THEGERMAN

GENERALSTALK
B.H.Liddell Hort
Stortling revelotions from Hitler's high commond

c^-.-!r i

57 Ccd:rr'rest Rd.
Crnton, MA 02021
 T-
-f{6,ty
t-r
A{*,e6
(ruq. e)
THE
GERMAN
GENERALS
TALK-
 BY THE SAIUE AUTHOR:

REPTITATIONS TEN YEARS AFTER

SHERIVIAI{, GENruS OF CwIL WAR

WAR IN OTITLINE 191+1918
 .."f-*-"-'*
.

;8fl,,2 1

/.---

THE
G ERMAN
GENERALS
TAL K I'
B. TT. LIDDELL HART

Z
^v
/euttt
NEW YORK 1979
It is the policy of William Morrow and Company, Inc., and its imprints and affil-
iates, recognizing the importance of preserving what has been written, to print
the books we publish on acid-free paper, and we exert our best efforts to that
end.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, re-
cording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the Publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to Permissions Depart-
ment, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1350 Avenue of the Americas, New
York, N.Y. 10019.

Copyright 1948 by B. H. Liddell Hart

Copyright renewed L975 by Kathleen Liddell Hart

Printed in the United States of America

 Lg
n ho*4,^/-t h{oa.a,^y
t 4,w\ffrTb ,

UMW
To my son, Adrian,
and to all who helped in this efiort
to bc of service to history

$
6.
I,\
itn
)\!
Itt-
.\
\
\
CONTENTS

PREFACB t:

PART I-HITLER'S GENERAIS

I THE STIICIDAL SCHISM 3

II. THE MOT'LD OF SEECTT IO
II[. TITE BLOIilBERG-FRITSCH BRA n
ry. THE BRAUCHITSCH.HALDER ERA 3r
v. ..SOLDIER
IN THB ST'N"-ROMMEL 45
vL SOTDIERS IN TIIE SHADOV J5
vlr. ..THE OtD GUARD'-RI'NDSTEDT
T

PART II-PREUMINARIFS TO WAR

VIU. HITIER
THE RISE oF 8T

DI THB RISE oF ARMoT,R 9

vII
 uu CONIENTIT

PART III-THROUGH GERMAN EYES

X. Ho\r HITLER BEAT ERAI{cE-

AND SAYED BRITAIN r05
XL THE END IN FRANcE
AND THE FIRST ERUSTRATION rg7
)trI. MISFIRES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN t54
XIII. FRUSTRATIoN AT Mosco\T l.66
XIV. FRUSTRATToN IN TI{E cAUcASUS
AND AT STAI.INGRAD r88
X\I. AFTER STALINGRAD 2to
XVI. THE RED ARJVTY zn
)ffII. PARALY$SIN NoRMANDY 27
X\NIL THE ANTI-HITLER PLoT-
AS SEEN FROM nQ. N THE VEST 259
XD(. HITLER's tAsT GAMBLE-
TIIE SECOND ARDENMS STROKE 272
)OI HITTER-
AS A YOI'NG GENERAL SA\T HIM 44
CONCLUSION 29
TABLE OF IHB GERMAN HIGH COMMAND 30r
INDH( 303
!vIAPS

TI{E ITESTERN FRONT, r94o r39

THE MEDITERRANEAN tli
THE EASTERN FRONT 173
THE \TESTERN FRONT, 1944.4' 247
 PREFACE

\vrrEl,I IIrB WAR EIIDED, r \rAS FORTUNAIE rN HAVTNG AI\r

W carly oppornrnity of exploring the inside of *the enemy
camp"-to 6nd out what had gone otr behind thc opposing
fronq and in the opponent's mind. Some work I was doing for
official quarters brought me in contact with the German gen-
erals and admirds over a l*gthy period. In the course of
many discussions with them I was able to gather their evidcnce
on the evcnts of the war before memories had begun to fade
or become incrcasingly coloured by after-thoughts. It brought
light many sccrets of the C'erman command and its work
.to
ms.
Understanding of what happcned was helped by sttrdying
the German generds, as well as hearing their accounts. Few
of them resembled the typical piaure of an iron "Prussia["
soldier. Rundstedt came nearcst it, but in his case the impres.
sion was offset by his natural courtesy and light touctr of hu-
mour. His quiet digorty in adversity and uncomplaining ac-
ceptance of hard conditionrthat were no credit to his captorc

-won the respect of most British officers who encountered

him" In contrast to him were a number of aggressive young
gFneral$ blustering and boorisb who owed their rise to Nazi
favour. But the maiority wcre of a different type to bodr, and
IX
 X PREFACB

by no Eeans a dominating otre. Many would harrc lookcd in

their naturd place at any confcrcoce of bank Eanagcss G
civil enginecrs.
They-wcre essentially tec.hnicians, intent on their Prder.
sional job, and with little idea of thingr outside it It is easy
to sce how Hitlcr hoodwinked and handled thcm, and fond
them good instnrmcnts up to a point
In sifting and piecing togetha their erridencc it was usdul
to havc a background knowledge of thc miliary sinration in
tlc prc-war paiod. It was a guidc not only in saving timetrt
in avoiding misconceptions that wcre still wid'Jy prwdcot
at thc cnd of the wat
Betwcen the wars, my work as a miliary correspondent rc.
quird me to keep a watchful eye on developments in Europg
and I dways sought to keep touch withthe trends in Ccrmanp
This task was eased, directly and indirectly, by the cxtctrt to
whictr my own military books were read in Gcrmany,-sooc
of thc leading soldiers themsclves undertaking the uanslation
Thc warnings I gave about the Nazi meftrce, and the etr!'
-in
phatic line I imk opposing thc qolicy of-'hp1rcasemeot"
biU Uc known to Eost of those who, in America as well as in
I
Europc, followcd Ey pre-war *itingt. pointed out +c
omidous signs eren before Hitler came into Power. At ,h9
samc time it was evidcnt to me that the German Crenerd SAff
had little influencc with Hitlcr compared with what it had
cxerciscd in the Kaiscr's timg and that it tendcd to bc morc
of a brake upon his aggresivc plans than an impcnulo them.
But the idea that thc General Stafi had playcd a dominant
part itr C'ermany's aggressive course, as it did,before-r9r&$I
ioloured the prLsecu-tion proceedings at the Nurembcrg trial
Earlier, that fixed idca had hindered the British and American
governments from giving timcly and effcaive enPur€emgj
[o the undcrgroundmovement in Gcrmany which, with Eilt
ury backing, had long been planning Hitler's overthrorr. That
still prevailing conception of the Gcneral Staffs infucncc on
po[t wat a Ioog outof-date notioo. But legen& are pcrsist'
 PNEFACB T
ent, and dclusions tenacious. They had the unfornrnate cfiect
of postponing Hitler's downfalt and prolonging thc war
monthg and probably years, after it would o-thcrwise have
cnded. The ilkonsequenccs for Europe are now hginning to
bc rcalised.
I would likc to ac"knowledge my indebtedness to the hctp
and historical sense of those who ficilitated the carly explori-
tigq of Also, to Capt{n F. S. Kingston, whose.ir*ry
_wcnts.
of
$c GryT lqgr.g. and intuitive teahwork were of great
asisance in the discussions. At thc sams tims I would er[rcss
pl.anfrcgiation of the ready help given by so Erany of thosc
in the-other- cam-p in contributing to this'piecc of'historical
researctr, and of df,c objective attitide .ort of them showed in

$*s-r3q evenq. Finally, I wish to thank lvlajor-General Sir

Percy Hobart, Chestcr Wilnot, G. R. Atkinsonand Desmond
Flower for vduable comments and suggestions whilc the book
was io
B. H. Lmru.I{rrr
PART I
HITLER'S GENERALS
 I
THE SUICIDAL SCHISM

r'lvERYmrNG rN WArLd)rS DIFBBnENT ATTITBTTMB 3totf, WHAI

.E it bols in thc clearcr lighi th4 comes aftcr thc war.
Nrrhl"t foot" * aigo*t or-O. form of the lcadcn The
p,rblil picturc of thcm at the time ir rct only an unrcal one,
but ctranges with thc tide of succcss.
Beforc the war, and still more druing the conquest of the
Wat, Hider cemc to appear a ggantic figloq combining thc
stratcgy of a Napolcon with thc ctrnning of a }vlaciiavdli and
the fanatical fcrvour of a Mahomet AIt{?r hil 6rst &o& iD
Russia, his figure hgur to shrin\ and towards the eod he
was rcgardcd as a bltrndaing aoateur in the niliary 6dd,
whorc crazy orders and crass-ignorancc had bceo the-Nlics'
grcatest asct All the disastcrs of the Gcrman Army werc st-
tributcd to Hitler; dl its succcsscs werc creditd to the Gcrnan
General SaI[.
That picnrc is not true, though there is somc tnrth in ia
Hider was far from bcing a stupid stratcgisL Rathcr, he war
too brilliant-and silfcred from thc Daturd faults that tcnd to
accompany such brilliance.
He had a dccply subtlc sensc of suqprise, and war a Eastcr
of the psyctrological side of strategy, whictr he raiscd ro a Dcw
pitch. Long hforc the war hc had describcd to hb asociatcl
3
 4 TrrB GERTIAN GENERer.s TAr.a-

how the daring coup that captured Norway might bc car- ricd
out, and how-the French could be maneuwed out of the
Maginot Line. He had dso seen, better than any general,
how the bloodlcss conquests that preceded the wa.- might bc
achieved by undermining resistance hforehand. No stratcgist
in history has been mori clever in playing on thc minds of
his opponent*which is the supremc art of strategy.
It wis the very fact that he had so often proved right, con-
trary to the opinion of his professional advisers, which hclped
hirn f6 gain influcnce at their exPensc. Those rcsults wcakcned
thcir arguments in later situations which they gaugcd more
corrcctly. For in the Russian campaign his defccts becamc
morc potent than h gfo; and the debit bdance accumularcd
to thcpoint of bankruptcy. Even so, it has to be remcmbercd
that Napoleon, who was a professional strategist, had been iust
as badly dazdedby hit own success, and made the same fatal
mistakes in the samc place.
Hitler's wonrt fault here was'the way he refused to "cut his
loes' and insisted on pressing the attack when the chanccs of
success were fading. But that was thc very fault which had
bccn most conspicuous in Foch and tlaig, the Allicd com'
manders of the last war, as well as in Hindenburg and Luden
dorfl who then held the German Supreme Command. All
these had been professional soldiers. Hider also did mud to
producc the German armies' collapsc in Francc by hit reluc'
tance to sanction any timely withdnwal. But, hcre again, his
attitudc was exactly the same as that of Foch. The vial dilfer.
cnce was that in r9r8 the commanders on the sPot did not
obey Foch more than they deemed wise, whereas in ry44-45
the German generals were afraid to disobey Hider's ordem.
It is the cause of that fcar, and the internal conflia in the
High Command that wc have to probe in order to find thc
red explanation why the German plans miscarried. Hitler'r
strategic innrition and the General Stafi's suategic calculation
might have been an dl-conquering combination. Instead, they
 TIIB SUTCIDAL SCHUIM 5
produced a suicidd schism that becamc the salvation of thcir
oPPonents.
The older school of generals, products of thc General Stafi
system, had bcen the chid cxecut4nts of German strategy
tbroughout the war, but in the days of success their part had
not received full recognition. After the tide nrned they filled
an increasing part in the public picture, and came to be rc-
gerdcd by the Allied pcoples as the really formidable element
on the opposing sidc. During the last year the spotlight was
lrrg.ly focuscd on Rundstedt, their leading representative
The constant question became, not what Hitler would do, but
what Rundstedt would drboth in the -iliary field and in a
political coup to wrest lrcwcr from the Nazis.
The Gcrman generals have been regarded as suctr a closcly-
knit body, and so much of one min4 a$ to be capable of widd-
ing tremendous political po\rcr. That impression accounts for
the persistent expectation, on the Allies' side, that the generals
would overthrow Hider--an expectation that was never fuI-
filled.It dso accounts for thc popular conviction that they wcre
as grcat a menacc as he was, and shared the rcsponsibility for
Gcrmany's aggressions. That picnre was true of the last war,
but was no\r out of datc. The Crerman generds had littlc efiect
on the start of the Second World War-cxcep as an inefieo
tual brake
Once the war had starte4 thcir executive efficiency con-
tributed a lot to Hider's success, but their actricvement was
ovcrshadowed by his triumph. rffhen they came into more
promincnce in the eycs of the outside world, as Hitler's star
waned they had bccome more impotent inside their own
country.
That was due to a combination of factors. They stood for a
conservative ordcr and tradition which had litde appeal to a
generation brought up in the revolutionary spirit and-fanatical
faith of Natiooal Socidism.They could not counton the toydty
of theil o\rn troops in *y move against the rdgime-ani
especially ie faith-inspiring Ftihrcr. They were handicapped
 6 TrrB GERMAN GBNEBAIs rAr,r-
by the way thcy had isolated themsclves from public afiairc,
and by thc way Hitler cunningly isolated them from sourccg
of knowlcdge. Another factor was their ingrained discipline
aad profound sensc of thc importance of thc oath of loy"lty
which thcy had sworn to the Head of the Sate. Ludicrous as
this 61y scem in rcgprd to one who was himself so outstand-
iog * a promise-breakcr, it was a genuine fccling on thcir
parq aod the most hononrable of the factors which hampercd
thcm" But along with it often ran a scnse of personal intcrest
which undercut their loydty to thcir fellows, and their
tt's b.rt intercstg in facc of a common threat Thc play of
individud ambitions aod the cleavage of personal intcrcsts
constinrrcd a faal weaknes in their prolongpd strugglc to
Eahtain their profesional claim in the -ilit.ty ficld, and to
preserve it from outside intcrfercnce. This struggle wetrt on
throughout the trrelve years from Hitler's risc to Gcrmany'g
fall.
fhe in a dcfinite to the

HiiE[ Icars so

It is@thc latter designcd to

ovcrthrow Hitler, but there is no doubt that they werc aspiring
to 6ll a big place in thc military systcm. Oncc thcy wcrc killcd
Hidcr hcame more dcpendent on the generds'supporg
and the latter werc able to rc+sablish thcir own suprenacy
in the Army.
a dimar in laouarv. roa8. when
the
-fS. In rglS Hitlcr had ciosen General von
-Minista.
BffiE&g as EE War His fellow-generals became
increasingly dishrbed at his susceptibility to Hidcr's influcncg
and wcre then shocked to hear that he was marrying a typist
in his ofice. Ttat dienated thcir sympathies still further. But
Hitlcr gave this *democratic" marriage his blessing and graced
the wcdding. Soon after ig Himmler produced a police dosicr
 IIIB SUICIDAL SCHISM

prqporting to show that the bride was a prostitute. Ttercupon

Hitlcr, in rcal or simulated firy, dis-Lscd Blomberg dom
office. Himmler followcd this upby producing another-dosier
in whi& homoscxual cherges Ha Uen febdeeejl ap1:ainst
Gcncral von Fritsch, thc Commander-in€hid of Oe io-*
whcrcupon he in tunr was rcmoved from his post by I{id;;
-and ncvcr reinsated, though s'bscqucntly ,ird."tld after
(A fuller-account 6r ad crisis is given in
atrffi"rliii*
Sdf cxploircd thcthemoral shoc& that thc o6ccrs, coqps had
Mqd.bt tlog oppornrnity to assume supreme @E-
mand of thc Crerman armod forcig this
Eyqmetl f"t'"t ft-'.Sp^@
ir nurn "firtlEur!^r GcncralKitel, w:ffi6e wuc.
wcaLencd the united front of thc gencrals
senerals in
p.rltgrt against Frits,fi'g trqltEert, was appointcd to
rucccedd Blombcrg but with a lower status, and hencdon[
onlykept thatplacc by subscrvience to Hitlcr. A.or.,.p.rabL
coldier, Gcncml von Brauchitschn who hlonged neithd to the
rcactionary nor the Nazi school, was made h-ead of the Armv.
gyqf t*ra.*.pl Hidcr eought to placate the Army, rnii.
asnt'ng himsdf of an crccutive commandcr who wbuld bc
casier to handlc then Fritsch"
y.Brauchitsch, lowwcr, made a stronger olly io defcnce of
the professional class than had been cx-pat d.'He aLo;sht
t9 doy d^o* the pace of Nazi foreigi p"li.y by a warnlng
that thc German Ai-y was not ready"foiwar-e th"t lritL;
Eust not push his aggressivc moyo' sd ar as to produce a fisht
He was stiffened in his protesr by the chicf of oe ccnlral
Stafi, Gencrd Bcd(, who came ort witn s'c.h opcn corrd.mna-
tion of Hider's warlikc policy .s to spur Iriu.r to dismiss
him, Even thcn, Braucf,itsch'and ffafder, Bcclr,s a*;r,or,
nade a stand when
IT,tg looted like proceeding to .*t r...i
ageinst czcchoslovakia, but the-ground was cut.:way leneath
their fect whcn the Frcnc.h aod-British Govcrnmcrits
to Hitlcr's thrcat of war.
b";J
 8 rrrr GEBMAN GENEnATs rAr.r-
With the added prestige of his bloodless conquest of Czecho-
Slovakia Hider was able to force the pace over Polaod. The
generals were litde check on him here hyond helping to con-
vince him that no risk of war on that issue must b€ taken
unless he fust secured Russia's treutrality. On the other hand,
once he had done that, he was able to lrcrsuade most of them
that Briain and France would stand aside, and that a suoke
against Polandbwould carry no serious risk'bf involving Crer-
matry in a major war.
A fresh strain developed berreen Hitler and his generals
when, after the conquest of Poland they found that he was
intent on precipitating the wider confict they feared by taking
the offensive in the West Aprrt from the long-tcrm risks,
they did not believe that it was even possible to overcome
France. But once again their protests were overrulcd, and their
subsequent talk of a concerted move to overturn Hider camc
to nothing. It would bc unjust to blame them for their in-
cfiectiveness at this stage, for it is clear that they had good
reason to doubt whether their troops would have followed
them in nrning against Hider, and they had a natural rcpug!
trance to appearing as traitors to their country whcn at war.
The invasion of France was ordered by Hider in face of
their doubts. Its success was due partly to new actics and
weapons which he had fostered when the older generals were
still conservatively sceptical; partly to an audacious ncw plan,
suggested by a junior, which he had pushed them into adopt-
ing; partly to blunders by their fellow-profesionals in France
on which they had not reckoned.
Nevertheless, their executive skill was an indispensable factor
in Hitler's conquest of France. Indeed, it was throogh his sud-
den and strange hesitation, not through theirs, that the full
fruits of the swift cut tbrough to the Channel were not reaped.
But their great contribution to victory resultd, ugig[y, in
a further weakening of their own position. It was Hitler who
filled the world's eye after that uiumph, and the laurcl!
crowncd his brow, nlt theirs.$e took caie to crown nimsctfi ;i
 IIIB ST'ICIDAL SC:HISM 9
In his min4 too, he qqr became convinced that he was the
of dl
* , whileE even
to listen from them ran

Most of them were fearful when they found that he was in-
tending go plunge into Russia" But, like io many spccialistg they
were rather narve outside their own spherer-and Hitler wai
ablc to overcome their doube about his Russian adventure with
the aid of political "information" designed to convince them
of its neccssity, and that Russia's interna,[ weakness would affect
fisr mititary streogth. Elgg-thgjggu!
itsch and Haldcr to
come too close to Moscow to resist its He
on pressing at all @st, were fad-
T-S: Yh:"Ifo
failure could no longer-be concealed he cleverly
shifted the blame by a public dismisial of Brauchitsch, and hirn-
self assumed suoreme command of the fu-y
assumedsupreme Armv as rncll as
^f tha
ns well ac of the
forces as a wholc.
For the rest of the war, he was able to brush aside the sen-
crals'views o! policy, and even to override their judgm.ri't in
their oum field.If one of them made a protest he iouft dwavs
find another one ambitious to 6ll thdvacancy, and ready io
qlpress
f.i h T continued attacl-as most soldie$ are, Ui i*
stinct, dwals inclingd . dp.i$ 9. *. time, the *i*n *
qow open for ever increasing-infiltration of S.S. leaderl into
the ArmyrJand of Nazi spieJ to keep watch on all suspected
command-ers. The possibility of a srrccessful revolt of thi gco-
erals progresively diminis[ed. All the latter could do wa-s to
make the best of their orders--or to make the worst of them.
For therc is reason to suspect that some of the generals became
ready to carry out orders that they considered-hopelessly rash,
slmdf.as3lry of sabotaging Hider's designs aia hslcning
ttre end of ttrc war.
 II
THE MOT]LD OF SEECKT

GERMAN GENERAL WHO HAI' TIIE GREATEST INFLT'ENCB ON

'TIHE O. First World rffar died the year before it bcgan<nd
+t
sihad retircd seven yea$ before it. This was Alfred von
,# *Uti.S*, who."-. fro- Mccklenburg on the Bdtic coasc
fl was hc who designed the mastcr-plan for the invasion of
t FIt *.g prepared thc "tinopcnerC' 1o picrcc thc- fortrcss bar-
ricr, and trained the safl to handlc thcm" That plan cmbraccd
the violatioo of Belgium's ncutrality-for th9 sake of outflank'
ing France+nd tfirs Urougk Britain into thc war. Althorgh
its-cxccrrtion wan bungled by Sc.hliefien's successor, it camc
dangerously close to winning thc war within a month.
Tf,e Gcriran general who had thc grcatcst infuencc on the
&cond \Iforld War dicd three years before the war-and re'
tired ten ycars earlier still. This was Hans von Sceckt, who
came froir Schlesrig-Holstein, thc land betrreen Mcc"Llen'
..Y bure aod Denmark.-Hc was the man who contrived to re'
an efiective German At-y after the last war, and laid
'-;*f buift
the foundations on whi& a muC[ greater strucfirre could arise.

{f; His
plans had to be designed and carried out under the cx-
to.-lty hampering condif,ons of the victors' 1rcace scttlement
designed to frustrate any serious rebuilding of thc
-itseli
Gcrman Ariy. Those restrictions makc his performance the
IO
 IIIB MOI'I.D OD SEECB.T

more signiEcant Most of the achievcments of the Wchrmac$t,

espccidly in the victorious early phase of this w"r, w.re casi
in Sccckt's mould. ttr&rcrjailurs-Ecrc foreshadovred in hi!

. No:._nempt
* be
to:lss6s Hider's generals in the Second World
Itr* of adoqrnrc vdue unlcs it fust assessctr the infu.
/ence of Sccclt-o important for the funre was the rcconstrue
tion period of the Gcrman Army. tlaving trcatcd it at lcnstb"
thc individual treament of the-military-lcaders who rqd to
fame in ry3y4j can be corrcspondinglf condcnsed. For here
we have a baclground common to al[ lnd can sce the mould
in which their docuine was casu Naturally, there wcrc dif-
fcrences of but these were liss imporant than
-inteqpraation,
rrrr broad
the rounoarlon that
rrr<xttr foundation urat had
nao been
Dcen built
Drult up erlrcrh
atrcsh in rhe
the
days whg thc Stalf, banncd by the Virsailtes Trcaty,
Qgncral
was workiqg underground
See&g then a licutenant+oloncl, had hgun the r9r4-r8
wiu ils ctrid of stalt of a coqps in Kluc&'s FirsiArmy, and thru
had a close view of the steps by which a mastcrly dtign wcnt
wrong in the exeortion, and decisivc victory wai forfelted iust
as it appeared within rcach. Seec.kt made his own mark ,i*
later, u-r rgrj-, :ls the cool_brain that guidcd a dashing Hd,rar
gener-d, the bca* sabrcsr Field-I{arsf,al von Mackensir, in tte
gaalf break-through at Ciorlice in Poland which split the
Russian armics-+ stroke from which they nevcr full| rccov-
erod. It was hcre that Seeclt introduced a method oi atac.k
that conained the germ-of modern infiltration taaics-push-
ing in resewc at the *ft qpots, and thrusting on as decp as
possible, instcad of the former method of trilns to advince
uniformly aad using the rescrves to breaL dodL the tough
8poB.
Seec&t not only made his mark but also his n ma For the
concealed brain behhd lvlaclensen bccame known more and
Tr* w1*ry, so
$rt-the saying spread through the German
4*f'TAg" Itlackensen is,- Seecet is; wlere Seee&t ir,
victory is." He continued to play an imporant pan in thi
 12 TTIE GERMAN GENER,AIS TAI,T-

Eastern campaign, but it was his misfornrne to tre oueide of,

and unpopular with, the Hindenburg-Ludendorfi ring whi&
acquired supreme control of the German fu-y from 1916 to
thC end of the war. That, however, saved his rePutation from
b"irg involved in the final collapse in the Wesg and he be.
came adviser to the German delegation at the Peace Con-
ference. From this it was a natural step for him to become
Commander-in-Chid of the Reictrswehr, the small army of
roo,ooo oficers and men to which Germany was restricted
under the terms of peace.
It was even more natural that he should have dedicated him-
sclf to the task of stretching these bon& and preparing thc
way for Gcrmany to regaio fisr military strength+s any sol-
dier of any country would have done in similar circumstances.
As a guide, he had the example of how Scharnhorst had
managed to evade the disarmament of the Prussian Army that
Francc had imposed after 1806, and had built up a camou-
fl"gFd army that turned the tablcs on Napoleon seven years
later. But Sceckt and his pupils in some ways improved on
Scharnhorst's process, under more difficult conditions.
The fust obstacle that Seec,kt had to overcome was the
narural mistrust of the leaders of the new Republic for the
military caste that had treated civilians with disdain, and then
led the nation to a crushing defeat Here Seec"kt was helped
by th. imprcssion that his polished mannet diplomatic tacg
and apparent understanding of their problems made upon
mcn who had been accustomed to the domineering brusque-
ness of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Seeckt w:rs a pleasing
contrast to the browbeating Prussian generd of whom they
had biuer experience. His elegance, artistic interests, and
knowledge of the world added a subde flavonr to the self-
contained personality that had gained him the ni&name of
the *Sphinx." While his somewhat cynical attitude and
ironical comments had been distasteful in higher miliury
circleg they appealed to the politicians as evidence of a lac&
 TIIB MOI'LD OP SEECKT 13
of fanaticism, and an assurance that he btcnded .ilit ry
ciency with modcration in miliaris,m. "6-
&cckt kept the army $ a whole out of politio, and bv his
apparent loyaly qo thengy republican r€gihe .t * r*lirrj
time, he was tte better able tocloak tis iilitarv development
sch.mes, as well as the hdf-veiled poritical actiiities i.';hi.h
numerous oficers of the oldcr schooi indulged. so far ,r o.rt
d
iorf.rlr allorned he ensured that the cadre! of the n* na.U"
yelr shguld repr€scnt the pick of the oficers and N.C.O.s who
had undergone the tcst of war. He aimed to make this small
force of 4ooo oftcers and t'poo rnen a corps of qualified in-
stnrctors and leaders, capable of serving .s th. ro-.*o* iot
rapid qpansiorwher this- might 8.o.. po"iil.. fh.i,
Fl*g wp dgye]oped to a higfpitch and oi,r., lino,,o
ttrat they should become more intensely profesional in soirit
and sLill than the unlimited army of thl
-'---
iast had been-
He supplemented this framewbrk with a variety of under-
grround s&emes by which officers could gain widei.r*i*..
thal was practicable in an army compul-sorily deprived of the
parol modern -weapons, and by wliA .*-om.L, could be
kept gcfting rusty. Ivlany sraff oficers and technicians
-trom
tguo<I. temporary employment in |apan, China, the South
American countries, the Bdtic state-s and soviet Russia-
I1*. *l -uq have some practical experience with-Jnls.
Other o$g*r gined fly*g experience with civil airwavs. A
considerable p-roportion of the demobilized army w*r
to
"bl.
get some continued military practice in unofficialbreanizations
that were nrnning insido Grmany, *a mr"y ;rb,.rd;
w:f *.d-to-preserve extm weapons for thcir triinine.
These devices were testimonf to the ingenuity o?-a
keen

".*Z* oir.*i.urill
soldier and hfu asisants in evaiing
They..were also a constant *o.ry" to " the Allied
"m;;;-;;:
sponsible.for."yhq that the peaie terms were fulfilled.
But
lt $ an n$toncal mistake to overate their importance in mdc-
L-ry possible Ger-many's renewed b,rst of aggression.
cfrect w:ur very sright, compared with the weight
m.iot l
that Germany
 14 1II8 GERMAI{ GENISAI.S TALE-

had to regain bcfore shc could again become a serious dangcr.

Tte bulk- of thc material devclopments that redly mattered
was only actrieved after Hitler had come into porrcrr- io ,g1g
and ladnchcd the large-scale re-armamcnt with which thc
former Allics did not attempt to intcrfcre.
Sceckt's morc red a&icvlment was in starting a uain of
ideas which revitdizcd the Gcrman Army, ftrnod it into a
ncw line of progress, and cnabled it to add a quditativc sr.
-quantitative
pcriority to ihe recovery that the victors' ircrtia
iramittta it to carry ouu He gave the Reic.hswchr a gospcl of
mobility, bascd on the view that a quic.k-moving quic&-hitting
army ol picked troop,s could, under modern conditions, make
ringp round an old-fashioned ru$s army. That vicw was in no
smill measure due to his cxperience on the Eastern Front
wherc the wide spaces had allowed far more room for mr
neuwe than had bccn possible on the Westcrn Front. The
first post-war manuals of the Reidswchr laid down that
"cvery action ought to be based on surprise. Without surPrisc
it would be difiicult to obtain great results." Flexibility was
anothcr keynote-*reserves should, above all, be pushed in to
cxploit where a succcss is gained, even though it bccomcs
necessary, by so doing, to shift the original cenue of gravity."
To promoti such fleiibility the Reichswehr was quick to do
vclop new means of intercommunication, and devoted a larger
proportion of its limitcd strength to this servicc thal any othg
post-war army. It also insistcd on commanders of all grades
bcing further forward than was then the custom, so that they
coulii keep their fingers on the pulse of battle and excrt a
qui&er
-
infuence.
In the exdtation of maneurne, these post-war German
manuds offered a striking contrast with those of the Frcnch
Army, whi& &ew the conclusion that "of the two elcmcnts,
fire and movement, fue is preponderanL'The Fren& doc-
trine obviously visudizcd the repetition io *y future war of
the slow-motion actics of r9r8. That dillerence wat ominou$
But thc Gcrman view was not mercly gwerncd by thc neoqh
 TIIB tlour.D oB sBEctrf t5
sity of malring the most of thcir handicaps under thc pcacc
trcaty. For Sce&t, in his prdacc to the ncw manud, wrote
with remarkablc frankncsp'1lhese regulationr are bascd on
the srengdr, armancnt, and equipment of the army of a Ed.
crtr great nilitary powct, and not *ly * the Gcrman Arny
of roorooo mcn formcd in accordancc with the Peacc Trcaty."
Sec&Cs active work came to an end b rfi, whcn hc made
a elip and was forccd to rcsign following the political srotn
that arosc throogh his action in pcrmiuing the cldcst son of
the German Crown Princc to takc part in the Army ma-
Deuvrcs. Thc limiations of his outlmk-which had appcarcd
broad by comparison with othcr still- morc
dcarly brought out by his subsequcnt vcnnrc into politics, as
a spokesman of the hdf-baked ideas of thc Gcrman Pcoplc's
Party. But the influence of his own military ideas continucd
to gow.
His vision of the future cmerged clcarly from thc booL hc
wrote soon aftcr hc Icft ofrc*Thor.ghrt of a Soldicr (rgzS).
{c therc qucstioncd the vduc of the huge conscrip armics of
the pasg snggesting that thc cfiort aod sacrificc-was dispro
portionarc to their effect, and mcrely led to a slow-grinding
war of exhaustion. 'Iylass hcomes immobile; it cannot ma,
Deuvre and thcrdorc cantrot win viaorics, it can only cnuh
!y $* weighC' I\fiorcovcr, in pacc-time, it was imiroaant
oto
limit as far as posible thc unproduaive retcntion of nalc
labou io.iliary icrvicci'fanricat scicnce and actical sl,ill
wcre the kcys to thc futue. oA conscript Eass, whoc traioing
has been bricf and *p*n.i.f, ir:*[" tJio; h ,h;ffi
scnse of the wor4 if pittcd against a small number of prao
tiscd technicians on the other-sidc." That prcdiction waiful-
fillcd in r94o when a handful of panzct divisions, suiking in
combination with divc,bombers, paralyrcd and pulvcrized-the
ill-cquipped conscript mass of tha Frcicl fumyi,
h-See&t's view, *the opcrating army" sh6uld consist of
'Jrofessionalrlong-tcrm soldicrs, voh:ntcirs as far as possiblc3
The bulk of thc nation's manporf,cr would h batcr i.ptoyod
 t6 THE GERIcAN GENERATS rAr.t-
duriog peece-time in hclping to expand the industry required
to provide the profesional army with .1 amPle equipment-of
uptodate weapons. The typc- of weapons must be setded
we[ in advancg and arrangements for rapid mass production
developed.
At dle same time a brid paiod of compulsory military
training should bc given to all fit young men in thc countryr
"preceded by a uaining of the young, which would lay les
cmphasis on the military side than on a general physical and
menal discipline.' Such a system would help to link the
army with the people, and cnsure national uoity. "In this way
a military mass is constituted whic.h, thoogh unsuited to takg
part h a w:u of movement and se*, a decision in formal
batde, is well able to ful6l the duty of home defence, and at
the same time to provide from its best elements a continuous
reinforcement of the regular, combatant army in the field."
It was a conscript levy ofthis kind which filled the bulk of the
Germany inf*try divisions in r9r4o. They merely followed up
the decisive armoured slrcarheads, and occupied the conquered
regions. Later, as their own training improved, they were avail-
ablc to expand and replenish the striking forces in thc way
that Seeckt had foreseen.
"In brief, the whole funre of warfare appears to me to lie
in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of
high qualrty, and rendered distincdy more effective by the
addition of aircraft, and in the simultaneous mobilization of
the whole forces, either to feed the attack or for home ddence."
Curiously, Seec.kt's book scarcely touc.hed on the subject of
tanks, but dwelt at length on the value of cavalry, as wellas of
motor transport, in the mobile operations he picnred. He cvcn
wrote lyrically that "ttre days of cavalry, if trained equipped
and led on modern lines, are not numberedr" and that "its
Iances may still flaunt their pennants with confidence in the
wind of the future." It has been suggpsted in later years that
Seeckt's neglea of armoured warfare was prompted purely by
political discretion, and that the word 'tank" should bc read
 TIIB MOT'IJ' OT SEECET t7
into his sentences wherevcr he trsed the word "cavdry." Such
a view is contradicted by the undisguised way in dhid he
advocated conscription and aircraft, -both of n;nicn wcre for.
bidden to Germany by the pqlce teffiN.
T* his dlnamism, See*t was a man of his generation,
4
rather than a forenrnncr of the ncxt His militarylision was
d:* po sh to see the..lecesrty of mobile wariare for any
offensive pqpose, but did not ieac.h far cnough to sc" theit
om2uyd-mobfity wq th9 only way to makiit possible. It
was left for othcrs to devclop that p6ssibility+nd aggrcssive
neccssity.
-The
old miliary battlejicnre dso coloured See&ts vision
when he argued that the immediate obiect of the air force's
atta& should be to desuoy the opposins air for.e. The Luft-
wafie did that in Poland, ina to iiesser-extent in France. But
w,hen it tried that way of preparing the invasion of Briain, it

T{*..9.ripp$g loses on mceting for thc fust time, a strong

oetenorng arr torce.
On the wider issucs of war and life his outlook was patchy.
With some truth he contended that direct experience'of tde
horrors of war madc soldiers more chary than
lofitical leadcrs
of becoming involved in a war, but he went fi far in trvins
to slow thcy were rcally'pacifisrc" in the best scnse of OI
word. That characteristic profesionat apologia, familiar io
evcry country, does not find much support in-cascs whcre the
archives of a war-making couotry have been opened to extm-
ination. High soldiers [ave to6 often failed to show that
'pacifism esablished on knowledge and born of a sense of
responsibility" whictr Sceckt claimld for them.
He was rather weak in his argument that ..miliarism, and
'hggression" were merely catdwords. At the same time he
w.as prophetic in his remarks that whenever policy
{hrew$ly
qi.:4 at the acquisition of power, .'the statesman will'sooi
find himself thwarted in some way or other, will deduce from
this opposition a menace first to-his plans, then to nationai
prestigp, and findly to the existence of thc sate itself-and so,
 $ IIIE GEBMAN GBNERAI,s TAI,B-
regFrding his country as the party attacLed, will cngagc in a
war of defcncc."
A scnsc of humanity, as wcll as of prophecy, gleamed
tbrorgh his ironical comment on thc modera psychological
tendcncy to reversc thc mord judgments of thc Past-"I find
it very inconvcnicnt that I may no longcr regarq Nero simply
as thi i.poirl monstcr who used to go to bcd by the light
of a burning C'bristia& but rather as a wise if somewhat
pcculiar modern dictator." Was he hittitg a doubt of ,hq ry{
mordity that men like the Nazis were starting to proclaim?
Again, in cmphasizing the vdue of "action " there is_ a sig-
niEcant qualification conveycd in hfu cpigrammatic iudgment
is worthles, will without intcllect is
-"Intcllcct without will
dangerous." Thcre was a wisc warning too, in another of his
wider reflections-'"fhc satemcnt that war is a continuation
of policy by othcr means has become a catch-pfuasc, and_is
thadori dangerous'We can say with qual truth-war is thc
banknrptcy of policy."
At t[e iemJ time &eclCs care to keep his army out of
politics caricd a danger of its own His attitude of profer
fronal dctactrment, an-d the sharp dividing line hc drew bc-
twccn the miliary and politicd spheres, tended towards a
renunciation of the soldier's potcntial rcstraining influencc on
adveDn[ous statcsmcn
The See&t-pattern professional hcame a modcrn Pontius
Pilatc wasLing his hands of dl responsibility for the orders
hc cxccutcd. hrre miliary th*ty deals in cxtremes that are
hard to combine with wisc policy. When soldiers concentrate
on the absolute military aim, and do not learn to think of
grand strategy, they are morc apt to accePt political argY
tents that, while sccming nght in pure strategy, commit pol-
icy bcyond the point where it can halt Extreme military ends
arc dificult to reconcile with moderation of policy.
That dangcr would gow because profesional opinion, as
cmbodied in a Cieneral Staff, is never so unitcd in practicc as
it should bc in principlc. It is split by its own "politics" and
 TIIB MOI'I.D OF SBECKT r9
pcrsonal ambitions hirnsclf oot only recallcd the past
-Sec&t
but foreshadowod the future when he wrote-"A history of
the Gcncrd Stafi . . . would h a history of quiet positivc
worL; it would tcll oJ arogancc and haughty icquiisccncc,
of vanity and cnvy, of all htrman wcakncsscs, 6f tUi fight bo.
genius and burcaucracy, and of the hiddcn causcl of
viaory and ddcaa It would takc the radiancc from many a
hdo, and it would not bc lacLing in tragedy.'t '
The Gcncral Stafi was esscntiilly htcndtd to form a col-
lcctive substinrtc fon genius, whic[ no :umy can count on
produging at n-ccd.- Of its very naturc it tcndtd to cramp thc
growth of genius, bcing a burcaucracy as wcll as a hieraichy,
but in it-sought to raisc- the generd standard 6i
competcncc to a high levcl. The uncvcnncs of its pcrformancc
-than
was due less to difiercnces of individual alent to the
underlying diflcrenccs of pcrsonal int rcst, as wcll as to con-
fli.tiog pcrsonal vicws. Thc c,hance of promotion tcndcd to
make any general srallow his doubts f6r the moment, loog
cnough tgcnable Hider t9 split the solidity of profcsional
opinion. That applics to all armics, but is paiticularly marLed
rurder a diaatorship. A ncwly-promoted seneral is dwavs con-
fident that the sinrition is beir,ir than it i'ppeared to hisircdc-
ce$or, and that hc can succeed where thC iattcr failcd. Such a
dispoition is a powcrful lwcr in thc hands of
-y nrlcr.
 III
THE BLOMBERG.FRITSCH ERA

EECKT WAS SUCCEEDIX' 8Y HEYE, A!{D Ir{B U\TIER, rN r93ot

D by tlammerstein Neither was quite of Seeckt's cdibre,
but both on the whole continued to develop his policy. I{am'
merstein was decply pernrbed by the growing strength of
the Nazi movemeng finding both its creed and its methods
-to
repugnaot, and he was led dcpart from Seecktt principle
of political deta&ment to the extent of considering the po.
sibilitics of taking forcible mcasures to check Hider's accession
to power. The ground was cut away bcneath his feeg howcver,
by the dccision of the senile President of the Republic, Fidd'
Marshd von Hindenburg, to appoint Hider to be Chancellor
valid. Moreover,
-thus making his position constinrtionally
Hammerstein's apprehensions were not shared by other lca&
ing generals who were soldiers "pure and simple."
the next imporant steP came when Hitler, almost immo
diately after en-tering office, appointed General von Blombcrg
as War Minister. That choicc was inspired by the ambitious
Colonel von Reic"henau, who had been Blomberg's Chid of
Stafi in East Prussia, and was in close contact with Hitler.
Blombcrg himself did not know Hider, and his character
was in many ways the antithesis of Hider's. His accepance
n
 TIIB ELOMBIRGERITSCTI ERA 2I
o-! the appointment, as well as his performance in it, was an
illustration of how ri-pt" thc pure soldier can be.

BIOMEEBG

the previous year, Blooberg had been chief military

Tyg
adviser to the German delegation at the Disarmament Confer-
cnce. He was o-nly just oycr fifty-young by comparison with ttc
ayerage age of the High Command in t[e ererman and other
armies. This faa in itsclf natually excited envy of his suddeo
elevation. That hostile
fegling wis increased 6y tfie German
generals' a$nrd9 of disdain for the "Bohemian Corpord.,,
Ivlany of them had been ready to welcome Hitler,s iirc to
power in so far as it seemed likely to favour their own sdemcs
of miliury expansion, but they scoficd at the idea that as
ex?rporal- *oll be credircd with any militxr.y judgment,
and were thus the mo-re.quick to question any prefaice hi
showed in making military appointinents.
This attinrde among the sifuor officers of thc Reichswehr
prejudicgd Blombergt position from the oueet By hcoming
suspect in thc eyes of his fellows he was thrown back oi
Hider's support, and so was forced to follow Hitler,s linc
further than his own iudgment would have led him. Ironically,
the nanral pleasantness-of his persondity, rcfreshingly diii
ferent from the '?russi1n" gpe, hcame a hrndi.rp "in suc.h
circumstances of dcpendence.-lhis combination wint far to
account for the ni&name of the "Rubber Lion" that was
bestowed on him by other soldiers.
For Wcrner von Blombcrg wa9 of a different type from
the violcnt and unscrupulous leaders of thc new i6qime. If
he was mo-re.rn symp-athy with thc Nazis than other
rt"o.lr,
it was pardy because he was more idealistic-while hiiroman-
tic enthusiasm easily blinded him to aspects he did not care
to see. The Nazi movement for a time attracted quite a num-
b-cr o!yc! idealistg
$"rgh most of them were mirch younger
tha'r Blombcrg. Soldierg f,owever, are slow to groly uf. UoIr.
 22 TIIB GERMAI{ GENERAIS TAI.T-

bcrg was a naftrd cnthusiast, and looked on the profession of

arms in the spirit of a knight+rant. This was evident to me
I
when mct him at Geneva n ry32 He showed an eager
interest in new military ideas, especially those that promised a
new artistry in actics as a game of skill, but was still morc
cnthusiastii about the possibiiities of resuscitating the code of
chivalry. He hcame atnost lyrical in discoursing upon the
apped of "gentlemanliness" in war. Close observation of the
higher military levels over a long petiod makes for scepticism,
but Blomberg impressed me as exceptionally gcnuine, if boy-
ish, in his piofession of faith. Tdl and broad physically, he
was neithcr overbearing nor grim in his manner, but showed
a natural coutesy combined with a refreshingly frank way
of talking. It was his hard fate to be cdled on to deal with
two rival groupg and to become a buffer between them. In
a better environment he might have proved a greatcr figura
Yet in one important respect his influence may have becn
more effective than it seemed. One of the suqprising feanres
of the Second World'W'ar was that the German fu-y in the
field on thc whole observed the rules of war better than it did
in r9r4-rFat any rate in fighting its western opponcnts-
whereas it was reasonable to expect that the addition of
"Nazisd'to'?russianism" would make its behaviour worsc
than hfore. The rclative improvcment in behaviour, and the
greater care shown to avoid stains on its record may be traccd
io the more refincd conception of soldierly conduct which
Blomberg and a number of others who shared his views had
striven to instil in the Reichswehr. The resuaint shown in r94o
by the troops that invaded Belgium and France, compared
with their predecessors of. ryr4was dso a wise policy. It went
quite a long way to soften the sting of defeat and conciliate
the people of the conquered countrieg and might have had a
more lasting effect but for the contrasting behaviour of the
Gestapo and the S.S. forces.
In the taaicd sphcre Blomhrg helped to give an important
nrffr to tfie trend of devclopmene I{ammerstein had perpenr-
 TBB DI.oMEEBESnIIIICH ERA 23
ated the German Armyt old doctrine of the offenslve, with.
out the matcrial mcans to practise it or a new technique to
sh.{p* irc 9dge. Bqt, in East Prusia, Blomberg had eipcri-
mentcd with new forms of tactics whid more redisticallv
recognizcd the existing superiority of modern defencc, ani
sought to firflr this to advantage thc other \pay, as an ofiensive
aid. Instead of attacking a strongly ddendtd position, one
Eighj lurc the *.Ty out of position, draw him-into making
a rash advancc or hurried assault, catch him in a uap, anii
then cxploit his disorder by delivering one's own real suoke-
in the more deadly form of a ripostc. The bait -ight be created
by luring withdrawal
withdriwal or by a a'sudden
sudden swoop that thlt threatcnod
threarcnod
the encmy's communications. The potcntidities of this .baited
move" combining
combinins offensive stratesv with defcnsivc
ofiensive stratcgy racri"c-
defensivc tactics-
like sword and shield-had struck-mc in thc course of my
sardy of Sherman's campaign in Creorgia, and in subsequent
bools I had claboratcd its application-to modern warfaic. It
was Blombcrg's partiarlar interest in this idea which frst
brought us ino conact.l
Blomhrg also showcd more appreciation than most gcn-
crals at that darc of the new conccption of mobile warfarq
,ry& t *tfulfilling the historic r6lc of cavdry-a conception
whid had met with a half-hearted response in the Eidsh
Army, _exlcpt in the circle of the Royrt Tank Coqps. Reichenau
was still keencr- and had himsglf translatcd some of my books,
thoogh cven he did not cmbrace the conccpt of armoured
warfare quirc so folly *
men like Guderian and lnoma who
lShcruran's mcthods also 6rd Gecral Patton's imacioation:{articulerlv
with rcgard o thc way that thcy exploitcd thc indirect aod 6e
"pp-""1
value { cutting dowa impcdimeou in order to gain mobility. Whcn I met
Pamon in rgi+ shortly bdore he mok his army ecro$ o Normandn he told
me how E h"9 carlicr spcnt-a long lcave studying Sherman's ..mfaigu! on
thc ground with my book h haud and wc discussed the possibiliticgoflooh-
ing sud mctho& in modcrn warfara Ihey were dc.onstrated irr hi! !ii;
queot swccp from Nonnandy o the Moselle. Gcncral \ilood, who com.
maadcd his spcarhcad the 4th Armourcd Divisioa, was anothcr eathusiast for
thcsc idcar, snd oo rcaching thc scinc wrote b tcll mc how cucccsdul thcit
epplicatioa had provod.
 24 ITIE GERMAN GENERAIS TAI.K-

took a more direct hand in creating Germany's armoured

forces from 1934 onwards.
The triumphs of German tactics and of the German
armoured forces in the fust two years of the war cast an
ironical refection on the measures taken to disarm the de.
feated country after the previous war. Materially, they proved
efiective. For the numerous evasions that German military
chiefs practised were on a petty scale, and in themselves
amounied to no considerable recovery of strength. Germany's
actual progress in materid rearmament constituted no serious
dangei up to the time when the Nazi Government oPenly
thew oflthe restrictions of the Peace treaty. It was the hesi'
ancy of the victors after that time which dlowed G.tl*I
again to become formidable. Moreover, an important result of
hir enforced disarmament was to give her a clear start, by
freeing her army from such an accumulation of ryr4+9r8
weapons as the victorious nations had preserved-a load of
obsolescence that tended to bind them to old methods, and
led them to overate their own strength. When the German
Ar-y began large-scde re-armament, it bene6ted by having
more room for the development of the newer weaPoili sug-
gested by a fresher current of ideas.
- The development of such fresh ideas was, in turq helped
by another of the measures imposed by the victors-the sup
pression of the General StaII. If it had been left to carry on
in its old form, and its old cumbersome shell, it might have
remained as routinely inert and overwhelmed by its ofices as
other General Staffs. Driven underground, its members were
largely exempted from administrative routine, and impelled
to concentrate on constnrctive thinking about the futtre-thus
hcoming more efficient for war. Any su& military orgaaiz.t-
tion can be destroyed in so far as it is a physical substance,
but not in respect of its activities as a thinking organ-thought
cannot be suppressed.
Thus the net effect of the sweeping disarmament of Ger-
many after the First World War was to clear the path for the
 TIIE BLOMBERG-TRIISCII ERA 25
more efficicnt modernization of her forces when a politicd
opportunity for re-armament developed. timiations in the
degree of modernization were due- more to internal con-
servatism a1ld 66ffisting interests than to the erternal restsic
tions that had been placed upon her.

TRITSCIT

Blombergt position as War Minister enabled him 16 foster

the growth of the new tactics he favoured, and to overcome
the resistance whid the more orthodox generals had shown-
as in other countrics, especially France.-But the weaknes of
oryn
|is ryriri*, as a- "btlfer+atd, handicapped him in
hastening their spread and development at the paci that might
otherwise have been possible. When he tried, at the end]of
1933, to secure the appointment of Reichenau as Chid of the
Army C,ommand in place of Hammerstein, he was foiled by
t$.con1eg{ opposition of the senior g.n.r.lr. Aairg on theii
advice, Hindenburg &ose General v;n Fritsch, a loldier of
great dl-round ability, who represented the more conserv&
tiv3 schgol
F,n e.U.o."qy and -iliorily. He had grasped the
vdue of tanks and aircraft up to e pointrbut regardid tir. new
arms es "oprt r*r" and was intent to keep thei in their placc
sub.ordinate
_place,
in his view. Moreover, General ieck,
who
--a subscquently became Chief of the General Statf, was
almost as critical of the tank "revolutionaries,, as he was of
the Nazi revolution Thus German military organization,
thoogh it forged ahead of othcr counuics'in ievelopins
mechanized forces, remained a compromise between the olt
and new patterns.
Werner von Fritsch, as a-comparatively young staff oficer,
had worked under Generd von Seec&d it thi Reidswehi
\tl,*g from rgrzo to toq in preparing the new organiza-
tion Then he went to regimenal duty in command of-a bat-
teryr and subsequendy became ctrief of stalf in East pnrsia.
la ryq, he renrned to the Reidswehr Ministry as assistant
 2fi rrrE GEBMAT{ cBNERAI^s rAr,K-

to Blombcrgr who was head of the opcrations branch. Here

he was hr{ely rcsponsible for devising the p19., q of of
war, for a-sdift ohensive against Polind combined with a
ddensivc in the Wcst to hold France in check. It was the
cmbryo of the plan that was actually cxccutcd in 1939 al'
thoqgh then amplified in scale and resources.
Driring the p-re-Nazi period Fritsch showed l-dtPt"T+
talent, riusual-among German oficers of the old school, in
dealing with democritic deputies who were inclined to ask
awkwird qucstions regarding increases in the military.budget,
aod the rearcns why an army limited in size required q.h 1
disproportionetely lirge frunework of stafi and instructiond
ca&es. Fritsch was adep in explaining away zu& curious
points, and in persuading critics not to press- their inqrriries.
-He
knew how to gag thcm in subde ways--by appealing- to
thcir patriotism, playing on their weaknesses, or cultivating
their hiendship. Nonrilly he had an ice<old manner, atrd
naturg but he-could turl oo a warm-taP of charm, when it
gcrrred a purpose.
llVhen-thiNazis arrived in power the gcnerals realized tat
thcv would nccd a chid who combincd dctcrmination with
dipioma.y in ordcr to hold their own. It- yas Fritsch's por
cc;ion oi these quditics, in addition to tris rePutatio-n as a
strategisg that led to his appointment carly in rg3+ His fust
movcs were directed to curb the ambition of the amateur sol'
diers of the Nezi partfr headcd by Capain Rochm, and to
oounter thc threat that their advancement might carry to thc
authority and intercsts of the professional armyt Heprovidcd
Hitler with cvidence that their plans for arming thc storm
troopers as a supplement to the army were_ {esrgle{_-b n1r.
the way for a c'oap ttta, aimed at Hitler himself. Himmler
was working on the same line-from a dillercnt motive- They
succceded in convincing Hitlerso well as to produce thc bloody
purge of lune 3oth, r93+
- fiis had thi double efiect of strengthening Fritsch's posi'
tion with Hitler and with all the elements in Gcrmany that
 :XlE EI.OMBERCTERIISCTI IRA 2f
fordivcrse rcasonq feared thc growth of the Nazi influcnce
For a ti-e, he establishcd thc supremacy of the Ar
y Com-
mand upon the internd bdance of power, and was able to
outnaneuvre Himmla. Ovcr such issucs as thc rcintroduc.
tion of conscription and the rcoccupation of the Rhineland
Fritsch marc.hed in step with Hider. But he insistcd on tesriqg
the ground bcforc cactr stcp was taken, and was carcful to
tcstrain the pacc of developments, so that the Gcrman Army
should not be committcd to a dangerous trid of strcogth while
it was still growing.
Emboldcncd by the submissive way in whic.h thesc dcfiant
stcps were takcn by the Fren& and British Govcrnments, the
Nazi leaders ncxt madc the more move of ioter-
vening in the Spanish Civil Waein order to euurc the orc.
ces of Gcneral Franco's rorolt, and thus cstablish a Fascist
power athwart the sea<ommunications of Francc and Britain
Fritsch was kcen to use the Spanish battleficld as an expcri-
menal practicc-ground for the Gcrman Army's n€w wcapons
and actics, cmploycd by samplc units scnt out for thc puqpooe,
but hc was sbrcwd cnough to scc that Spain was an awfwara
place strategically at whic,h to risk an opcn cldlcngc to France
and Britain. His caution was rescnted by the Nazi leadcrs,
flushed with their rcccnt succc$em in defiance. At the camc
time his diplomatic cfforts to foster bettcr relations with thc
Rcd Army excitcd violent complaint on their part Hitler'o
anti-Bolshevist obscssion providcd Frircht cncmies with &uit-
ful soil in whictr to sorsuspicion. Friction was incrcascd by
Fritsch's efforts to mainain the old spirit in the ncw offic;
co_qp_r, an{ frcc from pcrmcation by Nazi idcology.
_keep-it
Mcanwhile the rift bctwcen Fritsch and Blomberg-war
growinq Fl,r.h and his fcllorrs feh that Blomberg r.r fyf
notized by Hider, q4 y* not sanding up for 6. A*i/t
interests as he should have done. tt scemea to thcm that
.Blombergll
spirit subscrviencc was symbolizcd in the way
-oI
he wore Nazi cmblems on his uniforn, and thcy ni*ramcd
 28 TIIE GERlvraN cENEneI,s rALK-
him ffidqr-f6uth-Quex, after an idealistic boy portrayed in a
Nazi film"

TIIE DOT'BI,E DISMISSAL

A crisis cr-e in |anuar/r 1938, arising out of an affair that

was very rcmote in appearance from its real causes. Blomterg
had fdlen in love with a typist in his office, and married her.
Hitler elpressed approval of Blomberg's intention, as a public
proof that the military leaders of National-Socialist Germany
wcre broadening their social oudook and identifying them-
sclves with the people, instead of marrying only into their own
caste. He graced the wedding, as a witness. Blomberg's fellow-
generds regarded the marriage as unseemly, but<ontrary to
what was widely reported at the time-it is not true that they
made a concertcd protest and caused Blomberg's rcmoval from
office. For any prot€st they might have made was forestalled-
by Himmler.
Aftcr Blomberg's marriage had taken place Himmler pre-
scnted to Hider a police dossier purporting to show that the
bride was a prostitute. It has been suggpsted by American in-
vestigators since the war, that Himmler had planted her in
Blombcrg's o6ce as part of a trap. Hider's reaction to the reve-
lation was violeng for by his own presence at this wedding of
'a woman of the streets" he had been made to look ridiculous.
Hc dismissed Blomberg from his post, and even crossed his
name ofi the list of the oficers'corps.
That news did not disturb the other generals. But they were
shakcn to their roots by a second stroke that immediately fol-
lowed. For now that the question of appointing a new War
Minister had to be considered Himmler brought out a further
dosier to show that Fritsch was under police watch for homo-
sexral offences. It was, acnrally, a dossier about another bearer
of the same name. But when Hitler sent for the Co--ander-
in{hief, Himmler produced a witness who formally identil
 TTIB BLOMBERG-TRITSCII ER,A 29
fied him as the man in the case. Hitler thereupon ls6eygd him
from his post
According to Gencral R6hrichg the rcason for this move of
Himmler's was to prevent Fritsch succeeding to Blomberg's
position and powerywhich carried with it rofr.-. .o--"id
of the Webrmacht-the armed forces as a whole. "Anyone
zuccceding to that post would hcome the supcrior of Goering
who was now Crcmmander-in-Chief of the Luftrralfe. It wodl
have been very difficult to appoint any fresh soldier over his
head. Fritsch was the only possible one, becausc of his ."irtiog
scniority to Goering as a Commander-in4hief. Himmht
intcrrrcntion was not for Goering's sake, but for his own ends.
All his rnoves had thc aim of paving the way for his ambition
of_replacing the army by the S.S., slep by step."
Fritsch dcmanded a Court of Inquiry, but it was only with
muc.h ffi*tty that he was grantcd on+after energetic rep
res'entations by Rundstedt, as rcpresentative of the senior gen
erals. When it was conceded, Himmler wantd to preside 6ver
it himsclf, but the Minister of fustice then came-to Fritsctr's
h.lp by declaring that a miliary court was necessary. Himmlcr
ncxt tried to get at the witncsses for the ddcncc. To en-
sure thcir attendancq and their of.ty, the generals arrangpd
f9r $em to be guardcd by soldiers. Ar the loqriry tfimmtert
chief witness recantcd his evidenc+and paid lbr inis with his
Iife. But Fritsch was completely acquitted.
Meanwhilc, Hitler had taken the oppornrnity to assumc
Ip-reT9 command of the Webrma&t himself, declaring that
he had lost confidence in the gencrals. Blomberg's formcr pot
was reduced to a lower status, and filled by Gcneral Keitel,
who_appeared to Hider to have the qualities of a good lac.:key.
At the same time General von Brauctritsd, was appointed io
command the Army in place of Fritsch, so no room was ldt
f-", 9. lauer by thc time he was cleared of the charges that
had bcen framed against him. Thus the outcome of the crisis
that had bcen so delibcratcly engineercd was to pave the way
 30 TIIB GERMAN GBNENAIS IAI,K-
for Hider's uhimate control of strategy, while
flimmler's infuencc.
By making himself acrual Commander-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht (the armed forccs as a wholc), Hitler naturally
increascd the importance of its executive organ, the Ober'
kommando der Wchrmacit-a tide commonly shortened to
OJLW. In this were centralized the political and administra'
tive matters common to dl three services. It included a small
"national defence" section (Landesvcrtcidigung) which dealt
with matters on thc borderline berneen policy and strategy,
and with the coordination of the three sm,ices. Therc was
soon a move to develop this into a Wehrmadt Generd Stafi
---a development cqudly desired by Hider and Keitel.
This project was strongly resisted by the At-y High C,or
mand (bbakommando das Hecrcs{.KJl for short), who
were quic.k to sce it as an attempt to displace them as the heir
of thCold Great Gcncral Stalf. They argued that it was un'
sound to subordinate a long-esablishcd organization nrch as
thcirs to a newly formed body of an amateur naftre, and that
as Crermany" .ilit ty problcms were prcdominandy conti-
nental the Army High Command ought to have the decisive
influence. Theiropposition prevailed for the moment, helpgd
by the Navd HiSh Command's inhcrent dislikc of being-di.
riaed by landJubbers, and the more personal objcctions-that
arose 6m Goering's position as Commandcr-in{hid of the
Air Forca $o the is-stre remained in ahyance, and the General
Stafi of the Army rcmained in control of strategy, strbject to
Hitler's broad direction. He had still a long way to go bdore
he could ful6l his ambition of playing the part of executivc
suatcgist-and actually h*dliog the pieccs on the board.
 IV
THE BRAUCHITSCH-HALDER ERA

A T rlnsf, SrcnT rr
MAy stEM crrRrorrs lrraT srrcH a MAII as
la Wdthervon Brauctritsd was appoioted to replacc Frisch,
and that he accepted the appointmcnu For he had shown him-
self conspicuorrsly loyd to the former republican r6gime, and
inclined to taLe a libcral vicw of political and cconomic issuca,
whilc outspokenly cridcal of Nazi policics. Neither lrrnkcr
niurownc$ nor Nazi &naticism appealed to him. At the samc
timc hc was gencrally reguded irs a man who had a kecn
scnse of hononr and was by no means sclf+ceking. For thcsc
rcasons, couplcd with hig strong sensc of justicc and consid-
cration for othcrs, hc was tnrstcd both by his fellows and his
juniors to an exceptional degrcc. Wu his acccptancc of Hitlcrb
olfer in Fcbruary, r93$ duc to a sudden yielding to pcrsonal
ambition-when the prizc was so big-or to a fcelingthat he
-ight be ablc to scrve the Senicc by stepping into the brcaci?
Thc sccond and better, elplanation tends to be supported by
the fact that Brauditschcontinued on gmd termswith Fritsch
afrcr the latter had bccn shclved, and took more than one
opporttrnity of paying tribute 1q him, in a way distasteful to
the Nazi lcaders. Events soon showed however, that Brau-
chitsch had steppcd on to a slippcry slo1rc where he would find
it hard to Lccp upright
3r
 ? TI{E GERMAN GENERAI.S TAIX-
fAe reasons for his appointment are simpler to understand.
Hider was sbrewd enough to realize ths imPortance of making
a choice that would inspire general confidence, even though
it meant taking a matr who was not in sympathy with the Nazi
party. Brauchitsch was generally regarded as a sound ye1
progressive soldier-although primarily an "artillerist" he had
i better appreciation of tank potentialities than most of the
senior generals. In other respects, too, hc was less conservative
than the sctrool that Fritsch had represented. His popularity
with all sections was an obvious asset, which would help to
ofiset suspicion of the political motives behind the cianges
and of the internal struggle that had preceded them. fIfu
unassuming manner fostered the hope that he would Prove
easier to handle than Fritsch.
Hider soon found however, that Brauchitsch-though more
polite in his manner-was no more disposed than Fritsch had
been to allow a political infiltration in the army. His frst steps
were to introduce a number of welfare measures for improv.
ing the condition and post-service prospects of the ordinary
soldier, but he insisted on keeping these clear of Nazi organi-
zation. At the same time, he tightened discipline. He sought
to quicken up the process of equrpping the forces, but dso to
put a brake on the tendency of Nazi foreign policy to precipi;
tate an early conflict. His stand was reinforced by General
Be&, then Chief of the Generd Stafi. Beck, though a soldier
of great ability and suong character, tended towards tte "anti-
tank" school, so that in his opposition to Elider's aggressive
poli.y he was inclined to underrate what Hider might achieve
by the use of new instruments.
-After
Hider, that summer, had made his designs clear,
Brauchitsch sum-oned all the senior generals to a conference,
and told them that Beck had drafted a memorandum whic,h,
if they approved, he proposed sending to Hitler. BecI theo
read the memorandum. It argued that German poli"y ought
to avoid the risk of war, especially over such "a smdl issue as
the Sudctenland." It pointed out ttre weakness of the German
 frrB ERAUcrrrTscH-ItAr.DEn ERA 33
forces, and thcir intaiority to the combination 6x1 might h
grayed against them. It ehphasized that, even if the Unitcd
States did not trLe a direci part, she was likely to use her
resources to supply Gcrmany's opponents with arms and equip
ment
.
giving mc his account of the conference, said-
-Rundstedt,
"When Beck had finished reading the memorandum, Brau-
got up a1d-asted whethcr any of those present iad ob.
SfA
igctigns to raise before it was sent to Hitler. No ine objected, so
the document was delivered. It provoked Hitler to great *r"th,
and led to the dismissd of -Beck-who was ieplaad by
flalder.'
_-This momentarily damped opposition, but when the Czccho
Slovakian crisis came to a head, in September, Brauchirch told
Hider that the Germao Army was not prepared for war, and
warned
fight
!m aglnsl pressing his demandi sdhard as to produce
1 _Brauchitsch was buttressed by flaldcr, who followed
predecesq'-s rather than Hitier's-showing the latter
$ Ff
that it was still diftcult to drivea wedge into thE closoknit
German military corporation. While Halder was more pre
gressive than Beck in his military views, he was also a ian
of.Iong views
T 4. political field-and not inclined to gamble
yi6 -Cy-any's future. ,{. tougher pcrsonality than- Brau-
ditr&, he was more ready to bJtougl with Hitler. When it
became clear that Hider was not to b-e checked by counsels of
caution, Halder became bgsy with plans for a military revolt
agapst Hider's policy and regime.
The Frencl and British Governments, however, were even
lCIs prepared,for war o1 willing to risk a fight on behalf of
Czecho^Slovakia, so Hider gaiild his claimslor the Sudeten-
land with litde diEculty, ai Uunich.
In the flush of that triumph, Hitter became harder to curb.
Next.spring he occupied the- whole of the Czechs" territory by
a suddgn- coup, breaking the Munic& agreement He ihei
proceede4 without pausc, to put presurJon Poland for the
return ot Danzigto Germany and the right to build an extr&
 U TIIE GERMAN GENEEAIS TAI.K-

territorial railway and road across the Polish Corridor into

East Prussia Unable to see anybody else's point of view, hc
could not understand that these limited demands lost their
aplruuancc of moderation in the circumstances of their pro-
posal. Whcn the Polcs, stiffened by the British Government's
hurricd offcr of suppor! refused to consider su& readjust-
ments, Hider became so angry under his sense of injury as to
press matters further and quicker than he had intended. While
still hoping that the Poles would climb down, and savc hig
face, he became more inclined to risk war-provided that the
risk in a war would not bc too big.
When he consulted the .iliary chiefs on this question,
Brauchitsch gave a more qudificd reply than Keitel. Brauctr-
itsch considered that Germany could "probably" reckon on a
favourable result if the opposition were confined to Poland
France and Briain. But he emphaticdly declared that Gs-
qany would not have muctr chance of winning if she had
dso to 6ght Russia. The French Ambassador in Berlin, M.
Coulondre, heard of the arguments and reported them to his
govcrnrncnt early in |une
Brauchitsctr's doubts, coupled with his disparaging com-
ments on the value of Italy as an ally, annoyed thcmore vio.
Icnt Nazis, who had alrcady been complaining of the way he
had checked the Nazffication of the Army. They developed a
campaign against him. This may e4plain why he was lcd at
this time to makc a public declaration of confidence in the
Fiibrer, and also to express sentiments in a speech at Tannen
berg which sounded threatening towards Poland-though
thcy could be construed in a strictly defensive sense. But iiis
understandable that he should feel that there was little danger
in nrd l*go"g., since no one who weighed the situation in
miliary scdes was likely to imagine that Briain and France
would acttrally carry their support of Poland to the point of
war in such a hopeless strategical position as would result if
Russia was induced to sand aside. For Hider was driven to
mcct Brau&its&'s stipulations so far as Russia was concerncd
 I}IB BnAUCHTTSCH-rIAr.DEn lRA 35
and to recast his whole policy of the past in an cfiort to secure
her neuuality. he accepted thi necessity of a political
-Once
hrn-aboug Hitlcr moved qui.kly to arrange a fact witf, Russia
suiking contr:uf to the hesiation and dclay of the British
-in
Governmcnt in their s with Russia atthe same time.
Dcspitc the announcement of thc RussoGerman pacg the
Bridsh Government de6cd logt military cdculation by dc.
ciding to fight, and pushed the "l French irito thc same course.
But the invasion of Poland had already been launche{ on
Hitler s ordcr, beforc the fallacy of that ialculation was appar-
enL For thc moment, Brauciitsch and Halder werc fully occu,
pid in conduaing the campaign--and could drowri their
anxieties by immersing themselves in their profcssional taslr.
The plan was of their desrgn, and the campaign was swiftly
strcccssful. The executive commanders were allowed a fut
hand, and demonstratcd the vdue of it by showing an initia-
tive and flexibility that wcre in the bcst vein of the old uadl
tion. The main r6le was played by Rundstedt's Army Group
in the South which, after breakind tbrough the Poliih front,
scnt Reichenau's mobile roth Army-this had the bulk of thc
mechanizcd divisions'<n a northward $yerve to Warsaw, to
cut astridc the rear of the main Polish armies in the ccntrc.
Ibat stroke, whici dccidcd the isstre, was the morc notable
bccausc OJLW. had ordcrcd that the roth Ar-y should bc
scDI str4gh! ahead ovcr the Visnrla, as thc Poles wcrc thought
to be alrcady retreating to the south.east. But Rundstedt and
his Chief of StaIf, lvlansteir5 had gauged that the main Polish
armies wcre still wcst of Warsaw, and could thus bc trapd
on thc near side of the Visnrla. On this occasion the coo-
mandcr on the spot was allowed to act on his own judgmcnt,
whictr the renrlt vindicatediut when a similar cnrciil turn
came in the next campaign Hider impocd his orvn dccision
and thereby paid a houy forfeit
Tte effea of viaory in Poland had an intoxicating efrect on
Ifitlcr. But with it was mingled a fear of what -ight hrpp.o
ie him in the East if he did not soon secure peacc in thc tffcsL
 36 rrrE GERMATv cENERATs rALr-
The intoxication and the fear, working on one another, im-
pclled him to fresh action while making him more reckless.
To Brauc.hitsch and Halder the victory in Poland had
brought no such intoxication. Once the dust of battle had
setded they perceived more clearly the awkward consequences
of that victory and the dangers of becoming cmbroiled more
deeply. After thc campaign was over they recovered the rong
view so far as to opposHven to the point of contemplating
a revolt-Hitler's idea that an ofiensive in the West would
make the Allies more inclined towards Peace. But something
more than a few monttrs'inactivity would have been required
to restore favourable conditions for peace, and during the
wintcr the Allies' threats of "opening up the warr" publicly
voiced by Winston Churchill in broadcasts, had a natural
tendency to spur Hitler into forestdling them. The dynamism
of war increasingly took charge of the train of events.
The invasion of Norway h eptit, r94o, was the frst of
Hider's aggressive moves that was not premeditated. As the
cvidence biought out at Nuremberg made clear, he was led
into it unwillingly, more by fear than by desire, under the 9om-
bined influence of persuasion and provocation. Although he
achieved this conquest with ease he was no longer in control
of his own course. The persuasion started from the arguments
of Vidkun Quisling, the Norwegian proNazi, about the like-
lihood of the British occupying the coast of Norway, with or
without the connivance of the Norwegian Government It
was reinforced by the anxiety of the Naval High Command
about the danger of such a development, both in tightening
th. gnp of the British blockade and hampering their own
submarine operations. Thcse fears were increased, after the
outbreak of the RussoFinnish war at the end of November,
by Franco-British offers of aid to Finland-which, as the Ger-
mens shlss/dly suspected concealed an aim of gining strategic
control of the Scandinavian peninsula. Hitler, however, still
felt that Germany had more to gain by Norway's continued
rcutralityr and wanted to avoid an enlargement of the war.
 IIIE BBAUCHTTSCH-TIALDER ERA 37
After he had met Quisling in mid-December, he decided to
wait and see whether Quisling could fulfil his hope of ac.hiev-
ing a political coup in Norway.
In fanuaryr however, Dervousness was accentuated when
Churctrill made an emphatic broadcast appeal to the neutrals
tg--jop in thc fight against Hitler, while other signs of an
Allied multiplied. On February r8th the Britislidestroyer
Cossa* pushed into Norwegian waters and boarded the Ger-
man snrpply ship Altnoft to rescue caprured British searnetr
it was carrying. This step was taken- on orders from thc
Admiralty,
9f which Churctrill was then head. It not only
infuriaied Hidcr, but made him think that if Churchill was
qcldy to violate Norwcgian neutraliry for the rescue of a hand-
ful of prisoners, he was still more likely to do so in order to
cut oI[ the ironore supplies from Narvik that were vital to
Germany.
h this connection Rundstedt remarked to me in one of our
trlLs: "Churchill's broadcasrc used to make Hitler angry. They
got under his skin-as did Roosevelt's later. Hider repeatedly
Tgucqto the Ar-y High Command especially over Norway,
that if he did trot movc firsg the British would-and esablish
themselves in such neutral points." Admiral Voss, who was
present, confirmed this account from his experience in thc
Naval High Command and also said: "The British atta& on
the Altmuftproved decisive, in its cfiect on Hider-it was the
'fusc' that touchcd oIf thc Norwegian ofiensive."
Immcdiately after this, Hitler appointed Gencral von Fdk-
cnhorst to prepare the forces for a coup to seize the Norwegian
ports. At a conference on February z3rd Admiral Raeder, the
Naval Co--ander-in€hiet cmphasized that: "The best thing
for mainaining this (ore) uaffic as well as for the situation in
general is the maintenance of Norwcgian neutrality." But he
went on to say: "What must not be permitted as stated earlier,
is the occupation of Norway by Briain That could not be
undone."
By thir Eme reports from Norway showcd that Quisling's
 38 TrrB GERMAN GENEnet.s TAr.K-

