Resit Ergener

Religion and
Economics
Religion and Economics
 Resit Ergener

Religion
and Economics
Resit Ergener
Boğaziçi University
Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey

ISBN 978-3-030-44454-9 ISBN 978-3-030-44455-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6

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For my daughters
Defne and Balca
and my Love
Sevda
 Acknowledgments

This book grew out of the lectures for a course on religion and eco-
nomics, which was initially entitled History of Trade and Finance: Sacred
Beginnings, which I have been teaching at the International Trade De-
partment, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul. I am grateful to the Department,
particularly to Professor Arzu Tektas for making it possible for me to de-
sign and teach this course and for supporting me in every way. I thank my
students for their interest and enthusiasm. I thank the reference librarians
of Boğaziçi University Library, Zeliha Günday, Filiz Ekingen and Yılmaz
Kamber for providing all research material in a timely fashion.
Special thanks to my daughters Balca and Defne and to my dear wife
Sevda for their love and support. I could not have done it without them.

vii
 Introduction

Religion is often associated with the spiritual, the metaphysical and after-
life. There are also those who think of religion as a scam which benefits
the establishment, both the priestly and the secular, and which provides
ideological support to the way things are. Either way, during the course
of many years I worked on this book, whenever I shared that I was work-
ing on a book on the relationship between religion and economics, the
response would almost always be something like: “How interesting. Is
there such a link?”—unless of course, the person I was talking to was an
academic knowledgeable on the subject.
It should be common sense however that an institution that has been
with us for so long and is so pervasive is likely to have economic impli-
cations—otherwise it would not have lasted. As the story goes, the con-
gregation that a missionary had built with much effort vanishes, when he
stops serving beans, bread, meat and coffee to those who attend the Sun-
day Mass. The succinct explanation for the disappearance of the congre-
gation, provided by the only remaining member, an unfortunate cripple
was: “No beans, No Jesus”. (reported by John Wetherill in 1936, cited in
Stanish 2017, 269).
Humans strive to survive and to be better off. To this end they employ
theirs and others’ labor and capital. In order to obtain the material and
non—material rewards which they are unable to get through the use of
labor and capital, humans can choose to beseech things through prayer

ix
x INTRODUCTION

and ritual, which activities are not likely to provide the intended mate-
rial returns, though some practitioners are likely to believe that they do.
Yet, even though they do not lead to the desired material rewards, prayer
and ritual (and other religious activities) are likely to have unintended
consequences, which render them essential for survival and for material
wellbeing.
Regardless of whether they are undertaken to supplicate for material
prosperity or to attain spiritual wellbeing and otherworldly salvation, re-
ligious acts are likely to impact our material wellbeing as well, and this
has been so ever since our early beginnings. Religious acts such as prayer
and ritual and the related beliefs, define and delineate groups, enhance
within group solidarity and cohesion and reinforce intra group alliances.
Religion, facilitates exchange, contributes to the creation of networks of
trust, contributes to the creation and justification of both inequality and
charity, enhances and attenuates social hierarchies, and affects economic
performance both at the individual and at the macro levels.
As one of the two Crusaders in a New Yorker cartoon, published during
the days leading to the Gulf War, says looking over an olive orchard: “Let’s
face it. It’s all about olive oil” (Fradon n.d.).

References
Fradon, Dana. n.d. “‘Let’s Face It. It’s All about Olive Oil.’—New Yorker
Cartoon Premium Giclee Print by Dana Fradon.” Art.Com. https://www.
art.com/products/p15063247659-sa-i6845439/dana-fradon-let-s-face-it-it-
s-all-about-olive-oil-new-yorker-cartoon.htm. Accessed February 11, 2020.
Stanish, Charles. 2017. The Evolution of Human Co-operation: Ritual and Social
Complexity in Stateless Societies. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press.
 Contents

1 Defining Religion 1
References 5

2 An Illusion, a Capability, a Tendency: Formation of

Groups and the Encounter with Gods 7
An Illusion: Animism 8
A Capability: The Community Dance 11
Unintended Outcomes of the Community Dance 14
Encounter with “Big Gods” 18
A Propensity: Exchange 21
References 32

3 Exchange with Nature and with Gods: License to Exploit 37

Gifts to Nature, Gifts to Gods 39
Oneness with God: Sufism, Eastern Religions, Monism 43
Abrahamic Religions 46
St. Francis, Pope Francis, and Patriarch Bartholomew 48
Religion and Environmentalism 49
References 51

4 Exchange Among Humans: Divine Supervision 55

Divine Supervision of Trade 57
Sacred Markets 58

xi
xii CONTENTS

Emporia 60
Religious Texts Promoting the Fulfillment of Contract
Obligations 63
References 65

5 Exchange Among Humans: Networks of Trust 69

Contract Uncertainty 70
Groups and Reputation 73
Insignia: Recognizable 75
Insignia: Genuine 77
Sects and Cults 78
Sects in Diamond Industry 81
Outcast Groups and Trade 84
Diasporas 87
Cooperation and Diffusion: Long-Distance Trade and Spread
of Islam in Africa 89
Trade and Religion Today 92
References 95

6 Religion and the Rise of Inequality 99

Egalitarian Beginnings 100
Why Share? 102
Aggrandizers Biding Their Time 103
Appropriating by Consent Rather Than Force 108
Spread of Inequality 124
References 125

7 Religion and Hierarchies of Dominance 131

Oppression and Discrimination 132
Myths: Attenuating and Enhancing Oppression 133
Institutions: Attenuating and Enhancing Oppression 134
Religion and Oppression 135
Religion and Subordination of Women 138
Attenuating Oppression: Early Christianity 139
Enhancing Oppression: Christianity After Constantine 140
Christianity and War 144
Islam: Holy Jihad 147
Muslim Empires: Tolerance and Dominance 149
 CONTENTS xiii

Pope vs. The Sultan 153

References 155

8 Religion and Charity 159

Gaining Prestige and Status 160
Creating Obligations 161
Benefiting the Donor 162
Selfless Giving 162
Punishes 164
Rewards 167
Defines Groups 169
Provides the Leadership Gift 169
Asks 170
Sanctifies 171
Reminds 171
Teachings and Practice of Charity in Abrahamic Religions 173
References 177

9 Religion and Economic Performance 181

… Of Individuals 181
… Of Nations 200
References 208

10 Religion and Historical Divergences in Economic

Performance 219
Possible Explanations for the Relative Backwardness
of Muslim Economies 220
Kinship-Based, Agrarian Coercive, and Market Economies 223
Weber and the Rise of Capitalism Among Puritans 225
Monasticism and the Rise of Capitalism 229
Autonomization of the Economic Sphere and Canon Law 235
Final Words on the Great Divergence 237
References 238

11 Concluding Remarks 243

References 246

Index 249
 CHAPTER 1

Defining Religion

Despite their frequent use, there is a lack of consensus on the defini-

tion of both terms religion and economics, there being more of a con-
sensus on the meaning of economics than there is on that of religion.
Most, if not all would agree that economic activities are about the use
of scarce resources to produce, distribute, and consume goods and ser-
vices and growth. There is less of an agreement on what makes an activity
religious, which renders the term religion harder to define, so much so
that a three-year-long high-level interdisciplinary conference held at Çatal
Höyük, a significant Neolithic site in central Turkey, ended lacking a con-
sensus among the participating scholars about the use of the term religion
(Hodder 2010, 1). This, despite the fact that one of the key questions
probed at the conference was whether “changes in spiritual life and reli-
gious ritual were a necessary prelude to the social and economic changes
that led to ‘civilization’” (Hodder 2010, 18).
The participants in the study offered sophisticated definitions of reli-
gion and of the religious, such as:
A burial is religious “not because of its separateness from everyday
life, but because it focuses, refers to broader imaginings and deals with
the relationship between self and community” and, lived in houses are
religious “in the sense that they” are “about imagining, remembering
and interacting with past houses and those who lived in them” (Hodder
2010, 17).

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2 R. ERGENER

“Religious dimension” is defined “as that emergent sphere of human

life in which social groups tend to their fascination with and fear of ulti-
mate boundedness, which shape and are shaped by all other dynamic
modes of being bound – religion has to do with the way in which one is
ultimately bound together with others” (Shults 2010, 77).
“What looks like religion may be the convergence of practices that
produce effects of markedness and absence” (Keane 2010, 189).
“For some, religion may be the ultimate utility providing protection
against misfortune, access to divine powers or guidance to good life”
(Keane 2010, 191).
As the definitions of religion given above illustrate, the range of phe-
nomena that has been put under the heading of religion in academic and
in daily usage has been very wide. Such phenomena have included ritual,
taboo, symbolism, morality, altered states of consciousness, and belief in
supernatural beings (Sosis and Alcorta 2003, 264).
Of all these phenomena, belief in the existence of supernatural beings is
probably the one that has been most widely attributed to religion. Tylor,
one of the founders of the study of religion, made the remark that “the
minimum sign for the presence of religion, is a belief in spiritual beings,
in the supernatural” (Tylor 1958; cited in Bloom 2012, 212).
Supernatural beings have the capability to provide what humans cannot
get through exchange with other humans or through productive labor.
Gods are powerful supernatural beings with the additional powers to give
and take away life, to control destiny, and to reward good deeds and
punish the wrong.
Perhaps, the most important function of religion is to open up and to
maintain communication channels with supernatural beings and gods, so
that they will approach humans favorably and grant their wishes. We agree
with Bloom that religion also has the mystical and civic dimensions as
well. But these are also experienced in relation to the supernatural (Bloom
2012, 183).
We are going to define religion as the sum of the beliefs and actions
aimed at obtaining favors from supernatural beings (Rossano 2006, 346).
Religious actions include, among others, transcendent rituals, observing
taboos, obeying dietary requirements, moral behavior, gifts, and sacrifice.
Supernatural beings are not always (probably never!) impressed with
gifts and rituals and do not always (if ever!) fulfill the requests of their
believers (even though at times, by coincidence, they may appear to be
 1 DEFINING RELIGION 3

doing so). And, transcendent and civic aspects of religion seem to be

lacking explicit economic goals.
Yet, the actions undertaken to win the favors of supernatural beings
and the religious activities that are transcendent and civic are not totally
void of economic outcomes, as such actions often trigger mostly unin-
tended and significant economic outcomes. Religious actions and beliefs
will last to the extent they contribute positively to the well-being of
the community. Actions and beliefs that have negative impact may be
encouraged by the dominant community in order to keep the negatively
impacted community subservient.
In this book, we shall explore the myriad ways our worldly well-being
has been affected by the unintended by-products of human efforts to gain
the favors of the supernatural.
We start with an exploration of the beginnings of religion.
Archaeological remains related to the religion of our ancestors are
rather scarce and consist of no more than some wall paintings and buri-
als. In the absence of sufficient archaeological information, we seek clues
about the religion of our ancestors in the religious practices of present-
day humans, who have retained the way of life of our early ancestors. The
assumption being that contemporary hunter-gatherers have largely (if not
wholly) retained not only the way of life but also the religion of our early
hunter-gatherer ancestors.
There are some problems with this approach. The size of contemporary
hunter-gatherer groups is not uniform. There is no uniformity with regard
to their beliefs and lifestyles either. And, contemporary hunter-gatherers
inhabit marginal habitats, not exploited by agriculturalists, which was not
necessarily the case with our ancestors.
Also, one should consider that even though their roots stretch back to
early ancestors, extant present-day hunter-gatherer groups are not direct
replicas of the early ones. Through millenniums, hunter-gatherer groups
have experienced technological change and evolved and adapted. This
would have happened through their own inertia and also in response to
other groups and to the environment. Change would have accelerated in
response to relatively recent contact with westerners and (mostly western)
agriculturalists. For instance, some (the Hadza) have adopted new tools
such as metal arrowheads and pots.
However, even though contemporary hunter-gatherers are not living
fossils, they are pre-agrarian and they should therefore give us a good
idea about the way of life of pre-agrarian communities at the end of the
4 R. ERGENER

last ice age and about the selection pressures that many have suggested
brought our species into being (Blurton Jones 1987).
Fortunately, there are groups like the Australian aborigines who were
observed before their way of life was modified through contact with west-
erners. What is more, Australian aborigines are all descendants of the orig-
inal migrants who arrived in Australia 45,000 years ago and managed to
avoid contact with any outsiders thereafter.
Another group who are the descendants of the original migration
from Africa to Australia and who did not have any outside contacts until
very recently are the dark-skinned Andaman Islanders, who live on the
Andaman island, in the Bay of Bengal, 120 miles off the coast of Burma.
Yet a third such group are the !Kung San bushmen of the Kalahari
Desert in South Africa, who belong to the oldest of the three lineages of
humans who moved out of Africa.
Groups such as the three mentioned above, which had none or min-
imum outside contact at the time the observations about them were
recorded, provide us with windows through which we can observe the
existence of our hunter-gatherer ancestors (Wade 2009, 98–100).
Hunter-gatherers have supernatural beings—who are not (as strictly)
bound by the physical and psychological limits that humans are subject
to, but who are not all-powerful and who do not know all, as the later
powerful big gods would. Supernatural beings of the hunter-gatherers can
be tricked by humans and influenced by other supernatural beings. There
are no temples, no priests, no idols, and no regular meetings. Punishment
of bad and the rewarding of good behavior are issues for the humans to
settle among themselves—their supernatural beings are usually not inter-
ested in and do not interfere with the interactions among humans. Yet,
these beings can reciprocate humans with rewards of their own, if they
are approached with properly presented requests, and with calamities, if
they are not (Norenzayan 2013, 122–23).
We propose that supernatural beings evolved out of the universal illu-
sion that non-humans possess human features (animism). The efforts to
communicate with and to propitiate the non-humans (to which human
features have been attributed) through prayers and through rituals made
up of synchronous movements, a capability unique to humans and
through gift offerings, motivated by the human propensity to exchange,
led to the beginnings of religion—with economic consequences.
 1 DEFINING RELIGION 5

References
Bloom, P. 2012. “Religion, Morality, Evolution.” Annual Review Psychol ogy 63:
179–99. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100334.
Blurton Jones, N. G. 1987. “Tolerated Theft, Suggestions About the Ecology
and Evolution of Sharing, Hoarding and Scrounging.” Social Science Infor-
mation 26 (1): 31–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/053901887026001002.
Hodder, Ian. 2010. “Probing Religion at Catalhöyük: An Interdisciplinary.” In
Religion in the Emergence of Civilization: Çatalhöyük as a Case Study, edited
by Ian Hodder, vol. 1, 1–31.
Keane, Webb. 2010. “Marked, Absent, Habitual: Approaches to Neolithic Reli-
gion at Catalhoyuk.” In Religion in the Emergence of Civilization, edited by
Ian Hodder. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
Norenzayan, Ara. 2013. Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and
Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rossano, Matt J. 2006. “The Religious Mind and the Evolution of Religion.”
Review of General Psychology 10 (4): 346–64. https://doi.org/10.1037/
1089-2680.10.4.346.
Shults, LeRons. 2010. “Spiritual Entanglement: Transforming Religious Symbols
at Catalhoyuk.” In Religion in the Emergence of Civilization, edited by Ian
Hodder, 73–98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosis, Richard, and Candace Alcorta. 2003. “Signaling, Solidarity, and the Sacred:
The Evolution of Religious Behavior.” Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News,
and Reviews 12 (6): 264–74. https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.10120.
Tylor, Edward B. 1958. Primitive Culture. New York: Harper.
Wade, Nicholas. 2009. The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved and Why It
Endures. New York: Penguin Press.
 CHAPTER 2

An Illusion, a Capability, a Tendency:

Formation of Groups and the Encounter
with Gods

Order is difficult to attain and maintain with human societies, as humans

tend to be selfish, each seeking personal gain. Nevertheless, even though
there are times of disorder, there is mostly order. Earlier philosophers
such as Hobbes emphasized the role of the state in eliminating disorder
and achieving alliance and solidarity. Yet, human societies with some order
were in existence, long before the state came into being.
Hobbes pointed out that the state emerges out of the need people have
to come together for mutual protection. Otherwise, life is “solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 2019b) and “there can be no security
to any man, how strong or wise so ever he be” (Hobbes 2019b) as “every
man is enemy to every man” (Hobbes 2019a).
State has the power to impose order through the use of authority.
Hunter-gatherers, which is what humans were 99% of the time of they
have been in existence as a species, lived in groups that lacked state
authority. Except for the last 5000 years or so, power in human soci-
eties remained diffused. In the absence of central authority, it was for the
individuals to defend their claims against each other, which would have
created disorder.
Before the state came into existence, a capability and a propensity con-
tributed hunter-gatherers’ ability to form groups with some order.
More precisely, it was the capability to move synchronously with other
humans (community dance) and the propensity to exchange, that bonded
early humans together and contributed to the formation of groups and
to group solidarity and cohesion.

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8 R. ERGENER

Religion was born out of the attempts to set up communication chan-

nels with supernatural beings using community dances and gift exchange
as a means of communication with supernatural beings.
Supernatural beings probably never responded to these attempts. Nev-
ertheless, such activities had outcomes which contributed to the survival
of humans:
Community dance undertaken to impress supernatural beings supple-
mented the impact of such dance undertaken for other purposes, in defin-
ing and delineating groups and in reinforcing group solidarity and screen-
ing free riders. (As we discuss later in this chapter, community dance
probably started with the synchronous movements undertaken for pur-
poses such as scaring animals during the hunt.)
Exchange with supernatural beings would justify the claims humans
have on nature and on the produce of the labor of others.
But, what led humans to conceive supernatural beings? The answer
may be animism, a fundamental and widespread human illusion.

An Illusion: Animism
“The belief that ‘natural’ things, such as plants, animals, stones and even
phenomena such as thunder, have intentionality (or a vital force) and can
have influence on human lives” is known as animism (Peoples et al. 2016).
According to a study published in 2016, of all the traits observed with
hunter-gatherer spirituality, animism is the oldest that has been observed
in the most recent shared ancestor of present-day hunter-gatherers. Other
traits observed were: (1) belief in afterlife (“Belief in the survival of the
individual personality beyond death.”); (2) shamanism; (3) ancestor wor-
ship (the “belief that the spirits of the dead kin remain active in another
realm”); (4) worship of ancestors who may influence and who are open to
be influenced by the alive; (5) worship of high gods (single, all-powerful
creator deities.); and (6) worship of high gods who can interfere in human
affairs and enforce morality (Peoples et al. 2016).
With hunter-gatherers, any natural being, including animals, vegeta-
bles, minerals, trees, mountains, and stones—can be supernatural. (When
asked if all stones had a sprit an Ojibwa responded “No, but some do”
[Hallowell 1960].) Interestingly, the salient feature that makes natural
beings supernatural is their possession of human-like qualities.
Animistic tendencies are not unique to hunter-gatherers. They are uni-
versal. In his book Faces in the Clouds, Stewart Guthrie discusses how
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 9

we attribute human features to a strikingly large range of objects, which

include vehicles of all sorts, buildings, natural calamities such as volcanic
eruptions or storms or natural blessings such as rain, heavenly formations,
daily items, rocks, and mountains (Guthrie 1995a).
We attribute human characteristics even to omnipotent and omniscient
gods. Our mind assigns Gods to the same category with humans. The
areas of the brain which are alerted when we think of the minds of others
are the same areas that are alerted when we think about the minds of
gods (Norenzayan 2013, 15). The Abrahamic God knows and can do
anything, but he is in many ways like a person (Wright 2009, 473). Book
of Genesis says “God created man in his own image.” But, Aristotle’s
statement “Men created gods after their own image,” is probably closer
to truth (Wright 2009, 473).
What led humans to animism was probably the desire and the need to
understand how non-humans behave. One of the approaches that can be
adopted to this end is to assume that non-humans reason as humans do.
Here is how it works:

The individual whose behavior we are most familiar with is ourselves. When
there is no other explanation, we can choose to assume that other humans
will reason and perform like we do. What we know about how we behave
and how other humans behave in general, we can use to analyze and pre-
dict the behavior of inanimate objects and of animals and plants. We can
also apply what we know about the behavior of animals and plants, which
are familiar to us, to explain and predict the behavior of other inanimate
objects or of other animals and plants. (Guthrie 1995b)

For example, we know on the basis of our experience with other humans
that (1) a person can be dangerous, if he is angry, (2) a person gets angry,
if something is taken from her, and that (3) anger can be soothed with a
gift and by supplementing this act with an invitation to calm and peace.
Or, one can intimidate a person to force him to give up claims to what
was taken away from him.
There would be no harm in applying the above line of reasoning to
relations with forces of nature. Storms can be accepted as a sign of heav-
ens’ anger and wrath. The wrath of the heavens may be because they are
missing something. The way to calm down heavens may be to make an
offer to soothe its anger. Or, one can yell and chant at the heavens or beg
with it to invite it to calm down.
10 R. ERGENER

The predictions and explanations one makes based on animistic think-

ing are likely to be wrong, but useful anyway. Useful, because they lead
to action and any action is often better than none: When we hear a noise
in the night, it is better that we ask the question “Who is it?” rather than
“What is it?” If it is a burglar or a wild animal, we are in danger, if it is
just the wind, no harm done by having checked for other causes.
Our readiness to attribute human characteristics to non-humans has
been illustrated by several experiments. In a well-known experiment con-
ducted in 1944, participants were shown geometric figures (triangles,
squares, circles) moving around a screen. The movement was not random.
The psychologists who designed the experiment intended to tell a story
through these movements. The participants attributed personalities (bul-
lies, victims, heroes) and goals and desires to the geometric figures and
interpreted their movements as a story which was very much like what
the designers of the experiment had in mind (Heider and Simmel 1944).
It has been suggested that animistic thinking was present in early
hominids, before language (Peoples et al. 2016, 274). The roots of ani-
mism may indeed be deeply grounded in our animal past. For, the ten-
dency to explain the behavior of a species or objects with the knowledge
based on the behavior of other species is observed with animals as well.
Animals can seek an agency behind the unexplained movement of objects
or behind natural events (Guthrie 2002). Among the examples, Guthrie
gives in this respect is the barking of the dog owned by Darwin every time
a parasol moved, as the dog assumed human agency behind the move-
ments of parasols—just like the Isa Upanishad (First Mantra) assumes
the presence of divine power behind every movement.
Because supernatural beings had human qualities, one could seek to
open up communication channels with them, just like one can seek
to open up communication channels with fellow humans, in pursuit of
rewards.
The tools that have been employed to that end are prayers, gifts, and
rituals.
Rituals are exaggerated, formal, sequenced, fixed, and repetitive acts.
Such acts are powerful tools of communication as they are exciting, stim-
ulating, catchy, and easy to remember and as they revoke associations.
A form of ritual ubiquitous with hunter-gatherers involves synchro-
nized movements by the participants, or the “community dance.”
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 11

A Capability: The Community Dance

For tens of thousands of years, our ancestors lived in small groups, the
largest of which had no more than about 150 members. The formation
and the sustaining of groups with more than 150 members became pos-
sible about 40,000 years ago. One of the developments that made this
possible was the use of language. Language has enabled large-scale coop-
eration based on the reservoir of human knowledge and experience. Such
cooperation is now universal (McNeill 1995, 24–25).
Yet, the use of language by itself would not have been sufficient
to bond large human groups together. It was probably the dance and
other rhythmic activities undertaken by groups that made the difference
(Ehrenreich 2007, 23–24).
The use of verbal or written representations for communication pur-
poses is possible only if there is an implicit agreement about the pre-
dictions with regard to the actions of others (Freeman 2001, 7). The
strongest basis for the formation of such an agreement is provided by
the dance and other rhythmically repeated motions, because they are pre-
dictable and allow people to anticipate and move in accord with their
expectations. It was the background beat given by music, a wordless,
illogical, emotional human technology that made behavioral consistency
possible in masses—first temporary and then, eventually permanent, by
enabling the crossing of barriers and the creation of harmony between
individuals (Freeman 2001, 9).

The Community Dance

The capability to initiate and perform synchronous movements such as
dance is unique to humans. The chimpanzees whose DNA is so simi-
lar to that of humans can be taught to do rhythmic dance. For exam-
ple, the chimpanzees studied at a compound on the Tenerife Islands in
1913–1917 were taught to circle a post, with their walking turning into a
trot, making rhythm by putting emphasis on one foot, stepping the other
lightly, and “keeping time” with others (Kohler 1925, 314–15). But no
chimpanzee group is known to have initiated the community dance on
their own.
A “community dance” is performed by an indefinite number of par-
ticipants who move their muscles rhythmically, “establishing a regular
12 R. ERGENER

beat, and continuing to do so long enough to create euphoric excite-

ment among all dancers and also to a certain extent among the observers”
(McNeill 1995, 13). Participants enjoy an ecstasy and deep satisfaction
along with a feeling of physical expansion, of growing to be larger than
in real life. Feeling of self becomes fuzzy as the feeling of solidarity
with the participants in the dance is heightened (McNeill 1995, 8). This
state of being has been labeled by a dance historian as “boundary loss”
(Hanna 1977, 119 cited in McNeill, 8). “Boundary loss” is experienced
not only by those who participate in a community dance, but also by
those who participate in other synchronous activities such as marching
together (McNeill 1995, 7).
What triggers the feelings of boundary loss in the participants of com-
munity dances and other synchronous activities may be the invocation by
these dances of a state of being belonging to the very beginnings of a per-
son’s existence as a fetus, in the womb, with no separation between the
self and the surroundings. The rhythmic inputs which the dancer or the
marcher receives from muscles, which lead to boundary loss, may echo
the circumstances of the fetus, with the heartbeat of the mother, syn-
chronized with the heartbeat of the fetus, providing the major, if not the
most significant stimulus to the developing brain (McNeill 1995, 7).
Boundary loss is experienced by hunter-gatherers when performing
rituals. Andaman Islanders, for example, lose themselves in the dance,
becoming absorbed in the unified community (McNeill 1995, 8). A Swazi
king, who happened to have been trained as an anthropologist, said that
when rival Swazi warriors danced, they felt that they were one and they
could praise each other. Singing and dancing that may go on for eight
hours or longer would evoke intense emotions and bind together all who
are present with a sense of community and shared exaltation.
It is possible that a community dance is conducted simply to experience
the feeling of boundary loss. The dances of hunter-gatherers however are
often conducted not for the sake of experiencing boundary loss, but with
a specific purpose—like to ward off evil, to heal, to invite fertility and the
boundary loss is an unintended by-product of vital importance. Indeed,
the beginning of community dancing can be traced to the rhythmic activ-
ities undertaken by groups with a purpose. One possible scenario is that
community dance started with the actions undertaken to hunt big ani-
mals.
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 13

Compared with predator animals, humans are physically weak, fragile,

and vulnerable, lacking features such as claws or sharp teeth. Neverthe-
less, early humans managed to prevail against the predators and one of
the practices they employed in order to do so was to face the predators
in groups, waving their hands and sticks and stamping their feet in uni-
son and with rhythm. Banded together and enlarged with masks, they
appeared as large as any animal could be (Ehrenreich 2007, 29–30). The
group, pretending to be a single, multi-legged, noisy animal, would suc-
ceed in scaring the predator animals and to drive them into nets or cul de
sacs or over cliffs. Archaeological evidence shows that this type of hunting
goes back to the Paleolithic and that it precedes the stalking of individ-
ual animals by small groups of men (Pringle 1997). We may be invoking
this multi-headed creature when we feel “being part of something larg-
er” when in a trance, brought about by participation in a synchronous
activity.

Beginnings of Religion: Dancing to Influence Nature

As communal hunting waned, the thrill of overcoming animals could be
revoked as ritual. The successful encounters could be repeated to train
the youth and to relive the feelings of joy emanating from overcoming
animals. Prehistoric dance images show participants wearing animal masks
and waving branches.
The synchronous movements undertaken when dealing with danger-
ous predators could have been repeated not only to train the youth and
to relive the joys of the hunt, but also to deal with forces of nature—to
persuade the forest to give more animals to hunt and more fruits to be
collected and to ward off evil, to invite healing and fertility and the like.
In reaction to threats related to natural events like thunderstorms or to
their rivals, chimpanzees and gorillas can also engage in behavior which is
similar to community dancing, foot stamping the ground, swaying rhyth-
mically, swinging saplings, hooting noises, waving arms, and making facial
gestures. Such behavior is aimed at relieving tensions, challenging rivals,
and impressing the rest of the group. Even though this behavior is labeled
as “rain dance” by Goodall, as the movements are so much like those
of human dance, it is not dance by human standards as the participat-
ing chimpanzees do not move according to a common rhythm (Lawick-
Goodall and Lawick 1967, 77). Ethologists therefore label such acts by
monkeys as “display behavior,” rather than dance. What is unique about
14 R. ERGENER

similar acts by humans is that human acts are performed in synchrony, a

capability which only humans possess as a species.

Unintended Outcomes of the Community Dance

Solidarity and Cooperation
Trotting, hooting, and facial gestures performed by the chimpanzees do
not keep storms away. Likewise, the synchronous movements performed
by humans, do not ward off storms or illnesses. But, synchronous move-
ments or the “community dance” performed by humans generate unin-
tended benefits, the primary benefit being the reinforcement of the soli-
darity and cooperation—among the dancers and between the dancers and
the spectators, which chimpanzee display behavior does not, not to the
same extent anyway (McNeill 1995, 26).
One of the reasons why humans can attain a much higher level of
cooperation than chimpanzees is because humans are able to “keep time”
with other humans through dance, a capability which chimpanzees—or
members of any other species do not have—which again, only humans
have. Particularly when done in circles, group dance, heals divisions and
bonds the participants in communitas (Ehrenreich 2007, 23–24).
The dance and the higher level of cooperation it led to, made larger
groups possible, facilitated intra-group cooperation and contributed to
overcome problems of collective action, including cooperative hunting,
food sharing, taking care of offspring defense, and warfare (McNeill 1995,
4). Ultimately, the trances that dance led to, together with dreams, would
lead to the awareness of big and powerful gods, who were capable of
influencing nature and humans.

Definition and Delineation of Groups

Dance not only reinforces within group stability and cohesion, but also
helps to define and delineate groups from each other. During dance ritu-
als, the self does not expand to all humans but only to those one dances
with. According to an anecdote attributed to Dr. Livingstone, identity
marker of an African is (or, used to be) not where he is from or what his
language is, but his dance (Halikarnas Balıkçısı 1982).
The delineation of groups leads to the pooling of resources within the
group, which brings about their more productive use as compared with
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 15

when the resources are shared with all (Bloom 2012). This is the begin-
ning of the much-criticized tendency religions have to divide peoples,
sowing seeds of hatred against those who are different, like the heretics
and apostates and justifying violence and war.
But, success can be gained only at the expense of others. It is not
surprising therefore that successful religions have had a tendency to bind
believers more to each other than to outsiders. With most religions, moral
teachings are explicitly parochial (Graham and Haidt 2010). Religious
commandments advise compassionate treatment of the members of one’s
faith but not necessarily of members of other faiths.
For instance, the “neighbors” in the Bible, who are to be loved, as one
loves himself (Leviticus 19:18), are the Israelite neighbors, not neighbors
belonging to other groups.
Christians are nice to everybody but not endlessly so. Christian love
was not brotherly but familial—directed to the kin, rather than everybody
else (Wright 2009, 280). Galatians 6:10 invites Christians to work for the
good of all, but particularly for those of the family of those who shared
the faith. 1 Corinthians 5:13 invites Christians to expel the wicked from
their communities, which can be interpreted to mean that you were an
outcast with Christianity, unless you shared the faith (Wright 2009, 300).
The Koran has similar dictums, asking believers not to form alliances
with Jews and Christians (Koran 5:51; see also 29:68–69).

Intra-group Alliances
Bonding with other groups through alliances is as important for the sur-
vival of groups as their delineation is. Shared ecstasy contributed to the
creation of bonds between groups, which provided humans with a selec-
tive advantage in survival in a hostile environment (Hayden 1987, 25–
34). Here is how:
Up until five million years ago, primate ancestors of early humans
were living in the lush environment of the jungles of Africa. Because
of a draught which started about five million years ago, jungles dwin-
dled and savannas emerged on some of the land which was originally
forested. Ancestors of present-day humans who were relatively small pri-
mates weighing no more than about 25 kg on the average were pushed
out of the remaining forests by the larger primates. The larger primates
who pushed the ancestors of present-day humans out of the forest are still
in the forest. They have not been through much evolution. The tough
16 R. ERGENER

conditions in the savanna forced our primate ancestors, which were rela-
tively small, to evolve. The features that evolved which enabled the ances-
tors of modern humans to survive in the savanna included standing on
two feet, running fast and dexterous hands, which could be used to throw
things and make tools.
Bonding between groups would have also played a crucial role in
the survival of early humans in a hostile environment. Groups living in
different parts of the savanna which had bonded and formed alliances
could mutually support one another at times of need. Groups living
in dry regions of the savanna could be hosted by those living in wet
regions. When dry regions turned wet and wet ones dry, the hosts and
guests could reverse their roles. Such alliances were more likely to evolve
between groups made up of kin.
Ecstasy attained jointly by members of different groups through jointly
conducted dance rituals also helped to create, recreate, reaffirm, and
strengthen bonds between groups. Alliances created through shared
ecstasy can be as strong if not stronger than kinship bonds for, those who
share the same ecstatic states perceive to be connected by forces which
are beyond the self and this world.

Eliminating the Free Riders

Another benefit of community dancing (and singing) would be the elim-
ination of free riders—who want to consume the produce of others, but
not contribute to production themselves. The less effort one puts in a
collective endeavor like hunting, the greater his gain will be, provided
that the fruits of the joint effort are shared equally, regardless of how
much effort individual participants put in. Therefore, there will always be
those who will attempt to free ride on the efforts of others, even though
the total benefits created would be greater if all participated fully in the
endeavor.
The dance is a powerful tool to encourage cooperation. Many have
tasted the joyful exultation experienced when dancing in celebration,
with arms joined, together with friends. Experiments show that the syn-
chrony experienced during such dances makes the participants more pro-
social. As compared with members of groups who do not participate in
synchronous activities such as singing or dancing together, members of
groups which participate in synchronous activities are more likely to sup-
press their self-interest for the sake of other group members (Norenzayan
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 17

2013, 115). For instance, they are more generous in giving away money
when participating in economic games (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009).
How this happens is not clearly understood. One possible explanation
is related to boundary loss. That is, when “I dance with others, and they
move with me, their bodies moving as I intend my own body to move,
it confuses me into the boundaries of myself to include them” (Bloom
2012, 189). Whatever the cause, human groups that were bonded with
the dance would have an evolutionary advantage, as they would have
fewer free riders and more cohesion among their members.

Screening the Non-committed

Dancers questioned by anthropologists have all reported how joyful the
community dance is. Dancing makes the hearts of the hunter-gatherers
of the Kalahari Desert “happy” (Katz 1982). Greek ritual dancers report
feeling “light, calm and joyful” (Danforth 1979, 159).
Not all rituals performed to communicate with supernatural beings are
pleasant or joyful. Some are very difficult if not painful. Fasting and cir-
cumcision are examples of such rituals. Of course, there are more difficult
ones.
Such actions can generate benefits such as psychological and physical
well-being, increased power to put up with difficulties, economic benefits,
feeling of membership in a community, solidarity during crisis, fertility,
and opportunities to find partners (Sosis and Alcorta 2003, 264). Never-
theless, the material costs of difficult rituals as well as the costs born in the
form of physical and psychological pain and discomfort when performing
them can be greater than any benefits derived.
Why people put up with the painful and time-consuming aspects of
difficult rituals remains a mystery unless one realizes that the negative
aspects of difficult rituals are the very reason of their existence (Iannac-
cone 1992). Negative aspects of rituals are actually screens that eliminate
those who are not strongly committed. As compared with the commit-
ted, uncommitted will find the performance of difficult rituals costlier
and leave the group in order to avoid putting up with such high costs.
Stronger cooperation will emerge and stabilize among the committed
who stay behind. Had the less committed not left, they would have been
free riders, enjoying the benefits of membership, without making the nec-
essary sacrifices.
18 R. ERGENER

Their being difficult makes costly rituals hard to fake. Rituals that are
easy and therefore not hard to fake can be easily imitated by free riders.
A group member will bear the costs of hard-to-fake insignia only if he is
sincere with membership in the group and its requirements. Performance
of difficult rituals then serves as signal of true commitment and of coop-
erative intentions.

Encounter with “Big Gods”

The synchronous activities undertaken by our ancestors were intended to
influence objects such as trees, animals, volcanoes, and storms, which were
assumed to have human-like attributes. Ancestors of modern humans
were not aware of the presence of gods, who had the capacity to control
things in general and to deal punishments and rewards. Gods made their
presence felt, as the concept of each tree having human attributes evolved
into the concept of a forest god ruling over trees which then led to the
concept of a single god who ruled over everything—as initiallly outlined
by the nineteenth-century scholar Tylor (Bird-David 1999, 599).
We do not know how this transformation happened. It is plausible
that ecstatic states attained during the course of synchronous activities
provided a venue through which the presence (or the illusion) of gods was
experienced, as ecstatic states can lead to transcendental concepts such as
deities and spirits.
Another such venue would have been provided by dreams. Dreams
were believed to be what the souls experienced as they wandered around,
as the body where the soul resides remained stationary (Wade 2009, 53).
In other words, spirits could exist independent of the body, which meant
that the spirits could live on after the bodies which hosted them passed
away. The dead ancestors who appeared in dreams were their souls who
were living on after the bodies had died (Wright 2009, 13).
What comes through dreams, comes spontaneously, which reduces the
reliability of dreams as a channel of communication with the supernatural.
Also dreams cannot be used in public rituals. Trance induced by commu-
nal dances as part of public rituals, provided controlled deliberate access to
the supernatural, through which gods were conceived (Wade 2009, 93).
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 19

Dance and the Gods

Dance rituals continued under gods. For instance, dance was an essential
part of Greek–Roman religious practice (Ehrenreich 2007, 33). Artemis
and Demeter were foci of ecstatic worship in Greece. In Rome, ecstasy
was experienced during the worship of Isis, imported from Egypt, Cybele,
the Great Mother or Magna Mater, imported from Asia Minor and
Mithras, imported from Persia. Dances to Artemis were particularly wild
in Sparta with men and women wearing only a slip each. With Dionysus,
one had no other choice but to obey his call to ecstasy. Otherwise, the
person would be driven to madness and destroy his own children. Gods
who were very much like Dionysus were, worshipped under many differ-
ent names over a range of five thousand miles, from Portugal through
North Africa to India.
Not all gods were like Dionysus or Artemis. Many did not like ecstasy.
Or maybe it was the elites who monopolized the relations with gods as
their intermediaries, who did not like the dance.

Decline of the Dance

Our hunter-gatherer ancestors were egalitarian. Community dance had
evolved in an egalitarian environment, which it reinforced. The dance
would level and bind the society and remove budding inequalities. Dance
rituals were conducted without leaders or intermediaries. There were no
temples, no priests. Anybody could try to contact supernatural beings.
Presumed benefits derived from such contacts were shared.
Egalitarianism was probably a necessity for the hunter-gatherers. Liv-
ing in harsh environments, with (1) no government, (2) limited variety of
consumption goods, (3) limited trade with other societies, (4) production
of perishable consumption goods only (no food storage), (5) negligible
gains from innovation or increasing the variety of goods, (6) immobile
population, sharing with other members of the society in return for their
commitment to reciprocate, was the rational choice, as a reversal of roles
was quite likely in the future (Posner 1980). Such sharing provides a prim-
itive form of social insurance. The impossibility of food storage rendered
the choice to share not only the rational but also the only choice, as what
is not consumed has to be thrown away—if not shared.
20 R. ERGENER

Social stratification emerged as above assumptions ceased to be true,

particularly as storage became possible. During the course of later chap-
ters, we shall be discussing the details of how inequality emerged, how
it became entrenched and the role religion played in the process. Suf-
fice it to say for the moment, that the emerging elites, who gained con-
trol of stored goods, would not be fond of the elimination of rank and
social stratification which was experienced during the community dance.
Also, the newly emerging elites would assume the role of being interme-
diaries with gods and enjoyed the benefits this role entailed. To this end,
it was imperative to prevent the less well off from intermingling with gods
through rituals which included synchronous actions by the participants.
Archaeological evidence shows that as social stratification increased,
rather than everybody participating in the dance, only members of the
elite would. Ultimately, it was only the priests who conducted religious
rituals. One of the sites where these developments are best illustrated is
the remains of Oaxaca, in Mexico.
Recent carbon-14 dating suggests that the earliest known residents of
Oaxaca were hunter-gatherers, who lived about nine thousand years ago.
When performing rituals, entire community of early Oaxacans would meet
at an area cleared for the “dance.” Later, with the rise of agriculture
(which is one of the developments that opens up the paths leading to
social stratification, as we discuss in Chapter 7), rather than the whole
group participating, rituals were seemingly conducted by members of a
male elite. About two thousand years ago, following the emergence of
state and military might, it was only the priests who performed the impor-
tant rituals, at times determined by religious calendars, in temples built by
corvee labor (Ehrenreich 2007, 44).
With the rise of modern religions, the direct contacts which the less
well-off had with supernatural beings were curtailed by the emerging
elites. Dance rituals which provided one of the venues for such contacts
were discouraged.
In the Middle East, the dance scenes which are seen on pottery shards
and wall paintings between 8000 and 4000 BC are not seen after 3500,
the date when the first city-states appeared.
Even though the prophets of Israel belonged to a prophetic and danc-
ing tradition and King David was a musician who danced avidly before
the Lord when the ark was brought to his city, Old Testament references
to dance are not very positive (Wade 2009, 135).
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 21

Christian Church has wavered between allowing some dancing to meet

the challenge by the ecstatic rivals and the fear of letting things get out
of control. The church has tolerated music more so than the dance.
With Islam, the reverse has been true—synchronous bodily action has
been more part of the worship with Islam, than music. Mystical groups
like the whirling dervishes who claim to attain union with God through
the trance attained through the dance can be regarded as the extensions of
Muslim way of bodily worship. Such groups (like the Bektashi, along with
the whirling dervishes) have been very widespread and in the lands newly
conquered by Muslims, they have historically provided the pathway to
Islam for non-Muslims. While the Muslim states welcomed the provision
of this valuable service by mystical Muslim groups, such groups were also
suppressed by the state because their members sought direct union with
god, outside of the religious establishment (Wade 2009, 135–39).

Synchronous Movements Today

Despite the decline of the dance, promotion of group solidarity in which
the community dance provided has remained as one of the primary func-
tions of religion. This function of religion becomes more obvious at times
of crisis such as war and natural disasters. On such occasions, religious rit-
uals tend to become more participatory.
Synchronous activities are observed in the secular spheres as well. One
area is folk dancing. Another is joint exercises conducted by workers,
particularly in the Far East. And of course, there is the military. Recent
research shows that people are more likely to execute the orders issued
by a leader to perform violent deeds if they have previously acted syn-
chronously with the leader (Wiltermuth 2012a). People are also more
likely to fulfill the requests to do harm to others, if the request is made
by those with whom they have acted in synchrony in the past (Wiltermuth
2012b).

A Propensity: Exchange
Another practice which, like music and dance, has played an important
role in the creation and maintenance of social order is exchange. Poten-
tially antagonistic individuals seeking personal gain are allied by exchange,
while retaining their own strength, and not necessarily submitting to the
higher authority of a state (Sahlins 1974, 169).
22 R. ERGENER

How is it that humans choose to cooperate through exchange? Clearly,

“taking” has precedence over “giving.” Why don’t humans (always)
cheat? Wouldn’t “not returning” be more profitable than “returning?”
Wouldn’t natural selection favor the cheats over cooperators? Apparently
not—not always anyway.

“Friends Make Gifts, Gifts Make Friends”

With hunter-gatherers, exchange can be a social activity, as well as, if not
more than an economic activity. That is how it has been observed with
some contemporary hunter-gatherers, whose way of life is likely to be
similar to those of our ancestors. A well-known case is the Nuer studied by
Sir Evans-Pritchard, one of the pioneers of the discipline of anthropology.
With regard to the economic relations of the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard
made the observation that these relations cannot be treated as economic
relations only: Economic relations are almost always part of a set of gen-
eral social relations, to which they must conform (Sahlins 1974, 90–91).
Indeed, with the Nuer, much of exchange is undertaken to initiate friend-
ships rather than for material gain as such. The wisdom which enabled
Nuer to attain some order without a state is hidden in the words, “If
friends make gifts, gifts make friends” (Sahlins 1974, 130–40).
With food crises always a possibility, the primary goal of exchange in
hunter-gatherer societies was coverage during times of need. Under the
circumstances, the most valuable information about an exchange partner
is what he or she has to offer and will offer in the long run and whether
he or she will be supportive of others at a time of shortage.
In this context, exchange can be undertaken at times not only for mate-
rial rewards, but perhaps in order to cement relationships and to prove
and strengthen mutual dependencies (Langdon 1987, 109), or in order
to gain information: Through exchange, one is informed about the qual-
ities of the givers from different households (Posner 1980, 41).
This explains why members of egalitarian groups can engage in
exchange of like things and in equal amounts. Bushmen, for example,
are always engaged in the exchange of plentiful gifts of foods, such as
antelope meat, tsi nuts and nuts from mangetti trees. On one occasion,
anthropologists observed tsi nuts being exchanged among the same indi-
viduals, with the quantities getting smaller at each round, starting out
with sacks, getting down to small bags and to handfuls until at last to
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 23

the sharing of very small quantities of cooked tsi, which would be shared
while being consumed (Sahlins 1974, 213).
Displays of supportiveness are reinforced by egalitarian institutions
which foster trust and make interactions more predictable (Wiessner et al.
2002, 235). Rather than guessing how cooperative each individual will be
at a time of need, group members are left with no choice other than coop-
eration. Individuals, who refuse to share, are punished. Prestige is gained
not by having more of things, but through generosity.

Reciprocity as the Rational Choice

All this being said for the social aspects of exchange; it is also true that
there is a strong tendency with humans to seek reciprocity in exchange.
This is partly because to reciprocate is the rational choice, particularly if
the exchange partners are likely to meet again: It could be worthwhile
to cheat a person if you’d never see him again but not so if you were to
meet him at least once more.
The case is illustrated by the famous prisoner’s dilemma: Two pris-
oners, suspected of having cooperated in committing a crime, are being
questioned. If neither implicates the other, both will go free. If one impli-
cates the other and the other does not implicate him, the one who impli-
cates will get away. If both implicate each other, both will be punished but
both will benefit for having cooperated with the authorities. Under such
circumstances, cheating and implicating the other would seem to be the
rational thing to do, provided that the parties were not to meet again. Yet,
if the parties were to meet again under similar circumstances, it would be
advantageous to cooperate and not implicate the other; unless one knew
that the other had cheated on him previously, indicating a likelihood of
being cheated on again.
The prisoner’s dilemma was simulated in computer tournaments
(Axelrod 1984). Economists and mathematicians who were skilled in
game theory were invited to submit strategies for playing to the first
tournament, which involved 200 prisoner’s dilemma games. Computer
hobbyists and academicians from various fields including economists
and mathematicians were requested to submit strategies to a second
tournament, in which the encounters were not exactly 200 games each,
but of varying duration with a median average of 200 games. The winner
in both tournaments was the tit-for-tat proposed by Anatol Rapaport.
24 R. ERGENER

Tit-for-tat has only two rules: be cooperative at the opening and repeat
what the opponent does on all subsequent moves. These rules imply that
one should not be the first to cheat, retaliate if cheated on and be ready
to forgive if the cheater opponent changes his behavior. Thus, tit-for-tat
is both retaliatory and forgiving.
If somebody made a mistake, it would be difficult for tit-for-tat to
correct itself, as the mistake would set off a series of retaliations. A better
strategy would be to repeat the move if successful and change it if not
(“win-stay, shift-lose”).
One must remember that this strategy is valid only if the players are to
meet again. Computer simulations showed that tit-for-tat paid only when
the probability of playing with the same player again exceeds 2/3. The
implication is that selfish individuals seeking personal gain can cooperate
and reciprocate, if the probability of future interaction among them is
sufficiently high.

“RULES OF COOPERATION”

Evading reciprocation for a benefit received from others (cheating)

benefits the evader. But groups are successful to the extent that
members reciprocate (cooperate).
In a brilliant article published in Science, Martin A. Nowak sum-
marizes the five conditions under which natural selection can favor
cooperation (Nowak 2006).
Natural selection can favor cooperation if,
1. exchange partners are related (“kin selection”),
2. the probability of exchange partners’ meeting again is higher
than the cost benefit ratio of reciprocating (“direct reciproci-
ty”),
3. the probability of one’s good deeds’ (that he gives to others
without expectation of return, which will motivate others to
give him without expectation of return) being known by oth-
ers (reputation) is higher than the cost benefit ratio of giving
to strangers, without returns (“indirect reciprocity”),
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 25

4. the benefit-cost ratio of reciprocating to members of networks

within larger groups exceeds the number of network members
per individual (“network reciprocity”),
5. the benefit cost ratio of reciprocating is higher than group via-
bility, as groups of cooperators will grow and split beyond a
certain size (“group selection”).

