The London School of Economics and Political Science

Military Assistance as a Tool of 20th Century American

Grand Strategy: The American Experience in Korea and
Vietnam after World War II

Jonathan Freeman

A thesis submitted to the Department of International

Relations of the London School of Economics for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2018
 Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the
extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly
identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without my prior written consent.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of 73,576 words.
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language,
spelling and grammar by Marci Tanner Freeman, PhD.

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 Abstract

Military Assistance, the development and training of capacity and capability of

foreign security forces, has largely been ignored by the research community,
including the security studies research community. Military Assistance, as a tool,
creates the possibility of both positive and negative outcomes for both recipient and
providing nations, and as such it should be examined within the broader framework
of international relations, with regards to the projection and perception of power.
This research is timely and important, since Military Assistance is an actively
pursued security solution within the international system. With the growth of
Military Assistance missions around the world, from Iraq and Afghanistan to the
Central African Republic, understanding the dynamics that can create or facilitate
successful Military Assistance and its broader implications has become more
critical. As a tool of United States foreign policy, Military Assistance missions extend
United States power, while at the same time minimizing the risk of protracted
United States military involvement. Consequently, reliance on Military Assistance
has become the preferred method for pursuing strategic military direction and the
development of strategic alliances. This will be explored in two case studies: South
Korea and Vietnam.
This research study seeks to recognize and define the dynamics of successful
Military Assistance missions: more specifically, by defining its role in possibly
linking the development of an army and a broader strategic alliance between states.
I trace how the creation of capacities and capabilities establishes a more integrated
relationship between two states, and acts as a prime process to extrapolate and test
an applicable theory that can be used in multiple contexts. The goal of this research
is a better understanding of Military Assistance as an international relations tool
which can further strategic alliances and American Grand Strategy.

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 Acknowledgements

I would first like to express gratitude to Colonel (retired) Mark Childs and Team
Sandman with whom I served in training Iraqi Security Forces in 2007. COL Childs
took me under his wing, spending a great deal of time talking through training
foreign security forces. It was our talks that coalesced as the inspiration for tackling
this project.
Many years ago, Professor Stanley Hoffmann provided guidance and academic
mentorship when I most needed it. He was an old-school gentleman of the highest
class and the truest sense of the term. Sadly, he did not live to see this dissertation,
but I know that he would have been pleased that I have survived the journey.
Dr. Sean McFate, Dr. Mark Jacobson, and Professor Jay Parker have all been there
for me at key moments of this process. Dr. McFate encouraged me to start the
program when I was on the fence. Dr. Jacobson was a great friend at every juncture,
whether it was downloading a file that I could not access from London, or forcing
me to refine my question, he was a support for me when I needed it. Professor
Parker was a mensch in every sense of the word: writing recommendations for me
to get into LSE, advising me on things to consider in my case studies, and many late-
night talks — he was just great.
Professor Douglas Boyce, his wife, Melane Rose Boyce, and their son, Tiernan,
were incredibly kind to me, from long dinners of Peruvian chicken, to allowing me to
metaphorically cry on their shoulders. I feel privileged to call them friends.
Linda Kleckner and her son, Max, brought me into their home and lives in 2008,
and have been nothing but generous and supportive to me through this entire
journey.
General (retired) Walter Sharp and General (retired) Carter Ham were both
incredibly helpful at a few key moments. Each of their thoughts and insights were
impressive and timely.
Many thanks to General (retired) David Petraeus for his time.
Many thanks to the SDD office of the Joint Staff J-5 for their support.
Secretary, then General (retired), Jim Mattis could not have been more fantastic.
Initially only having 15 minutes for a quick phone call, he spent substantial time
with me, even offering thoughts and advice after our conversation. He is an officer
and a gentleman in every way.
General (retired) Paek Sun Yup is the last living general from the Korean War,
having started as a colonel when the DPRK invaded, and was Chief of Staff of the
ROK Army by the signing of the Armistice at Panmunjom. Many American officers
considered him as the finest soldier they had ever met in any uniform. He kindly
allowed me to speak with him, and was very helpful in filling in some details around
the war.
The Goodenough College community has proved to be a wonderful home away
from home, and I have appreciated my time and friendships formed here more than
I can express on these pages.

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 When I was in the middle of my tour of duty in Iraq training Iraqi Security
Forces, Major General (retired) Jonathan Bailey of Her Majesty’s Army, was kind
enough to respond to my email, and has over the years exchanged a number of
ideas, all of which I have appreciated, about the development of foreign security
forces.
Over thirty years ago, my father met his best friend, Barry, and over the years his
entire clan has warmly embraced me. This family specifically helped me on this
project by introducing me to a few people who offered key thoughts that helped me
with direction on a few of the case studies.
About ten years ago, I had the pleasure of reading Max Frankel’s autobiography,
The Times of My Life, My Life at the Times. It was incredibly inspiring, and I was
thrilled to speak with him in conjunction with this project. He had a number of
interesting ideas, which helped tremendously during my drafting of the Vietnam
case study.
Professor Theo Farrell and Professor Sir Hew Strachan were both kind enough
to meet with me early on in this project, and each had suggestions and
recommendations that proved invaluable.
In 2008, as I was leaving active duty in the United States Army, I met then
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl at Camp Funston on Fort Riley, Kansas. In his own
unique way, he forced me to seriously think about the question I was trying to ask,
and pushed me along on this journey.
Knowing Antonio Acuna since I was 16 years old, he was the first person I met
when getting off the plane in London, and has been a fantastic friend throughout this
process.
Darryl Poole remains one of the smartest people I have ever met, and he has
been incredibly encouraging and challenging in all the best of ways. His wisdom and
patience helped give me the confidence to push forward, and I have appreciated his
friendship over the years.
Scott Gould and I met about ten years ago and he has proved to be a fantastic
mentor and a steadfast friend. Specifically, when I was struggling on the final push
of writing, Scott gave me a dressing-down of epic proportions that was the exact
kick in the fourth point of contact that I needed to drive on. There is no question that
I was able to deliver on schedule due to his advice and stern talk.
Kathleen McInnis, is a fellow doctoral student to whom I am incredibly indebted.
A few years ahead of me in the process, she had fantastic advice for me at every step
of the way and was encouraging when I struggled. Her advice easily saved me a year
of spinning my wheels in the dirt.
Professor Peter Trubowitz, now Chair of the International Relations Department
at LSE, took the time to give me incredibly constructive criticism and guidance.
There is no question in my mind that this project is better for his input. I would also
like to thank Dr. Tarak Barkawi and the rest of the International Relations
Department staff for their assistance over the years. They have been supportive and
helpful at all the right times.
Professor Coker made this a relatively easy process, being timely and
constructive with comments, and always open to having a discussion on an issue. He

5
had advice when I needed it, and yet left me to my own devices to work things out. I
can only hope that, as his last doctoral student, he has been as pleased to have me as
a student as I have in having him as my supervisor.
It is with all love, gratitude, and profound thanks to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi for
his knowledge without which, I most certainly would have had a far more difficult
experience. Master John Douglas provided me with strength and guidance and
generosity of spirit for which I will be forever grateful. Also, the deepest thanks to
Dr. Robert Robb and Starr Fuentes for their wisdom and assistance.
My thanks to my two wonderful sisters, Eliana and Leela: I promise to be a better
brother. To my father, Marc, for resisting his impulses to ask me about my thesis
every time we spoke and only asking every other time. To my mother, Marci, who
with patience and perseverance read through every word of this dissertation, many
times, and gave amazing edits. She is the envy of every doctoral student I know and
made my entire journey certainly not easy, but easier.
Last but not least, to the next generation: my niece, Lillian Angeline Bolser. May
we leave you a better world than we found it.

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 Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother, Lillian Schneider Freeman,

and grandfather, Morris Irwin Tanner, with whom I had my first political arguments.
Knowing both of them the way I did, my grandmother would have been thrilled that
there was a “Doctor” in the family, and my grandfather would have wanted to know
how this degree would get me a job, only to be horrified that I spent all this time and
money to figure out a single problem and had no desire to use this degree for actual
employment.

I would also like to dedicate this dissertation to three friends who did not
survive the September 11th attacks: Gregory Richards, Jim Gartenberg, and NYFD Lt.
Harvey L. Harrell. I think of all three whenever I hear about 9/11 or remember that
morning when all of our lives would forever be changed.

Throughout the writing of this dissertation many good friends passed away,
which had an enormous impact on me. Major Lawrence “Roo” Yacubian and his
father, Larry, both of whom I was privileged to call friends. United States Navy
Captain Charles Spencer “Soupbone” Abbot who I have thought about almost every
day since his passing. Army Air Corps Captain Jerry Yellin, a World War II fighter
pilot, who was one of the finest men I ever knew. Victor Pardo who pushed me to
make an amazing journey. My dear friends Jim and Dr. Audri Lanford who could not
have been more supportive of my efforts. Lastly, my childhood friend Gabrielle Cran,
one of the kindest and gentlest souls I ever met, and who left far sooner than we
would have wished.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the Members of the Armed
Services of the United States of America. Serving side by side with these amazingly
brave men and women has been a privilege and an honor. To their families, I can
only say that the entire nation owes you a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid.

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 Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 4

Dedication 7

Introduction 9

Chapter 1: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy 35

Chapter 2: Military Assistance and United States Military Doctrine Post 9/11 64

Chapter 3: Military Assistance in Context of the American Military Experience 99

Chapter 4: The United States and the Republic of Korea:

A Case Study in Successful Military Assistance 129

Chapter 5: Vietnam: Military Assistance and the Origins of Failure 168

Chapter 6: In Summation:
Military Assistance in the Context of Warfare and International Relations 201

Bibliography 211

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 Introduction

Accepting broad strategic failure since World War II has never been easy for the
United States of America to admit, to itself or others. However, as many successful
leaders have found, understanding their failures can create opportunities to reach
their highest successes. The United States has experienced this in warfare as well,
having had initial struggles followed by victory in the War of Independence, the Civil
War, and World Wars I & II. Whether or not a cultural flaw, the United States has
had challenging military experiences since becoming a global power after WWII, and
central to that experience has been the pursuit to train and develop the capacities
and capabilities of Foreign Security Forces, or Military Assistance.

The United States has had a long relationship with Military Assistance, both as
recipient and supporter. Understanding this relationship is important due the
United States’ pursuit of Military Assistance missions numerous times since WWII
with varying results. In addition, the Unites States Army recently recommitted itself
to Military Assistance as an enduring capability, in the creation of the Security Force
Assistance Brigades.1 To this end, this research project explores the foundations of
the relationship between the United States and Military Assistance, along with its
application in the broader, geopolitical narrative, specifically, American Grand
Strategy. Ultimately, this research project probes whether conditions can be created
to result in more positive outcomes for the United States and its foreign nation allies
while contributing to the United States’ strategic goals.

From the policy perspective, the concept of Military Assistance became ever
more relevant during the time of this research. What many times the United States
has considered a secondary effort to combat operations is now2 at the forefront of

1 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Training Quick and Staffing Unfinished, Army Units Brace
for Surging Taliban,” The New York Times, January 26, 2018, accessed April 7, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/world/asia/afghanistan-army-
trainers.html. Morgan Smiley, "Security Force Assistance Brigades: It’s About Time,"
Small Wars Journal, accessed April 7, 2018,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/security-force-assistance-brigades-
it%E2%80%99s-about-time.
2 As of the writing of this section, in the winter and spring of 2018.

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military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On this point, the Secretary of the Army,
Dr. Mark Esper, recently stated that Security Force Assistance would be an ongoing
need for the Army. “My view right now is that with regard to irregular warfare,
we’re going to be engaged in that indefinitely. There will always be a need to help
build allied or partnered forces, so [the Security Force Assistance Brigades] can take
on that mission, which is far better than us doing it with our combat brigades’
soldiers.”3 This evolution in thinking by senior military leaders cannot be
minimized, as it is the first time that a leader of the Institutional Army4 has not only
declared that Military Assistance is important, but placed institutional resources of
money, manning, equipping, and training toward filling this gap.

On a personal note, while deployed in Iraq as a United States Army officer in

2007, I served as a member of a Training and Transition (TT) Team assigned to
train, advise, and assist in developing the capabilities and capacities of Iraqi Security
Forces, both Police and Military.5 While the American endeavor was both poorly
designed and executed during this time, the entire experience began an internal
dialogue of questioning how it could be done better. I had long conversations with
my team chief, a Special Forces officer who had trained Foreign Security Forces
around the world. Thinking that there must be a better method for such Training
and Transition Teams, and more broadly, the development of Foreign Security
Forces, I began to reflect on when and where in history this expansion of capabilities
and capacities had been more strategically created and implemented — where
Military Assistance emerged in context of a broader Grand Strategy.

3 Corey Dickstein, “Army Plans for More Security Force Assistance Brigades,” Stars
and Stripes, April 1, 2018, accessed May 9, 2018,
https://www.stripes.com/news/with-1st-sfab-deployed-army-looks-to-build-more-
adviser-brigades-1.519734.
4 The Institutional Army is the part of the United States Army responsible for

training, manning, and equipping soldiers for global operations. The Chief of Staff of
the Army is the most senior military leader of the Institutional Army.
5 Training and Transition Teams were formed in 2006 as part of an effort to train

and advise Iraqi Security Forces by the United States Army. Michael R. Gordon,
“Break Point? Iraq and America’s Military Forces,” Survival 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-
2007): 74.
10
 At the height of the British Empire there were numerous examples of developing
populations in many locales into competent forces fighting for the abstract concept
of “King and Country” — a king they had never met, a country they had never seen,
and no real emotional tie or connection to either. In one example, the Fourteenth
Army in World War II (WWII) under the command of Field Marshall William Slim6
featured thousands of soldiers from every corner of what was known as Pax
Britannia. Fighting in India and Burma as part of the Southeast Asia theater, the
Fourteenth Army constituted one of the least known but most important fronts of
WWII, as it supported China’s freedom to maneuver against the Japanese in the east,
while limiting any possible assistance between the Axis powers.7 Had those supply
lines and exchanges been opened, it is likely that the war would have taken far
longer to reach its eventual conclusion. This was just one instance unearthed in my
initial exploration of the history of Military Assistance that could be mined for more
exacting questions.

My first challenge forced a re-evaluation of comparing the development of

Foreign Security Forces under colonial rule versus those under the United States in
Iraq and Afghanistan: the obvious difficulty being the comparison of such dissimilar
concepts. In looking at the colonial dynamic, it was clear that colonial power existed
absent of other formal governing structures or organizations.8 Indeed, the British
colonial government was the only governing authority nationally existing in the case
of India, although in fairness there was long history of governance among the
various regions of India. In addition, there were similar examples around the globe
composed of Colonial Britain. In contrast, there is a great deal of debate in viewing
the present-day United States as a colonial power or even an empire.9 In spite of the

6 William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945
(New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 180, 181, 183, 185, and 195. Russell Miller,
Uncle Bill: The Authorised Biography of Field Marshall Viscount Slim, (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2013), 233-235.
7 Slim, Defeat into Victory, 373-376.
8 I certainly do not mean to imply in any way that these indigenous societies were

not capable of governing themselves absent colonial rule or that they had been
unable to do so prior to being colonized.
9 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First

Century (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), 47-48. Niall Ferguson, Colossus:
The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 3-9.
11
United States being the leader of many coalitions, each member of such a coalition
still acts, and more importantly, is empowered to act, within the norms of a
sovereign nation state, placing limitations on their participation within said
coalition. The United States may utilize diplomatic and economic incentives and
pressure with varying forms and methods of severity, such as in Turkey’s opening a
northern front during the Iraq War in 2003.10 However, as a broad point of national
policy, the United States has not pursued colonial endeavors in a similar manner as
the nations of Europe, although there are certainly examples to the contrary, such as
taking control of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other territories after the Spanish
American War. We can see, therefore, that the policy was inconsistent at best.11

In contrast, the coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom, had various forms of recognized international legal
authorities that enabled the coalition’s presence in both countries — sometimes
after the fact.12 In addition to working within a set of accepted international norms,
both Iraq and Afghanistan had recognized governments. While their local forms of
self-rule may differ from Western, liberal democracies, both maintain and
maintained some level of legitimacy and sovereignty. The United States’ coalitions
had created interim governing systems that were as democratic as possible under

Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the
Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 367-370.
10 Dexter Filkins, “Turkey Seeks $32 Billion for Helping U.S. in an Iraqi War,” The

New York Times, February 18, 2003, accessed April 24, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/18/international/europe/turkey-seeks-32-
billion-for-helping-us-in-an-iraqi-war.html.
11 William McKinley, “First Inaugural Address,” Speech, Washington, D.C., March 4,

1897, accessed April 8, 2018, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-

speeches/march-4-1897-first-inaugural-address. John L. Offner, “McKinley and the
Spanish-American War,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004):
50,52, 57, and 61, accessed May 24, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552563.
12 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373, “Threats to international peace

and security caused by terrorist acts,” September 28, 2001, accessed April 13, 2018,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001).
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1377, “Threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts,” November 12, 2001, accessed April 13, 2018,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1377(2001).
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1472, “Situation between Iraq and
Kuwait,” March 28, 2003, accessed April 13, 2018,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1472(2003).
12
wartime conditions, and these systems created frameworks for the governments in
Iraq and Afghanistan to come to power.13 This placed the United States in the
situation of having to support those governments’ independent sovereignty despite
their frequent resistance to the United States’ influence. This recognition led to my
understanding that to compare colonial governance with a relatively clear line of
authority to the complex systems and relationships in Iraq and Afghanistan would
attempt to contrast very dissimilar entities, prohibiting logical or consistent
conclusions. As such, this necessitated a step back to re-think the actual question to
be answered, which was to understand the “why” of Military Assistance rather than
the “what” or “where” or even “how” research questions, which have been discussed
in other research projects.

In summation, the two underlying questions being explored in this research

project are:

1. Why is Military Assistance a tool rather than a strategy?

2. Why was Military Assistance important in the context of Grand Strategy?

This research project probes these timely questions which are relevant for both
policymakers and academics. As noted, policymakers’ requirement to use Military
Assistance has not diminished in the post-September 11th world; if anything, it has
increased. As such, it is even more essential for policymakers to understand how
Military Assistance can help, and its limitations, in achieving their policy goals and
objectives. For academics, the concept of grand strategy become more relevant in
International Relations literature14 — a growing appreciation of the necessity of
broader, long term objectives as a focal point for national power. Consequently,

13 Mark Oliver, “The New Afghan Administration,” The Guardian, December 5, 2001,
accessed April 24, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/05/qanda.markoliver. Sharon
Otterman, “Backgrounder – Iraq: Iraq’s Governing Council,” Council on Foreign
Relations, February 2, 2005, accessed April 24, 2018,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-iraqs-governing-council.
14 Paul von Hooft, “Grand Strategy,” in Oxford Bibliographies, online edition, ed.

Patrick James, August 23, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018,

doi:10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0218.
13
exploring the relationship between Military Assistance and Grand Strategy is all the
more important due to the gap in the literature.

Definitions

Although the entire Chapter 2: Military Assistance and United States Military
Doctrine Post 9/11, is devoted to discussing military doctrine with these definitions
in far more depth, it’s essential to begin by establishing a fundamental
understanding and baseline appreciation of context for various terms used. As with
any research study of this magnitude, there are certain definitions and assumptions
that must be made, while other related subjects simply cannot be explored due to
time and space constraints. This section lays out the design and scope of concepts
discussed in this study that will lay the foundation of analysis undertaken. Outlining
multiple definitions surrounding the concept of Military Assistance is important
because Military Assistance itself, as a concept, it has been quite muddied,
consistently confused and used interchangeably with the concept of Military Aid. In
addition, Military Support is another concept that is sometimes used synonymously
with Military Assistance and Military Aid, and yet it is also quite different. Most
important to appreciate is the idea that each of these concepts — Military
Assistance, Military Aid, and Military Support — exists under the umbrella of
Military Intervention and the fundamentals of understanding the definitions of
warfare itself.

All too often, both in the realms of international relations and military strategy,
definitions and conventional wisdom result in some variation of United States
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s famous “I know it when I see it”15 construct
about obscenity. As in many scenarios of conventional wisdom, the “I know it when I
see it” phrase only offers a glimpse of the story; however, it is the entirety of the
concept, with all its nuances, that ascribes the challenges, difficulties, and the
importance of defining key terms. In an odd way, the very idea of war and warfare
has come to occupy this lexicon and definitional experience. The United States Army
specifically has evolved in its usage of terms for the concept of war. Past terms such

15 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 197 (1964).

14
as “full spectrum warfare”16 and “unified land operations,”17 to name a few, have
become technical terms for what the general public would commonly consider as
war — a vast array of armies, airplanes, and ships competing against one another
for destruction or domination. Images of war are condensed into soldiers fighting in
the trench warfare during World War I (WWI), enormous ships battling across the
Pacific Ocean during WWII, or bombs being dropped from airplanes during the
Persian Gulf War.

When Military Invention is discussed, it often evokes the popular idea of

physically placing forces into a foreign conflict where an altruistic intention may or
may not exist. Examples raised may include 1990 in Saudi Arabia, where the United
States planned to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.18 Another issue may be that of the
Russians coming into South Ossetia in 2008 at the defense — flimsy though it may
have been — to defend other ethnic Russians,19 or Yemen’s civil war with both Saudi
Arabia and Iran backing their respective factions under various trumped up
humanitarian goals, but actually competing for regional domination.20 Military
Intervention calls for situations that differ from traditional warfare, even though
war may be experienced as a result of Military Intervention. Military Intervention is
considered a broader term and concept, the general idea being a military partnering
with a foreign country, under which would be methods for how the military is
partnering, or intervening: through aid, assistance, or support. Military Intervention,

16 United States Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department
of the Army, February 27, 2008), 3-1.
17 United States Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Operations (with

Change 1) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 6, 2017), 3-1. United
States Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the
Army, December 6, 2017), 1-68.
18 Joseph P. Englehardt, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop

List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis” (Carlisle, PA: Army War College), 14-43,
accessed June 3, 2018, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234743.pdf.
19 CNN, “2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts,” CNN Library, April 3, 2008,

accessed June 3, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-

georgia-russia-conflict/index.html.
20 Kareem Fahim, “U.N. probe details fallout of proxy war in Yemen between Saudi

coalition and Iran,” The Washington Post, January 11, 2018, accessed June 3, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-probe-details-fallout-of-proxy-war-
in-yemen-between-saudi-coalition-and-iran-/2018/01/11/3e3f9302-f644-11e7-
9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html.
15
however, is defined within United States military doctrine as “[t]he deliberate act of
a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an
existing controversy.”21

Conceptually, there is differentiation between war and Military Intervention, and

this is an important distinction that enables properly placing Military Assistance
within its appropriate context. The best example to distinguish this difference
between war and Military Intervention is that of Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. Operation Desert Shield was the operation focused on the buildup of
resources and formation of the coalition seeking to remove Iraq from Kuwait in
1991,22 and more specifically, a Military Intervention, as it was the action whereby
the United States deliberately acted “to introduce its military forces into the course
of an existing controversy.”23 Operation Desert Storm was the actual war. These
distinctions are important because aspects of Military Intervention in the form of
Military Support, Military Aid, or Military Assistance can be introduced at any point
within an operation, including within the actual activity of war.

It’s equally important to clarify what is not Military Assistance. It is not the
equipment and/or training with that equipment, which would be defined factually
as Military Aid; it is not the humanitarian assistance given by a military to further
develop local relations. Military Aid is a popular tool of foreign policy, from the
United States and many other states — one of the most prominent examples being
the Lend Lease program during WWII. Indeed, one of the case studies that will be
discussed, Vietnam, began as a Military Aid mission, especially prior to the fall of
Dien Bien Phu and the French abandoning their claim. Military Aid is defined as the
act of supplying foreign security forces, official or otherwise, with military and/or
civilian equipment in order to contribute to the military and political goals of those
foreign security forces.

Military Support is not an often-used term but its concept, as defined for the
purposes of this research project, is often confused with Military Assistance. Military

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), GL-13.
22 Englehardt, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” 14-43.
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, GL-13.

16
Support is defined as the act of a military or coalition of similar capacity and
capability allying with another military with armed forces and equipment. An
example of Military Support is the United States becoming allies of the French and
British during World War One (WWI) and WWII. Military Support as a concept could
be considered problematic in the event that a hegemonic power such as the United
States uses its power to create or manipulate a coalition, as was thought by many
with regards to Operation Iraqi Freedom,24 although not relevant for this research
project.

Military Assistance does not refer specifically to training foreign security forces,
but to advising and mentoring. Professors Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy Kalinovsky,
in Missionaries of Modernity, clarify: “Mentors [trainers] practice a form of on-the-
job training and focus on developing the skills of individuals. Advisors, by contrast,
should be more focused on the organization within which individuals operate, even
if they may be assigned to advise a particular individual.”25 The authors continue to
note the frequent confusion between trainers and advisors, but simply distinguish
trainers as more often associated with Military Aid due to the relationship of
equipment and training on that equipment. Military Assistance, however, is defined as
the efforts that develop capacities and capabilities in a foreign security force with an
agreed-upon structure and doctrine understood by both the support nation and the
recipient nation.

As stated earlier, military doctrine will be analyzed in greater depth in Chapter

2; however, it is important at this juncture to clarify Military Assistance in the
context of what is known in the United States Armed Forces as Security Force
Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense. Security Force Assistance, or SFA, is
“Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US
Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign

24 Toni Erskine, “Coalitions of the Willing and Responsibilities to Protect: Informal

Associations, Enhanced Capacities, and Shared Moral Burdens,” Ethics and
International Relations 28, no. 1 (March 2014): 115-116, 121, and footnote 1.
25 Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, Missionaries of Modernity: Advisory

Missions and the Struggle for Hegemony in Afghanistan and Beyond, with
contributions by Paul Robinson, Bob Spencer, and Alfia Sorokina (London: Hurst &
Co., 2016), 21.
17
security forces and their supporting institutions.”26 Foreign Internal Defense, or FID,
as defined by United States Army Forces doctrine is “participation by civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”27
To the casual observer the definitions of Military Assistance, SFA, and FID may seem
somewhat redundant; however, FID by its very name focuses on internal defense,
SFA is more comprehensive and encompasses all forms of foreign security forces,
whereas Military Assistance, as I define it, is the only definition that stipulates the
relationship between the recipient and supporting nation.28 In addition, this
research project will not be using International Military Education and Training, or
IMET as it is known, for the simple reason that IMET happens in small numbers
rather than a wholesale institutional development of foreign security forces.

Thus, Military Assistance, Military Aid, and Military Support are all methods of
Military Intervention. It becomes essential to establish these definitions within the
context of this research project, since within the literature, United States Armed
Forces doctrine, and general usage these terms are used interchangeably and
inconsistently. None of these concepts should be considered as replacement for
“war” or “warfare,” whatever terminology used, although Military Support comes
closest. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, these concepts’ evolving definitions make it all
the more necessary to lay out a foundation of baseline understanding for this research.
Ultimately, any form of Military Intervention, whether it be Military Support, Military Aid, or
Military Assistance, applies the usage of military power and influence, thereby classifying
these as tools rather than strategies. In the usage of any tool, the “why” question is the
strategy. The goals and processes by which those goals are achieved — these are all aspects
of strategy.

26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense (Washington,
D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-11.
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, GL-7.
28 Afghan War News Staff, “Difference between FID and SFA,” Afghan War News,

accessed June 16, 2018,

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/differenceFIDandSFA.htm.
18
 The purpose of this project is two-fold: first, to explore and answer the question
about what conditions could and should contribute to a positive outcome for a
Military Assistance mission, but also to expand the understanding of Military
Assistance in the context of American Grand Strategy, ideally, to fill a gap in the
minimal literature surrounding Military Assistance. While grand strategy will be
explored in more depth in Chapter 1: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy, in the
context of defining terms here, it may be useful to discuss the term “grand strategy”
at this point. Basil Liddell Hart’s29 definition states that the purpose of grand
strategy “is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations,
towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by
fundamental policy.”30

The final definition to be explored at this juncture is the term “success.” Success
as a concept can refer to numerous events, like most definitions; however, there is a
specific application in the context of military action with regards to this research
project. Success should be considered the achievement of the military objectives of a
nation state for the purpose of securing political goals. Carl von Clausewitz’s treatise
On War states, “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent
to fulfil our will.”31 The idea of imposing a “will” onto an enemy is based on having a
political objective. Clausewitz considers that “war is to be regarded not as an
independent thing but as a political instrument,”32 and therefore war is that
continuation of efforts to achieve a political agenda or set of goals.33 This is not
intended to measure the rightness of the war, or the politics and motivations behind
war, but simply to state this constant observed in Military Intervention.34

29 Basil Liddell Hart was a British soldier, historian, and military theorist who
explored the field of strategy both professionally and academically.
30 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: 2nd Revised edition (New York: Meridian,

1991), 322.
31 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham, eds. F. N Maude and Anatol

Rapoport (Herfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 5.

32 Clausewitz, On War, 23.
33 Clausewitz, On War, 22.
34 Military Intervention can and should be seen as a concept of war by other means,

although the idea of Military Support would potentially look more like traditional
warfare. While there certainly are instances of tactical engagements of violence that
19
Furthermore, if war is to be regarded as continuation or a means by which that
political agenda or those goals would be achieved, then the basis of this must be
achieving military objectives, as this is the measurement of the completion of
military action. This is important because many consider success in context of
victory in battle, but as many wars have shown, it is altogether possible to achieve
military objectives in every battle but to ultimately lose the broader strategic war.
All this is to say that any form of success in warfare must ultimately complement a
political effort, and this is the rationale behind the definition of success stated above.

These definitions of success and the varying aspects of Military Intervention

comprise the foundation of understanding for this research project. They are by no
means the only definitions within this research project, but they are, thematically,
the baseline conception for the context of this research project. While there is plenty
of critique on Clausewitz’s thinking and philosophy, the relationship between war
and policy seems to have withstood the test of time and serves as a solid foundation
of rationale.

Methodology35

The methodology for this study will be historical case studies using the United
States as the main protagonist. Specifically, the United States as the supporting
nation should be considered the independent variable of this research study, while
the respective recipient nations in the historical case studies would represent the
dependent variable. It could be argued that since the Military Assistance is the
action or method by which dependence, in the variable sense, is created, then the
supporting nation, the United States, should be the independent variable, since the
recipient nations only have a relationship with the United States due to the Military
Assistance being given, at least as far as this research study is concerned. If this
research study was solely about Military Assistance as a concept then this argument

can be imagined within the umbrella of Military Intervention, the focus is to pursue
war through influence to achieve the political goals of which Clausewitz speaks.
35 This section was develop using Stephen Van Evera’s Guide to Methods for Students

of Political Science but there was no individual quote or specific reference for a
citation, thus the general citation here. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for
Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
20
would be far more relevant. However, since this research project is, in fact, about
Military Assistance as a tool, and specifically about how that tool contributes to
American Grand Strategy, then that argument does not stand.

American Grand Strategy exists and is conceptually independent regardless of

whether there is a nation receiving Military Assistance, and even regardless of
whether or not Military Assistance is utilized as a tool. This would beg the question
about why American Grand Strategy or Military Assistance as concepts are not
considered variables, independent or dependent. The issue with placing either
concept as a variable is that in this research project, and based on the question
being asked, both concepts should be considered constants rather than variables.
American Grand Strategy, while an ever-evolving construct, is, within the context of
this research project, a constant, in that it does not change between the case studies
being researched. Military Assistance, on the other hand, is more nuanced. On the
practical side, every military mission is different and no two Military Interventions,
even those between the same nations, will be exactly the same.36 This, again, is why
the application of the tool of Military Assistance is so important. Since the focus of
the research project is about the broader strategic examination of the application of
Military Assistance, the process of the application should similarly define Military
Assistance as a constant. More pointedly, the application of that constant with
respect to the independent variable, the recipient nation, and the dependent
variable, the United States as the supporting nation, creates the proper structure for
a research project.37

36 A perfect case of this is the two case studies on Lebanon outlined by Dr. Mara
Karlin in her book on building militaries. Mara E. Karlin, “Lebanon I: ‘The United
States is Short of Breath’ but Others are not” and “Lebanon II: ‘The Side that Won
was Willing to Kill and be Killed,’” in Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges
for the United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 108-147
and 148-192.
37 In one sense it could be confusing that the United States is thought of as the

dependent variable given that the United States provides the Military Assistance.
Since the underlying question of this research project is about the effect of Military
Assistance on American Grand Strategy, it is the United States that actually
experiences the effect.
21
 Within the methodology of this research project, a natural evolution of thought
when considering the concepts of Military Aid or Military Assistance is the relevance
of colonialism,38 the very construct of which involves enslavement, racism, and any
number of charged concepts that would create a difficulty in any research study.
While this research project touches on colonialism, it purposely avoids the topic, not
out of cowardice or intellectual dishonesty, but in the true belief that trying to
untangle the knot of colonialism does not assist in answer the questions
surrounding Military Assistance. As a result, this study is not intended to focus on
either colonialism or governance, since research into colonialism could easily
necessitate a drift into a complex, moral quagmire, and ultimately not answer the
question of focus of the research study. Similarly, research exploration of
governance would focus more on the question of “how” Military Assistance evolves
from the original conceptualization of policymakers,39 rather than an exploration of
“why” it can achieve its goal — a sustainable security in the nation receiving the
Military Assistance. However, it was

1. Necessary to have a context of the nations that receive Military Assistance

given their own history and experience with colonialism; and

2. Important questions about the underlying objectives of Military Assistance,

ideally the pursuit of a Grand Strategy, and the methods to reach such
objectives.

Due to these points from the perspective of developing the methodology for this
research project, I determined to study and understand these questions from a
qualitative approach rather than quantitatively. The rationale behind a qualitative
approach rather than a quantitative one is derived from the old saying that
“generals always fight the last war.”40 This stems from an appreciation that generals,
and even militaries as organizations, in addition to policymakers, tend to think

38 Anthony F. Lang, Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 197-198.
39 Karlin, “Understanding the Problem” in Building Militaries in Fragile States, 1-19.
40 This saying has numerous origins and references that are lost to time and history,

but this source provided the best synthesis. Charles Clay Doyle, Wolfgang Mieder,
and Fred R. Shapiro (ed), The Dictionary of Modern Proverbs (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2012), 94.
22
qualitatively rather than quantitatively, with a compounding body of literature
concerning this topic from Professor Graham Allison’s 1971 book Essence of Decision
to Robert Komer’s report “Bureaucracy does its Thing,” both of which delve into the
methods by which policymakers come to their decisions.41 While this should not
minimize the importance of data or a quantitative methodology, there is an
emphasis within military culture on history, and military history more specifically,
that creates an understanding for decision-makers, and right or wrong, this is how
many policymakers and decision-makers tend to view the world.

In his work on that subject, Analogies at War, Professor Yeun Foong Khong
wrote: “The way they [policymakers] have invoked historical parallels when
confronted with a domestic or foreign policy problem has ranged from the
implausible to the prescient.”42 He continues to describe how policymakers post-
WWI viewed the diplomatic inflexibility as the foundation for the alliances that
allowed what was a small regional conflict to escalate into the Great War. After the
Treaty of Versailles there was a desire for more conciliatory exchanges in order to
prevent hostilities, helping to drive the “peace in our time”43 narrative that led to
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the Munich Agreement. This, in
turn, led to a post-WWII environment in which the fear of conciliating to a Hitler-
like character developed into a deep concern, in that any form of diplomatic
capitulation would be considered an allusion to the Munich Agreement.44

In furthering Khong’s work, Professor David Patrick Houghton states that many
people, including senior policymakers, find themselves overloaded with
information. In the search for the ability to make a rational decision, people allow

41 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New
York: HarperCollins, 1995). R. W. Komer, “Bureaucracy does its Thing: Institutional
Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam,” The RAND Corporation, August
1972. David Patrick Houghton, The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy
Decision Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
42 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the

Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3.

43 Neville Chamberlain, (speech, 10 Downing Street, London, 30 September 1938),

Oxford Book of Quotations: 8th Edition, ed. Elizabeth Knowles (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2014), accessed April 8, 2018,
doi:10.1093/acref/9780199668700.001.0001.
44 Khong, Analogies of War, 4-5.

23
themselves to consider history, drawing satisfaction from the problem before them
that has existed before, or a similar type of problem whose solution therefore can be
referenced and categorized.45 Incorporating both Khong’s perception of
policymakers and Houghton’s view of history, the relevance to this research project
was to utilize a methodology that would be clearly relatable to the thought process
of policymakers.

Appreciating the basis with which to communicate this study, there are three
possible approaches specific to historical case study research: time-period analysis,
singular actor analysis, and regional analysis. A time-period analysis establishes a
method to examine multiple cases over a finite period, such as examining Military
Assistance from the years of 1950 to 1970. This is a challenging method for
examining Military Assistance due to the breadth of examples, and more
importantly in that the examination of a period of time for specific cases does not
guarantee an answer to the underlying question of the conditions that can affect a
successful or unsuccessful Military Assistance mission. Limiting the examination
focus on a period would create an artificial set of boundaries without creating a
more effective method to examine the variables of the case study, and at the end,
potentially create more challenges than solutions. However, there remains an
important element of time, in that focusing around a general but similar period
would minimize the differing factors that could create the conditions for successful
Military Assistance for the United States post-WWII. Like all projects of this nature it
is just as critical, and possibly more so, to clearly delineate what will NOT be studied
as much as it is defining the parameters of the research project itself.

Similarly, regional analysis examines cases in a specific geographic area such as

Southeast Asia or Africa. The weakness with solely using this method is that the
focus understandably and automatically becomes the region itself, and the possible
underlying variables that are most likely affecting the outcomes rather than Military
Assistance and its relationship to Grand Strategy. Another challenge that could
derail logical conclusions is that a regional strategy is more than likely to focus on
immediate outcomes in the diplomatic, development, or security areas of a region

45 Houghton, The Decision Point, 13-15.

24
that could vary from a broader grand strategy. At the same time, the strength of a
regional analysis is that the nature of the contrast is far more apparent, in that if the
result in one nation is vastly different than that of another nation, the factors that
have contributed to the differing outcomes or results are far more specific in what
may influence those variables, making this aspect fascinating to study and providing
a much-needed case study analysis.

This in no way mitigates the underlying challenge that what impacts one nation
in a region could very likely have little or no effect on another nation. However, this
challenge is minimized by broader construct of Military Assistance and its
relationship with grand strategy in this research project. That is to say, given that
this research project examines how Military Assistance is being applied with respect
to grand strategy, the comparison and contrast is more apparent due to the fact that
Great Powers had regional strategies and rarely approached international relations
as a “one-off” and a country by country approach.46 This is certainly the case in the
Cold War in the personification of the United States and the Soviet Union. Ultimately,
however, it is the separating of a regional strategy and a Great Powers’ grand
strategy, more specifically American Grand Strategy, where the problem begins.
That problem can manifest economically, diplomatically, or militarily, but the
shortcomings of a solely regional analysis case study-based approach seemed to
open too many variable interpretations, which prevented its adoption.

The singular actor method of analysis would examine Military Assistance

through the prism of a singular actor as either the supporting or recipient nation.
The challenge of using the recipient nation as the singular actor is that since support
has been applied in varying forms from multiple nation states, in the middle or
conclusion of conflicts, there is no clear line of correspondence drawn between the
application of Military Assistance and by whom, in order to illicit what type of effect.
Examples of this can be seen in Iraq or Afghanistan after the United States invaded
each respective nation, when a coalition of multiple nations, including the United

46 Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts:
Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War
Era,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 51-86, accessed August
1, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600907.
25
States, then participated (and as of this writing, are currently participating) in
developing the capacity and capabilities of Foreign Security Forces. This becomes
problematic from a logic perspective, due to the multiple types of support from
multiple actors that ultimately fail to allow enough commonality or consistency to
create a solid qualitative research methodology. Using a singular actor is therefore
most fitting in the context of studying Military Assistance, as using one source of
doctrine and relationship, while adding the flexibility of time and space, does not
confine or restrict this research project.

While recognizing the challenges and shortcomings, the primary method for this
study was determined to be the single actor analysis, using the United States as the
main protagonist. At the same time, this research incorporated time-period analysis
and regional analysis in order to examine the endeavor of Military Assistance as
thoroughly as possible, and to minimize the possibilities of effects from other
variables, as opposed to the application of Military Assistance. Using the United
States takes advantage of its long history of Military Assistance as a means of
expressing global presence and power, specifically being the main proponent of the
Military Assistance mission within the time-period of the Cold War from the West in
the context of the field of international relations. The time-period examined with the
case studies will be narrowed to a specific period in the relationship between the
United States and the recipient nation. In particular, the research will focus on the
period at the beginning of the relationship, when aspects of Military Assistance are
being explored and the Military Assistance effort is beginning to take hold. The
origins of the relationship appear to establish foundations from which the
remainder of the relationship can be examined, which is similar to the regional
perspective that is being achieved by examining recipient nations in a specific
region.

Case Studies

The case studies for this research project are South Korea and Vietnam,
examined before and after WWII. The reason for the focus of this period is due to
WWII’s marking a turning point in international relations, chiefly with reference to
the breakdown in prior global order, and foundation for the onset and development
of the Cold War. This time featured the collapse of empires and colonialism as a

26
viable construct, which manifested in a final breakdown of a pre-WWI imperial
global order. However, this research project overall avoids any focus on WWII itself.
War, sometimes referred to as full spectrum warfare, will be analyzed in Chapter 2.
Whereas the goal of Military Assistance is on the creation and maintenance of a
sustainable security, war, true warfare such as WWII, does not allow Military
Assistance to influence foreign policy. This is due to the complete focus on defeating
the enemy by actors in this type of war, as opposed to concerns regarding long-term
sustainable security.

It should be noted here that this is the main rationale for not including the
examination of Lieutenant General Stilwell in China during WWII as a case study.
Although Stilwell’s experiences highlight one of the main conclusions of this
research project, ongoing difficulties between recipient and supporting nation in the
event of no shared understanding of methods and goals, this partnership did not
emerge as a long-term Grand Strategy, as it did in the chosen case studies. While the
Stilwell example was a critical strategic element that prevented the victory of the
Japanese by the Chinese, the partnership did not play into a long-term Grand
Strategy in the way of this research’s case studies. Rather, it was the experience of
Military Assistance solely in a time of war.

This is the difference between the United States’ experience in China and South
Korea, as South Korea already had a Military Assistance effort well underway prior
to the Democratic Republic of Korea’s crossing the 38th parallel to start the Korean
War. In this example, the Military Assistance was implemented and tested during
war rather than organized due to it, such as in the WWII China example.

After WWII, as India and Pakistan regained independence from the British, and
the citizens of Algiers threw off French control, there was a general reordering of
the broader colonial world into the West, represented by the United States and
Europe, and the East, represented by the Soviet Union, China, and their assorted
allies. The United States was acknowledged as the leader of the West just as the
Soviet Union was the recognized leader of the East. The United States, like the Soviet
Union, utilized any number of tools to project its power and influence through
various forms of diplomacy, from economic influence to various types of Military

27
Intervention, with the Military Assistance mission being one of those tools within
the toolkit of options for American policymakers.

While each case — South Korea and Vietnam — has its advantages and
disadvantages, they mark a broad range of results, namely: clear success and clear
failure. When the foundations contributing to these advantages and disadvantages
are delineated and theoretically applied elsewhere in another time, these case
studies can indicate a broader argument creating the conditions for future Military
Assistance mission success. Due to the different outcomes, my conclusion will show
why these particular outcomes developed by differentiating common conditions can
be extrapolated, identifying a required quality or process for successful Military
Assistance missions and the goal of long-term sustainable security.