party was losing gpoun4 while rcPorts from England-indi'

catcd that some iction in the Norwegian area wal being
planncd, togethcr with thc assembly of troops and transports.
bn Marci ist Hider issued his directivc for the expdition to
Norway. On the 9th, the Naval High C,o--and prcsented
their plan, and dwelt on the urgency of the operatigl in view
of thCreports that a British landing was imqincnt. They w-crc
very woiried but their own preparations would take somc time
to iomplcte, and dl they could do was to send submarincs to
lie ofi &e poru in case the British transPorts appearedt
-Allies'
But thc plans were uPset for thc moment by
-F1n.
land's capinrlation-on thc r3th, whictr deprived -them_
-of $e
prctcxt oi whictr they werc intending to land at Nanik"
Vlh.n Admiral Racdei saw Hitler on the z6th, hc exprcssed
the view that the danger of a British landing in Norway was
no longer actrte for thE momeng bq conlidered it certain that
a fresh-pretext would soon bc foturd and fresh-attempts madc
to interrupt thc ironore trafic. "sooner or later Germany
will bc faced with the ncccssity of carrying out operation
'Wcserucbung''Lth. codc n'-e for thc cxpedition to occtlPy
Norway. Thus it was advisable to do this soon, rathcr than bc
too lati. Hitler agrced, and 6xcd thc date. Now that Prelara'
tions had gonc so-far, there was an irrcsistillc urge to-prLth3m
into operition. At almost thc same time the Allies decided to
put frish prcssurc on thc govcrnmentsof Norway and.Sw;dq1
e, mirr.-Uitt was to bc hia in Norwegian waters, on April5th'
and the 6rst convoy of troops was tb sail for Narvik on thc
8th. But the mincJaying op,eration was delayed until the night
of the Zth, -d ncxt iftcrnoon the Gcrman invading forcc
sailcd.
Early on April 9th, small detachm*q of German_troops,
carried mostly in warships, landed al the chief po-r-ts-of Norw-ay,
from Oslo to Narvik, aid capnued them with litde di6""1ty.
The sequel showed that the Allies' designs had outrun the
cficicncy of thcir prcparations, and the collapse of thel5 cgunta'
movcs ldt Germant in posession of the whole of Norway,
 IIIB DSAUGrrrscIr-EAr.,DlB IIA g
togethcr with Dcnmark. This corquest was achicvcd withoA
any material subtraction from the forccs on the Wcstcrn front,
or ioterference with thc preparations there. Morcover, the
olrcratioo was carried out under the dircaion of O.K.\[. and
not of O.K.H.
Thc story of how the plan for the invasion of thc Wcst took
form is related in later chapters, and is too complcx for brid
sunmary herc. For the momcnt it is more rueful to tracc thc
outline of the plan, and point out the basic factors that gov-
crncd its issuc-as a background to thc morc deailed rccord of
pcrsonal influcnces and internal controversics.
While it appeared to thc world as a suprcme cxamplc of the
shockoficnsivg it was really more rcmarkablc for its subdcty.
The cssential condition of its success was thc way that the
Allied armics of the ldt wing the pi& of thcir
mobile forccs, werc lured deep into elg"q and even into
Holland. It was only through the left wing bcing caught in
this trap, and wrcnched froi is socket, that-the pinzcr-stoke
ort through the Allied ldt centrc daply and quiclly enough
to have dccisivc effccts, Moreovcr, as fast as the Gcrman
armoured divisions drove towar& the Clhanncl coasg cuuing
a pocket in the Allied froot, the motorizcd divisions followed
them up to form a ddcnsivc lining dong the whole length of
the pocket. These tactics extracted a ma*imum advanage from
a minimum use of Sd, and exploited the power of taaical
ddence as an aid to the offensive. For the burdcn of attac.king,
at a disadvanage, was thereby thrown on the Allicd armics in
any attempt to force open the trap and retrnirc thcir scvcrcd
parts. Sud subtlcty is the esscnce of strategy.
With the failure of the Allied ldt wing to break out, its fate
was seded savc for the portion that manag;ed to cscape by sca
from Dunkirk, lcaving all its equipment behind" None at all
might have escalrcd but for thc fact that Hider stoppcd thc
sweeping advancc of the ?arrzcr forces on the outskirtg of
Dunkirk-for rcaeome that are discussed further on. But this
forfeit did not aficct the immediatc futtuc. Afur the climina.
 40 TIIE GERMAN GENEIAIS TALB-

tion of the left-wing armieg the remainder were left too weaL
to hold the far-stretching front in France against a powerful
ofiensive, so that their collapse in turn was mathematically
probable even before the next German stroke was delivered. In
r9r4 the aim had beeo to wheel inwards and round up the
opposing armies in one vast encirclement, an eflort thet Proved
too great for the Germans'capacity. In r9r4o the German Com-
mand concentrated on cutting ofi a portion of the opposing
armies by * outward sweep, with the result that in this
piecemeal process it eventually succeeded in swallowing them
completely.
But it was bafled, as Napoleon had beeq when it came to
dealing with the problem that remained-the continued re-
sistance of island Britain, and the prospect of her continuous
"thorn-in-the-fesh" efiects unless and until she was conquered.
The Webrmacht had been prepared for continental warfare,
and for a more gradud development of events than had taken
place. Having been led on to attempt, and attain, much more
than had bcen foreseen, it was caught unprepared in shipping
and equipment for carrying out any such new technique as
was involvcd in a large-scale oversea invasion.
Placed in that dilemma, the sweeping success of the earlier
continental campaign encouraged the tendency, inherent in
the Nazi gospel, to follow in the footsteps of Napoleon and
repeat his invasion of Russia. Brauchitsch and Halder tried to
curb Hider's ambition to succeed where Napoleon had failed,
but the immsnsily of their own successes hitherto made it more
dimcdt for them to impose a policy of moderation. Moreover,
while ttey were far from agreeing with the Nazi view that
the conquest of Russia would be easy, the relatively high_estl
mate thit they had formed of Russia's suength made-th1m
more inclined-to accept the necessity of taclling Russia bdore
that strength had still further increased.
The plan they framed was designed on the -same principle
as rgr4rthat of piercing weak spots in the Rcd Army's fronq
isolating large Gctiomof it, and forcing these to attac& in
 TIIB DMUCIIITSCH.IIAI.DER, ENA /tr
reverse in the endeavour to get out of the net woven routrd
them. They aimed to destroy Russia's armed strength in bat-
des near to their own frontier, and wantcd to avoid] above dl,
b.iog drau'n deep into Russia in pursuit of a still unbroken
army that retreated before their advance. Conditions in Russia
favoured this design in so far as the vast width of the front
ofrered rnore room to maneuvre for piercing thrusts than there
had becn in the W'est, but were unfavourible in the lac*, of
nanral back+tops, comparable to the Channel, against whic.h
thgy- could hope t9 pin the enemy after breaking ihrough.
The German plan achieved a series of great piecemeal vic-
tories which brought it ominously close to complete success-
helped by the inirial over<onfidence of the Russian leaders.
lhe armoured thrusts cut deep, and successively ctrt ofi large
portions of tle-Rusian armieq induding a dangerously high
propo-rtion o{ their best-trained and bestiquippel troops. BIt,
on balance, the advanage which the German-ofiensive-derived
from the brcadth of spacc in Russia was outweighed by the
disadvanage of the dcpth of sprcc tlooogh whi-ctr the'Rtrs-
sians could withdraw in evading annihila-tion. That balance
of disadvanage tended to increaie as the campaign continued.
Another handicap which emerged was the limited scale of
the armoured forces on which -the success of the German
ltrokes mainly depended. In r94o the viaory in the West had
hen virtually decided by the thrusts of the io panzer divisions
us9{-to-opcn the way for the mass of r5o or-dinary divisions
which the Germans deployed there. For the invasion of Russia
in r9r4r the number of panzer divisions was raised to zr-but
only by-halving the number of tanks in eac.h. Thc greater
power of maneuvre provided by thir increased scale of mobile
divisions was valuable on such a broad front, while the de-
creased pun&ing power did not matter much in the earlier
phary" of the invasion. Indeed, the consequent rise in the pro-
po$T of infantry in these divisions wis welcomed by-the
orthodgx, sincg it provided a higher ratio of troops to ho[d the
ground gincd. But the limited punching power became a
 42 IIIE GEBMAN GBNERAIJ TAI.K.
scrious factor as thc campaign continued cspccially when the
Gcrmans mct a morc concentrated ddence on approaching the
great cities.
- It was on t[ose *rocks" that the Gcrman ProsPect of victory
foundered. The nearer they camc to such objectives, thc more
obvious beca-e the direction of thcir attacls and the less room
they had for deceptive man@uvrc. Hider's long-profitable in-
stinct for the strategy of indirect approactr deserted him whcn
such grcat prizes loomed before his eyes. Moscow became as
fatal a magnet for him as it had been for Napoleon.
When tf,c German armies failed to fulfil their eim of a
dccisive victory west of the Dnicper-to destroy the Rusjan
armies hfore they could retreat beyond it-Hitler wavered in
a state of indccision, and then temporarily flung his wcight
southward into the Ukrainc. But after a spectacular encircle-
mcnt of thc opposing forces around Kiev, he reverted to thc
original axis. Alrthoug'h autunn was now at hand, he decided
to iontinue the advance otr Moscow-as well as the southern
advancc throogh thc IJkraine towards the Caucasus. Early in
Octobcr he staked his prestige on the gamble by the an-
nounccment that thc final stage of the oficnsivc to caPturc
Moscow had begun
The opening phase was brilliandy zuccesful, and &o,ooo
Rrssians-were-caught by a geat encircling movemcnt around
Vyasma, carried out by the armies under Bock's command.
But it was the cnd of October bcfore they were rounded up,
and by that time wintcr had set m, with the rcsult that the
exploiation of viaory was bogged in the mud on the way to
Moscow.
When Hider cdled for fresh efforts, Brauchitsctr and tlalder
advised that the armics should &aw in their horns and consoli-
date a safe defcnsive line for the winter, where the troops
could gain shcltcr from the weather as well as from the eneml.
But Hitler would Dot listen to such cautious arguments. So
anothcr great cfiort was mountcd in Novembcr. But the ob
viorsnesrof its aim and the convergence of its thrusts simplificd
 'IIIB ERAUCHmICH-HAI,DER tBA 43
the Russians'problem in concenrating reserycs to &c& cach
dangcrous development. Brauchitsch ceascd to be responsiblc
exccpt in a nominal scnse for this later stage of the o{fensivg
carried out under Hider's orders. After its frnal failure early
in December, coupled with the Cierman rctreat from Rostov in
the south, it was oficially announccd that Brauchitsch had
bcen relieved of his post, and that Hitlcr had decided to "follow
his innritions" and ake over supremc command of the C'crman
Army, in addition to the supreme command of the forccs as a
whole, which he had assnrmcd whcn hc had partcd with Blom-
bogir Fcbruary, 1938.
Brauchitsch was fortunarc in the time of his dcparture. Fon
it left hir -ilit ry record distinguished by the most striking
gcries of victories in modern history and blemished mercly by
a chcc& whictr hc had not only forcseen but of which he had
forewarncd his superior. But his dismissal registered the frnal
ddeat of the soldiers'claim to decide questions of strategy and
miliary po[cy. Henceforth thc "Bohemian Coqporal" would
dictate to thc generals in their own spherq and their powcr
would be limited to advice or protcsL Unwilling exccutants
do not makc for good exeortion.
The transition was traccd by Dittmar in one of our talks.
"Thc Polish, Western and Bdkan campaigns, and the first
stagc of thc Russian campaign, were conducted by O.K.H.-
with comparatively little intcrferencc from OX.W. The batde
of Kicv was the first occasion when Hidcr attcmptcd to take
direct charge of operations. He justified thb on the ground
that it was csential to finish the Russian campaign bcfore the
wintcr. From then on, OJLH. was increasingly dominated
by OJL\tr-which rcally s1rclt Hitlcr.'
Dittmar wcnt on to emphuize the ellect of another im-
portant : "Hitler decided that O.K.H.'s sphere of
rcsponsibility should not bc confined to the Russian front,
and that OJLW. should assume the exclusive direction of dl
othcr theaues of war. Ar a reruIt, O.K.II could not kecp a
vicw of the war as a wholg and this resriction of outlooL
 44 TIIE GERIYIAN GENEMLS TALK-

progressively weakened its ability to argue the case against

errors of suategy. The division of spheres, and interests, be-
tween O.K.W. and O.K.H. was a grave weakness in the
German planning.
"I heard much about the effects from flalder. He said that
Hider was a mystic, who tended to discount, even where he
did not disregard, all the rules of strategy.
"Hider taught and believed that reason and knowledge are
nothing, and that the unbending will to victory and the rglent-
less pulsuit of the goal are everything. Mystical speculation
replaied considerations of time and space, and the careful
calculation of the strength of one's own forces in relation to
the enemy's. All freedom of actior was eliminated. Even the
highest co--anders were subjected to ao unbearable tutelage."
 ..SOLDIER IN THE SUN''_ROMMEL

rlRoM I9t4r orirwARrxt IIrE NAMES oF AI, oItrER GERMAN GEN.

.F erals came to be overshadowed by that of Erwin Rommel.
He had the most surding risc of any-from colonel to field-
marshal. He was an outsider, in a double sensFas hc had not
qualfied for high position in the hierarchy of the General
Staff, while he long performed in a theatre outside Europc.
His fame was deliberately fostercd-not only by his own
efiorts but by Hitler's calculated choice. For Hitler, rccogniz.
ing thc public craving in warti-c for glamorous military 69
ures, decidcd to pick two soldiers (and tno only) whom he
could safely nrn into popular heroes-"one in the sun and
one in the snow." Rommel in Africa was to be the stur-hero
and Dietl in Finland was to be the snow-hero.
Both performed in the wings of the main stage, where Hitler
intended to keep the limelight for himself. Both were vigorous
fighting soldiers whose qudities promised well for local suc-
cess, without b.ing of the intellectual cdibre that might make
them competitors for the higher strategic direction. Both
seemed certain to be loyal instruments of Hider. In the out-
come, Rommel did more of the two in performance to justify
his sclection, but Hitler's confidence in his sustained loyalty
was not so well iustified. When Rommel camc to sce that
45
 46 TrrE GERMAN GENERATS rAr-r-
Ilitler's survival and Germany's survival were incompatible
he put his country 6rst and turned against his pauon.
While Ro--ei owed much to Hider's favour, it was testi'
mony to his own dynamic personality that he first_impressed
himsltf on Hider's mind, and then impressed his British op
poncnts so deeply ai to Eagnify hit fame beyond Hitler's
calculation.
As a junior o6cer in the previous war Rommel gained-ex'
ceptionil distinction, receiving the highest German decoration,
P6rr le Mtrite, after the Caporefto ofiensive of' ryr7 against
the Italians. But his professional knowledge wali not regarded
as equal to his fighting record, and he was given only minor
empl-oy*et t in &e post-war army. He was not considered
suitabfc for the select circle of the futurc General Staff. The
story that in thc post-war years he was a Nazi storm-uoop
Icader is, howeverra legpnd invented by propagandists in the
days when he became famous, in ordcr to asociate his repua-
tion with that of the party.
His opporttrnity came when, after the Nazis attained Power
in rgfg, hc was appointed a military insuuctor to the S.A.
He wai a good lccnrcr, with a gft of vivid exposition, and had
widened his horizon by snrdying the new "science" of gpo'
politics-he was one of Professor Haushofer's disliplc. Subso
(uently hc became instructor at the Infantry School at Drcs'
dcn, and was then appointed to the new one at Wiener-
Neustadt. Beforc this he had come in contact with Hider, who
found him 3 refreshingly unorthodox soldier with whom to
discuss new miliary ideas. On the outbreak of war he was
appointcd commander of Hitler's personal headquarterg whic.h
nanrally incrcased both the contact and the opportunity. Aftcr
the Polish campaign he asked Hitler for command of a panzer
division, and got it. This was ctraracteristic of Rommel's keen
sense of the right opening and his opportunism in grasping it.
For, prior to the war, he had been suc,h a keen infantryman
that hc had opposcd the ideas of those who preached the gos.
 tsq.DIEB
rN zrrB stn'-*orarrL 4l
pd of tant warfarc. Hc saw the light on the road to \Marsaw,
and lost no timc in'Tollowing thc glcam."
He was appointed to command the 7h Panzer Division, and
lcd it in the W'estern offensive. His division playcd a dashing
part in the break-through over the Meuse and ori to thc Chad-
nel coast In thc Dext stage, it broke through thc Frend front
on the Somme betrreen Abbeville and A,miens, and lcd the
drivc to the &ine ncar Rouen. Its brilliant pcrformance was
still furthcr enhanced by subsequent publi-city, and it was
rctrospcctivcly christened'"Ihe Phantom Division."
l1en, early in r9r4r, whcn Hidcr dccided to scnd an ar-
moured and motorizcd expcditionary force to help his Italian
dlies in thc invasio4pf Egypt, he appointed Rommel to com-
mand this "ffii6s Frorps." By the timc it arrived in Tripoli
the Ialians had not only been thrown ba& over the fronfrcr,
but their arml had bcen destroyed in thc pursuiu Rommcl was
aot dlmte4 by th. disastrors sinration-whic.h greeted him.
Knowing that the victorious British army was small, and
glucssing that it was probably at thc cnd of its tether, he
promptly launched an oflensive with the 6rst insalment of
lir -*qpr. Hc had litdc undersanding of ank tecinique, but
hc had a tremendous sense of mobility and a flair ior sur-
prise. He caught the Bridsh distributcd piecemeal, and with
most of their tanks in need of repair. Tte speed of his onset
and enveloping dust+louds magnified his strength. The British
were swept headlong out of Cyrenaica and-back ovcr the
Egypti* fronticr.
In thc ncxt eightecn months Rommel's fame continudly
grew, owing to the way hc baffed successive British offensivci,
and, abovc all, through his sarding ripostes whenever his an-
nihilation -\ras prematotdy announced. In the process thc
troops of the British E ghth Army camc to think much morc
highly of him than they did of their own commandcrs, and
bis lac&-in-the-box pcrformance so tic&led their sensc of hu-
mour that their admiration became almost aficctionate. Hc
rea&ed thc peak of his career in the summcr of ,g+, whcn

l*t
(e Nwffitw#,w"*/,
 48 rHE GERMAN GENEnaT,s TAr.r-

he defeated the Eighth At-y piecemeal betrreen Gazda and

Tobruk, and then-chased the remainder of it back thtorgh
the'Western Desert to the Yerges of the Nile delta.
General Au&inlec.k, the British Com-ander-in-Chief in the
Middle Easg intervened at this crisis by taking over personal
charge of the battercd Eighth At-y and rlllyyrg the dis\eart'
eneJuoops for a definite stand on the E[ Alamein-position.
Rommel'itroops were tired and short of supplies {:t-,nt
long pursuit. Iir two successive efiorts they- were {oilgd and
tb,rowir bac*,. That chec,k proved fatal to the invader's prov
' Ro--el still appeared confdent that he would succeed at
Pects.

a third attempt, Uut nis inward hopes were fadyrE, while t!3e
was slipping away in the Process of acctrmul"I$ lrPPli::.
Duri"g ihc-inte*.I the British were reinfor..9 by fresh. dt
visions-from home. There was also a change of commenders.
lvlr. Churchill wanted the British to take the ofiensive as soon
as the reinforcements arrived. Auchinleck, more wisely, ir
sisted on waiting until they were accuttomed to desert con-
ditions. In the sJquel, Auchinlec& was replaced by- Alexandcr
as Commander-inChief, while Montgomery took over the
Eighth Ar-y. But Rommel stru&. first, at the end of August,
ao-d *"r Uam.d by the new defence plan. Then the
"gii"
initiative changed sides. After a long pause for thorough prep
aration-longei than Auchinleck had contemplated-_ Mont-
somery laurrched an offensive in the last week of October
ih"t *"r now backed by a tremendous superiority in air-
power, gur-power, and tank-power. Even then it was a to-Ygh
ittuegl.-for-a whole week, ai there was no wide outflanking
maridort . But the enemy, besides being oversuetched, were
vitally crippled by the submarine sinkings 9! +.T pcuol tank'
crs .iorrG! the Mediterranean. That decided the issue, and
once the eir.-y begm to collapse at their extreme forward
point they werl not capable ol any serious stand until they
haa ro.l.a the wcstcrn end of Libya, more than a thousand
oilcs ba&.
 "so[,DIER rN rrrB suN'--*o!6dEL 49
For Rommel himself the decisive blow had been the frustra.
tion of his August attac&. Following that disappointment, he
wiur so badly shaken that his moral depression lowered his
physical state, and he had to go sick, with desert sores, for
treatment in Vienna. On hearing of Montgomery's ofiensivg
he insisted on fying back to Africa at once, regardless of the
doctors'protests, but was not fit enough 1e ds himsslf justice
in the months that followed. Although he conducted the long
retreat su6ciently well to evade eaci of Montgomery's at-
tempts to encircle his forces, he lost opportunities to administer
a check, while his sickness may havc accounted for his bad
slip in the Batde of Mareth that opened Montgomery's path
into Tunisia, and thus paved the way for the enemy's final
collapse in Africa He himself left Africa, for further ueat-
ment, in March<ver a month bdore that occurred. For
Hitler it was as important to preserve Rommel's prestige as
to preserve his services for the funre.
Since Alamcin, there has been a tendency to talk of the
oRommel
lcgendr" and to suggest that his reputation wrs un-
duly infated. Suctr disparagement is a common accompani-
ment of a change of fortune. But there was a deeper reason
for it in the first place. He had become the hero of the Eighth
At-y troops before Montgomery arrived on the scenethe
scale of their respect for him was shown by the way they
coined a term "a Rommel" as a synonym for a good perform-
ance of any kind. This attitude of admiration carried a subtle
danger to morale, and when Montgomery took over command
specid efforts were made to damp the "Rommel legend" as
well as to creatc a counter-legend around "Monty."
This propaganda gradually spread the view that Rommel
was an overrated general. Montgomery's private feelings, how-
ever, were shown in the way he collected photographs of
Rommel and pinned them up beside his desk, thoogh he later
eqprcsscd the view that Rundstedt was the more formidable
opponent of the two Hcre it must be remembered that Mont-
gomer,r never met Rommel at his best, and that when thcy
 I 1IIB GERMAN GBNESAI.S TAr,K-

met itr battle Rommel was oot only weakcncd by sickness but
actically crippled by a heavy infaiority of force and shortage
of petrol supplies.
The outsanding feanre of Rommcl's succcsses is that they
were actricvcd with an inferiority of force, and without any
command of the air. No other generals on eithcr side gaincd
the victory under such conditions, except for the carly British
leaders under Wavell, and their succe$es were won against
Italians. That Rommel made misakes is clear, but when fight-
ing supcrior forces aoy slip may rcsult in defeat, whcreas
numerous mistakcs can bc effectively covcrcd up by the gsn-
crd who enjoys a big advanage of strength.
Morc definite ddects were his tendency to disregard the
administrative sidc of strategy and his lack of
over dcail. At thc same timc he did not know how to dclc-
gate authority, a ddcct that was very irritating to his chid
iubordinates. He not only uicd to do everything himself but
to be cverywhcro-so that he was oftcn out of touch with
his headquarters, and apt to be riding round the battlefield
whcn hc was wantcd by hit safi for some important decision"
On thc other han4 he had a wondcrful knac.k of appearing
at some vital spot and gving a decisivc imFetus to the action
at a crucid moment. He also gave dynamic junior officers zuc"h
oppornrnities to prove their value as seniority-bound generals
would never have dreamt of dlowing them. As a rcsult hc
was worshipped by thc youngcr men. That fccling was shared
by many of the Italian soldiers who saw him in such a vitd
contrast to thcir own scnile and safety-fust higher com-
manders.
In the ficld of actics, Rommel was often brilliant in nrsc
and blufi. In his 6rst attac*, in Africa he pushed his tanks so
hard that many wcnt astray in the descrt, but when he rcachcd
the main British position hc cleverly concealed the scanty
numbcr ttat wcrc prcsent by utilizing rucks to raise a grcat
cloud of dusg and crcate the impression that tants ssrs cos-
ycrghg from dl sidcs. This produccd a collapsa
 osor.DrEn
rN TuB suafl-*oranro 5r
Unlq R-tremcly daring he was also subtle. A rqcated fea-
hr:rc of his batdes was the way hc used his t-qks as a bait, to
lure the British tanks into traps that werc lined with anti.
tank gunrthus skilfully blcnding the ddcnsive with the
offensive. These "Rommel actics" becanc inacasingly adoptod
by armics as the war advanccd.
"ll he ldt Africa his deparnre was almost rcgratcd by
Whcn
his opponents; so big was the place hc had come to n1l in thciL
livcs, and h thcir imagination. That wu partly due to his
remarkably gmd treatment of British prisonersj indad, thc
numbcr who managcd to crape and return to thcir own lines
aftcr- a lrcrsond contact with hi''' suggests that his chivalry
was blcnded with strategy. Muc"h widcr still was the imprcs-
sioq male byhir swiftness of mancuwc andhissartlingaono.
ba&s after bcing apparendy ddeated.
As a strategist, his ddccts wcrc apt to be a seriors ofisa
to his strbdety and audacity. As a actician, his qudities tcndod
p cclipse lis ddccts. As a commander, his crccptional com.
binatiorr of lcading po\rcr and driving power-wag accrrmr
panied by a mercurial temperamcnt, so that hc was qpt to
uring too violently htrnecn exalation and depression. -
In 1944 Rommel reappcard as army gtroup commander on
the Channcl coast, to mect thc Anglo-Arncricao invasion.
Here he was under Field-Marshal von Ruodstcdt, thc Com-
mander-in{hid in the West Tteir views difrcrcd as to thc
bcst way to meet the invasion and dso as to thc place wherc
it was to bc cxpected. Rundsrcdt favourcd ddcncc in dcp6,
trusting to the cfrect of a powerful countercffensive wherthc
invaders had fully committed thcmsclvcs Rommel had a
nafi:r€l disposition to favour suctr a form of stratcgy, which he
had followed so often inAfricarbutcxpericncc thclehad modi-
ficd his vicw of its praaicability against an inradcr nrpcrior in
air-powcr. He was now anxious to conccntratc right forward
with the aim of checking the invasion bcfore it bccame cstab
lishcd ashore. Rundstedt dso hcld the view that the main
Allied oflcnsivc would comc dircct aqoss thc Channcl at its
 Y TTIB GER,MAI{ GENERAI.S TAI.K.

narrower part, between the Somme and Calais, whereas Rom.

mel became rnore concerned with the possibilities of an in"
vasion of Western Normandy, between Caen and Cherbourg.
Here he took the same view as Hider.
On the latter issuc Rommel's anticipation (and Hider's) *as
right Moreover, there is evidence that he had striven hard in
the last four months to improve the coast defences in Nor-
mandy, which had been neglected by comparison with those
in the Pas de Calais. His efforts, forttrnately for the Allies,
were hampered by the shortage of resources-so that both the
under-watcr obstructions and the coast fortffications werc far
from complete.
On the other issue, tfie general opinion on the Allied side,
cspecially among the gpnerds, has been that Rundstedt's plan
---of holding the reserves back and then launching a massive
suokc at a chosen moment-was a good one, and that Rommcl
spoilt it by using up strcngth in thc effort to pen the Allied
armies within their Normandy bridgehead. That was even
more strongly the opinion of most of the German generds-
those who belonged to the General Stafi'taste" regarded Rom-
mcl as only less of an amateur than Hitler. They argue4 dso,
that Ro--el had had no war experience comparable to that
provided by the Russian campaign, which had aught the im-
portance of disposing forces in geat depth.
RundstedCs plan was certainly more in accord with thc
basic theory of strategy. But when ooe takes account of the
{ae of. the Allied forces, coupled with their domination of
the ar, and sct against the wide sPace op,en for maneuvre, it
looks very doubtful whether any deliberate counter-offensive
by the Germans could have stopped the invading armies once
they pcnetrated deep into France. [n such circumstances the
only red hope may have lain in preventing them from secur-
ing a bridgehead big enough for building up their strength
on that side of the Channcl. Ro-mel went close to depriving
them of this opportunity in the fust few days, and his eventual
failure to hold them in check may be traced back, not to his
 osotDltn
tN TrrB smf-*orrarcx. 53
misakes, but to d.Ly i" switching forces from the Pas de
Calais. lAat was due to the Highcr C,ommand's continued
belief that thc Normandy landings were only a prelude to
largcr landings between Le Havre and Cdais. Beyond that
therc was the la& of any adequate general reserve in the West
Rundstedt had wished to creatc one by cvacuating the south-
cm hdf of France, but Hider would not sanction such a step.
The effccts were made fatal by Hitler's refusal to dlow a
withdrawal in Normandy when it became clear to both Rund-
stedt and Rommel that it was no longer posible to hold the
invading forccs io chcc.k. A timely withdrawal mighi fuv6
enablcd thc Gcrman forccs to make a stand on the Scine, and
a mu& lorgp stand subscquently on the Gcrman fronticr.
But Hider insisted that therc must bc no gencral with&awal,
and would not allo\r thc commandcrs in the West the frcc-
dom to carry out a locd withdrawal, even of a fcw milcs, with-
out his approvd. As a result divisions had to cling on until
they wcre hammercd to bits-a rigdity whic.h in the end
resulted in much lorg* rctreats than Rundstedt and Rommel
had proposcd.
A common sense of the hopelessness of Hitler's policy had
brought these two into closcr accord than ever hfore. At the
cnd of lune Hitler came to France at thcir urgent request-it
was the only visit he paid to the West in ry44<rd they met
him at Soissons. But he would not agree to their very modest
proposal to withdraw behind the Orne, preparatory to an ar-
moured countcr+troke. In the following we* the strain on
the front grew worse. Rundstcdt now blundy said that it was
vain to continue the struggle, and that the war ought to bc
cnded. As that solution did not appeal to Hider, he decided to
try a change of co--anders, and despatched his leading gen-
crd in the East, Ficld-Marshal von Klogp, to replace Rund-
stcdt
It was significant that Hider passed over Rommel, though
he did not remove hi-. Rommel's attitude at Soissons had
not fourd favour with Hider. But Rommel's view of Hitlcr
 54 IrrB GIRMAT{ GENETATS TAr.r-
had changed even more. Hc had remarked to a number of his
own subordinate commanders that Gcrmany's only hope now
lay in doing away with Hider as quic.kly as posible, and then
uying to negotiate lrace. It is certain that he was acquaintcd
the lcast-with the plot fixs 6ulminated iD the aucmptcd
-at
assasination of Hider on |uly zoth.
Three days before that Rommel was driving dong a road
near the front when low-fying 'planes attackcd ie His car
capsizcd and he was tfuown ou! fracturing his skull. The
sccne of this crash was thc apdy-namcd villagc of Sainte Foy
dc Montgommerrt He was taken to hospitd in Paris and when
convalescent wcnt to his home at ULn. By thir time the Gcs.
tapo had investigatcd thc plot against Hidcr. Two gencrals
came to see Rommel at his home and took hi- out for a &ivc.
During it they gavc him a message from Hider that hc could
choosc htrncen taking poison and coming to Berlin for intcr-
rogation. He c.hosc thc poison. It was then annonnced that he
had died from the result of his accidenq and he was given a
state funeral.
thus ended thc career of a soldier who, though ddeaive
both h hit gf*P qf high6 strategy and in adminisuative de-
tail, had a rcal touch of gcnius in the tactical ficld, combincd
with dynamic cxecutive power. Hc had a flair for the vial
spot and the critical moment Exasperating to his salf o6ccrs,
hc was worshipped by hir fighting troop.
 VI
SOLDIERS IN THE SHADOW

TN CTIAPI!n, IV IIIE PAITtsNN OI TIIB WAR ON GERMAIlrt'S SIDB

I *.r traced as far as the end of r94r. The last chapter, after
following the divergent tbrcad of Rommel's carcer in thc
African 6el4 camc back dong si1f, him to the decisivc
reopening of the Wcstcrn ficld in thc summer of 1944. But
that has left a gap in the pattern; hforc passing to the find
stage it is desirable to pick up thc thrcad of evcnts in Europe
from the cnd of r9r4r, and carry it thoogh the intcrvd. To
avoid anticipating the fuller picttuc that emcrges from the
accounts of the generals, in Part III, this interim chaptcr will
be confincd to a brief indication of thc coursc of cvcnts, still
in terms of the chid military pcrsonalitics conccrncd. They
were "soldicrs in the shadowr" in a double sensc-for the
cloud of Hider's disapproval as wcll as the cloud of ddcat
overhrurg thcir course.

EAT,DEB's lrsf, IrP

In r94z the oprations in Russia were conducted by General

Franz tlalder, Chid of the Gcnerd Stafi, but subject to over-
.idirg dircctiacs from Hitlcr. Halder had a fine strategical
braio, and the acnral doign of the plans whic.h had proved so
55
 56 TrrB GEa,MAN GENERATs rAr.K-
successful earlier had been mainly his own work, rather than
the inspiration of brilliant assistants in the background. But
O.K.H., over which he presided after Brauchitsch's removal
was henceforth more definitely under the conuol of O.K.W'.,
which was scoffingly called "the military bureau of Corporal
Hider.'
In this difficult situation Halder mised the support that
Brauchitsch, by virtue of his authority, had formerly provided.
It had been more possible to argue with the Commender-in-
Chief of the rillehrmadt when bacled by the Crcmmander-in-
Chief of the Ar.y than it now became when the two were
one+.nd whcn that one was a man of Hitler's temperamcoL
Bctween Brauditscfi and Haldcr there was a harmony rare
in high quarters, and differences of view hardly ever arose.
According to other generals who knew them, the two had
worked so closely togpther that their respective functions and
influence could hardly be distinguished, though Haldcr tended
to bc the dominating mind. "What I{alder thought out,
Brauciitsch presented to Hitler. Hdder never saw Hitler with-
out Brauchitsch being present to support him." But hence-
forth Halder had to fight his batdes done.
The summer campaign of. ry42 had brilliant initial success
and bore evidence of mastcrly planning by Halder. An artful
delay in opening the campaign on the main front, coupled
with a sartlingioup against the Crimean peninsula, incited
the Russians to take the initiative with an offensive towards
Kharkov. Having got the southern Russian armies d..ply
embedded here, the main German offensive was launched past
their flank, and gained a clear run down the coridor benreen
the Don and the Donetz rivers. But after crossing the Iower
Don the German drive split in divergent directions under
Hider's interference. The prospects of the main advance into
the C,aucasus, and of securing the oilfields there, were sacrificed
to his desire to retrieve the ctreck suffered by the nrbsidiary
advance on Stalingrad, the original object of which had merely
bccn to secure flanL cover for the avenue of advance into the
 sq.DrERS rN IrrB STTADO\p 17,
Caucanrs.'W'orse still, Hitlerteyes bccamc as narrowly focr$ed
on Stdingrad as _ttrey had been on Moscow thc previous ycar.
Ih" ".tl'name of the city was a challenge to him-. Once alaiq
by the directness of his aim he helped tLe Russians to coicen-
trate their reserves to frustrate him,
As soon as it bccame clear that the eflort was losing mo
mentum, Halder argued that it should bc broken otf. Flitler
had grown increasingly impatient of his objections, and this
time his unwelcome advice led to his dismissal, at thc cnd of
Septembcr.

ZI[,NA,I;R

I{alder was replaced by Kurt 7*ie;ler, who had recently becn

Chief of Stafi in the Wese lhe fact that he had thus b*n out
of touctr with thc situation in the East addcd to his handicap
in taking over at such a aitical momcnt--aad lessened his
chance of disputing Hitlcr's vicw of it
7*ita,ler, a mu&. younger man, had been only a colonel
an infantry regiment beforc the war, but strbsc.
quendy became chid of stafi to Klcist's panzer army. It was
he who fouod a way to solve the problem of supplying ar.
moured forces during long-rurge advanccs and rapid Jwitihcs.
Able and energetig he was predominantly the "man of action"
type that appealed to the Nazi leaders, in contrast to thc "man
of reflection" represented in tlalder, who was a mathcma-
tician and botanist as wcll as a miliary writer of distinction
Less of a suategist tha" his prcdecessor, TAvler was an out
sandingly rcsourceful organizcr of strategic moves, with an
cxcepional grasp of what could be done with mectranizcd
forces. His brilliant salfwork in organizing arrd ssfulaining
the panzer drive through the fudennes and on throogh F"ao.e,
in r9r4o, had been excelled in the complex series of maneuvres
callcd for in r94r-when Kleisfs penTrr forces had first
swerved down through tLe lJkraine towards the Blac.k Sea, to
block Budcrury's retreat acro$ the Bug and the Dnieper; then
 58 TrrB GERMAII GENERATs rAr.r-
turned about and dashed north to meet Guderian and com-
pletc the vast encirclcment round Kicv; then been switchcd
south agai+ onto the rear of the fresh Russian forccs that were
attacling the German bridgehead over the Dniepcr at Dnepro
pecovsk; an{ after producing a Russian collapsc here, had
driven down throrgh the Donez Basin to cut ofi thc Rusian
forces near the Sea of Aznv. As Klcist emphasized to me, in
paying unstinted tribute to his chid of stafi, the biggesl prob
Iem in'throwing armics about in this sxy" was that of main-
aining supplies.
7*itzlefi performance attractcd Hitlcr's attention, and early
in ry,42 hc zummoned him for an interview. Hider's impres-
sioo was deepened by what 7*itzler told him of the emergency
mcasurcrl that had becn improvised, in thc rst Panzer Army,
to help the uoops thtough the rigours of the winter. It im-
proscd Hider dl thc more because he had deep co,nvi{o1
l
ihat Gcrman professional soldiers were too imbued with sealcd-
pattern methods, and could not imProvise. Soon aftcrwardg
-Zriu;lcr
was sent to be Chid of Staff in the rfllesg and reorgan'
ize the dcfcnces therc. In &ptember, after the repulse of the
Di.ppc landing, he was called back to the East, an{ told- by
Hitler that hJwas to become Chid of the C'encral Stafi. It
wirs a dazzlng jump for a young major-gencral
Hidcr's preference for younger men who understood mecha-
nized warfare, coupled with7*itilcr's practical rccord in that
field, might sufice to explain his selection-but it was not the
complete explanation. In placing such a i*i* general at th€
head of OJLH" Hitler hoped he would be so grateful to his
petron as to sink his professional loydty and become Hitler's
Lsrctrman as Keitcl and Jodl had done. In ridding himself of
Ilalder, Hider counted on relicf from the constart objectioos
he had endured from that'nrbulcnt pricst" of the established
militarv ordcr.
Monienarily, Zciulr* was dazz)ed. Thus he acquiesced in
the continuancc of the asault on Stalingrad, as wcll as the
advance in the Caucasus, until the bulk of the German te
 SOLDIENS IN TIIB SHTDO\r 59
lerves had been committed too far to be exricated-in so &r
as they had not already been consumed in vain cfiorts.
But his doubtg soon began to grow, and he questioncd the
wisdom of Hitlcr's intention to hold on to an idvanccd poi.
tion at Salingrad d*iog thc wintcr. When the Russian
counter-ofi-cnsivc began, he wanted to with&aw Paulus's army
immcdiately, but ftler
anfily refuscd. After that, friction was
frequent, for cven whcn Paultrs's aflny w:ls cncirclcd Hitler
would not agree that it should be ordued to abandon is posil
tion and 6ght its way out to thc we$ Aitrler was driv& o
tcndcr his resignation, but Hitlcr brushcd that aside.
_ Aftcr thc army at Salingrad had beco forced to surrcndci,
?Au)q managed to indrrcc Hitlcr to sanction withdrawals
from two dangerous salients in the north, f".ing Mocorr and
Ieningrad respectivcly. Ttis eased the strain and helpcd to
Eaintain that front inaa in facc of subscquent assaults, h-
sides rcleasing rcservc$ for clsewherc. But Hitler was galtcd
!f haying to make such an unconccalablc stepbac.k-&om
Russia's two grcatcst cities, and he would not ionsider any
gpn_*d strategrc withdrawal.T*iuf,cr. did not la& courage ii
{anding up to Hitler, but he had to fight his batdes doaq for
Kcitel and lodl dways ba&ed Hitler. Hc was the morc
handicapped in combating thcir influencc becausc th& oficcs
wcre at Hitlcr'g headquaners, whilc his was some distancc
1way. lut
thc scparation was morc than a matrer of mileagg
for as time went on and his protests multiplicd, Hitla's mil-
ner bccame disant when they met at tha daily confcrencec.
All this tendcd to augment thc influcncc of Generd fodt
thc chid of Hitlcr's pcrioml safi, and thus of Hitleds own
control ovcr opcrations. For lodl, who kept his place throrrglr-
9ut the war, wotld neyer have lasted so long if he bad iot
beeg adcg in'tecping his place" within thJtimis asigncd
to him, He was a firit-rate clcrk. 7Au)u, by contrasq-was
impulsive and far from subservient-fie frequently tost hi!
tcmper in arguing with Hider. But the latter sccnrs to have
bccn rducant to part with a man who was suc,h, a Easter of
 6 TrrB GERMAN GENEneT.s rAr.t-
mc&anized log"tio, with a practical capacity to solve movo'
ment problcms that neither Keitel nor fodl possessed_.
Thiend came early in ]uly, rgr44, soon after the collapse-of
thc armies on the Upper Dnieper. 7*itz;ler went to see Hider
privatcly and urged-hi- 1s sanction the withdrawal of the
iilorthein Army-Group, in thc Bdtic States, before it was
cncircled. Hidci refused, and then both men flared up. Having
had his resignation rejected several times, 7*itzlet went sicl as
the only w"y out of a responsibility he w1s unwilling t"jh"t9
any loriger.-Hitler took fus reYeng€ by depriving 7*itzlct-of
various pAvilcges of his rank, and thenby grYing the humiliat-
ing ordJr that-he was to bc discharged from thc fumy without
thi normal right to wear uniform.
GT'DEBIAN

To 6ll TAullers place Hitler cdled on an earlier and older

unk expert-Gudlrian That appointment shocked gany of
the members of the Gcneral Stafi, who regarded Guderian as
a one-sidcd cnthusiast for his specialty and a "t ull" on thc
battlefcld la&ing the strategical sense and balanced vicw
requircd in a Chiif of the Gcneral Stafi. The choice dcmon'
stratcd Hitla's instinctivc preference for revolutionary idex,
and his apprcciation of what he had owed to Guderian's-past
activitiesi it appcarcd to set t[e crown on the qreer of the
man who had-been thc pioneer in creating Germany's Paryer
forces, and then thc spearman of Germany's run of victorics.
Bug in reality, it proved more in the nature of window-
dressing.
For Hitler had long since taken the direction of the war
complctely into his own hands, and regarded O.K.H- as little
mori thrri a means of trans:mitting his orders to, and handling
the executive details of, the Eastern Front Even if Guderian
had been fitted by temPerirment and experience to !e Cry.f
of the General Stafi he would not have been allowed to olay
l Ttcsc arc related in Chaptcr Dt 'Thc Rise of Armour."
 sou)uns rN TrrB srrADo\r 6t
the part As-things werg he was doubly ctre&ed-{y an
-hi-,
atmosphere of profesional mistrust around and by Hitla
on top ef him.
His subordinates on the General SaII pauonizingly, and
139o rcsgndully, spokc sf him as "a fighting soldier, not a
War-Academy soldier." They were suspicious-of any sign of
his unfamiliaiity with their icctrnique.'Witn Hitler,J ba&ing
hc might have overcome such resiitance, but he soon foun8
clashing with Hidcr as wcll. It was difficult enough
ry-r#hir-*oy into office came whcn Germany's strength das
SI
cbbing bug mgre difficult still that it came lust after lhc plot
of luly zoth. Hider was row in suctr a mood of dis:tnrst ihat
hc was apt to gke any contrary opinion as a symptom of
treason. Some of the younger soldiers kncw how to diiarm his
sJsp.ugn$- qol4 arguc with hi- up to a point, but
"4
Gudcrian lackcd the knack
Guderian himsclf had aged, and mrrch of his origind vi-
tatity had bcen used up. He had partialty burnt himsclf out
in fighting continued batdcs against disbelievcrs and doubtcrs.
I* thc proccs$ dctcrmination had tendcd to degencrate into
obstinacy;-and
!oy- **gy, into irucibility<s oftcn happns
to mctr of his kind. Thc cramping circumstaoces of hiJ be.
Iated oppornrnity aggravatcd thcse iendcncies.
Nevertheless, this aposde of the new oficnsive gospcl seems
to have shown morc insight than his mastcr into ihc-ddcnsive
of thc sinration. &rly in 1944, when he was still
Inspcctor-Crcneral of the Panzcr Forceg he had urgcd Hidc
to carry out a strategic with&awal in the Easg and for tbat
purpo-se prcp:ue a srong rearward ddensive line dong the
r9r4o fronticr. Whcn he becamc Chief of the General StaE, the
front north of the Pripet lvlarshes had just previously col-
l.pr.-d, !u!,hq Russian food was eventualiy chaked on a line
not far behind what he had proposed. Sonie twcnty divisions,
however, had becn lost or had sacrificed their equipmcnt in
the hasty retreat that followed the collapse, and the breac.h
was only 6lled by rushing back panzer-divisions from Ru-
 & TTIB GERMAN GENERAIS TAI.T-

menia. The weakened front in that quarter soon collapscd,

and the collapsc was deepencd by Rumania's quick c-hange 9f
side.lAis opened the way for thc Russians to push-up tbroogh
the CarpaGans into Cenual Europe in a wide fanL march.
Guderian's aunrnn eflorts to consolidate tte new line cov-
cring East Prussia and Centrd Poland wcrc ham_pcrc4 not
only by thc drain of rcserves to bolstcr up -the H-ungar!tr
forccs, but by Hider's dcsire to attemPt another offensive in
thc'W'est Ali possible reserves were collccted for this drcam'
plan of "dunkirking" th" British again by another_S+
ihrust thro"gh thc Ardennes. Yet cven at this late stag_e, Hi lj"
would not usi-ten to arguments for withdrawing from the
Bdtic States, the Balkans and Italy in ordcr to providc re'
scrycs for the main front in the East
Whcn the Ardennes suoke had endcd in failure, Hitler
still resisted Guderian's arguments. Hc allowed only a Pdtry
reinforcemcnt to be sent casnrard, although Guderian warned
him that a fresh Russian oflensive vxs imminent there, and
that thc Gcrman front was not strong enough to hold out.
'Worsc still, that smdl addition was more than cancelled out
bv Hitler's order that tbrcc of the best armourcd divisions in
pfuana wcre to bc sent southward in a vain ofiensivc attemPt
to brcak thc Russians'encirding gtiP on Budapest
When the Russian ofiensive was launched on lanuary rzth,
Gudcrian had a mobile rescrve of only tn'clve divisions for a
front of nearly 8oo miles. Moreover, three days .rt-li.t,tdo
had refused liis apped for permission to forestall the Rus'
sians bv withdrawine from the threatened sdients. As a result
the frcrht in Poland-collapsed quiclly, and the Russians'on'
nrsh could not be stcmmcd until they had penetratcd deep
into Germany and reached the Oder. Here thcre was a mt>
mentary chance for a riposte, as they had outrun thcir sup
plies and their flanks weic exposed. Hider had now agreed to
ia."r. the 6th Panzrr At-f from thc West, but instead of
allowing it to bc uscd for this counterstroke be sent it to
Hunearl for another vain bid to rclievc Budapcst, He was
Iivid in a world of &eams, remote from rediw,
 SOLI)IE8II I}I 1IIB SIIADO\r 63

Reduccd to desperation, Guderian now acklod some of thc

othcr leading Nazis about the urgency of sccking peace. His
activiticssoon cirme to Hidcr's ears, and he was dismisscd from
h p*r, in Mardb barcly a month beforc thc 6nd collapr.
MA}iISItsIN

The ablest of dl the German gcnerals was probably-mo* Field-

Marshal Erich von Manstcin. That was thc vcrdict of of
thosc with whom I discuscd the war, from Rundstcdt down-
wards. He had a supcrb stratcgic sense, combined with a
greater of mechanizcd wcapons than any of
thc gencrals who did not bclong to thc t"nk school itsclf. Yct
in conuast to some of thc singlc-uac& cnthusiasts hc did not
losc sight of the of improving dternativc wcapor$
and ddencc. He was responsiblg sh*dy bcfore the war, for
dcvcloping thc armourod assault-gun, whic.h proved invduble
Iater.
A Lcwinski by birth, he had bcen adopted by the lt[anstcin
family as a boy. H. got an infantry commission shortly bdore
the r9r4 war, anq although too young to qudify for the Stafi
C,ollege, hc madc his mark on thc stafr of Gencrd von loos.
bcrg, who ia ryr7 produced thc new system of ddcnce in
depth. By ,gg5 Manstcin had bccome head of thc olrcrations
scction of thc Gcncral Saff, and ncxt yc:r was made D"puty
Chief rurder Bcck. But in Fcbnrary, rg3$ whcn Fritsfi was
oustcd ltfianstein was also removcd from OK.H.-+s anothcr
movc in opposition to OK.rff. and Nazi dcsigns.
He was scrt to command a division in Silcsia. Etrowever, on
the cve of war in ,939 hc was appointed Chid of Stalf to
Rundstedt's Army Group, which played the decisive rdlc in
the Polish campaign After that he accompanied Rundstcdt
to the West
Here he was the source of thc brain-wavc that produced
the ddeat of Francc-the idca of the ank+hnrst through thc
Ardcnnes. But his arguments only prevailed after he had paid
pcrsonal forfcit For the top military circles fclt that he war
 64 THE GERMAN GENEr^rs rArK-
too pushing, and at the end of |anuary, r94o, he was pushed
out of the way by sending him to co--and an infantry co{Ps,
the 38th-his request for a panzer corps being rejected on the
ground that he lacked cxperience. After his rcmoval he was
summoned to see Hider and seized the chance to explain his
idea. Hider agreed with it; a week later OJ(H. issued the
revised plan. Manstein's removal at least had the benefit of
sore feelings in Bock's Ar*y Group, which was re-
"ll"y*g
duced to a secondary r6le, by showing that Manstein's ad-
vocacy of transferring thc leading r61e to Rundstedt's At-y
Group was not for personal advantage. At the same time his
"brain-wave" proved so eflective in upsetting thc Frenctr that
his own absence from the steering-wheel was not seriously
missed.
In the fust stage of the campaigR, Manstein had no chance
to show what he could do as a commander of troops, for his
corlls w,ur merely among the bac"kers-up of the panzer drive.
But in the second stage, the atta& on the new Frenc,h defence
line along the Sommg his coqps was instrumental in achiev-
ing the first break-through, west of Amiens. Rommel's tanks
exploited the opening but Manstein raced them in the pursuit,
handling his infantry like mobile troops. His corps was the
first to reach and cross thc Seine, on lune roth-marching over
forty miles that day. IAcn, by rapid strides, he pushed on to
the Loire. After thag when it came to a question of invading
England, he was allotted the formidable task sf 6nking
the initial landing across the Straits of Dover, near Folke-
store. But that plan was stillborn.
Before the invasion of Russia he was given command of a
trew panzer corprthe 56th, in East Prussia. He broke tbroogh
the Russian front herg and raced on so fast that he reac.hed
the Dvina (nearly zoo miles distant) within four days<ap
turing the main bridges across it But he was not allowed to
pursue his drive towar& Leningrad or Moscow, as he wished
and had to wait on the Dvina for a week while the other
panzer coqps and the r6th Army came up. He then drove
as far again to reactr Lake Ilmen south of ktrgf.4 by Ioly
 sor.DrERn rN TrrB STIADOW 65

I5th, but was there chec,ked by Russian teserves that had row
had time to gather. In September he was promoted to com-
mand the rrth Ar-y, in the far south, and there opened the
gateyal to th9 Crimea, by breaking tlooogh the narrow and
fortffied lerekop Isthmus-a feat which provcd his mastery
of the technique of srege warfare.
When the invasion of Russia became stuck in the mud and
snow before Moscow that winter, and Hider sought a scapa
ggat_in sacking Brauchitsch, mrny of the youngergeneralrin
thc German Ar*y hoped that Manstcin woulil bJchosen to
succced him as C,ommander-in€hid. But Hider wanted to
TllTc -,hg po* himself. H9 thought of appointing Manstein
Chicf of the General Stafi, but felrhc mighi provieven more
difficult than Halder.
In the surlmer of. rc42, Manstein was responsible for thc
atta& on the famous foruess of Sevastopol, which preccdcd
the main offensive. His success in that task deprived the
Russians of their chid naval base in the Blac& Sea. After that,
he was chosen to command the attack on Leningrad with
forccs transferred for the purpose from one extreme flrnlc 16
the other. It looked
T thoogh his scope was to bc continually
limited by the skill he had shown in this spccialized r6le oi
siege tactics.
lvfanstein's mission
_went unfulfille4 however, for by the
time the forces were being moved to I-eningrad a call came
for them to go to Stalingrad, where Hitler's advance had
become stuck. Soon that impasse developed into a aisis, and
the army there was surrourrded. In thc-emergency lvlanstein
wt gtven an improvised force, cdled Army-Group ..Doq'
and sent to the rescue.
It was too late and the effort failed-after some of the most
breathless cut-and-thrust in the war. In the zubsequent retreat
be rdlied the cra&ing line and prevented the Russians crosg
ing the Dnieper. lt dazzlng countcr-stroke threw them ba&
a loqg way and recaptured Kharkov, in March, r9r43. Manstein
now commanded Army Group "South." lhat summer, itr
 6 TIIB GERMAN GENEBAIS TALK-
*Ccntre"), he dcliv-
combination with Kluge (Army Group
cred Germany's last offensive in the East
He had proposed altcrnativc courscs. One was to suike early
ir M"y before the Russians were ready, and dislocate thcir
preparitions by a pincer-stroke against the Kursk salient. The
other-which he thought better-was to wait for the Rus-
sians' ofiensive, recoil before it, and then launch a flank stroke
from the Kiev area to roll up their line. Hitlcr rejected the
latter, fearing to nrn the risks involved in such a daring stra-
tcgic gambit But after choosing thc former hc postpon.d +.
atacb-just as it was about to be launched-with the idca
that by waiting until his own sucngth had increased he would
re-insure his cLanccs. In thc cnd he waited until |uly before
striking<nd the Rusians profitcd more by the delayr AL
,horgf, thc southern pinccr (Mansteinls) penctratcd fairly
dccp,the northern one was blunted by th9 combined terycity
and eluticity of the Rusian ddencer and thcn brokcn by -a
flank counter-stroke on the part of the Russians. This dcvel'
oped into a general counter-offensivg whic.h the Germans no
lorg* had the suength to resist
Irlanstein showed gFeat ski[ against heavy odds, in con'
ductingthe stepby-step reEeat to the Polish frontier. But Hider
would-not listcn io his arguments for shaking ofi the Russian
presstrre by a long step-bac}. The vigour with whictr he argued
Lccamc ari incrcasing annoyance to Hitlcr, who finally shelved
him in Marcb rg44, n favor of Model-saying that stubborn
resistancc yard by yard was more needcd than skill in m+
neuwe. Ah underlying factor in the dange was Hitler's and
Himmler's political diJtrust of Manstein. That ended the mili.
ary carecr of the Allied most formidable military oPPonent
i man who combined modern ideas of mobility with a
classical sense of maneuvre, a mastery of tcchnical detail, and
great driving power.
- Dwelling iegredully on Manstein's disappearance from the
field, Blumenfrtt said to me: "He was not only the most
brilliant suategist of all otr genuals, but he had a good
 SOLDIERS IN TflB srrADorr e7
politicat sensa A man of that quality walr too dificult for
Hitler to swallow for long. At -conf&cnccs lvlanstcin oftcn
diffcrcd from Hider, in front of others, and would go so far
as to dcclare that some of the idcas whic.h Hitlcr put-forward
wcrc nonsctrsc."

TLUGB

Hitlcr had lost his other hst-knonn commander in the Eut

a few months carlicr, whcn Kluge was injurcd in an air crash.
But in thc summcr of. rc4+when hc was 6t again, Hitler found
fresh room for him-in thc West Hc was-scnt to s'upcrsedc
Rundstedt as C.ommandcr-in-Chid therc.
Field-Marshd Guenther von Kluge was the only survivor
of the original arny comnanders-with whom Hitler em-
barLed o! war in rglg In thc Polish c^-Faign, thc Frcnch
c^mFaignr and the r94r campaign in Russia f,e comrnandcd
the Fourth Army. In thc first and the third he had bcen in
Boc}'s Army Group, and had been cntrusted with the of-
fcnsivc against Moscow, o,ur though he did not share the
optimism- of Hidcr and Bock. While he was a strong p€r-
?on"lity, it-was testimony to his forbering temperamcrit ihat
he endurcd Bock so long-for Bock was a vcrydificult man
to scrve. In thc samc way Klogp had srrficicnt'mord courage
to cxpress his views frankly to Hidcr, yet hc also rcfrainil
from pressing his views to th9 point oi hing troublesome.
After Bock war put-o-n the she$ early in 1942, Kluge succccdcd
him in command of the C,cntral Army Group Therc he crcatcd
a well-woven ddcncc that withstood lu.ccsive Russian assaultc
during the next two years.
His ddcnsive succcsses, together with his temperament and
loy.lty, naftrdly recommendqd him to Hider-when Rund-
stedt and Rommcl f"i!{_1"-giv-c satidaaion by achio,ing the
impossibl*and causcd Hitler furthcr annoyance by pointinq
out the incviable. By the time Kluge took oi,er, the Ailies hai
pourd such a volume of forcc into thcir *l*gFd Normandy
 68 rrrE GERIVTAN GENEMTs TAr.K-

bridgehead that the sheer weight of it was soon bound to

burst the too cxtensive dam with which thc Germans were
trying to conain it Three we*s later it collapsed at the west-
ern end under the fresh imFact of Patton's American Third
Ar-y. But Hider still forbade any withdrawal.
Kluge was too obedient to disregard suctr definite instruc-
tions. One eflect was seen in the attcmpted counter-stroke on
August 6th against the bottlcnecl at Avranctres through which
Patton's forces had poured out. Shrewdly aimed +his stroke
could havc been dcadly if the panzcr divisions there employcd
had bccn strong in tanks; but in thcir diminished statc its
ctrances were dcsperatcly smdl, cvcn bdorc it was broken
up by conccntrated air attack. Worse still, thc Gcrman forccs
were not pcrmitted to break away from the clinch whcn thir
forlorn hopc miscarried. Although retrcat was now incviablg
cvery with&awd was f.ally latc and short In conscquencq
the battle cnded in a gcncral collapse of the German armier
in France. When this dcveloped Hider sa&cd Klugc and
appointcd Fidd-lvfarshal Model to replacc him.
-Rhg"
took his dismissd with apparent caln, spcnt a day
and a Lalf explaining thc situation to his successor, then quicdy
sct off for home and swallowed a capsulc of poison on the
way. That action was dug not to his chagrin at the cnding of
his career, but to his anticipation that he would be arrestcd on
arriving home. For he had been in close cotrtact, and sympathy,
as early as rg42 with the conspiracy that culminatcd on |uly
nth, rg44, in the attempt to ovcrthrow Hitler. Character-
istically, he had rcfrained from committing iimsclf, but he
kncw that his name had been found in the documcnts wheo
the plot was investigatcd after thc attempt had failcd.

MODEL

Wdter Model was fifty-four, a decade younger than most of

the German hrgher commanders-whose average age had
remained much higher than in the opposing armies. Nor did
he come from the same social level. In this as in otber re
 sor.DrEBn rN TrrE srrADow 69

pects he had many similarities to Rommel thoogh he had

p:ofited by a more thorough professional grounding. Whcn
the big expansion of thc army began, with the Hider r6gime,
Model worked under BraucJritsch in the training department
of the War Ministry', and there established close touch with
the Nazi lcadcrs. He made a strong impression on Goebbcls,
who introduccd him to Hider. Later he was put in charge of
the invcntions department His tecinical knowledge-was
scanty, but he made up for it by imagination and energy, so
that, dthough his enthusiasm was apt to misl6xd him-as to
the practicability of various ideas, he did a lot towards devcl-
oping ncw forms of cquipment.
After being chid of staff of the 4th Corps in the Polish
campaigp, and then of thc r6th Army in the Frcnch cam-
paign, hc was given command of thc yd Panzer Division. In
thc invasion of Russia he distinguishcd himself by hir thnrst-
ing power, and Ied the way in the racc to thc Dnieper. His
entreme etrergy won quick promotion-first to a panzer corps
and theo, in thc wintcr, to command of an army, the 9th. He
showcd muc.h ability hcre in a ddcnsivc rdle under fficult
conditions and was'..*g the frst to dcmonstratc the valuc
of tanls in ddence, notably by diggrg them in as mi',iature
movable "hedgchogs."
In ro€ he was cast for a lcading r6le in the summer of-
fcnsiveas thc northern arm of the pincer-stroke against thc
Kursk salient Herc he lost the best chance by persuading
Hider--<ontrary to the opinion of Kluge and Manstein-to
postpoDe the stroke so :uf to accumulate more tanks and
strengthen the punctr. The dday gave the Russians time to
prepare, and Model's eventud attack failed at heavy cost, to
break through their well-knit elastic defence. But he did well
in ctrecling the dangerous Russian oIlensive that followed,
and in October lras promoted to command Army Group
"Northr" where he conducted the with&awd from Lenin-
grad and stabilized the front on the line Narva-Pskov.In Apr{
ro44, he was transferred to Army Group "Southr" in place of
Manstein, and parried the Russian thrust towards the Car.
 70 TlrB GERMAN GENEX.ATS TAr.B-

pathiatr passes. In late lune the Rusians' summer offensivc

ias launched against At-y Group "Centrer" which sPecSI
collapsed. Modelwas sent totakc it ovcr. |ust as he had checked
the flussians along the line of the Vistula, hc was dcspatctred
to ded with the crisis in the Wcst.
After the failure of the luly zoth attemPt on Hitler's li[e,
Modcl had given a lcad in reproclaiming his faith i" ,h9
Fiihrer, andiad sent the first-telegram of loydty received
from the Eastern front. That assurance reinforced Hitlcr's
confidencc in his military gifts. But Model was also onc of
the few who ventured t6 ilisregard Hider's instnraions and
act otr his own judgment.
i
In talLing to oi-b.r of generals who had scrvcd under
him, I fouid that all paid triSute to his Po\rer of command
,tiL emphasizing thai he was difficult bci$ as a supcrior and
subordina:te. trlan[ufiel said of him: "Model was a very good
tactician, and bctter in defcnce than in attac.k. He had a knac;k
of gaugrng what troops could-do, and what they could n-ot do.
ffl m-anicr was rough, and his methods \perc trot always
acceptable in the hig[er quarters oI the German fu-gy, byt
thct'werc both to ffdat-tifing. Model stood up to Hider in
a w"v that hardly anyone else dared, and evcn rcfuscd to carry
out ordcrs with;hdh he did not agree."
In the Wcst it qrss mainly owing to his cfiorts and his
extraordinary capacity for scraping uPrcsclvcs, from an almost
bare cupboai4 illat the shattcred-drman forccs succccdcd in
actrievirig their astonishing rdly on the German frontier and
fnrsuatiig the Allies .*p.ctation of complete in the
auhrmn of. rcq+ He also played thc principal executivc part
in checling the Allies' later ollensivcs and in the Gcrmans'
Ardennes lounterofiensive of December+lthough the nr'
preme direction of these fiyl gpgatignt -r" S. for
'Germanv" Hitler
was in the hands of-Rundstedt For had
called Uicl Ae "Old Guard" at the moment whcn Gcrmetry
sccmed about to fall
 VII
..THE OLD GUARD"-RUN{DSTEDT

,HE WHEEL IIAD @ME TUI.L CIRCIA. IN TIIE BR.AI{TIC EFTORT rc

restorc the army's confidence Hitler was &iven to put
-I
bac&, h the chid miiit ry placc the man who, above all othLs,
reprcscntcd the old Gcrmany and the miliary tradition-with
its devotion to duty, politicd conservatismr- professional cx-
clusivenesg aod contempt for amateurs in suatcgy an repre-
sented by Hidcr. Morcover, Gerd von Rundstedt was a gpo,to
tna! to the core. His natural dignrty and gmd manners in-
qpircd the rcslrcct even of thosc who dilfereilwidely from him
in views. To su& an essential aristocrat the democracT of the
Wcimar Republic had been unpalatable, but hc had found
thc manners of Nazism far morl disastcful.
Now close on his seventieth ycar, he was almost the same
agp_as Hindcnburg had hen on attaining supreme command
in the-last yar. Age and achievement had simitarly combincd
to makc him 1 national idol on something appr6aching thc
same scdc. But he was a far abler soldier than-Hindenbure-
ablcr even than the combination of Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff-while his actrievcments were intrinsicdly finer. That
was symbolizcd in the contrast that his face and figurc pra
sented to theirs. As forceful as they had been, in a-morJro
6ncd way, he was lean, ascetig and thoughtful in appcarane
T
 T2 TIIE GERMAN GENEMLS TALK-

his thought was confined to his prof991ion. In his

-thoughto the At.y, and to Germany, an overriding scnse of
devotioi
duty had led him toswallow much that he would have liked
to ipit out. Here was the root of an inner conflict which
reveiled itself in tfie career and in the countenance of this
military priest He despised politics, but they kept on intrud-
ing into his seclusion.
hy ,g?, after successive promotionsr -he became Chid of
the firii Ar-y Group Command, cgvering gflil Almost at
once he unwittingly acquired a political smell, for it fell to
him 6 carry out the orders of the new Chancellor, Papcrg to
evict the Social-Democratic Ministers of Prussia when thcy
rdused to quit office. Then Papen overeaded himself and
was succeedid as Chancellor by Gcneral von Sctrleicher. But
Sc.hleicher could not gain sufrcient political suPPort to main'
ain his position, and thus the way was opened for Hider to
become ehancellor and abolish all parties other than the Nazi
Rundstedt did not like the way thingp had turned out, and
he definitely disliked both the social rims and the manners of
the Nazi leaders. But he found satisfaction in the vehcment
campaign of the Nazis for military expansion, and was even
bctt& Content when the purge of fune 3oth, 1934, curbed thc
powcr of the storm-trooPers. It seemcd a healthy srgn to his
iimple soldierly mind that so many military Pretcnders \f,ere
wiped ofi the slate and the professional army frecd from the
menace of sud "brown dirt " as he descrfued t[em.
Hc was now able to devote his attention to the develop
mcnt of thc Army. In the -ilit"ty sphere he was primarily
concerned to revive the power of the irrf*tty', and their
confdence in themselves, by modernizing their equipment
as well as their training. For while he was receptive to the
new ideas of mechanized warfare, and followed with keen
interest the British theories and experiments, he was not otrc
of those who fervendy embraced them. Rather, he was one
of thc more progressive leaders of the school that regardcd
 ttTtrE
or.D GUArDtt-Rtn{DslrEf[,
73
anks as useful servants, not as the future mastcrs, of the
battlefield.
He believed that there was more value in motorization and
multiplied firc-power to improve the capacity of the existing
arms than in producing completely mechanized forces. Be.
sidcs_his po.tql steps
!o overcome the "machine-gun paraly-
sis" that the infantry had suflered in the last war, he initiated-a
propaganda campaign to cure their infcriority complex. But
he was too nearly a scientific soldier to go so far as the British
generals who in ro3t4 contrivcd that the big exercise of thc
squon should show that an infantry division could pardyze
an armoured division-and thercby helped to postpone the
formation of Britain's fust armourid division foi thlee years
more. Rundstedt favoured the creation of armoured divisions
in the German Army, providcd that the proportion was not
I"luly high 3nd did not hinder the re+quipment of the
infantry mass. In 2m, the extent of his vision and that of his
school accounts for the superiority which the German Army
enjoycd against France in r94o, while the limitations of theii
vision explah why it fell short of the te&nicd zuperiority that
was needed for victory over Russia in r9r4r.
-At
thc star-t oJ r9S8 lis concentration was disnrbed by *-
9$9r political shock, when Himmlcrs mac.hinations proiidcd
Hitler with an excuse to tunr out Fritsd, the head of thc
Ar.y, at the same time as Blomberg, the head of the wholo
rymed forceq and himself assume the supreme command.
Rundstedt protestcd to Hider against Fritsd's treatment, bug
dthgugh Fritsch was acquitted of the moral charge framed
lgpsl him, suctr acquittal did not alter the faa thit his post
had already been filled. A few months later Rundstedt en-
dorsed the warning mcmorandu- drafted by B..h the Chid
of the General Stafi, in an attempt to put a-brake on Hider's
war-risking policy4ut that protest merely led to Beck's re-
moval. In the autumr, after the occupation of the Sudeteor
Ian4 Rundstedt asked and obtained p-ermission to retirg oo
the plea of age.
 74 rrr8 GERMATV GENERAIS TAr,K-

