IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA

AT PAR ES SALAAM

(CORAM: MUGASHA, J.A.. MURUKE J.A. And NANGELA. J.A.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 171 OF 2022

MCH. DKT. RONILICK E. K. MCHAMI...........................................APPELLANT

VERSUS
THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE EVANGELICAL
LUTHERAN CHURCH IN TANZANIA.................................... 1st RESPONDENT
THE BOARD OF MAKUMIRA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF THE TUMAINI UNIVERSITY......................... 2nd RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division at
Dar es Salaam)
( Mzirav, Aboud And Mashaka, JJ^

dated the 12th day of February, 2016

in
Revision No. 03 of 2013

RULING OF THE COURT

18th & 24th June,, 2025

MURUKE. J.A.:
The present appeal, originates from the decision of the High Court in

Labour Revision No. 03 of 2013 dated 12th February 2016, in which the

appellant's application for revision of the Trade Dispute Inquiry No. 145 of

2006, before the Industrial Court of Tanzania at Arusha was dismissed for

want of merits.

Brief facts leading to the present appeal goes like this: The appellant

was a Reverend serving at Iringa Dioscese by then. In 1988 the

Evangelical Lutheran Church, requested his service for him to serve as a

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lecturer at Makumira University. The Iringa Dioscese, approved the request

and the appellant was placed at Makumira as a Lecturer on secondment

basis from 1st March 1988. He enjoyed all the benefits as employee of

Makumira University until 23rd January 2006, when the appellant received

a letter instructing him to return to his original Dioscese of Iringa.

The appellant was aggrieved with the decision, therefore referred the

dispute to the Labour Commissioner who, upon investigation, also referred

the same to the then Industrial Court of Tanzania at Arusha as a Trade

Dispute Inquiry No. 145 of 2006. The Commissioner found that, there is no

Labour dispute between the parties, thus, dismissed the claim, serve for

claim of payment of half salary for the month of March, 2006, that the

appellant was entitled to be paid.

Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner for Labour,

the appellant filed Labour Revision No. 5 of 2011, before the High Court

Labour Division against the respondents. The Revision application

encountered preliminary objection raised suo motto, on time limitation in

which the same was found to be filed out of time. Thus the appeal was

not heard on merits.

The appellant was not happy with the finding of the High Court that

the revision application was out of time. He therefore filed an application

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for extension of time through Misc. Labour Application No. 183 of 2013.

The same was granted ex-parte in a ruling delivered on 12th December

2013. Following the grant of extension of time, the applicant instituted a

fresh Revision application No. 3 of 2013, in which the High Court dismissed

the same on 12th February 2016 for lack of merits.

Now the appellant has further appealed to this Court armed with 12

grounds of appeal as appearing at pages 658 -662 of the records.

At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Ezra Mwaluko learned counsel

represented the respondents whereas the appellant was present in person,

with no representation.

Before hearing could commence, we wanted to satisfy ourselves on

the competence of the appeal before us on account of panel of three High

Court Judges' finding that first revision No. 5 of 2011 between the parties

herein was filed out of time.

The appellant was quick to respond that although the revision was

found to be out of time, it was not dismissed. On being asked on the

remedy provided by section 3 of Law of Limitation Act [Cap. 89 R.E. 2002]

on matter found to be out of time, his answer, was that, the law of

limitation was not applicable on the revision that was before the High

Court, originating from the decision of the Industrial Court, rather, the
Industrial Court Rules. However, he could not mention any rule in that

regard. However, on reflection the appellant, Dr. Ronilick Mchami,

conceded that the appeal before the Court is incompetent.

On his part, Mr. Mwaluko was brief, but to the point that, after High

Court finding that the revision was filed out of time, the appellant had no

right to apply for an extension of time to file revision already found to be

out of time.

It is worthnoting, at the outset that, there cannot be proper

litigations in the Courts of Law in the absence of law of limitation. The very

object of the law of limitation would be defeated for, as C. K. Takwani

writes in CIVIL PROCEDURE, With Limitation Act, 1963, 7th Edition,

Eastern Book Company, at page 782

"Statutes on limitation are based on two well -

known legal maxims:

(i) The interest o f the State requires that there

should be an end to litigation (interest
reipubiicae ut sit finis iitium).

(ii) The law assists the vigilant and not one who
sleeps over his rights (Vigiiantibus non
dormientibusjura- subveniunt) "

We take note that the first objective of the Employment and Labour

Relations Act No. 6 of 2004 is to promote economic development through

economic efficiency, productivity and social justice. The learned High Court

Judge (Rweyemamu, J as she then was) appreciated that fact and

proceeded to state the following in Dr. Noordin Jella v. Mzumbe

University, Complaint No. 47 of 2008 (unreported):

"For one, economic development cannot be

promoted by allowing labour disputes to remain
unresolved for an undue long period\ as that would
keep both the employer and employee tied up in
disputes instead o f being productively engaged....
To revert to the submission o f counsel for the
complainant) I stress that it is in regard to the
nature o f labour disputes that time limits for
initiating actions must be provided."

We fully adopt that statement and add that; Tanzania Labour laws

have been crafted in hybrid manner with emphasis on time management

from administrative process of dispute resolution to the courts of law.

