14

POLITICS AND DECISION-MAKING IN

THE TAIPEI DOME COMPLEX PROJECT
Chun-Chieh Lin

Taipei Dome Complex, alternatively referred to as Taipei Cultural and Sports Park or
simply Taipei Dome Complex, is arguably the most balanced public-private stadium
project in Taiwan. Although this project has yet to be completed at the time of this
writing, the planning of the Taipei Dome Complex intertwines with the hegemonic
discourse of Taiwan baseball nationalism, the public-private partnership in response to
financial austerity, and the national policy against international isolation.
Despite Taipei Dome’s cultural and political representation and significance in
Taiwan, it also details the project’s externalities, including the loss of public parklands,
the impact on the living environment, and safety concerns. This refers to the contentious
decision-making process that ensued as a result of an environmental injustice affecting
surrounding neighborhoods and the entire Taipei population. Taipei Dome is viewed in
this light as a contested field in which collective actions taken by stakeholders or interest
groups that have an effect on not only the process, evaluation, and implementation of the
Taipei Dome project but also jeopardize the natural and living environment in the
process of pursuing, contending, and negotiating their concentrated interests.
This chapter integrates the aforementioned perspectives within the framework
of the urban regime to provide a holistic analysis of the political and decision-
making processes in the Taipei Dome project. This chapter argues that the policy
initiation, decision-making process, and dynamic politics surrounding Taipei
Dome have profoundly affected the natural, social, and living environment. To
illustrate this point, I begin below by reviewing recent scholarship related to urban
regimes in the context of sports stadiums.

Urban Regime and Sports Stadium: A Brief Overview

Urban regime theory has articulated an analytical framework for examining the
political process of urban land-use changes as it relates to the formation-, capacity-,
DOI: 10.4324/9781003262633-16
212 Chun-Chieh Lin

agenda-, agency-, and identity-building in a governing coalition in which mo­

bilized actors exercise their power to interact with broader structural conditions in
particular local and national contexts (Dowding, 2002; Imbroscio, 1998; Stone,
1989). The role of sport in urban politics has been critically discussed in the
regime-related analysis in terms of (i) how various types of governing coalitions
can be identified in sustaining sport-city relationships (Jakar et al., 2018); (ii) how
place-based stadium constructions become a contested field between public and
private sectors in order to shape urban politics toward a local development end
(Sullivan, 2008); and (iii) how urban regimes use sport-centered development
strategies to achieve their social, cultural, and political interests (Riess, 2001).
Stadium construction, in the context of urban planning, should be structurally
understood as what Hall (1980) defined as a decision-making process for im­
plementing a physical plan in a geographical space. Urban geographers asserted
that entrepreneurial governance results in the commodification of urban land use,
transforming the spatial dimension of urban projects into a point of contention
between local and global communities, displacing the authentic, pluralistic, and
organic daily practices of urban spaces (Harvey, 1989; Zukin, 2011). Additional
studies have examined the relationship between displacement and stadium con­
struction (Gustafson, 2013; Smith & Himmelfarb, 2013).
Nonetheless, little research has been conducted outside of Western settings on
the implementation process of sports stadiums using a regime analytical framework
(Koch, 2016). East Asian developmental states have developed a similar state-led
model, collaborating with the private sector to build stadiums for mega-events
(Ahn, 2002; Tagsold, 2020). Such a top-down development strategy has the
potential to reconstruct a closed-border coalition that restricts civic participation
during the stadium construction process (Kellison et al., 2019). In light of these
considerations, the following section discusses the social implications and decision-
making process in the Taipei Dome Complex.

Who Wants the Domed Stadium? More Than Just a Game

On November 10, 1991, a sudden downpour in downtown Taipei forced the
umpire to suspend Game 7 of the Taiwan Series between the Wei-Chuan Dragons
and Uni Lions due to flooding at the 32-year-old Taipei Municipal Stadium.
Thousands of enraged spectators responded by repeatedly shouting toward the
press box, where former Taiwanese Premier Pei-Tsun Hau stood, with the
catchphrase “Premier! We demand a dome-shaped stadium!” (Chow, 1991). Hau
did not commit until the Chinese Taipei baseball team won a silver medal in the
1992 Summer Olympics, prompting parliament members to urge Hau to declare
baseball as Taiwan’s national pastime officially and include such a domed stadium
project in Taiwan’s Six-Year National Development Plan (Yan & Yang, 1992).
On August 28, 1992, Hau then directed Da-Zhou Huang, Mayor of Taipei
(1990–1994), to initiate the domed stadium project (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2015a), raising the curtain on the 32-year-long Taipei Dome saga.
 Taipei Dome Complex Project 213

