11

Caste, Karma and the Gltä

I
In chapter 4, verse 13 of the Bhagavad-Gltä, Lord Krsna says:
The assembly of four varnas (castes) has been created by me in accordance with
the division of 'qualities' and actions. But although I am its creator, know me as
a non-creator and imperishable (undiminished).
The context is rather odd for talking about the origin of the four varnas
or the caste-system of Hinduism. And yet the first line of this verse has
often been quoted by modern apologists to show that the hierarchy
prevalent from time immemorial in the Indian Vedic (Hindu) society,
known as the caste-system, was actually based upon merits and capabili-
ties rather than on heredity. But, paradoxically, heredity seems to have
been the general practice throughout. For caste is usually determined by
birth, and birth is something over which the person does not have any
control. If hierarchies are determined by birth, then there is something
about which a human being (a rational being, that is) has a right to feel
uneasy. For it is somewhat unfair. Hence there is an apocryphal (but also
very ancient) line attributed to the well-known Mahäbhärata character,
Karna, which says:
daiväyattam knie jarnma madäyattam tu paurusam.
I translate:
My birth in a family is under the control of the 'book of Fate'1
but I myself control my qualities as a human being.2
The significance of this line is obvious in the context. A person may be
born in a lowly family, but through effort, determination and cultivation
of virtues she or he may rise in life and be somebody. Karna became a
great hero, and a king; in fact in the Mahäbhärata he was the only match
for the invincible Arjuna, although he was supposed to be the son of an
 Caste, Karma and the Glta / 137
ordinary charioteer. It can match a modern story where a cabbie's son
becomes a prince or a general.
That the heredity-determined hierarchy in a society is somewhat un-
fair and even irrational was felt much earlier in the tradition. Kama's
assertion quoted above (apocryphal though it may be) expresses the pro-
test of the dissident groups in the society. A human being's worth must
be judged by her actions, virtues and merits, by what she makes of her-
self, not by her birth. Support of this point comes from another source,
which is by no means apocryphal in any sense. Poet Bhavabhüti writing
in the eighth century AD, said in his Uttarammacarita:
Gunah pujästhänam gunisu na Ungarn na ca vayah (act IV, verse 11)

