JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES:

WHO ARE THE GREEN BERETS

SUPPOSED TO BE?

COL. EDWARD C. CROOT

JSOU Report 24-5 U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
On the cover: President John F. Kennedy meets Brig. Gen. William P.
Yarborough, Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Warfare Center,
during his visit to Fort Liberty (then Fort Bragg), NC, in October 1961.
Source: JFK Presidential Library and Museum

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy,
or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense,
U.S. Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special
Operations University.

JSOU PRESS

Melanie Casey, Editor in Chief

Eric Hughes, Editor
Book design and layout by Laura Tindall

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

December 2024

ISBN 978-1-941715-73-4
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge several supporters

for encouraging me to have the courage to ask
tough questions about your profession, build
a research design rooted in academic rigor,
capture the essence of data in a consumable
document, and stand by me over the course of
hundreds of hours of research and writing!

Thanks to my special operations leadership

Lt. Gen. John Brennan, Lt. Gen. Frank Donovan,
and Maj. Gen. Steve Marks; Duke Professors Ken
Rogerson, Peter Feaver, David Schanzer, and Tim
Nichols; great friends and mentors Cdr. (Ret.)
Steve “Troll” Dennis and Maj. Benjamin Ordiway;
and my patient and loving wife Tracy and
supportive children Scout, Zach, and Kaylee.
THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES:

Who are the Green Berets

Supposed to Be?

COL. EDWARD C. CROOT

U.S. Army Special Forces

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida | December 2024

JSOU Report 24-5

 Table of Contents

About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Chapter 1: Defining the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Special Forces: A Unique and Necessary Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Green Berets in the Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Mission Drift Away from Core Competency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Understanding the Problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Chapter 2. Research and Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Literature Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Survey Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter 3: Principal Finding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Principal Finding: An Identity Crisis in SF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Chapter 4: Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Chapter 5: Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Failing to Recruit and Retain the Nation’s Best Special

Warfare Talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Failing to Modernize for Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Failing to Improve Force Preservation and Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . 53

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Chapter 6: Recommendations for Further Action

and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Author's Note. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Afterword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
 About the Author

COLONEL ED CROOT is an Army Special

Forces officer from Long Valley, NJ, and a Deputy
Operations Officer (DJ3) for the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC). He and his wife
Tracy have two sons, Scout and Zach, a daughter,
Kaylee, and live in Fayetteville, NC.
Croot is a graduate of the University of
Pittsburgh (bachelor of arts in business and bachelor of science in
psychology), the Army School of Advanced Military Studies (master of
arts in theater level operations), and Kansas State University (master
of science in education). Most recently as a Fellow at Duke University's
Sanford School of Public Policy, he won the U.S. Army War College
2020 Special Operations Research and Writing Award for his work
titled "There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces."
Croot joined the Army in 1995, earning his commission in the
Infantry through ROTC. He has commanded at the company and
battalion levels and served on operational assignments in Bosnia,
Macedonia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Yemen, Zambia, Iraq, Bangladesh,
South Korea, the Phillippines, and Jordan. He has interagency and
policy experience from two U.S. embassy assignments in Sanaa
(Yemen) and Dhaka (Bangladesh) and multinational experience
on both a UN and NATO staff. His most recent assignment from
2022-2024 was as the Operations Officer (SOJ3) for Special
Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), responsible for all U.S.
Special Operations across the Indo-Pacific Theater. He has focused
on national security threats in the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, and
Africa for more than 29 years.

i
 Foreword

The ongoing exploration of identity in Special Forces is particularly

relevant as Army Special Operations redefines its purpose in a new era
of integrated deterrence. This research by Army Special Forces Colonel
Ed Croot adds an informative perspective that is highly prescient to
the identity formation of the largest population of the SOF profession.
As Col. Croot argues in There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces,
recognizing that there is an identity crisis in this fourth age of SOF in
general, and within the Special Forces branch in particular, is essential
for two primary reasons.
First, professional Special Forces Soldiers of all ranks should think
deeply about their experiences over the past two decades and ask
the truly tough questions about the future of our profession. Each
year, hundreds of Army SOF professionals attend mid-career and
senior-level professional education schools in which they partner with
academia to conduct meaningful research. Although time away from
the operational force might seem risky, there is greater risk in allowing
our formations to fall victim to overconfidence and continuation bias.
In a highly complex and rapidly changing global security environment,
professional education is essential to developing and shaping the
intellectual capital of our profession. Thus, if we are to outpace the
People’s Republic of China, our nation’s most significant strategic
challenge, members of Army Special Operations must remain open
to reflexive academic approaches in how we learn as a profession.
I encourage all SOF leaders to think critically about our profession
and have the personal courage to provide us with your findings. It is
important AND we are listening.
Second, I want to acknowledge that although many senior SOF
leaders do not fully concur with all of Col. Croot’s conclusions, the data
derived from the 1,200 active-duty Green Berets who responded to
his surveys unveils some troubling information. Specifically, the data
found that almost a third of the participating Green Berets are not
committed to long-term partnership approaches, regional alignment,

iii
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

or language skills. Moreover, a full 10 percent of respondents do not

believe unconventional warfare (UW) is an appropriate or relevant
Green Beret mission. The survey also found that an alarming number
of Green Berets are not prepared to conduct irregular warfare (IW)
as a necessary part of America’s strategy of integrated deterrence.
Given the modern threats from strategic competitors resident the last
several years in Ukraine, in the Red Sea, and in the South China Sea,
it is undeniable that Special Forces’ UW/IW skills are in much higher
demand now than they were over the past two decades. This level of
misalignment with our most essential core skills, competencies, and
missions within our profession is an integral part of Col. Croot’s identity
argument and something we must all address.
In closing, I commend Col. Croot’s academic and empiric rigor in
addressing the Special Forces’ identity and how we understand the
distinctive qualities that make us unique and valuable to the Joint
Force. Although some may disagree with Col. Croot’s arguments and
conclusions, his research methodology and subsequent findings remain
sufficiently valid and serve as a claxon that demonstrates a need for
introspection that we cannot afford to ignore. As such, I recommend
that all stakeholders in SOF, supporters and critics alike, explore the
impact that “Green Beret identity” has on the SOF profession and
how we must continue to adapt to successfully compete against,
deter, and defeat our adversaries now and in the future. Once again, I
want to encourage all Green Berets to explore this research and think
critically about our profession. Our role as irregular warfare professional
practitioners, with and through our interagency, international, and joint
partners, remains critical to achieving integrated deterrence against
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. As such, every member of our
profession must understand our essential strategic value to the nation,
and we owe it to future American generations to learn, adapt, and
appropriately apply our skills to sufficiently protect it.

Lt. Gen. John W. Brennan

Deputy Commander, U.S. Africa Command
August 2024

iv
 Chapter 1: Defining the Problem

At the heart of the Green Berets’ identity crisis… is a generation

only knowing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with the next
generation recruited on the promise of door-kicking raids,
dynamic entries, and kill/capture methodologies.
—Green Beret1

INTRODUCTION
U.S. Army Special Forces quickly adapt to emergent threats that
face the Nation; this is expected. What is unexpected, however, is
when these temporary adaptations disfigure a unit and create mission
drift away from its unique capabilities. In fact, Special Forces, known
commonly as “Green Berets” or simply “SF,” is experiencing this now.
Strategic shifts over the last two decades have changed expectations
of SF twice, from peacekeeping operations in the late 1990s to
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations post-9/11, and then
to competition with Russia and China circa 2015–2017. These changes
have left an impact.
Public and congressional questioning of Green Beret activities
renders recent Department of Defense (DoD) decisions to modify
Army and SF capacity, and SF’s slow transition from the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT) leaves the Green Berets unrecognizable. There is
an identity crisis in SF, and it is influencing the culture and behavior of
Green Berets. The result of multiple changes in the expectations of SF
post-9/11, the identity crisis is no one person’s fault—it has manifested
over two decades. However, strong leadership must address the
identity crisis now to restore the morale and honor of the force, enable
modernization, and recapture readiness.

1
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

SPECIAL FORCES: A UNIQUE AND

NECESSARY FORCE
As the Nation’s only special warfare force trained
and educated to operate within the “human terrain,”
SF have long served with valor at the vanguard of
our Nation’s irregular warfare conflicts. The reader
may recall bearded men on horseback, arm-in-arm
with the Northern Alliance, conducting unconventional warfare to
overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Others will remember SF
again conducting unconventional warfare with the Iraqi Kurds during
the invasion of Iraq, or even their counterterrorism/counterinsurgency
support to Syrian Kurdish forces in their struggle against ISIS. At this
very moment, across the Baltic nations and SF stand shoulder to
shoulder with their allies, empowering them through security force
assistance (SFA) and foreign internal defense (FID), ready to transition
to unconventional warfare if Russia dares more encroachment.
This service has not been without tremendous cost to the “quiet
professionals.” Since September 11, 2001, 188 Green Berets have been
killed in action (KIA).2 2019 was especially fraught with sacrifice—of
the 24 U.S. servicemembers listed as KIA, 11 were Green Berets.3 This
price has not gone unnoticed. Since 2001, three Green Berets have
been awarded the Medal of Honor.3 However, recent moral–ethical
transgressions risk overshadowing their sacrifices.

GREEN BERETS IN THE MEDIA

SF have provided the media plenty of headline material over
the years. Accordingly, in 2018, Congress mandated a full review of
United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) culture
and accountability; this led to the 2019 publication and issue of
formal ethics guidance to all 66,000 SOF servicemembers within
USSOCOM.4 In January 2020, General Richard Clarke, the former
commanding general (CG) of USSOCOM, directed a “comprehensive
review” of the culture and ethics of all SOF.5 The review did not find

2
 CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

“a systemic ethics problem.”6 However, it did find in units, including

the Green Berets,:
a culture overly focused on force employment and
mission accomplishment create[ing] the contexts or
situations allowing for misconduct and unethical behavior
to develop…The Review Team uncovered not only potential
cracks in the SOF foundations at the individual and team
level, but also through the chain of command, specifically in
the core tenets of leadership, discipline and accountability.7
…Many individuals across the USSOCOM enterprise—at
all levels—identified this cultural problem…perpetuating
[SOF] focus on COIN [counterinsurgency] and CT
[counterterrorism] while not developing SOF and SOF
leaders for the full spectrum of SOF core activities and
Component specific skills and capabilities.8
Less than one month after the review’s publication, retired Army Lt.
Gen. David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel of Johns Hopkins University
called for another review, this time a congressional commission, to
further investigate SOF culture and ethics.9 These criticisms are to be
expected given the ultimate finding in USSOCOM’s comprehensive
review regarding culture and core activities.

