When you think of Weiwei, you think of Zhang: An Intellectual in the context of

Nationalism, Capitalism, and Aesthetics

Abstract. In this paper, I provide a sociology of intellectual interventions-based account of

Zhang Weiwei. I explain why Zhang became such a renowned intellectual. His position and

performance cannot be understood apart from three main elements: Nationalism in contemporary

China, the role of market forces, and the aesthetics of intellectuality. Beyond the theoretical

dimension, this paper engages with two empirical sources: first, ethnographic observations in

Shanghai, and in particular at Guancha news ( guancha zhewang 观察者网), where Zhang Weiwei

was one of the founders.1 Second, an interpretation of the style and content of his TV program:

“This is China” (zhejiushizhongguo 这就是中国). In short, I try to explain why, when we think about

“Weiwei”, we now think of Zhang.

Keywords: intellectuals in China, nationalism, market of ideas, aesthetics of academia,

sociology of intellectual interventions.

Introduction

Zhang Weiwei is one of the most recognized intellectuals in modern China. In the West, he is

particularly recognized by his defense of the Chinese system of governance. In Zhang’s account,

China is not a typical nation-state, but a civilizational state.2 So, the usual paradigms for political

interpretation (like, say, democratic accountability), would not neatly apply to the Chinese case.

In China, together with his intellectual contributions, he is also well recognized by being the host

1
All factual statements about Guancha News in this paper (like, for example, data about his inner workings), have
been gathered in these in-site observations.
2
His main contribution, translated to English, can be found in Wei-Wei Zhang, The China Wave: Rise of a
Civilizational State (World Century, 2012).
of the TV program “This is China” (zhejiushizhongguo 这就是中国). The TV platform that airs the

program is “Dragon TV” (dongfangweishi 东方卫视), based in Shanghai. This city is one of the

main protagonists of our story too. Zhang Weiwei also enjoys a professorship at Fudan

University. He was also the founder of Guancha news (guancha zhewang 观察者网). All these

different endeavors have been in Shanghai. Zhang was also the official translator for Deng

Xiaoping, Shanghai being one of the destinations of Deng’s famed “southern tour”, spending

Chinese New Year in the city.3 Why has Zhang Weiwei enjoyed such a plethora of platforms?

Why is he so well-recognized internationally and domestically? This work aims to solve that

question.

Basing our work on the new sociology of intellectual interventions, we aim to explain why

Zhang’s participation in the academic and broader popular culture sphere has been so well-

received.4 This approach has matured from a tradition of different sociological approaches to

ideas, intellectuals, and audiences. Recently, it has come to the fore of academia’s attention

because it was used as a framework to explain the success of the West‘s “most dangerous

philosopher”: Slavoj Zizek.5 In the Slovenian philosopher’s case, his popularity arose partly

because of his sacrificial role. A role that we will also find in the case of Zhang Weiwei, the

meaning of which we will make explicit later. In simple words, this account is based on

resonance. That is, in how much the type of discourse produced by the intellectual in question

echoes and is aligned with the values of the broader sphere, with its material conditions, and with

3
See Jonathan Chatwin, The Southern Tour: Deng Xiaoping and the Fight for China’s Future (Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2024).
4
For one of the seminal works crystallizing this approach see Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz, “From the Sociology
of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions,” Annual Review of Sociology 36 (August 1, 2010),
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102625; also Patrick Baert and Josh Booth, “Tensions Within the Public
Intellectual: Political Interventions from Dreyfus to the New Social Media,” International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 25, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 111–26, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-012-9123-6.
5
Eliran Bar-El, How Slavoj Became Žižek: The Digital Making of a Public Intellectual (University of Chicago
Press, 2023).
the audiences’ desires and attention. Nationalism, market, and aesthetics corresponding

respectively to each previously mentioned dimension in the case of Zhang Weiwei.

In terms of primary materials, I will make use of ethnographic observations at Shanghai, and

especially at Guancha news.6 Secondly, I will also make recourse to observations of Zhang’s

program “This is China”, as it embodies more than anything else his identity as a scholar, as a

nationalist lamppost, and as a public persona.