In the case of South Korea, the United States developed a more permanent
relationship with the Republic of Korea from the aftermath of the civil war on the
peninsula. This relationship was based both nations going to war together and like
brothers, they shed blood for one another. The United States operated under the
grand strategy that containment of communism was fundamental to its freedom.
Following the domestic belief that President Truman had “lost” China to
communism, the emphasis for the Republic of Korea to survive became a driving
force domestically. Consequently, the United States was determined to assist South
Korea at all costs, leading to a brutal and bloody war that lasted roughly three years.
After the Korean Armistice, the United States maintained bases and stationed tens of
thousands of troops in South Korea, supporting a Military Assistance mission for the
South Korean Army to this day. Meanwhile, South Korea developed from an
impoverished, backwater nation to one of the top economies in the world. While the
Korean War ended in a stalemate, this case study clearly exemplifies a successful
Military Assistance mission, one that ended in a long-term stable and sustainable
level of security.

The United States and Vietnam had a complex relationship due to military
actions: from the insurgent operations that occurred after WWII, followed by the
open warfare from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. This case study has many
disadvantages, given the nature of both the conflict and the breadth of research that
has been done on virtually every aspect of the conflict. Further challenging the

28
analysis is the fact that Military Assistance came in many different forms and was
sometimes interwoven with the Military Aid and foreign aid disciplines, such as the
case with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS
Program.47 This support program had both military and development personnel
assisting the Vietnamese on multiple aspects of both civilian and military
development of capacities and capabilities, in order to achieve a political outcome.
The CORDS programs, while being acknowledged, will not be examined due to the
emphasis on foreign aid as a core aspect of the program, which is not germane to
this project.

On a macro level, the United States’ policy operated on the domino theory with
respect to communism, that being if one state in Asia fell to communism, the rest
would likely follow, similar to that which occurred in the transformation of Eastern
Europe after WWII. As such, in order to isolate the logic which enabled comparing
and contrasting Vietnam with Korea, this research project ceased to examine
Vietnam’s situation after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964.48 The rationale
for this decision is that the Johnson Administration utilized this incident to justify
the change of mission, from a Military Assistance mission under the Military
Assistance Advisory Group to its eventual incarnation as the Military Assistance
Command-Vietnam. Although the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam was the
unit that operated from 1962 to 1973, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the troop
strength went from 23,000 to over 500,000, which completely transformed the face
and operations of the mission.49

47 Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency

Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” Military Review 86, no. 2 (March/April 2006):
77.
48 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,

Vietnam, 1964, vol. 1, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Simpson. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), documents 255-308, accessed August 1,
2018, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/ch8.
49 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Vietnam Conflict—U.S.

Military Forces in Vietnam and Casualties Incurred: 1961 to 1972," Table No. 590,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1977), 369.
29
 The United States’ and its allies’ recent military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq
have highlighted these strategies and concepts in the public sphere. With the
prominence of Military Assistance in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,50 it is understandable to wonder why this research project will not
be using either action as case studies. This is due primarily to the fact that it would
not be possible to determine whether this Military Assistance has been a success or
failure in developing or even contributing to a long-term sustainable security, given
the immediacy of each military experience. Even without the advantage of historical
perspective, however, both experiences of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan created a
scenario in which the responsible exit strategy for the US and its allies was to
pursue a strategy of Military Assistance.

Chapter Overview

Providing a roadmap seems necessary in a research project of this magnitude. As

discussed earlier, this research addresses a dual objective: on the one hand, to
clearly answer the question regarding Military Assistance, while at the same time, to
unequivocally identify the areas that are not being studied and stipulate why those
areas are not germane to question at hand. Thematically, however, the goal here is
to demonstrate how the basic questions of this research project are being answered.
That goal speaks to the “why” questions around Military Assistance classification as
a tool as opposed to a strategy (and the importance of that distinction), along with
the placement and positioning of that tool within a broader strategic framework.

The first chapter of this dissertation is an explanation of the relationship

between Military Assistance and American Grand Strategy. This relationship
formulates the basis for the dissertation, in that it places Military Assistance in the
framework of the tools required for policymakers to associate into the broader
environment of International Relations. This chapter begins to contextually answer

50 Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense Security Cooperation

and Assistance Programs and Authorities, Before the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, 114th Congress (March
9, 2016) (witnesses Mr. Jeffrey W. Eggers, Ms. Melissa G. Dalton, and Mr. Michael J.
McNerney). Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq: Developments in U.S.
Strategy and Operations and the Way Ahead, Before the Committee on Armed
Services, 110th Congress (September 10, 2008).
30
the second question of this research project: the importance of the tool of Military
Assistance within American Grand Strategy. The chapter also explores the necessity
of employing grand strategy as a great power in international relations. In addition,
this chapter avoids going too far into the history of international relations or grand
strategy, and yet provides the reader perspective to appreciate the questions being
asked and explored.

The focus of the second chapter is to elucidate a fundamental understanding of

how the United States Military considers the position of Military Assistance within
the context of its own doctrine. This includes the examination of what conflicts exist
within that recently-developed doctrine, and how these could be resolved. The
challenge with this section is one of military doctrine itself, in that it is not a static
phenomenon: all doctrines evolve, adapting to reflect new missions, equipment, and
strategy. Military Assistance and the doctrine surrounding it is no different. A
striking and timely example of an evolution in doctrinal terminology is that in the
time that this research project has been completed, the United States Army has
changed its term for warfare from “full spectrum war”51 to “unified land
operations”52 to “multi-domain operations.”.53 This is the nature of doctrine. This
chapter examines the basic views of strategic planning to determine how the United
States Armed Forces considers and does not consider Military Assistance within its
options of engagement for policymakers.

The third chapter offers a historic perspective and analysis of Military Assistance
to the United States Army and its predecessors in Colonial America. The goal of this
chapter was to create a structure which develops concepts and understanding to
appreciate how the United States Military views the historical context of Military
Assistance. This historical perspective stops at the early 1800s, due primarily to the

51 United States Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 3-1.

52 United States Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, 3-1.
53 David Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future,”

Military Review 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 6-12. There is yet a current debate to
change the term from “multi-domain battle” to “multi-domain operations” (Sydney J.
Freedberg, Jr., “Services Debate Multi-Domain: ‘Battle’ or ‘Operations,’” Breaking
Defense, April 10, 2018, accessed July 23, 2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/beyond-multi-domain-battle-services-
brainstorm-broader-concept).
31
fact that the United States rarely experienced Military Intervention as a recipient
nation after this period in the same manner as defined. The reason for this was that
the United States at that time developed an isolationist stance focused on internal
expansion, as seen in the Mexican-American War and Indian Wars. Between those
conflicts, the Civil War and questions regarding slavery dominated the attention of
the United States, until the Spanish-American War at the turn of the 20th century.
The United States Armed Forces are in reality deeply aware of their traditions and
history, and this chapter describes the role of Military Assistance in the formation of
many of these traditions, ultimately affecting its perspectives and attitudes, and its
perceptions regarding Military Assistance as a tool to utilize internationally.

The fourth chapter is the first case study on the relationship between the United
States and South Korea, how that relationship was created and developed based on
Military Assistance, and the experience of the Korean War. This case study is an
example of how successful Military Assistance, characterized by achievement of
military objectives in support of political goals, facilitated the strategic alliance
between South Korea and the United States, as well as factors that allowed the
Military Assistance to be successful. This case study demonstrates how Military
Assistance fits as a tool for the successful pursuit of those strategic alliances in the
broader framework of the International Relations discipline. Writing this case study
helped crystalize a necessity to evolve and refine the approach and research
question further, showing the need to incorporate the concept of strategic alliances
as an end goal of Military Assistance, and how that fit into a broader American
Grand Strategy. This case study also led to an appreciation about why considering
and assessing Military Assistance in a vacuum is unrealistic and indeterminate,
requiring a broader understanding while maintaining a specific focus. However, in a
more comprehensive sense, the Military Invention in the Korean War is an example
of the successful use of Military Support and Military Assistance.

The next chapter and second case study concerns what could only be considered
the most obvious failure in the history of American warfare, the Vietnam War. In its
quest to combat a perceived global threat of Communism, the United States found
itself immersed in the conflict in Vietnam. When this research project began, one of
the major goals was to avoid the Vietnam conflict in its entirety, considering it too

32
large and too complex to encourage detailed research. Furthermore, due to the
changing inflection points, as well as evolving political goals and military objectives,
a case study about Vietnam simply appeared to be a journey into an intellectual
quagmire and academic blackhole. However, as this project evolved, it became clear
that understanding the beginning of the Military Assistance mission in Vietnam was
crucial to appreciate how and why a Military Assistance mission can end in failure.
As it is often noted that we learn more from our failures than our successes,
understanding the failure of the Military Assistance mission in Vietnam was critical
to appreciating its utility within the toolset of American foreign policy. At the same
time, it is critical to recognize the extent to which the failures of Vietnam affected
the United States. These include concerns of political leaders too involved in tactical
military operations, such as planning bombing runs from the Oval Office, or
questions of draft dodging that plague political candidates to this day. The Army also
felt the trauma that the United States, as a nation, experienced, but it could be
argued that the Army did not learn the lessons from Vietnam, which led to both the
successes in the Persian Gulf War and the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan. While
there are a myriad of failures evident in the story of the Vietnam War, the focus of
this project will be on how the Military Intervention mission failed to link with a
consistent set of political goals, starting with the Military Aid mission, followed by
considering a Military Support mission to the French during the Battle of Dien Bien
Phu, and then evolving into the Military Assistance mission that eventually became a
basis for the Military Intervention effort that went disastrously wrong.

The final chapter is the summation of the findings in the research project,
wrapping up the thread of the questions posed at the beginning: 1. Why is Military
Assistance a tool rather than a strategy? and 2. Why was Military Assistance
important in context to Grand Strategy? This chapter also explains some of the
issues that time and discipline determined were unable to be explored in depth,
even given that these issues represent areas that could and should be researched.
That these have not been academically explored is possibly due to a serious lack in a
foundational literature surrounding Military Assistance, its nature and application.

Ultimately, the goal of this research project was to answer the question of where
the Military Assistance mission pursued by the United States represented a tool of

33
its foreign policy, and how it fit into the options for policymakers in the pursuit of
American Grand Strategy during the 20th century, eventually being applicable in the
current international security environment. This perspective additionally includes
understanding how the lessons learned from these experiences might be applied to
current alliance development through Military Assistance by the United States.
Furthermore, the underlying factor that seems to differentiate successful Military
Assistance from a failed one is the clear linkage to a broader, achievable political
goal. As linking military objectives to political goals is hardly a new concept, the case
studies indicate the challenges of these linkages due to political leaders who failed
to operate under a more inclusive strategic framework with respect to international
relations, and military leaders who failed to challenge the political leadership to
insure such a linkage.

Conclusion

The practical and theoretical underpinnings of Military Assistance are military

power and its application, either through warfare or some other construct of
international relations. While this research project addresses that aspect of Military
Assistance which is a part of warfare, the more important aspect is to further
understand international relations, very much within the rubric established by
Clausewitz and political goals. This project will show that Military Assistance is a
tool of military power, not a strategy, and has more substantial ramifications than
that of the pursuit of war. This broader application explored is one whereby Military
Assistance plays a key role in the creation or continuation of long-term sustainable
security within the context of American Grand Strategy.

34
 Chapter 1

Military Assistance and Grand Strategy

Within the various topics of International Relations, the idea of “Grand

Strategy” is a relatively new one, coming into the academic lexicon in the 1920s
with Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s classic work, Strategy.1 As Professor Sayle
mentions in his article, Liddell Hart’s comment about Grand Strategy states that,
“the term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution.’
For the role of grand strategy — higher strategy — is to coordinate and direct all
the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the
political object of the war — the goal defined by fundamental policy.”2 Although
a more recent academic concept, nation states have had and pursued grand
strategies since their origins, whether it was the tribes of Israel in biblical times,
the city-states of Thucydides’ Greece, or the empires that developed to expand
their influence far past their shores. Each sought to pursue an agenda with their
rivals, clients, and others, in order to further their interests while utilizing all of
their nation’s resources and power.

Whether through expansions of power or engagements with others through

alliances or simply a refusal to recognize other states, all were grand strategies
being pursued in the context of international relations. Those grand strategies
can be encapsulated and conceptualized as the following: engagement, selective
engagement, and isolation.3 There is also a sense that a grand strategy should be
global in its pursuit and should define a nation’s sense of its place in the world

1 Timothy Andrews Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy,” The Telegram
4 (January 2011), accessed 27 February 2017,
http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/defining-and-teaching-grand-strategy.
2 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: 2nd Revised edition (New York: Meridian,

1991), 322.
3Foreign policy thinker, Ian Bremmer, in discussing the next steps for American

foreign policy, refers to the United States as having three choices: Independent
America, Moneyball America, and Indispensable America. Ian Bremmer,
Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World (London:
Portfolio/Penguin, 2015).
35
and world order, along with the willingness to pursue that grand strategy with
all levels of its power and influence. In this sense, it is difficult to imagine that a
weak or small state could pursue a grand strategy, and thus it has generally been
the purview of a Great Power. This chapter will seek to explain Military
Assistance in the context of grand strategy more inclusive and American Grand
Strategy more specifically.

The realization of a necessity of security in general relates to Military

Assistance in that security, or the need for safety, acts as the link or glue between
Grand Strategy and Military Assistance. That connection draws upon the
fundamental need for the population of a nation state to feel secure, with respect
to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.4 With that fundamental need for security, an
external actor can utilize Military Assistance as a tool of grand strategy to
facilitate that need for security. This becomes an effective method of connection
and dependency between a recipient nation and a supporting nation, which is
the external actor.

Modern American Grand Strategy has been most traditionally recognized as

the broad, strategic thinking that challenged Communism in the post-WWII
bipolar global order. As the WWII fighting alliance that was commonly known as
the “Allies” but in fact founded under the lofty name of “United Nations”5 began
to dissolve in the aftermath of WWII, the rise of what is known as the liberal
world order came into fruition in the form of institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Security Council, the
North American Treaty Organization, and others. In one sense these institutions6

4 A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4

(July 1943): 379, accessed April 12, 2017, doi:10.1037/h0054346.
5 Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N. (New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 110. William Manchester and Paul Reid,
The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill Vol. 3 Defender of the Realm, 1940-1965
(New York: Little Brown and Company), 461.
6 It is important to note that these institutions that were considered the liberal

world order were as much about maintaining and spreading capitalism as they
were about collective security. It was thought that the protectionist economics in
the aftermath of the Great Depression helped prolong and deepen the economic
challenges for many, giving rise to the hyperinflation that led to the Nazis gaining
power in WWII. Paul N. Hein, A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern
36
came into being in the hopes of creating an international forum that would be
more successful than the ill-fated League of Nations, the international institution
created in the aftermath of WWI.7 In another sense there was an underlying
effort to link nations together economically to prevent the terrible cost of global
wars; the idea was that where diplomacy had failed, economic dependency and
the threat, rather than the application, of military force could succeed.

Success in the case of the liberal world order may be defined as an

environment that would allow for a peaceful discussion of disagreements
between nation states without escalating into the outbreak of another global
conflict. However, an additional intention of the Western Powers in the founding
of those military and economic organizations was to prevent the rise and
expansion of Communism throughout the world. The Western Powers’
perspective was that a community of many nation states committed to the
betterment of all would be far more successful than the closed, controlled system
of Communism practiced by the USSR and its satellite states, and this would be
attractive to the various smaller potential client states throughout the world.8
The construct of this engagement type of Grand Strategy was endemic over many
decades until the fall of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However,
this was not the first time the United States had pursued or developed a
purposeful Grand Strategy.

John Quincy Adams and America’s First Grand Strategy

The history of American Grand Strategy is in one sense synonymous with the
history of the United States. The origins of American Grand Strategy can be found
within the Farewell Address written by outgoing President George Washington.
As he commented, “With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain

Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930-1941 (New York:
Continuum, 2002), 394-395.
7 Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and

the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1990), 1-2.
8 This is important with reference to grand strategy in that as Liddell Hart stated,

it was about coordinating and directing all elements of a national power. Liddell
Hart, Strategy, 322.
37
time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to
progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which
is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.”9
Many have incorrectly interpreted these comments as the original impulse
toward an isolationist grand strategy,10 but this is a clear misreading of the text.
Washington’s point “to progress without interruption to that degree of strength
and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of
its own fortunes” is an indication of his considered and balanced statecraft.

This perspective developed in his years overseeing the need for the young
United States to find its own place within the broader array of 18th century
nation states without suffering through the challenges and interference of
alliances, wars, and other such events that could weaken the United States before
it had “command of its own fortunes.” Washington had seen how the competing
interests of the European nations created conflict. In fact, he and the United
States had been the direct beneficiaries of such a policy, as the French competed
with the British for spheres of influence and extensions of their respective
empires, resulting in French support of American during the War of
Independence. While from one perspective Washington’s Farewell Address is a
distinctive advocacy of an isolationist grand strategy, the more nuanced
understanding is that he had intended to allow the young nation its breathing
room to grow, eventually enabling the United States to develop a stable, strong
position in the world and in global affairs.11

9 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796, page 30,

accessed August 8, 2016,
http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents_gw/farewell/transcript.html.
10 Paul O. Carrese, “George Washington’s Legacy as a Foreign Policy Guide,” in

Public Discourse, October 22, 2012, accessed May 23, 2017,

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/10/6688.
11 John Avlon, Washington’s Farewell: The Founding Father’s Warning to Future

Generations (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2017), 185-186.

38
 The next chapter came from the son of Washington’s successor. President
John Quincy Adams12 is identified as both the son of President John Adams and
one of the less-skilled presidents of the young republic, even “by his own
admission his single term was a failure.”13 While John Quincy’s presidency ended
in disappointment, and eclipse by the rise of the Jacksonian era, the position that
prepared him for the presidency and should enshrine his place in history was his
role as Secretary of State for James Monroe. This was the position in which John
Quincy would create a place for the United States in global affairs within the
Commonwealth of Nations, and redefine American Grand Strategy through the
development and drafting of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine was critical to the evolution of the United States for
many reasons, not least of which being an establishment and change in American
Grand Strategy. Washington’s farewell address demonstrated both practical and
strategic thinking, specifically as it related to international relations,14 but other
presidents directly after Washington changed directions entirely. Presidents
John Adams, Jefferson, and Madison decided to involve the country in
international matters, rather than heeding Washington’s warning to allow the
United States to establish itself before engaging abroad. These series of
involvements culminated in the War of 1812 and the destruction of Washington,
D.C. by the British. Heeding the lessons of President Madison and through the
work of John Quincy as Secretary of State, Monroe’s presidency became the first
presidential administration to establish a defined Grand Strategy, through the
Monroe Doctrine. This Grand Strategy stated that the United States would
establish its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere and would protect
its interests and influence there if necessary.15

12 To more easily distinguish between John Quincy Adams and his father, John
Adams, John Quincy Adams will be referred to as “John Quincy” and his father,
“John Adams.”
13 Lynn Hudson Parsons, John Quincy Adams (Lanham, MD: Rowman and

Littlefield Publishers, 2001), xvi.

14 Washington believed it prudent to avoid the international entanglements of

Europe that he thought could lead to ruin for the young nation.
15 It is important to note that there is no desire to give an excuse or lend

credibility to some of the actions taken by the United States in pursuit of

39
 Another aspect of the Monroe Doctrine is that it was the first time in the
nascent nation’s history that it separated itself from the political dynamics of the
European nations. As a small nation on the edges of empires, the United States
was essentially a pawn in the various conflicts of Europe, being swept up into
broader wars between various great powers. The conflicts of the United States
from the French Indian War through the War of Independence to the War of
1812 were all, by some extension, simply different conflict theaters of European
wars. The Monroe Doctrine declared to those European powers that the United
States would no longer engage in European conflicts. It could be argued that this
concept has become so ingrained within the identity of the United States that it
formulates a foundation of resistance that prevented immediate entry into the
global conflicts of WWI and WWII.16 From this perspective, it could easily be
seen that the United Stated was in actuality creating a sense of isolationism, to
literally and figuratively detach itself from European wars and power
dynamics.17 However, this does not support the concept that the Monroe
Doctrine actually represented, more a statement on the advent of selective
engagement, in that the doctrine solidified the terms under which the United
States would engage in global affairs.

John Quincy had what could only be described as an excellent background to

become Secretary of State. While his father, John Adams, served the nation as
first Ambassador to the Court of St. James in Great Britain, he brought his son,
John Quincy, as his assistant. After the completion of his formal education, John
Quincy became the ambassador to the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia,
culminating in following his father’s footsteps as the Ambassador to Great
Britain. John Quincy had a front row seat to observe the European Powers using
their economic might, diplomatic skill, and finally, military power in pursuit of

maintaining dominance in the Western Hemisphere, especially during the Cold

War. The general point is to merely acknowledge that the Monroe Doctrine is an
established tradition in United States foreign policy that has been maintained
since the Monroe Doctrine’s inception.
16 Marco Mariano, “Isolationism, internationalism and the Monroe Doctrine,”

Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, no. 1 (March 2011): 36-39, accessed June 20,
2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14794012.2011.550776.
17 Mariano, “Isolationism, internationalism and the Monroe Doctrine,” 40.

40
their ability to best one another in a seemingly endless struggle for continental
dominance. As the first ambassador to Russia, he witnessed the Napoleonic Wars
first hand.18 As these wars were the birthplace of a major cornerstone of military
strategy, Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, so too were they the beginning
conceptualizations of American Grand Strategy. However, it is important to note
that Clausewitz’s On War was a book on military strategy, and not about Grand
Strategy. Professor Charles Edel describes, in his book on Grand Strategy and
John Quincy Adams, the misconception that Grand Strategy must be developed
prior to implementation or even success: “While [John Quincy] Adams acted
broadly according to his grand strategy, he was also prepared to adjust when
necessary….Adams’s grand strategy helps explain why America’s rise from a
confederation of revolutionary colonies to a continental power was not an
inevitable result of resources and demographics, but rather the product of a
deliberate pursuit. And because grand strategy is assessed not only at a national
level, but also at the personal level, it allows for an analysis of what occurred
when certain principles, values, and priorities were in conflict.”19

By way of advice from his father, the previous American Ambassador twenty
years prior, John Quincy gained an understanding of the value of taking his first
post in The Hague. He acknowledged that his was a unique opportunity to view
the politics of Europe and in comparison, those of the United States. Europe in
the late 18th century was awash in revolution and political instability, and this
was the political uncertainty feared by John Quincy and the Founding Fathers.20
Professor Edel articulated a key point: “He [John Quincy Adams] came to
understand that without security, the nascent republican principles and
institutions would not survive in a world dominated by militarized empires.”21
That instability was fueled by nationalist moods of the population due to a

18 William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 7-8.
19 Charles N. Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of

the Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 10.

20 Edel, Nation Builder, 58-61.
21 Edel, Nation Builder, 62.

41
buildup of debt from wars and elites ignorant of the plights of their citizens.22 By
its logical conclusion, there was a recognition that if security could be developed
and managed without the cost of war, there would naturally be a lessened impact
on the population, and with this rational, John Quincy appreciated that security
was necessary to protect America. This foundational notion of John Quincy’s, as
he formulated his concepts of Grand Strategy and America’s place in the world,
could not be more relevant to the concept of Military Assistance. It is incumbent
on a Military Assistance mission to have purpose, a strategy, that ideally links
with a grand strategy.

Support for this conclusion is found in recent memory, for the Iraq War offers
an interesting similar example of security as it relates to Grand Strategy and
Military Assistance. When General Petraeus took command in Iraq, he stated:
“the term ‘secure’ is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of
an area or terrain feature and to protect it from the enemy. Thus, the tasks will
be clear-cut, though difficult. Certainly upcoming operations will be carried out
in full partnership with Iraqi forces, with them in the lead whenever possible and
with arm’s length when that is not possible.”23 While it could easily be argued
that the tasks were anything but clear, there can be no question that General
Petraeus, based on his own Congressional testimony, saw the Military Assistance
mission in Iraq as a critical effort to establish security for the Iraqi population. It
was the security General Petraeus sought to establish that was fundamental to
linking his efforts to a broader strategic effort in the War on Terror, even though
a Grand Strategy in the War on Terror had not been readily apparent.

John Quincy’s career arc reinforced this critical understanding of the

principal need of security for the general public; however, his key question then
considered was, “What next?” As wars continued to consume the European

22 George Rudé, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France

and England, 1730-1848 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1964), 6-11.
23 David H. Petraeus, “Opening Statement,” United States Senate, Armed Services

Committee, January 23, 2007, recorded by Federal News Service and reprinted by
The New York Times, accessed August 20, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/middleeast/24petraeustextcnd.h
tml.
42
Powers, John Quincy commented to his father about the benefits of the United
States’ continuing policy of neutrality.24 In a sense, John Quincy’s comments were
a forerunner to George Washington’s Farewell Address, later in the same year.
This is by no means a statement that John Quincy influenced Washington’s
thoughts on the matter of neutrality, as it would be a stretch of the imagination
for John Adams to consider sharing his son’s thoughts with President
Washington. It does indicate, however, that there was common thinking between
Washington and John Quincy in their assessment of a need for American
neutrality and divorce from European machinations. More importantly, John
Quincy’s thoughts on the issue were more extensive than Washington’s
published Farewell Address, and displayed an appreciation that neutrality was
not an ongoing Grand Strategy, but rather a temporary policy that recognized the
United States’ ability to influence events, which was to say, minimal at that
point.25

Security and Power Projection

In the context of Military Assistance this idea of a temporary strategy versus

an actual Grand Strategy is interesting and relevant. In order to be successfully
implemented, the tool of Military Assistance must support the Grand Strategy of
the supporting nation: on a practical level, this could not be considered an act of
neutrality according to John Quincy’s line of thinking. However, as discussed,
Grand Strategies can take many forms, though certainly not at the same time.
When the United States pursued a grand strategy, be it engagement, selective
engagement, or isolation,26 Military Interventions can and have been used to
further that Grand Strategy. For example, when the United States pursued a
grand strategy of isolation prior to WWII, it utilized Military Aid in the form of
the Lend-Lease Act, allowing the United States to arm the Soviet Union, China,

24 Edel, Nation Builder, 83.

25 Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 24 June 1796, in Writings of
John Quincy Adams, 7 vols, ed. Worthington C. Ford (New York: Macmillan, 1913-
1917), 1:497-508. Initially found through Edel, Nation Builder, 83.
26 Bremmer, Superpower, 25-26.

43
Great Britain, and others.27 When the United States chose a grand strategy of
selective engagement, such as with China in WWII, Military Assistance was the
tool of choice.28 Finally, when the United States chose a grand strategy of
engagement in WWII, it pursued an option of Military Support, in addition to
Military Aid, prior to full commitment to the war.29

Temporary strategies, however, make less sense to utilize Military

Assistance, such as the neutral stance the United States took at its inception in
the 18th century. The reason that a temporary strategy, like neutrality, does not
work for a Great Power is that by its very definition it is transitory, in that it
primarily is the movement from one permanent grand strategy to another. In
general, these are a function of the flow of time, and the tools of Military
Intervention will have difficulty fitting into the temporary strategy box.
Specifically, Military Assistance as a tool of foreign policy must focus on
supporting a specific end state and political objective.

Recall that John Quincy viewed the War of 1812 from the Russian Court of the
Tsar, and the second rise of Napoleon from his next posting at the British Court
of St. James, providing him with a unique perspective. Seeing these events from a
distance metaphorically as an ambassador and their impact on American
prestige and influence had a profound effect on John Quincy, who became more
convinced of the necessity of power projection — essentially adopting the realist
school of international relations.30 It is important to note that John Quincy came

27 Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, eds., “Lend-Lease Act,” in The Reader’s
Companion to American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 649.
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1944), 73 and 89-98.
28 Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945

(New York, 1971), 1-5 and 529-531.

29 Well before the United States declared war on Japan and Germany, December

8 and 11, 1941 respectively, the draft began over a year before with the
knowledge that support would be provide to the United States’ allies. The
National WWII Museum, “Research Starters: The Draft and World War II,” The
National WWII Museum, accessed May 8, 2018,
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-
resources/research-starters/draft-and-wwii.
30 Edel, Nation Builder, 101-102.

44
to this conclusion having considered the experience of the United States during
the War of 1812, as it dealt with the small standing army and navy left by
President Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans.31 This adoption of the
Realist school of thought could seem to be the antithesis of the Jeffersonian
model of a more liberal political philosophy, a belief in the rationality of
populous, or, rule by the governed. While it is true that John Quincy aligned
himself politically with Jefferson after his father left office, his commitment to a
more established central government did not change.

He noted, “But the surest pledge that we can have of peace will be to be
prepared for war. The peace of [the Treaty of] Ghent did not settle any of the
contests for which the war had been waged, because the peace in Europe had
removed the causes of the contest.”32 This comment bears a striking resemblance
and parallel to the statement made by President Washington in his first State of
the Union, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of
preserving peace.”33 The difference between the two comments is that in John
Quincy’s letter, he broadly addresses the need to employ Realism within the
construct of international relations and the ability to project power, whereas
President Washington’s statement is a point of departure without a clearer or
expansive meaning.

John Quincy, however, understood that the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the
War of 1812, was not agreed to by force of arms, but rather because the strategic
necessity for warfare by the aggressor, Great Britain, simply dwindled away.
John Quincy was confirming a greater acknowledgement of where military
power fit within the nature of Grand Strategy, rather than the ideology of his
current political party. The application of this entire experience for John Quincy

31 James Scythes, “Military Peace Establishment Act,” in The Encyclopedia of the

Wars of the Early American Republic, 1783-1812, vol. 2, ed. Spencer C. Tucker
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 422-423.
32 Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Plumer, 5 October 1815, in

Worthington, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, 5:400-401. Initially found

through Edel, Nation Builder, 102.
33 George Washington, “First State of the Union,” January 8, 1790 in New York,

NY, accessed March 25, 2017,

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0361.
45
led to his position as one of the early leaders of the United States who
understood and appreciated the “where” and “how” of the application of the tool
of military power with respect to Grand Strategy, essentially understanding the
linkage between the two. That understanding is relevant to the relationship
between Grand Strategy and Military Assistance, in that Military Assistance, like
any other application of military power, also requires such a linkage.

It is in this regard that Military Assistance can be viewed as a tool for a

similar projection of power. Whereas in the 18th and 19th centuries, power
projection meant influence through colonies and naval presence on the high seas,
in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, power was projected through colonial
empires where resource extraction became a main focus. However, in the post-
WWII era, where colonialism began to be considered a national form of
enslavement, powerful nations more specifically required a more extensive set of
options to apply power and influence. Whether hard power or soft power is
projected, all are ultimately tools of Grand Strategy. This connection thereby
relates back to Liddell Hart’s original definition, in that both hard power and soft
power in pursuit of a policy objective inherently marshal the resources of a
nation. John Quincy, in his own time, wrestled with these concepts in how most
advantageously to project without threatening the European Powers — trying to
digest and develop an appropriate grand strategy for the day and age.

Examining Hard and Soft Power with Respect to Grand Strategy

It is important to note that Military Assistance is the product of both hard and
soft power. Given its military basis, the relation to hard power is clear, but
considering that Military Assistance is also an aspect of soft power is a little less
obvious. Professor Joseph Nye stated that “soft power rests on the ability to
influence others”34 but that it “is not merely the same as influence.”35 He
expanded in a later journal article, “Hard power is push; soft power is pull. Fully
defined, soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by

34 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004), 5.
35 Nye, Soft Power, 6.

46
the ‘co-optive’ means of framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive
attraction.”36 Military Assistance by its very nature is dependent on “persuasion”
and “positive attraction” on a tactical basis as the manner of conduct between
supporting trainers and receiving trainees. However, as a broader tool of
American foreign policy, Military Assistance cannot help but become a projection
of soft power. Nye agreed, pointing out that “The military can also play an
important role in the creation of soft power. In addition to the aura of power that
is generated by its hard-power capabilities, the [United States] military has a
broad range of officer exchanges, joint-training, and assistance programs with
other countries in peacetime.”37 This projection exists in the experience of
soldiers serving side by side under austere and challenging circumstances,38 but
more importantly in the exchange of values. These values vary depending on the
unit and the understanding of the mission: for example, from the torture that
occurred in Abu Ghraib, to the communications of fundamental values of the
United States Military, such as civilian control of the military. Whatever they
result in formulating, these values contribute to the soft power that John Quincy
understood, while at the same time recognizing the necessity for hard power to
support it.

In the days that inaugurated John Quincy’s tenure as Secretary of State, the
State Department had a wide range of responsibilities in addition to the duties of
foreign relations, from patents to the monitoring of laws in each of the states.
Interestingly, almost two centuries later, Secretary Powell, understanding the
pains and pressures of time and works schedules, would specifically schedule

36 Joseph Nye, "Power and Foreign Policy," Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1
(2011): 19, accessed March 27, 2017,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2158379X.2011.555960.
37 Nye, Soft Power, 116. As a side note, it is very likely that Professor Nye was

referring to foreign assistance when discussing “assistance programs” in this

quote.
38 General Paek Sun Yup, the last living general officer from the Korean War,

described how Korean soldiers would come back from serving in United States
Army units with a newfound craving for coffee. Paek Sun Yup, in discussion with
the author, November 11, 2015.
47
time on a regular basis to simply think.39 John Quincy, however, had a staff of
only ten. The sheer volume of critical needs from numerous directions over-
burdened this small staff, implementing the movement to segment and create
efficient processes in order to develop effective administration of departmental
responsibilities. This eventually enabled all involved to afford time to think, and
by so doing, to appreciate the global dynamics afoot and their effect on the
United States in the beginning of the 19th century that would allow them the
opportunity to contemplate and develop America’s first Grand Strategy.40

Formulation of the First American Grand Strategy

Interestingly, it was the British, and more specifically, the British

Ambassador to the United States, Stratford Canning, who happened to be the
foreign minister’s cousin, who instigated the discussions that developed both
John Quincy’s ideas of American Grand Strategy and the Monroe Doctrine in
1823. Through various treaties, wars, and agreements the United States had
acquired the territory of Florida, negotiated access rights in the Pacific
Northwest, and agreed to relinquish its claim on Texas. Ambassador Canning
sought John Quincy to discuss a broader alliance, essentially a “special
relationship,” because the United States and the United Kingdom were more
closely aligned in governing styles, language, and relations than other nations in
Europe. Due to this alignment, Ambassador Canning proposed that both nations
should ally together with the intention to prevent any further expansion or
influence of other nations in the Americas. President Monroe and much of his
Cabinet were impressed by the offer, but John Quincy disagreed, understanding
that this offer gave the British a great deal while limiting the United States’
opportunities.41 John Quincy stated to the Cabinet, “we give her [Great Britain] a
substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge against ourselves, and really obtain
nothing in return. Without entering now into the enquiry of the expediency of
our annexing Texas or Cuba to our Union, we should at least keep ourselves free

39 Daniel Patrick Forrester, Consider: Harnessing the Power of Reflective Thinking

in Your Organization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 66.
40 Edel, Nation Builder, 107-116.
41 Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire, 180.

48
to act as emergencies may arise, and not tie ourselves down to any principle
which might immediately afterwards be brought to bear against ourselves.”42
The next month John Quincy wrote the draft that President Monroe gave in an
address to Congress that articulated the Monroe Doctrine, the Unites States’ first
endeavor at developing a Grand Strategy that was a response to a poor effort
made by the British to continue expanding their empire.

In envisioning America’s first Grand Strategy, John Quincy understood that

the United States would only be able to grow — physically and strategically, in
both hard and soft power — by creating options for itself. This entailed
preventing the British from expanding their influence in North America, rather
than creating limitations for the United States’ own probable (and eventual)
expansion throughout North America. As one scholar noted, “the three guiding
principles of the Monroe [A]dministration’s foreign policy — reciprocity treaties
and commercial retaliation, reconciliation with Great Britain, and a strengthened
military — constituted a blueprint for global expansion.”43 More importantly,
though, John Quincy appreciated that these options to create opportunities of
expansion, whether influence or trade or diplomacy, were all simply tools, much
like Military Assistance, to achieve that Grand Strategy. As prescient as John
Quincy was, no one could have predicted the far-reaching nature of the Monroe
Doctrine. No one in the United States could have known with certainty how it
would develop relations within the Western Hemisphere, but in the 19th century
world of international relations, the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated that the
United States was present on the international stage and understood how to
define and achieve a Grand Strategy for itself.

From the perspective of Military Assistance, this foundational understanding

of the difference between what is strategy, albeit Grand Strategy, and a tool of
that strategy is an important and nuanced distinction that most policymakers fail

42 The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection (Boston: Massachusetts

Historical Society, 2005), Diary 34, 1 January 1823 - 14 June 1824, 149, accessed
March 30, 2017, http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries. Originally seen in Edel,
Nation Builder, 174.
43 Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire, 47.

49
to appreciate. While Military Assistance is by and large thought to be a tactical
implementation of military doctrine, as discussed earlier in the chapter, there is
a clear exchange of values. This value exchange, or soft power, should be placed
in the context of the development of greater capabilities between the recipient
and supporting nations. This leads to a natural conclusion that Military
Assistance is in fact a tool rather than a strategy. Military Assistance cannot be a
strategy because there can be no goal or achievement of militaries assisting one
another that is anything other than tactical, such as meeting the goal of every
soldier knowing how to fire a rifle or how to perform land navigation. Military
Assistance must be a tool to achieve a broader goal or Grand Strategy. While the
United States did not have the capacities or capabilities to utilize Military
Assistance to pursue its Grand Strategy in the early 19th century, it was certainly
familiar with the tool. This familiarity arose from the United States Army’s
essentially having been created through the Military Aid from France and the
Military Assistance of Major General Baron de Steuben during the War of
Independence. Although the option to utilize Military Assistance in pursuit of
Grand Strategy was not available at the time, the post-WWII administration of
President Truman proved to be a clear example of how Military Assistance could
and would act as a tool of Grand Strategy.

Grand Strategy as a Presidential Doctrine

The Truman Doctrine was a declaration made to Congress on March 12, 1947
by President Harry Truman, as a clear statement that the United States would
stand against Communism, as a political movement, in all ways — politically,
economically, and militarily. In a broader sense, it was the first post-WWII
pronouncement by the United States of a clear, focused Grand Strategy. The
Truman Doctrine was the first declaration of the United States against the global
spread of Communism. It was the embodiment of Liddell Hart’s definition of
Grand Strategy in the sense that Truman would marshal “all the resources of a
nation” toward a “goal defined by fundamental policy.”44 While Truman never
used the “domino theory” term, either as a theory or a metaphor, it should not be

44 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 322.

50
minimized that the Truman Doctrine as a Grand Strategy was the basis for the
domino theory that President Eisenhower would express a few years later.45

The March 1947 declaration to Congress never directly referenced

Communism or its global spread, but there was no question to listeners
concerning exactly to what Truman was referring.46 He specifically called for
economic and military assistance for Greece and Turkey,47 both of which had
growing Communist insurgencies. In addition, at the time there was a growing
sense that the Soviets viewed themselves in a global competition with capitalism,
or, as stated by noted foreign policy and Soviet expert, George Kennan (or “X”),
“tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a
basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds.”48

This type of antagonism was one which many within the international
community were carefully observing. The year before Truman’s declaration,
Former British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill dramatically stated: “From
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of
Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade,
Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie
in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another,
not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing

45 Frank A. Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in

the Twentieth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 173-174.
46 Dennis Merrill, “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and

Modernity” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 28, accessed
May 20, 2018, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1741-
5705.2006.00284.x.
47 Harry S. Truman, “Message to Congress,” March 12, 1947, Document 171, 80th

Congress, 1st Session, Records of the United States House of Representatives,

Record Group 233, National Archives, accessed April 2, 2017,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=81&page=transcript.
48 George Kennan [X, pseud.], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25,

no. 4 (July 1947): 570, accessed June 23, 2014,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030065. The reason for the differing dates
between the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the “X” article is that the
article was internal to the Truman Administration and allowed to be made public
so long as Kennan published under a pseudonym.
51
measure of control from Moscow.”49 Churchill, in his eloquence, highlighted the
impressions and emotions of many leaders in the West, but it took President
Truman, as the leader of the free world, to communicate the Grand Strategy, in
the Truman Doctrine.

The political world, articulated by Churchill, and the policy world, in the form
of George Kennan, created a receptive environment for Truman’s declaration. In
addition, there were domestic, political considerations, in that the Republican
Party controlled the House of Representatives and the Senate, creating a political
necessity for Truman to find commonalities to work with his opposition. The
Truman Doctrine was fundamentally guided by Kennan’s principle of
containment, which stated that it “is clear that the main element of any United
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but
firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”50

The Truman Doctrine as a Grand Strategy based on this principle of

containment created by and large a unification among politicians. There was
little debate between liberals and conservatives as to whether the Soviet Union
should be contained,51 but the debate as to how best to accomplish this goal was
passionate, which created or dismantled many political careers. It should be
noted that there was a great deal of criticism when the article was published,52
but with the coming period of McCarthyism and “Red Scare,” there were few who
would stand against the policy of containment. At the same time, there was
considerable doubt from the very architect of the containment policy, George
Kennan, who, serving as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State

49 Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace,” (speech, Westminster College, Fulton,

Missouri, 5 March 1946) The International Churchill Society, accessed April 4,
2017, https://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/the-sinews-of-
peace.
50 Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 575.
51 James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, Partisanship,

and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988"

The Journal of Politics 52, no. 4 (November 1990): 1078-1079, accessed June 1,
2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131683.
52 Charles Gati, "What Containment Meant," Foreign Policy, no. 7 (1972): 29-30

and 32, accessed February 3, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147751.

52
Department, was unable to publicly clarify his thoughts due to his government
position. With regard to the containment areas being advocated based on his
article, “The Source of Soviet Conduct,” Kennan, in fact, was not a supporter of
President Truman’s policy of containment, believing instead that containment
should only be pursued if it was within the United States’ capabilities.53

However, establishing the Truman Doctrine as a Grand Strategy was unlikely

to have been prevented or even limited by Kennan’s thinking. This was due to
Liddell Hart’s original definition and understanding that the purpose of grand
strategy was “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of
nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal
defined by fundamental policy.”54 What Kennan was calling for amounted to a
basic understanding and assessment of each challenge that the spread of
Communism would create. It was a thoroughly rational approach that would be
expected of Kennan as a disciplined planner and practitioner of foreign policy.
However, Kennan’s measured approach and Truman’s broader Grand Strategy
demonstrated that good policy rarely makes for good messaging in politics.
Truman clearly felt that he needed the grand gesture to unify elements of his
support for other initiatives at hand.55 Had Kennan’s approach been
implemented, quite likely many of the Military Assistance missions would have
been constructed quite differently.

There is an underlying reason why the Truman Doctrine and the

Containment Grand Strategy it espoused is so critical as it relates to Military
Assistance. On a practical level, Military Assistance is often one of the first tools
to be utilized by the United States post-WWII under the rubric of containment,
and as a result has been used extensively. The general understanding in this
usage is that if the United States could help create self-sufficiency among the
recipient, sometimes client nations, this would be far less expensive than the

53 Gati, “What Containment Meant,” 34.

54 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 322.
55 Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, 172-174.

