JOINT

JOINT SPECIAL
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY

THE NEW WAY OF

LIMITED WARFARE
THE VALUE OF THE AFGHAN MODEL OF WARFARE AFTER THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS

CAPTAIN TIJS ALTHUIZEN, MA PROFESSOR MARTIJN KITZEN, PHD

NETHERLANDS MARINE CORPS NETHERLANDS DEFENCE ACADEMY

JSOU Report 24-3

On the cover: Coalition Special Operations Forces operate in Syria
with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). In front, a bulldozer
creates a protective barrier against vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices. Source: https://www.france24.com/fr/20160422-reporters-doc-
syrie-fds-kurdes-arabes-assaut-califat-ei-shedade-assad

Back cover: A Syrian Democratic Forces deputy commander advises

his soldiers of an incoming missile attack on ISIS vehicles in Deir ez-
Zor province, Syria, Nov. 28, 2018. Continued assistance to partner
forces is essential to setting conditions for regional stability. The
Coalition and its partners remain united and resolved to prevent the
resurgence of ISIS and its violent extremist ideology. Source: U.S.
Army photo by Sgt. Matthew Crane

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those

of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views,
policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of
Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the Joint
Special Operations University.

JSOU PRESS
Cameron Cobb, Editor in Chief
Melanie Casey, Editor | Eric Hughes, Editor
Book layout and design by Laura Tindall

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

June 2024

ISBN 978-1–941715-70-3
The New Way of Limited Warfare:
The Value of the Afghan Model of Warfare
After the Fight Against ISIS

CAPTAIN TIJS ALTHUIZEN, MA

Netherlands Marine Corps

PROFESSOR MARTIJN KITZEN, PHD

Netherlands Defence Academy

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida | June 2024

JSOU Report 24-3

 Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Methodological Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Chapter 2. The Academic Debate

2.1 Introduction to an Existential Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Prelude: A New Revolution in Military Affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 The Birth of a New Way of Limited War?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 The Invasion and Occupation of Iraq: A Progress
Report on the Revolution in Military Affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 The Afghan Model in Libya: Same Elements,
Different Dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6 Wrapping up the Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Chapter 3. Toward a Framework for Analyzing the

Applicability of the Afghan Model of Warfare
3.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Applicability Factors at the Political Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3.3 Applicability Factors of the Airpower Component. . . . . . . . . 19

3.4 Applicability Factors Concerning the Indigenous
Forces Component. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5 Applicability Factors Related to the SOF Component. . . . . . 26
3.6 Conclusion: A Provisional Framework for Analysis. . . . . . . . . 27
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

Chapter 4: A
 ssessing the Fight Against ISIS in Iraq
and Syria
4.1 To What Extent is ISIS Defeated?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4.2 Assessing the Grand Strategy and USCENTCOM'S

Operational Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4.3 How Did the Role of the Afghan Model Evolve

During Operation INHERENT RESOLVE on the
Strategic Level?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

4.4 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Chapter 5: Validating the Afghan Model Applicability

Assessment Framework in the ISIS Case
5.1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5.2. Political Applicability Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5.3. Airpower Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

5.4. Indigenous Forces Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5.5. SOF Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.6. What New Factors Can Be Identified Based on the

Use of the Afghan Model in the Fight
Against ISIS?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

5.7. Conclusion: An Upgraded Afghan Model Applicability

Assessment Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Chapter 6: The Value of the Afghan Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Appendix A: O
 peration INHERENT RESOLVE’s Lines
of Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Appendix B: C
 ombined Joint Task Force-Operation
INHERENT RESOLVE Campaign Design . . . . . . . 95
 CONTENTS

Appendix C: C
 ombined Joint Task Force-Operation
INHERENT RESOLVE Command Structure. . . . . . 97

Appendix D: U.S. Dynamic Targeting Steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
 Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s international security environment confronts the United
States and its partners with unprecedented challenges. Escalating
competition with China and Russia, growing assertiveness of regional
powers like Iran and North Korea, the persevering threat of violent
non-state actors, and even a major war on European soil present
multiple dilemmas that can only be faced with the help of a versatile
strategic toolkit. Current military operations rely heavily on traditional
deterrence strategy. China’s military buildup and the conventional
nature of much of the fighting in Ukraine as of 2024 reinforces this
posture. Yet this covers only one side of the multifaceted threats we
are facing. This fact especially reverberates in the special operations
community, which finds itself engaged in both countering gray
zone activities and the enduring fight against violent extremist
organizations. This monograph seeks to contribute to the development
of a broader strategic palette by analyzing the importance and utility
of the so-called Afghan model (AM) as a way for achieving political
ends through the employment of limited means.
Looking back at the war in Afghanistan today does not seem
to illustrate a model for a successful future military approach. The
lingering image of Western involvement there is one of strategic
failure epitomized by the dramatic evacuation of Kabul in 2021. Yet
in 2001 the initial invasion was regarded as hugely successful as
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), supported by airpower and
close cooperation with indigenous allies, toppled the Taliban regime
in a matter of weeks. Furthermore, this was achieved using limited
means. This novel operational approach was enabled by new doctrine
based on major military innovation and aimed at exploiting new

1
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

technologies in the fields of information processing, communication,

surveillance, networking, and precision weaponry. The ground­
breaking level of air–ground integration that emerged thanks to
the revolution in military affairs (RMA) enabled an unprecedented
synergy between airpower, SOF, and indigenous forces–the core
elements of this new model of limited warfare. The effectiveness
and swift success of this combination triggered a debate on the
exact significance and implications of what was dubbed the Afghan
model of warfare. According to some scholars and policy officials, it
presented the United States with an opportunity to reach strategic
objectives through a new way of limited war, and hence the armed
forces should be restructured accordingly.1 Others, however,
considered the approach of little value outside its original context.2
More than 20 years later, the approach has been successfully applied
in several other cases (e.g., Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2010, and Iraq and
Syria from 2014–2017). This demonstrates that the AM is not a one-
day wonder and that it holds relevance beyond the unique situation of
Afghanistan in 2001. On the other hand, it has also become clear that
the AM is not a panacea; the invasion of Iraq and the counterinsurgency
and stabilization efforts in that country and Afghanistan required
far more than a limited approach. Moreover, as aforementioned, the
reemergence of great power competition as a consequence of a
resurgent Russia and rising China has emphasized the importance of a
broad strategic toolkit that includes traditional conventional options as
well as methods for limited warfare.3 The key issue with regard to the
AM, therefore, is to establish under which conditions this approach can
be successfully applied to assess its utility in future cases.
Based on earlier research on Afghanistan, Iraq (2003), and Libya
(2011), this monograph presents a framework of factors that determine
to what extent an AM-type approach is applicable in future contexts.4
This assessment tool is subsequently employed to analyze the most
recent use of this form of limited warfare: the fight against ISIS in Iraq
and Syria (2014–2017). The latter case has delivered a tremendous
amount of relevant new data that can be used for further augmenting
our understanding of the applicability of the AM in a specific context. As
such, the resulting insights contribute to the current debate on the exact
role of the model in the ISIS case and the way this should influence

2
 CHAPTER 1

thinking about this type of limited warfare. Furthermore, it should be

mentioned here that positions in this discourse often seem heavily
influenced by teleological reasoning in favor of, or objecting to, defense
transformation (following an author’s preference). This monograph does
not originate from such a stance as it seeks to provide an objective
analysis by addressing the value of the AM after the fight against ISIS.

1.2 METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN Introduction and

The value of the AM is dependent on Methodological
Design
the degree to which it is applicable in
other contexts. The applicability of the AM
is thus what could be called a necessary
intermediate variable to draw conclusions Academic
on its value, which is the dependent variable Debate
in this study. This value of the AM is shaped
by the future strategic context as it depends
on the expected occurrence of conflicts that
meet the applicability requirements. To draw Toward a
Framework on
conclusions on the model’s value after the Afghan Model
fight against ISIS, this study first explores Applicability
the underlying academic debate. Chapter 2
discusses the origin of the AM, its theoretical
embedding, and its relevance to different
Assessing
stakeholders. Chapter 3 introduces the
Coalition
framework of factors that determine whether Operations
the AM is applicable in a specific context. As
previously mentioned, this is based on earlier
research into the three cases in which the
Validate
AM was employed prior to its most recent
Framework
use in the fight against ISIS.5 In Chapter (Intermediate Variable)

4, essential elements of the ISIS case

and its operational and strategic context
are discussed to provide the necessary
Value of the
understanding to utilize and, if necessary, Afghan Model
refine the AM applicability assessment (Dependent Variable)

framework. Ultimately, this allows for

Figure 1.1. Methodological
drawing a conclusion on the value of the design and chapter outline.
AM in Chapter 5. See Figure 1.1. It should be Source: authors

3
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

noted that it is not this study’s purpose to provide a definite vision

on the remaining relevance of the AM in future conflict. This requires
additional, more extensive research, for which this monograph aims
to provide a substantiated underpinning as well as potential avenues
for further exploration.

1.3 METHODOLOGY
This study combines several types of research methodologies.
Chapter 2 is based on content analysis of extant literature whereas
Chapter 3 relies upon a comparative-case-based research study.6 With
regard to the latter, the necessary data has been retrieved by vetting a
wide range of available literature. The analysis of the application of the
AM against ISIS and validation of the framework of factors in Chapter
4 follows the case study method. It should be noted that in the first
instance, insufficient data was available for providing in-depth insight
in the operational dynamics, as scholarly publications were particularly
lacking. To overcome this challenge, newly available material from
different sources like RAND, the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI), academic journals, newspaper articles, policy publications and
U.S. Senate hearings on Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) were
combined to allow for a comprehensive analysis of the application
of the AM in the ISIS case.7 Furthermore, at various points this
monograph delves into the strategic context, for which the authors rely
on the analysis of a wide body of available literature. See Figure 1.2.

Operation
Operation
ODYSSEY DAWN
IRAQI
AND UNIFIED
FREEDOM,
PROTECTOR,
Iraq 2003
Libya 2011

Operation Operation
ENDURING INHERENT
FREEDOM, RESOLVE,
Applicability
Afghanistan Iraq and
Afghan Model
2001 Syria 2014
Intermediate
Variable

Figure 1.2. Case study outline. Source: authors

4
 Chapter 2: The Academic Debate

2.1 INTRODUCTION TO AN EXISTENTIAL DEBATE

Since the emergence of the AM, there has been ongoing academic
debate about the question as to what extent ground forces can be
supplemented–or even replaced–by airpower under influence of
the new RMA. The discussion on the applicability of the model is
intimately connected to this debate and therefore should be placed
in the context of grand strategy and international relations. If the AM
should be perceived as the new, limited way of warfare for the U.S., this
would lower the costs of global force projection. This is of existential
relevance at both the military and the grand strategic level as it
carries the potential to respectively change the power ratio between
military services and influence the international geopolitical balance by
improving the force projection toolkit available to the United States.
Hence, it is no surprise that the nature and the potential of the AM have
become the subject of a thorough academic debate, as many scholars
have tried to value and comprehend its success. In this chapter the
most relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed chronologically.

2.2 PRELUDE: A NEW REVOLUTION IN MILITARY

AFFAIRS
Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 inaugurated a new era in the
application of airpower by the United States and its allies.8 For the
first time in history, efforts in the air dominated a large-scale military
campaign.9 During this war against Iraq, airpower proved itself beyond
expectations and, despite being criticized as an anomaly, it gained
a new reputation for effectiveness.10 Consequently, airpower quickly
became the preferred weapon for Western politicians who oversaw the
use of force in a post-Cold War era characterized by wars of choice.11

7
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

Keith Shimko, in this regard, explains that during this period, the focus
shifted from industrial age to information age warfare, which inspired
a transformation from air–land battle doctrine into network-centric
warfare (NCW).12 The simultaneous emergence of new technologies
such as information technology, advanced digital networking, sixth-
generation computers, a variety of electronic sensors, space-based
platforms, precision-guided munitions (PGM), and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) convinced American military thinkers at the end of the
20th century that this new RMA was indeed taking shape, as Alexander
Salt explains.13 Previously disparate forces and weapons systems were
integrated into a coherent system with unprecedented battle space
awareness and speed of decision-making that provided the United
States with a decisive advantage over opponents.14 Shimko, a balanced
advocate of the RMA, demonstrates that in the latter half of the 1990s,
the paradigm of NCW-dominated American military thinking and was
embraced by political elites. Consequently, there was a broad support
base for far-reaching changes in U.S. military organization and doctrine
to gain maximum advantage from this RMA. Of course, skeptics
pointed at the fact that even high-tech sensors and information
dissemination could not fully lift the fog of war, yet it was undeniable
that the new developments greatly helped to mitigate this factor.15

2.3 THE BIRTH OF A NEW WAY OF LIMITED WAR?

The fairly traditional invasion plan that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
proposed for overthrowing the Taliban and attacking Al-Qaeda would
take too long to come to effect and was therefore politically useless
and “depressingly conservative and unimaginative.”16 Instead, the Bush
administration, which embraced NCW and corresponding defense
transformation, opted for the highly unconventional CIA proposal
of relying on CIA operatives and SOF that would join efforts with
indigenous Afghan forces.17 This joint combined ground maneuver
element would be supported by U.S. airpower, and as such, the
“Afghan Model of Warfare” was born.18 See Figure 2.1.
Many scholars have tried to value and comprehend the success
of the AM. One striking description is offered by Benjamin Lambeth,
who says, “the three pivotal ingredients that made this achievement
possible were long-range precision airpower managed by a uniquely

8
 CHAPTER 2

sophisticated and capable

[Combined Air Operations Center
(CAOC)]; consistently good real- Airpower
time tactical intelligence; and mobile
SOF teams on the ground working in
close concert with indigenous Afghan
resistance forces and equipped Local
SOF
with enough organic firepower Forces
and electronic support to maintain
adequate situation awareness,
operate independently, and avoid Figure 2.1. The three elements of
ambushes.”19 Richard Andres et al. the AM. Source: authors
explain that the AM was successful
because of the combination of interrelated tactical- and operational-
level dynamics. The first of these dynamics that the AM imposes
upon the enemy is what William Lind in 1985 identified as the air-
ground dilemma, which dictates that whenever an opponent tries to
concentrate forces to resist an infantry attack they become vulnerable
to airpower and therefore forced to disperse.20 The second dynamic
is that air interdiction denies the enemy ability to wage an effective,
combined arms defense at the operational level because this would
require operational communications and mobility.21
RMA proponents saw the rapidity and ease of victory as evidence
for fundamental change. This camp believed that the AM would be
“the new way of war” for the West, and they attributed great strategic
value to this new operational concept.22 Andres et al. argue that the
model has strategic relevance “because this new way of war lowers
the costs to the United States, in both blood and treasure, it creates
a more credible stick to use in coercive diplomacy against small- and
medium-sized opponents than do threats of conventional invasion.”23
RMA sceptics, however, of whom Stephen Biddle is most influential,
argued that local conditions formed the key to the Taliban’s fall and
therefore the implications of the AM for the future of warfare would be
low. Biddle denies a transformation of warfare because the combination
of ground maneuver and firepower, which are indeed the core of the AM,
are merely another demonstration of the modern system that emerged
in the final years of World War I.24 Biddle believes that SOF-guided

9
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

precision air strikes cannot decisively influence the equation of ground

combat because the AM cannot compensate for a skill imbalance
between allies and the enemy. Andres counters Biddle’s reasoning by
stating that the strategic benefits of fighting by proxy outweigh the
costs created by the proxy’s limited tactical skill. He acknowledges that
tactical skill remains a relevant consideration but skill relative to the
operation plan is what matters most, not skill relative to the enemy. In
other words, the tactical requirements of an operation plan should be
matched to the level of skill of an indigenous ally. See Figure 2.2.

Skill Skill Mission/

Skill
Indigenous Indigenous Operation
Enemy
Forces Forces Plan

Figure 2.2. Schematic display of the theoretical standpoints of Biddle and Andres
Source: authors

The limiting factor for the utility of the AM on the strategic level,
which transcends the lack of skill of indigenous forces according to
Biddle, is their possible absence in certain contexts and misalignment
or divergence of interests along the way. There is abundant academic
literature on interest misalignment and related compliance issues in
alliance politics and war by proxy.25 There is no doubt that there will be
serious problems when relying on small allies. However, when interests
are real but non-existential, this limited approach will likely remain the
preferred policy option for a long time to come.

2.4 THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ:

A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE REVOLUTION IN
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Given the differences between the Iraqi Army and the Taliban, and
the geographical concentration of Kurds in the North, most military
planners opposed the idea of going in light and using an equivalent of
the AM. The question then became exactly how heavy the United States
should go in. The biggest issue that [then-Secretary of Defense Donald]
Rumsfeld had with U.S. Central Command [USCENTCOM]’s plan for
the invasion of Iraq was that it ignored the RMA. The consequence was
that it required a much larger number of U.S. troops then he thought
desirable. The intense troop size debate that followed revealed deeper

10
 CHAPTER 2

disagreements on two related questions that carefully need to be

disentangled. First, what troop size would be required to defeat the Iraqi
military and eliminate Saddam Hussein? Second, what troop size would
be required for the post-war stabilization phase?26 In retrospect, the
answer the United States formulated to the first question was excellent,
and although the conventional operation required more ground troops
than Rumsfeld preferred, it embraced the RMA in many aspects.27
Because of Turkish unwillingness to lend its territory for a large-scale,
combined-arms maneuver into Northern Iraq, the United States was
forced to partially rely on the AM. Although the AM this time was used
in a different way, i.e. complementary to a conventional attack, it again
proved to be a successful solution. The U.S. answer to the second
question, however, proved catastrophic. Rumsfeld and [then U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz, ignoring senior military advice,
failed to accept that the RMA was about winning the war and not
about post-war stabilization.28 “Technologies that substitute for mass
in war do not necessarily substitute for mass in situations other than
war,” writes Shimko, who, in this regard, separates the invasion phase
and the stabilization phase by speaking of the Second (2003) and the
Third Iraq Wars (2003– 2011).29 The role of airpower in the Second Iraq
War confirms the RMA, and that precision, information, and jointness
transformed the character of warfare. Meanwhile, the role of airpower
in the Third Iraq War confirms (neo)classical counterinsurgency (COIN)
doctrine by demonstrating that the role of airpower in war among the
people is more limited and complicated.30 What the utility of modern
air assets should be in protracted asymmetrical campaigns remains the
subject of heated debate and whether, as some argue, the AM might
provide a more sustainable alternative for large numbers of U.S. boots
on the ground.31

2.5 THE AFGHAN MODEL IN LIBYA: SAME ELEMENTS,

DIFFERENT DYNAMICS
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which addressed
the chaotic situation in Libya in 2011, prohibited the use of ground
forces. Therefore, it might seem obvious to draw an analogy with
Kosovo, where NATO’s airpower achieved the desired campaign
goals without the employment of conventional ground troops into

11
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

the fight. It is, however, well known that small teams of SOF were
embedded with the rebels to whom they offered assistance, advice,
and coordination of air strikes.32 Erica Borghard, Constantino Pischeda,
and Frederic Wehrey, among others, made important scholarly
contributions to the AM debate on the basis of new data provided
by the Libyan case.33 They argue that Libya demonstrated how a new
factor, “time,” has emerged into the balance of the AM because it
alters the dynamics of the balance of skill between parties.34 First, the
process of attrition of [Libyan leader Muammar ] Gaddafi’s forces over
a prolonged period enabled relatively unskilled rebels to sustain in the
fight. Second, the time provided to the rebels by the deployment of
airpower enabled the rebels to organize themselves and become more
skilled. The Libyan case has thus demonstrated that the AM is able
to alter a major skill imbalance. In other words, pre-intervention skills
are not a definite predictor for battlefield outcomes.35 Additionally,
the arrival of foreign ground advisors had a vast transformational
effect on air-ground coordination.36 Altogether, the Libyan conflict has
effectively stretched the definition and applicability of the AM.