MISSION DRIFT AWAY FROM CORE COMPETENCY

Over the past two decades, SF have experienced mission drift and
have only begun to address it. USSOCOM disbanded the SF Crisis
Response Forces in March 2020 to support the wider DoD’s move
from counterinsurgency operations to “a near-peer conflict with
adversaries such as Russia and China.”10 The Army’s transformational
decision, perhaps owing in part to SF mission drift, to build Security
Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) signals a paradigm shift toward
conventional military partner capacity building.11 In February 2018, the
Army established 1st SFAB, the first of six 800-soldier units intended to
train, advise, and assist foreign nation military partners overseas.12 Since
1952, this mission was the sole domain of the uniquely manned, trained,

3
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

and equipped Green Berets.13 These decisions demonstrate senior

leadership’s perception of SF’s utility and effort to redirect mission drift
back toward traditional, appropriate, and relevant missions.
In October 2019, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) CG, Lt. Gen. Fran Beaudette, acknowledged the mission
drift, stating in his Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Strategy
that “to shake off the strategic atrophy…we must evolve.”14 He directs
the force to “shift the mindset and bring about evolutionary change”15
through a three-pronged approach: prioritize people and build trust,
focus readiness to support the Joint Force in conflict, and modernize
to be the Army’s force of choice in competition.16 For SF, this means
returning to its unique, globally postured partnership role. It also
means moving away from “inhabiting secure forward operating bases
to one of surviving and thriving in large-scale combat operations”17
and “[operating] on the increasingly lethal multi-domain battlefields
of today.”18
Finally, career SF officers likely found it disconcerting to watch
traditional partnership missions entrusted to other SOF and
conventional forces in Syria and Yemen instead of SF. Beaudette’s call
for change is justified. In struggling with the effects of “mission drift”
for two decades, SF have drifted away from complex, long-duration
partnerships toward more linear, short-term, transactional combat
operations. Despite Beaudette emphasizing partnership, many Green
Berets who responded to this project believe that partnership with
indigenous forces—the very foundation of SF’s existence—is simply
not important. A senior warrant officer stated: “If we use indigenous
people, it is for our sustainment, our protection, or to multiply our
ability to employ force. We are not trainers. Conventional forces can
do that.”19 This misguided perspective is a symptom of a much larger
problem: the actual SF organizational and individual identity is not
aligned with the expected identity.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

It is necessary to define the problem and clarify definitions, concepts,
and ideas that have become confused and entangled in this public

4
 CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

discussion. What is expected of SF? What is not expected of SF? What

does it mean to have an identity crisis?
What is Expected of the Green Berets?
Title 10 law requires SF to possess unique capabilities that support
USSOCOM roles, missions, and functions as directed by Congress.20
Doctrine requires SF to build, partner, and fight “alongside indigenous
combat formations in permissive,
uncertain, or hostile environments.”21 In struggling with the
They are uniquely trained and effects of “mission drift”
educated in special warfare, which
for two decades, SF
requires a “deep understanding of
have drifted away from
cultures and foreign language”22
complex, long-duration
proficiency to prepare them for
the “human domain” of military
partnerships toward
operations. In the most complex more linear, short-term,
irregular warfare environments, SF transactional combat
are expected to leverage indigenous operations.
forces, understand relevant actors,
build and maintain partnerships, and create access for interagency
partners.23 SF provides options to leadership through core special
warfare activities: SFA, FID, UW, counterinsurgency (COIN), and
counterterrorism (CT).24
Policies at multiple levels of government direct SF to support
interagency partners by providing long-duration interactions that
develop allied military capabilities, reassure partners, maintain
influence, and gain important access. The National Security Strategy
authored by the President25 and the National Defense Strategy
authored by the Secretary of Defense26 cite partnership 199 times,
cementing it as a vital component of our national security. The Army
recognizes the importance and value of partnership in its operating
concept, multi-domain operations that direct forward presence for
competition (with Russia and China), which “deter[s] armed conflict
by preventing adversaries from attempting a fait accompli attack
on favorable terms.”27 In turn, the USASOC CG directly supports the

5
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Army, Joint Force, and interagency partners by directing SF to posture

forward “on the leading edge of the Department of Defense”28 and
“remain ready and engaged against violent extremist organizations,
[while] also adapting to compete against Russia and China, and
preparing for war.”29
SF can and will support “traditional” warfare efforts. But once
those efforts are complete, SF are expected to return to their primary
form of warfare, “irregular” warfare, which is the “violent struggle
among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over
the relevant populations.”30 “Resistance”31 against governing bodies,
oppressive groups, or occupying powers may never grow to full
traditional warfare. Resistance is the subject of their profession32 and
what makes SF special.
What is not Expected of the Green Berets?
Since 2001, strategic leadership expectations have driven SF from
their traditional global partnership missions toward more unilateral
direct action (DA) missions. However, the organization expected
to return to traditional special warfare activities. After nearly two
decades of shouldering a disproportionate number of combat

U.S. Army Green Berets assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) teach
Beninese soldiers from the 1st Commando Parachute Battalion how to identify signs
that an improvised explosive device (IED) may be present in Ouassa, Africa, March 11,
2022. U.S. engagement comes with mutual benefit, upholds international norms, and
treats partners as equals. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Jael Laborn)

6
 CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

rotations, some Green Berets now believe surgical strike is their

expected core competency. Surgical strike is the precise capability in
“hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy,
capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence
threats.”33 Surgical strike activities are typically unilateral, short
duration, and executed by specially selected small units with extensive
training for extreme risk and precise execution. The activities of
surgical strike include hostage rescue (HR), unilateral DA, kill/capture
operations against designated targets (K/C), unilateral special
reconnaissance (SR), counterproliferation (CP), and counter weapons
of mass destruction (CWMD).34 Although required at times to conduct
unilateral DA missions, SF are not expected or trained to execute
surgical strike missions.35
How to Model Green Beret Culture and Identity?
Any discussion of identity must begin with culture. The Army frames
culture as beliefs, values, norms, and behavior.36 Dr. Edgar Schein of
the MIT Sloan School of Management undergirds the Army’s definition
of culture, arguing that culture is composed of a group’s shared basic
assumptions, which inform accepted beliefs and values.37 These, in
turn, inform accepted norms for members to adhere and enforce—and,
ultimately, manifest in behavior.38 Schein’s “Model of Organizational
Culture” establishes “any group’s culture can be studied at three
levels,”39 from a shallow outer level (artifacts), commutable middle level
(espoused beliefs and values), and deeply embedded core level (basic
underlying assumptions).40
In 2013, the Army used Schein’s model to frame its organizational
model for culture and its influences on defining the Army as a
profession. The Army adapted Schein’s model, adding The Army
Profession to the outer layer and The Army Ethic and Identity to the
core layer.41 The Army Ethic “defines the moral principles that guide us”
and “is the heart of our shared professional identity, our sense of who
we are, our purpose in life, and why and how we serve the American
People.”42 The SF model featured throughout this monograph

7
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

incorporates both Schein’s and the Army’s model to buttress the

model with a strong academic and professional base (see Figure 1.1).

The Outer Layer: Artifacts and Behavior Army Profession-Special

Forces Profession
Schein defines the artifact layer as “visible and feelable structures
and processes” and “observed behaviors” of an organizational culture
that are easily viewed but difficult to decipher.43 The Army model
considers this outer layer the Army Profession, visible in the Army
flag, uniform, equipment, and practice of soldiering.44 The SF model
considers symbols (beret, flashes, patch, and dagger), legend (e.g.,
President John F. Kennedy establishing the headgear, bearded men
on horseback, John Wayne, Barry Sadler’s song),45 and mottos (“De
Oppresso Liber” and “quiet professionals”) as the outer layer. This
layer also captures their service and sacrifice, transgressions, and the
mission drift outlined earlier. Though this outer layer is plainly visible, it
is difficult for those outside of the organization to decipher causation46
(see Figure 1.2).

SF Organizational Culture Model

SF
Artifacts & Army
Behavior
Outer Layer Profession Outer Layer
Profession

Values & Middle Layer SF Middle Layer Trust

Beliefs Values & Beliefs

Underlying SF Ethic &

Core Layer Core Layer
Assumptions Identity
Ethics & Identity

Army Model of Organizational Culture and

Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture
Professional Ethic

Figure 1.1. Special Forces Organizational Culture Model. Source: Author

8
 CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

SF Organizational Culture Model

Outer Layer: Artifacts SF Outer Layer: Army Profession
– Visible & Feelable Structures & – Accepts Schein: myths-symbols-
Processes; Observed Behavior
Profession behavior
– Easy to view / difficult to decipher – Adds Profession; Guided by ethic

Legend Legend

” “D
et ls e
ui na O
Li pp
“Q ssio be re
e r ” ss
rof o
P

Symbols Symbols

Behaviors Behaviors
Russia Isis Iraq Taliban Niger Mali Cocaine Pardons
(2020) (2017) (2003) (2001) (2017) (2017) (2018) (2019)

Figure 1.2. Special Forces Organizational Culture Model Outer Layer: Artifacts–Army
Profession–Special Forces Profession. Source: Author

The Middle Layer: Values and Beliefs-Trust-Special Forces Values

and Beliefs

Schein defines this layer as the “shared, espoused [beliefs],

values, norms, and rules of behavior” that can be modified through
interactions and experiences but “may only reflect rationalization or
aspirations.”47 The Army model includes in this middle layer the “laws,
values, and beliefs embedded within the Army Culture of Trust [by
codes and creeds] that motivates and guides the conduct [behavior]
of Army professionals.”48 For The SF model, the middle layer considers
the individual and group ideals, goals, sense of what rules ought to
be, what beliefs are right or wrong, what techniques to value, and
what strategies will work or not work.49 To have an organizational
culture, the members must be trained in the same way, using the same
doctrine, and to the same skill set and values.50 Espoused culture
and actual culture may not, and in SF’s case are not in agreement/
harmony.51 For example, a Green Beret trained and educated in special
warfare skills may not believe language proficiency is important, nor

9
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

value long-term partnership approaches. This is a key aspect of group

culture and foreshadows the importance of the dense central core
layer, the basic underlying assumptions and identity (see Figure 1.3).

SF Organizational Culture Model

&
e
ag
ngu ture
l
La Cu

Legend
SF
Legend
Surgical Values & Beliefs
Strike
Beliefs-Values-
Espoused Beliefs and Characteristics
Values
+ Schein’s beliefs and
- Norms and Ideologies
values
- Ideals, goals, values
+ Trust
- Rationalizations
– Informed by ethic to
guide behavior
Direct
Action

Unilateral
Army Model of Organizational Culture and
Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture
Professional Ethic

Figure 1.3. Special Forces Organizational Culture Model Middle Layer: Values–Beliefs–
Trust. Source: Author

The Core Layer: Underlying Assumptions-Identity and Ethic

According to Schein, when beliefs and values are consistent and
repeated, they come to be taken for granted and are ingrained in
the unconscious as underlying assumptions and absolute truths.52
At the individual level, core identity (underlying assumptions of
one’s self) is generally set by young adulthood.53 At the group level,
individual identities coalesce, contributing to (and influenced by) the
organizational identity.54 This “group identity [is a] key component
of culture,”55 and the shared assumptions are strongly held, guide
behavior, and “tell group members how to perceive, think about, and
feel about things.”56 The assumptions are so strongly held, members
find any other behavior inconceivable.57 Within an individual and
culture, “changing basic assumptions is difficult, time-consuming, and
highly anxiety-provoking.”58

10
 CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The Army’s model adds The Army Ethic to the core layer. Soldiers
arrive to the organization with their core identity formed and are
further guided by this ethic, which informs their values and beliefs, and
influences their professional behavior.59 The SF model assumes that a
recruit’s identity and ethic are likely formed prior to attending Special
Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). Individual identities gravitate
to corresponding recruiting messages congruent with their underlying
assumptions. An identity attracted to danger, action, and combat, or
an identity attracted to partnership, autonomy, and irregular warfare,
will be difficult to modify later. Also, the professional ethic will only
influence the Green Beret’s beliefs and behaviors if it is congruent with
the individual’s formed identity and ethic (see Figure 1.4).

Culture: Structurally Binding Individuals for Protection

Cultures structure. An individual’s identity, ethic, values, beliefs,
norms, and behaviors are inextricably linked within that individual;
the SF model adds the premise that like-identity individuals seek
to form cultures that provide structure. People need stability

SF Organizational Culture Model

re
fa n
ar ai e
l W om far
ia D ar
ec an r W
Sp um ula
H eg
Irr
Legend

SF
Ethics & Identity
Basic Underlying Assumptions (Identity) Professional Ethic and Identity
– Identity manifests in beliefs and behaviors – Adopts Schein’s assumptions and identity
– Deeply Rooted / Difficult to Change – Adds the Army Ethic; sense of purpose
– Generally set by young adulthood – ”Heart” of the Army’s Professional Identity

D
Sh irec
or t A
t-D c
ur tion
at
ion

Army Model of Organizational Culture and

Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture
Professional Ethic

Figure 1.4: Special Forces Culture Model Core Layer: Core–Underlying Assumptions–
Identity and Ethic. Source: Author

11
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

to make sense of their world and to create order in their lives.60

“Disorder [and] senselessness” lead to anxiety, so people cope with
that anxiety by cultivating cultures that support “consistent and
predictable views of how things should be.”61 Culture ties together
group assumptions, ethic, identity, values, beliefs, norms, and
behaviors into a coherent whole.
Cultures protect. Individuals and groups deal with conflict and
ambiguity by striving toward integration that satisfies the human
need for stability, consistency, and meaning.62 Once a group of like-
identity individuals achieves a sense of group identity, this culture
becomes the “major stabilizing force and will not be given up easily”
because group members
value that stability.63 Any As the only uniquely trained
challenges to identity produce and educated special warfare
anxiety and trigger cognitive force in the military, SF are
and behavioral defense expected and directed to
mechanisms.64 Ultimately,
return to their traditional
the group culture mutually
partnership roles across
supports an individual’s
the globe to deter jihadist
defense mechanisms to ensure
groups, compete with Russia
that the status quo remains
and China, and prepare for
intact, for better or worse.
conflict or crisis.
What is an Identity Crisis?
An identity crisis is defined as “a period of uncertainty and
confusion in which a person’s [or group’s] sense of identity becomes
insecure, typically due to a change in their expected aims or role
in society.”65 As previously established, each time the strategic
environment changed over the last two decades, the expected
“aims or roles” of SF changed. Research shows that uncertainty and
confusion are present in SF’s culture. The question remains: Have
these strategic-level changes caused the SF culture to become
insecure, and if so, what are the consequences and implications?

