Complementary Therapist's Guide to Red Flags and

Referrals The 4 8=8AB@0B @ download

https://ebookgrade.com/product/complementary-therapists-guide-to-
red-flags-and-referrals-the-4-88ab0b/

Download full version ebook from https://ebookgrade.com

More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Red Hat RHCSA 8 Cert Guide EX200 0135938139

https://ebookgrade.com/product/red-hat-rhcsa-8-cert-guide-
ex200-0135938139/

ebookgrade.com

Freelancer's Guide to Corporate Event Design 4 8=8AB@0B @

https://ebookgrade.com/product/freelancers-guide-to-corporate-event-
design-4-88ab0b/

ebookgrade.com

Internal Auditing Pocket Guide 4 8=8AB@0B @

https://ebookgrade.com/product/internal-auditing-pocket-
guide-4-88ab0b/

ebookgrade.com

Practical Guide to Clinical Data Management Third Edition

4 8=8AB@0B @

https://ebookgrade.com/product/practical-guide-to-clinical-data-
management-third-edition-4-88ab0b/

ebookgrade.com
New Flags Flying

https://ebookgrade.com/product/new-flags-flying/

ebookgrade.com

Mosby's Field Guide to Occupational Therapy for Physical

Dysfunction 4 8=8AB@0B @

https://ebookgrade.com/product/mosbys-field-guide-to-occupational-
therapy-for-physical-dysfunction-4-88ab0b/

ebookgrade.com

Wealthy Fit Pro's Guide to Getting Clients and Referrals

Jonathan Goodman The Jonathan Goodman & Mike Doehla

https://ebookgrade.com/product/wealthy-fit-pros-guide-to-getting-
clients-and-referrals-jonathan-goodman-the-jonathan-goodman-mike-
doehla/
ebookgrade.com