This ambitious project appeared to be motivated by the suspended game in

1991, but it was also in response to Kuomintang’s (KMT)—the nationalist party
that fled to Taiwan in 1949 after being defeated by communist China—governing
discourse about baseball that penetrates Taiwan’s development history. Taiwan
baseball nationalism is a discourse that combines collective memories of suppres­
sion under Japanese colonialism (1895–1945), perseverance of commitment to
legitimate China against Communist China since the 1950s, measurement of
building Taiwanese confidence through international baseball tournaments vic­
tories against international isolation since the late 1960s, and the niche of regaining
recognition from other countries in Asian and Olympic games for shaping and
ruling Taiwan’s domestic and national identity to support KMT’s governance (C.-
C. Chan, 2012; Yu, 2007). Thus, this persuasive discourse assists the KMT in
establishing patron–client relationships within society, political parties (C.-S.
Wang, 1996), and in growth coalition operation of this domed stadium project.
Taipei Dome was also the successor of a suspended project entitled Building an
Indoor Stadium within Minimum 50,000 Seating Capacity in Taipei in 1979. Ching-
Kuo Chiang, Taiwan’s last dictator and President (1978–88) commanded this
project as a sport-for-all policy after observing that Taipei residents were highly
engaged in regular sports activities in 1979 (Taipei Municipal Government,
1984a). In 1980, the Taipei Municipal Government selected two potential sites,
the No. 7 greenfield site and Guandu Plain, but they were halted due to a lack of
funding for processing the compulsory purchase of the land (Taipei Municipal
Government, 1984b). After South Korea successfully elevated its international
profile by hosting the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games, Teng-Hui Li
(President of Taiwan, 1988–2000), Premier Hau, and the Chinese Taipei National
Olympic Committee (CTNOC) supported the Taipei Municipal Government’s
relaunch of this suspended project as part of their bid for the 1998 and 2002 Asian
Games (Lai, 1989; W.-J. Wang, 1990).
Taipei lost its 1998 Asian Games bid to Bangkok because of suppression from
China (Feng, 1990). Rather than frustrating KMT politicians, this result en­
couraged them to pursue their dream of hosting mega-sport events by completing
this domed stadium project in some form. The Taipei Dome project thus is not
merely motivated by a suspended baseball match but also by a state apparatus
seeking to shine a light on its governance legacy.

Building Taipei Dome: Briefing the Decision-making Stage

and its Core Issue
An overview of the decision-making process of the Taipei Dome complex is
necessary to appreciate its political and administrative complexity. The decision-
making process of the Taipei Dome complex can be divided into five stages: site
selection (1992–99), stadium plan preparation (2000–03), invitation to tender
(2004–06), design review (2007–11), and the commencement of construction
works (2011–). Each thematic stage highlights specific issues and controversies
214 Chun-Chieh Lin

within the political context, aligning with the project’s broader problematic de­
velopment agenda.
The first stage examines the flipped process of site selection decisions for Taipei
Dome. Three former Taipei mayors were discussed: Da-Zhou Huang (1990–94),
Shiu-Bien Chen (1994–98), and Ying-Jeou Ma (1998–2006). This was prompted
by their disparate political positions, levels of support from the central govern­
ment, and perceptions of the financial feasibility of land acquisition in reserved
options for Taipei Dome, which included Guandu Plain, Taipei Municipal
Stadium, and Songshan Tobacco Factory. An identified externality is the land
politics that resulted in soaring property prices in those areas, increasing Taipei
Municipal Government’s financial burden and compelling developers to flip
properties in those areas.
In deciding on a location for Taipei Dome, the second stage specifies the
contentious preparation process (2000–03) of preparing Songshan Tobacco
Factory, the historic industrial building with expansive greenspaces located in one
of the ritziest and heavily trafficked neighborhoods in central Taipei, for a domed
stadium under Mayor Ma’s directive to make Taipei a global city and attract the
2008 Asian Games and 2009 East Asian Games. Ma’s proposal to build a 40,000-
seat domed baseball stadium was later accepted by the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) central government in 2000 via a build–operate–transfer (BOT)
contract. Nevertheless, this project disregarded the opposition and voices of ex­
perts, scholars, and local neighborhoods concerned about negative environmental
externalities.
The third stage emphasizes the dubious invitation to tender; the selection of the
best applicant; and the BOT contract negotiation process between the best ap­
plicant, the consortium led by the Farglory Group, and Taipei Municipal
Government from 2004 to 2006. Throughout this process, the Taipei Municipal
Government was suspected of (i) unequally unraveling the definition of the
building’s total gross floor area for each tender, (ii) violating conflict of interest
standards during the applicant selection process, and (iii) recklessly deciding not to
charge development royalty, which was estimated to be NT$28.7 billion1 (Taipei
Municipal Government, 2015a). Following the agreement between the Taipei
Municipal Government and the Farglory Group aggreged the BOT contract in
2006, this resulted in a reputational externality for Taipei Dome, exacerbating the
design disputes.
The focus of the fourth stage is the administrative review process (2006–11) of
the Taipei Dome design proposal. This period specifically focuses on Lung-Pin
Hau, successor of Mayor Ma, and more specifically on the tensions and power
dynamics between pro- and anti-construction groups regarding the project scale in
the Urban Design Review (UDR) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Committees. Both parties engaged with issues about the (i) rationale for adding
commercial properties to this project, (ii) loss of greenspace, (iii) possible damage
to Songshan Tobacco Factory, (iv) safety and evacuation plan, and (v) traffic
congestion and light pollution. After Mayor Hau was reelected in 2010, the
 Taipei Dome Complex Project 215