12
 CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

SUMMARY
As the only uniquely trained and educated special warfare force in
the military, SF are expected and directed to return to their traditional
partnership roles across the globe to deter jihadist groups, compete
with Russia and China, and prepare for conflict or crisis. They are not
expected or directed to conduct unilateral strategic strike operations.
However, there are identity issues present within SF’s culture,
which likely contribute to eroding trust and negative impacts to
modernization and readiness.

13
 Chapter 2. Research and Design

At the individual level, an SF recruit is attracted to a recruiting

message congruent with their already-formed ethic and identity.
This deeply rooted identity will produce cognitive dissonance when
confronted with incongruent organizational culture. If an individual
Green Beret does possess a
different identity than that of the ...strong leadership must
expected and desired SF identity address the identity crisis
and culture, they will seek the now to restore the morale
stability and protection of a like- and honor of the force,
identity sub-culture…if one is tacitly enable modernization,
allowed or explicitly encouraged
and recapture readiness.
to exist. And, if sub-identities and
sub-cultures do exist at various echelons within SF, there can be no
guarantee that individual and collective behavior will be consistent
with any espoused (though not codified) overarching organization
identity and ethic.

THESIS
There is an identity crisis in SF, and it is influencing the culture and
behavior of Green Berets. It is the result of multiple changes in the
expectations of SF post-September 11, 2001. The identity crisis is no one
person’s fault—it has manifested over two decades. However, strong
leadership must address the identity crisis now to restore the morale
and honor of the force, enable modernization, and recapture readiness.

METHODOLOGY
Comparing the espoused with the actual Green Beret identity
and associated values, beliefs, and behaviors will illuminate any
misalignment between the two identities. Ultimately, this will establish
if the overall culture is contributing to an identity crisis. The model of a

15
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

1990s Circa 2015-2017

Peacekeeping Strategic Environment Competition

11 SEP 2001
Counterterrorism

Green Beret Identity

Norm
es

e
Valu

s
l
Literature Review Purpose Capability Survey
Expected Identity Exp i s Actual Identity
ecta tion
tion ecta
s e Exp

f
s

Green Beret Identity

Figure 2.1: Research model: 3-legged stool. Source: Author

“three-legged stool” of Green Beret culture assists in conceptualizing

the espoused and actual Green Beret identities (see Figure 2.1).
The gray base represents the Green Beret organizational identity,
providing a deeply rooted foundation. Each “leg” represents the actual
Green Beret of values, beliefs, and norms; informed by identity and
ethic, they influence and guide behavior. The legs support the “seat,”
which represents behavior at the point of interaction between values,
beliefs, norms, and the outside world. Finally, the “stretchers,” aligning
and securing the legs, represent the established purpose, capabilities,
and expectations of Green Berets. The stretchers are the independent
variables of the project and are established in legal, policy, doctrinal,
and professional documents. The legs are the dependent variables
and are established by a survey of active-duty Green Beret values,
beliefs, and behaviors.

16
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Psychologist Carl Jung’s culture and identity concept of archetypes

is used to define the independent and dependent variables. Jung
explains that individual and collective identities consist of bunches of
individual strands (values, beliefs, and norms) that, when combined,
form a distinctive visual or audible emanation (behavior).66 Jung names
these identity strands “archetypes” and describes them as human
thought strands that identify what a person is (i.e., what someone
might do, say, feel, or desire).67 Documented Green Beret capabilities
(attributes, standards, and skills), purpose (competencies, activities,
and tasks), and expectations (contemporary mission requirements)
form the archetypes. When the archetypes are uniquely arranged and
structured, they define the expected Green Beret identity.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Analysis of 18 legal, doctrinal, policy, and strategy documents
determined which archetypes form the established identity (see Table
2.1). Of note, there is not a single source document that holistically
defines the SF profession; this key issue will be addressed later.
The review of the 18 documents yielded 95 possible criteria for
consideration as archetypes of the Green Beret identity. Based on a
weighting of leadership priority, consistency, and frequency across
the documents, 25 essential archetypes were chosen to define the
expected identity and form the foundational survey questions that
expose discontinuity between espoused and actual identity (see
Table 2.2).

DESIGN
A six-part research design explored the thesis for USASOC; 1st
Special Forces Command (SFC); and the Army’s Special Operations
Center of Excellence, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School (SWCS) at Fort Liberty, NC (formerly Fort Bragg):
(I) Survey of the SF regiment to measure misalignment between
established and actual organizational identity;
(II) Survey results;
(III) Principal finding;

17
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Survey
Green Beret Identity

Norm
es e
Valu

s
Purpose i Capability
Exp
ecta e tion
s
tion ecta
s f Exp

Survey Survey Survey

Strategic Leader Expectations (5):

Special Warfare (Long-Term/Partner Enabled):
1. Reassure Partners and Allies
2. Disrupt Jihadist Terrorist Groups
3. Compete against Russia and China
4. Prepare for Crisis
5. Prepare for War

Activities and Tasks (8): Attributes, Standards and Skills (12):

Recruited, Assessed and Selected for:
Special Warfare (Long-Term/Partner Enabled):
1. Above Average Physical Fitness
1. Unconventional Warfare (UW) 2. Above Average Intellect
2. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 3. Mature in Years and Experience
4. Trustworthiness
3. Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Individual Special Forces Skills:
4. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 5. Expert in MOS
5. Partnered Counterterrorism (CT) (Weapons/Engineer/Medical/Communications)
6. Specialty Skills
6. Partnered Direct Action (DA)
7. Competent in Small Unit Infantry Tactics
7. Partnered Special Reconnaissance (SR) Special Warfare Skills:
8. Preparation of the Environment (PE) 8. Master Trainers
9. Proficient in Assigned Language
10. Culturally Astute in Assigned Theater
11. Commited to Long-Term Partnership Approaches
12. Trusted to Operate in Sensitive and High-Risk
Environments

Figure 2.2. Research model: 3-legged stool with archetypes. Source: Author

18
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

(IV) Analysis;
(V) Implications, and;
(VI) Recommendations for further action and research.

SURVEY
In consultation with the U.S. Army War College, Duke University,
and USASOC, the 2020 Green Beret Survey was a mixed-methods
comprehensive survey that included 42 quantitative and two
qualitative questions based on the 25 selected archetypes (see Figure
2.2). The survey was distributed via email twice over a 30-day period,
from December 2019 to January 2020, to all 6,906 Green Berets on
active duty.

SURVEY RESULTS
Demographics and Statistical Significance
The 2020 Green Beret Survey received 1,201 responses, or 17.3
percent of the total population, yielding both statistically significant
quantitative data and more than 100 pages of qualitative data.

Responses by Assignment
(612 Responses / 51% from Operational Groups)

1st SFG (133)

3rd SFG (152)
15% 11%
5th SFG (87)
4% 13% 7th SFG (95)
10th SFG (145)
14% 7%
SWCS (189)
8%
GO/FO Staff (170)
16% 12%
Senior Leaders E9-W5-06 (54)
Other (176)

KEY: SFG = Special Forces Group

SWCS = Special Warfare Center and School
GO/FO = General Officer/Flag Officer

Figure 2.3. 2020 Green Beret Survey responses by assignment.

19
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Sergeants first class (E-7s) responded the most of any grade with
291, or 24 percent (see Table 2.3), and survey responses represented
all possible duty assignments with 612, or 51 percent of responses
coming from the operational Special Forces Groups (see Figure 2.3).
Duke University recognized 1,100 responses and 5 percent population
segment participation as the thresholds for statistically significant
research results.
Results
For the purposes of this study, misalignment is indicated when 15
percent or more of the population demonstrates inconsistent values,
norms, beliefs, or behaviors with the espoused identity archetypes.
There are 19 misalignments recorded, and each misalignment is
identified below and in Table 2.7 at the end of this section.

Twelve Individual Archetypes

(Attributes, Standards, and Skills) Strategic leaders expect
Seven of 12 archetypes recorded SF to provide a persistent
15 percent or higher quantitative global presence that
results indicating belief or behavior contributes to five
misalignment. Two archetypes reveal contemporary missions:
qualitative misalignment (see Table reassure partners and
2.4).
allies, deter jihadist
Eight Special Warfare and Surgical terrorist group threats,
Strike Archetypes (Competency,
compete against Russia
Activities, and Tasks)
and China, prepare for
Unanimous alignment, and
conflict, and prepare for
strongest agreement, was expected
crisis response.
from Green Berets and the special
warfare partnership approaches
of UW, FID, COIN, SFA, and CT. However, Green Berets responded
that UW (89 percent), FID (88 percent), COIN (77 percent), SFA (57
percent), and CT (64 percent) were appropriate activities; far from
unanimous agreement. Five of eight special warfare archetypes
recorded quantitative results of 15 percent or higher indicating belief

20
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

misalignment, and all four surgical strike archetypes inappropriately

recorded 15 percent or higher belief misalignment (see Table 2.5).
In contrast, the other ARSOF core competency, surgical strike,
is intended for other specifically identified ARSOF small units with
extensive training for extreme risk and precise execution. The unilateral
strike activities of HR, K/C, CT, SR, and DA, and the highly technical
activities of CP, CWMD, and PE to enable strike and technical activities
are not appropriate or expected of SF. Therefore, alignment with

Green Beret Identity

E

Capa
e

x
pos

p
Pur

e bility
c
t
Beli a rs
efs avio
t Beh
i
o
Survey n Survey

Leg s
Leg
1 2
Leg
3
Activities and Tasks for Strategic Leader Attributes, Standards and Skills
Special Forces ODAs (8): Expectations for Green Berets (12):
Special Forces (5):
Special Warfare (Long-Term/ Recruited, Assessed and Selected for:
Partner Enabled): 1. Reassure Partners 1. Above Average Physical Fitness
1. Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Allies 2. Above Average Intellect
2. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 2. Disrupt Jihadist 3. Mature in Years and Experience
3. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Terrorist Groups
4. Trustworthiness
4. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 3. Compete against
Individual Special Forces Skills:
5. Partnered Counterterrorism (CT) Russia and China
5. Expert in MOS (Weapons/Engineer/
6. Partnered Direct Action (DA) 4. Prepare for Crisis
Medical/Communications)
7. Partnered Special Reconnaissance (SR) 5. Prepare for War
6. Specialty Skills
8. Preparation of the Environment (PE)
7. Competent in Small Unit Infantry Tactics
Special Warfare Skills:
Leg
8. Master Trainers
1
9. Proficient in Assigned Language
Inappropriate Activities and Tasks 10. Culturally Astute in Assigned Theater
for Special Forces ODAs (4): 11. Commited to Long-Term Partnership
Surgical Strike (Short-Term/Unilateral): Approaches
1. Hostage Rescue (HR) 12. Trusted to Operate in Sensitive and
2. Kill/Capture Designated Targets (K/C) High-Risk Environments
3. Counterproliferation (CP)
4. Counter Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD) ODA = Operation Detachment Alpha

Figure 2.4. 2020 Green Beret Survey archetype misalignments.

21
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

unilateral surgical strike activities was not expected. However, Green

Berets responded that HR (24 percent), K/C (47 percent), CP (30
percent), and CWMD (29 percent) were appropriate SF activities.

