allowed for a broader comparative analysis
seen in other regions, often leads to failure. of these movements within the context of the MENA region’s
political evolution.
Social divisions: Pre-existing societal cleavages re-emerged
over time, allowing regimes to divide the opposition. In Lessons from 2011 and 2019: One of the key insights that
Lebanon, after a few months of revolts, the political system was emerged from these discussions was the importance of not
able to divide society and the movement along the cleavages that rushing into elections in the aftermath of popular uprisings. As
the movement was attempting to overcome. noted in the discussions, “rushing to the ballot box can be a tool
for old systems to reassert themselves.” This observation reflects
Economic factors: In oil-producing countries like Algeria, a growing understanding that sustainable political change
higher oil prices allowed regimes to maintain patronage networks requires more than just formal democratic procedures.
and resist demands for change. The Algerian regime benefited
from higher prices on international oil markets. Economics central: The discussions also highlighted the
need to focus more on economic issues in future movements.
Geopolitics: Unlike in 2011, there was limited external support This point underscores the interconnectedness of political and
for the movements. In Sudan, the political situation was further economic reforms.
complicated by external interventions, including a United
Nations envoy who did not manage to diffuse existing tensions. External actors: The role of external support for civil society
was debated, with participants noting that such support can be a
Significance for the future double-edged sword. While international solidarity can bolster
movements, it can also be used by regimes to delegitimize
Despite these setbacks, participants argued that the movements protesters as foreign agents.
represented the start of a long-term revolutionary process with
significant impacts: State-Society Relations: An interesting comparison emerged
between different state-society configurations in the region. As
Political awakening: There is increased awareness about one participant observed, “Iraq and Syria have a very strong,
rights, inequality, and the need for change that will be difficult brutal state and a very weak society. Lebanon has a very weak
to reverse. Arab revolutions should be viewed as a protracted state and a strong society.” This diversity in state-society
process that may unfold over decades. relations helps explain the different trajectories and outcomes.

New political generation: A new cohort of politically engaged Long-term Impact and Future Prospects
youth has emerged with different values and visions for the
future. The Tishreen movement in Iraq, for example, saw the The discussions highlighted several developments that are likely
emergence of a dynamic political generation, a quality that only to shape the region’s future:
existed in the recent past in top-down movements.

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

• The failures of the past have not addressed, and they have
become exacerbated by the rise of social movements.
Grievances fester and cannot be buried – clear signs of
unhappiness can be seen in low turnout of elections meant
to legitimize autocrats abroad.
• There is a risk that part of the opposition will become violent
if peaceful means continue to fail.
• There is also likely to be harsher repression in the future,
facilitated by new technologies like AI and increased
control over social media.

Implications for Theory of Change

Participants proposed a dual-track approach to political struggle:

• A peaceful track involving democratic, cultural, and even

parliamentary work.
• A continuation of street-based protest movements.

There was also recognition of the need to change society first,

resolving social splits (religious/secular divides, addressing past
crimes) before attempting rapid political change.

In conclusion, while the 2019 movements did not achieve

their immediate goals of regime change, they have unleashed
important social and political dynamics that are likely to
shape the region’s future. The discussions provided a forum
for analyzing these dynamics, contributing to a more nuanced
and comprehensive understanding of the complex processes of
political and social change in the region.

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

First Panel
RETHINKING THE SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS of 2019-2020
June 14, 2021
The session focused on the social movements in Algeria, Iraq,
Lebanon, and Sudan. The questions we wanted to think about
include the sources of grievances, the goals of these movements,
their structure, and the conditions for success. In doing so, we also
aimed to draw parallels with the Arab Spring of 2011.

The session, chaired by Amel Boubekeur, had four speakers:

Ishac Diwan, reflecting on the political economic dynamics of

these movements.

Gilbert Achcar, asking if the mobilization paradigms used for the

Arab Spring apply to the most recent movements.

Eva Bellin, reflecting on how the concept of autocratic resilience is

still relevant today.

Seteney Shami, focusing on notion of crisis and the importance of

knowledge creation.

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Ishac Diwan demonstrates how new bottom-up identities are formed in

action. Street movements require groups to “negotiate” their
I would focus on three issues of interest: the genesis of slogans with those around them, creating a process of discovery
grievances, the meanings of leaderless social movements, and a and shaping a more inclusive national identity.
comparison between 2019 and 2011.
There are important differences between the social movements
We still lack a comprehensive understanding of the grievances of 2011 and 2019. The 2011 revolts came on the heels of a period
driving these movements, partly due to the limited focus of of relatively high growth, albeit non-inclusive. While 2011 could
opinion polls on protesters. In Iraq, however, there are now data be called the revolution of dignity, the 2019 revolutions were
sets polling large numbers of protesters. The slogan Khubz, much more driven by poverty and hunger. The very low recent
Hurriya, wa Adala Ijtima’iya (Bread, Freedom, and Social economic outcomes resemble the 1980s more than the 2010s.
Justice) points to several recurring sources of grievances. Since then, the economies have deteriorated further, including
because of COVID. Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Algeria are cases in
The first is repression, indignity, and a lack of freedom. Over point. In these countries, governments must reduce expenditure,
time, many regimes have increasingly used repression as a at a time when growth is falling, and political risk is further
governance tool, especially leading up to 2011. taxing investments. The street is inflamed, and it is unlikely that
reforms will be put in place to grow the economy, even though
The second source is the rollback of the state. In Egypt, public this is what’s ultimately needed. The protesters don’t trust the
expenditure as a share of GDP was 60% when Mubarak took government and fear that the proposed reforms will only help
over, and 30% when he left. As the state shrank, services like repressive regimes renew themselves. There is a risk of a falling
health, education, and infrastructure were slashed, leading to deep into a poverty/repression trap.
petty corruption and growing inequalities. The wealthy turned to
private schools and hospitals, while the poor faced deteriorating Gilbert Achcar
public services. This not only increased social inequality but
also diminished social mobility, further frustrating those denied The rollback of the state accelerated from the 90s onward with
equal access. the implementation of neoliberal reforms. The private sector did
not pick up and compensate for the withdrawal of the state and
The third aspect is the economy. After the modernist post- remained dominated by crony capitalism. The region ended with
independence states, development strategies broke down in the rates of growth per capita lower than most of Asia and Africa,
1980s, leading to the structural adjustment programs of the 1990s resulting in the highest regional rate of youth unemployment in
that rolled back the state and liberalized markets. This marked the world. The economic conditions in 2019 were even worse
a significant shift in the social contract and the underlying than in 2011. The instability caused by the revolutionary process
political settlement, as the regime’s alliances with key societal that started in 2011 is such that they will keep degrading.
actors changed. This shift gave rise to new grievances tied to Uncertainty and instability created by the process itself add to
crony capitalism, where large firms were owned by companies the general conditions that lead to low rates of growth.
close to the rulers.
In terms of social movements, there are clear differences
The result was a small formal private sector, stark dualism between 2011 and 2019, notably in the weaker role of Islamic
between formal and informal sectors, and between big cities and forces in 2019 and the more prominent role of women. While
rural areas. This imbalance led to the rise of billionaires. Most both waves used new information technologies, networking is
educated youth couldn’t find good jobs, leading to high youth different from organizing, which requires some degree of central
unemployment and low returns on education. Many ended up decision-making. However, the movements were overall less
in the informal economy, facing low wages and poverty. The leaderless than they appeared. They were actually very much
inequality among the rich (1% to 10%) contrasts with widespread driven by political forces. Egypt’s Uprising started as a rally
equality in poverty, leaving the middle-class youth frustrated, as called for by 17 political parties on 25 January 2011, which the
education failed to deliver the expected opportunities. In reality, Muslim Brotherhood officially joined three days later.
Gini coefficients remain low partly because education hasn’t
provided a clear path to upward mobility. There was actually a broad range of class/social forces involved
in the uprisings of 2011 and 2019. These can be described as
The leaderless feature of the movements has been criticized for a revolt of civil society against the state, with the state here
the failure of the uprising to build a new political landscape. including its social clientele, crony capitalists, and the rest of the
But it is very dangerous to try to change a well-established state’s immediate constituency. The prominent role of the labor
autocratic and repressive political order, which made leaderless movement has also been crucial. It’s no coincidence that Tunisia,
contestation a necessity, at least initially. On the positive side, the first country to manage to get rid of a president, is the only
leaderless movements allow space for the emergence of a new country in the MENA region, where there is a strong, powerful,
political and social culture and a new national identity—key to organized labor movement which is largely autonomous from
driving long-term change. These new values help counter the the state. The latter had some control over the top of the labor
hegemonic narratives pushed by ruling classes and regimes movement, but not over the rank and file. And they played a
through top-down ideologies. Starting with Arab nationalism, crucial role in the uprising. Likewise, in Sudan in 2019, the
these regimes transformed citizens into docile clients through professional association played a crucial role in the uprising. In
official discourse, religious institutions, and the education Egypt and Bahrain too, the labor movement was very much part
system. Research shows that education promoted values like of the process at the beginning, before repression was unleashed
respect for authority, political quietism, and lack of participation in Bahrain.
in social action, all while upholding patriarchy. The Hirak

