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China’s Civilian Army
China’s Civilian Army
The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy

P E T E R M A RT I N

1
 3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2021

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Martin, Peter (Reporter), author.
Title: China’s civilian army : the making of wolf warrior diplomacy / Peter Martin.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2021] |
Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021004587 (print) | LCCN 2021004588 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197513705 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197513729 (epub) | ISBN 9780197513736
Subjects: LCSH: Diplomatic and consular service, Chinese—History. |
China—Foreign relations administration—History. | China—Foreign relations—1949–
Classification: LCC JZ1734 .M38 2021 (print) |
LCC JZ1734 (ebook) | DDC 327.51—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021004587
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021004588

DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197513705.001.0001

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by LSC Communications, United States of America
 Contents

Acknowledgments  vii

Introduction  1
1. The Founder  14
2. Shadow Diplomacy  32
3. War by Other Means  48
4. Chasing Respectability  64
5. Between Truth and Lies  82
6. Diplomacy in Retreat  96
7. Selective Integration  115
8. Rethinking Capitalism  132
9. The Fightback  148
10. Ambition Realized  171
11. Overreach  193
Conclusion  225

Notes  231
Index  289
 Acknowledgments

Of the many ways that attempting to write a book has humbled me, two stand
out. One is learning just how much help I needed. The other is how lucky
I am to be surrounded by people willing to provide it.
Jim McGregor took a chance on me a decade ago and has been a friend
and mentor ever since. “Just slop it out” proved to be the sagest of all the
advice I received during the drafting process (any remaining slop is my re-
sponsibility alone). My dear friend David Cohen deserves a running foot-
note throughout this book and everything else I write.
I likely would not have begun this project without the early encourage-
ment of Charles Edel over dinner at Founding Farmers in DC. I would
certainly never have seen it through without the unstoppable insight and en-
thusiasm of Jude Blanchette. Ken Wills, Lucy Hornby, Ting Shi, James Green,
Steven Lee Myers, Nerys Avery, and Tom Pomeroy all struggled through
early drafts, which must at times have been painful to read. They all offered
invaluable advice and encouragement.
The book also benefited tremendously from the input of the following
people whose expertise and experience improved the manuscript’s style and
substance: Chris Anstey, Alec Ash, Antony Best, Matt Campbell, Andrew
Chubb, Alan Crawford, Rush Doshi, Alex Farrow, Carla Freeman, Chas
Freeman Jr., Karl Gerth, Clara Gillispie, Andy Heath, Tim Heath, Ken Jarrett,
Jeremiah Jenne, Betsy Joles, Dan Ten Kate, Jeff Kearns, Wes Kosova, James
Mayger, Trey McArver, Richard McGregor, Jessica Meyers, Will Millard,
Colum Murphy, Lance Noble, Junni Ogborne, Lena Schipper, Brendan Scott,
Charlie Seath, Gerry Shih, Katie Stallard-​Blanchette, David Wainer, Bob
Wang, Dennis Wilder, and Keith Zhai.
I owe an immense vote of thanks to the many dozens of people who spoke
to me during the course of this project who are either named in the footnotes
or chose to remain anonymous. I would also like to thank Wang Wei, my
wonderful Chinese teacher of many years who tolerates my strange desire to
master Party-​speak.
I am grateful to the Bloomberg Politics team for being supportive of this
project, especially Brendan Scott, Dan Ten Kate, Ros Mathieson, and Wes
viii Acknowledgments

Kosova. Kristin Powers and Samantha Boyd have also been generous with
their time and provided useful advice. All of the opinions in the book,
though, are mine alone. Thank you also to David McBride and Holly Mitchell
at Oxford University Press for commissioning this project and patiently
helping me see it through to the end.
I would like to thank my partner, Alexandra, for being my best friend
and constant inspiration, and my brother, Graham, for being a rock. Finally,
I would like to thank my parents to whom I owe more than they will ever
know. This book is dedicated to them.
 Introduction

