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 The tsar thought the situation warranted calling another
conference of the Quintuple Alliance. Metternich objected, being
chiefly concerned by the seeming certainty that the tsar would wish
to carry into the situation his well-known views in support of
liberalism. To him it seemed sufficient that the powers should agree
severally to give their arms to the suppression of revolution, without
meeting in conference. After much discussion a conference was
called, at Troppau, but it was regularly attended by only three of the
five powers. The suppression of constitutional government was not
popular in Great Britain, and her government took no official part in
the conference. France held aloof also; she was so much under the
protection of Great Britain that she did not dare risk British
displeasure by allying herself with the forces of repression.
Did the absence of two nations from Troppau presage the
dissolution of the Alliance? Castlereagh gave a negative reply. His
nation, he said, was not bound beyond her treaty obligations, the
terms of which were clear and specific. They were embodied in the
Treaties of Chaumont and Paris. He considered the project of dealing
with revolution in its present form as beyond the meaning of these
agreements. “If,” he said, “it is desired to extend the Alliance so as
to include all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it
would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far,
that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our
course at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us without
our having quitted it.” These frank words show that the Alliance was
strained but not broken. It would seem that a system like that of
which we speak should have at bottom some broad common
principles. In purpose it should be harmonious. As between the
prevailing British idea of liberty and Metternich’s ideas of legitimacy
there was no ground for mutual support; and out of this divergence
of views was to grow the disruption of the Alliance, as we shall soon
see.
Up to this time the two ideas that had run side by side were the
tsar’s plan for a league to secure coöperation of a general nature
and the British plan limiting common action to a few specific
matters, chiefly connected with the repression of France in case she
wished to return to a policy which would threaten the peace of
Europe. As it became increasingly apparent that France was no
longer a menace this type of union became less important, and the
British ardor for it cooled, especially since it was becoming more and
more certain that the Alliance was being used to support repression.
At the same time a change was passing through the mind of the
tsar. In all he had done he had been supported by liberal ministers,
against whose influence at his court Metternich did not hesitate to
intrigue. Alexander’s conversion to the cause of repression came
suddenly and completely in 1820, when there was a mutiny in a
favorite regiment of his guard. Sober advisers pointed out to him
that the action of the regiment had no political significance, but he
would not be convinced. He insisted he would not countenance
revolt abroad, lest it encourage insurrection at home. All the fervor
he had shown in behalf of liberal ideas he now manifested in behalf
of repression. At Troppau he met Metternich in a spirit of profound
repentance for what he had done in the past, saying with an
outburst of emotion: “So we are at one, Prince, and it is to you that
we owe it. You have correctly judged the state of affairs. I deplore
the waste of time, which we must try to repair. I am here without
any fixed ideas; without any plan; but I bring you a firm and
unalterable resolution. It is for your Emperor to use it as he wills.
Tell me what you desire, and what you wish me to do, and I will do
it.” The speech astonished the Prince as much as it pleased him. All
his schemes had lost in the defection of Castlereagh, and probably
more, was made up in the accession of his new ally. Not only was
the cause of legitimacy, as he advocated it, made safe; but the
danger was removed of a Franco-Russian alliance, always a thing to
be dreaded by the great Powers in the center of Europe.
In the conference at Troppau, Austria, Russia, and Prussia now
acted together. Up to that time Metternich had ignored the Holy
Alliance. He now brought it out as his stalking horse. The three
sovereigns, controlling the conference, issued a declaration
suspending from the Alliance any state that tolerated revolution in its
borders and declaring that the other Powers in the Alliance would
bring back the offending state by force of arms. Under the indefinite
terms of the instrument this was a legal interpretation of power, but
it was not in the spirit of the benevolent sovereign who made the
Holy Alliance possible.
Those of us who now favor a league or federation of states as a
means of preserving peace perpetually may well study the crisis to
which a similar system had come in the development of international
relations in 1820. The tsar’s ideal was a thing of glory thrown before
a sordid world. Not even he, as we see, was proof against the
debasement of his surroundings. If his plan had been adopted by all
the nations, it is likely that the time would have come when the
confederation thus formed would have become an agency for
reaction against which liberal views would have been unable to
contend.
On the other hand, we must not ignore the weight that a
confederation would have had as an idea in promoting respect for
liberal government. If it had been established under the protection
of the tsar, it may well have been that Metternich would not have
taken up the crusade of legitimacy, that the tsar and Castlereagh
acting together in behalf of liberal institutions would have insured a
steadier attitude on the part of the former, and that under such
circumstances the kings of Spain and Naples would have been less
inclined to the severe measures which provoked revolution. Of
course, these are mere conjectures, but it is only fair to mention
them as things to be said for the other side of the question.