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Even when apparently leaderless, ad-hoc networks or coalitions Second, the coercive apparatus must not shoot at protesters. If
coordinated the movement. However, these movements in it chooses to side with the regime and use violence, the game is
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria later fractured due to the lack over. The behavior of the coercive apparatus depends on three
of unified vision on the alternative to the existing regime. factors. First, are its members invested in the regime’s survival,
Truly leaderless movements in Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon through patrimonial ties (as in Syria), economic privileges
were weakened by their lack of leadership and coordination. (like Bahrain’s military), or ideology (as for the generals in
Sudan was different, combining several types of coordination: Tiananmen Square and the Communist Party in China)? Second,
political (the Freedom and Change forces), labor (the Sudanese is there social distance between the apparatus and the protesters
Professional Association coalition), and youth (the Resistance in terms of class, ethnicity, or religion? The more similar they
Committees), although it faced a major obstacle: the armed are, the less likely violence will occur. Third, has the regime
apparatuses of the state. Radical change often requires a strong successfully coup-proofed the independent power of the
revolutionary legitimacy (counter-hegemony) or external defeats coercive apparatus for instance by rotating officers or creating
in wars that shatter the armed forces. In 1979, Iran’s revolution multiple militias to prevent independent power? These factors
succeeded thanks to a counter-hegemonic religious leadership explain why Tunisia’s military did not shoot at protesters, while
that won over a significant part of the state. Syria’s and Bahrain’s did.

In Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, where the patrimonial state is Third, leadership is crucial. There was much celebration of
owned by ruling families, overthrowing the regime without the leaderless nature of the Arab Spring, but real change,
war is impossible. In neo-patrimonial states like Tunisia, Egypt, beyond bringing down the dictator, requires leaders who are
Algeria, and Sudan, the armed forces can overthrow the president ideologically committed, have credibility within civil society,
when he becomes a liability, preempting a revolution with a and can mobilize to pressure opposing forces to build democratic
coup d’état. So, the road to change is still very long. However, institutions. Tunisia had such leaders, like Hussein Abassi and
the deep-rooted regional structural crisis that exploded in 2011 Rashid Ghannouchi, who helped build democratic institutions
is only the beginning of a long-term revolutionary process. with their deep networks in civil society, the trade union
Without radical change, the alternative is more tragedies and movement, and the Islamist movement. Where that leadership
degeneration to come. was absent, as in Egypt, the downfall of the autocrat did not
make way for the rise of democracy, but just paved the way to
Eva Bellin the rise of another autocrat.

I am intrigued by whether the trajectories that we see in this What do these lessons from 2011 tell us about today’s movements
current wave are different from the trajectories that we see in the in Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and Algeria? Are their protests large,
Arab Spring of 2010 to 2012, and what conceptual insights we peaceful, and costly? Is the coercive apparatus invested in regime
might bring from the past to understanding the present. survival, and why? Is there credible leadership with strong roots
in civil society? Two factors distinguish today’s protests from
All three cases involved mass protests that were sudden, those of a decade ago. First, people have learned from the past.
contagious, and powerful. However, the uprisings across the Regimes, like Sisi’s in Egypt, have become more repressive,
Arab world took different paths. Some, like Syria, Libya, and with mass arrests, disappearances, and media shutdowns to
Yemen, turned violent in the face of harsh repression. Others, prevent large protests. Second, social media, once celebrated as
like Bahrain, were utterly repressed. In Tunisia and Egypt, an enabler of protests, is now being used by regimes to repress
dictatorships fell, but only Tunisia transitioned to democracy. opposition, whether through cyber surveillance or through
These countries followed different trajectories, and I expect control and perversion of communication among people on
similar diversity in the outcomes for Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq, and these sites. This new dynamic is a critical and terrifying aspect
Algeria today. of modern mobilization.

There are some generalizable patterns from 2011 that apply to Seteney Shami
2019. For change to occur, protests must be large, nonviolent,
and costly to the regime, coercive apparatus must not shoot at I am going to focus on how knowledge about social movements
the people, and there must be credible leadership with deep roots and the current crisis is produced in the region. My fellow
in civil society for protests to lead to institutional change. panelists have discussed the dislocations, disruptions, and
fragmentations happening in the region and globally. The
First, protests must be large, nonviolent, and costly to the regime. COVID pandemic has amplified these issues, revealing a deeper
Small protests are easy for regimes to ignore or repress like lack of trust in state authorities, inequalities, and the suffering of
the Kifaya movement protests on the steps of the government marginalized communities.
buildings during the Mubarak era. Nonviolence is critical because
violence invites repression. More importantly, protests must be What’s the status of research in light of these crises, the fall of
costly for the regime, making it difficult for them to simply wait old orders, and the rise of new hegemonies? How are research
it out. For example, in Serbia, Milosevic waited out the 1996 communities and institutions adapting to demands for new
protests, but in 2000, when protesters allied with striking coal knowledge? There is a need for qualitatively different knowledge
workers, they couldn’t be ignored. In Algeria, the problem is rather than traditional knowledge. This can be categorized
that the protests are not costly enough for the regime to act. The as academic knowledge, media knowledge, and civil society
authorities are waiting for protesters to exhaust themselves and knowledge.
have to go back to work.
We are witnessing new antagonisms and struggles for regional
influence, as well as complex interstate rivalries. These regional

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

trends occur within an increasingly unstable global order. Ishac Diwan

Instability is not just regional, but global, with a co-construction
of instability at both levels. The focus on war and conflict often The economic model has not worked well for decades, and this
overshadows the region’s significant role in mediating global is a major cause of political and social problems in the region.
networks of trade, logistics, infrastructure, and finance. We must Despite its failure in the 1980s and 90s, the new model that was
revisit older literature to understand regional inequalities and constructed was also ineffective, leading to the crisis in 2011.
dependencies being created. Intellectuals need to develop a convincing vision for where these
societies should go. Countries like Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria,
Gilbert Achqar and Iraq are living far below their potential. They must organize
differently to improve their situation. The goal isn’t to return to
The cases where you can speak of leaderless movements are 60% GDP state expenditure but to create a larger economic pie,
Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq. In these countries, there is no clear improve productivity, and foster innovation, meritocracy, and
epicenter or coordination. Some see this as a matter of pride, but competition. Now is the time to debate these issues and converge
it’s in fact a weakness. It stems from a lack of trust among actors on a “progressive” vision for the future.
who agree on opposing the common enemy but don’t agree on
what to build instead. In Algeria, while the movement was large, A key failure has been the fear of autocrats to open-up to the
it posed no real threat to the military. They used COVID to crack private sector. Progress requires a more competitive, meritocratic
down—occupying squares couldn’t bring down the regime. If private sector. Economic thinking has been driven by politics
you can’t strike at the heart of power, you get stuck in a “war of rather than focusing on growing the pie. In Lebanon, the old
position” rather than a “war of movement.” model with capital flowing in like a river is dead. In Algeria and
All other cases had some coordination—Syria’s local committees Iraq, oil will not flow in forever, now that the carbon transition
acted as leadership, and Egypt and Tunisia had coordination has started . It will be crucial to imagine new, more productive
and leadership too. Sudan is the most advanced, combining economic models throughout the region.
political, social, and labor coalitions with youth networking. The
challenge in Sudan is dissension within the political coalition, But minds remained focused on more symbolic goals. In Sudan,
fueled by the military and its backers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the economy has collapsed with hyperinflation, but the popular
UAE). Sudan faces a formidable, entrenched military, making opposition that has sacrificed many martyrs for revolution is led
optimism difficult. by old communists who oppose the private sector and subsidy
Regarding non-violence, we can’t place all responsibility on the reform, and as a result, the inability of the transitional government
protesters. Everywhere, they tried to remain peaceful. But when to stabilize the economy has been the revolution’s Achilles’
facing an entrenched power willing to crush movements, their heel. In Tunisia, the unions that helped deliver democracy have
choices narrow to surrender or civil war. This happened in Syria, continued a corporatist approach - demanding higher wages the
where the regime escalated repression, pushing the movement economy can afford.
into war. Myanmar saw similar patterns—starting peacefully
but forced to align with armed movements. At some point, I would also stress the role of armies. As Eva and Gilbert
movements face no other alternative mentioned, armies may shoot people to protect the regimes that
employ them. In Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan, however, armies act
I want to emphasize the difficulty of Sudan’s task. Their in their corporate interests, not necessarily shooting at people
strongest component is coordination between the resistance but manipulating situations for their long-term gain. Armies are
committees and the Sudanese Professional Association.But the now controlling the economy, much like autocrats and private
political forces often collaborate with the military, and seem sector elites did in the past, at the cost of keeping the national
willing to fully dismantle the military dictatorship. Tunisia is a pie small. In Algeria, during the oil boom, Bouteflika increased
simpler case—there is no strong military dictatorship, and labor army spending to 15% of oil revenues. When oil prices dropped,
unions and civil society are powerful enough to neutralize the this became 30% of oil revenues. A democratic system would
police state. In Sudan, despite strong youth networks, they face threaten the army’s lifestyle. Their coup is now largely driven by
a vicious enemy. corporatist motives.