2.6 WRAPPING UP THE DEBATE

The NCW RMA refers to a period of new doctrine and major
military innovation aiming to exploit new technologies in information
processing, communication, surveillance, networking, and precision
weaponry.37 The overwhelming success of the First Gulf War
validated the RMA and related force transformation in the eyes of
many observers; however, the RMA and its implications remain a
controversial subject. The RMA has not changed the nature of war,
which in its essence remains violent, interactive, and political.38 It did
have transformational effects on the character of war, more specifically
on the role of airpower. In a world where politicians need a fast, low-
risk, and light footprint option to project forces in wars of choice,
the AM is an attractive new approach. History has demonstrated
that the AM is more than a fluke, but critics like Biddle nevertheless
deserve praise for balancing the debate and preventing the dangerous
slip into airpower dogma.39 Three recent cases have demonstrated
that airpower can be useful in overthrowing states, but that it holds
limited value when trying to rebuild them. Scholars such as Frederick
Kagan, Max Boot, and Alexander Salt have convincingly stressed the

12
 CHAPTER 2

downsides of technocentric military transformation when caught up

in a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign after the initial
phase of warfare is over.40 Some scholars stress the disadvantage of
being dependent on indigenous forces. This disadvantage is inherent
to the AM and seems an acceptable price for a light footprint option
for as long as it concerns non-existential interests. The AM is more
versatile and robust than claimed by some skeptics, but it does have
significant political and military limitations that need to be further
examined. The RMA beyond doubt has proven its potential against
a conventional adversary, but its utility against an insurgent style
opponent is less clear.

13
 Chapter 3: Toward a Framework for
Analyzing the Applicability of the
Afghan Model of Warfare

3.1 INTRODUCTION
The question of the AM’s applicability in other contexts has
become prevalent, as demonstrated. Academic literature has
provided a multitude of factors that influence the expectations
about the extent to which the AM can be successfully utilized, but a
comprehensive framework of variables for analyzing the expected
applicability of the AM remains absent in leading publications. In
this chapter, the most relevant variables regarding the applicability
of the AM are identified by performing a comparative, case-based
research analysis to construct such a framework. The relevant aspects
of the cases in which the AM played a role will be concisely discussed
to extract these variables. This chapter is largely based on earlier
research on the applicability of the AM in Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in Afghanistan (2001), Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003),
and operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya
(2011). For more extensive analysis and reasoning that substantiates
the proposed variables, we refer to this earlier research.42 The central
question is which factors determine and predict the applicability of
the AM of warfare? The factors, or variables, will be classified into
four categories: political, airpower, indigenous forces, and factors
related to the SOF component. See Table 3.1.
The political category tries to catch the factors that connect the
political strategic level to the operational applicability of the model.
After all, employment of the AM is the continuation of politics by other
means. These other means, in the case of the AM, are divided into
three categories that represent the pillars of the AM. They individually
influence the degree of synergy that can arise, and they offer a clear
and logical framework for analysis.

15
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

Table 3.1. Afghan Model Applicability Assessment Framework

Political Airpower Indigenous Forces SOF Component

Risk and Political

Air Superiority Availability Capability
Sensitivity
Legal Mandate and Liaison Capacity and
Capability Reliability and Dependability
Rules of Engagement Human Enablers
Sustainability and
Time Unity or Fragmentation
Capacity
Regional Political
Sensor-to-Shooter
Support and Coalition Cultural Aspects–Trainability
Time
Involvement
Motivation, Morale, and
Unit Cohesion
Triangular Balance:
Indigenous Forces
–Mission Plan
–Enemy Skill

Factors that determine the applicability of the Afghan model of warfare based on author
research. Source: authors

3.2 APPLICABILITY FACTORS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL

Political Risk and Sensitivity
The ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated
that the risks and consequences of military intervention are hard
to comprehend for political decision-makers. These experiences
have had major influence on the manner in which the international
coalition operated in Libya: “never before was aerial intervention
pursued so intentionally as a strategy–introducing outside ground
forces into the Libyan civil war was proscribed not only by the desire
to avoid another quagmire in the region, but explicitly by the very
U.N. resolution that the operations were conducted to enforce.”43
Learning from Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States and its
allies were sucked into large-scale counterinsurgency operations, the
coalition was determined to avoid a repeat in Libya. The Libyan case
thus provides a double-edged example of why politicians might need
a limited military option that excludes conventional ground troops to
pursue limited political interests. The AM obviously provides such an
option, since small numbers of SOF can be deployed despite political
sensitivities regarding “a foreign occupation force of any form.”44

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 CHAPTER 3

The positive first reaction of airpower proponents when looking at

the short-term results seems justified. Mueller’s response to Biddle’s
skepticism is characteristic of this initial sentiment and significant
regarding the above-mentioned political preference for a limited
military option. He writes, “In contrast to Stephen Biddle’s March
25, 2011 warning that ‘warfare rarely allows big payoffs from small
investments,’ the aerial intervention in Libya was in fact just such a case
of a very small investment of resources paying off for the coalition.”45
The short-term payoffs were indeed impressive, but when looking at
the long-term outcome, Biddle’s statement seems more appropriate
since the intervention has not improved the political situation in Libya.
Although we do not yet know how this case will ultimately resolve, it
seems fair to state that the interests at stake were not existential but
limited, and that whereas Afghanistan and Iraq were expensive losses,
Libya might be labelled a relatively cheap loss due to the absence of
conventional ground troops. Consequently, it can be concluded that
although the AM has its limitations (such as the inability to deliver
political stability), it does offer U.S. politicians an attractive option in
cases where political risk is low due to the limited interests at stake.
Furthermore, the Libyan case demonstrates that SOF units can be
secretly deployed to increase the effectiveness of airpower and
indigenous forces.

Legal Mandate and Rules of Engagement

Legal mandates, the rules of engagement resulting from such
mandates, and other factors, such as political sensitivity toward
collateral damage, can have a restricting effect on the extent to which
synergy is achieved between the elements of the AM. This potential
of the rules of engagement (ROE) to restrict the synergy between
the air component and the combined ground component within the
AM is clearly visible when analyzing the Libyan case. Marcus Mohlin
argues that SOF units could not directly coordinate airstrikes in Libya
because certain countries were present in the CAOC that might not
have accepted the tension between the deployment of SOF units and
resolution 1973.46 Therefore, SOF units could not play the direct role
they played in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they had to be deployed
under national authority, carefully avoiding NATO’s command
structure. “Illuminating targets with hand-held laser designators

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

would have required considerable interaction between SOF and the

CAOC, and such interaction could easily have compromised the covert
SOF teams operating in Libya.”47 The result was that SOF units had
to coordinate airpower through the rebels, which clearly meant a
limitation in the direct synergy of the AM and thus its effectiveness.
Paradoxically, a restricted legal mandate might thus result in a
situation in which a variant of the AM seems the only viable option,
while simultaneously, the extent to which direct synergy between the
components of the model can be achieved is restricted.

Time
In 2001, the Bush administration’s lack of time, or more exactly,
patience, led to the birth of the AM. While a conventional ground
invasion would have taken months to come into effect, the AM
proved a rapid option for effective force employment. As mentioned
earlier, the time factor also proved critical for the AM’s successful
application in Libya where “the process of attrition over time
enabled unskilled rebel forces to make substantial progress against
[Gaddafi’s] ground forces.”48 In this case, time was vital for the
unskilled and unorganized rebel forces since it allowed them to
improve their chances with regard to Biddle’s balance of skill. The AM,
by making use of the provided time, facilitated a new sort of indirect
synergy. SOF units and liaison and intelligence officers helped to
organize the indigenous forces in the time that was provided to them
by airpower. To conclude, time is, first of all, a relevant factor because
the AM can be utilized on relatively short notice. Second, by buying
time, the AM is thus able to trump an imbalance of skill, organization,
and sometimes even unity.

Regional Political Support and Coalition Involvement

Coalitions have always played an important role in warfare and it is
no different when it comes to the AM. There are, however, a number
of specific factors with regard to the composition of a coalition that
influence the achievable degree of synergy between the AM’s different
components. Most importantly, the presence of regional countries has
a strong positive influence on the applicability of the AM within certain
contexts. Regional participation improves a coalition’s legitimacy,
which is essential for the willingness of indigenous forces to potentially

18
 CHAPTER 3

cooperate with the international coalition.49 Moreover, when regional

countries deploy SOF and intelligence personnel there is a positive
influence on the cooperation between the ground elements as there
are less practical obstacles such as language, cultural differences or
even distrust.50 Furthermore, regional SOF and intelligence personnel
are likely to share the same culture as the local population, which
improves their situational awareness.

3.3 APPLICABILITY FACTORS OF THE AIRPOWER

COMPONENT
Air Superiority
The vital tasks of the airpower component in the AM are
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air interdiction,
close air support (CAS)–or more precisely, ground-directed dynamic
targeting–and lastly, battlefield air interdiction (which closes the gap
between air interdiction and CAS).51
Joint Publication 3-09.3 defines
While a conventional
the preconditions for effective CAS
as “thoroughly trained personnel ground invasion would
with well-developed skills, effective have taken months to
planning and integration, effective come into effect, the
command and control, air superiority AM proved a rapid
(especially suppression of enemy
option for effective
air defense [SEAD]), target marking
and/or acquisition, streamlined and force employment.
flexible procedures, and appropriate
ordnance.”52 In Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, air superiority was
achieved within a matter of days. The lesser the degree of air
superiority, the less effective the model will be. There is, however, no
clear threshold in this matter.

Capability
The next rather obvious factor that influences the applicability of
the AM is the degree to which an international coalition possesses
the capabilities necessary to execute the airpower-related tasks of
this approach. Just like the next factor, capacity, capability serves
as a generic term to capture all relevant facets of airpower within

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

the applicability framework. This includes essential functions related

to the realm of airpower-centric RMA such as NCW, PGMs, ISR and
SEAD, but also logistical support assets such as precision airdrop
systems to resupply isolated SOF units and indigenous forces. 53
When certain capabilities are insufficiently available this might act as
a bottleneck for generating airpower and thereby severely limit the
applicability of the AM. 54

Sustainability and Capacity

Sustainability might be of decisive importance in a military campaign.
Whenever the AM is utilized, the airpower capacity must therefore be
large enough to guarantee long-term deployment on an operational
level. This factor relates to the sustainability and capacity of all relevant
airpower capabilities such as aircraft carriers, tanker aircraft, PGMs
and ISR assets. The experience in Libya demonstrated the vastness of
this range as it turned out that the CAOC required sustainable vetting
capacity that could assess the enormous amount of target information
provided by indigenous observers (rather than SOF). The limited
capacity to address this niche and allocate additional air intel assets for
longer periods proved a bottleneck that led to an airpower gap which
severely limited the effectiveness of the operation.55

Sensor-to-Shooter Time
The shorter the time between the request for a PGM by a Joint
Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) or an indigenous observer and the
destruction of that target, the bigger the combat effectiveness of the
AM. There is a strong negative causal relation between the sensor-to-
shooter time and the degree of synergy that can be achieved between
the components of the AM. The length of the sensor-to-shooter time
is highly dependent on the combination of the available airpower
capability and capacity, when either one is suboptimal, the response
time will be suboptimal as well. Other factors in this framework such
as the legal mandate for example, also influence this factor. The legal
mandate can prohibit direct communication between attack platforms
and SOF and the Libyan case has demonstrated that air-ground
synergy is suboptimal when indigenous forces provide the target
information. The reaction time, consequently, is longer because the
target information has to be vetted.56

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 CHAPTER 3

3.4 APPLICABILITY FACTORS CONCERNING THE

INDIGENOUS FORCES COMPONENT
Availability
The availability of suitable indigenous troops is possibly the most
critical factor that determines the applicability of the AM because
this factor is harder to control for the West than most other factors.
As Mueller states: “Libya demonstrates that airpower can do much
to compensate for a local partner’s physical weakness, in fact more
than many observers imagined when analyzing the Afghan model
previously. But if no suitable political actor exists on whose behalf
one can usefully intervene, it is extremely unlikely that one can
be fabricated to effectively fill the vacuum.”57 The Libyan case did
however shift thinking about the indigenous forces component
because it demonstrated that a fragmented and unorganized rebel
opposition was successfully shaped into that role. In Afghanistan and
Iraq there was an obvious candidate to perform this role but in Libya
this was certainly not the case.58 This factor can be broken down into
the presence of a political ally, which is a political level issue, and the
related presence of military operational allies in specific geographical
areas of the theater where the AM is used. Obviously, these two levels
overlap and cannot be separated. It is therefore important to analyze
this variable on the political level as well as on the military operational
and tactical level.

Reliability and Dependability

Lack of trust in the reliability of a potential local ally can cause
restraint on the political and military strategic level. Every case in
which the AM has been utilized has proven that the reliability of local
allies is a difficult point. When General Franks was asked whether
or not he believed that the Northern Alliance (NA) was reliable,
his answer was “well, we’re not sure.”59 Even the Kurds, with their
reputation for being a dependable ally, ignored the order that was
given to them by the U.S. under diplomatic pressure from the Turks
not to take Kirkuk.60 What further influences decision makers is that
the U.S. has found itself repeatedly fighting former allies who are
armed with U.S. weapons that were previously provided to them.
Strategic divergence between the West and their local ally is the

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

rule, rather than the exception. Although this factor is highly related
to, and overlaps with other factors, it is of such importance that it is
classified as a separate issue here.

Fragmentation
The Libyan case demonstrates that the more fragmented an
opposition group that has to be shaped to function as an indigenous
ally is, the more difficult cooperation is and the more unclear and
complicated the political risk will be.61 Fragmentation limits the
degree of synergy that can emerge. It furthermore increases the
potential for internal disputes, which has a negative influence on
the prospected reliability of the indigenous ally. A high degree of
fragmentation does on the other hand improve the chance that a
local force can be found for each operational objective–but that is
a blessing in disguise. What should be taken into account is that
as part of the AM’s external support to a conflict, such as financial
assistance, weaponry, or manpower, can contribute enormously to
fragmentation.62 In general, the more fragmented a local opposition
is, the less attractive the AM option will be. A potentially divisive
form of external support are armed actors from antagonistic regional
powers joining the domestic movement so they can then have a
direct influence on the ground.

Cultural Aspects
Understanding a local ally’s culture is first of all a precondition for
estimating the value of that ally. The motivation, reliability and degree
of fragmentation cannot be understood without thorough cultural
understanding. Second, cultural differences, when not adequately
anticipated, might limit the degree of cooperation that can be achieved
within the ground element of the AM. The three AM cases have
delivered multiple, strong examples of how cultural aspects influence
the applicability of the AM. Some potential indigenous allies might
have a strong warrior culture, as was the case for the NA for example.
That warrior culture made it unacceptable for them to receive combat
training, while in the Libyan case, the training offered by SOF units
was of vital importance for the success of the AM.63 The trainability of
an indigenous ally, in this model classified under the umbrella term of
cultural factors, is therefore a vital subfactor to consider for decision-

22
 CHAPTER 3

makers and executors. Another consideration is that most potential

target countries have internal cultural differences that should be
anticipated. Lambeth, for instance, has demonstrated how proxies with
certain ethnical backgrounds are not suitable to conquer terrain that
is inhabited by other ethnic groups.64 The importance of this generic
cultural factor cannot be overstated. When the tribal structures,
ethnicities, religions and attitudes toward the West are not properly
understood, it is unlikely that the AM will be successful.

Motivation, Morale, and Unit Cohesion

Troop motivation is a critical factor in war and when combat
prolongs, and if conditions grow more dangerous, it becomes even
more important. Michael O’Hanlon argues that the interests of
local allies and the US can overlap but will not be exactly the same.
O’Hanlon, among others, refers to Operation ANACONDA, where the
interests of the NA and the United States diverged, to make his case.65
Andres, Wills, and Griffith state that “probably more important than
skill, however, was Afghan morale. Understanding the motivation of
the indigenous ally is a critical consideration in proxy warfare…Thus,
at Tora Bora, Afghan morale was built on U.S. diplomacy and cash,
not internal motivation. Nevertheless, the Afghans fought.”66 When
interests diverge, the motivation to fight stagnates. This motivation or
loyalty cannot be bought but it can certainly be rented. Understanding
when motivations in the ground element of the AM might start to
diverge, and to what extent it can be controlled, is vital for preventing
failures of the AM. Furthermore, indigenous unit cohesion forms
another aspect vital for the degree to which an indigenous force can
be expected to persevere in combat conditions. After all, the relation
between military performance and unit cohesion is well known in
military psychology. Wong et al. have demonstrated that social
cohesion is even more important than task cohesion to the unit’s
commitment to the mission.67 This has important implications for the
applicability of the AM. To put it provocatively, if Western infantry can
be found prepared to die for money and unit cohesion in messy wars
of choice, then why not indigenous allies?

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

The Triangular Balance of Indigenous Force Skill vs.

Mission Fitness vs. Enemy Skill
This factor contains the deeper argumentations of the debate
between Biddle and Andres et al. Their disagreement on the strategic
value of the AM originates in conflicting views on the character of
war at the tactical level. Biddle argues that, “only allies with skills and
motivation that approximate their enemy’s will suffice. Inept or ill-
motivated allies cannot realize the potential of U.S. airpower and SOF
against competent enemies.” In this point of view, indigenous allies
are qualified if they are able to conquer defended terrain. A well-
trained defender is able to limit his exposure to airpower, and, as World
War I demonstrated, “a mere handful of surviving, actively resisting
defenders in cover and armed with modern automatic weapons can
slaughter even masses of unsophisticated allies who lack the skills
to reduce their exposure and instead walk forward in the open.”68
However, history, and more specifically, the Libyan case, demonstrated
that the AM can compensate for even a great imbalance of skill partly
because skill can be influenced by training and experience over time.
A precondition for the improvement of skill—and therefore even more
important—is the motivation and morale of an ally to sustain the fight
against an initially stronger opponent. Biddle makes a valuable point
by stressing the importance of the balance of skill between enemies
and local allies and it is therefore incorporated in this framework. In
certain contexts, when the imbalance is large, the AM might not be
able to compensate for it.
Andres et al. oppose Biddle’s reasoning by stressing the dynamics
the AM can unleash on the operational level. Airpower prevents the
enemy to effectively wage defensive operations by suppressing and
disrupting their maneuverability and communication. This renders
the opponent unable to counterattack with reserves and to call in
artillery. Despite this, it should be realized that an indigenous ally will
never be a supplement for professional infantry, and, inherently, every
indigenous ally will have its limitations. Consequently, military planners
need to anticipate an ally’s shortcomings. If an allied group is not
competent to perform basic fire and maneuver tactics, it should not be
allocated such tasks. “Leaders must plan custom solutions to unique
problems, hardly a shocking revelation in the annals of warfare.”69 The

24
 CHAPTER 3

applicability assessment framework therefore also incorporates the

balance between an ally’s skill level and the military tasks assigned. In
some situations, however, it might be inevitable to assign tasks to a
local ally that prove too ambitious for the involved fighters.
This balance is of vital importance when estimating the
applicability of the AM. Theoretically, however, this balance produces
an unsatisfying situation as it effectively consists of three factors: the
ally’s level of skill, the enemy’s level of skill, and the appropriateness
or fitness of the mission or operation plan. Biddle and Andres both
stress the relationship between two factors, and, thus they pay
too little attention to the fact that all three factors are strongly
interrelated. This study, therefore, proposes a different model that
does more justice to reality by placing these three factors in an
interrelated triangular relation. See Figure 3.1. A viable operation
plan must be attuned to the level of skill of an ally, but it also has to
anticipate the level of skill of an enemy. The triangular model is more
realistic because of the dynamic interrelation it represents between,
for example, the operation plan and the skill of the enemy, which is
neglected by Biddle and Andres et al. Because of Allied airpower,
Gadaffi’s forces were no longer able to employ conventional tactics

