LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

OF
SECURITY ANALYSIS

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Copyright © 2024

Published by
National Institute for
Legislative & Democratic Studies,
National Assembly,
Abuja.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved
above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in, or
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 Foreword

Professor Abubakar O. Sulaiman

Director-General,
National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies,
Abuja

The National Institute of Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), is an organ

of the National Assembly, established by the NILS Act 2011. Its mandate was later
expanded as amended by the NILS Act 2017 to include the Democratic Studies
component. NILDS has among its mandate; the strengthening of Democratic
Institutions and the deepening of democracy in the country. In its bid to provide
effective support to the National Assembly as it responds to the growing
accountability demand by the citizens and the expanding role of the legislature,
NILDS established the Legislative Centre for Security Analysis (LeCeSa) in 2023.
The Centre was established to bridge the knowledge and experience gap between
the legislature and the Executive, which was created by intermittent military
interruption of democracy in Nigeria. In each case of these military incursions,
the constitution and the legislature were disbanded while the Executive enjoyed
relative continuity in governance.To achieve this mandate, the Centre is responsible
for providing policy and capacity-building support to the legislature and generating
cutting-edge research output that would support policy actors and stakeholders to
provide effective and efficient security sector governance.

The birth of the Legislative Journal of Security Analysis (LJSA) is a timely effort
and a welcome approach to discharging the Centre’s mandate of providing local
and international scholars the platform for disseminating research output. The
Journal which places a high premium on empirical and policy research will serve

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as a repository for knowledge in security, peace, strategic, and conflict studies. The
LJSA’s preference for empirical and policy research sets it apart as an agenda-setting
platform for the deepening and strengthening of the security sector in Nigeria
and the West African sub-region. This is coming at a time when Nigeria is facing
a plethora and worsening insecurity and the West African subregion is challenged
by conflict, military coups, insurgency, terrorism, transnational crimes, leadership
crisis, and development failures. At this trying time, research output from the
journal will provide the necessary empirical data required for security policy while
setting the agenda for national, regional, and global security governance.

This maiden edition of the journal lined up several well-researched articles that
present findings on thought-provoking issues capturing different aspects of national
and international security concerns. These articles not only reflect novel areas of
thought on the different problems they set out to address but also the interest
of scholars from different institutions and walks of life across the length and
breadth of Nigeria. I therefore recommend this journal to members of the security
committees in the national, state assemblies and the Local Government Councils,
members of the Federal, State, and Local Government Council executives with
security portfolios, members of the Armed Forces, the Nigeria Police, Department
of State Security, other agencies in the security sector. Others include Ministries,
Departments and Agencies (MDAs), international development partners, Civil
Society Organisations (CSOs), the mass media, researchers, and students.

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 Editor’s Note
On behalf of the Editors, it is exciting to introduce the Legislative Journal of Security
Analysis (LJSA). LJSA is a Journal of the Legislative Centre for Security Analysis of
the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), National
Assembly, Abuja. The LJSA is part of the effort by the Centre to build knowledge
to support the National Assembly, legislatures at subnational levels, security policy
actors, and practitioners in responding to national security. This maiden edition
is coming just over a year after the Centre was established in May 2023. The
Journal will bring you original and quality research on Peace, Conflict, Security,
and Strategic Studies with empirical and policy bias. LJSA is published twice each
year (April and September) and is open to receive contributions by scholars from
across the globe. The editorial board comprises scholars of international repute
with decades of research and policy experience and a highly skilled and committed
editorial team to drive the vision of JLSA to becoming an internationally reputable
Journal within the first decade of its existence.

The LJSA welcomes original scholarly articles, on policy analysis, and book
reviews on relevant topics. This maiden edition features eight scholarly articles
and opens with a paper entitled, Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical
Assessment. The author critically examined the nexus between youth and national
security in Nigeria. It argues that Nigeria’s youthful population, comprising over
60% of its citizens, represents both a potential asset and a security challenge. The
papers suggest that the high level of unemployment and underemployment among
young people contribute to economic exclusion, provide incentives for criminal
behaviours, and enhance the potential for their recruitment into extremist groups
such as Boko Haram. The paper concludes that with concerted efforts by the
government, Nigeria could transform the demographic potential of its youths from
a security liability into an asset for national economic development. In the paper
Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria:

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The Story So Far, the author highlighted the threat of Boko Haram terrorism and
banditry to the political, socioeconomic, and cultural heritage of Nigeria and the
need to employ technology, particularly, drone in fighting terrorism, insurgency,
and banditry. The study found that the deployment of drone by the military in
its counterinsurgency operation reveals that it lacked the necessary capacity and
expertise to operate it. The paper recommends the deployment of more drones
to counter insurgency, training and retraining of the military in drone technology,
and encouraging local production.

The paper Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What
Policy Options for the National Assembly? Weigh the different arguments for and
against establishing state police in Nigeria. It argues that while Nigeria’s federal
constitution recognises the existence of only a federal police force, the worsening
insecurity and the weak performance of the police over the years have elicited
public agitation for establishing state police. This has sparked a public debate for
and against the adoption of state police. With insights from the strengths and
weaknesses of both strands of arguments, the paper concludes that the country
is not yet mature for state policy and recommends several policy options for the
National Assembly. Between Providing Security and Building a Leviathan: Understanding
the Conversation on State Policing in Nigeria, examined the ongoing conversations on
state policing in Nigeria and explored the delicate balance between establishing
state police and ensuring security while risk creating a Hobbesian Leviathan at the
state level. In assessing the arguments for and against state police, the paper made
a case for a reform that will enhance security without undermining civil liberties
as an essential element of democratic governance.

The paper entitled Conflict Transformation Approach: A Panacea for Inter-Religious

Conflict in Nigeria examined the complex, deeply rooted, and persistent issue
of inter-religious conflict in Nigeria and its challenge to social cohesion and
national development. The author argues that several unsuccessful efforts at
resolving recurring religious conflict through dialogue in Nigeria have created
the need to adopt a conflict transformation approach - a comprehensive and

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dynamic framework to resolve conflict by fundamentally altering the structures,
relationships, and narratives perpetuating them.The paper argues that key elements
of the approach such as actors, issues, rules, and structural transformations could
contribute to sustainable peace. Actor’s transformations emphasize the emergence
of new, peace-promoting leaders and organizations, fostering a culture of dialogue
and collaboration across religious divides. Issue transformations shift the focus
from identity-based disputes to shared socio-economic goals. In contrast, rule
transformations involve changes in the norms and laws governing inter-religious
interactions to promote inclusivity and justice. Structural transformations aim
to decentralize power, ensure equitable resource distribution, and build robust
institutions that reflect the diversity of Nigerian society. By integrating these
transformative strategies, the conflict transformation approach creates a foundation
for enduring peace and unity in Nigeria. In Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to
Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats, the author shows the multifaceted
challenges facing security governance because of the worsening insecurity. Using
securitization theory, the paper provided insights into strategies for mobilizing
resources, implementing targeted interventions, and policy instruments to address
insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements in Nigeria.

The paper on the Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks
of Alcoholism among Commercial Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria, identified alcoholism
as a major cause of several diseases and premature deaths. The paper showed that
small group awareness campaigns against alcoholism are more effective because
they offer opportunities for interpersonal interactions and people can ask questions
and get answers on the spot. However, the study finds that poverty, parental and
peer influence, including political thuggery are the major causes of alcoholism
in most bus terminals in the South West. Anti-alcoholic campaigns targeted at
school children can be an effective measure to check the tide of the menace. The
Southwestern governments can set up therapeutic centers for victims of alcohol
addiction. The last article entitled: Youth, Social Media Abuse, and Mental Well-Being,
argues that social media like every technology has its good and bad sides. Social
media could adversely affect youths who suffer from or are vulnerable to mental
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illness. The paper establishes a positive correlation between the growing use of
social media and a rise in mental health concerns among youths. The prolonged use
of social media can lead to mental instability such as anxiety, stress, and depression
– a trend that Health experts have described as a second pandemic.

To sustain the vision of the LJSA in providing a lead in security research and taking
a vantage position as a journal of choice for scholars, security policy actors, and
other stakeholders, it shall adopt a rolling call for papers and accept manuscripts
throughout the year. However, manuscripts that successfully scaled the peer review
process would be published at intervals in April and September, respectively.
LJSA publishes in print and online as a platform to reach the global audience. It is
therefore a great pleasure to unveil the Legislative Journal for Security Analysis.

Dr. Christopher Ochanja Ngara

Editor

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 EDITORS
Prof. Zubairu Dagona Editor-in-Chief
Dr Christopher Ochanja Ngara Editor
Mr. Egwuatu Onyejelem Editorial Secretaries

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Professor Abubakar Olanrewaju Sulaiman DG, NILDS, - Chair
Professor Nuhu Yaqub Sokoto State University, Sokoto
Professor Audu N. Gambo Karl KUM University, Vom
Professor Bola Adetula University of Jos
Professor Istifanus S. Zabadi Bingham University, Abuja
Professor Gani Joses Yoroms National Defense College, Abuja
Dr. Ndubusi Nwokolo NexTier SPD, Abuja
Dr. Ruth Abiola Adimula Centre for Peace & Strategic Studies,
University of Ilorin
Professor Gerald Ezirim University of Nigeria, Nsuka
Professor Ibrahim Muhammad Jumuare Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto
Professor Chukwuemeka Jaja Nwanegbo Nnadi Azikiwe University, Awka
Professor Nacha Alahira Nigerian Defence Academy
Julie Sanda National Defense College

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CONTENTS

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: 12

A Critical Assessment
Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram 30

Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: The Story So Far
Asor Gbamwuan

Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. 58

What Policy Options for the National Assembly?
Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

Between Providing Security and Building a Leviathan: 80

Understanding the Conversation on State Policing in Nigeria
Abubakar Sadiq Ahmed

Conflict Transformation Approach: 98

A Panacea for Inter-Religious Conflict in Nigeria
Ephraim Makuochukwu Ogugbuaja

Security Governance in Nigeria: 120

Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats
Ikwuoma Sunday Udochukwu, Ojo Idowu Akinwumi & Fanne Haroun

Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks of 144

Alcoholism among Commercial Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria
Adebayo John James

Youth, Social Media Abuse, and Mental Well-Being 162

Ezekiel Ephraim Pati Osiriehegbe

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11
 Youth and National
Security in Nigeria:
A Critical Assessment
Adedoyin Jolaade Omede
Department of Political Science
University of Ilorin, Ilorin Kwara State

&

Arinze Ngwube
Department of Political Science
Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

Abstract
This paper critically assessed the interplay between youth and national
security in Nigeria, emphasizing the demographic, socio-economic, and
political dimensions of this relationship. Nigeria’s youthful population,
comprising over 60% of its citizens, represents both a potential asset and a
security challenge. High unemployment and underemployment rates among
young Nigerians contribute to economic disenfranchisement, making them
susceptible to criminal activities and radicalization by extremist groups
such as Boko Haram. The inadequacies in the education system, political
exclusion, and social marginalization further exacerbate these vulnerabilities.
However, this demographic also presents significant opportunities for
national development. By investing in youth empowerment, education
reform, political inclusion, and economic policies conducive to job creation,
Nigeria can transform its youth from a security liability into a driving force
for stability and growth. Comprehensive counter-radicalization programs
addressing the root causes of extremism are also crucial.The paper concluded
that strategic investments in youth are essential for enhancing national
security and fostering long-term prosperity in Nigeria.

Keywords:
Development, National Security, Political, Unemployment,Youth

Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 13

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

Introduction

The youth population of a country is one of its greatest assets. They are the future
leaders of a country and also serve as a pivot of a country’s development. Nigerian
youth constitute much of the Nigerian populace and are within the age bracket
18 to 35 years which accounts for 70% of the entire population of 140 million
based on the 2006 population (Omoju and Abraham, 2014). However, based on
the data presented it is observed that more than 60% of them are unemployed.
These gives room for the possibility of some becoming members of criminal gangs
and serve as a pool of recruitment for sponsorship of militancy. There is a need
to recognize the power of the youth, a force that has great potential and one
that needs to be harnessed towards nation-building (Ahluwalia, 2016). The
current trend of the youth being hyper-active on social media needs to be
channelled by diverting their energy towards national integration and building
a pluralistic society. Ahluwalia argues further that it is important to have the
youth understand the basic concept of national security and the impact it has
on “human security’ and “economic growth.” As a link between the present
and future, how a society, especially the governing elites behave as well as the
roles they assign to this important segment of the population, will determine
to a large extent whether that society is advancing or heading towards disaster.
Most development actors in Africa consider youth as a crucial segment of society
whose needs to be addressed adequately in every effort to ensure comprehensive
socio-economic and political development. This recognition has passed through
various degrees of focus in tandem with the changing development paradigm that
informs the African political economy.

Since the return to a democratic dispensation, successive governments have

expressed serious concerns about the challenges facing the Nigerian youth in general
and how this constitutes a threat to national security. The population of Nigerian

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

youth is on the increase through birth rates and reduced infant mortalities. These
are accompanied by demographic transitions that arise from a steady increase in
death rates and shortened life expectancy. If the population is not managed could
undermine educational opportunities, prolong dependency on parents, aggravate
unemployment, diminish self-esteem, and ultimately fuel youth frustrations.
However, statistics from International Labour Organizations explain the threat to
global security owing to a disturbing rise in global youth unemployment from
23.5 million in 2013 to 71 million in 2016. Similarly, a report titled “The Security
Demographic by Population Action International,” asserts that a country with
more than 40% of its population aged between 15 and 29 was 2.3 times more
likely to face civil strife than one with a lower youth proportion (Population
Action International, 2016), this is true in Pakistan and Algeria with 66.7 and 70%
youth population respectively. For the most part, youth empowerment is seen
as a measure to address the problems of rising unemployment and criminality,
particularly among youths. The focus on the youth also derives from two popular
views (1) that they are the best measure of the extent to which a country can
reproduce as well as sustain itself. In essence, the vitality, conduct, and roles of
youth in society are positively correlated with the development of their country. It
is against this backdrop that this paper navigates the contours of youth and national
security in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

To enhance the understanding of this paper it is necessary to put the discourse in a

conceptual context to provide a framework for analysis. Thus, we can proceed to
clarify the concepts of Youth and National Security.

Youth: In its simple form, in different parts of the world, youth are generally
regarded as individuals who are between the age range of 15 and 35 years (Susan
and Rogaly, 2015). However, according to the United Nations, youths are persons
between the ages of 15 and 24 years (United Nations, 2019). People in this age

Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 15

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

bracket represent the most active, most versatile and yet the most vulnerable and
volatile segment of the population. Presently approximately 44 percent of the
world’s 7.2 billion people are below 24 years old and 26 percent are under 14
years old (Carter, 2013). About 82% of youth live in less developed regions of
the world, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (Carter, 2013). Where this
population segment is not well managed, it is always accompanied by a great scale
of instability. For example, 67 nations of the world, with highly alienated youth
populations are currently experiencing youth restiveness in the form of violent
extremism (Carter, 2013).

For many youths, finding a way to sustain themselves and their current or future
families through employment or livelihood is a top priority. However, the level of
investment a nation makes in the well-being of the youth determines the pace of
economic growth development, and security of the nation.Through their creativity,
ingenuity, emerging talents and social capital a nation makes a giant stride in
economic development and sociopolitical accomplishments.This is particularly the
case with societies that have invested copiously in youth development programs
and general human capital development (education and health care).This is because
“in their dreams and hopes, a nation founds her motivation; on their energies, she
builds her vitality and purpose; and because of their dreams and aspirations, the
future of a nation is assured” (FRN, 2001). Contrary to the above views, the African
Youth Charter (2006) defines youth as every person between the ages of 15 and
35 years. Akoda (2010) still uses the transition from dependence to independence.

In its primary form, youth refers to the period of transition from childhood
dependence to independence in adulthood. The definition of youth by a nation
depends on several objective human conditions and realities as well as historical and
contemporary political and socio-economic issues. Notwithstanding definitions by
nations, the United Nations delineates the youth band as persons between the ages
of 15 and 24. Nigeria’s National Youth Policy 2009, on the other hand, defines
the same as all young people male and female between 18 and 35 years (National
Youth Policy, 2009). However, there is a consensus among scholars that the youths

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

are leaders of tomorrow and this belief propels countries across the world to pay
serious attention to youth development programmes (Okolie, 2010; Mbachu and
Akande, 2016; and Gonyok, 2016).These are a combination of energy, enthusiasm,
ambition, creativity and promise.They are faced with high levels of socio-economic
uncertainty and volatility thereby becoming the most vulnerable segment of
the population. This may be a bit confusing, especially in our current political
dispensation. The role of youth as a critical element in democratic development
cannot be overemphasised given that youths are key components of any society. It
is a generally acceptable fact that youths are the indispensable and dynamic portion
of the population of any nation. They are the incubators and the driving force
for innovation change and progress in all human collectivities; and no society can
experience positive change and advancement if its youths are not strategically and
constructively invested in, empowered and engaged (Inokoba and Maliki, 2011).

The youth are an important segment of any society. Therefore, neglecting their
needs will expose them to bad influence and push them into anti-social activities.
This will threaten the peace, stability and security of the society, and thus, prevent
them from thriving socially, politically and economically. Also, understanding
the needs of the youth will enable youth development practitioners, parents,
and schools (in fact, the entire community) to provide them with life-changing
experiences and support to become productive adults (YDN, 2014). The role of
the youth as peace-builders in Nigeria (and other countries around the globe)
cannot be overemphasized. For the youth to function properly, successful adults
with good moral compasses should guide them to imbibe in them positive values,
attitudes and behaviours. This will enable them to learn to make good decisions
in times of crisis, resolve conflicts become good leaders in their communities and
promote harmonious relationships among their peers and adults (YDN, 2014).

Their immense energy and drive must be tactfully packaged and directed
towards playing a constructive role in the process of governance and democratic
development of society. As a link between the present and future, how a society’s
adults especially the governing elites behave as well as the roles they assign to this

Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 17

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

important segment of the population will determine to a large extent whether

that society is advancing towards disaster. A key aspect of Nigeria’s socio-political
profile is its demographic trajectory which carries both opportunities and risks.
Our population is one of the fastest growing in the world with a current estimated
figure of 201 million and the demographics reveal an estimated 70 million youth
between 15 and 34 years or 35 % (Omoju,2014). This very large youth population
is impacted substantially by poverty and inadequate health and education services.
Despite modest improvements across several health indicators, life expectancy
at birth is still 55.2 years for all sexes which gives Nigeria a global ranking of
187 (Odubola, 2018). Also, in the educational sector, about 38% of the Nigerian
population is still illiterate (Vanguard Newspaper, 2018). Given these conditions,
the opportunity for gainful employment is low as indicated by the average youth
unemployment rate of 35.83 percent in 2018. These deficits engender restiveness
and criminality among impressionable and vulnerable youth. Where persons aged
50-65 are known to have been elected as youth leaders of political parties. In this
chapter, we shall stick to the definition of youth in the national Policy.

National Security: Several scholars have given different views of national security.
National security is evidenced by socio-economic transformation through improvements
in the safety of lives and property, job creation, poverty reduction, meaningful per
capita income, and general quality of life. Sabina (2002) views national security as
the capacity to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive
threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment. Her views are
vital to the discourse on the subject matter, but those things that constitute the vital
core of all human lives as she postulated were not highlighted. Korany (2004) opines
that national security is the defence against military or external threats, perceived
or real, potential or immediate. This definition focuses on defence against armed
threats. However, the contemporary understanding of National Security has been
expanded to include the social, political and economic well-being of the people.
Korany’s definition of national security is not comprehensive and all-encompassing

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

as it does not adequately capture the socio-political and economic well-being of

the people. Morz (2009, p.10) defined national security as “deliberate measures
to identify and eradicate perceived as well as real threats to the core values of
a sovereign nation.” Morz’s definition is centred on the traditional perception of
national security which is premised on military might or capabilities. Similarly, Morz
did not identify man-made threats such as terrorism which are the underpinnings of
national security in his discourse. Paleri (2010) opines that national security is the
measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional
threats to the apparent well-being of its people and survival as a nation at any given
time by balancing all instruments of state policy that border on socio-economic,
environmental, cultural, and military factors.

According to Richards (2012), national security is a particular articulation of

security priorities and concerns put forward by the political leaders of a state, at
a given time in its history. Richards’ view reflects the perspectives and practices
of Western advanced democracies where the priorities and concerns of political
leaders align with the interests of the nation and the well-being of citizens.
National Defence College (2012) defines national security as the aggregate of a
nation’s ability to protect its citizens from physical, political, economic, social,
environmental, human and natural resource threats from within and without and
to project these abilities in the international arena. Adelugba and Ijioma (2008)
were of the view that the guarantee of national survival and prosperity as well
as the promotion of the well-being of the nation and its citizens. It is a concern
for nations. In a nutshell, national security revolves around the ways and means
of preserving the state, especially its sovereignty territorial integrity, leadership
and governance system as well as the well-being of the citizenry. Imobighe (2013)
asserts that national security is freedom from danger or from threats to a nation’s
ability to protect and defend itself from physical, economic, social, resources,
environmental, food, natural or man-made disasters and other threats arising
from terrorists and insurgents that may be in the form of maiming and killing
through explosives and other means to endanger the quality of life and threaten
state survival.

Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 19

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

From the above definitions, the interconnectedness of youth and national security
is obvious. Thus, the energy and vitality of the youth can be exploited in promoting
security and development. On the other hand, the vulnerabilities of youth especially
about unemployment could easily degenerate into a web of complex uncertainties
that could heighten insecurity. This discourse will lead to the next section.

Assessment of Youth and National Security in Nigeria

The youths form a major proportion of the Nigerian population with about 20
percent of the population (National Youth Policy, 2009). However, this number
cannot be ignored. They are the force that drives the country and the barometer
with which the dimension of development and occurrences in the country can be
gauged.They are full of ideas, dreams and aspirations and once these are endangered
their innovativeness comes into play. This is more so in the age of globalization
and Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). They are exposed to ideas
across the world and can circulate these ideas with the greatest ease and cheap cost.
Social media platforms like Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and Yahoo
group Nigerian youths; come in handy for ambitious knowledge gathering and
information dissemination among the youths.
Since 1999, the Nigerian governments have initiated various youth-oriented
socio-economic programmes to change the country’s socio-economic fortunes.
These include programmes of poverty alleviation /eradication skill acquisition
and youth employment. Some of these youth empowerment programmes include
the Graduate Internship Scheme and Empowerment (GIS) Youth Initiative for
Sustainable Agriculture in Nigeria (YISA) Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment
Programme (SURE-P) Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (You Win),
National Directorate of Employment scheme (NDE) and N-Power. Much of these
programmes have however recorded limited successes due largely to unhelpful
values and ethics, political partisanship at various tiers of government, poor
funding and poor programme implementation as well as inadequate performance

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

monitoring and Evaluation (PME). It is also disheartening to note the public

commentaries on Nigerian youth as lazy and fraudulent and constantly harassed by
the Nigerian police.

Global statistics from external lenses do not give a good picture of the state of
Nigerian youth. In 2016, Nigeria ranked 141 out of 183 countries in the global
youth development index organized by the Commonwealth Nigeria was ranked
behind 14 African nations such as Libya, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Gambia, Ethiopia,
Uganda, and Sudan among others. Commenting on youth empowerment and
national security in Nigeria, Gonyok (2016) disclosed that although successive
governments and nongovernmental organizations have initiated policies and
programmes in this regard, a lot more still has to be done in the area of youth
empowerment to give the youths a bright future to guarantee a safer and secured
society. Gonyok believes when the youths are empowered with skills, education
and jobs the rate of poverty in our country will be reduced as well as the level of
criminality.

Many observers have argued that the high rate of crime in Nigeria is largely attributed
to the poor level of youth empowerment and the high rate of youth unemployment.
This goes to reaffirm the saying that “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop”. It
follows there that if the youths are gainfully employed and engaged in productive
ventures, the level of crime will drop drastically putting into consideration the
seriousness of unemployment in the teeming youth population in the country. The
former Minister for Youth Development Mallam Bolaji Abdullahi disclosed that 67
million youths were unemployed as of 2012 when the total national population was
140 million people (Osakwe, 2013). The youth population increased to about 80
million in 2016 and over 70% of this population is unemployed (Gonyok, 2016).
This no doubt poses serious to national security as about 80% of the unemployed
youths do not possess a University degree (Osakwe, 2013) further asserts that
there is a strong relationship between youth employment and national security
in Nigeria. As Gonyok (2016, p.2) puts it “A situation where youths after several
years of acquiring education could not get jobs, necessitates some of the negative

Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 21

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

vices of the country has continued to witness in recent times like armed robberies,
cultism, prostitution, drug addiction hostage taking, gangsterism and lawlessness.”

At the Buharimetre town hall meeting on Nigeria’s economy, NuhuYaqub observed

unemployment, lack of access to education and health care despair, hunger, poverty,
etc of the youths to a large extent account for the threat to national security (AIT,
2017). He further added that over 12 million school-age children are out of school.
This further deepens the woes of the youth in the country. The challenge of youth
empowerment in Nigeria is exacerbated by the poor and defective education
curricula which make most graduates lack the required skills. The result is evident
in the high propensity of youths to engage in criminal activity.

In the Global Youth Well-being Index on Nigerian youths in 2017, Nigeria was
ranked 29th coming behind Kenya, South Africa, Egypt, and Uganda. These countries
represented 70% of the world’s youth population from 2018 to 2020.These results
were derived from a composite index of several indicators that include gender
equality citizen participation; education; economic opportunity; health; safety and
security and information and communications technology among young people.
At the Domestic Level National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in Quarter 3 of 2017
reported a combined unemployment and under-employment of 63.3% for young
persons between 25 and 34 (NBS, 2017).
According to the National Bureau of Statistics Labour Force Survey, Nigeria’s
unemployment rate was 27% in Q2 2020 four percentage points higher than the
23% reported in Q3 2018.Youth Unemployment is higher than for older workers
as shown in Figure 1. The 15 to 24 age group had an unemployment of 41% and
the age group 25 to 34 with an unemployment rate of 31%. Nigeria has one of
the largest cohorts in the world with over 35% of the country’s population falling
within the age group of 15 to 34. Without unemployment highest among this
demography, the risks of social vices, depression, and apathy are especially high.

Sulaiman (2020) was of the view that the need for the inclusion of youths in nation-
building is critical to ensure sustained development and shared prosperity.According

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

to Onuorah (2021) since independence in 1960, Nigeria has always spent less than
26% of its budget on the education sector which is the sector that affects youth
substantially more than other sectors of the economy. She was worried that over 10
million out-of-school children in Nigeria would spur unemployment and illiteracy
among the youths. It is believed that the attention of the government is drawn to
consider developing a policy that will specifically address youth development. If
Nigeria is to be secured the place of the youths should not be trivialized against the
background of the parameters being explained.

However, youths are the sustainable vanguard of the nation and tomorrow’s
leaders. They are thus the conscience of the nation and the sight of the country.
Any nation that underestimates the capacity of its youth in the quest for national
security becomes history. There is thus the need for sustainable understanding and
appropriation of the youth’s capacity if Nigeria is to ever be secured and developed.
National security creates an enabling environment for development (Orji, 2011).
For people and resources to be sustainably mobilized and deployed for national
development, there must be a strong sense of security within the nation.

Figure 1: Youth Unemployment

Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 23

Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

Examination of the low state of youth well-being in Nigeria translates to some

undesirable registers on key elements of national security. The different economic
and social conditions continue to drive the youth to restiveness, illegalities, and
crimes that make them vulnerable to unpatriotic manipulation and violence. The
reason is not farfetched when the government of the day is unable to provide
the education needs, create jobs for the expanding workforce and provide basic
infrastructure and services such as roads, electricity and stable food supplies. Nigeria
has found itself in a state of demographic fatigue.This is a condition where the state
lacks the financial resources to stabilize its population growth and the capacity to
manage available resources. The EndSARS protest of 2020 showed that Nigeria has
reached the state because of the huge backlog of youths whose capacity was not
developed over the years and the reason for the high rates of unemployment. These
are compounded by a lack of political will on the part of the government to address
the needs of the youth. These often fuel their willingness and readiness to migrate
from Nigeria at any given opportunity and by whatever manifests illegal means.
This further creates a lot of reaction in the populace to this outcome. This could
bring indifferences on the part of the youths and at the expense of the nation. The
tendency for them is to be reactive and become indifferent to activities that could
secure the nation once detached and struggle for survival.
This explains why some of them have taken to crime regardless of the backlash on
the nation. In the long run, it has its socio-economic and diplomatic implications
on the polity. As far as they are concerned, this is how they can survive in a nation
that does not care about their existence amid plenty. This has to cause a rethink
of how we view our youths from a positive view. It is when we begin to see the
average young person from a more positive perspective. The statistics should help
us reflect and encourage our youths to do more in our polity. It should serve as a
reflection on the part of leadership.