Reciprocity in Nature
Adam Smith was wrong when he asserted that the propensity to exchange
was to be found in no other race of animals. Reciprocal exchange, as
defined by the saying “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours,” which
is the rule with humans, can be practiced by the members of lower species
which are capable of making the distinction between cooperation and
cheating. Even though all-inclusive generalizations cannot be made in this
respect, it seems logical that evolution has favored species which practice
reciprocity in their interactions with each other (Trivers 1971).
For example, Vervet monkeys and olive baboons are more responsive
to the requests for help of those who have helped them in the past (Packer
1977). If a male Hamadryas baboon watches and does not challenge the
formation of a bond between a female and another male, then the male
he did not interfere with, will subsequently not challenge him, when he
forms a bond with another female (Kummer et al. 1974).
Monkeys are intelligent and their societies are complex, but reciprocity
is not by any means particular to members of such high species only.
Striking examples of reciprocity is observed among members of lower
species, some of which cannot even distinguish between their opponents.
Tree swallows (Tachycineta bicolour) parents generally do not chase off
non-breeder swallows, which join their groups. Non-breeders can poten-
tially kill young birds and usurp nests. Yet, when allowed in a group,
they refrain from this type of behavior. Mutual benefits are involved in
allowing non-breeders into groups. Non-breeders learn about good nest
sites. Parents have extra birds in the group against predators. When the
young nestlings in a nest were removed to make it seem like non-breeders
had defected, parents attacked the non-breeders. Yet, cooperative behav-
ior between the parents and the non-breeders was restored as soon as the
26 R. ERGENER

young nestlings were returned to their nests (Lombardo 1985). The swal-
lows had employed the tit-for-tat strategy of not being the first to cheat,
retaliating when cheated and cooperating again when cheating behavior
ended.
A hermit crab with a shell, which is either too large or too small, can
offer to exchange its shell with another crab. To initiate the exchange,
one crab taps or shakes shell of the other crab in a way that is unique to
the species. The exchange needs to be mutually beneficial. A crab cannot
be forced to accept a new shell, which is larger or smaller than its needs.
The non-initiating crab does not come out of its shell, unless it agrees
with the offer. When it agrees with the offer, it first taps the crab which
has initiated the transaction and comes out of its shell. The transaction
then takes place (Hazlett 1980).
Stickleback fish (Gasterosteus acofeatus ) goes closer to a predator fish
(possibly to properly determine what it is and to estimate the likelihood
of a bout.) when accompanied by a cooperating companion following
it as opposed to when it is with a defecting companion that is staying
increasingly behind (Milinski 1987).
With humans, archaeological evidence suggests that division of labor
and exchange of goods may be as old as the human race itself. The
hominids living in the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania two million years ago
would bring the meat they hunted to central locations. It has been sug-
gested that raw materials and manufactured tools were stored at these
sites and carcasses were brought there to be processed (Potts 1984). It
is also possible that these sites were locations where food exchange took
place (Isaac 1978, 1983; Isaac and Crader, n.d.). Such sites may be the
antecedent of the home bases used by contemporary hunter-gatherer peo-
ples where social activity and food processing are concentrated.

Exchange as Production
Objects in nature can be acquired by means of seizure or through labor,
which improves a natural object, both productive activities. Karl Marx, in
an early work about Precapitalist Economic Formations (1857–1858), rec-
ognized “property” as the object of the feelings triggered by productive
activity. “Thus originally property means no more than man’s attitude to
his natural conditions of production as belonging to him, as the prereq-
uisites of his own existence; his attitude to them as natural prerequisites
of himself, which constitute as it were, a prolongation of his body” (Marx
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 27

1965, 89). Locke maintained that what changed the value of an object
was the labor put in it (Locke 1967, 314). Property rights are triggered
in the forager on the berries he picks, in the hunter on the bear he hunts
and in the miner on the gold he mines (Olivecrona 1974, 227).
That exchange is production is another reason why reciprocity is
sought in exchange. The keenness to protect property rights to the fruits
of one’s labor and not to give it up unless it is reciprocated by an object
of equal value are naturally selected inclinations.
The propensity to defend the fruits of one’s labor is likely to have evo-
lutionary origin. Those who were genetically programmed to defend their
property would have an advantage over those who were not so inclined.
The guilt feelings of a thief may too have evolutionary origins (Silver
1989, 102).
Not surprisingly, linguistic and ethnological evidence indicates that
exchange has been considered as production triggering property rights.
Seizure may be the absolute beginning of ownership (Gernet 1981,
257). Romans could assume the ownership of an object which nobody
claims by occupatio, meaning “seizure.”
The claim to ownership of seized objects is strengthened if the object is
improved through labor. Animals demarcate their territories by scent-or-
sound signals, which are instinctively comprehended by other members
of the species (Silver 1989, 34). A piece of stone belongs more strongly
to the person who has picked it, if the picker of the stone also chips it.
Property rights on land remain provisional unless labor is spent on it, like
building a fence, raising a flag, and living on it (Silver 1989, 51).
In many ancient Middle East languages, words meaning “purchase”
also mean “seize” (Silver 1989, 51). This may be true for the Latin
(emo) as well. In this context, the word “seizure” is probably an expres-
sion of the productive effort, which makes one the rightful owner of an
object, not theft. Akkadian term sibittu meaning “correct behavior” is
from sabatu “to seize.”
Again, in ancient languages, terms meaning “buying” or acquiring are
often derived from terms meaning “producing” or “doing” (Silver 1989,
51). In Middle and Late Assyrian documents (c. 1600–c. 600 BCE),
Akkadian uppusu, the intensive of epesu, “to make”, is used in sale doc-
uments of slaves, land, and objects. In the second half of the third mil-
lennium BCE, the same verb in Egyptian meant both “make, do” and
“buy, acquire.” Prekter in Greek means both “trader, merchant” and also
28 R. ERGENER

“doer.” The same Greek verb ergazesthai is used to express both “man-
ual labor” and “the earning of interest from capital.” Latin for business
effort, negotium, is from necotium, which literally means the “absence of
leisure.” The terms meaning business in German, French, and Italian are
related to words meaning “make” or “do.” Geshaft in German is related
to schaffen, affari in Italian to fare and affaires in French to faire.
That exchange actually “makes” is also illustrated by ethnological evi-
dence. During the seventeenth century, when Indian-European fur trade
flourished in eastern Canada, a Jesuit missionary heard a Montagnais
remark: “The Beaver does everything perfectly well, it makes kettles,
hatchets, knives; and, in short, it makes everything” (Martin 1982, 153).
Beginning in the 1950s, meat dealers purchased hunted antelope meat
from the Mbuti Pygmies of Zaire’s Ituri Forest and compensated them
with cassava flour. That is why pygmies would say that they were hunting
for cassava flour when they were hunting for antelopes (Hart 1978).
The feeling of indebtedness and the urge to reciprocate which one
feels whenever he receives something can be explained by exchange being
production (Greenberg 1980, 3–26).
In order to elicit reciprocity, humans first display generosity, gratitude,
sympathy, and sincerity. If such displays fail to generate appropriate reci-
procity, psychological intimidation is employed in order to discipline the
cheat. And if psychological aggression fails, then the non-reciprocator
faces punishment. But, more than reciprocity is normal when exchanging
with kin or individuals that one is very close to and cheating is tolerated
if those who are cheated are strangers.

Balanced, Generalized, and Negative Reciprocity

Charles Darwin believed that reciprocity, based on the golden rule, “As ye
would that men should do to you, do ye to them likewise.” was the foun-
dation stone of morality (Darwin 1875, 131). Balanced reciprocity, which
entails direct and equal exchanges, is only one type of exchange. Marshall
Sahlins points out two other types of exchange: Generalized reciprocity
and negative reciprocity (Sahlins 1965, 147–49).
Generalized reciprocity is giving with no expectation of immediate
return or any return—like the care a mother gives to her offspring.
Negative reciprocity is cheating, giving less than one takes, or outright
theft.
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 29

The recipient(s) of generalized exchange—for example, the con-

sumer(s) of the meat of an animal he (they) did not hunt—is (are) in
a way benefiting from negative exchange or theft—which is being toler-
ated by the donor of the largesse—who, in this case is the group mem-
ber(s) who hunted the animal that was shared. (As we shall be discussing
later in more detail, the hunter has reasons to tolerate others to consume
the meat he hunted: He cannot store the leftover meat and by tolerating
others to consume the meat of the animal he hunted, he strengthens his
claim to eat the meat of the animals hunted by others at a future date.)
Generalized reciprocity is practiced among family members. Balanced
reciprocity is practiced with kin and friends. Theft is a “no, no” with kin
and friends but quite ok with strangers, or with those that one is not likely
to see again.
And then, there is the sophisticated technique to take while pretending
to give: The Gift.

The Gift
Gift exchange is a type of tit-for-tat observed only with hominids, and not
with other animals. (Undeveloped versions of gift exchange are observed
with primates—the deal is often upset by the chimpanzees who trick,
cheat, and lie [Burkert 1987, 47–48].) The separation of humans from
apes became more evident as hominids began to produce and exchange
gifts (Isaac and Crader, n.d., 91).
In a sense, there is no real gift with humans either, as each gift creates
in the recipient the obligation to reciprocate. The care mothers give to
their offspring may be the closest to being pure gift, but even that is
reciprocated. Often, gift is the retribution for another gift, given with the
expectation of retribution. The existence of a time gap between the giving
of a gift and its retribution makes a gift seem like a true gift (Burkert
1987, 47). An interesting anecdote illustrates the point.

“NO RECIPROCITY!”

When Sir Raymond Firth1 was on his way to Tikopia,2 the Bishop
of the mission in Melanesia at the time, hosts him on the mission
30 R. ERGENER

yacht and gives him transport. During the voyage which lasts for a
few weeks, the Bishop and Firth have discussions on many issues,
including the concept of the free gift. The Bishop was about to
retire and the likelihood was that the two men were never to meet
again. It was quite obvious therefore, that Firth would never have
a chance to return the Bishop’s hospitality. When leaving Sir Ray-
mond Firth on the shores of Tikopia, as the two are shaking hands,
the Bishop says to Firth: “No reciprocity!”
The Bishop was of the opinion that selfless giving, purely in order
to do good was possible. The truth is that such cases are rather rare
and that even though they are seemingly voluntary, in practice gifts
are given and returned under obligation (Mauss 1967, 1).

Exchange of gifts, as discussed above, contributes to maintain equality

and build friendships. But, gift can also be used as a tool to build obliga-
tions in the recipient toward the donor. Marcel Mauss argued in his book
The Gift that gifts indebt individuals, families, societies, and nations to
each other, in tight and complicated webs of bondage. It is as if gifts are
alive with personhood and spiritual values. One way or another, they are
to be repaid.
Gift-giving can be an expression not of goodwill but of self-interest.
Indeed, the gift can be a sophisticated cultural “weapon,” a way of sub-
liming greed and hostility into a socially acceptable form.
Every gift calls forth a counter-gift, so gift-giving can be a way of (not
giving) but taking and the receiver of a gift may ultimately be the true
giver (loser) rather than the receiver. One who accepts a gift may be set
to lose—like the Trojans who accept the gift of the wooden horse (Nagy
1981, 191).
Several other stories in Greek mythology also illustrate the point. Her-
mes, gains the status of a god and his duties as “the herdsman and friend
to Apollo” and as the “messenger” are defined after he gives to Apollo,
a concert and a lyre as gifts, to compensate for the sheep he had stolen

1 Born in New Zealand, taught mostly at LSE, regarded as founder of economic anthro-
pology.
2 The southernmost of the Solomon Islands, the untouched Polynesians of which were
studied by Sir Raymond Firth.
 2 AN ILLUSION, A CAPABILITY, A TENDENCY … 31

from his (Apollo’s) herd (Nagy 1981, 194–95). In another story, even
though he had been ordered by Zeus to return Persephone, who he had
kidnapped, to her mother Demeter, Hades gets to keep Persephone for a
third of the year because Demeter makes the mistake of accepting from
him a gift of pomegranates, in return for which she is obliged to part with
her daughter part of the year (Nagy 1981, 195).
Not surprisingly, there are societies that do not allow gift exchange.
Inuit Eskimos do not give or receive gifts, for receiving gifts makes one
dependent. “With gifts you make slaves just as with whips you make
dogs.” (Told to Peter Freuchen after he thanked an Inuit man for giv-
ing him a share of seal meat, Freuchen [1961, 154].)

Religion and Exchange

The interaction between the institution of religion and the propensity
humans have to exchange has been diverse and complex, with contradic-
tory outcomes.
Religion (or relations with the supernatural) would be employed to
fix the exchange rates between humans and nature, between humans and
humans and between humans and gods.
Driven by their propensity to exchange (rather than seize), humans
would attempt to engage in exchange with nature. Religion (or relations
with the supernatural) would contribute to set the exchange rates in favor
of humans.
With regard to exchange in between humans, religion would con-
tribute to reduce cheating and set up networks of trust.
Yet, at the same time, with regard to exchange between humans,
religion could be employed to justify exchange rates that favor one party
over the other.
And yet, religion could be employed to support charity, tilting the
exchange rates in favor of the weak.
With regard to exchange with gods, it would seem that the exchange
rates would be in favor of humans, as gods never receive more than a
fraction of the benefits they supposedly bestow on humans. On the other
hand, with regard to exchange between gods and humans, it can also be
said that rates are infinitely better in favor of the former (and those who
mediate on their behalf, like the priests and shamans) as they are receiving,
without giving anything in return, except perhaps, providing the justifica-
tion for the emergence and the perpetuation of hierarchies of dominance.
32 R. ERGENER

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 CHAPTER 3

Exchange with Nature and with Gods:

License to Exploit

Hunting, gathering, and farming are economic activities. Praying and per-
forming rituals for the hunt and for the food to be gathered to be plen-
tiful, for the animals to allow themselves to be hunted, and for seeds to
mature are religious activities. Most societies use a combination of eco-
nomic and religious activities to obtain things. In most cases, if not all,
religious activities are ineffective in providing the desired economic out-
comes. Nevertheless, religious activities do contribute to the worldly well-
being of believers, through the provision of unintended by-products.
At the beginning, humans sought to influence animated beings
through dance, music and other rituals. Animated beings were proba-
bly not impressed by dance and music. But the performances of dance
and music contributed to the definition and formation of groups and to
the strengthening of within group cohesion, cooperation, and solidarity.
Rituals also contributed to the building up of intra-group alliances and to
the elimination of free riders. The trances reached through ritual perfor-
mances also led to encounters with gods.
Religion properly started with the recognition of gods who humans
believed had the capability to provide things, which humans could not
get otherwise. This too was an illusion also with economic ramifications.
Gifts were given to supernatural beings and gods in order to obtain
rewards (the use of natural resources)—or to reciprocate for rewards
which, it was believed, had already been granted by gods. It was common
sense to attempt to exchange with nature or with gods only if cheaper,
more efficient alternatives were not available. It was again common sense

© The Author(s) 2020 37

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_3
38 R. ERGENER

to seek exchange with other humans, before seeking exchange with super-
natural beings (nature) or gods. Therefore, the rewards sought from
supernatural beings (nature) or gods would be the scarce ones that did
not seem to be available through one’s own labor or through exchange
with other humans (Stark and Bainbridge 1987, 34).
Ethnological studies support this view. For example, the primitive agri-
culturalist who cannot control the weather or prevent swarms of insects
from eating his crops may offer gifts to gods to control these influences
in his favor (Malinowski 1948, 29). Yet, the same primitive agriculturalist
may not regard gifts to gods necessary in dealing with problems of gar-
dening: He can pull the weeds rather than pray for food. He may resort
to work guided by knowledge and reason rather than gifts to gods in
order to deal with broken-down fences or destroyed, dried, or washed
away seeds (Malinowski 1948, 29).
All three types of exchange were observed in the exchange relations
between humans and gods. Humans expected supernatural beings and
gods to give true gifts with no expectations of immediate returns (gener-
alized reciprocity). They also tried to reciprocate for what they believed
gods had given them (balanced reciprocity) and to lure gods to give more
to humans by giving them gifts (negative reciprocity).
The assumption that humans have the capability to engage in gift
exchange with nature and eventually with gods would have very profound
consequences.
Gifts to nature clear the feelings of guilt one had about taking from
her. Once freed from feelings of such guilt, humans were relieved of an
important inner restraint that could have put the brakes on the reckless
exploitation of nature, which has been ongoing for millenniums, paving
the way to the ecological disaster we are experiencing today. For, whereas
during the course of gift exchange amongst humans, gifts are recipro-
cated with larger gifts, when dealing with nature, humans can cheat and
return to nature far less than what they receive from her. Because, dur-
ing the course of gift exchange between (animated) natural beings and
humans, the amounts exchanged are evaluated not by both parties, as
is the case during gift exchange between human exchange partners, but
by the human party only. If the animated non-human has an opinion,
it cannot be relayed—definitely not through the conventional channels
comprehended by humans. Humans have therefore been free to set the
terms of trade with nature in their favor, in many cases outrageously so,
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 39

thereby making gains in the short run, at the cost of depriving themselves
of riches in the long run.
Here are some examples from different ages and places of gifts offered
to nature by humans, often accompanied by rituals. In all cases, humans
are receiving far more than what they are giving away as gifts.

Gifts to Nature, Gifts to Gods

Several complete skeletons of reindeer, with heavy stones in their thoracic
cavities, discovered in 1935, in an ancient lakebed at Meiendorf in north-
ern Germany, are among the oldest known remains of gifts to nature.
These animals were probably sacrificed by Mesolithic hunters who were
active toward the end of the last ice age. As the ice age was coming to
an end, hunters started to follow herds of reindeer during the summer
months, far north to the edge of the receding ice. We can imagine that at
the beginning of the hunting season, a suitable animal was killed, its chest
cavity opened, and that the opened chest cavity was filled with stones. The
animal would then be sunk in the lake, as a sacrifice, perhaps accompanied
by certain rituals (Gill 1982).
The world is extensively animistic for the Eskimo, who believe every
pebble on the beach may contain its individual soul (Service 1979, 79).
When Netsilik Eskimo hunted a seal, the animal was laid on fresh snow
and offered water so that its soul, when reincarnated, would be grateful
and allow the seal to be killed again (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 25).
The Ainu,1 an indigenous people living in Japan and Russia, regard
all animals and plants as spirit beings (“Kamui deities”) who temporarily
incarnate themselves, such that “the earth’s surface, covered with fauna
and flora, was seen by the Ainu as the abode and activity field of the
Kamui deities.” Some of these, such as the bear and the salmon, would
visit people as spirit beings, each at the behest of its spirit master. At
their visit, the bear and the salmon would offer their flesh in return for
hospitality and ritual objects, which, on returning to the spirit domain,
would be offered by the spirit (of the bear or the salmon) to its master,
along with laudatory reports on the hunter’s family and village (Watanabe
1972, 475–79).

1 Japan (Hokkaido, and formerly northeastern Honshu) and Russia (Sakhalin, the Kuril
Islands and formerly the Kamchatka Peninsula).
40 R. ERGENER

This is the Ainu variant of the circumpolar “bear cult,” with roots, pos-
sibly, deep into the Paleolithic (Irving Hallowell 1926; cited in Guenther,
1999). The relationship of friendship and respect, as well as reci-procity
and complementarity, between the hunter and the game animal is exem-
plary. (This is of course what the hunter assumes—whether the hunted
bear feels the same way, we shall never know.)
Bear is the most revered animal among the peoples of the Northern
hemisphere who share a common belief that the elusive animal has super-
natural qualities. Until recently, ceremonies during which the slain bears
are venerated were an important part of the belief system of Sami peoples
(Bledsoe, n.d.).
The relationship between the hunter and the bear has explicit paral-
lels with the model of the man-woman or husband-wife relationship, as
in the myth of the “hunter’s animal wife,” found commonly in North
America and southern Africa (Tanner 1979, 136–40; Biesele and Wein-
berg 1990, 95; cited in Guenther 1989, 86–87, 92–94, 98–100; cited in
M. Guenther 1999, 429). In the various versions of this myth, the hunter
is married with an animal, which authorizes him and his fellow villagers
to hunt the relatives of the “bride.”
With the First Nation hunters of the American continent, hunting is
not a violent process but a long-term relationship of reciprocal exchange
between animals and hunters. First Nation hunters believe that they do
not hunt animals but rather receive them as gifts from the animals, who
are (none) other—than human persons, who offer themselves as gifts to
humans, thereby indebting them. The debt is paid through the perfor-
mance of certain rituals (e.g., Alfred Irving Hallowell 1960; Speck 1935),
such as food taboos, feasts, and disposing of animal remains according to
prescribed methods, as well as rules against overhunting and talking badly
about, or playing with animals (Nadasdy 2003, 88–94; 2007).
For instance, with the Naskapi hunters of the Labrador in eastern
Canada, it is believed that animals were humans during the primal era
and that, therefore as animals, they were in possession of both human
and animal features: Social structure of animals was believed to be like
those of the Naskapi and it was believed that they could communicate
with each other like humans do. Because animals were half human, the
Naskapi could socialize with them, communicating with them with the
aid of sorcerers and diviners, through dreams, songs, and drums. The ani-
mal gives the hunter its flesh in return for the respect the hunter shows
him and the gifts he gives. If the animal is killed properly and if its body
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 41

is properly used, it can go home where it can generate flesh again (Gill
1982, 42).
Seneca2 was astonished with the practice of gifts to nature which he
ridiculed. In his Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca writes about the imposters
who claimed that they could forecast the coming of hail. Those who
believed these impostors would sacrifice their lamb or chicken to keep
the hail away. Those that did not possess animals which they could sac-
rifice would cut their fingers and let it bleed for a while (Burkert 2001,
34–35).
With the emergence of gods, gifts could be offered not only directly
to nature or its elements like animals, lakes, and storms—but also to the
gods who ruled over them.
In order to persuade him to give some rain, the Manganja of Lake
Nyassa offer to the Supreme Deity a meal and a pot of native beer. As
they poured the food on the ground, priestesses would chant “Hear thou,
O God, and send rain!’ to which the gathered group would respond by
clapping their hands softly and intoning “Hear thou, O God!’” (Tylor
1958, 451).
In order to stop lightening which they are afraid of, African Nuer
would throw small pieces of tobacco into the air as ransom (Evans-
Pritchard 1971, 221).
The Haida of North America pour fresh water into the sea, or put
some tobacco or deer tallow on the end of a pole, in order to plead with
the killer whale deities to cut down a storm (Wright 2009, 467).
When starting a journey on the Lake Superior, the Algonquin of North
America would stop their canoes about two hundred yards into the lake
and their chief would pray in a loud voice for about five to ten minutes,
pleading with the god who had created both the lake and the humans to
keep the lake calm so that they could have safe passage. At the end of
the prayer, the chief would throw some tobacco in the lake as a gift and
others would follow (Gill 1982, 41–42).
Even though they are god-believing Muslims, some of the Turkic ori-
gin people of the Balkans, Turkey, and Central Asia have maintained an
unusual relationship with nature that is not observed with other Muslims
(Zarcone 2005, 35). In the seventeenth century, Turkmen nomads of the
Karakoyunlu tribe based in the north-west of Iran, who were Muslims,

2 Roman Stoic philosopher, statesman, and dramatist, 4 BC–65 AD.

42 R. ERGENER

nonetheless worshipped trees, beside which they lit candles and to the
barks of which they attached pieces of iron (Evliya Çelebi 1928, 740–42;
cited in Zarcone 2005). Two centuries later, a report presented to the
Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II mentions that some nomad peoples from
Anatolia (Asian part of present-day Turkey), “blindly worship the great
trees and the monumental rocks that are touched by the first rays of the
rising sun” (Zarcone 2005, 35).
During the previous century, ethnologists made similar observations
in Anatolia and the Balkans (Stahl 1965; Zarcone 2005). Practices such
as placating the spirits of trees before felling them or of animals before
hunting them are still observed with heterodox Muslims in Turkey like the
Bektashi3 and the Alevi,4 who combine Christian and traditional Turkish
Buddhist-shamanistic beliefs and rituals with Islam.
A group of the semi-nomad Alevis known as the Tahtacı (“woodcut-
ters,” studied in 1960 by Jean-Paul Roux [1970]), who lived on the Tau-
rus Mountains in southern Turkey, making a living by felling trees, never
failed to say that they loved trees. The Tahtacı insisted that they did not
harm trees, even though they felled them. This is because when felling
trees, they followed a number of required rules, the meaning of which
sometimes eludes us (Zarcone 2005, 42).
The Tahtacı chant devotions to the trees they are made to clear and
they even ask forgiveness for what they have been made to do. They
also ask forgiveness of an animal which they are going to kill, because
they have been forced to do so. A forestry manager, who by chance had
the opportunity to witness a clandestine ritual organized by a group of
Tahtacı woodsmen, before clearing trees, reported that the leader of the
group was given a ritual wash before performing his job. The ceremonial
washing was done by women (Zarcone 2005, 42).
Some aged trees are never cleared voluntarily. If they are, it is under
pressure from a non-Tahtacı superior. Aged trees are cut with great sad-
ness and with feelings similar to those felt when a sacrilegious act is being
conducted (Roux 1970, 189–90, 197–201, 280; cited in footnote 38

3 A Sufi order founded in the thirteenth century by Hacı Bektashi Veli. Women and
men jointly participate in ritual dance and wine drinking. Bektashis in the Balkans adapted
Christian practices such as sharing the bread and the confession of sins.
4 Turkish Muslims who venerate the fourth caliph Ali, son in law and nephew of
Propht Muhammed. Alevis believe in the trinity of God, Muhammed and Ali, identi-
fying Mohammed and Ali with the light of God.
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 43

Zarcone 2005; on the secret ritual that precedes tree-felling, see also Gül
1998, 175–76). One should emphasize that the Tahtacı respect all trees,
and not one tree in particular (Zarcone 2005, 42).
The Tahtacı group belongs to the larger group of Alevi. On the web-
site of an Alevi group, it says that Alevis acknowledge that each thing,
including mountains, stones, trees, rivers, and insects has a soul or spirit
(“can, ruh” in Turkish). So, none must be harmed, all must be respected
and protected.5

Oneness with God: Sufism,

Eastern Religions, Monism
Sufis are Muslim mystics, who also believe that all creation is Divine
because all have emanated from God and all that emanates from God
is his manifestation. God was a Hidden Treasure, who was not known,
for there was none to know him. He conceived creation so that there
would be some who would know him (Denny 1998).
There are many schools of Sufism, all known primarily for their
rejection of a sharp separation between god and creation. In its ver-
sion preached by the twelfth-century Andalusian master Al-Arabi, Sufism
claims an underlying unity or oneness of all beings,6 with a “common ori-
gin in the unique and indivisible Godhead” (Knysh 2000, 171; cited in
Zarcone 2005, 44). “There is nothing other than God, Have no doubt”7
Says the thirteenth-fourteenth-century Turkish Sufi poet Yunus Emre.
Belief systems that deny that God and the universe have their own
separate identities and that the two are one and the same are known as
pantheist. Pantheism recognizes the unity of all beings and the identity of
the cosmos with the divine.
A logical extension of pantheist beliefs cares for the environment. If
there is no reality other than God, nature needs to be revered and pro-
tected as a manifestation of divine. Not surprisingly, the term “ecology”
was invented by a German scholar, who had formulated a teaching of
immanence that refuses to acknowledge the existence of any separating
boundaries or differences between creation, whether it be plant, animal,

5 Zarcone (2005, 43).

6 Wahdat al-wujud in Arabic, vahdet-i vücut in Turkish.
7 In Turkish: “Haktan ayrı ne vardır, Kalma guman içinde”.
44 R. ERGENER

or human (Haeckel 1866; cited in Zarcone 2005, 44). The name of the
scholar is Ernest Haeckel (1834–1919), and the teaching he formulated
is known as Monism. “Monism posits that there is ‘a spirit in all things’”
(Haeckel 1895; cited in Zarcone 2005, 44). Haeckel also defined the
term ecology as a “science that studies the conditions of existence of liv-
ing beings and the interactions of all kinds that occur between these living
beings,” a definition which remains valid (Dajoz 2003; cited in Zarcone
2005, 44).
Pantheist ideas probably have roots deep in our hunter-gatherer past—
which is not surprising since 99% of our time on this planet we have lived
as hunter-gatherers. Beliefs and practices of Mbuti Pygmies, a hunting
and gathering people who live in the heart of the Congolese rain-forest,
illustrate this point.
Every morning as they set out for the hunt, Mbuti Pygmies light a fire
at the foot of a tree, in tribute to the forest. In the evening, they share
the hunt of the day by this fire and sing songs thanking the forest for the
hunt. Even though they thank the forest as a separate entity, the Mbuti
are not truly separate from the forest, which is everything that exists,
including the Mbuti themselves. It is to the forest, who is the “father,”
the “mother,” the “friend” and even the “lover” that the breath of the
Pygmy returns to upon his death, intermingling with the breath of the
forest, the wind (Godelier 1977, 4).
Pantheistic ideas are present in eastern religions. Buddhism, Hinduism,
Jainism, and Zoroastrianism all teach to some degree that man should
respect nature, because he is part of the same whole with nature.
A Western Buddhist characterizes Buddhism as a “religious ecolo-
gy” (Batchelor and Brown 1992; cited in Swearer, n.d.). “The Buddhist
worldview or dharma refers not only to the teachings of the Buddha but
also to all things in nature” (Batchelor and Brown 1992; cited in Swearer,
n.d.). “Out of concern for the living environment as a whole, Buddhist
environmentalists extend loving-kindness and compassion beyond people
and animals to include plants and the earth itself” (Swearer, n.d.).
Buddhists believe that all things, both material and spiritual, are related
and they also believe in reincarnation. Humans can be reborn as animals.
Buddha himself had been a lion, a dog, and a tree, in his previous lives.
One should therefore refrain from mistreating animals as the mistreated
animal may actually be a dead relative, like the grandma, for example, who
had recently passed away.
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 45

Buddhist environmentalists reject hierarchical dominance of humans

over other humans or humans over nature. They have an ethic of com-
passion that honors biodiversity. Thai monk, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, taught
that we can make our surroundings honorable only if we build our lives
on the truth that everything that makes up the entire cosmos, including
the stars and earth and animals and trees and humans, are all members of
a cooperative enterprise that is mutually interdependent. Otherwise, we
shall perish (Swearer, n.d.).
The cosmological views of the Hindus may or may not be friendly to
ecology. Trees and rivers are held in reverence. The agrarian and even
wildlife images found in the Vedas and Upanisads are in harmony with
the environment. Various texts in the Vedas exalt the “earth (bhu),” the
“air (bhuvah),” and “sky (sva),” and the goddess of “earth (Prthivi)”
and the gods of “water (Ap),” fire and “heat (Agni),” and of the “wind
(Vayu)” (Chapple, n.d.).
The Advaita Vedanta tradition asserts that “the highest truth involves
a vision of oneness that transcends nature and, in a sense, dismisses the
significance of the material world by referring to it as illusion or maya”
(Chapple, n.d.).
According to The Rig Veda, a Hindu religious text, the beginning of
the uni-verse was brought about by the dismemberment of the Purusha,
the primordial cosmic being. All creation is sacred because all have sprung
from a part of his body—the sun from his eyes, the earth from his feet.
Zoroastrianism, which is practiced in Iran and India today, describes
the earth as an “angel.”
The Jain tradition, which has coexisted with Hinduism for at least
2800 years, has at its core five vows that dictate the daily life of Jain
laypersons, monks, and nuns. These five vows, which can easily be
reinterpreted as being ecological, are “nonviolence (ahimsa), truthful-
ness (satya), not stealing (asteya), sexual restraint (brahmacarya), and
non-possession (aparigraha)” (Chapple, n.d.). Adherence to these oaths
enables one to do the least damage to all varieties of life. Mahatma Gandhi
was inspired and influenced by Jain vows (Chapple, n.d.). Zoroastrianism,
which is a religion practiced in Iran and India today, describes the earth
as an “angel.” The Jain believers have great emphasis on non-violence
and respect for nature. Jain monks sweep the ground before their feet to
avoid harming insects and small animals.
Finally, in Japan, the bullet train and other high technology prod-
ucts exist in an environment that is thoroughly deified. According to
46 R. ERGENER

Japan’s indigenous religious tradition, Shinto, the world is permeated

with “kami,” which are god-like deities. Many Japanese, who claim not
to be religious, nevertheless believe in and pay tribute to the kami. New
religious movements that proliferate at a high rate are largely based on
kami-like animisms (Reader and Tanabe 1998; cited in Bulbulia 2004,
682).

Abrahamic Religions
Belief in the “oneness of all beings” is not in line with the standard view of
God observed in the Abrahamic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam. In Abrahamic religions, God and the created universe both
have their own separate identities. This is the dualist view in which God
exists independently of the world which he created.
With the dualist view, nature is deprived of the protective shield
accorded to it, by it being part of the divine. The emphasis with Abra-
hamic religions is on otherworldly salvation, rather than celebrating
nature as a manifestation of God, leading to a further devaluing of this
world, rendering it more vulnerable to mistreatment and exploitation.
How the world will end according to Christian teaching is not very
promising with regard to the protection of the environment. With the
Apocalypse, the natural world will be destroyed making the way to the
Kingdom of God. For a believer of such teachings, there would be no
point in protecting the environment, which is going to be annihilated
anyway. American fundamentalists, who believe that apocalypse is immi-
nent any day, oppose environmental laws of any sort.
Nevertheless, a case can be made in the dualist approach that it is the
duty of man to take proper care of the environment, because it is a domin-
ion of god.
A conviction commonly shared among Muslims is that nature derives
its value from God. For, in the Koran it is clearly stated that it is God
who has dominion over all things (Koran 2:107; 5:120) and that all things
ultimately return to him (Koran 24:42). An offer of global trust had been
made to the heavens and to the earth and to the mountains, which they
had declined out of fear. It was then that man undertook to bear the role
but he was unjust and ignorant. God guides humans in their stewardship,
punishing them for their mistakes (Koran 33:72).
In Genesis, Adam, and more as an afterthought Eve, to keep him
company, are brought to life after dark and light, the stars, the world,
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 47

and all vegetation and animals. But it is mankind who gives all animals
their names, thereby asserting herself as the superior. Being created last,
humans were at the apex of creation with a great feast prepared for them
by God. God told first humans to be masters of the earth and to have
dominion over living things (Fink 1998).
There is the argument that when he told man to have dominion over
nature, God meant that man would be His steward on Earth. Yet, the
Judeo-Christian theology has historically been used to provide justifica-
tion for the rational and economic conquest of nature by man, rather
than man’s stewardship over nature.
Lynn White (1967) argues that Christianity, particularly how it has
been practiced the West, is the most human-focused religion ever. As
early as the second century, both Tertullian8 and Saint Irenaeus of Lyons9
insisted that God had created Adam in the likeness of Christ, who was
not only God made flesh, but also the second Adam. With Christianity,
humankind is a bit like God, in his separateness from nature. Whereas
humans had started out as being one with, or seeking oneness with
nature through rituals, Christianity taught that exploitation of nature was
humans’ rightful claim, approved by God (White 1967).
There have been those who preached that man has been indeed gifted
by God but that he should enjoy the gifts of God with discretion and
moderation. Rashi, a distinguished commentator of the Torah, pointed
out nine hundred years ago, that dominion in Hebrew has the identical
origin as with descent in Hebrew and that humans can maintain their
dominion over animals so long as they themselves remain worthy. As a
psalmist reminds, “The Earth is Lord’s” (Psalm 24:1) and our dominion
means that we are guardians of a divine trust. We can enjoy God’s gifts
but not waste or destroy them (Fink 1998).
And, there is yet another way to interpret men’s being the last of god’s
creations: One rabbi has suggested that their being last to be created indi-
cates a lower rank for humans among living beings, not the highest. Along

8 Tertullian (born c. 155, /160, Carthage now in Tunisia—died after 220, Carthage)
was an “important early Christian theologian, polemicist, and moralist who, as the initiator
of ecclesiastical Latin, was instrumental in shaping the vocabulary and thought of Western
Christianity” (Wilken, n.d.).
9 Saint Irenaeus (born c. 120, /140, Asia Minor—died c. 200, /203, Bishop of Lug-
dunum (Lyon) and leading Christian theologian of the second century. He refuted Gnos-
ticism “and advanced the development of an authoritative canon of Scriptures, the creed,
and the authority of the episcopal office” (Wingren, n.d.).
48 R. ERGENER

these lines, thirteenth-century St. Francis of Assisi wanted to replace the

notion of man’s unlimited right to rule over all creation with the idea of
the equality of man and all other creation (White 1967).

St. Francis, Pope Francis,

and Patriarch Bartholomew
St. Francis is widely known as the protector of the poor. Environmental
concerns of the Saint are not as well known. Yet, his concern for the envi-
ronment was so keen that it would not be wrong to hail him as the “pa-
tron saint of the environment.” Francis believed “in the virtue of humil-
ity—not merely for the individual but for man as a species. He tried to
depose man from his monarchy over creation and to set up a democracy
of all God’s creatures” (White 1967).
With St. Francis “the ant is no longer simply a homily for the lazy,
flames a sign of the thrust of the soul toward union with God” rather,
“they are Brother Ant and Sister Fire, praising the Creator in their own
ways as Brother Man does in his” (White 1967).
It has been claimed that his approach to the poor, together with his
approach to the environment, makes St. Francis “the greatest radical in
Christian history since Christ” (White 1967).
Pope Francis, who chose Francis as his namesake, followed the foot-
steps of the Saint with regard to the poor and also to the environment.
In line with the environmentalist ideals of his namesake, Pope Francis
devoted his Second (“Green”) Encyclical released on June 18, 2015, to
climate and environmental issues. The encyclical is named “Laudato Si”
or “Praise Be to You,” after an ode to nature written eight hundred years
ago by Saint Francis, in which the saint shares his perception of the basic
unity of all creation (Doyle 1996). Pope Francis would add active work to
save the environment to the list of “seven mercies” which include feeding
the hungry and visiting the sick. The pope described the destruction of
the environment as a sin (Knight 2016).
The environmentalist approach of Pope Francis is comprehensive. He
refutes the old theological view that humans have dominion over the
earth. He points attention to the food shortages that the destruction of
the environment will lead to. He mentions the plight of those who are
forced to migrate because of environmental deterioration and are refused
refugee status nevertheless (Diaz 2015).
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 49

The environmentalist position of the Pope was welcomed by the Ecu-

menical Patriarch Bartholomew, the “first among the equals” of the
Orthodox Patriarchs. Bartholomew had been focusing on environmen-
tal issues for more than two decades before the issuing of the Second
Encyclical. The Ecumenical Patriarchate had drawn attention to the close
connection between ecology and economy at a series of conferences held
between 1994 and 1998 at the Heybeli (Halki) island off the shores of
downtown Istanbul. The Patriarchate had also brought together scholars
and politicians and activists to study the problems of world’s major seas
and rivers. “…The earth unites us in a unique and extraordinary man-
ner. All of us ultimately share the earth beneath our feet and breathe the
same air of our planet’s atmosphere. Even if we do not enjoy the world’s
resources fairly or justly, nevertheless all of us are responsible for its pro-
tection and preservation.” says the Patriarch (Bartholomew 2015).

Religion and Environmentalism

Religious leaders who are usually not able to cooperate on most issues
seem to be able to cooperate with regard to the protection of the envi-
ronment.
The position of the Pope and the Patriarch was received favorably
by senior Muslim preachers and scholars from Morocco, to Bosnia, to
Indonesia, who met in Istanbul in 2015. Muslim clerics had a detailed
appeal for a global pact at the coming Paris climate summit and the
phasing out of greenhouse-gas emissions no later than the middle of the
century.
Previously, leaders of world religions had come together at a confer-
ence organized by the World Wide Fund for Nature, in Italy 1986. Fol-
lowing this meeting, about 130,000 projects were started worldwide with
a religious approach to environmentalism. In Russia and in Greece, the
Orthodox Church cleaned some of its holdings of land from waste and
started to protect the wildlife on their property. In India and China, con-
servationist cooperated with holy man to protect forests and mountains
regarded sacred by religions.
Whether or to what extent religious teachings and initiatives can actu-
ally mobilize people and governments to adopt environmentalist attitudes
and practices is an open question. Socialist President of France François
Hollande seemed to think that they could. The green pronouncements of
50 R. ERGENER

the Pope and of other spiritual luminaries were warmly received by Hol-
lande. The French President toured typhoon-stricken areas of the Philip-
pines in February 2015 in the company of Patriarch Bartholomew, the
staunch defender of ecologist causes. In July 2015, Hollande hosted a
“summit of conscience” that involved the leaders of many faiths.
The Economist newspaper reported that the French President
Hollande, who had otherwise firmly renounced the Catholic faith in
which he was raised, had been advised to use religion to touch and
inspire people toward ecologist causes, by his advisor Nicolas Helot, an
environmentalist and also a filmmaker. Helot believed that in order to
raise the public interest in global warming, something more than dry
statistics was needed (ERASMUS 2015).
Like Helot, adviser to the French President Hollande, an increasing
number of scholars and theologians are more and more pointing out that
now is the time for Christian theology to contribute to a more sustainable
relationship between earth and humans (Hessel 1998).
Exchange rates in gift exchange between humans and animated objects
always favor humans. This is not surprising as these rates are determined
by humans. Some water, a few prayers are deemed sufficient to persuade
an animal to give itself up to be hunted. One expects those who have
a more holistic view of the universe, who regard the whole universe as
being sacred, to pay higher rates when dealing with nature. But that is
not necessarily so. Even for the most sensitive, saying a few prayers or
taking a ritual wash is sufficient to be atoned of a big sin committed by
the felling of an ancient tree. A large segment of humankind believes that
nature will settle for less, even with nothing. The interpretation of the
Genesis story which places humankind at the apex of all creation provides
the justification.
And the religious establishment worldwide may need to clean its own
kitchen before promoting environmentalism.
In 1995, Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew was the host for a confer-
ence on religion held on a ship cruising from Istanbul to the island of
Patmos. During that conference, an Orthodox theologian declared that
any damage to the environment would be regarded as a sin.
Well, many of those who are inadvertently committing that sin may be
the devout religious who may also regard themselves as sincere environ-
mentalists, not being aware of the fact that several well established and
widespread religious acts are major contributors to pollution worldwide.
In a very interesting book entitled When God isn’t Green, law professor
 3 EXCHANGE WITH NATURE AND WITH GODS … 51

and humorist Jay Wexler gives examples of religious practices that are
damaging to the environment (Wexler 2016). Candles lit copiously by
members of various faiths for myriad reasons create as much pollution as
lighting cigarettes does. So does burning incense. The paper money which
the Taoists burn in Hong Kong and in Singapore fills the air with smoke
and harmful toxins. In Israel, the smoke from the bonfires started during
the Lag B’omer holiday, which honors a famous rabbi, is so widespread
and so intense, that there is an increase in pulmonary conditions and
asthma cases reported to the hospitals. Elephants are slaughtered to make
(Buddhist in Thailand and Catholic in the Philippines) icons of their tusks.
Leopards are killed for their pelts which are worn in South Africa in ritu-
als to symbolize power. Rain forests of Guatemala and South Mexico are
decimated to provide palm frond to be used during Palm Sunday cele-
brations in the United States. In Mumbai, the Hindus further pollute the
scarce water resources of Western India with the twenty-feet tall idols of
the elephant god Ganesh, which they sink in the ocean and leave on the
ocean floor. Taiwanese Buddhists practice the release with “mercy” of ani-
mals, millions of which are captured and caged to be later released “mer-
cifully”—often in unfriendly environments, where most of them perish.
The donations made to gain the right to practice such mercy are a major
source of income for Buddhist temples. And then there is the methane
emitted by sacred cows and the damage done annually to the population
of stock animals worldwide with the Muslim sacrifice feast.
The imposition of bans on religious behavior such as the lighting of
candles and of bonfires can be more effective in relaying the environmen-
talist message, than simple words.

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 CHAPTER 4

Exchange Among Humans:

Divine Supervision

Cephu was a Mbuti pygmy. The social organization he belonged to was

the simplest that has existed, a band. Band members have few possessions.
They engage in “generalized exchange” with each other, giving whatever
is requested of their meager possessions by other band members, expect-
ing to be reciprocated at an indefinite future with what they demand from
others. Those who do not participate are punished like Cephu was.
Cephu had made a habit of ignoring the rules of his band with regard
to food sharing and participation in the hunt. Even though he was not
fulfilling his role in the hunt, Cephu was trying to have more than his
share of the meat. Other members of the band let him know of their
disapproval of his behavior through ridicule, insult, and criticism. They
talked with him to persuade him to change his ways. When all this failed,
band members threatened to ostracize him and his family. Being ostra-
cized was the equivalent of death for Cephu and his family as they would
not have been able to hunt and survive on their own. Therefore, at that
point Cephu started to beg the band members to forgive him and he
shared with others the food he had hoarded (Turnbull 1961).
According to a generally accepted classification of human organization,
bands evolved into tribes, chiefdoms and states (Service 1979).
Tribes started to come into being about 10,000 years ago, with agri-
culture. Mostly, they practiced horticulture and herding and had about
hundred members on average. Tribes were egalitarian. Tribal chiefs who
have been labeled as “big men” tried to get things done not by the use
of force, but through persuasion or by setting examples.

© The Author(s) 2020 55

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_4
56 R. ERGENER

Chiefdoms had social hierarchy and chiefs had varying (minor to con-
siderable) authority. Chiefs collected tribute from commoners, which they
then redistributed.
States emerged about five to six thousand years ago, as some chief-
doms went through further transformations. States had economic special-
ization, class divisions, use of writing and centralized governments and
the monopoly of authority to punish cheaters and free riders.
As the number of groups and group size increased, the number of
transactions would increase and there would be variations in the type of
transactions conducted.
With bands there would be almost only generalized exchange, with
a band member exchanging (in a way) with the group as a whole, giv-
ing what is demanded from him by any band member and receiving
what he requests from any band member. (The renowned archaeologist
James Woodburn claims that the Hadza people, whose home territory is
the savannah to the east of Lake Eyasi in Tanzania’s Great Rift Valley,
exchange only if there is no reward. Indeed, according to Woodburn, the
Hadza “share and not exchange:” [Woodburn 1998, 54] “Exchanging
with other Hadza is reprehensible. To barter, to trade or to sell to other
Hadza was not acceptable as late as the 1990s … Even mutually benefi-
cial bartering without thought of profit was very difficult … People had
to give freely without expectation of return.”[Woodburn 1998, 54])
As the group size became larger and the organization evolved from
band to tribal to chiefdom to state, there were transactions based on
balanced and negative reciprocity as well, with individuals and groups
exchanging particular objects with each other. Under the circumstances,
individuals’ policing of each other, which was adequate to prevent free
riding with the bands, would not be adequate to prevent free riding with
the larger groups. This job would be eventually performed by the state
which would be equipped with monopoly powers to punish free riders
and cheaters. Before the evolution of state, with tribes and chiefdoms, it
was for the “big men” or chiefs to perform this job. The powers these
men had were limited. They were aided in their tasks with “ritualization”
and by Gods.
Ritualized behavior is internalized as a norm and conducted voluntar-
ily, without outside enforcement (Stanish 2017, 271). Ritualized trade,
conducted according to internalized norms, would therefore reduce the
need for supervision by big men and chiefs. Ritual need not be associated
with gods. Nevertheless, gods were welcome to supplement the efforts of
 4 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: DIVINE SUPERVISION 57

the big men and chiefs in supervising trade. Eventually, the state would
assume monopoly powers to punish free riders and cheaters. But, gods
would continue to support the state to prevent cheating and to enforce
contract obligations. Only countries like Denmark, where the legal and
security institutions are very advanced, can be said to rely exclusively on
secular institutions to enforce contract obligations.