Time lines are set as a strategy towards productivity. Both insist on the

crucial element for attainment of economic growth and improvement of

standard of living by ushering and honouring productivity whether

administratively or court process.

Therefore, in an employment dispute, delays in not only filing but

resolving dispute has the negative effect in Industrial Services. Thus, the

Commission, Tribunals and Court of Law must adhere to the principal of

effective and timely resolutions of disputes to allow smooth Industrial

Labour relations for enhanced productivity.

According to the records, there is no dispute that, the panel of three

Judges in the first Revision No. 5 of 2011 challenging decision of Industrial

Court found the revision to have been filed out of time. For clarity, at

page 000314 of the record to appear it was observed that:-

"... In our view, there is no proof o f the date when

the applicant was supplied with a copy o f the
Judgment required. This is a serious error and
renders the revision hopelessly time barred".

"In the result, we stick to our point on limitation we

have raised suo motto, and hold that the revision
as filed by the applicant is hopelessly time barred".

Section 3(1) of the Law of Limitation Act (Supra) provides that any

matter filed out of time should be dismissed. To our understanding the law

of Limitation is applicable in the employment matters. The exception of

applicability of the same stated under section 43 of the Act as follows:

"43. This Act shall not apply to:-

(a) Criminalproceedings;

(b) applications and appeals to the Court o fAppeal;

(c) proceedings by the Government to recover

possession o f any public land or to recover any
 tax or the interest on any tax or any penalty
for non-payment or late payment o f any tax or
any costs or expense in connection with any
such recovery;

(d) forfeiture proceedings under the Customs

(Management and Tariff) Act or the Excise
(Management and Tariff) Act;

(e) proceedings in respect o f the forfeiture o f a ship

or an aircraft;

(f) any proceeding for which a period o f limitation

is prescribed by any other written law, save to
the extent provided for in section 46".

More so section 46 provides clear that:

"Where a period o f limitation for any proceeding is

prescribed by any other written law, then unless
the contrary intention appears in such written law,
and subject to the provisions o f section 43, the
provisions o f this Act shall apply as if such period o f
limitation had been prescribed by this A c t"

The language of the two provisions is plain and very clear in our view

that the Act applies to all proceedings except those mentioned under

section 43 (a) - (f). It is also clear again that under section 46 even those

proceedings whose time limit is prescribed by other statutes as mandated

by section 43 (f), the time limits set by those other statutes are deemed to

be prescribed by the Act.

It is apparent on record that having been dissatisfied with the

Industrial Court decision, the appellant lodged an application for Revision

before the High Court Labour Division, where the Full bench suo motto

raised the issue of competence. The High Court Judges heard the parties,

they were satisfied that the application for Revision has been lodged

beyond the prescribed 14 days. They thus, declared the application to be

time barred. For ease of reference, the relevant part is hereby reproduced.

"In the result we stick to our point o f limitation

which we have raised suo motto and hold that the
revision as filed by the applicant hopelessly time
barred. Each party to bear its own costs as
normally costs are not awarded in trade disputes".

Subsequently, the appellant filed Misc. Labour Application No. 183 of

2013 seeking for extension of time on ground of illegality. He was seeking

to lodge again an application for revision before the same Court which

ruled that the application was time barred. Surprisingly, his application was

granted, hence he filed the Revision Application No. 03 of 2013 subject of

this appeal.
 It is settled law that once an application is declared time-barred by a

court, generally, there is no direct remedy to revive it, and dismissal is the

usual outcome. This is clearly provided under section 3 (1) of the Law of

Limitation Act, that gives power to the courts to dismiss matters found to

be instituted outside the prescribed time. The High Court in the Labour

Revision No. 5 of 2011 having found the application was time barred, it

ought to have dismissed the same. See the case of Barclays Bank

Tanzania Limited v. Phylisiah Hussein Mcheni (Civil Appeal No. 19 of

2016) [2021] TZCA 202.

We would have ended here, however, in view of the nature of this

matter, we are of the view that, it is necessary to go a step further and

put the record in order. It was wrong for the appellant to go back and

seek extension of time as he did in Misc. Labour Application No. 183 of

2013, seeking to challenge the application which was already declared

time barred. Therefore the extended time given was illegal thus the

proceedings, ruling in Misc. Labour Application No. 183 of 2013 and Labour

Revision No. 3 of 2013 are a nullity. It goes without saying the appeal

before us emanating from null proceedings cannot be left to stand.

In the circumstances, therefore, we are constrained to invoke our

revisional powers under section 4(2) of the Appellant Jurisdiction Act as we

hereby do. We therefore quash and set aside Ruling in Misc. Labour
Application No. 183/2013; Judgment and decree in Revision Application

No. 3 of 2013 together with all subsequent orders that is, Drawn Order

and Decree. This being an appeal originating from Labour dispute, there is

no order as to cost.

DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 18th day of June, 2025.

S. E. A. MUGASHA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

Z. G. MURUKE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

D. J. NANGELA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

Ruling delivered this 24th day of June, 2025 via video link, in the

presence of the appellant in person from Arusha and Mr. Lecktony

Ngeseyanyi holding brief for Mr. Ezra Mwaluko, learned counsel for the

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