In August, r93g he was calied bac;k to take command of

an anny Soup on the Polish fronL His obediencc to that
sunlmons may seem hard to explain, since he had long in-
sisted that a primary principle of German policy must be to
avoid another war with England. It was a questionable con
ception of pauiotism which required hi- to akc a leading
part in the kind of war which he had predicted as likely to
prove faal to Germany in the end. To account for it, we need
to underst*rd the extremely strait rule of soldierly duty and
obedience in which he had been brought up. Beyond that may
have hen the psychologol factor that any ardent soldicr 6nds
it hard to resist a professional
oppornrnity.
That oppornrnity he certainly ful611ed for it was the army
group he commanded whic,h brilliandy carried out the de-
cisive moves in the conquest, frst of Poland and then of
France. Yet there werc signs that the glory and the plcasure
*
\rtrc spoilt for him by undalying disquietude. In the Rus-
sian campaign of r9r4r he again proved the outstanding figrg
by hir direction of the sweeping olrcrations that oveftuned
the Russian armics in the south and gave Germany posscssion
of the mineral and agiculnrral riches of thc lJkraine. But
this time cven the victories fell short of being a complete
success, and in that fdling short presaged ultimate disaster.
Rnndstedt was quick to see con6rmation of the apprehcnsionr
whi& had impelled him, bdorehand to ofier Hitler unwcl-
come advice against attacling Russia. Whcn the qucstion of
continuing thc advance on Moscow was discusscd in the au-
tumn, Rundstedt argucd in favour not merely of a hdt but
of a withdrawal to the original starting-line. That advicc was
still more unwelcome to the Fiihrer. At the sa-c time Rund-
stedt was growing more and more impatient of "Corporal"
Hidcr's interfercncc in operationd details. Evennrally, at the
end of Novemhr, Rurdstedt replied to one of Hider's ordcrs
by telcgraphing bacl that, if the Fiib:er did not susl him rq
sury out the operation as he judged best, thc Ftihrer should
6nd someonc else to take command. The offer of rcsignation
 "mrg oro GarAnD"--f,ullDs:truf T5
was accepted by Hitler with equal alacrity; Rundstedt's doubts
and protests had been ftting on his nerves, which wcre
alrcady strained by thc way that victory was cluding hir gp.ry.
But Rundstcdt was not ldt long on the shclf. Early in r94a
Hider asked him to take ctrarge in the Wat, and overcamc his
hesiation by cmphasizing thc notc of oationd duty. The cntry
of the Unitcd Sates into the war created thc poisibility thit
American armies might orcntually jump off from Britain to
invadc the Continenq and Rundstcdt \ras vcry conscious of
that risk. Hc spnt the next two years in prcparation for the
danger he feared a1 wcll as in wrcsding wit[ the civil prob
Icms arising out of the Gcrman occupation of Franca and
the Low Countries. In Inne, ro4+ the danger mattred" That
-
part of thc story has alrcady bcen outlined"
Rundstcdt was in rctircment on the fatd luly zotlr, so that
he had no c.hancc of giving thc army a lead agiinst the Nazi
t6g . whcn thc first tdegraphic mcssage of ihe conspirators
-+ayiqg that Hitler had becn killcd-reached thc high& hcad-
quarters in thc East and the Wcsr It is thus imposs-ible to say
whcthcr he would havc actod dillcrcntly frod most of thl
otha high commanders-who, whatcvcr-their intentiong bc"
came paralyz*d x sooD ils sccond rq,orts indicated that Hitlcr
was still alive. Rundstedt was not associatcd with the plot, and
that is significane
Whilc many soldiers, knowing his repqgnance to Nazism,
i
lad beeg looking to him to givc thcm lead against HitLr,
thosc who knew him best do not seem to have [ad any snrch
idea. In the 6rst place hc was regardcd ar a mrn so stiaight-
forward, so strict in his conccption of the soldicrly cod; of
honour, as to be unsuiable to piticipate in a conspiricy which
requircd nrbdety. Secondly, hcausc of the symEolcil vduc
of his reputation, they wanted to teep it clear 6f the incviablc
aint that any plot carries, cven though irc objea may be good.
Beyond that he was more closcly watched than otheis, becausc
oi his cminencg by the network of Nazi spics in whic.h dl
the generals werc envdoped.
 ?6 ITIE GERMAIY GENERAIS TAI.I-
At the seme time a number of the generals had hoped that
Rundstedt would bring about an armistice with the British
and Americans, or at least allow them an unopposed entry into
Germany, in order to checl the Russians. That hopg w1s
quenched by his rcmoval early in ]uly, though it revived with
his recall in September. In the meantime Kluge had con'
tcmplatcd a similar step or luly zoth, but had hesitatcd to
attempt it. The reasons for his hesitation were, first, ,h.! it
would be a breach of the oath of loyalty to Hider; second, tfiat
thc German people had been kept so much in the dark that
thcy would not support such an action; third, that thc soldiers
on the East front would reproach thc Wcst front for bcuay'
ing them; fourth, the fcar of going down to history as a
traitor to his country. It was natural that such rcstraining con'
siderations should have even more influence on a man like
Rundstcdt whcn he was su--oned back in thc Scptcmbcr
crisis.+part from the practicd difficulties of aking suci a
step whcn under close survcillance. As a result of ttul psycho
log.l conflict betwcen his judgmcnt and his sense of duty, as
will as Hitler's continucd intcrfcrence at evcry turn, he was
virtually in a state of impotence during the autumn months
when the Allies imagincd him to bc condrrcting the Gcrmao
defcnce in thc'W'esL
His conncction with the so<dled "Rundstedt offcnsivc" of
December in the Ardennes was hardly more than that of a
distant and doubting obsener. The project was purely Hitler's
in respect of aim, timing and placethough improved by the
tec.hnical suggestions of Manteuffel, commanding the Fifth
Panzcr fumy. The execution was in the hands of Modcl and
his trro principal subordinates, Manteuffel and Sepp Dietrich,
commander of the Sixth Panzer At*y.
Late in October Hider sent his plan to Rundstedt It had
the s"-e basic pattern as the r94o masterpiece. It was designed
to profit by the way that the Allies had co--itted their
strength to the push through the Belgian plain towards
Aa&en and Cologne, and were unlikely to exPect a German
 "THE or.D G{rAnD"-*tnlDsatrDT n
counter-offensivc at this time, particularly in the Ardcnnes-a
psychological calculation that again proved correct. The main
eflort was to be a doublc-pronged thnrst by the Fifth and Sixth
Panzcr Armies, with the aim of breaking through the wcak
Amcrican front in the Ardennes, then whieling riorth to cross
thc Meuse and converge on Antweqp. The Sixtf, Paw*s Army
w:ls to movc on the inner arc of the wheel, past Liege, and thl
Fifth Panzer on the outer arc, pasr Nirmur. The Fifteinth Ar.y
\ras to help the Sixth Panzer Ar-y by a flank thrust north oi
Li.g., whilc the Seventh Army wils to provide flank covcr
for the Fifth Panzer Army as it wheeled north.
!y tfir scythc-like sweep Hider hoped to cut off Montgom.
cry's Twcnty-fust Army Group from its bascs and from it!
American allies, driving it to a Dutch "DunLi'k" evcn if he
could not annihilate it Britain was now out of reach, but her
armies wcrc not-+nd thcy were the closen target of his final
fling. But Hitlcr's cxecutivc commanders dl regardcd the aim
as far too ambitious for the resources.
Realizing that a dircct protest was hopeless, Rundstcdg
Modcl, and }vfanteuffel agreed in proposing a morc modest
dtcrnativc plan-to pin& off the American salicnt east of the
Meuse, around Aacicn. But Hitler rcjected any suc.h limia.
tion of aino, thorgh Mantcufrel persuaded him to accept
ccrtain changes of timing and method-for Hider was always
more rcceptivc to the arguments of the youngpr generals than
to thosc of the older generals, and rcady to -listm to original
ideas when he was deaf to counsels of taution. 1Ac changes
increased the chances of initial surprisc, but they could notin
crc:ule the ultimate c.hances.
The offensive was a gamble-at long odds. Alt the higher
executants realized that Germany was playing her last trump,
and that she had not the resources to provide more than-a
slender chance of success-unless the ofiensive wzs eccortr
panied by extraordinary lu& or the Allied commanders were
extraordinarily inepe That redization was not a good founda-
tion for an offensive. In the event, the stroke thriw the Allics
 78 mrr GERMAN GBNTRATs rna-
ofr their balance suficiendy to put them in serious di6orlties
and undue danger. But the German forces were so diminished
in strength that they could not afford anything like the normal
proportion of ctrecks and slips that occur in the nrn of any
offensive. Manteuffel almost reachcd the Meuse, but Scpp
Dictrich, who had a larger suength and a shortcr distancc to
gor ran into trouble sooner; and when the reserves were
switchcd to back up Mantcuffel it was too late for any great
results in the facc of the Allics'prompt countcr-measurcs. Thc
oficnsive fcll far short of its aimq and when it cndcd it had
fatally impovcrished Germany's reservcsr leaving hcr no chance
of long<ontinucd ddence.
PART II
PRELIMINARIES TO T$(/AR
 VIII
THE RISE OF HITLER

rrllE SITORY Op HmrR'S ENlR'r INIO FOWER IIAS BEEN TItr.D

I from many angles, but not from that of the Reichswe.hr.
Its chiefs have been chargcd with aiding and abctting his
mtrI', but remarkably little evidencc has been produccd to
support this accusation.
It is obvious that the oficers of the Reidsrehr wcre bctrG.
ficiaries, in their professional prospects, from the cx,pansion
of the forces that followed Hider's advenL Morcovcr, Blom-
bcrg and other generds have admitted that they originally
welcomed his r6gime bccause it released Gcrmany and the
Army from the shac.kles of the Vcrsailles Trcaty. That was
a very Datural attitude on the part of keen profesional soldierq
thorgh one that many of them lived to regrcL Others, with
more foresighg were apprehensive from the start, for thcre
was good reason to assumc that thc amateur or "displaccd"
soldiers who lcd the S.A. would not be content, once their
Party was io power, to see military ofice remain a privileged
prescrve of the traditionally conservative Reichswehr.
But evidence that a considcrable number of oftcers were
favourably disposed towards Hitler's rise is not equivdcnt to
evidence that they were instnrmenal in aidi"g hG arrival in
still less that the Army in its corporate sense wag
 8z rrrr GBRM N GENERATs TAr.B-

instrumcnal. For that would only have bcen practicable if

thosc who were then in conuol of the At^y were favourably
disposed. On this score the cardinal facts seem to point the
other wap The political head of the Army at this crucid
period was General von Sctrleicher, who had becn made
Reicissrchr Minister in Papen's Cabinet; under him on that
side came Colonel von Bredow, the Chid of the Ministerid
Safi (the Ministeramt, which was latcr developed into the
High Command of the WehrmadQ. The military head of the
Army was General von Hammcrst€ti (Chd dcr Hccrcs-
lcitung).
Not long after Hitler came into power, Hammerstein was
removed from the command of the At-y.1hen, in the bloody
purge of Junc aoth, 1934, Schleicher and Bredow were mur-
ilered. Such treatment is presu-ptive evidence in zupport of
what other soldiers say-that they had tried to Prevent the
Nazis'risc to power.
Gcneral Riih,ri&t, who was one of Sctrleicher's assistans at
the time gave me an account of this critical phasg as well as
subsequent phases of thc conflict between the generds and
Hider. TVhile it runs counter to outside impressions it de-
scrvcg consideration as to testmony of one of thc few surviving
witnesses who were on the inside of evcnts d*iog the decisive
weeks.
In his preliminary remarks R6,hricht sketded the personali-
ties of Sctrleicher and Elammcrstein This was the dcscription
of Schleictrer-"He was not so much a soldier as an cxpcrt in
home politics, thoogh not tied to any party. He was very
sympathetic towards, and popular with, the trade unions,
while suspected by the C,onservatives on account of his tendency
to social rdorms. He was anything but a 'funker.' A o.rrt
skilful and astute political actician, but without thc pcr-
sondity of a statesman that was needed at this pcriod." Sped<-
ing of Hammersteh, Rdhdcit said-"He was gifted and ex-
tremely clever, politically level-headed but a lazy soldier. Hc
 rrrB RrsB oP rrman 83

was strongly opposed to National Socialism, and followod

Scileictrcr's politicd @urse."
Rilhricht's narrativc follows:

Thc Scqrcrcc of Etcttts

In their strugglc with the National-socidist Party the Papen

&hleicher Government dissolvcd the Reidsag and rcsigncd
October, ryEzTbe clcctionq in sprte of an obvious loes of
-in
votes for the NationalSocidists, rcsulrcd in a Parliamcnt with-
out aoy clear basis of coofdcncc and definite majonty either
for Papcn or for the Opposition-whid was split into Right
and Lcft. At first the Prcsident intended to charge Papcn ancw
with forming thc Crovernment But thcre was high rcnsisn
with all circlcs of revolutionary opposition. During thc Bcrlin
transport worLcrs'strikc in Novcmber, 1934 cobperation bc-
fireen C,ommunists and Nationd-Socidists was appareoL This
had to be rcgardcd as a critical symptom"
Based qa this alarming sinration, a confcrencc and map
exercisc was hdd about the zoth November at the Ministeramt
of thc Rcicbswebr Ministry, in conjunaion with the Irftfstry
of thc Interior, in ordcr to cxamine thc question whcthcr the
armcd forccs of thc Satc would be suficicnt to break a simul-
taneow rcvolutionary asault by the cxtrcmists of both the
Right and thc Lft This sinration sccmed likcly to arisc if e
ncw Papen Govcrnment rclicd cxclusivcly on the Conscrra
tivc Right (Deusch-Nationalc), thc Stahlhclm includerl
Thc conclusion reached at this confcrence was that a gc['
cral transport workcrd strile would peru!lar- thc entirc strue
ture and organization of thc Sate and of thc armed forccE
For the Rcichswehr was only motorized to a slight cxtcng and
irc cmergency-units for tc&nical work (Technische Nothilfe)
were not inan eftcient sate.In &hleictrer's opinionwe oughtto
avoid a sittration where the troops had to 6re on their own
Gountrymert" He did not went to "sit on bayonets."
At this Eoment, vcry muci against his wrll Schlei&cr war
 84 TtrE GERMAN GENERAT.S rALt-
&iven to take over the office of Chancellor hitnself, with the
idca that it would be for a limited timc. Inasmuch as he was
not-like Papen-regarded as a representativc of conservativo
reactionary &cles, but as a neutrd soldier, he was acccpted ar
a lesscr evil by the Crntre Party and the Social-Democrats. The
Nationd-socialists dso acquiesced-regarding this stopgap
arrang€mcnt as a possible stepping stonc to theL_own coming
into powa. Thus his appointment at the end of November had
a calming cffect and provided a breathing _sPac9. - _
Schleiclcr planned to break the onslaught of the Natio:raL
Socialists by lpfitting up their faction in the ReichTag.-The
moment ti.-.d faiouiable, as the Party was badly disap
pointed by their elcctoral setbac,k and woricd with financial
difficulties. Ncgotiations started with Strasscr and about:rghty
other M.P.s. tre opening of the Reictrstag was delayed.
The prospect Iooked bctter still when, at the teginning of
Deccmbcr, i success was gained in the sphere of fotergn allairs
Confcrence (presumably under thc prcs'
-thc Disarmament developmcnt in Germany) co-r
snre of the stormy domcstic
ceding to Gcrmany the right of military equality on principle.
Bui from the start Schlcicher met with violent opposition
from thc Conservatives (Deutsch-Nationale) because his pro-
gramme contained far-reaching social reforms. Thercupon
Schleictrer thrcatened to disclosl ncpotism in thc usc of thc
Eastcrn Rclid funds (Osthilfc). Thc President-who, otr ac'
count of his agg was no longer capable of clear judgemcnt-
fcll under thi influence of his contemporary conservative
friends, who accused Schleicher of "Bolshevist" tendencies and
spread the suspicion that he wanted to Pervert the Army- for
bis own political aims. At the same timc Papen started an
intrigu*negotiating with Hitler$y which he hoped to come
badiinto powa with the aid of the National-socialists, but
in the end was cheated himself.
The Hindenburg-schleicher crisis reacted on Schleicher's at'
tempt to split thJNational-socialist P.tty-by wrecking thc
discussions, which had opened with good ProsPects.
 TrrE RrsE oF rrrrr.En 85
Sc"hleicher's situation, therdore, soon appeared hopelcss-

1o .slpport by th. President, no prospects of a majority in

Parliamena On |anuary z6th or zZth Generat von Hammer-
stein, the Chid of the Army Co--and . .. attempted oncc
more for the last time to the President's mind. He was
"h*g
sharp-1y-rebuffed. &hleicher's rcsignation on the zgth fanuary
was followed by Hitla's appointmetrt as Chancellor on Iand-
ary 3oth.
With General von Schlei&er the only Chancellor who arosc
from the Wehrmadt was ovcrthrown. Schleicher wili mtlr-
dered at the 6rst suitable moment (3oth |une, 1934) by agens
of $e Nazi Party, togpther with Coloncl von Brcdow-(.pp.-
ently overrated as a politician) and Strasser.
By Hider's appointment the Reictrsn'ehr lost their hitherto
oirtirg monopoly as the f,nd and decisive instrument of the
Government Their r@rooo men were distributed in small units
dl over the Rei&, whercas the Party dominatcd thc entirc
apparann of the Sate, dl the means of uansporg public com-
munications and utilitics, the opinion of the man in the strcctr
and a large part of the working class lhe Ar-y had lost its
rmPortance.
In view of these evcnts and facts I vetrture to suggest that it
is historically falsc to charge the Wcbrmaclt tilh havrng
assistcd Hider in his coming into power. The facts point to
thc contrary.

In this connection I would like to 6=amine the qucstion,

whether there was the posibility for the Reic,hswehr to rise in
open rchllion.
The circles around Schlei&er and llammerstcin, during thc
critical days and aftcr the Nazi Party camc into power, consid-
ered the possibility of a coup d'tt* by the Reidswehr but rc-
jected the idea as hopeless.
These were the rcasons. Hider had been appointcd ChanceL
Ior by the Presidetrt as leader of the suongesi pafty according
to thc constittrtion-therdore at first in a wholly legal manocr.
 86 mrl GERMAN GENERATs rAr.K-

A cottp tttat by the Reichswehr ordered by Gencals von

&hleicher and von Hammerstein-who were but litdc known
by the rank and file-would have appeared to be not only
alainst thc ncw Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg Cabinet byt also
.g"inr, the gready respected person of their universally ven'
crated Commander-in{hief, the President A political dliancc
with the Communists was impossible; with the other republican
partics it was not prepared. The trooPs, bound by their oath to
Hindenburg, would have declined to follow such an attemPL
Bcsidcs, the disproportion of power was now still more un'
favourable than in November. Findly, the unhappy coDsc.
qucnces of a failurc could not be overlooked.

TrrB pERroD rrp ro ruxprxarrnc's DEATTT (Jewuenr, 1933

eucusr, r93)

'lhe Reiciswehr stood aside from the political events which

changed Gcrmany's feanrres with sweeping rwolutionary
mc.asures. It was like an island-not commanded by Hidcr,
but by Hindenburg, who, however, was very old. tlammcr.
stcitr was rcplaced by Fritsch on Hindenburgs order.

TIIE NRW l[EN

Von Blombcrg was appointed as rffar Minister ("Reichskriegs'

ministcr") in |anuary, 1933. Until then he had bccn Gcrman
Rcprescntative with thc Disarmament Confcrence at Crcncva
had had no previous relations with Hider. He was a
-and
gifted rcldier, m"n of the world, widely educatcd and with
many intcrcsts," but not a strong c,haracter, and was easily
influcuced.
Von Reictrenau was Chid of the Wehrmachtamg until then
the MinisteramL He was a strong personality and full of
initiative, a Eran of action and instinct rather than of intellect
Ambitious, clcverr l',rghly educated eyen a poet, he wits trcvGf.
 rrr8 xrsa or HmrB E
lhelcss of a sturdy Deture and a sporsman. lVelt acqruintcd
with Hidcr for some lears, he fclt [imsclf bound to t$ pcrson
of Hidcr, not to thc Party.
Freiherr von Fritsch (Chd der Hecresleitung later C.om-
mandcr-in-Chid of the &.y) was an excclldt and distin-
guished_soldicr, but his ideas, wcre limited to thc military
rp.lo.* He was a gendcman from top to toq and atso vcry
rcligious.
Blombcrg and Rcichcnau had thc task of assuring thc poai.
.
tion due to the Army withh tlrc new State-whid ther-had
to accept as aD otablishcd faa-and the task of hclpiire to
rgcover normal public lifc by eliminating the rwohitidary
clemcorc of thc Party.
_ Thc rcvolutionary S.Ao dominating the masscs and thc
Party at thl timg was opposcd to the Army from thc start
The S.,t claimed to form the Army of thc iew Sarc out of
its own ranks. The fumy preparcd to fight for its poition
within the new Sate Hitler, like wery &ctator, was forccd
to rid hnnself of his S.,L rcbcFhis Prrtorian Guard*'ho
had raised him to po\rer. Hc sidcd with thc Army and routcd
the S.4. (Rochm) on 3oth lung ro3+ without c^lli"g in any
troops.
Tte Reictrswehr regarded that day as a succeFnotwith-
standing scrious crce$es (thc mtrder of Schleictrer and
others). flowever, it provcd a Pyrrhic victory. From that day,
with the founding of the Waficn-S.S, datid the risc of atr
crcmy much more dangcrors to thc Ar.y.

trrB pEnroD FaoM nDlorNsurc's DEATTT ro 1938

Following Hindenburg's de"th, Hider declared himsclf Head

of the State-tilhictr made him at the samc timc thc titular
Suprcme Commandcr-in-Chid of thc ttrehrmactra
Re-armamcnt, at 6rst only aimi'lg at equdity with Gcr-
-*y'r neighbours, began to absorb the entire attention and
strength of the troops. E *y Dcw sagc of rcermamcnt wcak
 88 TrrB GEnMAN GENERALs rAr.K-

ened the solid foundations of the hitherto unanimous profer

sional army. The 4,ooo professional officers had not only to
form the nucleus for the oficers of the gradually expanding
army, but also for the Lufnraffc. To their numbers were
added the newly-reinstated ofrcers, who came from the most
various professions and circles. These-'<specially the younger
ones4rought along their political ideas. The features of the
o6ccr<orps werc ctrangrng, and the Party began to gain
ground within the Army. Soon, one could not count ary
Ionger on unity of mind.
With the reinuoduction of conscription the whole army lost
its character as aD instrument in domestic struggles. It was
further weakened by the formation of the LufnraIf+which
was guided by Nationd-socialist principles from the outseL
For the Luftwafie, not without purpose, embraced the Flak
(AA.)+ decision whictr deprived the Army of every means
of anti-aircraft defence. The Army's scope of action for do.
mestic stnrggle grew ever more hopeless.
For all thit, the leaders of the Army once more considered
the question of a rehllion against Hider, wheq with the fdl
of Blomberg, thcre arose a grave confict over the person of
Colonel4eneral von Fritsch in |anuary and February, 1938.
Hitler himself took over direct command of the'Wehrmacht
in place of Blomber& and retained Keitel (Reichenau's suc-
cesior), whose importance never exceedcd that of a pliant
head+lerk.
The incredible injustice with which the distinguished Gcn
crd von Fritsch was treated, exasperated the generals in posl
tions of high co--and-no others were ever informed-to
great heatl This boiling pot was stired, already, by a secret
gprp of opposition (Goerdeler, Schacht) which was inclined
'ito go all out.' Fcr decisive action, however, the generals
lackCd unity in the sense of a solid acting corporation-which
had not been attained since the days of Seeckt. They lacked
lCivilian opponcnE of Hidcr, howa,cr, comptain that thc fault of thc
geaerals was that thcy simmerd but nevcr camc to the boil.
 IrrE nIsB ot tlmrB &
the instrument of power-troops ready to go into action for
such a purpose. They lac.ked political leaiiershi5that was
ryady for action and ready to take over political power. Rebel-
lion remained untried. On the other band Hiiler from thc
outset used his "insertion" within the leaders of the Wehr-
macht in order to split up the body of military leaders and to
break their back-bone. Each commander was reduced to his
own counscl and guidance; it was no longer possible to rcc.kon
on uniform and united political action by the Ar.y.
 IX
THE RISE OF ARMOUR

I!7,HIII IIIE N$E OF IIITIJR CTIANGED TIIE MA'P OF EI'ROPB

W -or. qui*ly than even Napoleon had done-though for
a shorter pe-rioa-it was the rise of armoured forces in the
Cicrman Army that mainly enablcd him to adieve his run of
conquests. Wiihout them his dreams would never have turned
into redities. More even than the Luftvvafie, and much more
than the Quislingp, they were his decisive instrument. All his
othcr means of softeniirg opposition would not have suftced
for the qoi& success he-sought without their unrque-caPTIy
to penctrate and overrun a country. Hc had had the fole$ght
to Lack this new development, though hc ultimatcly paid for-
fcit for not backing it more fully.
I was fornrnate in getting a long account of the rise of the
?anzers" from Gencral von Thoma, thc most famous of thc
original Gcrman tank lcadcrs next to Gudcrian. A tough but
Iikiable type he is obviously a born enthusiast who lives in a
world of-t-anks, loves fighting for the zest of it, but would
fight without ill-feeling, respecting any wolhy- opponent In
tf,e Uidale Ages he would have bccn perfectly happy as a
knight+nant, ihdlenging dl comers at,anl cross.road-for thc
horiour of crosing speari with them. The advent of thc ank
in warfare wat a [odsend to such a man, g"itg him a c^hance
to rc-livc the parrof the mail-clad knight
I
 ITrB XnlB Or ABMOUT gt
He descrihd the wayit wa$developed in the German Army
after this was released by Hitlcr from the restrictions of tht
Versailles Treaty. "It was wonderful to have rcal anks for thc
fnsg time n ry34, after being confined to actical crperimcnts
with dummies for so Eany years. Until then our only prao.
ticd expcriencc was in an cxpcrimcnal camp that wc hid in
Russia, by arrangemcnt with the Soviet Governmcnt Ttig
wa! lear Yr.azan, and was partiorlarly for studying tcdnical
problcms. But in ro34 our first tank battalion was-formcd at
Ohrdruf, undcr the name 'Motor-Instruction Commando.' I
was in ch*gp of it It was the grandmother of all the otherE
"ft was subsequcndy expandcd into a regimcnt of trro bat-
talions, while two morc were cstablished at-Zosscn. They wcre
equipp-e4 by degrecs, rather slowly, according to the produc.
tion of the factorics--at frst with thc air+ooled Krupp tant
lvla* I, with only two ; the next year u,ith odd
Maybaci !"rk$ f,Ia* II, that had water cooling; in ,gy-38
came the fust Mark III and lvIark IV anks, whic.h wcrc co!-
siderably bcttcr. Meantime our organization was growing. In
1936 two tank brigadcs were formcd---onc for each of thJtwo
armourcd divisions that wcrc thcn crcated. Ttc Gcrman trnk
oficcrs closely followod the British ideas on atmoured war-
fare, particularly your orrn; also General Fullcr's. Ttey like.
wise followed with Lccn intercst thc pioneer activitics of the
original British tank brigadc.' (This was formed in r93r for
expcrimeng under Colond (now General) Broad, and givcn
pcrmancnt form in 1934 trndcr Brigadicr (now Gcneral)
Hobart.)
I asked him whethcr the Crerman anl methods had dso beco
influenced by Gcnerd de Gaullc's wcll-known book, as has
bcen commonly rcported. His answcr was: oNo, that did nc
reccive muctr attention then, as we regarded it as rather'fan-
tastical.'It did not give muctr actical grid*., and was rather
up in the clouds. Besideq it came much later than thc British
clposition of the posibilities of tank warfare."
Ttoma went on to say: olt may suqprise you to hear 6at
thc dwelopmcnt of armotucd forccs ma with muc.h resistancc
 I fHB GERIVIAN GENERAIS TALK-
from the higher generals of thc German Ar-y, as it did in
yours. The older ones were afraid of developing such forces
fast-because they themselves did not understand the tech.
nique of armoured warfare, and were uncomfortablc with such
new instruments. At the best they were interested, but dubious
and cautious. We could have gone ahead much faster but for
their attinrde."
Thoma himself wer setrt to Spain in 1936 when the Civil
War broke out "For it was seen that Spain would serve as'the
I
European AldershoC acnrally started on the night that
Gencral Franco's revolt was due to begin, and went via Mar-
scilles and Lisbon-meeting him at Merida, and arranging
how we were to help him.I was in command of dl the German
ground troops in Spain during the war. Their numbers wcre
gFcady exaggcratcd in newspapcr reportrthey were never
more than 6oo at a tine." (This excludes air and administra-
tive personnel.) "Th.y were used to train Franco's tank force
-and to get batde experience themselves.
"Our mein help to Franco was in ma&ines, aircraft and
tanks. At thc start he had nothing beyond a few obsolete
machines. The frst batctr of Crerman tanks arrivcd in Scp
tember, followed by a larger batch in Octobcr. They were the
Krupp lvIark I.
"Russian tanks began to arrive on the other side even quicker
.+t the end of |uly. They werc of a heavier typc than ours,
which wcrc armed only with machine-guns, and I oficrcd a
reward of 5oo pesetas for every one that was captured, as I
was only too glad to convert them to my own use. The Moors
bagged quitc a lot It may interest you to hear that the present
lvlarshal Koniev was my bpposite number'on the other side.
"By carefully organized dilution of the German personnel
" able to train a large number of Spanish tank+rews.
I was soon
I found the Spanish q"i.k to learn-though also quick to for-
gFt. By 1938 I had four ank battalions under my co-mand-
eac.h of three companieg with fifteen tanks in a company. Four
of the companies were equipped with Russian tanks. I also had
thirty aoti-tank companies, with six !7 rrm. guns apicce.
 IIrE nISE OP ARMOTTB 93
"General Franco wished to parcel ont the tanks among the
trfantry-in the-usual way of generals who belong to thE olil
school.I had to fight this tendency constantly in tG endeavour
to use the tanks in a concentrated way. The Francoists'suc-
cesses were largely due to this.
"f came back from Spain in ]une, r93g after the end of the
war, and wrote out my experiences and the lessons learned. I
was theo given command of a tank regiment in Austria. I had
been offered a tank brigade, but said that I prefered to polish
up Ey knowledge 9f rycent German practice by handling a
regiment 6rsg as I had bcen out of touch so l*g with wlat
yas lapgening in Ciermany. General von Brauchitsch agreed.
But in-Alg", I_was grvcr-r command of the unk brigade in
the znd Panzcr Division, for the Polish campaign
"f1at division was in General von List's fu.y on the cx-
treme southcrn wing, hyond the Carpathians. I was ordercd
to advance on the |ablunka Pass, but suggested instead that
the motorized brigade should bc sent there, while I carricd
out with py tan! brigade a flrnki.g move-through thick
wmds and over the ridge. O,n dcscending into thelallcy I
arrived in a village to 6nd the people all going to chur&.
Horr astonished they-w-ere to see my tanls appearingl I had
turned the- enemy's defences without losing a single tank-
after a night approa& march ot fitty miles.
'After the Polish campaign I was appointed to thc Gcncral
Staff, as Chief of the Mobile Forces. This directorate embraccd
,hg qo! forces, the motorized forces, the horsed cavalry<f
whictr there was still onc division-and the cyclist uniis. I!
the Polish campaign we had six armoured divisions and four
Iight divisions. The armoured divisions cacl had a trttL
brigde of trro regiments with tno battalions apiece-the com-
bat strength of a regiment at the hginning-was about rz5
tanks After an operation lasting severd days, one must, in thl
light of cxperience, deduA one quarter from the number of
tanks-to allow for those under repair-in reckoning the av-
crage combat strength."
As combat strength, lhoma expl"ioe4 he includcd only
 9+ TIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TAI.T-
the fighting tanks in the companies (or squadrors). The total
number in a regimeng including the light ta"Ls uscd for
rcconnaissance, was t5o,
'"The light divisions were an experiment, and the strength
of cach of them varied. But the average was two motorized
rife regiments (of three battalions cach) and one tank bat-
alion. In addition they had an armotued reconnaissancc
battdion and a motor-cyclist battalion, as well as an artillcry
regiment-like the armoured divisions.
"We gave up this erperiment after the Polish campaign,
and converted them into armoured divisions. For the r94o
olfcnsive in thc W'est wc had ten complete armourcd divisions,
and the S.S. tank regiment'Lcibstandartc'-the scalc of whic,h
was considerably above a normal tank regimenL The proPor-
tion of mcdium tanks in a division was increased by that time.
Even so, tftere were too many light tanks."
Thoma thcn madc thc surprising rcvelation thag for the
invasion of France, the Crermans had only zr4oo tanks {-
together-not 6rooo as Frenci reports at the timc sated. Hc
said that he did not count the light reconnaissance tanks, whi&
he called "sardine tins." The French tanks were better than
ours, and as numerous-but thcy wcrc too slow. It wx by
speed, in exploiting the surprise, that wc bcat thc Frenctr."
Discussing the diffcrent types of tank, and their rcspcctive
qualities, Thoma remarked that if hc had to choosc bctween
"a thick skin" or 'h fast runncr" he would always choosc
the latter. In other words, he prdered speed to hcavy armour,
having corne to the conclusion, from much cxpcriencc, that
spced was a more desirable quality on balance. He wcnt on
to say that, in his vicw, the ideal tank regiment would bc made
up of tsyo-thirds large tanks, fairly fasg and one-third very
fast tanks, lighdy armoured.
Tdking of the r94o offensive, Thoma said-"All thc tank
oficcrs wantcd to see Gudcrian in ctrarge of the panzer army
that carried out the thust thtoogh thc Ardennes. Klcist had
not ttc same undcrstanding of tankrhc had carlicr bcen one
 IIIB BrSB Or rnMOrrB 95
of thc ctrid opponents of them. To put a sceptig cvcr r cotr
vcrtcd reptig in supremc charge of the armoured forces was
typi.al of the way thing;s werc done in the German Ar y-
as in yours. But Guderian was regarded as a dificult sub
ordinatc. Hitlcr had thc voice in thc issue, and he
approved Kleist's appointmcnt Nevcrthelcss, Gudcrian was
called on to carry out the actud break-through, whic.h he did
on the same lincs that he had practised in the 1937 Ar-y
Manoeuvrcs. Aftcr that, hc continued to lead the drive to thc
Channcl. He conccntratcd all his thought on exploiting suo
ccss, urd took thc attitudc 'to hell with what is happe"i"g
bchind.' That thnrsdulncss was decisivg bccausc it gave the
French no time to rally.
"It \tras comnonly said in thc Gcrman Ar-y that Guderian
was always seeing red, and was too inclined to charge like a
bull.' I dont agree with that opinion. I had personal cxpcricnce
of serving undcr him sa the Salingad front in r94a wherc
opposition wir vcry stilf, and I found him a very fine com.
mandcr under thorc diftcult circumsances."
I asked Thoma what hc considercd thc principd clemcnts
in thc succcsr of the German armourcd forces in achieving
suctr a scries of breaks.through as thcy did in thc eadier
part of thc war. He gavc fivs main rcasons:
'r. Thc concentration of all forces on the point of Fnctra-
tion in co-opcration with bombers.
"2. Exploiting the success of this movement on the roads
d*ing the aightas a rcsulq wc often gained success by *-
prisc dccp in, and bein4 thc cncmy's front.
'!. Insrfficicnt anti-ank ddencc on the cncmy's parq and
our own superiority in the air.
'4. The fact that thc armoured division itsclf carried enough
1I have oftco noticcd that wheo the senior Gcrrran gcocrats waotcd to
convcy criticism of some exceptiondly vigorous commandcr who did not
conform to thcir own standards of methodical, and almost chess-likc opcr.
etion, thcy habitually spokc of him as 'b bull." Such a term might bc more
cuiably applicd o
those who butt at strongly dcfcqdcd positions thrn 1p
those who looscn opposition by audacity and spccd"
 # IIIB GERMAN GDT.IEBAIJ TAI,B-

petrol for r5o-zoo kilometres-supplemented, if necessary, with

supply of petrol to the armourcd spearheads by *, dropped
in containers by parachutc.
'!. Carrying rations sufficient for tlree days in the anks,
for three more days in the regimental supply column, and
three more days in the divisional supply column."
Thoma mentioned some of the examples of sustained speed
in long*ange drives by the armoured forces. In the Polish
campaign, he said, the sevenday march from Upper Silesia to
'W'arsaw
averaged about thirty miles a day, fighting included.
In the second stage of the French campaign the advance from
the Marne to Lyon averaged the same. In the r9r4r Russian
campaign thc advance from Rosslawl to beyond Kiev averagtd
fiftecn miles a day over a period of twenty days, whilc the
thrust from Glukov to Orel covered forty miles a day for three
days. The record advance was up to sixty milgs in the day.
Thoma stressed thc imPortance of the co--ander of an
armoured force being well forward-'in the midst of his
tanks." He should give "saddle ordersr" like cavalry leaders
of old. "Thc tactical task for a commander is up in front, and
he must be on the spot. He should leavc the administrative side
to his chief stall officer."
Thoma then talked of the reorganization of the German
armoured forces that was carried out beforc the Russian cam-
paign, and made it clear that he considered it a grave mistake.
"f1e armoured divisions each had one of their two tank
rcgimcnts taken away from them, in order to form further
I
armoured divisions-making twenty in all. did not agee
with this decision, and protested to Hitler-for he always took
a personal interest in technical questions." Thoma argued that
the net effect would bc disadvantageous on balance, since it
meant doubling the number of stafls and au*iliary trooPs
without any effective increased in the armoured punch. "But I
could not persuade Hider-he was obsessed with the advan-
tage of having an increased number of divisions. Numbcrs
dways inflamcd his imagination.
"Hitler had not interfered in the Polish campaign, but the
 TIIE IrSB OF AnMOITB gr
immense public acclaim of 'his'stratcgy there, and still more
aftcr the Frend campaig!, had given him a swelled head" Hc
had a taste for strategy and actia, but he did not undersand
ttre executive details. He often had good ideas, but hc wag
snrbborn as a rock-so that he spoilt the fulfi.Lnent of his orrn
conceptions.
"Twenty armoured divisions sounded a great increase, but
the actual numbcr of anks was no greater than before. Otr
combat suength was only 2n434 anks-not r2rooo, as the
Russians stated. About trro-thirds now were medium tanks,
instead of nrothirds beinglight anks asinour fustcampaign."
Discussing the Russian campaigR, Thoma said that the
German armoured forces developed a new method which
they found very successful. "Armoured divisions would break
thro"sh the Russian front at oighg and then go into hidios
in woods behind the front The Russians meantime would
glose the gep. In the morning the C,erman inf*try would
laund their atta& qn this partially cemented sectoi-whictr
was naturally somewhat disorganized-while the armourcd
divisions would emerge from the place where thcy were tying
up, and strike the ddendcrs in the rear."
For the r9r4z campaign four new armoured divisions were
formed-this was actrievcd p*dy by breaking up the existing
horscd cavalry division, which had not proveil efiectivc. Three
more infantry divisions were dso motorized-in addition to
the ten which had been motorized for the r9r4r campaign.
"But only ten out of the twenty former armoured divisions
were brought up to strength again-because, under Hitler's
orders, an increase of tank production was neglccted in favour
of the U-boat programme."
tho* strongly criticized the failure of the senior g€nerals,
and of Hider, to appreciate the vital importance of the
armourcd forces, and to dwelop them in time to the scale
that was required as well as in the form required. "\lllhat we
had was good enough to beat Poland and France, but not
gmd enough to cotrquer Russia. The space there was so vast,
and the going so difrcult Wc ought to har'e had twice ar
 98 rrrE GTRMAN GENEBATs rAr,r-
Dany trnlrr in our armoured divisions, and their t[otot
irf*try regimcnts were not mobilc enough.
'oThc origind pattern of our armoured division was ided
-with trro tank regiments and two regiments.
But thc lamcr should be carried in armourcd trac.ked vehiclcs,
cven though it entails more petrol. In the carlier part of thc
Russian campaign it was possible to bring them up in their
Iorries closc to the scene of action before they dismounted.
They were oftcn brought up :ls close as a quarter of a milc
from thc fighting linc. But that ccased to be possible whcn
the Russians had more aircraft The lorry<olumns were too
nrlnerable, and thc iof*try had to get out too far bac}. Only
armoured irrf*try can come into action quickly enough fon
the needs of a mobile batde.
"\Morse stilt these clumsy lorries easily became bogged.
France had been ideal country for armourcd forces, but Russia
was the worst-$ecause of its immense tracts of country that
wcre either swamp or sand. In parts the sand was two or three
feet deep. When the rain camc down the sand turned into
swamp."
Thoma added: "Africa was paradisc in comparison. Tank
troops who had been in Russia found it casy to adapt them-
sclves to thc African conditions. It is a mistakc to &aw lcs-
sons from the African c^-Faign and apply them to quitc dif.
fcrcnt conditions. For you in future it is only Russia that
Eattcrs-trot the dcsert any morc." It was a characteristic
ending.
Thoma emphasized that another grcat mistake of the Rus.
sian campaign was the lack of co'operation betwecn armoured
forces and airborne forces. "This forfeited many successes that
ps mighl havc gaincd. The cause of it was that the parachute
troop formed part of the Luftrraffe, and consequently there
were conflicts of opinion in the highest places about their
employment Goering, in partictlar, was an obstacle. Another
handicap was the defeaiveness of our sclf-propelled artillery.
Ttis weapon is invaluable. But those we used wcre only
makcshift$ and the clussis was overloaded."
 rIrB nISB ()8 ABMOUB I
As Iboma was capturd at Alamcin in the eunrmtr ot ry42
hc could contribute-no cvidcnce bascd on io thc
Iast part of the war. But in that pcriod }vlanteuficl was the
outstrnding exponent of armourod warfare and his conclusions
borc out flhoma's earlier vicws, on the wholq whilc supple.
menting them in certain respects. lvlanteuffcl gavc me his
views at too grcat l*gth to set forth hcrc, for non-tcchnical
rcadcrs, but some of his main points are worth citing-"Tanks
,n*rrbr-, fast That, I would say, is thc most important lesson
of the war in regard to tank dcsign. Thc Panther was on the
right lines, as a prototypc. 'lVe uscd to cdl the Tigcr a'firrni-
nrre van'-though it was a good machinc in thc initial brcaL-
throrgh. Its slowncss was a wonrc handicap in Russia than in
Francc, bccausc the distances were grcater."
Hc considcred that the Rusian "$telin" tank was the fnest
in the world. It combincd powcrful armament, thic.k armour,
Iow build, with a specd supcrior to the Tiger and not much
less than that of the Panthcr. It bad more gencral mobility
than any Gcrman tank.
Manteufiel then spoke of two avoidable handicaps tbat the
Gcrman armourcd forces had suffcred.'E"oy rrnit in the dL
vision should havc its own Mobilc Workshop, whic.h should
accompeny the actical cchelon. Our army madc a gravr cffor
in thinking that thcsc Mobile Worlshope should bc kqpt in
the rear. They ought to h wcll forward rurdcr thc command
of a taaical lcadcr who is in wirclcss touc.h with thcm. Ttis
is csscntial so that repairs can bc done during thc night, cxcept
in cases of scrious damage. Such a system siryeg many of thc
accidentd canralties that cause wastage. It would havc countcr-
aacd the pcrnicious effca that our acod systcm had in lead-
ing thc commandcrs to ca.rry on with a dwindling Tnlr
strength bccausc they could not afford to wait for tanlrs to be
repaircd. Too often they attempted asks that were beyond
their rcd suength--bccausc the task was calctrlatcd on what
a division should be able to ac.hievc on its norninal strogth.
"It is cssentid, too, for an armoured division to havc its o\rn
air clement-a rcconnaissancc sqtra&on, a tacticel bonbing
 IOO TTIE GERMAN GENERALS TALK.'

squadron, and a liaison squadron of slowfying aircraft- for

the use of the commander and staff. fhe commander of an
armoured division ought always to direct from the air. In the
early part of the Russian campaign, t[e armoured divisions
had-thlir own air contingent. But the High Command took it
away from them in November, r9r4r, in favour of cenualized
control. That proved a grave mistake. I would also emphasizc
that the air squadrons should be trained with the divisions
in peace ti-e.
supplies of ammu-
"Air transport is dso essential-to carry
nition, fuel, food and men. For armoured divisions will have
to operate at much longer distances in future. They must dso
bc plepared to make advances of.tn kilometres a day. H.o-.g
real so many of your translated writings in the years before
the war, I know what attention you gave to the development
of this air sidc of armoured warfare. This warfare is a dif'
ferent language from infantry warfare-and infantrymen don't
undersand it. That was one of our great troubles in the war."
Discussing tank design and tactics; Mante'rfiel spoke of the
vdue of deiigning tanks that were low in height, and thus
a less visible i*g.,. The diftculty was to combine low build
with the necessity that thc underside of thc tank should bc
nrfficiently clear of the ground to avoid hcoming "bellied" in
crossing obstructions such as bumps in the ground, rocks and
trce stumps. "A slight handicap in ground clearance, however,
can bc overcome by a good eye for ground. That is the most
vital quality in handling tanks."
Giving an example, Manteufrel narrated the story of a riposte
he had delivered against the Russian break-through near |assy,
inside the Rumanian frontier, early in May, ry44. "A tank
batde developed in which a total of some five hundred tanks
were involve-d on the two sides. The Russians were repulsed,
and only 6o of their tanks got away, most of them damaged.
I lost only rr of mine. It was here that I fust met thc Statin
anks. It was a shock to find that, although my Tigers began
to hit them at a range of. 4zoo yards, our shells did not pene-
tratc them until we had closed to half that distance. But I
 IIIE RISB OF ATMOT'B IOI
was able to counter their technical superiority by maneuwe
and mobility, in making thc best use of ground cover." Man
teullel concluded his account with the emphatic remark: "In
a tank batde, if you stand still you are lost." Recalling the
memory of that piece of tactics gave him obvious professional
satisfaction, and he added: "It would have given you a lot of
pleasure to see this fight "
He went on to spaak of the imporance of the careful selec-
tion of tank crcws, in order to ensure actical aptitude and
gein the advantage whi& this slfers in modern batde.'TVith
that condition fulfitled tank design must aim at a careful
balance betn'een armour, weapons and speed taking into ac.
@unt particularly the spccial risks introduced by air attac,k,
parachutists, and roc.ket wcap,ons."
I asked him v[21he considered to be the ideal composition
of an armonred division. His reply was: "In the fust place, a
trnL regiment of three battalionq each of 6o tanks--so as to
cnsure that somewhere about r5o would be available for action,
dlowing for mccianical troubles. Secondly, tno infantry regl
ments, eac}. of two battalions carricd in armoured hdf-tra&
v&icles. In one regiment these should bc well armoured-
the 7 mm. of armour whid they had in the war was not
enough when it came to bringing them up close under fairly
heavy fue. In the other regiment the carriers should be of a
more lighdy armoured typHo that they could move faster,
and exploit opportunities of pushing forward where opposition
was slight Another essential element in the division is a strong
reconnaisance unit, carried in full-track vehiclcs. In this war
they had hdf-tra& vehicles, whi& were not good cnough for
a reconnaissance role, under the conditions mct in Russia.
There should dso be a pioneer battalion-what you call en-
gineers. This need not be lrrgo than the present scale, because
cvcry unit in the division ought to have its own section of
pioneers, capable of laying and lifting mines, and of building
bridges. The other main element is the artillery. I should like
four batalions of artillery, cach of three batteries. Thrce of
them should be mixed batalions, each of trro light ficld
 IUz TIIE GERTf,AN GENERAiI.S TAI.K-

howiucr batteries, and one hcavy 6eld howitzer battcry. lIe

fourth battdion shoulil consist of three heavy batterics, with
r5o mm. pieces. Two of the three mixed battalions at lea*
should be self-propclled instead of tractor-drawn."
In anothcr of our tallrs Manteufrcl gave his views on the
question of horr armics should bc organized in thc funre.
"Modern conditions indicate that therc should be npo classes
of army within the Army. The best policy would be to con-
stitute an Clitc. A certain numbcr of divisions should be picked
out for this purpose, and they should be given the best posible
equipmenq ample money for training, and the pic,k of thc
pcrsonncl. A large country might be able to c,reate an army of
up to thirty divisions iD this way. Of course, no country could
equip an army of millions q1 this scalc. But it is bctter to have
an €liu army for the main operational purposes than to havc
a muctr bigger army that is mediocrely cquipped and uained
throughout \\tt lliu army would have an increased ProPor-
tion of & *ppotq airborne forces and roclet weapons. The
present scale of artillery with armoured forces is a handicap
on mobility. It is required by the need for plunging fue, such
as only howitzers can provide undcr existing conditionq but
the dcvclopmcnt of rockct weapons may provide an cffcctive
zubstitute."
Mantcuficl went otr to say that he agrccd with thc view I
had oftcn exprcssed io -y writings that the basic military
problcm of thc prcscnt time was to diminish the proportion
of auxiliary troops and vchiclcs in comparison with the strik-
ing arms. "But for such progres to bc attainod the High Com'
-ind must learn the new language of mcchanized warfare.
oThe ncw model army cdls for the design of a new kind
of strategy. For these ideas to win acceptancg it is imporant
that all the ncw type of forces should be under a single chid
of adequate status. At the same time in order to foster the
cspit dc corps of the troops composing thts dlitc army they
should not only have the best of equipment and training
facilities but a distinctive uniform-the smartest grossible."
PART III
THROUGH GERIUAN EreS
 HOW HITLER BEAT FRANCE-
AI\D SAVED BRITAIN

rFIrE REAL SIDRY OF ANf GREAT EVEIiIT IS APf T0 BE VERY DIl.

I f.r*t to what appears at the timc. Thar is especially the
case in war. The fate of millions of people turns on decisions
that are taken by one man-who may be infuenced by the
most curious of motives in reactring a decision that changes
the whole course of history. The way he makes up his m,ind
is known only by a few men behind the scenes, who usually
have good reason for keeping it quiee The truth sometimes
leaks out later; sometimes never.
When it emerges it often bears out the saying that "tnrth
is sranger than fiction." A novelist has to appear plausiblg
and would hesitate to make use of su& astounding contradic,
tions as occur in hirtory throogh some extraordinary accident
or twist of psychology.
Nothing could be more extraordinary than the way that
the decisive events of r9r4o were shaped. France wae over-
come by an oflensive in whictr few of the higher executants
had any faith, and the invasion only succeeded through a ba
lated change of plan on the German side that happ-ened to
fit the situation produced by rigrdity of plan combined with
over<onfidcnce on the French side. Stranger still was thc
rq5
 106 THE GERI{AN GENERAIS TAIX-

way that the British Army escaped and Briain hcrself was
prcserved from invasion. The truth here ru1s quite cotrtr _ary
io the popular picnre. It would have seemcd incredible to the
BritisLpioplc it that time, and equdly incredible to most of
Hitler's-ardent followcrs in Germany. Litde indication of it
emcrged in the revelations at Nuremberg. The barc facts were
known to a small circle at the top of the German Army, but
the cssential clue was held by only a few, not the topmost,
who were present one day at Rundstedt's headquarters whcn
Hitler Ciscloscd the way his thoughts \ilere running.
The escape of the British Ar-y from France has often bcen
cdled *thcmiracle of Dunkirk.' For the German armoured
forces had reactred the Channel coast behind the back of the
British Ar-y while this pxs still deep in tht interior 9f
Flanders. Cut off from its own bases, and from the bulk of thc
French Ar-y, it seemed likely also to be cut off from the sca"
Those who got away have often wondered how they managed
to do so.
The answer is that Hitler's intcrvcntion saved them-when
nothins else could have. A sudden order from him over thc
telephoire stopped the armoured forces iust as lhey were in
sight of Dunkirk, and held them ba& until the retrcating
niitish had reac.hed the port and slipped out of their clutches
Rundstedt and other generals concerned, as exccutive @E-
manders or or the higher staffs, gavc me accounts from thcir
dificrcnt angles of this staggering order and its effects.
But although the British At-y thus cscaped from the trap
in Francc, it was in no state to defend England. It had ldt
most of its weapons behin{ and the stores at home were dmost
empty. In the following months Britain's smdl and scantily-
armeil forces faccd thc magnificently<quipped army that had
conquered France-with only a strip of watcr benreen them"
Yet the invasion never came.
At the time we believed that the repulse of the Luftwafie in
thc "Batde oor Britain" had saved her. That is only part of
the explanation. Tte last part of it. lhe original cause, whic.h
 HOW HITT,EA, BEAT FRAITCB-AND SAVEI' BRITAIN Idl
gocs declrcr, is that Hider did not want to conquer England"
Hc took littlc interest in the invasion preparations, did nothing
to spur them on, and cancelled them at the first plausible
excuse.
Before relating in detail the inner story of these fateful de.
cisiong there is a previous one to reveal. For the rcd c.haractcr
of earlier events is hardly less amazing than the climax<r
anti<limar While Hider saved England Francc was cotr-
quercd in spite of his Gencrals.
When France lay prostrate under the German heel, the mcn
of the victorious At-y would have becn astonished had thcy
known that thcir highest military chids had not believed such
a victory to be possible+nd that the victory had bcen gained
by a plan which had been forced on a doubting Genaal Safi
as the result of a badstairs approactr. IvIost of thcm would
have bcen horrified to hear that six months earlier they had
nearly been ordered to mard on Berlin instead of on Paris.
Yet thosc werc the facts hidden bchind the uiumphant fagada

SCHISM IN IIIB DNAIN

The conquest of the West, dthough it appeared so irresistiblc

in rctrospcct, was conceived in an atmosphere of fcar and
doubt The prcccding period of "the phoney war" was so
cbristencd by Amcrican commentators indcrision of thc AllieC
inactivity. In that scnsc it was hardly just, since thc Allies
lacked the equipment nccded to take the offensive-as latcr
events showcd. But therc wcrc"phoney" factors on thc Gcrman
side.
Aftcr the conqucst of Poland, and the division of the spoils
with Rusia, Hider made a bid for peace with thc Wo-tcrn
Powcrs. When he was rebufied he began to feel afraid of
what he had started--and of his temporary parrner. He ex-
pressed the vicw that a long-drawnout wai oI attrition with
Briain and Prance would gradudly exhaust Germany's lim-
itcd rcsourccs, and expose hlr to a fital atta* from befiind by
 IO8 IIIE GERMAN GENERALS TAI.T-

neuudity be
Russia. "By no treaty or pact can Russia's lasting
ensuredr" he told his generals. His fear urged him to force
peace on France by * offensive in the West. He hoped that i!
ihe French were defeated the British would see reason and
come to terms. He reckoned that time was working aginst
him on every counL
Hitler did not dare to risk playing a waiting game, to see
whether the French grew tired of war. He believed that for
the moment he had the suength and equipment to beat France.
"In ceftain arms, the decisive arms, Germany tday possesses
clcar, indisputable supcriority of weapons." Hider felt that he
must suike as soon as possible, bdore it was too late. His order
was: "fae attacl is to be launc.hed, if conditions are at dl
possible, this autumn."
Elitler's reckoning, and thesc instructions were set out in a
long memorandum of October gth, rglg. His analysis of thc
military factors in the situation was masterly, but he ldt out
of account a vital political factor-the "bulldoggednes" of the
British people when aroused.
His generals shared his long-term fears, but did not sharc
his short-tcrm confidence. They did not think that the Gcrman
fury was strong cnough to beat France.
All the top ones to whom I dked, including Rundstedt and
his chief planner, Blrrmentritt, admitted that they were full
of doubt about taking the offensive in the West. As Blumcn-
uitt remarked: "Hitler alonc believed that a decisive victory
was possible."
General Siewerg who had becn Brauchitsch's personal as.
sistant from 1939 to r9r4r, said that no plan for an offensive in
tte West had even been considered until after the Polish cam-
paign, and that Brauchitsch was dismayed when, early in
October, he received Hider's directive to prepare such a plan.
'field-Marshal von Brauchitsch was dead against it All the
documents relating to this plan will be available in the archives
wherever they arg and they will show that he advised the
Ftihrer against invading thc Wcst He went to see the Ftihrer
 HOW !IrIT,ER BEAT ERANCB-AND SAVED BRIINN Iq9
persoDally, to demonstrate the unwisdom of su& an attempu
When he found he could not convince the Fiihrer, he bcgan
1q thinL of resigning." I asked on what grounds the objection
was made. Siewert replied: "Field-Marihal von Brauifiitsch
did not think that the German forccs were strong cnough to
conqucr France, and argued that if they invaded FrancJthcy
would draw Briain's full weight into thc war. The Fiihre;
discounted this, but the Field-Marshal warned him: 'We knorr
the British from the last war---and how tough they are."'
Faced with sud doubts on the part of the army chiefs,
Hitler summoned a conference in Bcrlin, on November 23,
with the aim of implanting his own conviction. I had an
account of it from Gcneral Rdhricht, who was head of the
Training Department of the General Stalf, and was subse-
qucndy responsible for compiling the lessons of the r94o cam-
paign. R<ihricht said: "The Ftihrer spent two hours in a
l*gthy rcview of the sinration aimed io convince the Army
C-o-mand that an offensive in the West was a necessity. But
Ficld-lrfarshal von Brauchitsc.h argucd against it, and'drew
upon himself a severe rebuke from the Fiihrer. Generd tlaldcr
was equally dubious about uLing the offensive. Both of them
algued th-at the Gcrman fu.y was not strong enough-it was
the only linc oI argument ihat could have any chance of do
terring the Fiihrer. But he insisted that his will must prwail.
After this conference -"nI new formations were raiscd, to
increase the Army's strength. That was as far as the Fiibrer
would mcet the opposrng views.'
In Hider's ad&ess to the higher commanders he exprcssed
bis anxiety about ultimate danger from Russia, and tf,e con-
sequert necesity of being free in the Wesr But the Allies
would not consider his peace ofiers, and lay behind their for.
tificationrout of reactr, yet able to spring when they dose.
How long could Germany endure zuch a situation? While
shetad the advanage at the moment, in six months it -ight
no longer be so. "Time is working for our adversary." T1icre
was ciruse for anxiay even in the West nWe have an Actrilld
 IIO TIIB GERMAN GENEBAIS TAI,B-

I{eel-the Ruhr . . . If Britain and France push throug!

Bclgium and Holland into the Ruhr, wc shall be in the gFeat
ot dangcr. That could lcad to a pardysis of Gcrman resistance.'
The menace must bc removed by striking fust
But even Hidcr did not display much assurance of succcss
at this time. He described thc offensive as
*a gambld' and a
choice "between victory and dcstruction." Moreover, he cndcd
his cxhortation on the gloomy, and prophctic note-"I shall
stand or fall in this stnrgglc. I shall ncver survive thc ddcat
of my people."
A copy of this address was found in the archives of the
Supreme Cnmmand after Germany's collapsg and produccd
at Nuremberg. But there was no mention there of thc oppo-
sition that Hitler had met in the discussion, nor of a sequel
that might have ctrt short his career in the first autumn of thc
war.
For the generals were driven by their forcbodings to considcr
despcrate remedies. Rirhricit told me: "It was mooted in
OK.H" by Brauciitsch and l{alder that-if thc Fiifuer would
not moderate his policy, and insisted on plans that would in-
volvc Gcrmany in an all out strugglc against Britain and
France-they should ordcr thc German At-y in thc Wcst to
nrn about, and march on Bcrlin to ovcrthrow Hitlcr and thc
Nazi r€gime.
"But ihc one Ean who was redly vial to thc succcss of
this counter-plan dcclined to co-olrcratc. This was C'cncrd
Fromm, the Co--ander-in€hief of the Home Forces, in
Gcrmany. He argucd that if the uoops werc ordered to ttrn
against the rdgime most of thcm would not obcy4ecausc they
had too muci trust itr Hitler. Fromm was only tm right on
this score. His rcfirsal to coopcrate was not due to any love of
Hider. He disliked the rdgime just as muctr as the others did,
and in the end became one of Hitler's victims-though not
until Marc\ ro4j."
Rrihricht went otr to say: "Apan from Fromm's hcsiation,
I think that the plan would have failed. The Luftrnalle, whic.h
 IIO\T HIII.TN BEAT ITANCB,-AIID SAVID DBITIUN III
was eothusiastically pro-Nazi could havc broken atry rcvolt
whi& the Army attcmptc{ since it had thc /a( undcr itr
control. Thc original stcp of malring Gocring and thc Luft-
waffc responsible for thi anti-aircraft ddcnce of thc Army
was a very shrcwd move in wcakening the lnwcr of thc
Army.'
Fromm's calculation about the troops'reaction was probably
corrccL That is admitted by thc gpcrals who wcrc upsct at
thc time by hir rcfusal to co.operate, and it tcnds to bc on
6rmcd by otr knowledge of how hard it \pa, to looscu thc
pcople's faith h Hitlcr even in the latcr days of dcvastion
and disastcr. But although this r9S9 plot might not havc suc.
cccdcd in its immcdiatc object of ovcrthrowing Hitlcr, the
attcmpt would have bccn worthwhile. For at thc lcast it would
havc so shakcn Germany as to nullify Hidcr's plans for the
conquest of Francc. In that casc all the Europcan pcoplc!
would have been spared the miscry that hfell thcm as a qrn-
sequence of that ill*ry triumph. Even the German pcoplc
would not havc sufrered anything like what thcy did aftcr a
longdrawn war, accompanicd by cvcr-multiplying dcvasation
from thc air.
Although the generals' plot was sti[$orD, Hitlcr did not
succeed in delivering his oficnsive io ,919 as he wishod. Rund-
etcdt cxplained-"The weathcr intcrvencd 1s fn6g26 him,
rnorc than anything clsc. Thc l,ostlroncncne continucd
throughout the winter.'
Bltrmenuitt revealed that on clarca occasions htwecn No
vembcr and April the armies reccivod the order to ofrll in"
--to be rcady to attack in forty+ight hours.'Eactr time it was
cancelled beforc the timc expircd. Thcsc repeatd cancella,
tions led us 1s thint that Hitlcr was merely blufing and was
only using thc thrcat of atta& as a mcrns of prompting the
Allics to considcr his peace offer." But when the twelfth order
cane, in the month of l["y, cvcnts took their faal cous
 ttz 1IIB GERMAI{ GENEXAIS TALE-

TIIE VITAL CTIANGE OB PL/IN

The original plan, worked out by the General StaII under

Halda, yyas on broadly similar lines to that of r9r4, though
its aim was less far-reaching. The main weight was to be con-
centrated on the right wing, for a d:ive through the plains of
Belgit'm, carried out by Ar-y Group "B" under Bock. Army
Group "A" under Rundstedg in the centre facing the Ar-
dennes, was to play a secondary part. Army Group "C" undet
Leeb, on the left, facing the frontier of France itself, was
simply to threaten and pin down the Frenctr armies that were
holding the Maginot Line. Bock had the r8th, 6th, and 4th
Armies-listing them from right to left; Rundstcdt had the
rzth and r6th Armies; Leeb had the rst and 7h Armies. What
wes more important the bulk of the tank forces was to be
conccntrated for Bock's blow. None were allotted to Rund-
stedtr whose ask was merely to advance to the Meuse, and
thcre covcr Bock's left flank.
In fanuary, Rundstcdt's strcngth was incrcased by providing
him with one panzer corps, and his part in the plan enlargpd
to some extent-he was to push across the Meuse and estab
lish a wide bridgehead beyond, linking up with Bock's fank
and covering it better. But that was only a modification, rather
than a radical change. The plan still placed the main weight
on the nght wing.
It is clear now that if that plan had been carried out it
would havc failed to be decisive. For the British Army and
the best equipped part of the French Ar-y stood in the path.
The German atta& would have met these forces hcad on.
Even if it had broken their front in Belgium it would merely
have pushed them ba& on their fortfficd line in Northern
France, and closer to their bases of supply.
The inner story of how the plan was changed is an extraor-
dinary one. It was only by degrees that I got on the track of
it From the outset the Gcrman genuals were very fortficom'
 HOW HIIIEB EEAT TSAIVCB-AIiID SAVEI' EXITAIN I13
.:hg me-about
*S T obj..tiurty the military opcrationr*uch profes.
lional is a characteristic'of t[.q
theirs. Most of I
found, were old students of my militarv writinss. so that thev
were all the more ready to alk, and txchangl'vicws. Thei
were equally frank in discussing most of OI Nazi leaderi
whose infuence they hgartily detested. In regard to Hitler
they were more reserved at first It was obviotri that many of
$em-had been so hypnotized by him or so fearful of him ihat
they hesiated to mention his-name. As they eraduallv be-
came convinced that he was dead this inhiLitlon subJided
and they criticized his actions more freely-Rundstedt was
dways critical. Buj they still had a tendency, a very natural
ole, to cover-.up c\avarys in their own ranks. So it was only
after manl discussions that I learnt the real truth about thl
brain-wave that beat France.
fhe new plan was inspired by General von Manstein, who
was Rundstedt's ciid of stalf at the time. He thought that the
oirtiog plan was too obvious, and too much a repefition of the
past-{o that it-was iu-st the kind of move thC A[ied High
Command would anticipate.
If the Allicd forces advanccd into Belgium, as was expected,
thcre would bc a fronal clash. That #ouH not promlse da
cisive results. Another drawbacl was that the dciisive battle
would-be fought out with the British Army, whicb Manstein
trgue4 was likely to be a tougher opponent than the French.
Morcover, the German tank forces, bn whom the chanccs of
victory dcpcnded-, would have to make their drive tbrorg_h
country which, though fat, was filled with rivers and canis.
That was a serious handicap, since the whole issue nrned on
speed.
So Manstein conceived the bold idea of shifting the main
stroke to the Ardennes. He argued that the enlmy would
never expect a tnass of anks to be used in such difficirlt cou&
try. Yet it should be practicable for the German ank forceg
since oppgsition was lik ly t9 be slight during the cnrcial
stage of the advance. Once they had emerged Eom thc Ar.
 lr4 IrrB GERMAN GENERATS TAr,r-

dcnnes, and crosscd the Marse, the rolling plains of Northern

France would providc idcal country for tank maneuvrc and
for a rapid sweep to thc sca.
This idca was too bold for his able but more conventional
supcriors to swdlow casily. He found dificulty in persuading
them until he took an opporttrnity of expounditg hit idea to
Hitler, whose imagination was 6red by it That led to the
adoption of Manstein's plan
Tte man whosc brain-wave produced the defeat of Francc
had to pay forfeit for his audacity. He was not allowed any
paft in tirecting the cxecution of his own plan. The vigolr
-with
which he f,ad pressed his ideas had bcen rescnted by hit
nilitary supcriors, and they suspccted !i- of ttyrng a back'
sairs approactr to Hitlcr. Their sore feelings wcre aggravated
when ii camc to their ears that many of the younger members
of the General Stafl were safng that "Itrlanstein ought to be
made Commandcr-in-Chid." Three months bcforc thc of-
fensive was launctred he was appointed to command an army
corps, and rcplaced by Gcncral von Sodenstcrn. That Promo'
tion was a convenicnt mearr of moving him out of the way,
to the relid of his superiors yet with honour to both partics.
Nerrcrtfielesg it was ironical that the man who had shown
the most imagination in grasping the potcntialitics of higtrly
mobile armoured warfarethough not himself a tank specid-
ist--+hould have bcen sent to take charge of an iof*uy
formation (which merely played a wdking-on part in the
ofiensive) just as the new type of mobility was to achieve
its suprcmc fulfilnent

SIIORT VIEIYS

In discussing the campaign with the various generals con-

cerned I found that dmost every one of them admitted that
he had not anticipated zuch a dccisive viaory as was acnrally
gained. The general run of opinion was represented by
R6hrichq who remarkcrl-"We hoped to strcceed far enough
 HOW HrTIJB EBAT !BA!{CB-AND SAVTD DBTTATN tI5
to reach the line of thc Somme, separatc the British from the
main French armies, and occupy Belginm togpthcr with North-
ero France." Blumentritt was rnore explicit-"We wcre surc
that the Allied ldt wing would advance into Belgium, to
Brusels at least, and thus rccloncd on antting it ofi. Beyond
thag wc did not look" Thc complctcncs of oru victory was
a surprise."
Most of the generals said that they had feared a delay in
crossing the Mcuse. But they did not seem to have consid-
crcd thc problcm of what .ight have happcned if thc break-
tbrough had failod, and they had been definircly checked.
Underlpng Brauchitsch's and tlaldcr's objections to Hitler's
plans there may havc bccn su& a thought; if so it was cf,-
ccptiond. Yct had thc invasion failed to producc thc collapsc
of Francc, but mcrcly taken a bitc of hcr soil, it would hivc
made any scttlemcnt morc dilficult{y arousing and stificn-
ing the spirit of Francc. Thus, for thc C'crmans an indccisivc
oIlcnsivc -rght have bccn worsc than none, and much les
yi* Q* a policy oI rcmaining quiet in the Wcsg improving
their ddence, until the Frenci bccame wcary of dcad- i
locL war. This point did not seen to have occtrned to the
German generals. Blumentritt said hc had no recollection d
it bcing discused eithcr in confercnce or in convcrsation
among thcmsclves. The reply that most of them madc to me
was that questions of this sort bclonged to the political sidc
of war, and werc outside thcir ken.
IXe neglea to consider such obvious contingencies, and
the vital questions involve4 sheds a particularly r6yerling light
on the limiations of thcir professiond outlook. It shows how
lacking they were in a sensc of grand stratcg[r or in due
rcga,rd for the objccts of war, as distina from its military
objcaives. Suctr purc stratcgists wcrc bound to be inefiective
is dcaling with Hitla, who had a grasp of both aim and
method, of politio and strategy-from the mating of which
gpand strategy procecds. Since they could not arglrc on thc
same plane thcy wcrc impotent to correct the mistaLes of his
 n6 mrg GERMAN GENEBALS rALB-
grand strategy, or curb his increasingly excessive ambitions,
their professional skill on tte lower planes--of strategy and
tactics.-only served to carry him, and them, deeper into a pit
from which there was no way of extrication.
By * irony of history, however, the greatcst contribution
of all to the success which paved Hidcr's path to the pit came
from his opponents.

TIIB FRENCII PLJ\N

The shattering effect of the Ardennes sroke owed much to

the desigu of the French plan-whictr fitted perfecdy, from
thc Germans'point of view, into their own remodelled plan.
What proved fatd to the French was not, as is co--only
imagined their defensive attitude or "Maginot Line complexr"
but the more ofrensive side of their plan. By pushing into
Belgium with their left shoulder forward they played into
the hands of their enemy, and wedged themselves in a trap
as had happened with their near-fatal Plan XVII of
-j*t
r9r4. It was the more perilous this time because the opponent
was more mobile, maneuvring at motor-pace instead of at
foot-pace. The penalty, too, was the greater because the left
shoulder push-made by the rst, lh, and 9th French armies
and the British Expeditionary Force-comprised the most
modernly equipped and mobilc part of the Allied forccs, so
that once these were deeply co--itted the French High Com-
mand lost most of its maneuvring power.
The supreme advantage of the new German plan was that
Gycry step forward that the Allies took made them more sus-
ceptible to Rundstedt's fanking drive tbrough the Ardennes.
That had been foreseen when the scheme was drafted. Rund.
o1sd1 himself told me: "We expect"-d.thpt, the Allies would
try to advance through Belgium and Southern'tt<;{taad egefttst
the Ruhr-and our oflensive would thus have thc effect of a
corurter+trokg with the natural advantages this carries." Such
an expecatioo went beyond the Allies'intentions, but that did
 HO'W HrrITN. BEAT IRANCE-A}ITD SAVED BNTAIN II7
Dot Eatter. For the opening of the German right wing assault
on thc fronticrs of Belgium and ttrolland acted like a pistol in
starting the Allies' dash fonrard into thosc countrics, in ful-
fihnent of Plan D-which they had framed in the autumn.
Bock's direct thrust drew them out of their ddcnccs, and far
forward into the open, leaving 6sir €enL and rear exposed to
Rundstedt's indirect thrust
While it was not dificult to foresee the Allies'rcaction, thc
ultimatc decision in favour of Manstein's sc.heme was guidod
by something more than intelligent anticipation. Blumentriu
madc a significant disclosure in giving me his account of
eventF"The opposition was finally overcomc and the plan
changcd owing to definitc news, emanating from Brusscls, of
the Allied plans."

THB M,ITADOB,S CLOAX,

Hider's invasion of the West opened with startling succcsses

on the seaward flank" These focuscd attention to such an e&
tent as to server like a matador's clodq to distract attention from
the thrust that was b.irg delivered tbroqgh the Ardennes-
towards the heart of France.
The capital of Holland and the hub of its communicationq
at Rotterdam, were attac.ked in the early hours of May rot\
by airborne forces, simultaneoudy with the asault on its fron-
tier ddences a hundred miles to the ease The confusion and
alarn created by this double blow, in front and rear, were
increased by the widespread mcnace of thc Lufnrrafie. Ex-
ploiting the disorder, German armoured forces raced through
a gpp in the southern flank and joined up with the airborne
forces at Rotterdam on the third day. They cut through to
their objeaive under the nose of the 7h French Army which
was just arriving to the aid of the Dutch. On the fifth day
the Dutctr capinrlated.
The main gateway into Belgium wa$ dso forced by a
dramatic opening coup. Airborne trooPs pi&ed thc lock-{y
 II8 TIIB GERMAI{ GENERAIJ TAI.E-

seizing the bridges over the Albert Canal near Maasuidt By

the second day, armoured forccs pushed tbroush into the open,
outflanking the fortified bridgehead of Li6ge. That evening
the Belgian Ar-y was driven to abandon is fortificd frontier
line, and fall back wesnrard as its Allies werc nshing up to
the linc of the Dyle as planned.
At the time these dircct assaults, on Holland and Bclgium,
carricd the impression of tremendous strengdr. It is remark-
able to find how lighl tpxs the weight put into these strokcs,
cspecidly in the case of Holland. The German r8th At-y
under Gencral von Kiichler, whic.h dealt with the Dutch, was
considcrably smdler than the forces opposing iq and the path
of its advance was intcrsected by a nennork of canals and
rivers that should have been e:tsy to defend. Its chances turne4
primarily, on the effcct of the airbornc coup. But this new arm
was astonishingly small.
Crcneral Stuileng its Commandu-in Chief, gave me the de-
tafu. "Altogethcr, we had 4,5oo traincd parachute troops in
the spring of r9r4o. To grve thc oEcnsivc against Holland a fair
chan-ce iCwas neccssary to use the bulk of them thcre. So we
allotted five battalions, some 4,ooo men, to that ask, zupple-
mentod by * air-uansportcd division, the zznd which com-
prised r2,ooo men.
- "The limitations of our strength compellcd rxs to concen-
trate on rwo objectiverthe points which seemed the most
essential to the success of the invasion. The main efiorg under
my own control, was directed against the bridges at Rotter'
darm, Dor&echt, and Moerdijk by whid the main route from
the south was carried across the moutbs of the Rhine. Our
task was to capture the bridges bdore the Dutch could blow
them up, and Leep them open until the arrival of our mobile
ground-forces. My force comprised four para$utg battalio-ns
urd one air-transported regiment (of three battalions). rffc
a&ieved complete success, at a cost of only r8o casualties. We
darcd not fail, for if we did the whole invasion would have
failed." Student himsslf was one of the casualties, b.iog
 IIOW HITUER BEAT FRA}IICE-AND SAVED DRITAIN II9
wounded in the head by a sni1rcr's bulleg and he was out
of action for eight months.
"The secondary attack was made against The Hague. Irc
aim qrxs to get a hold upon the Dutch capital, and in par-
ticular to crpnre tte Government ofices and the Servicc head-
quarters. Thc force employed here was commanded by Gen-
eral Graf Sponeck; it consisted of one parachute batalion and
trro air-transported regimcnts. This atta& did not succeed.
Scveral hundred men were killed and wounded, while as many
were taken prisotrer."