government retook the initiative to approve the Taipei Dome project and fulfill
Hau’s political commitment to bid for the 2017 Summer Universiade, 2018 Asian
Games, and 2019 East Asian Youth Games.
Since 2012, the Farglory Group has been expediting Taipei Dome Complex in
order to prepare for the upcoming 2017 Taipei Universiade until Wen-Je Ko, a
rising populist politician who reviewed Taipei Dome as a scandal, was elected as
Taipei’s mayor in 2014. Ko’s strongman-like influence over the decision-making
process is central to the fifth stage, particularly his administration’s approach to
pressuring the Farglory Group for contract negotiation and design amendment.

Struggling with the Promised Land for Taipei Dome: The

Politics of Site Selection
Finding the ideal location for Taipei Dome has been a matter of geography and
politics. As part of the Six-Year National Development Plan, the KMT govern­
ment identified Guandu Plain, a natural reserve and prospective sub-city center in
suburban Taipei, as a potential site for the Asian Games. Nonetheless, Mayor
Huang’s ambition necessitated the acquisition of over 1 million sq ft of private land
and more than $53 billion for stadium construction (S.-Y. Chan, 1994). Although
the Huang administration was successful in getting this bill approved by the City
Council in January 1994, the Chen administration later dropped this intolerable
burden in December 1994 (Kung, 1994).
After reconsidering the budget bill’s use, the Chen administration proposed
three alternative plans for Taipei Dome in order to keep land acquisition costs
down. The initial proposal, made in December 1994, was to redevelop the
Zhongshan football stadium, a publicly owned facility located within 1.1 million
sq ft of the hinterland, but it fell short of meeting the 704-ft building height
restriction and the traffic impact assessment (Chin, 1995). Chen’s second proposal,
made in 1995, was to form a consortium with the Taiwan Provincial Government
to redevelop nearly 3.8 million sq ft of the Songshan Tobacco Factory, which was
owned by the provincial government (C.-Y. Yang, 1996). Although both parties
had reached an agreement following a 17-month negotiation, Governor Soong, a
KMT power figure, halted the plan in May 1996, ending the negotiation (Chin,
1996). Mayor Chen was then forced to reconsider the use of Taipei Municipal
Stadium and the surrounding 1.1 million sq ft of public-owned land for the
construction of Taipei Dome. However, this plan encountered the same obstacles
as the first plan ( J.-C. Chen, 1997), thus making this plan die on the vine prior to
Chen leaving office in December 1998.
Ying-Jeou Ma was elected Mayor of Taipei in December 1998, and as a
descendant KMT power figure, he revived the idea of building the Taipei Dome
in Songshan Tobacco Factory to host mega-sports events. Due to the Taiwan
province’s downsizing, the National Property Administration, a central govern­
ment agency, took over all province-owned properties (Chu, 1998). Such a re­
organization of government measurement facilitated administrative efficiency in
216 Chun-Chieh Lin

reevaluating the aforementioned options, ultimately leading to the selection of

Songshan Tobacco Factory as the promised land for Taipei Dome (Chin, 1999).
From Mayor Huang to Ma, the hidden agenda of land politics and the legacy of
hosting mega-sport events have played dominant roles in deciding the location of
Taipei Dome. Neither local neighborhoods nor local retailers benefited from these
changes. Between 1980 to 1996, average property prices in Guandu Plain rose 30
times from $1,820 to $54,600 per sq m (Economy Daily News, 1991; Hung,
1996). From 1995 to 1996, local retailers surrounding either Songshan Tobacco
Factory or Taipei Municipal Stadium faced rent increases of 60% and 20%, re­
spectively (Hung, 1996). Nevertheless, this was only the beginning of the butterfly
effect, let alone the subsequent conflicts during the preparation process.