Divine Supervision of Trade

So long as the traders believed that they were around, gods did not need
to do much to secure safe trade. One simple task performed by gods
was “watching.” The awareness of being watched by gods (and as well
as) chiefs possibly led to more honest behavior by the merchants. Recent
experiments have shown that being watched or even being in the presence
of the picture of an eye make people cheat less (Norenzayan 2013).
Scholars have also shown that as a tool to motivate desired behavior,
fear of punishment for wrongdoing is more effective than the anticipa-
tion of being rewarded for doing the right thing (Shariff and Norenzayan
2011). The powers gods had to punish misconduct would therefore con-
tribute to maintain order in the market. Again, it wasn’t necessary for
gods to actually punish traders in order to prevent free riding. It was suf-
ficient for the traders to believe that gods had the capability to punish.
Not all gods were honored by all trading parties, but some were.
Trade took place in sanctuaries where gods who were jointly honored by
the trading partners were represented or where gods of different groups
were jointly represented. Such sanctuaries evolved into what we shall call
“sacred markets,” where the ritualized performance of merchants was
overseen by gods who had the powers to punish cheaters. Ritualization
and gods’ involvement reduced the amount of human effort necessary
for policing trade (Laurin et al. 2012).
Successful behavior by groups spreads, as less successful groups either
imitate the behaviors of more successful groups or they are absorbed by
the more successful ones, if they do not do so. The institution of sacred
markets, with gods overseeing ritualized trade spread, because it was
successful.
58 R. ERGENER

Sacred Markets
Markets operated as late as the twentieth century by peoples like the Tiv
of Tivland, Nigeria, give us an idea about what the earliest sacred mar-
kets were like. At the time, the Tiv had no central authority to punish
the cheaters and the wrongdoers in the market. The chiefs did the job.
Because his powers were limited, chief would seek the assistance of the
akombo fetish (Bohannan and Bohannan 2017). The fetish consecrated
the market and had the power to punish breaches of market peace with
serious disease. The members of various tribes and lineages who attended
the ritual erection of the fetish were jointly committed to avoid such
calamities by honest trading. Such a market would be an appropriate
place for intergroup negotiations even at time of war. The strong man
who oversaw the market would make gains out of his efforts (Netting
1972, 229). He would be paid tribute for maintaining safe conduct in
the market, with the help of gods (Bohannan 1958, 63).
Sacred markets were usually founded at the crossroads of territories
belonging to different groups, in areas which are not rich in resources,
which meant that no particular group would be interested in claiming it
(Stanish 2017, 236). Hilltop locations would allow for a certain kind of
theatricality with people staying at the base in temporary camps, ascend-
ing the hill in prescribed ways and at prescribed times (Stanish 2017,
236). Simple sacred spaces with fetishes overseeing orderly behavior, over
time evolved into monumental complexes designed to attract people to
ritualized exchange at fixed times of the year, usually related to the sol-
stices (Stanish 2017, 236). Even though that possibility cannot be ruled
out, marking solstices does not necessarily imply a more complicated cal-
endar. It is quite likely that marking solstices was simply an effective way
of structuring a calendar of significant events in a stateless society, which
does not have writing or other types of formal communication (Stanish
2017, 264). The more spectacular the structures were, more people were
attracted and hosted, leading to the intensification of reciprocal relation-
ships and to the creation and distribution of resources (Stanish 2017, 16).
The oldest known and one of the most spectacular complexes of this
type is at Göbekli Tepe, located in South East Turkey, near Şanlı Urfa.
Discovered during a surface survey in the 1960s and developed in the
1990s by the late archaeologist Klaus Schmidt, Göbekli Tepe is commonly
depicted in popular literature as the “first temple” and the “cradle of civi-
lization.” It is as if after tens of thousands of years of existence in the dark,
 4 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: DIVINE SUPERVISION 59

all of a sudden, humans had gone through a metaphysical illumination,

which led them to build temples at Göbekli Tepe—and civilization had
started! The truth is much more complicated—and interesting: Göbekli
Tepe was probably a sanctuary, but also a center for ritualized trade.
Göbekli Tepe is located on a 780 m tall hill, which is the highest point
for kilometers to the south, all the way down to Saudi Arabia, therefore
a natural gathering point (Curry 2008, 276). There are at least twenty
oval complexes, spread over an area of about nine hectares. Each com-
plex contains two monumental limestone steles, each more than 2 m
high (Schmidt 2003, 5). At the earliest phases, there are circular build-
ings, each with two monumental T shaped pillars. The pillars are 3–6 m
high and weigh up to ten tons. The circular structures are surrounded
by more pillars and walls. Altogether, the stone pillars and walls create a
massive and impressive monumental landscape (Stanish 2017, 235). The
main excavator of Göbekli Tepe, Klaus Schmidt refused any claims that
the site was occupied as a village and believed that it was “simply” a tem-
ple structure without any other functions. But there is evidence which
shows that people lived at Göbekli Tepe at least part of the year and that
many mundane activities were also conducted there, besides “religious”
ones (Stanish 2017, 236).
During special times of the year, people would congregate at Göbekli
Tepe and engage in exchange and other intense social, economic, and cer-
emonial interactions. There are clear signs of feasting, including the (Stan-
ish 2017, 235) consumption of alcohol (Dietrich et al. 2012). There is
also evidence of production of stone tools (Schmidt 2000). People would
bring stone materials from distant places, where they would collectively
manufacture lithic objects (Stanish 2017, 237).
Here is how the scene would have been, according to Charles Stan-
ish (Stanish 2017, 237). At the base of the hill, there would be tem-
porary tents made of animal skin. Each social group would be clustered
with their own. People would have brought with them exotic materials
which they would have collected during their seasonal rounds. In and
between the structures at the top of the hill, feasts and communal pro-
duction of stone tools, ornaments, and other commodities would take
place. Exchange of highly ritualized nature would be conducted in the
structures. The architecture and the placement of the structures on the
landscape were designed so that individuals could not cheat the group.
Ritualized norms of behavior required that all exchange would take place
60 R. ERGENER

at predetermined times in predetermined places. All this would have made

any free riding virtually impossible (Stanish and Haley 2005).
Monumental complexes such as Göbekli Tepe where people congre-
gated at fixed times to enhance both their material and social well-being
are observed with chiefdom societies in many parts of the world.
Prior to the development of the more elaborate monuments, sites such
as the Neolithic Hambledon Hill in Dorset, England were the gathering
places of communities scattered in the surrounding areas (Renfrew 1983,
154). People would come to the hill for short periods of time, sometimes
in spring, sometimes in the fall, sometimes in hundreds, sometimes in
smaller numbers. They came from of up to 45 km away to the south,
and as much as 80 km away to the northwest. They brought with them
dismembered human remains, wheat, barley, hazelnuts, red deer antler
and pots from their own area as well as pots and axe heads exchanged
from farther away and livestock, especially cattle (Stanish 2017, 255).
On the coasts of Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, archaic nona-
gricultural peoples constructed U-shaped shell mounds as congregation
places (Stanish 2017, 253). At the center of a large trading network that
integrated the Mississippi Valley in Louisiana, there was the Poverty Point,
built seventeen to thirteen hundred BCE. The allied peoples who came
together at Poverty Point for feasting would be filled with “rallying casu-
istry, joyous friendship, and uplifting unity (Gibson and Melancon 2004,
190). But there was more to Poverty Point. It was also a place where
people produced and bartered goods (Stanish 2017, 248).
Stonehenge and other henge “monuments are examples of massive
labor expenditures by people living in stateless societies. They are spe-
cial places built into the landscape and are the result of centuries or even
millennia of earlier peoples refining and enhancing ritualized economies”
(Stanish 2017, 16).
Some of the features of gathering places for stateless populations are
observed with complexes of later times, where trade was imbued with
ritual and sanctity and combined with other social activities.

Emporia
There are interesting similarities between the seventh and sixth cen-
tury BCE Greek emporia (“ports of trade”) and the centers for periodic
exchange of hunter-gatherers. Emporia are founded at frontier zones, in
 4 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: DIVINE SUPERVISION 61

topographic, cultural, and political terms. They are located at the intersec-
tion point of long distance trade between minimum two groups. Safety
and neutrality of trade are enhanced by cults. Very few have residential
areas accompanying them (Kramer 2016).
Temples of the ancient Near East and Greco-Roman world were at the
same time, both places of worship and inter-regional trade. Creation of
common religious practices, the identification of one group’s god by the
other group, and the formation of pantheons reduced transaction costs
(Silver c1995, 7–22).
In Mesopotamia, the centrally located chief god Enlil was known as the
“merchant (damkar) of the wide world,” and his wife as the “merchant
of the world” (Silver c1995, 3). 125 sailors and pilots were employed
by the Baba Temple in Lagash to help with water transportation (Chase-
Dunn and Lerro 2016, 145). Payment of debts coincided with the cultic
murub-festival (Silver c1995, 3). After the second half of the fourth mil-
lennium, complexes for large-scale storage facilities are built near or on
temple grounds (Silver c1995, 4).
In ancient Greece, panegyris meant both “religious festival” and “mar-
ket” (McInerney 2010, 191). Shrines and temples shared the same
precincts with shops. Having paid homage to the gods, pilgrims would
pay silver to the shops (Silver c1995, 19).
Then there is the peculiar case of Delos. A small, totally insignificant
island, with almost no fertile soil and lacking a well-protected harbor,
which became host to one of the most important temples of the Greek
world and the center of an important religious federation as well as being
a bustling commercial center (Rostovtzeff 1941, 231). The presence
of the public statue of Apollo, the patron god of the island, and of
other statues and inscriptions, jointly contributed to the creation of an
atmosphere of trust that promoted safe exchange among the merchants
at Delos (Peralta, n.d.).
62 R. ERGENER

TRADE THE MOST INTERESTING OCCUPATION WITH

ISLAM
It is mentioned more than once in the Koran that trade is the most
interesting occupation. There are direct reminders to be fair in bar-
gaining. There are words of admiration for the beasts (camels) and
particularly the ships that carry merchandise (Torrey 1892, 2–3).
The use of commercial and accounting concepts to relay mes-
sages probably reinforced the positive approach to trade among the
believers.
“All is counted, everything measured” … “Life is a business, for
gain or loss. He who does a good or an evil work (‘earns’ good or
evil), receives his pay for it, even in this life” … “The unbeliever has
sold the divine truth for a paltry price, and is bankrupt. Every soul
is held as security for the debt it has contracted. At the resurrection,
Allah holds a final reckoning with all men. Their actions are read
from the account-book, weighed in the balances; each is paid his
exact due, no one is defrauded. Believer and unbeliever receive their
wages. The Muslim (who has been given manifold payment for each
of his good deeds) receives moreover his special reward” (Torrey
1892, 48).

Fairs and festivals have been common throughout history with many
peoples and civilizations. They were observed in Roman Greece and in
pre-modern, pre-capitalist Europe (Spawforth 1989).
In Medieval England, most trade was conducted in periodic fairs and
markets (Lipson 1956, 197). First fairs and markets were more religious
institutions than commercial ones. Fairs started as “periodic congrega-
tions of the pious” around well-known shrines or as pilgrimages. The
pilgrims were often merchants and the pilgrimage site a fair ground. The
periodical gatherings of the worshippers would provide an environment
suitable for trade (Lipson 1956, 197).
Mecca was a center of pilgrimage in ancient Arabia, before Islam.
As was the case with such centers, idols of different tribes were jointly
venerated in Mecca. The practice of pilgrimage and trade continued
under Islam. There were four “sacred months” for trade at the “sacred
territory.”
 4 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: DIVINE SUPERVISION 63

Whether sacred places or months would have existed without trade, is

an interesting question. “The cloak of religion” no doubt enhanced secu-
rity for the pilgrim–merchants at the pilgrimage sites (Lipson 1956, 196–
97). Indeed, even today, merchants everywhere rely to various degrees on
the cloak of religion for the prevention and punishment of cheating.

Religious Texts Promoting

the Fulfillment of Contract Obligations
The recording of information on physical media became available after
about 3500 BCE. During the millenniums when religion and exchange
evolved, the emphasis was on oral tradition. Koran was delivered by the
Prophet Muhammad orally. So was the Old Testament. Historically, orally
transmitted sacred texts have provided another channel through which
people were reminded of exchange obligations.
At Iron Age I Israel, where the events narrated in the Book of Judges
takes place, there was no writing and therefore no archives, no author-
itative system of written records, no formal courts. Also missing were a
capital city, a standing army and the monopoly by the state to use force
over an extended area. There was no king either (Miller 1993, 16). Under
the circumstances, contracts had to be oral. Oral contracts depend on the
twists of memory and are therefore subject to uncertainty and open to the
possibilities of fraud (Miller 1993, 16). Also, it is difficult for oral con-
tracts to be as specific as written ones. Again, as compared with written
contracts, defecting is easier with oral ones. Once one party has fulfilled
his obligations, the other party may well be tempted to exploit the situ-
ation and refrain from fulfilling his share of the promises. In the absence
of a government apparatus possessing the exclusive right to use violence
(as was the case with Iron Age I Israel), non-breaching parties would find
it difficult to enforce their rights, when contracts were breached (Miller
1994, 761). Disputes over contracts could be settled by self-help, but,
that was undesirable.
All this made it very difficult to clearly define property rights and to
render them effectively and readily transferable, which greatly enhances
welfare (Miller 1993, 16). One solution was to pass on the legal rules
about the making of contracts orally, by narrating stories. Several of the
captivating stories in the Old Testament fulfill this function. These stories
describe the making, the fulfillment, and the breaking of contracts and
contract-like arrangements (Miller 1993, 17).
64 R. ERGENER

The stories are mostly found in the Book of Genesis and include the
sale by the desperately hungry Esau of his birthright to his brother Jacob
for a very cheap price, namely a mess of pottage; Jacob’s earning of Isaac’s
blessing through fraud; the marriage of Leah; the deal Jacob makes to
work for Laban; the story of Shechem and Dinah and Jephthah’s vow to
make a sacrificial offering if he wins a military conflict.
These texts are different from explicitly legal material in the sense that
they do not entail obligatory bans or injunctions. They are not the deci-
sions of courts with the authority to resolve disputes, either. Rather, they
are vibrant, colorful narrations of significant landmarks in the lives of Jew-
ish fathers and heroes. One important feature of such texts is that they are
easy to remember. In the absence of written texts, oral narration of sto-
ries of this sort, allowed for the preservation and the transmission through
generations of laws without the distortions which can be introduced by
scribes or lawyers (Miller 1993, 17). That the main characters were tribal
ancestors with patriarchal authority further validated the messages relayed
by these stories (Miller 1993, 18).
On the basis of these stories, we can say that the customary law of the
time held that coercion or inequality of bargaining power did not have an
effect on the enforceability of an otherwise valid contract (Miller 1994,
759). This position may have been adopted to minimize the possibility of
feuds. The moral of the Jacob-Esau story, for example, is that a contract is
valid even if the bargaining power of the contracting parties is not equal,
with one party being significantly disadvantaged (Miller 1993, 18).
To illustrate the point, below we have summaries of the stories of Jacob
and Esau and the story of the marriage of Leah.
Being the firstborn, Esau has the birthright over his twin brother
Jacob. Esau is a hunter and Jacob is a farmer. Esau comes from hunt-
ing starving, finds his brother Jacob and demands from him some of the
pottage of lentils which he has. Jacob refuses to give any lentils to his
starving brother Esau, unless Esau agrees and swears an oath to hand
over his birth right to him. An oath makes a deal formal and legally bind-
ing, with a god, who is often one of the beneficiaries, bearing witness
(Miller 1993, 23–24).
Genesis 27:1–40 tells the story of how Jacob and his mother Rebecca
conspire to get Isaac’s blessing, which was Esau’s right, for Jacob.
Rebecca makes Jacob wear Esau’s clothing and put on animal hide to
make him appear hairy, the way his brother is. Wearing this outfit, Jacob
deceives his father, whose eyesight is impaired, to believe he is Esau and
 4 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: DIVINE SUPERVISION 65

receives from him the blessing intended for Esau. Isaac is upset when he
finds out about the con-spiracy but he cannot reverse things. He says to
Esau: “Your brother came treacherously and took away your blessing”
(Miller 1993, 27).
The story of Leah’s marriage narrated in Gen. 29:15–35 is built around
a contract undertaken by Jacob with his relative Laban. According to the
contract, upon the completion of seven years’ service by Jacob to Laban,
one of Laban’s daughters will be Jacob’s wife. It is quite clear in the
text that the daughter Jacob intends to marry is Rachel. But when Jacob
has fulfilled his obligations, Laban gives him his older daughter Leah,
rather than Rachel. Jacob is deceived because he is drunk and the bride is
veiled. So, Jacob spends the wedding night with Leah. Jacob protests in
the morning when he becomes aware of the switch. Laban explains that
according to the custom of the land, younger daughter (Rachel) could
not have been married before her elder sister Leah was. Jacob could yet
marry Rachel as well if he works for seven more years for Laban. Jacob
agrees and serves Laban seven more years, following which he marries
Rachel as well (Miller 1993, 31).

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 CHAPTER 5

Exchange Among Humans: Networks of Trust

SEIDENSTRASSE
China was once connected to the Mediterranean basin, by a network
of trade routes, which went over the tall mountains and through
the vast deserts of Central Asia and across the rough seas of the
Indian Ocean, stopping at exotic cities and ports en route. This
network is now collectively known as the Silk Road, a name (Sei-
denstrasse) which was introduced by the German scholar Ferdinand
von Richthofen in the nineteenth century, therefore, not in use at
the time when the route was active, roughly 500 BC to 1500 AD.
When active, this network of trade routes was the main trade artery
of the world.
Interestingly, it was not only goods that circulated along the
routes of the Silk Road. Religions did too, being transformed,
exchanged, shared, dominated, subdued, taught, lost, and forgot-
ten, on the way …
Ancient practices such as fire worship, exposure of the dead, wor-
ship of a sky god, reverence for the horse, reverence for the bull, and
reverence for the moon were followed by Zoroastrianism, Judaism,

© The Author(s) 2020 69

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_5
70 R. ERGENER

Buddhism, the heretic Christian Nestorian and Manichean beliefs,

and the final takeover of the route by Islam.

Silk Road is not the only case of religions spreading along trade routes.
Paul preached Christianity along ancient trade routes. Early Islam spread
along trade routes in Arabia.
Can the spread of different religions along trade routes be explained
simply by the dissemination of religious teachings by the missionaries who
traveled along these routes together with merchants—and to a certain
extent by the merchants themselves? In Syriac, the word for merchant tgr
was used as a synonym for missionary (Foltz 2000, 62).
It is a fact that not only merchandise but technologies, ideas, and
cultural products are transmitted by merchants and by their fellow trav-
elers along trade routes. Cultures and ideas are cross pollinated during
the course of long-distance trade. The vocation of a merchant is partic-
ularly suitable for the spread of religion. A twentieth-century missionary
points out that traders have advantage over other missionaries as trade
provides an accepted and legitimate justification for a stranger’s presence
in a strange land. Unless there is such a justification, the stranger is likely
to be viewed as an “alien,” “criminal,” or “spy” by the members of the
local culture. A merchant has a place and is accepted in a foreign culture.
He can travel and be welcome where many cannot be. In addition to all
that, merchants have the advantage of having a trade that provides fund-
ing wherever they go. Therefore, they could serve as “tentmakers,” not
be dependent on support from home churches or monasteries (Munson
1968).
It is then a generally accepted preposition that trade facilitates the
spread of religions. Yet there is another dimension to the relation between
the spread of religions and trade: It is not only trade that facilitates the
spread of religions but also religions can facilitate trade. Here is how.

Contract Uncertainty
The degree to which humans exchange is one of the features which set
humans apart from animals. Everything is exchanged: dinners, trading
cards, gifts, political contributions, housework, performance, babysitting,
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 71

etc. (Shield 2005, 101). And, exchange can take different forms such as
mutual aid, gift exchange, or trade (Davis 1992).
No matter what form it takes, by definition, exchange requires give and
take between partners. Exchange partners can mutually anticipate benefits
from exchange only if there is a high likelihood that the recipient of a
benefit will reciprocate (Axelrod 1984).
The uncertainty as to whether exchange obligations will be fulfilled is
known as contract uncertainty. Unless such uncertainty were eliminated,
transactions would take place either at very high costs that take con-
tract uncertainly into account, or not all (Carr and Landa 1983, 138).
Legal and financial institutions and consumer organizations as well as the
media are employed to overcome the problem. Reputations are tracked
and the information is disseminated. Financial institutions keep records
of the creditworthiness of individuals and of firms. Individuals and orga-
nizations survey and test the quality of products and of the performance
of companies and make the results public on the web and through other
media. Police and legal institutions keep records of cheaters. The fulfill-
ment of reciprocal obligations is monitored. There are legal and moral
punishments for those who do not fulfill such obligations (Hayek 1979,
cited in Paxson and Buchanan, 17).
The problem would be easier to solve if exchange always required an
immediate payback, as the cheater would then be immediately identified.
However, reciprocation can often be delayed and can be indirect. One can
enjoy the benefits of exchange (e.g., in the case of hospitality) long before
the time comes to reciprocate. The true worth of a product may become
clear long after the date of its purchase. For example, the weakness in the
makeup of a new car may not be apparent until a few months or years
after the date of purchase.
The monitoring of cheating is relatively easier in societies which are
small and closed. If the society is small, those who fail to fulfill their recip-
rocal obligations will be known by all. Cheaters are easily punished and
excluded from the cycle of exchange, temporarily or permanently.
The punishment and exclusion of cheaters become more difficult as
group size increases. As group size increases, it becomes difficult for all
group members to know who all the cheaters are. If the cheaters are not
known by all, it is difficult to keep them out of the cycle of exchange as
cheaters can continue to exchange with those who are not aware of their
records as cheaters.
72 R. ERGENER

The problem becomes more complicated if the society is not closed.

In this case, the cheaters will be able to leave the groups where they have
built up reputations as untrustworthy exchange partners and join other
groups where their reputations are not known.
Modern humans live mostly in large and open societies, where the
tracking and punishing of cheaters pose challenges. Majority of mod-
ern exchange relations take place between agents who do not know each
other. Anonymity of exchange agents makes cheating easier, as cheaters
have many ways to hide and avoid sanctions.
If the frameworks for the monitoring and punishment of cheating were
universal and perfect, conditions surrounding exchange relations would
be similar to those prevailing in small and closed societies. There would
be immediate access to information on the past behavior of exchange part-
ners and on the quality of the goods and services, immediate monitoring
and the immediate application of legal and moral sanctions.
When formal means to deal with contract uncertainty are not available,
exchange partners may have no choice but to resort to the use of less
formal methods in order to improve their choices. Being suspicious of
unfamiliar persons reduces the risk of being cheated (Enquist and Leimar
1993).
It is common to prefer as exchange partners one’s own kind, rather
than others, because, one may feel inferior or superior to those who are
different, fear or suspect them, have communication problems with them
and have difficulties perceiving what drives them and what their conjec-
tures, bonds, traditions, and habits are (Huntington 1996). When a quick
decision needs to be made, those who are native speakers of the same lan-
guage, members of one’s own sex, nationality, religion, clan, tribe, and
family are preferred over others as exchange partners. “Old boys” prefer
to deal with other “old boys.” In a multiethnic society, where ethnicities
are not integrated, members of ethnic groups may choose to trade with
members of their own ethnic groups (Carr and Landa 1983, 150).
Another shortcut employed when making a quick decision about the
trustworthiness of a trade partner is to use proxies, attributing reliability
or not to members of certain groups.
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 73

Groups and Reputation

And members of groups which monitor and punish cheating behavior of
their members are regarded as more reliable. Monitoring and punishment
are possible if the group is a closed social structure.
Within a closed structure, there is exchange of information on the
members breaching contracts, which helps to eliminate cheaters. The
group can impose on those who violate the rules of the game sanctions,
in addition “to those normally imposed by the market … Such sanctions
can be social as well as economic – those who breach contracts can be
removed from group membership and prohibited from contact with other
members of the group” (Carr and Landa 1983, 138), or they can be
deprived of credit or left out of future projects.
Within a closed group, members build up reputations. The group itself
will have a reputation and membership in that group will give the mem-
bers a reputation in the larger society.
Membership in religious groups is likely to invite the trust not only
of coreligionists but also of outsiders, as there is a general expectation for
religious individuals to be more moral (than atheists). This is because reli-
gions often (if not always!) preach morality. What is more, in comparison
with members of other types of groups, members of religious groups can
be more eager to monitor the behavior of each other (social monitoring)
as “the cognitive awareness of gods is likely to heighten pro-social reputa-
tional concerns among believers” (Bering and Johnson 2005). And, mem-
bers of religious groups are monitored not only by other group members,
but also by supernatural beings as well. Supernatural monitoring, to the
degree that it is genuinely believed and cognitively salient, encourages
moral behavior (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008). Divine punishments and
divine rewards raise the cost of cheating for believers and reinforce hon-
esty (Bulbulia 2004, 30; 2005, 86).
Critias1 was one of the first to notice the power of religion to enforce
moral behavior. In a fragment of a speech which he puts in the mouth of
Sisyphus, Critias says that law punished public crimes but was ineffective
against what was done privately. An intelligent man introduced the fear of
gods among men so that they’d be afraid even when they did something

1 (460–403 BCE), uncle of Plato, associate of Socrates, an author of tragedies, elegies

and prose works and a leading member of the thirty tyrants who ruled Athens during the
last years of the Peloponnesian war.
74 R. ERGENER

in secret. This is how Critias has Sisyphus explain how the concept of a
god who has a sense of justice and who can hear all was invented (Meijer
and Versnel 1981, 230).

ADAM SMITH AND MAX WEBER ON GROUPS AND REPUTA-

TION
Adam Smith recognized that membership in a religious group
would enhance the reputation of an individual in a large society
in which individuals do not know each other (Lewer and Van den
Berg 2007, 255).
Smith points out that in a village society, the behavior and there-
fore the reputation of an individual would be controlled by other
villagers. The same individual however would turn into nobody in
a city, lacking both a reputation and also effective monitoring of
his behavior. Joining a religious group however would immediately
provide him with a good reputation since religious groups closely
monitor the behavior of their members, in order to protect the cred-
ibility of their groups (Smith 1776, 795–96).
Weber also noted that membership in a religious group would
enhance the reputation of an individual and help him to attain
favored business status (Berndt 2007, 1006–7).
In 1904, Weber witnessed in the United States the baptism of
a banker by immersion in a lake, as practiced by the Baptists. The
banker was planning to start a bank in an area that was not pop-
ulated by Baptists as such. Nevertheless, he had chosen to be bap-
tized like a Baptist as an outward proof of his credibility, as Baptists
were very strict with the moral quality of their members. A person
would be admitted to the Baptist church only if he passed a charac-
ter inquiry going back to his childhood. Membership certificate in
the Baptist church would therefore open up vast opportunities for
networking and credit for its holders (Weber 1948, cited in Shear-
mur and Klein 1997, 36).
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 75

Insignia: Recognizable
The baptism which the banker in the above story goes through provides
him with a clear sign of his membership in a group, which has trustwor-
thiness attributed to its members. Membership in such groups should be
easily recognizable, as it is difficult for membership to create benefits, if
not recognized.
Through recognizable insignia, individuals and groups offer definitions
of themselves. Potential partners make decisions as to enter into exchange
with groups and individuals, based on such definitions (Williamson 1993,
465).
Some insignia are natural in the sense that one is born with them. Sex,
nationality, language, religion, ethnicity, clan, tribe, and family name are
examples of natural insignia.
An interesting example of using language as a test to identify friend
from foe is narrated in the Old Testament. In order to test to detect
the fleeing Ephraimites, Gileadites ask them to spell the word shibboleth,
literally meaning torrent of water, because the Ephraimites could not pro-
nounce the sound sh (Judges 12:4–6). This is why in English, the word
“shibboleth” means a “word or pronunciation that distinguishes people
of one group or class from those of another.”2
The family name that one is born with gives one a unique identity
that carries a reputation. Surname can help to identify an individual as
a member of a social group of kinsman and clansman, which may invite
preferential treatment by wealthier relatives or clan members, who may
regard relatives and clan members as more trustworthy (Carr and Landa
1983, 146–47).
One can be born to a group or adopt it during his or her lifetime.
Insignia of adopted groups can be very manifest such as coat of arms,
blazons, flags, totems, and decorations. The way one dresses can also sig-
nal manifest messages about membership in a particular group: Scottish
clans had one or more tartans with specific colors and patterns (Carr and
Landa 1983, 156).
Messages of membership in a group can also be relayed not in manifest
but in subtler ways through practices such as accent, consumption habits,
and lifestyle.

2 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition.

76 R. ERGENER

Dress style signals various messages: Different personality features are

associated with those who wear dark suits and with those who wear jeans.
Style of haircut, beard (or no beard), jewelry, perfume, watch, are all
insignia, which can be interpreted as messages of trustworthiness or lack
of. Car, house, neighborhood of residence, level of education, diplomas
from various schools, and club membership are all insignia revealing infor-
mation about the person.
A taxi driver has no way of knowing much about the trustworthiness
of a potential rider. He makes his decision whether to give a person a
ride or not, on the basis of the potential rider’s outlook and his way of
defining himself.
Behavior such as inefficient gift giving can be undertaken and under-
stood as a signal of the serious intentions of the gift giver (Camerer 1988).
Some symbols are secret and their disclosure to the public can be penal-
ized. Insignia, like the Jewish chai symbol, can be easily recognized by
Jews but is meaningless for others.
It is more common however for insignia to be open and recogniz-
able by all, as members of the group who wear the insignia expect to
derive benefits from recognition (Carr and Landa 1983, 155). Insignia,
the wearing of which is conditional on the fulfillment of generally rec-
ognized education, moral or other requirements, will generate trust not
only among those who wear the same insignias—and also among those
who do not.
Humans seem to have a psychological bias toward those with whom
they share the same symbolic identity markers (Fershtman and Gneezy
2001). Trust is generated among those who wear the same insignia,
regardless of whether the insignia is associated with certain virtues and
qualifications. Experiments have shown that “Cooperation can emerge
and stabilize between agents that share identifying markers” even if
they “have no prior history of interaction and no expectations of future
encounters” (Riolo et al. 2001).
Such tendencies may have biological roots. Genetic similarity leads to
cooperation among animals (Wilson 1980). In a similar manner, cultural
similarity may lead to the reduction of uncertainty in exchange among
humans. “In our evolutionary history, symbolic identity markers were
likely to be reliable indicators of in-group identity, as they generally, but
not always, are today” (Sosis 2005, 207).
One of the reasons why members of religious groups often prefer to
display their particular insignia such as worship, appearances, and practices
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 77

openly, even at the sake of facing discrimination and persecution, is to

invite trust.
Perfect strangers in foreign lands can be treated as “brothers” by
coreligionists who recognize them through the markers of the religion
which they wear. No prior experience of long-term reciprocal relations is
required. This was the case, for example, with nineteenth-century migrant
Muslim traders from the Sudan who traveled to Ethiopia (Triulzi 1975,
59). As they were dispersed throughout Europe and the Middle East,
Jews preferred to remain recognizable through their dietary laws and
other particular practices (Carr and Landa 1983, 154).
By displaying their insignia openly and by fulfilling religious require-
ments in public, believers let others know that they are obeying the divine
rules, the implication being that they are also fulfilling the related moral
requirements, and are therefore “trustworthy” (Bulbulia 2005, 92). The
fulfillment of religious requirements privately gains divine favors and inner
peace, but not recognition. If worship is to generate trust among fellow
humans, it needs to be performed in public: The sanctuary is more useful
when others are present (Bulbulia 2004, 28).

Insignia: Genuine
Once in a market place in early America, a farmer requests a loan of hun-
dred dollars for six months from a Quaker wearing his traditional attire.
When rejected, the farmer inquires whether he can borrow the Quaker’s
hat for a few hours, as looking like a Quaker, he would be easily able
to collect the credit he needed, Quakers, like the Baptists being known
for their reliability and creditworthiness. This story raises the question of
how reliable a seal of approval is, if it can be worn so easily (Klein 1997,
5). Indeed, not all insignia are genuine indicators of membership in a
particular group (Zahavi 1993, 227).
A shortcut to assess the reliability of a signal is whether it requires a
high level of investment.
Amotz Zahavi, who studied signaling behavior in the animal world,
noticed that the reliability of a signal rises with the amount of invest-
ment it requires. The investment required by a reliable signal “should
be acceptable to an honest signaler and prohibitive to a cheater” (Zahavi
1993, 227).
“For example, wasting money is a reliable signal for wealth because a
cheater, a poor individual claiming to be rich, does not have money to
78 R. ERGENER

throw away; the message of strength can be displayed reliably by bearing

heavy loads; and confidence may be displayed by providing an advantage
to a rival” (Zahavi 1993, 227).
“Walking toward the opponent is less costly for an individual willing to
fight, not frightened of a clash while it may be detrimental to an individual
not ready to fight by decreasing its chances to escape the rival, if a real
clash occurs” (Zahavi 1980, 79).
The genuineness of the insignia is correlated with its strictness, as
stricter insignia require higher levels of investment. This is true even if
the strictness of the insignia leads to social estrangement and alienation.

Sects and Cults

Insignia worn by members of religious groups (particularly those worn by
members of “strict” religious groups) tend to be rather strict.
Sikhs wear turbans and do not cut the hair on their body. Krishnas
have their heads shaved, wear pink-colored robes, and chant in public.
Moonies must agree to prearranged marriages. Orthodox Jewish males
wear side curls, yarmulkes, and dark hats and tail coats. Orthodox Jewish
women cover their heads. Devout Muslim women also cover their hair
or their whole body. Muslims are not supposed to drink alcohol or eat
pork or charge interest, and Muslims fast from daybreak till sunset dur-
ing the month of Ramadan. Jews do not eat pork, follow other dietary
restrictions, and they are not supposed to conduct business on Sabbath.
Seventh-Day Adventists do not eat meat. Mormons refuse do not drink
coffee and do not smoke. Jehovah’s witnesses do not allow blood trans-
fusions. Christian Scientists refuse medical treatment. (The list of strict
insignia is mainly from Iannaccone 1992, 273.)
Religious groups which demand strict stigma of their members, putting
their members at odds with the rest of society are defined as “sects” (Ian-
naccone 1992, 283). Sect members agree to deprive themselves of certain
earthly amenities and pleasures, causing physical discomfort for them-
selves, some to the point of risking their health. Such behavior is often
considered by outsiders as not only deviant, but also as irrational and
against the best interests of the practitioners. Those who adhere to such
rules are likely to be labeled with uncomplimentary terms such as “cult
member,” “fundamentalist,” “militant,” “extremist,” or even as “terror-
ist” and are likely to be alienated from the rest of society, rendering inte-
gration with the mainstream difficult (Paxson and Buchanan 2004, 24).
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 79

The physical discomforts and the social alienation brought about by

sect membership may actually be not against, but in the best interests of
the practitioners. The seemingly irrational dietary, dress and grooming
rules, and social customs can serve the rational purpose of screening out
the less committed members of the faith. Only those whose devotion is
strong enough to put up with the burdens remain (Iannaccone 1994b,
1187). Those who stay behind can enjoy spiritual as well as material ben-
efits.
The primary spiritual benefit derived from the screening of less
devoted practitioners of the faith is heightened satisfaction (those who
stay behind receive) from religious service. The satisfaction one derives
from a religious service is based not only on one’s own contribution but
also on the contribution of others who participate. “People are better off
in a group whose average level of participation is greater than their own”
(Iannaccone 1992, 276).
One of the material benefits of strict rules, which is a benefit for low-
income individuals, is the reduction in the consumption of worldly goods
as the practice of strict religious requirements will raise the costs of par-
ticipation in alternate activities. Sects therefore tend to be more attractive
during recessions and for those from low-income groups (such as low-
income minorities and women). Low-income groups have limited bud-
gets. The restriction of worldly consumption by sects suits the budget
constraints of such groups (Iannaccone 1994a, 1188).
Another material benefit of sect membership is the enabling of
exchange networks, which assure trust when the legal system is not effec-
tive. This is so because sect members can be easily and reliably identified
(through the rules and requirements they obey) and effectively monitored
(because membership is limited) and punished. Punishments such as par-
tial or total exclusion from the group will be very effective in sects, as a
sect member who is expelled from his or her sect risks losing “not only
his or her membership and belief structure but his or her entire social
network as well.” For, the strict rules and prohibitions imposed on sect
members isolate them to various degrees from the outside world, ren-
dering the sect as their only universe. Therefore, the excluded member
will find himself or herself alone, facing the task of rebuilding new “social
networks” (Berndt 2007, 1007).
80 R. ERGENER

One religious group, whose distinctive religious observances lead to

gains for them in their interactions with the members of other religions
are the “Sikhs” (Paxson and Buchanan 2004, 12).

SIKHS

Sikhs do not cut their hair, which they regard as a gift from God,
representing radiance. Males cover their heads with colorful tur-
bans. They also wear steel bracelets (kara) as sign of commit-
ment to their faith. They can also wear “Kangha (comb), symbol-
izing cleanliness and presentation, Kirpan (saber) for defense and
Kachera (breeches) as a token of loyalty to one’s spouse” (Paxson
and Buchanan 2004, 7).
Sikh insignia require high levels of investment by the individu-
als who wear them. It is therefore hard to imitate being a Sikh.
Cheaters are not likely to wear Sikh insignia because the amount of
investment required to wear these insignia will exceed the gains a
cheater can make by using them improperly.
Sikh insignia are costly not only because of the investment
required by the symbols themselves (such as not cutting the hair
for a lifetime), but also because the wearing of the insignia is asso-
ciated with high moral standards.
Sikh teaching strongly emphasizes morality and good conduct.
The Sikh community closely monitors that the members remain
moral and good. The insignia such as colored turbans, long hair,
and steel bracelet therefore function as signs of approval which indi-
cate that the person wearing them has accepted and is implement-
ing the Sikh moral codes. This is the reason why Sikhs wearing such
insignia are regarded as trustworthy exchange partners not only by
other Sikhs and also by outsiders.
Because the insignia they wear are so unmistakably visible, Sikhs
are easily recognized both by their coreligionists and also by the
rest of society at large. Whereas recognition by their coreligion-
ists is in the best interest of Sikhs, as they can always seek mutual
support from their coreligionists, their recognition by the rest of
society may not always be in their best interest, this may lead to
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 81

their social alienation and estrangement and even to discrimination.

For example, during the days following September 11, Sikhs expe-
rienced negative attitudes as they were often mistaken for potential
Islamic terrorists.
Nevertheless, Sikhs insist on the wearing of visible and easily
recognizable insignia of Sikhism. From a personal point of view,
the insistence of Sikhs to wear such insignia can be explained with
the strength of their faith. Objectively however, it is also true that
insignia such as turban, long hair, and steel bracelets function as
seals of approval, signaling both to other Sikhs and to the rest of
the world that the person wearing the insignia is moral and reli-
able. The benefits Sikhs derive from being recognized as reliable
exchange partners exceed the costs of their occasionally being mis-
taken for terrorists.

Sects in Diamond Industry

Approximately 65% of unpolished diamonds go through the Central Sell-
ing Organization (CSO) in London. CSO distributes unpolished dia-
monds through four brokers. The brokers sell presorted diamonds in
boxes to 125 specific merchants known as “sight holders” at personal
“sights,” or “viewing sessions” in London. Sight holders then sell the
unpolished diamonds to a network of individual dealers (Richman 2006,
390). The rough and polished diamonds are sold in ever more smaller
bunches, until they reach the hands of jewelry manufacturers for com-
mercial sale to final users (Richman 2006, 390–91).
As bunches of diamonds exchange hands, the pieces are priced and
matched with demand. The process is potentially very risky. Diamonds
are easily portable and therefore easy to hide and steal. It is not too diffi-
cult to sell stolen diamonds in the black market, as diamonds are valuable
everywhere. Also, it is hard to know for sure whether a dealer stole dia-
monds or if he wasted them because of poor judgment, when cutting. For
these reasons, law enforcement alone is not sufficient to stop the thefts in
the diamond industry. This is where the religious groups have had a role
to play.
82 R. ERGENER

Half of world diamond jewelry transactions take place in the United

States. Over 95% of the diamonds imported into the United States are
handled by the merchants of 47th Street in New York (Lueck 1997).
The business is overseen by the Diamond Dealers’ Club (DDC). The
membership of the DDC is dominated by Jews and particularly by the
Ultra-Orthodox ones. DDC provides a hall where diamonds can be safely
viewed and traded.
The diamond merchants who are members of the DDC can be roughly
divided into two groups: the long-term players and the contractors.
The long-term players are the dealers or buyers, including the jewelry
manufacturers. The contractors do the brokerage, seeking for buyers in
return for small sales commissions. The contractors also do the diamond
cutting and polishing in return for fixed wages.
Cheating would not be too hard for members of either group.
The dealers buy and sell on credit, which they can evade. Contractors
exchange immensely valuable diamonds on the DDC floor with a hand-
shake and the Hebrew “mazel un b’rachah” (“luck and blessing”). Or,
the contractors leave with the cutters the valuable diamonds which are to
be polished in plain envelopes. On the envelope, there is the name of the
owner and the cutting instructions will be inside, and there will be no
other reliable written records (Richman 2006, 405). It would definitely
be very easy for the contractors to walk away with the diamonds entrusted
with them, without a payment, collateral or written contract.
Cheating is not commonly encountered with either the long-term deal-
ers or the contractors.
DDC enforces obligations through the dissemination of information
on the past performance of dealers. Names and pictures of potential mem-
bers as well as of those who have failed to fulfill the requirements of
their contracts are put on the walls of the DDC—and nowadays on the
web. The dealers with records of failure to meet obligations are fined and
excluded from the exchange network of the DDC and with the associated
bourses worldwide. Those who continue to deal with excluded merchants
are also excluded.
Two different mechanisms related to the religious and family structures
of the two types of merchants contribute to this outcome.
Long-term dealers are usually partners in family owned businesses.
They expect their offspring to continue with the business. Therefore, what
is at stake if they should be caught cheating is not only their reputation
but also an income stream spread over several future generations. The
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 83

benefits they would gain from cheating on a contract would be insignifi-

cant as compared with the long-term gains of the family business.
Unlike the long-term dealers who are wealthy, the contractors are not,
because the skills required for their job (brokerage and cutting) are low
and the job market is competitive. This is why contractors are widely
known as “diamond studded” or “religious paupers.”
Unlike the long-term players, contractors do not plan to be in the
industry for long. They hope to retire with modest savings so that they
can devote the rest of their lives to religious studies. They usually do not
have plans to hand over their businesses to their offspring, as they would
rather their children not have regular jobs and devote themselves to the
study of the Torah, surviving on financial support.
Since their earnings are low and spread over a short time span, cheat-
ing should be all the more attractive for the contractors. Yet, they remain
mostly honest. One of the factors that lead the Ultra-Orthodox contrac-
tors to honesty may be their being monitored and sanctioned not only by
the DDC but their own community as well.
The community prospers as a whole through the success of its mem-
bers. Like with the Baptists and the Sikhs, honesty is a virtue held in high
esteem in the religious belief system of the Ultra-Orthodox community.
By assuring the honesty of its members, the religious satisfaction of the
community is also raised. Ultra-Orthodox therefore monitor the honesty
of their members. There are community sanctions against offenders.
An extreme penalty is excommunication by rabbinical courts, which is
very severe indeed, because individuals who are used to living within
small, insular communities, devoting most of their adult lives to religious
studies experience immense difficulties in adjusting to the outside world
(Richman 2006, 396).

“WHERE WOULD I GO?”

A Hasidic Jew employed in the New York diamond industry, who
was used to concluding diamond transactions worth millions of dol-
lars, with no money changing hands, only with a handshake and the
Hebrew “mazel un b’rachah” (“luck and blessing”), was asked why
84 R. ERGENER

he didn’t default on his agreements and went away, his response was
“Where would I go?” (Berndt 2007, 1024).

A new group which is beginning to play a major role in the global

market for diamonds is also a tightly knit religious group: the Jain from
India. Indian cutters and dealers started to make an impact in the 1970s
by cutting the small diamonds which others had rejected (Richman 2006,
410). Over decades, Indian diamond dealers built an extensive interna-
tional network. An active bourse has developed in Mumbai. There are
thousands of active cutting factories in the nearby Gujarat province. As of
2000, 90% of the cut stones sold in the world were polished by Indian
diamond cutters.
Like the diamond merchants of the 47th Street, Indian diamond mer-
chants also rely on monitoring by religious and family networks. The main
dealers, including almost all of the leaders of the India’s seven largest
companies which control a quarter of the country’s gem exports, are
Jain from Palanpur. The numbers of Jain among the Antwerp diamond
merchants are rising as the numbers of Jews are dropping. The Jain are
active even in the diamond market in Tel Aviv. The Jain are successful
in diamond trade because just like the Ultra-Conservative Jews, they have
tightly knit social structures which enable them to enforce contracts which
public courts cannot.

Outcast Groups and Trade

Sects and minority religions are different from the mainstream. Main-
stream members of society may perceive “different” (sects and minority)
religions as having too many practices and rules which are too deviant.
As more and more of the deviant practices of the “different” religions
become manifest, the rest of the society can come to suspect that there
may be other insignia and particular practices not yet publicly known. It
is possible for the members of the mainstream to come to the conviction
that the behavior of the members of “different” religions is unpredictable
(Berndt 2007, 1009).
Unpredictable is resented as it involves a perceived risk. Prejudice can
grow among the mainstream members of society, against members of the
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 85

“different” religious groups. There may be derision, discrimination, seg-

regation, prohibition, withholding of opportunities and at the extreme
violence and even genocide (Berndt 2007, 1011). All this, makes it very
difficult for members of the “different” religious groups to assimilate and
socially integrate with the mainstream (Paxson and Buchanan 2004, 24).
The uncertainty felt toward members of groups who are regarded as
deviant can create difficulties for them in business. Perceived increase in
risk associated with the unknown may lead members of the majority to
take measures to protect themselves, including “selective exclusion of the
‘different’ person or the withholding of patronage or privilege” (Berndt
2007, 1011).
Throughout history, many groups have taken the path of compro-
mise under such pressure and abandoned their belief systems and altered
their lifestyles, giving up their insignia and unique practices. Many other
groups, however, have chosen to stick to their beliefs and have not com-
promised under extreme pressure.
The choice not to compromise may be primarily a matter of faith and
principle. In some cases, however, not compromising under extreme pres-
sure, may be not (only) a matter of faith, but a rational choice, as the
economic benefits of being different can exceed the costs.
The resentment felt toward “different” religious groups by the rest of
society makes it very difficult if not impossible for the members of such
groups to survive outside of their deviant group. They are therefore not
likely to risk behavior which could lead to their expulsion from the group.
Cheating other members of the group is therefore avoided, as cheating
can be punished by expulsion. Strong within group honesty makes it pos-
sible for such groups to build networks of exchange. Jewish peddlers in
the nineteenth-century US West were one such group.

PEDDLERS IN THE US WEST

As the frontiers of the United States expanded to the West during

the nineteenth century, consumption needs of the pioneers living
in dispersed, small communities would be met mostly by peddlers.
(General stores were set up where larger communities existed.)
86 R. ERGENER

Peddlers had start up credit to buy the products they would mar-
ket. They would then sell for cash or barter and pay back their
credit.
It was certainly possible for a peddler not to return his loan and
to start a new life somewhere. However, this possibility was very
unlikely if not nonexistent for the peddlers who were conservative
Jews of German origin. Members of this group were so resented by
other members of society that it was impossible for them to survive
and start a new life outside of their communities. They therefore
always paid back the credit they had received from fellow group
members.
It is possible of course that the loans were repaid because the
debtors had high moral standards. The fact is however that they did
not have much choice.
German Jews, who migrated to the United States in the nine-
teenth century, stood out within the majority population, even
though their numbers were small. They had particular religious
traditions, manner of dress, grooming habits, and dietary restric-
tions, and they were reluctant to work on Saturdays (Berndt 2007,
1023). They were estranged and alienated from the mainstream
Christian Americans, because of their immigrant status and religious
and language differences. They were also estranged (if not to the
same extent) from the older generation of Sephardic Jews, who had
immigrated earlier, and whose religious practices and traditions were
quite different from those of German Jews (Sklare 1958).
These differences led to the social separation of the German Jew
from the non-Jew and also (again, if not to the same extent) from
the Sephardic Jew, since as a general rule, members of groups prefer
the company of those who are alike—not different (Berndt 2007,
1019).
German Jews were therefore not in a position to establish trust
networks with the rest of society. Consequently, they lacked access
to standard credit markets. People would trade with German Jews if
necessary but did not trust them sufficiently to extend them credit,
especially if they were to go far away as peddlers to sell their mer-
chandise, before returning to pay back the credit. German Jews
could borrow only from each other within a religious trust network,
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 87

which was further strengthened by the lack of outside opportunities

(Berndt 2007, 1023).

Peddlers in the US West are a typical example of a middlemen minority

group. “Around the world, middleman minorities have distanced them-
selves and their offspring from social involvement with the majority pop-
ulation surrounding them, leading to accusations of being “clannish.”
Such groups are often resented by the rest of society. The resent-
ment experienced by middlemen minorities can initially arise exogenous-
ly” (Bonacich 1973). However, the resentment can be internalized and
made endogenous. As a group distances itself from the rest of society
and cultivates inter-group relations, in order to protect its members from
abuse, benefits, sometimes in the form of increased economic opportu-
nities arise which can strengthen the desire of the group to maintain a
separation from the majority population. The persistence of the separa-
tion will lead to an increase in the exogenous resentment (Berndt 2007,
1006).
Close ties within the minority group raise the level of trust among
group members who will have less need to take precautions when
exchanging within the group. This gives members of minority groups a
competitive advantage when conducting exchanges as middlemen, where
it is particularly costly to take such precautions (Sowell 2005).