It was late afternoon when Rimbink Pato, Papua New Guinea’s foreign min-
ister, heard a loud commotion outside his door. Seconds later, four Chinese
diplomats burst uninvited into his office, demanding last-​minute changes to
the communiqué of the 2018 Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation summit,
the Pacific’s most important economic and political forum.
For Papua New Guinea to have even hosted a meeting of APEC, whose
members represent around 60 percent of the world’s GDP, was a feat in itself.
The sprawling archipelagic nation in the middle of the South Pacific has a
population of just 8.6 million people and is among the poorest on earth. With
850 languages and more than 600 islands, it was difficult to govern at the best
of times. The capital Port Moresby had a reputation for violence, prompting
the country’s southern neighbor and former colonial overlord Australia to
provide security for the event by stationing a warship in the harbor.
China had been meticulously building its influence in the resource-​
rich nation for years, ramping up investment and building infrastructure.
Chinese loans had funded hospitals, schools, and hydropower stations across
the country. By the time the summit took place in November 2018, the na-
tion owed a quarter of its external debt to Beijing.1 Further afield, China was
promising more than $100 billion to finance infrastructure projects across
the Pacific and Eurasia under its Belt and Road Initiative.2
It looked like the event would be an easy win for Xi Jinping, the presi-
dent of China and head of the ruling Communist Party. President Donald
Trump skipped the meeting, sending Mike Pence, the vice president, instead.
Pence spent little time on the ground, instead stationing himself in nearby
Cairns inland from Australia’s Great Barrier Reef because of concerns about
violence.
Xi was the first foreign leader to land in Port Moresby. Ahead of his ar-
rival, local newspapers carried an op-​ed in his name, which hailed the “rapid
growth” in ties as the “epitome of China’s overall relations with Pacific island
countries.”3
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2 China’s Civilian Army

Xi made a grand entrance. His motorcade, which included two Hongqi

(“red flag”) limousines air-​lifted from China, sped from the airport to the
hotel along a Chinese-​funded highway past the fluttering flags of both coun-
tries. Xi drove past crowds of cheering high school students and billboards of
himself shaking hands with the country’s prime minister. His hotel was deco-
rated with red lanterns and an elaborate Chinese gate.4
At the summit, Xi delivered his standard speech on the importance of
open markets and globalization. He’d used public appearances since Trump’s
surprise election victory in November 2016 to contrast China’s approach
to the “America first” protectionism espoused by his American counter-
part, and APEC was no exception. The audience of global executives and
political elites applauded when he told them, without naming names, that
implementing tariffs and breaking up supply chains was “short-​sighted” and
“doomed to failure.”5
This public display was largely under China’s control. The ongoing behind-​
the-​scenes wrangling over the summit’s communiqué, however, was not. In
a last-​minute push to influence wording about “unfair trade practices” that
they believed targeted Beijing, Chinese diplomats took matters into their
own hands by requesting a sit-​down with Papua New Guinea’s foreign min-
ister. He refused, arguing that bilateral negotiations with an individual del-
egation might jeopardize the country’s neutrality as host. The Chinese tried
again but were once more rebuffed.
Undeterred, four Chinese diplomats decided to push their way into the
foreign minister’s office, calling out that they just needed two minutes of his
time. Security guards then asked the Chinese officials to leave and police were
later posted outside the door. Publicly, Papua New Guinea’s foreign min-
ister sought to downplay the incident, telling reporters it was “not an issue.”
Privately, the country’s officials described China’s behavior throughout the
negotiations as “bullying.”6 China’s foreign ministry denied that the inci-
dent ever occurred, calling it “a rumor spread by some people with a hidden
agenda.”7
As reporters waited for the outcome of the summit, Canadian prime
minister Justin Trudeau eventually confirmed that negotiations over the
communiqué had collapsed. “There are differing visions on particular elem-
ents,” he said with understatement. For the first time since leaders began
attending the annual summit in 1993, no joint statement was issued.8
The APEC summit should have been an opportunity for China to boost its
reputation. Trump had spent the two years leading up to the Port Moresby
 Introduction 3