Five Strategic Leader Mission Expectations

Strategic leaders expect SF to provide a persistent global presence
that contributes to five contemporary missions: reassure partners
and allies, deter jihadist terrorist group threats, compete against
Russia and China, prepare for conflict, and prepare for crisis response.
Green Berets are expected to recognize that all five requirements
are appropriate missions, with the reassurance of partners and allies
as the top priority. Further, survey results were expected to produce
unanimous understanding that SF’s contribution to all five missions
is through partnership approaches and a nuanced understanding
that the access and placement gained by any of the five partnership
approaches (UW, FID, COIN, SFA, and CT) enable SF to contribute to
all five missions at once. Finally, USSOCOM leadership expects that
Green Berets are prepared for the five contemporary missions upon
graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).
The 2020 Green Beret Survey results illuminated unexpected
misalignment between SF beliefs and leadership expectations of SF
toward the contemporary missions. Sixteen percent of respondents
indicated that they do not believe degrading jihadist terrorist groups
and competition with Russia and China are appropriate SF missions.
When asked to rank order the missions by priority, only 15 percent
of respondents ranked the foundational mission for SF, reassurance
of partners and allies, as the most important. Degradation of jihadist
terrorist groups and competition with Russia and China are best
accomplished unilaterally, according to 16 percent and 18 percent of
respondents, respectively. Finally, 67 percent of Green Berets believe
they are least prepared to compete with Russia and China, with many
qualitative responses stating that they do not understand how Green
Berets compete with Russia and China (see Table 2.6).

22
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Table 2.1: List of Documents Analyzed to Determine Archetypes for 2020

Green Beret Survey

LAW
Title 10, United States Code: Section 164, Commanders of Combatant Section
167, Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces (SOF)

DOCTRINE
– Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Special Operations (May 2014)
– Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05 Special Operations (January 2018)
–A rmy Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05 Army Special
Operations (June 2019)
– Army Field Manual (FM) 3-18 Special Forces Operations (May 2014)

JOHN K. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL (SWCS)

COMMANDING GENERAL (CG) POLICY LITERATURE ON CAPABILITY
(ASSESS-SELECT-TRAIN-EDUCATE)
– SWCS Placemat (16 October 2019)
– SWCS Academic Handbook FY 2019
– SWCS CG Talking Points NCR (6 November 2019)
– SWCS CG Strategy FY 2020 (21 November 2019)

USASOC CG POLICY LITERATURE

–U
 nited States Army – Special Forces Qualifications - GOARMY.COM
https://www.goarmy.com/special-forces/qualificatios-and-benefits.html
–U
 nited States Army – Special Forces Training - GOARMY.COM
https://www.goarmy.com/special-forces/training.html (accessed 21 November 2019)
–U
 nited States Army – Special Forces Missions - GOARMY.COM
https://www.goarmy.com/special-forces/qualificatios-and-benefits.html

USASOC CG POLICY LITERATURE

–U
 nited States Army Special Operations Forces Strategy (2019)
–U
 SASOC – Office of the Command Historian (Veritas) – Definition of a
Special Forces Soldier (CG directed Calling Card):
https://arsofhistory.org/articles/v14n3_calling_cards_page_1.html

STRATEGIC LEADER STRATEGY LITERATURE

–N
 ational Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017)
–N
 ational Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2018)

NOTE: SWCS = Special Warfare Center and School; CG = commanding general

23
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Table 2.2. A
 rchetypes Selected for the 2020 Green Beret Survey that
Define the Special Forces Identity

SPECIAL FORCES CRITERION

Individual: (Attributes-Standards-Skills)

Recruited-Assessed-Selected For

Above-average physical fitness Mature in years and experience

Above-average intellect Trustworthiness

Trained & Educated in Special Forces Skills

Expert in military occupational Competent in small unit infantry

specialty (MOS) tactics (SUIT)
Competent in specialty skills

Trained & Educated in Special Warfare Skills

Master trainer Committed to long-term partnership

Proficient in assigned language approaches
Culturally astute in assigned theater Trusted in sensitive and high-risk
environments

Collective: (Competencies-Activities-Tasks)

Core Competency: Special Warfare (SF)

Unconventional warfare (UW) Partnered counterterrorism (CT)

Foreign internal defense (FID) Partnered direct action (DA)
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Partnered special reconnaissance (SR)
Security force assistance (SFA) Preparation of the environment (PE)

Core Competency: Surgical Strike (Other ARSOF)

Hostage rescue and recovery (HR) Counterproliferation (CP)

Kill/capture designated targets Counter weapons of mass
(K/C) destruction (CWMD)

Strategic Leader Missions by Priority

Reassure allies and partners Prepare for conflict

Deter Jihadist terrorist group threats Prepare for crisis response
Compete against Russia and China

24
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Table 2.3. 2020 Green Beret Survey Demographic Data by Rank and MOS.
SF Survey % of Rank- % of Total
Population Responses MOS Response
Received Population Population
NCO (Rank) 4,922 553 11% 46%
Sergeant 34 6% 3%
Staff Sergeant 94 17% 8%
Sgt. 1st Class 291 53% 24%
Master Sgt. 105 19% 9%
Sgt. Major 29 5% 2%
NCO (MOS) 4,922 553 11% 46%
18B 1,053 79 8% / 14% 7%
18C 900 80 9% / 14% 7%
18D 775 101 13% / 18% 8%
18E 833 91 10% / 16% 7%
18F 452 68 15% / 12% 6%
18Z 909 134 15% / 24% 11%
180A 523 109 21% 9%
W1 11 10% <1%
CW2 36 33% 3%
CW3 29 27% 2%
CW4 21 19% 2%
CW5 12 11% <1%
18A 1,461 539 37% 45%
Captain 470 146 31% / 27% 12%
Major 547 188 34% / 35% 16%
Lt. Colonel 294 148 50% / 27% 12%
Colonel 150 57 38% / 11% 5%
TOTAL 6,906 1,201 17%

25
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Table 2.4. 2020 Green Beret Survey Alignment and Misalignment of

Individual Archetypes
Attributes-Standards-Skills Beliefs / Behaviors
Recruited-Assessed-Selected For
(1) Above Average Physical Behaviors (physical fitness)
Fitness -54% no unit or leadership
accountability
(2) Above Average Intellect +
(3) Mature in Years & Experience Behaviors (Not mature enough to
accomplish mission)
-27% describe peers
-72% describe 5-12 SFOD-A teammates
(4) Trustworthiness Qualitative misalignment only
Uniquely Trained & Educated in Individual Special Forces Skills
(5) Expert in MOS +
(6) Competent in Specialty Skills +
(7) Competent in SUIT Behavior
-49% describe 5-12 SFOD-A teammates
not competent
Uniquely Trained & Educated in Individual Special Warfare Skills
(8) Master Trainer Behavior
-91% do not feel prepared
-77% never trained in this skill
-57% skill not assessed by organization
or leadership
(9) Proficient in Assigned Belief
Language -29% do not believe an important skill
Behavior
-62% do not regularly practice
-52% did not speak their language on
their last deployment
(10) Culturally Astute in Assigned Behavior
Theater -42% not currently regionally aligned
with assigned theater
(11) Committed to Long-Term Belief
Partnership Approaches -69% describe 5-12 SFOD-A teammates
not committed
-34% report it is better to conduct
mission unilaterally
(12) Trusted to Operate in Sensitive Qualitative misalignment only
& High-Risk Environments

26
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Table 2.5. 2020 Green Beret Survey Results for Special Warfare and Surgi-
cal Strike Archetypes

Competencies-Activities-Tasks SF Survey Responses

Believe Believe
Appropriate Activity
Activity Expected
for SF by Strategic
Leadership

Core Competency: Special Warfare (SF)

Expected Result 100%

Unconventional warfare (UW) 89% 81%
Foreidefense (FID) 88% 85%
Counterinsurgency (COIN) 77% 78%
Security force assistance (SFA) 57% 61%
Partnered counterterrorism (CT) 64% 63%
Partnered direct action (DA) 68% 69%
Partnered special reconnaissance (SR) 79% 67%
Preparation of the environment (PE) 86% 72%

Core Competency: Surgical Strike (Other Army SOF)

Expected Result 0%
Hostage rescue and recovery (HR) 24% 7%
Kill/capture operations against designat-
47% 32%
ed targets (K/C)
Counterproliferation (CP) 30% 10%
Counter weapons of mass destruction
29% 9%
(CWMD)

27
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Table 2.6. 2020 Green Beret Survey Results for Contemporary Mission
Archetypes
MISSION
REQUIREMENTS BY SF SURVEY RESPONSES
PRIORITY
*Special Warfare Believe Chose Believe Believe least
long-term partnership appropriate as mission prepared to
approaches (UW, FID, mission mission best accomplish
COIN, or SFA) provide priority achieved
access and placement unilaterally
platforms to:
1. R
 eassure allies and Not
15% 3%
partners surveyed
2. D
 eter Jihadist X
terrorist group 25% 16% 7%
threats (16% No)

3. C
 ompete against X
25% 18% 67%
Russia and China (16% No)
Not
4. Prepare for conflict ✓ 26% 9%
surveyed
5. P
 repare for crisis Not
✓ 9% 14%
response surveyed

28
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Table 2.7. 2020 Green Beret Survey Results by Archetype

SPECIAL FORCES CRITERION

Individual: (Attributes-
Belief Behavior Description
Standards-Skills)

Above average physical + -43% Fitness lower post Special

fitness Forces Qualification
Course
Above average intellect + +
Mature in years and + -27% Peers immature
experience -72% 5-12 teammates immature
Trustworthiness + - Qualitative responses
Trained and Educated in Special Forces Skills
Expert in MOS + +
Competent in specialty skills + +
Competent in SUIT + -50% 5-12 teammates not
competent
Trained and Educated in Special Warfare Skills
Master trainer + -24% Not a master trainer
-53% Never taught or assessed
Proficient in assigned -29% -62% Practice
language -52% Try to use
Culturally astute in assigned + -17% Do not maintain
theater -45% Assignment not aligned
Committed to long-term -34% -28% Not committed
partnership approaches
Trusted in sensitive and high- + - Qualitative responses
risk environments
Collective: (Competencies- Belief Description
Activities-Tasks)
Core Competency: Special Warfare (Special Forces)
Unconventional warfare -11% Believe inappropriate:
(UW) DA identity
Foreign internal defense -12% Believe inappropriate:
(FID) DA identity

Continued on next page

29
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Table 2.7. 2020 Green Beret Survey Results by Archetype (continued)

SPECIAL FORCES CRITERION

Individual: (Attributes-
Belief Behavior Description
Standards-Skills)

Counterinsurgency (COIN) -23% Believe inappropriate:

DA identity
Security force assistance -43% Believe inappropriate:
(SFA) DA identity
Partnered counterterrorism -36% Believe inappropriate:
(CT) legacy identity
Partnered direct action (DA) -32% Believe inappropriate:
legacy identity
Partnered special reconnais- +
sance (SR)
Preparation of the environ- -12% Believe inappropriate:
ment (PE) DA identity
Core Competency: Surgical Strike (Other Army SOF)
Hostage rescue and recovery 24% Believe appropriate:
(HR) DA identity
Kill/capture designated tar- 47% Believe appropriate:
gets (K/C) DA identity
Counterproliferation (CP) 30% Believe appropriate:
DA identity
Counter weapons of mass 28% Believe appropriate:
destruction (CWMD) DA identity
Strategic Leader Missions
Belief Description
by Priority
Reassure allies and partners +
Disrupt Jihadist terrorist -16% Believe inappropriate:
Group Threats Legacy identity
Compete against Russia and -16% Believe inappropriate
China -67% Do not feel prepared
Prepare for conflict +
Prepare for crisis response +

30
 Chapter 3. Principal Finding

To summarize, the 2020 Green Beret Survey confirms a total of 22

misalignments between expected and actual archetypes of the Green
Beret identity (see Figure 2.4 and Table 2.7).

PRINCIPAL FINDING: AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SF

Quantitative and qualitative survey data reveal misalignment
between the espoused Green Beret identity with actual Green Beret
values, beliefs, and behaviors. This misalignment is causally linked
to the formation of an uncertain, confused, and insecure Green
Beret identity. Unexpectedly, the uncertainty and confusion enabled
individuals to self-determine their professional beliefs and behaviors;
left unchecked by leadership and absent
a professional identity-anchoring
document, like-identities
aggregated into three distinct DA
identity sub-groups: Direct Legacy 26%
Action identity (26 percent), 28%
Legacy identity (28 percent),
and Modern identity (46 percent; Modern
see Figure 3.1). 46%

The Three Sub-Identities Defined

Direct Action Identity
Approximately 26 percent Identity Crisis
of the SF population makes DA = Direct Action

up this segment. This group Figure 3.1. Identity crisis in Special Forces: three
is aligned with all four sub-identities. Source: 2020 Green Beret Survey

individual attributes, and

all three SF skills, established for Green Berets. However, this group
does not believe in the individual skills of language (29 percent) or
long-term partnership approaches (34 percent) that build the human

33
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

domain expertise required for special warfare. They also undervalue or

reject the established Special warfare activities of UW (11 percent), FID
(12 percent), COIN (23 percent), SFA (43 percent), and PE (12 percent).
Further, this group believes that the unilateral surgical strike activities
of HR (24 percent), K/C (47 percent), CP (30 percent), and CWMD (28
percent) are appropriate and expected activities of SF. Regarding the
contemporary missions, this segment believes that the deterrence of
jihadist terrorist groups (16 percent) and competition with China and
Russia (18 percent) are missions best conducted unilaterally.