Diasporas
The nineteenth-century peddler network was within the national bound-
aries of the United States. Members of strict religions can spread across
the borders forming trade networks known as “Diasporas.”
Diasporas are formed by peoples who have been dispersed, often in
some degree forcibly from their original homelands, from which they
are not entirely cut off. Members of a diaspora remain distinct from the
host societies they are forced to live with, but united among themselves,
with strong ties of religion, language, and ethnicity, across geographi-
cal distances. As such, Diasporas have played an important role in social,
cultural, and intellectual as well as economic and imperial history (Israel
1985, 3).
88 R. ERGENER

Diaspora was first used in the Greek translation of the Bible, implying a
forced scattering, as described in the Deuteronomy (28:25). Initially, the
term was exclusively reserved for the Jews. Today, there are more than
30 groups identified as Diasporas (Vertovitch and Cohen 1999, 267).
Organized groups of merchant ethnic and religious communities such as
Arab, Armenian, Chinese, Greek, Jewish, Japanese, Maltese, Parsi, Scot,
or Western Indians and subgroups such as Julfan Armenians, Baghdadi
Jews, and Hadhrami Arabs have formed diaspora trade networks which
transcend the boundaries of national states.
Three classical Diasporas are Greek, Armenian, and Jewish. Histori-
cally, Greeks have remained confined largely to the Levant, Balkans, Italy,
Russia, and the Black Sea. Armenians connected Central Asia and Mongo-
lia with Middle East and Italy. Jewish traders connected Roman Mediter-
ranean with Silk Road.
An interesting case of merchants forming a network in the eleventh
century in the Mediterranean is the Maghrebi (Greif 1993). The
Maghrebi merchants had a coalition that served both as an informational
conduit and an enforcement mechanism in an area of commerce where
legal systems failed to adequately address breach of contract (Berndt
2007, 1007).
Maghrebi traders were Jewish merchants who originally lived in Bagh-
dad under the Abbasid Caliphate. During the first half of the tenth cen-
tury, these merchants moved to North Africa, mainly to Tunisia, in order
to escape the increasingly insecure circumstances around Baghdad. They
were known as Maghrebi traders, because for the Arabs from Bagh-
dad, Tunisia was in the Maghreb, meaning the “West.” At the time,
Tunisia was under the rule of the Fatimid Caliphate. The capital of the
Fatimid Caliphate eventually moved to Cairo. The Maghrebi merchants
also moved to Cairo and from Cairo spread out to Spain, Sicily, Egypt,
Palestine, and even to Byzantium and Eastern Europe. They were even-
tually forced out of the Mediterranean by the Italian naval and military
supremacy. They then participated in the Indian Ocean trade. Toward the
end of the twelfth century, they were forced by the Muslim rulers of Egypt
to withdraw from this activity as well. At that point, they mixed with local
Jewish communities and lost their distinct identity. Later yet, beginning
in the fifteenth century, Sephardic Jews would build a worldwide trade
network.
It is important to note that even though the Maghrebi traders retained
a strong sense of identity and solidarity among themselves, they did
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 89

not constitute a distinct religious-ethnic community apart from the Jew-

ish communities in general (as did the Jews of German origin in the
nineteenth-century United States). Nor did they represent a “natural”
group, which binds together individuals in all (or at least most) impor-
tant aspects of their lives (Sombart 1953, 36, cited in Greif 1989, 862).
The bonds of a natural group usually discourage dishonest conduct.
Since he had no such bonds, a Maghrebi trader, living far away from
most other Maghrebi traders and within a large and well-organized Jewish
community, could have cheated his trade partners if he chose to do so and
become totally integrated into the group he was living with (Greif 1989,
862).
The explanation for the moral behavior of the Maghrebis in trade can
be sought in their religious background. There were two aspects of this
background.
On the one hand, the Maghrebis belonged to the “Jewish community,
within which it is a prominent idea that ‘All Israel is responsible for every
member’” (Greif 1994, 923).
Secondly, having adopted the norms of the Muslim society they lived
in, the Maghrebis were obligated not only to stay away from committing
sins themselves, but also to make an effort to prevent members of their
community from doing so as well (Greif 1994, 922).
Along with their religious background, the need to maintain a trust-
worthy reputation in order to remain in the trade network contributed
to the reinforcement of trust in relations of trade among the Maghrebi
merchants. Maghrebis were left alone by the Fatimids. They handled
their internal problems themselves. Dishonest merchants were punished
by exclusion from the trade network. Agents could maximize their gains
through honesty. It was against the self-interest of the merchants not to
follow the rules (Greif 1994, 923).

Cooperation and Diffusion: Long-Distance

Trade and Spread of Islam in Africa
Going back to the peddlers in the US West, we noted that the resentment
felt toward members of this community contributed to their building of
a middlemen trade network. The material prosperity of the members of a
strict religion can intensify the feelings of resentment already felt toward
them (because they are different) and attract the animosity of non-group
members, who are envious of their success. At the extreme, there may be
90 R. ERGENER

violence against the members of the wealthy group and their wealth may
be expropriated.
Members of the strict religion who have grown wealthy and attracted
hostility can reduce the friction with the rest of society through invest-
ment in inter-religious cooperation. Such investments may take the form
of “veneration of same shrines, adoption of similar languages, customs
and norms, creation of inter-religious organizations, or investment in
common public goods” (Jha 2005, 12). For example, Ismailis invested
in public schools and educational facilities in Zanzibar in order to stay on
good terms with the rest of the population (see for India’s syncretic tra-
ditions: Keay 2011; Burman 2002). The environment of toleration cre-
ated by such acts contributes to eliminate intra-religious violence. Such
practices may explain the absence of religious violence in medieval Indian
coast towns.
Trade networks founded by members of religious groups which are not
very strict will not attract as much animosity and are therefore less likely
to be targets of violence and expropriation. Non-members are able to
join the group relatively easily, leading to a diffusion of wealth as well as
the spread of the religion, rather than the networking of the members of
a strict religion amassing wealth exclusively among themselves. This was
what happened as Islam spread in Africa through trade (Farrell 1996).
Military might was effective in the conversions to Islam in North
Africa, during the seventh century. There were Jihads or Holy Wars
throughout Africa during the nineteenth century. Other than these excep-
tions, politics and military did not play much of a role in the conversions
to Islam in Africa, where such conversions were mostly voluntary.
The first contact between Islam and West Africa took place in the
eighth century, when Islam began to expand along the trans-Saharan trade
routes from North Africa (Ensminger 1997, 8). After the eleventh cen-
tury, there were voluntary conversions to Islam on the whole of West
Africa and also in parts of East Africa (Ensminger 1997, 8).
The voluntary conversions to Islam in Africa cannot be explained by
the similarities between the social, cosmological, and ritual systems of the
Africans and of Muslims, as the two were quite different (Horton 1971).
The lifestyle required by Islam did not necessarily make life more enjoy-
able either. On the contrary, becoming a Muslim imposed new burdens
on the convert such as praying five times daily, fasting, pilgrimage, absti-
nence from alcohol, banning of extra marital sex, modification of inheri-
tance systems, and the recognition of offspring.
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 91

The more likely explanation for the attraction of Islam for the African
was the economic benefits provided to the converts, namely through
long-distance trade.
Long-distance trade was not developed in Africa before the arrival of
Islam. Credit was not common, and the existing trade was based largely
on direct exchange. Islam stimulated trade by providing the institutional
structures for the development of credit and “an immediate link to the
commercial centers of North Africa and via them to the rest of the world.
Islam brought a common language of trade (Arabic), a monetary system,
an accounting system, and a legal code to adjudicate financial contracts
and disputes. In social and legal terms, Islam provided a way of making
outsiders, insiders. By providing a legal structure binding upon individ-
uals of different ethnic groups with otherwise non-binding institutional
structures, it greatly expanded the size of potential trading networks. All
of the above provided an improved institutional structure in which trade
could take place among people who previously had, at best, limited insti-
tutional structures with which to regulate trade beyond their own ethnic
group” (Ensminger 1997, 7).
Much of the conversions to Islam in Africa were done by long-distance
merchants (Ensminger 1997, 6). Even though the merchants openly pro-
fessed their religion, they would initially refrain from initiating conver-
sions. They had come for trade, and they had no time for marketing as
well as preaching. “Yet, after they had settled for some time, the desire to
educate their … children and, one may add, to introduce the commercial
aspect of the Sharia code of law, created the need for fresh conversions”
(Ensminger 1997, 9).
Conversions were also rendered necessary by trading practices. A key
institution that was introduced by Muslim merchants was the commenda,
a credit contract and partnership, which “enabled an investor or group
of investors to entrust capital or merchandise to an agent-manager, who
traded with it and returned the principal and previously agreed-upon
share of profits to the investor. The agent received the remaining share
of the profits as a reward for his time and labor” (Perinbam 1980, 465,
cited in Ensminger 1997, 10).
With the expansion of trade as an outcome of the application of prac-
tices such as commenda, long-distance merchants felt the need to set up
middlemen to deal on their behalf (Ensminger 1997, 10). The amount of
credit extended by these agents was quite sizeable. The legal and opera-
tional framework for the functioning of these contracts was supplemented
92 R. ERGENER

by the reputations of trustworthiness the agents built for themselves. The

most easily recognizable and the most widely sought after signs of trust-
worthiness were displays of true allegiance to the faith which had provided
the framework for the expansion of trade. Abstaining from the consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages, fasting during Ramadan, and pilgrimage were
deemed three such proofs of a merchant’s true allegiance to the faith.
Of the three, the costliest was the pilgrimage. Some of the costs of pil-
grimage could be recouped through the sale of the merchandise brought
from Mecca. But mostly, the gains were to be made through the enhanced
status the pilgrim had gained and the more reliable image he had acquired
by having become a pilgrim. As the number of pilgrims rose, larger acts
of piety, like building a mosque, were needed to further enhance a mer-
chant’s reputation (Ensminger 1997, 11).
Islamic economic system lacked flexibility due to practices such as fixed
tithes and restrictions on credit and interest (Ensminger 1994, 751). Nev-
ertheless, as the above discussion shows, in the African environment, “rel-
ative to what existed before, when there was virtually no institutional
structure with which to regulate trade across ethnic groups, even a rigid
structure was an improvement” (Ensminger 1994, 751).

Trade and Religion Today

Networks of trust based on religion or on other bases such as ethnicity,
language, race, or nationality are still operational, despite the improve-
ments in contract enforcement within and across countries, which has
reduced the need for such networks. In this context, we will review two
studies, one by Lewer and Van den Berg (2007) and the other by Matthias
Helble (2007).
Religious cultures affect commerce directly through facilitating the for-
mation of trade networks. Lewer and Van den Berg call this the network
effect.
Religious cultures affect commerce also indirectly, through their influ-
ences on other “institutions such as traditions, customs, laws, government
and other organizations” (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 257). This is
the institutional effect.
“A particular religious culture may, or may not, make a country’s gov-
ernment, laws, regulations, social customs, and traditions supportive of
international trade” (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 257). “Network
effects of religious cultures” can be “fundamentally different from their
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 93

institutional effects. Even when a religious culture’s institutional effects

discourage trade, the sharing of the religious culture can still have posi-
tive network effects” (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
As Greif’s study (1989) on Maghrebi merchants shows, networks can
“thrive precisely when institutions fail and impersonal transactions are
risky. Hence, it should not be surprising that some religious cultures may
have negative or insignificant institutional effects on trade … but still
encourage the trust that supports trade networks” (Lewer and Van den
Berg 2007, 270).
Lewer and Van den Berg find that “only two religions, Buddhism and
Judaism, have trade-enhancing network effects as well as positive institu-
tional effects” (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
“That Buddhism is so positively and consistently correlated with inter-
national trade” is not surprising as the performance of “Japan after
World War II, and China, India, and many other Asian economies more
recently,” have proved “that rapid economic growth can be achieved in
non-Western societies” (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
That Judaism has positive network effects implies that merchants with
Jewish affiliation have webs that contribute to the expansion of interna-
tional trade, like the Jewish Maghrebi merchants did a millennium ago
(Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
Confucianism has positive network effects which affirms Rauch and
Trindade’s findings (Rauch and Trindade 2002) that strong trade rela-
tionships are maintained by the ethnic Chinese communities in Singapore,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Indonesia.
Lewer and Van den Berg find that Hindu culture does not lead to any
obvious networking effects. This is unexpected given the presence of a
large Hindu Diaspora throughout Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. The
reasons may be the divisive nature of the remnants of the Hindu culture’s
caste system or the lack of a single unifying written doctrine (Lewer and
Van den Berg 2007, 270).
Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism do not have clear,
visible institutional contribution to international trade. Nevertheless, the
three Christian religious cultures, with which secularism and individual-
ism have strong roots, have affirmative indirect effects on trade, through
their influence on other institutions that supplement bilateral trade. “The
finding that, Protestantism is likely to have indirectly inspired other
institutions that encourage international trade, is supportive of Weber’s
94 R. ERGENER

hypothesis that Protestantism was instrumental in the growth of capitalist

institutions” (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
Stulz and Williamson (2001) propose that, compared with other coun-
tries, Catholic ones provide less protection for the rights of creditors.
Blum and Dudley (2001) and McCleary (2007) argue that contractual
defaults are more likely in Roman Catholic countries because the Catholic
sacrament of penance makes it possible to gain forgiveness of sins at any
time, thereby reducing the “cost” of not observing a contractual obliga-
tion (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
Lewer and Van den Berg found the network effect of Islam on trade as
negative. Unfortunately, in the literature on the economic implications of
Islam (Kuran 1997, 2004; Lal 2001; Nafissi 1998; Noland 2003), there
are no consistent explanations as to why trade networks founded by Mus-
lims do not increase total trade. One explanation may be that Islamic net-
works are especially exclusive. Or, the results may be a reflection of the
division of Islam into competing Shiite and Sunni sects—the data in the
study treats all Muslims as members of a single religious culture (Lewer
and Van den Berg 2007, 270).
Mathias Helble studies the impact of religious beliefs on trade (Helble
2007). This impact manifests itself in two ways. Sharing same values
may enhance trade among coreligionists and religion itself may have a
favorable or unfavorable attitude toward trade.
Hindu belief favors trade but only by certain castes. Because it has so
many varieties, Buddhism does not generate trust among coreligionists
across boundaries. Judaism both generates trust across boundaries and is
positive toward trade in general. The Prophet Muhammad himself being
a merchant, Islam is strongly in favor of trade, but honest trade (Helble
2007).
As would be implied by these beliefs, Hindus and Christians are indif-
ferent between trading with strangers or coreligionists, Buddhists would
rather not trade with coreligionists, Jews and Muslims have strong pref-
erence to trade with coreligionists (Helble 2007).
 5 EXCHANGE AMONG HUMANS: NETWORKS OF TRUST 95

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 CHAPTER 6

Religion and the Rise of Inequality

“AS GOD DOES…”

Nasreddin Hodja is a Turkish folk hero for jokes. In one of his sto-
ries, the Hodja is depicted as delivering his annual alms not to the
poor, as preached by Moslem religion, but to the richest man in
town. Perplexed, the rich man asks Hodja whether he is making a
mistake, as God says that one should give to the poor—not to the
rich. “I know what God says” replies Hodja, “but, I thought there
may be greater good in doing as God does, rather than as God
says.”
What is the truth in Hodja’s words? Is it God who gives to the
rich—their riches?

There are those who do indeed believe that it is God who has the final
say in the dispensation of riches. At least, this is how it is said in various
religious texts, which are the words of God for their believers (Ecclesiastes
6:2, Deuteronomy 8:18; Koran 17).
Yet, there was once a time when god had not (yet) given riches to
the rich and therefore there were no rich and no poor—all were equal—
until about five thousand years ago at which point inequality emerged and

© The Author(s) 2020 99

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_6
100 R. ERGENER

spread to become the dominant structuring principle of human societies

(Price and Feinman 2010, 2). How the rich and the poor emerged and
what role religion played in the process will be the subject matter of this
chapter.
We start with an exploration of our egalitarian beginnings and the paths
that lead to inequality even in the absence of religion. We then explore the
contribution religion makes to the creation and the sustaining of inequal-
ity by justifying claims to ownership of resources and to leadership posi-
tions and hierarchies, by providing services and by providing a leverage
for surplus extraction.

Egalitarian Beginnings
Inequality rather than egalitarianism seems to be the norm with most
species. One exception is the ancestors of modern humans who “ex-
isted well over two million years in a state of relative equality” (Hay-
den 2001, 231). This, despite the fact that inequality should be deeply
rooted in the human psyche, as some sort of hierarchy with differential
access to resources was typical of societies of our closest non-human pri-
mate ancestors (Knauft et al. 1991; Kummer 1971; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1974;
Salter 1995; Tiger and Fox 1971; all cited in Wiessner et al. 2002, 232).
Egalitarian societies emerged during the lower or middle Paleolithic
as hierarchical tendencies among our human ancestors were dampened.
Societies with egalitarian structures have persisted through the twentieth
century into the twenty first.
Part of the reason for the dampening of hierarchical tendencies was the
physiological changes we went through as we evolved as a species. As sex-
ual size dimorphism declined with evolution to the modest levels which
prevail today, the reproductive variance between males and females was
reduced. Changes in brain physiology favored cooperative breeding and
feeding, making aggression by dominants more difficult, thereby soften-
ing hierarchies (Scheidel 2017, 26–31).
Close quarter fights with sticks and rocks favor strong men. Use of
projectile weapons and changes in shoulder anatomy which made it pos-
sible to throw objects helped to keep our stronger ancestors at a distance
from the weaker ones and limited the possibilities of their use against the
weak. Other developments such as the controlled use of fire 800,000 years
ago, cooking 160,000 years ago, darts and stone arrow tips 70,000 years
ago, all favored skill over size and aggression, making ambushes and first
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 101

strikes possible. The improvements in cognitive skills complemented these

developments. Strong men were also restrained by the coalitions of the
weaker. Use of language which made more sophisticated alliances possi-
ble and reinforced morality was available hundred to three thousand years
ago (Scheidel 2017, 27–31).
We deduce the way of life of our hunter-gatherer ancestors mostly
from the studies of extant present-day ones. According to the renowned
anthropologist James Woodburn, with extant egalitarian societies, “equal-
ities of power, equalities of wealth and equalities of prestige or rank are
not merely sought but are, with certain limited exceptions, genuinely real-
ized?” (Woodburn 1982, 432) When there is inequality, some members
of the group have differential access to material resources and exert con-
trol over others (Classic definition by Fried 1960; cited in Wiessner et al.
2002).
Woodburn studied the Hadza who live in the savannah to the east
of Lake Eyasi in Tanzania’s Great Rift Valley. When James Woodburn
studied the Hadza there were about 400 of them, living roughly equally
divided up into four regions. Because of the continuous movement from
one campsite to another, the camp was considered as the main social unit
of the Hadza. Camps consisted of about eighteen persons but could be
with as few as one hunter or as large as a hundred members (Flannery
and Marcus 2012, 35). During part of the year the families lived in small
camps. When cordia and salvadora bushes were ripe the groups would
converge in the valleys where these plants were abundant. Camps became
even larger during the dry season as this would be the time for hunting
and everybody would want to be closer to the good hunters (Flannery
and Marcus 2012, 35).
Generosity and hospitality were respected and valued. Visitors were
welcome. Visitors would often make themselves more acceptable by
bringing with them some honey for their hosts. Honey and meat made
up only twenty percent of the diet. Yet, the egalitarian sharing of the
honey brought by visitors played a very important role in the strength-
ening of the social fabric (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 36). There were
no exclusive territories. Everybody could hunt, harvest, and draw water
everywhere. Big game was shared with all.
102 R. ERGENER

NOT “NOBLE SAVAGES”

Egalitarian hunter-gatherers were not “noble savages.” Like all

humans, egalitarian hunter-gatherers too were born with both self-
ish and sharing tendencies. It is their culture that cultivated and
reinforced the sharing tendencies while suppressing and controlling
the selfish ones. Yet the acculturation was never completely success-
ful. Anthropologist Richard Lee, who studied the !Kung, reports
how on one occasion t-Toma//gwe, an elderly member of the
group, “asked for a blanket and said, ‘All my life I’ve been giv-
ing, giving; today I am old and want something for myself.’ Similar
sentiments have been expressed by other oldsters. Perhaps because
they are old, their departures from the cultural norm were tolerated
more than would those of younger adults” (Lee 1979, 461).
It was not unusual for the elderly among the hunter-gatherers
to have certain privileges. Indeed, egalitarian hunter-gatherers were
not strictly undifferentiated (Flannery 2002, 1989). Most had “in-
ternal divisions based on age, sex, kinship, or ability in order to
apportion tasks and to promote complementarity within families or
groups” (Wiessner et al. 2002, 236). With the Australian aborig-
ines “the elders enjoy special privileges with regard to food, men
have similar privileges in opposition to women, or individuals are
obligated to make gifts of food to kin”… Based on these facts one
can make the argument that “some forms of exploitation may exist
among nomadic hunter-gatherers. These forms of exploitation will,
however, very limited” (Testart et al. 1982, 527).

Why Share?
High degree of sharing among the Hadza and other hunter-gatherers was
forced on them by the strong mutual dependencies which were necessi-
tated by the impossibility of producing surpluses in the harsh environment
of the savannah (Wiessner et al. 2002, 236). Food sharing and other
egalitarian practices are observed not only on the savannah but also in
other harsh environments, for example, with the Netsilik Eskimo, living in
the Arctic, on the tundra. Egalitarian hunter-gatherers who lived in lush
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 103

forests also had a sharing attitude, regarding the forest as their parents
(Bird-David 1990). Life of the egalitarian hunter-gatherers was not totally
free of problems. Quite a bit of violence was committed, mainly because,
in the absence of an authority to impose order, people were obliged to
self-protect their claims.
In this context, the sharing of the meat of the big game can be viewed
as “tolerated theft”—tolerated partly because there is no authority to stop
the scroungers and it would be difficult for the successful hunter to keep
the meat of his trophy away from the failures, as the failures are likely to
outnumber him (Blurton Jones 1987). It is also the case that there is not
much to be gained by saving meat, as it deteriorates fast. By tolerating
theft, the person who hunted the big game is paving the way for him to
be tolerated, when he himself scrounges or “steals” from others, when
others have a big hunt, and he does not.

Aggrandizers Biding Their Time

There would be those among the egalitarian band members who would
not be content with the social insurance egalitarianism provides and seek
self-insurance, which would be provided by the possession of hoarded
goods. After Hayden and Villeneuve, we shall call these “aggressive, accu-
mulative, acquisitive” (Triple A) types as aggrandizers—who are likely
to be present in every gene pool and were present with the egalitarian
hunter-gatherers as well (Hayden 2001, 255).
In order to attain self-insurance, aggrandizers needed to be able to
keep in storage some of their own produce and also control the produce
of some others. The absence of the infrastructure to hoard their riches,
namely the absence of goods that can be stored and the facilities of stor-
age, prevented those with aggrandizing tendencies from realizing their
goals.
Also, in egalitarian societies, “aggrandizing” tendencies were leveled
off by a process which has been labeled as “reverse dominance,” with
the weaker members of the group curbing the initiative of those who
attempted to have more.
Those who are greedy and who do not share are ridiculed and made
fun of by the members of the “alliance of reverse dominance.” More
serious violations such as adultery, incest, using others’ hunting grounds
could be punished by ostracism, which would be equivalent to death
as no other group would admit the ostracized individuals (Lips 1947;
104 R. ERGENER

cited in Fry 2006, 405). Respected individuals would be not the bul-
lies but the generous, modest, and diplomatic. “Alliance of reverse domi-
nance” would circumscribe bullying behavior and even murder the bullies
if they persisted (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 59). There is the story of
the Naskapi man who insisted on hunting in others’ grounds. The man
and his family who were outcast from their group and rejected by other
groups who were aware of their reputation ended up starving to death.
Of the two obstacles the aggrandizers faced, absence of the infrastruc-
ture was more important, the true bottleneck. When the constraints were
released and hoarding became a possibility, young or old, the aggran-
dizers would find a way to overcome the obstruction of the “alliance of
reverse dominance” and embark on the path to achieve their goals, going
beyond differentiation based on age, sex, kinship, or ability, to be better
off (“more equal”) than others.

PATHS TO INEQUALITY

The key developments that were needed to take place in order to

open the doors for the aggrandizers to achieve their goals were: (1)
creation of surpluses, (2) storage facilities becoming available, (3)
production of food items that last long under storage, and (4) the
recognition of the right to refrain from general exchange and to
engage in reciprocal exchange.

Creation of Surpluses
Surpluses are necessary for aggrandizers to reach their goals because sur-
pluses reduce the need for egalitarian sharing, thereby weakening the
resolve of the reverse dominance coalition. With surpluses available, those
who desired to have more could be tolerated to do so, without forcing
others to have less. Inequality emerged with groups which produced sur-
pluses and never with those who lacked surpluses—like for example, the
aborigines of Australia (Hayden 2001, 241).
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 105

Surpluses became available for various reasons such as more efficient

hunting or environmental changes. One activity which made a big differ-
ence is farming. Farming would contribute to the creation of inequality
by enabling the more industrious individuals to produce food surpluses
(Flannery and Marcus 2012, 67). (This does not mean that inequalities
would not have been possible without agriculture).
The narration in many histories of technology is that agriculture was
“invented.” Yet, as Kent Flannery, who is one of the pioneers of archae-
ological studies on the emergence of farming, observed, “we know of no
human group on earth so primitive that they are ignorant of the con-
nection between plants and the seeds from which they grow” (Flannery
1968 cited in; Bowles and Choi 2013, 8834). Therefore, no invention
was necessary.
What was necessary for agriculture to take off were the development
of storage facilities and the recognition of the choice not to participate
in generalized exchange (Bowles and Choi 2013, 8834). Otherwise, the
fate of farmers would be the same as the fate of the two Batek foragers
from Malaysia, whose fellow group members simply harvested and shared
with the entire group the rice which the two had planted. Similar cases
of claims on would-be first farmers were observed among the !Kung in
southern Africa and the Hiwi in Venezuela (Wiessner et al. 2002; cited
in Bowles and Choi 2013, 8831). “There is little incentive to intensify
production in … societies” with which “whatever is produced must be
shared” (Flannery 2002, 421).

Storage Facilities Becoming Available

Wealth cannot be truly possessed and passed on to heirs unless it is
stored. Members of egalitarian societies had no means to store anything
other than skills, experience, knowledge and simple tools and the good-
will of fellow group members. In order for aggrandizers to realize their
goals, storage facilities where the surpluses could be stored needed to be
available.
Three types of storage had evolved: (1) Storing in the self, by fattening
during the abundant season and losing weight during the lean season. (2)
Social storage, of obligations, which assures one access through debt rela-
tionships to resources other than their own. (3) Physical Storage, which
could be of three kinds (Soffer 2015, 722).
106 R. ERGENER

First, beginning during the upper or middle Paleolithic, rather than

using food simply to meet energy needs, humans started to convert food
surpluses into labor or other demanded items, such as objects of prestige.
Those commodities could be saved. This was a very revolutionary step
because there is no limit to how much that can be transformed into usable
forms employing this technique (Hayden 2001, 254).
Secondly, with the domestication of animals, it was possible to store
herds and fat in animal bodies (indirect intra-corporeal storage) (Hayden
2001, 254).
Finally, there was material storage of either portable goods or of goods
for long lasting storage in pits, storehouses, or other immovable facilities.

Production of Food Items that Last Long Under Storage

Sun dried, smoked or salted meat or fish were for portable storage.
Smoked, salted or frozen meat or fish, roots, tubers, nuts, and cereals
could be kept in permanent storage in immovable facilities (Soffer 2015,
723).
Production of portable goods by drying, smoking, or salting can
require more effort than the production of goods for storage in immov-
able facilities, such as the butchering of meat into segments to be thrown
into pits to be frozen. Portable goods, however, allow for the continua-
tion of residential mobility and the associated egalitarianism.
Storage in permanent facilities, on the other hand, ties those who store
to the locations where they store. This leads to a rise in the number of
people who continuously stay in touch and cooperate. Storing allows for
a lag time between production and consumption, and it is this basic fea-
ture of storing that enables manipulation, appropriation of surpluses, and
the formation of hierarchies (Soffer 2015, 723). Here is how long var-
ious products would last under storage: fish oil, two to three months;
roots/tubers, less than six months; frozen meat, three to nine months;
dried fish, up to a year; unshelled nuts, nine months to two years; and
cereals, three to five years (Labuza 1982 cited in; Soffer 2015, 723).
(The long lasting nature of cereals and the lapse between the time they
are produced and the time they are consumed allows the elite to tax and
appropriate surpluses. Hierarchical societies have grown where cereals are
produced and not where tubers are. If it is sufficiently productive, farmers
prefer tuber production to cereal production [Mayshar et al. 2016]).
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 107

Some of the earliest known remains of permanent storage facilities are

in the East European or the Russian Plain, in the Dnepr—Desna drainage
system, with storage of frozen meat in pits going back to 18,000 BC. Per-
manent storage of harvested wild cereals is observed during the Natufian
at Levant. At Natufian sites such as Ain Mallaha and Hayonim, storage
was probably possible in caves, plastered pits, and stone lined huts built
for the purpose or baskets (Soffer 2015, 728; Bar-Yosef 2001, 13; Hayden
1995, 152) Humans started to live in permanent home basis and cultivate
food rather than hunt and gather food during the Neolithic, starting at
about 10200 BCE. Prior to the Neolithic, before agriculture, the Natufian
culture in the Levant in the Middle East was sedentary or semi sedentary.
Early storage facilities were probably communal. As above develop-
ments made self-insurance possible, storage pits were removed from pub-
lic to private locations (Flannery 1972). Private storage enabled the family
to determine who to share with. Larger size of villages meant that not all
residents were kin that one would be willing to share with. The length-
iness of the agricultural cycle made it difficult to control cheaters. Pri-
vate storage contributed to the solution of these problems. With private
storage, families were free to determine how much to produce (Flannery
2002, 421).
These developments were taking place during Prepottery Neolithic B
(PPNB), at villages such as those located at the upper levels of Beidha and
Tell Mureybet, and Jarmo and Ali Kosh (Flannery 1972, 40–43). Because
they could protect their produce from the demands of their neighbors,
families who worked harder got ahead of their neighbors (Flannery 2002,
421).
A few thousand years later, at about 5500 BCE, unit family homes were
replaced by larger ones for 15–20 residents some of which had multiple
hearths, kitchens, and storage facilities. Large families could go beyond
simple food cultivation and undertake multiple tasks at the same time,
such as herding goats and pigs and raising flax (Flannery 2002, 424).

Reciprocal Rather Than Generalized Exchange

In order to be able to store surpluses, the aggrandizers needed the recog-
nition of the right not to share. This condition is often defined as the recog-
nition of private property, which is wrong. For, it is not as if the egalitarian
hunter-gatherers did not have property. Property probably always existed
with humans. Natural objects could always be turned into property by
108 R. ERGENER

means of possession (or occupation), improvement, and exchange (Silver

1989, 32).
Field studies by social psychologists give support to the proposal that
humans feel in debt and under the obligation to reciprocate when they
receive favors (Silver 1989, 58). Egalitarian hunter-gatherers, who prac-
ticed generalized exchange, gave almost all of their limited belongings
when requested, with the expectation to be reciprocated by others (not
necessarily by the recipients of their largesse) at an indefinite future.
The crucial change which allowed aggrandizers to take off, was the
recognition of the right not to participate in generalized exchange
which egalitarian hunter-gatherers practiced. Reciprocal exchange, with
the exchange partner deciding when to exchange and in return for what,
had become a possibility instead. Reciprocal exchange would open the
way to manipulation as one could always deceive the exchange partner to
agree to an exchange rate which was unfavorable to him.

Appropriating by Consent Rather Than Force

There are limits to what an individual or group can produce. In order
to hoard surpluses, it is necessary to appropriate some of the produce of
others.
One of the ways to appropriate the produce of others’ is through the
use of force. However, during the transformation from egalitarian social
systems to unequal ones, the use of force may not really have been an
option, as force can be used as a means to ensure the acceptance of social
conventions only if there is “an administrative structure capable of wield-
ing a certain amount of power.” Power has been defined as the mathe-
matical product of men X (times) resources X (times) organization (Bier-
stedt 1950; cited in Drennan and Flannery 1976, 346). With the emerg-
ing unequal societies, the technology of force was simply not sufficiently
advanced to render large numbers of men a truly effective coercive body
(army, police), even if they could be mobilized (Drennan and Flannery
1976, 346). Even if the use of force were an option, consent was probably
more useful than force in creating and sustaining stable relations of sur-
plus extraction. As M. Godelier says, classes were created probably more
by consent than by force (Godelier 2011, 12).
Those from whom surpluses are extracted are more likely to give their
consent if they are persuaded that they are being fairly compensated.
Unequal relations of exploitation are likely to be more stable and last
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 109

longer if they are disguised as an equal exchange of services (Godelier

2011, 160). The trick is to create in those who are being exploited the
illusion that they are receiving as much or even more in return for what
is taken from them (the exploited). Another trick was to persuade the
exploited that their misfortune is the will of a superior being whose wishes
cannot be denied: “Lies have always been one of the means employed by
the dominant to preserve their domination” (Godelier 2011, 154).

Debt
The magic tool that was employed to create unequal relations of exchange
out of egalitarian ones and to create bonds of dependence was debt
(Godelier 2011, 161). Resources were transferred to the aggrandizers
through debt payments, with the donors receiving as payback more than
what they loaned. If the other party could not pay, he would remain in
debt and the aggrandizer could foreclose at the appropriate time. For
instance, with the Nootka of the Northwest Canada, with whom there
were small houses and large ones, the small houses which ceased to be
economically viable between 800 and 1200, received support from larger
ones, in return for which they became subservient (Flannery and Marcus
2012, 79).
This is totally unlike the debt practice with egalitarian groups, with
which givers of gifts would take care not to shame their recipients and
make sure not to give more than what the exchange partner could recip-
rocate (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 66). With egalitarian groups, if the
recipient is unable to reciprocate nevertheless, he is not regarded as hav-
ing incurred debt. Help given to others would not be used to build posi-
tion and to exploit (Wiessner et al. 2002, 235).
The !Kung of the Kalahari Desert for example had a series of partners
within a gift-giving system known as hxaro. One would give gifts to a
partner with the expectation that it would be reciprocated within roughly
two years. Gifts were exchanged with partners living up to 50 miles away.
This allowed partners to visit each other during times of scarcity and stay
up to several months, sharing food and water (Flannery and Marcus 2012,
33). Such behavior should be considered more as social insurance than
altruism as it allows the hosting partner to accumulate social obligations
which entitles them to enjoy the visiting party’s hospitality if the situation
should be reversed in the future (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 34).
110 R. ERGENER

Divine Justification for Claims to Resources

One of the paths taken by aggrandizers to build up wealth was by claim-
ing the ownership of productive resources such as water sources, more
productive land, fishing locations, and hunting territories.
Egalitarian hunter-gatherers make claims to such resources based on
being the first to arrive at a resource (Hayden 2001, 258). For exam-
ple, the !Kung of the Kalahari had claims to a water hole around which a
camp would be formed, the justification being their having arrived there
first (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 32). One should note, however, that
claims based on having arrived first did not necessarily mean ownership
and were not recognized by all groups (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 55).
For example, no Netsilik Eskimo group could claim exclusive rights to
land, traps and weirs, regardless of whether they had arrived first (Flan-
nery and Marcus 2012, 22).
Claims to ownership of resources could also be based on the costs
incurred in order to intensify production through for example land clear-
ance, the construction of fishing weirs or platforms, hunting drive lines
or dams or irrigation ditches (Hayden 2001, 258).
The story of two peoples living in Assam, Northern India, illustrates
the evolution of ownership rights based on costs incurred.
Dafla Miri of Assam in Northern India did dry rice farming on hillsides.
They could farm, but not own land, as they believed that land could not
be owned—just like skies could not be owned.
Apa Tami who lived in the same region cultivated rice in paddies. In
order to do so, they had to convert unproductive swamps to productive
paddies. They had to dig check dams and canals and contour terraces for
the purpose. Land on which so much investment had been made could
not be shared with others and became private property (Flannery and
Marcus 2012, 251–59).
Aggrandizers’ claims for ownership of productive resources were made
on the basis of being the first to arrive. Belief in deceased ancestors and
celestial beings is observed with egalitarian hunter-gatherers and it was
these beings who were employed by aggrandizers to justify their claims of
ownership of productive resources.
Celestial beings were the creators who gave humans the divine laws
of social behavior. Deceased ancestors possessed super powers which they
could employ to intercede on behalf of their descendants (Flannery and
Marcus 2012, 549). For example, with the Nootka of Pacific Northwest,
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 111

Canada, claims of prior occupancy to inlets, associated plank houses, fish-

ing spots on the rivers and offshore waters, were reinforced with the
claims that such property had been inherited through supernatural con-
nections (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 75).

Feasts
Feasts, which were sharing events, would be converted by enterprising
aggrandizers into mechanisms for creating among those who attended
debt obligations toward the hosts (Hayden 2001, 258).

Divine Justification for Claims to Leadership

Remote ancestors and supernatural beings were employed not only to
justify claims to resources but also to justify leadership positions and the
material benefits which came with such positions.
Egalitarian societies usually consist of kin groups or lineages. With lin-
eages and kin groups, society is consensus based (Flannery and Marcus
2012, 36). Leadership is not coercive and amounts to no more than the
advice of a few respected seniors. Authority is divided, temporary in appli-
cation, lacking sanctions, and arising from personal leadership character-
istics (Netting 1972, 220). With the !Kung of the Kalahari for example,
the senior known as kxau was respected but had little authority. His main
job was to make sure that only members of his group could use waters
and the food of the camp (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 32).
The absence with egalitarian societies of coercive leadership and the
associated material benefits is rather strange in view of the fact that chim-
panzee groups, with whom humans share ninety-eight percent of their
genes, are strongly hierarchical. Alpha male chimpanzees dominate all,
betas dominate all but alpha and so it goes down to the level of omega.
The rank is changeable and determined through a series of continuous
interactions and alliance formation.
Flannery and Marcus propose that egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies
seemed to be lacking hierarchy because the hierarchy was hidden. No
living member of the group would be allowed to be more than a gamma.
Alphas were the supernatural beings who cannot be overthrown and who
are both the source of prosperity and cause of misfortune. The betas are
the invisible but powerful ancestors who bid with alphas and provided
112 R. ERGENER

protection for their living descendants (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 58–
59).
Ancestors made their presence felt as betas as they gave their support
to the aggrandizers (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 59) who also claimed
the possession of ritual knowledge and the ability to offer costly sacrifices
(Hayden 2001, 261). Aggrandizers would claim to be in touch with betas
through rituals and would eventually assume their role as betas. Ulti-
mately, as divine kings, the most ambitious aggrandizers would assume
the role even of the alpha, as with the Egyptian Pharaohs.

Circumscription
Aggrandizers had the opportunity to become coercive leaders with con-
nections to ancestors and supernatural beings, as lineages and kin groups
merged forming larger groups.
Members of lineages and kin groups typically move away from social
and economic problems when such problems emerge. Groups can lose
their ability to move away from problems because of the attraction of con-
centrated resources (e.g., because they want to stay close to rich hunting
grounds) or due to a rise in population in general (Aldenderfer 1993, 11).
When they cannot move away from problems, individuals feel trapped,
incapacitated, and afraid (Netting 1972, 220). There are disputes over
productive property and hindrances to the local and regional exchange
of goods. In response, lineages merge with other lineages forming larger
groups, which can better deal with issues such as defense or amassing
foodstuffs and or amassing valuables needed for rituals (Flannery and
Marcus 2012, 17).
Large groups made up of several lineages are known as clans. Anthro-
pologists borrowed the term clan from Scottish Highlanders (Flannery
and Marcus 2012, 16). Whereas egalitarian foragers can leave their group
when the pressure builds up, clan members are trapped within the clan.
Clan members stay within the group so long as the perceived net costs
of group membership are lower than the perceived benefits. This state of
being tied to membership in a group has been labeled as circumscription.
Clan members are circumscribed.
Circumscribed individuals will be more tolerant of social inequality
because what they perceive as benefits of staying in the group can out-
weigh the costs of inequality (Betzig 1986, 101; cited in Aldenderfer
1993, 11). Circumscription, therefore, contributes to the emergence of
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 113

inequality (Proposed by Price and Brown 1985, 8; cited in Aldenderfer

1993, 11).
Lineages forming clans can propose to be related, whether this is true
or not, claiming descent from father’s or mother’s line or from mythi-
cal ancestors. Aspiring clan leaders can resort to connections with ances-
tors and other supernatural beings in order to bring different lineages
together.
A potential leader who wants to unite diverse groups cannot afford to
be closely associated with any single one of them. Instead he will present
himself as a messenger from ancestors or from a powerful god. Groups
united under his leadership will be bonded with their allegiance to the
god, whose messenger the new leader is. Associated with the new god,
there will be a cosmology, symbols and rituals, all of which will contribute
to bond the believers to each other. The leader can put his claim to lead-
ership into practice by having visions and through divining, by importing
alien cults, by maintaining the sacredness of markets, and by providing
safe havens and the like (Netting 1972, 233).

Leadership Benefits in Return for Imaginary Services

A clan leader can use his position to create benefits for himself by claiming
the “general and ultimate responsibility in the minds of his subjects for
both their material and moral well-being” and then by demanding the
returns for the well-being he provided (Netting 1972, 239).
With the Kachin of Burma for example, hereditary rank could emerge
if one lineage convinced others that the village nat is their ancestor, as the
village territory is the domain of the nat. Since the nat ruled the lands,
his descendants would have the right to control the lands and would be
entitled to receive tribute because they (his human descendants) alone
could intercede with the nat on behalf of society (Flannery and Marcus
2012, 199).
The So, who are settled on the slopes of the Kadam and Moroto moun-
tains in Uganda make a precarious living off sorghum, livestock, and a lit-
tle hunting. Periodic droughts and various diseases attack their plants and
threaten their agriculture. Karamojong shepherds who live on the plain
regularly steal their cattle. The forest has been driven back by slash-and-
burn as a result of which there is no game. There are about five thousand
So divided into patrilineal clans.
114 R. ERGENER

Among the seniors, there exists a small minority of about fifty men,
each of whom represents his lineage and clan. As a group, these initi-
ated men (kenisan) dominate the rest of society. The kenisan can com-
municate with the ancestors (emet ) and obtain from them all the good
things of life, such as peace, health, good harvest, and so on. The ances-
tors themselves communicate with a remote god Belgen. The initiated
elders bury the more important of the dead with threats to society such as
severe droughts, epidemics, external enemies, or internal conflicts. Their
witchcraft powers scare their enemies. They make the rain come when
harvest is devastated by drought, insects, worms, or mildew. Their ser-
vices entitle them to the highest prestige, and authority and a number of
material benefits (Godelier 2011, 158).
An interesting case in this context is the Alur
With the Alur, “segmentary state” on the Uganda–Congo border,
studied at the end of 1940s and beginning of 1950s (Southall 1956),
the chief’s aura of supernatural effectiveness depended largely on his abil-
ity to make rain through the enactment of a complex of mysterious ritu-
als that are in the domain of the chiefly line. Political power can never be
assumed unless one has the powers to make rain (Southall 1956). In addi-
tion, the chief’s personal ancestor worship and service at ancient shrines
were believed to play an important role in the management of weather
and seasons. These powers invoked fear and reverence for the chief, who
supposedly had the power to stop fighting among his followers simply by
his presence (Netting 1972, 23).
The chief received regular tribute in return for providing rain and good
weather. He was entitled to allotments of meat. His followers provided
labor on his farm. When he dispensed justice he would collect fines and
court costs. The chief was also the node of a redistributive network. Salt,
ivory, dried fish, ironwork, and basketry from different ecological areas
were redistributed through the chief. The chief gave away some of the
girls he had received as fine payments to singles and to his favorites. He
gave feasts with the meat he was entitled to and with the grains cultivated
on his farm employing voluntary labor (Netting 1972, 239).
The priest-chief of the Kofyar people of the Jos Plateau in Nigeria was
another leader who claimed the power to provide for the health and well-
being of his people, through certain ritual sanctions and spiritual connec-
tions, which he claimed he possessed in his aspect of miskagam (Netting
1972, 221).
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 115

The Kofyar chief had neither much power nor authority. During the
course of his tenure, he would need to make use of his ritual skills only
on a limited number of occasions (Netting 1972, 223). His intervention
would be necessary in case of draughts, sterility of domestic animals and
of women, failure of the hunt, unrest or violence within the community
and conflict with other villages (Netting 1972, 222).
Yet in most religious assemblies, the chief did very little. The Kofyar
religious meeting resembled a Quaker meeting, with no marked leader-
ship or assignment of duties among the participants.
A Kofyar chief was not particularly wealthy, but he had more wives,
sons, cattle, horses, and goats than the average villager (Netting 1972,
225). In some villages he would be entitled to an annual tribute of grain,
or salt, or an iron hoe.
The ethnographic record provides numerous examples of this same
strategy by which emerging elites use the control of ritual activities and
the appropriation of sacred powers as a basis for economic and political
centralization (Netting 1972, 233).
To give an ethnographic example, the sheikh of the el Shabana tribe in
modern southern Iraq reinforced his economic pre-eminence and political
legitimacy through his control over the tribal mudhij (a combination of
guest-house, community center, and administrative/judicial center). The
sheikh controlled a large amount of land whose produce was theoreti-
cally allocated to the maintenance of the mudhij. In practice the sheikh
contributed only a portion of the produce from this land to the commu-
nal mudhij, while keeping the remainder for his use (Fernea 1970, 91).
The sheikh was able to mobilize tribal labor to construct and maintain
the mudhij, along with food surplus animals and grain for periodic tribal
feasts. In short, the sheikh of the el Shabana manipulated his sponsorship
of the community mudhij to his own gain (Stein 1994, 43).
An interesting case of the use of religion to justify material benefits for
those in leadership positions is with the Enga of Papua New Guinea. A
general rise in prosperity took place with the Enga of Papua, New Guinea,
with the introduction of sweet potato.1 The chiefs benefited more than
others from this development. The chiefs justified the disproportionate

1 Sweet potato, which was domesticated in Central America, may have come to Papua
New Guinea from the Philippines where it was introduced by the Spaniards or it was
moved from island to island by indigenous people.
116 R. ERGENER

rise in their wealth with a reference not to their own magical powers but
to the powers of a cultic deity.
In the West of the Enga region, big men employed cults to justify their
newly earned wealth (Wiessner and Tumu 1999, 179–213). The Kepele
cult, which was originally a boy’s initiation ceremony in which the initiates
were revealed the secrets of the spiritual world, was totally transformed to
suit the needs of big men (Aldenderfer 2010, 85).
The main religious idea that was added to the cult was the associa-
tion of agricultural fertility with a mythical wandering fertility woman,
who had supposedly introduced the sweet potato to the Enga (Wiessner
and Tumu 1999, 198). Sacred stones were created and accepted as the
actual depictions of the wandering women. Eventually, a male figure was
introduced to the cult. Male and female symbols mated “within specially
erected cult houses, which over time became larger, more elaborate, and
more central to the community... Activities within the cult houses, espe-
cially the mating of the male figure and the sacred stones, were closed and
private. The cult house, where the mating took place, was often burned
after the completion of the ceremony, while the other structures were
abandoned and left to rot” (Aldenderfer 2010, 86). The transformations
of the Kepele cult had mystified the newly acquired wealth of the big men
and presented it as the creation of a goddess.
Another producer of imaginary products, shamans have been known as
the first politicians. The words for “shaman” and “leader” are very similar
in Inuit language—angakok and angajkok. The first political leaders of
the Buryat of Asia were shamans. Even when the shaman does not have
explicit political powers, he can wield influence on critical issues which
were of concern to the society (Wright 2009, 42).
In exchange for treatment services which they also provided, shamans
could charge on a per service basis. For payment, a shaman could charge
yams in Micronesia, sleds and harnesses with Eastern Eskimo, beads and
coconuts with Mentawai of Sumatra, tobacco with Ojibwa, buckskin with
the Washo from Central Nevada, slaves with the Haida and the patient’s
wife or daughter with the Eskimo. With the Nootka, the shaman would be
offered blankets, furs, and canoes. If the offer was not sufficient, the sprit
the shaman was addressing would reduce his power. The shaman would
be allowed by the sprit to perform his singing and other rituals, only after
the sprit had been satisfied with the gifts offered. A Gitskan shaman in
western Canada would return the gifts if the patient died. Ojibwa shamans
did not charge for their services but they could practice polygyny. Among
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 117

the Eskimo an erring woman could be atoned by having intercourse with

the shaman (Wright 2009, 35–36).
The shaman can persuade his followers that the “mystical means of
production” are controlled by him and that he therefore deserves a share
of the hunt. This is considered as exchange, since it is the shaman who
transforms the animal nature of meat, which is dangerous, into a nutri-
tious nature, like a vegetable (Granero 1986, 664).
“Cult” and “cultivate” are from the same etymological root. In the
Old Testament, the word ‘bd means both the “cultivation” of the soil
(Genesis 2:25) and the performance of the cult (Exodus 3:12, Numbers
18:7, Deuteronomy 4:19) (Wyatt 1988, 119). With many societies, the
priest or the imam who preys for rain is entitled to a portion of the crop.
The Brahman priest has a recognized claim to a share of the harvest
(Neale 1985, 955). The Pawnees of the Great Plains would pay their
dues to the priests to whom they believed they owed the regulation of
the seasons (White c1983, 176).

Leadership Benefits in Return for Real Services

The chiefs’, priests’, and other imposters’ claims that it was they them-
selves or the supernatural beings who they are in touch with, who were
responsible for the well-being of the people, were obviously false. Never-
theless, the idea has persisted in many civilizations up to our times: Pro-
vision of first fruits (aparchai) and tithes (dekatai) to the temples was an
essential part of ancient Greek religion (Jim 2014). The Pharaoh of Egypt
reciprocated for the continuous flow of offerings by making the sun rise
and the Nile flood. Prosperity gospel believers have no doubt that the
gifts they offer to their ministers will be returned to them in multiples.
Genze riyaku or the pursuit of this—worldly benefits in return for mate-
rial gifts is still the most popular religious practice in Japan (Reader et al.
1993).
Yet, even though they are susceptible to manipulation, people are
not just manipulated tools. Ideologies can be used to legitimize private
interests and material domination but they are unlikely to attain a hold
over people if they are merely this (Mann 2012, 23). People have their
doubts and ask questions, particularly at times of long-lasting hardships.
It became obvious that religion had to come to terms with negative atti-
tude of gods toward humans. Under such conditions it would feel useless
118 R. ERGENER

to insist on placating gods with gifts in order to gain their favors, par-
ticularly if one considered gods owned everything anyway (Smith 1927,
393).
Therefore, in order for his position to be tenable, a prudent priest,
a shaman, a chief would diversify and provide some “real” services, to
supplement the “fake services” they supposedly provided.
The shaman made a real contribution, as the ecstatic states he induced
in himself and others strengthened social bonds (Hayden 1987, 86).
One of the real services a priest chief could supply to his people was
order in the market. This was the case with the leaders of Tiv, another
Nigerian people who lived not too far from the Kofyar and who also
lacked centralization. Tiv society was egalitarian and lacked anything
resembling an office. Individuals had no recourse to wealth by exploit-
ing the labor of others. Yet, there were mechanisms by which men did
indeed attain influence and prestige (Bohannan 1955, 1958; Bohannan
1953; cited in Netting 1972, 228).
In building up prestige, a man had to seek affluence at home and
ultimately influence the economic activities of others by his control of
a market (Bohannan and Bohannan 2017, 35–36; Bohannan 1958; cited
in Netting 1972, 229). A man in control of an important market was
in a very strong position. He was an arbitrator, he settled disputes and
received gifts in return, which made him wealthy (Bohannan 1958, 63;
cited in Netting 1972, 229).