When we come to apply the lessons of 1815–1820 to the
present day, we must not forget that conditions are now very greatly
changed. It was the supremacy of arbitrary government in Europe
that made the hopes of 1815 come to naught. Of all the agents who
then controlled affairs in the great states of Europe, Castlereagh,
next to the tsar, was the most liberal. If a plan of union were
adopted after the present war, it might not be a success, but the
failure would not be for the same reasons as those that brought the
Alliance of 1815 to a nullity.
Castlereagh made a protest against the purposes of the three
Powers at Troppau in which were some telling arguments against
such a league as was threatening. They were well made and would
be applicable to the situation today, if it were proposed to establish a
league like that which found favor at Troppau. The plan proposed,
said he, was too general in its scope. It gave the projected
confederation the right to interfere in the internal affairs of
independent states on the ground that the general good was
concerned, and if carried out the Alliance would, in effect, be
charged with the function of policing such states. Against all this he
protested, and he pointed out that so many grounds of
dissatisfaction lay in the scheme that to try to enforce it would surely
lead to counter alliances, the end of which would be war. It ought to
be said, also, that Castlereagh was opposed to giving up war as a
means of settling disputes. “The extreme right of interference,” he
said, “between nation and nation can never be made a matter of
written stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of an alliance.” If a
man takes that position he can hardly be expected to see good
points in any scheme to preserve peace perpetually.
The evils he pointed out are largely eliminated in the modern
plans that are offered. For example, the jurisdiction of the proposed
leagues or federations is strictly limited to the enforcement of peace.
A supreme court held by eminent judges would pass upon cases as
they come up and say whether or not the central authority should
employ force. Under the plan it would be hard to bring a purely
internal question before the court, and if brought there it would not
be considered by the judges, since the pact of the federation would
specify that such cases were not to be tried. The pact would be the
constitution of the federation, and the court would be expected to
pass on the constitutionality of measures from the standpoint of that
instrument. Under a system like that recently advocated a revolution
in Naples would have to be submitted to a court whose members
were appointed from states in which free institutions are in
existence. It could not be the tool of a Metternich. Under such a
system the whim of a tsar, if such a ruler ever again wears a crown,
could not make or mar a question like that which underlay the
calling of the Conference of Troppau. So many are the differences
that it is, perhaps, not profitable to dwell longer on this point. The
study of the peace problem and the attempt to solve it a hundred
years ago is extremely interesting to one who considers the situation
now existing, but it is chiefly because the mind, having grasped the
development of the former problem and become accustomed to see
the process as a whole, is in a better state to understand the
present and to know wherein it differs from the past and in what
respect old factors are supplemented by new factors. Such lessons
from the past are open to all who will but read.
These reflections should not make us forget the main thread of
our story, which became relatively weak after Troppau. From that
time it was clear that Europe had no hopes of peace through
coöperation under either of the two plans that had been suggested.
Almost immediately began a train of events which gave added
impulse to the dissolution of the Alliance. In 1821 began the Greek
War of Independence. Austria was in consternation lest the
revolution should spread to her own people. Russia, however, was
deeply sympathetic with the Greeks, partly through religious
affiliations and partly because the Russian people, looking toward
the possession of Constantinople, were anxious to weaken the Turk
in any of his European possessions. Alexander I showed signs of
going to war for the Greeks, and Metternich hastily sought to
counteract any such course.
At the same time the situation in Spain’s American colonies was
becoming more urgent, because the weakness of the government
had stimulated the South American revolutionists to renewed activity
until Mexico as well as the rest of the Continental colonies except
Peru was in successful revolt. Metternich would have helped Turkey
against the Greeks and allowed the tsar to carry out his long
cherished wish of intervening in Spain, as a means of keeping him
quiet. The situation seemed to call for another conference and after
some discussion a meeting was arranged at Verona, 1822. France
was anxious to take over the task of punishing the Spanish
revolutionists, and as Russia, Austria, and Prussia agreed to her
plan, four of the five Great Powers now stood side by side in favor of
repression. They would have gone further, and settled the fate of the
American revolutionists, but against that course Great Britain made
such a protest that the question was left open.
It was not definitely closed until the next year, and then through
the action of the United States, taken in association with Great
Britain. For when France had performed her task, she looked forward
to taking some of the Spanish colonies as indemnity for her
expenses. The principle of federation among the Powers was
working so well that it was considered only a natural thing to call
another conference at which France could be assigned the right of
conquering the colonies. Canning, at the head of the British
government, was genuinely alarmed. The four united Powers were
willing to defy Great Britain if she stood alone. He turned to the
United States as the only ally in sight. Would we support him in
opposition to the designs of the Powers? President Monroe,
influenced by John Quincy Adams’ stout patriotism, replied in the
affirmative and went a step further; for he insisted that the defiance
of the Powers should be announced in Washington, not as a mere
expedient to meet an isolated case, but as a general policy of our
government. The Monroe Doctrine was one of the things that broke
up the Quintuple Alliance, already weakened by the alienation of
Great Britain.