The three themes through which I explain Zhang’s influence are： nationalism, market, and

aesthetics. All of three are also particularly embodied by the city of Shanghai. The fact that they

are three distinct analytic categories should not blind us to the fact that they are tightly related,

and that in reality they do not come separate. I should also note that this work is greatly indebted

to Cheng Li’s “Middle Class Shanghai”, and I borrow from it across the three thematic

categories.7

In section 2 I analyze the issue of nationalism. Given China’s increasingly nationalistic zeitgeist,

Zhang Weiwei’s push for cultural self-confidence has found a receptive audience, both at elite

levels and the level of the populace.8 Basically, there is resonance in the broader public with

Zhang Weiwei’s current ideological position.

In section 3 I analyze the issue of market forces. Zhang Weiwei’s program works for-profit, as

the network that airs the program is private and lives on through the use of advertisement.

Guancha News, founded by Zhang, is also a private company, living mainly through the

deployment of advertisement. That is, what keeps Zhang alive in the public imagination is not
6
I understand that “observations” is not the best social scientific tool. I wasn’t able to secure recorded interviews or
something else for concerns over privacy.
7
Cheng Li, Middle Class Shanghai: Reshaping U.S.-China Engagement (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2021).
8
For a general overview of what cultural self-confidence entails in China’s context, see Guangyun Cheng, “Chinese
Culture: Self‐awareness and Self‐confidence,” Social Sciences in China, November 1, 2008,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02529200802500532.
simply an anointment by the state. The demand comes from the market. Zhang Weiwei is the

supply.

In section 4 I analyze the issue of aesthetics. Intellectuals do not become famous merely by the

force of reason. There are plenty of aesthetic and “performative” dimensions to their place in

society. This case is no exception. I will touch into how Zhang plays with performance to give

the impression of intellectuality.

In section 5 I return to the sacrificial role of intellectuals. Zhang Weiwei is the object of many

internet memes and satire. Guancha News as well has been a target. The fact that they become

outlets for just such a behavior is also part of their position.

2 Nationalism and Intellectuals

The issue of nationalism and the role of intellectuals has a long history, and has been particularly

studied in the case of China.9 In terms of nationalism alone, there is a consensus in the literature

that it has become particularly prominent during the Xi Jinping era.10

Zhang’s account of China is nationalistic just in this regard. Nationalism is a protean concept, of

course, so there are many ways of being nationalist. Nevertheless, given Zhang’s experience at

the apex of power (as an aide to Deng)， and as a a seasoned Chinese professor, he embodies in

9
See Matthew M Chew, “Rethinking the Relationship between Intellectuals and Nationalism: A Sociology of
Knowledge Approach to Philosophers’ Construction of National Cultural Identities in Modern Japan and China,”
Current Sociology 62, no. 3 (May 1, 2014): 314–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392114522759; also Jerome B.
Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China (Simon and Schuster, 1983).
10
For a recent work dealing with this, see KEVIN RUDD, On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism Is Shaping
China and the World (Oxford University Press, 2024). See also Zhidong Cai, “Neo-Authoritarianism: A New Type
of Chinese Nationalism,” in Research Handbook on Nationalism (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), 428–39,
https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781789903430/9781789903430.00048.xml.
himself the conflicting character of Chinese nationalism—just like Shanghai.11 As defended

recently by the anthropologists David Graeber and David Wengrow, human societies in general

are organized by a rejection of that which is other.12 Nationalism follows the same pattern. In

folk terms, China is not the United States, it is not Europe. It is not a Western liberal democracy,

and it has the right to remain so. In Zhang’s lingo: China is not a nation-state, China is a

civilizational state, it plays by other rules.13 This tradition of “nationalist intellectuals” is not new

in China, but Zhang might be one of the latest iterations of it.14

Nationalism can be found in Chinese social media, where such act of cultural negation (as

Graeber calls it) is common—that is, highlighting China’s different and refusal to assimilate. 15

There is an alignment, then, between the politics of Zhang and the cultural medium he inhabits.

This is similar in the case of Guancha News, which was founded by him. In their offices, photos

of Zhang can still be seen.

We think of Zhang when we think of Weiwei because he is a nationalist intellectual, in a

nationalist epoch.