After meeting the paramount needs of the coup in Hollan4

only 5oo airborne troops werc lcft to help thc invasion of
Belgium, Studcnt told me. They were uscd to capture the two
bridges over the Albert Canal and the Fort of Eben Emaef
Belgium's most modern fort, which flanked this waterlinc-
frontier. That tiny dcachmcnt, however, made all the dif-
ference to thc isue. For the approach to the Belgian fronticr
here lay across the southerly projeaion of Dutch territory
known as the "ldaastricht Appendixr" and once the Gcrman
Army crosscd the Dutch fronticr the Belgian frontier guards
on the Albert Canal would have had ample warning to blow
the bridges before any invading ground f6rccs could-cros that
fifteen-mile strip. Airborne troops dropping silently out of the
night sky offered a ncw way, and the only way, of sccuring
thc kcy-bridgcs inact
The vcry limitcd scale of airborne forccs used in B.lg*
gives a fantastic air to the reports at the timc that German
paradutists wcre dropping at scores of places, in numbers that
cumulatively ran into thousands. Student provided the er-
planation" He said that to compensate the scantincss of the
acnrd resource$ and create as mu& confusion as possiblg
dummy paraciutists werc scattcred widely over the country.
 IN IIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TALT-

f1is ruse certainly proved most effective, helped by the natural

tendcncy of heated imaginations to multiply dl figures.
The course of the invasion was described to me by General
von Bechtolsheim, then rA (operations chief) to Reichenau's
6th Army, whictr carried out this frontal offensive. Hc was an
old acquaintance, having hen the German Military Auactrd
in Iondon before the war.
"The axis of the 6th Army ran through Maastricht to Brus-
sels, its right wing b.i"g directed from Roermond past Turn-
hout to Malines, and its left wing from Aachen past Li6ge to
Namur. Maastricht was the vital point in the first phasc-or,
to be exact, the two brilges over the Albert Canal west of
Maastricht. These were captrred before they could be blown
up, by gliderJanding on the west bank. Fort Eben F.-ad
was captured in the same way, though not so quickly. The
great disappointment of thc fust day was that thc bridgps over
thc Meuse in Maastricht were blown up by the Dutctr, thrs
dclaying the advancc to support thc glider-parties on the
Albert Cand.
"flowever, Hocppner's r6th Panzcr Corps was pushed
through as soon as the Mcuse had been bridged, although it
was strung out in excessive dcpth, as it had to use a single
bridge, and thrs had to be passcd through a bottlene&. Once
througb it drove towards Nivelles. Progress now bcca-e
guick.
"Under the origind plan therc was no intention of atta&.
ing Li6ge. That fortified city was to be by-passe4 while
screened on the north by our left wing and on the south by
the 4th Army's right wing. But our left wing, pushing down
towards Li6ge, succeeded in driving into it from the rear with-
out any serious opposition.
"Our main forces pushed on westward, and made contact
with the British Ar-y on the Dyle line. We paused to close
up our divisions for the attack, while staging a turning move-
ment from thc south, but beforc it developed the British had
 HO\[' HITLER. BBAT FRANCE_AND SAVED BRTTAIN ,;2I
fallen back to the Scheldg so we halted for a short timc on
th9 Dylc to enable onr divisions to close up.
"Thrroughout-_our advance to Brusels wi were continually
ex-pccting-an Allied coutrtcr€tta& from Ant*qp against our
right ffank.
"Meanwhile, the r6th Panzer C.{pr had driven ahead on
our southern fank, and fought battles near Hannut and Gem-
bloux with the French mechanizcd C.r.lry Corps. At first our
tanks were outnumbered, but the Frenctr anls foueht in a
static way that forfeited thcir advantage, and their lackif enter-
p:ise allowe9 ,i-: fol the rest of Hoeppner's corps to arrive on
the sccne. That decidcd the Gemblouibattle in our favour on
the r4th. But we wcrc dcprived of the chance to exploit our
T..:*, forlloeppnert corps was nonr takcn away toback up
thc break-through whictr had bcen a&ievcd south of thc
Meuse, in thc Ardennes. This decision of the Supreme Com-
mand ldt the 6th Army without any armoured lorces.,'
This ordcr causcd much and a heatcd protest
from Rcichcnau. But he was overruled in thg higher iiteresrc
9f the.generd offensive plan. The 6th Army h--ad well per-
formed its r6le of attracting the attention of the Frenctr Fiigh
9-rn*4 and distracting their attention from the greatlr
threat that was devcloping-in the Ardennes.It had aho
fiinned
down the mobile forces of the Allied ldt wing durGg the
g*.4 days.-Fgr on the r3th Rundstedt's armoured speu-
heads crossed the Meuse arorurd Sedan and burst into the
rolling plains of northeastern France. When Gamelin, thc
French p-C-hl.f, thought of switching his mecia-
gized cavalry from thc ldt wing io stem thc flood at Sedan
he was told that thcy were too fully cngagcd at Gembloux.
- Once that object had been fulfilled there was gmd reason
f9r reducing Rlichenau's punctring power, since"it was not
desirable to husde the Allied left wlng into too rapid a retreat
before Rundstedt's net had been suetihed across its rear.
Reichcnau's air support had been reduced even before his
armour was switchei-away, Bectrtolsheim said. "In the frst
 12 IIIB GERMAN GENERAIS TAI,T'

phascof the offensive the 6th fu-y was given very powerful
iopport by the Luftlva.fie, for the crossings of the Meuse and
thi-Albdt Canal near Maastricig but the corps of dive'
bombers were then concentrated southward against the cross'
ings of the Meuse ncar &dan." I asked Becitolsheim whether
thE freedom from bombing whictr the B.EJ'. had enjoyed dur'
ing its advance to the Dyle was delibcrately intended to entice
itTorward. Hc replied: "Not so far as we werc concerned at
6th Army HQ, but it may have becn planned on a higher
lcvcl.'

Bcfore passing to the story of Rundstedt's break-through qoP

the Ardenneito the Channel coast, which trapped the whole
Allicd left wing, it is worth gritg some of the main Points
from Bectrtolshcim's account of the 6th fumy's latcr advance
in fotlowing up the belated Allicd retreat from the Dyle linl
..,,e axis of our advance was nour directed sn I illel with
our right flank moving on Ghent, and our left on Mons and
Condd, The fust scrious contact with the British was on the
$heldt General von Reictrenau wanted to cnvelop Lille by a
nrning movement round the north, but O.KJI. ordered thc
oain cffort to be made on the other flenlr-in order to asist
Crcncral von Kluge's 4th Army (on tbe right wing of Gcneral
von Rundstcdt's Army Group), which was hcavily engagpd in
the arca Roubaix-Cambrai.In this advancc otr 4th Corps had a
tough fight at Tournai, where it did not succced in pcneuating
thc British defcnce.
"Bettcr reports then came from the Cambrai area, and Gen-
eral von Reictrenau prsuaded OJ(.EI. to aPProve his plan of
sm,ingrng round north of Lille towards Ypres. A powerful
attack by th. rrth C.orps broke through the Belgian front here
on the Lys near Courtrai" Following tiis success, we concen-
tratcd dl possible suength towards Roulers and Ypres. The
 IIO\f, HIITEN, BEAT IBAI{CFAND SAVD DBITAIN 14
6nal ovcrthrorr of the Bclgian Army wan now a&icvcd b,
the 6th Army.
"On the crrening of May zTth wod, came from thc rrth
Corpr that a B.lg* gpnffd had anived at its H.Q. and askod
for the conditions of an armisticc. This roqucst was reftrrod
ba& to OJLW" whici scnt bac} ordcrs that unconditional
surrendcr must be dcmandcd.' Ttis was acccpted, and the
Belgiam laid down thcir arms early next morning. "I callod
on King kopold at Bnrges the day aftcr. He did not likc thc
idca of going to the castlc of Ia&en for internment, and askod
if he might go to his ooutry housc. I pascd on his rqpeq
but it was not grantcd""
I asked Bcchtolsheim whahcr he considcred that the Betgian
Army could have hdd out l*go. He rcplied: *I thiqL it
coul4 for its losscs wcrc not sevcrc. But when I drovc throogh
thc lines of Belgian troops moot of them sccncd to bc vcry
rdieved that the stnrggle had cndcd."
Another question I put was whethcr he had any ncmt at
this time of prcparations to evecuate thc B.EF. tle said: Ye
had rcports that a large conentration of shipping hed bcco
seetr at DunkirL. Thrs led us to snspect that an cvacrntion was
contemplated. Prcviously, wc bad cxpcacd the British to with-
draw southward."
Summing up the brid campaign, hc rcmarkod: '1[tc only
rcal difrculty we mct \ras the crossing of rivcrs and canal$
not from opposition \ilhen the r6th Panzcr Corps had bcctr
taken ?w"ft Eost of oru bridging units wcnt with it, aod thir
became a handicap on our progrcss.'
Hc also cnumcrated what he rcgardcd as the fq6 main lq.
sons of thc camprign:
"First The outstanding lesson was thc nccesity d air.
ground Uaison in actual batdc. This was gpod in 1f,6 mein
eEorts, at lvlaastri,cht aod Sedan, but not in gencral At lt{aa&
tricht the 6th Armyhad cxccllentsnrpportfrom and coopcration
with Ricithofcn'g Stukat, but these were then snrbsequcndy
 124 TIIE GERMAIY GENERALS TALK-

scnt to support Kleist's thnrst th'rough Sedan. The Air Forcc

should dways know when to switch from attacking comml.
nications to close cooperation in the batde. There is need for
great flexibility.
- 'Second. Even after the Panzer Group had been taken away,
events proved that infantry attack was still possiblc without
tank support-thanks to the way that the infantry had been
trained; to welkontrollcd supporting fuc; and to influation
tactics. Widely dispersed threats create openings for conccn-
trated thrusts.
'Third. When armoured forccs are fairly equal, a kind of
standing battlc develops-where spacc is lacking for ma-
ncuvrc.
"Fourth. The nced of flcxibility in switching forces whcn
they are checked in batde along any particular line of advaoce."

urg MArADon's TrrRUsT

Bcfore dawn of }vIay roth thc greatest concentration of tanls

yet secn in war was massed opposite the fronticr of Luxcm-
bo*g. It was poised for a dash ,51s"gh that state and thcn
tbrough Bclgian Luxembourg to the Frcnch frontier near
Sedan, seventy miles distant. Made up of tbree Panzer cory$
thcse were arrayed in three bloc,ks, or layers, with armoured
divisions in the fust two, and motorized infantry divisions in
the third. The van was led by Gcneral Guderian, Germany's
chid tank experq and the whole was coutmanded by Gcneral
von Kleist
"Like a great phalana the three blocks stood densely closed
up one behind the other"-that was Blumentritt's description.
Even sq this armoured array was more than a hundred miles
deep from head to tail-which lay nearly fifty miles ea* of the
Rhine. A vivid impression of its scale was conveyed in a re.
mark whid Kleist made to me: "If this Panzer Group had
advanced on a single road its tail would have stretctred right
 HOW Hm.EB EEAT FMNCE-AND SAVED BRITAIN 125
back to Kocnigsberg in East Prussia, when its head w:ul at
Trier."
To the right of KIeisCs gFoup lay a separate panzer corps
under Hoth, which was to dash through thc northern part of
the Ardennes, to the Meuse between Givet and Dinane
Thesc armoured phalanxes, however, formed only a frac-
tion of the armed mass that was drawn up along the Gcrman
frontier ready to plunge into the Ardennes. According to
Blumentritt: "fumy Group A had dtogethcr 86 divisions of
alt kinds closely packed on a rarrow but very decp front "
He went on: '1fhis advaoce through thc Ardennes was not
rcally an operation, in thc tacticd sensq but an approac.h
march" In making the plan we had rec*,oned it unlikely that
we should meet any serious rcsistrnce hfore reaching the
Meuse. That calculation proved correcL We met no resistancc
in Luxembourg and only slight resistance in Belgian Luxem-
bourg*from the Chasscus Ardcnaak and some French cav-
alry. It was weak opposition, and easily brushed aside.
'1[he main problem wag Dot tactical but administrative-
the complicated movcment and supply arangements. It was
csentid to utilizc dl roads and tracks that were to any dcgree
practicable. The grcatcst possible precision was rcquired in
plouing the route on thc map; in the regulation of uafic;
and in the arrangements for protecting the movement against
both ground and air interference. The many infantry dil
visions had to march on field paths and across country, inter-
spcrsed among the armoured divisions that were using the
roads. The most intricate staff work was demanded in livins
down start-lines for the succcssive pawzer bloc.ks, while'thi
beginning and end of each division's was prccisely
regulated by the clock. The terrain was di
ous and wooded-and the roadg tho"gh they had a gmd
surface, were often steep and full of bends. The worst pro6lem
of dl came later, in the passage of these densely<rowded col.
umns of tanks and iof*try over the deep<ut valley of the
Meuse-a very awkward obstade."
 tfi TtrB GERMAN GENERAIs rAr.t-
Tte chances of success largely depended on the quiclncs
with which Kleist's forces could push through the Ardennes
and cross the Meuse near Sedan Only when they werc acroslt
that river-barricr would their tanls have room for -nan@u\rre.
They must get across beforc the Frcnctr realized what was
happcning and collccted reservcs to stop thcm. But the German
airphotograpbs showcd what appcarcd to be a large fortified
bridgehead covering the approach to the river at Sedan. Is
presence reinforccd the doubts of dl who questioned thc
practicability of the Hitlcr-Manstein plan. They felt that the
ianks could not ru$h such a fortffied position, and that thc
advancc would bc hung up for days in the ellort to capture ie
A few days beforc the atta& was launc.hed however, an
Austrian oficer with a flair for interpreting air photographs
was given the oppornrnity to re-examine them. He sponed
what-no one elsc had discovercd-that thc Frenc.h fortifica-
tions here wcre not complcted but merely in proces of con
struction. His report was sert olf in hastc to Klcist It dis-
pclled the final hesiations. Kleist realized that h9 could speed
up the advancc by pushing his armoured and infantry dL
visions forward simultancously, without waiting until the latter
had cleared the way. The advance to the Meuse bacame a race
rather than a normal military operatioru The infantry corps
of List's rzth Army, "marding likc the devif" reached the
Mcusc only one day after the armoured divisions, but the lattcr
were alrcady over the river by the time they arrivcd.
In thc desire to keep his fingpr on the pulse of the battle,
Rundstedt himsslf came forward to sce the armoured dt
visions in the Forest of Sedan, bdore they madc their pouncc
on the Meusg and subsequently followed them down to the
river to watch the enginecrs bridging ie
Giriog me a detailed account of the olrcration, Kleist said:
"My leading troops, after traversing the Ardenncq crosed the
Frenctr frontier on May rzth. General Schmundt, the Fiihrer's
adjutant, came forwari to see me that morning, and asked
wlicther I would prder to continue the advance at oncc, and
 l{OW HUI.ER EEAT FBANC,FAND SAVEI' IEITAIN IZ?
acklc the Meuse, or wait rurtil the iof*try corps came up. I
decided to makc the attempt without loss of time. Gcncrd
&hmundt then said that thc Fiihrcr would placc at Ey die
ncxt day, the r3th, thc maximum support from the
affe-including the whole of Richthofen's air coqps, of
dive-bombcrs. arrangemcnts were sctdcd at a confcr-
ence on thc evcning of the rzth with Gcneral Sperrlc, who
few up to see me for the puqposc-my hcadquarters were thcn
near Bcrtrix.
"During the day my leading troops had pushed through the
wooded bclt north of the Meuse, and reactred ie southern
cdge, overlooking the river. That night the reservcs closcd up,
rcady for an advancc in strcngth. On thc morning of the r3th
the infantry regimene of the armoured divisions p"rhed down
to the river bank. The Luftwa6e+bout a thousand aircraft-
appeared on the scere at mid&y. Crossi.gF were ac,hicvcd early
in the afternoon-at two places near Sedaq by General Gu-
derian's corps, and near Montherm( by C'cnad Rcinhardt's
corps. All tbrce attempts were succesdul, but thc one ncar
Monthermd proved rather morc dificult than the others,
mainly bccause of the difictrlt tcrrain and stecply *iodiog
routc of approac.h.
"The oplrcsition was not scrious. That was fortunate, for
my artillcry had only 6fty rounds per battcry<s the ammu-
nition columns had bcen delaycd by the congestion on the
roads through the Ardcnnes. By thc cvening of the r3th my
armoured divisions had established strong bridgphcads ovcr
the Meusc. The lcading iof*try coqps only hgan to arive otr
the r4thl
I asked Klcist about the state of the Frenctr ddenccs. He
replied: "Along the Mcuse there was a moderatc amount of
fortification, in the way of pilboxes, but thcsc were not prop
erly armed. If the Frcnch troop,s hcre had been adequately
cquipped with anti-tank gurr we should ccrainly have noticcd
it, as the Eeiority of our tantrs s6ss of the early Itlark I typq
and thus vcry nrlncrablcl fhc French divisions in thc scctoE
 tE rIrE GERtvtAN GENEBATs TALB-

were poorly armed, and of low qualiry Their troop's, as we

repearedly found, gaye up the fight very soon after being sub
jected to air bombing or gunfue."
-
On the French side, four znd Reserve divisions, of oldish
men, were holding a front of over forty miles. Besides beiog
thinly stretched, they were not even provided with the meagrc
normal scale of anti-tank guns, while lacking anti-aircraft
grurs. Assailed by swarms of dive-bombers while the Germans
were bridging the river and then by masses of tanks, it is not
surprising these low-grade French iof*uy quictly collapscd.

A FIRST PAUSB

The German commanders, however, could hardly believc their

luck. They were still more surprised that no counterofiensivc
devcloped. Rundstedt had feared the dclivery of a heavy strokc
against his ldt flank while he was pushing thtorgh the Ar.
dcnnes. "I knew Cramelin before the war, and, uying to read
hb mind, had anticipated that he would make a flanL move
from the Verdun direction with his reserves. rW'e estimated
that he had thirty to forty divisions which could be uscd for
thc purpose. But nothing of the sort developed."
Hider shared these apprehensions. In consequence he put a
curb on the advanceit was the first of two interventions on
h p.rt, the second of which had greater consequences. Tclling
of this first case, Siewert said: "After we had crosed thc Meuse,
the Co--ander-in-Chief wanted to make a quic& dash for
Abbeville and Boulogne. But the Fiihrer was nervous about the
risk that the main French armies mrght strikc westwar4 and
wanted to wait until a large number of infantry divisions had
been brought up to provide flank cover along the Aisne."
R<ihricht, thcn acting as chief liaison officer benreen O.K.H.
and rzth Ar-y H.Q" wes more explicit: 'The rzth At-y,
whictr was following Kleist's panze.r Soup, was ordered to
wheel south to the Aisne, when he wheeled west after crose
ing thc Meuse and headed for the Channcl coast. Wei&s's znd
 IIOW IilrI.ER DEAT FRA}iICE-AND SAVED BRITAIN I2O

Army was brought up from the rear to provide the infantry

bacling for this seaward drive. Io .y opinion this decision
was a bad mistake. I recloo it cost us two days. It would have
been beuer if the znd Army had carried out the whccl south
to the Aisne, while the rzth Ar-y marched straight on to
support the armoured forces."
Kleist himself, however, qualified these opinions.'My forces
werc acfimlly hdtcd only for one day. The order came when
my leading clcmcnts had reached the Oise, betrnecn Guirc
and La Fdre. I was told that it wixi a direa order from the
Fiibrcr. But I d6l thinlc it was thc dircct consequcnce of
the decision to replace the rzth Army by the znd as our backer-
up. It was due to the Ftihrer's anxiety about the danger of a
counter-stroke against our ldt flank; he did not care to let us
push too dccply until the sinration there was clearer.'

IIIE DRIVE TO TIIE SEA

Such uneasiness is undersandable, especially on the part of

Hidcr, who was far in rear. For the quickness of the French
collapse on the Meusc, and the absence of any strong countcr-
offcnsive reaction, naturally seemcd too good to bc true. But
events in the batdc-zone smn displled thcse apprehensions.
Thc shock of the me&anized blilz\rieg had paralyzed the
Frcnch Army, which was mentally and materially unfitted to
copc with it.In that state of pardysis it was incapable of profit-
irg by thc brid relaxation of prcssue whictr Hitlcr's fustinter-
vcntion providcd.
Aftcr crosing the Meuse and turning wesnrard Kleist's
&ive met littlc resistance. His tanks rolled along what was
virtually an open corridor, behind the back of the Allied left
,ing io Belgium" There was no'Battle of the Bulge" such as
the official commentators described so graphically at the time.
It was a smooth nrn. The few counter-atacks against its flank
were spasmodic and uncoordinated. The fint had been at
Stonnc, just south of Sedaq where the French 3rd Armourcd
 I3O IITB GERMAN GENENAIS TAI,K-

Division caused a momentary jolt before it was itself taken in

flank and swept back. The next was near Laon, by the newly-
formed 4th Armoured Division, under Gcneral dc Gaulle. In
rcgard to this Kleist remarked: "It did not put us in any such
d*g.r as latcr accounts have suggestcd. Guderian dealt with
it himself without troubling me, and I only heard of it the day
after." Of the two other armoured divisions which the Frcnch
possessed, tfie rst ran out of petrol and was encircled while
helpless, while the znd was frittered away in paclets by the
higher command to guard bridges.
The German armoured forces, apart from their brief pauser
at the Oisc, raccd westward so fast that their opponents werc
utterly confused. As an example, Kleist related-"I was hdf-
way to the sea when one of my stafi brought me an extract
from the Frenc"h radio which said that the commander of
their 6th Army on the Meuse had been sacled and General
Giraud appointed to take charge of thc situation. lust as I was
reading it, the door opened and a handsome Frend general
was ushered in. He inuoduccd hi"'se[f with the words,'I am
General Giraud.' He told me how he had $et out in an
armoured car to look for his fumy, and had found himself in
the midst of my forccs far ahead of where he had expected
them to b.. My first encounter with the British was when my
tanks came upo& and overran, an infantry battalion whose
men werc cquippcd with dummy cartridgps, for field cxerciscs.
This was a sidelight on the apparent uncxpcctednes of our
arrival." The Germans poured like a flood across thc back areas
of thc B.EJ'. while the bulk of it was still deep in Belgium.
Kleist continucd: "In sum, our advance met no serious op
position after thc break-through. Reinhardt's Panzer C,orps had
some fighting near Le Cateag but that was the only notc-
worthy incident Guderian's Panzs Corps, sweeping farther
soudL reacied Abbeville on the zoth, thus splitting the Allied
armies. Wietersheim, with the motorized divisions, was close
on its heels, and promptly took over the defence of the sector
.l*g the Somme from Peronne to Abhvillg while Guderian
 HOII HIILEB 88AT RTTNCE-AND SAVED BBITNN I3t
turned noflfi next &y." I{e had already ctrt the BJ.F.'s com,
munications with its bases; he was now aimiog to cut it od
from rctreat to the sca.
- The Gcrman higher command had a bad shoc& that day,
howcver, dthough it did not affcct Klcist-who was unaware
of it at the time, as he had gone forward to Abbcrrillc on the
zoth immcdiately after the place was occupicd. As hc had
&iven deepr into France fifu fl^nlr guards [aa Uccn relicvcd
in turn by a system of relays.+s gart of the proces of main-
t iniog the momcnnrm of the advance. The infantry coqps
werc bac*.ing up his panzcr co{ps, and they came undcr f,is
fdTr tor 7.day or two at rt"g" yhil" they took-up de.
-*t
fensivc positions on the flanks. But, in thc later stages, thCpacc
of the panzers bccame so fast as to leave a dangerous intcrvd
hhind them. A small British counrcr€fta& forcc suddcnly
inscrtcd a wcdge into the gap.
Rturdstedt told me: 'A critical moment in thc drivc camc
iu{ 1! my forces had rcached the Channd. It was canscd by
a British coutrtcr-stroke southward from Arras towards Cam-
brai, on May zr. For a short time it was fcared that our ar.
moured divisions would bc cut ofi bcfore the infantry divisionr
could come up to suppoft them. Nonc of the Frenctr countcr-
atta&s carried any scrious threat as this one did." (It is rc.
markable to lcarn what a j* thir gavc thc Germans and horr
it nearly upsct their drive, for it was delivered by a vcry smdl
force, part of General Martefs 5oth Northumlirian Division
y,h ,h. 4th and 7h Sattalions Royal Tank Rcgiment It is
clear that if thcrc had been nro Biitish armourid divisions,
instead of battalions, the whole Gcrman plao might havc ben
paralyzcd.)
That proved to bc the last cfrort to ort the net whictr the
Germans had cast acro$ the rear of the Allied armies in Bcl.
guim-a nct which was sq)n &awn tightcr. Hitler was jrsti-
ficd by thc isnrg against all the iodg *t of his generals. Ya
tey were justified in their doubts* *y basis of probability.
No reasonable cstimatc of the prospect'couU havi re&onod
 l9 TErE GERMAN GENERATS TALK-

that the French Commander-in-Chid, General Gamelin,

would have made such an elementary blunder as to leave the
hinee of his advance almost uncovered when he rushed the
whi'le of his left wing armies into the central plains of Bel-
gium to meet the threat thcre. But for that extraordinary over-
Ight, it is almost certain that Hitler's attack would have had
only a limited succe$. If it hed peneuated only a short dis.
tance ovcr the French frontier, and stu& there, the whole
coruse of the war, and of the world in our time, would have
been very diflerent
Blumcntritt said (and others endorsed this): "Thc fact that
Hitler's 'judgment' had been justiGed in face of his generals
intoxicated him, and madc it muctr more dificult for them
cver to argue with, or restrain him, again." Thus, in the end,
the r3th May proved cver morc urlucky for thcm-and for
Gcrmany-than it did for France.
Thc nrn of fornrne hgan barely a weck later. Ironically, it
started &om a strange instance of rcsuaint oo flitlcr's part,
rot from his generds'caution

ITTTIJR'S
tt,rlrC' oRDER

On wheeling north, Gudcrian's Panzet Corps headed for Calais

while Reinhardt's swept west of Arras towards St. Omer and
Dunkirk. On the zznd, Boulogne was isolated by Guderian's
advance, and next day Calais. That same day Reinhardt
reached the Aire-St Omer Canal, less than twenty milcs from
Dunkirk-the only escape port left to the B.E.F. The German
armoured forces were mu& nearer to it than the bulk of the
B.EJ..
"At that moment " Rundstedt told mer "a sudden telephone
call came from Colonel von Grieflenberg at O.K.H., saying
that Kleist's forces were to halt on the line of the canal. It was
the Fiihrer's dircct order-and contrary to General Halder's
view. I questioned it in a message of protest, but received a
 HO\II IIITIJN, BEAT RANCE-AND SAVED BBITAIN T33
art telegram io r.ply, saying: The armoured divisions are to
remain at medium artillery range from Dunkirk' (a distancc
of or npc milo).'Permision is only granted'for rccotr
-eight
naissance and protective movements."'
Klcist said that when he got the order it scemed to makc no
sense to him"
*I decided to ignore it, and to push on across
the Cand. My armoured cari acrually entered Hazebrouclg
and cut across the British lines of setreat. I heard later that
the British Commaoder-in-Chief, Iord Gort, had becn in
Hazcbrou& at the time. But then came a more emphatic
order that I was to withdraw bchind the canal. My tanks- were
kcpt hdted therc for threc days."
Thomq who was ctrid of the ank side of the General
Saff, told me that he was right up forward with the leading
tanks, near Bcrgueg where Ee coUa bok into tfie town oi
DunkirL itself. He sent back wireless messages direct to
OILH, hgg"S forprmision to la the ankslush on. But
hisappeal !d-uo effect Rdening to Hitler's attitude, he bit-
fsll.remark$:'You can nevcr-talk to a fool. Hitlcr spoilt
the chance of viaory."
Meanwhilc the British forces streamed bac.k towards Dun-
kir!, and cementcd a ddcnsivc position to covcr their re-
cmbarkation. The Crcrman tank commanders had to sit and
watctr the British.lippqg away undcr their very nose.
-After thrce days ifie b,-an was lifte4" Klcist rlid, ..*d th.
advance was resumed--against stiffening opposition. It had
irr,-b.gql to -akg_headwfl when it ias'iirternrpted by a
fresh order from Hitlcr-thit my forces were to Ue witn-
drawn, and sent southward for thi attacl on the line that the
remainder of the Frcnctr
{n1y had improvised along the
Somme. It was ldt to the infantry foroei which had tme
down from_Belgium to complete tle occupation of DunLirk
-after the British had gone."
 t34 IIIB GERMAN GBI{EBAIS TALK-

IITITR'S RBASOMT

A few days latcr Kleist metHider on the airfield at Cambrai

and venturcd to rcmark that a great oPPortunity had becn
lost of reaching Dunkirk before thc British cscapcd. Hidcr
rcplicd: "fhat may be so. But I did not want to send thc
tanks into the Flanders marshes'+nd the British won't come
back in this war."
To others Hitler gave a somewhat difierent excuse-that
so many of thc tanks had fallen out from me&anical break-
downs that he wanted to build up his suength and reconnoitre
thc position bcfore pushing on. He dso explaincd that he
wanted to be sure of having suficient tanks in hand for the
subsequent oflensivc against the rest of the Frenctr At-y.
I found that most of the gcncrals, including Klcist, had ac-
cepted these explanations with little question, though they
were sore about the decision that had deprived them of com-
plete victory. They fclt that flitler's anxiity about thc marshy
ground was e&ggcrated, and were convinccd that they could
havc casily avoided iu They knew that lots of frcsh anks had
been uriving daily to replacc wastage. Nevcrthelcs, Hider's
decision was assumd to h purcly an effor of judgmcnt or
excess ofcaution
But cerain members of Rundstcdt's staff regarded the cx-
cuses as thin, and belicvcd that Hider had a dceper motivc for
his hdt order. They connected it with the surprising way hc
had talked when visiting their headquartcrs at Charlcvillc on
Wy zqfi, the day after the armoured forces had been halted
in their stride.
Hidcr was accompanied by only one of his staff, and talkd
in private to Rundstedt and the tno key men of his stafi-
Sodenstern and Blumentritt, Here is what the latter told me
was in very good humour, he admitted that the
-"Hider
course of the campaign had been'a decided miraclg' and gave
ru his opinion that the war would be finished h six wee.ks.
 Irow Hrrun BEAT PRANCB-AND SAVED BUTATN t35
Aftcr that he wished to conclude a rqronable peace with
Francq and thcn thc way would bc frec for an agrccmeot with
Britain.
"He then astonished ts by spcaking with admiration of the
British Empire, of thc necessity for its and of the
civilization that Briain had brought into the world. Hc ra
markcd, with a shrug of thc shouldcrs, that the crcation of its
Empire had bccn achieved by means that were oftcn harsb
but 'where there is planing thcre are shavingp fying.' He
compared thc British Empire with the Catholic Church-+ap
ing they were both esscntial elemenrc of sability in thc world.
He said that dl he wanted from Britain was that she should
a*nowlcdge Germany's position on the C.ontincnt The rcturn
of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not essential
and he would evcn ofier to support Britain with troops if she
should be involved io diftculties anywhere. He remarked
that the colonics were"oyprimarily a matter of prestigg sincc
they could not be hcld in war, and few Crermans could settle
in the tropics.
"Hc concludcd by say'rng that his aim 1y2s to maLe peacc
with Britain on a basis'that she would regprd as compitiblc
with her honour to acccpt
"Ficld-lvlarshal von Rundstcdt, who was always for agreo.
ment with France and Briain, expressed his satidaaionfand
latcr, after Hider's deparnrg rcmarkcd with a sigh of rclid-
'\ilell if he wants nothing clsg then we shdl havc peacc at
last."'
When Hider continued to keep on the brake, Blumcntritt's
thoughts ran back to this convcrsation. He felt that thc "halt"
had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was
part of a political schcme to make peace easier to rea&. If
the British Army had been capturcd at Dunkirk, the British
people might have felt that thcir honour had sufiered a sain
which they must wipe out By letting it escape Hitler hopcd to
conciliate them.
This conviction of Hider's deper motive was con6rmod
 86 Tr{E GERrvraN GENERATs rALK-

by hir suangely dilatory attitude over the subsequent plans for

the invasion of England. "He showed litde interest in the
plansr" Blumentritt said, "and made no effort to speed up the
preparations. That was utterly different to his usual behavioru."
Before the invasion of Poland of France, and later of Russia,
he repeatedly sprured them on. But on this occasion he sat
ba&.
Since die account of his conversation at Charleville and sub
sequent holding back comes from a section of the gencrals
who had long disrusted Hitler's pohcy and bccame more hos.
tile to him 3s the war continued that makes their testimony
on thi. point more notable. They have criticized Hider on
almost cvery score. It would be natural to expect, that, in thc
present circumstances, they would portray him as intent on the
capturc of the British Army, and themselves as holding him
back. Their cvidence has the opposite effece They very hon-
estly admit that, as soldiers, thcy wantcd to finish ofi their
victory and were upset at the way they were checked from
doing so. Significandy, their account of Hitler's thoughts about
England at the decisive hour before Dunkirk fits in with much
that he himsclf wrote earlier n Mein Kampfarrd it is re-
markable how closely he followed his own bible in other
resPects.
Was this attitude of his towards England prompted only by
the political idea, which he had long entertained, of securing
an alliancc with her? Or was it inspired by a deeper feeling
which reasserted itself at this crucial moment? There were
some complex elements in his make-up which suggest that he
had a mixed love-hate feeling towards England similas to the
Kaiser's.
'Whatever be the true explanation, we can at least be content
with the result. For his hesitations came to Britain's rescue at
the most critical momert of her history.
 XI
THE END IN FRANCE AND THE
FIRST FRUSTRATION

,TIIIE SE@ND AND EINAL PIIASE OF TIIE CAMPAIGN IN FNANCB

I opencd on ]unc 5th, when the ncw German offcnsivc was
launched southward over the Somme. That was barcly a
weck after thc bulk cvacuation of the B.EJ'. from Dunkirk
had begun, and the day after the last ship had sailed from
thcre.
In their severcd lcft wing the Frcnch had lost 3o divisions,
nearly a third of their total forces, including the best part of
their scanty number of mechanized divisions. They had also
lost the help of rz British divisions, for all that rcmained in
Francc were two that had not becn with the main body of
the B.E-F. when the blow fell. Weygand who had non
replaced Gamelin, was ldt with 66 divisions, mosdy depletad
or of inferior qualiry to hold a stretctr that was longer than
the origind front. The Germans, on the other hand had now
had time to bring up the mass of their marching divisions,
whictr had taken little part in the first offensivc.
The most striking feature of the new ofiensive was in its
prelud+the fact that the German armoured divisions, dl of
whi& had been engagd in the westward drive to the Channel
could be swit&ed southwards or easrnards in so short a time
ready for the ncxt stroke. Such rapidity of reconcentration in
tE?
 r38 rrrB GERMAN GENERATS rAr.r-
a frcsh direaion was proof that mcc.hanizcd mobility had
trandormcd strategy.
In the new offensivc Rrurdstedt's fumy Group once again
pl"y.d the decisive r6le. It was not defnitely cast for- that in
-thc
plan. rtrhile Rundstcdt had the larger front a1f for-ces,
six of the ten Gcrman armoured divisions were dlotted to
Bock's Army Group at the outseL But the planning was fexible
and the pattem developcd from the course of the battle. The
change o1 pattern was anothcr proof of the Power conferred
by mcchani"ed mobility.
'Nothing could have b..r, *or. concise than the way Run&
stedt summed up the battle in our first talk-"There was
tough going for i few days but the issue was hardly in doube
The oEensifu was opened by Bock's At-y Group, on the right
wing. I waited until his attack had made headwaR across thc
Somme bdore Fi"i"g in the ofiensive. My armies met with
strong resistance in crosing the Aisne, but aftcr that it was
casy.-The vital thrust was that made over the Plateau de
Iairgres towards Besangon and the Swiss frontier, behind thc
badr of the French right wing in the Maginot Line.'
The opening of the offensive, by the German right win-g
had noi fulfilied cxpectations where success w:N most de-
sired, though it had surpassed exPectations on a sccondary
sector wherc the obstacles had appearcd gteatcr.
On the cxtrcme right, benreen Amiens and thc seq thc
attack was dclivered by Kluge's 4th fumy, as the rSth Army,
origindly the right of the line had been ldt behind to clear
up the position at Dunkirk. Kluge was given onc Prurzer coryt
and owing to a spcedy by Rommel's 7h Armoured
Division, his advance soon reached the Seine at and around
Rouen. The Frenctr troops here were thrown into conftrsion
and made litde attempt-to ddend the crossings, so that the
Gcrmans got over thc river on the heels of the French.
But it was not here that the decisive suoke had been con-
templated-for no reasonable plan could have reckoned on
 $

[.
$
z
E
2
g
\
hrt B
ttr
q5
\

ii
raB
I

lb3
l3-rl
rA
 I4O IIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TALK-

suctr a smooth pessage of a broad riverJine that was easy to

defend. The main weight of the attack by Bock's At-y Group
had been placed with Reichenau's 6th At*y, on the secto_r
east of Amiens, where more decisive results were anticipated.
What happened here was related by Bedtolsheim, Rcictr'
*Gmerd von Kleist's Panzer Group
cnau's operations dief.
was placcd under the 6th At-y for this ata*. Is composition
difiered from that in the 6rst ofiensive, for Guderian had
been transferred to Army Group "A" in Champagne, and his
corps had been replaced by Hoeppner's r6th Panzer C,orps. We
mrde a fi,v@pronged thrust. Wietersheim's r4th Panzcr Cory!
auacked from thi brilgphead over the Somme that we had
geined at Amiens, and Hoeppner's flom the bridgeh?d T
Feronne. The idea was that thcy should converge to join hands
on the Oise beyond Se lust-en-Chauss&. After that, the de'
cision was to be taken whcther the advance should bc purnred
east or west of Paris.
"In planning the attack there were some arguments about
this method. Persondlyr l should have prderred to concentrate
the two panzer corps in a single Pmd, but in the end Gencral
von Reic.hcnau decided in favour of the pincer stroke from the
trno bridgeheads. The drivc might have gone quicler if the
wcight had been concentrated.
"When the attack was launded it met stiff opposition in
the "\Meygand Line'for the fust three or four {ays As a resulq
contrary io anticipation, thc decisive break-through wg not
made on our sector, but on the Aisne east of Soissons. There,
upon O.K.H. decided to withdraw General von Kleist's Panzer
Group from us, and move it east to exploit this breach. Nat-
urally we werc disappointe4 for it was a repetition of what
had happened to us in Belgium."
Kleiitiontinued the story-.'Wietersheim's Corps had actually
sained a brideehead over the Oise at Pont Sainte Maxence,
Eot Ho.pprro?, advance was delayed by hgavy fighting wesl
of Noyoir. By thit t'me a break-through had been adieved
in Chimpagrie. Atthough the auack there did not start trntil
 TIIB END IN ERANCB AND TIIE FIRST TBUSIRATION ,.4I
th. gth, the passage of the Aisne was quickly forced and
Guduian's Panzer Group prshed through th. gpp made by
the rzth fu.y east of Reims. The 9th and zrd fumies had
also broken through west of Reims, and I now received ordcrs
!o pull out of thr batde I was fighting, and bring my forces
back and round to exploit this opcning. tffc made-a long
circuit behind the front, north of CompGgne thcn crosscd thi
Aisne at Soissonq and next the Marne at ChAtcau Thicrry,
after which we headed for Troyes. By thir time the French
were collapsing in confusion, so wc drove on past Dijon down
the Rh6ne valley to Lyons without check. Another big switch
took place hfore this drive 6nishc4 for Wietcrshcids Corps
was brought ba* and rotrnd for a southwcsterly &ivc io
Bordeau4 and then to the Spanish fronticr bcyond Biarritz.'
What had happcned in the course of the brcak-through on
-
thc Aisne was told by Blumentritt 'lfherc was only onc big
strategic decision taken during this offcnsive. When Gudcriant
Panzer Group was right through the Frcnch front and rcached
the area bctrreen St. Dizicr and Chaumont, on the upper
Marng the question arose which of thrcc courses it sboiild
ake. Should it turn east, over the Plateau de Langfcs, towards
the Swiss frontier, in ordcr to cut off the Frcnd armies in
Alsacel Should it advance south+ast over the plateau to Dijon
and Lyor5 in order to reach the Mediterrancan and to hclp
the Ialians over the Alps? Should it turn south-wcst towardi
Bordcaux, in order to cut ofi the French armies rctrcating from
the Paris area to the Loire and beyond? Three shon wirelos
cues were prepared beforehand for this purposc."
In the eveot, Guderian was directed to follow the frst course,
vfiile Kleist's Panzer Groupr racing up on its right after pass-
ing through the gap on the Aisne, carried out both the second
and third. For by that time the French armies were brcaLing
up i"!o incghelenl fragments, and the Germans could safdy
take the risk of splitting their own forces.
Guderian was already sweeping across the rear of the
M"grnot Line when, on lune r4th, I*eb's Ar-y Group "C''
 142 lrrE GERMAN GENBAT.S TALB-

joined in the batde by striking at that famous barricr. Sig'

nificandy, the Germans had not vcntured to atta& it dirct
until it was undercut; and even then their efforu were in thc
nature of probing. The main one was a narrow-frontcd asault
by Heinrici's rzth Corps (of the rst fumy) near Puttlingen,
south of Saarbrucken, while a sccondary cffort was made a
hundred milgs fs the south, on tfie 7th Army front, where the
Rhine was crossed near C,olmar.
Hcinrici told me that he brokc throogh the Line in twelve
horus. But in further discusion hc admittcd that this brcak-
tbrorgh took place only after the defence had bcen weakened
and the French were in process of with&awing. "On the r4th
my troops lrcnetrated at two points, after stifi 6ghting. I had
ordered a continuance of the atack for the r5th when at mid-
night an interccptcd French ordcr was brought to me, show-
ing that the defenders of the Maginot Linc had bcen ordered
to withdraw. So our olrcration ncxt day bccame a purzuit rathcr
than an assault."
What had been happening meanwhile on the 6fi6s f,ank,
where the German offensive had started was described by
Boctrtolshcim-resuming his account from the point where
one of Kleist's panzer corps had gained a bridgehcad over the
Oisc at Pont Sainte Maxencg bdore being pulld out and
switched to the Aisna "'When our infantry relicvcd the tr"ts
and pushed on beyond the Oisq an awkward problcm was pre-
scntcd by the outcr line of fortifications covcring the approaci,
to Paris that the French had built near Scnlis. Gcncral von
Rci&enau was doubdul about the best way of a*ling this
obstacle, but then decided to turn it by moving round the
eastern flank. However, the French retreat saved us uoubls
When thcy abandoned Paris, our right corps was transferred
to the r8th Army, which had now arrived from the nordry
for the move into the capitd, while we continued our ad-
v:rnce southward. After crossing the Seine at Corbeil and
Montereau, we pushed on to thc Loire. We found the bridges
at Sully and Gien had bcen blown up, but we cepftrcd thosc
 Tr{B 8!rD rN rnAr{cB AlrD IIrB Fr$il FBUSTBATTON t43
at Orleans intaa by e cotp de main. The advance was 6sctr-
tiallya pursuit dl the way from thc ldarne to thc Cher, whcre
it ended. Therc war not muc,h fighting."
Su-tning up thc gFneral courie of-the ollensivg Blumen-
$!t ryd: j'O4y the crossing 9f the Aisne, which was strongly
ddendcd by
Fq French, involved a scrious engagemcnt
the armoured divisions were not launched until thc inf*try
Uii
had forccd the passage; eyen so, they had some stifi oppositioir
beyond the rivcr beforc they broki tbrough. After t[at, the
fighting became less and less strenuous. tLe armotrod-divi.
toy p*n.a9q wlthout lto_pping or without bothaing about
thcir cxpossd flenlrs, and floodd thc south of Frani. The
German irrf*try followcd them up in forccd marches of forty
to sixty kilometres a &y, tiquiditing such fractions of thl
Frenctr Ar-y iN were still hiilding iut after the tanks had
driven oo. On many of the main ioadr our armoured forccs
advanced without olposition past Frenc,h columns that were
marching ba*, in the same direaion.
*During
- lhir rog. thc Luftwafie worked in dose coopcra-
tion with thc armoured divisions, in a new form of .itrett
tactic,s.'Whcn a placc was ddende4 the bombers were callod
up to atta& it, and then the advanced dcaciment of the divi-
sion took it; mcanwhilc the bulk of the division, without leav-
*g-O. road, usudly waitcd in a long column (ncarly a hun-
dred miles in lcngth) until the roal ahead was cljar. fhis
was po-ssiblc only becausc we had air superiority, because the
cne1lls anti-tank ddencc was inadoguate, and inincs werc as
yet litde uscd.
"In the-r94o campaign the Fren& fought braveln but they
were no lorg* the Fren& of r9r4-r8-of Vcrdun and thi
Somme. The British forgLt much more snrbbornln as thcy
{d p The Bd[ians io p"n fought gallantly; thl
r914-r8.-
}rr,+ 94y " few days, Wc bad, *p.ri*i y ilthe #
com-
b--.4 with more uptilate tenks thai the French. Above all,
the German tanL troops were more mobile, quicker and better
at in-fighting and able while in movemcnt-to nrn whcrcver
 I44 TIIE GERMAN GENEMI,S TALK-

rcquired by their leader. This, the French at that time were

unible to do. They still fought and fought more in the tradition
of the First Worid rWar. They were not uP to date either in
Ieadership or in wireless control. When they wanted t9 dalge
direction on the move, they had to hdt first, give fresh orders,
and only then were they able to start again. Their tank tactics
were out of date4ut they,wuc bravcl"
This authoritative German verdict should correct the hasty
iudgments that the world passed on the defenders of France.
Wfif. the 6nal collapse wai accelerated by a rapidly spreading
breakdown of morde, it is clear that the issue of the second
ofiensivc was a foregone conclusion. Ddeatwas inevitable from
its outset, though ii might havc been delayed a litdc longcr.
On an elementary cdculation of forces in relation to sPacg
--the space that had to be covered betrneen the Somme and
the Swiss frontier-Weygand had an insoluble problem to
mcct. A calculation in terms of quantity multiplied by tectr'
nical quality only makes the sinration look more hopcless. It
is more surEising that the British Government, and even part
of the French, Continued to cheri,sh illusions after DunLirk,
than that soldiers like Weygand and Petain abandoned hop
as soon as the Somme-Aisne line began to crack. But the
strangest fcatue of thc whole pcriod is that the German
gener:als should have countod on cutting ofi-$e Alligd le{t
wing in Belgium, yet not expectcd a generalcollapse of French
rcsisianc*ils dmost mathematically calculable consequence.
When that collapse came, it was soon clear that they had failed
to reckon with such a probability, and were urprepared to
follow it up.

REct MBENT "SEA-LIoN"

After the collapse of France the German Ar-y relaxed with

a happy feeling that the war was over and that thc fruits of
victory could be enjoyed at leisure. Blumentritt's account of
the sequel conveys a vivid impression of the prevailing atti'
 lTrB END rN ERANCB AND IIIE FIRST TRUSIBATION I45
tudc. "Immediately following the armistice with France, orders
came from O.K.H. to form the stafi for the viaory parade in
Paris, and to despatctr the troops that were assigned to take
part in the parade. We spent a fortnight working on the
of this parade. Spirits were high, as -everyone
counted on a gcneral peace. Preparations for demobilization
had already begun, and we had riceived a list of the divisions
that were to be sent home for disbanding."
After a few we*s, however, the victory mood hgan to
subside, and a feeling of uneasiness grew in the absence of
any srgn that Britaio was disposed to make peace. Hopcful
rumours filled the void. "Ihcrc was talk of negotiations-with
Britah bcing coaducted through Swcden; theq through the
Duke of Alba." But nothing definite came in the way of
confirmation
The first indication that Hider was considering an invasion
of England came on Iuly zn4 when he directedthe hcads of
the threc Serrrices to study the problem, and called for intdli-
gencc appreciations from them. But he ended by emphasizing
that "the pl"t fo in irc infancyr" and added: "$ far it is odt
a question of prcparing for a possible cvcnC' Two wccks
passed before the next developmcne
On |uly r6th, nearly a month after the collapse of Francg
Hitler issucd a directive saying: "Since England in spitc of
her militgily hopeless situation, shows no sign of coming to
terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation aginst
Englald q4 if necessary, to carry it out-. . . The prepara-
tions for the entire operation must be completed 5V iniA
r
August." The order, dow.ver, sounded ooy:'ifiy."
Hider's disinclination to invade England had bien manifest
at a conference with the C-o--ander-in-Chief of the Navy,
Admfual Raeder, on fuly rrth. The record of this conferenie
was in the archives captured after the war. Proccedings began
yrt I long discussiol, not of
9" problem og i1y2d;"g Eig-
tand, but of the development of Norway-a matter in-whi&
Hider showed more interesl He expressed his intention of
 q6 THB GERMAN GENERAT,S rArx-
building "a beautiful German clty" in the fiord near Trond.
heim, and ordered plans to be submitted. Later, the question
of invading England was discussed. Raedcr considered that
*an invasion shbuld bc used only as a last resort to force
Britain to sue for peace." Hc dwelt on the many difrculties of
the venture, and the l*gthy EansPort preparations required,
as well as thc need for air superioritp When he had finished
Hitler expressed his views, which are thus summarized in thc
rccord: 'the Ftihrer also views invasion as a last resorg and
also considers air superiority a prerequisite."
Although the operational directive was issued on thc r6th,
its tentativencss was emphasized by Hida's step three days
later in making a peace appeal to Britain in his sPeech t9 the
Reichstag on the victory in France. He struck a remarkably
moderati notg deploring the possibility of a war to the bitter
end, and dwelling on the sacrifices it would enail for both
sidcs. Even thc cynical Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano,
was impressed and noted in his drary:'t believe that his desire
for peace is sincere. In fact, late in the evening, wheo the first
cold gritish reactions to the speech arrive, a seiurc of ill'
coocealed disappointment spreads among the Germatts . . .
thcy are hoping and praying that this aPPeal will not h
rejected."
Ncxt morning he calted on Hitler, and noted in his diary:
"fle confrms my impressions of yesterday. He would likc
an understanding with Grcat Britain. He knows that war with
the British will be hard and bloody' and knows also that pcople
cvcrywhere today are averse to bloodshed.'-' Oo rerurning to
Romg however, Ciano found that Mussolini was upset by
the spcech, fcaring that the English would respond to Hider's
appcd and considcr a negotiated pcace. "Ihat would be sad
foi Mussolini, hcause nolr more than ever he wants wtrr."
On the 2rst Hitlcr held a conference of his higher com-
manders. His opening remarks showed that he was puzzled
as to the grounds for Britain's persistence in carrying on the
war. He couU onty imagine that she was hoping that Amcrica
 IIIB EITD IN ITANCE AIiID IIIE FINSf, INUSI".ATION 14?
or Russia would enter the war, but it did not sccm likcty that
cither would, though Russia's cntry *would be unpleasait for
Germany especially on account of the thrcat from the air.'
Then he came to the question of invading Eog,lan4 and hgan
by goinling oyt that it would bc "atr cxceptiondly hazardous
turdertaking because cvcn if the way is sf,org thii is not iust
a rivcr crossing but the crosing of a sea which is dominitd
!f the-cnemy. Operational suqpiisc cannor bc cxpccted; a da-
fensivcly prcparcd and utterly detcrminod *.6y faccs us."
He went on to emphasizc the diftcultics of reinfoiccmeot and
supply after a landing. He insistcd that "complac mastcry of
tte air" was csscntial bcforc startiryg and that as the vcniurc
dependcd o9 susaincd & *pport, whic.h in nrn dcpardod
on the wcather-which was usually bad during the sccond half
of Scprcmbcr-+he main operation mr$t be completod by the
r5th. The surrcy cnded with the declaration:1'f it ii not
ccrtain that prqrarations can bc complcted by the bcginning
of Scptember, 6thcr plans must be ionsiderid"" The"wholi
addrcss brcathcd doubg and tbc 6nal norc impliod that hir
mind was trrning dsewhcre.
It is intcresting to look up orrc's notec of the sinntion in
England at that time. Thc Navy's dispcitions did not promisc
a vcry prompt intervention in the Channel for thC Bridsh
admirals wcre almoot as arxious about the mcnacc of the
German Air Force as the Gcrman admirals werc about the
interfercnce of the British N"y. But on the same day that
I
Hider's dircctivc was issucd, hcard authoriative$ that
Britain': fightcr strengdrr- gravdy depletcd in correriig the
cvacuation from Dunkirk, had becn built up again to its fdrmer
lcvcl-its fifty-scven squadrons now compriscdover a thonsand
mactrines, with roerves.
Duftrg thc sir wecks since DunkirL the land forces ayail-
able to meet an invasion had ben so scanty that errcn a fqp
cnemy divisions might havc brushed them aside. But dthore[
the rcorganization and re+quipmcnt of the land forccs evair-
i
atod &om Francc was still slow proc6$ ooc fclt that with
 l48 TTIE GERMAN GENERATS TAI,K-

the restoration of our fighter strength in thc air thc Primary

assurance against invasion had been a&ieved, and that the
danger of this succeeding was on the wane. Nevcrtheless, a
glinipse of 'the other side of the hillr" as an unseen onlooker
it Hitler's conferences, would have been still more cheering.
So would a glimpse into the reports of the German Intelligence
scrvice. For-they grossly over-esti-ated even the strcngth of
our land forces. It is not surprising that Hitler and his gencrals
had growing doubts as they studied the proble-.
Only the-air marshds, hcaded by Goering, showed con6-
dence in fulfilling their part-the doublc rdle of dominating
thc Roy.l Air Force and c.hecking the Royal Navy's intervcn-
tion. It may havc bcen only their assurance which kept the
plan dive.
- The German generds and admirals had a cotnmon mistrtrst
of Gocring's promises, but they did not agree among them-
selves. A landing force of 4o divisions was origindly pre
pose{ but had to be scaled down to 13 divisions because the
Naval High Command declared that it was impossible to
transport more. The remainder were to be sent over at inter-
vals, in tfuee more waves, if conditions allowed. The panzer
menace would not have been as great as the British expected,
for only small elcments were includcd in the landing force,
and the bulk were held bac*. until a later stage. The Army
High C,om-and insistcd that the landings should be made on
the- widest possible front-from Ramsgate to Lyme Bay at
least-in order to distract and stretch the British reserves.
But the Navd High Command insisted that they could only
protect a passage and landing on a nlurow front, no farther
west than Eastbourne. The argument raged for two or three
weeks. Halder declared that the Navy's proposal spelt "com-
plete zuicide" for the Army-"I might just as well put the
o*po that have been landed straight through a mincing
machine." The Naval Chief of Stafl retorted that it would
be equdly suicidal to cross the Channel on a wider front.
Eventudly the controversy ended in a compromise, or-
 IrrB EIID rN TnANCB AND TIrB FIRST FRUSIIATION I,49
dained by Hitler, that satisfied neither service. By-tat time
it was tni miaate of August, and the completion of th9 PreP
arations had been defered until the middle of September. As
Goering had begun his preliminary air ofiensive on the r3th,
both th; generals and tf,e admirds felt the more inclined to
wait and iee whether the Luftwafie mastered the R.A.F., or
whethcr by failing it conclusively sctded the issue against
attcmpting invasion.
Dis&rssftg the invasion plans with Rundstedt, I asked hi-
about the tining and the reasons for cancelling the invasion.
He replied: "As-the frrst steps to PrePare for an invasion were
taken only after the French capinrlation, no definite date could
be fixed when the plan was drafted. It depended ol the time
rcquired to provide the shipping, to aker ships-so th.y go{d
carry tanksr-and to train the trooPs in embarking-and dis'
embarking. The invasion was to be made in Augustif posiblg
and September at the latest The military reasons for its can-
cdlation were various. The German Navy would havc had to
control the North Sea as well as the Channel, and was not
strong cnough to do so. The German Air Force was not su6'
cient to proiect the sea crossing on irc own. While thc leading
part of ihe forces might havc lande4 thetg was the danger
ihat they might be cut ofi from supplies and reinforccments."
I asked-Rundstedt whether it might not have bcen possible
to kecp the invasion forces supplied by .it for a time+s was
done on a very large scale in Russia during the winrcr of
r9r4r. He said the system of air supply was not suficiendy
developed in r94o for this posibility to be considered.
Rundstedt then outlined the military side of the plan. "The
responsibility of commanding the invasion fcll to me, as the
task was asigned to my At-y Group. The r6th At-y urr4o
General von Busch wei or the righg and the 9th Army undcr
General Strauss was on the lefu They were to sail from ports
stretching from Holland to I-e Havre. The r6th Army was to
use ports from Antvcerp to Boulogne, while the 9th At-y
wat to use the ports between the Somme and the &ine. No
 I5P IllB GERMAN GENEnAIS TALE-

l."diog wils to bc made nofl[ of the Ttames." Rundstedt

indicatid on the map the sector ovcr which thc landings were
to be made, stretchGg from Dover to near Portsmouth. 'W'e
wcrc thcn to push forward and cstablish a much largerbridge-
head along an arc south of London. It ran uP thg sguth shop
of the Th=amcs to the outskirts of Iondon, and thcn outh'
westwards to Southampton \M'atcr." In answcr to a furtfier
qucstion, he said the original idea was that part of-Reichenau's
dth Army-from Bockt At-y Grou5was to land on thc
coast wesi of the Islc of WSh., on both sides of Weymouth, to
cut ofi thc Dcvon€ornwall pninsula, and drive north to
Bristol. But that was &oppcd, except as a posible later de'
vclopmcnt.
In ftrther discussion he conveyed that he never had much
confidcnce in thc prospects of succesdul invasion, and that he
was oftcn thinlring of how Napolcon had becn baflcd.In that
sensc the Gcrman gFncrals seem to havc becn hampacd by
bcing historically minded<s thcy werc once again in Russia
the following auhuDn.
Brauchits& seerns to have been rather more hopful than
Rundstedt That is the impression I gathered from Gcneral
Siewerg who was with him at the time. Whcn I askcd him
about Brauchitsch's views as to the practicability of thc plan,
he rcplicd:
*If the weather was favourable, and given time to
prep:re, and considering Briain's great losses at Dunkirk,
Field-Marshal von Brauchiuctr thought it a possibility.' But I
gathered that thc thought was promptcd by the wish, bccausc
f,e could sce no other way of gaining peace in face of I\[r.
Churdill's refusal to consider any proposals for peace. "Our
idea was to 6nish the war as soon as possible, and we had to
g€t across the watcr to do that." "Tten why wasn't it carried
out?" I asked. "There were many preparations in progres, but
the wcather outlook was not too good. Thc attempt wan sup
poscd to bc carried out in Septembcr but Hitlcr cancelled all
the prcparations because he thought it impracticable. The
Navy's heart was not itr ig and it was not strong enough to
 IrrB E![D rN BnANCB AND TrrE BrBSt SRUSIAATION I5r
protcct the f,anls. Neither was the Gcrman Air Forcc strong
coough to stop the British N"ry."
lVhat the soldicrs told me about the Navy's attitude was
amply borne out by the views gathered from a numbcr
of admirals, among them Vosg Brinkmann, Brarning and
Eog.l. One very significant coErment sccmed to erprcss the
corrrmon vicw: "The Gcrman Navy was utterly unprcpared
to hold ofi thc British N"ry, cvcn for a short timc. Morcover,
the accumulation of b*go brought from the Rhine, the Elbc
and thc Dutch canals wcrc quirc unsuiable." In discusioo
some said that they did not bclieve thesc barges were masscd
with the idca of using them, and doubtcd whethcr an invasion
of England was rcally intcnded" Tterc was a seosc of plap
acting-as if mo.* of the higher people concerncd wcre pre.
tcndiog to be more serious about the projea than thcy wcra
"From what we lcarnt later about Briain's sinration, it would
sccm that the war might have been won in Itrly, r94o, if thc
Cicrman Intelligencc scrvicc had bcen bctter; but most scnior
navd oficcrs considered it lost on &ptembcr gr4 rggC' Io
other wordq from thc day Briain cntercd thc war.
@neral Student geve mc dcails of the pan that the airborne
forccs wcre to havc played in thc invasion plan, as wcll as somc
morc intercsting comments on the way he would have wishcd
thcm to be uscd. As Studcnt himsclf was thcn in [ospial,
rccovering from thc head wound hc had sufiered at Rottcr-
dam, the airborne forces werc commanded by Gencrd Rreier:
'1fwo divisionsr wcrc to be cmployod, as well as 3oo glidcrc-
cac.h of thesc carried a pilot and nine other men, three thousand
in all. The intcntion was to use the airborne force for sectring
a bridge-hcad ncar Folkstong about twenty miles widc and
twclve miles deep. thc intended dropping zonc was kqt
closely under air obscrvation It was seen that obsaclcs wcrc
being qui&ty prqared--that the suiable landing fields werc
boiog 6lled with upright sakes--and it was assumed that
rThc Parachuc Divisioo and thc zend Air-Iending Divisioq forning 6c
XI Air CorpG
 t2 IIIB GERMATV GENERATS TAr.K-

mineficlds were also hing laid there. For these reasons Putacr
reportcd at the end of Augusg that an airborne invasion was
trow out of the question.
"If I had been still on the scene I should have urged the use
of the parachute forces against England while your evacuation
from Dunkirk was still in progresg to seize the ports where
your troops were landing. It was known that most of them
had left Dunkfuk without any of their heavier weapons.
"Even if this project had bcen vetoed, my plans for the air-
borne part of the invasion would have been different to what
was actudly decided. I should have used my force to capture
airfields considerably deeper inland than the intended bridgc-
head. Having captured these, I should have transported in-
fantry divisions over by air, without tanks or heavy artillery-
some to turn outwards and attack the coast defences from the
rear, and some to move on London. I reckoned that one in-
fanuy division could be brought over by air in a day and a
half to nro days, and that this rate of reinforcement could be
kept up." It seemed to me that Student's plan was optimistig
uking account of the small force that could be carried in this
pay, and the time it would take to increase.
oBut
the best timer" Student again emphasizedr "was imme-
diately aftcr Dunkirk-Scfore yoru defensive measures were
developed. We heard later that the people in Britain had a
lnrachute psychology. That amused us, but there is no doubt
it was the best defensive precaution, properly directed."
The attinrde shown in the decision that the airborne opcr-
ation should be abandoned was symptomatic. Although the
preparations continued, the nearer they came to completion the
further the will to invade receded. The progress of the air
offensive was not very encouragn& and all the doubters in the
other services were prompt to stress that Goering's expecta.
tions were not being fuliilled as qui&ty as proLised. the
strain that this "batde over Britain" was imposing on the de-
fenders was unduly discounted. At the same time, the lntelli,
gmce reports emphasized, and exaggerated, the growth of the
 IIIB END rN TRANCB AND TtrE FrsST FRUSIAATTON t53
British defences on land-there is reason to suspect that this
was, in parg deliberate. Hitler himsslf tended to emphasize
not only the dificulties, but the ill+ffects of failing inan in-
vasion attempt. The "wait and see" note became louder as the
provisiond date approached. Hider kept on putting oII the
crucid decision about 6xing a definite date, and on Septcmbcr
r7h decided "to postpone'Sea-Lion' inde6nitely."
Throughout the whole pcriod the minutes of his conferences
reek, nog only of doubg but of a deeper disinclination. Thcy
tend to bear out the account that Blumentritt gave me. "Ai-
though fOperation Sea-Lion' was ordered, and preparations
made, the alfair was not pushed forward. Hider- scarcely
seemed to bother about it at all<ontrary to his usual way-
and the stafis went on with their planning without ary irr.
clination. It was dl regarded as a 'war game.' Field-Marshal
von Rundstedt did not take the affair seriously, and busied
himself litde with the work. His Chief of Staff, General von
Sodensterr5 frequendy went on leave. After about the middle
of August no one believed in ir execution any longer, and
fromaid-September the means of transport-which wire quite
insu6cicnt-were already being silently dispersed. By thelnd
of September it was quite clear that the plan was not intcnded
seriously, and it was dropped completely. Among ourselves
we talked of it as blu6, and looked forward to news that an
undcrsanding with Britain had been reached."
It seems evident that the gpnerds had no heat in the at
tempted invasron, and that the admirds were even morc dis
inclined to make the venhre. They took the gloomiest view
of what the British Navy might do. Goering and the heads of
the air force were the only people who werekeen on the plan.
They werc dlowed to test the British suength in the air, but
when they failed to drive thc R*{'F. out of the sky the generals
and the admirals were quick to renew their objections to the
venture-and Hider was surprisingly ready to accept their
excuses for a postponemenL It was a permanent postponemenL
For his mind was already turning eastward.
 XII
MISFIRES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

WrTI{ IIIE GERI\,TAN GENENAIS BROUGIIT FRESH LIGT{T

$CT'SSION
lJ on many facets of thc canpaign in North Africa and the
war in the Mediterranean at a whole. Here are some of thc
ctrid points that camc out.
Egypt and thc Suez Canal were savcd, at the time the British
forccs were weakest, by the Italians' jedousy of the Germans
coupled with Hider's indifference to the opportunity of caE
nring these kcys to the Middle East.
Cyprus was saved by the price the British made the Germans
pay for thc capture of Crcte.
- Gibraltar was saved by Franco's rcluctance to lct thc Gcr.
mans into Spri*
Malta was saved by Hider's distrust of the Italian N""y.
All that happened during r94r, when Britain's forfirnes were
at their lowest In r94z the tidc b.gpo to turn, with Russia's
strsained resistance to Hider's invasion, with the entry of
America into the war following ]apan's assault, and with
the growth of Britain's own strength. But there was a long
roadto travel. It might have been longer but for Hitler's help.
It was Hider who cnsured the British the chance to win such
a victory at El Alamein as to decide the war in Nortfi Africa"
For he forbade his genaals to forestall Montgomery's attac,L
t54
 MrsFrn8s IN IIIB tlEDUInnaNEAlr t55
by a timcly step ba*, ttrat would have prcscrvcd thcm from
crtrshing ddeat
I gathercd thesc revelations from various generds, but most
of all from Gcncral von Thoma, thc famous tank commander
who was finally capturcd at Alamein, and &om Gcneral
Student, the Commandcr-in-Chid of Crcrmany's airborne
forces.
Thoma rclatcd the origins of cntry into thc
Crermany's
Mcditerrancan field.'I was scnt to North Africa in October,
rgqo, to report on the question whethcr German forces should
bc-sent therg to help the Italians turn thc British out of Egypt.
After sceing lvlarshal Graziani, and snrdying the sinratioil I
madg my reporL It emphasized that the supply problem was
the decisive factor-nor only bccausc of the difiidecs of the
deserq but bccause of the British Navy's command of the
Mediterranean. I said it would not bc possiblc to mainain a
large Crcrman Army thcre as well as the Itdian Army.
conclusion_was thag if a force was sent by us, itihould
-bc"My
an armourcd force" Nothing lcss than four-armoured di-
visions would sufice to ensure succcss,{nd this, I cdculated,
was also $g ma.imun that could be eflectively maintained
with supplies in an advance across the desert to-the Nilc vd-
Icy. At the same time,I said it could only be donc by replacing
the Itali* troops with Gcrman. L"rge h"-Uor .J"H';;t-b:
supplie4 a$ th9 vital thing was tha[cvcry man in thc invad-
ing_forcl rlould bc of thc hst posible qdality.
"But Badoglio and Graziani opposed the-substinrtion of
Gcrmans fe1 ltelians. Indee4 at that time thcy were against
{""eg any German troops serlt there. They dantcd to-keep
the glory of conquering Egypt for themselvcs. Mussolini bac&ei
their objections. While, unlike them, he wanted some Crcrman
help, he did not \ratrt a predominantl| Germen force.,
The importance of this revelation can be better realizrd if
we remember that Thoma's mision to Africa was made two
months before O'Connor's brilliant riposte, undcr 'Wavcll,s
direction, broke up Graziani's auemptid invasion of Egypt
 t56 Tr{E GERMAN GENERATS TAr,K-

The small and scantilytquipped British forces were capable

of smashing the larger but worse equipped Italian Army. Bul
the prospects wouldhave been very dim if a German armoured
force had been on the scene.
It is all too likely that a picked force of four armoured di-
visions, such as Thoma suggested, would have swept into
Egypt-any time that winter. For O'Connor's force then con-
sisted of only one armoured and one infanry divisioq both
incompletely equipped.
Now comes another remarkable disclosure. Mussolini got
his own way-to defeat-pardy because Hider was not 6red
by the idea of throwing the British out of Egypc That was
very different to what the British imagined at the time. Yet it
may be compared with his equally surprising attitude to the
invasion of England. Thoma was stntck by Hider's indilfer-
cnce, though he is not the sort of man to speculate about the
underlying motives.
"When I rendered my report, Hitler said he could not spare
more than one armoured division. At that, I told him that it
would be befter to glvc up the idea of sending any force at
My remark made him angFy. His idea in ollering to send
"ll.
a German force to Aftica was political. He feared Mussolini
might ctrange sides unless hc had a German stiffening. But he
wantcd to send as small a force as possible." (It is to be noted,
here, that Hitler had alrcady suspended the plans for the
invasion of England, and was considering plans for the in-
vasion of Russia.)
Thoma went on to say: "Hider thought that the Ialians
were capable of holding their own in Africa, with a littlc
German help. He expected too much of them.I had seen them
in Spainr'6ghting'on the same side as we were. Hider seemed
to form his idea of their vdue from the way their command-
ers talked when he met them at the dinner-table. When he
asked me what I thought of them, I retorted: 'I've seen them
on the batdefield, not merely in the Officers'Mess."' (If Thoma
spoke to Hider like that, it is not surprising that he was out of
 D.