This has been said about Sltä, the abandoned wife of Räma. The argu-
ment of the verse was that Sltä excelled all others by her virtue and merit,
hence her abandonment was entirely unjust. I translate the above line:
Qualities of the qualified persons are worthy of our adoration,
not their sex, nor age.
This was a remarkable assertion in the predominantly sexist society of
so-called traditional India. It is no doubt charged with sexist reflexes, as
are, alas, many statements heard in modern society today. I believe our
language is given to us and as such it always suffers from the defects of
the Orwellian Newspeak. Anything you say in it does not really sound
right in the light of the newly gained consciousness of injustice, domination
and tacit discrimination. Hence it seems to me that the concept of muting,
developed by the sociologist E. Ardener, is a very suitable one in this
context. The subdued group is often the muted group.3
But let us go back to the Gltä. I had read the Bhagavad-Gltä many
times in my youth. And I must admit that I did not understand many things
because I did not know much Sanskrit at that time. At that time its appeal
was more in the form of an inspired 'song' sung by Lord Krsna to per-
suade reluctant Arjuna to do his duty. So the crude message was: we
must do our duty no matter what. We have been taught to treat the book
with reverence. It is regarded (mostly by European scholars) as one of
the 'Hindu Scriptures'. In the orthodox Indian tradition, the Gltä is
regarded as part of our smr'ti, not sruti (in fact, 'scriptures' is a poor trans-
lation of the Sanskrit sruti, if not totally wrong). In our Vedänta parlance,
the Gltä is one of three prasthänas, the other two being the Upanisads
(sruti) and the Brahmasütra. Hence anybody interested in the Vedänta
(both Advaita and non-Advaita) cannot afford to ignore the Gltä.
138 / Philosophy, Culture and Religion
Western scholars generally identify the Gltä as a' Vaisnava text' .4But
it is not exclusively for the Vaisnavas, although Krsna/Visnu is the main
speaker here. In fact, this is a text which is accepted as authoritative even
outside the Vedäntic circle. Apart from the Advaitin Samkara, Abhinava-
gupta, the well-known Saivite author, wrote a commentary on this text.
This falsifies the idea that it is exclusively for the Vaisnava. Besides, I
believe this sort of 'exclusivism' which tries to discover a clear-cut and
sharp line of demarcation between Vaisnavism and Saivism and other '-
isms' in the Indian context is a product of Western reading of Indian cul-
ture. It is, mildly speaking, a discourse constructed by the perception of
the Western Indologists.
If the message of the Gltä is to be taken seriously (as we must from
the Hindu point of view at least), then certain paradoxical questions do
arise regarding the concept of ethics and morality. These issues have
been debated over the ages and many ad hoc but not very satisfactory
solutions have been given. We sometimes do not wish to see the para-
doxes but go on acting according to some dictum or other and believe that
these are given to us. Must we always indulge in rational thinking before
acting? We do not like to share Arjuna's doubts and reluctance. For if
everything has been decided for us by the supreme intelligence of Krsna,
who are we to think about the propriety or justification of the moral codes
that the Gltä presents?
There are philosophers and other people who believe that there cannot
arise any moral or ethical dilemmas because there is always some right
answer to all apparently paradoxical questions. It is our duty to know the
right answers. We may not be able to discover these right answers, but
persons with superior intellects can conduct the rigorous 'critical level'
thinking (as R.M. Hare insists5) and discover the right answers for us,
and our duty would be to follow them. There are, however, others who be-
lieve just the opposite. Dilemmas are realities. They do arise and a totally
satisfactory resolution of them through rational means may be simply
unavailable to us.
I wish to concentrate upon one particular issue: the paradoxicality of
caste and karma. This paradoxicality has often gone unnoticed. To un-
cover the paradoxicality as well as complementarity of the two notions
of caste and karma, we have to go back to Max Weber. The caste-hier-
archy was anti-rational for it was underwritten by the ritual sanction of
pollution, as well as by heredity rather than merit. Predominance of hier-
archy is found in all civilized societies, including the egalitarian ones,
and its usefulness is not in question here. The question is whether it
should be heredity-based or merit-based. Rationality supports the second
 Caste, Karma and the Gita / 139
alternative, whereas practice makes the first alternative more acceptable.
The doctrine of karma, on the other hand, is, or at least seems to be, an
example of ethical rationalism. For Weber this doctrine represents a
coherent theodicy. He saw in the caste-dharma and its tie-in with karma,
a completely unique concept; the combination of the two produced for
Max Weber 'the most consistent theodicy ever formulated' ,6 It produced
a persistent social order. From the point of view of an internalist—an or-
thodox Hindu, for example—the karma doctrine must also be comple-
mentary to the caste-hierarchy, for it may resolve the tension created by
the unaccounted-for inequalities nurtured in a hierarchical society.
The mixture of caste and karma, however, was, as J. Heesterman has
recently put it, 'volatile'.7 The two notions are also mutually opposed to
each other. Karma or ethical rationalism emphasizes the 'merit-based'
nature of the social order, while the caste-hierarchy emphasizes its
'heredity-based' nature. The first allows freedom and self-responsibility,
the second closes the door to freedom and accentuates the givenness of
social duties and responsibilities. But at the same time their combination
became feasible. If the heredity-based caste-hierarchy made the social
system anti-rational and unfair, the karma theodicy was introduced for
the rationalization of the existing practice. The social order that resulted
therefrom was not a rational, but a rationalized order. However the inner
conflict did not disappear completely. For the heredity-based hierarchy
presumably received a rational support as well as a ritual sanction, and
the merit-based hierarchy was not given the prominence it deserved.
The merit-based nature of a hierarchy, however, seems to be rational.
This awareness became more and more a shared feeling among the
members belonging to this social order. The feeling found expression in
various forms. Those who denounced orthodoxy rejected the hereditary
nature of caste-hierarchy. Those who became renouncers went the same
way. But within the tradition itself, many asserted that the merit-based
nature of the hierarchy is a more acceptable alternative. Thus brähman-
hood is not dependent upon birth or family but is constituted by a set of
several moral virtues, several duties and responsibilities. Similarly ksa-
triya-hood or vaisya-hood. It is the echo of this view—the critical view
rather than the view of the conformist—that I believe we find in the line
of the Gitä that I quoted in the opening sentence.