Mission /
Operation Plan

Skill Indigenous
Skill Enemy Forces

Figure 3.1. Triangular balance of skill and mission. Source: authors

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

in their fight against the rebels. Gadaffi’s forces were forced to rely
instead on new, unconventional tactics and skills in which they were
relatively less proficient. This example, which demonstrates the
paradox of tactics and strategy, explains how the mission plan leveled
the chances on the battlefield.70

3.5 APPLICABILITY FACTORS RELATED TO THE

SOF COMPONENT
Capability
For the application of the AM as it has been employed in the last
two decades, it is obviously a precondition that the international
coalition has SOF units available that are capable of fulfilling this
role. The SOF component has to integrate modern technology for
operating successfully within an AM variant. Integration of modern
equipment and doctrine for the SOF component is vital for reaching
air-ground synergy. For example, think of communication technology,
laser range finders, and laser target designators. The presence of air-
ground synergy specialists, forward air controllers, or joint terminal
attack controllers is preconditional. However, the role of the SOF
component goes far beyond the guidance of airstrikes.71 Despite
modern technology, coping with mental and physical hardship and
old-fashioned soldiering skills are still essential for these units to be
effective in hostile environments. O’Hanlon states that the skills of the
SOF forces are just as important as modern technology.72

Liaison Capacity and Human Enablers

In this framework, the SOF component is stretched to also include
some non-SOF human enablers such as intelligence personnel, liaison
officers, military advisors, and translators. In some situations, it is
unlikely that SOF units without these embedded other human enablers
can cooperate with indigenous allies effectively, as the Libyan case
demonstrated. In Libya, human enablers from the UAE and Qatar
made a large contribution to the cooperation that was achieved, and
it remains doubtful whether the West would have been able to deliver
enough qualified personnel absent of these Arab contributions. “As
brotherly Arabs with preexisting ties to elements of the opposition
leadership, shared language, and awareness of Islamic traditions, they

26
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were well positioned to play this role in ways that were culturally and
politically preferable to Western parties.”73 It is clear that the scarcity
of SOF personnel and other human enablers with the preferred
language skill form a bottleneck in some situations. “Cooperation with
indigenous forces is all-important in cases such as Libya and should
be the first among many areas of further investigation into improving
strategies and techniques for aerial interventions.”74

3.6 CONCLUSION: A PROVISIONAL FRAMEWORK

FOR ANALYSIS
This chapter sketched the outlines of a provisional framework for
assessing the applicability of the AM to a certain context. Based on
three earlier cases, only those factors with specific relevance to this
operational approach have been identified. Other factors relevant for
warfare in general, such as terrain characteristics, are not included. Each
of the 16 identified factors provide information regarding its respective
category (political, airpower, indigenous allies, and SOF) and how these
aspects might hold negative or positive influence on the applicability
of the AM in a specific conflict. Yet, it is important to stress that the
framework is not a checklist—it merely forms a tool for structural
analysis of potential operational environments. Thorough understanding
of the unique circumstances in which the AM might be employed is
paramount. Or, in Nardulli’s words, “individual context is everything.”75

27
 Chapter 4: Assessing the Fight Against
ISIS in Iraq and Syria

4.1 TO WHAT EXTENT IS ISIS DEFEATED?

This chapter concisely discusses various elements of the fight against
ISIS, which in turn provides the analytical context of the campaign that
will be used in the next chapter to apply the AM framework.
On April 4, 2018, the White House claimed that the military mission
to eradicate ISIS in Syria was coming to an end. Two days later, however,
Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)
warned that much work remained to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria.76 An
interesting theory for clarifying why it was too early to claim ISIS’ defeat
is Mao Tse Tung’s protracted guerrilla warfare framework.77 It might
seem odd to suggest that jihadists are inspired by Mao, but experts
such as Craig Whiteside, among others, have demonstrated that Mao’s
famous three phases of guerrilla warfare form the foundation of ISIS’
grand strategy to establish an Islamic State.78 This powerful method of
insurgency as described in Mao’s book, On Protracted Warfare, heavily
influenced works of jihadist strategists such as Abu Musab al Suri, who
wrote The Call to Global Islamic Resistance and for Abu Bakr Naji’s
work, The Management of Savagery.79 The latter, in particular, adjusts
Mao’s principles and stages for use in a modern context of waging jihad
with the ultimate goal of establishing a caliphate. According to ISIS‘
Dabiq magazine, ISIS founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi even stated, “it is
as if the author [Naji] knows what I’m planning.”80
Looking through this Maoist lens with the benefit of hindsight, it
becomes clear that in mid-2016 (after nearly two years of triumphalist
rhetoric), ISIS began preparing an ideological ground for the collapse
of its territory following battlefield realities.81 According to Kyle Orton,
the first major statement that marked this rhetorical tipping point
was what turned out to be the final speech of ISIS spokesman Taha

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Falaha on 21 May 2016.82 In this speech, published by al-Hayat Media

Centre, Falaha ideologically prepares the jihadists for the coming
strategic degradation.83 This new line of communication, fitting Mao’s
strategic narrative, was followed up by an article in al-Naba 34 “and
culminated in al-Naba 101 on 12 October 2017, where the Islamic
State announced it was reverting from governance to insurgency.”84
The latter article aptly reminds Jihadists how a similar abandonment
of conventional warfare paid off in 2007, when ISIS was suffering
a setback in the wake of the Sunni Awakening and deliberately
opted for switching a phase back. This demonstrates that once ISIS
had been militarily degraded, it was important to consolidate that
success and deploy comprehensive follow-on operations that would
target the group’s ability to sustain in Mao’s second phase and await
the right moment for a full-fledged “resurrection.” Thus, the Maoist
revolutionary warfare narrative provides an understanding of ISIS’
enduring threat, and the value of the AM needs to be considered
from that perspective.

4.2 ASSESSING THE GRAND STRATEGY AND

USCENTCOM’S OPERATIONAL APPROACH
This study focuses on the applicability of a military concept of
operations, for which a thorough understanding of the strategic
context is vital to reach a conclusion on its wider value. War should
be the continuation of politics by other means, after all.85 It goes
beyond the scope of this
...the Maoist revolutionary monograph to analyze the
entire strategic background
warfare narrative provides an
in which the international
understanding of ISIS’ enduring
coalition, and more
threat, and the value of the AM specifically the United
needs to be considered from States, has fought ISIS.
that perspective. Instead, we will sketch a
rough outline of the grand
strategy, which forms the most tangible and relevant demonstration
of this context. This exploration will first focus on the grand strategy
and subsequently work down the military strategic to the operational

30
 CHAPTER 4

levels of the campaign to enhance the understanding of how exactly

the application of the AM fits in this wider context.86

The Global Coalition’s Strategy

The global coalition against ISIS was formed in September 2014 and
has since been committed to degrading and, ultimately, defeating the
extremist group. The 83 allied members have agreed to fight on all
fronts to dismantle ISIS’ networks and counter its global ambitions.87
This is echoed in the alliance’s guiding principles, in which the coalition
is described as “a mobilizing and coordinating mechanism nested in
a much larger diplomatic, military, and counterterrorism ecosystem,
in accordance with the principles of international law, including
the Charter of the United Nations, and relevant Security Council
resolutions.”88 The grand strategy of the global coalition follows five
lines of effort (LOEs):89
1. Stabilizing liberated areas in Iraq and Syria
2. Countering ISIS’ propaganda
3. Military progress; defeating ISIS by denying it safe haven and
building military capacity
4. Preventing the movement of foreign fighters
5. Tackling ISIS’ finance and funding
Each of these LOEs is assigned to a so-called Coalition Working
Group with a unique path forward. According to the coalition’s
website, there is no single approach to defeat ISIS and that all efforts
should be tailored to address the unique nature of the threat in a
given country or region. That said, the alliance aims to achieve unity
of purpose across the various LOEs and between its members to quell
ISIS-related threats on a global scale. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the coalition stresses that most activities to counter ISIS will
not mirror efforts in Iraq and Syria, where military action is central.
To decide the best approach for addressing the overall threat, the
participating countries’ foreign and defense secretaries will continue
to coordinate regularly. Obviously, in this arena the coalition90 deals
with a lot of political sensitivities. This reason, among others, clarifies
why it remains largely unmentioned that military efforts in Iraq and
Syria have been led by the United States, and this has been implied

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

by a statement91 on the coalition website the that these operations are

directed from Tampa.92

The United States’ Comprehensive Strategy

In the fight against ISIS, the United States pursued a whole-of-
government strategy coordinated across nine LOEs, as explained by
President Barack Obama in 2014.93 Each LOE was assigned to a lead
U.S. implementing agency or agencies.94 Appreciating this whole-
of-government strategy is a necessary step toward understanding in
which framework the military efforts of OIR should fit. The strategy for
OIR consisted of the following nine LOEs:
1. Supporting effective governance in Iraq (Department of State
[DOS] and U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID])
2. Denying ISIS safe haven (DOD)
3. Building partner capacity (DOD)
4. Enhancing intelligence collection on ISIS (Director of National
Intelligence/National Counterterrorism Center [NCTC])
5. Exposing ISIS’ true nature (DOS/NCTC)
6. Disrupting ISIS’ finances (Treasury/DOS)
7. Disrupting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (DOS/NCTC)
8. Protecting the homeland (Department of Homeland Security/
Federal Bureau of Investigation)
9. Humanitarian support (USAID/DOS)[MC2]
The DOD was, and still is, responsible for the execution of LOE two
and three. These two LOEs could be viewed as the military pillar of
OIR. Although this presents a somewhat oversimplified view, it does
represent the formal communication of the operational-level military
command that lies with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM).

USCENTCOM’s Strategy
The USCENTCOM website makes reference to the DOS website,
thereby recognizing that OIR is not limited to military efforts. It also
refers to OIR’s official website, which clarifies that OIR is a military
mission consisting of three LOEs:95
1. Enable the military defeat of ISIS in the Combined Joint
Operations Area (CJOA)

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 CHAPTER 4

2. Enable sustainable military partner capacity in the CJOA

3. Leverage cohesive coalition effects
CJTF-OIR’s mission is described as follows: “In conjunction
with partner forces CJTF-OIR defeats ISIS as a military force
on the battlefield in designated areas of Iraq and Syria and sets
conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability.”96
It might appear as if there is a disconnect between the whole-of-
government strategy that claims that OIR consists of nine LOEs and
USCENTCOM’s OIR strategy that consists of three LOEs. See Figure
4.1. An explanation for this could be that from the overarching U.S.
strategy, USCENTCOM is only responsible for the two (out of nine)
LOEs assigned to the DOD and that USCENTCOM’s three LOEs for
OIR form the military operational campaign plan.97 Nevertheless, it
seems as if there are two separate operations that are both named
OIR. This is supported by a RAND report which concludes that the
relationship between, and the degree to which the global OIR effort
and USCENTCOM’s OIR effort are integrated and complementary, is
not particularly clear.98 Moreover, the fact that USCENTCOM speaks of
“follow-on operations” in combination with their isolated military focus
suggests that what should be a comprehensive approach is in reality
a sequential approach.99 Additionally, reports of friction between the
global coalition and USCENTCOM reinforce the idea that what should

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE–OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE MISSION

STRIKE ISIL ACROSS THE

TRAIN AND EQUIP, ADVISE MAXIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS
BREADTH AND DEPTH OF
AND ASSIST REGIONAL OF COALITION
THEIR SO-CALLED
PARTNERS CONTRIBUTIONS
“CALIPHATE”
ONE MISSION, MANY NATIONS

Figure 4.1. Combined Joint Task Force Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. Source: Combined
Joint Task-Force INHERENT RESOLVE/graphic redrawn by JSOU Press

33
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

be part of the operational implementation of an overarching strategy

is, in reality, a disconnected and isolated effort.100

4.3 HOW DID THE ROLE OF THE AFGHAN MODEL

EVOLVE DURING OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL?
When it became clear that the United States had to step up efforts
in order to contain the ISIS threat, it initially did so with minimal
assets—both on the ground and in the air.101 Since the AM offers an
outcome when commitment is limited but not minimal, the concept
of operations did not follow the approach.102 It was only after severe
criticism about the lack of effectiveness of U.S. airpower that the
Obama administration intensified its effort.103 It was because of the
persistent calls of various influential experts (such as John McCain and
John Nagl) to deploy the air-ground integration specialists who had
proven so effective before, that the AM became the operational reality.
The combination of USCENTCOM’s first LOE, “strike ISIL across the
breadth and depth of their so-called caliphate,” and the second, “train
and equip, advise and assist regional partners,” contains all elements
of the AM. Regional partners, assisted by Western SOF, identify
dynamic targets while Western airpower strikes those targets. This
is equivalent to the more direct form of synergy that characterized
the AM in Afghanistan and Iraq. The combination of these two lines
of effort also contains the indirect and slower synergy between the
various components that characterized the approach in Libya. In Iraq
and Syria, Western airpower contained and suppressed ISIS on the
battlefield. This enabled indigenous forces to organize resistance,
assisted by SOF. In the beginning of the campaign, only the direct
synergy of the AM was practiced, but as international commitment
grew and more training capacity was deployed, the indirect form
of synergy also started to play a major role. Thereby the AM’s two
operational edges were practiced in parallel.

The By-With-Through Operational Approach

Some of the strategic mismatches and imperfections that have
come to light in this chapter have been addressed by a “new”
operational approach propagated by Defense Secretary James Mattis

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 CHAPTER 4

from mid-2017 onwards.104 In his words: “Our approach is by, with, and
through our allies, so that they own these spaces, and the U.S. does
not.”105 The by-with-through (BWT) operational approach seems to be
Mattis’ promising effort to rethink the U.S. approach to light footprint
campaigns. Subsequently, USCENTCOM Commander General Joseph
Votel explained how BWT has been operationalized against ISIS and
in other campaigns.106 This explanation indicates that the AM might
constitute an important part of the overarching BWT approach. It
remains unclear, however, what the exact definition of BWT is, and
Votel, therefore, encourages further doctrinal development of this
concept.107 On the other hand, is it perfectly clear that BWT is not a
new concept as it has evolved over the years, that it is not necessarily
less resource-intensive regarding enabling support, that it requires
tactical and operational patience, and, most of all, that there is a lack
of common understanding about its meaning[MC3].108 At this place,
however, we will leave the further debate on the BWT approach and
focus on two, among potentially many others, important strategic
solutions that its (re)emergence seems to offer.109
First, an important strategic problem related to the AM is that it
seems to lack strategic and doctrinal embedding because it is typically
an ad hoc solution, or, in the ISIS case, an incremental and pragmatic
solution. Preferably, it should be part of an overarching strategic
design and an operational plan from the onset of a campaign. The ad
hoc, incremental, and pragmatic character initially accompanying the
AM in the ISIS case has, for example, resulted in underinvestment of
important aspects of OIR such as the coalition’s advisory presence.110
Merging the AM into the overarching BWT operational approach and
the wide attention the latter has been receiving offers a chance to
solve this problem.
A second problem with the U.S. counter-ISIS strategy is the
aforementioned mismatch between the military LOEs and the other
comprehensive efforts, which gives the impression of a sequential
approach instead of the intended comprehensive approach. CJTF-
OIR’s campaign plan remains vague by stating that conditions
will be set for “follow-on operations.” The BWT approach makes
an effort to close the gap between physically destroying ISIS and
stabilizing liberated areas. It states that “compared to Operation

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM missions

that debated the amount and length of U.S. force presence needed
for long-term stability, in OIR the domestic Iraqi forces are the
hold, build, and stabilize forces that can remain indefinitely.111 The
BWT approach thus answers the question of “how to not own the
liberated spaces.” This has been CJTF-OIR’s plan from the start, but
BWT integrates and connects those military LOEs in an overarching
approach, thereby dramatically increasing the chances of success.

4.4 CONCLUSION
Mao’s three-stage model is useful when trying to understand why
ISIS is not defeated and what the limitations of military force are. In
this view, ISIS has ordered their fighters to abandon statehood and
switch back to the insurgency phase. They are currently awaiting
an opportunity to resurrect. The global coalition that was forged
to fight the extremist organization has consequently adopted
a comprehensive strategy that aims to mitigate the threat and
ultimately defeat ISIS. The United States has designed a whole-of-
government strategy that
By-with-through is not a new builds on the coalition’s
strategy and consists of
concept as it has evolved over
nine LOEs of which two
the years, that it is not necessarily are assigned to the DOD.
less resource-intensive regarding At the military level,
enabling support, that it requires USCENTCOM has the
tactical and operational patience, lead over the efforts of
OIR, for which a strategy
and, most of all, that there is a
consisting of three LOEs
lack of common understanding has been implemented. In
about its meaning. its formal communication,
USCENTCOM gives the
impression that OIR exclusively consists of these three LOEs. After
militarily defeating ISIS on the battlefield, follow-on operations will
take care of the rest. This seems to imply that the comprehensive
approach has deformed into a sequential approach. In the beginning
of the campaign, after SOF units were deployed to support
indigenous forces, the AM was put into practice in its direct form as
seen in Afghanistan. Later, when international commitment grew and

36
 CHAPTER 4

more troops, trainers and advisors were deployed, the indirect form
of the AM, as seen in Libya, also became practice in parallel, thereby
improving the results of the direct form.
The emergence of the BWT operational approach might close the
strategic gap between the military LOEs and other non-kinetic efforts
by integrating the AM into an overarching operational approach.
The strategic embedding of AM variants in the BWT operational
approach improves expectations about U.S. reliance on the AM and
its effectiveness, since its potential is now widely recognized by top
military planners. This recognition implies that AM variants are now
part of the collective knowledge of military elites. It is therefore much
more likely to be relied upon in campaign planning and is not just used
as a pragmatic solution. For this purpose, BWT, and the AM approach
as a more aggressive subset of operations, should also be properly
institutionalized within the U.S. military and its doctrines.

37
 Chapter 5: Validating the Afghan Model
Applicability Assessment Framework in
the ISIS Case

5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the framework constructed on the basis of the
employment of the AM in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya will be further
developed and validated by use of the ISIS case. The individual factors
will be analyzed in the context of the fight against ISIS, and, vice versa,
the campaign will be evaluated through the framework. This latter
analysis not only serves the purpose of understanding the application
of the AM in this specific conflict but also seeks to identify previously
‘hidden’ variables that might not have manifested themselves in earlier
cases. Thus, this chapter will provide an enhanced and validated
version of the AM applicability assessment framework that can be
used to analyze the suitability of the AM in future contingencies. While
this case study relies upon extensive research, its complexity cannot
be fully described within the limitations of this monograph. Instead,
we will focus on essential information concerning the framework
and its variables to gain a profound insight into the AM and its
applicability. See Table 5.1. Ultimately, this serves as an underpinning
for drawing a conclusion on the degree of generalizability, and
therefore the value, of the AM.