In June 2019, the military tried to crush the movement, but a

general strike and civil disobedience paralyzed the economy,
forcing the military into compromise. However, this compromise
has been gradually eroded by the military, leaving the movement
struggling to regain momentum.

COVID played a counterrevolutionary role, aggravating the

crisis that has worsened since 2011. The pandemic exacerbated
an already deep structural crisis. In places like Lebanon, where
the economic system is crumbling, the region has entered a
prolonged revolutionary process marked by destabilization. This
vicious cycle of economic and social crises will continue unless
the movements find a way forward.

13
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Second Panel
GENDER in Transformation
& Politics
July 5, 2021
This session focused on the place of women in the revolutionary
processes of 2019 in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan, drawing on
comparisons with the Arab Spring of 2011.

Amel Boubekeur chaired, and there were four speakers:

Naoual Belakhdar focusing on Gendering the Algerian Hirak.

Zahra Ali speaking about the Iraqi uprising and the feminist
imagination.

Nada Ali discussing the role of women in the Sudan revolution.

Rola El Husseini covering Lebanon.

14
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Naoual Belakhdar As repression increased, some female political prisoners

became symbols of resistance. There was also repression aimed
The Algerian Hirak, rooted in previous mobilizations, stands specifically at discouraging young women’s participation
at the crossroads of various temporalities. It represents a through humiliating body searches, torture, and rape. These
moment of rupture where gender, class, ideological, and accusations were brought forth by a young activist, breaking the
generational cleavages were questioned. Though the Hirak taboo of the violated male honor by speaking out, leading to the
did not launch a clear transition process, it brought important creation of the Committee Against Torture.
societal transformations. Intense political mobilization induces
renegotiations of norms and power between state and society. The Hirak featured different levels of participation by ordinary
These ruptures, experienced by many individuals, introduced women and activists. This included acts of solidarity by
new ways of being and new conflicts. housewives distributing food and drinks to demonstrators, and
transgressive practices like wearing traditional clothes and
The massive presence of women was a key feature of the Amazigh symbols when the Amazigh flag was banned. Balconies,
Hirak. This renewal of the feminist movement rose against serving as semi-private spaces, became platforms for women to
both authoritarian systems and patriarchal norms. This led to cheer on protesters, while older women, or hajjas, encouraged
contradictory dynamics, with women’s roles celebrated but also the crowds. Women re-appropriated public space, and some
idealized or objectified. Drawing from ethnographic fieldwork artists organized debate circles and performances in popular
done mainly in Algiers and academic literature, I explore the areas. Women, in some instances, protected male protesters
ambivalent gender dynamics during these mass protests through from the police, creating a transgressive situation. Many women
the acts of resistance of ordinary women and the mobilization of described a strong sense of liberation and collective belonging
feminist collectives. for the first time.

A gendered lens helps interrogate social change and political Moments of upheaval and political transition provide both
transformation. The Hirak was triggered by President opportunities and challenges for women. The Hirak renewed
Bouteflika’s candidacy for a fifth term, despite his physical feminist activism, with feminists fostering new trans-
incapacity. This announcement catalyzed simmering discontent generational connections, all determined to protect their struggle
with the political system and the exhaustion of the material from being sidelined—an echo of what happened after the War
and symbolic legitimacy of the regime. The weakening of the of Liberation, where women who had fought were relegated to
patriarchal bargain, linked to the inability of the patriarch to the private sphere and stripped of their rights by a discriminatory
provide and control, was also a factor. family law. In response, feminist groups organized a “feminist
block” every Friday in Algiers, Wahran, and Béjaïa, continuing a
One paradox of the Hirak was its use of peaceful methods to long history of resistance against patriarchy, colonialism, armed
demand radical change. This enabled a broad coalition across Islamist groups, and misogyny. Their demands focused on full
class, gender, ideological, and generational lines. Women gender equality and the abolition of family law.
played a massive role, a phenomenon rarely seen before in
Algeria, despite a rich history of female activism in the National However, some civil society activists argued that demands for
Liberation, the democratic movements of the 70s-80s, protests women’s rights threatened the unity of the Hirak and would
for transitional justice and public sector demands, and fracking divide the movement. This led to conflicts over who could speak
in the South. The scope of female presence in the Hirak was for the Hirak and set its agenda, highlighting the difficulties
remarkable, as was the repertoire of actions they engaged in. faced by heterogeneous mass movements after their initial goals
are met (such as the departure of Bouteflika).
Women’s massive presence triggered ambivalent reactions.
Some commentators noted that the involvement of women One of the main challenges the feminist movement faced was
helped legitimize street protests, reduce violent aspects, and increasing repression, which made free debate nearly impossible,
diminish the “Baltagi effect”. However, some celebrations of especially against the backdrop of an unresolved, conflictual
their active involvement reduced them to aesthetic elements, past. Despite hardships and violent opposition—many women
with phrases like “thanks to the women, the Hirak flourished,” were physically assaulted and harassed online—women
circulating iconic pictures of attractive women holding flags. continued to maintain their block in the weekly marches. There
This tended to undermine their agency and courageous challenge were clear positive outcomes, including the reconfiguration of
to patriarchal norms. the feminist movement at a national level. Unlike other political
organizations, feminists invested in organizing effectively. In
Among the central figures, the Mujahedats—former war the end, all demonstrators—whether symbols of resistance,
veterans—stand out, such as Djamila Bouhired, a living icon figures of subversion, or ordinary citizens cooking, dancing, and
of the National Liberation War. Her participation symbolized protesting with men against the police—collectively acted as
continuity with the revolutionary past, highlighting the what Asef Bayat terms a “non-movement.” Through individual
illegitimacy of the current regime, accused of hijacking the actions, they collectively challenged and renegotiated norms,
struggle for independence. Other key figures included the sparking real change. Despite feelings of defeat, with protests
mothers of the Haragas (those who illegally crossed the now banned in Algeria, it’s important to view the uprising as part
Mediterranean) and the mothers of the disappeared from the of a longer process, even beyond regime change, and shaping the
1990s conflict. These women subverted official discourse by evolving relationship between citizens and the political sphere.
their presence, using their stories to challenge the post-colonial
regime’s failure to provide dignity and a future for the younger
generation.