TI

$ A
c ).
b o
h $l

2
fi
z
a
Ei
FI
i.
a
H
H
H

tr sJls! $
'.1!

d { $i
!a
d
$t -[I$
o
rl
d
$
bi
$$
$tr
 t58 TrrE GER!trAN GENERAT.S rAr.K-
favour after this talk.)
*I told Hider:'One British soldier is
bcttcr than twclve ltalians.' I added: 'The Italians are good
workcrs, but thcy are not fighters. Thcy don't like noise."'
The Gcrman General Stafi was also against sending German
forces to Africa, eithcr on a big scale or a small scale. Accord-
ing to Thoma, Brauchitsch and Halder did not want to get
involvcd in the Mediterrancan at dl. "Halder told me that be
had tricd to imprcss on Hitler the dangers of cxtending too
far, and had pointcdly remarked-'Our danger is that wc win
dl the battles except the last one."'
But Hitler would not refrain from interfering in the Medi-
terranean, tho"gh he hesitated to go all out there. After Grazi-
ani's ddeag he sent a pi*ed detachmcnt thcrc, under Rommef
to restore the situation It was strong enough to frustrate British
plans for the conquest of Libya-and to go on frustrating them
for more than two years$ut not strong enough to be dc-
cisive. The battle swayed to and fro, from the spring of r9r4r
to the auhunn of. ry,42.
Meanwhile, Britain's position in the Meditcrranean was
strbjcct to serious threats clscwherg thorgh they nevcr ma-
hrcd. That has tended to conced how deadly they might have
bcen. I gathered dcails of them from General Student, the
C,ommander-in-Chid of Germany's airborne forccs.
The most scrious was thc projeaed attack on Gibraltar-
which could have barrcd the Wcstern Meditcrranean. He told
mc that in |anuary, r94r, hc was instructcd to draft a plan for
capturing Gibraltar by a parachute desccnL He came to the
conclusion that it was too big a job to be done by the para-
c.hute forces alone. His summing up was-"Gibrdtar cantrot
h taken if the neutrality of Spain is observed by us.
'After my rcporg" Student went onr "the plan was danged
into the brgg;er one of capturing Gibraltar by * attacl from
the mainland. Eight divisions from France were to tace
through Sp"ir. But thie depended on the Spanish agreeing to
let us through. Hitler did not want to take the risk of having
to fight a way tbrough Spah. He tried to persuade Francq
 MrsPrBts rN IrrB MDmBTANBAT{ tg
but Franco would not agree. The discrsdons went on for somc
timc, but thcy proved fruitless. So thc Gibrdtar plan had to
be droppcd."
Student then madc the suqprising disclosure that Hitlcr was
Dot at dl keen about thc strokc that captnred Cretc+nd gave
the British zuch a shock in the Eastcin Mcditerranean zHc
wanted to break off the Balkan campaim aftcr reachins the
south of Greece. When I heard this], iflew to scc G*rtqg
and proposcd the plan of capttuing Crctc by airborne forcei
alone. Gocring-wto was
4*qyr casy to enthusc-was qui&
to sec the posibilities of the idca, and scnt mc on to }frdcr.
I saw hirn 61 April zrse When I 6rst cxplained the proicct
Hidcr said: 'It 6unds dl right, but I doirt thi"l. itt piac.
ticable.' But I managod to convincc him in the cnd.
"In the operation we uscd our one Paractrutc Division, our
one Glidcr Rcgiment and the 5th Mounain Division, which
had no prcvious bcing
of by air. The
zznd AirJanding Division, which had thC expcricirce of thc
Dutctr campaign, had bccn flown to Plocsti in-March, to pro.
tect the Rumanian oil6el&, as tLe Fiihrcr was afraid of sibo.
tage there. F. *ry so concertrcd with this danger that he
rcfused to rclcasc the divisioofor the Qrctc opcration.,,
Ttc air support was provlded by the iiivc.bombcrs end
fightcrs of- Richthofen's 8rh Air Coqps, whici had playod
snrch a vital part in forcing the entry inio ndgUm and i'raircc
in turn. Student said: "I aiked that ihis sliouli[bc placcd under
my command, as well as thc airbornc forces, but my rcquest
was refirsed. Then the higher dircaion of the wholc 6pcrition
was entrusted to Gcnerd lohr, who had bccn in command
of all the air forccs aking part in $e Bdkan campaign. Horr-
cvcr, I workcd out all the plans for the operation--and was
dlowed a &ee hand in this-r-espect The 8th Air Coqps was
excellent, but its action would havc bcco more ellcctiie if it
had bccn placed nndcr my direa conuol.
"No troops camc by sea Suctr a reinforcement had bccn i&
tcndcd originally, but the only sea tra$port available was a
 160 TIIB GERMAN GENERAI,S TAI.K-

Dumber of Greek caiques. It was then arranged that a convoy

of these small vessels was to carry the heavier arms for the
cxlrcdition-anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the artillery and
some tanks-together with two battalions of the 5th Mountain
Division. Escorted by Itdian torpedo-boats, they were to sail
to Melos, and wait there until wi had discoverld the where-
abouts of the British fleet rWhen they rea&ed Melos; they
were told that the British feet was still at Alexandria-whereas
it was actudly on the way to Crete. The convoy sailed for
Crete, ran into the feet, and was scattered. The Luftwafle
avenged this setback by'pu[ing a lot of hairs' out of the Brit-
ish Navy's scalp. But our operations on land in Crete, were
much handicapped by the ahsence of the heavier weapons otr
whictr we had recloned.
*Although we succeeded in capturing the island, our cazual-
ties were heavy. We lost 4,ooo killed and missing apart from
wounded out of 2:zrocn men we dropped on the island-r4rooo
of these were parachute troops and the rest belonged to the
Mountain division. Much of the loss was due to bad landingr
there were very few suiable spots in Crete, and the prevailing
wind blew from the interior towards the sea. For fear of &op
ping the troops in the sea, the pilots tendcd to drop them too
far inland--some of them actually in the British lines. ftc
weapomontainers often fell wide of the troops, which was
another handicap that contributed to our excessive casualties.
The few British tanks ttrat were there shook us badly at the
start-it was lucky there were not more than two dozen. The
iof*try', mostly New Zhalanders, put up a stifi fight, though
taken by surprise.
'"The Fiihrer was very upset by the heavy losses suffered by
the parachute units, and came to the conclusion that their
su4rrise value had passed. After that, he often said to me:
olhe
&y of parachute troops is over.'
"He would not believe reports that the British and Americans
were developing airborne forces. The fact that none were used
in the St- Nazaire and Dieppe raids confumed his opinion He
 MISFITEs rN rrrB MEDTTIRBANEAN 16r

said to me: 'Tterg you seel They are not raising such forces
I was righe' He only changed his mind after the Allicd con-
quest of Sicily in ro43. Impressed by the way the Allies had
used them there, he ordered an expansion of our own airborne
forces. But that change of mind came too lat+hcause by
then you had command of the air, and airborne troops could
trot be eflectively used in face of a superior air force."
Renrrning to the events of t94r, Student said: "When I got
Hider to accept the Crete plan, I also proposed that we should
follow it up by capturing Cyp* from the ar, and then a
furtfier jump from Cyprus to capture the Suez Canal. Hider
did not seem averse to the idea, but would not commit himself
definitely to the project-his mind was so occupied with the
coming invasion of Russia. After the shock of the heavy losses
in Crete, he rdused to attempt another big airborne effort I
pressed the idea on him repeatedly, but without avail.
"A y* later, however, he was persuaded to adopt a plan for
capturing Mdta. Tnrs* was in April, r9r4z. The attac.k was to
be carried out in conjunction with the Ialians. My airborne
forces, together with the Italian ones, were to be dropped on
the island and capture a bridgehea4 whid would then be
reinforced by a large Italian seaborne force-<f six to eight
divisions. My force comprised our one existing Parachute di,
vision, three additional reqiments that had not yet been
organized as a division, and an Itdian parac;hute division.
t'I hoped to carry out the plan not later than August-it
depended on suitable weather-and spent some months in
Rome preparing it In fune I was summoned to Hider's head-
quarters for the final conference on the operation. Unfor.
nrnately, the day before I got there, Hider had seen General
Crtiwell, who was just back from North Africa, and had bcen
given a very unfavourable account of the state of the Italian
forces and their morale.
*Hider at once took alarm. He felt
that if the British Flcet
appeared on the scene, all the Italian ships would bolt for their
 r:62 TrrB GETMATY GBNERAI.s rAr-B-

home portrand leave the German airbornc forces strandod.

He dccided to abandon the plan of attacling Mdta."
That decision was the mori significant because Rommel had
just won a striking victory over thc British in North Africat
Lrri"S the EighthAr-y out of the Gazala position and cap
nring-Tobruk. Exploiting its confusion Rommel pursued it
hclter-skelter tbrough the Western Descrt. Hc camc within
rcach of the Nile valley before hc was c.hecked on the Alamcin
linq at the beginning of !uly.
That was the worsf crisis which the British passed through in
the Middle East. The situation was madc dl the more gravc by
the simultaneous collapse of Russia's southcrn armies in facc of
Hitler's ncw drive to the Caucasus. At Alamein, Rommel was
hammsring on the front door to the Middle East; in the
Caucasus, Kleist was threatening the back door.
Thoma dcclared, howcver, that the threat was accidental
rather than intcnded.'l[he great pincer movement against the
Middle East, which your people imagincd to be in Progress,
wis nevcr a scrious plan. It was vaguely discusscd in Hitler's
cntourage, but our Gnerd Stalf ncver agreed with it, nor
rcgarded it as practicable."
Evcn the threat to Egypt only developed haphazardly<ut
of the uncxpected collapse of the Eighth Ar-y in the GazaT*
Tobruk battle. Rommel's forces were nothing like strong
enough to attempt thc conquest of Egypt. But he could not
resist the temptation to push on in the flush of victory. That
was his undoing.
I asked Thoma whether it was true that Rommel was so
confident of reaching the Suez Canal as appeared in some of
the remarks he made to his oficers. Thoma replicd: "I'm
surc he was notl He only expressed such confidence to en-
courage his troops, especially the Itdians. He soon cooled down
when he was checked by the British on the Alamein position.
He knew that he needed surprise in order to throw the British
ofr their bdance, and he didnt see horr he could possibly
ac.hievc a fresh suqprise in face of thc Alamein ddenccs. More.
 M$8ITES IN TIIB MEDTEXNANf,AN ,63
over, hc kacw that British rcinforccments wcre coatinouly
arriving.
"Rommel realized that he had gone too far-with his lin-
itod forccs and dificult supply linciut his succcss had causod
suctr a sensation that hc could not &aw back. Hider would
not lct him. Thc rcsult was that hc had to stay there until the
British had gathcrcd ovcrwhclming forccs to smash himl
Thoma said that he had learnt most of this from Rommel
and Rommcl's chid subordinatcs. Hc himself had only gone
to Africa, from Russia, in Scprcmber. *When I received'orlcrs
to rclicvc Romm:I, who was sick with janndice, I telephoncd
bac& that I did not want to take the job, saying: 'See-what I
wrote two years ago.' But back came a Ecssage that thc
Ftihrer i$isted on my going, as a pcrsonal orderrso nothing
more could be done.I arrived in Africa about Seprcmber zot{,
and spent a few days disarssing the sinration with Rommel-
who thcn wcntfor treatmeottoWiener Ncusadt, near Vienna
A foraight latcr Crcncral Snrmme arrived on the scene, having
bccn appointcd to take .h*gF of the African theatre as a
whole. This meant that I only had command of our troops
at the front, facing tle El Alamcin position, which limited my
capacity to improve the administrative organization. Soon aftcr-
wards Snrmme had a strokc, and dicd. Alt this complicatcd
our preparations to meet the coming British oficnsivc.
"I did what I could to improvc our dispositions, under difi-
cult conditiong as any idca of withdrawing bdore the British
oficnsive opencd was vetoed. But wc would-havc had to reucat
in spite of Hitlcr's ordcr but for the fact that wc wcrc ablc to
fecd our troops with$c supplics which we had capturcd from
Pg {ora at Tobnrk" They kcp us going."
On hearing this, I remarked-that it tooted as if our own
Ioss of Tobruk-{is:rstrour as it seemed at the tim+-had rcallv
hdped to win us the war in Norrh Africa. For if the Gcrmai
forces had retrcatcd from Alamein before Montgomery struc*,
it was unlikely that they would have becn so aecrtveryL*nj
 $4 IIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TALK-

as they were. This point did not seem to have occurred to

Thoma.
Thoma then gave me his impressions of the batde, whi&
opened on October 23, rg42. He said that the Eighth Army's
immense superiority of strength in all the decisive weapons
made its victory almost a certainty before the battle opened.
"I reckoned that you had rpoo aircraft available at a time
when I was reduced to barely a dozen. Ro-mel arrived back
from Vienna a week after the offensive had begun. It was too
late for him to change any of the dispositions. He was in a
nervy state, being still ill, and was very apt to change his
mind. After he arrived I had com*and of only part of the
front, but then he suddenly wanted me to take charge of the
whole once more, under his general direction. The British
pressure grew heavier, straining us to the limit
"When it was clear that we could not hope to ctrec.k the
British break-through, we decided to carry out a withdrawal,
in two stages, to a line near Daba, 5o miles to the west. That
might have saved us. The fust stage of the withdrawal was
to be made on the night of November 3. It had already begun
when a wireless order came from Hider forbidding any such
withdrawal, and insisting that we must hold our old positions
at all costs. This meant that our troops had actually to go for-
ward again-to fight a hopeless batde that could only prove
fatal."
Thoma then related to mc how he himself came to be cap
tured. He had been racing in a tank from one criticd point
to another during the batde, being hit several ti-es, and in
the end was trapped when his tank caught fue and he was
pitched out. "I felt it was a fittirg finish." He showed me his
cap, which had several holes in it-symbols of lucky escapes.
With a note of regret he said he had only been able to take
Part in 24 tank fights during the war-in Poland, France,
Russia and Africa. "I managed to 6ght in ,g ank actions
during the Spanish Civil War."
After Thoma's capture he was trLen to see Montgomery
 MISFIRES IN TI{E MEDITERRANEAN I:65

and with hi- discussed the batde over the dinner-table. "Instead
of asking me for information, he said he would tell me the
state of our forces, their supplies and their dispositions. I was
staggered at the exactness of his knowledge, particularly of our
deficiencies and shipping losses. He seemed to know as mud
about our position as I did myself."
Then, speaking of the victor's handling of the batde, hc
said: "I thought he was vcry cautious, considering his im-
mensely superior suength, buC'-Thoma paused then added
with emphasis-"he is the only Field-Marshal in this war who
won all his batdes.
"In modern mobile warfarer" he concluded, "the tactics are
not the main thing. The decisive factor is the organization of
one's resources-to maintain ttre momentum."
 XIII
FRUSTRATION AT MOSCOW

rIIJR'S GAI{BI.E IN RUSSIA FAIL,ED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT BOI.D

.[-l enough. He wobbled for weeks at the critical phase,
losing time he could ncver regain. After that he ruined himself,
and Gcrmany, becausc he could not bring himsslf to cut his
losscs. There, in a nutshell, is thc sum of the cvidence I gath-
crcd from his generals.
It is the story of Napolcon over again4ut with important
difierences. Whilc Hider miscd the chance of capturing Mos.
cow, he came nearcr dccisive victory conquered far more of
Russia, and mainained his army therc much longer, only to
reactr an evetr more catastrophic end.
Hitler had countcd on desuoyrng the bulk of the Red Army
bcfore reactring the Dniepcr. When he -isscd his mark-by
a hair's breadth-he could not make up his mind what to do.
When at last he dccided to drive for Moscow it was too late
to win bcfore thc winter.
But that was not the only cause of failure rcvealed in what
thc German generals told mc. Sometimes they themselvcs did
not perceivc the conclusions, having been too deep "in the
trees to see the wood." But they did provide the facts from
which conclusions could be drawn.
Here is the most starding of dl. What saved Russia above all
was, not her modern progress, but her backwardnes. If the
fi6
 TRUSIRATION AT MOScoS T6?

Sovict regime had given her a road system comparable to that

of wcstern countrics, shc would probably have bccn overnrn in
qy* time. Th9 G.rm* mccianizcd for.o wcre baulked by
thc badncss of her roads.
But -\is conclusion has a converse. The Germans lost the
clance of victory becausc thcy had based their mobility on
whccls instcad of on tracks. On thesc mud-roads the whiclcd
transport was boggcd when the tanks could move on
Panz*r forccs witb trrcled transport might have ovemrn
Russia's vital centres long before the autumn, despite the bad
roads. World War I had shown this nced to anyone who uscd
his eycs and his imagrnation. Britain was the birthplace of the
tulr, and those of us hcre who preaded the idei of mobile
mcchanizcd warfarc after r9r4-r9r8 had urged that the ncw
model forccs should have cross+ountry vehicles tbroughout
The German Army wcnt further thanbur own anny, or any
oF*, -rn adopting ihe idea. But it fell short in the rop..i
of neglccting to develop su& cross-country transport."itiiIn did,
the Gcrman fu-y was morc modern than any othcr in tg4o.4t,
blt missed its goal h*q.- it had not yet caught up with ideas
that were twenty years old.
The German gencrals had studied their profesion with the
greatcst thoroughncss, devoting themsclvecfrom youth on to
{9-T.u.ry'of its technique., with litde regard to politics and
still less to thc world outside. Men of tha[ type are apt to be
cxtrcmely competcnt, but not imaginative. Il was only latc
in the war ttat the bolder minds of ihe tank school of thbught
were dlowcd free rein, and thcn it was too lat+fornrnatily
for other countries.
Now for the main points of their cvidence on thc war in
Russia

TIIB EEEECT OT TIIB MI.KAN CAMPNGN

Prcli$nu1to theissues of the Rusian campaign itself is the

question whether the Greek. campaign caused ivial
delay io
 168 rrrB GERMAI{ cENERAT.s rAlr-
its launching. British Government spokesmen have claimcd
that the despatch of General Wilson's force to Greece, though
it ended in a hurried evacuation, was justified because it pro
duced six weeks'postponem€nt of the invasion of Russia. This
claim has been challengcd, and the venture condemned as a
political gamble, by a number of soldiers who were well ac,.
(uainted with the Meditcrranean situation-notably General
de Guingand, later Montgomery's Chid of Staff, who was
on the foint Planning Stafi in Cairo.
They argued at the time, and argue still more strongly now,
that a golden oppornrniry of exploiting the defeat of the
Italians in Cyrenaica, and capturing Tripoli before German
help arrived, was sacrificed in order to switch inadequate
forces to Greece that had no real chance of saving her from a
German invasion. They emphasize that the Greek leaders were
very dubious about accepting the British Government's ofier
to intervene, and were jockeyed into acceptance by Itrfr. Eden's
persuasiveness, supported by an inflated impresion of the
extent of help that Britaincould provide.
The historian must recognize that this military vicw was
confirmed by events. In three weeks, Greece was overrun and
the British thrown out of the Balkans, while the reduccd Brit-
ish force in Cyrenaica was also driven out by the German
Africa Corps under Rommel, which had been enabled to land
at Tripoli. These defeats spelt a damaging loss of prcstige and
prospect for Britair5 while bringing misery on the Greek
people. Even if the check campaign was found to have re-
tarded the invasion of Russia that fact would not justify the
British Government's decision, for su& an object was not in
their minds at the time.
It is of historical interest, however, to discover whether thc
campaign actually had such an indirect and unforeseen eflect
The most defnite piece of evidence in support of this lies in
the fact that Hider had originally ordered preparations for
the attac"k on Russia to be completed by May r5th, whereas
at the end of lvlard the tentative date was defered about a
 TBUSI3ATION ATMOSCO![' Iq
Eotrth, and then fixed for |une zznd. Field-Marshal von
Rundstedt told me how the preparations of his Armv Grouo
had been hamrered by the iatd arrival of the armol*ed di-
visions that had been employed-in the Balkan campaign, and
that this was the key-facior
l in the delay, in combinatiin'with
the weather.
Field-tvlarshal von Kleist, who commanded the armoured
forces under Rundstedt, was still more explicit. ..It is tmer,,
he said "that the forces employed in the'Balk*, *.r. not
largc compar.d. *.r,h our togl sirength, but the proportion of
tanks employed there was high. T[e bulk of the ianks that
came under me for the ofiensive against the Russian front in
Southern Poland ha{ taken part in the Balkan ofiensivg and
needcd overhaul, while their crews needed a resg A iarse
number of them had driven as far south as the peloponnei,
an4.had- to h-brougtt ba& dl that way.,,
The views of Field-Marshals von Rundstedt and von Kleist
were naturdly conditioned by the extent to which the of-
fensive on their front was dependent on the return of these
armoured divisions. I found that other generals attactred les
impo:tance to eficct of the Balkan -campaign. They em-
-th.
p}*i*j ,ng 9f main r6le in the offcnsive RussL was
"ffit
dlotted to Field-lvlarshal von Bock's central-rlrmv Grouo. in
Northern Poland and that the chances of victorv princioallv
y"d on-its pr.ggress. A diminution of Rundstedl,r'for..i foi
r:.o$rry-r6le of his fumy Group, might not have agected
*.
the decisive issue, as the Russian forces-courd not bc easilv
switchcd. It might even have checked Hitler's inclination t6
sritch his effort southward in the second stage of the invasion
inclination that, as we shall see, had a-fatally retardins
-an
effcct on the prospects of reaciing Moscow before th. *int.rl
The invasion, at a pinch, could [ave been launched without
awaiting the reinforcement of Rundstedt's Army Grouo bv
the arrival of the divisions from the Bdkans. But, in th..'u.rri
that argument for delay was reinforced by doubts *n tn.t
the gro'nd was dry enough to attempt r"". c.o.r.r
-.rrli.r
 t|O fHE GERMAN GENER I^9 TAII-
Hddcr said that the weather conditions were not suitablc h.
fore the time when the invasion was actually launched.
The retrospectivc views of generals are not, however, a sur!
gurde as to what might have been decided if the situation had
6ccn devoid of Balkan complications. Once the tentative date
had been postpored on thaf account the scdes were weighted
against any idea of striking before the extra divisions had
returncd from that quarter.
But it was not the Grcck campaign that caused the post-
ponemcnt. Hidcr had drcady rcckoned with that commitment
whcn thc invasion of Grcece was inserted in the r94r Pro-
SFrmme, as a preliminary to the invasion of Russia. The
decisivc factor in thc change of timing was the uncxpcctcd
coa? tttot in Yugoslavia that took place on March z7h,
when Gcnerd Simovich and his confederates overthrew the
Government that had just previously committed Yugo-Slavia
to a pact with the Axis. Hider was so inccnsed by thc uPset-
ting ncws as to decide, that same day, to stagc an orrerwhelm-
ing ofiensive against Yugoslavia. The additional forces, land
and ar, requircd for zuch a stroke involved a greater comrnit
ment than the Greek campaign alone would have done, and
thus impelled Hider to take his fuller and more fateful de,
cision to put oII the intcnded start of the atack on Russia.
It wasthe fear, not the fact, of a British landing that had
prompted Hitler to move into Greece, and thc outcome set
his mind at rest. The landing did not even chcck thc existing
Government of Yugo-slavia from making terms with Hitlcr.
On thc othcr hand, it may have encouraged Simovich in mak-
iog hir successful bid to ovcrthrow the govcrnmcnt and defy
Hitler-less succesdully.

TIIE IMPI'ISB TO I}WADE RUSSIA

As a next sagp in my cnqury I sought such light as the gen-

crals could shcd on the qucstion why Hider invaded Russia.
It was a dim light Although the project had becn inarbating
 rBusrBAlroN aT MO6@\tr t7l
h his mind since !uly, r94o, and had taken definite form
beforc the cnd of that ycar, it was remarkablc how hazy most
of hir generals were about the rcasons for a step that had de.
cided their fate. Most of them had been appretrcnsivc when
they were told-of the decision, but thcy werl told very little,
and told _very late. Hider was clever ii the way he [ept his
commanders_ in separate "water-tight comparunentd'--qcl
was told only what Hitler consid&ed necessary for hi- to
I1o, in carfing out his own localized ork. Th.i wcrc almost
Iike prisoncrs on picccwork in a row of cclls.
As I hcard from dl of them that Rundsrcdt had becn the
strongest opponcnt of thc invasion-and the first to urge its
abandonmcnt-I was anxious to get his vicws on the queition.
Hc told mc: "Hitlcr insistcd #. m*t strike hfor; Russie
bccame m rFglg and that she was much trearer striking than
ys imagined. He provided us with information that sfe was
ptanning to lannch an ofiensive hcrself that same summcr,
o-t rg4r-. For my pd, I was vcry doubtful about this.-+nd I
found titde.slSn of it when we croscd the fronticr. lrfany of
us who had fcared such a suoke had bcen reassured bv'the
yay_the Russians had remained quiet during our battfcs in
the \[cst, in r94o, when we had -onr hands-fuIl. I felt that
our best way of guarding against the danger was simply to
strengthen our fronticr ddcncg lcaving thc Rusians t6 iake
the offensivc if they &osc. l1at would h the best test of
their intcntions, and less risL than launctring into Russia.r'
I asked him further about the reasons that haa led hirn to
discredit Hidcr's belid in aa imminent Russian oficnsive. He
replicd: *In the first place, the Russians appeared to bc alen
by surprise when ws crosscd the frontiei.-On my front we
found no srgns of oflcnsive preparations in thc forbard zong
though therc were some farther ba*. They had t\renty-fivi
divisions in thc Caqpathian sector, facing the Hungrian
frontier, and I had expccted that thcy would sning iound
and strile_ rJ py
lq!, fu* as it advanccd. tnsteld thcy
rctrcatcd. I deduccd from this that they were not in a satl
 I72 IIIE GERMAN GENERAI,S TALK-

of readiness for offeruive operations, and hence that the Rus.

sian Command had not been intendins to launch an offensive
at an early qglfe:"
I next questioned General Blumentritt, who at the time was
Chief of Stafl to Kluge's 4th Army on the main line of aftack,
and who at the end of the year becamc Deputy Chief of the
General Safi at O.K.H.-where he was in close touch with
the records, and the "post-mortems" into tfie course of the
invasion.
Blumentritt. told me that the Commander-in-Chid, Bggr-
Crit*h. and the Chid of the General StaII, Halder, as well as
Rundrtedl" 'Al1
tbree realized thodifrcultics presented by the naftre of the
country from their experiences in the r9r4-r8 war<bove all,
the difrculties of movement, reinforcement' and supply. Field-
Marshal von Rundstedt asked Hider bluntly: 'Have you
weighed up what you are undataking in an attac& on
RussiaP"'
Hitler was not moved from his decision. But he was brought
to declare that the Russian campaign must be decided west
of the Dnieper. He admitted bdorehand the difficulties of
bringing uprand mainaining, sufficient reinforcements if the
advance eitended beyond that line. When he found that the
Russian Armies had not been decisively beaten in the battles
west of the Dnieper, he was led, like Napoleon, to order a
continuance of the offensive beyond this river line. That wgs

I fatal by Hitler's own

isn.It was made
as to the bcst directiotr to
take then.
Further sidelights came in discussion with Field-Marshal
von Kleist, who remarked that he was only told of Hider's
intention to invade Russia a short time before the attack was
Iaunched. "It was the same with the other high com-anders.
Wc were told the Russian armies were about to take the of-
fensive, and it was essential for Germany to remove the
menace. It was explained to us that the Fiibrer could not
 c oo ,oo tto Q
F'-- b@rla-zbarl
'u*; (rba-"e*)hr9g
twhw
)a .n. fuanofud
hwtuhM
tr tta l!)QJfugg.fuaut
fionfie.
B"
ar{
q
.!' ,eL
T,

s avtET
letdd

lav\
$''
e,vt3LNta

,on sl
I

&;: acE
oTillit

IIIB EASIERN IRONI

 t74 lrIB GERMAN GBI.IERAT.S TArX-

proceed with other plans while this threat loomed close, as

ioo large a part of the Gcrman forccs would be pinned down
in thc east Leeping guard. It was argucd that attack was the
only way for us toremovc the risks of a Russian atta&.
*I bclicve that Iodl was opposcd to Hitler's conclusion, as
well as Brauchits& and Halder. Keitel, too, was doubtful
about it, but hc was morc hcsitant to make his doubts clear
to Hitlcr.'
Klcist went on: "\tre did not underratc the Rcd Army, as
is commonly imaginsd. Thc last German military attactr6 in
Moscow, Gnerd-Kiistring-a very ablc man-had kept us
well informed about the sate of thc Russian At-y. But Hidcr
refuscd to credit his information.

final v
*
rfle-zufiercd heavy defeats Tte hlicf was
f6stercd by lhc-fthra's political advisers, and we, as soldicrs,
didnt know enough about the political side to dispute it -
"Ttere wcre no prcparations for a prolonged struggla
Evcrything was based on the idca of a_decisivc resn]t bdore
the autumn"" The Crermans paid a terrific pricc for that short
view, whcn winter came.
An even more astonishing fact is that Hider embarked on
the invasion of Russia in face of the knowledge that his forces
would be fcwcr than those opposing him at the outsct, and
wcrc bound to be incrcasingly outnumbered if the campaign
wcre prolonged. Ttat donc made thc invasion an offcnsive
gamble withbut precedent in modern hittoty. When Hider's
flan had been unfolded to the generals in Februar], they
-had
been perturbed by Keitcl's estimate of the comparative
strcngtbs on eithcr sidc. For, cven on his figures, the Red
Army had the equivalent ot q5 divisions available in Western
 SBUSTnATTON AT M(XTOOW 175

Rusia, whereas the invading forces could muster only rzr.

(Actudly Keitel's cstimate wiu a little rurder the mark.) Tbe
assurance that the Crcrman forces wcre "far sulrcrior io qo"l-
ity" did not sufice to dlay their qudms.
Thc advanage of thc initiative enabled the Gcrmans to
producc a moderate supcrionty of sucngth on thc scctor, north
of the Pripet lvlarshes, where Field-lfiarshd von Boc&'s Cen-
tral Army Group advanced astridc the Minsk-Mocow high-
way. But keb's Nortfiern Ar-y Group near tte Bdtic had
bare equdity to thc opposition and Rundstcdds Southern Army
Group had to perform its part with the handicap of a markcd
inferiority of strength, espccially in armoru-the most e$cn:
tial element Kleist told me that his Panzcr fumy, whic.h
formed RundstedCs spearhead compriscd only fuo tank&
"That will probably seem incrediblc to you, but it was dl wc
could assemble after the returtr of the divisions from Greece.
Buderury's Army Group, facing us in the South, had some
aqoo tanls. Ap.rt &om suqprise, we depcnded for nrccess
ti-ply on the snrpcrior training and skill of thc troops. Thcse
wcre decisive asscts until ths f,ussians gained cx1rcricnce."
In the light of events it bccomcs clcar that Hider's bclid
in the powcr of tccinical quality to discount superior num-
bers had more instification than appeared in the 6nal issue of
the war. The test of battlefield rcsule for long bore out hir
asurance of the dccisive advanage of quality ovcr quantity.It
brought his gamblc dangcrously ncar fulfilmcot

TIIB MISCANNAGB OT TIIB IIWASION

Tte next question I explored was how the plan went wrong.
Kleist's answer was: "The main sag5g of our failure was that
wintcr camc carly that ycar, coupled with the way thc Rur
sians repeatedly gave ground rathcr than lct themselves bc
drawn into a decisive batde suctr as \re were se*ing."
Rundstedt agccd that this was "the most decisive" cause.
"But long before winter came thc ctrances had bem diminished
 tfr mrE GERMAT{ cENERNS rAr.r-
owing to the repeatcd delayc in the advance that were caud
by bad roa&, and mud. The 'black carth' of the lJkraine
could be hrned into mud by ten minutes'rain-*oppirg
movement until it dried. That was a heavy handicap in a racc "ll
with time. It was increased by the lack of railways in Russie-
for bringing up supplies to our advancing troops. Anothcr
adverse factor was the way the Russians received continual
reinforcements from their back areas, as they fell back. It
seemed to us that as soon as one force was wiped oug thc path
was blocled by the arrival of a fresh forcc.'
Blumenuitt endorsed these verdicts except for thc point
about the Russians yielding ground. On the lV[oscow routq thc
principal line of advance, they repeatedly held on long cnoug!
to be encircled. But the invaders repeatedly failed to reap thc
opportunity through hcoming immobilized themselves.'Ttc
badness of the roads was the worst handicap, but next to 6at
was tfie inadequacy of the railways, even when repaired. Our
Intelligence was faulty on both scores, and had underestimated
their effect Moreover the restoration of railway tra6c war
delayed by the change of gauge bayond the Russian fronticr.
The supply problem in the Russian campaign was a vcry seri.
ous one, complicated by locd conditions." Ncvertheless, Blrr
mentritt considered that Moscow could have been captured if
Guderian's unorthodox plan had been adopted or if Hider
had not wasted vial time through his own indecision. Blumen
tritt's evidence on these issues will be given later.
Another factor, cmphasized by Kleist, was that the Germans
had no sucb' defioite advantage in the air as they had enjoycd
in their r94o invasion of the West. Although they took zuch a
heavy toll of the Russian Air Force as to ftrrn the numerical
balance io their favour, the diminished opposition in the air
was offset by the stret&ing of their own air cover as they
pushed deeper. The faster they advanced on the ground the
Ionger the stretch became. Talking of this, Kleist said: "At
severd stages in the advance my pAnzr'r forces were handl
capped tbrorgh lack of cover overhead, due to the fighter air.
 FRUSIAATION AT MOSOO\r IN
fields bging too far bac.k. Moreovo, srctr air supuiority as wc
enjoyed during the opcning months was locil rath& than
generd. We owed it to the superior skill sf otu airmen, not
t9 a_superionty in numbers." That advantage disappeared as
the- Russians gained experience, while being ablc io renew
their strength.
Besides these basic factors there was, in Rundstedt's opinion,

f-frr-tt in the original German dispositions that had a delayed

ill+ffect on the course of operations subsequent to the inidd
break-through. U:rder the plan of the Supreme Command a
wide gap was left benreen his ldt flank anil Bock's right flank,
op.posite the wcstern end of the Pripet Marshes-the idea being
this area could be safely neglected because of its nature, and
the maximum efiort put into the two rapid drives, north and
south of the marsh-belt. Rundstedt doubted the wisdom of this
asumption when the plan was under discussion. "From my
oyn gxperience on the Eastern Front in r9r4-r8 I anticipated
that the Russian cavdry would bc able to operate in the Fripet
Marshes, and thus felt anxious aborrt the gap in our advanci.g
&ont, since it left the Russians free to develop flank threaE
from that area."
In the fust sage of the invasion no such risk materialized.
After Reichenau's 6th Ar-y had forced the crossings of the
!ug, ryuth 9f the Marshes, Kleist's armoured forcis passed
$toogh and - swept rapidly forward, capturing LuC[ and
Rovno. But after crossing the old Russian frontiir, and head-
gg fo, Kiev, the invaders were heavily counter-attacled in
{an! by Rusul cavdry corps that suddenly emerged from
th9 Pnpet Marshes. This produced a dangerous situation, and
dthough the tbreat was eveohrally curbed after tough fight-
ing it delayed the advance, and spoilt the chanCe ofan
early arrived on the Dnieper.
While it is not dificult to see how this interruption weighed
on Rundstedt's mind, it is not so clear that the g*o"l prospects
of the invasion suEered in consequence. For no similar inter.
ference played any considerable part in checking Bock's a&
 t78 rrrB GIEMAN GENEBAT,S rAr.K-

v:rnce nortfi of the Prip.t Marshes, where thc ccntre of gravity

of the whole offensive lay.
It was hcre, dong the direct route to Moscow, that Hitler
had concentrated his strongest forces, and had planned to
bring off the decisive batde. While the course of evcnts on
that-front brought out with even greater cmphasis thc dil[-
cultics that Rundstedt and Kleist had encountered on thc
southern front, it also turncd on morc personal factors'<f
human misjudgmcne
A clear picture of the offensive design was given me by
Gcnerd H-inrici, who traced the moves on the map. He is a
small, precise man with a parsonicd manner-he talLs as if
he were saying gracc. Although he hardly looks like a soldieE
proof of hir -ilit ty ability is provided by the fact thag start-
ing a * corps hg finished as Army Group G-:
mander con-ducting the find batde of the Oder in defence of
Bcrlin. His oudine of the pattern of the operation was filled in
with fuller deails and background disclosures by General
Blumenuig who was Chid of Stafi to Kluge's At y through-
out the advance from Brest-Litovsk to Moscow.
The plan, in brid, was to trap the bulk of the Russian forces
by a vast encircling maneuvre-with the infantry corPs mov-
ing on an inner circle, and two grcat groull of tanks on an
ouier circle. The pinccrs nearly closed round the Russians near
Slonim, but most of thcm managed to slip out Then the
pinccrs opcned out again, and a still bigger cncirclement was
ittempted around Minsk-it was hoped to make this the de-
cisive batde. But it fell short of full success, though masses of
Russians were captured. The pincers failed to close in time-
"owing to nrdden heavy rain.'These moves had been executed
at great spce{ and Minsk was capff9d og th9 ninth day. But
the Germans were no\r two hundred miles deep in Russia-
and had missed their red aim;
Beyond Minsk the country became worse, and the weather
no better. Blumentritt vividly described the conditions. "It was
appallingly dificult country for ank movement-reat virgin
forats, widespread s\ramps, terrible roads, and bridges not
 trBUSrAATlON AT Mqi@\r ryg
strong cnough to bcar the weight of tanls. The resistance dso
becamc stiffcr, and the Russians bcgan to cover their front
with mincficlds. It was easier for thcm to block thc way bc-
fcw roads.
cause thcrc wcrc so
"The grcat motor highway leadi"g from the fronticr to
Moscow was unfinished-the onc road a Westerner would call
a'road.'Wc wcrc Dot prepared for what we found bccause our
maps in-no way correspondcd to reality. On those maps dl
supposcd main roads wcre markcd h d, and there seemed to
be many, but thcy often proved to bc mercly sandy tracks. The
Gcrman intdligencc servicc was fairly accurate about condi-
tions in Russianaorpied Poland but badly at fault about
those bcyond the original Russian &ontier.
"Suc.h country was bad cnough for the tanks, but worse still
f9r the Eanrport accompanying them<arrying thcir fucf
their supplies, and all thc auxiliary troops they neidcd. Nearly
atl this transport consisted of whecled vchicies, which couli
not move ofi the roads, nor movc on it if the sand turned into
mud. An hour ot trro's rain rcduccd the ponrgl forccs to stag-
nation. It was an extraordinary sight, with groups of tanEs
-suet&,
and transport strung out over a-hun&cd-mile dl
stucl-until the sun came out and the ground dried."
Dcspite such rcpeatcd d.l"yr the Gcrman forces pushcd on
to the Dnieper. Ncar the cnd of Ioly, a month from the sart,
a third cncirclemcnt \ras attemptcd around Smolensk, on a
l*gpr scale than cver. "flalf a million Russians seemed to h
trappcd. The trap was almost dosed-within about six miles
--Sut the Russiarus oncc again succcedcd in extricating a large
part of their forces. That n:urow failure brought Hiiier rig[t
up against thc question whether to stop or not Wc werc niw
over four hundred -il1 dfp ioto Russia. Moscow lay two
hun&ed milcs farthcr ahcad."
Blumcntritt revealed thaq from the starg there was a vial
conflict of ideas about the method of operations. "Hitler al-
w.ys wTt d-to-carry out encirclcments-according to the prin-
of ortfiodox Bock agreed with nid" So
"iplo
did most of the senior generals on this issue. But Guderian
 r8o rrrE GERMAN GENERALs rAr.r-
and the new s&ool of tank experts had a different idea-to
drive deep, as fast as possible, and leave the encirclhg of thc
enemy to be completed by the infantry forces that were fol-
lowing up. Guderian urged the importance of keeping the
Russians on the run, and dlowing them no time to rally. He
wanted to drive suaight on to Moscow, and was convinccd
he could get there if no time was wasted. Russia's resistance
might be paralyzed by that thrust at the heart of Stalin's power.
But Hitler insisted on having the plan carried out in his own
way, and k.pt curb on the advance of the armoured forces.
" was a very bold one-and meant big risks
"Guderian's plan
in maintaining reinforcements and supplies. But it might have
been the lesser of nro risks. By making the armoured forces
turn in each time, and forge a ring round the enemy forces
they had by-passed a lot of time was losL
"After we had reached Smolensk there was a stand-still
for several weeks on the Dcsna. This was due pardy to the
need of bringing up supplies and reinforcements, but even
more to a fresh confict of views within the German com-and
--about the future course of the campaign. There were end-
less arguments."
Bock wanted to push on to Moscow. Hider, after three fail-
ures to uap the Russian armies on that front, was inclined to
turn south. Therc, Rundstedt had broken ttuough south of
Kiev, on a slant to the Black Sea. It suggested to Hitler the
idea of a bigger encirclement on a fresh line. Eventually he
decided on this course. From Rundstedt's front, Kleist's tank
umy was to swing upward; from Bock's frong Guderian's
tank army was to swing downward; and between them trap
the massed Russian forces around Kiev. Hitler halted the
march on Moscow in favour of this southerly pincer-
maneuvre.
A significant point about this crucial decision was mentioned
by Blumentritt: "Although Field-Marshal von Bock desired
to continue the advance on Moscow, von Kluge did not share
his view and was strongly in favour of the alternative plan
of encircling the Russian forces around Kiev. It was his idea,
 TRUSIRATION AT MOSOO\r I8t
and desirg that his own 4th A"-y should swing south to
carry out this pincer-movement along with Gudcriir's panzer
fo1-ces. When
-setting
fort[ the arguments for this plaq he
said to me, with emphasis:'It would also mean rhat ue stouU
be under Field-tr[arshd von Rrurdstedt, instead of Field-
Marshal von Bock.'Von Bock was a very diEcult man to
serve, ancl von Kluge would have been glai to get out of his
sphcrc. This was an interesting example of thJ influence of
-
the persond factor in strategy.'-
The Kiev encirclcment succeeded and over 6orooo prison-
ers were bagged. But it was late in Septembcr bdore thi battle
was completed. Wioter was &awing-near.
Now Hider had to facc the question whether to be contcnt
with what he had gained, or io make another bid for final
yrJtory -- r94r..-Rpdstedt-was quite definite; telling me of
hls view, he said: "We ought to f,ave stopped on the-Dnieper
after taking Kiev. I arguA this strongli, Field-Marsint
von Brauchitsch agreed with me. Bui Hider, ""a elated by the
victory at Kicv, now wanted to push on, and felt sure he iould
ctpture Moscow. Field-tr{arshd von Bock naturdlv tcnded to
concur, for his nose was pointing towards Mosco#."
order for tLe advance, which began on
-So.Hider..gave_the
October 2. "But " as Bhrmentritt remarked ..its chanci wcre
shortencd hcause Hitler had given the Russians two months'
grace on the Moscow front We had been halted durins Ausust
and.*prcmber-the bcst two montls of the year. That pro:ved
fatal.'
But this decision was accompanicd by another, which in-
volvcd him in further complications and in a loss oi concentra-
tion. For Hider could not resist the temptation to cxploit thc
success in the South at the same time as he pursued'fts ,i-
of capnring Moscow.

FRrrsrATroN ar rrrB'carts ro rrrB caucasus',

When Hidcr made up

$.i"4 to push on, he assigned Rund-
stedt the cxtremely ambitious frcsh-task of clearin! the Black
 I;62 TIIB GERMAITI GBNEEAIS TALK-

Sea coa* and reactring the Caucasus. the objectives, as Rund-

*edt traced them for me on the map, were to gain the line
of thc Don from Voronezh easnpard to its mouth near Rostov,
and drive far enough beyond it to secure the Maikop,rilfields
with his right wing and Stalingrad on the Volga with his ldt
wing. When Rundstedt pointcd out the dificulties and risks
of advancing a further 4oo miles beyond the Dniepcr, with his
ldt exposed over such a long stretch, Hitler confidently as-
serted that thc Russians werc incapable of ofiering serious
opposition and that the frozcn roads would enable a quick
advance to the objcctive.
Describing what happened, Rundstedt said: "The plan was
h-di*pp.d from the start by thc diversion of forces to the
Moscow front. A number of my mobile divisions were drawn
off for g north+asterly advance past Orel towards the south-
crn flank of lvloscow. That achieved little, and lost an oppor-
nrnity. I bad wanted von Bock's right wing to turn south-
castward aod strike across the rear of the Russian armies that
wcrc opposing me near Kursk, thus cutting them ofi. It
sccmed to me a great mistake to swing the offensive cetrtre
of gravity northeastrrard as the Russians were muctr bctter
place4 with the help of the railways radiating from Moscow,
to counter a move iu that dircction.
"As it \ras, my 6th Army on the lcft wing was blocked
bcyond Kurck, and fell short of its objective, Voronezh, on thc
Don. This check rcactcd on the progress of its neighbour, the
r7h Army, and constrictcd thc width of thc advancc towards
the Caucasns. Tte r7h fumy met stifi resistruce along thc
Donee. It could not push far enough fonrard to protect the
flank of von Kleist's rst Panzcr At-y. In consequence, von
Kleist's flank was cndangered by the strong counter-attacks
whictr the Russians developcd in a southerly direction, towards
the Black Sea.
"On the other 0ant von l\[anstein's rrth fu.y pierced thc
ddences of the Perekop Isthmus and broke into the Crime4
quickly mosl 9f that peninzula except for the
fortrcss of Sevastoool and the eastern tio at Kerch. But this
 TBUSTAATTON AT MOS@W IE3
divergent moye, ordercd by Hider, reduccd thc sacogth I
had availablc on the mainland."
The story of what happencd to thc Caucanrs drivc is bcst
given in Kleist's own words. "Before wc rcachcd thc Iowc
Don it bccame clcar that thcrc was no longer time or oppor-
tturity to reach the Caucasus. Although wc had trapped most
of the encmy forces west of the Dnicpcr, and thus gaincd an
apparcntly open path, the Russians were bringing up Eatry
fresh divisions by rail and road from thc eut Bid wcathcr
intmrened and our advance was boggcd down at a cnrcial
time, while my leading troops ran short of petrol.
"My idca now was mercly to cnter Rostov and dcstroy the
Don bridgcs therc, not to hold that advanced line. I had
rcconnoitrcd a good ddcnsivc position on the Mius Rivcr,
and taken stcps to organizc it as a winter linc. But Gocbhls's
propaganda made so muc.h of our arrivd at Rostoy-it war
hailed as having bp"o.d the gateway to thc Caucasrrs'-that
we werc prcventcd from carrying out this plan My troops
werc forced to hang on at Rostov longo than I had intcudad,
and as a renrlt str{fcrcd a bad knock from the Russiatr coutrtGt-
offensive that was launched in thc last wcek of Novcmba.
Howcver, they succeeded in chaking the Russian pursuit as
soon as they had fdlen ba& to thc Mius River line, and d-
thoogh thc enemy pushcd otr far hyond their inland n,rk
they managed to mainain thcir poition hcre, only 5o miler
wcst of Rostov, throughout thc winter. It was the most ad-
vanccd scctor of the wholc German front in the EasC'
Klcist addedl "Thc German armies wcrc in gravc danger
during that first winter. They wcrc virnully froz*t in, and
rurable to move. That was a great handicap in mccting and
checking the Russian encircling movements."
RundstedCs account confrmed Kleistb and also brought out
the story of his own 6rst rcmovd from command. "\Mhcn I
wantcd to break olf thc baule and with&aw to thc Mius Rivcr,
Ficld-Marshal von Brau&itsch agrecd, but then an overriding
ordcr came from thc Fiihrer, whici forbadc any such with-
drawal I wircd back that it was nofiErutc to hold on whercwe
 r84 mra GERMAN GENEMLs TALE-

were, and added:'If you do not acccPt my view you mustfnd

someone clse to command.'That same night a reply came from
the Fiihrer that my resignation was accePted-I left the Eastern
Front on December rst, and nevcr rerurned there. Almost
immcdiately afterwards the Fiihrer fcw down to that sector;
aftcr seeing thc situation, he changed his mind and sanctioned
the stepbick. Significantly, the Mius River line was the only
sector of tle front that was not shaken during the winter of
t{xr-+."
Nevertheles, Rundstedt made it clear to me that he con-
sidered the deep advance of his Army Group had been a funda'
mental mistake in sEategy. In contrast to most generals, of
any nationdity, he did not blame the miscariage of the plan
orr the failure to provide his particular efiort with suficient
resources, but rather suggested that the error lay in developing
it at all. For in further discussion he said: *Ihe r9r4r oper-
ations in Rusia should, io ,y opinion, have had their main
cflort dircctcd, not at first towards Moscow, but towards Lenin
grad. That would have linked up with the Finns. Then, in the
next stage, should have come an attack on Moscow from the
north, in coopcration with the advance of Ficld-Marshal von
Boc*,'s Ar.y Group from the west."

FRUSISATION AT MOSCOW

Tte offensive aimed at Moscow, starting on October znd, was

carried out by three armics-the znd on the right, the 4th in
the centre, and the 9th on the lcft-with the two panzer
groups of Hoth and Hoeppner. The latter had replaced Gu-
derian's, which had beensent southward for the Kiev encircliog
Elan(EUVre.
Thc coursc of the olfcnsive was vividly described by Blumen-
tritt: 'oThe first phasc was the battle of encirclement around
Vyasma. This time, the encirclement was perfecdy completcd
and &orooo Russians were captured. It was a modern Cannac
-on a grcater scale. The panzer groupc played a big part in
 DTUSITATION AT MOS@\T $5
this viaory. The Russianc wcrc caught napping, as they did
not expcct a big drive for Moscow to bc launchcd at suctr a
latc date But it w:ut too late in thc year for us to harvest irc
fruitrfor the operation was not complcted rrntil the cnd of
Octobcr.
"Aftcr thc Russian forces had bccn rounded up, wc pushcd
on towards Moscow. Thcre was little opposition for the mo
Ectrt, but the advance was slow-for the mud was awful, and
the troops werc tired. Moreover, they met a well-preparcd
ddensive position on the Nara River, wherc they werc hcld
up by thc anival of frcsh Russian forccs.
'All the commanders were now asking:'When are wc go-
ing to stopl' They remembered what had happened to Na-
poleon's army. Ivlany of them bcgan to re-read Caulaincourt'e
grim account of r8rz That book had a weighty influence at
this cridcat time in r94r. I can still see von Klugc t*dgog
thtorgh the mud from his dceping quartcrs to his ofrcc, and
there standing bcfore the map with Caulaincourt's book in
his hand. That went on day after day."
This point was of particular interest to mc as in Augusg
r94r-when thc Crcrman tidc of invasion sccmed to bc fow-
ing inesistibly-I had written an article for the October Stranil
on the rclation of Napoleon's campaign to Hider's, brsing it
on cxtensive quotations from Caulaincourtr to brhg out my
implied conclusion. I remarked that we had evidendy bcen
thinking on the same lines, thoogh the Crcrman generals had
hgun to rcmcmber Caulaincourt a bit latel Blumentritt
agreed, with a vrry gfin.
Resuming his accoung he said:'fie troops themselves werc
less dcprcscd than their gencrals. They could scc thc flashcs
of the A.,4r. guns over Moscow at night, and it fued their
imagination-the city seemed so near. They also fclt that thcy
would find shelter there from the bitter wcather. But thc
commanders felt that they werc not strong enough to push
those last forty miles.
'The geoerals eqpresscd their doubts in conference, but
 186 TIIE GERMAN GBNERAIS TAI,K-

Hidcr overruled them, and Bock tcndcd to agree with him

Hider said hc had good reason to belicvc that Russian rc-
sistance was on thc verge of collapse. He gave the order for a
find attempt to take Moscow. The ordcr said that the Iftemlin
was to bc blown up, to signalizc thc overthrow of Bolshevism."
The dispositions were reshufled before the ofiensive was
Iaunchcd. On thc southern wing it wixt to bc carried out by
Kluge's 4th Army, with the rst Panzer &{pr; and on the
northern wing by Hocppner's Panzcr Group, with some in-
f*try divisions of the 9th Army. The whole attack was placcd
under Kluge's direction. This was ironical in vicw of his dis.
hlicf in the posibility of achieving what he must undertake.
Blumentritt continucd: "Ihe offensive was opened by
Hoeppner's Panzcr Group on the left. Its progress was slow,
in face of mud and strong Russian counter-attacls. Our losscs
were heavy. The weathcr then turncd adverse, with snow
falting on the swampy ground. The Russians made repcatcd
countcr-atacls from the-flank across the frozen Moskwa, and
Hoeppncr had to divert more and morc of his strcngth to
c,hecft- thesc thrusts. The znd Panzcr Division succcedcd in
penctrating far cnough to get a sight of the Krcmlin, but that
was thc nearest it came.
"Ihesc unpromising conditions raised the question whethcr
the 4th Army should join in the oficnsivc or not. Night aftcr
night Hocppner came through on the telephone, to qrgc tlis
course; nig[t after night von Klugp and I sat uP late dis.
anssing whcther it would bc wise or not to agree to his itr-
sistenci. Von Kluge decided that hc would gain the opinion
of thc front-linc troops thcmsclvcrhe wir a very energetic and
active commandcr who liked to be up among the fighting
troops--{o he visited thc forward posts, and consultcd -thc
junior oficers and N.C.Os. The troop leaders believed they
toUa reacl Moscow and were eager to try. So after five or
six days of discussion and invcstigation, von Klogp dccided
to makc a final cflort with the 4th At-y. Thc snow was
thick on the ground and thc earth was frozen to a depth of
 FIU$TRATION AT M(}slco\r IV
scveral inches. The hardness of the ground was Eore favour-
able for artillery movcment than if it had bccn otherwise.
"The atack was laun&cd on Dccember znd but by after-
pot reryrls wcri *pog bac*, that it was held up by strong
Russian ddcnccs in thc forcsts around Moscow. TLe itussians
wcrc artists in forcst fighting and their ddence was hclpcd by
the fact that darkness-camJas carly as 3 o'clock in th; aftcr-
n(x)n.
"A fcw parties of our troops, from the z58th Infantry Dt
vision, actually got into thC suburbs of Moscow. Bu[ thc
Russian workers pourd out of the factorics and fo'rght with
thcir hammers and othcr tools in ddencc of their cilv.
"During the nrght the Russians strongly countcr-ittackcd
-
thc isolatcd elcmcnts that had penetratcdlhcir ddcnces. Next
dalour corlrs co-tnmatrdcrs reported that thcy thought it was
po lon-ger pocsible to break throogh. Von Kluge aria t had a
long disarssion that evcning and'at the end-hc dccided to
withdraw thesc advanccd troops. Fornrnatcly the Russians did
not discovcr tbat they wcre moving back, so-that we succccdcd
rn extricatin-g
position
9.-
fryty
and bringing thcm back to their originat
T good order. But thcrc bad bccn vcry f,eavy
casudties in thoc nro days'fighting.
"fhe decision was just in tilnc to avcrt thc worst @D$.
quenccs of the general counter-oficnsivc that thc Rusians now
unlcashed, into which il[arshal Zhukov thrcw a htrndrcd dL
visions. Undcr their convcrging prcssure our position hcame
{aily more dangerous. Hitler was at last bro:ught to realizc
that we could not chcck theq and gavc reluctait pcrmission
for a short withdrawd to a line in iear. Wc had &* b"dl,
Eishd about thc quantity of reinforocments that the Russianl
could producc. They had hiddcn their resources all too well."
Ttat was the cnd of Hidcr's bid for Moscow-+nd it proved
his last bid on that capial fronr Ncver again woul-d anv
German soldicrs catch- right of the Ik6lin, .opt
prisoncrs "i
 XIV
FRUSTRATION IN THE CAUCASUS
AND AT STALINGRAD

I\77HEN MOS@\r REMATNED OUT OF REACIT, AND WTNTDR SEr rN

W., its worsq fear spread among the Glrman troops. With
it grew the danger of a collapse as terriblc as befcll Napolcon's
Grandc Armle.
It was Hider's decision for'tto withdrawal" ttat averted a
panic in that black hour. It appeared a display of iron nene-
though it may only have been due to sheer mulish obstinacy.
For it was against his generals' advice.
But his success in surviving that crisis was his undoing in
the end. Firsq it l6d him to plunge deepcr into Russia thc
next summe\ rg42. He started well but soon went astray. Hc
missed taking Stalingad because his eyes were fixed on thc
Caucasus, and then forfeited the Caucasus in bclated cfiorts
to capture Stalingrad.
When wintcr came he was led to gamble again on his
"Moscow" inspiration. This time it produced a disaster from
which he never recovered. Even then, he might have spun out
the war until Russia was exhausted, by practising elastic de-
fence in the vast buffer-space he had gained. But he snr&
,rgdly to his rule of "no withdrawalr" and so hasteoed
Germany's fdl.
r88
 FRUSINATION IN TIIB CAUC,ASUS AND AT STALINGMD I89

MIE WINTER CRISIIT

It is clear from dl the generals told me that the German armics

were placcd in the gravcst danger after being repulsed bcfore
Moscow in December, r9r4r. The generds urged Hitlcr to
make a long step bac& to a sccure winter linc. They pointed out
that the troops wcre not equipped for the rigours of a wintcr
campaign. But Hitlcr refrscd to listcn. He gave the ordcr:
"Thc fumy is not to rctire a single step. Every man must 6ght
where he stands."
His decision seemed to invite disaster. Yct the cvent iustificd
him<nce agin. The basic region was brought out by Gcn-
cral von Tippelskircn, han and profcssorial, a corps and latcr
an arny co-mander there. 'Frontal dcfcncc was mur.h
stronger in this war even than in r9r4-r8. The Rusians always
failed to break our frong and although they pushed far round
our fanks, they had not yet the skill nor suficient zupplics to
drive home their advanage. Wc conccntrated on holding the
tonns that were rail and road ccntres, rolling up round them
Iike 'hcdgehogs'-that was Hider's idea-and-succcedcd in
holding them fumly. The situation was seved."
Many of the generals think now that Hidcr's dccision was
thc bcst in the circumstances, thoogh they did not agree with
it at the time. "It was his one great achicvemcnt " said Tippds-
kirch. "At that critical moment the troops wcrc remembering
what thcy had heard about Napoleon's rctreat from Moscow,
and living under the shadow of it If they had once begun a
retrcat, it might have nrned into a panic fighC'
Other generds endorsed this. Rundstcdt, however, caustically
remarked: "It was Hidcr's decision for rigid resisance tthat
causcd the danger in the frst place. It would not have ariscn
if he had permitted a timely withdrawd."
Indircct support for that view was provided by the account
Blumcntritt gavc me of what happcned on the Moscow front
d*ing December. It brought out thc needles puils that rc,
 IgtO TrrB GERMAN GENERAT.S rAr.K-

sulted from Hidcrt rigid ddence com-

excessive insistence on
bined with his unstable way of revoking any conccssions hc
had granted.
"Following the 6nal check before Moscow, Gencral von
Klugc advised the Supreme Command that it would bc wisc
to maLe a gcneral withdrawal to the UeF., betrnecn Kduga
and Vyasma, a linc which had already becn partidly prcpared.
There was prolonged deliberation at the Ftihrcr's Headquar-
tcrs over this proposal before reluctant permission was granted-
Meanwhilc the Russian counter-offcnsive developed in a men-
acing way, cspecidly on thc flanks. The withdrawal was just
hginning when a fresh ordcr came from the Ftibrer, saying:
The 4th Ar-y is not to rctire a single step.'
"Our position became dl the worse because Guderian's
Panzcr Group was lying out beyond our right wing, near
Tula and this mucidcpleted force had to be extricated beforc
the main part of the 4th fu.y could withdraw. The delay
qui&ly produccd a frcsh complication, for the Russians at-
ackcd Guderian's thin line and rolled it back precipitatcly
ovcr the Oka River. At the same time Hoeppner's Panzcr
Group on our left was b.irg vcry hard pressed by thc Rus.
sians, who threatcned to outflank it
"In conscquence the 4th fumy became isolated in its for-
ward position, and in imminent dangcr of encirclement Thc
rivers wcre all frozen, so that thcy provided an inadequatc
barrier against the Russian thrusts. Soon the d*g* bccame
acute, for a Russiao cavalry corps pressed round our right
0ank wcll to the rear of it.lhis corps was composed of horsed
cavalry and sledge$orne infantry, while roping in all the
men from the recaptured villages who were capablc of carry-
ing a rifle.
"Strch was the grim situation of the ath Army on Dccember
z4th-and it had arisen from Hitler's refusal to permit. ti..ly
step back. My chief, von Kluge, had gone on the r1h to
replace von Boc*, who was si&, and I was left in charge of thc
army.I and my safr spent Christmas Day in a small hut<ut
 lluslraTroN rN TrrE caucAsus AND aT SIALINGRAD rgl
headquarters in Malo Yaroslavits-with tommy guns on the
ablc and sounds of shooting all round us. luit is it scemcd
that nothing could save us from hing cut of[, we found that
the Rusians were moving on westnard instead of arning up
north astride our rear. Thcy cerainll missed their opportunity.
"The sinration remained vcry prccarious, for Hitler still dL
fayed a dccision, and it w:rs not until |anuary 4th that hc at
iast sanctioned the gencral withdrawal to the Ugra. I had ldr
just bdor+to become Deputy Chid of the Gnerd Stafi-
and Gcncral Kucbler had arrived to akc command. But he
soon found that he could not stand the strain and was replaced
by General Heinrici, who managpd to maintain the new posi.
tion
-until spdng gm_c, and longer, though it was d*ply
envelopcd on both flanks.'
Tdking of thc conditions under which the forces had to bc
extricated, Blumentritt said: *The roads were so deep in snow
that thc horses werc up to their bellies. When the divisions
with&ew, part of thc troops had to shovcl a path by d"y
dogg the qoutg their transport was to move by night You may
rurdcrstand what their uids wcre whcn I mcntion that tht
temperature was nrcnty+ight degrecs bclow fueez;,ngFahrcD-
hcit'
Even though Hider's decision may havc saved a collapsc
on the Moscow frong a terrible price was paid for it "Our
tosses had not bccn hoy trntil thc frnd attac& for Moscowr"
Blumcntritt told me, "but $cy bccamc very scrious during the
winter-both in men and material. Vasd numbcrs per6hed
&om thc cold.a More spccific detafu came out in discussion
with Tippelskirch, who spent the wintcr as a divisional com-
mander in the Sccond Coqps among the Vddai Hills, benreen
I*ningrad and-Moscorr, and told me that his strcngth war
rcduced to one third of its cstablishmcnt "Divisions weie down
!o 5,,ooo men before the end of the winter, and companies to
barely 5o men.'
He also threw lighl on a more far-reaching efiect of Hitler's
--
ono
withdrawal" poli.y.'"I1at winter ruincE the Luftrralte-
 rya, rHE GERMATV GENERAT.S TAr.r-

becaurc had to be used for flying supplies to the ganircns of

it
the 'hedgphogsr' the forward positions that were isolated by
the Russian 6Lnking advances. The Second Corps required zoo
tons of supplies a day, which cdled for a daily average of r-oo
transport aircraft But as bad weather often intervened, the
adual number had had to be considcrably largcr, so as to make
full usc of an intcrvd of pasable weather<n one day as mary
as 3io aircraft were used to reprovision this single corPs. Many
aircraft crashed as fying conditions were bad. The overall
strain of keeping up supplies by to all the isolated posi'
"it
tions on such a vast front was fatal to the funrc development
of the Luftwaffc."
I questioned the generals about the course and eflect of the
Russian winter offensive of ry4t-42. All testified to the nerve
strain caused by the deep flanking threats of the Russian
forces, whic.h lapped round their positions and communica'
tions, but the genaal verdict was epitomized in Blumentritt's
cotnment thatihc indirect results were grcater than the dirca
danger. "The principd effect of that winter ofiensivc was in
upse-tting the German plansfor 1942.1h9 weather was a more
damaging and dangerous factor than the Russian offcnsive
-lowering
operaiions. Bcsides moralc, the weather accouoted
for the greater part of thc German casualtics-which were at
least as heavy as the Rusians' during that winter."
He went on to say that the strain was increased by the way
that the Gcrman forces were stretched. "The average extent of a
divisional frontage was 20 to z5 milcs, and even on crucial
sectors, such as those near Moscow, they were ro to r5 miles.
That thinness of the front was made more precarious because
of the dificulty of bringing up and distributing supplies, whictr
in turn was aggravated by the difrculty of building roads
and railways."
I asked irim how he accounted for the faa that nrch thin
fronts ha4 in general, been able to withstand attack, sincc
they were far more widely suetched than what had been
regardcd in World War I as the limit that a division could
 IBITSInATTON rN IIrE CAUC,ASUS AND AT STALTNGBAD tg},
hold in ddcnce. He replied: "In that war, the fronts were
narrowcd by the great dcpth in whic.h divisions wcre dirs-
tributed. Ncw wcalnns and thc improvenent of automatic
small e'ms partly accounted fol the posiUitity of holding wider
fronts than we could then The grearcr mobility of d&cnsive
meane was the othcr main reason. If the aiackers brokc
throogh the front, small deachmenrc of tanks and motorized
troops often chcckcd thcm by mobile counter-moves bcforc
they could expand the pcnetrition into a wide breac,h.,'
B],_4. w-ay that the disaster was repcatcdly avened by this
qdertying increase of defcnsive advantage lad the ir6*cat
c{ea -of Hitler to gamble more heavily on the
oIfensive. The fact that the crisis was survived exalteci Hitler's
faith in himself; he felt that his iudgment had been justified,
against that of his generals. From now otr he was less-inclincd
than evcr to tolerate their advice.
After the find repulsc at Moscow he had got rid of Brau-
chitsd, and himselltaLen ovcr the Suprcme iommand of the
Ar.y ('OJLII") in addition ro his oirtirg position as Su-
preme Commander of thc Wehrmactrt, the fbrces ar a wholc
("OJ(W."). Thc announcement that Brauctritsch had bcen
1o1ovc{ naturdly suggested to the crcdulous public that thc
faults of the military chiefs had been the causd of the failure.
By that adroit step Hider shifted the blame on to thcir
shoulders while adding to his own power. An apt comment
was provided by Blumenuitt: "Only ihe admirals Lad a happy
time in this war-as Hitler kncw nothing about the iii
whereas he felt he knew d[ about land warIare."
Even the admirals, however, had their troubles. Like Na-
poleon's admirals, they had to deal with a leader who was
too continental-mindcd to ake full account of the obstacles
created by British seapower, and its indircct effect on his
continental designs. Ttey had not-succeeded in making Hitler
renlize the primary importance of cutting away the 6ises of
that seapow-er-where these were within reach oi
before tac&ling furthcr objeaives
 IIIE GERI{AIV GENERAIS TALT-

Ttc generals, on the other hand, were the less able t9 PuL:
brake oi, Hitlo becausc their outlook was too exclusively mili'
tary, bcsides being continental. That narrowing Yision tendcd
to ofiset the efiecl of their greater caution. In this connection,
Kleist contributed some siefuficant refections in the course of
one of our talks: "Clauiewitz's teachings had fallen into
neglect in this generation<vcn at the time when I was at thc
WIr Academy and on the General Soff. +-phrascs were'
quoted, but his bmks w_erc n9t closely studied. He was rc'
$uaca as a mililasy philosopler,- rather 9"1 "t a practicd
[eacher. The writinet of Schlicfien received much greater
ettcntiotr. l}cy secmlcd more practical because they wcrc.di'
rected to the froblem of how an iumy iofgti* in suength-
which was aliays Germany's position in relation to the wholc
<ould overcome enemies on both sides who, in combination,
were superior in strcngth. But Clausewitz's refections were
fundamentally soundispccially his dictum that war was a
continuation bf poticy by otha mcans. It implief that the
political factors iere more impo-tlTt than the military ones.
Thc German mistake was to think that x miligly success
would solve political problcms. Indeed, under the Nazis wc
tended to reversc Clausewiu's dictum, and to regard Peace as
a continuation of war. Clausewiu, also, was prophctically right
about thc dificulties of conquering Russia."