Planning the Domed Stadium in a Tobacco Factory? Voices

of Doubt and Certainty
The voice of doubt has never been silent during the Taipei Dome’s preparation
and planning stages. Previously reserved sites for Taipei Dome had elicited re­
peated complaints about property flipping, environmental disruptions, and de­
graded neighborhood quality of life (C.-K. Chen, 1994; Niu, 1994). Indeed,
Taipei residents are sensitive to those externalities, as the city has consistently had
the highest population density and property prices in Taiwan, but lacks green­
space. Experts, scholars, and residents questioned the project’s rationale, proce­
dure, and assessment for displacing such scarce greenspace in Songshan Tobacco
Factory with a multi-purpose, domed-stadium complex. These doubters were
howling at the moon because governments were pursuing political gains from
Taipei Dome rather than addressing public concerns.
In July 1999, the Ma administration presented the BOT proposal to the
Executive Yuan’s review board (the executive branch of government). The Ma
administration proposed establishing superficies for 70 years and requesting a
gratuitous appropriation of nearly 3.8 million square feet of land, valued at $48
billion, from the central government in order to attract private sector investment
of $18.34 billion for the construction of a hotel, department store, international
conference center, and a domed stadium with a capacity of 25,000 seats (Hsiao,
1999). Following party alternations in 2000, the DPP central government
amended the Ma administration’s proposal in March 2002 into a 50-year BOT
project that requested the Taipei Municipal Government to purchase 1.9 million
sq ft of land in Songshan Tobacco Factory with $25 billion (Li & Wang, 2002). In
2003, the Ma administration used A21, which is located in the ritziest Xinyi
District and is worth $10.5 billion, with $14 billion cash as an exchange (C.-Y.
Yang, 2003), together with entrusting Taipei Dome’s planning and feasibility
study to Shau-Yu Hsu’s Architects and completing Advance Taipei Cultural and
Sports Park’s master plan and EIA (Taipei Municipal Government, 2015a), thereby
wrapping up the whole preparation and planning process.
 Taipei Dome Complex Project 217

Despite such a top-down perspective promoting win-win cooperation between

the DPP and the KMT, grassroots voices of doubt were drowned out by political
commitment, rendering the entire decision-making process a democratic façade.
In 1999, eight village leaders, scholars, and experts identified the cultural, his­
torical, and environmental significance of Songshan Tobacco Factory, urging the
Ma administration and the KMT central government to reconsider the site’s lo­
gistical suitability (W.-T. Chien, 1999). These concerns were later addressed
during three public hearings held between May and August 2000. Despite the fact
that Songshan Tobacco Factory was designated a monument in 2001, there was no
agreement or consensus regarding the impact on the environment and quality of
life during the discussion (Taipei Municipal Government, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c),
leaving behind the externalities raised by the local residents.
It’s difficult to say that the Taipei Dome’s preparation and planning processes
were inclusive. Rather than that, it was exclusively those in positions of authority,
including politicians and urban decision-makers, who demonstrated their influ­
ence over the development process by outperforming public doubt. Although this
was common in Taiwan, the development of Taipei Dome demonstrated the act
first–ask later agenda dynamically negotiated by power figures in regime politics
between the central and municipal governments, eclipsing the public demand for
environmental justice.

FIGURE 14.1 Songshan Tobacco Factory historic site and Taipei Dome Complex
under construction in June 2015. National Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall is visible be­
hind the stadium and to the left
218 Chun-Chieh Lin