15
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Zahra Ali Gender does not solely shape women’s experiences in Sudan; it
intersects with race, ethnicity, social class, and ability, influencing
A parallel study of the Algerian and Iraqi contexts is needed, as both subordination and strategies for resistance. Intersectionality
the experiences of Algerian women in the 1990s mirror those has gained interest among Sudanese women activists, following
of Iraqi women during the 2006-07 civil war. The role of the theories pioneered by African American women activists such
mothers of the Mafkoudeen (the disappeared) is central in both as Kimberlé Crenshaw. Following the publication of three
countries. Examining the uprisings since 2011—especially in booklets discussing ways in which the former regime could
Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq, and Sudan—requires a spa-ce-focused engender a constitution process that it started in 2011-2012, at
analysis. My talk, entitled “Intifada, the Iraqi Uprising, and the University of Khartoum, an op-ed came out titled: Gender, is
Feminist Imaginations,” begins with a demonstration organized it Heresy, Conspiracy, or Promiscuity?
by women activists on Al-Mutanabi street against the “Jaafari
law,” a law proposal which aimed to sectarianize personal status Sudanese women have faced marginalization since
laws. This proposal by conservative Shia parties highlights independence. The country saw two uprisings before 2018. The
how gender issues intertwine with statehood, citizenship, and October Revolution 1964 led to some family law changes, and
religion, showing the fundamentally patriarchal nature of the another in 1985, both of which involved active participation by
post-2003 sectarian system imposed by the U.S. women. The 2018-2019 uprising, marked by the participation
of women and young people, fulfilled the late Hisham Sharabi’s
The history of women’s activism in Iraq is rich, but since 2003, prediction about the crucial role women could play in driving
activists have faced two main obstacles: First, they live in a country political and social change in the Middle East and North Africa,
where basic services and state institutions have been destroyed, alongside ordinary citizens.
and sectarian political fragmentation affects daily life—whether The uprising in Sudan began in December 2018 in three cities,
accessing electricity, water, education, or healthcare. Second, with students protesting the rising cost of food. Other underlying
there is the “NGOization” of women’s activism, where, even issues included war, excessive military spending, political
as the country is being bombed, programs by USAID and repression, discrimination against women and girls, corruption,
the UN promote women’s empowerment and democracy. economic crises, and austerity measures. Organizing was
Feminist activists have had to balance accepting funding with enabled by neighborhood committees and new social activism,
the limitations it imposes. Major protest movements, including both on the ground and via social media. A sit-in took place
the 2019 Thawra or Intifadat Tashreen, pushed many activists from April 6 to June 3 at the Sudanese army headquarters, which
to connect women’s issues with broader structural challenges, participants described as a utopia. On June 3, security forces
linking gender to infrastructure and governance. forcibly dispersed the sit-in, leading to hundreds of deaths,
disappearances, and rapes.
In Sahat al-Tahrir, people re-appropriated public areas, creating Women initially participated as citizens without a feminist
a utopian miniature society where people meet to negotiate a agenda. However, when negotiations with Bashir’s security
new social contract while exchanging services. Demands for committee excluded them, they organized a demonstration
elections and political freedoms mixed with celebrations of at Medan al-Etissam, demanding meaningful representation.
art and personal rights, such as the right to have curly hair. Women’s participation was distinct: they used the “Zaghruta” to
This redefinition of politics, engaging with the notion of a start protests daily and practiced a politics of care by preparing
“production space,” is theoretically significant. The uprising and distributing food to protesters.
was the creation of an imaginary space, an alternative to the
dominant, militaristic, capitalist narrative. The physical presence Several women’s organizations emerged during and after the
of women and men from diverse backgrounds, across social protests. “La ly Qahr al-Nisaa’,” founded in 2010, opposed
classes and political views, offered something entirely different public order laws. “Mansam” is a coalition of women’s
from the dominant discourse. There is a clear parallel with La organizations formed during the protests, while “Noon” is a
Commune de Paris, which Henri Lefebvre described as a “big youth-led movement aiming to break away from traditional
party.” The Iraqi uprising, after decades of war and destruction, women’s groups. Al-I’tisam, the Cooperative of Women Street
became a celebration of life, challenging the forces of death and Vendors, focused on Khartoum, Port Sudan, and the war-affected
repression. Nuba Mountains.

Jacques Rancière’s idea of “déplacer le partage du sensible” fits The latter region, under Sudan People Liberation Movement
here, as the uprising demonstrated that ordinary people were not (SPLM) control, was engaged in peace talks with the transitional
just equal to their rulers, but better, having created in the squares government, addressing key issues like secularism and the
a society that provided services, electricity, and negotiated a less relationship between religion and the state, which affects men
patriarchal social contract and women differently. Research has shown that women in these
areas, many displaced by war or famine, were often harassed
Nada M. Ali while selling tea and food on the streets, part of the informal
economy supporting their communities.
My presentation is titled: “Sit Al Shay, Epistemological Insights
on Gender in Sudan’s 2018-2019 Uprising and Transition.” Tea During the uprising, street vendors along Nile Avenue played
sellers played a significant role in the uprising. I will provide a key role. Awadiyah Mahmoud Koukou, founder of the
background on Sudan and discuss “new” epistemologies, which Cooperative Union of Women Food Sellers, distributed 10,000
draw on previous activism that remains relevant. The research free meals daily to protesters. Summarizing what she said: “I went
was conducted by a team including Sawsan Moussa Abdel-Jalil, to Al-Qiyada, joined the sit-in, and addressed the protesters. A
Najla Abdel-Wahid, May Azzam, and Azjed Abdel-Muneim. civil society organization donated food ingredients, and I started
cooking for them.” While food preparation reinforced traditional

16
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

gender roles, it also became a means for women to share their with male warlords who control Lebanese politics.
dreams and ideas for Sudan’s future, fostering solidarity.
The uprising has since lost momentum due to the financial crisis,
Rola El-Husseini COVID-19, and the Beirut port explosion in August 2020, which
temporarily preserved the political class. As living standards
There are many parallels between Lebanon and the other cases. collapse, women now face the added burden of securing basic
My presentation is titled “The Revolution is a Woman.” Lebanon necessities like food and medicine. In times of crisis, women’s
ranks low on the gender gap index, at 145 out of 153 countries. rights are often sidelined for more immediate needs. Today,
Political representation has never exceeded 6%, with personal Lebanese women must prioritize their families’ survival over
status laws biased against women, as religious courts handle their own rights.
issues like divorce, custody, and inheritance. A 2015 Human The Lebanese case, like others, emphasized the significant
Rights Watch report found that women, across sects, consistently role of women in the uprising, reinforcing that Arab women
fare worse than men in accessing divorce and childcare. have agency and do not need to be saved by others, as Laila
Abou-Loghd suggests. But why did the uprising start almost a
During Lebanon’s 2019 uprising, women demanded to “bring decade after the first wave? Many countries from the first wave
down the sectarian regime,” using slogans like “‫”ثورتنا ثورة نسوية‬ backslid into authoritarianism or fragmented, like Syria, Libya,
and “‫طالعة تسقط النظام‬,” reflecting the intersection of patriarchy, and Yemen. Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon, having recently
racism, and economic exploitation. A major issue was the emerged from civil wars, may have initially preferred “a century
nationality law, which prevents Lebanese women from passing of tyranny to one year of chaos,” to quote Ibn Taymiyyah. But
their nationality to foreign spouses or children, especially after another decade of worsening conditions, they had little
affecting those married to Palestinian and Syrian men or other choice but to risk rebellion, even at the cost of becoming a failed
foreigners living in Lebanon. They face discriminatory hurdles state.
to legal residency and barriers to accessing work, education, and
services. Participant
Women’s demands were intersectional, seeking change across In Algeria, during Bouteflika’s era, there was a one-third quota
sects, regions, class, age, economic, and educational levels. They for women in each political party. However, parties brought in
also addressed migrant and refugee women’s rights, organized women that were not particularly educated, so, isn’t the solution
marches against gender-based violence, and brought attention to to provide equal access to education? Are quotas worth it?
LGBTQ+ rights, particularly the violence faced by homosexual
and transgender women. Naoual Belakhdar
Women’s participation made protests safer, attracting families In Algeria, women already have broad access to education. In
and creating a “carnival” atmosphere. Their presence also fact, in some university branches, there are more women than
protected men, playing on notions of chivalry to prevent men. The issue with quotas isn’t just about state feminism but
violence and ensure the protests remained peaceful, despite also clientelist relationships. The women who entered parliament
provocations. In one iconic moment, a young female martial were often part of political parties close to the ruling regime.
artist kicked a politician’s bodyguard who brandished a weapon The goal wasn’t gender balance but rather access to new clients.
at her, becoming a symbol of the revolution. A stylized sketch of What we need instead is a political use of quotas that genuinely
this went viral, highlighting women’s unexpected strength and promotes equality.
their role in the uprising.
Nada Ali
Women were also objectified, such as in Saudi newspaper, Al-
Qaas that reduced them to their looks, publishing pictures of Quotas are an important first step, but they don’t guarantee
good looking women at protests, and playing on stereotypes gender equality. In Sudan, under the former regime, women’s
about Lebanese women. However, they reclaimed public spaces, representation reached 27%. Activists are now pushing for 40%
speaking out on rape and harassment. in the legislative assembly. Achieving the full benefits of the
Female journalists played a key role in bringing the population’s uprising depends on the strength of the women’s movement. In
concerns to the forefront. Female academics joined teaching tents the meantime, having quotas to increase women’s representation
to discuss government, the environment, and feminism. Female is a positive move.
artists created revolutionary symbols like the phoenix by Hayat
al-Nazir, crafted from tent scraps destroyed by the government,
and Pierre Aboud’s “The Revolution is a Woman,” also made Rola Al-Husseini
from scrap materials. Older women took on traditional roles,
cooking and distributing meals, allowing those with family Quotas represent the politics of presence. Women need to be in
obligations to participate. As in Sudan, this was a political act, important political positions so younger women can see them and
showing how women used whatever means available to highlight be inspired. It’s important for them to prove their competence,
their concerns and engage actively. paving the way for other women to be elected in the future.
Women’s participation had immediate consequences. In the
January 2020 cabinet, women were allocated six portfolios, Ishac Diwan
marking an implicit 20% quota, a first in Lebanese history.
Women held significant positions, such as Raya El Hassan as Recalling these vibrant moments from a feminist perspective
Minister of Interior (2019-2020) and Zeina Akar as Minister of enriches our understanding of the uprising—as a celebration of
Defense (2020). However, some of these women remain aligned life, a re-appropriation of public space by ordinary people. You

17
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

all describe the formation of new social norms, where feminists

are negotiating with other groups, advocating for changes that
challenge patriarchal norms.