3 The Market for Intellectuals

11
For an example of the unstable mix of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in Shanghai, see Eriberto P. Lozada,
“Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in Shanghai Sports,” City & Society 18, no. 2 (December 2006): 207–31,
https://doi.org/10.1525/city.2006.18.2.207.
12
David Graeber and David Wengrow, The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity (Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2021).
13
Zhang, The China Wave.
14
See Ben Xu, “Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral Dilemma,” Representations 76, no.
1 (2001): 120–40, https://doi.org/10.1525/rep.2001.76.1.120.
15
Florian Schneider, China’s Digital Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2018),
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190876791.001.0001.
The metaphor of the market place of ideas has galvanized something important.16 Intellectuals

and their products are also, to an extent, commodities, as everything else in capitalism. They also

work by laws of supply and demand. Zhang’s case is exemplary of this. The connection comes

from his TV show, “This is China”. Being owned by a for-profit enterprise, the show needs

advertisement. Although the numbers of the show are unknown to me at the moment, it should

be safe to say that the goal is to at least break even at some point. (Anecdotally, it took Guancha

News ten years to break even and start making a profit). Zhang’s success comes from accepting

the rules of the market place. While other intellectuals hide from it, or consider its mechanisms

not to be proper for scholarly practice, Zhang embraced it, making his voice known not only

through the traditional media of intellectual discussion, symposia, and papers, but through mass

media.17

As theorists have noted, we also live in an age of affective capitalism.18 That is, capitalism is not

oriented simply to the satisfaction of “real needs”, but is geared towards the soothing of affective

demands. Zhang’s program, with cheesy music, inspiring testimony, youth and elders alike in the

public, and a well-crafted conversation atmosphere, seems to play exactly this game. As noted in

the introduction, the mechanism of the market is not separate from that of the nation and the

state. Shanghai, although it has this huge cosmopolitan, commercial style, has its economy

composed equally from State-owned enterprises as from private ones.19

We think of Zhang when we think Weiwei because he knows how to sell intellectuality in the

marketplace.
16
For an origin and analysis of the metaphor, see Jill Gordon, “John Stuart Mill and the ‘Marketplace of Ideas,’”
Social Theory and Practice 23, no. 2 (1997): 235–49.
17
Mass media of communication crucial for the existence of mass society in China and shared ideologies, see John
Alekna, Seeking News, Making China: Information, Technology, and the Emergence of Mass Society (Stanford
University Press, 2024).
18
Hangwoo Lee, Affective Capitalism: For a Critique of the Political Economy of Affect (Springer Nature, 2023).
19
Cheng Li, Middle Class Shanghai, chapter 5.
4 Aesthetics of intellectuality

Intellectuality is not only rational and theoretical. It is also enacted. As Fabio Lanza has shown in

his work on the creation of the category of student in 20th century China, being a student was

also an aesthetic performance. 20 I Zhang Weiwei’s program is an example of just that, as

foreshadowed in the last section. Apart from that, seeing his pictures, lectures, etc., it is

noticeable that there is a whole mis-en-scene to Zhang’s actions. Shanghai is the prime place for

that, as the art scene is one of the most thriving ones of China.21

First a word on performance. The sociology of intellectuals is part of a broader scholarly

tradition：Science and Technology Studies (STS). The approach I’m using is indebted to the

efforts of many historians, sociologists, and anthropologists to extend the use of tools from STS

for analyzing the workings of the human and social sciences.22 One of the many analytical

categories used by the STS tradition is performativity. Given the contingency that academic

practices display, tools from the performative studies tradition have been widely applied in STS,

where the “enactment” of science is also seen as a sort of aesthetic and even theatrical display. 23

This approach helps us too to comprehend Zhang Weiwei.