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

Conclusion

This paper has examined the assessment of youths and national security in Nigeria.
Our national security has failed to inculcate the idea of unity that affirms the
differences of our youth. This has affected our young people who are talented,
patient adaptive, resilient, indomitable, and easily amenable to national services.
Our youths find it difficult to catch up with the norms and nuances of today’s
dynamic society in which the power of youth roughly approximates to the power
of the nation. Our leaders have not helped matters in expanding employment
and engagement possibilities for young persons whether educated or in the lower
economic cadres. This has made our young people inability to take advantage of the
knowledge-driven environment in positively engage themselves positively.

Recommendations

The following would need to be adopted;

If our Country is to grow and develop as we desire time has come on the need
for empowerment of our young people and the womenfolk. This can be done by
liberating the minds of our young persons from age-long cultural, religious, and
political misconceptions. It is expected that education, social security, peace and
justice be accorded priority in governance. We should be able to encourage our
youths to air their ideas. Our youths should be made to understand that patience is
a virtue and plays a role in social engagement.

There is a need for the establishment of new paradigms for the improvement of the
overall well-being of our youths. Take for example the expansion of our political
space and make it less exclusionary. This encourages increased representation of
our youths in all elective and appointive positions in all tiers of government. It has
been observed that our young people participate year in and year out in national
orientation, national immunizations, voter education and actual elections. Our
youths can do more if given more opportunity at nation building.

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Youth and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment

It becomes essential when we adopt long-span youth development and economic

empowerment models that would engage our youth before their most vulnerable
years. These models should be adopted as a nonpartisan youth strategy planned
at the Federal level but implemented at the state and local levels. This should be
able to capture young Nigerians during their education at Secondary school till
turn 25 years of age. Our education curriculum should be structured to deliver
knowledge, skills, and attitudes to participants during their formative years. This
will assist them in the latter part of their lives in pursuit of self-employment in the
future. It is expected that the programmes be implemented for youth in agriculture,
manufacturing, ICT, entertainment and service delivery.

The goal of socioeconomic and political integration of Nigerian youth will be

defeated if the power of their mind and body are not properly harmonized. There
is a need to use our schools as a credible agent of social change in developing
our youth to maturation. Our youths need an atmosphere of happiness which
involves promoting positive social, especially through sports. It is vital; we need
not reinvent the wheel. The Governor of the Former Mid-West State (now Edo
and Delta State) the Late Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia proved this with the Sports
Development Programme at Afuze, which produced great sports people for
Nigeria. This experiment can be revived and replicated across the country.

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 Adedoyin Jolaade Omede & Arinze Ngwube

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Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 29

 Drone Technology and the
Fight Against Boko-Haram
Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria:
The Story So Far
Asor Gbamwuan
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies
KolaDaisi University, Ibadan-Nigeria

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 Asor Gbamwuan

Abstract

Terrorism, insurgency, and bandits are not new phenomena but they have
undergone dynamism over the centuries. In Nigeria, Boko-Haram terrorism
and banditry have posed serious challenges to socio-economic, religious-
cultural, and political developments. Therefore, this study established the
link between the uses of drone technology, in the fight against terrorism,
insurgency, and banditry in Nigeria. The research methodology is a desk
review of historical facts which have been analysed objectively. The study
approach is historical, narrative, and analytical. The study is based on the
frustration-aggression thesis, social conflict, and failed state theories.
The study unveils that the Nigerian military has adopted the use of drone
technology in fighting terrorism, insurgency, and banditry. However, the
adoption of this technology has exposed the weakness of the Nigerian
military in terms of surveillance, civil-military relations, and expertise with
this novel technology. In this wise, the study recommends the domestication
of drone technology laws for its usage, production, and regulation in Nigeria
to match with global best practices. The study also suggests the training and
retraining of the Nigerian military in the use of drone technology, while the
acquisition of drones to intensify the war against terrorism, among other
majors are strongly emphasised.

Keywords:
Boko-Haram, Terrorism, Banditry, Drone Technology, Nigeria

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Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: The Story So Far

Introduction

Terrorism and banditry are not recent phenomena; they are as old as the world itself
and a global problem. The history of terrorism shows that the ‘terror cimbricus was
a panic and state of emergency in Rome in response to the approach of warriors
of the Cimbritribe in 105 BC’ (Wapmuk and Agbu, 2014). The zealots were active
in Judea, and their mission was to overthrow the Roman Empire by assassination.
Between 1090 and 1272 the assassins were against the Christian crusaders in the
Islamic world (Benjamin and Stevens, 2002). During the French Revolution of 1789-
1799, the Jacobins formed a reign of terror in the war (Wapmuk and Agbu, 2014).
In the 19th century, elements of terrorism were visible in ‘People’s Retribution’
in Russia in 1869 formed by Sergey Nechayev (Wapmuk and Agbu, 2014). By the
beginning of the 20th century, terrorism was a mechanism used by Nazi, Fascists,
and authoritarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union respectively
(Hoffman, 2004). In the Middle East, the Palestine Liberation Organisation led by
Yasser Arafat for the creation of the independent state of Palestine carried out a
series of terrorist attacks.

In Africa, the nationalist approaches against colonial imperialism in certain

instances took the form of terror, especially in Kenya, Angola, and Algeria. The
Mau Mau movement organised by Jomo Kenyatta the doyen of Kenya nationalism
attacked, maimed, and killed the British in scores (Chikendu, 2010). Ahmed Ben
Bella of Algeria fought the French imperialists using terrorist tactics like guerrilla
warfare. In Nigeria, there has been an avalanche of records of terrorist acts since
the pre-colonial societies of both centralised and decentralised states. For example,
the secret cult was a typical instrument of terrorizing their various societies by
intimidating, maiming, kidnapping, armed robbing, looting, assassinating, and
killing. Some such secret societies were the Ogboni, the Ekpe, Obon, Okonko,
Ekpo, Awopa, Osugbo, et cetera (Chinwokwu, 2012).

The European colonialists compounded this problem with the slave trade. Oshita
(2007, p. 27) was more forthcoming when he asserted that “…the entry of colonial
administrators into Africa saw colonizers aligning with local rulers as they set up

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 Asor Gbamwuan

trade centers in places where it would serve their strategic mercantilist interests. In
the process, they unleashed terror in the form of systematically organized slavery.
The colonialist with the use of maxim guns instilled fear in Nigeria’s traditional
Chiefs and forced them into acquiescence. The British particularly put in place
policies that in the final analysis encourage ethnic division and intimidation of
minority groups in the post-colonial era. Also, because of the struggle for power
among the dominant ethnic group state-sponsored terrorism emerged. For
instance, the various military administrations from 1966-1999 used state powers
autocratically. Democratic principles were compromised while anarchy, chaos, and
authoritarianism became the order of the day. The June 12 scenario took terrorism
in Nigeria to its highest level hijacking and bombing of aircraft and public places.
For example, the Airbus A310 with 150 passengers was diverted to Niamey in
Niger on October 26, 1993, by the Movement for Advancement of Democracy
(MAD) led by Jerry Yusuf (Chinwokwu, 2012). The incident of January 17, 1996,
in which a British-made Forker Sidney AS-125 700 Series aircraft crashed and killed
Ibrahim the son of Sani Abacha was unconnected with the act of terrorism. This is
because the United Front for Nigeria’s Liberation (UFNL) claimed responsibility
for the crash (Igbo, 2007).

The return of Nigeria to democratic governance has been characterised by Boko-

Haram terrorism. This terrorist group has a global network with the likes of Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISWAP). Boko-Haram also went into alliance with Bandits whose strongholds are
in the North-Western and some parts of North-Central Nigeria (Rufa’i, 2021).
Other criminal and terrorist activities conducted by Boko-Haram are cattle
rustling and stimulation of farmers-herders clashes in all parts of the country. It
is based on this background that this study is carried out with the view of looking
into how terrorism and banditry would be surmounted in Nigeria using drone
technology. The general objective of this study, therefore, is to explore the extent
to which the Nigerian government adopted the use of drone technology in fighting
the twin problem of Boko-Haram terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria. The study
also attempts to examine the successes, challenges, and the way forward given the

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Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: The Story So Far

glaring inadequacies of drone technology in the Nigerian context.

The study is structured in several closely related parts with an introduction, review
of the related literature, conceptual analysis, theoretical issues, and historical
investigation of Boko-Haram terrorism and banditry in Nigeria. Other components
of the study are the history of drone technology, the use of drone technology
in Nigeria in the fight against terrorism and banditry, its impact, challenges,
conclusions, and recommendations. These parts guided the proper conduct of this
research study. The study analysis is purely qualitative, analytical, and historical. Its
sources are desk reviews of primary and secondary materials rigorously gathered
from libraries, archives, and the internet.

Review of Related Literature

In their studies, Udounwa (2013); and Adedire, et al (2016) examine strategies

that the government should employ to end Boko-Haram terrorism and banditry
in Nigeria. These strategies included a people-centric, community-based,
intelligence-driven, whole-of-government approach to better police its borders,
enhance interagency cooperation, improve the capacity of the security forces,
reform the criminal justice system, advance socio-economic development and
leverage international assistance to end the insurgency, terrorism, and banditry.
Hanson (2020) analyses cooperation among nations as a viable pattern for fighting
terrorism. In the context of Nigeria, the study argues that the country has
domesticated the universal counterterrorism treaties and put in place domestic
legislations and their enforcements but acts of terrorism persisted. This is because
the enforcement mechanism is weak. The study, therefore, recommended
cooperation and discouraging corruption, impunity, unnecessary compromise,
and sabotage. As noted by Eme (2018), a lack of inter-security cooperation has
hindered progress against the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST).
Eme noted that it is when a synergy is drawn among these security forces through
the sharing of intelligence reports, and avoidance of conflicts among them that

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 Asor Gbamwuan

NACTEST as a policy guide for fighting terrorism would be effective.

Wara (2020), provides the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in fighting
terrorism in Nigeria and Tunisia. The author streamlined the approaches the
CSOs adopted in these countries. They are awareness, Damnation, motivational,
appraisal, rehabilitation, partnership, indoctrination, and coordination approaches.
Uyi-Ekpen (2011) gives ten policy recommendations that could stem terrorism
in Nigeria. The study isolated the directorate of counterterrorism, gun control,
proactive defense majors, personal training, conflict management techniques,
global networking, abolition of terrorism, protection of fundamental human
rights, intensification of the war against corruption, and good governance. Abiodun
(2016) postulated that the Nigerian government should not make any mistake to
grant amnesty to Boko-Haram as did in the Niger Delta. This would rather escalate
the conflict.

Kumar (2020); Ogunlana (2019); and Khalilzada (2022) advance ways in which
drones could be used to halt terrorism globally. Byrne (2018) condemned the
unethical policy of making killer drones that could end up killing civilians instead
of protecting them. On this note, Byrne tagged killer drone manufacturers as
killers and urgently called for their production to be stopped. However, American
citizens are optimistic that the use of lethal drones is timely in fighting criminals
and terrorist groups. The challenge is how to use such drones to target criminal
activities without attacking innocent civilians which is the major concern of Byrne.

Farer and Bernard (2016) reinforce that the use of lethal drones outside war zones
is an act of summary execution which contradicts the ethos of liberal democracy.
Hendrix (2016) avails that with Boko-Haram terrorism in Nigeria, the government
needs no technological transfer to fight but to tackle bad governance that breeds
terrorism. By implication, Hendrix discouraged the use of drone technology
to fight Boko-Haram terrorism. Heyns, Akande, Hill-Cawthorne and Chengeta
(2016) advise that the use of drone technology in fighting terrorism and criminal
activities should comply with international law including ‘the law regulating the
use of force; international humanitarian law and international human rights.

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Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: The Story So Far

Therefore, this study contributed its quota to the body of extensive literature on
the subject matter with a special spotlight on the war against terrorism in Nigeria.
It is in this wise that the study looks at the use of drones as modern technology in
countering terrorism in Nigeria.

Insurgency, Terrorism, and Banditry Conceptualised

Insurgency and terrorism are entwined and can only be understood when
they are collectively analysed. This is because insurgency is the initial stage of
terrorism (Unal, 2016). It is on this note that Merari (1993) succinctly declared
that ‘insurgents exploit terrorism whenever possible because it is one of the
easiest modes of struggle. Therefore, what is insurgency? According to the U.S.
Government (2012, p.1), it is:

A protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or

displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying
power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a
territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal
political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent
groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a
particular territory, including its resources.

The US government further clarifies some of the conceptual differences

underpinning the definition of insurgency. For instance, insurgents could be
revolutionary when they seek to replace the entire political system with the use
of violence. They could be reformists when their motive is to change the socio-
economic and political system. Separatist insurgence on the other hand controls
a particular region within a sovereign state; while commercial insurgence is
after wealth accumulation through the seizure and use of political power. An
insurgency may also be categorised as politically organised, military organised,
traditionally organised, and urban-cellular (US Government, 2012). Insurgency
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 Asor Gbamwuan

followed a trajectory from one state to another. For instance, the pre-insurgency
stage, incipient conflict stage, open insurgency stage, and resolution stage. This is
what the US government termed the life cycle of insurgency. The insurgents use
terrorism as a potent weapon to fight.

Terrorism on the other hand is a costly form of signalling, using intimidation,

provocation, attrition, outbidding, and spoiling. However, this analytical
classification is based on a very broad definition of terrorism that only reflects the
basic tenets of action [targeting civilians], actor [by non-state actors], and purpose/
motivation [political goal] (Kydd and Walter, 2006). What differentiates insurgents
from terrorists is that the latter have different goals (Findley and Young, 2007).
Terrorism is used both by insurgents and non-insurgent groups who intend only to
affect policy or reach a particular target audience rather than seek regime change.
Most insurgents practice some form of terrorism; however, terrorists need not be
insurgents (Findley and Young, 2007). Against this backdrop, Wara (2020) argues
that ‘terrorism is the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective by
targeting innocent people’.This could be through suicide bombing of public places,
kidnapping, and guerrilla warfare.

Wara (2020, p.168) distinguishes three traits that define terrorism: Firstly, it is an
act of violence that produces widespread disproportionate emotional reactions such
as fear and anxiety which are likely to influence attitudes and behaviour. Secondly,
the violence is systemic and rather unpredictable and is usually directed against
symbolic targets. Thirdly, violence conveys messages and threats to communicate
and gain social control. Generally, terrorists use violence on specific targets to
gain social control. It is in light of this that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) asserted that terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Wara,
2020, p.169). It should be noted that terrorist groups see themselves as ‘freedom
fighters and liberators’, ‘armies or other military organizational structure’, “self-
defense movements,” “righteous vengeance,” and so forth. In Nigeria, Boko-Haram

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Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: The Story So Far

has taken themselves as liberation fighters in the decayed state while the state has
taken this group as terrorists who take control of ‘ungoverned spaces.

Banditry refers to the use (threatened or actual) of an instrument of violence

to dispossess a person’s material belongings. Banditry is, more often than not, a
gang phenomenon, although some bandits have been known to operate as lone
brigands unassociated with any criminal syndicate (Okoli and Okpaleke, 2014).
The epistemic trajectory of banditry, insurgency, and terrorism in the Nigerian
context is what Al Chukwuma termed the crime-terror nexus. This nomenclature
according to Al Chukwuma (2021) ‘presupposes that organized criminality and
terrorism are functionally intermeshed.’ The terms pontificate acts of criminality
against the law and humanity. In this wise, Rosas (2018) streamlined how these
terms converged and coalesced on the premised of criminality as demonstrated in
Table 1.

Table 1: Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgence, and Banditry in Crime-

Terror Matrix
Pattern Remark(s)
Coexistence criminal and terrorist groups operating in the same medium
Activity criminal organizations committing terrorist acts or vice
appropriation
versa as tactics for greater strategic advantages
Symbiotic criminal and terrorist organizations collaborating and contributing
collaboration their areas of expertise to achieve their separate strategic goals
(alliances)
Organizational fusion criminal organizations becoming part of terrorist organizations, or
vice versa
Strategic criminal organizations shifting strategically to become primarily
transformation terrorist organizations, or vice versa

Source: Rosas (2018).

Terrorism, insurgence, and banditry have a common linkage to intimidate, kill,

destroy, and forcefully collect material resources from the victims. Their mission

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 Asor Gbamwuan

and targets are criminal and are counter-productive and impede development. It
is based on this knowledge that the next section tries to establish some theoretical
underpinnings of the study.

Theoretical Issues
Terrorism, insurgence, and banditry are too complex to be explained from a single
theoretical standpoint. Therefore, this study explores social theories including
relative deprivation theory, the social conflict theory, and the failed state theory.
Although, other social theoretical constructs could explain these social problems
as well. However, this study specifically referred to the above-isolated theories to
unpack the contending arguments. The theory of Relative Deprivation as variously
documented is an ancient Greek theory. One of the great Greek philosophers,
Aristotle posited that the idea behind revolution is driven by a sense of relative
inequality feelings (Bature, 2016). Richardson (2011, p. 5) citing Aristotle argued
among others that “the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic
or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it and the
aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have i.e., a discrepancy in
both instances between what people have of political and economic goods relative
to what they think is justly theirs.”

Runciman (1996) corroborated this argument that: ‘where person A feels deprived
of object X): person A does not have X; person A wants to have X; person A knows
other people who have X; person A believes obtaining X is realistic’ are indices
of frustration that could trigger aggression. Against this backdrop, Gurr (1970)
coined his famous analysis of the Frustration-Aggression hypothesis. Elaborating on
this hypothesis, Gurr emphasizes that anger induced by frustration is a motivating
force that disposes men to aggression irrespective of its instrumentalities. Gurr
firmly asserts that people are more likely to revolt when they lose hope of attaining
societal values and the intensity of discontent/frustration varies with the severity
of depression and inflation.

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Drone Technology and the Fight Against Boko-Haram Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: The Story So Far

Gurr’s exposition gains potency in the context of terrorism, insurgency, and

banditry in Nigeria arising from myriads of problems the country experienced
since the post-independence era. For instance, a greater percentage of Nigerians
are discontented with Nigeria’s democratic governance as a result of hunger,
poverty, unemployment, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria scourge among others
amid abundant capital and mineral resources. Therefore, the high expectations
of the people that democracy would reverse decades of poverty, corruption, and
underdevelopment have hardly been met. This in essence has created feelings of
alienation, deprivation, and impulse to form terrorist/insurgence and bandit
groups who undertake senseless attacks on innocent citizens.

Strengthening the foregoing explanation, the Social Conflict theory alludes that
society’s social life is determined in the main by social production. That is what
is produced and how it is shared in a given society. Indeed, the sharing formula
is uneven hence the inevitability of instability characterised by ethnic, political,
religious, and economic conflicts. The theory, therefore, sees violent attacks by
terrorist groups in Nigeria as a contradiction inherent in human activities in the
course of material production (Yecho, 2006). It is the contention of the social
conflict theoretical paradigm that terrorist activities should be examined and
analysed from the perspective of political and historical materialism. Accordingly,
the theory postulates that political formation is a historical entity that encompasses
and penetrates all social formations including class structures. It would be genuinely
misleading to assume that terrorist groups operate independently. They operate
alongside such variables as economic, political, religious, and ethnic lines. Looking
at the Nigerian political trajectory, it is astute to assert that terrorism/insurgency/
banditry is used as a mask by the privileged class to perpetrate violent attacks for
the furtherance of their economic and political selfishness. This is what Agidi and
Gbamwuan (2022) allude to as a failed state. Gbamwuan (2013) citing Anyanwu
averred that a failed state is when states are consumed by internal violence and
cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. To Gbamwuan, a
failed state is perceived as having failed at some of the essential responsibilities of a
sovereign government. This means, that such a state is unable to hold its social and

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political structures which are rather characterized by failures.

Common characteristics of a failing state are when a central government is so weak

or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory, non-
provision of public utilities or services, widespread corruption and criminality;
refugees and involuntary movement of populations, and sharp economic decline.
Nigeria has exhibited these attributes; Boko-haram terrorism, banditry, secessionist
movements, and communal violence are lucid features of a failed state. Others are
unemployment, hunger, poverty, and diseases, which all stimulate the youths to
take arms and commit criminal activities. The youths are also cheap and available
tools in the hands of the politicians to commit electoral fraud.

History of Boko-Haram and Banditry in Nigeria

Boko-Haran is a combination of Hausa and Arabic words. Boko is a Hausa

word meaning ‘Western education’ and Haran is an Arabic word meaning “sin.”
According to Adibe (2014), members of this group prefer to be called jama’atu
Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awatiWal-Jihad which is “people Committed to the Propagation of
the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” The emergence of the Boko-Haran insurgence
was in 2009 and it is a product of dissatisfaction against the Nigerian state. Its
leader Ustaz Muhammed Yusuf (1970-2009) expressed this dissatisfaction with
an ideology that ‘Western Education is Forbidden’ hence the meaning of Boko-
Haram (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). Yusuf was hostile to democracy, Christianity,
and the secular education system, vowing that: ‘this war that is yet to start
would continue for long’ if the political and education system was not changed
(Duyile et al, 2020:241). Ustaz Muhammed Yusuf’s activities were a threat to the
Nigerian government and this led to his assassination in 2009. The assassination
of Ustaz Muhammed Yusuf in police custody, his father-in-law and sect financier,
Ustaz BujiFoi (Borno State former Commissioner of Religious Affairs), and other
members (over 800) has drawn a battle line between the Boko-Haram group and
the Nigerian state (Adibe, 2014). With the emergence of the group’s new leader,

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Mallam Abubakar Shekau, [Yusuf’s second-in-command], the battle became fiercer

(Chothia, 2014).

The frequency, lethality, and sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks increased

dramatically under its erstwhile leader Mallam Abubakar Shekau, allegedly as a
result of increased cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Apart from these networks,
Boko-Haram went into alliance with Bandits whose strongholds are in the North-
Western and some parts of North-Central Nigeria. In his 15th inaugural lecture
series of Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Rufa’i (2021, p.32) argued in
extenso that:

In 2018, Boko Haram fighters from the Northeast were sent by the
Shekau faction to support bandits in the Northwest. Eventually, they
became integrated with the bandits and abandoned the course of Boko
Haram.The reason is that banditry is not ideologically based and gives
freedom to individual fighters. Moreover, there is what may be called
bountiful wealth in banditry. Dogo Gide later allied with Boko Haram
in the last quarter of 2019.Thus, from his base in the forest ofWawa in
Niger state, Gide was recruiting members for this group and ensuring
the group has a stronghold in Zamfara state. In light of this, assistance
is often given to armed groups in Zamfara in the form of fighters and
equipment. Alhaji Shehu Shingi from Zurmi is the major Boko Haram
link with the bandits.

What is extracted from the above piece is that Boko-Haram and bandits have a close
link spread to the rest of Nigeria. This affiliation has underscored the dynamics
of terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria in contemporary times. Bandits occupied
ungoverned spaces with different leaders. Rufa’i’s Study chronicles the names
of these bandit’s leaders and their jurisdictions of operation comprehensively as
captured in Table 2.

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Table 2: Names of Bandits Leaders in Northern Nigeria, 2021

S/N Bandit Leaders Areas of Operation
1 Abubakar Abdallah (alias Dogo Kaduna and Niger State
Gide)
2 Yellow Jan-Bros Birnin Gwari Forest and Giwa Areas, Kaduna
State
3 Tsoho Manjagara Giwa Local Government, Kaduna State
4 Alhaji Bodere and Ahaji Beleri Sabon Birni, Giwa LGA, Kaduna State
5 Yellow Ashana Sabon Garin, Gyadam, Kaduna State
6 Ali Kawaje (alias Ali Kachalla) Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State and Kagara LGA,
Niger State
7 Alhaji Isiy, Buhari General Kaduna- Abuja Highway, Kaduna State;
Gannaie

8 Alhaji Ado Aleru Yan-Kuzo, Chafe LGA as well as some parts of

Kastina and Zamfara states
9 Lanke Umar Bengo,Yahaya Kabir Dan Rumfa village, Jibya LGA

10 Auwalun Daudawa Safana, Dan-Musa, Batsari LGA, Katsina State

11 Dangotte Bazamfare Katsina and Zamfara borders
12 Alhaji Auta, Ardo Na-Shaware, Birnin Magaji LGA, Zamfara State
Ardo Nashama, Alhaji Shingi
13 Dankarami Zurmi LGA, Zamfara State
14 Alhaji Shehu Rekep Alhaji Halilu Maru and Anka LGAs, Zamfara State
Tsafe
15 Manu D. O. Birnin Gwari and Giwa Areas, Kaduna state
16 Saleh piya-piya Anchau, Kaduna State
17 Bello Turji Shinkafi/Isa, Sabon Birnin
Source: Rufa’i, (2021).

Table 2 establishes the names and locations of bandit leaders in Northern parts
of Nigeria in 2021. However, their leadership kept changing over time because
their emergence was based on the “survival of the fittest.” Unlike Boko- Haram,
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bandits in Nigeria operate in ungoverned spaces of their sphere of influence. Their

power is determined by the sophistication of their weapons and the followers they
have. The activities of bandits include kidnapping, killings, arms smuggling, cattle
rustling, forced marriages, collection of farming and grazing levies, Gender-Based
and Sexual Violence (GBSV), including assault, rape, forced prostitution, gang
rape, and what have you. Since the inception of Boko-Haram terrorism in 2009, it
has carried out several major attacks including the bombing of the United Nations
Secretariat in Abuja in 2011; the Baga Massacre in 2013; the Buni Yadi Massacre in
2014; the abduction of 276 Chibok school girls in the night of 14-15th April 2014
et cetera (Gbamwuan, 2016). The death tolls caused by Boko-Haram amount to
35, 646 in Borno, 5, 747 in Zamfara, 5,462 in Kaduna, 4, 097 in Adamawa, 3,
774 in Benue, 3,359 in Plateau, and 3,176 in Yobe (Statista, 2022). The attacks
have led to the displacements of thousands of people, rendered many children
and women orphans and windows, and generally created hunger, poverty, and
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases in the country (Atim and Gbamwuan,
2022; Gbamwuan, 2016). It is in line with the atrocities committed by Boko-
Haram and bandits that the Federal government of Nigeria launched a fight against
these groups using drones in the later parts of the fight. Now, the paper switches
its searchlight of analysis to drone technology.

Drone Technology: A Sketch Historical Investigation

Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in form automated or remotely

controlled. The history of this technology was unconnected with the history of
military technology. The idea was that the military wanted to reduce the cost of
operating aircraft in war and the mortality of the armed personnel arising from
uncertainties. The UAVs were also designed to be used for boring tasks like aerial
reconnaissance, and dangerous missions (Palik and Nagi, 2019). The American
Elmer Sperry is credited with the introduction of drone technology (Curtis N-9)
tested in 1917. Shortly, Charles Kettering invented the Kettering Bug in November
1917 (Palik and Nagi, 2019; Palik, 2013; Blom, 2010). The Kettering Bug was a

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flying bomb that was achieved with the aid of Orville Wright and Elmer Sperry. By
the end of World War I, innovations in aircraft technology led to the production of
stronger, faster, and maneuverable aircraft. To match this technology with AUV, the
United Kingdom military developed the Queen Bee. Palik and Nagi (2019, p.157)
noted that:
This new type of UAV meant a breakthrough and was a real innovation.
It was the first system with the capability of returning after completing
its mission unless it was hit. The remote-control system was mounted
into a De Havilland DH 82 Tiger Mouth, with a ceiling of 5200 m
and a top speed of 180 km/h. Furthermore, the Queen Bee was the
first aircraft that was nicknamed Drone, meaning that it deserves its
place in the history books.