Selecting the Dream Builder: Process of Tender and

Beyond
Before delving into specifics about controversies, it is necessary to outline the
tender process. When the Ma administration issued a 90-day invitation to tender
for Taipei Dome on December 26, 2003, this 50-year BOT project requiring $17
billion in private investment offered concessional taxes, loans, and rents, attracting
the interest of hundreds of multinational corporations (W.-C. Yang & Huang,
2003). Surprisingly, only the Taipei Dome Entrepreneurial Consortium (TDEC),
led by the Farglory Group and comprised of Takenaka Corporation and Ricky Liu
Architects, submitted their investment proposal prior to the April 30, 2004
deadline. This consortium was later selected as the exclusive tenderer in May
2004, but it was contentiously dissolved prior to contracting with the Ma ad­
ministration in October 2004 due to a conflict in project design and liquidating
distribution (Shih, 2004). To process the BOT application, the Farglory Group
regrouped with Obayashi Corporation and Populous in January 2005 (W.-C.
Yang, 2005). After eight contentious selection meetings and eleven contract ne­
gotiations, the selection committee approved the new consortium in June 2006
(W.-C. Yang, 2006a), thus finally becoming the builder of Taipei Dome in
October 2006 (I.-C. Lin, 2006).
To begin, TDEC was the sole tenderer because the Ma administration was
inconsistent in its responses to Ricky Liu Architects and Proma Group’s inquiries
about the tender period’s limit and definition of total floor area (TFA; Taipei
Municipal Government, 2015a). The Ma administration replied to Proma Group
with numbers addressed in the Tender Document (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2003a), which established a development limit of 3.41 million sq ft
for TFA and a minimum floor area of 1.24 million sq ft for the domed stadium
(Taipei Municipal Government, 2003c); the reply to Ricky Liu Architects (Taipei
Municipal Government, 2003a) implied that the TFA should adhere to Articles 1
and 162 of the Building Technical Regulations, which exempted parking lots,
electromechanical, and other evacuation-related equipment from the TFA. The
former interpretation may create the false impression that builders should reduce
commercial space to accommodate the aforementioned facilities, thereby de­
creasing the interest of other potential tenderers and vice versa.
Second, the consortium’s dissolution was related to the administrative conflict
between the DPP-led central government and the Ma administration, not just to
the conflict among members of the growth coalition. When Ricky Liu Architects
and Takenaka Corporation withdrew from the consortium in October 2004, the
Farglory Group was forced to find new subcontractors. Nonetheless, the selection
committee disagreed twice on whether this new consortium possessed comparable
or superior technical competence to previous ones, thus waiving the Farglory
Group’s best applicant from July 2005 to January 2006 (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2005, 2006a). On three occasions, the Farglory Group filed for
administrative remedy to the Public Construction Commission (PCC) in
 Taipei Dome Complex Project 219

Executive Yuan (W.-C. Yang, 2006b). PCC overturned the selection commit­
tee’s arbitrary administrative disposition three times due to procedural flaws (W.-J.
Lin, 2006). The Ma administration, on the other hand, never accepted such
charges and urged the DPP central government to respect local autonomy. In June
2006, this controversy was resolved by reconvening the selection committee and
conducting a review of the applicant’s qualifications and subcontractors (Taipei
Municipal Government, 2006b).
Another source of contention was the 11-time contract negotiation process that
occurred between June and September 2004. To begin, Shu-Te Lee, the selection
and negotiation committee’s Chief Commissioner, waived the development
royalty on September 23, 2004, claiming Mayor Ma and the Farglory Group had
reached an agreement prior to September 20, 2004 (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2015a). This top-down directive influenced both the neutral roles
and decision-making mechanisms of both committees during the tender process.
Second, the negotiation committee did not renegotiate the BOT contract after the
Farglory Group controversially regrouped the consortium and redesigned Taipei
Dome Complex, which increased the profitability to $116.9 billion (Taipei
Municipal Government, 2015a). Without the contract’s royalty and feedback
provisions, there was no compensation for environmental externalities to sur­
rounding neighborhoods or financial externalities to the Taipei Municipal
Government, which had spent $14.8 billion on land acquisition.
All of the tender processes’ identified controversies do not simply concern the
interests of various enterprises, political parties, or governments. As a result of
these disagreements, externalities such as environmental impact have shifted from a
single sector to multi-level tensions within the administrative system, parliamen­
tary system, and local communities, as discussed in greater detail in the following
section.

Mobilization, Communication, and Negotiation: Tensions

in Taipei Dome Complex’s Design Review
The total floor area of the Taipei Dome Complex and the proportion of com­
mercial properties were central issues during the review process, particularly the
Farglory Group’s 2008 alternate plan to the UDR and EIA. In comparison to the
Ma administration’s 2003 BOT plan, the Farglory Group’s 2008 alternate plan
increased the total floor area from approximately 3.9 million sq ft to more than 6.3
million sq ft. Additionally, it decreased the proportion of the domed stadium from
27% to 21%, as illustrated in Table 14.1 (Taipei Municipal Government, 2003b,
2011b). Residents expressed outrage at this revision due to the anticipated impact
on daily life. As a result, local communities and environmental groups joined
forces with members of the Taipei Municipal Council to investigate the decision-
making process that resulted in the malpractices, closely monitor the Hau ad­
ministration’s reevaluation of the project’s feasibility, and press both the UDR and
EIA committees for a thorough review of the Taipei Dome Complex.
 220
Chun-Chieh Lin