Zahra Ali

In Iraq, ordinary women participating in the uprising didn’t

present a clear gender-focused agenda. When we interviewed
young women involved, they said they joined to honor the
martyrs of the protests. Yet, the massive women presence led
to the emergence of new slogans, expanding both feminist and
political imaginations beyond traditional terms like feminism,
class struggle, or workers’ rights.

Naoual Belakhdar

I agree with the idea of negotiation through protest. Before

2019, I studied social protests, where riots became a way for
ordinary citizens to express their vision of a just state. This
raises questions about the methodologies and concepts we
use. It’s also vital to be aware of the language, body language,
and interactions of the protesters. There was beauty in those
mass protests, moments shared among people. In countries
that went through societal fragmentation and violence, people
suddenly found ways to connect, even if only temporarily. They
performed the solidarity, fraternity, and respect they wanted to
see in their country. Of course, after the protests ended, issues
like sexual harassment returned, but in those moments, a utopia
was performed, and that’s where we should look for the seeds of
a new social contract.

18
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Third Panel
Where has the THAWRA
Gone?
February 11, 2022
The session explored the historical temporalities of the social
movements of 2019 and how they evolved - not only in terms
of successes or failures, but also of various social and political
transformations.

The discussion, chaired by Ishac Diwan, included five speakers:

Karima Direche, talking about the Algerian Hirak and how the
ruling regime has used history in an instrumental way to limit
opposition.

Ali Al Hammood, speaking about the evolution of the Hirak in Iraq.

Ibrahim El Badawi focusing on the tensions in the Sudanese

revolution.

Sari Hanafi on: “the Lebanese revolution as a balance of regimes

and opposition weaknesses.

Mohammad Bamyeh acting as a discussant to open up the Q&A

session.

19
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Karima Direche Lastly, the latest elections in Iraq have seen progress, with
discussions about forming a majority government rather than
The 2019 Hirak in Algeria was a massive, leaderless movement relying on public consensus. While many of the movement’s
with no specific ideology. It operated peacefully and with a demands remain slogans, there is hope that reforms advocated
sense of responsibility. As a historian, I was struck by how this by the Tishreen movement will eventually be realized.
opposition to the regime was framed as a patriotic movement,
creating hope for political transition and the dismantling of the Ibrahim El Badawi
regime. The regime responded in two phases: first, by initiating
dialogue, and then by resorting to intimidation. A president was The situation in Sudan is complex, with the revolution largely
elected in 2019, initially pledging to support the Hirak, but soon led by young people under 30, showing an unprecedented
after, repression escalated—nearly 10,000 people were arrested, willingness to risk their lives. The military leadership staged a
and allegations of rape and torture surfaced. coup against the civilian-led transitional government on October
25th, 2021, in order to pre-empt the envisaged elections and
Although elections and a referendum were held, they were transition to civilian democratic rule and maintain their grip
military-engineered, and the chief of staff, Saleh, temporarily on power and pursue their narrow economic interest. However,
assumed control during 2019, remaining influential even after the military was shocked by the youth’s resilience, resulting in
the elections. Despite these events, the country remained over 80 fatalities. Instead of suppressing the movement, this
dominated by the same financial and security interest groups. only fueled further opposition. The coup leaders also failed to
The Hirak revealed the exhaustion of political movements in mobilize sufficient external support, though they did receive
Algeria and the regime’s weakening. However, this also led to tacit but lukewarm support from some of Sudan’s Arab partners.
economic decline. By 2020, rising oil prices allowed the regime For example, one day after their takeover, the African Union
to return to its old clientelist practices. suspended Sudan’s membership, pending a return to power of
the transitional government.
Ali Al Hammood
Despite early optimism at the dawn of independence about Sudan
The October 2019 protests, also known as the October/Tishreen as a rising African giant, the Sudan has come to be defined by
protests, provide several important lessons. conflicts, political instability and development failures. To date,
it has experienced three long-reigning, dysfunctional, autocratic
First, they were initiated by politically disengaged youth, aged military regimes interrupted by three popular uprisings (in 1964,
15-25, with political actors initially absent. Civil society elites, 1986 and 2018- present) and three fragile, short-lived democratic
who had led previous protests, such as in February 2011, only governments. Sudan’s political structure grew increasingly
joined later. complex, culminating in the rise of Islamist movements under
President Numeri and the subsequent imposition of Sharia law,
Second, the protests aimed for a complete overhaul of the which triggered the launch of the second Southern Sudanese
regime, rather than partial reforms. The protesters recognized insurgency, the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM),
that meaningful change could not be achieved under the existing and the rise of its charismatic leader Dr. John Garang, who
regime. Unlike earlier protests that sought reforms like ending challenged the Islamist-Arabist political discourse of that
sectarian quotas, the youth-led October protests demanded a regime. The current situation mirrors these historical patterns.
complete overhaul of the regime. The fall of Omar al-Bashir regime in 2018 didn’t end the turmoil,
as military leaders, despite claiming to support the revolution,
Third, the protests achieved significant gains, including changes colluded with the remnants of the supporters of that regime
to the Election Act, restructuring of the Supreme Commission and some militia warlords to stage the 25 October coup. The
of Elections, removal of public inspectors, and the toppling of situation remains dire, and while international support has been
the Adel Abdel Mahdi government. The protests also shifted vital, continued assistance is needed to rebuild Sudan and push
away from sectarian divisions and adopted a nationalist stance, the military out of politics.
weakening traditional power centers like political Islam, armed
Shiite groups, and Kurdish leadership. Sari Hanafi
Fourth, the protests learned from past movements, recognizing The Lebanese revolution began with strong popular support,
the need for organization, programs, and leadership. While combining political issues and social justice concerns like the
October organizations have begun forming structures, they treatment of Syrian refugees and gender discrimination. While
still lack cohesive leadership and concrete political programs. the revolution initially showed strength, it faltered with the
Political parties must now translate the movement’s slogans into COVID-19 pandemic and economic crisis. Despite political
actionable policies. successes, such as the resignation of PM Hariri, sectarian
divisions and geopolitical factors, like Iran’s arming of
The October movement has begun to shift away from the leftist Hezbollah, remained obstacles. Hezbollah’s influence has been
tendencies that previously dominated social movements. While compared to the role of the Ba’ath parties in Iraq and Syria.
some political parties boycotted recent elections, others secured The lack of leadership in the Hirak reflects the flawed idea of
significant parliamentary seats. Civil society organizations have leaderless movements, which often leads to failure, as seen in
started to articulate their own visions for political change, aiming Latin America and elsewhere.
to form more authentic and effective groups. These organizations
are now working to expand their support across both urban and Leftist movements in the Arab world tend to adopt radical
rural areas, and among different age groups. positions, neglecting achievable goals that could foster alliances,
as seen in Sudan, where the military intervened due to elite

20
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

exclusion. Amel Boubekeur

The Arab Spring exposed deep polarization among elites who All presentations focused on rejecting parties and leaders,
rarely engage with each other, creating a vacuum for the military but we haven’t highlighted two key factors: repression and
to regain control. This issue is compounded by a lack of effective clientelism. Mohammed argues that these revolutions were
leadership in the opposition. against leaders, not the regimes themselves, with clientelism and
For the first time, Arab media is discussing the separation of neo-patrimonialism remaining popular. Is this why the Hirak
religion and politics, such as Tunisia’s debate on gender equality was halted?
in inheritance laws. Though polarized, this debate showcased
peaceful, pluralistic discourse. However, elites have not learned Karima Direche
from such examples. In Lebanon, the leftist camp heavily
influences the Hirak, creating a dynamic not of balance but Returning to Sari’s question on romanticism and representation,
of weakness, as both the state and opposition remain notably social movements in Algeria stem from early 1990s chaos and
fragile. repression. While there is a romantic appeal to these movements,
we must consider the realities behind them. Some persistently
Mohammad Bamyeh oppose leaders and are ready for strategic challenges.