“Water Temples” of Bali

An interesting case of the religious establishment providing real services
is in Bali, where a network of “water temples” under the “Master Tem-
ple” Ulun Danu Batur, organized the whole ecosystem for rice cultiva-
tion, including the creation of new channels, tunnels, pest control the
establishment of weirs and the resolution of water rights (Lansing 1987,
326). “Water temples” constituted an institutional system separate from
the state. Earlier attempts to identify a discrete system of irrigation man-
agement had misconceived the problem. For most crops, irrigation simply
provides water for the plant’s roots. But in a Balinese rice terrace, water
was used to construct a complex, pulsed artificial ecosystem. Water tem-
ples manipulated the states of the system, at ascending levels in regional
hierarchies. The permanence of water temple networks contrasts sharply
with the instability of the traditional Balinese states (Lansing 1987, 326).
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 119

Mesopotamia: Organizing Irrigation and Labor

Temples played a key role in controlling the irrigation system at an entirely
different time period and region where irrigation provided the basis for
chiefly power, namely Ubaid (Stein 1994). (“Ubaid” refers to both a time
period and a material culture assemblage which originated in southern
Mesopotamia and lasted for more than 1500 years, from the mid-sixth
millennium to the early fourth millennium B.C.)
Good farm land with access to water was scarce in Mesopotamia. The
ownership of such land would determine who the elites were. Elites
needed to control not only land and water but also labor as land was
useless unless the labor necessary to maintain canals and for sowing and
harvesting was mobilized. The ability to mobilize labor, more so than the
ownership of land, put limits on the number of elites.
Emergent elites can draw labor from their immediate kin group or
from the social group they belong to (Stein 1994, 41). Immediate kin
are the most reliable labor pool. Various studies have shown a persistent
correlation between family size and household wealth (Bates 1973, 96–
97; Irons 1975, 161–63; Kramer 1982, 70). Such a correlation probably
existed during Ubaid times as well. Rare and unusual goods which may
indicate wealth, such as mace heads, tokens, ‘proto-tablets’, and high-
quality polished stone vessels, are found mostly in the largest excavated
houses at Tell Abada (Stein 1994, 41). Ubaid chiefly elites probably grew
out of large, geographically well-located families who consistently mobi-
lized large farm labor through their kinship ties (Stein 1994, 41).
Temples were the other and probably the more important source
of surplus labor. Chiefs could enhance or extend their access to labor
resources beyond the limits of kinship through the manipulation of com-
munity organizations such as temples (Stein 1994, 42).
A cohesive, bonded community with formal institutions and ideolo-
gies that cut across kinship ties allows for the mobilization of labor
beyond constraints of kinship. Ubaid must have been such a society. The
widespread presence of temples in Ubaid communities shows the pres-
ence of a commonly accepted religious ideology. This environment made
it possible for “Ubaid chiefs” to manage surplus food and labor on a
larger scale while at the same time providing justification for their politi-
cal power (Stein 1994, 42).
In the case of Ubaid, the labor supply was provided by the populations
displaced by the dramatic decline in climate conditions during the second
120 R. ERGENER

half of the sixth millennium. The administrative personnel to direct the

labor was already present at the temples (Hole 1994, 139).
A similar situation existed in south India, where Hindu temples “pro-
vided the institutional context for the social mobilization of both low
ranked caste groups…and incipient political elites” (Appadurai and Breck-
enridge 1976, 189).

Mesopotamia: Storage in Temples

Temples in southern Mesopotamia stored surpluses and the disbursed
them when necessary to the supporting population. By doing so, the tem-
ples provided a powerful buffer against the risk of subsistence failure, a
very vital service.
A relatively recent practice of wheat storage from northern Libya
sheds light on what was happening with food storage in the temples of
Mesopotamia (Hallaq 1994).

ASHWAZ OF NORTHERN LIBYA

Inhabitants of Akhdar Mountains in present-day northern Libya

(Jabal al-Akhdar, ancient Cyrenaica), stored cereals in communal
store houses known as awshaz (single washz), literally meaning
“places which are difficult to reach.”
When stored in a single mass, grain is more resistant to damp
which cannot reach the center of a large quantity. Digging individual
storage is more difficult than the digging of a single, large one.
Individual storage areas take more space than the communal.
There may also be reasons of belief. Inhabitants of Akhdar Moun-
tains believed that baraka (fertility) descends into communal food
and not descend into divided things. Even today the local people of
the region eat their meals from a large communal dish.
Records of the cereals kept in awshaz were transcribed on stone
or broken pottery registers known as khattatat (Single khattata).
The storekeeper, a person worthy of trust, received a quantity of
grain as payment.
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 121

The storekeeper “supervised the grain store, protected and

defended it and kept those who had deposited the grain informed
of any eventualities.” He had to watch for traces of damp, for ants
and other insects. He also had to protect the khattatat from coun-
terfeiting or alteration.
The storekeeper had the right to prepare some khattatat for his
own use where he recorded the withdrawals by each person. Those
who withdrew their grain from storage would take their own khat-
tatat with them. The khattatat found in the storehouses are prob-
ably those belonging to the storekeepers.

Beginning during the Neolithic or even earlier, there are cases of food
being stored in sacred areas with the members of the religious estab-
lishment functioning as the trusted storekeepers. In Egypt, more than
7000 years ago, a wind-deflated desert basin Nabta Playa served as a rit-
ual center and also had storage pits for wild sorghum, grass seeds, tubers,
legumes, and fruits (Flannery and Marcus 2012, 396).
In Mesopotamia, as early as the Neolithic, the sacral organization had
assumed control of food storage facilities (granaries) built at a distance
from the settlements. By the second half of the fourth millennium, these
facilities had been incorporated within temple complexes. Religious rituals
such as the annual cleaning of storerooms provided both symbolic and
actual protection for stored goods (Makkay 1983).
Granaries associated with temples were elevated which provided pro-
tection from flooding, which could be catastrophic for the stored grains.
But, flooding was otherwise useful for the growth of the plants that could
be used for early summer forage (Hole 1994, 138).
The temple establishment did not own the food and other items stored
in temple complexes but they managed it, setting some aside for trade
and some for the temple. It is not clear whether at the beginning, the
sacral organization kept for the temple only the amount necessary to meet
the needs of the temple staff and the costs of temple maintenance or
more. It is very likely that a considerable part of the surplus was used to
finance the temple management which explains the presence of large tem-
ple economies during the second half of the Ubaid period. The remains
122 R. ERGENER

of Khirbet el-Kerak suggest that with the Ubaid period, some of the sur-
pluses kept in storage was already being used for non-religious purposes
(Makkay 1983).
The surplus appropriated by the temple in return for providing ade-
quate storage facilities, and other services was augmented by the surplus
presented in the form of offerings.

Offerings to Temples
Offerings to supernatural beings are an ancient practice ubiquitous among
many different peoples at different times. Exchange with gods can take
the form of unilateral sacrifice on behalf of humans with no expectations
of reciprocation. Such was the case of gift exchange labeled as potlatch
which was practiced by the clans of Northwest America. The competitive
exchange between clans would put the burden of reciprocation on the
other party.
Both with the Kwakiutl and the Papuan potlaches, the gifts are not
given with the aim of trying to draw a counter-gift from the gods, in
the form of good weather for crops, or some such similar benefit that
only gods (supernatural beings) can provide by “controlling the uncon-
trollable.”
There were also other forms of sacrifice, with which one dedicates
wealth to the supernatural on the basis of a give and take relationship.
Even if the supernatural is a fiction, it can still be considered an active
agent by those who do believe in it. The supernatural is supposed to
be appeased, or to favor those who are constant to their “obligations”
and those who “invest” on it. In other words sacrifice can be seen as an
“uncertainty buffering mechanism” (Kyriakidis 2001, 129).

KWAKIUTL AND THE PAPUAN POTLACHES

With the Kwakiutl, the hosts would go as far as bankrupting them-

selves by destroying and burning property in order to display their
unselfishness, power and wealth (Mauss 1967, 12). As Mauss notes,
property destroyed in potlatches can be considered as gifts to god.
A man who puts his slaves to death, burns his precious oil, throws
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 123

coppers into the sea and sets his house on fire is not only displaying
his indifference to loss but also sacrificing to the gods and spirits
(Mauss 1967, 14).
Motu clans of Papua New Guinea had a different sort of potlach.
Rival clans would present each other progressively larger amounts
of bananas, the giving party enjoying temporary superiority, until its
gift was reciprocated. Ultimately, the competition would end with
both parties mutually presenting each other equal but large quanti-
ties of bananas (Gregory 1980, 629). At the conclusion, leaders of
both clans would say to each other “We are equals now” (Gregory
1980, 630). This was a “gifts-to-men system” different from the
“gifts-to-god system” of the classic potlatch type, which the Kwak-
iutl potlach was.
A locally trained pastor who was appointed as head of the Pore-
porena church, near Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, converted
the traditional “gifts-to-men” system of the Motu clans to “gifts-
to-god system” with the difference that the gifts took the form
of money and were appropriated by the church instead of being
destroyed (Gregory 1980, 630).
Faced with the problem of raising money for his church the pas-
tor had designed a flag called Boubou Kwalim Toana (collection-
winner-sign) and arranged for the deacons, who were clan leaders,
to compete for it in an annual gift-giving competition. The clan
(iduhu) that raised the most money was given the flag to fly. In
I950, the church raised 38% of its money by this method. In I979,
the ratio had risen to 95% (Gregory 1980, 630).

Amassing Wealth in Temples

Tribute given in return for what was perceived as gifts from gods was one
of the main sources of revenue of the temples of ancient Mesopotamia.
The temple was the receiver of many gifts from the devout followers of
the deity, whose house the temple was. Dues of wheat, sesame, oil, fruits,
wool, animals, etc. were received in large quantities (Price 1916).
The offerings augmented the large reserves which the temple had
already received in exchange for storage and various other services. These
124 R. ERGENER

reserves were partly used for the benefit of the community (e.g., in peri-
ods of famine), but a large portion was undoubtedly mobilized, mainly
through trade, adding to the riches of the temples (Makkay 1983, 5).

Spread of Inequality
Inequality has spread very rapidly during the course of last 10,000 years,
replacing the hundreds of thousand years old egalitarian way of living.
James Woodburn, one of the leading experts on the hunter-gatherer
way of life, had enjoyed the egalitarian life style of the Hadza he studied
so much that, at the end of the first few years he spent studying the
Hadza, his friends and colleagues had great difficulty persuading him to
come back to Cambridge to complete his thesis.
Other authors do not think as highly of the egalitarian hunter-gatherer
way of life. For instance, Carles Boix points out that “in equal, stateless
communities, life will be short, poor, and given the social mechanisms in
place to exact compliance from every individual, oppressive” (Boix 2015,
8). With strictly egalitarian societies, life is likely to be stagnant as inno-
vation is tolerated only if all can copy it or if the benefits can be divided.
“Many theories about the spread of stratified society begin with the
idea that inequality is somehow a beneficial cultural trait that imparts effi-
ciencies, motivates innovation and increases the likelihood of survival”
(Rogers 2012). For example, the distinguished archaeologist Marcella
Frangipane says: “The seed of inequality is terribly destabilizing and vic-
torious, because it produces more dynamic societies, able to absorb con-
tradictions and ready for change” (Frangipane 2007, 172).
On the other hand, based on demographic simulations conducted at
Stanford, Deborah Rogers makes the interesting point, that, in stable
environments, rather than imparting advantages to the group, unequal
access to resources is inherently destabilizing and greatly raises the chance
of group extinction. Yet, the groups which were put at a disadvantage
by the destabilizing effects of inequality, rather than becoming extinct,
spread, as they chose to migrate in search of resources (Rogers 2012).
Inequality is with us to stay, partly through the contribution of reli-
gion. In the next chapter, we shall see how religion contributes to the per-
petuation of inequalities by defining and reinforcing hierarchies of domi-
nance.
 6 RELIGION AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 125

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 CHAPTER 7

Religion and Hierarchies of Dominance

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER ON THE OPPRESSION OF

WOMEN:

The male interpretations of religious texts and the way they interact with,
and reinforce, traditional practices justify some of the most pervasive, per-
sistent, flagrant and damaging examples of human rights abuses. (Carter
2009)

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States 1977–1981, has been a

sincere and active Christian throughout his life. He has been a deacon and
Bible teacher for many years. In his words, his faith has been “a source
of strength and comfort to” him “as religious beliefs are to hundreds of
millions of people around the world” (Carter 2009).
Yet, late in his life, the President took the painful and difficult step
of severing his ties with the Southern Baptist Convention, which he had
been a member of for six decades. Jimmy Carter thought that the deci-
sion to part with his Church had become unavoidable, when the lead-
ers of the Southern Baptist Convention, “ordained that women must be
‘subservient’ to their husbands and prohibited” them “from serving as
deacons, pastors or chaplains in the military service.” The leaders of the

© The Author(s) 2020 131

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_7
132 R. ERGENER

convention had based their decision on a few Bible verses according to

which Eve is created after Adam and is accountable for the original sin.
According to Carter, these verses were carefully selected and were in con-
flict with the Holy Scriptures which he believed confirmed “that we are
all equal in the eyes of God” (Carter 2009). Later in his life, Carter would
declare that from that point on, fighting against injustice against girls and
women would be his “his highest priority” (Carter 2015).

Oppression and Discrimination

“Injustice against girls and women” is one of the many different types
of oppression and discrimination which humans are often subject to in
various degrees in their everyday lives (Sidanius et al. 2004, 847).
Oppression and discrimination tend to be group-based (Sidanius et al.
2004, 847). Members of dominant groups strive to make themselves bet-
ter off at the expense of groups, which are rendered as subordinate, by
securing access to resources and privileges for members of their (domi-
nant) group and denying it to others (subordinates) (Pratto et al. 2006,
279).
Members of the dominant groups get to enjoy more of the good
food, housing, schooling, health care and political power and other ben-
efits than what could be justified by their share of the population (Pratto
et al. 2006, 272). Conversely, negative social value is disproportionately
imposed on the subordinates in the form of poor quality housing, poor
or no health care, unemployment, dangerous and difficult to enjoy jobs,
excessive punishment, branding, and denigration (Brown 1991; Lenski
1984; for example, Tilly c1998 cited in Pratto et al. 2006, 272).
There are three group-based dominance systems which are qualitatively
distinct from each other. One is based on gender, the other on age and
the third includes all those which are based on arbitrary features.
Within the gender system, men control disproportionately more social,
political, and military power as compared with women.
Within the age system, elders possess unequal social power over young-
sters. This type of dominance relation is cyclical as one experiences being
both a subordinate youngster and a dominant elder during the course of
the life cycle.
Arbitrary-set groups are based on social distinctions such as nationality,
race, ethnicity, class, estate, descent, clan, or religion (Pratto et al. 2006,
274).
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 133

Gender- and age-based dominance seem to be deep rooted and very

widespread, if not universal. Even with Hadzas, who are egalitarian
in every other way, males are dominant over women and elders over
youngers (Marlowe 2010).
Gender-based social dominance may be integral to understanding
social hierarchy because it is at the core of both social and material well-
being and of social reproduction. Meeting such basic needs is in the family
domain. In meeting these needs, women in almost all societies do more
work than man, cooking, cleaning the house and taking care of children
(Pratto and Walker 2004). Women belonging to subordinate groups can
be employed by the dominants to do housework, but not the other way
around (Pratto et al. 2006, 295).
The boundaries of arbitrary-set groups and what their distinctive fea-
tures are, harder to define. Impact of arbitrary-set hierarchies can go
beyond their own spheres and influence the relations between the domi-
nant and the subjugated in gender- and age-based hierarchies. For exam-
ple, as Carter points out, there are variations in gender-based systems of
dominance under different religions.
Psychological, socio-structural, ideological, institutional, and other
forces jointly contribute to the creation and continuation of oppression.
Coercion and violence are often used. The level of violence employed
varies across different societies and over time (Pratto et al. 2006, 274).
In general, the degree of violence observed with arbitrary-set systems is
much more severe than the violence observed with the age or gender
systems (Pratto et al. 2006, 274). For, arbitrary-set systems are often
about the subjugation of coalitions of men by coalitions of other men,
and this tends to be tougher and require more effort than the subjuga-
tion of women or children by men.

Myths: Attenuating and Enhancing Oppression

Myths and institutions are employed to define arbitrary-set systems of
dominance and to modify the relations between the dominant and dom-
inated in both gender-based and arbitrary-based systems.
Defined as “consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes, and
cultural ideologies,” myths can be employed either to legitimize or to
attenuate dominance hierarchies and the related oppression and inequality
(Pratto et al. 2006, 275).
134 R. ERGENER

Justification for group-based oppression and inequality is provided

by hierarchy-enhancing myths (Pratto et al. 2006, 275). Hierarchy-
attenuating myths on the other hand counter dominance.
Socialist, social democrat and communist political teachings and reli-
gious ones based on the new testament, which are egalitarian and doc-
trines such as universal human rights, children’s rights and feminism,
which are humanist, are all examples of hierarchy-attenuating myths
(Pratto et al. 2006, 276).

Institutions: Attenuating
and Enhancing Oppression
Institutions, such as governments and corporations, rather than individ-
uals are the major forces which create, maintain, and recreate systems of
group-based dominance. Institutions are capable of allocating resources
on larger scale, more systematically, and in a more stable manner than
individuals generally can. Large institutions have a larger “reach” in terms
of systematic influence over larger areas. Also, as institutions are perpet-
ual, the discrimination they practice can be perpetuated over generations.
When challenged, discrimination by an institution is often defended as
defending the institution itself. Internal standards coordinate those who
work for institutions and homogenize the personal dissimilarities among
them. Finally, individuals working for many institutions, including the
military and corporations, are likely not to be held accountable for their
actions, as the institution they are working for is likely to be covered by
legal immunity (Pratto et al. 2006, 277).
Internal security organizations such as Gestapo, KGB, SAVAK, FBI,
and criminal justice systems are examples of influential hierarchy-
enhancing institutions. Criminal justice systems contribute to enforce
group dominance and control. Worldwide, as compared with dominants,
members of subjugated groups are over-represented in prison and torture
cells and in execution chambers. This is after taking into consideration the
different criminality rates between groups.1 For example, in the United
States, the incarceration rate for African Americans is six times more than
what it is for whites (See Ch. 8 in Sidanius 1999).

1 See Sidanius and Pratto (1999, Ch. 8).

 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 135

There are hierarchy-attenuating institutions as well. Hierarchy-

attenuating institutions, whether civic or religious, strive to improve civil
rights, civil liberties, and welfare. These institutions provide relief and aid
for members of discriminated against ethnic, racial, and religious minori-
ties, which make up the subjugated groups, opening up for them access
to resources, particularly public services.
As compared with hierarchy-enhancing institutions, hierarchy-
attenuating ones are considerably weaker as they are likely to be missing
a supporting legal framework and sizeable and permanent funds. Unlike
the criminal justice and employment sectors, which can allocate negative
social value such as prison terms and dangerous work to subordinates,
hierarchy-attenuating institutions can seldom allocate negative social
value of any sort to the dominants (Pratto et al. 2006, 277). Overall,
one can say that it is easier to perform actions that maintain or enhance,
rather than attenuate inequality and hierarchy.
Members of more powerful groups tend to behave in their own interest
more so than the members of subordinate groups (Sidanius et al. 2004,
848). Subordinates on the other hand are likely to engage in behavior
which is against their own personal interest and against the interest of the
group they belong to (Pratto et al. 2006, 279). This process is known
as self-debilitation. Frequent criminal behavior, violence aimed at one’s
own group, drug use, truancy, and school attrition are examples of self-
debilitating behavior (Ch. 8 in Sidanius 1999).
Subordinate groups are looked down upon and disdained by dominant
ones yet their existence is necessary for the dominant to dominate—“no
subordinates” would mean that there are “no dominants.”

Religion and Oppression

Jimmy Carter is a member of the very small but influential “Elders”
group, made up of independent world leaders, who were brought
together in 2007 by Nelson Mandela. Elders are committed to work for
peace and human rights and are therefore a hierarchy-attenuating institu-
tion. Elders regard all religions as sources of hierarchy-attenuating myths
and ask “leaders of all religions to have the courage to acknowledge and
emphasize the positive messages of dignity and equality that” world’s
major faiths all share (Carter 2009).
136 R. ERGENER

The role historically played by religion with regard to relations of dom-

inance has been a lot more complicated than simply providing “positive
messages of dignity and equality,” as the Elders claimed.
Major faiths have provided some of the more powerful myths and
institutions that define arbitrary-set groups. Furthermore, religion has
provided the institutional framework and the myths which contribute to
enhance or to attenuate dominance. Religious institutions and texts have
served different purposes at different times and places. A religion that
starts out as a hierarchy-attenuating institution can be transformed into a
hierarchy-enhancing one over time.
This being said, historically, religion has been mostly used to define and
enhance dominance hierarchies. Religious legitimation makes unequal dis-
tribution of income look like a part of the cosmic order of things. Also,
religious legitimation diverts attention away from the material to the spir-
itual or moral domain and devalues this-worldly existence in favor of the
spiritual realm. This renders the hardships and suffering of the subordi-
nates as unworthy of serious attention.
Pharaohs of ancient Egypt claimed to be gods. Many other rulers
claimed to be representatives of gods, in possession of the divine right
to rule. The special relationships they had with gods would justify the
inordinate share of everything these rulers enjoyed.
In classical Greece and Rome (as in many other civilizations), the trea-
sures stored in temples were regarded as a manifestation of the achieve-
ments of the city. Monuments and temples dedicated to gods confirmed
the social order. Religious processions attended by the people processing
according to their social rank, served the same purpose (Fox 1986, 80).
Gifts to gods strengthened social order. As the senior partners in the
distribution of wealth, Gods were the first to receive their share in any
kind of distribution. Confirming the share of gods confirmed the share of
others, large and small, as well (Burkert 1987, 47).
Gifts honored the deities while at the same time allowing the donor
to demonstrate his wealth and power. By giving lavish gifts to gods, high
status individuals sought to prove the special relations they claimed they
had with gods as well as their own prominence and superiority (Burkert
1987, 49).
Physical force is often necessary to establish and solidify social hierarchy
but not sufficient to maintain it in the long run, as use of force generates
strong resentment and raises the threat of an uprising. Use of force is also
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 137

costly—costlier than the employment of an ideological system that per-

suades both the elites and the subordinates that the system of oppression
is morally and intellectually legitimate.
With the rise of capitalism and secularism, teaching of economics has
been employed to legitimize inequality. It is the supposedly objective
forces of supply and demand, which determine who are going to be rich
and who poor. Previously, it was religion which performed this task—
which it still does today, together with the teachings of economics.
Inequality becomes more acceptable to the subordinates, if it is the sta-
tus quo. Justifications make the subordinates accept their positions more
comfortably (Haines and Jost 2000). And one of the strongest justifica-
tions for the visible superiority of the dominants with regard to outlook,
housing, living—standards and level of sophistication has been, that this
is the will of God—and not subject to change. As such, social institutions
assume the stability and the inevitability which are characteristic of the
ultimate spiritual and material truths. As Berger puts it, “Theodicies pro-
vide the poor with a meaning for their poverty, but may also provide the
rich with a meaning for their wealth” (Berger 2011, 59).
Religion is also a source of comfort for the poor. The hardships the
believers are experiencing today will be made up by the greater power,
later in their lives, and if not, in the other life. Believers also receive con-
siderable support from religious organizations. For all these reasons, reli-
giosity spreads among the poor with the rise of inequality.
At the same time, as inequality rises, religion becomes more attractive
not only to the poor but also to the rich. Social discontent and demands
for redistribution spread with the rise of inequality. Under the circum-
stances, religion is a powerful tool to justify the existing social structure.
According to a study conducted in the United States, the more reli-
gious are more likely to passively accept their place in society (Jacobson
1999). A study conducted simultaneously in Orthodox, Catholic, Protes-
tant, and Jewish societies found that religiosity is correlated positively with
values such as status quo and conformity and negatively with values like
independent thinking and openness to change (Schwartz and Huismans
1995). As pointed out by Stark, “religion not only bids the deprived to
accept their lot but maintains that it is the just outcome of rules that
are the best possible, indeed, in some instances divinely inspired” (Stark
1964, 702). It would therefore be in the interests of the wealthy to be
more religious themselves and to spread it using their economic power.
Wealthy individuals respond to the rise of inequality by becoming more
138 R. ERGENER

religious and by spreading religiosity among the poorer members of soci-

ety, rather than by allowing income redistribution to take place (Solt et al.
2011).

Religion and Subordination of Women

First institutionalized form of hierarchy was slavery and first slaves were
women and children—as women and children are easier to subdue than
men. Initially, it was all men dominating all women and later it became
some men dominating other men and all women. Rather than use of
physical force, rape was sufficient to break in female slaves, who were
expected to be attached to their captors once they were pregnant. What
led to do demise of women was probably the long period of nourishment
it takes to bring up the human infant. Women probably preferred to have
less mobile lives, leaving mostly to men, tasks like the hunt and violent
expeditions against other tribes, which enabled men to learn how to use
violence to subdue others—a skill which they applied to capture and rule
female slaves (Lerner 1987).
The subordinate role of women continued through ages. Various reli-
gions have played an important role in the definition of gender-based
inequalities. There are marked differences between religions and their
subgroups with regard to the rights of women and to the roles women are
permitted to play in society. These positions are subject to change over
time and also in between different congregations of the same faith.
Verses from the Bible have been used both to enhance and to attenuate
the subordinate role of women. Paul invoked the creation myth to argue
that women should cover their heads in church as a sign of their subordi-
nation to males, which is how the divine order was supposedly ordained.
The proof is that a woman is created from and for man, not the other
way around (I Corinthians II:3–16).
1 Timothy recalls Eve’s sin and commands that women must keep
silent and never claim authority over man. After all, it was not Adam but
Eve who was deceived. The only way out for women is to be modest, to
have faith and to bear children (1 Timothy 2:11–15).
Since Christ is the head of mankind and husband the head of wife (1
Corinthians 11:3), husband had to love his wife as if she were his own
body and the wife had to accept the superior judgment of husband, as if
he were her own head (Ephesians 5:28–33) (Pagels 1989, 54).
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 139

How he performed as a family patriarch, keeping his wife and children

submissive and in line was an indication of the leadership abilities of a man
(Pagels 1989, 25). How could a man that could not manage his house
obviously could not manage a parish either? (1 Timothy 3:2–5).
Yet, for Jimmy Carter and the Elders “the justification of discrimina-
tion against women and girls on grounds of religion or tradition,” was
unacceptable (Carter 2009). They believed that the “carefully selected”
Bible verses which are used to justify the superiority of men, are more
the outcome of the efforts by male leaders to retain their influence—than
eternal truths. Women served as deacons, priests, bishops, apostles, teach-
ers, and prophets during the early Christian church. “It wasn’t until the
fourth century that dominant Christian leaders, all men, twisted and dis-
torted Holy Scriptures to perpetuate their ascendant positions within the
religious hierarchy” (Carter 2009).

Attenuating Oppression: Early Christianity

Christianity had indeed started out as being opposed to dominance hier-
archies of any sort. Clement of Alexandria claimed that the statement that
God had created humanity in his own image (Genesis 1, 26) meant that
all humans were created equal. Centuries later, in 1776, these ideas would
form the basis of the western ideals of freedom and equality expressed in
the US Declaration of Independence and would transform the Western
political institutions as well as ethics and law (Pagels 1989, xx).
Based on this vision of human nature early Christians made the attempt
to create a new society where, in the words of Tertullian, everything was
voluntary among them. Rather than giving to the Caesar what is due to
Caesar, early Christians preferred to use the money they would have paid
as taxes to fund Emperor’s wars and palaces, to support the destitute, the
needy and the sick, whether young or old or even dead, as Christians paid
for burial expenses as well. The old, the orphans, and the widows were
attracted to the movement by the generosity of Christians, who shared
everything except their spouses, unlike the pagan Romans, who shared
nothing but their spouses (Pagels 1989, 50).
Following such teachings, pious individuals like Pinian and Melania,
she at twenty and he at twenty-four and married for six years, put on
the attire of peasants made of rough clothes, gave up their usual com-
mitments and devoted themselves to fulfilling the injunctions of Christ,
140 R. ERGENER

hosting strangers, giving money to the poor, paying for the release of
those held in mines and prisons for debt (Pagels 1989, 87).
The “Sermon of the Mount” which according to the Gospel of
Matthew, Jesus delivered to his disciples and to multitudes in the desert,
provided the guidance to Pinian and Melania and to those who were on
the same path with them. The poor were blessed because the kingdom
of heaven was theirs (Matthew 5:2–3). The treasures in the kingdom of
heaven could not be stolen and could not be corrupted by moth or by
rust whereas worldly treasures could always be corrupted or stolen. Jesus
himself would live and die poor, setting an example for others to follow
(Janes 1998, 61).
As we are going to discuss in the remaining sections of this chapter,
over the centuries, the Catholic Church has diverged from these initial
aspirations. The definition of the role of the Catholic Church adopted
at the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) called in 1962 by Pope John
XXIII was more in line with the teachings of early Christians. The coun-
cil was called to give a message to the modern world. According to the
council resolutions, individuals of different means and abilities who made
up the congregation of Christians were all equal in the eyes of God and
shared the same destiny. They were to be known as the “People of God”
(Christian S. Smith 1991, 96; cited in Williams 2000, 1). The church
would actively take sides with the poor in their conflicts with their rich.
In order to reach the poor, the church would adopt a more modest atti-
tude (Berryman 1987, 7; cited in Williams 2000, 1). Association of the
church with the powerful elites was refused (Christian S. Smith 1991, 97;
cited in Williams 2000, 1), and it was confirmed that the world order was
in need of being more just (McGovern 1989, 5; cited in Williams 2000,
1). The Latin American bishops, who did not play an active role in the
formulation and the adoption of the council resolutions, were neverthe-
less keen to apply the resolutions back home, reconsidering the relations
of the church with the oppressive social order prevailing in their dioceses
(Williams 2000, 1).

Enhancing Oppression:
Christianity After Constantine
Despite egalitarian beginnings, throughout its long history, Christianity
was to be associated not only with relieving the suffering of the poor,
but perhaps even more so, with maintaining and justifying the power of
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 141

wealthy elites. The Church institution itself would be an instrument of

wealth extraction.
This transformation took place rather early in the history of the
Church. By the fourth century, Bishop of Constantinople John Chrysos-
tom (“Golden Mouth”) was complaining that (at least some) Church
government had become corrupt and source of profits for office hold-
ers.2
Chrysostom’s vision of the church had been shaped by heroic fathers
such as Justin,3 Athenagoras,4 Clement, and Origen.5 He was upset and
angry that the standards of the churches of his day, which he knew in
Antioch and Constantinople, fell far short of these earlier ones. Chrysos-
tom was vocal in expressing his grief and anger: (Pagels 1989, 104)

Plagues, teeming with untold mischiefs, have come upon the churches.
The primary offices have become marketable. Hence innumerable evils are
arising, and there is no one to redress, no one to reprove them. Indeed,
the disorder has taken on a kind of method and consistency of its own.
(Chrysostom, Homilae in Epistolam ad Ephesios, 6, 7)

Chrysostom claimed that the integrity of the churches was destroyed by

too many riches, excessive power, and unashamed luxury. Bishops were
appointed on the basis of wealth, family ties, or partisanship. Nobody
sought for “excellence of character,” which should have been the only
valid criterion (Pagels 1989, 104). All this made Christians subject of
ridicule among the pagans (Pagels 1989, 104).

2 Archbishop of Constantinople, an important church father, known for his preaching

and public speaking and his denunciation of abuse of authority by both ecclesiastical and
political leaders, c. 349–407.
3 An early Christian apologist who was martyred in the second century and is considered
as a saint in the Catholic Church.
4 Christian apologist who lived during the second half of the second century, a philoso-
pher who converted to Christianity.
5 An early Christian theologian who was a scholar and ascetic c. 184/185–253/25.
142 R. ERGENER

“Becoming a bishop in the fourth century guaranteed a man tax

exemptions, vastly increased income, social power, imperial gifts and pos-
sibly even influence at court?” (Pagels 1989, 105, xxv) Bishops were actu-
ally in alliance with the Emperors, giving support to the political hierar-
chy. Emperors had become patrons of Christianity, the implicit assump-
tion being that the Christians they ruled were not capable of governing
themselves.
Christians who were martyred by the Romans as criminals would have
been of the contrary opinion that humans were capable of governing
themselves. Justification for this was in Genesis 1 which not only said
that God had made man in his image but had given him “dominion
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cat-
tle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth
upon the earth” (Genesis 1, 27), thereby giving the power of earthly rule
to Adam. Adam’s story which is given in Genesis 2 was interpreted by
early Christians to mean that man had a divinely given capacity for free
will. The story of Adam was a warning not to misuse that capacity (Pagels
1989, 108). As a young priest in Antioch, John Chrysostom would argue
that because man was created in the image of God, the right government
belonged not to the emperor but to the whole human race. Just like there
was none greater than God in the firmaments, there was none greater on
earth than humanity (Pagels 1989, 100).
But, Genesis 2 could also be used to legitimize man’s need to be gov-
erned. After all, according to Genesis 2 man was created out of dust and
Adam committed a major sin by giving in to the temptation to eat the
forbidden fruit. Humankind was the product of that sin. The church was
needed to guide humankind to stay away from sin. This was why St.
Augustine endorsed the use of threats, commands, coercion, penalties,
and even physical force by the church minister to discipline humanity
which had been tainted with sin (Pagels 1989, 117).
The approach to the Christian god of Constantine the Great, the
emperor who legitimized Christianity, was different from the approach
of early Christians and resembled the approach of the pagan emperors
toward pagan deities. Christians had disdained the pagans who believed
that success was accorded to them because of the piety, which they
showed to their pagan gods, in the form of giving gifts.
Constantine backed the Christian God by massive patronage. Previous
Roman Emperors who were pagan “had always honored their favored
gods with benefactions and buildings. Constantine’s patronage for the
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 143

Christian God was so lavish that he had to strip resources from temples to
fund it. One of his early foundations in Rome was the church of St. John
Lateran, whose the apse was to be coated in gold. Around 500 pounds’
weight of it were needed at a cost of some 36,000 solidi. This sum, which
might be translated into approximately £60 million today, could have fed
about 12,000 poor for a year (according to calculations from Dominic
Janes’ God and Gold in Late Antiquity (1998). Another 22,200 solidi
worth of silver (3700 lbs.) was required for light fittings and another
400 pounds of gold for fifty gold vessels. The costs of lighting were to
be met by estates specifically granted for the purpose which brought in
4390 solidi a year. Everything in these new churches had to be of the
highest quality. “While early Christian decoration, in the catacombs or
house churches, for instance, had been painted walls, now nothing less
than mosaic was appropriate. In order to make the effect more brilliant,
the mosaics were made of gold, silver or precious stones set within glass”
(Freeman 2001, 12).
Under Constantine’s rule, “statues of pagan gods were brought out”
of the dark recesses where they were kept in their respective temples to
daylight. The valuable materials which adorned the images were stripped
and melted down (Janes 1998, 53). The precious metal was used to deco-
rate the churches, which were in contrast to pagan temples, adorned with
splendors (Janes 1998, 53).
The Church accepted its new buildings and new interpretation was
given to the scriptures to justify the fortunes spent on these buildings. The
horrified Jerome wrote “Parchments were dyed purple, gold is melted
into lettering, manuscripts are dressed up in jewels, while Christ lies at
the door naked and dying” (Freeman 2001, 13).
Purple which was used to dye Church documents was very expensive as
it would take twelve hundred Mediterranean mollusks (murex) to obtain
1.6 grams of purple dye. According to the Diocletian’s price edict issued
in 301, one pound of best purple wool was worth one pound of gold
(Janes 1998, 37).
Gold, jewelry, and purple are elite markers which show social distinc-
tion. The bestowing of riches on to the churches by Constantine was part
of his effort to gain and maintain the dominance of the church and of
himself as the emperor, through the Church (Janes 1998, 13).
144 R. ERGENER

Christianity and War

In 312 Constantine who was the senior Emperor at the time confronted
the usurper Maxentius who was holding Rome and the provinces in
Africa. Armies of the two went to war at the Milvian Bridge, just to
the north of Rome. According to the account of Lactantius,6 the night
before the battle Constantine had a dream instructing him to have his sol-
diers put on their shields the heavenly sign of God Chi-Ro.7 According
to another version of the story narrated by Constantine to his biogra-
pher Eusebius, at some moment before the battle, a cross made of light
appears in the sky with the inscription “By this conquer.” The message is
confirmed by Christ who appears in a dream and instructs him to have the
cross on his standards as a protection against enemies (Fox 1986, 616).
After having his vision Constantine had craftsmen make a gilded spear
with a crossbar (labarum 8 ). The wreath of gold and gems at the top had
a chi-rho in its midst. A gem-embroidered cloth was suspended from the
crossbar. A golden half size portrait of Constantine and his children was
also made. It has been suggested that the chi-rho was a solar symbol. The
cross could also be understood as a reference to the four points of the
compass. But it was subsequently to be adopted as a Christian symbol.
Constantine also had a crux gemmata (Latin for jeweled cross, a form of
cross which is at least its front side, decorated with jewels.) on the golden
ceiling of the imperial palace (Janes 1998, 53).
Constantine had used Christianity to mobilize his soldiers and enhance
his war effort as a means to assert his dominance. Previously, pagan
Romans had also used their religion to mobilize the Roman war effort
toward Roman dominance. Success, Romans believed, was a reward which
they were entitled to in return for their consummate piety. It was because
of their unique devotion to religion, Romans had been raised to such
heights of power as to become masters of the world (Pagels 1989, 54).
Early Christian apologists had attacked not only the pagan gods
and the imperial cult, but also the myths which legitimized the origins
of the Roman Empire. In its place, they had offered a condemning

6 An early Christian author (c. 250–c. 325) who became an advisor to Constantine the
Great.
7 One of the earliest forms of christogram formed by superimposing the first two (cap-
ital) letters chi and rho (XP) of the Greek word “XPITO” = KHRistos = Christ.
8 Military standard that displayed the “Chi-Rho.”
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 145

and demythologizing view of Roman history. Tertullian, for example,

challenged the myth that the gods had rewarded the Romans for their
devotion with their empire. On the contrary, said Tertullian, “if I am not
mistaken, kingdoms and empires are acquired by wars, and expanded by
victories. Moreover, you cannot have wars and victories without taking
and often destroying cities” (Pagels 1989, 54). In their wars of con-
quest, he continued, the Romans “have destroyed and despoiled temples
indiscriminately with houses and palaces.” The Romans succeeded, he
concluded not because of their piety, but by subordinating their supposed
piety to their obsession for conquest (Pagels 1989, 54).
Minucius Felix9 also argued that the founders of the Roman Empire
were a coalition of criminals and murderers: “Did not (the Romans) in
their origin, when gathered together and fortified by crime, grow by the
terror of their own ferocity?” (Minucius Felix 1643; cited in Pagels 1989,
54). They initiated conflict against the peoples who bordered them, dev-
astated their cities, raping and enslaving the residents and driving out the
survivors (Pagels 1989, 54). According to Felix, “The Romans were not
so great because they were religious, but because they were sacrilegious
with impunity” (Minucius Felix 1643; cited in Pagels 1989, 54).
One of the best-known fusions of religion and war is the Crusades.
Throughout the Crusades the Catholic Church provided the myths and
the institutions which contributed to enhance the dominance of Christian
West over the Muslim East and of the Christian feudal—military aristoc-
racy in general as well as of the church itself.
At the outset, crusading armies were almost wholly raised, supported,
and directed by the church. The First Crusade is unique because it was
based on the premise that it was legitimate for the church to follow its
aims through military means. Later crusades were sponsored and directed
by national states. Yet, the Catholic Church continued to support the
Crusades in various ways.
The Church offered temporal (worldly) benefits to individual crusaders
by providing them with immunity from secular prosecution, variety of tax
privileges including amnesty from secular taxation for the duration of the
crusade, exemption from secular control of their property, credit to buy
weapons and finance knights and protection for their wives and children
(Anderson et al. 1992).

9 One of the earliest of the Latin apologists for Christianity. Little is known about his
life.
146 R. ERGENER

Salvation (otherworldly) benefits were also provided. Those who

joined the Crusades were promised “paradise and remission from their
sins.” Crusaders were absolved from penance, an especially sacred cere-
mony (a sacrament), consisting of a confession of sin, made with sorrow
and with the intention of amendment, followed by the forgiveness of the
sin. Absolution from penance was the origin of the concept of “indul-
gence.” Eventually, awarding of indulgences would be commercialized.
The proceeds of indulgences were meant to be spent on crusades, but no
doubt some of it would be profits for the church (Anderson et al. 1992).
This was one of the cases of the Church enjoying material benefits itself
while providing support for the political and military establishment.
The right to pillage and plunder without fear of secular or religious
sanction was also rendered officially legitimate for the crusaders by the
Church, so long as the victims were infidels. But such activities could
be directed also against fellow Christians, as with the Fourth Crusade,
which ended with the sacking of the Orthodox Christian Constantinople
(Anderson et al. 1992).
Crusades provided a powerful fiscal rationalization for new taxes. The
Papacy sanctioned new taxes to pay for the expenses of the Crusader
campaigns. According to the Lateran IV Council one twentieth of all
ecclesiastical revenues would be given to the Papacy for three years and
according to the Lyons II Council one tenth of all ecclesiastical revenues
would be given to the Papacy for six years. The church introduced forty-
three new levies between 1188 and 1326. A huge profit was made by the
Papacy, as all of this revenue was not spent on war (Anderson et al. 1992).
The church profited from the loans made to crusaders who were in
need of cash to finance their effort. A Papal Bull (a formal Papal docu-
ment having a bulla or seal attached) related to the Second Crusade had
exempted crusaders from paying usury. Since lenders were under no obli-
gation to lend at zero interest, this bull destroyed credit worthiness of
crusaders, leaving them with no other recourse but to borrow from the
church itself. The Church would exploit the situation for its own benefit.
Of course, the church was not supposed to charge interest. But interest
could easily be hidden as “intertemporal exchange” or as “gift exchange.”
For example, a crusader who borrowed from a monastery would in effect
pay interest by renting his land to the same monastery while at the same
time remitting rent for a certain number of years (Anderson et al. 1992).
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 147

Profits were to be made for the Church from the buyback of crusader
oaths. Revenues from such buybacks were meant to be spent on cru-
sades, but in reality most of such revenues were spent on activities such as
the travel expenses of clergy, which were supposedly related to crusades
(Anderson et al. 1992).
Securing of the pilgrimage routes to the Holy Land was one of the
main aims of the Crusades. Pilgrimages, which had started during the
fourth century, had become increasingly popular by the eleventh century.
Pilgrims were an important source of income because of the donations
they made to the monasteries on the route and at the destination and the
donations they made to the church of Holy Sepulcher. Pilgrims were avid
buyers of relics such as the bones of the Apostles and Saints, pieces of the
true cross, the Holy Grail and so on. These were in demand because of
the miraculous properties attributed to them (Anderson et al. 1992).

Islam: Holy Jihad

Another well-known case of the fusion of religion and war is the military
expansion of Islam following the mass conversion of Arabs to the religion.
In order to understand how the mass conversions to Islam took place
among Arab tribes, one needs to consider the pre-Islamic pagan back-
ground. In pre-Islamic Arabia, tribal gods were not embodiments of the
definitive meanings concerning the various features and wisdoms of life,
but they were definitely the sources of wonders observable in this world.
“More precisely, they were ultimate sources of all those phenomena that
are of great importance in human society, but beyond direct human con-
trol: rain, fertility, disease, the knowledge of soothsayers, the nature of
social groups and so forth. They were worshipped for all (Crone 1987,
237) the practical services they could render in respect of these phenom-
ena.” Gods were to be invoked and manipulated so that they would use
their powers on behalf of their devotees (Wellhausen 1897, 213 cited in
Crone 1987, 238).
“Tribal gods” of prehistoric Arabs “did not request and did not receive
emotional commitment, love or loyalty from their devotees.” There is
the story of the members of the Banu Hanifa10 tribe eating an idol which

10 An ancient Arab tribe which inhabited the area of al-Yamama, which is in central
modern Saudi Arabia.
148 R. ERGENER

they had made of dates and clarified butter—during a famine, after having
worshipped the idol for a while (Crone 1987, 238).
Much in the same sprit a modern Bedouin pledges to God half of an
animal he will hunt. Having hunted, he takes away and eats his share,
leaving the other half to God, as he had pledged. His hunger not fully
eliminated, he sneaks back and successfully steals the half he had pledged
to God and consumes it as well. His justification being that he had a right
to God’s share, as God had failed to protect it (Ibn Qutayba, 1970 cited
in Crone 1987, 238).
There was no point in serving a god who did not use his powers in
favor of his subjects. Gods who failed to perform were therefore aban-
doned with ease, as a pre-Islamic tribesman did with his idol Sa’d, when
Sa’d dispersed his camels, rather than keeping them together (Ibn al Kalbi
1914 cited in Crone 1987, 238). Gods who performed on the other hand
could be adopted with similar ease and speed. When a Christian monk
cured their chief of childlessness, a whole tribe abandoned their pagan
gods and adopted Christianity (Sozomen 1855 cited in Crone 1987,
238).
If pre-Islamic Arabs were so practical and worldly with their religious
choices, unless they had unexpectedly turned very spiritual for some rea-
son, Allah must have had an attractive offer for them to become Muslims.
Patricia Crone proposes that what Islam offered Arabs was a program for
state formation, the creation of an umma, conquest and jihad (Crone
1987, 242). Arab tribes in pre-Islamic Arabia had been divided, each fol-
lowing their own ancestral deities. Muhammed united them under one
ancestral deity, the God of Abraham, the ancestor of all Arabs (Crone
1987, 43). United under one banner, Arab tribes would channel outward
the martial energies they had been wasting against each other and turn
into conquerors.
Tribal states need to conquer to survive and tribesmen were willing
fighters. A God that asked them to conquer would raise their tribal mili-
tancy into supreme religious virtue. For example, on the eve of the Battle
of Qadissiya,11 Arab soldiers were told with reference to Iraq, “if you hold
out … then their property, their women, their children, and their coun-
try will be yours” (Crone 1987, 245–49). In other words, according to

11 A decisive battle fought between the Arab Muslim army and the Sassanid Persian
army in 636 during the first period of Muslim expansion. It was the key to the Islamic
conquest of Iraq and led to the Islamic conquest of Persia.
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 149

Islam, victorious Arabs not only had the right but also a duty to despoil
the defeated.
Why Islam emerged in the seventh century and not before may be
because Arabs were under pressure both from Byzantium and from the
Sassanids at the time. As Mughira b. Shu’ba12 explained to a Persian com-
mander, before God sent his Prophet to them, Arabs were the victims.
Other peoples crushed them under their feet while Arabs trampled no
one. One of the promises of the Prophet was that they would conquer
and overcome (Crone 1987, 245–49).
Muslim Arab victors would be entitled to spoils of those they had
defeated. But the defeated were not necessarily forcefully converted to
Islam. Rather, Muslims had a system which made the perpetuation of
the non-Muslim community under conquest, rather than its elimination,
more beneficial for the Muslim conquerors.

Muslim Empires: Tolerance and Dominance

Muslims regard Christians, Jews and also Sabians13 and Zoroastrians,14
as “people of the book” who were to be treated and judged accordingly
(Qur’an V, 51.). Even though they were somewhat lesser people, there
were no instructions in the Qur’an for the extermination or the forced
conversion of the “people of the book” (Arnakis 1952, 238). They were
to be left alone to run their own civic and religious affairs, provided that
Muslims were not involved (Runciman 1968, 78).
Following his conquest of Jerusalem, Caliph Omar had granted such
rights to the Patriarch Sophronius. The monks of Mount Sinai claimed
that their property and their right to worship was recognized and put
into writing in 623 AD by the Prophet Mohamad. This document was
probably fake but the Arab Muslim conquerors accepted it as authentic,
and that is all that mattered (Arnakis 1952, 38).
The practice of grouping peoples according to their faiths is a practice
that has roots in the Middle East that go beyond Islam. Jews had been

12 One of the more prominent companions of Muhammad, one of the last to see the
Prophet before his death, ruler of Kufa in Iraq in his old age.
13 A religious group mentioned three times in the Qur’an as a “People of the Book.”
14 One of the oldest religions ascribed to the teachings of the Iranian Prophet Zoroaster
or Zarathustra who exalted the deity of wisdom Ahura Mazda.
150 R. ERGENER

treated in a similar manner by the Persians and the Christians by the Sas-
sanids (Runciman 1968, 78). In return, the religious leader assured the
good conduct of the his people and their loyalty to the dominant group.
In line with this religious, philosophical, and historical background,
Muslim Arabs had a taxation system which made the persistence of non-
Muslim communities not only tolerable but also economically beneficial
for the Muslims. The main tax revenue of the Muslim Arab states was the
poll tax jizyah 15 imposed on non-Muslims. In order to be taxed, it was
necessary for the non-Muslims to be tolerated.
Similar tolerant attitude would be pursued by the Muslim Turks toward
members of non-Muslim communities. Seljuks, the Turkoman conquerors
of present-day Turkey, allowed the Orthodox bishops of the territories
they had conquered to retain their ties and relationships with the Byzan-
tine Emperor and the Patriarch in Constantinople (Runciman 1968, 78).
Following the collapse of the Seljuks, Ottoman State emerged as a tiny
principality and grew rapidly to be a world empire. Ottoman rulers would
also pursue tolerant policies toward their non-Muslim subjects.
“‘Tolerant policies’ toward Muslim minorities had been pursued by
certain Catholic rulers, when in a frontier environment. James I of Arago-
Catalonia (1208-76) did not attempt to convert Moors when he con-
quered Valencia. The French Crusader Kingdom in Jerusalem tolerated
religious practices of the Muslims they ruled and discouraged missionary
activities aimed toward them” (Halperin 1984, 444–49 and 455–59).
“However, Catholic experiments in religious tolerance remain excep-
tional and were relatively short lived, whereas such policies seem to be
the norm and were longer lasting with Muslim states. At the turn of the
twentieth century, after nine hundred years of rule by Muslim Turks, more
than half of the population of the land, which is now modern Turkey, was
made up of non-Muslims” (Ergener 2004, 5).
Implied in the term tolerance, however, are relations of dominance.
Poll tax for non-Muslims (cizye) was one of the main sources of hard
cash for the Ottoman State—the other being the proceeds from tax farms
(mukata’a) on revenue producing enterprises.