meeting undoing much of the goodwill the United States had developed
in the region. Within days of his January 2017 inauguration, he had with-
drawn from the Trans-​Pacific Partnership, a twelve-​nation trade deal that
aimed to help America compete with China’s engagement in Asia. He’d gone
on to launch a trade war with China, forcing Pacific nations to choose be-
tween two powers they could not afford to offend. The president had also
personally insulted America’s partners across the region, hanging up halfway
through a January 2017 phone call with Australian prime minister Malcolm
Turnbull and branding Canada’s Trudeau “very dishonest” and “weak.” But
instead of taking advantage of the opportunity, China emerged from APEC
looking ever-​more like a bully. Its diplomats—​the very people who should
have been most concerned about their country’s reputation—​only seemed to
be making matters worse.
The APEC debacle was just one of a series of setbacks for Chinese diplo-
macy in the months before and after the summit. Two months earlier, at the
Pacific Islands Forum in the Micronesian microstate of Nauru, China’s envoy
had walked out of a meeting when the host refused to let him speak ahead
of another nation’s prime minister. The president of Nauru described the
Chinese diplomat as “very insolent” and a “bully.”9
In the months after the Papua New Guinea incident, China’s ambassador
to Canada publicly accused his hosts of “white supremacy.” China’s chief em-
issary in South Africa declared that Donald Trump’s policies were making
the United States the “enemy of the whole world.” Its representative in
Sweden, Gui Congyou, labeled the country’s police “inhumane” and blasted
its “so-​called freedom of expression.” In the space of just two years, Gui was
summoned by Sweden’s foreign ministry more than forty times while three
of the country’s political parties called for him to be expelled. Unabashed, he
told Swedish public radio, “we treat our friends with fine wine, but for our
enemies we have shotguns.”10
While these aggressive displays won plaudits at home, they compromised
China’s efforts to cast itself as a peaceful power. The foreign media began to
brand this new confrontational approach “wolf warrior diplomacy” after a
series of Chinese action movies that depicted Rambo-​like heroes battling
China’s enemies at home and abroad. The second in the series, Wolf Warrior
2, told the story of a group of People’s Liberation Army soldiers sent to rescue
stranded Chinese civilians in a war-​torn African nation. The 2017 movie
was a huge success for China’s film industry, making more than $854 mil-
lion at the domestic box office.11 Its tagline read, “Even though a thousand
4 China’s Civilian Army

miles away, anyone who affronts China will pay.”12 The moniker captured the
intimidating and sometimes bewildering nature of Chinese diplomacy as
seen by the outside world, and it stuck.
The behavior of Chinese diplomats grew even more combative as Covid-​
19 spread around the world in early 2020. Beijing’s envoys hit back hard at
suggestions China was to blame for the spread of the virus. Some did so on
Twitter: “You speak in such a way that you look like part of the virus and
you will be eradicated just like virus. Shame on you,” Zha Liyou, China’s
consul-​general in Kolkata, India, tweeted at one user who criticized China.13
Others vented their frustration through embassy websites: an anonymously
authored text posted on the website of the Chinese embassy in France falsely
accused French retirement home staff of leaving old people to die, sparking
public anger in France and a rebuke from the country’s foreign ministry.14
Most provocatively of all, Zhao Lijian, a recently appointed foreign ministry
spokesman, suggested that the virus might have been spread deliberately by
the US Army, prompting fury in Donald Trump’s Oval Office and worldwide
alarm about Beijing’s role in spreading disinformation.15
The behavior of Chinese diplomats helped fuel a global backlash against
Beijing. Reinhard Buetikofer, a German lawmaker who chairs the European
Parliament’s delegation for relations with China, said the foreign ministry’s
“extremely aggressive” behavior combined with the Communist Party’s
“hard line propaganda” had helped turn European opinion against the Asian
nation. Its conduct, he said, spoke to the “pervasiveness of an attitude that
does not purvey the will to create partnerships, but the will to tell people
what to do.”16 A global poll released in October 2020 showed that negative
perceptions of China hit record highs in the United States and eight other
developed economies including Germany, Britain, South Korea, Australia,
and Canada.17
These setbacks matter. As global politics is increasingly defined by Sino-​
American rivalry, the ability to compete diplomatically will help shape the
history of the twenty-​first century. Taken together with economic, mili-
tary, technological, and ideological prowess, diplomacy is a key part of what
makes any power great. American strategists have long defined it as a core
element of any nation’s power: diplomatic, informational, military, and eco-
nomic capabilities are often reduced to the acronym “DIME.”18
Chinese diplomats play an outsized role in representing the country
abroad. The Communist Party’s top leaders speak to the world through a
blend of empty-​sounding platitudes about “win-​win” cooperation or Marxist
 Introduction 5