The last blow was the revolution in France in 1880, which drove
the Bourbon king into exile and made a liberal government possible.
At the same time so strong were the manifestations of republicanism
in other countries that the old conservatism was lowered in tone and
chastened in pride. From France the revolutionary movement passed
into Belgium, which the Congress of Vienna had decreed should be a
part of the kingdom of the Netherlands. So completely was the
revolution successful that even the Great Powers had to bow to it,
and in a congress at London they recognized Belgium as a separate
state and saw it set up a liberal constitution with a king at the head
of the government. Several of the small German governments also
adopted more liberal forms. Poland broke into rebellion and before
its power of resistance was crushed by Russia the infection spread
into Lithuania and Podolia. At last the arms of the tsar overpowered
all resistance and peace reigned; but the reactionaries were sobered,
and the dream of a league to enforce repression passed away.
Glancing backward we may see through what a development the
ideas of reform had passed. Europe, distressed by the wars of 1800–
1815, had hungered for peace. Having issued from a decade of
discussion of liberty and humanity, the friends of freedom were more
than ordinarily earnest for replacing war by an age of reason. In our
own day the cause of universal peace stands on a broader and
better laid foundation than a hundred years ago, but it is, perhaps,
no more impressive. At any rate the philosophically inclined men of
the earlier period supported Kant and Rousseau, among them,
Alexander I. A considerable portion of the world believed that the
outcome of the war madness then reigning must be an era of sanity.
We have seen that two plans of improvement were formed in
the minds of men who were in position to have practical influence:
the tsar’s scheme for a league, or federation, that was so strongly
integrated that the central authority should be able to enforce its
commands upon constituent states; and the plan of Castlereagh for
prolonging the existing system of coöperation in a form which we
may call the Concert of the Great Powers. We have seen that the
tsar’s plan, ignored at first, was seized on by Metternich as a
possibility for enforcing a system of reaction, that it met the
opposition of Great Britain and aroused the revolutionary protest of
1830, and thus it came to an end. It was never the dream of any of
the philosophers that a federation should be formed which might
become an engine of despotism, yet practical use showed that such
a course was within the bounds of possibility. The mere glimpse of
such a thing was enough to make Europe prefer the old era of wars.
 One does not have to look far into the situation to see that the
real failure of the plan was due to the wide use of arbitrary
government in Europe. Had Austria, Russia, and Prussia been ruled
by the people, either as republics or as liberal monarchies, the great
alliance of Europe could hardly have been turned to the side of
repression; and under the guidance of enlightened statesmen it
might have been the beginning of a long era of peace and
international good will. The failure of the nineteenth century,
therefore, does not prove that federation is essentially impossible. It
only proves that a century ago the world was not ready to employ it
successfully.
 CHAPTER V

THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF

EUROPE

The revolutionary movement of 1830 did not destroy the

influence of Metternich in Europe. He was too able a man to be
overthrown as leader of the legitimists merely because the people
were in a ferment. To his party he was still the man to be trusted,
and as legitimacy managed to beat down revolution in most of the
areas in which commotion appeared, the scope of his power was
wide, although it was evident that he could not use it with former
impunity.
At the same time he gave up the pretense of making the Alliance
of the Powers a federation. He was content to try to secure that
concert of action that would enable the states that leaned to
legitimacy to act together against incipient revolution; and for a time
he was successful. In anticipation of the failure of the plan to permit
France to interfere in the Spanish colonies, Canning exclaimed:
“Things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation
for itself and God for us all!” But the cry of joy was premature. The
time had not returned in which each crisis was to be met in its own
way, without reference to a recognized concert of action, and the
reason was the deep consciousness of the states that certain grave
questions that ever hung over the horizon had in them the
possibilities of general war. Let one of these questions loom large,
and common action was taken to avert the threatened danger. In
such way the Concert of Europe was kept alive, and remained
something to be reckoned with as a part of the background of
European policy. In spite of its temporary disuse, it was a thing to be
brought forth again if the nations decided that it was needed to
meet an emergency.
In fact, it reappeared many times in the course of the nineteenth
century, notably in 1840, when the so-called Eastern question
became prominent. At that time Mehemet Ali, who had made himself
lord of Egypt and seized Syria, was threatening Constantinople,
having the support of France. Russia became alarmed, made a close
alliance with the sultan, and seemed about to get that secure
foothold on the Bosphorus for which she had striven many years.
Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia resented this prospect and took
steps jointly to counteract it. Their object was to preserve Turkey
from the dangers that threatened to divide her. Before such a
combination Russia was not able to stand, and she gave up her
pretensions in order to join the other three powers. France, however,
held to her purpose, supporting the adventurer of Egypt. Thus it
happened that the four Great Powers, reviving the Concert of
Europe, but leaving out the government of Louis Philippe, had a
conference in London to settle Eastern affairs. They decided to offer
Mehemet Ali certain concessions and to make war on him if he
refused to accept them. He spurned their counsel and was expelled
from Syria but was saved from utter destruction by the interference
of France, who secured a settlement by which he was left in firm
possession of Egypt, as hereditary ruler under the nominal authority
of Turkey. All the powers now united in an agreement by which
Turkey was to exclude foreign warships from the Dardanelles. Thus,
by an appeal to the principle of the Concert of Europe, a grave crisis
was averted, and war between Great Britain and Russia was
avoided.
In 1848, seven years after the conclusion of these negotiations,
Europe was thrown into convulsions by the appearance of a new era
of revolution. France became a republic, and Germany, Austria, and
Hungary went through such violent upheavals that the existence of
arbitrary government hung for a time in the balance. Out of the
struggle emerged Napoleon III, of France, who thought some
military achievement was necessary to stabilize his power. At that
time Russia was asserting a protectorate over all Christians in
Turkey, and it was generally believed that she was about to establish
vital political control. Napoleon took up the sword against her and
Great Britain came to help, the result being the Crimean War, 1854–
1856.
In the beginning of this struggle the Concert of Europe seemed
to be dead, but two years of heavy fighting and nearly futile losses
brought it to life again. The war, which began in an outburst of
international rivalry, ended in the Conference of Paris, 1856, in which
all the Great Powers but Prussia undertook to settle the Eastern
question by neutralizing the Euxine and the Danube and by making
new allotments of territory which were supposed to adjust
boundaries in such a manner that rivalries would disappear. The
Conference went on to take up the work of a true European
congress by agreeing upon the Declaration of Paris, in which were
assembled a body of rules regulating neutral trade in time of war.
England gave up her long defended pretension to seize enemy
goods on neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, and in
return gained the recognition that privateering was unlawful. Thus
the Crimean War, fought by Great Britain and France against Russia,
and in support of Turkey—with Austria and Prussia as neutrals—was
at last ended by an agreement between all the parties concerned.
The nations undertook to settle the long Eastern dispute by pledging
the sultan to reforms which it was not in his nature to carry out.
The next three wars were fought without respect to the Concert
of Europe. They arose from local causes and were soon determined
without the aid of the Great Powers. They were the war of Austria
and France over the liberation of Italy, 1859; the war between
Prussia and Austria, 1866, in which Prussia overthrew the Austrian
predominancy in Germany; and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–
1871, in which Prussia crushed France and made herself the head of
the German Empire. In the first of these struggles no state could
gain enough power to become a menace to the other states, since
Italy was to be the recipient of all territory gained. Had the contest
gone so far as to promise the vast enlargement of the power of
France by reason of an alliance with enlarged Italy, interference
might have resulted. In fact, the German states began to suspect
such a result, and the realization of it was one of Napoleon’s reasons
for withdrawing very unceremoniously from the war. Here we see,
therefore, that the principle of concert was not entirely dead. The
second and third wars were fought by a brilliantly organized state,
Prussia, with whose successful armies no nation cared to make a
trial of strength.
In 1877 Russia made war on Turkey and proceeded with such
energy that she soon forced the sultan to sign the treaty of San
Stefano, altogether in favor of Russia. The particulars of the struggle
7
belong to another chapter, but here it is only necessary to point out
that the Concert of Europe was now suddenly revived by the Great
Powers, and Russia was forced to submit her well won victory to the
Congress of Berlin, which scaled down the awards of San Stefano
until Russia might well ask what was left of her victory. A similar
thing happened in the Balkan War of 1912–1913. Here the parties
concerned had fought their quarrel out to the end and had nearly
expelled Turkey from Europe, dividing the spoils among themselves.
Then in stepped the Great Powers, prescribing in a treaty at London
the limits of gain to the successful contestants. They acted in the
interest of peace; for Austria, watching the actions of Serbia and
Greece, let it be known that she would not allow Serbia to have
Albania, and the Powers interfered in order to prevent such action
from kindling a great European war.

7
See below, p. 112.

Thus in three notable wars, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish

War, and the Balkan War, the action of the Great Powers was not to
prevent war, but to neutralize its gains. So far did this principle go
that writers were known to suggest that war would no longer be
profitable to nations, since in a Concert of Europe the Great Powers
would ever nullify the gains of the contestants.