Laboratory Mouse 2nd The 4 8=8AB@0B @

https://ebookgrade.com/product/laboratory-mouse-2nd-the-4-88ab0b/

ebookgrade.com
Other documents randomly have
different content
 to acquiesce in the return of those persons to power.
On the other hand, those members who had kept
aloof from the interests of the enemy, and retaining
their loyalty had retained the confidence of the nation,
had an unquestionable claim to be reinstated in their
situations. Declaring therefore that his instructions
were to take measures for forming a Regency as soon
as possible, composed of such persons of rank,
character, and talents, as might be found ready to
undertake, and qualified to discharge, the important
trust, but with as few changes (particularly in the
subordinate departments) as might be compatible
with the public interests, in the fulfilment of this duty
he naturally addressed himself to his Excellency and
the Provisional Board of Government at Porto. “You,”
Sir Hew continued, “have already turned your
thoughts to the great question now at issue, and are
doubtless prepared to propose measures for
completing the Council of Regency so as to merit the
confidence of the nation, and to prevent any just
cause of discontent in any other provisional
government, or other respectable description of the
people. For my own part, I have only been able, from
the information I have received since my arrival in
Portugal, to form one decided opinion on this subject;
which is, the infinite importance to the public welfare
that your Excellency should yourself hold a
distinguished place in the proposed Regency.”
The Council of The Bishop’s reply was, that he should readily
Regency re- acquiesce in whatever might be determined upon,
established. except his own nomination to the Council; for he,
better than any other person, knew what was
necessary for the good of the public cause, and of the
northern provinces, and therefore would not remove
from the place where he had been stationed by God
 and by his Prince. It was soon, however, ascertained,
that if this Prelate could not remain at the head of the
government at Porto, he would not persist in refusing
to accept a share in it at Lisbon. Sir Hew therefore,
upon mature deliberation, and with the best advice
which could be obtained, issued a proclamation,
saying, that through the success with which
Providence had blessed the British arms, the time was
come when the re-establishment of the Portugueze
government could be effected. He gave the people
Sept. 18. due praise for the exertions which they had made
against the French; and saying that no views of
interest or of national aggrandizement could be
imputed to the liberal policy of Great Britain, declared,
that the best manner in which he could fulfil the
intentions of his Sovereign, and promote the welfare
of Portugal, was by restoring that Council to which
their Prince had delegated his authority when he
preserved his royal dignity from the insults of an
implacable enemy, and secured his American
dominions. One of that Council had been unhappily
sent away from his country; others had incurred
imputations which rendered their restoration
impossible at this time. The three, however, who had
contracted no such disability, the Monteiro Mor, D.
Francisco Xavier de Noronha, and Francisco da Cunha
e Menezes, he called upon to resume the
administration, and with them the Desembargador
Joam Antonio Salter de Mendonça, and Brigadier D.
Sept. 20. Miguel Pereira Forjas Coutinho, whom the Prince had
named to succeed in case of vacancies. These
persons assembled accordingly, and to fill up the
number which the act of regency appointed, elected
the Marquez daz Minas and the Bishop of Porto. The
Junta of Porto then dissolved itself, declaring,
however, that if the Regency should again be
 overthrown by any new invasion of the enemy, (which
they prayed God to avert,) or any other calamity, they
should by that event enter again upon the full
exercise of the authority which they now laid aside.
The other Juntas were in like manner dissolved: the
Regency was acknowledged throughout Portugal, and
things resumed, as far as possible, their former
course.
Outcry in While Sir Hew Dalrymple was employed in carrying
England the terms of the convention into effect, putting an end
against the to the anarchy which prevailed, and preparing with all
Convention.
possible speed to advance into Spain, an outcry which
he little expected had arisen against him at home.
The official account of the battle reached England a
fortnight before the news of the armistice and
convention: tidings came with it that the French had
proposed to evacuate Portugal, and the news of
Junot’s unconditional surrender was looked for as
what must necessarily ensue. When the terms of the
convention were received the Park and Tower guns
were fired; but the public feeling was not in accord
with this demonstration of joy, and never was any
public feeling so unanimously and instantaneously
manifested. The hopes of the nation had been raised
to the highest pitch; their disappointment was in
proportion, and it was expressed with a violence only
to be explained by the deep and general abhorrence
which the conduct of the French in Portugal had
provoked. The capitulations of the Helder and of
Buenos Ayres were remembered as less mortifying
than the convention of Cintra. Nothing else could be
talked of, nothing else could be thought of: men
greeted each other in the streets with execrations
upon those who had signed this detested convention;
it kept them waking at night, or disturbed their sleep,
like a misdeed or a misfortune of their own. The
London newspapers joined in one cry of wonder and
abhorrence; on no former occasion had they been so
unanimous. The provincial papers proved that, from
one end of the island to the other, the resentment of
this grievous disappointment was the same; some
refused to disgrace their pages by inserting the treaty;
others surrounded it with broad black lines, putting
their journal in mourning for the dismal intelligence it
contained; some headed the page with a
representation of three gibbets, and a general
suspended from each, cut in wood for the occasion.
What could be done? There were not wanting
writers who called upon government to annul the
convention. The Romans, they said, would have done
so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it,
bound and haltered, to the enemy’s discretion. Would
it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to
break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was so
framed that it could not be fulfilled without breaking
our faith towards each and all of our allies! We were
the allies of Portugal; and it was a breach of faith
towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves,
ravishers, and murderers out of the country in which
they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which
they had no other possible means of escape. We were
the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of faith
towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French
troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should
be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own
country, with arms and baggage, that they might join
the forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to
march against the Spaniards. We were the allies of
Sweden; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden
to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet for
the purpose of manning Russian ships against the
Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our
enemies, or to betray our friends? for to this
alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced
us! No law of nations could justify them in making
such stipulations; no law of nations therefore could
justify us in performing them. But the French, it was
urged, had already fulfilled their part of the
convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns,
and admitted us into Lisbon. Thus we had already
reaped the advantages, and were, in honour, bound
to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which
was advantageous to them. In whatever way we
acted, some loss of honour was inevitable; but it was
less disgraceful to break the terms than to fulfil them;
better that the French should reproach us, than that
they should compliment us upon a fidelity which
enabled them to injure our allies. The blow, it was
affirmed, might have gone far towards deciding the
fate of Europe. France had lost one army in Andalusia,
and how deeply Buonaparte felt the loss was shown
by the anxiety with which he concealed it from the
French people. What might not have been the effect
of the destruction of a second and larger army,
following so close upon that of the former! How would