Legacy Identity
Approximately 28 percent of the SF population makes up this
segment. This group is aligned with all four individual attributes, all three
SF skills, and all five special warfare skills established for Green Berets.
This group also accepts the established special warfare partnership
activities of UW, FID, COIN, SFA, and PE and appropriately recognizes
that the unilateral surgical strike activities are inappropriate for SF.
While this group believes SF are overinvested in CT (36 percent)
and DA (32 percent), 16 percent do not believe deterrence of
jihadist terrorist groups, and competition with Russia and China are
appropriate missions. This group calls for a shift away from deterring
jihadist terrorist groups and cautions against supporting ongoing
efforts to compete with China and Russia. This group advocates
a return to the pre-GWOT mission focus on the special warfare
partnership activities of UW, FID, COIN, and SFA and are focused only
on reassuring partners and allies and preparing for war or crisis.

Modern Identity
Approximately 46 percent of the SF population makes up this
segment. This group’s beliefs are aligned with all established SF
archetypes surveyed. This group believes the expectations established
by law, doctrine, SOF senior leaders, the SFQC, and strategic leaders
are appropriate for SF. This group understands how the 12 individual
archetypes build expertise in the human aspects of military operations
(special warfare) and how to leverage indigenous partners through
the contemporary missions of reassuring partners and allies, deterring
jihadist terrorist group threats, competing against Russia and China,
preparing for conflict, and preparing for crisis response. This group

34
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

understands that the access and placement gained by any of the

four partnership approaches (UW, FID, COIN, or SFA) enable SF to
contribute to all five missions at once (see Table 3.1).
Sub-Identity Group Rank and Unit Distributions
No single rank or unit dominates a sub-identity. The sub-identities
generally reflect ranks and units equivalently, consistent with survey
population segment sizes. A 2 percent tolerance value was used to
measure rank and unit variance between survey population and sub-
identity group sizes. Minor variances are highlighted below (see
Table 3.2).
The DA identity group was 11 percent higher for NCOs (7 percent
from the Sergeant 1st Class segment) than expected, with warrant and
commissioned officer segments within 2 percent tolerance for their
respective population sizes. This sub-group was 5 percent higher for
7th SFG (A) and 3 percent lower for 3rd SFG (A) segments.
The Legacy identity group was 21 percent higher for NCOs (14
percent from the sergeant first class segment and 6 percent from
the Staff Sergeant segment) and 20 percent lower for officers than
expected; warrant officers were within 2 percent tolerance for their
respective population sizes. The Legacy group was 13 percent higher
for the “Other” category and 4 percent higher for 7th SFG (A)
segments. 1st SFG (A) (7 percent) and 10th SFG (A) (8 percent) were
lower than expected for their respective population sizes.
Summary
One in four Green Berets identifies with short-term and unilateral
DA approaches; one in four identifies with long-term partnership
approaches, but does not believe they are appropriate for the
contemporary deterrence and competition missions; and two of four
identify with long-term partnership approaches and recognize that
traditional skills and activities demonstrated by SF are necessary
and applicable to the contemporary missions required today. Green
Berets evince the sub-identities without respect to rank or unit. This
identity crisis and the presence of three sub-identities is consistent
with Schein68 and other leading experts’ organizational culture models.
But does this matter? Should three sub-cultures be allowed to coexist
within SF? Part IV analyzes the implications of the identity crisis for SF.

35
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Table 3.1. 2020 Green Beret Survey Results by Sub-Identity (+Aligned)

SPECIAL FORCES CRITERION Identity

Individual: (Attributes-Standards-Skills) DA Legacy Modern

Recruited-Assessed-Selected For
Above Average Physical Fitness + + +
Above Average Intellect + + +
Mature in Years & Experience + + +
Trustworthiness + + +
Trained & Educated in Special Forces Skills
Expert in MOS + + +
Competent in Specialty Skills + + +
Competent in SUIT + + +
Trained & Educated in Special Warfare Skills
Master Trainer + + +
Proficient in Assigned Language -29% + +
Culturally Astute in Assigned Theater + + +
Committed to Long-Term Partnership
-34% + +
Approaches
Trusted in Sensitive & High-Risk Environments + + +
Collective: (Competencies-
DA Legacy Modern
Activities-Tasks)
Core Competency: Special Warfare (SF)
Unconventional warfare (UW) -11% + +
Foreign internal defense (FID) -12% + +
Counterinsurgency (COIN) -23% + +
Security force assistance (SFA) -43% + +
Partnered counterterrorism (CT) + -36% +
Partnered direct action (DA) + -32% +
Partnered special reconnaissance (SR) + + +
Preparation of the environment (PE) -12% + +
Core Competency: Surgical Strike (Other Army SOF)
Hostage rescue and recovery (HR) 24% + +
Kill/capture designated targets (K/C) 47% + +

36
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Table 3.1. 2020 Green Beret Survey Results by Sub-Identity (+Aligned)

SPECIAL FORCES CRITERION Identity

Collective: (Competencies-
DA Legacy Modern
Activities-Tasks)

Core Competency: Special Warfare (SF)

Core Competency: Surgical Strike (Other Army SOF)

Counterproliferation (CP) 30% + +
Counter weapons of mass destruction
28% + +
(CWMD)
Strategic Leader Missions by Priority DA Legacy Modern
Reassure allies and partners + + +
Deter Jihadist terrorist group threats 16% -16% +
Compete against Russia and China 18% -16% +
Prepare for conflict + + +
Prepare for crisis response + + +

37
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Table 3.2. 2
 020 Green Beret Survey Sub-Identity Characteristics by Rank
and Unit
TABLE 9. SUB-IDENTITY CHARACTERISTICS (RANK AND UNIT)[1]
Identity by Rank and Unit Identity (2%>X>2% Tolerance)
Rank DA Legacy Modern
Total 312 Total 336 Total 553 Total
67%
Non-Commissioned Officer 57% (46%)
-46%
Sergeant/E5 6% 4%
14%
Staff Sgt./E6 7%
-8%
31% 38%
Sgt. 1st Class/E7
-24% -24%
Master Sgt./ E8 9% 10%
Sgt. Major/ E9 4% 1%
Warrant Officer 9% 8%
Warrant 1 2% 1%
Chief Warrant 2 3% 4%
Chief Warrant 3 1% 2%
Chief Warrant 4 1% 1%
Chief Warrant 5 2% 0%
25%
Commissioned Officer 34%
-45%
6%
Captain/O3 6%
-12%
10%
Major/O4 9%
-16%
7%
Lt. Colonel/O5 15%
-12%
2%
Colonel/O6 4%
-5%
Unit DA Legacy
4%
1st SFG (A) 9%
-11%

38
 CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Table 3.2. 2
 020 Green Beret Survey Sub-Identity Characteristics by Rank
and Unit
TABLE 9. SUB-IDENTITY CHARACTERISTICS (RANK AND UNIT)[1]
Identity by Rank and Unit Identity (2%>X>2% Tolerance)
Unit DA Legacy
10%
3rd SFG(A) 15%
-13%
5th SFG(A) 6% 9%
13% 12%
7th SFG(A)
-8% -8%
4%
10th SFG(A) 10%
-12%
SWCS 18% 15%
GO / FO Staff 15% 13%
28%
Other 19%
-15%

Note: SFG (A) = Special Forces Group (Airborne); SWCS = Special Warfare Center and School;
GO/FO = general officer/field officer

39
 Chapter 4. Analysis

I was recruited to SF with the promise of killing or capturing

terrorists; my NCO assessor at selection described our
purpose as partnership; I participated in the ROBIN SAGE
UW Exercise; upon arrival at my SFOD-A, my Team Sergeant
focused on DA, Team Leader on UW, Company Commander
on competition with China and Russia (whatever that means),
and my Battalion Commander seemed most concerned with
language currency. “Who am I supposed to be?”
—Notes from interview with departing Green Beret69

ANALYSIS
The frustration in this Green Beret’s response captures the essence
of the identity crisis in SF. His organizational socialization experience
and confusion at multiple echelons by key influencers, each with
a different identity narrative, highlights the central problem for
SF: There is no single established definition of the SF profession
accepted across all components of the institution. The absence of
a common organizational purpose, formalized in a manner such
as doctrine, has several major implications. Without a centering
mechanism, institutional components project their sub-identity
over the profession’s desired identity and self-determine how best
to support objectives. Since there is no unity of purpose across the
recruiting command, training base, and operational force, the resulting
degraded organizational socialization aggravates the identity crisis.
The USASOC CG cannot realize the three focus area goals absent a
coherent organizational socialization process.

41
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Special Forces Socialization Model

Before addressing the implications, it is necessary to establish a
new model as a framework to help visualize the convergence of the
identity crisis, organizational
socialization, and institutional There is no single established
components and the resulting definition of the SF
impact on the USASOC focus profession accepted across
areas (see Figure 4.1). The all components of the
three sub-identity groups were institution. The absence of
brought forward from the a common organizational
findings and represented across purpose, formalized in a
the new model: DA (26 percent), manner such as doctrine, has
Legacy (28 percent), and several major implications.
Modern (46 percent). Remember,
the DA identity rejects special warfare as a core competency, the
Legacy identity accepts special warfare but rejects the contemporary

SF Socialization Model

USASOC People Modernize Readiness

USAREC JFKSWCS JFKSWCS 1st SFC

Stage 1: Pre-Arrival Stage II: Encounter Stage III: Metamorphosis

Recruit Assess-Select Train-Educate Tactical Units-Operational Staffs
Operator A
DA Identity
S S
F F
(26%)

Operator B
Legacy Identity A Q
(28%)

S C
Operator C
Modern Identity
(46%)

Gate Gate
1 2

USASOC = U.S. Army Special Operations JFKSWCS = John F. Kennedy Special SFAS = Special Forces Assessment and
Command Warfare Center and School Selection
USAREC = U.S. Army Recruiting Command 1st SFC = 1st Special Forces Command SFQC = Special Forces Qualification
DA = Department of the Army Course

Figure 4.1. Special Forces Socialization Model. Source: Author

42
 CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS

deterrence and competition missions, and the Modern identity is fully

aligned with the desired organizational identity.
It is also important to apply these concepts from the SF
Organizational Culture Model: (1) an individual’s identity is formed
by early adulthood; (2) the individual will be drawn to like-identity
recruiting messages; (3) despite enculturation by the organization,
the individual’s core identity and ethic will remain difficult to
modify, and; (4) when faced with an incongruent culture, the
individual will seek a congruent sub-culture if one exists, remain in
the culture albeit frustrated and unsatisfied, or reject and depart
the culture altogether.

Organizational Socialization
Organizations enculturate through socialization, the process
of moving a “naïve outsider to a fully socialized insider” of the
organization.70 This is how the organization “transmits” its desired
identity and culture to the members.71 Socialization occurs in three
stages: pre-arrival,72 encounter,73 and metamorphosis.74 Within the
SF Socialization Model, the SF socialization elements are organized
within the established academic stages: recruitment, assessment,
and selection (prearrival); training and education (encounter); and
organization integration (metamorphosis).

Institutional Components
As the three-star headquarters, USASOC oversees the three two-
star headquarters responsible for SF’s stages of socialization: The
United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), SWCS, and the
1st SFC. USAREC is responsible for the non-prior service recruiting
or 18X Program (approximately 40 percent of the annual recruiting
mission). Within SWCS, the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion
(SORB) is responsible for in-service recruiting (approximately
60 percent of the annual recruiting mission). SWCS has overall
responsibility for assessment, selection, training, and education. The
prearrival stage assessment and selection occur in the 24-day SFAS
Course and serve as the first socialization gate. The encounter stage
occurs throughout the 54-week SFQC and serves as the second

43
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

socialization gate. 1st SFC is responsible for the metamorphosis

stage of organizational integration. With the SF Organizational
Culture and SF Socialization Models established as guideposts, it is
time to consider implications of the identity crisis.