At this time concert had come to mean another thing than it
meant in the decade after the fall of Napoleon. Then it was a fixed
system of consultation and decision in anticipation of some issue
that threatened war: now it was concerted action to keep a local war
from going so far as to involve a general conflict. It was a last resort
in the presence of dire danger. A more present means of preserving
peace was the Balance of Power, which consisted in forming the
states in groups one of which balanced another group and prevented
the development of overwhelming strength. The principle was well
known in the past history of Europe, but it was never so clearly
defined in the remote past as in the last half century. For our
purposes its modern phase begins after the Franco-Prussian War,
1870–1871.
Before that time Prussia was strong in Europe but not over-
whelmingly great. On one side was Austria, long her enemy, and on
the other was France. Within five years they were defeated with
such quick and crushing blows that the world was startled and the
Germans themselves were as much astonished as delighted. Out of
this brilliant period of success arose the German Empire, with
Prussia for its corner-stone and Bismarck for its builder and
guardian. Immediately a singular thing happened. One would hardly
expect that a beaten state would straightway form an alliance with
the power that had humiliated her; yet such a relation was
established between Germany and Austria, and it has lasted to this
day. Where Germany has loved Austria has loved, where Germany
has hated Austria has hated, and the ambition of one has been
supported by the other. Bismarck’s policy had this state of friendship
in view and he gave Austria generous terms of peace in 1866, when
she was at his feet. Common blood bound the two states together
and later led to the hope of unification in a great Pan-German
empire.
 With France, however, the empire which Bismarck founded was
to have no such state of amity. Between them was no brotherhood,
not even in the tenuous bonds of the theory of the rights of man.
Back of 1871 were many acts of aggression, many bitter wars, and
some very humiliating experiences for states inhabited by Germans.
And now the tables were turned. France was weak and the often
beaten Germans were strong and victorious. Their vengeance was
expressed in the long siege of Paris, the proclamation of the German
Empire in the château of the old French kings, the humiliating
indemnity levied on the French people, and the annexation of Alsace
and Lorraine, so long in the quiet keeping of France that they were
thoroughly French in sympathy and political purpose. Bismarck
usually ruled his heart with his head, but he lost himself for the
moment when he sent a defeated neighbor under the yoke of
needless disgrace, and Germany has paid the price many times over
in maintaining a great army and parrying the diplomatic thrusts of
France. The hostile feelings thus engendered gave rise to the
particular kind of balance of power that has existed in Europe since
1871; for on whatever side Germany was found France was on the
other, and however the elements shifted in the grouping of nations
these two states were always opponents.
It was Bismarck’s idea to form an alliance so powerful that no
other state nor group of states would dare attack it, and by holding
his allies in hand to preserve peace. That was the way the Balance
of Power was to serve to prevent war. For his purpose he formed
what was known as the Three Emperors’ League, consisting of the
rulers of Germany, Russia, and Austria. The combination was weak
in one important point; for Russia and Austria had rival hopes of
territorial gains in the Near East, and they were not likely to remain
permanently in accord. With an eye to such a disruption of the
alliance Bismarck looked about for another state which could be
added to the group. He turned to Italy, bound to him because he
had befriended her in her struggle for nationality.
To bring Italy into the alliance was not easy; for she was bitterly
hostile to Austria, who still held the unredeemed part of the Italian
people and who was still hated in the peninsula for her ancient
oppression of Italian provinces. The Iron Chancellor generally carried
his point, partly because of his personal ability and partly because it
was felt that he could and would live up to his promises. He showed
the king of Italy the advantages the kingdom would have under
German protection, which would support it against France,
strengthen it in the quarrel with the pope, and even hold back
Austria if that power was inclined to pay off old scores. These
arrangements were completed in 1882 and gave rise to the Triple
Alliance, until 1914 a strong factor in European affairs. The
greatness of Bismarck is well shown in the fact that he could carry
this plan through and still retain Russia in coöperation with Austria
and Germany. Until he retired from office in 1890 he had the support
of the tsar.
After he withdrew the union of the three emperors was
dissolved. But for his strong hand it could hardly have been formed.
Russia and Austria were at bottom rivals. If Germany supported
Russia in her plans for the Near East she would offend Austria, and if
she lent herself to Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if she
favored Russia openly she was likely to arouse the opposition of
Great Britain, who was at that time very suspicious of the tsar’s
designs on Constantinople. It was a delicate situation, and it was
only good luck and Bismarck’s character that kept it intact for more
than fifteen years.