it have encouraged the Portugueze, given new
animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope and
the courage of those various states who were
suffering under the tyrant’s yoke!
The conditions which had been granted to the
Russian Admiral were condemned with the same
vehement feeling of disappointment. The intimate
connexion which had so lately subsisted between the
Courts of London and Petersburgh, and the personal
regard which the British Admiral entertained for
Admiral Siniavin, had been adduced as reasons why
an agreement acceptable to both nations should be
concluded. Certainly it became us to manifest every
mark of personal respect toward the Russian officers,
because, though the false policy of their government
had engaged the two countries in war, there existed
no angry feelings nor jarring interests between them;
and the wishes of both were for a renewal of that
long established intercourse which was beneficial to
both. It also behoved us especially to show ourselves
grateful for the protection which the Russians had
afforded to the English and Portugueze refugees, and
the facilities which they had given them of effecting
their escape. These were personal favours, for which
the obvious personal return should have been to have
immediately sent home men and officers under an
engagement not to serve against us or our allies, and
to have shown towards them every courtesy and
kindness by which the evils of hostility can be
mitigated. But that personal regard should influence
the terms of capitulation, was a thing as unheard of
as the terms themselves. “Hold in deposit!” The
phrase had never before been known in the British
navy. They knew what it was to fight their enemies;
they knew what it was to beat, capture, sink, burn,
and destroy them, according to the spirit and letter of
their instructions. This was said by the navy, and by
the nation; and the bitter reflection arose, how would
Nelson have received such a proposal!
Such language as this arose from a right feeling;
but the disappointment of well-founded and high-
raised hopes had heated the public mind, and
disqualified it for regarding the whole transaction
dispassionately. The manner in which the Portugueze
had been overlooked in the negotiation was
 aggravated in England by persons who supported the
pretensions of the Junta of Porto; and undue stress
was laid upon the neglect of formalities which could
not have been overlooked if the Portugueze General
had been acting with the British army as he ought.
There had been one serious omission affecting the
Portugueze, which was, in not insisting upon a
stipulation that the troops of that nation who had
been sent to serve in Buonaparte’s armies should be
restored to their own country; such a stipulation
ought to have been required, though it would
undoubtedly have been broken. The other oversights
which were objected were merely frivolous, and the
manner in which, through all the subsequent details,
the feelings as well as interests of the Portugueze had
been consulted, had already contented them, and
made them grateful for the conduct of their allies.
There was another cause which exasperated the
English people: they compared the treatment of
Junot’s army with that of Dupont’s, and were
mortified by a comparison which ought rather to have
elated them; for looking to what seemed
advantageous, and not to what was just, they did not
perceive that in deferring to a popular cry the Junta of
Seville had broken a solemn engagement. The strong
disapprobation with which Sir Hew Dalrymple
regarded that breach of faith, acted upon him,
perhaps unconsciously, when he allowed the French
the utmost which could be claimed upon the most
liberal construction of the letter of the treaty in their
favour.
Board of Meetings were convened in most parts of England
Inquiry to express the indignation of the people at the
appointed. convention, and call for the punishment of those by
whom it had been negotiated. The Common Council
presented an address to the same purport, and were
told in reply that it was inconsistent with the
principles of British justice to pronounce judgement
without previous investigation, and that their
interposition was not necessary for inducing the King
to institute a due inquiry into a transaction which had
disappointed the hopes and expectations of the
nation. Accordingly the three Generals were recalled,
and a Board of Inquiry was appointed, composed of
the Earl of Moira, General Craig, Lord Heathfield, the
Earl of Pembroke, Sir George Nugent, and Lieutenant-
General Nicolls, with Sir David Dundas for president.
Their decision, after a long and full investigation, was,
that they could not pronounce, with confidence,
whether the victory of Vimeiro ought to have been
pursued or not; but, considering the extraordinary
circumstances under which two new commanders
arrived from the ocean, and joined the army, (the one
during, and the other immediately after the battle,
and these successively superseding each other, and
both the original commander, within the space of
twenty-four hours,) it was not surprising that the army
was not carried forward until the second day after the
action, from the necessity of the generals’ being
acquainted with the actual state of things, and
proceeding accordingly. On a consideration of all
circumstances, they were of opinion, that no farther
proceeding was necessary; and, however some of
them might differ respecting the fitness of the
convention, it was their unanimous declaration, that
unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited
by all the three generals.
As this was, in fact, delivering no opinion at all, the
board was called upon, by the Duke of York, as
commander-in-chief, to resume its consideration of
 the armistice and convention, and pronounce
decidedly whether they thought them adviseable. The
armistice was disapproved by Earl Moira; the
convention by the same nobleman, by the Earl of
Pembroke, and General Nicolls: thus, six of the seven
members approved the armistice, and four approved
the convention. The dissentient members delivered in
their reasons for the opinion which they gave. General
Nicolls and Earl Pembroke confined themselves to a
military point of view. Earl Moira took a wider scope,
and argued ably against the moral and political effects
of the treaty. The proceedings were concluded by a
Jan. 18, 1809. declaration from the King, adopting the unanimous
opinion of the board, that no farther proceeding was
necessary; but expressing his disapprobation of those
articles of the convention in which stipulations were
made, directly affecting the interests or feelings of the
Spanish and Portugueze nations. That disapprobation
his Majesty had signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple when
the treaty was first laid before him, and he repeated
it, deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be
clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger
of the unauthorised admission, into military
conventions, of articles of such a description. Nor
could he forbear observing, that Sir Hew’s delaying to
transmit the armistice concluded on the 22d of
August, till the 4th of September, when the ratified
convention was transmitted at the same time, was
calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and
that such inconvenience had, in fact, resulted
therefrom. The King abstained from any observations
upon other parts of the convention.
Thus the whole censure fell upon Sir Hew
Dalrymple. But it was seen by the people that the
great error of judgement had been committed at
home, in not providing that the General by whom the
campaign was planned should carry it to the end. And
how often may it be observed in history, as in private
life, that the course of events is better directed to the
end desired, than if the persons most interested in the
success could themselves have ordered it! So it was in
this campaign, which at the time so severely
disappointed the nation. A more splendid triumph
might have been obtained in the field, a higher tone
might have been taken in the negotiation; but in
either of these cases Almeida and Elvas would have
been left in possession of the enemy; and whatever
efforts might have been made for reducing them, they
could easily have held out till the dispersion of the
Spanish armies. It would then have been a great
object with the French to relieve the garrisons, and
this would have brought them to Lisbon at a time
when there were neither preparations nor means for
resistance there.
 CHAPTER XII.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.
OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
EMBARRASSMENTS AND MOVEMENTS
OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. ESCAPE OF
THE SPANISH TROOPS FROM
DENMARK.