slogans that fall flat with foreign audiences, while China’s civil society is too
tightly constrained to present its own alternative. NGOs are closely regu-
lated, while the country’s media and cultural industries are heavily censored,
and its business leaders studiously avoid politics. While the foreign ministry
is widely seen as a weak bureaucratic player at home, on many crucial global
issues, its diplomats are the face of the Chinese state to the world.
China knows diplomacy is important and it’s spending big to compete.
Between 2012 and 2017, Beijing nearly doubled its spending on diplo-
macy to $7.8 billion, even as the United States slashed funding for the State
Department.19 In 2019, its diplomatic network overtook that of the United
States, with 276 embassies and consulates around the world. Just three years
earlier it had ranked third behind America and France.20 Still, instead of win-
ning friends, its “wolf warrior” diplomats have become symbols of the threat
posed by a rising China.

***
To understand what’s going wrong, we need to step into the shoes of the
country’s diplomats. Chinese envoys are behaving so undiplomatically be-
cause they are unable to extricate themselves from the constraints of a se-
cretive, paranoid political system which rewards unquestioning loyalty and
ideological conviction. While their actions can sometimes seem aggressive—​
even bizarre—​from the outside, they make perfect sense when seen from a
domestic perspective. Understanding why involves looking at how China’s
political system has shaped the behavior of its diplomats since the earliest
days of the People’s Republic.
In 1949, Mao Zedong established Communist China after decades of
bitter political struggle with Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) rivals. The
Communists had spent much of this time living secretive, underground lives
in fear of capture and persecution. After being nearly obliterated in 1934,
they were forced into a humiliating retreat across China’s remote heartlands
before rebuilding their revolutionary movement and eventually seizing on
Japan’s 1937 invasion to stage a comeback. Despite the Communist Party’s
eventual victory in 1949, the new regime feared that its rule could be
undermined by class enemies at home. What’s more, it faced the threat of in-
vasion by the Kuomintang, which had established a new capital on the island
of Taiwan, and an increasingly hostile, anti-​communist United States.
Still, Mao’s new regime badly needed to build bridges with the outside
world. Establishing ties with capitalist nations would strengthen its claim
6 China’s Civilian Army

to be the sole legitimate government of China, a status contested by the

Kuomintang on Taiwan. Strong diplomatic ties with the communist world
could bring military protection for the new regime, as well as access to the
crucial foreign technologies and expertise needed to modernize the country.
Communist China’s approach to diplomacy was forged by this imperative to
establish relationships around the world while jealously guarding the Party’s
hard-​won victory.
The man charged with squaring this circle was Zhou Enlai, one of the
Communist Party’s most experienced revolutionaries and the founding fa-
ther of modern Chinese diplomacy. The task was especially daunting given
that the new government had no diplomats to speak of. Acting on Mao’s
instructions, Zhou cast aside any Kuomintang diplomats who had opted
to remain in mainland China, and instead set about creating a diplomatic
corps from scratch. Other than a small group of Party officials who had ex-
perience dealing with foreigners, the bulk of Zhou’s diplomatic corps would
be made up of fresh college graduates, ex-​soldiers, and hardened peasant
revolutionaries. Most spoke no foreign languages and some had never even
met a foreigner.
Zhou’s task was doubly daunting because, domestically, diplomacy had
often been associated with weakness and capitulation to foreign powers.
Beginning in the mid-​nineteenth century, Chinese envoys had represented
the crumbling Qing Dynasty by signing agreements that gave foreign powers
preferential access to the Chinese market, extra-​legal privileges on Chinese
soil, and even control over portions of the country’s territory such as Hong
Kong. The imperial capital of Beijing itself had been sacked on more than
one occasion. The Communists came to power promising to end bullying at
the hands of foreign imperialists and declaring that China had “stood up.” In
order to distance the new regime from this humiliating legacy, the diplomacy
of the People’s Republic would need to win the respect of other nations while
never allowing its own diplomats to show weakness.
Zhou’s solution was to model Chinese diplomacy on the military force that
had propelled the Communists to power: the People’s Liberation Army. He
told the new recruits to think and act like “the People’s Liberation Army in
civilian clothing.” They would be combative when needed and disciplined
to a fault. They would instinctively observe hierarchy and report to their
superiors on everything they did. When necessary, they would report on each
other. Most important, the idea of working as a “civilian army” underscored
the fact that the first loyalty of Chinese diplomats would always be to the
 Introduction 7