53
obligation of fighting an entire war in the respective region.56 This strengthening
of recipient nations was employed in Greece and Turkey as part of President
Truman’s declaration in March of 1947. Before that, Lieutenant General John
Hodge, commander of the United States Army Military Government in Korea,
implemented Military Assistance as a method for supplementing local security
for which he did not have the personnel. An additional purpose for its
implementation was to provide the foundation for an eventual South Korean
army, which would be the Republic of Korea Army, supported by the United
States Army Korean Military Advisory Group. It was used again in the Philippines
before WWII under the leadership of General MacArthur, who served as the
senior military officer to the Philippine government. Post-WWII, Military
Assistance was instituted in a more formal manner in the Philippines when the
United States organized the Joint United States Military Advisory Group. And
again, this time in Indochina, which would become Vietnam, it was part of the
Military Advisory Command-Vietnam. This utilization of Military Assistance as a
tool of American Grand Strategy is entirely dependent on achievable political
objectives being determined. In addition, it is dependent on policymakers
understanding that the strategy they are putting forth is also achievable.

Grand Strategy as Theory

Domino theory57 was a concept popularized by President Eisenhower during

a press conference in 1954, when he discussed Vietnam as one of many possible
falling dominos. He stated: “Finally, you have broader considerations that might
follow what you call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes
set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the
certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a

56 It should also be noted that given the various manning needs of the United
States Military, such as serving as the occupying force in Germany and Japan in
the late 1940s, the full-scale Korean War in the 1950s, and then Vietnam in the
1960s, there were rarely more troops to send to another war in the event one
developed.
57 It is important to note that the idea of “domino theory” is not a political theory

in the sense of International Relations theories such as Realism, Constructivism,

or Neoliberalism. Domino theory is far more relevant as an aspect of American
Grand Strategy and therefore is discussed in this chapter.
54
disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”58 This statement
was essentially the foundation of the United States’ policy of containment of
Communism for the next twenty years, and it was the basis for escalation in
Southeast Asia. In fairness to Eisenhower, he was only articulating what he saw
as the natural evolution of the Truman Doctrine that established the focus of
American Grand Strategy to contain the spread of Global Communism.

The problem with the domino theory was that it was a fallacy on the face of it,
failing to appreciate any sense of strategic or practical thinking, despite the
theory being propagated by Eisenhower, a great appreciator of strategic and
practical thinking. The fallacy was that Eisenhower, and others who subscribed
to the domino theory, conceived that the actions existing within one nation could
create a predictable outcome in another nation. History can be conceptualized as
occurring in waves, which is as good an explanation as any for the waves of
revolution that were occurring around the world at that time. WWII had changed
the global order of things, and the resulting bipolar world that arose from the
ashes of war helped to create these waves. Conceptualizing a wave does not
mean that there is a clear predictable outcome, such as a government falling or
even failing. It does, however, mean that what happens in one nation will more
than likely affect, in some manner, the dynamics of domestic affairs in its
neighbor. This is extremely different from a domino theory and is far less
predictable, making it more challenging to appreciate.

Many years later the neoconservatives seemed to believe that they were
picking up the mantle of domino theory and Grand Strategy at the end of the Cold
War. As noted former neoconservative Francis Fukuyama stated, “Communism
collapsed within a couple of years because of its internal moral weakness and
contradictions, and with regime change in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, the Warsaw Pact threat to the West evaporated.”59 However, it was the

58 Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, United States – Vietnam
Relations, 1945 -1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, “The
Pentagon Papers,” Part 5, Section A, Volume 1B, B-11.
59 Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the

Neoconservative Legacy, The Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics, and Economics

(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 51.
55
neoconservatives misunderstanding of history that led to the Iraq War in 2003.
Since this research project is not specifically exploring the Iraq War, delving into
this conflict is not critical per se, but what is important to the broader dynamic of
American Grand Strategy is how the neoconservatives saw the Iraq War in the
context of American Grand Strategy.

The misunderstanding that neoconservatives had with regards to the fall of

the Soviet Union and Communism had far more to do with internal issues, as
discussed by Fukuyama. However, the neoconservatives viewed the fall of
Communism very much under the rubric that the Reagan Administration
created. The narrative consistently advocated was that the buildup of the United
States Military created a competition that eventually broke the economy of the
Soviet Union. This led to a natural conclusion by the neoconservatives that the
external pressure contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, and that actions
made by external actors could create similarly predictable results. However, this,
in fact, did not follow.

Fukuyama continued, “the [Soviet] hardliners themselves had no stomach for

such a struggle [with respect to military force] suggested a much deeper moral
rot at the heart of the communist system than practically anyone had
suspected.”60 Similar to the case of the Soviet Union, the neoconservatives
viewed the Arab dictators and autocrats as resting on the “moral rot” of their
governments and political organizations that allowed them to remain in power,
which led the neoconservatives to believe that an external action could topple
them from power. As the neoconservatives rose to power in the administration
of President George W. Bush, they entered the Bush Administration looking to
take on Saddam Hussein and Iraq.61 They did this for many reasons, not the least
of which was the sentiment that Saddam had avoided justice during the first Gulf
War, but also because they believed that they had enough support among the

60Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 52.

61Fredrik Logevall, “Anatomy of an Unnecessary War: The Iraq Invasion,” in The
Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical Assessment, ed. Julian E. Zelizer
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 90-93.
56
region and that there was a minimal risk of resistance among the United States’
allies.62

Ultimately, it was the goal of the neoconservatives to create a reverse domino

effect: if the United States was able to topple a dictator and creating a liberal
democracy in its place, this would result in a natural wave, or outbreak, of
democracies throughout the Middle East. However, because of the
misunderstood lessons of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as
outlined by Fukuyama, the entire endeavor failed, and failed spectacularly. As
previously stated, the purpose of this research project is not to delve into the
Iraq War; however, this sidestep is useful to consider in this context, since the
neoconservatives were attempting to develop and extend the reverse domino
effect, based on the original domino theory propagated by Eisenhower, into a
new Grand Strategy for the United States in a post-Cold War era. This idea of
reverse domino effect is important, as it highlights what is not a Grand Strategy.

Ironically, the effect created by the Iraq War was exactly opposite in almost
every aspect of what had been intended by the neoconservatives. To begin with,
the United States quickly and painfully learned that where a nation state has
none of the institutions necessary for a liberal democracy to flourish, democracy
in any form would struggle. This lesson underlined the understanding that the
formation of a liberal democracy is far more than simply having the public vote
at a ballot box. With the total failure of the Iraq War to achieve its broader
strategic aims, the idea of reverse domino effect through external actions for a
Grand Strategy was deemed a failure. It should be noted that the idea for the
reverse domino effect of democracy seemed as though it might come into
fruition with the advent of Arab Spring, which arose at the end of 2010. As in the
completion of this research project in 2017, the effects of the Arab Spring are still
being integrated and debated, and although there was regime change in a
number of Middle East countries, those transitions were all the result of internal
rather than external pressure. Finally, the pursuit of this domino/reverse

62Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), 39-43.
57
domino theory of Grand Strategy ended in the necessary examination and
development around Military Assistance.

Connecting Grand Strategy to Military Assistance

Due to the failure of standard warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan against
the local insurgencies that the United States was unable to defeat,
Counterinsurgency or COIN doctrine was developed for United States Military.
This doctrine was based on the work of David Galula63 and his more
contemporary evolution, David Kilcullen,64 who both made the argument that the
goal of COIN was to win the “hearts and minds” of the people, (from the
perspective of the United States Armed Forces) to legitimize the local
government. This was done through first clearing out enemy militants or
combatants, then engaging with the population, building infrastructure to
maintain or raise the populations’ standard of living, and finally, developing local
security forces to keep the population secure.

It is important to note that this is the origin of the United States Armed
Force’s recognition that it needed to begin the process of developing a set of
doctrines around the concept of Military Assistance, beginning with the creation
of the Unites States Army Field Manual 3-24.65 Previous doctrinal endeavors had
failed to become institutionalized with the conventional forces of United States
Armed Forces and more specifically within the United States Army.66 This led to
the further development of Joint Doctrine: that is, doctrine developed by the

63 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall

Mall Press, 1964). A. A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer
Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012).
64 David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level

Counterinsurgency," Military Review 86, no. 3 (May-June 2006): 103-08, accessed

April 5, 2014,
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryRevie
w_2006CR1031_art017.pdf
65 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American

Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (London: Allan Lane, 2009), 24-31.

66 Acknowledging that there has been a great deal of doctrinal development

within the Special Forces and Special Operations community, little of that
doctrine had been applied to the conventional forces of the United States prior to
the thorough re-write of FM 3-24 by then LTG Petraeus.
58
Joint Staff within the Department of Defense that is applicable to the entire
United States Armed Forces, and created to explore and clarify elements of
Military Assistance. This area of research will be further explored in Chapter 2.

The connection and relevance of Military Assistance and Grand Strategy as

theory is that Military Assistance is a tool, a method of implementation, by which
to achieve a grand strategy. COIN similarly is a method of implementation to
accomplish a grand strategy. The failed understanding of the neo-conservatives
regarding the domino and reverse domino theories was the unsupported belief
of a predictable outcome given the application of an external influence. At the
same time, policymakers seem to have mistaken the nature of COIN and Military
Assistance and the connection between both. The flawed strategies of the
domino and reverse domino theories were potentially as problematic as
believing that a tool or method can be construed as a strategy. This
demonstrated the misunderstanding of the nature and the differentiation
between strategy and methods. As military theorist Professor Colin Gray stated,
“in modern times it has become ever easier for policymakers and military
commanders to be so diverted by the proliferation of different forms of war that
they have neglected ‘the basics’ of strategy.”67

The Powell Doctrine and Military Assistance

The Powell Doctrine was further evolution on the Weinberger Doctrine68 and
was both a result of and a response to the Domino Theory of the Vietnam era. At
its essence, the Powell Doctrine outlined the principle concept to only commit
military force as a last option. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 on United States
Military Doctrine, the nature of the strategic level of warfare is such that
international relations is first and foremost an integral part of military planning.
This construct of strategic thinking, however, is distinctively different from

67Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 127.
68Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine,”
Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 1 (March 2009): 73, accessed March 13, 2017,
doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00642.x.
59
Grand Strategy, and this understanding is important when appreciating the
utilization of the tool of Military Assistance.

The Powell Doctrine is relevant to military strategic planning in that “the

Powell Doctrine largely came to define the conventional wisdom among much of
the military leadership and officer corps.”69 It colored the process by which
military planners and advisors presented options to their political masters. This
eventually created enough of a disconnect that then Army Chief of Staff General
Eric Shinseki, in a now famous exchange, told the United States Senate Armed
Services Committee that it would take approximately 350,000 soldiers to secure
Iraq.70 This was wildly different from the Bush Administration’s predictions, but
in a sense, both were correct, and both were wrong. General Shinseki,
responding from the perspective of the Powell Doctrine, was correct in his
prediction that those soldiers would be required in order to achieve
overwhelming force, both during the force on force phase of the conflict, as well
as securing the population. General Shinseki was wrong, however, in thinking
that the goals for his estimate were the same as the Bush Administration’s goals.
The Bush Administration, on the other hand, was correct in its assessment based
on its Grand Strategy of reverse domino theory, while being incorrect regarding
the need to emphasize a clear, coherent plan for the day after the military
victory.

Why outline the Powell Doctrine within the context of this research project?
Military planners and advisors mistake the Powell Doctrine for a Grand Strategy.
The Powell Doctrine neither meets the definition outlined by Liddell Hart nor
does it outline a goal or set of goals. The Powell Doctrine is rather more of a
checklist of necessary factors that should, or must, in then General Powell’s
opinion, be met prior to beginning military action. This is not to say that there is
no use or utility in the Powell Doctrine’s being considered as a strategy on any
level, but it should be specified as a method or a tool for achieving a strategy or

69 Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett, “Models of Crisis Decision Making and
the 1990–91 Gulf War,” Security Studies 19, no. 3 (August 2010): 503, accessed
March 13, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.505129.
70 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 101-102.

60
Grand Strategy. This is the relevance of the Powell Doctrine to American Grand
Strategy, in that similar to Military Assistance, the Powell Doctrine must be
considered a tool rather than a strategy.

Military Assistance as a Tool of Grand Strategy

At best, the doctrine around Military Assistance constitutes a tactical

strategy, which may be conceptualized as a strategy that is implemented by
tactical military units, that is, by soldiers on the ground. This is not a traditional
construct of strategy, in fact, as Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in his
seminal work Strategy: A History, “there is no agreed-upon definition of strategy
that describes the field and limits the boundaries.”71 As stated, while this issue
will be explored in detail in Chapter 2, it is important to extrapolate that this
perspective of the United States Military and policymakers is incorrect. Military
Assistance, as it has been defined in terms of developing the capacities and
capabilities of an indigenous military, cannot be thought of as a “strategy,” even
by Professor Freedman’s loose definition.

“There was a consensus that strategy had something to do with the supreme
commander and it was about linking military means to the objects of war.”72 By
this construct of strategy, Military Assistance does not fit, as it is much more of a
“means” or a method to engage the enemy, rather than matching the broader
concept of a strategy. As a “means” or method, it is far more logical to think of
Military Assistance as a tool within a range of options for policymakers, Military
Assistance simply being one option for policymakers to consider with respect to
a broader strategy or Grand Strategy. On a more practical side, as the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars evolved into insurgency-based conflicts and a COIN strategy
was agreed upon, Military Assistance became a critical component of that COIN
strategy, as a method to achieving the broader Grand Strategy in the War on
Terror, a grand strategy that was never fully articulated or understood.

71 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press,

2013), xi.
72 Freedman, Strategy: A History, 74.

61
 Ultimately, however much disagreement there exists among policymakers
regarding nation building,73 it remains a means or method of American Grand
Strategy. Given the various grand strategies available to the United States that
are likely to be pursued by policymakers,74 an engagement grand strategy is one
in which Military Assistance is most likely to be implemented in pursuit of a
COIN strategy, since this Grand Strategy is one where nation-building seems
most likely.

Conclusion

If there is one lesson from warfare, it is what United States Naval Academy
historian Kenneth Hagan and University of New South Wales professor Ian
Brickerton concluded: “Going to war did not solve problems, it created new
ones.”75 War in pursuit of Grand Strategy creates an inherent conflict, in that
pursuit of a Grand Strategy requires utilization of all elements of national power
in pursuit of “fundamental policy.” However, if war is being used in pursuit of
that Grand Strategy, there will automatically be an issue with limiting the
construct of the pursuit of war. At the same time, there can be no question that
the dynamics of international relations have evolved such that limited warfare is
the only option that will be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the international
community.

The reason that many concepts by policymakers are referred to as

“doctrines” is more a matter of political messaging and framing of what many are
trying to thematically develop into an American Grand Strategy. However, very
few “doctrines” can or should be considered as Grand Strategy: many are simply
sets of rules or guidelines by which policy or military action should be pursued,
as was outlined with the Powell Doctrine. However, the history of Grand Strategy
in the United States, begun under John Quincy Adams in his role as Secretary of

73 Barbara J. Falk, “1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the "Wrong"
Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?” International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 22, no. 3 (September 2009): 309-310, accessed May 20,
2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621927.
74 Bremmer, Superpower, 17-19 and 44-45.
75
Kenneth J. Hagan and Ian J. Bickerton, Unintended Consequences: The United
States at War (Reaktion Books Ltd: London, 2007), 188.
62
State, established a broad base of power internationally that allowed the United
States to grow and prosper domestically. That the Monroe Doctrine continues to
endure as a policy of United States foreign policy to this day speaks to the
acceptance of that policy by other nations. The costs of this policy have been
extremely high, whether with reference to the Native Americans driven from
their homes, or the South American regimes supported to prevent the spread of
Communism. However, it must be recognized that due to this Grand Strategy, the
United States was able to establish itself as a force in the world.

Leading off that example, President Truman, being pressured domestically

for being soft on Communism, needed to establish a clear signal of where the
United States would stand. By establishing a policy of containment versus the
global spread of Communism, using Military Assistance as a tool of that Grand
Strategy, Truman unknowingly established a link between the two that has been
maintained throughout the Cold War and after. At the same time, policy makers
must understand the relationship between Grand Strategy and Military
Assistance in that Military Assistance can and should be considered as an
application of both hard and soft power. Appreciating that Military Assistance
has a natural connection of both hard and soft power enables a clear link
between those who want to project power and those who see institutional
development as a critical method for establishing power.

63
 Chapter 2

Military Assistance and United States Military Doctrine Post 9/11

Customarily found only within the grounds of military doctrine, the concepts
surrounding Military Assistance are ultimately rooted more broadly in the
concepts of international relations. As previously discussed, Military Assistance
is a tool rooted in both the projection of power and cooperation within an
extensive international regime and the fraying global order. This chapter
describes and develops a fundamental understanding of the different types of
Military Assistance, the concepts of Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force
Assistance, and the Advise and Assist mission that collectively exist within
United States Armed Forces’ joint doctrine, placing those concepts into the
overall structure of the operational timeline that is a foundation of that doctrine.
The purpose of this fundamental understanding is then to translate these
concepts from military tactics and methods, placing them within the larger
context of the international relations security narrative, in order to better
explain the strategy nature of the tool of Military Assistance. While this doctrine
has been primarily developed from the lessons of Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom, the methods and structure that are found within the doctrine
are still applicable to the chosen case studies of Korea and Vietnam. However,
the doctrine and this chapter are intended to give context to the tool of Military
Assistance and the framework of American Grand Strategy.

Though the tool of Military Assistance has involved training the respective
militaries to lead and fight a conflict in their own indigenous methods, its
purpose is to develop the foreign security force to the extent that those forces
could eventually assume responsibility for the overall security within their
respective nation. At the same time, throughout history, nations have sought to
influence other nations through other methods of Military Intervention, such as
Military Aid or Military Support, as discussed during the Introduction. Examples
of Military Intervention in history can be seen in the Athenian and Spartan
alliance during the Peloponnesian War, the Crusades in which European nations
64
sought to save Christendom, efforts to modernize the Japanese military in the
late 1800s, and the experience of United States Civil War veterans in Egypt.
Military Intervention has been a time-honored tradition for nation states to
consistently extend their influence, within an international context for their own
security. They operationalize the theoretical arguments about the need and
desire to project power with an international framework. Iran, for example,
believes that to protect itself from the United States, it must extend its sphere of
influence into Lebanon through Hezbollah and in Iraq through various armed
militias.1 While the fallacy or genius of this strategy has and will be debated for
years to come, the fact is that the strategy is a reality, one in which nation states
presently operate under and have done so for centuries.2

During those centuries, theorists and strategists have discussed how the
fundamental nature of war works with respect to relations between nation
states. Sun Tzu described in The Art of War how the goal of warfare was to
impose one nation’s will onto another through violence,3 while Clausewitz
declared in On War that war was not only a continuation of politics by other
means but “a real political instrument.”4 These understandings have become so
ingrained into the lexicon of warfare that they are fundamental to the
perceptions and assumptions of the nature and origins of war. The idea that war
has this fundamental nature in terms of an extension of relations between states
is essentially the core of the understanding of international relations, regarding
how nation states relate to one another, with war being a violent expression of
that core idea. Within the more expansive construct of war and warfare, Military
Assistance is a nuanced approach to expanding a nation’s power and influence,

1 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, September 30,
2013, accessed December 8, 2013,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander.
2 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press,

2013), 136–139.
3 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” trans. Lionel Giles, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, 6:2, accessed

April 3, 2014, http://suntzusaid.com/book/6/2.

4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham, eds. F. N Maude and Anatol

Rapoport (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 22.

65
while in one sense to extend relations, but more as an exercise in extending a
nation’s interests. The connection between Military Assistance and Military
Invention is that Military Assistance is the concrete manifestation of Military
Intervention, which more comprehensively is the extension of the nations’
interests. As French President and former general Charles de Gaulle once stated,
nations did not have friends; they had interests.5 The concepts and constructs of
war and the nature of war and warfare are relevant to the United States Armed
Forces’ doctrine, because that doctrine too is based on understanding and
incorporating the fundamentals of war and warfare.

If war is, as Clausewitz observed, politics by other means, then the extensive
concept of Military Assistance should be interpreted as war by other means, and
just as military operations have existed and do yet exist in modalities of
peacetime, so too can Military Assistance. Military Intervention has taken many
different forms throughout the ages, from the Persian funding of various Greek
city-states to ferment animosity between them,6 to the Soviet Union’s sending
weapons and other materials to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the
Vietnam War,7 both forms of Military Aid. Military Assistance has often become a
method of being involved in a conflict without being fully committed to a war, as
will be shown in more detail in the case studies. The essence of this concept
entails allowing others to do the fighting and dying, while the sponsoring nation
helps develop the capacities and capabilities of a recipient nation. In one sense, it
could be considered a less expensive military endeavor or more aggressive form
of military engagement, and possibly thought of as a war on the cheap, but in
another sense simply a lighter exertion of influence.

5 Yoel Marcus, “A self-respecting country has interests, not friends,” Haaretz, last
modified November 22, 2013, accessed April 6, 2014
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.559444.
6 M. I. Finley, “Appendix 4: Notes on Book VIII,” in Thucydides, History of the

Peloponnesian War, 617-620. Hermann Bengtson, The Greeks and the Persians:
From the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries, trans. John Conway (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1969), 297.
7 John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (Lawrence,

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 545-549.

66
 It is important to note, however, that this type of Military Assistance is rarely
only about building and developing capacity and capabilities — it is in fact all
about extending and projecting power through international cooperation. In both
the example of Persia’s Greek city-states, and the Soviet Union with the Viet
Minh, neither was about anything more than creating a strategic quagmire for
their respective enemies in extended conflicts. The Persians were trying to keep
the Greek city-states from uniting and fighting the Persian Empire, which
eventually did happen under Alexander the Great.8 The Soviet Union similarly
was supporting the Vietnamese to limit the Chinese as much as to frustrate the
United States.9

Capabilities and Capacities

Building capacity and capabilities is an integral part of not only developing a

military but also the broader national security apparatus. In examining both the
idea of capabilities and capacities, capabilities should be understood as the
development of skillsets within the overall goals of a military. If, for example, a
unit within the United States Army is to have the capability of being an airborne
unit, there will be a set of tasks associated with that capability. Those tasks
would, for example, include the ability of each Soldier to parachute out of an
airplane at a certain altitude, or the ability to operate without a resupply for a
certain number of days. Each of the tasks exists in order for the unit to become
capable of carrying out a specific type of mission. That mission must then feed
into an overall strategy, and this concept is known within United States Army
doctrine as nesting.

Nesting refers to the act of vertically connecting from that list of tasks that
create a capable military unit, all the way up through to the national strategic

8Bengtson, The Greeks and the Persians, 306-307 and 310.

9Joseph L. Nogee, “The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures”
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, June 20, 1980), 16-17 and 20, accessed
May 20, 2017 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA090959.
67
objectives.10 Tasks lead to capabilities that lead to the capacity to accomplish a
given mission, which in turn leads to accomplishment of military objectives,
which in turn ultimately leads to the overall national strategic objectives
achieved. Essentially, this is how the smallest of details can develop, create, and
even have an impact on the integration of the most expansive circumstances.11

The term, capacity, by traditional definition, is specifically about numbers or

resources, but in a military context similar to capabilities, have to do with the
nature of how military units are able to function. Whereas capabilities relate to a
unit’s ability to accomplish a task, capacity has to do with whether a unit has the
time, space, and most importantly, the resources to accomplish the task in question.
Capacity essentially involves the resource constraints a unit may have that
enables it to be capable of accomplishing that task, and this is the reason that the
concept of time and space is so critical to the definition of capacity. As such,
capacity building is about creating sustainability, insuring that a unit can in fact
maintain its operations throughout the duration of a mission. Capacity building
is more than simply having a unit allocated supplies, but in reality, deals with
developing systems, processes, and models that can fluctuate and be flexible
depending on mission circumstances and dynamics.

Capacity building and unit sustainment are a necessary aspect of developing

foreign security forces. Although numerous books and studies have been done on
military logistics, capacity building is much more about the underlying

10 United States Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 5: The Operations
Process (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 17, 2012), 2-14 to 2-19.
11 The concept is so common that Benjamin Franklin cited a traditional nursery

rhyme in Poor Richard’s Almanac: “For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want
of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a
rider the message was lost. For want of a message the battle was lost. For want of
a battle the kingdom was lost. And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.” Benjamin
Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanac (New York: H. M. Calwell Co., 1900), 17-18
accessed April 6, 2014, https://archive.org/details/poorrichardsalm01frangoog.
Kenneth Mackey, For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and
Communications (London: Brassey's (UK), 1989), xiii. Based on “Outlandish
Proverbs: #499,” in Mr. G. H. (thought to be George Herbert), Outlandish
Proverbs, (London, 1640).
68
organization and the systems it supports rather than specifically about the
delivery of goods and services. Maturing those foreign security forces into self-
sufficient and reliable forces, capable of securing their local population, is the
fundamental principle of Military Assistance. It is only by developing and
expanding the capacities and capabilities of the recipient nation’s military and
security forces that the supporting nation can assist in creating long-term
sustainable security. From the perspective of the supporting nation, once the
recipient nation’s military and security forces become capable of maintaining
local security, the recipient nation can cease to be a resource drain on the
supporting nation, and may be thought of as a future ally, such as the Republic of
Korea during the Korean War.

Understanding capacities and capabilities is necessary, then, for appreciating

Military Assistance, in that they form the foundational, practical basis for
Military Assistance. While on a theoretical basis Military Assistance may be
about power projection through international cooperation on the unit level, on
the soldier-to-soldier level, Military Assistance must entail expanding capacities
and developing capabilities. It is only from this expansion and development that
Military Assistance can possibly achieve a long-term, sustainable security that is
linked to a political objective.

Military Assistance and Joint Doctrine

United States Armed Forces joint doctrine outlines warfare generally in two
separate concepts: regular or conventional warfare12 and irregular warfare.

12The doctrinal terminology for what would commonly be thought of as “war”

such as in WWI or WWII has evolved even since pursuing this research project.
Initially the term “full spectrum operations” was outline in Field Manual 3-0:
Operations in 2008 (page 3-1) and then evolved to “unified land operations” in
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Operations in 2017 (Glossary-9). The
term is currently under review with a quick evolution to “multi-domain battle”
(David Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future,”
Military Review 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 6-12). There is a current debate to
change the term from “multi-domain battle” to “multi-domain operations”
(Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Services Debate Multi-Domain: ‘Battle’ or ‘Operations,’”
Breaking Defense, Arpil 10, 2018, accessed July 23, 2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/beyond-multi-domain-battle-services-
69
Irregular Warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s),”13 and is the
underlying basis for Security Force Assistance and as such, Military Assistance.
The challenge is that while there are libraries (and generations of those
libraries) about traditional, regular warfare there is little in the way of official
military doctrine on Irregular Warfare.14 Indeed, one of the foundational (and
current) documents on Irregular Warfare is the Joint Operating Concept titled
“Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats” from 2010. In this Joint
Operating Concept are five core activities or operations that can be used,
according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Irregular Warfare: counterterrorism,
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency
(COIN), and stability operations.15

As a footnote of the Joint Operating Concept, there is mention that Security

Force Assistance overlaps with FID.16 As it was noted in the Introduction of this
dissertation, Security Force Assistance and FID involve two different doctrinal
missions with differing capabilities and capacities. To revisit the definitions
discussed in the Introduction, FID is “participation by civilian and military
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its
security.”17 Security Force Assistance entails “Department of Defense activities

brainstorm-broader-concept). Within Joint Doctrine the term “traditional

warfare” is used and is outlined in Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the United
States Armed Forces (25 March 2013 incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017, X).
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the United States Armed

Forces, GL-8.
14 This has been a factor for years and was even noted when United States Army

doctrine began maturing for WWII in the late 1930s. Walter E. Kretchik, U.S.
Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror (Lawrence,
KS: The University of Kansas Press, 2011), 145-147.
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Concept: Irregular Warfare: Countering

Irregular Threats (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 May 2010), 5.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Concept, 5 note 7.
17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-7. (This doctrine has
70
that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the
development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their
supporting institutions.”18 The general difference between the two is that FID is a
core capability of Special Forces,19 while Security Force Assistance as stated by
Secretary of the Army Dr. Mark Esper indicates that it was capability that the
Army had been doing and was going to continue doing as practice of Irregular
Warfare.20 Military Assistance, however, was defined in the Introduction as the
efforts that develop capacities and capabilities in a foreign security force with an
agreed-upon structure and doctrine understood by both the support nation and
the recipient nation. A nuanced difference but a difference nonetheless.

Within the broader construct of Military Assistance, this chapter will seek to
analyze all the various forms that Military Assistance can take: Foreign Internal
Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance, and then the Advise and Assist mission.
In order to appreciate the context and nuances between these three, it is crucial
to understand and appreciate how each participates in the broader rubric of
military operations and concepts of international relations. Moreover, to best
understand and appreciate that broader rubric, an explanation of the general
timeline or phases of military operations is required. Existing within military
operations planning are six phases along the operational timeline: Shape (Phase
0), Deter (Phase 1), Seize Initiative (Phase 2), Dominate (Phase 3), Stabilize
(Phase 4), and Enable Civil Authority (Phase 5).21 These phases exist irrespective

not been updated since 2010 but discussions are currently underway to address
this shortcoming within various sections of the Joint Staff).
18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, GL-11.
19 Special Forces are commonly referred to as “Green Berets” in reference to the

headgear they wear, but as a general point the “Special Forces” referred to here
is the range of special operations forces, only one part of which, are “Green
Berets.”
20 Corey Dickstein, “Army Plans for More Security Force Assistance Brigades,”

Stars and Stripes, April 1, 2018, accessed May 9, 2018,

https://www.stripes.com/news/with-1st-sfab-deployed-army-looks-to-build-
more-adviser-brigades-1.519734.
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), V-9 to V-11.

71
of the type of military operation and whether the operation is foreign
humanitarian assistance or counterinsurgency or full spectrum warfare. Each
phase, however, is distinctive while at the same time malleable, and has the
potential to bleed into one another.

In the Shape phase, Armed Forces have begun planning efforts of possible
outcomes based on the type of scenario that may develop, while on the
diplomatic side, ongoing negotiations and relationship development would be a
status quo. At this point there is a status quo phase, when no specific mission or
scenario is being engaged. This enables the Armed Forces to continually plan for
any number of contingencies, and the diplomats to constantly negotiate and
build relationships. From the perspective of international relations, this idea of
contingency planning is a challenge to the idea of the status quo, because there is
always some crisis, humanitarian or otherwise, happening in the world. Due to
the nature of military action, there does exist a “steady state” or status quo as
conceived by the Shape phase. The same cannot be said of the international
arena since the nature of the international arena is always an existing conflict,
conflict in the field of international relations being different than the idea of
conflict in a military setting. Ultimately, then, the definition for the Shape phase
that makes the most sense in the area of international relations is a phase in
which international actors can manage and drive events rather than be
controlled by them.22 An obvious example of this situation would be when Iraq
invaded Kuwait and prior to the Persian Gulf War until the buildup of forces for
Operation Desert Shield, as it was a period in which the international community
was working to shape events in the broader sense.

The Deter phase is the phase of the initial response to a crisis. If that crisis is
humanitarian in nature, then the response will begin with the civilian leadership
outlining the scope of the response with personnel and/or resources, such as in
the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. If the crisis is military in nature,

22Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-42. (The 2017
version of this joint publication does not address the phasing aspect of planning).
72
various military posturing would begin this phase with something akin to
massing forces at a border, such as during Operation Desert Shield from 1990 to
1991. If the crisis is diplomatic in nature, there could be an effort of shuttle
diplomacy such as the actions of Secretary Henry Kissinger with Arab-Israeli
disputes in the 1970s. In general, however, the nature of crisis is that two or
three of these aspects are present simultaneously and this requires a multi-
faceted approach, because no single crisis can be prevented by one solution set.
The international relations dynamic to this phase involves actors being driven by
events rather than being drivers of them, because in some sense outside actors
and external events are imposing a set of events. As events continue to develop,
actors become more and more consumed by those events, trying to prevent them
from escalating and continuing to exacerbate.23

The next phase, the Seize Initiative phase, is one that can be best described as
the phase in which friendly forces, be they military, humanitarian, or diplomatic,
create a scenario to allow for freedom of maneuver within the operational area.
While usually thought of as a physical area, such as the seizing of a beachhead at
the outset of Operation Overlord (more popularly known as D-Day), this area
does not necessarily have to be restricted to a physical space. On the diplomatic
side, there could be the creation of a metaphoric space, such as United Nations’
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s address to the United Nations Security Council
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.24 In this instance, enough “space” was created
for a solution to be created between the Soviet Union and the United States
behind the scenes. From the perspective of the international relations aspect,
this phase on the operational timeline is one in which actors transition from a
more preventative or defensive stance to a proactive one. Essentially, this phase

23Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-42.

24Thomas Hamilton, “Stevenson Charges in U.N. Cuba is Soviet Bridgehead,” The
New York Times, October 24, 1962, accessed May 18, 2017,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1962/10/24/90546817.htm
l?pageNumber=1.
73
is preparation for the Dominate phase, which at this point in the operational
timeline is usually a foregone conclusion.25

Building on the Seize Initiative phase, the Dominate phase is one in which
decisive operations take place. It is in this phase of the operational timeline that
the necessary efforts to accomplish the overall goal or goals are accomplished.
Diplomatically, this might be the time when negotiations conclude and
ratification of a treaty takes place, essentially where the diplomatic actions are
being implemented and completed. On the humanitarian side, an example of a
Dominate phase would be when an emergency response begins, because that
type of response is the critical part of the operation. On the military side, the
focus of this phase is on operations specifically designed to accomplish the key
task or set of tasks that will achieve the overall strategic goals of the mission. At
the level of international relations, the Dominate phase is one, as Sun Tzu stated,
whereby one actor is taking the actions necessary to impose goals onto
another.26 Clausewitz would recognize this principle as one whereby an actor is
intent on compelling another to fulfill his or her will.27 Actors are hoping to
achieve the focus of their actions that have occurred within the operational
timeline thus far. In achieving those actions through maneuvering within the
international system, the actors can and will be able to impose their will upon
the system more widely.28

Following the Dominate phase is the Stabilize phase, in which the concept of
nation building begins. Whether the operation is humanitarian, military, or
diplomatic in nature, this is the phase for the development of governance
capacity. From the international relations perspective, this is the phase on the
operational timeline in which the will that was imposed by one nation on the
other during the Dominate phase becomes normalized. By making the actor’s
newly imposed will normalized or the new status quo, the purpose of this phase

25 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-42 and III-43.

26 Sun Tzu, Art of War, 6:2.
27 Clausewitz, On War, 5.
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-43.

74
becomes one of transition into a scenario where that will is integrated into the
overall system.29 While on the face of it, this phase may resemble one not taken
seriously by planners or actors, as the head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, Ambassador Paul Bremer, found during Operation Iraqi Freedom, this
phase is extremely difficult, one that requires substantial effort and planning. In
fact, WWII is an excellent example of how the Stabilize phase prepares for
ongoing relations, as there were numerous conferences of political leaders
during the war, such as Teheran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945, in which the war’s
aftermath was discussed in detail, in addition to planning teams devoted to long-
term solutions for Italy, Germany, and Japan.30

Finally, in the last phase, Enable Civil Authority, all elements focus on
legitimizing the host, or invaded, nation government and the transition to having
the host-nation in the lead begins. This is to say that the dynamics within the
nation are such that there exists a new reality or a new normal or status quo; a
capacity and capability to maintain security and basic services to the population.
This is the reality in the frame of reference of the international relations
perspective as well. As the government becomes more legitimized, both internal
to the nation and within the international community, the government, on behalf
of the nation, becomes capable of being admitted as an actor within the extensive
international arena. Operating within this new paradigm, the host nation will be
seeking to pursue all avenues that create and solidify its legitimacy, the new
status quo, or in military parlance, a new “steady state.”

An important point to note is that these phases have elements of their

primary activities happening in some form concurrently throughout each phase,
and depending on the specific phase, on which activity is most demonstrative, as
the graph below displays. For example, within the Stabilize phase there are
serious elements of the Dominate phase still at work that can and do create

29Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-43.

30Office of the Historian, “Tehran Conference, 1943,” United States Department
of State, Milestones: 1937-1945, accessed May 18, 2017,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/tehran-conf.
75
constraints on personnel and resources. Due to the dynamic nature of the
international systems in which actors and militaries operate, each of these
phases may even be occurring simultaneously, depending on the situation at any
given moment. However, due to the nature of the international system, there
generally exists a primary scenario that is the predominate focus within the
international community.31

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-39.

Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is defined by the United States Military’s Joint
Staff32 as “the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in

31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, V-5 to V-29. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Publication 5-0, III-38 to III-44.
32 The term “Joint Staff” refers to those civilians and military members that work

directly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff, on behalf of
the Chairman, is responsible for the development of Joint Doctrine.
76
any of the action programs taken by another government or designated
organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.”33 Traditionally, the
FID mission is developed and accomplished by United States Special Forces,
sometimes know by the more popular nomenclature “Green Berets,” and not by
Conventional Forces. FID connects into a more comprehensive nation assistance
program and is dependent on the recipient nation’s support. That support
cannot simply be an invitation into the country, and is dependent on a plan
known as an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Plan. In addition, the
recipient nation’s support must include a whole of government approach in
cooperation. This means that based on the Joint Staff doctrinal definition, FID
cannot only consist of a military-to-military cooperation; there needs to be an
integration with the recipient nation’s government to create a broader basis of
capacities and capabilities, such as comprehensive institutional reforms. The
concept of institutional development is referred to in military doctrine as
Defense Institution Building (DIB) or sometimes, Minister of Defense Advising
(MODA).34 From the planning perspective, the government agencies responsible
for internal security should be incorporated into the security arrangements for
the recipient nation, and the supporting nation should be prepared to work
towards such initiatives. The IDAD plan is the document in which the recipient
nation will clarify these initiatives, the capacities and capabilities needed to
create a sustainable security.

According to Joint Staff doctrine, the IDAD plan “focuses on building viable
political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of
the host nation’s society.”35 As such, the IDAD is the foundational document that
creates a baseline of the status quo of the host nation, from the perspective of
where the host nation would like to be with respect to those institutions, and in a

33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), I-1.
34 Walter L. Perry, et al, Defense Institution Building: An Assessment (Santa

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, II-1.

77
sense it is logical that the “recipient nation” of Military Assistance, or FID in this
case, is referred to as a “host nation,” since in a FID the host nation is quite
literally hosting the supporting nation.

This is an important goal-building process for the host nation for several
reasons: first, in that it creates a need in the host nation to understand and
confront likely or current issues with respect to its security, and secondly, the
process helps inform both the host nation and the supporting nation of the
various dynamics at work that could possibly prevent the success of the mission.
These dynamics could be internal, from competing internal politics to economic
challenges to an actual insurgency, or they could be external, from a neighboring
aggressor to general regional insecurity. The necessity is to understand and plan
in an all-encompassing way around the total security situation faced by the host
nation.

As a doctrinal concept, FID creates numerous concerns that should be

examined more closely, particularly in that the definition is problematic in terms
of its alternating from being both too specific and not being specific enough.
Where the definition delineates “participation by civilian and military agencies of
a government,” there exists an implication to develop a whole of government
solution, which creates a further problem when addressing the issue of which
agency of the host nation is the coordinator during a FID mission. Logic would
conclude that this be a Ministry of Defense due to the FID mission being
promulgated by United States Special Forces,36 but that is not necessarily the
case. The challenge arises from the fact that the definition is unclear on this point
because the United States Armed Forces doctrine maintains that a FID operation
can occur during any phase of an overall operational timeline, as was discussed
earlier.37 This does not necessarily make sense, however, in the broader

36 Afghan War News Staff, “Difference between FID and SFA,” Afghan War News,
accessed June 16, 2018,
http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/differenceFIDandSFA.htm.
37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, I-4 and I-5.

78
construct of both Military Assistance and international relations, or even the
United States Armed Forces’ own operational timeline.

From the military perspective, each phase on the operational timeline has
elements of all the others, as seen above on the graphic, even during its own
predominant phase; therefore, the idea of FID strategically fitting into the
operational timeline at any phase is not justified by the understanding of the
operational timeline established by United States Armed Force doctrine. FID and
nation building more broadly cannot fit into the Deter, Seize Initiative, or
Dominates phases. While many types of Military Assistance missions could be
taking place during these phases, it would not make sense to begin FID during
these phases. This is due to the emphasis of those phases being on the
development and implementation of an operation, rather than the overall
strategic perspective. In addition, from a logical perspective it is unlikely that a
host nation will have the capacity or capability to create the IDAD plan during
these phases.38 Looking at these three phases specifically, the Deter phase is
highlighted by a response. As previously mentioned, in the Deter phase, actors
are being driven by events, and this does not allow beginning a FID effort,
because an actor is being driven by events and trying to focus on controlling the
outcome. It is unlikely that the actor, being focused on that outcome, will be able
to integrate the type of broad national assistance program that would have
incorporated FID into its national strategy, because the host nation’s national
security assets would be consumed by the events in the ongoing operation.

The Seize Initiative phase, emphasized by creating the space for a successful
offensive, whether that space is physical or metaphoric, is also a poor choice to
begin FID. It could be argued that a method for creating that space is to begin a
FID program, but that follows from misunderstanding where the Seize Initiative
phase ends up on the operational timeline. The space or freedom to maneuver in

38Examples of where host nations have worked with the United States on a
Military Assistance mission during Phases I-III, such as Columbia, have had
governing institutions that, while not ideal, certainly function. The point here, is
that Phases I-III are entirely separate from institution building or development.
79
military parlance exists in order have a successful Dominate phase, in which the
protagonist “focuses on breaking the enemy’s [or opposing forces’] will,”39 or as
Sun Tzu stated, “to impose one’s will on the enemy.”40 A FID program, however,
in its fully realized state, is not going to break the enemy or opposing forces in
either a military operation or humanitarian crisis, because at its core a FID
program is supporting and developing, not imposing. As such, actions to launch a
FID program during the previous phase of Seize Initiative would not lead to the
breaking of anyone’s will, and so should not be a phase of consideration for a FID
program.

This leaves three possible phases to begin a FID program: Stabilize, Enable
Civil Authorities, and Shape. The Stabilize phase is a possibility, because as
stated, this is when nation building begins as a primary focus, or when the
actor’s will that was imposed during the Dominate phase begins to become the
status quo. A fully develop FID program would seem to make sense during any
stage where the primary focus is nation building, since the cornerstone of any
functioning society is one in which citizens feel secure to pursue their interests,
and the purpose of a FID program is to create security capacity and capability.

There are, however, a few challenges that come with the Stabilize phase that
lend itself to not being an ideal phase for a FID program. One perspective is that
any state beginning in some way to rebuild itself, on its own or with external
assistance, has a primary focus of legitimizing itself. As such, the state, or more
specifically, the government, is unlikely to have the capacity or capability to
focus on first developing an IDAD plan and then integrating the broad nature of a
FID program into a probably nascent national security apparatus.41 The reason
there is such a focus on an IDAD plan is that, when properly developed, the IDAD

39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-43.

40 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” 6:2.
41 While the host nations’ legitimacy must be a concern, and may even be a goal,

of the IDAD plan, it must be a result of the plan rather than a part of the plan due
to the fact that the United States Armed Forces, be they conventional or non-
conventional forces, do not have the capability to bequeath legitimacy upon a
host government.
80
plan will help to expose many of the fault lines and discrepancies within the
security structure of a nation state. The Stabilize phase, due to its transitory
nature, theoretically is unlikely to have functioning national security institutions
or government, and will not be able to identify where its long-term shortcomings
exist, because there simply has not been time to create or develop a baseline
apparatus.

