China and Bangladesh were not on good terms after Bangladesh’s independence but eventually after establishing diplomatic relations in 1976, China became Bangladesh's principal armament supplier (around 75 per cent of Bangladesh's arms come from China ) as well as a vital ally. Although Indian security experts have long monitored this relationship, Bangladesh's recent purchase of the price of USD 203 million of two Type 035G diesel-electric attack Chinese submarines and two frigates named- Abu Bakar and Ali Haider , has raised questions about the potential consequences for India’s security. However, Sheikh Hasina has assured that India has always been prominent in consideration and Bangladesh must remember its contributions to the liberation war.Security analysts from Bangladesh claim that acquiring submarines is more political than tactical. They believe that the military forces provide stability for political parties in that nation. This also applies to the current Awami League government. To keep strong relations with the armed services, the administration adopted the Forces Goal 2030. Additionally, Bangladesh is buying many weapons from China. It is attempting to make its navy a three-dimensional power. Submarines are seen as essential. The technology aboard this vessel is antiquated and its commissioning is intended to raise military morale. Bangladesh has also asked for help from China in building the submarine base with the facilities of wharves, barracks, repairing dock and ammunition depot. This is assigned to a Chinese company named PolyTechnologies Inc. China-Bangladesh’s increased trade percentage should be a concern to India as the trade gaps between India and Bangladesh are being filled by China. After the 2024 election, Bangladesh and China decided to expand the scale of trade specifically the export of Bangladeshi goods with fewer tariffs. The export figures from China to Bangladesh were USD 15.1 Billion in 2020, in 2021 it increased to 23.8 Billion and in 2022 it was USD 26.8 Billion. Earlier, China was not interested in South Asia whereas, now China is significantly showing its influence in Bangladesh with its projects, duty-free trade and investments especially with BRI to establish its presence in the Indo- Pacific region and contain India. ¢ China has been increasing itsinvestments in Bangladesh, particularly in the areas of infrastructure development, energy, and telecommunications. For example, BRI and investment in Chittagong port. Assisting Bangladesh with critical technologies and financial assistance will further strengthen India’s relationship and help India counter China's influence to a greater extent. Its economic and defense ties with Beijing have grown significantly in recent years. We've gotten to the point where China is financing Bangladesh's first submarine base. This is another reflection of Dhaka's successes as a balancerLast year, Bangladesh inaugurated a $1.2 billion (€1.1 billion) submarine base in Cox's Bazar named after Sheikh Hasina. The base was built with Chinese help and caused concern in India that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was trying to covertly move into India's sphere of influence. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the country's investment in Bangladesh now stands at about $1.5 billion. Bangladesh has also been part of China's global infrastructure-for-influence project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since 2016. Bangladesh's government is considering a proposal from China to undertake dredging and embanking on significant sections of the river. The so-called TeestaRiver Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project is tagged at around $1 billion. The Chinese proposal came after Bangladesh and India failed to sign a water-sharing treaty after almost a decade of negotiations. In 2011, a potential deal was postponed due to opposition from the Indian state of West Bengal. India's Siliguri Corridor, often called the Chicken's Neck, is near the proposed project site. It is a geopolitically sensitive passage connecting northeastern Indian states to the rest of India through a narrow strip of Indian territory measuring 20-22 kilometers (12-14 miles) at its narrowest section. India fears China might aim to establish its presence near the corridor under the guise of development work with Bangladesh."These developments might have implications both domestically and in the broader context of regional geopolitics Bangladesh prefers to buy Chinese weapons as they are cheaper than those of established arms-exporting countries in the West or of Russia, and also because China extends soft loans to make these purchases.20 Security-related cooperation extends to the police force. In 2018, the two countries signed agreements on law- enforcement training assistance and providing arms and ammunition to the national police.21 Beyond the technical benefits that accrue to Bangladesh, this security relationship—which is unique in a region that India considers its direct sphere of influence—also points at Dhaka'sdexterity in balancing its relations with China and India. This balancing act extends well beyond security. China has been an ideal partner for Bangladesh to expand its manufacturing base to cater to diverse export markets, including the Chinese one, and to overcome infrastructure gaps through project finance and construction. Economic engagement is primarily in trade, infrastructure, and business-to- business partnerships. China is also directly setting up manufacturing industries in Bangladesh, located in special economic zones (SEZs) such as the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone-2 in Chittagong.27 Bangladeshi companies have expressed a preference for joint ventures with Chinese ones as, beyondattracting investment and financing jobs, this helps to facilitate the transfer of expertise and technology.28 According to Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, investment from China comes in clusters, as an initial investment generally leads to follow-on joint ventures, eventually establishing an entire ecosystem. China has emerged as a key partner in constructing and funding several infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, such as the Padma