Arising from the above, the drone originated at the twilight of WWI. By WWII,
the German drone V-1 aerial torpedo was developed to destroy the city of London
with little success. After WWII, about 3200 V-1s were launched, which demanded
about 1000 lives. The advancement of technology brought supersonic UAVs,
especially during the Cold War (Blom, 2010). UAV technology has different
nomenclatures in historical trajectory. In the 1940s and 1980s basically, it was called
drone technology or remotely piloted vehicles. The UAV became commonplace
in the 1990s. During the administration of the 42nd US President Bill Clinton
(1993-2001), the UAV was considered by the administration as an “unpiloted aerial
vehicle” and an “uninhabited aerial vehicle”. Drones gained momentum during
their use in the various post-9/11 armed conflicts in the Middle Eastern states.The
United States government makes use of drones to conduct detailed surveillance
and reconnaissance activities in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, as
well as to drop targeted missiles (Abiodun, 2020).

To say the least, drones proved effective for a range of missions, including battlefield
surveillance, artillery spotting, attacking armoured vehicles and missile launchers,

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and so forth in the contemporary world (The Conversation, 2023). On this note,
Abiodun (2020, p.38) buttresses that:

In recent years, drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are more

employed in military operations. But at present, the use is dynamically
expanding in the areas of commercial, scientific, recreational, and
other applications, such as policing/ surveillance, aerial photography
agricultural irrigation, and others… In addition to these, drones are
being considered for use in domestic surveillance operations to protect
valuable assets and assist in crime fighting, disaster relief, immigration
control, and environmental monitoring.

The above quotation underscores the fact that there are different types of drones for
different purposes. There is a commercial and portable drone that is less expensive
and flies below 1.5 miles [2.4 kilometers] and with limited distances of less than
19 miles [31 kilometers] (The Conversation, 2023). This drone is specifically used
for recreation and agricultural surveillance and it includes various types like DJI
Phantom 4 RTK [use for surveying and mapping], Flyability Elios 2 [use for Indoor
inspection], Parrot Bebop-Pro Thermal [use for Fire Fighting], DJI Matrice Series
[use for construction], DJI AGRAS T20 and Parrot Bluegrass [they are used for
agriculture ure production] (Remoteflyer, 2021).

A suicide drone on its part is a self-destructive device that circles its target for
hours before attacking it. The United States of America (USA) has Switchblade
and Phoenix Ghost, models. Russia has Lancet -3 drones, while Iran owns Shahed-
136. Today, high-end military drones are using Rolls Royce engines; the kind
made by the US military (The Conversation 2023). Although, this kind of drone is
expensive but has efficient capabilities and has been useful for the US military in
the fight against terrorism across the globe. Abiodun (2020, p.39) summarises this
argument:

Target and decoy Drones: they provide ground and aerial gunnery;

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a target that simulates an enemy aircraft or missile. Reconnaissance

(Surveillance) Drones: they provide battlefield intelligence. Combat
Drones: they provide attack capability for high-risk missions. Logistics
Drones: they are used for delivering cargo. Civil and commercial
Drones: they are used for agriculture, aerial photography, and data
collection.

Drone technology is one of the modern ways of fighting wars. Therefore, the
military across the globe was positioned to take this advantage before they would
be left out. It is against this backdrop that the proceeding section discusses how
Nigeria has positioned itself with drone technology in fighting terrorism and
banditry.

The use of Indigenous and Exported Drones Technology in the

Fight against Terrorism and Banditry in Nigeria: Success Stories and
Challenges

Nigeria has taken advantage of drone technology in fighting terrorism and banditry.
The country inaugurated its first indigenous UAV named GULMA in 2013 under
the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. GULMA is a technology
demonstrator used to gather performance data on UAV systems (Punch Newspaper,
2023). GULMA UAV has an operational endurance of four hours, a service
ceiling of 5,000 feet, and cannot be operated beyond 20km. The GULMA drone
had mechanical problems which truncated its effectiveness. For instance, one of
the GULMA drones was lost during an operation in 2015 making the operation
unsuccessful (Kurpershoek et al, 2021).

Under the watch of President Muhammadu Buhari, the military Air Force Research
and Development Centre at Nigeria Air Force (NAF) Base Kaduna produced
TSAIGUMI [Hausa language meaning surveillance] (Punch Newspaper, 2023).
TSAIGUMI is a twin-boom UAV spotting a pusher propeller configuration. It is
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fitted with an Electro-Optical Forward Looking Infra-Red System (EO FLIR). For
take-off and landing, Tsaigumi UAV is fitted with tri-cycle landing gears which
have two main wheels and a steerable front wheel attached to the nose of the
vehicle. Its maximum take-off weight is 95 kg (Shakirudeen, 2018).

Besides these developments, Nigeria acquired the CH- -3A drone from China
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation in 2014 and has continued to place
orders for many more (Abdullahi, 2021). For example, in July 2014 two Antonov
An-124 were imported from Chengdu in China to Nigeria through Yola Airport
in Adamawa. The drone, a lookalike of the American-built MQ-9, is equipped
to carry an electro-optical payload pod, fitted with sensors for surveillance and
targeting, alongside a variety of laser-guided missiles and GPS-guided bombs
(Abdullahi, 2021). In 2021 also, Nigeria acquired Wing Loong II, two CH-3, and
four CH-4 from China. Although, the problem with these Chinese drones despite
their accessibility and affordability is complicated maintenance and operational
track records. This has posed a daunting challenge to the use of these drones in
fighting terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

It is genuine to observe that those Chinese drones have broken down except the
CH-3A drone arising from maintenance and operation challenges. Generally, the
impact of drones in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria cannot be overemphasised.
Few examples suffice to demonstrate and reinforce this argument. First, in 2014,
Nigeria allowed the US to use an unarmed Predator drone to find 276 Nigerian
schoolgirls who were kidnapped by Boko Haram (Kurpershoek, Valdez, and
Zwijnenburg, 2021). The team of 80 combatant men was stationed in Niger to
conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions over northern
Nigeria and the surrounding area (NBC News, 2014). Although, the operation was
marred by internal propaganda which in the final analysis yielded little success.
Second, on February 3, 2016, the Nigerian military used an armed drone, the
Caihong 3 (CH-3) to conduct air strikes in the Boko-Haram North East (News
America, 2016) and the mission yielded little success. Also, on January 27, 2018,
NAF surveillance aircraft and CH-3A drone trailed Boko Haram insurgents

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withdrawing with a mobile artillery system and gun trucks to the Parisu area of the
group’s Sambisa enclave. The scouting drone then dropped an explosive payload
and destroyed the artillery system alongside the crew (Abdullahi, 2021).

Despite these achievements, there are also instances where drones have misfired
their targets. In the Doma area of Nasarawa State, a military drone attacked and
killed 40 Fulani herdsmen with cattle in 2019. Between 2014 and 2022, over 12
cases of military bombardment of civilians were recorded. Some of these instances
are unconnected with drone attacks (Ezeamalu, 2019). An instance where over
200 refugees were bombed by the Nigerian Air Force in Maiduguri in 2017 cannot
be explained in the context outside drone warfare. Olaigbe (2024) lamented that
it is not the first deadly mistake of its kind. In January 2023, a drone strike killed
27 people in Nasarawa, in the north of Nigeria. In April 2023, six children were
killed by an airstrike in Niger State, also in the north of the country. In December
2022, 64 civilians were killed by an air strike in Zamfara, in northwestern Nigeria.

Similarly, a military drone whose target was bandits in the Kaduna area axis of
the Nigerian state missed its target and destroyed the lives of over 100 innocent
civilians of Tudun Biri Village on the 3rd of November, 2023 (Kareem, 2023).
The incident was another manifestation of Human rights abuse which attracted
condemnation by the Nigerian citizens, USA, and her Western Allies. Despite
laudable achievements of the Nigerian military in resolving internal and external
violence across the globe (Bamidele, 2015; Azgaku, 2015; Kuna, 2012; Sule, 2013;
Hamman, 2014; James, 1990; Daudu et al, 2017), drone warfare has exposed the
unpreparedness and great dearth of intelligence gathering by the Nigerian military.
This implies that the incident has shown the knowledge gap in the handling of
drones and airborne combat devices by the Nigerian military. Besides, one would
also see the contradictions and rivalries between the Nigerian army and the air
force arising from all these incidences. This, therefore, calls for a re-orientation of
the entire Nigerian military in dealings with the civilians. It should be noted that
instances of drone killing civilians in Nigeria are regional; what has been isolated
and discussed in this study is the tip of the iceberg. Owojori, Akinyemi, and Azman

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(2023, p.166) were not far from reality when they succinctly noted that; “the
severity of the problem, terrorist attacks and the counter-attacks by Nigeria’s
defense and security forces have been responsible for 39,311 deaths between
29 May 2011 and 2 February 2021.” As usual with the Nigerian government,
President Ahmed Bola Tinubu called for an investigation of the Tudun Biri incident.
This investigation must be genuine to tackle the complexities surrounding drone
mishaps in the trajectory of drone warfare in the Nigerian State.

The terrorist and bandit groups have taken advantage of cheap drones to fight the
military.There is a plethora of incidences in Africa and other parts of the world.The
Shabaab in Somalia, insurgents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
and Mozambique have been talking about the advantages of drone technology at an
alarming magnitude. Boko-Haram as well has used drones on several missions against
the Nigerian state. It is in light of this fact that the Berom Youth Moulders, a socio-
cultural and political association of the Berom people of Plateau State affirmed that
bandits used drones for surveillance before the attack (Shobayo, 2023). The above
facts have been underscored by the UN Security Council Resolution 2617, and Kim
James, an executive member of the Commercial Unmanned Aircraft Association
of Southern Africa stated that syndicates use ‘narco drones’ to commit atrocities.
In this wise, Cronin (2019) avers that; ‘the most common type of drone used by
Islamic State was the DJI phantom, purchasable on Amazon.com for as little as 450
USD’. The use of drone technology by a terrorist if not checked properly would
worsen the intensity of terrorism, insurgency, and banditry shortly in Nigeria.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Nigerian military cannot shy away from using modern technological equipment
to fight insurgency, terrorism, and banditry arising from a plethora of advantages
associated with this new technology. Despite the human rights violations noted
in this study, drone warfare has come to stay as a modern-day warfare tactic. If
the Nigerian military fails to take advantage of it, then, bandits, terrorists, and

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insurgents will do as we have started seeing in a few cases in Nigeria. This would be
disastrous for the Nigerian military to win this ‘most-win warfare’. Even in theatres
where there are boots on the ground, military authorities contemporaneously also
deploy drones, and it is safe to presume the same will continue by the Nigeria
military high command.
Sadly, the Nigerian military has not taken much advantage of using drone technology
to fight terrorism, banditry, and insurgence. This partly explains the rationale that
the Nigerian war on terrorism, insurgency, and banditry prolonged for almost two
decades leading to displacements, loss of lives and property, and the pauperisation
of the mass of the people. The use of drone technology can provide surveillance
and reconnaissance which can lead to the destruction of Boko-Haram and bandits
hideouts. Besides these facts, drones are cheaper than sending soldiers to die while
citizens continue to be killed as a result of terrorism and the activities of bandits.
For Nigeria to make efficient and effective use of drone technology as a counter-
insurgent strategy the following majors must be taken.

First, there is every need to domesticate international laws that specify the use of
drones, their production, and control in Nigeria to align with international best
practices. Such laws could also put in place majors that could curtail the acquisition
of drones by Boko-Haram terrorists, insurance, and bandits on one hand, and
encourage the indigenous production of drones by security agencies.

Second, the Nigerian military and security high command must

place preventive measures like policy frameworks, capacity
building, Rules of Engagement (RoE), Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP), and Commanders’ Directives among
others, on the use of drones that underline the importance of the military-
complying with all applicable national and international laws to protect civilians.The
drone as a weapon for confronting terrorism, insurgency, and bandits in Nigeria
is a recent phenomenon and as such, protection of civilians is imperative and
must be mainstreamed into the military Concept of Operations (CONOPs). Risk
assessment should be undertaken before the use of the drone is authorised. The

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attack in Tudun Biri village occurred at night when hundreds of villagers gathered
to celebrate a Maolud. A risk assessment before the operation might have suggested
to the military that such a large gathering of apparently unarmed people, on foot
and with no motorbikes visible, was unlikely to be a gathering of Boko Haram or
bandits.
Third, Nigeria should train all its military apparatuses on the use of drone warfare.
There are clear examples in which drones have misfired their targets and killed
innocent civilians in their scores. The training of the Nigerian military in this respect
will intensify the war against terrorism. The training of the military apparatuses
should go a long way with the acquisition of more drones and partnerships with
countries like the USA, Russia, Israel, and so forth that have the latest drone
technology for executing war against terrorism. Finally, the war against terrorism,
insurgency, and banditry using drone technology can be successful if there are
civil-military relations. This is because civilians would provide the military with
relevant information that would be used to launch a war against terror using drone
technology.

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Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1 57

 Arguments for and Against the
Adoption of State Police in Nigeria.
What Policy Options for the National
Assembly?

Christopher O. Ngara
Legislative Centre for Security Analysis (LeCeSA)
National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja

Egwuatu U. Onyejelem
Legislative Centre for Security Analysis (LeCeSA)
National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja

&

Zubairu K. Dagona
Legislative Centre for Security Analysis (LeCeSA)
National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies (NILDS), Abuja

58 Legislative Journal of Security Analysis Vol. 1, N0. 1

 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

Abstract
This paper examines arguments for and against the adoption of state police in
Nigeria. Using the methodology of desk review and cross-country analysis,
it argues that although Nigeria is a federal state, its constitution recognised
only the existence of a federal police force. However, worsening insecurity
over the years and the increasingly weak capacity of the Nigerian police to
guarantee the security of lives and properties have elicited public agitations
for the adoption of state police. While the quest for the adoption of state
police is gaining more popularity and acceptance, a significant segment of the
population believes that state police is not viable for the country. Although
both strands of argument have their inherent strength and weaknesses, the
paper holds that the adoption of state police can enhance internal security
and strengthen the country’s federal practice. However, Nigeria is not yet
mature enough for it; and will be difficult to realise in the short run due to
several constraints including legal, funding, logistics, expertise, structural,
and administrative, among others. The paper recommends among others that
the National Assembly should provide necessary budgetary and legislative
support to the Nigeria Police Force to strengthen its capacity and improve its
effectiveness and efficiency.

Keywords:
State police, Nigerian Federation, Restructuring, National Assembly,
Nigeria Polce Force

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

Introduction

In the last two decades, the issue of state police has featured frequently in public
debates in Nigeria as one of the key elements in restructuring the Nigerian
Federation – an agenda mostly pushed by civil society groups and other non-state
actors. However, the tempo of public debates has often waned or waxed depending
on the severity of national security situations or events. Further, the call for
state police has appeared very contentious in the recent past and tends to divide
national elites into blocs across the country. While these lingered, there appears
to be an acceptance of the principle of state police among most state governors as
demonstrated by the establishment of security outfits in 23 out of the 36 states of
the federation (Isamotu, 18 February 2024). Despite the existence of these security
outfits across the different states, insecurity has been on the rise.

Since the beginning of 2024, there has been a renewed call for state police; and unlike
before, the agenda is now spearheaded by policy actors. Despite the doubts about
its viability and sustainability, the recent push for it by state actors has increased the
chances of its realization due to growing elite consensus. It will be recalled that in
February 2024, the Nigerian Federal Executive Council consisting of the President
and Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces and State Governors considered
the option of state police to bolster the national police force as it struggles to
contain widespread violence and insecurity. This is the first time Nigeria’s federal
and state governments have agreed on the need to set up state police to reinforce
the more than 300,000-men national police force in Africa’s most populous nation
(Reuters, 15 February 2024).

This move has also received the support of the National Assembly as the House
of Representatives is currently processing a Bill for an Act to alter Sections 34,
35, 39, 42, 84, 89, 129, 153, 197, 214, 215, and 216 of the 1999 Constitution
to provide for the establishment of state police (Akintola, 18 February 2024).

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

The constitutional implication of the proposed legislation is the transfer of Police’

from the ‘Exclusive Legislative List’ to the ‘Concurrent Legislative List’, to
effectively empower states to have state-controlled police and the establishment
of State Police Service Commissions as distinct from the Federal Police Service
Commission with clearly defined roles and jurisdictions (Arise News, 21 February
2024). The bill sponsored by Deputy Speaker Hon. Benjamin Okezie Kalu and 14
other lawmakers noted that the increasing threats to the nation’s collective security
have made the option of state police compelling.

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is a large organization consisting of 36 State and the
Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Commands.These Commands are further grouped
into 17 zones and 8 administrative organs. Nevertheless, almost every case would
end up on the desk of the Inspector-General of Police. This adds to the reasons
for the calls for its decentralization and the establishment of state police forces to
address insecurity issues at state levels. Many Nigerians believe that the worsening
insecurity in the country can be better managed by state governments without
having to wait for signals from the federal government or Force Headquarters
in Abuja before acting on intelligence or tackling crimes. Others also argue that
under the state police regime, governors would be held accountable by citizens for
security breaches in their states, unlike the prevailing situation where, in defense,
they apportion blame to Abuja and express their incapacity and limitation by
law. Further, it is argued that the limitations of size, lack of local knowledge, and
bureaucracy would be addressed by the establishment of state police (Mbah, 28
May 2020).

Despite the growing acceptance of the need to establish state police, stakeholders
and experts have strong reservations about the financial and resource capacity of
the states to fund, maintain, and operate functional state police successfully. Others
have questioned the political maturity of state governors to maintain and deploy
the police to protect the citizens rather than their vested political interest and high-
handedness. This paper interrogates the arguments on the viability or otherwise of
setting up a state police against the existing federal police in Nigeria.

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

Literature Review on the Origin, Nature, and Structure of Nigeria

Police Force

Ahire (1991), Tamuno (1993), Nwolise (2004), Newburn (2004), and Alemika
(1995) suggest that police mean different things to different people due to
differential perceptions. Still, it has also been defined in a way that appeals to many.
Walsh and Whetstone (2024) define police as a body of officers representing the
civil authority of government responsible for maintaining public order and safety,
enforcing the law, and preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal activities.
For Reiss (1977) (cited in Idowu 2013) the police represent the legal system in
transactions with citizens. Because of the emergency functions they perform during
a personal and public crisis, it monopolise the legitimate use of force. Section 4
of the Police Act (2020) conceives police as the body that is responsible for “the
prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation
of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all
laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.”

Usang (2021) suggests that Nigeria as a federal state should allow for powers sharing
between the central and the component units, the police should be decentralized
as practiced in the United States of America, Canada, England/Wales, and even in
India and Pakistan. Although the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(1999 as Altered) in Sections 214 and 215 provides for the Nigeria Police Force
(NPF) in the Exclusive list, many segments of the society have been calling for the
establishment of state police in line with Usang’s (2021) view. Several literatures
abound on the call for the establishment of state police or the maintenance of the
status quo, especially since the worsening of insecurity in Nigeria and the inability
of the NPF to contain the situation. For instance, Ibeanu and Momoh (2020);
Odekunle (2017); Alemika (2010); Soniyi (2020); Taiwo and Orifowomo (2020);
Agbonna and Ariguzo (2020), and Ezeobi, (2022), among many others, have
expressed different views on how best Nigeria can organise its policing structures.

Soniyi (2020); Udeuhele and Elechi (2022); Alemika (2010); and Nwocha and
Nwuhuo, 2024) argue that understanding the nature, structure, and capability

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is possible only when one makes historical
reference. They observe that the NPF is a colonial creation that began in 1861 with
the formation of a Consular Guard in Lagos. It was created originally to protect the
colonial overlord and to assist in oppressing the indigenous population to facilitate
the exploration and exploitation of natural and human resources for export to
Western countries. Thus, from the beginning, the objective was not to protect the
lives and property of citizens. Although the NPF has over the years transitioned
from local and regional policing systems to the present-day centralized force, its
focus on protecting the state rather than the citizens has not changed.

Ijalana (2018); Alozie (2019); Agbefe, Ikenga, and Atare (2023) corroborate the
assertion that the NPF is elitist and not structured for citizens’ protection. It
held that the NPF was originally established to serve the colonial administration’s
security needs, primarily focusing on maintaining order and suppressing resistance
against colonial rule its history has influenced the contemporary NPF’s reputation
for brutality and its perceived prioritization of the state’s interests over those of
the general populace. This approach to police duty was one of the main causes
of the #EndSARS protest in Nigeria in October 2020. #EndSARS was a protest
calling for the disbandment of an abusive police unit Known as the Special Anti-
Robbery Squad (SARS) and for ending police brutality (Human Rights Watch,
2021; Amnesty International, 2021).

Bakare and Aderinola (2019), Alozie (2019), Agbo (2023), and Kweitsu (2023) all
agree that in the last few years, the role of the police as the lead agency responsible
for the maintenance of internal security has been seriously challenged. As insecurity
worsened, there has been widespread agitation and demand for accountability
from the police even as its capacity to maintain law and order across the country
weakens. This development has also led to the call for restructuring of the Nigerian
federation to enable the devolution of more powers to the state governments
including the powers to establish state police. The demand for the establishment of
state police in some quarters and the caution for restraints by others have polarized
the Nigerian public into two opposing camps, those who wish for state police and

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

those who prefer the status quo with better efficiency.

One of the strong arguments for state police is articulated by Ibeanu and Momoh
(2020) who held that the current centralized structure fails to provide adequate
security across the diverse and expansive Nigerian landscape, contributing to
increased insecurity, including terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, and communal
violence. Furthermore, the absence of a localised structure makes it difficult to
demand and hold the police accountable as decisions are taken by distant federal
authorities rather than local representatives who are more attuned to community-
specific security concerns. Stretching this position further, Iwuoha and Aniche
(2022) observe that despite the decentralisation of the NPF into 925 Divisions,
106 Area Commands, 37 State Commands, and 17 Zonal Commands across the
thirty-six (36) states and the FCT, as well as the local government areas of the
country, the system remains but highly centralised and centrally controlled as each
command is accountable to the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) in Abuja, rather
than the state governors under whose jurisdiction they operate. This command
structure is reinforced by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution which place
police under the exclusive legislative list and the Nigeria Police Act of 2020,
respectively. Odekunle (2017) suggests that the perennial failure of the NPF to
contain insecurity and the growing ineffectiveness and inefficiency in its operation
point only to the fact that a decentralised police system is a panacea for addressing
Nigeria’s worsening security challenges.

Taiwo and Orifowomo (2020) argue that the right to establish police is a
constitutional matter provided for in the 1999 Constitution. Despite the growing
agitation for state police, its realization depends on the alteration of the relevant
sections of the constitution. Moreover, Agbonna and Ariguzo (2020) and Ezeobi
(2022), observe that the creation of multiple layers of police force could further
worsen the security situation as it may promote arms proliferation in the country.
Ezeobi (2022) suggests that 70% of the eight million Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW) in West Africa are in Nigeria, about 59 % are possessed by civilians, 38%
with the armed forces, 2.8 % are with the police, while 0.2 are in the hands of

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

the various armed groups across the country. Most of these armed groups emerge
from the vigilante and other quasi-security organized by some state governments.
Okenyodo (2016) noted that the proliferation of ad-hoc security arrangements
also creates unique security challenges as some become a law unto themselves. It is
important to note that the state debate on the NPF echoes much broader concerns
about Nigeria’s security governance, federalism, and ultimately, the balance of
power between the federal government and federating states.

Cross-Country Analysis of Police Forces in Federal Context

To better understand the practicability or otherwise of state police, it is important

to draw valuable insights from countries with similar legal and structural
arrangements as Nigeria. A brief note is therefore made on the United States of
America, India, and South Africa.

The United States of America (USA): The United States of America presents a
prototype of a federal system of government with a decentralised policing structure.
The lower (Local) levels (city and county) also have police departments as different
from the Federal and State police Departments. These police departments exist
side-by-side with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and other similar
federal agencies. A similar policing structure existed in Nigeria under the regional
governments before the 1966 military coup. During this time, the regions and local
authorities had their police systems until the regional government was abolished
following the civil war. The succeeding military government later brought them
under the command of the Inspector-General of Police and finally, the Gowon
regime abolished them (Ikedinma, 2018).

India: Like the United States, the Republic of India equally runs a federal
system with a dual police structure at the national and state levels. The primary
responsibility of state governments in India is to maintain law and order which it
carries out diligently with a state police force that operates independently under
the national law. The central government has its police force-the Central Bureau

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

of Investigation (CBI) which deals with specific types of crimes or cases that have
national implications. The Indian experience shows the advantages of state-level
policing in managing local security issues effectively but also highlights challenges
related to political interference and disparities in resources among states.

Whereas the police command structure in the US is multi-layered, in India it is

two layers despite its vast size and large population. The state governments are
primarily responsible for law and order, while the central government provides
support through specialized agencies.This model highlights the recognition of local
security needs through state-level control and response mechanisms that factor
in the divide and huge population of the country. Nevertheless, like in Nigeria,
there are also resource inequalities and political interference challenges in policing
among Indian states, and a lack of proper coordination strategy.

The Republic of South Africa: Closer home, the Republic of South Africa
seems to be one of the most progressive and respected African countries with a
relatively good security system compared to Nigeria. However, like Nigeria, South
Africa went through phases of colonial influence at national, regional, and local
levels, impacting law enforcement in both countries. During the Apartheid regime,
the South African Police Service (SAPS) experienced legitimacy arising from
insecurity and allegations of police brutality, corruption, rape by police officials,
and other forms of criminal misconduct which tarnished its image (Govender and
Pillay, 2022).

According to the Constitution of South Africa 1996, as amended, the national

police service must be structured to function in the national, provincial and,
where appropriate, local spheres of government. The constitution adds that the
SAPS is responsible for investigating crimes and security throughout the country
(South African Government, 1996). This means that like Nigeria, it has only
one national police service, but while the NPF has Divisions, Area Commands,
State Commands, and Zonal Commands, all taking orders from the Inspector-
General, the SAPS operates at National, Provincial, and Local levels, with some
degree of independence and powers (Motsepe, Mokwena and Maluleke, 2022). It

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

is noteworthy that while insecurity in Nigeria is blamed on the centralisation of

the police command, in South Africa, insecurity is essentially blamed on the non-
centralised command structure, improperly coordinated efforts, and ununiformed
strategy and tactics of law enforcement agencies (Mabasa and Olutola, 2021).

Regional Policing as De Facto Apparatus for Transitioning to State

Police

The civil liberty and freedom that accompanied the transition to democracy
in 1999, opened up the space for the expression of years of bottled anger and
frustration by citizens. This development severely tested the capacity of the
Nigerian state to ensure effective social control and manage its economy and
diversity with disappointing results leading to the emergence of different centres
of agitation and violent armed groups. The failure of the state to nip in the bud this
dissension culminated in pervading insecurity of different forms over the years
including terrorism by Boko Haram militancy in the Niger Delta, armed robbery,
banditry, kidnapping for ransom, conflicts between farmers and herders, cultism,
and other social vices.

Despite different interventions by successive governments, data shows that the

level of insecurity has worsened over the years. This has elicited agitations by civil
society for the reforms of the national security architecture including a call for
state police. Initially, the call was exclusively dominant in the southwest, but later,
it gained support among people from different segments of the Nigerian society
including state governors as insecurity worsened across the country. Section 214
of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution stipulates that no other police force shall be
established for the federation or any part of it. There shall be a police force for
Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force. This provision expressly
prohibits the establishment of any additional police for the federation or at any of
its subnational levels. This section creates a constitutional encumbrance for the
establishment of police at subnational levels leaving state governors to rely on

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. This section provides for the communalizing
of the protection of the right to life, the right to the dignity of the human person,
and personal liberty as granted in Sections 33-35 by joining other persons to form
associations to pursue and protect those rights and interests. The results were that
some state governors set up security outfits to complement the roles of the Nigeria
Police.
The growing agitation for state police and the formation of ethnic and regional
security groups is a direct reaction to the failures of the federal and state
governments to discharge their fundamental duty of defending the lives and
property of the populace. Consequently, there has been a proliferation of informal
state and regional security organizations. These notably include the Ebubeagu in
the southeast and Amotekun in the southwest. There are Benue Forest Guards and
Operation Rainbow in Plateau State. In Kano State, there is Hisbah, the Civilian
Joint Task Force in Borno State, and most recently, the Katsina State Government’s
Community Watch Corps are a few, among others (Mohammed, 25 January 2024).
The political and legislative contraption that birthed these state and regional
security outfits has been a source of public concern and controversy as much as
their powers, jurisdiction, mandate, and roles. Similarly, the disposition by several
state governors to set up, support, and fund informal security outfits demonstrates
their preference for a decentralized police institution irrespective of their official
positions on the matter.