Another challenge with the Stabilize phase is that since it is transitory,42 it

enables an actor to move from the Dominate phase to the Enable Civil
Authorities phase, taking into consideration the reality that there are variations
of stability. It also clarifies that an actor must have a strategy to assist in this
transition, since no nation could emerge from either a conflict or disaster with an
unscathed government. At the same time, from the perspective of international
relations, the Stabilize phase could be constructed to be that stage of transition.
Since a FID program could also be considered a transitory program, and one that
would fit within the dynamic described by the Stabilize phase, there is a
challenge in that this analysis could be parsing over minutia, as it is a matter of
degrees.

Based on Joint Staff doctrine,43 a FID program is part of a larger nation

assistance effort, and there is an inherent need for the nation to exist at a certain
level of stability in order to receive a fully advanced program of assistance. This
is due to the simple reality that any nation, whether advanced or developing,
only has a limited amount of capacity with which to absorb and utilize any
external assistance, and this is equally true of Military Assistance. When an actor
is in the Stabilize phase on the operational timeline, this means that the actor
and/or the host nation is transiting from unstable to stable, because the
Dominate phase of the operational timeline is an inherently unstable phase. In

42 It has been noted that each of the phases are, by their own nature, transitory.
However, Phases V and 0 can be maintained and go back and forth depending on
the operational nature in question. At the same time, the Stabilize phase is
transitory in the sense that there is an operational shift from Phases I-III to
Phases V and 0.
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, I-1, IV-1, IV-2, and IV-16.

81
addition, because the concept of the Stabilize phase is transitory, this does not
mean that no instability exists. In fact, more than likely there will be pockets of
significant instability. The instability that exists will probably be both geographic
and societally specific, more likely in the areas of the economy or governance. If
that instability is too great, then broad assistance efforts will likely fail.

The host nation needs to have a certain level of capacity and capability in
order to internalize any external development efforts. Recognizing this is crucial
for any national assistance program to be successful, and a FID program
specifically will not create the sustainable level of military competence or
broader security that is needed to be considered successful without an overall
national assistance program to act as the foundation.44 No military structure can
exist in a governance vacuum. This dynamic of a FID program and the Stabilize
phase does not give the best foundation for a FID program to begin, because of
its transitory nature. The Stabilize phase, however, does call for a type of Military
Assistance to be discussed later in this chapter.

As stated earlier, the Enable Civil Authorities phase is one that highlights the
recipient or host nation’s being the primary driver with respect to security and
other areas of governance. The purpose of this phase is to legitimize the state,
and more specifically, the government. It is important to note that the Enable
Civil Authorities phase ends in transitioning back to Phase 0, the Shape phase.
When looking at the operational timeline, it may seem natural to view it linearly,
but in fact the timeline should be conceptualized and viewed as circular. This
view of one phase blending into the next makes it is easier to imagine the
nuances of each phase, appreciating that there are no hard stops in transitioning
from one phase to another, but more of a shading between one another, and
thereby elements of one phase exist in another.

Based on this understanding of a circular timeline, there will be elements of

instability within the Enable Civil Authorities phase. As the phase progresses and

44Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, I-1 and GL-9. Walter L. Perry, et al,
Defense Institution Building, 33 and 115-116.
82
the host nation and government become more legitimized, the natural outcome
is that less instability exists, and the more substantially the government can
maintain its existence. For the FID program, Enable Civil Authorities is not the
ideal phase to start due to the instability and the lack, though being reduced, of
the legitimization of the host nation. With the assumption that the foundation of
the FID program is to expand the capacities and capabilities of the national
security apparatus within a host nation, it is equally necessary that a FID
program develops into long-term, sustainable security.

In order to establish such long-term, sustainable security, the population

must recognize the government as legitimate. With that legitimization, a sense of
permanence can extend the efforts the government is pursuing, and in keeping
with that permanence, the developments in the national security apparatus that
come with a FID program are a seamless fit. However, the Enable Civil
Authorities phase is one in which the host nation is moving from less stabilizing
toward more stabilized. A FID program cannot create stability, as it is developing
capacity and capability to create a sustainable national security apparatus,
because the government remains in transition. That transition is critical for the
host nation to develop through, but the FID program might be mistaken for a
stabilizing force, which it is in the sense that it results in a deeper level of
military expertise in the host nation. At the same time, it is not primarily
stabilizing, since in order for a FID program to be implemented, the host nation
must have effectively developed an IDAD plan. To imagine that IDAD plan being
created during a period of instability is simply not realistic for many of the same
reasons discussed regarding the Stabilize phase.

The creation of the IDAD plan, which is a separate but necessary step
completed before beginning a FID program, should ideally start during the
Enable Civil Authorities phase. While it is also possible to develop the IDAD plan
during the Shape phase, the Enable Civil Authorities is the ideal phase for several
reasons. The first reason is that by the time the host nation is capable of
transitioning through much of the remaining elements of instability from the
Stabilize phase, the host nation has developed, in order to survive, a level of

83
depth in both its national security knowledge and its capabilities. More than
likely, due to the transition from instability, the host nation has some capacity
challenges, and therefore is requiring a FID program. This level of depth in the
national security apparatus is the expertise necessary to develop a thorough
IDAD plan. Indeed, a solid IDAD plan may be a sign of government legitimacy,
both in how the host nation sees itself, and in how the population will react to an
invitation of foreign trainers aiding the host nation’s capacities and capabilities.

An argument could be made that a host nation that is able to develop an IDAD
plan competently likely does not need a FID program, but this conclusion creates
a possible false correlation, since one does not necessarily result in the other.
One rationale for this argument could be the logic that if a host nation is able to
clearly define and describe its shortfalls, then it should be able fix them, perhaps
not at the speed that it would prefer, but still capable of accomplishing such an
effort. When a host nation is capable of developing a thorough IDAD plan, it
could simply be due to a deep understanding of the internal defense and security
issues, an awareness on the part of the host nation. This is a level of self-
awareness that should exist by the time an IDAD plan is developed in the Enable
Civil Authorities or Shape phase.

The IDAD must be developed in concert with the supporting nation, because
if the host nation has an unrealistic understanding of the capacities and
capabilities that the supporting nation brings to the endeavor, then the FID
program will clearly fail. The work on the IDAD can take many different forms,
and in theory, each set of circumstances will dictate not only the final developed
IDAD plan, but also the style in which the host nation and supporting nation will
work with one another. At the conclusion, however, the goal of both should be
the same, in that they have a foundational plan from which to accomplish the FID
mission.

The FID program is best aligned for the Shape phase primarily because of its
stable nature, although this could also mean beginning the FID program at the
end of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. This is due to the recognition that the
host nation’s military will have the most ability to absorb the broad dynamics of

84
a FID program and incorporate those lessons during times of greater stability. It
is important to remember that a FID program is about expanding the capacities
and capabilities of the entire national security apparatus. Any nation, especially
one emerging from a transition period the way that a host nation likely would
evolve into the Shape phase, can best adapt and evolve during a more stable
environment. At the same time, organizations and specifically military
organizations change and adapt during periods of conflict or instability;
however, they do not necessarily institutionalize that new way of thinking or
acting. Many times, the new ways are just considered as adaptations specific to
the current circumstance, and not as options for long-term change. During a
period of stability, and given the probable transition necessitating a FID
program, the host nation has opportunities to determine what kind of
capabilities and capabilities it wants and needs its military to have, which is why
the IDAD plan is developed.

The concept of a FID program is encompassed within an overall national

assistance program, which requires stability so that it, too, can become
sustainable. In pursuance of that sustainable national assistance effort to exist,
security must have been established at an early phase within the operational
timeline. Based on the understanding of the operational timeline, the phase
where the host nation moves from instability to stability is the Stabilize phase,
and additionally into the Enable Civil Authorities phase. These are the phases in
which the concepts of Security Force Assistance and the Advise and Assist
mission become part of the national security reality in the host nation.

Security Force Assistance

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is defined by Joint Staff doctrine as “a range

of activities to enhance the capacity and capability of partner nations by
organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and building, and advising and
assisting FSF [foreign security forces].”45 The challenge with this definition is
that it is essentially similar to the definition for FID, which was defined as “the

45 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, VI-30.

85
participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the
action programs taken by another government or other designated organization,
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,
terrorism, and other threats to their security.”46

There are two problems with these definitional similarities, the first being
the execution of the mission. SFA, as defined by Joint Staff doctrine, can and is
executed by any member of the United States Armed Forces; however,
traditionally this has involved the training and development of foreign security
forces by the Conventional Forces, which would be defined as those service
members who are trained for regular warfare rather than Irregular Warfare.47
The conceptual problem as discussed previously in this chapter is that the
definition of FID given within the Joint Staff’s doctrine is too broad, and
encompasses aspects of the United States Government that are neither under the
authority or expertise of the United States Armed Forces.

To enable a FID program to be part of the sustainable security effort, it must,

by its own nature, address the broader capacity and capability with the host
nation’s national security apparatus. In the context of the above definitions, this
means that a FID must broadly meet the needs of the host nation to aid in the
expansion of its national security capacity and capabilities. To equip the FID
program to address those concerns, it (and by logical extension the IDAD plan),
must focus on national security as a whole, its interactions and
interdependencies, but cannot seek to control them. More specifically, just as the
Department of Defense cannot dictate Department of State policy, even in
Afghanistan during the decade-plus conflict, neither can a FID program seek to
develop a control between the host nation’s military and other parts of its
national security apparatus. Joint Doctrine does, however, state this,48 and while

46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, I-1.

47 Irregular Warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the United States Armed Forces, pg. GL-8.
48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-20: Security Cooperation (Washington,

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017), viii and I-10.
86
a FID program can and should seek to develop the host nation’s capabilities for
interagency coordination and cooperation, it should not attempt to create a
scenario in which the host nation’s military is dictating those relationships as the
doctrine implies. It is due to this reasoning that the definition for SFA is in fact a
much better and precise definition for a FID program.

How then should SFA be defined and where should it exist on the operational
timeline? In spite of the doctrinal definition, SFA is best defined, under the rubric
of Military Assistance, as those security operations where the host nation, which
at this point may only be thought of as a “nation” in a limited manner, is not in
the main effort nor do its security forces have the capacities and capabilities to
successfully secure the population. The supporting nation has primary authority
over what will eventually be the host nation’s territory in this scenario. This is
not to say that the host nation does not have some form of sovereignty that is
recognized domestically, and even possibly diplomatically recognized within the
international community. At the same time, the reality on the ground is likely
that the host nation has little or no authority or control over much of anything,
for example, when Afghan President Hamid Karzai was referred to as the “Mayor
of Kabul” in order to highlight his lack of authority and control.49 More than
likely, the host nation is primarily focused on getting its domestic political house
in order. In this situation, the host nation needs to ensure that it has a legal and
moral framework for the government to govern. That legal framework will most
likely take the form of a constitution or a similar type of document, which will be
of no practical use unless the population, and probably the various factions
within the nation, support that overall framework. It is this support that forms
the basis of the moral framework that can and will express itself in empowering
the legitimization of the government or not.

49Ullrich Fichtner, “The Third World War: Why NATO Troops Can't Deliver
Peace in Afghanistan,” Speigel Online, May 29, 2008, accessed June 28, 2018,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-third-world-war-why-nato-
troops-can-t-deliver-peace-in-afghanistan-a-556304-4.html.
87
 Based on its definition, the placement of SFA most naturally presents itself in
the Stabilize phase. This phase in the operational timeline is one in which the
host nation is still developing and formulating its government, building
coalitions that will hopefully lead it to legitimization by the broader population.
During the Stabilize phase the host nation’s military forces, from the perspective
of the United States Armed Forces, will likely be at a nascent level due primarily
from having withstood a Dominate phase in some form, whether the
circumstances are military conflict or a humanitarian disaster. At the same time,
because the purpose of the supporting nation is to leave a legitimate government
in its wake, and since part of a legitimate government is having a functioning
security force that both enforces and upholds rule of law in the nation, there is
an implied task to begin developing the host nation security forces. As a result, a
rebuilding effort of the host nation’s national security apparatus and military
forces will be required. However, at the Stabilize phase the host nation’s national
security apparatus is still beginning to be formed, based on the founding
governing efforts taking place. Thus, the focus from the protagonist (or
supporting) nation must be on the military or FSF itself.

In focusing on the FSF, the supporting nation will understand the nascent
capabilities and capacities inherent in the FSF and plan accordingly, which
entails the SFA being defined more carefully than Joint Staff doctrine implies.
SFA should be defined as a specific mission and implemented at a specific point
in the operational timeline. As previously discussed, SFA should be defined as an
effort to learn through partnership and teaming-up together with the forces of
the supporting nation. While stating that SFA was best placed at the Stabilize
phase, Joint Staff implies that aspects of SFA exist within each phase on the
operational timeline,50 although this results in an untidy conceptualization in
which to utilize the SFA aspect of Military Assistance.

50Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13: Security Force Assistance
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 April 2013), III-10 & III-11.
88
 Operational realities suggest that SFA should be integrated with the Stabilize
phase because of its emphasis on the dynamics of development of FSF, where
few capabilities and capacities exist. For Joint Staff doctrine to declare that SFA
exists within each of the phases indicates a lack of understanding or appreciation
of the six phases outlined with the Joint Staff’s own doctrine. This type of
misunderstanding parallels the lack of understanding of FID, first and foremost
about what the SFA mission clearly is and what it is not, and about how the
definition of that mission is linked with its placement on the operational
timeline. SFA could not address diminished capabilities and capacities with FSF
in the Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, or Dominate phases, because the nature of
each of those phases indicates that FSF in those phases has a credible level of
competence. In reality, this would amount to doing SFA for the sake of doing SFA,
without achieving a strategic effort. As such, there is no need for an SFA mission
at this time, but there are instances specifically in the Shape phase where a FID
program is likely needed, as discussed previously in this chapter. This leaves the
Stabilize and the Enable Civil Authorities phases as possibilities.

In the Enable Civil Authorities phase, the fundamental element is that the
host nation has already transitioned, or is in the later stages of transitioning, into
a situation of stability in which the government of the host nation is becoming or
has become legitimate. While it is taken for granted that in each of these
situations, the dynamics on the ground are volatile at best, there still must be
some element of stability. It is difficult in any scenario to have a legitimate
authority of a government when it has little or no control of the security scene
within its own borders. These types of situations establish a population’s
unsurprising conclusion that its government, rather than being a legitimate
representation of the people, is in fact a puppet government playing the pliable
front for the supporting nation, which clearly helps neither the supporting nor
the recipient nation. Since the previous phases in the operational timeline are
partially a response to some form of unstable situations, for the population to
believe in the independence of its government, the people must see signs of
transition as well as basic services being met, which is the core of the
legitimization efforts of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. One of the elements of
89
government that will be most visible during the phases of instability is the host
nations’ security forces. The government will hardly be considered as legitimate
if the security policy and its security forces are blatantly seen being dictated by a
foreign power, such as the supporting nation. While not the purpose of SFA, this
scenario is certainly a plausible risk that would need to be addressed. This idea
and concept of host nation legitimization makes the Enable Civil Authorities
phase a less natural phase for SFA than the Stabilize phase.

The Stabilize phase should be the period for the SFA mission, due to its
nature as one of transition from the instability of the Dominate phase to the
stability of the Enable Civil Authorities phase. Similarly, SFA must also be a
mission of transition.51 This is not only to help develop the FSF, but even more
importantly, to assist in assuring the population of the temporary disposition of
the supporting nation’s involvement, preventing the perception that the
recipient nation’s security forces are beholden to the support nation’s security
forces. Ideally, for the host nation, the supporting nation is sincere in its desire to
remain solely for a limited period. This is most important for the population: to
believe that ultimately, it will have influence over the future of their nation.
When the population does not believe in either the legitimacy of the government
or its eventual independence, expected concerns will arise. Those concerns will
be represented in the population’s interests in the social contract with the
government, and if not, then the consent of the governed begins to breakdown.
That breakdown will likely lead to some form of protest, either marching or
rioting, or in the worst of cases, an actual armed insurgency such as the clashes

51While there is no doctrinally set timeline for an SFA mission, there are
implications within the doctrine regarding its not being an indefinite mission.
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13: Security Force Assistance, III-2).
However, there are numerous examples of the SFA mission from South Korea to
Afghanistan where the mission has, as of the writing of this dissertation,
continued indefinitely.
90
between the United States Marines and the forces of Muqtada al-Sadr in Fallujah
in 2004.52

The transition that the SFA efforts are striving for is from the nascent
condition of FSF post the Dominate phase, into a security force that exists
independent of the recipient nation, due to the supporting nation’s own
increased capacities and capabilities. This transition is intertwined with the
transition of the overall phase from Stabilize to Enable Civil Authorities. The SFA
mission can begin during the Dominate phase depending on the broader
operational mission of the supporting nation, because the supporting nation will
be the primary proponent of the SFA mission. Specifically, the commander of the
supporting nation’s forces will set the priority of starting and resourcing the SFA
mission. It will be the staff of the commander that will set up a structure to
monitor and evaluate the development of the FSF, whose monitoring and
evaluation will need to clearly delineate a desired end state to demonstrate
when the transition from the SFA is complete. It is essential that this monitoring
and evaluating be fluid and flexible, for, as the host nation’s government comes
into power, it will be required to set up its own priorities and metrics for its
security forces. Once the end state for the supporting nation is reached and the
SFA is complete, the dynamics in the recipient nation should be at a place where
it can transition, or be near transitioning, to the Enable Civil Authorities phase.

As the host nation transitions into the Enable Civil Authorities phase, the
necessity for Military Assistance is not to be eliminated; rather, the FSF are at a
critical juncture in their development. That juncture can best be described as the
stage in which the host nation’s security forces are the main effort, and primarily
planning and executing operational missions. More than likely, however, they
will not yet have created an extensive logistical supply chain and training
capabilities or capacities. Due to this lack of capability and capacity, the

52Steven M. Buechler, “Social Strain, Structural Breakdown, Political

Opportunity, and Collective Action,” Sociology Compass 2, no. 3 (May 2008):
1035, accessed May 18, 2017, http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1751-
9020.2008.00109.x.
91
supporting nation will be obligated to provide some form of assistance to the
host nation, as the host nation is not likely to be able to develop an IDAD plan as
a precursor to a FID program. At the same time, this phase is a point when
Defense Institutional Building or MODA should begin. As recipient and
supporting nations are in a transitory phase, so too is the transition from SFA to
the Advise and Assist mission of Military Assistance.

Advise and Assist Mission

While Joint Staff doctrine does not clearly define the specifics of the Advise
and Assist mission, it does recognize that advising and assisting is part of SFA;53
however, this does not allow for transition between an SFA and a FID program.
That bridge should be characterized as the Advise and Assist mission. Allowing
for different understandings of the dynamics that compromise the main tenet,
the Advise and Assist mission from the supporting nation provides Military
Assistance to help legitimize the host nation, given the focus of the Enable Civil
Authorities phase. The Advise and Assist mission is best described as a training
effort, whereby the supporting nation is allowing (and at times insisting) the
recipient nation’s FSFs to be the main effort during operational missions. The
supporting nation will be required to provide continual logistical aid, and will
probably be called on to actively assist FSFs to create systems and processes
where none previously existed, in some cases where there has been no history of
the FSF having a system or a process.

The Advise and Assist mission, however, cannot be limited to logistical

support. As the bridge between SFA and a FID program, the Advise and Assist
mission must continue helping to develop capacities and capabilities around the
planning and staff functions that are indicative of a modern military
organization. These staff functions are essential, because it is the staff that will
develop the IDAD plan, which will in turn create the foundation for the FSF to
becoming a fully functioning military organization. The supporting nation, as a
result, will need to adjust its resourcing of this mission from the units that were

53 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, VI-30.

92
originally partnered with the FSF during the SFA mission, to groups or teams of
advisers that can focus the FSF unit on its development. It is important to note
that the theoretical scenario cannot overcome the dynamics of human
relationships, making this critical to the success of the mission, not only so that
the supporting nation’s teams have good relations with the FSF commander, but
additionally so that the FSF commander desires the advice and assistance of the
supporting nation’s team. In the end, both the supporting nation and the
recipient nation have a security relationship that is dependent on the good
relations between individuals, making the development of the advising teams a
critical effort of the supporting nation.

The Advise and Assist mission reaches its culmination point once the
recipient nation’s military forces have demonstrated the capacity and capability
to both train and equip themselves independent of external resources or
knowledge, and to own the planning abilities in order to develop a competent
IDAD plan. The IDAD plan, as previously noted, is important at this juncture to
develop more sophisticated planning and systems of a modern military
organization. These two benchmarks for the Advise and Assist mission’s
completion are required so that each feeds into the overall effort of creating a
military that is independent. From the training and equipping capacity, the host
nation will need to have the infrastructure, processes, and systems in place for a
smooth flow on both logistics and personnel. This will ensure that the requesting
military unit receives what is required in a timely manner. The completion of the
IDAD plan is critical, given that the capabilities needed to develop an IDAD plan
validate the host nation military’s underlying understanding and ability to assess
where and how it must train so as to develop into a better military. Once the FSF
have that capability and can capably execute the IDAD plan, they are prepared to
transition to the next phase and embrace a FID program.

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Operational Levels of Warfare54

The importance of the Operational Levels of Warfare to Military Assistance is

to understand the nature of the impact of the Military Assistance mission from
the perspective of the United States Armed Forces. The challenge that many
military operations suffer from, be they SFA or other types of missions, is that
there is a failure to link the actions of the Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine on
the ground with a broader strategic narrative, or even a grand strategy.55 In
order to appreciate this underlying fundamental theme of this research project,
it is necessary to establish a baseline understanding of what the levels of warfare
are from the planning methodology, and how they factor into the Military
Assistance mission and it relationship to American Grand Strategy.

The doctrine of United States military operations divides operational

planning into three levels of warfare – tactical, operational, and strategic. Each
level is based on unit size and focus.

1. Tactical level operations tend to focus on immediate tasks with limited

perspective of long-term implications. They take the form of operations such
as the need to hold a crossroad for effective flow of logistical traffic, or the
need to take control of a mountaintop for visibility. The units that focus on
these operations range from a few to several hundred people. Since the
tactical level operations focuses primarily on immediate tasks, and those
tasks may either be achieved or not, the tactical level of warfare is the easiest
level to examine under the framework of success and failure. The concept of
success and failure concentrates on achieving or not achieving a task or set of
tasks. While this appears obvious, the need to appreciate the grander
strategic effort necessitates a link to the operational level of warfare.56

2. The operational level of war tends to focus on the “why” of the tasks or set of
tasks along with the planning factors of warfare, essentially planning and
connecting tactical operations into more comprehensive strategic goals.
These units are composed of many tactical units, totaling a few hundred to a
few thousand personnel. Common knowledge holds that a military can win

54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, I-12 to I-14.

55 Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block
War," Marine Corps Gazette 83, no. 1 (January, 1999): 18-22.
56 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, II-11 and GL-15.

94
 every battle but ultimately lose the war, a concept applicable to many wars
that the United States has fought since World War II, from Vietnam to the
post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This happens when the link
between the tactical level and operational level of warfare is not properly
established, and the operational level is not adequately nested with the
strategic level of warfare.57

3. Strategic level operations are those military operations most associated with
international affairs. These tend to be internationally based operations on a
scale that involves several or many nations, such as General Eisenhower’s
command of the European Theater during WWII, or General MacArthur’s
during the Korean War. Strategic level operations allow for the linking of the
tactical and operational levels of warfare into a broader international
strategic narrative, one that must be closely aligned with a political objective
and foreign policy goals or ideally, a grand strategy. An example of this
interconnected relationship between strategic narratives is the Korean War;
an example of when this relationship was not well interconnected is the
Vietnam War.58

Within each of these levels of warfare exist nuances that differ from one
another in levels of varying subtleties, and those levels are only coherently
linked to one another through the concept of “nesting,” a concept defined earlier
as the process of connecting tasks to national strategic objectives. The United
States Army defines nesting as “a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose
whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept of operations is aligned by purpose
with the higher echelons’ concept of operations.”59 This means that tactical
operations or tasks done by a specific unit must be clearly aligned with the
overall goals of the campaign. It also means that if a unit’s task is not properly
nested, it could go on continually completing tasks, “being successful” by one
definition, but in the broader strategic dynamic, in fact, failing to contribute its
requirements for the overall mission. This idea of nesting then becomes almost

57 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, II-13 to II-14 and GL-13.
58 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, II-13 and GL-14.
59 Department of the Army Headquarters, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-

0: The Operations Process (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-

20.
95
like the conceptual connective tissue between the levels of warfare, which when
severed creates a disconnect effecting the entire endeavor.

Since nesting is also an important factor in shaping mission failure or success,

it should be the responsibility of the operational level of warfare in order to
ensure that the concept is being properly implemented. Monitoring and
implementation tend to be the driving factors for determining success or failure
at this level of warfare. Because the operational level of warfare must focus on
linking the tactical level of military operations to the broader strategic goals of a
campaign, operational units must logically be able to assess and analyze. This
includes not only the success or failure at the tactical level, but whether the
tactical level tasks being assigned and achieved are fitting properly, or “nested,”
within the overall strategic narrative. This is true for both the planning and the
implementation of tasks or sets of tasks.

Even though there is no higher level of warfare for a strategic unit to nest
with, it would be a mistake not to appreciate that at the strategic level of warfare,
nesting also serves a critical purpose. That role is to balance the military
strategic efforts and goals with the desired civilian or political outcomes, in
essence, nesting the military strategy with a political end state or objective.
Those outcomes are both dictated to and from the dynamic existing within the
field of international relations and structure of the global political regime. This is
what an overall strategic narrative means — that the civilian political objective
must be the ultimate focus of any military operation.

Conclusion

The aspects of the doctrine surrounding Military Assistance are important

not only because of the framework to develop capabilities and capacities at the
local and nation state level, but also in how these aspects of Military Assistance
contribute to the broader concepts within international relations and a nation’s
grand strategy. Since the focus of these tools is to help create a sustainable
security in the recipient nation, it is important to also recognize that this is a
contribution to the stability of the international arena. In that regard, there is no
better example of regional stability (or lack thereof) than the Arab Spring that
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occurred throughout 2011, as one country’s protest led to another’s, because
instability bred more instability.60 Sustainable security and stability throughout
the international environment is the goal of all aspects of Military Assistance,
including the forms of SFA, Advise and Assist, and FID, as they function within a
cohesive framework of international relations.

The basis of that stability in the end is due to the support of the population,
and it is this support that forms the foundation for the security of the nation.
From the perspective of international relations, it is necessary to appreciate that
these aspects of Military Assistance are both dependent on and dependent of the
experience of the local population. “Dependent on” because as previously
mentioned, these Military Assistance aspects must have the support of the
population to ultimately allow a transition from instability to stability.
“Dependent of” in that the support of the population will be unlikely to come to
fruition in the event of a poor security environment. In the framework of
international relations, Military Assistance should be considered a tool of a
nation’s foreign policy, and to the degree that these aspects of Military Assistance
are utilized in the broader strategy of a nation, that nation can more easily
transition through the phases of the operational timeline.

The approach within this chapter has been to examine, assess, and clarify the
concepts of Military Assistance from the perspective of United States Armed
Forces doctrine under the framework of the operational timeline. The
operational timeline that has been developed under Joint Staff doctrine is the
foundation for this research project, because all of the case studies being
examined have in common the United States’ acting as the supporting nation.
The challenge with the existing doctrine is a lack of clarity and a general
inconsistency. This lack comes from the inability of current doctrine to clarify

60Florence Gaub, “Understanding Instability: Lessons from the ‘Arab Spring’”

(Swindon, UK: Arts and Humanities Research Council, December 2012), 8,
accessed June 3, 2018, https://ahrc.ukri.org/documents/project-reports-and-
reviews/ahrc-public-policy-series/understanding-instability-lessons-from-the-
arab-spring.
97
distinct definitions and differences between the different tools and even within
the construct of Military Intervention itself. This causes a natural and structural
confusion when examining and assessing the tools and aspects within the rubric
addressed.

While Joint Staff doctrine can and will change and evolve, the underlying
dynamics of war rarely do so. Realizing the aspects and definitions of Military
Assistance within the context of international relations challenges the paradigm
of traditional constructs of power projection and international cooperation. The
framework of the operational timeline allows for this context, enabling those
Military Assistance aspects to be examined within the structure of military
operations. Most importantly though, defining the concepts of Military
Assistance creates a need for the United States Armed Forces to re-examine its
fundamental understanding of Military Assistance, enabling the intellectual rigor
to re-think and re-frame its doctrine, which is a constant effort in refinement.
The broader debate with the international relations field with regards to the
global order is further appreciated due to Military Assistance furthering the
strategic efforts of a nation understanding the concept as a tool of grand strategy.

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 Chapter 3

Military Assistance in Context of the Early American Military Experience

The history of Military Assistance within the early American military

experience can be conceptualized as a microcosm history of warfare and grand
strategy. In whatever time and age that nation states have attempted to project
power through alliance or subterfuge with minimal expenditure of money and
manpower, Military Assistance has often been a strategy pursued either in the
forms of material or advisors. Material, however, has been referred to in the
Introduction as Military Aid, whereas Military Assistance is actually in the form
of people, such as those present in a recipient nation to develop capacities and
capabilities. The formation of the modern state recognized under the Treaty of
Westphalia is replete with such examples, whether as the Soviets training the
Vietnamese or Cubans against the United States, or Iranians and Syrians training
Hezbollah against the Israelis. This chapter seeks to establish a historic
foundation and framework from which to assess the United States Armed Forces
experience with the tool of Military Assistance and how that experience forms
the basis of the utilization of Military Assistance.

The focus of Military Assistance must begin on the development capacity and
capabilities of another military for a broader strategic purpose, a grand strategy,
because tactical success divorced from a strategy does not end in victory. One
such example is advisors who are nominally commanding the troops of a
recipient nation, such as the Marquis du Lafayette during the Revolutionary
War,1 an experience that will be seen repeated during the Korean War by the
American advisors of the Korean Military Advisory Group. Another example is
the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, which, while not
uniformed military personnel, did provide technical assistance in Vietnam from
1955 to 1962 in the form of public administration and police training.2

1 Harlow Giles Unger, Lafayette (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002), 21-
22 and 55.
2 Robert Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, Technical Experience in Vietnam: The Michigan

State Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

99
Examining the dynamics by which a supporting nation pursues and furthers its
power and influence through extending the capacities and capabilities of a
recipient nation is necessary for appreciating Military Assistance as a tool within
the context of the comprehensive framework of international relations, and
through this, a grand strategy. By way of integrating this discussion with the case
studies developed further in this project, the focus of this historical analysis will
feature the United States’ military origins and the colonial experience of Western
Europe in the Americas.

The focus on Western Europe is due to the colonial military history of the
Americas, and how that history has become part of the underlying military
culture of the United States. The United States simply did not absorb the military
cultures of Asia or other parts of the globe in the same manner or tradition that it
has with Europe. This is likely due to America’s own colonial connections with
Europe, but also due to common language and recognition of national power.
Furthermore, placing this history in context helps establish the understanding of
the capabilities and capacities that the Europeans brought to the New World.
Although it could be argued that Russia and China also have and have had
enormous capacities and capabilities, both have a limited history with the United
States with regard to Military Assistance, other than perhaps in opposing one
another or in the present-day competition. A noted exception to this is when, at
the onset of WWII, the United States sent military advisors to China to train and
develop the Chinese Nationalist Army, teaming senior military advisor
Lieutenant General Joseph “Vinegar Joe”3 Stillwell to assist China’s leader, Chiang
Kai-shek.4

It should also be noted that both this chapter and this research project
focuses on Military Assistance with reference to advisors rather than military
observers. While both may serve varying political ends, and more inclusively, the

3 The irony of the United States sending a senior advisor to China whose
nickname was Vinegar Joe should be lost on no one.
4 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, China-Burma-India Theater:

Stillwell’s Mission to China (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1987.
First published 1953 by Government Printing Office.), 212–221.
100
projection of power in a realist sense, the distinction is that advisors are present
in a recipient nation to assist in the development of that nation’s military
capacities and capabilities. Observers, on the other hand, may have any number
of intentions, from genuine to more sinister, but have more of an intelligence-
gathering function rather than a development endeavor. Observers certainly
have been utilized within the context of sharing information around similar
enemies or conflicts, and the United States has a long tradition of sending
military observers even up to the present. An example of this can be seen in the
Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel,5 which resulted in an entire
United States Army battalion stationed on the Sinai as observers. Since their
focus is to “observe” rather than “advise” there is little to be gained from
understanding how a military observer could extend the capacities and
capabilities of a recipient nation in this instance.

Professor Donald Stoker, of the Naval Postgraduate School, notes that

“military advising” usually can be categorized as one of the following: 1. Military
modernization; 2. Nation building; 3. Economic purpose or penetration; 4.
Ideological; 5. Counterinsurgency; or 6. A corporate approach for fun or profit.6
While Stoker’s categorization of Military Assistance is quite complete, it still fails
to allude to either the dynamics of power projection in an extended sense or
more specifically, the need for both the supporting nation and recipient state to
cooperate in order to accomplish each other’s broader goals. While these
categories of Stoker may define the tactical or operational basis of Military
Assistance, they do not include the principles of the strategic interaction
between states or their underlying motivations for partnering to expand
capabilities and capacities of another state’s military. This is important in that

5 Thomas W. Spoehr, “This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to

the MFO,” Parameters 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 109-25, accessed July 20, 2018,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/articles/00au
tumn/spoehr.htm.
6 Donald Stoker, “The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and

Assistance, 1815 – 2007,” in Military Advising and Assistance, ed. Donald Stoker
(London: Routledge, 2008), 2.
101
the categorizations of Stoker are ultimately limited in their scope, failing also to
capture the need of a nation state that has a grand strategy driving its agenda.

In looking at Military Assistance from the perspective of the United States and
the framework provided by United States Armed Forces doctrine, the levels of
warfare offer an insight into the experiences of Military Assistance. The three
levels of warfare — tactical, operational, and strategic — are primarily viewed
through the prism of the size and scope of a unit, from smallest to largest. The
levels of warfare within the overall construct of Joint Staff doctrine are both a
standard and an ideal of placing the context within the greater scope of history of
Military Assistance with respect to the discipline of international relations. The
concept of a grand strategy should also be considered from the holistic
perspective of encompassing all the levels of warfare, because as United States
Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak noted, even a corporal at the
tactical level can affect the national strategic narrative.7

Military Assistance and the Origins of the Colonial Americas

Military knowledge does not exist in a vacuum, and the relevance of the
origins of Colonial America can be appreciated in the modern experience of
Military Assistance. Unlike many other disciplines, Military Assistance has no
single discovery that flips every known prior on its proverbial head: it is a
discipline of precedence, making origins of military relations in the Americas
critical for understanding and appreciating the issues of present day
international relations.8 For example, contemporary United States Army Rangers
learn that many of their current tactics have a direct lineage to experiences of
Colonel Benjamin Church in Colonial Massachusetts.9

7 Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,"
Marine Corps Gazette 83, no. 1 (January, 1999): 18-22.
8 John M. Collins, “How Military Strategists Should Study History,” Military

Review 63, no. 8 (August 1983): 32, 38, and 44.

9 Garrett DeWayne Hall, “Benjamin Church and the Origins of American Rangers”

(masters’ thesis, Valdosta State University, May 2016), 20,

https://vtext.valdosta.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10428/2174/hall-
garrett_thesis_history_2016.pdf.
102
 The origins of the United States differ when examined from the perspective of
the various states. From the penal colony of Georgia to the religious freedom of
Massachusetts to the Dutch merchant trading center of New Amsterdam (New
York), each state had its own origination story, an understanding of self-
actualization that was affected by its wider interests in becoming part of the
overall United States,10 and it could be said that these differences continue to
play out into the present day. This origination story can be seen almost as a
social or cultural construct. A simple example of an origination story as a cultural
construct is the mythology that has developed in the American South around
what is widely considered the Flag of the Confederacy, although in fact it is the
battle flag of the Army of Virginia from the American Civil War.11 As in many
histories, the myth acts as the basis of reality from which future generations
learn and act, the interpretation of which becomes a new reality. Since the
origins of the Americas are rooted in a Colonial past, one that survived based on
the assistance and involvement of Western European powers, in its essence, the
military foundation of the United States was formed on the concepts of Military
Assistance.

In some instances, that Military Assistance took the form of weaponry, an

example of Military Aid; in others, it was sending troops from Britain during the
French and Indian War in the 1750s, which included the training of local
Colonists.12

10 Colin Woodward, American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional

Cultures of North America (New York: Viking, 2011), 23-111.
11 John M. Coski, The Confederate Battle Flag: America’s Most Embattled Emblem

(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 13-14 and
292.
12 An important note is that because the United States, at the time of the French

and Indian War, was a colony of Great Britain, concepts of Military Assistance do
not apply. The colonists viewed themselves as British subjects, which had much
to do with the origin of the complaints during the American Revolution. Don
Higginbotham, “Army, U.S.: Colonial and Revolutionary Eras,’ in The Oxford
Companion to American Military History, online edition, ed. John Whiteclay
Chambers (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), accessed May 19, 2017,
doi:10.1093/acref/9780195071986.001.0001.
103
 In effect, conflicts that existed in the colonies were simply extensions of the
conflicts that existed in Europe, a fight for supremacy between the Great Powers
of England, France, and Spain. Despite the extension of European power in the
New World, each nation had settled in the Americas for different reasons. For the
French, it was furs; Spanish focus was gold; Dutch interest was trade; and the
English came for land.13

This theme continued throughout every region, and through the colonizing of
the Americas, the Great Powers extended their search for resources and wealth
in newfound areas, while at the same time continuing many of the same
interactions of the Old World. But this only explains part of the equation, that of
the Europeans Powers. Ultimately, as the American Colonies stated in their
Declaration of Independence certain terms relating to the principles of John
Locke:14 “Governments are instituted among man, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed.”15 So even prior to the Revolutionary War, the
Colonist in the Americas had some sense of cooperation, such that Military
Assistance was requested by the local population and supported by a European
Power. Indeed, this concept of Military Assistance to local communities was the
basis of local militias, which evolved in the United States more formally into the
National Guard due to the Militia Act of 1903.16 This capability and capacity
development as it relates to Military Assistance came to be engaged in the early
years of the colonies leading up to the French and Indian war.

The origin of this dynamic initially coming to fruition was in fact the
competition between the British colony of Massachusetts and the French in
Quebec. The French, in their desire to extract resources for the accumulation of
wealth, primarily furs, in the most efficient way possible, had created an alliance

13 Robert Leckie, The Wars of America, 2nd revised and updated edition (Edison,
NJ: Castle Books, 1998), 7-8. D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A
Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, Vol 1 Atlantic America, 1492-
1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 41-42.
14 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. J. W. Gough, 3rd edition

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1966), 49.

15 United States Continental Congress, Declaration of Independence, 1776.
16 Louis Cantor, “The Creation of the Modern National Guard: The Dick Militia Act

of 1903,” PhD diss., Duke University, 1963, Proquest (AAT 6307503), 248.
104
with Native American tribes against the major tribe of the region around the
French settlement. In this alliance, the French neither supplied weaponry nor
training, but soldiers to partner with their Native American allies for the purpose
of defeating the Iroquois. This was not based on a need to project power, since
power projection would not create greater efficiency of resource extraction or
make them more money. If anything, projecting power would cost money and
resources; however, the relationship between the French and the Native
American tribes can be appreciated more in the context of a cooperative
coalition.17 This was indicative of the general experience in the North American
Colonies. The various Western European Powers amongst and against one
another perpetuated that dynamic, a projection of power and pursuit of
interests, prior to the War of Independence, through various forms of Military
Assistance. Therefore, to appreciate the underlying effects of the power
undercurrents between the Great Powers of the day, understanding the ebb and
flow of Military Assistance is all the more critical.

It could be argued that these efforts advanced due to either the immediate
realities or necessities within the various colonies. This offers, however, a limited
perspective in that it fails to incorporate the strategic military perspective and
the extensive political goals of the Western European states. More importantly,
at best it presents an idea that the tactical realities being experienced were
divorced from any overall grand strategy, and in a larger sense, that the efforts of
Military Assistance may have been simply tactics that were pursued for
expediency. However, examining Military Assistance within the framework of
the levels of warfare instead of an extension of tactical efforts provides a more
complete understanding of that broader strategic understanding.

Europe and the Native Americans

Although it may have been considered at the time an effort of expediency,

when the British Colonies of New England gave arms and weapons training to
the Iroquois so that the tribe could pursue revenge against the French,18 there

17 Leckie, The Wars of America, 3-10.

18 Leckie, The Wars of America, 5-6
105
were unforeseen benefits. This action also had the effect of blunting French
expansion efforts, which was certainly part of the English policy of expanding its
territorial control on the continent.19 As per the definitional differences of
Military Assistance and Military Aid, the efforts of the New England colonists
would clearly be construed as Military Aid, as there was little exchange of
capabilities and capacities that were not focused around material in some form.
However, the tradition of Military Intervention, in both the form of Military Aid
and Military Assistance, would contribute to conflict between the Native
Americans and the European Colonists until the conflict resulted in the French-
Indian War.

While there is an element of extending or exporting the European military

methods and capabilities, there was also the blending of techniques that allowed
the American Colonies to develop into a fighting force able to withstand the
strength of the British Empire.20 This blending of techniques was both by
necessity due to a need to focus on the practicalities of warfare in a colonial (and
often wilderness) region over the ceremonies popular in Europe, and the
underlying need to be linked to the overall strategic narrative, the political goals
of the War of Independence. Though not to minimize the contribution of the
French during the War of Independence, the support had to have a structure
both logistically and organizationally,21 and yet also had to properly feed or nest
into both nations’ strategic narratives, which was to blunt British power and
influence in the Americas.

At the beginning of the colonial experience, it was in fact the Military

Assistance that the Native Americans gave to the Colonists that enabled
America’s eventual edge over the British. Both before and after the French-

19 Jack P. Greene, “The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The
Causal Relationship Reconsidered,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 8, no. 2 (January 1980): 86 and 89.
20 Leckie, The Wars of America, 117-118. Paul Lockhart, The Drillmaster of Valley

Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the American Army (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 166.
21 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States

Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973),
37-39.
106
Indian War, the Colonists, French, and British learned numerous techniques from
Native Americans. In some instances it was more formal tutelage, such as the
techniques that Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rogers learned that led to the
foundation of the Rangers.22 In others, it was learning from the techniques used
by Native Americans against the Colonists, such as the raiding parties that
occurred during King Philips’ War, which created a great deal of fear in the New
England Colonies.23 Taking the best practices and marrying them with political
objectives is what created the environment for the Military Assistance of the 17th
Century to become part of the American military lexicon. This is exactly what
happened during the French-Indian War.

The French Experience in Canada

Since by and large the American Colonies each existed as completely separate
entities, with their own origins and goals, it was difficult to conceptualize how
they would form an effective identity let alone an effective fighting force. Indeed,
in this regard the French had a great deal of advantage. Because the goal of the
French Colonies was resource extraction, the French had an authoritarian
settlement structure with a military to support it. However, the British Colonies
had a minimal military presence, and were supported more generally by local
militias.24 Although these militias could be quite professional, and many of them
were paid wages for participation, they were still a part-time, volunteer force
that was not regarded as having same level of expertise as a professional
military.

In North America it was the French, not the British, who were clearer on their
strategic objectives and grand strategy: namely, resource extraction versus
colonization of land. However, in this sense the French did not have a greater
political objective, because resource extraction, while economically important,

22 Owen Connelly, “Rangers, U.S. Army,” in The Oxford Companion to American

Military History, doi:10.1093/acref/9780195071986.001.0001.
23 Philip Ranlet, “Another Look at the Causes of King Philip’s War,” New England

Quarterly 61, no. 1 (March, 1988): 79 and 100.