After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its existence, Italy
suppressing her dislike for Austria as well as she could in view of her
need of strong friends among the nations. But Russia fell away and
in 1895 announced that she had formed a Dual Alliance with France,
a thing which Bismarck had been very solicitous to prevent. By
holding Russia in hand he had been able to isolate France in Europe,
but her isolation was now a thing of the past. The Dual Alliance
confronted the Triple Alliance and the result was peace. At the same
time the rivalry of Russia and Austria over Turkey became more
energetic, which tended to increase the probability of war.
 Succeeding Bismarck came German statesmen who were not so
steady as he, and their weaker hold on the situation added to the
gravity of the prospects of peace. It can hardly be doubted that the
fall of Bismarck lessened the prospect that Europe would remain at
peace. The Balance of Power, which took so clear a form with the
organization of the Dual Alliance, was not as good a guarantee of
peace as it seemed; for while it made the checking of powers by
powers more apparent, its very existence was evidence of a state of
stronger rivalry of nations than existed before the Dual Alliance was
formed. At the same time the men who now guided the fortunes of
Germany were not so convinced as Bismarck that the country should
have peace.
While these things happened Great Britain remained generally
neutral. She was busy with trade expansion and the development of
her colonies, especially in Africa; and her chief interest, so far as the
schemes of the Continental nations were concerned, was to see that
none of them interfered with her progress in that field of endeavor.
Late in Bismarck’s time, however, she became convinced that
Germany was becoming a rival both in trade and colonization. It is
true that France was also a rival, and between her and Great Britain
occurred some sharp passages; but France was not an aggressive
nation and had no strong military resources to back her ambitions in
the field of peaceful activities. Germany, on the other hand, was
increasingly militaristic and the logic of events seemed to indicate
that she would at some time in the future be willing to support her
commercial and colonial ambition with a formidable appeal to arms.
British anxiety was quickened when the young kaiser began to build
a great navy, with the avowed object of making it equal to the
British navy. For centuries it had been the key-note of British policy
to have a navy that could control the seas; and while there was
nothing in the will of Father Adam that gave Britons the dominion of
the seas, the kaiser must have known that he could not challenge
their superiority on water without arousing their gravest
apprehension. During the Boer war (1899–1902) Germany gave
added offense to Britain. She showed sympathy openly for the
Boers, and it was generally believed in Great Britain that she took
advantage of the opportunity to try to form a grand alliance to curb
the power of the “Mistress of the Seas.” Rumor said that the plan
was defeated only by the refusal of France to lend her assistance
unless she received Alsace-Lorraine. If the report is true, it only
shows what a costly thing to Germany was the hatred that Bismarck
created when he put France to the humiliating dismemberment of
1871.
During this period Théophile Delcassé was head of the French
foreign office (1898–1905). He was a man of great original ability
and was desirous of restoring the prestige of France. When he came
into office the French public was excited over the Fashoda incident, a
clash of French and British interests in the Sudan which seemed to
threaten war. The British government took a strong attitude, as it
was likely at that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing with a
weaker nation. Delcassé realized that the true welfare of his country
demanded friendship with the one power which could help it against
Germany, and at the risk of denunciation at home he gave up all that
Great Britain demanded in the Sudan. He thus showed that he
possessed that high trait of statesmanship which consists in the
ability to convert an opponent into a firm friend.
The opportunity to which he was looking forward came when
Germany set her plans into operation during the Boer war. He not
only held out for the return of the lost provinces but, that failing,
made overtures for a better understanding with the British. It was a
time when a friendly hand was gladly received by the London
government. The result was a series of agreements which became
known as the Entente Cordiale, 1904. They marked the
reappearance of Great Britain as a leading power in Continental
affairs, after a long period of aloofness. She had become an active
part of the Balance of Power, and her strength was thrown to the
side which was bent on restraining the vast influence of Germany.
Her action caused great alarm at Berlin, where her motive was
interpreted as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of that city
apparently forgetting that they had provoked it by their unfriendly
attitude in the Boer war.
In the same year began the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905).
At first glance it would seem that this conflict threatened to weaken
the Entente Cordiale, for Japan was allied to Great Britain and Russia
was bound up with France by the Dual Alliance. But the result was
just the opposite. The Entente was not only left intact, but it was
actually strengthened. When Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain
ceased to fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which made it
possible for her to draw nearer to the Muscovite power. At the same
time, Russia, always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her eyes
with greater eagerness than ever to the Near East, which brought
her into a more intense state of opposition to Austria and Germany.
Delcassé seized the opportunity offered him and succeeded in
bringing together these two great nations, which for many years had
been continually ready to fly at one another. He put into motion the
negotiations out of which was formed the Triple Entente (1907) in
which Great Britain, France, and Russia announced that they had
settled their differences and would stand together in future crises.