1808. When Castaños was informed of Sir Hew

Dalrymple’s appointment to the command of the
Necessity of a British army, he declared that he regarded this
provisional
government.
nomination as the most fortunate event of his own
life; so much advantage to the common cause did he
anticipate from their confidence in each other, and the
cordial co-operation which would ensue. In reality that
influence which the confidence of a British
commander would have given him, might have been
of the most essential benefit to Spain at this
momentous crisis.
Such was the national character, that when the
struggle commenced every man was ready to follow
in the cause of his country; but so pitiable had been
the state of education, and so successfully had the
double despotism of the government and the
inquisition shut out knowledge from their empire, that
no man was fit to lead. There were now as many
governments as there were Juntas, each acting with
little regard to the others; and as these were every
where filled by persons chosen because of their
station, the government throughout Spain was
delivered, or rather fell into the hands of the
provincial nobility and gentry, with a few clergy; a set
of men whom their general want of information, their
prejudices, and their previous way of life, in great
measure disqualified for the task to which they were
called. Among them were some persons who had
formerly been in office at Madrid; but whatever
advantage they might have derived from habits of
business, was more than counterbalanced by the
dilatory formalities acquired at the same time, and
their attachment to the old routine with all its defects
and evils. Wherever therefore such statesmen of the
old school were found, the Juntas were less efficient
than they might have been without them. The powers
with which these bodies found themselves invested
were neither limited in extent or duration: the people
in their confidence (which at such times is as blind as
their suspicion) never thought of proposing
restrictions: and the Juntas, when once in possession
of authority, thought only of making it as extensive,
and retaining it as long as they could. Some of them
passed decrees bestowing upon themselves the titles
of Excellencies and Highnesses, and adopted uniforms
of the gaudiest fashion. This was mere vanity; but
serious injury was done, when, with as little decency
as had been observed under the old system, they
conferred commissions and commands, not upon
those persons who had the fairest claim, but upon
their own friends and relations and dependents; and
thus, as the enrolment was general, the armies were
filled with officers who had no other pretensions to
rank and promotion than what they derived from
favour.
Castaños After the great success in Andalusia, the provincial
prevents a Juntas, instead of exerting themselves to the utmost
contest for completing the deliverance of the country, became
between jealous of each other. Where the rival authorities were
Granada and
far distant, this feeling impeded the public service;
Seville.
greater evils were threatened when they bordered
upon each other. Granada at this time refused to
acknowledge the supreme authority which the Junta
of Seville assumed, and had hitherto exercised with
ability and good fortune. A warm contention ensued;
and Tilly, either from irritation, or worse motives,
proposed that a division of the Andalusian army
should be sent to enforce submission. Fortunately
Castaños was present at the meeting in which this
proposition was made; he rose from his seat, and,
striking the table, said, he should like to see the man
who dared order a division of the troops under his
command to march without his authority! He knew no
distinction of provinces; he had the honour to
command part of the army of Spain, and never would
he suffer it to be made the instrument of civil war.
Plans for a The occasion required, and therefore justified, this
government. prompt assumption of a power, dangerous in its kind,
and in nowise congenial to the unambitious temper of
Castaños, a man whose only desire was to do his duty
like a true Spaniard under any circumstances. It
proved, however, the necessity of establishing a more
legitimate authority than as yet existed. Lord
Collingwood, in his first communications with Seville,
had advised that a general Council, Cortes, or
Congress, should be appointed, and invested with
power from the several provincial Juntas to preside
over and act in the name of the whole. The necessity
of some such arrangement became every day more
apparent. Some persons proposed to establish a
 military form of government, in which that vigour
which the emergency required might be found; some
were for assembling a Cortes; others recommended
that a viceroy or lieutenant of the kingdom should be
appointed, and to this Castaños was at one time
inclined. His first thought before the struggle began
had been to invite the Archduke Charles; but upon
considering that the invitation could not be accepted
while Austria continued at peace with France, and
that if a war between those powers took place, the
Archduke’s services would be required at home, he
then thought the Prince Royal of the house of Naples
would be the fittest person to hold the regency till the
fate of Ferdinand should be known; and this he
Arrival of a proposed to the Junta. The Sicilian court from the
Sicilian Prince commencement of the insurrection had directed their
at Gibraltar. views to the same object: their minister in London
had sounded the disposition of the British
Government, and found it decidedly unfavourable to
their schemes; and they sent a plenipotentiary to
reside at Gibraltar, for the purpose of furthering the
interests of the family. But Sir Hew Dalrymple
happened to be informed of what had passed in
London, and finding that the object of this mission
was altogether disapproved by the British
Government, and that the agent had papers which he
intended to circulate without previously
communicating their contents to him, felt it necessary
to let him know that his residence in the garrison,
under these circumstances, might be attended with
inconvenience, and therefore he must return to
Palermo for new instructions. This was about the
middle of July; in the ensuing month, a few days
before Sir Hew left Gibraltar to take the command of
the army, Prince Leopold, second son of the King of