Multipurpose Bridge project, several expressways, and power plants.33 As of January 2021, the government was implementing nine crucial development projects, such as the multilane road tunnel under the Karnaphuli River, with Chinese loans and credits worth $7.1 billion Despite all of this rapidly growingengagement, there are elements of Bangladesh's approach to China that have run into problems. The Rohingya conflict in Myanmar, which has led to an inflow of refugees in Bangladesh after sectarian conflict between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhist communities, has been a cause of great concern for Dhaka. It views China as capable of exerting influence on Myanmar, and the two sides have discussed the issue at the highest levels when Sun Guoxiang, special envoy for Asian affairs from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, met Bangladesh’s foreign minister in April 2017.59 China has tried to mitigate any negative Bangladeshi reaction to its stance by providing Rohingya-related aid on multiple occasions. For example, in June 2019 the two sides exchanged letters on providing rice aid to the refugees.60 However,Bangladesh believes geopolitics has come in the way of China doing more to resolve the issue despite promises. India and China are offering large sums of money for infrastructure projects in Bangladesh. Both are promoting large railway projects (low return investments that will do little for Bangladesh) and both are keen to get involved in building a deep- sea port in Bangladesh. But none of these projects are making much headway and efforts to build big coal-fired power plants have thrown up significant operational and environmental risks. So far the rivalry in infrastructure investment has produced limited tangible outcomes, with Bangladesh the loser. And India’s and China’s manufacturing and energy investments in Bangladesh remainextremely low despite promising intentions. China has long been the main supplier of military equipment to the Bangladesh armed forces. India is trying to catch up, but the Bangladesh military procurement office remains sceptical about the quality of Indian military hardware. South Asia's geopolitical environment is changing rapidly. Bangladesh is now at the center of China and India's strategic rivalry. The combined military exercise "China- Bangladesh Golden Friendship 2024," which featured hostage rescue scenarios and anti-terrorism operations, is one recent event that highlights this change.Strategic and Security Concerns: The increasing number of Chinese military exercises and the provision of advanced military hardware to Bangladesh, including submarines and fighter jets, heighten security concerns for India. These developments enhance China's strategic presence in India’s immediate neighbourhood, posing threat to India by potentially enabling Chinese military operations in the Bay of Bengal, thereby disrupting the regional balance of power. Economic Competition: China’s substantial investments in Bangladesh under the BRI, totalling over $38 billion, significantly overshadowIndia’s economic engagements. These investments, which include energy, connectivity, and infrastructure projects, may lessen India's economic power and influence in Bangladesh. The growing trade volume between China and Bangladesh, which reached $25 billion, exacerbates the trade imbalance in favour of China, potentially sidelining Indian exports and economic influence in the region. Bangladesh's heavy reliance on Chinese loans for BRI projects raises concerns about a potential "debt trap." Large-scale infrastructure projects often come with opaque loan terms and high-interest rates. If Bangladesh struggles to repay these debts, China could gain significant leverage over the Bangladeshi economy, dictating future policy decisions or even acquiring strategic assets. This economicdependence could limit Bangladesh's ability to pursue independent economic policies or forge closer ties with other partners like India. China's dominance in infrastructure development projects could crowd out Indian companies, hindering opportunities for regional economic cooperation and knowledge sharing. Additionally, BRI projects often prioritize Chinese labor and materials, limiting opportunities for Bangladeshi businesses and skilled workers to participate fully. Political Influence: China is contesting India's historical ties to and influence over Bangladesh by its steadfast backing of the Awami League, the ruling party in Bangladesh, and its non-interference in domestic affairs. India's capacity to retain good relations with any government, no matter which party is in power, is impacted by the geopolitical rivalry that affects Bangladesh's elections, as China and India compete for control over the political landscape. China has developed tight bilateral ties with nearly every South Asian state as it has become one of the world's most powerful economies. Over the past ten years, China has surpassed India as Bangladesh's top commercial partner. The two nations have also continued their tight security collaboration because China is Bangladesh's main supplier of defense equipment.Perhaps the most concerning aspect of China's strategy is the cultivation of an “all- weather ally" image. China's robust economic and military ties with Bangladesh create a perception of unwavering support, contrasting with India's occasional tensions with Bangladesh on issues like water sharing and border disputes. By positioning itself as a reliable partner regardless of the Bangladeshi government in power, China undermines India's ability to maintain a strong relationship. The upcoming Bangladeshi elections will be a turning point. Can India shed its old skin and project itself as a future-oriented partner? Or will China's carefully crafted persona of a non-interfering, reliable ally reshape the political landscape? The answer to this question will not onlyimpact India-Bangladesh relations but also influence the entire geopolitical calculus of South Asia. While China's short-term benefits are alluring, long-term strategic concerns and the potential pitfalls of debt dependency cannot be ignored. India, which seeks to retain its own hegemonic position in the South Asian area, is not fond of this kind of cooperation.