15 The per capita yearly tax historically levied by Islamic states on sane male non-Muslim
subjects permanently residing in Muslim lands under Islamic law. Those who did military
service or who could not afford were exempted.
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 151

Tolerance in this context then is to be understood as the members of

the dominant religion Islam putting up with the members of other (sub-
ordinate) religions, on the condition that the subordinates compensate
the dominants for putting up with them. Members of other religions were
subject to discrimination but not persecution. As late as the early twenti-
eth century, Christians were regarded by the Ottomans “as no more than
taxable assets (Arnakis 1952, 238).
Ottomans taxed the revenues of the Orthodox churches, treating this
institution as a tax farm (iltizam) and the patriarch as a tax farmer (mul-
tezim). This radical view of the Patriarchate has been proposed based on
legal documents by Macit Kenanoğlu (2004) and put in a historical con-
text by Tom Papademetriou (2015).
Revenues of the Orthodox Church consisted of the revenues from the
estates owned by the church, the revenues from services provided by the
church, such as marriage and burials and alms and taxes collected from
parishes and communities. The patriarch would be in charge of making
these collections and deliver a significant portion of the collection to the
Ottoman treasury. He would also make lump sum payments to get the
appointment to the office.
To Gennadius, the first patriarch he appointed following the conquest
of Istanbul, Sultan “Mehmet the Conqueror had made a gift of one thou-
sand florins” (Ergener 2004, 6). “But, he discontinued this practice when,
in 1467, some members of the Church offered to pay him an equal
amount for the appointment of their choice. From then on, it became
an accepted practice for the Orthodox Patriarch to make money gifts to
the Sultan, later to the Grand Vizier” (Ergener 2004, 6), equivalent of the
Prime Minister. (“Patriarchs were confirmed by the Sultan until 1657 and
by the Grand Vizier after this date” [Ergener 2004, 6].) The gifts made to
get the appointment and the yearly tribute both “rose steadily over time.
By the end of the seventeenth century, the usual price paid by a patriarch
on his appointment was in the neighborhood of 3,000 gold pounds. In
1726 Callinicus III paid no less than 5,600 gold pounds. An annual tax
of 3,000 gold pounds was also paid as well as minor taxes, such as the
mutton for palace guards. As the Ottoman rulers exploited the opportu-
nity to make earnings, as many as sixty-one” change “of patriarchs” took
place between 1595–1695 (Runciman 1968, 201–202). Wealthier bish-
ops would have higher chances of being elected, even if they were less holy
than their rivals. Poor but ambitious bishops would borrow from guilds
or moneylenders in order to pay for their office (Arnakis 1952, 247).
152 R. ERGENER

“After 1759 it was decided that the gift would be paid out of church
funds” (Arnakis 1952, 248). It was often the case that the aspiring patri-
arch would be financed by the leading members of the Greek Orthodox
community who would then make up for their contribution through the
collections of the church. “By the time of Greek independence the church
was 230,000 gold pounds in debt” (Runciman 1968, 202).
Local bishops would also buy their sees and make their flock pay back
what they had spent (Miller 1901, 469; cited in Ergener 2004, 7). The
bishop and the local Ottoman government officials would often be allies.
The bishop wanted the aid of the local Ottoman government to compel
the peasants to pay their dues to the church and would in return perform
diplomatic services to the Ottoman State. The Bulgarian wanted to get
rid of the Greek who exploited him and the Rumanian regarded as enemy
the Greek clergy, who owned one fifth of the land and lived comfortably
in monasteries, while the Rumanian died of starvation in his wretched
housing (Miller 1901, 469).
Ottomans pursued similar policies not only toward their Greek sub-
jects, but also “toward members of other religious groups as well. A Patri-
archate was set up in Istanbul for the Armenian subjects of the Sultan.
Jews expelled by Catholic kings from Spain and Portugal and those who
fled the persecution in Central Europe were given refuge by the Ottoman
rulers. Office of the ‘Chief Rabbi’ was set up to head the Jewish commu-
nity. The Armenian Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi were empowered with
powers similar to those of the Orthodox Patriarch” (Ergener 2004, 3)
and put under similar obligations.
A Protestant missionary reports in the nineteenth century that the
Armenian patriarch paid an annual tribute (Smith and Dwight 1833, 56)
as well as presents to the government to get the office (Smith and Dwight
1833, 58). “During fifty years in the seventeenth century, fourteen per-
sons were raised to the office of the patriarch, one of whom was elected
and deposed no less than nine times, the whole number of elections and
depositions was nearly forty, and one priest held the office for six years,
(including one in which he was supplanted by an individual raised directly
from the humble employment of baker) before he was ordained bishop”
(Smith and Dwight 1833, 58). It was not unusual for bidders for the
office to offer to raise the tribute by 40% or even 400%, the burden ulti-
mately falling on the laity (Smith and Dwight 1833, 59).
Because the Jewish communities were mostly made up of new arrivals,
the construction of an institutional structure similar to the Greek and
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 153

Armenian Patriarchates was more difficult. Nevertheless, the office of the

chief rabbi was established and leading members of the community, if not
the chief rabbi himself, would be employed to collect tributes from the
Jewish members of the Ottoman community.

Pope vs. The Sultan

Religious institutions are providers of goods, the quality and the reliability
of which cannot be verified even after the purchase, but presumably only
after death. These goods can be worldly (success, good health, wealth,
victory) or otherworldly (salvation). Such goods are known as credence
goods, credence meaning the mental attitude that something is believable
and should be accepted as true (Emons 1997).
The medieval church was like a monopoly selling a pure credence
good—a system of belief leading to eternal salvation that cannot be exter-
nally verified. Credibility was of utmost importance for such a church. The
claim that the Church was the sole institution representing God on earth
was essential to protect its credibility. It was important therefore that the
church retained a monopoly.
“On the whole, the Catholic Church sought for monopoly in provid-
ing religious services and declaring as heretics and persecuting its rivals,
whereas in Ottoman lands members of different faiths lived in what can
be called” pluralist equilibrium (Ergener 2004, 5).
“The Catholic Church provided religion as a private good, marketing
and selling “a set of identifiable ‘products’ (salvation) in a rational, self-
conscious, ‘profit’- maximizing manner” (Ekelund et al. 1996, 6). For
the church, new members meant rise in revenues. The Church would
therefore want more new members, and seek the conversion of conquered
peoples belonging to different faiths (Ekelund et al. 1996, 135)” (Ergener
2004, 5).
“Islam on the other hand was provided as a public good to the faith-
ful. The equivalent of tithes, church dues, marriage fees, sale of relics
or indulgences, had no place in the Islamic practice. More members for
Islam meant more recipients of a public good and it was therefore in the
interest of the Muslim establishment to limit the number of entrants to
Islam – by allowing conquered religious groups to continue with their
practice” (Ergener 2004, 5).
154 R. ERGENER

“In order to maintain the credibility of its product (salvation), the

Catholic Church relied on ‘miracles’ and other manifestations of the effi-
cacy of religion” (Ekelund et al. 1996, 27; cited in Ergener 2004, 6).
“For the followers of Mohammad, that ‘Setting out from the remote
east, he (Mohammed) came as far as the west, victorious,’ was proof of
the power of Islam” (Arnakis 1951, 110).
“To those who paid for its services, the Church promised salvation
after death. Islam offered the fruits of victory to the faithful, here and
now” (Ergener 2004, 6).
Church decorations would remind one not “only of the joys of par-
adise, but also of the horrors of hell, which one would have to endure
if he or she did not fulfill his or her obligations toward the Church”
(Ergener 2004, 6).
“The mosques had no images of hell and remained only as glorious
reminders of the permanent state of bliss that the followers of Islam lived
in” (Ergener 2004, 6).
“The Church sought for monopoly power market place and did its best
to eliminate all its rivals, employing all means, including war” (Ergener
2004, 6).
“Islam relied on members of other faiths to continue to exist, to pay for
the joys that the victorious faithful would enjoy” (Ergener 2004, 6). Islam
also resorted to war, but not to eliminate, to subjugate rival religions.
Non-Muslim religious establishments under the Ottomans would be
allocated their market niches by their Muslim rulers who would also pro-
tect the niches for them.
Catholics would have a hierarchy within the members of the faith, with
the church selling the salvation good to the believers and deriving bene-
fits from that. Ottomans on the other hand had a system of dominance
delineated by religion. Moslems were on top of the hierarchy, leading “An
effortless life as rulers of the earth as opposed to one as plodding as mer-
chants or doing other work” (Crone 1987, 243), members of other faiths
forming the lower ranks.
Finally, we should mention if briefly, an extreme and effective form
of legitimation of oppression using religion, the caste system of India.
Imposed on the people of India in the second century by Arian con-
querors, the caste system assures the legitimacy and superiority of the
Brahman rulers and the obedience of the members of the lower castes.
Everybody has been assigned to his caste because of his or her perfor-
mance during his previous life. If his rank is low this time, never mind,
 7 RELIGION AND HIERARCHIES OF DOMINANCE 155

there are many more chances to do better: If one performs well in his
present life, he will be reincarnated as a member of a higher caste next
time. And, performing well means, being obedient and resigned toward
the members of the upper classes. Very ingeniously, the order of things is
both one’s own making (through various reincarnations) and divine at the
same time. Past performance (in previous lives) and future bliss (as one
is reincarnated) point to one course of action in present life: subservience
to the dominant and the cherishing of one’s subordinate status.
Whereas the subjects of Muslim empires were stratified according to
which religion they belonged to, members of Indian society were stratified
according to their membership in the levels of the same religion. Members
of lower Indian castes could aspire to be members of higher level castes
in their future lives, provided that they remained docile and obedient to
members of the higher castes in their current lives. Non-Muslims subjects
of the Muslim Empires were allowed to remain on the path their own
religion prescribed to bliss, provided they remained docile and obedient
to the dominant Muslim rulers.
More recently, Sriya Iyer has demonstrated that in present-day India,
religious establishments are moving in to fill the vacuum created by the
failure of the secular authorities to adequately provide services such as
education. The provision of religious education rather than the teaching
of skills that contribute to productivity enhances the income inequality
that exists between Muslims and Hindus (Iyer 2018).

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a History of the Church from A.D. 324 to A.D. 440. London: H.G. Bohn.
Stark, Rodney. 1964. “Class, Radicalism, and Religious Involvement in Great
Britain.” American Sociological Review 29 (5): 698–706. https://doi.org/
10.2307/2091420.
Tilly, Charles. c1998. Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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Williams, Elisabeth Erin. 2000. “Liberation Theology and Its Role in Latin
America.” The Monitor: Journal of International Studies: 7 (1).
 CHAPTER 8

Religion and Charity

“THANKS TO GOD!”

“Let the rich support the poor; and let the poor give thanks to God,
because he has given him someone through whom his needs may be
met” Clement of Rome (Mason and Robinson 2004, 708; cited in
Kim 2010, 17).

It is expected of individuals to seek profit when engaged in exchange—or

reciprocity at the least, if profit is not possible. Quite often, however,
humans intentionally engage in exchange that brings them seemingly
no returns—in other words, they give and are not reciprocated. Such
behavior is often directed at the poor, weak, and the needy and it is
known as altruism—or as charity or philanthropy, with slight variations
in meaning, charity having more religious connotations and philanthropy
more secular ones.
It is to be expected of an individual to have concern for her own well-
being and undertake actions that benefit her. It requires some explanation
as to why one should practice altruism, with more concern for the well-
being of others at her expense.

© The Author(s) 2020 159

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_8
160 R. ERGENER

Gaining Prestige and Status

It is possible is that what looks like altruism is not really so, as it involves
returns for the altruist, which may or may not be visible at first sight.
One common case is when the altruist is compensated by the status and
prestige he will have gained through the act of altruism.
Amotz Zahavi, a Tel Aviv University biologist, suggested that altruism
involves no sacrifice as altruistic giving enables the altruist to signal and
claim status and prestige (Zahavi and Zahavi 1999, xv–xvi). Zahavi’s
conclusions are based on the behavior not of humans but of animals.
Based on decades long observations of babblers, a bird that lives in
groups in the Arava desert, Zahavi proposed that altruism offers a reli-
able, concrete index of the altruist’s capabilities. Altruistic act proves the
giver’s interest in the receiver, while at the same time proclaiming the
giver’s dominance.
Group members have good reason to pay attention when an individual
acts not in his, but for the group’s benefit. The message displayed by this
act is that the altruist is so strong, that he can afford to care for others.
Subordinates will avoid a fight against this stronger rival. Each member
of the group is constantly assessing whether to stay on in the group as a
subordinate, or to leave and try its luck elsewhere, or risk everything in a
fight for the top position. Support by the dominant male makes some of
the subordinates choose to stay rather than leave the group, which enables
the dominant bird to lead a large, strong group (Zahavi and Zahavi 1999,
xv–xvi).
Along these lines, many cases of what appears to be altruism, may actu-
ally be selfish efforts in disguise, undertaken to attain a favorable social
reputation within a group or to project a pro-social image (Norenzayan
and Shariff 2008, 62). It has been argued for example that much of what
looked like altruism in ancient Greece and Rome was actually motivated
by such concerns.
Some classical philosophers taught that rational individuals should
avoid emotions such as mercy and pity. Mercy was against justice because
it led one to support that had not been earned (Kim 2010, 14).
The object of Greek and Roman philanthropy was not the poor. Even
with food distributions by city officials, which was the main philanthropic
activity that the poor benefited from, the primary target was the rich
rather the poor, as only the rich had the capability to return the largesse
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 161

(Hamel, n.d.; Hands 1968; cited in Loewenberg 1995, 308). When patri-
cian families donated food at festivals, it was primarily to gain the loyalty
of the poor crowds, not necessarily to satisfy their needs (Kim 2010, 4).
Present-day altruists who ostentatiously display their charitable acts are
likely to be after prestige and recognition rather than or in addition to
providing genuine support.

Creating Obligations
Even a selfish individual will support another person if the chances are
sufficiently high that he will be reciprocated in the future (Gintis et al.
2005, 3). It is possible that the seemingly altruist individual may not really
be giving away with no returns but, simply expecting to be reciprocated
in the long run. What looks like selfless giving may be a way to earn future
benefits by the donor (Hamilton 1964; Williams 1966; Trivers 1971).
French sociologist Mauss proposed that true altruism does not exist
and that all giving is compulsory and reciprocal (Mauss 1967). Mauss
based his opinions on his observations in the Pacific islands and in the
Pacific Northwest.
Pre-Islamic Arabia had similar concepts and practices. Pre-Islamic
Arabs believed that belongings had an excess that had to be given away
because it was others’ right. When the excess was given to someone, the
recipient would be in possession of more belongings but his status would
be reduced, becoming or remaining more strongly a dependent of the
donor, as a protégé, client, or ally. And, the recipient of the gift would
be under the obligation to reciprocate with a larger gift. The dependency
relationship between the donor and the recipient would be reversed, when
the former recipient reciprocated with a larger gift. In pre-Islamic Arabia
then, the circulation as gifts of the excess hidden in belongings was a
perpetual process, which created more unhappiness than joy, putting ever
more burdens on both the recipients and the donors (Bravmann 1963;
Kister 1965).
Islamic teachings would replace the returning cycles of claims and
duties of pre-Islamic Arabia with a virtuous cycle of generosity and
solidarity (Cohen 2005, 351).
162 R. ERGENER

Benefiting the Donor

The altruist may be giving with the awareness that the benefits he will
create will spill over on to him as well. More specifically, altruism in areas,
such as education, health, and poor relief, contributes to reinforce social
stability and to raise the general level of happiness. The reinforcement
of social stability and the rise in the general level happiness will raise the
well-being of the altruist, together with the recipients of his donations.
The altruist in this case would be giving in an indirect manner, for selfish
reasons.

ADAM SMITH AND ALTRUISM

Adam Smith, who is commonly known for his opinion of human

nature as being selfish and materialistic, was aware of the possibility
of selfless giving with no return, which we can call as pure altruism.
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith advocates that prosperity
is created by market competition. One of the virtues of competition
is that its wonders are manifested (sometimes even better) when the
buyers and sellers are entirely in pursuit of their own interests. “It is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker
that we expect our dinner,” wrote Smith, “but from their regard to
their own interest” (Smith 1970).
Yet, Adam Smith recognized the existence of genuine altruism.
In another book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he writes: “How
selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some prin-
ciples in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing
from it, except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith 2002).

Selfless Giving
There seems to be a different sort of giving which is selfless—of money,
food, resources, one’s own well-being and even life, for little known
people, or in many cases for total strangers, with no visible returns. A
European can donate to charity in Africa. A fireman risks his life for a
person trapped in fire.
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 163

This is the kind of altruism preached by Christ who reminded his

followers that they would be blessed if they gave to the poor and to the
physically tainted, who will not be able to reciprocate (Luke 14: 13–14).
With pure altruism, a monetary donation or volunteer work for a
charity is equivalent to the purchase of a “charity good,” charity good
being the happiness of the recipient of altruistic giving. The utility which
the sincere altruist gains from the consumption of the charity good has
been labeled as “warm glow” (Andreoni 1989).
Various studies conducted mainly in the United States show that reli-
gious persons’ demand for the “warm glow” tends to be higher than those
of who are not religious (Monsma 2007, 6). As compared with those who
pray less, those who pray more show a greater affinity to share with those
who are weak and in need (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 60).
Why are the more religious more inclined to give to the needy and to
do volunteer work, more so than the less religious do?
Does religion cultivate the warm glow or are the religious blessed with
the warm glow at the same time. Those who come together in a church
may be “charitable” not because they go to church but by disposition.
There may be an unidentified factor which motivates individuals to be
religious and charitable simultaneously.
Or, religious individuals may be giving more to charity simply because
they belong to groups (congregations) that go beyond their family and
immediate friends. As members of such groups, they have more exposure
both to those who are in need and also to those who solicit chari-
table collections. Such simultaneous exposure could explain why those
who belong to religious congregations give more than those who don’t
(Becker and Dhingra 2001, 316; Wilson and Janoski 1995, 138; Putnam
2000, 120).
Not surprisingly, “active members of modern secular organizations
are at least as likely to report donating to charity as active members of
religious ones” (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 62). Members of some
secular groups give more than those who are members of religious groups
(Campbell and Yonish 2003, 105). Highest givers seem to be those
who belong both to religious and secular groups. People who belong
to neither group type give the least (Monsma 2007, 6). Individuals, who
lack the penchant for the “warm glow” then, are encouraged groups to
be altruistic.
Various religions have had a key role to play in encouraging altruism,
reconciling the selfish and selfless in human nature by,
164 R. ERGENER

• punishing lack of altruism,

• rewarding its presence,
• sanctifying the practice,
• defining the groups within which altruism is practiced,
• providing the leadership gifts that motivate the lesser donors,
• constantly asking prospective givers to donate,
• reminding them of the existence of the poor.

Punishes
In daily life and under experimental conditions people display a disposi-
tion to be generous toward their kin as well as toward strangers. Humans
also tend to have a tendency to punish those who treat others unfairly.
Punishment is accorded not only to fellow group members but also to
total strangers. Punishment of those with whom one will have no rela-
tionship with in the future may be explained as applying a rule of thumb.
But, it is hard to justify anonymous punishment of those who have hurt
others with any self-interested motivation (Gintis et al. 2008, 250). This
kind of altruistic behavior which will bring no benefits to the donor has
been labeled as “strong reciprocity” (Gintis et al. 2008, 249).
The problem would be solved if there were sufficient number of human
volunteers who are willing to exercise altruistic punishment, that is, who
are motivated “to punish free riders even though it is costly and yields no
material benefits for” them (Fehr and Gächter 2002, 137).
Another solution would be to solicit the support of supernatural beings
or humans who are acting on their behalf in the punishment of the free
riders (Fehr and Gächter 2002).
The early humans, who became our ancestors, were the survivors.
Knowledge of things probably contributed to the survival of our ances-
tors. Yet, other mental tool kits would also have contributed to the
survival of our ancestors. One of those would be the distortion of reality.
False beliefs can be useful for survival, just like knowledge, if they lead to
useful behavior. Along these lines, belief in supernatural agents, rather
than narrow reasoning, could have been more effective in justifying
altruism in the eyes of our selfish ancestors (Wilson 2002, 40).
Belief in the presence of supernatural beings reduces the need for the
worldly policing of believers, as supernatural beings are present when
no humans are. If, genuinely believed and taken seriously, supernatural
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 165

monitoring can therefore make the monitoring of cooperative interac-

tions possible even when worldly monitoring is absent or insufficient
(Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 59).
The larger the size of a group, the more likely it is that gods
worshipped by group members will be concerned with human morality as,
the larger the group size, the higher the need will be for moralizing gods
either to supplement or to make up for the absence of worldly monitoring
(Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 61). Supernatural rewards and punish-
ments which supplement the worldly ones can make the difference in
determining how the individual behaves (Atran and Henrich 2010, 24).
It is also the case that supernatural beliefs can actually be more
powerful than secular ones in enabling altruism (Atran and Henrich 2010,
24). Tortures of hell as punishments for the lack of, and joys of paradise as
rewards for the presence of altruism, may be more effective than worldly
rewards and punishments (Johnson 2005).
Supernatural monitoring of altruism is powerful also because super-
natural punishment and rewards tend to be indiscriminate or collective,
which makes all members of a community to be concerned about the
behavior of each individual. If lack of altruism by one will lead to
the punishment of the whole community, say with a natural disaster,
all members of the community will be watching that each individual
performs his duties (Atran and Henrich 2010, 24).
Below are some examples of supernatural monitoring of altruism:

In ancient Greece, “it was believed that when a poor person

was expelled from the table of the rich or even rudely handled,
the vengeance of the Furies would be visited upon the heartless
miscreant, for ‘gods and Furies exist for beggars’” (Eliade 1993,
3:223).
According to the Proverbs, the punishment for those who do not
respond to the call for help by others is not to be heard when they
themselves are in need: “He that stopped his ear against the cry of
the poor, shall also cry himself, and shall not be heard” (Proverbs
21:13).
God would punish Christians who refused to be charitable by
denying them eternal life (Bird 1982, 163).
166 R. ERGENER

In Islam, rejecting the orphans and neglecting the feeding of the

poor was equivalent to denying the Day of Judgment (Koran 7:1–
3). Those who do not have faith in God and do not feed the needy
(Koran 69:34).
Divine punishment for failure to practice charity can be supple-
mented by earthly punishments dealt by religious specialists. One
example is with regard to the ancient Jewish practice of leaving
harvest portions on the field to be gathered by the poor at harvest
time (Loewenberg 1995, 312). In the Bible, there are no mecha-
nisms to enforce this practice. Whether the farmer complied would
depend on his goodwill and on social pressure. During later times,
punishments such as flogging were introduced for those who did
not comply (Loewenberg 1995, 312). Still later, charity wardens
and rabbinical courts were given the authority to seize the prop-
erty of the farmers who did not give sufficient amount as charity
(Loewenberg 1995, 317).

A MALADAPTATION OR AN ADAPTATION

Altruism in a small group made up of kin, would not create any

disadvantages for the altruist, as the chances are high that altru-
istic giving would be reciprocated within the small group. Also, the
recipients of altruistic giving are likely to be the donor’s close kin
and altruism would therefore strengthen the genes of the altruist.
Yet, much modern altruism is aimed at total strangers. Evolu-
tionary psychologist Price believes that altruism toward strangers is
a maladaptation, a relic of altruism toward close kin (Price 2008).
Our brains evolved over 2.6 million years during the geological
epoch known as the Pleistocene. During most of this era, our ances-
tors lived in small groups, in the company of close kin. During the
Holocene, which started about 11,700 years ago, humans started to
live in larger communities made up mostly of those who were not
relatives. Under the circumstances, selfless giving became a maladap-
tation from the point of view of the donor. Nevertheless, humans
continued to help others because existence in small kin groups for
millions of years had rendered it unnecessary for the human brain to
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 167

develop the faculties to separate the stranger from kin (Tooby and
Cosmides, n.d.).
But the truth is that we do accord varying degrees of related-
ness and closeness to fellow humans (Gintis et al. 2005, 25). Also,
modern humans are capable of distinguishing between long-lasting
relationships and one time only encounters.
All of this may be because our prehistoric ancestors did not really
live in isolated small groups made up largely of kin. Archaeological
and anthropological evidence shows that, especially during migra-
tions, they had repeated contacts of all sorts with members of other
groups. In eastern and southern Africa people covered hundreds of
kilometers long distances in order to trade, to maintain networks of
mutual support, to enhance their living, and to find mating partners
(Fehr and Henrich 2003). Group conflict would be frequent. Under
the circumstances, it is inconceivable that people would be inca-
pable of recognizing the difference between long- and short-term
relationships (Gintis et al. 2008, 251).
Genetic differentiation observed with present-day hunter—gath-
erer groups provide additional evidence that our ancestors had
frequent contact with those who were not in their immediate group.
Modern altruism then cannot be a maladaptation but an adap-
tation that would have evolved for the obvious reason that groups
with higher rates of altruism would be more prosperous and have
higher chances of survival as compared with those with lower rates
of altruism (Gintis et al. 2008, 248).

Rewards
If fear of punishment is one of two motivators of behavior, the other is
the promise of reward. Religion encourages altruistic behavior with the
promise of rewards, which are not only otherworldly, but also worldly.
Here are some examples.
Ancient Jews believed that those who helped the poor would be
rewarded directly by God (Loewenberg 1995, 309). In the Deuteronomy,
all are expected to be charitable, as the Lord will bless those who are
charitable (Deuteronomy 13:7–10). Proverbs says, that showing mercy to
168 R. ERGENER

do poor is in effect lending to God and that the merciful will be blessed
and repaid (19:17, 21).
“The disciples assumed that how persons would fare at the time of
judgment could not be predetermined by strict observance of either ritual
or moral codes but rather by unswerving devotion to the community and
God’s purpose (cf. Luke 10:38-42) … Acts of hospitality and charity,
especially when they included some element of self-sacrifice, were viewed
as indications of such devotion” (Matthew 25:31–46; Luke 18:18–30;
John 13:34, 35) (Bird 1982, 156). “Disciples were promised that God
would reward their charitable gifts by forgiving their sins after death … In
relation to the ultimate end or telos of the Christian life, namely, seeking
God’s good favor, whether or not one was charitable was a matter of great
import” (Bird 1982, 163).
With the Catholics, acts of mercy which entailed giving by the rich and
the strong to the poor and the weak strengthened one’s defense at the last
judgment day. The deeds could be directed to unworthy persons, so long
as they were poor. That led to dependence, palliated poverty and led to
the emergence of groups of professional beggars (Cohen 2005, 305).
In Islam, there are two kinds of almsgiving: the obligatory zakat and
the voluntary sadaqa. The believer has no choice but give the zakat.
Giving the zakat brings no extra benefits yet not giving it, brings serious
penalties. Giver of the sadaqa, on the other hand, accumulates extra
credits which he can use against sins at the judgment day. “Take alms
(sadaqa) from their possessions so as to cleanse and purify them with (the
alms), and pray on their behalf’ (Koran 9:103)” (Bonner 2005, 309).
For a Muslim, one of the ways to expiate a sin is feeding the poor.
Feeding an unspecified number of poor or making a gift of a domestic
animal at the Ka’ba, or performing the equivalent in fasting would atone
for deliberately hunting while in a state of sanctification (ihram) and/or
in the sacred grounds (Koran 5:95). Giving food to ten persons in need
would be sufficient to expiate the sin committed by breaking an oath.
The amount of food to be shared was to be calculated according to the
consumption standards of the donor’s family. The repentant also had the
other options of dressing up the poor, releasing a slave, or, if he could not
afford any of these, fasting for three days (Koran 5:89). It was necessary
to feed sixty poor to retract an oath (zihar) one had made to repudiate
his wife (Koran 58:4) (Bonner 2005, 397).
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 169

Defines Groups
People tend to think of themselves as members of groups, which are in
rivalry with other groups (Wilson 2002, 27). Altruism is practiced with
group members, not with members of rival groups. Communities larger
than a few hundred individuals with moral behavior never existed before
the advent of agriculture and are therefore not natural as such (Wilson
2002, 119–120). Religious imagery and symbolism provide a suitable
medium to represent and to activate a moral system that is essential for
such groups to exist and operate (Sosis and Alcorta 2003, 266).
Religion can reinforce altruistic behavior by having divine laws validate
society as an entity, which is more than the sum of the persons and organi-
zations, which make it up (Durkheim 1965). This can stimulate charitable
behavior and attitudes by the stronger individuals toward the weaker ones,
as part of the effort to maintain the group (Rappaport 1999).
“In response to the broader society’s hostility toward them, early
Christians generally intensified their in - group fellowship and solidarity
(Schnabel 2004; cited in Kim, 14). This is precisely how the Apostle Paul
exhorted Christians to respond in Romans 12:12–16 (Kim 2010, 14).”

Provides the Leadership Gift

One of the most consistent stylized facts on fund-raising strategies is the
importance of leadership gifts, which are the largest gift of the drive which
stimulate others to donate. “When a big (leadership giver) comes in, the
smaller donors pay attention. It legitimizes a fund-raising project and puts
the institution on a much faster track” (Firestone 1998; cited in Andreoni
2006). Possibly, no other “leadership gift” can be as powerful as a model
and as a source of inspiration for potential altruists, as what Christian
religion provides: the image of the dying and suffering God, who has
sacrificed himself for the good of humankind.
The Hebrew root aheb, which refers to male–female love, also means
God’s love for humankind and the love of humankind for God, as well
as the feelings of love humans nurture toward each other. God’s love
for humankind stems from his inherent features (Deuteronomy 10:13–
17, Psalms 145:15–16). Love of God and of other humans is a person’s
response to God’s love and her expression of her gratitude for it (Eliade
1993, 3:223).
170 R. ERGENER

With Christianity, “to be charitable was to show mercy like God

himself” (Bird 1982, 163). Acts like martyrdom or taking care of inflicted
Christians as well as non-Christians during epidemics, at the risk of
getting sick or dying themselves, were leadership gifts which made great
contribution to the spread of Christianity (Stark 1996).
God provides the model for altruism for Muslims. Moslem donors are
to give to the needy generously and continuously and with no expectation
of reciprocity. Giving in this manner would be imitating God, who gave
gifts to humankind that cannot be reciprocated (Bonner 2005, 392). The
pious person remembered the kin and the non-kin, who were poor and in
need. Rather than wishing these persons never existed, he warmed their
hearts with kind words and filled their empty stomachs (Koran 4.36, 86)
(Brown 2005, 520).
Families also provide new generations with models of charity. Chil-
dren remain skeptical of supernatural agents except for those which
their parents and other adults they respect, endorse through their
actions (Harris et al. 2006). Interviews conducted with highly religious
parents from diverse backgrounds and different faiths (Christian, Jewish,
Mormon, and Muslim) show that families believe that in order for reli-
gion to be effective in holding their children on a righteous path, it is
necessary for the parents to make costly investments in “practicing (and
parenting) what they preach” (Marks 2004; cited in Atran and Henrich
2010, 22).
Leadership gifts are also provided by religious leaders by fulfilling
costly obligations required by their respective religions. Costly religious
traditions in the form of gift-giving ceremonies and other holy rites,
are likely to generate more commitment. Successful groups and institu-
tions will have costly displays of faith and also the values which glorify
these costs. For example, the Navajo males allocate one-third and Navajo
women one-fifth, of their productive time to the performance of “priestly
rites” (Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946). Among the Native American
groups, Navajos are the most successful in terms of cooperation and being
survivors (Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946).

Asks
Feelings of empathy and pro-social behavior are greatly influenced by
communication, especially by the power of asking. Social cues can be
employed to activate the capacity for altruism. Requests by potential
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 171

recipients and others are one of the ways to have tendencies of compas-
sion to overcome the feelings of self-defense and asking repeatedly is one
of the ways religions promote altruism (Andreoni and Rao 2011, 519).

Sanctifies
Much more so than animals, humans learn behavior patterns, beliefs,
motivations, and strategies from other members of their species, and
mostly from those who are in their own group, through cultural mecha-
nisms (Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Richerson and Boyd 2005; cited in
Atran and Henrich 2010).
Natural selection may have cultivated in our psyches a willingness
to prefer culturally acquired information to information we obtain
through direct experience or intuition (Atran and Henrich 2010, 22). For
example, a frequently observed behavior among foragers is to remove the
toxins in the plants they consume, even though they have no informa-
tion on what would happen if they did not process the plant (Beck 1992;
cited in Atran and Henrich 2010, 21). The toxins removed are usually
present in the plants consumed in small quantities. The amount of toxins
present would not alter the taste of the plant and cause limited harm over
a period of weeks or even months. However, if consumed continuously,
such toxins can build up in the body and cause major health complica-
tions, including loss of life. A forager who prefers to rely on his own
judgment and intuition rather than doing what everybody else does can
choose not to process the plant. This will save him some effort, but kill
him in the long run. To trust customary rules may therefore be an adap-
tive attitude that would raise one’s chances of survival (Atran and Henrich
2010, 21).
One of the cultural mechanisms employed to cultivate altruism is sanc-
tifying such behavior, which religion does. As Rappaport says, “People
are more willing to accept sanctified than un-sanctified messages as true;
to the extent that they do, their responses to sanctified messages will tend
to be predictable and the operation of the society orderly” (Rappaport
1971, 30).

Reminds
Results of various experiments illustrate that the faithful are likely to give
more help to those in need and cheat less when they are reminded of
172 R. ERGENER

religion. Temples are among the reminders of religion which would stim-
ulate altruistic behavior. It has been proposed that beginning with early
civilizations, societies that exploited this aspect of human psychology,
for example, by building monumental temples, such as ziggurats and
pyramids, did better than others (Atran and Henrich 2010, 26).
Religious rituals and religious surroundings, related to morally
concerned deities, would remind one of the moral attitudes of these
deities and by default facilitate concern for the well-being of others
(Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 59).
Peter Brown makes the interesting point that more so than material
support, or in order to be identified as recipients of material support, the
poor need above all to be remembered. For, the poor are unsettling and
ambiguous and they are often alone, outside of family and other networks
that provide support (Brown 2005, 520). As it is said in the Proverbs,
“The poor man shall be hateful even to his own neighbor: but the friends
of the rich are many” (14:20).
At the farther ends of the spectrum of the forgotten, there are the dead
and god himself.
It is easy to forget the dead and religions teach that it is both shameful
and inhuman to do so.
God Himself is liable to be forgotten by the well off and the worldly,
as he is invisible (Brown 2005, 520). With the three Abrahamic religions,
good deeds, aimed at the easily overlooked deprived, are intertwined
with teachings that remind the believers of a God, who too can be easily
forgotten (Brown 2005, 520).
Interestingly, the most enthusiastic defenders of the poor, the religious
personalities who are the rabbis, the clergy, the monks, and the ulema
(Muslim scholars) are themselves often in danger of being forgotten,
as what they do can be regarded not worthy of being remembered by
the rest of society (Brown 2005, 520). Despite the prestige accorded to
religious experts in their own environments, the rich were not always
impressed by the otherworldly benefits these experts supplied (Brown
2005, 522). And those who exercise real power, can consider the contri-
bution of religious leaders to society as unimportant and “forget” them
(Brown 2005, 520).
In the early medieval period, clergy, monks, and nuns were banned
from carrying arms and having children. This debarment rendered clergy,
monks, and nuns marginal to the needs of a community, the livelihood
of which was based on warfare and kin support. But the saving of the
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 173

souls would be possible only through these marginal individuals. And the
survival of these strictly unnecessary persons depended on their being
remembered. And, these unnecessary persons would indeed make the
effort to be remembered by the laity.
All through the early centuries of the Christian church, the clergy
expected to be supported by the faithful and demanded tax exemptions
(Brown 2002, 23–31). While organizing the relief for the poor, the Chris-
tian clergy would make persistent claims for themselves. Christians were
preached to give gifts not only to the poor but also to the Church.
Perhaps the priests preached the remembrance of the poor with urgency
because if one forgot the poor, he could forget his priest as well (Brown
2005, 521).
Ignoring the needs of the clergy, monks, and nuns was no different
from neglecting the “poor.” Indeed, whether the references to the “poor”
in Medieval Europe were in reference to the clergy, monks, and nuns or
to the lay poor, is hard to decide. Both groups could be considered as
being “‘poor’ in that they had reason to fear being forgotten” (Brown
2005, 521).
There was a similar situation in the Ottoman Empire, where the ulema
(scholars) were valued as Islamic judges, legal experts, teachers, and
preachers. But their position in the social network was fragile as their
employment was controlled by a patronage system which involved many
uncertainties. At any time, they could find themselves out of a job and
with no means of income. They were remembered within the context
of the large public soup kitchens of the Ottoman Empire, known as the
imarets. The imarets were large complexes which often included not only
soup kitchens but also mosques, schools, and public baths. The right to
eat at an imaret was granted not so much to those who were in genuine
need but to scholars and students, providing them with social security
(Brown 2005, 522).

Teachings and Practice

of Charity in Abrahamic Religions
Ancient Greek and Roman religion was not charitable as such. Believers
could make any wishes from gods including amoral ones provided that
they made the appropriate offerings—and provided that the gods lent
an ear and cared to respond. Charity was preached by philosophers such
as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The pre-Socratic philosophers proposed
that principles of justice and equality were of divine origin. Pythagoras
174 R. ERGENER

emphasized the importance of equality and harmony in social relations.

The Stoics perceived charity as a social and economic need, as an obliga-
tion that was moral and religious and as a duty toward all “broken and
destitute humanity wherever found (Eliade 1981, 223).
Jewish, Christian and Muslim scriptures enjoined compassion for the
poor (Brown 2005, 518).
Yahweh was at the beginning a national god who was interested
primarily with the defense and material prosperity of his people. “Threats
of punishment and doom directed at this people arise only for the worship
of foreign gods whose exemplars are the Baalim. All this changes in the
eighth and seventh centuries B.C.E. with the classical prophets” (Silver
c1983, 123). Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, Zephaniah, and
Ezekiel, teach that Yahweh foreshadows personal and national devas-
tation above all because some of his people are left to be poor and
oppressed. Prophet Amos (5:21–24) tells openly that he hates offerings,
festivals, hymns, and ceremonies. What God wants from well-off Israelites
is goodness, not offerings (Hosea 6:6).
Two types of poor relief were preached in the Bible during early
periods: measures aiming at preventing the working poor from sinking
to poverty and measures designed to provide basic support for those who
were already poor and dependent on others.
First kind of measures included the provision of loans without
interest (Exodus 22.24) and their cancelation in the Sabbatical Year
(Deuteronomy 15.1–2), payment of wages promptly (Deuteronomy
24.15), relatives’ claiming (Leviticus 25.23–28), and the restoration in
the Jubilee Year to the original owner of land (Leviticus 25.13) that had
been sold (Loewenberg 1995, 311).
“Poor relief institutions of the second category which were aimed at
providing for those who were already poor included the assignment of
various agricultural harvest portions to the poor, such as the corner of
every field (Lev. 19.9), gleanings (Lev. 19.9), forgotten sheaves (Deut.
24.19), grape droppings, and defective grape clusters (Lev. 19.9–10).
These annual provisions were supplemented twice in every seven-year
cycle by the poor person’s tithe (Deut. 14.28). The institution of contrac-
tual slavery (by which a poor Jew sold his services for six years) should
also be included in the second category of poor relief schemes (Exodus
21.1–6).” (Loewenberg 1995, 311).
Spread of Christianity was rapid. 350 years after Christ, the total
number of Christians had risen to 33.8 million or half the population
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 175

of the Roman Empire (Stark 1996, 7). Several scholars have proposed
that the most important reason for the rapid spread of Christianity was
the widespread practice of charity by the early Christians. (Brown 2002;
Harnack 1962; Schnabel 2004).
In the following statement taken from a letter, the fourth-century
Roman emperor Julian (the Apostate, 361–363 C.E.), who tried to revive
paganism, admitted how the practice of charity among the Jews and the
Christians was much stronger than the practice among the pagans: “It
is disgraceful when no Jew ever has to beg and the impious Galileans
(Christians) support not only their own poor but ours as well, all men
see that our people lack aid from us” (Epistle 22; cited in Sperber, Roman
Palestine, 200-400, the Land, 263).
Early Christians put greater emphasis on the well-being of the commu-
nity and of others than their own. “The apologist Aristides, writing in the
second century, reports that if there is among them (Christians) any that
is poor and needy, and if they have no spare food, they fast for two or
three days in order to supply to the needy their lack of food” (Aristides
1896, 277; cited in Kim 2010, 5). Christians would even have themselves
imprisoned to ransom others and sell themselves to slavery to buy food
for the hungry with the proceeds (Clement of Rome [Bishop of Rome,
88–99], the first Apostolic Father, quoted in Mason and Robinson 2004,
697; cited in Kim 2010, 5). Even in the giving of alms, Christians prob-
ably went beyond the tithe that was instituted later, in perhaps the fourth
century (Bird 1982). The transfer of resources from the rich to the poor
was, after all, large enough to meet the basic needs of everyone in the
community. There was not a single Christian who was in need as the
property owners would sell their houses and land and lay the proceeds at
the apostles’ feet (Acts 4:34–36).
The Didache, an extensively circulated ancient guide for the early
church, urged a uniting charity with an emphasis on eternity: “Share all
your possessions with your brother, and call nothing your own. If you
and he share what is immortal in common, how much more should you
share what is mortal!” (Kim 2010, 17).
Similarly, “The Koran provides a blueprint for a new order in society,
in which the poor will be treated more fairly than before” (Bonner
2005, 391). Refusal to feed the deprived is a reflection of the excessive
attachment to worldly riches (Koran 89:17–20).
“And all of you should serve God and associate none with Him; and
show kindness and affection to your parents, and be kind to near relatives,
176 R. ERGENER

and to orphans, and to the needy; and be considerate to your neighbor’s

kinsmen and strangers and to the companions at your side and to the
wayfarer and to the slaves in your possession. Believe it that Allah does
not like such persons as are self-conceited and are niggardly and bid others
to be niggardly, and conceal the bounty of Allah that He has bestowed
upon them” (Koran 4:36–38).
“Piety (al - birr) does not consist in turning your faces toward East and
West. It consists rather in a person’s believing in God, the Last Day, the
Angels, the Book and the Prophets; and in his giving his property/money,
despite his love for it, to his relatives (dhawi l - qurba), the orphans, the
poor, the traveler, the beggars (al - sa’ilin), and to the slaves, and in
his per-forming the prayer and in giving zakat ” (Koran 2:177) (Bonner
2005, 400).
Members of the community who first gathered around Muhammad
when he began to receive revelations, came from varied tribal and
social backgrounds, many of whom were in poverty. The revelations of
Muhammad from this time, which are known as the early Meccan suras,
or “chapters” of the Koran, probably put greater emphasis on generosity
and almsgiving than on any other kind of action (Bonner 2005, 394). In
the Meccan or early suras, giving food to those who could not afford it
themselves was a sign of being one of the “Com-panions of the Right
Hand” (Koran 90:13–20).
There are frequent referrals to the poor again in the suras which
descended during Muhammad’s final years. Many members of the
Moslem community could not afford the camels, martial equipment,
and provisions necessary to join Muhammad’s final military campaigns.
There were particular difficulties with the preparations for the campaign
for Tabuk in 630 C.E. Various people gave weapons, riding animals,
and other necessities to those who could not afford them. The eighth
(Al-Anfãl or “The Spoils of War”) and ninth (Al-Tawbah or “The Repen-
tance”) suras put emphasis on the themes of joining the war effort and
giving support to other Moslems to fight.
We shall finish this chapter with a story from the Babylonian Talmud,
Baba Batra, 10a (Epstein, I. (ed.) 1935; cited in Loewenberg 1995,
311). Tineius Rufus, the Roman governor of Judea, asks Rabbi Akiva,
an outstanding scholar of second century C.E., the provocative question:
“If your God loves the poor, why does he not support them?” In his
answer, Rabbi Akiva points out that it was God’s desire for both the rich
 8 RELIGION AND CHARITY 177

and the poor to have a chance to help each other, rather than rely on
heavenly support.

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 CHAPTER 9

Religion and Economic Performance

… Of Individuals
Paul Gifford, a scholar from School of Oriental and African Studies at
the University of London, who made an extensive study of the spread
of Christianity in Africa, observed in 2007 that all forms of Christian-
ity were growing in an explosive manner in Africa but the churches
growing fastest were the ones which concentrated on “success.” Mem-
bers of these churches, which Gifford labeled as “neo-Pentecostal” or
“Pentecostal-like,” are expected to be “successful; if not, something is
very wrong” (Gifford 2007, 20). The success promised by these churches
for their members embraces all areas of life; material success, however, was
paramount (Gifford 2007, 21). The testimonies of successful ones are
almost all not about spiritual conquests, but material accomplishments,
such as “scholarships, jobs, cars and promotions” (Gifford 2007, 21).
Pastors of these churches are often called with grand titles such as
“Man of God” or “Prophet” or “Mega Bishop,” and they have great
powers over their congregations. Some churches have a seating capacity
of 50,000 (Gifford 2007, 21). Prophets are persons of a totally different
order from these massive congregations. They are totally unchallengeable:
Going against a prophet is equivalent to rising against the word of God
(Gifford 2007, 22). African prophets claim that they were commanded
by God to make “His people rich,” just like Moses was commanded to
go and set “His people free” (Gifford 2007, 21).

© The Author(s) 2020 181

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_9
182 R. ERGENER

Sermons preach that motivation and positive mental attitude bring

material success. If one is not successful and rich, it is his fault. One can
become anything he wants—one’s own self is the only thing that can
stop him. Africans should expect and demand the success which is their
right and inheritance. Individual self-esteem, ambition, and confidence
are emphasized. Being African does not mean subservience and poverty,
Africans can succeed just like the whites do (Gifford 2007, 22).
The focus is above all on entrepreneurship. Well-known entrepreneurs
are presented as models to emulate. At least once during every service,
worshippers at several churches are told to ask other worshippers if they
have started their own businesses (Gifford 2007, 20). Gifford reports that
Bill Gates can be mentioned twice in a sermon in which Christ is not
mentioned at all (Gifford 2007, 21).
Teachings such as “you matter,” “you belong to the top,” and “you
will get what you want” motivate the churchgoers in a manner which
is very much missing in African societies, where success is very rare.
The churches that survived must have had a sufficient number of suc-
cessful members which vindicated the veracity of their teachings (Gifford
2007, 24).
Divine energy and miraculous provision were also important if not
more so in achieving success, than human energy and motivation
(Gifford 2007, 21). The amount of motivation and miracle needed to
enable changes would be determined case by case.
Miracles do not happen unless “seeds are sown”—meaning “tithes are
paid” to the church. Whether and how “giving” (to the church) con-
tributes to the material success of (the giving) individuals, are questions
that beg explanation. There is no doubt however that such theology has
proved extremely useful for gifted religious entrepreneurs to amass wealth
(Gifford 2007, 22).
Similar messages are given by the churches preaching the “prosper-
ity gospel” in North America. Indeed, it was the “prosperity gospel”
churches which most likely provided the models for the African churches
which preach success.
“God knows where the money is, and he knows how to get the money
to you,” preaches Mrs. Copeland of the Kenneth Copeland Ministries
(Goodstein 2009). “God is the Presence of Infinite Good within you here
and now … and this presence is within everyone … You unlearn sickness
and learn health. You unlearn poverty and know prosperity…You solve
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 183

every problem yourself!” preached His (Late) Divine Eminence, Dr. Fred-
erick J. Eikerenkoetter II, the self-proclaimed “Apostle of Green Power,
who was known affectionately as “Rev. Ike” to his followers (Schroeder
1981).
“I like money. I need money. I want money. I love money in its right
place. The lack of money is the root of all evil! Money is good! I bless
the idea of money in my mind…” preached Rev. Ike and money came to
him (and to other preachers of the prosperity gospel) through outright
gifts, solicited gifts, copyright revenues, lecture fees, and the fees received
for faith healing and for prayers conducted on behalf of members. Rev.
Copeland created from among the members of his ministry an “Elite CX
Team” whose duty it was to raise money to purchase the ministry a Cita-
tion X airplane (Goodstein 2009).
Another source of revenue would be the sale of various items. Rev. Ike
sold plastic “money rakes” to symbolically and magically rake prosperity.
Prayer cloth which could be used for healing was available through various
ministries. The prayer cloth sold by preacher Oral Roberts came with the
print of the preacher’s right hand. The cloth sold by Rev. Ike was so
powerful that if a single thread of one of those bargains fell by chance
through the newly slit throat of one of New York’s crime victims, instant
and total healing would be provided (Schroeder 1981).
The altar call was a major source of revenue for all prosperity gospel
preachers. “Give and God will give to you! The more you give, the more
you get!” preached Reverend Ike. During his altar call, members were
invited to the altar in an order based on how much they are going to
donate. First, those who are going to give 100 dollars, then those who
are going to give 75, then 50 and so on all the way down to those who
will give 5 dollars or even 1, because of the weakness of either their faith
or their purse or both. They would flock to the altar as Ike read his ver-
sion of the prayer of Abraham, with the fleecing of sheep and goats and
everything that happens. The hallelujahs would rise from the ranks to the
gold-gilded ceiling, Ike would chant “Hold those bills high! I want every-
one to see your faith! I want to hear the rustle, not the jingle!” and the
ushers would collect the donations in plastic buckets, as the conventional
collection baskets would be inadequate in this case (Schroeder 1981).
Prosperity gospel then provides very well for its preachers, just like
the Pentecostal churches of Africa provide for theirs. Again, as in Africa,
it is questionable whether the members who make regular contributions
to merit special prayers, who purchase various products marketed by the
184 R. ERGENER

ministries and who respond to “altar calls,” dropping or “sowing” money,

like seeds, get much if anything in return for their investments.
Even though such religious practices, which are undertaken explicitly
with the intention of raising one’s earnings, probably fail to do so, it
has been well established that various other religious practices, do indeed
positively impact economic performance.