The degeneration of insecurity to further new heights in the country despite the
existence and proliferation of these informal security outfits across states and
regions has been advanced as an indication that the creation of state police may not
necessarily end insecurity without deliberate non-kinetic strategic interventions.
The protagonist of state police has responded by shifting their argument adducing
poor training, motivation, and equipment as reasons for their current poor
performance. Despite these, many have acknowledged the contributions of
informal security outfits in securing the local population and complementing the
roles of the NPF. However, most, if not all of these informal security outfits have

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

been accused at one time or the other of highhandedness and abuse of powers in
their respective areas of operations. But they have nevertheless come to stay as
a de facto policing outfit in their local jurisdiction and a precursor towards the
transition to state police if the legal barriers are removed.

Arguments for and Against the Establishment of State Police in Nigeria

The notion of whether or not state police is appropriate for the country has
continued to generate national debate. This debate may not be closed even if a
constitutional amendment paves the way for the establishment of state police in
Nigeria. Suffice it to say that this section will provide the argument and position
from both sides to make meaning of the study.

Arguments in Favour of State Police

Just like those who argued against the establishment of state police in Nigeria,
many believe that state police provide the most viable option out of the current
security dilemma in the country. The following among others are their key
arguments:
Failure of the Federal Police to Protect Citizen against Rising Insecurity:
The Nigerian society has transformed greatly since independence and the current
policing architecture can no longer serve the policing needs of local communities.
Therefore, the solution to the pervading insecurity in the country in the face of the
increasingly weak capacity of the Nigerian Police is for states to own their police.
In this case, the leadership, command, control, coordination, and communication
of the force will reside fully with the State or regional authorities.

Strengthening the Federal System: This is encapsulated in the views that Nigeria
is a federal state with a federal constitution whose key element is the devolution
of powers among the federal, state, and local governments, but in practice, an
important institution of the criminal justice system such as the police has remained
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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

centralized. This has impeded its capacity to adequately maintain law and order
to protect lives and properties across the country, leading to the proliferation of
ungoverned spaces. Thus, an inherent requirement of a federal system is to devolve
the authority and enforcement powers of the Nigeria Police Force.

Lack of Effective Command and Control of Federal Police by Federating Units:

State governments have argued that the financial and logistics support extended to
the Nigerian Police by the state government could go a long way in funding its
police if established. Some felt that Nigeria Police receiving its statutory budgetary
allocations and still collecting financial logistical support from States amounted
to “double-dipping.” Moreover, such “Funding without authority” remained a
vexatious, contentious, and unacceptable situation for most State authorities (FES/
CISLAC, 2020).

The gap between the Police and National Population: According to the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the number of police personnel per 100,000
resident population is an indicator of the incapacity for adequate policing in a
country. However, the flip side is a high number of police personnel per resident
population could mean fewer freedoms, whereas fewer police could mean a high
risk of insecurity. The ratio of the Nigerian police to the national population of 200
million, is 1:540 (Akpede, 7 August 2019).This literary means the risk of insecurity
is very high for citizens. This is far below the United Nations recommended figure
of 1:450. Despite these highly inadequate figures, a majority of the police personnel
especially the Mobile Police (MOPOL) and the Special Protection (SP) Units are
outsourced for private protection to foreign and domestic companies, government
officials, politicians, and the Very Important Persons (VIPs). According to sources,
about 200,000 of the total 400,000 personnel of the Nigerian Police are deployed
for the protection of the elite class (Raheem, 5 November 2020) This means that
there are about 200,000 police available to protect more than 180 million in
Nigeria.

Lack of Effective Coordination: The absence of synergy and complementarities

in security and law enforcement between the federal and state authorities has

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

mostly put the states at the receiving end, especially during emergencies. This has
necessitated the clamour for state police, particularly by state governors who want
to effectively control the security situation in their domain.

Public Distrust for Nigeria Police: The distrust gap between the police and the
national population has bred mutual suspicion between the general public and the
police rather than the cooperation that is needed to check rising insecurity. This
has created a situation where individuals are unwilling to volunteer information
necessary for intelligence gathering which in many ways frustrates security
operations. Those who argue in favour submit that state police will facilitate the
recruitment of locals who possess the local knowledge to operate effectively in
their local communities. This, according to them, will help build the mutual trust,
cooperation, and synergy necessary to surmount security challenges.

Arguments Against State Police

The following are some highlights of the position of those who do not support state
police:

Absence of Enabling Legal Framework: One of the central arguments by those

who oppose state police is that there is no enabling legal regime to accommodate
regional or state police in Nigeria.This position is based on the provision of Section
214 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that (1) There shall be a police force
for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to
the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the
Federation or any part thereof. By the provision of Section 214(1) states have no
legal powers to establish police.

Abuse of Power by State Governors: One of the central arguments by the

antagonists of state police especially the Federal Government is that Nigeria is
not politically mature to operate state police. The assumption is hinged on the
fear that the state governors would use police to persecute political opponents
and oppress non-indigenes and perceived political rivals. This fear is borne out of
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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

the historical lessons of the immediate postcolonial period when regional leaders
used the native constabulary - the Dogaris, in the North, the Ilaris and Olokpas in
the South-west, and the Police-Eliza or ‘Court Man’ (Kotima) in the South-east to
harass, intimidate, and oppress perceived political rivals and opponents. How some
state governors have muscled down state houses of assembly, manipulated local
government elections through State Independent Electoral Commission (SIECs),
and mismanaged local government finances since the reintroduction of democracy
in 1999 have reinforced these fears. As an alternative to state police, the Federal
Government has recommended Community Policing which is consistent with the
provisions of the 1999 Constitution.

The Police is Sufficiently Decentralised: Asking for the decentralization of the

police is uncalled for because the Nigeria police is presently composed of 925
Divisions, 106 Area Commands, 37 State Commands, and 17 Zonal Commands
(Babalola, 2022), which makes it sufficiently decentralized. Therefore, what
is required for effective policing in Nigeria is to reform the police structure to
eliminate the existing trust deficit, increase the budgetary allocation, train and
retrain, provide adequate equipment, and enhance the welfare and morale of men
and officers.

Inexperience and Lack of Trained Manpower: The states do not have the
political maturity, experience, and trained manpower to operate modern police
outfits. It is important to note that the trial and experimentation with regional and
state security outfits have not yielded the desired results as insecurity worsens.
Furthermore, there are several reported cases of abuse of power, extortion, extra-
judicial killings, and other human rights breaches, as unethical unprofessional, and
partisan conduct by these security outfits across different states where they exist.
The shortage of trained and experienced manpower has raised the fear that it would
be too risky to entrust states with the responsibility of operating state police.

Lack of Financial Capacity: It has been argued in many quarters that policing is
a capital-intensive venture in which the majority of the 36 states of the federation
lack the financial capability to fund and support adequately. Most of the states

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

depend on allocations from the federation account to run the affairs of their
respective states and such allocations are hardly enough to meet their expenditure.
The burden and cost of maintaining a state police force even with the security votes
allocated to them may thus be too enormous for the State Governments in Nigeria
to bear (FES/CISLAC, 2020). Given the difficulty the Federal Government is
facing in funding and running the Nigeria Police Force today, the situation may
be more precarious if states are left to fund their police forces. Those who reason
along this line submit that establishing a state or regional police without the
necessary budgetary capacity to fund the same could reproduce an even worse
service condition than the Nigeria Police Force. This could lead to low morale,
corruption, abuse of power, etc.

State Police as Incentive for National Disunity: This is premised on the view
that Nigeria is a unique federation where most of the issues that belies insecurity
in the country is rooted in the poor management of its diversity. Therefore, the
establishment of state or regional police will further highlight the divisive contours
and exasperate national disintegration.This will undermine the national integration
and nation-building efforts that have continued since independence in 1960. Thus,
to adopt a policing system in other federal states like the United States of America
which has state and local police, with only the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
being an arm of the federal government may be counterproductive to the Nigerian
local realities.

Policy Options for the National Assembly?

Based on the foregoing arguments for and against the establishment of state police
in Nigeria and the conclusion drawn from the study, the paper recommends policy
options for the National Assembly as follows:

The Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Police Affairs in

collaboration with the Nigeria Police and the Police Service Commission should
carry out a thorough needs assessment of the Nigeria Police and come up with a

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

funding and budgetary plan for 10 years. The plan can be further broken down
into short, medium, and long term for implementation and effective monitoring
and oversight. The Senate and House Committees on Police Affairs may have
to improve and strengthen their oversight of police budget implementation. In
addition, the House Committee on Legislative Compliance may step up oversight
to ensure that releases are made for all items on the budgetary provisions for the
Nigeria police and that allocations are not diverted to unapproved uses by the
police’s top hierarchy.

The Senate and House Committees on Police Affairs should initiate a Bill for
levies from the petroleum/solid mineral sectors to be tied to the procurement
of equipment, training, and welfare of police personnel. The Senate and House
Committees on Police Affairs may consider budgetary support for the immediate
recruitment of 600,000 police personnel over 5 years to boast its manpower
needs to surpass the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:450. This will
increase physical security and close gaps in ungoverned spaces. The Senate and
House Committees on Police Affairs may parley with the management of the
Nigeria Police and the Police Service Commission (PSC) and Police Institutions
to undertake a total overhaul of the guidelines and processes of recruitment into
Nigeria Police and training of personnel. Great emphasis should be on the merit
and integrity of recruits. In addition, training and retraining of men and officers of
the police should be prioritized.

The Senate and House Committees on Police Affairs in collaboration with the Nigeria
Police Force may strategize on ways of building and strengthening community
policing by making the police departments highly accessible to the public. This can
be achieved by encouraging the Nigerian Police and putting mechanisms in place to
build ties and close working relations with members of the communities through
partnerships to reduce crime. This is in tune with the modern police model that
is proactive, intelligence-led, and problem-solving-oriented. The Nigerian Police
may also adopt the system of police union that is operated in countries like the
United States of America and the United Kingdom, where officers float unions to

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

ventilate and aggregate their views and grievances and advocate for their welfare
and concerns.

The Senate and House Committees on Police Affairs may encourage the police
departments to further decentralise decision-making powers to the local police
units. This is important to reinforce the implementation of community-based
policing and assuage the grievance of state governors over the centralization of
police command in their jurisdiction. Such decentralization of decision-making
will enable local police heads to respond directly to local needs, especially during
emergencies. It should also allow for greater input and participation of the local
authority and local police heads in policing priorities and budgets.

The Senate and House Committees on Police Affairs in collaboration with the police
authorities should strategize towards strengthening external civilian oversight
of the police and the credibility of police complaints mechanisms in the eyes of
the public. A dedicated independent police complaints body may be legislated
for and established to receive and investigate complaints of police misconduct.
Similar bodies exist in Belgium, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom with
mandates different from generic independent bodies/ombudsman that receive and
investigate public complaints such as the National Human Rights Commission.
The Senate and House Committees on Police Affairs, National Security &
Intelligence, as well as the Senate Committee on Diaspora and Non-Governmental
Organisations and House Committee on Civil Society and Development Partners
to collaborate with the Legislative Centre for Security Analysis in organizing more
dialogue sessions involving the federal and state governments, as well as Civil Society
organisations (CSOs) on how best to improve the performance of the Police, be it
as currently established or with a view to restructuring/ decentralization so that
an effective police regime may be birthed in the country.

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Arguments for and Against the Adoption of State Police in Nigeria. What Policy Options for the National Assembly?

Conclusion

The worsening state of insecurity in Nigeria over the years has swung emotions in
favour of state police even among its most ardent antagonists, who now see it as an
urgent matter. While devolution of powers is an important principle of federalism,
its practice and implementation without a critical review of the environmental
realities could be counterproductive. It is not out of place to point out that given
careful planning, collaboration, and commitment of stakeholders across the
board, a well-structured state police system can enhance security while respecting
constitutional provisions. But then, without necessarily joining the bandwagon, it is
the position of this study that Nigeria is presently not politically and economically
mature for state police.

The stark reality of the state government’s mismanagement of notable institutions

such as the local government councils, State Houses of Assembly, and even more
painfully the State Independent Electoral Commissions still stares the general public
in the face.To be allowed to run a state police that wields and exercises a monopoly
over instruments of coercion may be a costly mistake.The recent landmark decision
by the Supreme Court declaring it unconstitutional for the state government to
withhold funds meant for Local Government Administration and the ongoing Bill
to repeal the legislation empowering the State Independent Electoral Commission
to conduct local government elections are all standing examples. Therefore, the
most viable and cost-effective option is to undertake a thorough reform of the
NPF, increase its budget, strengthen its operation, and grant its state and local units
more decision-making powers.

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 Christopher Ochanja Ngara, Egwuatu U. Onyejelem & Zubairu K. Dagona

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Walsh,W. F. and Whetstone, T. (2024). Police Law Enforcement. Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/
topic/police

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 Between Providing Security
and Building a Leviathan:
Understanding the Conversation
on State Policing in Nigeria
Abubakar Sadiq Ahmed
Department of Social Sciences
Kaduna Polytechnic

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 Abubakar Sadiq Ahmed

Abstract
This paper examined the ongoing conversations on state policing in Nigeria.
The analysis explored the delicate balance between creating state police and
ensuring security while risking creating an overpowering state apparatus that
may be, akin to what Thomas Hobbes, in his treatise, described as, creating
a Leviathan. In a systematic approach, the paper examined the historical
context, current debates, and the potential implications of state policing
in Nigeria. By assessing the arguments for and against state policing, this
study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the complexities of
enhancing security without undermining civil liberties, an essential element
of democracy and democratic governance.

Keywords:
Security, State Policing, Leviathan, Community Policing

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Between Providing Security and Building a Leviathan: Understanding the Conversation on State Policing in Nigeria

Introduction

Nigeria’s population estimates of 45 million at independence in 1960, increased

to 55 million in 1970 and 114 million at the return to democracy in 1999 (United
Nations, 2019; Federal Research Division, 1991). This population explosion has
given way to widening challenges, including rising cases of insecurity. The latter
can be gleaned from the spikes in crime and criminality, such as rape and armed
robbery, and as time evolved, to be accompanied by cases of cultism, ethnic militia
activities, pipeline vandalization in the South East and the South-South; kidnapping,
and banditry that cuts across the country’s six regions, with the North West and the
North Central as the epicenter. Alongside these, there were also other threats from
religious groups and irredentist movements, such as Boko Haram in the North East
and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and
the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) especially in the South East respectively.

Amidst these challenges, came a stark realization of the “ineffectiveness of the

Nigerian Police Force (NPF) in the discharge of its constitutional mandate of
maintaining law and order” (Wakili and Adamu, 2022, p.632; Igbuzor, 2018).
In other words, as further alluded to by Wakili and Adamu (2022, p. 632), “the
Police is an integral part of a nation’s security architecture and the frontline
provider of internal security.” Conversations around Nigeria’s rising insecurity and
by implication, the challenges of policing have been adduced to several factors,
including the structure of the Nigerian Police Force (Abdullahi, 2019; Bamidele,
2024), and the insufficient personnel and equipment. The former, for instance,
can be situated in the provision of Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended which provides, amongst others, that:
“there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigerian
Police Force, and subject to the provision of this section, no other police force shall
be established for the federation or any part thereof.” This has, therefore, brought

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to the fore the clamor to amend this section of the constitution and give way to the
decentralization of policing, a euphemism for State Police in Nigeria.

However, it is important to note that discourses on state policing remain

contentious. This is especially so given that matters of policing appear to have been
subsumed within the ongoing debate on the restructuring of the polity (Bamidele,
2024). Thus, while proponents of state policing insist that the creation of state
police can help to address many local security challenges that now bedevil the
country more effectively, its opponents opined otherwise. They fear that allowing
state police could lead to abuse of power and may further threaten the foundation
of the country’s fragile national unity.

This paper seeks to unpack the concerns in these binary conversations by examining
the historical, political, and socio-economic dimensions of state policing in Nigeria.
The paper is divided into Nine Sections with this part as Section One. Section
Two provides clarification on the keywords used in the paper. Section Three of
the paper offers a Theoretical Framework for a better understanding of the paper.
In Section Four the paper examines the historical transformation of policing in
Nigeria with an insight into its colonial and post-independence legacies. Section
Five dwells on the debates for and against state policing. Section Six X-rays state
policing model in India and the United States. Section Seven is an insight into
Nigeria’s experience with Community Policing. While Section Eight of the paper
serves as Recommendations, Section Nine provides concluding remarks.

Conceptual Clarifications

For clarity, this section provides clarification on the following recurring terms.

Security: The concept of security enjoys a wide definition depending on the

context and who is using it. This informed the assertions by scholars like Jackson
(2014); San-Ei, (2017), and Williams and McDonald (2020), that security is a
highly contested term. Regardless, Buzan (1991, p. 432-433), defines security
as “the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to
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Between Providing Security and Building a Leviathan: Understanding the Conversation on State Policing in Nigeria

maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of
change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also
reasonably includes a substantial range of concern about conditions of existence”.
This definition appears all-encompassing, as it bridges the sentiments expressed
in both the traditional and the non-traditional conception of security. Perhaps,
drawing from this, San-Ei (2016, p.1), conceptualizes security as “freedom from all
threats.” In the same vein, Williams and McDonald (2020, p.6), associate the term
security with “the alleviation of threats to cherished values, especially those which,
if left unchecked, threaten the survival of particular referent objects soon”. In this
context, this paper, therefore, conceptualizes security as freedom from anything
that threatens human and societal peace.

State Policing: This paper proceeds with the assumption that understanding the
term state policing needs to begin firstly, with an understanding of what a state
is, and secondly, what policing is. The term state is used to refer to an organized
political community, a nation, or a territory under a single government. It is often
defined as an institution that establishes who shall possess the monopoly of the
legitimate use of force within a given territory and how the power that rests upon
that monopoly shall be organized and used (Chinoy, 1967 cited in Oyediran,1998,
p.17). Interestingly, a state has certain fundamental features, which are: people
(population); permanent territory; a government, and sovereignty. Policing, on
the other hand, refers to the process or processes through which law and order
are maintained within any given state or country. In other words, policing is
the activities embedded in the actions/functions of police in the discharge of its
responsibilities.

Within a broader context, state policing is conceptualized as the process that

allows the maintenance of civil order, ensures public safety, enforces law, and
investigates crime within a state. Contextualized within this paper, it is essentially
conceptualized, as Bamidele (2024, p.15), alludes, as a “sub-national police
formation, established, organized and maintained under the direct control and
jurisdiction of a particular state government” and operates outside the control of

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the central government to meet the security needs of its inhabitants.

Leviathan: The term Leviathan has several connotations. One; it connotes, in

the Bible, a reference to a sea monster depicted as powerful and fearsome. Two,
it is often used in describing anything enormous in size and power, whether
human, animal, or inanimate object. Third and this is notable, the term is cited in
the political works of Thomas Hobbes, published in 1651. In this work, Hobbes
describes the emergence of a powerful, all-encompassing state through a social
contract, metaphorically labeled as the Leviathan. This concept is particularly
significant when discussing the potential consequences of individual security
surrendered to individual hands without checks. This idea will be further espoused
in the Theoretical Framework section of the paper.

Community Policing: Wrobbles and Hess (2004, p.134), have defined

community policing as “an organization-wide philosophy and management
approach that promotes community government and police partnership, proactive
problem solving and community engagement to address the causes of crime and
community issues.” In the same vein, Ordu and Nnam (2017, p.85) have defined
community policing as a “system that unites members of the society with police. It
gets the community directly involved in solving both criminal and civil disorders
and makes the community involved in judicial settlement of societal problems.”
This paper, therefore, uses and conceptualizes community policing as a process that
allows the community and the police to be engaged in the day-to-day prevention of
crime and the maintenance of law and order. In other words, it is an arrangement
in which specific police functions are devolved to the public for the maintenance
of peace and order and ensuring public safety.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan approach to its analysis. Inherent
in the Hobbesian argument is a view that human society is in a state of nature
where life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Johari, 2018, p.248; Mahajan,

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2013, p.207-9) owing to the constant struggles between contending interests that
create fear and threat of violence. Thus, to escape from this condition, individuals
collectively agreed to surrender some of their freedom to a sovereign authority
in exchange for security and order through the form of a social contract. Arising
from this, a powerful government was established to maintain peace and prevent
returning to the chaotic state of nature.This is the context within which the police as
an instrument for maintaining law and order needs to be contextualized. However
important the police and by implication the state is, there is a great danger where
individual liberty and freedom are surrendered without proper safeguard.

The shortcoming of Hobbes’s social contract theory which, by implication, further

exposes its weakness, is how to strike the delicate balance between navigating
security needs and the danger of creating an oppressive state apparatus in the form
of a leviathan, that could undermine people’s rights and civil liberties.

Historical Context of Police and Policing in Nigeria

It is important to proceed in this segment by saying that the root of Nigeria’s

centralized policing can be traced back to colonial times when the police force was
designed to serve colonial interests. This legacy influenced the current structure
and the perception of the police in Nigeria, contributing to the current calls for
decentralization. However, it is safe to ask, what was the nature of policing in these
societies before the advent of colonialism and in what later came to be known as
Nigeria?

Law and order in pre-colonial societies were maintained through communal efforts,
using local institutions in both the Southern and Northern parts of Nigeria (Wakili
and Adamu 2022; Nwocha and Nwuhuo, 2024). In the same vein, Bamidele, (2024,
p.12) is also of the view that “pre-colonial policing methods were rooted in the
community and are closely interlinked with social structures”. However, following
colonial conquest and perhaps, the changing economic, political, and social needs
of the conquering power- Britain, a new policing method was developed. This

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view seems further corroborated by Ehindero (1998, p.10) that, “British trade
interest and the need to prevent squabbles between the native chiefs and imperial
merchants were the impetus for the formation of the force.”

The introduction of the new policing method in Lagos in 1861 commenced with
what was known as the Lagos Consular Guard, composed of 30 men (Wakili and
Adamu, 2022; Kpae and Eric, 2017; Abdullahi, 2019). As further expansions were
sought across more locals, quite consistent with the colonial interest of subjugation
and ending all native resistance, two important developments unfolded. Firstly,
in 1883, the Lagos Consular Guard was transformed into what later came to be
known as the Hausa Police, comprising 600 men, most of whom were captives and
slaves. The force later again transformed into what came to be known as the Hausa
Constabulary, and further enlarged to include mainly Hausa recruits in 1879.

Secondly, in 1886, the Lokoja Armed Constabulary, patterned along the Hausa
Constabulary, was formed by the Royal Niger Company (RNC). This was again,
followed by the establishment of the Niger Coast Constabulary for Southern
Nigeria in 1894 in Calabar. At this point, it is important to note that, both the
Hausa Constabulary and the Niger Coast Constabulary were to suffer the same fate
in 1900, as they were disbanded following the proclamation of the Protectorate
of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria respectively.
Consequently, Nigeria emerged with 3 separate police forces; one in the North and
the other 2 in the South- Lagos, and the Southern Protectorate based in Calabar.
However, in 1906, the Lagos Constabulary was fused into the South following
the merger of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate, effectively allowing separate
operations for the Northern and Southern police (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2000).
On this note, Bamidele, (2024, p.12) has argued that this action has allowed the
establishment of decentralized police forces, which was a divide-and-rule tactic
that was meant to maximize the imperial colonial interest in the new colony.
However, by 1st April 1930, these forces were unified under what later came to be
known as the Nigerian Police under the command of its first Inspector General Mr.
C.W. Duncan (Nwocha and Nwuhuo, 2024), with its office at force headquarters
in Lagos.
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With the introduction of the 1954 Constitution, the force was transformed into
a Federal Police force and then regionalized and was later nationalized in 1960,
following growing nationalist activities and agitations. This saw the appointment
of Mr. Louis Edet, as the first Indigenous Inspector General, with the mandate
of catering to the country’s internal security and providing support to prisons,
immigration, and Customs as may be directed from time to time. Subsequent
developments in 1963, ensured that the Nigerian Police was divided into five
regional commands, viz: Lagos Command, Northern Command, Western
Command, Eastern Command, and the Mid-Western Command (Nwocha and
Nwuhuo, 2024), each headed by a Commissioner under the command of the I.G.
based at the Headquarters. This arrangement was replaced with a 12 Command
structure following the creation of 12 states in 1967. This was again effectively
replaced by a 19 Command structure in 1991 and now, the 36 State Command
structure and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in 1996.

Before these developments, however, two important things need to be noted.

Foremost, is that the aftermath of the 1966 military coup had centralized police
operations in the country, with the Inspector General of Police taking direct orders
from the military Head of State and executing orders to the specification of the
Head of State (Wakili and Adamu, 2022; Bamidele, 2024). This is the trend that
has continued with subsequent military administrations that culminated in the
First, Second, and Third Republics. Additionally, the police force had maintained
an operational policy that allowed its personnel to be deployed to different parts
of the country for security purposes. This policy was sustained until 1989, when it
was changed by President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida’s regime, to allow a large
number of its personnel to be posted to their native areas to facilitate community
policing (Okoro, 2013) and to partly address the existing shortcomings in the
country’s policing framework.

While we shall return to the conversation on community policing shortly, it suffices

to say that it was in further appreciation of the shortcomings of community policing
and the growing failure of the police to meet the country’s expanding security

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threats that prompted the setting up of 3 Presidential Committees on Police

Reforms. The committees are, the 2006 Muhammad Danmadami Presidential
Committee on Police Reform; the 2008 Mohammed D.Yusuf Presidential Reform
Committee of the Nigerian Police, and the 2012 DIG Parry Osayande Presidential
Committee on Police Reform.

The Agitation for State Policing: Understanding the Contestation

Post-independence policing in Nigeria has entrenched a system that has ensured

centralized policing that gave way to the emergence of various security challenges
and regional tensions in the country. This has sparked debates about the efficacy
of state policing across the country’s diverse landscape. Dwelling on the views
expressed by the proponents of state policing, many of the arguments revolve around
the fact that state policing could help to remove the current over-centralization
that has hindered the current policing framework in the country. The centrality of
the argument often advanced by the proponents is that Nigeria, with a population
estimate of over 200 million is too large for a centralized policing framework that
is currently being operated in the country, and by implication, decentralization of
state policing would improve efficiency, and enhance the system of policing in the
country (Mercy and Nnaji: 2015; Bamidele, 2024).

Instructively, there is also the argument that state policing allows police
personnel to be drawn from their immediate environment. This would make
them more receptive to local issues and the cultural nuances that would allow
for effectiveness and swift response to security needs and challenges of their
environment. Additionally, Nigeria operates a federal system with the federal,
state, and local governments as federating units. This arrangement allocates power
along exclusive, concurrent, and residual matters, with the maintenance of law
and order sandwiched within matters under concurrent legislation. The notion of
centralized policing, as the proponents have argued, is in breach and is antithetical
to the true operation of federalism. Furthermore, state police and policing often

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tend better accountability as they are close and directly overseen by a government
that is very close to it. In this context, its proponents have argued that state policing
would remove the bureaucratic bottleneck and the red-tapism associated with the
running of centralized police and a federal system (Agwanwo, 2014).

Yet, proponents of state policing have argued that, while the current policing
framework is federal, the activities of the police force in many, if not all the
states of the federation are, in fact, partly funded by state governments. This is
either through building or the rehabilitation of police structures and sometimes,
in providing logistics for police operations. Therefore, apart from ensuring more
efficient use of the state’s resources, would allow for the deployment of additional
funding (Aleyomi, 2013) for the specific and strategic needs of individual states,
thereby improving security, economic efficiency, and development.