TABLE 14.1 Square Footage of Taipei Dome Complex Plan at Selected Stages of Environmental Impact Analysis Review

Original Plan Alternate Plans Final Plan

Aug 2003 Jan 2008 Jun 2010 Feb 2011 May 2011 Jun 2011

Domed stadium 1,054,324 1,344,734 1,317,329 1,317,329 1,317,329

Department store 579,098 1,441,243 1,376,272 1,376,272 1,239,011
Office building 1,141,673 550,197 543,308 543,308 370,935
Hotel – 771,126 721,397 721,397 570,928
Parking lot 1,112,169 2,102,825 2,012,473 170,146 1,623,271
Other facilities – 141,653 159,370 182,598 182,598
Total area 3,887,264 6,351,777 6,130,149 4,311,050 5,304,072
Result of review Approved Continue Rejected Continue Revision Approved

Source: Converted from sq m and rounded to the nearest whole number.

 Taipei Dome Complex Project 221

Between 2008 and 2009, both the UDR and EIA committees, in response to
public concern about the Taipei Dome Complex BOT project and dissatisfaction
with the project’s negative impact on traffic and the natural environment, re­
peatedly directed the Farglory Group to clarify their position on the Taipei Dome
Complex (Taipei Municipal Government, 2008b), to provide the committee with
documents pertaining to the Taipei Dome Complex BOT project (Taipei
Municipal Government, 2009), and to propose solutions to local community
concerns, including but not limited to tree transplantation, fire evacuation, con­
struction noise prevention, and traffic congestion measurement (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2008a). To address these concerns, the Farglory Group was delayed
by a year, resulting in an increase in construction spending from $18 billion to $26
billion in 2008 (W.-C. Yang & Huang, 2008).
The Farglory Group maintained communication with the Taipei Municipal
Government and local communities to expedite the review process. Nonetheless,
Yi Yu, a member of a protest group, appealed to the government’s watchdog
Control Yuan, and Control Yuan censured the decision to change PCC’s sub­
contractors in 2006, as well as 39 problematic clauses in the Taipei Dome
Complex BOT contract, in September 2009 (Control Yuan, 2009). As a result of
the Hau administration’s decision to halt the dome project, the Farglory Group
was forced to regroup with the previous consortium (C.-Y. Chien, 2009), but was
later revoked by PCC in May 2010, providing the Farglory Group with a silver
lining in the June 2010 review process.
The 97th EIA committee, however, vetoed the 2008 alternate plan due to its
massive building mass and unresolved traffic impact and recommended that the
Farglory Group resubmit another alternate plan (Taipei Municipal Government,
2010a). After revising the alternate plan, the 296th UDR committee approved the
alternate plan in December 2010 with significant changes, including reducing
building mass and proposing solutions for traffic and environmental impacts
(Taipei Municipal Government, 2010b). The Farglory Group then revised its
alternate plan, which was approved in May 2011 by the 107th EIA committee
(Taipei Municipal Government, 2011a), obtaining a building permit in a record-
setting 14 days on June 30 (Ho, 2011) and completing a $16-billion syndicated
loan agreement on November 15 (Lu, 2011). Construction work finally com­
menced in April 2012.
In comparison to the twists and turns of the 2006–2009 review process, the
2010 review process took place in a different setting. As the Farglory Group
reached successive agreements with the UDR, the EIA, and the Hau adminis­
tration, public and Municipal Council members expressed reservations about such
an efficient review and administrative work that the Hau administration might
defend (Taipei Municipal Government, 2011c) in order to avoid contract breach
and disregard those environmental externalities. This uncertainty developed as a
result of an internal power imbalance, particularly between the Hau administration
and other stakeholders, which resulted in information asymmetry and harmed the
decision-making process.
222 Chun-Chieh Lin