24 John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for

American Independence, Revised edition (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan

Press, 1990), 31-33.
107
did not lend itself to a political goal. It should be noted in passing that among a
current set of recognized international military values, such aims of the French
and British were repugnant at best, and illegal or immoral at worst. In spite of
this contemporary perspective, the purpose of this research project is not to
delve into values, but rather to understand and appreciate relevant historical
antecedents to modern constructs of military planning and its application to the
field of international relations. Within the context of the operational framework
of the levels of warfare at that time, the French had developed and were
implementing a more efficient, although not long-term, sustainable approach.

The difference between the two approaches, the French goals of resource
extraction versus the British goals of land colonization, is that the French tactical
level of warfare was linked to the overall strategic narrative, while that of the
British was not. The French decisions focused on resource extraction, whether
by means of outposts or relations with the Native Americans. From the
perspective of the levels of warfare, French leaders made sure that their tactical
efforts were in pursuit of their strategic objectives.

An illustration of this concept is the example of Samuel de Champlain and the

founding of Quebec with respect to the Military Assistance against the Iroquois.
Champlain had reasoned that if he had a local ally to aid his growing colony, then
he could be more profitable overall in his trading and extracting efforts.25 This is
the rationale that led him to support the Huron and other tribes. It could be
argued that Champlain was simply reacting to the circumstances that were
presented to him, and this could very well be true; however, even if those
decisions were simply tactical in nature they ended up, in hindsight, to link
excellently with the broader strategic goals of France, in that local allies could
further French interest in aiding with resource extraction.

Continuing to delve into the framework of this perspective, it would be

understandable to adopt a position that strategic narratives were layered onto
the tactical achievements and efforts after the fact. However, this concept does

25John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World,
1650-1900 (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 186-187.
108
not take into consideration the origins that most of these efforts had to begin
with: explorers and colonizers do not set forth from a vacuum. Indeed, all
involved had to raise money and gain support from their respective states or
monarchies to pursue both their ventures and adventures. When gaining
support, all parties had to offer feasible plans to recoup the investment in one
way or another, a type of business plan during the Age of Discovery. The French
were quite clear about their desire to extract resources, just as the English were
for colonization.26

Partnerships as a form of Military Assistance

The partnership aspect of Military Assistance is the common thread, as it

relates to the broader construct of the European experience in the Americas. The
theoretical framework that the levels of warfare offers is the understanding that
Military Assistance is both a projection of power in the realist sense, and a
cooperative dynamic. It is important to note here that Military Assistance
challenges each theoretical paradigm, in that both are necessary to establish a
balanced effort, the potential limitations of one being too great without the
underlying appreciation of the other. Champlain could not project the power of
France through Military Assistance with the Native Americans without also
embracing a dynamic of partnership.

The example of Champlain highlights this concept of partnership, in that both

he and the Native American tribes came out of the Military Assistance
relationship in positions of greater influence than they began. For Champlain and
the French, there was further support for resource extraction involvement in the
region with a minimal commitment of resources and assets expended, while for
the Huron there was a stronger advantage over the Iroquois. Since both parties
met their objectives, the experience between the two with respect to Military
Assistance should be considered a success. In addition, both achieved a
projection of power, the Huron in that they had an ally who expanded their
capabilities, and Champlain who had an ally expanding his capacities.

26Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (London: Profile Books Ltd,
2011) 330.
109
 There was, however, completely no regard for a long-term effort to develop
the capacities and capabilities necessary for sustainable security, nor an
appreciation of Grand Strategy, although in fairness, neither party was in
position or had the geopolitical vision to pursue a grand strategy, let alone
articulate one. In this regard, the example of Champlain serves as a failure. It is
certainly appropriate to acknowledge that the French had little interest and
more specifically, no strategic interest, in assisting Native Americans to develop
any type of modern military organization. And though it could be questionable as
to whether the Native Americans had a cultural interest in adapting to develop
those European capacities and capabilities, they certainly accepted Military Aid
when offered. In addition, there was no effort to assist or offer to assist Native
Americans in developing the necessary institutions, nor was there any idea of a
need for sustainable security for the Native Americans from either their side or
that of the Europeans.

Champlain’s strategic interests of resource extraction had little to do with the

long-term, sustainable security of his partner. From the Native American
perspective, strategic interests had much more to do with regional relations with
other tribes than the resource extraction the French had planned. The conflict
existed not only where the actors’ strategic interests did not align with the
construct of sustainable security, but also with each other’s strategic interests.
Ultimately the reason Champlain’s case is not one of Military Aid is that it was
more strategically based than it was materially or logistically based. The Military
Assistance experience between Champlain and the Huron met one aspect of a
successful construct, such that both had a motivation to enter into a temporary
partnership, which was the foundation for the rest of the military relationship
between the actors. However, both were pursuing their own interests, which
ultimately lend to the downfall of both in the region.

This is not to imply that identical interests are necessary for the tool of
Military Assistance to be successful, but there must be an alignment of interests.
A recent study by Dr. Kathleen McInnis and Nathan Lucas for the Congressional
Research Service discussed the alignment between parties as a key factor for
partner capacity. “An alignment of interests between the United States and

110
recipients of security assistance in the short, medium, and long term appears to
be important for overall BPC [Building Partner Capacity] success.”27 This is to say
that success matters with respect to an alignment, but there is no requirement
for identical interests.

The concept of partnerships is important when conceptualizing Military

Assistance as a tool, because even though each side of a partnership will not
always have an equal set of equities, nor will they even be “equals,” they should
have an equal desire for the relationship to achieve a desired and mutually
agreed upon end state. For Champlain and the Huron, the desired end state was
to displace the Iroquois as the predominant power in the region, making this
entire endeavor limited in its scope and accomplishment. This exchange of
Military Assistance however, is simply a means to an end for Champlain, whose
sole purpose was to facilitate the resource extraction goals of French policy.

More comprehensively, this idea of partnerships relates back to the levels of

warfare, in that the “why” of warfare must be actors’ motivation to develop and
create the capacity and capability for a sustainable security for all. In this regard,
the “why” or operational level of warfare is the concept or interaction that
marries tactical victories, such as individual battles won, being nested with a
grander strategic narrative or possibly an actual Grand Strategy through the
strategic level of warfare, the interplay between nation states.

Military Assistance in the American Colonies

Continuing the origins of the European experience in the Americas, the

Colonial American military experience was also based in the concept of Military
Assistance. However, the implementation of Military Assistance produced an
early undercurrent of separateness between the Colonists and the British. This
separateness was created when the American Colonists realized that neither
they nor their service to the British Empire was viewed in the same regard as
that of British natives. It was a classic case of bigotry, one that played time and

27U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, What is ‘Building

Partner Capacity?’: Issues for Congress, by Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J.
Lucas, R44313 (2015), 4-5.
111
time again between the Colonies and England. Prior to the French and Indian
War from 1754 to 1763,28 a British expedition against the Spanish was planned
and executed to conquer the port of Cartagena. The expedition went poorly from
the start, as the British Government’s inefficient planning resulted in inadequate
equipment and provisions, setting the stage for internal conflict. This manifested
as the British regular army soldiers’ consideration of their Colonial compatriots
with contempt and disregarding any need to treat them with respect.

This lack of regard by the British towards the Colonists created a feeling of
separation, because prior to this time the Colonists regarded themselves as
Englishmen, citizens of the British Empire who simply did not live in England.
The idea that they would be considered less than full citizens of the British
Empire had to have been a foreign and distasteful concept to them. Indeed, even
when the Thirteen Colonies of the Americas tried to petition King George III, it
was over the idea that their rights as Englishmen were not being respected or
regarded.29

Furthering the experience of the Cartagena expedition, the French and Indian
War compounded many of these beliefs. Even at the beginning of the conflict,
Major General Braddock comment on the Virginia militia: “their slothful and
languid disposition renders them very unfit for military service.”30 Indeed, the
French and Indian War in many ways created the fermentation needed for the
Revolutionary War. For many of the soldiers on both sides of that war,
Revolutionaries and Loyalists had served the British during the French and
Indian War. This is how that war experience relates to Military Assistance: the
entire British campaign assisted in developing the capabilities and the capacities

28 While referred to as the French and Indian War in the United States, most
Europeans would refer to it as the North American theater of operations for the
Seven Years’ War between the French and British empires. Fred Anderson,
Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2000), xv.
29 Walter A. McDougall, “The Colonial Origins of American Identity,” Orbis 49, no.

1 (Winter, 2005): 8-9, accessed May 19, 2017,

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.002. Weigley, The American Way of
War, 19.
30 Leckie, The Wars of America, 46.

112
of the American Colonists such that they in turn developed the foundation and
structure to emerge victorious over the British roughly twenty years later.

Principally, the American Colonists’ engagement in combat with the British

was the Americans’ first exposure to a modern military organization. The French
and Indian War in retrospect was a perfect type of military exchange, as the
British learned techniques from Rogers’ Rangers, and the American Colonists
witnessed the effects of combining warfare, the merging of irregular and regular
troops with artillery.31 Ultimately, the Colonists absorbed a lesson in the
development of capacities and capabilities where none was anticipated or
intended.

By the time of the French and Indian War, Captain Robert Rogers was
considered as one of the military innovators of irregular combat in the
Americas.32 He had learned techniques from Native Americans in tracking and
frontier survival, which, combined with European weaponry, was a substantive
advantage over the fixed positions of the British, or minimal firepower of Native
Americans. Indeed, techniques of the Rogers’ Rangers may still be found in the
United States Army Ranger Regiment, which continues the lineage to the present
day. During the French and Indian War, despite most British commanders who
thought little of American Colonists, Brigadier Lord Augustus Howe observed the
irregular warfare techniques of the Colonials and ordered them applied
throughout the rest of the main British force.33

The situation of the supporting nation in fact receiving and giving Military
Assistance from the recipient nation is rare. Although the American Colonies and
British were not separate nations at that time, in terms of capacities and

31 Peter E. Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular

Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760,” The William and Mary Quarterly
35, no. 4 (October 1978): 630 and 641-647. Weigley, The American Way of War,
13-14.
32 Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700-1789 (Westport, CT:

Praeger, 2003), 194-196.

33 Leckie, The Wars of America, 57.

113
capabilities they certainly could have been considered as such.34 Unfortunately
for both the American Colonists and the British quest to crush the French in New
France (now Canada), Lord Howe was killed in one of the first engagements of
the campaign,35 and as so many Military Assistance engagements are personality
based, so too was this one, which failed to mature after Lord Howe’s death.

The uniqueness of this type of exchange is expressed in the fact that Colonial
America was in effect a developing nation in terms of infrastructure, while at the
same time having many aspects of a developed nation. The relationship of
colonizer and the colonized at times had created a tendency for romanticism
within American thinking, one put forth by noted foreign policy expert, George
Kennan in his book, The Cloud of Danger. Kennan references the Wisconsin
Indian tribe of his grandparents’ time, 1851, and relates how the individuals of
the time focused on industry rather than war.36 This romanticized fallacy at the
very least discounts the Civil War fought only ten years after the time that
Kennan references: he remembers this period as one where Americans thought
of farming rather than the political reality, that the United States was tearing
itself apart over the issue of slavery, which was the focus of most political
decisions.

These points apply to the American experience of Military Assistance with

respect to the British, in that the Colonists and Colonial America were not simply
a third-world infrastructure with developed world mentality. The American
Colonists at the time of the French and Indian War, and even the War of
Independence, were primarily a nation of British expatriates, British citizens
living abroad. While the Colonists may not have had a similar set of capabilities
and capacities honed by hundreds of years of military conflict, they did have a

34 A similar, more recent historical exchange of Military Assistance can be seen in

the Gurkhas of India, where the development of these capabilities originated
from a singular entity. Just as Lord Howe for the Americans, so was the British
East India Company Army for the Gurkhas. George Evans, “The Gurkhas,” The
Contemporary Review 276, no. 1611 (April 1, 2000): 197.
35 Leckie, The Wars of America, 57.
36 George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign

Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 38 – 39.

114
fundamental cultural understanding and motivation to desire, accept, and
integrate the Military Assistance offered to them. This is relevant in that, while
there was no formal partnership per se, that fundamental cultural familiarity
allowed for an ease of exchange and knowledge transfer.

An argument against this idea of a unique exchange of capabilities and

capacities can be seen in the French, whose local Canadian colonists37 had
likewise adopted many of the techniques of Native Americans. However, there is
no evidence of an exchange of tactics between the local Canadians and the native
French. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that the French held their
colonists in the same contempt that they did Native Americans,38 frequently
threatening those Native Americans into submission and in this regard affirming
the French as very similar in their relations to Native Americans as the British.
This is relevant because it likely became a factor that drove the Native Americans
to develop a relationship, and thus offer Military Assistance, to the Colonists, be
they of French or British origins, because the Native Americans saw and dealt
more frequently with the Colonists.

Military Assistance and the Battle of Quebec

The culmination of this Irregular Warfare capability in the French and Indian
War occurred at the Battle of Quebec in 1759. It was the third campaign
offensive for the British and their American Colonists, the previous two having
ended in failure. While the Military Assistance that American Colonists had
provided was long past useful, having been developed with an entirely different
expedition, the Battle of Quebec campaign was a clear example of how leadership
could affect the outcome of smaller battles, and as a result a larger theater of
operations. Most importantly, however, was the critical value of staff officers to

37 It should be noted that the French used the term “Canada” and “New France”
“interchangeably.“ Germaine Warkent in and Carolyn Podruchny, eds.,
Decentring the Renaissance: Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective,
1500-1700 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 234, note 1.
38 Gordon M. Sayre, “John Smith and Samuel de Champlain: Founding Fathers and

Their Indian Relations,”, in Les Sauvages Américains: Representations of Native

Americans in French and English Colonial Literature (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 1997), 49-78.
115
develop the engineering, logistical, and planning capabilities necessary for
prolonged campaigns in modern warfare. The Colonial American officers here
experienced all of these capabilities for the first time.

The British military staff present at the Battle of Quebec was a long way from
the development of the tradition of the Prussian General Staff becoming
institutionalized at the time under the leadership of Fredrick the Great.39
However, the American Colonists would have seen the combined action of the
Royal Navy and Royal Army, in the forms of Admiral Saunders and General
Wolfe, both in conflict and working through their differences to achieve military
victory. In this regard, the Colonial American officers would have seen the
extraordinarily confusing chain of command, one where General Wolfe had been
placed in charge of war effort while Admiral Saunders had a different reporting
authority.40 They would have observed and possibly worked with the engineers
assessing the breastworks of the French, and understood the critical necessity in
the emplacement of artillery. Most important, the officers from the American
Colonies would have considered how these capabilities worked and did not work
together, in addition to the leadership and command personality necessary to
create a plan utilizing all the pieces of this particular puzzle.

Levels of War in the French and Indian War

Within the dynamics of the levels of warfare, the French and Indian War
presents a case that on its surface level is simplistic at best: the British and the
American Colonists won, while the French and their allies lost. The facts,
however, present a far more interesting case: until the final campaign and the
Battle of Quebec in 1759, the British had consistently lost, a scenario of losing
each battle but ultimately winning the war. The difference is that between the
second and third campaign, French tactics became divorced with broader French

39 Christopher Duffy, The Army of Fredrick the Great (London: David & Charles,
1974), 143-149.
40 It may well be that these experiences contributed to the American method of

military leadership, which was to have a clearly designated officer as the

Commander-in-Chief during a given campaign with clear lines of command and
control.
116
strategic endeavors of resource extraction that came to the fore, and created a
stir of trying to project power in the form of territorial expansion with little or no
planning behind the strategic shift.41 It could easily be argued that this confusion
in French strategy began much earlier, with the building of a new fort at what is
now Pittsburgh. When American Colonists, being led by then Major Washington,
requested that the French leave what the Colonists considered British territory,
the French attacked the Colonists. Had the French continued to solely focus on
resource extraction, which was how their military and political assets were
organized, the possibility of threatening British territory would have been
unlikely. This is a disconnect of the French Grand Strategy that would ultimately
prove its undoing on the continent and the Seven Years War.

Relating back to Military Assistance, this attack initially motivated the British
only to give Military Aid, in the form of arms and training, but grew to include
Military Support, in the form of British soldiers and officers, and Military
Assistance, in the forms of training and command structure, which expanded
their capacities by developing the American Colonists’ capabilities — a complete
Military Intervention. This exercise would have been meaningless had the entire
endeavor not been linked with the strategic level of warfare and a political
objective — a grand strategy. Understanding that Military Assistance is a tool,
and not a strategy, to implement national policy creates an appreciation for how
the British used that tool, and by so doing, expanded the capacities of the British
military by creating the capabilities of the American Colonists. This
demonstrates how the tactical level of warfare was nested within the broader
British strategic narrative. That strategic narrative was one of development and
colonization focusing on the British goals of expanding its empire, one with
which the French expansion efforts was bound to create conflict.

The French began the entire endeavor in North America during the French
and Indian War conflict period by locating the original fort, Fort Duquesne,
nearby what is now Pittsburg. Whether it was planned or not, the British
believed that the French were trying to extend and expand their power in North

41 Anderson, Crucible of War, 11-32.

117
America,42 using territorial expansion in a manner very like previous British
efforts in the Americas to project influence. Since these were the days of slow
communications and minimal level of introspection, one certainly operating
from the Realist school of international relations, the British interpreted the
actions of the French as little other than an attempt by the French to exploit the
position of the British and the gaps in their security.

With respect to the operational framework, the emplacement of the fort was
a disconnect for the French between the actions they were implementing —
projecting the expansion of their territory — and their actual and state strategic
goals, namely resource extraction. The fort did not facilitate their resource
extraction efforts, neither from a capability or capacity basis. Due to the efforts
by the French to project power, when then Major Washington came to request
the fort’s dismantling, the request was automatically dismissed. These efforts are
consistent with the French attempt to create a more permanent colony in the
Americas, although there is little evidence to support a claim that the French
planned to develop a broader set of capacities or capabilities. However, it could
be argued that there was an increased security posture presented by the French,
thereby being considered as the further development of capacities and
capabilities. On the other hand, those capabilities and capacities did not nest
within the strategic goals of the French, and therefore were not conducive
toward the operational framework. Had the French properly nested these
efforts, or at the very least thought through their implications under a strategic
framework, the outcome might have changed. However, there can be little
question as to the fact that the French, while able to win many the battles of the
French and Indian War, eventually lost and were essentially ejected from the
continent.

Ultimately, however, there were no permanent efforts by the French to

develop capacities and capabilities during the time of the French and Indian War,
and as such, it is difficult to appreciate the strategic efforts of the French under
the levels of warfare. This is due to the underlying resource extraction strategy

42 Anderson, Crucible of War, 15-17.

118
being pursued by the French, which was properly nested through the
operational framework, from the tactical level of warfare to the operational level
of warfare, but not to the strategic level of warfare. Each of these factors
collectively reinforce the paradigm of the inability of the French during the
French and Indian War to develop a Military Assistance mission that contributed
to the broader strategic narrative being pursued by the French Empire of the
18th century.

This was a challenge to the paradigm existing within the traditional construct
of colonies and colonists, which may have occurred simply in the course of the
pressure of the French creating the necessity to extend their existing capacities
and capabilities. Whether by accident or by design, there is a great deal of
evidence that the British commanders, with the notable exception of Brigadier
Lord Howe, did not think much of their American Colonists.43 However, the
response to the power projection efforts of the French was to develop the
capacities and capabilities among the American Colonists. It was necessary to
extend those efforts to maintain a sustainable security in the Colonies through
the creation of military institutions and structure, which, ironically would prove
to be the undoing of the British.

The development of sustainable security through an expansion of capabilities

and capacities was possible because of the alignment of strategic purpose
between the American Colonists and the British, namely, that both desired the
British Empire to be the dominant power in the New World. This strategic
narrative was the basis for the tactics pursued by the British and American
Colonists that were finally victorious against the French. Since their efforts were
properly nested between their strategic goals and tactical operations, the British
and American Colonists were able to sustain continuous campaign setbacks, yet
eventually were able to accomplish their strategic goals in the French and Indian
War and emerge victorious.

43 Leckie, The Wars of America, 46 and 57.

119
Military Assistance and the Origins of the American Military

Although the origins of the American Military can be found in the capacities
and capabilities developed through the experiences of the American Colonists
during the French and Indian War, the War of Independence has an origin of
separate, almost regional beginnings. Indeed, the New Englanders who started in
Concord and Lexington had little in common with the landowners of the South,
who, while displeased with British policy, were not as committed to declaring
open war on the Crown.44 While the Continental Congress was formed to help
unify the Thirteen Colonies, it was the proposal of Massachusetts Representative,
John Adams, to appoint then Virginia Militia Colonel George Washington to be
the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army. This calculated action on
Adams’ part was to help bring the South into the revolution, to create a sense of
unity of purpose among all the Thirteen Colonies. The result was that the United
States unified in some respects, not necessarily by the cause, but in a practical
sense, by the formation of the Continental Army.

When the Seven Years’ War between France and Great Britain had ended,
many European officers saw their career prospects stall and the American War
of Independence provided an opportunity to those officers to continue
employment in the only profession they knew. This was common practice in
Europe in the 18th century. Officers would be awarded their commission from
one nation and after a period of service to their nation, if circumstances
warranted, would request a commission in another nation’s military.45 Baron
Friedrich de Steuben was one such officer.

Raised in a military household, training from a young child for a life in the
Prussian military, Steuben attended the Prussian version of a staff college under
the tutelage of Fredrick the Great, and became a rising star in Prussian military

44 James MacDonald, “Appointment as Commander in Chief,” George

Washington’s Mount Vernon, accessed May 8, 2017,
http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/appointment-as-
commander-in-chief.
45 Scott Hendrix, “Continental Army, Foreign Officers in,” in Encyclopedic of War

and American Society, vol. 1, ed. Peter Karsten (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 2006), 193-194.
120
circles. However, Steuben’s climb in the Prussian Army was prevented by some
competing rivals, ending in his being unceremoniously ousted from the Prussian
Army in 1763. After being employed in various households in Europe, he
petitioned for a commission from the Americans, who were recruiting European
military officers.46

Accepting the opportunity to be a soldier again, he travelled to General

Washington’s camp, developing relationships with many of the factions of
Revolutionary America. Upon arrival at Valley Forge, he made numerous
recommendations to General Washington, and eventually was appointed the
Inspector General of the Continental Army, a position responsible for the
training and development of the Army. Specifically, he was given a few weeks to
train the Continental Army to fight the British, who were perceived at the time to
be one of the best militaries in Europe.47

The training and development that Steuben instituted was not unique, and
other European officers who had received commissions in the Continental Army
remarked as such. What Steuben did instinctively understand, even better than
many American officers themselves, was how different the America citizens were
compared to the conscripts of Europe. As Steuben wrote a friend later in his life,
“The genius of this nation is not to be compared…with that of the Prussians,
Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier, ‘Do this,’ and he does it; but I am
obliged to say, ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that,’ and then he does
it.”48

In this regard, Steuben was challenging the paradigm of the American

officers, who themselves were modeled from the British from their experiences

46 Eric Spall, “Foreigners in the Highest Trust: American Perceptions of European

Mercenary Officers in the Continental Army,” Early American Studies: An
Interdisciplinary Journal 12, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 353-354 and 363, accessed May
20, 2017,
http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/early_american_studies_an_inte
rdisciplinary_journal/v012/12.2.spall.html.
47 Spall, “Foreigners in the Highest Trust,” 352. Leckie, The Wars of America, 181-

183.
48 Lockhart, The Drillmaster of Valley Forge, 104.

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both during the French and Indian War and in the Colonies. The British model of
officer-ship however, was one of detachment, allowing the non-commissioned
officers to provide much of the interaction with the soldiers. The Prussian model
was one in which the officers progressed through the lowest ranks, being treated
as an officer trainee, and then ultimately training soldiers on the technical
aspects of the profession. Steuben modified this model for the Continental Army
and American culture and in this aspect, Steuben intuitively embraced the
concept of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.

Washington’s war strategy was to pursue a war of attrition. He believed, and

was proven correct, that the debt of obligations of the British were such that the
British public would not meet a protracted war in a distant land with support
either politically or financially. He also knew that a key factor in defeating the
British was drawing other European powers into a military alliance with the
nascent nation. This meant taking tactical losses, sometimes very difficult ones
such as the retreats from New York and then Philadelphia. Washington held this
strategy in order to maintain the very existence of the Continental Army, and to
perpetuate the belief that the American Colonies could and would maintain the
protracted war effort. As a result, while Steuben shouted and ordered on the drill
field at Valley Forge, he infused a level of pride and confidence in the Continental
Army, which in the modern military is defined as morale. More importantly,
however, Steuben inculcated a professionalism and discipline within the
Continental Army where none had existed prior to his arrival.49 This discipline
and professionalism was the connection between the tactical level of warfare
and the strategic goals for which Washington was striving, the “why” of warfare,
essentially creating the link between tactics and General Washington’s strategy.

Steuben developed both the capacity and capability of the Continental Army.
The capacity he expanded by developing a training regime that would institute a
confidence in the Army such that it could do more with the little it had. The
capability he similarly deepened, by imparting military skills where little had
previously existed. This experience of Military Assistance, unlike the previous

49 Leckie, The Wars of America, 181.

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examples, was one where there was no expression of power projection by
another state. Indeed, there was no other state involvement, since Steuben was
to a certain degree a man without a nation, and certainly a man without an
agenda on behalf of another nation. While many other foreign officers had ties
with their former nations to varying degrees, Steuben had not lived much in
Prussia since 1763. Therefore, when examining the Military Assistance rendered
by Steuben, there is a unique aspect that does not apply, simply because there
was no supporting nation using Steuben as a tool with which to project power.
Even looking at Stoker’s model, none of the six general categories fit, given
Steuben’s status as a lone operator. He was simply a man with the right skills at
the right time and in the right place, a place that had the right need and exactly
the right leaders willing to incorporate his knowledge into their efforts.

The importance of Steuben cannot be minimized, and though he did not know
it at the time, Steuben was developing, through his training and later writing of
the original rules and regulations of the Continental Army, the basis that would
become the foundation for the United States Army.50 In essence, he created the
foundations for institutional development that would extend far beyond his
service. At the same time, it is accurate to state that what Steuben wrote was not
so unique that it created a paradigm shift in thinking, such as those by Fredrick
the Great or Napoleon, or any of the other military innovators of the day.
However, Steuben did understand how to take aspects of the Prussian system,
marry it with French military thinking, and simplify both, to adapt these into a
system for adoption into an American practical process. By developing a basis for
the Continental Army, Steuben was developing an institutional foundation
whereby the United States could operate within the international regime,
furthering its alliance to the French and eventually leading to alliances with
Spain and other European powers. It is this memory which exists in the
traditions and lineage of the United States Army to this day.51 As such, it is logical
to recognize that those traditions assist in creating a social construct that

50 “Publisher’s Note,” in Baron von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A

Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1985).
51 Collins, “How Military Strategists Should Study History,” 31-44.

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continues to affect the manner in which the United States Armed Forces view
Military Assistance.

Military Assistance and the American Army’s Initial Conflicts

The initial conflicts of the nation did little to change or develop the military
footprint in the United States. Whether it was the various conflicts with Native
Americans, the Barbary Wars, or the rebellions that began from time to time,
most notably the Shays and Whiskey rebellions, none of these military
engagements had much of an impact on the broader military buildup or
evolution of the United States. Congress under both the Articles of Confederation
and then the United States Constitution always had more pressing business than
authorizing an appropriate military force posture. Indeed, given the experience
of the War of Independence, and prior, with respect to the British Army,52 the
public was suspicious of standing armies.53

Although Congress had little interest in creating or developing an

appropriate military foundation or structure, the War of 1812 provided an
abrupt awakening. Even though this War ended quietly, much like it had begun,
it did have an enormous psychological impact, as it pertained to expanding the
capacity and capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. It was after the War
of 1812 that Congress began supporting naval innovation,54 as well as
developing further capabilities regarding procurement and logistics by
standardizing the components, in addition to centralizing distribution.55 As
researcher Adam Rothstein states, “open and standardized systems improved
manufacturing performance, and we see a new coordination between the
military and industry.”56 However, it was Lt. General Winfield Scott who would

52 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 24,” in The Federalist, ed. Terence Ball
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 110-114.
53 This gave rise to the desire and ultimately to the ratification of the Third

Amendment to the Constitution: “No Soldier shall, in times of peace be quartered

in any house, without consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be proscribed by law.” United States Congress, Constitution of the United States
Bill of Rights, 1792.
54 Weigley, The American Way of War, 60 – 65.
55 Adam Rothstein, Drones, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015) 21.
56 Rothstein, Drones, 22.

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define the strategic impact on the 19th century military experience, one rooted in
his own experiences with Military Assistance.

Scott grew up in Virginia, educated for a career in law, which enabled his
access to the trial of Vice President Aaron Burr.57 After experience in the local
militia, he was able to secure a commission as a captain in the light artillery from
President Jefferson, since the Army was expanding. This would be a constant for
Scott both in terms of his rank and the political methods he used to gain it,
allowing him to end the War of 1812 as a brigadier general, having achieved that
rank at the age of 27.58

While the Monroe Doctrine and the Grand Strategy that it defined were the
prevailing foreign policies of the period between the War of 1812 and the Civil
War, the United States was far more absorbed in pushing the Native Americans
further west. At first glance, the idea that the European methods of warfare
would be most efficient against Native Americans could be considered
counterintuitive, since formations seemed poorly designed to fight an irregular
combat. However, when there are few, if any, concerns about the safety, or lives,
of non-combatants, the European methods were surprisingly effective. They
were effective because the focus of European tactics at the time was to mass

57 Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864),
12-15, accessed May 20, 2017,
https://archive.org/details/memoirsoflieutge00inscot. Suzanne B. Geissler, “A
Piece of Epic Action: The Trial of Aaron Burr,” The Courier 12, no. 2, (Spring
1975): 5.
58 It is important to note that the United States Armed Forces currently goes to

extreme lengths to remain apolitical in every possible way, in order to avoid the
conditions of which General Scott was able to take advantage. Office of the Under
Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense Directive 1344.10:
Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces, February 19, 2008, accessed
March 13, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf.
However, the American Military of the 1800s had no such reservations, and
officers were routinely involved in dealings with politicians, who made
numerous decisions based on political dealings, rather than what was best for
the United States Military as whole. Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson, “The
Role of the Military in Presidential Politics,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009-
2010): 59-60, accessed May 20, 2017,
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/09winter/corbett%2
0and%20davidson.pdf.
125
fires, which is to say, a concentration of firepower, toward the enemy, and
combine arms, such as artillery and cavalry. Many of these tactics, along with
maneuvering actions for logistics to support that, were experienced during the
Napoleonic Wars on the European continent, and it was there that General Scott
traveled after the War of 1812.

This version of Military Assistance differs from the previous examples or

even the traditional understandings of Military Assistance, namely that others
would be present in the recipient nation to expand the capacities and capabilities
of that nation’s military. In this regard, Scott was in fact an importer of Military
Assistance, taking ideas and concepts that he would learn and absorb from
Europe, developing them into an American method, and thereby utilizing the
knowledge of a supporting nation to create and develop the capacities and
capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. This started with his efforts in
1815 as presiding officer for the Board of Tactics, which essentially translated
and minimally adapted a 1791 French manual on infantry tactics.59 His efforts
continued when he wrote an entire set of standardized regulations for the United
States Army in 1818, drawing heavily on his European travels.60 Scott repeated
this experience again in 1826 in his effort to develop and standardize other
aspects of the Army, such as engineering, artillery, and ordinance, among
others.61

Through each of these developments, Scott became an importer of Military

Assistance. Understanding tactics from the French and the British, general staffs
and planning from the Prussians, these enrichments of capabilities and
capacities contributed to the long-term security of the United States after the
War of 1812. Scott’s importation of Military Assistance contributed to the tactical
level of warfare, in that the standardization techniques the Army adopted were
directly applied to the Native Americans in the West. While understandably the
military actions against the Native Americans by the United States Army are now

59 Timothy D. Johnson, Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998), 68.
60 Johnson, Winfield Scott, 75–77.
61 Johnson, Winfield Scott, 79.

126
seen as neither moral nor ethical, it is still important to acknowledge the tactical
effect in Scott’s techniques. This tactical effect nested directly with the America’s
strategic goals of a manifest destiny, along with a broader strategic political
narrative of the Monroe Doctrine.

Conclusion

The idea within the construct of the levels of warfare with respect to the
origins of the American military experience is one in which the framework aids
in appreciating the broader history and context in which the United States
Military views itself.62 From the founding Western European colonies in the
North Americas, to the evolution and development of the United States Army,
Military Assistance is a common thread and theme. The origins of the United
States Army, like the origins of any institution, have affected and molded the
culture organizationally and strategically. As this chapter describes, the
principles of the tools of Military Assistance are embedded within the origins of
the American military culture, tradition, and experience.

This history and context are further perpetuated by the principle within the
United States Army, that its foundation as an institution was strengthened due to
its receiving Military Assistance, and that this foundation has been the cause of
its success. Indeed, in some of the most significant but subtle ways, Military
Assistance has influenced the American way of war, one clear example being
Steuben’s adoption of equipment accountability, a cultural aspect that influences
the United States Army to this day. In and of itself the concept of equipment
accountability is seemingly innocuous; however, the culture of accountability
extends from an individual soldier’s equipment to the accountability of the
personnel themselves. That leaders within the United States Armed Forces
believe in continuing to apply this concept of accountability of personnel
supports the morale of the entire military culture. Similarly, many of Steuben’s
drill and ceremonial exercises have continued to be carried out in United States
Army units to this day. Here, simple ideas imported in 1777, due to the frugality

62 Weigley, The American Way of War, 65 – 66.

127
of an imported Prussian officer, have expanded into an organizational cultural
bedrock of the United States Armed Forces.

It is these institutionalized and ingrained memories enshrined within the

United States Armed Forces that the tool of Military Assistance creates to
develop capacities and capabilities. Given the intimate experience with Military
Assistance as a foundation of the United States Army, from its birth in the
Colonies to United States’ emergence as a great power, it is only natural that the
institution has a visceral connection to Military Assistance. More specifically, on
both a policy basis and a level of strategic thinking, it is on this foundation that
the United States Armed Forces continue to hold that Military Assistance is a
viable tool. The commonality among these seemingly disparate military
experiences of the United States supports the process of adoption and
internalizing from a cultural aspect of Military Assistance. Ultimately, the reason
the United States Armed Forces views Military Assistance as a viable tool to work
within the international framework is that it developed this structure, which it
values as the basis for its success.

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 Chapter 4

The United States and the Republic of Korea:

A Case Study in Successful Military Assistance

When examining Military Assistance as a tool of foreign policy from the

perspective of the United States, the most relevant time period to be considered
is after WWII. It was at this time that the United States emerged on the world
stage as the dominant power in the Western world, doing so through
international forums and alliances such as the United Nations and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the post-WWII environment, the United
States pursued a policy of Military Intervention utilizing the tools of Military
Assistance, Military Support, and Military Aid. In some cases, this policy was
instituted so as to influence another nation’s progress, and in other instances to
develop relationships with the leaders, but in all cases to prevent the spread of
Communism and the growing influence of the Soviet Union — the pursuit of the
Grand Strategy of the Truman Doctrine. While the United States was neither
successful nor moral in every scenario related to the pursuit of its interests, it did
so under a perceived ideal of expanding its influence through the empowerment
of institutional development in the post-WWII order and with the motivation of
preventing the rise of Communism. The experience of the United States’
relationship with Korea, and later South Korea, offers an example of these
pursuits through the tool of Military Assistance. This chapter will examine and
analyze the United States’ relationship with South Korea before and during the
Korean War, the extent to which this ongoing relationship was developed and
forged by the tool of Military Assistance into a sustainable security for South
Korea, and how Military Assistance contributed to American Grand Strategy.

To understand the origins of this discussion, it’s important to appreciate that

while the rest of the world was modernizing through the industrial revolution in
the 19th century, what little power and influence Korea had was waning. This
was due primarily to isolation and rebellion, and ultimately Korea was
conquered and annexed by the Japanese starting in 1910, ending a five-century-

129
old dynasty that had grown insular and corrupt.1 The occupation of the Japanese,
which lasted until the end of WWII, was a traumatic experience for the Korean
people and one which provoked a challenging dynamic between the Korean
people and the American Military Government after WWII.2 Many elements of
the Korean establishment, and as a result, the Korean population, resisted
American-led rule of their homeland and opted out of the process, thereby
siphoning-off much of the legitimacy from the endeavor. This resulted in
enabling Dr. Syngman Rhee to seize power virtually unopposed in the newly
formed Republic of Korea in 1948.3

Many factors led to the Korean War, leaving scholars to examine and re-
examine the war even now, seventy years later. Although the reverberations of
the Korean War continue to play into the general affairs in the region, specifically
due to North Korea’s continuous quest for weapons of mass destruction, the war
also had an enormous impact on the developing relationship between the United
States and the newly-formed Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK). While it is
not the purpose of this chapter to examine the origins of war in the process of
appreciating the dynamics of the ongoing military relationship between South
Korea and the United States, it is crucial to understand the relationship in
context.

Historical Context

At the Yalta conference in 1945, President Roosevelt secured an agreement

with Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin to support the Allies against Japan in the
Pacific Theater of WWII after achieving victory in Europe.4 In August of 1945,
during the period when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union revoked its neutrality agreement with the

1 James F. Schnabel, The United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), 2-3.
2 Bonnie B. C. Oh, ed., Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948

(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 1-2.

3 Jinwung Kim, “South Korea,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean

War, eds. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Pub. Ltd,
2014), 27.
4 Schnabel, The United States Army in the Korean War, 7.

130
Japanese and declared war on Japan. The Soviets immediately began invading
Manchuria, which threatened Japan’s supply chain, and at the same time
positioning troops to attack into the Korean peninsula.5 This led the Japanese
leadership to begin serious discussions on surrender, resulting in the eventual
signing on the decks of the USS Missouri, and placing command of the Far East,
including South Korea, with General Douglas MacArthur.

As the war in the Pacific drew to a close, many within the United States
Armed Forces and the Truman Administration knew that the Cold War with the
Soviet Union was just beginning.6 In Washington, D.C., military planners were
discussing how Korea would be dealt with after Japan’s surrender, and it was
then arbitrarily decided that the 38th parallel would act as a demarcation point
between North and South.7 The Soviet Union agreed, and marched its forces to
the line of the 38th parallel. There they waited at the newly-drawn border until
Lieutenant General John Hodge landed “the 25,000-strong 24th Corps of the
United States Tenth Army”8 at Inchon in September of 1945, before occupying
the remaining southern half of the peninsula. Both the Soviet Union and the
United States were backing leaders who would support their respective political
goals in order to accomplish their respective efforts of a Grand Strategy at work
throughout the world. On the Korean peninsula the Soviet Union was supporting
Kim Il-sung, who had proven himself to the Soviets by serving with the Red Army
in WWII. For the United States it was Dr. Rhee who had developed good relations

5 The Learning Network, “Aug. 9, 1945: U.S. Drops Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki,”
The New York Times, August 9, 2011, accessed June 23, 2015,
http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/aug-9-1945-u-s-drops-atomic-
bomb-on-nagasaki-japan.
6 Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, “World War II and the Beginning of the Cold

War” (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford
University, 1996), 1, 17-18, and 30-32.
7 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic

History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 11 – 13.

8 Oh, Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948, 3.

131
with the United States military and diplomatic leaders since the Russo-Japanese
War in 1904.9

For the next few years the American Military Government acted as the
administration of South Korea, until the United Nations agreed on a plan leading
to the election of a legislative body and an eventual constitution.10 The Soviet
Union protested the adoption of the United Nations plan under the grounds that
it violated the United Nations Charter. Rhee was elected by the South Korean
legislature as the first President of the ROK, and proceeded to embark on
creating a government that quickly became known as thoroughly corrupt and
incompetent.11 The American Military Government withdrew, as did most of the
United States Armed Forces except for the 500-man Korean Military Advisory
Group (KMAG). It was under these auspices that Kim Il-sung, as leader of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK), established in
1948, launched an offensive in June of 1950, the beginning of the Korean War.12

The Truman Administration was able to gain approval to intervene by the

United Nations Security Council due to the Soviet Union’s boycotting its seat on
the Security Council, a boycott ironically started because the United Nations had
not granted the new government in China, the Peoples’ Republic, the Chinese
seat on the Security Council, instead leaving that power with Chiang Kai-shek’s
Republic of China on Taiwan.13 After obtaining United Nations Security Council

9 Michael Breen, “Fall of Korea’s First President Syngman Rhee in 1960,” The
Korean Times, April 10, 2010, accessed July 2, 2015,
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/01/113_64364.html.
10 Schnabel, The United States Army in the Korean War, 26-27.
11 Kim, “South Korea,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War,

eds. Matray and Boose, 30.

12 Hakjoon Kim, “North Korea,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean

War, eds. Matray and Boose, 37.

13 The Soviet boycott was in protest of Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China on

Taiwan’s continuing to hold China’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council

rather than the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. The Learning
Network, “Oct. 25, 1971: People’s Republic of China In, Taiwan Out, at U.N.,” The
New York Times, October 25, 2011, accessed September 3, 2015,
https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-
republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un.
132
authority under United Nations Security Council Resolution 82,14 the United
States counterattacked with a coalition of United Nations forces.15 The next three
years of fighting up and down the peninsula eventually ended in a stalemate in
1953 around an area eventually known as the demilitarized zone or DMZ. The
DMZ that was established under the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 was a
far more natural barrier than the initial line of the 38th parallel, and has
remained to this day the dividing line between North and South Korea.16

Republic of Korea as a Successful State

To appreciate the extent to which the Military Assistance to the ROK Army
may have impacted the United States and its alliance with the ROK, it is
necessary to consider what constitutes a successful state and why the ROK can
be considered as such. For example, is a successful state one that could be an
example to others, having progressed throughout a period of years? While there
can be no question about any state being perfect, all having their issues and
challenges, the specific dynamics that constitute a successful state and to what
extent might well be a Western construct.

Despite this perspective, at the end of the Korean War, South Korea was by
any standard a decimated nation. Furthermore, unlike the Western European
nations after WWII, the newly created Republic of Korea did not have similar
capacities or capabilities upon which to draw. Western European nations,
despite having been the stage of over ten years of war throughout WWII, had
capacity and capability, and in addition, a level of modernity prior to the
outbreak of WWII that South Korea did not possess. Having endured Japanese
occupation since 1910, and prior to that, an imperial-styled monarchy that was
decidedly isolationist, South Korea had not created a high level of expertise in
developing an infrastructure or industrial-based capacity that would be

14 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 82, “Complaint of aggression upon

the Republic of Korea,” June 25, 1950, accessed September 5, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82(1950).
15 These were not blue-helmeted United Nations peacekeeping forces but a

wartime coalition far more similar to NATO operations.

16 William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1995), 210, 238, and 320.

133
recognized as a modern nation. This necessitated the ROK’s development of
these capacities and capabilities internally, with the aid and assistance of
external nations, specifically the United States.