5.2 POLITICAL APPLICABILITY FACTORS

Political Risk and Sensitivity
In this chapter, the framework based on the employment of the AM
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya will be further developed and validated
by use of the ISIS case. The individual factors will be analyzed in the
context of the fight against ISIS, and the campaign will be evaluated
through the AM framework as well. This latter analysis not only serves
the purpose of understanding the application of the AM in this specific

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

Table 5.1. Afghan Model Applicability Assessment Framework

Political Airpower Indigenous Forces SOF Component

Risk and Political

Air Superiority Availability Capability
Sensitivity
Legal Mandate and Rules Reliability and Liaison Capacity and
Capability
of Engagement Dependability Human Enablers
Sustainability and
Time Unity or Fragmentation
Capacity
Regional Political
Cultural Aspects–
Support and Coalition Sensor-to-Shooter Time
Trainability
Involvement
Motivation, Morale, and
Unit Cohesion
Triangular Balance:
Indigenous Forces
–Mission Plan
–Enemy Skill

Factors that determine the applicability of the Afghan model of warfare based on author
research. Source: authors

conflict but also seeks to identify previously “hidden” variables that

might not have manifested themselves in earlier cases. Thus, this
chapter will provide an enhanced and validated version of the AM
applicability assessment framework that can be used to analyze the
suitability of the AM in future contingencies. While this case study
relies upon extensive research, its complexity cannot be fully described
within the limitations of this monograph. Instead, the focus will be on
essential information concerning the framework and its variables to
gain a profound insight into the AM and its applicability. Ultimately, this
serves as an underpinning for ultimately drawing a conclusion on the
degree of generalizability, and therefore the value, of the AM.
The ongoing war in Syria is even more complex and fluid than the
war in Iraq.113 In this civil war, several different groups fight against
the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad—and against each other.
Several of these actors are simultaneously fighting ISIS, and Syria also
forms the theatre of an international proxy war involving parties like
Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United States—to only mention
the most influential players.114 Syria, thus, has become an arena for
realpolitik with the associated risks of staying out versus getting
involved. Even within the global coalition, there are countries such as

40
 CHAPTER 5

Turkey and Saudi Arabia that pursue interests that conflict with those
of the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, that the perceived
political risk of getting (re)involved in both Iraq and Syria has strongly
influenced decision-making. Since the most limited military option of
exclusively relying on airpower proved too ineffective, the next serious–
yet limited–option, the AM, was put into practice. In the ISIS case,
therefore, the perceived political risk and sensitivity have certainly
contributed to the choice for an AM option.
It should also be noted that the BWT approach might mitigate the risk
for military forces and thus in some cases it can also limit the political
risk. See Figure 5.1.115 The trade-off, however, is that decreasing the risk
to friendly forces increases the risk of not accomplishing the mission.
This is exactly why Votel and
Risk to Mission

Eero Keravuori conclude

Shape

Train
this approach is not suitable
when existential interests are
at stake. Furthermore, they Advise
Prevent

conclude, as we did in earlier Assist

Enable

Equp
Risk

research, that when boots

on the ground are politically Accompany
Consolidate Gains

deemed too sensitive, a covert

Risk to Force

AM or BWT variant might Large-Scale

be the only option to secure
Combat
Operations
certain interests, although
this would at the same time Figure 5.1. Tradeoff between risk to mission
limit the effectiveness of and risk to forces in the By-With-Through
approach. Source: Garrett et al., 2018.
the approach.116 Redrawn by JSOU Press

Legal Mandate and Rules of Engagement

The CJTF’s combat operations have been based on solid and
workable legal mandate–much more than was the case in Libya.
Consequently, this does not seem to be a limiting factor and will not
be elaborated on further. The ROEs for airstrikes, however, have been
either heavily criticized for being too restrictive or praised for the
extreme level of precision and restraint.117 The ROEs far exceed the
requirements of the Laws of Armed Conflict.118 As early as 2015, this
triggered both Lambeth and Michael Knights to plead for loosening the

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

ROEs, which they argued greatly held back the number of daily strikes
and therefore the pressure on ISIS.119 Moreover, Lambeth concludes that
the restrictive ROEs are misplaced because the fight against ISIS is
not about winning indigenous hearts and minds, and it should not be a
COIN campaign.120 It should be noted here, however, that together with
his reminiscent reasoning for an air campaign resembling those against
Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1991 and 2003, this demonstrates a lack of
awareness of the campaign’s strategic context and the utility of force
in it.121 More important is that apart from such superficial criticism, the
ROEs were altered to better fit the complicated situation in the battle
for Mosul when U.S. Army Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend
issued a new tactical directive in the field.122 Before 26 December 2016,
SOF units had to keep a distance of 1,000 meters from the fight in
accordance with Directive 001.123 The new ROEs allowed operators
to move closer toward the front line, more directly supporting their
local partners. Advisors who had been previously embedded at higher
levels were pushed toward brigade staff and allowed to directly call
for airstrikes. This allowed for a much quicker targeting process, as
attacks could now be directed without going through the cumbersome
Baghdad bureaucracy and strike cells. While this obviously increased
the responsiveness of airpower, it simultaneously also improved the
relationship between Western SOF units and indigenous forces.124
Effectively, this encompassed a shift in focus from the training effort,
or the indirect Libyan AM variant, to tactical and operational support,
or the direct AM variant. The U.S. advisor on the ground almost
immediately reported that the increased synergy paid off, as it broke
through the threatening stalemate in Mosul.125

Time
With recent counterinsurgency experiences in mind, the U.S.
administration was better able and more realistic in their estimates
about the time U.S. military involvement needed to be sustained.
Obama counseled strategic patience from the start and anticipated that
it would be a multi-year campaign.126 Planning for a long war, the White
House committed the minimum amount of military assets that public
outrage seemed to allow.127 Yet, the absence of quick and tangible
results along with increasing criticism resulted in a slow and reluctant
increase of the U.S. military effort.128 The limited escalation that followed

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 CHAPTER 5

clearly led to an AM variant, as Obama stated that, “it will take time to
root them out … doing so must be the job of local forces on the ground,
with training and air support from our coalition.”129 Irregular wars tend
to be long. It is certain that the estimated duration of a campaign,
balanced against the interests at stake and perceived public support,
pushed toward a limited military approach (as offered by the AM).130

Regional Political Support and Coalition Involvement

From its onset, the global coalition has been composed of various
Arab and North African countries such as Egypt, Somalia, Libya,
Tunisia, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).131 Although most of these
countries have not actively participated in CJFT-OIR, their support
nevertheless has proved vital for political and logistical reasons.132 Most
importantly, CJTF-OIR has always enjoyed a good amount of regional
legitimacy and support. Despite the fact that—as has been the case
in the past—the United States carried out the bulk of the combat
operations in a Middle Eastern conflict, it has successfully avoided the
perception of another U.S.-led war.
Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, the UAE, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia all
performed or assisted in the first coalition airstrikes over Syria, but
generally speaking, Arab contributions have been rather small.133
According to Kathleen McInnis, the UAE is the only Arab country of the
Global Coalition that has committed an unspecified number of ground
personnel to Syria in a training and advisory role.134 The UAE has also
been exceptional because it has proven capable of performing to the
Western standard.135 However, the military contributions of countries
such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia came to an end.136 Although it is
unclear what the exact contribution of Arab countries to CJTF-OIR
was on the ground, they did not play a similar bridging role between
Western forces and local allies like they did in Libya. Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and Qatar have put on record that they are willing to contribute
ground troops to Syria under U.S. command.137 Nevertheless, the
fact that these Arab countries have made several air bases available
has been of vital importance for the air war. The most important
contribution of these allies has come in an intangible, yet precious form
as their participation greatly augmented regional legitimacy.138

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5.3 AIRPOWER FACTORS

Air Superiority
Air superiority over Iraq has never been an issue for CJTF-OIR, but
in Syria it initially was a concern.139 This, however, did not provide a
problem as the Assad regime chose to stand down when their air
sovereignty was breached by coalition combat aircraft.140 Another
new aspect in the Syrian war resulted from Russia’s involvement.
U.S. and Russian officials agreed on a geographical deconfliction
line, according to which Russian aircraft would remain west of the
Euphrates river while the coalition’s assets would remain east of this
watershed.141 Part of the agreement was that if either military needed
to cross the river for operations, they would use a much discussed
“deconfliction hotline.”142 Yet, air superiority in Syria has suffered from
almost continuous tension resulting from Russian violations, which
have occurred despite regular talks at the highest military level and
daily calls between senior officials at the CAOC at Al Udeid base in
Qatar and their Russian counterparts.143 To formulate it concisely,
Russian involvement has highly complicated CJTF-OIR’s mission
from the top strategy level down to the technical level of warfare.
Moreover, the resulting pressure on air superiority has claimed
coalition air assets that consequently cannot be employed for ground
support. A final consequence of the operational reality is that the
geographical reach of the AM has been effectively limited to those
areas east of the Euphrates.

Capability
Karl Mueller, among others, clearly exposed how certain airpower
capability gaps had a limiting effect on air operations during the war
in Libya.144 Since that time, Western countries have been steadily
investing in scarce assets to reduce that gap. Although it has not
completely disappeared, the CJTF has access to all necessary
airpower capabilities for its operations against ISIS. An example of
how new ISR capabilities (and capacity) improved the applicability of
the AM might be found in the fact that in Libya, Strike Coordination
and Reconnaissance (SCAR) sorties, as part of the dynamic
targeting process with embedded JTACs, had to be launched to
identify targets and direct airstrikes.145 During OIR, there have been

44
 CHAPTER 5

no reports of SCAR sorties, a task that seems to have been taken

over in full by JTACs operating from the combined joint operations
centers (CJOC) via remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) equipped with ISR
assets.146 The availability of RPAs had increased enormously, and their
capabilities were enhanced, which enabled JTACs to rely on these
RPAs for guiding airstrikes. This made SCAR sorties obsolete. OIR
demonstrates a clear difference
with the Libyan air war in the role Russian involvement has
that RPAs fulfilled. “In addition to
highly complicated CJTF-
tankers, RPAs were the platforms
in greatest demand in OIR. Despite
OIR’s mission from the top
past research demonstrating a strategy level down to the
preference of Airmen and JTACs technical level of warfare.
for manned assets, the almost
limitless desire for RPAs in OIR seemingly bucks this trend. RPAs
enabled the ‘air accompanied’ approach that emerged in OIR. Rather
than U.S. or coalition JTACs on the ground, operating alongside Iraqi,
Syrian, and Kurdish ground partners, JTACs early in OIR instead
relied on aerial surveillance—chiefly, full-motion video provided by
RPAs—to overwatch partner forces and call in strikes.”147 This notion
demonstrates how the improved competence of RPAs influences the
ratio between the three pillars of the AM.

Sustainability and Capacity

Some observers have stated that compared to previous campaigns,
the intensity of OIR’s air war has been relatively low.148 This suggests
that lack of capacity should not be a limiting factor during OIR. Yet,
a statistical analysis of the air war against ISIS in comparison to other
wars rejects this view and paints a more complicated and nuanced
picture. Data released monthly by USCENTCOM has enabled us to
compare the capacity used for OIR with the capacity used for the war
in Afghanistan.149 The data about the latter gives us crucial information
on OIR, as assets used in Afghanistan cannot be used in Iraq and Syria.
Whenever the situation required so, a shift in priority led to a transfer
from one theatre to the other.150
This is best demonstrated by looking at the changing distribution
of ISR assets. See Figure 5.2.151 Military officials and analysts have

45
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

repeatedly called for additional RPA for their ISR capabilities.152

According to Scott Vickery, in January 2015, USCENTCOM used six
to 10 times as many ISR assets in Afghanistan, which constrained
the amount of available targets in Iraq and Syria. In this early phase
of the campaign, there also lacked ground troops that could act as
sensors.153 Table 5.2 demonstrates the relationship between the total
number of ISR sorties per year in the Afghan theatre and for OIR. It is
obvious that ISR assets were relocated to OIR to increase the amount
of ISR sorties. Since the war in the Afghan theatre at that time was
by no means over, this data endorses the reported shortage of ISR
assets. In this regard, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 demonstrate that the
call of generals such as the commander of U.S. Air Forces Central
Command had impact.154
The battle for Mosul obviously was given the highest priority, and
corresponding air assets were allocated. At its peak, an airstrike
was conducted roughly every two minutes with the only thing
limiting the tempo being the speed at which the targeting cycle
and accompanying vetting processes could completed.155 Once
the combat was over, air assets were concentrated elsewhere with
negative consequences for CAS requests in Iraq. This dynamic clearly
demonstrates that there were insufficient platforms for ensuring
optimal sensor-to-shooter time in the whole theatre simultaneously.156
As has been previously mentioned, the loosening of the tactical
directives allowed JTACs to be more effective from 2016 onward,
enabling them to identify more targets. The data in Table 5.2 supports
that conclusion. Comparing the total number of strike sorties for
2016 and 2017 with corresponding total numbers of weapon releases,
it seems likely that the effectiveness of the campaign did indeed
improve. The CJTF was able to deliver a far greater number of
weapons with a smaller number of strike sorties after the new directive.
This demonstrates that with less strict ROEs, more munitions can be
deployed, or more targets can be engaged with a smaller number of
attack sorties. When ROEs are stricter, this puts a greater demand on
ISR capacity for pattern-of-life analysis to minimize civilian casualties.
The more stringent the collateral-damage mitigation measures are the
higher the demand for ISR.157 The ROE is thus related to the ISR and
RPA capacity that is required for a campaign.

46
 CHAPTER 5

Table 5.2. Iraq/Syria and Afghanistan Air Power Statistics

% Strike Sorties of Tot. Sorties

Released of Tot. Strike Sorties

Av. Weapons. Released/Day

Sorties with at least One

% Sorties with Weapons

Tot. Weapons Released

Av. Strike Sorties/Day
Tot. Strike Sorties

Weapon Release

Tot. ISR Sorties

% IRS Sorties
Total Sorties
Total Days

Iraq/Syria
365 55.417 21.116 38% 57,85 9.912 47% 28.696 78,62 9.514 17%
2015
Iraq/Syria
365 54.915 21.181 39% 58,03 11.825 56% 30.743 84,23 12.270 22%
2016
Iraq/Syria
365 56.386 19.680 35% 53,92 9.944 51% 39.577 108,43 14.015 25%
2017
Iraq/Syria
1.368 195.832 73.942 38% 54,05 34.030 46% 107.383 78,50 40.595 21%
Overall
Afghanistan
365 39.540 5.774 15% 15,82 411 7% 947 2,59 21.634 55%
2015
Afghanistan
365 40.053 5.162 13% 14,14 615 12% 1.337 3.66 19.681 49%
2016
Afghanistan
365 36.887 4.603 12% 12,61 1.248 27% 4.361 11,95 15.404 42%
2017

Note: ISR = intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Source: U.S. Air Forces Central
Airpower Summaries 2018

ISR missions in Iraq/Syria and Afghanistan

Coalition airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria are highly dependent of aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to provide
targeting and post-strike assessment given the absence of ground troops. As our ongoing tracking of ISR operations shows, the coalition
remains significantly under-resourced in comparison to Afghanistan.

1000
1500
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1500
1000
1000
1500
1000
500
0
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
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Mar
Apr
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Mar
Apr
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Jun
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Feb 18
Mar 18
Apr 18
e

e
ch

ch

ch
t

20

20
2018
20

Afghanistan Iraq/Syria

Figure 5.2. Changing distribution of ISR assets between Iraq/Syria and Afghanistan.
Source: Airwars.org

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 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

Table 5.3 is based on Micah Zenko’s comparison of the first year

of OIR with previous campaigns.158 This data only holds value if one
is aware of the specific contexts of the different campaigns. An
interesting difference with the Libyan campaign is that it needed much
more strike sorties per day to release a smaller number of weapons.
Mueller explains that this was caused partly by limitations in tanker
capacity, ISR assets, and “personnel skilled in the arcane arts of air
targeting.”159 This suggests that OIR’s air war was relatively efficient.
See Table 5.3.
Figure 5.3 demonstrates how USCENTCOM’s strategy shifted from
an Iraq-first approach to an operational-level simultaneity strategy, and
later, how the successes in Iraq freed air assets for Syria.160 During OIR,
sustainability and capacity of assets related to airpower once again
proved to be a factor, or major importance and concern.

Sensor-to-Shooter Time
There are several ways in which an airstrike can be initiated. Some
insight into the different methods and corresponding situations is
necessary to understand how the sensor-to-shooter time factor
played out in the ISIS case. First, there is dynamic targeting. This is
ad-hoc weapon deployment often used for time-sensitive targets.161

Table 5.3. Air Campaigns Compared

STRIKE SORTIES/WEAPONS RELEASES BY AIR CAMPAIGN
Average Average
Total Total Percent Total
Total Strike Bombs
Sortie Strike Strike Weapons
Days Sorties Dropped
Missions Sorties Sorties Releases
Per Day Per Day

IRAQ 1991 43 120,000 42,000 35% 265,000 976 6,163

BOSNIA 1995 17 3,515 2,470 70% 1,026 145 60

KOSOVO 77 38,004 14,112 37% 28,018 183 364

AFGHANISTAN 76 20,600 6,500 32% 17.500 86 230

IRAQ 2003 26 41,000 15.500 38% 27,000 596 1,039

LIBYA 2011 210 25,944 9,700 37% 7,642 46 36

IRAQ/SYRIA 361 16,164 3,837 24% 15,245 11 43

Source: Zenko 2015

48
 CHAPTER 5

Typically, but not exclusively, these dynamic targeting strikes

are requested by embedded SOF units operating from a static
observation post. When their indigenous partners get involved in a
troops in contact (TIC) incident, the SOF JTAC requests an air strike
that opens with the words “green forces, troops in contact.” However,
in the fight against ISIS, the ROEs generally did not allow embedded
JTACs to direct the strike on a target via a “talk-on procedure” or
by laser marking. Thus, these air-to-ground specialists were not
always allowed to control the terminal attack phase, as would be
optimal.162 Instead, directing the strike on target is in most cases done
by JTACs working in one of the two CJOCs via ISR assets such as
the MQ-1 Predator or MQ-9 Reaper (which are equipped with laser
guiding capabilities).163 For self-defense, or in a so-called “blue [own
SOF] forces, troops in contact” situation, however, the embedded
JTACs are allowed to direct air strikes themselves. It is easy to
understand that this has gained them the nickname of “SOF’s life
insurance.”164 This suboptimal situation changed when the battle of
Mosul began to stall in December 2016, and CJTF-OIR Commander
Lt. General Stephen Townsend modified U.S. military authorities
with Tactical Directive 1 in a successful effort to regain momentum.
“This order delegated target engagement authority to American
combat advisors with the organic ability to conduct terminal control

Coalition strikes per month, in Iraq and Syria

The term airstrike is imprecise. According to AFCENT, an average of 3.65 weapons were released by allied airstrike to December, 2017,
with allies admitting that multiple targets, aircraft actions an even locations might be labelled under any one ‘strike’ report.