Religious Attendance and Personal Income

An interesting quantitative study on the impact of church attendance on
the economic performance of individuals was made by Jonathan Gruber.
Using data obtained from white Americans who did not have Hispanic
roots and who belonged to various Christian churches, to other religions
or who had no faith, Gruber reached the conclusion that if a person dou-
bles his church attendance, his income rises by 10% (Gruber 2005).
People are expected to go to church more frequently, if they are of the
same faith with their neighbors. For example, Irish Catholics, who share
the same neighborhood in Boston with Polish and Italian Catholics, are
more likely to attend church weekly, as compared with the Irish Catholics
in Minneapolis, who live in an area populated predominantly by Scandi-
navian Protestants.
Therefore, Gruber reasoned that the density of members of same faith
but of different ethnicities (or nationalities) in a city in the United States
would be a good forecaster of church attendance. Since his goal was to
identify the impact of religion and not of ethnicity on income, Gruber
focused on the “density of co-religionists” (individuals who shared one’s
religion but not ethnicity) and not on the density of the members of
an ethnic group. Studies have shown that people who live in “ghettos”
with others who share their ethnic roots are likely to be less well off as
compared with those who do not (Economist Economic Focus 2005).
After taking into consideration other differences between cities, Gru-
ber’s findings showed that a 10% higher concentration of those who share
the same religion in a neighborhood would lead to a 0.9% increase in
earnings. He also estimated that a 10% rise in the concentration of those
who share the same religion in an area brings about an 8.5% increase in
church attendance (Economist Economic Focus 2005). In other words,
Catholic Poles in Boston will both go to church more often and will be
materially better off relative to Poles in Minneapolis, because in Boston
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 185

there are large numbers of non-Polish Catholics and relatively few Scan-
dinavian Protestants, whereas there are more Scandinavian Protestants in
Minnesota relative to non-Polish Catholics (Economist Economic Focus
2005).
Residing in areas with different ethnic groups who share the same reli-
gion has no influence on participation in other civic activities. There are
no differences between the Poles in Boston and the Poles in Minnesota
with regard to joining secular organizations. After taking into considera-
tion the general differences between cities, Gruber concludes that differ-
ences in income are caused by religious attendance (Economist Economic
Focus 2005).
Is Gruber right? Does a causal link between religious attendance and
prosperity truly exist? And if so, how is it that going to church makes one
richer? (Economist Economic Focus 2005).
It is possible of course that rather than high earners earning more
because they go to church frequently, high earners are also frequent
churchgoers. Rather than religious behavior having an impact on other
behavior, both religious behavior and other behavior can be shaped by
underlying reasons. Being highly motivated and having high degree of
self-control could make a person both a high achiever at work and also a
frequent churchgoer (Economist Economic Focus 2005).
It may therefore be more appropriate to interpret what seems like the
positive impact of religious attendance on individual economic perfor-
mance as a partial correlation (Guiso et al. 2003, 232).
With this qualification in mind, let us look for the ways in which reli-
gious attendance can enhance economic performance of believers.

Religious Attendance, Non-economic Behavior, and Economic

Performance
One approach is that religious attendance can positively impact certain
non-economic behavior such as obeying the law, substance use, school
attendance, and health and marriage, which can then have positive impact
on economic performance.
One should keep in mind that reservations, similar to those which
apply to the studies on the relation between religion and high earnings,
also apply to the studies which relate various positive behavioral outcomes
to religiosity.
186 R. ERGENER

First, that the correlation between religion and good behavior is causal
is far from being clear. The results may be endogenous. In other words,
it is possible that “good kids … avoid drugs, stay in school, and (not
because) they go to church” (Freeman 1986). Religiously brought up
people may be behaving in a certain way not because of their religious
upbringing but because another variable has been passed on to them
through their families either through genes or training.
Second, what seems like a relationship between religion and outcomes
is actually to a large extent shaped by other factors as well. For example,
on the average, the Catholics in the United States tend to be wealthier
than the members of all other religions, with the exception of Jews. This
success is generally attributed not to Catholicism as such but to the quality
of the Catholic educational system (and to other reasons which we shall
discuss later in this chapter). Therefore, what makes American Catholics
successful is not religion as such, but the influence of the Catholic edu-
cation system and church institutions. It would be wrong therefore to
propose on the basis of wages received by Catholics being high in the
United States that Catholicism would raise the standard of living in Latin
America (Guiso et al. 2003, 231).
Finally, these studies are mostly based on the United States and cannot
necessarily be generalized to other countries.
Once more, with above reservations in mind, let us look at some of the
studies, which trace the positive impact of religiosity on income through
the positive impact of religiosity on certain non-economic outcomes.
Gruber claimed that regular religious participation is correlated with
better education. Gruber’s claims were confirmed by Freeman (1986),
who argued, based on NBER and NLS surveys, that there was a posi-
tive correlation between church attendance and school attendance. Data
gathered by Sherkat and Ellison also show that high school students that
attend church services regularly are more likely to attend school regularly
and do their homework and graduate as compared with those who do not
attend church regularly (Sherkat and Ellison 1999).
Freeman also showed that among black males in the United States,
church attendance had a positive correlation with employment rates and
negative correlation with crime, alcohol consumption, and drug use
(Freeman 1986). According to Freeman, at least some of the positive
effects of church attendance can be attributable to causal impact (Free-
man 1986).
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 187

Other studies also reveal a negative relationship between frequent reli-

gious participation and levels of adult crime behavior, at both the individ-
ual (Evans et al. 1995) and at the area levels (Lipford et al. 1993; Hull
and Bold 1995). Violent and nonviolent crime rates were found to be
lower in the United States, in states and counties with higher rates of
religious membership. These results would be valid after taking into con-
sideration other factors which can have an impact on crime rates such as
police expenditures (Iannaccone 1998, 1476).
High level of religious attendance is correlated with lower levels of sub-
stance abuse (Cochran and Akers 1989). Frequent religious participation
is also associated with the retarding of deviant behavior of many types
among youths (Bachman et al. 2014; cited in Wallace and William 1997,
4; Gruber and Mullaainathan 2006, 4).
In the United States, lower levels of most “deviant” behaviors includ-
ing drug use, smoking, drinking, and criminal activity are observed among
youth who are raised in sectarian denominations (Bock et al. 1987; Stark
and Bainbridge 1987).
Being religious seems to have a positive influence on health as well.
Strict religious rules with regard to smoking and alcohol make a difference
(Levin 1994). Members of strict religions such as Mormons and Seventh-
Day Adventists who do not tolerate smoking, drinking, drug use, and
other types of behavior have lower rates of cancer, stroke, hypertension,
and heart disease, and they live longer, as compared with the rest of the
population who do not follow such strict rules (Iannaccone 1998, 1477).
Non-marital sex is less common among those who are more religious
(Green 2003). AIDS among Muslims in Central Africa and Christians in
Uganda is reduced, and this may be because of the restraints imposed on
sexual activity by religion (Green 2003).
Religiosity is correlated with marital stability (Lehrer and Chiswick
1993) and lower divorce rates (Heaton and Pratt 1990). This can be
explained by religious teachings and rules and also by the strengthen-
ing of religious bonds by the couple being of same religion and of same
denomination (Becker et al. 1977).
Rate of divorce is significantly lower among those sect members who
are married with members of the same sect as compared with those who
are married with members of different sects or those who are of less sec-
tarian religious backgrounds (Lehrer and Chiswick 1993).
Religious believers may be better equipped for success in life, because
they are less concerned with daily problems—the assumption being that
188 R. ERGENER

those who are less concerned with daily problems tend to be more suc-
cessful (Economist Economic Focus 2005). Various studies point to a
correlation between religiosity and self-reported measures of well-being
(Ellison 1991; Hout and Greeley 2003). The change that takes place in
self-reported happiness as one moves from never-attending church ser-
vice to attending weekly is comparable to a move from the bottom to top
income quartile (Gruber and Mullaainathan 2006). This may be because
religion can relieve the effects of upsetting events on subjective well-being
(Levin 1994).
One of the ways religion can reduce the distress caused by a decline
in self-perceived well-being is by reducing the value associated with such
changes. Cross-sectional data from Europe show that divorce has less of
a drop in the happiness of Catholics than it does in that of the non-
religious. Along the same lines, well-being of members of religious orga-
nizations is less affected by unemployment as compared with those who
are not members of such organizations (Clark and Lelkes 2005).
Various empirical studies show that levels of religious commitment and
activity are positively associated with mental health, lower stress, and con-
tentment of life (Ellison 1991). These results are valid when other factors
that can have an impact on mental health, such as stress and life satisfac-
tion, age, income, education, gender, race, marital status, place of resi-
dence, social ties, and the traumatic events one has had to live through,
are also taken into account (Ellison 1991).
Empirical evidence seems to show that the tendency to commit suicide
is lower with religious individuals, another sign of mental health (Bain-
bridge 1989; Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989). In his 1897 study on
the impact of religiosity on suicide rates, Durkheim had found that sui-
cide rates were lower in the more Catholic communities than in Protestant
ones. Durkheim had attributed this difference not to Catholic teachings
on suicide, but rather to the Catholic communities being more integrated
than Protestant ones as Catholicism tends to promote integration and
regulate standards of faith, piety, and moral conduct through ritual and
community action (Ellison et al. 1997).

Religion and Social Support

One of the explanations for the positive correlation between mental health
and religiosity can be the positive correlation between church involvement
and social solidarity and support. (Levin 1994)
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 189

Church attendance can provide a sort of happiness insurance. In a study

conducted in the United States, this finding was found to be true mainly
for the blacks. Regularly attending church service provides blacks with sig-
nificant happiness insurance. Income shocks on happiness are almost fully
offset if attendance is weekly rather than once a year. For whites, religious
attendance has no statistically significant happiness insurance effect. How-
ever, weekly rather than once a year attendance offsets about one-third of
the effect of income shocks on happiness for the whites as well (Dehejia
et al. 2007, 261).
Religious networks are one of the social networks which, together with
families and the local community, make up for the failure of private and
government to remedy individual income shocks. Churchgoers provide
for each other not only mutual emotional but also financial insurance
which allows them to recover more quickly from setbacks (Economist
Economic Focus 2005).
If capital markets were perfect, the optimal consumption of consumers
would be insensitive to transitory changes in income: They would borrow
in the formal capital market against expected income and maintain their
level of consumption (Dehejia et al. 2007, 260). In reality, people have
only limited opportunities to make such borrowing. Private companies
do not offer insurance against income risk, and the government insures
income risk only partially, mainly through the taxation system, transfer
payments, unemployment insurance, and similar programs (Dehejia et al.
2007, 260).
Consequently, substitute instruments have been developed to shelter
consumption from income shocks. In response to a fall in income, indi-
viduals can protect their consumption by using savings (Leland 1968) or
by having more family members join the labor force (Cullen and Gruber
2000).
In this context, religious organizations can play an important role in
the provision of social capital and in the fostering of norms of mutual
aid and reciprocity (Putnam 2000). Membership in such groups is costly,
which limits the number of potential beneficiaries and makes it easier to
correctly identify and meet needs (Iannaccone 1992; Berman 2000). The
monitoring of fellow members within the group reduces the possibility of
moral wrongdoing and deception.
One of the hypotheses Dhejia et al. investigate in their 2007 paper
is whether religious organizations provide consumption insurance against
income shocks (Dehejia et al. 2007, 260). Their findings show that being
190 R. ERGENER

involved in religious organizations eliminates 40% of the decline in con-

sumption caused by a fall in income. “Being involved in religious orga-
nizations” is measured in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, CEX,1 as
making any contribution to a religious organization (Dehejia et al. 2007,
261). These findings are correct primarily for white households, who
make up the larger share of the sample. It is not clear whether the same
outcomes would be true for blacks as well (Dehejia et al. 2007, 261).
Another interesting case of religious establishment functioning as a
provider of social (and financial and moral) insurance against income
shocks is provided by Chen in Indonesia (Chen 2010). In Indonesia,
households experiencing decline in their income are more likely to join
Qur’an study groups and switch their children to Islamic schools. Those
who did so would find it easier to receive alms and credit to meet their
basic income needs within four months, as compared with those who did
not (Chen 2010, 343). When credit is easily available, there is no marked
tendency for families to spend more time studying Islam. Those who ben-
efit most from the alms and credit following an increase in religious stud-
ies are households who were not religious previously (Chen 2010, 343).
Social insurance is likely to be less significant for those who are at least
partially insured through religion against changes in consumption and
happiness, brought about by oscillations in income. Conversely, the avail-
ability of social insurance can lead to a reduction of the demand for insur-
ance provided by religion (Hungerman 2005; Gruber and Hungerman
2007). A reduction in social insurance will lead to a rise in the demand for
insurance provided by religious organizations and to a rise in their influ-
ence, even if the country remains secular with the separation of church
and state (Dehejia et al. 2007, 277). Indeed, demand for social insurance
is likely to be relatively lower in areas and among individuals that are more
religious (Stasavage and Scheve 2005, 2006).
Sectarian denominations practice strong mutual community support
(Iannaccone and Berman 2006b, 118). In the United States, members
of Christian sects donate a high share of their income to the members of
their own communities (Iannaccone 1998). The same is true for Judaism

1 “The CEX is a nationally representative survey of roughly 5000 households per year,
is the basic source of data for the construction of the items and weights in the market
basket of consumer purchases to be priced for the Consumer Price Index, and is widely
regarded as the best source of U.S. consumption expenditure data” (Dehejia et al. 2007,
261).
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 191

and Islam. Ultra-Orthodox Jews both in Israel and the rest of the world
have more extensive networks of mutual support than (Iannaccone and
Berman 2006a, 118) the less observant Judaic denominations (Berman
2000).
When the secular provision of basic services such as schooling, health
care, poverty programs, property rights, financial services, and police pro-
tection are negatively affected by poor government or civil disorder, sects
can step into fill the vacuum (Iannaccone and Berman 2006a, b). The
main reason why radical Islamist groups enjoy broad support, especially
among the poorer segments of society, is because they supply mutual aid
and social services (Iannaccone and Berman 2006a, 118).
So far, we have considered the impact of religiosity on family income
in general—with no focus on the possible differences between different
religions.
We will now review some of the studies (mainly of Lisa A. Keister)
on the different influences different religions in the United States have—
not on household income, but on another indicator of well-being, house-
hold wealth (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Featherman 1971; Greeley 1969;
Lenski 1963b; Glenn and Hyland 1967; Roof 1989; Keister 2003, 2008).

Religion and Wealth

Wealth of a household is its net worth—value of the total assets minus the
value of total obligations (Keister 2008, 1238). Religion is likely to impact
wealth ownership as religion is likely to impact the timing and ordering of
marriage (and divorce), the timing and number of children, educational
aspirations and attainment, gender roles with regard to labor force partic-
ipation (Keister 2008, 1251). Religion also directly affects wealth accu-
mulation by defining the socially important goals, by forming a reservoir
of expertise and info that one can resort to when making financial choices
and by playing a role in determining who one’s social contacts are (Keister
2003, 199).
Indeed, Lisa Keister finds sharp differences in the United States among
religious groups, namely Jews, Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Con-
servative Protestants (CPs), with regard to wealth ownership.
The faith of CPs is relatively old-style. They take the Bible as the undis-
putable word of God. They attach importance to personal transformative
experiences and believe that Christian faith can be applied to the solu-
tion of public issues (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Woodberry and Smith
192 R. ERGENER

1998). Assembly of God, Baptist, Churches of Christ, Church of God in

Christ, Nazarene, and Pentecostal are among the best-known and more
sizeable CP churches (“Conservative Protestant denominations are some-
times called ‘Evangelical,’” but as explained in Smith c2000; Woodberry
and Smith 1998 “in reality Evangelicals are a subset of CPs”; cited in
Keister 2008, 1238, footnote 3). Roughly 25% of all Americans belong
to a CP denomination (1998 General Social Survey, cited in Keister 2008,
1238).
Mainline Protestants belong to high-status families and are relatively
wealthy (Keister 2003, 2005; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Mainline Protes-
tant churches include Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians, Luther-
ans, and Unitarians. These churches have more liberal theologies and are
more open to social change (Keister 2007, 7).
Jews and Conservative Protestants are at the opposite tails of wealth
distribution. Whereas the Jews are the wealthiest, CPs are the poorest
in terms of wealth ownership. (In 1998, the mean net worth of Jewish
families was twice as high as the average for a sample of adult Americans.
The median net worth was three times as high [Keister 2003, 187].) With
regard to wealth ownership, mainline Protestants and Catholics are similar
to each other and to the national median (Keister 2003, 173).
Religion seems to be a determinant of wealth, independent of race.
Both black and white CPs have low wealth (Keister 2008, 1254). More
specifically, with regard to financial asset ownership, CPs are the least
well off as compared with members of other faiths (Keister 2003, 2005).
In 2000, the median and the mean net worth of the CPs in the NLSY
(National Longitudinal Survey of Youth) were equal to roughly to 40%
of what it was for the full sample (Keister 2008, 1250).
Until about a generation ago, Roman Catholic families used to be
behind particularly the mainline Protestants families on a number of mea-
sures of well-being (Glenn and Hyland 1967; Lenski 1963b; Sherkat and
Ellison 1999). This has changed as significant changes took place in cer-
tain demographic behaviors of non-Hispanic whites raised in Catholic
families that affect wealth ownership, including fertility, education, and
income (Keister 2007, 2).
Let us now discuss how differences observed between religious
groups with regard to marriage, fertility, and education impact wealth
accumulation.
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 193

Religion, Marriage, Child Ownership, Education, and Wealth

Marriage makes two individuals combine their assets within a single
household, thereby leading to an increase in wealth. Marriage also encour-
ages couples to save, as it creates common goals with regard to areas
such as homeownership and retirement (Keister 2007, 4). Divorce on the
other hand tends to reduce wealth as it leads to the division of assets,
with the former partners maintaining two households rather than one
and each partner making payments that she did not have to do before,
like payments for legal fees that reduce the total sum of the assets which
previously belonged to the family unit (Keister 2007, 4).
Religious affiliation has an indirect impact on wealth ownership, for,
the religion one belongs to affects the choice of a spouse (Lehrer 1998;
Sherkat 2004), the likelihood of marriage (Hammond et al. 1993; Mosher
et al. 1992; cited in Keister 2007, 4), marital stability (Lehrer and
Chiswick 1993; cited in Keister 2007, 4), and the likelihood of divorce
(Call and Heaton 1997; Filsinger and Wilson 1984; cited in Keister 2007,
4).
CP couples tend to marry early. Getting married at a young age can put
off professional self-advancement plans and those for schooling and, thus,
have a negative impact on wealth accumulation. However, early marriage
also makes it possible for married couples to combine their assets, buy
a house, and make other joint savings for a longer period. Therefore,
the negative impact of early marriage on wealth is slight: Strong positive
influence of current marital status on wealth makes up for the negative
influence of early marriage (Keister 2008, 1251).
Catholic marriage and marital stability rates are high (Lehrer 1998;
Sherkat 2004; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; cited in Keister 2007, 4). Mar-
riages between persons with similar propensities (known as homogamy)
are exceptionally high with Catholics. The marriage partners being of the
same religion raises the likelihood of their having same attitudes and prac-
tices with regard to finance. If these attitudes and practices are favorable
to savings, as it is with Catholics, marriage will have a positive impact on
savings and wealth.
Homogamy is high also among Jews, reinforcing the traits that favor
wealth accumulation (Kalmijn 1991; Lehrer 1998; Lazerwitz 1995;
Thornton 1985).
Families with one or two children tend to be wealthier than families
who don’t have any children, as having children prompts mothers and
194 R. ERGENER

fathers to raise their savings and to buy homes (Keister 2008, 1240).
However, as the number of children rises above two, wealth declines sig-
nificantly, because of the rise in expenses (Keister 2008, 1240). If the par-
ents are young, child ownership puts limits on the schooling and career
development opportunities for the young parents and limits their ini-
tial savings and investments that could lead to lifelong asset appreciation
(Keister 2008, 1240).
Members of religions with low fertility rates are likely to accumulate
more wealth over their lives (Keister 2003, 175). Low fertility means less
strain on the financial resources of the family and that family wealth is
not as much diluted through inheritance. High fertility is likely to have a
negative impact on wealth accumulation for an individual over a lifetime,
as more siblings one has, the less the family resources available per child
is going to be, both in moral and material terms (Lehrer 1999; Thornton
1985; cited in Keister 2003, 178).
One of the trends observed in the United States with regard to reli-
gious affiliation and fertility is that fertility rates are relatively low in Jew-
ish families (Chiswick 1986; DellaPergola 1980; cited in Keister 2003,
177).
With the CPs, traditional attitudes have led to relatively high fertility.
CP couples tend to have children when they are relatively younger (Pearce
2002; Keister 2008, 1240) and they have large families (Lehrer 1996;
Marcum 1981; Keister 2008, 1240).
In the past, Catholic families used to be larger than mainline Protestant
families (Alwin 1986; Lenski 1963a; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Nowa-
days, with regard to the likelihood of their remaining childless and with
regard to the age at which they have their first baby, US Catholics are
similar to mainline Protestants (Lehrer 1996; Marcum 1981, 1986; cited
in Keister 2008, 1240).
Parenting styles and parent–children relations are influenced by reli-
gion (Bartkowski and Ellison 1995; Ellison et al. 1996; Ellison and
Sherkat 1993; cited in Keister 2008, 1239). One area in which the influ-
ence of religion on the parenting style is most pronounced is through
education (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Lehrer 1999; Glenn and Hyland
1967; Greeley 1969; Lenski 1963a).
Education by itself is one of the strongest determinants of wealth, and
it also has an impact on other determinants of wealth such as family
size, female labor force participation, and income. Religion plays a role
in determining both the quality of education and the years of schooling
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 195

one receives (Keister 2007, 5). Members of religions that favor education
are likely to receive better quality and more years of education (Keister
2003, 175).
History has led Jewish culture to put heavy emphasis on the devel-
opment of human capital, hence education (Brenner and Kiefer 1981;
cited in Keister 2003, 177). Jewish mothers are more likely to stay home
when their children are young (Chiswick 1988; DellaPergola 1980). The
net outcome is higher child quality with Jewish children, which leads to
higher educational attainment and to the associated returns (Chiswick
1986; Lehrer 1999; Wilder 1996; Wilder and Walters 1998; cited in
Keister 2003, 177).
CPs have relatively low level of schooling (Darnell and Sherkat 1997;
Sherkat and Ellison 1999; cited in Keister 2008, 1240). Their educational
attainment is significantly lower than the attainment of members of other
faiths (Keister 2008, 1040). The reasons for the poor educational attain-
ment of the CPs are their literal interpretation of the Bible and their oppo-
sition to formal schooling and science, which stems from their approach
to the sacred texts (Sikkink 1999; Darnell and Sherkat 1997; cited in
Keister 2008, 1240). Accepting all that is written in the Bible as true
does not go well with science and formal education, the goals of which
are the pursuit of truth. Also, the large number of children in the typical
CP family reduces the resources available per child (Lehrer 1999).
Typically, CP children are home educated or they attend Christian
schools (Keister 2008, 1240). Educational attainment drops drastically
after high school as they follow the advice of the church leaders not to
send their children to secular colleges (Lehrer 1999).
US Catholics were known for moderate educational attainment, lower
than those of mainline Protestants (Keister 2007, 5). In recent decades
however, there has been a major improvement in the education per-
formance of both male and female Catholics (Keister 2007, 5). This
may be partly because the Catholics are no longer immigrants (Borjas
2000). Also, Catholic schools lead their students to success in every way,
including higher test scores (Bryk et al. n.d.; Hoffer et al. 1985; Sander
c1995), higher probability of completing high school and attending col-
lege (Evans and Schwab 1995; Neal 1997; cited in Keister 2005, 2007),
higher rates of college graduation (Neal 1997; cited in Keister 2007, 5),
and higher salaries and wages as graduates (Neal 1997; cited in Keister
2007, 5). The reason for the success of Catholic school students may be
196 R. ERGENER

due to tight discipline, increased social capital (Keister 2007, 4–5) cre-
ated by parents’ networks, and administration that takes into considera-
tion parents’ choices and consensus more so than what is possible in pub-
lic schools (Coleman et al. 1982a, b; cited in Keister 2007, 5). Roughly
two-thirds of all Catholics attend Catholic schools for at least a few years
and about one-third for at least seven years (D’antonio et al. 2001; cited
in Keister 2005, 2007). Catholic orders are well known for the support
they give to schools both with social and religious and also secular goals
(Samuelsson and Coleman 1993; Greeley c2004; cited in Keister 2005,
2007). Franciscan and Jesuits stand out in this respect (Keister 2007, 5).

Religion, Strategies, Values, and Wealth

Religion plays a role in the teaching of the strategies and behaviors that
lead to savings and wealth, by raising the value attached to such strategies
and behaviors.
Strategies and tactics that keep one out of debt and work manners that
stimulate savings are mostly acquired. Those who do not have an oppor-
tunity to learn such strategies, tactics, and manners when they are growing
up are likely to experience difficulties in amassing wealth as adults.
One learns savings behavior from family members and from close
acquaintances as well as in school and at church, during religious cere-
monies and activities (Chiteji and Stafford 1999, 2000; cited in Keister
2008, 1241). Because almost all religious teachings encourage savings
and rightful and straight living, those who attend church are likely to live
modestly which will open up the way to savings and wealth accumulation
(Keister 2003, 178).
Decisions related to work and finance are based partly on values (Keis-
ter 2003; Swidler 1986; cited in Keister 2007, 3). Values are expressions
of how worthy actions and outcomes are. Defining and distinguishing
desirable behavior which is valued and undesirable behavior that is not, is
one of the primary goals of religion. Rituals, symbols, beliefs, and expec-
tations that one is exposed to through her religious affiliation and the
associated religious ceremonies lead her to identify what objectives are
worthwhile. Most American religions value hard work, saving, and invest-
ment (Keister 2003, 179). Working for certain organizations and in cer-
tain professions is valued by religion. All faiths agree that money is mean-
ingful and that finances are intimately related to values (Wuthnow 1998;
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 197

Zelizer 1978; cited in Keister 2007, 5). But, what types of work and what
types of financial behavior are valued, vary according to one’s faith.
For historical reasons, Jews are more inclined to invest in financial and
more liquid assets rather than real estate and other fixed assets (Keister
2003, 178).
Jewish culture regards wealth as a sign of accomplishment (Stryker
1981; cited in Keister 2003, 177). Rather than emphasizing the other
world and downgrading worldly rewards, Jewish families inspire and sup-
port the pursuit of worldly goals including wealth accumulation and the
routes leading to wealth, such as high-income careers and wise invest-
ments. Jewish families have a strong cultural disposition toward education
and professional status. Jewish children grow up with the awareness that
they are expected to be successful in this world. Observing the behav-
ior of the parents which has led to their (the parents’) worldly success
enhances the development of such skills with children and contributes
to their eventual fulfilling of their parents’ expectations of them (Keister
2003, 177).
Conservative Protestants do not object to worldly pursuits, so long
as such pursuits do not endanger their souls (Darnell and Sherkat 1997;
cited in Keister 2003, 179).
CP values regarding money, finances, and work are rather unique and
quite the opposite of Jewish ones. Unlike the Jews, CPs prefer to invest
in real estate rather than financial assets (Keister 2003, 179). But, there
is more. For the CPs, too much accumulation is not desirable. There are
three reasons as to why this is so (Keister 2008, 1243).
First, too much accumulation may lead one to become too obsessed
with worldly riches rather than the spiritual ones. “No servant can serve
two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will
be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God
and Money” (Luke 16:10–13). The Bible also points out that the “love
of money is the root of all kinds of evil” (1 Tim. 6:10) People “who want
to get rich fall into temptation” (1 Tim. 6:9), and that “a man’s life does
not consist in the abundance of his possessions” (Luke 12:15). That is,
savings can distract one from the true object of value. Where one gives her
tithes and offerings shows what she values (Kreider 2002, 29). Because
they are concerned primarily about their finances, first thing those who
invest in stocks look at, in their daily newspaper, is the stock market.
198 R. ERGENER

Secondly, even if it were morally acceptable, accumulation of material

things is a poor investment, as worldly belongings will not survive the fire
that will consume the material world (Alcorn 2003, 18–19).
Finally, accumulating too many worldly goods is not necessary because
our stay on earth is short and once it is over, it is God who will take care
of us during afterlife, which will last forever. It would be more prudent to
invest in the other world by giving money away to support charities and
as tithes directly to god (or to his church and to his ministers), rather than
accumulating wealth (Alcorn 2003, 21; cited in Keister 2008, 1243).
All this is related to the key CP belief that money belongs to God
(Keister 2008, 1264). It is primarily because god owns all, it is required to
return some wealth back to God and to use remainder to do God’s works
(Keister 2008, 1242). Many references in the Bible indicate that God is
the one and only owner of worldly riches (Lev. 25:23; Deut. 10:14; Ps.
24:1; Ps. 50:10–12).
CPs are not likely to change the savings behavior that they learn from
their parents and their environment, because large majority of CPs never
leave their faith (Roof 1989; cited in Keister 2008, 1241). Also, CPs are
unlikely to marry those who are members of other religions, which block
one of the possible routes to the development and expansion of their
abilities and strat-egies to save and accumulate (Kalmijn 1991; Thorn-
ton 1985; cited in Keister 2003, 180). Consequently, low-savings pat-
terns tend to accumulate through generations, reducing savings and asset
inheritance in each generation.
Compared with other religious groups, Catholic attitude toward work
tends to be more instrumental. That is, for the Catholics, work is under-
taken to attain certain outcomes, but not necessarily to enjoy in and of
itself (Tropman c1995, c2002; cited in Keister 2007, 6). Work is a way to
earn money to buy necessities. Catholics also tend to have a strong fam-
ily orientation. Their motivation to work is extrinsic and usually oriented
toward the family (Tropman c2002; cited in Keister 2007, 6). The roots
of the family orientation are based on the recent immigrant experience
and the strong ethnic ties involved in immigration (Borjas 2000, 2001;
Keister 2007, 6). Even though they have largely assimilated, evidence
shows that the strong family focus has persisted with white non-Hispanic
Catholics (Tropman c2002; cited in Keister 2007, 6). Although an instru-
mental attitude can reduce the incentive to work, the strong family ori-
entation makes Catholics relatively hard workers (D’antonio et al. 2001;
Greeley 1979; cited in Keister 2007, 6). They work hard even if they work
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 199

only as much as necessary to provide for their families. Catholic house-

holds with two adults are likely to have two earners, as gender roles tend
to be egalitarian (Oats 1989; Keister 2007, 6). Wealth research shows that
having two earners in a family has an important positive impact on asset
accumulation (Keister 2007, 6). Having two hardworking earners sug-
gests that the Catholic family will have enough to save and to accumulate
assets (Keister 2007, 6).
Like their attitude to work, Catholic attitude toward money is instru-
mental. Money is a tool used to buy necessities (Tropman c1995, c2002;
Keister 2007, 6). Otherwise, money has no intrinsic value (DeBerri et al.
2003; Thibodeau et al. 1997; cited in Keister 2007, 6). Their strong fam-
ily orientation however leads Catholics to save and invest in ways that will
ensure their families are secure (Tropman c2002; cited in Keister 2007,
6). With the Catholics then, the strong extrinsic motivation provided by
the desire to take care of the family makes up for the reduction in saving
that an instrumental view of money can lead to. Overall, for Catholics,
religious affiliation should have a direct positive effect on wealth (Keister
2007, 6).
In addition, the tradition of tithing with the Catholic church is not
strong enough to dilute the amount of income available for Catholic fami-
lies to save (Chaves and Miller 1998; D’antonio et al. 2001; Keister 2007,
6). There is some evidence that Catholics are community-oriented (Gree-
ley 1989; Tropman c2002; cited in Keister 2007, 6), and they may be
relatively more likely to volunteer and otherwise be generous (Regnerus
et al. 1998; Nelson c2003; cited in Keister 2007, 6). Yet there is little
evidence that tithing reduces their disposable income in a way that would
slow wealth accumulation (Steen 1996; cited in Keister 2007, 6).
Religious affiliation and participation can affect wealth accumulation
also by contributing to the building of social contacts. Social contacts are
valuable in obtaining information that facilitates wealth ownership such as
information about business opportunities or capital for investing. Again,
social contacts cultivate values and norms that encourage positive behav-
iors and long-term investment in relationships (Sherkat and Ellison 1999;
cited in Keister 2003, 181). One can obtain capital to start a business
or to make a down payment on a home through social contacts (Keister
2003, 176).
The value of the information that contacts will have and their abil-
ity to assist coreligionists will vary by religion (Keister 2003, 176). Such
200 R. ERGENER

opportunities were found to be relatively high in American Jewish fami-

lies (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; cited in Keister 2003, 178). Information
about investment tactics and prospects and access to funds to finance
investments, which make investing feasible for young people, can be
reached through family links and through one’s immediate Jewish circles
and through social connections nurtured at schools and universities.
No matter the quality of contacts provided, simple church attendance
can contribute to the building of networks of trust and therefore to the
economic prosperity of the attendees and of the community. “Virtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, cer-
tainly any transaction conducted over a period of time” (Arrow 1972,
357). Empirical papers show that economic performance of a community
is positively affected by the prevailing level of trust (Knack and Keefer
1997; Zak and Knack 2001; cited in Guiso et al. 2006, 34). Being near
those with whom one shares the same religion can lead to an increase in
the total number of social interactions and of trust. Temples can therefore
function as civic organizations which help to build a web of relationships
that cultivates trust. Such webs of relationships are labeled as “social cap-
ital.” Social capital helps to smooth out business dealings and reduces
transactions costs (Sacerdote and Glaeser 2001; Putnam 2000; cited in
Gruber 2005, 27).
Yet, being close-knit does not necessarily lead a group to prosperity.
Gypsies or Roma are a close-knit minority but they do not prosper in
business like some other religious groups do (McClelland 1976; cited in
Noland 2003, 2).

… Of Nations
It has been argued that the network approach trivializes religion by reduc-
ing it to one of the many paths leading to the creation of social capital.
Yes, religious organizations are one of the many different types of social
organizations. Yet (as Weber pointed out), temples are more than social
clubs. The cultural facets of religion such as community support, prayers,
and academic institutions are significant not only because they help to
build up social capital, but also and primarily because they influence beliefs
and, through beliefs, behavior—which impacts productivity and economic
growth (McCleary 2007, 50).
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 201

It being the only social organization with the capability to provide oth-
erworldly rewards and punishments such as salvation, damnation, and nir-
vana makes religion a particularly powerful motivator of worldly behav-
ior. Fear of otherworldly punishment and hope for heavenly rewards can
raise productivity and spur investment and economic growth by reinforc-
ing desirable personality traits such as honesty, trust, work ethic, thrift,
hospitality to strangers, and so on. It is possible of course that beliefs
about afterlife can promote violence. This is the “dark side of religion”
(McCleary and Barro 2006, 51).
Religion also has costs. Such costs consist of time spent on worship
by congregants and religious officials, cost of temples, and precious sacra-
ments. It is economically desirable or more cost-efficient to minimize the
costs of religion per amount of belief.

Beliefs, Participation, and Economic Growth

Barro and McCleary consider beliefs among the outputs of the reli-
gion sector and attending or performance of religious services as the
inputs. “Believing relative to belonging (or attending) is the main chan-
nel through which religion matters for economic and other outcomes”
(McCleary and Barro 2006, 51). “Church attendance affects religious
beliefs, which affect individual traits, which in turn affect individual and
aggregate economic outcomes” (Barro and McCleary 2003a, 779). For
example, beliefs in heaven and hell might affect individual traits by creat-
ing perceived rewards and punishments that relate to “good” and “bad”
lifetime behavior.
A religion which requires more attendance for a given amount of
beliefs is less efficient than a religion which requires less attendance for
the same amount of beliefs. Higher church attendance should therefore
be expected to have a negative influence on economic performance.
Using the framework described in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2003, Chapter 12), Barro and McCleary inquired about
the relationship between certain variables and the growth rate of per
capita GDP over three 10-year periods—1965–1975, 1975–1985, and
1985–1995. Among the variables considered are “per capita GDP, life
expectancy, years of school attainment, the total fertility rate, average
ratios of investment and government consumption to GDP, an inter-
national openness measure, based on the ratio of exports plus imports
202 R. ERGENER

to GDP, changes in the terms of trade, subjective measures of mainte-

nance of the rule of law and democracy, and the inflation rate” (Barro
and McCleary 2003a, 772). To this list of explanatory variables, Barro
and McCleary added measures of religiosity, measured as attendance in
religious services (Barro and McCleary 2003a, 772).
Barro and McCleary found that religion-based dogmas, particularly
beliefs in afterlife, boosted economic growth. Even though the fear of
the stick from hell seemed to be more effective in stimulating positive
economic behavior than the carrot from heaven, the difference was not
very strong (McCleary and Barro 2006, 66–67).
With beliefs as given, growth rate dropped in response to a rise in par-
ticipation at formal religious services (McCleary 2007, 50). “Higher lev-
els of church attendance depress economic growth because greater atten-
dance signifies a larger use of resources by the religion sector, and the
main output of this sector (the religious beliefs) has already been held
constant. The results do not mean that greater church attendance has a
net negative influence on economic growth - this net effect depends on
the extent to which an increase in attendance leads to stronger beliefs,
which in turn encourage growth” (Barro and McCleary 2003b, 779).
Attendance at religious services can also be a sign of the power the
church has on the legal system, which has an influence on economic
incentives. General discouragement of the profit motive, restrictions on
credit and insurance would adversely affect economic incentives. Legisla-
tion and regulation aimed at curtailing fraud and corruption would have
a positive impact (Barro and McCleary 2003b, 772).
Overall, Muslims have strong religious beliefs and their religious beliefs
are stronger than their religiosity, as measured by attendance. This is very
impressive when one considers that Muslims have the highest attendance
at religious services, followed by Catholics (Barro and McCleary 2003a,
36). Again, belief in paradise and netherworld is the highest for Muslims,
followed by Catholics (Barro and McCleary 2003a, 36).
With strong beliefs and strong attendance, Muslim economies should
be growing at unusually high rates. Yet this has not been the case. Muslim
economies may not be growing as fast as they could because Muslim legal
and regulatory systems discourage economic activity (Kuran emphasizes
that Muslim legal structures restrict contracts, credit, insurance, and cor-
porate ownership. We shall discuss these in more detail in the following
chapter [Kuran 2004]). Barro and McCleary tested this proposal using a
dummy variable for whether religion does have an effect on a country’s
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 203

laws and regulations. The results failed to confirm that Muslim legal and
regulatory practices had negative effect on economic growth (McCleary
and Barro 2006, 69).
Based on these results, special aspect of religion with regard to eco-
nomic performance seems to be belief formation (McCleary and Barro
2006, 68). “Religion does not seem to operate as a social organization
that enhances productive social capital and networking. If that were true,
there would be a positive relation between growth and participation in
formal services, rather than the negative relation found in the data.”
Durlauf and colleagues propose that the studies which show that reli-
giosity and religious beliefs are good for growth are an artifice of ad hoc
modeling choices and that there is no compelling case that such relation-
ships exist (Durlauf et al. 2012, 1068).
Durlauf and colleagues place Barro and McCleary’s model within a
larger one. They retain the set of variables by Barro and McCleary, and
they supplement them with the canonical Neoclassical Growth variables
and other variables which are believed to impact growth rate. More recent
growth literature suggests that a set of basic determinants such as geogra-
phy, institutions, and fractionalization can make a difference in the growth
rate of an economy. Durlauf and colleagues include a climate variable
which is the share of a country that is tropical and subtropical and a
measure of geographic isolation which is the share of a country that is
within 100 km of an ice-free coast (Durlauf et al. 2012, 1067). As an
approximation of ethnic fractionalization, Durlauf and colleagues use lin-
guistic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003; cited in Durlauf et al. 2012,
1068), which is a measure of the likelihood that two persons arbitrar-
ily picked from a population would not have the same mother tongue
(Durlauf et al. 2012, 1068).
Following Acemoglu and Johnson (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005),
Durlauf and colleagues (2012) include in their analysis two measures of
economic institutions. The first is a measure of property rights protec-
tions, which is the average value of expropriation risk of private invest-
ments. The other is a measure of the enforcement of economic contracts,
based on the number of steps necessary to take a bounced check (Durlauf
et al. 2012, 1968).
In contrast to the research of Barro and McCleary (2003b), Durlauf
and colleagues fail to find persuasive proof that religious beliefs, for exam-
ple beliefs in the punishments of hell or the rewards of paradise, have a
vigorous correlation with growth. The findings of Durlauf and colleagues
204 R. ERGENER

bring limited support to the idea that monthly church attendance can
have a negative impact on growth (Durlauf et al. 2012, 68).

Beliefs, Attitudes, and Economic Growth

Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales also studied the relation between religion
and economic growth and reached the conclusion “that religious belief is
positively associated with attitudes which contribute to economic growth”.
(Dehejia et al. 2007, 260)

Religion is an important cultural institution. Culture consists of “custom-

ary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit
fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso et al. 2006, 23).
Based on this definition, if religion is to have an impact on the economy,
it will be through beliefs and values (or preferences). Beliefs and values
have a direct impact on expectations and preferences, and expectations
have an impact on economic outcomes. In order to establish a causal link,
one should concentrate on inherited rather than voluntarily accumulated
culture (Guiso et al. 2006, 24). Even though cultural traditions can be
changing to optimize economic efficiency, these changes are likely to lag
behind the changes in economic life (Guiso et al. 2006, 25). There are a
number of reasons for this.
First, culture changes slowly because parents have a tendency to bring
up their children as their parents brought them up, regardless of whether
the old ways are optimal under new conditions. A striking example is
the wearing by Mursi women of Ethiopia of large lip ornaments made of
clay which disfigure the lips and force the removal of some of the front
teeth. This practice was introduced among the Mursi women to make
them less interesting as commodities for the slave traders (Carillet and
Gordon 2003; cited in Guiso et al. 2003). Even though the reason for this
tradition is lost today, some Mursi women still wear such lip ornaments
(Guiso et al. 2006, 25).
Second, organizations like the state and the church and academia
which play a role in promoting culture might have a vested interest in
promoting the continuation of certain beliefs as those beliefs can be pro-
viding them with rents (Guiso et al. 2006, 25).
Finally, some cultural norms which negatively affect economic output
can at the same time be raising fertility which will enable such norms to
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 205

spread in a population even though they are inefficient (Guiso et al. 2006,
25).
Religious beliefs are not necessarily based on sacred texts. Rather,
beliefs are distilled over time and passed on to future generations. There-
fore, the negative or positive correlation between attitudes and economic
outcomes cannot be attributed to sacred texts as such but to the religious-
cultural traditions and the way they have evolved as a consequence of
historical developments (Guiso et al. 2003, 230).
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales studied the religion-related attitudes
with regard to following areas that might have an impact on the economy:
“(1) trust and cooperation, (2) working women, (3) the government, (4)
the law, (5) the market and its fairness, (6) thriftiness and (7) tolerance”
(Guiso et al. 2003, 225). They found that religious beliefs were corre-
lated positively with attitudes that were associated with higher income
and growth. The correlation was stronger with Christian beliefs.
Trust and cooperation have positive impact on growth (Zak and Knack
2001; Knack and Keefer 1997; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 232). Intoler-
ance has negative impact (Landes 1999; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 232).
Attitudes toward women can enlarge or limit the size of the labor pool
(Guiso et al. 2003, 232). Attitudes toward the government are impor-
tant because political instability has a negative impact on investments
(Alesina and Perotti 1995; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 232) and economic
growth (Barro 1991; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 232). Attitudes toward
the law affect a country’s law-and-order tradition, which in turn affects
financial development (LaPorta et al. 1997; cited in Guiso et al. 2003,
232) and growth. Corruption has a strong negative impact on growth
(Mauro 1995; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 232). Pro-market policies favor
growth (Easton and Walker 1997; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 232). Weber
attributed the success of Protestants’ being superior to their being thrifty.
Thrift is important also in the modern theory of growth (Guiso et al.
2003, 227).
As compared with those who are not religious, religious people have
more trust in others, in the government, in the legal system, and in mar-
ket outcomes and they are less willing to break the law. Whether religios-
ity leads to the strengthening of market implements such as “incentives,
competition, and private property” is not as clear (Guiso et al. 2003,
228).
Religious participation and religious upbringing both play a role in
shaping attitudes. “Trust toward others is associated mostly with religious
206 R. ERGENER

participation, not religious upbringing” (Guiso et al. 2003, 228). Intol-

erance toward immigrants is correlated with having been brought up reli-
gious. As compared with the rest of the population, active churchgoers are
as tolerant toward immigrants but less favorable toward women’s rights
(Guiso et al. 2003, 228). Both religious participation and upbringing raise
trust toward government institutions (Guiso et al. 2003, 228).
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales find that there are differences between
members of different religions with regard to attitudes related to eco-
nomic growth. It is not clear with certainty which religion has a stronger
positive impact on growth. In order to establish this with more accuracy,
one needs to know the relative importance of various attitudes on eco-
nomic growth. Also stronger evidence is needed to prove that the statisti-
cal relations are causal (Guiso et al. 2003, 280). Despite the uncertainties,
there are some findings which point to differences between religions with
regard to economic growth.
Active members of all religions have more trust in government than
the non-religious do, with the Buddhists being the exception. Hindus
and Muslims have more trust in the government than the Catholics and
Protestant (Guiso et al. 2003, 228). Increase in trust with an increase in
religious services is true only for Christians and stronger for Protestants
than for Catholics, as Putnam proposed (Putnam 1993; cited in Guiso
et al. 2003, 228).
Members of all religious denominations are less tolerant as compared
with the non-religious, the Buddhists being the only exception. Hindus
and Muslims, followed by Jews, Catholics, and Protestants, are less tol-
erant towards immigrants and other races (Landes 1999; cited in Guiso
et al. 2003, 228). Religious people belonging to all faiths, with the excep-
tion of Buddhists, are likely to believe that the poor are lazy and devoid of
willpower. Protestants are more likely to have this opinion than Catholics
(Guiso et al. 2003, 228). Members of all religious denominations have
a less positive approach toward women’s rights, as compared with the
non-religious. Least positive are the Muslims (Guiso et al. 2003, 228).
“Judaism has the strongest negative impact on the willingness to cheat
on taxes, followed by Protestantism (second), Catholicism and Hinduism
(third), and Islam (fourth)” (Guiso et al. 2003, 228). The strongest
negative attitude toward accepting bribes is with Buddhists, followed by
Protestants and Muslims, with the Catholics being the last (Guiso et al.
2003, 228) Muslims and Hindus are strongly opposed to competition
(Guiso et al. 2003, 228).
 9 RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 207

Overall findings of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales show that Christian

denominations are the most favorable toward markets and Muslims the
most anti-market.
The differences between the members of Christian churches are not as
pronounced. Catholics are thriftier and favor private property and com-
petition (Guiso et al. 2003, 228). Protestants have more trust in others
and the law than the Catholics do and they are less likely to cheat on
taxes and to take bribes. Protestants are more pro-market than Catholics
with regard to incentives. Again, Protestants and Hindus are the only two
religious groups who are willing to put up with more income inequality
for the sake of providing incentives (Guiso et al. 2003, 280).