The Argument Against

However, there is another side opposed to the establishment of state police. Those
who share this perspective fear that with the enormous powers enjoyed by state
governors, the creation of state police may render the police not only in complete
control of state governors but even more so, the force risk of being politicized and
used in the witch-hunt of political opponents and suppressing opposition voices.
This, they argued, citing cases in the First Republic during which opposition
elements in the country were hounded and imprisoned using the instrumentality
of the then-regional police system. In the same vein, there is the argument that
the introduction of state policing, while allowing for the fragmentation of law and
order in the country, would give rise to “challenges about inter-state crimes, co-
operation between the police of different states as well as with federal police”
(Bamidele, 2024, p.24).This may tend to render the enforcement of law ineffective,
and inconsistent and could end up breeding chaos and confusion in the country.

Moreover, matters of security require consistent funding for logistics and other
auxiliaries. The current reality, as argued by the opponents, where most states in

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the federation depend on funds from federally generated revenues, even for the
payment of worker’s salaries, could further create a financial crisis. This is more
so as the idea of state policing could only aggravate the existing financial burden
of most of these states. Additionally, the arguments against state policing also stem
from two interrelated factors, viz: Nigeria’s political maturity and the country’s
multi-cultural nature. The former seeks to argue that Nigerian politicians have a
strong attachment to primordial sentiments, which render them too immature to
discern and navigate issues arising from “jurisdictional problems arising from the
operation of multiple police forces” (Bamidele, 2024, p.42). The latter frowns at
allowing state policing in a multi-ethnic state like Nigeria. A combination of these
two, as the opponents have argued, could be a harbinger of crisis and the country’s
possible dismemberment. This said it behooves at this point, to pause and ask, what
models are there to show as success stories of regional or state policing under a
federated state like Nigeria?

State Policing Model: India and USA

This section draws experience from other international examples of state or

regional policing models in a federal state like Nigeria. For this purpose, the paper
thus examines India and the United States of America’s (USA) model. This choice
was on purpose. The Indian model was considered given that India, being a former
colony like Nigeria may have any experience Nigeria could draw in its regional
policing model. The U.S.A model was considered given that Nigeria operates a
federal model tailored along that of the USA.

Writing on the Indian police and policing model, Varghese (2010) has argued that
India operates multiple unorganized decentralized policing. It is a model which
allows each state to maintain its Police Force for the maintenance of law and order.
This arrangement, therefore, renders policing within the jurisdiction of states, to
be overseen by the Ministry of Home Affairs at the federal level. For instance,
“Section 3 of 1861, Indian Police Act vested the superintendent of the state police

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force in the state government” (Varghese, 2010, p.9). Within this arrangement
however, each state’s senior members of the police forces and that of the federal
government belong to what is known as the Indian Police Service (IPS) which is
a central service, with the Central Bureau of Investigation of India (CIB), saddled
with the task of handling federal-related crimes in the country.
While the above arrangement allows for greater coordination and regulation of
policing, it makes it easy for operational and organizational patterns of police and
policing in India to remain the same. Arguing further Varghese (2010, p.9), has
opined, that this has created “an oblique centralized control” of the police force in
India and thus, prompting forces in various state formations to undertake regular
reforms to provide for wider community engagement, ensure accountability, and
professionalism of the force.

Looking at policing in the United States of America, the task is organized largely, at
the state and local levels to conform with the principles embedded in federalism.
In this case, the component units share and exercise executive, legislative, and
judicial powers through concurrent or residual arrangements. Law enforcement is
thus completely “decentralized to municipal, county, and states, with the federal
authority left to oversee the violation of federal laws that fall within specific
jurisdiction” (Varghese, 2010, p.8). This, therefore, goes to say that while policing
is unique to each state authority, the police in each state have wide authority to
conduct law enforcement activities and criminal investigations on matters related
to traffic laws, highway, and interstate patrol, overseeing the security of state
capital complexes and protecting governors.

On the whole, state policing, whether in India or the US, fits into the matrix
of each state’s security needs owing to the flexibility, and the familiarity of the
security agent with their environment. This builds more trust and cooperation
between the police and the community.

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Community Policing: The Nigerian Experience

Discourses on state policing often argued that Nigeria’s experience with community
policing, itself necessitated by the need, and the calls for the reform of policing in
Nigeria could provide invaluable lessons in the current quest for decentralization
and the establishment of state police in Nigeria. This thus, raises the question, what
was Nigeria’s experience in community policing? Community policing, as said
earlier, was introduced in Nigeria following the rising distrust of the police and
the need for reform by the then I.G. Tafa Balogun. This followed the establishment
of the 36 state Police Command, The Police Complaints Bureau, and the Human
Rights Desk in 2003, with the pilot community police project established in Enugu.
The police community pilot project has the following agenda: (a). Onslaught
against robbers, murders, assassinations, and other crimes; (b). Fast and decisive
crime and conflict management; (c). Community partnership in policing; (d).
Serious anti-corruption crusade; (e). Comprehensive training program conducive
to qualitative policing; (f). Improved conditions of service and enhanced welfare
officers for officers; (g). Inter-agency cooperation at all levels; and (h). Robust
public relations as necessary for the vision of people’s police (Ibeanu, 2007 cited in
Kpae and Eric, 2017, p.52).

With the departure of Tafa Balogun and Mike Okiro on the saddle as the IG,
community policing was redefined with the introduction of what was known then
as the “9 Ways Test”. The community policing project was further expanded to
include states like “Ogun, Ondo, Kano, Jigawa and Anambra, Sokoto Cross Rivers,
and Edo State” (Ibeanu, 2007 cited in Kpae and Eric, 2017, p.52).

An assessment of community policing in Nigeria tends to reveal the project, as

Ikenga, (2023) in his study of community policing in Delta State, as significant,
especially in the manner it has complemented the work of the Nigerian Police
Force in the fight against crime. However, Kpae and Eric (2017, p.52) have viewed
“community policing as a failure” given, as they argued, that public perception of
police is not only worse, but that the police are becoming more and more corrupt,
and its operations remain still very centralized.

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Conclusion

Conversations around state policing reflect broader concern on matters that

transcend governance, security, and democracy in Nigeria. There is no doubt that
state policing has the potential to provide a reprieve to the rising cases of crime and
criminality in the country. What we must, however, not lose sight of is the fact that
the project of state policing also has the potential of being hijacked and deployed
in the service of the interest of very few within the society. This calls for not only
vigilance but also a balanced approach that would help to ensure that in the quest
for providing security, a greater disservice and a more threatening danger is not
created. This particularly, calls for more research, and dialogue that could help to
provide a better understanding of the complexities of state policing.

Recommendations

Nigeria has experimented with community policing initiatives, which it was hoped
would provide valuable lessons on the feasibility and workability of decentralizing
policing and law enforcement. This informed the thrust in the wider conversation
on state policing in in Nigeria. However, for the project of state policing to succeed
and endure, there is the need for the following:
1. It calls for the establishment of a robust policy framework that clearly not only
defines but also highlights the roles, responsibilities, and oversight mechanisms for
state police and policing in Nigeria.

2. Additionally, it is also imperative to pursue a policy of training and capacity

building of police personnel to ensure that they are professionally accountable and
better equipped to handle local security challenges.

3. There is also the need to embed in the training manual for the promotion of
cooperation and better coordination between federal and state law enforcement
agencies. This is important in addressing issues that border on national security and
at the same time, respecting the local autonomy of states.

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4. The success of state policing needs to, in addition to stringently implementing

safeguards that protect human rights and ensure measures that prevent abuses by
state police forces are put in place, there is a need to also ensure resources are
allocated to guarantee funding for the activities of state police and the maintenance
of law and order.

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 Conflict Transformation
Approach: A Panacea for
Inter-Religious Conflict
in Nigeria
Ephraim Makuochukwu Ogugbuaja
Department of Religious Studies,
Adeleke University, Ede, Osun State

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 Ephraim Makuochukwu Ogugbuaja

Abstract
The issue of inter-religious conflict in Nigeria has been deeply rooted and
persistent, posing a significant challenge to social cohesion and national
development. Despite numerous attempts at resolving religious disputes
through dialogue, achieving a peaceful resolution has proven elusive. This
study aims to engage the conflict transformation approach, a comprehensive
and dynamic framework designed to address and resolve these conflicts
by fundamentally altering the structures, relationships, and narratives
perpetuating them. The study adopted a sociological research method
designed to study the interaction between religion and society and the
interplay between society and religion. Thus, the primary source comprises
oral interviews with 20 respondents: 5 Christians, 5 Muslims, 3 African
traditionalists, 5 Peace and conflict scholars, and 2 Nigerian legal officers.
This study explored the application of the conflict transformation approach
as it examined the key components of the approach, which include actor,
issue, rule, and structural transformations, highlighting how each element
can contribute to sustainable peace. Actor transformations emphasize the
emergence of new, peace-promoting leaders and organizations, fostering
a culture of dialogue and collaboration across religious divides. Issue
transformations shift the focus from identity-based disputes to shared socio-
economic goals. In contrast, rule transformations involve changes in the
norms and laws governing inter-religious interactions to promote inclusivity
and justice. Structural transformations aim to decentralize power, ensure
equitable resource distribution, and build robust institutions that reflect the
diversity of Nigerian society. By integrating these transformative strategies,
the conflict transformation approach creates a foundation for enduring peace
and unity in Nigeria.

Keywords:
Conflict Transformation, Inter-Religious Conflict, Christianity, Islam.

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Conflict Transformation Approach: A Panacea for Inter-Religious Conflict in Nigeria

Introduction

Religious conflict refers to the struggle over values and competition for scarce
resources, status, and power, intending to neutralize or eliminate rivals (Rothfuss
and Joseph, 2010). This definition aptly captures the tensions between Muslims
and Christians in Nigeria, as these groups vie for political and economic influence,
as well as access to land and water resources. Since gaining independence from
British rule in 1960, Nigeria has experienced numerous religious crises, which
have persisted into the 1990s and 2000s. This division into a Muslim North and a
Christian South affects nearly every aspect of social life in Nigeria. Even natural
disasters happen to extend the divide and spark conflicts because of competition
over foreign aid (Harris et al., 2013). The country’s religious divide is deeply
ingrained in society, politics, and the economy. Although the Nigerian government
has been presenting problems that arise from income inequality and bureaucratic
corruption as the result of economic policies, and these problems are reflected in
security concerns, it is clear that religious conflict in Nigeria is the biggest threat
to prosperity, security, and overall governance (Udom and Okolie, 2022). Inter-
religious conflict has been an insistent challenge in Nigeria, a country known for
its diverse religious composition. The coexistence of Christianity and Islam, along
with traditional African religions, has led to occasional tensions and conflicts.

To address this issue, the concept of conflict transformation has gained attention as
a potential solution. Existing studies on inter-religious conflict have taken several
approaches towards reconciliation and settlement, however, fewer or fewer studies
have taken the Conflict transformation approach in mitigating the resultant mayhem
laid by these conflicts. The conflict transformation seems to be a valuable approach
for addressing and curtailing the state of inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria, but
it is important to recognize that it is not the sole panacea or a one-size-fits-all
solution.

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Given that the inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria are complex and deeply rooted in
historical, cultural, and socio-political contexts, requiring multifaceted approaches
for their resolution. However, conflict transformation plays a significant role in
promoting understanding, reconciliation, and sustainable peace between religious
communities. Thus, this study explored the idea that conflict transformation can
serve as a panacea for inter-religious conflict in Nigeria.

Methodology

The study adopted a sociological research method as the study has to do with the
sociology of religion and the immediate problem facing society. Thus, the study
considered the interaction between religion and society on one hand and the
interplay between society and religion on the other. The primary source comprises
oral interviews with respondents. Oral interviews were conducted with three 20
respondents: 5 Christians, 5 Muslims, 3 African traditionalists, 5 Peace and conflict
scholars, and 2 Nigerian legal officers. These data are systematically interpreted
to comprise the primary data. The secondary sources were gathered from books,
journals, and internet sources.

Theoretical Framework: The Conflict Transformation Theory

Conflict transformation as a comprehensive and holistic approach to dealing

with conflicts was propounded by Lederach (2003). It goes beyond mere conflict
resolution or management and seeks to address the root causes of conflicts. Conflict
transformation focuses on changing the dynamics and relationships between
conflicting parties by promoting dialogue, understanding, and reconciliation.
Conflict transformation takes place both before and after the violent conflict
episodes. The goals of conflict transformation are to minimize the destructive
effect of social conflict and unlock the potential for well-being and growth in
the person as an individual human being at the physical, spiritual, emotional, and
perpetual (intellectual) levels. Structurally, the goals are to understand and address
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the root causes and social conditions that influence violent conflict and to promote
non-violent mechanism that reduces adversarial confrontations thus, minimizing
and ultimately eliminating structural violence. Conflict transformation involves
constructive changes that include and go way beyond the resolution of specific
problems, it goes deeper by involving the conflict parties themselves and their
relationships, and it focuses on building healthy relationships and communities
locally and globally (Mavalla, 2014).

The utilization of a religious framework for conflict transformation holds

significance in this study, as it delves into the examination of the impact of religious
doctrines on conflict transformation. The aim is to view the current problem as an
opening to engage in a more comprehensive context, to investigate and comprehend
the system of relationships and the pattern that led to the crisis. Therefore, this
framework employs “a crisis-responsive approach rather than a reactive one for
resolution” (Lederach, 2003, p.31). Its focus lies on de-escalating and engaging in
conflict to pursue constructive change.

Developing the Nature of Inter-Religious Conflict in Nigeria Using

Conflict Transformation Theory
There are four (4) key dimensions of conflict; personal, structural, relational, and
cultural aspects of conflict, brought about over different periods (short, mid, and
long-term) and affecting different system levels at different times (Miall, 2004).
These key dimensions are viewed in two ways when it comes to change. The first
view is a descriptive approach, which refers to the tangible impact of conflict on
society. This includes observing the general changes created by the conflict and
the patterns it follows. The second is prescriptive; where conflict transformation
involves an active intervention to bring about the desired change (Miall, 2004).

Authors within the conflict transformation tradition also draw heavily from ideas
on the key dimensions of conflict dynamics. This is because the common pattern
is for conflict to broaden (suck in new issues), widen (suck in new actors), and

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intensify (suck in new victims) which is the representation of these four dimensions.
But it is also possible for conflict to be transformed, as parties shift positions and
adopt new goals, new actors emerge and new situations develop allowing for new
relationships and changed structures. Therefore, there is a need to understand
which of the dimensions is in play in inter-religious conflict and how it could be
tackled.

Table 1: The Key Dimensions of Conflict Dynamism

Key Dimensions Descriptive Prescriptive

Suggests that individuals are

Personal Represents deliberate intervention
affected by conflict, in both
to minimize the destructive effects
The changes affected negative and positive ways. For
of social conflict and to maximize its
and for the individual. example, in terms of physical
potential for growth in the person
This involves emotional, well-being, self-esteem,
as an individual human being (at
perpetual, and spiritual emotional stability, capacity to
physical, emotional, and spiritual
aspects of conflict. perceive accurately, and spiritual
levels).
integrity.
Refers to how relational
patterns of communication
Relational and interaction are affected by
conflict. It looks beyond the
Depicts the changes effected tension around visible causes Represents intentional intervention
in, and desired for the that maximizes poorly functioning
to the underlying changes
relationship. Here we take communication and mutual
produced by conflict in the
into consideration the areas pattern of how people perceive, understanding, and that surfaces in
of relational affectivity and and what they desire and pursue an explicit manner and relational
interdependence, and the fears, hopes, and goals of the people
in their relationship: how close
expressive, communicative, or distant or how independent involved in terms of affectivity and
and interactive aspects of interference.
they wish to be, what they
conflict. perceive the other wants and
how reactive or proactive they
become in the relationship.

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Conflict Transformation Approach: A Panacea for Inter-Religious Conflict in Nigeria

Structural Represents the intervention to

Highlights the underlying provide insight into underlying
cause of conflict and the causes and social conditions that
pattern and change it create and foster violent expressions
brings about in the social Refer to the analysis of social of conflict, and openly promotes
structures. At times conditions that give rise to non-violent mechanisms that reduce
understood as the “content” conflict and how conflict affects adversarial confrontation, minimize
or “substance,” structural changes in existing structure and and ultimately eliminate violence,
dimensions focus attention decision-making patterns. and foster structures that meet basic
on the area related to basic human needs (substantive justice) and
needs, access to resources, maximize participation of people in
and institutional decision- decision that affect them (procedural
making patterns. justice)

Cultural Seeks to understand explicitly the

Interest in how conflict affects
cultural patterns that contribute
Refers to the changes and changes the cultural patterns
to the rise of violent expression of
produced by conflict in of a group, and how those
conflict, and to identify, promote,
the cultural patterns of a accumulated and shared patterns
and build on the resources and
group, and the ways culture affect the way people in that mechanisms within a cultural setting
affects the development and setting understand and respond of constructively responding to and
handling of conflict. to conflict.
handling conflict.

Source: Mavalla (2014).

From the arguments and table above, it is apparent that the nature of the inter-
religious conflict in Nigeria takes a structural dimension as one can trace the
formation as a result of a protracted conflict. As stated earlier under the potential
causes, the inter-religious conflict arises from the historical context, the denial
of basic human needs of access, identity, and security, a distorted pattern of
governance and a militarized form of politics, as well as through the roles played
by the state, international political and economic linkages.

Structural Conflict Theory is divided into two main sub-orientations. Firstly,

“the radical structural theory represented by the Marxist dialectical school with
exponents like Marx and Engels, and V.I. Lenin” (Mavalla, 2014). Secondly, liberal

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structuralism representatives of which its proponents include Ross, Galtung, and

Faleti (Mavalla, 2014). The concept of structural conflict was first articulated by
Johan Galtung in 1969 (Galtung, 1969).

Structural conflict theory argues that conflict is inherently built into society through
its structure and organization. Like conflict transformation theory, the theory looks
at social problems such as political and economic exclusion, poverty, injustice,
exploitation, disease, and inequality, which are sources of conflict (Mavalla, 2014).
Structuralists maintain that conflicts occur because of the exploitative and unjust
nature of human societies, and the domination of one class by another (Faleti,
2006). Faleti (2016) contends that communists such as Friedrich Engels, Karl
Marx, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung have criticized capitalism for its exploitative
nature, which is rooted in its system of production relations and the division of
society into two main classes: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (Faleti, 2006).The
exploitation of the proletariat under capitalism leads to social conflict. According
to Marxist theory, this conflict can be resolved through a socialist revolution led by
the working class, resulting in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie (Saroj and Dhanju,
2019).

The existing socio-political and economic disparities between the poor (proletariat)
and the rich (bourgeoisie) directly contribute to the conflict. In conflict
transformation theory, the proposed solution is not a revolutionary overthrow as
suggested by Karl Marx’s conflict theory, but rather a revolution that dismantles all
forms of violence while preserving social bonds.Therefore, conflict transformation
offers a framework that seeks to repair relationships and reshape the structures that
perpetuate systemic violence.

The Potential Causes of Inter-Religious Conflict in Nigeria

Inter-religious conflict in Nigeria has been a longstanding issue, primarily between

the Muslim and Christian communities. Many scholars have written on the historical
antecedents (Omotosho, 2003), cases (Ezeibe, 2009), and causal diagnoses of

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religious violence in Nigeria (Sampson, 2012). Several factors contribute to the

potential causes of inter-religious conflict in Nigeria. However, adopting conflict
transformation theory gives a different perspective on Nigeria’s major causes of
inter-religious conflict. This theoretical context presents a different facet of this
conflict, thus stating three significant factors that cause inter-religious Conflict in
Nigeria.
Firstly, the conflicts are asymmetric and marked by inequalities of power and status
(Miall, 2004). Nigeria is a diverse country with a large population comprising
various ethnic and religious groups. The two major religions in Nigeria are Islam
and Christianity, and tensions between these groups have led to frequent conflicts.
In many instances, the inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria have been characterized
by a power imbalance. Muslims make up the majority in the northern regions of
Nigeria (Mustapha and Ehrhardt, 2018), while Christians are more prevalent in
the southern parts of the country (Manala, 2013). This demographic divide has
contributed to a sense of religious competition and has resulted in clashes over
resources, political power, and societal influence. In terms of power dynamics,
Muslims in the northern regions have often held more political and economic
influence compared to Christians in the south (Ohazurike, 2023). This inequality
has fueled grievances and perceptions of marginalization among Christian
communities, leading to inter-religious tensions. Additionally, there have been
instances where extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, have targeted Christians,
exacerbating the asymmetry of power and the severity of the conflicts (Omotosho,
2003).

Furthermore, the inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria are also marked by disparities

in social status (Jegede, 2019). Muslims and Christians may face discrimination,
stigmatization, and limited access to resources based on their religious affiliation.
This unequal treatment can further deepen divisions and contribute to a cycle of
violence and retaliation. It is important to note that while inter-religious conflicts
in Nigeria are often asymmetric, it does not mean that all conflicts fit this pattern.
There have been instances where violence and discrimination have occurred in both

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directions, with members of both religious communities being affected (Human

Rights Watch, 2019). However, the overall power and status imbalances do play a
significant role in shaping the nature of these conflicts.

Secondly, many contemporary inter-religious conflicts are protracted, crossing

repeatedly into and out of violence and thus defying cyclical or bell-shaped models
of conflict phases (Miall, 2004). Inter-religious conflicts have always been raised
from a variety of factors, but more especially from historical grievances, political
power struggles, social inequalities, and cultural differences. These conflicts often
involve deep-rooted religious identities, beliefs, and narratives from the time past,
which presently have contributed to their persistence and complexity. Additionally,
inter-religious conflicts are influenced by external factors such as geopolitical
interests, economic disparities, and global ideologies as presented by Sampson
(2012), further complicating the dynamics.

The trajectories of the present inter-religious conflicts are also influenced by a

range of factors, including the actions of extremist groups, political leaders, and
external interventions. Escalation into violence can occur through acts of terrorism,
communal riots, or state repression, leading to cycles of revenge and retaliation
(Sampson, 2012). Therefore, peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts may
encounter significant hurdles arising from long-standing distrust, entrenched
ideological divergences, and the enduring polarization of communities. These
challenges have developed over an extended period, further complicating the path
to reconciliation and sustainable peace.

Additionally, inter-religious conflicts often intersect with other forms of identity-

based conflicts, such as ethnic, national, or sectarian tensions. These overlapping
fault lines can create complex and volatile situations, with conflicts spilling over
into different realms and exacerbating social divisions. Overall, the protracted
nature of inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria is complex and multifaceted, often
defying simple models or linear progressions. Understanding and addressing these
conflicts requires a holistic and context-specific approach that recognizes the
unique dynamics and complexities involved, hence, the conflict transformation

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approach.

Thirdly, protracted conflicts warp the Nigerian societies, economies, and regions
in which they are situated, creating complex emergencies fuelled on the one hand
by local struggles and on the other by global factors such as the arms trade and
support for regimes or rebels by outside states. Economically, inter-religious
conflicts in Nigeria have severely hampered economic development (Adegoke
and Akaholu, 2022). The constant inter-religious violence and instability disrupt
trade, investment, and economic activities, leading to the collapse of local
industries and businesses. Infrastructures such as roads, schools, and hospitals are
destroyed, hindering the provision of essential services. The protracted nature of
inter-religious conflicts has ripple effects that extend beyond national borders,
destabilizing entire regions. Armed groups involved in these conflicts often
exploit porous borders to seek refuge, recruit fighters, and acquire weapons. This
contributes to the proliferation of arms and exacerbates regional tensions. Also,
conflicts are not isolated from global dynamics (UNDP, 2023).

The arms trade plays a significant role in fuelling these conflicts, as weapons flow
into conflict zones, prolonging the violence. Additionally, outside states provide
support, either directly or indirectly, to regimes or rebel groups involved in inter-
religious conflicts.This support can come in the form of military assistance, funding,
or ideological backing, further intensifying the conflicts (Melzer, 2009). Although
foreign states’ involvement in conflicts in Nigeria through religion is a complex
issue with various dimensions, still, it is still important to note that not all foreign
states contribute to conflict in Nigeria, and the situation can vary depending on
specific circumstances. Nevertheless, there have been instances where external
factors; including religious influences, have played a role in exacerbating inter-
religious tensions in the country.

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Peacebuilding: An Application of Conflict Transformation to Inter-

Religious Conflict in Nigeria

Lederach’s (1997) work serves as one of the most comprehensive statements to

date on conflict transformation thinking for practitioners. He sees peacebuilding
as a long-term transformation of a conflict system into a peace system, inspired by
a quest for the values of peace and justice, truth and mercy. Peacebuilding is thus
seen as a process of transforming this protracted structural conflict. This approach
is based on the idea of transformation rather than settlement as the theory opines.
Thus, adopting Vayrynen’s (1991) suggestive approach to the types of intervention
that peacebuilders should be considering, this study expounds on approaches to
maximize a working model for conflict transformation on inter-religious conflict
in Nigeria. These approaches are:

i. Actor transformations – internal changes in parties, or the appearance of

new parties;

ii. Issue transformations – altering the agenda of conflict issues;

iii. Rule transformations – changes in the norms or rules governing a

conflict;

iv. Structural transformations – the entire structure of relationships and

power distribution in the conflict is transformed.

Actor Transformations: Actor transformations involve internal changes

within existing parties or the emergence of new parties. It serves as a solution
to inter-religious conflict in Nigeria by altering the dynamics and interactions
between conflicting groups. These transformations can lead to more constructive
engagement, better representation, and the emergence of peace-promoting
leaders and organizations. Internal changes within existing parties: here, religious
leaders may recognize the need to adapt their policies or ideologies to address the
concerns and grievances of different religious groups. This could involve internal

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debates, leadership changes, or the formation of new factions within the party that
represent diverse religious interests (E. Godspower, personal communication, 14th
April 2024).

There is a need to encourage the rise of moderate and peace-oriented leaders

within religious communities which can facilitate dialogue and reduce extremism.
These leaders can promote tolerance and reconciliation. These leaders should be
provided with training and capacity building by providing training for conflict
transformation, negotiation, and peacebuilding, this will in turn enhance their ability
to manage conflicts constructively.This training includes workshops, seminars, and
exchange programs with other regions or countries that have successfully managed
similar conflicts (L. Adedotun, personal communication, 14th April 2024).

Issue Transformations: Issue transformations, which involve altering the agenda

of conflict issues, can serve as a solution to inter-religious conflict in Nigeria by
shifting the focus from divisive, identity-based conflicts to collaborative, shared
goals. By shifting the focus from religious differences to common challenges faced
by communities in Nigeria, such as poverty, inequality, lack of access to education
and opportunities, unemployment, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure, the
agenda can be transformed. Emphasizing shared interests and goals can help foster
unity and collaboration between religious groups, reducing tensions and promoting
cooperation for the betterment of society (S. Ezekwe, personal communication,
19th April 2024).

Again, socioeconomic disparities often contribute to inter-religious conflicts. By

shifting the conversation from religious identities to shared interests and common
goals, such as economic development, education, healthcare, and infrastructure,
parties can find common ground. This redefinition can reduce the perceived zero-
sum nature of inter-religious conflicts. Promoting economic development, social
justice, and equal opportunities for all can help reduce the grievances that fuel
inter-religious tensions (S. Okediya, personal communication, 16th April 2024).

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Additionally, there is a great need to address the socioeconomic disparities in

the nation because these disparities often contribute to inter-religious conflicts.
Promoting economic development projects that require cooperation between
different religious groups can foster interdependence and mutual benefit. For
example, joint ventures in agriculture, commerce, or infrastructure can create
shared interests that transcend religious lines. Initiating social programs that
address the common needs of all communities, such as healthcare initiatives,
educational programs, and poverty alleviation efforts, can help shift focus from
religious differences to collective well-being (C. Garba, personal communication,
17th April 2024).

Similarly, transforming the agenda of inter-religious conflicts requires addressing

the structural factors that contribute to the tensions. Strengthening institutions,
promoting good governance, and ensuring the impartial enforcement of laws can
help create a fair and just society where religious communities feel protected and
represented. This can contribute to building trust and reducing the likelihood of
conflicts (S. Ezekwe, personal communication, 19th April 2024).