II
The caste duties are talked about in the Gitä in at least four different pla-
ces: chapter 2, 31-7; chapter 3, 35; chapter 4, 13; and chapter 18, 41-8.
140 / Philosophy, Culture and Religion
The context of chapter 4 is rather odd, as I have already mentioned. Lord
Krsna is dwelling on the point that although in this world (iha) people
perform sacrifices desiring success and do obtain such success (verse
12), God (who created the world, divided people into four varnas accord-
ing to their merit) should not be regarded as an agent. For agency belongs
to the humans (who work with desire in their mind), not to the Changeless
One, God. The idea is probably that God works without any desire and
the fruits do not cling to him (as is made explicit in verse 14). Hence, al-
though there is no emphasis on how the varaa-division came to be, it
nevertheless is pointed out that the caste-classification is not really
created by the divine will, but by the distribution of merit according to the
law of karma. The commentators (e.g. Sndhara) note that since the ia-
equalities were not created by God but by the law of karma which God
only administered, the so-called problem of evil is somehow averted.
Chapter 2, 31-7: Here Lord Krsna tells Arjuna that it is his duty as a
ksatriya to fight this battle to recover his kingdom. This is the action
prescribed by the ksatriya code of duty. In fact, it is morally binding by
the principle of group-morality. If Arjuna as a ksatriya fails to act in the
prescribed manner, he would be disgraced and condemned by all other
warriors. The ksatriya code is also the 'death before dishonour' code.
The situation is this: As a human being, as a loving member of the royal
family, he feels that the killing of a grandfather and other relatives is bad;
but as a ksatriya he is told that it is his sacred duty to fight and kill—a
classic case of moral conflict, which tends to inspire moral scepticism.
Chapter 3, 35: It emphasizes again that one must follow one's own
dharma, duties prescribed by the code, even when performance of such
duties could be faulty or devoid of any merit. The expression svadharma
(the key expression in all such contexts) is intriguing, for it is also inter-
changeable with svabhäva, 'own nature'or simply 'nature'. 8 Thus it may
be read as the advice to follow one's own nature, natural inclination, in
choosing the course of action. One should try always to be one's own
self, not somebody else. Arjuna was by nature a warrior, not a forgiving,
self-sacrificing recluse. Hence, Krsna seemed to be saying, Arjuna's
sudden decision to turn back and run away from the battlefield to be a re-
cluse (cf. bhaiksyam aplha loke, Arjuna's pious wish: I would rather be
a mendicant) would be acting against his nature. That is, against the grid
of a natural warrior, a ksatriya, who always fights for his honour. Thus
Arjuna's own dharma at this stage is just to fight as best as he can. It
would be doing what he can do best and to do otherwise would be danger-
ous and fatal (cf. bhayävaha).
 Caste, Karma and the Glta / 141
Chapter 18, 41-8: Lord Krsna says that the four varnas {brahman,
ksatriya, vaisya and südra) have their duties assigned to them according
to the 'qualities' arising from their 'own-natures'. Samkara, in his com-
mentary on verse 41, introduces, as he does on many other occasions, the
three Sämkhya gunas: sattva, rajas and tamas. The first is connected
with anything that is good and pious. The second is connected with acti-
vity: the dynamic qualities, drive, passion and so on which are not always
good, but not bad either. They are, however, much needed for a life of ac-
tion. The third is connected with ignorance, darkness, confusion, the
non-intelligent, mechanical labour and so on Samkara connects the ori-
gin of the bmhmans with sattva; the ksatriyas with rajas mixed with
tamas; and the südras with tamas mixed with a bit of rajas. This is a neat
classification which acknowledges the different natures (svabhäva) we
witness in various human beings.9 But it does not explain the origin of
this variety. Both Rämänuja and Samkara add another crucial comment
here. According to them, one's caste or birth is predetermined by one's
former lives, that is former karma. This seems to be an acceptable ration-
alization of the prevalent caste-hierarchy. Your previous karma (in
former lives) is responsible for what you are today (what status in the
hierarchy you have).
This type of rationalization was enough to fire the imagination of Max
Weber, who even quoted from the Communist Manifesto to show how
much more acceptable the caste-d/zarma system would become:
'... They (the proletariat) have nothing to lose but their chains, they have a world
to win', the same holds for the pious Hindu of low caste, he too can gain Heaven
and become a god—only not in this life, but in the life of the future after rebirth
into the same world pattern (p. 122).