PTJINS FOR rO42

Thc question of what should bc done in the sPring had been

dcbated throughout the winter. lte discussion had hgun
cven beforc tle final assault on Moscow. Relating what hap
pened, Blumenuitt told me: "A number 9f the generals do
llared that a resumption of the ofiensive ,g+ was impos'
sible, and that it was wiser to make sure ^
of holding what had
bccn gained. Halder was very dubious about thc continuance
of the"ofiensive. Von Rundstedt was still more emphatic and
cvcn urged that the Gcrman At y should withdraw to their
 !RUSITATION tN TrrB CAUCASUS AND AT SIALTNGRAD l:96
original front in Poland. Von Lceb agrecd with him. Whilc
othcr generals did not go so far as this, most of them wcre vcry
worried as to whcre the campaign would lead. With thc da
parhrre of von Rundstcdt as well et von Brauctritsch, thc
rcsisancc to flidcr's prosurc was weakening and that prcs.
sure was all for resuming thc offensive."
As Blumentritt had bccome D.poty Chid of thc Gcncral
Staff early in fanuary, undcr HaHcr, no one was bcttcr plaacd
to know the motivcs and idcas hhind Hitlcr's dccision. Hc
strmmed them up as follows:
First, Hitler's hope of obtaining a ry,4zwhat he had faitcd
to obain in r94r. He did not bclicvc that thc Rusians could
increasc their sucngh, and would not listen to evidcncc on
this scorc. Thcre was a'battlc of opinion" betrrccn tlalder
s1d him. The Intelligence had information that &o to ?@
tanLs a month werc coming out of the Russian faaoricq in
the Urd Mounains and elscwhere. IVhen Ilaldcr told hio
of this, Hitlcr slammed the able and said it was impcsibla
Hc would not bclicvc what he did not want to bclicve.
Sccondlp he did not knorr what clrc to do.--as he would
not listcn to any idca of a withdrawal. He felt that hc must
ds somsthing and that somcthing could only bc oficnsivc.
Thirdly, therc was much prcssure from economic au-
thorities in Crcrmany. They urgod that it war essentid to
continuc thc advancc, telling Hidcr that they could not
continue thc war without oil from the Caucasus and whcat
from thc Ukraine.
I askod Blumentritt whether the General Stafi had crrrm.
incd the grounds for these asscrtionq and also whethcr it was
tnrc, as reportcd at thc time, that the manganese ore ronnd
Nikopol in the Dnieper Bend was vial to thc German stecl
industry. Replying to the latter qucstion 6rsg he said he did
not kno\r about thi$ as he was not aoquainted with thc ec+
nomic side of the war. It seemed to me a significant revda-
tion of the way that the German strategists hed bcen divorccd
 $ TIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TAIx-
&om the study of factors that were vitd to their planning. He
w€nt on to say that it was more di6cult to question suc,h
assertions by the economic exPerts as the General Saff was
not represented at conferences on these issucs--<vidcnce of
Hider's desirc to keep thcm in the dark.
While taking the fateful decision to plunge dceper still into
the depths of Russia, Hider found he no longcr had enough
strength left for an offensive on the whole front, such as he
had carried out the year before. Forced to choose, and hcsitat-
ing to make another atta*, towards Moscow, hc dccidcd to
strike south for the Caucasus oilfields, thoogh it meant er-
tending his flank, like a telescope, past the main body of the
Red Army. When his forces reactred the Caucasu$ they would
be cxposcd to a counter-stroke at any point for nearly a thou-
sand -iles back.
Thc only other sector on whictr offcnsivc opcrations were
to be underaken was on thc Baltic flank. The r94z plan
originally included an attempt to taken Leningrad in the
coursc of the sum'''er, in order to secure safe communica-
tions with Finland and bring relief to her semi-isolatcd sinr-
ation. With this exception, the Northern and Cenral Army
Groups werc to rcmain on thc defensive, merely improving
their positions.
A spccial At-y Group "A" was created for the advance
to the Caucasus and placed under Field-Marshd von Lisg
while the rcduced Army Group South opcrated on its left
flank. Rcichenau had rcplaced Rundstedt in command of thc
latter, but he died suddenly from a heart attack in fanuary,
and Bock was brought back to command it, only to be shelved
fir"lly before the offensive was launched. Klugp remained in
command of the Central Ar-y Group and Busc.h replaced
Leeb in command of the Northern fu-y Group. Explaining
this, Blumentria said: "Field-Marshal von LeeE wal so dis.
satisfied with the decision to resume the offensive that he
asked to bc dlowed to give up his command. His heart was
trot in if Apart from regarding it as a hopless venfirc or
 trnusIIATroN rN rHB CAUCTSUS AND AT STALINGRAL tgl
military grounds, he was dso opposed to the Nazi r6gimg and
thus glad of a pretext on which he could ask to rcsign. Rorgr
nation would not havc been possible without a rcason that
satisfied Hider."
In fnrther discussion of the way that the plans for rg4zcaae
to be formulated, Blumentritt made some gencral observations
that are worth inclusion as a sidelight "My exlrcrience on the
higher staffs showed me that the vital issucs of war tended
to be dccided by political rathcr than by strategical factors, and
by mental hrslcs in the rcar rather than by the fighting on the
batlcficld. Moreover, those trssles are not rcfected in thc opcr-
ation ordcrs. Documents are no safe guide for
mcn who sign orders often think quitc difierendy from what
thcy put on palrcr. It \ilould be foolish to take documenrc that
historians find in the archivcs as a reliable indication of what
particular oficcrs really thought.
"I began to perccive that truth long ago when I was work-
ing on the history of thc r9r4-r8 war, under Gencral von
Haeften, a very conscientious historian who taught mc both
thc techniquc and the dificulties of historical rcsearch. But I
came to see it much clcarer from my own close obsenation of
high headquarters in this war-undcr the Nazi system.
'1fhat systcm had some strange by-products. rffhile thc
Gcrman, with hfu liking for organization and order, has a
tendency to put more down in writing than others do, a lot
more 'paper' than cver before was produced in this war. Ttc
old army were trained to write brief orders, that allowed free.
dom to the cxecuants. In this last war the practice was
changed because mental freedom war more and more chained.
Every step, and all conccivable cases had to be regulatcd in
order to protect ourselves from penalization Hence the
abundance and length of the orderrthe very contrary to our
training. Their oftcn bombastic language ancl use of supcrla-
tives was against all the rules of the old style-with its prcA
nant shortncss and concise phrasing. But our orders now hid
to be'stimulatin& in the style of propaganda. tvlany of the
 t98 trrE GERMAN GBNERATs rAr.r-
ordcrs of the Ftihrer and O.K.rff. were rcproduccd word for
word in subordinate orders, so as to en$ue that, if things went
wrong, the latter could not bc charged with having failed to
convey the Ftihrer's intention.
"Ihe conditions of compulsion in Gcrmany under the Nazi
systen wcre dmost as bad as in Russia" I oftcn had cvidencc
of what they werc likc there. For cxamplc, quite carly in thc
I
campaign, was prescnt at the interrogation of two high
Russian oficers who wcre captured at Smolensk. Th.y made
it clear that they were entirely in disagreernent with the plans
they had cxcantcd but said they had cither to carry them out
to the lctter or losc their hcads. It was only in suctr circum-
stanccs that mcn wcrc ablc to talk freely-while in the grip
of thc rdgimc they wcrc forccd to ccho it and suppras tLcir
own thoughts.
"Thc systcms of National Socialism and Bolshcvism werc
similar in many ways. Tdking in his own circle onc day,
whcn Gcncral Haldcr was prcsent, thc Ftihrer said how muc,h
he envicd Stalin, who could dcal in a more radical way with
the obstinate generds than he could himself. He went on to
speak about the prc'war purge of the Red Army Co-mand
and how he cnvied the Bolshevists who had an army and
gFncrals completcly imprcgnatod with thcir own idcology and
thus acting unconditiondly as one man-whercas the Crcrman
generds and the General StaII had no similar fanatical hlief
in thc National Socialist idea.'Thcy havc scruples' make ob
jcctions, and are not suficiently with me.'
"As the war went on Hider indulged more and more in
tirades of this kind. He still necded the class that he per-
sonally despised, as he could not carry out his operational func-
tions without them, but hc controlled their functions more and
more closely. Ivlany of the orders and reports thus bear rwo
faces. Often what was signed did not represent the mind of
the rttan conccrned but he had to s€n it unless the nvo familiar
consequences were to follow. Future psychologisus, as well as
historians, should pay attentioo to these phcnomcna."
 FXUSISATION IN TIIB CAUC,ASI'S AI{D AT S|IALINGRAI' t9
TIIB DNIVB D(x. TIIE CAUC,AST'II

T-h: ,913 ollensive l"d t curious fup., even in its originat

doigrr. It was to bc latrnctred from thJbackward+lantiniline
Taganrog-Kursk-the right flanlr of which, on thc sca of Azav,
was alrcady closc to thc Don at Rostov, while 1f,g lctft flank
at Kursk lay morc then roo miles hhind to the wcsL The
ofrensive was to start with a powcrful thnrst from this rear-
trryd f,anlr. The objcaives wcre dual, thc Caucasus and Salin-
gfa{ bgt thc lattcr had only a prorcctive purpose-to safo
guard the flT_k of thc advance to thc CaucaJus At Statingrad
it was intendcd only to go far cnough hyond the city to cn-
sure the tactical saurity of that strategical point
The faa that Salingrad was not a main objective will sur-
prisc most pcople. For in that crucial summer of the war thc
lght f9r Salingrad 6lled the Einds of the Allied public.
They felt that thcir own fatc was bound up with ig armuch
as Rusia's.
Further light on thir point was provided by Klcist, who
cxplained: "Ihe capture of Salingrad was suSsidiary to thc
main rim. It was only of as a convcnient placq
in the botdenec& betwccn thc Don and thc VolS., whcie wc
could block an atta& on our 0ank by Russian forccs coming
from the Ease At the start Stdingrid was no morc than i
namc on thc map to us." Blumcntritt, howcver, told mc that:
"Hil* originally had thc idea of whceling north &om Salin-
grad with the aim of getting astride thc-rcar of thc Rusian
armies at Moscow, but he was pcrsuadc4 after considerable
argument, that this was an imposibly ambitious plan. Some
of his entourage had even $6sa talking about an-advancc to
the Urals, but that was still more a fanasy."
Even as it was, the plan was a hazardous one, and became
morc hazardous from the way it workcd out in practicc
Kleist, who commanded the atmoucd drive to thc Caucasug
was sent for by Hitler on April r-an ominou date. ..Hftlcr
 2OO IIIE GERMAN GEI{ERAIS TAI,A-

said we must epture the oilfields by the autumn bccausc

Germany could not continue the war without thcm. Whcn I
pointed out the risks of leaving such a long flank exposed, hc
said he was going to draw on Rumania, Hungary, and Italy
for troops to cover it I warned him, and so did othcrs, that it
was rash to rely on suctr troops, but he would not listcn. He
told me that these Allicd troops would only be used to hold
the flank dong the Don from Voronezh to its southerly ben4
and beyond Stalingrad to the Caspian, which, hc said, wcre
the easiest sectors to hold."
The warningp, and forebodings, of Hitler's m;litary execu-
anrc were justified by the ultimate course of events. Never-
tleless, it has to be recognized that his sccond-year gamble did
not fdl far short of success. The summcr of, r94z saw Russia's
tide at its lowest ebb. It was fortunate for her that so much of
Germany's initial strength had evaporated. A little greater
i.P.t tt might have sprcad the many local collapses into a
generd collapse.
The su-n er offensive opened with brilliant success. For
the Russians were suffcring from their huge losscs of men
and equipment in r94r, and their newly-raiscd armies had
not yet appeared on the sccne. The Crcrman ldt wing made
a rapid advance from Kursk to Voronezh. Its progress \pet
helped because thc Russian reserves were scanty-they mostly
lay farther north in the Moscow sector. Another helpful factor
was the Russian offensive towards Kharkov that had been
canied out, with great persistence, during the month of lvlay.
Referring to this, Blumentritt said: "It uscd up much of the
strength that might otherwise have been available to meet our
offensive." He went on: "The 4th Panzer At-y was the
spearhead of this advance from Kursk to the Don and Vo
ronezh. The znd Hungarian Army then took over that s'ector,
while our armoured forces swerved south-eastward along the
right bank of the Don."
Remembering the stirring reports at the time about the
Russians' stubborn ddence at Voronezh and the way it had
 TBUSIXETTOU IN TIIE CAUCESUS AND AT SEALINGRAD 2OI
bloc.ked the Gcrman cfiorts to continue their &ive in that
fg*, I questioned him further on this score. He replicd:
"f:'hcre was never any intention of pushing beyond Vor6nezh
and continuing this dircct casterly drivc. the'orders were to
halt on the Don near Voronezh and assume the defensive
thcrq as fartL @ver to the south+asrward advance-whici
was carried olt bJ ,h. fh Panzrr Ar-y, backed up by the
6th Army under Paulus."
This danting drive down the corridor betrreen the Don and
the Donetz hclped in turn to scrcen, and ease thc way for,
the thrust of Kleist's rst Panzer Ar-y, which was entrustcd
with the princrp.l r6le. Sarting near Kharkov, it made a
rapid advance past Chertkovo and Millerovo towards Rostov.
The r7h Army, south of the Doneu, only joined in the of-
fcnsive when Kleist app:oachcd Rostov. Relating the story of
that ligltning stroke, Kleist told me that his army crosscdthc
Iower Don above Rgstov and then pushed eastward along the
,-dt y of-the lvlanych River. The Russians blew up thc-dam
there and the consequent foods threatened to upsit the Ger-
man plans.-But his armoured forces srccccded in
S.,ting across
the river after nro dayC delay and thcn $rung southwar4 in
tluee columns. Klcist himself accompanied th- right column,
which reachcd Maikop as garly as the 9th of Auguse At thi
same time his centre and ldt columns were approaching the
foothills of thc Caucasus mounains, r5o milej iarther t6 ttre
south+asu This fan-sha1rcd armoured drive was backed up by
the r7h Army, which was pushing forward on foot.
Thus in six weeks from the outset the Germans had reactred
and captured
ceedcd
9: -qr" westerly oilfields, but they nevcr suc-
rgacling the mein sources-whici. lay'beyond the
1n
mounains. 'llhe primary cause of our failurer;, Kleist said,
cwasshortage
of peuol. Tte bulk of our supplics had to comi
by rail from the Rostov bottleneclg as the niict sea route was
considered unsafe. A certain amount of oil was delivcrcd bv
a', but the total whic.h came through was insulf,cicnt to..iJ-
 fr2 TIIE GERMAIV GE}iIERAIS TN.K-
tain the momentum of die advance, whid came to a hdt
just when our c.hances looked bcst
"But that was not the ultimate cause of the failure. Wc
could still havc readed our goal if -y forces had not been
&awn away bit by bit to hclp the attac,k, at Stalingrad. Bc-
sidcs part of my motorizcd troops, I had to grve up thc wholc
of flak coqps and all my air forcc cxcept the reconnaissancc
^y
squadrons.
'That zubtraction contributed to what, in my opinion, was
a furtler cause of the failure. The Russians suddenly con-
centrated a force of 8oo bombcrs on my front, operating from
airfields ncar Grszny. Although only about a third of thesc
bombcrs were scrviceable, they suficed to put a brake on my
resumcd advance, and it was all the more effective because of
my lack of fighters and of flrk."
Paying tribute to the snrbbornnes of the Rusian ddencc
here, Kleist made an interesting psyctrological point "In the
earlier stages of my advance I met little organizcd rcsisancq
As soon as the Russian forccs wcre by-passed most of thc
troops secmcd more intent to find thc way ba& to thcir homes
than to continue 6ghting. That was quite different to what
had happened in r94r. But when we advanced into the C,au'
causus, thc forces we met therc werc local troops, who fought
Eore stubbornly because they were fighting to defend their
homes. Their obstinate rcsishnce was all the morc cficctive
bccause the country was so dilfcult for the advance."
Deding in more detail with the coursc of operations in the
later bound<fter the capture of Maiko5he went on to say
that thc first objcctive asigncd to him was to secure the whole
l*gth of the great highway from Rostov across the Caucasus
mountains to Tiflis. Baku was to be a second objeaive. The
advance met its 6rst serious check on the Terek. He thcn tried
to cross this river by a maneuvre farther to the east and strc.
ceeded. But after this [s was held up again in the very difi-
cult country hyond the Taek, which was not only precrpi-
toug but densdy wooded. The brake imposed by thit fronal
 BRI'SI?ATION IN TIIB CAUCASUS AND AT STALINGRAD 2O3

resistance was increased by the cxposurc of his 19ft funk, iD

thc Stcppes bcnrcen Stalfuigrad anl the Caspian.
"The Rusians brought rescrves round fiom the southcrn
Caucanrs and also from Sibcria. fhese developed a mcnace to
my flank herg which wiut so widely stret&cd that thc Rus-
sian cavalry could dways penetrate my outposts whencver they
chosc. This flank concentration of tLeirs-was helpcd by thl
oilr.y that thc Russians built acro$ thc Steppcs, from Astra-
&han southward. It was roughly laid straiglt over the lcvcl
plain without any foundation. Elforts to deal with the menacc
by wrccking thc railway proved useless, for as soon as any
section of thc railway was destroyed a fresh sct of rails was
q-urckly laid down, and joincd up. My patrols reached thc
shores oJ thc fupi*, but that advance canica us nowherc,
f-ot
ry forccs in this-quartcr were striking against an inangiblc
foe. As timc passcd and thc Russian strength grew in-that
arg th. flanking menace became increasingly ser]ous.',
Kleist went on trying to reactr his objectivi until Novembc
--by repeatcd nrqprise auacks at dificrent points. Aftcr fail-
ing to-get through from Mozdok he made a hrning movc-
ment from Ndchik on his westcrtr flank and succecdod in
rcaching Ordzhonikidrc, b combination with a convcrging
stroke from Prokhladnaya. He traced this multiple mane[wi
f9r me on the map, dgscritirg ig with profesiiond satisfac.
tion, as ". ,.ry elegant batdc." For it, he hed at last becn givcn
a E-easure of eir support. But then bad weather held hii up,
and aftcr a short intervd the Russians counter-attackcd. ..fn
*his counter-attack a Rumanian division, which I rc&oncd
as
a-good *gldg.d a srdden collapse and threw my plan out
of joine After thag a sralemate sci in."
The other gcnerals confrmed Kleisds erridence on the
ciulscs of the failurg cspccially the shorage of petrol-the
armoured divisions were someti-es at a sandstill-for wceks
m eld, waiting for fresh supplies. Orirg 1s this shorage thc
ftrol- lo1no themselves wcre immobilfud and peuol was
brought forward on camels.-an ironical rcvival of thc uadi
 TTIE GERI\TiAN GENERAIS TN.iK-

tional 'ship of the desert." Blumentria furnished a supple'

mentary po*l i" saying.that 6...dP:: of -overcoming the
rcsisan-ce-in the mountans was ormrmshed because most of
the Germans' expert mountain trooPs, instead of bcing uscd
to support Kleist, had becn employcd to hdq th9 rnh Ar-m/s
advanie along the Blac,k Scr coast towards Batum. "That
coastd advanie was less imPortant than von Kleist's thrust,
and it was a mistake to Put so much effort into it. When it
was checked at Tuapse, and reinforcements were demanded
some of us demurred. The argument went on raging. We used
to say, to those who pressed the need of the coastal advance-
'Yesr'chil&en, but the oil is over ,6sg'-Pointing to Baku
But the clamour for the reinforccment of the Tuapsc opcr'
ations prevailed with the consequent spliaing of our efiorts
in the Caucasus, until it was too late."
The divergence of cflort that tooA place in the Caucasus
area was repeated, on a grcatcr scale, in the splitting of the
forccs between the Caucasus and Stdingrad. But on this qucs-
tion, too, Bltrmcntritt differed from the prevailing view. "It
was absurd to attempt to capture the Caucasus and Stalingrad
simulancously in fice of strong resistance. My own pref-
crence, which l expressed at the time, was to concenuate first
on taking Stalingrad. I felt that caPhryng th. g4 was_less im'
porant than desuoying the Russian forces. AlthougE i! Y.t
irot posible to contradict economic exPcrts who assertcd that
it was cssential to obtain the oil, if we were to continue the
war, evcnts disproved their contcntion. For we managpd to
carry on the war until 1945 without ever securing the Caucasus
oil."

DETE/IT AT STAIJNGRAD

The supreme irony of the ry42 campaign was that Stdingrad

could have been taken quite early if it had hen considered
of prime imporance. KleisCs account revealed this--'The 4th
Panzer Ar-y was advancing on that line, on my left It couldl
 FRUSTRATION IN rIIE CAUC,ASUS AND AT STALINGMI' 2A5

have takeo Salingrad without a 6ght, at the end of |uly, but

was diverted south to help me in crossing the Don. I did not
negd its ai4 and it merely congested the roads I was using.
When it turned north again, a fortnight later, the Russians
had gathcred just suficient forces at Stalingrad to che& it "
Ncvcr again did the prospect look so bright for the Germans
as in the second hdf of luly. The rapid sweep of the two
panzer armies had not only husded the Russians out of suc-
cessive positions but creatcd a state of confusion favourable to
furthcr . That accounted for thc easc with which
the German armourcd forces were able to gain crossingp ovcr
the lower Don. Therc was hardly anything to stop tf,em at
that moment from driving whcre they wishcdjouth-east-
ward to the C,aucasus or north+astward io the Volga. Most of
the Rnssian forces were still to the west of the Lower Don,
outstripped in their retreat by thc pace of the panzers.
lpen
-SalingradF t n Panzer Army mis$ed the chance 6f telring
with a nrsh, through its temporary diversion soutE
casnrard thc sinration began to change. The Russians had
time to rally and collect forces for the-ddence of Stalinerad.
The Germans, aftcr their first had to wait until the
bulk of PauluCs 6th Arny had fought"hed(, ie way forward to the
Don, mopped up thc Russian forces that were cornered in the
bcnd- of the rivcr, 1qd were rcady to join in a converging
attack on Salingrad. But is arrival on tLe scene was reaidel
not,only bccause it was a foormarching force but becausc its
pushing power dwindled as division after division was
dr_oppcd_to guard the continudly cxtending flank along the
Middle Don.
gy
. 4" _ume thry the more deliberate bid for Stalingrad
began, in the second half of August, the Russians had colle-aed
more res'erves there" Chec& followed chec&. It was easier for
the Russians b reinforce Stalingrad than the Caucazus, be.
cause it was nerer their main front Hitler became exas-
paated at therc _repeated checks. The name of the placc-
"the City of Stalin"-was a challenge. He drew od forces
 fi TIIE GERMAN GENEMLS rAr.r-
from his main line, and everywhere ehe, in the effort to
overcome it-and exhaustcd his army in the effort.
The three months' struggle became a battle of battering'
ram tactics on thc Gcrmans'sidc. The more closcly thcy con'
verged on the city, the narrower bccame their scope for tactical
mancuvrq as a- lever in loosening rcsistancc. At thc same
time, the narrowing of the front made it easier for the
ddendcr to switch f,is local reserves to any threatened point
on the ddcnsive arc. The more decply the Gcrmans 1rcne'
trated into thc dcnsely built-up area of the crty, the slower
their progress hcamc. ln the last stages of the siege the front
line was larely half a mils fr66 the west bank of the Volga,
but by then the suength of their cfiorts was fading, as a rezult
of very heavy loscs. nach step forward cost morc and gined
less.
Tte inherent dificulties of sueet fighting in face of stub
born opponents, tcnded to outwcigh the handicaps wtid thc
ddencilufiered in this case. Tbc most scrious of thesc was
thc fact that reinforccmcnts and supplies had to come acrorile
thc Volga by fcnies and bargpt und& shcll-fire. This limited
the scale of the forccs that thc Russians could usc, and main'
tain, on thc west bank for the defcnce of thc city. In Gons€'
quence the defcndcrs werc oftcn hard-pressed. The strain on
tLcm was the morc sevcrc bccause the higher comman4 with
cool stratcgic calculation, reinforced thc dircct ddcnce as
sparingly as posibl*prderring to concentratc most of its
gFthcring rcscrves on the flanks, with a view to a counter-
6ficnsive. In the later stages, only on two occasions did it
divert to Salingrad itsclf a division from the armies that it
was assemblini t* the countcr-offcnsive. The margin by
whictr the gallant ddenders of Stalingrad held otr wtrtt Dlt'
row, but it su6ced"
The story of the prolonged battle for Stalingrad has been
sraohicdln related from the Russian side. On the German
eLt
siag actaii is tacling because most of the cxecutive command-
cr$ as wcll as their troops, fcll into thc Russians' hands. So
 trBI'SITArION IN TIIB CAUCASUS AND AT STALINGNAI' N?
far as it is known, it appcars to havc becn a rather dull proces
g!battcring a1 b-laks of the city, with dinirdshing rs;urce$
Thc hopes of the ata&ers fadcd long hforc tf,e initiative
was wrcsted from thcmJut thcy were-forced to continue try-
ing undcr Hitler's unrelaxing dcmands for rcncwcd cfiori.
Morc historical intcrest lics in thc evidcncc as to thc wav
that the push for Stalingrad nrned into a trap for thc armii
cngaged. The gollapsc of the fanks was forishadowcd long
bcfore it acnully occurred. Emphasizing this fact Blumentrii
said: "The danger to thc long+trctctred- flank of our advancc
developed gaduelly, but it trccame clear early cnough for
anyonc 1o pcrceive it who was not wilfully blind. During
A-ugtlsl the Russians by dcgrces incrcased their strcngth on thi
other side of the Don, from Voronezh south+astnarI. A nuo
ber of short and shaqp attacks on their part explorcd the
weakncsscs of thc German ddencc tf,e Don-Thcsc cx-
p.loratory attacks showcd thcm that "I*g
thl Sccond Hungarian
Arry was holding the sector south of Voronczh, and thc
Eighth Italian At y was holding thc scctor hyond that The
risk bccamc worsc aftcr Scptembcr, whcn tLc Rumanians
took over the more southasterly sector as &r as the Don
bcnd wcst of Stalingrld, Thcre'was only a slight ereruan
stillening in this long'Allicd' fronL
"Haldcr had scnt me oo a flyrng visit to the Italian $ctor,
as an- alarming repoft had comc that the Russians had pcna
-horr-
trated it and madc a targe bread. On invcstigating ig
gvcr, I found the atac& had bccn madc by only onc Rusian
battalion, but an cntirc Italian division lad UoGa. I took im,
mediate stepj-to dosc the gap, filling it with an Alpine division
and part of the 6th Gcrman division
'! spent tcn days in that sector and after rctnrning madc a
writtcn repoft to the effect that it would not bc safi to hold
suci. a long ddensive fank during thc wintcr. Thc railheads
wcre as mud iN 2oo kilometrcs hhind the front, and the barc
nature of the couotry meant that therc was little timbcr avail-
ablc for **tr*tidg dcfcnccs. Such Gcrman divisions a!
 208 IIIB GEBMAIY GBITERAIs TAIa-
wcre available trere hold.g frontagps of 5o to 6o kilomctrcc
Tbere werc no propcr trcnchcs or 6xcd positions.
"Gcncrd Elaldcr cndorsed this rcport and urged that our
ofiensivc should h halted, in vicw of the incrcasing resistancc
that it was mccting, and the incrcasing signs of dangpr to the
long+tretched flank. But Hitler would not listen. During
Scptember the tcnsion benreen the Ftihrer and Flaldcr in-
crcased and their arguments became sharper. To see thc
Ftihrcr discussing plans with Halder was an illu-inating
expcrience. The Fiihrer used to movc his hands in big sweeps
ovcr the ma5'Push hcre; push thcre.' It was all vague and
rcgardless of practical difficulties. There was no doubt he
would havc liked to remove the whole Gcrman Staff, if he
coul4 by a similar sweep. He felt that they were half-hearted
about his ideas.
"Findly, General Halder made it clear that he refused to
take the responsibility of continuing the advance with wintcr
approaching. He was dismissed, at thc end of September, and
rcplaced by General 7*ie;ler-wbo was then Chief of Stafi to
Ficld-Marshal von Rundstedt in the West I was scnt to the
I[cst to tekeZAulds place.
oArriving fresh on the scene, and being newly appointed
to sucfi a high position, Zr;iu,ler did not at first worry the
Fiihrer by constant objections in the way that Generd Halder
had done. Thus Hitler pursued his aims unctrecked, exccpt by
the Russians, and our armies wcre committed more deeply.
Bcfore longr T*ivler became gloomy about the prospect and
argued with the Fiihrer that his intention of maintaining our
armies forward near Stalingrad tbroughout the winter was
impossible. When the outcome proved the truth of his warn-
ings, the Fiihrer became increasingly hostile to 7*itzles. He
did not dismiss him, but he kept him at arm's length."
gumming up the situation Blumenritt said: "Ihere would
have been no risk of panic in withdrawing this time, for the
Cicrman troops were no\r properly equrpped for winter 6ght-
ing andhad got over the fear of the unknown that had fright-
 rIUSITAIION IN TIIB CAUCASUS AND AT STALING&II' 2q
cn{ {em th9 year bdore. But thgy were not strong enough
to hold on where they were, and thc Russian streogth was
growing wce"k by week.
"Hitler, however, would not budge. His 'instincf had
proved right the year bcfore, and he was sure that it would
be justffied again. So he insisted on 'no withdrawal.' The
result was that when the Russians launctred thcir winter
counter.ofrensive his army at Stalingrad was cut off, and forccd
to surrender. lVe werc already too weakened to bcar such a
Ios. The rales of the war had turned against Germa[y."
 XV
AFTER STALINGRAD

Qt r.sTroN ltraT r Prrr !o MAlrr GENERALS WAS: "DO YOII

A Oint that C,crmany could have avoided defeat after
Stalingndt" Rundstcdt's rcply was: "I think so, if thc com-
mandcrs in the 6eld had bccn allowed a free hand in with-
&awing whcn and wherc they thought fit, instead oi being
compellcd to hold on too long, as rcpcatedly happened cvery-
where.' While Rundstedt himsclf was not on the Eastern
front after r94r, his position gave him more deta&mcnt of
view. Moreover, the fact that he never took an oPrimistic view
throughout, while having uniquc experience of high com-
mandon both fronts, gives a particular vdue to his opinion
on the broad iszue. When putting thc same question to the
gencrals who saycd in the East, I found them muctr more
definite. All felt that Russia's offensive po\rer could have been
worn down by elastic defenc+-if they had only bcen allowcd
to practisc it Some gave striking examples.
Kleist citcd his own experience in conducting the retrcat
from the Caucanrs aftcr Paulus's armies had been trappcd at
Stalingrad. He was promoted to field-marshal for his achieve
ment in conducting that retreat without serious loss, and it
would seem to have becn better carned than many who have
gined thcir baton for offensive successes, as is thc normal
2ro
 ArIEB SIALINGB,AD

rule. For it is dificult to think of any retreat in history that

has extricated atr army from nrch a dangcrous position under
suctr extraordinary difiarlties-with the handicap of dis.
tancc multiplied by winter, and then again by the prasure of
snrpcrior forccs prcssing down on his fank and rear.
Relating the story of that retrcirt Klcist said: "Although our
offensivc in the C,aucasus had rcached its abortivc cnd in No.
vember, r94e when stdemate sct in, Hitler insisted on our
staying in that exposed forward position, deep in the moun-
ains. At thc beginning of Ianuary a serious d*gF to Ey
jss'flantr dcvelopcd from an atack whictr thc Rusians deliv-
crcd from Elisa wcstwards past thc southern cnd of Iake
lvlany&. This was more serious than thc Russian counter-
attac,ks on my forwardpositioq ncar Mozdok. But the great-
est danger of dl came from thc Russian advancc from Satio-
grad, down the Don towards Rostov, far in my rear.
'When the Russians wcre only 7o Lilomeucs from Rostov,
and my armics wcrc $o kilometres east of Rostov, Hitler sent
Ee atr ordcr that I was not to withdraw under any circtro-
stances. That looked likc a setrtence of doom. On- thc nc*
day, howcvcr, I received a frcsh ordeto retrclt, and bring
away cverphing with mc in the way of equipmcnt Thit
would havc hcn dificult uroqgh io-*y case, but hcame
muctr more so in the depths of the Russian winter.
"Thc protation of my flank from Elista ba*, to the Don
had originally bcen entrustcd to the Rumanian Army Group
rurder lvlarshal Antoncsor. Antonescu himsclf did n6t arrG
on the scene, thank Godt Instea4 the sector was placod under
Manstcin, whose 'Ar.y Group Sorrth' includoil part of the
Rumanian forces. With lvfanstein's help, we succeeded in with-
drawing thr*gh the Rostov botdenick bcfore the Russiaos
could cut us off. Even so, Ivfanstcin w:ut so hard prcssed that
I had to scnd some of my own divisions to hclp hirn in holding
cfi the Rusians who were pushing down tL Doo ,o*.rai
Rostov. The most dangerous time of the rctreat was the rast
half of fanuaryl
 2I2 TIIE GERMAN GENEMLS TAIX-
Kleist emphasized how the course of this retreat, which had
appcared hardly possible to achieve, showed the power of
elastic defence. After his forces had got safely back to the
Dniepcr, they were able to launch a counter-offensive that
turned the tables on the Russian advance westward from
Stalingrad and the Don. This riposte recaptured Kharkov and
restored the whole situation on the southern front. A long lull
followed, which lasted until after mid-summer ro43.
That breathing space enabled the Germans to consolidate a
fum position in thc East, and to build up their strength
afresh-not to its former level, but sufficient to provide a
good prospect of holding the Russians at bay. But Hider
refused to listen to any advice in favour of changing to e
defensive strategy. It was he, not the Russians, who took the
offensive initiative in the surrmer. Although his efiort wari otr
a more limitcd scale and frontage than ever, he tbrew into it
dl the resources he had-employing seventeen armoured di-
visions in a converging attack on the Russians'Kursk sdicnt.
Talking of this ofiensive, Kleist said that he had little hope
of any good resulting from it, but Kluge and Manstein who
were put in charge of the pincers stroke seemed to be quite
optimistic beforehand. "If it had been launched six weeks
earlier it might have been a great success-though we had no
longer the resources to make it decisive. But in the intcrvd
the Russians got wind of the preparations. They laid deep
mineficlds across their front, while withdrawing their main
forces farthcr to the rear, so that comParatively few were leE
in the bag that our high command had hoped to enclosef
When this last German offensive had been brought to a
hdt, the Russians launched theirs-as a counter-offensive. They
now had ample resources to maintain the momentum, whereas
the Germans in this last gamble had squandered the suength
that might still have enabled them to impose a prolonged
series of checks, and even produce a stalemate. Almost all the
mobile reserves were exhausted. Thus the Russian advance
rollcd on during the autumn and winter with only short hdts
 AX'IER, STALINGRAII 2I3
-caused-more by out-running its own supplies than by the
Germans' countcr-thrusts. Tha whole sourlern front was io
a state of fux.
But on the northern frong where the German forces had
been allowed to remain on the defensivg the Russian attacks
repcatedly broke down in face of the tenacious and well-knit
resistance. I had a striking account of this period from Hein-
rici, who then commanded the 4th Army on the sector from
Rogachw to Orsha, astride the great highway from Moscow to
MT*. Mentioning that he hid bcen-re-rciai"g what I had
written about the trends of modern warfare, he-said: .,I want
to tell you how strongly I agree, from experience, with your
conclusions as to the zuperiority of defence over attack in the
tagticd field. Thc problem turns, :ls you remark, on the ratio
9-f
rpr.: to force. I think it may inlerest you to have some
illustrative eremples from my expcricnce.
oAfter the evacrration
of Smolensk, the Russians advanced
qqrhin twenty |jlomcqes 9f Orsha, whcre the troops of the
'4th Army r:r: to ctrc& them, after occupyingi ludy
prcpared position"bFthat consisted of only one trcnch-line. Thalt
euturDn we there had to meet a seriei of strong Russian of-
fernsives, bcginning in Octobcr and continuing unil Decembcr.
There were five successive ofiensives. I had'' ten divisions in
my army to hold a sector that was r5o kilomctres wide as the
crow fics, but ac-nnlly aboug zoo kilomctres dlowing for the
incgularity of the front The 4th fumy was witfiout atry
trserves, and mu& weakened by the loises it had suficred.
But its artillery was intact-+hat was a vial asset
main objgaive of the Russians was the grcat rail certre
-*Th9
of Orsha-in order to cut thc lateral railway fiom I*ninsrad
to Kiev. With thfu.i. th.y concentrared the weight of freir
assault on a frontage of zo kilometrcs astride the main hiqh-
way. In their first ofiensive they employed z*zz divisionsiin
the second 3o divisions; and in the next three about 36 divisions
apiecc. Part of them wcre the original ones, but most of them
were fresh.
 214 TrrE GERMAN GENERALS TAr.r-

'1fo mect this assault I used 3% divis;ions to hold the zc

kilometrcs fronage where the attac& came, leaving 61k tohold
the remainder of my very wide front. Every attack nar
checked. Thcse 6ve successive batdes each lastcd five or six
days, but the crisis uzually camc about the third or fourth
day, after whictr the attack began to peter ouL Thc Russians
did not try any large armoured drivetccause no considcrablc
gap wes made in the defences. The attadrs wcre suPPorted by
up to fifty infantry tanks, but these were dways checked. ,
'Thc Russians usudly madc about tfuee tries a day-the
first about 9 &Mr after heavy artillery preparations; thc scc.
ond betrreen ro and rr; and the third benrecn z and 3 in
the afternoon. It was almost like clockworkl There was no
question of the Russian troops failing to advance, until thgy
wcre stopped by our fue-for they were driven forward under
the compulsion of officers and commissars, marching in rcar,
and ready to turn thcir pistols on anyotre who shirked. The
Russian iof*try wue badly trainc4 but they attacked vig-
orously.
"L, my opinion, there were three main factorc that con-
tributed to the success of the defence. Firsg I formed narro\tr
divisional sectors, with a high ratio of force to space, on the
acftd frontage of the Russian assault. Secondly, I managed
to form a very powerful artillery grouping, of 38o guns, to
cover the threatened sector. This was controlled by a single
commander, at Army Headquarters, and was able to concen-
trate its fire on any required point of that zo kilometre front-
age.lthe Rusian offensivcs were supported byup to a thousand
guns, but their fire was not so concentrated. Thirdly, the losses
of the German divisions engaged-whid had to be recloned
as the equivalent of about one battdion per division in each
day of battl+were compensated by a system of drawing bat-
alions from the divisions on other parts of the Army front.
I dways ried to have tb'ree fresh battdionHne for each of
the divisions holding the battle front-ready behind this bdorc
the attac,k started. The other batalion of the regiment from
 ATIIR, STALINGRAI' 2I5
which it was drawn would follow, together with the rcgi-
mcnal stafr, and in this way I would get complete fresh rcgi.
ments incoqporated in the front, and then complctc frcsh di.
visions. The temporary mixing of divisions wu inevitablc, and
part of thg price of the ddensive success, but I dways ried
to lestore their intcgrity as soon as p,ossible."
-

In May, ro44, Heinrici was givcn command of the rst Panzer

Army togcthcr with the rst Hungarian Ar-y on thc Car.
pathian front, and with these forces conducted the rctrcat to
Sflesia .rly io r9r45 after thc German front had collapsed in
the north. In l\dardL 1945, hc was given command of the
Ar-y Group that faccd ths f,ussians' 6nal push for Berlin
With this he fought the battle of the Oder and the battlc of
Berlir
In this later stage, hc sai4 he had further developad the
ddensive methods which hc had dready descrihd. "'Whetr
the Russians were found to be concentrating for an atta&, I
with&ew my troops from the 6rst line undcr cover of dght,
to the sccond linr-usudly about z kilometres behind. Thc
result was that thc Russian blow hit the air, and its furtter
atta& did not have the same impctus. Of coursg a necessary
condition of succcs was to discover thc actual intcndcd day
of the assault, whictr I sought to do by using patrols to securc
prisoncrs. Aftcr the Rusian attack had bcen brokcn, I con-
tinucd to hold the second line as my new fonrard positioq
while on the sectors that had not becn atacked the troops
moved fonrard again to re-occupy the first line. This systcrn
worked very well in the batde of the Oder-the only &aw-
back was our scaoty strcngth, after so much had been wasted
ncedlessly by thc rigid ddence of positions imposible to hold.
oI never nrffercd ddeat d*iog three
years of defensive bat-
tles when I could base my plan on suctr mcthods.+nd I was
proud that I never had to call on the Highcr Command to
spare me any of its reserves. I found sclf-propelled guns werc
of the greatest vdue in applying thcse defensive tactics.
"In the light of my cxpericncg I consider that your con
 216 THE GERIdA}iI GENERAI.S TAI.K-

clusion that thc atta&er nceds a threc to one superiority is

under the mark, rather than over it. I would say thag for
success, the attacker needs six to one or seven to one against
a well-knit ddence that has a reasonable frontage to cover.
There were times when my trooPs held their own against
odds of t2 to r or cven 18 to r.
"The German defeat in the East was, in ty opinion, due to
one main reason-that our trooPs were comPelled to cover
immense spaces without the fexibility, in the co--an4 that
would have enabled them to concentrate on holding decisive
points. Thus they lost the initiative permanendy. I doubt
whether we could have worn down the Russians by pure
defence, but might well have been able to turn the bdance
by a more mobile kind of warfare, and by sholening oru
fiont so as to release forces that could be used for effective
counter*trokes.
"But the army commanders were never consulted about the
plan or method of defence. Guderian, when Chief of the
General Stafl in the last year, had no infuence on Hitler. His
predecessor, 7*i:rz,ler, had only a very slight influence. Earlicr
iti[, Halder's advice had been largely disregarded.
"My fust expcrience after aking over comm*d 9! 4. +F
n
fu.y ry42, opened my eyes. I withdrew a smdl deta&'
ment from an awkward position it was holding-whereuPon
I received a warning, conveyed through General von Kluge,
then the commander of the At-y Group, that if I did anp
thing of the sort again the least that would happen to me
would be a court-martial.
"Hitler dways tried to make us 6ght for every yard., threaq
ening to court-martial anyone who didn't. No withdrawd
-officially
was permitted without his approval<ven a small-
scale withdrawat. ttis principle was so hammered into the
army that it was a co--on saylng that battalion cotmanders
weri afr.id'to move a sentry from the window to the door.'
These rigid methods cramped us at every turn.- Time after
time, forces stayed in impossible positions until they were
 AFIER, STALINGBAD 2I7
suroudod and captnred. But sone of us ventured to evade
his ordcrs so far as we could.'
Such evasion was only possible in a local and limited way.
Tippelskircn, who succeedcd Heinrici in command of the 4th
Ar.y, bore witness to the vdue of elastic defence, but dso
to the disastrous coflrequences of being unable to practise it
to an adequate cxtent "At Mogilev in March, ro44, I was
commanding the rzth Corpr-whictr consisted of three dL
visions. In the ofiensive the Russians then laturched, they used
ten divisions in the assault on the fust day, and by thi sixth
day had used twenty divisions. Yet they only captured the fust
line, and were brought to a halt before the second. In the lult
I
that followed prepared a counter-stroke, delivered it by
moonlighg and recovered dl the ground that had been lost
-with comparatively few casualties."
Tippelskirch then went on to relate what happened in the
Russians' sunmer ofiensive n ry44. He took ovir co--and
of the ath Army three weets before it opened. The army
commanders on that front begged for permission to withdra*
to the linc of thc Bcresina---a long step ba& that would havc
takcn thc sting olt of thc Russian blow. But their proposals
werc rcjccted. Tippelskirch nevertheless made a short step
bac.k on his scctor to the line of the Dnieper, and that suficci
to kcep his front inace But the fronts of both the armics on
lis right and left werc ruptured, and a gencral collapse fol.
lowed. Tte retreat did not stop rurtil the Vistula had bcen
reacied near Warsaw.
"It would have been much wiser strategy to with&aw the
whole front in time. The Russians dways ni:eded a long pau$e
for preparation afterany German withdrawal, and they-always
lost disproportionately when atacking. A serics of with&aw-
ds by adequately large steps would hive worn down the Rus-
sian strength, besides creating oppornrnities for counter-strokes
at a time when the German forces were still strong enough
to make them effective.
oHitler had been justified h his rgr4r
veto on any with-
 2I8 rlIB GERI{AN GBNERAIS TAI,B-

drawal, but his great mistake \ras to repeat it in r94z and

latcr, when conditions were different For after the fust ycar
the German Ar-y was well equipped for winter fightingrand
felt quite able to hold its own with the Russians undcr thcse
conditions. Thus a strategic withdrawal would not have shaken
irc morale. Our troops were quite capable of carrying out
suc,h a Eranceuvre in wintcr. Besides 66esemizi11g their own
strcngth, it would havc cnabled thcm to stage a powerful
come-bac}.
"The root cause of Germany's ddeat was thc rray that het
forces wcre wasted in fruidess efiorts, and above all in fnrit-
lcss resistancc at the \ilrong time and place. That was due to
Hitler. There was no strategy in our campaign."
Gcncral Dittmar contributed some interesting points to thc
discussion, from his wider and more detactred point of view.
As a miliury commentator he was amazingly objeaive in his
broadcast commentaries during the war-more so perhaps
than any other miliary critic anywhcre. This was the more
notablc bccause hc had to expound the situation undcr ro
strictions, and dangers, far worse than any Allicd corrmertr-
tor had to fcar. Whcn I asked him how he was able to sPeak
so candidly on many occasions, hc told me that he owcd this
Iatinrde to Fritschc, the head of radio propaganda, who alonc
saw his broadcasts beforc they were delivered. He had the
fecling that Fritschc had rcached an rurdcrlying disillusion
ment with regprd to the Nazi r6gime, and was glad to givc
scope to someone who would exprc$ what he sccrcdy felt
himself. Naturally thcre were many protests, thoogh Fritsche
did his best to shicld Dittmar. "I dways felt that I was wdk-
ing a tighrrope with a n@se round my ne&."
WbcD I asked Dttmar whether he thought that if thc
Germans had adopted a strategy of elastic defence they could
have worn down the Russians, he replied:'I believc we could
and thc advanages of elastic defence were clear, but our mili-
tary diefs could not apply it propcrly because of Hitlcr'l
objeaions. The Gcncral Stafi were not dlowed to order thc
 AFIIA SIALTNGRAD ztg
constnrction of lines in rcar, or even to discuss plans in car
of hing drivcn badl Ttey wcre forbidden to makc any prc-
paratory plans for a withdrawd. In ro+S; howevcr, thcy man-
aged to do a littlc preparatory work on thc quiet, by cirorlat-
ting instructions in discrcedy wordcd lcaflcts. Thesc lcaflets
wcre distributcd amoog the various armies, but without any
imprint to show that thcy emanatod from thc General Stafi."
I asked Dittmar whethcr any stratcgic withdrawal wir at-
tcmpted on the Gcrman side, prior to the launching of thc
grcat Rtssian offensive in fuly, ro43, or aglin bdore that of
|anuarfi ro4j. He replied:'No Each was a casc of an absolutc
break-through, owing to thc strategy that Hider imposcd.
Somc of thc commandcrs of thc lowcr formations were shrcwd
cnough to evade his nrle that every place was to bc hdd at dl
cosq and carried out short withdrawals on thcir own, but
others .l*g oo in stria obedicncc to ordcrq and as a rcsult
their troops were cut olf and capnrd. Ttc disastcr in cac.h
case was due to thc fundamenal crror of a rigidty ddcnsive
strateg'y. Ttat disastcr was dl the worsc in the casc of the Rus.
eian oficnsivc from thc Visnrla in lanuary, ro4t bccausc thc
reserycs that had bccn held rcady to mcct the thrcat wcre takcn
away at thc aitical moment and dispat&cd to the relid d
Budapest" thcy compriscd threc of the best+quippod ar-
moured divisions available.
"The policy of clinging on at all costf in partiarlar places
rcpeatcdly e*gFd the campaign for thc worse. Thc atrcmpt
to cement one thrcatencd breach in the gcnerd front rc.
peatedly causcd fresh brcac.hcs. In the end that provcd fatal"
 XVI
THE RED ARMY

rNHE GERMAN GENERAIS' IMPRESSIONS OF IIIE RED ARTf,Y WERE

I interestirrg, and often illuminating. The best appreciation
in a concise form came from Kleist: "The men were first-rate
fightcrs from the start, and we owed our success simply to
superior training. They became first-rate soldicrs with ex,
periencc. They fought most toughly, had amazing endurancg
and could carry otr without most of the thing;s other armies
regarded as necesities. The Staff were qui& to learn from
their carly defeats, and soon became highly efficiene'
Some of the other Gcrman gpnerals disagreed and said
that the Russian iof*try in general remaincd rather poor,
tactically and tectrnicdly, though the tank forces were for-
midable. I note4 however, that the more critical opinions
came from generals who had been on the norttern half of
the front-which suggests that the more skilled p.rt of the
Red Army operated in the south. On the other hand, the
guerrillas scem to have been more active behind the German
front in the north, and by 1944 had forced the Germans there
to abandon the use of all except a few of the trunk roa& as
supply routes. Tippelskir&, whose 4th Army was cut ofi on
the northern Dnieper by the Russian summer offensive that
year, told me that hc extricatcd it by making a detour south-
an
 IIIE NED ARMY

wards towards the Pripet Marshes, after the mein lias qf

retrcat to Minsk had been blocke4 moving by way of roa&
which had long been abandoned bccause -of guerrilla inter-
ference. 't found every singlc brilge on thc routc had been
broker5 and had to repair them in ihe course of my retreaC'
Talking of his four years'experience of the Northern front,
he rcmarked: "Our infanuy lost their fear of the Rusian
iof*try T ,94r, buqthey remained fearful of bcing taken pris-
oner-and sent to Siberia or worse. This fear helped to stihen
their resistance, but it had an insidious efiect as time wcnt on,
partigularly ryhen they were compelled by Hitler's ordcr to
remain in isolated forward positions whcr! they wcre bound
evcntually to be cut ofi."
I askcd Rundstedt what he considered were the strong and
weak points 9f the Rcd Army, as he found it in ,94rI His
reply was: "The Russian heavy tanks wcre a surprise in quality
and rcliability frog thc outscL But the Russians proi.a t6
!1ye les artillery than had bcen cxpccte4 and thcir air force
did not offer scrious
lpllsitign in that fust campaign.,,
more specificdly of the Russian weapons (leist said:
-_f"lF"g
'"Their equipment was vcry good cven in r9r4i, especially the
anks. Their artillery was exicllent, and dso mosi of Oc in-
fangy weapons-thlir rig.r wcre more ..d;,h*-"*$
gd h{ I more rapid ratc of fre. Their T.3a tank was thi
finest in the world.'r Io -y talks with Mantc-uifel, he cmpha-
sized that the Russians mainaincd their advantage in iank
{or81r
and
-tl''atin
the "stalin" tank, whictr i" ,gaa,
they had what he considerod the best ant "pp.rrld ,., *d
tilat io
batde, anywhere, up to the cnd of the war. British experts harc
criticized the Russian tanks for la&ing the refinements, and.
Epdg.tr, desirable in various operatioial respectHsp.l,i"Uo
for wircless control. But the ccrman t^"r. exierts .rriria.rif
that the British and Americans tended to sa&fice t*.r.h
much' in the way of power and performance for th.re ie-
hnements.
on the equipment side Kleist said that the Russians, weakest
 ANz ?iIIB GEBMAIV GENERAIS TALK-

period had been in r94a Ttey had not becn able to make up
ih.ir r94r losses, and throughout the year were very short of
artillery in particular.'They had t9 use mortars, !t*g\t
"p
on lories, to compensate their la*. of artillery." But from
1943 on thcir equipmcnt position becamc bctter and better.
Whilc thc inpouiing fow of Allied supplia was a lig faaort
opecidly in-motor transPort, the increasTg Ploduction of
th-e ncw-Russian factories in the East, out of rcach, accounted
for even more. The anks cmploycd wcre dmost cntirely of
thcir own manufachrre.
A rather zuqprising feature of the campaign in the East was
that the Russians di-d not make any effective use of airborne
forccs, dthough they had led the world in the developTent
of this ncw arm-which had played a prominent Paft in their
Army lvlaneuvres in prc-war years. I discus'sed this qucstion
with-Studeng who rcplied: 'I often wondered why the Rus
sians ncvcr used their paradurc trooPs. The reasonr l imagine,
may have becn that their training was ilsufEcicntiue to lac&
of practice in navigation as wcll as in &opping. Alt thgy did
in lhis way was todrop agents and small Parties for sabotagc
hhind our fronC'
Co-ing to the question of lcadership I askcd Rundstedt
which werc the best of the Rusian gFnerals in his experience.
He replicd: "None were any good in r9r4r. Of Budenny, who
commanded the armies facing me, a capturcd Russian oficer
apdy remarkcd-'Hc is a man with a vcry large mousadc,
dut-a vcry small brain.' But in later years thcre is no doubt
of the improvement in their generdship. Zhukov was very
good. It is-interesting to recdl that hc fust studied suategy in
Germany under Generd von Seeckt-this was about rgar-23."
Dittmar, who in his position as the leading military com-
menator was bcst placed to gathcr the consensus of opinion
among the German gencrds, said that Zhukov was regarded
as outstanding. Koniev was good, a clever tactician, but not
*As the war went on, the Russians
quite on the iame level.
developcd an increasingly high standard of leadership from top
 mrB xED ABrdr 23
to bottom. One of their greatest asscts was their oficers'rcadi-
ness to learn, and the way they studied th& job.' He added
that the Russians could afiord to make mistakes, becausc of
their immense superiority of streogttr, in a way that the
Germans could not
This verdict on the Russian gencrats was questionod by
some of their German opponents, espccidly thosc who had
bcen on thc Northern front Broadly speaking thc nrn of
opinion sccmed to bc that th. top and bottom of thc Russiao
laddcr of command bccame the strongest scctionq whilc the
middle picce was shaLy. fr. top rungs wcre filld by mcn
who had proved themselvcs so ablc that they wcrc allowed to
cxcrcise their oqm judgmcng and could safcly insist on doi"g
thingp in thcir owr way. Thc bottom rungs wcre filled by
junior oficers who, within their limited sphcre, tendod to
{evelop a gmd tactical serurc, bccausc the incompctcnt soon
bccame casudtics in a ficld that was ruled by thc hard rcalitics
of thc cnemy's bullcts and shells. But the intermediatc com-
manders, cycn more than most armics, werc conccrncd with
othcr factors. Their supcriors'orders and judgmcnts were more
to bc feared than thc cnemy.
In this conncction one of the German army cotnmandcrs
on the northern front made a significant conuncnt: 'It was
usually safe to the Rusians to attac;k, so long as the
-encgurage
ddencc was clastically designcd. Thc Rusians wcre-always
very bull-headed in their ollensive methods, rcpeating thcir
attadrs agprn alq again.llhis was due to the wrythcirleaders
lived in fear of b.iog considcred tlclring in dciermination if
they broke off their atack."
As regards the general characteristics of the Rusian soldicr,
Dttmar gave me an illuminating sidelight when I asLed hin
what he considered was the Russiang'-ctrid assel .,I would
put first, what might bc cdled the soulless indifference of the
trooprit was something more than faalism. They wcre not
quite ry insensitive_w!* things wcnt badly for-them, but
normdly it was difficult to make any impresion on thcm in
 24 lrrB GERMAT{ GENERATS TAr,K-

the way that would happen with troops of othcr srationr. Dur-
iog my perid of command on the FiDnish front there was
only one instance wherc Russian troops acnully surrendered
to my own. While that extraordinary stolidity made thc Rus-
sians very difficult to conquer it was dso their chid weakness
in a military sense-because in the earlier c'mPai8ins it often
led to them being cncircled."
Dittmar added: "On Hider's specific orders, ar attempt was
Iater made in the German At*y to inculcate the same menal
attitude that prevailcd in the Red Army. We tried to copy
the Russians in this respect, while the Russians copicd us,
more succesdully, in taaics. The Russians could aflord to traitr
their troops in this attitude hcause losses mattered little to
them, and the troops were accustomed to do implicitly what
they were told."
Blumentritt, who was fond of discoursing philosophically
and historically on all these subjects, gave me his impressions
at greater lenglh, sarting nith his experience in the First
World War.
*In r9r4-r$ as a lieutenant, I fought for the first two years
against the Russians, after a brief contact with the French
and Belgians at Namnr in Augusg r9r4 In our vcry first
attack on the Russian front, we qui*ly realized that hcre we
were meeting esesntidly diflerent soldiers from the French.
and Belgian-hardly visible, entrenched with consumrurte
sLill, and resolutet We zuflered considerable losses.
"In those days it was the Russian Imperial Army. Hard, but
good-natured on the whole, they had the habit of setting fire on
militery prin.tple to towns and villagps, in East Prusia when
they were forced to withdraw, just as they dways did there.
after in their own country. When the red glow from the burn-
ing villages lit up the horizon at evening, we knew that the
Russians were leaving. Curiously, the population did not seem
to complain. Ttat was the Rusian way, and had been so for
centuries.
"\ilhen I rderred to the bulk of the Russian Ar-y as good-
 TrrB RED ARtrY 25
ganye4 I am speaking of their European troops. lAe muc.h
hardcr Asiatic troops, the Sibcrian @rpg were-cruel in their
behaviour. So, also, were the C,ossadrs.-Eastero Germany had
plenty to suffer on this score in r9r4.
"Even in r9r4-r8 the greater hardness of war conditions in
the East had its cfiect on our own troo1x. Mcn preferred to
bc sent to the Western rather than thc'Eart rn froot In the
West it was a war of material and mass.artillery-Verdun,
the Sommg and so on" These factord were paramoung and
y_9ly grueryrg to. endure, but at least we were deding with
Western adversaries. In the East there was not so muci- shell-
fire, but the fighting was more doggud, as the human type
was much harder. Nightfighting,hand+ohand Eghting fidlt-
pg -* the forests, were particularly fosrered by lhe fursiins.
In that war ttere was a Salng current among German sol-
diers: 'In the East the ga[a;r lrmy is 6ghtin[; in the West
the Fire Brigde is sanding by.'
"It was in this war, however, that we first learnt to realize
what-'RussH r.-rtty The opening battle in |une, r9r4r,
-me1!s.
rcvedcd to us for the 6rst time the new Soviet Armv. Our
casuakies yrc up tg fifty per ccna The Ogpu and a w6mcn's
battalion ddendcd the old ciadel at Brest-If,tovsk for a wc*,
fighting to the last, in spite of bombardment with our heaviest
guns and from the air. Our troops soon learnt to know what
fighting the Russians mqmt TLe Fiihrer and most of our
highest chiefs didn't knorr. That caused a lot of troublc.
"The Red Army of, ry4t-45 was far harder than the Czar,s
Ar.y, for they were fighting fanatically for an idea. That
increased their doggpdness, and in turn made our own troops
hard, for in the East the maxim held good-'You or I.' Dis;L
pline in the Red Ar-y was far mori rigorous than in the
Czat's Ar-y. These are examples of the sort of order that we
uscd to intercept+nd they were blindly obeyed. .Why do
you fail to atta&.P I order you for the lait timi to take'Strv-
lenko, ot[erwise I fear for y-our health.'"\Mhy is your regiment
not in the initial position for attac,k? Engpg. at once unless
 226 TIIE GERMAIV GENERAIS TAI,K-

you want to lose your head.' In zuch ways we werc

-brought
io realize the inexorable character of our oPPonents. Wc had
no idea in r9r4r that within a few years it would be muc-h
the same with us.
"Whcrever Russians have appeared in the history of war, the
fight was hard ruthles, and invofved heavy lossls. Whet. +.
Rissian makes a stand or defcnds himself, he is hard to dc'
feat, and it costs a lot of bloodshed. As a child of naturc he
works with the simplest expedients. As all hlvc to o\I
blindly, and the Slav-Asiatic ciaracter only understands thc
absolu'te, disobedience is non+xistent. Thc Russian command'
ers can make incredible demands on their men in every way
-and there is no murmuring, no complaint.
"The East and the West are trro worlds, and they qmnot
undersand eac,h. other. Russia is a dumb question mark on
the Sphinr The Russians can keep their mouths shut, and
their minds are closed to us."
Blumentritt's refections touched on a point that played a
part dmost as great as morde. For all the generals emphasized
ihat the Russilns' greatest asset was the w1y they could dP
without normal ruplties. Manteuffel, who lcd many tankrai&
decp behind theirhont, gave thc most vivid picttre-"The
adv-ance of a Russian Army is something that Westerncrs
can't imagine. Behind the tank spearheads rolls on a vast hordet
largely m=ountcd on horses. The soldier carries a sa& on his
baJk, with dry cruss of brcad and raw vegptablcs collccted on
the march frbm the fields and villagcs. The horses eat the
straw from the house roofs-they get very litde else. The
Russians are accustomed to carry on for as long as three weeks
in this primitive way, when advancing. You can't stoP theP
Iike an-ordinary army, by cutting their commuoications, for
you rarcly 6nd any supply columns to strike."
 XVII
PARALYSIS IN NORMANDY

rroB BUTATN AND 1Ir8 t NIED Sf,AI?S IIIE L/tNDrNc IN NORMA!{DY

.F ..r the suprcme vcoturc. The story of it has been abuo-
dantly told,from thcir points of view. It is more i[uminating
to follow the coursc of thc invasion from othe other side o:E
,h. hillj-'During the fust month, the oppoing Comrnandcr-
in€hid was Field-lvfarshal von Rundstedt, who had bccn in
command of the Wcstern theatre sincc early in 1942. He gave
mc his accounL At the start of the second month Rundstedt
was,replaced by Field-Marshd von KloS, who held the post
y"til th. collapse came. He is dead-after thc collapsc he swd-
-Hitler.
Iowcd a dose of poison in despair, and fear of But
ereneral Blumenuitt was Chid of Stafi to both throughout
this crucial campaigR, and I had a very dcailcd accounifrom
him ef events during both periods.
Under Rundstedt and Kluge in nrrn, the batde to check the
invasion was conducted by Field-Marshd Rommel command-
ingArmy Group "Br" whictr stretctrcd from Brittany to HoL
Iand. Rommel, too, is dead. But I was able to gain light on his
part in the Normandy campaign from memLers of his stalf
-and get a checl on each of the higher commanders' accounts
from othcr generals wtro were on thc scene.
Sccing thc battlc tbroogh the opponent's cyes is the most
t7
 ?28 TI{E GERMAIY GENERAIS TAI.tr'

dramatic way of sceing it It is difierent in one impolLnt

respect from-"looking it it through the gpqosile en{ of t\e
teliscope." For insteid of being minimize4 the picnre is
magnihed-with startling vividness.
t ooti"g at the invasion problem from the Englistr sho1e,
it appeard tremendously formidable. Looking at it from the
Freirih shore, as the enemy saw it, one could htter appreciate
the very difierent feelings of those who faced the threat of
invasion by Powers which held the command of the sea, and
z'I
of the air. had over 3,ooo miles of coasdine to coved'Rund'
stedt told me, "from the Itdian frontier in thc rcuth to the
Crerman frontier in the north, and only 6o divisions with
whictr to defend it. Most of them were low-grade divisionq
and some of them were skeletons."
The 6gure of 6o would not "go" into 3rooo miles on any
sratcgic cdculation It spelt fifty miles per divisioq cvcn
without allowing for the need of reserYes bdind. That was
an imposible proposition. In the r9r4-r8 war it used to bc
considcred that 3 milgs Per division was the safcty limit against
any strong ana&.. The power of modern defence had increased
since then at least double, perhaps ueblc<ven so, the num'
bcr of divisions available was far too small to covcr the wholc
frontage with any degree of security.
The-chances thus depended on guessing correcdy where the
Allies were likely to make their landing. Unlikely sections of
the coastline had to be left almost defenceless in order to have
any appreciable cover for the more probable strctches. Evcn
then, these could only be held thinly if reserves were to be
kept back for counter-attack at the actual Points of landing
within the sector-when these were clearly known-
Rundstedt and Blumentritt emphasized to me how muc-h
more difficult their problem was made by Hitler's rcadincss
to imagrne that the invasion might come anywhere on the
circumference of occupied Etuope, and his inclination to
scout the shipping factors.
 PASALYSUi IN NONMANDY n9
PRELUDB

I asked the Field-Marshd whether he had expected an Allicd

invasion of the West at any time prior to whcn it actudly
came. He replied: "I was surprised that you did not attemp
g qvasion in r94r while our armies were advancing deep
into Russia. But at that t'-e I was myself on the Easton front,
and out of touctr with the situation in the West. Whcn I came
there, and knew the situation better, I did not cxpect an early
invasion, for I realized that your resources were not sufficiend,
Rundstedt's reference to his r94r view would appear to bear
out earlier r-eportg that he then got on E{ider's nerves by hit
warrrings about leaving the German rear exposcd-a- risk
ryhich Hider sought to cover by sending Rundstedt to take
charge in the West. Rundstcdt's sphere of responsibility
stretihed from the Dutd-German fiontier to thl Frand
Italian frontier.
In answer to a further question, the Field-lvlarshal said hc
did not ryagne that thc landing at Dieppe, in Augusq ro4a
portended an actual invasion. He thought it was mercly an
expcrimental atta&, to tcst the coastal defences. WhA I
qrrestioned Blumentritt on thc same point he gave a somewhat
diffcrent answer-'I was not in the West ai the time, but I
heard a lot about the landing aftcr my arrival, at the cnd of
September, to succeed Gencrd Tni.aller as Chief of StaII thcrc.
The Germa. Command was not surc whether it was mercly
a rai4 or whether it might have been followed up with larg;
reinforcements if it had becn more successful ai the outse-C,
It would seem that both %itzler and Keitel took a serious vicw
of it
Continuing his account, Rundstedt said: "I expcctcd an
invasion in ro43 once we had occupied the whole of France.
For I thought you would take early advantage of this ex-
tensive stretching of the German forces in the West"
Blumentrin amplifiod this point: "After the A1lied land.
 29 lrrE GERMAN GENERATS TAr.K-

ings itr French North Africa-in November, r94-the

Ftihrer's ordcr for us to advance into thc unoccupied part of
France was prompted by his conviction that thc Allies would
go on frorAfrica to invade southern Ftance. It was rccl'
6ned that thcy would land on thc Mcditerranean coast, and
that the Vicfi Governmcnt would not oPPosc them. The oc-
anpatioo took place without any grcat friction, and thc only
casultics were causcd by partisans-whose activitics wcre
alrcady bccoming uocomfortable. Field-Marshal von Rund'
rtedt Limsclf wcnt on done ahead of his trooPs in order to
arrangq at Vidy that thc occupation should bc carricd out
pcaahrlly, so as to avoid uclc.s loscs to both sida. He suc'
cccdcd in that purpose."

r!{f"TI{B YEAR or uNcERTAD.IT"

oAfter the fdl of Tunis in May," Blumentritt said, "Hitler

bccame increasingly anxious about thc possibility of a landing
in the south of France. In facg that ycar Hitler was cotr'
standy on the jump+t one moment he expcctcd an invasion
in Norway, at another moment in Holland, then ncar the
Sommg or Normandy and Brittany, in Pornrgal, in Spain, in
the Adriatic. His eyes were hopping all around the map.
'\ffry
0, f'He was particularly concerned about the possibility of a
pincer-type invasioglwith simultaneous landingp in the south
' of Francc and the-Bay of Biscay. He dso fearcd a stroke to
capture thc Bdearic Islands, followcd by a landing at Barcc-
lona and an advancc from there northward into France. He
was so impressed with the risks of an Allicd invasion of Spain
that he ordered strong German forces to be scnt to the Pyre-
Dees to meet it)At the same ti"'e he insisted that the German
*' forces must be careful to obscrve the suictest neutrality, and
avoid any ofience to Spain(
"We soldiers, however, did not share some of his apprehen-
sions. We thought it was unlikely that the British High Com-
mand would attempt a landing in the Bay of Biscay as it
 PANALYSUI IN NORMAI{I'Y

was outside thc range of air $pport from England. TYc dso
discounted the Spani,sh posibilities, for scvcral realom-we
doubted whether the Allies would risk incuring Spain's hos.
tility, and io *y case it was unfavourablc countrlfor largt.
scale opcratiory thc communications bcing bad, and iLc
Pyrcnces forming a barricr bcyond. Morcover, we were oD
licndly terTs with the Spanish gencrds along thc Pyrcnean
fronticr, and while thcy let us know clearly that they would
rcllt any Germaninvasion, they wcre helpful in providing us
with information.'
Blumentritt, howcver, wcnt on to say that while the gencrals
discountcd some of the threats that worried Uitl&, they
thought a landing would come rcmcwhere. "This par showcil
evcry sign of hing the one for the expcacd invasion. Rumours
grcw stonge{ tfuoughout 196 that an invasion was coming.
Thcy rcached *Lrgply from foreign diplomatic gourccs-
from the Rumanian, Hungarian, and lapanesc military at-
tac.h&, as well as from Vichy quarters"
It would scem that rumour was more cficctivc than plannod
deccption in playing on thc mind of the cnemy command. In
onc of my talLs with Rundstedg asLed I hi- whcthcr hc
thought $at a cros-Channcl invasion was coming b S.p
tcmbcr that year-at that timc we madc an claboiate fcing
moving large forces down to the south coast of England and
making an a-ppcarancc of cmbarkiog them. He rcplicd, with
a smile: "Tte movements you made at that timi wcre too
obvioupit was evidcnt thai thcv werc a bluf[."
That too apparent piece of stige-play tcnded to rclievc the
anxieties of the German Command, by its indication that thc
{lics wcre putting ofi thc attempL Since autumn gales wcrc
about duc, it meant that the Gcrman garisons of Francc might
count upon anothcr winter's rcspitc bcforc the storE broke
u-pon thcm. It was a partial rdid aftcr a long period of strainod
alcrtncs.
'In brid, 196 might be summed up as'the ycar of uncer-
ainty and insccurityr"' rcmarkd Bhrmentritt Its dificulticg
 292 TI{B GERMAN GENERAT.S TAr.K-

were increased because the Resistance movement in Francc had

by thcn become very formidable, a1d was causing us manl
^ casudties. as well as serious strain.llt had not amountcd to
\) muctr in i9az.llt was then divided in[o tbree distinct goups-
Communisq-Gaullisrc and Giraudists. Fortunately for ns,
these threc groups were antagonistic to one another, and oftcn
brought us information about one another's activities. But
from ro43 onwards they became united-with Britain directing
their operations and supplying them with arms by air."

CIIANGING ITIE GUAND

During rg43 various dterations were made in the defencc

sc.heme to meet invasion, under the handicap of limited re-
sources. For France had been used as a convalescent home where
divisions exhausted in the Eastern campalgn could rccuperate
and reorganize. Describing the steps, Blumenritt said: "Up
to ro43 there had been fifty to sixty divisions in France which
were repeatedly being replaced by badlydamaged divisions
from the Russian front. This continual interchange was detri-
mental to a proper systcm of defence on thc coast. So perm&
nent coast-defence divisions werc formed with a specidized
organization adapted to their particular sectors. This system
.had thc advantage of ensuring that they were well acquainted
with the sector they had to guard, and it also enabled the most
--rconomic use of the limited ilable in the West
The o6ccrs and men wcre
of the ffi
pro!-ortion of capnued French, Polish, and Yugeslav weapons,
which fued differing kinds of ammunition-{'o that supplies
were more liable to run out, at awkward moments, than in the
case of sandard weapons. Most of these divisions had only two
irf*try regiments, with trxro field batteries comprising z4
pieces in all, and one medium battery of rz pieces. As thc
. -.-
 PAnALYSIS tN NORMANDY 233
"Besides these coastddence divisions there was the coasal
.$tgrJ. But this, whether naval or military,.... *dEEf
Naval Command-whici yras always inilined to disagrcg
witE tbe-f,r* m: Cgmmand.
A fresh complication arose at the end of the vear with Rom-
iTo-ft
ffiGerman ior.., thait occupied North-
ern Italy, but in November he was appointed by Hitla to
inspect and improve the coast defences from Denmark to the
Spanish frontier. After dealing with those in Denmark he
p*{ to-France just bdore Christmas-which brought him
into Rundstedt's sphere. He worked under special instructions
from Hider, yet without any clear definition about his rela-
tionship to Rnndstedt Conuoversy narurally developed and
the more inevitably because their ideas diIferld.
Blumentriu's comment was: did not
know whether were under the-com-and of 19+<
as latter wanted his ideas on coast defenceio
be put into practice everywherc. To solve the problem, Rund-
stedt suggested that Rommel should take over executive charge
of the_most imporant sector of the front along the Channe[
from the Dutch-German border to the Ioire, wlile the South-
ern front from the Loire to the Alps would be entrusted to
Blaskowitz-$oth being under Rundstcdt as supreme com-
mander. Under Rommel's Army Group "8" would be placed
the.troops in H9!nd; the r5th Ar-y, holding from'there
to the Seine; and the 7h Army, from ihe Seine-to thc Ioire.
Blaskowitz's
S-y - 9.rp "Gl' comprised the rst fumy,
covering the Bay of Biscay and the Pyreneeq and the rgth
Army, covering the Mediterranean coast."
According to Rommel's stafi, the proposal 6n6s frs6 him
-"as the only way of putting his ideas inio execution qui&Iy.,,
In *y case the arrangement was sanctioned, about ilffi-tn
after his arrival. It went some way to ease the situation, al-
though the difference of views betrreen Rundstedt and Rom.
mel was not compatible with a real solution
 234 TIIE GERI{AIY GENERAIS TALE-

Speaking to me of Rommel, Rundstedt said-*He wet a

brave man, and a very capable commander in small oper.
ations, but not really qualified for high command." But he
had no complaint of Rommel's loyalty. "When gave an I
order Rommel ohycd it without making any dificulty." On
the othcr hand, it would appear that Rundstedt was almost
too scrupulous in rcfraining from interference in what he
rcgarded as his subordinate's propcr sphere of responsibility.
Hencc he hesitated to overrule Rommel on matters where his
own view was basically difiereng and where Rommel's de-
cisions werc bourd to have a far-rcaching eflect on his own
stePs.
Here I would remark that the more I saw of Rundstedt thc
bctter impression he made. That was due to iriilffiifirell
as direct cvidcnce. His seniority might have pardy explained
the bi&-gespgs but gg the dceqlrffectio",he inspircd among
those who shared his captivity. Hc has a rathcr orthodox min4
not only in the operational spFc, but it is an able and sensL
tive mind, ba&ed by a charactcr that makes him outstanding.
Hc is dignificd without being arrogang and essentially aristo
cratic in oudook-giving that term its bcst sense. Hc has an
austere appearance that is offsct by a pleasant smile and a nice
gleam of humour. This frequendy comes out Wdking bac.k
with him on one occasion to his cramped litde room, aftcr
passing tbrough the heavily barbed-wire gate into the innc
compound, we came to the front door. I motioned him to go
in 6rst. Hc replied to this gcsture, with a s-ile: "Oh, no-
this is rzy house."

wrrnr?