44
 Chapter 5. Implications

The identity crisis will continue unless it is countered by an

established, understood, and shared definition of the SF profession.
Without a centering mechanism, institutional components self-
determine how best to support objectives, which in many instances
are not congruent with the organization’s desired identity, and this
degrades the socialization process. Without proper socialization of
the desired SF organizational culture, the identity crisis will continue
to thrive and prevent the USASOC CG from fully realizing his goals to
prioritize people and build trust, modernize to be the Army’s force of
choice in competition, and focus readiness to support the Joint Force
in conflict.

FAILING TO RECRUIT AND RETAIN THE NATION’S BEST

SPECIAL WARFARE TALENT
The USASOC strategy directs a focus on “21st Century Talent
Management” that attracts and retains the Nation’s best performers,75
and for SF, this means the best special warfare talent. Lacking
a shared professional definition to guide
marketing, the nearly five-minutes long official The conflicting
U.S. Army SF recruiting video repeatedly recruiting
dramatizes direct action skills but only hints messages
at irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, and goals set
and the concept of partnership.76 Also, the conditions for
recruiting pages present a total of 16 pictures; SF socialization
one portrays SF engaging with indigenous failure.
peoples, while 15 display unilateral and direct
action activities.77 These initiatives to recruit Green Berets present
misleading direct action themes in lieu of more desirable partnership
themes (see Figure 5.1).

47
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Figure 5.1. GoArmy.com Special Forces recruiting pictures from 4 April 2020.

The conflicting recruiting messages and goals set conditions for

SF socialization failure. In the pre-arrival stage, individuals form
their expectations of an occupation and determine congruence
between the organization and their needs and desires.78 In turn, the
organization establishes its “organizational selection”79 criteria to
include desired member identity and marketing strategy to attract
the right applicant. Finally, effective matching of the individual’s
desires and expectations with organizational reality will simplify “the
transition from nonmember to member.”80 Within SF, this stage serves
as the first gate to the organization and includes the recruitment
of Green Berets by USAREC and the SORB and assessment and
selection by SWCS in the 24-day SFAS course.
However, because Green Beret socialization does not begin with
an authentic recruiting message, and, given only 24 days to assess
candidates, SFAS cannot accurately select all individuals with the
desired organizational identity. It is likely that many in the 26 percent
DA sub-group were attracted by a DA recruiting message, entered SF
already valuing and desiring a DA profession, and will not modify this
DA identity in the future.
Many survey respondents confirmed this assessment by describing
the SF recruiting narrative, pictures, and videos as “disingenuous” and

48
 CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS

“biased” toward direct action and surgical strike. A master sergeant

currently serving in SWCS proclaimed, “While doctrine states that we
are looking for people to do [the special warfare activities], that is not
who we select. The current assessment and selection system is broken.
As is recruiting. We are recruiting the wrong people, for the wrong
reasons.”81 A CW3 on staff stated: “We acquire soldiers under [the]
false premise of DA/CT/HR. Our posters and recruiting [are] focused
on the kinetic activity and not the professional soldier who is selected
to run guerrilla or counter-guerrilla operations and integrate or fight
directly against a resistance/insurgency by enabling partners.”82
A sergeant 1st class serving on a Special Forces Operational
Detachment Alpha (SFOD-A) summarized the impact of failed
socialization in the prearrival stage and its impact:
It seems most SF Soldiers are recruited with the
promise of conducting DA against terrorists. This causes
frustration and a lack of desire [and] appreciation for
Irregular Warfare. Many…don’t care about the Human
Domain. This marks a failure to understand what SF’s role
and purpose is. The culture and values of SF have been
slowly eroding due to this. The professional implication is
that the force doesn’t know what its purpose is. And if it
doesn’t know its purpose, then how can it be effective?83
Another sergeant first class from the operational force stated:
“We have forgotten what we were designed to be. Recruiting and
retention are less than stellar for CMF-18 [SOF career progression
plan]. Why are the NCOs of the regiment disgruntled? Maybe it is
because they were recruited to become door kickers with beards
and not overthrowing strategic level entities. When was the last
time someone said ‘De Oppresso [Liber] with pride?”84 Yet another
sergeant first class commented: “Special Forces is experiencing
an identity crisis in a few ways. [New] SF soldiers coming to the
regiment today believe they are joining something that mirrors [a
special mission unit]. This is affecting the quality of individuals we are
receiving and is largely affecting retention.”85

49
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

Authentic recruiting messages and accurate selection practices are

necessary to ensure congruence between personal and professional
identities. One must recruit, assess, and select the congruent identity
that will imbue the beliefs, values, and norms of the profession. One
cannot simply overlay the beliefs, values, and norms of a profession on
a person with an incongruent and preformed identity. Failure to get
recruiting right in the prearrival stage of socialization will not attract
now, or retain later, the best special warfare talent.
At this point in the socialization process, the identity crisis begins
for the DA identity group, who joined the organization under false
pretenses. Conversely, the Legacy and Modern identity groups were
attracted to the organization by different influences and are aligned
with the desired identity at this stage.

FAILING TO MODERNIZE FOR COMPETITION

USASOC strategy directs the force to “sustain Counter-VEO
[violent extremist organizations] operations while shifting focus
to near-peer competition”86 and “out-maneuver adversaries in the
competition space.”87 But without a shared professional definition
to center the training base, the misguided
Failure to get DA identity group continues to reject
recruiting right special warfare’s approaches, and the
uninformed Legacy identity group struggles
in the prearrival
to appreciate special warfare’s relevance
stage of
to the deterrence and competition mission
socialization will requirements; both tendencies indicate
not attract now, inadequate SF socialization.
or retain later, The underlying principle of socialization is
the best special that the organization repeatedly exposes the
warfare talent. individual to the desired culture that includes
expected identity, values, beliefs, norms,
and behaviors. If an individual is exposed to contrary versions of the
culture, such as DA identity, or is not exposed to critical components
of the culture, such as contemporary missions, effective socialization
cannot occur. A major and recent company commander observes

50
 CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS

the effects of the identity crisis on his formation and its impact on
modernization objectives:
Across my company, it is not universally clear what
our purpose is. Some are very comfortable with the
counterterrorism mission, some believe our purpose is
to remain focused on Unconventional Warfare readiness,
and some believe we should be spread across our theater
competing with Russia and China in the grey zone. What
[should] set us apart from all other military forces is
our unique ability to establish lasting and meaningful
partnerships. With partnership as our foundation, we
should be viewed as an enormous strategic asset and the
[U.S. Government’s] force of choice for deterring jihadist
groups, competing in the grey-zone, and preparing the
environment for war. Unfortunately, the Green Berets
in my company didn’t graduate the SFQC with this
understanding, and they don’t hear it from leadership.88
Failure to orient the force toward contemporary missions during
the encounter stage sets conditions for reduced readiness and
modernization. In the encounter stage, individuals begin to learn their
role, master tasks, develop relationships, and confirm or deny their
expectations of the organization.89 This stage is considered the “most
crucial for effective socialization”90 because the individual’s primary
goals are learning the rules of the culture and gaining acceptance, and
most frequently leads to “blind obedience and conformity.”91 Within SF,
this stage serves as the second gate to the organization and includes
training and education by SWCS in the 54-week SFQC.
From the survey, 42 percent of respondents claimed not to have
received adequate training or education on the contemporary
operating environment and were not prepared upon graduating
from the SFQC. They cited a lack of advanced strategic studies and
education to help them bridge cultural awareness with the nuances
of the strategic environment. Many NCOs share this master sergeant’s
belief that officers should not have a monopoly on strategic

51
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

education and opportunities at SFQC, universities, or abroad

and surmise that the lack of strategic study opportunities limits
their appreciation of the
contemporary deterrence From the survey, 42 percent of
and competition missions. respondents claimed not to have
This claim is consistent with received adequate training or
20 percent more NCOs education on the contemporary
populating the Legacy operating environment and were
group (as highlighted in
not prepared upon graduating
Table 9). A master/team
from the SFQC.
sergeant from Group
lamented, “The SF operators are expected to know and understand
the current operating environment, however, in the SFQC they do
not teach the National Security Strategies and U.S. priorities to the
operators”92 and only to the officers.
A large group of survey respondents, CT (36 percent) and DA (32
percent), believe SF is overinvested in deterring jihadist groups and
should shift away from these activities and missions. A sergeant first
class from the Legacy identity group demonstrated this sentiment:
Deter jihadist terrorist group threats should be other
organizations like [national units], SEALs, MARSOC, and
Rangers. They train on Direct Action. Green Berets have
unique and special skills of working with people. Quit
chasing the shiny and cool object we call counter-terrorism.
A successful GB doesn’t even have to go on the objective to
have desired effects. If a GB wants to shoot people, then he
should just go to a SMU [special mission unit].93
Further, 16 percent of survey respondents do not believe
competition with Russia and China is an appropriate mission for SF,
and a much greater 67 percent do not understand or feel prepared
for the competition mission. A master sergeant from Group stated,
“In my opinion, zero SFQC graduates are fully prepared to execute
competition with Russia and China…the base-line trained Green Beret

52
 CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS

graduate of the SFQC does not get this training.”94 A captain from a
different group noted:
I rank order preparation for competing against
Russia and China as low…we do not discuss how this is
accomplished (against near peer enemies) in the Q-course.
[I understand] there are ways to accomplish this task
through actions we are already conducting, but we did not
discuss this as a critical focus during the course.95
A third Green Beret noted, “We need to have the SFQC teach
that DoD is not the government agency [with] primacy to compete
against China and Russia. We support the interagency competition
efforts…right now, most GBs I meet [still] think killing people is [all
that] we do.”96
At this point in the socialization process, and, given that 46
percent of the surveyed population (Modern identity group) is fully
aligned with the desired Green Beret identity, it is apparent that the
SFQC successfully socializes nearly one half of SFQC students. Also,
drawing from the SF socialization model, the DA identity group (26
percent) will not modify their identity even under proper socialization
conditions. Finally, socialization in the SFQC is not adequately
integrating the contemporary irregular warfare environment, which
largely manifests in the Legacy identity group (28 percent).

FAILING TO IMPROVE FORCE PRESERVATION AND

READINESS
The USASOC CG is focused on improving readiness by protecting
and preserving a healthy force that “no longer deploys to redline,”
with a goal of “1:2 deployment to dwell ratio.”97 To achieve this, he
directs leadership and staff to “[maximize] predictability, [reduce]
uncertainty, protect [soldier’s] time…divest of legacy missions, and
exercise discipline in sourcing [missions].”98 Unfortunately, identity-
conflicted leaders and planners over-employ and misallocate the
force and thus disrupt the CG’s goal of improving readiness through
more disciplined force employment. As cited earlier, this is also

53
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

a major finding of the USSOCOM Comprehensive Review. These

practices have strategic consequences for SOF and other services,
as summarized by these comments from a sitting team sergeant and
major on staff, respectively:
We are deployed all over the world doing missions
outside of our scope. Generals and policymakers seem to
think that USASF can do anything… SOCOM on down either
agrees or doesn’t know how to say no…SF is trying to be
too many things to too many people…we have become
jack of all trades and masters of none.”99 … “By taking the
approach of ‘we’ll do it! what is it?’ we cannot reliably
deliver what we sell as our capabilities to senior leaders,
and we are undercut by other services who more narrowly
scope their capabilities and then perform them better.100
Drawing from the SF socialization model, 1st SFC is responsible
for the metamorphosis stage of organizational integration and is
expected to cultivate an individual identity and culture congruent
with the desired organizational identity and culture. In the
metamorphosis stage, individuals learn how things “really work” on
the inside and are most concerned with what it takes to become a
“fully accepted member of the organization.”101 The individual “settles
into new values and behaviors consistent with prevailing norms”
of the organization.102 It is in this stage that if new members find
congruence with their individual identities, they are satisfied.
However, if faced with an incongruent identity and culture, the
individual will seek a congruent sub-culture if one exists, remain in
the culture albeit frustrated and unsatisfied, or reject and depart the
culture altogether. An SF organization that fails to synchronize unified
purpose, personnel assignments, and appropriate missions, prevents
individuals from ever becoming special warfare experts. This reduces
the organization’s effectiveness and leads to job dissatisfaction.
Many survey respondents are frustrated with the incongruent
organizational culture within the operational force. Leaders and
planners with the DA mindset value short-term, transactional
relationships. Moreover, this mindset gravitates toward unilateral