Verses 42-4 give four lists of virtues and assign them to the four
varnas respectively. Thus calmness, self-restraint, ascetic practice, pur-
ity, tolerance, uprightness, wisdom, knowledge and faith—all constitute
brähman-hood. High courage, ardour, endurance, skill, not turning back
on the battlefield, charity, majesty—all these constitute ksatriya-hood.
Cultivation, cattle-rearing, trade—these are the constitutive properties
of vaisy a-hood. Finally, service to others is what makes a südra a südra.

Ill
To list the constitutive properties of brähman-hood etc., was in fact a
significant development. For if we depend upon the constitutive properties
142 / Philosophy, Culture and Religion
to assign hierarchical status, lower or higher, then birth or family (i.e.,
heredity) becomes immaterial for such status distinction. I shall conclude
after relating a relevant story from another part of the Mahäbhärata.
In the Vanaparvan, Yudhisthira, the Dharmaräja, had an encounter
with a huge python, who was in fact King Nahusa, one of the forefathers
of Yudhisthira. Nahusa, through his good deeds and piety, obtained as
his reward the throne of Heaven, but then his downfall started. For he be-
came too proud and forgot the distinction between dharma and a-dharma.
He kicked at the head of sage Agastya and was cursed, which turned him
into a python for thousands of years. He had been waiting, in the form of
the python, for a long time to be saved by pious Yudhisthira through a
discourse on dharma. So he one day got hold of Bhima and was about to
crush him when Yudhisthira appeared in search of his brother. The fabu-
lous power of Bhima, who used to kill almost endless numbers of de-
mons, elephants, pythons, and so on was of no avail. Nahusa was more
powerful for he had a noble mission—a discourse on dharma. Nahusa
said to Yudhisthira, 'I will let your brother go, if you answer my questions
on dharma.' So the discourse started. The first question was: What
makes a brahman a brahman? Yudhisthira listed a number of virtues:
truthfulness, generosity, forgiveness, goodness, kindness, self-control
and compassion—all these qualities together constitute a brahman. The
list is not very different from the one found in the Gltä, chapter 18, verse
42. The python asked, 'But this goes against the principle of four varnas.
For even a südra may have all these virtues. Virtues cannot be the mono-
poly of any caste.' Yudhisthira replied in unambiguous language, 'Indeed,
if a südra is characterized by all these virtues, he is to be "defined"
(cf. laksya) as a brahman. And if a brahman lacks them then he is to be
regarded as a südra.' The python asked again, 'But if brähman-hood is
constituted by a number of virtues, then birth (in a brahman family)
would be in vain, where such virtues are conspicuous by their absence.'
Yudhisthira replies, 'Indeed. Since through sexual urge iräga) people
copulate and produce children (and copulation is not always between
husband and wife of the same caste), birth is always a dubious criterion
in such matters. Therefore, the old sages depend upon good conduct
{silo) as the indicator of a better person. Even one who is a brahman by
birth would be a südra through poor and despicable conduct.' Yudhisthira
even referred to the 'self-originating' Manu as his authority.10
I believe this reflects the presence of what I call the 'internal criticism'
within the tradition about the prevalence of the heredity-based caste hier-
archy. Hence, if one portion of a whole text is to be treated as a comment-
ary on another portion, then this discourse on caste may be regarded as
 Caste, Karma and the Gita / 143
a commentary on the remarks on caste in the Gltä, chapter 4, verse 13,
or chapter 18, verses 41-8. In the light of the above remarks a comment
such as guna-karma-vibhägasah (in accordance with the division of
'qualities' and actions) is to be regarded more as a criticism of the exist-
ing heredity-bound caste system, than an assertion of an already existing
practice. But Weber's commendation of the caste-karma order was a bit
premature. The undercurrent of rationality in the tradition no doubt inter-
preted the karma doctrine in such a way as to make it adjustable to the
heredity-bound caste-hegemony. But then we are back with the same old
quandary. If one's responsibility extends not only to what one does in this
life but also to what one is supposed to have done in one's many (hypo-
thetically construed) former lives, then the thin thread of rationality that
presumably tied karma to the heredity-bound caste hierarchy becomes
too elusive to allow freedom and autonomy. And, paradoxically, karma
becomes almost synonymous with Fate or Destiny.
It may be argued that my interpretation of these passages of the Gltä
is only an intepretation, a novel or modern one. But that is all we can do
with a text like the Gltä. The multivalent character of this text (or scrip-
tural texts in general) is wellknown and welldocumented.111 believe the
history of the ever changing social and religious ethos of Indian society
is to be gleaned from the enormous body of the textual material we have
at our disposal. Very broadly speaking, hierarchical society was heredity-
bound from time immemorial, which was found unsatisfactory because
of its 'irrational' nature. The karma doctrine was reinterpreted to rationalize
it. My point is also very general. There existed (and I believe, still exists)
an internal critique of this within the tradition itself. And this was based
upon what I must call a form of rationality not very different from what
we call rationality today. This form of rationality came into conflict with
the form of relativism which the caste-relative set of d/iarma-prescriptions
encourages.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. It is difficult to translate 'daiva' in English. In the Indian tradition it is usually