Rule Transformations: Rule transformations, which involve changing the norms

or rules governing a conflict, can serve as a solution to inter-religious conflict
in Nigeria by creating a fairer, more inclusive framework for interaction and
governance. Here are how rule transformations can help address inter-religious
conflicts:

1) Establishing Inclusive Legal Frameworks

• Equal Rights Legislation: Implementing and enforcing laws that guarantee

equal rights and protections for all religious groups can help prevent
discrimination and marginalization.This can include constitutional reforms
to enshrine religious freedom and anti-discrimination measures (Barrister
R. Timi, personal communication, 20th April 2024).

• Fair Representation: Ensuring that all religious groups are fairly represented
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in government institutions, including legislative bodies and public offices,

can promote inclusivity and prevent the dominance of one group over
others.

2) Reforming Governance Structures

• Power-sharing arrangements: Developing power-sharing arrangements that

ensure equitable participation of different religious groups in governance
can reduce tensions. This can include rotating leadership positions among
religious groups or creating joint committees for decision-making.

• Decentralization: Decentralizing power to local governments can allow

for more tailored and context-specific governance that respects the unique
needs of diverse religious communities (Barrister J. Olariwaju, personal
communication, 20th April 2024).

3) Promoting Transparent and Accountable Institutions

• Anti-Corruption Measures: Strengthening anti-corruption measures and

promoting transparency in government institutions can help build trust
among religious groups. Corruption often exacerbates tensions by skewing
resource allocation and services.
• Independent Judiciary: Ensuring an independent judiciary that can
impartially adjudicate disputes, including those involving religious issues,
can provide a fair avenue for resolving conflicts (Barrister J. Olariwaju,
personal communication, 20th April 2024).

4) Creating Mechanisms for Dialogue and Collaboration

• Interfaith Councils: Establishing formal interfaith councils or forums where

representatives of different religious groups can regularly meet to discuss
and address common issues can foster cooperation and understanding.

• Joint Problem-Solving Committees: Creating joint committees to tackle

specific issues such as community development, education, and security

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can promote collaboration and reduce suspicion between groups (Barrister

T. Roland, personal communication, 20th April 2024).

5) Strengthening Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Processes

• Peace Education Programs: Implementing peace education programs

in schools and communities to teach conflict resolution skills, promote
tolerance, and foster a culture of peace among young people from different
religious backgrounds.

• Local Mediation Mechanisms: Establishing local mediation and arbitration

mechanisms that involve respected leaders from different religious
communities can provide culturally sensitive ways to resolve disputes
(Barrister T. Roland, personal communication, 20th April 2024).

6) Ensuring Equitable Resource Distribution

• Fair Allocation Policies: Developing and enforcing policies for the fair
allocation of resources and public services can reduce competition and
grievances between religious groups. This includes transparent criteria for
funding, development projects, and social services.

• Monitoring and Evaluation: Setting up systems to monitor and evaluate the

impact of resource distribution policies to ensure they are implemented
equitably and adjusted as needed to prevent imbalances (Barrister J.
Olariwaju, personal communication, 20th April 2024).

7) Structural Transformations

• Structural transformations involve altering the entire structure of

relationships and power distribution in a conflict. This can serve as a
comprehensive solution to inter-religious conflict in Nigeria by addressing
the root causes of inequality, marginalization, and power imbalances.

• Politically, it is imperative to introduce proportional representation in

elections to guarantee fair political power and representation for minority

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religious groups in legislative bodies. Additionally, implementing power-

sharing agreements to rotate or share key government positions among
different religious groups can prevent the dominance of one group and
foster inclusivity (Pastor C. Obiora, personal communication, 12th
February 2024).
• Economically, it is crucial to ensure the equitable distribution of
resources, including oil revenues and development funds, to all regions
and communities to address economic grievances that often fuel inter-
religious conflicts. Furthermore, enacting economic policies that
promote development and job creation in marginalized areas will uplift
disadvantaged religious communities and reduce economic disparities (U.
Donard, personal communication, 15th December 2024).

It is essential to enhance the independence and impartiality of the judiciary to fairly

adjudicate cases involving religious tensions, thereby reducing perceptions of bias
and ensuring justice. Furthermore, integrating customary and religious courts into
the formal legal system, with clearly defined jurisdictional boundaries, can help to
respect cultural and religious practices while upholding national laws (M. Benard,
personal communication, 14th May 2024).

In the educational sector, there is a pressing need to develop school curricula that
promote inter-religious understanding, tolerance, and respect. This approach can
play a vital role in reducing prejudice and fostering a more unified society from
an early age (Chief J. Ezechima, personal communication, 26th April 2024). On a
social level, strengthening civil society organizations that advocate for interfaith
dialogue and cooperation is crucial for creating grassroots movements for peace
and mutual understanding. Encouraging joint community development projects
that involve collaboration between different religious groups can also promote
interdependence and shared interests (Elder Engr. C.J. Ogugbuaja, personal
communication, 14th March 2024).

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Establishing fair and transparent land ownership and use policies can help mitigate
conflicts over land, which are often linked to religious and ethnic tensions.
Encouraging sustainable management of natural resources, with community
participation, can ensure that all groups benefit and prevent environmental
degradation from worsening conflicts (Barrister J. Olariwaju, personal
communication, 20th April 2024). Addressing social inequalities is crucial; this
can be achieved by ensuring equal access to healthcare and other social services
to enhance the well-being of all communities and minimize competition and
resentment. Additionally, implementing robust anti-discrimination policies in
employment, housing, and other areas can safeguard minority religious groups and
advance equality (C. Garba, personal communication, 17th April 2024).

To foster national dialogue and reconciliation processes, it is essential to establish

commissions to address past injustices and promote reconciliation. This is
critical in healing historical wounds and laying the groundwork for lasting peace.
Furthermore, promoting a national identity that transcends religious and ethnic
differences, while honouring diversity, can cultivate unity and a shared sense of
purpose (Chief Engr. J. Ezeudo, personal communication, 14th April 2024). By
reshaping the power dynamics and relationships in Nigeria, these measures can
contribute to a more equitable, inclusive, and stable society, ultimately addressing
the root causes of inter-religious conflict.

Conclusion

While conflict transformation cannot completely eradicate inter-religious conflict

in Nigeria, it offers a promising approach to managing and transforming conflicts
in a way that promotes peace, understanding, and reconciliation. By prioritizing
dialogue, relationship-building, addressing socioeconomic disparities, and
promoting education and awareness, conflict transformation can contribute to
a more harmonious and inclusive society in Nigeria, where religious diversity is
embraced and celebrated. Also, implementing conflict transformation in Nigeria

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Conflict Transformation Approach: A Panacea for Inter-Religious Conflict in Nigeria

may face challenges such as deep-seated prejudices, political interference, and

resource constraints. Overcoming these challenges requires strong leadership,
commitment from religious leaders, collaboration between government and civil
society, and international support. Sustainable funding mechanisms and ongoing
evaluation of conflict transformation initiatives are necessary to measure their
impact and make necessary adjustments.

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 Security Governance in Nigeria:
Strategies to Address
Insurgency,Banditry, and
Secessionist Threats
Ikwuoma Sunday Udochukwu
Department of Political Science,
University of Lagos Akoka, Lagos

Ojo Idowu Akinwumi

Department of Political Science,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka

&

Fanne Haroun
Department of Political Science,
University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos

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 Ikwuoma Sunday Udochukwu, Ojo Idowu Akinwumi & Fanne Haroun

Abstract
Security governance in Nigeria is confronted with multifaceted challenges
stemming from persistent insurgencies, rampant banditry, and resurging
secessionist movements. These threats not only undermine the stability
and unity of the nation but also impede socio-economic development. This
paper examines the complex dynamics behind these security challenges
and proposes strategies for effective governance. This paper examines the
challenges of addressing insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements
in Nigeria within the framework of securitization theory. The study employs
a qualitative analysis of existing literature, government reports, and policy
documents. Drawing on theoretical insights from securitization theory,
the paper analyzes how these security threats are constructed, framed,
and addressed by political elites and institutions. It explores the policy
responses, governance mechanisms, and implications of securitization for
security governance in Nigeria. The discussion highlights the multifaceted
nature of security challenges in Nigeria and the importance of balancing
security imperatives with democratic norms, human rights considerations,
and socio-economic development efforts. Through a theoretical lens of
securitization, the paper provides insights into strategies for mobilizing
resources, implementing targeted interventions, and engaging in governance
mechanisms to address insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements in
Nigeria, ultimately aiming to restore stability, promote peace, and foster
inclusive development in the country.

Keywords:
security governance, insurgency, banditry, secessionism, securitization

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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

Introduction

In recent years, Nigeria has faced significant security challenges stemming

from insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements. These threats have not
only jeopardized the safety and stability of the nation but have also hindered its
socio-economic development. Effectively addressing these challenges requires
a comprehensive approach to security governance that encompasses various
dimensions, including political, social, economic, and military strategies. Nigeria,
the most populous country in Africa, faces multifaceted security challenges that
threaten its stability, prosperity, and territorial integrity. Among the prominent
security concerns are insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements, each
presenting distinct yet interconnected threats to the nation’s security landscape.

Nigeria’s security challenges have deep historical roots, shaped by a combination

of factors including colonial legacy, ethno-religious diversity, governance failures,
socio-economic inequalities, and geopolitical dynamics. The country’s colonial
experience under British rule led to the imposition of artificial boundaries,
ethnic divisions, and uneven development patterns, laying the groundwork for
inter-communal tensions and identity-based conflicts. The insurgency in Nigeria,
notably perpetrated by the Boko Haram terrorist group, emerged in the early
2000s, initially as a localized movement seeking to establish an Islamic state in
the northeastern region. Over time, Boko Haram’s activities escalated, targeting
security forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure, and spreading its influence
across borders, posing a significant threat to regional security.

Banditry, characterized by criminal gangs engaging in kidnapping, cattle rustling,

and armed robbery, has surged in Nigeria’s northwestern and central regions,
fueled by factors such as porous borders, proliferation of small arms, weak law
enforcement, and socio-economic marginalization. These criminal activities not
only undermine public safety but also exacerbate communal tensions and erode

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trust in government institutions. Secessionist movements, particularly prominent

in Nigeria’s southeastern region, challenge the country’s territorial integrity and
national unity.The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), advocating for the secession
of the Igbo-majority region, represents one such movement. Grievances related
to historical marginalization, political exclusion, and socio-economic disparities
fuel secessionist aspirations, necessitating a nuanced approach to governance and
conflict resolution.

The effectiveness of Nigeria’s security governance strategies is undermined by

several factors. Firstly, corruption and mismanagement within security agencies
lead to inadequate resource allocation and poor operational efficiency. This issue is
compounded by the lack of accountability and transparency in security operations
(Akanji, 2019). Secondly, the over-reliance on military solutions often leads to
human rights violations, which in turn fuel grievances and perpetuate conflicts.
There is a need for a balanced approach that incorporates human security and
respects the rights of affected communities. Moreover, the absence of a coordinated
and integrated security framework results in fragmented efforts and inter-agency
conflicts. An effective security governance strategy requires synergy among various
security agencies, clear command structures, and robust intelligence-sharing
mechanisms (Osumah and Aghedo, 2011).
Addressing insurgency, banditry, and secessionist threats in Nigeria requires a
holistic and multi-dimensional approach. While current strategies have achieved
some successes, their limitations underscore the need for comprehensive reforms
in security governance. Combating these security challenges necessitates not only
military interventions but also socio-economic development, political inclusivity,
and respect for human rights. Ensuring accountability, transparency, and effective
coordination among security agencies is crucial for the success of these strategies.

This paper focuses on Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address

Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats. The primary objective of this study
is to critically examine the strategies employed by the Nigerian government to
address the security challenges posed by insurgency, banditry, and secessionist

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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

movements. Specifically, the study aims to:

i. Evaluate the Effectiveness: Assess the effectiveness of military and non-

military strategies in combating insurgency, banditry, and secessionist
threats in Nigeria.

ii. Identify Challenges: Identify the key challenges and limitations inherent in
the current security governance framework.

iii. Analyze Impact: Analyze the socio-political and economic impacts of these
security threats on national stability and development.

iv. Propose Recommendations: Provide evidence-based recommendations

for improving security governance in Nigeria, with a focus on achieving
a balanced and integrated approach that combines security measures with
socio-economic development and political inclusivity.

v. Examine Coordination: Investigate the level of coordination and synergy

among various security agencies and the implications for effective security
governance.

Conceptual security governance issues

Security governance is a multidimensional concept that encompasses the
mechanisms, processes, and institutions responsible for managing and ensuring
security within a given society or state. It involves not only the provision of
protection against traditional security threats such as military aggression but also
the management of non-traditional threats including terrorism, organized crime,
cyber-attacks, and environmental degradation. The following are key components
of security governance:

Policy Formulation and Implementation: Security governance begins with

the formulation of policies and strategies aimed at addressing various security
challenges. This process involves assessing threats, setting objectives, and designing

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interventions to mitigate risks and enhance resilience (Howlett, 2011). Effective

policy implementation requires coordination among different government
agencies, as well as collaboration with non-state actors and international partners
(Aras and Crow, 2016).

Institutional Frameworks: Security governance relies on the presence of

robust institutional frameworks responsible for decision-making, oversight, and
implementation of security policies (North, 1990). These institutions may include
ministries of defense, interior, justice, intelligence agencies, law enforcement
bodies, and regulatory authorities (Thelen, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001). The effectiveness of security governance often hinges on the
capacity, professionalism, and accountability of these institutions (Chandler, 2013).

Civil-Military Relations: The relationship between civilian authorities and the

military plays a crucial role in security governance (Cohen, 2004). Democratic
oversight, civilian control of the armed forces, and respect for human rights are
essential principles underpinning civil-military relations (Feaver, 2003). A healthy
balance between security imperatives and democratic norms is necessary to ensure
effective security governance (Hänggi, 2018).

Community Engagement and Participation: Security governance is not solely

the prerogative of the state but also involves active engagement and participation
of local communities, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders (Pateman,
1970). Community policing, public awareness campaigns, and grassroots initiatives
contribute to enhancing security at the local level and building trust between
citizens and authorities (Collins, 2018).

Implications of Security Governance

Human Security: Security governance goes beyond the traditional focus on state
security to encompass the protection and well-being of individuals and communities
(Ostrom, 1990). Human security emphasizes the importance of addressing
root causes of insecurity, such as poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, and
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prioritizing the protection of human rights and human dignity (Buzan et al., 1998).

Transnational Security Challenges: In an interconnected world, security

governance extends beyond national borders to address transnational security threats
such as terrorism, organized crime, pandemics, and environmental degradation
(Held and McGrew, 2002). Effective governance mechanisms involve cooperation
and coordination among states, regional organizations, and international actors to
counter these global challenges (Bilgin and Morton, 2002).

Rule of Law and Accountability: Security governance is inseparable from the

principles of the rule of law, accountability, and respect for human rights (Healey,
1997). Upholding legal norms, ensuring transparency in decision-making, and
holding perpetrators of security violations accountable are fundamental aspects of
effective governance (Baylis et al., 2017, Israel, Schulz, Parker, and Becker, 1998).

Nigeria’s Security Governance Architecture

Nigeria’s security governance architecture is a complex system comprising various

institutions, policies, and mechanisms aimed at ensuring the safety, stability, and
integrity of the nation.

Key Components of Nigeria’s Security Governance Architecture

Military and Law Enforcement Agencies: Nigeria’s security apparatus

includes several military and law enforcement agencies responsible for maintaining
internal security and defending the country against external threats. Key
institutions include the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, Nigeria
Police Force, Department of State Services (DSS), and Nigeria Security and Civil
Defence Corps (NSCDC) (Ikelegbe, 2005).

National Security Policy: Nigeria’s national security policy provides the

overarching framework for addressing security challenges and guiding the activities

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of security agencies. The policy outlines strategic objectives, threat assessments,

and priority areas for intervention, emphasizing the protection of territorial
integrity, and sovereignty, and the promotion of national interests (Amuwo, 2007).

Civilian Oversight Mechanisms: Civilian oversight mechanisms play a crucial

role in ensuring accountability, transparency, and respect for human rights within
Nigeria’s security sector. These mechanisms include legislative oversight by the
National Assembly, judicial review by the courts, and public scrutiny by civil society
organizations and the media (Aborisade, 2017).

Intelligence and Counterterrorism Units: Given the prevalence of security

threats such as terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime, Nigeria has established
specialized intelligence and counterterrorism units within security agencies. These
units are responsible for gathering intelligence, conducting counterterrorism
operations, and coordinating with international partners to address transnational
threats (Udombana, 2015).

Community Policing Initiatives: Recognizing the importance of community

engagement in addressing security challenges, Nigeria has implemented community
policing initiatives aimed at enhancing collaboration between law enforcement
agencies and local communities. These initiatives promote information sharing,
trust-building, and community-led crime prevention efforts (Alemika and
Chukwuma, 2010).

Despite the existence of various components within Nigeria’s security governance

architecture, several challenges persist, hindering effective security management:

i. Capacity and Professionalism: Some security agencies in Nigeria suffer from

issues related to capacity constraints, inadequate training, and corruption,
which undermine their effectiveness and public trust (Oyebode, 2013).

ii. Coordination and Collaboration: Limited coordination and collaboration

among security agencies often lead to duplication of efforts, intelligence
gaps, and inefficiencies in addressing security threats (Akinola, 2018).

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iii. Human Rights Violations: Instances of human rights violations, extrajudicial

killings, and abuses by security personnel raise concerns about accountability
and respect for the rule of law within the security sector (Ojo, 2017).

iv. Ethnic and Religious Divisions: Nigeria’s diverse ethnic and religious
landscape exacerbates tensions and conflicts, complicating efforts to foster
unity and consensus in addressing security challenges (Aning and Teye,
2007).

Indeed, Nigeria’s security governance architecture comprises various institutions,

policies, and mechanisms aimed at safeguarding the nation’s security. While the
country has made strides in addressing security challenges, persistent issues related
to capacity, coordination, accountability, and social cohesion pose significant
obstacles.

Insurgency

Several studies have focused on Nigeria’s response to insurgency, particularly

the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern region. Akinyemi and Ogundipe
(2020) argue that effective security governance requires intelligence-led
operations, enhanced military capabilities, and socio-economic interventions to
address the root causes of radicalization. Conversely, Mustapha (2018) criticizes
the militarized approach, advocating for a holistic strategy that includes dialogue,
amnesty programs, and community engagement to de-radicalize militants and
promote reconciliation.

Banditry

Banditry, especially in Nigeria’s northwestern and central regions, has received

attention from scholars examining governance responses. Ajibola and Ojo (2019)
emphasize the need for border security measures, law enforcement capacity-
building, and socio-economic development initiatives to combat banditry
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effectively. However, Ojo and Arogundade (2020) argue that structural factors
such as governance failures, corruption, and weak rule of law exacerbate banditry,
calling for comprehensive governance reforms to address underlying grievances.

Secessionist Movements
The literature on secessionist movements in Nigeria, notably the Indigenous People
of Biafra (IPOB), highlights the challenges of managing ethno-nationalist aspirations
within the security governance framework. Oyewole (2018) underscores the
importance of political dialogue, economic inclusivity, and respect for human
rights in managing secessionist tensions. However, Ibrahim (2017) warns against
securitizing ethno-nationalist movements, advocating for political solutions and
constitutional reforms to address grievances peacefully.

While existing literature provides valuable insights into Nigeria’s security

governance challenges, several gaps warrant further research: Limited attention has
been paid to the gender dimensions of security governance in Nigeria, particularly
the experiences of women and marginalized groups affected by insecurity. More
research is needed to understand how regional variations in governance structures
and socio-economic conditions influence responses to security challenges across
different parts of Nigeria. The role of civil society organizations in advocating for
accountable and inclusive security governance remains underexplored, warranting
further analysis. Studies assessing the effectiveness of security governance
interventions in mitigating insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements over
the long term are needed to inform evidence-based policy decisions.

Theoretical underpinning

Securitization Theory: Securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen

School, offers insights into how security issues are constructed and addressed by
political elites (Buzan et al., 1998). In the Nigerian context, securitization processes

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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

are evident in the framing of insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements

as existential threats to national security. This framework helps to understand
how security governance responses are shaped by discourses of threat, risk, and
urgency, influencing policy priorities and resource allocations. Securitization
theory, developed by the Copenhagen School of International Relations, provides a
useful framework for analyzing how issues are transformed into matters of security
that necessitate extraordinary measures. This theory is particularly relevant to
the context of Nigeria, where insurgency, banditry, and secessionist threats pose
significant challenges to national security.

Key Concepts of Securitization Theory

Securitization theory revolves around several key concepts:

Speech Acts: The process of securitization involves speech acts where political
leaders or influential figures declare an issue as a security threat (Wæver, 1995).

Referent Object: The entity perceived to be under threat and needing protection,
which can range from the state to specific communities or values (Buzan, Wæver,
and de Wilde, 1998).
Securitizing Actor: Individuals or groups who perform securitizing speech acts,
such as government officials or military leaders (Balzacq, 2005).

Audience: The group that needs to be convinced by the securitizing actor that
a particular issue constitutes a security threat requiring extraordinary measures
(Balzacq, 2005).

Emergency Measures: The exceptional policies or actions justified by the

securitization of an issue (Buzan et al., 1998).

Nigerian government officials frequently frame insurgency, particularly the

activities of Boko Haram, as an existential threat to national security and
stability. For instance, former President Goodluck Jonathan and his successors

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have emphasized the severe threat posed by Boko Haram in their speeches and
policy statements (Walker, 2012). The Nigerian state, its territorial integrity, and
the safety of its citizens are the primary referent objects. Government officials,
military leaders, and security agencies are the main actors involved in securitizing
the insurgency threat. The Nigerian government has implemented a range of
emergency measures, including declaring states of emergency in affected regions,
deploying military forces, and seeking international assistance and cooperation to
combat Boko Haram (Agbiboa, 2013).

Government officials and local leaders have increasingly framed banditry, especially
in the Northwest region, as a major security threat. President Muhammadu
Buhari and state governors have highlighted the severe impact of banditry on
communities and the economy (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). Rural communities,
economic stability, and public safety are the referent objects. Political leaders, local
authorities, and security agencies are key actors in securitizing the issue of banditry.
Measures include military operations, the establishment of joint task forces, and
negotiations with bandit groups. Additionally, there have been calls for regional
cooperation and intelligence sharing to address the cross-border nature of banditry
(Okoli and Ugwu, 2019).

Nigerian leaders have framed secessionist movements, such as the Indigenous

People of Biafra (IPOB), as significant threats to national unity and sovereignty.
Statements by President Buhari and other officials underscore the existential risk
posed by these movements (Obi, 2015). National unity, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity are the referent objects. The Nigerian government, security forces, and
political elites are the primary securitizing actors. Responses have included military
crackdowns, proscription of secessionist groups, arrests of leaders, and efforts to
counter secessionist narratives through media and public engagements (Ibeanu,
Orji, and Iwuamadi, 2016).

While securitization theory offers a valuable framework for understanding security

governance in Nigeria, it also faces several critiques and limitations:

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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

a) Securitization often prioritizes state-centric approaches, potentially

overlooking the roles of non-state actors and local communities in
addressing security threats (McDonald, 2008). The frequent use of
emergency measures can lead to their normalization, undermining
democratic processes and civil liberties in the long term (Huysmans, 2006).
b) The effectiveness of securitization as an analytical tool can vary depending
on the political, cultural, and social contexts within Nigeria, making it
challenging to apply uniformly across different regions and issues (Buzan
and Wæver, 2009). Despite its limitations, securitization theory offers a
robust framework for examining the dynamics of security governance in
Nigeria and the broader implications for national and regional stability.

Framing of Security Threats

Securitization theory highlights the role of political elites and institutions in framing
certain issues as security threats that require urgent and extraordinary measures
(Buzan et al., 1998). In Nigeria, the government has framed insurgency, particularly
the activities of Boko Haram in the northeastern region, as a grave threat to national
security. The discourse surrounding Boko Haram emphasizes the need for decisive
military action, counterterrorism measures, and international cooperation to
combat the insurgency. Similarly, banditry in Nigeria’s northwestern and central
regions has been securitized through narratives of lawlessness, economic sabotage,
and threats to social cohesion. The government’s response to banditry includes
deploying security forces, implementing emergency measures, and advocating for
community engagement to address the underlying grievances driving banditry.

Implications for Security Governance

The securitization of threats in Nigeria has profound implications for security

governance, shaping policy priorities, resource allocations, and institutional

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responses. By framing certain issues as security threats, political elites are able
to garner public support, mobilize resources, and justify the use of coercive
measures to address the perceived dangers (Balzacq, 2005). In the case of Nigeria,
the securitization of insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements has led to
the militarization of security governance, with an emphasis on counterinsurgency
operations, intelligence gathering, and border security measures. This has
implications for civil-military relations, human rights protections, and the rule
of law, as security imperatives often take precedence over democratic norms and
accountability mechanisms (Williams, 2003).

While securitization can be an effective strategy for mobilizing resources

and addressing security threats, it also raises concerns about the potential
for authoritarianism, abuse of power, and neglect of non-security priorities
(Huysmans, 2006). In Nigeria, critics argue that the securitization of certain issues,
such as insurgency and banditry, has led to a neglect of underlying socio-economic
grievances, political exclusion, and governance failures that contribute to insecurity
(Oyebode, 2013). Yet, securitization theory provides a useful framework for
understanding the dynamics of security governance in Nigeria, particularly about
insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements.

By examining how threats are constructed and framed as security issues, analysts can
gain insights into the policy responses, institutional arrangements, and governance
mechanisms employed to address these challenges. However, securitization also
raises important questions about the balance between security imperatives and
democratic values, highlighting the need for scrutiny and accountability in security
governance.

Addressing Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Movements in

Nigeria through the Lens of Securitization Theory

Securitization theory offers a theoretical guide for understanding and addressing

security challenges such as insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements

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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

in Nigeria. By framing these issues as existential threats to national security,

securitization theory provides insights into the strategies, policies, and governance
mechanisms required to effectively tackle these threats while balancing security
imperatives with democratic norms and human rights considerations.

Insurgency: Insurgency, particularly the activities of Boko Haram in northeastern

Nigeria, has been securitized as a grave threat to national security, necessitating
exceptional measures to combat terrorism and restore stability (Buzan et al., 1998).
Building on the securitization frame, policy responses to insurgency in Nigeria
have focused on military interventions, intelligence operations, and international
cooperation to counter the threat posed by extremist groups. These measures
include deploying security forces, conducting counterinsurgency operations, and
implementing counterterrorism strategies aimed at dismantling terrorist networks
and preventing further attacks (Mustapha, 2018).

Security governance structures and institutions are mobilized to coordinate

responses to insurgency, enhance intelligence sharing, and promote community
resilience. Civil-military coordination mechanisms, such as the Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF), facilitate regional cooperation in addressing transnational
security threats (Akinyemi and Ogundipe, 2020).
Banditry: Banditry in Nigeria’s northwestern and central regions has been
securitized as a threat to public safety, economic stability, and national cohesion,
requiring urgent measures to restore law and order (Balzacq, 2005). In response
to the securitization frame, policy measures to address banditry include deploying
security forces, enhancing border security, and implementing community policing
initiatives to disrupt criminal networks and prevent further attacks. Additionally,
socio-economic development programs aimed at addressing underlying grievances
and providing alternative livelihoods for vulnerable populations are integrated into
the security governance framework (Ajibola and Ojo, 2019).

Governance structures are mobilized to strengthen law enforcement capacities,

improve intelligence gathering, and foster collaboration between security agencies

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and local communities. Community engagement initiatives, such as town hall

meetings, community policing forums, and neighborhood watch programs,
facilitate information sharing, trust-building, and grassroots efforts to combat
banditry (Ojo and Arogundade, 2020).