1800
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Source: Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve

Figure 5.3 Development of air war intensity over time. Source: airwars.org

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in an effort to increase the responsiveness of surface and air fires

and their coordination with Iraqi forces.”165 The devolution of target
engagement authority during OIR demonstrates that this improved
the sensor-to-shooter time and that this was vital for winning the
more challenging battles. See Figure 5.4.
Another way to initiate an air strike is via the deliberate targeting
procedure.166 This typically concerns targets that have been identified
and subsequently observed–often for protracted periods of time. To
prevent collateral damage, the surroundings and patterns of life are
meticulously watched. Obviously, in such cases the sensor-to-shooter
time is much longer, ranging from hours to days or even months. In
these cases, the term sensor-to-shooter time does not apply properly
because the sensors are used for a pattern-of-life analysis, which
encompasses a different process than dynamic targeting.167
The sensor-to-shooter time for dynamic targeting is much shorter—a
couple of minutes for self-defense situations up to dozens of minutes
(depending on the situation) for more complicated strikes. What
generally applies is that the higher the estimated possible collateral
damage, the higher the target approval authority lies, thus the longer

Sanliurfa •

• Mosul
• Aleppo

• Kirkuk
Deir ez-Zor •

Syria

★ Damascus
• Baghdad

• Ar Rutbah Iraq

Figure 5.4. Geographical dispersion and magnitude of OIR airstrikes 2014-2018. Source:
Airwars.org

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the sensor-to-shooter time will be.168 Dynamic targeting strikes, often

in the shape of CAS, may be approved by subordinate commanders
closer to the front lines.169 All strikes in Iraq must be authorized by
an Iraqi or Kurdish government official. Due to classification, it is
not entirely clear how the ROEs and tactical directives have exactly
evolved, although open sources confirm that the sensor-to-shooter
time has improved during the course of the war. First, because target
approval authority was pushed down from Tampa to the CAOC, and
later for some cases, Tactical Directive 1 pushed it further down to
the CJOCs and local commanders. It is clear that this improved the
applicability of the AM.170
Apart from air support, the increase of artillery has also improved
the sensor-to-shooter time. The ISIS case demonstrates that this
classical form of fire support can also be of importance in AM-type
approaches. Paladin howitzers and other ground systems were
important enablers during the battle for Mosul, and throughout the
campaign they were even more important to the lightly armed Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria.171

5.4 INDIGENOUS FORCES FACTORS

Availability
While a myriad of local factions joined the fight against ISIS, this
section focuses on the SDF, which provides the most valuable and
promising example when theorizing about the generalizability of
the AM.172 Initially, Syria proved a challenge as there were no obvious
reliable indigenous forces to act as proxy.173 U.S. efforts to create a local
ground force through the so-called Train and Equip Program largely
failed and were eventually abandoned. This made it apparent that the
United States could only rely on the Syrian Kurds.174 The fact that the
SDF was created and able to fulfil the role of the indigenous ground
force in the AM is promising for the generalizability of the success of
the AM. After the failed train and equip efforts, expectations were low.
The SDF case demonstrates that the inherent limitation of the AM,
relying on a local proxy, might in some cases be less problematic than
AM critics argue.
This operational necessity had severe political consequences.
Without a doubt, the Kurdish People Protection Units (YPG) have

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proven to be the most effective proxy in Syria. They are, however,

related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which NATO ally Turkey
believes to be an even bigger threat than ISIS.175 Another problem even
more relevant for our analysis is that Syrian Arabs would not accept
Kurds entering (and occupying) their territories in order to fight ISIS.176
To circumnavigate this precarious issue, the United States created the
SDF as an umbrella organization that incorporated not only the YPG
but also the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC) and other militias.177 Yet, it is
clear that the Kurds delivered the bulk of the fighting power. In 2015,
for instance, there were roughly 40,000 Kurdish fighters and 5,000
fighters of the SAC, which endorsed its symbolic role as it mainly
seemed to be co-opted for legitimacy purposes.178 On the ground,
however, the Arabs turned out to be a formidable fighting force as well
and as their number gradually increased. They not only gave legitimacy
to SDF operations but also bore the brunt of actions in routing ISIS
from Raqqa.179

Reliability and Dependability

In the ISIS case, abundant reports on failures confirm that reliability
of potential indigenous forces is a major problem for policymakers and
the military alike.180 Whereas the Syrian Kurds proved the most reliable
indigenous partner force, even they could not always be relied upon.181
As long as ISIS represented the main threat to the Kurds, the Kurds
shared the interest of degrading this extremist movement. With the
decline of ISIS, however, interests diverged between the United States
and the Kurds due to Turkish pressure. In January 2018, when Turkey
launched Operation OLIVE BRANCH against PKK and YPG targets in
the Afrin region, Kurdish SDF fighters massively deserted and crossed
into western Syria to fight alongside their brethren.182 Whereas the
United States attempted to pass off the SDF as a balanced fighting
force separated from the YPG and the PKK, it now became clear that
the SDF was intimately related with the YPG, which had delivered the
backbone of the umbrella organization.183 Thus, the battle for Afrin
painfully revealed the limitations of the SDF’s reliability, as it stressed
they could not be depended on when interests diverged.184 In order
to cope which such issues, Aaron Stein recommends that to achieve
the alignment of end-goals, the United States should be prepared to

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tolerate the possibility that partner forces may act in ways that do not
perfectly align with its objectives.185

Fragmentation
One of the factors in which the ISIS case distinguishes itself from
the other cases where the AM was applied is the extreme degree of
fragmentation of the Syrian opposition. This is an important issue,
as some commenters consider this the “new normal” in civil wars.186
The fact that the AM was successfully employed in this fragmented
context, therefore, holds a promise about the approach’s applicability
in future conflicts. This, however, does not mean that fragmentation
has become irrelevant. As was seen in Syria, this matter greatly
complicated operations. Paradoxically, the hesitant conduct of
the United States and its Western partners in the beginning of
the Syrian civil war seemingly contributed to the fragmentation
of the opposition.187 As the Syrian opposition was confronted with
an “extreme military asymmetry favoring the Assad regime,” the
various factions could not unite. They were forced to fragment, as
centralization would render them far more vulnerable.188 Furthermore,
Western reluctance created an opportunity for Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and others to create their own
Islamist proxy forces.189 Young Syrian men willing to resist the
regime could hardly be blamed for preferring well-resourced Islamist
groups over uncertain Western-sponsored groups that required
cumbersome vetting processes. It should be noted, therefore, that
when political leaders consider the AM, it is important to prevent a
phase of ambivalence that might increase fragmentation and thereby
complicate or hamper the execution of such a limited approach.
Another issue concerns internal rifts within local partners. This might
be best illustrated by the Iraqi Kurds’ partisan division, which seriously
endangered the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) advance on Kirkuk in
October 2017. Fighters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
abandoned their positions, even though the fighters of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) expected them to stand their ground.190 This
supposed betrayal resulted in severe tensions between the two Kurdish
factions.191 Almost two years later, one of the authors learned about
this the hard way when, during a deployment in Iraqi Kurdistan as

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Battalion Staff Trainer for a Regional Guard Force Battalion consisting

of both PUK and KDP elements, he mentioned the retaking of Kirkuk.
The normally relaxed and kind atmosphere quickly turned sour,
and a vicious discussion emerged that could only be quelled by the
battalion’s commander. The topic was very sensitive and led to the
awareness that the soldiers’ loyalty still lay with either the PUK or the
KDP instead of the newly combined Regional Guard Force.192 In the
eyes of both factions, the new force structure was a necessary evil to
absorb support and funding.193

Cultural Aspects
The ISIS case is full of examples that demonstrate the importance
of cultural aspects when considering an AM approach. This part of
the discussion will focus on the crucial point that OIR’s efforts to train
and equip the ISF were seriously undermined by cultural differences,
as introduced by Biddle.194 The methods and processes taught to local
officers for executing command and control are based on Western
military principles such as mission command, which is part of the
maneuverist approach. This command philosophy requires a high
degree of mutual trust between commanders and subcommanders
to share information, delegate tasks and responsibilities, and enjoy
freedom of action within the boundaries set by the commanders’
intents. Unfortunately, these principles proved difficult to reconcile
with Iraqi culture.195 An Iraqi military commander, for instance, might
not at all be pleased with well-trained subcommanders since he might
perceive them as a personal threat. This discrepancy likely contributed
to the limited availability of trainees for OIR’s officer training capacity.196
This triggers the question of whether the current approach of imposing
Western military doctrine is the most effective approach.197 Culture and
doctrine, after all, are inextricably linked.198 A deep understanding of a
partner force’s culture can be an AM force multiplier.
Both the United Kingdom and NATO have published capacity-
building doctrines that stress the importance of tailoring training
to the needs, habits, and situations of the local training audience,
and that training should begin with an extensive analysis of these
needs, habits, and situations.199 Despite this doctrinal imperative, the
Kurdistan Training and Coordination Centre prescribed a curriculum

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based on the U.S. Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), written

orders, and relatively complex staff procedures. When explained
to the Kurdish battalion commander—who could not read—that he
should start the MDMP by issuing a warning order to his company
commanders as soon as possible to give them as much time as
possible to conduct their own planning, he explained that he would
typically be informed no more than 24 hours before the start of an
operation where to assemble his battalion. To ensure operational
security and maintain surprise, all other information would be
received later. Via an interpreter, he explained that timely warning
orders, like those on which the MDMP relies, would certainly ruin
operational security. Or in his words, “The housekeeper of a staff
officer will spread the word to the barber of the cousin of the local
ISIS commander.” It became painfully clear that standard operating
procedures and the MDMP, which we imposed upon them, were
worlds apart. This is just one of many examples of how, despite the
availability of excellent doctrine, Western militaries dramatically fail to
tailor staff training programs to local partners.

Motivation, Morale, and Unit Cohesion

Critics such as Biddle have pointed to supposed lack of motivation
of indigenous allies to fight ISIS as one of the reasons why a strategy
based on an AM variant will not be effective.200 It is clear that lack
of motivation, morale, and unit cohesion of the ISF, among others,
initially facilitated the rise of ISIS and provided a grim prospect for
the future. It can be concluded post hoc that the course of events
leading to the physical degradation of ISIS proved that willing local
allies had been found and formed.201 The retaking of the northern
Syrian city of Manbij is just one example of the SDF’s, or arguably
the YPG’s, impressive ability to maintain morale and motivation.
During the two-month urban battle, the SDF persevered despite
losing around 300 fighters, with another 1,200 injured.202 Later during
the war, when the YPG’s interests diverged from its SDF umbrella, it
became clear that the SDF’s unit cohesion had limits that followed
ethical divisions. Understanding local motivation, therefore, remains
essential for successful application of the AM.

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The Triangular Balance of Indigenous Force Skill vs.

Mission Fitness vs. Enemy Skill
In OIR’s concept of operations for annihilating ISIS, SOF units
reported enemy positions to the CJOC when indigenous forces and
ISIS got into a TIC situation. Dependent on the situation and after
vetting information such as coordinates, the JTAC in the CJOC would
direct an airstrike after authorization. Initially, airstrikes were able
to inflict major damage on ISIS because they were not prepared
for Western airpower. When ISIS commanders got a grasp of the
coalition’s strengths and weaknesses, however, they quickly proved
able to adapt their combat tactics accordingly.203 The weekly ISIS
newspaper, al-Naba, which was meant to inform fighters, reveals
how these commanders perceived Western strategy and how they
proposed to counter it.204 These analyses of ISIS’ and the coalition’s
military performances testify to a keen military insight and creative
solution for countering and exploring an adversary‘s weak point.205
An article in al-Naba, for instance, provides detailed instructions
on how to hide positions.206 The coalition had to react to ISIS’
adaptability by employing more ISR capabilities and by moving
SOF units closer to the front lines, which endorses the interrelation
between the three elements of the triangular balance. The changing
skillset of ISIS, in turn, demanded a higher skill level from indigenous
partners. This required a more systematic and coordinated approach
to cope with the newly arisen necessity to move closer to the enemy
without being annihilated.207 Thus, the final element of the triangular
balance encompassed increased training and advisement for local
partners to cope with these new tactics, then accompany them
more closely to the forward line of operations. This was an ongoing
process of adaptation. The perceived ability of Western troops and
local allies to cope with these dynamics influences the applicability
of the AM.208 The dynamic nature of the three elements of the AM
stretches the generalizability of the model when they are understood
and anticipated by military planners and politicians. If not, the same
dynamic nature might blunt the AM’s effectiveness.

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5.5 SOF FACTORS

Capability
Former USCENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel has
described the campaign against ISIS as warfighting “by, with, and
through” local forces.209 The BWT terminology is often echoed by the
SOF community, and Votel’s explanation of that term suggests that it
aptly captures the general operational approach to which SOF units
contribute.210 The role of SOF units is “building partner capacity” and to
“advise, assist, accompany, and enable” local forces.211 This, of course,
is all but new as it fits seamlessly in the U.S. Army’s SOF doctrinal term
special warfare.212 Moreover, special warfare campaigns might well
include the coordination of air strikes.213 Elaborating further on this
theoretical standpoint, the AM could be regarded as the convergence
of classical special warfare doctrine with NCW and airpower RMA. SOF
units contributing to an AM approach therefore have to be capable
of acting as sensors in order to direct modern airpower as well as
performing special warfare.214
This perspective suggests, or explains, why the AM is less
revolutionary from the SOF perspective than it is from an airpower
perspective. It has even been suggested that the role performed
by SOF in Iraq and Syria is a return to their roots.215 Contemporary
American strategic culture favors direct action-types of SOF activities
such as “surgical strikes.”216 Therefore, the latter type of operations
typically catches disproportionate attention
compared to special (or unconventional)
...the AM could
warfare. This also applies to their
contribution to the desired ends of the BWT
be regarded as
operational approach. Because surgical strike the convergence
operations entail direct kinetic force by SOF of classical
units on the ground, it could well be argued special warfare
that operations of this type fall outside the
doctrine with
scope of the BWT approach and the AM. In
reality, however, both types of operations are NCW and
used mutually. Whenever necessary, surgical airpower RMA.
strikes have been employed to support
special warfare.217 In Iraq and Syria, the acceleration of successful
intelligence-driven SOF raids on ISIS leadership raised the prospect

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of outrunning the advances in building a competent and coherent

hold force in both Iraq and Syria.218 Yet, it should be noted that while
contributing tremendously to the demise of opposing groups, the
overall AM approach’s emphasis on local allies is deemed more
effective for guaranteeing a limited involvement since it recognizes
the importance of battlefield success exploitation and consolidation.
The SOF capability that should thus be critically reviewed when
considering an AM- or BWT-type approach is the capability of
conducting special warfare, combined with the capability to achieve
air-ground integration in the specific context at hand. Although the
United States has a rich history of special warfare, and it has dedicated
SOF units specialized in this type of SOF operation, the role of SOF
units keeps evolving and seems to emphasize direct action missions.219
Therefore, the question of whether the SOF component is prepared for
their envisioned task in a particular operational environment remains
relevant when considering them for use in an AM-type operation.

Liaison, Advisory, and other Human Enabler Capacity

The relevance of liaison, advisory, and other human enabler capacity
is essential in any AM-variant. This factor comprises all personnel that
enable the AM other than SOF personnel. Liaison officers and advisors
that link the different elements of the AM together are obvious
human enablers, but there are more essential specialists, including
specialists from the intelligence community, specialists occupied with
target vetting, or reliable translators that communicate between SDF
fighters who request air strikes on the ground and JTACs in strike cells.
The particularities of Iraq and Syria not only confirmed this but also
revealed some additional points regarding this factor. First, the use of
advisors at the tactical and operational level should be dramatically
increased. Although the debate on the role of ground troops focuses
on the coordination of airstrikes and other fires, the advisory functions
entail far more than that, thus necessitating additional troops.220
While one might expect this problem to be less relevant in the case of
Iraq, where a U.S. presence since 2003 has resulted in an impressive
network of human enablers, the absence of a large number of advisors
was felt almost as badly as in Syria, where scarce human enabler
capabilities were totally dependent on SOF units.221 In Syria, the strike

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cells were exclusively manned with SOF personnel.222 Moreover, force-

protection concerns further hampered operators’ abilities to connect
with local partners. At the onset of the campaign especially, the “risk to
forces” outweighed the “risk to mission.”223 Altogether, this constrained
the results of OIR, as it led to a lack of coordination with, and between,
indigenous elements. It also instigated preventable friction, of which
the performance of Iraqi units during the battle for Ramadi is perhaps
the most infamous illustration.224
Developments at the strategic level seem to emphasize the
importance of this factor, as BWT seems to be embraced by
USCENTCOM as a new, light-footprint strategy. In 2018, for instance,
the approach was simultaneously employed in Yemen, Afghanistan,
Syria, and Iraq, which indicates the need for an increased capability.225
Furthermore, both Votel and former Secretary Mattis have stressed
the importance of BWT and the accompanying demand for greater
liaison, advisory, and other human enabler capabilities.226 With the
reemergence of great power competition, this gives the United States
additional options for enhancing and maintaining its influence with a
relatively limited number of resources.

5.6 WHAT NEW FACTORS CAN BE IDENTIFIED

BASED ON THE USE OF THE AFGHAN MODEL IN
THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS?
The analysis of the ISIS case in the preceding part of this chapter
revealed that not all relevant data was covered with our framework.
Therefore, we introduce three new complementary factors, or, rather,
they have been detached from overarching factors and are now
separately included in the framework. The ISIS case has stretched the
definition of the AM, and consequently, the applicability assessment
framework must be updated.

Public Support and Political Will

In conflicts that only hold limited strategic interest–either real or
perceived–and a corresponding degree of public support, the political
will of a nation to massively deploy its own troops is typically absent,
rendering proxies essential.227 Although general factors were earlier
excluded from the AM applicability assessment framework, the ISIS

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case brings forward the insight that political will and support should
be included. This might push decision-makers toward an AM approach.
Moreover, maintaining political support is crucial since public support
in a democracy is, or should be, the source of political will. The
evaporation of public support for the Iraq war, for instance, meant that
the success of the 2007 U.S. troop surge into Iraq was abandoned.
The intensity of the surge was clearly not aligned with U.S. public
support, and Obama was voted into office on a course that drastically
changed U.S. political will to remain committed in Iraq. However,
when ISIS emerged, there apparently was enough public support for
an AM variant (which was initially beyond the expectation of the U.S.
government). The almost continuous shifts in U.S. and wider Western
commitments are highly inefficient. The ISIS case has demonstrated
that understanding the degree of public support for an operation and
the ability to sustain it is an important factor that should influence
decision-makers when deciding on strategy.228 Valuing this factor could
cause them to consciously opt for the AM. Moreover, this factor could
also constrain decision-makers to the point where such an approach is
the only realistic escalation or de-escalation strategy for containment.

Strategic Interest Misalignment and Divergence

This factor relates to the inherent risks of proxy warfare, or the
“indirect approach,” as it was labelled in the 2006 U.S. Quadrennial
Defense Review.229 When real but limited interests are at stake, the
result is a dilemma that has dominated U.S. security policy for decades
and is likely to do so for a long time.230 A favorite answer to this
problem has been to rely on a proxy that is willing to fight in its own as
well as U.S. interests. Proxy warfare offers clear political benefits, but
it does come with inherent disadvantages. These could be strategic
interest misalignment and divergence, which always lead to systematic
frustration.231 The process of strategy becomes even harder when one
must trust a local political ally that has to be co-opted for achieving
political ends.232 The issues caused by strategic interest misalignment
and divergence might be essentially understood as a principal–agent
problem. Biddle et al., in this regard, argue that agency loss will
be high, and that adverse selection even promotes major interest
asymmetries between the provider and the recipient.233 The prospects

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about interest misalignment and the abilities to manage it should

influence the decision whether to opt for the AM.
This, again, can be easily demonstrated through the example of
the Kurds.234 Given the sensitivity of employing and empowering
this ethnicity as proxies against ISIS, the coalition had to be cautious
of possible unintended consequences—especially when it came
to Turkish or Iraqi national interest. Seemingly, policymakers who
instigate proxy warfare rarely consider the long-term implications of
their actions.235 Although it is too early for definitive judgement, in
Iraq the West’s strategic interest most severely diverged from that
of the sponsored Kurdish faction when the latter started focusing
on more political autonomy or even independence from Iraq. The
events did not end up escalating even though it was all but certain
beforehand.236 In Syria, the strategic interest of the sponsored
Kurdish faction clashed with Turkish interests. The empowerment of
Kurdish factions in Syria triggered the Turkish invasion of Syria and
subsequently, the absurd situation materialized that Turkish troops
have been fighting the U.S.-backed SDF. A clash between NATO
allies was far from inconceivable at some moments.237 It is beyond
dispute that the perceived misalignment and divergence in strategic
interests have been, and will remain, relevant factors when estimating
the applicability of the AM. The risk of unintended strategic
consequences is a major hazard when the West tries to influence
strategic outcomes by indirect engagement in conflicts with third
parties who have overlapping, but not identical interests.

Building Partner Force Capacity

The ISIS case demonstrates that coalition SOF units were unable
to provide the required amount of personnel needed for the building
partner force capacity LOE. Conventional forces have played an
important role in the training of the Iraqi military. Votel and Keravuori
argue that the most constraining factor for a BWT approach is “the
required supporting forces and sustainment levels needed to ensure
the host partner’s progress, parity or overmatch–and ultimately secure
the shared U.S. interest.”238 As mentioned, the coalition’s limited
capacity to train the Iraqi military, and the Syrian opposition troops had

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a restrictive influence on OIR’s effectiveness and the efforts to build

counter-ISIS forces proved more modest than generally believed.239
Historically, SOF units have been the primary advisory force
in support of both conventional and irregular forces around the
world.240 However, that perception has changed significantly over
the last 20 years.241 Conventional forces have played an important
role in building partner force capacity in the ISIS case and therefore
they too, like SOF units, should invest in understanding historical
context, language, and culture.242 This, however, results in a recurring
and highly debated dilemma because conventional forces should,
according to many, focus on conventional warfare instead of low
intensity warfare.243 The U.S. Army has addressed this problem (and
probably anticipated the prospect of future BWT warfare) by creating
specialized Security Force Assistance Brigades.244 While some
might consider such units as an institutional threat to SOF, there are
significant advantages to conventional units in the advisory role.245
A conventional combined arms maneuver is, for example, the core
competency of conventional forces and not of SOF units. Therefore,
an Iraqi battalion commander might be better off with conventional
advisors specialized in combined arms maneuvers, as this type of
operation approaches battlefield realties. It should be noted, however,
that despite similarities in task and organization, cultural awareness
is key for building indigenous partner capacity in a way that is self-
sustainable. The prospect that AM variants and BWT are a recurring
model for future warfare, in combination with the suboptimal
capacity building efficacy in the ISIS case, necessitate that this should
be incorporated in the AM applicability assessment framework as a
separate factor.