54
 CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS

actions and seek missions with promise of enemy contact such as

counterterrorism operations against jihadist terrorist groups. Many in
SF are frustrated with leaders from the DA identity group (26 percent),
as expressed in the following sentiments:
“SF is the National Partner Force, not the National
Mission Force.”
“We have a holdover era of leaders from Iraq [and
Afghanistan] that wants to spend 90 percent of their
[training] time on CT, DA, and SR through [Special
Forces Advanced Urban Combat], [Combat Management
Marksmanship Skills], and [military free fall].”
“It is really frustrating because our Company has regional
engage-ments, not combat rotations, scheduled for the
next several years.”103
Another Green Beret stated, “One of the greatest frustrations of a
Green Beret is that you sign up to do this great task and mission of
UW, yet [you] are constantly employed doing [other missions].”104
Leaders with the Legacy identity undervalue regional alignment and
persistent presence that reassures allies and partners and competes
with Russia and China. From the survey, 42 percent of respondents
reported that they are not
assigned to a regional unit
An SF organization that fails to
aligned with their target
synchronize unified purpose,
language and 52 percent
personnel assignments, and
report their last deployment
appropriate missions, prevents was to a country not aligned
individuals from ever becoming with their assigned region.
special warfare experts. This misalignment sends the
message that language and
culture are not important to leadership or mission accomplishment,
resulting in 62 percent of respondents not valuing or practicing their
language routinely.
A team sergeant explained that “In eight years on an SFOD-A, I
deployed to the region of my language one time for a two-month

55
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

[Joint Combined Exchange Training]; now, I am a team sergeant in a

different Group assigned to a different region. I think language should
be important but why bother when leadership doesn’t consistently
assign us to units or missions aligned with our language?”105 A sergeant
first class currently serving on an SFOD-A commented, “We, as a force,
are not committed to long-term anything because we infrequently
deploy to the same place/mission twice. How can anyone become a
master in their field if they can’t even devote sufficient time…to one
[area of responsibility]?”106
The DA and Legacy identities are at variance with the contemporary
special warfare missions and activities and incur opportunity costs.
Energy expended toward activities not assigned to, or expected of,
a unit will compete with opportunities to increase readiness in those
activities that are assigned and expected to be performed. When SF
are used for non-SF missions, there are several undesirable effects:
SF does not divest from legacy missions, leaders and planners do not
exercise discipline in sourcing, and SF are not available for appropriate
SF missions. The identity crisis adversely impacts all USASOC’s
readiness objectives.
At the conclusion of the socialization process, members from the
DA identity will migrate to a DA sub-identity group, if one exists. If
not, they will become dissatisfied, increasing the likelihood of their
departure. The Legacy identity group will behave in the same manner
as the DA group, albeit for different reasons. Members of the Modern
identity group have the best chance (46 percent) of working with
and for like-identity individuals. However, even though this group is
aligned completely with who and what a Green Beret is expected to
be today, it may not matter; when they are smothered by misaligned
leaders or teammates with DA and Legacy identity group paradigms,
values, beliefs, norms, and behaviors, they also experience frustration
and job dissatisfaction.

SUMMARY
To summarize, without a sanctioned common definition of the
SF profession, the identity crisis within SF will continue. Without a

56
 CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS

centering mechanism, institutional components self-determine how

best to support objectives, which are in many instances not congruent
with the organization’s desired identity, and this weakens the
socialization process (see Figure 5.2).

SF Socialization Model

USASOC People Modernize Readiness

USAREC JFKSWCS JFKSWCS 1st SFC

Stage 1: Pre-Arrival Stage II: Encounter Stage III: Metamorphosis

Recruit Assess-Select Train-Educate Tactical Units-Operational Staffs
Operator A
DA Identity X
Recruiting
message
S S X 74% Chance
Dissatisfaction

F F
(26%)

Misallocation
Operator B
Legacy Identity A X
Education of
contemporary
Q X
72% Chance
(28%) Dissatisfaction

S C
missions

Overemployment
Operator C
Modern Identity 54% Chance
(46%)
X Dissatisfaction

Gate Gate
1 2

USASOC = U.S. Army Special Operations JFKSWCS = John F. Kennedy Special SFAS = Special Forces Assessment and
Command Warfare Center and School Selection
USAREC = U.S. Army Recruiting Command 1st SFC = 1st Special Forces Command SFQC = Special Forces Qualification
DA = Department of the Army Course

Figure 5.2. Identity crisis impact on Special Forces socialization. Source: Author

The DA sub-identity prevents authentic recruiting efforts to attract

the right talent and causes damaging effects on trust and soldier
wellness. The identity crisis disrupts modernization goals by preventing
some from gaining a nuanced understanding of special warfare in the
contemporary environment. Finally, the DA and Legacy sub-identities
undermine special warfare readiness with issues of opportunity cost
and degrade force preparation and readiness through overemployment
and misallocation.
Where does USASOC begin to address the identity crisis within SF?
Are there potential lessons for other cohorts within USSOCOM who
are possibly struggling to understand their identity, culture, and ethical
transgressions? These questions are the subject of Part VI, which
provides initial recommendations for consideration by USASOC and
USSOCOM leadership.
57
 Chapter 6. Recommendations for Further
Action and Research

USASOC leadership must assess and define the Green Beret

profession in a foundational doctrinal document similar to the Army
Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication
(ADRP) 1 to ensure alignment across all institutional components of
the SF enterprise. Defining the profession in ADP 1-18 Special Forces
Profession will establish one identity “down and in” to recalibrate and
unify SF.
For a military profession to lose its sense of identity and purpose
is nothing new. A decade of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq left the Army underprepared for
land warfare with nation–state peer armies, and the Army’s Chief
of Staff, retired Gen. Raymond Odierno, recognized the “period of
strategic transition” and that change was necessary.107 When faced with
changes in the strategic environment, Army leadership acknowledged
it had lost its sense of purpose and identity. It then boldly and
holistically initiated recovery and transformation by focusing on
reassessing and redefining its core108 and promulgated ADP 1, The
Army, which included a chapter specifically defining Our Profession.109
Subsequently, in 2013, it published ADRP 1, The Army Profession,
to reassess its purpose, redefine its profession, and describe Army
culture.110 It further addressed questions about the Army Ethic as the
foundation for developing the moral identity of Army Professionals.111
The Army White Paper notes “that the essential characteristic Trust is
based on adherence to the Army Ethic in the performance of Duty and
in all aspects of life.” 112
Anchoring the profession in ADP 1-18, Special Forces Profession, will
provide the centering mechanism to ensure unity of purpose and effort
across the institutional segments. It will ensure authentic recruiting
messages are rooted in the profession’s core purpose and align
recruit expectations with the SF profession. It will remove ambiguous

59
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

readiness requirements for SF by directing the organization’s attributes,

skills, competencies, activities, and missions. It will enable leaders
and planners to analyze contemporary mission requirements and
decline tasks and missions misaligned with special warfare capabilities,
ultimately protecting the force from inappropriate commitments.
Finally, ADP 1-18 will build consensus at higher levels by accurately and
coherently communicating the value of SF “up and out” to the Army,
Joint Force, and interagency partners. Only when the profession is
clearly defined, and shared, by all SF Green Berets, can the organization
overcome the identity crisis and fully realize the USASOC CG’s
objectives for the force.
USSOCOM should consider organizational identity in any future
reviews of cohort culture or ethics. Although this was an active-
duty Green Beret research project, the lessons likely apply to other
USSOCOM cohorts struggling to understand their identity, culture,
and ethical transgressions. General
Clarke’s comprehensive review
Only when the profession
of the culture and ethics of SOF
is clearly defined,
did not find a systemic ethics
and shared, by all SF
problem,113 but it did find cultural
Green Berets, can the
problems.114 This seems inconsistent
organization overcome
with published academic studies
and the Army’s understanding of
the identity crisis and fully
the interdependence of identity, realize the USASOC CG’s
culture, and ethic. objectives for the force.

Therefore, understanding the

beliefs and behaviors of the individual, and how they impact the
shared beliefs and behaviors of the individuals that make up the
group’s identity and culture, are essential to changing a culture115 and
not mutually exclusive from ethical decision-making. “Professionals
are guided by their ethic; the set of principles which they practice,
in the right way, on behalf of those they serve—demonstrating their
Character…this [ethic] is their identity.”116

60
CHAPTER 6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION AND RESEARCH

Perhaps the real problem, one that addresses the ethics issues,
can only be addressed by taking a hard look at the underlying
assumptions and identity beliefs of the cohort cultures across
USSOCOM. The existence of a problematic culture, without ethical
and identity problems, is unlikely. Identity, culture, and ethical
decisions are inextricably intertwined. The identity crisis is impacting
SF culture and ethical decision-making. It is likely that similar identity
crisis issues exist within other cohorts of USSOCOM and impact their
cultures and organization’s ethics. The ethic enables the professional
to understand the purpose of their profession, “that the ethical
practices are the professional standard and that unethical practices
must not be tolerated.”117

CONCLUSION
The Green Berets have a proud history, rich heritage, and a historic
ethic of service to the Nation and willingness to sacrifice. However,
there is one very hard “truth” for senior SF leadership from this
research: The Green Berets have an identity crisis.
U.S. strategic leadership reactions to 9/11 and subsequent events
resulted in changing expectations for Green Berets, and this dialectic
has manifested itself in three distinct identities within the force.
Through their beliefs and behaviors, some currently serving Green
Berets are no longer embracing the doctrinal role of SF by rejecting
long-term partnership operations in favor of short-term unilateral
approaches. Others do not understand or accept our current value
to the Army, Joint Force, and interagency partners. A third group,
even though aligned completely with who and what a Green Beret
is expected to be today, is often smothered by misaligned leaders or
teammates. How will SF leadership identify the hazards and manage
the risks associated with the established identity crisis?
Cultural fragmentation in an organization will eventually tear the
organization apart from the inside. Leadership must recognize and
acknowledge the dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and
manage the necessary cultural evolution in a way that enables the
group to survive in a changing environment. If leaders do not become

61
 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

conscious of the sub-cultures within their organization, “those cultures

will manage them.”118 Understanding identity and culture “is essential to
leaders if they are to lead.”119
We must reflect on the experiences of the past 20 years and assess
the impact on the identity of the force. If we are a learning institution,
it is imperative that we see ourselves clearly and honestly so we can
determine how we should define our profession. Senior SF leadership
must begin by acknowledging this crisis and commit to understanding
and defining who Green Berets are and what Green Berets do.

62
 Author's Note

Maybe you agree with the thesis of this monograph; maybe

you don’t. Either way, let’s continue the conversation! JSOU Press
welcomes submissions that rebut or reinforce the concept of an
identity crisis in Special Forces. For more information, visit www.jsou.
edu/press/publishwithjsou or email [email protected].
Hear what others in Special Forces have to say on the topic in the
following podcasts:

U.S. Army War College War Room podcast, The Turmoil of Identity Crisis:
Special Forces Organizational Culture, featuring Col. Croot, Maj. Gen.
John Brennan, Brig. Gen. Steve Marks, and host Ron Granieri, professor
of history at the U.S. Army War College: https://warroom.
armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/sfcom-culture

Indigenous Approach podcast, Special Forces Identity Part I, featuring

seven sergeants major from across Special Forces: https://www.
listennotes.com/podcasts/the-indigenous/special-forces-identity-part-
1-HfLnsIlt2yj/

65
 Afterword

I was asked by active-duty Army and Special Forces Col. Ed Croot,

the author of the project “There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces,”
to write an Afterword for his important and valuable work. As the
Vice Commander of the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM), and leader of the USSOCOM 2020 Comprehensive
Review, I am happy to assist for two critical reasons.
First, I believe that Col. Croot’s research construct and methodology
represents a thorough and honest assessment of U.S. Army Special
Forces, providing micro-level analytical details and suppositions that
mirrored the macro findings of the 2020 USSOCOM Comprehensive
Review. His work provides a lens to be leveraged by USSOCOM leaders
across the enterprise as the force steps further away from the global
war on terror (GWOT) and its associated impacts on the force – both
positive and negative.
Second, I want compliment Col. Croot for taking on a difficult and
unpopular topic, knowing that it would create friction and divisiveness
within his own formation and across the USSOCOM enterprise. At
a time with our nation facing global competition on a scale not
seen since the Cold War, much more will be required of USSOCOM.
Embracing Col. Croot’s work allows SOF leaders to better understand
and address the subcultures within their formations, develop effective
socialization models, and train their force to apex levels of competency
and lethality.
In closing, I commend Col. Croot for addressing this topic head-
on, as I know that some agree and some do not. I also recommend
that every Green Beret, Air Commando, Ranger, SEAL, and Raider
take the time to read this research, recommend it to our Special
Operations Forces supporters and critics, and use it to inform their
own debates and decisions moving forward. And finally, I want to once
again encourage all in the SOF formations to think critically about our
profession. We owe this to our nation as the world’s premier special
operations force.