the Two Sicilies, with the Duke of Orleans and a large
 retinue, arrived there in a British man of war. A more
ill-judged step could hardly have been taken. Great
Britain had scrupulously avoided any thing which
could have the appearance of dictating to the
Spaniards, or interfering with them in any other way
than that of giving the most prompt and liberal
support; but what a pretext would it afford those who
were ever ready to malign the measures of England, if
at a time when the Spaniards were deliberating
concerning the settlement of their government, a
Prince who claimed the regency should be received
with royal honours at Gibraltar, and at the very
juncture when a British army arrived upon the coast!
Under these embarrassing circumstances Sir Hew
acted with great firmness and discretion. Persisting in
that upright and steady course of conduct which had
in so great a degree contributed to win the confidence
of the Spanish nation, he refused in any manner to
support pretensions which he had reason to believe
were not approved by his government; to that
government he referred the Duke of Orleans, who
accordingly resolved to go to England, and make his
representations in person; the Prince was received
into Gibraltar, and left there, when Sir Hew went to
the army; if he were chosen Regent, any deputation
duly appointed to announce that nomination was of
course to be admitted, and considered as attached to
his retinue; but no such deputation from any local or
provisional government was to be received on such
terms.
Ambition of the There was at this time a report that the Junta of
Junta of Seville. Seville had declared for a regency, and were
hesitating between the Archbishop of Toledo, as the
only remaining member of the Bourbon family in
Spain, a Prince of the Neapolitan house, and the
 Conde de Montijo, the most intriguing, and then one
of the most popular persons in Spain. As this
individual had no pretensions to such a charge, except
what his undeserved popularity might give him, the
report was probably raised by himself as one means
to bring about his elevation. Some members of that
Junta were intoxicated with success; a few others
cared for nothing but their own interest: the latter
wished for a Regent of their own appointment, under
whose name they might possess the real power; the
former were for retaining the authority which hitherto
they had administered well, but which ceased to be
legitimate when it became apparent that it was
retained for ambitious motives. A paper from the
Junta of Murcia, which expressed the opinion of
Florida-Blanca, had forcibly pointed out the necessity
of a central government, and the inevitable ruin which
a polyarchy of independent Juntas would bring on. It
advised that the cities which had a seat in the Cortes
should elect a council to govern in the name of
Ferdinand, and that the military affairs should be
entrusted to a council of generals. The Junta of Seville
suppressed this paper wherever their influence
extended; but a like measure was now recommended
by an authority with which the Junta could not cope.
The Council of The Council of Castille had recovered some of its
Castille advise lost reputation by the tardy resistance which it
a central Junta. opposed to the Intruder, and by exerting itself with
authority to maintain order in the capital, after the
retreat of the French. It published a justification of its
own conduct, more elaborate than convincing, and
dispatched a circular address to the provincial Juntas,
declaring its readiness to co-operate with them in any
Aug. 4. plans of defence. With respect to measures of another
kind, it said, which were necessary to save the
 country, all that belonged to that Council was to excite
the authority of the nation, and assist it with its
influence, advice, and knowledge. Under
circumstances so extraordinary it was not possible to
adopt at once the measures indicated by the laws and
customs of Spain; the Council therefore would confine
itself to recommending that deputies should be
appointed by all the different Juntas, who should
meet together, and, in union with it, confer and
determine upon this important object; so that all
provisions proceeding from this common centre might
be as expeditious as the end required.
Project of the The better spirits in the Junta of Seville prevailed
Junta of Seville. on this occasion, and that body, yielding with a good
grace to the general opinion, seemed at the same
time to direct it. They published an address, written
with the ability which distinguished all their public
papers. Hitherto, they said, the cause of the
Spaniards had been prosperous, and nothing could
frustrate their hopes of success, except a want of
union among themselves. Their enemies were anxious
to foment divisions. Human passions, personal
interests ill understood, the ignorance, the weakness,
the blindness of men, might assist these evil designs,
destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate the ruin
of Spain. This they were endeavouring to guard
against, protesting, before God and man, that they
wrote nothing but what was dictated by the love of
their country, being ready to hear the opinions of
other provinces, and to amend their own errors,
whenever it should be shown that they had
committed any. The chief care should be to avoid
whatever might serve to sow disunion: of this nature
were all discussions concerning the royal house, and
the order of succession in the different families which
derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were
well known; but are we, said they, in a situation to
talk of this? Long live King Ferdinand VII. and his
august brothers, heirs of the crown after his attested
decease! Why anticipate inquiries which could only be
necessary in default of them?
The second question which agitated the people
was of a different nature: ... Was there a necessity for
creating a supreme government, which should unite
the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the
restitution of Ferdinand to his throne? From the
beginning they had been persuaded such a
government was by all means necessary. Many Juntas
and many military commanders had expressed their
conviction of this truth, ... a conviction arising from
the necessity in every nation of a civil government, to
which the military may be subordinate. Spain, deriving
wisdom from history, had never thought of appointing
a dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most
honourable to the Spanish name) had been the first to
acknowledge a system of things as ancient in Spain as
the monarchy itself. The confidence of the people in
the Supreme Juntas, the abundance with which
pecuniary resources had been placed at their disposal,
the heroic loyalty wherewith the army had obeyed
them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their civil
administration, and of the military enterprises which
they had directed, placed in the most conspicuous
light, and established, beyond all doubt, this
fundamental truth, and most essential political
principle. But who was to create this supreme civil
government? Who were to compose it? Where should
be its place of residence? What the extent of its
authority? How might it be established, without
producing disunion among the different provinces?
These were the important questions to be examined.
It had been said that the Cortes ought to
assemble, that the Council of Castille should convoke
them, and the whole proceedings be executed under
the authority of that tribunal. But the Council of
Castille never possessed the right of convoking the
Cortes, ... why then should they give it that authority?
Was it because it had lent the whole weight of its
influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in
opposition to those fundamental laws which it was
established to preserve and defend? Because it had
afforded the enemy every facility to usurp the
sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary
succession of the crown, and the dynasty legally in
possession? Because it had recognized and seated on
the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow
of a title to it? What confidence could the Spanish
nation place in a government convoked by an
authority incompetent, illegal, and guilty of acts which
might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes
against their country? But the Council of Castille being
thus excluded from all consideration, who was to
convoke the Cortes? It was the peculiar and exclusive
prerogative of the King to summon them; the
provinces would not submit to any other authority;
they would not unite: thus, therefore, there would be
no Cortes, or, if a few deputies were to assemble, that
very circumstance would occasion divisions, the very
evil which all were anxious to avoid. The kingdom
found itself suddenly without a king and without a
government, ... a situation unknown in its history, and
to its laws. The people legally resumed the power of
appointing a government. They created Juntas
without any regard to the cities which had votes in
the Cortes. The legitimate power was therefore
deposited with the Juntas: in virtue of that power
they had governed, and still were governing, and had
been, and still were, universally acknowledged and
obeyed. Their situation had not changed; the danger
still existed; no new authority had supervened: the
lawful authority resided entire in the Juntas to which
the people had confided it. It was therefore
incontestable that the sole and exclusive right of
electing those who were to compose the supreme
government was vested in the supreme Juntas. And
whom should they elect? Most certainly individuals of
their own body; for they alone derived their power
from the people, and in them the nation had reposed
entire confidence. Hence, if there were any province
in which the military power subsisted alone, it was
absolutely necessary that a supreme Junta should be
constituted there, by which the people might act; this
being indispensable, in order to concentrate the
legitimate power of the people; for, under present
circumstances, the government could not be
legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent.
The Junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that
the supreme Juntas, meeting on the same day, should
each elect, from its own members, two deputies; and
the persons so elected, from that moment, be
acknowledged as governors-general of the kingdom.
The supreme Juntas ought nevertheless to be
continued till the termination of the present state of
things, being invested with the internal management
of their respective provinces, but under due
subordination to the general government. They ought
to give instructions to their deputies constituting that
government, and it would be the duty of those
deputies to observe them, and to represent and
 support the claims of their provinces, as far as was
consistent with the public weal. If there were one of
the Royal Family capable of presiding in the supreme
government, he, and no other, ought to be appointed
to that office; but if there were no person of the royal
blood, then it must elect a president from its own
body; and, to obviate all danger, the presidency
should be only for such limited time as might seem
best. The Juntas would appoint a place for the seat of
government, which the government might afterwards
change, if it should see cause. It ought to be at a
distance from the dangers of war, and to possess
other local advantages. Seville possessed those
advantages, but had no anxiety to be selected, and
willingly sacrificed her claims. The Junta of that city
would, however, frankly state, that, in their opinion,
La Mancha was most convenient for the seat of
government, and, especially, either the city of Ciudad-
Real, or Almagro. But this point was to be decided by
the free choice of the supreme Juntas. The paper
concluded with a brief and dignified recapitulation of
what the Junta of Seville had done for their country,
disclaiming, on their part, any affectation or desire of
superiority, and declaring, that whatever they had
done was no more than their indispensable duty.
The Provincial The general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of
Juntas assent the plan of government thus recommended; and it is
to it. no light proof of its fitness, that schemes the same in
principle and effect should have been suggested by
persons who had no communication with each other,
and whose views were in other respects so different.
There were many in England who thought it would
have been better to have at once convoked the
Cortes, in the supposition that there was more
resemblance between the Cortes and the English
 parliament than had ever really existed, and in the
generous but mistaken hope that vigorous measures