When ro44 came it was clear that the main invasion would
be launched from England, because of the scale of the Amer-
ican forces which were being uansp,orted there. But it was
more difficult to determine where the landings would bc
made in France.'Yoy litde reliable Dewg came out of Eng.
 PAS.ALI$S IN N$MAI{DY 23,
landr' Bhrmcntritt told me. "AIl that side of the
was directcd bv OJLW. undcr flidcr. not wat
a b wcrc da-
pcndent on thcm for ou information.
'1[hey gave us reports of wherg broadly, the British and
Amcrican forccs respectively wcre asscmblcd in Southern
England-thcre were a smdl number of Gcrman agents in
f+dq4 who rcported by wirclcss transmining scts what
thcy obscrvcd. Buq they found out vcry little hyond thaa lVc
wcre so wcak in the air that rcconnaisancc over England was
vcry limited" Towards Dday, howwer, night-fying 'planes
rcportcd large movements of transport to*ards tf,e -south-
west coast-which thcy could follow bccausc thc vehidcs had
their headlights on" (P:csumably thcsc wcre Amcrican tr*pr,
as thc \rcstcrn hdf of Southcrn England wx ocarpied by
9*) "Wc also intcrccptcd a wirCless mcssage frbm thl
British Fleet which gavc us an indication thit something
important was about to ukc placc in the Charurcl.
"Another hint camc from thc incrcased activrty of the
'ResisancC in France. Wc capnrcd scvcral hun&c<i wirclcss
transmittcrs, and were ablc to discovcr the haring of the code
pbrases uscd-in g with England. fhe mcssages
wcre vciled but thc broad significancc was cvidcnt
"But nothing we learnt gavc us a definite cluc wherc thc
invasion was
ltrully coming. We had to dcpcnd on our owtr
judgmcnt in that vital rcspcct."
Blumcntriu thcn told me: "Our Naval SaIf dways insistcd
that thc Allics would land near a big port. They anticipated
an attac"k on k Iilaw*not only bicause of iti valuias a
p9rt, by! b.*gf it was the base for our midget submarines.
lVc soldiers did not agrce with thcir view. Wc doubted
whether the Allies would maLe a direct attaik on suctr a
well-fortified place. Moreover, we had information about a
big exercise carried out in southern England wherc thc troops
had been discmbarked on a flat and opcn coastline.
'From rhis we deduccd that the Allies would not try to
 46 IIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TAI.I-
atack a port at the outse! But we had no idca, nor any
report, tfat i[ey w6Tveloping artificial harbours-the
Mulberries. We thought you were probably intending to lay
your ships side by side, to form a bridge over which stores
could be unloaded and carried ashorc to the beaches."
Rundstcdt said frankly: "I thought the invasion would comc
across the narrower pait of the 6hannel, betwecn I.e l{avre
and Calais-rather than between Caen and Cherbourg. I
erpected the landing to take place on either side of the
estuary of the Somme. I thought the 6rst landing might take
place on the west side, betrreen Ir Tr6port and Le Havrg
followed by a further landing betu,een the Somme and Calais."
I asked Rundstedt his reasons for this calculation. He re.
? plied: *rhEffiejAlais area seemed to us so much better,
)'stotegi"auy,6m-your pant of view-because it was so much
closcr to Germany. It was the quickest route to the Rhine. I
re&oned you could get there in four days."
His reasoning suggested that his calculation was governed
by a preconceived view, based on the assumption that the
Allies would take what was theoretically the best ling regard-
less of the practical difficulties. I remarked to him thag for
the same rcasons, it was likely to be the most strongly dc-
fended sector-surely a good reason why the Allies wcrc
likely to avoid it
Hc admitted the

people as wcll as the Allies. It used to make me angry to

iead the stories about its impregnable defences. It was non-
sense to dCIcribe it as a'wd[.' Hitler himself nevef, came to
visit it, and see what it really was. For that matter the only
time he came to the Channel coast in the whole war was back
in r9r4o when he paid a visit on one occasion to Cap Gris Nez.*
I remarked: "And looked across at the English coast, like
Napoleonl" Rundstedt nodded, with an ironical smile.
Rundstedt went otr to say that another reason for his
 PAnALY$S rN NORMANDT 217

that the invasion would come in the Sommo

Catais area was that we should be forced to attack the arca
where V-wcapons were located at the earliest possible mo
ment, in order to save London from dcsuuction. Hc was told
that of these weqld be much greater
and
that affected
was Hruer, , who guessed that the Allied land-
ingp would come in Normandy. Blumentritt revcded this.
"At the end of March O.K.W. issucd instructions which
showed that Hider expected an invasion of Normandy. From
that time onward we received repeated warnings about it,
I
starting with the words-'The Fiihrer fears . . .' don't
know what led him to that conclusion. But as a result thc
grst AirJanding Division with some tank squadrons was
movcd down there, and posted in reserve behind the Cher-
bo*g Peninsula-near Carentan."
Members of Rommel's safi had told me that he

not know how far it was his own i or influenced by

tt
Hider's repcated warnings-"r
It would seem that Hider's
nearer the mark than the calculations of thc ablest profes.
sional soldiers. They were unduly infuenced by their tend-
etrcy to go by what was the proper course in orthodor
strategic theory--<r by a conviction that the Allied planners
were sure to do the conventional thing. The value of doing
the "unexpccted" was overlookcd.
In this connection, Rundstedt made a significant disclosure
in answer to one of my questions. "If the Allies had landed
in western France, near the Loire, they could have succeeded
very easily-$oth in establishing a large cnough bridgehead,
and then &iving inland. I could not have moved a single
 48 rHE GERMAN GENERAIS TAIA-
division thcre to stop them." Blumenuitt added:'Such a land-
ing would have mcipractically no opposition. Therc wcrc only
threc divisions covering 3oo miles of coast south of the Ioiret
and two of thcm wcre training divisions composcd of raw
recnrits. A company commandcr on that coast had to cycle
&y in covcring his company scctor. We regarded the Loirc
"ll
area as too far from England for air $PPort, and thus as-
ormed it was unlikcly the Allicd Command would attcmpt
to land thcreknowing how muc} thcy wcrc inclincd to
count on cnsuring maximum air cover."
On thc same reasoning the Gcrman Command, ggg9!
Be-m4 thought that a tiaing in Normandy was lisstrffify
tfiffiEire thc Channcl was narrower, and air support casier.
Rundstedt said too: 'We thought that any landing in Nor-
mandy would be limited to aD attempt to capture 9bebEgg.
The American landing near here was thus less unexpected
than the British landing round C,aen "
IIIB GERMAIY DIIiFOSIIIONS

In lune, ro4.4, there wcre (to be exact) 59 German divisions

io the Wcst<ight of these b.itg in Holland and Bclgium.
More than half the total were coastdefcnce or training dL
visions. Of thc z7 freld, divisions, only ro wcre armoured-
threc of these were in the south, and onc near fuitrrerp.
Along the zoo mile strctch of the Normandy coast, west of
the Scine, stood six divisions (four of ttem mercly coast-
ddcnce). Three of these werc in thc Cherbourg Peninsula,
tno hcld the forty-mile stretch bctween there and Caen-
from thc Virc to the Orne-and one wiur betrneen the Orne
and thc Seine. BJumcmriq commented:
+F would more trulv be described as 'cou
tlan-as-tl@t As we did not anticipate that any landing
would bc madc on the west side of thc Cherbourg Peninsula,
that scctor was hcld very lighdy-we even put Russian unic
therC'
 P.InALY$S rN N()nMAI{DY 239

Tterc was one armoured division in the forward area, fotr

counter-attack. This was the zrst Panzcr Division. 'Ttere
wcrc prolonged argumentsr" Blumentritt said, "as to where
thc zrst Panzer Division should be placcd. Ficld-It[arshal von
Rundstedt would have prdcrrcd it to be south of St Lo,
hhind the Cherbourg Pcninsula. But Rommcl &ose to put
it nearer the coast and on the other fank, clorc to Caen This
Eeant that it was too near the coast to bc rcally available as a
ttscryc for the sector as a whole."
Ncvcrtheless, the prescnce of that division near Caen provcd
an important factor. But for ig the British might havc cap
turcd Caen on the first day of the landing. Rommel b.gg.d
in vain for a second armoured division to be at hand ncar
thc mouth of the Vire-where the Americans landed.
Here we are brought to thc great controversy that ,iAlly
afrccted thc Gcrman plans to mcet the invasion. Rundstedt
fclt that, with forces so limited and a coastline so long it war
not possible to prcvcnt the Allies ac,hieving a landing. He
rclie4 therdore, on a powerful counter-ofiensive to throw
them out-after they had committcd themsclveg but bcforc /-
they wcre wcll esablished.
Rommel, on the other hand fclt that the only ctrane Ly io
d{eating the inladers on the coast, bcforc they wcrc properly
ashore. "The first twenty-four hours will be decisivei ht
often said to his Saft Blumentritt, though of thc opposirc
sctrool, cxplained Rommel's reasout to me most fairly:i'Rom-
mel had found in Africa that the tanlrs were ryt to bc too 1ra",P
fu ba& for delivering a countcr-attack at the'critical
ao%
EeDL He also fclt that if the pan?Er resenres were kept far
back inland, as the Commander-in-Chief prderred- their
movc-up would bc intemrptcd by the Allied air force." From
) Rommcl's own Stafi I learnt that he was gready infuenced
lby the memory of the way he had been nailed down for dayr
|on end in Africa by.o air force that was not nearly so strong
I as what he now had to face.
I
rl
 24O TrrB GERMAT{ GENERAIS TAr.r-

But neither Rundsrcdt's nor Rommcl's plan prevailcd. Each

was prevetrtcd from doing what hc thought best
"Before the Allied invasion " Rundstcdt sai4 "I had wanted
to evacuate the wholc of southern France up to the Ioire, and
bring back the forces there to form a strong mass of ma-
\, rr@uvre with which I could strike back at the Allies. This
Y would have provided ten or twelve iof*tty divisions and
$ three or four armoured divisions to fight a mobile batde. But
Hider would not listen to su& an idea-though it was thc
,i only way in which I could hope to form a proper reseryg All
the' n.Jrp"per talL about'fundstedt's Ct#ai-@rwas
\ sheer nonsense-that At-y did not exist. Worse still, I was
.:cl
not even allowed a free hand with the handful of armoured
I
divisions that were available in Francc. could not movc
one of them without Hider's permission."
But Rommel was also narrowly restricted in applying his
difierent idea. That was not redly due to Rundstedt but to
la& of reserves. He was dlowed to place his divisions where
he wished. As Rundstedt said to mr"While I did not like
thcm being so near the coast, it would not have been right
for me to interfere with the commander on the spot in such
matters of detail-it was only Hider who interfered in that
way." But Rommel had only three armoured divisions for
his whole front, from the Loire to the Sctreldt<ne for the
Eastern, one for the Cenral and one for the'Western scctor.
These had not nearly the number of tanks that a British or
division possessed. Ilwas a verv light
-Amer.ical.armouled
,zpunc,h with whirh to c^rrnter a lrnwerful invasioq,
-TEe-chances were further diminished by earlier neglect to
dcvelop the coast ddences. From Rommel's stafi I heard of
the feverish efforts he made in theS!@of ro44 to hasten
the construction of under-water obstacles, bomb-proof bunkerst
and mine-fields along the Normandy coast-g[q9*!g-ggg-
) r..tlv iodg.4 .h. i"r"ri* *ould .b . For-example, less
tE-an two million mines had been laid al-ong the whole north
coast of France in the tb,ree years bdore he arrived on the
 pAnar.ys$ rN NoRMANDr 24t
tcene.In the few montbs hfore Dday the numbcr was trebled
-tut he was aiming at ovcr fifty dilion mines. It was for-
nnate for the invaders that thert was so much more to do
than could bc actrieved in the short timc available.
Rundstedt's explanation to me was: ..The la& of labour
troops and material was the main handicap in developing thc
defences. Most of the men of the Todt labour force, iho-had
been previously available in France, had bcen &awn ofl to
Germany tg lepair air raid damage there. At the same timg
the coast ddence divisions were Ioo widely extended-often
oJer a. forty-mile suetch-to carry out the nccessary work
themselves.
lcyond this, there was not enough madial for
the job-owin! to the consant interfercncjof the Allied
Air Forces, whictr checked both the manufacture and thc
Eovement of the necessilry material.',
But this does not cover the earlier neil.cg in roaz and
t943,
43,.oi complIffiAif6er eroirr,rtion
of which Rommel compfihffe-@"-opiil.tloi
may h fu
that Rundstedt, a ma'sterly .*poo*i of mlobile oL
drfrn"rP*f;
fensive warfare, had little belief in the vrlu. of satic
pq ro.geve jp litde..attention p their construcrion. Thai 4,4
is the view of Romnelt saE, and is in accord with the tvoe
of co,nteroffensive plan on whictr Rundstedt relied. It ;;
a verrrnatural attitude for the man who had maneuvrcd the
French out of the }vlaginot Line.
i Th. measures to meet the Allied invasion ..fell benrreen I
/y" **lrl'-as-the result of the confia of opinion between
Rundstedt's and Rommel's idcas,)hultiplied Uy Uitlat tight J lr#^
f
the rescnes$t had more efieci in ofening the #ay
I l*d_* i
France than anything the Allies did to iai.rE surprise
linto
rHE IJINDING
oThe
coming oj the invasion', Blumentritt remarked .,could
be.recognized by many signs. Increasing disorder in- the in-
tcrior became a serious thr-at, and caused us considerable loss
--through ambushes and raids. There were many derail-
 242 TIIB GIBMAI{ GENENAIS TAI,K-

mentt of trains that were carrying nrpplies and reinforca

Eents to thc front Beyond thfu was the planned destruction
bv air bombins of the railwavs in France and Western Ger'
oi*y-*rp.ciaiiy of thc bridgps across the Somme, the Seine
and the l-oire. All thcse wcre pointersl
Rundstedt emphasized: "Although we had no deGnitc re'
port of the date of the invasion that did not matter, as wc had
6ecn cxpeaing it any time from March onward." asked I
.I whethcrthc siorm thit postponed thc launc,hing twcnty-four
.r hours, and nearly complllcd its cancellation, had not lulled
q,
the defcnders into a sense of security at the critical momcnt.
{
t
..I
Blumcntritt replied: 'No, it didn't havc that effect-becausc
wc thought thCAllies were sure to have the kind of vesscls that
would not bc aficcted by hcavy scas. So we were dways on
tcntcr-hooks, and just as ready at onc time as another."
Rundstedt went on: "The one real surprise was the time of

$$ day at whictr the landing was made--because our Naval Stafi

hai taa us that the ellied forces would only land at high
'ttr weter. A further cficct of yo* *,o@-!&,
Lrding, was that the leading uoops werlprotectcd trom
for- the

6rc to a corsiderablc extent by the rocks.

$t "The scale of the invading forces was not a surprise-in
fact, we had imagined that they would be larger, because wc
had rcceivcd exaggerated rcports of the numbef, of American
divisions present in England. But that over+stimate had an
indirect elcct of important consequence, by making us the
more inclincd to expect a second landing, in the Calais area""
Blumentritt rclated to me the story of Dday, from the
point of view of the German Headquarters in thc West-
which was locatcd at St Germain, iust west of Paris. (Rom'
mcl's headquarters was at La Rochc Guyon, midway betw-cen
Paris and floucn, but, as at Alamein, he was oI[ the scene whcn
the blow feU, being on his way to see Hitler.)
"About ro p.rrf,. on June 5th we intercepted messages bo
tween the Frcnch Resistance Movement and England from
which it was deduaed that thc invaders were coming. Our
 PANALYS$ IN NORMAIiIDY 243
ysth Army east of_thc Scine at once issucd thc'Alarmr'thoogh
for somc rcason lhe -th fumy in Normandv ddeFd .loiig
so undz-earl
So until 4 ^-rrr 'midnio,hi
was unfortunate. Soon afta midnight
l
news crme that Allied paractrute troops had hgun &oppirg.
"Iimc was vital. f1i ncarest availible part;f the gcieril
rescrye was the rst S.S. which lay norih-wcst
of Paris. But wi not move it without pcrmission from
Hitlcr's headquarters. As early as 4 A.rr& Fi;H-Marshal von
Rundstcdt tclcphoncd them, aird asked for the release of this
Corps-to strengthcn Rommel's punch. But fodl, speaking for
Hider, r@ doubtcdffii[E tf,e tanilinsg
in Norffindy wcre more than a fcing and was sure thit
another landing was coming east of the Scine. The ,battlc,
of argumcnt wcnt on dl day untit 4 pil, whcn this Corps war
at last released for our use.
"IAcn furthcr-difficulties interfercd with its -"". The
Corps artillery had bcen kept on the East bank of thc Scine
-and the Allicd Air Forces had destroyed the bridgu. The
Field-Marshal and I had secn somc of ihem hing ,t rh.d.
The artillery thus had to -aLe a long circuit sorithward by
way of Paris beforc they could gct acriss thc Seine, and was
rgneatedly.bombc{ on the mard, which causcd morc dclap.
As a result trno days pqsed hfore this rescrve w.s on tLe
scene, rcady to strike."- l, i., ftua-..A &st-
Py that time the Allied forces wcre wcll csablishcd ashore,
and the _chanqqlof an early counter+trokq had fadcd. The
ar-o*. fit5g pi;;Dcal,
in the effort to cleck thc invadcrs from sprcading iar6e, in-
land instead of hing used to drive therd bac& frto thc sea.
I asked Rundstedt whethcr he had hopo of ddcating the
ilva$on I any stag: after the landing. Hi replied: ..Not"aftcr
the fust fey days, The Allied Air F&ces par:alyrcd all mova
ment by day,, and made it very difrarlt Cvcn it night They
had smashcd the bridges over-the Ioire as wcl dover thl
y'l*afu.go 7h Army ruds, bmcvcr, thc alarm thcre was isuod ee
l.3o AJc
 244 TIIB GERMAN GENEMLS TAI.K-

Seine, shuttingofi the whole area. These factors greltly de

laved the conientration of reserves therrthey
layed therrthev took three or
four times longer to reach the front than we had reckoned."
Rundstedt added: "Besides the
fu.6, the fire of your h:ttleshifs was a main

f-ttru:,rutffi#;",*tym#
u iicdsd ^ffinut:) nlumentritt atlarmy
oficers who interrogated him after the war did not slem to
7 have -realized what a serious effcct this naval boPbardgc.nt.
n a.1
there was still another cause of delay. Rundstedt and
-S{t
Blumentritt said that after about a fortnight they came to the
conclusion that thc expected secot'd lo".ling eest of the Seha
was not comin+ but Hider's headquarters were still coo-
;ffiffi'was-d wcre reluct*t to let them move forces
wesnrrard to Normandy from the Calais *... -
dlowed to rcshuflE*their forces iqNormandv as they wished.
nl;Giam;; Field-lvlarshal von Rundstedt
to come to France for a talk. He and Rommel togethcr went
to meet Hitler at Soisrcns, and uied to make him undcr-
stand the situation. Although Cacn and St. Lo, thc nro pivots
of the Normandy position, were still in our hands, it was
obvious they could not be held muc.h longtr. Thc two Fidd-
Marshals were now in full agreement as to the only step that
might save the situation short of a big retreat-which they
kniw Hider would not permit. Th.y wanted to withdraw
from Caen, leave the iof*tty to hold thc line of the Orng
and pull out the armourcd divisions to reft and reorganize.
Their plan was to use the latter for a powerful counter-stroke
against the Americans'fank in the Cherbourg Pcninsula.
-'But Hider insistcd that there must bc no withdrawal-
You must stay where you are.' He would not cven agree to
allow us any more &eedom than before in moving the forces
ar we thought best
*The .Field-Marshal and I had come to realize more and
more clearly,
 PARALYSB IN NORMAIiIDY 45
the forces back into the But Hitler still believed
was not his orders, the troops
had to continue clinging on to their crac.king line. There was
no plan any longer. We were merely trying, withoql bgpg to
comply with Hider's order that the line Caen-Iffi?ffiirst
be held at dl costs."
Whilg :efering sympathetically to the sulferings of thc
k
g*pr, Blumentritt remarked: "They did not stand artillery
fire as well as our troops had done in the last war. The Germai
iof*try of this war & Thc
t.a
,eSrerL-
and file had too many ideai were not so' o_
and obedient armv had suf- w
a thorough
Th9 meeting with Hider was followed by Rundstedt's ra
movd from command-for the time being. "Field-Marshal
von Rundstedt had flatly said that he could not qrry oo unlcss
he had a free hand. In view of this, and of the-pesimi.tic
tone of his reports on the situation, Hidcr decided to 6nd a
ncw commander. Ife wrote the Field-lvfarshal a letter, whic.h
was quite pleasantly worded, saying that he had come to thc
conclusion that, in the circumsuurces, it was best to makc a
change."
That decision of Hitler's was influenced by another piece of
plain speaking on Rundstedt's prrt, a.*rdirrg to Blumentria
Keitel had rung him up to asL abogt the situation, and after
hcaring Rundstedt's gloomy report, had plaintively asked:
"\Mhat shall we doP" Rundstedt pungently replicd: 'iEnd the
warl What else can you dol"

COI.LAPSE T'NDER BACK-AIIDEROIIT STRAN

Field-Marshal von Kluge happened to bc visiting Hitler's head-

quartcrs at that moment. He had bcen on the sick list for nine
months recovering from the injuries sustained in a bad air
crash in Russia, but Hitler had sent for him at the beginniqg
 246 mrE GERMAN GENERATS rAr.tr-

of |uly in view of the precarious sinration on the Eastern front

Hider's idea was to send him ba* there to replacc Busctr, as
co--atrdcr of the Cenual Ar-y Group, which was cracking
under the strain of the Russian srmrmer offensive that had just
opcncd. According to Blumcntritg Klug. was actually with
Hider, whcn Kcitel came in and told Hider what Rundstedt
had said on the telephone. Thereupon Hitler at once dccided
that Kluge must go to take charge in thc West instead of in the
East (wLere Gencrd Model wat now promoted to replace
Busctr). While thc decision was taken on the spur of the
moment, it had long bccn in Hider's mind that Kluge should
bc Rundstedt's deputy if thc nced arose.
"Field-Ifarshal von Kluge was a robusg aggresive typc of
soldierr" Blumenuitt remarked. "He arrived at our headquar-
ters at Se Gcrmain on fuly 6th to take up his ncw appointment
as Commander-in-Chid in the West At the start he was very
ctrcerful and confident-like dl ncwly-appointed commanders.
Indeed he was dmost gay about the prospects.
"In our 6rst talk he reproached me becausc we had for-
warded, and cndorse4 Rommel's report on the gravity of the
situation in France. He said such a pessimistic rcPort ought
not to have bccn sent to the Ftibrer but should have bcen
modified by * before it was forwarded. Field-Marshal von
Rundstedt was still at St. Gcrmain at the moment-he stayed
thcre for three days after Field-Marshal von Kluge arrivcd.
When I told him what Field-Marshal von Kluge had said,
he was rather shocked and declared emphatically: 'It was
propcr that such an imporant documcnt Sould bc forwardod
without any alteration by a superior headquarters.'
"While Field-Marshal von Klug. clearly thought at first
that the dangers of the situation had been exaggcrated, his
view soon &anged. For he was qui& to visit the front, i$ was
his habit rffhile there he saw the Commandcr of the 7h
Ar-y, Hausser, the Com-andcr of the 5th Panzer Ar-y,
Ebcrbach, and then the various corps corrunandcrs-including
the rst and znd S.S. Crcrps. All of them pointcd qut to him
 tn
F
*
e
E
2

E
B

I
{
il

i b
E
ul
 248 TrrE GERMAN GENERATS rAr.r-
the seriousness of the situation. Within a few days he became
very sober and quieu Hider did not likc the changing tonc
of his reports.
"On the r7h Rommel was badly injured when his car
crashed after being attacked on the road by Allied 'planes.
Hider then instructed Field-Marshal von Kluge to take charge
of Army Group'B' for the moment, as well as being Com-
mander-in-Chid."
Then, three days later, on luly zoth, came the attemPt to
kilt Hitler at his headquarters in East Prussia. The con-
spirators' bomb -issed its chief target, but it had terrific re-
percussions on the batde in the West at the critical moment
there.
"Ficld-Marshd von Kluge was at the front that day and I
was not able to get into touch with him until the evening. By
that time he had already had the messages about the attemPt
that it had succeeded, and then that Hider was still
-first
alive. The Field-Marshal told me that, more than a year be.
fore, some of the leading officers who were in the plot had
approacied him, and that he had received them trnice, but
at the second meeting he had told them that he did not want
to be mixed up with the plot. He knew, however, that it was
continuing. The Field-Marshal had not said anything to me
about it before, and I had not been aware of the plot
"When the Gestapo investigated the conspiracy, in the days
that followed, they found documents in which Field-Marshal
von Kluge's name was mentioned so he came under grave
suspicion. Then another incident made thing;s look worse.
Shordy before General Patton's break-out from Normandy,
while the decisive battle at Avranches wes in progress, Field-
Marshal von Kluge was out of touch with his headquarters
for more than twelve hours. The reason was that he had gone
up to the front, and there been trapped in a heavy artillery
bombardment. At the same time his wireless tender was de-
$troyed by bombing so that he could not communicate. He
himsglf had to stay under cover for severd hours before hc
 PARALYSIS rN NORMAIiTDY 249

could get out and start on the long drive back to his head-
quarters. Mcantime, we had been sufiering tombardment'
from the rear. For the Field-Marshal's prolonged 'absence'
excited Hider's suspicion immediately, in view of the docu-
ments that had bcen found. A telegram came from Hider per-
emptorily stating 'Field-Marshal von Kluge is at once to
€xtricate himself from the batde area around Avranc.hes and
conduct the batde of Normandy from the tactical headquar-
ters of th. Sth Panzer Army.' This was ba* near Falaise.
"The reason for this order, as I heard subsequentln was that
Hider zuspected that the Field-Marshd's prirposi in going
right up to the front, w:ur to get in touch with thc Allies anI
negotiate a surrender. The Field-Marshal's cventual return
did not cdm Hitler. From this date onward the orders whictr
he sent him wsrs worded in a brusque and even insulti.g
I*gu"g.. Field-Marshal von Kluge beiame very worried. H;
feared that he would be arrested at any moment-and at the
mne time realized morc and more that he could not prove his
Ioyalty by *y battlefield success.
*All this had a very bad efiect on
any chance that remained
of pr.f-qglg the Ailies from breaking out In the days of
crisis Field-Marshal von Kluge gave only part of his attention
to what l-tr happening at the front. He was looking back over
his shoulder anxiously-towards Hider s headquart-crs.
"He was not the only generd who was in that statc of
worry-for -conspiracy_ir ,h9 plot against Hitlcr. Fear pcr.
meated and pardyzed the higher commands in the wicks
and months that followed. The infuence on the generals of
luly zoth is a subject that would form a book in iiself."
After General Patton's breakout from Normandy, and the
collapse of the front in the'West, Field-Marshal Modcl sud-
d.rly arrived on August rTth as the new C,ommander-in-
Chid "His arrival was the first news of the change that Field-
Marshal von Kluge received-this sudden arrival6f a successor
had become the customary Eranner of dismissal at this time
and had already happened in the case of thc commandere of
 21p IIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TALE-

the rgth and r5rh Armies. At that moment Field-IvGrshal von

Kluge was at Larochc-Guyonr- the headquarters of At-y
Group '8.' Hc stayed on there for twenty-four hours Putting
Ficld-Marshal Model in the picture.
"I went over there from St Germain to say good$ye to hi-,
and saw him alone. As I went in he was sitting at his tablc
with a map in front of him. fl6 kept tapping it at the pgint
markcd 'Avranctres'-where Patton had broken through-
and said to me: 'That is where I lose my reputation as a
soldier.'I uicd to console him, but with littlc efiect. He wdked
up and dourn the room ruminating gloomily.tlc showed-me
the lettcr from the Fiihrer, that Ficld-Marshal Model had
brought him. It was written in quite polite termrthe Ftihrer
savinl that he felt the strain of the batde was too much for
tnt r.iaa-uarshal and that a c,hange was desirable. But the
last sentcncc of the letter had an ominous not+'Field-Marshd
von Kluge is to state to which part of Germany hc is going.'
The Field-Marshal said to me: 'I havc written a lctter to thc
Fiihrcr in which I have cxplaincd to him clcarly the military
-\iq
poition, and also other matters'--$ut he did not show me
r
Iettcr."
lThc lettcr war fornd by the Allics in the capnrcd Gerrran Archivcs
Afer e&nowledgiag thc ordcr for his rcplaccmcot, and remarking that thc
obviour rcason for it was thc frilurc to closc thc gap at Avranchcs, it wcnt
on o eaf"'!ffbeo you reeivc thcsc lines . . . I shall bc no more. I cannot
bcar the rqnoach that I havc aealcd thc fatc of thc Wcst throlgh faulty
Eeasur6, and I havc no meaDs of ddcoding mysclf. I draw a coldusion from
that and am dispatching myself wherc alrcady thousands of my comradc
arq I have no,er fcared dcath. Ufc has no more mcaning for mg aod I dso
6gurc on thc list of war criminds who are o be dclivcrcd ug.'-' The]eqcr
thco *ent oD to a long aad dctailcd cxposition of thc practical
of avcrtiog-othc collapsc at Avranchcs, and a rnild rcbukc to Hidcr for not
atrcodiqg thc warnings hc had bcco given both by Rommd and Kluge
hinself as to ttre critical position.
'l)ur apprcciations wcre aot diaated by pcsimism but by sobcr knowldge
of thc facts. I do not koow if Field'Marshal Modcl, who has bccn provcd in
cvcry sphcrg will still master thc sinration. From my hcart I hopc so. Should
it not bc eo, howarcr, and your chcrishcd nef,/ weapons not succcc4 thcn, my
F&htrr, maLc up your nind to cnd thc war. Ttc Gcrman pcoplc haveborac
arch unold ruficring that it is timc to put ao cnd o this frigbdulncr* fhcrc
 PAN.ALYSE IN NONMA}iIDY 25I
'Field-Marshal von Kluge ldt for home ncxt day. On the
weuing of the day after his dcparnre I had a tclcphonc call
from Mcs to say that hc had had a heart attack, and nad died.
Two days latcr camc a mcdical report stating that his death
was due to a ccrcbrd hemorrhage. Thcn came word that he
was to havc a Statc Funeral, and that Field-Marshal von
Rundstedt had bccn instruacd by the Fiibrer to rcprescot him
in laying a wrcath aod delivcring the Funerd Orition. Ttcn
came a suddcn ordcr that there-was to bc no Starc Funcral
I thcn heard that Fidd-Ivlarshal von Kluge had takcn poison,
and that this had bccn confrmed by a post-mortcm" Likc
other generals who had bcen on the Eastcrn front, hc had
carriod poison capsulcs in casc of hing captnrcd by the Rur
qagy did not take thcm evcn when they wcrc
captured. He had swdlowed one of thcse capsulcs in thc
car and was dead bdore he arrived in Metz. My opinion is
that he committcd suicidg not becausc of his dismisal, but
becausc hc believed he would h arrcstcd by the Gcsapo as
soon as he arrived home.'
While Kluge committed suicide of his own accord, Rommcl
was compcllcd to swdlow a similar dosq iust over e month
later, whilc hc was still convdcscing from his accidcnt Two
fcllow-gcnerals visitd him, undcr ordcrs from Hitler, and
took him out for a drivc and thcre con&ontod him with Hit-
lcr's dccision that he must commit suicidc or bc brought to trial
the certainty of a degrading exccution. HChad been
-\rith
morc definitely implicatcd in the plot A realization of the
hopelcssnes of thc sinution in the T0Vest had brought him
into revolt at an earlier stage" I was told by hir stafi that he
had litdc confidence in thc prospcct cvcn bdorc the Allies
landed and thereafter becamc incrcasingly critical of Hidcr's
lac,k of a setrse of rcdity.
Aftcr the Allies had succecdcd in otablishing their bridge
nust be weys to attain this end, and above dl b prcvent the Rci& &om
o
fdlling uadcr thc Bolshcrist hecl." Thc lettcr cndcd with a final tribute
Hitlcr'e grGatncs and afirmation of Kluge's loyelty cvcn in dcatb"
 2y rHE GERMAN GENERAI,S TALE-

head in Normandy he said to one of ttem: 'A[1 is over. It

would be mud better for us to end the war now, and livc
as a British dominion, than to be ruined by continuing su&
a hopeless struggle." Realizing that Hitler was the mein e[
stacle to peace Rommel openly said that the only thing was to
do away with him and then approach the Allic. That was a
remarkable change of attinrde in Hider's favourite gencral.
It cost Rommel his life, but it was too late to save Germany.
Tdking of the general breakdown which followcd Patton's
breakout from the Normandy bridgehead Blumentritt madc
another significant revelation. "Hitler and his stafi at O.K.W.
had been deluded, in postponing a withdrawd so long by
their belief that our forces would have time to get back and
occupy new lines in rear, if the need arose. They counted on
the British advance being deliberate, and on the Americans
being 6lrrmsy. But P6tain, who was an old acquainance of
Field-Marshal Rundstedt's, had several times warned him not
to underrate the speed with which the Americans could movc,
once they had gained experience. The evcnt proved it. The
lincs in rcar which O.K.W. had rec.koned on holding were
successively outflanked by Patton's dash before they werc evea
occupied."

After following the course of the decisive break+hrough as

the German High Command saw it, it is worth while to suP
plement it by a short account of how it appeared and felt,
to the fighting commanders on the spot.
A gaphic impression of the American break-through at
Avranches as it looked from the German side was given me
by General Elfeldt who commanded the 84th Corps, holding
that sector, at the foot of the Cherbourg Peninsula. He was
only sent there to take over charge just as the decisive of.
fensive was opening. Until then he had been commanding
th. +Zth Division, which held the Calais-Boulogne sector. "It
 PARALYS$ rN NoRr![A]lDY 253
was on the zSth fuly, so far as I remember, that orders came
for me to go aj once to Field-lvfarshd von Kluge's headquar-
ters. On arrivd he told me that I was to take over command
of the 84th Corps from General von Choltitz. He said he did
not agree with the defence policy of the latter, but did not
say in what rcspegt The Corps, he told me, compriscd the
remnants of seven divisions. HC dso said that the u6-th panzer
Division was to counter-attack westward to relieve the pres-
sure, and would be under my command. After spendini the
3r_Sht
witp the Fietd-lvlarsha[ I &ove in the -oirrirrg ti I.
Mans and or to the tactical headquarters of the Th ermv,
whictr was then ro to 15 kilometres east of Avrandes. Froii
there I was directed to my own corps headquarters. I do not
1s66ml'er exacdy where it was, as i[ was hidden in the uees,
ay-1y from any villagc. Everything was confused and thi
Allied air force dominated the area. On the following day I
went round my troops. They were very weak and there was
no continuous fronr Some of the divisions had onlv about
three hundred iof*try lefq and the artillcry wal much
depleted.
'The first order I geve yas that dl the troops south of the
Ri-r.J L. Seg near Avranctrcs, were to ddend the south banh
while the troops from the east were to hang on where they
were until the rr6th Panzcr Division arrived-that nisht: the'v
were tfien to join in its counter-attack. But the rr6tf,'did ncit
arrive, as it was divcrted to another danger point while on
the w1y. On the morning of the 3rst Adcrican tanks drove
towards Brescy, on the River See, 15 kilometres east of Av-
ranches. At that mometrt my headquarters was north of
Brescy, and was nearly ant ofi'by this flank thrust. My head-
quarters personnel were in the fighting line all day. Luc,kily
the Americans wcre not very vigoroui in their thnrst herJ.
"In the next two d"yr I was ieinforced by two new di-
visions which were nerly-up to- sqm$h, as well as by the
rr6th Parzer Division. I formed the iemnants of the Lther
seven divisions into a single one. My orders were to stop I
 254 llrB GERI{AI{ GENERATS TALr-
funhcr break-through bctwcen Brescy and Vire, and to do"
-American
lay the expected thrust south<astwarcis from
Avranctres, as a powerful counter-thrust w:ui to bc madc by a
panzer corps, undcr Gcncrd von Funk. This was subsequently
icinforced, to providc a countcr-stroke of biggcr scale, by all
the tanls thaicould bc made available from Eberbach's 5ith
Panzer Ar-y.'
Elfcldt went on to dcscribc at length the cven morc Prc.
carious situation that devclope4 after the armoured strokc
had failcd to rcach Avranches, and his left fank was increas.
ingly outflankcd. Hc whccled bac,k gradually to thc castward
and thc dificulties of the withdrawal were the greatcr becausc
the armourcd forces rctircd through his frong crcating con-
fusion. Fortunately the Amcrican pressure on his front and
immediate flanks was not too dangerourPatton's 3rd Army
was moving on a wider cirorit "The Amcrican trooPs, of the
rst Army, on my front were not actically at dl clever. They
failcd to scize oppornrnitierin particular they missed several
chances of cutting off the whole of my corps. Thc Allied air
force was thc most scrious dangcr.
"By thc time wc had got back to thc Orne the whole front
had become much narrower than before, so my corps head-
quartcrs had bccome superfluous and was temporarily with-
drawn from the line. But thc following morning the Cana-
dians broke tbrough southwards to Fdaisc and I was at once
ordered to form a front to chec,k them. The available troops
werc very scanty and we had no communications. The
e,anadian artitlcry fired dl day into my headquarters, but
fortunately did no damage at all dthough they fired about
a thousand shells. These fcll all round the small house in
which I was, but no one wiur hurt During the day I was able
to re-form a continuous line, but beyond my right fank I
could see the British tanls driving down the other side of the
River Dives towards Tnrn" Thus our line of retreat war
blocked.
'The next day I was ordered to break olut fiorth<astnard,
 PAITLYSIS rN NOBMAT{DY 255
bdind the bads of thcse armourcd forccs. It was soon clear
that this was not possible, as the British wcre now therc in
suength. So I proposed to the army co--ander, Crenerat
Hausser, that my troops should bc placcd at the disposat of
C'rncral Meindl, who was 66mmurding the paractrute forccs,
to hclp the latter to break out ncar St Iambcrg southast-
ward. It seemed to mc that one strong thrust might have a
bctter chance than a number 6f srnall ones Mcindl succccdcd
in breaking out, but when I rcac.hed St Lambcrt mysclf ncxt
morning th. gpp was again closcd. I tried an attac&, with all
I had ldt--a couple of tanks and trro hundred men. It startod
well but then ran into part of the rst Polish Armotrod
Division. Aftcr a twohour fight our ammunition bcgan to
ruo ouu Then the troops whic.h werc following behind me
surcndered thus leaving me with a handful of mcn at the
ctrtoff tip of thc wedge. So we had to surendcr in turn. Tte
commander of this Polish divisioo wiu a fine-looking -an
and a gcnde-a". Hc gavc mc his last cigarcttc. His division
isclf was in an awkward situation and had nrn out of water
--the forccs of thc two sidcs wcre cxtraordinarily intcr-
minglcd."

I- took the opporttrnity of asking Elfeldt what hc thooght

about the German soldicr in this war comparod with the prc.
vious war. His vicws dillcred in some rcspccts from thoc of
Blumcnuitt (scc pqgc 259). oThe infanelwcre quitc as good
g in rgl+-r$ and thc artillery much bcttcr. Wcapons-had
imFroved, and so had actics. But thcrc werc oth& factorc.
Ir ,h. last^two _ygrs 9f thc f,rst war, the morde of thc troopr
became allcaod by thc spread of Socidistic idcas that we;e
pacifist in trend. In this war, National Socialisn bad thc
opposite cffca-it fortified thcir moralc."
"Ilo\tr did disciplinc comparc in the trro warsl" "That ir
morc difficult to aoswcr. Natiooal Socidisn madc thc troqF
 256 TrrE GERMAN GENERAIS rAr,K-

more fanaticd-which was both good and bad for discipline.

But rclations between ofrcers and men were bcttcr than in
r9r4-r$ and that helped discipline. The improved relation'
ship was due partly to the new conception of discipline that
was inculcated in the Reiciswehr, based on the experience of
r9rEr8, and pardy to the subsequent infuence of National
Socialism in diminishing thc gulf benreen officers and men.
1Ae ordinary soldiers showed more initiative, and used their
hea& better-in this war than they did in the last<specially
when fighting on their own or in small parties." On this score
ElfeldCJopinion corresponded with the judgement of British
command&s, who often remarked how the German soldiers
excelled their opponents when oPerating alone or in pairs-
a verdict that wal in surprising conuast to the experience of
r9r4-r$ as well as to the continuing popular view that thc
Germans were no good as individualists. Since Nationd So'
cialism made so suong an appeal to the herd instin6 the
nanual assumption was that the generation whictr grew uP
under it would show less, not more, individual initiative on
the batdefield than their fathers. I asked Elfeldt if he could
suggest an explanation. He said that he himself was puSzled
bui-aaae4'I think it may have been due to the kind of scout
uaining these young soldiers had received in the 'Hider
Youth' organization."
The qucstion how the German soldier of the two wars
compared came up again, a few days later, in a discussion with
Heinri4 R<ibricht, and Bechtolsheim. Heinrici's view was that
the German Ar-y was better trained in the fust war, but he
did not consider that the discipline had been better. Rd,hrictrt
and Bechtolsheim agreed, and the former added: "The Army
needed a long intcrvd betrreen the Polish and the Western
campaigns to-develop its uaining<specially 16" raining of
the non<ommissioned oficers. As head of the Training De-
partment of the Generd Staff, I was in close touch. with this
question. But morde, and discipling were better in the later
f.rt of thi" war than in the later part of the fust war. Be.
 PAnALYSTIi IN NoRMANDY 211
twlen r-916 and r9r8 the soldiers'morale was gradually undcr-
mined ly infiltration of Socidistic idcas, and thi sugges.
-th.
tion that they were fighting thc Emperor's war, whereaithis
timg they had and kept sud extraordinary confidence in
Hider that they remaioed confident of victory in facc of all
ttre facts."
Heinrici and Bechtolsheim endorsed this statemert of
Riihrichtb who went on to say: "Nevertheless the morde of
the fumy was gradudly weakened by the effects of over-
strain, and by the tendency of the S.S. to grab the best men.
On the Eastern Front the divisions never got a rest, and that
became a debilitating factor."
In reply to a further question about the eflect of National
Socialism on the fu-y, R<ihricht said: "It had a mixed eEea.
It created dilEculties for us, and weakened our control, but it
fostered an ardent patriotic spirit in the soldiers, which went
deeper than the spirit of ryr4-tor this time there was no
enthusiasm for war suctr as there had been then. That spirit
had greater endurance under reverses." Heinrici agreed with
R6hrictrt, while emphasizing that faith in a persondity
counted for more than the system. "Thc troops' tremendous
confidence in Hider was the dominant factor, whether one
liked it or rot."

What did the German generals think of their \Yestern op

ponents? They were difrdent in expressing an opinion on
this matter, but I gathered a few impressions in the course
of our talLs. In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rund-
stedt said: "Montgomery and Patton were the trro best that
I met Field-Marshal Montgomery was very systematic." He
added: '"That is dl right if you have sufrcient forces, and
suficient time." Blumenuitt made a simils commenL After
papng tribute to the speed of Pauon's drive, he added: "Field-
I\[arshal Montgomery was the one general who never suf-
 2* TlrE GERMAN GENERAIS TALK-

this"-Blumentritt took a scrig

fered a teverse. Hc moved like
of very deliberate and short steps, putting his foot down
heavily cach time.
Giving his impression of the difiercnt qualities of the Brit-
ish and American troops, Blumentritt said: "The Americans
atta&cd with zcsq and had a keen sensc of mobilc action,
but when they came under hcavy artillery 6re they usudly
fell back<ven after they had made a successful lrcnetration.
By contrast, once the British had got their teeth in, and had
bcen in a position for twenty-four hours, it proved dmost
imposible to shift them. To counter-attack the British dways
cost us very heavy losses. I had many opportunities to ob.
serve this interesting difierence in the autumn of, ry44 when
the right half of my corps faced the British, and the ldt half
thc American "
 XVIII
THE ANTI-HITLER PLOT_AS SEEN
FROM H.Q. IN THE WEST

rrEG Stuy oF TrrB ut't tI,I.a pL(,f IIA!; DEEII !or.D FRoM
I many angles, but not &om that whid has the closest
bearing on the miliary issue. A fairly clear picnre has
cmerged about what happcned aftcr the bomb cxploded at
Hider's headquarters in East Prussia, and failed 16 ftitl him;
also about the course of cvcnts in Bcrlin, and how thc con-
spirators therc tailod to scizc their momcntary opportunity.
To complete the picnue it is imporant to trace what hap
pcned on that fateful day at Gcrmar Headquartcrs in thc
Wcst I had a Iong account of this, and thc subscquent ro.
actions, from Gcncral Blumentritt whic,h is worth gi"g in
full-not only for is dircct cvidcncg but for the atmospLcre
it convep.
rturrBlunrrt's accouNT

During the early months of ,g44 there were many visitorg to

Supreme Headquarterg Western Frong at St Gcrmain, and
Iong disorsions of the war+ituation A matter that was often
mooted was whethcr the field-marshals should joindy ap
proa& Hidcr and urge him 6 make peace.
Onc day, about thc cud of lfiarcn, Field-lvfarshd Rommct
259
 2fu TTIE GERMAN GENERAIS TAI.B-

came to St. Germain accompanied by his Chief of Staft,

General Speidel. ]ust before they teft, Speidel said he wanted
to have a word with me in private. When we had withdrawn,
Speidel told me that he was speaking on Rommel's behalf
and then said: "The time has iome when we must tell the
Ftihrter that we cannot continue the war." It was agreed that
we should broach the matter to Field-Marshal Rundstedg and
this was done. We found that he was of the same opinion A
telegram was then sent to O.K.W., asking the Fiihrer to come
to 5t. Germain "in view of the serious situation in France-"
But no reply was received.
General Speidel came to see me again about the matter,
and in the course of our conversations told me that there were
a number of people in Germany who were intending to ta&le
Hider. He mentioned the names of Field-Marshal von Wiv.
leben, General Beck, General Hoeppner, and Dr. Goerdeler.
He also said that Field-Marshal Rommel had given him a fcw
days lcave to go to Stuttgart to discus the matter with othcn
thereboth Speidel and Ro--el came from the state of
Wurtemburg, and had long known Goerdeler. But in these
conversations Speidel never indicated that the assassination
of Hider was contemplated.
Nothing further developed before Field-Marshd von Klog.
arrived to replace Field-Marshal von Rundstedt as Com-
mander-in-Chief in the West-following the latter's heated
telephone talk with Field-Marshal Keitel, in which he had
insisted that the war ought to be brought to an end. I would
add a little more about this &ange. Hider knew that Field-
lvlarshal von Rundstedt was much respected by the fu^y,
and by the enemy. Allied propaganda broadcasts often sug'
gested that the views of the Field-Marshal and his stafi dilfered
from those of Hider. It was notable, too, our headquafters was
nevcr subjected to air attack. Nor was the Field-Marshal ever
threatened by the French Resistance Movement-presumably,
because it was known that he had always been in favour of
 IIIE ANTr-r{rTr,ER qror'-As SEEN FROM H.Q. rN WEST Z6t
good treatmcnt for the Frenc.h. AII these thingp were brought
to Hitlert
notice, of course, in reports from his or4rn agents.
While he treated the Field-Marshal with respect-more re.
spec! than he showed other soldiers-he kept him under
careful watch. Theq the Field-lvlarshal's emphatic advicc
lbot seeking peace provided Hitler with a suitable ground
for replacing him.
Field-Marshd von Kluge arrived at St Germain, to take
over, on )uly 6th. On the r7h Field-Marshal Rommel was
knocked out Thereupon von Kluge moved to Rommel's
hcadquarters at La Roche4uyon, to conduct the battle from
therg leaving me in charge at Su Germain"

,luLY 2sTH

The first news of the attempt on Hitler's life reached me about

3 n.u.-from C,olonel Finck, the Deputy Chief of Stafi, who
had been tranderred from the Ea"*ern front about six wecks
earlicr. C,olonel Finck came into my room and said: "General
the Ftihrer is dead. A Gesapo mutiny has taken placc in
Berlin.' I was very suqprise4 and asked how he had heard.
Tio& qeplied that it had come from C,eneral von Snrlpnagcl,
the Military Governor of Paris, on thc telephone.
_I tried to get hold of Field-Marshal von Rluge on the tele-
ptong at LaRochc4-uyon, but was told that lie was visiting
the front I then told Speidel in very guarded tcrms-as wi
werc talking over the telephone-that there were serious dc-
velopmcnts, and that I would drive over myself to tell him
I
what had happened. left St. Germain about 4 p.rrr. and
arrived at La Roche-Guyon about j.3o p.M.
Field-Marshal von Kluge had just returned there When
I went into his room I saw that he had in front of him an
extract from the German Radio to the effect that an attempt
had been made on the life of the Fiihrer, but that it Md
failed. Von Kluge told me that he had previously had two
telephone messages from Germany, but without any indica-
 frz TIIE GERMAIY GENERAIS TAI.E-

tion of thc scnder's identity, whictr said: "Thc Fiihrer is dead

and you must make a decision." Von Klogp went on to-say
thag about a year bdorc, Wiulebcn, Beck and others had
come to his home to sound him about an approach to thc
Ftihrer and how it should bc conducted. He also said that hc
had madc notes of these discussions.
Whilc wc were alking a tclephone message from St Gcr-
main was brought in. It said that an anonymjus telegram had
arrivcd thcre stating that Hider was dcad. Kluge was Puz.
zled as to whictr of the statements were true, and wondercd
whethcr the Radio was merely putting out a falsc rePort Aftcr
some further discussion I put i telephone call in to General
\Marlimont, fodl's dcpury at O.K.W. It was a long timc
before the cdl came through. Then the reply was merely that
Warlimont was not availablq as hc was engaged with Kcitcl.
So von Klogc and I Put our hcads together, and discusscd
whom we could try ncxt Wc telephoncd the Chid of thc S.S.
in Paris. He repliid that he did not know anythi"g b.yood
the radio announccmcnt Wc then telephoned General Stieff
-the Chid of the Organization Department-at O.K.H. I
tnew Sticfi wcll, but had no idea that hc was in thc inner
circlc of thc conspiracy, as later cmcrged. Stieff at once asked:
"\lllhere did you-get the news that the Fiihrer was dcad?'
He addcd: "Thc Fiihrcr is quite wcll, and it good spirits"-
and then rang ofi. We fdt very uncasy about this telcphone
call afterwards, realizing how suspicious it must havc ap
pcarcd in the cirormsances.
Stiefi's answer and manner were so curious :ls to suggcst a
Iik.ly cxplanation, and I remarked to von Kluge: "Ihis is an
attempt that failed.' Von Klog. then said to me that, if it
had succcede4 his first step would have been to order the
dis&arge of the V r's against England to be stoppcd, and that
his second step would have been to get in toucb. with the
Allied C.ornmanders.
Von Kluge then instnrcted me to telephone General von
Stulpnagel, and tell him to cone to La RocheGuyon" I was
 rHE ANrI-HIILER PLOHAS SEEN BROM H.Q. IN WESr 63
dso to suulmon Field-Marshal Spcrrlc, commanding thc Luft-
wafre in thc West
Crcncrd von Stulpnagel arrived first, about ?Bo p.W ac-
companied by Lieue€oloncl Hoffackcr. They sat round a
ablc with the Field-Marshal, Speidel and I-ali the circle arc
dcad norr, cxcept Spcidel and I. Von Snrlpnagel hgpn by oy-
ing: "May Licue€oloncl Hoffacker cxplain mattcrs." It soon
bccame clear that Hollacker knew dl about the attempq and
was the link bctrrcen von Stulpnagel and von Witdebcn Hc
traccd how the plot had developed from an intcndcd pctition
into a ptxch<s it was realized that Hider would not listcn
to argument, and that the Allies would not listcn to any
pcacc ofier from Hider. Hc told how von Staufienbag haii
orgaoized the acnul attcmpt, and gave us the details.
lVhen he had finished, von Kluge, with obvious disappoint-
ment, remarked: *\Mell, gentlemen, thc attempt has-failed"
Evcrything is over.'Von Stulpnagel thcn cxclaimed: 'Field-
Ilarshdr l thought you \rerc acquainted with the plans. Somc.
thing must b donc!'Yon Kluge rcplied: "Nothing morc
can be done. The Fiihrcr is still divc.' I noticcd that voo
Slulpnagd had bcgun to look very uncomforabla Hc got up
and walkcd out otr thc vcrandah" Whcn hc returncd, he said
very litde
Thcn Field-Ivtarshal Sp*L anived--and only stayod a fqr
minutcs. Hc refuscd von Kluge's inviation to remain for din
ncr. I felt that Spenlc did not want to get drawn into thc
disarssion, or bc a witncss of anything that transpircd"
The rest of us norr went in to dinner. Von Kluge scemod
very vivacious and unworried in manner, whereas von Stulp
nagel was tacitum. After a whilc he turned to von Kluge and
said: "May I speak to you privately againl" Von Kluge aged
---and said to mg "You come too." We went into a small room"
Herc von Stulpnagcl told me that he had takcn 'the first
precautions" hfore lcaving Paris. Von Kloep cxdaimed:
"Heavensl Wbat havc you bccn doing?" "I gave orders fc
 fr4 TrrE GERMATv cENERALS rArx-
dl the S.S. in Paris to be arrested"4y this he mcant not thc
Wafien S.S., but the S.D., or Security Service.
Von Kluge exclaimed: "But you can't do that without my
orders." Von Stulpnagel replied: "I tried to telephone you
this afternoon buiyou were away from your H.Q., so I had
to act on my own." Von Kluge remarkcd: "Well, that's your
responsibility." After that, they didn't go back to finish their
dinncr.
Von Kluge then told me to telephone to von Stulpnagpls
Chief of Stafi in Paris and ask whether steps had actually been
taken to arrest the S.S. This was Colonel von Linstow-who
is also dead.t He told me that steps had been taken, adding
"And nothing can stop ttem." Von Kluge then said to von
Stulpnagel: "Ircok here, the best thing you can d9 is to chan-ge
intocivilian clothes and go into hiding." He told voo Stulp
nagel to release all the arrested S.S. at once.
After von Stulpnagel had gone, I said to von Kluge: fW9
ought to do something to help him.' Von Kluge Plndere$
m/suggestion and then told me to drive after von Sgulpnagd,
and advise him 1s disappear somewhere in Paris for a few
days. Suictly, of course, von Kluge should have placed him
under arresl
I drove to St. Germain 6rst. On arrival there my stalf
brought me fresh telegra-s which had come while I had been
away. One was from Field-Marshal Keitel; it said that all
reports of the Ftibrer's death were false, and all orders sent otr
thlt assumption were to be ignored. Another was from
General Fromm, saying fi31 flimmler had just taken over
co--and of the home forces from him-Hider no lotgo
trusted any of the generds in Germany. A third was from
Himmler+i-ply selng that he had taken over command
of the home forces. While I was reading the telegrams a tele-
phone call came from Admiral Kranckg the Naval Cin.C
in the West-the Fidd-Marshal had not thought of cdling
him 1s the conferenc*to ask if I would drive into Paris to
s66 him.
r Blumenuitt's narrative was putrctuated witli rcpetitions of rtot'' (dcad).
 TIIB ANTI-HMTB PT.OHAII SEEN FROM H.Q. IN \trEST 2G
About an hour after midnight I set off for Paris, where I
found dl the Naval H.Q. staE assembled. Admiral Krancke
showed me a long telegram he had received from Ficld-
Marshal von Wizleben, saying that the Fiihrcr was dead and
t!a, . rew government was being formed, undcr himself for
thc time b.irg. Thcreupon Kranike had telephoned O.K.W.
and by chance had been put through to Admird Doenitz, who
said that it was untrue.
I then went on to the H.Q. of the Sccurity Police. They wcrc
just coming back from prison. The frst olfrccrs I saw wanted
to know what had happcned and why they had been arrested
without any reason. Their attitude was very decent, and they
showed a'foilirrgrros to help in hushing ini"gr up. t
"rt
i
y!:r. Obergruppenfiihrer OboS the Clief ol the Security
Policc, was at ttre momenL I was told that he was at a hote[
.l*g with von Stulpnagel.
I went on there, about 2 l.;v.", and found what was almost
like a party in progresrincluding Abea, thc Ambassador in
Paris. Oberg took me aside into another room, and told mc
that he had no idea what was betrind the situation, but that
we must agree as to what ought to be done next. I must
say thag throughout, Oterg behaved very decendy, and uied
to smooth things over for thc sake of the Ar-y. He suggested
that the regiment that had carried out the arrests sfJtld bc
confined to barracks, and tbat the men should be told that it
lad hen merely an exercise. But von Srulpnagel considered
that it.s5 impossible to prevent a leakage. I 6en conveyed
von Kluge's advice to von Stulpnagpl-that he shoula iis-
appear. But when I got back to St. Germain I found that a
message
lad alre{y come from O.K.W. saying that he was
to proceed to Berlin at once, to render a report.
.byIater iq the {ay von- Stulpnagel set ofi for Berlin by *,
way of Verdun and Meg. He was accompanied bv one
man besides the driver, ar an escort in case thiy mct Fien&
partisans. Irst before Vcrdun was reached he ordered the car
to stop, and-sfljt that as *.rS just coming to the partisan
-,hq
area it would be a good thing for them to get out and ftc
 2ffi TrrB GERMAT{ cENERATS TN.K-

thcir pistols at a treq to make zure they were in working

order.-After that they drove on, but he stopped the car again
when they came to the old Verdun batdeficlds-whcre he had
fought in the previous war-and said that he would like to
show thcm round. After going a short way he said to ttem:
"You stop herer l'm going on alone to look at a point I know."
They suggested they ought to accompany him in gse 9f
meeting paftisans, but hc said it was not necessary. Shortly
aftcrwardi they heard a shot They ran forward and found
hirn fexlisg in a canal. He had shot himsclf after getting into
the water-so that he would drown if thc fust shot did not
succced. But his attcmpt at suicide had not succecdcd. Thc
two mco 6shed him eu1 and took him to hospital. Hc had
shot one cye out, and the other cyc was so badly damaged
that it had to be removed.
I heard these details subscquendy from Oberg who, feeling
that von Stulpnagel was probably mixed up itr the attempt
on Hidcr, had drivcn to Verdun to scc von Snrlpnagcl in
hosprtd, still in thc hope that he might bc able to kccp thi"S
quiet Von Stulpnagel, however, had rduscd to say anything
Obog told me. After about a fortnight in hospital, von Snrlp
nagel was removcd to Bcrlin on ordcrs from thcre Hc was
brought to trial, condemncd and hanged.
Meanwhile there was somcthing like a panic inParis among
thc Stafi-as to who wcre suspect. Obcrg rcccivcd a string
of tdcgrams to iurest various pcoplc-fusq Hofiacker, then
Finck; and in dl about thfutt, or forty people, both soldiers
and civilians. A few days later Oberg telcphoned me to comc
and sce him, and told mc that Hofiac*,cr had mentioncd von
Kluge's name in his prcliminary interrogation. Obcrg said
that he could not belicve that von Kluge was implicated"
I accompanied Obcrg whcn he went to see von Kluge and
mat<e a rcporL Von Kluge told Oberg: "Carry out these inter.
rogations as your sense of duty tells you." Oberg remarked to
me that he did not like the task, but as it could not bc avoided
he wanted to conduct the interrogations in a gentlemanly
way. So it was arrangcd that, as arr assurancq one of thc o6-
 TrrB ANTr-Hnr.EA pr,(rrAlt SEBN IBOM rl.Q. n{ WESI frl
ccrs of my staff should bc present during them. Herc it is
wotth that neither Spcidel nor I had brcathed a
word to anyotrc about the conferencc on the evening of loly
20th.
Soon after this, von Klugr visited Rommcl in hospital in
Paris. On his renrn he told mc that Rommel had cxpresscd
snrprisc that thcrc had bccn an anempt to kill Hillcr, as
distinct from putting prcsurc on him to sue for pcacc.
In the days that followed I noticed that von Klugp hgan
to look more and more worried. He often talked about bim-
sclf and his own affairs. On one occasion hc rcmarked, som,
brely: "Events will take thcir coursc." Then Ficld-lvlarshel
Modcl zuddcnly arrivcd to rcplacc him. On his way home, as
I have already related, von Kluge was found dcad in thc car,
having swdlowed a poison capsulc
Apart from the convcrsation wc had on thc errcning of luly
zoth, von Klugc neycr said anything to me about plot to i
I
ackle or ovcrthrow Hidcr. had ldt von Kluge's ;tafi in
fanuaryr r94z,-and had no closc relations with hin agin until
ldyr g*4. C,olonel von Tresclow was rat to von Kluge, ard
may have bccn akcn more into his confidcnc+Sut hc is
dcad.

- I *T in Sc.hlcswig with Gocral Dempsey aftcr the capitu-

lation io l&y, rg4t and saw vcry clculy that even thcn thc
civil population was dividcd h their vierr of Hidcr. One half
was sho&cd that the Crcrman gpncrals had takcn part in thc
?ttcmpt to ovcrthrow Hidcr, and fclt bittcrly towar& thcm
in coasequcnce-thc samc fecling wss manifcstcd in the Army
itsclf. Thc other half complained that the gencrals had Dot
tnrncd out Hitler bcfora

TIIB AFItsBMATII

After talring over command in the West, Field-lr{arshal Modcl

rtayed atthe HQ. of Army Group "8." Telephoningmefrom
l Hcad of tbc Opcratioor breoc[.
 ffi TrrE GERMAN GENEMT.s TAr.t-

there a day or two later, he said that he had just received a

disconcerting message from the Fiihrer's H.Q. 'All thcy can
talk about and think about is the zoth ]uly, and now they
want to take Speidel away, as a suspect." He had emphaticdly
told Keitel that he could not spare the Chief of Stafi at Ar-y
Group H.Q. when the situation was so critical. As a result,
Speidel was left there until the fust week of September. He
was then relieved, and came to see me, telling me that he had
been ordered to return home. On arrival there he was arrested
by the Gestapo.
Aftcr Generd Speidel had gone, a telegram came whic,h.
said that I was to be relieved by General Westphal, and was
to report to the Fiihrer's H.Q. on the r3th September. I felt
somewhat depressed! On setting offr I went first to see Field-
Marshal von Rundstedt at Coblenz, where he had just estab
lished his H.Q. on being recdled to take supreme command
in the West Field-Marshd von Rundstedt was very annoyed
to hear that I was being taken away from my post just as
he had returned to command. He at otrce protested to O.K.W.
and asked that he might retain me as his Chief of Staff. But
the answer ca-e back that the request could not bc granted.
The reason given was that I had repeatedly expressed a desirc
for a fighting command. This did not sound very convincing
in the circumstances.
I Ieft Coblenz on the 9th September, and took the oppor-
tunity to visit my family-at Marburg-in case of what might
h.pp*. I spent Sunday, the roth, at home. I felt a quiver
every time the telephone rang or the sound of a car was heard
approaching the house-and went to the window to look out.
On tle rrth I took the train for Berlin. The uain was held
up by an air raid at Kassel, so I telephoned from there to say
that I was delayed, and would thus miss the special courier
train that ran nighdy from Berlin to East Prussia. Continuing
in the train to Berlin I had to get out at Potsdam, because of
bomb damage on the line. |ust as I got out of the train I
suddenly heard a voice in the dark saying: "Where is General
 TrrB aNu-HITrrR pr.oHAs SEEN FROM II.Q. IN WESit 269

Blumentrittl" I felt atrother quiver. After I had answered, an

oficer came up to me, accompanied by a soldier who was
carrying a tourmy gun. The officer addressed me politely, and
said he had ordcrs to escort me to a hotel in Berlin-thc
Adlon. On arrivd therg the hall porter told me there was a
sealed envelope awaiting me. I opcned ir..-all that it conainod
was my ticket to Angerburg in East Prussia That was rathcr
sa safialimerr. But it brought only a temporary sense of rc.
Iid. I still had to wait and wonder what was in store for me at
the Fiihrer's H.Q.
The following night I caught the special train thencg ar-
riving at Angerburg on the morning of the r3th. I was met
by Field-Marshal Keitel's who tmk me to Keitefs
"djoarrt,and left my baggage. I was
special train; herc I had breakfast
told that the Fiihrer was too tired to receive me,-but that I
could atteod the daily conference at midday if liLd. I I
decided to do so.
In front of the house where the conference was held I found
a group of generds. I went up to them and reported to General
Guderian, who had become Chief of the General Stalt. I
noticed that hc did not attempt to shake hrn&, while Keitel
and others stood dmf. Guderian said to me, in a loud voice:
*I wonder you dare to come here after what has happcned
I
in the WesC' showed him the telegram ordcring me to
reporL Theo an S.S. officer arrivcd and said thag after all,
the Ftihrer had dccided to attend the daily conference A few
minutes latcr we saw Hidcr wdking through the forest, with
tired and slow steps, accompanied by * escort of five or sir
melL
Guderian turned to me and sai4 gimly: 'tlorr you ctn
report yourself to the Fiihrer." But to my surprise Hitler
greeted me in a pleasant manner, saying: "You've been having
a very hard time in the W'est I know the Allied air forces
ar€ on top and what it mslns. I'd like to have a tilk with you
after the conference."
When the conference ended Guderian said to me: "Come
 27O TrrB GERMAN GENERATS TAr.r-

and have a talk with me about the Eastern front.' I replied:

'It docsn't interest me in the lcast at the moment." I then had
ten minutes'talk with Hitler, done, and he was again very
nice.
When I came out, thc other generals were dl waiting and
at once asked me: "What did thc Fiihrer say to youl" I re-
plicd: "He was vcry pleasant." Thereupon, they
"U- Et :
very pteasang and Kcitel invitcd me to have tea with him" I
repiiJd that I would like to get away that evening and go !omc,
ad-ding: "It's two yean sinci I spent a leavc with my *if: *{
chil&in." At thai, Keitd saidt"I don't think it is possible."
I said: "But the Fiihrcr told mc I could go on leavc, and was
then to rcport to Field-Marshal von Rundstedg who would
givc me commana of an army coqps in the West." Keitel told
me to wait half-an-hour. Aficr sceing the Fiihrer, he camc
back and told me I could go.
During our conversation, this timc Keitel spoke of- von
Klrg., and remarkod that thcy had documentary cvidcncc
about his treasonablc activities. Kcitcl said that they had inter-
ccpted a wirelcss message from some Allied H.Q, whid
aslcd to bc put in touch with von Klog.. Keitcl addcd: "And
that's why f,c was missing so long that day near Avranc,hcs."
Protcsting that this srxpicion was unjusg I related how von
Klogp Md been forccd-to ake cover, and how he had been
uoa6lc to get in toud with his own H.Q. for hours, bccausc
his wireless tender had bcen knocked out But it was obvious
that Keitel did not believc this explanation.
I also paid a call on lodl bcfore leaving. Iodl said-to mg
without in.fiog hands: 'fiat seems to bc a bad show of
yours in the W-est" I retortod: "It might bc wcll for you to
iome yoursclf and have a look at the situation." |odl was snu'
prised-to hear that I was gorng oq lcavg that evcning.
- Aftcr that I wcnt back io Kiitcl's train to pi*' up my bag
Eage. An orderly thcre gave mc a botde of cla,rct to akc ac?y,
id*t qg at the samc-time: "\ilherc you had brcakfast thir
norning you wce ritting in thc same scat whcrc Coloocl
 TIIB ANfr-rilIr.rB D!.qf-AS sSEtr IBOM tr.Q. IN WBSr 4l
Stieff last saC' I fdt that I hed had a lucky cscapc. Evco
after I reached my home at lvlarburg I still jumped when the
telephonc rang. I did not bcgin to fcel at case until I got ba*
to the front, and took oycr couuDatrd of my ncw corps. An
underlying anxiety continucd.
From thcn on to the end of thc war many of us fclt that
we were undcr a cloud of suspicion In IvIardL ro4t whcn I
yas cogganding,the army in Holland, I reccived a tclcgram
from O.K.W. tclling me to report at oncc the whcreabouc
of my family. That sounded ominous-as if they ,ight bc
I
takcn as hosagcs. looked at the map and saw thit thc
American forces werc approaching tvlarburg4cing already
Icss than sixty miles away. So I didnt send an answer to this
I
tclegaml felt that my family would bc safcr with tLc
Americans.

Ftj- the night of luly zoth onwards the Gcrman gencrals

oftcn uscd to disctss among thcmsclves whethcr thclshould
gct in toud with the Allies-as von Kluge had thoqght d
doing that cvening when he thought Hidcr was dead, Ttc
reasons that chccked thcm from doing so wcrc:
(r) Ihe oath of loy"ky to the Fiihrcr. (m.y oow argucs
*\ilc gavc otr oath of loyalty to thc Fiihrcr. If he is
dead that is cancellcd." So most of thcm want to bc-
licve that he is dead.)
(z) The pcople in C,ermany had not rcalizd thc truth
of the situation, and would not undcrstand any action
thc gcncrals took towards mating pcace"
O Th. troops on thc East front would rcproach thc Wc*
front for Lttiog thcm down"
(+) th. fcar of going doum to history as traitors to thcir
country.
 XIX
HITLER'S LAST GAMBLE-THE
SECOND ARDENNES STROKE

N lIrE DAXK, FOGGT MORNTNG OB DECEMBER t6, 19,44, T?,'8

I German Army struck in the Ardennes. The blow carne as
a shock to the Allies, for some of their highest commanders
had been confidendy saying that the Germans would never
be capable of anothei offensive. It soon became a greater $o&,
for thl blow burst tbrough the American front in the Ardennes
and threatened to sever the Altied armies. Alarm spread b+
hind the frong and was worse still in the Allied capitals. It
was like a nightmare. Fears were voiced that the Germans
might reactr thi Channel coast, and produce a second Dunkirk.
Ii was Hitler's last big gambl*and the rashest of all.
Everything looked very-ditferent from the German end of
the telJscop.] Th. offensive was not only a longodds chancg,
but an inciedible muddle. The Allies spoke of it as the "Rund'
stedt offensive." That title acts on Rundstedt like the proverbial
red rag, for his feeling;s about the plan were, and remain, very
bitter. ln reality he f,ad nothing to do with it excePt in the
most nomin.l -"y. Having failed to dissuade Hitler from
attempting it, and feeling that it was a hopeless venture, he
stoodback throughout and left Field-Marshal Model to run it.
The decision was entirely Hitler's own, and so was the
strategic plan. It would have been a brilliant brain'wave ff
272
 ETI,ER:S L.AS[ GAMBI,E-{IIB SECOND ANDEI{NES SIR.OKE 273

he had still poscssed the forces and resources to gwe it a fair

c.hance of suicos in the end. That it gained . rtitling initial
success wrylargply due to tactics suggested by the young Gen
cral von Manteufrel-+n srtDy cornrnander at forty+even-
who persuadcd Hitler to ad6pt them. Hitler oro,ild nevcf,
listen to-the argumcnts of the-oldcr generals, whom he dis,
tnrsted but he had a vcry dillerent ittitude towards newer
men and ideas. He regardod Manteufiel as onc of his discov-
eries. He loved revolutionary ideas.
The surprise achieved at the start dso owed much to the
extreme secrecy io whi& the design had been hidden. But
this was carried so far that it became more hindrancc than
help. It caused many of the muddles which forfeited such
chance as the attac,k gained. But long after the plan had mir
carried Hider insisted on purzuin& the atack" He forbade
any timely withdrawal. If the Allies had movcd quicker, his
gryes_ might have been trapped. Even as it was-they were
badly hammered. The loses they suffcred were fatal-to the
prospects of the continued defence of Germany.
It is instructive to follow tte course of events through the
eyes of some of the chid German co--anders concerncd.
At the top cane Rundstedt, who had been restorcd to his
old place as Commander-in4hief in the West early io S.p
tember-when the Allies were approactring the R[ine, and
Hider needed a symbol that would rally the confdence of
his shattered armi&. Under Rundstedt came Modcl, who was
not a great strategist, but who had a ruthless energy in scrap
ing up reserves from a bare cupboar4 and was one of the
few generals who dared to argue with Hitler. Modcl com.
mitted suicide at the end of the war. Under Model cr-e the
two Panzer Ar.y commanders, Sepp Dieuich and Manteufiel.
Sepp Dietrictr was ao S.S. leader, formerly a rolling stone in
various business jobs, who had caught Hitler's fancy by
his aggressive spirit Rundstedt regarded him as responsible
for fumbling the crucial part of thi ofiensive. Manteufiel war
 274 rHE GERMAN GENERJIT,S TAr,B-

a professional soldier of the youngtr school, and an aristocrat

Aman of quiet dig*ty, similar to Rundstedt's, he was also
a dynamic exponenl of new methods. Within a ycar f. Fd
riseir from command of a panzcr division to command of an
Arry. Bcsides beiog the dCIigner of the tactics of the fu'
dcnnes ofiensivg it was his thrust that proved by far the mct
threatcning feature. For these reasons I give the story lTgFly
in his words, checked and supplemented by evidence gathered
from other sources.
lvlantcufiel is keenly professional enough to enjoy "6ghting
"
his battlcs over again in discussion, whilc philosophical
enough not to dwcll disproportionately on how thingp went
wrong. He has a pleasant vein of humour, too. It surrived
the h-ard conditions of thc camp where ttre generals wcre
then confine4 as well as the suain of arxiety whici all d
them felt about the fate of thcir families, and whether thcy
would ever sce them again. That ctreerless camp deep in a
rcmote mountain vdley was depresing enough even with-
out thc barbed wirg to induce claustrophobia Visiting it on
one of the &eariest of mid-winter days, I remarked to Man'
teufiel that Grizedale was not a pleasing place at such a time
of the year, but that it would bc bctter in summcr. He rcplcd,
with a smilg, "Oh, it might be worse. I expca wc shall bc
spcnding next wintcr on a barrea islad or clse in a ship
anc.horcd in Eid-Atlanticl

TIIE PI./IN

"The plan for the Ardennes offensivd'Manteuffcl told mg

"was drawn up completely by O.K.W. and sent to us as a
cut and dried Fiibrer order.' The object defincd was to
actrierre a decisive victory in the \trest by throwing in trro
ganzer armies-the 6th under DietridL and thc :th u"4o
me. Tte 6th was to strike north<ast, cross the Mcuse bc-
rweetr Li6ge and Huy, and drive for Antrrerp.. It had the
main 16lg ad main strength. My army was to advance.l*g
e more cuning linq cros the Meuse bctneen Namru'and
 HITLB,'S gASf cAldBLSrrtIIB SE@![D AIDENNES SIAOKE ZT5

Dinant, and push towards Brusscls-to covcr the flank. Oo

the third or fourth day thc r5;th Army, using the specidly
rcinforced rzth S.S. C.orps under Gcncril Blumentritrwas to
make a converging tbnrst from the northrast towards the
Meuse at lvfeastrictrt-to assist the 6th Panzcr fumy's drive on
Aot*.{p. Thc Fiihrer's idea was that the Ardennes oIfensivc
would by then have drawn ofi a largc part of the reservcs to
E nap -of the Americans, so that this sccondary -
strokg
although lighter, should have a chance of succes.
"l!s aim of the whole oficnsive was, by ctrtting ofi thc
&itish Ar-y from its bases of supply, to force it to crncuate
the ContincnC'
Hidcr imagincd that if he produced this second DunkirL,
Briain would virnrally &op out of the war, and he would
havc-brcathing-sp1f to hold up thc Russia$ and produce
a stalemate in thc East
Rundstcdt told me: "When I receivcd this plan carly in
-con-
Novembcr I was staggered. Hidcr had not troubled to
sult me about its possibilities. It was obvious to mc that the
available forces wcre far too small for such an cxtremcly
ambitious plan. Model took the same view of it as I did. I;
frct, no soldier hlieved that the aim of reachins Antrrcro
was really praaicablc. But I knew by now it wai usel.ss t'b
prgtest to Hitler aF.ut the posihlity of anything. After con-
sulation with Model and Manteuffcl I fdt ihat the onlv hooe
wiur to wcan Hitler from this fanastic aim bv puttins t6rwaia
ln dternative proposal that might appeal t; Iiiq aid would
bc more practicable. This walfor i limited offensive with
the eim of pinctring ofi the Allics' salient around Aachen."
Manteuffel gave mc a fuller account of their discussion and
conclusions. "We were agreed in or objections to the plan
In the fust placc the strategic dispositions were faultyr'and
there would bc grave risk to thC fl^"Ls unless therc were
buttressed.- Bcyond that, the ammunition supplies were not
suficicnt for such cxtensive aims. Beyond -t[at aEain" the
Allies'air nrpcriority would be too gfbt a handidp in at-
tempting such aims. Moreovcr, we &ncw that strong AlliGd
 q6 TIIE GERMAN GENERAIS TALT-

reinforccments were available back in France, and also in

I
England. myself stressed the point that we must exPect
intervention from the airborne divisions that were ready in
England. I also emphasized how the good netrnork of roads
bey-ond the Meuse would facilitate the Allies' counter-moves.
"We drafted a report to O.K.W. emphasizing that the
forces were not adequate to deliver an oflensive on the lines
laid down. At the same time we suggested a modified plan.In
this, the r5th Army, with a strong right fank, would deliver
an attack north of Aachen, towards Maastricht The 6th
Panz,q Ar.y would attack south of Aachen, and cut in
bfnind that place with the eventual objective of establishing
a bridgehead ovcr the Meuse in the Li6ge area. The main
aim here was to fix the Allies' attention. The 5th Panzer
Army would strike from the Eifel through the Ardennes
towards Namur, with the eim of gaining a bridgehead there.
The armies would then turn inward and roll up the Allied
position dong the Meuse. If opposition seemed to be col-
lapsing, they could exploit their success by an advance towards
Annrerp, but otherwise they could limit their risks."
The most that they really hoped, Manteuffel said, was
to pinch out the American forces that had pushed beyond
Aachcn as far as the River Roer. But he would have pr+
ferred to wait until the Allies started a fresh offensive, and
keep dl the German armoured forces in hand for the deliv-
ery of a concentrated counter-stroke. Rundstedt was of the
same opinion, as Blumentritt independendy confumed-"fL'he
Field-Marshal was really against any further offensive on our
part His idea was to defend the Roer and hold all the ar-
moured divisions in readiness behind that line, as a powerful
reseile for counter-attack against a break-through. He wanted
to pursue a ddensive strategy."
Since Hitler rejected such an idea, the only hope seemed
to lie in subtly inducing him to modify his offensive design
to a form that would offer a ctrance of moderate success with.
out involving too heavy risks.
Manteufiel explained that the scop and direction of the
 HrTr.ER s LAST GAMEr.E-TIIB SE@ND AnDENNES SIAOKE I77
thruss suggested was enough to Hitler's design as to
-close
appear not so vcry different In putting forward thc dtern+
tile plan, they tried to increase its appeal by suggesting thag
if opposition seemd to be collapsing,-they ioukl.-then &pbit
-November
the success towards Antwerp. "On 4, so far as I
remember, this dternative plan was sent to OJLW. for sub.
mision to Hider. It was emphasized that we could not be
ready to laund the attack bdore Decembcr ro-Hider had
originally fixed the date as December r."
lvlanteufrel went on: "flider rejected this more moderate
plan, and insisted on the original pattern. Meanwhilg know-
ing that he usudly kept us waiting for an answer we had
begun our own planning$ut only on the narrower basis of
our o\iln propouls. All the divisions of my own 5th Panzer
Army were assemble4 but kept widely spaced, betrreen Trier
and Krefeld-+o that spies and the civil population should
F* go inkling of what \ras intended. The uoops were told
that _they were hing got ready to meet the coming Allied
attac.k on Cologne. Ooly a vcry linited number of saE o6cers
were informed of the actud planJ'
The 6th Panza Army was assembled still farther badr, in
the area benrcn Hanovcr and the Wcser. Its divisions had
bcen drawo out of the line to recuperatc and be re+quipped.
Curiously, Sepp Detric.h was not informed of the tas[lhat
was intended f6 him nor consulted about the plan he would
have to carry out, until much closcr to the event Most of the
divisional commandcrs had only a fcw days' noticc" In the
case of Manteuffcl's Army, the move down to the starting linc
was made in three nighre.