Throughout the design process, Municipal Council members from various

parties accused the Hau administration of municipal council contempt for refusing
to reevaluate the project’s feasibility, disclose key decision-making factors, and
provide Taipei Dome Complex documents for close scrutiny (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2010c). Rather than that, the Hau administration agreed to an
extension of the Farglory Group’s building permit and syndicated loans agreement
in August 2010 and March 2011, respectively, as well as an additional extension in
July 2011 for syndicated loans agreement (Ho, 2011).
Rather than overturning national policy in favor of a domed stadium, the
UDR and EIA committees served as a forum for discussion and alignment of
expectations between builders, municipal government, municipal council mem­
bers, and local communities. Although the case of Taipei Dome Complex ex­
emplified civic mobilization in the name of environmental justice to engage the
decision-making process, a critical impediment to inclusive communication is the
municipal government’s entrenched power imbalance. Having said that, decisions
regarding the Taipei Dome Complex were highly centralized and reserved for
elected officials. Thus, the Taipei Dome Complex is not only a matter of sport,
land, environment, community, or institutional system but also a social issue with
political implications.

FIGURE 14.2 Construction of Taipei Dome Complex in April 2015. During this time,
civic organizations staged a protest, legally closing one-way lanes on Guangfu South Road
to simulate traffic congestion during events at the stadium. The banner reads, “Once the
domed stadium is completed, this area will experience bumper-to-bumper traffic”
 Taipei Dome Complex Project 223

Scandal, Construction, and Public Safety: Taipei Dome

Complex as Bargaining Chips
On November 29, 2014, newly elected non-partisan Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko
pledged to conduct a thorough investigation into five high-profile, contentious
projects. Taipei Dome Complex was on the list two years after construction began.
Following its December 25, 2014 inauguration, the Ko administration boldly de­
clared its intention to renegotiate those pragmatic 39 clauses in the BOT contract
with the Farglory Group. As a result, it established a Clean Government Committee
(CGC)—an anti-corruption agency—to conduct a reinvestigation of the Taipei
Dome Complex project, as well as an ad hoc Safety Review Committee (SRC) to
conduct the project’s safety inspection. On the one hand, the Ko administration
leveraged this high-profile tripartite structure to garner media attention and support
from constituencies in Taipei. On the other hand, such an approach may reveal
evidence or information against the Farglory Group that was overlooked during the
previous decision-making process. Both were used by the Ko administration to
safeguard the public interest and establish command at the negotiating table.
SRC determined in April 2015 that the Taipei Dome Complex was a high-risk area
due to the following: (i) the entire complex, which includes a department store, an
office building, a hotel, and a parking lot, is expected to accommodate 140,000 people,
but the current design can accommodate only 59,833 people; (ii) the underground
interconnectedness of the main buildings could result in the uncontrolled and rapid
spread of fire; (iii) the evacuation plan, open-air space, and emergency ladder place­
ment were all designed inappropriately; and (iv) an implausible plan for medical and fire
services in the event of a disaster (Taipei Municipal Government, 2015b). Following
the seven safety standards proposed by SRC, SRC recommended that the Farglory
Group increase open space by demolishing either the department store connected to
the domed stadium (Alternate Plan A), which would increase capacity to 88,638
people, or the domed stadium itself (Alternate Plan B), which would increase capacity
from 59,833 to 78,927 people (Taipei Municipal Government, 2015b).
Following that, CGC released its Taipei Dome investigation report, re­
commending that the Ko administration pursue legal action against Mayor Ma and
Shu-Te Lee, reevaluating the BOT’s utility for infrastructure development, and in­
volving civil society in public project decision-making (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2015a). Although this report served as a reference for the Ko admin­
istration in gaining a better understanding of the Taipei Dome Complex’s context, its
ad hoc nature limited its impact on reviewing BOT in public infrastructure devel­
opment and promoting civic participation in the Taipei Dome project.
In May 2015, the Taipei City Government ordered a halt to construction on
the Taipei Dome Complex due to violations of the approved blueprint, as well as
damage to adjacent historic buildings and the MRT blue line (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2016c). Given the low quality of construction and design, the Ko
administration considered terminating the BOT contract with the Farglory Group.
To expedite decision-making, members of the cross-party Municipal Council filed
224 Chun-Chieh Lin