Although there can be no question that the development of a nation, both

politically and economically, has to do with numerous factors, from culture to
history to natural resources, there are measurements that can be examined and
assessed. And “while most of the world’s societies have endorsed to some extent
modern (Western) configurations such as capitalism, liberalism and democracy,
no single civilization or basic ideological principle has become dominant.”17 This
indicates that while the Western understandings of the success of a nation state
have become prominent, there still remains a broad debate within the field for
exploration. The parameters of the current discussion are very much rooted in a
Western construct of the development of human potential and state building.18
Underlying all of this discussion, the relevance to Military Assistance and more
specifically, to this research project, is to provide a context by which the
Republic of Korea could be considered a “success” and relate this to the Military
Assistance provided by the United States.

The end of the Korean War, then, is a natural place to begin an examination of
the success of South Korea as a state, since it was imperative for South Korea to
rebuild both economically and politically. While new statistics and
understandings are continually being developed to measure democratization
and economic development, there have been several standards that have
advanced from the development community. One such statistic is the Freedom in
the World index, a measurement of democratization that was created by the NGO
Freedom House, which states that the Freedom in the World index “is the
standard-setting comparative assessment of global political rights and civil

17 Kyong Ju Kim, The Development of Modern South Korea (New York: Routledge,
2006), 13.
18 Rather than delve into this debate, it should suffice to acknowledge that there

exists a substantial debate within the International Relations and International

Development fields, and that the exploration of this debate is not crucial for this
research regarding Military Assistance.
134
liberties.”19 Covering the years from 1973 to 2015, the index rated South Korea
as “Not Free” in 1973 and “Free” in 2015 as the state relates to political rights
and civil liberties.20 Although the index does not continue back to 1953, research
of that time period includes numerous citations confirming South Korea’s poor
level of freedom.21

Regarding the economic development aspect, there is no index that has

become quite so renown in the development field as the Human Development
Index or HDI, developed from the works of Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya
Sen. An obvious statistical analysis of economic development might be based on
per capita income, which is a nation’s Gross Domestic Product divided by the
population. The goal of Per Capita Income to develop a clearer understanding of
an individual’s purchasing power parity is a measurement of the true cost of
purchasing goods and services across different countries. Per Capita Income
however, is only part of HDI, which seeks to capture a picture of a nation’s
economic opportunity, doing so not only through Per Capita Income but also
education, based on literacy rates, and health, from measurements in life
expectancy. By applying these three indicators in HDI and comparing it between
nations, a statistical understanding emerges on where the greatest economic
opportunities exist to survive and thrive in a society.22

HDI has evolved and been refined over the years, with the latest review and
improvement occurring in 2010, and though these refinements have affected the
placement of a nation’s rank in comparison to others, it cannot account for the
dramatic shift of South Korea’s position. In 1980, when the United Nations

19 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” accessed August 22, 2015,

https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VbidG5NViko
20 Freedom House, “Individual Country Ratings and Status, 1973-2015 (final)”

accessed August 22, 2015, https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-

types/freedom-world#.VbidG5NViko
21 Gregg Brazinsky, “Institution Building: Civil Society,” in Nation Building in

South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 41-70.
22 Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen, “The Income Component of the Human

Development Index,” Journal of Human Development 1, no. 1 (2000): 84-85,

accessed September 19, 2015,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14649880050008782.
135
Development Program, the organization responsible for creating the yearly HDI
reports, began its measurements, South Korea was ranked 45, which was a high
rank among lesser-developed nations. This is in comparison to the United States,
which was ranked 2, and Australia, which was ranked 1. By 2013, South Korea
had jumped to tie with Hong Kong (which does not including the rest of China or
Taiwan) at 15, in comparison to the United States’ ranking of 5 and Australia’s of
2.23 Again, similar to the Freedom in the World index, there is not an HDI ranking
for 1953, but the state of the South Korean economy can be seen through the per
capita income of $1,072 in 1953 whereas in 2010 it was $21,701, in 1990 US$
and in comparison Australia is $7,505, the United States is $10,613 in 1953
rising to $25,584 and $30,491 for Australia and the United States, respectively.24
There can be little debate that the ROK emerged from the aftermath of the
Korean War as an economic success, which is not to excuse the method and
process the ROK government pursued to achieve that success, nor the behaviors
the United States excused in order to maintain its alliance. The statistics simply
show that South Korea experienced a dramatic economic evolution as a nation,
rising to greater democratization and economic development.

Context of Military Assistance in South Korea

With the alliance between the United States and South Korea and the general
use of the tool of Military Assistance post WWII, it could be assumed that the
purpose of the military relationship is one of military modernization and the
promotion of an ideological agenda. In the previous chapter, Professor Stoker
was referenced regarding his model of the six underlying categories of Military
Assistance, from modernization to corporatization. He outlined these six

23 United Nations Development Programme, “Table 2: Human Development

Index trends, 1980-2013,” accessed August 23, 2015,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-2-human-development-index-trends-
1980-2013. United Nations Human Development Programme, “Korea (Republic
of),” in Human Development Report - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a
Diverse World, lead author Khalid Malik (New York: United Nations Development
Programme, 2013), accessed August 23, 2015,
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/KOR.pdf.
24 The Maddison-Project, accessed August 24, 2015,

http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version.

136
categories as a framework to view Military Assistance, and one of these was the
category of Military Assistance “as a tool of nation building.”25 This point must be
challenged, in that fundamentally all Military Assistance is focused on nation-
building, including in South Korea, as discussed below. Whether the emphasis of
the Military Assistance mission is promoting a counterinsurgency strategy such
as in the case of the Philippines, or Military Assistance with a corporate
emphasis such as Iraq’s private security contractors, any of these categories
conclude as an effort to further develop the capacities and capabilities within a
nation. Irrespective of whether nation-building is a good or bad endeavor,
whether thought to be an extension of a colonialist or a humanitarian mindset,
nation-building fundamentally is about developing capacities and capabilities
within a state with little cultural impact. Military Assistance, the development of
capacities and capabilities to create a sustainable security within and on behalf
of a state, is a part of that nation-building, but more fundamentally it is about the
pursuit of a political objective.

Additionally, it is likewise logical to dismiss Professor Stoker’s other options,

from “corporatization of military advice” to “economic purpose or penetration”
to “counterinsurgency.” In these categories, he describes companies and
individuals who help train foreign security forces for profit as mercenaries,26
whereas on the economic side he describes Military Aid.27 There is little evidence
of mercenaries being used to any great effect in South Korea, although the idea of
counterinsurgency efforts was an original concern of ROK security forces. The
DPRK’s methods of infiltration prior to the Korean War were frequently
deployed, and created numerous challenges for the American occupation prior to
1948 and the ROK government thereafter.28 Due to this concern, one of the
primary missions of the Constabulary and then the ROK Army was a focus on

25 Donald Stoker, “The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and
Assistance, 1815 – 2007,” in Military Advising and Assistance, ed. Donald Stoker
(London: Routledge, 2008), 2.
26 Stoker, Military Advising and Assistance, 6.
27 Stoker, Military Advising and Assistance, 3-4.
28 Kim, “South Korea,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War,

eds. Matray and Boose, 28-29.

137
infiltration by Communists and their sympathizers, and this was supported by
the advisory efforts of the United States.29 As it turned out, this mission focus
was detrimental to the development of the ROK Army, as it prevented more
training and development as a combat force, which became apparent with the
invasion of the DPRK as will be discussed in this chapter.

Finally, the economic effort, or Military Aid as defined in this research

project, was not a major factor in the security relationship between the United
States and South Korea, at very least not prior to the Armistice. As Stoker puts it,
“nations selling the arms…generally wanted to place missions in foreign nations
because they believed that it gave them leverage for the sale of arms. To the
nation supplying the mission the sale of weapons was far more important than
the modernization of the military forces of the country in question.”30 This
becomes an important point for the alliance between the United States and South
Korea: over the sixty-plus years of their security relationship, billions in Military
Aid have been given to South Korea by the United States.31 It is not due to
leverage that either South Korea has over the United States nor leverage that the
United States has over South Korea that the alliance has continued. It is due,
however, to an underlying desire by the United States to assist in modernization,
so that South Korea can more fully maintain in its own defense, lessening the
cost for the United States in manpower and resources, which, as a point of policy,
has been reducing the number American troops over the years.32 At no time was
this more prevalent than between the occupation of South Korea by the
American Military Government and the end of the Korean War. Acting on behalf
of the United States, the little KMAG equipment and general logistical guidance to

29 Allan R. Millet, “The Ground War, 1948-1953,” in The Ashgate Research

Companion to the Korean War, eds. Matray and Boose, 112-114.
30 Stoker, Military Advising and Assistance, 3-4.
31 Pil Ho Kim, “Guns over Rice: The Impact of US Military Aid on South Korean

Economic Reconstruction,” International Development Cooperation Review Vol 9,

no. 1 (2017), 33-50, accessed July 1, 2018, https://cpb-us-
w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/2/20360/files/2017/04/GoR-final-
w0lqqp.pdf.
32 Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., “Aftermath, 1953-2013,” in The Ashgate Research

Companion to the Korean War, eds. Matray and Boose, 421-434.

138
the Constabulary and then the ROK Army was focused on trying to support them
at a minimal level of functioning. This was due to the simple fact that the KMAG
mission was low on the priority list for the United States Armed Forces
consumed with the occupations of Germany and Japan, while the United States
Government focused on the rebuilding of Western Europe.

Another scholar, Derek Reveron, defines the goals of Military Assistance (or
as he calls it “security assistance”)33 as the following: “creating favorable military
balances of power; advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements;
building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and
multinational operations; and preventing crisis and conflict.”34 The difficulty
with these goals is that they are limited in their scope primarily to the immediate
threat, as opposed to taking a more global perspective. In the case of South
Korea, this is certainly applicable due to having a very realistic immediate threat
in the north from both the DPRK and China. There can be no question that this
immediate threat is a prime motivator for the actions and reactions in terms of
the security posture and development of capabilities and capacities in South
Korea, especially given the period of focus.

The challenges, however, with these underlying goals is that they all take a
narrow view of comprehensive United States’ foreign policy interests, regarding
the United States as utilizing the tool of Military Assistance solely under a realist

33 Dr. Reveron is clearly not referring to “security assistance” in the United States
Joint Staff doctrinal definition, which is much closer to the definition in this
dissertation of Military Aid. Security Assistance is defined as “Group of programs
authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the
United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-
related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national
policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation
funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by
Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, D.C.: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-11.
34 Derek S. Reveron, “From Confrontation to Cooperation: Weak States,

Demanding Allies, and the US Military,” eds. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray
Mission Creep: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2014), 68.
139
agenda in order to pursue its immediate interests. While there can be no
question that the United States pursues its foreign policy goals as part of a
broader interest-based agenda, it must, as the most powerful military in the
world, look beyond its immediate interests and into potential threats and future
conflicts. In the past, this was the pursuit of a defined Grand Strategy. The United
States could afford this privilege of assessing potential threats and futures
because of its economic power and influence. These can and should be seen in a
more global context, particularly against the perceived threat of Communism,
which, given the time, consumed the attention of the United States as a strategy
of containment. For example, had the United States simply pursued an interest-
based agenda, there can be little question that it would have left Vietnam far
earlier, as the conflict began becoming more unpopular, and political leaders
incurred the wrath of voters and the American population in general.35

The United States continued its Military Intervention, first in the form of
Military Assistance and then in the form of Military Support in places such as
Vietnam, as some would argue, well past the viability of the mission. This was
due to a commitment to the Truman Doctrine, and coupled with the domino
theory, defined American Grand Strategy as focusing on the containment of the
march of Communism around the globe. The basis, however, of these concepts
originated from the liberal neurosis and accepted narrative that President
Truman had “lost” China.36 The politics of post-WWII in the United States was
dominated by the “Red Scare” propagated by Senator Joseph McCarthy, a concept
that began with a speech on 9 February 1950,37 barely four and half months
before North Korea would cross the 38th parallel. Any number of factors led to
the rise of McCarthy, not the least of which was the Senator’s own desires for

35 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940
to Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 129.
36 Arthur Waldon, “How China was ‘Lost’?: And could it have been saved?,” The

Weekly Standard 18, no. 9, January 28, 2013, accessed April 3, 2017,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/how-china-was-lost/article/696345.
37 Office of the Historian, “Senate History, 1941-1963: February 9, 1950,” United

States Senate, accessed August 26, 2015,

http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Communists_In_Govern
ment_Service.htm.
140
fame and glory. On the national security front, McCarthy’s claims of Communist
infiltration of the United States Government, specifically the State Department,
fed the idea that President Truman had “lost” China not through lack of influence
or resolve but by purposeful negligence.38 These factors exacerbated the
domestic political dynamics pushing Truman into a foreign policy corner, and
are relevant to the Korean peninsula because they forced President Truman to
act.

Once the DPRK had broken through the ROK Army defenses and the country
was in chaos, there was a great possibility that the ROK would be crushed by its
enemy and simply cease to exist. However, partially due to the domestic political
pressures faced by Truman and his Administration, the United States affirmed
the concept of collective security. Additionally, for the United States the Korean
War marks an interesting point in the pursuit of war, from a general
abandonment of war as a sole nation endeavor, into an alliance-based pursuit, if
for no other reason than to create the perception publicly of an easing burden of
cost in manpower and expense. Granted, in the case of the Korean War, the
alliance was American-led, but still the United States was operating under the
mandate of the United Nations, a similar dynamic that would be repeated in
Vietnam, although not with the identical construct of collective security.

The other change that the Korean War created for the United States was the
abandonment of the strategy of total war. Although General MacArthur was quite
public about utilizing the combat strategy of total war through the use of nuclear
weapons, specifically against the Chinese as they entered the war to assist the
DPRK, it was the decision of Truman and his Administration that from a political
perspective, a regional conflict such as the Korean War required containment,
establishing Kennan’s misunderstood policy as the prime strategic prism
through which conflicts would be viewed throughout the Cold War and

38Waldon, “How China was ‘Lost’?: And could it have been saved?,” accessed
April 3, 2017, http://www.weeklystandard.com/how-china-was-
lost/article/696345.
141
solidifying the concept of limited warfare in the nuclear age.39 It is this concept of
limited warfare and fear of being placed into a quagmire that created this space
of Military Assistance, especially in the case of South Korea during the American
occupation and the ROK afterwards. Military Assistance allowed the United
States to reduce its military footprint, meaning the number soldiers in country,
while at the same time cultivating relationships and influence to support the
desired political outcome. Most critical, however, was that Military Assistance
empowered a nation such as the ROK to develop its capabilities and capacities by
way of crafting methods and processes in order to create a long-term,
sustainable security situation.

Like the political construct of limited warfare, the Armistice of 1953 between
the Koreas was unlike previous conclusions of conflicts, such as in WWI or WWII.
It could, in fact, be considered the continuation of the changing characteristics of
warfare in the post-WWII era, which was that neither side truly stopped being at
war; there was just a secession of full spectrum armed hostilities. Each side
simply went back to their respective physical areas to restructure, resupply, and
re-strategize for the next phase of conflict. This dynamic has happened in
numerous post-WWII conflicts, from the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1967, and
1973, as well as the multiple military conflicts between India and Pakistan.

That the Armistice of the Korean War displayed this new dynamic of warfare
is not critical for this research project, but what is essential is that the Armistice
evolved and developed into a permanent level of an amplified security posture,
necessitating a unique security structure being put in place that was based on a
firm alliance between the ROK and similarly anti-Communist United States. The
reason for a permanent security structure was due to the permanent perceived
threat, in the form of the DPRK and its ongoing sabre rattling, as well as a legal
framework that created a permanent mandate, in the form of United Nations

39Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 563-592, accessed May 20, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/173775.
142
Security Council Resolution 84.40 In spite of this security posture, it was Military
Assistance that provided the connection between the nations to establish that
sustainable security.

The United States and President Rhee — A Case of Strange Bedfellows

The permanent security arrangement between South Korea and the United
States partially had its origins in the relationship between the United States and
President Rhee, the nominal leader of the South Korean elite. Rhee was an
individual whom the United States had backed as early as WWII, and other
Korean elites supported him largely due to that backing, although he had been
ousted in the Korean independence movement in the 1920s.41 However, this
solidified an interesting American method of operating foreign policy, one in
which the individual became the prime avenue of relationship rather than
developing an alliance with a nation state in the post-WWII era. As Roger Makins,
later Lord Sheffield, serving as the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the United
States, pointed out: “the American propensity [is] to go for a man, rather than a
movement — Giraud among the French in 1942, Chiang Kai Shek in China.
Americans have always liked the idea of dealing with a foreign leader who can be
identified and perceived as ‘their man.’ They are much less comfortable with
movements.”42

This concept is highly significant in the context of Military Assistance in that

the United States having “their man” tends to be the foundation of the
relationship with another state, developing into an alliance. This has led to
numerous relationships with dictators all in the pursuit of defeating
Communism, a willingness to sacrifice long-term ideal for short-term

40 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 84: Complaint of aggression upon

the Republic of Korea,” July 7, 1950, accessed September 1, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950)
41 Michael Breen, "Syngman Rhee: president who could have done more," The

Korea Times, November 2, 2011, accessed September 2, 2015,

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2014/03/363_97887.html.
42 Interview between Roger Makins (Lord Sheffield) and Max Hastings on 10 Jan

1986. Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1987), 23.
143
objectives.43 Those alliances are the basis by which Military Assistance and
Military Aid and Military Support are given, and certainly was in the case of the
ROK. This relationship, during the Cold War, led to a skillset among recipient
nations, which some would refer to as client states and their dictator leadership,
of resource. Noted Strategic Studies Professor Michael Handel stated, “The
diplomatic art of the weak states is to obtain, commit, and manipulate, as far as
possible, the power of other, more powerful states in own interests. Weak states
can sometimes manipulate and lead a great power, almost against its own will.”44

During the Vietnam War, the desire by the Johnson Administration to create
the appearance of an international coalition led President Johnson to request
troops from the ROK, which readily supplied over 300,000 soldiers, but did so
based on the pretense of gaining more Military Aid.45 While the Military Aid
might be crucial from a bottom line dollar amount, it was, in fact, the Military
Assistance that helped to cement the relationship between the ROK and the
United States into a long-term alliance. In addition, it was the Military Assistance
to the ROK Army that allowed those roughly 300,000 soldiers to support the
Vietnam campaign.46

This was the dynamic that played out between Rhee and the United States:
Rhee used the United States’ fear of Communist expansion to gain greater
commitments in the beginning years of the ROK’s existence. The United States,
through its ambassador, John Muccio, was able to use Military Assistance to
extract itself out of a perpetual obligation by pointing out how well the ROK
Army was performing. Rhee also publicly praised the ROK Army for its skill level
and once doing so, there was little he could do when the United States

43 Samuel P. Huntington, “American Ideals versus American Institutions,”

Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1-37.
44 Michael I. Handel, Weak states in the International System (London: Frank Cass,

1990), 257.
45 Charles K. Armstrong, “America’s Korea, Korea’s Vietnam,” Critical Asian

Studies 33, no. 4 (September 2001): 531-532. Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The
War Before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986), 263.
46 Ibid.

144
announced the withdrawal of military forces in 1949.47 In this instance the
United States was pursuing its foreign policy interests through Military
Assistance as it impacted several policies. The most obvious expression of that
pursuit was that the United States, specifically the Truman Administration, did
not want to continue the American Military Government any longer than
necessary, in order to bolster the United Nations as an institution charged to
peacefully resolve international disagreements. In addition, the United States did
not favor creating or exacerbating an area of contention with the Soviet Union
any more than required. Lastly, the Truman Administration had concerns about
the expenses of maintaining military personnel on a continuous basis, given that
Congress had not given such formal financial authorization.48

The undercurrent of these issues was the Military Assistance being provided
by the United States because of the relationship it had with President Rhee.
Ambassador Muccio seemed to understand, prior to the Korean War, that Rhee
would do all he could to retain a heavy presence of American military forces.
However, Military Assistance provided yet another tool for the United States to
continue both its relationship and influence without the heavy burden in costs
and personnel, allowing the United States to pursue its foreign policy goals of
preventing the spread of Communism. This was possible due to the relationship
the United States believed it had developed with Rhee, namely, that Rhee was so
fervently anti-Communist that the United States was willing to gloss over his
many other imperfections, from his unstable temperament to his poor ability to
govern.

Time and time again throughout the Cold War, the United States found itself
developing similar relationships with comparable dictators and dictator-like
individuals, as referenced by Ambassador Makins. There was a constant belief
that the threat of the spread of Communism was so great that all other issues

47 “Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio, Special Representative of the

President to Korea, 1948-49; Ambassador to Korea, 1949-52; Envoy
Extraordinary to Iceland, 1954,” by Jerry Hess, Trumanlibrary.org, February 10,
1971, accessed September 3, 2015,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio1.htm.
48 Schnabel, The United States Army in the Korean War, 19.

145
were minimal in comparison. As a result, clients like the ROK learned quickly
that in order to secure the support necessary, connecting that argument to the
Communist threat was the surest way to succeed.49 This is not to say that the
threat was not real: the ROK saw that threat from the north in the form of both
the DPRK and Communist China. However, from a broader perspective, this
client relationship served the United States extremely well with respect to its
Grand Strategy in the post-WWII era to defeat the global spread of Communism.
At the same, the United States in its pursuit of that Grand Strategy was willing to
sanction many sorts of dictators, as long as they pledged to be anti-Communist.
This by and large is the challenge with the foreign policy of the United States:
short-term, with a blatant disregard for the long-term costs associated with the
gains.50 This dynamic has been consistent in American endeavors for many
years, one where the smaller evils perpetrated by clients like Rhee were
overlooked for the “greater good.” Ultimately, the challenge with this perspective
is that at the individual and local levels, the small evil is much more painful to the
population than the perceived goodness of the greater good. So, for example, the
corruption and incompetence of the Rhee government was felt more acutely than
the perceived fear of a takeover by Communism, one reason, no doubt among
many, that President Rhee was eventually deposed in 1960. The concept,
however, of backing an individual leader has continued as a foreign policy habit
of the United States continually creating blind spots, such as President Rhee was
prior to the beginning of the Korean War.

Origins of the Korean War

The interweaving of the past in this case creates a necessary fascinating

background of perspective. As mentioned, one of the reasons that the Korean
War was able to receive a United Nations mandate through United Nations
Security Council Resolution 82 was that the Soviet Union had been boycotting

49 Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: the U.S. Defense

Commitment to South Korea (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 119-120 and
124.
50 James F. Dobbins, “America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq,”

Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 87-89.

146
the Security Council. As mentioned, this was enacted as a protest because the
People’s Republic of China was not seated at the Council, but went to the
Republic of China on Taiwan. In President Roosevelt’s conception of the United
Nations, his desire was that China would become a world power,51 and based on
that belief, he ensured China’s seat on the United Nations Security Council. This
intention was based on the belief that Chiang had a firm grip on China, a scenario
exemplifying what Lord Sheffield stated about the United States’ backing a man
as opposed to a movement. The problem, however, was that Chiang constantly
worried about his position, even during WWII when General Stilwell was leading
the Military Assistance mission in China. In 1943, General Stilwell commented to
General Marshall “that the Generalissimo did not want the [Chinese] regime to
have a large, efficient ground force for fear that its commander would inevitably
challenge his position as China's leader.”52 Ultimately, as with many Military
Assistance missions, the relationship between advisor and advisee helped to
dictate the relationship between nations. The relationship between Stilwell and
Chiang degraded to the point that Stilwell was recalled.53 Being challenged as he
was, when Chiang lost to Mao Zedong in 1949, escaping to Taiwan, Chiang took
China’s relationship with the United States with him.54

There were numerous factors that led to the loss of China to the Communists;
however, those factors and the reality that the Communists won are not critical
in the context of Military Assistance in South Korea. Nevertheless, that the loss
occurred is extremely important, as it placed President Truman in a position in
which he could not risk Korea’s being “lost.” It should be noted here that some
scholars, such as critic Noam Chomsky, have objected to defining China as a
“loss,” in that this implies a sense of ownership. “In 1949, China declared
independence, an event known in Western discourse as ‘the loss of China’ in the

51 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, China-Burma-India Theater:

Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United
States Army, 1987. First published 1953 by Government Printing Office.), 62.
52 Romanus and Sunderland, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Mission to

China, 353.
53 Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival

(London: Allen Lane, 2013), 344 and 348-349.

54 Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 1937-1945, 369, 379, and 381.

147
US, with bitter recriminations and conflict over who was responsible for that
loss. The terminology is revealing. It is only possible to lose something that one
owns. The tacit assumption was that the United States owned China, by right,
along with most of the rest of the world, much as postwar planners assumed.”55

This point is absurd, however, that the United States or even the Western
Powers were implying an ownership of China. When discussing the situation,
foreign policy officials clearly stated that this “loss” represented a loss to
Communism from the Chinese Nationalists and the perspective of Western
democracies. This situation thereby created a state that the Western Powers
knew they could not work with or possibly influence, making the “loss” not one
of ownership, but a loss of a relationship and likely influence. The relevance to
the Military Assistance in South Korea is that the loss of China had to be a factor
for leaders in Washington and MacArthur, as they allowed for the withdrawal of
troops from South Korea, leaving only the KMAG mission in its stead. This raised
the question of to what extent the Korean peninsula was being considered in the
broader context of the struggle against Communism prior to the DPRK’s
invasion, to which the simple response is not much at all.

This was one of many miscalculations by both sides that led to the escalation
of the Korean War, another being the full force of McCarthyism as a considerable
domestic pressure on Truman in the United States. Chomsky in his critique cites
Kennan’s comment that “we should cease to talk about vague and — for the Far
East — unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living
standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have
to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic
slogans, the better. We should recognize that our influence in the Far Eastern
area in the coming period is going to be primarily military and economic.”56

55 Noam Chomsky, “'Losing' the world: American decline in perspective, part 1,”
The Guardian, February 14, 2012, accessed September 3, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/14/losing-
the-world-american-decline-noam-chomsky.
56 George F. Kennan, “Policy Planning Staff Memo 23: Review of Current Trends

US Foreign Policy,” February 24, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1948, General: The United Nations, Vol. I, Part 2, eds. Neal H. Petersen et al
148
 This prism, by which a senior foreign policy advisor at the State Department
defined how he foresaw the Cold War evolving, is crucial with respect to Military
Assistance and relevant as to how Military Assistance was practiced in South
Korea before, during, and after the Korean War, the relationship construct by
which the military alliance with the ROK was based. Given the numerous abuses
of power by South Korean elites towards their own people, from corruption to
military coups, the United States was extremely tolerant in one way or another in
order to continue the ROK-US alliance against a possible Communist influence or
invasion. Under this rubric it is understandable that the evolution of foreign
policy during the Cold War takes on a Realist perspective in terms of
international relations theory.

This Realist perspective can be considered the context for the Military
Assistance mission between South Korea and the United States, despite the fact
that the advisory mission begins at the end of WWII and before the machinations
between Stalin and the West evolved into the Cold War. That period between the
end of WWII and end of the Korean War was the incubator which set in motion
both the Cold War on a global scale, as well as how the United States would
approach and maintain its alliances and their development. The purpose of the
ROK and United States alliance was ultimately for the purpose of promoting the
ideology of anti-Communism. This alliance was able to do so through the Military
Assistance mission that was to utilize military modernization as a method to
extend and solidify the ROK Army’s capabilities and capacities in the security
arena.

The Military Assistance experience in the Republic of Korea

After considering the background of Military Assistance in South Korea, the

next consideration in investigating the topic of alliance development through
Military Assistance is exploring the form and substance of the Military Assistance
provided by the United States to the ROK. In addition, it is helpful to appreciate

(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), accessed

September 3, 2015,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d4.
149
the context of the American Occupation in South Korea after WWII and the
presence of the United States Military in support of the ROK after the Occupation
and prior to the outbreak of the Korea War. Historically speaking, in some form
or another the United States had a Military Assistance relationship with Korea
dating back to 1881.57 However, the current Military Assistance mission in the
ROK can find its origins in the KMAG58 that began with the Occupation by the
United States of South Korea and the American Military Government in Korea in
1945.59 That Military Assistance mission during and after the American Military
Government was extremely distinctive, given that before the Korean War the
underlying need in South Korea was simply to exist: that mission created a
structural foundation that would become the ROK Army. It was this structure
that withstood the might of the DPRK surprise invasion and that ultimately held
together the ROK Army during its retreat over the first months of the Korean
War.60 This timeframe, between the American Military Government and the
Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, is critical because it provided for the
foundation of alliance between the United States and the ROK, all based on the
form and substance of the Military Assistance begun in 1945.

The KMAG and its predecessors were primarily focused on the Advise and
Assist mission, first with the Korean Constabulary and then the ROK Army once
it was constituted under the founding of the ROK. The Advise and Assist mission

57 Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, ed.
Walter G. Hermes (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1963), 5.
58 The KMAG prior to the Korea War was referred to initially as the Department

of Internal Security (DIS) during the American Military Government, evolving

into the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) once the Republic of Korea
declared its independence and the Constabulary became the ROK Army. For the
sake of ease of understanding, I will refer to the DIS, PMAG, and KMAG simply as
the KMAG.
59 Robert D. Ramsey III, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea,

Vietnam, and El Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
2006), 5. Bryan R. Gibby, The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea,
1946–1953 (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012), 3. Sawyer,
Military Advisors in Korea, 35 & 45.
60 A military retreat is considered one of the most challenging tactical

movements. That the ROK Army was able to hold together while so engaged
bespeaks of camaraderie and unit discipline.
150
was defined earlier in terms of the recipient nation in the lead with the support
nation taking an advisory role, possibly helping more directly on logistics and
material to expand the capacities and capabilities of the recipient nation. This is
consistent with the general understanding of the Advise and Assist aspect of
Military Assistance discussed in Chapter 2. The reason for the emphasis on the
Advise and Assist mission is that the American Military Government emphasized
local security being led by local forces. The Constabulary mission grew out of the
effort to create a domestic security force capable of withstanding infiltration
from the north and internal insurgencies, which current United States Joint Staff
doctrine would consider a foreign internal defense mission.61 In fairness to the
American Military Government, it was not well prepared to take on governing
responsibilities and knew little of the area or Korean people. The best that could
be said about the American Military Government in South Korea is that it knew
itself to be a transitory government until political leaders both in Korea and
around the world agreed on the final disposition of the Korean peninsula. It also
knew how to help facilitate an internal security force. The intent was to have
military-like security, which was separate from the National Police, and while
there was no stated declaration that what was known as the Constabulary would
become the Army of South Korea when the occupation ended, it could not have
been far from the minds of the American Military Government, the elites around
Rhee who would eventually form the ROK, or the advisors of the Constabulary.62

The Constabulary

Although there was a desire to have greater capability than a militarized

version of the National Police, there was serious political posturing both
internally as well as on the international stage surrounding the establishment of
the Constabulary. Internally, there were concerns by the State Department about
the ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union on the final disposition of the

61 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), GL-7.
62 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, 73-74. Schnabel, United States Army

in the Korean War, 32-33.

151
Korean peninsula.63 At the same time, General Hodge, the commander of the
American Military Government, must have believed that the Constabulary was an
achievable effort to undertake. The precise capabilities and capacities that the
Constabulary would set as a goal seems to have been the subject of an ongoing
discussion between Hodge and MacArthur. Although both wanted the
Constabulary to have a greater military capability, the State Department, uneasy
concerning Soviet reactions, influenced both Generals. The Constabulary would
end up more capable than the National Police, having small pieces of artillery,
but not as capable as an actual army, resulting in minimal machine guns and
anti-tank weaponry.64 This represented minimal concern for an internal force
but a major capability gap, as was found in June 1950.

The initial officers of the Korean Constabulary would eventually form the
core of the ROK Army that would eventually be established. From the class of
110 of the first officers, 75 would become general officers, and of these, 13 would
become the chief of staff.65 However, the Constabulary experienced an
immediate conflict between the United States Army training doctrine and
discipline with the equipment, manuals, and even money left by the Japanese.66
In addition, many of the officers from the Constabulary had been part of the
Japanese military, which allowed them a better than basic understanding of
military operations, but it also had the effect of tainting those officers, allowing
them to be seen as Japanese collaborators, and as such, sometimes mistrusted by
the Korean populace. These officers had to deal with the underlying challenge of
negotiating between Japanese and American military doctrines. While the
Korean members of the Constabulary made for competent soldiers, suspicion of
them initially prevented attaining any level of senior command.67 As the
Constabulary evolved into the ROK Army, the officers who advanced did so on
the basis of their relations both with their KMAG advisors and President Rhee

63 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, 73.

64 Schnabel, The United States Army in the Korean War, 33.
65 Gibby, The Will to Win, 30.
66 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, 76-77. Gibby, The Will to Win, 31-32.
67 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, 74.

152
and his inner circle.68 The KMAG advisors had disproportionate levels of
influence due to their ability to supply the Constabulary with weapons,
ammunition, and basic living amenities along with general logistical support.69 In
this regard, it was both the Military Aid and the Military Assistance that
developed the relationship between the KMAG trainers and the Korean trainees.

The American advisors, however, found other ways by which to involve

themselves in the development of the Constabulary. At the very beginning of its
formation, it was not unusual to see American officers traveling with their
Korean counterparts to partake in a recruitment drive. This put the Constabulary
in direct competition with the National Police for material and men, but as the
National Police started arresting leftists, more men rushed to join the
Constabulary. The recruitment rush caused conflicts, given that at the time the
Constabulary’s mission was to assist the National Police and prevent the
infiltration by Communists. During these endeavors, one of the major issues of
focus for the American advisors was to create the structure for the Constabulary
based on the Prussian model of staff support to a commander, the first time
South Korea had tried to develop this type of capability.70 While this Prussian-
based structure did little good when the Constabulary was struggling for food,
weapons, and bullets, it began to integrate a level of professionalism and
planning discipline within the Korean defense structure that became critical in
the war to come.

This was the type of Military Assistance that the United States provided:
professionalization of the security forces and logistical assistance, as the
American Military Government transitioned power to the South Koreans. It is
important to note that there was very little Military Aid given to the South
Koreans, either before or after the ROK declared its independence. As noted,
most of the equipment provided to the South Koreans was leftover Japanese
supplies from WWII. However, the Constabulary’s professionalization extended
not only to the development of the Prussian staff model, but also to the creation

68 Gibby, The Will to Win, 67.

69 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 14-15.
70 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 23-25.

153
of their professional military education. The KMAG developed, through their
Korean counterparts, the beginnings of technical and leadership training. The
technical training created was in the form of artillery, engineering, signal,
infantry, and logistics schools, training which was for all ranks in the
Constabulary.71

Although the technical military education was important in adding

capabilities to the nascent Constabulary, capacity would come from the
leadership training. Initially, there was a specific development of the Officer
Training School (OTS) course, which because of minimal requirements was able
to push through class after class of junior leaders. This in turn created an
additional difficulty for which the KMAG was unprepared: a Korean officer corps
as inexperienced as the Constabulary they helped bring into being. However, the
KMAG was able to develop an officer academy modeled on West Point early in
the existence of the Constabulary and gain access for many graduates to the
branch schools in the United States for specialized training such as infantry,
artillery, and engineering.72 The few officers who were able to attend were not
present in enough numbers to have a significant effect on the junior officers.
Although those few were able to do so as they rose through the ranks, the
experience of training in the United States had a profound effect. One officer
commented on how, for the first time, he conceptualized the idea of service to a
“nation” rather than an individual.73 While the positives and negatives of
nationalism may certainly be debatable, the important effect on these young
officers was to begin to experience their service as part of a broader
contribution, an offering to something greater than themselves. However,
despite this broadening experience, a few junior officers were not able to
influence the challenges of inexperience within the Constabulary. This
inexperience resulted in a natural tension between those with Japanese training
and development of capacities and capabilities the KMAG was trying to instill in

71 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, 75.

72 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 180-181.
73 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, 75.

154
the Constabulary, a challenge that continued throughout the existence of the
Constabulary.

As the ROK began taking control in the government from the American
Military Government in 1948, the expectation of the ROK Army was to continue
the mission of the Constabulary. Focusing on internal defense, primarily from
Communist infiltration, and border defense from the DPRK, raiding became the
primary mission.74 It was at this time that a discussion took place between the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and General MacArthur as the Commander-
in-Chief of United States Armed Forces Far East regarding the final disposition of
forces in the ROK. MacArthur stated, “the United States did not have the
capability to train and equip Korean troops to the point where the Koreans
would be able to cope with a full-scale invasion.”75 He further stipulated that in
the event of an invasion, the United States would have to actively support the
ROK Army, but then, in a move confusing in retrospect, concurred with the
recommendation to withdraw United States Armed Forces in the ROK. The
intention to remove United States Armed Forces in 1948 seems to have been
based more on costs76 than on any desire to build and develop a long-term
alliance with the ROK. It would be hard to imagine that newly appointed
President Rhee could not help but feel abandoned by the United States due to the
reliance by the ROK on the United States,77 since it was withdrawing thousands
of troops and leaving less than 500 personnel78 to manage what could only be
defined as a herculean effort to train and develop the capacities and capabilities
of the soon-to-be-founded ROK Army.

Shortly before the transition from the Constabulary to the ROK Army,
Brigadier General William Lynn Roberts assumed direct responsibility of the
KMAG, taking command from May 1948 until a month after the invasion, when

74 Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces, 5.

75 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 37.
76 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 19.
77 Allan R. Millet, The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS:

University Press of Kansas, 2005), 156.

78 “Theme of the Quarter: A Closer Look at…Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group-

Korea,” DISAM Journal 5, issue 2 (Winter 1982-1983): 5.

155
the Eighth Army assumed command of all forces in Korea. The KMAG had
continued its mission of advising and assisting after the completion of the
American military occupation. This mission evolved very directly as the forces of
the DPRK broke through the 38th parallel on the 25th of June in 1950.79
Unfortunately, many of the KMAG personnel, along with the ROK Army officers,
were absent due to the weekend when DPRK forces rolled through.80 The ROK
Army was in a state of disarray, as were their American trainers. While the ROK
Army was being decimated by the onslaught of the 135,000-man attack,81 the
KMAG focused on retreating and reorganizing the ROK Army to face the enemy.82
As with many surprise attacks, and with the benefit of hindsight, there had been
many warnings but none had been heeded, resulting in the KMAG, and more
specifically Brigadier General Roberts and the ROK Army, bearing the brunt of
the criticism for failing to stop the North Korean advance.83 However, a more fair
argument can be appreciated in the perception of United States Army historian,
Colonel Bryan Gibby: “the confused state of the advisory groups simply mirrored
confused policy in Tokyo [at MacArthur’s headquarters] and Washington.”84 That
confusion of policy had already led to the withdrawal of the United States Armed
Forces a few years before.

The continued confusion in policy resulted in major miscalculations on both

sides of the 38th parallel. In 1948, Truman believed that when United States
Armed Forces left Korea they were doing so with a partner in Rhee and the
establishment of the ROK.85 Rhee, however, was known to have a difficult
personality, and had been projecting through various actions that he wanted to
unite Korea under his rule by conquering the DPRK.86 These were not the
dynamics that created a strong alliance, but this was the broader framework

79 Hastings, The Korean War, 438.

80 Gibby, The Will to Win, 124.
81 Hastings, The Korean War, 45.
82 Gibby, The Will to Win, 124.
83 Gibby, The Will to Win, 7 and 9.
84 Gibby, The Will to Win, 7.
85 Kim, “South Korea,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War,

eds. Matray and Boose, 27 and 29.

86 Stueck, The Korean War, 22.

156
under which Roberts and the KMAG were operating. A myth arose, however,
throughout MacArthur’s headquarters and the national security circles in
Washington that the KMAG failed completely in its mission of developing the
ROK Army prior to the invasion. The KMAG, however, had been consistently
reporting the lack of existing capability and capacity within the ROK Army.87 Part
of the challenge arose from the idea that because the ROK Army had beaten back
various skirmishes, raids, and withstood artillery bombardments, they were
assumed to be prepared for a full assault. However, in fairness to the KMAG,
neither MacArthur nor the military and civilian leaders in Washington
considered this a serious possibility, and apparently MacArthur did not
remember his earlier assessment that the ROK could not withstand an assault.88

At the time of the invasion the KMAG consisted of roughly 249 officers and
NCOs. Although like other advisors, Roberts had no formal training to advise
foreign military forces, he had a foundational understanding of how to advise. He
recommended that his KMAG subordinates give advice and not attempt to
command, ensuring that they were sensitive to not try to remake the American
Army.89 But his challenges with the Constabulary on his arrival were such that
many of the Korean officers, who had trained under the Japanese military system
and been mistrusted, resulted in an army in which leadership was based more on
relationships than professional military skill. However, one positive of the soon-
to-be Korean War was that any competency of the Korean officers enabled them
to quickly rise to the top.

During his time commanding the KMAG, Roberts gave every impression that
the ROK Army was excelling. However, it is critical to appreciate that he was
judging them proficient compared to their basic beginnings, praising their
excellence based on the expectations of the ROK leadership and to a much lesser
extent that of the United States.90 Given the expectation that the ROK Army

87 Bryan R. Gibby, “American advisors to the Republic of Korea: America’s first

commitment in the Cold War, 1946-1950,” ed. Donald Stoker, Military Advising
and Assistance, 103-104.
88 Gibby, The Will to Win, 119 – 120.
89 Gibby, The Will to Win, 98.
90 Gibby, The Will to Win, 103-104.

157
would be able to prevent the intrusion of the DPRK, either in the form of border
skirmishes or infiltration, Roberts gave praise to the ROK Army and in his
reports on numerous occasions.91 At the same time, he agreed with MacArthur’s
initial assessment from January 1949 that the ROK Army was not prepared to
withstand a total assault. However, the reports left impressions in the minds of
many senior leaders, who held to their belief that Roberts had misled them, as
the ROK Army nearly collapsed in June and July of 1950 following the DPRK’s
invasion.92

In his reports, Roberts outlined the successes of the KMAG and the ROK
Army, praising the burgeoning force as he “expressed the view that the Korean
Army had the capability of containing the North Korean forces in being.
However, he pointed to the need for additional U.S. aid for the Korean security
forces.”93 Since the Pentagon and national security apparatus of the United States
were focused on nuclear weapons, the Communist threat, and general internal
machinations such as the Revolt of the Admirals in 1949, the concept that senior
leaders did not have to worry about Korea must have been a relief, and
considerations of the region being more as an afterthought. Judging by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff disbelief regarding the North Korean onslaught and their overall
disappointment in the KMAG’s accomplishments, it could easily be assumed that
there was little, if any, attention being paid to the Korean peninsula. The nature
of the disappointment by the senior leaders likely had two effects in the days
following the North Korean invasion: the first being that Roberts was permitted
to continue his retirement process when the more advantageous course of action

91 Gibby, “American advisors to the Republic of Korea,” in Stoker, Military

Advising and Assistance, 104.
92 Gibby, The Will to Win, 311 note 119. Bryan P. Gibby, “Best Little Army,” The

Journal of Military History 77, (January 2013): 187-188.

93 Everett F. Drumwright [For the Ambassador], “Memo to the Secretary of State,

Subject: Ambassador Jessup’s Visit to Korea,” January 28, 1950, in Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Vol. VII, Document 7, ed. John P.
Glennon (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976),
accessed September 5, 2015,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d7.
158
would have been to re-activate him, and the second was to doubt the viability of
the KMAG mission altogether.