opposed to purusakära, which means what humans can achieve by their own
effort. A parallel, though not quite the same, distinction in the West is be-
tween freedom of will and determinism. I believe 'The Book of Fate' cap-
tures essentially the core sense of the word in the context.
2. 'Paurusa' is derived from 'purusa' = 'man'; hence, heroism, prowess, ach-
ievements, etc., could be indicated by the same form.
3. Ardener(1975).
144 / Philosophy, Culture and Religion
4. A curious anecdote: Once a colleague of mine in Oxford used the expression
' a Vaisnava text' to describe the manuscript of the Gitä which was on display
at Bodleian Library Manuscript Display Room. It was an exhibition of the
Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bodleian. But an Indian who came to Oxford to
see the exhibition was upset because he was an Advaitin (not a Vaisnava)
and still regarded the Gitä as one of his scriptures. He complained. But of
course, my colleague did not want to change the description just to please
him. For Western Indologists have for a long time identified the Gitä as a
Vaisnava text; it makes categorization easier.
5. Hare (1981).
6. Weber (1958), p. 121.
7. Heesterman(1985),p. 195.
8. Sva-dharma: On this Heesterman writes, 'it is better to perform the duties of
one's own caste, one's svadhanna, indifferently than those of others with
outstanding distinction' (p. 196). This clearly identifies svadharma with
one's caste-duty. Though this is the general understanding of the term, I be-
lieve it misses at least one subtlety: lsvd* refers to the person himself or
herself. Besides, if the division of castes is according to natures of human
beings, then what is proper for one's own caste is also proper for one's own
self or nature. I believe sva-dharma can be interpreted in the second way on
several occasions, without emphasizing the caste-bound duties. Manu also
refers to 'svasya capriyam1 (verse II/2) as well as to 'ätmanas tustireva cay
(verse II/6), as one of the authorities on dharma, over and above the Vedas,
etc.
9. Indian society was pluralistic and hence we find ready acceptance of multi-
ple interpretations of the textual tradition. That the Gitä has a multivalent
character is today well recognized by even the most devout Hindu. See also
Sharma (1986), pp. 248-52.
10. It may be that what Yudhisthira was made to say here was against the pre-
valent and dominant views of the society. It is undoubtedly a form of social
criticism to ridicule the hereditary nature of the social hierarchy. Hence it
seems to me that an authority, like that of a Svayambhu Manu, was needed
to combat the authority of other dharmasästrakäras.
11. Sharma (1986), p. 252.

Ardener, Shirley (1975), editor, Perceiving Women, London: Malaby Press.

Hare, R.M. (1981), Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heesterman, J.C. (1985), The Inner Conflict of Tradition, Chicago: University of
Chicago.
Sharma, Arvind (1986), The Hindu Gitä: Ancient and Classical Interpretations
of the Bhagavadgitä, La Salle: Open Court.
Weber, Max (1958), The Religion of India, New York: Free Press.