5.7 CONCLUSION: AN UPGRADED AFGHAN MODEL

APPLICABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
This chapter applied the AM applicability assessment framework
to the ISIS case. This not only enhanced our understanding of this
particular case but also demonstrated that all factors identified
in earlier cases are echoed in the latest application of the AM.
Furthermore, the brief analysis of each individual factor serves to
illustrate how the framework can be used to identify bottlenecks or

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potential restraints that influence the applicability of an AM variant, or

how certain factors might even be an incentive for its use. Additionally,
three new complementary factors have been introduced, or rather,
they have been detached from overarching factors and are now
separately included in the framework.246 The ISIS case provided data
demonstrating that these three factors are of such importance for the
successful application of the AM that they should be critically assessed
individually when contemplating AM-type approaches. Building
partner force capacity, in particular, has stretched the definition of
the AM since there is now a role for conventional forces in some AM
variants. But what does this all mean for the remaining relevance and
value of the AM in the coming years?

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 Chapter 6: The Value of the Afghan
Model

What option does the AM provide in the contemporary security

environment? Or, in other words, what is the remaining value of the
AM after the fight against ISIS? First, its success is dependent on 19
factors that constitute the AM applicability assessment framework.
This monograph has demonstrated how that framework can be used
to identify bottlenecks or limitations that influence the applicability
of an AM variant and how factors can be drivers for the use of the
AM. By analyzing the ISIS case along these lines, we validated the
framework and identified that there are three additional factors
that need to be included: public support and political will, strategic
interest misalignment and divergence, and building partner force
capacity. See Table 5.4. The value of the resulting framework is that
it provides a clear analytical structure that provides guidance for
military and political decision-makers who decide how to align ends,
ways, and means in limited warfare. The success of the AM in the ISIS
case has improved expectations about the generalizability of the
success of the AM and it has stretched the definition of the AM.
Two decades after the AM appeared as a new and promising
concept of operations, the Afghan war finally came to an end. It is
hard to frame this in any other way than complete strategic failure.
The concept of operations that was used for overthrowing the Taliban
during the initial phase, however, remains in no way less promising.
The AM once again proved its utility in the fight against ISIS. Western
airpower contained and suppressed ISIS on the battlefield, which
enabled indigenous forces to organize resistance assisted by Western
SOF. This analysis sheds a revealing light on some highly disputed
issues in the academic debate related to the RMA, war by proxy, and
the generalizability of the success of the AM. The employment of

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Table 6.1. Afghan Model Applicability Assessment Framework

Political Airpower Indigenous Forces SOF Component

Risk and Political

Air Superiority Availability Capability
Sensitivity
Legal Mandate and Reliability and Liaison Capacity and
Capability
Rules of Engagement Dependability Human Enablers
Sustainability and Unity vs Building Partner
Time
Capacity Fragmentation Force Capacity
Regional political
Sensor-to-Shooter Cultural Aspects
support and coalition
Time -Trainability
involvement
Public Support, its
Motivation, Morale,
Maintenance, and
and Unit Cohesion
Political Will
Triangular Balance:
Strategic Interest
Indigenous Forces
Misalignment and
–Mission Plan
Divergence
–Enemy Skill

Validated and complementary set of factors that determine the applicability of the
Afghan model of warfare. Source: authors

modern airpower is still evolving, and new ways to achieve air-ground

synergy have emerged. This indicates that the network-centric RMA
might still not be fully exploited; consequently, the AM approach will
continue to develop as it has been doing since 2001.
Furthermore, there are underexposed developments that could
have great implications for AM-type approaches. The role and
influence of private military companies is ever-increasing, and some
already have the capabilities to take over the role of the Western
ground component by coordinating airstrikes and training and
advising indigenous forces. This possible replacement obviously
increases the potential of an AM-type approach in cases where
plausible deniability is required, or where boots on the ground are not
desirable. This potential is also well understood by Russian political
and military elites as witnessed by, among others, the deployment of
the Wagner Group in Syria.247
Whatever the future might have to offer, it is clear that even–or
maybe especially–in a time of (renewed) global competition, the
United States needs to deal with real but limited security threats.
Therefore, three options are available. First, go all-in with the risk of

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overspending so that limited stakes are realized. Second, stay out

and remain unengaged, which results in losing the stake, although
cheaply. Finally, and most likely, there is the option to go for a middle
approach in which it is likely that an AM variant will be the preferred
concept of operations to bring about this balance.248
Asymmetric adversaries have drawn the right lesson from Desert
Storm and will take all possible measures to limit their exposure to
Western airpower. Recent history indicates that it is not viable for
Western democracies to maintain a large COIN force for the time that
this type of operation requires. It is, however, possible to maintain the
components of the AM, which, when combined, are able to suppress
insurgencies while transitioning from covert insurgency to overt
control of territory. If used in that sense, an AM variant would not
be a solution for deeper political grievances. However, containment
should be preferred over an uncontrolled power vacuum, as the ISIS
case demonstrates. The AM in its narrow definition can be a useful
tool for situations that require containment or destructive power. The
AM, however, might be much more valuable when it is embedded in
the proper, overarching strategy. The BWT approach, as used against
ISIS, seems to offer appropriate strategic embedding of the AM,
by connecting the AM, which is mainly a kinetic tool, to other non-
kinetic means. As such, it closes the strategic disconnect between the
physical destruction of an enemy and operations that address root
causes of conflict. Furthermore, the employment of the AM in the ISIS
case endorses that the RMA can also be of great value in asymmetric
or irregular warfare. Twenty years after the emergence of the AM
in Afghanistan, international coalition forces left that country with
Afghan Security Forces far from self-sustainable. The AM in its narrow
containment form could have provided an alternative course of action
for the U.S. to deal with this theatre.
Since successful application of the AM is dependent on the factors
presented in the AM applicability assessment framework, the value
of the AM depends on the occurrence of situations that meet the
requirements of these factors. A multitude of scholars and political
entities have tried to comprehend and predict the future security
environment. Generally, the result has been that over the past few

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years, Western militaries have been reorienting toward high-end

warfare against an equally sophisticated, or even superior opponent.
This focus has been further enhanced as a consequence of China’s
build-up of traditional-style armed forces and the predominantly
conventional nature of the Ukraine War. Whereas it is understandable
that militaries prepare for the most dangerous course of action,
history reveals a recurring pattern in which disappointing irregular
endeavors act as a catalyst for such a reorientation.249 This comes
with the tendency not to learn from and prepare for future limited
wars, which is a very dangerous development in a time of tense
relations between superpowers, assertive regional actors, and a
corresponding likelihood of proxy war.250 Besides this, it might not
even be relevant to try to make a clear separation between irregular
or unconventional warfare and conventional warfare because
future armed conflicts will likely contain elements of both.251 Great
power competition, therefore, might very well come, or is already in
progress, in the form of manifold low-intensity conflicts. Therefore,
this monograph calls for the investment in limited or low-intensity
warfare capabilities in order for the West to also prepare for the most
likely course of action.
Ultimately, the RMA has not changed the nature of war, since war,
in its essence, remains violent, interactive and political. It did have
transformational effects on the character of war or the nature of
warfare.252 When politicians need a fast, relatively low-risk and light
footprint option to project force, an AM variant will form an attractive
option that is widely applicable. Even though some scholars stress
that being dependent on indigenous forces is a disadvantage of the
AM, it seems an acceptable price for a light footprint option—as long
as interests are limited. Moreover, this approach is more versatile
and robust than claimed by some sceptics. However, it does have
significant political and military limitations that strategists should be
aware of and which can be understood for each unique case through
the assessment framework.
The ISIS case has revealed that the AM can be even more effectively
employed as part of a sustainable, realistic, and long-term strategy.
In this regard, the BWT approach offers a promising underpinning for

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developing and institutionalizing a new Western way of limited

warfare. Whereas the AM, in itself, holds remaining value for future
conflicts, its incorporation in such an overarching approach will
definitely transform the character of limited war. This ultimately
provides a powerful and much-needed addition to the strategic toolkit
for dealing with the multi-faceted threats of today and tomorrow.

69
 Notes

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 20–32;
Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Winning with Allies: the Strategic
Value of the Afghan Model," International Security 30 no. 3 (2006): 136, 337.
2. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense
Policy, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2002), 6.
3. See, for instance, Martijn Kitzen, “Operations in Irregular Warfare,” in The Handbook of Military
Sciences, ed. A. Sookermany (Cham: Springer, 2020), 18, https://link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_81-1.pdf, 18.
4. Tijs Althuizen, “The New Way of Limited Warfare: The Value of the Afghan Model after the
Fight against ISIS” (master’s thesis, Netherlands Defence Academy, August 2018), https://
bibliotheeknlda.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p21075coll27/id/73 http://defbib.kma.
nl/art2/pdf/Masters/2018/Althuizen, T.H.M.pdf
5. Tijs Althuizen, “Het Afghaanse Model en de Strijd Tegen ISIS: Een Onderzoek naar de
Mogelijkheden en de Beperkingen van het Afghaanse Model in de Strijd Tegen ISIS,”
(bachelor’s thesis, Netherlands Defence Academy, 2016) http://defbib.kma.nl/art2/pdf/
KMA/2016/Althuizen.pdf; Tijs Althuizen, “The New Way of Limited Warfare.”
6. Laura Roselle and Sharon Spray, Research and Writing in International Relations (New York:
Routledge, 2016).
7. With a few exceptions, the literature on the ISIS case focuses on the period up to the end of
2018 because at the time this research was conducted there was a lack of data from after
this period that met the reliability criteria. Hence the decision to focus this particular case on
the years 2014–2017.
8. See, among others, John Andreas Olsen, “Operation Desert Storm, 1990,” in A History of Air
Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Dulles: Potomac Books Inc., 2010), 177-200; Benjamin S.
Lambeth, “American and NATO Airpower Applied: From Deny Flight to Inherent Resolve,”
in Airpower Applied, U.S., NATO and Israeli Combat Experience, ed. John Andreas Olsen
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 124–216.
9. Tony Mason, however, claims that it was actually Operation Allied Force in 1999, rather than
Desert Storm, that marked the beginning of a new era of airpower because of the used
technology, the evolution of asymmetric countermeasures, the impact of humanitarian
issues, the exposure to the international media, and the uneasy alliance. Tony Mason,
“Operation Allied Force, 1999,” in A History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Dulles:
Potomac Books Inc., 2010), 225–252.
10. This unpreceded potency of airpower did not suddenly fall from the sky but was the result of
military innovation framed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
11. Frans Osinga, “Air Warfare,” in The Oxford Handbook of War, ed. Julian Lindley-French and Yves
Boyer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 444–457.

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12. Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 108–109.
13. Alexander Salt, “Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” Strategic Studies Quarterly
(Spring 2018): 101–102.
14. Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 108–109.
15. In the remaining years of the 20th century, American-dominated airpower prevailed in two
more cases.
16. Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 135.
17. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” 20–32.
18. The indigenous force consisted of the Northern Alliance (NA) with whom the CIA had ties
since the insurgency against the Soviets. Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 138. Additionally, in the
south and east, the indigenous component consisted of various more tribally affiliated
militias.
19. He uses this identical description in the following three publications: Benjamin S. Lambeth,
Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 2005), 248; Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001,”
in A History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Dulles: Potomac Books Inc., 2010), 270;
and Lambeth, “American and NATO Airpower,” 158.
20. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Boulder: Westview Press).
21. Andres, Wills, and Griffith Jr., "Winning with Allies, 136, 337.
22. Another scholar impressed by the results of the AM is Frederick Kagan, who states that the
model demonstrated that because of innovative doctrine and new technology, “warfare will
be truly revolutionized.” Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target (New York: Encounter Books,
2006), 305–306.
23. In Afghanistan, airpower denied the Taliban the ability to rapidly communicate, move, and
counterattack. Andres, Wills, and Griffith Jr., "Winning with Allies," 127.
24. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, 6.
25. Barbara Elias, “The Big Problem of Small Allies: New Data and Theory on Defiant Local
Counterinsurgency Partners in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Security Studies 27, no 1: 1-30.
26. Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 144.
27. Shimko describes: “[…] the goal was to create the paralysis envisaged by Warden while getting
inside the Iraqi decision cycle as suggested by Boyd.” Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 147.
28. Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 145.
29. Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 145.
30. The withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq began after the surge in December 2007
and was completed by December 2011, thereby ending the Third Iraq war. Although the
Third Iraq War was still raging when Shimko published his book, it is clear that the formal
withdrawal would mean the end of the Third Iraq War. The current war against ISIS could
therefore be labelled the Fourth Iraq War; Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 145.
31. James S. Corum, “Air Power in Small Wars: 1913 to the Present,” in A History of Air Warfare, ed.
John Andreas Olsen (Dulles: Potomac Books Inc., 2010), 327–350; US Army/Marine Corps,
FM 3–24.
32. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today,” Parameters 38,
no. 2 (2008): 52–66.

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33. Lambeth concludes that Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR, as case
studies in airpower employment, “did not depart in any fundamental way from the
six previous American and NATO air combat experiences since 1991 […].” This shows
that Lambeth does not classify the operations where the AM was utilized as a relevant
subcategory of these recent combat experiences. Lambeth is correct by this observation in
the way that the AM is merely a concept of operations to which the new technologies of the
RMA are a precondition. However, with this statement, he does seem to undervalue the role
of the rebels and SOF, thereby underestimating the relevance of the synergy between the
three elements of the AM that delivered the success. This unfortunately seems to be the case
for various other airpower focused RMA proponents as well, even after this third campaign
that demonstrated the importance of synergy between ground and air operations. Lambeth,
“American and NATO Airpower,” 179.
34. Erica D. Borghard and Constantino Pischedda, “Parameters,” Parameters, (Spring 2012): 64.
35. Frederic Wehrey, “The Hidden Story of Airpower in Libya (and What it Means for Syria),”
Foreign Policy, (2013).
36. Borghard and Pischedda, “Parameters,” 67.
37. “By nearly every account, the arrival of foreign ground advisors had a transformational effect
on air-ground coordination. They built trust, provided training, and corroborated targeting
information provided by Libyan networks of spotters and informants that reported to the
operations rooms. They helped smooth the political and regional divisions within the rebels’
ranks. They proved instrumental in major breakthroughs on the Nafusa front, Misrata, and
the liberation of Tripoli. Their effectiveness suggests a new variant of the Northern Alliance
model that can amplify airpower’s effects through the coordination of precision strikes, even
when the military competence of indigenous forces is low or nil.” Frederic Wehrey, “The
Libyan Experience,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P.
Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 45.
38. Salt, “Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” 101–102.
39. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
40. For a balanced critique of Biddle’s absolute reasoning in the revolutionary change versus
continuation debate, see Eliot A. Cohen, “Stephen Biddle on Military Power,” The Journal of
Strategic Studies 28, no. 3 (2005): 421–422 or Shimko, The Iraq Wars, 142.
41. Salt, “Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” 102.
42. Tijs Althuizen, “Het Afghaanse Model en de Strijd Tegen ISIS: Een Onderzoek naar de
Mogelijkheden en de Beperkingen van het Afghaanse Model in de Strijd Tegen ISIS,” (Breda,
The Netherlands Defence Academy, 2016), http://defbib.kma.nl/art2/pdf/KMA/2016/
Althuizen.pdf
43. Karl P. Mueller, “Examining the Air Campaign in Libya,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the
Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 8.
44. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.
45. Karl P. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the
Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 380.
46. Marcus Mohlin, “Cloak and Dagger in Libya: The Libyan Thuwar and the Role of Allied Special
Forces,” in The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign, ed. Kjell
Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin, and Charlotte Wagnsson (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 195–216.
47. Mohlin, “Cloak and Dagger,” 202.
48. Borghard and Pischedda, “Allies and Airpower in Libya,” 64.

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49. L.W.E.M van Geel, G. de Koster en F.P.B. Osinga, “De NAVO tegen Gaddafi: Operation Unified
Protector,” Militaire Spectator 128, no. 5 (2013): 220–236.
50. Bruce R. Nardulli, “The Arab States Experience,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the
Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 369–372.
51. A debate emerged that most missions cannot be qualified as CAS since “detailed integration”
was often absent. See Mike Benitez, “How Afghanistan Distorted Close Air Support and Why
it Matters,” War on the Rocks (June 29, 2016), https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-
afghanistan-distorted-close-air-support-and-why-it-matters/ (accessed April 13, 2018).
52. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-09.3 Close Air Support, November 25, 2014, 1–6.
53. Géraud Laborie, “The Afghan Model More Than 10 Years Later, An Undiminished Relevance,”
ASPJ Africa & Francophonie 4, no. 3 (2013): 56.
54. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 385,391.
55. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 385–387.
56. Frederic Wehrey, “The Libyan Experience,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil
War, ed. Karl P. Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 45, 61.
57. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 390.
58. Nardulli, “The Arab States Experience,” 361.
59. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 105.
60. Richard B. Andres, “The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3
(2016): 409.
61. For a comprehensive analysis on the influence of fragmentation in contemporary armed
conflict, seeKathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Fragmentation in Conflict and
its Impact on Prospects for Peace,” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (December 2016).
62. Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Fragmentation in Conflict,” 6.
63. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 375–378.
64. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 115.
65. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece: Assessing the Afghan Campaign,” Foreign Affairs
82, no. 3 (2002).
66. Andres, Wills, and Griffith, “Winning with Allies,” 147–148.
67. Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, and Terrence M. Potter, Why They
Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 2003).
68. Biddle, “Allies, Airpower and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,”165–166.
69. Andres, Wills, and Griffith, “Winning with Allies,” 153.
70. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1987), 200.
71. Géraud Laborie, “The Afghan Model More Than 10 Years Later, An Undiminished Relevance,”
ASPJ Africa & Francophonie 4, no. 3 (2013): 56.
72. O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece: Assessing the Afghan Campaign,” 7.
73. Nardulli, “The Arab State's Experiences,” 368.
74. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 391.
75. Nardulli, “The Arab State's Experiences,” 370.
76. Thomas Joscelyn, “U.S. Coalition Says “Much Work Remains to Defeat ISIS,” FDD’s Long
War Journal, Foundation for Defence of Democracies (April 6, 2018), https://www.