Our main focus is on social movements and what we can learn Since Algeria’s independence, despotic and tyrannical regimes
from the Arab Spring regarding their dynamics. Over the past have suppressed any political alternatives. Leaders who emerged
decade, we’ve gathered substantial empirical evidence from the were either eliminated or co-opted, and those who gained
Hirak (uprisings), offering a chance to develop theories rooted prominence often struggled to integrate political and historical
in the Arab context rather than relying on Western perspectives. elements
There is continuity between the movements of 2011 and 2019.
While lessons were learned, similar features remain, such as the As a historian, I believe revolutions reflect complex societal
notable absence of leadership. Figures like Saad Zaghloul or dynamics. Societies have transformed significantly, especially
Khomeini, who could unify and guide movements, are missing. with the increased participation of women in education and the
The lack of coordination, seen in the Syrian conflict, persists. rise of feminist movements. Revolutions should be seen as long-
Unlike past revolutions, the Hirak has no prominent party term processes, not short-term events, reflecting deep societal
leading it, reflecting a broader rejection of traditional leadership. changes brewing over time.
The slogan “The People want to topple the regime” has been
central to all Arab Spring revolutions, including Iraq and Ali Al Hammood
Lebanon. These uprisings aimed to dismantle entire regimes,
rejecting traditional leadership models, which leads to anarchic There have been no leaders like Khomeini or Zaghloul in recent
revolutions. This is problematic, as it suggests the post-Hirak movements. Iraq’s situation differs from the 2011 Arab Spring
phase will be fraught with crises, as replacing one elite with countries. Society now realizes that political leadership is
another only results in more polarization. The solution lies in essential for guiding revolutions. We cannot consider political
creating a new form of governance that allows individuals to movements in isolation from transitional phases. While some
freely express themselves. So far, these movements haven’t movements have created genuine platforms, Iraq’s elections
focused on how to build a regime that aligns with the nature led to the Sadrist movement, which focused on distributing
of the Hirak. The challenge isn’t replacing leaders but fostering oil revenues. However, communal power-sharing remains
governance grounded in civil society, not political parties. This unresolved. Additionally, the distinction between civic rule and
highlights the need to study the role of CSOs formed post-2011, secularism is important. Secular-minded groups often mask their
which have been important forces even if they haven’t fully intentions under the guise of civic society, while others adhere to
defined their goals. Islamic principles on inheritance and marriage.

For many young people, these revolutions have been formative

Sari Hanafi
experiences, shaping a generation that will influence politics for
decades. Political Islam, while a powerful force for the past 40
When discussing elite polarization, some strive to reduce it. For
years, may be shifting. While not disappearing, conservative
instance, Nahda in Tunisia took a moderating role, focusing on
segments may evolve into new forms of participation beyond
civil freedoms and European ties while avoiding corruption.
solely religious frameworks.
Although regime change has failed, these revolutions should
be seen as “cognitive revolutions”. The younger generation is
Anti-revolutionary responses are expected, as elites are
learning, and it will take time for these lessons to lead to tangible
unwilling to relinquish their power. Despite a decade of demands
results. True secularism must align with pluralism, equality,
for reform, there has been little change—no civil state, no real
and individual freedom, rather than using religion for political
governance improvements, and the same elites remain in power.
purposes. What we need is an ethicalization of politics.
However, Arab revolutions are part of a protracted process. With
unmet demands, this phase will likely persist. These movements,
unlike past stagnation, have introduced new dynamism, Mohamed Bamieh
signaling a shift towards greater activity. The collective memory
of past revolutions, such as the 1919 revolution recalled in Tahrir Revolutions succeed when there’s consensus among protesters,
Square, highlights the ongoing impact of these uprisings. but maintaining it is difficult. Tunisia’s transitional government
faced challenges but succeeded more than Egypt, where elites
struggled with unity. Ghannouchi worked hard to maintain

21
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

consensus in Tunisia. Further exploration is needed on how to

sustain this, such as collective transitional leadership.

22
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Fourth Panel
What do we learn from the
2019 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?
December 15, 2022
This session completed a day spent with experts in the social
sciences from Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, and Iraq at the American
University of Beirut, discussing various aspects of the 2019 social
movement - in these four countries.

Chaired by Ishac Diwan, there were four speakers:

Naoual Belakhdar, Ibrahim El-Badawi, Faris Nadhmi, and

Joseph Bahout.

The discussion covered the genesis, the drivers, aspirations of people

rebelling. The goal was to place the movements in the longue durée,
to try to understand why they went to sleep, what would it take to
reawaken them, what has been left behind, and what has changed
since then.

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Naoual Belakhdar Joseph Bahout

Several factors contributed to the weakening of the Hirak in Let’s start by recalling Lebanon’s political system, which helps
Algeria. A major repression campaign aimed at banning political explain the lack of change. Unlike Iraq and Syria, where strong
demonstrations and dividing the protesters. The regime took states suppress weak societies, Lebanon has a weak state and a
advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to halt the Hirak in strong society. Yet, the result was the same—no structural change.
March 2020. A lack of consensus within the opposition, rooted Lebanon’s system is a triangle: a weak state, a strong oligarchic
in unresolved social tensions from the 1990s civil war and the political system organized around confessionalism, and a strong
absence of transitional justice, further weakened the movement. society bound by primordial ties (Rawabit al-awalia). When the
Despite attempts to eliminate opposition, voter turnout remained upheaval began, the political system easily remobilized these
low in the 2019 presidential election, the 2020 constitutional ties, torpedoing the revolution without violence by exploiting
referendum, and the 2021 legislative election. societal divisions (see Bashar Haidar’s analysis on this).

Infighting within the regime increased, and attempts to co-opt After a few months, the political system used a few slogans to
the Hirak, such as incorporating it into the constitution, failed. divide the movement along old cleavages—Muslim/Christian,
The crisis of confidence between the state and society persists, Shia/Sunni, and the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. The original
although the regime currently benefits from high international slogan, “all of you means all of you,” was forgotten as society
oil prices. However, these revenues are temporary and do not reverted to old divisions: March 14th Match against Hezbollah
address the structural weaknesses of the Algerian economy, and March 8 March against the West. The political system
leaving the social situation volatile. emerged stronger than it was three years ago.

Ishac Diwan This was partly due to the weakness of the opposition and
the lack of a political culture for change. While Syria and
You mention that the Hirak has paused, largely due to repression, Iraq suffered from 40 years of political desertification under
the regime’s ability to divide society, and a temporary boost authoritarianism, Lebanon’s neoliberalism fostered extreme
from oil revenues. Yet, you also say the regime is at its weakest, individualism, making collective action difficult. Youth do not
suggesting the protests could resume. Let’s explore these themes engage in political parties, and there is no tradition of working
in Iraq, where repression has been severe. Like Algeria, oil together or creating programmatic alternatives. Elections were
revenues are rising, allowing the government to increase wages rushed before new leadership or programs could form, allowing
and subsidies. Fares, you’ve interviewed protesters—what do the system to co-opt the movement.
they say drives them? And do you think they will return to the
streets soon? In other Arab countries, counterrevolution succeeded through
coercion and repression. In Lebanon, it happened without
Faris Nadhmi violence, through cooptation. The system was rejuvenated
though with Some change actors are now in Parliament, but
The revolutionary movement in Iraq is currently exhausted but their behavior mimics the old political system. Co-optation
not over. Revolutionary energy is likely to evolve into other forms remains strong in a society easily divided by the political system.
of political action. Based on a 2019 opinion poll I conducted
(with my co-author xx Mazen), 65% of protesters believed they On the economic front, there’s an unanswered question: Did
would return to the streets if their goals weren’t achieved. While the collapse weaken the revolt, or is it simmering and ready to
this hasn’t happened yet, participants in the Tashreen movement burst again? The narrative around the collapse is divided, with
have split into four groups. The first group is disillusioned, with no consensus on what caused it or what should be done. This
some leaving politics or emigrating. The second has shifted confusion allows economics to fuel political divides, hindering
toward violent movements, believing peaceful transition is the change movement.
impossible. The third has been co-opted by the political system,
though they still claim opposition. The fourth, more mature Ishac Diwan
and realistic, has begun forming new progressive parties. This
“power of change” coalition includes old leftist parties and a It would be a paradox if the economic crisis leads to social
Shiite party, advocating a dual approach: peaceful democratic demobilization. This is a pressing question, especially in oil-
work and continued street protests. importing countries like Egypt and Tunisia, where an economic
crisis is brewing. People have risen for better governance and
Ishac Diwan to move away from the confessional system, yet regimes have
managed to divide the streets using old confessional tools. This
You highlight how the movement has evolved into both a suggests that societal change is needed first, particularly in how
protest movement and a new political organization, moving people perceive identity. If this shift has begun, it would be a
away from leaderlessness. This shift could reshape future valuable legacy for the future.
politics. Moving to Lebanon, two big questions arise. Like Iraq,
Lebanon’s confessional system complicates change. And as in In contrast, repression in Sudan was intense, yet the movement
Iraq and Algeria, the economy is struggling. Does this economic stayed united during weeks of protest. What maintained this
collapse fuel or weaken confessionalism, and does it mobilize or unity? Was it the economic collapse, since the revolt began amid
demobilize people? economic hardship?