Communist Party. As every good Communist knew, when Chairman Mao

declared that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” he had added
that “the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to
command the Party.”21
The idea of a “civilian army” proved a potent and lasting metaphor for
Chinese diplomacy. It provided Zhou’s ragtag group with a way to feel proud
of what they were doing and some sense of how to do it. A little like the “mis-
sion statement” pinned to the wall of a tech startup, it gave them a way to
scale their organization quickly while conveniently ignoring the fact that
they didn’t really know what they were doing.
“They applied the same discipline to the foreign ministry that they applied
to the military,” explained Gao Zhikai, a former foreign ministry interpreter.
“The discipline applied to the organization and also to every individual. The
pressure is huge: everyone is watching everyone else to make sure no one is
fooling around.”22
Using this rubric, the Communists found a way to communicate with the
outside world while minimizing the risks of doing so. Zhou encouraged a
style among his diplomats that one cadre aptly described as “controlled
openness.”23 Chinese diplomats were expected to adhere to a rule that for-
bade them from meeting alone with foreign counterparts. Instead, they
worked in pairs to ensure that if anyone deviated too far from the Party line,
or shared sensitive information, the person next to them was there to report
it. Diplomats were instructed to ask permission before they acted, even on
the most trivial matters, and to always report what they said, did, and heard
to their superiors. They were banned from dating or marrying foreigners.
They were told to stick rigidly to pre-​approved talking points, even when
they knew these often failed to resonate with foreign audiences.
Born of necessity more than seventy years ago, these rules and practices
are still in place today. Zhou’s approach has survived and evolved through
revolution, famine, capitalist reforms, and the rise of China as a global power.
“We’re very different from other ministries,” one diplomat said. “We’re unu-
sual in that we’ve had a strong culture that’s lasted since 1949.”24 Even within
the secretive world of the Chinese bureaucracy, foreign ministry officials
have a reputation for being unusually uptight and somehow more difficult
to relate to than their peers in other ministries. Officials in the Ministry of
Commerce sometimes jokingly refer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as
the “Ministry of Magic” (mofa bu), a play on words in Chinese from the ac-
ronym MOFA.
8 China’s Civilian Army