Performativity is not something alien to Chinese scholars. It was in the early years of the

Republic, where the educated-abroad engineer Zhouhou Kun, in front of a mass audience,

changed his scholarly clothes by those of a mechanic. With his new clothes own, he invited the

20
Fabio Lanza, Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing (Columbia University Press, 2010).
21
Cheng, Middle Class Shanghai, chapter 10.
22
For a volume that had a pioneering role in advocating these kinds of approaches, see Charles Camic, Neil Gross,
and Michèle Lamont, Social Knowledge in the Making (University of Chicago Press, 2011).
23
See Chris Salter, Regula Valérie Burri, and Joseph Dumit, “Art, Design, and Performance,” The Handbook of
Science and Technology Studies, 2017, 139–67.
crowd to abandon China’s aversion for manual work, and to dare to get their hands dirty.24

Changing one’s clothes is not an argument. It is a performance: something crucial for the

reproduction and enactment of different intellectual styles. Coming back to Lanza’s contribution

mentioned earlier, some students would not groom or wash themselves as their grimy appearance

was distinctive and gave them immediately the social mark of being a student. Zhangweiwei also

makes recourse to just such performative strategies.

One of the founding origins of Guancha News was an intellectual forum in Shanghai where

Francis Fukuyama and Zhang Weiwei were the two main exponents. A picture of said event

immediately brings our point across.25

Picture 1. A photo from the previously mentioned forum.

Let’s stop by the picture for a second. Fukuyama is seen intently looking in the direction of the

audience. His finger crooked with the purpose of emphasis. He is projecting authority and
24
Jing Tsu, Kingdom of Characters: A Tale of Language, Obsession, and Genius in Modern China (Penguin Books
Limited, 2022).
25
Data on the event can be found in the Guancha News website. See “谁的终结？——福山与张维为对话“中国模
式”https://www.guancha.cn/ZhangWeiWei/2011_11_01_61959.shtml
sapience. Zhang Weiwei does his part too. Elegantly crossing his legs, he has his gaze directed

upwards, as if lost in thought—a metaphor of intellectuality that could be traced back to Greek

Antiquity, where Socrates was mocked by being “lost in the clouds”.

Zhang Weiwei’s program also displays a strong use of performance. The music in the show is

moving and mellow, having resonances with soundtracks from propaganda videos. The audience

is always looking attentively at the host and his guests—one can find people from all ages,

although especially from the youth, who frequently ask questions on the program. Instead of

fervent debate, or loose ends, Zhang’s answers seem to be definitive: he is the professor giving

the lesson.

Picture 2. A poster from Zhang’s TV show.

Even in the promotional poster for the show, seen above, the dynamics of performance are at

play. Again, authoritatively pointing his finger, Zhang’s whole bodily demeanor can be seen as
geared towards the performance of intellectual authority. Given his previous working relation

with Deng Xiaoping, one might well wonder if he didn’t learn the rudiments of theatricality with

him, given the spectacular nature of one of Deng’s last interventions (already mentioned before):

the Southern tour.

We think of Zhang when we think Weiwei because he knows how to perform being an

intellectual.

4 the Sacrificial intellectual

Coming back to another landmark work of the sociology of intellectual interventions, let’s

explain why Zizek occupies such an important role—which, as we will see, is analogous to some

reasons for Zhang’s star status. It is because his role as a sacrificial intellectual. That role is

defined as that of a scapegoat, that is, as the target of criticism an outlet of emotions. Bar-El, in

his study of Zizek, uses the words of one of Zizek’s influences to express this role—the

psychoanalyst and theorist Jacques Lacan: “the philosopher is inscribed in the discourse of the

master. He plays the role of the fool within it. . . . The court fool has a role: that of being the

replacement of the truth.”26 This scapegoating effect works at multiple levels (including at the

level of a scapegoat for academia, for the general public, among other audiences). I will not stop

to retell Zizek’s case, but I bring it up because, as already foreshadowed, Zhang Weiwei plays a

similar role. As some sacred people and things are out of bounds for criticism, Zhang’s role is

that of the sacrifice. This also explains his success.

26
Bar-El, How Slavoj Became Zizek, epigraph.
An expert of international relations by training and profession, Zhang has been recognized by

netizens for being also the master of a new emerging discipline: winnology (yingxue 赢理论). A

critical, if subterraneous, discourse has emerged in the Chinese internet, criticizing the “China

wins twice” mentality of intellectuals and politicians.27 Echoing the critique of Lin Yutang to his

contemporaries, almost 90 years ago, this new online discourse decries the avoidance of

discussing China’s real problems and weaknesses.28 Memes using Zhang’s figure abound, as well

as Wechat stickers using snapshots from his program.