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 NOTES

longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/us-led-coalition-says-much-work-remains-to-defeat-
to-isis.php ( accessed April 13, 2018). The Trump administration was eager to claim victory
and to collect political gains. The CJTF-OIR military command, on the other hand, is seeking
consolidation of military gains and knows that territorial loss is not the same as defeat in an
insurgency context.
77. The first phase is called the building or preservation phase, followed by the expansion phase
and finally the decisive statehood phase.
78. Whiteside offers a thorough explanation of how these three phases of blended guerrilla
activities and increasing conventional strength have taken shape in ISIS’ struggle for
statehood, summarized by himself in the following words: “The Islamic State built a
widespread network of ideological fighters that thrived in the chaotic environment of Iraq
(Phase 1), expanding into a national network with a strong bureaucracy and organization
supporting its operations (Phase 2). The tribal backlash forced it to return to the build
phase, where the leadership analyzed the problem and addressed the fissures within their
community. Iraqi political dysfunction and a failed reconciliation allowed the movement
to use sectarianism as a lever to return to the second phase. Conditions in Syria provided
supplies, money, and a new flow of foreign fighters to enable the Islamic State to initiate
a decisive campaign that secured the political and environmental conditions for their
establishment of the caliphate (Phase 3).” Craig Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary
Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-2016),” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no.
4, (2016), 7. Although this revolutionary warfare lens is not uncontested, reality in
communications as well as in practice demonstrates that the three-phase protracted warfare
framework is relevant. It should be noted that Zarqawi disputes Naji based on philosophical
arguments but the military strategy he prescribes is spot on. Islamic State, “The Revival of
Jihad in Bengal,” Dabiq 12, no. 39, (2015): 37–41.
79. Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare,” 7, 10.
80. Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare,” 7.
81. Kyle Orton, “The Islamic State Says the Loss of the Caliphate Does Not Mean Defeat,” The
Syrian Intifada. December 16, 2018, https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2017/12/16/the-
islamic-state-says-the-loss-of-the-caliphatedoes-not-mean-defeat/. (accessed February 10,
2018).
82. Orton, “The Islamic State.”
83. For extended research on the evolution of ISIS’ media enterprise, see Craig Whiteside,
“Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016),”
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT Research Paper November
2016).
84. Orton, “The Islamic State.”
85. Clausewitz, On War, 280.
86. All efforts at the tactical level should, connected by the military operational level, contribute to
the perceived strategic end state.
87. The revolutionary warfare model implies that ISIS can be on the on the strategic defense in
general in their core areas of operation while being on the operational offensive in other
areas, such as their distant franchises. If pressure is not applied over the entire width of
ISIS’ areas of operations, they will simply keep transferring their resources to the location of
opportunity.
88. Global Coalition, Guiding Principles from the Global Coalition to Defeat DAESH, http://
theglobalcoalition.org/en/mission-en/ (accessed July 1, 2021).
89. Global Coalition, Guiding Principles.

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90. The website, for example, tries to disassociate participation in the Global Coalition from
military action under OIR by mentioning that OIR is only a minor part of the Coalition’s
efforts thereby implying that participation to the Global Coalition does not automatically
mean support to OIR. When visiting the website of OIR however, one gets directed to the
same Global Coalition website. The explanation is probably that certain individual partaking
countries in the Global Coalition want to downplay their support for the military operation
in Iraq and Syria while the command of OIR wants to profit from the perceived increased
legitimacy that the support of these same countries yields (www.inherentresolve.mil).
91. Global Coalition, Military Progress in Syria and Iraq, January 31, 2017, https://theglobalcoalition.
org/en/mission/military-progress/ (accessed July 1, 2021).
92. Jon T. Rymer, Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent
Resolve, Report to the United States Congress December 17, 2014–March 31, 2015, 1.
93. The U.S. Joint Strategic Plan to conduct “Overseas Contingency Operations,” such as OIR, is
overseen and audited by the Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO), who reports quarterly on US OCO’s to Congress. The partaking departments for OIR
are the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).
94. CJTF-OIR, “CJTF Campaign Design,” http://www.inherentresolve.mil/campaign/ (accessed July
1, 2021).
95. CJTF-OIR, “Our Mission,” http://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-Us/ (accessed July 1, 2021).
96. It is worth mentioning that the air war is not commanded by the commander of CJTF-OIR,
currently Lt. Gen. Funk II, but is commanded, via the CAOC, by the commander of Air Forces
Central Command (AFCENT), currently Lt. Gen. Harrigian. Both Lt. Generals parallelly report
to CENTCOM’s commander, currently General Votel.
97. Ben Connable, Natasha Lander, and Kimberly Jackson, Beating the Islamic State, Selecting a
New Strategy for Iraq and Syria (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 19.
98. CJTF-OIR does however try to connect its military efforts to the overarching strategy on its
website by explaining that military action is not the only action the governments of the
Global Coalition are taking in the following words: “The Coalition’s military operations
against ISIS weaken the terror group and enable the nations of the Global Coalition
to bring the full might of their national power—including diplomatic, informational,
economic, law enforcement, and other aspects of national power—to bear against the
group. The Global Coalition realizes that not only must we defeat the military power
of ISIS, but we must also defeat the ideology of ISIS to stem the global flow of foreign
fighters and radicalized jihadists in all of our nations.” CJTF-OIR, “Combined Joint Task
Force Operation Inherent Resolve Fact Sheet,” http://www.inherentresolve.mil/Portals/14/
Documents/Mission/20170717-%20Updated%20Mission%20Statement%20Fact%20Sheet.
pdf?ver=2017-07-17-093803-770 (accessed February 20, 2018).
99. Connable et al, Beating the Islamic State, 66.
100. Elizabeth Quintana, "Introduction: Countering ISIS - A Military Operation to Buy Time," in Royal
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Occasional Paper Inherently
Unresolved: The Military Operation against ISIS, eds. Elizabeth Quintana and Jonathan Eyal
(London: RUSI, October 2015), 1.
101. This reluctance was understandable since President Obama was chosen into office on a
campaign program that involved ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
102. John McCain, “Senate hearing on White House ISIS strategy,” 7 July 2015, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=BcblYQRi9lU, and David E. Johnson, “Fighting the 'Islamic State': The Case for
US Ground Forces,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (2015): 7–17.

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103. Cheryl Pellerin, “Mattis Highlights Working By, With, Through Allies,” U.S. Department of
Defense, October 12, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1340562/mattis-
highlights-working-by-with-through-allies/ (accessed July 5, 2018).
104. Joseph Votel and Eero Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 89 (April 2018): 40.
105. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 40.
106. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 47.
107. Michael Garrett et al., “The By-With-Through Approach: An Army Component Perspective,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 89 (April 2018): 48–55.
108. The Second Quarter 2018 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly is, with seven articles, for a large part
dedicated to debating and elaborating on the BWT approach.
109. Linda Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for
Adaptation, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016): 59.
110. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 43.
111. The fact that the words “defeat ISIS on the battlefield” are used could mean that USCENTCOM
has a disturbingly biased perception of the situation, or, more likely, it represents the desire
of USCENTCOM to formulate a realistic and limited end state for OIR.
112. The political risks for the United States was different for the situations in Iraq and Syria. In
Iraq, the political risk lay in the damage to the U.S.’ reputation as a military super power and
Obama’s reputation as the one who provided ISIS with a power vacuum. By allowing ISIS to
advance further, both reputations would suffer. This risk had to be balanced against the risk
of redeploying to Iraq, which could become a quagmire once again after all. The “no boots
on the ground” discussion between the media and the Obama administration demonstrates
how sensitive the redeployment of U.S. troops was for Obama.
113. Quintana, Inherently Unresolved: The Military Operation against ISIS, 3.
114. Garrett et al., “The By-With-Through Approach,” 51.
115. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 44.
116. Scott Vickery, “Operation Inherent Resolve: An Interim Assessment,” Policy Analysis for the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 13, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.
org/policy-analysis/view/operation-inherent-resolve-an-interim-assessment (accessed May
16, 2018).
117. Vickery, “Operation Inherent Resolve.”
118. Lambeth argues that the “uniquely stringent ROE regime imposed by a micromanaging
White House” was the most inhibiting constraint on airpower’s effectiveness. Lambeth,
“American and NATO Airpower,” 189. Michael Knights calls the ROE’s “without doubt the
most obsessively restrictive of any air campaign ever fought by a U.S.-led coalition, and
probably by any nation in any war.” Michael Knights, “Campaign Acceleration: How to Build
on Progress and Avoid Stalemate Against ISIL,” War on the Rocks (University of Texas,
November 3, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/11/campaign-acceleration-how-to-
build-on-progress-and-avoid-stalemate-against-isil/ (accessed May 24, 2018). The restrictive
ROEs often prohibited JTACs on the ground to coordinate airstrikes. Instead, this had to be
done by JTACs working from the CJOCs via UAVs. sometimes, the ROEs thus resulted in
suboptimal target designation thereby increasing the chance on civilian casualties instead of
decreasing it. Conversation between CJTF-OIR JTAC and author.
119. These statements might give the impression that almost no civilian casualties were being
caused by the air war, but other sources contradict that image. At a certain point during
the campaign, the website www.airwars.org even reported that Coalition airstrikes were
killing more civilians than Russian airstrikes. Raf Sanchez, “U.S.-Led Coalition is ‘Killing More

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Civilians than Russia’,” The Telegraph (February 23, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/2017/02/23/us-led-coalition-killing-civilians-russia/ (accessed July 16, 2018).
120. Airpower cannot solve the root causes for ISIS’ emergence; moreover, civilian casualties would
only increase Sunni resentment against the Iraqi government, delegitimize the CJTF, and
increase approval of ISIS.
121. Balint Szlanko and Susannah George, “U.S. Changes Rules of Engagement for Mosul
Fight in Iraq,” The Associated Press (February 24, 2017), https://apnews.com/
f084b4f094f440058e6b58318a67adce (accessed May 24, 2018).
122. Conversation between CJTF-OIR JTAC and author.
123. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Why U.S. Forward Air Controllers are Moving Closer to Combat
in Mosul,” Washington Post (February 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
checkpoint/wp/2017/02/24/why-u-s-forward-air-controllers-are-moving-closer-to-combat-
in-mosul/?utm_term=.7a6143519f9c (accessed July 9, 2018).
124. Gibbons-Neff, “U.S. Forward Air Controllers.”
125. Peter Baker, “Defending ISIS Policy, Obama Acknowledges Flaws in Effort So Far,” New York
Times (May 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/world/middleeast/obama-
defends-approach-to-islamic-state-fight.html (accessed May 25, 2018).
126. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, suggested that defeating ISIS
might take up to 20 years. Lambeth, American and NATO Airpower, 186.
127. Shreeya Sinha, “Obama’s Evolution on ISIS,” New York Times, (June 9, 2015). https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/obama-isis-strategy.html (accessed
May 25, 2018).
128. Sinha, “Obama’s Evolution on Isis.”
129. Another example that demonstrates the importance of the factor “time” and that deserves
mentioning is that the duration of OIR has altered the skill balance between Iraqi forces and
ISIS. This is thus the same dynamic as was seen in the Libyan case. The factor “time” is able
to alter the balance of skill.
130. Global Coalition, 75 Partners, http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/ (accessed May 25,
2018)
131. For an extensive analysis on the contribution of Arab countries to the air war, see: Becca
Wasser, et al, The Air War Against the Islamic State; The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent
Resolve (Santa Monica: RAND, 2021): 32–37.
132. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State 34; Justine Drennan, “Who Has
Contributed What in the Coalition Against the Islamic State?,” Foreign Policy (November
12, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/12/who-has-contributed-what-in-the-coalition-
against-the-islamic-state/ (accessed May 25, 2018).
133. Kathleen McInnis, Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State, Congressional
Research Service Report R44135 (August 24, 2016) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44135.pdf.
134. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed
‘Little Sparta’,” Washington Post (November 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-potent-ally-nicknamed-
little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_term=.
d64e7683f829 (accessed May 25, 2018).
135. Other priorities, policy differences between the more involved Western countries and Arab
countries and differences or rivalries between regional countries themselves, have probably
prevented them to play that role. Nick Thompson, “War on ISIS: Why Arab states aren't
doing more,” CNN, (December 17, 2015), https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/10/middleeast/isis-
what-arab-states-are-doing/index.html (accessed May 25, 2018).

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136. Sabahat Khan, “Lessons Learned from Arab Military Contributions to the War on ISIS,” The
Arab Weekly, (August 7, 2016), https://thearabweekly.com/lessons-learned-arab-military-
contributions-war-isis (accessed May 25, 2018).
137. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 28.
138. Because of the worries over Syria’s unusually sophisticated and capable Soviet-style integrated
air defense system, that U.S. and NATO aircrews had never before encountered, the U.S. flew
the first-ever combat sorties with the fifth-generation F-22 stealth fighter (Raptor) in the
first night of coalition air strikes in Syria. The Raptor, which entered service in 2005, made
its combat debut because of its capabilities as a highly survivable ground-attack platform.
Lambeth, American and NATO Airpower, 188.
139. Amy McCullogh, “With the Raptors over Syria,” Air Force Magazine (February 2015): 26–33.
140. Eric Schmitt, “In Syria’s Skies, Close Calls With Russian Warplanes,” New York Times (December
8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-russia-us-air-war.
html (accessed May 27, 2018).
141. Schmitt, “In Syria’s Skies.”
142. Schmitt, “In Syria’s Skies.”
143. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 387.
144. Deborah Kidwell, “The U.S. Experience: Operational,” in Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the
Libyan Civil War, ed. Karl P. Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015): 127.
145. For an extensive analysis of the air war and how RPAs were used by JTACs, see Wasser, et al.,
The Air War Against the Islamic State, 75.
146. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 303.
147. Lambeth, Airpower Applied, 186.
148. AFCENT, Airpower Summaries, (May 31, 2018), http://www.afcent.af.mil/About/Airpower-
Summaries/ (accessed June 1, 2018).
149. Conversation between CJTF-OIR JTAC and author.
150. Airwars.org, “Iraq and Syria; Conflict Data,” Airwars.org, https://airwars.org/data/ (accessed
June 6, 2017).
151. Oriana Pawlyk, “These are the Fighter Jets Leading the Air War Against ISIS,” Military.
com (June 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-fighter-jets-leading-
the-air-war-against-isis-2017-6?international=true&r=US&IR=T (accessed May 30,
2018); Oriana Palyk, “More Intel Flights could Minimize Collateral Damage AFCENT
Commander Says,” Air Force Times (May 28, 2016), https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/
your-air-force/2016/05/28/more-intel-flights-could-minimize-collateral-damage-afcent-
commander-says/ (accessed June 1, 2018).
152. Vickery, “Operation Inherent Resolve.”
153. At the time Lt. Gen. Brown.
154. E-mail exchange and telephone conversation between CJTF-OIR JTAC and T. Althuizen, June
2018; Wasser, et al, The Air War Against the Islamic State, 25.
155. One might expect a strong positive relationship between the number of ISR sorties and
the number of strike sorties because, as explained, ISR sorties find, fix, and vet targets
for strike sorties. Table 1 does not, however, confirm this relationship. What undermines
the assumption is the fact that all strike sorties nowadays also provide ISR data via their
targeting pods. A strike sortie might therefore reduce the need for a dedicated ISR sortie.
It is even possible that a JTAC in the CJOC performs a talk-on based on the data delivered
by the targeting pod of the same jet that performs the strike. Vice versa, ISR platforms are
often equipped with Hellfire missiles. Pawlyk, “More Intel Flights could Minimize Collateral

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Damage AFCENT Commander Says.” The separation between ISR assets and strike assets
is fading. Furthermore, the paradox of an effective air campaign is that the enemy adapts in
order to limit its vulnerability for strikes which causes an increasing demand for ISR assets
that will provide fewer targets.
156. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 223.
157. Micah Zenko, “Comparing the Islamic State Air War with History,” Council on Foreign Relations
Blog (July 6, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/comparing-islamic-state-air-war-history
(accessed May 28, 2018).
158. Mueller, “Victory Through (not by) Airpower,” 377.
159. “Iraq and Syria; Conflict Data,” Airwars.org, https://airwars.org/data/ (accessed July 17, 2018).
160. Guus de Koster and Joel Postma, “F-16’s in de Strijd tegen ISIS: De Nederlandse Air Task Force-
Middle East,” Militaire Spectator 185, no. 5 (2016): 204–216.
161. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 25.
162. Valerie Insinna, “Unmanned Unleashed: In the Fight against ISIS, Predators and Reapers Prove
Close-Air Support Bona-Fides,” Defense News, (March 28, 2017), https://www.defensenews.
com/smr/unmanned-unleashed/2017/03/28/in-the-fight-against-isis-predators-and-
reapers-prove-close-air-support-bona-fides/ (accessed June 3, 2018).
163. Conversation between CJTF-OIR JTAC and T. Althuizen.
164. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 100.
165. Typically, this procedure is used for more complicated targets that are identified by ISR assets
and are not in vicinity of blue and green forces.
166. Chris Church, “On Target: The Making of an Airstrike against ISIS aboard the USS Bush,” Stars
and Stripes (July 7, 2017), https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/on-target-the-
making-of-an-airstrike-against-isis-aboard-the-uss-bush-1.477070 (accessed June 3, 2018).
167. Once developed, the strike package for both a dynamic and a pre-planned target go to a senior
target engagement authority for approval, which might involve further vetting and legal review.
168. Church, “On Target: The Making of an Airstrike.”
169. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 11.
170. Linda Robinson, “SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, and Through’ Local Forces,” The
RAND Blog, (May 9, 2017), https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/sofs-evolving-role-warfare-
by-with-and-through-local.html (accessed June 20, 2018).
171. For a comprehensive analysis of local counter-ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria, see Linda Robinson,
Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign, 25–42.
172. In September 2015, Secretary of Defense Carter stated that he wanted to apply the AM in the
fight but that there were no readily available proxies. “Of course, in this current circumstance
in Syria and Iraq, we’re having to build those forces, and they don’t exist in the same way
that they did in the Northern Alliance (NA).” Ashton Carter, “Hearing to receive testimony on
the U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and U.S. policy toward
Iraq and Syria,” Stenographic transcript before the Committee on Armed Services for the
United States Senate (Washington D.C.: Alderson Reporting Company, 9 December 2015).
173. Aaron Stein, Partner Operations in Syria: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward, Policy Analysis,
Washington D.C. Atlantic Council (2017): 6. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/
reports/partner-operations-in-syria (accessed June 4, 2018).
174. Arnold Schuchter, ISIS Containment & Defeat: Next Generation Counterinsurgency - NexGen
COIN (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2015).
175. Stein, Partner Operations in Syria, 2, 20.

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176. Schuchter, ISIS Containment & Defeat: NexGen COIN; Stein, Partner Operations in Syria, 10.
177. Schuchter, ISIS Containment & Defeat: NexGen COIN.
178. John Davison, “Raqqa: Isis Completely Driven out of Syria 'Capital' by US-backed Forces,”
Independent (October 17, 2017). https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/
raqqa-isis-battle-syria-defeat-latest-lost-us-sdf-rebel-monitoring-group-a8004581.html
(accessed June 5, 2018).
179. Paul McLeary, “U.S. Acknowledges Reality and Scraps Failed Syria Training Program,” Foreign
Policy (October 9, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/09/u-s-acknowledges-reality-
scraps-failed-syria-training-program/ (accessed June 6, 2018). It is worth mentioning that
reliability should be reciprocal and is dependent on the relationship that Coalition Forces
are able to develop with indigenous allies. Mutual trust is paramount and the commonly
seen 4-month rotation cycle “does not match up with the importance of relationships.”
Some promising suggestions have been made to improve mutual trust and reliability, such
as sending SOF teams and advisors back to the same locations of previous tours. Votel and
Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 45, 46.
180. Stein, Partner Operations in Syria. And: Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Pentagon Will Continue
to Work with SDF in Syria,” The Region (April 20, 2018), http://theregion.org/article/13310-
pentagon-will-continue-to-work-with-sdf-syria (accessed June 6, 2018).
181. One should ask the question whether the Kurds in the SDF are to be blamed for this. It could
also be perceived as a strong strategic move by Turkey to damage the U.S.-Kurdish alliance.
182. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 31–32.
183. Adam Garrie, “Pentagon Admits Losing Control Over SDF in Northern Syria, Leaving The US
Without A Reliable Proxy Force in The Region,” Eurasia Future, (March 6, 2018), https://www.
eurasiafuture.com/2018/03/06/pentagon-admits-losing-control-sdf-northern-syria-leaving-
us-without-reliable-proxy-force-region/ (accessed June 6, 2018).
184. Stein, Partner Operations in Syria, 21.
185. Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Fragmentation in Conflict.”
186. Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. Fragmented Syria’s Rebels,” Washington
Post, September 22, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/
wp/2014/09/22/how-the-u-s-fragmented-syrias-rebels/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
cfb3ca791701 (accessed June 7, 2018); Wendy Pearlman, “Understanding Fragmentation
in the Syrian Revolt,” Project on Middle East Political Science, (November 8, 2013), https://
pomeps.org/2014/02/12/understanding-fragmentation-in-the-syrian-revolt/#_ednref1
(accessed June 7, 2018).
187. Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. Fragmented Syria’s Rebels” ; Pearlman, “Understanding
Fragmentation."
188. Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. Fragmented Syria’s Rebels” ; Pearlman, “Understanding
Fragmentation."
189. Farhad Hassan Abdullah, “PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk,” Jadavpur Journal
of International Relations 22, no. 2 (May 2018): 1–20.
190. Hawre Hasan Hama and Farhad Hassan Abdulla, “Kurdistan's Referendum: The Withdrawal of
the Kurdish Forces in Kirkuk,” Assian Affairs 50, no. 3 (2019): 364–383.
191. This concern is widely shared amongst scholars. See for example: Wladimir van Wilgenburg
and Mario Fumerton, "Kurdistan's Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga
Forces," Regional Insight Report, Beirut and Lebanon: Carnegie Middle East Center (2015).
192. For further reading see "Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict," Crisis Group Middle
East Report (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015).