The core of China’s distinctive approach to diplomacy is the enduring

martial ethos established by Zhou. “Our diplomatic corps is a civilian
army,” wrote one former ambassador in 1997. “It was trained and developed
through education from the Party and under the care of Zhou Enlai.”25 In
2019, while touring the new military museum in Beijing, foreign ministry
spokesperson Hua Chunying reminded her People’s Liberation Army host
of the ministry’s roots as a “civilian army.”26 Today, as Chinese diplomats
square up to the United States in an increasingly intense global rivalry, they
still work off assumptions forged in the bloody revolutionary struggles of the
twentieth century.
There are real strengths to China’s approach. Its diplomats bring unri-
valed discipline to the pursuit of their goals. “They can be very charming and
professional,” one European diplomat said. “Dealing with them can be ex-
hausting because they won’t deviate from the official line for even a second.”27
As a result, foreign interlocutors are never left in any doubt about China’s
stance on the country’s core interests such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet.
What’s more, China’s disciplined approach to these kinds of issues extends
all across its central government agencies, hiding most inter-​agency conflicts
from the world and enhancing China’s ability to present a united front in
negotiations. It’s a powerful combination in a world beset by disruption and
uncertainty.
At times, Chinese diplomacy has performed impressively. In the 1950s,
China undertook a charm offensive that won it friends in the developing
world and helped build support for the Communist Party as the internation-
ally recognized government of China. In the period after the 1989 Tiananmen
Square massacre, Chinese diplomats helped rehabilitate their country in the
eyes of the world, kickstarting a nearly two-​decade run of successes that cul-
minated in China’s hosting of the Summer Olympic Games in 2008.
Yet the system also has major weaknesses. China’s approach to diplomacy
makes its envoys effective at formulating demands, but poorly equipped to
win hearts and minds. Their fear of looking weak in front of Party leaders and
the Chinese public makes them focus excessively on small tactical wins at
the expense of strategic victories; their constant repetition of official talking
points is unpersuasive at best and, at worst, looks like bullying; and their lim-
ited space to improvise, show flexibility, or take the initiative leaves them un-
able to tailor their approach to different audiences.
These constraints matter because they cut to the heart of what it means
to conduct diplomacy. Daniele Varè, an early twentieth-​century Italian
 Introduction 9

diplomat, described it as “the art of letting someone else have your way.” Chas
Freeman, a veteran American diplomat, elaborated on the point: “Diplomacy
is a political performing art that informs and determines the decisions of
other states and peoples. It shapes their perceptions and calculations so that
they do what we want them to do because they come to see doing so as in
their own best interest.”28
Judged by these standards, China’s political system sets severe limits on the
performance of its diplomats. Ultimately, it’s a system that’s better at silencing
critics than persuading others to share its point of view, a system that leaves
the Party with tremendous international influence but few true friends. This
is true for China on a state-​to-​state level—​the closest thing it has to an alli-
ance is with North Korea; its closest relationship is with Pakistan. It’s also true
on a personal level: “You know, I don’t think I ever really got to know anyone
well,” another senior European official said at the end of a four-​decade ca-
reer dealing with Chinese diplomats. “I played tennis with a couple of people
in the 1990s, but I wasn’t able to sustain those relationships. There’s no one
I could really call a friend.”
The system performs particularly badly at times of political tension in
Beijing, when Chinese diplomats find themselves more concerned with
avoiding charges of disloyalty than improving their country’s reputation.
These periods of political uncertainty at home have often been accompa-
nied by the forceful assertion of domestic ideologies on the global stage—​
regardless of the reputational consequences for China. This impulse played
out most dramatically during the 1966–​ 1976 Cultural Revolution. As
diplomats watched Mao push Chinese politics in an ever more radical di-
rection, they followed his lead in their interactions with foreigners by
barking slogans and handing out copies of the Chairman’s “Little Red Book.”
Eventually, the tight discipline of the foreign ministry broke down so com-
pletely that junior diplomats locked ambassadors in cellars, forced them to
clean toilets, and beat them until they coughed up blood.
Today, as Xi Jinping pushes China in a more authoritarian direction
at home and promotes a new, more assertive, role for the country abroad,
many of the forces that previously held back China’s diplomatic progress are
once again resurfacing. Unlike Mao, Xi favors domestic order over radical
rebellion. Above all, he seeks political security for himself and a state appa-
ratus that is responsive to his needs. In October 2016, the Communist Party
declared Xi its “core leader,” a title that had eluded his predecessor, Hu Jintao,
and signaled the demise of collective leadership in the Party. In March 2018,
10 China’s Civilian Army