U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Francis L. Donovan

Vice Commander, USSOCOM
August 2024

67
 Acronyms

ADP – Army Doctrine Publication

ADRP – Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ARSOF – Army Special Operations Forces
CG – commanding general
COIN – counterinsurgency
CP – counterproliferation
CT – counterterrorism
CWMD – counter weapons of mass destruction
DA – direct action
DoD – Department of Defense
FID – foreign internal defense
GWOT – Global War on Terrorism
HR – hostage rescue
K/C – kill/capture
KIA – killed in action
SF – Special Forces
SFA – security force assistance
SFAB – Security Force Assistance Brigade
SFAS -Special Forces Assessment and Selection
SFC – Special Forces Command
SFG (A) – Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SFOD-A – Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha
SFQC – Special Forces Qualification Course
SORB – Special Operations Recruiting Battalion
SR – special reconnaissance
SWCS – [John F. Kennedy] Special Warfare Center and School
USAREC – United States Army Recruiting Command
USASOC – United States Army Special Operations Command
UW – unconventional warfare

69
 Notes

1 David Walton and Joseph Long, “Green Berets: Rebuilding the Guerrilla
Leader Identity,” Small Wars Journal (2018), accessed December 10, 2019,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/green-berets-rebuilding-guerrilla-leader-
identity.
2 “Honor the Fallen,” Military Times, acessed April 10, 2020, https://thefallen.
militarytimes.com/.
3 “Medal of Honor Directory,” U.S. Army, accessed March 23, 2020, https://www.
army.mil/medalofhonor/recipients.html.
4 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces: Backgroud and Issues for
Congress (Washington, D.C., 2019, accessed April 11, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf.
5 Gen. Richard D. Clarke, Comprehensive Review (Tampa, FL: United States
Special Operations Command, 2020).
6 Clarke, Comprehensive Review, 4.
7 Clarke, Comprehensive Review, 5.
8 Clarke, Comprehensive Review, 39.
9 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “How to Fix U.S. Special Operations Forces,”
War on the Rocks (February 25, 2020), accessed February 28, 2020, https://
warontherocks.com/2020/02/how-to-fix-u-s-special-operations-forces/.
10 Stavros Atlamazoglou, “United States Special Operations Command to
Disband Elite Green Beret Unit,” Business Insider, accessed March 13, 2020,
https://www.businessinsider.com/army-special-operations-command-to-
disband-elite-green-beret-unit-2020-3?amp.
11 C. Todd Lopez, “Security Force Assistance Brigades to Free Brigade Combat
Teams from Advise, Assist Mission,” U.S. Army, accessed April 11, 2020, https://
www.army.mil/article/188004/security_force_assistance_brigades_to_free_
brigade_combat_teams_from_advise_assist_mission.
12 Security Force Assistance Command, “Operational and Organizational
Concept,” Security Force Assistance Command. Accessed April 14, 2020,
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://fortbenningausa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/TCM_SFAB_2018.pdf__;!!OToaGQ!9A4uGHdWQCrljeXqVXl
qg9_jYPnn_dWharDbuXNFDkMZI8wI0M640obAMvUNvhF-pms$.
13 United States Army Special Operations Command, “United States Army
Special Forces Command History,” last modified 2020, accessed April 11,
2020, https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/SFhistory.html.
14 Francis M. Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy (Fort Liberty,
N.C.: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2019).

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 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

15 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 2.

16 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 4.
17 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 2.
18 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 6.
19 Edward Croot. “2020 Green Beret Survey.” Survey. January 8, 2020, 68.
20 Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces (as Amended through January 7,
2011), vol. I, Section 164, Commanders of Combatant Commands: Assignment;
Powers and Duties, and Section 167, Unified Combatant Command for Special
Operations Forces (2011).
21 Headquarters Department of the U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-05
Army Special Operations (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2019). 1-3.
22 U.S. Army, ADP 3-05 Army Special Operations,1-3.
23 U.S. Army, ADP 3-05 Army Special Operations.
24 U.S. Army, ADP 3-05 Army Special Operations, 2-4 through 2-11. Definitions
of the core Special Warfare activities: Counterinsurgency (COIN):
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneusly defeat
and contain insurgency and address its root causes; Counterterrorism (CT):
Activities and operations taken to neutralize terroritst and their organizations
and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill
fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals; Foreign
Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian agencies and military forces
of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and
activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats
to its security; Security Force Assistance (SFA): Department of Defense
activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of
foreign security forces and their supporting institutions; Unconventional
Warfare (UW): Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla
force in a denied area.
25 President, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C., White House, 2017).
26 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America : Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive
Edge (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018).
27 Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army in Multi-
Domain Operations 2028 (Fort Knox, KY: Training and Doctrine Command,
2018), 17.
28 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 1.
29 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 2.
30 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,
2017), I-6.

72
 NOTES

31 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Training Pamphlet 3-18.1: Unconventional

Warfare (2019). Resistance is defined as efforts by individuals or groups to
resist, oppose or overthrow an oppressor, usually an established government
or occupying power.
32 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication-1: The
Army Profession (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 2013). The U.S. Army defines
profession as a trusted and disciplined vocation, that provides a unique
and vital service to the nation, develops and applies expert knowledge,
establishes and upholds the discipline and standard of the profession, through
professional development and certification.
33 U.S. Army, ADP 3-05 Army Special Operations, 1-3.
34 U.S. Army, ADP 3-05 Army Special Operations, 2-4 through 2-11.
35 Headquarters, Departent of the Army, Field Manual 3-18 Special Forces
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2014). 3-4.
36 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession. A-1.
37 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership 4th ed. (Jossey-Bass
Business and Management, 2010), 24.
38 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership,18. Organizational Culture and
Leadership defined:
Culture: A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
those problems.
Basic Underlying Assumptions: Unconscious, taken—for—granted beliefs and
values that determine perception, thought, feeling, and behavior.
Values: Articulated publicly announced principles and values that the group
claims to be trying to achieve.
Norms: Implicit standards and values that evolve in working groups.
39 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 32.
40 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 24.
41 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession, A-1.
42 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, The Army Ethic White Paper (Fort
Knox, KY: Mission Command Center of Excellence, U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014), accessed April 13,
2020. 11.
43 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 24.
44 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession, A-1.
45 Pop History Dig, “The Green Berets,” last modified March 16, 2018, accessed
April 13, 2020. https://www.pophistorydig.com/topics/tag/green-berets-john-
f-kennedy/.

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 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

46 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 24.

47 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 32.
48 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession, 1-3.
49 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 26.
50 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 21.
51 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 24.
52 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 28.
53 Valka-Mir Human Security, Psychosocial-Emotional Aspects of Hostnation
Partner-Force Training, Advising, and Employment 2nd ed (January 2020): 114.
54 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 29.
55 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 16.
56 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 29.
57 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 28.
58 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 33.
59 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession, 2-3.
60 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 17.
61 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership.
62 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 18.
63 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 16.
64 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 29.
65 Oxford English Dictionary, “Definition of Identity Crisis in English,” Oxford
University Press, accessed April 14, 2020. https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/
login?url=https://www.oed.com.
66 Valka-Mir Human Security, Psychosocial-Emotional Aspects, 110.
67 Valka-Mir Human Security, Psychosocial-Emotional Aspects.
68 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 24.
69 Croot. “Green Beret Survey.” Post-Survey Phone Interview. December 19, 2019.
70 Cynthia D. Fisher and Jeff A. Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 1982), accessed April 14, 2020,
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rypNaxSmqp7pU--7gWHIl5w$, 28.
71 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 94.
72 Stephen H. Konya and Rob Johnson, Organizational Culture: Anticipatory
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74
 NOTES

chapter_8_organizculture.htm__;!!OToaGQ!4hmTZwO_9-p1a0vEVVMKguHnlv
XfAzZyN0WBU1ma6xY-rypNaxSmqp7pU--7VTIwPN0$.
73 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 31.
74 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 32.
75 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 5.
76 U.S. Army, “Special Forces Recruiting Video,” accessed April 4, 2020. https://
www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/
combat/special-forces-candidate.html.
77 U.S. Army, “Special Forces Recruiting Page,” accessed April 4, 2020. https://
www.goarmy.com/special-forces.html.
78 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 31.
79 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 28.
80 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 31.
81 Croot. “Green Beret Survey,” February 10, 2020, 78.
82 Croot. “Green Beret Survey,” January 17, 2020, 80.
83 Croot. “Green Beret Survey,” December 17, 2020, 113.
84 Croot. “Green Beret Survey,” January 9, 2020, 95.
85 Croot. “Green Beret Survey,” January 9, 2020, 91.
86 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 4.
87 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 5.
88 Croot. “Green Beret Survey,” Post-Survey Phone Interview. January 3, 2019.
89 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 31.
90 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations.
91 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations.
92 Croot, “Green Beret Survey,” December 18, 2020, 112.
93 Croot, “Green Beret Survey,” January 19, 2020, 107.
94 Croot, “Green Beret Survey,” January 9, 2020, 93.
95 Croot, “Green Beret Survey,” January 13, 2020, 83.
96 Croot, “Green Beret Survey,” December 16, 2020, 123.
97 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy, 5.
98 Beaudette, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy.
99 Croot, “2020 Green Beret Survey,” December 19, 2020, 110.
100 Croot, “2020 Green Beret Survey,” December 17, 2020, 117.
101 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations, 32.
102 Fisher and Weekley, Socialization in Work Organizations.

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 THERE IS AN IDENTITY CRISIS IN SPECIAL FORCES

103 Croot, “2020 Green Beret Survey,” December 26, 2020, 107.
104 Croot, “2020 Green Beret Survey,” December 16, 2020, 122.
105 Croot, “2020 Green Beret Survey,” December 31, 2020, 93.
106 Croot, “2020 Green Beret Survey,” December 17, 2020, 113.
107 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. The Army Ethic White Paper, i.
108 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. The Army Ethic White Paper, 1.
109 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession.
110 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession.
111 U.S. Army, ADP-1 The Army Profession, 4-2.
112 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. The Army Ethic White Paper , 2.
113 Clarke, Comprehensive Review, 4.
114 Clarke, Comprehensive Review, 39.
115 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 33.
116 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. The Army Ethic White Paper, i
117 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. The Army Ethic White Paper, 2.
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119 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership.

76
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81
 In struggling with the effects of “mission drift” for two
decades, Special Forces (SF) have drifted away from
complex, long-duration partnerships toward more linear,
short-term, transactional combat operations. There is
subsequently an identity crisis in SF, and it is influencing the
culture and behavior of Green Berets. This study of the identity
crisis in Special Forces earned Col. Ed Croot the U.S. Army War College
Colonel Francis J. Kelly Special Operations Writing Award.

I want to encourage
all Green Berets to ex
and think critically ab plore this research
out our profession.
warfare professional Our role as irregular
practitioners, with an
interagency, internati d through our
onal, and joint partn
to achieving integrat ers, remains critical
ed deterrence again
and North Korea. As st China, Russia, Iran,
such, every member
must understand ou of our profession
r essential strategic
and we owe it to fut value to the nation,
ure American generat
and appropriately ap ions to learn, adapt,
ply our skills to suffic
iently protect it.
— Lt. Gen. John W. Br
Deputy Commander,
en nan
U.S. Africa Command

topic head-
t for addressing this
I commend Col. Croo do not. I also
me agree, and some
on, as I know that so r Commando,
ery Green Beret, Ai
recommend that ev e to read this
Raider take the tim
Ranger, SEAL, and Operations
nd it to our Special
research, recomme to inform
d critics, and use it
Forces supporters an forward.
d decisions moving
their own debates an L. Donovan
— Lt. Gen. Francis
Command
. Special Operations
Vice Commander, U.S

United States Special Operations Command

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jsou.edu/press

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