might be expected from a free legislative assembly.
The best and wisest of the Spaniards wished also for
a Cortes, and looked to it for such judicious reforms
as were conformable to the constitutional principles of
the monarchy, and suited to the habits and feelings of
the nation. But they saw that many points must be
determined before the manner of assembling the
Cortes could be adjusted, and that the necessity of
forming a central government was immediate and
urgent. The plan therefore which the Junta of Seville
proposed was assented to without opposition. Still it
was a great object with many of the provincial Juntas
to retain their power. That of Valencia drew up secret
rules for its deputies, declaring that they were to
follow the direction of their constituents, remain
subject and obedient to them, communicate regularly
with them, and in no instance depart from their
instructions; and they reserved to themselves the
power of displacing their deputies at pleasure. This
paper was made public; and it was known that other
Juntas, that of Seville in particular, had pursued the
same mischievous course.
Unworthy The Junta of Seville, however, did worse than this.
choice of the In electing its deputies it chose two persons so
Junta of Seville. notoriously unworthy of such a trust, that the only
motives which could be assigned for the choice were
a desire of being rid of them, or an opinion that they
would submit to any terms for the sake of the
appointment. D. Vicente Hore was the one; he had
been a creature of Godoy’s, and was so sensible of
the estimation in which he was held, that he declined
the charge, knowing his life would be in danger if he
appeared in Madrid, where it was of course expected
 that the Central Junta would assemble. D. Juan de
Vera y Delgado, titular Archbishop of Laodicea, the
coadjutor of Seville, was then chosen in his place; and
this was an unexceptionable choice. It was hoped and
expected that Tilly, the other member, would follow
Hore’s example, in declining an appointment for which
he was equally disqualified; but Tilly was of a bolder
stamp. A blasted character had not prevented him
from obtaining great popularity at Seville; and being
utterly regardless of the means by which he brought
about his ends, he was ready to venture for the
highest stake in the game of revolution. Foul facts had
been proved against him, and fouler were, upon no
light grounds, imputed. He had found it necessary to
fly from Madrid before the troubles, because he was
implicated in the robbery of a jeweller. The murder of
the Conde de Aguila was attributed to him, because it
was certain that he might have saved the Count by
the slightest interference in his behalf. A wretch who
was notoriously his creature had been one of the
most active instruments in Solano’s death; and Reding
would have been made away with by his means
before the battle of Baylen, if the intention had not
been disclosed to Castaños, and by him prevented.
This appointment was not perhaps what Tilly would
have chosen; for it was believed that he had no
inclination to show himself at Madrid; but he trusted
to his talents for intrigue, obtained a monthly
The other allowance of 500 dollars, and looked for those
members opportunities which revolutionary times offer to insane
unexceptionabl and desperate ambition. It is to the honour of the
e. Spaniards, that this was the only exceptionable
person elected for the central Junta: perhaps in no
country could an equal number of men, under similar
circumstances, have been chosen more worthy of the
trust reposed in them. To be elected to a situation of
so great responsibility, in a time of unexampled
difficulties, was no object of desire; in no instance
was the appointment solicited, and in most it was
reluctantly accepted. The persons deputed were
32
thirty-five in number; of whom Florida-Blanca and
Jovellanos were the most remarkable, for the offices
which they had formerly filled, and the rank which
they held in public opinion. Both were scholars as well
as statesmen, both men of business, both high-
minded and honourable Spaniards. Florida-Blanca had
more of the spirit of his country, Jovellanos was more
influenced by that of the age. The former had been
an ambitious politician; the latter was always a
philosopher, in the true and virtuous meaning of that
polluted word. As the despotic minister of an absolute
king, Florida-Blanca had used his power vigorously to
uphold the dignity of the kingdom, and improve its
internal condition; most of his measures were wise,
and all were well-intended; but if he had ever
conceived a wish to correct the abuses of the state, it
had never appeared in his actions: Jovellanos had
unwillingly accepted office, because it placed him in a
sphere uncongenial to his modest habits and better
mind, and withdrew him from the task to which he
had devoted himself, of improving his native province.
Jovellanos’s desire was to meliorate the government
and the nation by recurring to the free principles of
the old constitution; Florida-Blanca thought that if
governments were administered as they ought to be,
the strongest must be the best. Both, without
33
hesitation , obeyed the call of their country, though
Florida-Blanca, who was in extreme old age, would
more willingly have passed the short remainder of his
days in preparing and waiting for death; and
 Jovellanos, broken down, more by the infirmities
which an unjust and cruel imprisonment had
aggravated or induced, than by the weight of sixty-
five years, desired for himself nothing in this world
but tranquillity. The former brought with him little
more than a venerable name; but Jovellanos was in
full possession of his intellectual powers.
Jovellanos Every effort had been made by Azanza, O’Farril,
refuses all Urquijo, Mazarredo, and Cabarrus, to engage this
offers of the excellent man in the Intruder’s service. He had lived in
Intrusive
habits of friendship with all these persons, more
Government.
especially with the two last. Knowing how inaccessible
he would be to all unworthy inducements, they
endeavoured to deceive him, as they would fain have
deceived themselves, by representing that theirs was
the only course which could secure the welfare of
Spain; and that by no other means could the
calamities with which it was threatened be averted;
for they thought it absurd to imagine any effectual