Picture 3. A meme using Zhang as an example of “China wins twice” discourse

27
For an example of how “winnology“ is used, see the blogpost 赢理论研究杂志 Journal of Winnology Research -
https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/533198387
28
I’m referring here to the classic “My Country, My people”， published originally in 1935. See Yutang Lin, My
Country and My People (Read Books, 2008).
Censorship in China is no news. Criticism of certain figures is forbidden, both at the level of law

but also at a cultural level: bodies and brains are imprinted with a reverence for authority, that

some claim traces back to ancient times in China, and being connected to the importance of

family reverence (a better translation of what is usually rendered “filial piety”). 29 We should also

note that this dimension of Zhang’s popularity also interacts with that of nationalism.

Nationalism is a multifaceted phenomenon in China. Sometimes, it is used as a tool precisely for

criticism of the existing status quo.30 That is, Zhang Weiwei is both an object of nationalist

consumption, for people who want to see their nationalist identity reflected in an important

chacter,31

As a brief mention of Guancha News, the platform has people permanently on duty to moderate

the comment section of the website, a site where even new content is produced and where there

is a lot of netizen attention. Given the limited affordances for interaction that can be found in

State-owned media companies, Guancha offers an outlet for free, sometimes virulent, expression

in the internet. That ritual role as a space for venting and unregulated self-expression is also part

of the success of the website. Playing a similar role to that of Zhang Weiwei.

We think of Zhang when we think Weiwei because he is a stand-in. A representative, a Fool (in

the Lacanian sense), a metonym for something larger: our criticisms of the whole turn into

criticisms of the sacrificial part. As I said before with performance, Zhang “plays the part”.

29
See Tao Jiang, “Intimate Authority: The Rule of Ritual in Classical Confucian Political Discourse,” Confucian
Cultures of Authority, 2006, 21–47. For the point on xiao being best translated as family reverence, see Roger T.
Ames, A Conceptual Lexicon for Classical Confucian Philosophy (State University of New York Press, 2022).
30
See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism,” China Perspectives 2005, no. 3 (June 1,
2005), https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.2793.
31
For nationalism as consumption, see William A. Callahan, “History, Identity, and Security: Producing and
Consuming Nationalism in China,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 179–208,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710600671087.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the multifaceted role of Zhang Weiwei as an intellectual in modern China

underscores the intricate interplay between nationalism, market forces, and aesthetics. Zhang’s

success cannot be fully understood without recognizing how these elements converge in his

public persona and intellectual interventions. His nationalistic stance resonates deeply with the

zeitgeist of contemporary China, offering a robust cultural and political narrative that appeals to

both elite circles and the broader public. Market forces, in turn, amplify his reach, as his

engagements through television and online platforms demonstrate a keen understanding of the

dynamics of supply and demand in the intellectual marketplace.

Moreover, Zhang’s adept use of aesthetics and performance further cements his influence. By

meticulously crafting his public appearances and leveraging the power of visual and auditory

elements, he transforms intellectual discourse into a compelling spectacle, enhancing the

relatability and impact of his ideas. This performative aspect is crucial in bridging the gap

between theoretical constructs and public engagement, making his intellectual contributions both

accessible and persuasive.

Additionally, Zhang’s role as a sacrificial intellectual, similar to that of Slavoj Žižek, plays a

significant part in his prominence. By becoming a focal point for criticism and satire, Zhang not

only absorbs societal tensions but also strengthens his position as a pivotal figure in intellectual

and public debates. This duality of being both admired and critiqued enhances his visibility and

solidifies his status, illustrating the complex and strategic nature of his engagement with the

public.
 Ultimately, Zhang Weiwei exemplifies the dynamic and performative nature of intellectuality in

contemporary society. His ability to navigate and integrate nationalism, market dynamics, and

aesthetic performance into his intellectual persona highlights the evolving landscape of

intellectual interventions. Zhang’s success story, rooted in the vibrant cultural and intellectual

milieu of Shanghai, offers valuable insights into the ways intellectuals can effectively engage

with and influence the public discourse in the modern era.

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