it abolished term limits for the presidency, clearing the way for Xi to remain
in power for life. These changes mean that any ambitious diplomat must ap-
pear to be on the right side of Xi’s political agenda, as there is little prospect
of waiting him out.
The costs of getting on the wrong side of Xi have also become ever more
apparent. Under Xi, Chinese politics has become an increasingly repres-
sive and frightening place. Since 2012, as part of an anti-​graft campaign
that treats political disloyalty as a form of corruption, more than 1.5 mil-
lion officials have been punished. That’s around four times the population
of Iceland. Diplomats have had to sit through “self-​criticism” sessions in the
foreign ministry and “inspection tours” that test their loyalty to the Party and
willingness to follow orders.29 As such, the impulse for Chinese diplomats to
follow Xi’s lead is rooted in fear as well as ambition.
The easiest way for diplomats to work toward Xi’s wishes is to assert
Chinese interests forcefully on the world stage. Even before Xi became
president, he used a February 2009 trip to Mexico to complain about
“foreigners with full bellies who have nothing better to do than point the
finger” at China’s human rights record.30 One of his first acts after be-
coming leader of the Communist Party in November 2012 was to lay out
an agenda for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” signaling his
ambitions for the country to retake its rightful place in the world. Since
then, he has repeatedly instructed diplomats to stand up for China more
aggressively than they did in the past, even crafting handwritten notes
instructing them to show more “fighting spirit.”31
As a result, the country’s envoys have taken a more assertive and even bel-
ligerent tone to prove their loyalty to the leadership. They have handed out
copies of books about “Xi Jinping Thought” at diplomatic events, echoing the
way their predecessors behaved with Mao’s “Little Red Book” more than four
decades earlier; they have waxed lyrical about Xi’s leadership in meetings
with foreign counterparts; and they have shouted at and insulted foreign
politicians rather than risk looking weak. “Beijing rewards diplomats that are
aggressive advocates of China’s views and scorns those that it perceives as
overly timid,” explains Ryan Hass, who served as a China expert on President
Barack Obama’s National Security Council. “We seem to be watching China’s
diplomats matching the mood of the moment in Beijing.”
The trend has become even more pronounced as the world increasingly
questions American leadership. In the space of less than two decades, the
United States’ authority has been dented by foreign policy mistakes in the
 Introduction 11

Middle East, an indecisive response to the Global Financial Crisis, paralyzing

political gridlock at home, the “America first” populism of Donald Trump,
and its fumbling response to the Covid-​19 pandemic. At the same time,
China’s economy boomed and the country faced down the global pandemic
more successfully than most Western nations. Many Chinese diplomats
began to feel that their political system and development model were su-
perior to those of the West, a belief reinforced by domestic propaganda.
In May 2020, foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying responded
to State Department criticisms of China’s crackdown in Hong Kong by
simply invoking the final words of George Floyd as he lay pinned down by
Minneapolis police: “I can’t breathe.”32

***
Given all this, you might expect Chinese diplomats to relish the “wolf war-
rior” label. They don’t. To many, it’s just the latest example of foreigners
refusing to treat China fairly in the court of international opinion. “We think
it’s really unfair,” said one foreign ministry official. “We work so hard to im-
prove China’s image and explain our policies, but it doesn’t matter what we
say. Whatever we do, America and its allies will criticize us.”33 Le Yucheng,
the foreign ministry’s top vice minister, called the term a “discourse trap that
aims to prevent us from fighting back” in a December 2020 speech. “I suspect
these people have not awoken from their dreams 100 years ago,” he said.34
This frustration is understandable. In terms of credentials, today’s Chinese
diplomats are up there with the best of their international counterparts. Many
hold advanced degrees from Georgetown University or the London School
of Economics, and have spent years mastering foreign languages ranging
from Czech to Bahasa. They have invested much of their lives studying the
countries to which they are posted and often care deeply about China’s repu-
tation. On a personal level, they can be suave, sophisticated, and even funny.
Quietly, many understand that their behavior is contributing to a global
backlash against China. Yuan Nansheng, China’s former consul general in
San Francisco, voiced the concerns of many inside China’s foreign ministry
in September 2020 when he warned that “if we let populism and extreme na-
tionalism flourish freely in China, the international community could misin-
terpret this as Beijing pursuing ‘China First’,” referring to Trump’s “America
First” policy. Yuan called for a return to the low-​key approach to diplomacy
the country had followed in the 1990s and early 2000s. “Chinese diplomacy
needs to be stronger, not just tougher,” he said.35
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