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Ibrahim El Badawi Ishac Diwan

The future of the region will depend on learning from the In Iraq too, the confessional system seems to have reasserted
revolutions of 2011 and 2019. A key factor in the early success itself, but major economic challenges remain. The street could
of Sudan’s December Revolution was the strong societal pressure the new government to deliver. Could the street become
opposition to the religious state project of the National Islamic a new political force pushing for reforms? How do you see the
Front. This project led to state control over economic resources future unfolding?
and the nationalization of armed gangs, as well as a monopoly
over ministries and the civil service. The regime created its Faris Nadhmi
own private sector and distributed oil rents to maintain power.
However, the separation of South Sudan in 2011, which resulted The street opposition in Iraq is currently silent, in a stage of
in the loss of 75% of oil resources, crippled the economy and latency, marked by frustration and despair. The recent government
undermined Bashir’s ability to rule through a centralized system has integrated militias directly into its structure, unlike previous
of political patronage, enabled by the oil rents. administrations. The counter-revolution, including the October
2021 elections, was an attempt to re-legitimize the political
The economy collapsed after 2016 due to inflation and sanctions, system, but participation was under 20%. Despite the setbacks,
which, in turn, contributed to the factors that fueled the 2018 the revolutionary movement has had a transformational impact.
protests. The successful revolts of 1964 and 1985 provided The political system remains unchanged, corruption is rampant,
inspiration, and the demographics—youth born under the Inqaz and sectarianism persists, but there is now a clearer understanding
regime with no opportunities—were emboldened by the Arab of the need for redistributing political power and wealth.
Spring to demand their rights.
Taboos and sanctities (“mukaddasat”) once considered
Ishac Diwan untouchable, like religious figures and symbols, are now publicly
discussed. A new sense of intellectual and physical courage
There are important lessons from the events of 2011 and 2019, has emerged. The sanctity now lies with the individual citizen
and although each country’s situation is different, there has been reclaiming their rights. The most significant impact of Tishreen
valuable learning across the region. The question now is: what is the rise of a dynamic political generation. This generation is
has changed? Is it values, with new identities and emancipative organizing, developing its own political preferences, demands,
ideals emerging? Or is it the rise of political parties? Will we see and an implicit ideology, though not yet formalized.
a shift from leaderless movements to organized ones, as seen
in Sudan and Iraq, where neighborhoods have organized and Ishac Diwan
challenged old political elites? Could this lead to better political
organization in the future? This is a significant discovery. Joe reminded us earlier that the
post-colonial independence movement led to Arab nationalism,
However, elections in Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq haven’t the big idea our parents lived with. When modernization faltered,
brought change. Were they manipulated, or did they happen too it was attacked by conservative Islamicists. Dictators liberalized
soon for new political parties to emerge? the economy but not politics, leading to crony capitalism in the
80s and 90s. This system failed to provide the freedoms that
Joseph Bahout a more educated, globally aware youth desired. The 2011 and
2019 rebellions reflect a new political culture—neither top-
Lebanon and the region have lived under an iron curtain for down, Arab nationalism nor political Islam—but something new
decades, so change can’t happen rapidly—it must be a cumulative bubbling from below.
process. It requires a shift in the societal balance of power, not
just the political one. Values around gender, youth, and climate The focus should now be on understanding this culture. Naoual’s
are key, along with grassroots mobilization. Change must come work on feminism in the Algerian Hirak is a great example. Three
from the bottom up. This is the first lesson. Organized political years of massive Friday demonstrations created a new common
action is needed, though traditional parties may need to reinvent culture. In the demonstrations, diverse groups negotiated and
themselves as “parties 2.0.” found common slogans, generating a bottom-up culture in real
time. It’s a fascinating process of identity production happening
The second lesson is the importance of the economy. Lebanon’s in the streets. Naoual, could you tell us more about this cultural
past economic success led people to focus on politics while and identity production?
ignoring the economy. Now, as the economy struggles, people
are starting to understand its mechanisms, increasing political Naoual Belakhdar
awareness.
Elections didn’t bring immediate change because they weren’t
The third lesson is about patience. The Arab world hasn’t fully meant to. Following massive repression, elections were rejected
understood the transition in Eastern Europe. Elections shouldn’t by the population. This is a lesson from the past: holding
be rushed—they should come at the end of a process, not the elections while political prisoners remain does not allow for
beginning. Rushing into elections allows the old system to critical debates about the future. The main goal of these elections
return, as seen in Lebanon, where co-optation is strong. It’s was to restore the regime’s external legitimacy.
essential to resist quick fixes, often recommended by Western
actors, and instead focus on long-term change. Change must be viewed in the long term. One key aspect is
reconciliation in a post-conflict society. As Hisham al-Matar

25
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

suggested, the Arab revolutions reshaped not only the political in 2019, which resulted in hundreds of deaths. While political
landscape but also the “self.” This long-term reconciliation leaders have expressed commitment to justice, the military
with the self means rejecting violence and working collectively remains central to the investigation, making this process difficult.
towards peaceful projects. While cleavages remain, this process There is no broad consensus on how to pursue transitional
is a significant achievement to build on. justice, complicating the transition further.

The second aspect is the politicization of society. Numerous The third challenge involves the youth movement, which played
collectives, including strong feminist groups, have emerged at a key role in challenging the regime but lacks a clear political
various levels. Some accused these groups of diverting the Hirak, project or path to power. The youth represent a long-term force
but they resisted and held their ground, creating initiatives like in Sudan’s demographic and political landscape. Key actors
shelters for young girls. must engage the youth in meaningful dialogue to align their
goals with the strategic objectives of the revolution. Reaching
Ishac Diwan compromises with the military is necessary for long-term
success, as no revolution can succeed without finding a way to
Ibrahim, could it be that the political culture in Sudan has work with the military. Tactical flexibility is needed to promote
accelerated because this isn’t the first revolution and due to national consensus and ensure the success of the transition.
the severe economic collapse? Over time, economic collapse
can stir anger. In Lebanon, though, we see that collapse can Ishac Diwan
make clientelism cheaper, and militias or violent groups gain a
comparative advantage in the chaos. In this context, how should Thank you, Ibrahim, for concluding with the big question:
we understand the recent agreement between the military and when change comes, will it be revolutionary or gradual? Is
the FFC? the lesson that it must be gradual, occurring simultaneously in
organizational, social, cultural, and political domains?
Ibrahim El Badawi
Feedback from the floor- various participants
The transition in Sudan is particularly difficult. The two
previous transitions in 1964 and 1985, after revolutions that • We need to delve deeper into the process of dismantling the
ousted authoritarian regimes, didn’t implement the deep laws and constitutional systems created by former regimes.
reforms needed. They failed to purge the security institutions There’s also the issue of timing for credible elections,
and civil service, allowing entrenched powers to remain. The especially with traditional parties and the military in Sudan
National Islamic Front (NIF), upon taking control, quickly pushing for early elections before counter-revolutionary
implemented its “Tamkeen” agenda, aimed at privatizing the elements are dismantled. By the end of the transitional
state and consolidating power under its regime, using Islam period, what can elections achieve given the fragmentation
as a justification. This system empowered a narrow group to of politics?
ruthlessly rule Sudan.
• There are positives common to the four countries that could
Tamkeen weakened the state’s capacity, even in basic functions lead to successful revolutions. First, political awareness of
like delivering health and education services, and stripped rights has grown, making it harder for people to be deceived.
meritocracy from public institutions. Corruption and crony Second, there’s a growing awareness of inequality and the
capitalism thrived, degrading governance and contributing to the need for wealth redistribution. Third, a new generation has
regime’s downfall. The collapse of the NIF came in phases: first, emerged with fresh values and a vision for the future.
internal divisions, then the Darfur insurgency and partitioning of
South Sudan, and finally, the loss of oil revenues, which led to • Regarding transitional justice, can Sudanese society accept
economic collapse. reconciliation similar to Rwanda, Burundi, or South Africa?
Crimes in Sudan were committed by a regime and militias—
While these factors helped bring down the regime, they can society forgive such atrocities?
also created difficult conditions for transitioning to a better
governance system. Along with the economic crisis and U.S. • In Sudan, armed movements have signed peace agreements.
sanctions for state-sponsored terrorism, Sudan faces three major What are the chances of building a broad coalition between
challenges: the entrenched economic interests of the military, political parties, civil society, and these armed groups?
the need for transitional justice, and how to integrate the youth
movement into the democratic process. • The youth resistance committees are a unique Sudanese
phenomenon. They led the protests but prefer to stay out of
First, the military’s deep economic interests led them to stage a politics, focusing instead on protecting the revolution and
coup in October 2021, reversing their commitment to civilian countering counter-revolutionary forces.
rule. Popular protests, international isolation, and worsening
economic conditions forced the military to agree to a new • How do Islamic movements claim a contract with God but
“framework agreement” with the FFC, brokered by the UN and fail to honor one with their own people?
African Union. This agreement calls for a civilian transitional
authority and for the military to exit politics and business, • Why didn’t the Sudanese prioritize the economy over
creating an apolitical and professional military institution. political concerns?