Secessionist Movements: Secessionist movements, such as the Indigenous

People of Biafra (IPOB) in southeastern Nigeria, have been securitized as threats
to national unity, territorial integrity, and political stability, warranting measures
to preserve the integrity of the state (Williams, 2003). In response to the
securitization frame, policy measures to address secessionist movements include
political dialogue, economic inclusivity, and legal reforms aimed at addressing
underlying grievances and promoting peaceful coexistence. Additionally, measures
to prevent the escalation of violence and uphold the rule of law are integrated into
the security governance framework (Oyewole, 2018).

Governance structures are mobilized to facilitate political negotiations, address

socioeconomic disparities, and promote inclusive governance processes that
accommodate diverse interests and aspirations. Civil society engagement, national
reconciliation initiatives, and constitutional reforms are employed to address
grievances and build trust between the government and marginalized communities
(Ibrahim, 2017).

Interventions and Solutions

Governance interventions aimed at addressing insurgency, banditry, and

secessionist movements in Nigeria should prioritize a multifaceted approach that
includes strengthening security institutions, promoting community engagement,
addressing root causes, and fostering regional and international cooperation.

Strengthening Security Institutions: Enhancing the capacity, professionalism,

and coordination of security forces is crucial for effectively combating security
threats and safeguarding public safety. This can be achieved through several
measures:
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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

• Investing in comprehensive training programs for security personnel to

enhance their skills and professionalism. This includes specialized training
in counter-insurgency, intelligence gathering, and community policing
(Walker, 2012).

• Upgrading the equipment and technology available to security forces

to improve their operational efficiency and effectiveness. This includes
surveillance systems, communication tools, and advanced weaponry
(Agbiboa, 2013).

• Implementing reforms to improve the accountability, transparency, and

coordination of security agencies. This involves establishing oversight
mechanisms, enhancing inter-agency collaboration, and reducing
corruption within the security sector (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016).

Promoting Community Engagement: Building trust, cooperation, and

partnerships between security agencies and local communities is essential for
intelligence gathering, conflict prevention, and community-led initiatives. Effective
community engagement strategies include:

• Establishing community policing programs that involve residents in security

efforts. This helps in building trust and ensuring that security measures are
responsive to the specific needs and concerns of the community (Okoli and
Ugwu, 2019).

• Facilitating dialogue and mediation between conflicting parties to address

grievances and prevent violence. This includes engaging community
leaders, religious figures, and civil society organizations in peacebuilding
efforts (Ibeanu, Orji, and Iwuamadi, 2016).

• Conducting public awareness campaigns to educate communities about the

importance of cooperation with security forces and the role of citizens in
maintaining security (Obi, 2015).

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Addressing Root Causes: Tackling the underlying drivers of insecurity, including

poverty, unemployment, inequality, and marginalization, requires targeted socio-
economic development programs, job creation initiatives, and inclusive governance
reforms. Key strategies include:

• Implementing economic development programs that focus on job creation,

skill development, and entrepreneurship. This helps to reduce poverty and
provide alternative livelihoods for at-risk populations (Agbiboa, 2013).

• Promoting inclusive governance reforms that ensure the representation

and participation of marginalized groups in decision-making processes.
This includes implementing policies that address ethnic, regional, and
gender disparities (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016).

• Investing in education and youth empowerment programs to provide young

people with the skills and opportunities needed to contribute positively to
society and avoid involvement in criminal activities (Walker, 2012).

Fostering Regional and International Cooperation: Collaboration with

neighboring countries, regional organizations, and international partners is vital
for addressing transnational security threats, enhancing border security, and
promoting regional stability. Effective strategies include:

• Negotiating bilateral and multilateral agreements with neighboring

countries to enhance cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing, joint
military operations, and border management (UNODC, 2018).

• Strengthening regional security frameworks, such as the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union
(AU), to facilitate coordinated responses to security challenges (Shelley,
2010).

• Seeking support from international partners, including the United Nations,

the European Union, and donor countries, for technical assistance, capacity
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building, and funding for security initiatives (Deibert and Crete-Nishihata,

2012).

Addressing insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements in Nigeria requires

a comprehensive approach that incorporates strengthening security institutions,
promoting community engagement, addressing root causes, and fostering regional
and international cooperation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the discussion on addressing insurgency, banditry, and secessionist

movements in Nigeria through the theoretical guide of securitization theory
reveals the multifaceted nature of security governance in the country. Utilizing
securitization theory as a framework, policymakers frame these issues as existential
threats to national security, justifying exceptional measures and policy responses.
For insurgency, securitization leads to a focus on military interventions, intelligence
operations, and international cooperation to counter the threat posed by extremist
groups. Banditry is addressed through law enforcement measures, border security
enhancements, and socio-economic development programs aimed at disrupting
criminal networks and addressing underlying grievances. Similarly, secessionist
movements are countered through political dialogue, economic inclusivity, and
legal reforms to address grievances and uphold the rule of law.

However, while securitization provides a strategic framework for addressing security

challenges, it also raises concerns about potential authoritarianism, human rights
abuses, and neglect of underlying socio-economic factors. Therefore, a balanced
approach is essential, integrating security imperatives with democratic norms,
human rights considerations, and socio-economic development efforts. Overall,
addressing insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements in Nigeria requires a
comprehensive strategy that leverages securitization theory to mobilize resources,
implement targeted interventions, and engage in governance mechanisms aimed at
restoring stability, promoting peace, and fostering inclusive development.

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Recommendations:

The following recommendations are necessary to strengthen Nigeria’s security

governance and address security challenges:

1. Holistic Approach: Implement a holistic approach to addressing security

challenges in Nigeria that integrates security measures with socio-economic
development initiatives, political dialogue, and community engagement.
This approach should address underlying grievances and root causes of
insecurity while promoting inclusivity and resilience.

2. Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration: Foster collaboration among state actors,

non-state actors, civil society organizations, and international partners in
addressing security challenges. Multi-stakeholder partnerships can enhance
information sharing, resource mobilization, and coordination of efforts to
combat insurgency, banditry, and secessionist movements.

3. Enhanced Intelligence and Surveillance: Strengthen intelligence-gathering

capabilities and surveillance systems to improve early warning and detection
of security threats. Investing in technology, training, and cooperation
among security agencies can enhance situational awareness and enable
proactive responses to emerging threats.
4. Community-Centered Approaches: Prioritize community-centered
approaches to security governance, including community policing,
conflict resolution mechanisms, and grassroots initiatives. Empowering
local communities to participate in decision-making, security planning,
and implementation of interventions can enhance trust, cooperation, and
resilience against security threats.

5. Addressing Root Causes: Address the root causes of insurgency, banditry,

and secessionist movements through socio-economic development,
political reforms, and inclusive governance. Policies aimed at reducing
poverty, inequality, marginalization, and political exclusion can mitigate
grievances and address the underlying drivers of insecurity.
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Security Governance in Nigeria: Strategies to Address Insurgency, Banditry, and Secessionist Threats

6. Respect for Human Rights: Uphold human rights, the rule of law, and
accountability in all security operations and counterterrorism measures.
Ensure that security responses are proportionate, non-discriminatory,
and compliant with international legal standards to prevent human rights
abuses and promote public trust in security institutions.
7. Long-Term Strategic Planning: Develop and implement long-term
strategic plans for security governance that prioritize prevention, early
intervention, and conflict resolution. Strategic planning processes should
involve comprehensive risk assessments, scenario planning, and evaluation
mechanisms to adapt to evolving security threats and dynamics.

8. Regional Cooperation: Strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration

among neighboring countries in addressing transnational security threats.
Enhanced intelligence sharing, joint military operations, and regional
frameworks for counterterrorism can improve border security and disrupt
cross-border criminal networks.

9. Capacity Building: Invest in capacity building for security agencies, law

enforcement personnel, and local authorities to enhance their capabilities
in intelligence analysis, crisis management, and community engagement.
Training programs, equipment provision, and professional development
opportunities can improve the effectiveness and professionalism of security
forces.

10. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Promote dialogue, reconciliation, and

conflict resolution mechanisms to address underlying grievances and
facilitate peaceful resolution of disputes. Political dialogue, mediation
efforts, and inclusive peace processes can build trust, foster social cohesion,
and prevent the escalation of conflicts.

11. By implementing these recommendations, Nigeria can strengthen its

security governance framework, enhance resilience against security threats,
and promote peace, stability, and prosperity for all its citizens.

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 Influence of Small Group
Awareness Campaigns on
Knowledge and Risks of
Alcoholism among Commercial
Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria
Adebayo John James
Department of Mass Communication
Faculty of Communication and Media Studies,
Federal University, Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5274-9975

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Abstract
Alcoholism is one of the major public health concerns in developing nations.
Alcoholism has been identified as the major cause of numerous diseases and
premature death. As a result, this study is designed to examine small group
awareness campaigns on knowledge and risks that are involved in alcoholism.
The qualitative research method was adopted for this research work. Focus
group discussion (FGD) was adopted to examine the opinions, behaviour,
thoughts and knowledge of the commercial bus drivers about the small
group awareness campaigns on knowledge and risks of alcoholism among
commercial bus drivers in the Southwest. Findings showed that small group
awareness campaigns against alcoholism have been very effective. This is
because small group awareness campaigns offer face-to-face interactions,
and people can ask questions and get answers on the spots. Findings revealed
that poverty, parental and peer influence, including political thuggery are
the major causes of alcoholism in most bus terminals in the South West.
Anti-alcoholic campaigns should be taken to primary and secondary schools
across South-West states to enlighten the pupils and students about the
health implications of alcoholism. Counselling and therapeutic centres
should be established for people whose parents are alcohol-dependent users
to minimise the cases of alcoholic uptake.

Keywords:
Small Group, Awareness Campaigns, Knowledge, Risks, Alcoholism,
Commercial Bus Drivers

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Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks of Alcoholism among Commercial
Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

Introduction

Small group awareness campaigns have been identified to be effective in persuading

people to embrace certain health behaviour or quit addiction. Alcoholism is an
emerging public health problem in developing countries like Nigeria. Increased
population, poverty, and urbanisation have been identified to be causal factors
for the uptake of alcoholism (Rani and Hemavathy, 2022). Alcoholism is a severe
condition associated with brain damage, and neurological, social, and behavioural
disorders (Sadiq et al, 2023). Small group awareness campaigns have strengthened
enlightenment campaigns among the illiterate and the poor in developing
nations. Alcohol-dependent individuals derive instant gratifications from their
consumption, not minding the long-term negative consequences (Berre et al.,
2014). Alcoholism is a major health problem with an estimated lifetime prevalence
in the US of approximately 14 percent (Colrain et al, 2009). Alcoholism is the
major cause of mental disorders and negative social impacts (Chen et al, 2021).
alcohol-related morbidity and mortality increases among the young and the old in
low-income countries (Chen et al, 2021). Alcoholism is one of the major public
health concerns in developing nations (Dayo et al, 2017). Alcoholism has been
identified as the major cause of numerous diseases and premature death.

Public health awareness and enlightenment campaigns have led to a reduction in the
uptake of alcoholism and a hike in the number of quitters. However, commercial
drivers in Nigeria are the most resistant set of alcoholics who refuse enlightenment
campaigns about quitting risky behaviour. Small group communication is a very
vital instrument for enlightenment campaigns and alcoholic quitting behaviour.
Small group communication has been used to convince alcoholics and smokers
to quit risky behaviour (Voyer, 2016). Alcoholism continues to kill and cause
serious public health issues, locally, nationally, and globally (C. M and A.D., 2011).
Policymakers, civil society organisations, and the general public are often oblivious

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 Adebayo John James

to the risks involved in alcoholism. Group communication is more effective in

effecting behavioural change (Institute, 2007). The prevalence of alcohol abuse
festered in the last decades in adults in low-income nations of the world (Sullivan
et al, 2018).

The harmful use of alcoholics results in three million deaths annually worldwide
(Wang et al, 2023). Alcohol misuse is the most serious public health problem
characterised by addicted drinking habits, precipitating physical and emotional
dependence on alcohol (Khan et al, 2024). Alcoholism causes more than 200
temporary and permanent injury conditions (Wang et al, 2023). Such conditions
include health complications, loss of jobs, domestic violence, and unemployment.
There is a growing concern that a greater percentage of people who abuse alcohol
experience all manner of illnesses (Wang et al, 2023). Alcohol is a widely used
psycho-active substance and its use has been linked to various cancer and metabolic
problems (Surekha et al, 2023). Alcohol is a drug and it is the only drug whose self-
induced intoxication is socially acceptable (Surekha et al., 2023). Chinnusamy et
al (2021) investigated the effect of alcoholism on the family members of alcoholic
patients and found that alcoholism is one of the leading factors for marital issues
such as permanent separation, divorce, domestic violence, child abuse, neglect,
and strained relationships between husbands and wives, and between the parents
and children.

Research evidence has shown that small group awareness campaigns are more vital
in effecting change in people’s lifestyles (Akers et al, 2024). Alcoholic consumption
with a mild-severe disability has been under-researched (Oh et al, 2020). Only
a handful of health researchers have conducted studies on the impact of alcohol
abuse, misuse, and alcoholism among commercial drivers in Nigeria. Alcohol
consumption is globally a significant problem and is one of the major causes of
avoidable premature and disability. Excessive consumption of alcohol is a factor
for mental illness. One of the major results of alcoholism is the loss of cognitive
control over the amount of alcohol that is consumed (Airapetov et al, 2021). Two
billion people around the world consume alcoholic beverages and the majority of

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Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks of Alcoholism among Commercial
Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

them suffer from alcoholism. Alcoholism represents the global third-largest risk
factor for disease and disability (Li and Wu, 2022). Alcoholic manufacturers target
young people in a bid to replace them with old alcoholic quitters or old users of the
products. Drinking laws, especially in public places such as motor parks, airports,
seaports, markets, and road intersections, have never been enforced and youngsters
are proud to drink alcohol in public places in Nigeria without any caution.
When face-to-face awareness campaigns against alcoholism are involved, many
alcoholics tend to embrace a new life that is free from alcoholism. In Africa,
alcoholism is normal for men despite its health consequences, but stigmatic for
women. Men are hardly quitters of alcoholism as a result of some social factors
among which are the influence of peer pressure, egoism, self-conceit, and local
festivals. Exposure to parental alcoholism behaviour is a risk factor for children to
become adult alcoholics (Nwosu et al, 2022). Alcoholism harbingers dangerous
health issues, and it is a preoccupation with the use of alcohol and a refusal to
understand the health, and socio-economic implications of alcoholic consumption
(Nirmala and Hemavathy, 2023).

Small group awareness campaigns have bred enlightenment among commercial bus
drivers and citizens about the risks inherent in alcoholism. Alcoholism is a growing
health concern in South Western Nigeria, especially among young adults and older
people. Parental alcoholism is a risk factor for alcohol use disorders in children, as
well as reduced family bonding, divorce, and harsh corporal discipline (Chartier
et al, 2017). Alcoholism affects the family members of alcoholics, especially their
children’s education and proper upbringing (Suneel et al, 2022).

Small group awareness campaigns are more effective than mass media messages
in health behavioural modifications. Small group awareness campaigns encompass
interpersonal communication perceived to be more effective in behavioural
modifications regarding health issues (Nicoras et al, 2023). In small group
campaigns, questions could be asked about grey areas and answers could be supplied
immediately on the spot. Alcoholism is a risk factor for suicidal behaviour, and 40%
of alcoholics attempt suicide at some point in their lifetime, and 7% of alcoholics

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 Adebayo John James

end their lives by committing suicide (Sher, 2006). The most identified risk factors
for alcoholism in young adults and older people are lack of social support, living
alone, depression, unemployment, job loss, hopelessness, frustrations, and addicted
alcohol use (Sher, 2006). Sher (2006) conducted a study on risk and protective
factors for suicide in patients with alcoholism and found that age plays a crucial
role in the risk for suicide among patients with alcoholism. Sher (2006) pointed
out that widowed, unmarried, or divorced alcoholics are at higher risk of suicide.
Marriage has been identified to be a protective factor against suicide (Sher, 2006).
Suicide attempts are higher among socially disadvantaged backgrounds such as
low-income, low socio-economic, and poor backgrounds. Suicide attempts among
alcoholics are also higher in secular countries than in religious ones (Sher, 2006).

Alcoholic consumption comes in two major forms: alcohol dependence and

alcohol abuse. Alcoholism affects all parts of the body, specifically the brain (Wang
et al, 2019). Diabetes and alcoholism affect a larger population of adult alcoholics,
especially in low-income countries of the world (Kim and Kim, 2012). Chronic
alcoholic consumption has been identified to be a potential risk factor for the
incidence of type 2 diabetes mellitus and other life-threatening diseases (Kim
and Kim, 2012). Consequently, the objectives of the study were to determine
the effectiveness of the small group awareness campaigns on the knowledge of
and risks that are involved in alcoholism among commercial bus drivers in the
South West; to ascertain the factors that are responsible for the uptake of alcohol
among commercial bus drivers in the South-West; to understand the factors that
are responsible for the exposure of commercial bus drivers to alcoholism in the
South-West; to know the sources of enlightenment campaigns against alcoholism
among commercial bus drivers in South-West; and to know effects of alcoholism
on commercial bus driving in the South-West.

The study adopted a two-step flow of information theory. The two-step flow
of information theory was propounded by Kats and Lazarsfeld (1955). In the
observation of Malik (2023), two steps of information theory suggest that there
are opinion leaders who influence the thoughts and behaviour of the opinion

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Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks of Alcoholism among Commercial
Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

followers in their community. In the words of (Liu, 2023), the two-step theory
of information suggests that the flow of information and its effects from the mass
media involves two steps: from the media to certain people (Opinion leaders such
as traditional rulers, religious leaders, local chiefs and youth leaders), and from
them to members of the public. The theory stresses the importance of face-to-
face interactions in effecting desired behavioural changes. The theory postulates
that some people in our community have unrestrained exposure to media of
communication because of their education and social contacts. These people are
referred to as opinion leaders in their community. Others who have less exposure
to media of mass communication are classified as opinion followers. Opinion
followers rely heavily on opinion leaders for their information about socio-
economic, political, and health issues.

The assumptions of this theory are in sync with this study. In small group
awareness campaigns against alcoholism, opinion leaders share their experiences
and knowledge about the risks that are involved in alcoholism. When it comes
to behavioural modifications, face-to-face awareness campaigns are much more
effective than other forms of campaigns.

Materials and Methods

The qualitative research method was adopted for this research work. Focus group
discussion (FGD) was adopted to examine the opinions, behaviour, thoughts,
and knowledge of the commercial bus drivers about the small group awareness
campaigns on knowledge and risks of alcoholism among commercial bus drivers
in South-West, Nigeria. As Lapchmanan et al, (2024) note, FGD is the selection
of participants or respondents with adequate proficiency on the subject matter,
who are willing to voluntarily share their experiences and opinions articulately
and expressively. South West consists of six different states, namely: Oyo, Ekiti,
Ogun, Osun, Lagos, and Ondo States. As a result, a multi-stage sampling technique
was used. A multi-stage sampling technique, as Onabajo (2015) avers, enables the

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 Adebayo John James

researchers to take successive samples from levels or clusters until it is possible to

take a random sample of individuals.

A purposive sampling was later adopted to select urban-urban Local Government

Areas in each of the states where a major motor park is located. A Purposive
sampling, (Guarte and Barrios, 2006) note, is described as a random selection of
sampling units within the segment of the population with the most information on
the characteristic of interest. The most popular motor park in the state capitals of
each of the six states was selected. Consequently, Ojoo Bus Terminal was selected
in Ibadan, Oyo State; Ado Bus Terminal in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State; Abeokuta Bus
Terminal, Abeokuta, Ogun State; Oshodi Bus Terminal, Oshodi, Lagos State;
Osogbo Bus Terminal, Osogbo, Osun State, and Akure Bus Terminal, Akure, Ondo
State. Commercial bus drivers were selected as respondents in six bus terminals
located in the six state capitals because it is assumed that the respondents know
the risks involved in alcoholism. Using simple random sampling, the researcher
furthered selected sub-motor parks assumed to have a larger number of commercial
bus drivers within each of the Bus Terminals. The sub-bus terminals that were
sampled in each of the major bus terminals include Lagos garage in Ojoo Bus
Terminal, Ibadan, Oyo State; Akure garage in Ado-Ekiti, Ado-Ekiti Bus Terminal,
Ekiti State; Ibadan Bus garage in Oshodi Bus Terminal, Lagos State; Ibadan garage
in Abeokuta Bus Terminal, Abeokuta, Ogun State; Ibadan garage in Osogbo Bus
Terminal, Osogbo, Osun State, and Lagos garage in Akure Bus Terminal, Akure,
Ondo State.

The convenient sampling method was used to select the participants for the study.
Convenient sampling is chosen because data could be collected speedily and readily
when the respondents are available. In convenience sampling, researchers choose
their samples based on proximity to the researcher, and convenience sampling could
be used in both qualitative and quantitative studies (Isaac, 2023). Individuals in
convenient spots such as motor parks, and bus stops, are selected and interviewed
whoever is conducted for whoever is willing to answer. Access to respondents in
the main Bus Terminals in each of the six states was practically impossible, and

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Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks of Alcoholism among Commercial
Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

therefore, respondents were selected based on their proximity, close locations,

and knowledge of the subject matter under investigation. We adopted focus group
discussion because it allows researchers to have accurate access to thoughts,
thinking, opinions, knowledge, and risks involved in alcoholism among commercial
Bus Drivers in the Southwest States. The focus group discussions had six groups
with five participants in each of the sessions, making all the members in the five
FGD thirty in all.The session maintained high confidentiality because the identities
of the participants were never made known due to ethical considerations. Codes
were used for each of the sessions that researchers had in each of the six states.
Data were analysed and presented using explanation building and equally analysed
thematically in line with research objectives. Inferences were made about the
respondents’ knowledge and Risks of Alcoholism among Commercial Bus Drivers
in South West States

Results

Theme 1: The Effectiveness of The Small Group Awareness Campaigns

Data from the FGD revealed the effectiveness of small group awareness campaigns
on the knowledge and risks involved in alcoholism among commercial bus
drivers in Southwest Nigeria. The discussions showed that small group awareness
campaigns on alcoholism among bus drivers in six states have been very effective
in tackling the growing alcoholic habits among commercial bus drivers. Providing
more insights about alcoholism among bus drivers, a participant said:

Sometime in 2021, anti-alcohol awareness campaigns were led to Ojoo

Bus Terminal. During interactions, with the anti-alcohol campaigners,
we were made to know the health implications of excessive drinking of
alcohol. They educated us on the social, economic, and health effects
of alcoholism. In the process of the discussion, we were able to ask
questions, and answers were made available on the spots. Many of us
quit alcoholism at that time. The health benefits of non-alcoholism

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could only be imagined.We drive lives to different destinations every

day, and that requires us to behave responsibly. Behaving responsibly
means that we are dependent users of alcohol or any other hard
substances.

Providing more explanations, another participant in the FGD session at Oshodi

Bus Terminal, Lagos, said:

Seeing is believing. Health officials from the Lagos Ministry of Health

came to our park in June 2022. They brought different posters, bills,
and pictures to enlighten us on the risks of alcoholism. They showed
us the livers of non-alcoholics and the livers of alcohol-dependent
individuals. We were made to realise that the internal organs of
alcohol-dependent individuals get damaged gradually. Examples of all
these were shown to us from fliers, posters, and the handbills brought to
Oshodi Bus Terminal that year. Some of us asked them questions about
the means to quit alcoholism and we were very much enlightened on
the means to have a hitch-free quitting.

Findings showed that small group awareness campaigns against alcoholism have
been very effective. This is because small group awareness campaigns offer face-to-
face interactions, and people can ask questions and get answers on the spots.

Theme 2: factors that are responsible for the uptake of alcohol among
commercial bus drivers

Data from the FGD revealed the effectiveness of small group awareness campaigns
on the knowledge and risks involved in alcoholism among commercial bus drivers
in Southwest Nigeria. The FG session showed that many factors are responsible
for the uptake of alcohol among commercial drivers in the Southwest, of Nigeria.
Providing more explanations, an FGD participant at Ado-Ekiti Bus Terminal, said:

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Influence of Small Group Awareness Campaigns on Knowledge and Risks of Alcoholism among Commercial
Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

Socio-economic issues are the major reasons many commercial

bus drivers take up alcoholism. Socio-economic issues are multi-
dimensional. However, Poverty is the major cause of alcoholism. Poor
commercial bus drivers cannot afford to spend all their takes on
drinking good wine or beer. Many of them are addicted to hard drinks.
As a result of this, they resort to alcoholism to feel on top of the world
at the wheel. Besides, many of us who are battling with marital issues
resort to alcoholism to escape these marital realities. Some of us who
battle with domestic violence from our wives resort to alcoholism to
evade the realities.

Supporting these explanations, another FGD session participant at Akure Bus

Terminal, Ondo State, said:

Parental influence is one of the reasons for the uptake of alcoholic

drinks among bus drivers at Akure Bus Terminal.Whatever bad or ugly
behaviour any man puts up, people should check his parents first.
Parents are the first role models for children, and therefore, when your
parents are alcohol-dependent individuals, children will most certainly
become heavier users of the products in the future. Another issue is the
peer influence. Many of us in the Terminal here are influenced by our
friends. It is a social gathering of people, and therefore, you cannot
live in isolation. One way or the other, people get influenced to take up
alcoholism or smoking through their friends and peers.

Providing further explanations, a participant at the FGD session at Osogbo Bus

Terminal, Osun State, said:

Commercial bus drivers become heavier users of alcohol and weed

during political activities. Most often, politicians hire us for their
electioneering campaigns. Those politicians are also contending for
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 Adebayo John James

political offices with their opponents, and as a result, we are served

with all manner of hard and intoxicating alcohol to be able to fight
with the thugs of the political party in opposition. Some of us never
relinquish alcoholism even after the electioneering campaigns.

Findings revealed that poverty, parental and peer influence, including political
thuggery are the major causes of alcoholism in most bus terminals in the Southwest.

Theme 3: factors that are responsible for the exposure of commercial

bus drivers to alcoholism

Data from the FGD revealed the exposure of small group awareness campaigns of
commercial bus drivers in Southwest about alcoholism. The FGD session showed
that many factors are responsible for the exposure of commercial bus drivers
to alcoholism. Explain further about the exposure of commercial bus drivers to
alcoholism in Southwest, a participant of the FGD session at Ashero Bus Terminal,
Abeokuta, Ogun State, said:

One of the major factors responsible for the exposure of commercial

bus drivers to alcoholism is hawkers of hard drinks within the Bus
Terminals of six states of the South West. The bus terminal operators
allow women to sell alcohol in sachets, small bottles, and nylons to
commercial drivers in most of the Bus Terminals in the South West.
We were also exposed to hard alcoholic drinks on radio and television
advertisements. Most advertisements are persuasive, and some of us are
tempted to take action regarding the products advertised either on the
radio or television.

Another participant of the FGD session at Ojoo Bus Terminal in Ibadan, Oyo State
Capital, said:

Some passengers are very obstinate and it requires that you should at
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Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

them before they pay for their transport fare. However, dealing with
some of these stubborn passengers cannot be possible if one is not under
the influence of alcoholic drinks. This is one of the reasons why some
of us allow hawkers and sellers of hard alcoholic drinks in the bus
Terminals.
Findings showed that hawkers and sellers of alcoholic drinks within the premises
of the Bus Terminals are the major sources of exposure to alcoholic drinks among
drivers in the South West.

Theme 4: to know the sources of enlightenment campaigns against

alcoholism among commercial bus drivers

Data from the FGD Revealed the sources of the enlightenment campaigns against
alcoholism among commercial bus drivers in South-West, Nigeria. The FGD
session showed that there are numerous sources of enlightenment campaigns about
alcoholism in Southwest. A participant of the FGD session in Oshodi Bus Terminal,
Lagos, explained that:

Officials of the Ministry of Health come to Oshodi Bus Terminals

regularly to enlighten us about the risks involved in alcoholism.However,
while some radio and television stations campaign against alcoholism
among drivers in theYoruba Language for easy comprehension among
commercial bus drivers, other radio and television stations also advertise
different brands of alcohol. Officials of the Lagos State Ministry of
Health have populated quitters and de-populated addicted users of
alcohol through their face-to-face enlightenment campaigns about the
risks of alcoholism, which are more effective.