The incidents that followed the culmination of Delcassé’s
diplomacy are very striking, but they must be deferred until I reach a
later stage of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe that it
brought the theory of the Balance of Power to its logical
development. Delcassé was in a world in which one great and most
efficiently armed nation stood in a position to turn suddenly on the
rest of Europe and sweep it into her lap. By her military and naval
power, by her vast trained army, by her readiness for instantaneous
action, by her well planned strategic railroads, and by her alliances
with the middle-European states she was in a threatening position.
At a given signal she could seize great domains, fortify herself, and
defy all the world to drive her out of what she had taken. There was
hardly an intelligent German who did not believe that this course
would be followed in the near future and who did not feel confident
that it would make Germany the dominating nation of the world.
Against this system the Triple Entente was formed, as a means of
balance. It was larger than the Triple Alliance but not so effectively
led.
And here I must observe that these two groups had come into
existence in the most natural way. Bismarck had founded the Triple
Alliance as a means of preserving peace, not as a means of
aggression; but it had become something more than he intended it
to be. It had enabled Germany to play such a part in European
politics that the creation of another great group as a balance was
apparently demanded. Immediately that her position was lowered
Germany felt aggrieved that the combination had been made against
her. So powerful were her convictions about her wrongs that she
threw away all thought of a concert of the Great Powers for the
settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted to the Balance to protect
her; but she now considered it something more than a state of
equilibrium and she appealed to arms. Before this narrative recounts
the actual events by which she felt that she was justified in taking
this step, it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a series of
causes and events which for nearly a century has been an open
menace to European peace and stability.
 CHAPTER VI

THE BALKAN STATES

Viscount Grey has been criticized for not understanding the

Balkan problem. If his critics understood how complex is the story of
the last century in this part of Europe they would withold their
strictures. I, at least, do not blame any man for failing to carry in his
mind an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of races and
religions in the Balkan country have striven and hoped for during the
recent past. In this chapter the best that can be promised is an
account of the main facts of Balkan history. A more detailed
narrative would be confusing to the reader. A failure to mention the
subject would leave much unexplained that is essential to an
understanding of the origin of the present war. And we shall hardly
know how to decide what kind of a peace the future security of
Europe demands, if we leave out of consideration the proper
disposition to be made of the small states of the Southeast.
In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and began a series of
conquests that carried her to the very gates of the city of Vienna.
That important stronghold seemed about to fall into her hands in
1683, when an army of Polish and German soldiers came to its
rescue in the name of Christianity, drove off the infidels, and
wrenched Hungary out of their hands for the benefit of the Austrian
power. This struggle proved the highwater mark of Turkish conquest
in Europe. From that time to this, wars of reconquest have followed
one another, the pagans always playing a losing game. But for a
long time all that part of Southeastern Europe that could be reached
from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the part that was easily
reached from Germany was held by the Christians, and the part that
lay between, a broad belt of hilly country, was continually in dispute.
Across it armies fought back and forth, each side winning and losing
in turn, but with the general result in favor of the Christians, who
slowly pushed back the frontier of their enemies.
The region held by the Turks was tenacious of its Christian faith
and recognized the religious authority of the Patriarch of
Constantinople, who, Christian though he was, stood under the
control of the sultan. The inhabitants suffered many hardships and
were reduced to the condition of serfs under Mohammedan masters.
The long bondage to their overlords had a peculiar effect on their
characters. They came to think it right to use fraud, violence, and
subterfuge against their oppressors, and so they employed religion
and patriotism to defend the commission of acts which in ordinary
situations are considered without the pale of civilized conduct. To
this day the Balkan states are not rid of their heritage from these
years of moral darkness.
The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish subjects, have
gradually formed themselves into five principal groups as follows:
the Serbians, dwelling in the interior of the country northwest of
Turkey proper and occupying much of the hinterland lying east of
the Adriatic; the Bulgars, settled east of the Serbs and extending as
far as the shores of the Black Sea; the Wallachians and Moldavians,
who were of kindred stock and became known as Rumanians
because they believed themselves the descendants of the
inhabitants of the ancient Roman colony of Dacia; the Albanians
living along the lower eastern shores of the Adriatic; and the
Montenegrins, of the same race as the Serbians, who defended
themselves so well in their mountain strongholds that they could say
they had never been conquered by the Turks. Many race elements
entered into these groups, but the Serbs and Montenegrins were
largely Slavic, while the Bulgars were generally of a distinct race of
Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were generally Vlachs, a name
given to the Latin speaking population of the Eastern Roman Empire.
The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but they have a strong
sense of nationality. These five groups correspond respectively to the
five civil divisions that have emerged from the Turkish provinces,
each playing its part in the modern Balkan problem.