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193. Stephen Biddle, “Rethinking 2015–16: U.S. Strategy for Syria, Iraq, and the Islamic State,”
Seminar JHU Applied Physics Laboratory, (April 7, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rJH_1CBDYGM (accessed February 7, 2018).
194. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL, 27.
195. Peter Quentin, "The Land Component," in Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper
Inherently Unresolved: The military Operation against ISIS, ed. Elizabeth Quintana and
Jonathan Eyal (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies,
October 2015), 23.
196. Quentin, “The Land Component,” 19.
197. David Kilcullen agrees that the current approach is not optimal: “The natural tendency is to
build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This
is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and
seek to supplant the insurgent’s role.” David Kilcullen, Counter Insurgency, (London: C. Hurst
& Co. 2010), 22.
198. NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication-3.16; Allied Joint Doctrine for Security
Force Assistance (SFA), May 2016. Head Land Warfare Army Doctrine, “Army Field Manual
Tactics for Stability Operations,” Part 5: Military Support to Capacity Building, Warminster:
Land Warfare Centre, March 2018.
199. Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro, “Here’s Why We Can Only Contain the Islamic State,
not Bomb it Back to the Stone Age,” Washington Post, December 1, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/01/heres-why-we-can-only-
contain-the-islamic-state-not-bomb-it-back-to-the-stone-age/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.15a637db112c (accessed June 11, 2018).
200. “It’s worth noting that it was Iraqi soldiers who took back the city center of Ramadi and are
fighting every day to clear the remainder of the city, proving themselves not only motivated
but capable.” Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense Speech at Fort Campbell, January 13,
2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/642995/counter-isil-
campaign-plan-remarks (accessed January 20, 2016).
201. Stein, Partner Operations in Syria, 13.
202. Hassan Hassan, “New Document Sheds Light on the Changing Nature of ISIL's Combat Tactics,”
The National, September 20, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/new-document-sheds-
light-on-the-changing-nature-of-isil-s-combat-tactics-1.630289 (accessed June 12, 2018).
203. Whiteside, “Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-
2016),” 19.
204. The following quote from the al-Naba article demonstrates ISIS’ understanding of the Western
operational approach: “If you are fighting on a battlefield where there is aerial surveillance
and accurate targeting, the first step to enemy action is knowing your location and the
second is targeting. Therefore, your primary goal is to hide your position. And here, a whole
new fighting doctrine begins, because fighting while hiding your location requires drastic
changes in the methods of warfare and planning…The basic principle is always the same:
“Fight from a location unknown to the enemy and change place immediately if the enemy
discovers it.” “Therefore, the greatest mistake is that the mujahideen deal with them [the
YPG/PKK] as a fighting force. They are weak forces used by the crusaders as a bait for the
fish. The fighter should never swallow the bait. The best way to proceed is for the fighter
not to reveal his position to the enemy until the enemy is within shooting range and then,
and only then, God willing, must the mujahideen fire on an enemy target, before quickly
changing location.” Kyle Orton, “The Islamic State Adapts to the Coalition Campaign,” The
Syrian Intifada, October 3, 2017, https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2017/10/03/the-
islamic-state-adapts-to-the-coalition-campaign/ (accessed June 12, 2018).

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205. Orton, "Islamic state Adapts."

206. Moreover, the local allies had to learn to cope with fake camouflage, disguised attacks, hit and
run attacks, concealed defensive positions and other deceptions. Orton, “The Islamic State
Adapts to the Coalition Campaign.”
207. For an in-depth case study on adaptation by indigenous partner forces see Maarten P. Broekhof,
Martijn W. M. Kitzen, and Frans P. B. Osinga, “A Tale of Two Mosuls, the Resurrection of the
Iraqi Armed Forces and the Military Defeat of ISIS,” Journal of Strategic Studies (published
online Dec. 12, 2019): 96–118, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1694912
208. General Joseph Votel, “Statement Before The House Armed Services Committee on the
Posture of U.S. Central Command,” March 15, 2017, Stenographic Transcript, https://docs.
house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180227/106870/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-VotelJ-20180227.
pdf (accessed June 20, 2018), 19.
209. The Green Berets’ foreign internal defense; advise, assist, accompany, and enable (A3E); and
train, advise, assist are all tailorable subsets of the BWT approach. See John Richardson IV
and John Bolton, “Sacrifice, Ownership, Legitimacy; Winning Wars By, With, and Through
Host-Nation Security Forces,” Joint Forces Quarterly 89, (April 2018): 67.
210. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 42.
211. “Special warfare” is defined as the “execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal
and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep
understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the
ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain,
or hostile environment.” It includes “special operations forces conducting combinations of
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and/or counterinsurgency through and
with indigenous forces or personnel.” U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters, Special
Operations Army Doctrine Publication 3-05, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 2012), 9.
212. Dan Madden et al., Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2016), 139.
213. In April 2013, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command released a special edition magazine
entitled ARSOF 2022. This publication, which was meant to be a blueprint for Army special
operations forces, envisioned splitting SOF operations into two categories: special warfare
and surgical strike. For an analysis of ARSOF 2022 in relation to recent SOF deployment,
see: Tim Ball, “Replaced? Security Force Assistance Brigades vs. Special Forces,” War on
the Rocks, February 23, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/replaced-security-force-
assistance-brigades-vs-special-forces/ (accessed July 4, 2018).
214. Daniel Brown, “The U.S. Military's Special Ops has Slowly Fallen back to its Roots — and it's
Paying off in Iraq and Syria,” Business Insider, May 10, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.
com/the-us-militarys-special-ops-new-strategy-is-working-in-iraq-syria-2017-
5?international=true&r=US&IR=T (accessed June 27, 2018) and Linda Robinson, “SOF’s
Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, and Through’ Local Forces,” The RAND Blog, May 9, 2017,
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/sofs-evolving-role-warfare-by-with-and-through-local.
html (accessed June 20, 2018).
215. Michael Noonan, “The Seductiveness of Special Ops?,” War on the Rocks, March 3, 2015, https://
warontherocks.com/2015/03/the-seductiveness-of-special-ops/ (accessed June 29, 2018).
On the consequences of this and the urge to incorporate a broader view on the activities
of SOF see, for instance, Funs Titulaer and Martijn Kitzen, “The Population-Centric Turn in
Special Operations: A Possible Way Ahead for SOF Informed by a Cross-Disciplinary Analysis
of State-Building Interventions,” Special Operations Journal 6 no. 1 (March 19, 2020): 35-54.

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216. Owen Broom, “Assessing the Role of Surgical Strike Operations in Support of a Special Warfare
Campaign,” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017).
217. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for
Adaptation, 46.
218. Robinson, “SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, and Through’ Local Forces.”
219. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for
Adaptation, 55.
220. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 43.
221. Wasser, et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State, 26.
222. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for
Adaptation, 56.
223. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for
Adaptation, 53.
224. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 41.
225. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 40.
226. The U.S. and coalition partners will provide training, weapons, technical support, and airpower
but someone else has to do the dying on the ground, as Thornton put it. If a proxy has to
do the dirty work, an AM variant probably will be the planned or ad hoc outcome for many
decades to come. Rod Thornton, “Problems with the Kurds as Proxies against Islamic State:
Insights from the Siege of Kobane,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 6 (2015): 866.
227. Public support has the characteristic of being high in the beginning, after which it starts
decreasing. The better approach would obviously be to align public support and the
intensity of the commitment from the start and manage expectations from the start.
Select a sustainable approach and a realistic end state. Public support for a more limited
approach can more easily be maintained. Perhaps aiming low might therefore result in
higher scores.
228. Many other factors that are placed in the indigenous forces category are operational level
expressions related to, or arising from, this newly identified political level factor.
229. Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military
Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (2018):
89–90.
230. Tyrone L. Groh “War on the Cheap? Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Proxy War,”
(dissertation for the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; Washington: Georgetown
University, 2010), 1–22. Political benefits might take forms like conservation of resources,
obscured involvement, decreased political commitment, and the protection against
unwanted escalation.
231. Geraint Alun Hughes, “Syria and the Perils of Proxy Warfare,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no.
3 (2014): 532.
232. Biddle et al., “Small Footprint, Small Payoff,” 126.
233. The Kurds are a divided and fractious nation spread across three states. They are, furthermore,
historically famous for fighting among themselves. Thornton, “Problems with the Kurds as
Proxies against Islamic State,” 865.
234. Geraint Alun Hughes, “Syria and the perils of proxy warfare,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no.
3 (2014): 532; Hughes and Rod Thornton argued in 2014 that the biggest long-term risk of
strategic interest divergence originates in the possible exacerbation of factionalism.
235. It culminated in a referendum and consequently the invasion of Kirkuk by Iraqi government
forces.

84
 NOTES

236. Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Troops Attack U.S.-Backed Kurds in Syria, a Clash of NATO Allies,” New
York Times, January 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/21/world/middleeast/
turkey-syria-kurds.html (accessed May 24, 2018).
237. Votel and Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” 44.
238. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for
Adaptation, 46–47.
239. The Iraqi counter Terrorism Service is the unit that has been most effective in combat and they
have been co-created by coalition SOF units. The SOF model of insensive mentorship, from
the design and selection to going into battle alongside them, provides a good example to
other training efforts. Robinson, Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL
and Options for Adaptation, 50–51.
240. Ball, “Replaced? Security Force Assistance Brigades vs. Special Forces.” See also Ivor
Wiltenburg and Martijn Kitzen, “What’s in a Name? Clarifying the Divide Between Military
Assistance and Security Force Assistance,” Small Wars Journal (November 9, 2020), https://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/whats-name-clarifying-divide-between-military-assistance-
and-security-force-assistance.
241. Wiltenburg and Kitzen, “What’s in a Name?” 46.
242. For more background on this debate, see, for example, Martijn Kitzen, “Western Military Culture
and Counterinsurgency: An Ambiguous Reality,” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal
of Military Studies 39, no.2 (2012): 8, https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/
view/982.
243. Ball, “Replaced? Security Force Assistance Brigades Vs. Special Forces.”
244. Ball, “Replaced? “Security Force Assistance Brigades Vs. Special Forces.” The newly created
Security Force Assistance Brigades are specifically designed to conduct A3E in a combined
arms maneuver contex. Richardson and Bolton, “Sacrifice, Ownership, Legitimacy,” 67.
245. The inclusion of the three new factors is not only based upon the ISIS case, since their importance
was recognized in earlier research. Nevertheless, further research on these suggested new
factors is necessary before accepting them to the same degree as the other factors.
246. See for example the exploits of Russian Spetsnaz and the Wagner Group in Syria; Timothy
Thomas, “Russian Lessons Learned in Syria,” MITRE Center for Technology and National
Security June (2020): 18.
247. Stephen Biddle, “Rethinking 2015-16: U.S. Strategy for Syria, Iraq, and the Islamic State,” Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, April 7, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rJH_1CBDYGM (accessed January 23, 2018). Obviously, there are other even more
limited options, below the threshold of warfare, but these are outside the scope of this study.
248. According to many scholars, by preparing for that course of action, the chance of its actual
occurrence might decrease because of the deterrence mechanism.
249. During the cold war, the U.S. performed 66 foreign-imposed regime changes while it fought
zero conventional wars. Alexander Downes and Lindsey O’Rourke, “You Can’t Always
Get What You Want; Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate
Relations,” International Security 41, no. 2 (2016).
250. See for example, Martijn Kitzen, “Operations in Irregular Warfare,” 18.
251. Clausewitz, On War.

85
 Acronyms

A3E – Advise, assist, accompany, and enable

AM – Afghan model
AFCENT – Air Forces Central Command
BWT – By, with, and through
CAOC – Combined Air Operations Center
CAS – Close air support
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CJOA – Combined joint operations area
CJTF-OIR – Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve
COIN – Counterinsurgency
DOD – U.S. Department of Defense
DOS – U.S. Department of State
ISF – Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
ISR – Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JTAC – Joint Terminal Attack Controller
KDP – Kurdistan Democratic Party
LOE – Line of effort
MDMP – military decision-making process
NA – Northern Alliance

87
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

NCTC – National Counterterrorism Center

NCW – Network-centric warfare
OCO – Overseas contingency operations
OIR – Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
PGM – Precision guided munition
PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RMA – Revolution in military affairs
ROE – Rules of engagement
RPA – Remotely piloted aircraft
RUSI – Royal United Services Institute
SAC – Syrian Arab Coalition
SCAR – Strike coordination and reconnaissance
SDF – Syrian Democratic Forces
SEAD – Suppression of enemy air defense
SOF – Special Operations Forces
TIC – Troops in contact
UAE – United Arab Emirates
UAV – Unmanned aerial vehicle
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM – United States Central Command
YPG – People Protection Units

88
 Appendix A: Operation INHERENT
RESOLVE’s Lines of Effort

LOE 1: Supporting Effective Governance in Iraq (DoS/USAID)

Support the new Iraqi government in efforts to govern
inclusively and effectively as well as to strengthen its
cooperation with regional partners.

LOE 2: Denying ISIS Safe Haven (dod)

Conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against
ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Work with the Iraqi government to
strike ISIS targets and support Iraqi forces on the ground.
Degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS’ leadership and
logistical and operational capability, and deny it sanctuary
and resources to plan, prepare, and execute attacks.

LOE 3: Building Partner Capacity (DoD)

Build the capability and capacity of partners in the region
to sustain an effective long-term campaign against ISIS.
Train, advise, and assist Iragi forces, including Kurdish
forces, to improve their ability to plan, lead, and conduct
operations against ISIS. Provide training to help the Iraqis
reconstitute their security forces and establish a national
guard. Strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition and
help them defend territory from ISIS.

LOE 4: Enhancing Intelligence Collection on ISIS (Director

of National Intelligence/National Counterterrorism
Center [NCTC])
Gain more fidelity on ISIS’ capabilities, plans, and
intentions. Strengthen the ability to understand the ISIS
threat. Share vital information with Iraqi and Coalition
partners to enable them to effectively counter ISIS.

91
 THE NEW WAY OF LIMITED WARFARE

LOE 5: Exposing ISIS’ True Nature (DoS/NCTC)

Work with partners throughout the Muslim world to
highlight ISIS hypocrisy and counter its false claims of
acting in the name of religion.

LOE 6: Disrupting ISIS’ Finances (Treasury/DoS)

Work aggressively with partners on a coordinated
approach to reduce ISIS* revenue from oil and assets it has
plundered, limit ISIS” ability to extort local populations,
stem ISIS’ gains from kidnapping for ransom, and disrupt
the flow of external donations to the group.

LOE 7: Disrupting the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters

(DoS/NCTC)
Lead an international effort to stem the flow of fighters
into Syria and Iraq.

LOE 8: Protecting the Homeland (Department of Homeland

Security/Federal Bureau of Investigation)
Use the criminal justice system as a critical counterterrorism
tool, work with air carriers to implement responsible threat-
based security and screening requirements, and counter
violent extremism in the United States.

LOE 9: Humanitarian Support (USAID/DoS)

Provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced and
vulnerable in Iraq and Syria.

Source: Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Overseas

Contingency Operations —FY 2018 Comprehensive Oversight Plan, October 2018. https://
www.stateoig.gov/system/files/cop_oco_fy2018_signed.pdf. Redrawn by JSOU Press

92
 Appendix B: Combined Joint Task
Force Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
Campaign Design

CJTF CAMPAIGN DESIGN

PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV
SUPPORT
DEGRADE COUNTERATTACK DEFEAT
STABILIZATION

L
I
N ENABLE THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF DA’ESH IN THE CJOA
E “Strike ISIL across the breadth and depth of their so-called ‘caliphate’”
S

O
F ENABLE SUSTAINABLE MILITARY PARTNER CAPACITY IN THE CJOA
“Train and equip, advise and assist regional partners”
E
F
F LEVERAGE COHESIVE COALITION EFFECTS
O “Maximize effectiveness of Coalition contributions”
R
T

Source: http://www.inherentresolve.mil/campaign/. Redrawn by JSOU Press

95
Appendix C: Combined Joint Task
Force Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
Command Structure

U.S. UNITED
CENTCOM STATES
EMBASSY
& CFC BAGHDAD
U.S. UNITED
CENTCOM STATES
EMBASSY
& CFC BAGHDAD

CJTF-OIR OSC-I

CJTF-OIR OSC-I

CJFLCC- SOJTF-
OIR OIR

CJFLCC- SOJTF-
OIR OIR

CJOC- CJOC-
CJSOTF-S CJSOTF-I
Erbil Baghdad

CJOC- CJOC-
CJSOTF-S CJSOTF-I
Erbil Baghdad

OIR: Operation CSOJTF-S: Combined General Officer

INHERENT RESOLVE Joint Special Operations level command
CENTCOM: United States Task Force – Syria
Colonel level
OIR: Operation
Central Command CSOJTF-S: Combined
CSOJTF-I: Combined General Officer
command
INHERENT RESOLVE
CFC: Combined Forces Joint Special
Joint Special Operations
Operations level command
CENTCOM:(for
Command United
OIR)States Task
Task Force
Force –– Syria
Iraq Colonel level
Central CommandJoint
CJTF: Combined CSOJTF-I: Combined command
CJOC: Combined Joint OPCON (operational
CFC:Force
Task Combined Forces Joint SpecialCenter
Operations Operations control)
Command (for
OSC-I Office ofOIR)
Security Task Force – Iraq
Joint: Two or more
CJTF: Combined Joint CJOC: TACON
OPCON (tactical
Cooperation – Iraq militaryCombined
services Joint (operational
Task Force
CJFLCC: Combined Joint Operations Center control)
working together
OSC-I Land
Force OfficeComponent
of Security Joint: Two or more of Coordination, but
Cooperation – Iraq Combined: Militaries TACON (tactical
Command military services no command
two or more countries control)
CJFLCC:
SOJTF: Combined
Special Joint
Operations working relationship
working together
together
Force Land
Joint Task Component
Force Coordination, but
Combined: Militaries of
Command no command
two or more countries
SOJTF: Special Operations relationship
Source: http://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-Us/Organization/.
working together Redrawn by
Joint Task
JSOU Force
Press

97
 Appendix D: U.S. Dynamic Targeting
Steps

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60; Joint Targeting, January 31, 2013.
Redrawn by JSOU Press
99
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The SOF community in 2024 finds itself engaged in countering both
gray zone activities and the enduring fight against violent extremist
organizations. This monograph examines the importance and utility
of the Afghan model of warfare (combining SOF, airpower, and local
forces) as a way to achieve political ends using limited means and
presents a framework of factors that determines to what extent this
approach is applicable in future contexts.

United States Special Operations Command

ATTN: JSOU Press
7701 Tampa Point Boulevard
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323
jsou.edu/press

ISBN 978-1–941715-70-3