TIIE FLI\TS

This strategic camouflage h.lpd su4nise, but a heavy price

was paid for the €xtreme internd secrecy. C,ommandcir-who
weriinformed so latc had too linle tini to srudy thcir orob
tem, reconnoitrc the ground, and matc thclr prcfaratloni. er
a result Eany things wcrc wcrloo&d aod numcrour hite.hcs
 46 rrrr GERMAI{ cEI{ERAts rAlK-
occunod whcn the attac.k began. Hitler had worked out thc
plan at his headquarters in deail, with |odl, and secmcd to
lnint tnat this woutd su6ce for its fulfilmene He paid no
attention to locd conditions or to the individud problems of
his exccuants. He \tras equally optimistic about the nccds of
the forccs cngaged.
Run&tcdt-rcmarked: 'lfhere were no adcquarc reinforco
Ecnts, no supplies of ammunition, and dthough the nrrmber
of armoured-divisions ** hrgh, their strcngth in tanks was
low-it was largely papcr strength." (Manteuffel said that
the actual number of tanks in the two Panzer armies was
about 8ewhictr puts a different complexion on the Alliod
statcmeot, based on the numbcr of divisiorrs, that this was
the most powcrful concentration of tanks ever scen in the
war.)
The worst deficiency of dl was in petrol. Ivlanteulfd said:
"Iodl had assured us therc would be suficient peuol to de-
vclop our full strcngth and carry our drive through. This
assurance proved completely mistaken. Part of the trouble
was that O.f.W. wor[ed on a mathematicd and stercotyped
calculation of the amount of petrol required to move a
division for a hundrcd kilometres. My expcricnce in Russia
had taught me that double this scale was rcally needed undcr
battlefield conditions. Iodl didn't understand this.
"Taking account of the exua diftculties likely to !c met
in a winter batde in such difficult country as thc Ardenncg
I told Hider persondly that five times the standard scale of
peuol supply ought to be provided. Actually, when the of-
Iensive was launched, only one and a half times the standard
scale had been provided. Worse still, much of it was kept tm
far bac.k, in large lorry columns on the east bank of the Rhine.
Once the toggy weather cleared, and the Allied air forccs
came into action, its forwarding was badly interrupted."
The troops, ignorant of dl these underlying weaknesseg
k pt remarkable trrust in Hider and his a$urances of victory.
"
Rundstedt said: 'The morale of the troops taking part was
 IIEI,ER'S L\S! GAMBIA-{HA S8@ND ANDENNES SITOTB Z?I)

astonishingly htgh at thc start of the oficnsive. 'fhey rcally

bclievcd victory was posibl*unlikc the highcr comdaodcri,
who tnew the frcts."

NIXtr TACIICT

At the sarb the chances wcre improrred by two factors. thc

first was the thinncss of the emerican ddcnces in the Ar.
dennes scctor. The C'crmans had good information about thic,
agd knew that only fotu divisions covcrcd the 6milc atrctctr
of frone It was Hider's kcen scnsc of the vdtrc of thc un-
expccted whici lcd him to qploit this wcakness, and io
indication that the Allid High Comnand was unprcpard,-
despitg tE loryo of rg4rfor a largo.scalc Gcmai oEcnsivc
in such difiarlt coutrtry.
fhe sccond favourable frctor I"y io the actics that wctc
adoptcd. Thesc werc not parr of thc origind plan. lvlantarftcl
told me: "\lVhcn I saw Hitlcr's ordcrs for the oficnsive I war
astonished to find that thae cvcn laid dorrn the method aod
timing of the atack. The anillcry \pas to opcn firc et 1,go L.M.,
and the iof-try assault w:N to bc launched at rr e.ra Bc.
twecn thcsc hours thc Luftwaffc w:ls to bomb hcadquartcrr
and communications. tte atmourcd divisions wcre-nd to
strikc urtil the had becn achicved by the in
fantry mas. Thc anillay was spread ovcr the whblc &ont
of attack"
*This scemed to me foolish in ecverd lespea$
so I immo.
diatdy workcd out a,diffcrcnt mcthod, anii cxplained it to
-sarcastically:
Model. Model agrd with i6 but rcmarkod
You'd htter arguc it out with the Fiibrer.' I rcpliod: 'All
right, fll do that if you'U comc with mc.' So on-Dcccmbcr
a the two of us \rent to sec Hidcr in Bertin.
'I bcgan by saying: 'I.Ione of us knows what thc wcathcr
will bc on the &y of the attac&--arc yort sure the Lufnrafic
can fulfil its part in face of the Allicd air supcriorityP' I rc
minded Hider of two occasions io thc Vosgcs carlicr whcre it
 2b TtrB GERM N GENERALS TAr,K-

had proved quite impossible for the armoured divisions to

.or.'in daylight. Thin I went on: 'All our art{lery will do
et 7.3o is t6 wake the Americans<nd they will then have
thrce and a half hours to organize their counter-measures
before our assault comes.' I pointed out dso, that the mass
of the German inftotty was not so good as it had been, and
was hardly capable of making such a deep penetration as was
required, Lspelidty in such difrcult country. fo-t -.h. Ameri.
cai defences consisted of a chain of forward defence posts,
with their main line of resistance well hhind-and that
would be harder to pierce.
"I proposed to Hiiler a number of changes. The 6rst was
that the assault should be made at 5.3o e-rra., under cover of
darkness. Of course this would limit the targets for the artil'
lerv. but it would enable it to concentrate on a number
of
'key targetFsuch as batteries, ammunition dumps, and
headquarteis-that had been definitely located.
"seiondly, I proposed to form one 'storm battalion'from
cach infaniry division, composed of the most exPert oficers
and men. (i pic*.ed the oficers myself.) These ttorm bat-
alions were io advancc in the dark at 5.3o, without any
covering artillery fire, and Pcnetrate between the Americans'
fonn'ard'defenci posts. They would avoid fighting if possible
until they had peneuated deeP
"searchlightsfprovided by the fak units, w€re t9 light the
way for the storm troops' advance by proiecting their bcams
on'the clouds, to reflect downwards. I had been much im'
pressed by a demonstration of this kind which I had seen
ihortly bdorehand and felt that it would- b. S" key -to-.1
quick'penetration before daylight." (Curiously, JvIanleutI-el dld
not s.im aware that the British had already developed such
"artificial moonlight." And although he spoke to me of the
impression made on hi- by a litde book of mine, The Fututc
of-Infanty, which appeared ln 196z, he had forgotten that
this new developmeni was one of the principal suggestions
in that book.)
 HTII,xn,'s L/IST GAMEI.B{IIB sEcOND AnDENNES SIRor,E z8T
Resuming his accoung }vlantarffel said: "After setting forth
my alternative proposals to Hider, I argued that it w.N not
posible to caffy out thc offensive ir *y other way if we were
to have a reasonable chance of success. I emphasized: 'At 4
p.u. it will be dark. So you will only have 6ve hours, after
the assault at rr A"M., in which to achieve the break-through.
It is very doubtful if you can do it in the time.,If you adopt
my idca, you will gain a further 6ve and a hdf hours for the
pu{pose. Then when darkness comes I can launch the tanks.
They will advance during the night, pass through our in-
f*tty', and by dawn the next day they will be ablc to launch
their own attacl on the main position, along a cleared ap
proach."
According to Manteuffel, Hitler accepted these suggpstions
without a murmur. That was significant. It would seem that
he was willing to listen to zuggestions that were made to hinl
by a few generals in whom he had faith-Model was anothcr
-{ut he had an instinctive distrust of most of the senior
generals, while his reliance on his own immediate stafi was
mingled with a redization that they lacked experiencc of
battle conditions.
'Keitel, IodL and \Marlimont had never been in the war.
At the same time their lac;k of fighting experience tended to
makc them underrate practical dificulties, and encourage
Hider to believe that thingp could be done that were quitc
impossible. Hider would listen to soldiers who had fighting
experience, and praaical idcas."
What these taaical &angcs did to improve the prospects of
the offensive was offseg however, by a reduction of the
strength that was to be put into it. For the executive com-
manders soon had damping news that part of the forces
promised them would not be available-owing to the men-
acing pressure of the Russian attacks in the East. The rezult
was that Blumentritt's converging attack on Maastricit had
to be abandoned so leaving the Allies free to bring down
reseryes from the north. Moreover, th.lh Ar-y, whic,h was
 z&z TrrB GERMAN GENTRATS rAr.t-
to advance 6 flrnk cover to the other wing of the offensivg
was ldt with only a few divisions+nd without any anks.
lvlanteuficl was thc morc dismayed to hcar this, becausc he
had told Hidcr, on the znd, that in his view the Americans
would launctr thcir main countcr+troke from the Sedan arca
towar& Bastogne "I pointed out thc way that so many of
the roads converged on Bastognc.'
Ya thc ambitious aims of the offensive were not modificd.
Curiously, too, Hider and ]odl did not seem to realizc thc
cficct on thc momcnom of the advance. "The time of reacb
ing thc Meuse was not discused it *y detailr" Manteuffel
told me. "I i-ag'ned that Hitlcr must realizc that a rapid
advance would not bc possible under winter conditions, and
thesc limitations, but from what I have heard since it is clcar
that Hider thought the advance could go much quic.kcr than
it did. The Meuse could not possibly havc been reached on
the sccond or third day+s Jodl cxpected. He and Keitel
tcnded to encourage Hider's optimisli6 illusions"
Rundstedt receded into the background after Hider's rc.
icction of the "s'nellef'plan, leaving Model and Mantorfid
-who
had more ctrancc of influencing Hida, to fight for the
to&nical ci*go in the plan that were dl Hider would
considcr. Blumcnritt bitterly remarked: "Tte Commander-
in€hid in the'West was nog in fact, consulted any more.
Hc was cxpected to carry out thc ofiensive in a mc&anical
way in accordancc with the Fiihrcr's opcration ordcrs-which
regularcd the smallest details-without being able to inter-
fcrl in any way himself." Rundstedt took only a nominal part
in the final conferencg held on Dccembcr rzth in his hcad-
quartcrs at Zegenberg near Bad Nauheim" Hidcr was PreF
cnt, and controlld the procecdings.

IIIB MISSING CTXD

As the start of one of my talls with Manteuffel I raised a

qucstion about the use of thc airborne forces. I said that in
 IIr[IB's ITIIT GAMEI.B#IIIB s8@!TD Ail,ENNEs slaor8 E3
travelling over a L"gp p.rt of the Ardenncs beforc thc war
I had been stnrck by thc faa that its possibilitia for tank
To1eTent-were grcater {an was gencrally supposcd opa.
dy by thc conventiondly-mindeilFrcnc.h high comnand.
At thc sane time thcre was aa obvious dift*lry in thc way
that thc roads dcsccndd into stccp vallcys at tht rivcr crooi
ings, and thesc might form tough obsacles if stoutly dc.
fendcd. It had sccmed to rne that ihe oficnsivc aurwcr t6 tnis
ddensivc problcm was to drop airborne forccs on thcse stra.
tegic defiles, and seizc them a[ead of the tank advancc. That
was why io -y commentarl whcn thc Ardennes ofiensive
opened I had assumed that the Gcrmans \il'crs using thcir
airborne
-troops
in rhis way. But it now appcared thit thcy
did not do so. Could hc,Ivlanrflficl, tclt mi-somcthing aborit
this.
lvfanteufrd's reply was: "I entirely agree with your de6ni-
tion of the nanre and problem of thc Ardcnncs, and I think
it would havc been an excellent idea to use parachute forccs
h the way you suggejt h might havc unlocked the door. But
I dont remcmbcr it hing mooted whcn the plan was bcrng
disarssed and in aoy case the availablc paradute forces weri
ycry scanty. Otr parachutc forccs wcrc hampcred by a short-
age_of transport aircraft, above dL but 6y a Ia& of mcn
"ho Thc daneerotrg
at the time whcn this offensivc was launched.
situation on the Eastern front had led Hitler to usc tf,.- .t
ordinary inf*try', to cement breactrcs. Other divisions had
been drawn away to Italy and absorhd in the baule thera
The result of dl these factors was that only about nine hundrod
parachutists were availablc for the Ardennes ofiensivg and
they were gyd on thc front of the 6th Panzcr Army."
Mantcuffd went on to talL of the neslect to makc anv
cficaive use of Gamany's parachute forc& after the optoti
of Crete in r9r4r-how they had been earmarked for a strokc
against Mdta or Gibralar whic.h never came ofi; how Snrdent
had wanted to rur,hJ^ io Russb and had been thwaned by
Hitlcr's prefcrencc for koqping them in rescrve for somt
 284 TrrE GERMAN GENEn.eT.s rAlK-
special coup; and how, in the end, they had been frittered
away in the rdle of ordinary ground troops instead of bcing
employed in their o\rn proper r6le. He concluded by saying:
"Io -y view, there could be nothing beuer than a combina-
tion of panzer and parachute troops."
On this subject Thoma told me, earlier: "Guderian dways
worked well with Student, who uained the parachute forces,
but Goering blocked proposals for combined action with the
prnzer forces. He always wanted to keep up the suength of
the Lufnnaffe, and was therefore niggardly with such air
transport as he had to provide for the paraciute forces."
From General Snrdent I got details of how the paractrute
troops were employed in the Ardennes offensive. When the
German front in France collapsed and the Allies dashed for-
ward into Belgium, at the beginning of Septembcr, he was
sent to form a fresh front in southern Holland. For this pur-
pose he was given command of a scratch force that was
imposingly named the rst Parachute At.y. It consisted of a
number of depleted inf*try divisions supplemented by a
sprinkling of parac.hute units that were then in course of
training under hirn. ffisi the new front had been established,
and the Allied advance checked, the German forces in Hol-
land were constituted as fumy Group 'Hr' comprising the
rst Paradute fumy and the still more newly created z5th
Ar-y. Snrdent was given command of this army group in
addition to his other funaion of Commander-in-Chid of the
Parachute Forces.
On Decembcr 8th he was told of the intended olfensive in
the Ardennes and instruaed to collect what he could in the
way of trained parachutists in order to furnish one strong
battalion. That was barely a week before the offensive was
Iaunc"hed. The battdion comprised about rooo men under
Colonel von dcr Heydte, and it was sent to the sector of Sepp
Dietrictr's 6th Panzir fu.y. On geuing in touch with tire
Luftwa(fe command von der Heydte fotrnd that more than
half thc crcws of thc aircraft dlottod had no cxpcriencc of
 IITIJR:S UIST GAMBLEJTITE SE@ND ABDENNES sTl,oKE 85
parachute operations, and that necessary equipment was lack-
_ing. ft
was
_not until the r3th that he managcd to see Sepp
Dietrich, who said that he did not want to use paradute
!r*pr fol f.* that they might givc the enemy a warning
but that Hider had insisted
The task eventually assigned to thc parachute troops was,
not to scize one of the awkward defiles ahcad of the panzer
advance, but to land on Mont Rigi near the lvfalmedy-Eupen-
Verviers goss-roads, and create a fank block to delay Afued
reinforcements from the north. Von der Heydte was-ordered,
despite his protests, to make the drop at night instcad of at
dawn, to avoid putting the enemy on the alert. But on the
evening before the atack the promised transport did not
arrive to take the companies to the affields, and the &op was
posEoned until the next night-when the ground attacL had
already startcd. Theo, onlla third of the-aircraft managed
to reach the correct dropping zong and the strong wind
dragged the parachutes so that many of the troops weri killod
or injured in landing on the woodcd and snow<overed
heights. By thir timc the roads were filled with American
columns streaming souttr, and as von der Heydte bad only
bcen able to collect a couple of hundred mcn he could not
gain the cross.roads and cstablish a blocking position For
several days he harasscd the roads with small raidiog prrtio,
and then, as thcre was no srgn of Scpp Dictrich's forles ar-
riving to relieve him, he tried to push eastward to mect them,
but was captured on the way.
'1fhis was our last para&ute operatiod' said Studcnt 'On
Dday we had had r5o,om para&ute tr*p$ and six organized
divisions. Of the total 5o,ooo wcre traine4 and the resi under
uaining. Wc were not able to complctc their training as they
were constantly committed to ground fighting and by thl
time they were nceded for the Ardcnncs offensivg five months
hter, only a handful were available4ccause they had bccn
uggd up as infaotry instead of bciog kept for their proper
r6le.t
 2ffi TIIB GEBMAI{ GEIIERAI.S TAI,T-

TIIE BLO\ilT

The blow that gave the Allies their biggest shock since r94z
had no suci weight behind it as they pictured at the timc.
That is now clear from the German order of batde, though
Murteufiel did not emphasize it-hc gave his account with
marked restraint, and is the type sf man who dislikes to oficr
cxcuses, however justifiable.
The ofiensive was launctred on December r6th along a
e strctctr betrveen Monschau (south of Aachen)
and Echternach (just north-west of Trier). But the 7h Arm/s
attac*, on thc southern sector did not really count, as it could
only employ four infantry divisions. The inten{ed mainpund
was delivered on a narrow front, of barely fifteen miles, by
Sepp Dieuid's 6th Patzer At-y, which was comPosed of
thilst and znd S.S. Panzer Corps, supplemented by the QTth
Corps (of infantry). Although it had more armoured divisions
than thc 5th Panzer Ar-y it was a light-weight for its purposc.
Sepp Dietrich's right-hand punch was blockcd early by thc
Americans'tough ddence of Monschau. His left-hand punch
burst through and, by-passing Malmedy, gained a crossing
over thc Ambleve beyond Stavelot on thc rSth-after a thirty-
mile advance from the starting line. But it was checked in
this naffsn, defile, and then cornered by* American couoter-
move. Fresh efforts failed, in face of the Americans' rising
strurgth as reserves were hurried to the scene, and the 6th
Patrzes Army's attac.k fizzled out
Manteufiel's 5rh Panzer Army attacked on a broader front,
of some thirty miles. He sketched out for me its dispositions
and course The 66th Corps (of infantry) was on his right
wing, facing in the direaion of St. Vith. "It was purposely
put there because thc obstacles were greater, and the chances
of rapid progress less, than farther sou6." The 58th Panza
C.rpr was in the centre, between Priim and Waxweiler. The
47rh Panz.u C.orps was on the left, between Waxweiler and
 IITIIB'S LAIIT GAMEI,B{IIB SE@IID AnDENNES slaorB *7
Bitburg facing the direction of Bastogne. At the start these
two coqps included only three armoured divisions, and despitc
rcccnt reinforccmcnt the latter only had a strength of -be.
twccn sixty to a hun&ed tanks cactr--one third d a half of
their normal establishmcnt &pp Dicuich's atmourod di,
visions werc not much stroDger in tanks.
On Manteufrel's front the ofiensive had a sood start "Mv
stonn batalions infiltrated rapidly into the i,ncrican frorit
-likc raindrops. At 4 o'clock in thc aftcrnoon the tankr
{vagccd and prcscd forward in the dark with the help of
'ardficiat moonlighC By that time bridges had been Suilt
over the Our river. Crosing thcse about midnight, the ar-
mourcd divisions rcached the Amcrican main position, at
8, .r.rra, thcn called for artillery supporr, and quickly brokc
through"
"But Bastogne then proved a vcry awkward obstacle. Part
of the trouble was due to the way that th. 7th Army had
been rcduccd in suength, for its task was to block the-roads
nurning up from tte south to Bastogne." After crossing thc
Our at Dasbrug the +Zth Panzcr Corps had to g.t tbroogh
another awlward de6le at Clervaux on the Woltz. Th&
obstacleq combioed with winter conditions, caused delay.
"Resistancc tended to melt whcnever the tanks arrivd in
fo:c.g but the dificulties of movemcnt offset thc slightncss
of the resistance in this eady sage. Whcn they approac.hod
Bastogne resistance incrcased."
On the r8th, the Germans came close to Bastogne<fter an
advance of nearly thirty miles from their starting line. But
during the night bdore, General Eisenhower had-placed the
8znd and rorst Airborne divisians, then near Rheimg at
C'cocrd Bradley's disposal Thc Sznd was sent to stiffcn the
northern sector, while the rorst was nrshed up by road to
Bastogue. Meanwhile part of the roth U. S. fumourcd Di.
vision had arrivcd at Bastogne just in time to help a battered
regimcnt of the z8th Division in checking the Germans'initial
threat-'When the rorst Airborne Division arrived ol1the night
 288 rrrB GERMAN GENERALS rALK-
of the r8th, the defence of this vital road<entre was cemented.
During the next trvo days thrusts were made against it, from
front and flanks, but all were foiled.
On the eoth Manteullel decided that no more time rnust
be lost in ttyi"g to clear away this obstacle. "I went forward
myself with the Panzq Lehr Division, led it round Bastogne,
and pushed on to St. Hubert on the 2rst. The znd Panzer
Division pushed round the north side of Bastogne. To cover
these by-passing advances I masked Bastogne, using the z6th
VolksgrenadierDivision to surround the town, with the help
of a panzer grenadier regiment from the Panzer Lehr Dt
vision. The 58th Panzer Corps meanwhile pressed on tbrough
116ufialize and Laroche, after momentarily swinging north to
tbreaten the fank of the resistance that was holding up the
66th C,orps near St. Vith, and help it forward.
"Even so, the masking of Bastogne entailed a weakening
of my strength for the forward drive, and thus diminished
the c.hances of this reaching the Meuse at DinanL Moreover,
the Zth Army was still back on the Wilta which it had not
been able to cross. The 5th Paraciute Division, on its right,
came through my sector and pushed forward close to one of
thc roads running south from Bastogne, but was not across
ic'
The situation was nolr less favourablc, and potentially
more dangerous than Manteuffel redized. For Allicd re.
scrves were gathering on all sides in a strength much exceed-
ing that which the Germans had put into the offensive.
Field-Marshal Montgomery had taken over t€mporary charge
of dl the forces on thc north fank of the breach, and the
3oth British Corps had been brought down to the Meuse, as
a support to the rst American Ar-y. On the south fank of
the breactr two corps of General Patton's 3rd American Army
had swung northward, and on the zznd one of them launched
a strong attack up the road from Arlon to Bastogne. Al-
thorgh its advance was slow, its menacing pressure caused
 IIrTI.xN,t LASI GAMBLE-TIIE SECOND ABDE}INES SI?,OKB 89
an increasing subtraction from the forccs that lvlanteulfd
could spare for his own advance.
Th9 days of oppornrnity had passed. Itdanteulfel,s swew.
ing thrust towards thc Meuse caused alarm at Allied Head-
quar-ters, lut it was too late to be redly serious. According
t9 plan, Bastogne wan to have becn giincd on the secooi
day, whcreas-it
ryas-
not readed rurtil the thir4 and not by-
passed until the sixth day. A "small firg*" of the znd panz&
Division came within a few miles of Dinant on the z4th,
but that was tte utmost limit of progress, and the finger was
soon cut off.
Mud and fuel shortage had becn imporant brakes on the
advance-<wing to
tac& of petro! only half the artillery could
be brought into action. Thit deficiency was not compensated
by support While the foggy weather of the opening days
had"it
favoured the German infiltration by keeping tne -eliid
air forces o-n thg ground, this cloak of 6Uscuriryiisappeared
9n the _zSr4 and the scanty resources of the Lufiwafie lroved
incapable of shielding the ground forces from a t:niblc
pummelling. That multiplied the toll for time IosL But Hitler
was also paying forfeit for the decision that had led him to
place his main strcngth on the northern wing, with the 6th
Panzer fuay, whcre room for mrneuvre was much. more
crampcd.
In the first wed the olfensive had fallen far short of
w-ha1 was hoped, and the quickened progress at the starr
of the second-week was illusory-for ii"iy amounted to a
deeper intnrsion between the nrain road-ceirtres, whidi the
Americans were now more firmly holding. On Christmas
Eve, MTteufiel got tbroogh on'the telJphone direct to
Hider's headquarters, to represent the realities of the situation
Td t9 make a proposd.- Speaking to fodl, he emphasized
that time was running short, that Bastogne was dusing a
lot of troublc, that tle Zrh 4r-y was not far enough ior-
ward to cover his flank, and that he expected a massive-Allicd
counter+troke very soon, driving up the roads from the
 ry TtrB GBRMAN GEI{EMIS TALE-

south. 'Trt me knorr this evening what the Fiihrer wan$.

The question is whether I shall use all my strength to oyer-
come Bastogng or continue masking it with small forces
and throw my weight towards the Mcuse.
"I then pointed out that the most we could hope to do was
to reach the Meuse+nd gavc my rcasons. First, becausc of
the delay at Bastogne. Secon4 because th. Zth Ar-y wat too
weak to bar dl roads from the south. Third, bccause aftcr
cight days of batde the Allies werc sure to be on the Meuse
in strength, and it would not be possible to force a crossing
in facc of suong opposition. Fotrth, hcause the 6th Panzcr
Army had not penetrated far, and was already held up o:r thc
line Monschau-Savelot. Fifth, it was clear that we should
have to fight a batde this side of the Meuse. For I had pickcd
up wireless messages from the Allicd Tra6c Control at
Huy, whictr was sending regular reports of the pasage of
rcinforcements acro$ the bridge ther*wc were able to de,
cipher the code."
After tfiag ]vlanteufId made his o\rn proposds-for a cir-
cular stroke northward on the near side of the Meuse, to traP
thc Allied forces that were east of thc rivcr, and swcep the
bcnd dear. This would cstablish the German forces in a
stronger position, which they might hope to hold. "\l[ith
this aim, I urgcd that the whole of my army, reinforced by
thc O.K.rff. reservc and by the 6th Panzer Army's rescrvcst
should be concentrated south of the Ourthe, around Iarochg
and then wheel round in a circtrit past Marche towards
Li6ge. I said: 'Give me thcse reserves, and I will ake Bas-
tope, reach the Mcuse, and swing north, so helping the 6th
I
Panzer Army to advance.' finished by cmphasizing these
points-I must havc a rcply that night; the O.K.W. rescffee
I
must have suficient peuol; would nced aid suPPort UP
till then I had only seen the enemy's aircraftl
"Dtring the night Major |ohannmeier, the Fiihrer's adiu-
tant, visitEd me and after discussion telephoned Iodl. At the
I
cnd came to the telephonc myself, but lodl said that thc
 IIITITE,'S IIIIT GAMEI.B:{ITB SGMIID AXDENNDS SiIaOTA 4I
Fiihrer had not ya made a decision All he could do fon thc
mimctrt w:rs to placc at my dispoal onc additional arnourcd
division
"It was not until thc z6th that thc rcst d the rcserves wcrc
gr"co to me--and then thcy could oot bc movql Ttey wcrc
at a standstill for la& of petrol-etrandod ovcr a straih of a
hun&ed milc*jrst when thry wcne neded.' (T[c irony
of this sinration was that on thc rgrth thc Germans had comt
within about a quarter of a milc of a hugc pctrol dump at
ncar Savdo6 conaining 45or,rw gpllo* It
was e htrndrcd timcs larger thr" the lrrgot of the dumpo they
acttnlly capnred")
I askd lvlantcufrel whcthcr he fdt that rcal sucoe$ would
have becn possible as latc as Dcccmbc z4th=oo if he had
bqn givctr thc roervcs immediatdy, and they had bccn pro
vidd with peuol He replied:'t thinlr a limitd succcst woutd
still have been possible-up to the Marse, and pcrhaps the
epture of bridgeheads bcyond iC'Itr further disasion, how-
cver, he admitted that such a bclated attainmcnt of thc Mcusc
yo ld h4ve brought morc disadvantqge than advantage in
the long rtrn
"rffe had hardly begrrn this lgp push bdore the AIIicd
counter-ofrensive devclopd. I telephoned Iodl and askcd him
to tell thc Fiihrer that I was going to withdraw my advanccd
forces out of the nosc of the salient we had mad+to thc
Iine laroche-Bastogtre. But Hitler forbade thir rt? bads So
instead of withdrawing in timc, wc wcre driven Uacl fit Uy
lit uo$er prryur! of the Allied attadrs, *Ifoiog necdlasly
hory losses. On lanuary Sth thc sinration was so-serious that
I feared Montgomery would cut ofi both otr Armies Al-
though w9 malaged to avoid & fug.r, a largp part of them
were sacrificcd" Our losses werc muc,h hcavi& in Ols lata
Pge +:l thcytad beco carlier, owing to Hitler'c policy of
'no withdrawdj It spclt bantnrptcy, Seusc wc could-nc
afrord snrch lossu.'
 ry IIIB GERMAI{ GENERAI.S TAIX-

AFTERMATII

Manteufiel summed up the last stage of the war in two sen-

tetrces: "After the Ardennes failure, Hider started a 'cor-
poral's war.' There were no big plans<nly a multitude of
piecemeal fights."
I
He went on: "\ilhen saw the Ardennes oflensive was
blocked I wanted to carry out a general withdrawd-fust to
our starting line, and then to the Rhine, but Hider would
not hear of it. He chose to sacriEce the bulk of his main
forces in a hopeless struggle on the West bank of the Rhine.'
Rundstedt endorsed this verdict. But he also made it clear
that, dthough the German Army's leading exponent of of-
fensive warfare, he had never seen any point in this offensivc.
*Eactr step forward in the Ardennes offensive prolonged our
funks more dangerously deep, making them more susceptible
to Allied counter+trokes." Rundstedt uaced the effccg on tte
Eap, as he talked. "I wanted to stop the offensive at an early
sage, when it was plain that it could not atain its aim, but
Hitler furiously insisted that it must go on It was Stalingad
No.2."
The Ardennes offensive carried to the extreme of abnrdity
the military belid that "atta* is the best defence." It proved
thc "worst defence"-wrecking Germany's chanccs of any
furthcr serious resistancc. From that time on, the -ain con-
ccrn of most of the German commenders seerns to have been,
not whcther they could stop thc Allies' advance, but why thc
Allies did not advancc faster and 6nish the war qui&er.
They were tied to their posts by Hitla's policy, and
Himmler's police, but they were praying for release. Through-
out the last nine montbs of the war they spnt much of their
time discussing ways and means of getting in touch with thc
Allies to arrange a surrender.
I
All to whom talked dwelt on the eIlea of the Allics'
"unconditional surrender" lnlicy in prolonging the war. They
 HNI,ER'S IIST GAMBLE-.TTIB SECOITID ATDENNES SIAOTE 2g3
told me that but for this they and their uoops-the factor that
war more important-would have been ready to surrender
soo-ner, separately orcollectively. "Black-listening" to the
Alies' radio service was widespread. But the Allied propa,
-condi.
ganda never said anything poiitive about the peace
tions in the way of encouraging them to give up the strugglc.
Its silence on the subject was so marked thai it tended to
confrm what Nazi propaganda told them as to the dire fatc
in store for them if ihef sirrendered. So it geatly helped the
l,loir to leep the German troops and peoplc to continue
fighting-long aftcr they were ready to give up.
 XX
HITLER_AS A YOTING GENERAL
SAW HIM

rN mIE COITXB OP ONE OF I\,fY TALAS WfnI MANTEUFFEL ABOIIT

l. ,n. Ardennes ofiensive he gavc me a military charactcr'
sketctr of Hitter that diflered markedly from the impression
of him that thc older generals conveyed. It is worth reproduc'
ing because it goes further to explain the sources of both his
pov/cr and his failure.
- The way in which Manteuffel artracted Hider's noticc is
also illuminating. In Augusb ro43, he had been given-com'
mand of the 7:h Armourcd Division-which Rommd had
ld in r94o. It was in Manstein's fu-y Group. That autumn
the Russians surged ovcr the Dnieper and captured Kjev, tlien
rollod on rapidly west towards the Polish frontier. lvlanstein
had no formid r-escrve ldt to meet this fresh crisis, but charged
Manteufiel with the task of collecting such odd units as he
could find for an improvised counter'stroke. Mantzuffel broke
in behind the rear of the advancing Russians, eicaed thet-n
from Zhitomir iunaion by a night attacb and drove on north
to reepture Korosten. By his measre forces into a
number of small mobile'e group8 Manteuttel created an lm-
im-
pression out of ion to nrs
ot ProPoruon and the zudden
his strength, aI
lip** brought the Russian a{vanc9 to- a halt.
After that, lvlanteufiel further developod this mahod of
44
 IIIIIIN-AS A YOI'NG GEIirlNAL SAT HIM rys
raids that cut in bawccn the Rusian columns
and stnr& at thcm from the rear. "It was handicapped by
the Russinns' lac.k of depcndcncc on a normal systcm bf nrp
plH
plFI rever
prr-r met aDy
Dever rtreE ,qpply corruruN
any supply thcse'interiod raiis
columns on tncse'rDtenor' rards
-fut I caught stafr and-sigtral ccntrer bcsidcs srriking bodics
ol trgons in the badr" Therc pmetratiog raids provid very
cffcctive in spreading confuion Of coursg for operations of
this kind an armoured division must b self-conaincd for sup
plies, carrying with it what it nccds, so as to bc free from
dependence on communications during the whole coursc of
the opcration." (It is evident that lt{anteufiel what
Generd (then Brigadier) Hobnrt demonstratd with the rst
Brimde in thc Salisbury
Tank Brigade Salisburv Plain arca in roaa-a<-thoush
r934-35-though
without convincing the British C'cDcrat Srafi that such a forn
of suategy was praaicable.)
Hitler was delightod with thc aew mafiod, and eager to
-hear more about it So he scnt an inviation for lvlanieufiel
and the commandcr of his tank regimcnf Crcloncl Schulta
g spcnd Christmas at his hcadquarters ncar Angerburg in
East Pnrsia. Aftcr congratulating lvlantcufi4 Hitler -said:
"As a Christnas present, I'll givc you fifty ank$"
F,arly in rg44lvlanteullel wu givcn command d a specially
rcinforced divisioq the'Gross.Dartschlandr" and witLthis ht
was sent to diEercnt sectors to check a brea&$rough or to
rclease forces that had beeo trapped by thc Russian tide of
advancc. In September, aftcr he had cuta way through to the
C'crman forces that were hemmcd in on the Baltic coast
round Riga, he was given a bb irmp in pro!rction-to com
mand the Sth Panzcr Army, in thc Wcst-
Throughout 19146 lvlanteuffcl silw more of Hitler thao al-
Eost any other commandcr di4 as Hidcr frequcndy sum.
monod him to his headquartcrs to discus these cmergenc,y
missions and to consult him qa atmonred warfare problcms.
This close contact enabld lvlanteufid to get under the stuface
that terrified or mcsmcrizcd othcr gencrals.
 zfi mrB GERMAN GBNERALs rAr,E-

"Hitter had a magnetic, and indeed hypnotic prsondity.

lhis had a very marked effect on peoplc who went to see
him with the intention of putting forward their views otr any
matter. They would begin to argue their point, bq wou!
gradually 6nd themselves zuccumbing to his persgndity' and
fo the end would often agree to the opposite of what they
intended. For my part, having come to know Hider well in
the last stages of the war, I had learned how to kcep him t9,
the point, and maint.io my own argumenl I did not feel
afraid of Hider, et so many were. He oftcn called me to his
headquarters for consultation, after that Christmastide I had
spent at his headquarters by invitation, following the suc,
cesdul stroke at Zhitomir that had attracted his attention"
"Hitler had read a lot of military literature, and was dso
fond of listening to military lectures. In this way, coupled
with his personil experience of the last war as an ordinary
soldier, he had gained a very good knowledge of the lowcr
level of warfare-the properties of the different weapons; the
efiect of ground and weathcr; the mentality and morale of
troops. He was particularly good in gau$ng how the trools
fclt I found that I was hardly ever in disagreement with his
view when disarssing suc,h mattcrs. On the other hand he
had no idea of the higher suategical and tactical combina-
tions. He had a good grasp of how a single division moved
and fought, but he did not understand how armies operatod."
Idanteuffel then went on to talk of how the "hedgehogf'
system of defence had develope4 and how Hider was led to
carry it too far. "When our troops were being forced back by
the Russian attacks, they were attracte4 as by magnets, towards
the ddended locdities that had been prepared in rear. Falling
back on thesg they found it natural to rdly there, and put up
a shrbborn resistance. Hider was quick to see the value of such
locdities, and the importance of maintaining them. But he
overlooked the need of giving the sector commanders reason-
able latitude to modify their dispositions, and to withdraw if
necessary. He insisted on having the question submitted to
 IImIR-AS A YOTTNG GENEBAL SAW HrM 287
ev.ery g3se: Too often, before he had madc up hi, min4
ry-_-
the Russians had broken tbrough the over+trainEd defence.
'He had a real flair for suategy and actia, cspccially for
surprise moyes, but he lacked a i,iffia.nt fo*i.tioo of iaU-
nical knowledge to apply it properly. I\[oreover, he had a
Fld*.y to intoxicate himself with figures and quantities.
When one was discussing a problem onifi ni-, Iie would
repeatedly pick up the telephong ask to be put tbrough to
some departmental chief, and ask himHori rxlny si'and
so have we gotl' Then he would ftm to the man hho r.,
arguing with him, quote the number, and say: .Therc you
are'-as if that setded the problem. He was too ieady to a...pt
paper fiSoo, without asLing if the numbers stated weie
available in reality. It was ilways the.same whatever the
subjat might be{ank$ aircraft, rifa, ifiovels.
- "Generdly, he would riog up Speer or Buhl+who was
in *argc of factories. BuhG kept a little notebook
"ir"ir
beside liim, with all the figures reidy for which Hitler was
Iikely to ask, and would ariwer pat iut even if the numbers
had-act.ally been produced a large part of them were still
in the_faaories, atrd not with the-troops. In mu& the samc
way, Goering said he would provide ten divisions of grround
troops from the Luftwafie ai short noticg for the f,ussian
front-forgening that the ofrcers had beeo trained only for
air operations, and would need a lcnethy fresh trainini Uc.
e
fore they would be fit for land operatlons.',
I remarked to Manteuffel that -the more I heard about the
German side of the war the more the impression had srown
that, on the one han4 Hitler had a natui"l fair for ,firt *
and taaics of an original kin4 while the German G€ner?l
Stafr, on the othcr
l*4 were very coml,etent but without
much originality. I felt that, from tLe wai many of the sen-
erals had talked, Hider's misunderstandingof tecfinical fa&ors
ry ig{-them $gt $.y t od.d to discoGt the possible value
of his ideas, while he was angered by their orthodoxv and
i
lac;k of receptivity. In this way, it ueeied ro me, that nrg
 2fi rrrB GERMAN GBNERAI.s rAr.r-
of-war had dweloped, instead of a good working combina'
tion. lvlanteufiel said that he agreed completely with that
definition of the situation It summed up the trouble on the
military side. "I said muctr the same thing to-Hidg my:df
when i spent Christmas with him n \A3, *!* discussing
the difierence of outlook between the tank leaders and those
who had grown up with the older armg The more senior
generds could not get into the mind of the fighting trc'op
trnder the new conditions of warfarC'
 CONCLUSION

clt RllEf,INC TIIE RE@nD OF GERMAN LEADERSililp rN TIIB \rAn,

D and the coursc of operations, what are the concluions
that cmerge? An uncr frilure on thc plane of war policy, or
grad stratcgy, is seen to bc accompaniod by a renrartabte,
thoogh pcveq ry" _"f performance in stratcgy and tactica.
Thc explanation is also of a dual netrrrc. Tte-oldcr profcs-
sional leaders traind under the Gcncral Stafi system icndod
to prove lrghly cfficicnt, but la&ing in genius-+avc in the
sensc of "an infinite capacity for tiking pains.', Their im-
mcnse ability carried i& orin limiatiol'They tcodod to
conduct war more in the m:umer of chcss thr'. as atr aft,
rurlike the old rursters of war. They were inclined to frorrn on
fdlow-professionats who had novel idcas, and werc rrcrc Gon-
temptuous when su& ideas came from arnateurs. flost of
th9m, also, were limitcd in understandiog of any faaors or-
side the military fidd.
Hider was quicker to spot the vdue of new ideas, new
wqp-ons, and new-talent He recognized the potcntialitics of
mobile armoured forccs s@ner than the Cenerat StaIf di4
and the way hc bac.ked Guderiao, Germany's leadine ex-
pooert of this new instrument, proved the most d&sive
factor in the opcning victories. Hitler had the flair that is char-
a$eristic of genius, tho-ugl accompanied by liability to make
elemenary mistakeg both in calculation- and aaion" Tte
younger soldiers he pi&ed out and on wcfc often aLin
1s him in these respects<specidly Rommel, the most fa-
voured military "upstart" Such men had an instina for thc
ry
 3OO TIIE GERIVIAN GENERAII TALK-

unexpected and a greater sense of its incalculable vdue in

paralyzing opponents. They brought back into warfare, in a
-".*
goiti thi classical rusis and itratagems whictr the estab'
[shei military teactrers of the last half<entury had declarld
out of date and impossible to apply in modern operations. By
Hitler's success in demonstrating the fallacy of orthodoxy he
gaincd an advantage over the military hierarctry whic.h he
was quicker to exploit than to consolidate.
Soietimes the intuitive amateurs were justified by events;
sometimes the mathematiotly calculating profesiondrthe
latter more, naturally, in the-long nrn. But the jealousy be-
tween them, and thi way it aggrivated inevitable clashes of
opinion, proved more fatal to Germany than the actud errors
o? ath.iride. For thag the Primary responsibility lay with
the established hierarc.hy, as it dways does. The result may
have been inevitable, for war is not an activity that teaches
wisdom to its priests, or the quality of reconciling contraly
views. In view- of Hider's Policy and his temperament, he
would have been very diffarlt to restrain io *y circumstances;
but the attitude of ihe professionals and the frequency with
whictr his insight proved morc correct than theirs made him
unconuollable. guineither side was conscious of its own limi'
ations
The German generals of this war were the best-6nishe'l
product of their frofession+nywhere. They could have been
Ltt , if their ooilook had been wider and their trnderstanding
deeper. But if they had become philosophers they would havc
ccascd to be soldiers.
 TABLE OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMTvIAND

crN4 oF THE COMBTNED FORCES (WEHRMACHT)

re33-38 Blomberg rggs+s{HLl

GIN.C OF TI{E ARMY

1933-38 Fritsch r93&4r Brauchitsch r94r-45 Hitlcr

CHIEF'OF THE GEI{ERAL STAFF

1933-38 Bcck ry3&.42 Hdder ry42r44 TAtzlcr
tg,+4-45 Gudcrian

POSTS HELD IN THE WAR BY SOME OF THE OTHER

GENERAIS MENTIONED
RT'NDSTEDT
Army Group South in Poland, 1939; Army Group A in Wcsg 1939
4o; Army Group South in Russia, r94l; Gin-C West, rg4z to Z/2/++
ud g/+/u a 3/fi/45
BOCK
Army Group North in Poland, 1939; Army Group B in Wcst, 1939
4o; Army Group C.cnuc in Russia, r94r; Shelved carly in r9r4z
I EFR
Army Group C in Wcst, rg3y4oi Army Group Nonh in Russia,
r9r4r; Rcsigncd carly in r94z

RETCIIENAU
roth Pz. Army ia Polaad, 1939; 6th Army in Wcsg r94o, and in
Russia, r94r; Army Group South in Russia, Dec., r94r; Dicd tan, r9r4t

KLUGE
4th Army in Poland, 1939; 4th Arrry in West, r9394o; 4th Army ia
Rrssia, r94r; Army Group C,enue ia Russia, ry4*43 (Iniured in air
aash); CiD-C West, luly-Augr r944i Rcmoved asd committcd suici&
KLEIST
Pz. C.orps in Poland, ry39; Pz. Group in West, tg4o; pz. Group ia
Russia, r94r; rst Pz. Aray in Russia, 19143; Army Group A i! Russia,
Oe., ry42,44; Shelved

30r
MANSTEIN
RundstcdCs Chief of Stafi in Polaod and Wcsg r939lao., r9r4o; 38th
Corps in \Mcst, r94o; 56th Pz. Corps in Rusia, r94r; rrth Army in
Rtrssia, Sept, r94r-Nov, tg42i Army Group South in Rrssia' 1943;
Shclved in Mar&, 1944

ROMMEL
ZthPz. Div. in Wcsg r94o; Aftica Corps and then Pz. Army
Aqry,
rg+r-Apnl, 1943; Arrry Group ia N. Italn 1943; Army Group B io
Wcst, 1944; Iojured in Iuly and compulsory suicidc in OcL
TI{OMA
German uoops in Spain, 193639; Pz. Bde. in Poland, 1939; Director,
trdobilc Forccs, e,cneral StaE, r94o; Pz. Div. & Corps in Russie, r9r4r'
4z; ltkrce C,orps, Scpt.Nov., r9r4z; Capturcd at
Alarncin

MODEL
Chicf of SaE, r6th Army (Busch) in Wcsg r94o; 3rd Pz' Div' and
yd Pr. Corps in Russia, r94r; 9th Army in Russia, 194+43; Army
Grcupe North, South, C.cnuc in turn, Russia, Oct., r943'Aug" t944i
Annj Croup B io Wcst, tg44'45 (rc-P. ChC West,larc Aug, 1944)
HEINRICI
rzth C.orps in \[resg r94o; 43rd Corps in Russia, r94r; 4th Army ia
Rusde, ry4z.Nlay, r9,+4; rst Pz. Army, ry44'45i Army Group Wcsg
covcring Bcrlin, March, 19145

TIPPEISKTRCH
3oth Inf. Div. in Rrssia, rg4r'42i rzth Corps in Russia, 1943-44; 4th
Aily in Russia, May-fuly, 1944 (tnjured in air crash); r4th Army in
Italy, carb t945; 4th Army ia E. Gcrmann Apnl, rg+l
.MAN]EIJFFEL
Motor Inf. Rcgt in Zth Pr. Div. (Rommcl) in Wcst, rg49,--od
Rusia, r94r; Mo:tor tnf. Me. ia 7th'Pz' Div' in Russia, r94z; Mircd
Div. in carly 1943; Zth *d G. D. Pz' Divs' in Russia,
T*itir, ry$'$i
,h Pr. Army in Wcst, &Pt., 1941'45
BLT'MENTNTT
Rundstcdds rA (Ops. Chid) in Poland, 1939 aod in West, r91o;
Chief of Stafi, 4th'Army (Kl"g") in Russia, r94r; D'C'
G' S' (Ob'
Q. L), r9r4r; cii.f of Sufi, Wcsg Sept', rg4zSept,
1944; C'orps &
Arny io Wcst, Oa, ry44'ltlaY, ry45
302
 II{DH(

Abbadllc, r3o enillcryr-g8, tor-4 r?2, zryD a.\ zl4

Africa, North, 4?-49, t5465 '<+ 2b
airboroc forccr, 98, tr7-N, t5;t54 Atlatrtic War[ g6
z$,2!4"35 Auchidcclg Fidd-Merghd Sir Cl.udq
Aisnc Rivcr, r38, r4o4r, r43 48
Alamci!, El battlc of, 48, 164; Hit, Awanchcr, UW 15+
lcr's rcsponsibility for ddcat at,
r*5ri Mongonery, commaod Badogliq t{anhal rS
tatcn ovcr bn 48; Rommd a6 fizi Basogaq 28ruo
end Rommel legcn4 495o; Itme Dcholshcino, Gcocml von, oa lnv*
et, $365 cion of Bclduq reoa4; on invr,
lbcrt Caml, rr8, r2o
Albcrt doo of Francq r.{o,6; 6 Gcrnrl
Alcxandcr,
lcxandcr, Ficld-lvtarghal Sir llarcl4 roldicrr, 25557
48 Bct, Gcneralr 2J; dirrinal &7r3;l
Allicd armics in Gcrmea invarioa of oppoeition b Hitlcr, ?, *3! ft
thc Wcst, 39 fu,62
Abmof, 37 Ecld,rry, allicd amicr hu,od lnq fgi
antiaircraft ddeocc, 88, rrr invasioa d,, ut tz4
Anooescu, Marshd, zrr Bcrlrn, rZE, z5 zrx^ 6gdt
Annrcrp, n, t2rr 2n Black Sca, 65, r8r34 zor
Ardeooce, advance through the, r9{o, Blastowitz" Gcocral, 234
tt3-tl, rz4-z\ counuofieorive, Blombcrg, Picld-Manhal ys6, di.rnir
rg44 7678,27t43 sal dr 6r, z8; Hidcr, nrbcavicocc
armoured forcca, 17 2?z$ {L 4\ O, b,2I-28t iaf,ucncc d ze; purm.
57,73,9clo2, 124-34 ality of, 2t'o;rit, Srer Mniu, zo.
armoured 66!ilg infanEri, g.$, rct 28,8688
army, American, Blumcouitt oa, 258; Blumcotritt, Gcocrd, oo eDti.Hidcr
Elfddt on, 254 gl*,15y7r; aod Ardenncr oountsf.
army, Britisb" Rundscdt and Blrr odcosirre, 26,276, z&rSzi on Brio
mentrin on,25758 ish and Amcrican troop$ 25Ei oD
arnn Frcoch, armanent d, r:7-dl2 Eodan4 invasion o6 r:r; on
Blnmcotritt o\ r4344i docirinc Prancg hvasion of, roE, rrr, rrt
ofr, t4 !!ht45,rhr*#, r4:Hj; o
armn Gcrman, bcheviorr of, z!; cro$. Klugg 246, 27oi on Man*cin, 66;
@urtry tra$port, deficicacics io, oo Montgomcry, 2575f; on Nc.
167; disarmamcot, cfrcct oL 4z5i t Vrzi oo Patbn,
mendy invasioor
cxpaosion of, 87-88; Spain, wcap zSZioa Ronmcf z33tz391i on Rur.
ons and tactica tricd in, a7; World riq 6, ry2, ry6, ry&84
invrsion
\[rer I, comparison wtU ryySl _ filmg; on Rusian atay, n4.6
ermn lalian,.15658 Bodr, Fidd-Marchal vcr.,&fi and io
rrmn Russian, ryry75, 7,*6 n.ghnd
vasion of pleo, r5o; aod
Arras, r3r-g Invasioa of FralcA ri4 68ao; eod
93
 304 INDEE

invadou of Russia, eo r.69- t75t Dieppc l"nding, 58, r6t, zzg

t79fi, tg6.; replaccmcnt ot, 67, Died, Geoeral, 45
dckness of, r9o Dietrich, Gencral Sepp, ?6j8, ljg,
Eradlcy, Gcncral Oma4 t87 277,28437
Brauchiech, Ficld-Marshal vo\ jt Disarmament Conference, concessbn
g 93; as Army head 7,3r-43; di* o Gerrnaoy of miliary cqudig
missal of, 9t 43t r93i and Hdder, 85
3356; Hider, warnings bt 33-34i disarmr-ent of Germaon eEect of,
and invasion of England plan, r5o- 24-25
5.t; and invasion of Francc, ro&r5; Dittrnar, General, on Hitler, 43-44t
on Mediterranean, rj8; and inva- zr&19; on Russian campaign, zr&
sion of Poland, y16; and invasion 19; on Russian soldiers, zzz.z4
of Russia, 4o43, r74 r8r33 Doenitz, Admird, 265
Bredow, Colonel von, 82r 85 Dunknh British escape fromr 3g ro6,
Brest-Litovsk, 178, t2, 4>36
Brcuning, Admird, r5r
Britain (sce also England), Ahmcrfr, Ebca Emael, Fort, rzo
attack on, 3Zt end Finlaod, 36; and Ebcrbach, General, 246, 254
Greecg t6L7o; atd Municb Sf; Eden, Anthonn 168
and Normandy landtng, 22155; Egypg rS6
and Norwan 38; and Poland,34- Eiscnhower, General Dright, 287
35 Elfeldt, General, on American soldicrq
Broad, Lt Gen. Sir Charlcs, gr 254; oD Avranches breakthrough,
Brussels, rr5.r2t 252?55i on German soldiers, 255
Budapest, 62,, ztg England, escape from iavasion, 1o5-7
Budeonn Marshal, 57, r:5, xt2 132.36; invasioo plans for, .14553
Busch, Gcncrd voD, r49b tg6., z6
Fdaise, a49,254
Caen, 23855 Falkenhorst, General vou, 3?
Caucasus, 42,164 r8r$3, r88$g 196 Finlan4 96, S8
20,4 France, Finland, aid to, g6; invasioo
C,aulaincourg General de, r85 of, $, 4o, ro5-r34, 137-45; and Mu-
Cherbourg, 23655 nich, E:; and Norwap 38; aod
Churchill, W'inston, $,
3?r 48, r5o Polaod, 34-35
Ciano, C.ouot, 146 Fraoco, General, 27r 943, t5*59
Clausewitz, Karl von, .rg4 French resistance movem 6E 234 235,
Cossrcfr,37 nlc, z60
Crcte, capture of, r54, t5g,6r Fritsch, General von, and Brauchisch,
Crimea, 56,65, rBz 3r; caution of., z7i as Chid of
cross4ouDtry movcmenq, 167 Army C,ommatd, z5-27,8548; di-
Clprus, r54, 16r plomacy of, z6; dismissal of.r 7, zg;
Czechcslov4Lia, 8, 33 Himmler's trep for, z&29
Fritsche, Hans, zr8
Daazig 33-34 Fromm, Generd, ilvtr,64
D4ay, z4z-43 Funk, General vonr 254
ddensiveoEensive actics, 23t 3g 1,t, F*are ol Infantry, The, zb
561 6, 97, 116, r9r93, zoo, z3gs 276
ddensivc, strength of, rZ, p, r89,, Gamelin, Generd, rzr, t28, 84 r3?.
tgz93, zo6, zrotg Gaulle, General de, 9r, r3o
Dcmpsen Generd Sir Mles, 262 Gestapo, zz, z6t
Deomarkr:g Gibraltar, $4, 15,8-59, 283
 nrDt*
36
Girau4 Gcneral, l3o Eent of Hidcr a Cbancellor, g,
Gocbbclr, Dr. Paul |oseph, r83 f5;manner ofr rz; Rundstcdt, cot
Gocrdelcr, Dr. Carl Friddch, 88, 25o padson wit\ 7r; aod Schlcichcr,
frocring Rcichsmarshd Hcrmann, 98, 8CSS; in lVorld War I,4
r.'r; aad capturc of Cretq r59; ar Hidcr, Adotf, anti-Bolshevist obccs.
Commandcr-in€hid of Air Forcg sion of, z7; appoiotmcnt of Brarr
4tt 3or-283i and invasion of Eng- chisch as hcad of Armn z9; and
!qd.p!er 48ail" $3i aud Rri
$aD nvasrotr, 297
Ardeoncs @urtcrcficosive, 27243i
and armourcd forccs, 91697; assar
Gort- Field-Marshd Viscount, :33 rinali6a aftempt aginst, 54, 4,
Graziani, Marshd, r55, r58 21g7ri assumption of suprqnc
Grccce, invasion of, t6!7o commaod L 2g3g" +g, 88{g, rg3.
Guderiaa, Gcoeral 6o63; and ar- and plomberg z7-28; pritish Em.
logurd warhrg 23,!Ag5, zgg; and pire, admiration of, r35i36; Chan
Blumentritg z6917o; dismissd of, ccllorship, appointrrcnt b, 25, 9Ei
63; and Frcnch invasion, rz4-32, and Cretg .rSg-6u CzccboSlovalda
r4u4ti and Rusian invasioo, 6r- and Polan4 conqucst of, 8, 33i35;
64 rfi, Ug.8o, tgc., z:6; and Snr and Dic{ 45; atd Dunkirk, S9,
dcnt, 283
Gui"Sa!4 Major6cncral Sir Francis 1Sz:6; Eoglan4 invasioo plans
foir, r45_53i and French invision,
de, 168 ro&rr, 115-16, r3r-35; and Fribch,
H"gt g fte, rrg
/ z8-zg1 and Greccg r7o; and
Guderian, 6$3, zgg; and Klugg
Haldcr, Gcneral, 33, 55571 58; and
Brauchitscb, 33, 56, dismissal of,
!168, uBSo; Lut fling of, Vi {td
Mala, r6.rjz; and Maostcin, 65,
5h er,&i and puakirk, r3z; and rr4;- lnd Manrcuffd z7; NIa*
HirJu, 79, 33, 555:, r98; and in teufiel on, ry+58; aurtd Mcditerra-
-vasiog of England plan, r48; and neao, _r5Mz; and Modcl, 697o;
invasion of Fraoce, rcyt2, rr;;,, Mudch agreccncat, brcaking bf,
J32; _on Mediterranean, r58; and !+; ql mystic, ,{4; and Normaody
tSvasioa- of Poland, 35j6; inva- invasion, gt 53, zel, 46,37i aa6
sion of Russia, 4c4+ S*57, r6y:.lo, North Africq 15657; Nornan in
r74 t94-to8 vasion of, 3639; pcc, bid fur,
Hamnersrcin, Geoeral von, 2r,, xt la1, rcg, 146; plot to ovcrthrow,
23, z5r Bzr 85{6, rro-1r; Poland victory in, l:;
Haushofcr, Professor, 46 pmer, risc or 8r{S; and Rommcl,
Hausser, Gcncral, 246, 255 4r54D 2St, zggi aad Rundstedt, 7r,
Hciadci, Gcnerd, on Frcnch inva, jyn, 24+45i Russia, invasion of,
sion, r4z; oo German soldicrs, 256 4o44 r6Gzfi; Russia, pact wid1
57; _r[US$a,
57; in, rgt,
comnrand ,D,
Russia, Comrnand rgr, zr5;
2r5i V,3+3ji as stratcgist, 39, 3a, p
on r(lts$ao
oE iovasioo, t7
Russian lovaslo!, r78,,2t3-t7
zr3-r.7 44tT7i and Ttom+ 16z; aad
!!odt+ Coloncl voo d.ri i$4$s" 7Aule4 5*5s
Hcyc, Gcnerd von, ao zq
Himmler, Heinrich; commaad of I{:,U..rr,.t"tO. cco" Sir Pacy,9r,
taoilrnd, 39 !17_ttg
home forces, ef,4; atd lvfanstein's Hoeppncr, Gcneral, and Hitlcr, zdo;
removal. oursa 6
66: and Roehm purgc
removal, 66; 6. and invasion of Bclgrum, rzr; aod
{i
6j,
trae for llombcrg an<I rtitscb,
z&zg
617, z&29
invasion of France, r4o; aod Mos.
cow oficnsive, 18+S6, rgo
Hindcnburg, Fidd-lvfanhal von, all.
pointment of Frisch as Chid of
Hofia&er, tt Col.r'Xi, fu
Hotb, GcDeraL r:5, t84
Army Coooand z*86; appoint, Hungary, 6z
 306 IITDEX

Inc[igeocq Gcrnen, iooorrcctncs Irqol4 King, rz3

of rcporu, 14$ r5r, t5;zPS3, t74rf5i List, Fidd-Marshd voo, 93, r,f,, rgi
and Norrrandy invasion, 235; and Iabr, General, r59
Russia, 196 Iassbcrg, Geacrd voo, 63
Italy, 3+ Ludcndorfi, Gcncral, 4r r2,?r
Luftwalfe, and Ardcnnes couot€!.
lapan, r54 Brit
offensivc, zTgi and Batde over
Iodl, Gcneral, 58; and Ardenner aig q, ro6; and Crcte, r596oi
couotcroficnsivi 278, z8r.8rz, z8g. formation of, 88; aqd Francc" 17
9r; and Blumentritt, e7o; Hidcr, r27, t43i and Gocring 2grgD, tto,
enitudc bwards, 59 zSzi and Nor- z84i as Hider's iastrumcnt, .ru;
mandy iovasioa, z6; and Russia and Poland r7; aod Russi4 rgrjn
17+ Luxembourg, rz4

Kcitcl, Ficld-Marshal 30, 3+ ;,8,88, Maasuichg n7-4 27y76, z&t

U*q6i ud anti-Hidcr plog rt2, Maginot Line, Hidcr's strategy for,
7oi and Ardcnnes couotcr.offc& 3; invasion of Fraocg yt6, r4t4z
sive, z8r.8z; and Dicppc taoding, lv{akao r54, firfiz
243 War Ministry lneition, ap Manstcin, Ficld-Marshal vot, 6347i,
poiatment b, ?, 29i and Blumcn- ability of, 6S; dismissd of, 66i
tttt, $7o; and Normaody inva. France, plan for ddeat of, 6:6+
sio!,260; and Russia, 17475 rr3-r4; and invasioa of Polandr 35;
Kharkov, 561 65, ry1, zrz and invasion of Russi+ 6+56, r84
Kiev, batdc of, * $, g8o$r, r$4, ztt,294t
2r3 Manteulf4 Gcrcral von, and Ar-
Klcisg Ficld-Marshd voo, on Bdtan dconcr countcrcfisrsive, ?&78,
campaign, 169; and iovasioo of 273gai on amroured warfrrg 99
France, jT58,94j5, 124-34, r4v Io2; on Hidcr, z9r4j8; on Modeln
44 aod invasion of Rusia, r6a ?oi and invasion of Russia, roo-r,
172.83, rg4, l9p,2a;, 2rGr2; on 2g495.i on Russian Armn zz6; on
Red Armn t74r 2n4 ?:Dit:z Russian tanksr 99
Klugc, Ficld-Marchd von,6748, 76; Marctb, baalc of, 49
in Bdgium, rzz; dismissal of, 68; IvIertcL Ucutcnant Gencral Sir GG
in France,6& rg8; and Hidcr, 67 frrd L Q, r3r
2485o, ffi7; Iast lctcr of, z5ott- Mditerranean, ry4f5
5n; ia Normandn 53r 6768, zz7, Meindl, Gcncrd, 255
24*53i Run&tedt, replacemcnt of, Mcir Kampf, 17$
Q, q6i i! Russia, 67, t&o8.r, r&5, Middlc East, 15465
87, 19o96, r.16; suicidc otr 68,25r,, Mask, r75, r78, 179t, zrg
67 Modd Ficld-Marshd, 66, 6&7o; ab&
Konicv, Marshal 94 z2, ity of, 5g; and Ardcnncs oouatcr-
K&triag, Crcncral, f74 oficosivg p, fi, z7z-Bz; and Hit-
Krancke, Admird, z6+6S lq, Zo, 257; Klugc, replacemeot
Kiichler, Gcneral von, gr8 of,r 68, z4y5o; and Normaody in
Kursk, 66, r84 tgyzm, ztz vasion, 245; and Ruudstedt offen
dve, 76ili and invasion of Rusia,
Laon, r3o 6y7o
Leb Fid&Manhd von, and inva Montgomery, Fidd-Marshal Sir Bcr-
eion of Francg lr1 t4ri and inve. aar4 h Africa, 4&4q r54; and
rion of Rusia, ;6, rg97 Ardennes offcnsive, *8, urylii
Iraiograd, 5%65, t84, rgt, 196, zr3 Eighth ArmS comrrund of, 48;
 INI'EX
91
Run&odt end Blumeotria on, Rocbm, Capain, 6, fir Al5
zS75;Bi aad Thoma, 16465 Rdhricht, Gcocrat on Frcoch inr*
mmolight, aniftiaL z8o eion, rqgrr, tr4,r5r 1z$2gi on Ger.
Moecow, 9, 42, t8z, 18447, r}gp4 man soldier, z#Sli q Him.mler'r
Mulbenics, thc zE6 trap for Friscn, 29; on Hitlcr'r
MuoiclL SS drC 8 85; on &hlcicbcr snd tlam,
Mussoliaf Bcnitq 4$, 155116 mcrstcin, 8r
Rommd, Fid&Marfisl, 45-5li erxi-
Napolcon I, Ttc Emperor, 4or r85 dcot ant dcath o4 54,2a8j4 ald,
Nomraody iavasioo, 5r5$ D?5j auti-Hidcr plot, 2'154 z5gJl, 267 3
Norwan invasion of, 3G39 in Clrcoaicq 168; and Frcoch ia,
Nurcobcrg trials,36 vasioo, 47 r38; and Normandy io.
va$on, 5153, 227" 23*3$ 4746i
Ober& Gcocral, ia North Aftia, aTag r5E, 6zgii
O'Coooor, GcD. Sii Richerrd, f:556 dse oq 4648
Oder Rivcr, 63, r78, zr4 Rooccvdt, Fraaldin, gZ
O.KJI. (Obcrkommaodo de! Rotar&rn, rrZ
Heerc), i,
sg, cs-*
OJLW. (Obcrkommando dcr $rchr-
fi Ruhr, ro9r5 116
Rumania 6u
EachQ, 9t 3* 39 4!44, # Rundsdt, Fidd-Marshrl $D, 49, ?t
78; ability ot, lvls; end ind-fiia
Papcn, Fraoz v@, Vr 8a 83{6 lcr plot, 75; end Ardcnncs counEr.
Paton, Gcocral Gore3' in Ardcnaer ofreosivg, z7z&z" zgai arrry, dcvcl-
oficnsirrc, 288; Blumcncia aod opmcnt oL ZtZti oo Bdkan carn
Rundstcdt o\ 257i in Normaody paign, lQr; and Blumcntriq fili
invasion, z4&49; Shcmran'l mctb charactcr 9f, 7r; and Hitlcr, j3tnl
ods, itrspiration bom, z3n aod invasion of England
EnclandI plaa, rao
olaa. r49>
P"ulrr, Fidd-Manhal voo, jgb tro 50' I53;
5q and invasion of Frane.
I53: end rFrane,
P6td!, Marsbl, t4+ 2Sz 74, r&r7,
14, t9&t7, 1z
l:z/6, r3r'35, I3&4o; oa
plot _of fuly zoth egaiut Hider, 54, invasion of Nornan
Norwav. 37;az: and invz-
inrn
248, z5g4t t4 35,
rion of Poland It[ontgomery
iliiibntgemcry
g5,, ?+;
Polan4 cotrquelt & 8, 3?3j, 6+ rc6i o& 49; on Monqomcry and Pat-
and Luftwafre rZ too., 2;17i and Normandy invasioo,
Pripct Marehes, rf,, rTtig 5r5;, ?745i on Rd lumy, t*
htzicr, Cicncrdn r5r5z z3; rrplaccmcot of, Slr 6l, ll*.,
rr rqrtscoative of scnior gcacrah
Quisling VidLun, :6S8 5, 29; restoration b commaa4 Zr,
6168i rctirement of"V, r84, zbo
Racdcr, Admiral, 37r 38, t4j4 6r; and Ruodstcdt oficnsivg 76
Beichenau, Fid&Marshal von, 2o,, 25, ana Ru$ia, 76 r7r34, ti}g,
78i and-
28;
E6-!8; and Dritfuh tank ideas, zil zro;
2ro; otr
on Sudetenland
Duoercruand oontercDoa
conferencg 33?1
and invasiou of Bclgiuq rzr-23 g.e Hitla,
Russia, and -ss$, 8g, J),
rryt Finti;d;
35; r-utus,
r4o4z; and invasion o1 Fnglarrd wu y-i$, 36, 38; invasioo of, 4o
plan, r5o; and invasion of Polan4 -
44, t6il7
35i aad invasioa of Russia, r7,
r$ S.A., 46, 8r, 87
Rcichsn'ehr, rar4 St Nazairc raid, 16o
Rcinhar_dq GcDcraL n7, r?o, ryz Schacht, Dr. Hialmar, 88
l[rutrc ruver, , tst,23r,
7, 123, r44 &!!9.!o, C,encral voo, 72, 8zI5
zn zZ8 &hliefrcq Fid4l,IanhaL-6unt voq
RichtbftD, Gco€ral, t23, t2?, t5g lo, r94
 308 I!{DEX

Seeckt, General Hanl von, book bn g@7; oa invasion of France, 99

15; Heye as successor tq zo; and 95, r33; on invasion of Poland, 93;
unity,88; and World Wsr I, II-rz; oo invasioo of Russia, gZ.9rS; on
and World War II, r.crr, r4.r9; Middle East, 15555; on Montgom-
and Zhukov, zzz ery, fi445; on North Africa, 98,
Scvastopol, 65, r83 7554,8, fi245; on Panzcrs, 9o9r
Siciln 16z Thoughts ol a Soldio, l rg
Sicwert, General, on invasion of Eng- Tlppelskirch, Gen. von, on Russian
laod plan, r5ojr; oo invasion of invasion, r89r, r9rjr4 2rZ, 2?o
France, toSjl rz8 Tobruk, 16z1 763
Simovich, General, r7o Tunis, z3o
Smolensh r8o, r9g
Sodeostern, Gen. voa, rr4, 134, t5.3 IJtraine, 4z
space,influc[cc ofr 4rr 7z3, I44, r59' unconditional surrender poliey, zg43
t67, r88, 21243, aL7 United States, Avranches brcak
Spatt, t57, zeg through, 25153; Blumentritt oq
Spanish. Civil War, Nazi intcrvco. 25758; invasion of Normandn ze7
uon rn, 27 w3 55; war, etrtryi[to, 75r 154
Spcidel, Geaeral, z6M8
Slrrrle, Field-Marshal, D7, 263 Versailles Treaty, rr
S.S, 2c, 29,87, 257 Vichy Governmeat, 22gr3c
Salin, |osd, y74, fio Voronezh, r8o-8r, 198ggr5 2o5
Stalingrad, tgil., tgpaog Voss, Admiral,3h t1r
Staufienberg, Couot von, 263 V-weapons, 23rr 26t
Stieff, Generd, z6z7r
Strasscr, Gregor, E4, E5
Vyasma, e
fiaA5
Strauss, Generd von, r49 \Marlimont, Gcneral, fiz, 8t
Snrdcot, Gcneral, r5j; on Ardeoneg Wersaw, 35, 46,9,4, z16
countcr-ofiensivc, 284{5; on Cretg Wavdl, Field-Marshd Sir Ar&ibald,
1596r; on Gibrdtar, r5859i on h. 50, r55
vasiou of Belgium, rtgzo; on in- Wsichs, General vo& r28
vasion of England plan, 15152; on Westphal, Gcneral, 268
invasion of Holland, rr&r9; oo Wcygan4 Generd, BL t44
NIaltU r6l4zi on parachutc troopo Weygand r inq, 14q
in Russia, 283 Wiacrshcim, Geo. von, t3o, t4o4t
Soilpugel, Gcneral von, 76156 Wilsoa, Field-MarshalSir Hcnry
Stumme, Generd, .163
Maidand, 168
Sudetcnland, 3233
Witzleben, Field-Marshal voo, 260,
Suez Canal, .16z
supplS influence of, 48, 575, !fi
r24t *28,
rrlilood, Major4eoeral lohn S, z3n
155, 163, 165, r7z, r83, r9o, 196,
2OI, 2,3{/b 2t2, 212c? le6, ZV,278,
z896 zgr, 2tN; by &r 95r g, ry Youth, Hider, 256
232 Yugoslavia, r?o
3,2O3,

Tant Corps, the Royal, z3 7*iuler, General, 576q atd Dieppe

ftoma, Generd von, aad armoured landing, z2p; discharge of,6o; HaL
forces, z3, grojrg; on armoured war- der, replacemcnt of, 58, zo8; and
fare in Spain,9a43, 164; capturc Hidcr,5Mo; and invasion of Rug
of,, 996 r64i on Goering, 98, 284; sia, 585o; promotion of, 58
oa Guderian, t5,, 284; on Hider, Zhukov, Ma$hal, t8Z, lzt
 s5. 00

THE GERMAN GENERALS TALK

"Liddell Hart's book is a study ol great importance and inter-
est, indispensable to anyone who wants to know what really
went on during lYorld War II."
W. Ber,pwtN, The New York Times
-HlxsBN
The German Generals who survived Hitler's Reich talk
over World War II with Capt. Liddell Hart, noted British
military strategist and writer. They speak as professional
soldiers to a man they know and respect. For the first time,
answers are revealed to many questions raised during the war.
Was Hitler the genius of strategy he seemed to be at first?
Why did his Generals never overthrow him? Why did Hitler
allow the Dunkirk evacuation?
Current interest, of course, focuses on the German Gen-
erals' opinion of the Red Army as a flghting force. What did
the Russians look like from the German side? How did we
look? And what are the advantages and disadvantages under
which dictator-controlled armies fight?
In vivid, non-technical language, Capt. Liddell Hart re-
ports these interviews and evaluates the vital military lessons
of World War II.

CAPTAfN B. H. LIDDELL HART is not only a popular

writer who has made military history and theory interesting
and understandable to the non-professional reader, he is "the
most stimulating and thoughtful military writer, by far, that
qrs fiayg."-field Marshal Viscount Wavell. He has been
military writer for several London newspapers and Military
Editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His books have been
translated into 19 languages.

lIIfififfifi
.uLL 3s'Avenue. heAme cas Newy.k Ny 00 e ,lillffij[||lil[lll[lllil
^/ An imprint ol William Morrow & Co.
Printed in U.S.A. rsBN 0-bB8-0h01a-1