Montenegro aside, the first group to become a state was Serbia,
whose hardy mountain inhabitants rose in revolt in 1804. A number
of brave leaders appeared and valley by valley the Turks were forced
out of the country. The Serbs were practically independent for a
time, but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, and the
constant preparedness that was necessary to repel any attack he
might launch was a source of much expense and anxiety to the
people.
In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination of Turkey, rose in
revolt. Great sympathy was aroused in the rest of Europe and in
spite of the disposition of the Great Powers to allow Turkey a free
hand to preserve her territory intact, lest one of them gain over-
balancing territory, public opinion forced them to intervene. The first
to show sympathy was Russia, who had an interest in making herself
the protector of the Christians in Turkey. The other powers resented
her assistance to the Greeks, and finally Great Britain and France
united in a project of intervention, sending a joint fleet to the
Mediterranean which destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1827.
The stubborn sultan remained unyielding, and in 1828 Russia
entered the war openly, having come to an agreement with the
other Powers. She sent an army across the border which carried all
before it, and the sultan was forced to make the treaty of
Adrianople, in which Turkey recognized the independence of Greece
and acknowledged Serbia as an autonomous state under Turkish
suzerainty. At the same time Wallachia and Moldavia, where Rumans
lived, were recognized as independent under a Russian protectorate.
Thus one sovereign and three dependent but locally autonomous
states stood forth out of the confused and misgoverned Christian
area of Turkey in Europe.
 The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars and Albanians, with
Bosnia and Herzegovina, claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of
their national habitat, remained in an unredeemed condition and
were governed by agents appointed by the sultan. Montenegro
retained her position of practical independence, which Turkey had
been forced to acknowledge in 1799. These arrangements were
confirmed in a more formal treaty in 1832.
The successes of this period quickened the spirit of nationality in
the Balkans. Just as the Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm
for their classical culture and sought to revive the language and
ideals of the remote past, so the Balkan peoples set out to revive
their ancient culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish
masters. Serbs, Rumans, and Bulgars made grammars of their own
languages, gathered up what was preserved of their ancient
literatures and traditions, taught their children to revere the national
heroes, and sought in many other ways to stimulate the spirit of
nationality. The Slavic portion turned to Russia for support, whom
they called their “big brother,” while the Rumans cultivated an
appreciation of Italy and France, whom they considered kindred
descendants of the ancient Romans. To their national hopes in these
things was added the desire for religious independence. They
disliked being under the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch of
Constantinople, who was appointed by the sultan, and looked
forward to a time when they might have exarchs of their own, with
jurisdiction not limited by the Patriarch.
In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance in the region of
the Balkans, hoping to gain at last what Peter the Great had
declared was essential to her progress, a window looking out on the
Mediterranean. Great Britain and France came to the help of the
sultan and the Crimean War followed. After a hard struggle it ended
in Russia’s defeat, and at the Conference of Paris, 1856, the affairs
of the Balkans were again up for settlement, but this time the victory
leaned to the side of the Turk, although it was modified by the
restraining hand of his two allies. The purport of the treaty was to
reduce the power of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the
Balkans states were checked. The protectorate the tsar had
established over Wallachia and Moldavia was destroyed, and Bulgars,
who had expected independence, remained under the rule of the
sultan, while Greece, who had desired a large portion of Macedonia,
was forced to continue in her old boundaries. This crisis was not the
last in which the vexed Balkan question, seemingly near solution,
was made to give way before the complicated problems of the
general European situation. Looking backward we may well say that
if Russia had secured her wish, expelled the Turk from
Constantinople and liberated the Balkan states, the fortunes of
France would not have been lessened, and Great Britain, safe
through her supremacy at sea, would not have lost any of the
strength she had in India. At the same time the sore spot of
European relations would have been healed, and we should probably
have had no war in 1914.
Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same stock and wished to
unite as one kingdom. They made their desires known in the
negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the Powers did
not mean to create a large state on the borders of Russia which
might prove a bulwark of influence for the tsar, and accordingly they
denied the request. The two states found a way to accomplish their
desire, soon after the conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to
select rulers each chose Alexander John Cuza simultaneously, and
after hesitating two years the Powers acknowledged him as king.
Thus was formed the united kingdom of Rumania; and its formation
illustrated a weak point in the Concert of Europe. However much the
Powers might interfere to prevent the consummation of an act they
considered dangerous, they would think twice before trying to
punish a Balkan state, since in doing so they might set off an
explosion in the very system they were working to keep peaceful.
Rumania understood this phase of the matter and took her chances.
Her firm course had its reward.
The influence of Great Britain was now paramount at
Constantinople. The sultan was satisfied with his ally, since he knew
that of all the Powers he had least to fear from this state, which had
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