The KMAG and the Surprise Attack

Shortly after the initial assault, Truman called on both the United Nations
Security Council and the United States Congress to authorize a UN mission to
fight back the DPRK invasion.94 There are disputing sources as to whether the
Soviet Union and China had given permission to Kim Il-sung to launch the attack.
However, neither were in a position to prevent the diplomatic effort at the
United Nations, since the Peoples’ Republic of China had no voice on the Security
Council, that seat being occupied by the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the
Soviets, who were continuing to boycott their seat at the Security Council in
protest of the People’s Republic of China not being given that permanent seat.95
This maneuvering created the diplomatic space for the Truman Administration
to create a global response to what they viewed as Communist aggression. The
United Nations mandate under the United Nations Security Council Resolution
82 created a legal framework for the American-led coalition, although according
to Ambassador Muccio, the reality is that the United States was operationally
moving ahead at the same time that the diplomatic efforts were underway.96

While the diplomatic machinations occurred on the international level, the

KMAG officers and enlisted were in flight-and-fight mode, and the KMAG
advisors were acutely aware that their actions could have ramifications far
beyond Korea, despite having little time to consider the broader implications of
their actions. As KMAG Army historian Major Robert Sawyer stated, “there were
three alternatives that immediately came to mind: they [the KMAG Advisors]
could take up arms and actively help the South Koreans repel the invaders; they

94 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 83, June 27, 1950, accessed
September 5, 1950,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83(1950).
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 84, July 7, 1950, September 5, 1950,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950).
95 Hastings, The Korean War, 50 – 51.
96 “Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio,”

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio1.htm.
159
could advise the ROK Army in combat operations; or they could leave Korea and
abandon the republic to its fate. These alternatives involved questions of U.S.
national policy and had to be decided on the highest levels of the United States
Government.”97 During the initial invasion, the instincts of the KMAG advisors
took over, many times for their own survival, and began heavily pressuring their
ROK Army officer counterparts to maintain as much unit cohesion as possible,
given the circumstances. This heavy pressure evolved in many cases with the
KMAG officers in reality becoming operationalized, as in not acting or behaving
in an advisory status, and in emergencies began to take command from the ROK
Army officers.98

As in so many cases of Military Assistance and even warfare itself, many more
factors were at play than just the invasion from the DPRK. One related gem of
wisdom in Military Assistance is the Fifteenth Article that Colonel T. E. Lawrence
wrote in his 1917 essays, the Twenty-Seven Articles: “Do not try to do too much
with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”99
Although Lawrence speaks of a specific situation and time, this principle still
holds: the most sustainable way to develop capabilities and capacities through
Military Assistance is that the recipient must be the driving force. The example of
the KMAG officers taking over for the ROK officers during the invasion violated
every aspect of the broad framework of Military Assistance intended to be
established, but the realities of warfare are many times overcome by expediency.

The focus of Military Assistance during the Korean War was on developing
the ROK Army into a fighting force that could aid the United Nations Coalition,
not specifically developing long-term capabilities and capacities that would
contribute to a long-term, sustainable security, nor was there an effort on
furthering alliance development. The Military Assistance endeavor once the

97 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 121.

98 Gibby, The Will to Win, 114 and 136.
99 T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917,

accessed September 10, 2015,

http://www.telstudies.org/writings/works/articles_essays/1917_twenty-
seven_articles.shtml.
160
Korean War began was, however, primarily on survival of the ROK Army, their
KMAG advisors, and the ROK presence in South Korea itself. As was previously
alluded, Kim Il-sung is thought to have planned his attack of June 25th to be such
a surprise that it would overwhelm the ROK Army. At the time of the attack the
operational experience level of leadership in the ROK Army was dramatically
low, as many of the division commanders were colonels in their late twenties or
early thirties. By contrast, United States Army divisions are usually commanded
by two-star generals in their fifties. Though some of the ROK Army officers had
served in WWII under the Japanese, the only combat many had experienced was
the skirmishes with the DPRK over the past five years. As any battle-hardened
commander knows, probing skirmishes is a world of difference from a surprise
attack of 135,000 troops backed by artillery and airpower. Thus, the KMAG
found themselves leaderless and overwhelmed, as Roberts had returned to the
United States to retire, advising a leaderless and overwhelmed ROK Army.

KMAG during the Korean War — Forging an Alliance

It was no secret that President Rhee desired a solid partnership with the
United States.100 Having spent his formative years in America, Rhee knew,
intimately, how the United States could form alliances within regions, and given
his own deposing from the Korean independence movement in the mid-1920s,
he likely knew that having the United States behind him would continue to
ensure his authority. To that end, Rhee put in place two policies after the
beginning of the War that effected not only his, and by extension South Korea’s,
relationship with the United States; it also bound together the nations’ militaries
into the present day, both directly influencing the broader Military Assistance
mission in the Republic of Korea.

The first action of Rhee that helped establish the close relationship during
and after the Korean War was to cede command and control of all ROK Army
forces to General MacArthur.101 There is no clear way to describe the basis for

100 “Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio,”

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio2.htm.
101 “Oral History Interview with John J. Muccio,”

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio2.htm.
161
this type of decision; there is certainly no clear history of this happening in the
United States. In fact, the United States tends to adopt the exact opposite stance,
in that generally, United States Armed Forces will only function under the
command of an American commander.102 This was a standard policy dating back
to WWI, when General Pershing was placed in command of the American
Expeditionary Forces as opposed to allowing American Soldiers to simply
replenish British and French units in the trenches.103 MacArthur himself, though,
had prior experience with gaining control of a foreign military force, since prior
to WWII, he had developed and commanded the Philippine Army at the bequest
of its government. However, the experience MacArthur had there was during a
period of relative peace and prosperity, and not in the heat of combat. The
importance, ultimately, of Rhee’s relinquishing command and control of military
forces to MacArthur is because in the most fundamental aspects of military
institution, Rhee had bound the United States to the ROK.

A more cynical analysis could propose that Rhee was motivated simply by the
political desire for plausible deniability for any challenges that the military might
have.104 This, however, does not negate Rhee’s underlying desire to eventually
conquer and unite all of Korea under the ROK flag and rule. There can be little
doubt of Rhee’s intention to bind the United States closer to the fate of the ROK.
Relinquishing command and control to MacArthur may not have been by design,
as it may have been the best decision in a moment of panic and desperation, but
there can been no doubt as to the effect. Though various Status of Forces
Agreements have changed the command structure of the United States Forces -
Korea (USFK), similar elements remain that essentially allow the Commanding
General of USFK to assume command and control of the ROK military forces in

102 There are numerous exceptions to this concept, not the least of which were
the operations in Southeast Asia being under the command of Admiral
Mountbatten during WWII in the Southeast Asia Theater.
103 Frank E. Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing (College

Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 682 and 727.

104 Victor D. Cha, “’Rhee-straint’: The Origins of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,”

International Journal of Korean Studies 15, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2011): 6-8.

162
the event of an invasion from the DPRK.105 However, the underlying question is:
what did this change of command and control have to do with the KMAG and its
mission?

By 1951, the ROK Army had enough combat experience against the DPRK
forces that more serious conversations could be entertained between the United
States Eighth Army Commander General James Van Fleet and the KMAG
leadership about the ROK Army and its development. Van Fleet approached Rhee
with an ultimatum that the ROK Army needed better leadership, which it would
need to focus more on the extended construct of serving the nation rather than a
single political leader. Van Fleet was straightforward with the ROK President,
asserting that it would be difficult to continue to guarantee American support of
the ROK if the ROK Army did not have that better leadership.106 This proved to
be a watershed moment for the Military Assistance mission, because it placed
Rhee in a political situation where his own survival was at stake. The result was
that the KMAG was able to assist the ROK political leadership in assessing the
military capabilities of the ROK officers, something for which the KMAG was
perfectly suited, having advised and many times fought alongside the units in
question.

Under normal circumstances there potentially could have been major unit
repercussions involving the removal of officers, especially by foreign forces. The
Koreans had understandable cultural concerns with imperialism, as it was less
than a decade since Japanese rule over the Korean peninsula. With the American
Military Government immediately replacing the Japanese rule of South Korea,
creating a rough transition in the Korean-American relationship, it would have
been reasonable if the ROK Army units had looked upon the KMAG advisors with
disdain, causing friction during combat operations. However, due to the fact that

105 Won Gon Park, The United Nations Command in Korea: Past, Present, and
Future,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21, no. 4 (December 2009): 486,
accessed May 22, 2017,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10163270903298959.
106 Allan R. Millet, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North

(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010), 458. Gibby, The Will to Win, 166-
168.
163
the KMAG had been with their ROK Army units in the field and on the combat
lines, in the middle of battle, there was an inherent earned respect between the
ROK Army units and their KMAG advisors.107 In addition, the KMAG’s effort in
removing poor ROK Army officers, which could have been seen as heavy-handed,
was primarily focused on those ROK Army officers who had displayed blatant
disregard for their soldiers. Colonel “Tiger” Kim Chong-won, who was relieved of
command for beating a ROK Army soldier and shooting a fellow officer,
exemplified this.108 Due to the common relations and the underlying and
noticeable intention for soldier care, the KMAG rarely had challenges within
units, proving to be a microcosm of the broader dynamics at work within the US-
ROK alliance.

Korean Augmentation to the United States Army

Rhee further offered MacArthur to assist in filling American units

experiencing critical shortfalls, which greatly affected the US-ROK alliance. Thus,
was born the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army or the KATUSA
program. The idea was that English-speaking South Koreans would become full-
fledged members of the United States Army, going through the same training,
with the same ranks, and essentially being treated exactly like American soldiers,
although there is no evidence that they were similarly paid. When the KATUSA
soldiers finished their training, they were assigned an American Army unit in
which to serve. The program was enormously successful, bringing thousands of
Koreans into the American Army during the beginning stages of the war. This
program has continued to the present day, although as the number of American
military forces have decreased, so too have the Koreans serving in the KATUSA
program.109 The KATUSAs, as they were known, added capabilities to their
American Army units in that they were able to assist in Korean cultural
understanding, as well as aiding in anti-Communist infiltrations. They knew

107 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 182, 185, and 187-188.

108 Millet, The War for Korea, 1950-1951, 286. Gibby, The Will to Win, 139.
109 David Curtis Skaggs, “The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean

Nationals into the US Army, 1950–1965,” Military Affairs 38, no. 2 (April 1974),
53-58.
164
what to look for in terms of the subtle signs that might indicate an individual was
from the north.110

While on a practical level, the KATUSAs added capabilities and capacities at

the unit level, the symbolism in the time of war was far greater. The United
States, as discussed in previous chapters, has a long history of alliance
operations. From the Colonists and the British Army in the French Indian War, to
Baron de Steuben and the French during the Revolutionary War, the American
Army has constantly fought its wars with embedded allies; however, the KATUSA
program extended the idea of embedded allies to another level. It is important to
note that while the Korean War was a coalition operation, as indicative of being a
United Nations command and mission, and that Americans were used to fighting
alongside other nations’ militaries, there was no history within the United States
Army of formally bringing foreigners into an American combat unit, as evidenced
in the French Foreign Legion.

Like the experience of the KMAG and its efforts to replace poor commanders
and leaders within the Korean Army Officer Corps, the KATUSA program could
easily have disrupted combat unit cohesion, but the results were quite the
opposite. As the KMAG noted in their interactions with the ROK Army, the South
Koreans were extremely proficient fighters, but needed the equipment and
direction, in the form of combat leadership, to utilize their ferocious skills. It was
this involvement, of not only having ROK Army units fighting side-by-side with
American units, that helped create the sense of “bleeding together,” but it was
the actuality of bleeding together, side-by-side, that forged a common sense of
unit cohesion which helped to create a deeper bond. And because the Korean
War was such an all-encompassing experience for the ROK, as every citizen was
affected, this sense of “bleeding together” and the creation of that bond at an
individual level became part of the US-ROK lexicon.111

110 Martin Blumenson, “KATUSA,” Military Review 37, no. 5 (August 1957): 51-56.
111 Paek Sun Yup, in discussion with the author, November 11, 2015.
165
Conclusion

The US-ROK alliance has been one of the most persistent throughout the Cold
War, having withstood military coups, leadership challenges on both sides, and
sometimes questionable levels of support from the United States. The alliance
has endured not despite its challenges, but because of them. These challenges,
ultimately, were differences in political dynamics. However, the sense between
both nations, especially within the ROK, that an inseparable bond was created
and developed in combat during the Korean War, gave a sense of permanence to
the relationship. This was a sense that the blood that was shed would bind both
nations into the common purpose of resisting the spread of Communist influence
and aggression.

The Korean War United Nations’ mandate, while still American-led, remains
intact to the present day, although now it has evolved to a Korean-United States
coalition known as the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which continues to
operate under the United Nations mandate. That mandate provides a legal
framework for the security of South Korea, allowing United States forces to
remain as both a viable deterrent to the active aggression of North Korea, and
continue to act as tool of modernization for the ROK Army. It is the evolution of
the United Stated Forces – Korea, the security provided to the ROK, that has
allowed South Korea to develop, ultimately reducing the requirement for the
United States to keep forces in South Korea long-term. This is the fruition of the
Military Assistance provided at the outset of the alliance, formed side-by-side by
the bonds of combat.

The KMAG and United States-Republic of Korea relationship is rare in the

United States’ post-WWII efforts of Military Assistance in that it was a clear
success. The invasion of the DPRK failed, the ROK reached a sustainable security,
although it is necessary to continue the United States’ presence in the ROK, due
to the threat of the DPRK rather than the internal threat of insecurity. More
extensive, though, is the application of the Military Assistance that was given to
the Grand Strategy of containment that was being pursued by the United States.
Because of the ability of political leaders to take military operations, the Korean
War, and apply them to a narrow political goal, preventing Communist

166
domination of the Korean peninsula, there was remarkable success in furthering
the United States’ Grand Strategy.

167
 Chapter 5

Vietnam: Military Assistance and the Origins of Failure

“Wars with undefined purposes are dangerous things”1

In examining the Vietnam conflict, there is almost too much research. Even in
the small area of Military Assistance there exist numerous aspects to review and
study, from the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
(CORDS) program to the precursor to the United States Agency for International
Development which trained a civil and police force (legal and otherwise), to the
direct development of indigenous capabilities and capacities. The Vietnam
conflict academically, as much as militarily, politically, or diplomatically,
becomes something of a quagmire. At the same time, the theme of understanding
Vietnam for the United States remains: military objectives that were never
consistently linked to political objectives with a recipient governing partner that
was perceived as legitimate by both the security forces and the population.
However, contrary to the popular opinion the Second Indochina War, the
Vietnam War, was not lost when the American public abandoned the United
States Armed Forces. The war in fact was lost at the beginning, and Military
Assistance was the foundation of that failure.

The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group Indochina (MAAG

Indochina) was formed in September 1950 to assist the French military and their
South Vietnamese allies against the Viet Minh military forces and the Communist
North Vietnamese. MAAG Indochina and its evolutions offered the best insight
into how a Military Assistance mission can fail. It could be argued, however, that
failure was a foregone conclusion due to complete lack of understanding of
Vietnam, both politically and culturally, as well as its relations with the French
and then with the Communists.2 Most importantly, there was a general lack of

1 James Wright, “Have Americans Forgotten Afghanistan?” The Atlantic, March

23, 2013, accessed August 3, 2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/have-americans-
forgotten-afghanistan/274331.
2 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of

War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), xxii and 109.
168
understanding or appreciation of the history and its context within the region.
Added to that, an inability to adapt the organizational structure to different types
of warfare created a recipe for failure of the Vietnam War, but fundamentally, the
failure was due to the origins of the conflict — a war that was lost before the first
battle had begun.

Furthermore, the United States’ experience in Vietnam demonstrates how the

inability to understand these various dynamics led to a failure of understanding
how and with whom to partner for its Military Assistance missions. This chapter
will seek to create context for the history of the Vietnamese independence
movement and the resistance to the support provided by the United States. This
will explain why the origins of the American “adventure” in Vietnam caused a
failure of the Military Assistance provided prior to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution,3
foreshadowing the inevitable failure of the overall military mission in Vietnam.

Historical Context of the United States-Vietnam Relationship

Vietnam has a long colonial history, starting as early as 111 BCE, when the
Chinese seized the lands and people of an ethnic group known as the “Viet.” For
roughly 1,000 years the Chinese ruled the people and the land, until internal
strife and corruption within China weakened its grip on its external territories,
much like the fall of the Western Roman Empire. As nature abhors a vacuum,
likewise does governance and power; the opportunity created by the weakness
of the Chinese Empire was seized by local military leaders, who spent the next
hundreds of years fending off the Chinese through occasional wars, diplomacy,
and strategic alliances. While consistently concerned with the Chinese, the Viet
themselves began expanding into what is now modern-day Laos and Cambodia.
In the 1600s, a split that had been brewing became a full-blown civil war
between the North, the traditional seat of government power, and South, where
access to the sea had developed the area into an economic center. Eventually, as
the exploring Europeans began to establish colonies throughout Asia in the 18th

3The Johnson Administration used the Gulf of Tonkin incident and a subsequent
Congressional Resolution as the precipice for the increase in troops and the
expansion of the Vietnam War.
169
and 19th centuries, France realized that it was at risk of losing out in the
Southeast Asia region. This led France to formally establish French Indochina in
1887, which initially encompassed what is now Vietnam, and over the next few
years expanded into what is now Laos and Cambodia.4

Interestingly, the French did not necessarily have a clear or consistent policy
of engagement in Asia. As noted Hebrew University scholar, Professor Meron
Medzini concluded in his doctoral dissertation, “France did not behave in Japan
the way she behaved in North Africa and Indo-China, and what happened in
Japan was very different from what happened in India or China. The record of
French activity in Japan suggests that European expansion in the nineteenth
century was a more complex phenomenon than is sometimes allowed.”5
Professor Medzini, in this case, is referring to the Military Assistance provided by
the French to the Japanese, including some of the elements found in the book and
subsequent movie, The Last Samurai. This is an important dynamic, since
roughly 100 years later, in the 1950s in French Indochina, the French were
receiving a large amount of Military Aid from the United States, but did not allow
subsequent tactical training on the equipment. As Major General David Ott
wrote:

“French forces were happy to receive the new material but refused
American advice on how to employ it. The U.S. desire was that all
Vietnamese units be organized and trained to provide internal
defense of their own country and that aid be used to equip those
units. Such a desire was at odds with existing French policy. The
French Army was employed not only to counter enemy forces but
also to assert France as a colonial power.”6

The French were interested in re-establishing their colonial presence in

Vietnam after WWII. A common opinion among elites led the French to a policy
that it must recreate its pre-WWII French Empire in order that France continue

4 Mark Attwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8-11.
5 Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa

Regime (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 175.

6 David Ewing Ott, Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1954-1973 (Washington, D.C.:

Center of Military History, 1995), 21.

170
to be regarded as a global power in the post-WWII era.7 This policy was in stark
contrast to Great Britain, which was able to transition into the Cold War with
much greater ease — understanding that the time of colonial power was ending.
What is more important to appreciate is that the French had an inconsistent set
of colonial policies. In addition, the French desire to reassert colonial rule over
Vietnam affected the United States’ Military Aid, the training that went along
with that aid, and eventually the Military Assistance provided to South
Vietnamese soldiers. The relevance, though, to both the United States and this
research project specifically, is that the Vietnamese population would readily
perceive the United States’ efforts, no matter how well intended, as a
continuation of French colonialist policy, due to the population seeing American
equipment being used to support French colonialism.8 At the same time, in a
more expansive sense, the inconsistent political goals of the United States would
be unable to be supported by military operations, thereby creating an
unachievable and unwinnable scenario for the United States Armed Forces.

The historical relationship, however, between the United States and Vietnam
began at the birth of the United States, when newly installed Ambassador to
France, Thomas Jefferson, asked some French traders in what is now known as
Vietnam to find rice seeds that he hoped could grow in the Southern States.9
While the seed venture failed, it was a future prognosis for the commercial
endeavors between the two countries until the 20th century. As both Dr. Douglas
Borer, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, and historian Ambassador
Robert Miller recognized, with the Spanish-American War and the occupation of
the Philippines by the United States, and Japan’s newfound power after the
Russo-Japanese War, a conflict was inevitable between the United States and
Japan.10 Interestingly, it was Vietnam that would exacerbate the conflict between

7 Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 29.

8 Kathryn C. Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in
Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 261.
9 Robert Hopkins Miller, The United States and Vietnam, 1787-1941 (Washington,

D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990) p. xv-xvi (preface).

10 Miller, The United States and Vietnam, 154. Douglas A. Borer, Superpowers

Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 51-52.
171
the United States and Japan. However, the first direct interactions between the
United States and Vietnam in the early part of the century were at the Paris
Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919, when Vietnamese nationalists11 stated,
“Since the Allies’ victory, all subject peoples are trembling with hope before the
prospect of an era of law and justice that ought to open for them by virtue of the
formal and solemn commitments undertaken before the whole world by the
various Entente powers during the fight of Civilization against Barbarism.”12
Nothing came of that communication, and it is unlikely that Secretary of State
Robert Lansing received the message. However, as an interesting side note,
future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who would become central in the
Vietnam conflict, was assisting his uncle, Secretary Lansing, during the
negotiations at Versailles.13

Moving forward, once the Japanese began their invasion of China in 1931, as
a forerunner to WWII, the United States began using Vietnam as platform for
logistical transit so as to support the Chinese war efforts in a program of Military
Aid and Military Assistance to Chiang Kai-shek.14 Interestingly, this became an
issue, as the pre-war French government insisted that the United States protect
Vietnam, or Indochina as it was known then, from Japanese aggression. This
demand was considered recompense for the United States continuing to use
Vietnam as a supply transit; however, the United States declined.15 Within a few
years, Japanese expansion had led to taking over Vietnam from the French, and
with the German conquest of France and establishment of the French
Government in Vichy, the point of contention was moot. As Borer commented
about the entire United States-Vietnam relationship prior to WWII: “One could

11 The author is identified as Nguyen Ai Quoc, who would later be known as Ho

Chi Minh.
12 Ho Chi Minh, “An Appeal to the World Powers,” Note to US Secretary of State

Robert Lansing at the Versailles, June 18, 1919, in The Vietnam War: An
International History in Documents, ed. Mark Atwood Lawrence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 5. Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise
International History, 18-19.
13 Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Time (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1972), 26-33.

14 Borer, Superpowers Defeated, 32-33.
15 Borer, Superpowers Defeated, 33. Miller, The United States and Vietnam, 159.

172
characterize US policy toward Vietnam in terms of a continuous absence of
significant interaction, with major changes occurring in the years following the
Second World War.”16

Post-World War II and the First Indochina War

In August 1945, after the unconditional surrender of the Japanese, Bao Dai,
the Emperor of Vietnam, attempted to instate a provisional Vietnamese
government, but was unable to do so, due to Viet Minh forces that were already
establishing themselves as the new authority in the land.17 In addition, “the
Vietnamese had learned that the British would be arriving in Vietnam to
[formally] receive the Japanese surrender south of the 16th parallel, as the
Chinese were to do in the north. Behind the British, however, hovered the
French.”18 Bao Dai, recognizing the situation with the Viet Minh, chose to
abdicate to Ho Chi Minh, who, as president, declared the independence of the
newly formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam.19 In one of his last acts as
Emperor, Bao Dai, fearing the coming French re-colonization of Indochina, wrote
to French leader Charles de Gaulle:

“I address myself to the people of France, to the country of my youth.

I address myself as well to the nation's leader and liberator and I wish
to speak as a friend rather than as Head of State.
You have suffered too much during four deadly years not to
understand that the Vietnamese people, who have a history of twenty
centuries and an often glorious past, no longer wish, can no longer
support any foreign domination or foreign administration.
You could understand even better if you were able to see what is
happening here, if you were able to sense this desire for independence
which has been smoldering in the bottom of all hearts, and which no
human force can any longer hold back. Even if you were to arrive to re-
establish a French administration here, it would no longer be obeyed;
each village would be a nest of resistance, every former friend an

16 Borer, Superpowers Defeated, 38.

17 Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans:
Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2001), 100-107.
18 Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, 105-

106.
19 Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 26.

173
 enemy, and your officials and colonists themselves would ask to
depart from this unbreathable atmosphere.
I beg you to understand that the only way to safeguard French
interests and the spiritual influence of France in Indochina is to
recognize frankly the independence of Vietnam and to renounce any
idea of re-establishing French sovereignty or administration here in
whatever form it may be.
You would be able to listen to us so easily and become our friends if
you would stop aspiring to become our masters again.
Making this appeal to the well recognized idealism of the French
people and the great wisdom of their leader, we hope that peace and
the joy which has rung for all the people of the world will be guaranteed
equally to all people who live in Indochina, native as well as foreign.”20

This statement would be a harbinger of the things to come over the next
thirty years, one of numerous signs that the dynamics at play in Vietnam were
not favorable to any form of external intervention. Bao Dai himself said
regarding his abdication, “that he could live as a simple citizen in an independent
country rather than king of a subjugated nation.”21

In what could only be described as a perfect storm of events leading to the

First Indochina War, the United States unintentionally created an eventual
vacuum that would lead to further involvement in Vietnam, by positioning
Vietnam to become a symbol for the ideological fight between the West and the
Global Communist movement. To start with, when Roosevelt and Stalin met in
Tehran in November of 1943, both had begun discussing the post-war order.
Neither was supportive of the European Powers regaining their colonial

20 Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, United States – Vietnam
Relations, 1945 -1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, “The
Pentagon Papers,” Part 1, Section B (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,
1971), 29-30, accessed November 3, 2016,
https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers. Hereinafter referred to
as “The Pentagon Papers.” Citing Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled,
vol. 1 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 435-436. Citing Bao Dai, “Letter of Bao Dai
to General de Gaulle,” August 18, 1945, Conflict in Indo-China and International
Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955, ed. Allan B. Cole (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1956), 17-18.
21 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London: Century Publishing, 1983), 147.

This comment is quoted but an original source is not cited.

174
possessions, and used the occasion to agree that France should not regain
control of Indochina. This played out in that Stalin wanted France to pay for
supporting Nazi Germany during the war, and Roosevelt was against colonialism
in general, as an institution.22 The French after WWII, on the other hand,
believed that they would only be able to regain power on the world stage once
they had recovered the colonies and territories lost during the War.23

The contention began with the end of WWII, the death of Roosevelt, the civil
war in China, and the Rise of Global Communism, leading to a perceived need to
keep a Western alliance together. At the end of the War, the Chinese, still under
the authority of Chiang Kai-shek, along with the British, demobilized the
Japanese occupying Vietnam. As the French re-inserted themselves through
politics and force in 1946, the Truman Administration was called upon to do a
quick calculation on an issue that seemed to be of prime importance to its French
allies and of little importance to the United States. The Truman Administration
declared, despite many efforts by Ho Chi Minh and the newly formed DRV, that
the United States would remain neutral, while as a matter of American policy
indicating its displeasure for colonialism. With the fall of China to Mao’s
Communist revolution in1949, and the perception within the United States that
Truman had “lost” China, the United States began to be lured into the First
Indochina War as part of the extensive fight against Communism. This neurosis
was carefully supported by the French to maximize the benefits of the
involvement of the United States’ money and equipment without the
involvement of the United States in the field, which the French regarded as an
internal matter.24

The United States, as mentioned earlier, began supporting the French and
South Vietnamese allies with Military Aid through the work of MAAG
Indochina.25 The Truman Administration tried to convince the French that the

22 The Pentagon Papers. Part 5, Section B, Volume 1, 24-25.

23 Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, p. 29.
24 Robert H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (Honolulu,

HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005, reprinted from 1985 edition), 95, 103,
110.
25 Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 115-121.

175
Vietnamese would stop supporting Ho Chi Minh if they did not identify the South
Vietnamese as a tacit continuation of French colonial rule. The French, however,
easily manipulated the United States due to its need of French support on the
global stage, specifically in Europe against the Soviet Union, and more
importantly, due to the ongoing war in Korea. Additionally, other communist
movements began during 1948 in Malaya and Burma,26 which continued the
perception that there was a communist wave in the making.27 This created a
domestic pressure whereby the Truman Administration was unable to strongly
protest French actions in Vietnam, allowing the colonial machinations
reasserting control to continue.28

The relevance of this history to the present research project is that the ability
of the French to manipulate greater involvement in Vietnam by the United States
is very like the actions other client nation states would pursue so as to involve
either great power during the Cold War.29 In fairness to the French, they were
not the first actors to pursue this strategy of endeavoring to draw in the Great
Powers in this conflict. Indeed, Ho Chi Minh specifically designed the
announcement of the DRV to reflect the terminology of the United States’
Declaration of Independence.30 On the founding of the DRV, Ho Chi Minh stated,
“All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness.”31 To be fair to the United States, it was adjusting to its newfound
leadership of the Western democratic world as it was pushed onto the world
stage after the victory of WWII. However, with loss at the Battle at Dien Bien Phu,

26 Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, p. 36.

27 The idea of a communist wave is essentially the argument of the “domino
theory” that was prominent from the late 1940s until the withdrawal of US
forces from Vietnam in 1945. Domino theory was discussed extensively in
Chapter 2: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy, but it was a driving rationale
that the French were able to utilize to bring the United States into the First
Indochina War.
28 Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, p. 29-41.
29 Benjamin Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional

War and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 226-227.
30 Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, p. 27.
31 The Pentagon Papers, Part 1, Section B, 34.

176
the French negotiated a peace at the Geneva Conference of 1954 that would
create the separate countries popularly known as North and South Vietnam and,
more broadly, created the likelihood that Southeast Asia would be perceived to
be “lost” to Communism.32

There were additional dynamics with respect to the French, due to their
perception that Vietnam was critical to their regaining the power and prestige in
world affairs that they had lost during WWII. There existed a real chance that
had the United States not responded to aid the French in Indochina, the French
would have abandoned the Western alliance in Europe and other places in the
world.33 As mentioned, the French skillfully modified the concept of the fight in
Vietnam, from the reinstatement of colonial rule, which the United States was
opposed to, into a fight against Communism, knowing that the United States
would not resist being drawn into the conflict.34 This change, along with the real
risk that the French could and likely would abandon NATO and other global
security cooperation efforts around the world, was a risk that the United States
was unwilling to take. In this case, the challenge was that the Grand Strategy
being pursued by the United States, that of containment of the Global
Communism movement, dictated an involvement in Vietnam.

Direct Involvement of the United States in Vietnam

The hubris of the United States was not that it chose a specific side in the
conflict, or even the belief that it could succeed where France had failed, despite
France’s long history in the nation. The United States’ failure, and hubris,
resulted from not appreciating the internal nuances of the Vietnamese people
and their relationship to a ruling authority. It has been said that wars begin
because of miscalculations upon miscalculations.35 The Vietnam War, or in this

32 Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina (Barnsley,
UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2005, originally 1961), 312-313.
33 Statler, Replacing France, 19-21.
34 Statler, Replacing France, 15-16.
35 Barbara Tuchman is often quoted as saying, “War is the unfolding of

miscalculations.” She is even cited for this quote in the New York Times (Anatole
Broyard, “Books of the Times: War by Albert R. Leventhal,” The New York Times,
December 3, 1973, accessed March 15, 2017,
177
case the Second Indochina War, is a perfect example of these miscalculations.
What if the people of the United States had heard Ho Chi Minh in 1945 declaring
the independence of the DRV, and been motivated to support him, or at least, to
not support the conflict against him? What if the United States had been able to
convince the French that they did not need to reestablish themselves in Vietnam
to be thought a global power? These “What ifs” could go on and on, but the
importance for this research project is that these miscalculations started at the
very beginning of the direct involvement of the United States in Vietnam,
specifically influencing the Military Assistance efforts, in addition to the United
States’ political goals.

As stated, as France looked after its own interests, it manipulated the United
States into giving large amounts of Military Aid in the form of supplies and
equipment. In addition, the United States in the form of MAAG Indochina gave
advice to the French concerning the use of that equipment, which was mostly
ignored, when it was permitted to be given at all.36 Furthermore, the United
States was also consulted for advice at Dien Bien Phu. The defenses at Dien Bien
Phu were toured by many senior military officers from around the world,
including the United States, studying all areas of the defensives, and giving all
sorts of tactical advice. Lieutenant General John O’Daniel, the commander of
MAAG Indochina, led the United States team.37 The advice, however well
intentioned, proved to be poor, especially regarding the location of the
artillery.38 As Vietnam historian Bernard Fall put it, the blame was very much

http://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/03/archives/through-a-lens-darkly-books-
of-the-times-expression-of-proud.html). There is, however, no known original
source that Mrs. Tuchman ever made this statement. It is the belief of the Yale
University Manuscripts and Archives Division, where Mrs. Tuchman’s papers
were donated, that the quote was mistaken from the original: “History is the
unfolding of miscalculations” in her book Stilwell and the American Experience in
China, 1911 -1945 (originally published by Macmillan in 1970 but quoted from
the 2001 edition published by Phoenix Press, page 132). This note is to clarify
any confusion that may arise regarding this citation.
36 Ott, Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1953-1973, 21.
37 Fall, Street Without Joy, 318 and 323-324.
38 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 2 (London: Pall Mall Press,

1967), 824.
178
placed at the feet of the French Commander-in-Chief, the northern theater
commander, and the fortress commander.39

In fact, the fortress artillery chief, Colonel Piroth, was the first to understand
the “fatal error,” and killed himself during the battle with a grenade after
apologizing to those around him for the failure.40 In contrast with the French
artillery placement, the DRV forces were perfectly placed. Mountains that the
French and other military advisors believed would be insurmountable with any
type of artillery surrounded the French base at Dien Bien Phu. They had chosen
this position because of the airfield, which allowed easy access for supplies and
soldiers. The DRV, cognizant of the hazardous terrain, were nevertheless able to
bring their artillery up into the mountains and surround the French, digging into
the mountain to provide ideal cover and concealment for that artillery. The
result was that the DRV forces could deploy their artillery in an effective circle
around the French base, firing down on the French with minimal risk to DRV
forces, whereas the French artillery had very little ability to strike back and
neutralize the threat.

Once the attack from the DRV forces was underway, the French had begun to
realize that Dien Bien Phu was their last stand. The Fourth Republic’s dreams of
the French Union were quickly being undone.41 Knowing that the Geneva
Conference was taking place in a few weeks, the French decided to make a final
diplomatic effort to prevent a disaster. The US Ambassador to Vietnam, Donald
Heath, was deeply concerned with the situation, and believed that conflict in
some form would continue until the Vietnamese people were independent of
France. At the same time, the United States Ambassador to France, C. Douglas
Dillon, argued in Washington that the Vietnamese were at fault and that the
United States should not do anything to undermine the French.42

39 Fall, Street Without Joy, p 318

40 Fall, Street Without Joy, p 323.
41 Tony Smith, "A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,"

Comparative Studies in Society and History 20, no. 1 (1978): 74 accessed April 28,
2017, http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0010417500008835.
Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, 212-216.
42 Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, 224.

179
 Unites States Considers Airstrikes to Support the French

While the diplomatic back and forth continued, the French Chief of the
General Staff of National Defense, General Paul Ely, led a mission to the United
States in March of 1954, about one week into the siege of Dien Bien Phu. The
diplomatic efforts between the various factions of the Communist Vietnamese
and the French Government had failed; the political negotiations in the French
Government that would have allowed a French withdrawal and Vietnamese
independence failed; and the military situation was failing. While President
Eisenhower removed himself and tried to appear disengaged, multiple efforts
were taking place; one of the more important events was a meeting hosted by
Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the
Congressional leadership. This meeting was a background brief on the current
state of affairs in Indochina, and was meant to have Congressional leaders begin
efforts around a joint resolution for airstrikes, since the United States had the
military resources in the area on a “training” exercise.43

As noted, French General Ely, who had sought to plea for American military
support, predicated the meeting with Congressional leaders on his mission to the
United States. However, upon confronting Admiral Radford, General Ely found
that there was already a plan being formulated to support the French at Dien
Bien Phu, Operation Vulture, once there was a formal request from the
Government of France to the Government of the Unites States. After General Ely
had returned to France the request was made, but in a stunning reversal, the
United States formally rejected the request. Secretary Dulles had intervened.44

43 Chalmers M. Roberts, “The Day We Didn’t Go to War,” from The Reporter,

September 14, 1954, reprinted in The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on
American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Crisis, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard
B. Fall (New York: Random House, 1965), 57-66. John Prados, Vietnam: The
History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2009), 27-29.
44 Guhin, John Foster Dulles, 242-243 and 247. Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon

Embattled, vol. 2, 816-824 and 1082-1083 (endnotes). Dommen, The Indochinese

Experience of the French and the Americans, 233.
180
 What could easily be thought a betrayal was considered by Secretary Dulles
as a strategic necessity. “He [Secretary Dulles] did not want a one-strike
American intervention to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. He wanted more.
Indochina — all of it — had to be saved from Communism.”45 This was the shift
in which the United States moved from supporting the efforts of the French, to
taking on the responsibility for the outcome. While it is only natural to question
why Secretary Dulles shifted his strategic perspective, and why President
Eisenhower supported such a shift, what is obvious is that “Dulles was not
interested in U.S. intervention merely to improve the position of the French for a
deal with the Communists at Geneva.”46 This change was based on a belief that
there was a requirement to expand the conflict, supporting it to evolve from a
regional conflict to bring a colonial empire back to power, and into a full civil war
that was being supplied and supported by Western democracies and the Soviet
Union and their Communist allies.

This entire incident relates back to the issues around Military Assistance in a
rather unique way, because what becomes clear from this example is that the
circumstances surrounding the airstrikes in support of the French at Dien Bien
Phu were not Military Assistance nor was it Military Aid. As discussed earlier,
Military Assistance is about developing capacities and capabilities of an
indigenous force to support a long-term, sustainable security for the recipient
nation; Military Aid refers to the equipment and training on that equipment for
an indigenous military. This example does not readily fit either definition, as the
French and their Vietnamese allies were already capable and already had
sufficient capacity at Dien Bien Phu in terms of the definitions explored in this
research project. This situation does exemplify the issue that just because a given
military already has a high level of capabilities and capacities, it does not
guarantee victory in battle.

It could well be argued that the circumstances of this example of Military

Intervention at Dien Bien Phu, and that of the Korean War, discussed previously

45 Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 2, 820.

46 Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 2, 820.
181
in Chapter 4, were quite similar. In one sense, in each scenario there was an ally
on the ground facing an aggressive Communist attack being ultimately supported
by the Soviet Union. Both are examples of a Military Support type of Military
Intervention, while at the same time both had an integrated Military Assistance
mission already underway, although the KMAG in Korea was far more robust
than its Vietnamese counterpart. In the case of Vietnam, as seen here, there had
not been a robust Military Assistance mission previously due to the presence of
the French.

The perspective from the discipline of international relations, however, is far

more interesting. In Korea, there was an expanded Military Support mission that
was tied to a focused, limited political objective to prevent a first Communist
victory, and from the domestic politics side to prevent any interpretation of
giving way to the Communists. In Vietnam, due to the machinations of Secretary
Dulles, a limited Military Support mission to help the French at Dien Bien Phu was
disconnected from the limited United States Military Assistance mission, which was
not pursued in order to enable a more expansive political objective — the global
containment of Communism. This is in direct contrast to the Korean War, in which
the Military Assistance mission and the Military Support mission were
dependent and supportive of one another.

With hindsight, the remarkable issue is not that every military official missed
the possibility that the DRV forces would be so familiar with the territory as to
capably place artillery in what was considered impossible places. What is
striking is that after observing the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, there
was no reassessment from any level of military establishment of the DRV’s will
to fight, especially in context of Bao Dai’s original plea to de Gaulle. Although
there was little additional consideration that there might be shifted situational
dynamics that should give pause before fully committing additional forces from
the military perspective, there was plenty from the political perspective.
Everyone involved was exhausted with spent efforts, and saw the Geneva
Conference, which began while the Battle of Dien Bien Phu raged, as the sole
possible agency to untangle the situation with a minimal amount of

182
embarrassment.47 There was no reconsideration of the desired political end
state, though it should be argued that there was an inconsistent one between the
United States and France and their Vietnamese allies.

The defeat at Dien Bien Phu, which happened in the middle of the Conference,
however, forced the French to negotiate with the DRV for a withdrawal from
North Vietnam, as well as the effective pullout of French forces from the south.48
The eventual split of Indochina and the founding of the Republic of Vietnam (or
South Vietnam), occurred through negotiations at the Geneva Conference. In
addition, it was due to this conference that the Military Assistance in Vietnam
began as the mission focus by the United States through the Military Assistance
Advisory Group Vietnam, which had been in country since 1950 as a distributor
of Military Aid.

The Geneva Conference of 1954

The Geneva Conference of 1954 was initially structured around the issues of
the Korean peninsula,49 but since the Korean peninsula had evolved into a cold
peace after the Armistice was signed in July 1953, the focus of the conference
became squarely intent on Indochina. This was a general agreement, since the
battle of Dien Bien Phu was being played out during the conference opening. This
conference was like any other foray in international relations, however, with
declining nations, such as France, trying to maintain their power, and ascending
nations attempting to be recognized for the achievements they had already
made, such as the DRV’s intention to capitalize on their soon-to-be victory. In
addition, each negotiating government was deeply concerned with its own
domestic politics: British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and the British tried to
maintain popular support for the Conservative Party; the French were in the
process of a governing upheaval that, combined with Algerian uprising, would
bring about the collapse of the Fourth Republic; the DRV attempted to secure the
recognized independence that it had promised its citizens; the United States

47 Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 30.

48 Ott, Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1953-1973, 22.
49 The dynamics of the Korean War had a distinctive impact on United States’

operations in the Philippines and Vietnam.

183
aimed to prevent being seen, in any way, as soft on Communism, given the state
of McCarthyism going on domestically. This conference, however, was the first
meeting of the international community trying to settle the question of Southeast
Asia, once the lines of the Cold War had been set.

The importance of the Geneva Conference is that while the fall of Dien Bien
Phu set the stage for the military conflict to come, the Conference set the stage
for the political and diplomatic conflicts that would inevitably arise. As
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, prior to the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Bao
Dai, the Emperor who abdicated the throne in 1945 to become Chief of State,
asked Ngo Dinh Diem to become the Prime Minister of what would become the
Republic of Vietnam, and it was during this Conference that Diem accepted that
offer.50 One of the major outcomes of the conference was the partition of
Vietnam. While there were some extended discussions concerning whether
Indochina should be partitioned into two or three separate areas, an agreement
was finally settled upon: it would split into a North, the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV), and a South, the Republic of Vietnam, at the 17th parallel. As
scholar and diplomat Dr. James Waite stated, “Partition, coupled with the failure
to reunite Vietnam in 1956, [through the Geneva Conference-scheduled free
elections] provided an important cause for the conflict’s second phase, which
culminated with US entry into the war as a belligerent.”51 While the conference
ended declaring a state of peace and armistice,52 many disagreed with the
diplomatic conclusion, and this would come to define the Military Assistance
mission in Vietnam.

The challenge with the partition was rooted in the challenges of the Geneva
Conference itself. Bao Dai and his government, with the partnership of the
French, had been fighting a war against the DRV and the Viet Minh. Bao Dai’s

50 Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 37. James Waite, The End
of the First Indochina War: A Global History (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012),
130-131.
51 Waite, The End of the First Indochina War, 81.
52 “Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954,” in The Vietnam

Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam
Crisis, eds. Raskin and Fall, 96-97.
184
administration knew that the French were losing their will to fight, and while his
government was ardently anti-communist, they were also firmly nationalist.
They feared that the Conference would think that the French, in their desire to
withdraw with some semblance of dignity, would ignore their wishes completely
and make a deal directly with the DRV and the Viet Minh, abandoning the South
Vietnamese. The reason this was so risky for Bao Dai’s government was that its
political, and potentially literal, survival was dependent on an external ally for
some form of Military Intervention, which had been Military Aid and Military
Support,53 though not in the traditional sense. That these would be an ancillary
concern was the primary reason for Bao Dai’s government’s resistance to the
Geneva Conference.54 This became relevant since the Republic of Vietnam’s
government felt no ownership of either the process or the outcome.