Providing further explanations about the sources of enlightenment campaigns

against alcoholism, a participant of the FGD session in Ado-Ekiti Bus Terminal,

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 Adebayo John James

said:

Most often, leaders of the National Union of Road Transport Workers

(NURTW) Lagos State Branch hold regular meetings with us where
they always declare that alcoholic drinks are not allowed among
commercial bus drivers in Lagos State. Those who run against the
pronouncements are usually made to pay a fine or an option of fine
and suspension from driving passengers for three months.

Findings showed that officials of the Ministry of Health and Leaders of the National
Union of Road Transport Workers at the Bus Terminals are major sources of
enlightenment campaigns in the Southwest.

Theme 5: to know the effects of alcoholism among commercial bus

driving in the South-West

The data from the FGD session revealed the effects of alcoholism among commercial
bus drivers in Akure, Ondo State Capital. The data showed that alcoholism has
diverse effects on commercial drivers in Akure, Ondo State. Explaining further,
the participant said:
By the age of 55 years, many of us can no longer drive commercial
buses. Many of us by that age start to battle with terminal diseases such
as diabetes, stroke, liver problems, and so many others. These are the
effects of alcoholism on some of us. Besides, many of our colleagues who
are heavy and dependent users of alcohol have died untimely through
road crashes and unexpected accidents taking their lives and the lives
of the innocent passengers they were taking to other states within the
Southwest geo-political zone.

Also, explaining further about the effects of alcoholism, a participant of the FGD
session in Osogbo Bus Terminal, said:
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Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

Alcoholism has increased the rate of thuggery, hooliganism, rancour,

supremacy battles among members of commercial bus driver unions,
and in-fighting in most Bus Terminals in the South West. It has also
resulted in social disorder. It increases cultism and cult activities in
many of the Bus terminals in Southwest.
Findings showed that the effects of alcoholism are health-related. However, alcohol-
dependent individuals have lost their lives and those of their passengers to the cold
hands of death through road crashes.

Discussions

Findings showed that small group awareness campaigns against alcoholism have
been very effective. This is because small group awareness campaigns offer face-
to-face interactions, and people can ask questions and get answers on the spots.
Corroborating the findings, Akers et al. (2024) aver that small group awareness
campaigns are more vital in effecting change in people’s lifestyles because it is a
face-to-face means of sharing knowledge. Findings revealed that poverty, parental
and peer influence, including political thuggery are the major causes of alcoholism
in most bus terminals in the South West. Corroborating the findings, Suneel et al.
(2022) maintain that alcoholism influences children in a family where parents are
alcohol-dependent users.

Findings showed that hawkers and sellers of alcoholic drinks within the premises
of the Bus Terminals are the major sources of exposure to alcoholic drinks
among drivers in the South West. Supporting the findings, Chinnusamy et al.
(2021) posited that below-the-line and above-the-line means of exposure to
alcoholism in low-income countries of the world. Findings showed that officials
of the Ministry of Health and Leaders of the National Union of Road Transport
Workers at the Bus Terminals are major sources of enlightenment campaigns in the
South West. Corroborating the findings, James (2019) averred that interpersonal
communication and interactions with relevant targets are the best means to make

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people embrace certain behavioural modifications, especially in African societies.

Findings showed that the effects of alcoholism are health-related. However,

alcohol-dependent individuals have lost their lives and those of their passengers to
the cold hands of death through road crashes. Corroborating the findings, Wang et
al. (2023) affirmed that the harmful use of alcoholics results in three million deaths
annually worldwide.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Strengthening public health education and decreasing the age of alcoholism is very
helpful for the control of alcoholism. Anti-alcoholic campaigns should be taken to
primary and secondary schools across South-West states to enlighten the pupils
and students about the health implications of alcoholism. Besides, a subject must
be dedicated only to teaching the students about the risks that are involved in
becoming alcohol-dependent users.

• Governments across six southwest states must establish special anti-alcohol

squads in Bus terminals to ensure the safety of passengers and commercial
bus drivers in the region.
• Counseling and therapeutic centres should be established for people whose
parents are alcohol-dependent to minimise the cases of alcoholic uptake.

• Alcoholism is a problem of regulatory failure by the government. Media

of mass communication in Nigeria must strengthen their regulatory
frameworks aimed at curbing the growing cases of alcohol-dependent
people in the Southwest.

• Health is wealth. The campaigns against alcoholism must specifically

mention the health benefits of being free from alcohol issues.

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Bus Drivers in Southwest, Nigeria

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 Youth, Social Media Abuse,
and Mental Well-Being
Ezekiel Ephraim Pati Osiriehegbe
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja

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 Ezekiel Ephraim Pati Osiriehegbe

Abstract
As with every technology, there is a side that is not so good. In particular,
social media can harm youths who suffer from or are vulnerable to mental
illness. The rise of social media use in young people coincides with a rise
in mental health concerns. Many health experts are calling it a second
pandemic. At the same time, social media use can be beneficial and have
positive effects, it increases communications and connections. If properly
used, it builds bridges over barriers and strengthens relationships. This paper
examined the effect of the use of social media on the mental well-being of
youths. The paper adopted the secondary method of data collection where
books, newspapers, journals; the internet, and other related materials were
consulted. The findings point to the fact that prolonged use of social media
can negatively impact the mental health of young people, and young people
develop conditions including anxiety, stress, and depression. The research
concludes that Social media, a rapid communication tool, significantly shapes
youth lifestyles but also raises privacy concerns and addiction issues. As
technology advances, social media’s pervasive influence varies across different
fields, affecting people in diverse ways. Hence, some recommendations were
suggested among others that: youths must be taught that what they see on
social media often does not reflect reality but rather is a biased perspective of
happenings in the real world, parents should instruct their children on how
to apply the privacy protections in each social media platform.

Keywords: Social Media, Mental Health,Youth, Technology, Nigeria

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Youth, Social Media Abuse, and Mental Well-Being

Introduction

The concept of “social media” could seem somewhat fresh to those who do not
regularly use different social media platforms. In actuality, the bulk of today’s social
media users would find it difficult to comprehend that its roots go back more than
thirty years to technology. Although it took social media decades to establish itself
as a useful tool for business and communication, the rate at which technology has
grown in recent years is challenging to comprehend. Social media, according to
Angus, Thelwall, and Stuart (2008), provide people with knowledge about every
aspect of life. Due to the accessibility of platforms that enable people to connect
with the entire universe and advance global development, there has been a great
deal of development and expansion in the media. As media use grows, many
people, especially young people, use it to learn about the historical evolution of
society, ideas, religion, etc.With 77% of respondents in the United States having at
least one social media profile in 2018, social media is a technology that is becoming
more and more popular (Edison Research, 2018). The average consumer reported
using more than four different social media platforms in 2018 (Duggan and Page,
2016; Smith and Anders, 2018). In 2016, 56% of consumers had more than one
profile on social media. To meet various needs, many social media platforms have
been and will continue to be developed. Some of the contemporary social media
sites include Myspace, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Vine, Snapchat,
YouTube, Google+, Pinterest, Tumbler, Reddit, and WhatsApp. Facebook is still
in charge of social media. 239 million users checked their profiles at least once a
month in 2017, according to Verto Analytics (2018), with more than half doing so
on their mobile devices.

Young people use social media as an experiment to do things they think would
be fun or interesting for them and their pals while avoiding adult supervision.
To construct, experiment with, and present a reflexive project of the self in a

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social context, as well as, for some, for flouting communicative norms and other
risk-taking behaviors, is a social psychological task of adolescence. According to
Livingstone (2008), teenagers may enthusiastically adopt the online realm because
it represents the more visible to the peer group more than to adult surveillance.
Al-Sharqi, Hashim, and Kutbi (2015) stated that in addition to having a good side,
social media that is well integrated into society, also has a bad side, such as being
involved in fraud, cybercrime, cyberbullying, and lack of physical human relations.
Rajeev and Jobilal (2015) expressed that youths do not usually use the good side of
social media; they are tilted toward the downside.

This study concentrated on youths because, during this stage of development, they
are particularly prone to copying what they observe. Additionally, according to the
PEW Internet and American Life Project (2014), children and adolescents now
account for 75% of all social media users. Similarly, NCC (Nigeria Communication
Commission, 2015) reported that more than 90 million individuals use social media
in Nigeria, with children and teenagers making up the majority of these users.

Clarification of Terms

Social media: Social media is a network of internet facilities that is on the

technological and ideological foundation of Web 2.0. Which provides space for the
development of user-changeable content (Kaplan and Heinlein, 2010). According
to Lewis (2010), social media is an umbrella term for technologies that provide
space for people to create and send content, link up, and connect with others.
Howard and Park (2012) stated that social media has three main parts, namely
(1) the infrastructure and instrument to create and share content (2) content,
such as concepts, ideas, messages, information, and news (3) decoders, users and
consumers, e.g., industries, organizations and individuals. Kaplan (2010) in his
study describes social media as an internet-based application that constructs the
ideological and technological foundation that permits to exchange of content.

Youths: Youth refers to a young person between childhood and adulthood. The

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Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines “youth” as “the period of your

life when you are young, the state of being young, or a young person” (2002,
p.1213). In like manner, Collins English Dictionary for Advance Learners sees youth as
a transitionary phase in an individual’s life between childhood and the age of full
maturity as an adult (2000, p.1822). It is for this reason that several institutions,
agencies, and countries, in defining youth, put it within a certain age bracket,
meaning that youth is a matter of age. The UN General Assembly says youth are
those “between the ages of 15 and 24 years inclusive”. The World Bank pegs the age
of youth between the ages of 15 and 25. The United States Government is more
generous; it considers everyone under the age of 21 years to be a youth. (Agbese
2007, p.14).

Youth invariably is a delicate phase in human development. It is the time when future
choices are made. It represents the most volatile, complex, unpredictable, dynamic
as well as the most vulnerable segment of the population, socio-economically,
emotionally, and otherwise (Inokoba and Maliki 2011, p.3).

Mental Health: According to the United Nations (UN), mental health is a

positive concept related to the social and emotional well-being of people and
communities. The concept relates to the enjoyment of life, the ability to cope with
stress and sadness, the fulfillment of goals and potential, and a sense of connection
to others. Mental health is about wellness rather than illness and is not merely the
absence of a mental health condition. Mental health does not exist on its own. It
is an integral and essential part of overall health, which can be defined in at least
three ways – as the absence of disease, as a state of the organism that allows the full
performance of all its functions, or as a state of balance within oneself and between
oneself and one’s physical and social environment (Sartorius, 2002). Which of
these three definitions is used depends on the level to which the basic health needs
are satisfied. These needs include food, shelter, survival, protection, society, social
support, and freedom from pain, environmental hazards, unnecessary stress, and
any part of exploitation (Maslow, 1968).

Positive Mental Health: Positive mental health is not merely an absence of

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negative symptoms or reactions such as depression or anxiety (Massé et al, 1998).

A low level of distress does not automatically mean a high level of subjective well-
being, as neither self-control nor mental balance for instance has a direct counterpart
in distress manifestations. The model of psychological well-being created by
Massé et al (1998) included aspects of 53 control of self and events, happiness,
social involvement, self-esteem, mental balance, and sociability. Although their
conception of well-being includes happiness and life satisfaction, subjective well-
being cannot be restricted to these dimensions. The epidemiological assessment of
mental health needs to include measures of both negative and positive aspects if it
is to fairly portray the mental health of a population. Positive effects, for instance,
can be used to differentiate between anxiety and depression and to distinguish
between individuals scoring minimum or perfect scores on scales of psychological
distress (Massé et al, 1998).

The theme of positive mental health can be traced through the work of Jahoda
(1958) back to the WHO definition of health (1948). Earlier research considered
positive mental health largely from the viewpoint of life satisfaction (McDowell and
Newell 1996). Life satisfaction refers generally to a personal assessment of one’s
condition comparing it to an external reference standard or one’s aspirations. A
second approach records affective reactions to daily experiences and a third screens
for psychological distress (McDowell and Newell 1996).The principal components
of positive mental health can be grouped in several ways. According to Diener
(1994), well-being should be defined and measured using multiple cognitive and
affective components.The definition by Horley (1984) and Okun and Stock (1987)
has three major components: life satisfaction, morale, and happiness. Although
during the past decennia mental health care mainly focused on psychopathology,
there is nevertheless a long history of research into positive aspects in the field
of psychology, including several models. In 1958, Marie Jahoda described a
multidimensional model of positive mental health, based on several theories
and research findings. She distinguished six criteria: 1) attitudes of an individual
towards his self; 2) the degree of growth, development, and self-actualization; 3)
coherence and continuity of personality; 4) autonomy and self-determination; 5)

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an adequate perception of reality, and 6) environmental mastery. Half a century

later,Vaillant (2003) contrasts six different empirical conceptualizations of positive
mental health: 1) mental health as above normal, as an ideal state of complete
functioning; 2) mental health as positive psychology and positive personal qualities
such as love and wisdom; 3) mental health as healthy adult development; 4) mental
health as social-emotional intelligence; 5) mental health as subjective well-being,
and 6) mental health as resilience and coping (Vaillant, 2003). The models of
Jahoda (1958) and Vaillant (2003) share the assumption that positive mental health
is best conceived as a multidimensional phenomenon. This fits in with approaches
to positive mental health from other disciplines.

Theoretical Framework

Uses and Gratifications Theory (UGT) is an approach to understanding why and

how people actively seek out specific media to satisfy specific needs. The driving
question of UGT is:Why do people use media and what do they use them for? UGT
discusses how users deliberately choose media that will satisfy given needs and
allow them to enhance knowledge, relaxation, social interactions/companionship,
diversion, or escape. It assumes that audience members are not passive consumers
of media. Rather, the audience has power over their media consumption and
assumes an active role in interpreting and integrating media into their own lives.
Unlike other theoretical perspectives, UGT holds that audiences are responsible
for choosing media to meet their desires and needs to achieve gratification. This
theory would then imply that the media compete against other information sources
for viewers’ gratification.

Assumptions of the Theory:

 The audience is active and its media use is goal-oriented

 The initiative in linking need gratification to a specific medium choice rests

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with the audience member

 The media compete with other resources for need satisfaction

 People have enough self-awareness of their media use, interests, and

motives to be able to provide researchers with an accurate picture of that
use.
 Value judgments of media content can only be assessed by the audience.

Modern Applications of Uses and Gratifications Research

Internet Usage: Modern communication scholars such as Tomas E. Ruggiero,

highlight the necessity of UGT in understanding the proliferation and success
of computer-mediated communication forms. Ruggiero (2000) states that UGT
provides a cutting-edge theoretical approach in the initial stages of each new mass
communications medium: newspapers, radio and television, and now the Internet.
Furthermore, Ruggiero argues that new media forms require analysis of potentially
29 new uses and gratifications; for example, interactivity, hypertextuality,
asynchronous communication, and demystification. Scholars like LaRose et al
(2004). utilize UGT to understand Internet usage via a socio-cognitive framework
to reduce uncertainties that arise from homogenizing an Internet audience and
explaining media usage in terms of only positive outcomes (gratifications).
LaRose et al. created measures for self-efficacy and self-disparagement and related
UGT to negative outcomes of online behavior (like Internet addiction) as well.
New Media Examples of UGT: The application of New Media to the Uses and
Gratifications Theory has been positive. The introduction of the Internet, social
media, and technological advances have provided another outlet for people to use
and seek gratification through those sources. Based on the models developed by
Katz, Blumler, Gurevitch, and Lasswell (1973), individuals can choose to seek out
media in one outlet, all falling within the proscribed categories of need. The only
difference now is that the audience does not have to go to multiple media outlets
to fulfill each of their needs. The Internet has created a digital library, allowing
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individuals to have access to all content from various mass media outlets.

Being Immersed in Social Networking Environment: Facebook Groups, Uses

and Gratification, and Social Outcomes
In 2007 a study was conducted to examine the Facebook group users’ gratifications
concerning their civic participation offline, a set of level of agreement questions
to properly gauge their level of life satisfaction. The study ultimately yielded
results through principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. The
results showed that there were four needs for using Facebook groups, “socializing,
entertainment, self-status seeking, and information.” Gratification Received from
Use of Facebook Groups

• Socializing: Students interested in talking and meeting with others to

achieve a sense of community and peer support on the particular topic of
the group.

• Entertainment: Students engaged with the groups to amuse themselves.

• Self-Seeking: Students maintain and seek out their status, as well as those
of their friends, through online group participation.
• Information: Students used the group to receive information about related
events going on and off campus (Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009).

UGT Analysis of Twitter

Twitter is an online micro-blogging platform that contains both mass-media

functions and interpersonal communication options via sending tweets. Research
has found a positive correlation between active time spent on Twitter and the
gratification of a need for “an informal sense of camaraderie”—connection—with
other users. Furthermore, the frequency of tweets and the number of replies and
public messages mediated the relationship between Twitter users. This helped

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increase both the use and gratification of the media by satisfying the need for
connection.

UGT Approach to New Mass Media Technologies

In 2011, a survey was conducted to investigate the viewing of animated news. The
results of hierarchical regression analysis suggest predictive relationships among
personality characteristics (sensation seeking and locus of control), the seven
motives, the effects of perceived news credibility and newsworthiness, and the
intention to share such animated news videos with others.

Relevance of the Theories to The Study

The theory describes the framework under which the media is supposed to operate.
It explores the similarities between social media and the audience’s perception and
opinion. The theory study seeks to determine the correlation between the youth
and their daily usage of the internet and interactive media and to bring out the
effects experienced. This will determine the suitability of the models to the effects
of using social media on campuses.With everyone electronically mailing each other
today, there is no longer a need to write a joke down to remember it.You can just
forward it to a friend. We also do not communicate with distant friends over the
telephone anymore. We have started to only communicate through the impersonal
use of the internet. The theory tries to explain how youth have developed and
what they have changed. The theory provides a way to see why this has happened.
The theory explains the simple cause-and-effect analysis between the introduction
of new technology and the changes in youth’s way of thinking, feeling, acting, or
believing.

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Social Media and Youth

The practice of social media has a substantial control and effect on youth’s social
lifestyle. It has shaped an alternative innovative world and a large domain of
information, interconnectivity, and communication which cannot be started using
social communication and interaction among youth. Most youths accept having
more friends on social media than in real life. Further, social media has created a
new inventive mindset in youth as well as improved inter-social interactions and
peer-to-peer relationships (Aatiqa 2020).

Social media sites provide a platform whereby the youth can create groups
and pages depending on their common interest and discipline and they build
connections and opportunities for their careers by updating various topics for
discussion. Youth are more dependent on social media for the latest information.
The younger generation says that social media is a part of their life and it makes life
easier and more efficient. Social media sites enable them to communicate speedily
and efficiently. It helps to build social relationships and makes it easier to get in
touch with friends and families living outside the country and even closer to family
members. Writing updates takes over 15 seconds and with cross-posting over
social networks switched on, the updates get to everyone you want them to reach.
It gives the youth a place to express themselves and helps to develop social skills
which enable them to evaluate and interpret different situations contextually and
prepare themselves mentally for situations later on (Dimitrov, 2017).

According to the BBC news report, it stated that social media creates social isolation,
the reason being that most youths tend to spend many hours on social media, and
they rarely have face-to-face interaction (BBC, 2009). Scientists have evaluated
social isolation in many studies, and have determined that it can lead to a host
of mental, psychological, emotional, and physical problems including depression,
anxiety, somatic complaints, and many others (Reed, 2017). The lives of people,
especially youth, are largely influenced by what is posted by other people on their
profiles. Their habits are more influenced by what their friends do and less by the
teachings of their parents. Actions that attract more public attention hold more

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value, even despite some of them being immoral or illegal.

In our time, youth love to post their daily lifestyles and personal information on social
media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. It has become a trending style for
youth to showcase to people everything they have done (Loking and Castillo, 2012).
Statuses, photos, and videos of users on social media remain available indefinitely.
Therefore, youth who use social media often have a high chance of being exposed
to cybercrimes and dangerous situations such as kidnapping, murder, and robbery
(Dimitrov, 2017).

Impacts of Social Media on Youths

Positive Impacts

There are many positive impacts of social networking media sites on our youth:

• Friends; it has been easier to make friends and connect with them from
anywhere, anytime, mainly thanks to social networking sites. Just a decade
ago it was tough to search for an old friend or make a new one tougher
to reach and costly to communicate with them anytime, anywhere unless
one has to overly going type, able to make conversations with everyone at
a party. Social sites connect everyone to anyone and let them stay friends
with an easy approach at a very reasonable cost.

• Empathy; Each of us now spends more time talking about ourselves on

social networking sites. We’re sharing our lives- the downs, the twists
and turns with people we think have the same mindset. They generally
do care and will converse with us well Even most of the time they have
better solutions for our problematic situations or circumstances. The main
concern is that by all of us sharing our experiences, both good and bad, on
social networking sites, we can empathize with each other.

• Speedy Communication; Social networking sites like WhatsApp, Facebook,

and Google Mail offer a chance to communicate quickly and efficiently.;
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Even voice media, visual media, and word media, any methods can be used
to communicate with others in seconds.Writing an update on Twitter takes
just 20 seconds and with cross-posting over other social networks switched
off, that update reaches everyone, another person wants to reach in an
instant.
• In touch with the world; Social networking sites allow everyone to
communicate easily and effectively anytime and from anywhere, any place
in the world. By using social networking, we are connected with the world.
Each news, message, and update can be reached and, well-versed, and
updated within seconds. It is like capturing the whole world in a hand.
When it comes to social networks, everyone is equal, regardless of any
demographic changes.

Negative Impacts

• One of the negative effects of social media or networks is it leads to

addiction. Spending immeasurable hours on social sites can deflect focus
and concentration from a particular task.

• Social media can easily affect kids; the reason is sometimes people share
photos, and videos on media that contain violence and negative things
which can affect the behavior of kids or teenagers.

• Kidnapping, murder, and robbery can be easily done by sharing details on

social media.

• Because of social media students lose their ability to engage themselves for
face to face-to-face communication.

• There are many cases registered in a police station where adults target
young children and lure them into meeting them.

• Cyberbullying: Cyberbullying mostly takes place on social networking

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sites and blows down pages. While 30% of the students in middle and high
school have been identified as victims, 18% of the affected students are
girls as compared to 12% boys.15% of these victims attempt suicide out
of depression.

• Electronic aggression (EA): EA refers to harassment caused through emails,

chat rooms, instant messaging, text messages, fake websites, etc. and the
report says, that 9% to 35% of youngsters have been affected by EA at any
point in their young age.

Vulnerability of Social Media on The Mental Health of Youths

Most of the literature review on social media and mental health relates specifically
to Facebook and Instagram. The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) (n.d.)
cites that one in five teenagers, aged 13-18, have or will have a mental illness.
NAMI (n.d.) estimates that 11% of those with a mental illness will cope with a
mood disorder, such as depression or bipolar disorder and 8% will be diagnosed
with an anxiety disorder, like General Anxiety Disorder (GAD), panic disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, or social anxiety disorder. These mental health
challenges leave significant impacts on diagnosed and undiagnosed teens (NAMI,
n.d.). Approximately half of the teens with a mental health challenge drop out of
high school and while suicide is the second leading cause of death for youth aged
10 – 24, 90% of those who die by suicide have a mental health illness (NAMI, n.d.;
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2017). Twenge et al. (2017)
and Shafer (2017) both found that a 33 % increase in the number of teens from
2010-2015 who felt useless, joyless, lonely, and had signs of a depressive illness
positively correlated with the rise of smartphone ownership when economic,
schoolwork and unemployment stressors were factored out. Social media use
promotes risky behaviors regarding mental health; including replacing time for
face-to-face conversations and increasing sedentary behaviors, two identified
protective factors against mental illness (Strickland, 2017). Strickland (2017)

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found that chat rooms and 19 gaming social media reduced the risk of depressive
symptoms while those that promoted image sharing increased narcissistic behavior,
a risk factor for mental illness.

Time on social media significantly and positively correlates to several depressive

symptoms social media users and anxiety levels social media user perceives (Lin et
al., 2016; Twenge et al, 2017; Woods, 2016). This means that the more time one
spends on social media, the more depressive symptoms and higher levels of anxiety
are reported. Access to social media has also been shown to be a mediator in teen
reports of anxiety symptoms, when access to social media, including texting, was
removed, teens reported considerable increases in their levels of anxiety (Woods,
2016). Overall, individuals who spent more than two hours online per day were
significantly more likely to have suicidal risk factors (Twenge, et al, 2017). Recently,
Allcott, Braghieri, Eichmeyer, and Gentzkow, (2019) found that a control group,
who voluntarily deactivated Facebook accounts for one month, reported small,
but significant, improvements in levels of well-being, levels of happiness, and life
satisfaction. Users who deactivated accounts also self-reported lower levels of
depression and anxiety compared to the control group (Allcott et al, 2019).

Further research indicates that the way a consumer uses social media platforms
has a significant impact on mental health status. Passive browsing on social media
is particularly harmful to mental health (Frison and Eggermondt, 2017). Frison
and Eggermondt (2017) studied self-reported depression scales in teens at two
points, nine months apart, finding that passive browsing of Instagram at measure
one directly and positively correlated to a depressed mood at measure two. Allcott
et al. 20 (2019) found little evidence to report the same findings in terms of active
vs. passive use of social media. Frison and Eggermondt (2017) also discovered
that a depressed mood at measure one predicted posting on Instagram at measure
two. Literature suggests that Instagram’s use can increase negative life comparisons
because it is a more image-driven platform that does not require mutual sharing
(one user can follow a profile without that profile following the user back) (Lup,
Trub and Rosenthal, 2015; Weinstein, 2017). Choosing to use a filter, or not, for

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your post is a necessary step before each Instagram post and because the only option
for emotional icon feedback is liking, mostly positive images or videos are shared
(L’Ecuyer, n.d.; Lup et al, 2015; Weinstein, 2017). Adolescence is a key time for
defining self-identity and teens are prone to social comparisons (Weinstein, 2017).
Social media use can cause a user to see only the happiest versions of life, creating
a sense of inadequacy, and unattractiveness and stimulating feelings of jealousy and
envy (L’Ecuyer, n.d.; Weinstein, 2017).

Conclusion

Social media is one of the fastest modes of communication and it has a huge impact
on shaping the personal lifestyles of youth. Though it has huge access among youth,
it also has certain negative impacts where there is always a question of privacy
issues. As technology is growing social media has become the routine for every
person, and people are seen as addicted to this technology every day.With different
fields, its impact is different on people.

No doubt, social media is and will always remain a vital tool in human life as far as
communication is concerned. The study discovered that the nature of social media
is as a useful servant but a dangerous master which depicts that it is useful and
harmful at the same time depending on the way, our youth uses it. Social media
has numerous adverse influences on the quality of life in every aspect. We cannot
dissent from the fact that social media is a crucial platform that allows us to share
photos, disseminate knowledge and information, communicate with groups and
fellows, and provide broadcast and gossip, but we cannot tolerate it becoming the
focal point of our youth lives. it portrays unattainable beauty standards through
images, advertisements, and articles resulting in anxiety, depression, and lower
self-esteem. It has made our youth prefer virtual communication and made them
uninterested in face-to-face communication, which eradicates the possibility of
profound and meaningful conversation. Our Youth have lost their ability and skills
to communicate effectively, which is an indication, of what kind of effective social

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Youth, Social Media Abuse, and Mental Well-Being

media has over the lives of youth. Overall, social media can be advantageous if it is
used sensibly and in the appropriate proportion (Ejaz, 2020).

Recommendations
School authorities should organize workshops and seminars regularly for students
and school staff on social media usage and its influence on social behavior so that
they can effectively monitor the behavior of students

1. All stakeholders, especially network providers, need to devise means

of filtering information that reaches young people through social media
platforms. This will help minimize exposing them to pornographic and
other unwarranted materials.

2. To avoid having a generation that does not have face-to-face communication

skills, all the stakeholders should consider organizing social events that the
youth will use to interact and mingle with each other physically.

3. The youths need to be trained on better social media usage to minimize

time wastage on chatting and other irrelevant engagements that are
unimportant in their lives.

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