a motion on May 28, 2015, urging the Municipal Government to immediately

terminate the contract and take over the Taipei Dome Complex (Y.-C. Wang,
2015). The Ko administration rejected the council’s proposal but continued to
look for a silver lining toward contract termination, averting the worst-case sce­
nario in which the government would have to repurchase Taipei Dome Complex
from the Farglory Group for $37 billion (Wei, 2016a).
Despite contract termination, the Ko administration amended the design to
comply with seven safety standards. Chou-Min Lin, the Department of Urban
Development’s commissioner from 2014 to 2018, incorporated the concept of
urban disaster prevention and the seven safety standards into the scope of the EIA
and UDR reviews after inquiring with the Ministry of the Interior’s Construction
and Planning Agency about review gaps between multiple government regulatory
standards (Taipei Municipal Government, 2016b). It then assisted the Ko admin­
istration in discussing the design amendment with the Farglory Group, resulting in
the submission of a feasible alternate plan on July 15, 2016, that suggested reducing
the building’s mass and increasing (semi-)outdoor space (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2016a).
However, the Ko administration opted out of both proposed resolutions. On
June 8, 2016, the Ko administration issued an ultimatum to the Farglory Group to
resolve safety concerns by September 8, 2016 (Wei, 2016b); in the event that these
issues are not resolved, the contract will be terminated. Both parties reached an
agreement on the due date (Liberty Times, 2016a), provoking public outrage and
criticism from members of the Municipal Council (Liberty Times, 2016b), requiring
Taipei Dome Complex to undergo another review of its safety concerns via EIA and
UDR committees. Commissioner Lin, chair of the UDR committee, insisted that
the Farglory Group amend the design to comply with seven safety standards, and
from 2016 to 2018, they rigorously reviewed Farglory’s alternate plan (Taipei
Municipal Government, 2018a, 2018b), while Ching-Mao Huang, Lin’s successor,
controversially approved the revised design in October 2019 without reviewing all
safety standards (Taipei Municipal Government, 2019). Farglory’s alternate plan was
later reapproved by the EIA committee in March 2020 (Taipei Municipal
Government, 2020) and received a new building permit in July 2020. After a five-
year suspension, work resumed in August 2020.
Throughout this decision-making phase, the Ko administration’s actions spoke
louder than words—with the exception of a contentious start to contract negotia­
tions and design amendments with the Farglory Group, the administration largely
exhausted the patience of citizens, council members, and Farglory over a five-year
period. Additionally, the Ko administration’s reckless decision-making significantly
harmed the government’s credibility and diminished private sector interest in public
infrastructure development. Without defending or pursuing the public interest, the
Ko administration fell short of public expectations, deferring to neighboring areas
and Taipei residents to address safety and development externalities.
 Taipei Dome Complex Project 225

Conclusion: An Unfinished Saga

Throughout the 32-year development process of the Taipei Dome Complex,
residents, environmental groups, and Municipal Council members have raised
the same environmental concerns on each occasion, including the displacement
of greenspace, damage to historic buildings, traffic congestion, safety concerns,
and reflecting light from the stadium. Nonetheless, those in positions of power
have failed to take these issues seriously. At the time of this writing, the Farglory
Group intended to seek user license approval from the Taipei Municipal
Government in order to complete construction work before Mayor Ko’s tenure
ends in 2022. However, in August 2021, the Taipei Dome Complex’s con­
struction encountered another setback when the Construction and Planning
Agency discovered problems with the building’s refuge floor plan (Liberty
Times, 2022). Taipei Dome Complex has not yet scheduled an opening cere­
mony date.
In a broader sense, the political significance of Taipei Dome is linked to
collective memories of Taiwan baseball (Yu & Bairner, 2008), the East Asian
state’s neoliberal land politics (Chou & Chen, 2014), and its struggle for re­
cognition by the international community following its withdrawal from the
United Nations in 1971 (Yu, 2007). In a narrow sense, it exhibits the stunning
local politics shaped by client politics and the systematic failure of urban plan­
ning (C.-C. Lin, 2020). This failure resulted in a heavy reliance on adminis­
trative support from the central government, depriving the municipal
government of the autonomy to assess feasibility and suitability in advance,
resulting in unexpected externalities at a later stage. At the moment, nothing is
guaranteed except that those issues mentioned earlier will remain controversial,
and the dreams of bidding for the 2025 East Asian Games and 2030 Asian Games
will keep shining.
From a dictator’s decree to a sports mega-project, this chapter examined the
dynamic decision-making process within a selective account of the historical
and political context to demonstrate how this butterfly effect developed to
affect the natural, social, and living environments of neighboring areas. Unlike
current stadium studies, which employ a regime analysis framework in which
sport serves as a powerful discourse that outweighs other voices, politicians
associated with the Taipei Dome Complex have politicized sport in order to
advance their own interests. Thus, Taipei Dome is a political arena in which
politicians’ governing agendas have a strong influence on the decision-making
stage and snowball issues, affecting Taiwan society’s quality of life, public
safety, and civic trust.

Note
1 All cost figures in this chapter are listed in New Taiwan dollar (NT$).
226 Chun-Chieh Lin

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