resistance could be opposed to the determined
ambition of Buonaparte. His reply was, that if the
cause of their country were as desperate as they
supposed it to be, still it was the cause of honour and
loyalty, and that which a good Spaniard ought to
follow at all hazards. Jovellanos held with his favourite
author Cicero that friendship was to be preferred to
every thing except honour and virtue; he had given
proof of this by his former conduct toward some of
these friends, and they found now, as they had then,
that no considerations could ever prevail in him over
the sense of duty. It gave him no little pain that his
name should be published in the Madrid gazette as
one of Joseph’s ministers; thus to appear a traitor
even for a few days to those who knew him not, or
knew not how decidedly he had refused the
 appointment, was an injury which he felt severely.
This was one of Buonaparte’s insolent acts; fallen as
Urquijo and his colleagues were, they would not have
thus outraged the feelings of a man whom it was not
possible that they could ever cease to respect and
admire. At length, the Intrusive Government having
ascertained that he was really suffering under severe
bodily infirmities, forbore to molest him with further
solicitations. He was gradually recovering when news
of the battle of Baylen refreshed his heart, and
seemed to give him new life as well as hope. And
when his appointment to the Central Junta was
announced, though his first thought was of the
ravages which age and affliction had made upon his
Jovellanos a debilitated frame, the sense of duty overcame all
sus personal considerations, and he notified his
Compatriotas, acceptation without delay, at the same time declining
p. ii. art. i. 18– a salary of 4000 ducats which had been assigned him.
25.
In little more than a week he joined the deputies
Aranjuez
chosen for the for Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, at Madrid; and
place of then two difficulties, which had not been anticipated,
meeting. occurred. The first related to the instructions with
which the Junta of Seville had fettered their members;
instructions wholly repugnant to the principle upon
which the provisional government was formed. The
inconsistency and the evils of this measure were
represented to Castaños, who was then in Madrid with
his army; that General’s influence was never exercised
unworthily, nor withheld when it might be useful; and
in consequence of his remonstrance the obnoxious
instructions were withdrawn, though it appeared
afterwards that secret ones to the same tenour had
been substituted. The other difficulty was concerning
the place of meeting. Jovellanos thought that no place
could be so proper as the metropolis: there, in the
 palace of their kings, the Central Junta would derive
consequence and respect from the place; they would
appear at the head of the first tribunals and chief
magistracy; the public documents were upon the spot,
and any advice or assistance which they might require
at hand. The members who were at Madrid agreed in
this opinion, which was supported also by Castaños:
but the Junta of Seville were averse to any measure
which might lessen their authority, and in this instance
they were well served by Tilly for reasons which
nearly concerned himself. He had stopped at
Aranjuez, and succeeded in persuading Florida-
Blanca, who was decidedly for fixing the government
at Madrid, that it would be convenient to hold their
first sittings where they were, and determine there
upon the forms which they should observe in the
capital. He gained time by this ... always a great
object for one who trusts to intrigue and fortune. So
fully persuaded however were Jovellanos and his
colleagues when they went to Aranjuez that they
should speedily adjourn to Madrid, that they left
orders for forming an establishment there.
Installation of The greater part of the deputies having arrived,
the Central their installation was performed with as much
Junta. ceremony as the place and circumstances would
Sept. 26.
permit. The Archbishop of Laodicea performed mass,
and administered an oath to his colleagues, first
taking it himself, that they would preserve and extend
the holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion,
defend their Sovereign Ferdinand, their rights,
privileges, laws, and usages, and especially those
relating to the succession in the reigning family,
promote every thing conducive to the welfare and
improvement of the kingdom, keep secret every thing
which ought not to be divulged, maintain the laws,
 and resist the enemies of the country at all hazards.
The oath having been taken, Te Deum was sung by
the barefooted friars of St. Pasqual, and the assembly
then adjourned to the hall chosen for their sittings.
Florida-Blanca was appointed president, and his first
act was to proclaim King Ferdinand from the great
gallery of the principal front of the palace. The gates
of the palace had not been opened till now since the
departure of Charles for Bayonne; and the ceremony
of thus proclaiming Ferdinand in the favourite
residence of his ancestors, ... the scene of his own
childhood, ... the spot where, six months ago, he had
been acclaimed King, ... he who was now prisoner in
a foreign land, and in the power of the perfidious
tyrant who had ensnared him, ... moved the
venerable statesman to tears when he pronounced his
name, and excited feelings of grief and indignation in
the multitude, which heightened and hallowed the
enthusiasm wherewith they repeated it.
Conduct of the The Junta dispatched copies of the act and oath of
Council of installation to the different councils and tribunals,
Castille. requiring their members to take the same oath, and
issue orders to all the subordinate Juntas, provinces,
magistrates, governors, and viceroys, for obeying the
new government, as holding in deposit the sovereign
authority for Ferdinand, the councils continuing in the
exercise of their ordinary functions, but referring to
the Central Junta all matters exceeding their powers,
and upon which the Sovereign ought to be consulted.
Other tribunals immediately signified their prompt and
unreserved obedience; the Council of Castille alone
delayed their answer. The mortification which they felt
at not being incorporated with the provisional
government, as they had proposed, was embittered
by a consciousness that they had forfeited all claim to