The second challenge is transitional justice, especially regarding

the violent dispersal of the sit-in at the Army High Command

26
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Naoual Belakhdar having a more homogeneous society compared to Syria’s tribal

divisions, and the difference between a republican army and
Is democracy still possible? The fact that millions across the a praetorian guard, the geopolitical context played a key role.
Arab world took to the streets to pursue this dream suggests the Tunisia’s revolution didn’t face external interference, while Syria
answer is yes. But it will take time. Several complicating factors, became a battleground for regional and international conflicts.
like external intervention and the military’s persistence, remain.
In Algeria, removing the military from power is extremely
difficult, as it struggles to renew itself or form new alliances.
While the future may not brighten soon, gradual change is
possible. Yet, the paradox remains: can a revolution truly happen
in small steps through peaceful means? For any chance of
success, civil society must work to build broad social consensus
around a common vision for an economic and political model
suited to the country’s unique context.

Ibrahim El Badawi

Both economics and politics are crucial. Economic reforms are

inherently political, and transformative economic changes affect
political settlements. This was a key message in a recent “growth
commission” report on MENA’s development, led by ERF and
FDL. In a paper on the “Sudanese Syndrome,” we argue that the
national project must address two challenges that have hindered
past democratic transitions. Politically, the failure to manage
competition within democratic forces after successful uprisings
has led to coups and authoritarian regimes. Economically, the
lack of transformative, equitable development left the country in
poverty, fueling civil wars, coups, and instability. Overcoming
these failures requires a social contract, clearly defining political
and economic agreements within the national project.

How can harmony be created among elites? In Sudan, this

includes leaders of the armed resistance movements, which
have historically cut deals with authoritarian regimes rather than
making peace with civilian governments, as seen after the 1964
and 1985 revolutions. However, they played a role in weakening
the Ingaz regime until its fall in April 2019 after the youth-led
uprising. Still, both the armed movements and professional
syndicates failed to consolidate gains through the democratic
process. Sustainable change likely requires a hybrid security-
political agreement, alongside a strong social contract supported
by transformative economic growth to address the root causes of
Sudan’s recurrent instability.

Faris Nadhmi

Is the democratic objective realistic in countries dominated

by corruption, mafias, and oligarchies? A peaceful democratic
transition seems unlikely. We’ve discussed four revolutions,
each representing radical choices. In Iraq today, there’s a
political crisis, with a street movement opposing a regime that
has monopolized the country’s wealth for 20 years, unwilling
to share it with new political forces. Instead, it chooses to
eliminate or expel opponents. This political system keeps
reproducing itself—cut off its head, and it reappears elsewhere.
The Hirak seeks peaceful change, but in reality, it faces a radical
confrontation.

Joseph Bahout

Foreign intervention and the international environment are

critical. Consider two examples: Why did the revolution succeed
in Tunisia but turn into a massacre in Syria? Besides Tunisia

27
 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Speakers’ Biographies

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Gilbert Achcar is a Professor of Development Studies and Ishac Diwan is a professor of economics at the American
International Relations at SOAS University of London. He is University of Beirut and the Director of Research for the
the author of several books, published in a total of 20 languages. Finance for Development Lab, at the Paris School of Economics.
He wrote two books on the MENA uprisings: The People Want: His current research interests focus on the political economy
A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (2013) and Morbid of the Middle East, in addition to broader development and
Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Uprising (2016). international financial issues.

Zahra Ali is Associate Professor of sociology at Rutgers Rola El Husseini is an associate professor with the Centre for
University-Newark. Her work explores (racial) capitalism, Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University. She has previously
(post)coloniality, decolonial theory, and transnational feminisms held positions at Yale University, Texas A&M University, and
as well as critical knowledge-making and epistemologies with a the Graduate Centre of the City University of New York.
focus on Iraq, the Middle East, and Muslim communities. She is
the author of Women and Gender in Iraq, and founder of Critical Ali Al Hammood is the managing director of Al-Bayan Center
Studies of Iraq, an initiative that centers the knowledge-making for Planning and Studies. His research focuses on Shiite political
and epistemologies of social scientists and feminists based in Islam, ethnicities, and minorities.
Iraq.
Sari Hanafi is currently a Professor of Sociology, Director of
Nada Mustafa Ali is a feminist and an intersectional scholar, the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies and Chair of the
practitioner, and activist whose scholarship spans the fields of Islamic Studies program at the American University of Beirut.
comparative politics, women’s, gender, and feminist studies, He is the President of the International Sociological Association.
development studies, and African and Middle Eastern studies.
She teaches at the Faculty of the Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Ibrahim El Badawi is the ERF Managing Director (since
Studies Department [which university?] January 2017- August 2019; August 2020- present). Minister of
Finance and Economic Planning, Republic of Sudan (Sept 2019-
Joseph Bahout is director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public July 2020). Professor Emeritus, University of Khartoum. Before
Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the American University that he was Director at the Economic Policy & Research Center,
of Beirut (AUB), where he is also Associate Professor of Practice the Dubai Economic Council (2009-2016); Lead Economist at
in Political Studies. the Development Research Group of the World Bank, which he
joined in 1989; and Professor of economics at the University of
Naoual Belakhdar is a political scientist affiliated to the Center Gezira in Sudan.
for Middle Eastern and North African Politics at the Freie
Universität Berlin. Her research and teaching interests focus on Faris Nadhmi is President of the Iraqi Association for Political
social movements and statehood in the post-colonial Maghreb Psychology. He has a PhD in socio-political psychology. He also
and Mashreq, with a particular focus the transformation of lectures in a number of Iraqi universities and writes in protests,
state-society relations in post-civil-war Algeria in light of deprivation, social justice, national identity, and the psychology
social protests as well as on political participation, protest and of political religion.
resistance movements, collective memory, film and politics.
Seteney Shami is founding Director-General of the Arab Council
Eva Bellin is a comparativist whose interests center on issues for the Social Sciences since 2012. She is an anthropologist from
of democratization and authoritarian persistence, political and Jordan and obtained her BA from the American University of
economic reform, civil society, religion and politics, and the Beirut and her MA and PhD from the University of California,
politics of cultural change. Berkeley. She has conducted fieldwork in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey,
and the North Caucasus. She has worked at Yarmouk University,
Mohamed Bamieh is a professor of sociology at the University Jordan, the Population Council in Cairo and the Social Science
of Pittsburgh and the incoming editor of the International Research Council in New York.
Sociology Review of Books (ISRB). His areas of interest have
included Islamic studies, sociology of religion, political and
cultural globalization, civil society and social movements, and
comparative social and political theory.

Amel Boubekeur is a political sociologist. She is a research

fellow at the Arab Reform Institute and the European Institute
of the Mediterranean. She is also a lecturer at the American
University of Paris and the co-director of the Research Group
in Algerian Studies. Her research focuses on Maghreb countries
politics, political economy and Islam in Europe.

Karima Direche is a French Algerian historian specializing in

the contemporary history of the Maghreb. From September 2013
to August 2017, she has been the director of the Institute for
Research on the Contemporary Maghreb in Tunis.

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Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

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 Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs

Inaugurated in 2006, the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the
American University of Beirut is an independent, research-based, policy-oriented institute. It aims to
initiate and develop policy-relevant research in and about the Arab world. The Institute aims at bridging
the gap between academia and policymaking by conducting high quality research on the complex issues
and challenges faced by Lebanese and Arab societies within shifting international and global contexts, by
generating evidence- based policy recommendations and solutions for Lebanon and the Arab world, and by
creating an intellectual space for an interdisciplinary exchange of ideas among researchers, scholars, civil
society actors, media, and policymakers.

American University of Beirut, Riad El-Solh, Beirut 1107 2020

Lebanon P.O. Box 11-0236
Tel: +961-1-350000, Ext: 4150
Fax: +961-1-737627
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.aub.edu.lb/ifi

aub.ifi @ifi_aub

Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs IFI

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Lessons from the 2019 Social Movements of the MENA Region

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