Classical Economists, Marx, and Weber

In this chapter, we considered the impact of various religion-based beliefs,
values, behaviors, and attitudes on economic performance.
Classical economists were comfortable with the use cultural variables
to explain economic occurrences. Adam Smith’s arguments in A Theory
of Moral Sentiments and those in The Wealth of Nations complement each
other. John Stuart Mill agreed that cultural determinants could at times
be more important than economic ones (more important than even the
pursuit even of self-interest), in shaping economic behavior (Mill 1843,
484; cited in Guiso et al. 2006, 26).
Feuerbach and Marx believed that the causality was the other way
around and that man, made religion, rather than religion making man
(Marx 1970; cited in Guiso et al. 2003, 229). “The mode of production
of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life processes
in general” (Marx 1965; cited in Guiso et al. 2006, 26).
Weber’s views were the exact opposite. In his definitive work The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber explores the role
played by the Protestant ethic in the emergence of capitalism.
We will consider Weber’s ideas in more detail in the following chapter.
208 R. ERGENER

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 CHAPTER 10

Religion and Historical Divergences

in Economic Performance

One of the sharpest and best-known divergences along religious lines

in terms of economic performance is observed between the Muslim
economies of the Middle East and the Christian nations of the West. In
1995, Muslim share of global income was 5.98%, whereas the Muslim
share of world population was 19.22% (Kuran 1997). In 2010, Muslims
made up roughly 23% of the world population, occupied 21.7% of the
world’s landmass, and produced 8.1% of the world total income. Exclud-
ing the contribution of oil, the GDP of the Islamic world would be
4% of the total world GDP. The combined per capita income of Mus-
lim countries in 2010 was $4185, which was approximately 40% of the
world average (Sherani 2013). The situation was pretty much the same by
2014, when average per capita income in terms of purchasing power was
$17,500 for all other countries and $10,015 for the Muslim ones (Kuran
2018, 1).
In this final chapter, we will explore whether there are religion-related
reasons which put breaks on the development of Muslim economies and
accelerated the development of those of the West. While doing so, we
shall also be exploring the possible religion-related causes for the emer-
gence of capitalism.
The divergence between Muslim and Christian economies did not
come about instantaneously, but evolved through time. Early Muslim
countries of the Middle East were wealthier than their Western contem-
poraries. According to Timur Kuran, one of the most eminent scholars in
the field, by the tenth-century Middle Eastern economies, were the most

© The Author(s) 2020 219

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_10
220 R. ERGENER

advanced in the world with the possible exception of China, according to

all generally accepted criteria such as living standards, technical prowess,
farm yield, literacy, and organizational innovation (Kuran 2004, 71).
Noting the economic achievements of the first Islamic communities
and that enrichment is encouraged in many verses of the Qur’an, Muslim
economists have proposed “that the economic prescriptions of Islam -its
financial regulations, contracting guidelines, distributional instruments,
and behavioral norms - provide an ideal framework for economic devel-
opment” (Kuran 1997, 48). The remarkable economic performance of
the initial Islamic society in seventh-century Arabia being the evidence
(Kuran 1997, 48).
As Kuran (1997, 48) points out, “there is no inherent conflict between
the economic successes of early Islamic civilization and the proposition
that Islam itself discourages economic development.” Islam may have pro-
vided growth for a while but not later. The early successes could have
taken place despite the growth-inhibiting features of the religion. Rather
than economic factors, non-economic ones, such as the blending and
assimilation of peoples in the aftermath of military campaigns and politi-
cal restructuring, may have provided the primary source of development.
Later unfolding of the economies of Muslim states showed that the early
successes had not laid down the foundations for continued growth—as
was the case with Western economies.
Some of the better-known practices particular to Islam which have
been proposed as the possible causes of the relative backwardness of Mus-
lim economies vis-a-vis the West are discussed below (for a comprehen-
sive and up to date survey of the topic, see Kuran 2018). After going over
these proposals, we shall consider the absence of a practice, monasticism
as a possible cause of the underdevelopment of Islamic economies.

Possible Explanations for the Relative

Backwardness of Muslim Economies
One major issue was the Islamic prohibition on interest and on specu-
lative contracts such as sale by auction or insurance. The ban on interest
was actually on riba, which can be defined as unjustified increment in bor-
rowing or lending money, an increase in a particular item, non-equality in
an exchange or interest or usurious interest. The ban may have its roots
in the practice in ancient Arabia of the doubling of debt when defaulted,
which eventually led to the enslavement of the debtor (Esposito, n.d.).
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 221

Such restrictions inhibited commercial activity even though they were

to a large extent circumvented by Muslim legalists through ruses or legal
tricks known as hiyal. A trick widely employed to avoid the prohibition on
usury was the practice of “dual purchase,” which entailed the making of
two contracts, one for purchase and the other for re-purchase, at a higher
price. For example, the lender could buy a watch from the borrower for
one hundred gold coins with a promise by the borrower to buy the watch
back for hundred and ten coins at a specified date. Use of such ruses
to circumvent restrictions on interest would not totally block economic
development but would put breaks on it (Jones 1988).
Christianity was also opposed to interest. This opposition had its roots
in Plato and Aristotle and other Roman thinkers such as Cicero, Seneca,
and Cato who regarded it unnatural for money to bear fruit as money
is sterile. In the Old Testament, there is a ban on taking advantage of
the poor members of the community through interest charges (Exo-
dus 22:25, Leviticus 25:35, and Deuteronomy 20:19) and permission to
charge interest on outsiders only (Deuteronomy 20:19). And the follow-
ing statement by Christ was also taken as justification of a ban on interest:
“… lend, expecting nothing in return” (Luke 6:35).
Yet, in the West, that lending had a cost to the lender as foregone
income was eventually recognized and a distinction was made between
interest as foregone income and usury as exorbitant interest.
Banking which enabled the pooling of resources of a large number
of depositors evolved in the West beginning in the twelfth century. In
Islamic economies, finance was provided on an individual basis through
personal contacts.
The conduct of business by individuals and not by corporations was a
problem in general with Muslim economies (Kuran 2005). Corporations
are joint ventures which possess legal entities distinct from their owners
and their employees. Corporation has many advantages as compared with
individually owned enterprises. Corporation makes litigation simpler and
shields jointly held assets from the liabilities of individual shareholders.
The liabilities of both the shareholders and of the company itself are lim-
ited (Kuran 2005, 2). Corporation can change its guidelines of action
and its goals and can reassign its assets (Kuran 2004, 14). The decisions
of the corporation do not need to be approved by each and every mem-
ber. It continues to exist after the founders die or retire (Kuran 2004,
3). Corporations can pool larger resources as compared with individually
222 R. ERGENER

owned enterprises, make use of economies of scale, and consider longer

time horizons when undertaking projects (Kuran 2004, 9).
Business corporations began to evolve in the West beginning in the
sixteenth century and matured in the seventeenth. The waqf, which was
Islam’s distinct form of trust and the Islamic alternative to the corpora-
tion, lacked several of the favorable features of the corporation. For one,
waqf was to be managed forever according to the will of the founder and
therefore trapped resources into an organization which was most likely to
become dysfunctional over time (Kuran 2004, 71).
One of the reasons for the absence of corporations in Islam is the frag-
mentation of estates after death according to Muslim law. This practice
had a negative impact on economic growth not only because it curtailed
the formation of corporations but also because it impeded the accumu-
lation of capital. Laid out in detail in the Qur’an, Muslim inheritance
law stipulated that two-thirds of inheritance would go to extended rela-
tives of both sexes, “including children, parents, spouse(s), siblings, and
under certain circumstances also more distant relatives. The individual’s
testamentary powers” were “limited to one-third of his or her estate. In
addition, at least in the Sunni interpretation, no mandated heir may also
be included in a will. This inheritance system limited the concentration
of wealth. By the same token, it hindered the preservation of successful
enterprises, or other assets, across generations” (Kuran 2004, 5).
Because the Bible does not prescribe rules for inheritance, Chris-
tians were free to alter inheritance practices in response to changing
needs. Some adopted primogeniture or the practice of leaving all income-
producing wealth, if not the entire estate, to the oldest son, a practice
which favored the concentration of wealth (Kuran 2004, 11).
More recently, another interesting explanation for the historical under-
development of Muslim economies has been proposed by Jared Rubin
(2017). Rubin points out that in Muslim countries, as compared with
the west, the rulers had greater reliance on the clergy to justify their rule.
Muslim rulers would therefore be more likely to block developments (like
the printing press), which would have supported economic growth, if
such developments were deemed likely to reduce the power of the clergy.
Another problem with Muslim economies was the inadequate devel-
opment of personal rights and liberties and of property rights (Facchini
2009). The status of land, which was defined during the first caliphates,
was the main obstacle to the full development of property rights. In
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 223

Islamic states, the status of land protected public ownership over the pri-
vate, with the private always under the threat of being confiscated by
the state. Such rights were extended to cover even the claims for water.
Consequently, economic gains were sought not through the rational and
optimal use of resources (the ownership of which was never certain) but
through securing good connections and a good position within the ruling
elite. Profits were created not through economic calculation but artificially
through the rents seized by the ruling class (Facchini 2007).
Weak property rights are typical of what sociologist Randall Collins
calls “agrarian-coercive societies.”

Kinship-Based, Agrarian
Coercive, and Market Economies
According to Randall Collins, agrarian coercive societies are one of the
three types of economic structures which have existed in history. Agrarian
coercive structures were preceded by “kinship - organized networks” and
succeeded by “capitalist market economies” (Collins 1997, 843).
With “kinship - organized networks,” there is no separate state orga-
nization and economic exchange is shaped by marital alliances and cere-
monial gift exchange.
With agrarian coercive structures, a specialized military class appropri-
ates the land and coercively extracts most of the surplus produce (Collins
1997, 843).
Of the three types of economic structures, only the capitalist market
economies have had the rational use and the optimization of resources
with the aim of long-term gain. It is not surprising therefore, of the three
types of economic structures that have existed in history, it was only cap-
italism that allowed for self-sustaining growth.
It is not as if the Christian West did not go through the agrarian coer-
cive stage—it did, just like the Muslim Middle East did. But the West
came out of the agrarian coercive to the capitalist stage while the Muslim
Middle East did not until the end of the nineteenth century and beyond.
In the West, the rational and optimal use of resources in capitalist mar-
ket economies led to self-sustained growth, which did not happen in the
Muslim Middle East where agrarian coercive structures prevailed.
Therefore, in order to understand why the economic performances of
Western and Muslim economies diverged, the fundamental question we
224 R. ERGENER

need to address is why capitalist market economies evolved in the Chris-

tian West—and not in the Muslim Middle East.
Rodinson (1974), who made one of the better-known studies on the
subject, inquired whether the reason for capitalism to have an indigenous
growth in Muslim countries was Muslim teachings and whether Islam
disapproved of capitalism. He claimed that the answer to both questions
was “no.”
Rodinson points out there are no statements in the Kuran that oppose
private ownership or inequality. Private ownership of the means of pro-
duction and wage labor are accepted. Trade is approved. Like the Qur’an,
the traditional portion of Muslim law, based on the words and acts of
Muhammad, and preserved in the traditional literature known as Sunnah,
also defends the claims to private property, the quest for profit, trade and
output for the market with the goal of profit.
The legal system of early Islam was prolific in producing a large number
of doctrines, rules, and methods which regulated contractual relationships
(Based on Udovitch 1970; Çizakça 1996). Rules were designed to regu-
late the problems arising from the joint ownership of property and from
the combining of means for trade ventures. Under Islamic law, such part-
nerships had their limitations. The number of partners and the duration of
the partnerships were limited. Even though there was no legal limit to the
number of partners, their number rarely exceeded six. Typically, commer-
cial partnerships had one home-based financier who would underwrite
the trading mission of a single itinerant merchant and their joint ven-
ture would last no more than a single voyage. Nevertheless, compared
with other legal systems of the time, the Islamic legal structure allowed
traders and investors plenty of flexibility in circumscribing trade missions
and sharing profits. Islamic practice was one of the sources of the prac-
tice of commenda1 which has played an important role in Mediterranean
trade (Udovitch 1962; Pryor 1977).

1 “The simplest form, the unilateral commenda, is an arrangement whereby an investor

or group of investors entrusts capital or merchandise to an agent-manager, who is to
trade with it, and then return to the investors the principal and a previously agreed upon
share of the profits. The remaining share of the profits goes to the agent as a reward for
his labor. Further, the agent is in no way liable for any loss resulting from the exigencies
of sea-travel or from an unsuccessful business venture. This is borne exclusively by the
investor(s), the agent losing only his expended time and effort” (Udovitch 1962).
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 225

Having ruled out the factors which he thought would have hindered
the emergence of capitalism, Rodinson (1974) singled out external fac-
tors, namely imperialism as the main obstacle to the indigenous growth
of capitalism in Islamic countries.
There may be truth in this argument. It has been argued that imperi-
alist Western powers cultivated and reinforced extractive agrarian coercive
economies in the prosperous countries they dominated (Acemoglu et al.
2001). Yet, it is not possible to prove that agrarian coercive Moslem struc-
tures would have evolved into capitalist market economies, if there was no
imperialism (Jomo 1977).
What Islam lacked was a social group that could have led the trans-
formation of agrarian coercive economic structure to a capitalist market
economy. For, the presence of a group that can play the leadership role is
essential for an economic structure to be transformed:
With agrarian coercive structures, farmworker labor was tied up in
innumerable tenancy agreements and was in no position to be the driving
force of such a change. Military landowning classes (who were, with the
Islamic case, very much dependent on the favors of the ruler) enjoyed the
benefits of the agrarian coercive structures and therefore had no interest
in change. Also, military landowners lacked the prudent, optimizing men-
tality which is a prerequisite of capitalism-status among the aristocrats was
gained through gift exchange and consumption—not through prudence
and production. Merchants were likely to possess the economic approach
(motivation for hard work, prudence, and optimizing mentality) neces-
sary for capitalism but they were held under control by the aristocrats
and therefore lacked the power to lead the transformation to a capitalist
market economy.
According to sociologist Max Weber, it was a group defined along reli-
gious lines, the Protestant Puritans who ended up being the vanguards of
capitalism in Western Europe and North America.

Weber and the Rise of Capitalism Among Puritans

Puritans had an ascetic (or prudent) lifestyle and were a minority. But, the
emergence of capitalism among Puritans was neither because they were
ascetic, nor because they were a minority. After all, Puritans were not the
only religious group that preached asceticism, and there were other reli-
gious minorities living in Western Europe and in North America (Noland
2003, 5–6).
226 R. ERGENER

Max Weber proposed that modern capitalism was made possible by the
mental revolution which the Protestant Reformation triggered through
its impact on belief systems (Weber 1946). That the pursuit of wealth
was not an advantage but a duty, was one of the key teachings of the
Protestant Reformation. It was this religious anointment that would give
the capitalists the moral power to replace the previous order with a new
one (Guiso et al. 2006, 26).
With the Puritans, it was the Calvinist principle of predestination and
the associated notion of the “calling,” which played a role in the conver-
sion of the approaches toward economic activity and wealth accumulation.
Reformer John Calvin preached that every individual was predestined
to either salvation or damnation. “Good works” assured the individual
and demonstrated one’s fate to others. Everyone had a “calling.” The
daily performance of his religious mission pleased God and served as a
mark of His blessing.
Calvin conceived a persistently moral life rather than the Catholic cycle
of sin, repentance, atonement, and sinning again. As a result, the believer
would pursue “this - worldly asceticism,” which required one to be thrifty,
diligent, and efficient in his economic activities and non-ostentatious
in the accumulation of wealth. Weber regarded Calvinist “this-worldly
asceticism” as the bedrock of modern capitalism (Noland 2003, 2).
Weber also proposed explanations as to why capitalism did not emerge
in lands populated by members of other religions.
The key non-Christian religion that was most closely related to Protes-
tantism in theological terms was Judaism (Sombart proposed that capital-
ism and Judaism had the same ideas and the same basic entrepreneurial
sprit. Sombart 1911; cited in Wagner-Tsukamoto 2012). Jews were suc-
cessful because they were a marginal minority group of outsiders, which
status forced them to be rational and worldly. Unlike the Protestants, for
the Jews, success was not a sign of devotion. Weber points out that cap-
italism did not develop in areas where Jewish presence was most intense,
namely Southern and Eastern Europe and in the “Orient” (Weber 1920a;
cited in Noland 2003, 6).
In Weber’s view, Confucianism was “this-worldly” but it was antitheti-
cal to the “creative destruction” of capitalism as it promoted harmonious
relations along prescribed patterns. Confucianism hampered the evolution
of capitalist market relations because it put emphasis on ethical rather
than formal legal measures. In Weber’s words, “Confucian rationalism
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 227

meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant ratio-

nal mastery of the world” (Weber 1920b, 248; cited in Noland 2003, 6).
Whereas a Puritan could live “in the world and not be part of it,” the
Confucians desired to live in the world and be a happy part of it (Weber
1920b; cited in Noland 2003, 6).
Weber argued that Hinduism and Buddhism promoted “otherworldly”
or “world-rejecting” abstinence that led to a retreat from, not the asser-
tion over the physical world. Hinduism had emphasis on ritual law which
impeded technical and social innovation from within and even blocked
local adaptations of foreign innovations (Weber 1920c; cited in Noland
2003, 69).
With Islam, at the level of the individual, a warrior ethic that consid-
ered war loot as an acceptable means of procurement was not in line with
the “spirit of capitalism.” Many authors have observed that facts did not
support Weber on this issue (cf. Turner 1974; Kuran 1997; Lapidus 1999;
Levtzion 1999; cited in Noland 2003, 7). Capitalism did not evolve with
Muslims when there were no war spoils to enjoy, as in South Asia. Dis-
senting Muslim movements did not encourage rational mastery of the
world, like the Calvinists did.
There are studies which support Weber’s arguments with regard to the
role played by Protestant Reformation in the emergence of capitalism.
Let’s cite a few.
In his study of economic development in Italy, Putnam (1993) iden-
tifies less trust toward others in the south as compared in the North.
Putnam explains this with the existence of a stronger Catholic tradition
in the south which puts more emphasis on the vertical bonds with the
Church. Existence of vertical bonds with the church tends to undermine
the horizontal bonds with one’s fellow citizens. Evidence of supporting
this theory was found in cross-country studies (LaPorta et al. 1997; Ingle-
hart 1999).
A sophisticated version of the Weber thesis is provided by Blum and
Dudley (Blum and Dudley 2001) who argue that costs of contractual
defection are higher according to the Calvinist doctrine of predestina-
tion, as compared with the Catholic practice of ritual atonement. Break-
ing contracts was therefore a more serious affair for Protestants. Because
they themselves were unwilling to breach contracts, Protestants assumed
others were likely to behave the way as they did and they therefore had
greater trust with strangers. Consequently, they were more willing to
make contracts with and more willing to honor the contracts they made
228 R. ERGENER

with strangers. The net outcome was the creation of more wide-ranging
info webs in the Protestant countries of Northern Europe. The externali-
ties created by these networks promoted economic growth and the rise of
industrial capitalism (Noland 2003, 3). Blum and Dudley use this theory
to explain why in Protestant cities wages rose between 1500 and 1750,
while the wages in Catholic cities fell during the same time period (Guiso
et al. 2003, 230).
Other studies have vigorously challenged the empirical validity of
Weber’s argument (Anderson et al. 1992; Delacroix 1992; Tawney c1998;
Samuelsson and Coleman 1993). It has been shown that nearly all insti-
tutions of capitalism had already come into being before the Protes-
tant Reformation, which Weber argued was their cause (Stark c2005;
Tawney c1998). Early Protestant religious leaders did not have much
interest in economic issues (Iannaccone 1998, 1474). Nor did they seem
to understand markets. And, like their Catholic colleagues, most had an
unfavorable opinion about credit and interest (Samuelsson and Coleman
1993). Finally, Weber’s stylized account of European economic history
was refuted. It was shown that in the regions mentioned by Weber, there
was either no correlation between religion and economic changes, or if
there was, the pattern was not as it was claimed by Weber (Samuelsson
and Coleman 1993; Delacroix and Nielsen 2001).
Jacques Delacroix and Francois Nielsen (Delacroix and Nielsen 2001)
explored the validity of the argument that Protestantism had a determin-
ing influence on the rise of industrial capitalism. They looked to see if
there was a correlation between the percentage of Protestants in European
countries and the growth of capitalism during mid-to-late nineteenth cen-
tury. Five sets of variables, namely “measures of wealth and savings, the
founding date of the principal stock exchange, extension of the railroads
network, distribution of the male labor force in agriculture and in indus-
try, and infant mortality” were considered (Delacroix and Nielsen 2001,
509). According to Weberian analysis, as compared with those living in
Catholic countries, Protestants should have saved more, be wealthier, had
a stock market established at older dates, a more extensive rail system,
larger percentage of labor in industry and better health. None of these
predictions were correct, except for the finding that Protestants saved
more. These outcomes provide weak support, if any, to the idea that the
strength of Protestantism in a country raises the likelihood of the early
advancement of industrial capitalism.
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 229

Delacroix observes, “Amsterdam’s wealth was centered on Catholic

families; the economically advanced German Rhineland was more
Catholic than Protestant; all-Catholic Belgium was the second country to
industrialize, ahead of a good half-dozen Protestant entities” (Delacroix
1992, 126).
Even though it is often treated as his distinctive contribution, that
the psychological impetus for rationalized, entrepreneurial capitalism was
provided by the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, is only a fragment
of Weber’s full theory (Collins 1980, 925). It took more than the reli-
gious beliefs of a minority group to spearhead such a transformation. A
widespread religious practice and institution played a role as well. This
practice and institution was monasticism.
Weber emphasized that the Protestant work ethic and prudence played
an important role in the rise of capitalism. Before Protestant puritans,
however, it was the Catholic monks, who regarded work and asceticism as
virtuous. In other words, Catholic monks “had Protestant ethic without
Protestantism” (Collins 1986, 54).

Monasticism and the Rise of Capitalism

Monasticism has its roots in Christianity going back to stoicism and to the
Love Community of Jerusalem under James. The message of Paul’s gospel
is self-sufficiency. Teachings which regard hard work and restraining one’s
consumption as practices which contribute to the effort to attain salvation
go back to the beginning of Christianity (Dodd and Gotsis 2007, 137).
Beginning of monasticism is attributed to St. Anthony of Egypt (251–
356). Yet, the practice was probably started independently by many, as
according to St. Athanasius’s Life of St. Anthony (2013), Anthony himself
had received instruction in monastic life from others. Early monks prac-
ticed in solitude near their own villages. Anthony’s contribution was to
take the practice to the desert where he guided his disciples and acted as a
spiritual father to them. Anthony’s followers lived alone in cells and con-
ducted their spiritual fight against devils in isolation. (The term “hermit”
is from Latin erēmı̄ta and Greek erēmı̄tē´s meaning “living in the desert”
and the term monk is from the Greek monos meaning “alone.” ) Monas-
tic community life emerged under St. Pachomius (292–346), a younger
contemporary of Anthony. Pachomius was the leader of a large monastery,
with a thousand monks or nuns, who were obedient to him as abbot and
230 R. ERGENER

to a Rule. After Pachomius’s rule, there was the rule of St Basil and that
of St. Benedict of Nursia (480–547) (Smith 2009, 10–11).
Upset by the immorality of life in Rome, Benedict had given up his
studies there at age fourteen and become an ascetic monk. He lived as a
hermit, setting an example with his zeal and attracting disciples. He wrote
his Rule near the end of his life at the monastery of Monte Cassino, which
he founded in 529.
Some rules of Benedict would be labeled as socialist today. He banned
private property for the monks. All things were to be common. Based on
Acts 4:35 (“Distribution was made to everyone according to as he had
need”), distribution was to be made according to need.
Some of the other rules of Benedict would paradoxically lead to the
material enrichment of the monasteries.
In addition to asceticism, which had been part of monastic practice
from the very beginning, Benedict prescribed hard labor for the monks:
“Idleness is the enemy of the soul. Therefore, the brothers should have
specified periods for manual labor as well as prayerful reading … When
they live by the labor of their hands as our fathers and the apostles
did then they are real bonds” (Stark 2006, 62). Indeed, together with
“peace” (pax), “pray and work” (ora et labora) is one of the two mottos
which best express the Benedictine spirit.
Benedict was not a bishop or pope and was in no position to impose his
rule on other monasteries. But his rule was widely adopted because it was
useful and provided a near normative framework for Western monasticism.
Weber and others had noted how the ban on the free consumption of
the rewards of their disciplined labor had led ascetic Protestants to pros-
perity. The process was all the more noticeable with monasteries, where
the monks invested the savings created by religious restraint. Monks could
not siphon the wealth they created neither for their own consumption, as
they were ascetics, nor for family consumption, because they were celi-
bate. Consequently, it was the monastery that grew rich (Collins 1997,
848).
By putting aside attachment to worldly things, Catholic monks had
ensured the economic security of their monastic estates (Stark 2006, 56).
“Throughout the medieval era the Catholic Church was the biggest
landowner in Europe – and its wealth surpassed the wealth of all nobility
in Europe” (Stark 2006, 58). Monastic corporations also fronted advances
in production techniques which elevated efficiency. Plowing with horses
rather than cows, the introduction of the heavy mouldboard plow, and the
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 231

three-field system raised productivity immensely. Cistercians amalgamated

previously uncultivated land, cleared forests, and drained flooded areas
(Stark 2006, 59). As a result of these changes, monasteries ceased to be
subsistence economies and started to produce the items they specialized
in for-profit (Stark 2006, 58).
Organizational growth of the monasteries was accompanied or fol-
lowed by proselytizing among the common people by monastic preachers,
such as Augustinian, Franciscan, and Dominican friars.
It was through the efforts of these preachers that asceticism was
brought out of the cells and halls of monasteries into daily life, as reli-
gious asceticism was now demanded not just from the members of small
and secluded spiritual elites, but from members of the religious commu-
nity as a whole. The outcome in the religious sphere was the emergence
of self-styled ascetic religiosity among the uninitiated (Weber 1961, 268).
One of the significant outcomes of the proselytizing activities of the fri-
ars was the spillover of monastic values and practices to the secular econ-
omy. Consequently, there was the spread in lay society of market relations
and disciplined economic practices. Ultimately, during the reformation,
monastic wealth would be confiscated by secular authorities. But, at that
point, economic activities such as hard work and abstention from exces-
sive spending had already been recognized as means through which one
could obtain religious salvation (Collins 1997, 849).
“Such developments did not take place in Islam. The Muslim ascetic
was not committed to hard work. Ahis and Bektashis in Ottoman lands for
example did valuable work in legitimizing central authority, in building up
the fabric of new society in lands newly conquered by the Ottomans and
in making conversions to Islam. But, members of such orders were not
devoted to abstention and hard work as such, as Catholic monks were”
(Barkan 1942 cited in; Ergener 2010, 7).
“Why Catholic style monasticism which demanded both asceticism and
hard work did not take roots in the Muslim world is a subject which
needs exploration. There are statements in the Qur’an and by Muhammad
himself which are explicitly against monasticism” (Ergener 2010).
“But monasticism they invented. We ordained it not for them-only
seeking Allah’s pleasure, and they observed it not with right observance.
So we give those of them who believe their reward, but many of them are
evil-livers” (Koran, 57:27).
“When Muhammad himself found out that some of his followers had
taken a vow to fast during the day, pass the night in worship, abstain from
232 R. ERGENER

meat and fat and renounce intercourse with women, he warned that what
they were doing was not his creed, that their body had rights over them,
that they should fast, but also eat and drink, that people who renounced
women, good food, perfume, sleep and worldly pleasure would come to
ruins, the remnants of whom would be seen in monasteries and convents”
(Chaudhry 1999; cited in Ergener 2010, 7).
Can the absence of Catholic style monasticism with its emphasis on
hard work and labor be one of the reasons for the failure of capitalism to
evolve in Muslim lands? One is tempted to answer “yes.”
Yet, as pointed out by Ilona Silber, the image of monasteries staffed
with hardworking ascetic monks may not be so accurate. Monasteries
were not uniform in terms of economic achievement. There were huge
differences in the economic methods employed and in the resulting
achievements. Examples of bad management were as many as of good
management (Silber 1993, 110). Many monasteries barely survived, and
the surplus they produced was so minimal that it would have made little
difference whether they reinvested it “rationally” or “irrationally” (Silber
1993, 109). The successes were facilitated more by tax-exemptions and
trading privileges than by the efficient management of resources (Silber
1993, 112).
Work was not valued by all monasteries as an ascetic instrument.
Monastic ideology had been ambiguous on that issue from the very
start. Even though St. Benedict encouraged economic self-sufficiency and
emphasized the therapeutic and ascetic value of work, physical labor was
perceived, at all times, as a low and servile activity not quite suited to a
spiritual aristocracy of monks—many members of whom did actually came
from the upper social strata. This attitude culminated in the displacement
of physical with liturgical labor. Indeed, at the origin of numerous monas-
tic achievements there was not the valuation of labor but rather its dero-
gation (Silber 1993, 110).
The derogation rather than the valuation of labor may well have stim-
ulated the numerous monastic achievements in technology as well (Silber
1993, 110). Monks may have introduced mechanical sources of power
and invented labor-saving devices in order to have more time for study,
meditation and prayer (Silber 1993, 110).
Monastic life was disrupted by Viking, Magyar, and Saracen raids as
well as by the violent internal disorders of the Carolingian Empire in the
late ninth century, and it had to be rebuilt all over. The renewed orders
were based on a combination of the Rules of Benedict of Nursia, on the
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 233

view that monasteries were centers of erudition, on German notions of

authority in which monastic powers were linked to the princely ones, and
on a hierocratic vision of the monks. According to the hierocratic view,
monks would be above the peasants who worked the monastery lands
and the liturgical role of the monks would be exulted. In the hierocratic
society, there would be those who pray (oratores ), who fought (bellatores ),
and who worked (laboratores ).
Monasteries, delegated economic management tasks to a small number
of monks, each responsible for a specific office, or, if they could afford,
employ lay personnel to undertake most economic and menial duties.
Thereby, the higher monks could fully devote themselves to the spiri-
tual vocation. It was with the same logic that Cistercians developed the
systematic use of illiterate lay brothers, who were following a simplified
monastic regime, to handle all physical and economic tasks (Silber 1993,
110).
Much of monastic wealth was not the produce of hard work and asceti-
cism but was donated. Monastic communities lived mainly off the land
endowments which had been donated by members of the land-controlling
class (Little 1994, 62). Those who gave to the Catholic Church would
add divine legitimization to the aristocratic legitimization they already
had of their rank, political authority, and property, not only for them-
selves, but also for their heirs as well (Weiner c1992, 34, 15; cited in
Silber 1995, 223).
Monastic houses provided the continuous connection to the other-
world. The land endowments which were donated to monasteries at their
founding or at later dates were to be used for the upkeep of monks and
nuns, who would in return provide services such as prayers and masses
that would improve the chances of salvation of the souls of the donors
and their relatives. In Catholic Europe in the eighteenth century, sub-
stantial fraction of the sizeable amounts willed by the faithful was to be
spent on prayers and Masses, in order to gain God’s mercy (Beales and
Beales 2003, 316). The donor could be buried within the monastery’s
cemetery, or allowed to join the monastery and don the monastic habit
ad succurendum, i.e., just before death. Laymen seem to have been espe-
cially inclined to making donations at important turning points in their
life cycles, particularly when they were close to the final turning point
before passing away, when one’s awareness of his sinfulness and fear of
pending punishment tends to be most acute, and would therefore look
234 R. ERGENER

up to a donation to a monastery as a possible quick remedy (Epstein

1984; Cohn 1988; Rosenwein 1989; cited in Silber 1995, 218).
“Consumers” other than the initial benefactors could buy such services
on a regular or impromptu basis from monasteries and convents. Instru-
ments such as prayers, hymns, masses, lighting of candles or of incense
were employed to take care of the spiritual welfare of not only the resi-
dents of monasteries and convents, but also of the community at large.
Beyond these legitimizing, spiritual, and mortuary services, however,
monasteries were often expected to reciprocate their benefactors’ generos-
ity in a very practical and material manner. Kings could be very generous
benefactors but also expected, especially in time of war, to be provided
with financial and other resources if need be, including even military con-
tingents recruited from the population on monastic territory. Monaster-
ies, moreover, owed hospitality to their benefactors and in the case of
noble or royal benefactors, to their whole entourage—a duty which could
become a very heavy economic burden. Frequently enough, an endow-
ment would be made against the monastery’s explicit commitment to pro-
vide the donor with food, clothing or even lodging for the rest of his life.
What was permanently donated to a monastery could be claimed at
a later date by the heirs of the donor or by laymen or even by another
monastery, claiming to be in possession of usually fake documents sup-
porting their right to the property. It was possible that the Lord who had
made a donation to a monastery would choose to confiscate it at a later
date (Baker and Mason 1978; Silber 1995, 222). It was not unusual for
donors to remain attached to what used to be their personal property.
Those who had founded monasteries sometimes continued to consider
these still being as their own and continued to dispose of their resources
as they wished (Silber 1995, 222–23).
So, monastic wealth was not all based on the hard work and prudence
of monks, but on the labor of lay monks, on technological change, on
donations, on privileges accorded and on the sale of dreams (salvation
in afterlife). All this makes monasticism in a different way a model for
and a forerunner of capitalist enterprises. Prudence and hard work may
have been essential for the petty capitalists. But employment of labor,
technological change, various privileges (like tariff protection), and the
sale of dreams are essential features of the capitalist practice.
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 235

Autonomization of the Economic

Sphere and Canon Law
An important contribution of monasticism to the rise of capitalism was
the autonomization of the economic sphere and the reinforcement of
the property rights against the state, both essential to the growth of
capitalism.
Monastic wealth rested on the strictly maintained theoretical claim that
personal and collective or corporate wealth was distinct. It was this prin-
ciple that allowed the monastery to accumulate and manage wealth as a
corporation while the individual monk remained personally poor, in accor-
dance with his ideal.
There would be a similar distinction between the property of the pri-
vate entrepreneur and the assets of the enterprise. Weber emphasized that
this distinction carried with it a de-personification and the autonomiza-
tion of economic activity, which is essential to the operation of a capital-
ist market economy. The monastic de-personification of wealth, together
with the high degree of institutional autonomy which monasteries had,
may be an early case of the autonomization of the economic sphere
of activity, at least on a purely organizational-institutional level. The
autonomous monastery preceded the medieval autonomous city which,
according to Weber and many others played an important role in the
unique development of Western capitalism (Silber 1993, 116).
During the tenth century, a considerable portion of monastic property
was confiscated by the worldly establishment. In response to these seizures
and for other reasons, during the second half of the eleventh century, the
Church initiated reforms that recognized the Pope’s supremacy over both
the Church and the earthly leaders. One of the outcomes of the eleventh-
century reforms instigated by the Pope was the advent of ecclesiastical
courts which had the authority both to create and to exegete the Church
canon. The ecclesiastical would shield the Church properties from confis-
cation by the state. Several of the canon law doctrines that protected the
Church from the arbitrary appropriation of its property by the state are
still part of the modern Western law, assuring the rights to own property
and to make contract with individuals vis-à-vis the state. Similar develop-
ments did not take place in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, China, and
India, where unlike Western Europe, the central government was strong
and the religious authorities were missing the clout and the superiority
236 R. ERGENER

which the Medieval Church had on the secular rulers (North and Gwin
2010, 1–2).
A society that provides incentives and opportunities for investment will
be richer than a society that doesn’t (North and Thomas 1973; North
and Weingast 1989; Olson 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 1). This view
dates at least back to Adam Smith, who stressed the role of “peace, easy
taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice” in generating prosperity
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 1). Also essential for economic growth is the pro-
tection of property rights against the state. John Locke argued for the
necessity of securing property rights against the state, in order for indi-
viduals to undertake productive activities.
The efforts of the medieval Church to protect itself from the arbitrary
whims of the princes and rulers led to the evolution of the legal principles
that restricted the power of the state against property holders (including
the Church itself). These principles were eventually put into the law of
most countries of Western Europe, an innovation, which would be one
of the key developments that opened the way to the economic ascendance
of Western Europe (North and Gwin 2010, 18).
Canon law, however, ultimately failed to protect the monastery land,
and most monastery property was confiscated with the reformation. In
Tudor England and at the end of the eighteenth century in France, Aus-
tria, and Bavaria, all monastery properties were taken over by the state
and then sold in the market—at cheap prices.
Similar developments took place in Japan and China where monasteries
were supported by donations from the aristocrats, enjoyed tax incentives,
employed lay workers, ran business establishments like mills lent money
and were ultimately taken over by the state.
In Muslim countries, property rights were secured against the state
within the framework of pious endowments known as the waqf. Waqf
could be set up for pious purposes like to support a religious order, to
maintain the upkeep and the clergy of a mosque, to provide public ser-
vices, or to maintain descendants of the family members of the founder.
In economic terms, waqf lacked the flexibility of the business corporation
as resources endowed had to be used in accordance with the wishes of the
founder. The institution of waqf never evolved into a legal system which
would lead to the protection of property rights in general. As the Middle
East came under the domination of the west, Middle Eastern economies
became more extractive and arbitrary.
 10 RELIGION AND HISTORICAL DIVERGENCES ... 237

But the property rights of waqfs were never disputed, which is not
necessarily true for monasteries.

Final Words on the Great Divergence

It is the optimal and rational use of resources with a long-term view and
savings and technological change that made sustained growth possible
under capitalism. Weber argued that what made capitalism possible was
a change of mentality which started with Puritans, according to which
both pursuit of gain and asceticism became duties. Monks were puritan-
ical before there were puritans. They worked hard, innovated and saved.
Monastic ideals penetrated the society through friars. Monastery also
introduced the autonomization of the economic sphere with the institu-
tion getting richer as the monks themselves remained poor, in accordance
with their vow. Canon law protected the monastery property against the
state, and this was incorporated in the legal system. So, can we say that
monastic teachings of hard work and asceticism as well as the legal frame-
work associated with monasticism contributed to the rise of capitalism?
The answer may not be so clear.
Not all monasteries were efficient and not all monks were hardwork-
ing and poor. Many employed peasants to do the menial tasks. Much of
the monastic wealth was based on donations and from the sale of irra-
tional goods such as prayers for the well-being of the community or of
the donor to the monastery or of his soul. The legal immunity was not
complete. Donors or their heirs or strangers with fake claims could always
go to court to reclaim the land. Ultimately, most monastic properties were
confiscated during the reformation.
Islam did not preach hard work and asceticism as paths to salvation.
This may be why there were no monasteries as such, which is possibly one
of the reasons why the indigenous breakout from military coercive society
to capitalist markets did not take place in Muslim countries. Interestingly
however, the waqfs, which were Muslim havens of sheltering private prop-
erty from confiscation, were never confiscated, whereas most of monastic
property ultimately was.
238 R. ERGENER

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 CHAPTER 11

Concluding Remarks

We have covered long distances, stretching from Africa to the Arctic, from
faraway China to the US West, across the mountains, through the deserts
and over the oceans, tracing the remains of the religious and the economic
which have been coevolving ever since a population of about 2000 Homo
Sapiens, ancestors of us modern humans, embarked on a long journey out
of Africa, beginning roughly 70,000 to 130,000 years ago, spreading very
rapidly all around the world—a journey with its roots hidden deep in the
ancient past and heading yet to an unknown future (Chan et al. 2019;
Zhivotovsky et al. 2003).
What did we find? Are there any patterns? Any trends?
The task of uncovering any trends or patterns is quite challenging
because of the very uneven distribution of information over time. We
happen to know the least about what we have been the longest: hunter-
gatherers. Yet, some trends are discernable nevertheless.
Today, there are few hunter-gatherers, but until about ten thousand
years ago, that is what we all were.

TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL TO BOOK RELIGIONS

The changes that took place in the religion of hunter-gatherers’

ancestors, as the elites inserted themselves as intermediaries between

© The Author(s) 2020 243

R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6_11
244 R. ERGENER

gods and humans, have been labeled as being the transition from the
“traditional” to the “book” (Howells 1948), or from the “ances-
tral” to “modern” (Hayden 2003) or from “imagistic” to “doctri-
nal” (Whitehouse 2002) religions.
Traditional practitioners sought favors from everything: animals,
plants, people, rocks, the ocean, mountains, and the sky and celes-
tial bodies (Hayden 2003, 5). Believers of book religions asked for
things from gods.
Traditional practitioners had no priests or churches. The congre-
gation was the whole community. Rituals were improvised. In book
religions, there is a separation of the priest and laity. The priests
provided the contact with gods and also fixed and supervised the
rituals.
Members of traditional religions participated in rituals whereas
members of book religions mostly observed them (Hayden 2003,
8).
Traditional religions celebrated this world and provided worldly
rewards. Food, drink, and dance rituals are part of the traditional
religious practice and are mediums of contacting presumed higher
powers.
Book religions consider this world as a somber place (Hayden
2003, 8) and they advise the giving up of pleasures of this world for
the sake of the other world (Hayden 2003, 7). The benefits due to
followers of book religions are mostly deferred until afterlife.
Ecstasy, which is attained through rituals, is the religious expe-
rience in traditional religions. In book religions, ecstasy is mostly
looked down upon, discouraged, or hidden (Hayden 2003, 7).

As hunter-gatherers we lived in small groups, foraging, hunting, gath-

ering, and fishing in habitats that allowed for immediate returns, imme-
diately consuming the fruits of our labor.
There was no or very little storage, no wealth accumulation, no
inequality, and no social stratification.
There was no central authority. Individuals shared (Woodburn 1998)
all their meager belongings or tolerated their belongings’ being robbed,
to make sure that they themselves will be looked over when they are in
need and steal from others. Free riders who did not share or did not
 11 CONCLUDING REMARKS 245

tolerate theft from them would be dealt with, by the individuals involved.
When friction became too intense, the weaker party would leave.
There was this world only. Punishments and rewards were this worldly
and therefore bearable to endure and affordable to lose. There was no
risk of missing eternal bliss or enduring fires of hell forever.
There were no big gods, who could rule over the forces of nature and
who knew all, including thoughts and desires, and who could punish all.
There were no big gods but everything was imbued with sacredness.
Everyone could set up her own communication channels with animated
non-humans. Religious actions were impromptu and spontaneous. There
were no temples with priests mediating with gods.

All this changed, as…

… the mode of production shifted from hunting and gathering to hor-
ticulture, pastoralism to farming (and eventually to industry),
… people started to live in permanent home bases, in larger groups,
… volume of exchange expanded, rendering self-protection of rights
more difficult
… humans started to live in harsher habitats, (Botero et al. 2014)
… storage and the production of surpluses became possible,
… accumulation and inequality were tolerated,
With the recognition in the religious sphere …
… of powerful gods and otherworldly punishments and rewards
… first of dead ancestors and later of powerful big gods (Moralizing
high gods are observed more frequently among those human groups that
habit poor habitats. This is because, moralizing high gods both stimulate
and deepen cooperation, which is much needed and very useful to cope
with harsh environments (Botero et al. 2014, 16787). Intensificatıon of
rituals and of the tendency to cooperate are all human reactions to threats
in unpredictable environments). (Botero et al. 2014, 16787)

… the monopolization of connections with gods by the elites, depriving

the ordinary individuals from direct access to gods,
Elites were empowered to…
… impose and justify inequality. (Peoples and Marlowe 2012)

Inequality spread, bringing to an end the stagnation which had lasted

with human societies for hundreds of thousands of years, and unleash-
ing forces of innovation and other dynamics. The positive and negative
outcomes have been revealing themselves.
246 R. ERGENER

The entanglement of religion and economics continues. Ever since the

sharp turn away from hunting gathering to agriculture, religion has played
a key role in the spreading of trade, reducing contract uncertainty, pro-
moting charity, attenuating and enhancing dominance, and promoting
attitudes, beliefs and behaviors that are good for growth. The successful
combinations of religion, ecology, and social structure will prevail. The
loser combinations will be wiped out. (Yet, the loser combinations may
be encouraged by the successful who may wish to weaken rivals.)
Stark and Bainbridge argue in a Theory of Religion (Stark and Bain-
bridge 1987), that humans resort to gods to access what they cannot get
from each other. Religion may not provide but it can expand the scope
of what humans can provide for each other, because it is one of the rare
institutions that can issue the “Because…”, statement that cannot be dis-
puted. Rather than concentrating on how it is outdated, irrational and
dying, it may be wiser to understand religion, its rational uses and to
acknowledge that it is here with us to stay.
Because …

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 Index

A C
Abrahamic, 9, 46, 172, 173 Calvin, John, 226
Aggrandizer, 103–105, 107–112 Carter, Jimmy, 131, 135, 139
Al-Arabi, 43 Çatal Höyük, 1
Alawi, 42, 43 Catholic, 50, 51, 94, 137, 140,
Ancestor worship, 8, 114 141, 145, 150, 152–154, 168,
Animism, 4, 8–10, 46 184–186, 188, 191–196, 198,
Apocalypse, 46 199, 202, 206, 207, 226–233
Armenian, 88, 152, 153 Chief, 41, 55–58, 61, 114, 115,
117–119, 148
Chiefdom, 55, 56, 60
Chimpanzee, 11, 13, 14, 29, 111
B Christianity, 46, 47, 70, 139–142,
Bainbridge, William Sims, 38, 187, 144, 145, 148, 170, 174, 175,
188, 246 181, 221, 229
Band, 55, 56, 103 Circumscription, 112
Baptist, 74, 77, 83, 131, 192 Clan, 72, 75, 112–114, 122, 123,
Bartholomew, Ecumenical Patriarch, 132
48–50 Collins, Randall, 223, 229–231
Bear cult, 40 Community dance, 8, 10–12, 14, 17,
Big gods, 4, 18, 245 19–21
Boundary loss, 12, 17 Conservative Protestant (CP),
Buddhism, 44, 70, 93, 94, 227 191–195, 197, 198
Bushmen, 4, 22 Contract uncertainty, 70–72, 246

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 249
license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
R. Ergener, Religion and Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44455-6
250 INDEX

Conversion, 90, 91, 147, 149, 153, H

226, 231 Hadza, 3, 56, 101, 102, 124, 133
Cult, 61, 78, 113, 116, 117, 144 Haeckel, Ernest, 44
Hasidic, 83
Henge monuments, 60
D Hinduism, 44, 45, 206, 227
Delos, 61 Hobbes, Thomas, 7
Diamond Dealers’ Club (DDC), 82, Holy War, 90
83 Homogamy, 193
Diaspora, 87, 88, 93 Hunter-gatherer, 8, 20, 26, 102
Divorce, 187, 191, 193 Hxaro, 109
Dualist, 46

I
E Iannaccone, Larry, 17, 78, 79, 187,
Ecstasy, 12, 15, 16, 19, 244 189–191, 228
Education, 76, 155, 162, 186, 192, Islam, 21, 42, 46, 62, 70, 90, 91, 94,
194, 195, 197 147–149, 151, 153, 154, 166,
Emporia, 60 168, 190, 206, 220, 222, 224,
Emre, Yunus, 43 225, 227, 231, 237

F J
Feasting, 59, 60 Jain, 45, 84
Fertility, 12, 13, 17, 116, 120, 147, Jewish, 64, 76, 78, 85, 88, 89, 93,
192, 194, 201, 204 137, 152, 153, 166, 170, 174,
Francis, Pope, 48 192, 194, 195, 197, 200, 226
Free rider, 8, 16, 17, 37, 56, 57, 164, Jihad, 90, 148
244

K
G Kalahari, 4, 17, 109–111
Genesis, 46, 50, 64, 117, 139, 142 Kami, 46
Gift, 2, 4, 8–10, 22, 29–31, 37–41, !Kung, 4, 102, 105, 109–111
47, 50, 70, 76, 80, 102, 109,
116–118, 122, 123, 136, 142,
151, 152, 161, 168–170, 173, M
183, 223, 225 Maghreb, 88
Göbekli Tepe, 58–60 Mainstream Protestant, 191, 192,
Greek Orthodox, 152 194, 195
Greif, Avner, 88, 89, 93 Mbuti, 28, 44, 55
Gypsies, 200 Monism, 43, 44
 INDEX 251

N Shibboleth, 75
Naskapi, 40, 104 Shinto, 46
Netsilik, 39, 102, 110 Sikh, 78, 80, 81, 83
Norenzayan, Ara, 4, 9, 16, 57, 73, Silk Road, 69, 70, 88
160, 163, 165, 172 Smith, Adam, 25, 74, 162, 207, 236
Nuer, 22, 41 Stark, Rodney, 38, 137, 170, 175,
187, 228, 230, 231, 246
Stonehenge, 60
O
Storage, 19, 20, 61, 103–107,
Oaxaca, 20
120–123, 244
Ojibwa, 8, 116
Sufi, 42, 43
Orthodox, 49, 50, 78, 137, 146,
150–152
T
Tahtacı, 42, 43
P
Tit-for-tat, 23, 24, 26, 29
Pantheism, 43
Tithe, 92, 117, 153, 174, 175, 197,
Peddler, 85–87, 89
198
Pentecostal, 183, 192
Transaction costs, 61
People of the Book, 149
Peoples, Hervey C., 8, 10, 245
Poverty Point, 60 U
Prayer, 4, 10, 41, 50, 176, 183, 200, Ultra-conservative Jews, 84
232–234, 237
Pygmy, 28, 44, 55
V
Vatican II, 140
Q
Quaker, 77, 115
W
Warm glow, 163
R Wealth, 77, 90, 101, 105, 110, 116,
Reciprocity, 23, 25, 27–29, 38, 40, 118, 119, 122, 136, 141, 153,
56, 159, 170, 189 182, 191–194, 196–199, 222,
Ritual, 1, 2, 4, 10, 12–14, 16–21, 37, 226, 229–231, 233–235, 237,
39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 50, 51, 56, 244
58, 60, 90, 112–116, 121, 168, Weber, Max, 74, 93, 200, 205, 207,
172, 188, 196, 227, 244, 245 225–231, 235, 237
Wexler, Jay, 51
White, Lynn, 47, 48
S
Sahlins, Marshall David, 21–23, 28
Saint Francis, 48 Z
Saint Irenaeus, 47 Zahavi, Amotz, 77, 78, 160
Sect, 78, 79, 84, 94, 187 Zoroaster, 44, 45, 69, 149
Sharia, 91