These well-found fears became reality. The French saw the partition as a way
for them to withdraw with some honor intact; the Soviets, Chinese, and Viet
Minh were all pleased because they knew that with continued support, the Viet
Minh and the DRV would eventually be able to conquer the remaining part of the
south that was not under their control, and that the French would no longer be a
part of the military equation.55 The continuing conversation during the Geneva
conference between Eden and Prime Minister Churchill was a recognition that
the United States, through Secretary Dulles, wanted to escalate the situation in
Indochina, and the British were increasingly uninterested in going along.56 As
Dulles wrote Eisenhower, “UK attitude is one of increasing weakness. British
seem to feel that we are disposed to accept present risks of a Chinese war and
this, coupled also with their fear that we would start using atomic weapons, has
badly frightened them.”57

53 As previously discussed, the French, prior to the Geneva Conference, would

not allow Military Aid to be given directly to the Vietnamese people, even their
allies.
54 Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 2, 834.
55 James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (London: Macmillan

Press Ltd, 1986), 61-65.

56 Ibid.
57 John Foster Dulles, “Telegram to President Eisenhower,” in Foreign Relations of

the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI, eds. Allen H.
185
 The relevance of this entire focus on the 1954 Geneva Conference to the
Military Assistance mission in Vietnam is that this issue set up the entire mission
for failure. Because the local government had not bought into the Conference and
the resulting partition, they did not feel obligated to follow through on the
commitments made on their behalf. This resulted in a disastrous situation, when,
after consolidating power for two years, President Diem (previously appointed
Prime Minister in 1954 under Bao Dai), purposefully declined to hold free
elections in 1956 as agreed to at the Geneva Conference. His argument declared
that the Republic of Vietnam was now a sovereign state, and therefore was not
bound by a treaty signed by a foreign power, France, on its behalf,58 exacerbating
an already tense political situation locally. The result of this situation was that
there were multiple constituencies vying for power, playing the French off the
Americans and vice versa.

The political will in the South Vietnamese ruling class was not one that
accepted a long-term sustainable political resolution to the conflict, as much as it
aimed to gather enough power and wealth for itself, resulting in a military coup
in 1963. As a result, there were no legitimate political partners for the United
States to work with to establish a long-term political objective so that the
Military Assistance mission could meet a long-term goal, there being no long-
term goal. Without political partnership, there was no possibility for any military
to achieve a long-term, sustainable security through any kind of military
operation, including Military Assistance. On the international side, Secretary
Dulles managed to both fail to develop a partnership of an ally, the British, while
at the same time committing to the strategy of containing Global Communism
when there was no clarity that the United States had the ability or resources to
achieve such a significant goal. This inconsistency would affect the Military
Assistance mission’s beginnings and goals.

Kitchens and Neal H. Petersen (Washington, D.C.: United States Government

Printing Office, 1981), Document 378, accessed December 5, 2016,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/d378. Originally
in Cable, The Geneva Conference, 65.
58 Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, 343-

348.
186
The Origins of Military Assistance in Vietnam

While there was some ongoing activity between of the DRV and Viet Minh
leaders with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner to the CIA,
during WWII, the establishment of the Military Assistance Program did not begin
until 1950. The initial effort of Military Intervention came in the form of a
Military Aid request, which was characterized “as modest and appropriate in
view of the military situation in Vietnam.”59 However, as military historian
Robert Spector stated, “military leaders earlier had viewed Southeast Asia as
important chiefly because of its relationship to the island chain of Japan,
Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs now [in 1950] saw
Southeast Asia as strategically important in its own right.”60

The Joint Chiefs’ of Staff Strategic Shift

Although the reasons why the Joint Chiefs made such a strategic shift is not
germane to this research project, the point is that they did, and the ramifications
of this strategic transition are germane to this research project. It very likely
could have been the general view that many in the West had, seeing Communism
as a monolithic movement, there being no difference between Stalin and Mao in
their minds, no matter that both deeply mistrusted one another, especially after
the Korean War. Perceiving a monolithic communist movement that was
expanding across the Asian continent had to be a concern. Their suspicions could
only have been confirmed a few months later, when North Korea launched a
surprise attack on the unprepared South Korea, pushing allied forces to the sea.
Articulating their views in the memorandum, the Joint Chiefs stated, “With
respect to the measures which, from the United States military point of view,
might be taken to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommend early implementation of military aid programs for
Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma.”61

59 Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 105.

60 Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 107.
61 Omar Bradley, “Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense: Strategic

Assessment of Southeast Asia,” April 10, 1950, in The Pentagon Papers, Part 5,
187
 This is germane for examining the failures made by senior leaders with
respect to Military Assistance in Vietnam. This memorandum outlines the first
recommendation by military leaders to the civilian, political leadership to
formalize a Military Aid and Military Assistance program. The problem with the
Joint Chiefs’ recommendation is that it lacked a connection to any political
objective. Certainly, prevention of the spread of communism, the domino theory,
is a political objective; however, the disconnect is that the Joint Chiefs, like many,
had a monolithic view of Communism — that what was happening from a policy
side in the Soviet Union was having a clear manifestation in Southeast Asia.
Although there is little question that there was an inherent relationship, at this
point there was poor connection to the underlying reasons of pursuit. Whereas
in Russia, Communism came to fruition due to class and economic disconnects, in
Southeast Asia there existed the belief that the Capitalist West intended colonial
interests and prevention of local governance. In pursuit of Grand Strategy, there
was the argument to contain the global spread of Communism; however, the
advice of George Kennan to initially pursue the policy of containment where it
was feasible had not been heeded. The Joint Chiefs were mindful, in the
memorandum, about expenses, and made a clear budget request for the fiscal
year; however, in 1950 there had been no in-depth study of resource input
versus outputs.

It is entirely possible that this was the beginning of the gradual escalation
that seemed to feature prominently in planning during the entire period that the
United States was active in Vietnam, but more concerning was the Joint Chiefs
themselves. All the Joint Chiefs — General of the Army Omar Bradley as
Chairman, General Clifton Cates as Commandant of the Marine Corps, Admiral
Forrest Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations, General Hoyt Vandenberg as Chief
of Staff of the Air Force, and Lawton Collins as Chief of Staff of the Army — had
extensive war records, having served in combat during both WWI and WWII. In
addition to their extensive war records, all were part of the Joint Chiefs during
the first part of the Korean War, so the natural question to ask is how one

Section B, Subpart 2(b), 310. Originally referenced in Spector, Advice and

Support: The Early Years, 107.
188
Military Assistance mission came to become so successful while this one was
clearly not.

One difference was in the wars themselves. In the Korean War, there was an
immediate full spectrum engagement, while in Vietnam there was a gradual
escalation. The problem with this answer, however, is twofold. First, in the
Korean War, as noted in Chapter 4, the Joint Chiefs thought that Brigadier
General Roberts and the KMAG had done a poor job in preparing the Republic of
Korea (ROK) Army for combat against the Communist North.62 This view caused
the KMAG to be essentially ignored, but for ROK President Syngman Rhee giving
command and control of the ROK Army to General MacArthur, until the KMAG
was able to prove its worth by assisting in the replacement and development of
many ROK Army officers. Furthermore, the policy regarding corrupt or inept
officers being replaced must also have impacted the overall outcome of the
conflict. In addition, the Korean War more clearly resembled the wars of the Joint
Chiefs’ pasts, in that it was a war with clear battle lines and military-on-military
maneuvers, attacks, and counterattacks. In contrast, the war that was being
fought in Vietnam was one of counterinsurgency and the perception by the local
populace that the United States had intentions to reassert foreign rule.

The second reason is that none of the Joint Chiefs would remain in their
positions much longer. General Cates would leave in 1951, Admiral Sherman
died that year, and Generals Vandenberg, Collins, and Bradley would all leave in
1953. Who is to know what they would have decided in later years if they had
been in the same positions, and whether they would have pushed back against
Secretary Dulles’ desire to expand the nature of the containment of the perceived
communist threat? In this regard, there was an inherent flaw in the system.
Significantly, the system at that time did not require strategic review or long-
term planning. Indeed, while this 1950 memorandum to Secretary of Defense
Johnson is termed a “Strategic Assessment,” rather than an actual strategic
assessment, it became more of a situational assessment. The difference is that

62Bryan R. Gibby, The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–
1953 (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012), 7 and 9.
189
the memorandum examined the situation in Southeast Asia but reviewed very
little of the strategic dynamics at work. In addition, there is no related analysis,
but a wholehearted embracing of the domino theory when the memo states, “The
fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states
of Asia.”63 This declaration was made years before President Eisenhower would
similarly articulate the issue. The relevance of this is to ask whether there was, in
fact, a structural problem regarding the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in that each Chief
would only serve approximately four years and as such, would be unable to
assess and reassess their strategic decisions, or whether simply a tragic mistake
was made by extraordinarily competent and experienced men.

However, there was a reversal of the underlying dynamics of the Joint Chiefs,
although not a change in policy. About a year after the Strategic Assessment
memorandum was written, Truman, on the advice of the same Joint Chiefs of
Staff, relieved MacArthur from command of United Nations Forces in Korea. In
May of 1951, Bradley was asked to testify at a joint Senate committee composed
of the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations on the circumstance
around the relief of MacArthur. General Bradley represented the thoughts of the
Joint Chiefs regarding the broader situation of the Korean War, stating, “Under
present circumstances, we [the Joint Chiefs] have recommended against
enlarging the war. The course of action often described as ‘limited war’ with Red
China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power
in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.”64 In this case the Joint Chiefs
were articulating need for a limited war of the “limited war,” that is, to narrow
the military focus of the Korean War to achieve the political objective of a limited
containment of Communism. Bradley continued to make his now infamous
statement, “Red China is not a powerful nation seeking to dominate the world.
Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us

63 Bradley, “Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,” in The Pentagon Papers,

Part 5, Section B, Subpart 2(b), 309.
64 Omar N. Bradley, “Testimony,” May 15, 1951, United States Senate, Committee

on Armed Forces and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in

the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1951), 731.
190
in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong
enemy.”65

This was all unfolding while at the same time there was gradual escalation of
commitment to French Indochina, and at no point did the Joint Chiefs state that
the conflict in Indochina threatened to expand throughout Southeast Asia.
However, the 1950 Strategic Assessment memorandum from the Joint Chiefs
requests the development of Military Aid programs throughout the region. In
addition, while there was no way to know how these military leaders would have
changed and evolved in their thinking, or not, had they continued in their
positions as Joint Chiefs, Bradley’s views are in fact known. Bradley, after his
retirement from active service in 1954,66 continued to give advice on the
Vietnam conflict to President Johnson as part of an informal group called the
Wise Men. Bradley stood out as one member in 1968, after the Tet Offensive,
who continued to advise that military escalation continue.67

The question again, then, is how could there be such a divergence in results
between the wars and their relation to Military Assistance? The difference in
results is much the same with respect to both the wars and the Military
Assistance, and ultimately has to do with a foundation of Liberal international
relations theory, which is based on partnerships and international cooperation.
The evolving situation in Indochina could not develop government that was
considered as legitimate in the eyes of the population. The French were viewed
as invaders and colonial occupiers, and after the loss at Dien Bien Phu, the
Republic of Vietnam was viewed as a personal fiefdom of Prime Minister, later

65 Bradley, “Testimony,” May 15, 1951, United States Senate, Military Situation in
the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, 732.
66 “American officers holding five-star rank [technically] never retire. They draw

full active duty pay for the remainder of their lives, although after a certain point
their actual military duties and responsibilities become minimal.” David T.
Zabecki, “Military Ranks,” in The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, Second
Edition, vol. 4, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 1685.
67 Rodney J. Ross, “Wise Men,” in The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, Second

Edition, vol. 3, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 1344-
1345. Frank E. Vandiver, Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 326-327.
191
President, Ngo Dinh Diem and his family. After Diem’s overthrow and
assignation in November 1963 by a military junta, the Republic of Vietnam was
ruled by a succession of military leaders — all of whom failed in varying degrees.
For the United States, there was no legitimate government to partner with
throughout the war with which it could engage on a broader political objective.

In addition, after the French left Indochina due to the negotiated settlement
at the 1954 Geneva Conference, and the United States took on more and more of
the burden of the Vietnam conflict, there was not the same sense of international
cooperation as there had been in the Korean War. This was due to Truman’s
taking advantage of the lack of Soviet Union participation in the United Nations
Security Council, and securing broad, global support against the clear aggression
of the DPRK. In contrast, due to the continuing challenges of any clear political
objective in the Vietnam conflict, there existed far less of an international
presence in the combat force, with so few nations contributing that the effort
was more of a regional security effort. Interestingly, a young Colin Powell saw
this first-hand, and made certain that the concept of broad, international
involvement was a cornerstone of future engagements for which he would be
responsible during his service in Vietnam, forming the important tenet of the
Powell Doctrine as discussed in Chapter 1.

Given the wide ramifications of the Vietnam conflict, these moments may
seem insignificant or trivial at best, but they all point to tremendously important
fundamentals of Military Assistance. It is clear from the Joint Chief’s
memorandum that there was an intent to have an established Military Assistance
mission in what would become Vietnam from the very beginning of the United
States Armed Forces involvement. That Military Assistance mission was never
properly linked to a political objective, something of which senior military
leaders such as the Joint Chiefs were certainly aware, taking Bradley’s comments
about “Red China” in his Congressional testimony into account.

The Failure of the Military Assistance Mission

While the shift in thinking by the Joint Chiefs happened prior to the beginning
of the Korean War, the change in approaches for the Military Assistance mission
happened after the Battle Dien Bien Phu, as the French withdrew, and the United

192
States became more involved in the Republic of Vietnam. MAAG Indochina had
been formed due to the recommendations in the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum to
the Secretary of Defense on April 10, 1950. MAAG Indochina was specifically
designed as a small unit to keep track of equipment and money from the United
States to the French and French Union soldiers, but this became a challenge due
to efforts by political leaders to expand the influence of the United States in
Indochina.

The first commander of MAAG Indochina, Brigadier General Francis Brink,

who commanded from the fall of 1950 to the summer of 1952, had a
disagreement with the newly installed head of the State Department run
Economic Cooperation Administration, Robert Blum. Blum, along with the State
Department for which he distributed economic aid, thought that given the level
of financial commitment the United States was making, it should be afforded
more influence over the military affairs in Indochina, and directly train the
Vietnamese rather than the French training the Vietnamese. Brink and much of
his team, disagreed, believing that to properly resource such a change in the
military mission would require over 4,000 soldiers.68

This break between the understanding of the political leadership in the form
of the State Department and the United States Armed Forces responsible for
carrying out their agenda would not be the first such. In this case, many
Washington, D.C. leaders must have misunderstood the reports being filed by
MAAG Indochina, which the Washington, D.C. based leaders believed were
positive. This is in direct contrast to MAAG Indochina’s actual statements
reporting a lack of understanding or training on American-made equipment,
with the Vietnamese Navy’s readiness even worse. These challenges culminated
in Brink’s suicide while in Washington D.C. in July 1952. He was replaced by a
commander from the Korean War, Brigadier General Thomas Trapnell, who
provided a youthful enthusiasm. He quickly sobered, having deep concern with

68 Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 155.

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the French and their inability to properly incorporate the Vietnamese soldiers
into their efforts.69

The experience of Brink highlights a frequent challenge that the United States
Armed Forces has had with political leadership with respect to military
operations and Military Assistance more specifically, which is appropriately
linking resources with objectives. This has been seen in Brink’s being refused
resources for the change in training the Vietnamese, Defense Secretary Les Aspin
turning down a request for armored vehicles to be used in the Somali raid in
1993 (popularized by the book, Black Hawk Down),70 and General Shinseki’s
testimony stating the need for far more soldiers than had been planned to
conquer and hold Iraq.71

There is a natural “tug-of-war” that occurs between policymakers and

operators, with operators asking for more and policymakers wanting or being
constrained, making it necessary to give less, either due to expense or the
political challenges of having a heavy military footprint in the respective country.
This tug-of-war has beneficial results, in that it demonstrates that each
profession is acting in accordance with how they are required to function to
achieve their respective goals. The fundamental challenge, however, is one of
contingencies.

In all military operations, from the smallest Military Aid mission, such as
MAAG Indochina when it was conceived, to the largest scale battles such as
Operation Overlord in WWII, there is one question that must always be asked:
What happens if every assumption being made is wrong? This is a question
ultimately of risk for both policymakers and military leaders. Brink and his staff
had clearly made the assessment that given the dynamics in Indochina at the
time, especially given the complications of dealing with the French, it would be a

69 Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 156-157.

70 Michael Gordon with Thomas L. Friedman, “Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia:
Success So Near, a Loss So Deep,” The New York Times, October 25, 1993,
accessed May 19, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/25/world/details-
of-us-raid-in-somalia-success-so-near-a-loss-so-deep.html.
71 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion

and Occupation of Iraq (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), 101-102.

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mistake to pursue a more extensive Military Assistance mission. This was an
assessment that General Shinseki had been able to make with respect to the Iraq
invasion, and that Secretary Aspin had not been able to make with respect to the
Somali raid.72 This is exactly the set of challenges and issues that would greet
Lieutenant General John O’Daniel when taking command of MAAG Indochina in
April of 1954.

O’Daniel was considered a top field commander, having served in WWI and
WWII with distinction, but his experience in Vietnam was less stellar, highlighted
by his declaration that it was not possible that the French base at Dien Bien Phu
would fall. In a report to the Joint Chiefs, he stated, “I feel that it [Dien Bien Phu]
can withstand any kind of an attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching.
However, a force with two or three battalions of medium artillery with air
observation could make the area untenable. The enemy does not seem to have
this capability at present.”73 It was also clear from the report that the French
remained uninterested in involving the United States in Indochina affairs that the
French regarded as internal, while at the same time the Vietnamese were
extremely anxious for more assistance from the United States.74 It is important to
note that MAAG Indochina in 1954 remained a unit focused on tracking Military
Aid.

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent negotiations at
the Geneva Conference culminating in the Geneva Accords, with the formal
division of Indochina into the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, MAAG Indochina was renamed MAAG Vietnam and placed under the
command of Lieutenant General Samuel Williams. Here was a unique officer in
that, after having been fired from his position as a general officer during combat

72 The Somali raid offers an interesting example of a military operation in which

the political goals were both achievable and clearly defined, and yet the
operation still went poorly. This relates back to risk and a lack of risk analysis, in
that there was no serious consideration of what could happen, or in military
planning parlance, what was the enemy’s most dangerous course of action.
73 John W. O’Daniel, “Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina,” February 5,

1954, in The Pentagon Papers, Part 5, Section B, Subpart 3(b), 252.

74 O’Daniel, “Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina,” in The Pentagon

Papers, Part 5, Section B, Subpart 3(b), 246-258.

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operations in WWII and being transferred to a staff position, Williams was able
to perform at a high enough level of excellence that he was later able to secure a
promotion back to a general officer rank. When he took over MAAG Vietnam
from O’Daniel in 1955, the entire Military Intervention in Vietnam was at a
critical juncture.

In his book, Masters of War, acclaimed Professor Robert Buzzanco stated,

“[Lieutenant General] Williams ignored both [President] Diem’s repressive ways
and the need to train the southern Vietnamese army to fight a guerrilla war. With
U.S. acquiescence, Diem organized his army not to fight the Communist enemy so
much as to maintain his own authority.”75 Williams commented in an interview
in 1964 about how good his relationship was with Diem and how the Republic of
Vietnam Army (ARVN) was organized based on the desires of Vietnamese
general officers, and not the United States’ military leadership.76 In this
interview, in addition to other sources, Williams cannot help but come across as
incredibly naïve in that he fails to recognize that Diem’s regime was corrupt, or
that the Vietnamese general officers might have an ulterior motive for the
organization of the ARVN in supporting Diem’s powerbase.

The organization decided on was a division-based army, which is a structure

that is based on a larger movement of soldiers, 15-20,000, and equipment. It is a
structure that is based on force versus force, or in the language of international
relations — a state versus state conflict. As historian Joseph Buttinger, pointed
out, “Organized under American direction on a division instead of in small
mobile units, and equipped for the task of holding off an invasion from the North,
the army was technically unprepared to counter insurgency.”77 Williams, while
stating that he was following the guidance of the Republic of Vietnam military
leaders, was criticized in a report written by a contractor based on the question
of how the United States could be victorious in so many battles but ultimately be

75 Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam
Era (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55-56.
76 “Why U.S. is Losing in Vietnam — An Inside Story: Interview with Former Chief

U.S. Military Adviser, Lieut. Gen. Samuel T. Williams (Ret.),” U.S. News and World
Report, November 9, 1964, 62-72.
77 Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 2, 984.

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defeated in the overall war. The reported stated, “That concentration on the
conventional approach [an organization around divisions] to security was
objected to by both the South Vietnamese military and the United States
Embassy.”78

Brigadier General James Collins, writing on the training of ARVN in The

Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, commented: “In
organizing and training the South Vietnamese Army, the United States relied
heavily on its recent experience in South Korea. The similarity between the
Vietnamese situation of 1954 and the Korean situation of 1950 prompted the
Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam to concentrate on developing a
South Vietnamese force capable of meeting an overt invasion from North
Vietnam.”79 This tends to be the trend for many militaries, and the United States
Army is no exception in training for the next war based on the last war. When
Williams took command of MAAG Vietnam in 1955, the Korean War was fresh in
the minds of most in the United States, and especially with respect to his own
most recent operational time as a division commander of the 25th Infantry
Division in the Korean War. As military historian, Max Boot, stated, “A veteran of
the Korean War, Williams worried primarily about a conventional invasion
across the DMZ…The army that he was building was ill equipped to handle the
guerrilla threat that South Vietnam would soon face.”80

However, ultimately the “American military and civilian observers in the field
had no trouble at all in finding out why the armed forces of the Diem regime
failed so conspicuously in fighting the Vietcong guerrillas. It needed no military

78 BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 6, book

1 (McLean, VA: BDM Corporation, 1980), I-19. Seen in Buzzanco, Masters of War,
62.
79 James Lawton Collins, The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese

Army, 1950-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 12. Seen
first in BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. 6,
book 1, I-20.
80 Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in

Vietnam (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W.W. Norton

& Company, 2018), 287.
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expert to see that the army had been trained for the wrong kind of war.”81
Williams and MAAG Vietnam, along with the political and military leadership of
the Republic of Vietnam, had been training, to use Bradley’s words, for the
“wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”82
The war in South Vietnam was a counterinsurgency war, being fought in the
south, in hearts and minds of villages and highlands, and by the time it was
discovered to be a mistake it was too late. “While the threat of an external
aggression was real, it was not until 1959 that the internal subversion and
insurgency openly supported by the north was recognized as the major threat
and that a strong effort to give South Vietnam a counterinsurgency capability
began.”83 The United States had failed before its soldiers were committed to
combat.

Conclusion

Observing the breadth of history, from the waning days of WWII through to
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and knowing what would happen to the United
States over the course of the next decades to a generation of service members,
their families, and communities, one cannot help but be pressed with feelings of
awe and frustration. Awe with reference to the sacrifices that were made:
frustration at the numerous failures, large and small, that no one of substance, at
any juncture, asked aloud, “What are we doing?” or “What if everything we have
assumed is wrong?” There seems to have been an almost blind and continuous
miscalculation, an underlying inability to assess and reassess what the long-term
goals and ramifications were of continuing the Military Assistance mission and
then following that, the Military Support mission in Vietnam. Eventually, after
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and the buildup of troops in Vietnam, the United
States settled on a strategy for winning over the Vietnamese people. The
program was called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
(CORDS) and worked well for a while, but in the end, it was as Robert Komer, the

81 Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, vol. 2, 984.

82 Bradley, “Testimony,” May 15, 1951, United States Senate, Military Situation in
the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, 731.
83 Collins, The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 12.

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first leader of the CORDS program, who observed, “its failure to have greater
effect on the overall Vietnam situation to too little, too late.”84

For his doctoral dissertation, retired Lieutenant General, and previous

National Security Advisor, H.R. McMaster wrote what became the book
Dereliction of Duty. It has been popularized that the Joint Chiefs failed to confront
their civilian, political leaders when they saw that the strategy was not working
in Vietnam. The true failure of Vietnam can be extrapolated from the experience
of the Military Assistance mission a decade before the events of Dereliction of
Duty, and the lack of securing a clearly defined political objective — one that
would allow the United States Armed Forces to both project power and
strengthen international cooperation. This inability to define an end state for the
Vietnam Military Assistance mission was exacerbated by the lack of partnership
options that existed for stable governance. The constant dependency by the
United States on President Diem, further showed that Roger Makins, the United
Kingdom’s ambassador to the United States at this time, was correct in his
assessment that United States has a consistent desire to have “their man” in
power.85 Another important lesson learned from the actions in Vietnam is that
United States Armed Forces can have a relatively successful security force
assistance program, followed by a good Advise and Assist effort, even coupling it
with a hearts and minds program like CORDS, winning every battle but still
losing the war.

Ultimately, the Vietnamese people voted with their support, the support of
the security structure that would keep them safe. The United States, as some
have argued, has been thought to have lost the Vietnam War domestically — in
newspapers, town halls, and college campuses — before the political will
escalated to pressure Congress and the rest of the United States Government to
stop the Vietnam War. This case shows, however, that the Vietnam War had been

84 Ross Coffey, “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory
in Iraq,” Military Review 86, no. 2 (March-April, 2006): 32. Due to the lack of
correct grammar, it should be noted that this is a direct quote.
85 Interview between Roger Makins (Lord Sheffield) and Max Hastings on 10 Jan

1986. Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1987), 23.
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lost at the very beginning by leaders who failed to understand the political goals
of military action, and were unable, or unwilling, to question and reassess
whether their military strategy was meeting any political objective at all. The
Military Assistance mission was a microcosm of this entire endeavor, and given
its relatively small size, would have been far easier to perceive where there were
serious strategic shortfalls. Had this effort been made, perhaps a different result
would have been possible, were it possible to re-make history.

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 Chapter 6

In Summation:

Military Assistance in the Context of Warfare and International Relations

This project began with the goal of understanding what concepts of

international relations, both the discipline and the phenomenon, could
contribute to a successful Military Assistance mission and as in all projects of this
magnitude, it has evolved into something similar and yet, slightly different from
its intended goals. In one sense, the consistency between the beginning of the
project and its completion has been that goal to understand the components of a
successful Military Assistance mission, namely: discovering, understanding, and
appreciating the necessity for political objectives in any form of Military
Intervention, including Military Assistance. More specifically to Military
Assistance is the crucial component of a partnership between supporting and
recipient nations that is of good faith. In another sense, the method and process
by which the conclusions were made were vastly different than those at the
project’s beginning. Initially, the idea was to compare the Military Assistance
done during the height of the British Empire, when the British Army trained and
developed foreign security forces in India, the Caribbean, Africa, and everywhere
the Union Jack flew, with the efforts of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan
to train and develop their respective indigenous forces. The challenge with this
approach was that areas in which the British Empire was training and
developing foreign security forces were colonies in some form, and thus
regarded by the Government in London as possessions.

In contrast, the United States has struggled mightily to assist the

development of governance and security forces on all levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan, trying to respect each county’s sovereignty, but in many cases
failing to appreciate local customs or traditions that directly affected the abilities
of the government to govern in those countries. These efforts were attempts to
impose some hybrid of Western democracy on peoples who had little history or
connection to that form of governance, while at the same time being cultures
with long traditions of honor and justice. This is a critical point as it relates to

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Military Assistance, because ultimately the British Empire could impose its will
and methods on foreign security forces, due to those forces being part of the
Empire, and the Royal Army along with the Government in London considering
and relating to them as such. However, the United States had to rely on
relationships and influence in its experiences with Military Assistance, while the
foreign security forces simply looked to the United States as a supermarket of
resources.

Though the United States is often considered an empire, and many times
referred to pejoratively as a colonial power or an imperial republic, there is
minimal evidence to suggest that the United States has operated as a traditional
colonial power post-WWII. Put more bluntly, if the United States is a colonial
power, it is without a doubt the most incompetent colonial power in the history
of the world. Though there can be no question that the United States has used its
power and influence to further its interests, as any nation state does, the number
of setbacks that have occurred with client states such as Iraq and Afghanistan
suggest an ongoing effort by the United States to respect other nations’
sovereignty and long-term independence.

With reference to Military Assistance, the United States’ challenges in

training and developing forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were compounded by
Army doctrine. The doctrine at that time emphasized large, unit maneuvers, and
very little in the realm of Advise and Assist or Security Force Assistance. Indeed,
much of the thinking in this area was done in 2006 during the development of
Field Manual 3-24, the United States Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual,
which concluded that training foreign security forces was a critical method for
increased local security. Although the Counterinsurgency Field Manual adjusted
military thinking at a tactical level, it did not include, nor was it appropriate to
include, a reassessment of the political dynamics and Grand Strategy that led to
the broad failures in combatting the Iraqi Insurgency.

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 This leads to an addition crucial point that is often confused by political
leaders:1 Military Assistance is not a strategy, but a tool within the broad array of
policy and even military options for policymakers to employ to reach their
political goals, ideally in order to pursue a grand strategy. This confusion tends
to be due to the lack of understanding about the nature of strategy as a general
concept within the political leadership in general, as this group is far more
concerned with immediate needs and concerns, as opposed to long-term
thinking and planning. The challenge with this misunderstanding, however, is
that if Military Assistance is incorrectly viewed as a strategy, then it may be
considered a comprehensive solution to an overall conflict, which is unlikely at
best and very dangerous at worst. Military Intervention of any sort should not be
considered a strategy, and to do so would seem to continue that
misunderstanding despite Professor Sir Freedman’s highlighting the vagueness
of the definition of strategy. Furthermore, if Military Assistance is correctly
recognized as a tool rather than a strategy, then like all military efforts, it must
be linked with a specific set of broader strategic or political goals: A military
means to a political end. In this way, it has a great deal of applicability within the
field of international relations as a practical application in the discipline. These
differing experiences by policymakers can be seen throughout the case studies in
this research project: South Korea and Vietnam prior to the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution.

1 Thom Shanker, “The Struggle for Iraq: The Military; General Says Training of
Iraqi Troops Suffered From Poor Planning and Staffing,” The New York Times,
February 11, 2006, accessed July 30, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/11/washington/world/the-struggle-for-
iraq-the-military-general-says-training.html. Editorial, “Afghanistan’s Army,” The
New York Times, December 4, 2009, accessed July 30, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/opinion/05sat1.html. Peter Baker,
Helene Cooper, and Michael R. Gordon, “Obama Looks at Adding Bases and
Troops in Iraq, to Fight ISIS,” The New York Times, June 11, 2015, accessed July
30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-
us-military-bases-martin-e-dempsey.html. Max Boot, “Back to Nation-Building in
Afghanistan. Good.,” The New York Times, August 22, 2017, accessed July 30,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/president-trump-
nation-building-afghanistan.html.
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 The examination of the case studies of South Korea and Vietnam reveals a
commonality of history: that of colonialism and its relation to the Military
Assistance provided by the United States. At the same time, the United States
entered into these relationships with each nation differently, creating an
understandable confusion in relating to an all-embracing grand strategy or
strategic vision for the United States in its approach to international relations.
This is not to say that there is a uniform approach to Military Assistance, but the
broader commonality should be strategic in nature, and for the United States, as
a Global Power, a grand strategy. In this respect, the United States falls woefully
short in its approach to global hegemony, if that was in fact its goal. Considering
itself far more of a limited power — and failing to be cognizant of its perception
in the world by other nations — the United States pursued relations with South
Korea and Vietnam in an almost transactional methodology, or as a grand
strategy of selective engagement, picking and choosing where to be active. By
this means, the United States gave a truly clear understanding of a long-term
strategy neither to allies nor enemies. The main difference between the
examples was the clarity of the long-term sustainable political goals the United
States had with each country, as well as the extent to which each nation agreed
with that political goal. The relationship with South Korea is the one clear
exception, though more by accident of circumstances than deliberate purpose.

The accident, of course, was one of timing. The DPRK and their allies, the
Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China, had assumed that the United States
would not return to assist the Republic of Korea, after all but abandoning the
peninsula a few months prior. President Truman was forced from a domestic
political perspective to pursue war and resist the aggression from the DPRK,
although domestically challenged by the general perception of having “lost”
China, and having developed the cornerstone of the post-WWII American Grand
Strategy of containment, a policy specifically focused on communism. The
accidental timing also helped to create the deep relationship between the ROK
Army and KMAG, even enabling the KATUSA program into existence. Although
the Military Assistance mission had already been underway in the ROK, this
timing allowed for a designed effort to pursue a Military Assistance mission that

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formed the foundational basis for the strategic relationship between the United
States and the Republic of Korea for years to come.

That strategic relationship, together with the strategic relationship with the
Japanese, formed the basis of the United States’ influence in Asia. While there
was an underlying dependence on the United States by the Republic of Korea,
much like most client-based relationships, there still existed a sincere perception
of indebtedness by the South Korean people to the United States, for the
American servicemen who served and sacrificed for the freedom of the South
Korean people. In addition, the relationship of the Republic of Korea with those
providing Military Assistance was successful due to the nature of the Korean
War, and to postponing any long-term political concerns due to the necessity of
survival. These “smaller” successes built the foundation of the long-term
successful strategic alliance and Military Assistance relationship enjoyed by the
United States and the Republic of Korea.

While the timing of the Korean War and the political circumstances that
forced President Truman into the conflict may have seemed happenstance, those
circumstances could not have developed into an actual success had it not been
for the important dynamics that were unique to the relationship between the
United States and Republic of Korea. One of the most important dynamics was a
clear understanding of the political goals of the relationship, namely, to resist the
aggression of the DPRK, which also fit well within the American Grand Strategy
of containment, preventing a global spread of communism. Although the goals of
the United States with respect to its Grand Strategy were clear in the case of
Korea, Vietnam offered a muddling effect of the domino theory concept.

In stark contrast to the Republic of Korea, Vietnam provided few or no

examples of a successful relationship, either sustainable or strategic, related to
Military Assistance. As the case study explores, the relationship misfired from
the beginning, as the United States misunderstood the anti-colonial sentiments
in Vietnam, allowing the French to frame the conflict as an anti-communism
endeavor, rather than a desire by the Vietnamese to be a free people, a policy the
United States fervently supported. The failure was also due to a poor broader
strategic understanding of the United States, one that gripped its international

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relations for decades: the domino theory — a different manifestation of the
Grand Strategy of containment. This conceptualization would eventually (and
similarly) place the United States on an unstable strategic footing. Rather than
following the Truman Doctrine of containment, with clear limitations on how far
the United States would extend itself, the United States allowed the Vietnam
conflict to occupy more and more of its time and resources.

The origins of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam were such that
unless a dramatic and widespread reevaluation of the original assumptions had
changed, there was little possibility of any other outcome. The inability of the
United States to find a legitimate partner and develop a set, or even a single,
clear political goal created a disconnect between the operations in Vietnam and
the Grand Strategy being pursued by the United States. In this case, Military
Assistance was unable to truly contribute positively to the overall mission due to
the inherent challenges evident in the mission itself. Many of lessons learned by
the United States, from both military and political aspects, failed to take hold, and
inevitably the United States repeated numerous mistakes.

Many policy leaders who worked in government during the years of the
Vietnam conflict continued in public service, and some evolved into a group of
fervent anti-communists known as the Neoconservatives. They recognized that
the Soviet Union and the communist system upon which it survived were
crumbling at its foundation, and this group came to believe that a little external
pressure was all it would take to bring down that house of cards. As many of
them came into power during the presidency of George W. Bush, their
understanding of the fall of communism, joined with their belief in the domino
theory of Vietnam, made for a dangerous combination applied to the Middle East,
where they sought to spread democracy through a strategy of reverse domino
theory, with disastrous results. Ultimately, the failure of Vietnam and the domino
theory is the same as reverse domino theory — an external pressure or actor
cannot bring down, or build up, a nation state with a predictable end state
because any external actor may create unforeseen factors that can affect a
positive outcome for all. In fairness, however, this concept could be an entirely
new dissertation topic in and of itself.

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New Areas for Research

As in all research studies, a few answers always result in more questions and
this one is no different. Although the focus of this study has always been on
Military Assistance, and the research aimed to avoid involving the experience of
Military Aid, there is a distinctive linkage between the two. An area in need of
further exploration is an understanding about the point of the convergence
between Military Assistance and Military Aid. This is due to the practical reality
that many American- and NATO-based tactics are directly tied to the equipment
being used. In addition, there is a need to explore the instances of Military
Assistance that have been implemented to reduce a recipient nation’s
dependence on Military Aid. Such objectives may have been continued influence
and/or the continuation of a domestic, industrial base, among others.

On a more conceptual level, this research project has shown how some of the
factors that the United States Armed Forces takes for granted may be the reasons
for so much concern or failure with respect to Military Assistance. Some years
ago, Peruvian author Hernando de Soto published The Mystery of Capital: Why
Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. This book detailed a
theory that the reason capitalism was successful in the West was due to there
being a recognized and minimally corrupted manner of acknowledging property
rights, allowing anyone to be recognized owners of property. Alternatively, in
countries where there was little or no proof of ownership, the poor were unable
to claim assets that may have existed in their families for generations. When
capitalist systems were introduced in these societies, they failed for the most
part because only those with recognized ownership rights could participate.
Essentially, this occurred because no one thought to question whether the very
foundational principles of the free flow of capital was in place for all to
experience. The point in relation to this study is that there are many underlying
factors of a Western-style democracy that are taken for granted, that are part of
the fabric of democracy, and that should be examined. This is especially true
where it pertains to security and the military where, by and large, the benefit of
the doubt is given to others.

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 One of democracy’s founding principles with reference to its military is
civilian authority of the military. The United States is truly unique in the world in
that it has never experienced a military coup, as the United States Armed Forces,
as an institution, relies on the political leaders to understand and appreciate the
support necessary to conduct military operations. This research project has
discussed at length how one of the most sacred values of the United States
Armed Forces, civilian control and oversight, is a principle neither
communicated nor developed as a value of Military Assistance in a clear,
consistent manner. Civilian control of the military should be explored from the
perspective of the military, as it is a cornerstone of sustainable, long-term
security for a nation.

Another impression that came out of this research project and the review of
literature is that much of the strategic thinking about the contest and
competition with Communism may be compared to that of the War on Terror. As
discussed in Chapter 1: Military Assistance and Grand Strategy, the domino
theory was popularized during the Cold War as a method to prevent the spread
of Communism. Similarly, the reverse domino theory developed from Kant’s
theory about democracies not attacking one another. In this regard, there has
been little change in the strategic approach to the War on Terror as it relates to
the Cold War. In addition, the language used is very similar when discussing the
War on Terror and the Cold War. It could be argued that this has much to do with
the actors in the United States’ national security apparatus, whether they are
Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative. Furthermore, this may be due
to whether their careers started during the Cold War or whether they were
educated, or mentored, by those who were involved in policy-making at that
time. Either way, the similarity of language begs for further insight and research.

Lastly, an area in which further research is clearly needed is that of

international relations political theory as it relates to Military Assistance. This
research project was not intended to be an international relations theory project;
however, there is a great deal of applicable international relations theory left to
explore. Having only reviewed and interacted with the major schools of
international relations theory, it has become clear that this entire topic could and

208
should be the subject of a research project of its own, one that encompasses
international relations theory and security sector reform.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this research project gives evidence of the following:

• Military Assistance, while not a strategy, is a useful tool for policymakers;

• Like other tools of military power, it must be linked with a broader

strategy and ideally, a grand strategy;

• As simple as the concept may seem, it is incredibly hard, resulting in the

United States failing far more than it has succeeded.

The resolution of conflict is immensely complicated, and the case studies of

this research project portray only certain aspects of some of those complications.
The creation of those complications is due to limited warfare. There has come to
be a need for limited warfare with respect to international law and the Geneva
Conventions of War. In a modern context, specifically with respect to nuclear
war, limited warfare has been the standard of the United States since Truman
fired MacArthur for communicating contrary policy about the use of nuclear
weapons during the Korean War. Once the decision has been made to operate a
conflict with limitations, options for the conduct of that conflict and its
conclusion became limited as well. Under the “Pottery Barn rule” for nation
states where Secretary of State Colin Powell famously stated that “if you break it
[Iraq] you own it,”2 Military Assistance becomes a tool that should naturally be
considered as a practical option for nation building.

While the nature of warfare has not changed from the Clausewitz-principled
idea of the imposition of political will through violence,3 the speed at which war
and peace develop has been changing the character of war itself. The order and
manner by which conclusions of warfare are imposed must be being acted upon

2 William Safire, “It You Break It…,” The New York Times Magazine, October 17,
2004, accessed July 31, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/if-you-break-it.html.
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham, revised by F. N. Maude

(Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 11-14 and 20-21.

209
and pursued at the same time and in the same aggressive manner as the war
itself for the peace to have any hope of being sustainable. As Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, stated, “the nature of war I wouldn’t argue has
changed, but the character of war — highlighted by those capabilities and
functions that I spoke about earlier and what our peer competitors as well as —
as well as non-state actors would have — the character of war is actually pretty
dynamic.”4 Given the dynamics of Military Assistance, there is an inherent
necessity to secure a plan to develop and incorporate all aspects of Military
Assistance prior to the beginning (or at very least, immediately after the
beginning) of a conflict, and to be flexible in the application of such a plan.
Creating this immediate basis of sustainable security can only help to solidify the
gains made during the conflict, as well as creating the bond for both opposing
security forces and the population.

If, however, the idea for such a plan is considered as an afterthought, or as a

secondary problem to the coming conflict, there will be an unavoidable and
possibly irreparable disconnect between the conquering military force and the
development of a sustainable security for the population. While it could be
argued that the plan for what should happen after a war should be second to the
plan for the war, the experience of Military Assistance post-WWII suggests the
opposite. In the two case studies in this research project, the one case that was a
clear success, South Korea, happened without planning and under duress, in the
sense that there was no real initial plan other than for survival. However, as the
Korean War progressed, the tool of Military Assistance that was integrated prior
to the war’s beginning became more integrated at every level, in every aspect of
the war, and then after the war. This was evident when South Koreans began
serving in the United States Army, so that Military Assistance became a main
driver for the military-to-military relationship. The key was having the tool of
Military Assistance understood by both recipient and supporting nations as

4Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Keynote Speech at the Center for a New American
Security,” Defense One National Security Forum, Washington, D.C., December 14,
2015.
210
integral to the success of the Korean War, and naturally to the peace that would
follow.

Vietnam, unfortunately, did not have such integrated approaches, and the
development of a Military Assistance program was more of an added effort once
other options failed. Seeking to recreate some of the success seen in South Korea,
the United States’ Vietnam involvement started as a Military Assistance mission,
and yet became an example of what happens to a Military Assistance mission
when there are no clear set of political goals, in addition to a lack of a willing
recipient nation that has a sustainable security plan, or at least security
objectives.

These efforts seem to have been continued in military operations after

Vietnam, as have the poor ability of policymakers to give sufficient policy
guidance for the United States Armed Forces to implement. However, leaders of
the United States Armed Forces must shoulder some of this blame, as they have
become more reluctant to push back against their political leaders. In conclusion,
the one principle that has become abundantly clear from this research project is
that military operations are implemented and concluded best when both
policymakers and military leaders work together and challenge each other
constructively. Grand Strategy must be understood to be a vision to which the
entire nation commits all aspects of its resources; policymakers and military
leaders are most successful when they understand and support that vision
through their own respective endeavors. Military Assistance, as has been shown
in this research project, is but one tool in pursuit of that Grand Strategy.

211
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